Court Opinion

ID: 9905030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:03:30.424713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.366800
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 P. v. Perry CA2/7

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B314950

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. TA150355)
           v.
                                                            ORDER MODIFYING
 LARRY EUGENE PERRY,                                        OPINION AND
                                                            DENYING REHEARING
           Defendant and Appellant.                         (No change in the appellate
                                                            judgment)

         THE COURT:
         It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 3,
2023 be modified as follows:
         1.        The following language shall be inserted as the last
sentence to footnote 10 on page 32:
                Because the record on appeal is devoid of affirmative
                evidence that defense counsel had no conceivable
         tactical purpose for not objecting, Perry’s additional
         claim that the failure to object constituted ineffective
         assistance is more appropriately made in a petition for
         habeas corpus. (See People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th
         960, 972; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 419.)

      There is no change in the appellate judgment. Appellant’s
petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________
SEGAL, Acting P. J. MARTINEZ, J. PERLUSS, J. (assigned)

                                    2
Filed 11/3/23 P. v. Perry CA2/7 (unmodified opinion)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B314950

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. TA150355)
           v.

 LARRY EUGENE PERRY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed in
part, vacating sentence with directions.
      Stephen M. Vasil, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       A jury convicted Larry Eugene Perry of forcible rape of a
minor 14 years old or older (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and
sexual penetration by a foreign object of a minor 14 years old or
older (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)).1 The victim was his daughter S.P.
On appeal, Perry raises several arguments. First, he contends
the trial court erred under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 34 U.S. 436
(Miranda) by admitting a recording of his police interrogation.
Second, according to Perry, the court should have excluded the
victim’s pretrial statements offered at trial. Third, he maintains
the prosecution committed prejudicial error during its rebuttal
closing argument by suggesting to the jury the defense
strategically withheld certain recordings the prosecution had
successfully excluded. Fourth, Perry argues his case should be
remanded for resentencing under amended section 1170,
subdivision (b).
       The convictions are affirmed, but we vacate the sentence
and remand for resentencing based on amended section 1170,
subdivision (b).

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.    The Information
      In December 2019 the People filed a three-count
information against Perry, alleging the following charges:
continuous sexual abuse of a minor under 14 years old in

1    Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.

                                2
violation of section 288.5, subdivision (a) (count 1), sexual
penetration by a foreign object of a minor 14 years old or older in
violation of section 289, subdivision (a)(1)(C) (count 2), and
forcible rape of a minor 14 years old or older in violation of
section 261, subdivision (a)(2) (count 3).2

B.     Prosecution Evidence
       1.    Perry’s Adult Daughter, Nakeya Perry, Takes Custody
             of S.P. and Perry Has Regular Visits with S.P.
       The information alleged the victim was S.P., Perry’s minor
daughter. S.P. was born in August 2003 and was 17 years old at
trial. Perry’s adult daughter Nakeya Perry, S.P.’s guardian, was
36 years old at trial.
       Nakeya testified she first met Perry when she was 23 years
old, and he informed her she had a younger half-sister, S.P.
Nakeya gained custody of S.P. when she was 11 or 12 years old,
at Perry’s request, after S.P.’s mother died and S.P. was in foster
care. S.P. had a learning disability and received special
education services in elementary and middle school, but was in
regular classes by high school. Perry retained parental rights
and had his disability benefits go to Nakeya for S.P.’s benefit.
       Perry and S.P. first met when S.P. was 11 years old and
Perry was living at a homeless shelter. He subsequently moved
into senior housing. Starting around sixth grade, when she was
12 years old, S.P. stayed alone with Perry at his apartment from

2     The People additionally alleged, as to counts 1 and 3, that
Perry had a prior serious felony conviction constituting a “strike.”
(§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) The trial court
granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the prior conviction
allegations.

                                 3
3:15 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. after school, as well as some weekends.
This arrangement continued until December 2017, when S.P.,
then 14 and in eighth grade, told Nakeya that Perry was sexually
abusing her.

       2.     Perry Sexually Abuses S.P.
       S.P. testified that, when she was 12 years old and visiting
Perry, he directed her to take down her pants and underwear and
get on the bed. S.P. felt “weird[ed] out,” but followed Perry’s
directions. Perry donned disposable latex gloves, “like doctor
gloves,” he took from his nightstand. Perry told S.P. he was
going to put his finger inside of her vagina and told her to lie
down, then put his fingers inside her and moved them around.
After he stopped, he told S.P. to put her clothes back on, and S.P.
asked why he had put his finger inside her. Perry replied it was
“to see if [you’re] a virgin.” Perry told S.P. he would get in
trouble with the police and go to jail if she told Nakeya what
happened, so S.P. said nothing to Nakeya that day. S.P. felt
confused and embarrassed.
       S.P. testified this “same routine” continued about once
every week after that first instance, through her seventh grade
year. Perry also sometimes began asking S.P. to take off her
shirt, starting when she was 12, and would touch her breasts.
When S.P. was 13, Perry began using two gloved fingers. Perry
continued this “routine” until a family cruise in August 2017 at
the start of S.P.’s eighth grade year, when she was 14. S.P. also
testified that in March 2017, Perry asked her to perform oral sex
on him. In August 2017 S.P. went on a weeklong family reunion
cruise to the Bahamas with Perry, S.P.’s half-sister Shantai
Lofton (Perry’s eldest daughter, who was about a dozen years

                                 4
older than Nakeya), and several other extended family members.
Nakeya did not go. Perry and S.P. shared a room throughout the
cruise. On the fourth day, while S.P. was resting in bed, Perry
asked S.P. to take down her pants and underwear and kiss him.
Perry kissed her and put two fingers inside her without using a
glove. S.P. did not say anything to her family members on the
cruise because she felt embarrassed and did not want them to
know.
       The weekend after the cruise, while S.P. was at his
apartment, Perry told S.P. to lie down on the bed and said he was
going to put his penis inside her. Perry then raped S.P. He used
a condom and when he removed it he told S.P. he used it so she
would not get pregnant, then flushed it down the toilet. S.P. did
not tell Nakeya what happened because she was embarrassed
and did not want Nakeya to be disappointed or angry with Perry.
Perry raped S.P. again the following week, and again two weeks
later.
       The abuse continued intermittently during S.P.’s eighth
grade year until the end of 2017. At trial, S.P. described it as
occurring “many more times” and “once in a while” with no
regular schedule. When she was in eighth grade, S.P. once
pushed Perry off her and told him she did not want to “do it”
anymore, and he “left [her] alone” and did not abuse her on that
occasion. Another time, also in eighth grade, she kicked him
when he approached her bed at night, and he walked away. The
last time Perry raped S.P. was around December 2017; S.P. could
not recall the last instance.

                                5
       S.P. believed Perry’s neighbors and building manager could
see something was bothering her. Perry’s next-door neighbor
would ask her if he was treating her well, seeming concerned.
S.P. testified Perry once yelled at her in front of building
manager Estrella “Starr” Garcia, and Garcia looked shocked.
S.P. testified she attended a residents’ meeting where Garcia
stated toilets were being clogged with toilet paper, food,
wrappers, and condoms. Perry “paused” and looked at the
ground during the meeting.

       3.     S.P. Discloses Perry’s Abuse to Nakeya
       Nakeya had a falling out with Perry and did not bring S.P.
to his apartment between Thanksgiving and Christmas 2017.
The dispute was about whether Nakeya was using Perry’s
disability benefits for S.P., and because Perry disliked Nakeya’s
boyfriend, Robin Dozier. Nakeya testified she and Perry resolved
their differences by Christmas 2017 and planned for S.P. to stay
with Perry for a week after Christmas.
       On December 26, 2017 S.P. told Nakeya that Perry had
been touching her. S.P. did not tell Nakeya everything at first
because she was embarrassed and scared. Nakeya testified S.P.
initially told her she did not want to stay at Perry’s house after
Christmas because he had been “checking” her “private area.”
       Immediately after S.P.’s initial conversation with Nakeya,
Nakeya called Perry and told him S.P. said he had been
“checking her,” including on the cruise. Perry replied S.P. had
asked him about sex, but he was otherwise quiet and did not give
any other response or deny touching S.P. Nakeya told Perry she
was going to tell “everybody,” including her older sister, Lofton.
When Nakeya could not reach Lofton, she called her mother,

                                6
Chandra Battee, who was previously married to Perry, and
relayed S.P.’s allegations. Battee testified she and Perry
remained friends after their divorce, and that she was close with
S.P., who called her “Granny.” Nakeya and Battee had a three-
way call with Perry, 20 minutes after Nakeya’s first call with
Perry, during which Battee cursed at Perry, said “Oh, my God,
you molested your daughter,” and asked how he could do this.
Perry said nothing until the end of the call, when he stated,
“Well, you guys do what you got to do.”
       Later that day, Nakeya asked S.P. more about what had
happened, and S.P. disclosed to Nakeya that Perry had raped
her. Nakeya asked S.P. if she wanted to file a police report and
press charges or “leave it alone,” and S.P. said she wanted Perry
to go to jail. S.P. felt it was the right thing to do, and did not feel
pressured by Nakeya.

      4.      Investigation and Interviews of S.P.
      The following day, Nakeya took S.P. to the Compton
sheriff’s station, where Deputy Adonay Molina interviewed S.P.
separately from Nakeya. According to Deputy Molina, S.P. said
her father had been sexually abusing her for about a year and
recounted the details of the abuse.
      On January 2, 2018 Sheriff’s Detective Maricruz Perez met
with S.P. and Nakeya. She spoke “briefly” with S.P. S.P. said
Perry would check her “privacy area” when she would visit him,
and that it also happened on a cruise around the beginning of
September. The first occurrence was when she was 13 years old,
on the last day of seventh grade. Perry was “always checking”
S.P. because he thought she was having sex. Detective Perez set
up appointments for S.P. to have a forensic interview and

                                   7
physical examination. Nakeya told the detective S.P. had
learning disabilities and a tendency to lie about small things at
school, but not at home.
       Two days later, children’s social worker (CSW) Tuyet Dang
conducted a forensic interview of S.P. that Detective Perez
monitored. A video recording of the interview was played at trial
during Dang’s testimony. S.P. recounted the details of Perry’s
abuse. S.P. also told her Perry was “spreading rumors about
[her] sister and her friend” and that, in November, Nakeya
stopped allowing S.P. to visit Perry’s apartment.
       The following day, sexual assault nurse examiner Jennifer
Rivera examined S.P. Rivera testified she noticed no observable
trauma or healed injury to S.P.’s genitals, but this was not
inconsistent with sexual abuse and did not mean S.P. had not
been penetrated.

      5.    Detective Perez Interrogates and Arrests Perry
      In April 2018 Detective Perez called Perry and asked if he
would meet with her to discuss the case. Perry agreed, and the
next day they met at the Compton sheriff’s station. During the
interrogation, Perry repeatedly denied abusing S.P., but made
two incriminating statements: he touched S.P. while adjusting a
menstrual pad, and he kissed S.P. on the lips. The entire
interrogation was played to the jury during the detective’s cross-
examination. The interrogation and Miranda-related rulings are
covered in greater detail below.

                                8
C.     Defense Evidence
       At trial, the defense theory was that Nakeya coached S.P.
to falsely accuse Perry because of her dispute with him over
money and her boyfriend. Perry did not testify but called several
defense witnesses. Perry’s next-door neighbor, Rochelle Collins,
testified she met S.P. and saw her “quite a bit” when she stayed
after school at Perry’s apartment, but never spoke to S.P. alone or
for long. She described S.P. as a “happy child” who never
appeared uncomfortable or upset with Perry, who bragged about
S.P. to the other residents. Collins said the walls were thin, and
she never heard screaming, yelling, or a girl raising her voice in
Perry’s apartment.
       Deborah Price lived several doors down and across the hall
from Perry and testified she often saw Perry waiting for the
school bus to drop S.P. off and had short conversations with S.P.
S.P.’s demeanor was pleasant, she did not appear upset when she
came to see Perry, and Price never observed any harsh behavior
toward S.P. from Perry or heard any screaming or noises from
Perry’s apartment. Price noticed no change in S.P.’s demeanor
over time, and never got any notification or heard discussions
from the apartment manager about condoms clogging building
toilets.
       Garcia was the property manager at Perry’s apartment
complex. When S.P. visited Perry, she sometimes stopped by
Garcia’s office to say hello and chat briefly with Garcia alone.
Garcia testified S.P. appeared in good spirits and never seemed
upset or uncomfortable with Perry. Garcia received no noise
complaints about Perry, and the building had no plumbing issues
involving condoms.

                                9
       Deidra Murphy, Perry’s niece, testified she had known
Perry for 53 years. In 2017 Murphy and several family members,
including Perry and S.P., went on a family reunion cruise. S.P.
seemed happy to be there, and Murphy did not notice any tension
or anything strange or inappropriate between Perry and S.P.
Murphy and her husband, Emmanual Huff, testified they never
had any concern about Perry’s interaction with their three
daughters. When they got off the flight home, S.P. accused Huff
of misplacing her iPad, but a flight attendant ultimately returned
it and said it was left on a backseat.
       Lofton, who is the older half-sister of Nakeya and S.P.,
testified she did not have a “personal relationship like a sister”
with S.P. or a “sister bond” with Nakeya. S.P. and Lofton had
never talked privately or spent any time one-on-one. Lofton had
a strained relationship with Nakeya because Lofton believed
Nakeya was jealous of her closer relationship with Perry. When
Nakeya called Lofton and told her about S.P.’s allegations,
Nakeya said she did not know whether to believe S.P. because
S.P. lied a lot. Lofton told Nakeya to take S.P. to the doctor the
next day and not to call Perry because he was on sleep
medication and would not know what he was saying. Perry never
inappropriately touched or checked Lofton.
       Lofton testified S.P. was quiet on the family cruise but did
not appear upset or scared. Lofton said S.P. lied to her on the
cruise, saying she had bought a certain towel Lofton knew S.P.
had not actually purchased. Lofton opined S.P. lied, S.P. was not
truthful, and S.P. believed anything anyone told her. Nakeya
told Lofton S.P. lied a lot. Lofton talked to Perry about S.P.’s
allegations, which he denied. Lofton testified Perry never told

                                10
her he accidentally touched S.P. while helping her put on a
menstrual pad.
       On recall, Detective Perez testified that when she
interviewed Lofton in April 2018, Lofton said Perry told her he
had helped S.P. with a menstrual pad. Detective Perez also
testified Battee told her that when Battee and Nakeya called
Perry to confront him about abusing S.P., Perry sounded like he
was asleep.

D.     Jury Verdict and Sentencing
       The jury convicted Perry of sexual penetration by a foreign
object of a minor 14 years old or older (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)) and
forcible rape of a minor 14 years old or older (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)).
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the continual sexual
abuse count, and the court declared a mistrial on that count.
       In September 2021 the court denied probation and
sentenced Perry to the upper term of 11 years on the forcible rape
count as the base count, and a full consecutive upper term of
10 years on the sexual penetration by a foreign object count, for
an aggregate prison term of 21 years. The court found six
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances, stating it “selected
the high term based on the aggravating factors substantially
outweighing or the nonexistence of mitigating factors.”
       Perry timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

       On appeal, Perry raises several arguments: (1) his police
interrogation should have been excluded under Miranda;
(2) S.P.’s statements to others about the abuse should have been

                                 11
excluded under the hearsay rule; (3) the prosecution’s rebuttal
closing argument contained prosecutorial error; and (4) he is
entitled to resentencing under amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b). We consider each in turn.

A.    Perry’s Interrogation Did Not Violate Miranda Because He
      Was Not in Custody
      Perry contends the trial court erred by admitting the
recording of his entire police interrogation because it became
custodial under Miranda at the “midway” point. The trial court
did not err.3

       1.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
       “A defendant who is in custody . . . must be given Miranda
warnings before police officers may interrogate him,” and
generally statements obtained in violation of Miranda are
inadmissible. (See People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 300.)
Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; see People v. Thomas
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 476.) Interrogation “‘refers not only to
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’” (People v.

3      The People concede Perry’s interview was “reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response” and thus an
“‘interrogation’” within the meaning of Miranda. (Rhode
Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301; People v. Elizalde (2015)
61 Cal.4th 523, 531.)

                                 12
Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis,
supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301.) “‘Absent “custodial interrogation,”
Miranda simply does not come into play.’” (People v. Ochoa
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.)
       We use an objective standard to determine whether a
person was in custody for Miranda purposes. (See People v.
Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) Whether a person is in
custody under Miranda presents a mixed question of law and
fact. (Ibid.; see also People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 401).
“[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether there was ‘“‘a “formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.’”’” (Leonard, at p. 1400.) If no formal arrest
has taken place, the relevant question is “whether a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would have felt he or she was in
custody.” (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830
(Stansbury).)
       “In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a suppression
motion on Miranda . . . ‘“‘we accept the trial court’s resolution of
disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if
supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine
from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the
trial court whether the challenged statement was illegally
obtained.’”’” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551, quoting
People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 753.)

      2.     The Trial Court’s Miranda Ruling
      During pretrial proceedings, the trial court denied Perry’s
motion to suppress after hearing testimony from Detective Perez.
She testified she called Perry and asked if he would come in for
an interview. Perry agreed and met her at the sheriff’s station

                                 13
the next day. Detective Perez met him in the station lobby and
walked Perry by herself to a small interview room on the second
floor containing a table and two chairs. Perry was not
handcuffed and went voluntarily. Detective Perez did not make
physical contact with Perry, search him, or draw a weapon.
       Detective Perez told Perry she was investigating a case, he
was not under arrest, and he was free to leave at any time. Perry
sat closer to the door than she did. Detective Perez informed him
the door was not locked and he could leave the same way he had
come up. Perry never asked to leave the room, never physically
tried to leave the room, and Detective Perez never physically
restrained Perry from leaving. Perry generally appeared to be
comfortable and in a good mood. Perry consented to recording.
Detective Perez spoke to Perry alone for approximately an hour
and a half. During the interrogation, Perry answered three cell
phone calls, and Detective Perez did not prevent him from taking
the calls.
       Over the course of the interrogation, Perry became upset
with Detective Perez’s questions. He then said the following:
“But we—we’re going to stay on the same conversation until I get
pissed off. You know, walk out of here. Look. Why am I going to
do that? We’re not going to solve anything by arguing. You
know?” Perry then asked if he needed to get a lawyer. Detective
Perez then said, “I’m done,” arrested Perry, and read him his
Miranda rights. Perry then confirmed incriminating statements
he made during the interrogation (including that he touched S.P.
while adjusting a menstrual pad and that he kissed her on the
lips). Detective Perez testified she spoke to Perry “just like [she
was] speaking” to the court during the hearing.

                                14
      The trial court ruled Perry was not in custody under
Miranda, noting that Detective Perez’s demeanor was
inconsistent with an “accusatory style interrogation.”

      3.     Under the Totality of the Circumstances Perry Was
             Not in Custody for Purposes of Miranda
       To determine if Perry was in custody for Miranda purposes,
we consider “all the circumstances regarding the interrogation,”
to determine if they constituted a “‘“restraint on freedom of
movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’”
(Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 830.)
       Relevant factors include: “whether contact with law
enforcement was initiated by the police or the person
interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily
agreed to an interview; whether the express purpose of the
interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect;
where the interview took place; whether police informed the
person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether
they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the
interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person’s
conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there
were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the
interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police
officers participated; whether they dominated and controlled the
course of the interrogation; whether they manifested a belief that
the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it;
whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or
accusatory; whether the police used interrogation techniques to
pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested at the
end of the interrogation. [Citations.].” (People v. Aguilera (1996)

                                15
51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162 (Aguilera); accord, In re I.F. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 735, 759; People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
432, 459 (Saldana).) “No one factor is dispositive. Rather, we
look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances
to determine whether . . . they created a coercive atmosphere
such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint
tantamount to an arrest.” (Aguilera, at p. 1162.)
      On appeal, Perry concedes the first half of the interrogation
was not custodial. We agree. Perry voluntarily agreed to the
interview and came to the station. He was not searched,
handcuffed, or otherwise restrained or restricted in his freedom of
movement. He sat closer to the door than Detective Perez. He
was interrogated by a single officer. Perry was told at the outset
he was not under arrest, could leave at any time, the door was
unlocked, and he could exit the station by taking the same route
that had brought him there. Under these circumstances there
were no indicia of coercion or restraint, and “telling [defendant]
he was not under arrest and was free to leave indicates the
beginning of the interrogation was not custodial.” (Saldana,
supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.)4
      We reject Perry’s contention the interrogation turned
custodial at the midway point, having independently reviewed
the transcript and recording. According to Perry, at that point
“[Detective] Perez informed [Perry] that [S.P.] had told her
[Perry] had touched her inappropriately and she believed [S.P.].”
Specifically, Perry maintains that because the detective “[1.]
interrogated [him] for an hour and a half, [2.] behind the closed

4     Perry concedes at least one incriminating statement early
in the interview (that he touched S.P. while adjusting her
menstrual pad) was not the product of custodial interrogation.

                                16
door of an interview room at the sheriff’s station, [3.] dominated
the interrogation, [4.] informed [him] she believed he was guilty
and she had the evidence to prove it, [5.] interrogated [him] in an
accusatory, confrontational, and aggressive manner, [6.] used
interrogation techniques to try to elicit incriminatory admissions,
and [7.] arrested [him] at the end of the interrogation, a
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.”
      First, it is clear that despite the length of the interrogation,
Perry felt free to leave when he stated toward the end that he
was ready to, “You know, walk out of here.” (See Howes v. Fields
(2012) 565 U.S. 499, 509 [a person is in custody if he or she feels
that he or she cannot end the interrogation and leave].) Earlier
in the interrogation he answered his cell phone two times, and
Perry answered a third call after the midway point of the
interrogation, telling the caller he would return the call after he
was done. Further, as Perry’s authorities confirm, the length of
the interrogation itself is not dispositive. (See People v. Moore
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 402 (Moore) [interview of “one hour 45
minutes” interview at station house noncustodial]; Green v.
Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 131-135 [two-hour interview
at station noncustodial]; Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at
p. 463 [duration may be a “tipping point” in close case, but “the
more significant factor is the nature of the questioning, the
character and quality of the interaction” between officer and
suspect].)
      Next, it is true Perry was arrested at the end of the
interrogation, but that arrest did not necessarily make the
challenged part of the interrogation custodial. (E.g., Moore,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 403 [no Miranda violation under the

                                 17
totality of the circumstances, despite “indications of police
skepticism” and formal arrest of suspect at end of interview].)
        As to the remaining factors going to the location and the
nature of the interrogation, that Perry’s interrogation took place
at a sheriff’s station and had some accusatory or strategic
interrogation aspects to it does not inevitably render it custodial.
(See Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492 (Mathiason);
Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 833.) As summarized by our
Supreme Court, “in [Mathiason] . . . the high court found that the
defendant was not in custody, though he was questioned in the
allegedly coercive environment of the police station. In that case,
the defendant acceded to a police officer’s request to be
interviewed at the police station. The officer told the defendant
he was not under arrest, but the interview was accusatory to the
extent that the officer told the defendant he was a suspect in a
burglary, and falsely told him that his fingerprints had been
found on the scene. The court nevertheless found that custody
had not been established.” (Stansbury, at p. 833, quoting
Mathiason, at p. 495.)
        The court in Stansbury continued: “‘Such a noncustodial
situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply
because a reviewing court concludes . . . the questioning took
place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one
suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects
to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a
law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect
to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.
Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because
the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the

                                  18
questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” (Stansbury,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 833, quoting Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at
p. 495, italics added.)
       “Indeed, ‘[e]ven a clear statement from an officer that the
person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself,
dispositive of the . . . issue, for some suspects are free to come and
go until the police decide to make an arrest. The weight and
pertinence of any communications regarding the officer’s degree
of suspicion will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.’” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 345,
quoting Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325.) Even
where “police indicate to the defendant their resolute belief he
committed the crime, the custody inquiry becomes whether a
reasonable person in the defendant’s situation . . . would think he
was free to break off the interview and leave.” (Saldana, supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 457-458 [although interrogation was not
initially custodial, subsequent “unrelenting number of accusatory
questions” made defendant feel he could not leave until he
confessed and rendered subsequent interrogation custodial].)
       We are persuaded Perry was not in custody even after the
midpoint of his interrogation because his actions confirmed he
felt free to leave until the moment he was arrested. The overall
tone and tenor of the interrogation was generally conversational
rather than one where the detective dominated. Although the
detective falsely stated she had forensic and DNA evidence
indicating Perry’s guilt, her use of this interrogation technique
was not unrelenting. Detective Perez was not confrontational or
aggressive, let alone threatening or intimidating. She expressed
skepticism about Perry’s explanations, but asked open-ended
questions, and generally stated “something happened” for which

                                 19
she wanted an explanation. To be sure, Detective Perez accused
Perry of dishonesty, but she was not unduly accusatory, and did
not raise her voice or threaten Perry. Perry also agreed with
Detective Perez that she was not arguing with him and that she
had not yelled at him.5 Further, as noted above, Perry answered
a cell phone call after the midway point and told the caller he
would call back and, near the end of the interrogation, told
Detective Perez he would “walk out of here” if he got “pissed off.”
These are not circumstances where a reasonable person would
believe he was in custody.
       Perry’s interrogation was like that in Moore, supra,
51 Cal.4th 386. There, “[t]he interview was fairly long—one hour
45 minutes—but not, as a whole, particularly intense or
confrontational . . . . For a substantial period, while defendant
filled in his previous statements with details, the questioning did
not convey any suspicion of defendant or skepticism about his
statements. [¶] After a while, to be sure, the detectives
interjected some more accusatory and skeptical questions.” (Id.
at p. 402.) Our Supreme Court observed such “police expressions
of suspicion . . . are not necessarily sufficient to convert voluntary
presence at an interview into custody” and “a reasonable person
in defendant’s circumstances would have believed, despite
indications of police skepticism, that he was not under arrest and

5     The trial court gave this factor significant weight, on the
assumption Detective Perez had a similar demeanor at the
Miranda hearing as she did in the interview. We note that, in
other circumstances, a “professional demeanor” and “pleasant
and conversational tone of voice” is not inconsistent with custody;
rather, “a professional and calm demeanor is a police technique to
keep a suspect there, answering questions.” (People v. Torres,
supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.)

                                 20
was free to terminate the interview and leave if he chose to do
so.” (Id. at pp. 402-403.)
       Perry’s authorities are inapposite. Aguilera, supra,
51 Cal.App.4th 1151 dealt with two officers engaging in a “tag
team” interrogation lasting two hours that “was intense,
persistent, aggressive, confrontational, accusatory, and, at times,
threatening and intimidating” (id. at p. 1165). Saldana, supra,
19 Cal.App.5th 432 involved questioning that was “persistent,
confrontational, and accusatory.” The detective there “did much
more than simply confront Saldana with adverse evidence. He
confronted Saldana with unqualified assertions of his guilt,
despite Saldana’s repeated denials.” (Id. at p. 459.) By contrast,
Detective Perez’s questioning, while pointed and disbelieving of
Perry’s version of the events, was not impermissibly accusatory
and confrontational. (See id. at p. 460 [“Over and over again,
Detective Gonzales conveyed the message that Saldana had no
meaningful choice but to admit to some version of the crime
because continued denials—in light of the extensive and
irrefutable evidence against him—was simply futile. Insisting on
the ‘truth’ until Saldana told him what he sought, the objective
message conveyed was that Saldana would be interrogated until
he admitted touching the girls.”].) Nor are the circumstances
here like Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 162, where the detectives
“essentially [told] Torres they would not leave, and Torres could
not return home, until Torres stopped lying and confessed to
what the detectives could prove scientifically with the DNA test
running in the trunk.” (Id. at p. 179.)6

6    Perry’s cases involving interrogation of minors do not help
him. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 772 [12-year-old
defendant]; In re Matthew W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 392, 407 [17-

                                21
      In sum, we conclude that based on the totality of the
circumstances Perry was not in custody for Miranda purposes.7

      4.     The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting the Entire
             Interrogation
      Perry’s counsel twice asked the court to admit the entire
interrogation rather than allow the prosecution to play excerpts.
After reviewing the interrogation, the court agreed. On appeal,
Perry now challenges admission of the entire interrogation.
There was no error because the entire interrogation was
noncustodial, and Perry advances no other argument why it
should have been excluded. (See People v. Waldon (2023)
14 Cal.5th 288, 304 [“‘“The doctrine of invited error is designed to
prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of
an error made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel
intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be
heard to complain on appeal. . . . [I]t also must be clear that
counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or
mistake.”’”]; see also Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
517, 538 [appellant’s failure to brief issue on appeal forfeits it].)

year-old defendant].) Perry does not argue he was vulnerable due
to his age.
7      Because we conclude the interview was noncustodial and
no Miranda admonition was required, we need not address
Perry’s argument Detective Perez employed a deliberate “two-
step” interrogation process violating Missouri v. Seibert (2004)
542 U.S. 600, 622 (police may not deliberately question suspect to
elicit confession, give Miranda warnings and then re-question the
suspect).

                                 22
B.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting
      S.P.’s Pretrial Statements
      At trial, the court admitted several of S.P.’s pretrial
statements alleging Perry had abused her. Perry challenges
admission of three sets of statements S.P. made to Nakeya,
Detective Perez, and CSW Dang. According to Perry, the trial
court prejudicially erred by admitting these statements as prior
consistent statements. We review for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590; accord, People v.
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 [“an appellate court applies
the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial
court on the admissibility of evidence, including one that turns on
the hearsay nature of the evidence in question”].)

       1.     The Hearsay Rule and Relevant Exceptions
       “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of its content.” (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818,
831; see Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Any out-of-court
statement made by a testifying witness, offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted, is inadmissible hearsay unless it falls
within a recognized exception. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a) &
(b); People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 185.) Evidence Code
sections 791 and 1236 set forth an exception for a testifying
witness’s prior consistent statements.
       Evidence Code section 1236 provides: “Evidence of a
statement previously made by a witness is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule if the statement is consistent with his
testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with
Section 791.”

                                23
       Evidence Code section 791 in turn provides: “Evidence of a
statement previously made by a witness that is consistent with
his testimony at the hearing is inadmissible to support his
credibility unless it is offered after: [¶] (a) Evidence of a
statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part of his
testimony at the hearing has been admitted for the purpose of
attacking his credibility, and the statement was made before the
alleged inconsistent statement; or [¶] (b) An express or implied
charge has been made that his testimony at the hearing is
recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper
motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for
fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.”
       An out-of-court statement may be hearsay or nonhearsay
depending on the purpose for which it is offered. Under Evidence
Code section 1250, relevant evidence of a declarant’s existing
state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation “is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is
offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or
physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is
itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to
prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1250, subd. (a); People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 823
(Riccardi), disapproved on another ground in People v. Rangel
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.) A declarant’s descriptions or
assessments of the victim’s actions affecting her state of mind or
conduct are admissible nonhearsay, “to the extent they were
admitted to prove circumstantially [the victim’s] state of mind or
conduct, and not to prove the truth of matters asserted regarding
defendant’s conduct.” (Riccardi, at p. 823; see Evid. Code, § 1250,
subd. (b) [“This section does not make admissible evidence of a

                                24
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed”].)
      Perry contends the challenged statements were
inadmissible hearsay because they fail the temporality
requirement of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b). The
People argue the statements were admissible under section 791,
subdivision (a), and under the state of mind exception. We
address each witness’s statements in turn.

      2.     S.P.’s Statements to Nakeya
             a.     Nakeya’s initial testimony recounting S.P.’s
                    statements was properly admitted to show S.P.’s
                    state of mind
       Nakeya was the first witness to testify. During her
testimony, the trial court overruled hearsay objections regarding:
S.P.’s statements to Nakeya relating to S.P.’s preliminary
hearing testimony; whether S.P. voluntarily wanted to report the
allegations and testify in court; and whether S.P. understood the
seriousness of the allegations. Nakeya testified S.P. “always told
me she wants to see [Perry] go to jail,” and that S.P. always
answered “yes” she wants to continue even though “[s]he dreads
coming to court” and getting on the stand. The court instructed
the jury each time that Nakeya’s answers to those questions were
offered to prove S.P.’s state of mind, not for the truth of the
matter.
       Contrary to Perry’s argument, these statements were not
admitted as prior consistent statements. Although the trial court
admitted S.P.’s statements to Nakeya under the state of mind
exception, Perry made no argument in his opening brief that
these statements were improperly admitted under that exception,

                                25
and offered no response in his reply brief to the People’s
argument these statements were properly admitted under the
state of mind exception. Perry has thus forfeited any objection.
(See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 [issues not addressed as error in a
party’s brief with legal analysis and citation to authority are
forfeited].)
       In any event, the statements were admissible because they
were relevant to S.P.’s credibility and to her state of mind on a
key theory at issue in the action: whether S.P. testified
voluntarily, or whether S.P. was pushed to do so or was coached
by Nakeya. In Perry’s opening statement, his counsel set forth
the defense’s theory that S.P. made the accusations against Perry
because of a family conflict between Nakeya and Perry, and that
Nakeya pushed S.P. to testify. Nakeya’s testimony described
S.P.’s statements to clarify the conversations the sisters had
before S.P. decided to report the conduct and testify in court.
S.P.’s statements to Nakeya tended to show S.P. voluntarily
chose to report the abuse, wanted to see Perry go to jail for his
actions, and appreciated the seriousness of her testimony. The
trial court was within its discretion in admitting these
statements as they went to S.P.’s credibility and state of mind
with regard to whether she was voluntarily testifying against
Perry, particularly given the court’s limiting instructions to the
jury. (See Evid. Code, § 1250; Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
pp. 822-823 [out-of-court statement may be admissible
nonhearsay for purpose of providing circumstantial evidence of
the declarant’s state of mind].)

                               26
            b.      Nakeya’s recalled testimony regarding S.P.’s
                    descriptions of abuse were properly admitted as
                    prior consistent statements
       S.P. testified after Nakeya, but was impeached with several
prior inconsistent statements. These included her testimony
from the preliminary hearing and statements to the police and to
CSW Dang regarding: her age and grade when the abuse began;
the frequency, timing, and number of instances of the abuse; and
whether she consistently reported Perry making her put her
mouth on his penis. Perry’s counsel sought to show her story was
inconsistent and S.P. had been coached by Nakeya.
       Nakeya was recalled to the stand and testified about her
first conversation with S.P. in December 2017 regarding Perry’s
abuse, over defense counsel’s standing hearsay objection. Nakeya
relayed the following additional hearsay statements from S.P.:
(1) Perry had been “checking her”; (2) Perry put his fingers in her
private parts; (3) Perry checked S.P. on the cruise; (4) Perry had
sexual intercourse with S.P.; and (5) S.P. was certain that the
sexual abuse happened.
       Perry concedes these prior “statements were consistent
with [S.P.]’s trial testimony,” but contends they did not satisfy
Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b)’s temporality
requirement (because they were made after the family dispute
that purportedly motivated S.P. to fabricate the allegations) and
the admitted statements “did not rehabilitate any of [S.P.]’s
inconsistent statements.”
       The trial court properly admitted these statements under
Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (a), which only requires
that “evidence of a prior inconsistent statement [made by the
witness] has already been introduced to impeach that witness,

                                27
and the consistent statement was made before the inconsistent
one.” (People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1357.) S.P.’s
statements preceded the inconsistent statements used to impeach
her, and were consistent with her trial testimony. Section 791,
subdivision (a), does not require more, and Perry cites no
authority the statements also had to be separately admissible
under subdivision (b). (People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d
102, 144 [“Whether or not subdivision (b) of Evidence Code
section 791 is applicable is of no consequence to the application of
subdivision (a) of that section. Even if it is assumed the [prior
consistent statement] postdated the inception of any bias or
motive to fabricate on the part of [the witness], that fact would
only bear on its introduction within the circumstances described
in subdivision (b) of section 791. It certainly would not preclude
application of subdivision (a) of section 791 and the introduction
of the [prior consistent statement] predating the [prior
inconsistent statement]. The statement was properly
admitted.”].)
       Perry asserts these statements were inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (a), because they did not
specifically rehabilitate certain details of S.P.’s prior inconsistent
statements to Detective Perez and CSW Dang (including that
Perry’s abuse was less frequent than she testified at trial and
that her statements to Detective Perez and CSW Dang omitted
that Perry forced her to put his penis in her mouth, as she
testified at trial). Perry further argues these statements “simply
bolstered” S.P.’s testimony, citing People v. Gentry (1969)
270 Cal.App.3d 462, 473 (“it cannot help the trier of fact in
deciding between [two witnesses] merely to show that one of the
witnesses has asserted the same thing previously”).

                                 28
       To be admissible, a prior consistent statement offered to
support the witness’s credibility need only be consistent with the
witness’s trial testimony, and there is no requirement that it
directly address each specific statement used to impeach the
witness. (See Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (a); see also People v.
Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 616 [where defense counsel
suggests a witness’s entire testimony is unreliable, “not just that
[she] had fabricated some specific point,” this “broad charge of
fabrication” warrants the admission of a prior consistent
statement]; cf. People v. Calhoun (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 275, 317-
318 [charge of fabrication under section 791, subdivision (b),
allowed the admission of prior statements that “were for the most
part consistent” with the witness’s trial testimony].) Further,
S.P.’s statements were not admitted for impermissible bolstering
purposes—that is, to show she said the same thing previously—
but, instead, to rehabilitate her testimony after defense counsel
impeached her, which is wholly permissible under Gentry.
       For the first time on reply, Perry argues the trial court
erred in admitting the hearsay statements because they did not
concern “the same fact or facts” as the prior inconsistent
statements with which S.P. was impeached, citing People v.
Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 780 (Ervine), and People v. Breaux
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 302 (Breaux).8 According to Perry, these
cases stand for the proposition that “a prior consistent statement
is admissible under Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (a),
only if [it] concerns the same fact or facts as the prior

8     Although we have no obligation to discuss arguments
raised for the first time on reply (Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 477, 489, fns. 9 & 10), we exercise our
discretion to do so here.

                                29
inconsistent statement with which the witness has been
impeached.” Neither case announces any rule that prior
consistent statements admitted under Evidence Code section 791,
subdivision (a), must directly contradict the prior inconsistent
statements (nor could they because that would be contrary to the
text of subdivision (a), which imposes no such requirement). At
most, these cases support the unremarkable proposition that
courts retain their discretion to exclude prior hearsay statements
that are either consistent with the prior inconsistent statements
(as in Ervine) or are wholly unrelated to the prior inconsistent
statements (as in Breaux).

      3.    S.P.’s Statements to Detective Perez
      At trial, Perry objected to Detective Perez’s testimony
regarding S.P.’s statements to her at their January 2018
interview. The trial court overruled Perry’s hearsay objection
regarding what S.P. said to Detective Perez about her family and
allowed a standing objection that S.P.’s statements describing her
abuse were “not even consistent.” On appeal, Perry objects to
Detective Perez’s testimony relating S.P.’s statements regarding
the abuse.9

9      Specifically, Perry objects to the following testimony that
Perry: was “checking” her with his index finger while wearing
gloves; asked her to raise her legs; told her it was for her own
good; told her he was checking her because he thought she was
having sex; put his fingers inside S.P. and wiggled them around;
was told by S.P. that it hurt and to remove his finger; removed
his gloves in the bathroom; and that he sexually assaulted her on
the cruise.

                                30
       The trial court explained it overruled Perry’s hearsay
objection under Evidence Code sections 1236 and 791 because
“there was an implication that the testimony [S.P.] gave here [at
trial] or in the preliminary hearing was fabricated or influenced
and this [is] a prior consistent statement for her testimony here.”
The trial court did not cite a specific subdivision of Evidence Code
section 791, but its “fabricated or influenced” language suggests
it admitted under subdivision (b).
       Perry argues the trial court misapplied Evidence Code
section 791, subdivision (b), because S.P.’s statements to
Detective Perez in January 2018 came after Thanksgiving 2017
(when S.P. allegedly had a motive to fabricate her statements),
and because they “did not rehabilitate any of [S.P.]’s inconsistent
statements.” To the extent the trial court admitted this
testimony under section 791, subdivision (b), it misapplied that
rule. To refute a charge of fabrication or bias under Evidence
Code section 791, subdivision (b), “a prior consistent statement is
admissible as long as the statement is made before the existence
of any one of the motives that the opposing party expressly or
impliedly suggests may have influenced the witness’s testimony.”
(People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 629, italics added.) But
“if the consistent statement was made after the time the
improper motive is alleged to have arisen, the logical thrust of
the evidence is lost and the statement is inadmissible.” (Cal. Law
Revision Com. Report, West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2022 ed.) foll.
§ 791, italics added.)
       We conclude, however, there was no reversible error. Just
as with S.P.’s statements to Nakeya, S.P.’s statements to
Detective Perez were admissible under Evidence Code
section 791, subdivision (a), because they were consistent with

                                31
her trial testimony and were introduced to rehabilitate her after
she was impeached. (See People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
343, 369, fn. 9 [“‘We will affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling
if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, even if
for reasons different than those expressly stated by the trial
court.’”], quoting People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188,
205.) And, as we explained above, there is no separate
requirement under subdivision (a) that prior statements
consistent with her trial testimony “rehabilitate” her inconsistent
statements.10

      4.    S.P.’s Statements to CSW Dang (Forensic Interview)
      During the direct examination of CSW Dang, over Perry’s
hearsay objection, the prosecution played the entire video
recording of Dang’s forensic interview of S.P. in January 2018.
Perry argues S.P.’s hearsay statements in the interview were
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b),
and that these statements “did not rehabilitate her inconsistent
statements.” We conclude S.P.’s statements to CSW Dang were
admissible under section 791, subdivision (a), for the same
reasons set forth above, i.e., they were prior consistent
statements offered to rehabilitate S.P.’s trial testimony after the
defense impeached her with prior inconsistent statements.

10     Perry concedes he raised no hearsay objection to Detective
Perez recounting S.P.’s statements during the forensic interview
with CSW Dang. Perry forfeited any objection. (Evid. Code,
§ 353, subd. (a); People v. Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333
[failure to object to hearsay testimony at trial forfeits appellate
claim improperly admitted].)

                                 32
      Perry also maintains that even if parts of the forensic
interview were admissible, it was error to admit the entire
interview, citing Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 803. According
to Perry, many details in the forensic interview were inconsistent
with S.P.’s trial testimony and “did more than rehabilitate” S.P.11
(Evid. Code, § 791; Riccardi, at p. 803 [trial court erred in
admitting portions of audio-recorded police interview of witness
with “little relation” to the relevant inconsistencies, went beyond
the scope of her trial testimony, and “did more than rehabilitate”
the challenged testimony”].) Here, however, S.P.’s statements
from the forensic interview were directly related to her trial
testimony recounting her allegations and descriptions of Perry’s
abuse. The trial court was well within its broad discretion to
permit the entire interview to be played.

      5.    The Challenged Statements Were All Admissible, and
            There Was No Federal Due Process Violation
      Because we find all the challenged hearsay statements
were admissible, there was no federal due process violation.
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035-1036 [“Application of
the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly
infringe on a . . . defendant’s constitutional rights. [Citation.]
Defendant fails to persuade us this case constitutes an exception
to that general rule.”].)

11    Specifically, Perry claims the following hearsay statements
from the forensic interview “did more than rehabilitate [S.P.]”
and “should not have been admitted”: (1) S.P.’s statements that
when Perry inserted his finger, he was laughing and refused to
take it out when she said it hurt; (2) S.P.’s statement that when
she tried to move Perry’s hands away from her chest, he
threatened to hit her with a belt.

                                33
C.    Any Prosecutorial Error in the Closing Argument Was
      Harmless
      Perry contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial error
under state and federal law during closing arguments by
suggesting the defense strategically shared only certain portions
of Nakeya’s recorded calls with Dozier rather than their entirety.
The prosecutor had previously successfully limited Perry’s use of
the two jail calls. Perry argues the trial court erroneously
overruled his objection. We conclude any error was harmless.

      1.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
      The prosecution’s closing argument to the jury is subject to
review for prosecutorial error under state law and federal law.
Such error occurs “as a matter of state law, when a prosecutor
‘engage[s] in deceptive or reprehensible tactics in order to
persuade the trier of fact to convict.’ [Citation.] Federal
constitutional error occurs only when the prosecutor’s actions
‘comprise a pattern of conduct that is serious and egregious, such
that the trial is rendered so unfair that the resulting conviction
violates the defendant’s right to due process of law.’” (People v.
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 854 (Daveggio),
quoting People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 718; accord,
People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1331-1332 [“‘“A
prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness
as to make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a
prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it
involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt
to persuade either the trial court or the jury.”’”].) Bad faith by

                                34
the prosecutor is not required. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th
800, 821; accord, People v. Lloyd (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 49, 61.)
In this regard, “‘[t]he term prosecutorial “misconduct” is
somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a
prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind. A more apt
description of the transgression is prosecutorial error.’” (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666-667; see People v. Sandoval
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 438.) “[T]he burden of proof is on the
defendant to show the existence of misconduct.” (People v. Van
Houten (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 280, 292.)
       “When attacking the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the
defendant must show that, ‘[i]n the context of the whole
argument and the instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a reasonable
likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of
comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In
conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury
drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v. Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)
       We review a trial court’s ruling regarding prosecutorial
error for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Alvarez, supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 213.) “‘“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct for appeal, a defendant must make a timely and
specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to
disregard the improper argument.”’” (People v. Charles (2015)
61 Cal.4th 308, 327.)

                                 35
      “In evaluating whether prosecutorial error is prejudicial,
the standard for prejudice depends on whether the error violates
the federal Constitution or the California Constitution.”
(People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 342.) “‘In order to
be entitled to relief under state law, defendant must show that
the challenged conduct raised a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable verdict.’ [Citation.] Under federal law, relief is not
available if ‘the challenged conduct was . . . harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 854, quoting
People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 828, fn. 35; accord,
People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 333-334.)

      2.     Relevant Background: The Court Admitted Only
             Limited Portions of Nayeka and Dozier’s
             Conversations at Trial Due to the Prosecution’s
             Objections
       Perry’s primary defense theory at trial was that Nakeya
coached S.P. to fabricate the accusations against him because of
Nakeya’s dispute with Perry regarding his disapproval of
Nayeka’s live-in boyfriend, Dozier, and the use of money. To
impeach Nakeya at trial, the defense played six excerpts from
two telephone calls between Nakeya and Dozier, which were
recorded when Dozier was in jail for unrelated charges. The
parties and court previously had several exchanges regarding the
admissibility of the calls, and defense counsel provided the court
with transcripts of the calls.
       The court initially admitted excerpts germane to “two
areas”: (1) whether Dozier and Nakeya had a public fight that
impeached Nakeya’s testimony denying or not remembering the
fight; and (2) whether Nakeya had coached S.P. during the lunch

                                36
break at the preliminary hearing.12 The court subsequently
admitted additional excerpts to show: (1) Nakeya spoke to S.P.
during the lunch break at the preliminary hearing; (2) Nakeya’s
tone and demeanor; (3) Nakeya told S.P’s foster parents that S.P.
lied a lot; and (4) Nakeya and Dozier were more than just friends.
       At trial, Nakeya and S.P. both denied that Nakeya coached
S.P. at the preliminary hearing. Defense counsel used Nakeya’s
calls to Dozier to impeach Nakeya regarding whether she spoke
to S.P. at the preliminary hearing and whether she had a public
verbal fight with Dozier. Nakeya testified at trial she lied to
Dozier on the recorded call and did not in fact speak to S.P. about
her testimony until that evening after S.P. finished testifying.
       On redirect examination, Nakeya testified she remembered
when she had that conversation with Dozier, but had not heard
the whole recording and did not remember the context. The
prosecutor showed Nakeya what she described as the “actual
transcript, this 54-page transcript,” and asked Nakeya whether
any of “these little snippets of conversations that you had with
Mr. Dozier” were different from what Nakeya testified to at trial,
to which Nakeya responded, “No, it isn’t.” At sidebar, defense
counsel argued the prosecutor’s questioning implied defense

12     At the preliminary hearing, S.P. answered “no” to questions
from defense counsel regarding whether she went to Perry’s
house after school or was ever alone with Perry. Nakeya’s friend
(or cousin) Raquel was in the courtroom, which Nakeya was
excluded from as a witness. On one of the recorded calls, Nakeya
later told Dozier that Raquel recounted S.P.’s testimony to her
and that Nakeya pulled S.P. aside at lunch, asked why she was
lying and whether she wanted Perry “to go free?” After the lunch
break, S.P. testified she visited Perry’s house, where he would
touch her.

                                37
counsel was “cherry-picking information” by introducing “limited
snippets” of Nakeya’s conversation with Dozier. Perry’s counsel
moved to have the entire conversation admitted “to give the full
context.” He argued it was prosecutorial misconduct to say
evidence was “non-existen[t],” and the jury was getting the
misimpression the defense limited the calls and “there’s more out
there that would somehow explain this.” The prosecutor
responded she had played only portions that counsel had
highlighted and it was not misconduct to have Nakeya explain
her statements.
       The trial court found “absolutely no prosecutor misconduct
or any conduct by [the prosecutor] that was the context that she
was able to or provide [Nakeya] the transcript so [Nakeya] can
review more of her conversation to remind her and give context to
that what she said.” The court denied defense counsel’s request
for a jury instruction that the court had restricted what had been
presented, and the court instead said it would instruct the jury
that “these are part of a conversation” and they were not to
speculate further.
       On further cross-examination, defense counsel asked
Nakeya if it would be helpful for her to hear the whole
conversation “in order to know the context.” Nakeya responded
“No” and that she had read the transcript.
       The trial court instructed the jury: “You have heard parts
of a conversation, the parts that were played for you. You are not
to speculate as to what the contents of the other parts that you
did not hear are. You’re not to speculate as to why you did not
hear the other parts of the conversation. All you have to
understand is that these conversations were, in fact, legally

                               38
recorded and provided to both counsel in the regular course of
trial preparation.”

       3. Any Error in the Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Was
          State Law Error and Harmless
       On appeal, Perry does not challenge the trial court’s rulings
above, but instead argues the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing
argument constituted prosecutorial error.13
       In its rebuttal, the prosecution noted defense counsel had
argued Nakeya was targeting Perry by having S.P. falsify sexual
abuse allegations against him. The prosecutor argued defense
counsel was trying to manufacture a “Perry Mason” or “Law and
Order” moment catching Nakeya in lies, and stated: “[Defense
counsel] wanted to show you portions—the only audio that you
didn’t hear the entirety of is that one thing, those phone calls
that she had with her ex-boyfriend.”
       Defense counsel objected and asked to approach. The trial
court denied the request, then told the jury: “But ladies and
gentlemen, like I indicated to you, what the lawyers say during
their closing argument is not evidence. And if it’s different from
your own recollection of the facts, you must rely on you own
recollection of the facts and not speculate whatsoever.” Defense
counsel asked to explain his objection at sidebar but the court
denied the request, stating it could be discussed later. The
prosecutor continued, stating “Nakeya explained to you on the
stand the portions that you couldn’t hear,” and arguing the

13    The trial court denied Perry’s motion for new trial asserting
the court had erred in ruling that only part of Nakeya’s calls with
Dozier was admissible.

                                39
telephone call excerpts heard at trial did not prove Nakeya was
dishonest or hiding anything.
      Defense counsel, without the jury present, argued the
prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting to the jury the
defense failed to present the entirety of the phone calls when the
prosecutor had objected to his attempt to admit the entirety of
the audio into evidence. The prosecutor responded that Nakeya
explained the context of her statements made in the phone calls,
including “what was not recorded or presented in the recording.”
The prosecutor argued she had “at no point commented that
[defense counsel] somehow failed or chose not to present any
evidence about the rest of that transcript,” and that “to discuss
what was discussed in testimony in front of this evidence after an
objection was overruled is certainly not prosecutorial
misconduct.” The trial court agreed, concluding: “There was no
comment whatsoever about the failure of the defense to bring on
something that was not permitted to be brought in. The exact
statements had—basically was, these are the statements. You
didn’t hear the rest, but [Nakeya] explains it. And that was the
extent of that statement so I do not find that there is any
prosecutorial misconduct whatsoever.”
      As Perry explains, “The prosecutor committed error by
successfully preventing the defense from presenting the entirety
of Nakeya’s two jail calls with Dozier and then arguing that the
absence of this evidence was somehow the defense’s fault.” The
People argue that “[i]n making these comments, the prosecutor
was arguing that counsel had taken Nakeya’s words out of
context, not that counsel had withheld the entire calls.” But
whatever the prosecutor’s intent might have been, the words
used in rebuttal were that Perry’s counsel “wanted to show you

                               40
portions” and “the only audio that you didn’t hear the entirety of”
was the Nakeya-Dozier calls.14
       We conclude, however, that any such error was harmless
state law error because there is no reasonable likelihood Perry
would have obtained a more favorable verdict in the absence of
the error. Perry’s counsel directly impeached Nakeya with the
key portions of the calls, and any suggestion by the prosecutor
the full context of the calls might have mitigated Nakeya’s
impeachment is minimal and speculative in light of the entire
proceeding. There was also strong evidence of Perry’s guilt at
trial from witnesses other than Nakeya. Further, there was no
prejudice in light of the trial court’s instructions to the jury that
it was not to speculate why it did not hear the entirety of the
calls. (People v. Katzenberger (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268
[arguments of counsel “‘“generally carry less weight with a jury
than do instructions from the court,”’” and if they conflict we
ordinarily conclude the jury followed the court’s instructions];
People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 940 [reiterating the
“‘sound presumption of appellate practice, that jurors are
reasonable and generally follow the instructions they are
given’”].) We conclude that any possible error was harmless,
because Perry has failed to establish “‘a reasonable likelihood the

14    The People rely on People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409,
465 and quote its language that it is “not misconduct for the
prosecutor to argue in closing that there was no evidence
supporting a particular proposition after the trial court has
properly excluded evidence the defense had sought to introduce
on that point.” Unlike Peterson, the prosecutor here was not
commenting on an evidentiary vacuum, but rather on the
defense’s purported motivation for not presenting the entirety of
the Nakeya-Dozier telephone calls.

                                 41
jury understood or applied the complained-of [statements] in an
improper or erroneous manner.’” (People v. Carter (2005)
36 Cal.4th 1114, 1205.)
       We conclude there was no federal constitutional error. The
rebuttal argument was a single instance that did not constitute a
pattern of conduct so “‘serious and egregious’” that “‘the trial
[was] rendered so unfair that the resulting conviction violates the
defendant’s right to [federal] due process of law.’” (Daveggio,
supra, 4 Cal.5th 790 at pp. 853-854; id. at p. 857 [“mild and
fleeting” sympathetic descriptions of victim not reasonably likely
to improperly sway the jury where court instructed jury not to be
influenced by sentiment or sympathy]; People v. Forrest (2017)
7 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1085 [“prosecutor’s fleeting misstatements of
the legal standard regarding provocation were not so egregious as
to amount to a denial of due process” and not part of a pattern of
conduct throughout the case].)

D.    No Cumulative Error
      Because we conclude any prosecutorial error was harmless,
and, as discussed above, find no error in the other contentions on
appeal, there is no cumulative error. (See People v. Duff, supra,
58 Cal.4th at p. 562 [“In the absence of error, there is nothing to
cumulate.”].)

E.   The Trial Court’s Sentence Did Not Comply with Amended
     Section 1170, Subdivision (b), and the Error Was Not
     Harmless
     Perry argues his case should be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court imposed the upper terms on both counts

                                42
without complying with the requirements of amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). Perry’s contention has merit.

       1.    Section 1170, Subdivision (b)
       At the time the trial court sentenced Perry in September
2021, former section 1170, subdivision (b), provided, “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute
specifies three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term
shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.” (Stats. 2020,
ch. 29, § 14.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended
section 1170, subdivision (b), to provide “(1) When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2). [¶] (2) The court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial. [¶] (3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court
may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1; see People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 401-403,
review granted October 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn); accord,
People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464 (Lopez).)

                                43
       Perry contends, the People concede, and we agree Senate
Bill No. 567’s amendments are ameliorative changes that apply
retroactively to Perry’s nonfinal judgment. (Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403 [“As Senate Bill 567’s amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b), lessen punishment, and there is no
indication that the Legislature intended it to apply prospectively
only, the new law must be retroactively applied.”]; People v.
Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1108 (Zabelle); Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 465; People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1032, 1039.)

      2.     The Trial Court Imposed the Upper Terms for Both
             Counts Without the Requisite Jury Findings or
             Defendant Admissions
       The trial court imposed the upper terms for both of Perry’s
convictions, 11 years on count 3 (forcible rape of a minor 14 years
old or older) and 10 years on count 2 (sexual penetration by a
foreign object of a minor 14 years old or older). It found six
circumstances in aggravation and none in mitigation, specifically:

           1. “The crime involved great violence, threat of great
              bodily injury, and other acts disclosing a high degree
              of cruelty and callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
              4.421(a)(1).)
           2. “[T]he victim was particularly vulnerable, a minor,
              his daughter, someone he exerted his authority over.”
              (Id., rule 4.421(a)(3).)
           3. “[I]t did take some sophistication and planning, the
              escalating nature, the rewards, and then threats.”
              (Id., rule 4.421(a)(8).)

                                  44
         4. “[T]he defendant took advantage of the position of
            trust he has—had as the victim’s father.” (Id.,
            rule 4.421(a)(11).)
         5. “[H]e was engaged in a violent conduct that indicates
            a seriousness—or serious danger to society.” (Id.,
            rule 4.421(b)(1)).)
         6. “The defendant’s . . . prior convictions are numerous
            and increasing in seriousness,” although the court
            noted that Perry had a period of no criminal history
            from 2002 until the present events. (Id.,
            rule 4.421(b)(2).)

The trial court also considered the probation officer’s report
listing Perry’s prior convictions.
       Perry did not stipulate to and the jury did not find beyond a
reasonable doubt the facts underlying any of the aggravating
circumstances. (People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1353,
review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266 (Ross) [imposition of
upper term based on trial court’s findings on aggravating factors
erroneous under amended section 1170, subdivision (b)]; Zabelle,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1109-1111 [“the trial court’s
imposition of the upper term based on its own factfinding violated
defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment” and
section 1170, subdivision (b)].) Perry also argues the probation
officer’s report is not a “certified record of conviction” within the
meaning of section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). (Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [“a probation report is not a certified
record of conviction”].) And the People concede the prosecution
did not provide certified copies of Perry’s prior convictions. As

                                 45
such, the trial court’s sentence did not comply with amended
section 1170, subdivision (b).
      As the parties note, there is a split of authority regarding
the applicable prejudice standard when determining whether a
case should be remanded for resentencing under amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). Our Supreme Court granted review
in People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.],
review granted August 10, 2022, S274942, to decide the matter.
Until the high court resolves the issue, we apply the two-step
harmless error test set forth in Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
pages 1111 to 1112 and the related approach in Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pages 465 to 467.15
      First, we evaluate whether the Sixth Amendment error is
harmless under the Chapman standard as formulated by
People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839: “‘[I]f a reviewing
court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury,
applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,
unquestionably would have found true at least a single
aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury, the
Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless.’”
(Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1111.) Second, we apply the
Watson harmless-error standard to evaluate state law error by
considering “whether it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have chosen a lesser sentence in the absence of the error.”

15    The parties also cite Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 409-410. Dunn’s analysis is similar to that of Lopez, but the
court in Dunn was “unconvinced that the Chapman standard of
harmless error . . . must be applied to all aggravating
circumstances in the Lopez court’s first step” and it applied a rule
modifying that step to incorporate Watson. (Id. at p. 408.)

                                46
(Id. at p. 1112.) As Zabelle explained, “Resolving this issue
entails two layers of review. We must first, for each aggravating
fact, consider whether it is reasonably probable that the jury
would have found the fact not true. We must then, with the
aggravating facts that survive this review, consider whether it is
reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a
lesser sentence had it considered only these aggravating facts.”
(Ibid.)
       Applying the two-step harmless error analysis to Perry’s
case, we conclude remand for resentencing is warranted. On this
record, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt at least one
aggravating circumstance had the circumstance been submitted
to the jury. (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111-1112.) As
noted above, one of the six aggravating circumstances cited by
the trial court, Perry’s history of prior convictions, was not
supported by a certified record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3);
Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 410.) And the other five—
great violence and high degree of cruelty and callousness, the
particular vulnerability of the victim, sophistication of the crime,
taking advantage of a position of trust, and violent conduct
indicating serious danger to society—all involve “vague or
subjective standard[s]” requiring “an imprecise quantitative or
comparative evaluation of the facts” such that it is “difficult for a
reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue
been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the
facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” (Sandoval,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840.) We also cannot “assume that the
record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented
had aggravating circumstances been submitted to the jury.” (Id.

                                 47
at p. 839.) Likewise, the state law error was not harmless under
Watson because we cannot conclude the trial court “would have
imposed the upper term sentence even absent the error.”
(Zabelle, at p. 1112.)
       The People argue the jury could have found two
aggravating circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, that “the victim was particularly vulnerable, since she was
a minor and appellant’s daughter” because the jury “necessarily
found that both crimes involved a child.” Second, “that appellant
took advantage of a position of trust as S.P.’s father.” But even if
the jury could have found either of these two aggravating
circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court did
not weigh any factor against the others, leaving us to speculate
about the impact fewer aggravating factors may have had on its
decision-making. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468
[remand required where trial court relied on “long list” of
aggravating factors but gave no indication what decision it would
make if fewer factors were available].) Overall, we cannot say
with certainty how the court would have assessed fewer
aggravating factors.
       Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for the
trial court to resentence Perry under amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). On remand, “full resentencing” is warranted,
including applicable retroactive changes in the law. (See
People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46 [“the need to apply
amended sections 1170, subdivision (b) and 654 creates
sufficiently ‘“changed circumstances’” [citation] to warrant a full
resentencing”]; People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 902
[“the trial court may revisit all of its sentencing choices in light
of” the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)].)

                                 48
                        DISPOSITION

      The convictions are affirmed. We vacate the sentence and
direct the trial court to resentence Perry in accordance with
section 1170, subdivision (b), and any other applicable
ameliorative legislation.

                            MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

     PERLUSS, P. J.

     SEGAL, J.

                              49