Court Opinion

ID: 9953288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 18:03:03.956982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:55.916901
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/24 Capra v. Ledesma CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION FOUR

 GABRIEL CAPRA et al.,                                               B313624

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. 21STCV03737)
           v.

 JULIAN LEDESMA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
     Matevosyan Law Firm, Arman Matevosyan, for Defendant
and Appellant.
     Rosenberger + Kawabata, Elliot Rosenberger, B. Mako
Kawabata, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
       Beginning in March 2019, plaintiffs and respondents
Gabriel Capra and Kristin Wright lived on the second floor of a
commercial building owned by defendant Royfield, Inc. Plaintiffs
lived on the property pursuant to an Airbnb rental agreement
requiring them to pay rent to defendant Christopher Kantrowitz,
who held the property out as a commercial hostel. After
Kantrowitz’s lease ended in January 2021, Royfield leased the
property to defendant and appellant Julian Ledesma.
       While plaintiffs continued to reside at the property,
Ledesma initiated construction and demolition activities on the
premises. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting claims for various
violations of the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (Rent
Ordinance) and related habitability issues. Ledesma asserted his
construction activities were to remediate code violations cited by
the City of Los Angeles (City). Pending trial, the court granted
plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunction and enjoined
Ledesma from engaging in any activities not in conformity with
the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The injunction also prohibited
Ledesma from engaging in conduct impacting plaintiffs’ rights of
possession and enjoyment.
       On appeal from the order granting the preliminary
injunction, Ledesma contends the injunction is a “prohibited
mandatory” injunction requiring him to engage in affirmative
conduct. He also contends the injunction infringes on his and the
City’s legal rights when enforcing local zoning ordinances. We
deem these contentions forfeited for the failure to raise them
below and reject them on the merits. We affirm.

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                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       In March 2019, plaintiffs began living in a dwelling unit on
the second floor of a commercial building owned by Royfield.
Plaintiffs rented the unit through an Airbnb listing posted by
Kantrowitz, the prior commercial lessee, who held the property
out as a commercial hostel known as the “Be Hive.” A lease
modification with Royfield allowed Kantrowitz to use the
premises for “short term overnight stays by guests obtained
through the ‘Airbnb’ system . . . to take advantage of health
related classes and activities offered within the Premises.” In
exchange for $600 biweekly rent, plaintiffs occupied their own
private bedroom with access to a shared kitchen and bathrooms.
       In January 2021, Kantrowitz notified plaintiffs he intended
to terminate their tenancies effective February 1, 2021. On the
effective date of termination, Ledesma spoke with Wright and
told her that he and his company would be leasing the property.1
The following day (February 2, 2021), construction workers hired
by Ledesma entered the common areas of the property and began
knocking down walls, drilling holes, and sawing lumber.
Plaintiffs posted a cease and desist letter in the hallway. The
workers continued construction, posting their own signs in
common areas indicating it was “private property.” The dust,
debris, and noise interfered with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of
the property and irritated Wright’s lungs. Plaintiffs sought

1     The evidence and trial briefs identify different companies owned
by Ledesma (Sweatheory, LLC, Sweatheory Wellness, LLC,
Sweatheory Group, LLC, and/or JPL Ventures, LLC).

                                  3
alternative living accommodations but did not receive relocation
assistance.2

                 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     The Complaint and Temporary Restraining Order
       Plaintiffs initiated the underlying action in January 2021
and filed the operative first amended complaint on February 8,
2021. In relevant part, plaintiffs alleged Ledesma’s ongoing
construction activities interfered with their enjoyment of the
property and restricted access to structural and plumbing
systems. Plaintiffs further alleged the construction activities
exacerbated existing habitability violations (plumbing and
heating issues and the existence of vermin and mold).
       The complaint asserted causes of action for violations of the
Rent Ordinance (Los Angeles Mun. Code, § 151.00 et seq.)3 for
accepting rent for property unregistered for residential use,
tortious and contractual breach of the warranty of habitability,
trespass, private nuisance, negligence, and violations of the
Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq.). Plaintiffs requested disgorgement of prior rent payments
(approximately $30,500), punitive and treble damages, and an

2      During a conversation with Capra through the Airbnb
application, Kantrowitz offered to “pro-rate [plaintiffs’] rent for
Jan[uary] based on your move-out date. Additionally, I will be
providing . . . $1[,]000 in moving assistance if the premises are vacated
before Feb[ruary] 1, 2021[,] and your rent is paid for the days you are
in residence in January.” Plaintiffs did not vacate by February 1.

3     Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Los
Angeles Municipal Code.

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order enjoining defendants’ unauthorized entry and interference
with plaintiffs’ rights of enjoyment.
      On February 8, 2021, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application
for temporary restraining order (TRO) and order to show cause
(OSC) why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Plaintiffs
argued they would likely prevail on the merits because
defendants failed to give them notice to vacate and failed to pay
mandatory relocation assistance as required by Civil Code section
1946.1 and the Rent Ordinance. In addition, plaintiffs argued
the construction caused them ongoing harm as opposed to
defendants, who would suffer no harm.
      In opposition, Ledesma argued the property was “safe” and
the construction was “City permitted and occur[ed] only during
regular hours.” He argued plaintiffs did not establish a
probability of success because they were “trespassers” who
refused his offer to sublet the property. Ledesma averred a TRO
would cause him irreparable injury by creating “endless liability
and uncertainty.”
      On February 10, 2021, the court issued a TRO and OSC re
preliminary injunction. The TRO restrained Ledesma,
Kantrowitz, Royfield, and all persons acting on their behalf from
engaging in construction requiring valid permitting or infringing
upon plaintiffs’ rights to quiet enjoyment of their units and
common areas.

B.    Ledesma’s Motion for Reconsideration: The Notice of
      Code Violation from LADBS and Letter from
      HCIDLA
      By motion filed February 18, 2021, Ledesma requested the
court reconsider the TRO in light of new facts. Ledesma asserted

                                5
the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS)
issued a “Notice of Code Violation” covering the property. The
notice informed Royfield it received a complaint alleging the
property violated various municipal code sections. A physical
inspection revealed the property was in violation for having
(1) unapproved occupancy or use of the office building as a
hostel/hotel; (2) substandard maintenance; (3) substandard
heating; (4) deteriorated or defective flooring or supports;
(5) inadequate fire protections; (6) hazardous electrical wiring;
and (7) damaged plumbing sanitation fixtures. The notice
advised Royfield its failure to comply by March 18, 2021, “may
result in further action including assessment of a fee.” Citing
these violations, Ledesma requested modifying the TRO to permit
“reasonable construction.”
       Plaintiffs opposed Ledesma’s motion and reasserted their
rights under the Rent Ordinance notwithstanding the notice to
cease unapproved use. Plaintiffs attached a letter from the Rent
Stabilization Division of the Los Angeles Housing and
Community Investment Department (HCIDLA) informing
Royfield the property “has been determined to be subject to [the
Rent Ordinance] based upon the residential use of the property
versus its legal use (commercial).” The HCIDLA advised Royfield
there was “a specific procedure the [Rent Ordinance] requires a
landlord to follow for evictions based on compliance with a

                               6
governmental order, such as the Notice of Code Violation that has
been issued by the [LADBS].”
      The court denied Ledesma’s reconsideration motion.

C.     The Preliminary Injunction
       By written opposition, Ledesma argued a preliminary
injunction would irreparably harm all parties involved in the
litigation by pausing any remediation efforts addressing health
and safety violations. Assuming the Rent Ordinance applied,
Ledesma argued the City prohibited all no-fault evictions under
the COVID-19 moratorium. He claimed the ban on evictions
prevented him from complying with the Tenant Habitability
Program (THP) (§ 152.00 et seq.), which requires landlords to
temporarily relocate tenants “to alternative housing
accommodations,” if necessary, during construction.4 (§ 152.01.)
In addition, Ledesma argued section 731a of the Code of Civil
Procedure prohibited injunctive relief for any reasonable and
necessary business operation in a commercial zone.
       In reply, plaintiffs argued Ledesma continued construction
activities in violation of the TRO and failed to minimize dust,
debris, and other effects impacting their rights of enjoyment.
Plaintiffs contended Code of Civil Procedure section 731a was

4      The City adopted the THP “to facilitate landlord investment in
Primary Renovation Work without subjecting tenants to either
untenantable housing conditions during such renovation work or
forced permanent displacement. The [THP] requires landlords to
mitigate such temporary untenantable conditions, either through
actions to ensure that tenants can safely remain in place during
construction or through the temporary relocation of tenants to
alternative housing accommodations.” (§ 152.01.)

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inapplicable because Ledesma’s construction was both
unreasonable and injurious under the statute.
       Following a hearing on March 3, 2021, the court granted
the application for a preliminary injunction. Finding plaintiffs
continuously occupied the property “for quite a long period of
time,” the court found a substantial likelihood plaintiffs would
prevail on a claim for quiet title under the Rent Ordinance. The
court then found Ledesma did not comply with the THP because
he failed to submit a tenant habitability plan covering primary
renovation work. Balancing the relative harms, the court found
in favor of plaintiffs and found Ledesma lacking in credibility.
       The order granting plaintiffs’ application for preliminary
injunction enjoined Ledesma and all persons acting on his behalf
(defined as the “Enjoined Parties”) as follows:
       “1.   The Enjoined Parties shall not engage in any
construction, remodeling, and/or demolition activities on the
second floor of the property . . . unless such activities comply with
the Los Angeles Municipal Code to the extent applicable[,]
including the requirement for an approved Tenant Habitability
Plan for Primary Renovation Work and Related Work pursuant
to [section] 152.03 B.
       “2.   In no event shall construction, remodeling,
demolition, or any other activities undertaken by any of the
Enjoined Parties impact Plaintiffs’ right to possession and/or use

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of their bedrooms, common areas, or free ingress to and egress
from the Premises.”
       Plaintiffs served Ledesma a file-endorsed copy of the signed
order. Ledesma timely appealed.

                           DISCUSSION
A.     Ledesma Forfeited His Appellate Contentions
       On appeal, Ledesma contends the trial court erred by
issuing a “prohibited mandatory” injunction requiring him to
engage in affirmative conduct. He also contends the injunction
infringes on his and the City’s legal rights. These contentions
were never brought before the trial court.
       It is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a
“party who fails to alert the trial court to an issue that has been
left unresolved forfeits the right to raise that issue on appeal.”
(Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1127 (Araiza);
see In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1138 [“It
is clearly unproductive to deprive a trial court of the opportunity
to correct such a purported defect by allowing a litigant to raise
the claimed error for the first time on appeal”].)
       Ledesma’s appellate contentions are not based, as they
were in the trial court, on plaintiffs’ right of possession or the
reasonableness of his construction activities. Apart from
Ledesma’s argument regarding section 731a of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we deem all of Ledesma’s appellate contentions
forfeited. (Araiza, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.) Despite
this conclusion, we exercise our discretion to consider the
contentions as presenting legal questions determinable from

                                 9
uncontroverted facts. (See County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 301, 326–327.)5

B.     The Rent Ordinance and THP Indisputably Protect
       Plaintiffs
       Before we address Ledesma’s appellate contentions, we
note what he has not argued on appeal. Ledesma offered no
argument in his opening brief challenging the trial court’s
application of the Rent Ordinance or THP to plaintiffs’ rights of
occupancy. Application of these protections by the court is
reasonable and unchallenged. (See § 151.02 [“Rental Unit”
defined in part as any housing accommodation in hotels or
boarding houses occupied as a primary residence for any period
more than 30 days]; ibid. [“Landlord” defined as any owner,
lessor, sublessor, “or the agent, representative or successor of any
of the foregoing”].) There is no showing the Rent Ordinance
protections were rendered inapplicable by the absence of any
lease agreement between Ledesma and plaintiffs. (See
§ 151.09(a)(5)–(6) [Rent Ordinance applies to unapproved
holdover tenants].) As such, it is undisputed the Rent Ordinance
and THP apply to plaintiffs’ use of the property and Ledesma’s
construction activities.

C.    Ledesma’s Contentions Are Unpersuasive
      Nor has Ledesma challenged the findings on which the
preliminary injunction issued: the likelihood of prevailing on the

5     We do not consider any arguments Ledesma raised for the first
time in his reply brief. “‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against
consideration of an issue raised initially in the reply brief of an
appellant.’” (In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
1467, 1477.)

                                  10
merits and balancing of harms. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th
528, 554.) We decline to reconsider those findings.
       Instead, Ledesma’s principal contention is that the trial
court issued a “prohibited mandatory” injunction requiring him to
engage in affirmative conduct. In addition, he asserts the
injunction infringes upon his rights and those of the City when
enforcing local zoning ordinances. We review each of these legal
contentions de novo. (People ex rel. Feuer v. FXS Management,
Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1159; see also People ex rel.
Herrera v. Stender (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 614, 629–630
[preliminary injunctions generally reviewed for abuse of
discretion].)

       1.    The Preliminary Injunction Is Not Mandatory
       Ledesma’s first contention questions the type of injunctive
relief awarded. He argues the injunction should be reversed
because it requires Ledesma to affirmatively pay for plaintiffs’
housing expenses and act as their “quasi-landlord and quasi-
property manager.”
       To the extent Ledesma contends the trial court could never
issue a preliminary injunction requiring affirmative conduct, he
is mistaken. Mandatory injunctions may be issued; they simply
are rarer and subject to stricter appellate scrutiny. (Shoemaker
v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 625.)
       We also reject the notion the injunction in this case is
mandatory and not prohibitory. “The designation given an
injunction by the trial court does not determine whether the
decree is prohibitive or mandatory. Instead, the appellate court
must examine the terms and effect of the injunction in order to
discover its character.” (People v. Mobile Magic Sales, Inc. (1979)

                                11
96 Cal.App.3d 1, 13 (Mobile Magic Sales).) “‘The purpose of
mandatory relief is to compel the performance of a substantive
act or a change in the relative positions of the parties.
[Citations.] By contrast, the prohibitive order seeks to restrain a
party from a course of conduct or to halt a particular condition.
[Citation.] The character of prohibitory injunctive relief,
however, is not changed to mandatory in nature merely because
it incidentally requires performance of an affirmative act.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Brown v. iMergent, Inc.
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 342 (iMergent), quoting Mobile
Magic Sales, supra, at p. 13.)
       The injunction in this case restrains Ledesma’s activities
that violate the law and infringe on plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment
of the property. In fact, the injunction provided Ledesma two
alternatives. He could either stop construction on the premises
or proceed lawfully in compliance with the Rent Ordinance and
THP. Given the choices afforded Ledesma, the injunction does
not compel Ledesma to do anything.6 At most, the provision
requiring Ledesma to proceed in accordance with local law is
“merely incidental to the injunction’s objective to prohibit
[Ledesma] from further violating” the law. (iMergent, supra, 170
Cal.App.4th at p. 342.)
       Ledesma’s discussion of the case law is unpersuasive. In
Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435
(Davenport), an insurer denied the plaintiff’s claim for what it
deemed “investigational” treatment to prevent a recurrence of

6     Ledesma provides no legal authority for the proposition he must
pay for plaintiffs’ rent or living expenses. Unapproved holdover
tenants are generally liable for the reasonable value of use during any
holdover period. (11382 Beach Partnership v. Libaw (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 212, 218–219; Civ. Code, §§ 3334, 3335.)

                                  12
cancer in the future. (Id. at p. 441.) The trial court enjoined the
insurer from “‘denying, refusing, excluding, limiting, or
discontinuing coverage and benefits for performance’” of that
medical treatment and the insurer appealed. (Id. at pp. 439,
443.) Though framed in prohibitory language, the injunction
order was found to be mandatory in nature. Rather than
preserving the status quo (denying treatment to prevent
recurrence in the future), the order required affirmative action
(authorizing and paying for treatment) that changed the parties’
relative positions. (Id. at p. 447; accord, Agricultural Labor
Relations Board v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709,
712–713 [defendant enjoined from “‘failing or refusing to
immediately reinstate’” former employees].)
       The injunction in this case does not do this. By enjoining
any activities infringing on plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the premises,
the injunction maintains the status quo of the parties pending
trial. (See iMergent, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 343 [“status
quo” refers to the last actual peaceable, uncontested status
preceding the pending controversy].) As such, the injunction
order is prohibitory in both purpose and effect.
       Indeed, Boy Kay Chan v. Gerdon Land Co. (1951) 103
Cal.App.2d 724 (Boy Kay Chan), another case on which Ledesma
relies, supports our conclusion. As in this case, the landlord-
defendant in Boy Kay Chan appealed from a preliminary
injunction order prohibiting it “from in anywise interfering with
the rights of the plaintiffs to use [a light well on the property]
‘and from preventing egress or ingress from said light well area
in and to the demised premises . . . .’” (Id. at p. 726.) The court
held this provision of the injunction “is, of course, purely
preventive and prohibitory.” (Id. at pp. 726–727; see ibid.

                                13
[finding second provision of injunction mandatory because it
required defendant “to rip out parts of the property”].) The
injunction in this case contains a similar directive prohibiting
Ledesma from engaging in any conduct infringing on plaintiffs’
use and ingress/egress. It too is “purely preventative and
prohibitory.” (Id. at p. 726.)

       2.    The Injunction Does Not Infringe Legal Rights
       Ledesma next contends the injunction violates his rights
and those of the City when enforcing local zoning ordinances.
This contention appears to be based on two alternative
arguments.
       Ledesma first argues California Civil Code section 3423
and Code of Civil Procedure sections 526(b) and 731a call for the
reversal in this case. These statutes do not apply to this tenant
dispute.
       Together, section 3423 of the Civil Code and section 526,
subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure prohibit injunctive
relief which prevents a legislative act by a municipal corporation
or the execution of a public statute by public or private officer.
(Alfaro v. Terhune (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 492, 500 (Alfaro); City of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423, 430.)7
Ledesma cites no authority, and we are aware of none, invoking
these principles to prohibit injunctions against private
individuals in his situation. Nor does Ledesma explain how the
injunction in this case interferes with the City’s ability to enact

7      An injunction may not be granted to “prevent the exercise of a
public or private office, in a lawful manner, by the person in
possession,” or to “prevent a legislative act by a municipal corporation.”
(Civ. Code, § 3423, subds. (f), (g); accord, Code Civ. Proc., § 526,
subds. (b)(4), (b)(6).)

                                   14
or execute its laws. The injunction permits Ledesma (and
Royfield as landowner) to remediate the violations in a lawful
manner.
       Section 731a of the Code of Civil Procedure “denies
injunctive relief to private persons whenever a commercial
enterprise operates within a legally defined area under an
express permit as long as the enterprise does not employ
unnecessary and injurious methods of operation.” (Christopher v.
Jones (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 408, 411.)8 Assuming the
construction activities in this case were in furtherance of
Ledesma’s business, those activities injured plaintiffs’ legal rights
under the Rent Ordinance and THP. As the statutory language
clarifies, section 731a does not apply to “unnecessary and
injurious methods of operation.” Ledesma cannot rely on sections
3423, 526(b), or 731a to engage in unlawful conduct. (See Alfaro,
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 501; Camp v. Board of Supervisors
(1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 356–357; Gelfand v. O’Haver (1948)
33 Cal.2d 218, 221.)
       Ledesma’s second argument concerns his own use and
enjoyment of the property. Ledesma avers he cannot possibly
resume construction in compliance with the injunction because he
is not the landowner or plaintiffs’ “landlord” and cannot submit a
tenant habitability plan under the Rent Ordinance and THP.

8      Section 731a of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “Whenever
any city, . . . shall have established zones or districts under authority
of law wherein certain manufacturing or commercial or airport uses
are expressly permitted, . . . no person or persons, . . . shall be enjoined
or restrained by the injunctive process from the reasonable and
necessary operation . . . of any use expressly permitted therein, nor
shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence of the
employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation.”

                                    15
Assuming he could, Ledesma argues the latter portion of the
injunction prohibiting construction “impact[ing] Plaintiffs’ right
to possession/and or use” of the property would still exclude him
from the property. As a result, Ledesma contends the injunction
violates his rights to due process and insulates plaintiffs from
being lawfully evicted from the property.
      This argument is unpersuasive. Ledesma is either a
“landlord” under the Rent Ordinance as successor lessee and
agent or representative of Royfield, or he is not. If he is, he
would be eligible to submit a tenant habitability plan to renovate
the property. (§§ 152.01, 152.03.) If he is not, he identifies no
authority permitting the type of interference with plaintiff’s right
of use and enjoyment presented in this case. Whether plaintiffs’
rights of occupancy interfere with Ledesma’s own ability to
occupy the property, plaintiffs’ rights continue until they are
lawfully extinguished. (See §§ 151.09(A), 151.09(G); Civ. Code,
§ 1946.1.)
      In sum, we discern no legal error in the language or
operation of the preliminary injunction. If changed
circumstances call for it on remand, Ledesma may seek
modification or dissolution of the injunction. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 533.)

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                          DISPOSITION
      The order granting plaintiffs’ application for preliminary
injunction order is affirmed. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs
on appeal.

                                           MORI, J.
      We concur:

            CURREY, P. J.

            COLLINS, J.

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