Court Opinion

ID: 9466510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:18:12.469582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:46.754177
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority in vacating the judgment of the district court. I dissent from the portion which remands for an evidentiary hearing for a determination of applicability of the tolling provision. Rather, I would remand for trial upon the merits.
As resolved by the majority, the issue presented here is whether, in applying a state statute of limitations in a § 1983 action,1 the federal court can alter the state *1043statute by imposing its own condition precedent. Conceding that four circuits2 have upheld tolling provisions which are part of state statutes of limitations, but noting that this circuit has not decided the precise question whether it must honor such provisions, the majority concludes that the necessity for tolling during imprisonment no longer exists and that therefore this court can ignore such proviso in the Texas statute unless the prisoner first proves lack of access to the courts during his imprisonment. In my opinion, this encroaches upon the legislative and judicial functions of a state.
The Fifth Circuit consistently has recognized state tolling provisions where applicable and has refused to engraft such provisions in absence of state authority. Thus, when this circuit has been urged to toll statutes of limitations in cases arising out of Florida or Louisiana which statutes do not contain tolling provisions, we have declined to do so. Knowles v. Carson, 419 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Florida law); Proctor v. Flex, 567 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1978) and Kissinger v. Foti, 544 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977) (both applying Louisiana law). Alabama, Georgia and Texas statutorily toll the running of the limitations period during imprisonment. However, because the Georgia Supreme Court had refused to toll the statute of limitations for the duration of incarceration, Scott v. Scott, 192 Ga. 370, 15 S.E.2d 416 (1941) and Hardin v. Dodd, 176 Ga. 119, 167 S.E. 277 (1932), this result was adopted by a federal district court in a § 1983 action filed in Georgia. Heard v. Caldwell, 364 F.Supp. 419 (S.D.Ga.1973). In Neel v. Rehberg, 577 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1978), also a § 1983 action from Georgia, this court, in footnoted dicta, accepted the Heard analysis. However, Neel is not inconsistent with our policy of recognizing state tolling provisions where they exist and are currently applied. Neel merely acknowledged that the Georgia Supreme Court had abrogated the tolling proviso of the Georgia statute; therefore, it no longer existed as part of the state’s limitations scheme. On the other hand, as noted in the majority opinion, this court has intimated that tolling provisions in Texas are still viable. Grundstrom v. Darnell, 531 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1976); Bryant v. Potts, 528 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1976).
More importantly, the tolling provision is currently recognized by the Texas courts. The Texas statute,3 including tolling,4 has been the law of Texas since 1869. Although various aspects of the statute have been modified on at least five occasions, the latest being in 1968, the Texas legislature has consistently reaffirmed the disability provision for prisoners. Furthermore, a Texas appellate court very recently expressly applied the prisoner tolling provision; the provision, therefore, is very much alive in Texas, at least in its own courts. Jenkins v. State of Texas, et al., 570 S.W.2d 175 *1044(Tex.Civ.App.1978).5 Jenkins thus supersedes the finding of the district court that “it has been 75 years since a State court has suspended the statute of limitations based on imprisonment.” 6 Surely the recognition of the provision by the court system charged with the interpretation of Texas law should be dispositive with this court.
The majority reasons, as did the district court, that the purpose of tolling for prisoners has ceased to exist. As authority for this factual conclusion, the district court and the majority use statistics showing the number and percentage of civil rights actions filed in Texas by prisoners during 1976. The majority, quoting from Stephens v. Curtis, 450 F.Supp. 141 (S.D.Tex.1978), also relies upon the percentage of civil actions filed in the United States by prisoners since 1960. There is no showing, however, that these general statistics are relevant to this particular case. The majority attempts to rectify this deficiency by remanding for an evidentiary hearing at which defendant must prove, before the statute is tolled, that state prisoners did not have unimpeded access to federal courts during his imprisonment, a condition not imposed by the Texas legislature. The majority, however, has failed to cite any authority that necessity for a tolling statute is relevant to a determination by a federal court whether a valid state statute should be applied.
Although I concede that the historical need for tolling during imprisonment has diminished in recent years, and especially since Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969),7 whether it has diminished sufficiently for the provision to be discarded is for the State of Texas to determine.8

. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with *1043the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.

. Austin v. Brammer, 555 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1977) (applying Ohio law); Ortiz v. LaVallee, 442 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1971) (applying New York law); Ney v. State of California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971) and Bergschneider v. Denver, 446 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1971) (both applying California law); and Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying Illinois law).

. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5526 (1925):
There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the following description:
6. Action for injury done to the person of another.

. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5535 (1968):
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this title be at the time the cause of action accrues either a minor, a married person under twenty-one years of age, a person imprisoned or a person of unsound mind, the time of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited for the commencement of the action and such person shall have the same time after the removal of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of this title.

. In Jenkins, the court specifically held: “The statute of limitations was tolled during the period of the appellant’s imprisonment and did not begin to run until after his release Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5535 (Supp.1978).” 570 S.W.2d at 177.

. It should be noted that several Texas courts, in unpublished opinions prior to the Jenkins decision, declined to apply the tolling provision. However, in Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F.Supp. 172 (S.D.Tex.1974), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102, 97 S.Ct. 1127, 51 L.Ed.2d 552 (1977), a federal district court held: “Imprisonment under Texas law is considered a disability and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until after the disability is removed.” 382 F.Supp. at 185.

. Johnson v. Avery was decided February 4, 1969, one month after the statute of limitations would have barred Miller’s claim, and was the first Supreme Court case to specifically grant a prisoner “meaningful access to the courts.”

. Alternatively, the result reached by the majority could be accomplished by amending the Civil Rights Act so that state tolling provisions would not be applicable. This power is reserved for Congress, however, and not this court.