Court Opinion

ID: 9560515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:50:22.802823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:05.910892
License: Public Domain

Six, J.,
dissenting: I would affirm the trial court. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. This is a mortgage foreclosure confirmation of sale case. The only question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the sale. The majority states: “The sole issue for appellate review is whether the trial court erred in confirming the sale and entering a deficiency judgment against the Manns.” The majority has substituted its judgment for that of the trial judge.
The majority concludes that anticipated holding costs (taxes, interest, and real estate commission) are not deductible from fair market value to determine fair value of the. foreclosed real estate as a matter of law. In my view, such a holding casts a long shadow over future foreclosure actions which will inevitably involve various factual situations to be resolved by the prudent *364application of a trial court’s equitable powers. The majority in the case at bar is reviewing and passing upon the credibility of trial testimony. The Manns did not introduce any evidence to contradict Meyers’ conclusion that a two- to three-year marketing period was likely. The Manns’ witness, Kiesling, did not dispute the estimated marketing period. The Manns did not question the accuracy of the alleged losses the Bank would incur during the marketing period. During the three years Kiesling, . on behalf of the Manns, had listed the property for sale, not one bid at any price had been made.
The trial court conducted a full hearing on the Bank’s motion to confirm the sale. Both parties presented evidence concerning their business relations, the characteristics of the property given as collateral for the loan, the Manns’ use of the property, and the property’s highest and best use as of the date of the sheriff’s sale. Following the hearing, the trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law in its confirmation order. Critical to the trial court’s decision were its findings from the evidence that: (1) The sale was made in conformity with equity and (2) the bid was not substantially inadequate.
The majority’s dual use of the terms “fair market value” and “fair value” will, in my view, endorse increased uncertainty in future K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-2415 actions. The majority remands, instructing the trial court to confirm the sale on the condition the Manns be credited with $500,000, an amount the majority, sitting as an appellate court, has determined to be the K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-2415(b) “fair value” of the property. In my view, such a “fair value” specific dollar amount determination by this court is outside of the province of appellate review. In the alternative, the majority extends to the trial judge the option of ordering a new sale.
I find no reason why the Bank should be required to bid substantially more than it would receive, based on the evidence at trial, if and when the property is resold by the Bank. Contrary to the Manns’ contention, K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-2415(b) does not require the trial court to determine the “fair value” of the property. The statute gives the trial court discretion to make such a determination.
*365The standard for confirming or nonconfirming a judicial sale is stated in K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-2415(a), i.e., whether the proceedings were “regular and in conformity with law and equity.” The court “may decline to confirm the sale where the bid is substantially inadequate.” K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-2415(b). The trial court concluded that the sheriff’s sale had in all respects been made in conformity with law and equity and confirmed the sale.
The trial court concluded: “The fair value of the subject property for the purposes of the instant proceedings is that sum which the mortgagee purchaser ought, under all the circumstances, reasonably expect to realize from the acquired property by way of resale,” citing Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ritz Holding Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 148, 172, 8 A.2d 235 (1939).
The trial court found that the cost to the Bank to hold the property until such time as the property likely could be sold should be considered. Other factors also were considered in arriving at the court’s determination of adequacy of the bid and whether the proceedings had been in conformity with, law and equity. The trial court was free to exercise its full équity powers in determining if the sale was in conformity with law and equity. The standard for confirmation is a bid which is not “substantially inadequate” under all the circumstances.
Can it be said that no reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s decision? The answer is “no.” My apprehension, concerning the majority opinion arises from the invitation it extends to reweigh trial testimony on appeal. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the Bank’s bid was not substantially inadequate. The evidence is uncontroverted that it could take three years to sell the property. The trial court, in the exercise of its equity power, reasoned that it is not equitable to force the Bank to pay the costs of holding property it was forced to buy.
The majority agrees with the statement in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ritz Holding Co., 126 N.J. Eq. at 165, that it is impossible to provide a formula for determining fair value which can be applied in all cases. The facts and circumstances surrounding each sale must be considered in determining the fair value at a confirmation hearing. The majority invokes the signal advanced in Nat’l Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 926, 506 P.2d *36620 (1973), that the trial court shall consider the local, long-term economic conditions; the type of property involved; its unique qualities, if any; its intrinsic worth; and other characteristics affecting the property’s value. The trial court, in the casé at bar, applied the teachings of Ritz Holding Co. and Equity Investors.
Perhaps, if sitting as a trial judge, I might not have evaluated the evidence exactly as the trial judge did; however, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s resolution of the instant controversy. Liberty Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 143 Kan. 422, 425, 54 P.2d 937 (1936).
McFarland, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.