Court Opinion

ID: 9536552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:02:06.900826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:43.226853
License: Public Domain

*292PHELPS, Justice
(dissenting).
I am sorry I am unable to agree with the majority opinion in this case. It is my view that when the deceased closed the business of the secondhand car lot at about 8:30 o’clock in the evening and proceeded to a grocery store on Speedway for the sole purpose of purchasing groceries for the family to be consumed over the week-end he was in the performance of an act wholly outside the scope of his employment as manager of a used-car lot. The trip to the store was an independent act of his own for -his exclusive benefit and in no way connected with the business of his employer. This is true even if we assume that the employer was liable for any injury sustained by him traveling the usual route to and from home. In leaving the usual course of travel and going approximately two miles out of his way for the purpose of purchasing groceries constituted an abandonment of his employment.
The rule is well stated in Restatement of the Law of Agency, section 234, p. 524, as follows: “ * * * If the driving is an independent journey as distinguished from a mere detour, the servant is upon an enterprise of his own and the master is not liable for his conduct during the trip.”
We said in the case of Cox v. Enloe, 50 Ariz. 201, 70 P.2d 331, 332, that: “* * * Under the rule of respondeat superior, the negligence of an employee is imputed to his employer, and the latter must answer in damages for such negligence. This rule, however, is subject to the qualification that if the employee at the time of the accident had abandoned his employment and was engaged in personal and private affairs not connected with the business of the employer, there is no liability on the part of the latter ^ ^
In the Cox case compensation was allowed but the facts were that Cox had driven his truck in from Nogales and upon arrival in Tucson was notified that he must leave immediately for a trip to Phoenix for a load of produce. It was necessary that the employee procure .a coat because of the coolness of the nights. The court held that it was just as essential that he provide himself with clothing to make himself comfortable on the trip as it was to service the truck and in driving to his home some few miles off the main highway to Phoenix, Arizona, he was in the performance of an act connected with his employer’s business.
The cases of Peters v. Pima Mercantile Co., Inc., 42 Ariz. 454, 27 P.2d 143; McCauley v. Steward, 63 Ariz. 524, 164 P.2d 465, and Johnston v. Hare, 30 Ariz. 253, 246 P. 546, all hold that where a person at the time of the injury, is in the performance of an independent act not connected with the business of his employer, that the relationship of master and servant does, not exist. If the relation of master and servant does *293not exist it follows that compensation cannot be allowed.
I cannot see how the fact that deceased was permitted to drive the car of his employer alters the case. In McCauley v. Steward, supra, the employee was given permission to drive one of the used cars of his employer to and from home and to use it in contacting prospective purchasers but when he drove the car a mile or two out of the way to see a lady friend it was held that he departed from his usual course of travel and at the time was performing an independent act in nowise connected with the business of his employer.
The fact that deceased intended to see someone in connection with the business of his 'employer after he delivered his groceries and left his wife at home can make no difference. The conference with the prospective customer was to be held after he performed the personal errand for himself and family. If, after deceased left home and delivered his groceries he again left home to see such prospective customer, such action would unquestionably restore the relation of master and servant between him and his employer and any injury then sustained by him would have been compensable.
The award, in my opinion, should be affirmed.