Court Opinion

ID: 9774050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:07:32.929598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:01.203028
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the result of the opinion by Justice Wallace for these additional reasons.
The issue in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), was “whether, consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products liability action, when the defendants’ only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an automobile accident in Oklahoma.” Id. at 287, 100 S.Ct. at 562. The question before this Court is whether, consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Texas court may exercise in person-am jurisdiction over a non-resident provider of helicopter services, when the defendant’s connections with Texas were all of those listed in the opinion by Justice Wallace.
In World-Wide, there was no evidence that World-Wide or its retail distributor, Seaway, did any business in Oklahoma, shipped or sold any products to or in that state, had an agent to receive process there, or purchased advertisements in any media calculated to reach Oklahoma. During oral arguments before the U. S. Supreme Court, plaintiff’s attorney conceded there was no showing that any automobile ever sold by World-Wide or Seaway had ever entered Oklahoma with the single exception of the car involved. Id. at 289, 100 S.Ct. at 563. Thus, World-Wide holds that driving a car through a state is not such “minimum contacts” to give that state jurisdiction in an action against a New York seller.
In reaching this decision, the U. S. Supreme Court stated:
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the state. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.
444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566, 62 L.Ed. 2d at 500.
Applying that same language to the facts of this case, I would write: Helicol carries on much business in Texas. They close many purchases of' helicopters and spare parts and negotiate contracts in Texas. They regularly secure the services of Bell Helicopter in training their pilots and repair technicians. They solicited business in Texas by sending a representative to Houston to negotiate with Williams-Sedco-Horn. The record shows they regularly buy helicopters and spare parts in Texas and seek Texas services for training their employees. They directly secure the services of the Texas markets, maintain employees in Texas on a year-round basis and 26 times sent officials of their company to Texas. This activity has continued since 1970. In this *875multi-million dollar business in Texas, Heli-col has availed itself of the privileges and benefits of Texas law. In short, our petitioners seek to base jurisdiction on many significant contacts in Texas that reflect a continuous general presence in Texas.
The U. S. Supreme Court, in World-Wide, was addressing the jurisdictional problem between states.' However, we do not have the same problem as World-Wide. We do not have a dispute over jurisdiction between coequal sovereigns in a federal system. We are deciding jurisdiction between countries; as to citizens of the United States and a resident of Colombia. Therefore, “due process” in this case must be universal in its application.
Now, let us look at what World-Wide said about “minimum contacts” and reasonableness of the “forum” among the states, and apply those tests to our facts:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their statutes as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of “reasonableness” or “fairness.” We have said that the defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, [326 U.S.] at 316 [90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057], quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 [85 L.Ed. 278, 61 S.Ct. 339 [342], 132 A.L.R. 1357] (1940). The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is “reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” [326 U.S. 310], at 317 [90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154 [161] 161 A.L.R. 1057], Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate ease be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 [223,2 L.Ed.2d 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201] (1957); the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, [436 U.S.] at 92 [56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696], at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, n. 37 [53 L.Ed.2d 683, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2583, n. 37] (1977); the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, [436 U.S.] at 93, 98 [56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690 at 1696, 1700],
444 U.S. at 291-92, 100 S.Ct. at 564.
The contacts of Helicol in Texas were not “minimal,” they were “substantial.” It is not unreasonable to require a company with the expertise in international business, as Helicol, to defend a suit in a state where it has conducted multi-million dollars of business. However, it is unreasonable to require the widows and children seeking relief here to go to a foreign country to prosecute their action.
This Court has an interest in adjudicating the dispute of these United States citizens. They do not have the power to select another state but must be removed to a foreign country. This Court has an interest in assuring these plaintiffs obtain convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum country.
“Due process” is not a rigid, unchanging rule that courts could always determine by *876an unchanging formula. The concept of “due process” is designed to meet the test of change and to protect the rights of American citizens in the 1980’s, as it did when the Constitution was written. In World-Wide, it was stated:
The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause, in its role as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation, have been substantially relaxed over the years. As we noted in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra [355 U.S.] at 222-223 [2 L.Ed.2d 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201], this trend is largely attributable to a fundamental transformation in the American economy:
“Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.”
The historical developments noted in McGee, of course, have only accelerated in the generation since that case was decided.
444 U.S. 292-93, 100 S.Ct. at 564-65.
The quote from McGee is as applicable to the facts of this case- as it was to the McGee facts. It could be written: Today many commercial transactions touch two or more countries and may involve parties separated by continents or oceans. With this increasing internationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail and satellite communications across continental lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a country where he engages in economic activity.
The McGee court further stated: “Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.” 355 U.S. at 224, 78 S.Ct. at 201. In my opinion, the inconvenience to Helicol, considering their substantial contacts in Texas, is certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.
In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), the Supreme Court, in explaining the requirements of due process, stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. [Emphasis added].
357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239.
This Court, in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1977), tested the jurisdiction of Texas courts over the Oklahoma resident by stating:
[T]he contacts of Burt with Texas are minimal and fortuitous, and he cannot be said to have “purposefully” conducted activities within the State. Burt’s contacts with Texas were not grounded on any expectation or necessity of invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law, nor were they designed to result in profit from a business transaction undertaken in Texas. The contract was solicited, negotiated, and consummated in Oklahoma, and Burt did nothing to indicate or to support an inference of any purpose to exercise the privilege of doing business in Texas. Simply stated, Burt was a passive customer of a Texas corporation who neither sought, initiated, nor profited from his single and fortuitous contact with Texas.
553 S.W.2d at 763.
Applying the U-Anchor test and using the U-Anchor language, I find Helicol’s con*877tacts are numerous and not fortuitous, as Helicol purposefully conducted activities within the state. Helicol’s contacts with Texas were grounded on the expectation, or necessity, of invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law; and they were designed to result in profit from a business transaction undertaken in Texas. The contracts and contacts were solicited or negotiated in Texas and some consummated in Texas. Helicol’s activities, therefore, did more than indicate or support an inference of purposefully exercising the privilege of doing business in Texas. Helicol was an active customer of Texas corporations and companies who sought, initiated, and hopefully profited from its many and purposeful contacts with Texas.
McGEE, J., joins in this concurring opinion.