Court Opinion

ID: 9774217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:42.527689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.518445
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting on motion for rehearing.
On Motion for Rehearing I am convinced that I erred in joining in the original opinion.
In response to Special Issues Nos. 10 and 11, the jury awarded $500,000 to each minor child for the loss of parental consortium. The original opinion held that under present Texas law, Eric and Sean cannot recover against a third party tortfeasor for this loss. The opinion then reformed the judgment to delete the $1,000,000 award. I concur with the original opinion with the exception of the reversal of the $1,000,000 award, and I respectfully dissent as to that portion of the opinion.
This court’s only rationale for taking away the damages awarded to Eric and Sean is that Texas law does not provide for such damages. I would argue that it does, or in the alternative, that if it does not, then the time has come to recognize such a cause of action in the State of Texas.
In 1978 the Supreme Court held that a spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from an injury to the other spouse caused by the negligence of a third party tortfeasor. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex.1978). Much more recently, the Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld an award of damages for mental anguish to the parents of an infant born prematurely and allegedly blinded by the administration of high levels of oxygen. Hall v. Birchfield, 718 S.W.2d 313, 337-38 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1986, no writ). That court cited Whittlesey and noted that “[n]o reasonable distinction can be drawn between a spouse’s right to recover for loss of companionship and society of the other spouse and a parent’s right to recover for loss of companionship and society of a child.” Id. at 337.
I find no reasonable distinction between a parent’s right to recover for the loss of companionship and society of a child and a child’s right to recover for the loss of companionship and society of a parent. To find such a distinction would be discriminatory to the child. The Austin Court of Appeals recently declined to allow a child’s cause of action for injuries to her mother, stating that it was not the role of an intermediate appellate court to create a new cause of action. However, the court did acknowledge the incongruity of allowing certain family members, but not others, to recover for substantially the same harm suffered by each. Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co., 670 S.W.2d 373, 379-80 (Tex.App.—Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In that case, the husband’s loss of consortium was compensable; in the case before us, the wife was awarded damages for loss of consortium. Arguably, a child’s loss is even more severe than that of a spouse or parent as the child is much more vulnerable and dependent upon the parent for care, comfort, advice, guidance and society.
Based upon the testimony at this trial, the jury found that Eric and Sean Eubanks each have sustained injuries resulting from the accident that rendered their father a paraplegic. The father has had difficulty adjusting to his condition, and his relationship and interaction with his family has deteriorated. He withdraws from any physical contact with his sons, tends to be too harsh with them and is obviously unable to participate in any physical activities with them. They, in turn, are becoming hostile and withdrawn and are having problems in school.
Although it was long overdue, this state finally recognized and allowed recovery of damages by children for loss of companionship and mental anguish in the wrongful death of a parent. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.1985). However, we have not as yet recognized and compensated the child for the loss the child suffers when the parent is severely injured but survives. Other states have recognized that no reasonable distinction can be drawn between death and severe injury where the effect on consortium is concerned. Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court of Arizona, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955, 957 (1986); Hay v. *767Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939, 941 (1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash.2d 131, 691 P.2d 190, 192 (1984); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1980). Often death is separated from severe injury by mere fortuity. Howard Frank, M.D., P.C., 722 P.2d at 957. Indeed, it might be argued that injury is worse than death for the survivor because the presence of the injured family member is a constant reminder of what once was and will never be again.
Appellants argue that once the injured party has been compensated for his injuries he theoretically is placed in the position he would have been in had no injury occurred. They contend that the other family members have sustained no compensable loss. This argument ignores the unique nature of the injury to the other members of the family. Eric and Sean have suffered a reasonably recognizable injury, one that is separate and distinct from the injuries sustained by their father and one for which compensation is reasonable and necessary.
Appellants also argue that there is no basis for an award to the minor plaintiffs because Special Issues Nos. 10 and 11 incorrectly state the elements of damages to which they would be entitled. I agree with appellees that this contention is waived. To preserve error, appellants were required to point out distinctly the matter to which they objected and the grounds for their objection. Tex.R.Civ.P. 274. Failure to do so results in waiver of any complaint on that ground of appeal. Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex.1978). In their objections to the charge, appellants merely stated that the listed elements of damages were those of a wrongful death action and that Eric and Sean were not entitled to recover for wrongful death. The complaint at trial does not comport with the complaint made the basis of the point of error on appeal. Furthermore, the jury could and did find that there was a loss connected with each of the submitted elements of damages.
The Supreme Court has previously recognized that injuries to the familial relationship are significant and worthy of compensation. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983). Justice Spears wrote, “The real loss sustained by a parent [in the loss of a child] is not the loss of any financial benefit to be gained from the child, but is the loss of love, advice, comfort, companionship and society.” Id. at 251. Certainly Eric and Sean have suffered this same loss of advice, comfort, companionship and society. Their father will never be able to pick the boys up, hold them in his arms, participate with them in athletic endeavors or represent the strong idol image of a father who has not lost the use of his arms and legs. If such a loss is compensable to a spouse or a parent, how can we say it is not a compensable loss to a child.
Although the Sanchez court was dealing with the Wrongful Death Act, they recognized earlier restrictions placed on recovery by the Supreme Court, and they reasoned, “It is, therefore, logical for this court to now act in response to the needs of a modem society, and abolish the antiquated rule in favor of recovery of loss of society and mental anguish.” Id. at 252. The court was speaking of the prior rule, created by case law, imposing a pecuniary loss as a limitation of the damages recoverable. It is well-known that the legislature has attempted to amend the Wrongful Death Act on many occasions, yet none of the bills have passed. The Supreme Court recognized its role in Sanchez and Cavnar and did what the legislature has failed to do.
Now we are faced with a recognizable and compensable loss which has not yet been awarded to children who suffer this loss by way of negligent acts resulting in injury to a parent. We cannot look to the Wrongful Death Act for a solution because fortunately, or unfortunately, the parent survived the negligence of the tortfeasor. However, the solution is alive and well in the tort law of this state. This special loss has been recognized and compensated when a party has lost the consortium, love, companionship and society of a spouse who *768has survived a tortfeasor’s negligence. Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 668. Further, the loss suffered by a parent whose child has survived the negligent acts of a tort-feasor has been held to be compensable. Hall, 718 S.W.2d at 337-38. It is my conviction that Texas law does provide for such a recovery and has simply not found the case to which such law should apply— until now. The jury in this case found injury to the plaintiff’s sons and sought to compensate them for that injury with a monetary award. I would affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding Eric and Sean $1,000,000.