Court Opinion

ID: 9580269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:41.652299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:10.834132
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion, except that part which relates to the court’s discussion and ruling reversing the trial judge’s granting judgment on the pleadings as to defendant’s counterclaim for the amounts the carrier paid to the mortgagees on the real property which was destroyed by fire.
First, a very capable and experienced trial judge included in the ordering portion of his judgment the following:
2. That pursuant to the stipulation of the parties that the defendant have and recover of the plaintiff on its counterclaim the sum of $48,792.76 with interest-from-a*d-arfter-t-he ------day--of-------------------49-— as provided by law [DLS].
It is obvious from the trial judge’s delineation and initialing thereof that he was particularly aware of and concerned about the accuracy of that paragraph.
There is a presumption in favor of the regularity and validity of judgments in the lower court and the burden is upon appellant to show prejudicial error. London v. London, 271 N.C. 568, 157 S.E. 2d 90 (1967). The judgment entered by Smith, J., indicates the existence of a stipulation. That must be presumed to be correct by this Court. Clearly, the burden was on the plaintiff to show that no stipulation exists. He could have done this by a stipulation of counsel, an affidavit of the trial judge, or some other means. He did not do so, nor even attempt to do so. He sim*686ply denied its existence in his appellee’s brief to this Court — a brief to which no reply is required.
The majority addresses this problem only in a footnote in which it finds that, except for the statement in the judgment, the record is silent as to the existence of a stipulation. Based upon this silence in the record, the majority reverses the trial judge’s grant of judgment on the pleadings on the counterclaim. This is entirely contrary to the dictates of our existing case law. “Where the record is silent upon a particular point, the action of the trial judge is presumed correct.” London, 271 N.C. at 570, 157 S.E. 2d at 92.
As will become obvious from a reading of the material hereafter presented, a stipulation at the bench or in chambers would not have been unusual or unexpected in this case. The plaintiff had the burden of dispelling that possibility, and he made no attempt to do so. This Court should not set aside the judgment entered on the counterclaim upon a mere assumption made because the record is silent.
The majority apparently believes that the validity of the judgment on the counterclaim is dependent on the existence of such a stipulation. Assuming that the existence of a stipulation is necessary to uphold the judgment entered on defendant’s counterclaim (and I do not believe that it is), and if such a stipulation exists, then clearly the majority has erred in allowing the judgment to be vacated. If one does not exist, that would be easy enough to determine. A far better procedure would be to remand the case for findings as to the existence or nonexistence of a stipulation as recited by the trial judge. The judge who tried this case deserves better treatment and consideration than the majority affords him.
Secondly, the plaintiff’s own allegations in his complaint would, without any additional stipulation, support the granting of judgment on the pleadings on the counterclaim and belie the subsequent denial in his reply (and the majority’s assumption) that the amounts paid by the carrier to the mortgagees were not the “amounts due.”
Paragraph 6 of the complaint alleges as follows:
6. That the true and actual cash value of the dwelling destroyed by fire was $84,877.60. The actual cash value of the *687personal property destroyed by the fire was $62,825.45. The plaintiff also incurred additional living expenses covered by the said policy in the amount of $3,087.50.
Thus, the total damages alleged by the plaintiff are:
$ 84,877.60 62,825.45 3,087.50
Total $150,790.55
Although the majority has completely overlooked it, the fact is that the plaintiff himself, in his own complaint, alleged as follows:
8. That at the time of said loss by fire, there was a first deed of trust to Industrial Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lexington, North Carolina, and a second deed of trust to Household Finance of High Point, North Carolina. That the defendant has paid to Industrial Federal Savings and Loan Association the sum of $21,382.23, and to Household Finance the sum of $27,268.18.
These mortgages total, according to plaintiff, $48,650.41.
The mathematical calculations evident in plaintiffs own complaint would then be as follows:
$ 84,877.60 62,825.45 3,087.50
Total Demanded $150,790.55
Admitted to be due Mortgagees - 48,650.41
Net demand $102,140.14
As one would expect, the plaintiff demands in paragraph 9 of his complaint and in the ad damnum a recovery of $102,140.14 as follows:
9. There is a balance due the plaintiff by the defendant in the amount of $102,140.14. The defendant has failed and refused, after due demand by the plaintiff, to pay said amount owed to the plaintiff or any of it.
*688Wherefore, the plaintiff prays the Court that he have and recover from the defendant the sum of $102,140.14 . . . .
Not surprisingly, then, it is precisely the amount due and paid to the mortgagees, to the penny,1 when subtracted from the amounts plaintiff claims as covered losses, that equals the amount demanded in the complaint. The logic of these allegations in plaintiffs own complaint should not escape even a Supreme Court Justice. At the very least, it makes the existence of a stipulation more probable.
I vote to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals except as to the part which affirms the trial judge’s entry of judgment for defendant carrier for the amounts paid to the mortgagees.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The defendant’s counterclaim clarified that the amount the carrier paid to Industrial Federal Savings and Loan Association was $21,524.58, rather than $21,382.23, as alleged in the complaint. This corrected amount was admitted by the plaintiff in his reply. The majority merely cites the similar allegations in defendant’s answer and in plaintiffs reply thereto.