Court Opinion

ID: 9726483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:52:46.993551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.624919
License: Public Domain

POCHÉ, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur. I agree that by reason of his two prior felony convictions defendant was statutorily ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4))1 and I further agree that under *100those circumstances the trial court had no obligation to state a reason for its sentencing choice of state prison for the middle term. That result is correct because (1) where one is statutorily ineligible for probation, the trial court is not required to explain why it is choosing state prison over probation (see, e.g., People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520, 523 [202 Cal.Rptr. 234]), and (2) imposition of the middle term, rather than the upper or lower term, does not require a statement of reasons (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 439(c)). But I totally disassociate myself and dissent from the dicta in the majority opinion which declares that a statement of reasons is never required when the court terminates probation and imposes a state prison term following revocation of probation where imposition of sentence had initially been suspended. (See majority opn., ante, pp. 98-99.) That broad statement is an incorrect statement of the law.
A sentence choice is “the selection of any disposition of the case which does not amount to a dismissal, acquittal, or grant of a new trial. It includes the granting of probation and the suspension of imposition or execution of a sentence.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(f).) There is no question in my mind that the definition includes a decision to send a defendant to prison upon termination of probation where imposition of sentence was previously suspended. Nor does there seem to be any question in the minds of those who draft and promulgate the Sentencing Rules for the Superior Courts. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 401 et seq.)
Where probation has been revoked on a defendant whose imposition of sentence had been suspended, the trial court has numerous options (1) it can reinstate probation on the same terms, (2) it can reinstate probation on modified terms, or (3) it can terminate probation and send the probationer to state prison. (§ 1203.2, subds. (a)-(c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 435(a) and (b)(1).)
If the court decides to terminate probation, and send the defendant to state prison, it must then decide, of course, on the length of the sentence. Rule 435(b)(1) instructs that determination is to be made upon considering (1) any findings previously made by the court which had granted probation (see rule 433(b)), and (2) the factors set forth in rule 433(c), which are the factors considered at every sentencing. Rule 433(c) tells the sentencing judge to (1) “Hear evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and determine, pursuant to section 1170(b), whether to impose the upper, middle or lower term; and set forth on the record the facts and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term, ” (2) determine whether to impose or strike any enhancement, (3) determine if consecutive or concurrent sentences are appropriate, (4) determine if any statutory prohibitions apply, and (5) “Pronounce the *101court’s judgment and sentence, stating the terms thereof and giving reasons for those matters for which reasons are required by law.’’ (Italics added.)
In short, rule 433(c) requires that in imposing sentence following revocation of probation the sentencing court must follow the identical procedure it would use in imposing sentence for the very first time following a jury verdict. Put plainly, the judge must give reasons for each and every sentencing choice he or she makes, such as to impose an upper or lower term, or a consecutive sentence.
The majority’s rationale, is that to require a statement of reasons at this stage is to have “two ‘initial sentencings’ ” something it believes is contrary to the intent of the Legislature and the drafters of the Rules of Court. (Majority opn., ante, pp. 98-99.) To the contrary, two sentencings are contemplated, endorsed and required by the drafters of the Rules of Court.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 29, 1987. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.