Court Opinion

ID: 9926260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 15:05:43.199225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:15.150706
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-116

                               STANISLAV PALTIS

                                       vs.

                                REGINA PALTIS.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Stanislav Paltis (husband), the former spouse of Regina

 Paltis (wife), appeals from a divorce judgment challenging

 certain aspects of the judge's property division.              We affirm.

       Background.     The parties were married in April 2010, and

 had one child together during the marriage.             The husband was the

 primary wage earner and was responsible for managing the

 family's finances, while the wife was primarily responsible for

 raising the parties' child and caring for the home.

       During the first year of the marriage, the parties resided

 together in the husband's property located in Allston which he

 acquired and fully paid for in 1998 prior to their marriage.

 The wife, who has "extensive employment experience in interior

 remodeling and design," made improvements to the Allston

 property by designing an extra bedroom and storage space.
     In March 2011, the parties purchased the marital home

located in Sharon for $470,000.   The down payment on the marital

home was partially funded with the proceeds from the sale of the

husband's interest in his family's business.   The parties also

used approximately $30,000 to $40,000 in cash that they had

received as wedding gifts to fund the marital home down payment.

Some of the parties' household expenses were paid by the wife's

rental income from a property that she owned in New Jersey.

After the wife sold the New Jersey property in 2015, she used a

portion of the proceeds to fund construction projects for the

marital home.   The wife also used cash gifts from her mother to

fund house projects, including a $20,000 gift in October 2019 to

fund a window and siding project.

     In June 2020, the husband filed a complaint for divorce.     A

two-day trial was held in July 2021.   At the time of trial, the

husband was residing in the marital home and the wife was

residing in an apartment with the child (the wife received

primary physical custody).   The husband was earning an annual

income of $211,796; the wife was unemployed, but the judge

attributed an annual income to her of $70,000. 1   The husband was

ordered to pay $550 per week in child support; no alimony was

1 The judge found that the wife was capable of earning more with
reasonable effort, having had recently turned down a job offer
with an interior design firm for $70,000 per year.

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awarded.   With respect to the property division, the judge

assigned both the marital home and the Allston property to the

husband and ordered him to pay the wife (1) $287,406,

representing one-half of the marital home equity; and

(2) $111,000, representing one-half of the appreciation in value

of the Allston property during the marriage. 2   The husband

appealed that decision to this court.

     Discussion.   In an appeal challenging the division of

marital property, "[w]e review the judge's findings to determine

whether she considered all the relevant factors under G. L.

c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant factors."

Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245 (2014).    "We will not

reverse a judgment with respect to property division unless it

is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'"   Id., quoting Baccanti v.

Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001).

     The husband contends that the judge erred in failing to

grant him a credit for his contribution to the marital home down

payment and in awarding the wife one-half of the appreciated

value of the Allston property, because both originated from his

2 The Allston property was worth $320,000 when the parties were
married; the value had increased to $542,000 by the time of the
divorce trial. At the time of trial, the marital home had a
fair market value of $815,000 and a mortgage balance of
$240,188, leaving equity of $574,812.

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premarital assets that should have been excluded from the

property division.   We disagree.

     It is well settled that a judge has broad discretion to

assign property in a divorce, including premarital property.

See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977) (judge may assign

property owned by either spouse "whenever and however

acquired").   The judge was not required to give the husband a

dollar-for-dollar credit for his contribution of premarital

assets to the home's down payment, especially where the wife did

not receive a credit for her own contribution of premarital

assets (i.e., the proceeds from the sale of her New Jersey

property used to fund construction projects for the marital

home) and funds gifted by her mother.    See Baccanti, 434 Mass.

at 789-792 (affirming equal division of marital estate where

judge's findings reflected consideration of husband's

contributions from premarital assets).

     With respect to the Allston property, the judge excluded

its premarital value from the marital estate entirely, only

assigning the wife one-half of the property's appreciated value

during the marriage.   The husband claims that it was error to

award the wife any portion of the appreciated value because she

made "minimal contributions" to the Allston property during the

marriage.   The judge found, however, that the wife contributed

to the Allston property both through her overall contributions

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to the marital partnership and through her interior design work

on the house.   The judge therefore was well within her

discretion to assign the wife a portion of the appreciated value

of the Allston property.    See Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App.

Ct. 151, 156-157 (1996) (judges permitted to include in marital

estate for purposes of equitable division both premarital assets

and assets accruing during marriage).

     The husband also argues that the property division was

inequitable because the judge failed to appropriately consider

his greater financial contributions to the marital estate.    The

judge found that the parties made relatively equal contributions

during the marriage. 3   See Moriarty, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 157

("The parties' respective contributions to the marital

partnership remain the touchstone of an equitable division of

the marital estate").    A judge may "consider the contribution of

each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or

appreciation in value of their respective estates and the

contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family

unit."   G. L. c. 208, § 34.   "Section 34 'must be read to apply

in a broad sense to the value of all contributions of the

3 The judge found that both parties "applied their income and
earnings to the marital assets" and made "valuable and
relatively equal contributions to the marital estate through
earnings, child-care responsibilities, homemaking, and car[ing]
for their real estate."

                                  5
respective spouses towards the marital enterprise.'"   Adams v.

Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 391 (2011), quoting Putnam v. Putnam, 5

Mass. App. Ct. 10, 17 (1977).   "[T]he care and maintenance of a

child by a spouse . . . is a contribution to the marital

partnership" entitling that spouse to share in assets acquired

by the other spouse.   Wheeler v. Wheeler, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 743,

745 (1996).

     The husband's tabulation of each party's contribution to

the marital enterprise fails to acknowledge the wife's financial

contributions to the marital home and household expenses, her

contributions in improving both the Allston property and the

marital home through her interior design work, and her

nonfinancial contributions to the overall marital partnership as

homemaker and primary caretaker of the parties' child.

     The judge's findings also reflect consideration of other

relevant factors under section 34, including the husband's

conduct in unilaterally withdrawing marital funds during the

pendency of the divorce proceedings, 4 the husband's potential

future inheritance (the wife's likelihood of inheritance was

unclear), and the husband's superior earning capacity compared

4 The judge found that during the divorce proceedings the husband
withdrew $44,000 from marital accounts, which he then gifted to
his parents. The judge found that the husband also made several
other large withdrawals; she did not credit the husband's claim
that he could not recall what the withdrawn funds were used for.

                                 6
to that of the wife.    See G. L. c. 208, § 34 (requiring judge to

consider each party's conduct during marriage, amount and

sources of income, and opportunity for future acquisition of

capital assets and income); Kittredge v. Kittredge, 441 Mass.

28, 38 (2004) (judge may consider spouse's dissipation of

marital assets as part of conduct and contribution factors under

section 34).

       The husband disputes the weight afforded by the judge to

each of the section 34 factors, but this is a matter squarely

within the judge's discretion.    See Ross v. Ross, 385 Mass. 30,

37 (1982).    The judge here considered all the relevant factors

under section 34 and there is no indication that she considered

any irrelevant factors.    Because the property division here is

not "plainly wrong and excessive," we will not disturb it.

Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, quoting Baccanti, 434 Mass. at 793. 5

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                        Milkey & D'Angelo, JJ. 6),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    January 24, 2024.

5   The wife's request for appellate costs and fees is denied.
6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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