Court Opinion

ID: 9408859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 21:01:09.746038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.345368
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-13260    Document: 74-1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023   Page: 1 of 19

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-13260
                           ____________________

        SEAN GARRISON,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cv-61477-JIC
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 20-13260      Document: 74-1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023     Page: 2 of 19

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13260

        Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,∗ District
        Judge.
        BRANCH, CIRCUIT JUDGE:
               This case asks us to consider the question of whether, under
        Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), an error occurred where
        the jury returned a general verdict, failing to indicate whether its
        conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was based upon two valid
        predicate offenses, or on one invalid predicate offense. The district
        court determined on collateral review that the petitioner was not
        entitled to relief because the predicate offenses were “inextricably
        intertwined.” We conclude that a Stromberg error did, indeed,
        occur but that error was harmless.
                Sean Garrison, together with three others, conspired to rob
        a cocaine stash house. They did not know that the conspiracy was
        part of a reverse sting operation administrated by the Bureau of
        Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Before
        Garrison and his co-conspirators could carry out the robbery, ATF
        apprehended them, confiscating a firearm from Garrison in the
        process. A jury convicted Garrison of conspiring to use and using
        a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug
        trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), among other
        crimes.

        ∗
         Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260      Document: 74-1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023      Page: 3 of 19

        20-13260                Opinion of the Court                         3

                Section 924(c) makes it a crime for someone to carry a
        firearm in furtherance of “a crime of violence or drug trafficking
        crime,” thus requiring that the defendant be convicted of an
        underlying predicate offense of a crime of violence or drug
        trafficking to be convicted of violating § 924(c). Here, Garrison was
        convicted of three predicate offenses—two drug trafficking charges
        and one charge of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery—
        supporting his conviction under § 924(c). However, after
        Garrison’s conviction, intervening decisions from the Supreme
        Court in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and this Court
        in Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2019), rendered
        the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery invalid as a predicate
        offense for a § 924(c) conviction.
               After receiving authorization from this Court to file a second
        or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate sentence, Garrison
        argued that the invalid predicate offense of conspiracy to commit
        Hobbs Act robbery entitled him to vacatur of his § 924(c)
        conviction. Garrison argued that the jury’s general verdict made it
        impossible to discern whether the jury based the conviction on the
        invalid predicate offense of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
        robbery or on one or both of the two valid drug trafficking
        predicate offenses.
              The district court denied his motion, holding that the jury
        convicted Garrison of participation in “one conspiracy to do two
        things”: (1) commit armed robbery in order to (2) obtain a large
        quantity of cocaine. Because Garrison’s convictions for the single
USCA11 Case: 20-13260      Document: 74-1     Date Filed: 07/13/2023     Page: 4 of 19

        4                      Opinion of the Court                20-13260

        conspiracy were “inextricably intertwined,” the district court
        concluded that the “only possibility” was that the jury convicted
        Garrison under § 924(c) based on both the invalid predicate offense
        and the valid drug trafficking predicate offenses such that his
        § 924(c) conviction could stand.
               On appeal, we must determine whether the district court
        erred in denying Garrison’s § 2255 motion. After careful review
        and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the
        predicate offenses in this case were so inextricably intertwined that
        there is no doubt that the jury convicted Garrison of a § 924(c)
        violation based upon both of the valid drug trafficking predicate
        offenses and, as such, any error was harmless. Accordingly,
        because his § 924(c) conviction was based on a valid predicate act,
        we affirm.
                                  I.    Background
               In March 2007, a conﬁdential informant provided ATF with
        information regarding individuals who were seeking a target to rob
        of cash or narcotics. Over the next few months, these individuals,
        including Garrison, met with the conﬁdential informant and an
        undercover ATF agent to plan an armed robbery of a cocaine stash
        house. On the day of the planned robbery, Garrison and his co-
        defendants met the undercover agent at a gas station and then
        followed him to a nearby business. The agent invited Garrison and
        the co-defendants inside the business to receive the address of the
        stash house and to ﬁnalize their plans for the robbery. Garrison and
        his co-defendants wore black clothing (which Garrison provided),
USCA11 Case: 20-13260         Document: 74-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023        Page: 5 of 19

        20-13260                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        including skull caps to mask their appearance and gloves to prevent
        leaving behind ﬁngerprints. Garrison would serve as the lookout
        and getaway driver.
               After discussing the plan for the robbery, the undercover
        ATF agent initiated the takedown signal and the ATF Special
        Response Team arrived to arrest the defendants. Garrison removed
        a gun from his waistband and tossed it under a table, at which point
        he was arrested without further incident. Once he was picked up
        for the robbery, Garrison informed agents that he carried the gun,
        which he found in a co-defendant’s car, to demonstrate that he was
        “for real.”
               A superseding indictment charged Garrison with seven
        counts: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation
        of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 1 (Count One); (2) conspiracy to possess with
        intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count
        Two); (3) attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in

        1 Section 1951(a) provides:
               Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
               commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
               commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires
               so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
               person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
               anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this
               title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
        18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of two elements: (1) a
        robbery; and (2) an effect on interstate commerce. United States v. Taylor, 480
        F.3d 1025, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 2007).
USCA11 Case: 20-13260         Document: 74-1         Date Filed: 07/13/2023         Page: 6 of 19

        6                           Opinion of the Court                      20-13260

        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Three); (4) conspiracy to use a
        ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug
        traﬃcking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count Four);
        (5) use of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime of violence
        or drug traﬃcking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
        924(c)(1)(A)–(B) 2 (Count Five); (6) possession of an unregistered

        2 Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:
                Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
                otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other
                provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any
                crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the
                person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses
                or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,
                possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
                provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
                        (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
                        than 5 years.
        18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
               A “drug trafficking crime” is defined as “any felony punishable under
        the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).” Id. § 924(c)(2). A
        “crime of violence” is defined as an “offense that is a felony” and
                (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
                of physical force against the person or property of another, or
                (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
                force against the person or property of another may be used in
                the course of committing the offense.
        Id. § 924(c)(3). Subsection (A) of § 924(c)(3) is known as the “elements clause”
        and subsection (B) is known as the “residual clause.”
USCA11 Case: 20-13260        Document: 74-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023        Page: 7 of 19

        20-13260                  Opinion of the Court                              7

        Israel Weapon Industries (Uzi) riﬂe, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
        §§ 5861(d), 5871 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Six); and (7) possession
        of a ﬁrearm by an illegal alien,3 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
        922(g)(5) (Count Eight). 4 The superseding indictment listed
        Counts One, Two, and Three as predicate oﬀenses for Count Five,
        the § 924(c) charge.
               At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury that
        it could ﬁnd Garrison guilty of Count Five if the government
        proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Garrison “committed the
        crime of violence charged in Count [One] or that [Garrison]
        committed the drug traﬃcking oﬀense charged in either Counts
        [Two] or [Three].” In addition, the jury had to ﬁnd that Garrison
        carried or possessed a ﬁrearm during the commission of the crime
        in order to convict on Count Five.
               The district court further instructed:
               The indictment charges that each Defendant
               knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to
               a crime of violence and a drug trafficking offense and
               possessed a firearm in furtherance of a crime of

                At the time of Garrison’s convictions, § 924(c) required that the term
        of imprisonment imposed for the § 924(c) offense run consecutively to any
        other term of imprisonment. Id. § 924(c)(1)(D).
        3 Garrison is a native of Jamaica who resides in England. Garrison did not
        legally reside in the United States and was subject to deportation at the time
        of his arrest.
        4 Garrison was not charged in Count Seven of the superseding indictment.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260       Document: 74-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023      Page: 8 of 19

        8                        Opinion of the Court                    20-13260

               violence and a drug trafficking offense. It is charged,
               in other words, that the defendant violated the law as
               charged in Count [Five] in different ways. It is not
               necessary, however, for the [g]overnment to prove
               that the defendant violated the law in all of those
               ways. It is sufficient if the [g]overnment proves,
               beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant
               knowingly violated the law in some way; but, in that
               event, you must unanimously agree upon the way in
               which the Defendant committed the violation.
               The jury returned a general verdict convicting Garrison of
        all counts, except Count Six.5 The verdict did not identify the
        predicate oﬀense upon which the jury relied for the § 924(c) charge
        in Count Five.
               The district court sentenced Garrison to four concurrent
        terms of 228-months’ imprisonment for Counts One through Four,
        a concurrent term of 120-months’ imprisonment for Count Eight,
        and a term of 60-months’ imprisonment for Count Five to run
        consecutively to his other terms. Garrison’s sentence of
        imprisonment totaled 288 months. Garrison appealed his
        sentence, but we aﬃrmed, and the Supreme Court denied
        Garrison’s petition for a writ of certiorari. United States v. Chung,
        329 F. App’x 862, 869 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Garrison v.
        United States, 558 U.S. 928 (2009). Garrison then ﬁled an initial

        5 Garrison was acquitted of Count Six (possession of an unregistered Israel
        Weapon Industries (Uzi) rifle), which was not a predicate offense for
        Garrison’s § 924(c) conviction.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260       Document: 74-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023      Page: 9 of 19

        20-13260                 Opinion of the Court                            9

        § 2255 motion, followed by an amended motion, which the district
        court denied. 6
               In 2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A),
        Garrison ﬁled a pro se request for permission to ﬁle a second or
        successive motion to vacate his sentence based upon the Supreme
        Court’s then-recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591
        (2015). 7 We granted his motion, permitting him to proceed with a
        Johnson-based challenge to his § 924(c) conviction. Garrison, now
        with counsel, ﬁled an amended § 2255 motion in the district court,
        arguing that his conviction under § 924(c) was void because
        conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery did not constitute a
        predicate crime of violence for the purposes of § 924(c). The
        magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the
        motion, but the district court held the motion in abeyance while
        the Supreme Court decided Davis. The Supreme Court ultimately
        held in Davis that the residual clause of § 924(c) was likewise
        unconstitutionally vague. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336. 8 We

        6 Thereafter, Garrison filed an unauthorized second or successive § 2255
        motion, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
        7 The Supreme Court in Johnson held that the residual clause of the Armed
        Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), was unconstitutionally
        vague. 576 U.S. at 597. Garrison argued that Johnson was equally applicable
        to § 924(c) based upon virtually identical statutory language found in the
        ACCA’s residual clause and § 924(c)’s residual clause.
        8 After lifting the stay on Garrisons’ motion, the district court ordered
        supplemental briefing on the applicability of Davis.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260     Document: 74-1     Date Filed: 07/13/2023    Page: 10 of 19

        10                    Opinion of the Court                20-13260

        subsequently held that Davis is retroactively applicable to cases on
        collateral review, like Garrison’s. In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032,
        1038–39 (11th Cir. 2019). We also held, post-Davis, that conspiracy
        to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of
        violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3) and, thus, is not
        a valid predicate for a § 924(c) charge. Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075–76.
               Following the issuance of Davis, the district court denied
        Garrison’s § 2255 motion and denied a certiﬁcate of appealability
        (“COA”). The district court found that Garrison did not carry his
        burden under Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 28–30, of proving that it was
        unclear whether the jury based its § 924(c) conviction on the
        unconstitutional conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery
        predicate contained in Count One. In the district court’s view, the
        jury convicted Garrison of participating in a single conspiracy with
        two goals: “(1) commit an armed robbery in order to (2) obtain a
        large quantity of cocaine.” As a result, Garrison’s convictions for
        the conspiracy to commit drug traﬃcking were “inextricably
        intertwined” with his conviction for conspiracy to commit Hobbs
        Act robbery such that the only possible conclusion was that “the
        jury based its 924(c) conviction on both the conspiracy to commit
        Hobbs Act robbery and one of the drug traﬃcking predicates.”
        Accordingly, the court held that Garrison was not entitled to
        vacatur of his § 924(c) conviction.
              Garrison timely appealed and ﬁled a motion for a COA in
        this Court. We granted the motion, certifying a single issue on
        appeal: “Whether the district court erred by denying [Garrison’s]
USCA11 Case: 20-13260         Document: 74-1          Date Filed: 07/13/2023          Page: 11 of 19

        20-13260                    Opinion of the Court                                 11

        United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), claim, in light of
        Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)?”
                                        II.      Discussion
               When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion under
        28 U.S.C. § 2255, this Court reviews legal conclusions de novo and
        factual ﬁndings for clear error. Brown, 942 F.3d at 1072. 9
               Garrison argues that the Stromberg error that purportedly
        occurred in this case was not harmless because the court instructed
        the jury that it could rely on any of the three predicate oﬀenses
        (including the invalid predicate oﬀense of conspiracy to commit
        Hobbs Act robbery) and the jury returned a general verdict form,
        such that it is impossible to determine which predicate was the
        basis for his § 924(c) conviction. He also argues that the district
        court erred by looking beyond the jury instructions and the verdict
        in reaching the conclusion that the predicate oﬀenses underlying
        his § 924(c) convictions were “inextricably intertwined” because in

        9 The government has raised the issue of procedural default, arguing that
        because Garrison did not raise his vagueness challenge to § 924(c) to the trial
        court or on direct appeal, he has procedurally defaulted his vagueness
        challenge on collateral review. The government contends that, while the
        Supreme Court had not yet invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) at the
        time of Garrison’s direct appeal, the “tools” needed to raise a vagueness
        challenged existed such that he should have raised the claim on direct appeal.
        We offer no opinion on whether Garrison has procedurally defaulted his claim
        because we conclude that it fails on the merits. See Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d
        1285, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 124 (2021) (“[A] federal court
        may skip over the procedural default analysis if a claim would fail on the merits
        in any event.”).
USCA11 Case: 20-13260        Document: 74-1         Date Filed: 07/13/2023         Page: 12 of 19

        12                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13260

        determining whether a Stromberg error was harmless, a court is
        limited to consideration of the jury instructions and verdict. We
        address each of Garrison’s arguments in turn.
                As an initial matter, the combined eﬀect of Davis, Hammoud,
        and Brown on this case is that Count One of Garrison’s indictment
        (i.e., conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery) is an invalid
        predicate oﬀense for his § 924(c) charge (Count Five). Both parties,
        correctly, agree as much. For Garrison’s § 924(c) conviction to
        stand, therefore, it must have been based on one or both of the
        valid drug traﬃcking oﬀenses in Counts Two and Three. The jury,
        however, returned a general verdict in which it did not specify the
        predicate basis for its conviction on Count Five.
               Why does this matter? Because of the Supreme Court’s
        decision in Stromberg.10 There, the Court held that a general
        verdict, such as the one here, cannot stand if one of the bases on

        10 Stromberg was a First Amendment case in which the Supreme Court
        recognized protections for symbolic expression. The state statute at issue
        prohibited display of a red flag as (1) “a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition
        to organized government”; (2) “an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic
        action”; or (3) “an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.”
        Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 363. The trial court instructed the jury that it need only
        find that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
        defendant displayed a red flag for any one of the purposes proscribed by the
        statute, rather than “conjunctively” as the charge in the information set forth.
        Id. at 363–64. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute as unconstitutionally
        vague because it could allow for punishment for the fair use of “the
        opportunity for free political discussion.” Id. at 369.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260     Document: 74-1     Date Filed: 07/13/2023     Page: 13 of 19

        20-13260              Opinion of the Court                       13

        which the jury might have found the defendant guilty is
        unconstitutional. 283 U.S. at 365–68. The Court stated:
              As there were three purposes set forth in the statute,
              and the jury was instructed that their verdict might be
              given with respect to any one of them, independently
              considered, it is impossible to say under which clause
              of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one
              of these clauses, which the state court has held to be
              separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon
              this record that the appellant was not convicted under
              that clause.
        Id. at 368. The Supreme Court has explained that its holding in
        Stromberg stands for the “the principle that, where a provision of
        the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the
        constitutional guarantee [of due process] is violated by a general
        verdict that may have rested on that ground.” Griﬃn v. United
        States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 (1991).
               Garrison argues a Stromberg error was committed in this case
        because the jury issued a general verdict based upon an indictment
        and jury instructions that contained both a valid and now-invalid
        predicate oﬀense, entitling him to vacatur of his § 924(c)
        conviction. Garrison is correct that a Stromberg error occurred in
        this case. By virtue of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis and
        our decisions in Hammoud and Brown, conspiracy to commit Hobbs
        Act robbery is a constitutionally invalid predicate oﬀense upon
        which Garrison’s § 924(c) conviction cannot be based. Thus,
USCA11 Case: 20-13260      Document: 74-1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023     Page: 14 of 19

        14                     Opinion of the Court                  20-13260

        because the general verdict convicting Garrison under § 924(c) may
        have rested on the unconstitutional conspiracy to commit Hobbs
        Act robbery predicate oﬀense, a Stromberg error occurred.
               However, following Stromberg, the Supreme Court clariﬁed
        that a Stromberg error is not structural and does not require
        automatic reversal. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60 (2008) (per
        curiam). Rather, in § 2255 cases, Stromberg errors are reviewed for
        harmlessness under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Id. at
        58–62. “Under th[e Brecht] test, relief is proper only if the federal
        court has grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had
        substantial and injurious eﬀect or inﬂuence in determining the
        jury’s verdict.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 268 (2015) (quotations
        omitted). In other words, “[t]here must be more than a ‘reasonable
        possibility’ that the error was harmful.” Id. at 268 (quoting Brecht,
        507 U.S. at 637). Importantly, we have held that “the harmlessness
        inquiry is more searching on collateral review than on direct
        review.” Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272, 1295 (11th Cir. 2021).
        Therefore, on collateral review, when determining whether an
        alleged Stromberg error is harmless, “it is proper to look at the
        record to determine whether the invalid predicate actually
        prejudiced the petitioner—that is, actually led to his conviction—
        or whether the jury instead (or also) found the defendant guilty
        under a valid theory.” Id. at 1294. In other words, in assessing
USCA11 Case: 20-13260         Document: 74-1          Date Filed: 07/13/2023           Page: 15 of 19

        20-13260                    Opinion of the Court                                 15

        whether the error is harmless, we may consult the entire record.11
        We review the question of harmlessness de novo. Foster v. United
        States, 996 F.3d 1100, 1107 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 500
        (2021). Garrison is incorrect that he is entitled to a remedy because
        the Stromberg error in this case was harmless.
               Our recent decision in Parker v. United States, is instructive.12
        993 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2021). We addressed a Davis challenge on
        virtually identical facts. The defendant had been convicted of,
        among other oﬀenses, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery,
        conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and attempt
        to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, as well as conspiracy to
        use or carry a ﬁrearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
        and a drug-traﬃcking oﬀense in violation of § 924(o), and using
        and carrying a ﬁrearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
        and a drug-traﬃcking oﬀense in violation of § 924(c). Id. at 1260–
        62. The drug traﬃcking and ﬁrearm charges served as predicate

        11 We have repeatedly rejected Garrison’s argument that our decisions in
        Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1985), and Parker v. Secretary for
        Department of Corrections, 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003), bar us from looking
        beyond the jury instructions and the verdict to determine whether his § 924(c)
        conviction rested on an alternative. See, e.g., Foster v. United States, 996 F.3d
        1100, 1109 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 500 (2021); Parker v. United States,
        993 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021); Granda, 990 F.3d at 1294–95.
        12 While Parker did not explicitly rely upon Stromberg in collaterally attacking
        his conviction and sentence, our decision in Parker is instructive in light of the
        factual, procedural, and legal similarities to Garrison’s case. More
        importantly, Parker’s challenge, while not explicitly based upon Stromberg,
        was, in essence, the same challenge that Garrison makes here.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260      Document: 74-1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023     Page: 16 of 19

        16                     Opinion of the Court                  20-13260

        oﬀenses for both the §§ 924(o) and 924(c) charges. With regard to
        those counts, the district court instructed the jury that it was not
        necessary for the “[g]overnment to prove that [Parker had] violated
        the law” by committing a crime of violence and drug traﬃcking,
        but rather “[i]t [was] suﬃcient if the [g]overnment prove[d] . . . that
        [Parker] knowingly violated the law in some way.” Id. at 1261. The
        jury returned a general verdict convicting Parker on all counts. Id.
                 Much like Garrison, Parker argued that because “the
        indictment, general verdict, and jury instructions left open the
        possibility that the jury had relied on an invalid predicate oﬀense[—
        conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery—]to convict him of the
        § 924(o) and (c) oﬀenses, . . . [those] convictions [had to] be set
        aside.” Id. at 1262. We rejected Parker’s claim, holding that
        “[t]here [was] no real possibility that Parker’s [§§ 924(o) and 924(c)]
        convictions rested solely on the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy
        predicate.” Id. at 1265. We held that the record made clear that the
        jury could not have found that Parker carried a ﬁrearm in
        furtherance of his conspiracy to rob the stash house without also
        ﬁnding that he did so in furtherance of his conspiracy and attempt
        to obtain cocaine. Id. As a result, “the inclusion of [the] invalid
        predicate oﬀense in the indictment and jury instructions was
        harmless.” Id.; see also Foster, 996 F.3d at 1109 (holding on virtually
        identical facts that because “the record [made] it crystal clear that
        if the jury relied on the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate, it
        also relied on the valid drug traﬃcking predicates[, meaning that
        t]he inclusion of Hobbs Act conspiracy as a possible predicate was
        . . . harmless”).
USCA11 Case: 20-13260        Document: 74-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023        Page: 17 of 19

        20-13260                  Opinion of the Court                             17

               Similarly, Garrison cannot prevail on the merits of his claim.
        As in Parker, the record demonstrates that Garrison and his co-
        defendants participated in a single conspiracy with two goals: rob
        the stash house in order to obtain a large amount of cocaine. The
        evidence presented at trial showed that Garrison was an active
        participant in this dual-purpose conspiracy: he agreed to be the
        lookout and getaway driver, he procured and provided to his co-
        defendants the dark clothing meant to conceal their identities, and
        he carried a gun. Furthermore, the cocaine that was the object of
        the robbery was the same cocaine that the jury convicted Garrison
        of conspiring and attempting to possess with intent to distribute.
        It is therefore inescapable that the predicate drug traﬃcking
        oﬀenses are “inextricably intertwined” with the invalid Hobbs Act
        conspiracy predicate oﬀense such that it is impossible to discern
        that the jury based its conviction under § 924(c) solely on the invalid
        Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate oﬀense. See Parker, 993 F.3d at
        1265. 13 In other words, given the tightly bound factual premise of
        the predicate oﬀenses, the jurors could not have found that

        13 Garrison attempts to distinguish this case from Parker on two grounds: (1)
        Parker was convicted of all charged counts, while Garrison was acquitted of
        possessing a short-barreled Uzi (Count Six); and (2) Parker was the leader of
        the criminal scheme, while Garrison was merely a quiet participant. Neither
        of these arguments are persuasive. For one, the count of which Garrison was
        acquitted was not a predicate offense for his § 924(c) conviction and it is
        therefore irrelevant. Second, the relative extent of involvement (or lack
        thereof) in the respective conspiracies is immaterial to our holding here. The
        fact remains that the jury convicted Garrison of all predicate offenses and of
        the § 924(c) offense.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260        Document: 74-1         Date Filed: 07/13/2023         Page: 18 of 19

        18                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13260

        Garrison carried a ﬁrearm in furtherance of the armed robbery
        conspiracy without also ﬁnding that he did so in furtherance of the
        conspiracy and attempt to obtain cocaine. For this reason, we hold
        that the Stromberg error that occurred in this case was harmless.14
        Id. Moreover, the jury instructions in this case are virtually identical
        to the instructions in Parker, where we held that any error in the
        instructions was harmless because of the tightly bound factual
        relationship between the predicate oﬀenses. See 993 F.3d at 1265.
        For the same reason, we conclude that any error committed by the
        district court in instructing the jury was harmless.
                                       III.    Conclusion
               Although Garrison’s § 924(c) conviction had three possible
        predicate oﬀenses—one of which is now invalid in light of Davis—
        he is not entitled to relief. The predicate oﬀenses are so inextricably

        14 Garrison also relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Zant v. Stephens,
        462 U.S. 862 (1983), for the proposition that a general verdict must be set aside
        when it is supported by an unconstitutional basis—even if one basis for the
        verdict is constitutional. Garrison’s reliance on Zant is misplaced for several
        reasons. First, Zant involved the question of whether a Georgia prisoner’s
        sentence of death “must be vacated because one of the three statutory
        aggravating circumstances found by the jury was subsequently held to be
        invalid by the Supreme Court of Georgia”—an issue that is decidedly different
        from the question in Garrison’s case. 462 U.S. at 864. Second, the Zant Court
        questioned whether Stromberg even applied in the sentencing context, but then
        reasoned that even if it did, under the circumstances of that case, the error was
        essentially harmless. Id. at 884–91. And, finally, post-Zant, the Supreme Court
        expressly reaffirmed that Stromberg errors do not require automatic reversal
        and are subject to harmless error analysis. Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 58.
USCA11 Case: 20-13260    Document: 74-1     Date Filed: 07/13/2023   Page: 19 of 19

        20-13260              Opinion of the Court                     19

        intertwined, the jury could not have based the § 924(c) conviction
        on the invalid predicate without having also based it on the valid
        drug traﬃcking predicate oﬀenses.         In other words, the
        Stromberg error that occurred below was harmless and thus
        Garrison is not entitled to relief.
              AFFIRMED.