Court Opinion

ID: 9373061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:25.766005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.274494
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JOMICHELE AGEE-LONG,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         SF-0752-17-0518-I-1

                  v.

     GENERAL SERVICES                                DATE: January 20, 2023
       ADMINISTRATION,
                  Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Andrew Kim, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

           Deborah Finch, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her alleged involuntary retirement appeal for lack of jurisdiction . For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review ,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                             2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2           The appellant was a Contract Specialist for the agency. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 10 at 46.       She alleges that, in early 2015, she reported that her
     second-level supervisor was intoxicated on the job and would be absent from
     work for “hours at a time” or an entire day. IAF, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 6 at 8. On
     November 9, 2015, the appellant’s first-level supervisor issued her a Letter of
     Warning for inappropriate behavior during a routine status meeting. IAF, Tab 10
     at 44-45.     According to the appellant, the same supervisor placed her on a
     3-month sick leave abuse plan during this timeframe, requiring that she provide a
     doctor’s note for each day that she requested sick leave. IAF, Tab 3 at 6 , 9, Tab 7
     at 16. In May 2016, the appellant’s first- and second-level supervisors issued her
     an interim performance rating of “unacceptable” and revoked her telework
     privileges.    IAF, Tab 8 at 50; Tab 10 at 43.         The agency also denied her a
     within-grade increase (WIGI) at or around the same time. IAF, Tab 8 at 50.
¶3           The appellant also alleges that she made reports to Federal Protective
     Services (FPS) in the summer of 2016. IAF, Tab 6 at 8, Tab 7 at 14, 29, Tab 8
     at 5. She alleges that she disclosed to FPS that supervisors and managers were
     engaging in a “chronic drinking environment . . . during duty hours.” IAF, Tab 8
     at 5.   She also claims that she disclosed to FPS that her second-level supervisor
     had an outburst at work, during which, “[f]or about 5 minutes, over and over
     again, he jumped and screamed, ‘I hate this fucking place’” and “‘I hate this
     fucking job.’” 2 IAF, Tab 6 at 8.

     2
       The appellant alleges that she spoke with the agency’s Office of Inspector General
     regarding her claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. IAF, Tab 5
     at 10, Tab 8 at 48. However, it is unclear if this conversation took place before or after
     her retirement. IAF, Tab 8 at 48. The appellant generally alleges that her second -level
     supervisor “yell[ed]” at her, but provides no example of this alleged yelling, other than
     the incident discussed above. IAF, Tab 6 at 14.
                                                                                        3

¶4         In June 2016, the appellant’s first-level supervisor issued her a written
     reprimand for two instances of failure to follow instructions.        IAF, Tab 10
     at 36-37. A month later, he issued the appellant a Notice of Proposed Suspension
     for failure to follow instructions, inappropriate behavior, failure to provide him
     with a contract inventory status, failure to send 60-day notices of the
     Government’s intent to exercise contract options, and failure to issue contract
     modifications.    Id. at 29-35.   The appellant’s division director, who was the
     deciding official, sustained the charges and suspended the appellant from
     September 6 to 20, 2016. Id. at 20-28.
¶5         On September 22, 2016, the appellant’s first-level supervisor again issued
     the appellant a written reprimand for disruptive behavior. Id. at 14-15. He also
     placed her on a 90-day performance improvement plan (PIP). Id. at 4-10. The
     appellant alleges that during the PIP the agency added new assignments on top of
     her existing assignments and denied her training that she needed to complete her
     assignments. IAF, Tab 5 at 19. Six days after the agency placed her on a PIP, the
     appellant began seeking retirement counseling from the agency.        IAF, Tab 11
     at 8-10.
¶6         On October 26, 2016, the appellant requested reasonable accommodations
     of a flexible work schedule and a quiet location where she could “focus on [her]
     duties.” 3   IAF, Tab 9 at 63-65.   On October 31, 2016, an agency reasonable
     accommodation      coordinator    asked   the   appellant   to   provide    medical
     documentation to substantiate her need for a quiet work location.          Id.   She
     observed that the medical documentation the appellant provided did not reflect
     “any required changes in [her] workplace.” Id. at 64. She also indicated that a
     flexible work schedule would prevent the appellant from performing her essential
     job duties. Id. at 65. It appears that the appellant did not provide the requested

     3
      The appellant alleges that she first requested accommodation while she was serving
     her September 2016 suspension and that the agency denied that request due to lack of
     medical documentation. IAF, Tab 6 at 13.
                                                                                     4

     documentation. IAF, Tab 6 at 13. She asserts that she believed documentation
     that she previously provided to the agency was sufficient because her disability
     was “well-documented and noted as permanent.” Id. According to the appellant,
     the agency’s treatment of her caused her medical condition to worsen, and she
     began a period of leave on November 3, 2016. Id. at 14. She also alleges that she
     learned on November 14, 2016, that her annual performance rating was going to
     be unacceptable. Id. at 13. She retired effective November 30, 2016. IAF, Tab 9
     at 53-54.   Two days before her retirement, she told an agency employee
     processing her retirement paperwork that, “I am happy with the decision and very
     much looking forward to the next season in my life’s journey.” Id. at 54.
¶7        The appellant filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint in
     which she alleged that she involuntarily retired as a result of agency
     discrimination. IAF, Tab 9 at 15. The agency issued a Final Agency Decision
     (FAD) denying the appellant’s EEO complaint on May 22, 2017. Id. at 16-39.
     Although the appellant also raised a whistleblower reprisal claim in her EEO
     complaint, the FAD did not include notice of her right to file a claim with the
     Office of Special Counsel (OSC).       Id. at 37-38.    The appellant filed this
     involuntary retirement appeal on June 21, 2017. IAF, Tab 1. She re-raised her
     discrimination and whistleblower reprisal claims. Id. at 12. The administrative
     judge gave the appellant notice of the elements and burdens of establishing
     jurisdiction over her involuntary retirement appeal, but did not address her
     potential whistleblower reprisal claim. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-3.
¶8        Both parties responded to the jurisdictional notice. IAF, Tabs 5 -8, 11. The
     administrative judge determined that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous
     allegation that the agency’s actions had affected her decision-making process in a
     way that deprived her of freedom of choice and coerced her retire ment. IAF,
     Tab 13, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-7. Thus, he dismissed the appeal for lack of
     Board jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing. ID at 1;
     IAF, Tab 1 at 2.
                                                                                         5

¶9         On review, the appellant reiterates that her decision to retire was the result
      of the intolerable working conditions caused by the agency’s discriminatory and
      retaliatory acts. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 19-20. The agency
      has filed a response in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File,
      Tab 3.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The appeal must be remanded for the appellant to make a knowing and informed
      election of remedies.
¶10        Under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g), an appellant who has been subjected to an action
      appealable to the Board, and who alleges that she has been affected by a
      prohibited personnel practice other than a claim of discrimination under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(1), may elect one, and only one, of the following remedies:        (1) an
      appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7701; (2) a grievance filed under the
      provisions of a negotiated grievance procedure; or (3) a n OSC complaint,
      potentially followed by an individual right of action (IRA) appeal. Corthell v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 15 (2016); Savage v.
      Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 17 (2015), overruled in part
      by Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25. An
      election under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) is binding only if it was knowing and informed.
      Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 17. An agency’s failure to inform an employee
      fully of her potential appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) and any limitation on
      those rights precludes a finding that the appellant made a knowing and an
      informed election of remedies under that provision. Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417,
      ¶ 17. Here, the agency did not issue a letter of decision regarding the appellant’s
      retirement, and its disciplinary actions did not include such notice. IAF, Tab 10
      at 15, 28, 37, 45. Further, there is no indication that she was informed through
      other means, such as the agency’s FAD on her EEO complaint. IAF, Tab 9 at
      37-39. Thus, we must remand the appeal for the appellant to make a knowing and
      informed election of remedies.       See Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶¶ 17-18
                                                                                           6

      (remanding a case for an administrative judge to allow an appellant to make a
      knowing and an informed election of his remedy because he had not receive
      notice of his option to file an adverse action appeal).
¶11          On remand, if the appellant elects to pursue an IRA appeal, the
      administrative judge should provide her with notice of her jurisdictional burden
      and an opportunity to establish jurisdiction over such an appeal. Burgess v. Merit
      Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that
      an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an
      appealable jurisdictional issue).      To do so, the appellant must show by
      preponderant evidence that she exhausted her remedies before OSC, and make
      nonfrivolous allegations that (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity describe d under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
      was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
      personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417,
      ¶ 8.
¶12          As to the first element of the jurisdictional burden, the appellant’s report to
      the OIG appears to qualify as protected activity under 5 U.S.C. ¶ 2302(b)(9)(C).
      Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 9; see also Weed v. Social Security Administration,
      113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 12 (2010) (reflecting that a former employee can make
      protected disclosures). As to the second element, the Board has found that an
      appellant may pursue an involuntary retirement claim as a personnel action in an
      IRA appeal. Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 10 (2015).
      In addition, the appellant’s letters of reprimand, suspension, WIGI denial, and
      placement on a PIP are personnel actions. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), (ix); see
      Horton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 106 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 18 (2007) (stating
      that a letter of reprimand is a personnel action); Hudson v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 104 M.S.P.R. 283, ¶ 15 (2006) (explaining that a PIP is
      considered a personnel action for purposes of an IRA appeal).           The letter of
                                                                                           7

      warning also was a personnel action because it cautioned the appellant that
      “future misconduct may result in more severe disciplinary action, including
      removal.” IAF, Tab 10 at 44; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9) (providing that a
      threat to take a personnel action because of a protected activity or disclosure is
      prohibited); Campo v. Department of the Army, 93 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶¶ 7-8 (2002)
      (finding that a memorandum of warning that included the threat of disciplinary
      action for any further misconduct was a personnel action).        Depending on the
      circumstances, the agency’s denial of the appellant’s request to relocate offices,
      processing of the appellant’s leave, and denial of training also may be personnel
      actions, either cumulatively or separately.        See Skarada v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 15-16 (finding that agency actions that,
      individually or collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall
      nature   and   quality   of     an   employee’s   working   conditions,   duties,   or
      responsibilities are actionable in an IRA appeal); Hoback v. Department of the
      Treasury, 86 M.S.P.R. 425, ¶ 10 (2000) (agreeing with an administrative judge
      that denial of training may be a personnel action if the training was reasonably
      likely to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other
      action described at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)); Easterbrook v. Department of
      Justice, 85 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶¶ 5, 10, 21 (2000) (adjudicating an appellant’s
      placement on leave without pay following the exhaustion of his an nual and sick
      leave as a personnel action).
¶13        We make no finding as to whether the appellant met her jurisdictional
      burden to nonfrivolously allege that her disclosures in early 2015 and the summer
      of 2016 were protected, or that her alleged protected disclosures or activities were
      a contributing factor in any of the alleged agency actions, b ecause the record is
      not developed on the jurisdictional issue. If the appellant elects to adjudicate any
      or all of the alleged personnel actions as an IRA appeal and meets her burden to
      establish Board jurisdiction, the administrative judge will lack jurisdiction over
                                                                                              8

      her EEO claims in connection with those actions. Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417,
      ¶ 16.

      If the appellant elects to pursue her chapter 75 appeal, the administrative judge
      should hold a jurisdictional hearing.
¶14           If the appellant elects to pursue a chapter 75 action as to her alleged
      involuntary retirement, the administrative judge should hold the appellant’s
      requested hearing on the issue of jurisdiction.              IAF, Tab 1 at 2.         The
      administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s
      alleged involuntary retirement because her claims that the agency’s actions were
      unjustified were not supported by the record. ID at 5-6. Further, he concluded
      that the evidence suggested that she was considering reti rement for some time.
      ID at 6-7. We find that the administrative judge improperly weighed the evidence
      at the jurisdictional stage without a hearing.
¶15           A retirement is presumed to be voluntary and outside of the Board’s
      jurisdiction.    Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532,
      ¶ 21 (2014).      An involuntary retirement, however, is equivalent to a forced
      removal within the Board’s jurisdiction under chapter 75. Id. The touchstone of
      the voluntariness analysis and the common element in all Board cases involving
      alleged involuntary resignations or retirements is that factors have operated on
      the employee’s decision-making processes that deprived her of freedom of choice.
      Coufal v. Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 22 (2004). The totality of the
      circumstances     is    examined   under   an    objective    standard   to   determine
      voluntariness.    Id.   Under that standard, the Board will find a retirement or
      resignation involuntary only if the employee demonstrates that under all the
      circumstances working conditions were made so difficult by the agency that a
      reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. Id.
¶16           An appellant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of Board jurisdiction over
      an appeal of an alleged involuntary retirement if she makes a nonfrivolous
      allegation casting doubt on the presumption of voluntariness.            Id., ¶ 23.    A
                                                                                            9

      nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of fact that, if proven, could establish a
      prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. Thus, to
      establish entitlement to a jurisdictional hearing, an appellant need not allege facts
      that, if proven, definitely would establish that the retirement was involuntary; she
      need only allege facts that, if proven, could establish such a claim. Id.
¶17         When, as here, allegations of discrimination and reprisal for whistleblowing
      activity are alleged, such evidence may be addressed at the jurisdictional stage
      only insofar as it relates to the issue of voluntariness and not whether the
      evidence would establish discrimination or reprisal as an affirmative defense. Id.,
      ¶ 24. Thus, evidence of discrimination and reprisal goes to the ultimate question
      of coercion. 4 Id.
¶18         In determining whether the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegat ion of
      jurisdiction entitling her to a hearing, an administrative judge may consider an
      agency’s documentary submissions. Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R.
      325, 329 (1994). But, to the extent that the agency’s evidence constitutes mere
      factual contradiction of the appellant’s otherwise adequate prima facie showing of
      jurisdiction, the administrative judge may not weigh evidence and resolve
      conflicting assertions of the parties and the agency’s evidence may not be
      dispositive.   Id.   Here, the appellant alleges that she suffered a hostile work
      environment beginning in November 2015 and ending with her retirement

      4
        If the administrative judge determines that the Board has jurisdiction over the
      appellant’s adverse action appeal, her appeal will not be subject to the jurisdictional
      requirements of an IRA appeal, and the administrative judge should adjudicate the
      appellant’s claims of discrimination and reprisal for protected activity and disclosures
      as affirmative defenses. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-26; IAF File, Tab 3 at 13-15; see
      Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 17 (providing that if, on remand, an appellant made a
      knowing and an informed election of pursuing a chapter 75 alleged involuntary
      retirement appeal, the adverse action appeal would not be subject to the jurisdictional
      requirements of an IRA appeal or limited to the issues listed at 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a));
      Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 22 (explaining that if an appellant proved that she suffered
      a constructive suspension on remand, the administrative judge should consider whether
      the suspension was taken in retaliation for whistleblowing activity).
                                                                                        10

      approximately 2 years later. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8, 11-12. She submitted her sworn
      EEO investigative affidavit, which attests to the facts underlying her claims.
      IAF, Tab 6 at 4-19; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s) (indicating that an allegation
      generally will be considered nonfrivolous when it is made under oath or penalty
      of perjury, is more than conclusory, is plausible on its face, and is material to the
      legal issues in the appeal).
¶19         This appeal involves a number of actions that the appellant alleg ed created a
      hostile work environment and forced her to retire. A combination of workplace
      actions, such as a PIP, a diminished performance appraisal, and workplace
      isolation, may be sufficient to meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard. Coufal,
      98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶¶ 26-27.      Here, the appellant alleged that the agency took a
      number of punitive actions for 2 years that culminat ed in her perception that she
      had no choice but to retire. In sum, during this period, she alleges that the agency
      issued her a letter of warning, two reprimands, and a suspension; placed her on a
      sick leave abuse plan; denied her a WIGI, placed her on a PIP with unreasonable
      work assignments, and rated her as unacceptable on her mid-year and end-of-year
      evaluations; and revoked her telework privileges, denied her training, and
      required her to submit medical documentation that it already had to support her
      reasonable accommodation request.
¶20         The administrative judge considered and discounted a number of the
      appellant’s allegations as not substantiated by the record.        ID at 5-6.    For
      example, he found that the agency’s October 31, 2016 response to the appellan t’s
      reasonable accommodation request was “detailed and thoughtful,” and the agency
      “reasonably required more medical documentation to address very valid
      concerns.” ID at 5. However, in doing so, he did not consider the appellant’s
      statement in her affidavit that she had already submitted sufficient medical
      information, and that the agency’s mistreatment caused her medical condition to
                                                                                            11

      worsen such that she could no longer work. 5 IAF, Tab 6 at 13-14; PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 18-19; see Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R.
      468, ¶¶ 14-15 (2015) (discussing those circumstance in which an agency may
      request medical information under the Americans with Disabilities Act
      Amendments Act), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016); O’Brien v. Department
      of Agriculture, 91 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶¶ 8-9 (2002) (finding that the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that the agency’s actions caused his m edical condition to
      worsen, resulting in his retirement).
¶21         In making his jurisdictional finding, the administrative judge considered
      evidence submitted by the agency that the appellant began inquiring about her
      retirement options as early as the end of September 2016, and expressed her
      satisfaction with her retirement decision a couple months later. ID at 6-7; IAF,
      Tab 9 at 54, Tab 11 at 8-10.          We agree that the timing of the appellant’s
      retirement   and   her   statements     concerning    that   retirement   are   relevant
      considerations in the voluntariness determination. E.g., Terban v. Department of
      Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the Board’s decision
      to give greater weight to events that occurred closer to an employee’s alleged
      involuntary retirement). Nonetheless, in finding this evidence more persuasive
      than the appellant’s affidavit attesting to her alleged coerced retirement, the
      administrative judge impermissibly weighed the evidence without holding a
      jurisdictional hearing to resolve the parties’ conflicting assertions regarding the
      Board’s jurisdiction over the appeal.         Walker v. Department of the Army,
      119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 9 (2013).
¶22         We find that, as alleged, a reasonable person in the appellant’s position
      could have felt that the agency’s actions left her no choice but to retire. Because

      5
        On review, the appellant disputes many of the administrative judge ’s factual findings.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-19. She also argues that he failed to address all of the agency’s
      alleged coercive acts. Id. at 15-16. In light of our remand for a hearing on the
      jurisdictional issue, we do not reach these arguments.
                                                                                       12

      the appellant disputes the agency’s evidence, resolution of this issue requires that
      the administrative judge hold a hearing to weigh the evidence and resolve the
      conflicting factual assertions.   Ferdon, 60 M.S.P.R. at 330 (remanding for a
      hearing because the appellant disputed the agency’s evidence and his allegations,
      if proven, could establish a prima facie case of Board jurisdiction).     Thus, the
      administrative judge should hold a jurisdictional hearing if the appellant chooses
      to elect her chapter 75 remedy.
¶23        Further, on remand, the administrative judge should rule on the appellant’s
      request to extend the period to initiate discovery. The appellant filed a timely
      request to extend this deadline. IAF, Tab 2 at 4-5, Tab 12. The administrative
      judge did not rule on that request below. The appellant is entitled to request
      discovery of relevant materials to assist her in meeting her burden of establishing
      the Board’s jurisdiction. Russo v. Department of the Navy, 85 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 8
      (1999).      On remand, the administrative judge should determine whether the
      appellant still wishes to engage in the discovery process and set appropriate
      deadlines.

                                           ORDER
¶24        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.