Court Opinion

ID: 9373296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:01.406274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.734905
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SANITA DENISE SIMONS,                           DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-0752-15-1179-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: October 21, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sanita Denise Simons, Stafford, Virginia, pro se.

           Glenn E. Cason, Jr., Esquire, Temple, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction .
     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. See title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decis ion. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).
¶2        Effective November 16, 2014, the appellant was appointed to a GS -12
     Human Resources Specialist position with the agency. Simons v. Department of
     Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-1179-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF),
     Tab 13 at 44.    She resigned from that position effective September 20, 2015.
     I-2 AF, Tab 17 at 10-12. Thereafter, the appellant filed a timely appeal with the
     Board alleging that her resignation was involuntary. Simons v. Department of
     Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-1179-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 1.
     After the administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice to allow her
     to exhaust her equal employment opportunity complaint remedies, the appellant
     refiled her appeal. I-2 AF, Tab 1, Tab 2 at 8. During the adjudication of the
     refiled appeal, a question arose regarding whether the appellant was serving a
     1-year probationary period at the time of her resignation. I-2 AF, Tab 15 at 1-3.
     The administrative judge informed the appellant of the jurisdictional elements and
     afforded the parties the opportunity to submit additional evidence and argument
     concerning the appellant’s potential probationary status .     Id.   The appellant
     responded to the order, arguing that she was not serving in a probationary period
     and that she was an “employee” with appeal rights. I-2 AF, Tab 16 at 4-17.
                                                                                            3

¶3         Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal, finding that the appellant was
     serving in a probationary period at the time of her resignation and thus the Board
     lacked jurisdiction over her involuntary resignation claim. I-2 AF, Tab 19, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 4. The administrative judge held that none of the appellant’s
     prior Federal service “tacked” on to her current service and that the appellant had
     not proven that, even though she was a probationer, she was nonetheless an
     “employee” with chapter 75 appeal rights because she could not demonstrate that
     prior to her resignation she completed 1-year of “current continuous service”
     under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less. Id.
¶4         On review, the appellant reasserts that she was not serving in a probationary
     period at the time of her resignation and that she is an “employee” with Board
     appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Simons v. Department of Agriculture,
     MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-1179-I-2, Petition for Review (I-2 PFR) File,
     Tab 1 at 4, 17. The agency did not respond to the petition for review. 2
¶5         An appellant who has not served a full year under her appointment can
     show that she has completed her probationary period, and so is no longer a
     probationer, by “tacking” on prior service if: (1) the prior service was rendered
     immediately preceding the probationary appointment; (2) it was performed in the
     same agency; (3) it was performed in the same line of work; and (4) it was
     completed with no more than one break in service of less than 30 days. Hurston
     v. Department of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9 (2010); 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b).
     Here, the record reflects that the appellant’s prior service ended with her
     resignation from a position with the U.S. Marine Corps on December 14, 2013—
     more than 11 months before her November 14, 2014 appointment at issue in this

     2
       In May 2018, the appellant filed a motion seeking a dismissal of this appeal without
     prejudice for a period of 6 months. I-2 PFR File, Tab 3. We need not rule on this
     motion as it is now moot. See Currier v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 191, 195
     (1996) (outlining that mootness arises, inter alia, when the issue presented is no longer
     “live”).
                                                                                     4

     appeal. I-2 PFR File, Tab 1 at 24; I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 39, 44. Additionally, none
     of the prior service during the period from August 14, 2011, through
     December 14, 2013, that the appellant claims should be tacked to her
     probationary period was completed with the Department of Agriculture. I-2 AF,
     Tab 13 at 32-43.    Because the appellant’s prior service did not immediately
     precede her probationary appointment, was not with the same agency, and
     included a break in service of more than 30 days, her prior service does not count
     towards completing her probationary period. See Hurston, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9;
     5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b).
¶6        Alternatively, an appellant can show that, while she may be a probationer,
     she satisfies the definition of an “employee” in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii),
     which requires that she “completed 1 year of current continuous service under
     other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.”           Hurston,
     113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9. The appellant did not identify any other Federal service
     during the 11-month period between her appointments with the Department of
     Agriculture and the U.S. Marine Corps. Instead, she argues that her period of
     Federal service from August 14, 2011, through December 14, 2013, should
     qualify as “current continuous service” sufficient to meet the requirements under
     5 C.F.R. § 752.402. I-2 PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. However, the Board has held that
     for competitive-service employees, “current continuous service” means a period
     of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a
     break in Federal civilian employment of a workday. Ellefson v. Department of
     the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 14 (2005); see 5 C.F.R. § 752.402. Because the
     appellant only served approximately 11 months at the Department of Agriculture
     and did not have any Federal service immediately preceding the alleged adverse
     action (her constructive discharge), she does not meet the “current continuous
     service” requirement necessary to satisfy the definition of “employee” under
     5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii).
                                                                                        5

¶7          Finally, the appellant highlights a remark provided on one of the S tandard
     Form 50s (SF-50) for her appointment to the Department of Agriculture position
     indicating that she had completed her probationary period. I-2 PFR File, Tab 1
     at 17; I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 44. However, a remark in a subsequent SF-50 converting
     the appellant’s term appointment to career-conditional status notes that the
     appointment is “subject to completion of one year initial probationary period
     beginning 11/16/2014.”     I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 45 (emphasis removed).          A later
     corrected SF-50 again indicates that her probationary period was complete. Id.
     at 46. 3   Notwithstanding the conflicting SF-50s included in the record, under
     5 C.F.R. § 315.801(a), a 1-year probationary period is contemplated for
     career-conditional appointments in the competitive service.       Additionally, the
     failure to inform an individual of her probationary status, without more, does not
     confer employee status on the individual.      Calixto v. Department of Defense,
     120 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶ 17 n.6 (2014) (citing Phillips v. Department of Housing &
     Urban Development, 44 M.S.P.R. 48, 52 (1990)). It is undisputed that at the time
     the appellant resigned from her position on September 20, 2015, she had not
     completed 1 year of service in her position with the Department of Agriculture.
     I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 39, 44; Tab 17 at 10-12. As such, the apparent inconsistencies
     on the SF-50s do not affect our analysis in this appeal, or change the fact that the
     appellant’s position was subject to a 1-year probationary period, which she had
     not completed at the time of her resignation. Hurston, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 2 n.*.

     3
       Yet another, later corrected SF-50 identifies the appointment as a “TERM APPT
     11/16/14,” suggesting that the appellant was employed in a term position and not a
     career-conditional appointment. I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 48. In the initial decision, the
     administrative judge identified the appellant’s appointment as career conditional. ID
     at 2. However, we need not determine what kind of appointment the appellant was
     completing when she resigned, since we find that she did not complete a 1-year
     probationary period and was not otherwise an “employee” with Board appeal rights.
                                                                                           6

¶8         Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we deny the appellant’s
     petition for review and affirm the initial decision dismissing her involuntary
     resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                              NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
           You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
     statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
     review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
     Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
     Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
     appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
     statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
     jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
     immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
     filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
     limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
           Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
     below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
     about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
     should contact that forum for more information.

           (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
     judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
     Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
     within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
     § 7703(b)(1)(A).

     4
       Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
     the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
     Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         7

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                  8

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, o r other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via co mmercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                      9

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           10

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsite s.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.