Court Opinion

ID: 9952767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 18:02:43.056105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:25.404043
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Hattley CA3
                                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                       THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Lassen)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                 C097926

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Super. Ct. No. 2022CR0088963)

           v.

 KESHAUN DONZALE HATTLEY,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Keshaun Donzale Hattley guilty of attempted voluntary
manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant contends on appeal that:
(1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony identifying defendant in a
surveillance video; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements
made by the prosecutor during summation; and (3) cumulative error compels reversal.
Finding no merit in defendant’s contentions, we affirm.
                                                I. BACKGROUND
         In 2022, the People filed a consolidated information charging defendant with
attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and assault with a deadly weapon

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). As to both counts, the information alleged that defendant personally
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and as to the attempted murder charge,
it further alleged that defendant used a deadly weapon, a baseball bat (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).
       At trial, the People presented evidence about a fight that happened at a mobile
home park on March 6, 2022. At that time, the victim, Michael D., lived in the mobile
home park with Aaron F. and Rebecca F.2 Aaron’s daughter Chelsea F. lived in the same
park at a different residence.
       Chelsea testified that on March 5, defendant and two females went to the gas
station market where she worked. The two females screamed at Chelsea, accusing her of
having their dog and saying they would forcefully enter her home while she was at work.
This was Chelsea’s first time interacting with defendant, although she recognized him
from having seen him around the mobile home park.
       Late that night after she got off work, a man approached Chelsea while she was
outside her home. Chelsea did not recognize him at first but as he got closer, she realized
it was defendant who had been “harassing” her that day at her store. She started walking
backward toward her home and tapped on her bedroom window to get her boyfriend
Faylon O.’s attention. Faylon came outside, asked the man if he was a “fucking Chomo”
(a term meaning child molester), and then punched him. The man ran off. At trial, Faylon
identified defendant as the man he punched, although a detective testified that Faylon told
him he was “not sure” about the man’s identity. Faylon testified he did not remember
saying this to the detective.

2 To protect their privacy, we refer to some of the victims, witnesses, and others by their
full first names and last name initials and, subsequently, by their first names. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).)

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         After Chelsea testified about the incident outside her home, the People began
asking Chelsea about a surveillance video depicting this encounter. Defense counsel
objected to Chelsea identifying defendant in the surveillance video arguing, among other
things, that this testimony would be an improper lay opinion and invade the province of
the jury. The trial court overruled the objection. Portions of the surveillance video were
played for the jury and Chelsea identified defendant as the person approaching her in the
video.
         After the incident outside her home, Chelsea called her father, Aaron. Aaron,
Michael, and Faylon went to tell defendant to stay away from Chelsea’s home. While
walking, they encountered a group of people. According to Aaron, this group included
defendant, the codefendant Terry Decutler, and Kymber Decutler, who is defendant’s
fiancé and Terry’s sister.
         Aaron testified that Terry had an automatic rifle that he fired at Aaron. Faylon then
struck Terry with a knife and grabbed the rifle until Terry dropped it. Aaron testified that,
at about this time, defendant ran into a mobile home, came out with a baseball bat, and
struck Michael in the head with the bat. Aaron, Michael, and Faylon retreated to
Chelsea’s residence. Portions of Michael’s face and head were “beaten in” and he was
bleeding profusely. He was admitted to the hospital for surgery to remove parts of his
skull from his brain and for reconstructive surgery. Michael testified that he experiences
ongoing problems due to his injuries, including constant headaches, problems with his
memory, and a speech impediment.
         After the incident, the police provided Aaron a photographic lineup that included
defendant. The parties stipulated that the officer who administered this lineup, if called to
testify, would have testified that: “I showed [Aaron] each picture separately. [Aaron]
picked out Photo Number 3, but believed it to be Number 4, (Hattley), but felt the person
in Photo Number 4 was too heavy. [Aaron] ultimately said he was 100 percent sure it was
Photo Number 3.” Aaron acknowledged he was unable to correctly identify defendant

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during the photo lineup. He explained that the photos were old and that in some of the
photos the suspects’ faces were obscured by their hair. Aaron denied that he told the
officer at the time of the lineup that he was “100 percent sure” the person in photo number
3 was the person who struck Michael with a baseball bat. Aaron testified that, at the time
of trial, he was “1000 percent sure” defendant was the assailant.
       Faylon was unable to say for certain at trial who struck Michael with a bat because
he “was already engaged with two or three other people” when it happened. Michael
testified he did not have clear memories of that night, citing his brain injuries. The last
thing he recalled was trying to step on the rifle on the ground.
       The prosecution introduced evidence regarding defendant’s Facebook account in
the name of “Kingee Carter.” Terry’s Facebook profile had a March 8 post tagging the
Kingee Carter profile containing a moving picture of someone swinging a baseball bat
with a “ha-ha” emoji. Another March 8 post on Kingee Carter’s profile contained the
hashtag “got ‘em.”
       Defendant called Kymber as a witness. She testified that she and defendant had a
child together and that defendant was at the trailer park earlier but left before the fight
broke out. Kymber admitted she lied to a police officer who was investigating the
incident and that she had a 2016 conviction for providing false identification to a peace
officer.
       During her rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor addressed Aaron’s
misidentification of defendant in the photo lineup. She told a story about how she once
witnessed a robbery but was unable to identify the perpetrator in a lineup: “When I was
20, I worked at a bank and I got robbed and I, as I stand here before you today, I can close
my eyes and I can see crystal clear the person who robbed me 22 years ago. The FBI
came down. Can you pick him out of a lineup? I am 100 certain I can pick him out of a
lineup, his face is etched into my brain, he’s burned into my retinas. I wish. I could not
pick him out of a lineup. Does that mean I didn’t get robbed? No. I couldn’t pick him

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out. I can see him today. Wouldn’t know him walking down the street. Couldn’t pick
him out of a lineup. It’s normal. This is a normal thing.”
       At the conclusion of her rebuttal, the prosecutor said to the jury: “It’s very
important for the People in the State of California, in and for the County of Lassen, to get
justice for [the victim], and so I’m asking you what is your brand of justice for [the
victim]?” The trial court used CALCRIM Nos. 104 and 200 to instruct the jury that the
attorneys’ arguments are not evidence and the jury must follow the law, rather than the
attorneys’ arguments, if the two conflicted.
       The jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of the lesser
included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a)). The jury
also found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and found the great bodily
injury and deadly weapon allegations to be true.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of three years for attempted
voluntary manslaughter, one year for the deadly weapon enhancement, and three years for
the great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant’s sentence for assault with a deadly
weapon was stayed under section 654.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.     Admission of Video Surveillance Identification
       Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
Chelsea’s testimony identifying defendant in the surveillance video because this testimony
was improper lay opinion. We disagree.
       Under Evidence Code section 800, a lay witness may offer opinion testimony if it
is “[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness” and “[h]elpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony.” We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 128.) Under this
standard, a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless the court exercised its discretion

                                               5
in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328-1329.)
       “Court of Appeal decisions have long upheld admission of testimony identifying
defendants in surveillance footage or photographs.” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th
569, 601.) In Leon, the trial court allowed a detective to identify the defendant in a
surveillance tape. (Id. at p. 600.) A detective testified he was “ ‘very’ ” familiar with the
defendant’s appearance though he had only first seen the defendant when he was arrested
and subsequently spent about two hours with him. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held that
because the detective’s “testimony was based on his relevant personal knowledge and
aided the jury, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it.” (Id. at p. 601.) The
court explained that “[q]uestions about the extent of [the detective’s] familiarity with [the]
defendant’s appearance went to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony” and
that “because the surveillance video was played for the jury, jurors could make up their
own minds about whether the person shown was [the] defendant.” (Ibid.; see also People
v. Son (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 689, 696-697 [finding no abuse of discretion when trial
court permitted detective to narrate what she perceived in surveillance video].)
       Defendant attempts to distinguish Leon, arguing that Chelsea’s testimony “was not
helpful to the jury determination of what was shown in the video,” in large part because
“Chelsea was unfamiliar with appellant.” However, there is evidence to the contrary.
Chelsea testified that she recognized defendant from having seen him around the mobile
home park where she lived. Moreover, she had seen him earlier that day during the
confrontation with him at her workplace and later that evening during the confrontation
depicted in the video. As Leon explained, questions about the extent of Chelsea’s
familiarity with defendant’s appearance go to the weight of her testimony, not its
admissibility. Further, as in Leon, the jury here was shown the surveillance video and
could decide for itself whether defendant was the person depicted. The trial court did not

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abuse its discretion in admitting Chelsea’s identification of defendant in the surveillance
video.
B.       Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
         Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by failing
to object to two portions of the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, specifically:
(1) the prosecutor’s story about her inability to identify a robber in a lineup; and (2) the
prosecutor’s question to the jury “what is your brand of justice for [the victim]?”
         To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. (People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-
692.) We presume that “counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of reasonableness,
and [we] afford ‘great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’ ” (Mickel, at p. 198.)
         As our Supreme Court has observed, “certain practical constraints make it more
difficult to address ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal rather than in the context
of a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.) This is
because “[t]he record on appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she did.
Under those circumstances, a reviewing court has no basis on which to determine whether
counsel had a legitimate reason for making a particular decision, or whether counsel’s
actions or failure to take certain actions were objectively unreasonable.” (Ibid.) We will
reverse only if there is affirmative evidence that counsel had no rational tactical purpose
for an act or omission. (Ibid.) If the record on appeal sheds no light on why trial counsel
acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to
provide one or there could be no satisfactory explanation. (People v. Mendoza Tello
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) A defendant thus bears a difficult burden when asserting an
ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. (Mickel, at p. 198.)

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         Defendant submits that his counsel should have objected because the prosecutor’s
statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct or improper vouching.3 “Under federal
law, ‘ “Improper remarks by a prosecutor can ‘ “so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Under state law,
‘ “a prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court
or the jury has committed misconduct, even if such action does not render the trial
fundamentally unfair.” ’ ” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206.) A prosecutor
engages in improper vouching when the prosecutor attempts to bolster a witness by
reference to facts outside the record. Thus, “it is misconduct for prosecutors to vouch for
the strength of their cases by invoking their personal prestige, reputation, or depth of
experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it. [Citations.] . . .
Nor may prosecutors offer their personal opinions when they are based solely on their
experience or on other facts outside the record.” (Id. at pp. 206-207.)
         To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments, the
defendant “ ‘must show that “[i]n the context of the whole argument and the instructions”
[citation], there was “a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.” ’ ” (People v. Dalton
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 251-252.) In assessing such a claim, a reviewing court does “ ‘ “not
lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997,
1129.)
         The prosecutor’s statements here were less than ideal. Her personal story about
being unable to identify a robber in a lineup relied on facts outside the record, and her
assurance that such a misidentification “is a normal thing” could be understood as

3 Defendant concedes that any substantive claim on these grounds has been forfeited on
appeal by his trial counsel’s failure to object.

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implying that misidentifications frequently occur in other cases. (Cf. People v. Medina
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 758 [“[P]rosecutors should not purport to rely on their outside
experience or personal beliefs based on facts not in evidence when they argue to the
jury”].) In addition, asking the jury what their “brand of justice” is could be understood as
invoking the jurors’ personal notions of justice as distinct from any legal standard.
       Nonetheless, we reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
record offers no insight as to why trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s
statements during her closing rebuttal. For example, it is possible that trial counsel
wanted to avoid drawing the jury’s attention to the challenged comments. (See People v.
Ramirez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 305, 311 [finding no deficient performance for failure to
object to prosecutor’s comments in closing argument because “the jury may have looked
bored, and the stimulus of an objection may have awakened the jurors’ interest in a
counterproductive way”]; cf. People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424 [“Failure to
object rarely constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal representation”].) As a result,
defendant has not established that his counsel’s performance was deficient.
       Further, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to object. For a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice is established if “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
       Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the attorneys’ remarks were not
evidence and that if there was any conflict between the court’s instructions and what the
attorneys said, they were to follow the court’s instructions. We presume the jury followed
those instructions in reaching a verdict (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436) and
we do “ ‘ “not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least
damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1129).

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       The challenged comments were a small part of a lengthy closing argument that
spanned 38 pages in the reporter’s transcript. Even if the prosecutor had not shared her
story about being unable to identify a robber in a lineup, the jury would likely have still
found Aaron’s in-court identification reliable and credited it. This is especially true given
that Aaron told the detective administering the photo lineup that he “believed” defendant’s
photo, which actually was in the lineup, was that of the assailant. In addition, there was
other compelling evidence of defendant’s guilt, including (1) the March 8 Facebook post
of a person swinging a bat with a “ha-ha” emoji in which defendant’s profile was tagged,
and (2) another March 8 post on defendant’s profile containing the hashtag “got ‘em.”
       We reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
C.     Cumulative Error
       Defendant contends that the accumulation of the errors he raises on appeal
undermined his right to a fair trial. Having found no errors, this claim is necessarily
without merit. (See People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1068.)
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                   Wiseman, J.*
We concur:

 /s/
Earl, P. J.

 /s/
Krause, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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