Court Opinion

ID: 9942880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 23:01:11.113042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:51.452166
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TRACY RANDLE et al.,

               Plaintiffs,

       v.                                           Civil Action No. 18-1525 (TJK)

SUNTRUST BANK, INC. et al.,

               Defendants.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Four named plaintiffs sue on behalf of a class of African American financial advisors em-

ployed by Defendants, which the Court refers to collectively as SunTrust. They allege that Sun-

Trust assigned them to bank branches with fewer opportunities to develop business and denied

them the chance to work on lucrative client accounts because of their race. The parties reached a

settlement resolving all claims, which the Court preliminarily approved. Now Plaintiffs, with no

opposition, move for class certification, final approval of the class action settlement, service

awards to class representatives, and attorney’s fees and costs. For the reasons explained below,

the Court will grant their motions.

I.     Background

       A.      Factual and Procedural Background

       Plaintiffs Tracy Randle, Allison Taylor, Arthur Boyd, and Tahir Johnson are former finan-

cial advisors for SunTrust. In their operative complaint, they allege that SunTrust maintains com-

pany-wide discriminatory policies governing “compensation, teaming, and the assignment of ter-

ritory, resources, designations and business opportunities,” ECF No. 16 (“Am. Comp.”) ¶ 15, “that

result in higher rates of attrition and lower pay for African Americans and that segregate the
SunTrust workforce by race,” id. ¶ 3. More specifically, according to Plaintiffs, SunTrust “‘race

matches’ and assigns African American [financial advisors] to branches with higher African

American and minority populations,” while “[w]hite [financial advisors] are assigned to wealthier,

and often ‘whiter,’ territories with greater opportunities.” Id. ¶ 18. African-American financial

advisors are purportedly “assigned branches with no or fewer licensed bankers . . . [and] are also

often assigned to multiple, smaller branches, diluting their time and resources, and limiting the

[financial advisors’] ability to form consistent, productive relationships with lead-generating bank-

ers and clients.” Id. ¶ 19. And the complaint alleges that African-American financial advisors

“are disproportionately excluded” from assignments to “Premier Banks,” which “are largely in

affluent areas and are disproportionately absent from predominantly African American communi-

ties, to which African American [financial advisors] are steered by SunTrust.” Id. ¶¶ 20–21. And

African-American financial advisors are “almost entirely excluded” from title designations needed

to serve “high net worth clients” and from “favorable teams and pools” that can increase compen-

sation. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.

       Plaintiffs bring the following claims: (1) class-wide racial discrimination in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) individual retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 as to Randle and Boyd; and (3) individual retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq. as to Randle. Am. Compl.; see also ECF Nos. 1, 15.

       The Court denied SunTrust’s motion to dismiss and granted the parties a stay to engage in

settlement negotiations. At that point, the parties exchanged “substantial discovery, including

documents reflecting and related to the policies and practices challenged by the lawsuit and the

employment workforce, human resources, compensation, and account data necessary to assess

their claims and damages.” ECF No. 56 at 4. Plaintiffs also retained experts to analyze that data.

                                                 2
Id. Mediation lasted more than two years and led to the proposed settlement agreement now before

the Court. Id. at 4–5.

       In August 2023, the parties sought provisional class certification, preliminary approval of

a class action settlement, and approval and distribution of notice to the class of the settlement.

ECF No. 56. The Court granted that motion, conditionally certifying the class and provisionally

finding that the proposed settlement was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and the result of extensive,

arm’s length negotiation between experienced counsel and Parties.” ECF No. 59 at 2–3. The

Court also approved notice to the class and appointed a neutral arbiter and claims administrator.

Id. at 4. Following the Court’s preliminary approval, the claims administrator mailed notices to

all members of the class and established a website describing the settlement and providing access

to all key documents. ECF No. 62-3 at 3–4. For each notice returned undeliverable, notice was

remailed to an updated address. Id. at 3. No class members objected to or opted out of the settle-

ment. Id. at 4; see Feb. 1, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 18:7–15. Plaintiffs, without opposition, now move for

class certification, final approval of the class action settlement, service awards to class represent-

atives, and attorney’s fees and costs. ECF Nos. 62, 63. The Court held a fairness hearing on

February 1, 2024.

       B.      Proposed Settlement Agreement

       The terms of the proposed class action settlement, which remain the same since the Court

preliminarily approved it, are summarized below.

               1.        Putative Class

       For purposes of the settlement, the putative class is “[a]ll individuals who were employed

by SunTrust Investment Services as a Financial Advisor” as defined by the settlement agree-

ment “at any time between June 24, 2014 and February 17, 2021, and who self-identified to

                                                  3
[SunTrust] as African American and/or Black, as reflected in Defendants’ workforce data, which

was used to develop the class list provided by Defendants to Class Counsel.” ECF No. 62-2 at 4.

               2.      Programmatic Relief

       The settlement provides for programmatic relief designed to enhance opportunities for em-

ployment, earnings, and advancement of African-American financial advisors over a two-year pe-

riod. ECF No. 56-1 at 30. That relief has three core components. The first is an advisory council,

which will meet on a biannual basis “to discuss issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion” facing

those employees. Id. at 30–31. The parties represent that the advisory council will seek to address

SunTrust’s account distribution policy, a key issue in this litigation. ECF No. 62 at 10. The second

part is SunTrust’s plan to increase African-American financial advisor representation and retention

in those positions, largely focused on tracking appropriate data to assess the effectiveness of the

bank’s efforts. ECF No. 56-1 at 30–32. Finally, SunTrust will maintain procedures for financial

advisors to communicate interest in working at particular branches when openings become avail-

able, and to ensure that accounts of financial advisors who leave SunTrust are distributed in accord

with SunTrust’s written policy and with its ongoing review of the effect of that policy on African-

American financial advisors. Id. at 31.

               3.      Settlement Fund and Claims Resolution Process

       Along with the programmatic relief explained above, the settlement provides for a fund of

$14 million. ECF No. 56-1 at 32. That fund is intended to compensate Plaintiffs (both named and

class); provide for attorney’s fees, costs, and service awards; and cover income taxes and costs of

administering the settlement. Id. at 32–33. Plaintiffs seek $175,000 service awards for class rep-

resentatives and attorney’s fees of 25% of the settlement fund. ECF No. 63 at 17, 21. Funds will

be distributed by individualized assessment of class members’ claims by the neutral arbiter, who

                                                 4
is tasked with weighing certain factors prescribed by the parties’ agreement. ECF No. 56-1 at 34–

40. As part of that assessment, class members will have to submit a detailed claim form and may

attend an hour-long session with the arbiter to discuss aspects of their claims. Id. Each class

member who submits a timely claim will receive a minimum award of $25,000. Id. at 35.

II.    Class Certification

       A.      Legal Standard

       Parties seeking class certification, even for settlement purposes only, must show that they

meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and fall within at least one of the categories described in Rule

23(b). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613–14 (1997); see also Trombley v.

Nat’l City Bank, 826 F. Supp. 2d 179, 191–92 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Trombley II”). A class certified

for “settlement purposes only” requires “closer judicial scrutiny” than settlements reached after

class certification, given that “meaningful judicial review” may be “more difficult and more im-

portant.” Trombley II, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (citations omitted). But Courts need not consider

whether “the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems.” Thomas v. Albright,

139 F.3d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591).

       B.      Analysis

       The Court will first consider the requirements of Rule 23(a), before turning to part (b). As

explained below, the Court finds that the class meets those requirements for certification.

               1.      Rule 23(a)

       “Rule 23(a) states four threshold requirements applicable to all class actions: (1) numer-

osity (a ‘class [so large] that joinder of all members is impracticable’); (2) commonality (‘questions

of law or fact common to the class’); (3) typicality (named parties’ claims or defenses ‘are typi-

cal . . . of the class’); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives ‘will fairly and

                                                  5
adequately protect the interests of the class’).” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613 (alteration in original)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). All are satisfied.

                          a.   Numerosity

        “[C]ourts in this jurisdiction have observed that a class of at least forty members is suffi-

ciently large to meet [the numerosity] requirement,” though “[t]here is no specific threshold that

must be surpassed” to satisfy it. Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C.

2007). Class sizes shy of 40 members may find themselves in “numerosity’s gray area—where

joinder is neither presumptively impracticable nor presumptively practical.” Coleman ex rel. Bunn

v. District of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 80 (D.D.C. 2015) (certifying class of 34 potential mem-

bers). Courts then consider “(1) ‘judicial economy arising from avoidance of a multiplicity of

actions’; (2) ‘geographic dispersion of class members’; (3) ‘size of individual claims’; (4) ‘finan-

cial resources of class members’; and (5) ‘the ability of claimants to institute individual suits.’”

Id. (citation omitted).

        The proposed settlement class comprises 37 members: “all individuals who were employed

by [SunTrust Investment Services, Inc.] as a Financial Advisor at any time between June 24, 2014

and February 17, 2021, and who self-identified to [SunTrust Investment Services, Inc.] as African

American and/or Black, as reflected in Defendants’ workforce data, which was used to develop

the class list provided by Defendants to Class Counsel.” ECF No. 56-1 at 18. Thus, Plaintiffs

“find themselves at the high end of numerosity’s gray area.” See Coleman, 306 F.R.D. at 80.

        The size of the proposed class notwithstanding, joinder would be impracticable here. Be-

cause SunTrust operates nationwide, class members are geographically dispersed across the coun-

try. See ECF No. 56 at 7–8. Some, too, are current employees who may be unable or unwilling

to personally appear in a suit against their employer. Id. And significant judicial economies are

                                                  6
gained by resolving claims against SunTrust for the same company-wide policies in one case. See

Coleman, 306 F.R.D. at 80. To be sure, cutting against certification are the sizeable claims and,

in some cases, the financial resources of class members that make the prospect of joinder more

plausible, along with the relative ease of identifying class members. See Frazier v. Consol. Rail

Corp., 851 F.2d 1447, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1988). But “the mere existence of ‘large claims will not

defeat certification when other factors’—in particular the ‘cardinal interests of judicial economy

and conservation of time and financial resources’—‘overwhelmingly indicate that a class action is

the superior method for adjudicating the controversy.’” Burks v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 16-

cv-1102 (CRC), 2023 WL 4838382, at *3 (D.D.C. July 28, 2023) (citation omitted). So too here.

Given the considerable judicial economies of settling these claims, which would likely be prohib-

itively difficult and expensive to litigate individually, the Court finds that the class satisfies the

numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).

                       b.      Commonality

       Commonality is satisfied when “there is at least one issue, the resolution of which will

affect all or a significant number of putative class members.” Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Warner

Holdings Co. III, Ltd., 246 F.R.D. 349, 357 (D.D.C. 2007). “[F]actual variations among class

members will not defeat the commonality requirement, so long as a single aspect or feature of the

claim is common to all proposed class members.” Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27,

33 (D.D.C. 2003). The parties argue that class members’ claims share multiple questions of law

and fact, given that “the class members are all financial advisors working for the same firm chal-

lenging the same firm-wide policies and practices as discriminatory under the same legal theories.”

ECF No. 56 at 8. The Court agrees. And where a class consists of employees holding the same

position and who “were subject to the same work policies and practices underlying this lawsuit,”

                                                  7
“[t]hat is more than sufficient to meet the commonality requirement.” Stephens v. Farmers Rest.

Grp., 329 F.R.D. 476, 483 (D.D.C. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court finds that

the class satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).

                       c.      Typicality

       “Typicality requires that the claims of the representative be typical of those of the class,”

Encinas v. J.J. Drywall Corp., 265 F.R.D. 3, 9 (D.D.C. 2010), and is generally satisfied “when the

plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same course of conduct, series or events, or legal theories of other

class members,” In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Secs. Litig., 237 F.R.D. 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2006).

“The facts and claims of each class member do not have to be identical to support a finding of

typicality; rather, [t]ypicality refers to the nature of the claims of the representative, not the indi-

vidual characteristics of the plaintiff.” Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 52

(D.D.C. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       The claims of Randle, Taylor, Boyd, and Johnson are typical of the class. They, like the

class as a whole, were employed by SunTrust as financial advisors during the relevant time and

self-identified to SunTrust as Black or African American. They allege claims typical of the class,

in that they assert they were harmed by the same discriminatory practices and policies as others in

the class. See ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 34–48. Thus, their claims are typical of those that could be advanced

by the class as a whole, and so the Court finds that the class satisfies the typicality requirement of

Rule 23(a)(3).

                       d.      Adequacy

       Rule 23(a)’s adequacy requirement demands that “the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “Two criteria for determining

the adequacy of representation are generally recognized: 1) the named representative must not

                                                   8
have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class, and 2) the rep-

resentative must appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified

counsel.” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

       The adequacy requirement is satisfied. Nothing in the record suggests conflicting interests

between the named and unnamed class members, and because “the named plaintiffs will receive

an award in accordance with the same formula as the rest of the class, aside from their service

awards for pursuing the claims for the class . . . the Court concludes that the named plaintiffs pos-

sess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” Kinard v. E. Capitol Fam.

Rental, L.P., 331 F.R.D. 206, 214 (D.D.C. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am-

chem, 521 U.S. at 625–26); see EFC No. 56-1 at 44. And the motion documents significant efforts

by Randle, Taylor, Boyd, and Johnson to participate in the negotiation of this settlement and ad-

vocate on behalf of the class. ECF No. 56 at 9. Finally, Plaintiffs are represented by sophisticated

counsel who attest they have “significant experience in civil cases relating to” the same subject

matter as this case. ECF No. 56 at 9 (quoting Kinard v. E. Capitol Fam. Rental, L.P., 331 F.R.D.

206, 214 (D.D.C. 2019). Thus, the Court finds that the named plaintiffs can vigorously pursue the

interests of the class through qualified counsel, and thus the class satisfies the adequacy require-

ment of Rule 23(a)(4).

               2.        Rule 23(b)

       Having satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiffs seek class certification under both

(b)(2) and (b)(3), presumably relying on the former for the requested injunctive relief and the latter

for monetary relief. ECF No. 62 at 29–30. Both are satisfied.

                         a.    Rule 23(b)(2)

       Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is warranted when the party opposing the class “acted or

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or

                                                  9
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(2). “The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory

remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful

as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.

338, 360 (2011) (citation omitted). That is, “a single injunction or declaratory judgment” must be

able to “provide relief to each member of the class.” Id.

       Plaintiffs allege that every class member was subject to the same company-wide policies

and practices that harmed African American financial advisors. And as part of this litigation,

Plaintiffs have sought a class-wide injunction against those policies and practices, which would

provide the same relief to all class members. See ECF No. 38 at 2. Notably, the proposed settle-

ment provides that relief. It addresses Plaintiffs’ allegations of company-wide discriminatory pol-

icies and practices and provides programmatic, injunctive relief for the collective class of African

American financial advisors. For example, that relief will put in place mechanisms by which fi-

nancial advisors may communicate their interest in working at particular branches and through

which it will ensure that accounts of financial advisors that depart SunTrust are distributed con-

sistent with company policy. ECF No. 56-1 at 31. This programmatic relief would apply to the

class as a whole. Given that, the Court finds that the proposed class satisfied this requirement.

                       b.     Rule 23(b)(3)

       Finally, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action may be maintained if “questions of law or fact com-

mon to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and

“a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

                                                10
       “The predominance inquiry implicates the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)” in

that “the common issues identified as sufficient under Rule 23(a) must be shown by the plaintiffs

to predominate over the non-common issues.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262

(D.D.C. 2002). “[I]n general, predominance is met ‘when there exists generalized evidence which

proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the

need to examine each class members’ individual position.’” Id. (citation omitted). As explained

above, the named plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same alleged policies and practices by Sun-

Trust, and thus hinge on the same “generalized evidence” of such practices. See Moore v. Napo-

litano, 926 F. Supp. 2d 8, 33 (D.D.C. 2013). And to the extent there are difference of fact among

the class members’ individual claims, “the existence of a settlement that eliminates manageability

problems can alter the outcome of the predominance analysis.” In re APA Assessment Fee Litig.,

311 F.R.D. 8, 18 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the Court finds that the pro-

posed class satisfies the predominance requirement.

       Next, “[t]he superiority requirement ensures that resolution by class action will ‘achieve

economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons sim-

ilarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable conse-

quences.’” Cohen v. Chilcott, 522 F. Supp. 2d 105, 117 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Amchem, 521

U.S. at 615). Given that a settlement agreement has been negotiated, “a class action is clearly the

superior method to adjudicate the claim.” Greenberg v. Colvin, 63 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C.

2014). “Any class member who wishes to prosecute his own claim may opt out of the Class,” and

“[b]ecause the class is certified only for settlement, the Court ‘need not inquire whether the case,

if tried, would present intractable management problems.’” Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at

620). Thus, this requirement is satisfied.

                                                11
                                           *       *       *

        For all the above reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class satisfies the requirements

of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), and with the consent of the parties, the Court will certify the

class for settlement purposes.

III.    Final Approval of Class Settlement

        A.      Legal Standard

        Parties to a class action cannot enter into a binding settlement agreement without court

approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see also Thomas, 139 F.3d at 231. A reviewing court may approve

a proposed agreement “only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and

adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In making that determination, courts in this District have

followed a five-factor test, evaluating (1) whether the settlement results from arm’s-length nego-

tiations; (2) the terms of the settlement in relation to the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (3) the

status of the litigation at the time of settlement; (4) the reaction of the class; and (5) the opinion of

experienced counsel. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2004). 1

When parties are “seeking class certification and settlement at the same time, however,” the court

must apply “‘closer judicial scrutiny’ than settlements that are reached after class certification.”

Trombley v. Nat’l City Bank, 759 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Trombley I”) (quoting Man-

ual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.612 (2004)).

        1
          Under the federal rules, a court must consider whether: (1) “the class representatives and
class counsel have adequately represented the class”; (2) “the proposal was negotiated at arm’s
length”; (3) “the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account,” as relevant here,
the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal, the effectiveness of the proposed method of distrib-
uting relief to the class, and the proposed attorney’s fee awards; and (4) “the proposal treats class
members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). In its analysis of the Vitamins
factors below, the Court also considers any of these factors not otherwise encapsulated by that test.

                                                   12
       Whether to approve a proposed settlement agreement is ultimately within the discretion of

the reviewing court. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 375 (D.D.C.

2002). But that discretion “is constrained by the ‘principle of preference’ favoring and encourag-

ing settlement in appropriate cases.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. at 103 (quoting

Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 103 (D.D.C. 1999)). Indeed, in this Circuit, “[s]ettlement is

highly favored, as ‘[n]ot only the parties, but the general public as well, benefit from the saving of

time and money that results from the voluntary settlement of litigation.’” United States v. MTU

Am. Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 60, 63 (D.D.C. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Citizens

for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

       B.      Analysis

       The Court now turns to the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, which as set

forth above, the Court must find are “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). In

doing so, the Court looks to the five factors considered by courts in this Circuit when making

such a determination. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 104.

               1.      Arm’s-Length Negotiations

       A “presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to a class settlement

reached in arm’s length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful dis-

covery.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 104. “[F]ormal discovery is not . . .

necessarily required even for final approval of a proposed settlement” if the parties “demonstrate

to the Court at the final approval stage their sufficient appreciation for the merits of the case and

[are] able to explain in greater detail the ‘significant factual investigation’ made prior to the set-

tlement.” Trombley I, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,

305 F. Supp. 2d at 105).

                                                 13
       Here, both parties were represented by experienced counsel. See ECF No. 62-5 at 4–10;

Feb. 1, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 20:15–21:5. And the parties represent that they engaged in arm’s-length

negotiations “over the course of more than two years, including four days of formal mediation

sessions, multiple additional sessions” with a “nationally well-known and experienced mediator,”

and “conferences among counsel.” ECF No. 63 at 8–9; see also ECF No. 62 at 16–17; Feb. 1,

2024 Hr’g Tr. at 21:6–21. During that time, they made “lengthy presentations of their factual and

legal arguments” along with “expert data analysis” and “theories of damages.” ECF No. 63 at 9.

Their negotiations were “protracted and contentious” and, often, seemed to be at an impasse, be-

fore ultimately resulting in the proposed settlement agreement. ECF No. 62-5 at 13–14. In light

of these representations, the Court easily concludes that the settlement resulted from fair, arm’s-

length negotiations between experienced counsel, and this factor supports approving the settlement

agreement.

               2.      Terms of the Settlement in Relation to the Strength of the Case

       Under this factor, courts typically “compare[] the terms of the settlement with the likely

recovery plaintiffs would attain if the case proceeded to trial, an exercise which necessarily in-

volves evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiffs’ case.” Stephens v. U.S. Airways Grp.,

Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 222, 227 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Secs., Deriv-

ative, & “ERISA” Litig., 4 F. Supp. 3d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2013)). That is, because “liability cannot

be assumed when evaluating a proposed settlement . . . [t]he value of the settlement must be bal-

anced against the likelihood of obtaining a substantial recovery at trial.” Radosti v. Envision EMI,

LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 58–59 (D.D.C. 2010). “The D.C. Circuit has suggested that this may be

the most important factor in evaluating a proposed class settlement.” Ceccone, 2016 WL 5107202,

at *9 (citing Thomas, 139 F.3d at 231).

                                                14
       Along with expansive programmatic relief, the proposed settlement agreement provides

for a fund of $14 million which, if approved, would rank among the largest employment discrim-

ination class funds in the last few years. See ECF No. 62 at 20. Even the minimum award to each

class members—$25,000—would be among the highest per capita awards in an employment dis-

crimination class action settlement in recent years. Id. True, the settlement will not be distributed

equally among the class. But the apportionment of relief among the class based on an individual-

ized assessment of class members’ claims still treats class members “equitably relative to each

other.” Rule 23(e)(2)(D); see In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-mc-197 (TFH), 2000 WL

1737867, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2000) (“Settlement distributions, such as this one, that apportions

funds according to the relative amount of damages suffered by class members have repeatedly

been deemed fair and reasonable.”).

       Should the case proceed, rather than settle, the parties represent that SunTrust would op-

pose class certification and attempt to disaggregate Plaintiffs’ claims, meaning, each Plaintiff

would need to prevail on the merits and prove damages. ECF No. 62 at 19. While Plaintiffs

“believe[] [they] would ultimately prevail,” they also recognize that “‘claims alleging systemic

employment discrimination are difficult to win.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, weighing the risks

and costs to both parties should they continue to litigate this case, as well as the extensive pro-

grammatic and monetary relief laid out in the settlement agreement designed to remedy Plaintiffs’

claims, the Court finds that the terms of the proposed settlement appear fair, adequate, and reason-

able given those considerations.

               3.      Stage of the Proceedings

       Next, courts look to “whether counsel had sufficient information, through adequate discov-

ery, to reasonably assess the risks of litigation vis-à-vis the probability of success and range of

recovery.” Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. III, 565 F. Supp. 2d 49, 57 (D.D.C. 2008)

                                                 15
(quoting In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., No. 99-cv-790 (TFH), 2003 WL

22037741, at *4 (D.D.C. June 16, 2003)). In doing so, courts may weigh favorably settlements

that do not “come too early to be suspicious nor too late to be a waste of resources,” but “at a

desirable point in the litigation for the parties to reach an agreement and to resolve these issues

without further delay, expense, and litigation.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d at

105.

       This case was filed more than five years ago, and the parties’ proposed settlement stemmed

from more than two years of mediation and other negotiations, after the Court denied SunTrust’s

motion to dismiss and granted the parties a stay to exchange discovery and engage in those nego-

tiations. The parties represent that there was a “substantial exchange of key information necessary

to fully evaluate the claims and potential damages,” and class counsel “retain[ed] an expert labor

economist and statistician to review and analyze the workforce and account data and conduct ex-

tensive studies and analyses regarding issues of liability and damages, which informed Plaintiffs’

mediation positions and negotiations.” ECF No. 62 at 24–25. Thus, the parties have had sufficient

time and information to assess the value of the settlement over the risks of continued litigation,

and it does not come too late, after much further class certification or merits briefing, so as to be a

waste of resources.

               4.      Reaction of the Class

       The next factor generally considered in determining the reasonableness of a settlement is

the reaction of the class. Thomas, 139 F.3d at 231–33; In re Nat’l Student Marketing Litig., 68

F.R.D. at 155. The four class representatives “fully endorse” the settlement. ECF No. 62 at 25.

And in addition, 33 notices of the Court’s preliminary approval of the settlement were sent to class

members, and all class members are believed to have received such notice by mail. ECF No. 62-

                                                  16
3 at 3. No timely objections or exclusion requests were received by the parties or the Court. 2 Id.

at 4. With no opposition to the settlement from class members, the Court finds that “[t]his factor

therefore unambiguously weighs in favor of approval.” Alvarez v. Keystone Plus Constr. Corp.,

303 F.R.D. 152, 164 (D.D.C. 2014).

               5.     Opinion of Experienced Counsel

       The opinion of experienced counsel “should be afforded substantial consideration by a

court in evaluating the reasonableness of a proposed settlement.” Chilcott, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 121.

Counsel for both parties are experienced in litigating class action discrimination suits, and have

represented that, in their opinion, the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. ECF No. 62 at

17 (“Based on their experience and an in-depth analysis of the merits, the record, and the risks of

this action, Class Counsel enthusiastically recommend this Settlement to the Court); Feb. 1, 2024

Hr’g Tr. at 20:15–21:21. So though the Court will not adhere “blindly to the views of counsel,” it

does credit the opinions of experienced counsel, and concludes that this factor, too, supports ap-

proving the settlement agreement. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 106.

                                         *      *       *

       2
          In fact, the opposite happened: one non-class member attempted to opt in to the agree-
ment. The day before the fairness hearing, a SunTrust employee moved to intervene, arguing he
was a member of the settlement class. ECF No. 64. But the parties who struck the agreement
argued otherwise, because the employee had not self-identified as African American and/or Black
in SunTrust’s workforce data that was used to develop the class list. ECF Nos. 65, 66. The Court
agreed. ECF No. 69. And this employee’s exclusion from the settlement class does not cast doubt
on whether the Court should approve the settlement. As explained, the parties have negotiated a
fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement on behalf of a defined class of plaintiffs. And non-class
members are no worse off for it—they retain all their rights, including the ability to sue SunTrust
for racial discrimination.

                                                17
        Thus, for the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the proposed settlement agree-

ment satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(e)(2) and will grant the motion to approve the settle-

ment.

IV.     Service Awards and Attorney’s Fees and Costs

        A.     Legal Standards

        First, “[i]t is common for courts to approve incentive awards in class-action litigations,

especially when there is a common fund created to benefit the entire class.” Little v. Washington

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 313 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2018). Indeed, courts in this Circuit

regularly approve service awards “to compensate plaintiffs for the services they provided and the

risks they incurred during the course of the class action litigation.” Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC,

760 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2011). In making that determination, courts may consider (1) “the

actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class,” (2) “the degree to which the

class has benefitted from those actions;” and (3) “the amount of time and effort the plaintiff ex-

pended in pursuing the litigation.” Wells v. Allstate Ins. Co., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2008)

(citation omitted). Besides compensating named plaintiffs for “work done on behalf of the class,”

incentive awards are also intended “to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in

bringing the action,” among other considerations. Cobell v. Jewell, 29 F. Supp. 3d 18, 25 (D.D.C.

2014), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 802 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

        Next, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), “[i]n a certified class action, the court

may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the

parties’ agreement.” And “a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other

than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the fund as a whole.”

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); see also Hartman v. Pompeo, No. 77-cv-

2019, 2020 WL 6445873, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2020) (“[F]air and just allowances for expenses

                                                18
and counsel fees should be spread among all the beneficiaries of the fund.” (internal quotations

omitted)). Courts in this District often consider “(1) the size of the fund created and the number

of persons benefited, (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by class members to the

settlement terms or fees requested by counsel, (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved,

(4) the complexity and duration of litigation, (5) the risk of nonpayment, (6) the time devoted to

the case by plaintiffs’ counsel, and (7) awards in similar cases.” In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n

Sec., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 4 F. Supp. 3d 94, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2013).

        As for costs, “[c]ounsel are entitled to reimbursement only for those expenses incurred in

the course of work that benefitted the class.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-mc-197 (TFH),

2001 WL 34312839, at *13 (D.D.C. July 16, 2001) (citation omitted). “Attorneys are clearly not

entitled to reimbursement of expenses where the request is for an amount which is excessive or

otherwise non compensable.” Id. (citation omitted). But courts do “routinely award[] expenses

for which counsel would normally directly bill their clients.” Id.

        B.     Analysis

        Plaintiffs request approval of service awards of $175,000 per class representative, as well

as an award of attorney’s fees amounting to of 25% of the settlement fund, or $3.5 million dollars,

plus reasonable costs, for Plaintiffs’ counsel. ECF No. 63 at 6. The Court takes each request in

turn.

        First, the Court will approve the parties’ proposed service awards. As counsel emphasize

throughout their briefing, Randle, Taylor, Boyd, and Johnson have “invested hundreds of hours

apiece over many years into prosecuting and settling this case.” ECF No. 63 at 11. They met

regularly with counsel, furnished documents and narrative input, and were part of all strategic

decisions. Id. at 11–13. They participated in all four mediation sessions, spanning a two-year

period, and regularly spoke with class members to keep them updated on the status of the litigation.

                                                 19
Id. at 13–14. That time devoted to pursuing this litigation cost class representatives “hundreds of

hours of lost business” and other opportunities, and, as financial advisors suing their current or

former employer, they “placed their careers in jeopardy.” Id. at 15; see generally Castillo v. Noo-

dles & Co., 16-cv-3036, 2016 WL 7451626, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2016) (explaining that the

need for service awards “to induce an individual to participate in the suit . . . is especially true in

employment litigation” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Named plaintiffs also signed a

general release of all claims, not just of their class claims. See Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,

No. 4-cv-9194, 2010 WL 4877852, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (granting enhanced service

awards because named plaintiffs released additional claims). Given these risks and the relative

size of the settlement fund—here, $14 million—an award of $175,000 is within the approximate

range approved by other courts. 3 Neither SunTrust nor any class member has objected to these

fees. Thus, given the considerable cost and risk incurred by named plaintiffs for their significant

time and effort expended, the Court will approve the service awards as fair and reasonable.

       Next, the Court considers the parties’ proposed award of attorney’s fees and costs. “[I]n

class action cases in which the plaintiff class recovers benefits from a common fund, the favored

method of calculating attorneys’ fees is to award a percentage of the fund.” Radosti v. Envision

EMI, LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2011). The requested 25% of the settlement agree-

ment—though large in absolute terms, given the overall size of the settlement fund here—is well

       3
         See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 5-cv-6583,
Dkt. 616 at 5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2013) (approving $250,000 service awards); Chen-Oster v. Gold-
man Sachs & Co., No. 10-cv-6950 (AT), 2023 WL 7325264, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2023) (ap-
proving $250,000); Slaughter v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 13-cv-6368 (HDL), Dkt. 113 at
5 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2017) (approving $175,000); Senegal v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 18-
cv-6006, Dkt. 40 at 5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2018), aff’d, 939 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2019) (approving
$150,000); Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 18-cv-3673, Dkt. 139 at 5 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2021)
(approving $150,000).

                                                  20
within the range of “reasonable” attorney’s fees recognized in this Circuit, which generally runs

from “twenty to thirty percent of the common fund.” In re Lorazepam, 2003 WL 22037741, at *7.

Of course, “[l]arger common funds are typically associated with smaller percentage awards . . .

because even a small percentage of a very large fund yields ‘a very large fee award.’” In re Fed.

Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 4 F. Supp. 3d at 111 (quoting In re Black

Farmers Discrim. Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2011)). In “megafund” cases with funds

of “many millions or even billions of dollars,” “an appropriate fee may be considerably less than

twenty percent of the fund.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing study of settlements involving funds of

over $100 million in which the mean attorney’s fee award was about 18%). But this is not such a

case. Plaintiffs’ counsel details the complexity and significant time and resources devoted to this

litigation warranting significant fees. ECF No. 63 at 24–29. And the requested fees are in the

range of others awarded in similar cases. 4 Again, neither SunTrust nor any class member has

objected to the proposed attorneys’ fees. For these reasons, the Court approves the fee request.

       Finally, the Court turns to the request for reasonable costs, amounting to $91,232.21. ECF

No. 63 at 31. About 20% are the costs of retaining an expert labor economist to analyze issues of

liability and damages, 45% are mediation costs, and the remainder relate to litigation expenses

such as travel and computerized research, all of which are regularly reimbursed, and the Court

finds they are compensable and not excessive. See In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., Derivative,

& “ERISA” Litig., 4 F. Supp. 3d 94, 113 (D.D.C. 2013) (reimbursing class counsel over $10

       4
         See, e.g., Little, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 38–39 (awarding 25% of $6.5 million fund in attor-
ney’s fees and costs in employment discrimination class action); Meyer v. Panera Bread Co., No.
17-cv-2565 (EGS/GMH), 2019 WL 11271381, at *9–10 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2019) (awarding 33.48%
of almost $2 million fund in attorney’s fees), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Meyer
v. Panera, LLC, No. 17-cv-2565 (EGS/GMH), 2019 WL 11271378 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2019);
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F. Supp. 2d 73, 81, 84–86 (D.D.C. 2006) (awarding $33% of
$12 million fund in attorney’s fees).

                                                21
million in expert costs); Howard v. Liquidity Serv. Inc., No. 14-cv-1183 (BAH), 2018 WL

4853898, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2018) (reimbursing class counsel for requested costs, “including

costs for travel, consulting experts, and conducting mediation, as well as for costs related to dep-

osition transcripts and computerized research”). For these reasons, the Court also approves the

costs request.

V.     Conclusion

       For all the above reasons, the Court will grant the parties’ motions for class certification,

final approval of the class action settlement, service awards to class representatives, and attorney’s

fees and costs. ECF Nos. 62, 63. A separate order will issue.

                                                              /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
                                                              TIMOTHY J. KELLY
                                                              United States District Judge
Date: February 21, 2024

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