Court Opinion

ID: 9523834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:47:26.468104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:15.029850
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
(concurring in part and *452dissenting in part) I concur with the holding of the panel affirming summary judgment on plaintiffs’ usury claim, but I dissent from the affirmance of the order awarding defendants attorney fees and costs, which the majority premises upon plaintiffs’ failure to perfect in timely fashion an appeal in accordance with MCR 7.203(A)(1).
The majority concludes that the order of May 28, 1985, requiring the setting aside of the lis pendens and the imposition of costs, was final and that the failure of plaintiffs to claim an appeal from that order deprives this Court of jurisdiction to review the merits of the trial court’s underlying decision. In so deciding, the majority omits any mention of its discretion to overlook technical deficiencies in appellate practice and to proceed to review the merits of even an improperly presented claim. In Guzowski v Detroit Racing Ass’n, Inc, 130 Mich App 322, 324-327; 343 NW2d 536 (1983), another panel of this Court engaged in appellate review on the merits of the claim presented, notwithstanding that the plaintiff erroneously claimed an appeal as of right from a nonfinal order. The panel held that the manner in which the appellant invoked appellate review was strictly a matter of procedure and that a defect in the filing of a claim of appeal need not preclude appellate review in every instance. "The problem posed here does not go to this Court’s power or authority to render judgment in a class of cases but, rather, concerns merely how this Court should respond when a litigant seeks review of a circuit court order by one method when the litigant should have sought review by another method and where it is undisputed that this Court does, in fact, have the legal authority to resolve the underlying merits of the action.” Id., pp 325-326. I agree with this reasoning and therefore conclude that this Court is *453vested with the discretion to excuse the failure to correctly invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. See also MCR 7.216(A)(3), (7).
In the ordinary case, I would be very reluctant to exercise this discretion. However, the instant case presents a difficult and somewhat obscure question of whether an order awarding costs but deferring the fixing of the amount of those costs is final; the failure of the appellate attorney to recognize and correctly resolve this question is understandable if not excusable. More fundamentally, I am persuaded that a more egregious error was committed in the trial court, namely, the erroneous conduct of proceedings after the filing of the first claim of appeal in the matter vested jurisdiction in this Court. The resolution of the majority will allow this error to go uncorrected, leaving the unfortunate, albeit unintended, impression that such procedures on the trial court level are to be condoned. This same defect flawed both the order of May 28, 1985 (awarding costs), and the order of August 1, 1985 (fixing costs in the amount of $693). For these reasons, I would treat the second claim of appeal filed in this case, erroneously taken from the order setting the amount of costs, as an application for leave, which I would then grant in order to review the trial court’s erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.
The filing of a claim of appeal vests jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals and, conversely, divests the circuit court of its jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings, except as otherwise permitted by MCR 7.208. See Moffit v Sederlund, 145 Mich App 1, 7; 378 NW2d 491 (1985), lv den 425 Mich 860 (1986). MCR 7.208 provides in pertinent part:
(A) Limitations. After a claim of appeal is filed or leave to appeal is granted, the trial court or *454tribunal may not set aside or amend the judgment or order appealed from except by order of the Court of Appeals, by stipulation of the parties, or as otherwise provided by law.
(B) Correction of Defects. Except as otherwise provided by rule and until the record is filed in the Court of Appeals, the trial court or tribunal has jurisdiction
(1) to grant further time to do, properly perform, or correct any act in the trial court or tribunal in connection with the appeal that was omitted or insufficiently done, other than to extend the time for filing a claim of appeal or for paying the entry fee or to allow delayed appeal ....
In Vallance v Brewbaker, 161 Mich App 642, 647-648; 411 NW2d 808 (1987), this Court, in construing the foregoing court rule, reversed the trial court’s decision to award costs and attorney fees after an appeal as of right was taken from an order of summary disposition, concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed once the claim of appeal removed the matter to this Court. I agree and would, based on MCR 7.208, reverse the award of costs without prejudice to defendants’ right to renew their challenge to the lis pendens and their motion for costs and attorney fees.