Court Opinion

ID: 9389072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 16:07:37.450555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:25.060509
License: Public Domain

J-S02026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RANDY OSCAR SEVERINO                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1114 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 1, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0002748-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 24, 2023

       Appellant, Randy Oscar Severino, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on July 1, 2022, following his bench trial convictions for

persons not to possess a firearm, possession of a firearm with an altered or

obliterated manufacturer’s number, and carrying a firearm without a license.1

We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

       While on duty [at approximately 9:50 p.m.] on July 29, 2021,
       Criminal Investigators [(“CI”)] James Gresh, Christopher Blauser,
       and Josiah Fischer, of the Reading Police Department Vice Unit,
       were driving, in an undercover police vehicle, behind a red
       Chevrolet Aveo in the 400 block of Walnut Street when the
       investigators noticed the rear passenger side tail[-]light was not
       functioning properly. The vehicle pulled into a parking space on
       Walnut Street. [T]he investigators [] activate[d] the lights and
       sirens on the [police] vehicle and approached the [Aveo] because
       of the issue with the tail[-]light[.]
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6110.2(a), and 6106(a)(1), respectively.
J-S02026-23

     The investigators were in plainclothes but also wore black
     bulletproof vests over their clothing that clearly displayed the
     word “Police” in reflective letters on the front and back of the vest.
     They were also carrying their badges and firearms. The driver of
     the vehicle was William Morales, and the passenger was
     [Appellant], Randy Severino. CI Fischer interacted with the driver
     and CI Blauser interacted with [Appellant]. CI Blauser noticed
     that [Appellant] was sweaty, visibly nervous, appeared agitated
     and was talking in circles during their interaction. CI Blauser told
     [Appellant] to relax and instructed him to stop making furtive
     movements. [Appellant] continued to make furtive movements
     toward his knees and waist. He was then directed by CI Blauser
     to exit the car. [Fearing for officer safety,] CI Blauser performed
     a pat down of [Appellant and] felt a firearm in [Appellant’s]
     waistband. While removing [Appellant’s] belt to retrieve the
     firearm, the firearm fell down the leg of [Appellant’s] pants. The
     firearm was recovered by CI Gresh who was standing with
     [Appellant] and CI Blauser. The firearm was a loaded black 9 mm
     Barretta APX handgun with an obliterated serial number.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/2022, at *1-2 (unpaginated). The police immediately

arrested Appellant.

     Thereafter, the case proceeded as follows:

     On October 21, 2021, [Appellant] filed a [counseled] motion to
     suppress evidence obtained during the search of his person on
     July 29, 2021, alleging that the stop of the vehicle was improper,
     and that the removal of [Appellant] from the vehicle and resulting
     search of his person were [] independently improper. A hearing
     was held on the motion on January 5, 2022. On March 4, 2022,
     the motion was denied. [Appellant] proceeded to a bench trial on
     July 1, 2022 at which he was convicted of [the aforementioned
     crimes]. On the same date, [the trial court imposed] an aggregate
     sentence of four (4) to eight (8) years of incarceration[.] On July
     11, 2022, [Appellant filed] a post [-]sentence motion [which the
     trial court] denied without a hearing on July 13, 2022.

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Trial Court Opinion, 9/7/2022, at 1 (footnote omitted). This timely appeal

resulted.2

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

       A. Whether the lower court committed an error of law by entering
          an order denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress evidence
          and [petition for] writ of habeas corpus [] since the stop of the
          motor vehicle was unlawful as the law enforcement officers
          lacked probable cause of a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor
          Vehicle Code[?]

       B. Whether the lower court committed an error of law by entering
          an order denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress evidence
          and [petition for] writ of habeas corpus [] as the search of
          Appellant was not supported by reasonable suspicion that
          Appellant was armed and dangerous[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       Both of Appellant’s issues challenge the suppression court’s rulings. The

standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is as

follows:

       An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge
       to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
       whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by
       the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
       facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
       suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
       Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
       remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
       a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are
____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 8, 2022. The trial court ordered
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on August 9, 2022. On August 24, 2022,
Appellant timely complied. The trial court filed an opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on September 7, 2022 that relied largely upon its earlier
decision denying Appellant’s motion to suppress filed in March 2022.

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       supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
       findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are
       erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the determination of the
       suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
       suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an
       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Bernard, 218 A.3d 935, 940 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). “Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a

pre-trial motion to suppress.” Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

       Appellant contends the trial court erred in determining that the police

had probable cause to conduct the motor vehicle stop at issue and,

subsequently, that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective

frisk of Appellant upon a reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and

dangerous. See Appellant’s Brief at 15. We will examine those contentions

in turn.

       First, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to conclude

that the driver was not in compliance with 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b)3 in order to

justify the traffic stop. More specifically, Appellant posits:

____________________________________________

3 General Lighting Requirements, Section 4303(b) provides, in pertinent
part:

       (b) Rear lighting.--Every vehicle operated on a highway shall be
       equipped with a rear lighting system including, but not limited to,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       First, the vehicle was appropriately equipped with a rear lighting
       system, including a rear lamp, rear reflector, stop lamp and
       license plate lights. There is no testimony that any of the lighting
       systems were not illuminat[ed] except for the rear tail-light. The
       officers testified that they were traveling behind the Chevrolet
       Aveo approximately fifty (50) feet on Walnut Street, traveling in
       a forward motion. There is no indication by the officers that the
       tail-light would not operate if the car was placed in reverse or if
       the tail-light would illuminate[] when the emergency four way
       lights turned on. As such, there is no indication by the testimony
       that the rear tail-light was ever in a position which would have
       triggered illumination of the tail-light or that it did not illuminate
       when it should have. There is simply no evidence [to support the
       officers’ belief that the tail-light did not function or illuminate
       properly].
                             *            *           *
       For the reasons set forth above the officers lacked probable cause
       to stop the vehicle, the stop of the Chevrolet Aveo was illegal and
       not authorized by law.

Appellant’s Brief at 20-21.

       “The issue of what quantum of cause a police officer must possess in

order to conduct a vehicle stop based on a possible violation of the Motor

Vehicle Code is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary

and our standard of review is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260

A.3d 263, 267 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation and brackets omitted). “For a stop

based on the observed violation of the Vehicle Code or otherwise

non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to make a

____________________________________________

       rear lamps, rear reflectors, stop lamps and license plate light, in
       conformance with regulations of the department. If a vehicle is
       equipped with a centrally mounted rear stop light, a decal or
       overlay may be affixed to the centrally mounted rear stop light if
       the decal or overlay meets all applicable State and Federal
       regulations.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b).

                                           -5-
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constitutional vehicle stop.” Id. (citation omitted). “Pennsylvania law makes

clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the

officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Id.

(citation omitted).

       Here, the suppression court found credible testimony that “[w]hile

traveling behind the red Aveo on Walnut Street, the investigators noticed the

rear passenger side tail[-]light was not functioning properly [and] under 75

Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b) provided probable cause that a traffic code violation was

occurring.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/2022, at *3 (unpaginated). We agree.

CI Blauser testified that while driving “approximately 50 feet” behind the

subject vehicle, he conducted a traffic stop “for a nonfunctioning rear

passenger side tail[-]light.” N.T., 1/5/2022, at 5. He further clarified that

“the rear tail[-]light in the lower left corner was[ not] working, it was[ not]

illuminating, there was no light coming from it.”       Id.   CI Gresh testified

similarly, noting that he “observed a nonfunctioning passenger side

tail[-]light” wherein “[n]ot all of the bulbs in the light were working properly.”

Id. at 20.    The suppression court credited this testimony, and we will not

usurp that determination as there is support for it in the record.4 Hence, we

conclude that the suppression court properly determined that the police had
____________________________________________

4   Moreover, we conclude that the statute fairly implies that a tail-light must
fully function when the vehicle is moving forward and, therefore, reject
Appellant’s argument that there was no evidence that the tail-light would not
operate if the car were in reverse or when emergency flashers were activated.
Evidence that the tail-light was not operating when the vehicle was moving
forward was sufficient to support the traffic stop.

                                           -6-
J-S02026-23

probable cause to conduct a traffic stop for a violation of Section 4303(b).

See Commonwealth v. Sebek, 716 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Pa. Super. 1998)

(“[T]he undisputed evidence provided by the trooper's testimony establishe[d]

that the appellant's motorcycle's tail[-]light was not functioning. …Failing to

have a working tail[-]light is a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b). The

trooper, therefore, had clearly articulable and reasonable grounds to have

suspected a Vehicle Code violation, which justified the stop of appellant's

motorcycle.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.

      Next, Appellant argues that “[t]he police officers search and seizure of

[his person] was unconstitutional because “the officers lacked reasonable

suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.”            Appellant’s Brief at 22.

Appellant concedes that the police conducted a protective frisk based upon:

“(1) nervousness and fidgeting, (2) sweat forming on his neck, and (3) left

hand [motions] towards his left knee.” Id. at 25. However, Appellant opines:

      Prior to the search there is no indication that the officers observed
      any additional criminal activity or observed any weapons. There
      is no indication that the stop occurred in a high crime area. The
      testimony never indicates that Appellant was reaching for items
      or attempting to gain access to any items, it merely states that
      his left hand would move towards his left knee. Under the theory
      of the Commonwealth, any movement, but for remaining entirely
      still for the duration of the questioning would amount to
      reasonable suspicion for officer safety.

Id. at 25-26.

      Our Supreme Court has expressly recognized that an officer conducting

a valid traffic stop may order all of the occupants of a vehicle to alight to

assure his or her safety. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903,

                                      -7-
J-S02026-23

907 n.4 (Pa. 2000). Moreover, with regard to vehicular stops and searches,

our Supreme Court has clearly stated that “[o]ur constitutional safeguards do

not require an officer to gamble with his life.” Commonwealth v. Morris,

422, 644 A.2d 721, 724 (Pa. 1994). While an officer may order both drivers

and passengers out of a lawfully stopped vehicle, the officer’s right to perform

a weapons search is governed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), which

we shall now review.

      We have previously explained:

      It is hornbook law that the Fourth Amendment to the United
      States Constitution, as well as Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania
      Constitution, protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
      seizures. Warrantless searches and seizures ... are unreasonable
      per se, unless conducted pursuant to specifically established and
      well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such
      exception, the [Terry], “stop and frisk,” permits a police officer to
      briefly detain a citizen for investigatory purposes if the officer
      “observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably
      conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be
      afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.

      Terry further held that “when an officer is justified in believing
      that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating
      at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or
      to others,” the officer may conduct a pat down search “to
      determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon.”
      Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.... The purpose of this limited search is not
      to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue
      his investigation without fear of violence.

      In order to conduct an investigatory stop, the police must have
      reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, 392
      U.S. at 30. In order to determine whether the police had
      reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances—the whole
      picture—must be considered. Based upon that whole picture, the
      detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis
      for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.

                                      -8-
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     To conduct a pat down for weapons, a limited search or “frisk” of
     the suspect, the officer must reasonably believe that his safety or
     the safety of others is threatened. If either the seizure (the initial
     stop) or the search (the frisk) is found to be unreasonable, the
     remedy is to exclude all evidence derived from the illegal
     government activity. The Terry totality of the circumstances test
     applies to traffic stops or roadside encounters in the same way
     that it applies to typical police encounters.

Commonwealth v. Arrington, 233 A.3d 910, 915–916 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(some quotations, some citations, and all original brackets omitted).

     Under the totality of circumstances test referenced in Terry, late night

stops, furtive movements, and nervousness can support an officer’s justified

belief that an individual is armed and dangerous. As noted by the Arrington

Court,

     we have held that a defendant's “furtive movement of leaning
     forward and appearing to conceal something under his seat, along
     with his extreme nervousness and [a] night time stop, was
     sufficient to warrant a reasonable police officer to believe that his
     safety was in danger and that [the defendant] might gain
     immediate control of a weapon.” [Commonwealth v.]Buchert,
     68 A.3d [911,] 916-917 [(Pa. Super. 2013)]; see also
     Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 401 (Pa. Super.
     2011) (finding reasonable suspicion where the traffic stop was
     conducted at night, in a high-drug and high-crime area, and the
     officer witnessed the defendant make the furtive movement of
     reaching under his seat and then towards his chest, consistent
     with concealing a weapon); In re O.J., 958 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa.
     Super. 2008) (finding reasonable suspicion where the traffic stop
     occurred at night, the defendant initially failed to stop his vehicle
     when signaled by police, and the defendant made “rapid and
     furtive hand movements over the vehicle's console,” which had
     been left partially opened); Commonwealth v. Murray, 936
     A.2d 76, 80 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding reasonable suspicion where
     the traffic stop occurred at night and in a high-narcotics area, the
     defendant's vehicle had tinted windows, and the defendant made
     “a lot of movement in the vehicle” as the officer was approaching).

                                     -9-
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      In contrast, this Court in Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d
      294 (Pa. Super. 2013), found that an officer lacked reasonable
      suspicion to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle where (1)
      the stop occurred at night, (2) the defendant's vehicle had tinted
      windows, and (3) the defendant appeared “extremely nervous.”
      Id. at 304. The Cartagena court noted that there was no
      testimony indicating that the defendant had made furtive
      movements, that the stop occurred in a high-crime area, or that
      the police saw any weapons in the vehicle prior to conducting the
      search. Id. at 304-306; see also Commonwealth v. Moyer,
      954 A.2d 659, 669-670 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that evidence
      that a vehicle's occupants engaged in furtive movements and
      appeared nervous was insufficient to establish reasonable
      suspicion); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1206
      (Pa. Super. 2002) (same).

Arrington, 233 A.3d at 916–917 (original brackets omitted).

      Here, the suppression court concluded that, “[u]nder the totality of the

circumstances,” “[t]he criminal investigator gave specific articulable facts”

showing “there was a reasonable suspicion to perform a pat down of

[Appellant] for officer safety.”     Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/2022, at *3

(unpaginated). More specifically,

      [Appellant] was sweaty, visibly nervous, appeared agitated, and
      was talking in circles during [police] interaction. CI Blauser told
      [Appellant] to relax and instructed him to stop making furtive
      movements. [Appellant] continued to make movements toward
      his knees and waist. CI Blauser had reasonable suspicion for the
      safety of himself and the other investigators. The determination
      [] to pat down [Appellant] was appropriate.

Id. at *4 (unpaginated).

      Upon review of the record and applicable law, we discern no abuse of

discretion or error of law in determining that the protective frisk of Appellant

was proper. Here, CI Blauser testified that he initiated the subject traffic stop

                                     - 10 -
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at night, at approximately 9:50 p.m. N.T., 1/5/2022, at 4 and 11 (emphasis

added). “Upon initial contact, [Appellant] appeared to be very nervous[,] he

was fidgeting around in his seat[,]” and visible “sweat [was] forming on his

neck.” Id. at 7. “[M]ultiple times” Appellant “would go towards his left knee

for no reason.” Id. CI Blauser advised Appellant “as to why the vehicle had

been stopped, to try to kind of put him at ease, but as the interaction went

on, his behaviors became more pronounced.” Id. (emphasis added). CI

Blauser told Appellant “to keep his hands visible” to the police officers. Id.

CI Blauser then asked Appellant to step out of the vehicle because CI Blauser

“wanted to conduct a pat down of his person, make sure he was[ not] armed

just for [] safety, [] based on the behaviors he was exhibiting.” Id. CI Cresh

confirmed that CI Blauser told Appellant to “relax” and “keep his hands where

he could see them.” Id. at 21. When Appellant failed to comply with police

instructions during a nighttime traffic stop, continued exhibiting nervousness

including visibly sweating, and continually made furtive movements toward

his leg despite being told not to, such evidence was sufficient to warrant a

reasonable police officer to believe that his safety was in danger and that

Appellant might gain immediate control of a weapon.5 As such, we discern no
____________________________________________

5 We specifically reject Appellant’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Reppert,
814 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc). See Appellant’s Brief at 25-26.
In that case, the traffic stop to address an infraction of Motor Vehicle Code
had already concluded when the police asked Reppert, a backseat passenger,
to alight the vehicle for a protective frisk. Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1203. The
Reppert Court determined that an illegal detention occurred when the police
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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trial court error or abuse of discretion and Appellant’s second issue pertaining

to suppression lacks merit.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/24/2023

____________________________________________

ordered Reppert out of the vehicle in question when “Reppert's hands
remained in plain view throughout the encounter, [and police] ordered him to
step out of the car based on suspicion of his head and shoulder movements
prior to the stop and his nervous appearance during the stop[.]” Id. at 1199.
This Court further recognized that although Reppert had “bulges in [his] front
pocket” that “Reppert's pockets were not visible from outside the car as his
lap was covered with a sandwich throughout the traffic stop [] and[, therefore,
the police] could not rely on the appearance of Reppert's pockets when []
ordered [] to exit the car, [and, thus,] the [suppression] court erred in
concluding that the bulging of the pockets contributed to the existence of
reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1204. This case is distinguishable because, as
set forth in detail above, Appellant continuously made furtive movements
towards a location where a firearm could be concealed, was sweating
profusely, and his actions continued and became more pronounced as the
encounter ensued. Furthermore, the Reppert Court did not specify the time
of day that encounter occurred, but, here, the traffic stop occurred at
nighttime and could be considered in determining reasonable suspicion under
the totality of circumstances.

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