Court Opinion

ID: 9586718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:16.454717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:48.536873
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the superior court’s grant of appellee’s Civil Rule 41(b) motion should he affirmed. In my view appellant had established a prima facie case, and therefore I would reverse the judgment of involuntary dismissal which was entered below.
The majority has decided (considering appellant’s evidence in its most favorable light) that appellant failed to establish that appellee owed any duty of care, and that appellant’s proof was further deficient in that no negligence on appellee’s part was shown.
As to the duty of care issue, I am of the opinion that section 392 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is apposite. Under the standard of care articulated in section 392, appellee had the duty of exercising reasonable care to make the ladder, which he furnished, safe for appellant’s use. This standard of care also compelled appellee to subject the ladder to such an inspection as the danger of using it in a defective condition reasonably required. Section 392 of the Restatement reads as follows:
One who supplies to another, directly or through a third person, a chattel to be used for the supplier’s business purposes is subject to liability to those for whose use the chattel is supplied, or to those whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by persons for whose use the chattel is supplied
(a) if the supplier fails to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied, or
(b.) if he fails to exercise reasonable care to discover its dangerous condition or character, and to inform those whom he should expect to use it.1
*259Comment e of this section of the Restatement is of significance here. This comment reads in part as follows:
One who employs another to erect a structure or to do other work, and agrees for that purpose to supply the necessary tools and temporary structures, supplies them to the employees of such other for a business purpose.2
In my opinion the record discloses that appellant’s case in chief comes within the purview of section 392 of the Restatement. Although it was initially agreed that appellant was to supply his own equipment when he arrived at the jobsite, appellee, without request, volunteered and insisted that appellant use appellee’s ladder.3 Under these facts the trier of fact could reasonably infer that appellee had agreed to supply the ladder to appellant, and that it was thereafter used in furtherance of appellee’s business purposes. I cannot agree that the “most (or more) logical inference” which can be deduced from appellant’s evidence is that the furnishing of the ladder was a gratuitous act.
I believe the case at bar to be distinguishable from the factual situation alluded to in comment e to section 392 of the Restatement where it is stated in part:
On the other hand, if it is understood that the person who is to do the work is to supply his own instrumentalities, but the person for whom the work is to be done permits his own tools or appliances to be used as a favor to the person doing the work, the tools and appliances are supplied as a gratuity and not for use for the supplier’s business purposes.
Here the record is devoid of any request from appellant to appellee for the use of his ladder. *What the record does disclose is that appellee (the general contractor) insisted that appellant not use his own ladder. Appellant’s proof further demonstrates that the ladder was used in furtherance of appellee’s business purposes, namely, in the furtherance of appellee’s general contract to repair certain portions of the goveronor’s mansion.4 I, therefore, conclude that section 392 of the Restatement is applicable here.5
*260Additionally, Í am of the opinion that appellant’s evidence established that ap-pellee owed him a duty of care under the rationale of Hilleary v. Bromley.6 In that case the defendant had agreed to place siding on a house and subcontracted the job of applying the siding to plaintiff. As part of the subcontract, defendant agreed to furnish the necessary ladders. In its opinion the court stated:
It is axiomatic that tort liability is predicated upon the violation of a duty growing out of a legal relationship voluntarily assumed by the tort-feasor with another, or a duty arising by operation of law because of thte situation of the parties. The defendants were the bailors and the plaintiff the bailee of the ladder in question. The legal rights and duties arising out of bailment are founded upon the contemplation of benefit accruing to one party or the other, or to both. Here, the defendants, as bailors, furnished the ladder to assist the bailee, the plaintiff, in performing a contract in which the bailors were interested. It was a bailment for mutual benefit. The extent of the duty of a bailor as to defects in the property, which he should recognize as likely to injure others, has its basis in the derivation of benefit to himself. Where the bailor has no beneficial interest in the bailment, it may be unreasonable to impose upon him a duty to put the subject matter of the bailment in usable condition unless it is an inherently dangerous instrumentality. Such an obligation would unduly restrict the transfer of property, causing persons to refrain from lending chattels to another for the sole benefit of the latter. However, where both the bailor and the bailee are benefited by the transaction, the situation is otherwise. It then becomes the bailor’s duty to make the chattel, which is the subject of bailment, safe for its intended purpose, or to inform the bailee of any unsafe condition in the chattel which it was the duty of the bailor, in the exercise of ordinary, care, to discover. * * *
Where a bailor is benefited by the bailment, as in this case, it is held that his duty should be of a higher nature than in the case of a bailment which benefits solely the bailee. * * * Such bailor is under obligation to use reasonable effort to anticipate danger by discovering defects which may exist in the chattel bailed. * * *7
I am of the opinion that the trier of fact, from the record in this case, could draw the reasonable inference that appellee, as bailor, supplied the ladder in order to assist appellant, the bailee, in the performance of both the subcontract and general contract. Both parties were interested in the completion of these contracts. Ap*261pellant’s proof established that the furnishing of the ladder was a bailment for mutual benefit. In such circumstances it was the duty of appellee to make the ladder safe for its intended purpose “or to inform the bailee of any unsafe condition in the chattel which it was the duty of the bailor, in the exercise of ordinary care, to discover.”8
As to the proof of negligence issue (i. e., appellee’s breach of a duty owed to appellant), I am of the opinion that appellant’s proof established a prima facie case. In Rogge v. Weaver 9 this court had occasion to construe Civil Rule 41(b) and in so doing stated in part:
We endorse generally the rule that a trial court should not reject uncontra-dicted and unimpeached testimony unless the testimony was inherently improbable. Nor should the testimony of a party to the case, or an employee of a party, be disregarded, discounted or considered inherently improbable or suspicious in the absence of conflicting proof, or of circumstances justifying doubt as to the truth.
I note that the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court considered the testimony of plaintiff or of his witness “inherently improbable or biased.”10 In my view appellant’s proof made out a prima facie case that appellee furnished him with an unsafe ladder (whether the standard of care is one arising out of the duties owed by suppliers of chattels in a business context or that which arises from a mutually beneficial bailment).
For the majority to conclude that “no evidence was produced which could logically support an inference of negligence” is to ignore appellant’s uncontrar dieted evidence that the ladder collapsed. Also ignored is appellant’s testimony to the effect that when he put his weight on the extension portion of the ladder, it gave way and that this was caused by the two hooks coming loose.11
The majority’s conclusion that the “most logical inference” is that appellant himself was inadvertent or careless represents a departure from the principles articulated in Rogge and embodies extensive specula-ation.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Comment a to this section of the Restatement reads:
The rules stated in §§ 388-390 determine the liability of those who for any purposes supply a chattel for the use of others. They, therefore, apply to determine the liability of a person who supplies a chattel for a use by others in which he or the others have a business interest, with knowledge that it is or likely to be dangerous for its intended use. (See § 391.) This Section states the rule under which a peculiar liability is imposed upon one supplying chattels for another’s use because of the fact that the use is one in .which the supplier has a business interest. A person so supplying goods . is required not only to give warning of dangers which he knows are involved in the use of the article, or which, from facts within his knowledge, he knows are likely to be so involved, hut also to subject the article to such an inspection as the danger of using it in a defective condition makes it reasonable to require of him. The additional duty of inspection thrown upon the person so supplying chattels for a use in which he has a business interest, as compared with the absence of any such duty when he has no business interest in the use *259for ■which the chattel is supplied, is analogous to the duty of inspection imposed upon one who permits another to come upon 1ns land for his business purpose.

. See illustration number 1 to this comment which reads:
A employs B, a painter, to repaint his residence. The contract provides that B he allowed to use the ladders which A has upon his premises. 0, an employee of B, while using one of these ladders, is hurt by a defect which, although not readily observable, could have been discovered by the exercise of a reasonably careful inspection. A is subject to liability to C.

. In addition to the relevant portions of the record referred to in the majority’s opinion, appellant testified that appel-lee told him, “I got my ladder here, don’t use yours. Use mine, mine is handy here.

. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning that the most logical inference is that it made no difference to appellee “whether or not appellant accepted his offer,” the trier of fact could reasonably have inferred that appellee agreed and insisted his ladder be used in order to avoid the necessity, of moving two ladders while engaged in removing a section of the railing for use as a pattern.

.In Jenkins v. Banks, 147 He. 438, 87 A.2d 908, 910 (1952), the court said in part:
Where the contractee undertakes to provide any of the instrumentalities with which the work is to be carried on, lie owes to the contractor and the latter’s employees the duty of exercising reasonable care with respect thereto. ‡ ‡ ⅜
* * * ⅜ *
If the relationship is that of con-tractee and independent contractor, and if as a part of the contract the con-tractee undertakes to furnish the contractor with appliances with which to do the work he, because of the contract, and as an implied obligation imposed thereby, owes the contractor the duty to furnish reasonably safe appliances and to use reasonable care to inspect such *260appliances prior to furnishing them to the contractor in order to discover and remedy defects.
See the following authorities which, in construing section 392 of the Restatement, have reached similar conclusions: Dowell, Inc. v. Lyons, 238 E.2d 633, 636 (6th Cir. 1956); Petty v. Cranston Print Works Co., 243 N.C. 292, 90 S.E.2d 717, 724 (1956); Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 77 A.2d 245, 253, 22 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1950); Hilleary v. Bromley, 146 Ohio St. 212, 64 N.E.2d 832, 835-36 (1946).

. 146 Ohio St. 212, 64 N.E.2d 832, 834-35 (1946).

. The court in Hilleary v. Bromley also said:
It is true that the plaintiff in this case was an independent contractor and not an employee of the defendants. The general rule is that a contractor cannot recover damages .from his employer for injuries which the former may sustain in the performance of his contract, and this rule is predicated upon, the fact that the contractor has control and is required, as every principal is, to provide for his own safety and protection. If the employer, however, retains the right of control or agrees to furnish the instrumentalities of the work to the contractor to he used by him in the prosecution of the work and the latter.is injured by reason of their being defective, a different rule obtains.
Id. at 835.

. Hilleary v. Bromley, 146 Ohio St. 212, 64 N.E.2d 882, 835 (1946). See Aircraft Sales & Serv. Inc. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So.2d 388, 391 (1951).

. 368 P.2d 810, 815 (Alaska 1962) (footnotes omitted).

. Id. at 814.

. Botli appellant and Lewis Carlick testified they heard the clicking sound made by the disengaged hooks at the time in question.