Court Opinion

ID: 9579245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:52:59.4197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.457556
License: Public Domain

BEA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the court’s disposition of Appellants’ claims under the IDEA. However, because I do not think the IDEA’S exhaustion requirements bar the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear these claims. I would instead affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellee.
In the district court, the Appellants contended for the first time that the District’s placement of the twins in the TEDDY program constituted intentional discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The Appellants contended the District, rather than making an individualized determination regarding the twins’ needs, simply labeled the twins “disabled,” and assigned the twins to special education. This, the Appellants claimed, constituted “segregation.” The Appellants sought monetary damages, a form of relief unavailable under the IDEA. See Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir.1999).
The IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under another statute if the plaintiff is “seeking relief that is also available under” the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(Z). Though Appellants seek some relief not available under IDEA, they were nevertheless required to pursue those remedies that were available to them in state administrative proceedings; their claims could have been redressed, to an extent, by remedies available under the IDEA. See Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 4,03, 308 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.2002).
But here, unlike Robb, Appellants are not attempting to “opt out” of the IDEA altogether. Id. Appellants have pursued or are pursuing all those remedies available to them under the IDEA. And, in the state administrative proceeding, Appellants contended the District assigned the twins to the TEDDY program without undertaking the individualized evaluation required by law. The plaintiffs in Robb, by contrast, failed to file any administrative claim whatsoever. See id.
In two cases, we permitted a plaintiff who first seeks administrative relief in state IDEA proceedings to file a separate suit for damages under § 1983 or the Rehabilitation Act. In Witte, the plaintiffs sought monetary damages under § 1983, *805the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act for emotional and physical abuse by school employees. 197 F.3d at 1276. In Blanchard v. Morton School District, the mother of a disabled child sought money damages under § 1983 for emotional distress and lost wages caused by the school district’s “deliberate indifference” to her son’s IDEA claims. 420 F.3d 918, 919 (9th Cir.2005). In both Witte and Blanchard, we held that the plaintiffs were not required to advance the claim for damages in state IDEA proceedings, provided the plaintiff had raised all of the “educational issues” implicated by the child’s disability in the IDEA proceeding. Id. at 921-22; Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275.
In short, Witte and Blanchard stand for the principle that once a plaintiff has raised all of the “educational issues” associated with an IDEA claim in a state administrative proceeding, nothing prevents him from asserting a claim for damages in district court alleging a defendant school district also violated other statutory provisions. Such an approach fulfills the purposes of exhaustion — providing courts with expert assistance and offering state officials the first opportunity to correct an educational deficiency, see Robb, 308 F.3d at 1051 — without forcing plaintiffs to engage in the futile gesture of raising damages claims in state administrative proceedings, where -the agency lacks the power to award such relief.
Here, Appellants have resolved all of the “educational issues” associated with their claims. Appellants contended in state administrative proceedings that the District’s evaluation of the twins was deficient and that the twins’ assignment to the TEDDY program did not meet the twins’ educational needs. The only new issue raised by Appellants’ Rehabilitation Act claim is an allegation that the District acted with discriminatory intent. In the IDEA proceedings, the intent with which a district acts in failing to provide a FAPE is irrelevant; only the result of its actions or inactions matter. Nor is the District’s intent an “educational issue” the resolution of which requires the expert guidance of a state administrator. Cf. Kutasi v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir.2007).
I would instead affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. Where a district assigns a student to special education pursuant to a valid IEP, the district is not liable for intentional discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir.2008). Because I agree that the District provided the twins valid IEPs, I would affirm the district court’s decision on the merits, rather than conclude the district court lacked jurisdiction over Appellants’ Rehabilitation Act claims.