Court Opinion

ID: 9956826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 22:05:06.945533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.198608
License: Public Domain

04/02/2024

                                          DA 22-0043
                                                                                           Case Number: DA 22-0043

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2024 MT 71N

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

CORY ANN RUCKER,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the First Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADC-2020-277
                       Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Rufus I. Peace, Peace Law Group, LLC, Jacksonville, Florida

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty,
                       Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       Kevin Downs, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Katie Jerstad, John
                       Nesbitt, Deputy County Attorneys, Helena, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: January 24, 2024

                                                               Decided: April 2, 2024

Filed:

                                 v5,.
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1       Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2       A jury convicted Cory Ann Rucker of exploitation of an older person and theft of

identity. Rucker appeals only the latter conviction, asserting the First Judicial District

Court, Lewis and Clark County, erred when it permitted the State to add a witness on the

first day of trial and allowed the witness to testify by two-way audio-video. We affirm.

¶3       Lewis and Clark County initially charged Rucker by Information with exploitation

of an older person, A.B., a felony in violation of § 45-6-333(1)(a)(i), MCA,1 or,

alternatively, theft, a felony in violation of § 45-6-301(1)(c), MCA. In its affidavit, the

State represented that Corporal Nathan Casey of the Helena Police Department was

contacted by Adult Protective Services (APS) in January 2020 about the possible financial

exploitation of A.B., Rucker’s mother. Though A.B. had been living with her son Ward in

Townsend, Rucker reported to the Broadwater County Sheriff’s Office in October 2019

that A.B. was fearful of her other children. A.B. began living with Rucker in Helena shortly

thereafter. Ward later reported to APS investigators that he reviewed one of A.B.’s bank

statements from Opportunity Bank and noticed an unusually high level of spending for

1
    All references to the MCA refer to the 2019 MCA.
                                                 2
A.B., including debit card withdrawals from casinos, even though A.B. was not known to

gamble. An APS investigator interviewed A.B. with Rucker present on January 21, 2020.

The investigator noted that she believed Rucker was “coaching” A.B. on certain responses

and prompting her to agree that certain charges were legitimate. After Cpl. Casey obtained

A.B.’s bank records, he discussed them with A.B. in February 2020, who appeared

“shocked” to learn that over $17,000 had been withdrawn within the three months she was

living with Rucker.

¶4     The State later amended its Information to include theft of identity, a felony in

violation of § 45-6-332, MCA. In its affidavit, the State explained that Cpl. Casey

discovered in a follow-up investigation that A.B. had a new Capital One credit card in her

name that she did not apply for. The credit card application used Rucker’s e-mail, phone

number, and mailing address. Cpl. Casey noted the application date was January 22, 2020,

the day after the APS investigator met with Rucker and A.B., and the ATM withdrawals

from A.B.’s Opportunity Bank debit card had stopped.

¶5     On the morning of trial, the State notified the District Court that “it came to the

State’s attention during trial preparations last week that [the State] did not [] endorse [] a

custodian of record for Capital One Bank. There is an application which was received

through an investigative subpoena from Capital One that the State had intended to

introduce.” It referenced that the Friday before the Monday trial, the State filed a subpoena

for “Capital One (USA), N.A., (Custodian of Records).” The State moved at trial to add a

witness from Capital One who was not previously listed in the Information. It also

                                              3
requested a pretrial ruling that the witness testify by two-way audio-video technology via

Zoom, explaining that Capital One had a policy that barred its staff from traveling for

testimony due to Covid-19. Over defense counsel’s objection to both motions, the District

Court permitted the testimony via Zoom for foundational purposes.

¶6     The State first called Mandy Allen, a representative of Opportunity Bank of

Montana who oversees fraud, information, physical security, and cybersecurity at the bank.

She testified that Opportunity Bank received a request for A.B.’s banking records from

APS in January 2020, and she reviewed A.B.’s account activity for potential fraud. During

Allen’s testimony, the State admitted exhibits of A.B.’s bank statements from April 2019

to May 2020. Allen described that A.B.’s accounts prior to October 2019 had “minimal

activity.”   In October 2019, Allen described a “substantial change” in the account

transactions, noting “numerous ATM withdrawals at casinos.”

¶7     A.B. testified at trial that Rucker “was stealing from [her].” A.B. stated that she did

not use a credit card and had used “[v]ery few” in the past. When asked by the prosecution

if Rucker ever discussed getting a credit card for her, A.B. “recall[ed] [Rucker] asking for

one” but testified that she did not need it. She denied that she gave Rucker permission to

use her information to apply for a credit card in her name.

¶8     During A.B.’s testimony, the State admitted a voluntary statement that A.B. had

written and provided to the Broadwater County Sheriff’s Office in May 2020. The

statement was signed by A.B. and stated:

       On Friday May 22nd, 2020, I had my grandson run a credit report on me.
       We discovered a new credit card with Capital One had opened on 1/21/2020.

                                              4
       I did not authorize this nor did I know about it until today. There [is] $2569
       charged on the account. I think that my daughter Cory Rucker . . . opened
       the account [without] my permission or knowledge.

¶9     Cpl. Casey testified that he served an investigative subpoena on Opportunity Bank

and reviewed A.B.’s bank records. He testified that during the time A.B. lived with Rucker

in Helena, A.B.’s bank account balance decreased from around $27,000 to $7,000. During

that time, Cpl. Casey noted ninety-three ATM withdrawals, totaling $11,400. He stated

that there were around $400 in fees associated with the ATM withdrawals, and “the vast

majority were in Helena at addresses either adjacent to or within a casino.”

¶10    Tabitha Trujillo testified that she gave Rucker rides to Roundup, Montana, in May

2020. Trujillo stated that Rucker was living in Roundup for a short period of time with

A.B., her daughter, and another man, and Rucker decided to move A.B. back to Helena.

She and Rucker went to Billings to rent a U-Haul truck to use during the move. After the

truck rental company asked for Rucker’s driver’s license and information, Rucker left and

asked Trujillo to make a cash withdrawal for her to rent a vehicle from Enterprise instead.

Trujillo stated that Rucker “had a credit card under her mom’s name that . . . they applied

for when her mom was with her.” Trujillo said that she declined Rucker’s request to

withdraw money for her.

¶11    Jeremy Bloxson, a fraud investigator for Capital One, testified via Zoom from

Chicago, Illinois. Bloxson stated that he responds to investigative subpoenas from law

enforcement and is familiar with the records of Capital One that are kept in the regular

course of business. During Bloxson’s testimony, the State admitted Exhibits 10, 11, and

                                             5
12.   Exhibit 10 consisted of information collected from A.B.’s online credit card

application, including her name, date of birth, Social Security number, e-mail address,

phone number, and physical address.        Exhibit 11 consisted of monthly credit card

statements for A.B.’s account from March to May 2020. Exhibit 12 was a letter sent from

Capital One to A.B. in May 2021 informing her that Capital One determined the account

in dispute to be fraud. On cross-examination, Bloxson testified that he could not be sure

who submitted the application for the credit card because it was done online.

¶12    Following Bloxson’s testimony, the State recalled Cpl. Casey as a witness. Cpl.

Casey testified that he issued an investigative subpoena to Capital One and received the

documents in State’s Exhibits 10 and 11. He stated that upon review of the credit card

application, he noticed that the application used A.B.’s Social Security number but listed

Rucker’s address, e-mail address, and phone number.

¶13    “This Court exercises plenary review of constitutional questions and applies de novo

review to a district court’s constitutional interpretations of the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution.” State

v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12, ¶ 11, 403 Mont. 34, 479 P.3d 967 (citing State v. Stock, 2011 MT

131, ¶ 16, 361 Mont. 1, 256 P.3d 899). “All other legal conclusions of law are evaluated

for correctness subject to de novo review.” Mercier, ¶ 12 (citing City of Missoula v. Duane,

2015 MT 232, ¶ 10, 380 Mont. 290, 355 P.3d 729). “Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for

an abuse of discretion.” Mercier, ¶ 12 (citing Duane, ¶ 10). A court abuses its discretion

if it acts arbitrarily and without the employment of conscientious judgment or in a manner

                                             6
that exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. Mercier, ¶ 12 (citing

Stock, ¶ 17).

¶14    Section 46-15-322(1)(a), MCA, states: “Upon request, the prosecutor shall make

available to the defendant for examination and reproduction the following material and

information within the prosecutor’s possession or control: (a) the names, addresses, and

statements of all persons whom the prosecutor may call as witnesses in the case in chief[.]”

Rucker argues that the State’s failure to disclose Bloxson as a witness prior to trial violated

its duties under § 46-15-322, MCA, and Rucker’s right to due process. The only tangible

evidence upon which testimony could be given for the identity theft charge, according to

Rucker, were the credit card application, credit card statements, and the letter from Capital

One to A.B., which could be admitted only after the foundation was laid by the undisclosed

Capital One witness. Therefore, Rucker asserts, the State knew or should have known

about the need for a Capital One representative to establish the State’s case and should

have sought out such a representative prior to the Friday before trial.

¶15    The State responds that Rucker fails to show prejudice from the District Court’s

decision permitting the State to add Bloxson as a witness. The State asserts that it did not

violate § 46-15-322, MCA, because Rucker was timely provided with the Capital One

documents that Cpl. Casey received pursuant to the investigative subpoena, and at the time

the State provided these documents, it did not know the name of the Capital One

representative it would call to testify at trial. Assuming there was error, the State asserts

                                              7
that it was inadvertent and did not prejudice Rucker because Bloxson’s testimony was

foundational and Rucker failed to request a continuance.

¶16    “A cause may not be reversed by reason of any error committed by the trial court

against the convicted person unless the record shows that the error was prejudicial.”

Section 46-20-701(1), MCA. “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not

affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Section 46-20-701(2), MCA.

¶17    Rucker has not shown on appeal that the trial court’s decision to allow the State to

call Bloxson as a witness at trial prejudiced her defense. Bloxson’s testimony related solely

to laying a foundation for the State’s Exhibits 10, 11, and 12, which Rucker had in her

possession long before. See State v. Olsen, 152 Mont. 1, 11, 445 P.2d 926, 932 (1968)

(affirming the lower court’s decision to allow the testimony of a witness not previously

named in the Information where “[t]he direct examination of the witness [] related solely

to laying a foundation for the exhibits which were introduced”). She does not claim the

prosecutor’s failure to list a Capital One representative on the Information was anything

other than inadvertent or that she was surprised by the late witness. See State v. Johnston,

140 Mont. 111, 114, 367 P.2d 891, 891-92 (1962) (holding that defendants did not suffer

prejudice by the county attorney’s inadvertent failure to endorse the name of a witness on

the Information where defendants did not show they were “surprised or unable to meet the

testimony given by the witness.”). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in

approving the State’s late request to call Bloxson as a witness.

                                             8
¶18    Rucker next argues that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing Bloxson

to testify via Zoom, which violated Rucker’s right to confront witnesses against her under

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the

Montana Constitution. Rucker asserts that this error was not harmless because without

Bloxson’s testimony, the State could not have admitted the Capital One documents and

could not, therefore, provide any other evidence in support of the elements of theft of

identity.

¶19    The State responds that this evidence was nontestimonial and therefore does not

implicate the Confrontation Clause. It further asserts that the Capital One documents were

business records and Bloxson was merely laying the foundation for these documents to be

admitted.    Assuming there was error, the State argues it was harmless because the

testimony of A.B., Trujillo, and Cpl. Casey presented cumulative evidence of Rucker’s

guilt as to the identity theft charge.

¶20    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” The Montana Constitution provides that,

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses

against him face to face[.]” Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.

¶21    “A constitutional deprivation of the defendant’s confrontation right is a trial error

and is subject to harmless error review.” Mercier, ¶ 31 (citation omitted). The State bears

the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Mercier,

                                              9
¶ 31 (citation omitted). We employ the “cumulative evidence” test, which “looks not to

the quantitative effect of other admissible evidence, but rather to whether the fact-finder

was presented with admissible evidence that proved the same facts as the tainted evidence

proved.” State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, ¶ 43, 306 Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735.

¶22     Section 45-6-332(1), MCA, provides:

        A person commits the offense of theft of identity if the person purposely or
        knowingly obtains personal identifying information of another person and
        uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain or
        attempt to obtain credit, goods, services, financial information, or medical
        information in the name of the other person without the consent of the other
        person.

“[P]ersonal identifying information includes but is not limited to the name, date of birth,

address, telephone number, driver’s license number, Social Security number . . . financial

institution account number, credit card number, or similar identifying information relating

to a person.” Section 45-6-332(3), MCA. To satisfy the elements of theft of identity, the

State needed to prove that Rucker used A.B.’s personal identifying information for any

unlawful purpose, including to obtain or attempt to obtain credit, goods, or services. The

State called Bloxson to lay foundation for evidence that would prove these elements.

¶23     That Bloxson was a foundational witness does not vitiate any confrontation

violation. We rejected this argument in Mercier, noting that, “nowhere in the text of the

Confrontation Clause is there language limiting the type of testimonial evidence to which

the right to physical confrontation applies.” Mercier, ¶ 27 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI;

Mont. Const. art. II, § 24; State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221, ¶ 22, 290 Mont. 479, 964 P.2d

766).

                                            10
¶24    Even if the court erred by permitting Bloxson to testify via Zoom, however, we

conclude the error was harmless. A.B. stated in a written statement made at the Broadwater

County Sheriff’s Office, and confirmed in her testimony, that the Capital One card was

issued without her permission or knowledge and used to incur over $2,500 in expenses.

She stated that she believed Rucker was the person who opened this account. Additionally,

Trujillo testified that Rucker told her she applied for a credit card in A.B.’s name and had

it in her possession during the trip. Rucker also told Trujillo that she used the card for

“emergencies.”    The testimony of A.B. and Trujillo provided cumulative admissible

evidence to prove that Rucker applied for and obtained the credit card in A.B.’s name

without her permission. The State has carried its burden of showing that any Confrontation

Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the theft of identity

conviction.

¶25    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review. The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 /S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE

                                            11