Court Opinion

ID: 9363092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:57:04.954225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:28.560053
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,            No. 20-10098

         Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                     2:17-cr-00073-
 v.                                   APG-EJY-2

JOSHUA RAY FISHER,
                                       OPINION
         Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,            No. 20-10101

         Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                     2:17-cr-00073-
 v.                                   APG-EJY-1

JUSTIN ANTHONY FISHER,

         Defendant-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Nevada
      Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
2                     UNITED STATES V. FISHER

                 Submitted December 7, 2022 *
                   San Francisco, California

                    Filed December 21, 2022

     Before: Susan P. Graber, Evan J. Wallach,** and Paul J.
                    Watford, Circuit Judges.

                   Opinion by Judge Wallach;
                  Concurrence by Judge Graber

                          SUMMARY***

                          Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed the district court’s orders denying
defendants Justin and Joshua Fisher’s joint motions to
suppress evidence from two searches, in a case in which the
defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to various sexual
offenses against children.
    The defendants first argued that the district court erred in
denying their first motion to suppress because a detective’s
affidavit supporting a 2016 warrant to search Justin’s
residence contained material, intentionally false and/or

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
  The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
***
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    UNITED STATES V. FISHER                   3

reckless statements and omissions that misled the issuing
judge; specifically, that the affidavit misstated the contents
of a CyberTipline Report, drew conclusions unsupported by
the Report, and ignored exculpatory factors. The panel held
that the defendants failed to show that the affidavit contained
any materially false statements or omissions (much less any
such statements knowingly or recklessly made). The panel
wrote that the defendants misstated the factual record by
insisting that only one IP address was relevant, and that the
defendants do not substantively address the results from a
Tumblr search warrant referenced in the affidavit, which
further supports the probable cause determination. The
panel concluded that there is no basis on which to find that
the district court erred in its factfinding, or that the issuing
judge was materially misled when reaching a probable cause
determination.
    The defendants further argued that the district court erred
in denying their second motion to suppress evidence derived
from a 2018 search. The district court did not reach the
merits because it determined that the defendants lacked
standing to challenge the search of certain devices recovered
from the attic crawlspace of the residence after it was sold to
new owners. The panel held that the district court did not
clearly err by finding that the defendants abandoned the
devices. The panel wrote that the defendants’ failure to
ensure that their brother recovered the devices before the
home was sold, and their subsequent failure to take any
additional action, is sufficient to support a finding of
abandonment, even if the defendants ceased their efforts
only because they feared detection by law enforcement. The
panel concluded that the defendants therefore lost any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the devices, and lacked
standing to seek suppression of their contents.
4                  UNITED STATES V. FISHER

    Judge     Graber      concurred    in    the    judgment
only. Regarding the 2016 search warrant, she wrote that
probable cause existed, even assuming the panel agreed with
the defendants’ arguments concerning IP addresses. She
therefore would not reach the merits of the dispute about the
IP addresses. Regarding the 2018 search, she wrote that the
defendants lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in
items that they had left in the house.

                        COUNSEL

Michael A. Humphreys, Paul Padda Law PLLC, Las Vegas,
Nevada; Daniel J. Hill, Hill Firm PLLC, Las Vegas, Nevada;
for Defendant-Appellant.
Daniel D. Hollingsworth; Christopher F. Burton and Richard
A. Lopez, Assistant United States Attorneys; Jason M.
Frierson, United States Attorney; Elizabeth O. White,
Appellate Chief, Office of the United States Attorney, Las
Vegas, Nevada; Robert L. Ellman, Assistant United States
Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Reno,
Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                         UNITED STATES V. FISHER                            5

                               OPINION

WALLACH, Circuit Judge:

    Defendants-Appellants Justin and Joshua Fisher
(“Defendants”) challenge their convictions under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Before us is
Defendants’ joint appeal from two orders by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada, denying their joint motions
to suppress evidence. The evidence obtained from two
searches, occurring in 2016 and 2018, led to Defendants
being charged with multiple federal offenses concerning the
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.
    Defendants first argue that the district court erred in
denying their first motion to suppress because the affidavit
supporting the probable cause search warrant for Defendant
Justin Fisher’s residence contained material, intentionally
false and/or reckless statements and omissions that misled
the issuing judge.
    Defendants further argue that the district court erred in
denying their second motion to suppress for lack of standing
because, contrary to the district court’s finding, Defendants
had not abandoned certain technological devices seized from
the residence after it was sold to a new owner.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1 and we
affirm.

1
  28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that the courts of appeal “shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States.”
6                     UNITED STATES V. FISHER

                                   I
    As is relevant to this appeal, Defendants Justin Fisher
and Joshua Fisher, brothers, were charged in a second
superseding criminal indictment returned March 12, 2019.
Justin Fisher was charged with nine counts, and Joshua
Fisher was charged with six counts, all for various sexual
offenses against children. Defendants entered conditional
guilty pleas, pursuant to plea agreements, on July 19, 2019.
   On March 5, 2020, the district court entered final
judgments against Defendants, sentencing Justin Fisher to
360 months’ imprisonment, and Joshua Fisher to 300
months’ imprisonment. Defendants’ timely notices of
appeal followed.
                                  A
1. The Tumblr Report and CyberTipline Report
    On April 27, 2016, the social media website Tumblr sent
a report to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (“NCMEC”), 2 which caused NCMEC to generate
a “CyberTipline Report” or “CyberTip” documenting the
incident. The CyberTip identified the “Incident Type” as
“Child Pornography (possession, manufacture, and
distribution),” based on eight files (videos and images) that
had been uploaded to a Tumblr user’s blog. The “Incident
Time”—that is, “when this report was created in Tumblr’s
system”—was April 19, 2016, at 14:14:40 UTC (2:14 PM
UTC). 3

2
 NCMEC is “a national clearinghouse and resource center . . . on missing
and sexually exploited child issues.”
3
 The parties agree that files were uploaded to the Tumblr blog on or
before April 19, 2016, though the Government argues, as a point of
                        UNITED STATES V. FISHER                           7

    Tumblr identified, as the “User or Person Being
Reported,” the username “mcw,” profile URL
“mcw.tumblr.com,” and associated email address
“mcwarson@gmail.com.”        The user IP Address was
50.118.198.254 (Other), but Tumblr also identified a second
IP address, 24.253.48.163, which accounted for four of the
“Suspect’s” five most recent logins, 4 as of the “Incident
Time.”
    The physical location of IP 50.118.198.254 (“Computer
254”) resolved to the geographical area of San Jose,
California, identifying, as the Internet Service Provider
(“ISP/Org”) “EGIHosting/Areti Internet.” IP 24.253.48.163
(“Computer 163”) resolved to Las Vegas, Nevada,
identifying Cox Communications as the Internet Service
Provider.
    In Section C of NCMEC’s CyberTipline Report,
“Additional Information Provided by NCMEC,” NCMEC
identified an “Associated CyberTipline Report,” which
appeared “to contain supplemental IP information for the
reported Tumblr profile in the current report.” The second
Report appeared in search results for “mcwarson” and
“24.253.48.163.”
   Accordingly, the CyberTipline Report in this matter
concluded that, “[b]ased on IP 24.253.48.163,” the matter

factual distinction, that the “Incident Time” is not the time of upload, but
rather, the time of Tumblr’s report generation.
4
 Tumblr reported the “last logins” as those occurring between March 16,
2016, and April 18, 2016. The April 18, 2016 login was from Computer
254.
8                     UNITED STATES V. FISHER

should be forwarded to the Nevada Internet Crimes Against
Children (“ICAC”) Task Force for investigation.
2. Detective Miller’s Investigation
    Detective Scott Miller of the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department’s (“LVMPD”) ICAC received, reviewed,
and further investigated the NCMEC’s CyberTipline Report.
Thereafter (but before Detective Miller prepared the
affidavit challenged by Defendants here), the LVMPD
sought information from Tumblr and Cox Communications
regarding IP 24.253.48.163/Computer 163.
    Specifically, on May 28, 2016, the LVMPD served an
administrative subpoena on Cox Communications,
commanding the company to produce customer records for
Computer 163 as of the Incident Date (April 19, 2016). On
June 14, 2016, Cox Communications responded to the
administrative subpoena, identifying the customer
associated with Computer 163 as Justin Fisher at an address
on Burkehaven Avenue in Las Vegas, Nevada (the
“Burkehaven Avenue Residence”).
    Further, on July 1, 2016, Detective Miller sought and
obtained a search warrant on Tumblr. The affidavit
identified “the following digital data” that was “sought to be
seized”: 5

5
  The “Probable Cause Offering” section of Detective Miller’s affidavit
served on Tumblr described the information sent by Tumblr to NCMEC
as follows: “Tumblr reported the user uploaded 8 images/videos of child
sexual exploitation. Tumblr provided the following information
regarding the user: IP Address 50.118.198.254 and 24.253.48.163….” It
also described the information regarding Justin Fisher’s account, home
address, and other information provided by Cox Communications and
corroborated by “[a] routine records check.”
                   UNITED STATES V. FISHER                 9

       All Tumblr account information for the
       following user on / or between the dates of
       April 19, 2016 through July 01, 2016:

           IP Address: 50.118.198.254 and
           24.253.48.163
           Date of Incident: April 19, 2016 at
           14:14:00 UTC
           Email Address:
           mcwarson@gmail.com
           Screen/User Name: mcw
           Profile URL: https://mcw.tumblr.com

    Tumblr responded on September 16, 2016, with a flash-
drive of files collected from mcw.tumblr.com and a list of
recent logins. As identified by LVMPD, the flash drive
“contained 40 additional images of child exploitation” and
“200-plus age-difficult child erotica” images from the
Tumblr blog. The only login listed for the mcw account
from April 19, 2016 onward was a login from Computer 163
on April 19, 2016 at 10:40 AM UTC—i.e., a few hours prior
to the time at which Tumblr generated its report to NCMEC.
(“Incident Time: 04-19-2016 14:14:00 UTC”).
3. The 2016 Search Warrant
    On November 16, 2016, Detective Miller sought and
obtained a search warrant for Joshua Fisher’s residence.
Detective Miller’s affidavit in support of the search warrant
stated that there was “probable cause to believe that certain
property hereinafter described will be found at [the
Burkehaven Avenue address].”
10                UNITED STATES V. FISHER

       In the Synopsis section, Detective Miller
       stated that
       On or about April 27, 2016, the [NCMEC]
       received a report from Tumblr reference [sic]
       a possible transmission of child pornography.
       Tumblr reported a user; “mcw”, screen/user
       name of mcw, and an IP address of
       24.253.48.163 uploaded 8 child exploitation
       images on their Tumblr account. Affiant
       viewed said image [sic] of child sexual
       exploitation and deemed 2 images to be child
       pornographic in nature.

       A search warrant was served on Tumblr
       reference [sic] above account which resulted
       in numerous other images/videos of child
       exploitation being discovered.

       This investigation conducted by Affiant has
       traced this child sexual exploitation computer
       activity of child pornography to [the
       Burkehaven Avenue Residence], where
       Affiant expects to find computer / digital
       evidence of these crimes.

    The “Probable Cause Offering” section of the affidavit
described the sequence of relevant events beginning with
Tumblr’s identification of the two IP addresses
(50.118.198.254 and 24.253.48.163) associated with a “user
[who] uploaded 8 images/videos of child sexual
exploitation,” the subsequent CyberTip/NCMEC’s Report,
the LVMPD’s investigation, the administrative subpoena on
Cox Communications, additional records collection
                  UNITED STATES V. FISHER              11

including the identification of Justin Fisher and his
residence, and the July 1, 2016 search warrant served on
Tumblr. Detective Miller described the July 1, 2016 search
warrant, and Tumblr’s response, as follows:
       On July 01, 2016, a search warrant was
       served on Tumblr for all account information
       regarding         Tumblr            account:
       mcwarson@gmail.com,          IP      address
       24.253.48.163, user name: mcw.

       On September 16, 2016, Tumblr responded
       to said search warrant with numerous other
       images/videos of child exploitation. Affiant
       viewed these images/videos and deemed over
       40 of them to be child pornography. . . .

    A justice of the peace for Clark County, Nevada,
determined that Detective Miller’s affidavit presented
sufficient evidence for a finding of probable cause, and
issued the search warrant.
4. The 2016 Search
    The search of Justin Fisher’s Burkehaven Avenue
Residence was executed on November 21, 2016. Various
technological devices were seized from the premises.
Joshua Fisher “approached the residence on foot” while the
search was ongoing, “stating that he worked out of the
residence where the search warrant was being executed.” He
turned over a cell phone to the NVMPD ICAC team.
12                     UNITED STATES V. FISHER

NVMPD obtained a search warrant for the phone on
November 23, 2016. 6
    Forensic analysis of the devices obtained from
Defendants (forty-eight in total) resulted in the recovery of
evidence of child sexual exploitation offenses. According to
the Government, “[t]his evidence led to Counts 1-5 and 7-12
in the second superseding indictment.” Defendants were
detained on federal Criminal Complaints as of February 15,
2017 (Justin Fisher) and April 7, 2017 (Joshua Fisher).
5. First Motion to Suppress
    On August 10, 2017, Justin Fisher moved to suppress
“all tangible evidence, and the fruits thereof” obtained from
the November 21, 2016 search warrant. Joshua Fisher joined
this Motion on January 1, 2018.
    By their Motion, Defendants asserted their entitlement to
an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 7 alleging

6
  FBI Special Agent Sue Flaherty recited these facts in her affidavit in
support of the warrant obtained to search devices collected from
Burkehaven Avenue Residence during the July 2018 search, which is the
subject of Defendants’ second motion to suppress. This warrant was
obtained after the new homeowner who purchased the home from Justin
Fisher in September 2017 consented to a search of the premises.
7
  Franks sets forth the standard by which a defendant may overcome the
“presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the
search warrant.” 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); see also United States v.
Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2019) (“To obtain
a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantial preliminary
showing that: (1) ‘the affiant officer intentionally or recklessly made
false or misleading statements or omissions in support of the warrant,’
and (2) ‘the false or misleading statement or omission was material, i.e.,
necessary to finding probable cause.’” (quoting United States v. Perkins,
850 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017))).
                       UNITED STATES V. FISHER                       13

intentional and/or reckless omissions and misstatements—
which they claimed were material to a finding of probable
cause—in Detective Miller’s affidavit. U.S. Magistrate
Judge George Foley considered the Motion to Suppress and,
upon review of Detective Miller’s affidavit in support of the
November 21, 2016 search warrant, 8 found that there were
false statements and omissions contained in the affidavit.
    Judge Foley then concluded that an evidentiary hearing
was warranted under the Franks rule to determine “whether
the false statements and omissions in Detective Miller’s
affidavit were intentionally or recklessly made, and, if so,
whether the balance of the information in the affidavit still
supports a finding of probable cause.”
   The evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 15,
2019. Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Foley issued his
Findings and Recommendation, recommending that
Defendants’ Motion to Suppress be denied.
    In his Findings and Recommendation, Judge Foley
determined that the Synopsis of Detective Miller’s affidavit
contained an “untrue and misleading” statement that
“Tumblr reported a user; ‘mcw’, screen/user name of mcw,
and IP address of 24.253.48.163 uploaded 8 child
exploitation images on their Tumblr account.” Judge Foley
believed that this statement conveyed as fact “that Tumblr
had affirmatively made such statement to NCMEC,” when
the statement “was actually Detective Miller’s conclusion

8
  Judge Foley’s analysis primarily concerned the contents of the
CyberTipline Report. Judge Foley acknowledged that the evidence
obtained from the July 1, 2016 Tumblr search warrant might provide
probable cause “separate and apart from the information regarding the
Tumblr Cybertip report,” but he declined to rule on the question for the
time being.
14                      UNITED STATES V. FISHER

based on his analysis of the CyberTipline Report and the
information that Tumblr provided in response to the search
warrant.” Judge Foley determined, however, that
         Detective Miller’s statement would not have
         been problematical if he had clearly
         identified it as his opinion or conclusion, and
         had included in the affidavit all of the
         relevant facts that the issuing judge would
         need to independently determine whether
         there was probable cause to believe that
         images of child pornography had been
         uploaded from IP address 24.253.48.163.
         (emphasis added).

Further, Magistrate Foley pointed to omissions he perceived
in the affidavit, including the login dates 9 for Computer 163,
the April 18, 2016 login from Computer 254, or “the
information in Tumblr’s response to the search warrant that
someone using IP Address 24.253.48.163 logged into the
Tumblr account on April 19, 2016 at 10:40, which occurred
only a few hours before the ‘Incident Time’ of 14:14:00
UTC reported in the CyberTipline Report.” 10

9
  Judge Foley noted that “[t]here is no disagreement that the IP address
login times indicate only when someone logged into the Tumblr account
from a particular IP Address. They do not establish when or if a user
actually uploaded images to the Tumblr account.”
10
   At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Miller testified to his belief that
the images provided by Tumblr (via flash drive) were uploaded from
Computer 163 because Computer 254 was an “encrypted” virtual private
network (VPN), from which uploaded data could not have been
recovered. Detective Miller affirmatively testified that the flash drive
stated that its contents were recovered from Computer 163. The flash
                       UNITED STATES V. FISHER                        15

    Nevertheless, once Judge Foley had considered how
Detective Miller’s affidavit would have been supplemented
and/or corrected to reflect “all of the relevant and material
information, . . . there would still have been probable cause
to believe that the child pornography images were uploaded
to Tumblr from IP address 24.253.48.163, most likely on
April 19, 2016 in close proximity to when Tumblr
discovered the uploading of suspect images.”
    On de novo review of Defendants’ Motion to Suppress
and related papers, the district court agreed with Magistrate
Judge Foley’s recommendation that the Motion be denied,
but modified Judge Foley’s Findings and Recommendations
in part. The district court reviewed Defendants’ proposed
supplemental statements to determine whether Detective
Miller’s affidavit—if so supplemented—would support
probable cause. Essentially, Defendants’ proposed additions
were aimed at modifying the affidavit’s representations as to
which IP addresses made the upload of incriminating files.
    The district court declined to make any of Defendants’
proposed changes, because it concluded that Defendants’
supplemental information was inaccurate, incomplete, and
immaterial to the probable cause determination. Although
the district court determined that Detective Miller’s affidavit
contained some potentially misleading statements, it
concluded that

drive itself was not produced at the hearing because of the nature of its
contents. Judge Foley remained unconvinced that, merely because a
VPN was “encrypted,” “a person logging into the Tumblr account
through that VPN IP address could not upload the child pornography
images to the Tumblr account. . . . No evidence was presented at the
hearing that information had been uploaded to the Tumblr account that
could not be ‘opened’ because it was encrypted.”
16                 UNITED STATES V. FISHER

       Miller’s      subsequent       investigation—
       especially the Tumblr response to the search
       warrant—confirmed that IP address
       24.253.48.163 was tied to the incident and
       uploaded the subject images. . . .
       [C]onsidered in its entirety, the affidavit was
       not misleading. Det. Miller summarized the
       chain of his investigation, including the
       results of the search warrants and subpoena
       he obtained. That investigation supported
       probable cause to issue the search warrant for
       the Burkehaven house.

     Further, the district court identified supplementing
changes that might be made if it found the affidavit
misleading as prepared: e.g., changing the Synopsis and
Probable Cause Offering sections to indicate that Tumblr
listed IP 50.118.198.254 (Other) in its proffered user
information for the Tumblr blog mcw.                The court
determined, however, that no such supplement would
undermine the sufficiency of probable cause in the affidavit.
In sum, the court concluded that “the affidavit still supports
a finding of probable cause because of the other information
obtained from the search warrants and subpoena that linked
the child pornography to IP address 24.253.48.163.” The
district court emphasized two facts in its conclusion drawn
from Tumblr’s response to the July 1, 2016 warrant: first,
that the only IP address logged in at the “Incident Time” was
24.253.48.163, and second, that Tumblr provided the flash
drive of additional files (including forty that were child
pornography) that were uploaded after the “Incident Time.”
                        UNITED STATES V. FISHER                         17

  Accordingly, the district court denied Defendants’
Motion to Suppress. 11
                                    B
1. The 2018 Search
    On September 15, 2017, Justin Fisher—while in
custody—sold the Burkehaven Avenue Residence to new
owners. On July 9, 2018, the new homeowner (referred to
in the record below as “T”) contacted the Las Vegas, Nevada
FBI office. T informed the FBI that he had learned from his
neighbors that the Burkehaven Avenue Residence had been
searched in connection with the previous owner’s criminal
activity.
    On July 12, 2018, Detective Miller—who had received
T’s contact information—reached out to T and informed him
of certain telephone conversations between Defendants. 12
These conversations involved Defendants discussing, at
times in code, the location of personal property apparently
concealed in the Burkehaven Avenue Residence.
Defendants had enlisted the help of another brother (referred
to in the record below as “E”) to search the Burkehaven
Avenue Residence to recover the property, but E’s attempts
were unsuccessful.
    T gave Detective Miller consent to search the upstairs
attic crawl space. “[C]oncealed between the insulation and
the wood framing” of the attic crawlspace, Detective Miller

11
  The district court also stated that, contrary to Magistrate Judge Foley’s
determination, it would not have granted Defendants’ motion for an
evidentiary hearing.
12
   These conversations were held in violation of a no-contact order,
obtained by the Government, that was in place at the time.
18                     UNITED STATES V. FISHER

located “a black cellular telephone and two portable SSD
drives.” Thereafter, FBI Special Agent Sue Flaherty sought
and obtained a warrant to search the recovered devices.
According to the Government, “[t]he search warrant was
executed and revealed that the brothers had compiled and
curated evidence of their sexual exploitation of children and
compiled it onto the three devices found in the attic.”
2. Second Motion to Suppress
    On November 7, 2018, Defendants moved to suppress
the evidence obtained in the 2018 search, arguing that the
evidence was “fruit of the poisonous tree”—i.e., that it was
a direct result of the 2016 search, which they were
simultaneously contending was unlawful. 13               The
Government argued, in opposition, that Defendants had
abandoned the personal property at issue, and thus, they
lacked standing to seek suppression.
    Judge Foley issued his Findings and Recommendations
on December 14, 2018, concluding, after conducting a
“totality of the circumstances” abandonment analysis, that
Defendants’ second Motion to Suppress should be denied for
lack of standing. 14

13
   The evidentiary hearing regarding Defendants’ first Motion to
Suppress had not yet been held at the time that Magistrate Judge Foley
issued his Findings and Recommendation on their second Motion.
14
   The Government also argued that, even if Defendants had not
abandoned the property seized in the 2018 search, and even if the 2016
search was unlawful, the fruits of the 2018 search were too attenuated to
be excluded pursuant to the “fruits of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
While attenuation is a recognized exception to the “fruits of the
poisonous tree” doctrine, Magistrate Judge Foley did not reach this
                    UNITED STATES V. FISHER                  19

    Judge Foley’s reasoning was based on Defendants’
communications with their brother E, wherein Justin
“instructed ‘E’ to remove the items from the house before it
was sold” and Joshua inquired “as to whether he had found
and removed the items.” When E was unsuccessful in
recovering any items, “Defendants made no further effort to
recover the items after the house was sold and was in
possession of a new owner with whom Defendants had no
relationship.” Nine months passed between the sale and new
owner T’s contact with the FBI and Detective Miller. Judge
Foley found it “reasonable to infer” that Defendants made
the decision to abandon the items rather than risk detection
of further incriminating evidence by pursuing their recovery.
This was sufficient for Judge Foley to find abandonment “by
a preponderance of the evidence” and recommend denial of
Defendants’ second Motion to Suppress for lack of standing.
    On de novo review, the district court adopted Magistrate
Judge Foley’s Findings and Recommendation in its entirety.
The district court concluded that Defendants’ concealment
of the items prior to sale of the Burkehaven Avenue
Residence made no difference as to the abandonment
determination because “no efforts were made to retrieve the
items after the house was sold in September 2017 until the
items were seized by the Government in July 2018.”
Accordingly, the district court ruled that Defendants
“abandoned the items after the house was sold,” and the
subsequent search and seizure of the personal property
concealed there did not violate their Fourth Amendment
rights.

argument because he based his Findings and Recommendation on the
issue of standing.
20                  UNITED STATES V. FISHER

                              II
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress evidence and its determination of validity of a
search warrant de novo. United States v. Underwood, 725
F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). We review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United
States v. Todhunter, 297 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We
may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress ‘on any basis
fairly supported by the record.’” (quoting United States v.
Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002))). Further,
“[w]e give ‘great deference’ to an issuing judge’s finding
that probable cause supports a warrant and review such
findings for clear error.” Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1081
(quoting United States v. Krupa, 658 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
     Whether defendants have standing to challenge a search
is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v.
Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). We review
“the district court’s ultimate legal conclusion” as to standing
de novo and its underlying factual findings for clear error.
Id. (citation omitted).
                              III
    The Fourth Amendment dictates that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. “The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
                    UNITED STATES V. FISHER                 21

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
    Evidence obtained during the execution of a warrant that
lacks probable cause “should generally be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule.” Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1084
(citations omitted).
    We consider each of the district court’s denials of
Defendants’ motions to suppress in turn. We affirm the
district court’s denial of Defendants’ first motion to suppress
because Detective Miller’s affidavit in support of the
November 21, 2016 search warrant did not contain material
misstatements or omissions. We also affirm the district
court’s denial of Defendants’ second motion to suppress for
lack of standing because Defendants abandoned the devices
that were seized and searched.
                              A
    Defendants first contend that probable cause did not exist
to support the November 21, 2016 search warrant by arguing
that Detective Miller’s affidavit “only established probable
cause through knowing and intentional deception or, at best,
recklessness to the truth or falsity of the information.”
    According to Defendants, Detective Miller’s affidavit
misstated the contents of the CyberTipline Report, drew
conclusions unsupported by the Report, “and ignored factors
exculpatory to [Defendants].” Defendants contend that the
affidavit “misquote[s]” the Report by “identify[ing] the
guilty party as ‘user mcw screen/user name of mcw and an
IP address of 24.253.163 [sic] [which] uploaded 8 child
exploitation images on their Tumblr account,” when in fact,
the “sub-heading” of the CyberTipline Report labeled “the
guilty device” as the computer with the IP address
22                      UNITED STATES V. FISHER

50.118.198.254. Defendants argue that “[t]his is a mindful,
purposeful substitution of one party (Computer 163) for
another party (Computer 254), or, at the very least, a reckless
disregard to the truth or falsity that Computer 163 was
identified as culpable.”
    Under the preponderance of the evidence standard set
forth in Franks, 15 Defendants contend that the false
statements made by Detective Miller with respect to which
IP address made the upload, and the “key material omission”
he made by “fail[ing] to disclose that the last reported IP
address login prior to the ‘incident’ was from IP address
50.118.198.254,” misled the issuing judge.
    We find Defendants’ arguments challenging denial of
their first Motion to Suppress to be unavailing. As a general
matter, “[p]robable cause exists if ‘it would be reasonable to
seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit.’”
United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). Reasonableness is determined by an
examination of “the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in a
‘common-sense’ manner.” United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d
948, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). It is true that the
deference we accord to an issuing judge’s determination of
probable cause “does not preclude inquiry into the knowing

15
   The preponderance of the evidence is the standard Defendants must
meet to show that the affidavit supporting a warrant is materially
misleading, not the standard for a finding of probable cause. See Franks,
438 U.S. at 156 (“In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury
or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by
a preponderance of the evidence . . . .”); Krupa, 658 F.3d at 1177–78
(citations omitted) (“Whether there is a fair probability depends upon the
totality of the circumstances, including reasonable inferences, and is a
‘commonsense, practical question,’ for which ‘[n]either certainty nor a
preponderance of the evidence is required.’”) (cleaned up).
                       UNITED STATES V. FISHER                         23

or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that
determination was based.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 914 (1984); see also Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1081
(citation omitted) (“Conclusions of the affiant unsupported
by underlying facts cannot be used to establish probable
cause.”).
    Here, however, Defendants fail to point to any
misstatements or omissions in Detective Miller’s affidavit
that, if stricken or supplemented, would undermine the
reasonableness of the ultimate probable cause
determination. 16 Defendants misstate the factual record by

16
    Related to their other IP-address-related arguments, Defendants
contend that Detective Miller’s affidavit contained a misleading
statement under the section heading “Computers, Technology and
Digital Forensics,” when he stated that he “has personally viewed files
identical to the ones on a computer using Public IP address
24.253.48.163 and determined them to be child pornography.” For
Defendants, Detective Miller’s statement “leaves the reader (especially
a county judge who might be unfamiliar with the arcane terminology and
concepts of digital communications connected to cyber-crime
investigations) with the distinct impression that Det. Miller had
physically examined the files on Computer 163” and identified them as
child pornography.
     The Government argues that this argument was not raised in the
district court, and is therefore waived, citing United States v. Peterson,
995 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2021). A review of Defendants’ motion
papers below, however, indicates that they did quote the same language
for the purpose of contesting its accuracy. Although this argument is
before us on appeal, we dispense with it as an obvious misreading of the
text of Detective Miller’s affidavit. Detective Miller does not say that
he “physically examined the files on Computer 163,” since he was, as
the Government asserts, seeking to gain access to those very files.
Rather, he was “merely summariz[ing] what the rest of his search
warrant asserts, namely that he had traced child pornography offenses to
the Nevada IP address and therefore expected to find additional evidence
24                   UNITED STATES V. FISHER

insisting that IP 50.118.198.254 was the only relevant IP
address. It is readily apparent from the CyberTipline Report
that Computer 163—Defendants’ computer—was also
identified as associated with the suspect Tumblr account.
Indeed, the CyberTipline Report stated that, “[b]ased on IP
24.253.48.163”—not 50.118.198.254—the matter should be
forwarded for investigation to the Nevada Internet Crimes
Against Children (“ICAC”) Task Force. Moreover, in his
affidavit, Detective Miller did not omit any mention of
Computer 254, but rather, emphasized the relevance of
Computer 163—a conclusion that he based on the
CyberTipline Report and his own investigation into the
origin of each IP address. (“Probable Cause Offering”).
    Further, at the time Detective Miller prepared his
affidavit, he had already received a response to the July 1,
2016 search warrant served on Tumblr, which showed that
the most recent login to the “mcw” account was from
Computer 163. While this particular fact—the last login as
of the incident time—was not explicitly included in
Detective Miller’s affidavit, Defendants cannot plausibly
argue that Detective Miller’s affidavit should be corrected
to indicate that the most recent login as of the “Incident
Time” was from Computer 254, since that change itself
would be inaccurate based on the record before us.
    Moreover, Defendants do not substantively address the
results from the July 1, 2016 Tumblr search warrant,
referenced in Detective Miller’s affidavit, which further
supports the issuing judge’s probable cause determination

on digital devices at the physical location associated with that IP
address.”
                    UNITED STATES V. FISHER                  25

and the district court’s denial of Defendants’ first Motion to
Suppress.
    Defendants do not acknowledge that Detective Miller’s
affidavit discussed the response that Tumblr provided to the
July 1, 2016 search warrant (not an administrative
subpoena). That search warrant, which requested all account
information on or between the dates of April 19, 2016 (the
“Incident Date”) and July 1, 2016, resulted in a response
from Tumblr indicating that Computer 163 was logged in
mere hours before the “Incident Time,” and that additional
files, later determined to be child pornography/child sexual
exploitation material, were uploaded to the blog. Based on
the date range requested, it can be inferred that the additional
files were uploaded on or after April 19, 2016, at which time
Computer 163 was the last logged-in IP address. Indeed, the
district court relied on these very facts in reaching its
conclusions that Defendants’ proposed additions to
Detective Miller’s affidavit were inaccurate, unnecessary, or
immaterial.
    Defendants’ failure to address the relevance of these
facts and their bearing on the accuracy of any proposed
alterations to Detective Miller’s affidavit, further
undermines their arguments on appeal.
    Thus, this is not a case where the warrant “rest[s] upon
mere affirmance or belief without disclosure of supporting
facts or circumstances.” Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1081
(quoting United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212 (9th
Cir. 1978)). Detective Miller’s affidavit conveys his fact-
based understanding of the most relevant IP address
identified by Tumblr and NCMEC—Computer 163—and
describes the sequence of events, including his investigation
between the time that he was assigned the CyberTipline
26                  UNITED STATES V. FISHER

Report and the time that he sought a warrant for the
Burkehaven Avenue Residence. Having reviewed the
affidavit and supporting evidence—the same evidence that
Defendants highlight to contradict Detective Miller’s
statements—we cannot say that the “issuing judge lacked a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”
Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1081 (cleaned up). Rather,
Detective Miller’s affidavit, relying on the CyberTipline
Report as well as the results of the Cox Communications
subpoena and the Tumblr search warrant, established “a fair
probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place”—here, the Burkehaven Avenue Residence.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Put another way, Defendants have
pointed to no facts that would alter “the central basis” of the
underlying probable cause determination. Underwood, 725
F.3d at 1081.
    Since Defendants fail to show that Detective Miller’s
affidavit contained any material false statements or
omissions (much less any such statements knowingly or
recklessly made), there is no basis on which to find that the
district court erred in its factfinding, or that the issuing judge
was materially misled when reaching a probable cause
determination. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Defendants’ first Motion to Suppress.
                                B
    We turn next to Defendants’ appeal of the denial of their
second Motion to Suppress. The district court did not reach
the merits of this Motion because it determined—adopting
Magistrate Judge Foley’s Findings and Recommendation in
its entirety—that Defendants lacked standing to challenge
the search of certain devices recovered from the attic
                       UNITED STATES V. FISHER                         27

crawlspace of the Burkehaven Avenue Residence after the
house was sold to new owners. 17
     To establish standing to challenge an illegal search and
seek suppression of evidence unlawfully obtained, a
defendant “must show that he personally had ‘a property
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment that was
interfered with . . . , or a reasonable expectation of privacy
that was invaded by the search.’” United States v. Lopez-
Cruz, 730 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Padilla, 111 F.3d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1997)). Where
a defendant depends on a “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” two elements must be met: (1) that he had “an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) that his
subjective expectation is “objectively reasonable”—i.e., that
it is an expectation “that society is prepared to recognize as

17
    It is worth noting that, even if Defendants could establish their
standing to challenge the 2018 search of the devices obtained from the
Burkehaven Avenue Residence, their sole argument on appeal rests on
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. See, e.g., United States v.
Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted) (“The
exclusionary rule generally applied in Fourth Amendment cases requires
courts to suppress any evidence obtained as a ‘direct result of an illegal
search or seizure,’ as well as ‘evidence later discovered and found to be
derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree.’”)
(cleaned up). Defendants argue that the 2018 search was unlawful
because it would not have occurred but for the 2016 search, which they
contend was unlawful based on Detective Miller’s underlying affidavit.
As discussed supra, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendants’
first Motion, holding that Detective Miller’s affidavit was not
misleading, and that it established probable cause to search the
Burkehaven Avenue Residence. Thus, were we to reach the Defendants’
“fruit of the poisonous tree” argument regarding their second Motion, it
would likewise fail.
28                    UNITED STATES V. FISHER

‘reasonable.’”      Lopez-Cruz, 730 F.3d at 807 (citations
omitted).
    “[P]ersons who voluntarily abandon property lack
standing to complain of its search or seizure.” United States
v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). Abandonment is a factual determination that “is a
question of intent.” Id. That is, the factfinder’s “inquiry
should focus on whether, through words, acts or other
objective indications, a person has relinquished a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property at the time of the
search or seizure.” Id.
    We find that the district court did not clearly err by
finding abandonment here, and accordingly, we conclude
that Defendants lacked standing to challenge the 2018 search
of the devices recovered from the Burkehaven Avenue
Residence.
    The district court found that one or both of the
Defendants had, at some point prior to detention, concealed
the recovered devices in the walls of the Burkehaven Avenue
Residence attic. Thereafter, the district court determined
that Defendants’ intentions with respect to those devices
changed, 18 because “no efforts were made to retrieve the
items after the house was sold in September 2017 until the
items were seized by the Government in July 2018.”

18
    As Magistrate Judge Foley detailed in his Findings and
Recommendation, Defendants initially took steps to retrieve the
concealed devices by enlisting the help of their out-of-custody brother,
E, “to remove something secret from the Burkehaven residence’ when
no one else was around” and before the home was sold. E was unable to
discover the concealed items.
                   UNITED STATES V. FISHER                 29

   Defendants argue on appeal that they did not intend to
abandon the items because they
       manifested a desire and concern to safeguard
       the items and keep them secure from
       accidental exposure or even an intentional
       search. . . . The effort to secret the items from
       prying and even searching eyes indicates
       their value to the owner.

Defendants further contend that they “had an ongoing
interest in the devices even though they had no physical
control over the devices. They were only not in physical
possession of the devices (and their home) because of their
arrest and subsequent incarceration.”
     This argument is unpersuasive. It is well-established in
this Circuit’s caselaw that property may be abandoned even
when the defendant only abandons the property in response
to, or in anticipation of, law enforcement action. See, e.g.,
United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 519–20 (9th Cir.
1975) (finding that contraband was abandoned property
when it was thrown from a truck during law enforcement
pursuit); Nordling, 804 F.2d at 1470 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (“Nordling physically relinquished control
of the tote bag when he left it on the airplane where anyone,
including the PSA employee who found it in Seattle, could
have access to it. That act of relinquishment, under the
circumstances in which Nordling found himself, also
supports an inference that he intended to abandon the bag. .
. . While everyone who leaves luggage on an airplane cannot
be said to have abandoned it, Nordling deliberately chose to
leave the bag behind when requested by officers to leave the
plane.”).
30                 UNITED STATES V. FISHER

    The district court’s finding here was premised on
Defendants’ “acts [and] other objective indications” that
they had decided to abandon the devices in the attic, thus
relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in them.
Nordling, 804 F.2d at 1469. Specifically, the district court—
and Magistrate Judge Foley—pointed to the lapse of more
than nine months between the sale of the residence and the
eventual search, during which the devices were recovered at
the consent of the new homeowner, T. That Defendants
concealed the devices, and initially attempted to recover
them by enlisting their brother E’s help, does not compel us
to reach a different conclusion than the district court on
either the facts or the law. “If one who has abandoned
property from all outward appearances in fact has retained a
subjective expectation of privacy, then a search of the
property is nevertheless valid if that expectation is
intrinsically unreasonable or not otherwise entitled to
protection.” United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1080
(9th Cir. 1981).
    As shown by the record, Defendants’ failure to ensure
that E recovered the devices before the home was sold, and
their subsequent failure to take any additional action, is
sufficient to support a finding of abandonment, even if
Defendants ceased their efforts only because they feared
detection by law enforcement. See United States v. Cella,
568 F.2d 1266, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[B]y telling [a third
party] to destroy the [documents later seized], and failing to
ensure that he did so, the defendants abandoned the materials
and lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in them.”);
see also Nordling, 804 F.2d at 1470 (“Nordling disclaimed
ownership and left the bag on the airplane in circumstances
in which it was virtually certain that the bag would be
opened, inspected and turned over to law enforcement
                   UNITED STATES V. FISHER                 31

authorities before he could possibly attempt to reexert
physical control.”).
    Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
clearly err by finding that Defendants abandoned the devices
seized in the 2018 search of the Burkehaven Avenue
Residence. Because Defendants abandoned the devices,
they lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in them, and
lacked standing to seek suppression of the devices’ contents.
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Defendants’
second Motion to Suppress.
   AFFIRMED.

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
   I concur in the judgment only.
    1. The district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion
to suppress evidence derived from the November 2016
search warrant. The affidavit in support of the search
warrant accurately reported that, in response to an earlier
search warrant, Tumblr had provided dozens of images of
child pornography linked directly to Defendants’ computer
and to Defendants’ Tumblr account. Probable cause
therefore existed, even assuming that we agreed with
Defendants’ arguments concerning the IP addresses. See,
e.g., Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding that, in reviewing a challenge to a search
warrant, we ask whether probable cause exists after purging
false statements and correcting misleading statements). I
therefore would not reach the merits of the dispute about the
IP addresses.
32                 UNITED STATES V. FISHER

    2. The district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion
to suppress evidence derived from the 2018 search warrant.
Nine months after selling the house to a third party,
Defendants lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in
items that they had left in house. See Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (reiterating that, to succeed in
suppressing the fruits of a search, an individual first must
have sought to preserve the items as private).