Court Opinion

ID: 9926843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 19:02:36.472634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:02.870762
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 Marriage of Bonner CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of CANDY and
TERENCE BONNER.
                                                                 D081725
CANDY BONNER,

         Respondent,                                             (Super. Ct. No. ED88462)

         v.

TERENCE BONNER,

         Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior
Court of San Diego County, Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Affirmed.
         Terence Bonner, in pro. per., for Appellant.
         No appearance for Respondent.
      This marriage dissolution action involving Terence and Candy Bonner,

returns to us for a third appeal.1 In our 2022 Opinion, we remanded to the
trial court with specific directions to, among other things, “resolve an
inconsistency between (a) the mathematical sum of the specific individual
monetary amounts identified throughout the [2020] Statement of Decision as
credits to either party, and (b) the total amount of $19,016.30 identified as
the equalization payment that Candy would have otherwise owed
to Terence.” (2022 Opinion, supra, D078148.) On remand, the trial court
entered an amended judgment, explaining that the inconsistency we detailed
in the 2022 Opinion was the result of a mathematical error, which the trial
court corrected in the amended judgment. After entry of the amended
judgment, Terence filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to set aside and
vacate the judgment. The trial court denied Terence’s postjudgment motions,
explaining that Terence sought relief that exceeded the scope of the authority
accorded to it by the limited remand described in the 2022 Opinion.
      Terence appeals from the amended judgment, as well as from the trial
court’s denial of his postjudgment motions. We conclude that Terence’s
appeal lacks merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment and the order
denying the postjudgment motions.

1      The two prior appeals resulted in the following opinions: In re
Marriage of Bonner (Dec. 22, 2015, D066627) [nonpub. opn.]; and In re
Marriage of Bonner (Apr. 22, 2022, D078148) [nonpub. opn.] (2022 Opinion).
As is customary in family law matters, because the parties have the same
last name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid any confusion, and
we intend no disrespect by doing so.

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                                      I.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
     In setting forth the relevant factual background for this appeal, we
turn to our 2022 Opinion:
           “Terence and Candy were married in March 1978. On
     August 30, 2012, Candy filed a petition for dissolution, in which
     she alleged August 29, 2012, as the date of separation. In
     January 2014, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution as
     to the parties’ marital status only.

            “Terence is retired from employment with an agency of the
     federal government, where he worked from May 1978 until May
     2010. Since retirement, Terence has received a federal pension,
     but he did not share the pension with Candy for the first two
     years after separation. In July 2014, in response to a request
     filed by Candy, the trial court ordered Terence to pay Candy half
     of his pension on a going forward basis. A domestic relations
     order (DRO) was created to implement the division. Terence
     made direct payments to Candy for her share of his pension until
     the pension administrator started making payments to Candy in
     2017.

           “Candy worked for the County of San Diego during the
     marriage, and she retired in 2019. In 2019, Terence stipulated to
     a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) that divided Candy’s
     pension.

           “During the marriage, the parties purchased a house in El
     Cajon and a house in Campo. After the date of separation until
     July 2013, the parties lived together in the Campo house. After
     that date, Candy moved into the El Cajon house. The El Cajon
     house produced rental income during the parties’ entire
     separation, including when Candy resided in it.

            “On eight days between January 29, 2019, and February
     11, 2020, the trial court held a trial on reserved marital property
     issues, as well as on Candy’s request for spousal support and both
     of the parties’ requests for an award of attorney fees as a sanction
     under [Family Code] section 271. Among the community

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      property items at issue were: (1) the parties’ two real properties;
      (2) the parties’ respective pensions; (3) Candy’s retirement
      account; and (4) the parties’ debt. The parties also sought
      reimbursement for certain payments they made from separate
      property funds during separation. During the trial, Candy was
      represented by counsel, and Terence represented himself.

             “In a 46-page statement of decision [issued on August 7,
      2020](the [2020] Statement of Decision), the trial court made a
      series of orders concerning the division of the parties’ community
      property and the requests for reimbursement. In addition, the
      trial court rejected Candy’s request for spousal support. The trial
      court also ordered that Terence pay $37,500 of Candy’s attorney
      fees as a sanction pursuant to [Family Code] section 271, to be
      paid at the rate of $250 per month. However, the trial court
      reduced the amount of sanctions that Terence was obligated to
      pay based on the amount of an equalization payment that it
      concluded Candy owed to Terence, which it stated was
      $19,016.30. The trial court reserved jurisdiction on several
      issues, including spousal support. It also ordered that a new
      DRO for Terence’s pension be prepared to accurately reflect
      Terence’s time of service attributable to his unused sick leave.
      The trial court ordered that an expert be appointed to calculate
      the amount that Candy was underpaid from Terence’s pension
      income under the prior version of the DRO. A judgment on the
      reserved issues was entered on August 7, 2020, which expressly
      incorporated the [2020] Statement of Decision.

            “Terence filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to set
      aside and vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied.

            “Terence filed a notice of appeal from the judgment as well
      as from the trial court’s order denying his postjudgment
      motions.” (2022 Opinion, supra, D078148.)

      Terence raised a wide range of issues in his appeal, all of which we
addressed in the 58-page 2022 Opinion. In the 2022 Opinion, we determined
that a remand to the trial court was warranted with respect to three different
issues raised by Terence. The first two issues, which are not relevant here,

                                       4
involved (1) the trial court’s failure to rule on Terence’s request for
reimbursement of the auto insurance premiums he paid for Candy; and
(2) the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction over spousal support based on its
mistaken understanding that it lacked the discretion to terminate its
jurisdiction over that issue. (2022 Opinion, supra, D078148.)
      The third issue, which is implicated in this appeal, concerned an
inconsistency in the 2020 Statement of Decision with respect to the amount of
the equalization payment that Candy would be required to pay to Terence,
prior to taking into account the trial court’s award of sanctions to Candy. As
our discussion of that issue is pertinent here, we set it forth in full:
            “Referring to the [2020] Statement of Decision, Terence
      states that because the trial court did not itemize the credits
      awarded to each party, the judgment is unclear. Terence gives a
      single example, explaining that ‘the court’s judgment stated that
      Terence would have been entitled to an equalization payment of
      $19,016.30 if it had not imposed $37,500 in [Family Code] section
      271 sanctions against him, but this figure is irreconcilable with
      the other amounts articulated in the court’s judgment.’ Terence
      refers to the following language in the [2020] Statement of
      Decision: ‘The Court orders [Terence] pay $37,500 in sanctions
      under . . . [Family Code] section 271. $18,483.70 in attorney’s
      fees are to be paid directly to [Candy’s] counsel . . . . The other
      $19,016.30 is satisfied from [Terence’s] share of community
      assets that would have otherwise resulted in an equalization
      payment. . . . [¶] . . . Neither party owes the other an equalization
      payment. Without the award of sanctions under [Family Code]
      section 271, [Candy] would have owed [Terence] $19,016.30. But
      the Court has applied that amount to the sanctions award under
      [Family Code] section 271.’ Terence contends that it is unclear
      how the trial court arrived at the figure of $19,016.30.

            “We agree with Terence’s assessment. In the course of the
      46-page [2020] Statement of Decision, the trial court identifies
      numerous credits for both Candy and Terence, all of which should
      logically inform the total amount of the equalization payment
      that Candy would owe Terence prior to the imposition of

                                         5
      sanctions. However, when we total all of those credits, we are
      unable to understand the basis for the trial court’s statement
      that Terence would be entitled to an equalization payment of
      $19,016.30. Either the trial court committed a mathematical
      error, or there is some other error in the [2020] Statement of
      Decision (such as an inadvertently omitted credit or a
      typographical error) that would explain the inconsistency. We
      are unable, on appeal, to figure out how the inconsistency should
      be resolved.

             “The trial court based its order that Terence pay $18,483.70
      in attorney’s fees to Candy’s counsel on the assumption that
      Candy would have owed an equalization payment of $19,016.30.
      However, the order for Terence to pay $18,483.70 would be
      erroneous if Candy’s equalization obligation (based on the credits
      identified in the [2020] Statement of Decision) did not, in fact,
      total $19,016.30. As it currently stands, the judgment is
      internally inconsistent and unclear as to the parties’ financial
      obligations toward each other. Therefore, we remand to the trial
      court with directions that it (1) resolve the inconsistency by
      clarifying how it arrived at the conclusion that Terence would be
      entitled to an equalization payment of $19,016.30 prior to the
      application of the sanctions award, and (2) in the course of doing
      so, correct any figures in the [2020] Statement of Decision that it
      discovers to be inaccurate, and amend the judgment accordingly.”
      (2022 Opinion, supra, D078148.)

      Based on our identification of the three items that needed to be
addressed by the trial court on remand, our disposition in the 2022 Opinion
described a limited remand with specific directions for the trial court:
             “This matter is remanded to the trial court for the following
      proceedings: First, with respect to the equalization payment that
      Candy would have owed to Terence prior to the imposition of
      [Family Code] section 271 sanctions, the trial court shall resolve
      an inconsistency between (a) the mathematical sum of the
      specific individual monetary amounts identified throughout the
      [2020] Statement of Decision as credits to either party, and
      (b) the total amount of $19,016.30 identified as the equalization
      payment that Candy would have otherwise owed to Terence. In
      so doing, the trial court shall (1) confirm that it has included a
                                       6
      credit of $31,636.40 reflecting Terence’s payment of community
      debt; (2) correct any errors that it discovers with respect to the
      figures set forth in the [2020] Statement of Decision; and
      (3) amend the judgment accordingly. Second, the trial court shall
      rule on Terence’s request for reimbursement of the auto
      insurance premiums he paid for Candy. Third, the trial court
      shall decide whether to exercise its discretion to make an express
      order terminating jurisdiction over spousal support.
            “In all other respects, the judgment and the trial court’s
      postjudgment orders are affirmed.” (2022 Opinion, supra,
      D078148.)

      After remand, the trial court addressed the issues that we specified in
the 2022 Opinion by issuing, on August 29, 2022, an amended judgment after
remand. The amended judgment attached and incorporated two documents:
(1) a Statement of Decision Regarding Remanded Issues; and (2) an
interlineated version of the 2020 Statement of Decision, which deleted the
specific Findings and Orders pertaining to the remanded issues and directed
the reader, on those issues, to the Statement of Decision Regarding
Remanded Issues.
      In the Statement of Decision Regarding Remanded issues, the trial
court explained that it had committed a mathematical error when calculating
the reimbursements due to each party. The trial court explained that “[t]o
ensure that [a mathematical error] does not occur again” it would “list[ ] each
reimbursement each party was ordered to pay with a citation to the [2020]
[S]tatement of [D]ecision where it was ordered.” The trial court then set
forth a table showing each individual reimbursement amount, with a citation
to the page on which that reimbursement was identified in the 2020
Statement of Decision. The trial court did not undertake to revisit or revise
any of the individual reimbursement amounts set forth in the 2020
Statement of Decision. The trial court concluded, “Subtracting the total

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reimbursements [Terence] owes from the total reimbursements [Candy] owes
($212,308.05-$195,844.47), leaves [Candy] owing an equalization payment of
$16,535.58,” rather than the equalization payment of $19,016.30 that was
erroneously calculated in the 2020 Statement of Decision. The amended
judgment, therefore, required that Terence pay $20,964.42 directly to Candy’s
attorney (at the rate of $250 per month), rather than the amount of
$18,483.70 specified in the 2020 Statement of Decision.
      After the trial court issued the amended judgment, Terence filed both a
motion for a new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 657) and a motion to set aside and
vacate the judgment (id., § 663) (the postjudgment motions). The
postjudgment motions sought relief with respect two specific reimbursement
items identified in the 2020 Statement of Decision.
      Specifically, on page 21 of the 2020 Statement of Decision, the trial
court stated, “The Court awards $2993.59 to [Terence] for payments made
towards the mortgage and insurance [for the El Cajon house] after
separation. These amounts are reduced by the $11,814.10 that [Candy]
deposited into the joint checking account during this time period.” Terence
argued in the postjudgment motions that instead of $2,993.59, he should
have been awarded $4,085.52 because he was entitled to the full amount of
the earthquake and homeowner’s insurance payments, not just half. Terence
also argued that instead of crediting Candy for the $11,814.10 she deposited
into the joint checking account, Candy should have been credited only
$128.68 because she allegedly withdrew or spent most of the funds. Terence
lodged numerous exhibits, upon which he proposed to rely to prove that the
trial court should enter a different judgment.
      The trial court denied the postjudgment motions at a hearing held on
November 9, 2022. In explaining the denial, the trial court stated,

                                       8
“[Terence’s] requests, if I were to grant them, would be in excess of what the
Court of Appeal[ ] gave me the power to do. . . . I believe to grant the motions
would be in excess of the authority that I have in this case.” The trial court
explained, “It was a very limited subset of issues that the Court of Appeal
sent down . . . . They did not direct me to revisit the findings about what
equalizations were made or what equalizations were owed. They directed
this court to correct mathematical errors based on what was in the [2020]
[S]tatement of [D]ecision. . . . That is the extent of the power they gave to
[this Court]. They said further proceedings, not new trial. If the Court of
Appeal had wanted there to be a new trial where the Court would consider
new evidence, where the Court would allow new evidence to be presented,
they would have said remanded for a new trial. They did not.”
      Following the November 9, 2022 hearing, the trial court issued a
minute order denying the postjudgment motions. The minute order included
a checked box on the form, which stated, “Resp [Respondent, i.e., Terence]
referred to the FLF [family law facilitator] for preparation of FOAH [a formal
order after hearing] . . . and FLF to prepare and submit directly to the court.”
(Capitalization omitted.) No formal order after hearing appears in the
appellate record, and there is no indication in the register of actions that any
such order was prepared.
      On December 8, 2022, Terence filed a notice of appeal from both the

amended judgment and from the order denying the postjudgment motions.2

2    Candy did not file a respondent’s brief and has not appeared in
connection with this appeal.

                                        9
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Despite the Absence of a Formal Order After Hearing, We Will Consider
      the Appeal from the Motion to Vacate the Judgment
      Before considering the merits of Terence’s appeal, we must first
address the preliminary issue of appealability with respect to the trial court’s
denial of the motion to vacate the judgment.
      Terence’s postjudgment motions sought a new trial and an order
setting aside and vacating the judgment. Case law provides that a ruling
denying either type of motion may be reviewed on appeal. (Walker v. Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th
15, 19 (Walker) [ruling denying a motion for a new trial]; Ryan v. Rosenfeld
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 124, 135 [ruling denying a motion to vacate a judgment].)
More specifically, a ruling denying a motion for a new trial may be reviewed
as part of the appeal from the judgment (Walker, at p. 19), and a ruling
denying a motion to vacate a judgment, brought pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 663, is independently appealable as an order made after an
appealable judgment. (Ryan, at pp. 134–135.)
      However, a complication arises in this case because of the content of
the minute order from the November 9, 2022 hearing, at which the trial court
denied both of Terence’s postjudgment motions. On its face, that minute
order seems to contemplate the preparation of a final order after hearing.
Specifically, as we have explained, a box is checked indicating “Resp
[Respondent, i.e., Terence] referred to the FLF [family law facilitator] for
preparation of FOAH [a formal order after hearing] . . . and FLF to prepare
and submit directly to the court.” (Capitalization omitted.)
      “A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order
is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101.)

                                       10
“[W]hen the trial court’s minute order expressly indicates that a written
order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.” (In re
Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170.) Based on those legal
principles, we issued an order on March 27, 2023, observing that “the portion
of the November 9, 2022 minute order that denies [Terence’s] motion to

vacate the judgment is premature.”3 We directed Terence to either submit a
copy of a final order after hearing or, in the alternative, to submit a letter
addressing why his appeal from the November 9, 2022 minute order denying
his motion to vacate the judgment should not be dismissed as being from a
nonappealable, interlocutory order.
      In response, Terence did not submit a final order after hearing. He did,
however, submit extensive briefing addressing why we should consider his
appeal of the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to vacate the judgment.
After receiving Terence’s briefing, we issued an order stating that the appeal
would proceed and that the parties should address, in their appellate briefs,
whether the trial court’s November 9, 2022 minute order denying the motion
to vacate was a final appealable order.
      Having reviewed Terence’s briefing, we have determined that, in the
interest of justice, we will construe the trial court’s minute order from the
November 9, 2022 hearing as the final appealable order denying the motion
to vacate the judgment. Significantly, at the November 9, 2022 hearing, the
trial court did not state on the record that Terence was referred to the family
law facilitator for the preparation of a formal order after hearing. In fact, at

3     Because a ruling denying a motion for a new trial need not be
independently appealable to be reviewed on appeal as part of the appeal from
the judgment (Walker, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 19), we did not identify any
problem with the prematurity of Terence’s appellate challenge to the ruling
denying the motion for a new trial.

                                        11
the conclusion of the hearing, Candy specifically asked, “How do we move
forward now? Do we just follow the order or what -- what do we do next?”
The trial court responded that “there is a time frame for appeal from this
type of motion. . . . [T]here is an entitlement to an appeal.” The trial court
made no mention of any requirement of a formal order after hearing to
perfect the ability to appeal. “An oral ruling controls where there is a conflict
with a minute order.” (Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, 588,
fn. 1.) Because the trial court made no mention at the hearing that Terence
was required to apply to the family law facilitator for the preparation of a
formal order after hearing, the trial court’s statements at the hearing control
over any box that was subsequently checked on the minute order.
      Further, Terence states, under penalty of perjury, that he was not
served with the minute order for the November 9, 2022 hearing. Consistent
with that representation, the superior court’s register of actions, as
reproduced in the appellate record, does not reflect any clerk’s certificate of
service for the minute order for the November 9, 2022 hearing. Therefore, it
appears that Terence was never given any notice that he was required to
apply to the family law facilitator for the preparation of a formal order after
hearing.
      In light of the lack of any communication to Terence, either on the
record at the November 9, 2022 hearing or by service of the minute order,
that he should seek the preparation of a formal order after hearing, we will
treat the minute order from the November 9, 2022 hearing as the final order
denying the motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. Terence has
properly appealed from that order.

                                       12
B.    The Appeal from the Amended Judgment and the Appeal from the
      Order Denying the Postjudgment Motions Lack Merit
      Turning to the merits, we are presented with both (1) an appeal from
the amended judgment, and (2) an appeal from the ruling denying the
postjudgment motions. We address each in turn.
      1.    The Appeal from the Amended Judgment
      In his appeal from the amended judgment, Terence challenges the
same pair of reimbursement items from the 2020 Statement of Decision that
he detailed in the postjudgment motions following the amended judgment.
Specifically, as we have explained, the 2020 Statement of Decision states that
“[t]he Court awards $2993.59 to [Terence] for payments made towards the
mortgage and insurance of [the El Cajon house] after separation. These
amounts are reduced by the $11,814.10 that [Candy] deposited into the joint
checking account during this time period.” In challenging the amended
judgment, Terence argues that “he should have been credited with all of the
homeowners and earthquake insurance expenses” after Candy moved to the
El Cajon house, which would result in him being awarded an additional
$1,091.92. He further argues that because the trial court, in the
2020 Statement of Decision, awarded Candy half of Terence’s pension
retroactive to the date of separation, the trial court should not have
additionally credited Candy for her post-separation deposits to the joint bank
accounts. According to Terence, Candy has received a “double payment.”
      Terence’s arguments rest exclusively on a challenge to the rulings that
the trial court made in the 2020 Statement of Decision. Specifically, he
believes the 2020 Statement of Decision should have credited him with
$4,085.52 instead of $2,993.59, and he believes that Candy should not have
received a credit for most of funds that she deposited in the joint bank

                                       13
accounts after separation. Nothing precluded Terence from raising those
arguments in his prior appeal. It appears that he simply failed to do so.
      Where a party “could have raised an issue in a prior appeal, the
appellate court need not entertain the issue in a subsequent appeal absent a
showing of justification for the delay.” (People v. Senior (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 531, 538 [concluding that a defendant waives an issue by not
raising it in an earlier appeal if “(1) the issue was ripe for decision by the
appellate court at the time of the previous appeal; (2) there has been no
significant change in the underlying facts or applicable law; and (3) the
defendant has offered no reasonable justification for the delay”].) “Waiver
precludes successive appeals based on issues ripe for consideration in the
prior appeal and not brought in that proceeding.” (People v. Jordan (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1143.) We perceive no justification for Terence’s delay
in raising the challenges to the 2020 Statement of Decision that he now

identifies in his appeal from the amended judgment.4 We accordingly need
not, and do not, entertain the issues that Terence should have raised in his
prior appeal.

4      At oral argument, Terence attempted to justify his failure to earlier
raise the two issues, stating that he viewed the 2020 Statement of Decision
on those issue as having been “unclear.” That justification fails because the
trial court’s ruling with respect to the two issues has not been clarified in any
manner since the 2020 Statement of Decision. Neither the Statement of
Decision Regarding Remanded Issues nor the interlineated version of the
2020 Statement of Decision contain any further clarification on the issues
that Terence now challenges. Thus, any challenge that Terence is currently
asserting he could have asserted in his earlier appeal. At oral argument,
Terence also explained that his prior appeal was focused on “broader issues.”
That attempted justification is also unavailing. Terence may have chosen to
focus on broader issues in his prior appeal, but nothing precluded him from
also raising additional specific challenges.

                                        14
      Further, “[i]n an appeal following a limited remand, the scope of the
issues before the [appellate] court is determined by the remand order.”
(People v. Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392, 396–397.) Our remand order in
the 2022 Opinion was limited in scope. Regarding the equalization payment
that Candy owed to Terence (prior to the sanctions she was awarded), we
remanded for the trial court to perform the very limited task of explaining
why the individual credits identified in the 2020 Statement of Decision, when
totaled, did not match the amount of $19,016.30. (2022 Opinion, supra,
D078148.) We authorized the trial court to investigate the reason for the
discrepancy and to make any corrections to the judgment that were needed
when it determined the cause of the discrepancy. (Ibid.) We did not
authorize the trial court to entertain any further argument by the parties
challenging the individual reimbursement amounts that are set forth
throughout the 2020 Statement of Decision. As all of the issues that Terence
raises in the appeal from the amended judgment exceed the scope of our
remand in the 2022 Opinion, those issues are not cognizable in this appeal.
      2.      The Appeal from the Order Denying the Postjudgment Motions
      Turning to Terence’s appeal from the order denying the postjudgment
motions, the trial court denied those motions based on its conclusion that it
did not have the authority, on remand, to grant the relief that Terence
sought. Terence contends that the trial court erred in reaching that
conclusion.
      “A ‘trial court’s jurisdiction on remand extends only to those issues on
which the reviewing court permits further proceedings.’ ” (Sanchez v.
Martinez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 535, 550.) “[T]he rule requiring a trial court
to follow the terms of the remittitur is jurisdictional in nature. [Citations.]
The issues the trial court may address in the remand proceedings are

                                       15
therefore limited to those specified in the reviewing court’s directions, and if
the reviewing court does not direct the trial court to take a particular action
or make a particular determination, the trial court is not authorized to do so.”
(Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 859–860.) “The
trial court may not expand the issues on remand to encompass matters
outside the scope of the remittitur merely because the reviewing court has
not expressly forbidden the trial court from doing so.” (Id. at p. 863.) “The
trial court is empowered to act only in accordance with the direction of the
reviewing court; action which does not conform to those directions is void.”
(Hampton v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1952) 38 Cal.2d
652, 655.)
      Here, as we have explained, the scope of the remand specified in the
2022 Opinion was limited. With respect to the equalization payment owed by
Candy, we authorized the trial court to investigate the source of the
discrepancy appearing in the 2020 Statement of Decision. Once the trial
court located the source of the discrepancy, we authorized the trial court to do
no more than to resolve the discrepancy by issuing an amended judgment.
      Terence argues that the relief he sought in his postjudgment motions
fell within the scope of this limited remand because “he sought to resolve any
internal inconsistencies and correct any math errors in the trial court’s
amended judgment after remand.” We reject Terence’s argument. The
alleged “internal inconsistencies” and “math errors” that Terence described in
his postjudgment motions are completely unrelated to the inconsistent
amounts and possible mathematical error that we identified in the
2022 Opinion. Specifically, in his postjudgment motions, Terence challenged
the trial court’s conclusion that (1) Terence should be credited for only half of
the insurance premiums he paid for the El Cajon house after separation, and

                                       16
(2) Candy should be reimbursed for the amounts she deposited in the joint
bank accounts after separation. In contrast, we remanded only for the trial
court to examine why the sum of the credits in the 2020 Statement of
Decision was inconsistent with the amount of $19,016.30. (2022 Opinion,
supra, D078148.) Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Terence’s
postjudgment motions on the ground that the relief Terence sought was
beyond its authority on remand.
                               DISPOSITION
     The judgment and the trial court’s order denying the postjudgment
motions are affirmed.

                                                                   IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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