Court Opinion

ID: 9959673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:09:07.968638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.162342
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1988-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

QUASHAWN D. SHIVERS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued February 28, 2024 – Decided April 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Gummer and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 21-
                   03-0644.

                   Luke C. Kurzawa argued the cause for appellant (Reisig
                   Criminal Defense & DWI Law, LLC, attorneys;
                   Matthew Whalen Reisig and Luke C. Kurzawa, on the
                   brief; Michael H. Ross, of counsel and on the brief).

                   Kevin Jay Hein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County
                   Prosecutor, attorney; Kevin Jay Hein, of counsel and on
                   the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Quashawn D. Shivers appeals from an order entered on January

6, 2022, denying his motion challenging the prosecutor's rejection of his

application for pre-trial intervention (PTI). Defendant argues the court erred by

failing to find the prosecutor's objection constituted a patent and gross abuse of

discretion. We disagree and affirm.

      On March 24, 2021, defendant was indicted on charges of third-degree

terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, second-degree unlawful possession of a

handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(l), second-degree possession of a weapon for an

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(l), and fourth-degree aggravated assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C: 12-1(b)(4) (pointing a firearm at or in the direction of another).

The charges stem from a November 2017 complaint made by the mother of

defendant's child, who claimed defendant had appeared at her home and

threatened to harm her, pointing a handgun at her face. Several months after the

indictment was returned, the State extended a plea offer in which defendant

would plead guilty to the third-degree terroristic threats charge—the sole charge

in the indictment not involving possession of a weapon—and the State would

dismiss the remaining charges.

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      Before accepting the plea offer, defendant sought the prosecutor's consent

to apply to PTI. The State agreed defendant could submit a PTI application but

did not consent to his acceptance into PTI.

      On August 24, 2021, one day before he was scheduled to plead guilty to

the terroristic-threats charge, defendant filed his PTI application and included a

statement of compelling reasons required by Rule 3:28-1(e)(3). He claimed to

be an ideal candidate for PTI based on: his age of thirty-four years; his lack of

prior criminal history; his motivation to participate in PTI; his current

employment as a social worker and counselor; and the fact he placed a high

importance on maintaining a law-abiding life. He also noted his alleged criminal

activity is "related to a condition that would be conducive to change through his

participation in supervisory treatment insofar as the structure PTI provides will

help" him lead a law-abiding life.

      Defendant acknowledged three of the four charges against him "would

ordinarily serve to disqualify him from consideration from [PTI] admission ,"

presumably referencing the weapons and aggravated-assault charges and Rule

3:28-1(d)(1), which provides that a person charged with a crime "for which there

is a presumption of incarceration or a mandatory minimum period of parole

ineligibility" is "ineligible for [PTI] without prosecutor consent to consideration

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of the application." However, defendant pointed out the State had extended a

plea offer in which those charges would be dismissed and defendant would plead

guilty to the terroristic-threats charge, which defendant contended would "avoid

the imposition of any jail time" and "is a charge that would make the Defendant

eligible for admission into the PTI program." Defendant contended the State

had made that plea offer after hearing defense counsel's arguments concerning

the difficulty the State would face in attempting to introduce into evidence the

gun defendant allegedly had pointed at the victim.

      On August 24, 2021, defendant executed a plea form in which he agreed

to plead guilty to the third-degree terroristic-threats charge. The plea form

included the following language:

            State has consented to allow [d]efendant to apply for
            PTI. If accepted, [d]efendant will participate in same.
            If ultimately denied admission into PTI, [S]tate will
            recommend a term of non-custodial probation,
            conditioned upon a psychological evaluation and any
            recommend[ed] treatment, a substance abuse
            evaluation and any recommended treatment, no
            uninvited contact with the victim, forfeiture of the
            firearm seized in this matter, and forfeiture of all
            firearms pursuant to the DV Firearms Surrender Order.

      At the plea hearing the following day, the court confirmed defendant

understood the nature of his plea and its effect on his PTI application:

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           [The court:] My understanding is you’re going to plead
           guilty to a terroristic threat, a third degree, in return for
           a recommended sentence of either PTI or probation. Is
           that your understanding?

           A: Yes.

           [The court:] Have you had enough time to review your
           case and your plea agreement including any discovery
           in this matter with [counsel]?

           A: Yes.

           ....

           [The court:] If you’re not accepted into PTI, you
           understand—and you're sentenced to the third[-]degree
           terroristic threat, you understand you'd have a criminal
           record?

           A: Yes.

           [The court:] If you are accepted into PTI and you
           successfully complete that program, then you would not
           have a criminal record. Do you understand that?

           A: Yes, I do.

     Defense counsel further clarified that there is a presumption against

admittance and that admission was not guaranteed:

           [Counsel:] So, there's two provisions in the statute
           governing PTI that I want to go over on the record with
           you. One is [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-12b(2)(b), which actually
           states that there is a presumption against you being
           admitted into PTI based on what you’re charged with.

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                                        5
      Do you understand that there is a presumption against
      your being admitted into the program?

      A: Yes.

      [Counsel:] And that we have to overcome that
      presumption against you.

      A: Yes.

      [Counsel:] And the other provision is that you’re
      entering a guilty plea today and also, concomitantly or
      simultaneously, applying for PTI, that’s because the
      statute, the same statute, 2C:43-12g(3) states that in
      cases involving domestic violence, which your case is,
      that you can only apply for PTI with a guilty plea. Do
      you understand that?

      A: Yes.

      [Counsel:] And you understand that there is—the
      reality here is you may not get into PTI.

      A: Yes.

      ....

      [Counsel:] And that if you don’t get in, the State is
      recommending non-custodial probation, which means
      you’re not going to prison and/or jail. Do you
      understand that?

      A: Yes, I do.

Defendant then made certain allocutions as to the terroristic threat charge:

      [Counsel:] And did you have a verbal disagreement
      with V.J. on that occasion at about 9:00 p.m.?

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                                  6
            A: Yes.

            [Counsel:] And during this verbal disagreement, was
            that verbal disagreement about ongoing co-parenting
            issues that you’ve had with V.J. as it related to the
            minor child in common?

            A: Yes.

            [Counsel:] And during this verbal disagreement, did
            you become both animated and unduly and
            unnecessarily argumentative?

            A: Yes.

            [Counsel:] And during that state, your state of being
            animated and unduly and unnecessarily argumentative,
            did you threaten to harm V.J. with the purpose to
            terrorize her during this verbal disagreement?

            A: Yes.

            [Counsel:] When I say "the purpose," is the intent to
            commit the crime?

            A: Yes.

            [Counsel:] And did you have that purpose?

            A: Yes.

      On September 27, 2021, the Prosecutor's Office notified defense counsel

it had reviewed defendant's PTI application and statement of compelling reasons

and objected to defendant's admission into PTI based on his failure to comply

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                                      7
with the deadline required under Rule 3:28-2, which requires that "[a]pplications

for pretrial intervention shall be made at the earliest possible opportunity,

including before indictment . . . unless good cause is shown or consent by the

prosecutor is obtained."

      The State asserted defendant had failed to demonstrate the requisite

extraordinary and compelling circumstances that would justify admission into

PTI. The State contended defendant's age, criminal history and employment did

not constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances and further stated

"the existence—and negotiated terms—of a plea offer, the potential legal

challenges defendant might raise, as well as the strength of the State's case do

not overcome the presumption of ineligibility that exists due to the nature of the

crimes charged."     Defendant filed a motion challenging the prosecutor's

rejection of his application.

      Following defendant's motion, a hearing was convened and the matter

adjourned to give the State an opportunity to update its response to include a

complete analysis of the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The State

issued a supplemental letter noting it did not dispute defendant's contention that

"consent was given for the late submission of the application, or for

consideration of the application due to the pending second-degree charges" but

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                                        8
reiterated its position that defendant's age, criminal history, and employment did

not constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying admission

into PTI.

      Relying on Rule 3:28-4(b)(1)(iii), the State focused on the victim's

statement that defendant had pointed a gun at her during the argument as a basis

for concluding that he had committed a deliberate act of violence and, the

presumption against admission into PTI had not been overcome. The State

further noted its objection was based upon the statutory criteria in N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(1) to (17) and specifically contended the following factors weighed

against defendant's admission to PTI: (1) the nature of the offense, (2) the facts

of the case, (3) age and motivation of defendant, (4) the desire of the victim to

forego prosecution, (6) the lack of likelihood defendant's crime is related to a

condition conducive to change through participation in supervisory programs ,

(7) consideration of the needs and interests of the victim and society, (10)

whether or not the crime is of a violent or assaultive nature, and (17) whether or

not the harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would

outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an offender into a supervisory

treatment program.

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                                        9
      On January 6, 2022, following argument, the court entered an order

denying defendant's motion. In rendering its oral decision, the court squarely

addressed defendant's arguments that the prosecutor committed a patent and

gross abuse of discretion by objecting to his application based on the original

second-degree charges in the indictment. The court stated,

            What the defense counsel is essentially asking the court
            is to consider the application was made prior to a plea,
            and that the State shouldn’t base its rejection on those
            charges . . . that the defendant was originally charged
            with . . . but rather, that—it should be what is
            essentially pled to . . . I think that timing is important
            here, and I think the State is correct that if it is supposed
            to be considered after the plea, then [State v. Bell, 271
            N.J. 336 (2014)] prohibits the application as PTI is not
            something that can be an option after a guilty plea.

Addressing the State's substantive objections, the court concluded there was no

"patent and gross abuse of discretion." Specifically, the court found the State

had considered all relevant factors, did not consider irrelevant or inappropriate

factors, and that there was no evidence presented that its denial had been

premised on a clear error in judgment or so far off the mark that it would subvert

the goals underlying the PTI program.

      The court subsequently sentenced defendant to a one-year term of non-

custodial probation on his guilty plea to the third-degree terroristic threats.

      Defendant makes a singular point in support of his appeal.

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                                        10
            POINT I

            THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
            ENROLLED     INTO    THE    PRE-TRIAL
            INTERVENTION (PTI) PROGRAM OVER THE
            PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTIONS SINCE THE
            REJECTION OF DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION
            WAS BASED ON A PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE
            OF DISCRETION BY THE CAMDEN COUNTY
            PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE.

      "PTI is essentially an extension of the charging decision, therefore the

decision to grant or deny PTI is a 'quintessentially prosecutorial function.'" State

v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 624 (2015) (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576,

582 (1996)); see also State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 17 (2023). A defendant may

challenge "the decision . . . of a prosecutor refusing to consent to consideration

of the defendant's application where required pursuant to R. 3:28-1(d), or of a

prosecutor's refusing to consent to the defendant's enrollment into the pretrial

intervention program[.]" R. 3:28-6. However, "the prosecutor's decision to

accept or reject a defendant's PTI application is entitled to a great deal of

deference." Roseman, 221 N.J. at 624 (citing State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360,

381 (1977)).

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                                        11
      "A court reviewing a prosecutor's decision to deny PTI may overturn that

decision only if the defendant 'clearly and convincingly' establishes the decision

was a 'patent and gross abuse of discretion.'" State v. Johnson, 238 N.J. 119,

128-29 (2019) (quoting Wallace, 146 N.J. at 583). Our Supreme Court has

defined a "'patent and gross abuse of discretion' in the context of a prosecutor's

denial of a PTI application" as follows:

             Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion will be manifest if
             defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not
             premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors,
             (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or
             inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error
             in judgement. In order for such an abuse of discretion
             to rise to the level of "patent and gross," it must further
             be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of
             will clearly subvert the goals underlying [PTI].

             [Roseman, 221 N.J. at 625 (quoting State v. Bender, 80
             N.J. 84, 93 (1979)).]

      The same standard governs our review. "The question is not whether we

agree or disagree with the prosecutor's decision, but whether the prosecutor's

decision could not have been reasonably made upon weighing the relevant

factors."   State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 254 (1995).          "When a defendant

convincingly demonstrates a patent and gross abuse of discretion, a court may

admit the defendant into PTI over the prosecutor's objection." Johnson, 238 N.J.

                                                                            A-1988-21
                                        12
at 129 (citing Roseman, 221 N.J. at 624-25). But when the prosecutor has failed

to consider all relevant information, a remand is more appropriate. Nwobu, 139

N.J. at 247 (citing State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562, 567 (1987)).

      Defendant challenges the State's use of the nature of the original charges

arguing "the existence of his original, unproved, now dismissed charges should

not have been used as a basis to deny his application for PTI." He disputes the

State's representation that he threatened to kill the victim, noting that during his

plea allocution, he "merely admitted that he became animated, unduly

argumentative, and threatened to harm the victim with the purpose to terrorize

her." Defendant further challenges the State's focus on the timeliness of his

application, stating the timing "was a result of the fact that the nature of the

prosecution changed when the State abandoned its prosecution of the weapons-

related offenses" and that "[i]t would have been foolhardy for [defendant] to

have made his application any sooner than he did." Lastly, he posits that in all

respects he "is an appropriate candidate for PTI, having no criminal history and

being charged/convicted of a [third] degree crime [or] less."

      Focusing less on defendant's failure to comply with Rule 3:28-2—and the

timeliness requirement—and more on the nature of the charges against

defendant, the State submits that defendant failed to establish a patent and gross

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                                        13
abuse of discretion in the prosecutor's objection to his PTI application and

remarked that the record shows the prosecutor considered all appropriate

statutory factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), including that defendant had

threatened to kill the victim, which weighed heavily against his admission into

PTI.

       The State further maintains that defendant did not overcome the

presumption against admittance to PTI. The State also asserts that defendant is

not a candidate for PTI because the second-degree weapon charges placed

defendant within the category of "Persons Ineligible for Pre Trial Intervention

Without Prosecutor Consent to Consideration of the Application," see R. 3:28-

1(d)(1), and that he failed to articulate any extraordinary and compelling

circumstances to justify admission. And, the State emphasizes that defendant's

discussion of his "age, criminal history and employment do not constitute

extraordinary and compelling circumstances" justifying admission to PTI.

       We agree with the court that the State reviewed all relevant factors and

there was no evidence presented its denial had been premised on a clear error in

judgment or was so far off the mark that it would subvert the goals underlying

the PTI program. We discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in

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                                      14
denying defendant's motion challenging the prosecutor's rejection of his PTI

application.

        As an initial matter, we are persuaded that the email exchange between

the prosecutor and defense counsel supports the conclusion the prosecutor

expressly consented to defendant's submission of the PTI application for

consideration. However, consenting to consideration of an application to PTI is

not the same as consenting to defendant's admission into PTI. See R. 3:28-6.

Thus, the sole issue is whether the prosecutor, after having consented to

defendant's late application to PTI committed a patent and gross abuse of

discretion by later opposing defendant's application based on the reasons stated

in her written objections.

        Defendant argues his application should have been "evaluated based on

the current posture of what the case is, and not what it was," referring to the

State's focus on the allegation that he threatened to kill the victim when, during

his plea allocution, he "merely admitted that he became animated, unduly

argumentative, and threatened to harm the victim with the purpose to terrorize

her."

        In applying our Supreme Court's holding in Bell, 271 N.J. at 348, the trial

court correctly evaluated defendant's application. The Court in Bell declared

                                                                             A-1988-21
                                        15
that "the vision of PTI . . . contemplates a pretrial decision by the defendant to

seek, and a pretrial decision by the prosecutor to admit, an offender to this

diversionary program" such that "permitting a defendant found guilty of a

criminal offense to seek admission to PTI transforms an effective pretrial

diversionary program into an alternative sentencing option. Such action stands

the PTI program on its head." 271 N.J. at 348; see also State v. Waters, 439 N.J.

Super. 215, 224-25 (App. Div. 2015) (holding that "such concerns are also raised

when a trial court grants a PTI appeal after a valid guilty plea").

      Based on Bell, the trial court found it had "to consider the State's denial

based on [its] consideration of the application prior to the plea and what the

charges were, and the facts [that were] alleged based on the charge, not what the

defendant ultimately pled to."      We agree.     To adopt the post-plea, post-

conviction analytical framework proposed by defendant would, as the Supreme

Court found in Bell, have the effect of "transform[ing] an effective pretrial

diversionary program into an alternative sentencing option," thereby "stand[ing]

the PTI program on its head." 271 N.J. at 348.

      Given that the court applied the correct analytical framework, that

defendant had been charged with crimes carrying a presumption against

admission into PTI, see R. 3:28-1(e)(2)(b), and the consideration of other

                                                                            A-1988-21
                                       16
applicable factors, see R. 3:28-4, we perceive no error in the court's finding that

defendant did not prove by clear and convincing evidence the prosecutor's denial

of defendant's PTI application constituted a patent and gross abuse of discretion.

      Affirmed.

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                                       17