Court Opinion

ID: 9763642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:51:06.133776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:47.223698
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
dissenting.
Alecia M. Zupo, a pedestrian, was struck by a car in July 1973. She sustained serious injuries to her left ankle and foot *34and was under active treatment for these injuries until May 1975. It appears that during this period of time she developed an osteomyelitic infection at the injury site, which required care. CNA Insurance Company, the liability carrier for the owner of the car that struck Ms. Zupo, paid all of her medical expenses theretofore incurred, pursuant to the personal injury protection (PIP) provision of its policy. The last payment of PIP benefits was made to Ms. Zupo in May 1975. In November 1980, she suffered a recurrence of osteomyelitis at the injury site. She was hospitalized and, in .1981, sent medical bills for this treatment to CNA, who refused to reimburse her, relying upon the limitations bar of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a).
The limitations provision of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (No Fault Law), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, provides as follows:
a. Every action for the payment of benefits set forth in sections 4 and 10 of this act, except an action by a decedent’s estate, shall be commenced not later than 2 years after the injured person or survivor suffers a loss or incurs an expense and either knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know that the loss or expense was caused by the accident, or not later than 4 years after the accident whichever is earlier, provided, however, that if benefits have been paid before then an action for further benefits may be commenced not later than 2 years after the last payment of benefits. [N.J. S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a) (emphasis added) ]
Under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, Ms. Zupo’s cause of action is barred. The last payment of PIP benefits was made to Ms. Zupo in 1975 and six years later, in 1981, Ms. Zupo sought reimbursement for the medical expenses she incurred in 1980-81.
Notwithstanding the clear language of the statute, the Appellate Division, whose opinion was relied upon by the majority, held that the two-year-after-payment bar need not be literally applied. It held:
We are satisfied, however, that the Legislature did not intend so anomalous a result and that its failure to have expressly provided for a situation such as this must be regarded as an oversight subject to the court’s remedial interpretation in order to effectuate actual legislative intent. [Zupo v. CNA Insurance Co., 193 N.J.Super. 374, 381 (App.Div.1984).]
*35It is the duty of this Court to interpret statutes, not rewrite them. As Justice Cardozo stated in his classic treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process:
In countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion. They have the right to legislate within gaps, but often there are no gaps. We shall have a false view of the landscape if we look at the waste spaces only, and refuse to see the acres already sown and fruitful. I think the difficulty has its origin in the failure to distinguish between right and power, between the command embodied in a judgment and the jural principle to which the obedience of the judge is due. Judges have, of course, the power, though not the right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it. They have the power, though not the right, to travel beyond the walls of the interstices, the bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom. None the less, by that abuse of power, they violate the law. * * * (Seventeenth Printing, Yale University Press, September, 1957 at p. 129). [State v. Fearick, 69 N.J. 32, 37-38 (1976).]
Viewed as above indicated, I believe that there exist no gaps or legislative oversight in the statute. Therefore, there is no room for judicial legislation when interpreting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1.
Moreover, there are few areas in which the legislature has been more active than in no fault insurance. The statute as enacted is the result of much discussion and compromise among various interest groups. I believe that it is eminently logical that the legislature intended to impose a strict two-year-after-payment bar. The legislature is interested in limiting the cost of automobile insurance to the public. It may well have concluded that without such a bar, numerous claims would be filed years after an accident and such open-ended claims would increase the cost of insurance to the public.
In view of the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, the continued interest of the legislature in this area, and the rational reasons for the legislature’s mandate, I disagree with the majority that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a) should be ignored. I would reverse the Appellate Division’s opinion.
Justice Schreiber joins in this dissent.