Court Opinion

ID: 9826834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:44:58.899483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:15.997895
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
This case is before us on a petition for a rehearing filed by the plaintiff in error, Life and Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee.
In the circuit court, the defendant in error, Mrs. Bertha King Robertson, as executrix of the will of her deceased husband, Dr. Robert Taylor Robertson, obtained a judgment against the plaintiff in error upon an insurance policy issued by plaintiff in error July 15, 1919, by which plaintiff in error insured the life ,of the testator of defendant in error for $5000. The judgment of the circuit court was for $4825 as the amount due on the policy, after deducting a loan of $175 made to the insured by the plaintiff in error, and the further sum of $578.20 interest thereon, and also an additional sum of $1300 as a penalty, making altogether the sum of $6703.20.
In our former opinion, we held that there is no evidence in the record which- reasonably tends to show that the refusal of the plain*72tiff in error to pay any amount due under the policy was in bad faith, and’ the judgment for a penalty was reversed and the penalty disallowed, but otherwise the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed.
In the petition for a rehearing we are ashed to review and reverse our rulings upon a number of questions discussed and decided in our former opinion, but the chief insistence urged in the petition relates to the eleventh assignment of error, which is directed to the action of the trial court in excluding from the jury, as “substantive proof of the fact of suicide,” certain statements to the effect that the insured, Dr. Robertson, committed suicide by taking poison, which statements appeared in a certificate of Dr. John S. Harris included in the proofs of death furnished to plaintiff in error.
In our former opinion we quoted the eleventh assignment of error and then quoted from the bill of exceptions the stenographic report of the proceedings below with respect to the matters of which plaintiff in ei*ror complains through its eleventh assignment. These quotations may be found on pages, sixteen to nineteen, inclusive, of the opinion, and need not be repeated here.
Immediately following the quotations mentioned, and preliminary to the statement of our views and citation of authorities upon the question raised by the eleventh assignment, we said: “It will be observed that the certificate of Dr. Harris was offered in evidence by the defendant; that it was admitted as a circumstance to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant company ‘was acting in good faith in holding back the payment’ of the amount due on the policy, but the jury was not permitted to consider it as ‘substantive evidence;’ that the assignment in this court is that the court erred in excluding the aforesaid question and answer in the certificate of Dr. Harris as ‘substantive evidence of suicide.’ There was no contention in the court below and there is no insistence here that the aforesaid question and answer to which objection was made in the certificate of Dr. Harris was admissible as a declaration or admission on the part of the plaintiff as the beneficiary of the policy. ’ ’
Petitioner urgently, but' respectfully, insists that this court “entirely overlooked the whole position of appellant in this lawsuit in, reference to this matter,” when we stated that “there was no contention in the court below and there is no insistence here that the aforesaid question and answer to Which objection was made in the certificate of Dr. Harris was admissible as a declaration or admission on the part of the jilaintiff as the beneficiary of the policy;” and, in the petition, it is pointed out that in the brief (not the assignments of error) of plaintiff in error it is said that the “statement and proof of loss as to the cause and manner of death of the assured *73are competent evidence as admissions against the plaintiff and in favor of the company,” and authorities are then cited which, it is there insisted, sustain the proposition thus advanced.
It is true that the argument indicated by the above quotation appears in the brief for plaintiff in error, but such argument is entirely outside of and beyond the scope of the assignment of error. A reexamination of the record and the assignments of error has confirmed our opinion that neither in the trial court nor in its assignments of error in this court has the plaintiff in error claimed that the statements of Dr. Harris now in question were competent to go to the jury as an admission of the defendant in error against her interest.
It is obvious that the attention of the trial judge was not directed to a claim that the excluded statement of Dr. Harris was competent evidence of an admission made by defendant in error that her testator had committed suicide.
Moreover, in the absence of an appropriate assignment of error, a complaint of alleged erroneous rulings of the trial court made in appellant’s brief is not sufficient to invoke the action of the appellate court. Priest v. Banking and Trust Company, 148 Tenn., 87, 91, 251 S. W., 904; Spofford v. Rose, 145 Tenn., 583, 613, 237 S. W., 68.
An assignment of error on the admission or rejection of testimony is insufficient, unless the appellate court is “able to see from the face of the assignment of error itself the exact point raised.” Gorrell v. Mayor, etc., of Newport, 1 Tenn. Chy. App. R., 120, 133.
However, the rules of this court reserve to the court the right to “notice an error overlooked by counsel” in their assignments of error, and, giving this rule a liberal interpretation, we have considered the question of the competency of the statement of Dr. Harris in his certificate, that the deceased Dr. Bobertson, committed suicide, etc., as an admission of the defendant in error.
We shall not undertake to restate the facts bearing upon this question, further than to say that Dr. Harris’ statement was not offered in evidence by defendánt in error, but, although filed as an exhibit to her testimony, she Avas asked to file it by counsel for plaintiff in error; that it was mailed to plaintiff in error by Mr. C. D. Walling, a banker of McMinnville; that Mr. Walling obtained and forwarded proofs of the death of the insured because he had been asked by defendant in error to “see to the collection” of the policy; that defendant in error, Mrs. Bobertson, was not in McMinnville at the time the proofs of death Avere obtained and for Avar ded to plaintiff in ei*ror by Mr. Walling and she had no knowledge or information of the contents of the certificate of Dr. Hams; that the policy sued on merely requires “proof of the death” of the insured — not proof of the cause of death — as a prerequisite to the liability of plaintiff in *74error thereon; that Dr. Harris’ certificate and the other “proofs of death” were transmitted to plaintiff in error by Mr. Walling (as shown by his letter of transmittal) as “proof records of the death of Dr. Robert Taylor Robertson” — not as proofs of the canse of Dr. Robei’tson’s death; that there is no provision in the policy that the contents of the proofs of death shall be evidence of the facts therein stated; that the policy is payable to “the executors, administrators or assigns of the insured;” that in bringing this suit defendant in error sued as the executor of the will of the insured, Dr. Robert Taylor Robertson, and her letters testamentary are in evidence; that the insui'ed' left surviving him a widow (the defendant in error) and three infant children, but the will of Dr. Robertson is not in evidence and the ultimate beneficiaries of the proceeds of the policy are not disclosed.
The admissions of a party in interest, although made out of court, are, as a general rule, competent evidence against him. Jones on Evidence, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, sec. 898, et seq. It should be borne in mind, however, that, in taking steps to collect the insurance policy here involved, the defendant in error was acting as executrix of the will of Dr. Robertson, and therefore as trustee for the beneficiaries of that will. Whatever was necessary to he done to put herself in a position to prosecute the claim for the proceeds of the policy here in controversy, she was authorized to do, hut as there was no obligation resting on the beneficiaries, either under the contract or under the law, to furnish to plaintiff in error proofs of the cause of the death of the insured, the executrix had "no power to bind the beneficiaries under the will by extra-judicial admissions, concerning the cause of the death of the insured. Buffalo Loan, etc., Co. v. Knights Templar, etc., Association, 126 N. Y., 450, 22 Am. St. R., 839, 843.
It might be argued with much plausibility that, as the policy was payable to the executors, administrators and assigns of the insured, the defendant in error as executrix is the beneficiary named in the policy, and therefore admissions against her interest, made by her, relevant to the issues in the case, are competent evidence when offered by the insurer. But,’ assuming that the proposition just stated is sound, it does not necessarily follow that the statement of Dr. Hands to the effect that the insured’ committed suicide, etc., is competent evidence of an admission against interest by the defendant in error. This depends on whether Dr. Harris was or not the agent of defendant in error to furnish information to plaintiff in error concerning the cause of the death of Dr. Robertson. Elliott on Evidence, Vol. 3, sec. 2388.
“When a party to any proceeding expressly refers to any other person for an answer to any particular subject in dispute, such *75answer is, in general, evidence against him, for the reason that he makes such third person liR accredited agent for the' purpose of giving' such answer.” Jones on Evidence, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, sec. 971, p. 1785.
"But such a reference does not make the person referred to an agent for the purpose of making general admissions. The declarations are not evidence unless strictly within the subject matter in relation to which the reference is made.” Idem, sec. 972, p. 1786.
In view of the record facts and the rules of law we have stated, we are of the opinion that the statement in the certificate of Dr. Harris that Dr. Robertson committed suicide was not admissible in evidence against defendant in error as an admission by her against her interest. Bentz v. Northwestern Aid Association (Minn.), 41 N. W., 1037, 1039.
This disposes of the main question discussed in the petition for a rehearing. It is insisted in the petition that this court misunderstood and misapprehended a number of cases cited in our former opinion. We have reexamined these cases and we find them now as we understood them when the original opinion was prepared. We fear that in some instances petitioner’s counsel have contented themselves with the headnotes to the cases, and in other instances they have misapprehended the point to which the cases were cited by us.
On the whole case we are satisfied with the result reached in our former judgment and the petition for a rehearing is denied and dismissed at the cost of the petitioner.
Crownover and DeWitt, JJ., concur.