Court Opinion

ID: 9912859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-24 18:09:46.427337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:17.814860
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                         OF TEXAS
                                     NO. WR-86,568-02

                         IN RE GABRIEL PAUL HALL, Relator

ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IN CAUSE NO. 11-06185-CRF-272 IN THE 272ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
                         BRAZOS COUNTY

       Per curiam.

                                        OPINION

       Before the Court is Relator and Real Party in Interest Gabriel Paul Hall’s Motion for

Leave to File a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and the accompanying Petition. Respondent

in this case is the Honorable J.D. Langley, the senior judge assigned to Hall’s initial Article

11.0711 writ proceedings which are currently pending before us in cause number WR-86,568-

       1
        Unless we specify otherwise, all references to articles in this opinion refer to the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
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01.2 Hall asks that we grant him leave to file his mandamus petition. He further asks that we

grant him mandamus relief by ordering Judge Langley to rule on the merits of Hall’s “Motion

to Find Applicant’s Right to Due Process in [Initial Article 11.071] Proceeding Was Violated

Due to Article 26.052 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure” (“Article 26.052 Motion”),

filed in the trial court on March 16, 2023. For the reasons discussed below, we grant Hall’s

motion for leave to file his Petition, and we conclude that he has shown an entitlement to

mandamus relief in this matter.

       Article 26.052 sets out the statutory requirements for appointed trial and appellate

counsel in death penalty cases. See Art. 26.052(d)(2). One of those requirements is that the

attorney

       ha[s] not been found by a federal or state court to have rendered ineffective
       assistance of counsel during the trial or appeal of any capital case, unless the
       local selection committee determines under Subsection (n) that the conduct
       underlying the finding no longer accurately reflects the attorney’s ability to
       provide effective representation[.]

Art. 26.052(d)(2)(C).

       In his Article 26.052 Motion, Hall argues that, when a capital habeas applicant claims

in an Article 11.071 application that his trial or appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance, Article 26.052(d)(2)(C) deprives the applicant of due process. More specifically,

       2
         Hall is an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional
Division pursuant to a 2015 capital murder conviction and death sentence for the murder of Edwin
Shaar Jr. in the course of committing or attempting to commit burglary. This Court affirmed Hall's
conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021).
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Hall posits that this subsection creates an incentive for an attorney accused of ineffectiveness

to be less than candid about the quality of his representation if the attorney wishes to continue

being appointed counsel in capital cases. In Hall’s initial Article 11.071 habeas application,

he alleges that his trial counsel, John Wright, was constitutionally ineffective. Hall

emphasizes that the evidence adduced at the live evidentiary hearing on that habeas

allegation shows that Wright wishes to be appointed as appellate counsel in future capital

cases. Thus, Hall contends, Wright allegedly labors under an unconstitutional incentive to

testify adversely to his former client. Halls asks the trial court to declare Article

26.052(d)(2)(C) unconstitutional on this basis.

       In his Mandamus Petition, Hall argues that his Article 26.052 Motion is truly a

motion, and that he presented it to the trial court (i.e., Judge Langley) in a timely and proper

manner. Therefore, Halls contends, the trial court has a ministerial duty to rule on the motion,

but it has declined to do so. Hall further asserts that he has no adequate remedy at law should

the trial court continue its refusal to rule on the motion.

       The habeas record in cause number WR-86,568-01 includes certain written findings

of fact and conclusions of law that Judge Langley made regarding Hall’s Article 26.052

Motion, as well as Judge Langley’s written clarifications (requested by this Court) of certain

language in those findings and conclusions. Also before us are supplemental findings of fact

and conclusions of law that Judge Langley entered in response to our invitation for him to
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respond to Hall’s motion for leave to file a mandamus petition.3

       Based on the above-mentioned findings of fact and conclusions of law, we understand

Judge Langley to take the position that the Article 26.052 Motion is actually an untimely

attempt by Hall to amend his initial Article 11.071 habeas application to raise an entirely new

claim attacking Article 26.052(d)(2)(C) on due process grounds. This position is generally

consistent with the stance that the State took at a trial court hearing concerning Hall’s Article

26.052 Motion. Judge Langley’s further position, as we understand it, is that the Article

26.052 Motion should therefore be dismissed.4

       But we disagree that Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is an untimely amended or

subsequent habeas application. To constitute a habeas application under Article 11.071, the

application “must seek relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death.” Ex parte Kerr,

64 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have

explained,

       [a] death penalty “writ” that does not challenge the validity of the underlying
       judgment and which, even if meritorious, would not result in immediate relief
       from [an applicant’s] capital murder conviction or death sentence, is not an

       3
         We also invited the State to respond to Hall’s motion for leave to file a mandamus petition.
To date, the State has not done so.
       4
          Under Article 11.071, Section 5(f), the trial court shall treat an untimely amended or
supplemental application as a subsequent application under Article 11.071, Section 5. Article 11.071,
Section 5(b) instructs a trial court that receives a subsequent application to forward that application
to this Court for us to determine whether it meets any of the exceptions (set forth in Article 11.071,
Section 5(a)) to the statutory bar on subsequent writ applications. Thus, if Hall’s Article 26.052
motion is an untimely amended initial or subsequent application, the appropriate response of the trial
court would be to forward Hall’s filing to this Court for a Section 5(a) determination.
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       “initial application” for purposes of [Article 11.071, Section 5] which
       generally bars consideration of a subsequent writ after filing the “initial
       application.”

Id.

       Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion, if granted by the trial court, would result in the trial

court declaring Article 26.052(d)(2)(C) unconstitutional on due process grounds. But that

victory would not provide Hall with immediate relief from his capital murder conviction or

death sentence. Accordingly, Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is not properly construed as an

untimely attempt to amend his initial Article 11.071 habeas application or as a subsequent

application. See Kerr, 64 S.W.3d ast 419.

       Having determined that Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is actually a motion rather than

an untimely amended initial or subsequent habeas application, the remaining question before

us is whether Hall has shown that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus relief may

be granted if the relator shows that: (1) the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial,

and (2) no adequate remedy at law exists. Winters v. Presiding Judge of Crim. Dist. Ct

Number Three of Tarrant County, 118 S.W.3d 773, 775–76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Additionally, the relator must have a “clear right to the relief sought,” meaning that the

merits of the relief sought are “beyond dispute.” Id. As we stated in In re McCann, “[t]o

show ‘a clear right to the relief sought,’ a relator must show that the facts and circumstances

of the case ‘dictate but one rational decision ‘under unequivocal, well-settled ... and clearly

controlling legal principles.’’” 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing In re
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State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). The clear-legal-right

requirement necessitates that the law plainly describes the duty to be performed, such that

there is no room for the exercise of discretion. Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775–76. Because this

is a death penalty case, the mandamus action is properly filed directly in this Court instead

of the intermediate appellate court. See In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d at 704.

       Hall has satisfied the first requirement for mandamus relief. We have said that a trial

court has a ministerial duty to rule upon a properly filed and timely presented motion,

although it generally has no ministerial duty to rule a certain way on that motion.5 In re Allen,

462 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court

of Appeals At Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

       Hall has also satisfied the second requirement for relief by showing that he has no

adequate remedy at law. The trial court’s failure to rule on Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is

not appealable. Hall’s inability to appeal leaves him with no adequate remedy at law.

Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775.

       We conditionally grant relief and direct Respondent to rule on the merits of Hall’s

Article 26.052 Motion. The writ of mandamus will issue only in the event that Respondent

fails to comply within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion.

       5
          Hall acknowledges that a trial court generally has no ministerial duty to rule on a motion
in a certain way, and he does not argue that his Article 26.052 Motion constitutes one of the rare
exceptions to this general rule. See In re Allen, 462 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(explaining that “[i]t is proper to order a court to rule a particular way only when the law invoked
is ‘definite, unambiguous, and unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case’”).
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      IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 20th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023.

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