Court Opinion

ID: 9914234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 20:09:02.741739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:47.205745
License: Public Domain

J-S39021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CLARENCE TYRONE TAYLOR                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 109 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 23, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-36-CR-0001085-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2023

       Clarence Tyrone Taylor appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his conviction for failure to comply with registration requirements. 1

He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the grading of his conviction.

We affirm.

       The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. In

2014, Taylor was convicted of multiple sex crimes stemming from events that

occurred “[b]etween December 4, 2012, and December 13, 2012[.]”

Commonwealth v. Taylor, No. 1090 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 7012589, at *1

(Pa.Super. filed June 2, 2015) (unpub. mem.). The court ordered Taylor to

register as a sex offender under two provisions of the Sex Offenders

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14 and

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(3).
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9799.15. Based on the date of his crimes, Taylor was subject to the

registration requirements of Subchapter I of SORNA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9799.55 (addressing sex offenses committed before December 20, 2012).

      In March 2022, the Commonwealth charged Taylor with failure to

provide accurate registration information. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(3)

(applicable to those required to register under SORNA Subchapter H). It then

filed an amended information with the same charge but graded as a felony of

the second degree. The amended information alleged that on July 16, 2021,

Taylor “failed to register, in that he failed to update [that] he was terminated

from his employment and failed to provide [an] accurate address for his

employment, as required under his Megan’s Law Registry requirement.”

Amended Information, filed 8/31/22.

      At Taylor’s jury trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Taylor

was subject to registration under Section 9799.55, had been terminated from

his place of employment, CVS, in October 2021, failed to update his

registration with this information, and failed to provide an accurate address

for CVS. See N.T., Trial, 9/19/22-9/20/22, at 101 (Pennsylvania State Police

(“PSP”) testimony that Taylor was subject to ten year registration under

SORNA); 99 (sentencing order and certified record for underlying offense

marked as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2); 154-55 (employee of CVS testifying

that Taylor had been hired in July 2021 and that location of CVS was 1507

Lititz Pike); 241-42 (detective testifying that he obtained information from

CVS that Taylor had been terminated on October 13, 2021); 195-98, 202-03

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(testimony from Christina Fluegel, a Lancaster County Prison employee, who

helped Taylor update his sex offender registration in November 2021 to reflect

Lancaster County prison address); 210 (testimony from Fluegel that no other

changes were made to Taylor’s registration form besides the address in

November 2021); Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3 (record of employment from CVS

for Taylor; the last page of the record reflecting termination date of October

13, 2021); 141 (PSP testimony that Taylor updated his registration with

employment information and listed the address for CVS as 1571 Lititz Pike).

During its closing argument, the Commonwealth argued that Taylor took away

the right of the public to know “precise information about w[h]ere he is[,]”

when he did not provide an accurate address for CVS. Id. at 304.

      After closing arguments, the court instructed the jury. It stated that the

Commonwealth had charged Taylor with “failure to follow certain registration

and reporting requirements under Megan’s Law.” Id. at 324-25. The court

then defined the offense and instructed the jury as follows.

         The offense is defined as follows:

         An individual who is subject to registration and periodic
         verification under Megan’s Law commits an offense if he
         knowingly fails to provide accurate information. Information
         that is required to be accurately reported includes a change
         of employer or termination of employment within three
         business days.

         To find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find
         the following two elements have been proven beyond a
         reasonable doubt:

         First, the defendant was an individual required to provide
         accurate information to the Pennsylvania State Police

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         regarding his employment and/or termination of
         employment within three business days in accordance with
         Pennsylvania Megan’s Law.

         Second, that the defendant knowingly failed to do so.

Id. at 325. The jury found Taylor guilty of “failure to provide accurate

registration information.” Verdict Slip, dated September 20, 2022.

      The morning of sentencing, Commonwealth amended the information to

correct the statutory citation from 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(3) to 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 4915.2(a)(3). N.T. Sentencing, 11/23/22, at 3-6. Over defense counsel’s

objection, the court permitted the amendment. Id. at 11. The court then

sentenced Taylor to 30 to 60 months’ incarceration. Taylor filed a post-

sentence motion that the trial court denied, and this timely appeal followed.

      Taylor presents the following issues:

         I.    Was the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
               insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
               Mr. Taylor was guilty of failure to comply with
               registration requirements, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
               4915.1 where Mr. Taylor did not commit a registerable
               offense on or after December 20, 2012, and therefore
               was not subject to registration under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
               9799.13?

         II.   Did the trial court err in grading for sentencing the
               failure to register conviction as a felony of the second
               degree where the conduct described in the amended
               [information] filed on August 31, 2022 constituted
               both felony 2 and felony 3 conduct, and it was unclear
               whether the jury found Mr. Taylor guilty of conduct
               constituting a felony 2, conduct constituting a felony
               3 or both based on the verdict slip?

Taylor’s Br. at 5 (unnecessary capitalization and answers of trial court

omitted).

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      Taylor claims that there was insufficient evidence of his failure to comply

with registration requirements under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1, which applies to

those required to register under Subchapter H of SORNA. He maintains that

based on his original underlying offense date, he is subject to the registration

requirements under Section 4915.2, applicable to Subchapter I of SORNA. He

argues that despite the Commonwealth’s later amendment of the information,

the information at trial listed Section 4915.1(a)(3). He also claims that he was

prejudiced by the “last minute attempt to amend the information.” Id. at 22.

      Taylor also maintains that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s

closing argument that he failed to provide information that the public had a

“right” to know, namely the correct address of his place of employment. He

notes that had the Commonwealth proceeded under the correct subchapter,

“this precise argument would not have been available.” Id. at 21.

      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view

the “evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict

winner,   and   we   draw   all   reasonable   inferences   therefrom    in   the

Commonwealth's favor.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 409

(Pa. 2018). We then determine “whether the Commonwealth proved all of the

elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The

Commonwealth may sustain its burden through wholly circumstantial

evidence. See Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 541 (Pa.Super.

2017) (en banc). Our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review

is plenary. See Chambers, 188 A.3d at 409.

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      The crux of Taylor’s argument is that the information cited the statute

applicable to those required to register under Subchapter H, and he was

required to register under Subchapter I. The difficulty for his claim is that the

court allowed the amendment to the information to cite the correct statute,

and he does not challenge the amendment. To the extent Taylor now claims

he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s argument during closing and the timing

of the amendment, he waived any such claims by failing to raise them in his

Rule 1925(b) statement or his Statement of Questions Involved. See

Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal, filed 2/22/23; Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

      In his second issue, Taylor claims that the trial court erred in grading

his offense as a felony of the second degree. He alleges that based on the

August amended information, the Commonwealth alleged that he committed

violations that would amount to second and third-degree felonies. Therefore,

he suggests that “[t]he jury may have decided he simply failed to register his

termination only, or the jury may have decided he provided an inaccurate

address only, or that he did both.” Taylor’s Br. at 28. He claims that since

there is no way to determine what the jury decided, we should remand the

case for resentencing.

      “The proper grading of a criminal offense is an issue of statutory

interpretation and implicates the legality of the sentence imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809, 816 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation

omitted). Our standard of review is de novo and our scope plenary. See id.

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     As with his prior claim, Taylor’s argument ignores the fact that the court

permitted the Commonwealth to amend the information to reflect a charge

under Section 4915.2(a)(3), which is statutorily defined as a felony of the

second degree. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(b)(4) (an individual . . . who

violates subsection (a)(3) commits a felony of the second degree”). His

offense is properly graded. We affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/2023

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