Court Opinion

ID: 9859244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:25:49.047937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:33:41.831846
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLACE,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I concur with the Appellate Division decision that the Association’s Bylaws are ambiguous.
The majority opinion states that despite the lack of a “specific reference,” Article III, Section VIII “plainly conveys” that a new owner is liable for arrears accrued by his or her predecessors in title. Ante at 115, 892 A.2d at 655. Although the majority asserts that the provisions are not ambiguous, it relies on “common sense” and a “fair reading” of the provisions “viewed in [their] proper context” to find that Section VIII “undoubtedly addresses” the past-due fees owed by prior owners and “makes clear” that a new owner must pay those fees to become a member of the Association. Ante at 116, 892 A.2d at 656.
In my view, the provision in Section VIII of the Bylaws that withholds membership privileges “on resale or other transfer of ownership of property until all Club dues, assessments and initiation fees in arrears are paid in full” does not give clear notice to a new owner that he or she must pay the arrears of a previous owner.
Article III, Section IX provides:
Membership in the Club shall be granted automatically to new owners upon proof of conveyance of title to property in Highland Lakes satisfactory to the Membership Committee. The effective date of the membership of such new owners shall coincide with the effective date of the acquisition of title by such new owners, and such membership shall continue for the entire duration of ownership. Such new *122owners shall complete a membership data form and file the same with the Club at the time proof of conveyance of title is presented but any failure or delay in presenting such proof of conveyance of title or filing such membership data form shall not be deemed to relieve such new owners from the obligation of paying Club dues, assessments and initiation fees from the time the same shall have become due.
I am in accord with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the word “arrears” in Section VIII
is just as easily and reasonably read to refer only to the “arrears” any new owner would expect to incur, pursuant to Section [IX], between the effective date of his or her membership, which is the date of the acquisition of title, and the date the new owner files the membership data and proof of conveyance of title.
Beyond that, the Bylaws suggest that an acquiring property owner may rely on the typical notice provided through a recorded lien search on the property. Article III, Section XI specifically states that the Association will have a lien on the property within the community for unpaid arrears, which will be effective “from and after the time of recording ... of a claim of lien stating the description of the property, the name and address of the record owner, the amount due and the date when due.” The plain import of that provision invites prospective purchasers to search for a filed lien that would inform a purchaser of any encumbrance on the property.
“Generally, the terms of an agreement are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 396, 794 A.2d 141 (2002) (citation omitted). But when “the terms of the [agreement] are susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations,” the language is ambiguous. Ibid. (internal quotation and citation omitted). This Court has recognized that “[w]here an ambiguity appears in a written agreement, the writing is to be strictly construed against the draftsman.”1 In re Estate of Miller, 90 N.J. 210, 221, 447 A.2d 549 (1982) (citing Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County Hackensack River Sanitary Sewer Dist. Auth., 18 N.J. 294, 302, 113 A.2d 787 (1955)). That principle is especially true where the *123parties to the contract do not have the same bargaining power. See Bd. of Educ. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 172 N.J. 300, 306-07, 798 A.2d 605 (2002).
Both Franzino and the Association posit reasonable alternative interpretations of the Bylaws. A contract is not clear if more than one interpretation is plausible. The Association drafted the Bylaws and presented them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to all residents of the development. Consequently, I would construe the ambiguity in the Bylaws against the Association, the party that drafted the documents, and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For reversal—Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and RIVERA-SOTO—6.
Dissenting—Justice WALLACE—1.

 The Restatement states the same: "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally *123preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981).