Court Opinion

ID: 9691510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:36:26.680678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:21.797179
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. The question before us is whether the officers who stopped Martinson had an objective reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct which justifies the stop. The burden of establishing that the suspicion was objectively reasonable1 is on the state. And, as the court states, a determination of whether the state has met its burden is to be made by examining the totali*853ty of the circumstances as observed by the investigating officers, given the officer’s training and experience.2 It seems to me, however, that to meet its burden, the state must provide some foundation for the officer’s claim that the facts relied on, in any given case, create a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. That is to say, the state must articulate what it is about the officer’s training and experience, coupled with the facts relied on, that creates a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. Absent such a showing, how can a reviewing court properly analyze whether the officer’s suspicion is reasonable,3 especially in cases when the officer is relying on conduct which, on its face, appears to be consistent with innocent activity? If any and every combination of acts consistent with legal activity can be used to form the basis for reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, then each and every person walking through an airport is subject to being stopped. I do not believe that the framers of either the United States or the Minnesota Constitutions intended to subject innocent citizens to such governmental intrusions.
In this case, the officers relied on 16 separate facts to support their claim of reasonable suspicion. When viewed individually, the conduct supporting each of these facts appears to involve innocent activity. Viewed in their totality, it is not clear what it is about this collection of apparently innocent acts that suggests that Martinson was engaged in illegal conduct. Requiring the state to offer some foundation, beyond the conclu-sory statement, that these 16 known facts, coupled with the officers’ training and experience, lead to the conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion, is not too much to ask. A review of the record here indicates that no such foundation was provided. Therefore, I dissent.

. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (to justify a Terry stop, the police must "point to specific and artic-ulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from .those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”).

. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581. 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

. Indeed, when no such showing is made, the state is, in essence, asking the reviewing court to:
"Trust us, we're from the government, we’re here to help you.”