Court Opinion

ID: 9891481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 18:03:41.723143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:05.480284
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/18/23 P. v. Caldera CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B321779

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. VA120392
        v.

 MICHELLE ESTELLE
 CALDERA,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Raul Anthony Sahagun, Judge. Affirmed.
      Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION

       In 2014, a jury convicted appellant Michelle Estelle
Caldera of premeditated attempted murder on a direct aiding and
abetting theory. The jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or the felony murder rule. In
2022, Caldera filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6)2 in which she argued that the jury
convicted her of attempted murder under an invalid imputed
malice theory of liability. The trial court summarily denied the
petition and Caldera appeals. We conclude the jury instructions
did not permit the jury to find Caldera guilty of attempted
premediated murder without also finding that she personally
acted with the intent to kill, and that Caldera was therefore
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. We therefore
affirm.

                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       Our summary of the underlying facts is taken from the
unpublished opinion in People v. Lerma and Caldera (Sept. 16,
2015, B256152).
       Gloria Montes and Arthur Peter Lerma were both members
of the Pico Nuevo criminal street gang. Caldera belonged to
Whittier Varrio Locos, a gang “on pretty good terms” with Pico

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section

1172.6, with no change to the text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). We refer
to the statute interchangeably as section 1172.6 and section 1170.95
depending on the context.

                                    2
Nuevo. The three had been friends growing up, and Montes and
Caldera were best friends.
      Lerma’s relationship with Montes soured in 2003 when he
was convicted of the robbery of two Gigante Market customers in
Pico Rivera. Montes was questioned during the robbery
investigation and told police that she had gone to Gigante Market
with Lerma to use an ATM. In the store were two men, one of
whom was African American. Lerma asked Montes, “ ‘What is
that nigger doing here? Doesn’t he know this is Pico Nuevo?’ ”
Lerma then approached the men and repeated his question, but
Montes did not see him rob anyone.
      Lerma was ultimately convicted of the robbery and
sentenced to eight years in prison. While in prison, he sent
Montes a threatening letter, telling her that “he was going to
come and get her” because she was a snitch and a rat. The letter
was never recovered. Montes never saw him again.
      In early May 2011, while Lerma was on parole for the
robbery, he paid a visit to Jose Trejo, a Pico Nuevo shot-caller in
charge of about 100 other gang members. Visiting Trejo was an
opportunity for Lerma to make a case to gang leadership that
despite his lengthy incarceration, he could still be valuable to
Pico Nuevo. Shooting Montes in front of Trejo would be another
way for Lerma to reestablish power in the gang and prove that he
could be an asset.
      The evening of May 18, 2011, someone rented a small motel
room at the Knights Inn to use as the venue for a “hood party”—a
gathering at which gang members and their friends assembled to
take drugs together. Each of the eight to 15 party guests was
connected in some way to Pico Nuevo. For example, Trejo was a
“shot-caller” or mid-level gang leader, Tish Sanchez had a son in

                                3
the gang, Lerma was on parole for a Pico Nuevo crime, and
Caldera belonged to an allied gang.
      Sanchez and Caldera arrived first. They pulled up in
Sanchez’s white Nissan Altima, which sported fancy rims. Trejo
was dropped off by some friends. Most of the people in the room
were strangers to Trejo, though he later identified Caldera and
Lerma.
      All of the party guests smoked methamphetamine that
evening; others, such as Trejo, also drank alcohol and smoked
marijuana. During the party, Caldera and Lerma were seen
talking to each other—either secretively or romantically. At some
point, Sanchez saw Caldera holding a cloth gun case.
      Eventually, Trejo grew restless and began looking for a ride
to another party; Caldera offered to drive him in Sanchez’s car.
Sanchez rejected this plan—she didn’t trust Caldera with her
car—but ultimately agreed to let Lerma borrow it for 15 minutes
to pick up his girlfriend. She left the key on the counter for him.
      Just after 1:00 a.m., Lerma and Caldera left the Knights
Inn with Trejo. Caldera drove Sanchez’s Nissan. Lerma rode in
the front passenger seat, and Trejo sat in the back. Unbeknownst
to them, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department had placed a GPS
tracking device on Sanchez’s car the week before as part of an
investigation into her activities.
      At 1:07 a.m., Caldera stopped the car on a street near
Montes’s apartment. She retrieved a cloth-wrapped item from
beneath her seat and handed it to Lerma. They did not speak to
each other over the loud music, but Lerma put the item in his
pocket. Lerma and Trejo got out of the car and walked down a
nearby alley, towards Montes’s apartment.

                                4
       Montes shared her small bedroom with Vicky Gollette, who
is partially blind. The women slept in separate twin beds. The
bedroom window faced the alley, and Montes kept it open to the
night air. Montes slept beside the window, and Gollette slept next
to the door.
       The men approached Montes’s window. Lerma looked
inside while Trejo stood nearby. Lerma called, “Go–Go,” twice
through the screen. As soon as the sleeping Montes mumbled a
response, Lerma shot her in the head. Then he paused, fiddled
with the gun, and fired two or three more shots.
       Trejo took off running. Lerma caught up to him at a chain-
link fence, and told him if he did not “keep [his] mouth shut,”
Lerma would “smoke [him].” After delivering this warning,
Lerma ran back to the waiting car. Caldera and Lerma drove off
in the Nissan at 1:10 a.m.
       Montes’s neighbors heard the shots and called 911.
Emergency dispatch began receiving calls at 1:11 a.m., and
sheriff’s deputies arrived within minutes. They found Montes in
her bedroom, laying on her bed. She had been shot in the right
temple, but was moving slightly and making a gurgling noise.
       The forensic evidence supported the witness accounts.
Police found holes in the screen, blinds, and wall, and a spent
bullet in the neighboring apartment; the trajectory of the bullets
established that they were fired through the bedroom window
and down towards the bed. Though the gun used in the shooting
was never recovered, criminalist Manuel Munoz testified the
bullets were fired from the same weapon—probably a .38 special,
or a .357 magnum revolver, based on the spent bullets and bullet
fragments recovered from the scene, and lack of shell casings.

                                5
       The record does not reveal where the Nissan went, or what
Lerma and Caldera did, for the hour following the shooting.
However, at 2:13 a.m., Caldera and Lerma arrived at the
Colmenero home in nearby Whittier. Melissa and Amie
Colmenero were close friends with Caldera, but barely knew
Lerma. Melissa later told authorities that she overheard Caldera
tell Amie, “ ‘we just did a jale’ ”—a gang job. The Nissan
remained at the Colmenero home until 2:24 a.m. It was returned
to the Knights Inn soon thereafter.
       A few days later, Lerma called Trejo and reminded him to
“keep [his] mouth shut.” Around the same time, someone told
Sanchez to get rid of her car. She was furious, but took it to an
auto body shop to have its distinctive rims removed. She also
swapped the license plate for a new one.
       Montes survived the shooting but was critically injured.
The shot injured the right side of her brain, which paralyzed the
left side of her body, and blinded her in one eye. Montes wore a
helmet in court because she was missing a palm-sized section of
the back of her skull. Doctors were unable to save her right ear;
they removed it entirely and sewed the opening shut.
       After four months in the hospital, Montes was released in
September 2011. Though she was able to testify at the
preliminary hearing in the summer of 2012, during the following
year and a half, Montes took a turn for the worse and slipped into
a vegetative state. The parties stipulated to her unavailability,
and her preliminary hearing testimony was read at trial.

                                6
                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In an information dated August 2012, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney charged Caldera with attempted
murder (§ 664/187, subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a
felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1))3.
       At trial, the jury was not instructed on a natural and
probable consequences theory or felony murder, but on direct
aiding and abetting. The court read the jury CALCRIM No. 400,
which states: “A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways.
One, he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will call
that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and
abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [¶] A
person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it
personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.”
       The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 401,
which states, in part: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a
crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The
defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the
crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the
defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing
the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in
fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶]
Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the

3 The Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010 repealed and

recodified former sections 12000 to 12809 without substantive change.
(§§ 16000, 16005, 16010.) Former section 12021 was recodified without
substantive change at section 29800, operative January 1, 2012.
(Stats. 2010, ch. 711 (S.B. 1080), § 4 [repealed]; id., § 6 [reenacted].)

                                    7
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends
to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime. [¶] If all of
these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to
actually have been present when the crime was committed to be
guilty as an aider and abettor.”
       The court also read the jury CALCRIM Nos. 600 and 601
with respect to attempted murder and deliberate and
premeditated attempted murder, respectively. CALCRIM No. 600
states in part: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted
murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took at
least one direct but ineffective step toward killing another
person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to kill that
person.” CALCRIM No. 601 provides in part: “If you find the
defendant guilty of attempted murder under Count One, you
must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
allegation that the attempted murder was done willfully, and
with deliberation and premeditation. [¶] The defendant acted
willfully if he or she intended to kill when he or she acted. The
defendant deliberated if he or she carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his or her choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant premeditated if he
or she decided to kill before acting.”
       In April 2014, a jury convicted Caldera of both counts. The
jury also found true the allegations: (1) that the attempted
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated; (2) that a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which
caused great bodily injury to Montes; and (3) that the attempted
murder was committed for the benefit, at the direction of, and in
association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to

                                8
promote, further, and assist in conduct by gang members. In May
2014, the court sentenced Caldera to 32 years to life.
       On direct appeal, this division modified the judgment to
impose required assessments and fees on Caldera and affirmed
the modified judgment.
       In January 2022, Caldera filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The People opposed the petition on the
ground that Caldera was not convicted of attempted murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory of culpability.
       The court appointed counsel for Caldera and set a hearing
to determine whether Caldera had made a prima facie case for
relief. In her reply brief, Caldera argued that CALCRIM No. 401
could allow the jury to conclude that Caldera was guilty without
the required mens rea for attempted murder. Caldera cited
People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), in which the
court held that the absence of any instruction concerning the
natural and probable consequences theory did not preclude a
prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6.
       At the prima facie hearing, counsel for Caldera conceded
that she was convicted under a straight aiding and abetting
theory and not under a natural and probable consequences
theory. The court observed that, in Langi, the defendant could
have been convicted on an implied malice theory. The court
distinguished Langi with People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539 (Coley), which it cited for the proposition that, if the
defendant is found guilty of a crime requiring express malice or
an intent to kill, such as attempted murder, she is not entitled to
relief under section 1172.6. After considering the jury
instructions, the court concluded that “there is no doubt that

                                 9
[Caldera] was convicted on an express malice theory.” The court
therefore denied Caldera’s petition.

                         DISCUSSION

      Caldera, citing Langi, argues the fact that the jury did not
receive a natural and probable consequences theory instruction
does not render her ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. She
contends that the instructions “left room for doubt” as to whether
the jurors would have understood whether Caldera had to
personally harbor an intent to kill.
      The Attorney General argues that the absence of a natural
and probable consequences theory instruction is determinative
and the trial court’s order should be affirmed on that basis alone.
The Attorney General further asserts that Caldera’s
premeditated attempted murder conviction demonstrates that
the jury found that she acted with express malice. We affirm.
1.    Caldera failed as a matter of law to establish a prima
      facie case for resentencing.
      1.1.   Applicable Law
      As amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (SB 775), section
1172.6, subdivision (a) provides: “A person convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts.” (Italics added.)

                                10
       An offender must file a petition in the sentencing court
averring that: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The
petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder
or attempted murder[;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)
Additionally, the petition shall state “[w]hether the petitioner
requests the appointment of counsel.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(C).)
       “Upon receiving a petition in which the information
required by this subdivision is set forth or a petition where any
missing information can readily be ascertained by the court, if
the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The
prosecutor shall file a response within 60 days of the service of
the petition, and the petitioner may file a reply within 30 days of
the response. (Id., subd. (c).) When briefing has been completed,
“the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.) “If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(Ibid.)

                                 11
       In determining whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court’s inquiry will
necessarily be informed by the record of conviction, which will
facilitate the court in distinguishing “petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) This includes the jury instructions,
which are part of the record of conviction, because the
instructions “given at a petitioner’s trial may provide ‘readily
ascertainable facts from the record’ that refute the petitioner’s
showing, and reliance on them to make the eligibility or
entitlement determinations may not amount to ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ”
which must wait to occur until after an order to show cause
issues. (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055,
disapproved on another ground in Lewis.) The court is prohibited
from engaging in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.) Rather, the
court must “ ‘ “take[ ] [the] petitioner’s factual allegations as
true” ’ ” and make a “ ‘ “preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) Summary
denial of the petition is appropriate where the record of
conviction establishes the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law. (People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
945; Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.)
       Because the trial court’s denial of Caldera’s petition
without issuing an order to show cause is a purely legal
conclusion, we review it de novo. (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)

                                 12
      1.1.1. Langi and Coley
       Langi and Coley feature prominently both in the court’s
reasoning below and the parties’ briefing on the issue of whether
a prima facie case may be established in the absence of any
natural and probable consequences theory or felony murder
instructions.
       In Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972, a division of the First
District held that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of the section 1172.6 petition where the
jury instructions given at trial permitted the jury to convict the
defendant under a theory of imputed malice, even in the absence
of any instructions concerning the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Langi was part of a group of four who
punched, kicked, and robbed the victim. During the attack, the
victim fell, striking his head, which led to his death. (Langi, at
p. 975.) The jury was instructed using the standard CALJIC
instructions on first degree felony murder, implied malice, and
direct aiding and abetting, but not on the natural and probable
consequences theory. (Id. at p. 981.) The jury acquitted Langi of
first degree felony murder but convicted him of second degree
murder, robbery and battery. (Id. at p. 977.) Langi filed a petition
for resentencing, which the trial court summarily denied. (Ibid.)
During the pendency of the appeal, SB 775 was passed.
       The Langi court reversed and ordered an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of the section 1172.6 petition. (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) Even without explicit
instruction on the natural and probable consequences theory, the
court found that the record of conviction did not conclusively
exclude the possibility that Langi was convicted under SB 775’s
newly added imputed malice theory. (Id. at p. 976.) The court

                                13
recognized the CALJIC instructions for aiding and abetting an
implied malice murder did not adequately explain the mens rea
required for implied malice murder liability. “Although the
definition of second degree murder in CALJIC No. 8.31 states
that the perpetrator must have acted with conscious disregard for
human life, the definition of an aider and abettor in CALJIC
No. 3.01 does not include the same requirement.” (Id. at p. 983.)
       The court concluded that this instructional imprecision
allowed the jury to find Langi “guilty of aiding and abetting
second degree murder” by imputing malice based solely on
Langi’s participation in a crime, “without finding that he
personally acted with malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 982.) The court explained that “[t]he aiding-and-abetting
instruction stated that a person aids and abets a crime if he or
she acts ‘with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and . . . with the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime.’
[Citation.] However, . . . the second-degree-murder instruction
specified that the direct perpetrator of that crime need not act
with the unlawful intent of causing death. Thus, while the
perpetrator must have deliberately performed the fatal act ‘with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life’ [citation], his purpose may have been only to strike or
to injure, or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim. Since the
perpetrator’s purpose need not have been to kill the victim, the
aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not
have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the
perpetrator need not have had ‘murderous intent,’ certainly the
aider and abettor need not have had such an intent.” (Id. at
pp. 982–983.)

                                14
        The court in Langi concluded that such a record of
conviction did not support summarily denying a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage because it did “not conclusively
negate the possibility that the jury found appellant guilty of
second degree murder by imputing to him the implied malice of
the actual killer, without finding that he personally acted” with
implied malice. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.)
        In Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 539, a different division of
the First District distinguished Langi from the circumstances
before it. The defendant in Coley was convicted of both second
degree murder and attempted murder and appealed the
summary denial of his petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. (Coley, at pp. 541–542.) The trial court concluded that the
record of conviction showed the jury had found express malice,
i.e., a specific intent to unlawfully kill, when it convicted
appellant of attempted murder, and therefore denied the petition.
(Id. at p. 545.) The Court of Appeal affirmed. With respect to
second degree murder, the court concluded that the “appellant’s
conviction for attempted murder demonstrates that he was
convicted of second degree murder with express rather than
implied malice” and that “Langi does not apply because that case
involves implied malice.” (Id. at p. 547.) The court explained that
“appellant was convicted of murder based on his aiding and
abetting of the same shooting that gave rise to the attempted
murder conviction” and that “[t]he jury was instructed by
CALCRIM No. 600 that attempted murder requires a
determination that ‘the defendants intended to kill that person.’ ”
(Ibid.) “[B]y finding appellant guilty of attempted murder, the
jury necessarily found he had personally harbored intent to kill

                                15
or express malice when he aided and abetted the second degree
murder.” (Ibid.)
       With respect to the attempted murder conviction, the court
observed that “[s]ection 1170.95 applies by its terms only to
attempted murders based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” and the jury was not instructed on that
doctrine. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) Thus, “[t]he
court was not required to grant resentencing on this count.”
(Ibid.)
      1.2.   Analysis
       Caldera first contends that the court erred in summarily
denying her petition because she checked all the required boxes
on her form petition. Caldera does not address the authority
establishing that a court is not limited to the petition in
determining whether a prima facie case has been made, but may
also consider the record of conviction. As our Supreme Court
explained, an examination of the record of conviction during the
prima facie inquiry permits courts to distinguish “petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Thus, the trial court did not
err in considering whether the jury instructions and verdict
conclusively negated the possibility that Caldera was found
guilty of attempted murder on an imputed malice theory.
       Caldera also argues that she may be entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 even though the court did not give any
instructions concerning the natural and probable consequences
theory. She relies on language in section 1172.6 stating that
relief is available for a defendant convicted under any “other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

                                16
However, she does not acknowledge that this clause applies to
felony murder and murder, not attempted murder. (Ibid.) Where,
as in this case, the instructions did not permit the jury to convict
appellant of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” (ibid.), the plain language of section
1172.6 indicates that Caldera is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [defendant convicted
of attempted murder not entitled to § 1172.6 relief because the
jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine].)
       Even assuming the language on which Caldera relies
applies equally to murder and attempted murder, the record of
conviction negates the possibility that Caldera was convicted of
attempted murder based on a theory of imputed malice. The only
theory on which Caldera’s jury was instructed was direct aiding
and abetting of attempted murder, which remains a valid theory
of liability under section 1172.6. (People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 204–205 [petitioner convicted of murder and
attempted murder either as perpetrator or direct aider and
abettor ineligible for § 1172.6 relief]; Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 548 [same].)
       The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 400 and
401, which state that an aider and abettor’s guilt is based on the
direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and
own mental state. (See People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1117.) CALCRIM No. 401 told the jury that to prove a defendant
was guilty of a crime as an aider and abettor, the People had to
prove, among other things, that Caldera knew that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime; intended to aid and
abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; and in fact aided

                                 17
and abetted the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. The
instruction further stated that Caldera, as an aider and abettor,
must know “of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose” and
specifically intend to “aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”
       CALCRIM No. 600 made clear that the People were
required to prove that Caldera had the intent to kill. By
convicting Caldera on the attempted murder charge, the jury
necessarily found that she shared her codefendant’s criminal
purpose, and, with the intent of killing the victim, Caldera in fact
aided, facilitated, promoted, encouraged, or instigated the
commission of the attempted murder. (See People v. Nguyen
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 [“ ‘the person guilty of attempted
murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill’ ”], quoting
People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 624.) Further, CALCRIM
No. 601 did not allow the jury to find the allegation true if the
jury found someone other than Caldera intended to kill. In
defining willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation, the trial
court’s instruction referred only to “the defendant.” By finding
Caldera acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, the
jury necessarily found Caldera acted with express malice. The
jury therefore did not convict Caldera pursuant to a theory under
which malice was merely imputed to her.
       Caldera asserts that “the body of instructions considered as
a whole, left room for doubt as to whether the jury would have
necessarily been clear from a number of instructions allowing
vicarious liability at several levels, that appellant Caldera herself
had any intent to kill.” Caldera relies on the fact that this was a
gang case and “gang issues are inflammatory to jurors, who will
tend to think of gang members as equally guilty of anything their

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gang does.”4 Caldera does not cite any language in section 1172.6
or any decisions supporting that the presentation of gang
evidence is sufficient to create an ambiguity as to whether intent
was imputed to the defendant. The jury here was expressly
instructed that gang evidence was introduced for a limited
purpose and that it was not to conclude from the gang evidence
that Caldera was a bad person or predisposed to commit crime.
As stated, the instructions also required the jury to find that
Caldera personally acted with an intent to kill to convict her of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor. “We presume jurors
understand and follow the instructions they are given, including
the written instructions.” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th
367, 431.)
      Caldera further argues that “[i]mmediately after the
instruction on an aider and abettor’s intent to kill, came the
instruction on this separate charge against the codefendant, for
shooting into an occupied dwelling, with the codefendant’s name

4 Caldera cites Assembly Bill No. 333 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 1–5),

which provides for the bifurcation of gang enhancements, as support
for this proposition. Setting aside that Assembly Bill No. 333 did not
apply to this case, “nothing in Assembly Bill [No.] 333 limits the
introduction of gang evidence in a bifurcated proceeding where the
gang evidence is relevant to the underlying charges.” (People v. Ramos
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1132; see also People v. Samaniego (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167–1168 [gang evidence is relevant and
admissible when the motive is gang related; evidence related to gang
membership not insulated from general rules applicable to relevant
evidence].) Relying solely on the facts presented by Caldera, it would
appear that gang evidence was relevant to the issues of Lerma’s and
Caldera’s motive and intent. In any event, as we discuss, Caldera fails
to establish that gang evidence is relevant to determining whether
express malice has been imputed to her.

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inserted in tiny, illegible handwriting, which could easily be
overlooked.” Caldera does not explain how this separate charge
undermined the jury’s findings that she personally acted with a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to kill. There is no
basis to conclude it did.
       Finally, Caldera asserts, without discussion of the jury
instructions, “[a]s was the case in Langi, the record here leaves
open the possibility that the jury convicted appellant on a theory
of imputed malice, and therefore it does not conclusively establish
that appellant was convicted under a still-valid theory of
murder.” Unlike the defendant in Langi, Caldera was convicted
of attempted murder. In contrast to second degree implied malice
murder, the perpetrator of an attempted murder must have the
specific intent to unlawfully kill another human being. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890 [“ ‘Attempted murder
requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct
but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ”].)
As discussed above, the jury instructions correctly required the
jury to find that Caldera, as an aider and abettor to attempted
murder, shared the perpetrator’s intent to kill before convicting
her of attempted murder. Thus, the possibility of imputing malice
to an aider and abettor identified in Langi was not present here.
(See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 547–548 [Langi is
inapplicable where the attempted murder conviction is based on
jury instructions requiring intent to kill].)
       We agree with the trial court that the circumstances here
are far more like those of Coley—where the defendant was
convicted of attempted murder and the jury was likewise
instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401, and 600 (Coley, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 546–547)—than those of Langi. We

                                20
conclude the jury’s verdict and the jury instructions show as a
matter of law that Caldera was convicted as a direct aider and
abettor, and therefore was convicted under a theory of attempted
murder that remains valid.

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                        DISPOSITION

      The order denying Caldera’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                    LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      ADAMS, J.

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