Court Opinion

ID: 9425434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:40.543906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:55.520167
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in the result in part in No. 71-6314 and concurring in the result in No. 71-1398.
I agree with Mr. Justice Stewart that respondent Flemings committed a “service connected” crime.1
As to the Gosa case I think the case should be put down for reargument on whether res judicata controls the disposition of the case. The argument that it does goes as follows:
Petitioner Gosa was tried for rape before a military tribunal and convicted. The case went through the hierarchy of review within the military establishment and after the conviction and sentence were affirmed, a *687petition for review was filed with the Court of Military Appeals (a civilian court created by Congress); but that court denied review.2 The events described took place in 1966 and 1967. On June 2, 1969, we decided O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258, invalidating the court-martial conviction for rape committed off the military base by a serviceman who was on leave.
O’Callahan in that respect is on all fours with the instant case, for here petitioner was officially off-duty, in civilian clothes, and was found to have raped a civilian in no way connected with the military, while he was in Cheyenne, Wyoming, near Warren Air Force Base but not on the base.
O’Callahan was decided in 1969 and in reliance on it petitioner Gosa started this habeas corpus action3 seeking *688release from his confinement under the military sentence.
The question whether one of our constitutional decisions should be retroactively applied has been before us on numerous occasions. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297; Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631.
But in all cases to date which involved retroactivity the question has been whether the court whose judgment is being reviewed should be required in the interests of substantial justice to retry the accused under the new constitutional rule announced by the Court after the first trial had been completed but before the new constitutional *689decision was announced. The measure applied as to whether the new rule should be prospective or retroactive4 was the three-pronged test stated in Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 297: “The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.”
Here the question is whether a civilian, rather than a military, tribunal should have tried him. Does the question whether the “jurisdiction” 5 of the military tribunal can be contested at this late date turn on whether res judicata bars that inquiry?
Petitioner Gosa in the review of his conviction by the military tribunal never raised the question raised in O’Callahan.6 If he was “constitutionally immune from punishment” in any court, we would have the problem presented in United States v. U. S. Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 723-724. But petitioner was not tried by a *690kangaroo court or by eager vigilantes but by military authorities within the framework established by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The case is somewhat unlike McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49, where a court-martial was constituted of officers of the regular army who by an Act of Congress were not authorized to sit in judgment on volunteers. The court-martial was held incompetent to sit on the case because it acted in plain violation of an Act of Congress. There was therefore no tribunal authorized by law to render the challenged judgment. Consent to be so tried could not confer jurisdiction in face of the mandate of the statute. In the present cases Congress by express provisions of the Code had authorized the military tribunals to sit in these types of cases.
In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, municipal debts were readjusted by a federal district court under an Act of Congress which this Court later held to be unconstitutional. The latter ruling was in Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, where a closely divided Court held that an extension of the Bankruptcy Act to include a readjustment of the debts of municipalities and counties was unconstitutional. Petitioner had its debts readjusted under that Act, which permitted less than all of the outstanding bondholders to agree to a plan. That plan was consummated before the Ashton decision. Respondent was one of the nonconsenting bondholders. After the Ashton decision it brought suit on its bonds. The question before the Court in the Chicot County Drainage District case was the extent to which the Ashton case should be made retroactive. The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, said that the proceedings in the District Court “were conducted in complete conformity to the statute” and that “no question had been raised as to the regu*691larity of the court’s action.” 308 U. S., at 375. Since the parties had an opportunity to raise the question of invalidity but did not do so, they “were not the less bound by the decree because they failed to raise it.” Ibid. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes added, id., at 377:
“Whatever the contention as to jurisdiction may be, whether it is that the boundaries of a valid statute have been transgressed, or that the statute itself is invalid, the question of jurisdiction is still one for judicial determination. If the contention is one as to validity, the question is to be considered in the light of the standing of the party who seeks to raise the question and of its particular application.”
He went on to say, id., at 378:
“[H]es judicata may be pleaded as a bar, not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier proceeding, ‘but also as respects any other available matter which might have been presented to that end/ Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm’n, [281 U. S. 470, 479].”
Petitioner claims, as did respondent in the Chicot County Drainage District case, that the tribunal that first adjudicated the cause acted unconstitutionally. At the time the military court acted, however, it was assumed to have “jurisdiction” and its “jurisdiction” was in no way challenged in the review proceedings available to petitioner. Did the issue of “jurisdiction” for that case therefore become res judicata?
These are, in brief, the reasons why res judicata arguably should lead to an affirmance in the Gosa case. Contrary to intimations in the dissenting opinion I have reached no position on the merits and would reserve judgment until the issue was fully explored on reargument.

 In the Flemings case respondent in time of war went AWOL and stole a car from a civilian. The military charge against him was an unauthorized absence from his duty station during wartime and theft of a car from a civilian. He pleaded guilty; and the only action brought came years later when he sought correction of his military records.

 The Uniform Code of Military Justice, after providing for investigation before a charge is referred to a general court-martial in Art. 32 (a), goes on to state in Art. 32 (b):
“The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to be represented at that investigation by counsel. Upon his own request he shall be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him, or military counsel of his own selection if such counsel is reasonably available, or by counsel detailed by the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command. At that investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after the investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides and a copy thereof shall be given to the accused.” 10 U. S. C. §832 (b).
Petitioner had counsel before the Court of Military Appeals, one designated by the Army; and only “the merits” of the conviction were raised, no question being raised relating to the “jurisdiction” of the military.

 Title 10 U. S. C. § 876 provides that military review of court-martial convictions shall be “final and conclusive” and “binding upon *688all . . . courts ... of the United States.” As we noted in United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 349-350, relief by way of habeas corpus is an exception to that finality clause.
It was suggested by the Solicitor General in his brief in opposition to a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of certiorari in Crawford v. United States, 380 U. S. 970, that while the statutes made the judgment of the Court of Military Appeals “final and conclusive,” habeas corpus would be available to a person confined and a writ of error coram nobis in the District Court if he is not confined; citing 25 U. S. C. § 1254 (c) (probably intending 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1)); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 106 n. 1. In that view one who was unsuccessful in obtaining relief by way of coram nobis in the district court, would be able to seek review in the court of appeals and ultimately by certiorari in this Court. That question was not resolved by this Court, since we denied certiorari in the Crawford case. In the Crawford case the question tendered on the merits was whether the restriction of court-martial membership to senior noncommissioned officers, excluding entire classes of statutorily eligible prospective court-martial members, deprived petitioner of due process and violated 10 U. S. C. § 825 so as to deprive the court-martial of jurisdiction. For the decision of the Court of Military Appeals see United States v. Crawford, 15 U. S. C. M. A. 31, 35 C. M. R. 3. And see Schiesser, Trial by Peers: Enlisted Members on Courts-Martial, 15 Cath. U. L. Rev. 171 (1966).

 The Court of Military Appeals decided that O’Callahan v. Parker would be applied only to those convictions that were not final before the date of that decision. Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U. S. C. M. A. 264, 41 C. M. R. 264 (1970).

 For purposes of habeas corpus, historically used to test the “jurisdiction” of tribunals to try defendants, the concept has been broadened to include constitutional guarantees. Thus in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused is entitled to counsel was held to be “an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.” Id., at 467. The rule announced used “jurisdiction” in an innovative way with the purpose of giving counsel to defendants who up to the time of our decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, had no lawyers to represent them and thus were commonly deprived of their constitutional rights.

 See n. 2, supra.