Court Opinion

ID: 9513458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:35:46.839717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:52.058101
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
[¶ 26] I concur with that part of the majority opinion that concludes even were we to adopt a continuous treatment exception it would be inapplicable to this case. I dissent from the remainder of the opinion.
[¶ 27] This Court first adopted the discovery rule in Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D.1968).2 In 1975, the Legislature amended and reenacted subsection 3 of section 28-01-18, N.D.C.C., relating to the limitation of malpractice actions to provide:
3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice, provided, however, that the limitation of an action against a physician or licensed hospital will not be extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice by a nondiscovery thereof unless discovery was prevented by the fraudulent conduct of the physician or licensed hospital.
This limitation shall be subject to the provisions of section 28-01-25.
1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 284, § 1. In Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708 (N.D.1983), we addressed the knowledge required by a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case which would cause an action to “accrue” under N.D.C.C. § 28—01—18(3).3 Our Court rejected the rationale of United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 121-22, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979), in which the United States Supreme Court concluded the two-year statute of limitations accrues or begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know of his injury and its probable cause, but there is no requirement he know or should know of the doctor’s wrongdoing. Anderson, 333 N.W.2d at 710. In construing our statute regarding when a medical malpractice claim accrues in Anderson, we also disagreed with Dr. Shook’s argument that the statute begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the possibly negligent act. We stated:
Dr. Shook’s construction of Sec. 28-01-18, NDCC encourages any person who has an injury to file a lawsuit against a physician or hospital to prevent the statute of limitation from running. This is contrary to the policy that unfounded claims should be strongly discouraged. The better interpretation of Sec. 28-01-18 is that discovery of “the act or omission of alleged malpractice” refers to discovery of medical malpractice consisting of breach of a duty, injury, and causation.
Id. at 710 (citation omitted). In Anderson, we quoted at length from courts in Utah, Oregon, Hawaii and the United States District Court of the District of Columbia in support of our decision. Id. at 710-11. We noted the reasoning of the United States District Court of the District of Columbia:
This policy [of a discovery rule] is applied to different factual situations as they arise. Where the injury is latent, the claim is held not to accrue until the plaintiff discovers the injury. Where causation of an injury is unknown, the action accrues when both the injury and its cause have been (or should have been) discovered. Where the injury and *260causation are known, but not that there has been any wrongdoing, the action is held to accrue when the plaintiff discovered, or by due diligence should have discovered, the wrongdoing. We believe the District of Columbia courts would follow this progression.... We predict that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would hold that the statute of limitations in this case did not begin to run until plaintiff learned, or in the exercise of due diligence should have learned, that her injuries were the result of some wrongdoing on the part of the defendants. This does not mean that plaintiff had to be aware of all the elements of a legal cause of action, of the probability of success in such a lawsuit, or that her knowledge of wrongdoing had to rise to a level of certainty. It merely means that she had to have some awareness, or imputed awareness, that her injuries were the result of some wrongdoing on the part of defendants ....
Id. at 711 (quoting Dawson v. Eli Lilly and Co., 543 F.Supp. 1330, 1338-39 (D.C. 1982)).
[¶ 28] Our court consistently has held the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions commences to run when the plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, of (1) the injury, (2) its cause, and (3) the defendant’s possible negligence. Zettel v. Licht, 518 N.W.2d 214, 215 (N.D.1994); Wheeler v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 451 N.W.2d 133, 137 (N.D.1990); Froysland v. Altenburg, 439 N.W.2d 797, 798 (N.D.1989).
[¶ 29] The Grand Forks Clinic argues that it is enough to commence the running of the statute of limitations if Schanilec knew Dr. Lambie failed to diagnose the two collapsed discs and the vertebral fracture. But, as we said in Anderson, our law requires more. The law requires not only knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of possible negligence — the misdiagnosis — but, also the knowledge of an injury and the cause of the injury. Nothing in the record indicates Schanilec knew or should have known he sustained an injury caused by Dr. Lambie’s failure to diagnose earlier a vertebral fracture and two collapsed discs. Schanilec admits he knew on February 19, 1994, his x-rays revealed the collapse of the vertebral discs between L2-3 and L3-4 and that he had a fracture of his L3 vertebrae. Dr. Zeller’s medical report dated February 19, 1994, to Dr. Kotnik indicates Dr. Zeller believed the fracture was from the car accident in 1981 and the ongoing “kyphotic deformity” was “secondary to the trauma sustained in his motor vehicle accident some 12 years ago.” There is nothing in the record to indicate Schanilec did not relate these medical conditions to his auto accident injuries. Dr. Zeller’s medical records dated March 17, 1994, indicate on that date he discussed the disco-gram results with Schanilec which confirmed Schanilec had significant two level disc collapse at both L2-3 and L3-4. There is no question Schanilec knew by March 17, 1994, of Dr. Lambie’s failure to diagnose his vertebral fracture. However, under our cases, he must also be apprised of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice he sustained an injury, i.e., accelerated collapse of his vertebral discs, and that the injury was caused by Dr. Lam-bie’s possible negligence.
[¶ 30] Based on the record, including the testimony of Schanilec, the medical record exhibits, and the answers to interrogatories, a reasonable mind could draw the inference that a reasonable person would not be placed on notice prior to March 25, 1994, that he had sustained an injury caused by the misdiagnosis, and not by the original car accident.4
[¶ 31] Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears there are no genuine issues of material fact or any conflicting inferences which may be drawn. Duncklee v. Wills, 542 N.W.2d 739, 742 *261(N.D.1996). “A malpractice plaintiffs knowledge is ordinarily a question of fact, and summary judgment is rarely appropriate on the issue of when the plaintiff should have discovered there was a potential malpractice claim.” Id. A plaintiff cannot have a potential malpractice claim without an injury, and the defendant’s negligence causing the injury. On appeal from summary judgment, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Wheeler, 451 N.W.2d at 136. In my opinion, determining when Schani-lee was apprised of facts which would have placed a reasonable person on notice that the failure to diagnose his vertebral fracture caused an injury is a question of fact. Until Schanilec is apprised of facts indicating the failure to diagnose his fracture caused an injury, it is difficult to see how the statute of limitations could begin to run. I, therefore, believe summary judgment of dismissal was not proper because reasonable differences of opinion exist as to the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts.
[¶ 32] The majority cites to a number of other jurisdictions for the proposition that the discovery rule applies to a misdiagnosis case. There is no dispute over whether the discovery rule applies to a case of misdiagnosis. In fact, Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D.1968), the case in which this Court adopted the discovery rule, was a misdiagnosis case.
[¶ 33] For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for trial on the issue of plaintiffs knowledge.
[¶ 34] NEUMANN, J., concurs.

. The statute relevant to the holding in Iver-son read in pertinent part:
28-01-18. Actions having two-year limitations. The following actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued:
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3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice.

. The North Dakota statute of limitations for malpractice read in relevant part the same as amended by the 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 284.

. Schanilec commenced this action on March 25, 1996.