Court Opinion

ID: 9896419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-11 11:12:21.257572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:54.326361
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-22-00124-CV

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

              TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                   TYLER, TEXAS

THE MORRISON LAW FIRM AND                      §      APPEAL FROM THE 114TH
SHELLI MORRISON, APPELLANTS

V.

ETX SUCCESSOR TYLER, F/K/A                     §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER
TYLER, ETX SUCCESSOR SYSTEM,
F/K/A EAST TEXAS MEDICAL
CENTER REGIONAL HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM, APPELLEES                              §      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellants The Morrison Law Firm and Shelli Morrison (collectively “Morrison”),
appeal from the trial court’s judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of ETX
Successor Tyler f/k/a East Texas Medical Center Tyler, ETX Successor System f/k/a East Texas
Medical Center Regional Healthcare System, ETX Successor Athens f/k/a East Texas Medical
Center Athens, ETX Successor Carthage f/k/a East Texas Medical Center Carthage, ETX
Successor Henderson f/k/a East Texas Medical Center Henderson, ETX Successor Jacksonville
f/k/a East Texas Medical Center Jacksonville, ETX Successor Rehabilitation Hospital f/k/a East
Texas Medical Center Rehabilitation Hospital, ETX Successor Specialty Hospital f/k/a East
Texas Medical Center (collectively “ETX”), and Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC, Jacksonville
Hospital, LLC, AHS East Texas Health System, LLC, Henderson Hospital, LLC, East Texas
Health System, LLC, Tyler Regional Hospital, LLC, Specialty Hospital, LLC, and Athens
Hospital, LLC (collectively “Ardent”). In three issues, Morrison argues that we should vacate,
correct, or modify the award (1) because the arbitrator exceeded his authority, (2) because the
award was procured by fraud or undue means, and (3) for public policy reasons. We affirm.
                                              BACKGROUND
       In 2015 and 2016, Morrison and ETX executed written contracts (“the Contracts”) under
which Morrison would accept for collection unpaid ETX patient accounts (“the Accounts”) for
hospitals in Tyler, Athens, Henderson, Carthage, and Jacksonville and advance collection
expenses. On recovery of payments, Morrison would be reimbursed for these expenses and
receive a percentage of the recovery. With some exceptions, that percentage was twenty percent.
ETX had the right to terminate the Contracts, in which event Morrison would cooperate with
subsequent collectors and receive a quantum meruit payment for pretermination work and
expenses, to be determined by a mutually agreed upon mediator. ETX had the right to withdraw
any account, in which case Morrison would receive her fee with respect to subsequent payments
made because of her collection efforts.
       On March 1, 2018, ETX sold substantially all its assets, including the Accounts, to
Ardent. Ardent did not assume the Contracts under the purchase agreement. ETX informed
Morrison of the sale and stated it was terminating the Henderson, Carthage, and Jacksonville
contracts. Subsequently, ETX and Ardent executed a side letter agreement, dated March 2,
transferring the Accounts back to ETX. Morrison withdrew her representation in October.
       In December, ETX sued Morrison for declaratory judgment regarding the scope of the
Contracts. Morrison countersued ETX and filed a consolidated third-party original petition suing
Ardent. In February 2020, the parties filed in court an agreement to “submit all disputes, claims
or controversies” to “neutral, binding arbitration at JAMS with Judge Harlan Martin.” Morrison
submitted a demand for arbitration stating claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit,
promissory estoppel, money had and received, injunction, an accounting, and tortious
interference.
       In April 2021, Morrison submitted the following statement of issues for arbitration:

         I.     Whether Claimants are entitled to a 20% contingent fee on the sale of the liability
                 accounts from ETX Respondents to Ardent Respondents, when paragraph 7 of the
                 Contingency Agreements specifically says a contingent fee is owed when EXT [sic]
                 Respondents receive payment “from any source” on any and all accounts that had
                 been previously assigned to Claimants for prosecution?

         II.    What is the dollar amount that ETX Respondents received on the sale of the liability
                 accounts, when it sold those liability accounts to Ardent Respondents?

                                                     2
          III.   Whether Ardent Respondents tortiously interfered with Claimants’ Contingency
                  Agreements and, if so, what amount of money in damages should Ardent
                  Respondents pay in order to compensate Claimants for that interference?

The final arbitration hearing was held May 4 through 7.
        In Judge Martin’s final award, he construed the Contracts as entitling Morrison to a
contingent fee upon collection of the Accounts from the patient or a responsible third party but
not upon a sale of the Accounts. He found that Morrison continued to perform under the
Contracts after the asset sale, and ETX paid Morrison all monies due and owed under the
Contracts through the date of her withdrawal. Judge Martin further found that Ardent owned the
patient account database after the asset sale, had the right to control access to it, justifiably
denied Morrison direct access based on concerns that she self-assigned accounts, and responded
to Morrison’s requests for account information. He found that the evidence supported none of
Morrison’s claims.
        ETX and Ardent filed a motion to confirm the award. Morrison filed a motion to modify,
correct, or vacate the award. After hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the trial court
confirmed the award. This appeal followed.

                                                  VACATUR
        Under the Texas Arbitration Act 1 (“TAA”), “[u]nless grounds are offered for vacating,
modifying, or correcting an award under Section 171.088 or 171.091, the court, on application of
a party, shall confirm the award.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.087 (West 2019).
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award de novo; however,
our review of the underlying award is extremely deferential. Dotcom Ltd. Co. v. DP Sols., Inc.,
No. 12-16-00340-CV, 2017 WL 3224887, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (citing CVN Grp., Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. 2002)). Judicial review of the
arbitration process is limited, and even a mistake of law or fact by the arbitrator in applying
substantive law is not a proper ground for vacating an award. Cambridge Legacy Grp., Inc. v.

         1
           The parties agree that the TAA applies. When, as here, an arbitration agreement is silent about whether
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or the TAA applies, and no party asserts that the FAA applies or preempts the
TAA, we need not address whether the FAA applies. See Cedillo v. Immobiliere Jeuness Establissement, 476
S.W.3d 557, 563 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). The FAA and TAA address the same
underlying substantive principles. Id. Because the substantive principles applicable to our analysis are the same
under both acts, we cite cases decided under the acts interchangeably. See id.

                                                        3
Jain, 407 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). We should indulge all
reasonable presumptions in favor of the award and none against it. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d at 238.
The party seeking to modify or vacate an arbitration award bears the ultimate burden of proving
the modification or vacatur grounds. Roehrs v. FSI Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

                                  ARBITRATOR’S AUTHORITY
       In Morrison’s first issue, she contends that Judge Martin exceeded his authority by (1)
deciding a matter not submitted to arbitration, (2) failing to provide a reasoned award regarding
her tortious interference claim, (3) failing to provide a reasoned award regarding fifteen other
purported claims, and (4) manifestly disregarding the law and issuing an award that was the
result of a gross mistake.
Issue Submission
       Morrison argues that Judge Martin exceeded his authority by finding that ETX paid her
all monies due and owed under the Contracts because the issue was not submitted to arbitration.
In support of her argument, Morrison asserts that ETX did not dispute that she was owed fees in
the event Judge Martin determined she had the contractual right to them for work performed
through her withdrawal date. She contends that ETX agreed she had not been paid such fees in
full. Morrison acknowledges that she and ETX disagreed as to the specific amount that would
compensate her for work she performed, but she distinguishes this disagreement from a claim
that if she was entitled to fees through October 17, she had been paid in full. Morrison argues
that Judge Martin’s finding that she was paid in full, absent the assertion of such a position by
ETX and despite ETX’s testimony and expert reports showing that she was owed fees through
October 17, exceeded the scope of his authority.
       ETX denies Morrison’s assertions that it (1) did not dispute owing her fees and (2) agreed
she was not paid in full. It notes that in its proposed findings and conclusions filed with Judge
Martin, it requested a finding that “ETX paid Morrison all sums owed under the contract.” ETX
further avers that when Morrison submitted post-arbitration proceedings evidence to Judge
Martin, ETX responded disputing any fee was owed.
       Additionally, ETX cites case law holding that an arbitrator’s authority is derived not from
what the parties put forth in the arbitration record or submissions but from their agreement to

                                                4
submit to arbitration. It observes that Morrison filed a lawsuit claiming she was owed money
under the Contracts, and the parties agreed to submit “all disputes, claims or controversies”
between Morrison and the appellees to arbitration. Consequently, ETX contends, Judge Martin
had the authority to issue the take nothing award on Morrison’s claims that she was owed money
under the Contracts. We agree.
       If an arbitrator exceeded his powers, the TAA requires the court to vacate the award.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(3)(A) (West 2019); D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd.
v. Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). “[T]he
court shall modify or correct an award if . . . the arbitrators have made an award with respect to a
matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision made with respect to the issues that were submitted.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 171.091(a)(2) (West 2019).
       Texas law strongly favors arbitration of disputes. Prudential Secs., Inc. v. Marshall, 909
S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1995). The arbitrator’s powers are derived from the parties’ agreement to
submit to arbitration. Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2011). Therefore,
we look to the agreement to determine whether the arbitrator had authority to decide the issue.
See id.; Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d at 534. An arbitrator exceeds his authority when he disregards
the contract and dispenses his own idea of justice. Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d at 534. The authority
of an arbitrator is limited to a decision of the matters submitted in the arbitration agreement
either expressly or by necessary implication. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry, 160 Tex. 139, 143, 327
S.W.2d 406, 408 (1959). An arbitrator does not exceed his authority when the matter he
addresses is one that the parties agreed to arbitrate. Centex/Vestal v. Friendship S. Baptist
Church, 314 S.W.3d 677, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
       An arbitrator does not exceed his authority merely because he may have misinterpreted
the contract or misapplied the law. Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d at 534. “[A]n arbitrator does not
exceed h[is] authority by committing a mistake of law, but instead by deciding a matter not
properly before h[im].” Id. (quoting LeFoumba v. Legend Classic Homes, Ltd., No. 14-08-
00243-CV, 2009 WL 3109875, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 17, 2009, no pet.)
(mem. op.)). The proper inquiry is not whether the arbitrator correctly decided an issue, but
whether the arbitrator had authority to decide the issue at all. Id.; Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio
Land & Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 431 (Tex. 2017).             Generally, “a complaint that the

                                                 5
arbitrator decided the issue incorrectly or made a mistake of law is not a complaint that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers.” Centex/Vestal, 314 S.W.3d at 686. Thus, “a mistake of fact or
law by the arbitrator in the application of substantive law is not a proper ground for vacating an
award.” Id. at 683. We resolve any doubts regarding the scope of what is arbitrable in favor of
arbitration. Id. at 684.
       The record here shows that the issue of whether and how much money was due and owed
under the Contracts was submitted in the arbitration agreement. The parties’ stipulation for
arbitration reads as follows:

         It is stipulated and agreed by the Parties to submit all disputes, claims or controversies by and
         between [ETX and Ardent] on the one hand, and [Morrison] on the other hand to neutral,
         binding arbitration at JAMS with Judge Harlan Martin, pursuant to the JAMS Arbitration
         Administrative Policies and, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties, to the applicable
         JAMS Arbitration Rules and Procedures. The Parties hereby agree to give up any rights they
         might possess to have this matter by and between [ETX and Ardent] on the one hand, and
         [Morrison] on the other litigated in a court or jury trial.

The phrase “submit all disputes, claims or controversies” is broad and may encompass a wide
range of issues. See Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. Maxus (U.S.) Expl. Co., 345 S.W.3d 672, 678
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (same conclusion regarding phrase “all claims asserted in
the Lawsuit”); Centex/Vestal, 314 S.W.3d at 685 (same regarding phrase “[a]ny claim arising
out of or related to the Contract”). We construe such broad language as evidence of the parties’
intent to be inclusive rather than exclusive. See Skidmore, 345 S.W.3d at 678; Centex/Vestal,
314 S.W.3d at 685. Such broad agreements have been held to support awards rendered on a
variety of grounds, including grounds not specifically argued to the arbitrator. Skidmore, 345
S.W.3d at 678 (citing City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (arbitrators did not exceed powers by awarding damages
for changed conditions even though issue was not specifically addressed in briefing); J.J.
Gregory Gourmet Servs., Inc. v. Antone’s Import Co., 927 S.W.2d 31, 34-5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (arbitrators did not exceed powers in determining issue the
resolution of which was not expressly demanded because issue was discussed during arbitration
proceedings)).
       Here, not only was the issue of monies owed under the Contracts encompassed by the
arbitration agreement, but Morrison specifically raised it in her arbitration demand. In Count I of

                                                        6
the demand, Morrison alleged breach of contract against ETX, specifically asserting that “(i) [she
had] a binding and enforceable contract(s) with [ETX]; (ii) [ETX] anticipatorily and materially
breached the contracts; (iii) as a proximate cause of said breach(es) of contract(s), [she] sustained
actual damages.” In Count IV, she sought temporary and permanent injunctions ordering ETX to
“place into the registry of the Court all disputed funds, which have not yet been invoiced and
paid to [Morrison] under the parties’ agreements” and “not to alter, destroy, and/or modify any
of the payment schedules and other documents, which would reflect amounts to be invoiced and
ultimately paid to [Morrison] on accounts germane to the parties’ agreements upon which
[Morrison has] yet to be paid.” In Count V, Morrison sought an accounting to “establish the
amounts that are due and owing [Morrison] under the parties’ various agreements.” Among
other relief, she sought actual damages against ETX. Under these circumstances, regardless of
whether the issue of monies owed under the Contracts was argued at the final hearing, we cannot
conclude that Judge Martin exceeded his powers by determining the issue. See Nafta, 339
S.W.3d at 90; Gulf Oil, 160 Tex. at 143, 327 S.W.2d at 408; Skidmore, 345 S.W.3d at 678.
Reasoned Award
       Morrison argues that Judge Martin exceeded his authority by failing to provide a
reasoned award regarding her tortious interference claim and fifteen other purported claims.
Absent an agreement otherwise, an arbitrator issues a “standard award,” which announces a
result without reasoning or explanation. Stage Stores, Inc. v. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d 848, 857
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).               However, when an arbitration agreement
requires that an award be provided in a specific form, such as a “reasoned award,” an arbitrator
may exceed his powers by failing to provide the award in that form. Cat Charter, SSC v.
Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 843 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 852, 863
(deciding issue of whether arbitrator provided a “reasoned award” as agreed by parties in
preliminary hearing).
       Here, the parties expressly adopted the JAMS Rules in the arbitration agreement. JAMS
Rule 24(h) provides that

         [t]he Award shall consist of a written statement signed by the Arbitrator regarding the
         disposition of each claim and the relief, if any, as to each claim. Unless all Parties agree
         otherwise, the Award shall also contain a concise written statement of the reasons for the
         Award.

                                                      7
The express adoption of these rules indicates that the parties agreed the award would contain a
“concise written statement of the reasons” for the award. See Cooper v. WestEnd Capital
Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2016) (express adoption of JAMS rules, which
authorize arbitrator to determine arbitrability, showed parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability).
We discern no practical difference between an agreement that an award would “contain a concise
written statement of the reasons” for it and an agreement that the award would be a “reasoned
award.” Therefore, we analyze the issue of whether Judge Martin’s award adheres to the parties’
agreement here under cases construing the definition of a “reasoned award.”
       Absent an agreed definition, a “reasoned award” is one that is provided with or marked
by the detailed listing or mention of expressions or statements offered as a justification of the
arbitrator’s decision. Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 844; Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 859. The detail and
specificity required in a “reasoned award” lies between that of a standard award and findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 844; Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 858. The
findings and conclusions standard is a relatively exacting standard.        YPF S.A. v. Apache
Overseas, Inc., 924 F.3d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 2019). An arbitrator’s award is reasoned if it
provides greater detail than that of a standard award—that is, it is more than a mere
announcement of the decision. See id.; Precision-Hayes Int’l, Inc. v. JDH Pac., Inc., No. 02-
21-00374-CV, 2022 WL 3913554, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
       The determination of whether an award is reasoned is a question of form, not substance.
Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 859. We do not review whether the award is correctly reasoned or well-
reasoned. Id. Courts have generally been reluctant to vacate an award challenged on the
grounds that its form was improper. Id. at 855.
       Before we address the specific claims about which Morrison complains, we note that
Judge Martin’s award provides far more than a mere announcement of his decisions.               He
provided a ten-page award that includes a “Claims” section, a lengthy “Background” section, a
three-page “Analysis” section detailing his reasons for the award, a “Findings and Conclusions”
section, and an “Award” section. We now address Morrison’s specific complaints.
       Tortious Interference
       Regarding Morrison’s tortious interference claim, the analysis section explains Judge
Martin’s reasoning as follows:

                                                  8
        MLF states claims against Ardent for tortious interference with the ETX/MLF Attorney’s Fee
        Contracts and/or their attorney/client relationship. MLF claims Ardent wrongfully caused the
        termination of the Jacksonville, Henderson and Carthage Attorney’s Fee Contracts; denied
        MLF access to the patient accounts and denied MLF the benefits of its contingent fee
        agreements.

        Following the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ardent owned and controlled the
        patient account data base and was privileged to decide for itself who might have access. Ardent
        was concerned that MLF had “self-assigned” thousands of patient accounts in the months
        leading up to closing and its denial of MLF’s direct access to the patient account data base was
        appropriate and justified. In fact, the evidence establishes that Ardent cooperated with MLF
        and was responsive to requests for patient account data base information following the closing
        of the Asset Purchase Agreement and MLF collected millions of dollars on patient accounts as
        it benefitted from Ardent’s cooperation.

        Additionally, Ardent was privileged to hire its own 3rd party collection facility going forward
        and the evidence does not establish any tortious conduct or quantify any claim of damages
        resulting from the 3rd party’s collection efforts.

        All of MLF’s claims against Ardent for alleged tortious interference are without merit,
        unproved and ought be denied.

In Judge Martin’s findings and conclusions, he concluded that “MLF failed to prove any
actionable claims of tortious interference against Ardent,” and “[a]ll claims stated by MLF
against ETX and Ardent, are not supported on the evidence presented, are without merit and
ought be denied.”      Because the award does not merely announce Judge Martin’s decision
regarding Morrison’s tortious interference claim in the award but provides detailed statements to
justify it, we conclude that Judge Martin did not fail to provide a reasoned award regarding that
claim. See YPF, 924 F.3d at 820; Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 844; Precision-Hayes, 2022 WL
3913554, at *7; Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 859.
       Nonetheless, Morrison argues that the award does not meet this requirement because
Judge Martin “failed to address the legal reason that Ardent would have the legal authority to
have their vendor, MRA, working the accounts owned by ETX, who hired Morrison to collect
those accounts.” This argument complains not that the award fails as a “reasoned award” but
that the award is incorrectly reasoned. Such a complaint provides no permissible basis for
vacating the award. See Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 859; Cambridge, 407 S.W.3d at 447. Because the
award was provided in the form required by the arbitration agreement with regard to Judge
Martin’s tortious interference decision, Morrison fails to establish that Judge Martin exceeded
his powers in that regard. See Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 843; Stage, 477 S.W.3d at 852, 863.

                                                       9
       Other Purported Claims
       Morrison complains that Judge Martin failed to provide any statements or reasons
regarding her claims for money had and received, an accounting, and the following purported
claims she describes as tortious interference “and/or” breach of contract claims:

         1) Interfering in pending litigation, in which Morrison, not MRA, was attorney of record, by
            contacting and conducting settlement negotiations with opposing counsel. [record citations
            omitted]

         2) Interfering with Morrison’s ability to collect the ETX accounts by altering invoices,
            making patient billing and insurance filings reflecting that Ardent owned the ETX
            accounts, responding to medical affidavit responses stating Ardent was the owners of the
            ETX accounts. []

         3) Fraudulently filing the ETX accounts with Medicare, against Morrison’s advice. []

         4) UT/Ardent refusing to provide Morrison with information needed for the collection of
            liability accounts, even going to the extent to say an account did not have an itemized
            invoice and one could not be generated. []

         5) Changing dates in the ETMC AS400 system regarding, insurance information, filing
            dates, payments, and adjustments. []

         6) Failing to follow the instructions of Morrison and contact carriers and drop insurance
            claims in a timely manner and/or in the proper order. []

         7) Balance billing by either reversing a managed care adjustment or never applying it and
            applying a liability payments [sic] instead of having the health carrier reprocess as
            secondary or applying the adjustment and refunding any credit balance to the appropriate
            party in violation of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 146 and is [sic]
            in breach of the provider contracts, creating legal liability for ETX, Ardent, and Morrison.
            []

         8) Wrongfully applying false adjustments and sending the patient/ carrier/ attorneys a zero
            balance invoice showing no payment was due, exposing ETX, UT/Ardent, and Morrison
            to legal liability when the lien was not timely released because Morrison was unaware of
            the zero balance. []

         9) Failing to provide Morrison with the payment reports needed to timely release liens,
            invoice, update accounts, and appeal insurance denials, as is required under the Morrison/
            ETX contract. []

         10) Providing Morrison with incorrect information as to in-network provider status, even
             refusing to correct accounts timely when requested by Morrison, compromising the
             amounts collectible under the liability claims. []

         11) Failing to timely provide medical records on liability accounts when requested in violation
             of HIPAA. []

                                                       10
               12) Sending invoices to patients without the knowledge and consent of Morrison, sometimes
                   applying improper discounts that were collectible from the liability claim, forcing
                   Morrison to honor the discount. []

               13) Improperly processing charity on accounts with Morrison and liability claims pending,
                   without the knowledge Morrison [sic], exposing ETX, Ardent, and Morrison to liability. []

Regarding the claims for money had and received and an accounting, Morrison has not met her
burden of establishing that statements or reasons were required. See Roehrs, 246 S.W.3d at 804.
Although JAMS Rule 24(h) requires a statement regarding “each claim,” it does not define what
constitutes a claim for purposes of the Rule, nor does Morrison contend that the parties agreed on
any such definition. Morrison does not contend that she argued the claims for money had and
received and an accounting at the final award hearing. Although she asserted money had and
received and accounting claims in her arbitration demand, her later-submitted statement of issues
omits any reference to the claims.                  Under these circumstances, indulging all reasonable
presumptions in favor of the award and none against it, we decline to conclude that the money
had and received and accounting claims constitute “claims” requiring statements and reasoning
under Rule 24(h). 2 See Delgado, 95 S.W.3d at 238.
           The remaining claims, numbered 1 through 13, are addressed in the award. Claims 1, 4,
5, 9, 10, and 11 are specifically addressed. In the portion of the “Analysis” section devoted to
Morrison’s tortious interference claim, quoted above in its entirety, Judge Martin explains his
reasoning regarding (1) third-party collection efforts, which relates to claim number 1, (2)
Morrison’s data access, which relates to claims 5 and 9, (3) Ardent’s cooperation with Morrison,
which relates to claims 4, 10 and 11, and (4) the insufficiency of the tortious conduct evidence,
which relates to all thirteen claims.
           Although the award provides no specific reasoning for claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13,
Morrison has not shown that any is warranted because she has not shown that the claims were
central disputes between the parties. When parties agree that an arbitration award will be in the
form of a reasoned award, the arbitrator does not exceed his authority by omitting detailed
reasoning regarding issues that were not central disputes between the parties. See Stage, 477
S.W.3d at 863. In Stage, Stage argued that the award was not a reasoned award because the
award simply stated the amount of attorney’s fees without specifically addressing any of Stage’s

           2
               We note, nonetheless, that Judge Martin acknowledged the money had and received claim in his “Claims”
section.

                                                            11
arguments or explaining the amount. See id. at 862. The court of appeals determined that the
attorney’s fee amount was not a central dispute, noting that the record pertaining to that issue
consisted of only 140 pages of a 1,614-page record. See id. at 863. Because the issue was not a
central dispute, the arbitrator’s award of Gunnerson’s requested amount of attorney’s fees—from
which one could conclude the arbitrator rejected each of Stage’s arguments—provided sufficient
reasoning regarding that issue. See id. at 863.
       Here, Morrison cites only eighteen pages of the 1,578-page final hearing transcript in
support of her argument that claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13 warranted reasoning in the award. In
those parts of the transcript, Morrison testifies briefly regarding the claims and refers Judge
Martin to various documents in evidence without explaining how they support the claims.
Morrison made no mention of the claims in either her opening statements or closing brief. See
id. at 853 (notice and cure defense merited reasoning in award where Stage raised issue in
opening and closing statements, both sides questioned Gunnerson about the issue, and issue was
relevant under contract). Based on our review, we conclude that the claims were not central
disputes. See id. at 862-63.
       We further conclude that Judge Martin’s disposal of the claims in his “Findings and
Conclusions” section provides sufficient reasoning regarding them. Therein, he disposes of the
claims as follows:

         7. . . . MLF . . . received all contracted for benefits under the terms of the Attorney’s Fee
         Contracts.

         ....

         9. MLF failed to prove any actionable claims of tortious interference against Ardent.

         ....

         11. All claims stated by MLF against ETX and Ardent, are not supported on the evidence
         presented, are without merit and ought be denied.

Because one could conclude from these disposals that Judge Martin rejected each of Morrison’s
claims of breach of contract and tortious interference, and claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13 were
not central disputes, their summary disposals were reasoning enough. See id. at 863. Based on
our review, we conclude that the award was provided in the form required by the arbitration
agreement with regard to each listed claim, and, therefore, Morrison fails to establish that Judge

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Martin exceeded his powers in this respect. See Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 843; Stage, 477
S.W.3d at 852, 863.
Manifest Disregard and Gross Mistake
       Within the argument section of Morrison’s first issue, she asserts that Judge Martin’s
“questions and comments throughout, even in the final award, evidence that he knew the law,
recognized that the law required a particular result, but simply disregarded the law, or acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in his decision, constituting manifestly disregarded [sic] the law
and/or the award was the result of a gross mistake.” She cites JAMS Rule 24(c), which reads as
follows:

           In determining the merits of the dispute, the Arbitrator shall be guided by the rules of law
           agreed upon by the Parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Arbitrator shall be guided by
           the rules of law and equity that he or she deems to be most appropriate. The Arbitrator may
           grant any remedy or relief that is just and equitable and within the scope of the Parties’
           Agreement, including, but not limited to, specific performance of a contract or any other
           equitable or legal remedy.

We liberally construe Morrison’s brief to argue that the parties agreed to expanded judicial
review by expressly adopting the JAMS Rules, particularly JAMS Rule 24(c), and that Judge
Martin exceeded his authority as limited by JAMS Rule 24(c) by manifestly disregarding the law
and issuing an award that was the result of a gross mistake. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9. Based on
the record in this case, we cannot vacate the award on those grounds.
       In proceedings governed by the TAA, Section 171.088 provides the exclusive grounds for
vacatur of an arbitration award.            Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490, 497 (Tex. 2016).
Common law vacatur grounds such as manifest disregard and gross mistake are generally not
grounds for vacatur in such proceedings. Id. (manifest disregard); Gordon v. Nickerson, No. 03-
18-00228-CV, 2019 WL 2147587, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 17, 2019, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (gross mistake). The parties in such proceedings may agree to expanded judicial review or a
corresponding limit on the arbitrator’s authority, but absent clear agreement to do so, the default
under the TAA is restricted judicial review. See Nafta, 339 S.W.3d at 101.
       The parties’ agreement that Judge Martin would be guided by the rules of law agreed on
by them or that he deemed most appropriate does not amount to a clear agreement to expand
judicial review. See Forest Oil, 518 S.W.3d at 432 (no clear agreement to expand review where
agreement authorized arbitrators “to award punitive damages where allowed by Texas

                                                        13
substantive law”); Sanchez v. Doctor’s Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., No. 13-19-00365-CV, 2021
WL 266614 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no clear agreement
to expand review where arbitration clause provided that “[t]he arbitrator(s) shall apply the
internal laws of the State of Texas (without regard to conflict of law rules) in determining the
substance of the dispute, controversy or claim and shall decide the same in accordance with the
applicable usages and terms of the trade”); Midani v. Smith, No. 09-18-00009-CV, 2018 WL
5660571 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (no clear agreement to
expand review where arbitration provision required arbitrator to render decision based on
evidence and governed by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of Evidence, and
statutory and case law); Prell v. Bowman, No. 05-17-00369-CV, 2018 WL 2473850, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas June 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no clear agreement to expand review where
agreement provided that “[t]he procedures by which arbitration requests are received, hearings
are conducted, and awards are made must be in strict conformity with the law”); Methodist
Healthcare Sys., Ltd., LLP v. Friesenhahn, No. 04-16-00824-CV, 2017 WL 4518284, at *3
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 11, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (no clear agreement to expand
review where agreement provided that “[t]he arbitrator will apply the same laws and will be able
to grant the same relief as would a judge or jury”). Consequently, restricted judicial review
applies, and we cannot grant vacatur on the grounds of manifest disregard or gross mistake. See
Nafta, 339 S.W.3d at 101; Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d at 497; Gordon, 2019 WL 214787, at *4.
       Because Morrison fails to show that Judge Martin exceeded his powers under any of her
theories, she has established no vacatur grounds under Section 171.088(a)(3)(A). See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171. 088(a)(3)(A). Accordingly, we overrule her first issue.

                                   FRAUD OR UNDUE MEANS
       In Morrison’s second issue, she argues that ETX and Ardent procured the award by
concealing, fabricating, and fraudulently misrepresenting evidence.
Applicable Law
       If an arbitration award was obtained by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, the TAA
requires the court to vacate the award. Id. § 171.088(a)(1). A party seeking to vacate an
arbitration award bears the burden of presenting a record that establishes grounds for vacating
the award. Statewide Remodeling, Inc. v. Williams, 244 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. App.—Dallas

                                               14
2008, no pet.). To protect the finality of arbitration decisions, courts must be slow to vacate an
award on the ground of fraud. Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 990, 103 S. Ct. 346, 74 L. Ed.2d 386 (1982).
       To vacate an arbitration award because of fraud, the movant must establish (1) fraud by
clear and convincing evidence, (2) the fraud was not discoverable upon the exercise of due
diligence before or during the arbitration, and (3) the fraud was material to an arbitration issue.
Las Palmas Med. Ctr. v. Moore, 349 S.W.3d 57, 67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied).
The elements of fraud are (1) a material representation was made, (2) the representation was
false, (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it recklessly
without knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, (4) the speaker made the
representation with the intent that the other party would act upon it, (5) the party acted in reliance
on the representation, and (6) the party thereby suffered injury. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52
S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001). Fraud by nondisclosure is a subcategory of fraud because, where
a party has a duty to disclose, nondisclosure may be as misleading as a positive
misrepresentation of facts. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Tex.
1997). “Undue means” has been defined as immoral, illegal, or bad faith conduct. See Las
Palmas, 349 S.W.3d at 69.
Concealment and Fabrication of Account Payment Data
       Morrison contends that ETX and Ardent secured the arbitration award through fraud by
concealing the Accounts’ “ownership, valuation, alteration, and payment information/data.” She
asserts that this data was “the primary material evidence needed to prosecute and defend
Morrison’s claims and to determine the proper amount that Morrison is entitled to receive for the
accounts that were collected.” She acknowledges that ETX and Ardent produced such data in
the form of the “UT-2757 spreadsheet,” but complains that they did not produce the data “in the
form generated by their system,” and the spreadsheet was not authenticated.
       Morrison offers no evidence showing that the UT-2757 spreadsheet data was falsified
except that she requested the data in its original form, ETX and Ardent failed to produce it in that
form, Judge Martin ordered Ardent to produce the data, she objected that the UT-2757
spreadsheet data was hearsay evidence, and Ardent failed to produce as a witness the creator of
the UT-2757 spreadsheet. Even taking all these facts as true, they do not establish that ETX and
Ardent intentionally concealed the true data and falsified the data in the UT-2757 spreadsheet.

                                                 15
Ardent’s representative testified that it could not produce the data in its original form because it
was impossible to rewind every keystroke that occurred since March 2018 and recreate an image
of what the data looked like then. Morrison cites no evidence to the contrary and no additional
evidence that ETX or Ardent concealed or misrepresented the data. Moreover, the absence of a
sponsoring witness for the UT-2757 spreadsheet does not necessarily establish that its contents
were falsified. “[A]rbitration proceedings are often informal; procedural rules are relaxed, [and]
rules of evidence are not followed.” See Nafta, 339 S.W.3d at 101. Based on our review, we
conclude that Morrison has not shown fraudulent concealment or fabrication by clear and
convincing evidence. See In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 758. Therefore, she fails to
establish that the award was obtained by fraud or other undue means. See Las Palmas, 349
S.W.3d at 67.
Concealment and Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Tax Returns
       Morrison contends that ETX obtained the arbitration award through fraud or undue
means by concealing a tax return (the “Return”) that she discovered after the final hearing
through a freedom of information request. According to Morrison, the Return shows that the
Accounts had book values of $6,922,623.00 on November 1, 2018 and $550,770.00 on October
31, 2019, and these values conflict with ETX’s and Ardent’s position that the Accounts had zero
book value at the time of the asset sale. ETX acknowledges that it did not produce the Return.
But, according to ETX, it produced all relevant tax returns for the period requested, and the
accounts receivable reflected in the Return are not the Accounts but accounts receivable of
entities with which Morrison had no contracts, such as an ambulance company and a purchasing
cooperative. In response, Morrison attempts to show that the accounts receivable in the Return
are the Accounts by citing transcript pages where, according to her, ETX testified it sold all its
accounts receivable to Ardent and the only accounts receivable transferred back to ETX in the
side letter agreement were the Accounts. The cited pages contain no such testimony. Without
evidence that the accounts receivable reflected in the Return are the Accounts, Morrison has not
carried her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that ETX’s nondisclosure of the
Return was fraudulent. See In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 758.
       Moreover, even if the nondisclosure was fraudulent, Morrison fails to establish vacatur
grounds. Section 171.088 does not mandate vacatur on every showing of fraud or undue means
but only if “the award was obtained by” fraud or other undue means. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

                                                16
CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(1). We read this language as requiring a nexus between the alleged
fraud and the basis for the arbitrator’s decision. See Forsythe Intern., S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of
Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990) (“award was procured by” language in 9 U.S.C. §
10(a) requires nexus between fraud and decision). Such a nexus may exist where fraud prevents
the arbitrator from considering a significant issue to which it otherwise lacks access.          Id.
However, where the arbitrator hears the allegation of fraud and rests its decision on grounds
clearly independent of issues connected to the alleged fraud, the statutory vacatur basis is absent.
Id.
       The record indicates that Judge Martin heard the allegation of fraud regarding the book
value of the Accounts and rested his decision not on the Accounts’ book value but on his
interpretation that the Contracts did not entitle Morrison to a contingent fee incident to a sale of
ETX assets. Thus, Morrison fails to show that “the award was obtained by” any alleged fraud or
other undue means. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(1); Forsythe, 915
F.2d at 1022. Because Morrison fails to establish that the award was obtained by fraud or undue
means, she has established no vacatur grounds under Section 171.088(a)(1). See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171. 088(a)(1). Accordingly, we overrule her second issue.

                                         PUBLIC POLICY
       In Morrison’s third issue, she argues that we should vacate, correct, or modify the award
based on public policy considerations, namely, (1) the encouragement of reporting illegal activity
and (2) the curtailment of profit gained through fraud against the public, discovery abuse, and
fabrication and concealment of evidence. She asserts no Section 171.088 or 171.091 grounds to
support such vacatur but cites Black v. Shor, 443 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013,
pet. denied) for the proposition that “an arbitration award cannot be set aside on public policy
grounds except in an ‘extraordinary case’ in which the award ‘clearly violates carefully
articulated, fundamental policy.’” Black, 443 S.W.3d at 167 (citing Delgado, 95 S.W.3d at 239).
The court in neither Black nor Delgado resolved the issue of whether the TAA permits vacatur
on the common-law ground of public policy, but more recent caselaw resolves the issue against
permission of common-law vacatur grounds.
       In Delgado, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged case law wherein courts vacated
awards on public policy grounds, observed that the parties in neither of those cases nor the one at

                                                17
bar raised the issue of whether such grounds were preempted by statutes governing arbitration,
and assumed without deciding that the grounds were not preempted. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d at
237-38. In Black, the court acknowledged that public policy is not listed as a vacatur ground
under the TAA but, for purposes of its opinion, assumed without deciding that it was a valid
vacatur ground. Black, 443 S.W.3d at 167. But the supreme court has since decided that in
proceedings governed by the TAA, Section 171.088 provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur
of an arbitration award. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d at 497. Consequently, Morrison’s assertions that
the award violates public policy are not valid bases for vacatur. See id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 171.087, 171.088, 171.091. We accordingly overrule Morrison’s third issue.

                                                   DISPOSITION
         Having overruled Appellant’s first, second, and third issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

                                                                         JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                            Chief Justice

Opinion delivered November 8, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Neeley, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.

                                                         18
                                  COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                        NOVEMBER 8, 2023

                                         NO. 12-22-00124-CV

           THE MORRISON LAW FIRM AND SHELLI MORRISON,
                               Appellants
                                  V.
  ETX SUCCESSOR TYLER, F/K/A EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER TYLER, ETX
    SUCCESSOR SYSTEM, F/K/A EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER REGIONAL
                        HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
                               Appellees

                                Appeal from the 114th District Court
                          of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 18-2870-B)

                      THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record, oral argument,
and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there
was no error in the judgment.
                      It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged
against the appellants, THE MORRISON LAW FIRM AND SHELLI MORRISON for which
execution may issue, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.

                   James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
                   Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Neeley, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals,
                   sitting by assignment.