Court Opinion

ID: 9778652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:15:02.361884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.377113
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT
STORCKMAN, Judge.
I agree that the facts of this case call for the application of subsection 1 of § 287.150 rather than subsection 3. It is quite evident that the liability of the third party was established primarily by the efforts of the employer. Counsel retained by the employer conducted the investigation to determine whether the negligence of the third person caused the death of the employee. Employer’s counsel developed the theory of liability and rather ingeniously secured demonstrative evidence on the issue of liability which evidence apparently was quite effective. The contribution made by the dependent widow related primarily to the amount of the recovery. She joined as a party-plaintiff in the action at the request of the employer and testified concerning her husband’s health and her loss by reason of his death. While the sum of $301.67 which remains- for her from the recovery hardly seems suitable recompense for the dependent’s contribution to the endeavor, the court is not free to determine the equities of the situation but is limited to the application of the methods of distribution prescribed by § 287.150.
I cannot agree, however, with the inference of the opinion that subsection 3 is likely to permit a “double recovery” and produce unjust and unreasonable results. These statements appear unnecessary to the decision in this case and may tend to discourage the application of subsection 3 in a proper situation.
“Someone may argue that the employee has no right to this excess [of the recovery against a third person in a negligence action], having had the benefit of the compensation system; but the answer is that, as between the employee and the stranger, there has been no such give and take, no such compromises struck, as between the employee and His own employer. The employer has made substantial concessions as the price of his limited liability; the employee has given up his right against his own employer to bring damage suits. But the stranger has given up nothing, and hence has a right to claim nothing resembling the immunities that exist between employer and employee. As for the employee, he gets no windfall; what he gets is nothing more than actual restoration to himself of what he has lost because of the third person’s wrongful act.” Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 2, § 71.20, p. 167. The purpose of the subro-gation provisions of compensation laws is to achieve an equitable distribution of the proceeds of a recovery from a negligent third person. 101 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 1042, p. 622. State statutes provide a variety of procedures and formulas as “a greater incentive” and “a financial motivation” to stimulate employers and employees alike to prosecute vigorously actions to recover damages from negligent third persons. Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 2, § 74.31, p. 209. What might on the surface appear to be a “double recovery” may be intended by the legislature as a quid pro quo for more effective cooperation.
The lack of uniformity in such statutes may indicate there is no best plan for achieving an equitable result in all or a ma*119jority of situations. Since the rigid formulas for distribution under Missouri statutes afford the courts little opportunity to achieve a fair result, the provision in subsection 3 of § 287.150 that “the balance of the recovery may be divided between the employer and the employee or his dependents as they may agree” is highly recommended. It is doubtlessly being widely used at the present time else more of these controversies would reach the courts. Nevertheless, I join in the suggestion of the principal opinion that a re-examination of these statutes might be fruitful. Perhaps agreements for distribution of the proceeds of common-law actions could he reviewed as to their fairness by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission along the lines now provided by § 287.450 regarding compensation payable under the act.
Having the viewpoint expressed, I respectfully present this opinion concurring in result.