Court Opinion

ID: 9455521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:25:07.995638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:37.973024
License: Public Domain

IRVING R. KAUFMAN,
Circuit Judge (dissenting):
While I do not quarrel with the conclusions of the majority — that Rondi-none was represented by competent counsel at his 1947 trial, that he was told he could appeal the conviction which followed that trial, and that he made no attempt to appeal — these conclusions do not dispose of Rondinone’s troublesome claim, that since he was denied an appeal in 1947 because of his indigence he is entitled to take that appeal now.
Rondinone claims that he could not afford to retain an attorney for an appeal when his trial ended and that he had no knowledge of any right to appeal with the assistance of counsel appointed by the state at no expense to himself. Everyone agrees, moreover, that the able trial judge did not advise Rondinone of the existence of any such right. All of these events, of course, antedated Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), where the Supreme Court instructed that indigents must be provided with counsel on appeal so that they may enjoy the same rights to appeal — and on the same terms — as non-indigents. This decision would not have presented a stumbling block to the result reached by the majority were it not for the further declaration in Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584, 84 S.Ct. 1929, 12 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1954), that Douglas is retroactive. Thus, as appealing as it might be to follow the habits of the ostrich, we must come face to face with the glaring realization that, although we may believe Rondinone had his full day in the courts, and we have a psychological repugnance towards seeing old criminal cases in a continuous state of litigation, Douglas, the Supreme Court has informed us, is applicable to Rondinone’s case.
Moreover, Rondinone’s case comes before us so soon after our exegesis of Douglas in United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1969) where the petitioner was convicted in 1959 following a trial at which he was *1310represented by retained counsel. Smith argued that his failure to appeal this conviction stemmed from his indigency at the conclusion of his trial and his failure to appreciate that he had a right to appeal with counsel provided at the expense of the state. “The only practical, logical and fair interpretation to be given to Douglas v. California,” we said, “is that it imposes upon the state a duty to warn every person convicted of crime of his right to appeal and his right to prosecute his appeal without expense to him by counsel appointed by the state if he is indigent.” We continued, “The right to appeal at the expense of the state is mere illusion if the convicted indigent defendant does not know such a right exists. And the one way to make sure that he does know is to tell him so.” Id. at 654.
We concluded, therefore, that since the state trial court had not informed Smith of his right to appeal with counsel provided by the state, he should be allowed an appeal out of time if, after a hearing to be held in the district court, it appeared that he had not learned of this right by other means. In view of this recent pronouncement by our court en banc in Smith, I cannot comprehend our different treatment of Rondinone’s case, unless it is based on our common dislike of raking over the bones of cases which should have gone to a decent burial long ago. Much as I share this dislike, I would honor our decision in Smith and remand for a hearing to determine whether Rondinone was indigent at the conclusion of his trial and whether he knew of his right to appeal with counsel provided by the state. If he can establish both his indigence and his ignorance of his rights at that time, I would grant him the appeal he could not afford in 1947.
My brothers have reached a conclusion which appears to have skirted Douglas, Smith v. Crouse, and the recent Smith —but to ignore them will not make them disappear. This is not to say that I favor releasing Rondinone. To this I am opposed. I cannot escape the feeling that the motivation for their conclusion was our common concern that to grant Rondinone an appeal at this time would, because of the peculiar circumstances present, result in the release from custody of a convicted criminal and three-time parole violator, without his ever having shown any error on the part of the court which convicted him. This interesting theory has been espoused because the court reporter at Rondinone’s trial is dead, and the notes he took, illegible. Accordingly, a trial transcript is unavailable. Since many of the witnesses at the 1947 trial have very likely died or disappeared, and the memories of those who remain have undoubtedly faded, it is reasonable to regard a new trial as impractical. If the majority is correct in its assumptions that neither an appeal nor a new trial is possible, it is argued, granting Rondinone an appeal will undeniably ensure his release. I differ with my brothers, however, not only as to the disposition of this appeal but also as to the consequences of the disposition I advocate. In my view, all Rondinone is entitled to at this time is an appeal with the assistance of counsel. He cannot have his cake and eat it too by first demanding an appeal, then complaining that the absence of a transcript of a 1947 trial must inevitably lead to a determination that any appeal would be ineffective. My reason for adhering to this view is grounded on the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision that an indigent must be provided with a transcript for his appeal at the expense of the state was based on the equal protection clause — that a poor man be treated no worse than a rich man in a criminal proceeding. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). If Rondinone appeals from this conviction at this time, he will be denied a transcript not by reason of his indigency but by death and the passage of time, factors which recognize no distinction between rich and poor. Although the Supreme Court has noted the problem which arises when a transcript becomes unavailable through no fault of the *1311state, it has not yet found it necessary to resolve this dilemma. See Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 422-423, 83 S.Ct. 1366, 10 L.Ed.2d 456 (1963); id. at 424, 425, 83 S.Ct. 1366 (Harlan J., concurring in the result). Moreover, in this instance, Rondinone would not seem likely to be seriously prejudiced by being required to prosecute his appeal without a transcript. Throughout the series of proceedings he has instituted in the state and federal courts over the past quarter century, he has urged only a single contention — that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his pre-trial motion for a severance. The merits of this claim turn on the law of Connecticut, not on what may be buried in the undecipherable transcript of Rondinone’s trial.