Court Opinion

ID: 9840196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:12:00.250821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:50.121773
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 15, 2023
                                                                                 EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                   OF WEST VIRGINIA
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

James M. Pierson,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-0501 (Kanawha County 21-C-651)

Rodney Lee Miles, Christie L. Lucas,
Danny M. Lucas, Individually and d/b/a
Rock Quarry Stables and Horse Rehab, and
Rock Quarry Stables, LLC,
Defendants Below, Respondents

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner James M. Pierson appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County,
entered on June 3, 2022, finding no basis for punitive damages, concluding that the amount in
controversy did not meet the jurisdictional threshold, and dismissing the matter without prejudice.
Respondents Rodney Lee Miles (“Mr. Miles”) and Respondent Christie L. Lucas (“Ms. Lucas”)
respond summarily in support of the order. 1 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision reversing and remanding the circuit court’s order is
appropriate, in accordance with the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the West
Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

        In his complaint, petitioner alleges that he purchased a hay elevator (a motorized piece of
equipment to lift hay bales) for approximately $3,500 in August 2006. He contends that he
ultimately did not use the hay elevator and instead stored it in his barn. Around July 2016,
petitioner agreed to lend his hay elevator to one of the respondents, 2 with the caveat it would be
returned to him at his request. In October 2020, petitioner requested that the hay elevator be
returned. Mr. Miles provided petitioner with Ms. Lucas’s telephone number. Petitioner alleges that
he contacted Ms. Lucas and Ms. Lucas acknowledged she was aware petitioner owned the
equipment. He further alleges that Ms. Lucas asked if he would sell her the hay elevator and he
declined. Danny M. Lucas (“Mr. Lucas”) returned the hay elevator that month. The Lucases then
borrowed the hay elevator again in November 2020, with permission. There is a dispute as to

       1
         Petitioner is an attorney and appears pro se. Respondent Rodney Lee Miles appears by
counsel L. Richard Dorsey, II. Respondent Christie L. Lucas appears by counsel Thomas H.
Peyton. Danny M. Lucas did not appear before this Court but was represented by counsel below.
       2
           There is a dispute as to whom petitioner agreed to lend the hay elevator.
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whether the hay elevator was later returned to petitioner or remains on Ms. Lucas’s property.

         Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents with three counts: conversion, civil
conspiracy, and punitive damages, on or about August 4, 2021. In his complaint, petitioner sought
compensatory damages in the amount of $6,344.10 ($3,844.10 in replacement costs and $2,500 in
damages for loss of use of his property based on the future purchase of hay bales) and punitive
damages in the range of four times compensatory damages or $25,376.40 to $500,000, whichever
is greater, plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. Respondents filed verified pleadings in
response. 3 The parties engaged in discovery, at times in a contentious manner. Petitioner, Mr.
Miles, and Ms. Lucas submitted pretrial memoranda to the circuit court. All parties attended a
pretrial hearing on June 1, 2022, where the circuit court sua sponte struck petitioner’s claim for
punitive damages and indicated it questioned his other damage claims. It noted that conversion
damages are limited to the fair market value of what was converted and that, as far as a loss of use
claim was concerned, there was a duty of petitioner to mitigate those damages. Subsequently, the
circuit court entered its order dismissing petitioner’s complaint without prejudice. The circuit court
concluded that petitioner’s claim for consequential damages was improper in this conversion
action and speculative. It also found no basis for punitive damages. After striking those claims for
damages, the circuit court concluded that the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy of
$7,500 set out in West Virginia Code § 51-2-2 was not satisfied and, accordingly, it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. It then dismissed the case without prejudice.

        Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s June 3, 2022, order dismissing his action based
on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We review dismissals for lack of jurisdiction de novo. See
Elmore v. Triad Hospitals, Inc., 220 W. Va. 154, 157-58, 640 S.E.2d 217, 220-21 (2006) (citing
Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac–Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d
516 (1995) and discussing review of motions to dismiss arising under West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)).

        On appeal, petitioner asserts that the decision of the circuit court was erroneous because
the circuit court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issues related to damages prior to
entry of the order and that he should have the opportunity to continue his action against
respondents. Although we do not reach the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing was required
in this case, we do agree that the circuit court was premature in dismissing petitioner’s claims
without providing him with an adequate opportunity to present probative facts related to his
claimed damages. We have held that “[w]henever it is determined that a court has no jurisdiction
to entertain the subject matter of a civil action, the forum court must take no further action in the
case other than to dismiss it from the docket.” Syl. Pt. 1, Lowe v. Richards, 234 W.Va. 48, 49, 763
S.E.2d 64, 65 (2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, “West Virginia remains
a notice-pleading state.” Goldstein v. Peacemaker Properties, LLC, 241 W. Va. 720, 730, 828
S.E.2d 276, 286 (2019). In this case, to reach the subject matter jurisdiction issue, the circuit court

       3
          Mr. and Ms. Lucas were in the midst of a divorce action during the proceedings below.
Although a verified answer signed by Respondent Danny M. Lucas was filed, he later filed an
affidavit, among other filings, contending that he was misled by Ms. Lucas as to what he was
verifying. Mr. Lucas’s affidavit also included facts, stated to be upon information and belief, that
tend to support petitioner’s allegation that his hay elevator remains on Ms. Lucas’s property.
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sua sponte struck punitive damages claimed by petitioner in his complaint. Those claims for
damages, specifically punitive damages, if awarded, could satisfy the jurisdictional minimum
amount in controversy set out in West Virginia Code § 51-2-2. In considering motions to dismiss
on an issue such as punitive damages, complaint allegations must be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, with all material allegations taken as true. See Collia v. McJunkin, 178
W.Va. 158, 160, 358 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1987) (“Motions to dismiss are generally viewed with
disfavor because the complaint is to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and its
allegations are to be taken as true.”) (internal citation omitted). Under this standard, the complaint
contained sufficient allegations related to punitive damages to proceed and, therefore, by striking
the claim for punitive damages sua sponte at the pretrial conference, the circuit court essentially
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the respondents.

        “‘Ordinarily, in the absence of a written motion for summary judgment by one of the
parties, the court is not authorized sua sponte to grant a summary judgment.’ Syllabus Point 2,
Gavitt v. Swiger, 162 W.Va. 238, 248 S.E.2d 849 (1978).” Syl. Pt. 2, Hanlon v. Boone Cty. Cmty.
Org., Inc., 182 W. Va. 190, 386 S.E.2d 847 (1989). We have recognized an exception to this
general rule

       [w]here a court acts with great caution, assuring itself that the parties to be bound
       by its judgment have had an adequate opportunity to develop all of the probative
       facts which relate to their respective claims, the court may grant summary judgment
       under Rule 56, W.Va. R.C.P., sua sponte.

Id. at 193, 386 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Southern Erectors, Inc. v. Olga Coal Co., 159 W.
Va. 385, 223 S.E.2d 46 (1976)). “Both the general rule and its limited exception, indicate that
judgments must be based on the merits after the parties have an opportunity to prove their
allegations and to respond.” Id. In this case, as in Hanlon, the limited exception does not apply.
Based on our review of the record, petitioner did not have an adequate opportunity to prove his
allegations and respond to the sua sponte striking of the damage claims at the pretrial proceeding
as there was no pending written motion and no notice that the damages issue would be heard and
decided at that time. 4 Therefore, we find that the circuit court’s ruling was premature.

        For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the circuit court’s June 3, 2022, order
for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum decision.

                                                                           Reversed and Remanded.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

4
  Although we find that petitioner must have an adequate opportunity to develop probative facts,
prove his allegations and respond, we do not require a specific type of opportunity to do so. The
required opportunity can be provided by the circuit court in a number of ways.
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CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

DISSENTING:

Justice Tim Armstead

Armstead, Justice, dissenting:

       I dissent to the majority’s resolution of this case. I would have set this case for oral
argument to thoroughly address the error alleged in this appeal. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs
and the issues raised therein, I believe a formal opinion of this Court was warranted, not a
memorandum decision. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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