Court Opinion

ID: 9749074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:23:16.295229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:43.698269
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion upon this sparse record that “it is clear that appellee [Mr. Hickey] actually assumed the role of a collection agent for his company.”
There is no record support for the majority’s jump to its conclusion that “appellee, suing in his own name, was collecting for his corporation.”1 Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that there was “an unlawful practice in this case because ap-pellee, though purporting to be appearing for himself, was in reality representing the interests of the corporate party to the subject contract.”
I note that the trial court expressly states in its Statement of Proceedings and Evidence, which is binding on us:
At no time during the January 8, 1980 proceeding was plaintiff’s [Mr. Hickey] status or any Rule 9(b) issue raised. The court presumed that Mr. Hickey was proceeding in his own behalf ... nor was the Court aware at the time of trial that such an issue [unauthorized practice of law] even “lurked in the record.” [Record at 23a; emphasis added.]
Surely, this court does not do justice to either the parties or the trial court to decide *1114this appeal upon an issue requiring factual findings that was never raised during the trial and never considered by the trial court.
Since there is an issue now whether ap-pellee is the real party in interest in this suit, see Heiskell v. Mozie, 65 App.D.C. 225, 227, 82 F.2d 861, 863 (1936), the proper disposition of this appeal is to remand the case to the trial court to reopen the proceeding in order to determine that issue.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. The majority appears to presume in its opinion that because there was testimony, according to the Statement of Proceedings and Evidence, that Mr. Hickey “runs” the Bethesda Refrigeration Service, Inc., he is the alter ego of that corporation and hence his purchase from the company of the note of appellant’s indebtedness was a sham.
On the other hand, Mr. Hickey refers in his pro se filing in this Court to his “superiors” at the company, thereby tending to negate the presumption that he is in control of the corporation. What this points up is the need, at the very least, for a further hearing before the trial court to determine the facts underlying the legal issue appellant has raised on appeal for the first time.