Court Opinion

ID: 9410487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 16:00:59.038111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.168611
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 29, 2022             Decided July 21, 2023

                       No. 21-3074

               UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                       APPELLEE

                             v.

         LOUIS A. WILSON, ALSO KNOWN AS SPUDS,
                      APPELLANT

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                   (No. 1:96-cr-00319-1)

    Anthony F. Shelley argued the cause and filed the
memorandum of law and fact and reply for appellant.
Alexandra E. Beaulieu entered an appearance.

    David P. Saybolt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on appellee=s memorandum of
law and fact were Chrisellen R. Kolb and John P. Mannarino,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
                                2
    Before: CHILDS, Circuit Judge, and ROGERS, Senior
Circuit Judge.†

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS.

    CHILDS, Circuit Judge: Louis Wilson appeals the denial
of his motion for compassionate release made pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 602(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). He argues that intervening
changes in law, in combination with other factors, warrant that
his motion be granted.

     Wilson waited the required time of thirty days after the
warden received his initial request for compassionate release,
but chose not to bring it on his behalf, to file his own motion in
district court. That motion included additional grounds for his
release, like his increased weight and a change in sentencing
law, not found in his request to the warden. See Req. for
Compassionate Release 1–2.

    The government maintains that Wilson failed to properly
exhaust his administrative remedies as to these additional
grounds such that the court may not consider Wilson’s
contentions on the merits. This Court, however, assumes
without deciding that Wilson properly exhausted his
administrative remedies and nonetheless affirms the district
court’s denial of Wilson’s motion.

    We hold that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional
because Congress did not use express language making it so.

†
 Senior Circuit Judge Silberman was a member of the panel before
his death on October 2, 2022. Judges Childs and Rogers have acted
as a quorum in this opinion. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
                               3
And per United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1192, 1198
(D.C. Cir. 2022), Wilson’s change in law arguments cannot
constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, whether alone
or in combination with other factors.

                               I.

                              A.

     A court can grant a defendant compassionate release from
prison if they meet certain criteria. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
They must demonstrate, in the court’s judgment, an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release.             Id.
(c)(1)(A)(i). And that reason must be consistent with the
various factors Congress instructs courts to consider when
sentencing defendants. Id. (c)(1)(A)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

     But before defendants may file a motion for
compassionate release, they must first exhaust their
administrative remedies. Two pathways are available for them
to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Either is sufficient. Id.
First, defendants can “fully exhaust[] all administrative rights
[by] appeal[ling] a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf.” Id. Alternatively, they may
file a motion for compassionate release “30 days from the
receipt of such a request [to] the warden.” Id.

                                    B.

     In 1997, Wilson was convicted of several federal crimes,
including killing a federal witness with the intent to prevent
him from testifying. Wilson is serving a sentence of life
imprisonment plus one consecutive five-year term.
                              4
     On September 18, 2020, Wilson first submitted his request
for compassionate release to the warden at Federal Correction
Institution (FCI) Petersburg. The warden denied the request on
October 6, 2020. On April 7, 2021, 201 days after submitting
his request, Wilson filed a pro se motion for compassionate
release in the district court. In that motion, Wilson added
factors not included in his request to the warden, such as his
increased “weight” and “length of time served.” See Req. for
Compassionate Release 1–2. The government argued that
Wilson did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies as
to those additional grounds under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) but
nonetheless addressed them. United States v. Wilson, No. CR
96-319-01, 2021 WL 107 5292457, at *3 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 6,
2021), recons. denied, 2021 WL 5292460 (D.D.C. Sept. 28,
2021). The district court considered the merits of these
additional grounds and did not deny the motion for failure to
issue exhaust. Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at *4–6.

     Wilson maintains that the following extraordinary and
compelling reasons support his release: (i) if United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), were issued prior to his sentence, he would
have received twenty-five years instead of life imprisonment
because the district court considered additional facts during
sentencing not proven to a jury; (ii) the national sentencing
statistics for murder have trended downward; and (iii) his
medical conditions plus his exemplary prison citizenship.

     Wilson argued to the district court that the purported
intervening changes in law went to his length of time served
and should constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons.
The district court concluded, however, that time served in
prison “does not in [and] of itself constitute an extraordinary
and compelling circumstance.” Wilson, 2021 WL 5292457, at
*3; see also id. at *4–6. After considering the Section 3553(a)
                                5
factors, the district court also decided that “the severity of his
crime, the need for the sentence imposed, and the risk to the
public outweigh[ed] th[e] factors that weigh[ed] in Mr.
Wilson’s favor.” Id. at *6. Thus, the district court denied
Wilson’s motion.

     Wilson timely appealed. On appeal, Wilson also contends
that if the district court failed to consider his change in law
arguments as extraordinary and compelling reasons under
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), they should have been considered
under the district court’s Section 3553(a) analysis. Appellant’s
Mem. Br. 17–18.

                               II.

     We have jurisdiction to review this appeal. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291; United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 352 (D.C. Cir.
2021). This Court reviews the district court’s denial of
Wilson’s motion for compassionate release for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Jackson, 26 F.4th 994, 1001 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Smith, 896 F.3d 466, 470
(D.C. Cir. 2018).

                               III.

                               A.

     Because this Court cannot assume it has jurisdiction, we
first answer whether Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
Joining our sister circuits that have considered the question, we
think not and thus address the merits of Wilson’s contention
without deciding whether issue exhaustion is required under
Section 3582(c)(1)(A).
                              6
    Begin with the text. Section 3582 (c)(1)(A) provides:

    (1) [I]n any case—

    (A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
        Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the
        defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights
        to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
        motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30
        days from the receipt of such a request by the warden
        of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may
        reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a
        term of probation or supervised release with or without
        conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion
        of the original term of imprisonment), after
        considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
        the extent that they are applicable[.]

    18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

     Jurisdictional rules “govern a court’s adjudicatory
authority,” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012)
(quotations and citation omitted), while nonjurisdictional
claim-processing rules simply “promote the orderly progress of
litigation . . . . ” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435
(2011). Congress must “clearly state[]” when a provision is
jurisdictional. Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850
(2019) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the
question of whether a statutory provision is jurisdictional is
governed by a “clear statement” rule where the statute must
“expressly refer to subject-matter jurisdiction or speak in
jurisdictional terms.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S.
237, 246 (2016). That high standard makes sense because
“[j]urisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited,
must be raised by courts sua sponte, and . . . do not allow for
                                7
equitable exceptions.” Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 1497 (2022).

      Absent Congress’s clear command, mandatory language
does not transform a statutory provision into a jurisdictional
requirement. Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 246; United States v.
Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015). For example, in Wilkins v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 870, 875 (2023), the Court considered
whether Section 2409a(g), a provision of the Quiet Title Act,
was jurisdictional. The provision at issue stated that action
“shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of
the date upon which it accrued.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Yet,
the Court held that it was nonjurisdictional not only because
the “text sp[oke] only to a claim’s timeliness,” but also because
the provision was placed outside of the jurisdictional grant
section of the statute. Wilkins, 143 S. Ct. at 877 (citation
omitted). In Boechler, a provision of the Tax Code stated that,
“The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this
section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination
(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such
matter).” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1). Because “to such matter[,]”
id., lacked a clear antecedent and contained “multiple plausible
interpretations,” the Court still held that the provision was
nonjurisdictional. Boechler, P.C., 142 S. Ct. at 1498. And this
Court “presume[s] [that an administrative] exhaustion
[requirement] is non-jurisdictional unless Congress states in
clear, unequivocal terms that the judiciary is barred from
hearing an action until the administrative agency has come to a
decision . . . .” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243,
1248 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quotations and citation omitted).

    Here, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rule. Congress did not speak clearly that this
provision is jurisdictional, Fort Bend, 139 S. Ct. at 1850, nor
does it appear in the jurisdictional portion of the criminal code.
                              8
See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Nothing in Section 3582(c)(1)(A) uses
any mandatory language that would deprive this Court of
jurisdiction should the defendant fail to satisfy either
exhaustion pathway. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Therefore,
the plain text of Section 3582(c)(1)(A) does not permit this
Court to infer that Congress intended it to be jurisdictional.

     Every circuit to have considered this question agrees.
United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52–53
(1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 121–24
(2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126,
129–30 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465,
467–68 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 920 (2020);
United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1030–31
(10th Cir. 2021).

    Since we conclude that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, we need not reach
whether it requires defendants to exhaust each issue in their
submitted requests before the warden before filing in district
court. See Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 53. Instead, this Court
assumes without deciding that Wilson properly exhausted as to
each of his grounds for compassionate release.

                              B.

     We next answer whether Wilson’s change in law
arguments can be extraordinary and compelling reasons
warranting compassionate release. They cannot. Accordingly,
this Court need not reach Wilson’s contention that his change
in law arguments should still be considered as Section 3553(a)
                               9
factors because, under Jenkins, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Wilson’s motion for lack of an
extraordinary and compelling reason. 50 F.4th at 1198.

    Nevertheless, we recognize that since this Court decided
Jenkins, the United States Sentencing Commission amended its
guidelines regarding what constitutes an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release. 88 Fed. Reg. 28,254 (May 3,
2023). That update will become effective on November 1,
2023. Id. at 28,254/1. The guidelines state that district courts
“may . . . consider[]” a “change in the law” to “determine[]
whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and
compelling reason” for release if he has “served at least 10
years” of “an unusually long sentence.” Id. at 28,255/2.
However, this Court does not decide whether Wilson’s
contentions would constitute extraordinary and compelling
reasons under the not-yet-effective guidelines.

     Wilson largely relays the same argument as this Court
rejected in Jenkins: if Booker, 543 U.S. at 224, and Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 483–84, were issued before his conviction, he
would have received a twenty-five-year sentence, instead of a
life sentence. He then supplements that position with
additional claims about general downward nationwide trends
for murder sentences, his overall medical conditions, and his
exemplary prison citizenship.        But intervening judicial
decisions, regardless of whether they are combined with other
factors, are barred as extraordinary and compelling bases for
release. Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1192, 1198. Consequently, we do
                         10
not reach whether Wilson’s arguments were properly
considered under Section 3553(a).

                          ***
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of
Wilson’s motion for compassionate release.

                                           So ordered.