Court Opinion

ID: 9640887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:17:39.990039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.504698
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). I concur in the majority opinion holding that the main defense — that Hurd’s' offer called for a cash payment, by July 18 — is un*420tenable. This' should result in affirming the decision below. It is of significance that Hurd’s repudiation was based solely on Dickey’s.failure to make cash payment within this time limit. This alone would ground a decision for the plaintiff by estoppel. Compare Robb v. Crawford, 56 App. D. C. 394, 16 F. (2d) 339, 441 and cases. But the decision of this court reversing is, in my opinion, grounded on disregard of two pretty important principles of law. I agree fully with the two learned District Judges, who, on careful consideration, held the language of Dickey’s telegram following his flat acceptance, “I will buy the property at your price and terms,” to involve nothing but an unnecessary statement of the legal implications — that the seller must give him merchantable title, and the acreage shown by deeds should be verified by survey.
An offer to sell land by the acre is generally — always unless the language of the offer plainly excludes that construction — subject to verification. Hurd’s offer falls under the general rule. He simply said, “My deeds call for 1,266 acres.” This fairly implied that he also expected verification by survey. Dickey in good faith caused a survey and found 1,-300.14 acres; the decree below requires him to pay for that acreage at $15 per acre. The authorities conclude this point'in favor of the plaintiff. Compare 39 Cyc. 1315, note 20, and cases cited; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2d Ed.) p. 620, note 6; McComb v. Gilkeson, 110 Va. 406, 66 S. E. 77, 135 Am. St. Rep. 944.
The fact that Dickey’s attorneys failed accurately to embody the contract, made by Hurd’s letter and Dickey’s telegram, in the unnecessary formal contract, is entirely immaterial. The binding contract was made by the letter and telegram. Neither party could withdraw from, or add any new condition to, the contract thus made. Dickey’s language as to title, fairly interpreted, involved nothing but the legal implication that Hurd should give a merchantable title. His statement as to remitting $500 attached no new condition; it simply showed good faith. Specific performance could have been enforced against Dickey.
But I think the District Court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to join the devisees under Hurd’s will, who took and held the legal title to the land. Morgan’s Heirs v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290, 298, 4 L. Ed. 242; 36 Cyc. 766; notes 93, 94, 95; 25 Ruling Case Law, p. 326, § 143.
The eross-appeal should be sustained; otherwise the decree below affirmed.