Court Opinion

ID: 9868155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:00:45.523646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:18.571030
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-20527        Document: 00516908259             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/26/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                     ____________                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                      No. 20-20527                            September 26, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________                                          Clerk

   Amanda Culbertson,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Harris County,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:12-CV-3644
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Southwick and Wilson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Amanda Culbertson appeals the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment in favor of Harris County finding that Culbertson lacks standing to
   pursue her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation claim against the County. We affirm.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 20-20527     Document: 00516908259           Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/26/2023

                                    No. 20-20527

                                          I
          In 2008, the Houston Police Department began using instrument vans
   in its breath-alcohol testing program. In 2009, Culbertson worked for the
   City of Houston as a technical supervisor responsible for maintaining testing
   instruments inside the vans and testifying about the tests at trial. While
   working for the City, Culbertson notified supervisors that she was concerned
   several issues with the instrument vans impacted the reliability of the tests.
   She contends these issues were never resolved.
          In 2010, Lone Star College contracted with Harris County to provide
   oversight of the County’s breath-alcohol testing program. The contract was
   for one year beginning October 1, 2010, and ending September 20, 2011.
   During the contract period, in May 2011, Culbertson resigned from the City
   and began working for Lone Star in a substantially similar role. After
   beginning work with Lone Star, in May 2011, the Harris County District
   Attorney’s (DA) Office subpoenaed Culbertson to testify about a test
   administered while she was working for the City. Culbertson told the DA’s
   Office she would testify that the testing instrument was working on the day
   the defendant took the test. Instead, Culbertson testified she could not verify
   the instrument was working, and the defendant was subsequently acquitted.
   Two months later, in July 2011, Culbertson was subpoenaed by a defendant
   to testify in a suppression hearing concerning evidence collected from an
   instrument van. Culbertson testified she left her employment with the City
   because she was not being permitted to maintain the reliability of the testing
   instruments.
          Later that month, Lone Star asked the County to renew its contract.
   The following month, in August 2011, Culbertson and the DA’s Office met
   to discuss concerns with her testimony. Both the DA’s Office and Texas
   Department of Public Safety (DPS) investigated Culbertson’s concerns

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Case: 20-20527          Document: 00516908259              Page: 3       Date Filed: 09/26/2023

                                           No. 20-20527

   about the instrument vans and concluded they were unfounded.                         On
   September 1, 2011, the DA’s Office met with DPS and others. The DA’s
   Office recommended the County contract with DPS instead of Lone Star. On
   September 13, 2011, the Commissioner’s Court discussed contracting with
   DPS at its meeting.           On October 4, 2011, the Commissioner’s Court
   approved the DPS contract, allowing the contract with Lone Star to lapse.
   Having lost its contract with the County, Lone Star laid off Culbertson.
          Culbertson sued Harris County, the DA, and an assistant DA, arguing
   she was fired in retaliation for her public criticism of the instrument vans.
   The district court dismissed her claims. Culbertson then settled with the DA
   and, on appeal, this court affirmed dismissal of Culbertson’s claims, except
   her claims against the assistant DA for tortious interference with a contract1
   and against Harris County for ratification of the DA’s retaliatory campaign.
   Culbertson then dismissed her claim against the assistant DA, leaving Harris
   County as the only defendant. After limited discovery, Harris County moved
   for summary judgment.                The district court held that Culbertson’s
   termination of employment by Lone Star “derive[s] from the County
   choosing a different servicer for its contract – an indirect injury” for which
   Culbertson has no standing to sue the County. Culbertson appeals, arguing
   that her “standing was already established in the previous appeal” as a
   “necessary implication” of this court’s reversal and remand.
                                                 II
          We agree with the district court that Culbertson lacks standing to
   pursue her claim against Harris County.

          _____________________
          1
              Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 623, 633 (5th Cir. 2015).

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Case: 20-20527          Document: 00516908259             Page: 4      Date Filed: 09/26/2023

                                           No. 20-20527

           First, Culbertson argues that we are foreclosed from assessing
   whether she has standing because, she contends, the prior panel already
   decided the issue by way of implication. Culbertson is incorrect. Standing is
   a jurisdictional requirement,2 and, broad applications of the law of the case
   doctrine are inappropriate.3 For that reason, we have held that a later panel
   cannot “defer to the prior panel’s exercise of jurisdiction as correct where
   the issue was neither raised by the parties nor addressed by the court.”4
   Culbertson’s standing was neither previously raised by the parties nor
   addressed by the prior panel. Her argument that we cannot assess standing
   because the prior panel implicitly decided the matter falls short.
           Second, because Culbertson’s injury is indirect and derivative of Lone
   Star’s injury, Culbertson lacks standing to pursue her claim against the
   County. Culbertson lost her job because the Commissioner’s Court voted to
   contract with DPS and let its contract with her employer, Lone Star, lapse.
   We have previously stated in the context of § 1983 retaliation claims that
   “the standing inquiry turns on the plaintiff’s injury, not the defendant’s
   motive” and “animus toward the agent [which] sparked mistreatment of the
   principal does not create an exception to the rule that an agent’s [§] 1983
   claim can flourish only if he alleges that he personally suffered a direct,
   nonderivative injury.”5 In two unpublished cases, Duran v. City of Corpus

           _____________________
           2
             Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., 565 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v.
   City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).
           3
            See Propes v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 18B Charles
   Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.5, at 790 (2d
   ed. 2002)).
           4
               USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 284 (5th Cir. 2011).
           5
            Duran v. City of Corpus Christi, 240 F. App’x 639, 642-43 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2006)).

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Case: 20-20527          Document: 00516908259               Page: 5        Date Filed: 09/26/2023

                                             No. 20-20527

   Christi6 and Garzes v. Lopez,7 we held that the plaintiff’s injury resulting from
   nonrenewal of a contract between the defendant and the plaintiff’s third-
   party employer, was too indirect and derivative an injury to confer standing
   on the plaintiff.8 Here, Culbertson’s injury is derived entirely from the
   County’s nonrenewal of its contract with Lone Star. She does not have
   standing to pursue her claim against the County.
                                         *        *         *
           We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

           _____________________
           6
               240 F. App’x 639 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           7
               281 F. App’x 323 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           8
              See Duran, 240 F. App’x at 643 (“[The plaintiff] was not an employee of, or in
   contractual privity with, the allegedly retaliatory government actor, here the [defendant].
   As such, [plaintiff’s] injury (potential loss of his share of the future administrative fees that
   would have been paid to [the third-party employer] by the [defendant] if it had awarded the
   new [c]ontract) was only a by-product of [the third-party employer’s] failure to receive the
   contract renewal itself. Here . . . only the [the third-party employer] . . . has standing to
   seek redress. [The plaintiff] does not have direct standing to bring a First Amendment
   retaliation claim against the [defendant] based on its award of renewal to [another] and not
   to [the third-party employer].” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Garzes, 281 F. App’x
   at 326 (“We agree with [d]efendants that any injury suffered by [the plaintiff] is
   insufficiently direct to confer standing. . . . Here, as in Duran, only the [the third-party
   employer] . . . has standing to seek redress, . . . and [the plaintiff] does not have standing to
   bring a First Amendment retaliation . . . claim against the [defendant] based on its
   termination of the [third-party employer’s] contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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