Court Opinion

ID: 9712343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:51:59.009305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.248700
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting, with whom Abrams and Lynch, JL, join). The court, in response to two questions reported, concludes that discovery in the context of civil litigation may not be had of certain information acquired by a licensed social worker, provided that information falls within the scope of G.L. c. 112, § 135.1 Thus, the court responds in the affirmative to reported questions (1) (a) and (1) (b). As to question (1) (c), pertaining to information obtained by visual observation, the court responds in the negative. I dissent as to the result the court reaches with regard to questions (1) (a) and (1) (b). I take no position on the proper answer to question 2.
*383Based on his reading of Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424 (1982), the judge was satisfied that (a) any information obtained by social workers from the plaintiff or from her estranged husband was privileged, and (b) information obtained by social workers from police officers, neighbors, teachers, and informants was not privileged. He was in doubt whether information obtained from the child’s grandparents (with whom the child did not reside), and from the child’s foster parents, was privileged. Additionally, he was in doubt whether information gained by social workers while visiting the plaintiff’s home, not based on verbal communication with the parents, was privileged under G. L. c. 112, § 135. Last, he was concerned whether the department’s file could be obtained, in light of the provisions of FIFA. Thus, he reported only those questions as to which he was in doubt. The questions reported are:
“(1) Is a licensed social worker in the employ of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services precluded by the provisions of G. L. c. 112, section 135 from disclosing information relative to a child who was the subject of a departmental investigation which the social worker acquired:
“(a) from the child’s maternal grandparents with whom the child did not reside;
“(b) from the child’s foster parents with whom the child had been placed by the department; and
“(c) from the social worker’s personal observations made within the home of the child’s parents in the course of the investigation?
“(2) Is the Department of Social Services precluded, by the provisions of G. L. c. 66A, from allowing access to materials or data in its files, which relate to a specifically named individual, to the defendants in a civil action seeking damages for the alleged wrongful death of that individual, where such materials or data contain information which would probably be of substantial assistance to those defendants in defending against the claims brought against them and where such material and data are not otherwise specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute.”
*384In my view, the proper answers to the first question reported should be: (1) (a), “No”; (1) (b), “No”; (1) (c), “No.”
I start with the words of the statute, abiding by the oft-stated principle that “ ‘[t]he general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’ Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975), quoting from Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).” Commonwealth v. Collett, supra at 432. See Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977).
Additionally, it is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that each word of a statute should be given its ordinary meaning, and that no word is to be considered surplusage. Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84-85 (1946).
General Laws c. 112, § 135, imposes an obligation of confidentiality on a social worker by the words, “[n]o social worker . . . may disclose any information ...” (emphasis supplied). The statutory obligation to maintain confidentiality is not necessarily the equivalent of the creation of a testimonial privilege. Tower v. Hirschhorn, 397 Mass. 581, 588 n.9 (1986). Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 67 (1985). Collett does not recognize adequately this distinction; indeed, the opinion appears to say that the obligation of confidentiality and a testimonial privilege are the same.2
Such an analysis overlooks the significant fact that an obligation not to disclose, quite apart from any testimonial *385privilege, goes a long way toward achieving the legislative purpose of § 135, as described by the court in Collett, supra at 427-428. In my view, § 135 serves a dual purpose. First, it imposes an obligation on a licensed social worker to maintain the confidentiality of “information he may have acquired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity.” “Routine disclosures” and open access to such information are thus precluded. Second, the statute recognizes, by its enumerated exceptions, circumstances in which disclosure may be had. See G. L. c. 112, § 135 (a) — (f). It is significant that of the six enumerated exceptions, several contemplate “disclosure” outside the context of a trial, i.e., without involving the concept of a testimonial privilege at all.3
If we postulate that a “privilege” is restricted to confidential communications arising from a social worker-client relationship, see Collett, supra at 440-442 (Lynch, J., dissenting), then information acquired ordinarily may not be disclosed, but is not privileged. Thus, it may be revealed in the course of discovery and litigation, without reference to any exception listed under § 135. The proper answer to question (1) (c) is, “No.”
Turning next to information acquired from the child’s maternal grandparents (question [1] [a]) and from the child’s foster parents (question [1] [b]) (and perhaps others such as police officers, teachers, and informants), the key to the statute’s mandate is whether such information was obtained from a *386person “consulting [the social worker] in his professional capacity.” Collett, unfortunately, expands the word “consulting” by reversing its meaning. A police officer may give information, or, so too, may a grandparent or a foster parent, but it is hard to say that every time a person talks to a social worker that person is “consulting” the social worker in the sense of seeking that social worker’s advice and assistance. Justice Lynch’s dissent correctly utilized the normal meaning of the word “consult” when he said, “To ‘consult’ a social worker or other professional means, in the common understanding of the term, to seek that professional’s advice or opinion. It is the confidences of persons seeking such advice that the statute in question was intended to protect” (emphasis in original). Collett, supra at 440. The court here unquestioningly accepts the strained interpretation of “consult” given in Collett — which appears to say that, by his very status, the social worker “consults” with others and, hence, casts a blanket of confidentiality and “privilege” wherever he goes.4
Additionally, the court overstates the result reached in Collett by stating that, “[i]n Collett, we [concluded] . . . that the privilege extends beyond communications from the victim and the victim’s family . . . .” Ante at 377. In Collett, we indicated that the issue was disclosure of communications made to the social worker “by the defendant [a live-in boy friend], members of the victim’s family and professionals working for other agencies.” Collett at 426. Later, we said that “part of the social worker’s professional duties would necessarily involve consulting with members of the victim’s family and others closely connected to the victim’s home situation” and that “[t]he defendant appears to be a person who consulted the social worker in her professional capacity.” (Emphasis supplied.) Collett at *387429. The court’s open-ended language in this case extends the privilege far beyond the mandate of Collett and inevitably leads to the erroneous conclusion that “grandparents and foster parents . . . police, teachers, neighbors, and others” all have a “privilege.” See ante at 378 n.5. Surely, at least in the sense of creating a testimonial privilege, no such obtuse and unique intent should be laid at the Legislature’s doorstep. While the information obtained from any source may be deemed confidential, a proper construction of the statute would limit the testimonial privilege only to those who consult with a social worker in his professional capacity.5 No suggestion is found in this record that the maternal grandparents and the foster parents and all the “others” consulted the social worker. Absent such a finding, question (1) (a) and (1) (b) should be answered, “No.”6
Last, although we are not asked, I state my agreement with the reporting judge’s view that information acquired from the mother and father of the child is not subject to discovery because such information was “acquired from [parents] consulting him in his professional capacity.”7

 The relevant provisions of G. L. c. 112, § 135, as appearing in St. 1985, c. 524, are: “No social worker in any licensed category, including those in private practice, and no social worker employed in a state, county or municipal governmental agency, shall disclose any information he may have acquired from a person consulting him in his professional capacity or whom he has served in his professional capacity . . . .”

 See and compare the language in Collett at 426-427, “General Laws c. 112, § 135, prohibits disclosure,” with the language, id. at 427, “[t]he privilege established by c. 112, § 135, is one of several provided by Massachusetts law”; id. at 428, “[t]he purpose of enacting a social worker-client privilege is to prevent the chilling effect which routine disclosures may have in preventing those in need of help from seeking that help .... We now consider to whom the privilege created by the statute extends.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 See, e.g., § 135 (a), (b), (d), and (f) (1984 ed. & Supp. 1985). Exception (b) clearly has nothing to do with courtroom privileges; instead, it places a duty on the social worker to disclose the “communication that reveals the contemplation or commission of a crime or harmful act.”
The significance of the use of the word “information” in the main part of § 135, as contrasted with the excepted “communication” under § 135 (b), is a matter I need not discuss at length. Collett, supra at 430, fails to note the distinction but engages, instead, in an analysis of the types of communications which may be revealed under § 135 (b). Id. at 431-432, 434-435. Similarly, the court’s opinion in this case seems to treat “information” and “communication” as synonyms. As the dissent by Justice Lynch in Collett correctly states, such a construction “gives the ‘social worker privilege’ a far greater scope than that of any common law or statutory privilege previously recognized.” Collett, supra at 441 (Lynch, J., dissenting).

 The blanket of confidentiality the court allows a social worker to cast over everyone he or she talks to reminds me of a famous comic strip character. In Al Capp’s Li’l Abner, a sad looking fellow named Joe Btfsplk walked under a constant rain cloud of misfortune which brought bad luck to all who came near Joe. A. Capp, From Dogpatch to Slobbovia (1964). The court’s view of the social worker privilege has a similar effect on all who talk to a social worker. Obviously, such an approach makes better comedy than sound legal doctrine.

 The court seeks to derive solace from the 1985 amendment to § 135 by its statement, ante at 376-377 & n.4, that the Legislature added the bar to disclosure of information acquired by a social worker from a person “whom he has served in his professional capacity.” St. 1985, c. 524.1 would have thought the clear import of such words to be that there is no “privilege” unless there is a professional relationship between the social worker and the informant. Obviously, there is none between the social worker and the police officers, teachers, neighbors, and others, nor does the record show any such relationship between the social worker and either the grandparents or foster parents.

 Nor does it appear that the police officers, teachers, and others “consulted” the social worker. I believe this explains the judge’s view that their information was not “privileged.”

 Having stated my views on the meaning of G. L. c. 112, § 135,1 join also in the dissent of Justice Abrams, who states an alternative analysis based on common sense as well as proper analysis of the statutory scheme.