Court Opinion

ID: 9529227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:01.455532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:42.802489
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority decision as to the application of the statute of limitations. The charge of reckless homicide was instituted more than three years after the accident which eventually caused the death of Patricia Weller but within a few weeks of the death of Patricia. The defense presented the limitation at trial, contending that the statute barred the prosecution. Whether the statute runs from the time of the accident or the time of the death caused by the accident in reckless driving charges is evidently a case of first impression in Illinois. Under common law, an action for death could not be brought for an act of malfeasance if the victim lived more than a year and a day after the wrongful act. This limitation was removed by the Criminal Code of 1961. Legislative bodies have the power to adopt statutes of limitations and have done so as acts of grace and repose. (14A Ill. L. & Prac. Criminal Law sec. 141 (1968); People v. Ross (1927), 325 Ill. 417, 420-21, 156 N.E. 303, 304.) They are based on public policy and subject to the will of the legislative body (People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38) and are to be given liberal construction in favor of the accused (People v. Ross (1927), 325 Ill. 417, 421, 156 N.E. 303, 304; People v. Steinmann (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757). If the limitation period has expired and no statutory exception applies, the prosecution is barred. (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 3— 5(b).) No extensions for good intentions are available. Obviously, there are times when the strict application of the limitation appears to further injustice. People v. Edwards (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 822, 434 N.E.2d 1179. The legislature has determined that there be no limitation as to certain felony offenses and that other felonies must be brought within three years. The limitation period runs from the commission of the offense. (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 3 — 5(a).) The limitation period has been held to run from the last overt act in furtherance of the offense. (People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38.) “Overt act” is defined as “An open, manifest act from which criminality may be implied. An outward act done in pursuance and manifestation of an intent or design.” Black’s Law Dictionary 995 (4th ed. 1951). The overt action in a reckless homicide case involves the method of operating a motor vehicle. (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3.) In the present case, the injury which eventually caused the death took place on May 8, 1982, the date of the vehicle collision. To find that the defendant continued with an overt action until death is a judicial holding, broadening the definition of “offense.” The legislature has recognized that there are offenses which require extended limitation. (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 3 — 6.) None of the exceptions apply to the facts in this case. Each of the exceptions provides for an alter-rate limitation which has a determinable time, either no more than three additional years or within one year after a child molested by a parent becomes 18. If the majority is correct in their treatment of the statute of limitations, then the action could commence within three years of a death, whenever it takes place, if caused by the original accident. In the present cause, the expert testimony indicated that the accident caused the coma and a comatose condition interferes with body defenses against pneumonia. Pneumonia caused the death. This evidently could be true in a pneumonia death of a comatose person 3 years or 15 years after the accident. Is this court in a position to say that the legislature intended that the State can bring a reckless homicide charge 5, 10, or 15 years after a vehicle collision, being conditioned solely on how long medical science can prolong the life of an injured party? We are not dealing with murder or manslaughter. We are dealing with a crime which in the opinion of the legislature is of a lesser magnitude than those offenses without limitation. If the sword of Damocles is to hang over the defendant’s head for an indefinite period of time, let the responsibility rest where it belongs. The extension of a statute of limitation should be based upon public policy, a responsibility of the legislative bodies, not the courts. I would reverse the conviction of the trial court and mandate the dismissal of the reckless homicide charge.