Court Opinion

ID: 2963512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:13.605672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:42.038191
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2122

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                     NOEL FEMIA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Kirsten M.  Lacovara, with  whom James  E. Carroll  and Peabody  &
            ____________________             _________________      __________
        Arnold were on brief for appellant.
        ______
            Heidi  E. Brieger,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with  whom
            _________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
        _______________

                                 ____________________

                                    June 16, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.   Defendant-appellant
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            Noel  Femia appeals from  a jury conviction  of conspiring to

            possess with  intent to distribute quantities  of cocaine, in

            violation of 21 U.S.C.   841(a)(1).  Defendant forwards  four

            issues  on appeal  which  we consider  seriatim.   We  affirm

            defendant's conviction.

            1.  The  Alleged Violation of  the Jencks Act  - 18 U.S.C.   
            1.  The  Alleged Violation of  the Jencks Act  - 18 U.S.C.   
                _________________________________________________________

            3500
            3500
            ____

                      The factual basis for  this issue is the accidental

            destruction  of certain tape recordings by a DEA agent.  This

            is the  second time we  have been  called upon to  decide the

            legal consequences of the destruction of the tape recordings.

            Some historical exegesis is necessary, most of which is taken

            from  our prior opinion, United  States v. Femia,  9 F.3d 990
                                     ______________    _____

            (1st Cir. 1993) ("Femia I"). 
                              _____

                      An  indictment  against defendant  and  eight other

            alleged co-conspirators  was filed  in the district  court on

            October 3, 1986.  Femia was not arrested until July 16, 1992.

            The facts relevant to  the tape recordings can  be summarized

            as follows.

                      Cristopher LaPlante  was the bookkeeper and  one of

            the  founding  members of  a  large-scale  cocaine operation,

            known as Triple X.  The DEA started investigating Triple X in

            1985.  LaPlante entered into a plea bargain with the DEA.  As

            part of  the plea  agreement, LaPlante covertly  made twenty-

                                         -2-
                                          2

            four  tape  recordings  of  conversations  he  had  with  co-

            conspirators or  customers of Triple X.  The DEA set up three

            files for three of the alleged co-conspirators, Perea, Stone,

            and  Femia.  The LaPlante tapes were physically stored in the

            Perea  file,  which was  cross-referenced  to  the other  two

            files.  

                      Trial of Femia's  alleged co-conspirators was  held

            in 1987.  At this  time Femia was still at large.   The eight

            defendants were  convicted either  by trial or  guilty pleas.

            Subsequent to those convictions, a DEA agent,  newly-assigned

            to the case,  authorized the destruction of all  the LaPlante

            tapes contained in the Perea file.

                      After his  arrest and  arraignment, Femia  moved to

            suppress the testimony of LaPlante, a key government witness,

            on  the ground that the destruction of the tapes violated his

            constitutional right  to due process as  annunciated in Brady
                                                                    _____

            v.  Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The district court granted
                ________

            Femia's  motion to  suppress.   The government appealed.   We

            reversed the district  court, finding that  there was no  due

            process violation  because the  tapes were "not  destroyed in

            bad faith."  Femia  I, 9 F.3d  at 994.   We also pointed  out
                         _____

            that  the  district  court  had  made  no  bad  faith finding

            relative to the destruction of the tapes.  Id. at 996.  After
                                                       ___

            remand,  the case  was  tried.   The district  court rejected

                                         -3-
                                          3

            Femia's  claim  that  the  destruction  of the  tapes  was  a

            violation of the Jencks Act.

                      We start our analysis of  this issue by quoting the

            district  court's written rejection of defendant's Jencks Act

            claim:

                              Defendant also contends that
                           judgment  of  acquittal  as  to
                           Count 1  is appropriate because
                           the  government   violated  the
                           Jencks Act, 18  U.S.C.    3500.
                           He  bases  this  claim  on  the
                           government's   destruction   of
                           tape recordings made by its key
                           witness,  Cristopher  LaPlante,
                           and     allegedly    containing
                           statements amounting  to Jencks
                           material.     The   Jencks  Act
                           provides  that  a court  shall,
                           upon defendant's request, order
                           the   government   to   produce
                           statements made  by its witness
                           which  relate to  the witness's
                           testimony.    18 U.S.C.    3500
                           (1970).  Such statements may be
                           used  solely   for  impeachment
                           purposes.    Palermo v.  United
                                        __________________
                           States,   360  U.S.   343,  349
                           ______
                           (1959).   Defendant  speculates
                           that  the  tapes  revealed  the
                           identities of  large scale drug
                           suppliers,  thereby  containing
                           statements      related      to
                           LaPlante's testimony.   Because
                           the  tapes   were  destroyed  I
                           cannot  review  them  and  thus
                           assess whether they fall within
                           the purview of the  Jencks Act.
                           The  record does  not, however,
                           require   me    to   make   the
                           "dubious"       inquiry      of
                           "reconstruct[ing]  a  [tape] no
                           longer in  existence using 'the
                           very  witness  whose  testimony
                           the    defendant    seeks    to
                           impeach.'"    United States  v.
                                         _________________

                                         -4-
                                          4

                           Carrasco,  537  F.2d  372,  377
                           ________
                           (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting United
                                                    ______
                           States  v.  Johnson,  521  F.2d
                           ___________________
                           1318,  1320  (9th Cir.  1975)).
                           Here,  the affidavits  of Agent
                           Reilly  and  Detective  Kinder,
                           which  stated that  the missing
                           tapes     "contained    general
                           conversations  that   were  not
                           specifically  relevant  to  the
                           Triple     X    investigation,"
                           support  the  ruling  at  trial
                           that the missing tapes were not
                           "Jencks   Act  materials   with
                           respect  to  the matters  about
                           which  the  government inquired
                           on direct . . . ."  

            (Footnote omitted.)

                      We review the district  court's ruling for abuse of

            discretion.    United  States  v. Augenblick,  393  U.S.  348
                           ______________     __________

            (1969).  Augenblick involved,  inter alia, missing tapes that
                     __________            _____ ____

            were,  without doubt, covered by  the Jencks Act.   The Court

            held that  the ruling by the law  officer and Board of Review

            that the tapes  need not be produced under the Jencks Act was

            not  an abuse  of discretion.   Id.  at 355.   In  Palermo v.
                                            ___                _______

            United States, 360 U.S.  343 (1959), the Court held  that the
            _____________

            final  decision as  to  production of  Jencks Act  statements

            "must rest  . . . within the good sense and experience of the

            district judge  . . . ."   Id. at  353.  In United  States v.
                                       ___              ______________

            Foley,  871 F.2d  235,  239 (1st  Cir.  1989), we  found  not
            _____

            clearly erroneous the district court's ruling  that so-called

            "302's" were not statements covered by the Jencks Act.

                      The pertinent parts of the Jencks Act provide:

                                         -5-
                                          5

                              After  a  witness called  by
                           the United States has testified
                           on   direct  examination,   the
                           court shall, on  motion of  the
                           defendant,  order   the  United
                           States to produce any statement
                           (as hereinafter defined) of the
                           witness  in  the possession  of
                           the United States which relates
                           to  the  subject  matter as  to
                           which    the     witness    has
                           testified.     If   the  entire
                           contents of  any such statement
                           relate to the subject matter of
                           the  testimony of  the witness,
                           the  court shall order it to be
                           delivered   directly   to   the
                           defendant  for his  examination
                           and use.

            18 U.S.C.   3500(b).

                              The  term   "statement",  as
                           used  in subsections  (b), (c),
                           and  (d)  of  this  section  in
                           relation to  any witness called
                           by the United States, means--

                              . . . .

                              a  stenographic, mechanical,
                           electrical, or other recording,
                           or  a   transcription  thereof,
                           which   is   a    substantially
                           verbatim  recital  of  an  oral
                           statement made  by said witness
                           and  recorded contemporaneously
                           with  the  making of  such oral
                           statement;

            18 U.S.C.   3500(e)(2).

                      There is nothing in  the record indicating that any

            of the  destroyed tapes  contained statements related  to the

            subject  matter of LaPlante's testimony.   On the other hand,

            the missing tape  observation we made in Femia I  is a strong
                                                     _____

                                         -6-
                                          6

            indication  that  the  tapes   did  not  contain  Jencks  Act

            statements:

                           The    evidence   before    the
                           district court  showed that any
                           missing  evidence--whether  one
                           considers   allegedly   missing
                           fragments  of   the  tapes  for
                           which  copies  exist  or  those
                           tapes which no longer  exist in
                           any   form--did   not   possess
                           exculpatory    value   apparent
                                                  ________
                           before      law     enforcement
                           ______
                           destroyed  the  tapes.    Agent
                           Reilly  and  Detective   Kinder
                           provided   affidavits   stating
                           that   the    destroyed   tapes
                           contained   no   references  to
                           Femia,   his   code  names   or
                           numbers.    Agent  Reilly  also
                           explained    that    any   tape
                           containing references  to Femia
                           would have been transcribed.

            Femia I, 9 F.2d at 995.
            _____

                      In light of  the facts and  the applicable law,  we

            rule that  the district  court neither abused  its discretion

            nor clearly erred in finding and  ruling as it did.  We think

            its decision was clearly correct.

            2.  Whether the Supplemental Jury Instruction on Conspiracy
            2.  Whether the Supplemental Jury Instruction on Conspiracy
                _______________________________________________________
                Was Reversible Error
                Was Reversible Error
                ____________________

                      The  only  way  to  understand  this  issue  is  to

            replicate what  happened.   After deliberating  for sometime,

            the jury submitted two  written questions to the judge.   She

            responded as follows:

                              Members of the jury,  let me
                           respond to your note, do it one
                           at  a time, and so I will state

                                         -7-
                                          7

                           for   the   record,   for   Mr.
                           Laughlin, each question.

                             Question 1 is:   Restate  the
                           charges.

                              I interpret that to mean the
                           accusations against  Mr. Femia.
                           I assume that's what you meant,
                           that you didn't wish me to give
                           you  the instructions  all over
                           again.

                              There   are   two  sets   of
                           charges.  Count  1 accuses  the
                           defendant  of   having  been  a
                           member   of  a   conspiracy  to
                           distribute  cocaine.     That's
                           Count 1.

                              There are two -- there's one
                           entirely   separate   set    of
                           charges, Counts  22 through 45,
                           that  accuse  the defendant  of
                           having  possessed  on  specific
                           dates,   specific  amounts   of
                           cocaine  with   the  intent  to
                           distribute that cocaine.

                              That's  the  second  set  of
                           charges.

                              Now,  let me  go back  for a
                           moment and explain again to you
                           each of these.

                              With respect to Count 1, the
                           conspiracy      charge,     the
                           government has to prove, first,
                           that  there  was  an  agreement
                           between two or more people, not
                           necessarily  Mr.  Femia,  could
                           have   been   anybody.      The
                           indictment  names some  people,
                           but any two people,  that there
                           was  an  agreement between  any
                           two   people    to   distribute
                           cocaine.     That's  the  first
                           thing it has to prove.

                                         -8-
                                          8

                              The second thing  it has  to
                           prove is that Mr. Femia at some
                           point,  while  this  agreement,
                           this    conspiracy    was    in
                           existence, willfully,  that is,
                           with an intent  to violate  the
                           law,  became  a member  of that
                           conspiracy.    That's what  the
                           government has to prove.

                      The second question was:

                           In  Count 1, is paragraph 1 the
                               _______                 ___
                           summation  of  charges  against
                           _________
                           Mr. Femia, or  is paragraph  2b
                           (Count 1) part of the summation
                                                 _________
                           of   charges   or   simply   an
                           explanation   of   charges   in
                           ___________
                           Counts 22-45.  Specifically--is
                           the   defendant  charged   with
                           conspiracy     to    distribute
                           cocaine   or   conspiracy    to
                           distribute   the  specific   47
                           kilograms  named  in  paragraph
                           2b.  (Id.)
                                 ___

                      The judge answered the question thus:

                              Now you  also inquired about
                           Paragraph   2B   [b]  in   this
                           indictment.    The   conspiracy
                           charge  sets  out, in  general,
                           what  the  conspiracy  was  all
                           about.   It  then  goes  on  in
                           Paragraph  2  to  describe,  in
                           general, the  role that various
                           of  the  defendants  played  in
                           this conspiracy.   And then  it
                           goes on in Paragraph 3  and its
                           various sub parts  to say  what
                           the purpose of this, the object
                           of this conspiracy was.  And it
                           kind of goes  on and on and  on
                           about that.

                              In  Paragraph  2B  [b],  the
                           government says what it -- what
                           it says Mr. Femia  did.  But in
                           your   deliberating   on   your
                           verdict and deciding this case,

                                         -9-
                                          9

                           you  should   base,  base  your
                           verdict   not   on   what   the
                           indictment says, but on  all of
                           the  evidence.   Taking  all of
                           the   evidence,  you   need  to
                           decide what Mr. Femia did, what
                           Mr.   Femia   knew,  what   the
                           circumstances were.

                              And  then  based  on all  of
                           that, all the  evidence in  the
                           case,  what the  witnesses told
                           you,  what  the  exhibits  tell
                           you, did he willfully  become a
                           member of the conspiracy?   And
                           specifically did the government
                           prove  and  convince  you  that
                           beyond a  reasonable doubt that
                           he -- there was  this agreement
                           and that he willfully  became a
                           member of the conspiracy.

                      The first paragraph of  Count One of the indictment

            charged nine named persons including Femia:

                           defendants      herein,     did
                           knowingly   and   intentionally
                           combine,  conspire, confederate
                           and  agree   with  each  other,
                           . . . and with other persons to
                           commit  an offense  against the
                           United   States,    namely   to
                           possess    with    intent    to
                           distribute, and  to distribute,
                           quantities   of    cocaine,   a
                           Schedule II narcotic controlled
                           substance,   in  violation   of
                           Title  21, United  States Code,
                           Section 841(a)(1).

                      Paragraph 2b of Count One of the indictment states:

                              b.    Defendant  Noel  Femia
                           also supplied  large quantities
                           of cocaine to  Triple X.   From
                           July   1984   to  April   1985,
                           defendant Noel Femia caused the
                           delivery    of    approximately
                           forty-seven     kilograms    of

                                         -10-
                                          10

                           cocaine,  having  an  aggregate
                           wholesale  value of  nearly two
                           million dollars, to Triple X on
                           consignment.          Following
                           delivery, this cocaine was sold
                           and distributed  by members and
                           associates of Triple X.

                      By now  it is axiomatic "that  a single instruction

            to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must

            be  viewed in the  context of the  overall charge."   Cupp v.
                                                                  ____

            Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973).  In this connection we
            ________

            note that defendant did not object to the original conspiracy

            charge which was, of course, more extensive and detailed than

            the   supplemental  one,  but  basically  conveyed  the  same

            message.

                      It is  difficult for  us to understand  exactly the

            basis  for  defendant's  contention  that   the  supplemental

            instruction  was  erroneous.    It  might  be  inferred  from

            defendant's brief  that he  is arguing  that the jury  should

            have  been instructed that in  order to convict  Femia on the

            conspiracy count,  the government had to prove the overt acts

            alleged in paragraph 2b.   At the sidebar colloquy  after the

            supplemental instructions were given, the judge asked defense

            counsel:   "What  do  you want  me  to tell  them?"   Counsel

            replied:

                           MR.  CARROLL:   This is  what I
                           want you to say, Judge.  I want
                           you  to  say that  Paragraph 2B
                           [b] is what the  government has
                           accused  Mr.  Femia  of  doing.
                           That's what they said he did in

                                         -11-
                                          11

                           this  conspiracy, that  was his
                           role in the conspiracy, and the
                           government must  prove beyond a
                           reasonable  doubt that  is what
                           he did.

            The judge quite correctly pointed out:  "No.  That's  not the

            law."  

                      The Supreme Court unanimously held in United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382, 383 (1994), that 21  U.S.C.   848
               _______

            does not require the government  to prove that a  conspirator

            committed  an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  We

            do  not think that United  States v. Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161
                               ______________    _________

            (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114  S. Ct. 2714 (1994), is of
                             _____ ______

            any help to defendant.  In Sepulveda we held:
                                       _________

                              Here,     the     challenged
                           convictions  center   around  a
                           charge of conspiracy to possess
                           and  distribute  cocaine.    To
                           prove a  drug conspiracy charge
                           under  21  U.S.C.     846,  the
                           government  is obliged  to show
                           beyond a  reasonable doubt that
                           a conspiracy existed and that a
                           particular defendant agreed  to
                           participate in it, intending to
                           commit      the      underlying
                           substantive    offense   (here,
                           possession   of  cocaine   with
                           intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.
                             841(a)(1).

            Id.  at  1173  (citations  omitted).1    That  was  what  the
            ___

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Since Sepulveda,  we have  clarified that the  "intent to
                      _________
            commit the underlying substantive offense" conspiracy element
            is  properly  construed  as  an  "intent  to  effectuate  the
            commission  of the  substantive offense."   United  States v.
                                                        ______________
            Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
            _____                                    _____ ______
            Ct. 1118 (1995).

                                         -12-
                                          12

            supplemental  instructions  charged   here.    And  even   if

            Sepulveda can be read otherwise, it is trumped by Shabani.
            _________                                         _______

                      We find no error in the supplemental instructions.

            3.  Was the Evidence on the Conspiracy Count Sufficient
            3.  Was the Evidence on the Conspiracy Count Sufficient
                ___________________________________________________
                for Conviction?
                for Conviction?
                _______________

                      In  reviewing the record  to determine  whether the

            evidence was sufficient to convict, we assess the evidence in

            the light most favorable to the government.

                              The         well-established
                           standard     for     evaluating
                           sufficiency claims  requires us
                           to  review  the  evidence as  a
                           whole, including all reasonable
                           inferences from  that evidence,
                           in the light most  favorable to
                           the  government.    If,  in  so
                           doing, we find that  a rational
                           trier of fact could  find guilt
                           beyond  a reasonable  doubt, we
                           have  no  option but  to affirm
                           the jury's verdict.  We may not
                           weigh  the  evidence,  and  all
                           credibility  questions must  be
                           resolved   in   favor  of   the
                           verdict.

            United States v.  Argencourt, 996 F.2d  1300, 1303 (1st  Cir.
            _____________     __________

            1993)  (citations  omitted), cert.  denied,  114  S. Ct.  731
                                         _____  ______

            (1994).  See also United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307,
                     ___ ____ _____________    __________

            1311  (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 356 (1993); United
                              _____ ______                         ______

            States  v. Innamorati, 996  F.2d 456,  469 (1st  Cir.), cert.
            ______     __________                                   _____

            denied, 114 S. Ct. 409 (1993).
            ______

                                
            ____________________

            

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      Applying this focus to  the record we summarize the

            evidence.  Cristopher (Cris)  LaPlante, the chief witness for

            the prosecution,  testified that  he, Alan Stone,  and Edward

            Intinarelli  pooled their resources and shared their contacts

            to form a drug cartel in  1984 for the purpose of  purchasing

            and selling cocaine and  marijuana.  The cartel was  known as

            "Triple X" or "XXX."  Defendant was a drug supplier for Stone

            and  Intinarelli.    LaPlante  met with  defendant  "numerous

            times" to  further Triple  X's business.   LaPlante explained

            that those who  did business  with Triple X  were given  code

            names and numbers.   Defendant's  code name was  Max and  his

            code number was 86.  After a raid on Intinarelli's house, the

            code  numbers were changed in January of 1985 "to protect the

            identities  of  the  suppliers  and  the  customers  and  the

            employees."  Defendant's new code number was 898.   Defendant

            was contacted  through  Fem's  Gas Station  on  Route  35  in

            Framingham, Massachusetts,  which he owned.   Defendant  told

            LaPlante  that  he  intended to  use  the  proceeds  from the

            cocaine sales to build a housing development on a large tract

            of land he owned and then retire.  LaPlante saw entries about

            defendant in a  notebook, used by Intinarelli  to record drug

            transactions.

                      Phillip Moore  was an  employee of  Triple X.   His

            duties  consisted of  holding the  cocaine ("sitting  on it")

            prior to sale,  breaking it up  into small saleable  amounts,

                                         -14-
                                          14

            and  delivering it to customers.   He was paid $1,000 a week.

            Moore introduced defendant to Stone in the spring of 1984; he

            told  Stone that  defendant  could supply  him with  cocaine.

            Moore  testified about  three cocaine  transactions involving

            defendant.  All three followed the same format.  Moore parked

            his car  unlocked in  a parking  lot.  He  then went  into an

            adjacent bar.  Defendant subsequently joined him and they had

            a  drink together.  Within a short time, defendant would tell

            Moore that he should leave.   Moore would then leave the  bar

            and get  into his car.   Each time  this scenario was  played

            out, there was  a package of cocaine wrapped in  duct tape on

            the back seat of the car.  Moore took the cocaine back to the

            "safe"  house where  he weighed  and tested  it.   Moore then

            "sat"  on the  cocaine  until he  received instructions  from

            Stone.  He then broke it up into small amounts  and delivered

            it to customers.  

                      Christine  Lenhard  testified  under  a   grant  of

            absolute immunity.  She worked for Triple X as a "mule";  she

            delivered cocaine to purchasers and picked up the money.  She

            was  paid $1,000 a  week by Triple  X.   She was romantically

            involved with defendant.  The Triple X partners that she knew

            personally  were  LaPlante  and  Intinarelli.   Lenhard  knew

            defendant's  code name  and  number.   She  knew, based  upon

            observations  and  her  work  for Triple  X,  that  defendant

            supplied the cartel with cocaine.

                                         -15-
                                          15

                      Donna Dinallo-Beane also testified under a grant of

            absolute immunity.  She lived with LaPlante during Triple X's

            operations and, like Lenhard,  was employed by Triple X  as a

            "mule."    She  knew  beyond doubt  that  defendant  supplied

            cocaine to Triple X.

                      Based   upon  the   evidence  and   the  reasonable

            inferences  to  be  drawn  from  it,  we  find  that  it  was

            sufficient  to   sustain   defendant's  conviction   on   the

            conspiracy count.

            4.  The Refusal of the District Court to Grant a Judgment of
            4.  The Refusal of the District Court to Grant a Judgment of
                ________________________________________________________
                Acquittal on Counts 22-24 of the Indictment or to Dismiss
                Acquittal on Counts 22-24 of the Indictment or to Dismiss
                _________________________________________________________
                These Counts with Prejudice.
                These Counts with Prejudice.
                ____________________________

                      This rather unique issue requires some explanation.

            The indictment charges as follows:

                           COUNTS    TWENTY-TWO    THROUGH
                           _______________________________
                           FORTY-FIVE:  (21 USC  841(A)(1)
                           __________
                           -  Possession  of Cocaine  with
                           Intent  to Dist.;  18 USC   2 -
                           Aiding & Abetting)

                           The Grand  Jury further charges
                           that:

                           1.    On  or  about  the  dates
                           listed   below,   at   Ashland,
                           Concord,  Framingham,  Gardner,
                           Holliston,  Hopkinton,  Hudson,
                           Marlborough,  Milford,  Natick,
                           Northboro, Upton  and elsewhere
                           in     the      District     of
                           Massachusetts,

                                2.   NOEL FEMIA a/k/a
                                "ABDULE"  a/k/a "MAX"
                                a/k/a "#86"
                                  [and others]
                           defendants  herein,  acting  in
                           concert  and in  furtherance of

                                         -16-
                                          16

                           the  conspiracy  described   in
                           Count  One,  did knowingly  and
                           intentionally    possess   with
                           intent  to distribute,  and did
                           distribute,    the    following
                           quantities   of    cocaine,   a
                           Schedule II narcotic controlled
                           substance.

                      Then follows a three-column list.  The first column

            is  entitled "Count" and under it are listed in chronological

            order the  words  "Twenty-Two"  through  "Forty-Five."    The

            second  column is  headed "DATE"  and opposite  each numbered

            count  are  specific  dates  starting with  "July  24,  1984"

            opposite  "Twenty-Two"  and  ending  with  "March  22,  1985"

            opposite "Forty-Five."  The third column is entitled "Amount"

            "(approximate").   Listed in  this column to  correspond with

            the  count and  date  columns are  amounts  in kilograms  and

            grams.   Defendant was  charged in Counts  Twenty-Two through

            Forty-Five  with  possessing  with intent  to  distribute and

            distributing specific amounts of cocaine on specific dates.

                      The jury found defendant not guilty on Count Forty-

            Five, but  did not return  any verdicts on  Counts Twenty-Two

            through Forty-Four.   In effect, there was a hung  jury as to

            these counts.   The  government moved that  Counts Twenty-Two

            through Forty-Four be dismissed without prejudice.  Defendant
                                            _______

            objected and moved for  judgment of acquittal on the  counts,

            or,  in   the  alternative,  that  they   be  dismissed  with
                                                                     ____

            prejudice.  A hearing  was held.  The district  court granted

                                         -17-
                                          17

            the government's motion and  denied defendant's motions.  The

            trial judge stated:

                              Defendant's assertion  as to
                           Counts   22   through   44   is
                           similarly  unpersuasive.     He
                           insists    that    since    the
                           government  offered   the  same
                           proof for Counts 22  through 44
                           as for Count  45 --  LaPlante's
                           testimony  and certain  ledgers
                           he  maintained  --  it  was  an
                           aberration  that  the jury  did
                           not acquit him on  those counts
                           as   well.      In  fact,   the
                           government   did   not   simply
                           duplicate the evidence for each
                           count.   Although  LaPlante was
                           the  key  witness  as   to  all
                           substantive    charges,    each
                           charge  reflected  a   separate
                           transaction  and  corresponding
                           entry  in  the  ledger and  the
                           testimony    was,    in   fact,
                           different as to each.   Matters
                           of credibility are for the jury
                           and   it   may   believe   some
                           portions    of   a    witness's
                           testimony     and    disbelieve
                           others.     United   States  v.
                                       ___________________
                           Jackson, 778 F.2d 933,  942 (2d
                           _______
                           Cir.      1985)      (upholding
                           instruction  that  "jurors  are
                           not   required  to   reject  or
                           accept any particular witness's
                           testimony in toto.")  Since the
                           evidence,   if  believed,   was
                           sufficient      to      sustain
                           convictions  as  to  Counts  22
                           through    44,   judgment    of
                           acquittal   is   inappropriate.
                           See  Fed.  R.  Crim. P.  29(a).
                           ___
                           Defendant's renewed  motion for
                           judgment   of    acquittal   is
                           therefore denied.

                              At the  sentencing hearing I
                           allowed the government's motion
                           to  dismiss  without  prejudice
                                        _______  _________

                                         -18-
                                          18

                           these  same counts  (Counts 22-
                           44).  For the reasons outlined,
                           defendant's  alternative motion
                           to  dismiss  with prejudice  is
                                        ____ _________
                           also denied.

                      The case  law holds squarely that  a defendant does

            not have standing to  appeal a without-prejudice dismissal of

            an indictment.  In Parr v. United  States, 351 U.S. 513, 516-
                               ____    ______________

            18  (1956), the  Court held  that a  defendant does  not have

            standing to appeal the dismissal of an  indictment because he

            is not legally aggrieved  by such action.  The  Court pointed

            out the obvious:  "The testing of the effect of the dismissal

            order  must  abide  petitioner's  trial, and  only  then,  if

            convicted will he have been aggrieved."  Id. at 517.
                                                     ___

                      In United  States v.  Moller-Butcher, 723  F.2d 189
                         ______________     ______________

            (1st Cir. 1983), there  was an attempted appeal in  which the

            defendant  there sought, as does the  defendant here, to have

            an  indictment dismissed with prejudice.   Citing to Parr, we
                                     ____                        ____

            held  that "absent  extraordinary circumstances,  a defendant

            has no  standing to appeal  the dismissal of  an indictment."

            Id.  at 190.  See also United  States v. Holub, 944 F.2d 441,
            ___           ___ ____ ______________    _____

            442  (8th Cir. 1991); United  States v. Reale,  834 F.2d 281,
                                  ______________    _____

            282 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Day, 806 F.2d 1240, 1242
                                _____________    ___

            (5th Cir. 1986).  We see no extraordinary circumstances here.

                      We  cannot help but  observe, however, that because

            defendant has  been convicted  on the conspiracy  count there

                                         -19-
                                          19

            seems  little reason  for keeping  the indictment  alive much

            longer.

                      The judgment below is Affirmed.
                                            Affirmed.
                                            _________

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                                          20