Court Opinion

ID: 9828105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:06:08.290252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:43.602121
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Both the appellant and the appellee have filed motions for rehearing, which are here considered and disposed of. The appeal was heretofore disposed of on two grounds: First, that there was evidence to support the jury finding of negligence in the particular instance in failing to ring the bell of the passenger engine, as customarily done in approaching the station of Leesville through the railway yards, and that such negligence could be regarded as a proximate cause of the injury and death, since the deceased had the right to rely upon the practice; he being rightfully at the place where he was working. If-the witnesses so testifying are believed, there is proof rendering probable the existence of the fact, as found by the jury, that the bell of the engine was not kept ringing through the yards in the particular instance, as customarily done. It is not entirely improbable in the circumstances that such failure of warning was a cause of the deceased being struck by the engine. Therefore the question of actionable negligence vel non in that respect remains in -the domain of. open fact and not of pure law, after all the evidence has been considered. We have further considered the other contentions of appellant's motion, and conclude that they should be overruled.
The second ground was' that the evidence conclusively showed the injury was partly the result of the negligence of the deceased, and as a consequence the jury’s finding to the contrary should be set aside because it was contrary to the legal effect of the evidence. This conclusion was based upon the determination made that all the circumstances united in indicating the deceased, several minutes before the train arrived—
“moved back (from the end of the box car) nearer to the main line track and there sat down or squatted near the ends of the ties. * * * The deceased knew, as did the other yardmen, that the passenger train was likely to pass at 7:05 o’clock and that it was about that hour when he assumed that position near the track. * * * It was not a proper place to be. * * * The deceased failed to use any diligence to get away from the approaching train, the glare of the headlight, and the rattle of which he could have seen and heard when it was some distance away.”
If that is not a correct determination of the facts, then the ruling made is erroneous; otherwise it is not wrong. Both the appellant and the appellee now challenge the conclusion of fact, and say “there is no evidence from which the jury or the court could reasonably find that deceased was sitting or squatting dangerously near the track.” Reference is made to the evidence of the engineer and fireman. The engineer testified:
“In going through that yard, I was keeping a lookout. I did not see Mr. Ferguson or any other man on or near the tracks in going through the yards that night. I did see' a lantern — a ear repairer’s lantern — sitting on the ground between the main line track and the passing track. I did not see Mr. Ferguson or any other man there about that lantern. I can see the ground within a few feet of the end of the pilot.”
The fireman testified:
“I was keeping a watch ahead in going through Leesville that night. I did not see any man on the tracks or near the tracks as we were passing through the yards. The headlight was giving a good light, so that I could see along the track through the yard there. I saw a lantern as I went through the yard, between the main line and passing track.”
The failure to note the significance of this evidence of the operatives of the engine in the large record is inexcusable, at least on the part of the writer of the opinion. A change of the fact mentioned changes the legal conclusion reached, to the extent that contributory negligence appeared as a matter of pure law. If the engineer and fireman are to be believed, and no reason appears why they should not be, then the deceased, for an appreciable period of time prior to his injury, was not knowingly standing and remaining in a position to be struck by the oncoming train, having time to avoid being struck by it. Hence it is thought, after all the substantive evidence had been considered, that the ultimate question of negligence vel non on the part of the deceased contributing to his injury remains in the domain of open fact for decision by the jury. There is proof rendering probable the existence of the fact, as was found by the jury, that the deceased did not “carelessly or while intoxicated place himself in such position upon or near the main line track that he was struck and killed by an in-coming passenger train.” We have accepted the fact that the on-coming passenger engine struck and killed the deceased. The deceased was rightfully between the two tracks, in the duties required of him at the time. He was between the two tracks, near the string of box cars he had inspected, im*315mediately before the passenger train came along, in waiting for the switch engine to come bach with more ears to be inspected. And the evidence of the engineer and fireman can be accepted as meaning that the deceased was not, prior to the very moment of being struck, in a position of such nearness to the main line track as to be struck by the engine. It is not difficult to conceive that the deceased must have stepped in the path of the engine at some moment of its passing, with the result of being struck and killed by the pilot beam or pilot of the engine, although he was not seen prior to that moment by the operatives of the engine. The inference is allowable that the deceased must necessarily have stepped quickly in the way of the engine for some cause, coming from somewhere very near the engine. The engine was running at the time “20 or 22 miles an hour.” Therefore, given the two premises, that the passenger engine struck and killed the deceased, and that he was not in or near the path of the engine before the moment he was struck by it, it does not follow in a way too certain for doubting that the act and conduct of the deceased were lacking in due care to avert his injury. There is an absence of something else which would weigh mightily before negligence as a matter of pure law could be imputed to him, which is the fact of whether or not deceased was aware of the approaching train, and in time to have avoided being struck by the engine. In view of the rattling noise of the train and the glare of the headlight on the engine, in connection with the fact that the deceased knew the train was about due, it is difficult to impute to him utter ignorance of the approaching train. Yet it is not wholly improbable that he was in reality unaware of the nearness of the engine to him. The conduct and act of the deceased are not necessarily inconsistent with due care on his part to avert the injury. It can be necessarily assumed from the instinct of self-preservation that he did not knowingly and deliberately place himself in the way of the engine to be struck. The jury expressly found that the deceased was not drunk. And the circumstances are not entirely unfavorable to the presumption that the deceased had mistakenly stepped in the path of the engine, due to deep confusion from some cause. ~ As the evidence bearing upon the conduct of the deceased just prior to his being struck by the engine does not conclusively indicate that the deceased was unmindful of the danger of his surroundings, the entire matter was for the jury, as in their province to say, under our system of law.
We have considered appellant’s other assignments of error, and think they should be overruled.
We grant the motion for rehearing, now set aside the former judgment of reversal, and here now enter a judgment of affirmance.