Court Opinion

ID: 9382675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:00:41.443448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.332935
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802       Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       March 28, 2023

                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 22-7000

  DONALD JOE BOOKER, JR.,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
                           (D.C. No. 6:21-CR-00037-JFH-1)
                        _________________________________

 Dean Sanderford, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
 Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

 Linda A. Epperley, Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher J. Wilson, United
 States Attorney, with her on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                         _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 EBEL, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       After Donald Joe Booker, Jr. repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised

 release, the district court revoked his supervision and sentenced him to twenty-four

 months in prison, the statutory maximum. For the first time on appeal, Mr. Booker

 argues that the district court erroneously based his sentence for violating supervised
Appellate Case: 22-7000    Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 2

 release on retribution whereas the statute governing the revocation of supervised

 release implicitly prohibits considering retribution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

       We review Mr. Booker’s sentence for plain error. Clarifying the scope of 18

 U.S.C. § 3583(e), we hold that district courts may not modify or revoke a term of

 supervised release based on the need for retribution. Because the district court

 quoted from a § 3553(a) sentencing factor representing retribution, we conclude that

 the district court erred. But even assuming this error was plain, Mr. Booker has not

 shown that it affected his substantial rights because we conclude there is no

 reasonable probability that his sentence would have been shorter had the court not

 erred. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we

 AFFIRM Mr. Booker’s twenty-four-month sentence.

                                I.     BACKGROUND

       In 2010, Mr. Booker pled guilty to one count of felon in possession, 18 U.S.C.

 §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced in the Northern District of Oklahoma

 to thirty-three months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Mr.

 Booker’s term of supervision began in 2020 after a concurrent state sentence ended.

 After a series of transfers, the Eastern District of Oklahoma took jurisdiction over his

 supervised release in March 2021.

       Mr. Booker’s probation officers first petitioned to revoke his supervised

 release on May 3, 2021. The district court issued a warrant for his arrest that day.

 The probation officers amended the petition twice, with the final amended petition

                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-7000    Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 3

 approved by the district court on June 29, 2021. The final amended petition alleged

 that Mr. Booker had violated several conditions of supervised release by

     violating traffic laws by speeding, driving without a license or insurance, and
      refusing to submit to sobriety testing,
     testing positive for amphetamine or methamphetamine use on four separate
      occasions,
     being found in possession of methamphetamine when he was booked into jail
      on the revocation warrant,
     leaving the Eastern District of Oklahoma without permission on three separate
      occasions,
     failing to notify his probation officer about contacts with law enforcement on
      three separate occasions, and
     failing to appear for drug testing on five separate occasions.

       Mr. Booker was arrested for these alleged violations and made an initial

 appearance in the Western District of Oklahoma on September 21, 2021, where he

 waived his right to an identity hearing. The Magistrate Judge ordered him

 transported back to the Eastern District of Oklahoma that day. In the Eastern District

 of Oklahoma, Mr. Booker waived his preliminary hearing at an initial appearance on

 September 28, 2021. A final revocation and sentencing hearing was set for

 December 16, 2021.

       In a sentencing memorandum filed before the final revocation hearing, Mr.

 Booker indicated that he intended to stipulate to the alleged violations and requested

 a guideline sentence. The memorandum explained that Mr. Booker suffered from

 “elements of schizophrenia” that “he need[ed] to treat with appropriate prescribed

 drugs rather than . . . illegal drugs.” R Vol. 1 at 57. It also indicated that Mr. Booker

 was prepared to undertake mental health treatment.

                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-7000    Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023        Page: 4

       The district court conducted the final revocation hearing on December 16,

 2021. At the hearing, the court stated that it had calculated the guideline range to be

 5 to 11 months in prison and that the statutory maximum sentence was a 24-month

 term of imprisonment. The court recited the factual bases for Mr. Booker’s charged

 supervised release violations, and Mr. Booker admitted to the violations. Mr. Booker

 apologized to the court, admitted that he had been self-medicating with illegal

 substances including methamphetamine, and represented that he was presently taking

 Risperdal and engaging in mental health treatment in detention.

       The court then revoked Mr. Booker’s supervised release and sentenced him to

 the statutory maximum, a 24-month term of imprisonment. The court justified the

 sentence as follows:

       The Court has considered the violation policy statements in Chapter 7 of
       the United States Sentencing Guideline manual now in effect and the
       guidelines in general. The Court views these policies and guidelines as
       advisory in nature for the purpose of these proceedings. Nevertheless, the
       Court has considered the sentencing guidelines along with all the factors
       set forth in Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 3553(a), which are applicable in the
       revocation context pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C. 3583(e), and I’ve done
       this to reach an appropriate and reasonable sentence in this case.
       Specifically, I’ve considered the nature and circumstances of the
       numerous violations and the violation conduct and the history and
       characteristics of Mr. Booker. Defendant has shown repeated disregard
       for rules and condition of his supervised release. He has continued to
       commit new law violations and he has illegally possessed controlled
       substances, which he acknowledges. He has on multiple occasions failed
       to report to his law enforcement contact as required by the conditions of
       his supervision and he has also travelled outside the district of supervision
       without permission of his probation officer.
       Based upon these factors, a sentence outside the advisory guideline range
       is necessary to serve as an adequate deterrent to this defendant as well as

                                            4
Appellate Case: 22-7000      Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 5

           others, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the
           offense, and provide protection for the public.
           R. Vol. 2 at 22–23 (emphasis added). Mr. Booker appeals, arguing that the

 district court’s reference to the need to “promote respect for the law, and provide just

 punishment for the offense” was reversible error in the context of a supervised

 release revocation proceeding. (Aplt. B. 5.) We agree that the district court erred,

 but affirm because Mr. Booker has not shown that the error affected his substantial

 rights.

                             II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

           Because Mr. Booker did not raise this argument below, we review for plain

 error. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en

 banc). Plain-error review requires Mr. Booker to “establish that (1) the district court

 committed error; (2) the error was plain—that is, it was obvious under current well-

 settled law; (3) the error affected the [d]efendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the

 error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

 proceedings.” United States v. Perez-Perez, 992 F.3d 970, 974 (10th Cir. 2021)

 (quoting United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1129–30 (10th Cir. 2019) (alteration

 in Perez-Perez)).

                                    III.   DISCUSSION

           A district court may revoke a term of supervised release and impose a term of

 imprisonment “when a person violates a condition of his or her supervised release.”

 United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2004). “However, in doing

                                              5
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023       Page: 6

 so the district court is required to consider” a subset of the § 3553(a) sentencing

 factors incorporated by reference into the statute governing the modification and

 revocation of supervised release. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Section 3583(e) provides

 that a district court “may” terminate, modify, or revoke a term of supervised release

 “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),

 (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

       Notably absent from this list is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which directs courts to

 consider the

       (2) the need for the sentence imposed--
                (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
                for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense[.]
 Section 3553(a)(2)(A) represents “retribution,” one of the “four purposes of

 sentencing” that courts must consider when fashioning a sentence during the initial

 sentencing process. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011).

       The district court justified Mr. Booker’s sentence for violation of supervised

 release in part as “necessary to serve as an adequate deterrent to this defendant as

 well as others, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the

 offense, and provide protection for the public.” R. Vol. 2 at 23. By referencing the

 need to “promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense,”

 the district court quoted from § 3553(a)(2)(A), the omitted factor.

       Mr. Booker argues that the district court erred by quoting from

 § 3553(a)(2)(A) because its omission in § 3583(e) means that district courts may not

 consider it when modifying or revoking a term of supervised release. In a series of
                                              6
Appellate Case: 22-7000    Document: 010110833802       Date Filed: 03/28/2023       Page: 7

 unpublished opinions, we have acknowledged that our circuit has not decided

 whether it is error to consider this “retribution” factor when modifying or revoking a

 term of supervised release. See United States v. Lee, 650 F. App’x 948, 951 (10th

 Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court have decided

 whether consideration of these § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors [not incorporated into

 § 3583(e)] renders a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable.”); United States

 v. Miller, 608 F. App’x 707, 709 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); United States v.

 Douglas, 556 F. App’x 747, 750–51 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); United States v.

 Chatburn, 505 F. App’x 713, 716–17 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).

        We construe the omission in § 3583(e) of the retribution factor found in

 § 3553(a)(2)(A) to preclude a sentencing court from relying on the need for

 retribution when modifying or revoking a term of supervised release and imposing a

 new prison sentence for violations of supervised release. However, we affirm

 because the district court’s reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) did not affect Mr. Booker’s

 substantial rights.

        A.     Section 3583(e) prohibits district courts from basing a revocation
               sentence on § 3553(a)(2)(A).

        When a sentencing statute mandates consideration of certain factors, it is

 procedural error to consider unenumerated factors. See United States v. Smart, 518

 F.3d 800, 803–04 (10th Cir. 2008); cf. Navajo Nation v. Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1213

 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he enumeration of certain things in a statute suggests that the

 legislature had no intent of including things not listed or embraced.” (quoting

                                            7
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 8

 Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1034

 & n.24 (10th Cir. 2003))). In Smart, we held that it was procedural error for a district

 court to base an initial term of imprisonment on a sentencing factor not enumerated

 in § 3553(a). Smart, 518 F.3d at 803–04. By its terms, § 3553(a) requires district

 courts to consider those factors that were enumerated in that section of the statute.

 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be

 imposed, shall consider . . . .”) (emphasis added). Because the statute “mandates

 consideration of its enumerated factors,” we concluded that it “implicitly forbids

 consideration of factors outside its scope.” Smart, 518 F.3d at 803–04.

       The rule from Smart applies here because § 3583(e) also requires courts to

 consider certain § 3553(a) factors when sentencing after a supervised release

 violation. United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1231 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting

 that “[b]efore deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release and

 determining the sentence imposed after revocation, the district court must consider”

 the § 3553(a) factors enumerated in § 3583(e) (emphasis added)); Kelley, 359 F.3d at

 1304 (noting that when modifying or revoking a term of supervised release, “the

 district court is required to consider the factors set forth in various subsections of 18

 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”). Because we read § 3583(e) to set forth those sentencing factors

 that courts must consider, the subsection “implicitly forbids consideration” of any

 other § 3553(a) factors when modifying or revoking a term of supervised release.

 Smart, 518 F.3d at 803–04. So, the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the sentencing

                                             8
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802         Date Filed: 03/28/2023      Page: 9

 factors enumerated in § 3583(e) precludes a court from considering the need for

 retribution when modifying or revoking a term of supervised release.1

       We find support for our conclusion in cases discussing § 3583(c), a similarly

 worded subsection that governs how a term of supervised release may be imposed.

 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). See Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Tr. Co.,

 522 U.S. 479, 501 (1998) (“[S]imilar language contained within the same section of a

 statute must be accorded a consistent meaning.”). That subsection likewise requires

 district courts to consider certain § 3553(a) factors, but not § 3553(a)(2)(A).2 In

 Tapia v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed § 3583(c) in dicta, noting that

 its import was to prohibit courts from “tak[ing] account of retribution (the first

       1
         We note that several of our sister circuits have concluded that mere reference
 to § 3553(a)(2)(A) does not necessarily make a revocation sentence per se
 unreasonable, but that reversible error may occur when the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor
 regarding retribution is the primary or predominating justification for a revocation
 sentence. United States v. Lee, 650 F. App’x 948, 952 (10th Cir. 2016)
 (unpublished) (collecting cases); see United States v. Sanchez, 900 F.3d 678, 684 n.5
 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Phillips, 791 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2015); United
 States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Young, 634 F.3d
 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062–64 (9th Cir.
 2007). McBride and Kelley oblige us to chart a different path.
       2
           Section 3583(c) states:

       The court, in determining whether to include a term of supervised release,
       and, if a term of supervised release is to be included, in determining the
       length of the term and the conditions of supervised release, shall consider
       the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D),
       (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).
 (emphasis added).

                                             9
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802         Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 10

  purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised release.” 564

  U.S. 319, 326 (2011).3 And in Benvie, we approvingly quoted Tapia for the same

  proposition. United States v. Benvie, 18 F.4th 665, 671 (10th Cir. 2021). We

  remanded for reconsideration of four of the supervised release conditions because the

  district court’s justification (1) did “not sufficiently explain, even in generalized

  terms, how the special conditions further the requirements of [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(d),”

  and (2) may have rested on “an impermissible rationale” because the district court

  justified the special conditions as “sufficiently punitive.” Id. While it is true that

  neither case squarely held that § 3583(c) prohibits a court from imposing an initial

  term of supervised release for purposes of retribution, they both support the

  proposition that when a statute uses mandatory language to direct a court to consider

  some but not all § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it is procedural error to consider an

  unenumerated factor. So, we consider both cases persuasive here.

        B.     The district court erred in sentencing Mr. Booker.

        With the foregoing established, we conclude that the district court erred in

  sentencing Mr. Booker. Our reason is straightforward: The omission of

  § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of sentencing factors enumerated in § 3583(e) means

  that a district court may not consider the need for a revocation sentence to (1) “reflect

        3
          This court considers itself bound by dicta from the Supreme Court almost as
  firmly as we are by its holdings. See United States v. Sutton, 30 F.4th 981, 987 (10th
  Cir. 2022); Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 892 F.3d 1066, 1079 (10th Cir. 2018)
  (noting that this rule applies with particular force when the “dicta is recent and not
  enfeebled by later statements” (quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217
  (10th Cir. 1996))).
                                              10
Appellate Case: 22-7000    Document: 010110833802         Date Filed: 03/28/2023      Page: 11

  the seriousness of the offense,” (2) “promote respect for the law,” and (3) “provide

  just punishment for the offense” when modifying or revoking a term of supervised

  release. So, when the district court concluded that “a sentence outside the advisory

  guideline range is necessary to . . . promote respect for the law, and provide just

  punishment for the offense,” it necessarily erred. R. Vol. 2 at 23.

        We reach our conclusion even though the bulk of the sentencing colloquy was

  focused on permissible considerations. We think it clear that when a defendant

  violates the terms of his supervised release, a district court can consider the conduct

  that resulted in the violations of the conditions of supervised release when deciding

  whether to revoke or modify the defendant’s supervised release. See United States v.

  Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To ignore the new violation

  underlying the revocation entirely would be to ignore a key predictor of a violator’s

  potential for reintroduction into society without relapse.”). This information is

  clearly relevant to assessing the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18

  U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), whether a sentence is likely to deter the defendant from

  committing further crimes, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and whether the public needs to be

  protected from the defendant, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing

  these factors as properly considered in the supervised-release revocation context);

  U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A(4) (2021) (“[T]he purpose of . . . supervised release should

  focus on the integration of the violator into the community, while providing the

  supervision designed to limit further criminal conduct.”).

                                             11
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023     Page: 12

        Here, the district court properly considered whether a term of imprisonment

  would deter Mr. Booker and others from engaging in violative conduct, the need to

  protect the public, the nature of Mr. Booker’s post-release conduct, and the number

  of violations. See R. Vol. 2 at 20 (“I have never seen so many violations of

  supervised release . . . [Y]ou really disregarded just about every term of your

  supervised release. It was not successful at all.”); Id. at 21 (“It sounds like you’ve

  have [sic] some history of drug use, and maybe you need some help coping with

  that.”); Id. at 22–23 (“Defendant has shown repeated disregard for rules and

  condition of his supervised release. He has continued to commit new law violations

  and he has illegally possessed controlled substances, which he acknowledges. He has

  on multiple occasions failed to report to his law enforcement contact as required by

  the conditions of his supervision and he has also travelled outside the district of

  supervision without permission of his probation officer.”). These are all permissible

  bases for revocation of the initial supervised release and resentencing and were

  relevant to determining (1) the extent to which Mr. Booker breached the trust of the

  district court, see United States v. Contreras-Martinez, 409 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th

  Cir. 2005), and (2) the likelihood that Mr. Booker would successfully abide by any

  future supervised release conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),

  (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5); see generally U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A (2021). But they do not

  cancel out the fact that the court also justified Mr. Booker’s sentence in part with

  direct quotation to factors that may not be considered when modifying or revoking a

  term of supervised release.

                                             12
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023    Page: 13

        The government argues that the district court did not err because the omission

  of § 3553(a)(2)(A) only prohibited the district court from punishing Mr. Booker

  again for his original offense of conviction. As our prior discussion indicates, we

  disagree. Here, the district court specifically justified Mr. Booker’s new sentence

  only on his violation of the terms of supervised release when it quoted the prohibited

  retribution factors. Clearly, violation of the terms of supervised release may be

  considered by the district court in determining how to address a defendant’s violation

  of those terms. The error here was in characterizing the new sentence, at least in

  part, as retributive. That would be error whether the district court was considering

  retribution for the original criminal conduct or for the behavior in violation of the

  terms of supervised release, or both.

        The government also relies on United States v. Douglas, but we find that

  unpublished case distinguishable. 556 F. App’x 747, 750 (10th Cir. 2014)

  (unpublished). For one, Douglas assumed that the district court erred when it

  referred to “the need to punish” the defendant but concluded that any error was not

  plain in light of a circuit split and no binding Tenth Circuit authority. Id. at 750–51.

  And even though the Douglas panel expressed doubt that the district court’s reference

  to punishment was error, it did so in part because the district court “never explicitly

  invoked § 3553(a)(2)(A) in its fleeting nod to punishment.” Id. at 749. But that is

  exactly what we have here: an explicit invocation of § 3553(a)(2)(A). So, Douglas

  does not undermine our conclusion that the district court erred.

                                             13
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023      Page: 14

        In sum, we conclude that the district court erred because it directly quoted

  from § 3553(a)(2)(A)—a factor it could not consider when modifying or revoking

  Mr. Booker’s term of supervised release—when explaining the reasons for Mr.

  Booker’s sentence.

        C.     This error did not affect Mr. Booker’s substantial rights.

        Mr. Booker’s appeal, however, fails at the third step of the plain-error analysis

  because he has not shown that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights.

  “An error seriously affects the defendant’s substantial rights . . . when the defendant

  demonstrates ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the

  result of the proceeding would have been different.’” United States v. Rosales-

  Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mendoza,

  698 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2012)); United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103,

  1108 (10th Cir. 2011). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

  undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Wolfname, 835 F.3d 1214,

  1222 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d at 1258)).

        Based on the record, we cannot conclude that Mr. Booker would have received

  a lower sentence had the district court not quoted from § 3553(a)(2)(A). To be sure,

  the quotation itself was error. But “a formulaic recitation of [a] statutorily

  enumerated sentencing factor[] supplies little indication that a court lengthened a

  sentence for [retributive] purposes.” United States v. Collins, 461 F. App’x 807, 810

  (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). That is especially true here, where the district court

  indicated that it was aware that not all § 3553(a) factors were applicable in the
                                             14
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023    Page: 15

  revocation sentencing context. R. Vol. 2 at 22 (“Nevertheless, the Court has

  considered the sentencing guidelines along with all the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.

  § 3553(a)], which are applicable in the revocation context pursuant to [18 U.S.C.

  § 3583(e)].”); see Collins, 461 F. App’x at 810.4

        We considered a similar issue in Penn, where the district court justified a post-

  revocation sentence as “just punishment for [the defendant’s] violation.” United

  States v. Penn, 601 F.3d 1007, 1012 (10th Cir. 2010). We concluded that a single

  reference to punishment did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. The

  court did not rely on the need for punishment in setting forth his initial reasons for

  the new sentence based upon violation of the terms of supervised release, and only

  raised it after defense counsel objected to his client receiving a high-end sentence.

  Id. “[B]ecause just punishment was not among the initial justifications the district

  court gave,” we saw “no reason to conclude [the defendant’s] sentence would have

  been different.” Id.

        Mr. Booker, citing Cordery, argues that because the district court referenced

  one impermissible factor as a reason for setting his sentence, we must conclude that

  “a lesser sentence [is] reasonably probable.” (Aplt. B. 15; Ry. B. 8.) We disagree.

        4
           Mr. Booker interprets the district court’s remarks differently, arguing that the
  district court’s reference to “all the factors set forth” meant that it considered every
  § 3553(a) factor, including § 3553(a)(2)(A). (Aplt. B. 9–10.) But we think the
  district court understood that not all § 3553(a) factors were applicable because it
  indicated that it was referring to the factors “which are applicable in the revocation
  context pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).]” R. Vol. 2 at 22. So, we disagree with
  Mr. Booker’s interpretation of the district court’s remarks.
                                             15
Appellate Case: 22-7000     Document: 010110833802        Date Filed: 03/28/2023      Page: 16

  In Cordery, the district court concluded that a sentence of “at least 56 months” was

  necessary to qualify the defendant for rehabilitative services in prison. 656 F.3d at

  1105. We concluded that the resulting 56-month sentence was error, because the

  Supreme Court held in Tapia that courts may not impose or lengthen a sentence for

  rehabilitative purposes. Id. at 1106. So, we agreed that “the court’s emphasis on its

  calculation of [treatment] eligibility suggests a reasonable probability that the

  sentence would have been lower without this consideration.” Id. at 1108.

        Unlike in Cordery, the district court in this case did not emphasize its reliance

  on an impermissible factor when sentencing Mr. Booker. It made a single

  impermissible reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) at the end of a lengthy and specific

  discussion of the appropriate reasons why a statutory-maximum sentence was

  necessary given Mr. Booker’s numerous supervised release violations and the fact

  that he clearly needed help to comply with the law in the future. While Mr. Booker

  casts the tenor of the district court’s sentencing remarks as retributive, we disagree.

  The district court’s sentencing remarks were proper and—apart from the single

  reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A)—focused on the sorts of considerations we expect

  courts to weigh when deciding whether to revoke supervised release. So, we think

  this case is closer to Penn than to Cordery.

        We also find Farley distinguishable. United States v. Farley, 36 F.4th 1245,

  1253 (10th Cir. 2022). There, the district court applied a six-level variance based on

  an erroneous interpretation of the guidelines. Id. We found the district court’s error

  affected the defendant’s substantial rights because it “was integral in the district

                                             16
Appellate Case: 22-7000    Document: 010110833802       Date Filed: 03/28/2023    Page: 17

  court’s reasoning and acted as a limiting factor in how low” the court “was willing to

  go with Mr. Farley’s sentence.” Id. But here, we have no indication that the district

  court would have imposed a lower sentence had it not quoted from § 3553(a)(2)(A).

        Had Mr. Booker raised this objection below, we are confident that the district

  court would have clarified its remarks and excised the erroneous quotation before

  imposing the same sentence. But because Mr. Booker “did not raise the issue when it

  could have been meaningfully addressed,” we are constrained to review a record

  “that has now become set in stone.” United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1119

  (10th Cir. 2017). Thus, plain error review is appropriate here and under that

  standard, Mr. Booker’s claim fails.

                                 IV.    CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district

  court. We DENY Mr. Booker’s Motion to Expedite Ruling as moot.

                                            17