Court Opinion

ID: 9841429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 14:05:52.73737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:28.412282
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                               NO. 2022-CA-0740-MR

JONATHAN PAGE                                                          APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 19-CR-00169

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND CETRULO, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Jonathan Page appeals from the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle in which he

was a passenger. Additionally, he complains the trial court incorrectly assessed

court costs. Having reviewed the briefs of the parties, the trial court’s order, and

the relevant law, we affirm the trial court in both respects.
                                       FACTS

             On September 16, 2019, Jonathan Page (Page) was the passenger in a

vehicle pulled over by the police in Union County by a Morganfield Police

Department officer. The officer stopped the vehicle because it had expired tags.

As the officer was approaching the vehicle, he noticed the smell of marijuana and

had both the driver and Page exit the vehicle. While Page was exiting the vehicle,

the officer observed him toss two baggies on the ground. The officer retrieved the

baggies, which contained suspected methamphetamine.

             While continuing to search Page, the officer found more suspected

bagged methamphetamine on his person, along with a pipe, a marijuana blunt, and

over six hundred dollars. A digital scale was found in the vehicle. Page was

arrested and transported to the police station. The arresting officer placed the

evidence in a temporary locker while processing Page.

             At the end of his shift, the arresting officer retrieved the evidence

from the temporary locker and placed the baggies into one large evidence bag

without emptying the contents, per departmental policy. The officer used a marker

to indicate the case number on each item of evidence, including the large evidence

bag containing the baggies holding the suspected illicit substance. The officer used

the scale in the police department to weigh the bag containing the baggies of

suspected methamphetamine and it weighed a total of 20.6 grams. The arresting

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officer then deposited the evidence into the evidence chute to be processed by the

evidence custodian.

             The next day, the evidence custodian processed the items of evidence

and the bag containing suspected methamphetamine was sent to the state police

laboratory for analysis. Printed identification stickers were placed on the baggies

to indicate the case with which the evidence was associated. At the same time, the

evidence custodian was processing evidence collected in another matter which

involved approximately two (2) grams of suspected powder cocaine. When he was

finished processing the evidence, he submitted the evidence to the state police

laboratory for analysis.

             When the results came back from the state laboratory, the substance

associated with the printed label listing Page’s case number was identified as

cocaine and amounted to 1.752 grams. Noting the discrepancy between the

arresting officer’s report of what he had seized and what was returned from the

laboratory, particularly the amount, the evidence custodian investigated. He

determined he must have switched evidence stickers, mistakenly placing the other

case’s sticker on the evidence in Page’s case. The bag actually containing the

evidence collected in Page’s matter was still located in the department’s evidence

locker and it had been mislabeled with the other matter’s case number. The bag

was re-labeled with a sticker containing Page’s case number and was submitted to

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the state police laboratory for analysis. The evidence custodian was confident the

bag which had remained in the department’s evidence locker contained the

evidence in Page’s case because the case number the arresting officer had marked

on the baggie prior to dropping it in the evidence locker was visible and was the

case number associated with Page’s case. The evidence, now believed to be

correctly marked, was submitted to the state police lab. The report generated

indicated the two bags recovered from Page contained methamphetamine with a

total weight of 18.235 grams, exclusive of packaging.

             Page filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from him citing

the confusion with the chain of custody. He noted the arresting officer insisted

there had been at least three baggies of suspected methamphetamine seized from

Page, but even after the “corrections” had been made, only two baggies were

attributed to his case, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the “correction.”

             In a written order, the trial court agreed there was a weight

discrepancy between the material weighed by the arresting officer before turning

the items in to the evidence custodian (20.6 grams) and the weight of the two bags

of methamphetamine received back from the lab (18.235 grams) but reasoned the

lab weighed the material exclusive of packaging, which explained the approximate

2.5 gram difference in weight. The trial court held the legitimacy of the

department’s evidence management procedures and whether the “correction” was

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valid were questions of fact to be determined by the jury. The motion to suppress

was denied.

              Page entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking in a

controlled substance, tampering with evidence, possession of marijuana, and

possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a sentence of seven (7) years’

imprisonment and now appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

We affirm.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

              The standard of review employed in reviewing motions to suppress

evidence is well established. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to

suppress, we utilize a clear error standard of review for factual findings and a de

novo standard of review for conclusions of law. Welch v. Commonwealth, 149

S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004).” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 305

(Ky. 2006).

              The imposition of court costs upon a defendant is a matter of

sentencing and this Court has inherent authority to correct a sentencing error.

Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 (Ky. 2010).

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                                     ANALYSIS

             1. Motion to Suppress

             Page argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

evidence seized in the case due to the confusion which occurred with the labeling

of the bags containing the purported evidence. He does not challenge any of the

trial court’s factual findings, but only the court’s legal conclusion.

             The trial court carefully reviewed the matter, including the testimony

of both the arresting officer and the evidence custodian at a hearing on the motion.

The court determined there was a “reasonable probability” the evidence had not

been altered in any material respect.

             Even with respect to substances which are not clearly
             identifiable or distinguishable, it is unnecessary to
             establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all
             possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as
             there is persuasive evidence that “the reasonable
             probability is that the evidence has not been altered in
             any material respect.” United States v. Cardenas, 864
             F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
             909, 109 S. Ct. 3197, 105 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1989). See also
             Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 738, 740
             (1969). Gaps in the chain normally go to the weight of
             the evidence rather than to its admissibility. United
             States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir.1988).

Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998).

             The trial court ruled any irregularities in the handling of the evidence

did not go to admissibility, but to credibility of the evidence as assessed by a jury.

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See Penman v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 237, 244 (Ky. 2006), overruled on

other grounds by Rose v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2010). “Even if we

assume there are gaps or problems in the chain of custody, their presence

‘normally go[es] to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.’”

Helphenstine v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Ky. 2014) (citing

Rabovsky, 973 S.W.2d at 8). We agree with the trial court. The trial court

committed no error in denying the motion to suppress.

             2. Court costs

             Page raises for the first time on appeal the question of whether the

trial court erred in assessing $165 in court costs. In his brief, he notes he was

represented by appointed counsel, so the trial court must have determined he was

indigent. However, one may be determined to be indigent, but not a “poor person”

who cannot be assessed court costs. See Maynes v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d

922, 929 (Ky. 2012) (“Having carefully considered the applicable statutes, we

conclude that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court

costs despite Maynes’s status as an indigent defendant entitled to the services of a

public defender.”).

             Page did not question the assessment of costs at the entry of his plea

and the imposition of his sentence.

             If a trial judge was not asked at sentencing to determine
             the defendant’s poverty status and did not otherwise

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             presume the defendant to be an indigent or poor person
             before imposing court costs, then there is no error to
             correct on appeal. This is because there is no affront to
             justice when we affirm the assessment of court costs
             upon a defendant whose status was not determined. It is
             only when the defendant’s poverty status has been
             established, and court costs assessed contrary to that
             status, that we have a genuine “sentencing error” to
             correct on appeal.

Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Ky. 2014).

             The trial court rescinded a “public defender recoupment fee” of

$1,250.00 which had been assessed by the district court. It is clear the trial court

determined, at best, Page was indigent, but did not and was not asked to determine

he was a “poor person” to whom court costs could not be assessed. We affirm.

                                  CONCLUSION

             We find the trial court did not commit error in denying the motion to

suppress evidence or in imposing court costs. The trial court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Kayla D. Deatherage                       Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Todd D. Ferguson
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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