Court Opinion

ID: 9912452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:05:21.536072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:25.807587
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                     Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                 Court of Appeals
                                    NO. 2022-CA-1260-MR

IJEOMA ODIGWE                                                                     APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE JAMES A. WETHINGTON, JUDGE
                             ACTION NO. 20-CI-00415

LAUREN ANDRINI AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES                                                                       APPELLEES

                                            OPINION
                                           AFFIRMING

                                          ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Ijeoma Odigwe (“Odigwe”), an Arizona resident,1 appeals

from two orders2 of the Daviess Circuit Court finding it has personal jurisdiction

1
    Odigwe currently resides in Missouri but considers Arizona his legal residence.
2
 Odigwe appeals from the November 17, 2021 Orders of Personal Jurisdiction, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Particular Case Jurisdiction and the September 1, 2022 Order Affirming
Jurisdiction and Contempt.
over Odigwe and particular case jurisdiction to modify a Michigan child support

order. After careful review, we affirm.

                                 BACKGROUND

             Odigwe and Lauren Andrini (“Andrini”) met at Notre Dame Law

School in Indiana in 2017. The two had a brief relationship and Andrini became

pregnant. A year later, Andrini returned to her home state of Michigan to give

birth to their child. Prior to the birth, Odigwe warned Andrini in an email: “I will

. . . make you hunt me down for child support. We will be in and out of court all

day, every day for the next 18 years. Every possible matter that I can take to court,

I will take to court.” The statement proved a self-fulfilling prophecy.

             In 2018, following the birth of the child, Andrini filed a paternity

action in Ottawa County, Michigan. Shortly after, the Michigan court entered a

Consent Judgment of Paternity (“Consent Judgment”), which established Odigwe’s

paternity, gave Andrini full custody of the child, and set child support and

parenting time. The court determined it had jurisdiction over the parties’ custody

and parenting time issues under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) and jurisdiction over the parties’ child support

issues under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”).

             After Andrini graduated from law school, she and the child moved to

Daviess County, Kentucky. The Michigan court entered an order granting

                                          -2-
Andrini’s request to change the child’s legal residence and domicile to Kentucky,

finding it “no longer ha[d] continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child[,]” and

that “[a]ny future modifications of the child-custody determination involving the

minor child shall be made by an appropriate Court which obtains appropriate

subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA[.]” The order did not address the

court’s previous child support ruling, but did note that “[e]xcept as provided in this

order, the prior orders of this Court remain in full force and effect.”

                 Subsequently, Odigwe moved to register the Michigan child custody

determination in Daviess County, Kentucky pursuant to KRS3 403.850. Attached

to his petition was the entire Consent Judgment, including the child support order

and worksheet. Andrini did not contest registration. Prior to the Daviess Circuit

Court’s ruling on the petition to register, Odigwe filed a motion to modify custody

and establish a parenting time schedule.4 Along with the motion, Odigwe tendered

an order which provided, in relevant part:

                Father is awarded eight (8) hours of parenting time on
                each day of the second weekend of every month. . . .
                Father is responsible for his costs of transportation such
                as hotel, car rental, gas, etc. Father will receive an
                appropriate credit towards his monthly child support
                payment for Minor Child that will be determined by
                this Court, or agreement of the parents.

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
    Odigwe later withdrew the motion on August 22, 2022.

                                              -3-
(Emphasis added.)

              A week later, Odigwe filed an emergency motion for summer 2020

parenting time and requested the court to “equitably divi[de] the transportation

time and costs . . . .” The hearing on the motion primarily concerned where the

parties would meet and who would bear the burden of transportation. At one point,

Odigwe’s counsel stated:

              One more arrow to the quiver of options here. [Odigwe]
              has a child support obligation on a monthly basis of, I
              believe, $150 a month which was set under Michigan
              law, however they do it. But I think it was done by an
              agreement . . . . [T]hat $150 a month, which he’s paying,
              can be utilized towards solving this parenting time
              problem to some extent. Let me say that another way, if
              Mrs. Andrini was traveling to facilitate the visitation that
              would . . . cost her time and . . . money to do that. The
              travel also costs [Odigwe] time and money. So, if he had
              a portion of that child support obligation, or all of it,
              suspended temporarily just to deal with this, it frees up
              some money for him to have a resource to visit.

However, this option was not further explored or pursued. The parties eventually

agreed Odigwe would travel to Owensboro on June 20-21, 2020, and cover the

costs of the trip.

              The Daviess Circuit Court entered an order registering the foreign

custody determination on June 17, 2020. The order found the court had subject

matter jurisdiction over the proceeding and personal jurisdiction over the parties.

                                          -4-
The order did not address Odigwe’s motion to modify custody and parenting time,

nor did it address child support.

               On August 7, 2020, Andrini filed a motion to modify child support.

Odigwe moved to dismiss the motion, arguing Andrini had failed to register the

child support order in Kentucky as required by the UIFSA.5 He also argued the

Daviess Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him to modify child

support because none of the grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction under the

UIFSA were applicable.6 Finally, Odigwe claimed the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction7 to modify the child support order because the requirements of KRS

407.5611 had not been satisfied.

               Andrini responded that Odigwe effectively registered the child

support order when he registered the Consent Judgment (with the included child

support order and worksheet) and had waived jurisdictional arguments by not

objecting to UIFSA jurisdiction when he filed his petition to register the Michigan

5
    KRS 407.5611.
6
    See KRS 407.5201.
7
  While Odigwe used the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” in his motion to dismiss, his
arguments actually pertain to particular case jurisdiction. “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a
court’s authority to determine ‘this kind of case’ (as opposed to ‘this case’).” Commonwealth v.
Griffin, 942 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Ky. 1997) (citation omitted). Particular case jurisdiction, on the
other hand, “refers to a court’s authority to determine a specific case (as opposed to the class of
cases of which the court has subject matter jurisdiction).” Id. Odigwe did not argue the circuit
court lacked authority to hear child support cases generally, but that it lacked authority to hear
this particular case because Andrini did not meet the procedural requirements of UIFSA to
invoke the circuit court’s jurisdiction. Odigwe has corrected this error on appeal.

                                                -5-
custody determination and by affirmatively seeking modification of his child

support payment to reflect his travel costs for visitation in a proposed order.

             A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on September 14, 2020.

The court informed the parties it had not yet read the pleadings and would

therefore take the motion under advisement. When the parties appeared again to

address Odigwe’s motion to modify parenting time, the court deferred ruling on

both motions until the November 20, 2020 final hearing, but stated it was inclined

to deny Odigwe’s motion to dismiss. On Odigwe’s motion, the hearing was

continued indefinitely.

             Four months later, on March 26, 2020, Odigwe filed a petition for a

writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals, seeking to prevent Daviess Circuit

Court Judge Julia Gordon (“Judge Gordon”) from modifying the Michigan child

support order. Ultimately, the petition was denied, and that ruling was affirmed by

the Kentucky Supreme Court on appeal.8 Also during this time, Odigwe

successfully moved to have Judge Gordon recused and the case was transferred to

Judge Jay Wethington (“Judge Wethington”).

             On November 17, 2021, following a hearing, the Daviess Circuit

Court denied Odigwe’s motion to dismiss, finding it had personal jurisdiction over

8
 See Odigwe v. Gordon, No. 2021-CA-0347-OA (Ky. App. Sep. 2, 2021); Odigwe v.
Wethington, No. 2022-SC-0026-MR, 2022 WL 3640915 (Ky. Aug. 18, 2022).

                                          -6-
Odigwe for child support purposes and subject-matter and particular case

jurisdiction to modify Michigan’s child support order, and that the UIFSA

requirements for registering the child support order had been substantially

complied with or waived. Odigwe then moved to alter, amend, or vacate and the

motion was set for hearing on February 16, 2022. On the day of the hearing,

Odigwe moved to disqualify Judge Wethington. He also filed a notice of

unavailability for the months of February, March, and April.

               The parties were next set to appear before the court on May 18, 2022.

However, on the eve of the hearing, Odigwe filed a renewed motion to disqualify

Judge Wethington. Odigwe’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate was eventually

denied on September 1, 2022. Odigwe then filed a motion to alter, amend, or

vacate the September 2022 order. Following that denial, Odigwe filed this appeal.9

                                         ANALYSIS

               Odigwe argues the circuit court erred when it determined (1) the

Michigan support order was registered in Kentucky, (2) it had personal jurisdiction

over him for child support purposes, and (3) it had particular case jurisdiction over

the Michigan support order. “Jurisdiction is a question of law, and our review is de

9
  Since filing the notice of appeal, Odigwe has continued to file motions in the circuit court,
including moving to disqualify a third judge, Thomas Castlen. All told, the three-year court case
produced 23 volumes of record on appeal, consisting mostly of motions and exhibits filed by
Odigwe. It does indeed appear that, in Odigwe’s words, “[e]very possible matter that [he could]
take to court, [he did] take to court.”

                                               -7-
novo.” Commonwealth v. B.H., 548 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. 2018) (citation

omitted).

             Turning to Odigwe’s first argument, the UIFSA requires a party

seeking to modify a child support order issued in another state to register that order

in Kentucky. KRS 407.5609. “The requirements for registration are set out in

KRS 407.5602, and include: a letter of transmittal to the court requesting

registration and enforcement; two copies, one certified, of all orders to be

registered, including modifications thereof; a sworn statement of the movant or the

custodian of the records stating the amount of any arrearage; and identifying

information of the obligor and the obligee, particularly where they live.” Adams-

Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky, 467 S.W.3d 767, 776 (Ky. 2015).

             The circuit court determined the child support order was registered

pursuant to KRS 407.5101(21) and KRS 407.5603 when Odigwe filed it alongside

his petition to register the Michigan custody determination. Attached to Odigwe’s

petition was the entire consent judgment, including the child support order. KRS

407.5101(21) defines “register” as “to file in a tribunal of this state, a support order

or judgment determining parentage of a child issued in another state or foreign

country[.]” Similarly, KRS 407.5603(1) provides that “[a] support order or

income-withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order is

registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.” Because

                                          -8-
Odigwe filed the child support order along with his petition to register the child

custody determination, the court ruled it had been effectively registered. The

circuit court did not address the more specific provisions in KRS 407.5602

concerning registration.

             Odigwe argues the child support order was never properly registered

because the specific requirements for registering the order, set forth in KRS

407.5602, were not followed. He cites Smyrichinsky, which held that the

“statutory requirements are not optional.” 467 S.W.3d at 777. However,

Smyrichinsky also recognized that “the rules for registering another state’s order

for purposes of modification, though important, can ultimately be waived. They

are claim-processing rules, not substantive, jurisdictional limits on a court’s

authority to act.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, we need not decide whether the

Michigan child support order was properly registered because we hold Odigwe

waived any objection to registration by filing the support order along with his

petition to register the custody determination.

             In Smyrichinsky, our Supreme Court held that mother’s failure to

timely object to father’s noncompliance with KRS 407.5602’s requirements for

registration waived any argument concerning improper registration. Here, Odigwe

filed the child support order in the Daviess Circuit Court along with his petition to

register the child custody determination. While he argues he did not intend to

                                          -9-
register the child support order, his actions certainly registered the order as defined

in KRS 407.5101(21). So, while Andrini may not have followed KRS 407.5602’s

requirements for registration, Odigwe was the one who filed the order in Kentucky

and thereby waived any later objection to registration.

             Further, as in Smyrichinsky, “by this point in time, the statutory

elements required to register a foreign decree or order can be established from

various filings and proof in the record, such that there is substantial if not perfect

compliance with the statute.” 467 S.W.3d at 778. We would note that while this

appeal has been pending, Odigwe successfully moved for modification of his child

support obligation in Daviess Circuit Court, certainly bringing all of KRS

407.5602’s required information before the court. Therefore, we find no error.

             As to Odigwe’s next argument, personal jurisdiction is a “court’s

authority to determine a claim affecting a specific person.” Nordike v. Nordike,

231 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Ky. 2007) (citation omitted). “Personal jurisdiction is

required for child support orders to be enforceable because such orders involve the

imposition of a personal obligation to pay money.” Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d

601, 606 (Ky. App. 2006) (citation omitted). For child support purposes, personal

jurisdiction is governed by KRS 407.5201, which provides in relevant part:

             (1) In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order
             or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this
             state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a

                                          -10-
             nonresident individual or the individual’s guardian or
             conservator if:

                   (a) The individual is personally served with
                   summons, or notice within this state;

                   (b) The individual submits to the jurisdiction of
                   this state by consent in a record, by entering a
                   general appearance, or by filing a responsive
                   pleading having the effect of waiving any contest
                   to personal jurisdiction;

                   (c) The individual resided with the child in this
                   state;

                   (d) The individual resided in this state and
                   provided prenatal expenses or support for the
                   child;

                   (e) The child resides in this state as a result of the
                   acts or directives of the individual;

                   (f) The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in
                   this state and the child may have been conceived
                   by that act of intercourse;

                   (g) The individual asserted parentage of a child in
                   the putative father registry maintained in this state
                   by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services; or

                   (h) There is any other basis consistent with the
                   constitutions of this state and the United States for
                   the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

KRS 407.5201(1).

             The circuit court determined it had personal jurisdiction over Odigwe,

an Arizona resident, pursuant to subsection (b), “[t]he individual submits to the

                                         -11-
jurisdiction of this state . . . by filing a responsive pleading having the effect of

waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction[.]” It found Odigwe waived any

jurisdictional objection and subjected himself to Kentucky’s jurisdiction by

affirmatively requesting an abatement of his child support obligation.

              The court noted that attached to Odigwe’s May 2020 Motion to

Modify Custody and Parenting Time was a proposed order specifically granting

him credit towards his monthly child support obligation, which it interpreted as a

request to modify his support obligation since he tendered the order. Then, in his

June 2020 Emergency Motion for Summer 2020 Parenting Time, Odigwe sought a

court order “equitably diving [sic] the transportation time and costs for parenting

time.” This request was clarified at the hearing on the motion when Odigwe’s

counsel suggested the court suspend “a portion of [Odigwe’s] child support

obligation, or all of it . . . temporarily[.]”

              The court found that while the modification request “was not done

with the formalities anticipated by UIFSA when the parties to a foreign support

order seek . . . initial modification . . . . the plain meaning of [Odigwe’s] requests,

both personally and through counsel . . . indicate Petitioner Odigwe requested a

modification of his child support in Kentucky[.]”

              Odigwe argues none of his pleadings can reasonably be construed as a

motion to modify child support because the procedural rules for filing such

                                            -12-
motions were not referenced or followed. He also urges us to look to his request

for relief in his Motion to Modify Custody and Parenting Time, which makes no

mention of child support, rather than his tendered order accompanying the motion,

in determining whether he affirmatively sought modification of the Michigan child

support order.

             While Odigwe’s Motion to Modify Custody and Parenting Time and

Emergency Motion for Summer 2020 Parenting Time make no mention of child

support, we cannot overlook the plain language of the proposed order that Odigwe

himself tendered along with his motion to modify custody. That order grants a

“credit towards [Odigwe’s] monthly child support payment for Minor Child” to be

determined by the Daviess Circuit Court or agreement of the parties, which is an

explicit reference to a reduction in child support. This is in addition to the clear

statement from Odigwe’s counsel at the June 2020 hearing on the emergency

motion for parenting time which proposed suspending Odigwe’s child support

obligation. While Odigwe may downplay these references to child support as

secondary to his primary objective – parenting time with his son – they remain

unequivocal requests to modify child support.

             As noted by the circuit court, Odigwe’s requests may not have been

formal motions to modify child support, but we find them sufficient to waive any

objection by Odigwe to Kentucky exercising personal jurisdiction over him for

                                         -13-
child support purposes. Indeed, the UIFSA’s long-arm statute does not require a

formal motion to modify child support to waive personal jurisdiction, only a

pleading “having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction[.]” The

Commentary to the UIFSA clarifies that “[s]ubsection (2) expresses the principle

that a nonresident party concedes personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief

. . . .” Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 201 cmt. (2001). By tendering an

order that gave him credit toward his child support payment, Odigwe effectively

asked for a modification of child support. At the very least, he should have

reasonably foreseen child support issues might be litigated in Kentucky. He cannot

now object to personal jurisdiction after attempting to avail himself of Kentucky’s

courts on child support issues.

               But that is not the end of our inquiry. The UIFSA’s long-arm statute

may not be used to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident to modify an

out-of-state child support order unless the requirements of KRS 407.5611 are met.

KRS 407.5201(2). This brings us to Odigwe’s last argument: the circuit court

lacked particular case jurisdiction to modify the Michigan support order.

               KRS 407.5611 governs the scope of a Kentucky court’s authority to

modify a child support order issued in another state.10 Pursuant to KRS

10
  KRS 407.5613 applies when all parties who are individuals reside in Kentucky, and the child
does not reside in the state that issued the child support order. Here, Andrini and the child live in

                                                -14-
407.5611(1), modification may only occur if three requirements are met: (1)

neither the parties nor the child resides in the issuing state; (2) a nonresident

petitioner seeks modification; and (3) Kentucky has personal jurisdiction over the

respondent.11 KRS 407.5611(1)(a). The circuit court found all requirements

satisfied.

              First, it is undisputed that none of the parties or the child still reside in

Michigan. As to the second requirement, the circuit court found that Odigwe, a

nonresident, sought modification of his child support in Kentucky through his

pleadings and the arguments of his counsel. The court noted Odigwe’s requests for

modification were prior to Andrini’s motion to modify child support, making him

the petitioner for purposes of the statute. Finally, the court held that Andrini, as

respondent and a resident of Kentucky, was subject to personal jurisdiction in

Daviess Circuit Court.

              Odigwe argues Andrini is the only party that moved to modify child

support and therefore she is the petitioner. Because she is a resident of Kentucky

and KRS 407.5611(1)(a)2. requires that the petitioner be a nonresident, the

statutory prerequisites for particular case jurisdiction were not satisfied. Odigwe’s

Kentucky, but Odigwe is a resident of Arizona. Therefore, KRS 407.5611, rather than KRS
407.5613, controls.
11
  KRS 407.5611(1)(b) provides an alternate means of modification: if all of the parties can
agree in writing that Kentucky can modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction.

                                             -15-
argument raises an interesting question, even if not developed fully. How can he

be the petitioner when it was Andrini’s motion to modify child support that was

before the court, and that was the subject of his motion to dismiss and

jurisdictional objections?

             Regardless, we find no error in the circuit court’s exercise of

jurisdiction to modify the Michigan child support order because Odigwe waived

any objection to particular case jurisdiction by his requests to modify child support.

Particular case jurisdiction, like personal jurisdiction, may be waived.

Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2013). The Commentary

to the UIFSA clarifies that KRS 407.5611(1)(a)2.’s requirement that the party

seeking modification be a nonresident of the forum in which he seeks modification

“attempts to achieve a rough justice between the parties in the majority of cases by

preventing a litigant from choosing to seek modification in a local tribunal to the

marked disadvantage of the other party.” Unif. Interstate Family Support Act §

611 cmt. (2001). That concern is not present in this case where Odigwe himself

twice moved for modification of the Michigan child support order in Kentucky,

albeit informally, and prior to Andrini’s request for modification. Having moved

himself to modify child support, we find that Odigwe waived his objections to

particular case jurisdiction.

                                        -16-
             Because of that waiver, the Daviess Circuit Court did not err in

asserting personal jurisdiction over Odigwe and particular case jurisdiction to

modify the Michigan child support order, or in denying Odigwe’s motion to

dismiss Andrini’s motion to modify child support for lack of jurisdiction. The

orders of the Daviess Circuit Court are affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAUREN
                                          ANDRINI:
William D. Tingley
Nathan R. Hardymon                        J. Andrew Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky                      Owensboro, Kentucky

                                        -17-