Court Opinion

ID: 9522025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:05.426482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:13.701377
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCOTT, dissenting: Considering the procedural posture of this case, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. This case comes on appeal pursuant to an order granting defendant/appellee summary judgment; therefore, all of the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. (Schuman v. Pekin House Restaurant & Lounge (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 532, 430 N.E.2d 145.) Plaintiffs need not prove their case at this stage, but must present some facts which would arguably entitle them to a judgment under applicable law. (Chisolm v. Stephens (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 999, 365 N.E.2d 80.) The central question in this case is whether plaintiffs have presented any evidence which would impute constructive notice upon the defendant of the defective condition of the stop sign. I believe they have. Illinois case law indicates that constructive notice of an unreasonably safe condition of property maintained by a public entity is established when a condition has existed for such a length of time, or is so conspicuous, that authorities, by exercising reasonable care and diligence, might have known of it. (Buford v. Chicago Housing Authority (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 235, 476 N.E.2d 427.) In this case, the majority states that plaintiffs have made judicial admissions which contradict Neff’s testimony and I agree that the testimony conflicts to a certain extent. Nonetheless, the evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and, as such, some evidence has been presented which indicates the sign may have been in a defective condition for as long as two weeks. Moreover, considering the conspicuous nature of the stop sign in question, I am not willing to state, as a matter of law, that two weeks are insufficient to impute constructive notice upon defendant. I believe that is properly a question for a jury to decide. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.