Court Opinion

ID: 9961396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 16:14:51.945905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:41.488204
License: Public Domain

No. 9                           April 11, 2024                                163

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                     STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                   Respondent on Review,
                              v.
                    RAJI AFIFE AZAR,
                    Petitioner on Review.
          (CC 18CR28295) (CA A170612) (SC S069578)

    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Argued and submitted March 3, 2023.
    Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs
was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section.
   Joanna Hershey, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, Bushong and Masih, Justices, and Balmer, Senior
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
    DeHOOG, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
  Bushong, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which
Garrett, J., and Balmer, S.J., joined.

______________
     * Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Kenneth R. Walker, Judge.
318 Or App 724, 509 P3d 668 (2022).
    ** James, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Baldwin, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral argument, but
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
164   State v. Azar
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                    165

              DeHOOG, J.
         Under the Oregon Criminal Code, a person com-
mits the offense of “computer crime” if, in relevant part, the
person accesses or uses (or attempts to access or use) a com-
puter, computer system, or computer network for the pur-
pose of committing theft. ORS 164.377(2)(c).1 At issue in this
case is whether defendant’s conduct fell within the scope of
that provision. That is, does knowingly selling stolen prop-
erty using the online auction site eBay—conduct that defen-
dant does not dispute would constitute theft by receiving
under ORS 164.0952 —constitute computer crime?
        The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, con-
cluded that such conduct constitutes computer crime, and
it upheld the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal as to the relevant charges against
him. State v. Azar, 318 Or App 724, 738, 509 P3d 668 (2022).
As we explain below, we conclude that the legislature did
not intend for the computer crime statute to reach conduct
such as defendant’s, which may constitute “theft” within the
meaning of the Criminal Code but neither interferes with
another’s protected interests in—or electronically located
on—a computer, computer system, or computer network
    1
        ORS 164.377(2) provides, in part:
        “Any person commits computer crime who knowingly accesses, attempts
    to access or uses, or attempts to use, any computer, computer system, com-
    puter network or any part thereof for the purpose of:
          “* * * * *
        “(c) Committing theft, including, but not limited to, theft of proprietary
    information or theft of an intimate image.”
    2
      Under ORS 164.095(1),
        “[a] person commits theft by receiving if the person receives, retains,
    conceals or disposes of property of another knowing or having good reason to
    know that the property was the subject of theft.”
     Although “disposes” is not defined by statute, defendant does not dispute that
selling property that a person knows or should know is stolen constitutes theft
by receiving. See State v. Farmer, 44 Or App 157, 160, 605 P2d 716 (1980) (reach-
ing that conclusion based upon ORS 164.055(1)(c), which provides that theft by
receiving constitutes theft in the first degree when “committed by buying, selling,
borrowing or lending on the security of the property”). We assume for purposes
of the present discussion that selling stolen property with the requisite mental
state constitutes theft by receiving, but we express no opinion on when in the
course of a transaction an online sale qualifies as “dispos[ing],” whether at the
time of the sale, at the time the property is physically transferred, or at some
other time.
166                                                            State v. Azar

(computer),3 nor depends on computer technology as the
means of gaining access to the thing that the person seeks
to unlawfully obtain. Here, the conduct with which the state
charged defendant involved the theft of merchandise that
bore no relationship to eBay’s or anyone else’s protected
interests in computers, their contents, or rights held in dig-
ital form, and defendant was not dependent on computer
technology to gain access to something he sought to steal.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and, accord-
ingly, reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Appeals.4
                           I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
         When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal, “we view the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the state to determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340,
343, 537 P3d 503 (2023). The Court of Appeals opinion sets
forth the relevant facts—which are undisputed—in some
detail. Azar, 318 Or App at 727-28. In brief, eBay is an inter-
net site on which individuals can post items for sale either
through an online auction or at fixed, “buy-it-now” prices.
The eBay website processes purchasers’ payments using—
among other services—PayPal, an online payment platform.
Sellers can then transfer funds received via PayPal into
their own bank accounts.

    3
      The parties do not distinguish whether, for purposes of the computer crime
statute, using eBay’s online sales platform should be considered using (or access-
ing) a “computer,” a “computer system,” a “computer network,” or some combina-
tion of all three, nor do they suggest that any such distinction might bear on our
assessment of the arguments or our interpretation of ORS 164.377(2)(c). Thus, we
use those terms largely interchangeably and use the term “computer” to collec-
tively reference all three terms.
    4
      At trial, the jury convicted defendant of three counts of computer crime
and other offenses. Four of those convictions were nonunanimous. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded defendant’s four nonunanimous convic-
tions—including the three counts of computer crime at issue here—under Ramos
v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). Azar, 318 Or App
at 726. Our decision regarding defendant’s three computer crime convictions
does not affect the Court of Appeals’ ruling as to the remaining nonunanimous
conviction.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                 167

          As part of an investigation into a series of thefts
from several retail stores, undercover investigators sold
defendant various items of merchandise, falsely telling him
that the items had been stolen. Law enforcement officers
were then able to track the “stolen” merchandise by pur-
chasing items from an eBay account associated with defen-
dant and confirming that those items were the ones that
they had sold to defendant. Police later arrested defendant,
who admitted that he had used his sister’s eBay account to
sell stolen property. Defendant further admitted that he had
obtained the sales proceeds by transferring the funds from
his sister’s PayPal account into his own PayPal account, and
from there into his bank account.
B.   Procedural History
         As a result of that conduct, the state charged
defendant with, in relevant part, three counts of “computer
crime,” ORS 164.377(2)(c).5 The state’s theory, as set out in
the indictment, was that, by selling merchandise on eBay
that he believed to be stolen, defendant had “access[ed] and
use[d] a computer, computer system, and computer network
for the purpose of committing theft of property” by receiv-
ing. At trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal as to
those counts, arguing that the state had not proved that he
had engaged in “computer hacking,” which, he asserted, was
required to establish computer crime.6 Defendant further
argued that, if the computer crime statute could be applied
broadly enough to encompass his conduct, then it would be
unconstitutionally vague. The trial court denied defendant’s

    5
      Defendant also was charged with and ultimately convicted of multiple
counts of attempted first-degree theft (ORS 161.405 and ORS 164.055), launder-
ing a monetary instrument (ORS 164.170), and conspiracy (ORS 161.450). Those
other convictions are not at issue on review.
    6
      In State v. Nascimento, 360 Or 28, 42, 379 P3d 484 (2016), this court
addressed a different subsection of the computer crime statute, ORS 164.377(4),
which prohibits, in part, the unauthorized use or accessing of computers, com-
puter systems, computer networks, or the data they contain. We observed that
such intrusion or unauthorized access by third parties was commonly referred to
as “hacking.” Nascimento, 360 Or at 42 (observing more generally that, as intro-
duced, the bill that later encompassed “computer crime” was initially concerned
with the theft of cable television services). We understand defendant to use the
term “hacking” in the same way. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1018
(unabridged ed 2002) (defining “hacking,” as relevant here, to mean “the gaining
of unauthorized access to data in a system or computer”).
168                                             State v. Azar

motion, and a nonunanimous jury convicted defendant of
those counts.
         Defendant appealed, reprising his arguments from
the trial court. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
defendant’s nonunanimous convictions for a new trial, but
it otherwise affirmed. Azar, 318 Or App at 726. In a split
decision, the majority held that “a person violates [ORS
164.377(2)] when the person’s use or access of a computer
is the direct, necessary means by which the person accom-
plishes one of the prohibited purposes in ORS 164.377(2)(a)
through (c).” Id. at 737. The court rejected defendant’s argu-
ment that computer crime is limited to computer hacking,
as well as his contextual argument that “theft” under ORS
164.377(2)(c) is limited to taking something from a computer
and does not encompass all conduct that might satisfy one
of the various statutory definitions of “theft.” In concluding
otherwise, the court reasoned that, because “theft” has an
“established legal meaning” in the Criminal Code, “theft”
as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses each of the forms
of theft described in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiv-
ing, see ORS 164.015(5) (incorporating ORS 164.095 (defin-
ing that offense)). Id. at 733-34. As to defendant’s vagueness
challenge, the court explained that, because it construed
the computer crime statute to require that a defendant’s
“use or access[ing]” of a computer be “more than incidental”
and “the direct, necessary means” by which the defendant
“accomplishes one of the prohibited purposes” identified in
ORS 164.377(2)—including “[c]ommitting theft”—the stat-
ute “would allow a person of ordinary intelligence to under-
stand the scope of what is prohibited * * *.” Id. at 737-38.
That, the majority opinion concluded, resolved any constitu-
tional concerns. Id.
         Judge Pagán disagreed. He reasoned that the legis-
lative history of ORS 164.377 indicated that the statute “was
intended to address the type of criminal activity we most
associate with hacking or other nefarious access to networks
or computers, not simply the use of electronics to commit
crimes.” Id. at 743 (Pagán, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Based in part on subsequent amendments
to ORS 164.377(2)(c), Judge Pagán viewed the computer
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                 169

crime statute as somewhat “analogous to burglary—that
is, accessing a place a person is not allowed to be with the
intention of committing a crime in that place.” Id. at 740
(emphasis in original). Judge Pagán further reasoned that,
due to the ubiquitous nature of computer technology in mod-
ern society, the majority’s understanding of the statute would
encompass far more conduct than the legislature could have
anticipated and would elevate any number of minor offenses
to Class C felonies, which could not, in his view, have been
what the legislature intended. Id. at 743.
           Defendant sought review in this court, which we
allowed.
                      II. DISCUSSION
         Defendant argues on review that, as relevant
here, computer crime under ORS 164.377(2)(c) is limited to
“accessing or using another person’s computer, computer
system, or computer network to commit an unauthorized
taking of information or data from that computer, computer
system, or computer network * * *.” It follows, defendant rea-
sons, that his conduct in utilizing eBay for the purpose of
selling merchandise that he believed to be stolen—conduct
that defendant appears to accept would be theft by receiv-
ing under ORS 164.095 if successfully carried out—does
not constitute computer crime. More specifically, because
“theft” as that term is used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) does not,
in his view, encompass theft by receiving, his conduct of
using or accessing eBay online to commit that offense is not
“us[ing]” or “access[ing]” a computer “for the purpose of * * *
[c]ommitting theft” within the meaning of that paragraph.
Defendant thus concludes that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.
A. The Text and Context of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
         “When, as here, a trial court denies a defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal based on an interpreta-
tion of a statute, we review the denial for errors of law.”
State v. Haley, 371 Or 108, 112, 531 P3d 142 (2023). The
specific statutory question in defendant’s case is whether
ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses his undisputed conduct of
selling purportedly stolen merchandise on eBay. We resolve
170                                                          State v. Azar

that question under the framework set out in State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Our goal is to determine
the intent of the legislature that enacted that provision. Id.
at 171. In making that determination, we consider the dis-
puted statutory text in context, together with any available
legislative history that we find helpful. Id. at 172. If a stat-
ute’s intended meaning remains unclear to us following our
examination of its text, context, and legislative history, we
may turn to general maxims of statutory interpretation for
additional guidance. See, e.g., Chaimov v. Dept. of Admin.
Services, 370 Or 382, 398 n 7, 520 P3d 406 (2022) (noting lim-
ited circumstances in which it may be appropriate for courts
to consider general maxims of statutory interpretation).
          In this case, the state charged defendant with com-
puter crime based on his alleged violation of ORS 164.377
(2)(c), which provides:
      “Any person commits computer crime who knowingly
   accesses, attempts to access or uses, or attempts to use,
   any computer, computer system, computer network or any
   part thereof for the purpose of:
       “* * * * *
      “(c) Committing theft, including, but not limited to,
   theft of proprietary information or theft of an intimate
   image.” 7
         The disputed text here is “accesses * * * or uses * * *
any computer * * * for the purpose of * * * [c]ommitting theft.”
On its face, that language is quite broad and can plausibly
be understood to capture utilizing eBay to facilitate theft as
defined by Oregon law, including theft by receiving under
ORS 164.095, the specific form of “theft” underlying defen-
dant’s charges. But, as we will explain, an examination of
the text and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c) leaves open the
question whether the legislature intended to capture conduct
such as defendant’s—specifically, the lawful use of another’s
computer system in the course of committing theft—when
it prohibited using or accessing computers “for the purpose”
of committing theft. That is, when—if ever—might using or
    7
      As originally enacted, the conduct addressed under ORS 164.377(2)(c) was
limited to “[c]ommitting theft.” Or Laws 1985, ch 537, § 8 (enacting House Bill
(HB) 2795 (1985)).
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                   171

accessing a computer in the course of committing a theft not
constitute use or access for the purpose of committing theft?
As noted, the Court of Appeals effectively concluded that a
person lacks that purpose when their use or accessing of a
computer is merely “incidental,” and not the “direct, neces-
sary means” of committing the theft. See Azar, 318 Or App
at 737. As the following indicates, our ultimate conclusion
in this case aligns with the implicit reasoning of the Court
of Appeals—as well as that of the dissenting opinion in this
court—which we understand to be that, despite the facially
broad language of ORS 164.377(2)(c), the legislature did not
intend that provision to apply as expansively as its plain
terms could possibly reach. However, despite our agreement
on that point, we ultimately disagree as to what limitation
applies.
          We turn to the relevant terms. Some of those terms
are defined within the computer crime statute itself. Those
include “access,” which means “to instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, computer system or
computer network.” ORS 164.377(1)(a). At a minimum, con-
ducting sales transactions through eBay necessarily entails
“communicat[ing]” with “a computer, computer system or
computer network,” and defendant does not contend that he
did not “access” eBay when he used that platform to market
items that he believed to be stolen. Similarly, although “uses”
is not statutorily defined, that term too is quite broad and, in
isolation, would seem to capture availing oneself of an online
service, such as eBay. The various meanings of “use” include
“to carry out a purpose or action by means of : make instru-
mental to an end or process : apply to advantage : turn to
account : utilize.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2524
(unabridged ed 2002); see also PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (explain-
ing that “words of common usage typically should be given
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning”). Thus, the
term “uses,” like the term “access,” might be understood to
apply to defendant’s alleged conduct: One who employs eBay
to conduct online sales “uses,” for at least that purpose, eBay
and, by extension, the computer, computer system, or com-
puter network on which eBay operates.
172                                                               State v. Azar

         And, if all that ORS 164.377(2)(c) required were
that a person use or access a computer for any purpose bear-
ing some nonincidental connection to an act of theft, then
our inquiry would likely be complete. However, even an ini-
tial examination of the statutory context suggests certain
parameters around those otherwise broad terms. “A statute’s
context includes, among other things, its immediate con-
text—the phrase or sentence in which the term appears—
and its broader context, which includes other statutes on the
same subject.” Shepard Investment Group LLC v. Ormandy,
371 Or 285, 290, 533 P3d 774 (2023). As noted above, the
various meanings of “use” include “to carry out a purpose or
action by means of,” Webster’s at 2524, and ORS 164.377(2)(c)
expressly states which “purpose” brings the “use” of a com-
puter within the statute’s coverage: “the purpose of * * *
[c]ommitting theft * * *.” Moreover, given the legislature’s
chosen phrasing—“uses * * * for the purpose of,” rather than,
for example, “uses in the course of”—the legislature may
have sought to limit the application of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
to uses that in fact “carry out” that purpose, and not any
use that in some way facilitates “theft.”8 Under that reading,
defendant’s conduct would constitute computer crime only
if the act itself of using eBay constituted a theft within the
meaning of ORS 164.377(2)(c).
         That qualifying language in ORS 164.377(2)(c)—
“for the purpose * * * of “[c]ommitting theft”—does not inde-
pendently shed much light on the intended scope of the stat-
ute. The word “purpose” commonly means “something that one
sets before [themselves] as an object to be attained: an end or
aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, exertion, or oper-
ation: design.” Webster’s at 1847. So, for defendant’s conduct of
using or accessing the eBay platform to constitute computer
crime in this case, he must at least have had a certain objec-
tive in mind, specifically, “[c]ommitting theft.” But, as noted
above, the word “use” itself appears to imply purpose-driven
conduct, and the fact that the state must prove a specific pur-
pose does not provide any further indication whether having

    8
      As noted, the plain meanings of “use” include “to carry out a purpose,”
Webster’s at 2524, and, in turn, “carry out” conveys the idea of bringing some-
thing to its conclusion, see id. at 344 (meanings of “carry out” include “to bring to
a successful issue” and “to continue to an end or stopping point”).
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                 173

that objective is sufficient to render a “use” of a computer
“computer crime” or, if not, what else the state must prove to
establish a violation of ORS 164.377(2)(c).
         “Committing,” in turn, means, as pertinent here, to
engage in specific conduct that the law makes punishable as
a crime. See Black’s Law Dictionary 248, 334 (5th ed 1979)
(defining “commit” as “[t]o perpetrate * * * a crime” and
“crime” as a “positive or negative act in violation of penal
law”); see also DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746, 380 P3d
736 (2016) (“When a term is a legal one, we look to its estab-
lished legal meaning as revealed by, for starters at least,
legal dictionaries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And
as ORS 164.377(2)(c) expressly provides, the relevant crime
for purposes of our analysis is “theft.” Again, however, noth-
ing in the word “[c]ommitting” or its immediate context tells
us whether ORS 164.377(2)(c) contemplates anything more
than facilitating a theft by using or accessing a computer,
whether it be the extraction of something from that com-
puter (as defendant argues), the successful completion of
some form of theft—even if, as here, the theft involves prop-
erty wholly external to any computer—or the realization of
some other theft-related goal.
         That brings us, finally, to the term “theft,” which
raises one of the parties’ central disputes in this case:
whether “theft,” as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c), is intended
to encompass the various meanings of theft found in other
parts of the Criminal Code (as the state contends), or,
instead, “theft” has a narrower meaning when it comes to
computer crime, one that (as defendant argues) limits ORS
164.377(2)(c) in a way that excludes theft by receiving, the
form of theft prosecuted in this case. For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that, under ORS 164.377(2)(c), “theft”
has the same meaning as it does elsewhere in the property
crimes chapter of the Criminal Code. As we also explain,
however, that conclusion does not resolve the ultimate ques-
tion raised by defendant’s appeal, namely, whether that pro-
vision reaches his specific conduct in this case.
        We begin by observing, as defendant emphasizes,
that ORS 164.377 does not define “theft,” despite defining
many of the other terms that the statute uses. See, e.g., ORS
174                                               State v. Azar

164.377(1)(a) (defining “access”); ORS 164.377(1)(b) (defining
“computer”); ORS 164.377(1)(j) (defining “property”). Nor
does it expressly incorporate the meaning of that term from
the theft section of the property crimes chapter, including
the offenses identified in ORS 164.015 (stating that one
“commits theft” by, among other things, “commit[ting] theft
by receiving as provided by ORS 164.095”). Defendant relies
on those contextual clues as evidence that the legislature
intended for “theft” in ORS 164.377(2)(c) to have its plain
and ordinary meaning, which he argues is “an unauthorized
taking.” See Webster’s at 2369 (defining “theft” as “the act of
stealing; * * * the felonious taking and removing of personal
property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it” or
“the taking of property unlawfully (as by robbery, embezzle-
ment, fraud)”); see also The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 1334 (1st ed 1969) (defining “theft”
as “the act or an instance of stealing; larceny”). Under that
reading, “theft” would seem not to include theft by receiv-
ing—at least as alleged here—because that crime does not
appear to require a “taking.” See ORS 164.095 (“A person
commits theft by receiving if the person receives, retains,
conceals or disposes of property * * *.”).
         The state responds that the legislature had no need
to define “theft” for purposes of the computer crime statute,
because that term already had a well-defined legal meaning
in Oregon when it enacted that law: the meaning found in
ORS 164.015, which is not limited to theft by taking. And
because the two statutes appear in the same chapter of the
Criminal Code, the state would rely on this court’s “general
assumption” that “the legislature intended the same word to
have the same meaning throughout related statutes unless
something in the text or context of the statute suggest a
contrary intention.” Village at Main Street, Phase II v. Dept.
of Rev., 356 Or 164, 175, 339 P3d 428 (2014); see also State
v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 99, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (so stating).
The state also compares the computer crime statute to ORS
164.235, which narrows the scope of “theft” to “theft by a
physical taking” in prohibiting possession of burglar’s tools. It
argues that, because the legislature did not similarly narrow
the scope of “theft” in the computer crime statute, we should
not narrow it ourselves as a matter of statutory construction,
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                  175

because that would violate our duty under ORS 174.010 to
avoid “insert[ing] what has been omitted” by the legislature.
           We conclude that “theft” as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c)
encompasses, as a general matter, those offenses identified as
theft in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiving.9 The legis-
lature enacted ORS 164.377 in 1985, Or Laws 1985, ch 537, § 8,
over a decade after it “eliminate[d] the traditionally distinct
crimes of larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement, obtaining
property by false pretenses, receiving stolen property and
extortion and * * * consolidate[d] them into one crime called
‘theft.’ ” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission
Proposed Oregon Code, Final Draft and Report § 123, 132
(July 1970); see also Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 123 (providing
five circumstances in which a person commits “theft”). Thus,
as the state notes and the Court of Appeals reasoned, “theft”
had a well-established legal meaning when the legislature
enacted the computer crime statute, a meaning not limited to
theft by taking. Moreover, House Bill (HB) 2795 (1985), which
included the computer crime provisions now compiled at ORS
164.377, also contained provisions amending the theft provi-
sions of ORS chapter 164. Accordingly, we can safely assume
that the legislature was aware of the meaning of “theft” in
ORS 164.015 when it enacted ORS 164.677(2)(c). See Jack L.
Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction, 97 Or L Rev 583, 638
(2019) (noting that “ ‘context’ for a statute is essentially any-
thing of which the legislature could have been aware at the
time of a given enactment”). Additionally, ORS 164.015 and
ORS 164.377 are closely related, in that they both address
the wrongful interference with property rights of others and
appear in the same chapter of the Criminal Code. As a result,
unless something else about the text or context of either stat-
ute suggests a contrary intention, we assume that the legisla-
ture intended “theft” to have the same meaning in both. See
State v. Colgrove, 370 Or 474, 483, 521 P3d 456 (2022) (stating
that principle).
    9
      We need not determine whether “theft” as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) also
encompasses forms of theft defined by other statutes, including ORS 164.125
(theft of services) and ORS 164.162 (mail theft). Further, although we conclude
that, in theory, ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses theft by receiving, ORS 164.095,
which is a form of theft identified in ORS 164.015, we discuss below whether, as
a practical matter, it was intended to capture conduct of the sort admitted by
defendant.
176                                                            State v. Azar

          In our view, nothing suggests a contrary intention.
Defendant contends otherwise. He offers various contex-
tual clues that he asserts support the view that “theft” in
ORS 164.377(2)(c) has a meaning independent of its statu-
tory definitions, one limited to the unauthorized taking of
property from a computer. Among other things, defendant
argues that, because ORS 164.377(2)(a) and (2)(b) crimi-
nalize conduct analogous to theft by deception, it would be
illogical for ORS 164.377(2)(c) to criminalize that same con-
duct, which would result if we accepted the state’s meaning
of “theft.”
         We are not persuaded. It is true that, in addition to
prohibiting using or accessing a computer for purposes of
committing theft, ORS 164.377(2) also proscribes two other
“theft-like” forms of conduct:
      “Any person commits computer crime who knowingly
   accesses, attempts to access or uses, or attempts to use,
   any computer, computer system, computer network or any
   part thereof for the purpose of:
      “(a) Devising or executing any scheme or artifice to
   defraud; [or]
      “(b) Obtaining money, property or services by means
   of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
   promises[.]”
         And, as defendant points out, both ORS 164.377(2)(a)
and (2)(b) proscribe conduct analogous to theft by deception,
which is both separately defined in ORS 164.08510 and one of
the forms of theft listed in ORS 164.015. Defendant reasons
that, if the legislature had intended for ORS 164.377(2)(c)
to capture those other forms of theft, it would have had no

   10
        ORS 164.085(1) provides, in part:
       “A person, who obtains property of another thereby, commits theft by
   deception when, with intent to defraud, the person:
       “(a) Creates or confirms another’s false impression of law, value, inten-
   tion, or other state of mind that the actor does not believe to be true;
       “(b) Fails to correct a false impression that the person previously created
   or confirmed; [or]
         “* * * * *
      “(e) Promises performance that the person does not intend to perform or
   knows will not be performed.”
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                     177

reason to separately define computer crime to include the
conduct proscribed by ORS 164.377(2)(a) and (b).
          We acknowledge that, as defendant observes, there
would appear to be considerable overlap between the con-
duct that paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) proscribe and the conduct
that paragraph (2)(c) encompasses if, as the state argues,
“theft” in paragraph (2)(c) wholly incorporates ORS 164.015.
Notably, however, paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) are not entirely
coextensive with any form of theft listed in ORS 164.015.
Among other differences, paragraph (2)(a) prohibits simply
devising a fraudulent scheme—whereas theft by deception
requires actually obtaining property—and paragraph (2)(b)
applies to fraudulently obtaining services, not just property,
and therefore is broader than theft by deception and any
other form of theft defined in ORS 164.015.11 Moreover, as we
have recognized, “the fact that a proposed interpretation of a
statute creates some measure of redundancy is not, by itself,
necessarily fatal. Redundancy in communication is a fact of
life and of law.” Cloutier, 351 Or at 97; see also State v. Fonte,
363 Or 327, 343, 422 P3d 202 (2018) (noting that “it may be
possible for the same person to commit acts that constitute
more than one type of theft under ORS 164.015”). And here,
given the broad scope of the computer crime statute, we find
it likely that any perceived redundancy is the product of the
legislature’s effort to enact a comprehensive statute, and not
evidence that the legislature intended for ORS 164.377—
including its reference to “theft”—to be wholly self-contained.
         In sum, the text and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
do not support defendant’s narrow construction, one that
would limit the scope of that provision to using or access-
ing a computer for the purpose of taking something from
that or another computer. However, that conclusion does
not answer the question at the core of this case: When does
using or accessing a computer in the course of committing
theft amount to using or accessing the computer “for the
purpose of * * * [c]ommitting theft”? Is it whenever the use or
access facilitates a theft? Is it when, as the Court of Appeals
    11
       A separate theft statute, ORS 164.125 (theft of services), does cover obtain-
ing services by deception, but the state has not argued that theft of services is
another form of theft covered by ORS 164.377(2)(c), nor has that statute been
offered as additional context for the computer crime statute.
178                                                               State v. Azar

concluded, “the person’s use or access[ing] of a computer is
the direct, necessary means by which the person accom-
plishes” a theft? See Azar, 318 Or App at 737.12 Or did the
legislature intend some different scope when it enacted the
computer crime statute? Because our assessment of the text
and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c) leaves open the question
whether that provision encompass defendant’s conduct, any
legislative history that sheds light on that question could
inform our final conclusion regarding the intended scope
of the statute. Thus, we now turn our attention to whether
anything in the legislative history of ORS 164.377 is helpful
in that regard.
B.    The Legislative History of ORS 164.377
         This court recognized in Nascimento, 360 Or at 42,
that the legislature’s primary concern in adopting the com-
puter crime provisions of HB 2795 was computer “hacking”—
the unauthorized use or accessing of computers or the data
they contained. Defendant relies on that point to support his
argument that we should narrowly construe what it means
to “use” or “access” a computer system for purposes of com-
mitting theft. Although the state agrees that the primary
concern of the legislature that established the offense of
computer crime was hacking, it attaches less significance to
that point than defendant. The state contends that the 1985
legislative history pertinent to that conduct focused on what
later became ORS 164.377(4) (prohibiting unauthorized
use or accessing of computers and their contents) and ORS
164.377(3) (prohibiting unauthorized alteration, damage, or
destruction of same), and not ORS 164.377(2), the provision
at issue in this case. The state further argues that, despite
having the principal goal of addressing computer hacking,
the legislature may well have had other objectives in mind

     12
        The Court of Appeals did not elaborate on its test, and it is not clear to us
whether, by requiring that the use of a computer be the “direct, necessary means”
of accomplishing a theft (and not merely “incidental”), that court intended to
require more than a causal relationship between the use and the result, and, if
so, what degree of necessity would suffice. We note that, although defendant’s use
of eBay may well have enhanced his ability to market the spoils of his crimes—as
well as to avoid apprehension—it is less than obvious how eBay was “necessary,”
at least if, by “necessary,” the Court of Appeals meant that defendant could not
have committed theft by receiving without his reliance on eBay, or on any com-
puter technology for that matter.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                 179

when it passed HB 2795. See Nascimento, 360 Or at 44 (not-
ing that the “legislature may and often does choose broader
language that applies to a wider range of circumstances
than the precise problem that triggered legislative atten-
tion” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
         Having reviewed the legislative history of the com-
puter crime statute, we conclude that it does not support as
expansive an application of ORS 164.377(2)(c) as the Court of
Appeals’ opinion would allow. When it was first introduced
in the legislature, HB 2795 was directed at the theft of tele-
vision cable services and included text amending the exist-
ing theft of services statute, ORS 164.125. Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee 1, Apr 11,
1985, Tape 425 (statement of Rep Randy Miller); see also Or
Laws 1985, ch 537, §§ 1-7. The “computer crime” text came
later at the request of the American Electronics Association
and was introduced as an amendment to HB 2795 by repre-
sentatives of General Telephone Company of the Northwest
(General Telephone). Tape Recording, House Committee on
Judiciary, Subcommittee 1, May 6, 1985, Tape 576 (state-
ment of Chair Richard Springer).
          Sterling Gibson, a security officer for General
Telephone, testified that the purpose of the amendment was
to “prevent people from calling into someone’s computer”
and manipulating a business’s data. Id. When Chairperson
Springer asked whether the existing theft of services statute
already criminalized the conduct described in the amend-
ment, Gibson responded that “a lot of times it may not be
theft[.]” Id. He continued that, even though “it may be con-
strued as theft, * * * the actual act was the manipulation, or
changing of documents” that are “vital” to an organization’s
survival. Id. He further explained that that conduct “isn’t
theft, that’s manipulation” and later reiterated that “we’re
not necessarily dealing with the theft of something, [we’re
dealing with] manipulation.” Id. Gibson said that, in his
experience, when law enforcement sought to prosecute acts
of computer hacking, they had found the theft of services
statutes “too broad” and “not useable.” Id.
        Echoing Gibson’s testimony, Legislative Counsel
Leslie Hammond later explained to the full House Committee
180                                              State v. Azar

on Judiciary that HB 2795 was intended to address “the
idea of people who use their computers or instruments to get
access to computer systems or networks and then gain by
using the information or program that belongs to someone
else.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB
2795, May 13, 1985, Tape 613, Side A; see also id. (explaining
that the bill makes “it a crime for people to access a computer
system to which they don’t belong or to destroy or damage the
property”). Hammond also prepared a staff summary for the
committee explaining that the bill was intended to address
the problem of people “using computers to break into com-
puter systems to steal information or programming.” Staff
Measure Summary, House Committee on Judiciary, HB
2795 (1985). The bill passed the committee without further
discussion. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2795, May 13, 1985, Tape 613, Side A.
         That legislative history readily supports what is
undisputed here: HB 2795’s proponents were most concerned
with the sort of conduct criminalized by subsections (3) and (4)
of ORS 164.377, which explicitly address the protection of
computers and their contents from intrusion. Admittedly
less clear is what conduct the legislature was targeting when
it chose to also criminalize using or accessing computers
for the purposes of “[c]ommitting theft,” ORS 164.377(2)(c).
But what evidence there is in the legislative history indicates
to us that, like subsections (3) and (4), ORS 164.377(2)(c)
was enacted to protect computers and their contents; it was
not enacted to provide broad protection from computers and
their potential value as instruments of crime, whether or
not a person’s crime bore any relationship to the computer
used or the contents accessed. In other words, the evidence
suggests a more limited understanding of ORS 164.377(2)(c),
one that, like computer hacking, was focused on computers,
their contents, and the access that computer technology
could give would-be thieves to electronically stored or man-
aged data and services. That evidence includes (1) the mea-
sure summary’s identified concern that individuals were
stealing “information or programming” from computers,
Staff Measure Summary, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2795 (1985); (2) legislative counsel’s explanation that the
underlying concern was “people who use their computers or
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                  181

instruments to get access to computer systems or networks”
and “using the information or program that belongs to some-
one else,” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2795, May 13, 1985, Tape 613, Side A; (3) proponents’
accounts of electronically stored business data being manip-
ulated or altered; and (4) the fact that HB 2795’s original
objective was to address those who were surreptitiously
acquiring cable television services—an electronically dis-
tributed commodity—for free. We turn next to what that
limitation is; that is, what qualifies as “use” or “access”?
C. What qualifies as “use” or “access” under ORS 164.377
   (2)(c)?
         As we have just discussed, the legislative history
suggests that the legislature that enacted ORS 164.377(2)(c)
never intended that provision to reach every act of theft that
somehow involved using or otherwise accessing a computer.
Rather, the legislature’s overriding goal was to stop people
from getting into computer systems for nefarious purposes,
as Judge Pagán observed. That understanding suggests the
need for some limiting principle as to what constitutes use
or access for purposes of theft under the statute. We are
cognizant that our understanding of the legislative history
can only inform our construction of the legislatively enacted
text; it cannot justify the adoption of limitations that the
text of ORS 164.377(2)(c) cannot support. See ORS 174.010
(in construing statutes, courts may not insert what the
legislature has omitted). For that reason, we have already
rejected defendant’s argument that “theft” as used in ORS
164.377(2)(c) is limited to taking things from a computer—
the only permissible limitation on what constitutes a qualify-
ing theft is that the person must have “use[d]” or “access[ed]”
a computer “for the purpose of” committing it.13 And, based
on our review of the text and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c),
we have also concluded that a qualifying theft may take any
one of the various forms of theft listed under ORS 164.015,
including, at least arguably, theft by receiving. However,
our review of the legislative history persuades us—as the

    13
       Indeed, nothing in the statute even limits its scope to crimes completed
entirely within the confines of a computer system. We address the implications of
that fact below.
182                                                              State v. Azar

Court of Appeals seems to have been persuaded by other
considerations—that not every act of using or accessing a
computer in the course of engaging in theft qualifies as use
or access “for the purpose of * * * [c]ommitting theft.”
          Before determining which acts do qualify, we first
note that we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ test, which
we understand to be that the person’s use or accessing of a
computer must be the “direct, necessary means” by which
the person committed a theft and that the use or access
must be more than “incidental.” Azar, 318 Or App at 738. For
one thing, that test does not adequately reflect the purpose
for which the legislature enacted the computer crime stat-
ute, as reflected in its legislative history. And for another,
the Court of Appeals’ test is, in our view, unworkable. That
is, “direct [and] necessary” is susceptible to myriad mean-
ings, and nothing in the Court of Appeals’ decision explains
which meaning applies.14 Notably, although defendant in
this case chose to employ computer technology in the course
of his criminal conduct, it is far from apparent that he could
not have committed the underlying offense without using
eBay, as the crime of “fencing” stolen property was commit-
ted far before the advent of the internet or of electronics of
any sort. Thus, at least to the panel majority in the Court of
Appeals, “necessary” must mean something less than truly
“necessary,” but what may qualify is far from clear. See
Webster’s at 1511 (including, among other definitions of “nec-
essary,” the ideas of being absolutely required, essential, or
indispensable).
        Relatedly, the Court of Appeals’ requirement
that a person’s use or access of a computer be more than
    14
       The word “direct” is relatively clear and, when used in the term “direct
means,” appears to mean “leading by the * * * shortest way to a point or end” and
suggests immediacy between the use or accessing and its objective. See Webster’s
at 640 (defining the adjectival form of “direct”). But when such use or accessing
might be “necessary” is far less clear. It may require a merely practical necessity,
such that it suffices if the person’s decision to use a computer bears a “but for”
relationship with a prohibited outcome—e.g., “if he had not used a computer, he
would not have committed a theft”—or, instead, it may require that computer
technology play an essential or indispensable role in the commission of the per-
son’s crime, such that the person could not have committed the charged offense
had they not had been able to use or access a computer. See id. at 1511 (defining
“necessary” to include “that cannot be done without : that must be done or had :
absolutely required : essential, indispensible”).
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                   183

“incidental” does not improve matters. There is no way to
anticipate when a particular prosecutor, jury, or court will
view one or another use of computer technology as merely
“incidental.” We therefore do not share the Court of Appeals’
optimism that its test is sufficient to “allow a person of ordi-
nary intelligence to understand the scope of what is pro-
hibited” so as to alleviate defendant’s vagueness concerns.15
See Azar, 318 Or App at 738. Thus, although we agree with
the Court of Appeals that it is appropriate to articulate the
intended scope of ORS 164.377(2)(c), we disagree with its
ultimate determination as to what that scope is.

          We, therefore, describe the scope of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
differently, in a way that is both workable—that is, under-
standable and predictable—and true to the legislature’s
principal goal in enacting the computer crime statute, spe-
cifically, to deter the targeting of computers and the data
they contain. In so doing, however, we find it significant that
the legislature also had in mind those who were using tech-
nology as a means of surreptitiously gaining access to ser-
vices they could not otherwise access—specifically, free cable
television services. Thus, in determining the scope of ORS
164.377(2)(c), we allow for the possibility that the legislature
intended for “computer crime” to capture at least some con-
duct that reaches beyond the strict confines of any computer,
computer system, or computer network. Synthesizing those
principles, we conclude that, for a person’s use or accessing
of a computer to be “for the purpose of * * * [c]ommitting
theft” under ORS 164.377(2)(c), the theft at issue must either
interfere with another’s property rights in—or electronically
located on—a computer, computer system, or computer net-
work, or depend on such computer technology as the means

     15
        Like the Court of Appeals majority, the dissent in this court appears to
recognize that, without some limiting principle, ORS 164.377(2)(c) has the poten-
tial to capture significantly more conduct than the legislature intended. 372 Or
at 189-90 (Bushong, J., dissenting) (recognizing that some computer uses would
likely be too “incidental” to be what legislature intended to reach; observing
that the Court of Appeals described defendant’s computer use as the “principal
mechanism” of fencing operation). But neither the Court of Appeals majority nor
the dissent here suggests that, under ORS 164.377(2)(c), a person’s computer use
must be the “principal” means by which they accomplish their theft. Thus, like
the Court of Appeals, the dissenting opinion in this court offers only the unwork-
able standard of computer use that is not “incidental.”
184                                                             State v. Azar

of accessing the thing that the person seeks to unlawfully
obtain.
D. ORS 164.377(2)(c) does not apply to defendant’s conduct.
          Turning to the application of that standard to this
case, we emphasize that, despite the limits that our construc-
tion may impose on the computer crime statute, ORS 164.377
(2)(c) remains broadly applicable. In addition to protecting a
broad range of property interests existing—physically or in
electronic form—on computers, computer systems, or com-
puter networks, we have also construed that provision to
capture forms of theft that rely on the special access to pro-
tected interests that computer technology might allow. Thus,
although we need not for purposes of this case delineate the
full range of conduct that ORS 164.377(2)(c) might reach, we
observe, for example, that it would necessarily capture such
conduct as manipulating computerized bank records or other
conduct that takes place via a computer but that affects
interests existing outside the digital realm. That being said,
even with that rather broad understanding of what it means
to access or use a computer for purposes of theft, it does not
encompass defendant’s conduct here.
         In this case, defendant does not dispute that his
conduct in selling purportedly stolen property on eBay con-
stituted theft by receiving. That conduct, however, did not
interfere with any interest that eBay or anyone else had in
a computer, computer system, or computer network, or in
any electronic contents thereof. Nor did defendant use eBay
or any other computer technology to gain access to property
that he sought to unlawfully obtain—to the extent that any-
one actually accessed the purportedly stolen merchandise
at issue in this case, it is apparent that they did so by phys-
ically entering the retail locations where such items were
sold. Under those circumstances, defendant’s conduct can-
not have constituted computer crime.16
    16
       The dissent suggests that there is an incongruity between suggesting that
it might well be computer crime for a person to obtain the fruits of theft through
eBay, but not to dispose of them through the same platform. 372 Or at 190-91
(Bushong, J., dissenting). Even assuming that the dissent’s premise is correct, we
disagree that our construction leads to incongruous results. Much like the crime
of burglary focuses on the entry or remaining upon premises to commit a crime,
not on the departure from premises with the fruits of that crime, the legislature’s
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                                         185

                            III.    CONCLUSION
         We conclude that a person does not violate ORS
164.377(2)(c) merely by permissibly using an online platform
such as eBay in the course of committing a theft, whether
theft by receiving or some other form of theft. Although ORS
164.377.(2)(c) broadly prohibits using or accessing a computer
to commit theft, the theft at issue must either (1) interfere
with another’s protected interests in either the computer or
its contents, or (2) depend on computer technology to gain
access to whatever it is that the person seeks to unlawfully
obtain. As alleged in this case, defendant’s conduct of theft
by receiving, while conducted on a computer, did not relate
to anything about the computer he used or its contents, and
defendant did not depend on a computer to gain access to the
purportedly stolen property. The trial court therefore erred
in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as
to the allegations of computer crime. We reverse the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquit-
tal, reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
and remand for further proceedings.
       The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
            BUSHONG, J., dissenting.
        Defendant used a computer to sell stolen merchan-
dise on eBay, obtaining money from those sales through
PayPal accounts that he accessed using a computer.1 The
majority opinion concludes that defendant’s use of a com-
puter to commit those crimes does not constitute “computer
crime” in violation of ORS 164.377 because the legislative

focus in enacting the computer crime statute was on the use of computers as
means of—and protecting computers against—intrusion. 372 Or at 180-81 (dis-
cussing that focus).
    1
       eBay is an internet platform that allows “private sellers to list goods they wish
to sell, either through an auction or at a fixed price.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 US 388, 390, 126 S Ct 1837, 164 L Ed 2d 641 (2006). The eBay website
processes purchasers’ payments using PayPal, which is an internet service that
allows “business[es] or private individual[s] to send and receive payments” online.
Comb v. PayPal Inc., 218 F Supp 2d 1165, 1166 (ND CA 2002). Sellers can transfer
funds processed through PayPal into their own bank accounts. Id.
186                                                           State v. Azar

history suggests “a more limited understanding” of what
conduct the legislature intended to prohibit when it adopted
the computer crime statute in 1985. I disagree with that
conclusion. In my view, the majority opinion misreads the
legislative history to reach a result that is contrary to the
text of the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
         As the majority opinion points out, a person com-
mits computer crime in violation of ORS 164.377(2)(c) if the
person knowingly “accesses” or “uses” a computer, computer
system, or computer network, for the purpose of “commit-
ting theft.”2 The majority opinion explains that “theft” had a
well-established meaning when the computer crime statute
was enacted and that theft by receiving as defined in ORS
164.015 was included in the conduct covered by the statute. I
agree with that reading of the statute’s text. But the major-
ity opinion goes astray when it interprets “access” or “use”
narrowly to cover only conduct that “either interfere[s] with
another’s rights in—or electronically located on—a com-
puter, computer system, or computer network, or depend[s]
on such computer technology as a means of accessing the
thing that the person seeks unlawfully to obtain.” 372 Or at
183-84.
         That interpretation finds no support in the text or
context of the statute, and the majority opinion does not sug-
gest that it does. Instead, the majority opinion relies on the
legislative history to support its narrow interpretation of
the statutory text. But that interpretation conflicts with the
plain meaning of the text, and we have long recognized that
“there is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the
legislature than the words by which the legislature under-
took to give expression to its wishes.” State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
        The words used here—to “access” and “use”—a
computer to commit theft are not limited by any words sug-
gesting that the “rights” a person may have obtained or

    2
      The computer crime statute defines “computer,” “computer system,” and
“computer network.” See ORS 164.377(1)(b) - (d). Defendant does not dispute that,
by engaging eBay and PayPal online, he accessed a computer, a computer system,
or a computer network.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                 187

interfered with when the person used or accessed a computer
must be “in or located on” a computer to constitute computer
crime. Nor are there any words limiting the reach of the
statute to using computer technology “as a means of access-
ing the thing that the person seeks unlawfully to obtain.”
Instead, paragraph (1)(a) of the computer crime statute
broadly defines “access” to mean “to instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make use
of any resources of a computer, computer system or computer
network.” ORS 164.377(1)(a) (emphasis added). The major-
ity opinion interprets that definition to include a limitation
that the legislature omitted, contrary to accepted rules of
statutory interpretation. See ORS 174.010 (in interpreting
statutes, courts may not “insert what has been omitted”).
         The majority opinion’s interpretation also overlooks
the fact that subsection (2) of the computer crime statute
expressly states what the purpose of using or accessing a
computer must be for the conduct to be considered computer
crime. That provision states that a person commits com-
puter crime when the person knowingly uses or accesses
a computer “for the purpose of” (among other things) “[c]
ommitting theft.” ORS 164.377(2)(c). The statute does not
say that, to constitute computer crime, a person must use or
access a computer for “the purpose of” obtaining or interfer-
ing with rights “in or located on” a computer, nor does it say
that the thief’s purpose must be to “access the thing that the
person seeks unlawfully to obtain.” But that is the effect of
the majority opinion’s interpretation.
         Moreover, although the legislative discussions lead-
ing to the enactment of the statute focused primarily on
the problem of “computer hacking,” as the majority opinion
points out, the legislature ultimately adopted a statute that
broadly covers conduct beyond “hacking.” That commonly
occurs during the legislative process. See, e.g., State v.
Nascimento, 360 Or 28, 44, 379 P3d 484 (2016) (recognizing
that the legislature “ ‘may and often does choose broader lan-
guage that applies to a wider range of circumstances than
the precise problem that triggered legislative attention’ ”
(quoting South Beach Marina, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 301 Or
524, 531, 724 P2d 788 (1986))); Hamilton v. Paynter, 342 Or
188                                                State v. Azar

48, 55, 149 P3d 131 (2006) (“[T]he statutory text shows that,
even if the legislature had a particular problem in mind, it
chose to use a broader solution.”). That does not mean that
we must interpret the statute “in the broadest sense that
the text might permit.” Nascimento, 360 Or at 44. Rather,
“ ‘legislative history would be a basis on which we appropri-
ately may construe the text more narrowly’ ” if that history
“ ‘reveals that the legislature had a narrower understanding
of the term in mind, and if that narrower meaning is consis-
tent with the text, even if not compelled by it[.]’ ” Id. (quoting
State v. Walker, 356 Or 4, 17, 333 P3d 316 (2014)).
         Here, the words used in the computer crime stat-
ute—“access” and “use”—broadly apply to a wider range
of circumstances than the hacking problem that triggered
the legislative enactment in 1985. As explained above, the
“narrower meaning” adopted by the majority opinion is
inconsistent with the text enacted by the legislature, and
as explained below, there is no evidence in the legislative
history that the legislature had a narrower understanding
of those terms in mind when it included that text in the com-
puter crime statute. In fact, if the legislature were to recon-
sider the computer crime statute in 2024 and wanted to be
certain that the statute covered this type of conduct—using
a computer to access eBay to sell stolen goods for payments
processed through PayPal—it would not need to amend the
statute at all. The words in the existing statute—“using” or
“accessing” a computer, computer system, or computer net-
work to commit theft (including theft by receiving)—work
just fine to encompass that conduct.
         The legislative history confirms that the legislature
did not have a narrower meaning in mind when it defined
computer crime to include any use or access of a computer
to commit theft. The widespread use of computer technol-
ogy was in its early stages when the bill that became ORS
164.377 was enacted in 1985. When the need for a computer
crime bill was initially discussed during a 1981 hearing
of the Senate Committee on Justice, Senator Kulongoski
asked whether it would be “a fair statement to say that the
purpose of the bill is not so much necessarily [the] problems
[of] today, as problems that could arise as we move into
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                  189

an age where we utilize computers more and more[.]” Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Justice, SB 439, Mar 25,
1981, Tape 83, Side B (statement of Sen Ted Kulongoski).
Two years later, one witness told the Senate Committee
on Judiciary that they were “living during a period of his-
tory which has seen an incredible explosion of technological
advances,” and that “[e]very indicator predicts the 1980s to
be a decade of overwhelming technological change, proba-
bly exceeding in impact all the years preceding them. In all
likelihood, in the next very few years ‘a computer in every
home’ will become a reality.” Testimony, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, SB 149, Feb 23, 1983, Ex A (statement of Terry
Hippenhammer). That witness further explained that col-
leges and universities across the country were consider-
ing requiring all students to own a microcomputer and he
broadly described the “potential abuse” that could occur. Id.
Another witness described computer crime as “the crime of
the future that is rapidly becoming the crime of the pres-
ent.” Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 149,
Feb 23, 1983, Ex B (statement of Jim Mattis).
         Thus, by the time the computer crime legislation
passed in 1985, the legislature was aware that its under-
standing of how computers could be “used” or “accessed”
to commit crimes was limited and that the technology
was changing rapidly. Instead of enacting a law that nar-
rowly addressed “hacking” and related problems that were
brought to the legislature’s attention at the time, the legis-
lature chose to broadly define “computer crime” to include
“using” or “accessing” a computer for the purpose of com-
mitting theft, regardless of how the computer was used to
commit the theft, the nature of the information or property
rights obtained or affected by a wrongdoer’s use or access of
a computer, or the wrongdoer’s ability to “otherwise access”
the property without using a computer.
         That broad wording does not mean that the leg-
islature necessarily intended “computer crime” to include
using a computer in any way to facilitate the commission of
a crime. Some uses are so incidental—sending an email to
confirm the time and place of a meeting before committing
a theft or using the internet to locate a store to shoplift, for
190                                                           State v. Azar

example—that it is unlikely that the legislature would have
considered them to rise to the level of “computer crime.”
But where a defendant’s use of a computer is integral to the
operation of a criminal enterprise—the Court of Appeals
described defendant’s use of a computer in this case as “the
principal mechanism for his extensive fencing operation,”
State v. Azar, 318 Or App 724, 738, 508 P3d 668 (2022)—I
would conclude that the conduct is covered by the computer
crime statute.3
         That conclusion is consistent with a common-sense
understanding of what it means to “access” or “use” a com-
puter for the purpose of committing a crime. The defendant
in this case built a criminal enterprise centered on using a
computer to access eBay and PayPal to facilitate his illegal
fencing operation. The eBay website allowed defendant to
market stolen goods to millions of internet users, something
he could not have done without the website and a computer to
access it. The PayPal platform allowed defendant to receive
payments for those stolen goods without risk, something he
could not have done without that internet platform.4 And
given the scope of defendant’s fencing operation, using eBay
and PayPal instead of selling stolen goods in person may
have reduced the risk of attracting the attention of neigh-
bors and law enforcement.
          Under the majority opinion’s test, using a computer
“as a means of accessing the thing that the person seeks
unlawfully to obtain” would be a computer crime covered by
the statute. 372 Or at 183-84. Thus, under that test, using a
computer to obtain stolen goods as part of an illegal fencing
operation would be a computer crime but using a computer
to sell stolen goods as part of the same criminal enterprise

    3
      The majority opinion and this dissenting opinion attempt to discern how
the legislature intended a statute enacted in 1985 would apply to present day
circumstances. Given the evolution of our understanding of how computers can
be used to commit crimes, further legislation to clarify what was intended to be
a “computer crime” could remove any uncertainty in this area.
    4
      Without PayPal or a similar internet payment platform, defendant would
have to receive payment via the mail—which by its nature involves some risk of
loss—or in person. A person receiving payment for stolen goods in those ways
runs the risk that a check may bounce, that counterfeit currency may be given,
or that the buyer might choose to rob the seller instead of paying for the stolen
goods.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)                                 191

would not be a computer crime. The majority opinion cites
no evidence in the statutory text, context, or legislative his-
tory for such a distinction, nor does it offer any good reason
why the legislature would intend to criminalize as computer
crime using a computer to obtain stolen goods but not to sell
them.
         Defendant’s use of a computer to conduct an illegal
fencing operation—which is theft by receiving under Oregon
law—falls squarely within the conduct that is prohibited by
the computer crime statute. The majority opinion’s contrary
conclusion based on its narrow interpretation of the statute
is, in my view, wrong. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
       Garrett, J., and Balmer, S.J., join in this dissenting
opinion.