Court Opinion

ID: 9546714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:34:32.051341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:48.408271
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
A trial lawyer reading this decision would have good cause to wonder whether some members of this Court have forgotten their experience and knowledge gained as trial lawyers. The majority opinion is correct in nearly everything it states, but in my opinion, wanders into gross error in not taking the analysis one step further, because it fails to think beyond the rule as to the inherent power, and indeed duty, of trial judges and hearing officers to not clutter the record by permitting witnesses to testify as to irrelevant or inadmissible evidence or evidence which is not appropriate because it is cumulative in effect.
The majority opinion is quite correct when it notes that Rule IX(c) provides for the taking of depositions within certain time limits after a hearing, and directs that the hearing officer do so. Similarly, and parallel in nature, is the duty of a trial judge to take the testimony of witnesses presented in open court. However, when a trial judge refuses to hear or permit the testimony of a witness because the testimony lacks foundation, the expert lacks expertise, or the testimony is cumulative of that of other witnesses, and the trial court therefore rejects the testimony for one of the appropriate reasons, the Supreme Court on appeal does not reverse and remand to order that trial judge to take the testimony of that witness “because the rules say he should.”
The pretext that the surety has dreamed up for urging the error in failure to allow the deposition of the employer representative, was that the purpose of the deposition would be to allow that employer representative, Mr. Kerby, to “authenticate” a letter he had written offering a “make-work” job. There are two things wrong with that position and they are precisely why the referee correctly rejected the evidence:
(1) There is absolutely no need to have a deposition to authenticate a document —the same could be done by attaching the letter to an affidavit (as was done here) and filing the affidavit with the Commission; and
(2) The letter they sought to authenticate was a purported job offer that was not in existence until after the close of discovery, after the hearing in the case had been held on July 30, 1986, and after Will Kerby, the president of J.I. Morgan had already testified at the hearing, until after the claimant had concluded the presentation of his case on July 23, 1986, and until after the defendants finally realized that the claimant had presented a prima facie case of odd lot disability.
The referee properly rejected the taking of the Kerby deposition stating at page 256 of the record:
Moreover, in this particular case it is hard to imagine a less reliable indication of Claimant’s probable wage earning capacity than the self-serving offer of employment by an employer involved in litigation on that very issue, which offer was not made until almost three years after the industrial accident. (Emphasis in original).
Finally, and probably most importantly, even if the referee’s refusal to admit the letter in evidence were error, it would not be reversible error in light of this record. *146Both we and the referee had the letter before us and know what it said and the referee dealt with the legal effect it would have if it were introduced into the record by way of affidavit or deposition and that effect is such as to not change the outcome. The conclusion of the referee read as follows at pp. 25 and 26:
All defendants have also made much of Claimant’s failure to apply for work with the U.S.F.S. Older Worker’s Program. However, the program as described obviously falls outside the general labor market. In fact, it is just the type of “make work” or “sheltered work” provided by a sympathetic employer which Larson, the well-known authority in the field of worker’s compensation, indicates should not be considered for purposes of determining permanent disability. See, 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 57.34. See also, Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403 [565 P.2d 1360] (1979). Accordingly, the availability of employment within the program and/or Claimant’s failure to apply for employment therein, does not defeat a finding of total permanent disability under the odd lot theory.
Finally, it is noted that the finding and conclusion of total and permanent disability herein is not defeated by evidence of the existence of potential employment within Claimant’s physical restrictions. It is not the existence of potential suitable employment by which disability is measured under the Idaho worker’s compensation law, but the likelihood that a Claimant will be able to engaged in gainful activity in the future, including the critical factor of whether potential employers will actually hire the Claimant in light of the pertinent medical and nonmedical factors. In finding and concluding that Claimant herein is an odd lot worker, the Referee has considered this factor and has concluded that it is extremely unlikely that any employer would hire Claimant for any of the few potentially suitable positions in evidence in light of his obvious physical and nonphysical limitations.
Hopefully, upon remand, both the Commission and its hearing officer will recognize that the majority has not ruled that the evidence offered, when accepted into evidence, will change the outcome of this case. The Commission should merely receive the evidence and then redecide the case. And it would appear that if there is nothing established beyond what has heretofore been presented, the outcome will be precisely the same because the hearing examiner correctly perceived the value of the evidence' when the case was first decided.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.