Court Opinion

ID: 9863006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:49:42.930953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:02.279461
License: Public Domain

OPINION
McCORMICK, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for failure to stop and render aid. Article 6701d, Sections 38 and 40, V.A.C.S. Appellant waived jury trial and pled nolo conten-dere. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at two years, probated.
This case involves a tragic accident wherein a woman was severely injured and her two small children killed. Since appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, a recital of the facts is necessary.
On June 1, 1978, Ricky Jack Ward was driving a truck loaded with grain on Highway 136 outside of Amarillo. He was south bound from Fritch to Amarillo going up a hill on the road. The south bound side has both a climbing lane and a passing lane. Ward was in the far right lane, the climbing lane. A light blue Ford pickup was immediately behind Ward and a Datsun station wagon followed the pickup. As Ward’s tractor-trailer truck began to slow because of the hill, he noticed the Datsun station wagon in the passing lane. As the station wagon pulled alongside the light blue pickup truck, the pickup truck began to pull into the passing lane. The Datsun veered away from the pickup truck and collided head-on into an oncoming north bound vehicle. Ward stated that as the pickup truck pulled into the passing lane, he did not see it signal the lane change.
Ward observed and heard the entire collision. As the pickup passed Ward, he saw the individual in the middle of the cab turn his head. The pickup slowed down, but then proceeded south without stopping. Seeing a CB antenna on the pickup, Ward called out over his radio for the person in the light blue pickup to come back because he had caused a wreck. He heard someone say, “I’m going for help. I’ll be right back.”
Ward testified that the collision occurred about four car lengths behind him at the time the pickup was two lengths in front of him. He had no trouble hearing the collision or the sound of gravel flying from the on-coming vehicle. Ward also testified that the pickup had its windows down.
Sherry Hill, the driver of the Datsun station wagon, testified that she had almost completely passed the pickup before the accident occurred. As it changed lanes, the pickup hit Hill’s right rear fender. Hill lost control and veered into the north bound lane, hitting an on-coming vehicle. Hill suffered a broken kneecap, crushed right elbow, and multiple lacerations to her face and legs. She also underwent surgery for removal of a ruptured spleen. Hill’s two sons, ages two and six, were killed.
Appellant testified he was driving home from work and started to pass Ward’s grain *914truck. He saw a north bound car skid on the road and saw gravel fly. He heard a noise but, thinking it was a tire blowout, did not stop. When he passed the grain truck, he looked back and saw a car in the middle lane. He acknowledged having a CB, but stated it intermittently worked and was not turned on at the time of the collision. After hearing news reports concerning the wreck and a light blue pickup, appellant drove to the Department of Public Safety office the following morning. Appellant denied any knowledge of the wreck and claimed that a car was behind him when he passed Ward’s grain truck.
Appellant was charged with failing to stop and render reasonable assistance under Article 6701d, Sections 38 and 40, V.A.C.S. Appellant waived jury trial and entered a plea of nolo contendere. The trial court found appellant guilty. However, the trial court also found that the State failed to prove an actual collision between appellant and Hill occurred.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that appellant intentionally and knowingly made an improper lane change, or that he was “involved” in an accident.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The verdict will be sustained if there is any evidence which, if believed, shows the guilt of the accused. Banks v. State, 510 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Norman v. State, 588 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). As to the insufficiency pertaining to the improper lane change, there is ample evidence that appellant did, in fact, intentionally make a lane change. The issue of whether it was improper is established by the fact that Ward saw the Datsun attempting to pass when appellant pulled into the passing lane. Additionally, Ward did not see appellant signal the lane change. Therefore, since appellant failed to maintain a proper lookout [Article 6701d, Section 60(b), V.A.C.S.], and failed to signal the lane change [Article 6701d, Section 68(d), V.A.C.S.], the lane change was improper.
The evidence of being “involved” in an accident is also sufficient. Ward testified that, although no collision occurred between appellant and Hill, Hill swerved to avoid hitting appellant. Although not substantiated, Hill testified that appellant collided with her, causing her to lose control. The natural consequence of appellant’s actions was the subsequent head-on collision. Regardless of appellant’s claimed ignorance of the accident, it is clear that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate appellant caused the accident. Without ensnar-Iing ourselves in the definition or implications of the term “involved in an accident”, we hold that appellant was indeed involved in the collision between Hill and the northbound vehicle.
Appellant next contends that the indictment is “fundamentally defective.” The indictment states that appellant did:
“... knowingly and intentionally while operating a motor vehicle did make an improper lane change which caused Sherry Hill a driver to take evasive action which resulted in an accident and subsequent injuries to the said Sherry Hill and the defendant did then and there unlaw-full (sic) after said accident, knowingly and intentionally fail to stop and render all reasonable assistance to the said Sherry Hill, including the making of arrangements for carrying of the said Sherry Hill to a physician for medical treatment, it ■being apparent that such medical treatment for the said Sherry Hill was necessary.”
Article 6701d, Section 38(a), supra, sets out the duty of the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to another:
“The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such *915vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 40. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.”
Section 38(b) is the penal section, setting forth the penalties for culpably failing to comply with Section 38(a):
“Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not to exceed five (5) years or in jail not exceeding one (1) year or by fine not exceeding Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
The requirement of culpability, under Goss v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), must necessarily be limited to a violation of the penal section. The proper allegation is that the accused culpably failed to comply with the requirements of Section 38(a), a known duty. To require the indictment to allege more would amount to an exercise in semantics. Therefore, the elements of an offense under Article 6701d, Section 38(b), are:
1. a driver of a vehicle
2. involved in an accident
3. resulting in injury or death of any person
4. intentionally and knowingly
5. fails to stop and render reasonable assistance.
Applying the correct rationale to the indictment before us, we find it sufficiently alleges an offense under Article 6701d, Section 38(b). The indictment can be dissected into two basic clauses: (1) that appellant intentionally and knowingly operated his vehicle in such a manner as to cause an accident; and (2) that appellant, having caused the accident, intentionally and knowingly failed to stop and render all reasonable assistance. We find the factual allegations in the first clause of the indictment sufficient to “allege that the defendant had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his conduct.” Goss v. State, at 785. The instant allegation, that an accused knowingly and intentionally failed to stop and render reasonable assistance, necessarily and sufficiently notifies the accused that he failed to perform a known duty. The duty arises under Section 38(a), supra. Accordingly, the ground of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.