Court Opinion

ID: 9857115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:16:14.097884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:01.983214
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the trial court properly admitted the results of the field sobriety tests but not with the reasons expressed.
When read together, ORS 813.135 and ORS 813.1361 provide a statutory scheme that results in the admissibility in evidence of the fact of a refusal to take a field sobriety test. An operator of a motor vehicle on premises open to the public or on a highway impliedly consents to the taking of field sobriety tests if he has been informed of the consequences of refusing to take the test. If the advice is given, and he then refuses to take the test, the refusal is admissible as *622evidence. Here, there was no refusal. Therefore, the event that triggers the applicability of ORS 813.315 and ORS 813.136 never occurred. ORS 813.135 and ORS 813.136 are not about the admissibility of the results of field sobriety tests. The trial court did not err when it refused to suppress the test results on the basis of the violation of ORS 813.135.
The majority also holds that defendant made a plain request to consult with counsel before he took the Breathalyzer test. However, the evidence is in conflict on that issue. Defendant testified that, while he was being transported to jail, he asked the officer “at least four or five times” to stop at a telephone so that he could call his attorney and ask him to be present at the test. Again, at the jail, he made a similar request. According to defendant, the officer said that he would not allow him to call an attorney, because the officer was not willing to postpone the test until the attorney arrived. On the other hand, the officer testified that defendant “never actually asked to telephone counsel” while being transported to jail or at the jail, that, if he had asked if he could make a telephone call, he would have been given the opportunity to do so, that he was told that “he would have an adequate opportunity to contact counsel” and that at, “one point, * * * he did state that he wanted an attorney present for the breath test.”
The trial court did not expressly resolve the conflict in the testimony, nor can we tell from its decision that it perceived that there was a conflict. It concluded:
“From what the officer said, and from what the defendant said, the only request was he wanted his attorney present. That falls outside [State v. Spencer, 305 Or 59, 750 P2d 147 (1988)] * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)
That statement is only susceptible to the inference that the trial court thought that defendant and the officer agreed that defendant’s only request was to have an attorney present at the test. The majority errs when it assumes the credibility of defendant’s testimony and doesn’t concern itself with the conflict in the testimony. Although it is correct that, if findings are not made on issues such as credibility and if there is evidence from which facts could be decided more than one way, we will presume that they were decided in a manner consistent with the ultimate conclusion, see Ball v. Gladden, *623250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968), the trial judge’s statement demonstrates that he misunderstood the evidentiary record. I would remand so that the trial court can make findings as to whether defendant made a request to call his attorney. See State v. Wise, 305 Or 78, 748 P2d 1179 (1988). If he did, the officer was bound to honor that request, regardless of the purpose underlying it. If he did not, then no constitutional right was implicated.

 ORS 813.136 provides:
“If a person refuses or fails to submit to field sobriety tests as required by ORS 813.315, evidence of the person’s refusal or failure to submit is admissible in any criminal or civil action or proceeding arising out of allegations that the person was driving while under the influence of intoxicants.”