Court Opinion

ID: 9625760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:50:38.462146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:23.211000
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge, dissenting.
The affidavit upon which the search warrant in the present case issued was made by an officer who swore in substance; that he has reason to believe that upon person or premises of defendant there is now being concealed — marijuana, and hashish — and that facts tending to establish the foregoing grounds for issuance of search warrant are as follows: "I have received information from an informant whos[e] reliability is known to me and other members of the DeKalb Narcotics Squad, that the Covington subject is selling drugs at the house 2655 Buford Highway and transporting the drugs in a blue Ford Van, Tag No. RF4713. Information from this informant has in the past month resulted in 4 arrests, all on drug charges.”
The affidavit then goes on to state that in the past week a stake-out has been on this house and that many people, cars, etc., *152have been stopping at this house; that Covington today has driven the Ford Van to a business establishment and bought triple beam balance scales, that by our experience have been used in weighing and packaging marijuana, and that the truck has made deliveries to the house in paper bags.
A motion to suppress evidence obtained under this warrant having been made, the state showed by evidence of the officer that he had told, but not sworn, to issuing magistrate at time affidavit was presented to magistrate, that the information given him by informant was within a week of the date of affidavit and warrant.
Under Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 303 (141 SE2d 574), citing Smoot v. State, 160 Ga. 744 (128 SE 909) it is stated: "the determination as to whether there is probable cause . . . must be made by the magistrate from a consideration of the facts submitted under oath. ” This was followed in Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143 (147 SE2d 666). These cases were decided before the Act of 1966 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 567, 568; Code Ann. § 27-303) was enacted. That Act and Section commences with the words "upon the written complaint of any officer ... under oath or affirmation which states facts sufficient to show probable cause,” etc., requires, in our opinion, that all facts relied upon must be put in affidavit.
The affidavit in this case does not state the time "tip” was received from the informant. It does state that he, upon giving information, states defendant is selling drugs, but with nothing more it is impossible to determine when information was received as to when he was (or is) selling drugs.
Therefore, the test to determine staleness of information — a time period closely related to the commission of the offense must be affirmatively stated within the affidavit to show that the information contained therein is not stale — has not been met. Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 (172 SE2d 447); Latten v. State, 127 Ga. App. 75 (192 SE2d 562); McMiken v. State, 127 Ga. App. 66 (192 SE2d 716); Bell v. State, 128 Ga. App. 426 (196 SE2d 894).
The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and the case should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Stolz joins in this dissent.