Court Opinion

ID: 9927234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:05:53.708036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:09.259520
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,846

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                       BENJAMIN A. BALLARD,
                                            Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick County District Court; JEFFREY SYRIOS, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed January 26, 2024. Affirmed.

        Grace E. Tran, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., COBLE and PICKERING, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f) of the Kansas Offender Registration
Act (KORA) requires registrants who have no fixed or identifiable address—that is,
transient—to report to the local registering law enforcement agency at least every 30
days. Benjamin A. Ballard appeals his conviction for violating this statute, arguing we
should reverse his conviction for two reasons. First, Ballard claims that the State
presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Alternatively, he argues that the
district court's failure to give the jury an instruction on the statutory definitions of
transient, residence, and reside as meant under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902 constituted

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clear error. On our review, we find neither of Ballard's arguments persuasive under the
applicable law and facts of his case and affirm his conviction.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Ballard's duty to register arose from his prior criminal conviction in Arkansas for
second-degree sexual assault. In June 2010, Ballard moved to Sedgwick County, Kansas,
and neither party disputes he was required to then register as a lifetime sexual offender
under KORA.

       Upon his initial registration, Ballard completed a "Kansas Offender Registration
Form." In this form, Ballard stated that his "physical residence address" was on Emporia
Street. On the same day, Ballard signed a second page acknowledging his lifetime
offender registration requirements in Kansas. By signing the acknowledgment, Ballard
recognized he must report any change of address to the local registering law enforcement
agency within 10 days of that address change. He also acknowledged that he must report
three times per year in person—"in the month of [his] birthday and every fourth and
eighth month occurring after [his] birthday" in accordance with the statute at that time,
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-4904(c). Later, in 2011, the statute was amended to the current
schedule, requiring lifetime registrants to report quarterly based on their birthday month.
See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(b). Ballard's birthday is in October, so to comply with
KORA, Ballard was to report to the Sedgwick County registration office each January,
April, July, and October.

       Although Ballard was convicted of a reporting violation in May 2017, it seems he
otherwise followed his registration requirements through August 2021. When he reported
on August 27, 2021, though, Ballard completed a "Registration Change of Information
Form." Lena Kastner, an employee at the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office Offender
Registration Unit, helped Ballard complete this form. On the form, Ballard changed his

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"Current Physical Residence" to an address on Hillside Street that belonged to his
brother, John Ballard. On the same form, in a blank section on the second page, Ballard
wrote: "I walk around Broadway and the Lord's Diner." And below this handwritten
statement, Ballard signed another acknowledgment of his duties under KORA.

       Sheriff's Deputy Michael Clopton of the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office works
with the Offender Registration Unit monitoring whether registrants followed their
requirements in Sedgwick County. On November 1, 2021, Deputy Clopton learned from
the registration office that it had no registration paperwork for Ballard in either
September or October 2021. So, Deputy Clopton tried unsuccessfully to reach Ballard by
phone. About a month later, the State charged Ballard with two separate KORA
violations: one for not reporting during his October 2021 birthday month under K.S.A.
2021 Supp. 22-4905(b)(1); and the second for violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f), a
provision that required registrants who were currently transient to report to the local
registration office at least every 30 days. As for this second charge, the State argued that
Ballard's August 27, 2021 change of information form proved he was transient, and so
after completing the change of information form, Ballard needed to report to the
registration office at least every 30 days. Because he had not reported in September 2021,
the State claimed he violated K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f).

       The district court held a jury trial on the State's charges in October 2022. But
Ballard, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, refused to attend his trial, despite the
district court asking him each morning of trial whether he would attend.

       During the jury trial, the State relied on the testimony of Kastner, Deputy Clopton,
and Ryan Hansen, the custodian of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation's Registration
Unit's records, to prove its charges. Highly summarized, Hansen's testimony laid the
groundwork of how the registration process works. Deputy Clopton and Kastner testified
that Ballard had to report quarterly based on his birthday month. They also testified that

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Ballard had to report to registration at least every 30 days after completing the August 27,
2021 change of information form. Kastner testified she considered the change of
information form Ballard completed to double as a transient report, and because he wrote
down places he could be found "walk[ing] around" in the blank section of the form, he
was considered transient, even if he wrote down a physical address where he could be
located. She testified that when she helped Ballard complete the August 27, 2021 change
of information form "[h]e was notified" that he must start registering every 30 days.
Although Kastner agreed that Ballard's August 27, 2021 change of information form
listed his current physical residence as John's Hillside address, Kastner testified that
Ballard "had reported that he [did not] actually reside there." Instead, Ballard sometimes
went "there during the day." Kastner also testified, "Prior to [Ballard's] registration in
August he had reported that he was transient, so he was marked in our system as such."

       Ballard's counsel presented a reasonable doubt defense containing two distinct
arguments. First, he suggested that the registration office was understaffed, with a high
turnover rate. Pointing to this high turnover rate, Ballard alleged he actually reported to
the registration office in September 2021 and October 2021, but his registration forms
were lost because sometimes "[t]hings fall between the cracks." Second, he argued he
was not a transient registrant who had to register every 30 days because he resided with
his brother John at the Hillside address in September 2021. John, who was Ballard's only
witness, testified that Ballard lived with him "[p]retty much from August till October,"
leaving sometime in mid-October. According to John, he believed that Ballard was
residing with him during this period because Ballard was "asleep on [his] couch about
everyday." He also explained that he believed Ballard completed his KORA requirements
in September 2021 and October 2021 because he drove Ballard to the registration office
and saw Ballard enter the registration office both months.

       Ultimately, the jury found Ballard guilty of violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-
4905(b) for not reporting to registration as required during his October 2021 birthday

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month and violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f) for not reporting every 30 days as
required for registrants considered transient. The district court then imposed a controlling
sentence of 47 months' imprisonment followed by 24 months' postrelease supervision.

       Ballard now timely appeals.

                  DOES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORT BALLARD'S
               CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING K.S.A. 2021 SUPP. 22-4905(f)?

       On appeal, Ballard does not challenge his conviction for failure to report during
his birthday month but focuses his challenge on his conviction for failure to register in
September 2021—within 30 days of his August 2021 reporting—because he was
considered transient. He contends the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him
for failure to registering as a transient because the evidence he presented at trial showed
he was living at his brother's house.

Applicable Legal Principles

       K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f) requires a transient offender "to register in person
with the registering law enforcement agency every 30 days, or more often at the
discretion of the registering law enforcement agency." It further provides that a transient
registrant must give the registering law enforcement agency two lists: (1) "places where
the offender has slept and otherwise frequented during the period of time since the last
date of registration" and (2) "places where the offender may be contacted and where the
offender intends to sleep and otherwise frequent during the period of time prior to the
next required date of registration." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f)(1) and (2).

       K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902 is the definitional provision of KORA. Subsection (l)
defines "transient" as "having no fixed or identifiable address." Subsection (j) states:

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               "'Reside' means to stay, sleep or maintain with regularity or temporarily one's
       person and property in a particular place other than a location where the offender is
       incarcerated. It shall be presumed that an offender resides at any and all locations where
       the offender stays, sleeps or maintains the offender's person for three or more consecutive
       days or parts of days, or for ten or more nonconsecutive days in a period of 30
       consecutive days."

       Additionally, subsection (k) provides that "'[r]esidence' means a particular and
definable place where an individual resides." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(k).

       When analyzing sufficiency of the evidence arguments, this court reviews the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-
finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Aguirre,
313 Kan. 189, 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021). While engaging in this review, this court cannot
reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicting evidence, or redetermine the fact-finder's
credibility determinations. 313 Kan. at 209. Instead, if a rational fact-finder could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under the evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, this court must affirm the defendant's conviction. See
State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 247, 474 P.3d 761 (2020).

       Yet, to the extent the parties' arguments involve interpreting KORA provisions,
statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review.
State v. Ayers, 309 Kan. 162, 163, 432 P.3d 663 (2019). When interpreting statutes, the
most fundamental rule is to interpret the statute's plain language to give effect to the
Legislature's intent by enacting the statute. If the disputed statute's language is plain and
unambiguous, this "'court must give effect to [the statute's] express language, rather than
determine what the law should or should not be.' [Citation omitted.]" 309 Kan. at 164.

                                                    6
Sufficient Evidence Supported Ballard's Conviction

       Ballard's first argument involves whether the State presented sufficient evidence
that he was transient as defined by K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l). Ballard stresses that
his August 27, 2021 change of information form included John's Hillside address and the
term "transient" does not appear in that form. He points to John's testimony as evidence
that John's address was his fixed and identifiable address after he completed the August
27, 2021 change of registration form. He asserts the evidence at trial only "showed that
[he] slept every night at [John's] house from August until mid-October of 2021." As a
result, Ballard asks this court to reverse his conviction for violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp.
22-4905(f) because the State presented insufficient evidence that he was transient as
defined by K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l). The State counterargues we should reject
Ballard's sufficiency of the evidence argument because it requires us to reweigh evidence
in his favor and ignore evidence supporting his conviction.

       Simply put, we find the State's argument persuasive. Again, K.S.A. 2021 Supp.
22-4905(f) requires KORA registrants who are considered transient under K.S.A. 2021
Supp. 22-4902(l)'s definition to register at least every 30 days with the local registering
law enforcement agency. This means at Ballard's jury trial, the State had to prove the
following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Ballard previously committed a crime
requiring KORA registration; (2) that Ballard failed to register every 30 days with the
registering law enforcement agency as required because of his transient status; and (3)
that Ballard failed to complete this requirement in Sedgwick County on or about October
1, 2021.

       Here, it is readily apparent the State presented evidence to meet its burden of
proof. At trial, the State admitted Ballard's Arkansas journal entry showing that Ballard
pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual assault in August 2004. Deputy Clopton testified
that when Ballard moved to Sedgwick County, he had to register as an offender for life

                                              7
based on his conviction in Arkansas. Kastner testified that Ballard had to report every 30
days once he completed his August 27, 2021 change of information form, because his
handwritten statement on the blank section of the form about where he could be located
showed Ballard was currently transient. Deputy Clopton and Kastner each testified that
the registration office had no records of Ballard reporting anytime during September
2021 or October 2021. Additionally, Kastner testified that she helped Ballard complete
his August 27, 2021 change of information form, at which point "[h]e was notified" that
he must start registering every 30 days. She explained that although Ballard listed John's
Hillside address as his current physical address on this form, Ballard had previously
reported he sometimes went "there during the day" instead of "actually resid[ing] there."

       Although Ballard cites John's testimony as proof that he reported to the
registration office in September 2021 and October 2021, by suggesting we focus only on
John's testimony, Ballard asks us to reweigh the evidence in his favor. Deputy Clopton's
and Kastner's testimony that Ballard did not report to the registration office at least every
30 days during those months directly contradicts John's testimony that Ballard completed
his KORA requirements in September 2021 and October 2021 because he drove Ballard
to and saw Ballard enter the registration office. Kastner's testimony that Ballard
previously reported that he did not "actually reside" at John's Hillside address directly
contradicts John's testimony that Ballard lived with him from August until mid-October.
The jury was tasked with making a credibility determination between Deputy Clopton's,
Kastner's, and John's testimony regarding whether Ballard violated his KORA
requirements in September and October 2021. Because the jury found Ballard guilty of
violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f) by not reporting to the registration office every
30 days as required for registrants considered transient, the jury found Deputy Clopton's
and Kastner's testimonies more credible. So, Ballard's sufficiency of the evidence
argument fails because it requires this court to reweigh evidence in his favor and ignore
evidence supporting his convictions contrary to the standards governing our review. See
Aguirre, 313 Kan. at 209.

                                              8
        Finally, although neither party emphasized the plain language of K.S.A. 2021
Supp. 22-4905(f), the statutory language also undermines Ballard's argument. Part of
Ballard's claim is that nothing in his August 27, 2021 change of information form
supports Kastner's conclusion that he was currently transient. But Kastner testified that
upon learning that a registrant had no "permanent place to stay," the registration office's
policy was to consider that registrant transient. She also testified that once the office
considered the registrant transient, the registrant must give the office a list of places
where he or she could be located.

        The plain language of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f)(1)-(2) supports Kastner's
testimony that Ballard knew that the registration office considered him transient.
Kastner's testimony about transient registrants giving the office a list of places where they
could be found if needed mirrors the rules found in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f)(1) and
(f)(2). K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f)(1) requires a transient registrant to provide the law
enforcement agency "a list of places where the offender has slept and otherwise
frequented" since the last registration. Meanwhile, K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f)(2)
requires a registrant to "provide a list of places where the offender may be contacted and
where the offender intends to sleep and otherwise frequent" before his or her next
required registration. So, because Ballard wrote he "walk[ed] around Broadway and the
Lord's Diner"—thus providing the list required under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f)(1)
and (2)—this supports that Ballard understood the registration office considered him
transient, which also meant he had to report to the registration office at least every 30
days.

        Here, the State presented significant evidence supporting Ballard's violation of
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f). When we consider that evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, we conclude a rational fact-finder could find Ballard guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of failing to register at least every 30 days as of October 1, 2021, as
required for registrants considered transient under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l).

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Accordingly, we reject Ballard's request to reverse his conviction for insufficient
evidence.

  DOES THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE STATUTORY
DEFINITIONS OF "TRANSIENT," "RESIDENCE," AND "RESIDE" CONSTITUTE CLEAR ERROR?

       In Ballard's second argument, he claims the district court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on the definitions of "transient," "residence," and "reside." Like Ballard's
sufficiency of the evidence claim, Ballard's jury instruction argument relies on the
statutory definitions of these three terms, previously defined above.

Applicable Legal Principles

       When considering jury instruction challenges in criminal cases, we apply a three-
step standard of review. State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). Under
the first step, we examine whether we "'can or should review the issue, i.e., whether there
is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal.'" 307 Kan.
at 317. Under the second step, we consider "'the merits of the claim to determine whether
error occurred below.'" 307 Kan. at 317. This requires us to determine whether the
disputed jury instruction was legally and factually appropriate. While making this
determination, we exercise unlimited review over the entire record. 307 Kan. at 318.
Then, assuming the district court erred, under the third step, we assess "'whether the error
requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed harmless.'" 307 Kan. at 317.

       Although this standard has three distinct steps, the first and third steps are
interrelated. 307 Kan. at 317. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3414(3) states:

               "No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction . . .
       unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating

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       distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection unless the
       instruction or the failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous."

       As a result, to prove the district court clearly erred, the appealing party must
firmly convince this court that the jury would have reached a different verdict but for the
instruction error. McLinn, 307 Kan. at 318.

       Here, Ballard admits that he never requested an instruction defining transient,
residence, or reside under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l), (k), and (j), respectively.
Likewise, he recognizes we will not reverse his conviction for violating K.S.A. 2021
Supp. 22-4905(f) unless he firmly convinces us the jury would have acquitted him but for
the district court's failure to give the definitional instruction. Even so, Ballard argues the
district court's failure to sua sponte give the definitional instruction was clear error under
the facts of this case.

       Ballard claims the instruction was legally appropriate because an instruction
including the statutory definitions would fairly and accurately define legal terms the jury
needed to understand. And, Ballard reasons the definitional instruction was factually
appropriate because his defense was that he resided with John in August 2021 through
mid-October 2021, making the definitions of "reside" and "residence" appropriate. He
argues the registration office wrongly found him transient and then required him to
register every 30 days, so it was vital that the jury understand the definition of "transient"
to determine whether he had a legal obligation to register every 30 days once he
completed the August 27, 2021 change of information form.

       Next, Ballard contends that the district court's failure to sua sponte give the
definitional jury instruction resulted in his conviction. He argues the jury would have
acquitted him if it had an instruction on the statutory definitions of transient, residence,
and reside because those statutory definitions supported John's testimony that Ballard

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resided with him during the relevant time period. Ballard argues that if the district court
had given a definitional instruction, the jury would have understood that his fixed and
permanent address was John's Hillside address because John testified that he slept on his
couch every day. And he contends Kastner's testimony that the term transient meant a
registrant had no "permanent place to stay" misled the jury because K.S.A. 2021 Supp.
22-4902(l) states only that "'[t]ransient' means having no fixed or identifiable residence."

         Although the State agrees with Ballard that an instruction giving the statutory
definitions of transient, residence, and reside would have been factually appropriate, it
disagrees with Ballard's contention that the definitional instruction was legally
appropriate for a couple reasons. First, it asserts the statutory definitions of transient,
reside, and residence are consistent with their commonly understood definitions. Then, it
suggests a definitional instruction was not legally appropriate because nothing in the
Kansas Pattern Jury Instructions requires such an instruction. See PIK Crim. 4th 63.140
(2022 Supp.).

         For a couple of reasons, we disagree with the State and find the definitional
instruction would have been legally appropriate. But we needn't linger long on the
legality of the instruction because, even so, Ballard cannot firmly convince us of clear
error.

         First, the broad and ambiguous definitions of transient, reside, and residence the
State cites from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary—as proof that the disputed
terms' statutory meanings mirror their ordinary meanings—do not include the interrelated
character of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(j) through (l); that is, the definition of
"residence" includes the term "resides," and the definition of "transient" includes the term
"residence." And, the definition of "reside" found in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(j),
which includes requirements for the number of days a person is found in a specific place,
undermines the State's argument. The dictionary definition of "reside" simply does not

                                              12
explain the counted-days requirements found in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(j): that a
registrant resides wherever he has stayed, slept, or maintained his person either in the
same place for 3 or more consecutive days or parts of days or in the same place for 10 or
more nonconsecutive days in a period of 30 consecutive days. So, we disagree that the
commonly understood definitions of these terms rendered a definitional instruction
inappropriate.

       And second, as for the State's argument concerning the PIK instructions, the State
correctly points out that there is no instruction statutorily defining the terms transient,
residence, or reside in the Kansas Pattern Jury Instruction PIK Crim. 4th 63.140. But our
Supreme Court has held that the district court should not hesitate to modify PIK
instructions when required. State v. Whitaker, 255 Kan. 118, 124, 872 P.2d 278 (1994).
Under the facts of this case, where Ballard's defense hinged on the specific interrelated
terms and required days found in the statutory definitions of transient, residence, and
reside, it is readily apparent that an instruction defining those terms was legally
appropriate.

       So, the State concedes the definitional instruction was factually appropriate, and
Ballard persuasively argues the definitional instruction was legally appropriate.
Accordingly, if Ballard had requested a definitional instruction at his trial, the district
court should have granted Ballard's request.

       Yet Ballard did not meet his burden of proof under the clear error standard of
review. By finding Ballard guilty of violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f), the jury
weighed competing testimony and made a credibility determination against John's
testimony about whether Ballard registered in September 2021 and October 2021 and
whether Ballard lived with him from August 2021 until mid-October 2021. The verdict
indicates the jury must have accepted Kastner's testimony that Ballard previously
reported he did not "actually reside" at John's address. It also apparently credited her

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testimony that Ballard was told he must start reporting to the registration office at least
every 30 days when he completed the August 27, 2021 change of information form
because the registration office considered him transient based on his statement that he
"walk[s] around Broadway and the Lord's Diner."

       Accordingly, the jury's verdict in this case establishes: (1) it found that Ballard
did not actually reside with John; (2) it found that Ballard understood he needed to report
to the registration office at least every 30 days because of his current transient status; and
(3) it found Ballard did not report to the registration office during September 2021 or
October 2021. Because the jury made these findings, it is highly unlikely the jury would
have acquitted Ballard but for the district court's failure to instruct it on the statutory
meanings of transient, residence, and reside.

       The jury's credibility determinations also undermine Ballard's main argument
about Kastner's testimony misleading the jury on the definition of transient. Ballard
contends that the jury's guilty verdict is unreliable because Kastner's testimony that the
registration office considers a registrant transient when he or she does not "have a
permanent place to stay" differed so much from K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l)'s
definition that "'[t]ransient' means having no fixed or identifiable residence." As just
discussed, though, the jury accepted Kastner's testimony that Ballard knew that he must
register every 30 days because his handwritten statement on the August 27, 2021 change
of information form resulted in the registration office finding him transient.

       And why would Ballard include a handwritten statement that he walked around
Broadway Street and the Lord's Diner unless he thought it was pertinent information for
the registration office to have? Even though Kastner's testimony regarding how the
registration office found a registrant transient does not exactly match K.S.A. 2021 Supp.
22-4902(l)'s definition of transient, her testimony is insignificant when viewed in light of
the following: (1) Kastner testified that Ballard understood he was considered a transient

                                               14
registrant that must report to the registration office at least every 30 days as of August 27,
2021, and (2) Kastner testified that registrants like Ballard who were considered transient
include places on the blank section of the change of information form where they may be
located before their next reporting period.

       Finally, Ballard's argument avoids a fundamental problem with his defense. To
review, Ballard does not appeal his conviction for violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-
4905(b)—failing to register during his October 2021 birthday month. The State charged
Ballard with violating this section of KORA "on or about" November 1, 2021. The only
conviction Ballard appeals is for violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f) by failing to
register at least every 30 days as required for a registrant considered transient under
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l). The State charged Ballard with violating K.S.A. 2021
Supp. 22-4905(f) "on or about" October 1, 2021, for his failure to register in September.

       At trial, Ballard presented two distinct reasonable doubt defenses to the jury. In
addition to arguing that he resided with John between August 2021 to mid-October 2021,
Ballard argued that he reported to the registration office in September 2021 and October
2021. In support of this defense, he alleged that the registration office lost his forms
because sometimes "[t]hings fall between the cracks." He also explicitly claimed he
reported to the registration office in September 2021 as well as his October 2021 birthday
month.

       It is obvious why Ballard would claim to report to the registration office during his
October 2021 birthday month because he was required to do so under K.S.A. 2021 Supp.
22-4905(b). But why did Ballard claim to report to the registration office in September
2021? If Ballard did not know that the registration office considered him transient, or
believed he was not transient, why would he make an unnecessary trip to the registration
office? Ballard never explains why he claimed to report to the registration office in
September 2021 while simultaneously arguing he had no legal obligation to report that

                                              15
month. His claim of reporting to the registration office in September 2021 and claim to
have no legal obligation to do so because he resided with John are conflicting defenses to
the violation of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f).

       In short, Ballard's defense that he reported to the registration office in September
2021 supports he knew he was required to report every 30 days because the office
considered him transient under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(l).

       To conclude, as with his sufficiency of the evidence arguments, Ballard's
arguments why the district court clearly erred by not instructing the jury on the statutory
definitions of transient, residence, and reside ignore the jury's credibility determinations
against him. Because the jury made a credibility determination that Ballard knew that he
needed to report to the registration office every 30 days as required for registrants
considered transient, Ballard cannot firmly convince this court that the jury would have
acquitted him if instructed on the statutory definitions of transient, residence, and reside.
Notwithstanding the jury's credibility determination, Ballard's arguments ignore that his
handwritten statement in the blank section on the August 27, 2021 change of information
form and his defense that the registration office lost his completed September 2021
paperwork is strong evidence that he knew the registration office considered him a
transient registrant who must register at least every 30 days. So, although Ballard has
proven that the definitional instruction was legally and factually appropriate, Ballard
cannot firmly convince this court that the jury would have acquitted him of violating
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f) had the district court instructed the jury on the requested
statutory definitions.

       Because Ballard cannot establish clear error on the district court's failure to
provide a definitional instruction and we find sufficient evidence presented by the State,
we affirm Ballard's conviction for violating K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4905(f).

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Affirmed.

            17