Court Opinion

ID: 9467857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:58:06.291519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:33.674443
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
Because section 501(c) of the LandrumGriffin Act is expressly designed to regu*1338late the conduct of union officials in the use of union funds, I agree that the district court erred in dismissing those counts of the indictment that charged violations of section 501(c), and join in Parts I and III of the court’s opinion. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s view of the scope of United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973). I believe that the rationale animating Enmons precludes the application of RICO, the Travel Act, or 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) to violence incidental to a legitimate labor dispute. Accordingly, I dissent from Part II of the majority’s opinion.
The majority distinguishes Enmons from the case at bar by reading it as based on the specific language and legislative history of the Hobbs Act. I agree with the district court, however, that “it is inaccurate to so narrowly limit the case.” United States v. Thordarson, 487 F.Supp. 991, 992-93 (D.C.C. D.Cal.1980). The Court in Enmons explicitly stated that even had the language and history of the Hobbs Act not precluded its application to violence during legitimate labor disputes, policy reasons would make such application improper. 410 U.S. at 411, 93 S.Ct. at 1015. The Court voiced its reluctance, absent unmistakably compelling statutory language, to conclude “that Congress intended to put the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes.” Id. This policy is as appropriate here as in Enmons and counsels against extending RICO, the Travel Act, or section 844(i) to “the use of force to achieve legitimate collective-bargaining demands.” 410 U.S. at 408, 93 S.Ct. at 1014.
The majority neglects this policy consideration. The only policy argument stated in Enmons that the majority acknowledges is that “the special characteristics of the crime of extortion” made the Court fear that applying the Hobbs Act to labor disputes risked transforming minor picket line violence into federal crimes. The majority scarcely recognizes that applying the Travel Act or RICO to labor disputes creates the same risk, since extortion is one of the “unlawful activities” to which the Travel Act applies and is included in RICO’s definition of “racketeering activity.”1
More serious, however, is the majority’s failure to appreciate that the Enmons decision rests not solely on the interpretation of the particular statute involved there, but on a broad, historically justified concern that the federal government not intrude into the business of policing the orderly conduct of legitimate labor disputes. Punishing lawlessness perpetrated during labor disputes has historically been and should continue to be the province of the States and their law enforcement authorities. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the court’s opinion.

. The Travel Act penalizes anyone who travels in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an “unlawful activity” and does thereafter carry on such activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). And it includes extortion in its definition of “unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b). RICO prohibits “racketeering activity” in various contexts, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and extortion chargeable under state law is explicitly included in the definition of such activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).
The majority does acknowledge this problem but suggests that Enmons “arguably should be extended to ... limit the scope of the RICO and Travel Act extortion provisions.” Majority Opinion, note 9. This concession makes it clear that Enmons cannot be read as based solely on the legislative history of the Hobbs Act.