Court Opinion

ID: 9687418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:27:42.787885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:16.157409
License: Public Domain

*1094Mason, J.
I dissent. A moro complete picture of the situation with which the defendant-father was faced requires narration of some additional facts.
During the last three or four months of defendant’s Muscatine employment the wife became dissatisfied with the requirements of being a wife and mother and moved to Chicago to sell Bibles. She had previously engaged in other types of sales work. Defendant continued his employment during the daytime which made it necessary that he secure baby-sitters for the children. This problem influenced defendant to move the children to Wheeling, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. Because of the difficulty of getting baby-sitters and the necessity of defendant taking care of the children while the wife continued her activities, he had only a part-time job. After a short stay in Wheeling the children were moved back to Muscatine; then to Elkhart, Indiana. On March 4, 1964, the mother left Elkhart without the children and went to California. Defendant has not seen nor heard from her since.
During the marriage defendant became indebted primarily, he asserts, as the result of Donna’s dissatisfaction being a wife and mother. Prior to the Bible venture Donna’s activities in the sales field required going into debt for different clothes, uniforms, transportation in the form of a ear or otherwise. She would buy these things before starting the job which frequently did not work out and the bills remained. At time of trial the Muscatine credit bureau had accounts against defendant for $3100, some at least six years old, generally four or five years old. Defendant claimed most of these accounts had been discharged in bankruptcy in 1961. One account not so discharged was Balph Neff’s claim for rent prior to October 31, 1962, reduced to judgment January 2, 1963. Defendant contends this indebtedness was the result of Donna’s renting a home they could not afford although they lived in it for approximately two years before moving to Wheeling. An airplane in which defendant had purchased a half interest was levied on under this judgment.
Defendant was faced with the situation created by the mother’s complete indifference and lack of interest for the wel*1095fare of her five children. She engaged in various sales projects that took her from the home and her family for days at a time, had at leást one illicit relationship in the home where her children were residing and finally made a complete departure. Thus, defendant was forced to turn to those who loved his children when the burden of trying to be both father and mother became too heavy, and continue an arrangement that he believed under the circumstances was for the best interests of his family.
After Donna left, defendant brought Debbie and John back to the Schafnit farm, Darla to Gene and Nancy Garvin’s in Muscatine. Gene is defendant’s cousin and Nancy is also plaintiff’s sister. Terry was taken to his maternal grandmother’s, Margaret Buntenbach, also in Muscatine, where be stayed for some time but because of Mrs. Buntenbach’s health was taken to Sehafnits to be with Debbie and John. At the time of trial these three children were still staying with defendant’s foster parents. Because of Mr. and Mrs. Sehafnit’s age, 66 and 64 respectively, all the children were not taken to the farm originally. After school was out in June 1965 Darla went to stay with Mrs. Buntenbach and was with her at time of trial.
Defendant testified that when he brought the other children from Elkhart he told the Leeches of being unable to contribute financially toward Margaret Ann’s support, and if taking care of her would be beyond their financial means, he could have her cared for either by his sister in Cedar Rapids or his brother in Davenport. However, defendant preferred to have Margaret Ann in the Leech home since Darla would be just a few blocks away and could be in contact with her throughout the week.' In addition it would have been impossible for defendant to go to Cedar Rapids or Davenport in order to get the children together when he came home weekends.
It- is admitted that while plaintiff and her husband had Margaret Ann defendant made no contributions toward her support. Mr. Leech testified he neither asked for nor' expected any help from defendant. Plaintiff and her husband were performing a charitable act and knew it.
«=::= * * fa-t;]ier should be encouraged to look for help with the children, from those who love them without the risk of *1096thereby losing the custody of the children permanently. This fact must receive consideration in cases of this kind.” Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1396, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156.
Unless we give weight to this fact, parents may be deterred from temporarily placing children in other hands, even where the child’s immediate best interests might be served by such a Separation, e.g., as when natural parents are seriously injured and unable to properly care for the child. Such loss of confidence in the ability to regain custody might severely undermine the widespread resort to temporary foster homes. The resulting uncertainty would discourage not only unjustifiable separations but justifiable as well. 79 Harvard Law Review 1710, 1714 (1966), a case comment on Painter v. Bannister, supra.
The majority opinion gives weight to defendant’s argument that “a parent in a time of need or crisis who loves his child, wants to provide the best training for it, but does not under any circumstances desire to give up the child permanently, is placed in an impossible situation. The soundest legal advice an attorney could give is that the parent place the child in a poor home. In this instance he would, therefore, have no difficulty in getting the child back. If the child is placed in a good home and the circumstances necessitate a long stay, whereby the child and foster home become attached, it may be next to impossible to remove this child.”
After the four children were returned to the Museatine-Atalissa area and began attending Wilton Junction school, defendant went to the school on numerous occasions, once to fill out school papers when Terry was injured, again to talk to Terry’s teacher as he had had a small problem and to attend many evening meetings in order to brush up on his knowledge of modern math so he might better help his children. The elementary principal described defendant as showing “the concern that a father should for his children in their education.”
During the trial and until entry of the court’s decree, defendant and four of the children lived in the farm home of his foster parents, a modern six-room dwelling with bath and fully equipped with electricity. There are two bedrooms upstairs where the two boys and defendant slept in the large room and *1097the two girls in the other. The parents’ bedroom is downstairs. Another room downstairs called the front room could be used as a bedroom. There is a vacant house on the Schafnits’ other farm that Mr. Schafnit agreed could be used at anytime. Defendant had talked to his foster father about bringing Darla and Margaret Ann. His father indicated their house was a little small for that many (six additional).
The situation in the Schafnit home with five additional people is not ideal, neither is the prospect of the trailer nor the possibility of using the other farm home. However, the family seemed to get along under the same conditions during and following trial. Seldom, if ever, do we find an ideal situation for children from a broken home.
Living with her father, either in the Schafnit home or the trailer, Margaret Ann would have the benefit of being with her brothers and sisters. “* * * A brother and sister should not be separated and lose the benefit of constant association with one another except where the circumstances require it.” McKay v. McKay, 253 Iowa 1047, 1053, 115 N.W.2d 151, 154, and citations. We find no circumstances here requiring her separation from the other children. This advantage where she may have to learn to share and develop a consideration for the rights of others in the family far outweighs the inconvenience of a crowded household.
The majority say Painter, Alingh and Halstead cited in that opinion are not only in point but also here most persuasive. In my opinion they are each factually distinguishable from the present case.
In Painter following the untimely death of his mother and sister, five-year-old Mark was temporarily entrusted to his maternal grandparents by his father in July 1963. Having remarried in November 1964, the father requested the return of Mark, but his request was denied by the grandparents. Mark was seven at time of trial, had been in Bannisters’ home for two years and a change of custody would have meant changing the child from Iowa to California. We relied heavily on the testimony of a child psychologist and focused attention on the psychological ramifications of a custodial switch at this time in young Mark’s *1098life. This testimony revealed Mark’s strong identification with the Bannisters and his acceptance of Mr. Bannister as his “father figure.” In deciding against a change, the court noted the probability, on the basis of analogous psychological studies and Mark’s former history of instability, that he might “go bad” if removed from the security of the Bannister home.
Although there was justification for Harold Painter’s placement of Mark with the Bannisters, and it was given consideration, it was held not to prevail against the likelihood of an adverse psychological impact on Mark, if he were returned to his father.
There is no showing here that a return of Margaret Ann to defendant is likely to have a seriously disrupting and disturbing effect upon her development.
In Alingh after' each was injured at the hands of the mentally-ill mother, first Stephan, age four months, and then his infant sister Robin were surrendered to their paternal grandparents by their father. A 1958 habeas corpus proceeding, instituted by the father, ivas denied and this 1965 action by the grandparents was brought to compel the return of the children unlawfully taken by the father. We affirmed a decision for the grandparents. At the time of trial the children, nine and ten, had been in the grandparents’ home since infancy and a change in custody would have meant returning the children to a home where they had previously been physically abused by a mentally-ill mother. The court refused to change custody in view of the uncertainty of the wife’s reaction to the responsibility of motherhood.
In Halstead at age two, Phillip was brought to his paternal grandparents’ home by his mother. Three years later, following her divorce from Phillip’s father, her second husband, she married a third time and moved to Texas, leaving Phillip with his grandparents, with whom he has remained. We reversed the lower court which had granted the mother custody after the natural father’s death in 1965. At the time of trial Phillip was 12 years old, had been in his grandparents’ home ten years, was visited by his mother about six times prior to trial and a change would have resulted in the. child being taken from Oran to Texas.
*1099In all three eases a change would have resulted to a new and strange environment.
Here the trial court found defendant had visited Margaret Ann on an average of once, every two weeks while she was in plaintiff’s home. On these occasions she would be taken to the Sehafnit farm to be with her brothers and sisters. She had lived with defendant from February 11 to May 11, 1966. They were not strangers. The Sehafnit farm, approximately 12 miles from the Leech home, would not constitute a change to a new and strange environment.
No stepmother nor stepbrothers or sisters are involved here.
Defendant’s frequent trips to Muscatine to be with his children, his efforts to be more help to them in their schoolwork and his consideration for Darla’s schooling is much stronger evidence of parental interest than any shown in Painter, Alingh or Hal-stead.
No complaint was made of the circumstances under which Margaret Ann was living while in the Sehafnit home during the trial nor is there complaint about the conditions under which the other children of this father are living.
Is the home now being furnished satisfactory as being for the best interest of three of his children but not for the best interest of Margaret Ann? The majority does not attempt to answer this question.
In child custody cases the primary concern is the, best interests and welfare of the child, but we are not of the same mind as to what that is in this instance. This is not easily determined with always a chance of human failure. We must weigh the benefits to the child and give them consideration along with the detriments.
The majority opinion says, “In June 1956, this couple [plaintiff and Kenneth] was divorced but remarried three, months later. Since then they ‘have gotten along fine’.” This is not the record. Plaintiff commenced three divorce actions against Kenneth, one before the divorce action of 3956 and one. following. She testified, “The last time I sued my husband for divorce was before we, bought this home. Since I filed my last *1100divorce, my husband and I have gotten along fine. We have had no trouble.”
Plaintiff, admittedly hotheaded, testified as to her haste in securing a writ of habeas corpus: “I didn’t think after the way he beat me up he would have guts enough to come back into my home and bring her back.”
Plaintiff, the mother of two sons, 19 and 17, living at home, has made Margaret Ann the center of attention while in her home. The trial court found Margaret Ann had been “doted upon by her aunt.” She has been taken by plaintiff’s older son on his dates, to high school athletic affairs by the family to be made a fuss over and generally waited on hand and foot. I feel under these circumstances discipline might become a problem and the sons, 19 and 17, might soon find a spoiled child a “pest.”
Weighing all the factors I am convinced the interest of Margaret Ann will be best served by placing her with her father.
Although the child is loved, well cared for and considered an important part of the plaintiff’s family three divorce actions, at least commenced, in one of which plaintiff asked that one of her sons be awarded to Kenneth and the other to her, do not reveal this to be a home where Margaret Ann may grow and develop free from the uncertainties of a speculative life and home environment which the majority feel is inherent in the defendant’s situation.
Even the Family Law Section’s 1963 model act, referred to in Halstead v. Halstead, supra, 259 Iowa, at 533, 144 N.W.2d, at 865, speaks only to a prima facie right of the de facto custodian, not an automatic one. The concern of the Family Law Section was with absolute rules (like the “natural right” theory) which lacked the sufficient flexibility to account for varying circumstances. Obviously, a contrary rule that the de facto custodian must be awarded custody, would be equally rigid and undesirable. The foregoing statement is from the Family Law Quarterly cited by the majority in Division II.
The majority say they “hold there should be no automatic determination in favor of a parent.” However, the other extreme suggested in the statement from the Family Law Quarterly, supra, is just as undesirable. In my opinion the majority is *1101coming dangerously close. Where is there room left for the necessary flexibility? I would reverse.
Moore and Becker, JJ., join in this dissent.