Court Opinion

ID: 9751629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:40:23.409457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:52.674605
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Associate Judge
(concurring in the result) :
The trial judge specifically ordered appellant detained under D.C.Code 1973, § 23-1322(a) (3). Since the case law supports the rule that upon a proper showing a defendant may be detained pretrial for obstructing justice by threatening prospective witnesses,11 concur in the result. The trial judge was unable to make the requisite finding under § 23-1322(b) (2) (C) 2 that *587there was a “substantial probability that the person committed the offense for which he is present before the judicial officer” in order to base detention upon § 23-1322(a)(1) or § 23-1322(a) (2). In my judgment, therefore, the court need not and should not treat appellant’s general constitutional attack on § 23-1322 in its entirety.

. Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 666, 7 L.Ed.2d 769 (1962); United States v. Gilbert, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 425 F.2d 490 (1969).

. D.C.Code 1973, § 23-1322 (b) provides in pertinent part:
No person described in subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered detained unless the judicial officer—
(1) holds a pretrial detention hearing in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section;
(2) finds—
* * * * *
(C) that, except with respect to a person described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section, on the basis of information *587presented by proffer or otherwise to the judicial officer there is substantial probability that the person committed the offense for which he is present before the judicial officer ; . . . [Emphasis supplied.]