Court Opinion

ID: 9503320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:41:13.833104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:23.164284
License: Public Domain

BALMER, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s analysis and disposition of this case. I write separately only to address concerns raised by defendant, amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense Counsel, and the concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals about the impact that this case may have on Oregon tort law. Defendant, for example, argues that a decision here that plaintiffs complaint states a claim for relief “would require a used vehicle seller, to avoid potential liability, to completely refurbish a vehicle before sale.” To preclude that result, defendant asserts that this court must hold that defendant’s alleged conduct could not “unreasonably create a foreseeable risk of harm.” For its part, amicus contends that this case requires the court to determine “[w]hat are the extreme circumstances where foreseeability is not reasonable.”
In fact, as I discuss briefly below, the allegations in the complaint plainly do state a claim for relief. As to the request by amicus that we use this case to set out the circumstances in which “foreseeability is not reasonable,” that general question simply is not presented by this case and does not lend itself to an abstract answer in any event. Rather, in this case, consistent with this court’s usual approach, the majority has decided only the issue before the court, drawing on our precedents and based on the arguments presented by the parties. That decision reaffirms prior case law, notably Hills v. McGillvrey, 240 Or 476, 402 P2d 722 (1965), and leaves intact the legal defenses and responses to the facts alleged in the complaint that defendant may have, as well as *291legal arguments that other defendants may raise in other contexts.
The problem with defendant’s position here is that, at this stage in the case, the answer to the question whether defendant’s conduct may have unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to plaintiff can be based only on the allegations in the complaint. Those allegations include that defendant negligently failed to perform recommended axle maintenance and to maintain a truck that was safe to operate; that defendant sold the truck to a third party; and that the subsequent failure of the truck’s axle was a substantial cause of plaintiffs injury. As the majority opinion carefully points out, accepting those allegations as true, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that defendant’s conduct “unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm” to plaintiff.
By limiting its defense (at this point) to asserting that the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim for relief, defendant has staked its position on a single defense: that its sale of the truck to a third party more than a year before plaintiff was injured necessarily bars plaintiff from bringing this action. The majority correctly rejects that argument.
But, of course, it does not necessarily follow that defendant is liable for plaintiffs injuries. The facts of this case might show that defendant was negligent, that defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of plaintiffs injuries, that plaintiffs injury was foreseeable, and that no contract or other source of law limits or supersedes defendant’s liability. On the other hand, the facts might show that defendant was not negligent in maintaining the truck. The facts might show that, after defendant had sold the truck and before the injury at issue here, the truck had been in a severe accident that damaged the axle. The facts might show that when defendant sold the truck, the initial buyer had agreed to completely recondition the truck — and either had or had not done so. The facts might show that defendant had sold the truck for scrap, but that the buyer had failed to scrap the truck and instead had resold it.
I raise these possible scenarios not to suggest that they accurately describe the facts in this case or that they *292necessarily would constitute successful legal defenses. Rather, I mention them because they demonstrate that the evidence may either refute the factual allegations in the complaint or may support one or more legal defenses that would permit defendant to avoid liability. Yet, because defendant has not filed an answer in which it could deny plaintiffs factual allegations and make its own factual allegations establishing any potential defenses, and because we lack even the limited factual record that we would have in a summary judgment proceeding, we must decide this case based only on the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.
I am not critical of defendant’s decision to file a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(8). Defendants often face the dilemma of whether to file such a motion and perhaps terminate the trial phase of the litigation quickly and inexpensively — but, perhaps, incorrectly and subject to reversal on appeal — or whether to file an answer, engage in discovery, and later file a motion for summary judgment, if appropriate. That decision has to be made by litigants in light of the circumstances of each case. It is noteworthy that Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or 329, 83 P3d 322 (2004) and Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Div., 316 Or 499, 853 P2d 798 (1993), two cases relied upon by the concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals, were decided on summary judgment. Even a cursory review of those decisions demonstrates that they rested on facts established in the summary judgment record and not only on allegations in the complaint. It is unlikely that the trial court in either Oregon Steel Mills or Buchler, looking solely at the allegations in the complaint, would have dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim or, if it had, that such a decision would have been sustained on appeal.
The presence of the litigant’s dilemma described above, however, does not mean that we can ignore our well-accepted standards for deciding motions to dismiss and our cases describing the elements of a cause of action for negligence. Here, those standards and cases fully support the majority’s conclusion.