Court Opinion

ID: 9958444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 14:06:40.206945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.569057
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0299-22
                                                                   A-0300-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER W. HEDDY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN M. LAFOLLETTE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted February 28, 2024 – Decided April 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Accurso and Gummer.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Sussex County, Indictment No. 21-02-0026.
            Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
            appellant Christopher W. Heddy (Brian P. Keenan,
            Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
            the brief).

            Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
            appellant Stephen M. LaFollette (Morgan A. Birck,
            Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
            the brief).

            Carolyn Murray, Acting Sussex County Prosecutor,
            attorney for respondent (Shaina Brenner, Special
            Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
            of counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

      In these back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of

issuing a single opinion, defendants Christopher W. Heddy and Steven M.

LaFollette appeal from an order denying their motions for entry into the pre-trial

intervention (PTI) program and subsequent convictions.           LaFollette also

contends his sentence was excessive. Agreeing with the trial court that the

prosecutor's rejection of defendants' PTI applications was not a gross and patent

abuse of discretion and discerning no error in LaFollette's sentence, we affirm.

                                        I.

                                                                            A-0299-22
                                        2
       During a warranted search of the home defendants shared, 1 law-

enforcement officers seized various electronic devices, including at least one

computer and several external hard drives. Those devices collectively contained

hundreds of thousands of images depicting the sexual exploitation or sexual

abuse of children, including images of children engaged in sexual intercourse.

On October 8, 2019, defendants were arrested and charged in complaint-

warrants with second-degree child endangerment ("possessing over one-hundred

(100) images depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor on a computer or

device that also had a peer-to-peer/file sharing network on it"), in violation of

N.J.S.A.     2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii),   and   third-degree   child   endangerment

("knowingly possessing over one-hundred (100) images depicting the sexual

exploitation of a minor on an external hard drive"), in violation of N.J.S.A.

2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii).

       LaFollette submitted a PTI application dated October 31, 2019.           A

probation officer recommended he be admitted into the program. The State

disagreed and denied his application, explaining its reasons for doing so in a

letter submitted pursuant to Rule 3:28-9.        The State indicated PTI was

"presumptively inappropriate" for LaFollette because he was "subject to a

1
    LaFollette was the boyfriend of Heddy's mother, who died in 2007.
                                                                           A-0299-22
                                        3
presumption of incarceration in light of his pending charges ." The State also

noted he had "prior charges from California with an unknown disposition" and

found his "attitude suggest[ed] a lack of remorse or regret." The State cited

paragraphs one through three, five through eight, ten, fourteen, and seventeen

of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) as weighing against his admission into PTI. The State

asserted LaFollette's "possession of a cache of illicit and illegal images that he

carefully organized and curated at home" was "not to be considered one of the

'victimless crimes' typically found to be appropriate for PTI."

      On November 14, 2019, Heddy submitted a PTI application, which

included a letter from his counsel "set[ting] forth the compelling reasons that

justify consideration of his PTI application without the consent of the

prosecutor." She included information about his age (thirty-eight years), the

lack of any prior arrests or convictions, his family life, the early death of his

parents, his cooperation with law-enforcement officials, his lack of contact with

the children depicted in the videos and lack of participation in the creation of

the videos, and his willingness to apply for his GED, become employed, obtain

a medical evaluation, follow treatment recommendations, and accept reasonable

restrictions on his use of computers in the future. The State denied Heddy's

application, setting forth the reasons for its denial in a letter submitted pursuant

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                                         4
to Rule 3:28-9(a). The State found PTI was "presumptively inappropriate" for

Heddy because his pending charges had a presumption of incarceration. The

State cited paragraphs one through three, five through eight, ten, and fourteen

of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) as weighing against his admission into PTI.

      Defendants appealed in the Law Division the State's denials of their PTI

applications. In his submission to the Law Division, LaFollette faulted the State

for "attempt[ing] to cast a negative light on [him], but omit[ting] nearly all of

[his] history and character."    He highlighted his recent acceptance into a

counseling program, the assistance he had given to Heddy and others, his history

of deep vein thrombosis and blood clots, a 2002 work-related injury, the

financial support he had received from others, and that he had not participated

in making child pornography.

      In his submission to the Law Division, Heddy identified "personal

problems which may have led [him] to commit the crimes," describing them as

"factors which led to his having too much time on his hands, resulting in this

offense": the early death of his father, his withdrawal from high school, and the

financial support he has received, which enabled him to remain jobless.

Referencing the State's assertion his crime was not "victimless," Heddy stated

he "had no involvement in procuring or posting the images he accessed" and had

                                                                           A-0299-22
                                       5
not met the children depicted in those images. He noted his eye issues and recent

diagnosis of high blood pressure and made the unsupported contention he "is

likely suffering from a diagnosable mental health condition . . . leading to the

commission of the crime."       Heddy disputed the State's conclusion he had

exhibited a pattern of anti-social behavior, asserting "[w]hat he was doing was

exhibiting a pattern of behavior of a person who lacked sufficient social

stimulation and other worthwhile outlets for his talents." Heddy characterized

as "weak" the State's reliance on factor fourteen.

      During argument, Judge Louis S. Sceusi summarized the facts set forth

before him, including that approximately 100,000 "alleged images and videos

depicting the alleged sexual exploitation of minors [had been] recovered from

the hard drives located in [defendants'] residence." Defense counsel did not

dispute that statement.    The assistant prosecutor stated, "defendants had

hundreds of thousands of images of child porn on their computers," "there is

damage that has occurred to these victims," and Heddy had "[sought] out over

an extended period of time vast amounts of child porn." Defense counsel did

not dispute those assertions.    Heddy's counsel described defendants as two

people who "just had too much time on their hands." LaFollette's counsel

disputed her client was "a violent individual" but emphasized she was "not

                                                                           A-0299-22
                                        6
arguing this was a victimless crime" and acknowledged, "this is a serious offense

. . . [a]nd having [these images] and sharing them . . . does have a tendency to

perpetuate the continual making of [child pornography]."

      On June 25, 2020, Judge Sceusi entered an order denying defendants'

appeal of the State's rejection of their PTI applications. In a comprehensive

written opinion, the judge found neither defendant had proved by clear and

convincing evidence the State's decision to deny their applications was a patent

and gross abuse of discretion.

      On February 4, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment charging

LaFollette and Heddy with "knowingly possess[ing], view[ing], or hav[ing]

under his control . . . 100,000 or more items depicting the sexual exploitation or

abuse of a child," a first-degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i); and

"knowingly stor[ing] or maintain[ing] an item depicting the sexual exploitation

or abuse of a child using a file-sharing program which is designated as available

for searching by or copying to one or more other computers," a second-degree

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii).      The indictment also charged

LaFollette with "knowingly distribut[ing] items depicting the sexual

exploitation or abuse of a child," a second-degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(b)(5)(a)(i), and "knowingly possess[ing] items depicting the sexual

                                                                            A-0299-22
                                        7
exploitation or abuse of a child with the intent to distribute the items," a second-

degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(ii).

      Pursuant to negotiated plea agreements in which the State agreed to

recommend ten-year prison sentences subject to Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1

to -19, and other conditions and to dismiss the remaining counts of the

indictment, defendants pleaded guilty to first-degree endangering the welfare of

children, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i). At his plea hearing,

LaFollette admitted he knowingly had possessed a computer and other devices

that contained almost half a million images and videos showing children

involved in sexual activity, including intercourse. At his plea hearing, Heddy

admitted   he   knowingly     had   possessed    electronic devices     containing

approximately 294,000 images depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a

child, including images and videos of children engaging in sexual intercourse.

      At the sentencing hearings, each defense counsel asked the sentencing

judge to reduce the degree of the crime and impose a sentence not to exceed five

years. The State asked the judge to sentence defendants in accordance with the

plea agreement. LaFollette under oath acknowledged and agreed with a finding

contained in "the Avenel Report" that he was "a repetitive and compulsive

violator when it comes to child pornography." Discussing a letter LaFollette

                                                                              A-0299-22
                                         8
had sent to the judge, defense counsel said LaFollette had written he "had been

struggling with [his child pornography addiction] for a long time ."

      The judge denied defendants' requests to lower the degree of their crimes.

He found aggravating factors three (risk defendant will commit another offense),

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and nine (need to deter the defendant and others from

violating the law), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and mitigating factor seven

("defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a

law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the

present offense"), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The judge sentenced each defendant

to a ten-year term of imprisonment and imposed $4,955 in assessments and

penalties. The judge also ordered defendants be placed on parole supervision

for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, register as sex offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, and

forfeit all devices seized.

      On appeal, Heddy challenges the prosecutor's rejection of his PTI

application, arguing:

             THE    PROSECUTOR'S    REJECTION   OF
             DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION INTO THE PRE-
             TRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM WAS AN
             ARBITRARY, PATENT, AND GROSS ABUSE OF
             DISCRETION WHICH MUST BE CORRECTED BY
             THIS COURT.

In addition to making that same argument, LaFollette challenges his sentence:

                                                                           A-0299-22
                                       9
            THE SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE WHERE THE
            TRIAL COURT DOUBLE COUNTED, RELIED ON
            FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO FIND
            MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORTED BY FACTS
            IN THE RECORD.

Unpersuaded by those arguments, we affirm.

                                        II.

      "PTI is a 'diversionary program through which certain offenders are able

to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected

to deter future criminal behavior.'" State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 16 (2023)

(quoting State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). "[T]he primary purpose of

PTI has been 'to assist in the rehabilitation of worthy defendants, and, in the

process, to spare them the rigors of the criminal justice system.'" Id. at 17

(quoting State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 513 (2008)). "PTI eligibility has been

broadly defined, subject to specified exclusions, to 'include[ ] all defendants who

demonstrate the will to effect necessary behavioral change such that society can

have confidence that they will not engage in future criminality.'" Ibid. (quoting

Watkins, 193 N.J. at 513). The State "may consider a wide array of factors when

determining whether to recommend someone for PTI," including "'[t]he nature

of the offense,' the motivations of the defendant, the desires of the victim or

complainant with respect to prosecution, the social harm perpetrated by the

                                                                             A-0299-22
                                       10
defendant, and '[t]he extent to which the applicant's crime constitutes part of a

continuing pattern of anti-social behavior.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e)).

      "[W]hether to admit a particular defendant into PTI has been treated as a

fundamental prosecutorial function." Id. at 18. Accordingly, courts afford

prosecutors "broad discretion" in determining whether a defendant should be

diverted into PTI, "[f]irst, because it is the fundamental responsibility of the

prosecutor to decide whom to prosecute, and second, because it is a primary

purpose of PTI to augment, not diminish, a prosecutor’s options." State v. Chen,

465 N.J. Super. 274, 284 (App. Div. 2020) (first quoting State v. K.S., 220 N.J.

190, 199 (2015); and then quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246).

      Given that broad discretion, "our review of a prosecutor's denial of a PTI

application is 'severely limited.'" State v. E.R., 471 N.J. Super. 234, 244-45

(App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003)). "Judicial

review of a prosecutor's decision about PTI admission is 'available to check only

the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness.'" Gomes, 253 N.J. at

18 (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977)). "[T]o overturn a

prosecutor's decision to exclude a defendant from the program the defendant

must 'clearly and convincingly' show that the decision was a 'patent and gross

                                                                           A-0299-22
                                      11
abuse of . . . discretion.'" K.S., 220 N.J. at 200 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146

N.J. 576, 582 (1996)). A patent and gross abuse of discretion occurs when "the

[PTI] denial: '(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors,

(b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c)

amounted to a clear error in judgment.'" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555, 563

(App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)). Because

"[i]ssues concerning the propriety of the prosecutor's consideration of a

particular [PTI] factor are akin to 'questions of law,'" we review those legal

determinations de novo. E.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 245 (quoting State v. Denman,

449 N.J. Super. 369, 376 (App. Div. 2017) (alterations in the original)).

      In determining whether a defendant should be diverted into PTI, a

prosecutor must make an "individualized assessment of the defendant," State v.

Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621-22 (2015), based on the defendant's "amenability

to correction" and potential "responsiveness to rehabilitation," Watkins, 193

N.J. at 520 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(b)).        In making that assessment,

prosecutors must consider seventeen non-exclusive factors listed in N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e) and additional factors regarding the nature of the offense set forth

in Rule 3:28-4(b)(1). E.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 246; RSI Bank v. Providence Mut.

Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 473 n.4 (2018). The weight given to those factors

                                                                            A-0299-22
                                      12
is left to the prosecutor's discretion. Wallace, 146 N.J. at 585-86. A court

presumes a prosecutor considered "all relevant factors" when making a PTI

determination unless the defendant demonstrates otherwise. Id. at 584.

      On appeal, Heddy asserts that "[a]s a non-violent, first-time offender who

expressed an attitude conducive to rehabilitation, [he] should have been afforded

the opportunity for reform through the PTI program." Specifically addressing

the   factors   under   N.J.S.A.   2C:43-12(e),    Heddy    contends    the   State

inappropriately found as weighing against his admission into PTI factor six

("likelihood that the applicant's crime is related to a condition or situation that

would be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory

treatment") because he never had a job, factor eight ("extent to which the

applicant's crime constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social

behavior") based on the present offenses, and factor ten ("whether or not the

crime is of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or

in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior") "based on the notion

that the possessory offenses here constituted acts of violence." Heddy also

asserts the State failed to demonstrate factor ten because "there is no evidence

[he] did anything to support the marketplace [for child pornography]." Heddy

argues the State's rejection of his PTI application "constituted a patent and gross

                                                                              A-0299-22
                                       13
abuse of discretion" because its "predominant focus . . . was the nature and facts

of the offenses."

      LaFollette "recognizes that he had accumulated a great number of images

and videos" but criticizes the State's decision for "seem[ing] to be solely based

on this fact, failing to take into consideration important factors and relying on

assumptions not based [o]n facts [i]n the record."       He faults the State for

"plac[ing] too much emphasis on the offense itself" and for failing to adequately

consider his remorse and "other factors relevant to his amenability to

rehabilitation," including his efforts since his arrest to seek help and attend

therapy, the medical conditions that purportedly prevented him from being

employed, his care for ill loved ones, and the trauma he experienced from their

deaths. LaFollette argues the State erred in considering factor eight because his

offense did not itself demonstrate a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior

and factor ten because his offense was not a crime of violence. He asserts the

State's "emphasis on the details of the offense and how the public would view

[his] admission to PTI" was a patent and gross abuse of discretion.

      We agree with Judge Sceusi; neither defendant proved by clear and

convincing evidence the State's decision to deny his PTI application was a patent

and gross abuse of discretion. Defendants did not demonstrate the State failed

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                                       14
to consider or to consider adequately the applicable factors. See Wallace, 146

N.J. at 584 (finding a court presumes the State considered "all relevant factors"

when making a PTI determination unless the defendant demonstrates otherwise).

The State in its denial letters explicitly stated it had reviewed "all discovery

related to the matter," "defendant's PTI application," defense counsel's letter in

support of the application, "the PTI Recommendation report," and "the

applicable factors for admission into the Program and the statutory criteria set

forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) through (17)." The State then identified and

described the factors it believed weighed against defendants' admission into PTI.

      A prosecutor is not required to "provide a defendant with a detailed report

outlining every step taken en route to his [or her PTI ] decision." State v. Waters,

439 N.J. Super. 215, 234 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110,

117 (1979)). "At a minimum, the prosecutor 'should note the factors present in

defendant's background or the offense purportedly committed which led [the

prosecutor] to conclude that admission should be denied.'" Ibid. (alteration in

original) (quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 249). Here, the State met that minimum

by stating the reasons why defendants' applications were rejected with enough

"specificity so that defendant[s] ha[d] a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate

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                                        15
that they are unfounded." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 249 (quoting State v. Maddocks,

80 N.J. 98, 109 (1979)).

      That the State gave more weight to the nature of the offense and facts of

defendants' cases than to factors defendants emphasize was within the State's

discretion. And in relying on the nature of defendants' offenses and facts of

their cases, the State did nothing wrong. The State did not make a blanket

declaration that because defendants were consumers of child pornography, they

could not participate in PTI.    Instead, the State considered expressly the

particular facts of the cases and specific information about defendants, thereby

fulfilling its obligation to make an "individualized assessment[]."     State v.

Johnson, 238 N.J. 119, 127 (2019).

      As to the individual factors referenced by defendants on appeal, the State

did not abuse its discretion in weighing factor six against Heddy's admission.

As Judge Sceusi found, Heddy had not provided any "medical proof" or

"medically-verified mental health diagnosis" demonstrating he had a "condition

that would be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory

treatment," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(6). And given that Heddy had not participated

in school through graduation, had not participated in a GED program, and had

not participated in any job, the State reasonably concluded the record contained

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                                      16
"little evidence" to support his ability to participate successfully in a

rehabilitative program. LaFollette also failed to provide medical proof he had a

condition that would be "conducive to change through his participation in

supervisory treatment." The State acted within its discretion in declining to find

LaFollette's post-arrest remorse or enrollment in therapy overcame the

presumption against admission or outweighed other factors disfavoring

admission.

      Defendants fault the State for considering defendants' actions as

"continuing pattern[s] of anti-social behavior" under factor eight, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(8). When they submitted their PTI applications and when Judge

Sceusi considered their appeals, defendants had been charged with knowingly

possessing over one hundred images depicting the sexual exploitation of a

minor. During argument on their appeal before Judge Sceusi, defendants did

not dispute the State's contention that they, in fact, possessed hundreds of

thousands of images of child pornography – a multiple of a thousand of the

threshold number required for the crimes for which they had been charged.

Heddy's counsel did not dispute the State's assertion he had "[sought] out over

an extended period of time vast amounts of child porn." On that record, we

perceive no abuse of discretion in the State's consideration of factor eight.

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                                       17
      Defendants contend the State inappropriately considered factor ten,

arguing their crimes did not include an act of violence.        Under factor ten,

however, the "assaultive or violent nature" of the crime is not determined solely

based on "the criminal act itself" but also on "the possible injurious

consequences of such behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(10).

      During argument before Judge Sceusi, LaFollette's counsel made clear she

was "not arguing this was a victimless crime," acknowledged "this is a serious

offense," and conceded "having [these images] and sharing them . . . does have

a tendency to perpetuate the continual making of it." Heddy's assertion that the

record contains "no evidence Heddy did anything to support the [child

pornography] marketplace" is belied by the undisputed fact he had spent an

extended period of time seeking out and retaining "vast amounts of child porn."

His contention that "[d]ownloading, storing, and viewing such images does

nothing to fuel the market for them" is unsupported and flies in the face of logic.

      The direct victims of defendants' crimes are the children depicted in the

hundreds of thousands of images in their possession, children who were

subjected to sexual abuse for the creation of the child pornography obtained and

retained by defendants and other consumers and purveyors for their own sexual

gratification. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the State's consideration of

                                                                             A-0299-22
                                       18
factor ten.   The "assaultive or violent nature" of defendants' crimes are

demonstrated by "the possible injurious consequences" of those crimes: the

sexual assault of the children used to create those images. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e)(10).

      LaFollette also appeals his sentence. We review a trial court's sentencing

decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Konecny, 250 N.J. 321,

334 (2022). We do "not substitute [our] judgment for that of the sentencing

court." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). We apply the deferential

standard so long as the sentencing court "follow[ed] the Code and the basic

precepts that channel sentencing discretion." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65

(2014); see also State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020). Thus, we affirm a

sentence "unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating

and mitigating factors found were not 'based upon competent credible evidence

in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case

makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.'"

State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297-98 (2021) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,

364-65 (1984)). The same standard applies to sentences "result[ing] from guilty

pleas, including those guilty pleas that are entered as part of a plea agreement."

State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 292 (1987); see also Rivera, 249 N.J. at 297-98

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                                        19
(applying abuse-of-discretion standard to review sentence imposed based on

guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement).

      On appeal, LaFollette argues the sentencing judge erred in finding

aggravating factor three while giving less weight to mitigating factor seven.

LaFollette contends the judge's conclusion defendant had been downloading and

viewing child pornography for a long time was unsupported and the judge

engaged in improper "double counting." LaFollette also faults the sentencing

judge for failing to find mitigating factors eight ("defendant's conduct was the

result of circumstances unlikely to recur") and nine (defendant's "character and

attitude . . . indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense").

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) and (9).

      The sentencing judge concluded aggravating factor three applied because

he concluded "there is a serious and significant risk of re-offense . . . when we

are talking about hundreds of thousands of children who have been molested and

seriously harmed in the making of child pornography images that the defendant

had such an overwhelming appetite to draw on."

      In finding mitigating factor seven applied but giving it "minimal weight,"

the judge acknowledged LaFollette had "led a law abiding life for [a] substantial

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                                       20
period of time prior to the commission of the present offense" but "life

experience, logic, common sense" and

             statements from the defendant about how and when he
             became in involved in this as his life began to spiral
             downward from the other events that he had described
             convince[d] the court that [defendant] was engaging in
             this activity for a substantial period of time prior to
             actually being arrested for the offense and thus why he
             was not . . . carrying on a law abiding life for a
             substantial period of time; he in fact was engaging in
             child pornography for an extended period of time but
             just hadn't been caught.

      In rejecting mitigating factor eight, the judge noted defendant voluntarily

had begun to participate in mental-health counseling "not too long after his

arrest" but concluded defendant's level of addiction and acknowledged inability

to control it prevented the judge from finding mitigating factor eight applied.

The judge found mitigating factor nine did not apply for the same reasons and

given "the sheer volume of the material that was located on the defendant's

computer."

      Unlike the defendant's sentence in Case, 220 N.J. at 54, LaFollette's

sentence was not based on "unfounded assumptions." The judge's conclusion

LaFollette had been downloading and viewing child pornography for a long time

has ample support in the record, including his own admissions. At his plea

hearing, LaFollette admitted he knowingly had possessed a computer and other

                                                                           A-0299-22
                                      21
devices that contained almost half a million images and videos showing children

involved in sexual activity. At his sentencing hearing, LaFollette agreed with

the finding that he was "a repetitive and compulsive violator when it comes to

child pornography," and his counsel stated LaFollette had admitted in a letter to

the sentencing judge he "had been struggling with [his child pornography

addiction] for a long time."

      On that record, we find support for the judge's findings and perceive no

abuse of discretion or legal error in the sentencing judge's findings regarding

aggravating factors three and nine and mitigating factors seven through nine, no

"double-counting," and no basis to disturb the sentence the judge imposed

pursuant to the parties' agreement.        Accordingly, we affirm LaFollette's

sentence.

      To the extent we have not otherwise commented on them, we have duly

considered defendants' other arguments and conclude they lack sufficient merit

to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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