Court Opinion

ID: 9847119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:54:20.191144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:01.304040
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
concurring. Disagreement with the second sentence in syllabus 2 prompts this special concurring opinion. I cannot agree “A popular formula is that summary judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing as would permit direction of a verdict were the case to be tried.” This statement as made equates the showing necessary to sustain or overrule a motion for a directed verdict to a showing necessary to sustain or overrule a motion for summary judgment. This simply is not correct or proper in the usual hearing on a motion for summary judgment. A ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is always made after the introduction and examination of all the plaintiff’s available evidence. A motion for summary judgment is made before trial and in most cases before a full disclosure of plaintiff’s available evidence.
A summary judgment proceeding should not be turned into a trial on affidavits and depositions, and the parties should always be afforded a trial when there is a good faith dispute over the facts. (Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 211, 403 P. 2d 964.) On a motion for directed verdict the plaintiff has been afforded a trial as to all plaintiff’s available evidence, so in such case the question is not whether there is a good faith dispute over the facts but whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the evidence introduced.
The second sentence in syllabus 2 as shown by the reference in the opinion was taken from a quotation appearing in Hastain v. Greenbaum, 205 Kan. 475, 481, 470 P. 2d 741. This quotation from Hastain was lifted from a general discussion of summary judgments appearing in 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition, § 1234, p. 133. The following additional comments appearing in that text place the statement quoted in better perspective:
. . Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine *392issues which will preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. A popular formula is that summary judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing as would permit direction of a verdict were the case to be tried. In applying this principle the court should consider both the record actually presented and the record potentially possible at the trial. If there is any question as to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, a summary judgment should be denied. In some cases summary judgment may be denied because it seems desirable to permit the opposing party an opportunity at a trial to cross-examine the witnesses of the moving party, but usually the opposing party has sufficient opportunity for cross-examination by taking the deposition of those witnesses.”
In 10 Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright and Miller, § 2713, beginning at p. 408, a comparison is made of the showing necessary for a grant of summary judgment with that for a directed verdict. The authors of this later work on federal rules indicate some of the differences which I have pointed out. The following quotation from Pierce v. Ford Motor Company, 190 F. 2d 910 (C. A. 4th), p, 915, is set forth by the authors:
“Even in cases where the judge is of opinion that he will have to direct a verdict for one party or the other on the issues that have been raised he should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather than attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment. . . .”
Similar reasoning on this point may be found in Firemen’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F. 2d 359 (C. A. 5th), p. 363, where it is said:
“. . . We do not think the judge ought on a motion for summary judgment to have considered the affidavits attacking or sustaining the character of the witness. He should not have concerned himself at this time with the question what he would do if the jury should render a verdict for plaintiffs.' A judge indeed does not know what he would do in that regal’d until he has heard the trial in open court before the jury and has the benefit of the opinion of the jury expressed in their verdict. Only when the evidence is such that it is clear the jury would have none to go on, though they believed that unfavorable to the movant for summary judgment, can the motion be sustained and a jury trial denied.”
I must respectfully disagree both with Barron and Holtzoff, as to the so-called popular formula, and with the majority of the court in adopting the same. The rule as adopted will lend confusion to the body of Kansas law governing rulings on summary judgments and it is unnecessary to a decision in this case.
However, I concur in the decision ultimately reached by the *393court in the present case. The record before this court shows there is no good faith dispute as to any material fact as to plaintiffs’ alleged claims brought upon the theories of guaranty by contract and actionable fraud. They simply cannot establish them under their own admissions. The record indicates that all parties to the action including the defaulting cattle buyer were deposed. The adverse parties fully cross-examined those deposed. At the hearing on defendants’ motions for summary judgment and on appeal no claim is made that material evidence in favor of the plaintiffs was unavailable or not before the court. The admissions of the plaintiffs in their depositions established that under the facts admitted and the law cited in the opinion of the court they could not successfully maintain claims against the defendants based either on guaranty or actionable fraud. In such case summary judgment is proper. (Mechtley v. Price, 217 Kan. 344, 347, 536 P. 2d 1385.)
Accordingly I concur in the affirmance of the judgment.