Court Opinion

ID: 9552660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:14:49.575507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:35.095946
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I am in agreement with Judge Coats that this court should not, in the context of this case, consider and decide a number of difficult and complex issues as to the scope of post-conviction relief under Alaska law when the issue raised was not preserved by a contemporaneous objection at trial. In particular, I do not think this case requires us to adopt or reject the “cause and prejudice” standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court.1 Nor do I think we need determine whether or to what extent plain error will be considered in Alaska post-conviction relief applications.2 In my view, because it is not strictly necessary to decide these issues in the present case, their resolution must be deferred until they are more directly presented in future cases.
I do not believe, however, that the opinion written by Judge Singleton purports to decide these issues. Rather, as I read the opinion, it considers Marrone’s claim in the light of alternative analyses and demonstrates that Marrone would not be entitled to relief under any arguable theory. Based on this understanding, I join in Judge Singleton’s opinion.

. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). See also Engle v. Isaac, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 801 (1982) (extending the “cause and prejudice” requirement to post-conviction relief applications raising issues of constitutional error that affect the truth-finding function of trial).

. See United States v. Frady, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (holding plain error inapplicable in post-conviction relief proceedings under federal law).