Court Opinion

ID: 9730962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:29:29.011113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.711060
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, specially concurring: While I concur in the judgment, I disagree with and feel obligated to respond to the statement that reads: “[A] defective charging instrument does not operate to deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction (People v. Rege (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 473, 478; People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23, 27) or necessarily render the charge void (People v. Walker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 306, 313-14; People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339).” (94 Ill. 2d at 17.) This is true if the defect is one of form. However, where the defect is one of substance, as in the instant case where the elements of the offense are missing, the charge is void. To render a valid judgment in a criminal case the court must acquire jurisdiction of the person as well as the subject matter of the offense. Whenever an information or indictment fails to set forth the necessary elements of an offense it deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concludes that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction because the State’s Attorney did not bring the charge and neither appeared nor acquiesced in the original proceeding. I agree that the circuit court’s jurisdiction was not properly invoked when the police officer initiated a felony charge on a traffic ticket. But more importantly, I find that the circuit court in this case never acquired subject matter jurisdiction because a proper information containing the necessary elements of an aggravated-battery offense was never filed before it. In my view, in Pujoue, Gilmore and here the court has misconstrued the concept of subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases. Before Pujoue, the court consistently had held that in order for a court in a criminal case to acquire jurisdiction of the subject matter, it was essential that the accused be charged with a crime. (People v. Edge (1950), 406 Ill. 490; People v. Harris (1946), 394 Ill. 325; People v. Nickols (1945), 391 Ill. 565; People v. Fore (1943), 384 Ill. 455; People v. Minto (1925), 318 Ill. 293; People v. Buffo (1925), 318 Ill. 380; People v. Wallace (1925), 316 Ill. 120.) In fact, just one year before Pujoue, this position was reaffirmed: “It is well settled that an indictment which fails to charge a criminal offense is void. (People v. Furman, 26 Ill. 2d 334, 335.) As such, it does not confer jurisdiction upon a court (People ex rel. Kelley v. Frye, 41 Ill. 2d 287, 290), and a conviction resulting therefrom may not be sustained (People v. Harris, 394 Ill. 325, 327; People v. Nickols, 391 Ill. 565, 571; People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 458). A convicted defendant may challenge the validity of an indictment for failure to allege a criminal violation either by direct review or in collateral proceedings. People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 494; People v. Buffo, 318 Ill. 380, 384.” (People v. Wallace (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 285, 288.) This position was again reaffirmed in People v. Gregory (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 111, 112, where it was said: “Whether an indictment was void presents a jurisdictional issue which is not to be considered waived by a defendant’s plea of guilty (People v. Reed, 33 Ill. 2d 535, 538-539; People v. Buffo, 318 Ill. 380), and it can therefore be raised at any time. (People v. Wallace, 57 Ill. 2d 285, 288; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, pars. 114 — 1(a)(6) and (8), 114-1(b).)” The basis of this rule is grounded in both the United States and Illinois constitutions. Both require that, in criminal prosecutions, a defendant has the right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 8. See People v. Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (Moran, J., dissenting).) This constitutional requirement is embodied in section 111 — 3(a)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which directs that a criminal charge set forth “the nature and elements of the offense charged.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a)()3). Nevertheless, in Pujoue, this court departed from the well-settled rule. It first stated that the failure to allege an element of an offense in a complaint did not, per se, render it void. It then established a new rule: “When attacked for the first time on appeal a complaint is sufficient if it apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.” (Emphasis added.) (People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339.) As authority for this proposition, the court cited People v. Grant (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 264, and People v. Harvey (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 585, both of which relied on People v. Patrick (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 255. In Patrick and Harvey, this court indicated that the use of statutory language in an indictment is sufficient where two requirements are met. The charging instrument must (1) contain the essential elements of the offense, as set forth in the statute, and (2) sufficiently inform the defendant so as to enable him to prepare his defense and also operate as a bar to any subsequent prosecution. The indictments in Patrick and Harvey were found sufficient since both requirements were met. But there is nothing in Patrick or Harvey which changes the need to allege the essential elements of the crime. Nor do these cases support the waiver rule Pujoue advanced. Pujoue was subsequently followed in People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23. There, after reciting the above-quoted portion of Pujoue, the court went on to state that a charging instrument which failed to charge an offense did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. (63 Ill. 2d 23, 27.) This statement is in direct opposition to what this court had described as the well-settled rule. People v. Wallace (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 285, 288. Gilmore’s rationale for this position had two foundations — that jurisdiction is conferred on circuit courts by the Constitution rather than by indictment and that the legislature, in section 114 — 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 114 — 1(a)), had distinguished between the absence of jurisdiction and the failure to state an offense. Neither of these reasons, in my opinion, supports Gilmore’s conclusion. The 1970 Hlinois Constitution abolished the various limited-jurisdiction trial courts and established a single unified trial court — the circuit court. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 1.) This avoided the multiple trials, “fragmentation and troublesome jurisdictional questions which were the hallmark of the former constitutional and legislative courts of limited jurisdiction, such as the county courts, probate courts, city and municipal courts and others.” (6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 808. See generally, G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 330-31 (1969).) The Constitution, of necessity, vested original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters in the one remaining trial court. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 9.) But this change in court structure should not be read as conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court. Section 9 of article VI allows any justiciable matter, which previously should have been brought in one of the limited jurisdiction courts, to be brought in the circuit court. This same provision was contained in section 9 of article VI of the Judicial Article of 1962, effective January 1, 1964. But subject matter and personal jurisdiction are still required. In fact, even after this constitutional section was adopted, this court said that an indictment which failed to charge an offense deprived the court of jurisdiction. People v. Wallace (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 285, 288. Gilmore’s second foundation centered on a legislative distinction made in sections 114 — 1(a)(6) and (a)(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. They provide: “(a) Upon the written motion of the defendant made prior to trial before or after a plea has been entered the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint upon any of the following grounds: * * * (6) The court in which the charge has been filed does not have jurisdiction; [or] * * * (8) The charge does not state an offense.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 114 — 1(a)(6), (a)(8). It must be emphasized that the language of section 114 — 1(a) has not been changed since its enactment in 1963, being prior to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution. At that time, the legislature was well aware of the limited jurisdiction of the various trial courts. A close reading of section 114 — l(a)(6) bears out this awareness. It does not read “the court does not have jurisdiction.” This reading would infer that the other grounds do not raise jurisdictional issues. Apparently, subsection (6) was interpreted in this way in Gilmore. But, on the contrary, this subsection specifically reads “the court in which the charge has been filed, does not have jurisdiction.” This emphasized verbiage implies that some courts in which criminal charges were filed had jurisdiction while others did not. While today there is only one trial court, in 1963 certain trial courts did not have jurisdiction over criminal matters. Through section 114 — 1(a)(6), the legislature merely intended to permit dismissal of a charge when it was filed in the wrong trial court. This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that, as an alternative to dismissal, the legislature allowed the court, without jurisdiction over the criminal matter, to transfer the cause to another trial court having competent jurisdiction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 114 — 1(f).) Obviously, the emphasized portion of subsection (6) has lost its importance and usefulness since there is only one trial court. Section 114 — 1(a)(8), on the other hand, followed the well-established rule that a charge which fails to state an offense deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Such a charge was, therefore, subject to dismissal. Given the trial court structure existing in 1963, there is no inconsistency in separating these two grounds, both of which raised jurisdictional issues. The later constitutional abolition of limited-jurisdiction trial courts ended the need for the separation. However, the mere retention of these sections by the legislature should not be read as a clear indication that a charge which contains a substantive defect is no longer a jurisdictional issue. Neither the General Assembly by legislation nor this court by opinion can deny a person his constitutional right of due process. This conclusion is fortified by a close reading of the committee comments to section 114 — 1(a)(8), which state: “Subsection (a)(8) permits the motion to dismiss where the charge does not state an offense. In accordance with Article 111, charge refers to the complaint, indictment or information. Since a charge which does not state an offense does not give defendant a full notice of why he is being tried, and the charge will not support a judgment unless an offense is stated therein, due process would be violated and may be attacked at any time. (See section 114 — 1(b) of this Code; and see generally People v. Clark, 256 Ill. 14, 99 N.E. 866 (1912).)” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 114 — 1, Committee Comments, at 197-98 (Smith-Hurd 1977). Further support can be found in section 114 — 1(b), where the legislature addressed the issue of waiver by stating: “(b) The court shall require any motion to dismiss to be filed within a reasonable time after the defendant has been arraigned. Any motion not filed within such time or an extension thereof shall not be considered by the court and the grounds therefor, except as to subsections (a)(6) and (a)(8) of this Section, are waived.” (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 114 — 1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1977).) The committee comments to that section state: “Special notice should be made of subsections 114— 1(b) ***. Subsection (b) provides that all of the grounds for a motion to dismiss may be waived except those which deprive the court of its jurisdiction, i.e., (6) and (8). These exceptions to waiver must be made since they involve constitutional rights which may not be waived. ***” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 114 — 1, Committee Comments, at 198 (Smith-Hurd 1977). In this case the complaint did not set forth the necessary elements of aggravated battery and was therefore void for failure to state a criminal offense. Since the charging instrument was void, the trial court did not obtain the necessary subject matter jurisdiction over the offense in order to entertain defendant’s plea of guilty. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court’s judgment was subject to collateral attack by the State. It is for the above-stated reasons that I concur in the judgment of reversal.