Court Opinion

ID: 9627015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:31:06.896397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:32.256146
License: Public Domain

IRWIN, Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion, the findings of the State Industrial Commission are insufficient to sustain an award against the Special Indemnity Fund for the reason they do not disclose in what respect claimant was a “previously physically impaired person” as required by Title 85 O.S.1951 § 171.
The only findings by the Commission relating to the previous disabilities are: “that he was a previously physically impaired person as defined by statute, by reason of injuries in 1947, 1950, 1954, 1955, and 1956.
In Special Indemnity Fund v. Keel, 196 Okl. 315, 164 P.2d 996, 997, we said:
“The act specifically defines the term ‘physically impaired person’, and the operative force of the act is made dependent upon the existence of said condition. One of the four conditions set forth in the statute must be found to exist before the Commission is author-ised to make - an atvard thereunder. They may be enumerated as follows: (1) Loss of the sight of one eye; (2) loss by amputation of. the whole or part of some member, of his body; (3) total or partial loss of use of a specific member such as is obvious and apparent from observation or examination by an ordinary layman, that is, a person who is not skilled in the medical profession; (4) any disability which previously has been adjudged and determined by order of the State Industrial Commission.”
■ In Special Indemnity Fund v. Hunt, 200 Okl. 1, 190 P.2d 795, 797, we said:
“ * * * As a necessary precedent to the application of the Special Indemnity Fund Act and the entry of an award thereunder by the Commission, it must be shown that the claimant is a ‘physically impaired person’ as defined in the Act; that he suffered a subsequent compensable injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Law which resulted in additional permanent disability; that the disability resulting from the subsequent injury is com-binable with the disability theretofore existing by reason of previous impairment; that the combination of both disabilities, the old and the new, is materially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent iiv-ju,ry standing alone.
■ “The foregoing prerequisite conditions on which the applicability of the Special Indemnity Fund Act rests are jurisdictional. In the absence of proof of their existence, the Commission is without power or authority to enter any award under the Act. The Industrial Commission, being an administrative fact finding board with certain judicial powers, is a quasi judicial body. But, unlike courts of record, it must not only determine its jurisdiction but mtist show the existence of its jurisdiction of record, so, therefore, it-is *932not sufficient that the evidence show the existence of the foregoing prerequisites to the authority of the Commission to enter an award against the Fund. These facts must be found by the Commission and shown of record.”
Although the record discloses claimant suffered the following accidents: 1947, injury to left knee; 1950, injury to lower back; about 1954, injury to right foot, and 1956, cervical spine injury; they are not conclusive that he was a previously physically impaired person. The Commission must find as a prerequisite to the applicability of the act a condition as prescribed by Sec. 171, supra, which is a jurisdictional requirement and must be found by the Commission, and the evidence must reasonably tend to support such finding. Special Indemnity Fund v. Quinalty, 201 Okl. 204, 203 P.2d 713.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.