Court Opinion

ID: 9882799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:11.161769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:00.765387
License: Public Domain

[Cite as ParkPlay Solutions, L.L.C. v. Avon Lake, 2023-Ohio-3103.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                      NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                 )

PARKPLAY SOLUTIONS, LLC                                    C.A. No.   22CA011848

        Appellee

        v.                                                 APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                           ENTERED IN THE
CITY OF AVON LAKE, et al.                                  COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                           COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
        Appellant                                          CASE No.   22 CV 205108

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 5, 2023

        STEVENSON, Judge.

        {¶1}    Appellant City of Avon Lake (“Avon Lake” or “the City”) appeals the decision of

the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas granting declaratory and injunctive relief to Appellee

ParkPlay Solutions, LLC’s (“ParkPlay”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

                                                      I.

        {¶2}    Avon Lake is a home rule municipality with a duly adopted Charter under Article

XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. In 2021, the City budgeted $750,000.00 for a public-improvement

playground renovation project known as Avon Lake Play Space (“the Project”). The City

terminated the first company that it hired to design-build the Project after that company failed to

meet the City’s needs.

        {¶3}    Timothy Pinchek, the City’s recreation director, then solicited open-ended

proposals for the Project from four playground designers. A specially formed committee selected
                                                 2

the four playground designers. ParkPlay and Michigan Playgrounds, LLC dba Midstates

Recreation (“Midstates”) were among the four companies contacted by Mr. Pinchek.

       {¶4}    The City did not provide the selected four playground designers with a specific

concept or set of blueprints. Rather, the City requested that each of the four playground designers

propose their own concept and project quote.

       {¶5}    After the playground designers presented their designs to the City, the City notified

ParkPlay and Midstates that they were selected as the two finalists and meetings were held with

each company. The City requested further documentation, including quotes and itemizations, from

ParkPlay and Midstates. After reviewing all submitted documentation, the City, by and through

its committee, decided to proceed with Midstates’ design. The City notified ParkPlay that it was

not chosen to complete the Project.

       {¶6}    After selecting Midstates’ design, the committee’s recommendation went before

the City’s parks and recreation commission. The parks and recreation commission voted to

approve the committee’s recommendation and the matter then went before the public service

committee. Once the recommendation to proceed with Midstates was approved by the public

service committee, the recommendation was presented to City council who voted to approve

Midstates’ Project design.

       {¶7}    After learning that it was not chosen to complete the Project, ParkPlay contacted

the City and voiced its objections to the proposal submission process. The City continued to move

forward with Midstates and the Project. In preparation for the new playground, the City had the

old playground equipment removed from the Project site pursuant to a separate contract.

       {¶8}    ParkPlay filed a complaint and a motion for temporary restraining order and

injunctive relief with the trial court on January 20, 2022. ParkPlay asserted that the City failed to
                                                 3

comply with mandatory state law competitive-bidding requirements.           The trial court denied

ParkPlay’s motion for temporary restraining order on January 27, 2022 and the case remained

pending. ParkPlay did not request or obtain a stay preventing the City and Midstates from moving

forward with the Project.

       {¶9}    City council passed Ordinance No. 21-186, after three readings, on January 31,

2022. This Ordinance passed and was adopted by a vote of 5-0, with the sixth council member

absent. Ordinance No. 21-186 authorized the City’s mayor “to negotiate and enter into a contract

with Midstates * * * to provide professional design-build services for the Project.” Ordinance No.

21-186 was passed as an emergency ordinance and the Project contract was awarded to Midstates

on January 31, 2022.

       {¶10} Once the City and Midstates entered into a contract, the City issued purchase order

2022-00000671 to Midstates, in the amount of $499,135.40, for phase 1 of the Project and

Midstates ordered custom and general playground equipment. Midstates ordered “[a]ll of the

Playworld, Berliner, [and] Freenotes Harmony equipment” and put a deposit down on “[t]he

poured-and-play surface.” Midstates put a deposit on the poured-and-play surface “so that the

pricing could be held and not raised for 2022 because of material shortages, et cetera.” This was

all done before the issuance of an injunction or restraining order. A stay was not in place when the

City and Midstates moved forward pursuant to the contract.

       {¶11} ParkPlay filed a second motion for temporary restraining order and for injunctive

relief with the trial court on March 9, 2022. The trial court granted ParkPlay’s motion for

temporary restraining order on March 10, 2022. The trial court’s order restrained the City and

Midstates from

       [t]aking any further action on, executing, performing, and transferring any funds as
       payment for or in connection with any contract between Avon Lake and Midstates
                                                   4

          resulting from or arising out of Avon Lake Ordinance No. 21-186 and purchase
          order number 2022-00000671 until further order of this court[.]

The trial court’s order also restrained the City and Midstates “from commencing construction of

[the Project] or taking any steps to prepare for commencing construction until further order of this

court.”

          {¶12} The trial court issued a temporary restraining order after the City and Midstates

entered into a contract; after the City issued a purchase order to Midstates for phase 1 of the Project;

after Midstates ordered custom playground equipment and general equipment for the project; and,

after Midstates placed a deposit on the playground surface.

          {¶13} With leave of court, ParkPlay’s amended complaint was accepted for filing on

March 11, 2022. ParkPlay again requested injunctive relief and sought a declaratory judgment that

the contract between the City and Midstates is illegal as the City failed to comply with mandatory

bidding requirements.

          {¶14} A two-day bench trial was held and the trial court issued a written decision on

March 22, 2022. The trial court granted ParkPlay’s request for a permanent injunction and, on

ParkPlay’s request for declaratory judgment, held that the City “failed to [follow] controlling state

law, the Charter provisions, and the ordinance concerning competitive bidding;” “[t]he selection

of Midstates and issuance of any contract between the City of Avon Lake, its employees or agents,

and Midstates is void and unenforceable;” and, “Midstates is not entitled to compensation as a

result of the unenforceable contract.”

          {¶15} The trial court held that the City sought and awarded a design-build contract and

that it was required to follow the bidding and selection procedure set forth in R.C. 153.65 et seq.

Because the City did not follow the proposal and bidding process required for awarding a design-

build contract, the trial court found that the contract was unenforceable. The City appeals, asserting
                                                 5

four assignments of error for review.1 To facilitate our analysis, we elect to address the City’s

assignments of error out of order.

                                                II.

                              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
        DETERMINING THAT PARKPLAY’S REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE
        RELIEF WAS NOT MOOT, GIVEN THAT PARKPLAY WAS A
        DISGRUNTLED BIDDER AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UNDERLYING
        CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT HAD COMMENCED.

        {¶16} The City argues in its second assignment of error that, as performance pursuant to

the underlying contract commenced, the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining that

ParkPlay’s request for injunctive relief was not moot. We agree.

        {¶17} This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s

granting of an injunction. Silver Lake v. Metro Regional Transit Auth., 9th Dist. Summit No.

22199, 2005-Ohio-2157, ¶ 11. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of

judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying an abuse of discretion

standard, a reviewing court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the trial court.

Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).

        {¶18} “A matter becomes moot when the issues ‘are no longer ‘live.’” Jacobson v. Akron

Children’s Hosp., 9th Dist. Summit No. 30188, 2023-Ohio-2225, ¶ 54. Ohio law has established

that:

        [i]n a construction-related case, if an unsuccessful bidder seeking to enjoin the
        construction of a public-works project fails to obtain a stay of the construction

        1
          This Court granted Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association’s (“OMAA”) motion for leave
to file amicus curiae brief and, accordingly, OMAA’s amicus curiae brief was accepted. OMAA’s
brief was filed in support of Avon Lake.
                                                6

       pending judicial resolution of its claims challenging the decision, and construction
       commences, the unsuccessful bidder’s action will be dismissed as moot.

State ex rel. Gaylor v. Goodenow, 125 Ohio St.3d 407, 410 , 2010-Ohio-1844, ¶ 11; Frank Novak

& Sons, Inc. v. Avon Lake Bd. of Edn., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 01CA007835, 2001-Ohio-1880

(request for injunctive relief rendered moot where movant did not obtain a stay of execution and

contract was awarded to another bidder); State ex rel. Wenger Corp. v. The Univ. of Akron, 9th

Dist. Summit No. 8078, 1976 WL 188839 (July 8, 1976) (appeal moot where plaintiff failed to

obtain a stay of execution and the defendant proceeded to consider and award the contract to

another company); Schuster v. Avon Lake, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 03CA008271, 2003-Ohio-6587

(appeal and request for injunctive relief moot where movant did not obtain a stay of execution and

construction commenced).

       {¶19} This Court addressed the issue of mootness, in relation to construction bids, in

Frank Novak & Sons, Inc., 2001-Ohio-1880. In Frank Novak & Sons, the Avon Lake Board of

Education and Avon Lake City School District solicited bids for the construction and installation

of a gymnasium floor at the high school. Appellant Frank Novak & Sons (“Novak”) and appellee

Cincinnati Floor Company submitted bids for the project. Novak filed a complaint in the court of

common pleas, seeking a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief,

after Cincinnati Floor was selected for the renovation project. Novak also “filed a motion for

temporary restraining order restraining Avon Lake Schools from accepting Cincinnati Floor’s bid,

from entering into a contract with Cincinnati Floor, and from allowing Cincinnati Floor to perform

any work on the project.” Id. at *1 The common pleas court denied Novak’s motion for temporary

restraining order and request for preliminary injunction. Like ParkPlay, Novak did not seek a stay

of execution of the trial court’s ruling denying its motion for temporary restraining order and

request for preliminary injunction.
                                                 7

       {¶20} This Court concluded that “Novak’s appeal was rendered moot by Avon Lake

School’s awarding the contract to Cincinnati Floor.” Id. . While Novak argued on appeal that the

repetition exception to mootness applied, this Court disagreed and provided:

       In this case, Novak could have sought a stay of the trial court’s ruling * * * but
       declined to do so. Furthermore, this Court does not agree that the issue raised by
       Novak is subject to repetition. Construction bids are based on unique facts that are
       not likely to be repeated.

(Emphasis added.) Id. at *2.

       {¶21} The trial court denied ParkPlay’s initial request for injunctive relief on January 27,

2022. When its initial request was denied, ParkPlay did not obtain a stay of execution prohibiting

the City from moving forward and awarding the contract to Midstates. Accordingly, when

injunctive relief was denied, the City moved forward on the Project and Midstates changed its

position in reliance on the contract. Once a contract was entered into, the City issued purchase

order 2022-00000671 to Midstates, in the amount of $499,135.40, and Midstates ordered custom

and general playground equipment. Midstates ordered “[a]ll of the Playworld, Berliner, [and]

Freenotes Harmony equipment” and put a deposit down on “[t]he poured-and-play surface.” This

was all done pursuant to the contract before the issuance of an injunction or restraining order.

       {¶22} Because ParkPlay did not obtain a stay, and the City and Midstates entered into a

contract and commenced action pursuant to the parties’ contract, ParkPlay’s request for further

injunctive relief was rendered moot and the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted an

injunction. The City’s second assignment of error is sustained.

                               ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
       INTERPRETING THE HOME RULE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF AVON
       LAKE, OHIO NOT TO AUTHORIZE THE COMPETITIVE
       DESIGN/BUILD PROCEDURE METHOD USED IN THIS CASE.
                                                 8

       {¶23} The City argues in its first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it

interpreted the City’s home rule charter and determined that the City was not authorized to utilize

the competitive design/build procurement method that was used in this case. We agree.

       {¶24} The City concedes that, even if a contract has been awarded to another company

such that a request for injunctive relief is moot, a wrongfully rejected bidder may be entitled to

bid-preparation costs if it establishes that the public authority awarding the contract failed to

comply with state competitive-bidding laws. Meccon, Inc. v. Univ. of Akron, 126 Ohio St.3d 231,

2010-Ohio-3297, ¶ 13.. Accordingly, regardless of this Court’s conclusion in Assignment of Error

No. 2, Assignment of Error No. 1 must be addressed because, at a minimum and as acknowledged

by the City, ParkPlay could be entitled to bid-preparation costs. Id. at syllabus (“When a rejected

bidder establishes that a public authority violated state competitive-bidding laws * * *, that bidder

may recover reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages[.]”)

       {¶25} The pertinent underlying facts are not in dispute. In dispute is whether, in soliciting

and selecting a bid for the Project, the City complied with its own Charter or whether the City was

required to comply with the design-build bidding process required by the Ohio Revised Code.

Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the City’s Charter or the Revised Code presents a

legal question. We accordingly apply a de novo standard of review on appeal. Young v. Young, 9th

Dist. Wayne No. 09CA0067, 2010-Ohio-3658, ¶ 17; In re S.H., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0057-

M, 2013-Ohio-3708, ¶ 34. As this Court previously stated, “[i]n conducting a de novo review, this

Court gives no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.” J. Bowers Constr. Co., Inc. v.

Gilbert, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27044, 2014-Ohio-3576, ¶ 21.

       {¶26} It is undisputed that the City is a home rule municipality with a duly adopted charter

under Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 7. This Article, known as the Home Rule
                                                9

Amendment, states that any municipality “may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its

government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all

powers of local self-government.” Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 7. “‘Section 7 of the

home rule amendment confers power on the municipality to frame and adopt a charter for its

government, and to exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government as provided by Section

3.’” Dies Elec. Co. v. City of Akron, 62 Ohio St.2d 322, 325 (1980), quoting Froelich v. Cleveland,

99 Ohio St. 376, 390-391 (1919).

       {¶27} Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3 authorizes municipalities to “exercise

all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,

sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” Article XVIII,

Section 3 does not “restrict the power [of the charter municipality] to enact laws for ‘local self-

government.’” Dies Electric at 325. “The citizens of the municipality are, thus, given power to

construct their own local government and to operate it themselves.” Greater Cincinnati Plumbing

Contrs. Assoc. v. Blue Ash, 106 Ohio App.3d 608, 612 (1st Dist.1995).

       {¶28} In accordance with the Home Rule Amendment, the City adopted a Charter that

provides at Chapter I, Section 2:

       The Municipality shall have all powers of local self-government now and hereafter
       granted to municipalities by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, and such further
       powers as are now or hereafter granted by the laws of the State of Ohio; and all
       such powers shall be exercised in the manner prescribed by this Charter or by
       ordinances of Council created hereby. Enumeration of or reference to particular
       powers by this Charter shall not be construed to be exclusive.

       {¶29} With respect to public procurement, the Charter provides at Chapter X, Section 59,

titled “Competitive Bidding”:

            Council or the Board of Municipal Utilities shall not authorize expenditures
       in excess of that provided by the Ohio Revised Code, unless pursuant to contract
       made with the person, firm or corporation whom Council or the Board of Municipal
                                                10

       Utilities determines to be the lowest and best responsible bidder, after public
       advertising and receipt of bids in the manner provided in this section and the
       ordinances of Council or, to the extent not in conflict with such ordinances, the
       regulations of the Board of Municipal Utilities.

             Council or the Board of Municipal Utilities may authorize the expenditure of
       funds exceeding that provided by the Ohio Revised without public bidding * * *
       for personal services * * * .

                                           ***

             Council or the Board of Municipal Utilities may also authorize the
       expenditure of funds exceeding that provided by the Ohio Revised Code without
       public bidding, for any purpose which contracts may be awarded by a municipal
       corporation without advertisement or competitive bidding under the general laws
       of the State of Ohio.

“Personal services” include those services “normally rendered by an architect, an engineer and

other professional person irrespective of whether that skill is discharged through an individual’s

corporation, partnership or firm.”

       {¶30} City Charter Chapter X, Section 60, pertains to “public improvements” and

provides:

             Public improvements of all kinds may be made by the appropriate department
       either by the direct employment of the necessary labor and purchase of supplies in
       the manner herein provided, with separate account being kept as to each
       improvement so made; or by contract let as provided in the next preceding section,
       either for a closed, firm bid price, or upon a unit basis.

       {¶31} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court, charter municipalities have “‘the

broadest possible powers of self-government in connection with all matters which are strictly local

and do not impinge upon matters which are of a state-wide nature or interest.’” State Personnel

Bd. of Rev. v. Bay Village Civ. Serv. Comm., 28 Ohio St.3d 214, 218 (1986), citing State ex. Rel.

Hackley v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 212 (1948). A city has broad, plenary powers to enact its

own procurement procedures when pursuing public improvements, which are a matter of local

self-government. Dies Electric, 62 Ohio St.2d at 326-327; Blue Ash, 106 Ohio App.3d at 613-614.
                                                  11

Neither party disputes that a playground improvement project is a public improvement and a matter

of local self-government.

       {¶32} A charter municipality’s exercise of authority over matters of local self-government

prevails over general state laws. Blue Ash, 106 Ohio App.3d at 613. This Court has recognized

that Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution “does not * * * limit the municipality’s

power over matters of local self-government” and that “[a] provision enacted pursuant to a

municipality’s power of local self-government will, therefore, take precedence over a conflicting

state provision.” Talbert v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 11173, 1984 WL 6104, *2 (April

4, 1984). “In matters of local self-government, if a portion of a municipal charter expressly

conflicts with parallel state law, the charter provisions will prevail.” State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen,

74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138 (1995).

       {¶33} ParkPlay argued, and the trial court agreed, that the City failed to comply with

mandatory competitive bidding requirements for design-build projects as set forth in R.C. 153.65

et seq. A similar argument was before the court in Blue Ash. The city in Blue Ash solicited bids

for phase III of a recreation center renovation. The city’s “design-build process provided end

specifications to the bidding contractors, but transferred the determination of how to get there to

the contractors.” Id. at 611. The city in Blue Ash engaged in a bidding process pursuant to its

charter instead of complying with state competitive bidding requirements.

       {¶34} Like ParkPlay, the plaintiffs argued in Blue Ash that “[t]he city’s charter did not

authorize the design-build contracting and the city was, therefore, required to follow the general

law on soliciting bids for its public improvement project.” Id. at 612. The city’s charter provided

that “[c]ouncil shall authorize acceptance of the bid made by the responsible bidder who in
                                                  12

Council’s judgment offers the best and most responsive proposal to the City, considering quality,

service, performance record, and price.” Id. at 614.

          {¶35} After discussing the Home Rule Amendment and recognizing that “[t]he citizens

of a municipality are * * * given power to construct their own local government and to operate it

themselves[,]” Id. at 612, the court in Blue Ash provided:

          [t]he city’s design-build bidding process for Phase III of its recreation facility
          improvements was not an exercise of municipal police power. Rather, the bidding
          process utilized for this public project was an exercise of the city’s local self-
          government. Therefore, the city, as a charter municipality, in the exercise of its
          powers of local self-government under Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution,
          may, pursuant to its charter, enact a bidding process for improvements to public
          property which differs from the bidding process contained in the Ohio Revised
          Code.

Id. at 613-614. The Blue Ash court concluded that the city’s bidding process for its recreation

facility “was in conformity with the broad provisions of its charter[]” which required the city “to

accept ‘the bid made by the responsible bidder who in Council’s judgment offers the best and most

responsive proposal to the City, considering quality, service, performance, record, and price.’” Id.

at 614.

          {¶36} Like the city in Blue Ash, the City asked the playground designers to propose their

own concept and a project quote. Hence, the City “transferred the determination of how to get [a

new playground design and concept] to the contractors.” Id. at 611.

          {¶37} Chapter 10, Section 59 of the City’s Charter addresses competitive bidding. This

section of the City’s Charter provides that:

          Council * * * shall not authorize expenditures in excess of that provided by the
          Ohio Revised Code, unless pursuant to contract made with the person, firm, or
          corporation whom Council or the Board of Municipal Utilities determines to be the
          lowest and best responsible bidder, after public advertising and receipt of bids in
          the manner provided in this section and the ordinances of Council[.]
                                                 13

       {¶38} The City’s Charter then lists several situations under which council can authorize

the expenditure of funds exceeding that provided by the Ohio Revised Code without public

bidding. Id. The Charter states that “[c]ouncil * * * may authorize the expenditure of funds

exceeding that provided by the Ohio Revised Code without public bidding, * * * for personal

services[.]” Id. “Personal services” are “act[s] performed by a particular entity, including an

individual, corporation, partnership or firm, which is, in effect, an economic service, including

either the intellectual or manual effort of that entity, not the saleable product of his, her or its

skill[,]” and “[t]his includes, without limitations, the individual personal and professional services

normally rendered by an architect, an engineer and other professional person irrespective of

whether that skill is discharged through an individual’s corporation, partnership or firm.” Id. We

note that the language in a municipal charter is to be construed according to its ordinary and

common usage. State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli, 69 Ohio St.3d 138, 142 (1994).

       {¶39} In construing the Charter language according to its ordinary and common usage,

the Midstates’ services are personal services under the Charter. The City budgeted $750,000.00

for a playground renovation project that required the intellectual effort of Midstates to design a

park playground for the Project. The Project was a matter of local interest and self-government.

The City did not provide the four selected playground designers with any specific concepts or

blueprints. Rather, as in Blue Ash, the City “transferred the determination of how to get [a new

playground] to the contractors.” Blue Ash, 106 Ohio App.3d at 611.

       {¶40} In summary, the City sought “personal services” as defined in the Charter from the

four playground designers. The City relied upon the playground designers to develop new

playground concepts and provide quotes for their designs and proposals. Per Chapter 10, Section

59, of the City Charter, the playground designers provided “professional services normally
                                                 14

rendered by an architect, an engineer and other professional person.” The playground designers

developed and designed their own playground concepts, presented their concepts to the City, and

provided quotes for their design concepts. Accordingly, we conclude that the bidding process the

City utilized for the Project was a proper exercise of its home rule power under its Charter and that

the utilized proposal process complied with the City’s Charter.

       {¶41} For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the City’s Charter authorized the

City to enter into a contract with Midstates. Appellant’s first assignment of error is, accordingly,

sustained.

                               ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING AN
       INJUNCTION AGAINST PROCEEDING WITH A PUBLIC PROJECT
       WHERE THE DISGRUNTLED BIDDER SUBVERTED THE PROCESS BY
       SURREPTITIOIUSLY   OBTAINING   PREVIOUSLY   REJECTED
       PROPOSAL DOCUMENTS, RENDERING ITS HANDS UNCLEAN.

                               ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING AN
       INJUNCTION AGAINST PROCEEDING WITH A PUBLIC PROJECT
       WHERE PERFORMANCE ALREADY HAD BEGUN, THE PRIOR
       IMPROVEMENT BEING REPLACED ALREADY HAD BEEN
       DEMOLISHED, AND THE DISGRUNTLED BIDDER WAITED UNTIL
       AFTER IT WAS NOT SELECTED TO RAISE ANY COMPLAINT ABOUT
       THE PROCESS.

       {¶42} The City again argues in its third and fourth assignments of error that the trial court

abused its discretion when it granted an injunction. Based on this Court’s resolution of the second

assignment of error, and conclusion that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted an

injunction, the third and fourth assignments of error are moot.
                                                 15

                                                III.

       {¶43} For the reasons set forth above, the City’s first and second assignments of error are

sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the matter

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                 Judgment reversed and remanded.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellee.

                                                       SCOT STEVENSON
                                                       FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.
                                       16

APPEARANCES:

KEITH A. SAVIDGE, GARY A. EBERT, DANIEL F. GOURASH, JEFFREY S. MOELLER,
and AMELIA J. LEONARD, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.

JONATHAN E. ROSENBAUM, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.