Court Opinion

ID: 9484113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:41:04.30067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:01.770132
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the motion to suppress, due process and equal protection issues; however, I disagree with its resolution of the post-arraignment statement and would affirm Palmer’s conviction.
The majority relies on Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir.1986), to conclude that a contemporaneous objection need not have been made. Consequently, it concludes that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion and that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Palmer’s statement.
The majority misreads Palmerin by omitting a crucial part of our holding in that case. We held that “where the substance of the objection has been thoroughly explored during a hearing on the motion in limine, and the trial court’s ruling permitting introduction of evidence, was explicit and definitive, no further action is required to preserve for appeal the issue of admissibility of that evidence.” Palmerin, 794 F.2d at 1413 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
In Palmerin, defendants sought unsuccessfully to exclude admission of evidence of their guilty pleas by a motion in limine. Id. at 1411. The district court rejected the defendants' motion, holding that the evidence was relevant and admissible. We held that their failure to object contemporaneously during trial to the admission of that evidence did not bar them from raising the issue on appeal. Id. We emphasized that
The substance of the objection to the admission of the guilty pleas was thoroughly explored during the hearing on the motion in limine, and the trial judge’s ruling was explicit and definitive. There was no hint that the ruling might *497be subject to reconsideration. Perhaps most important, there was nothing in the manner or context in which the guilty pleas were introduced at trial that was unforeseen or that cast any doubt on the applicability of the trial court’s in limine ruling.
Id. at 1413.
Before trial, Palmer objected to the introduction of any evidence of his prior conviction. Unlike in Palmerin, the district court declined to rule on the objection and required the prosecutor to request a bench conference if he chose to introduce such evidence. Only then would the court determine the admissibility of the evidence. The court did not suggest that reconsideration of the subject was foreclosed. Indeed, it did not even make an explicit ruling on admissibility. Therefore, Palmerin does not support excusing Palmer from the need to make a contemporaneous objection.
Because Palmer failed to make such an objection, we review for plain error. See United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 570 (9th Cir.1986). Plain error is “a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights,” United States v. Dischner, 960 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.1992), that most likely materially affected the verdict, United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 167, 107 L.Ed.2d 124 (1989). Reversal is appropriate only when necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings. Bryan, 868 F.2d at 1039.
Admission of Palmer’s statement did not constitute plain error. The court carefully monitored the government’s questioning of Palmer. His statement was not evidence of a prior conviction but, at most, evidence that he had once been arraigned. As the district court said, this case was a “straight forward swearing contest” between Palmer and Roberts. The jury chose to believe Roberts, who admitted to two theft convictions and to operating several marijuana grows of his own. I would affirm.