Court Opinion

ID: 9646667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:06:38.107956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.460082
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We desire to withdraw certain parts of our opinion on original submission which, while not material to the result reached, we feel to be erroneous.
On original submission we ruled that El-na and Cynthia Pfeffer, two of the appellants in this cause, were not parties to the appeal of Cause No. 8015 in the trial court, which appeal took No. 12,726 in this Court, and therefore that they were not parties to and bound by our order of affirmance of the trial court’s judgment. In their motion for rehearing the relators in Meissner v. Fuchs, Tex.Civ.App., - S.W.2d -, have called our attention to the Supreme Court case of Thompson v. Kelley, 100 Tex. 536, 101 S.W. 1074. Based on that and other cases, we have concluded that Elna and Cynthia Pfeffer were parties to the appeal in Cause No. 12,726 in this Court and that they are therefore bound by our judgment rendered therein.
The suit numbered 8015 in the District Court was a partition suit and the order entered in that case from which the appeal was taken was one among other things confirming a sale of the land involved, made pursuant to a prior foundation order finding the land not susceptible of partition in kind. It is clear, had we reversed in the appeal from No. 8015, that the rights of all parties to the judgment appealed from, including Elna and Cynthia Pfeffer, would have been materially affected. It is true that only Halley and Seldon Pfeffer gave notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment in No. 8015. It is also true that the appeal bond filed by them in that case named as obligees only the plaintiffs in No. 8015 and that it did not name as such obligees either Elna or Cynthia Pfeffer or any other defendant or other party to the proceedings. Nevertheless it seems to be settled law that all par*251ties, including defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are necessary parties on appeal from such a judgment as that rendered in No. 8015, and that the notice of appeal and the filing even of the defective bond—defective for failure to name as obligees all necessary parties—were sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction of the entire cause and of all issues and parties involved.
Because of lack of necessary parties, were this not true, we would not have acquired jurisdiction of the appeal from the trial court’s judgment in No. 8015. See Thompson v. Kelley, 1907, 100 Tex. 536, 101 S.W. 1074. In that case the appeal bond was made payable to all other parties to the judgment but since Hugo v. Seffel, 1899, 92 Tex. 414, 49 S.W. 369, the result is no different even in the case of the filing of an appeal bond defective either in form or substance at least in the absence of a motion to dismiss and opportunity to remedy the defect.
The substance of the statute upon which Hugo v. Seffel was decided is incorporated in T.R.C.P. Rules 404 and 430. See Conlee v. Burton, Tex.Civ.App. 1942, 188 S.W.2d 713, 720, from which we quote, as follows: “Furthermore, it seems to be well settled that when there are defects of substance or form in an appeal bond, such defects are not jurisdictional and are waived by failure to present objections to the bond by motion within thirty days after the transcript is filed. Williams v. Wiley, 96 Tex. 148, 71 S.W. 12; Pillow v. McLean, 126 Tex. 349, 88 S.W.2d 702; Roberts v. Stoneham, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 856; Neely v. Tarrant County, 132 Tex. 357, 124 S.W.2d 101; Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 694; 17 Tex.Law Review, Vol. 4, p. 482; Vernon’s Texas Rules Civil Procedure 404, 430. In this case, no motion having been filed challenging the substance or form of the bond, and the bond on its face (supported by the records and briefs of the parties) showing conclusively that appellant has attempted to perfect appeal in the two separate appealable orders, we must hold that the bond is sufficient for the purpose of effecting the appeal in both the venue order and the final judgment.”
Thompson, Morris & Co. v. Pine & Poindexter, 1881, 55 Tex. 427, as well as the text of 3a Tex.Jur., Title “Appeal and Error,” Sections 127, 128, pages 160, 161, are in point on the proposition that all parties whose interest in the subject matter of the proceeding would be affected by a modification or reversal of the judgment, are necessary parties to an appeal. See also Shanklin v. Rogers, Tex.Civ.App.1948, 213 S.W.2d 730, and Speckels v. Kneip, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 255, following Grogan Mfg. Co. v. Lane, 140 Tex. 507, 169 S.W.2d 141, on the point that failure to include proper obligees in the appeal bond is not jurisdictional and that absent a timely motion to dismiss the defect is waived.
An appeal is distinguishable from a writ of error proceeding where the failure to name in the petition for the writ all parties whose interest might be affected by reversal or modification is fatal. Files v. Buie, 1938, 131 Tex. 19, 112 S.W.2d 714.
We now rule that Elna and Cynthia Pfei-fer were parties to the prior appeal in Cause No. 8015 of the trial court, No. 12,-726 in this Court, and that they are therefore bound by our order of affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.
In our opinion on original submission, as is evident from several expressions appearing therein we ruled that this Court acquired direct appellate jurisdiction by the appeal in No. 8015, of the trial court’s order of June 19, 1951, and that our affirmance of the trial court’s judgment of January 30, 1954, operated to make the order of June 19, 1951, our own. In this we were in error. Such ruling is inconsistent with our contemporaneous holding that the order of June 19, 1951, was a final judgment, complete in itself, and appealable, to which we adhere. See the cases cited in the footnotes to § 135, sub-sec. b(6), and § 145, 4 C.J.S. Title, Appeal and Error.
*252We withdraw our holding that by the appeal of No. 8015 we acquired direct appellate jurisdiction of the order of June 19, 1951. This is because no timely appeal was taken therefrom. However, this is not to say that we did not acquire jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the order. It was 'a foundation order for the order of confirmation of January 30, 1954, and its validity was directly drawn in issue by the attack of Halley and Seldon Pfeifer made on it as a basis for their claim of right to a bill of review and as a basis of their opposition to confirmation of the receiver’s report of sale. This attack was overruled by the trial court’s order of January 30, 1954. The attack presented to the trial court in No. 8015 was brought forward for our review in the appeal from the order of January 30, 1954, and was considered and overruled by us in determining the validity of the order of January 30, 1954, which was appealed from. This made our own the ruling of the trial court involved in its order of January 30, 1954, that the foundation order of June 19, 1951, was not void but valid.
More precisely put we restrict our holding to the proposition that this Court acquired appellate jurisdiction by the former appeal in No. 8015 only to review the order of January 30, 1954. But that since that order was made in the face of a contention of appellants in No. 8015 that the foundation order of June 19, 1951, was void, which, if correct, would have required reversal, we necessarily ruled the order of June 19, 1951, to be valid by our judgment of af-firmance. That the issue was directly presented on the former appeal is briefly and adequately evidenced by the Ninth Pqint of Error presented to the Supreme Court on application for writ of error by appellants in No. 8015 when they sought review of our judgment. We quote:
“Ninth Point
“The trial court being without jurisdiction to rescind and modify its original decree of partition (in kind) and order the subject lands sold and appoint • a receiver to make such sale, it was without jurisdiction to render and sign judgment approving such sale and authorizing and directing conveyance of the subject lands by such receiver.”
The matters herein discussed are not material to the result we reached on original submission. We have carefully considered all grounds of appellants’ motion for rehearing and it is refused.