Court Opinion

ID: 9786687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:00:39.533598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.545094
License: Public Domain

W. JONES, J.
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision on the basis that it ignores longstanding law in Idaho governing the landlord-tenant relationship and the existing law of premises liability. It also deviates from this Court’s decisions holding that generally one is free to contract to absolve oneself from certain duties and liabilities with only two exceptions: (1) one party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power; or (2) a public duty is involved (public utility companies, common carriers). Lee v. Sun Valley Company, 107 Idaho 976, 978, 695 P.2d 361, 363 (1985); Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Company, 93 Idaho 496, 499, 465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979). In the present case, nobody suggests that the exculpatory clause in the rental contract is ambiguous or that it was in fact part of the contract voluntarily signed by both parties. The only argument advanced is that the clause violates public policy and therefore should not be enforced. As already noted, however, this Court has firmly stated that such clauses are enforceable with the two exceptions noted above.
There is also no suggestion here that the first exception applies, i.e., that either party was at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power. Although it might often be the case that a tenant has less bargaining power than the landlord, there is certainly no evidence offered here that that is the case in this particular situation. Depending upon market conditions, a tenant might have superior bargaining power in a rental market oversupplied with available properties. The only basis upon which plaintiff might challenge the exculpatory clause in this case that the landlord had a “public duty.”
This Court specifically addressed the public duty exception in Lee v. Sun Valley Company, supra. In that case, Sun Valley Company, which was a licensed outfitter and guide, required guests electing to participate in equestrian trail rides to sign a “Rental Agreement — Saddle Animals for Hire” which stated in pertinent part that:
Upon my acceptance of horse and equipment, I acknowledge that I assume full responsibility for my safety. I further understand that I ride at my own risk, and I agree to hold the above entity, its officers, employees, etc., harmless from every and all claim which may arise from injury, which might occur from use of said horse and/or equipment, in favor of myself, my heirs, representatives, or dependents. I understand that the stable does not represent or warrant the quality or character of the horse furnished.
In determining the enforceability of that exculpatory clause, this Court held that I.C. § 6-1201 imposed a public duty upon Sun Valley Company, rendering the exculpatory clause unenforceable. The important distinction between that case and the present case, however, is that § 6-1201 granted a limited liability to licensed outfitters and guides in exchange for adherence to specific requirements of § 6-1201. In making its ruling in Lee v. Sun Valley Company, this Court stated as follows:
We do not attempt to articulate a general rule applicable to all statutes. However, we do hold where the legislature had addressed the rights and duties pertaining to personal injuries arising out of the rela*81tionship between two groups, Le., employer-employees, outfitters and guides/participants, and has granted, limited liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such duties become a ‘public duty’ within the exception to the general rule validating exculpatory contracts. (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, there is nothing in § 6-320 granting any favorable limited liability to landlords in exchange for adherence to the duties prescribed in the statute, which is entirely different from I.C. § 6-1201 which was involved in Lee v. Sun Valley Company, supra. There is no basis, therefore, on which to hold that I.C. § 6-320 imposed any “public duty on landlords. Accordingly, the general rule firmly established in Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Company, supra; and Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., supra, should not be ignored.
It should also be noted that as stated by the majority, I.C. § 6-320 is a strict liability statute. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 883, 42 P.3d 672, 676 (2002). There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature intended to supplant the long-existing common law negligence standard applied to premises liability or landlord/tenant cases involving personal injury with a strict liability standard. The decision of the majority might well result in landlords becoming strictly liable for personal injuries which occur to tenants on their property. Absent a clear indication that the legislature intended such a result, this Court should not lightly disregard previous longstanding premises liability law.
Apart from the fact that I.C. § 6-320 did not impose a public duty upon landowners for the reasons already discussed, in the present case plaintiff has no right to rely upon that statute in any event. The statute specifically requires that before a tenant may file an action under that section, he must give his landlord three days’ written notice of each defect in the premises or each breach of the rental agreement upon which any action will be premised, which was clearly not done in the present case. Additionally, there is nothing in I.C. § 6-320(d) to indicate that it was intended by the legislature to be applied to causes of action for personal injury in any event. Reading the entirety of the statute indicates that the legislature never intended the statute to apply to an action for personal injuries, but rather intended the statute only to provide a means to enforce a tenant’s right to require repair or cure of defects in the premises that render the premises less than habitable. As noted above, this Court should not utilize this statute to produce a major change in the law of premises liability as it pertains to personal injuries to tenants.