Court Opinion

ID: 9900779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 15:05:18.621505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:17.840787
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-5554-18
                                                                   A-3894-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEROME DAVIS, a/k/a
JEROME R. DAVIS,
and JEROME GLOVER,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued (A-5554-18) and Submitted (A-3894-19)
                   October 30, 2023 – Decided November 20, 2023

                   Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 17-07-
                   0856, 17-07-0857, 18-07-1109, and 18-08-1225.

                   Robert Carter Pierce, Designated Counsel, argued the
                   cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
                   Defender, attorney; Robert Carter Pierce, on the briefs).

                   Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex
             County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II,
             Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

             Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

      These are back-to-back appeals. In A-5554-18, defendant Jerome Davis

appeals from his convictions for: first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1),

(count one); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, (count two); second-

degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), (count three);

and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(a)(1), (count four). He also challenges his sentence. In A-3894-19,

defendant appeals from his conviction following a guilty plea to a certain

persons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). We affirm.

      Defendant's trial lasted twelve days. In addition to audio, video, and

documentary evidence, the State adduced testimony of eighteen witnesses,

including:    defendant's ex-girlfriend Shaddia Booker; Middlesex County

Prosecutor's Office lead detective David Abromaitis; Booker's friend Princetta

Jarrett; an employee of Spy Shop, a retail company specializing in the sale of

security equipment; an employee of a gas station; a manager of a carwash; and

Booker's uncle, Curtis Booker, Sr.

                                                                        A-5554-18
                                        2
      Booker dated defendant for approximately seven years, between 2008 and

2015, and lived with him for three or four of those years. She testified the

relationship was abusive, however, she remained with defendant.

      When the relationship ended in 2015, Booker began dating other people,

including the victim, Patrick Olarerin. Booker's relationship with Olarerin was

not exclusive. She enjoyed socializing. Olarerin was much older, retired, and

receiving disability. He was content spending time at home. Although this

caused some friction in their relationship, as of 2017, Booker was living with

Olarerin in his North Brunswick apartment. She planned to terminate the lease

on a home she rented in Plainfield, which she once shared with defendant, and

move in with Olarerin.

      In February 2017, defendant began contacting Booker again. He sent her

multiple text messages and called her multiple times per day, using different

phone numbers. The messages, which were sometimes sexual in nature or

referred to marriage, indicated defendant was back in town, wanted to resume

his relationship with Booker, and wanted her to end the relationship with

Olarerin. Booker would occasionally speak with defendant or respond to his

messages, but she mostly ignored him.

                                                                         A-5554-18
                                        3
      Defendant sent flowers to Booker's workplace and her sister's home,

believing Booker lived there. Defendant contacted one of Booker's friends

through Facebook. Booker testified she was "agitated" by defendant's phone

calls and text messages. Although she loved him, she "didn't want to be in a

relationship with him anymore." She spoke with and texted with him because

she felt "sorry for him," "wanted him to get himself together," and encouraged

him to "stay on his path."

      In early March 2017, Booker and defendant met at her stepmother's house

so he could obtain a key from her to retrieve his belongings from the Plainfield

home. On another occasion in March, defendant stopped by Booker's sister's

house, uninvited, and argued with Booker's mother, who was there visiting.

Booker was also present on that date. She told defendant he "can't pop up at

someone else's house," and she would "talk to him later." She kept putting him

off because they "had a[n] abusive relationship so [she] was scared of him."

      On April 3, 2017, Booker met defendant at a motor vehicle agency, so he

could obtain a copy of the title to his truck, which had been in her name. They

had dinner afterwards.       On April 29, 2017, Booker met defendant at his

apartment in Piscataway and they had sex. She testified that afterward she "felt

like crap" and this was the last time they met. When she spoke with him later,

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                        4
she told him that she "needed space," and to "[g]ive it time," "[g]ive it a year,"

and if he changed "[m]aybe we can see if maybe we can get back together."

      However, defendant continued to text and call Booker. On May 4, 2017,

he visited Spy Shop and purchased a GPS tracking device to track Booker's

vehicle. Defendant told the salesperson "he had just gotten engaged or given

his fiancé a large diamond ring," and he "wanted some reassurance about this

investment that he made . . . ." Defendant stated he first had to "find his fiancé's

car because he hadn't seen it in a while," and "he didn't know . . . what she was

up to."

      The salesperson installed the necessary software on defendant's phone,

and explained how to use the GPS device, including how to access the tracking

data on the company's website. Later that night, defendant communicated with

the salesperson to troubleshoot the device. Defendant stated he had attached the

GPS tracker to the vehicle but could not pinpoint the vehicle's current location.

The salesperson testified the GPS tracking data showed the tracker was attached

when it was parked at Booker's workplace in Somerset.

      The following morning, defendant told the salesperson he had located the

vehicle at an apartment complex nearby. The corresponding GPS data indicated

the vehicle was parked in North Brunswick.

                                                                              A-5554-18
                                         5
      The next day, Booker received a text message from defendant, apparently

intended for someone named "John," in which he recited the license plate

number of a vehicle belonging to Olarerin, which Booker had been driving on

May 4. That day, Booker drove to lunch with Olarerin to celebrate his birthday

and then drove to work, where she had parked near Jarrett's vehicle.

      On May 6, defendant texted Booker, saying he had run into Jarrett. Jarrett

also called Booker about the same encounter. Jarrett testified that on one

occasion in May 2017 she observed defendant driving near her home . She

thought it was "strange and weird," and wondered what he was doing in her

neighborhood. A few days later, defendant cut her off while she was driving

with her son and forced her to stop. She asked defendant what he was doing and

why he was following her. He looked surprised to see her and said something

like "oh, I got the wrong person." Jarrett understood this to mean defendant

thought he had intercepted Booker and Olarerin.

      Booker informed Olarerin defendant was back in town and texting her,

including the text she received bearing Olarerin's license plate number. Olarerin

contacted a friend who worked as a North Brunswick police officer because she

was concerned whether someone could obtain his address using a license plate

number. The friend told Olarerin only a law enforcement officer, and the court

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                       6
could obtain this information and he "didn't think civilians could get that

information just by having his license plate number."

      The State presented evidence showing defendant continued to track

Booker by checking the tracking website multiple times per day between May 4

and May 14, 2017. The tracker data showed the tracker traveled from North

Brunswick to Piscataway on May 9 and made a return trip on May 12,

evidencing defendant removed the tracker to re-charge it and replaced it on the

vehicle. Booker testified she saw defendant as she walked out of Olarerin's

apartment the morning of May 9. Defendant exited his vehicle and walked

towards her. As she walked toward her car, she went "back and forth" with

defendant, asking him why he was there. When she got into her car, she called

Olarerin to let him know defendant was outside. She also answered her phone

when defendant called her, to tell him she did not want him coming to her home.

      After Booker left, defendant went to Olarerin's front door. The jury heard

Olarerin's 9-1-1 call, during which he noted with alarm defendant had somehow

entered the apartment.   Defendant also called 9-1-1 and was heard telling

Olarerin to "[l]eave my wife alone" and that he wanted Olarerin to "stop what

he's doing."

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                       7
      That evening, Booker and Olarerin went to the North Brunswick Police

Department and Booker obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against

defendant, which listed Olarerin as a protected party. According to the officer

who met with the couple, Booker seemed "upset," "nervous," and "afraid ."

Olarerin seemed even "more scared than" Booker and appeared "nervous" and

"shaken up about the entire incident."

      Booker's uncle came to the police station that night. As he was leaving

with Olarerin, he saw defendant in the parking lot.      Their interaction was

captured on surveillance video. He flagged down defendant and briefly met with

him in a nearby Krauszer's parking lot. The uncle told defendant Booker had

"moved on, . . . [and] didn't want to be bothered no more." He informed

defendant Booker obtained a TRO. After the uncle told defendant he did not

want to see him get into trouble and to "leave it alone[,]" defendant responded

he still loved Booker and that Olarerin made her obtain the TRO.

      The following day, Olarerin installed a camera inside his apartment facing

the front door. When the camera detected motion, it sent alerts to Booker's

phone.

      Police served the TRO on defendant on May 12, 2017.             However,

defendant continued to call and text Booker notwithstanding the TRO.

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                         8
      On May 13, 2017, Booker went shopping and to a hair salon with Jarrett

in preparation for a night out in Elizabeth. Defendant continued calling Booker.

She answered a few of his calls, but only to tell him to stop contacting her. In

the early morning hours of May 14, Jarrett picked up Booker at Olarerin's

apartment, and they headed out.      The home surveillance camera recorded

Booker's departure, including her asking Olarerin not to chain the door because

she intended to return. Olarerin locked the door after Booker left.

      Defendant continued to call and text Booker. According to Jarrett, at some

point, Booker spoke with defendant and appeared nervous and agitated. She

advised him she was out. Defendant called Booker at 3:21 a.m., and did not call

her again until 4:38 a.m. Defendant also checked the GPS tracker website at

3:26 a.m., but did not check it again until 8:51 a.m. In between that time,

defendant's phone recorded the use of its flashlight for approximately seven

minutes beginning at 3:36 a.m.

      At 4:11 a.m., 4:12 a.m., and 4:13 a.m., Booker received notifications on

her phone, indicating that the camera had detected movement inside Olarerin's

apartment. She assumed Olarerin was leaving to walk his dog, which he did

every day around 4:30 a.m. She tried to FaceTime him, but he did not answer,

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                       9
so she assumed he had left his phone in the house. She did not check the

surveillance video.

      When Booker arrived home at approximately 5:14 a.m., she found

Olarerin lying on the floor. He was cold, non-responsive, and bleeding from the

head, and the dog was locked in its crate. His phone and wallet were five to ten

feet away from his body. She could not recall whether the front door had been

locked when she got home. She called 9-1-1 at 5:16 a.m. and stated the top lock

to the front door was unlocked when she returned home.

      When the police arrived, they observed no evidence of forced entry into

the home and found no fingerprints on the front or back doors. However, they

noted that the front door was "old" and "weathered" and "not very sturdy or

stable." Olarerin was lying on his back, with his head touching the patio door,

which was locked. He was pronounced dead at 6:04 a.m. The State's forensic

pathologist testified the cause of death was an injury to the brain, caused by a

gunshot to the left side of his head, which had no exit wound.

      Booker showed police a videoclip from the security camera, which

showed an unidentified man quietly walk into the apartment, wearing gloves, a

mask, and a hoodie with the hood up, carrying a handgun between 4:11 and 4:13

a.m. Booker believed the man was defendant based on the fact he discovered

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      10
where she was living, the TRO, and subsequent text messages and phone calls.

The police also spoke to Olarerin's police officer friend, who confirmed Olarerin

was concerned defendant was attempting to locate his residence.

      Police searched defendant's home and vehicle but did not find any clothing

matching what the suspect wore in the surveillance video. Defendant's vehicle

was a silver-grey Ford Explorer. Inside police found mail addressed to Booker;

photographs of defendant and Booker; a post-it note with the GPS tracker

website written on it; a business card for Spy Shop; receipts from businesses in

North Brunswick, near Olarerin's apartment, with license plate numbers written

on their backs; a copy of the TRO; and multiple pairs of gloves.

      Police conducted a forensic search of two phones seized from defendant's

person. They discovered the text messages between defendant and Booker; the

messages and phone calls defendant made to Booker from other numbers;

messages from defendant to Booker asking her to unblock his phone number;

call forwarding applications, which allowed defendant to disguise his phone

number and make calls from different numbers on the same phone; evidence

defendant was blocking his number so his messages could go through to

Booker's phone; images of Booker's vehicle and license plates, which were taken

when he met her at the motor vehicle agency; a photo of Booker's sister's

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      11
residence; photos of vehicles parked near Booker's workplace; internet searches

attempting to locate Booker, including multiple license plate searches of

vehicles associated with Booker, Olarerin, Booker's friends, and vehicles parked

near Booker's workplace; text messages indicating defendant's attempts to locate

and track Booker; and the tracker application and evidence of defendant's use of

the GPS tracker, including his messages to the Spy Shop salesperson.

      After discovering the tracker application on defendant's phone, police

searched Booker's vehicle and found the tracker under the back bumper. They

also interviewed the Spy Shop salesperson about defendant's purchase and use

of the tracker.

      Police obtained surveillance videos from two businesses located at the

interchange of Routes 1 and 18 for the early morning hours of May 14, 2017.

The videos showed a light-colored truck, like defendant's, traveling in the

direction of defendant's home and away from Olarerin's at 4:23 a.m.,

approximately ten minutes after Olarerin was killed.

      On July 5, 2017, Detective Abromaitis received a handwritten letter, dated

June 27, 2017, which was sent from the Middlesex County Adult Correctional

Center (MCACC) bearing an inmate number "one number off" from defendant's

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      12
number. Defendant's DNA was found on the envelope, and Booker testified she

recognized the handwriting in the letter as belonging to defendant.

      Detective Abromaitis testified the letter contained information that only

the killer would know. The letter suggested the murder had happened quickly,

with no noise, and that Olarerin had been shot in the left side of the head. The

location of Olarerin's wound was not public knowledge at the time the detective

received the letter, because police would not receive the medical examiner's

report until July 19, 2017.

      According to Detective Abromaitis, there was other evidence defendant

wrote the letter. The letter attempted to point police away from defendant by

providing the names of two men who were listed as contacts in defendant's

phone. The writer misspelled the word cousin as "couison," which was the same

way defendant misspelled the word in his phone contacts. The letter referenced

car auctions, an industry in which defendant had worked. And the writer

referenced one of the other men driving a black Mercedes-Benz like Booker's,

and defendant's phone contained a photo of such a vehicle.

      The jury convicted defendant on all charges. The trial judge sentenced

defendant to: sixty-five years on count one, subject to the No Early Release Act

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; and concurrent terms of ten years each on counts

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      13
two, three, and four. Count two was subject to NERA, and count three was

subject to a five-year parole disqualifier pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6(c).

      Separately, defendant was indicted on one charge of second-degree certain

persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), because he had

previously been convicted of escape and robbery.          Following defendant's

conviction and sentencing on the offenses in A-5554-18, he pled guilty to the

certain persons offense and to another offense in a third indictment, which is not

a part of these appeals. Prior to entering the plea, defendant moved to dismiss

the indictment. The motion was denied.

      During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted that on May 14, 2017, he

had constructive possession of the firearm found by the police during their

search of defendant's home in Piscataway.           Although defendant denied

ownership of the firearm or having touched it, he testified he was keeping it for

a friend who had been accused of domestic violence. Defendant admitted he

knew he had prior convictions which precluded him from possessing a firearm.

Defendant's plea reserved his right to appeal from the trial court's denial of his

motion to dismiss.

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       14
      The court sentenced defendant on the certain persons offense in

accordance with the plea agreement to five years imprisonment with five years

of parole ineligibility. The sentences ran concurrently with the murder sentence

and the sentence on the third indictment.

      In A-5554-18, defendant raises the following points:

            POINT I THE CONTENT OF [DEFENDANT'S]
            CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER WOMEN WAS
            NOT OFFERED TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE
            MATTERS ASSERTED; THE TRIAL COURT'S
            EVIDENTIAL RULING THAT EXCLUDED THIS
            EVIDENCE DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF A FAIR
            TRIAL. . . .

            POINT II THE ALLUSIONS TO [DEFENDANT]
            "GOING AWAY" AND "COMING BACK" INVITED
            PREJUDICIAL SPECULATION THAT [HE] WAS IN
            PRISON FOR THE DOMESTIC ABUSE OF
            BOOKER. . . .

            POINT III THE REFERENCES TO DOMESTIC
            VIOLENCE AND THE RESTRAINING ORDER
            WERE PREJUDICIAL, AND THE JUDICIAL
            RESPONSE    IN  THE   FORM  OF      JURY
            INSTRUCTIONS WERE INADEQUATE. . . .

            POINT IV THE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS WERE
            NOT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE
            AND IT WAS IMPROPER FOR DETECTIVE
            ABROMAITIS TO TELL THE JURORS WHAT
            THEY WERE VIEWING. . . .

            POINT V DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS OPINED
            WHO COULD OR COULD NOT BE THE KILLER,

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      15
WHICH DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF A FAIR
TRIAL BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY INFRINGED
UPON THE ULTIMATE QUESTION FOR THE
JURY. (Not [r]aised [b]elow)[.]

POINT VI WITHOUT COMPETENT EVIDENCE
THAT [DEFENDANT] WROTE THE LETTER
AND/OR ADDRESSED THE ENVELOPE, THE
EVIDENCE WAS NOT PROBATIVE AND IF
ANYTHING SERVED ONLY TO CONFUSE THE
JURORS. . . .

POINT VII THE TRIAL COURT'S REVERSAL ON
ITS EARLIER DISCOVERY RULINGS IMPAIRED
[DEFENDANT'S]    ABILITY    TO   DEFEND
HIMSELF. . . .

POINT VIII   THE      STATE  FAILED  TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT [DEFENDANT] DID
NOT HAVE A PERMIT TO POSSESS A FIREARM,
THEREFORE THE CONVICTION MUST BE
VACATED. (Not raised below).

POINT IX THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER
ACQUITTING [DEFENDANT], OR GRANTING
HIM A NEW TRIAL. (Not raised below).

     ....

POINT X THE INDICTMENT WAS IMPROPERLY
PROCURED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED. . . . (Sub-Point A was not raised below.)

     A.  THE   GRAND    JURY   WAS
     PERMITTED TO BASE THE CHARGES
     ON A FIREARM WHICH THE
     PROSECUTION      DELIBERATELY

                                                       A-5554-18
                        16
            SHIELDED FROM THE PETIT JURY.
            (Not raised below)[.]

            B.   THE          PROSECUTION
            MISREPRESENTED TO THE GRAND
            JURY THAT [DEFENDANT'S] CELL
            PHONES WERE EQUIPPED WITH AN
            APP THAT TRANSFERRED HIS PHONE
            CALLS FROM ONE DEVICE TO THE
            OTHER.

      POINT XI [DEFENDANT'S] SENTENCE WAS
      MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE BECAUSE THE TRIAL
      COURT BASED THE SENTENCE ON PENDING
      CRIMINAL CHARGES AS WELL AS DOUBLE-
      COUNTING AGGRAVATING FACTORS. . . .

In his pro se brief, defendant raises the following points:

      POINT I [DEFENDANT] WAS DEPRIVED [OF]
      HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL BECAUSE THE
      TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED THE
      ISSUE WITH JUROR NUMBER ELEVEN INSTEAD
      OF TRICKING HIM (AS WELL AS THE REST OF
      THE      JURORS)      INTO BELIEVING THE
      JUROR/ALTERNATE SELECTION WAS RANDOM.
      (Not raised below)[.]

      POINT II THE INDICTMENT SHOULD HAVE
      BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE OF THE
      PROSECUTOR TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY
      EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY WHICH
      DIRECTLY NEGATES GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
      IN VIOLATION OF [THE] 5TH AND 14TH
      [AMENDMENTS]       TO         THE          U[.]S[.]
      CONSTITUTION[.] (N[ot raised below])[.] . . .

In A-3894-19, defendant raises the following points:

                                                              A-5554-18
                                 17
            POINT I THE INDICTMENT WAS IMPROPERLY
            PROCURED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
            DISMISSED. ( . . . Sub-Points A and B were not raised
            below)[.]

                  A.     THE     GRAND JURY  WAS
                  PERMITTED TO BASE THE CHARGE
                  ON A NON-SPECIFIC FIREARM. (Not
                  [r]aised [b]elow)[.]

                  B.    THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
                  EVIDENCE    TO   SUPPORT     THE
                  CHARGE OF CERTAIN PERSONS NOT
                  TO POSSESS FIREARMS. (Not [r]aised
                  [b]elow)[.]

                                        I.

      In both appeals, defendant challenges the grand jury proceedings leading

to his indictments. In A-5554-18, he asserts the State presented evidence of the

handgun seized from his home to substantiate the firearms charges, even though

the handgun could not be tied to the murder, and the gun was not presented at

trial. Defendant argues the State incorrectly claimed he used an application to

forward calls from the phones at his home to a phone found in his vehicle. He

contends the surveillance footage from the carwash was exculpatory and

wrongfully withheld from the grand jury, because it captured a vehicle like his

at 4:10 a.m., which given the distance and direction of travel, made it impossible

for him to have committed the murder between 4:11 and 4:13 a.m.

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       18
      In A-3894-19, defendant contends his certain persons conviction should

be reversed because: (1) the grand jury indicted him for possessing the firearm

used to murder Olarerin in North Brunswick, yet he pled guilty to possessing

the firearm at his home in Piscataway; and (2) there was insufficient evidence

presented to the grand jury to support the certain persons charge with respect to

the firearm because the evidence did not show he had constructive possession.

      Detective Abromaitis testified before the grand jury.        He explained

Booker's relationship with defendant, and defendant's conduct after she began

seeing Olarerin. He also testified about the May 9, 2017 confrontation with

Olarerin resulting in the TRO, service of the TRO on defendant two days before

the murder, Olarerin's installation of a security camera, and Olarerin contacting

his police officer friend.

      Detective Abromaitis testified about Booker's communications with

defendant the night of the murder, the discovery of Olarerin's body, the autopsy,

and his review of the security camera footage. He told the grand jury about the

police investigation, including an interview of defendant during which he

claimed he was home alone the night of the murder. The detective testified

about the search of defendant's home and discovery of a handgun underneath a

deck, which did not belong to the owner of the home. He told the jury the gun

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      19
could not be tied to the murder of Olarerin because the bullet recovered from his

body was damaged.

      The detective's testimony also covered the search of defendant's vehicle,

which produced two phones separate from the two phones seized from

defendant's person. One of the phones found in the vehicle was an iPhone that

had a forwarding application enabling calls coming into or from the phones

taken from defendant's person to be forwarded to the iPhone. He explained the

search of the phones taken from defendant's person showed one phone was being

used to monitor a tracking device defendant had recently purchased from Spy

Shop and attached to Booker's vehicle.

      Detective Abromaitis testified the surveillance footage from the

interchange showed a vehicle resembling defendant's traveling northbound on

Route 1, turning onto the ramp of Route 18 North, towards defendant's home,

within eight to ten minutes of the homicide. Police also interviewed defendant's

friend and housemate, who said defendant always talked about Booker. The

friend said defendant professed his love for Booker and wanted to marry her and

be with her.

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      20
      Detective Abromaitis testified about the letter received from the MCACC.

He explained police investigated the other men mentioned in the letter, but the

investigation yielded no leads.

      Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. He claimed the

State related incorrect testimony about the iPhone found in his vehicle because

further investigation after the grand jury presentation showed the iPhone

belonged to someone other than defendant, had no cellular service and could not

accept calls forwarded from defendant's other phones. The other arguments

defendant now raises regarding the gun and surveillance video were not made

in the trial court.

      The trial judge denied the motion, finding the information regarding the

application on the iPhone did not unduly prejudice the grand jury because it was

not "the main thrust of the State's case in terms of its proofs. It seemed to be

more of a . . . side issue." The judge found the evidence part and parcel of the

State's efforts "to present a complete picture of everything the State had."

      At trial, the State did not introduce any evidence about the gun because it

could not prove it was the murder weapon. With respect to the iPhone, counsel

argued about the extent of permissible testimony on this issue and whether

defense questioning of a State's witness about the phone would open the door to

                                                                               A-5554-18
                                       21
questioning by the State as to the iPhone's owner, namely, a neighbor of Jarrett's,

and how defendant acquired it. However, ultimately the State's questioning of

Detective Abromaitis focused on the State's changing understanding of the role

the phone played after the case had been presented to the grand jury.

      A "grand jury must be presented with sufficient evidence to justify the

issuance of an indictment." State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 12 (2006). However,

"[a]t the grand jury stage, the State is not required to present enough evidence

to sustain a conviction." State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016). The grand

jury is an accusatory rather than an adjudicative body, and it determines only

whether probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been committed. State

v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552, 559 (2020). All that is required is for the prosecutor to

present "some evidence establishing each element of the crime to make out a

prima facie case." Morrison, 188 N.J. at 12. "The quantum of this evidence . . .

need not be great." State v. Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115, 137 (App. Div.

1997).

      "[I]n reviewing the grand jury record on a motion to dismiss an

indictment, the trial court should use a standard similar to that applicable in a

motion for a judgment of acquittal at trial" under Rule 3:18-1. Morrison, 188

N.J. at 13. "The court should evaluate whether, viewing the evidence and the

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       22
rational inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, a grand jury could reasonably believe that a crime occurred and that the

defendant committed it." Ibid. Accord Feliciano, 224 N.J. at 380-81.

      "An indictment is presumed valid and should only be dismissed if it is

'manifestly deficient or palpably defective.'" Feliciano, 224 N.J. at 380 (quoting

State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 228-29 (1996)). For example, dismissal may be

appropriate where a "deficiency in the proceedings affect[ed] the grand jurors'

ability to make an informed decision whether to indict." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 229.

Ultimately, however, "the decision whether to dismiss an indictment lies within

the discretion of the trial court, . . . and that exercise of discretionary authority

ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal unless it has been clearly abused."

Ibid. (citations omitted). Accord State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611, 626 (2022); Bell,

241 N.J. at 561; State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 55-56 (2015).

      Pursuant to these principles, we conclude defendant's motion to dismiss

the indictment was correctly decided. The evidence presented to the grand jury

supported the charges on which defendant was indicted. As the trial judge

found, Detective Abromaitis's incorrect testimony about the iPhone was not

significant to those charges and did not undermine the validity of the indictment.

                                                                               A-5554-18
                                        23
      The other arguments defendant asserts warrant dismissal of the indictment

were not raised before the trial court. Regardless, we address them for the sake

of completeness.

      Detective Abromaitis's grand jury testimony about the gun was accurate

and not misleading.     His testimony about the surveillance video was not

exculpatory. To the contrary, the surveillance video supported a conclusion that

defendant committed the murder because it suggested that defendant was driving

away from the murder scene, in the direction of his home, shortly after the

murder was committed.         More importantly, Detective Abromaitis was

questioned about the video at trial. Therefore, the issues defendant raises about

the evidence presented to the grand jury are not grounds to reverse, given

defendant's subsequent conviction on the far greater evidence presented to the

jury at trial. State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51, 60 (App. Div. 1994).

      Neither the certain persons indictment nor the grand jury proceedings

preceding it were defective to warrant reversal of defendant's conviction. At the

outset, we note defendant never moved to dismiss the certain persons

indictment.

      Regardless, the grand jury that considered the murder charge heard

evidence defendant possessed a handgun, which he took to Olarerin's home and

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      24
used to kill him.     Although the grand jury learned police found a gun in

defendant's home, and the homeowner said it did not belong to him, it also knew

police could not establish the gun found was the murder weapon.

        With respect to the certain persons indictment, the same grand jury heard

evidence that defendant was convicted of escape in 1999, and armed robbery in

2017. As a result of these convictions, it learned he was a person prohibited

from having a firearm, yet he possessed a firearm to kill Olarerin on May 14,

2017.

        This evidence was sufficient to support defendant's indictment on the

certain persons charge. Indeed, "[t]he elements of the certain persons offense

are straightforward: conviction of a predicate offense and possession of a

firearm." State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 488 (2018) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

7(b)(1)).   It did not matter whether defendant possessed the gun in North

Brunswick or whether it was the murder weapon; possession in Piscataway was

enough to indict.

        Defendant's argument the indictment was improperly amended prior to his

guilty plea lacks merit. The record shows defendant consented to the amended

indictment to alter the location of defendant's certain persons offense from North

Brunswick to Piscataway, where the gun was found. This was consistent with

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       25
Rule 3:7-4, which permits the court to amend an indictment "to correct an error

in . . . the description of the crime intended to be charged . . . provided that the

amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged[,] and

the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in [their] defense on the merits."

The amendment merely revised the description of the crime and did not

substantively alter the offense with which defendant was charged, nor did it

prejudice the ability to mount a defense in any way.

      The plea colloquy also confirms defendant was not prejudiced by the

amendment because he clearly understood the nature of the certain persons

charge, including possession. Defendant gave detailed testimony recounting the

gun belonged to a corrections officer friend who had been involved in a domestic

violence incident. The friend left the gun in defendant's possession for a period

of years. While defendant was incarcerated, he arranged for a different friend

to hold the gun. When defendant was released, the gun's owner asked for the

gun back, and defendant arranged for the gun to be left at his home in

Piscataway, where it was found by the police before defendant had an

opportunity to return it to the owner. Although defendant denied touching the

gun, he admitted constructive possession by having it in his home and further

stated he knew he was not legally permitted to possess the weapon.

                                                                              A-5554-18
                                        26
                                       II.

      Defendant contends the trial judge initially allowed him to review

discovery during his pre-trial detention, but then reversed herself, which

deprived him of the ability to aid his attorney in preparing a defense and of a

fair trial. We are unpersuaded.

      On September 19, 2017, approximately eighteen months before trial, the

court entered an order permitting defendant to view thirty-two discs of

discovery. In December 2017 and January 2018, the court held pre-trial hearings

to address, among other things, defendant's complaints about access to

discovery. At the time, defendant was housed in South Woods State Prison.

There were technical difficulties in accessing the discovery due to the format in

which it had been produced by the State.

      As of March 2018, defendant was moved to the MCACC. On July 26,

2018, the court ordered the MCACC permit defendant "additional time

throughout the week to view his digital discovery." In September 2018, defense

counsel moved to enforce the July order. Middlesex County opposed the motion

arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the MCACC to let defendant

review the electronic discovery. Substantively, the county argued: there was a

program available to inmates to review electronic discovery; defendant had

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      27
declined numerous opportunities to participate in the program; when defendant

participated in the program, he had not utilized all the time available to him; and

the program was intended to supplement, rather than replace, defendant's

meetings with defense counsel.       The court denied defendant's motion on

jurisdictional grounds.

      During the pretrial conference, defendant refused to sign the pretrial

memorandum because he had not had an opportunity to review all the discovery.

The pretrial memorandum noted discovery was complete, and the trial judge

noted that pretrial motions regarding discovery had been made, discovery issues

had been reviewed on the record, and multiple opportunities had been provided

to defendant to review discovery. Defense counsel agreed with the court's

assessment and stated he would "spend the entire . . . next week at the jail with

[defendant] making sure he . . . reviews everything."

      "In New Jersey, an accused has a right to broad discovery after the return

of an indictment in a criminal case." State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451, 461

(2016). The trial court's "power to order discovery is not limited to the express

terms of the automatic discovery provisions of Rule 3:13-3(b)."           State v.

Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 132 (App. Div. 2017). "[C]ourts have 'the

inherent power to order discovery when justice so requires.'" Ibid. (quoting

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       28
State in Int. of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 555 (2014)). However, the right to discovery

"is not unlimited." Hernandez, 225 N.J. at 463.

      We are unconvinced there was a discovery violation here. The record

shows defendant had ample access to the discovery and the opportunity to

review it with his attorney. The trial judge correctly found she could not compel

the MCACC to grant defendant access to the discovery in the manner he wished.

Moreover, he did not take full advantage of the MCACC's process enabling him

to review the discovery. These facts do not establish defendant was prejudiced

or had an unfair trial warranting a reversal of his convictions.

                                       III.

      Defendant raises several evidentiary arguments on appeal. We afford

substantial deference to a trial court's evidentiary rulings. State v. Morton, 155

N.J. 383, 453 (1998). As a result, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371-72

(2011). The trial court's evidentiary rulings must be upheld, "unless it can be

shown . . . that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of

justice resulted." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982).

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       29
                                       A.

      Defendant sought to admit text messages from his phone, showing he had

romantic relationships with women other than Booker as proof he was not

obsessed with her and lacked a motive to kill Olarerin. He did not intend to call

any of these women as witnesses, but instead intended to introduce the messages

into evidence through the State's witness who extracted the data from his phones.

The State objected on hearsay grounds.

      The trial judge ruled the texts were inadmissible hearsay because they

were being used to prove the truth of their contents, namely, that defendant had

romantic relationships with other women. Further, a State's witness was not the

means by which to admit the evidence, because they extracted the messages but

did not send or receive them. The judge ruled to be admissible, the evidence

would require testimony from the individuals who sent or received the text

messages, who could testify from their personal knowledge about their

relationships with defendant and their communications with him. Defendant

never produced these witnesses.

      The court's ruling that defendant's text messages with other women

constituted hearsay under N.J.R.E. 801(c) was sound, and we reject defendant's

arguments to the contrary. As required by N.J.R.E. 602, defendant had to

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      30
present testimony from someone with personal knowledge of these

relationships; a police witness who extracted the messages or reviewed them did

not suffice.1

                                        B.

      Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of a threat defendant made

to Olarerin on May 9, 2017, and the TRO issued on that date. The trial judge

issued a written opinion analyzing the evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b) and State

v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), and granted the State's motion in part.

      The judge found the threat to kill Olarerin was admissible intrinsic

evidence under N.J.R.E. 401, 402, and 403. She also ruled the evidence of the

May 9, 2017 threat was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b), subject to a limiting

instruction.    However, the State could not refer to the TRO.         The judge

concluded the "court will sanitize any and all reference to the issuing and

violation of the victims' restraining order against . . . defendant as it is unduly

prejudicial."

      During a later pretrial hearing, the State sought additional guidance from

the court as to how the TRO could be sanitized. It asked the court to revisit the

1
  Notwithstanding the evidentiary ruling, the jury learned during the defense
cross-examination of Detective Abromaitis that defendant had a relationship
with another woman.
                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       31
issue because defendant was served with the TRO approximately thirty hours

before the murder, the TRO was found in defendant's vehicle, along with

engagement and wedding rings, and the State intended to tell the jury the TRO

was "the final straw" leading defendant to murder Olarerin.

      At a later pretrial hearing the judge stated she realized the "heightened

relevance" of the TRO, given defendant's knowledge of the TRO, and the timing

of its service on defendant. Over defense counsel's objection, the judge stated

she would "be taking a look at that and how these issues interplay" and whether

it could "disturb [her] initial ruling."

      On the first day of trial, the judge ruled the parties would be permitted to

use the phrase "restraining order." She noted defense counsel agreed. The judge

concluded the TRO was "highly probative and relevant to the issues of motive

and plan and identification and so intertwined with the . . . facts of the case and

intrinsic to the facts of the case that it is important that it be able to be brought

up." Rather than instructing the jury during opening statements, she would

instead give the limiting "instruction when the evidence comes in through

testimony."

      Although the defense consented to the State using the term restraining

order, defense counsel objected during the State's opening when it mentioned

                                                                               A-5554-18
                                           32
the May 9, 2017 incident and Booker obtaining a restraining order against

defendant.   The issue arose again with the State's first witness, a North

Brunswick Police patrolman who spoke with Booker at the crime scene and

asked whether she could identify the man in the home surveillance video. He

testified Booker mentioned defendant, and "a few incidents between him and the

deceased" and "two prior reports [of] harassment" at which point defense

counsel objected.   The judge instructed the jury to disregard the witness's

statement and permitted the State to lead the witness to avoid further problems.

      After the witness concluded his testimony, defense counsel moved for a

mistrial. The judge denied the motion, noting the court and counsel would be

"revisiting the issue of the prior domestic violence and the restraining order,"

the jury would hear testimony about the May 9, 2017 incident, and the court

would be issuing a limiting instruction.

      Before Booker testified, the trial judge discussed use of the phrase

"restraining order." The parties agreed the phrase would be used in the context

of what occurred on May 9, 2017, and Booker would be permitted to generally

reference an "abusive relationship." However, she could not go into details

about any allegations of past abuse, and the TRO would not be admitted into

evidence.

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      33
      Booker testified her relationship with defendant was abusive, and the jury

heard about the May 9, 2017 incident and the TRO. After the first mention of

the restraining order, the judge issued the following instruction:

                   Ladies and gentlemen, the State has introduced
            evidence of a [TRO] barring defendant from having
            contact with . . . Booker. A [TRO] as opposed to a final
            restraining order [(FRO)] can be obtained with a one-
            sided complaint in summary fashion.

                  Our rules of evidence specifically exclude
            evidence that . . . if a defendant has committed any
            other crimes, wrongs, or acts when it is offered to show
            only that he has a disposition or a tendency to do wrong
            and therefore must be guilty of the charged offenses.

                   Before you can give any weight to this evidence,
            you must be satisfied that the defendant committed . . .
            this other act. If you are not so satisfied, you may not
            consider it for any purpose.

                    However, our rules do permit evidence of other
            crimes, wrongs, or acts when the evidence is used for
            . . . [a] certain specific, narrow purpose.

                  In this case, the evidence is only to be considered
            by you, members of the jury, to prove . . . defendant's
            motive, intent, plan, or identification. The State has
            introduced evidence of the [TRO] to show that it was
            this defendant's motive, intent, or plan to commit the
            crimes charged.

                   Whether this evidence does, in fact, demonstrate
            motive, intent, or plan is for you to decide. You may
            decide that this evidence does not demonstrate motive,
            intent, or plan and is not helpful to you at all. In that

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                       34
            case, you just disregard this evidence. On the other
            hand, you may decide that this evidence does
            demonstrate motive, intent, or plan and use it for one or
            more of those specific purposes.

                  However, you may not use this evidence to
            decide that . . . defendant has a tendency to commit
            crimes or that he is a bad person. That is, you may not
            decide that just because . . . defendant may have
            committed another crime, wrong, or bad act, he must be
            guilty of the present crimes.

                  I have admitted this evidence only to help you to
            decide this specific question of whether the issuance of
            the [TRO] motivated . . . defendant to commit the
            crimes alleged. You may not consider it for any other
            purpose and may not find . . . defendant guilty now
            simply because the State offered evidence that he
            committed other crimes, wrongs, or acts.

      During summations, the State referenced the restraining order in the

context of defendant's unrestrained obsession with Booker, evidenced by

following Booker and Olarerin to the police station and then returning to

Olarerin's home and photographing his vehicle notwithstanding the TRO.

Defense counsel objected to the State's use of the phrase "restraining order"

because he thought the parties "had come to terms that we were calling it a

TRO," but counsel did not ask the court for a curative or limiting instruction.

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      35
      Following summations, the court's final jury charge instructed the jury

that counsel's statements did not constitute evidence. The judge also reiterated

the limiting instruction about the restraining order.

      The admissibility of evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b) is viewed

restrictively, as a rule of exclusion rather than inclusion. State v. Willis, 225

N.J. 85, 100 (2016). The trial court determines whether the evidence concerns

prior bad acts, under N.J.R.E. 404(b), or is intrinsic to the charged offense, and

therefore relevant under the N.J.R.E. 403 balancing test. State v. Rose, 206 N.J.

141, 179 (2011). It is "more likely that evidence of uncharged misconduct will

be admitted . . . if it is considered intrinsic to the charged crime and subject only

to [N.J.R.E.] 403 than if it is not considered intrinsic evidence and subject to

both [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) and [N.J.R.E.] 403." Id. at 178. Intrinsic evidence

"directly proves" the crime charged or if the other wrongs or bad acts in question

were performed contemporaneously with, and facilitated, the commission of the

charged crime. Id. at 180 (quoting U.S. v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49 (3d Cir.

2010)).

      The trial court must consider whether the evidence is: "relevant to a

material issue; . . . similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense

charged; . . . clear and convincing;" and if "[t]he probative value . . . outweigh[s

                                                                               A-5554-18
                                        36
the] . . . prejudice." Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover,

Balancing the Presumption of Guilt & Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), &

609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135, 160 (1989) (footnote omitted)).

      In performing its analysis under prong four, the court must consider

whether the other-crimes evidence is necessary to prove the fact in dispute or

whether other, less prejudicial evidence could be used to prove the same fact.

State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 303 (1989). "Nevertheless, some types of

evidence, such as evidence of motive or intent, 'require a very strong showing

of prejudice to justify exclusion.'" State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 84 (2018)

(quoting State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182, 197 (2017)). Accord State v. Castagna,

400 N.J. Super. 164, 180 (App. Div. 2008) ("greater leeway is given when the

evidence is proffered on the issue of motive").

      Where other bad acts evidence is deemed admissible, the trial court should

sanitize the evidence if appropriate, and issue a limiting instruction to the jury,

both when the evidence is admitted and in the final charge. Green, 236 N.J. at

84. "[T]he court must not only caution against a consideration of [N.J.R.E.

404(b)] evidence for improper purposes, it must through specific instruction

direct and focus the jury's attention on the permissible purposes for which the

evidence is to be considered." State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460, 472 (1996).

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       37
      The trial judge carefully considered the N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence and

concluded the State met the Cofield factors for admissibility. The TRO was

clearly intrinsic to the crimes charged, and it was impossible for the State to

present its case without referencing the May 9, 2017 incident and the fact Booker

obtained a restraining order against defendant.

      The probative value outweighed the prejudice to defendant because this

evidence helped prove defendant's motive and intent. We have upheld the

admission of restraining order and domestic violence evidence in similar

circumstances. See Castagna, 400 N.J. Super. at 178-86 (holding that restraining

order evidence was admissible as to the defendant's motive to kill victim); State

v. Amodio, 390 N.J. Super. 313, 329-31 (App. Div. 2007) (finding restraining

order evidence admissible as to motive, and no error in court's limiting

instruction). Cf. State v. Nance, 148 N.J. 376, 387-90 (1997) (holding that

evidence of the defendant's jealousy was relevant and admissible to prove

motive for murder); State v. Vargas, 463 N.J. Super. 598, 604, 607-18 (App.

Div. 2020) (holding that the defendant's prior threat that "if you can't be with

me, then you can't be with anyone," was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) as

relevant to his state of mind, motive and intent to kill victim); State v. Baluch,

341 N.J. Super. 141, 191-93 (App. Div. 2001) (finding evidence of past domestic

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       38
abuse of victim was relevant to establish motive, intent, and state of mind to

harm victim and negate defense theory); State v. Angoy, 329 N.J. Super. 79, 85-

88 (App. Div. 2000) (finding no error in admitting evidence of the defendant's

prior assault of victim/girlfriend, in trial for her murder); State v. Engel, 249

N.J. Super. 336, 372-74 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that evidence of the

defendant's prior acts of violence and threats against victim was properly

admitted on issue of motive).

      The restraining order evidence was "prejudicial in the way that all highly

probative evidence is prejudicial: because it tends to prove a material issue in

dispute." Rose, 206 N.J. at 164. However, it was not "unfairly prejudicial,"

because it did not "create[] a significant likelihood that the jury would convict

defendant on the basis of the uncharged misconduct because he was a bad

person, and not on the basis of the actual evidence adduced against him." Ibid.

      The trial judge's limiting instruction was timely, correct, and adequately

instructed the jury on the limited use of the restraining order evidence. "[W]e

trust juries to follow instructions." State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 65 (1993). The

record does not convince us the jury failed to follow the judge's instructions.

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       39
                                       C.

      Defendant argues the trial judge committed reversible error by permitting

the State to introduce the surveillance videos into evidence without proper

authentication.   He argues Detective Abromaitis could not authenticate the

videos. Furthermore, the detective was allowed to narrate the videos for the

jury. Regardless, he asserts the videos were exculpatory because the time

stamps on the clips shown to the jury prove he could not have committed the

murder and be on the surveillance videos at the same time.

      During a pre-trial hearing, the judge ruled videos from the businesses near

the Routes 1 and 18 interchange were "highly relevant" because they showed a

vehicle fitting the description of defendant's traveling what "would be a direct

route between the" murder scene and defendant's home. At trial, the State

presented testimony from the gas station employee whose station was at the

interchange. He testified the gas station had cameras recording twenty-four

hours per day, and the footage was from his station's cameras. He explained the

time stamp on the video was off by one hour because of daylight savings time.

Over defense counsel's objection, the trial judge found the employee had

authenticated the video.

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      40
      The State further adduced testimony from the manager of a carwash also

located in the interchange. He likewise explained the business's practice of

operating cameras and authenticated the video, also explaining a time stamp

discrepancy due to daylight savings. Notably, he was shown a clip bearing a

time stamp of 4:10 a.m. The trial judge ruled the witness authenticated the video

over the defense's objection.

      The State offered Detective Abromaitis's testimony after the videos were

authenticated. He told the jury police identified a vehicle fitting the description

of defendant's driving past the businesses toward defendant's home, "which is

right off of Route 18 . . . in Piscataway about ten minutes after the suspect is

seen leaving" Olarerin's home. The defense did not object to this testimony. An

objection only came when the detective began to describe the car, and the judge

sustained the objection mid-sentence before the detective could articulate an

opinion regarding what the video depicted.

      Under N.J.R.E. 901, to satisfy "the requirement of authenticating or

identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must present evidence sufficient

to support a finding that the item is what its proponent claims." This rule does

not require "absolute certainty or conclusive proof." State v. Mays, 321 N.J.

Super. 619, 628 (App. Div. 1999). Courts generally play the role of screener,

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       41
leaving to the jury a more intense review of the evidence. Konop v. Rosen, 425

N.J. Super. 391, 411 (App. Div. 2012).

      Pursuant to these principles, we have no difficulty concluding the videos

were properly authenticated by the gas station employee and the carwash

manager. Defendant's arguments to the contrary lack merit.

      Further, the evidence showed the murder was committed between 4:11

and 4:13 a.m. The carwash manager was shown a clip from 4:10 a.m., but not

for purposes of explaining that defendant's car was depicted in frame. That task

was left to Detective Abromaitis, who testified the vehicle appeared in the frame

at 4:23 a.m., which made it entirely feasible for defendant to commit the murder

and later be seen driving by the interchange.

      Defendant's argument Detective Abromaitis was permitted to narrate the

video lacks merit. Our Supreme Court recently stated "an investigator who has

carefully reviewed a video recording can . . . offer lay witness testimony. By

drawing attention to key details that a jury might otherwise overlook—as is the

case, for example, with a potentially confusing, complex, or unclear recording—

such evidence can be particularly helpful." State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 569

(2023). However, "the rules of evidence do not allow for continuous, running

commentary on video evidence by someone who has merely studied a

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      42
recording." Ibid. As we noted, there was no such improper narration here. The

detective's testimony was cut short, and there was no "continuous, running

commentary" of the sort disapproved in Watson.

                                       D.

      Defendant asserts Detective Abromaitis offered an improper opinion

about who the killer was, which usurped the jury's factfinding role and deprived

him of a fair trial. He claims the inadmissible opinion testimony came in the

form of the detective's statements regarding the suspects who were ruled out,

and that all evidence pointed to defendant.

      Defendant's assertion the State elicited testimony regarding the ruling out

of other suspects is unsupported by the record. Booker identified defendant as

a suspect in Olarerin's murder from the start of the investigation, and the police

investigation uncovered evidence supporting defendant's guilt. The evidence of

other possible suspects was adduced during the defense's cross-examination of

Detective Abromaitis to raise doubt about the thoroughness of the police

investigation. Indeed, the defense asked the detective whether a third party

might have been responsible for Olarerin's death, noting Booker's relationships

with men other than Olarerin, as well as Olarerin's business dealings. This

prompted the State to rebut those defense theories by questioning Detective

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       43
Abromaitis about the extent of the police investigation, including Booker's other

relationships and Olarerin's business and finances. Detective Abromaitis then

told the jury the other men were ruled out because: Booker and one of her male

friends were in Elizabeth at the time of the murder; another of Booker's male

friends had been involved with her in 2015/2016, when she was living in

Plainfield, and had not been in contact with her in 2017; and the police found a

third male friend's communications with Booker failed to show he had any issue

with Olarerin.

      Notably, the defense did not object to this testimony. We decline to find

it was reversible error considering it was invited by the defense. See State v.

Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 155-56 (2008) (finding the doctrine of invited error barred

the defendant from contesting on appeal testimony he agreed to at trial) .

      Defendant argues the following colloquy between the State and Detective

Abromaitis during the redirect testimony constituted reversible error:

"[Prosecutor]: Okay. And when you continue[d] with your investigation what

did you find when you continued to look into [defendant]'s phone? [Detective

Abromaitis]: Again, all signs and facts pointed toward [defendant] committing

this murder."

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                      44
      For strategic reasons, defense counsel waited until the detective was off

the witness stand to object, because the defense did not believe the prosecutor

intentionally elicited the testimony, and the defense did not want to highlight it.

The judge responded she would have sustained the objection if it was timely

made and instructed the jury that it, not the detective, was to decide guilt. The

judge and counsel agreed she would instruct the jury accordingly, and after a

brief charge conference and before the jury left for the day, the judge gave the

following instruction:

             One other instruction I need to give you is, that the
             decision . . . of whether the State has proven . . .
             defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is your
             decision. And the opinions that may have been given
             by any particular witness in this case as to whether the
             State and whether the evidence points in a particular
             direction is not something that you would consider. It
             is your decision as to whether . . . defendant has [been]
             proven guilt[y] beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the final charge, the judge repeated this instruction and instructed the jury on

third-party guilt.

      There is no doubt police are not permitted to opine on a defendant's guilt,

which is the ultimate question for the jury to decide. State v. Frisby, 174 N.J.

583, 593-94 (2002). However, we are unconvinced the detective's testimony

here constituted reversible error.    At the outset, we note the problematic

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       45
testimony came in on re-direct and followed testimony the defense elicited

regarding why the State ruled out certain individuals. Moreover, the judge

instructed the jury following the detective's testimony and again at the end of

the case about its factfinding role, which cured any prejudice created by the

redirect testimony.

                                      E.

      Defendant contends the trial judge erred by admitting the letter Detective

Abromaitis received from the MCACC, because the State presented no

competent evidence defendant wrote the letter or addressed the envelope. The

judge also erred in permitting Booker to testify she recognized defendant's

handwriting.

      Prior to trial the judge ordered defendant to provide a buccal swab and a

handwriting exemplar. When defendant objected to the State's attempt to admit

the letter, the judge held an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. At the hearing, Detective

Abromaitis explained the letter was signed by a "D. Smith," yet there was no

inmate by that name at the MCACC. Further, the inmate number on the letter

was one off from defendant's; the envelope contained defendant's DNA; the

letter's contents were consistent with information found on defendant's

cellphone, namely, misspelling "cousin" the same way and bearing names also

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      46
saved to the phone's contacts; the letter-writer appeared to have knowledge of

the crime that was not publicly known; the zip code on the letter was not the zip

code of the jail, but a zip code defendant used on other letters; and the

handwriting appeared consistent with the handwriting on letters found in

defendant's vehicle.

      At trial, the State established Booker was familiar with defendant's

handwriting. She testified she observed his handwriting on documents when

they lived together, and she was able to identify the handwriting from the

jailhouse letter as defendant's.

      A handwriting expert was not necessary because a jury can compare a

sample of a defendant's handwriting with a document purporting to be written

by the defendant, without the necessity of expert testimony. State v. Carroll,

256 N.J. Super. 575, 593-98 (App. Div. 1992). Witnesses familiar with the

defendant's handwriting may authenticate it. State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J.

Super. 349, 365 (App. Div. 2017). For these reasons, Detective Abromaitis

could testify the handwriting on the letter resembled items found in defendant's

car, and Booker could authenticate defendant's handwriting given her lengthy

relationship with him.

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      47
      Given the totality of the circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion

in the trial judge's decision to admit the letter into evidence. The State adduced

sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to prove defendant wrote the letter.

The probative value of the letter outweighed any prejudice to defendant.

                                       IV.

      An issue raised prior to trial involved how best to sanitize the fact

defendant was in jail between 2015 and 2017 to prevent the jury from holding

defendant's criminality against him. The trial judge's solution was to advise the

jury defendant had relocated during this time and returned.

      On appeal, defendant argues the sanitization failed.       He asserts "the

allusions to [defendant] 'going away' and 'coming back' invited prejudicial

speculation that [he] was in prison for the domestic abuse of Booker." He asserts

the two-year gap between the break-up with Booker in 2015 and his return into

her life in 2017 was irrelevant.

      This issue was the subject of substantial discussion between the court and

counsel. The State sought the judge's guidance on the issue because it was

concerned about explaining to the jury why the parties' separation in 2015 was

so abrupt.   Although the defense disagreed the separation was abrupt, it

suggested the judge instruct the jury defendant had moved or was not in the area.

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       48
      The trial judge suggested defendant's absence be sanitized by stating he

had "relocated," which "sounds like he moved for business or work as opposed

to . . . being forc[ibly] relocated." After some debate between counsel whether

the jury should know that defendant was unable to communicate with Booker

during his absence, the judge suggested that reference only be made to defendant

having temporarily relocated, which could be for many reasons. Both parties

accepted the compromise suggested by the judge. Defense counsel commented

the compromise was "vague" enough not to draw the jury's suspicions about

defendant's absence. The defense requested there be no limiting instruction that

could "draw attention" to the issue.

      At trial, the reference to defendant's absence by the State was fleeting.

Defense counsel objected when the State's questioning of Booker suggested

defendant had been involuntarily relocated. The trial judge reminded the State

about the discussions surrounding the compromise, and the prosecutor moved

on. Defense counsel also objected to a reference during the State's summation

that defendant was "coming home" to the extent it suggested "he does not have

a home." However, the court overruled the objection, finding that the State's

reference was consistent with the pretrial rulings and the testimony about

defendant's relocation.

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                       49
      We are unpersuaded there was an abuse of discretion or any prejudice to

defendant. The State never referred to defendant's incarceration, and its fleeting

references to his relocation and return did not imply he was incarcerated. The

relocation compromise suggested by the trial judge was neutral. Defendant

could have relocated and returned for personal, family, or work reasons.

      Further, the judge instructed the jury the comments made by counsel were

not evidential and the case had to be decided based on the evidence presented.

She charged the jury that "speculation, conjecture and other forms of guessing

play no role in the performance of [their] duty." The record does not convince

us the jury did not follow these instructions.

                                        V.

      On the fourth day of trial, the judge informed counsel "someone from the

prosecutor's office observed [juror eleven] consuming a flight of whiskey during

the lunch hour one of the days during the trial last week, which is concerning ."

The judge questioned court officers, but none of them observed any indications

the juror was intoxicated.

      The judge intended to speak with the juror and advise him not to consume

alcohol during the trial, but the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed the better

course would be to address the jurors together, rather than single out the juror.

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       50
Defense counsel suggested the judge tell the jurors "there was an issue in another

courtroom, so we're generally advising everybody" not to consume alcohol

during lunch. The defense reasoned this would not leave the jurors to wonder

which one of them was drinking at lunch.

      The judge agreed to proceed in the manner suggested by defense counsel.

Prior to the lunch break the judge advised the jury as follows:

            One of my colleagues reported that a juror involved in
            one of their cases was consuming alcohol during the
            lunch hour. And so we're all reminding everyone that
            that's inappropriate to do during the course of a trial. I
            presume that no one here would imbibe in that way
            during the course of the trial, because it could create
            some challenges with regard to your focus.

      Before summations the judge told counsel that at one point during the trial,

juror eleven had not looked at evidence as it was passed around. The day before,

the juror appeared to have his eyes closed, but the judge did not know if he had

fallen asleep. Defense counsel responded: "We're fine if you want to make him

an alternate." The State agreed that "if it's between excising and alternate, let's

go with an alternate."

      Consistent with this plan, juror eleven was made an alternate. Neither he

nor the other alternate participated in the deliberations or the verdict.

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                        51
      A trial judge has discretion whether to interview a juror whose conduct is

problematic. State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 89-90 (2016); State v. Reevey,

159 N.J. Super. 130, 133-34 (App. Div. 1978). Here, the trial judge went beyond

questioning the juror and took corrective action by issuing a jury instruction

regarding the consumption of alcohol and removing the juror from the

deliberations in a non-prejudicial manner.

      We discern no error in the way the trial judge handled the problems with

juror eleven. Moreover, defendant cannot argue error on appeal when he invited

the solutions employed by the judge to deal with the juror at trial. Regardless

of whether we consider this to be invited error, there simply was no miscarriage

of justice.

                                       VI.

      Defendant argues his conviction for unlawful possession of a handgun

should be vacated because the State failed to present evidence he did not have a

permit to possess a firearm. He asserts the trial judge erred when she failed to

grant his motion for acquittal on this charge. Defendant claims we should acquit

him on the other convictions as well and grant him a new trial because the verdict

was against the weight of the evidence.

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                       52
        The test on a motion for judgment of acquittal is "whether the evidence

viewed in its entirety, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable

testimony and all of the favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn

therefrom, is such that a jury could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant was guilty . . . ." State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 163 (2007). This

standard "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. "Once a defendant has been

found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the

evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of

the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution."

Ibid.

        In reviewing the record, "[n]o distinction is made between direct and

circumstantial evidence." State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 549 (App. Div.

2011). Moreover, "[i]nferences need not be established beyond a reasonable

doubt." Ibid. Instead, "a jury may draw an inference from a fact whenever it is

more probable than not that the inference is true . . . ." State v. Brown, 80 N.J.

                                                                                A-5554-18
                                         53
587, 592 (1979). "Nevertheless, the State's right to the benefit of reasonable

inferences should not be used to shift or lighten the burden of proof , or become

a bootstrap to reduce the State's burden of establishing the essential elements of

the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. On appeal, we apply the

same legal standard as the trial court, performing a de novo review of the

evidence. State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 590 (2018).

      Pursuant to these principles, we discern no error in the denial of

defendant's motion to acquit on the unlawful possession charge. The trial judge

correctly found the State presented enough evidence to allow the jury to infer

defendant lacked a gun permit. Likewise, the judge charged the jury it could

infer from the facts presented defendant did not have a permit. The record

supports defendant's conviction because there was no evidence presented

defendant had a permit, thereby allowing an inference that he lacked one.

      Although defendant's motion for acquittal focused on the gun charge, the

trial judge denied it as to all charges. She found "with regards to the balance of

the charges, I think assuming all inferences [in] favor of the State, which is a

standard that the [c]ourt has to apply at this point, there is sufficient evidence to

give the case to the [j]ury."

                                                                               A-5554-18
                                        54
      The record supports the judge's decision. There was ample evidence to

show defendant purposely murdered Olarerin, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(1). The second-degree burglary offense was proved because there was

evidence defendant surreptitiously entered Olarerin's home and purposely shot

him, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(2) and (b)(1). The second-degree

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(a)(1), was likewise established by the facts presented.

      Based on the substantial evidence presented by the State and according it

all favorable inferences, it is clear the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt

that defendant was guilty of the offenses charged. For these reasons, the trial

judge properly denied a judgment of acquittal.

      Defendant did not move for a new trial. Regardless, a new trial may be

granted where "it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under

the law." State v. Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 511-12 (App. Div. 1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A new trial should not be granted "unless, having

given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the

witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial

of justice under the law." R. 3:20-1. Our review of the record does not convince

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       55
us there was either a miscarriage of justice or a manifest denial of justice

warranting a new trial.

                                      VII.

      Finally, defendant argues his "sentence was manifestly excessive because

the trial court based the sentence on pending criminal charges as well as double-

counting aggravating factors." He asserts he was punished with a sentence that

is tantamount to life imprisonment because he declined to plead guilty and

instead proceeded to trial.

      The trial judge found the following aggravating factors: three, the risk

defendant would commit another crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six, defendant's

prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine, the need to deter

defendant and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).          She

concluded the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the non-existent

mitigating factors.

      The trial judge noted this was defendant's sixth conviction, and recited his

prior convictions, which included aggravated assault on a law enforcement

officer, escape, and armed robbery. Defendant had three pending charges—

including certain persons, stalking, and filing a false report offenses—all of

which arose from the investigation and prosecution of the present charges. The

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                      56
judge also recounted defendant's municipal convictions, a domestic violence

FRO issued against him, and his juvenile adjudications.

      The judge gave all the aggravating factors "great weight."             As to

aggravating factor three, she found "there is a very strong risk that this defendant

will commit another crime." She noted: defendant had "led a life of crime . . .

first as a juvenile offender, and continuing throughout his adult life"; he showed

"no signs of remorse," and "[o]nly an attitude of someone who fails to accept

the fault for taking another human life"; he "acted with clear premeditation

demonstrating that he is a cold[-]blooded killer and has complete disregard for

the value of another human life"; and "committed this crime in violation of a

domestic violence [TRO], demonstrating once again that he has absolutely no

respect for the law . . . ."

      The judge found aggravating factor six applied "not only due to the extent

of his prior criminal history," but because defendant committed the murder and

other offenses while on bail, awaiting sentencing for second-degree robbery.

She noted defendant was charged with a new offense, the false reporting of a

crime, while incarcerated in advance of trial, but did not consider it as part of

the sentencing because defendant enjoyed the presumption of innocence.

                                                                              A-5554-18
                                        57
      The judge found aggravating factor nine because "[i]t seems that the only

way to deter . . . defendant from committing crimes is to keep him in jail." She

noted defendant was undeterred by Booker's attempts to dissociate from him,

the TRO she obtained, or his prior convictions. The judge concluded "the kind

of ethical consci[ence] that pr[e]vents good and law[-]abiding people from

committing the irreparable and dreadful act of killing another human being does

not exist in [defendant]." And "[a]s for general deterrence, the public needs to

know that there are consequences for taking another life, and those

consequences are substantial."

      The judge rejected defendant's argument for mitigating factor eight, that

the circumstances of his offense were unique and unlikely to recur, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(8). She found "the severe nature of this crime, and . . . defendant's

complete and utter disregard for the law and the value of a human life,

[convinced her] the obsessive and evil nature of his behavior still lurks beneath

the surface based upon his outward demeanor and his continued denials."

      Defendant argued for mitigating factor eleven, that imprisonment would

entail excessive hardship, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), because he was in a

wheelchair and "[b]eing medically fragile in the prison system . . . put him at

higher risk than other people who are incarcerated." The State argued defendant

                                                                           A-5554-18
                                      58
was attempting to manipulate the system by claiming he had back problems,

even though in the presentence report, defendant reported good physical and

mental health. The judge rejected this mitigating factor because defendant

reported good health and could receive medical treatment, including back

surgery, in prison.

      Defendant also argued for mitigating factor twelve, defendant's

willingness to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(12). Apparently, defendant had offered to cooperate in a separate matter

in Essex County. The judge stated: "I think that the [c]ourt is aware of those

facts, to the extent that they are applicable here," and offered to hear them at

sidebar.   Although the sentencing transcript notes the discussion was

indiscernible, the record shows defense counsel conceded the applicability of

mitigating factor twelve was questionable. The State noted it had spoken to its

counterpart in Essex County, and defendant's information had not been of use.

The judge rejected mitigating factor twelve.

      Defendant argued the court should impose a thirty-year sentence in

accordance with the State's pretrial offer. The judge declined, noting she was

not bound by the offer and had to sentence defendant in accordance with the

law. She concluded "it is clear that the minimum sentence of [thirty] years is

                                                                          A-5554-18
                                      59
completely inappropriate, because of the substantial outweighing of the

aggravating factors."

      Sentencing decisions are discretionary in nature. State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.

321, 347 (2019). Therefore, we review them for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We defer to the sentencing court's factual

findings and should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65

(2014).

      "To facilitate meaningful appellate review, trial judges must explain how

they arrived at a particular sentence." Id. at 65. We will reverse a sentence

where: the findings of fact on the aggravating and mitigating factors were not

based on competent and credible evidence in the record; the court incorrectly

applied the sentencing guidelines enunciated in the criminal code; and the

application of the facts to the law constituted such an error of judgment as to

shock the judicial conscience. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).

      Pursuant to these principles, we discern no error in the trial judge's

consideration of the aggravating factors and mitigating factors. The judge did

not double-count the elements of the murder offense by noting that defendant's

crimes were premeditated when she was considering aggravating factor three.

An "emotional murder" and a "cold[-]blooded killing," constitute purposeful

                                                                            A-5554-18
                                     60
murder under the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1). See also State v. Gerald,

113 N.J. 40, 149 (1988) (rejecting "homogeniz[ing] distinctly different states of

criminal culpability"). Defendant's conduct was clearly purposeful. The trial

judge appropriately considered defendant's risk of committing another offense

when she noted the distinction between "emotional murder" and a "cold[-]

blooded killing." His remaining arguments concerning the aggravating and

mitigating factors, and the sentencing in general, lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed in A-5554-18 and in A-3894-19.

                                                                             A-5554-18
                                       61