Court Opinion

ID: 9461337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:11:47.088685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:00.446416
License: Public Domain

BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result):
While I am in complete agreement with the result reached by the majority opinion, that being the dismissal of the *508complaint, I prefer to concur specially in order to express some fundamental differences I have with the reasoning adopted by the majority in affirming the decision of the court below.
At the outset, this complaint could have been dismissed for the reasons that the act of an agent is the act of the corporation and it is necessary to have two persons or entities in order for there to be a conspiracy; a corporation cannot conspire with itself. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5 Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925, 73 S.Ct. 783, 97 L.Ed. 1356 (1953).1 A dismissal could have been achieved without reaching the constitutional question.
Turning to the constitutional issue, I have reservations concerning the broad view held by the majority as to the scope of Congressional power to punish private conspiracies. As I read the majority opinion, it implies that the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the authority and power to punish purely private conspiracies that would infringe upon the right to engage in activities which are enumerated in the Constitution as rights of the people. They decline to grant relief, however, because they do not read the statute (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)) as exercising that power and authority. They prefer to await a clear signal from Congress or the Supreme Court that this broad power has been approved and put into effect before acting to enforce it. I cannot agree with that view; Congress does not have such authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, no clear signal could properly be forthcoming from either Congress or the Supreme Court that the power had been exercised.
In my view the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to protect activities commonly considered to be federal rights only from interference by governmental entities. The majority seeks to broaden that power to encompass private interference. In fact, the language pertaining to most federal rights is specifically limited to proscribing governmental interference, e. g., “Congress shall make no law . . ,”2 or “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law . ” 3 The result is that the activities and conduct are protected only from governmental action; Congress has the authority to provide that protection and no other. The Fourteenth Amendment is specifically limited to protecting the citizenry from state action which impinges on the rights encompassed in that Amendment, while private infringements are not proscribed. There are some instances where Congress can reach purely private interference, such as voting in federal elections, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970); the right to travel, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); and the rights provided by the Thirteenth Amendment, Jones v. Alfred E. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); however, they are exceptional freedoms uniquely requiring complete and absolute protection. Otherwise, and I repeat, Congress is empowered to protect the enumerated activity only from infringement by a governmental entity. In this case, it is not just the language of the statute, but the words of the Fourteenth Amendment which limit the relief to be granted.
The case of United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966), relied upon by the majority, merely enunciates the fact that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, private conspiracies to cause state action which interferes with protected activities can be punished by Congress. Power to punish a private conspiracy to cause state interference is not power to punish a private *509conspiracy to cause purely private interference. Guest does not mean that Congress can punish all conspiracies interfering with Fourteenth Amendment activities. Since the Fourteenth Amendment rights are all guaranteed protection from infringement by state action, Congress can punish only conspiracies which seek to cause state action violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The authority of Congress is limited by the bounds of the mantle of protection the right provides, and that protection, in the Fourteenth Amendment, is limited to preventing governmental infringements upon the activities enumerated or incorporated into that Amendment. Thus, Congress cannot punish purely private conspiracies to interfere with activities which the Constitution protects only against governmental interference.
The example given by the majority, that Congress could pass a law proscrib-, ing private interference with public school attendance, is, in my opinion, fallacious. There is no federal right to be free from purely private interference in attending school. A conspiracy to cause the state to interfere with children seeking to attend classes could be reached by Congress, but not one to cause private individuals to interfere. The power of Congress is limited by the scope of the right, and the only method whereby the scope of these protections could be extended to purely private acts is by constitutional amendment, not by a signal from Congress or the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, there is no federal right to be protected against private discrimination because of one’s patriotic affiliations. Conspiracy to cause the state to discriminate on that basis might be reached by Congress, but not acts of purely private discrimination. The relief sought by Bellamy is beyond the power of Congress or the federal judiciary to provide.
Thus, I agree that this case properly was dismissed, but not simply because the statute does not reach the discharge for membership in a patriotic organization, conduct for which the remedy is here sought. Rather, I view dismissal as proper because neither the Congress nor the federal judiciary has the authority to protect an activity (freedom of association) specifically designated as a First Amendment right from any infringement other than that proscribed (governmental infringement) by the language establishing the right. Other than the exceptions stated above, that protection is limited to preventing governmental interference and cannot reach purely private acts. Since Bellamy does not assert interference with his right to vote, right to travel, or with any right cognizable under the Thirteenth Amendment, he has not stated a claim for which relief may be granted by a federal court when he seeks redress for a purely private act of discrimination based on his affiliation with a “patriotic organization.”

. Nelson Radio, supra, is cited with approval in Greenville Publishing Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflector, Inc. (Craven, J.), 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4 Cir. 1974).

. U.S.Const. amend. I.

. U.S.Const. amend. XIV.