Court Opinion

ID: 9862519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:17:42.806397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:43.040274
License: Public Domain

BENKE, Acting P. J., Concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s analysis and application of Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.5, subdivision (b).
My colleagues hold section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), cannot apply to cases where the parents have been negligent, that is, where the parents have unreasonably failed to protect their child from severe physical abuse. Rather, pointing to Pablo S. v. Superior Court (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 292 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 523], and Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 741 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 858], cases where the child’s injuries were obvious and the parents failed to act, my colleagues conclude that to deny reunification services under subdivision (b)(6), parental omission must rise to a level where the parents knew of the abuse and failed to intervene. Relying upon In re Kenneth M. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 16, 21 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 752], they then conclude that where such specific knowledge of abuse or pain and suffering does not appear on the record, there must be identification of the actual perpetrator of the physical abuse.
Applying its analysis to the case before us, the majority states the record is virtually devoid of evidence the parents knew the child was being beaten or was in pain, therefore it was necessary to name the actual perpetrator of the beatings. This identification, it urges, occurred at the time of the jurisdiction hearing where the trial court found both parents actually abused the child, and the failure to appeal that ruling precludes Tyrone W. from challenging the finding or the application of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
*856Respectfully, in an admittedly complicated area of the law, I disagree on multiple levels with the majority opinion. I part company from my colleagues on the interpretation of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) and that section’s relationship to the reunification bypass statutes. I also favor separation from the dicta in In re Kenneth M., which states an actual perpetrator of abuse must be named before reunification services can be denied under subdivision (b)(6). Finally, as Tyrone points out, there is no evidence in the record of the jurisdictional or disposition hearings supporting a conclusion he was the actual perpetrator of the injuries Y.W. suffered. Thus, counsel for the parties, as well as the trial court itself, will likely be surprised to discover that notwithstanding the trial court’s express determination it did not need to identify the actual perpetrator of the injuries Y.W. suffered, it nonetheless found both parents were indeed the actual perpetrators of physical abuse.
I

Welfare and Institutions Code Section 361.5, Subdivision (b)(6)

Subdivision (b) of section 361.5 sets out 15 separate circumstances under which reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian. Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5), a parent’s negligence, standing alone, will support an order denying reunification services. Subdivision (b)(3) deprives a parent of reunification services where a child has previously been taken from the parents’ home because of physical or sexual abuse and has been taken from the home on a second occasion because such abuse has recurred. There is nothing on the face of subdivision (b)(3) which requires the perpetrator be identified or the parent be more than negligent in failing to protect the child from the repeated abuse. Subdivision (b)(4) deprives a parent of services when the parent has caused the death of a child “through abuse or neglect.” Plainly, by its terms subdivision (b)(4) requires no greater level of culpability than neglect. Under subdivision (b)(5), services are denied where a child under the age of five has suffered severe physical abuse within the meaning of subdivision (e) of section 300 “because of the conduct of that parent or guardian.” As the majority points out, subdivision (b)(5), notwithstanding its limitation to “conduct of that parent or guardian,” has been applied where a parent knew or should have known about abuse. (See In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1732 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 282].)
Importantly, where a court finds a parent falls within the provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) or (4), reunification services may not be ordered unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence reunification is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) Where a parent is *857found to be described by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), the court has even less power to provide services. Where subdivision (b)(5) applies, the court must not only find reunification is in the best interests of the child, in addition it must also find “those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c).)
In short, the Legislature believes that in the circumstances described in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5), a parent’s failure to act when the parent knew or should have known about harm to a child requires an order denying services in the absence of additional findings. In this context, in which the Legislature has required that services be denied to parents who are negligent, it is difficult to find anything in the closely related provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) which requires a higher standard of culpability. Such a higher standard is certainly not found in the express language of subdivision (b)(6).
Contrary to the majority opinion, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) does not restrict the term “severe physical harm” to “deliberately inflicted” injuries. My colleagues quite properly take pains to point out we must presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme and cannot omit any express language. (See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 225-226 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 337].) Their analysis of subdivision (b)(6), however, omits the express language of subdivision (b)(6). The language which my colleagues fail to consider appears immediately preceding the words “deliberate” and “inflicted”: “A finding of the infliction of severe physical harm, for the purposes of this subdivision, may be based on, but is not limited to, deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child’s body ... by an act or omission of the parent or guardian . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6), italics added.) The phrase “may be based on, but is not limited to” entirely defeats my colleagues’ suggestion the later use of the words “deliberate” and “inflicted” were in any manner intended to limit application of subdivision (b)(6) to actual perpetrators. Rather, read literally, the phrase “may be based on, but is not limited to” expressly permits the trial court to consider, in addition to deliberate acts, other circumstances where a parent’s act or omission has resulted in serious injury.
The majority also fails to afford the term “omission” its ordinary and common meaning. “Omission” means “something neglected or left undone” or “apathy toward or neglect of duty.” (Webster’s Collegiate Diet. (11th ed. 2006) p. 865, italics added.) In using the word “omission” in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), the Legislature clearly intended that a parent’s failure to protect a child from serious physical injury would permit a trial court to deny reunification services.
*858A literal reading of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)—that is, one which gives meaning to the phrase “may be based on, but its not limited to” and the word “omission”—is also suggested when section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) is compared with the provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5). As I have noted, denial of services is required under subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5) unless the court finds the services are in the best interest of the child, and in cases where subdivision (b)(5) applies, the court also finds services will prevent further abuse or prevent detriment to the child. Thus, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5) contains a presumption services will"not benefit a child if a parent is guilty of the conduct, including negligence, covered by the subdivision. Once the court finds the circumstances set forth in subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5), it may deny services without making any further findings.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) is not nearly so harsh and provides parents with important procedural protections. Significantly, subdivision (b)(6) does not apply unless the court finds it' will not benefit the child to pursue reunification. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6).) Thus, unlike section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5), subdivision (b)(6) presumes that notwithstanding the parental conduct described in the subdivision, reunification services will benefit a child. Moreover, unlike the other provisions, services may be denied under subdivision (b)(6) only if the court considers the specific factors set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (i) and only after it puts its findings as to those factors in the record. (§ 361.5, subds. (h), (i).)
To summarize then, if a court finds negligence which is within the scope of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5), the court must presume services will not benefit the child and it may deny services without making any further findings. On the other hand, if the court finds the parental conduct described in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), it must presume services will nonetheless benefit the child and can deny services only if it makes specific findings on the record which show reunification services will not benefit the child. The varying presumptions employed by the Legislature and the requirement of express findings when subdivision (b)(6) is to be applied, clearly demonstrate the Legislature viewed the parental conduct encompassed in subdivision (b)(6) as relatively less hazardous to a child than the conduct encompassed in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) and (5). Because the. Legislature clearly believes the parental conduct described in subdivision (b)(6) poses somewhat less of a risk to children, it is simply not logical to find subdivision (b)(6) contemplates a higher level of parental culpability than section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4) or (5). In short, the majority’s interpretation of subdivision (b)(6) is contradicted by the express language of the statute and by comparison with the related provisions of section 361.5.
Finally, I note the majority’s reliance on In re Kenneth M., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 16, for the conclusion that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), *859requires the naming of the actual perpetrator of abuse. Dicta in Kenneth M. does indeed support the majority’s position. The difficulty for me is that, respectfully, I do not believe the dicta in Kenneth M. is correct. It does not find support in the language or construction of subdivision (b)(6). -
II

Application of the Law to This Case

My colleagues find that because Tyrone did not appeal the jurisdictional finding, he is bound by it. The majority opinion concludes that in finding jurisdiction, the trial court necessarily found the parents deliberately inflicted harm on Y.W. This analysis is unpersuasive because, respectfully, it seriously mischaracterizes the trial court’s jurisdictional findings.
The agency’s petition alleged jurisdiction over T.W. arose under section 300, subdivisions (j) and (e). In discussing the trial court’s jurisdictional findings, the majority opinion makes no reference to the section 300, subdivision (e), allegation in the petition. This is interesting because jurisdiction under subdivision (j) is not possible without reference to at least one other substantive provision of section 300. Subdivision (j) only provides for jurisdiction over a child when the child’s sibling has been neglected or abused within the meaning of one of the other substantive provisions of section 300. (§ 300, subd. (j).) In short, a finding of jurisdiction under subdivision (j) requires a finding under one of the other provisions of section 300 as to the sibling.
It follows that for purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata, the trial court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (j) included a finding under the other substantive provision of section 300 alleged in the agency’s petition, subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) provides jurisdiction when a child under the age five has been severely injured by a parent “or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child.” (§ 300, subd. (e).) Thus, in finding jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (j) and (e), the trial court did no more than find both parents knew or should have known about the abuse their daughter suffered. Because of the scope of section 300, subdivision (e), the trial court’s jurisdictional finding simply cannot be used in the place of evidence that one or both of the parents deliberately inflicted injuries on Y.W.
*860Because the record will not support a finding the parents deliberately inflicted injury on their daughter, the trial court’s order cannot be upheld under the majority’s interpretation of subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5. I would not grant Tyrone’s petition but would instead uphold the trial court’s order under a literal interpretation of the statute.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.