Court Opinion

ID: 9770691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:17.473855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.901418
License: Public Domain

HENRY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
On October 17,1974, petitioner, a resident of Pigeon Forge, Sevier County, filed his sworn complaint in the Chancery Court at Maynardsville, in Union County, seeking an absolute divorce. Among other sworn allegations were these:
a. that his wife was a resident of Union County, Tennessee;
b. that he and his wife “have been separated since October 1, 1974, and have not lived together since that time.”
I digress to point out that in point of fact each of these allegations was willfully, knowingly and flagrantly false.
On the following day, October 18, 1974, petitioner’s wife filed her answer admitting the statistical information contained in the complaint. This, of course, constituted a direct admission that she was a resident of Union County. Her answer contains no denial of the allegation pertaining to the separation of the parties, nor does it contain a general denial.
The hearing was conducted on October 21, 1974; and, by decree entered December 2, 1974, petitioner was granted a divorce. This decree approved and incorporated a property settlement agreement executed on October 16, 1974, which, inter alia, set out that petitioner’s wife, Freda S. Maples, was a resident of the “County of Union.” At the hearing petitioner testified that his wife was a resident of Union County.
Freda S. Maples died on July 18, 1975, under circumstances not here pertinent and not fully disclosed by the proof.
On September 16, 1975, petitioner filed his Rule 60.02 motion alleging that “the final decree was entered by mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; and/or fraud, by reason that the complaint was filed in Union County, Tennessee, to avoid embar-assment, and to pacify the defendant’s emotional state of mind.”
It is further alleged that “the parties were following advice of counsel,”1 and that the court “does not have the proper venue and jurisdiction over the parties as provided by T.C.A. 36-804.” It was further averred that the parties continued to live together as man and wife.
On the hearing conducted pursuant to this motion, the petitioner told the presiding Chancellor, William H. Inman, “Judge, I just lied to you.” The conclusion reached *207in the majority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, this was clearly “the particular conduct of petitioner which was found to be contemptuous,” as was found by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
It appears from the proof, somewhat sketchily, that this whole sordid affair was a scheme concocted by petitioner and his wife, with the connivance and counsel of his then attorney (not counsel of record before this Court) to protect their property against the claims and demands of creditors, by transferring title to valuable properties to the wife. This iniquitous scheme brings into play serious questions of ethics and erudition of counsel. (Again, not counsel before this Court.)
After the hearing, Chancellor Inman set aside the property settlement and divorce as being “obtained fraudulently because the defendant was a citizen and resident of Sevier County, Tennessee, as admitted under oath by the plaintiff.” He further adjudged petitioner to be in contempt of court, fined him $50.00 and bound him over to the next term of the grand jury.
While petitioner swore falsely in two particulars in the complaint (residence and separation) and again in the same two particulars on the divorce hearing and would have been subject to punishment for contempt in any of the four instances, the record is clear that he was punished for contempt for falsely swearing at the divorce hearing that his wife was a resident of Union County.
The ensuing grand jury indictment was artfully prepared and fully meets all legal requirements. It charges in plain terms that petitioner swore, before Chancellor In-man, that his wife “was a resident of Union County,” knowing at the time that in point of fact she was a resident of Sevier County.
Upon the trial under this indictment, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to serve in the state penitentiary for not less than one (1) nor more than two (2) years.
I.

The Double Jeopardy Issue

It should be noted at the outset that petitioner was convicted of a criminal contempt in Chancery Court.2
The Court of Criminal Appeals placed primary reliance upon Ricketts v. State, 111 Tenn. 380, 77 S.W. 1076 (1903). The very brief opinion in this case contains dictum that supports the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals; however, the court did not have before it two convictions. The defendant was tried and convicted for contempt of court consisting of subordination of perjury. Apparently his defense was that contempt merged into the greater offense of subornation of perjury. In this context the Court said:
The offenses [contempt and subornation] are entirely distinct and independent. They are created upon different principles, for different purposes, are tried and punished differently, and a conviction or acquittal of one is no bar in a prosecution for the other.
Ill Tenn. at 382-383, 77 S.W. at 1077.
Next, the Court of Criminal Appeals cites Osborn v. State, 160 Tenn. 599, 28 S.W.2d 49 (1930). There the defendant, a juror in a prior case, was convicted of bribery and was subsequently prosecuted for contempt of court based upon the same occurrence. The late Chief Justice Green, after holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for bribery and contempt, stated:
. [A] double punishment for the same offense is contrary to the spirit of our laws. Since he has been convicted of the felony, we suggest that the Attorney-General dismiss the contempt proceedings.
160 Tenn. at 602, 28 S.W.2d at 49.
Next, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Underwood v. State, 187 Tenn. 530, 216 S.W.2d 26 (1948). There the Court held that, where a defendant violated an injunction against violating the liquor laws, *208he was liable both for criminal prosecution for violation of the liquor laws and for contempt for violating the Court’s order. The Court reasoned:
When one is enjoined from committing certain illegal acts a commission of these acts subjects the offender to a criminal prosecution and a prosecution for contempt for violating the court order. This is not in effect double punishment. One is a punishment for violating a law while the other is for violating a court order. A court mandate or order would be a nullity if the violator could say I have paid a fine for a criminal violation and am, therefore, not subject to the order of the court.
187 Tenn. at 531-532, 216 S.W.2d at 26-27.
See also Barrowman v. State, 214 Tenn. 408, 381 S.W.2d 251 (1964) (following Underwood ).
These cases are indeed supportive of the conclusion reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. All are bottomed upon the premise that two separate and distinct offenses are involved. This predicate must be examined in the light of more recent cases.
I start my analysis with the Colombo series of cases.
Colombo was called before a Kings County, New York, grand jury and refused to answer questions. He was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt and punished accordingly. He was subsequently indicted for criminal contempt for the same failure to testify. The New York Appellate Court reversed the trial judge’s determination that double jeopardy precluded the prosecution under the indictment. People v. Colombo, 25 N.Y.2d 641, 306 N.Y.S.2d 258, 254 N.E.2d 340 (1969).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration. Colombo v. New York, 400 U.S. 16, 91 S.Ct. 99, 27 L.Ed.2d 16 (1970). On remand the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier decision, reasoning that the first citation was for civil contempt whereas the indictment charged the commission of a criminal offense.
The Supreme Court again granted certio-rari and in Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9, 92 S.Ct. 756, 30 L.Ed.2d 762 (1972), vacated the judgment below, held that the contempt was criminal in character, and, without determining the double jeopardy question, remanded to the New York Court of Appeals for the purpose of considering this issue.
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that the two convictions could not stand together basing its reasoning on the “same evidence” and “same elements” tests:
The same evidence provides the Judiciary Law contempt for which defendant was previously punished and the Penal Law contempt charged in the indictment, and the elements of the two contempt charges are the same. (Emphasis supplied). People v. Colombo, 31 N.Y.2d 947, 341 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98, 293 N.E.2d 247, 247 (1972).
The Court of Criminal Appeals attempts to walk around Colombo by saying that “[tjhere is no diversity of offenses present in Colombo" but that here “[t]he indictment and conviction ... for perjury is a separate and distinct offense.”
But are they? The evidence and the elements are precisely the same. To prove the criminal contempt, perjury must be established. To prove the perjury, perjury must be established. No additional fact is necessary to either proof. The fact that it violated two separate statutes is of no significance.
In our recent case of State v. Black, 524 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.1975), we did not expressly adopt the “same evidence” test; but the majority relied heavily upon Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), which is bottomed on the “same evidence” or “same elements” tests, which are essentially identical:
‘Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there *209are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not’ 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. (Emphasis supplied.) Quoted in 524 S.W.2d at 919.
The instant ease flunks the Blockburger test, for neither the contempt nor the perjury conviction requires proof that the other does not.
The criteria of Black were summarized by Judge Daughtrey, writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals in Greer v. State, 539 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn.Cr.App.1976):
(1) whether the episode or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions; (2) whether either of the offenses is a necessarily included offense of the other; (3) whether each of the offenses requires proof of a different element; and (4) whether each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. [Citation omitted.] A distillation of these factors produces essentially the ‘same evidence’ standard. 539 S.W.2d at 858.
Of course, the act in question here clearly violated at least two separate and distinct statutes: contempt, T.C.A. § 23-902(4), and perjury, T.C.A. § 39-3301. This is the factor which has dominated prior decisions permitting both offenses to stand together.
Neither offense is a lesser included offense within the other.
The final two factors, however, support the Defendant’s position. The contempt statute and the perjury statute do not have distinct elements for purposes of this case.
It is clear from Black and Blockburger that the last two criteria — differing elements and additional facts — are the controlling considerations. See also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), for further discussion of the issue of double jeopardy.
I think it evident that the clear trend of modern decisional law against dual convictions for what is essentially a single, indivisible act, as evidenced by the rationale of Black, Blockburger and Colombo, forces a re-evaluation of Ricketts and Underwood. I would hold that the criminal prosecution of the petitioner for perjury, following his conviction for criminal contempt, is barred by the double jeopardy provisions of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Tennessee and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
II.
There is yet another, and equally substantial, reason for reversing petitioner’s conviction.
It is fundamental to a conviction for perjury that the false swearing be to a material fact. The statute (§ 39-3301) so commands; our case law so requires. State v. Bowlus, 50 Tenn. 29 (1870).
On March 7,1977, we released our opinion in Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, holding (1) that Sec. 36-804, T.C.A., deals only with venue of divorce actions and not jurisdiction; and (2) that venue may be waived.3
It is evident that the Chancery Court at Maynardsville had jurisdiction to entertain a divorce action. By filing an answer and submitting herself to the personal jurisdiction of the court, petitioner’s wife waived venue. Because the court had both subject matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction, the residence of the parties had no materiality. It, therefore, follows that petitioner did not swear falsely “touching a matter material to the point in question” and his conviction for perjury may not stand.
I would reverse and dismiss.

. Advice of counsel is no defense to a criminal contempt, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment. Robinson v. Air Draulics Engineering Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 377 S.W.2d 908 (1964).

. See Shiflet v. State, 217 Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542 (1966); McCraw v. Adcox, 217 Tenn. 591, 399 S.W.2d 753 (1966); Gunn v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 201 Tenn. 38, 296 S.W.2d 843 (1956).

. I did not participate in Kane v. Kane and have grave reservations about the conclusions reached. It reinstates a practice long condemned by the bench and bar. However, it is currently the law in Tennessee.