Court Opinion

ID: 2964928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:05.543402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:03.358552
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                       ________

        No. 97-1289

                  AMERICAN BOARD OF PSYCHIATRY AND NEUROLOGY, INC.,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                             GLORIA JOHNSON-POWELL, M.D.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                  [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr. U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                     Campbell and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                                 ____________________

            Roibin  J.  Ryan with  whom  Christopher  B. Sullivan,  Kirkland &
            ________________             ________________________   __________
        Ellis, Richard S.  Nicholson, and Cooke,  Clancy & Gruenthal,  L.L.P.,
        _____  _____________________      ___________________________________
        were on brief for appellant.
            Alice E. Richmond,  with whom Ann Pauly and Richmond, Pauly & Ault
            _________________             _________     ______________________
        LLP, were on brief for appellee.
        ___

                                 ____________________

                                   OCTOBER 23, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff American
                                ____________________

            Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. ("ABPN") appeals from

            the  district court's denial  of a preliminary  injunction to

            order Dr. Gloria Johnson-Powell to desist from infringing its

            certification  mark.  ABPN had alleged  in its complaint that

            Dr. Johnson-Powell had  falsely claimed, both under  oath and

            on  her curriculum  vitae, that  she  was ABPN-certified,  in

            violation  of   the  Trademark  Act  of  1946,  15  U.S.C.   

            1114(1)(a)-(b)  (the  "Lanham  Act").    While  seemingly  in

            agreement that  Dr.  Johnson-Powell had,  in fact,  committed

            such  infringements,  the  court  denied  relief  because  it

            believed she  was unlikely to  infringe in the future.   ABPN

            asserts on appeal  that the district court  erred in refusing

            to grant  a the  preliminary injunction.   While the  case is

            close, we cannot say that the district court acted beyond its

            discretion; hence we affirm.

                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                      The facts are  largely undisputed.  ABPN is  a non-

            profit Illinois corporation that certifies psychiatrists  and

            neurologists  as  specialists qualified  in  their respective

            fields.1   ABPN secured and  owns a federal  registration for

            the mark:  "The American Board of Psychiatry  and Neurology."

                                
            ____________________

            1.  ABPN certification is optional and is distinct from state
            licensure.

                                         -2-

            ABPN authorizes physicians  to use its mark if  they have met

            ABPN's  requirements  and  received  an ABPN  certificate  or

            license to use the mark.

                      Dr.  Johnson-Powell is  a  prominent physician  and

            psychiatrist who has often testified as an expert  witness in

            court.   Although Dr. Johnson-Powell  is not certified by the

            ABPN,  she claimed under  oath on several  occasions that she

            was  ABPN-certified.    Dr. Johnson-Powell  first  made  such

            statements  at a  deposition and  during  trial testimony  in

            1991.  In  1993, after Dr. Johnson-Powell said  she was ABPN-

            certified   in  a   deposition,   a  lawyer   challenged  her

            certification status at  trial.  She proclaimed  ignorance of

            whether  she  was actually  certified.    In 1995  she  again

            misstated  her  status  at  a  deposition  and  during  trial

            testimony.  In  addition to her sworn testimony, Dr. Johnson-

            Powell also distributed  a resume on which she  claimed to be

            certified and even included a purported certification number.

                      ABPN   first   learned  of   Dr.   Johnson-Powell's

            assertions in November of 1995.  ABPN wrote to her, inquiring

            about her  actions.   She replied that  a clerical  error had

            caused the inadvertent inclusion of a certification number on

            her resume and that she had remedied the error.

                      ABPN  brought  this  suit  for  certification  mark

            infringement  on December  17,  1996  in  the  United  States

            District  Court  for  the  District  of  Massachusetts.    On

                                         -3-

            December  30, the court granted a temporary restraining order

            ex parte against  Dr. Johnson-Powell.  On January  23 and 24,

            1997, both parties attended a preliminary injunction hearing.

            ABPN  presented  documentary   evidence  and  testimony;  Dr.

            Johnson-Powell, who did  not personally appear,  tendered her

            affidavit  promising not to repeat her infringing conduct and

            attaching a redacted resume that did not  include a reference

            to ABPN  certification.  She  also asserted that she  has not

            seen  patients  nor provided  expert  witness  services since

            1995.

                      Upon completion of the hearing, the district  court

            denied  ABPN's request  for a  preliminary  injunction.   The

            court  reasoned  that,  although ABPN  demonstrated  a strong

            likelihood that it would prevail on the merits, it had failed

            to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm in

            the near future.  ABPN brings this  interlocutory appeal from

            the   district  court's  order  denying  its  request  for  a

            preliminary injunction.2

                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                      In trademark actions as in others, courts of appeal

            will  reverse  a  district court's  denial  of  a preliminary

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Our  appellate  jurisdiction  rests  upon   28  U.S.C.   
            1292(a)(1), which provides for  appeals from "[i]nterlocutory
            orders  of the  district  courts . . . granting,  continuing,
            modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions."  Id.
                                                             ___

                                         -4-

            injunction  only if the district court abused its discretion.

            See Camel  Hair & Cashmere  Inst. of Am., Inc.  v. Associated
            ___ __________________________________________     __________

            Dry Goods  Corp., 799 F.2d  6, 12-13 (1st Cir.  1986) (citing
            ________________

            Planned  Parenthood League  of Mass.  v.  Bellotti, 641  F.2d
            ____________________________________      ________

            1006, 1009  (1st Cir.  1981)).    Application of  an improper

            legal standard, however,  is never within a  district court's

            discretion.   See Camel Hair, 799  F.2d at 13.   Similarly, a
                          ___ __________

            district  court  abuses  its  discretion  if  it  incorrectly

            applies the law to particular facts.  Id.  We review findings
                                                  ___

            of  fact made  as  part  of the  district  court's denial  of

            injunctive  relief under a  clearly erroneous standard.   See
                                                                      ___

            Keds Corp.  v. Renee Int'l  Trading Corp., 888 F.2d  215, 222
            __________     __________________________

            (1st  Cir. 1989).    Absent  clear error  or  other abuse  of

            discretion, we will not reverse a district court's  denial of

            an  injunction merely because we  would have been inclined to

            grant the injunction had we  heard the matter ourselves.  See
                                                                      ___

            Celebrity, Inc. v.  Trina, Inc., 264 F.2d 956,  958 (1st Cir.
            _______________     ___________

            1959).

                                   III.  DISCUSSION

                      As  noted,  ABPN has  registered  its certification

            mark.   A  registered certification  mark  receives the  same

            protection  as  a trademark.    See  15  U.S.C.    1054.    A
                                            ___

            registrant may obtain  an injunction to preserve the value of

            its mark and  to prevent future infringement.   See 15 U.S.C.
                                                            ___

                                         -5-

               1114, 1116.  Here, ABPN sought a preliminary injunction to

            protect its  mark in  the interim  before the  district court

            could finally resolve ABPN's claims for damages and permanent

            injunctive relief.

                      We  have  stated   that  a  district   court,  when

            determining  whether to issue  a preliminary injunction  in a

            trademark  action,   should  weigh  four  factors:   (i)  the

            plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) whether

            the  plaintiff  risks  suffering  irreparable   harm  if  the

            injunction   is  not  granted;   (iii)  whether  such  injury

            outweighs the harm that injunctive relief would cause for the

            defendant;  and (iv)  whether the  public  interest would  be

            adversely  affected  by  granting or  denying  an injunction.

            See Equine Techs., Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d 542,
            ___ ___________________    ____________________

            544 (1st Cir.  1995).  Here, in denying  relief, the district

            court  mentioned two of  these four  factors in  remarks made

            from  the  bench.    It  indicated that  it  found  a  strong

            likelihood of success  on the merits  by noting that:  "[t]he

            indications   are  very  strong   that  there  has   been  an

            infringement  in  the past[,]  so  strong  as to  be  perhaps

            undeniable."     Nevertheless,  in   denying  a   preliminary

            injunction it said it "[did] not think  that there has been a

                                         -6-

            showing  that there is  likely irreputable [sic]  harm in the

            future."3  

                      ABPN asserts that  the district court erred  in two

            respects.  First, it contends  that the district court abused

            its discretion by relying upon an incorrect legal standard to

            determine whether  ABPN would suffer irreparable harm without

            a  preliminary injunction.   Second,  ABPN  asserts that  the

            court clearly erred when it found that Dr. Johnson-Powell was

            not likely to infringe ABPN's mark in the near future.

            1.   Incorrect Legal Standard.
                 ________________________

                      To  support its  argument  that the  district court

            used an incorrect legal standard to assess the likelihood  of

            irreparable harm, ABPN relies on  cases in which we have held

            that a trademark  plaintiff who demonstrates a  likelihood of

            success  on the merits  creates a presumption  of irreparable

            harm.  See,  e.g., Societe des Produits Nestle,  S.A. v. Casa
                   __________  __________________________________    ____

            Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1992); Keds Corp,
            ______________                                     _________

            888 F.2d at  220; Camel  Hair, 799  F.2d at 14-15.   We  have
                              ___________

            declared in cases such as this one, involving literally false

            statements, that "only a slight  likelihood of injury need be
                                     __________________

            shown to warrant injunctive relief."  Camel Hair, 799 F.2d at
                                                  __________

                                
            ____________________

            3.    The court did not expressly balance the relief afforded
            by the injunction against the harm to the defendant; however,
            it said  that it did not "rest  the denial of the preliminary
            injunction on  an assessment  of Dr. Johnson-Powell's  likely
            reaction."    It  made  no  mention  of  the  impact  of  the
            injunction on the public interest.

                                         -7-

            15  (emphasis added).   Reducing  the  standard of  proof for

            irreparable  harm in trademark actions reflects the intent of

              43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.   1125(a), "to encourage

            commercial companies to act as the fabled 'vicarious avenger'

            of consumer rights."  Camel Hair, 799 F.2d at 15.
                                  __________

                      ABPN  argues  that  the district  court  abused its

            discretion   by   requiring   it  to   demonstrate   "likely"

            irreparable  harm and imminent  infringement.  We  agree with

            the district court,  however, that, while certification  mark

            and trademark infringements  may be presumed without  more to

            cause irreparable harm, there is no parallel presumption that

            because  such infringements have  occurred in the  past, they

            will  inevitably  be  continued into  the  future.4   Rather,

            plaintiff  retained   the  ordinary   burden  of   showing  a

            sufficient likelihood that the infringing conduct would occur

            in the  future so as to give rise  to an enjoinable threat of

            irreparable harm.

                      Here,  the  court  determined  that  there  was "no

            prospect  that   there  would   be   [future]  occasions   of

            infringement."  It  is clear from Camel Hair  itself that the
                                              __________

                                
            ____________________

            4.  In   saying  this,  we  do  not  question  that  previous
            infringing  conduct  will  ordinarily  imply      often  very
            strongly     the likelihood  of continued  future violations,
            and  thus may  well  be  persuasive  evidence  of  threatened
            irreparable harm.  We say  merely that such evidence does not
            amount to a  legal presumption; it is proof  that, like other
            factual   evidence,  may  be  rebutted  by  other  facts  and
            circumstances.

                                         -8-

            court made no  legal error in considering whether  or not the

            evidence  as  a   whole  indicated  a  threat   of  continued

            infringement.    One of  the  Camel Hair  defendants  who had
                                          __________

            previously  sold infringing  garments  removed them  from its

            racks prior to  the preliminary injunction hearing.   Against

            that  defendant, we upheld the  district court's denial of an

            interlocutory   injunction,  stating   that  "there   was  no

            likelihood of [that particular  defendant] causing any injury

            to [the plaintiff] at the  time the request for an injunction

            was  being considered."   Camel  Hair, 799  F.2d at 13.   The
                                      ___________

            purpose of interlocutory injunctive relief is to preserve the

            status  quo pending final  relief and to  prevent irreparable

            injury to the plaintiff    not simply to punish past misdeeds

            or set an example.   See CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean  Coast
                                 ___ ____________________    ____________

            Properties,  Inc.,  48   F.3d  618,  620  (1st   Cir.  1995);
            _________________

            Acierno v. New  Castle  County, 40  F.3d  645, 647  (3d  Cir.
            _______    ___________________

            1995).  Absent  likelihood of future infringement,  there can

            be  none of  the  ill  effects that  an  injunction seeks  to

            prevent: no  loss of future  profits, no loss of  goodwill or

            reputation.     Thus,  contrary  to  ABPN's  suggestion,  the

            district  court's   inquiry  into  the  question   of  future

            irreparable injury was proper.

                      ABPN contends that  Camel Hair  commands courts  to
                                          __________

            grant  a preliminary injunction in  a trademark action if the

            plaintiff   demonstrates  even   a  "slight   likelihood"  of

                                         -9-

            irreparable  injury.  The district court's use of "likely" is

            said to have  signaled use  of too high  a standard of  proof

            here.5   But  while  even  a  "slight likelihood"  of  future

            infringement may  well warrant injunctive  relief, we  cannot

            say  that  a  district  judge's  discretion  to  withhold  an

            injunction turns here  on such nuances  of phraseology.   The

            "slight likelihood" standard  was discussed in Camel  Hair in
                                                           ___________

            reference to  whether the  act of  infringement would  itself

            create  irreparable  harm,   not  to  whether  there   was  a

            likelihood of  infringement in the  future.  As we  have said

            elsewhere, "[b]y  its  very  nature,  trademark  infringement

            results in  irreparable harm  because the  attendant loss  of

            profits,  goodwill, and  reputation cannot  be satisfactorily

            quantified, and, thus, the  trademark owner cannot adequately

            be compensated."  Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A., 982 F.2d
                              _________________________________

            at 640.    Certainly a  court should  grant an  interlocutory

                                
            ____________________

            5.  At one point  the court stated that  "harm isn't presumed
            if it's not certain or if it's certain that they  won't occur
            or not certain that they won't occur."  Presumably, the judge
            meant that he found little likelihood that Dr. Johnson-Powell
            would  infringe  in   the  near  future.    This  reading  is
            buttressed by  the fact that,  in the same breath,  the judge
            analogized this matter  to Camel Hair by noting  that in both
                                       __________
            cases  there was  "no prospect that  there would  be [future]
            occasions of infringement from the defendant."  
                 The judge  also noted, however,  that he did  not "think
            there  [was] a showing  that [the infringing]  behavior [was]
            likely to continue," and stated that the general requirements
            of equity demand  that a plaintiff "show the  likelihood they
            are about  to suffer some  irreparable harm."  He  also found
            that the  relevant question  for the  court was  "whether the
            harm is likely to occur or not."  

                                         -10-

            injunction in  a  trademark case  when  a realistic  risk  of

            future  infringement  (within   the  time   covered  by   the

            injunction)  has been  demonstrated, but  we  cannot say  the

            district court misunderstood this point.

                      To  be sure, there was ample  evidence here of past

            infringing  conduct, not to mention conduct indicative of bad

            faith.   As mentioned in note 4, supra, such evidence, if not
                                             _____

            rebutted, may  give rise to  a strong inference  that further

            infringing acts will occur in the future.  Even so, we cannot

            say that  a  defendant can  never  take actions  and  provide

            assurances  sufficient,  in  the face  of  such  evidence, to

            convince a court that she will not commit future  violations.

            Our system leaves  it primarily in the hands  of the district

            court to ascertain whether the danger of future harm has been

            adequately established so  as to warrant the protection of an

            injunction.  In arguing for a  rule that, in a situation like

            this, injunctive relief  is necessarily required as  a matter

            of law, ABPN points to  our language in Camel Hair  that "the
                                                    __________

            district  court's   finding  that   it   was  probable   that

            defendant's labels were literally  false in itself  warranted

            the grant of the injunction sought."  Camel Hair, 799 F.2d at
                                                  __________

            16.   But in that aspect of Camel Hair,  it is clear that the
                                        __________

                                         -11-

            district judge found,  and that we accepted,  that infringing

            conduct would continue unless enjoined.6

                      We,  therefore,  reject  ABPN's  argument that  the

            court committed legal  error in denying injunctive  relief on
                            _____

            the ground that there was no prospect of future infringement.

            2.   Findings of fact.
                 ________________

                      ABPN's  more potent argument  is that, even  if the

            court used a permissible legal standard to assess irreparable

            harm, the district court clearly erred in its factual finding

            thatDr. Johnson-Powell would not infringe in the near future.

                      ABPN  argues that the  court below should  not have

            credited Dr. Johnson-Powell's claim of voluntary reformation7

            because her conduct did not rise to the level of "irrefutably

            demonstrated, total  reform."   Pic Design  Corp. v. Bearings
                                            _________________    ________

                                
            ____________________

            6.  In Camel  Hair, the  district  court found  "there was  a
                   ___________
            probability  that   further  marketing  of   [the  infringing
            product] would occur if an injunction was not issued."  Camel
                                                                    _____
            Hair, 799 F.2d  at 9; see also  Keds Corp., 888  F.2d at  217
            ____                  ___ ____  __________
            (noting  that defendant  had  refused  to  stop  selling  its
            remaining inventory  of the infringing product);  Donoghue v.
                                                              ________
            IBC/USA  (Publications),  Inc.,  886 F.  Supp.  947,  953 (D.
            ______________________________
            Mass.),  aff'd, 70  F.3d  206 (1st  Cir.  1995) (noting  that
                     _____
            defendant continued its infringing activity).

            7.  Dr.  Johnson-Powell  filed  an affidavit,  in  which  she
            asserted, inter  alia, that:  (1) she  has not  seen patients
                      _____  ____
            since 1995; (2) she has not  circulated her infringing resume
            since  1995;   (3)  the  false   claim  on  her   resume  was
            inadvertent; (4) she  tried to locate and destroy  all copies
            of her misleading resume; (5) she has not served as an expert
            witness, nor assisted an expert  witness, since 1995; and (6)
            she will not claim to be Board certified in the future.  

                                         -12-

            Specialty Co., 436  F.2d 804, 809 (1st Cir.  1971).  We think
            _____________

            ABPN reads Pic Design out of context.
                       __________

                      In Pic Design,  we limited an earlier  statement in
                         __________

            Electronics Corp.  of Am.  v. Honeywell,  Inc., 428  F.2d 191
            _________________________     ________________

            (1st Cir.  1970).  In that  earlier case, we stated  in dicta

            that  "[w]e might  accept  the  principle that  so  far as  a

            preliminary injunction  is concerned,  . . . voluntary reform

            will always suffice."   Id. at 195 (emphasis added).   In Pic
                 ______             ___                               ___

            Design,  we modified  our  statement  in  Honeywell  so  that
            ______                                    _________

            voluntary  reform will always  suffice to  prevent injunctive
                                   ___________________________

            relief  only  if  it  is  "irrefutably  demonstrated,   total

            reform."  Pic Design,  436 F.2d at 809.  It  does not follow,
                      __________

            however, that a district court may, in its discretion, credit

            a claim of reform only  if it meets the Pic Design  standard.
                                                    __________

            Our affirmance  of an  injunction in  that case  demonstrated

            only that a court does  not necessarily abuse its  discretion

            by  granting an  injunction  when  the  nonmoving  party  has

            voluntarily  abated its infringing activity.  Whether a court

            goes  too far  in denying  an  injunction in  the absence  of

            something less than total reform is a fact-specific matter.

                      ABPN argues that  the record contains  insufficient

            evidence  for a  court to  conclude  that Dr.  Johnson-Powell

            would not  engage in infringing  conduct in the  near future.

            As ABPN correctly  notes, our decision to affirm the district

            court's  denial of  injunctive  relief  against  one  of  the

                                         -13-

            defendants in  Camel Hair rested  upon the good faith  of the
                           __________

            infringer and the infringer's rapid and credible cessation of

            its infringing  activities.  See Camel Hair, 799  F.2d at 13.
                                         ___ __________

            ABPN argues that Dr. Johnson-Powell has not displayed similar

            good  faith and  that  she is  extremely  likely to  infringe

            again.

                      We   must  agree   that   the   evidence  of   past

            infringement  is  very  strong.   The  district  court itself

            remarked  that  the  evidence  of Dr.  Johnson-Powell's  past

            infringement was  "so strong  as to  be perhaps  undeniable."

            The district court  also thought her affidavit  was "probably

            not true," apparently in respect to the claimed "inadvertence

            of the error  on the resume."   It can also be  inferred from

            the  record that Dr. Johnson-Powell violated past promises to

            reform her  conduct.   Moreover, Dr.  Johnson-Powell did  not

            proffer  her affidavit until  after the  court had  entered a

            temporary restraining order, timing argued by ABPN to suggest

            a  lack of sincerity.  Clearly, Dr. Johnson-Powell's behavior

            does not  rise to the  level of reformation displayed  by the

            defendant  in Camel  Hair; on  this record,  the court  could
                          ___________

            undoubtedly have issued preliminary  injunctive relief had it

            been so  inclined.  Our  review, however, is for  clear error

            and  for abuse of  discretion.  See  Keds Corp., 888  F.2d at
                                            ___  __________

            222.  We cannot say these standards were reached here.

                                         -14-

                      Despite its  skepticism about  some aspects  of Dr.

            Johnson-Powell's  affidavit,  the  district  court  plausibly

            found  that  the  character  of  Dr.   Johnson-Powell's  past

            misstatements   rendered   the   possibility   of   recurring

            infringement  remote.    Serving as  a  courtroom  expert and

            disseminating a resume, Dr.  Johnson-Powell's two methods  of

            infringement, are "not like someone offering goods for sale,"

            which could  occur at any  time.   In support of  the court's

            determination was Dr.  Johnson-Powell's affidavit of  January

            8, 1997,  filed with  the court by  her attorneys  and signed

            under penalty  of perjury, in  which she stated that,  in the

            future,  she  has "no  intention  to and  will  not represent

            [herself]  as  being  certified  by  The  American  Board  of

            Psychiatry  and  Neurology   and  will  not  engage   in  any

            unauthorized  use of the registered certification mark of The

            American  Board of  Psychiatry  and  Neurology."    She  also

            indicated  that she  no  longer engages  in  the business  of

            testifying as an  expert witness.   Along with the  affidavit

            was a copy of her  curriculum vitae which no longer contained

            her claim of certification.  Her attorneys, moreover, offered

            to stipulate in writing that, "from this date forward, Gloria

            Johnson-Powell will not represent  herself as being certified

            by [ABPN] and will not engage in any unauthorized use of  the

            registered certification mark." 

                                         -15-

                      The district  court retains jurisdiction  over this

            matter pending final  determination of the action  brought by

            ABPN.      Dr.   Johnson-Powell   and   her   attorneys   are

            unquestionably aware  that any violation  during that  period

            would constitute a serious breach of faith with the court and

            would erode  any hopes defendant  may continue to have  for a

            successful outcome.  ABPN, moreover,  will still  be able  to

            request  final injunctive relief.  District courts are better

            positioned than  ourselves to  observe the  nuances of  these

            matters.   Viewing all the evidence available to the district

            court and the posture of  this appeal through the deferential

            lens of the applicable standard of review, we cannot say that

            the  district court  clearly erred  or  otherwise abused  its

            discretion  in concluding that the defendant will not further

            infringe  ABPN's mark  in the  future period  during  which a

            preliminary injunction would operate.

                      Affirmed. 
                      ________

                                         -16-