Court Opinion

ID: 9646872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:14:13.749475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:14.437631
License: Public Domain

HOLSTEIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion reaches the remarkable conclusion that the word “fees” used in Missouri Constitution article X, § 22(a) does not mean “fees.” In reaching that conclusion, it leaps across the primary principles for determining the meaning of constitutional language and relies on secondary rules of construction and “legislative history” to support its result. The majority seeks to avoid direct precedent construing the same constitutional provision now at issue, declaring both the rationale and result of that precedent to have been overruled previously. More importantly, the majority nullifies the express intent of the voters who adopted the provision.
The pertinent provisions of article X, § 22(a) state:
Counties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited from levying any tax, license or fees not authorized by law ... or from increasing the current levy of an existing tax, license or fees, above that current levy authorized by law ... without the approval of the required majority of the qualified voters of that county or other political subdivision voting thereon.
The majority undertakes to construe § 22(a) by “looking at words in the context *306of both the particular provision in which they are located and the entire amendment in which the provision is located.” The majority cites Boone Co. Court v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. banc 1982), and McDermott v. Nations, 580 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. banc 1979), as authority for its rule of construction. Those precise words, or words approximating those words, are not found in Boone Co. Court. McDermott supports the notion that the meaning of a word is explained by the context in which it occurs. However, neither McDermott nor Boone Co. Court go so far as to say that the rule regarding contextual construction would deprive a word in the Constitution of any known dictionary meaning. Strangely, the majority overlooks the more fundamental principles in Boone Co. Court regarding the meaning of words in the Constitution. Indeed, it is puzzling that the majority relies on that case at all.
In Boone Co. Court the Court articulated the general rules applicable to construction of the Constitution. The Court noted that the same rules applicable to construction of statutes are applicable to construction of the Constitution, except the Constitution is construed more broadly due to its more permanent character. Here the majority construes the term “fees” so narrowly that it has no comprehensible, independent meaning. In Boone Co. Court, this Court stated that the first rule in determining the meaning of a constitutional provision is to ascribe to words the meaning that the people understood them to have meant when the provision was adopted. The meaning conveyed to voters is presumptively equated with the ordinary and usual meaning which is, in turn, derived from the dictionary. Boone Co. Court, 631 S.W.2d at 324. By contrast, the majority here makes no attempt to examine the word “fees” to give it the commonly understood, dictionary meaning.
Boone Co. Court also noted other rules of construction. For example, grammatical order and selection of associated words is also indicative of the natural significance of the words employed and due regard is given to the primary objectives of the provision “as viewed in harmony with all related provisions.” These rules are resorted to where a word is ambiguous or where two provisions are apparently at odds and in need of “harmony.” When harmonizing constitutional provisions, the Court is to render every word operative so as to give effect to the whole. State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, 332 Mo. 1229, 61 S.W.2d 750, 755 (banc 1933). Where related provisions and associated words are not in conflict there is no necessity to harmonize them. State ex rel. Martin v. City of Independence, 518 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo.1974).
In this case the majority has failed to point out in what way the word “fees” is ambiguous. The majority opinion does not find the word “fees” to be confusing. Instead, it finds other words and phrases associated with “fees” to be imprecise or confusing. Rather than “fees” explaining the less precise words with which it is associated, the majority uses those imprecise words to obfuscate the plain meaning of the word “fees.” Indeed, the majority uses that as justification to empty the word “fees” of any meaning and redefine it as “taxes.” That definition is foreign to any dictionary meaning of the word. To give the word “fees” the same meaning as the word “taxes” requires engaging in the sub-leties of a logical exercise not comprehensible to persons of ordinary understanding. If the words “taxes,” “licenses” and “fees” were intended to have the same meaning, the use of only one of them would have sufficed and the others would have been surplusage included for no reason at all. Such a construction is not favored. Boone Co. Court v. State, 631 S.W.2d at 325; Rathjen v. Reorganized School Dist. R-II of Shelby Co., 365 Mo. 518, 284 S.W.2d 516, 523 (banc 1955).
Some other well established principles transcend mere rules of construction. The rules of construction are not to be resorted to where a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous. E.B. Jones Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 298 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Mo.1957). Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties or for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of *307meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research; but they are instruments of a practical nature to be given a common sense construction. State v. Adkins, 284 Mo. 680, 225 S.W. 981, 984 (Mo.1920); J. Story on the Constitution, vol. 1, § 451, p. 345 (5th ed. 1891). The meaning apparent on the face of the constitution is controlling and no forced or unnatural construction is permissible. Wenzlaff v. Lawton, 653 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Mo. banc 1983); State ex rel. Heimberger v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 268 Mo. 598, 188 S.W. 128 (banc 1916). In sum, courts are not to rummage among the canons of construction in order to create ambiguity and confusion where none exists. The majority avoids these first principles applicable in determining the meaning of words found in the Constitution.
The majority argues that the use of the word “levying” is confusing when used in conjunction with the word “fees” because, in ordinary usage, taxes are levied, while a fee is charged. The argument is flawed.
The notion that “fees are not levied” is an exercise in wishful thinking. Since before the adoption of the United States Constitution, the word “levy” has been used in conjunction with words other than “taxes” in a state constitution to prohibit raising revenue without approval of the people.1 Case law is rich with examples in which “fees” were “levied.” See e.g. Carpenter v. King, 679 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Mo. banc 1984); Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School District, 548 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Mo. banc 1977); Automobile Club of Missouri v. City of St. Louis, 334 S.W.2d 355, 362 (Mo.1960); Fetter v. City of Richmond, 346 Mo. 431, 142 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Mo.1940); Ploch v. City of St. Louis, 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S.W.2d 1020, 1023 (Mo. banc 1940); Ward Baking Co. v. City of Ste. Genevieve, 342 Mo. 1011, 119 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Mo.1938); City of Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195, 204 (Mo.1935); Pflueger v. Kinsey, 320 Mo. 82, 6 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Mo. banc 1928); Julian v. City of Liberty, 427 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Mo.App.1968). While this list exclusively consists of Missouri cases, numerous examples could be cited from other jurisdictions.
The dictionary meaning of the verb “levy,” relied on by the majority, includes “to impose or collect ... to exact or require.” Among the meanings of the noun “levy” is “an assessment ... an amount levied.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1301 (unabr. ed. 1966). Similarly, the verb “charge” in the present context means “to impose a pecuniary burden on.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 377. Thus, “levying” a fee and “charging” a fee are synonymous. Both mean nothing more complex than imposing a fee. Common sense and the context of § 22(a) dictate that those meanings of the word “levying” and “levy” are applicable here. The ambulance district, by imposing or exacting fees without voter approval, is “levying” fees in violation of the Constitution. The adoption of the narrow and strained definition of “levying” relied on by the majority not only has the effect of creating ambiguity where none exists, but worse, it excises the word “fees” from the Constitution. As previously noted, each word must be rendered operative so as to give effect to the whole provision under consideration. The majority’s example of “the batter flew out” bears no resemblance to the clear and plain meaning of the words as used in the context of § 22(a), and simply illustrates the contrivance required to circumvent the meaning.
The majority also fails to follow direct precedent. In Roberts v. McNary, 636 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. banc 1982), this Court enjoined the collection of increased fees for numerous county services provided by St. Louis County, including parks and building inspections. This Court applied the “ordinary and customary meaning” standard and, resorting to a standard dictionary, defined “fees” as “A fixed charge for admission; a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services; a *308charge fixed by law for services of a public officer.” Id. at 335.
The Roberts court found no need to resort to the rules of construction beyond the plain and ordinary meaning.
Reading the words examined here [of § 22(a)] for their ordinary and customary meanings, they present a sweeping list of the types of pecuniary charges a government makes. Quite simply, this exhibits an intent to control any such charges to the extent that the voters must approve any increase in them.
Id. at 336.
Roberts also considered the argument that “user” fees are not germane to the purposes of the Hancock Amendment. The Court noted that the purpose of the amendment is to limit government taxes and expenditures. The Court concluded that a restriction on fees was connected to that purpose. Id. at 337.
The majority’s claim that Roberts has been overruled sub silentio2 by certain cases is not accurate. The cases relied on by the majority are anything but silent regarding Roberts. Zahner v. City ofPerryville, 813 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. banc 1991), cited Roberts with approval in defining “fees” and concluded that the dictionary definition of “fees” did not include special assessments charged for street improvements to abutting landowners because those owners were not provided with a “privilege” or “service.” 813 S.W.2d at 858. In Tax Increment Finance Comm’n v. J.E. Dunn Construction Co., 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. banc 1989), this Court addressed the issue of whether payments in lieu of abated taxes (PILOTS) on property in blighted areas that had been redeveloped were taxes. This Court again relied on Roberts for its dictionary definition of “taxes.” In concluding that PILOTS were not taxes, but special assessments for improvements on the owners’ property at public expense, this Court cited Roberts with approval and noted that the word “ ‘tax’ bears a more narrow meaning than ‘tax, license and fees.’ ” Id. at 76-77. Pace v. City of Hannibal, 680 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. banc 1984), also relied on Roberts. In that case the city utility board had made voluntary payments into the city general revenue, said to be made “in lieu of franchise tax.” The Court noted no similarity between the user fees in Roberts and the voluntary payments. The Court concluded that holding the voluntary payment to be a license, tax or fee would enlarge upon the plain language of article X, § 22(a), contrary to the teaching of Roberts. Id. at 948. The final case relied on, Oswald v. City of Blue Springs, 635 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. banc 1982), made no mention of Roberts and with good reason. There, while the plaintiff claimed that a city rate increase for water and sewer service had not been approved by voters, the plaintiff’s petition admitted that the voters of the city had approved a revenue bond proposal authorizing the city to raise water and sewer rates to pay the bonds. Because the bond issue had been submitted to and approved by voters, the Court found it unnecessary to determine “... whether the rates charged for water and sewerage services constitute[d] a tax, license or fee.” Id. at 333. The necessary voter approval was found to have occurred.
If the majority chooses to overrule Roberts it is far preferable to do so by the front door of reason rather than the amorphous back door of sub silentio. Is there a flaw in the rationale of Roberts? Is the plain meaning of words no longer the standard by which we judge the meaning of words in the Constitution? If so, call the error by name and cut it out. But if there is no error in reasoning, the Court should stand on its precedent.
The majority finds that user fees, characterized as “true user fees,” are not related to the Hancock Amendment’s purpose. The majority finds no purpose to limit local expenditures or revenues, only to limit local taxes. That innovative concept is inconsistent with the repeated prior declarations of this Court, that the purpose of the Hancock Amendment was to limit taxes by *309establishing tax limits and revenue limits and expenditure limits for the state and other political subdivisions. Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. banc 1983); Roberts, 636 S.W.2d at 337; Boone Co. Court, 631 S.W.2d at 325; Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Mo. banc 1981). By limiting tax, fee and license increases it naturally follows that the revenue of political subdivisions will be limited. By limiting revenues, expenditures are necessarily limited. The case precedent is uniform in declaring that limiting state and local spending is one purpose of the Hancock Amendment. Is the majority intending to overrule that aspect of Buechner, Boone Co. Court and Buchanan, as well as Roberts? If so, it is better to do so directly.
Also puzzling is the majority’s finding that the words “fees,” as used in article X, § 17(1), has a different meaning than the same word used in article X, § 22(a). The majority bases this conclusion on its reading of article X, § 16. That reading is apparently inspired by a footnote in a law review article and the so-called “Drafters’ Notes” of the Hancock Amendment. The “Drafters’ Notes” are not part of this record.
The “Drafters’ Notes” could not have been circulated among those who signed the initiative petition because those notes were dated months after the initiative petition had been circulated and submitted to the Secretary of State to be placed on the ballot. There is nothing to suggest that the “Drafters’ Notes” were ever communicated to the voters. The notes were not part of the ballot title. The particular note relied on by the majority admits that it was written “in retrospect.” Drafters’ Notes, p. 72.
Even if one considers the “Drafters’ Notes” as authoritative, they create as much ambiguity as they resolve. At the beginning of the notes, referring to article X, § 16, the drafters state:
[T]he objective, purposes and intent of the drafters ... [is] to place specifically defined limitations on both state and local governmental units ...
It is also clear from the remaining sections that “limitations specified herein” means tax and revenue levels existing at the effective dates of the Amendment.
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In essence, the drafters’ intent was to place the total dollar size of Missouri’s public sector under direct democracy.... Drafters’ notes pp. 63-64. If the drafters’ essential intent was to limit “tax and revenue levels” and restrict the “total dollar size” of the public sector, certainly restraints on local government fees and licenses advances that purpose.
In a footnote to a law review article, the decision in Roberts was roundly criticized for failing to give adequate consideration to “legislative history and rules of statutory construction.” R. Thomas, The Hancock Amendment: The Limits on Local Governments, 52 UMKC L.Rev. 22, 31-32, n. 28 (1983). As previously noted, the majority seems to adopt the footnote’s rationale. The article, like the majority opinion, fails to identify the ambiguity in the word “fees” that justifies resort to rules of construction or “legislative history.”3
Among the arguments raised in the law review article is the claim that § 16 does not place limits on local government other than limits on increased taxes and, since § 22(a) implements § 16, “fees” has a very limited meaning. The flaw in the argument is the assumption that § 16 clearly does not place limits on local government other than limits on taxes. If ambiguity exists it is not found in § 22(a) but in § 16. Section 16 states, “Property taxes and other local taxes and state taxation and spending may not be increased” except as provided in the Constitution. Whether “spending” relates only to the state or applies to both state and local government, is not clear. That ambiguity is made clear by § 22(a), which forbids increases in taxes, licenses or fees by political subdivisions without voter approval. Applying standard rules of statutory construction, the specific *310provisions of § 22(a) prevail over the general provisions of § 16. State ex rel. Osborne v. Goeke, 806 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 1991). Other arguments posed in the law review article are disingenuous efforts to avoid the plain meaning of the words in the Constitution. It is highly unlikely the voters engaged in the erudite gymnastics necessary to construe § 16 as a limit on the meaning of the word “fees” in § 22(a). The Constitution is not a document belonging to scholars. It is a document of the people.
In the final analysis, the drafters’ intent is irrelevant. The material inquiry is, after all, not what the drafters meant to say, but what the drafters made manifest to the voters and what the voters intended. The ballot title of the Hancock Amendment specifically informed voters that the amendment “prohibits local tax or fee increases without a popular vote.” Roberts, 636 S.W.2d at 336; Buchanan, 615 S.W.2d at 13. The meaning apparent on the face of the amendment is controlling, and no forced or unnatural construction is permissible. Wenzlaff, 653 S.W.2d at 216; Buechner, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. banc 1983).
The majority states that the Hancock Amendment does not prohibit shifting the burden of public services to users and leaves user fees to those elected to run political subdivisions. As a matter of policy, that is certainly attractive. But that is not what the voters said when they adopted the Hancock Amendment. Without restriction, they prohibited increases in fees by political subdivisions without voter approval.
In addition, requiring voter approval of user fees is not necessarily a bad policy. The facts in this case are a stark example of how onerous unrestrained user fees can be. The trial court found and the record reflects that when the fee increases at issue were adopted, the ambulance district was in the best financial condition of its history. In an ill disguised display of bureaucratic avarice, user fees were increased one hundred percent. The board unjustifiably contended the fee increases were necessary to put the district on a “profitable” basis, to improve services and to maximize payments from private insurance and public medical coverage providers. To the contrary, the trial court found no proven need to increase fees to maintain the service. This case is a remarkable example of the type of governmental action by a “political subdivision” which the Hancock Amendment is designed to curb. To suggest otherwise defies logic and thwarts the will of the people.
The voters, by adopting restrictions on fees, may well have been concerned about the symbiotic relationship that exists between the board of a political subdivision and the staff of a political subdivision. That relationship makes it difficult for board members to resist the entreaties of the staff to increase fees. That is particularly true in cases like this, where the burden of fee increases will fall on relatively few or on private or public insurance programs and may go unnoticed by the majority of the voters. In this case the only ones who suffer the direct impact of increased user fees are the truly unfortunate few who need ambulance services but are covered by neither public nor private health insurance. It is reasonablé to believe the voters who adopted the Hancock Amendment intended to prevent self-serving public boards and self-serving public employees of tax supported entities from increasing fees in such a way as to place critical services beyond the reach of persons of ordinary means.
The majority has rejected the plain meaning of the word “fees” and adopted a litany of criteria, no one of which is controlling, to assist in distinguishing “true” fees from taxes that are only “nominal” fees. By footnote, the majority assures continued uncertainty and expensive, protracted litigation as political subdivisions and taxpayers struggle to sort out prohibited fees from unprohibited fees. If a charge meets one or two of the criteria to be characterized as a tax, but not the others, is it a tax or a fee? The majority does not say. By failing to clearly define “fees,” the majority has created a moving target. The subleties and nuances that distinguish “true” *311fees from “nominal” fees will give rise to repeated lawsuits, perhaps allowing different courts to reach different results under similar facts.
Curiously, the majority has failed to analyze this case by its criteria found in footnote 10 of its opinion. The inclusion of the fifth criterion is especially odd. That criterion has nothing to do with whether the charge more closely resembles a tax or a fee. Instead, it would characterize a charge that is related to an activity that is historically and exclusively governmental as a tax. What are these activities? Certainly public health and safety, education, parks and roads are traditionally and exclusively governmental activities. Ambulance service is a critical aspect of public health and safety and is at least as essential as police and fire protection. Since 1975, ambulance service in Marion County and most of rural Missouri has been “historically and exclusively” performed by government. At least two, and perhaps more, of the majority’s criteria have been met, indicating this increase is subject to the Hancock Amendment.
The majority admits that the Hancock Amendment prohibits some revenue increases by political subdivisions without voter approval. Article X, § 22(a) describes those that are prohibited with specificity, i.e., taxes, licenses and fees. To deny those words their ordinary meaning is to thwart the intent and will of the people from whom all constitutional authority is derived. Judges are not philosopher kings, free to do what we consider good and wise. We are servants of a sovereign people, restrained by a Constitution of the people’s making. To nullify a vital word endangers the entire constitutional fabric upon which we all rely.
Notwithstanding my high regard for the opinion of my fellow judges, I dissent. I would affirm the trial court in sustaining the plaintiffs’ challenges to the increased fees.

. "No subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties ought to be established, fixed, laid; or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people_” Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXI.

. Sub silentio is defined as "without notice being taken or without making a particular point of the matter in question.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2279.

. Constitutional provisions originated by initiative petition have no legislative history. Presumably the author of the footnote was referring to the “Drafters’ Notes."