Court Opinion

ID: 9479266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:12:57.962052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:54.901689
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur in part in the majority opinion, I dissent from Part III.D.5 because I believe that Johnny Angelo’s perjury— which was compounded by FBI Agent Wiechert’s corroborating testimony and the prosecutor’s misleading statements to the grand jury—coupled with the government’s knowing presentation of an untrustworthy and unreliable witness to the grand jury require dismissal of the indictment against Spillone. I also dissent from Part III.D.7 of the majority opinion because I believe that the cumulative effect of the government’s misconduct requires dismissal of Spillone’s indictment.
I. ANGELO’S TESTIMONY
The majority concludes that the prosecu-torial misconduct concerning Angelo’s testimony before the grand jury was, at best, harmless error which did not warrant dismissal of the indictment against Spillone. I strongly disagree. The government used Angelo as a. grand jury witness even though it knew that he was so untrustworthy and unreliable that the DEA and the FBI,had terminated him as an informant. The majority states that the government has no duty to disclose information to the grand jury regarding the credibility of witnesses. But for the government to bring a witness before the grand jury in an effort to get an indictment returned against Spillone, knowing all the while that the witness is wholly unreliable, goes beyond nondisclosure of evidence regarding the credibility of witnesses. The government’s actions in this regard undermined the fundamental fairness of the grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Howard, 867 F.2d 548, 551-52 (9th Cir.1989) (indictment is subject to dismissal when defendant’s allegations challenge the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceedings).
In addition, Angelo committed perjury before the grand jury by falsely testifying that he did not become a government informant until after his involvement with Spil-lone had ceased. In fact, Angelo had been a paid informant throughout his dealings with Spillone. The government not only knew that Angelo’s testimony was false and failed to disclose that fact to the grand jury, but FBI Agent Wiechert’s testimony compounded Angelo’s perjury by confirming Angelo’s false version of the facts. The harm caused by Angelo’s perjury was further compounded by the prosecutor’s statements to the grand jury that implied that Angelo had not been an informant during his involvement with Spillone. The harm was likewise compounded by the prosecutor’s statement that the government had not made any deals with Angelo, when the government in fact had paid him a high salary as an informant and had assisted him in obtaining good time credit in his state court convictions.
*529We have held that due process is violated when a defendant has to stand trial on an indictment that the government knows is based partially on perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and when jeopardy has not attached. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir.1974). “Whenever the prosecutor learns of any perjury committed before the grand jury, he is under a duty to immediately inform the court and opposing counsel — and, if the perjury may be material, also the grand jury — in order that appropriate action may be taken.” Id. at 785-86. We based our decision in Basurto “on a long line of cases which recognize the existence of a duty of good faith on the part of the prosecutor with respect to the court, the grand jury, and the defendant.” Id. at 786.
In the present case, Angelo’s perjury went to the heart of his testimony and was amplified by the fact that the perjury was corroborated by a government agent and was implicitly confirmed by the prosecutor. Thus, Angelo’s perjury was certainly material in that it cannot be said that the grand jury’s decision to indict was not influenced by the perjury and the accompanying misconduct. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 2374, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (indictment must be dismissed if “ ‘it is established that [prosecutorial misconduct] substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict,’ or if there is ‘grave doubt’ that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations”) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78, 106 S.Ct. 938, 945-46, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
The grand jury stands as a shield between the government and the accused. When the government, in an effort to secure an indictment, knowingly brings a totally unreliable witness before the grand jury, and when that witness perjures himself and the government corroborates that perjury, the whole judicial process is corrupted. Because, in this case, the grand jury’s decision to indict could not help but be substantially influenced by this misconduct, and because the misconduct undermined the fundamental fairness of the grand jury proceedings, Spillone’s indictment should have been dismissed. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S.Ct. at 2374; Howard, 867 F.2d at 551-52.
II. CUMULATIVE EFFECT
During the grand jury proceedings that led to Spillone’s indictment, the government engaged in numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. This misconduct included the government’s failure to comply with its duty to produce exculpatory evidence until ordered to do so by the district court; the cursory manner in which the government obtained the superseding indictment against Spillone, with FBI Agent Wiechert as the sole witness; the government’s misconduct relating to Angelo’s testimony, as discussed above; and, finally, grand jury witness Irving Minster’s perjury before the grand jury, of which the government was aware yet failed to disclose.
It is true that each of these acts of misconduct (other than the misconduct regarding Angelo’s testimony discussed above), standing alone, might not be so severe as to require dismissal of the indictment. However, the cumulative effect of the government’s repeated acts of misconduct precludes a finding of harmless error and requires dismissal of the indictment against Spillone. See United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir.1979) (cumulative effect of government’s “errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operated to the defendants’ prejudice by producing a biased grand jury”).
The many instances of prosecutorial misconduct in this case robbed the grand jury proceedings of their integrity and, taken together, violated Spillone’s due process rights by undermining the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Howard, 867 F.2d at 551-52. In addition, based on the cumulative effect of the various acts of misconduct, it is highly unlikely that the grand jury’s decision to indict Spillone was *530free from the substantial influence of that misconduct. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S.Ct. at 2374.
III. CONCLUSION
The government’s conduct in this case “has placed in jeopardy the integrity of the criminal justice system.” Samango, 607 F.2d at 884. To allow the indictment against Spillone to stand in these circumstances makes a mockery of the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement.