Court Opinion

ID: 9653056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:37:53.225268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.174157
License: Public Domain

CRAHAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. At most, the majority opinion establishes that the briefcase could have caused Plaintiff’s fall. Defem dants concede that much. Whether it did cause or contribute to cause the fall is sheer speculation. Further, assuming arguendo that the briefcase played some role in the fall, Plaintiff failed to make a submissible case of premises liability against St. Luke’s.
The briefcase in question is a rectangular, brown leather soft-sided satchel, sixteen inches long, five inches wide at the base and twelve to fifteen inches high, depending on whether the handles are extended. When filled as it was on the date in question, it weighs six or seven pounds. The Searle representative had placed it adjacent to and at an angle from a partition while she was speaking with an office worker seated at a desk on the other side of the partition. At that location, the hallway formed by the partition and opposite wall is 47.5 inches wide. After conversing for a couple of minutes, she stepped across the hallway into an alcove for more than 15 but less than 30 seconds to check on the office’s supply of samples, leaving the briefcase next to the partition.
The Searle representative never saw Plaintiff until she was falling forward past the doorway to the alcove. The office worker, who was then standing, saw Plaintiff begin to fall when she was about five feet away from her and rushed forward to try to catch her head.
Although it is abundantly clear that the fall occurred in the general vicinity of the briefcase, no one saw or heard Plaintiffs foot come into contact with it. After the fall, the briefcase was still upright and there was no evidence that it had moved. There is no evidence that Plaintiff herself ever told anyone that she had tripped over the briefcase. Her sister testified that Plaintiff was conscious and lucid after the accident and after admission to the hospital but Plaintiff never told her she tripped over the briefcase and her sister never asked her.
Plaintiffs sister testified that after the accident, the Searle representative picked up a briefcase and said she “shouldn’t have left it there.” Although the Searle representative denied making such a statement, we must assume she did so in evaluating the submissi-bility of Plaintiffs case. At best, however, the statement if made could only represent conjecture and surmise because the Searle representative did not see what caused Plaintiff to fall.
Defendants concede that Plaintiff could have tripped over the briefcase. What is missing is any evidence that the briefcase was more probably the cause of her fall than some other cause. Plaintiff was 92 years of age when she fell. Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Eyerman,1 agreed that studies have shown that 30% of people over 65 years of age fall each year, as do 40% of people over 80. Further, Plaintiff had a history of falling. *907Her home health certification plan specifically noted “frequent falls” and a number of specific instances were recounted by her sister and/or her medical records. Dr. Eyer-man further conceded that plaintiffs arthritis could have made her more prone to fall; one of her medications, Lanoxin, could cause a fall; or Plaintiff could have fallen for no reason.
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, Heacox v. Robbins Educational Tours, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 600 (Mo.App.1992), is directly on point. Although it is true that Heacox also involved an issue as to the sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence to establish the angle of the incline as a dangerous condition, the dis-positive issue in that case, as in this case, was proximate cause, as revealed in the following passage:
More important, perhaps, plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing that the degree of the incline caused her to fall, even if the incline were in fact an unreasonable risk to her. The traditional and most often used test for cause is the “but for test”: a defendant’s negligence is a cause of an injury where the injury would not have occurred but for defendant’s negligent conduct. E.g. Delisi v. St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospital, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Mo.App.1985). Defendant’s negligence need not be the sole cause but simply a cause or a contributing cause. To make a prima facie showing of cause, however, the plaintiff must show defendant’s negligent conduct more probably than not was a cause of the injury. Morgan v. Toomey, 719 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Mo.App.1986). Obviously, the fact that plaintiff fell on the pathway does not show the incline of the pathway more probably than not caused her to" fall. It is guesswork where the greater probabilities lie.
The bus driver’s testimony that the incline “would be a steep slope for someone heavy or [for] an elderly lady” does not reasonably imply the incline would cause heavy or old people to fall. The more sensible or, certainly, equally sensible implication is that heavy or old people would find it tiring to walk up the incline. But, a prima facie showing of cause is not made where the operative facts, at best, support two equal inferences, only one of which would make the defendant liable. E.g. Cato v. Modglin, 545 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Mo.App.1976).
Moreover, on direct examination, plaintiff candidly admitted she does not know what caused her to fall “other than ... [the pathway] was ... really steep.” This is not a statement of an operative fact showing cause. Here again, we liberally view the legitimacy of inferences in plaintiffs favor. But, at best, her statement is only a guess as to the cause of her fall. How and why plaintiff fell, on this record, is nothing more than speculation and conjecture, and speculation and conjecture do not constitute a prima facie showing of cause. See e.g. Craddock v. Greenberg Mercantile, 297 S.W.2d 541, 547-548 (Mo.1957).
829 S.W.2d at 603. Likewise in this case, nobody knows what caused Plaintiff to fall. Whether it was the briefcase, dizziness, arthritis, old age, or simply tripping over her own two feet is pure guesswork.2 Such guesswork does not support a finding of proximate cause.3 Accordingly, I would re*908verse the judgment against both Defendants on that basis.
Assuming arguendo that the jury could properly infer that the briefcase caused Plaintiff to fall, I would further hold that Plaintiff failed to establish that either defendant breached any duty of care to Plaintiff by allowing the briefcase to remain unattended in a hallway for a period of 15 to 30 seconds.
As described above, the briefcase in question is a relatively large object. It was sitting in a well-lighted area next to a white wall on a gray carpet. There was ample room to simply walk around it. As Plaintiff proceeded from the waiting room into the office, she walked past an angled partition approximately four feet high. At that point, the partition angled away again to the left (not at a right angle) to form the corridor in which Plaintiff fell. The briefcase was situated several feet down this corridor on the left. From the photographs in evidence, the distance from the angled partition at the beginning of the corridor to the briefcase appears to be three to four feet. Any average person looking where they were walking could easily spot the briefcase and have ample room to adjust their path to the right in time to avoid the briefcase.
Although the more prudent course of action would have been to carry the briefcase into the alcove with her for the few seconds she was in there, the object is sufficiently large and visible that the Searle representative could readily expect that anyone walking down the corridor would see the briefcase and simply walk around it. Although the “open and obvious” exception of Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. banc 1993) has generally been applied in landowner liability cases, I see no reason why it should not be equally available to Searle. If a landowner, who by law owes an affirmative duty to invitees, cannot be held liable for failure to repair or warn of an open and obvious danger, afortiorari one who is under no special duty likewise should be entitled to assume that others will take steps to avoid open and obvious hazards.
As for St. Luke’s, who was the landowner in this case, there is no basis for a finding of actual or constructive notice. Nor did St. Luke’s have any duty to warn of the presence of the briefcase if it had notice because the “dangerous condition” presented by the briefcase was open and obvious.
Short of stationing corridor police or hall monitors in every corridor, it is difficult to see how St. Luke’s could possibly have done anything more than it did to avoid this accident. There was no evidence that any employee of St. Luke’s ever saw the briefcase prior to the accident. Under the most generous view of the record, the briefcase was sitting unattended in the corridor for, at most, 30 seconds.4 There was evidence that the medical assistant who opened the door for Plaintiff and her sister may have walked past the Searle representative standing at the partition but she had no recollection of seeing either her or the briefcase. Assuming she did walk past the Searle representative while she was standing at the partition, this would not impart constructive notice to St. Luke’s because at that point, the briefcase presented no danger to anyone. Briefcases, like purses, are highly personal accessories that are not generally left unattended for any substantial length of time. The Searle representative testified that while she was standing at the partition the briefcase was next to her right foot. So long as she remained there, the briefcase presented no danger. Assuming the medical assistant should have seen the Searle representative and her briefcase, there was no need for her to take any action because she was entitled to assume that if the Searle representative *909moved somewhere else, she would take the briefcase with her.5
The majority finds constructive notice by stating that the issue is whether the medical assistant should have seen the briefcase as she was accompanying Plaintiff down the hallway toward the examining rooms. Op. at p. 903. The majority then observes that the briefcase was in plain view and that “there was no evidence that the medical assistant’s view of the briefcase was obstructed.” Op. at p. 904. The latter observation is inaccurate. As the majority acknowledges in its recitation of the facts, Plaintiff was walking in front of her sister and the medical assistant was behind Plaintiff and to the right of her sister. Op. at p. 901. Plaintiffs sister testified that Plaintiff was walking on the left side of the corridor, next to the partition. Therefore, as Plaintiff turned past the angle of the partition and proceeded toward the briefcase, she would have been directly between the medical assistant and the briefcase.
The majority further observes that the height of the partition and the layout of the hallway suggest that the briefcase would not have been visible to Plaintiff until she rounded the angled portion of the partition and then would have had little time to notice the briefcase. If this is so, and in view of the fact that the alignment of Plaintiff, her sister and the medical assistant would have placed Plaintiff between the medical assistant and the briefcase as she rounded the corner, there is no basis for imputing constructive notice of the danger presented by the briefcase to either the medical assistant or St. Luke’s. The majority cannot have it both ways. If the briefcase was in a position that Plaintiff could not have observed it and appreciated the danger in time to avoid it (op. at p. 904) neither could someone walking a couple of feet behind her. Nor can St. Luke’s duty be predicated on Plaintiff’s advanced age and allegedly more limited powers of observation. Op. at p. 905. As the majority acknowledges elsewhere in its opinion, the Restatement provision adopted and applied in Harris employs the “reasonable man” standard. A landowner has no duty to warn of dangers where “both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man ... exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment.” Op. at p. 904, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A, emt.b (1965) (emphasis added). See also Harris, 857 S.W.2d at 226. In any event, absent actual or constructive notice, there is no liability on the part of St. Luke’s regardless of whether the danger presented by the briefcase was open and obvious.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgments against both Defendants.

. Dr. Eyerman did not render an opinion on the cause of the fall. The focus of Dr. Eyerman's testimony was the degree of the injury attributable to the fall.

. It is not clear whether the majority views the manner in which Plaintiff fell (e.g., op. at p. 902: "She described Plaintiff as being 'in flight’ a description which indicates Plaintiff did not simply collapse to the ground, but rather something propelled her through the air and to the floor.") as significant to the holding but there is no evidence that the manner in which Plaintiff fell would have been different if she had simply tripped over her own feet. At best, the manner in which she fell tends to rule out fainting but there is no evidence that it was not consistent with the other possible causes identified in the evidence and I do not see how we can judicially notice how people fall under different circumstances. Further, the fact that the briefcase didn't tip over and the absence of any evidence that it had even been disturbed suggest that it could not have "propelled her through the air.”

. Contrary to the majority’s analysis, nothing in Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores, 781 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo. banc 1989), purports in any way to relax the plaintiff's burden of establishing causation. See op. at p. 902. In Sheil, what caused the fall was not in issue. What was at issue was who placed the box in the aisle and whether the store could be deemed to have notice of it. 781 S.W.2d at 780-82. It was in that context — i.e., proving notice, that the court suggested that the *908dazed or helpless condition of the victim might be taken into account in weighing submissibility.

. Although Sheil and Moss v. National Super Markets, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Mo. banc 1989) do indicate that a submissive case can be made without showing that the dangerous condition existed for a certain length of time, it does not follow that a submissible case is made where plaintiff's evidence establishes that the length of time is very short. In Elmore v. Wal-Mart Stores, 812 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo.App.1991), we held that proof that a package of mints not sold at the store were on the floor less than 5 minutes precluded a finding of constructive notice as a matter of law.

. From the time estimates in the record as to how long it took the medical assistant to walk to the door to admit Plaintiff and her sister and how long the briefcase was left unattended, it does not appear possible that the medical assistant walked down the corridor while the briefcase was unattended.