Court Opinion

ID: 9705351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:03:39.278914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.248423
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, J.
I respectfully dissent.
Although I agree with the Majority that the 1986 Agreement and 1993 Agreement are void and unenforceable, I disagree with the Majority’s determination that the condemnation of Condemnee’s property is also void.
According to the Agreements, although granted the power of eminent domain through Sections 9(i) and 12 of the URL, Condemnor ostensibly could not condemn property without the written consent of Pulver. As the Majority states, “the power of [eminent domain] is inalienable and cannot be surrendered, even by legislation, to say nothing of the power of other governmental agencies to impair it or bargain it away.” City of Milwaukee v. Schomberg, 261 Wis. 166, 169, 52 N.W.2d 151, 152 (1952).
In this case, had the agreement purported to authorize Pulver to initiate condemnation proceedings on behalf of Condem-nor, I would agree with the Majority that the subsequent condemnation would be void. Condemnor has been granted the power of eminent domain through Section 9(i) and 12 of the URL but nowhere in the URL does it provide that the Condemnor may delegate the power of eminent domain to another. The right of eminent domain is exclusively in the sovereign and “[w]hile the right to exercise the power may be delegated, the body to which the power is entrusted has no authority beyond that legislatively granted.” Interstate Cemetery Company Appeal, 422 Pa. 594, 598, 222 A.2d 906, 909 (1966). As such, had Pulver attempted to initiate condemnation proceedings in the name of *1162Condemnor, such would be void because such proceedings could only be undertaken by Condemnor. Similarly, because condemnation proceedings could only be initiated by Condemnor it matters not whether the Agreements purported to require Pul-ver’s consent before such an undertaking was initiated. Condemnor at all times had the power to condemn and Condemnor acted lawfully in accordance with Sections 9(i) and 12 of the URL when it condemned Condemnee’s property.
Because I conclude that the condemnation was proper, I would address the remaining issues raised on Condemnee.
First, the trial court did not err in overruling Condemnee’s preliminary objections on the grounds of bad faith. Bad faith implies a tainted or fraudulent motive and it is palpable when it is readily perceived. Redevelopment Authority of City of Erie v. Owners, 1 Pa.Cmwlth. 378, 274 A.2d 244 (1971). One asserting bad faith or fraud must prove by clear, precise and indubitable evidence — that is, by credible witnesses testifying with detail to distinctively remembered facts. In re Condemnation by City of Philadelphia of Leasehold of Airportels, Inc., 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 409, 398 A.2d 224, 226 (1979).
Here, Condemnee argues that the condemnation was conducted with the motive to benefit a private party at the expense of the Condemnee and is therefore unlawful and must be set aside. However, Con-demnee did not allege this in preliminary objections. Because Section 406 of the Code, 26 P.S. § l-406(a) provides that failure to raise a matter by way of preliminary objection shall constitute a waiver of such matter, the issue of private rather than public purpose is not properly before us.
Condemnee also argues that Condem-nor acted in bad faith because it failed to provide adequate security for the taking of Condemnee’s property. Here, the trial court agreed that the security posted was inadequate and ordered the additional posting of $750,000.00. However, merely because the security was found to be inadequate, it does not follow that the security was posted in bad faith. In fact the trial court credited the testimony of Sinclair (Trial court opinion at p. 76.) whose estimate Condemnor relied on in posting security. As such, we disagree with Con-demnee that the security posted by Con-demnor evidenced bad faith because there was substantial evidence for the trial court’s credibility determination and a substantial lack of clear, precise and indubitable evidence of bad faith.
According to Condemnee, Condemnor’s failure to obtain an appraisal of its property immediately before the filing of the declaration of taking and reliance on Sinclair’s updated 1994 appraisal is also evidence of Condemnor’s bad faith. However, none of the sections cited by Condemnee, 26 P.S. § 1-407, 26 P.S. § 1-409 and 26 P.S. § 1-602 require that an appraisal of the property be obtained before the filing of a declaration of taking. As such, there is also no credible evidence of bad faith in this regard.
Additionally, Condemnee argues that Condemnor’s bad faith is evidenced by the fact that, before Condemnor filed the declaration of taking, it sent a letter to Con-demnee on March 15, 1995, offering to buy the property for $1,180,000.00 which was $20,000.00 less than the 1994 appraised value. Condemnee maintains that this offer was intended to be an offer of just compensation. However, even assuming that this was an insufficient offer of just compensation, Section 406 preliminary objections are not available to a condemnee who is challenging just compensation alleged to have been tendered prior to the delivery of possession. Township of Chester v. Department of Transportation, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 60, 339 A.2d 892 (1975).
Next, we will address whether the trial court committed evidentiary errors requiring a remand for a new hearing.
*1163Condemnee sought to introduce a letter from Attorney Galante, who was retained by Condemnor to advise it on the appropriate amount of security for the condemnation. The letter advised Condemnor that the proposed security, i.e., the $1.5 million state grant, plus $711,000 from Pul-ver would not be adequate and recommended that the Developer’s security be enhanced to $1 million. Condemnee sought to introduce the letter as evidence of bad faith on the part of Condemnor in posting inadequate security. The trial court refused to admit the letter on the grounds of privilege. Condemnee argues that the privilege was waived because it was disclosed to Pulver and privileges are waived when they are disclosed to a third party. Assuming arguendo that the privilege was waived we disagree with Con-demnee that there is a showing of bad faith on the part of Condemnor by its refusal to act on Attorney Galante’s advice. The case of Airportels, relied on by Con-demnee is distinguishable.
In AirpoHels, which involved a de facto taking, the condemnee initiated proceedings by filing a petition for the appointment of viewers. The trial court thereafter dismissed the preliminary objections filed by the City of Philadelphia (City). City did not timely appeal the dismissal of its preliminary objections and as such the City’s opportunity to contest whether a de facto taking had occurred was lost. Ultimately in the proceedings, the City entered its estimate of just compensation as zero dollars. Although the City maintained that two appraisers retained by it valued the property at zero, these appraisers did not testify nor were they identified and other appraisers retained by the City estimated just compensation at $4 million to $6.5 million. At the hearing, the City also maintained that no condemnation had in fact occurred. This court concluded that City’s estimate of just compensation in zero amount “was not based on a judgment of the leasehold’s value arrived at in good faith but that it was based on the City’s continued insistence that the City had not condemned Airportels’ leasehold.” Airportels 398 A.2d at 227. (Emphasis added.) Thus, in Airportels, this court determined that the offer of just compensation was based on City’s belief that no condemnation had occurred. No such issue is present in this case. Moreover here, Condemnor based its determination of security on the advice of Sinclair who testified at the hearing. Merely because Condemnor posted security in an amount somewhat less than that suggested by Ga-lante does not cause Condemnor’s actions to constitute bad faith.
Condemnee also argues that the court erred in excluding from evidence documents that demonstrated that Pulver had testified untruthfully at the hearing on the adequacy of the security. However, as Condemnee has not challenged the trial court’s determination as to the amount of security, the issue of Pulver’s testimony is of no moment.
Next, Condemnee maintains that the trial court erred in allowing Authority’s solicitor, Bruce Nicholson, to present extensive hearsay testimony. Condemnee argues that Nicholson, although not a member of Condemnor’s staff, testified as to the reason Condemnor wanted to acquire Con-demnee’s property and what motivated Condemnor to adopt a resolution authorizing the filing of the declaration of taking. Condemnee alleges that admission of Nicholson’s hearsay testimony was prejudicial because the trial court credited the testimony. However, we do not agree with Condemnee in this case that the trial court, by merely crediting Nicholson’s testimony, prejudiced Condemnee thereby. To amount to reversible error, an eviden-tiary ruling must be shown not only to have been erroneous but harmful to the party complaining. Hart v. W.H. Stewart Inc., 523 Pa. 13, 564 A.2d 1250 (1989). Here, Condemnee has failed to make such a showing warranting a new hearing.
Finally, Condemnee argues that the trial court erred in not allowing Condemnee to *1164introduce into evidence the standard agreement used by the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia (PRA), which does not have provisions conditioning any exercise of the governmental powers of the PRA on the developer’s authorization or approval. The trial court determined that the PRA agreement was irrelevant in this case and a trial court may exclude evidence it deems irrelevant. Concorde Investments, Inc. v. Gallagher, 345 Pa.Super. 49, 497 A.2d 637, 641 (1985). The type of agreement utilized by another redevelopment authority is irrelevant as to whether the Agreements at issue, which attempted to delegate certain functions to the developer, constituted an illegal delegation of power which was never exercised.
In accordance with the above, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
Doyle, P.J., joins in this dissent.