Court Opinion

ID: 9543874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:06.258722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:23.951517
License: Public Domain

SCHROEDER, Justice,
dissenting.
I would like very much to agree with the conclusion of the Court in this ease. Some public speech has a purpose; some does not. There is no discernable purpose in the comments that were made by Mr. Topp. However, that is not the standard for determining if disciplinary action should take place.
The Court correctly capsulizes the issue in its comment in Section IV: “Statements impugning the integrity of a judge ‘may not be punished unless they are capable of being proved true or false; statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment unless they “imply a false assertion of fact.” ’ ”
The analysis of what constitutes an opinion and what implies a fact can be complex. However, underlying any analysis is the commonly understood reality that it is often impossible to discern what-is in another person’s mind and what subjective motivations exist within that person’s mind. Topp could not know what was in Judge Michaud’s mind or what was in Judge Kosonen’s mind. Anybody reviewing Topp’s comments would understand that. Topp’s comments dealt with a subject matter that he could not know — the internal motivation of a judge making a decision. Two consequences flow from this: the first a matter of social decency; the other a principle of constitutional law. Since Topp could not know what was in Judge Michaud’s mind, it was a matter of social indecency to impugn the judge’s character by speculation. However, a reader or listener with common sense would understand that the comments were statements of opinion. That understanding of the nature of the comments as an opinion cloaks Mr. Topp in the protection afforded by the First Amendment.
It is easier to defend speech that has a social purpose than to defend speech that seems to have no point except to degrade another person. However, that is not the line the First Amendment draws. The noble purposes for the constitutional protection of speech have been set forth numerous times with great eloquence. Attempting a new flourish would add nothing to the wisdom inherent in the protection of speech in our constitutional structure. The speech at issue in this case falls within that circle of protection.