Court Opinion

ID: 9483207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:14:22.600316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:01.825162
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I join fully in the dissenting opinions of Chief Judge Merritt and Judge Martin. I write separately simply to emphasize my firm belief that this Court errs grievously in its continued insistence that the sentencing guidelines narrowly prescribe the factors a district court may consider in sentencing and, more important, that the Court misinterprets Congress’s clear language to the contrary.
As Chief Judge Merritt recounts, Davern was a college student who had a close-knit, supportive family and strong ties to his community. Davern consistently displayed contrition for his crime and appeared committed to conquering his addiction to drugs and alcohol. Although the district court recognized these factors, the court apparently feared that the sentencing guidelines prohibited its relying on them in imposing a sentence outside of the recommended guideline range. This Court’s recent precedent, including the majority’s decision today, confirms that the district court’s fears were well grounded. I suspect that, under this Circuit’s interpretation of the guidelines, the district court would similarly have gone astray in considering Davern’s personal situation had his life circumstances been less fortunate — if, for instance, Davern had come from a broken home, had only minimal education, and had intended to sell the drugs not to support his habit, but to support his family.
To articulate, in broad, general principles, when and to what degree a defen*1515dant’s personal characteristics and circumstances should be considered in imposing a just and equitable sentence would surely be a daunting task. It was undoubtedly in part this realization that motivated Congress to instruct the Sentencing Commission, in § 994(e), to promulgate guidelines and policy statements “reflect[ing] the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988). As Chief Judge Merritt correctly notes, however, this language is a far cry from a wholesale prohibition on the Commission’s consideration of such factors. In addition, this statutory directive is expressly directed solely to the Sentencing Commission, which is institutionally limited to promulgating comprehensive, generalizable sentencing principals that can be neutrally applied across a diverse range of individuals, crimes, and social contexts without regard to particular defendants.
Sentencing courts, by contrast, which are daily required to impose sentences upon flesh-and-blood individuals, operate under an entirely different set of congressional constraints. Section 3553 of title 18 instructs the sentencing court, without qualification, to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1988). Section 3661 confirms the all-encompassing scope of the district court’s inquiry by providing that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988). Thus, the statutory text explicitly reserves to district judges, who have the responsibility of imposing actual sentences on particular defendants, the authority to take into account personal and non-criminal factors in ways that, in Congress’s judgment, elude expression as generalizable sentencing directives and which, accordingly, are deemed inappropriate for guideline treatment. See generally Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1715-18 (1992) (exploring tension between 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3661).1 Thus, regardless of whether the Sentencing Commission was correct in its decision not to incorporate these factors into the guidelines, this Court misinterprets the unambiguous language of title 18 in holding that sentencing courts are similarly foreclosed from considering the personal circumstances surrounding the defendant and his or her crime. This Circuit’s cramped interpretation of the guidelines thus abrogates the sentencing discretion that Congress clearly intended to leave to district courts.
Congress’s attempt to replace a sentencing regime that it viewed as systemieally biased in favor of the rich over the poor, in favor of majority groups over minorities, or in favor of the advantaged over the disadvantaged, with a more equitable one is an admirable and worthy goal, one that undoubtedly receives the unqualified support of every judge on this Court. In my opinion, however, the sentencing guidelines, as interpreted by this and many other courts, have had the unfortunate effect of stripping district judges of their ability to consider those human factors that the Sentencing Commission has ignored, yet that are so crucial to humane and just sentencing. This Court should cease appealing to the *1516text of the guidelines and 28 U.S.C. § 994 as an excuse for divesting sentencing judges of their discretion that seems otherwise so apparent. By doing so, we dehumanize what is and must remain an intensely human process — after all, we are dealing not with machines and equipment, but with human lives. Because I believe that the guidelines sentencing system, as currently interpreted by this Court, fails of its essential purpose and frustrates the will of Congress, I respectfully dissent.

. Professor Freed, who also serves as coeditor of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, finds additional support for sentencing discretion in the language of § 3553(b), which instructs that the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the sentencing guidelines "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Professor Freed writes that "Congress no doubt delegated the evaluation of ‘adequacy’ to the sentencing court because it considered the judge to be in the best position to evaluate whether the Commission had sufficiently addressed the aggravating or mitigating circumstance 'to the degree’ present in the case.” Freed, supra, at 1734 (footnote omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).