Court Opinion

ID: 9487304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:13:09.737154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:11.622108
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I fully join the Court’s opinion, and append this separate writing merely to urge that the *1285en banc court reexamine the availability of general punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). That issue is squarely presented in this case.
In my view, Miles seriously calls into question the availability of punitive damages for nonpayment of maintenance and cure. If the First and Sixth Circuits, the Texas Supreme Court, and all the rest of the courts that have considered the matter, are correct that Miles bars recovery of punitive damages in a cause of action for unseaworthiness,1 as I believe they are, then this Court en banc should seriously rethink its previous panel decisions allowing punitive damages in maintenance and cure eases. See Gray v. Texaco, Inc., 610 So.2d 1090, 1096 (La.App.), cert. denied, 616 So.2d 686 (La.1993).
Both unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure are doctrines of general maritime law, and in the past we have looked to the availability of punitive damages under the one when deciding whether they are available under the other. In In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.1981), we cited a First Circuit case allowing punitive damages in maintenance and cure actions in support of our holding that punitive damages are recoverable in unseaworthiness actions. Thus, it would be highly anomalous to allow punitive damages in the context of the contract-like maintenance and cure claims if such damages are unavailable in the context of the tort-like unseaworthiness claims.2
Furthermore, even though the Jones Act and DOHSA may not be closely analogous reference points in the Miles analysis with respect to maintenance and cure, the Long-shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, may be. It has been said that maintenance and cure “is to the seaman almost what workmen’s compensation is to the land worker.” 2 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 26:1, at 3 (4th ed. 1985). The LHWCA, meanwhile, “creates a worker’s compensation scheme for certain maritime workers which is exclusive of other remedies and does not provide for punitive damages.” Miller, 989 F.2d at 1457; see 33 U.S.C. § 905 (exclusiveness of LHWCA remedies). Generally workers’ compensation schemes, whether state or federal, for seamen or land lubbers, do not permit injured workers to recover punitive damages. See 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 65.37, at 12-36 (1987) (“punitive damages are of course not recoverable under a workers’ compensation act”). See also Atkinson v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 838 F.2d 808, 813-14 (5th Cir.1988).
Before examining the genesis of this Court’s relevant jurisprudence, it will be *1286helpful to provide an overview of the law in this area among the other circuits. In addition to the Fifth, the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits have held (prior to Miles) that punitive damages are recoverable for nonpayment of maintenance and cure. See Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir.1973); Kraljic v. Berman Enterprises, Inc., 575 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.1978); Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam). In the Second Circuit, however, recovery is limited to the amount of attorneys’ fees. Kraljic. The law in the Sixth3 and Ninth4 Circuits is unclear. The other circuits have no law.
Although the right to maintenance and cure “stems from the ancient sea codes of the Middle Ages,” 2 Norris, supra § 26:2, at 4-5, this Court had never upheld an award of punitive damages for nonpayment of maintenance and cure until 1984. See Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir.1984). See also McWilliams v. Texaco, 781 F.2d 514, 519 & n. 11 (5th Cir.1986). Holmes deals with the issue in only an abbreviated fashion, the extent of Holmes’ analysis being as follows:
“In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962), the Supreme Court held that an employer’s willful and arbitrary refusal to pay maintenance and cure gives rise to a claim for damages in the form of attorneys’ fees in addition to the claim for general damages. Subsequent decisions have established that, in addition to such attorneys’ fees, punitive damages for such refusal are available under the general maritime law. See Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.1981) (collecting cases); see also Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir.1973).” Holmes, 734 F.2d at 1118.
Thus, Holmes relied exclusively upon three cases: the Supreme Court’s Vaughan, this Court’s Merry Shipping, and the First Circuit’s Pocahontas. None of these eases, however, provides significant support for the rule announced in Holmes.
In Vaughan, the Supreme Court upheld an award of attorneys’ fees where the shipowner had deliberately withheld maintenance and cure. The rationale underlying Vaughan’s holding is subject to considerable debate and we will discuss it at greater length later on. For now, it is enough to know this: Vaughan upheld an award of attorneys’ fees, not punitive damages, and therefore does not directly support the holding of Holmes. See Reinschreiber, Punitive Damages in Admiralty for Bad Faith Refusal to Provide Maintenance and Cure, 15 San Diego L.Rev. 309, 313 (1978) (“the Vaughan decision affords no new basis for recovery of punitive damages”). Nor did Holmes dispute this fact; it said that, after Vaughan, subsequent decisions made punitive damages available.
The second case cited by Holmes, and the one upon which it seems to rely most heavily, is Merry Shipping. Like Vaughan, however, Merry Shipping does not squarely support *1287the Holmes rule. Merry Shipping upheld an award of punitive damages for the wrongful death of a seaman in a cause of action for unseaworthiness. In support of its holding, Merry Shipping approvingly cited the First Circuit’s Pocahontas decision, which, in the words of Merry Shipping, “upheld an award of punitive damages for a shipowner’s willful and callous withholding of a seaman’s maintenance and cure.” 650 F.2d at 625. Yet this endorsement of the holding in Pocahontas is clearly dictum since Merry Shipping did not involve maintenance and cure. As one commentator has noted, “The Holmes Court’s authority for allowing an award of punitive damages is not readily apparent, because maintenance and cure was not at issue in Merry Shipping.” Davis, Punitive Damages for Maintenance and Cure, 10 Mar.Law. 103, 108 (1985).
Furthermore, when one looks back on Merry Shipping with the benefit of Miles, it becomes clear that Merry Shipping is doubtful authority at best. The holding of Merry Shipping — that punitive damages are available under general maritime law — rested upon two assumptions, both of which were capsized by Miles. First, Merry Shipping stated that nonpecuniary losses are recoverable under general maritime law. See 650 F.2d at 626. That proposition, of course, was squarely rejected in Miles. See 498 U.S. at 30-32, 111 S.Ct. at 325. Second, Merry Shipping argued that the unavailability of punitive damages under the Jones Act does not compel their unavailability under general maritime law. See 650 F.2d at 626. That reasoning, however, is flatly inconsistent with Miles’ insistence upon uniformity in the availability of damages under general maritime law and statutes such as the Jones Act. See 498 U.S. at 27-29, 30-32, 111 S.Ct. at 323, 325. Thus, because of Miles, it would appear that Merry Shipping is no longer good law.
The last case cited by Holmes is the First Circuit’s Pocahontas decision. To be sure, that case did squarely hold that punitive damages are available in maintenance and cure eases, and it was favorably cited in Merry Shipping. Pocahontas, however, suffers from the fact that it relied upon the dissent in Vaughan. See Pocahontas, 477 F.2d at 1051. As the Second Circuit pointed out in its Kraljic opinion:
“The [Pocahontas ] court justified the punitive damage award primarily by relying on Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in [Vaughan v.] Atkinson which, as we have indicated, would have awarded exemplary damages under traditional concepts not necessarily limited to the amount of counsel fees. The obvious difficulty with this approach is that the court followed the views of the dissenters in Atkinson and not the majority.” Kraljic, 575 F.2d at 415.
Holmes made no mention of Kraljic, even though it was decided six years earlier. In Kraljic, the Second Circuit held that willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure entitles a seaman to recover punitive damages limited to the amount of attorneys’ fees. The Kraljic court stated:
“The [Pocahontas ] court, we believe, correctly perceived that both majority and minority opinions in Atkinson in essence found that punitive damages were awarda-ble in maintenance and cure eases. The inescapable fact is, however, that the majority opinion in Atkinson limited that recovery to counsel fees despite the explicit view of the dissenters that no such curb be imposed.” Id. at 415-16.
Finally, a brief word is in order about the Eleventh Circuit’s Hines case, which was decided three years after Holmes. Recognizing that on the question of the availability of punitive damages, “Vaughan is not dispos-itive because in that ease only a claim for attorney’s fees was asserted,” Hines, 820 F.2d at 1189, the Hines court choose to “[f]ollow[ ] the guidance of Merry Shipping ”, id., and allow punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases. Again, however, Merry Shipping is questionable authority at best.5
To sum up, the cases that Holmes relied upon cannot now support the result in Holmes. Vaughan awarded attorneys’ fees, *1288not punitive damages; Merry Shipping did not involve maintenance and cure and has probably been overruled by Miles; and Pocahontas was based upon the Vaughan dissent. Of the cases that Holmes did not cite, Kraljic limits punitive damages to the amount of attorneys’ fees and Hines relied upon the now-dubious Merry Shipping. In arguable support of Holmes, there is one remaining possibility that should be considered, namely, that Vaughan, while only upholding an award of attorneys’ fees, announced a principle broader than its result. Vaughan is unquestionably the root of this entire area of law; hence, we now attempt to determine how broad Vaughan is.
Vaughan, a brief opinion by Justice Douglas, has been described as “ambiguous”6 and “cryptic”7 — and rightly so. What is clear is that Justice Douglas upheld an award of attorneys’ fees to a seaman where his employer had deliberately withheld payment of maintenance and cure. The confusion surrounds the theory under which Justice Douglas awarded the attorneys’ fees. On the one hand, the adjectives that Justice Douglas used to describe the employer’s behavior— “callous,” “recalcitran[t],” “willful and persistent,” Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 530-31, 82 S.Ct. at 999 — imply that the award was meant to be a punitive sanction. On the other hand, his statements that a seaman is entitled to recover “necessary expenses” and that the seaman “was forced to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what was plainly owed him,” id., suggest that the fees were meant to be a compensatory award for out-of-pocket expenses. As one commentator put it:
“Yet Vaughan did not clearly articulate if such an award was compensatory or punitive. Initially, the Court cited Cortes for the proposition that an employer’s failure to make timely payments of maintenance and cure may entitle the seaman to the recovery of necessary expenses, intimating that the award was compensatory. The Court went on to stress, however, that the defendant’s failure to make the payments was willful and callous, language that lends itself to the view that the award was punitive.” Maslanka, Punitive Damages in the Admiralty, 5 Mar.Law. 223, 228 (1980); accord Davis, supra, at 106.
The commentators are divided as to whether the Vaughan award was intended to be compensatory8 or punitive9 in nature.
Fortunately, in deciphering Vaughan, we are not confined to the text of that enigmatic opinion or the unexpressed intent of its author. Since Vaughan was decided in 1962, the Supreme Court has cited it in seven cases. Each of these cases concerns the shifting of attorneys’ fees; none of them concerns maritime law. In all seven cases, the Court has treated Vaughan as supporting an exception to the so-called “American Rule” that litigants generally must bear their own costs. In the first such case, Chief Justice Warren read Vaughan as establishing a compensatory basis for fee-shifting:
“Limited exceptions to the American rule ... have been sanctioned by this Court *1289when overriding considerations of justice seemed to compel such a result. In appropriate circumstances, we have held, an admiralty plaintiff may be awarded counsel fees as an item of compensatory damages (not as a separate cost to be taxed).” Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967) (emphasis added).
Since Maier Brewing, however, Vaughan has now come to stand for the proposition that attorneys’ fees may sometimes be awarded to a prevailing party when his opponent has acted in bad faith in the conduct of litigation.10 As one commentator has said, Vaughan now “is uniformly cited as a foundational case to the so-called ‘bad faith’ exception to the American rule.” Reinschreiber, supra, at 312.11 The purely compensatory description of Vaughan has not been aired in a majority opinion since Maier Brewing.12, In short, the Court’s current view is that the fee award in Vaughan should be understood as a sanction for bad-faith conduct in litigation.
However, our knowledge that Vaughan involved a bad-faith fee-shift does not immediately tell us whether awards of that type are compensatory or punitive. Although some have asserted that an award of attorneys’ fees under the bad-faith exception to the American rule is compensatory,13 the Supreme Court’s view now may be otherwise. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973), Justice Brennan stated:
“Thus, it is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of‘fee shifting’ is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of ‘bad faith’ on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.” Id. at 5, 93 S.Ct. at 1946 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Hall’s reasoning was reaffirmed in the recent case of Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). Quoting Hall, the Chambers Court said: “in the case of the bad-faith exception to the American Rule, ‘the underlying rationale of “fee-shifting” is, of course, punitive.’ ” Id. at 53, 111 S.Ct. at 2137. Even three dissenters in Chambers cited Hall for the proposition that “the rationale for the bad faith exception is. punishment.” Id. at 75, 111 S.Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Chambers Court specifically rejected the argument made by the petitioner that fee-shifting is compensatory in character. This argument, the Court said, “fails utterly,” id. at 54, 111 S.Ct. at 2137 n. 15, because even though the fees may have a compensatory effect, their primary purpose is punitive. The Court analogized to fines for civil contempt, which may be compensatory in consequence but are punitive in design.
*1290Based upon the above, it might seem that the Second Circuit in Kraljic got it right: the Vaughan award was a form of punitive damage, but one limited to the recovery of attorneys’ fees. A careful reading of Chambers, however, belies the view that awards made under the bad-faith exception to the American rule are essentially punitive damages. The Chambers Court drew a distinction between fees awarded pursuant to the bad-faith exception, which are based upon a federal court’s inherent power to sanction parties for their litigation behavior, and other “fee-shifting rules that embody a substantive policy, such as a statute which permits a prevailing party in certain classes of litigation to recover fees.” Id. at 52, 111 S.Ct. at 2136. In other words, bad-faith fee-shifting is not based on the outcome or merits of a suit, but rather “on how the parties conduct themselves during the litigation.” Id. at 53, 111 S.Ct. at 2137. While the Chambers majority opinion equivocated on the question whether a federal court has the inherent power to impose sanctions for conduct relating to the merits of the case, rather than the conduct of the litigation, see id. at 54 n. 16, 111 S.Ct. at 2138 n. 16, four justices were firmly of the view that bad-faith fee-shifting may not be used to sanction prelitigation conduct. Justice Scalia argued that the American rule is deeply rooted in our history and “prevents a court (without statutory authorization) from engaging in what might be termed substantive fee-shifting, that is, fee-shifting as part of the merits award. It does not in principle bar fee-shifting as a sanction for procedural abuse.” Id. at 59, 111 S.Ct. at 2140 (dissenting opinion; original emphasis). Likewise, Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and two others, argued that “[wjhen a federal court, through invocation of its inherent powers, sanctions a party for bad-faith prelitigation conduct, it goes well beyond the exception to the American Rule.” Id. at 74, 111 S.Ct. at 2148 (dissenting opinion).
The upshot of all this is the following: the bad-faith exception to the American rule, of which the Vaughan award was an example, is not in a true sense punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded on the basis of the merits of a case, whereas bad-faith fee-shifting sanctions abuses of the litigation process. As the Chambers Court said, quoting from the Fifth Circuit decision below, “ ‘[f]ee-shift-ing here is not a matter of substantive remedy, but of vindicating judicial authority.’” Id. at 55, 111 S.Ct. at 2138 (quoting Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, 894 F.2d 696, 705 (5th Cir.1990)). This interpretation comports with the facts in Vaughan. Because the shipowner’s liability for maintenance and cure was perfectly clear, it was an abuse of the litigation process to require him to “go to court to get what was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old.” Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531, 82 S.Ct. at 999.
At the end of the day, one need not definitely resolve whether Vaughan awarded compensatory damages or established an exception to the American rule. Either way, its award clearly was not a punitive damages award and therefore Vaughan provides no support for the Holmes rule. Vaughan entitles injured seamen to recover attorneys’ fees, or perhaps compensatory damages, when their employer unreasonably fails to pay maintenance on a timely basis. But in light of Miles, this Court should reconsider en banc whether punitive damages should be similarly available.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING, GARWOOD, JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHÉ, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Nov. 4, 1994
BY THE COURT:
A majority of the Judges in active service, on the Court’s own motion, having determined to have this case reheard en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the Court en banc with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.

. See our per curiam herein, note 8 and accompanying citations in text. See also, id. note 7 and note 10 and accompanying text.

. Punitive damages are generally unavailable for breach of contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355 (1979); 11 Williston on Contracts § 1340, at 209-11 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1968); 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1077, at 438-39 (1964). That the duty to pay maintenance and cure derives from contract was first stated by Justice Story in Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed.Cas. 480, 482 (C.C.D.Me.1823) (No. 6,047). Accord Brister v. AWI, Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 360 (5th Cir.1991) (Maintenance and cure "is implied in the employment contract between seaman and shipowner.”); 2 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 26:2, at 3 (4th ed. 1985) ("Maintenance and cure is a contractual form of compensation given by the general maritime law.”). To be sure, the contract analogy has its limits. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962), Justice Douglas stated that "[m]ainte-nance and cure differs from rights normally classified as contractual,” id. at 532, 82 S.Ct. at 1000, and then quoted Justice Cardozo: “Contractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in origin, but, given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the incident.” Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371, 53 S.Ct. 173, 174, 77 L.Ed. 368 (1932). Yet just because a shipowner’s obligation to pay maintenance and cure cannot "be abrogated by a contractual provision,” Dawdle v. Offshore Express, Inc., 809 F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir.1987), does not mean that none of the rules of contract law pertain to maintenance and cure. It has been held, for example, that the rate of maintenance and cure may be set in a collective bargaining agreement. See Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924, 107 S.Ct. 331, 93 L.Ed.2d 303 (1986). In sum, to the extent that the obligation to pay maintenance and cure is contractual in nature, allowing punitive damages for a breach thereof is anomalous.

. Relying on dicta in Al-Zawkari v. American Steamship Co., 871 F.2d 585, 590 n. 8 (6th Cir.1989), one district court in the Sixth Circuit has held that "a claim for punitive damages under the doctrine of maintenance and cure is recognizable in this circuit." Hoeffling v. United States Steel, 792 F.Supp. 1029, 1030 (E.D.Mich.1991). Another district court in that Circuit has said that a seaman may recover "an award of punitive damages limited to attorney's fees." Owens v. Conticarriers & Terminals, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 777, 792 (W.D.Tenn.1984) (original emphasis). Still another has suggested that they are not recoverable at all. See Mardoc Asbestos Case Clusters, supra, 768 F.Supp. at 600 n. 1. As noted, the Sixth Circuit held recently that general maritime law does not allow recovery of punitive damages in a cause of action for unseaworthiness. See Miller, supra. Miller, however, did not specifically discuss maintenance and cure claims.

. In Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1347 n. 12 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 1206, 89 L.Ed.2d 319 (1986), the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that "[p]unitive damages are awardable, in some circumstances to a seaman where payment for maintenance and cure is wrongfully denied." Relying- in part on Sample, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that punitive damages are available. See Ridenour, supra, 806 F.Supp. at 911-13; Nelsen v. Research Corp., 805 F.Supp. 837, 854 (D.Hawaii 1992) (dicta). Another district court, however, reached the opposite conclusion. See La Voie, supra, 797 F.Supp. at 831-32. Ridenour and La Voie, while reaching different conclusions, agreed that there is no Ninth Circuit case dispos-itive of the issue.

. Two of the judges on the Hines panel were on the pre-split Fifth Circuit panel in Merry Shipping, which was authored by one of them. Hines was a per curiam.

. 1 B E. Flynn, D. Cooper & G. Raduazzo, Benedict on Admiralty § 51, at 4-80 (7th rev. ed. 1991).

. Robertson, Judge Rubin’s Maritime Tort Decisions, 52 La.L.Rev. 1527, 1572 (1992).

. See 6 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 54.-78[3], at 54-503 n. 29 (2d ed. 1986) ("The [Vaughan ] court found that ... the expenses of the suit could rightly be treated as part of the compensatory damage."); id. at 54-504 n. 30; 2 Norris, supra § 26:41, at 111 (“The allowance of counsel fees was justified by virtue of the inclusion of 'necessary expenses' as items of damage arising out of the suffering and physical handicap which follows the failure to give maintenance and cure."); Reinschreiber, supra, at 312 (“the [Vaughan] majority award[ed] attorney’s fees as an item of compensatory damages").

. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 313 (2d ed. 1975) (Vaughan “awarded what were essentially punitive damages under the name of counsel fees.”); Mallor, Punitive Attorney's Fees for Abuse of the Judicial System, 61 N.CX.Rev. 613, 632 (1983) (“Although the Supreme Court awarded the seaman attorneys’ fees under the rubric of compensatory damages, it emphasized the role that defendant's bad faith had played in causing those damages.”). That the award was punitive was also the view of Judge Rubin. See Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir.1989) (“Fees were awarded [in Vaughan ] on the basis of the shipowners’ bad-faith response to the seaman's underlying claim.”). Judge Rubin has been described as “an acknowledged master of the maritime field.” Robertson, supra, at 1527.

. See Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v. Local 112, 456 U.S. 717, 719-721, 102 S.Ct. 2112, 2114, 72 L.Ed.2d 511 (1982); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183-85, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2601, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1622, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 128-30, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-6, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 1946, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973).

. Accord Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir.1988) ("Although Vaughan sounded in admiralty, the Supreme Court subsequently construed the case as an example of bad faith conduct justifying an award of attorneys’ fees in civil litigation generally.”); Green, From Here to Attorney’s Fees, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 207, 232 n. 148 (1984) ("Both the Court and commentators have, in retrospect, characterized the Vaughan decision as involving the ‘bad faith' exception to the American rule.”). Professor Moore calls the bad-faith interpretation of Vaughan "a revisionist view.” Moore, supra, at 54-506. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court is obviously the final arbiter of the meaning of its precedents.

. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, once revived the compensatory interpretation of Vaughan. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 280, 95 S.Ct. at 1633 ("the attorney’s fee award [in Vaughan ] was legitimately included as a part of the primary relief to which the plaintiff was entitled, rather than an ancillary adjustment of litigation expenses"). However, in a previous opinion written for the Court, Justice Marshall had endorsed the bad-faith view of Vaughan. See F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 128-30, 94 S.Ct. at 2165.

. See Reinschreiber, supra, at 313.