Court Opinion

ID: 9898173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:56.792192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:55.376332
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      OCTOBER 5, 2023
                                                                 In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )
                                              )         No. 38809-3-III
                     Respondent,              )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
TRAVIS MICHAEL CARNEY,                        )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
                     Appellant.               )

       STAAB, J. — Travis Carney appeals his convictions for three counts of first degree

rape of a child, one count of attempted first degree rape of a child, and three counts of

first degree child molestation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

finding one of the child victims competent to testify and by admitting the victim’s

hearsay statements made during forensic interviews. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

1.     ALLEGATIONS

       AS and ES are sisters who lived with their mother after their father passed away.

In 2012, when AS was about four years old and ES was about nine months old, their

mother started dating Travis Carney. Carney moved in with the family in 2013. They
No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

eventually all moved out of the apartment and into a house, and Carney and the mother

had twin boys together.

       At some point, Carney began sexually abusing AS on a regular basis. At first, AS

did not say anything about Carney’s sexual abuse. However, one day AS saw Carney

touching ES around her vagina and decided to tell her mother about the abuse to protect

her sister. In January 2019, AS told her mother that she was afraid that Carney was

hurting ES. Her mother asked her why, and AS said he had been hurting her and she did

not want it to happen to ES.

       The mother kicked Carney out of the home the day after AS told her about the

abuse. However, she did not report the abuse until May 2019. Carney was eventually

charged with multiple counts of rape of a child and child molestation.

2.     CHILD HEARSAY AND COMPETENCY HEARING

       After the abuse was reported, Tatiana Williams, a forensic interviewer, conducted

two interviews with ES where she asked ES questions about Carney abusing her. At the

time of the interviews, ES was 7 years old. Prior to trial, the State moved to admit ES’s

statements to Williams as child hearsay. Carney challenged both the competency of ES

to testify at trial and the admissibility of ES’s prior statements.

       A. Williams’ Pre-Trial Testimony

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       At the pre-trial hearing, Williams testified and explained her interview process and

methodology. Williams said that she formatted her interview questions differently based

on the age of the child, using more focused questions for younger children:

       So for younger children, like the kindergarten or preschool age children,
       it’s often difficult for them to understand a broader question that says like
       tell me everything. So then I have to be a little bit more specific and say,
       you know, tell me what you did, you know, in your bedroom or whatever,
       tell me what you did this morning.

               So just being a little bit more focused because they don’t have the
       ability to understand a broader question, but then with like a teenager, you
       can be a little bit more open because they have the ability to decipher
       between those things.

Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 19. Williams explained that these more focused questions were not

leading because she is still asking questions and not suggesting answers.

       Defense counsel asked Williams about whether she had asked ES to explain the

difference between a truth and a lie in either of the interviews. Williams admitted that

she had not, but explained that it was no longer “a part of standard protocol” to ask

children to define truth and lie during forensic interviews. RP at 38-40. She said that,

based on updated research, a child’s ability to define truth and lie or provide examples of

truths or lies does not indicate an ability to testify truthfully about what occurred to them

or what they witnessed. She further explained that it has been found that asking a child to

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State v. Carney

promise to tell the truth was more indicative of them being able to provide truthful

information, and for this reason, Williams had not asked ES to define a truth or a lie.

       B. Forensic Interviews

       Williams testified that she conducted two interviews with ES in 2019, the first on

May 28, and the second on June 19. ES was in first grade at the time of the interviews.

Williams started both interviews by going over the “rules” for the interview room. She

explained that she was going to ask ES questions and if ES did not know the answer, she

was not supposed to guess but should just respond by saying that she does not know the

answer.

       During the first interview, Williams then asked ES to practice not guessing with

her:

       Q: … If I said, let’s see, [ES], what is my favorite food? What would you
          say?
       A: Um, grapes.
       Q: Did I tell you my favorite food? My favorite food. Do you …
       A: Ah …
       Q: … know my favorite food?
       A: Yes.
       Q: I didn’t tell you my favorite food. No, but there’s no guessing. Let’s
          practice one more time. If I said, let’s see, [ES], what is my favorite
          movie? What would you say?
       A: Snow White?

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       Q: Okay. Um, I didn’t tell you my favorite movie. What is your favorite
          movie?
       A: Um, Cinderella.
       Q: Cinderella? Okay. So remember, no guessing. If you don’t know the
          answer, it’s okay to say, “I don’t know.” Okay?
       A: Okay.
       Q: All right. And, um, if I use hard words when we talk, I want you to tell
          me.
       A: Okay.
       Q: Okay? So make sure that, um, I use words that you know. So if I said,
          [ES], what is your gender? What would you say?
       A: I don’t know.
       ....
       Q: … And if I get something wrong when we talk, I want you to tell me.
       A: Okay.
       Q: Make sure I get everything right. So if I said, um, [ES], you told me that
          your favorite movie is Frozen. What would you say?
       A: Um, no.

Ex. P-8 at 3-4.

       During the second interview, Williams also practiced not guessing with ES:

       Q: … If I said, [ES], what is my favorite color, what would you say?
       A: Uh, blue.
       Q: But did I tell you my favorite color?
       A: No.
       Q: No, I didn’t tell you. Remember no guessing? We’ll practice one more
          time. If I said, [ES], what is my last name, what would you say?

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        A: Ah, I don’t remember.

Ex. P-9 at 5-6. Williams later asked ES, “So if I said, [ES], you told me, let’s see, your

favorite color is gray, what would you say?” ES responded that her favorite color was

not gray but purple and pink. Ex. P-9 at 6.

        Williams also explained during both interviews that they were only to talk about

things that were true and that really happened. And at both interviews, ES promised to

tell the truth.

        During the first interview, ES said that Carney had showed her videos of “how to

make babies.” Ex. P-8 at 10-17. ES described the video in detail, including how there

was a “boy” and a “girl” who were naked and the boy was “trying to get, um, his private

in the girl’s mouth.” Ex. P-8 at 10-17.

        ES also made multiple disclosures about Carney’s abuse. She said that, on two

occasions, Carney “was putting his finger in [her], um, private.” Ex. P-8 at 18. Williams

asked ES to “tell [Williams] everything that happened” when Carney put his finger in her

private the first time. ES responded, “he, um, he pushed in really cl- he pushed in really,

um, closed and then I said, ‘Ow.’ And then he, um, I started crying because he really

hurted me.” Ex. P-8 at 19. ES said that she had been at home on the couch with Carney

when this happened and that AS saw it occur. ES also said that she was in kindergarten

when that incident occurred.

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       The second time Carney put his finger in her private, ES initially said her mom

saw it happen. However, she subsequently said that she was at home when it happened

and her mom was at the store. ES initially seemed to say that she was in Carney and her

mother’s bedroom during the second incident, but she subsequently clarified that she was

sitting on Carney’s lap playing a game on his phone when he put his finger through her

pants and in her private “for a long time.” P-8 at 32-34, 36.

       She also said that Carney had tried to force his “private” into her mouth and he

had a “ring” that he put into her private. Ex. P-8 at 10-11. She said that AS was aware of

Carney’s abuse and “then my mom knowed about what [Carney] was doing to me.” Ex.

P-8 at 11.

       During the second interview, ES further discussed the incident where she said

Carney had tried to put his private in her mouth. She said that she was sleeping in her

bed in the basement and woke up to Carney opening her mouth and “then he, um, put it

in, like, (unintelligible) in my mouth.” Ex. P-9 at 25. ES said she told Carney to leave

and then her mom woke up and called the police. However, ES then said that Carney

claimed to have been sleepwalking and then her mother came downstairs and asked what

was going on. ES said she told her mom, “Dad hit me in the face and I punched him in

the face because he was waking me up,” and her mother took Carney upstairs. Ex. P-9 at

28. ES also said AS knew that Carney had put his private in ES’s mouth because AS had

been watching on “CramLock” or “camera stuff” and told ES about it.

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

       Williams then told ES to tell her everything she had seen when Carney put his

private in her mouth. ES responded by saying that it was really loud and her bed was

squeaking. She also said that she had a friend named Bridget spending the night and

Carney kicked Bridget in the face and “she really got hurt.” Ex. P-9 at 30. She also said

AS’s friend Emily was spending the night. ES then clarified that Carney had put his

private in her mouth on multiple occasions. Williams also asked ES to tell her everything

she had smelled and tasted when Carney put his private in her mouth.

       ES also told Williams that Carney had put a “ring” in her “butt” when she was on

her mother’s bed and her clothes and underwear were pulled down. She said the ring was

purple, had a big bump, and was made of gems. When Carney put the ring in her butt,

ES said it “really hurt” and felt “freezing cold.” Ex. P-9 at 41-42.

       C. Mother’s Testimony

       ES’s mother testified at the hearing and was asked whether, during the timeframe

when ES was five to six years old, she would describe her as truthful. She responded:

“On occasion, she would. She, also, lived in her head. So it was, also, fantasy land. So

we couldn’t really determine truth at that time because we didn’t know where she was

mentally.” RP at 248. The mother then explained that ES was diagnosed with ADHD1

and had started taking medication when she was in kindergarten. After she started taking

       1
           Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

                                               8
No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

medication, ES became “[m]uch calmer, much more able to tell us what exactly

happened, more detail, more truthful.” RP at 249.

         During cross-examination, the mother also explained what she meant by “fantasy

land”:

         Q: When you’re talking about fantasy land, what are you talking about?
         A: That she was into horses so unicorns, gum drop trees, just like fairies
            being involved in her world.
         Q: Okay. And that get [sic] convoluted when you were trying to talk to her
            about real things?
         A: If she didn’t want to talk about it, she would resort to her fantasy land
            because she didn’t want to talk about the seriousness of things.

RP at 264-65.

         The mother also testified that ES, at some point, had disclosed to her that she had

been sexually abused by Carney but did not provide much detail. She said that ES was

afraid that she would get in trouble for the disclosures.

         The mother explained that her and Carney used sex toys, including butt plugs. She

said that some of them were purple and a couple of them had gems on them.

         D. ES’s Testimony

         ES, who was nine years old at the time of the hearing, also testified. ES said that

at home she had rules about telling the truth: “If you lie to my mom, you will get in big

trouble, and if you tell the truth . . . you won’t get in as much trouble.” RP at 287-88.

The prosecutor asked ES, “I’m wearing a bright orange jacket, is that the truth or a lie?”

                                                9
No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

RP at 288. ES responded, “Lie.” The prosecutor then asked, “I’m wearing a pink shirt, is

that the truth or a lie?” RP at 288. ES responded, “truth.” Id. ES then promised to tell

the truth at the hearing.

       When asked if she saw anyone who looked like Carney, ES was unable to identify

him. However, the trial court noted just prior to ES’s testimony that the face shield

Carney was wearing had a “bad glare” on it and also later determined that Carney did not

need to wear the face shield due to the glare.

       ES was able to recount details from the time period when the abuse occurred.

Although she lived in an apartment at the time of trial, ES testified that she had

previously lived in a house with Carney, her mother, AS, and her two brothers. She said

that she and AS had shared a bedroom in the basement while her brothers slept in a room

with a bunkbed upstairs, and Carney and her mother were in another room upstairs. ES

also testified that she referred to Carney as “dad,” Carney would play games like “feed

the hippo” with her, and he was in the Army. RP at 289-90.

       ES also testified about the sexual abuse. She said that Carney tried to put his

“private” in her mouth, but she moved her head so he was unable to actually put it in her

mouth. ES also explained that Carney touched her “front private” on the couch with his

hand when she was four years old, and it felt uncomfortable. RP at 291-92. She said that

he touched her front private with his hand on multiple occasions.

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

       ES said that Carney had used a “long stick” that was pink and purple with

something that looked like a green button to touch her private. She also said that Carney

used a ring on her butt with a diamond on the end and a white “circle kind of thing at the

front” but she had told him to take it out “because it hurt.” RP at 293.

       ES said that she did not remember whether AS ever saw any of the abuse and her

mother did not see any of it because she would be gone when it would happen. She did

remember telling Williams and her mother about the abuse. However, on cross-

examination, ES said she did not remember talking to Williams and had only talked to

her counselor and her mother about what had happened.

       When asked to define a lie, ES responded that a “lie is something that is made up

or something is—something is not true” and that it was not the same thing as making a

mistake. RP at 295-96. Defense counsel also, on cross-examination, asked ES about

prior contradictory statements she had made that her mother and AS had witnessed the

abuse. ES denied having ever said that AS saw Carney abusing her.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made detailed findings on the

Allen2 factors for competency and found that ES was competent to testify. The court also

made findings on the nine Ryan3 and Dutton4 factors and held that ES’s prior hearsay

       2
           State v. Allen, 70 Wn.2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967).
       3
           State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
       4
           Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970).

                                              11
No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

statements were admissible. The court’s detailed findings are set forth in the analysis of

each issue below.

       The case proceeded to a jury trial at which ES testified and her statements made to

Williams during both forensic interviews were admitted. Carney was found guilty of all

charges.

       Carney appeals, challenging the trial court’s conclusion that ES was competent to

testify and that her hearsay statements should be admitted at trial.5

                                         ANALYSIS

1.     COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY

       Although Carney contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding ES

competent to testify, his primary challenge on appeal focuses on whether substantial

evidence supports the court’s findings pertaining to the Allen factors.

       Individuals must be competent to testify. RCW 5.60.020. There is a presumption

that all witnesses, including child witnesses, are competent. ER 601; Id. “A party

challenging the competency of a child witness has the burden of rebutting that

presumption with evidence indicating that the child is . . . incapable of receiving just

impressions of the facts, or incapable of relating facts truly.” State v. S.J.W., 170 Wn.2d

92, 102, 239 P.3d 568 (2010).

       5
           The notice of appeal has not been designated as part of the record on appeal.

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No. 38809-3-III
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       Our review is limited to determining if the challenged findings are supported by

substantial evidence and whether those findings support the trial court’s conclusions of

law. State v. Coleman, 6 Wn. App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). If the findings and

conclusions are supported by the record, then the trial court’s ultimate determination of

competency is reviewed under a very deferential abuse of discretion standard. State v.

Woods, 154 Wn.2d 613, 617, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005). As the trial court is in the best

position to observe potential witnesses, “particular reliance” is placed on the trial court’s

assessment of a child witness’ competency. State v. Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. 861, 878,

214 P.3d 200 (2009). In considering whether the court abused its discretion, we consider

the entire record on appeal. State v. Avila, 78 Wn. App. 731, 737, 899 P.2d 11 (1995).

       In determining whether a child witness is competent to testify, trial courts consider

the five Allen factors:

       A child witness is competent to testify if he or she: (1) understands the
       obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) has the mental
       capacity at the time of the occurrence to receive an accurate impression of
       it; (3) has a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the
       occurrence; (4) has the capacity to express in words his or her memory of
       the occurrence; and (5) has the capacity to understand simple questions
       about the occurrence.

Kennealy, 151 Wn. App., 877-78.

       Although Carney assigns error to the trial court’s findings pertaining to each of the

five Allen factors, he provides argument and analysis on only the first two issues: whether

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

ES understood the obligation to speak the truth and had the capacity at the time of the

abuse to receive an accurate impression of it.6 We hold that substantial evidence supports

the challenged findings.

       A. Obligation to Speak the Truth

       The first Allen factor a court must consider is whether the witness “understands

the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand.” Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 877.

A child who has a long-standing history of demonstrating an inability to distinguish what

is true may be found incompetent to testify. Id. at 878. But a demonstrated inability to

discern the truth is different from inconsistencies in a child’s testimony, which go to

weight and credibility, not competency. Id.

       The trial court found that ES demonstrated an understanding of her obligation to

tell the truth and had a general character for truthfulness. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 181.

The court also found that although ES had been diagnosed with ADHD, there have not

been issues with lying. Finally, the court found that ES acknowledged that she “gets into

more trouble if she tells a lie,” and “demonstrated an understanding of the difference

between the truth and a lie.” CP at 181.

       During the interviews and her testimony, ES made several promises to tell the

truth. In addition, ES testified as to the importance of telling the truth, was able to

       6
        See State v. Stubbs, 144 Wn. App. 644, 652, 184 P.3d 660 (2008) (“Passing
treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to allow for our

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

describe in her own words the difference between a truth and a lie, and was able to

distinguish between a truth and a lie. An affirmative answer in response to a prosecutor’s

question regarding whether it is important to tell the truth is sufficient to meet this first

factor. See Avila, 78 Wn. App. at 736.

       Carney contends that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence.

Instead, he argues that the evidence demonstrated that ES was unable to understand the

difference between a truth and a lie and the importance of telling the truth on the witness

stand. Specifically, he argues that Williams’ techniques were deficient, and the only

thing ES could distinguish was different colors.

       Carney points to ES’s attempts to guess the answers to questions posed by

Williams during the forensic interviews as evidence that she did not understand the

obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand. While ES initially struggled with

guessing the answers to questions, her ability to follow instructions, and not guess at

answers, improved during the second forensic interview. Moreover, Carney does not

explain how ES’s guessing during the forensic interviews related to her understanding of

the obligation to tell the truth when she testified two-and-a-half years later at trial.

       Carney also challenges the interview techniques of Williams, the forensic

interviewer. But his challenge goes to her credibility, which is something we do not

meaningful review.”), rev’d on other grounds, 170 Wn.2d 117, 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

decide on appeal. He claims that Williams failed to probe whether ES knew the

difference between the truth and a lie and simply asking ES to promise to tell the truth

was not probative of whether she understood her obligation. At the pre-trial hearing,

Williams testified that studies have shown that asking a child to promise to tell the truth

has a higher correlation to truth-telling than asking them to distinguish between a truth

and a lie. Carney did not challenge Williams’ testimony or techniques through cross-

examination or other evidence. He cannot meet his burden of rebutting the presumption

of competency by claiming for the first time on appeal that there are perceived credibility

issues or that an expert’s techniques were inadequate.

       Carney contends that ES’s pre-trial testimony that “[i]f you lie to my mom[,] you

will get in big trouble, and if you tell the truth [and] you won’t get in as much trouble,”

fails to demonstrate an understanding to tell the truth in court. We disagree. It is clear

from this statement that ES understood the importance of honesty. Moreover, this

statement coupled with ES’s statements about the color of the prosecutor’s clothing and

her definition of a lie during the hearing were more than sufficient to support the trial

court’s finding that ES understood her obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand.

       Finally, Carney claims the prosecutor’s colloquy with ES was inadequate, citing a

law review article suggesting that truncated competency hearings that focus solely on a

child witness’s ability to identify a lie based on the color of an object are insufficient.

See Laurie Shanks, Evaluating Children's Competency to Testify: Developing a Rational

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No. 38809-3-III
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Method to Assess a Young Child’s Capacity to Offer Reliable Testimony in Cases

Alleging Child Sex Abuse, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575, 584-85 (2010). This article does

not support Carney’s argument.

       The law review article contends that decisions on competency that are based solely

on asking if a child knows the difference between a red pen and a black pen fail to

explore the critical skills for determining if a child can testify accurately and truthfully.

Id. But in Washington, and particularly in this case, the court’s decision on competency

was not based solely on whether ES knew the difference between an orange jacket and a

pink shirt. Instead, just as the article suggests, the Allen factors considered by the trial

court addressed all of the “salient questions” the article suggests are necessary to

determine if a child has the critical skills to testify accurately and truthfully. Id.

       Here, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that ES

understood the obligation to testify truthfully.

       B. Capacity to Receive Accurate Impression of Events

       The second Allen factor requires the trial court to consider whether the child “has

the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence to receive an accurate impression” of

the event. Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 877.

       The trial court found that ES was capable of receiving just impressions and

relating them truthfully. The court noted that “[w]hile E.S. could not remember some

details, she was still able to relate what happened,” including where and with whom she

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lived with at the time of the incident. CP at 181. These findings are supported by

substantial evidence.

        During the child hearsay hearing, ES demonstrated that she remembered details

from the time the abuse occurred. She offered testimony regarding her family’s living

situation at the time, including who lived in what room in their house, her relationship

with Carney, and Carney’s employment. This testimony was more than sufficient to

show that ES had the mental capacity at the time of the abuse to receive an accurate

impression of it. See Avila, 78 Wn. App. at 733-34, 736 (child witness demonstrated

mental capacity at the time of the incident to receive an accurate impression of the

incident where, although she found it difficult to discuss the incident, she was able to

remember details of a trip three months before the hearing).

       Carney argues that the trial court erred in making this finding, pointing to the fact

that ES was unable to identify him in the courtroom to support his argument for lack of

mental capacity. Although ES was unable to identify Carney initially during the child

hearsay hearing, the trial court noted on the record that Carney was wearing a face shield

and there was a glare on the shield. ES’s inability to identify Carney at the hearing does

not demonstrate an inability to receive accurate impressions of events. Indeed, there was

testimony at trial that Carney’s appearance had changed dramatically since he had moved

out of the family home. RP at 341-42.

       C. Last Three Allen Factors.

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       Carney assigns error to the trial court’s findings of fact relevant to all five Allen

factors but fails to specifically challenge the last three Allen factors in his briefing.

Regardless, we find that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings on these

factors.

       The trial court found that ES’s testimony in court and during the interview

demonstrated that she had a sufficient memory to retain an independent recollection of

the occurrence. Although ES’s testimony regarding the abuse was not always consistent

or complete, she was able to remember specific instances of abuse during both the

forensic interviews and her testimony during the child hearsay hearing, including when

Carney tried to put his penis in her mouth, put a “ring” with jewels on it in her butt, and

put his fingers in her “private.” Inconsistencies alone do not demonstrate insufficient

memory as inconsistencies in testimony are pertinent to weight and credibility, not

competency. See Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 878.

       The court also found that ES’s ability to explain in her own words the events in

question and answer questions about it showed that she had the capacity to express in

words her memory of the occurrence. ES provided a clear account of the abuse at the

child hearsay hearing. Although she did not have words to specifically or correctly

identify some items, body parts, and actions, she communicated what had occurred

sufficiently for the court to understand.

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       Finally, the court’s finding that ES had the capacity to understand simple

questions about the occurrence was also supported by substantial evidence. ES recounted

the abuse multiple times in response to the prosecutor and defense counsel’s questions

during the interviews and child hearsay hearing and was able to answer questions

regarding what she saw, what she heard, and what she felt when the abuse was occurring.

       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings on each of the five Allen

factors. Since the court considered the five Allen factors before concluding that ES was

competent to testify, it did not abuse its discretion.

2.     ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILD HEARSAY

       Carney argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting ES’s

statements from the forensic interviews as child hearsay and assigns error to several of

the trial court’s findings of fact supporting this decision. We find no abuse of discretion

and affirm.

       This court reviews “a trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay statements for

an abuse of discretion.” Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 879. A trial court abuses its

discretion if its decision is unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.

Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 879.

       As explained above, this court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact for

substantial evidence. Coleman, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 516. Substantial evidence is evidence

sufficient to persuade a reasonable person of the truth of the finding. Id.

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       A statement that is otherwise inadmissible as hearsay may be admissible in

criminal proceedings if it is made by a child under the age of ten “describing any act of

sexual contact performed with or on the child by another” or “describing any attempted

act of sexual contact with or on the child by another.” RCW 9A.44.120(1)(a)(i). Prior to

admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing and determine that the “time,

content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability” and

the child either testifies at the proceedings or is unavailable as a witness. RCW

9A.44.120(1)(b)-(c).

       In determining the reliability of the child hearsay statement, the trial court should

consider the nine Ryan factors:

       (1) whether there is an apparent motive to lie; (2) the general character of
       the declarant; (3) whether more than one person heard the statement; (4) the
       spontaneity of the statements; (5) the timing of the declaration and the
       relationship between the declarant and the witness; (6) whether the
       statement contained express assertions of past fact; (7) whether the
       declarant’s lack of knowledge could be established through cross-
       examination; (8) the remoteness of the possibility of the declarant’s
       recollection being faulty; and (9) whether the surrounding circumstances
       suggested the declarant misrepresented the defendant’s involvement.

Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 880 (footnote omitted).

       No single factor is dispositive. Id at 881. Rather, reliability is based on an overall

evaluation. Id. However, for a statement to be found reliable, collectively the factors

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State v. Carney

must be “substantially met.” State v. Griffith, 45 Wn. App. 728, 738-39, 727 P.2d 247

(1986).

       A. Motive to Lie

       The trial court found that ES did not have a motive to lie. Carney does not argue

that ES had a motive to lie, and there was no evidence that she did. On the contrary, ES’s

testimony that she had a good relationship with Carney and called him “dad” tended to

show that she had no motive to lie. Additionally, there was evidence that ES was actually

afraid of getting in trouble if she disclosed the abuse to her mother, further supporting

this finding. Thus, this factor weighed in favor of admissibility.

       B. General Character of Declarant

       Carney argues that the trial court erred in finding that ES had a general character

for truthfulness. He points out that ES’s mother testified that ES tended to revert to

“fantasy land” when asked questions and was honest “on occasion” but had been

diagnosed with ADHD. Although the mother made statements regarding ES being

truthful on occasion and her tendency to revert to fantasy land during the time period

when she was abused, the details the mother provided to explain her testimony did not

demonstrate that ES was untruthful. Rather, it demonstrated that ES would avoid

questions if she did not want to discuss a topic. Instead of answering a question

untruthfully, ES would go into a world of her own imagination with “unicorns, gum drop

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

trees, . . . fairies.” RP at 264. In other words, ES’s ADHD did not appear to cause her to

be untruthful but rather avoidant and distracted.

       Even if the ADHD impacted ES’s character for truthfulness, the mother explained

that any issues substantially subsided after ES started taking medication when she was in

kindergarten. As ES was in first grade when the interviews with Williams occurred, and

when she made her statements, this was well after she had been diagnosed and treated.

Accordingly, based on her mother’s testimony, any issues with reverting to fantasy land

had been resolved.

       Carney also claims that ES’s ADHD diagnosis “was a serious diagnosis that went

directly to the Ryan factors and should have been deemed fatal to the hearsay question.”

Br. of Appellant at 29. He further maintains that the fact that ES had been prescribed an

unspecified medication made the finding of hearsay reliability untenable. This argument

is purely speculative as the only evidence in the record is that the medication helped ES.

If Carney believed otherwise, then he could have cross-examined the witnesses on this

theory and produced this evidence at the pre-trial hearing.

       C. Number of witnesses to statement

       The third Ryan factor is whether more than one person heard the statements. The

trial court did find that ES made statements regarding the abuse to both the mother and

Williams. However, our Supreme Court has determined that this factor is largely

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

irrelevant in cases such as this where a statement was recorded. See State v. Rice, 120

Wn.2d 549, 567-68, 844 P.2d 416 (1993).

       D. Spontaneity

       Carney argues that the trial court erred in finding that ES’s statements to Williams

were spontaneous and in response to non-leading questions. Carney claims that ES’s

“most inculpatory statements were made in response to improperly leading and

suggestive” questions.7 Br. of Appellant at 34.

       The definition of spontaneous under the Ryan factors is interpreted more broadly

and considers the entire context within which a child makes a statement. State v.

Henderson, 48 Wn. App. 543, 550, 740 P.2d 329 (1987). Generally, “for purposes of

determining the reliability of a statement made by a child victim of sexual abuse, any

statements made that are not the result of leading or suggestive questions are

spontaneous.” In re Dependency of S.S., 61 Wn. App. 488, 498, 814 P.2d 204 (1991).

Thus, in Henderson, the court determined that a detective’s question to a child victim

regarding why it hurt when her father touched her vagina was not leading or suggestive

where the child had already volunteered the information that her father had touched her

       7
          Carney also argues that Williams’ understanding of what qualified as a “leading
question” did not conform with the law. It is unclear, though, what bearing Williams’
ability to give a proper legal definition of “leading question” had on whether she used
non-leading questions.

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

vagina and it had hurt. 48 Wn. App. at 546, 550. The question drew on prior information

provided by the child, and therefore her answer still qualified as spontaneous. Id. at 550.

       Similarly, here, Williams’ questions generally drew on prior information that ES

had provided and therefore were not leading. And Carney only provides two examples to

support his claim that Williams asked leading questions. The first is when Williams

asked, “Tell me everything you smelled when [Carney] was putting his private in your

mouth.” Ex. P-9 at 33. The second is when Williams said, “when you were telling me

about being in the basement downstairs and [Carney], um, putting his, um, his private in

your mouth, tell me everything you tasted when that happened.” Ex. P-9 at 35. Carney

claims that because ES had not used the terms smell or taste previously in her interviews,

the questions were leading and suggestive.

       Carney’s argument fails because the questions were not leading. Williams

testified it is difficult for younger children to understand broad questions, so the questions

need to be more specific. Although the questions may have been more directed, they did

not suggest a specific answer. State v. Scott, 20 Wn.2d 696, 698-99, 149 P.2d 152 (1944)

(“In order to elicit the facts, a trial lawyer may find it necessary to direct the attention of a

witness to the specific matter concerning which his testimony is desired, and, if the

question does not suggest the answer, it is not leading.”). Instead, the questions drew on

prior information provided by ES (that Carney had put his private in ES’s mouth) and did

not suggest that ES had smelled or tasted anything in particular. Because the questions

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

were not leading or suggestive, under the broader definition of spontaneous given to

statements under Ryan, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that ES’s

answers were spontaneous.

         E. Timing and Relationship

         The fifth Ryan factor is the timing of the declaration and the relationship between

the declarant and the witness to the statement. Carney assigns error to the trial court’s

findings that ES disclosed the abuse close in time to when it occurred and that the timing

and relationship between ES and Williams suggested trustworthiness. Carney maintains

that ES did not disclose the abuse “anywhere even remotely close in time” to when it

occurred and the abuse was only reported to police months after the mother kicked

Carney out of the home. Br. of Appellant at 33.

         However, “a trial judge may find child hearsay statements unreliable on the

ground that there has been a lapse of time and intervening counseling between the abuse

and the statements at issue only when the evidence demonstrates that the lapse or

counseling somehow affected the child’s statements.” State v. Carlson, 61 Wn. App.

865, 872-73, 812 P.2d 536 (1991). Here, Carney only asserts that the lapse of time

affected ES’s statements and provides no additional support for this statement. This is

insufficient. Additionally, although there was a lapse in time between the abuse and ES’s

interviews with Williams, it appeared that this lapse was a matter of months and not

years.

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

       Carney offers no argument regarding the impact of the relationship between ES

and Williams on reliability. And in fact, as the State points out, the fact that Williams

was a trained professional, in a position of trust with ES, and her interview with ES

occurred in a trusting, comfortable space likely enhanced the reliability of ES’s

statements. See Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. at 884.

       Thus, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that ES

disclosed the abuse close in time to when it occurred and the timing and relationship

between ES and Williams suggested trustworthiness.

       F. Express Assertions of Past Fact

       The sixth Ryan factor is whether the statement contained express assertions of past

fact. Because child hearsay statements about sexual abuse generally include statements

about past facts, courts have determined that this factor is not useful in weighing the

reliability of child hearsay statements. See State v. Karpenski, 94 Wn. App. 80, 109 &

n.125, 971 P.2d 553 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672,

63 P.3d 765 (2003); State v. Stange, 53 Wn. App. 638, 647, 769 P.2d 873 (1989) (“For

practical purposes, it appears that the trial court can ignore questions as to whether the

statement does or does not contain assertion as to past fact, so long as it evaluates the

other factors indicating reliability in the context of the facts of the particular case before

it.”). Thus, we need not evaluate this factor.

       G. Declarant’s Lack of Knowledge

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

       The seventh Ryan factor is whether the declarant’s lack of knowledge could be

established through cross-examination. This factor has also been determined to be

generally unhelpful as it is unlikely that a trial court “can conscientiously find that cross

examination might not show lack of knowledge.” State v. Borland, 57 Wn. App. 7, 19,

786 P.2d 810 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472,

939 P.2d 697 (1997). And here, there is no reason to believe Carney was not able,

through cross-examination, to establish ES’s lack of knowledge.

       And even if this court does consider this Ryan factor, as the trial court found, ES

remembered enough from the time period when the abuse occurred that she could be

cross-examined on the statements. She was able to articulate who Carney was and his

relationship to the family and did remember some specifics from the abuse, although she

did not remember everything that she had relayed to Williams. Accordingly, there was

substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that ES’s lack of knowledge

could be established through cross examination.

       H. Possibility of Faulty Recollection

       The eighth Ryan factor is the remoteness of the possibility of the declarant’s

recollection being faulty. This factor has also been determined to be unhelpful as it is

already covered in the factor considering the timing of the declaration. See Borland, 57

Wn. App. at 19-20. Therefore, this factor is not pertinent in the analysis.

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

       Nonetheless, as noted above, ES’s statements in the forensic interviews were made

relatively close in time to the alleged abuse. And although she was inconsistent at points

and recounted different details of abuse during the two separate interviews, there is

nothing in the interviews indicating that her recollection was significantly flawed or

faulty. Thus, there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the

possibility of ES’s recollection being faulty was remote.

       I. Surrounding Circumstances

       The ninth Ryan factor is whether the surrounding circumstances suggested the

declarant misrepresented the defendant’s involvement. Neither party offers argument

regarding this factor, and it has also been found to be duplicative and unhelpful as it is

already covered by the third, fourth, and fifth Ryan factors. See Id.

       Even so, as explained above, there was no evidence that ES had a motive to lie

because, by all appearances, she had a good relationship with Carney and called him

“dad.” And there was no evidence that anyone else suggested or encouraged ES to invent

abuse allegations against Carney. In fact, the inconsistencies in her testimony tended to

render her allegations more credible as they showed that she was not simply repeating a

rehearsed, made-up story.

       In sum, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that ES’s

statements met the Ryan factors. Other than challenging the evidence to support the

court’s findings, Carney raises no other challenge to the trial court’s discretionary

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No. 38809-3-III
State v. Carney

decision to admit the hearsay statement. We therefore conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements.

       Affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                              _________________________________
                                                      Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

_________________________________
      Pennell, J.

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