Court Opinion

ID: 9901972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 19:02:21.974448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:42.395290
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 P. v. Golden CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE et al.,                                                   D080456

           Plaintiffs,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00021672-
                                                                      CU-MC-CTL)
 LISA GOLDEN,

           Defendant and Appellant;

 RICHARD C. GRISWOLD,

           Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Dismissed.
         Lisa Golden, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         Richardson C. Griswold, in pro. per.; Griswold Law and Neil R.
Sheaffer for Respondent.
         No appearance by Plaintiffs.
                         MEMORANDUM OPINION1

      Lisa Golden appeals from a March 3, 2022 order authorizing the
receiver of her residential property to retain counsel and increase the

receivership certificate.2 In June 2021, the trial court placed Golden’s
property in a receivership to remedy municipal code violations. The court
originally permitted the receiver to fund a $62,000 receivership certificate
but later authorized increases to the certificate, including in its March 3,
2022 order. That order stemmed from a deposition subpoena Golden served
on a representative of the receiver. The court granted the receiver’s request
for authorization to (1) retain counsel to represent the receiver and his staff,
and (2) increase the certificate by $10,000 to pay the counsel’s retainer fee.
      We requested and received supplemental briefing regarding the
appealability of the March 3, 2022 order. (See Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8
Cal.4th 121, 126 [“A reviewing court must raise the issue [of appealability] on
its own initiative whenever a doubt exists as to whether the trial court has
entered a final judgment or other order or judgment made appealable by
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.”].) Concluding the March 3, 2022 order
is not appealable, we dismiss this appeal.

1     We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to section 8.1 of
the California Standards of Judicial Administration.

2     Golden also sought to appeal from an order dated April 19, 2022. As a
vexatious litigant appearing in propria persona, Golden had to obtain
permission to appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.7, subd. (c).) We granted
permission as to the March 3, 2022 order but not as to the April 19, 2022
order. Accordingly, we disregard Golden’s discussion of matters beyond the
March 3, 2022 order in her briefing on appeal.

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      An order appointing a receiver is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1,
subd. (a)(7).) So is an order settling the final account of a receiver (Rochat v.
Gee (1891) 91 Cal. 355, 357 (Rochat)), or an order directing the payment of a
receiver’s compensation. (Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. (1901)
134 Cal. 121, 122, 124; Steinberg v. Goldstein (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 516,
518.) However, courts have held interim orders directing or authorizing
receivers to perform various acts to be not appealable. (See Title Insurance
& Trust Co. v. California Development Co. (1911) 159 Cal. 484, 493–494
[dismissing appeal from orders authorizing receiver to sell receiver’s
certificates]; Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Pacific Ry. Co. (1893) 99 Cal. 407,
409, 411 [dismissing appeal from order making the receiver’s lien “prior and
paramount” to any other liens]; Schwartz v. Schwartz (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d
133, 137, 139–140 (Schwartz) [dismissing appeal from order authorizing
receiver to pay attorney’s fees]; Wilson v. Day (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 598, 599
[same].) In Title Insurance, the California Supreme Court explained the
underlying policy: “Where a court has taken possession and control of
property through a receiver, the preservation and proper management of
such property can best be effected by permitting the trial court, pending a
final hearing of the cause, to direct the receiver in the disposition of the funds
coming into his hands, without having its supervisory action subject to the
delay and inconvenience incident to repeated and successive appeals from
separate orders.” (Title Insurance, at p. 492.)
      Here, Golden appeals from an interim order. The March 3, 2022 order
does not settle the receiver’s account. Nor does it direct the payment of
compensation to the receiver. Instead, it authorizes the receiver to retain
counsel and increase the receivership certificate to pay the counsel’s retainer.
Both components fall squarely within the realm of authorized acts not

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appealable until final judgment. As the court in Schwartz explained, “[i]f the
ordered payment of [attorney’s] fees constitutes an improper disbursement of
funds in the hands of the receiver, the matter is subject to review and
adjustment on an appeal from the receiver’s final accounting.” (Schwartz,
supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 140.) So too here. Golden may seek relief from the
trial court for any issues with the receiver’s payment of attorney’s fees and
may raise any such issues in an appeal following a final accounting. (Heinze
v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. (9th Cir. 1904) 129 F.337, 340 [“If the sum so
paid were improperly disbursed, the error in its payment may be reviewed in
adjusting the receiver’s final account.”]; Rochat, supra, 91 Cal. at p. 357
[“The final account will refer to previous reports filed, and when that is
settled, any one aggrieved will be fully protected by an appeal”].)
      In her supplemental brief, Golden contends the March 3, 2022 order
falls under the collateral order doctrine. However, as Golden acknowledges,
the collateral order doctrine only applies to orders “directing payment of
money or performance of an act.” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d
365, 368.) The March 3, 2022 order does neither. It authorizes the receiver
to retain counsel and increase the receivership certificate. It does not direct
Golden (or anyone else) to pay money or perform an act. Accordingly, the
collateral order doctrine does not apply. (See Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33
Cal.2d 116, 119 [“It is not sufficient that the order determine finally for the
purposes of further proceedings in the trial court some distinct issue in the
case; it must direct the payment of money by appellant or the performance of
an act by or against him.”].)
      Golden seizes on the receiver’s quotation from Free Gold Mining Co. v.
Spiers (1901) 135 Cal. 130, 132—“if every order which the court might make
for the preservation or proper management of the property in its custody is

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subject to a direct appeal therefrom, not only would the court be greatly
hampered in its efforts to preserve the property, but the interests of all the
parties interested might be greatly prejudiced”—to assert that the court’s
March 3, 2022 order “does nothing to ‘preserve property.’ ” But the quoted
portion of Free Gold does not state the test for whether an interim order is
appealable. It only describes the rationale for limiting appeals from interim
orders. The March 3, 2022 order “does not finally determine the rights of the
appellants in the property involved in the action or in any part thereof, nor
does it direct the performance of any act by or against the appellants.” (Free
Gold, at p. 131.) It is therefore not appealable.

                                 DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

                                                                          DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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