Court Opinion

ID: 9767336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:16:58.660753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.638108
License: Public Domain

On Appellants’ Second Motion for Rehearing.
Motion denied.
BOND, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The discussion of law applicable to this-case has reached large proportions, but to decide the question correctly is the function of this Court, ánd that, too, on the record as here presented. The majority’s original opinion to which I voiced my dissent, after-wards reduced to writing, states that “the material questions on the trial on the merits are whether ambulatory picketing is a proper exercise of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, and, if so, whether the manner in which appellants conducted such ambulatory picketing would or would not come within a proper exercise of such rights. But (says the majority), such are not the questions here. * * * An early trial on the merits should be had to settle such issues, and if such early trial is not accorded either’ party on request, appellants are fully protected .by our statute, Art. 1824, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.”—writ of mandamus. 246 S.W.2d 680. (Emphasis mine.)
On motion for rehearing the majority holds that there is “a distinction between a legal ambulatory picketing and an illegal secondary picketing constituting a secondary boycott under our Anti-Trust statutes” *684arising by reason of the fact that the suit to enjoin the picketing is brought by “innocent third parties who have no labor dispute” rather than by the employer with whom there is an admitted labor dispute. 246 S.W.2d 681. It will’thus be seen that the majority holds, in effect, that ambulatory picketing generally is a proper exercise of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, but in the case at .bar the manner in which appellants conducted such ambulatory picketing was unlawful, because, forsooth, “innocent third parties,” rather than the employer with whom appellants are admittedly in a labor dispute, brought the suit to enjoin the picketing. In other words, such pronouncement'is that a citizen has a ■constitutional right to engage in a constitutionally protected activity, but that such activity loses its constitutional protection, depending on who seeks to impose upon such right. The exercise of a constitutional right’ should never depend on who brought the lawsuit, and such rights cannot lawfully be abridged by parties who have suffered inconveniences and damages.
Our Texas Supreme Court, in Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588, 595, which I referred to in my previous dissent, has put at rest the questions of law applicable to the case at bar, wherein is held: “Picketing does not offend against the statutes merely because third parties who came to the area of the dispute may prove sympathetic to one disputant rather than to the other.”
This declaration -of our Supreme Court has relation to “secondary picketing and boycotting and conspiracy in restraint of trade, as denounced by our statutes.” The Court further said: “Our holding does not conflict with Carpenters and Joiners Union et al. v. Ritter’s Cafe, Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 223; Id., Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 694; Id., 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143; Borden Co. et al. v. Local No. 133 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W.2d 828; er. ref., or Turner v. Zanes, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W.2d 144, er. ref. N.R.E., cited by respondents.”
The Texas Supreme Court, in the Henry case, supra, cited with approval the holding in Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Carlson v. People of State of Calif., 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104.
In the Thornhill case the United States Supreme Court said: “It may be that effective exercise of the means of advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the scene of the dispute. Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another group in society. But the group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests.”
In International Brotherhood, etc. v. Missouri Pacific Freight Transport, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 219, the dispute was with one Heisig. The operators of the Missouri Pacific Freight Transport were incidentally hampered by the picketing of Hei-sig in the vicinity of the place of business of the Missouri Pacific, plaintiff in the suit. Notwithstanding that Heisig was not a party to the suit, nevertheless the injunction was by the court dissolved. Likewise, in Sutter v. Amalgamated Street Railway Employees, 252 Ala. 364, 41 So.2d 190, and in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. United Brick & Clay Workers Union, 218 Ark. 707, 238 S.W.2d 945, the employers were in dispute, but were not parties to the suit; the courts held that innocent third parties were not entitled to enjoin the picketing. Again, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 218 Ark. 724, 238 S.W.2d 950, injunction was denied to a third party, “stranger” to the suit, ’ where the employer was not a party to the proceedings. In Sutter v. Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Railway and M.C.E., 252 Ala. 364, 41 So.2d 190, the owner of a bus terminal sought to- restrain picketing on the streets and sidewalks adjacent to the terminal which was directed against one.of the several carriers using the terminal; as was indicated by signs carried by the pick*685ets, as here, shown in the majority’s opinion; and although it appeared that other carriers used the terminal and space was leased to various concessionaires, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the action of the trial court in dissolving a temporary injunction, holding that the defendants •were within their constitutional rights in picketing, and that any injury resulting from their lawful acts fell within the rule damnum absque injuria.
To the same effect as above, see Consolidated Realty Co. v. Dyers, Finishers & Bleachers Federation, 137 N.J.Eq. 413, 45 A.2d 132; People v. Ribinovich, 171 Misc. 569, 13 N.Y.S.2d 135; also Pignataro v. Dejulis, 174 Misc, 836, 21 N.Y.S.2d 995; Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N.Y. 26, 69 N.E.2d 233, rehearing denied 296 N.Y. 851, 72 N.E.2d 31, affirming 270 App.Div. 852, 60 N.Y.S.2d 793.
In the last cited case the unions of the Building Trades Council maintained a picket line at a gateway leading from the public road into a subdivision in. an effort to induce the builder to employ union men, as a result of which, union employees of the Lighting Company refused to cross the picket line to connect gas and electric services to the plaintiff’s house. There the court in pointing out that there was unquestionably a labor dispute between the builder and the union, held that the fact that the plaintiff was not party to the labor dispute did not make the injunction any more appropriate. The court specifically said [296 N.Y. 26, 69 N.E.2d 234]: “It makes no difference who is the plaintiff. There is no jurisdiction n> issue such an injunction on any one’s application. * * * ”
In Norman v. Sullivan, 185 Misc. 957, 57 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857, wherein an injunction was refused to a third-party plaintiff where the employer was not a party to the suit, as here, the court said: “There is seldom, if ever, a strike but that some stranger to it suffers damage for which he cannot seek redress. These industrial facts of life were indubitably determined and considered by the Legislature when it enacted section 876-a [Civil Practice Act] and were in large measure recognized in the great body of law which had developed prior to the enactment of that statute. If immediate strangers to a labor dispute, such as the plaintiffs herein, can in effect break a strike by [obtaining injunction] the efforts of the courts to safeguard the basic rights of labor would be rendered nugatory.”
It is unfortunate in the circumstances of our times that Capital and Labor cannot reach an agreement in .this labor dispute without resorting to the courts. Laws and legal systems must take over and expand to meet changed conditions and problems. It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages and working, conditions in industry and a bargaining position which .makes these possible have an importance which is not less than, the interests of those in. the business or industry directly concerned. , The health of the present generation and of those yet unborn may depend on these matters, and.the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing. The merest glance at State and Federal Legislation on the subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to' inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423.
The facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion, dissemination of information, and free advertisement of grievances by peaceful picketing guaranteed by the Federal Constitution as construed by our Supreme Court. The cardinal principles of our government are in the Bill of Rights, liberty of speech and the press, as contained in our Constitution, Federal and State. So long as Americans love liberty, the Bill of Rights will remain unchanged and unchangeable. *686It is not a matter for our consideration as to whether or not the Constitution, or the constructions given it by our Supreme Courts with reference to the exercise of one’s rights of free speech, the freedom of the press, or of religion, are justified. In the cases, as here, the Supreme Courts, Federal and State, have exercised the power vested in them by our Constitution to make the construction; hence it is the duty of this Court to respect such decisions, and the writer has no hesitancy in doing so. A common prejudice should not be found in one; whose duty it is to rectify errors.
The judgment of the court below should be reversed and here rendered, dissolving the temporary injunction with admonitory order to the effect as shall comport with the Bill of Rights of the Constitution and the decisions of our Supreme Court, affecting the rights of the parties here involved.