Court Opinion

ID: 9665249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:43:18.366026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.197959
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Gackler Land Company, Inc., platted a twenty-acre strip of a larger tract into fifty-four lots and additional outlots. Restrictions were recorded limiting the use of the twelve lots fronting on Payne Lake to site-built homes and permitting the use of the remaining forty-two lots for mobile or prefabricated homes. A paved road serving all the lots was constructed in accordance with county road commission standards through the center of the strip, the lots were surveyed, graded and filled, monuments were set, excavation work for drainage was completed, and sewers were installed for some of the lots.1
When the plat was recorded in 1969, the township zoning ordinance permitted the construction of mobile or prefabricated homes on the back lots. *582In 1972, the township amended its zoning ordinance to restrict mobile homes as there defined to mobile home parks. Single-wide (fourteen foot) mobile or prefabricated homes had by then been placed on eleven back lots.
Gackler commenced this action, challenging the zoning restriction banning mobile or prefabricated homes except in mobile home parks. A few days before this Court’s decision in Robinson Twp v Knoll, 410 Mich 293, 310; 302 NW2d 146 (1981), the circuit judge found that the zoning restriction was reasonable, and that Gackler was not entitled to use the remaining back lots for single-wide prefabricated homes as a nonconforming use. In Robinson Twp, this Court held that the exclusion per se of mobile homes from all areas not designated as mobile home parks was not a permissible exercise of the police power. After Robinson Twp was decided, the judge granted a new trial.
Also after Robinson Twp, the township amended its zoning ordinance to permit mobile or prefabricated homes in residential zoning districts provided, among other criteria, the minimum width of the home was twenty-four feet. Over eighty-five percent of all the mobile or prefabricated homes sold are single wide, fourteen feet being the greatest width permitted on the highway. All the prefabricated homes placed in the subdivision were single wides.
The judge found that the new zoning standards respecting mobile or prefabricated homes located outside of mobile home parks were by and large valid. Addressing the twenty-four-foot width requirement, however, he said that the concern cannot be health or safety because both the federal and state governments2 permit the construction of *583prefabricated homes less than twenty-four feet wide. The judge said the concern is aesthetics, but aesthetics would not justify application of a twenty-four-foot width requirement in this subdivision "already one-third full of fourteen foot wide trailers.”
The judge ruled against Gackler because it had failed to establish that the restrictions imposed on the use of the Gackler property by the new zoning standards precluded use of the property for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted.3 Since the evidence indicated that the vacant lots would sell "for conventional or modular home occupancy if the asking price was realistic and if screening was provided for the existing mobile homes,” the "plight of plaintiff here simply does not rise to the level of confiscation.”
The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed:
[Although plaintiff presented evidence that the lots could be sold for the asking price of $3,500 if the buyers could use single-wide mobile homes, there was contradictory testimony that the lots were far overpriced and that the lots could be (and had been) used for modular and custom built homes.[4]
We would reverse because Gackler had estab*584lished, before the zoning ordinance was amended to prevent the use of the remaining back lots for single-wide prefabricated homes, a vested right to sell the lots for use as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes as a nonconforming use. We therefore find it unnecessary to comment on the standards enacted by the township after Robinson Twp, limiting the placement of mobile or prefabricated homes in residential zoning districts to those that are at least twenty-four feet wide and meet other criteria.5
A property owner who claims a vested right to a nonconforming use need not show that the land cannot feasibly be used in conformity with the changed zoning. The inquiry is whether the nonconforming use was established before the enactment of the zoning that would bar the use. If so, government may not interfere with the use without regard to whether the property can, consistent with the change in zoning, be used for another purpose.
i
Land development and building construction generally stretch out over a period of time. The question is at what point will a court recognize that the developer is entitled to protection from a change in zoning that would bar a use permitted when development or construction was commenced.
This Court has indicated that a vested right to a nonconforming use is established when there has been a tangible change in the land by excavation *585and construction or work has been done of a "substantial character.”6
A landowner who has reached a stage of substantial construction or action on the basis of existing zoning has the right to complete the development and to use the property in accordance with the zoning extant when the work was begun without regard to zoning amendments that thereafter become effective. Developers are thus assured that investments calculated on the basis of prevailing regulations will be protected.7_
*586Land is developed and buildings are constructed by private entrepreneurs for contemplated profit. The zoning of property often determines whether development or construction might be profitable. Absent the expectation of the contemplated profit, development and construction generally will not occur. The opportunity to earn the contemplated profit becomes an investment-backed expectation when the development reaches the point of substantial construction and cannot thereafter be thwarted or confiscated by a change in zoning on the premise that the property is not worthless as rezoned or could, consistent with the revised zoning, be devoted to a marginal or less profitable use.
A
Allowing that a nonconforming use with respect to the lots on which the eleven prefabricated homes had been installed might have been established, the township asserts that the right to a nonconforming use applies only to those lots on which prefabricated homes were in place at the time of the zoning change. There is no sewer service to a number of the back lots and no improvements specific to these lots. The township argues that the road construction, grading, and excavating were undertaken mainly for the benefit of the lakefront lots and do not justify permitting the nonconforming use of the remaining lots.8_
*587We agree with Gackler that the subdivision development should be viewed as a whole, as a structure only part of which had been completed, analogous to a building that is partially completed or to a nonconforming use that is established in a portion but not in all of a building before an amendment to a zoning ordinance rendering such structure or use nonconforming. It has been said that "the extension of the nonconforming use is permissible if the design of the building indicates that at the time of the passage of the zoning restriction it was intended that the building be dedicated in its entirety to such use.”9
Gackler had lawfully commenced this development in 1969 — before the change in zoning — and substantial sums of money had been spent in carrying out the construction plan. The pattern of development in this subdivision was well established by the time the township adopted the amendatory ordinance in 1972.10
B
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court *588decision ruling against Gackler on the nonconforming use issue, stating that the township did not know of the recorded restrictions permitting the use of the back lots for mobile or prefabricated homes when it approved the plat.11 The knowledge of the township might be important if Gackler could only prevail on the theory that the township had misled it by conduct and was therefore es-topped from taking contrary action.12 Gackler, however, established a vested right to a nonconforming use on the basis of expenditures and development in the subdivision, not on the basis of conduct by the township.
ii
Gackler relies on Richards v City of Pontiac, 305 Mich 666; 9 NW2d 885 (1943), where this Court found a vested right to continue operation of a trailer camp although in violation of a zoning ordinance because the owners had purchased the property and operated it as a trailer camp for one year before the enactment and subsequent amendment of a zoning ordinance and had spent $8,000 in improving the trailer camp. Gackler argues that in Richards there was no investigation whether each of the trailers in the park was in place before the passage of the ordinance; rather, the development was viewed as a whole. The township distinguishes Richards on the'basis that the issue there did not concern a subdivision with individually platted lots, but a trailer camp._
*589In Patchak v Lansing Twp, 361 Mich 489; 105 NW2d 406 (1960), the question was whether the nonconforming use applied to the entire fifteen acres of a trailer park owned by the plaintiffs or only to five acres. The trial court found that the trailer park was in operation only on the north five acres. The court noted that a license to operate the entire fifteen acres as a trailer park had not been sought; the fee paid with the application for the license was $25, which was the fee for each ten acres or fraction thereof. Patchak does not compel the result sought by the township.
The disposition of this issue by other state supreme courts is instructive. In Sarpy Co Bd of Comm’rs v Petsch, 17 Neb 263, 268; 109 NW2d 388 (1961), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that an owner of a trailer court had acquired a vested right to a nonconforming use of a three-acre tract. Before the zoning ordinance, the owner had used part of the three-acre tract as a trailer park and had installed thirteen trailers and staked out spaces for fifty-nine trailers. Water and sewer lines, power and telephone lines were made available for the entire tract. In allowing the owner to complete his project for fifty-nine trailers, the court said that "where a trailer-court project is partially completed when zoning regulations become effective, and the evidence is clear as to the extent of the project, the completed project will ordinarily determine the scope of the nonconforming use.”
In Blundell v West Helena, 258 Ark 123, 131; 522 SW2d 661 (1975), the landowner purchased a five-acre tract. Twelve mobile home spaces were laid out on the east side. A twenty-foot road was built to serve those spaces and thirteen additional spaces were laid out on the west side. Subsequently, a newly adopted zoning ordinance would *590have barred use of the property as a mobile home park. Mobile homes had been placed on four or five lots before adoption of the zoning restrictions. The Supreme Court of Alabama allowed the completion and use of the twenty-five spaces because the spaces were actually leveled, the road between them was constructed, and water and sewer service were available. Although all twenty-five spaces had not been occupied by mobile homes, the court concluded that "their state of development at that time, constituted a use of the property for a mobile home park” under the "substantial use” test.13_
*591In Eklund v Clackamas, 36 Or App 73, 82; 583 P2d 567 (1978),14 the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that a land developer had "established a vested right to complete” as a nonconforming use the fourth stage of a subdivision development where a water system capable of supplying water to houses to be built in the fourth stage had been completed, and the water supply line had been laid up to the land comprising the fourth stage. In the instant case, the paved road had been laid throughout the Gackler subdivision and other work had been done.
It is apparent that a land developer may acquire a vested right to a nonconforming use of improved vacant lots if the developer has the same kind of investment-backed expectation in a nonconforming use of improved lots that the owner of a nonconforming structure might have. A property owner is deemed to have acquired a vested right to a nonconforming use when he has made substantial expenditure in respect to the improvement of the property before the change in zoning.
hi
Under each of the tests stated by the courts— "substantial use,” "tangible change in the land,” "integral part”15 — Gackler had acquired a vested right to sell for use as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes all the back lots that had been improved with a paved road._
*592A
Gackler’s recorded plan of development contemplated sale of the lakefront lots for site-built houses and the back lots for mobile or prefabricated homes. The road was constructed and other improvements were made on the basis of that plan.
The remaining back lots could, indeed, as the Court of Appeals observed, be used consistent with the recorded restrictions either for site-built or mobile or prefabricated homes. It is apparent, however, from the recorded restrictions placed on the land, that Gackler expected to market the back lots for mobile or prefabricated homes. The placement of single-wide prefabricated homes on eleven lots before the change in zoning substantiates that purpose.
After eleven lots were devoted to the single-wide use, the remaining back lots were in a subdivision that had taken on the ambiance of a single-wide prefabricated home subdivision. The presence of single-wide prefabricated homes in the subdivision might be a positive factor for a potential buyer interested in purchasing a lot for a single-wide prefabricated home, but might be a negative factor for a potential buyer who might otherwise be interested in purchasing a lot to construct a site-built home.
All appear to agree that while the back lots could indeed have been used for site-built houses, and might have been saleable as sites for site-built homes if the price of the lots were reduced, they were more valuable if they could be used for a single-wide prefabricated home. Inherent in the concept of a vested right in a nonconforming use is that the landowner is not limited to the value that *593would be realized upon use in a manner conforming to the change in zoning.
B
The asserted justification for the twenty-four-foot-wide requirement is aesthetics, not health or safety.16 Implicit in that justification for requiring a width greater than fourteen feet should be recognition that once a subdivision has taken on the character of a single-wide prefabricated home subdivision, the remaining lots will be more readily saleable for single-wide prefabricated homes than for double wide or site-built homes.
Where land has been subdivided and improved as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes, there have been substantial expenditures for land improvements, and single-wide prefabricated homes have been placed on the land before a change in zoning, the land developer has established a vested right to use all the lots so subdivided and improved as a nonconforming use.
Land is developed for a specific use or market. Roads and other costly improvements are installed on the basis of existing zoning because zoning is a major factor in deciding whether the economics justify making any improvements at all. Just as an owner or builder relies on the existing zoning in commencing construction of a building, expecting to be able to use it upon completion for a particular use, a land developer, in constructing roads or other improvements, also relies on existing zoning *594and expects to be permitted to sell the improved lots for the use permitted by the zoning when he begins substantially to improve the land.
When Gackler began substantial construction of the road and other improvements on the basis of the existing zoning, which permitted sale of the lots for use as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes, it made the kind of substantial expenditure that requires a finding that a vested right to a nonconforming use of the back lots was established.
IV
The majority opinion states that because the road, sewer and other improvements to Gackler’s property made the back lots “as suitable for 'dwellings’ under the ordinance as they are for single-wide mobile homes,” there is “no concrete manifestation that development of the plat was dedicated in its entirety to the use as sites for single-wide homes.”17 (Emphasis in original.) It is stated, similarly, that the improvements “rendered the lots in the plat equally suitable for the placement of single-wide mobile homes and conventional dwellings” and therefore the improvements "do not constitute work of a substantial character which makes apparent an actual use of the plat as a single-wide mobile home plat.”18 It is said that Gackler is seeking "preservation of an option to sell the unsold lots as sites for future nonconforming uses”19 (emphasis in original) and that “the use of the entire plat as a single-wide mobile home *595plat rests solely within the owner’s contemplation.”20 (Emphasis in original.)
A
The nature of sewer, water, and road improvements is that they may be adapted to more than one use. Sewer and water mains and roads are needed for commercial, industrial, and residential uses. It is not a sufficient response to a land developer who has made expenditures for such improvements in reliance on existing zoning to say that the improvements have made the land as "suitable” or even "equally suitable,” however that might be defined, for a use consistent with the change in zoning as a use permitted under the former zoning.
Suppose a foundation for a high-rise office building is completed before a change in zoning. Or that sewer or water mains and roads are installed before a change in zoning increasing minimum lot size from 80 to 120 feet. A foundation for a highrise office building might and probably would be suitable for another use, say a high-rise apartment building. Sewer and water mains and roads constructed when zoning permits 80-foot lots are suitable (or equally suitable) for 120-foot lots. See Wood v North Salt Lake, 15 Utah 2d 245; 390 P2d 858 (1964), discussed in n 13.
Construction of those improvements might and most likely would not, however, have been economically justified where the land so improved is located if an apartment house must be constructed on the foundation rather than the contemplated office building or if the minimum lot size is 120 feet rather than 80 feet.
Suppose the community changes the minimum *596floor area of the home that may be constructed. When the sewer, water, road and other land improvements were made, the minimum floor area was 1,000 square feet, now it is 1,500 square feet. There might not be a market or as good a market in the area for homes of 1,500 square feet at a price that justifies the investment. Had the developer known that he would be required to build 1,500 square-foot houses, he would not have invested a dime in the land improvements.
Suppose the community decides, after sewer, water, road and other land improvements have been made, that there is a need for low-cost housing, and changes the zoning so that in the future homes cannot be built on the land so improved having a floor area in excess of 1,000 square feet. Again, from an economic standpoint, the developer might not have developed the land at all if that limitation had been imposed before he made his investment.
A developer, whether building structures above the ground or making underground or surface improvements, decides initially whether to invest at all in part on the basis of existing zoning. Just as a landowner might not invest in sewer or water mains or roads if the zoning provides for a minimum of 120-foot lots, a minimum of 1500 square feet, or a maximum of 1000 square feet, and the developer of a high-rise office building might not have proceeded if he could only build a high-rise apartment building, so too Gackler might not have proceeded to develop the back lots or the subdivision at all with road and other improvements unless it could market the back lots as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes. Gackler’s investment-backed expectation is as much entitled to protection as a lot developer confronted with a *597change in lot size or floor area or an office building developer.
Until a home is actually under construction, no lot developer can make "apparent”21 at the site an actual use of a lot. Until construction is under way, he could bow to a requirement increasing lot size from 80 to 120 feet, minimum floor area from 1,000 to 1,500 square feet, or establishing a maximum floor area of 1,000 square feet. Requiring an "apparent” actual use of each lot would mean that the investment-backed expectations of a lot developer cannot, until a home is actually under construction, give rise to a vested right in a use permitted when the investment is made.
B
Gackler’s effort in this litigation to secure the right to sell the back lots as sites for the construction of single-wide prefabricated homes has been characterized in the majority opinion as an effort to preserve an option to sell the unsold lots as sites for "future” nonconforming uses. Whenever a structure is under construction and has not been completed before the change in zoning occurs, the proposed use will be inchoate at the time the change in zoning is enacted. Merely because the use has not come into fruition does not constitute it a "future” nonconforming use.
The nature of land development is such that unsold lots will, in a sense, always be sites for future uses. This Court cannot in principle justifiably deny to land developers the same protection of their expenditures made on the basis of existing zoning as is secured to persons who make land improvements above the ground. Merely because a land developer might change the contemplated *598use, in whole or in part, to a use permitted by the change in zoning does not justify denying him protection if he wishes to develop the land in accordance with the zoning as it was when he made his investment. Although dwellings have not been built on the "entire” plat before the change in zoning, development in accordance with the prior zoning does not rest "solely within the owner’s contemplation.”
c
While a high-rise office building developer would have plans and a building permit showing that he intended to construct an office building, a land developer will be able to point to other evidence— as can Gackler — of his intention to use the land for a use permitted by the former zoning no longer permitted as a result of the change in zoning.
Gackler’s intention to use the entire plat as a single-wide prefabricated home plat did not rest solely within its contemplation. Single-wide prefabricated homes had been placed on eleven back lots by the time the change in zoning occurred. The recorded restrictions permitted construction on back lots of prefabricated homes and did not permit the construction of prefabricated homes on the lakefront lots. Gackler, of course, might have restricted the use of the back lots to the construction of prefabricated homes, but that would have been, in a sense, bootstrapping.
It is, I think, clear that Gackler planned the development of the back lots with prefabricated homes when it recorded the restrictions. Be that as it may, when it sold eleven lots for the construction thereon of prefabricated homes, it gave the area the ambiance or character of a prefabricated-home subdivision. Gackler had both invested in *599the construction of a road and utility lines, and had given the area a certain character before the change in zoning.
D
The underlying rationale of the vested right/ nonconforming use exception is that a property owner should be protected in making an investment on the basis of existing zoning to improve the land. Many nonconforming uses could be adapted by the expenditure of money, and some without any financial expenditure, to a use consistent with a use permitted following the change in zoning. Nevertheless, the owner is not required to change the use or to incur any financial loss.
A dwelling house in a residential neighborhood might have been converted into a small neighborhood store before there was any zoning. The store could readily be converted back to a dwelling. The owner is not required to do so merely because the structure is suitable for use as a dwelling and could be readily reconverted for that use.
Gackler’s selling experience indicates that it will suffer an economic loss if required to sell the back lots in conformity to the change in zoning. Instead of the price obtainable if the back lots can be sold as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes, it will obtain a lesser amount upon their sale for site-built homes. There is no difference in principle between requiring Gackler to reduce the price of the lots so that they can be sold for the construction of site-built homes than in asking the owner of any other nonconforming use to adapt it so that it can be used consistent with the change in zoning.
Gackler is asked, as might the owner of any nonconforming use, to take an economic loss after *600an investment in the property on the basis of existing zoning has been made so that the community can bring about a different kind of development or use than was formerly permitted. There is no difference between asking Gackler to pay for the cost of installing screening, as suggested by the trial judge and referred to in the majority opinion, to hide the existing prefabricated homes than in asking the owner of the foundation for a high-rise office building or of the house converted into a store to make the changes that are needed so that the foundation can be used for an apartment building and the store once again as a dwelling.
All such changes could be made. It is just a question of money. But that is what vested rights/ nonconforming uses are about — money, the owner or land developer’s money. If one focuses on the concept that an investment made on the basis of existing zoning should be protected, one will not indulge in artificial distinctions that ignore the underlying rationale of the vested right/nonconforming use exception.
E
A land or lot developer should be permitted to use the property for a use permitted when improvements are made unless22 the court can properly find that the investment was made without regard to the zoning. This Court has no basis for concluding that Gackler would have constructed the road and other improvements if the back lots could not have been sold as sites for single-wide prefabricated homes.
Gackler’s selling experience would suggest that *601it would not have been a prudent investment to improve the back lots for construction of site-built homes. If Gackler is required to reduce the asking price to a "realistic price,” as the majority opinion requires, Gackler’s investment may, by virtue of the change in zoning and the majority opinion, become unrealistic.
We would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Williams, C.J., concurred with Levin, J.
Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

The lots fronting on Payne Lake are all on the east side of the road.

 See National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety *583Standards Act of 1974, 42 USC 5401 et seq., and the State Construction Code Act, MCL 125.1501 et seq.; MSA 5.2949(1) et seq. The federal regulatory scheme is extensive, covering a variety of areas involving health and safety, and interior and exterior specifications. The Michigan Mobile Home Commission has control of all phases of proposed mobile home use and of the mobile home industry under the provisions of the Michigan Mobile Home Commission Act, MCL 125.1101 et seq.; MSA 19.855(1) et seq.

 The judge referred to this Court’s decisions in Ed Zaagman v City of Kentwood, 406 Mich 137; 277 NW2d 475 (1979), and Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139; 215 NW2d 179 (1974).

 Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 138 Mich App 1, 11-12; 359 NW2d 226 (1984).

 The disposition of this appeal we believe to be correct also makes it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by the parties and amici curiae. We defer to another day the question whether single-wide prefabricated homes may be barred from all residential zoning districts other than mobile home parks.

 Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296; 84 NW2d 537 (1957); City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394; 225 NW 500 (1929). In City of Lansing, this Court denied the right to proceed with construction of a building in violation of zoning because nothing had been done of a "substantial character towards the construction of the building” before notification that the building permit had been revoked under the new ordinance. The Court said there would have been no question that plaintiff would have been able to proceed with the building if he had done anything of a substantial character towards the construction of the building because he would then have created a vested property right which could not be destroyed by a subsequently enacted ordinance. The Court referred to a New York case, Rice v Van Vranken, 132 Misc 82; 229 NYS 32 (1928), in which a similar claim was asserted, and quoted with apparent approval language stating that the question is whether "there has been any tangible change in the land itself by excavation and construction.”
The township rural zoning act provides for continuance of nonconforming uses. MCL 125.286; MSA 5.2963(16) states that a nonconforming use is "[t]he lawful use of . . . land [that is] existing and lawful at the time of enactment of [the] zoning ordinance, or, in the case of [the] amendment of an ordinance, then at the time of the amendment . ...” A nonconforming use has been defined as a "use which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance, and which is maintained after the effective date of the ordinance although it does not comply with the use restrictions applicable to the area in which it is situated.” 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, §6.01, p 354. The nonconforming use must commence before the zoning restriction is imposed and be in existence when the zoning restriction is enacted.

 A developer invests in property with intentions to develop it according to current regulations. The price paid for the property reflects the developer’s understanding of what he will be able to do with it — what public regulations will permit. Further investments in plans, engineering tests and drawings, and even site improvements are all based on what the devel*586oper perceives as legally permissible under prevailing laws and regulations. [Strom, ed, "Protection of Vested Rights in the Development Process: Recommended Actions,” 1983 Zoning & Planning Law Handbook, § 5.03, p 82.]

 The excavating work was for the immediate benefit of the lakefront lots; the back lots were graded so that the dirt could be moved onto the lakefront lots. The road benefits all the lots.
The sewer extends to the last prefabricated home on Lakeside Drive, but there is no sewer service to the last part of Lakeside Court.

 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d rev ed), § 5.208, p 118.
In Hawkinson v Itasca Co, 304 Minn 367; 231 NW2d 279 (1975), the Supreme Court of Minnesota allowed a landowner to complete the second floor of a building, even though the area had been rezoned for residential use.
In Keller v City of Bellingham, 92 Wash 2d 726; 600 P2d 1276 (1979), the Supreme Court of Washington held that the addition of six electrolytic cells to manufacture chlorine to bring the building to the capacity of thirty-two cells as intended before a zoning ordinance barred manufacture in the area was not an enlargement of a nonconforming use.

 Lots 13-16, 18, 29, 31 and 34-37 had been put to use as sites for prefabricated homes. Gackler argues that these lots are not restricted to one area, such as the Lakeside Court cul-de-sac, but are placed "throughout” the vacant land west of the road. The township counters that there are only four vacant lots (17, 30, 32, and 33) between the lots with prefabricated homes and the remaining lots were not affected by the existing prefabricated homes.

 Gackler testified that the restrictions were presented to the township board in the spring of 1969 along with the plat for approval. The township asserted there were no restrictions incorporated in the plat when it was approved by the township board, and the township supervisor testified there was no mention of the restrictions in the board’s minutes covering this period of time.

 See 4 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning, § 50.04.

 The court found no vested right with respect to a planned additional twenty-five spaces at another end of the tract because, due to a serious drainage problem, such use was a "long range future plan” as a possible third phase of development.
In United Citizens of Mt Vernon v Zoning Bd, 109 Misc 2d 1080; 441 NYS2d 626 (1981), a New York court discussed the extension or expansion of a nonconforming use with respect to the proposed construction of elderly housing on six acres of land remaining on a parcel of 29.5 acres that had previously been developed as a home for orphans. The proposed construction of the elderly housing was in violation of zoning enacted subsequent to the original development of the land. The court said that "if the extension or expansion of the non-conforming use forms an integral part of the original contemplation for the entire parcel, then the right to such extension or expansion becomes vested from the inception and is likewise constitutionally protected.”
The New York court cited In re Syracuse Aggregate Corp v Weise, 72 AD2d 254, 257, 259; 424 NYS2d 556 (1980), aff'd 51 NY2d 278, 285; 434 NYS2d 150; 414 NE2d 651 (1980), where the court allowed the owner to excavate an entire twenty-five-acre parcel although only five acres had been excavated before the passage of the prohibitory ordinance. There the court said that whether a nonconforming use may be extended depends on " 'whether the nature of the incipient nonconforming use, in the light of the character and adaptability to such use of the entire parcel, manifestly implies an appropriation of the entirety to such use prior to the adoption of the restrictive ordinance. . . . Special term erred in its application of the rule that nonconforming uses may not be expanded, implementing a blanket rule that no additional land, beyond that utilized as of the time the ordinance became effective, may ever be entitled ....’”
The Utah Supreme Court, in Wood v North Salt Lake, 15 Utah 2d 245; 390 P2d 858 (1964), held that where a developer had installed water and sewer lines for each lot in an approved plat, he had the *591right to develop lots of 6000 square feet as permitted when the plat had been approved, but which would not conform to a zoning amendment that raised the lots size minimum to 7000 square feet.

 Overruled on other grounds, Forman v Clatsop Co, 63 Or App 617; 665 P2d 365 (1983).

 See United Citizens of Mt Vernon v Zoning’Bd, supra.

 As the circuit judge observed, it cannot seriously be suggested that a fourteen-foot-wide home is a threat to public health or safety.
There are many apartments and townhouses in major cities where land is valuable, with units less than fourteen feet wide, and where the value of a 14' x 70' unit would be a number of times the value of a double-wide prefabricated home located on a desirable site in rural or urban Michigan.

 Ante, pp 575-576.

 Id., p 576.

 Id., pp 577-578.

 Id., p 578.

 Id., pp 576-577.

 We recognize that ordinarily when a nonconforming use is claimed no inquiry is made whether the property can be used in conformity with the new or revised zoning.