Court Opinion

ID: 9914044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:02:57.052732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:55.782886
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128871

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT

                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 128871)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        SANTANA GRAYER, Appellant.

                             Opinion filed December 29, 2023.

        JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, and
     Cunningham concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice Rochford specially concurred, with opinion.

                                        OPINION

¶1       Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant,
     Santana Grayer, guilty of attempted vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 18-3
     (West 2020)). On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by
     arguing that, due to his state of voluntary intoxication, the State failed to prove
     beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to commit the
     offense.

¶2       A divided appellate court panel affirmed. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808. The
     majority first found that evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer relevant to
     the issue of intent given that the legislature amended section 6-3 of the Criminal
     Code of 1961 (now the Criminal Code of 2012) (Code) (Pub. Act 92-466, § 5 (eff.
     Jan. 1, 2002) (amending 720 ILCS 5/6-3)), removing voluntary intoxication as an
     affirmative defense. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶ 39. The majority went on to find
     that, even if voluntary intoxication remained relevant to specific-intent offenses,
     the evidence failed to establish defendant’s state of intoxication was so extreme that
     he was unable to form the requisite intent. Id. ¶ 42. We affirm defendant’s
     conviction and sentence but for different reasons than the appellate court.

¶3                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶4       At a bench trial, the victim, Arnold Ong, testified that on September 6, 2020,
     he drove his white Honda CRV for the ridesharing service Lyft. At about 6 p.m. he
     received a notification through the Lyft app with a new ride for a woman named
     Phyllis. When Ong arrived at the pickup location, he noticed a group of people
     gathered. Ong spoke to Phylliss, who told Ong that she purchased the ride for
     defendant. Ong testified that defendant could walk but swayed side to side and that
     defendant sounded intoxicated when he spoke.

¶5       Defendant got into the back seat, and Ong started to drive following the GPS
     directions from the Lyft app to the drop-off location. Ong did not know if the drop-
     off location was defendant’s house; he just followed the directions on the Lyft app.
     During the drive, defendant told Ong that he was going the wrong way. Ong told
     defendant that they were going in the correct direction by following the Lyft app’s
     GPS directions. Defendant raised his voice and told Ong multiple times that he
     wanted to drive the vehicle himself. Ong refused, and defendant became angry and
     grabbed Ong’s shirt. Defendant also put his right hand on his own waist, which Ong
     described as “trying to grab something, and I thought it was a deadly weapon.”
     While defendant held onto Ong, he told him, “I’m going to kill you” multiple times.
     Ong explained, “I was so scared at the time. And then I—that’s the time I realized

                                             -2-
     my life was at stake. So as soon as I found a gas station, I tried to pull over and seek
     some help from people around me.”

¶6       Ong pulled into a gas station, picked up the keys to his car and his cell phone,
     and exited the vehicle as fast as he could to avoid being harmed. Defendant also
     exited the vehicle and “chas[ed]” Ong around the car. Ong then went inside the gas
     station to call 911. Defendant stayed outside, next to Ong’s vehicle. Ong remained
     inside the gas station until police arrived, but at one point he stepped outside to
     check on his vehicle and saw defendant waiving Ong’s house keys that he had left
     inside the car.

¶7       Ong spoke with police when they arrived. He did not remember if he told the
     officers at the gas station that he thought defendant may have a gun or knife. Ong
     also did not tell the 911 dispatcher that he believed defendant had a weapon. Ong
     did not recall telling anyone inside the gas station convenience store that he thought
     defendant had a weapon. However, when Ong later spoke with police again at the
     police station, he told an officer that he thought defendant had a weapon.

¶8       The State submitted surveillance video of the incident from the gas station’s
     security system into evidence. The video shows Ong driving the car into the gas
     station and parking it next to a gas pump. Ong exits the vehicle first. Defendant
     then exits the vehicle, and Ong moves toward the front of the vehicle. Ong turns
     around when defendant also starts walking toward the front of the vehicle. Ong
     opens the driver’s door and picks up his car keys and cell phone and closes the door
     again when defendant approaches. Ong then started walking toward the back of the
     vehicle with defendant following him. Ong circles the vehicle once again while
     defendant follows.

¶9       When defendant is standing near the front driver’s side, he opens the door and
     looks at Ong over the top of the vehicle. Defendant stays there while Ong goes
     inside the gas station convenience store. Defendant then walks around the vehicle
     and leans against the rear passenger side door. Later, Ong opens the door to the gas
     station store, but Ong goes back inside when defendant starts walking toward him.
     Later in the video, defendant is seen standing next to the open driver’s door holding
     Ong’s house keys. Defendant is seen shaking the keys toward the convenience
     store.

                                              -3-
¶ 10       About 20 minutes after they arrived at the gas station, defendant enters the
       vehicle and sits in the driver’s seat. Defendant appears to be reaching toward the
       dashboard with the house keys in his hand, making a turning motion. Defendant
       repeats this motion several times. He then reclines the seat and lies back until police
       arrive.

¶ 11      The State rested. Defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf.

¶ 12       In closing arguments, defense counsel argued, in relevant part, that the State
       failed to prove the element of specific intent. Although counsel argued that the
       evidence showed that defendant could not form the specific intent to hijack the
       vehicle, counsel’s reliance on defendant’s voluntary intoxication focused on her
       argument that the evidence showed that defendant merely wanted to go home and
       was upset by the fact that he believed Ong was not driving in the correct direction.

¶ 13       The State argued that “being drunk isn’t an excuse for criminal activity and
       that’s what happened here.” According to the State, defendant articulated his intent
       to take the vehicle from Ong when he asked if he could drive and threatened to kill
       Ong when Ong refused. Additionally, defendant’s actions at the gas station
       supported a finding of intent given that defendant appeared to taunt Ong with the
       house keys he found inside the car along with the fact that the State believed the
       surveillance video showed defendant reach toward the vehicle’s ignition in an effort
       to start the vehicle.

¶ 14       After hearing the arguments, the court noted that there was “evidence of some
       intoxication” but that the other evidence showed that defendant was aware of his
       environment, knew different directions, and “knew that to his way of thinking” Ong
       was driving in the wrong direction. The court concluded that defendant was “not
       intoxicated as a legal defense.” The court found Ong’s testimony credible that
       defendant grabbed the sleeve of Ong’s shirt and reached toward his own waistband
       with his other hand. The court also found that the surveillance video showed that
       defendant attempted to start the car using Ong’s house keys. The court found
       defendant guilty of attempted vehicular hijacking and sentenced defendant to five
       years’ imprisonment.

                                                -4-
¶ 15      On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
       doubt that he had committed the offense. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶ 34. 1
       Defendant claimed the evidence failed to establish that he possessed the requisite
       specific intent to commit vehicular hijacking or that he took a substantial step
       toward the commission of that offense. Id. ¶ 32.

¶ 16       On the issue of intent, defendant acknowledged that voluntary intoxication is
       not an affirmative defense in Illinois. However, defendant argued his voluntary
       intoxication remained relevant to specific-intent offenses, like attempt. Considering
       his intoxication, defendant argued that his actions and statements were not
       indicative of an attempt to steal Ong’s car. Instead, the circumstances showed that
       he pulled on Ong’s sleeve to get his attention and that the threats to kill Ong were
       mere drunken hyperbole.

¶ 17       A majority of a divided appellate court panel framed defendant’s argument as
       “essentially contend[ing] that [defendant] was so intoxicated that he was unable to
       form the specific intent necessary to commit the offense of attempted vehicular
       hijacking.” Id. ¶ 38. The majority rejected the argument on the grounds that
       voluntary intoxication is no longer a defense, given that the legislature amended
       section 6-3, removing voluntary intoxication as a defense. Id. ¶¶ 38-41.
       Nevertheless, the majority went on to find that the evidence did not establish that
       defendant’s “intoxication was ‘so extreme’ as to suspend entirely his power of
       reasoning.” Id. ¶ 42. Defendant appeals.

¶ 18                                         II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19       In this court, defendant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove he
       had the specific intent to commit attempted vehicular hijacking beyond a reasonable
       doubt. Before considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider what
       role—if any—evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication has in this case. The
       parties agree that Illinois no longer recognizes the affirmative defense of voluntary
       intoxication after the legislature’s 2002 amendment to section 6-3 of the Code.

           1
             Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that he made a substantial step
       toward the commission of the crime. Additionally, he argued that his sentence was excessive. He
       does not raise either argument in this court.

                                                    -5-
       Nevertheless, defendant contends that the amendment to section 6-3 had no impact
       on either the State’s burden of proof or the relevancy of voluntary intoxication
       evidence at trial when it is offered to negate the State’s evidence that defendant had
       the specific intent to commit the charged offense.

¶ 20       Our review requires this court to interpret section 6-3 of the Code. “The primary
       objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s
       intent,” which is most reliably indicated by the “plain and ordinary” language of
       the statute. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. We may only look to other
       interpretive aids, such as legislative history, when the statutory language is
       ambiguous. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 135 (2005).

¶ 21      Prior to 2002, section 6-3 provided that an intoxicated or drugged person was

          “criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition either:

                  (a) Is so extreme as to suspend the power of reason and render him
              incapable of forming a specific intent which is an element of the offense; or

                  (b) Is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity
              either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
              to the requirements of law.” 720 ILCS 5/6-3 (West 2000).

       Under this version of section 6-3, a defendant could raise his or her state of
       intoxication (either voluntarily produced or involuntarily produced) as an
       affirmative defense. Involuntary intoxication contemplated intoxication induced by
       some external influence such as trick, artifice, or force but also unexpected and
       unwarned adverse side effects from medication taken on doctor’s orders. People v.
       Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 295 (2006). Voluntary intoxication, which is at issue here,
       could be raised as an affirmative defense to specific-intent crimes. Raising the
       defense triggered the State’s burden to not only prove the elements of the crime but
       also to disprove the defense. 720 ILCS 5/3-2(b) (West 2000).

¶ 22       In 2002, the legislature amended section 6-3 to its present form. It now provides
       that an intoxicated individual “is criminally responsible for conduct unless such
       condition is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity either
       to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
       requirements of law.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/6-3 (West 2020). Now, a

                                                -6-
       defendant’s state of intoxication can be relied on as an affirmative defense only if
       it is involuntarily produced. Under the plain and unambiguous language of section
       6-3, Illinois no longer recognizes voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense.
       See 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Himber, 2020 IL App (1st)
       162182, ¶ 55); People v. Jackson, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1196, 1201 (2006); People v.
       Rodgers, 335 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433 n.1 (2002). Therefore, we need not look to the
       legislative history to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Powell, 217 Ill. 2d at 135.

¶ 23        However, the amendment to section 6-3 does not mean evidence of voluntary
       intoxication is barred from being introduced at trial to negate the State’s evidence
       of intent for specific-intent offenses. The amendment had no effect on the State’s
       burden of proving all elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
       including the requisite mental state. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
       Attempted vehicular hijacking is a specific-intent offense. Unlike general intent
       offenses, which only require that the prohibited result be reasonably expected to
       flow from the accused’s voluntary act, specific-intent offenses require the State to
       prove that a defendant intended to commit the stated offense. People v. Harris, 72
       Ill. 2d 16, 27-28 (1978). In other words, specific-intent crimes require the State to
       prove that defendant subjectively desired the prohibited result. People v. Garland,
       254 Ill. App. 3d 827, 832 (1993); see also People v. Slabon, 2018 IL App (1st)
       150149, ¶ 33.

¶ 24       Reliance on a defendant’s state of voluntary intoxication, therefore, is now a
       question of admissibility under the Illinois Rules of Evidence, rather than its
       recognition as an affirmative defense. See generally People v. Valdez, 2022 IL App
       (1st) 181463, ¶ 116 (“Whether a doctrine is recognized as an affirmative defense is
       an entirely different question from whether certain evidence is admissible to
       disprove an element of the charged crime under the facts of a particular case.”).
       Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable.
       People v. Rodgers, 53 Ill. 2d 207, 214-15 (1972). Since there is a subjective
       component to specific-intent crimes and intoxication affects an individual’s
       subjective mental state, a defendant’s state of voluntary intoxication may be one of
       many relevant circumstances for the trier of fact to consider.

¶ 25       We note that defendant relies on the Illinois Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions
       to argue evidence of voluntary intoxication remains relevant for specific-intent

                                               -7-
       crimes because it still contains instructions regarding voluntary intoxication even
       after the legislature’s 2002 amendment. Defendant contends that this court’s jury
       instruction committee agrees that the 2002 amendment to section 6-3 did not
       change the relevance of voluntary intoxication since the current instructions
       recognize that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication may render him “incapable of
       forming a specific intent.” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 24-25.02
       (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 24-25.02). The committee
       reviewed the jury instructions after the 2002 amendment to section 6-3 and added
       the comment to the instructions that “Public Act 92-466, effective January 1, 2002,
       amended Section 6-3 of the Criminal Code to delete voluntary intoxication or
       drugged condition as an affirmative defense.” IPI Criminal Nos. 24-25.02,
       Committee Note, and 25.02A, Committee Note (approved July 29, 2016).
       According to defendant, this means the committee concluded that the instruction
       did not need to be changed, demonstrating that it determined that the 2002
       amendment to section 6-3 had no impact on the relevance of a defendant’s
       voluntary intoxication at trials for specific-intent offenses. As discussed above, we
       agree that voluntary intoxication remains relevant at trial for specific-intent
       offenses, but this instruction only applies to charges for offenses that are committed
       prior to the 2002 amendment to section 6-3.

¶ 26        At the end of the day, the question of defendant’s state of mind at the time of
       the offense is a question for the trier of fact to decide. People v. Pertz, 242 Ill. App.
       3d 864, 903 (1993). A defendant has the right to both present a defense and
       defendant’s version of the facts to the trier of fact so it may decide where the truth
       lies. People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1977). Accordingly, although no longer
       recognized as an affirmative defense, we hold that the legislature’s decision to
       amend section 6-3 does not serve as a categorical bar to presenting evidence of
       voluntary intoxication as a means of attacking the State’s claim that defendant had
       the requisite specific intent to commit the charged offense.

¶ 27      We now turn to the merits of defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument.
       The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
       Constitution requires that a defendant may not be convicted “ ‘ “except upon proof
       beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
       which he is charged.” ’ ” People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting
       People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004), quoting In re Winship, 397

                                                 -8-
       U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). A reviewing court, faced with a challenge to the sufficiency
       of the evidence, must determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
       most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
       essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in
       original.) Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

¶ 28       To sustain a conviction for attempted vehicular hijacking, the State must first
       show attempt in that, with the intent to commit a specific offense, a person does
       any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.
       720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2020). “A person commits vehicular hijacking when he
       or she knowingly takes a motor vehicle from the person or the immediate presence
       of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” Id. § 18-
       3(a). In this case, the only issue is whether the State proved that defendant had the
       specific intent to commit the charged offense. “The intent to commit a criminal
       offense need not be expressed, but may be inferred from the conduct of the
       defendant and the surrounding circumstances.” People v. Terrell, 99 Ill. 2d 427,
       431-32 (1984). “Absent direct evidence, intent must be proven circumstantially,
       and a conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone.” People v.
       Murphy, 2017 IL App (1st) 142092, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Johnson, 28 Ill. 2d 441,
       443 (1963)).

¶ 29       In this case, Ong testified that defendant believed Ong was not driving in the
       correct direction and became angry. Defendant grabbed the sleeve of Ong’s shirt
       and asked Ong to let him drive. When Ong refused and told defendant they were
       following the directions on the GPS, defendant threatened to kill Ong several times.
       Although Ong never testified that he believed defendant would steal his car, a
       specific demand is not required if the circumstances are sufficient to show intent.
       Defendant’s threats caused Ong to fear for his life given that Ong observed
       defendant reach for his waistband, under which Ong thought could be a dangerous
       weapon. This caused Ong to pull the car into the gas station, abandon his car, and
       retreat inside the gas station convenience store to call 911. Given this, we find the
       evidence is sufficient to establish defendant had the specific intent to commit the
       offense by making a threat of imminent force while asking to take control of Ong’s
       vehicle, notwithstanding defendant’s state of voluntary intoxication.

                                               -9-
¶ 30       Defendant challenges this conclusion by arguing that defendant’s intent of
       pulling Ong’s sleeve was based on his belief that Ong was driving him in the wrong
       direction and that his threats to kill Ong were “mere drunken hyperbole.” We
       acknowledge that a reasonable person believing his Lyft driver is not taking him to
       the correct destination would be terrifying, especially when the person is under the
       influence. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶ 61 (Gordon, P.J., dissenting). However,
       defendant mistakenly focuses on the reason why he tried to take Ong’s car by force,
       but it does not matter why defendant intended to take Ong’s car by force. Attempted
       vehicular hijacking only requires an intent to take a vehicle by force or threat of
       imminent force. Moreover, defendant never raised a self-defense or necessity claim
       to excuse his actions.

¶ 31       Defendant also relies on his conduct after Ong parked the car to argue that his
       threats were not evidence of intent to commit vehicular hijacking. In defendant’s
       view, his conduct at the gas station was consistent with an intoxicated individual
       wanting to go home and not that of a person who just tried to steal a vehicle.
       Defendant points out that he waited outside the vehicle for five minutes before he
       opened the car and found Ong’s house keys. He also did not get into the driver’s
       seat until 20 minutes had passed since arriving at the gas station. Defendant also
       believes that his act of shaking the keys in Ong’s direction supports an inference
       that defendant wanted Ong to complete the drive. Further, the surveillance video
       supports multiple inferences, including an inference that he was adjusting the radio,
       rather than attempting to start the vehicle. Finally, defendant ultimately appeared
       to fall asleep in the driver’s seat.

¶ 32       We reject this argument. The State was not required to exclude every reasonable
       alternative explanation consistent with defendant’s innocence (People v. Larson,
       379 Ill. App. 3d 642, 654 (2008)), and the trier of fact was free to reject these
       hypothetical alternative explanations for his actions that day. Our review under the
       sufficiency of the evidence standard requires this court to draw all reasonable
       inferences in favor of the State. People v. Gonzalez, 239 Ill. 2d 471, 478 (2011).
       Under this standard it is reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude that defendant’s
       actions outside the gas station convenience store were consistent with an intent to
       commit the offense of attempted vehicular hijacking. Defendant did not leave the
       scene after Ong parked at the gas station. Instead, he followed Ong around the
       vehicle. Ong reached into the vehicle to retrieve his car keys and cell phone. After

                                               - 10 -
       Ong fled to the gas station convenience store, defendant stood between the vehicle
       and the convenience store, effectively blocking Ong’s path back to his vehicle. Ong
       attempted to exit the store but retreated when defendant started walking toward
       him. Defendant eventually accessed the driver’s door and found a set of keys, which
       he held up and shook in Ong’s direction. Given that he may have believed he
       possessed the keys to Ong’s vehicle, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant
       taunted Ong by shaking the keys in his direction. While it is possible to infer
       defendant only intended for Ong to complete the trip, that conclusion is rebutted by
       the fact that defendant chose to get into the driver’s seat of the vehicle, rather than
       return to the passenger’s seat. Consequently, we conclude the evidence is sufficient
       regardless of whether the surveillance video supports either an inference that
       defendant attempted to start the vehicle or an inference that defendant attempted to
       use the radio when seated in the driver’s seat.

¶ 33                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Illinois does not recognize the
       affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication, but evidence of voluntary
       intoxication, when relevant and admissible, may be considered by the trier of fact
       when determining whether the State has proven that defendant had the requisite
       mental state for specific-intent offenses. We further hold that the evidence in this
       case is sufficient to prove defendant committed the offense of attempted vehicular
       hijacking beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s
       conviction and sentence.

¶ 35      Judgments affirmed.

¶ 36      JUSTICE ROCHFORD, specially concurring:

¶ 37       I agree with my colleagues that the evidence was sufficient to support
       defendant’s conviction of attempted vehicular hijacking, and I therefore concur in
       the judgment. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendants in Illinois
       may use evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent. The appellate
       court correctly determined that section 6-3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code)

                                               - 11 -
       (720 ILCS 5/6-3 (West 2020)) does not allow a defendant to use evidence of
       voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶¶ 37-
       42.

¶ 38       This question is answered by section 6-3’s plain language, which is clear on
       this point:

              “§ 6-3. Intoxicated or drugged condition.

              A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally
          responsible for conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and
          deprives him of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
          conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” (Emphasis
          added.) 720 ILCS 5/6-3 (West 2020).

       Defendant argues that he is not guilty because his voluntary intoxication prevented
       him from forming the specific intent required to convict him of attempted vehicular
       hijacking. This is of no moment because section 6-3 states that he is criminally
       responsible for conduct unless the intoxication was involuntarily produced.

¶ 39       Thus, the statute does more than provide an affirmative defense of involuntary
       intoxication. It specifically states that, where the affirmative defense is not
       available, an intoxicated person is criminally responsible for conduct. Therefore, it
       is incorrect to say that a defendant may use evidence of voluntary intoxication to
       establish that he was not criminally responsible. The majority’s holding that a
       defendant’s voluntary intoxication is relevant to whether he had the specific intent
       to commit a crime (supra ¶ 24) is contrary to section 6-3’s plain language. Section
       6-3 makes evidence of voluntary intoxication irrelevant in determining a
       defendant’s criminal responsibility.

¶ 40       A brief review of how section 6-3 has evolved over the years shows that the
       legislature no longer intends for voluntary intoxication to be a defense to specific-
       intent crimes. As originally enacted, section 6-3 provided:

          “A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally
          responsible for conduct unless such condition either:

                                              - 12 -
                  (a) Negatives the existence of a mental state which is an element of the
              offense; or

                  (b) Is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity
              either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
              to the requirements of law.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, ¶ 6-3.

       As one commentator has noted, this statute abolished the common-law distinction
       between general- and specific-intent crimes and went even further than the Model
       Penal Code in that it would have allowed intoxication to negate any mental state,
       including recklessness. See Timothy P. O’Neill, Illinois’ Latest Version of the
       Defense of Voluntary Intoxication: Is It Wise? Is It Constitutional?, 39 DePaul L.
       Rev. 15, 25 (1989). However, the Illinois courts would be slow to recognize the
       sweep of this language, and some would still draw a distinction between general-
       intent and specific-intent crimes. Id. at 26-29.

¶ 41       In 1988, however, the legislature amended the statute to bring back the
       distinction between crimes of general and specific intent:

             “§ 6-3. Intoxicated or drugged condition. A person who is in an intoxicated
          or drugged condition is criminally responsible for conduct unless such
          condition either:

                  (a) Is so extreme as to suspend the power of reason and render him
              incapable of forming a specific intent which is an element of the offense; or

                  (b) Is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity
              either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
              to the requirements of law.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/6-3 (West
              2000).

       Under this version of the statute, voluntary intoxication was a defense only to
       specific-intent crimes.

¶ 42      Finally, in 2001, the legislature amended the statute to its current form,
       completely eliminating voluntary intoxication as a defense. And yet, the majority
       holds that the effect of the legislature eliminating the ability of a defendant to use

                                               - 13 -
       evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent is that defendants may
       still use evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent. Supra ¶ 23.

¶ 43       According to the majority, the legislature’s intent with the 2001 amendment
       was to make a minor procedural change. The majority concludes that the
       legislature’s intent was simply to eliminate voluntary intoxication as an affirmative
       defense but to still allow defendants to use evidence of voluntary intoxication to
       negate the intent element of specific-intent crimes. Supra ¶ 23. I find this
       conclusion unconvincing for several reasons. First, the statute was already couched
       in terms of negating specific intent. The previous version of the statute would have
       allowed evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the intent element of specific-
       intent crimes. But the legislature eliminated this provision in its entirety.

¶ 44        Second, any procedural distinction between voluntary intoxication negating
       specific intent being an affirmative defense or merely an evidentiary question is
       minor. As the majority notes, if it is an affirmative defense, the State would have
       had to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Supra ¶ 21. The State would
       do so by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that, in spite of evidence of defendant’s
       voluntary intoxication, he had the requisite specific intent to commit the offense. If
       it is not an affirmative defense but merely an evidentiary matter, the State would
       still have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had the requisite
       specific intent despite his voluntary intoxication. In either scenario, the State would
       be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in the face of evidence of voluntary
       intoxication, that a defendant had the specific intent required to commit the offense.
       For instance, assume that this case had been tried under the previous version of the
       statute and defendant had asserted voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense.
       Would this court’s analysis look any different? Presumably, this court would have
       reviewed the evidence and concluded, as it does here, that the evidence was
       sufficient to establish defendant’s specific intent to commit the offense
       notwithstanding defendant’s state of voluntary intoxication. See supra ¶ 29. Any
       difference between voluntary intoxication negating specific intent being an
       affirmative defense or an evidentiary matter is so negligible that one wonders why
       the legislature would even bother making such a change.

¶ 45      Third, it is reasonable to assume that, if the legislature intended what the
       majority believes that it did—that defendants could still use evidence of voluntary

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       intoxication to negate specific intent but that it is not an affirmative defense—the
       legislature would have amended section 6-4 instead of section 6-3. Article 6 of the
       Code is titled “Responsibility.” Id. art. 6. Section 6-4 provides that a defense based
       on a provision of article 6 is an affirmative defense, but it then provides an
       exception for mental illness:

           “Affirmative Defense. A defense based upon any of the provisions of Article 6
           is an affirmative defense except that mental illness is not an affirmative defense,
           but an alternative plea or finding that may be accepted, under appropriate
           evidence, when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised or the plea of guilty
           but mentally ill is made.” Id. § 6-4.

       The legislature could have left subsection (a) of the previous version of section 6-
       3 (720 ILCS 5/6-3(a) (West 2000)) intact but then provided in section 6-4 that
       voluntary intoxication under section 6-3(a) is not an affirmative defense. But this
       is not what the legislature did. The legislature eliminated the provision allowing
       defendants to use evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent and
       provided that, in circumstances in which the affirmative defense of involuntary
       intoxication is not available, an intoxicated defendant is criminally responsible for
       conduct.

¶ 46       One can certainly make a reasonable argument that defendants should be
       allowed to use evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate any mental state. Absent
       constitutional concerns, however, we are obligated to enforce the statute as written
       whether we agree with the legislature’s choice or believe that it is wise. 2 The
       legislature has clearly and unequivocally stated that an intoxicated defendant is
       criminally responsible for conduct unless the affirmative defense of involuntary
       intoxication is available. The appellate court correctly concluded that section 6-3
       no longer allows defendants to use evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate
       specific intent. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶¶ 37-42. I therefore concur in the
       majority’s judgment affirming defendant’s conviction, but I disagree with the

           2
            Defendant has not raised any arguments about the statute’s constitutionality. In Montana v.
       Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
       Montana statute providing that evidence of a defendant’s intoxicated condition could not be
       considered in determining a mental state that is an element of an offense.

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majority’s holding that defendants in Illinois may use evidence of voluntary
intoxication to negate the intent element of specific-intent crimes.

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