Court Opinion

ID: 9898575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:36.691483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.061441
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                             May 9, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint                             No. 56616-8-II
Petition of:

 CAROLL LEE POLLARD,                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                               Petitioner.

       MAXA, P.J. – Carroll Pollard seeks relief regarding the trial court’s imposition of

community custody conditions following Pollard’s guilty plea to a charge of second degree child

rape. Pollard argues in his personal restraint petition (PRP) that the challenged community

custody conditions should be stricken because they are not crime-related.

       We hold that (1) Pollard’s claims that the community custody conditions regarding the

use and possession of alcohol, frequenting establishments or areas catering to minor children,

and being in any place where alcoholic beverages are the primary sale item are time barred

because the inclusion of these conditions does not render the judgment and sentence facially

invalid, (2) the community custody condition regarding pornographic material is facially invalid

because it is unconstitutionally vague, and (3) the community custody condition requiring

plethysmograph examinations is facially invalid because it violates settled law.

       Accordingly, we dismiss as time barred Pollard’s claims that the community custody

conditions regarding the use and possession of alcohol, frequenting establishments or areas
No. 56616-8-II

catering to minor children, and being in any place where alcoholic beverages are the primary sale

item are improper. However, we remand for the trial court to strike or revise the community

custody conditions regarding pornographic material and plethysmograph examinations.

                                             FACTS

       In November 2002, Pollard had sexual intercourse with his 12-year-old granddaughter.

Pollard pled guilty to second degree child rape. The trial court sentenced Pollard to 125 months

of confinement and community custody for any period that he is released from total confinement

before the expiration of the maximum sentence. The trial court imposed numerous conditions of

community custody. Pollard appealed his sentence, and a commissioner of this court affirmed in

March 2004.

       In September 2021, Pollard filed a CrR 7.8 motion in the trial court. In this motion,

Pollard argued that several of his community custody conditions should be stricken because they

were either not crime-related or they are unconstitutional. The trial court transferred the motion

to this court as a PRP because his claims were time barred under RCW 10.73.090. Pollard

challenged additional community custody conditions in a supplemental brief.

                                           ANALYSIS

A.     SCOPE OF REVIEW

       In his PRP, Pollard lists 12 community custody conditions that he argues should be

stricken. However, a majority of the conditions on this list are not contained in the judgment and

sentence. Pollard’s counsel surmises that these conditions were imposed by the Indeterminate

Sentencing Review Board (ISRB) pursuant to Pollard’s release from custody. But Pollard did

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No. 56616-8-II

not appeal the ISRB’s imposition of conditions and the ISRB is not a party to this action.

Therefore, we cannot consider the challenge to these conditions.

       However, as the State concedes, two of the community custody conditions Pollard lists in

his PRP are identical to one found in the judgment and sentence:

       Defendant shall not enter into or frequent business establishments or areas that cater
       to minor children without being accompanied by a responsible adult. Such
       establishments may include but are not limited to video game parlors, parks, pools,
       skating rinks, school grounds, malls or any areas routinely used by minors as areas
       of play/recreation.

Response to PRP, App. A at 8. In addition, two of the conditions Pollard lists in his PRP are

similar to one found in the judgment and sentence: (1) “Defendant shall not be in any place

where alcoholic beverages are sold by the drink for consumption or are the primary sale item,”

Response to PRP, App. A at 7; and (2) “Defendant shall not possess or use any pornographic

material or equipment of any kind and shall not frequent establishments that provide such

materials for view or sale.” Response to PRP, App. A at 9.

       In Pollard’s supplemental brief, he challenges an additional community custody condition

found in the judgment and sentence: “Defendant shall not use or possess alcoholic beverages at

all.” Response to PRP, App. A at 7.

       Finally, in the trial court the State conceded in its response to Pollard’s CrR 7.8 motion

that the community custody condition regarding pornographic material and the following

condition is improper: “Defendant shall submit to periodic plethysmograph examinations at the

direction of his/her community corrections officer to ensure compliance with the conditions of

community placement/custody.” Response to PRP, App. A at 9.

       We will address these five community custody conditions.

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No. 56616-8-II

B.     PRP TIME BAR

       The State argues that Pollard’s petition is time barred because the judgment and sentence

is facially valid and Pollard does not argue that any time bar exception applies. We conclude

that some but not all of Pollard’s claims are time barred.

       1.    Legal Principles

       A collateral attack is “any form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal.” RCW

10.73.090(2). Under RCW 10.73.090(1), a defendant may not collaterally attack their judgment

and sentence “more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence

is valid on its face” unless one of the exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 applies. RCW 10.73.100

lists six exceptions to the one-year time limit. Unless a petitioner shows that the judgment and

sentence is facially invalid or one of the RCW 10.73.100 exceptions applies, a collateral attack is

time barred. In re Pers. Restraint of Hemenway, 147 Wn.2d 529, 532-33, 55 P.3d 615 (2002).

       Pollard does not claim that any of the RCW 10.73.100 exceptions apply here. Instead, he

argues that the imposed community custody conditions are facially invalid.

       A judgment and sentence is facially invalid if the trial court imposes a sentence that was

not authorized under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW (SRA). In re

Pers. Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo, 176 Wn.2d 759, 767, 297 P.3d 51 (2013). In other words,

facial invalidity exists when a trial court “exercised power that it did not have, most typically by

exceeding its substantive or statutory authority.” State v. Fletcher, 19 Wn. App. 2d 566, 573,

497 P.3d 886 (2021).

       However, a judgment and sentence is facially invalid only if the alleged error is evident

on the judgment and sentence’s face without further elaboration. Id. If a petitioner must rely on

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No. 56616-8-II

external documents to show facial invalidity, the judgment and sentence is not facially invalid.

In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 139-41, 267 P.3d 324 (2011).

       If a PRP raises one or more claims that fall within one of the statutory exceptions in

RCW 10.73.100 but also raises one or more claims that are time barred, the PRP is a “mixed

petition” that must be dismissed. In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 21 Wn. App. 2d 826, 830, 508

P.3d 687 (2022). However, this rule does not bar consideration of claims that allege that the

judgment and sentence is facially invalid. In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 200 Wn.2d 622,

632, 520 P.3d 933 (2022).

       2.   Using or Possessing Alcohol

       Pollard argues that the community custody condition prohibiting him from using or

possessing alcoholic beverages is improper because it is not crime-related. But RCW

9.94A.703(3)(e) expressly states that a trial court may impose a condition requiring an offender

to “[r]efrain from possessing or consuming alcohol.” Therefore, there is no requirement that this

condition be crime related.

       We conclude that inclusion of this condition does not render the judgment and sentence

facially invalid. Therefore, we hold that this claim is time barred.

       3.   Crime-Related Conditions

       Pollard argues that two additional community custody conditions are improper because

they are not crime related: (1) the condition prohibiting him from frequenting establishments or

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No. 56616-8-II

areas catering to minor children,1 and (2) the condition prohibiting him from being in any place

where alcoholic beverages are the primary sale item.

       Under RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f), the trial court may require an offender to “[c]omply with

any crime-related prohibitions.” A crime-related prohibition must “directly relate[] to the

circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted. RCW 9.94A.030(10).

There must be a basis for connecting the condition to the crime. State v. Geyer, 19 Wn. App. 2d

321, 331, 496 P.3d 322 (2021).

       Here, the trial court had substantive and statutory authority to impose discretionary

crime-related conditions. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f). Determining whether community custody

conditions are crime-related is discretionary, and a trial court does not abuse its discretion if

there is a reasonable relationship between the crime of conviction and the condition. State v.

Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 683-84, 425 P.3d 847 (2018). This determination is fact-specific and

cannot be made based only on the judgment and sentence.

       Because we cannot determine whether the conditions are crime-related without

conducting a fact-specific inquiry, we conclude that inclusion of these conditions does not render

the judgment and sentence facially invalid. Therefore, we hold that this claim is time barred.

       4.    Condition Regarding Pornographic Material

       The Supreme Court has held that a community custody condition prohibiting access to or

possession of “pornographic material” is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d

739, 758, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). Therefore, we conclude that inclusion of this condition is a

1
 The Supreme Court has held that a similar community custody condition satisfies due process.
State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 245, 449 P.3d 619 (2019).

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No. 56616-8-II

facially invalid defect in the judgment and sentence and the challenge to this condition is not

time barred. And because of the facial invalidity, this PRP is not a mixed petition even though

other claims are time barred. Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 632.

       5.   Condition Requiring Plethysmograph Examinations

       A trial court has authority to order a defendant to submit to plethysmograph testing in

conjunction with sexual deviancy treatment. State v. Peters, 10 Wn. App. 2d 574, 595, 455 P.3d

141 (2019). However, using plethysmograph testing as a monitoring tool is improper. Id. A

community custody condition can allow plethysmograph testing only for treatment purposes and

not for monitoring. Id.

       Here, the plethysmograph condition exceeded the trial court’s authority because it was

imposed to ensure compliance with community custody conditions. Therefore, we conclude that

inclusion of this condition is a facially invalid defect in the judgment and sentence and the

challenge to this condition is not time barred. And because of the facial invalidity, this PRP is

not a mixed petition even though other claims are time barred. Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 632.

C.     MERITS ANALYSIS

       As noted above, the condition prohibiting Pollard from possessing or using any

pornographic material is unconstitutionally vague. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 758. On the other hand,

a community custody condition prohibiting an offender from possessing, using, accessing, or

viewing any “sexually explicit material” is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 760; see also

Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 680. Therefore, on remand the trial court either should strike this

condition or revise the condition so it is not unconstitutionally vague.

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No. 56616-8-II

        And as noted above, the condition requiring Pollard to undergo plethysmograph testing at

the request of his community custody officer is improper. Peters, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 595.

However, such a condition is proper in conjunction with sexual deviancy treatment. Id.

Therefore, on remand the trial court either should strike this condition or revise the condition so

it complies with the law.

                                          CONCLUSION

        We dismiss as time barred Pollard’s claims that the community custody conditions

regarding the use and possession of alcohol, frequenting establishments or areas catering to

minor children, and being in any place where alcoholic beverages are the primary sale item are

improper. However, we remand for the trial court to strike or revise the community custody

conditions regarding pornographic material and plethysmograph examinations.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                      MAXA, P.J.

 We concur:

 LEE, J.

 PRICE, J.

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