Court Opinion

ID: 9721804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:09:49.811652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:42.509816
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, J.
I dissent.
This case involves an appeal by the plaintiffs from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Sheriff Block. Plaintiffs assert that there are triable *646issues of fact, thus precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant Sheriff Block. Issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot on which summary judgment law turns. (Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331, 338 [138 Cal.Rptr. 670].) Where defendant seeks summary judgment, his declarations and evidence must either conclusively disprove at least one essential element of every cause of action in plaintiff’s complaint against him, or prove an affirmative defense that would bar every cause of action in the complaint against him. (Ibid.) Moreover, “[t]here is nothing in the statute [Code Civ. Proc., § 473c] which lessens the burden of the moving party simply because at the trial the resisting party would have the burden of proof on the issue on which the summary judgment is sought to be predicated. In such a case, on the motion for summary judgment, the moving party must generally negative the matters which the resisting party would have to prove at the trial.” (Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 123, 127 [81 Cal.Rptr. 444].)
By their decision today, the majority place the burden of proving that there is a triable issue of a material fact on the plaintiffs, contrary to settled law. The gist of the majority opinion is that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence in support of their claims against defendant Sheriff Block, whether showing that the sheriff’s department used the public nuisance statute as a subterfuge to enforce prostitution laws or in some other alleged unconstitutional manner. The premise for this position appears to be, in addition to the declaration of Michael Quinn, the concession made by plaintiffs’ counsel in stipulating that the sheriff’s department “detain and warn individuals who cause motorists to stop in traffic lanes or restricted areas thereby obstructing the free flow of vehicular traffic. ” This substantial concession, made without a showing of specific authorization by plaintiffs, does not bind plaintiffs or this court. (Chitwood v. County of Los Angeles (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 522, 526 [92 Cal.Rptr. 441]; Price v. McComish (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 92, 96-99 [70 P.2d 978].) “While an attorney has broad authority to enter into stipulations relative to the conduct of a case, this right does not extend to waiving a client’s cause of action, or defense, without authority on the part of the client.” (Roscoe Moss Co. v. Roggero (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 781, 786 [54 Cal.Rptr. 911].) In fact, just recently, in Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 404 [212 Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645], our Supreme Court, in commenting on the authority of an attorney to bind his client, stated: “An attorney is not authorized, however, merely by virtue of his retention in litigation, to ‘impair the client’s substantial rights or the cause of action itself. ’ ” Moreover, in determining whether a “triable issue” of fact exists, we must strictly construe the Quinn declaration in favor of plaintiffs. (Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 373 [178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121]; *647D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10].) In my judgment, the Quinn declaration fails to conclusively negate a necessary element of plaintiffs’ case and demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material factual issue which requires the process of a trial. (See Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 851 [94 Cal.Rptr. 785, 484 P.2d 953].) There is still a triable issue of fact as to whether the California public nuisance statutes are being enforced by defendant Sheriff Block in an unconstitutional manner under the questioned guidelines.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court summary judgment in favor of defendant Sheriff Block.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 13, 1986. Thompson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 8, 1986.