Court Opinion

ID: 9839916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 17:05:24.768753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:06.141039
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/14/23 Ramy & Associates v. Snyder CA2/5

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 RAMY & ASSOCIATES, LLC,                                        B310502

       Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
       v.                                                       BC556689)
 DARRYL SNYDER,

       Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed.
         Mac E. Nehoray for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Donald R. Davidson III for Defendant and Respondent.

                           ______________________________
                        INTRODUCTION
       This appeal stems from a contentious partition and sale of
commercial property in Simi Valley. Plaintiff and appellant
Ramy & Associates (Ramy) at one time leased a car dealership on
the property, then acquired an ownership stake in the land.
After years of squabbling, the owners—primarily heirs of the
original purchasers—agreed to the appointment of a referee to
sell the property and to the trial court deciding all remaining
issues.
       On appeal, Ramy contends the court erred in how it
apportioned the sale proceeds and referee fees. Because Ramy
has both provided an inadequate appellate record and failed to
cite any legal authority in support of its claims, Ramy has not
met its burden of establishing error. We affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
       Edward Caraccia Sr. (father) and Lillie Fay Caraccia
(mother) created a joint trust to hold assets as part of their estate
plan.1 When mother died in 2002, the joint trust was divided into
a survivor’s trust (hereafter father trust) and a marital trust
(hereafter mother trust). Each trust was funded with the
parent’s respective separate property and one-half of their
community property. The community property included 2350–

1     The record does not contain any of the trust documents.
The Caraccias, both of whom are now deceased, are not parties to
this appeal.

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2380 First Street in Simi Valley, a car dealership that Hormorz
Ramy and/or his company had leased for decades.2
       Thus, upon mother’s death, a one-half interest in the Simi
Valley property flowed from the joint trust to father trust, and
the other half to mother trust. Father was sole trustee of both
trusts. His children, Edward V. Caraccia II (Eddie) and Denise
Economou (Denise), were joint beneficiaries of mother trust. As
best we can tell from the sparse record, father trust was, at this
point, revocable with father the primary beneficiary and his
children contingent beneficiaries.
       Several years later, the family became embroiled in five
internecine lawsuits.
       Lawsuit No. 1. In 2009, Denise and Eddie sued their
father, alleging he was mismanaging the trusts and requesting
an accounting and other relief. In response, father resigned as
trustee of both trusts. He appointed Darryl Snyder (an
accountant, and the respondent in this appeal) as successor
trustee of father trust; Denise and Eddie eventually became joint
successor trustees of mother trust. As part of the settlement of
the children’s lawsuit, Snyder, as trustee, transferred a
25 percent interest in the Simi Valley property—half of father
trust’s ownership share—from father trust to mother trust. At
the close of litigation, the respective interests in the property

2     Hormorz Ramy is a managing partner of Ramy &
Associates. To distinguish the person from the business, we refer
to Hormorz Ramy as Mr. Ramy and to Ramy & Associates as
Ramy. Although the record indicates Mr. Ramy and/or his
company had leased the property for many years, it is not clear
exactly who leased it, when, or how any arrangement ended.

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were father trust–25 percent; mother trust–75 percent. As Eddie
and Denise were the sole and equal beneficiaries of mother trust,
as a practical matter, each of them owned 37.5 percent of the
Simi Valley property.
       As the children’s lawsuit against father trust was reaching
an end, three more lawsuits arose.
       Lawsuit No. 2. In 2010, father trust (but not mother
trust) brought an unlawful detainer action against Mr. Ramy, as
an individual, and a man by the name of Salem Arnout.3 After a
court trial, judgment for $205,757 was entered in favor of father
trust and against Mr. Ramy and Arnout. The judgment was for
past-due rent, plus costs.
       Lawsuit Nos. 3 and 4. A year later, Ramy sued father
trust, alleging causes of action for recission and unjust
enrichment based on overpayment of rent.4 Then, a year after
that, Snyder, on behalf of father trust, filed an action seeking

3     Because the only document we have been provided from
that lawsuit is the two-page judgment, the circumstances and
issues involved are unclear. In particular, we do not know who
Arnout is, why he was a defendant in the lawsuit, whether he is
(or was) part of Ramy & Associates, or how he was involved with
the various individuals in either the family dispute or the car
dealership itself. He is not mentioned again in the record.
4     Although both lawsuits involved the same property, the
record does not reveal how it could be that Mr. Ramy was the
individual who owed rent in Lawsuit No. 2 but Ramy the
company allegedly overpaid rent in Lawsuit No. 3.
      Mother trust was originally a co-defendant in Lawsuit
No. 3, but Mr. Ramy dismissed the trust from the case at Eddie’s
request. Eddie and Mr. Ramy had been close friends for decades.

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removal of Eddie and Denise as trustees of mother trust and
requesting an accounting and appointment of successor trustees.
       Meanwhile—though again, the record does not reveal the
details—father married Patricia Caraccia (Patricia), and, in 2012,
made her the sole beneficiary of father trust.
       In late 2012 and early 2013, father trust settled both
outstanding lawsuits (Lawsuits Nos. 3 and 4).
       Lawsuit No. 3 Settlement. In settlement of Ramy’s suit
against father trust, father trust executed a $100,000 promissory
note in favor of Ramy, secured by a deed of trust on the Simi
Valley property. The note (and accrued interest) would be due
upon the earliest of: the sale of the Simi Valley property, or one
year after father’s death, or three years after the date of the
settlement. The present appeal—part of the fifth piece of
litigation among the parties—deals with who owes what to whom
under the note that was signed in settlement of Lawsuit No. 3.
       Lawsuit No. 4 Settlement. Father died in 2013, and
father trust’s suit against Denise and Eddie was settled five
months later, soon after Eddie and Denise first learned that
Patricia was the sole beneficiary of father trust. (Patricia had no
interest in mother trust.)
       In the agreement, Eddie, Denise, trustee Snyder, and
Patricia—in their individual capacities and as beneficiaries
and/or successor trustees of their respective trusts—agreed the
Simi Valley property would be sold. Upon the sale, mother trust
would reimburse father trust $36,501.57 in unpaid rent.5 Mother

5     Father trust and mother trust were owed rent in proportion
to each trust’s ownership stake in the property—eventually 25

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trust also agreed to pay “fifty percent (50%) up to the sum of
$50,000” of the amount owed on the promissory note executed as
part of the 2012 settlement of Lawsuit No. 3 between father trust
and Ramy. Father trust agreed to pay the accrued interest on
the note.6 The parties’ agreement notwithstanding, mother trust
refused to sell the property.
      Lawsuit No. 5. The present lawsuit followed in 2014.7
During the pendency of the litigation, mother trust sold half of its

percent and 75 percent, respectively. Though the record is
opaque on the point, it appears mother trust was supposed to
collect the full rent from the tenant—whomever that was—then
pay 25 percent of the rent to father trust. When father trust sued
mother trust, however, mother trust started deducting its legal
expenses from father trust’s share of the rent before remitting the
balance. The $36,501.57 was for past-due rent that mother trust
had wrongfully withheld during the suit.
6     Although the 2012 settlement between father trust and
Ramy referenced this agreement (between father trust and
mother trust) by providing that “[a]s a material inducement for
[father trust] to enter into this Agreement,” mother trust would
pay “up to” $50,000 towards the note, neither mother trust nor
Eddie and Denise were parties to father trust’s agreement with
Ramy. It is also not clear from the record how the exact amount
“up to $50,000” was to be calculated.
7     The suit apparently involved a complaint and a cross-
complaint, but neither is part of the appellate record. It appears
plaintiffs and cross-defendants were Ramy, and Eddie and
Denise, individually and on behalf of mother trust. Snyder is the
defendant and cross-complainant, individually and on behalf of
father trust. We have not been able to discern a basis for the suit
against Snyder as an individual. As such, we refer to him only in

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75 percent ownership interest in the Simi Valley property to
Ramy. Mother trust distributed to Denise the proceeds of the
sale and retained ownership of the remaining 37.5 percent. The
effect of this transaction was that Eddie became the sole trustee
and beneficiary of mother trust.8 The parties executed a
settlement agreement in 2016, but that agreement was later
rescinded, and the property was not sold.
       So, in 2018, the parties stipulated to the appointment of a
referee to sell the property. The parties also agreed that the
court would adjudicate all remaining issues after a post-sale trial.
       Later in 2018, father trust sold its 25 percent interest in
the Simi Valley property to Ramy. Ramy then owned
62.5 percent of the property. Mother trust owned the remaining
37.5 percent. As part of the sale, father trust agreed to deduct
$50,000 from the Ramy sale proceeds to repay its half of the
principal owed under the earlier promissory note.

his capacity as trustee. The court ultimately concluded neither
side had proven any of their causes of action. The parties do not
directly challenge this decision on appeal.
8     The mechanics of the sale and changes to the trust are not
apparent from the record, and even the parties can’t seem to
agree on what happened. Ramy insists, without citation, that the
proceeds from the sale were paid directly to Denise rather than to
the trust. Whatever happened, at the end of the process, Ramy
owned 37.5 percent of the property, mother trust (to wit: Eddie)
owned 37.5 percent of the property, and Denise was no longer a
beneficiary or trustee of mother trust. Father trust, which was
not involved with this transaction, still owned the remaining 25
percent of the property.

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       The court entered an order confirming the sale. Although
the proposed order had provided that the referee’s costs and fees
would be split evenly between the two sides, it was modified to
state that costs and fees would be split “75/25 between the parties
(75% by Plaintiff [Ramy, Eddie, and mother trust] and 25% by
Defendant [Snyder and father trust])” with the referee to
calculate the precise amounts due.
       After a bench trial on the remaining issues, the court found
father trust liable for half of the amount due on the promissory
note, which it had already paid, plus half of the interest, which
the court calculated to be $21,000. The court concluded Eddie
owed Ramy the balance of the principal and interest on the note.9
The court also concluded father trust was owed $36,501.57 from
the sale proceeds. This amount is not included in the judgment,
but the parties do not challenge that part of the court’s decision.
       The court subsequently entered judgment, and Ramy filed
a timely notice of appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
       Ramy contends father trust—and not mother trust—owes it
the remaining $50,000 plus interest due on the 2013 promissory
note. It also argues the court incorrectly allocated the referee
fees. Taken together, Ramy seeks $96,408.68. Because Ramy
neither provides legal analysis and citation to authority to
support these arguments nor affords us a record sufficient to
evaluate them, Ramy has forfeited its claims.

9     In support of its decision, the court relied in part on the
2016 settlement agreement; the court did not mention that the
agreement had eventually been rescinded.

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       “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle
of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional
doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “It is not this court’s role to construct
arguments that would undermine the lower court’s judgment and
defeat the presumption of correctness.” (Needelman v. DeWolf
Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762.)
       It is the appellant’s “responsibility . . . to support claims of
error with meaningful argument and citation to authority.”
(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Our role, by contrast, is to
evaluate “legal argument with citation of authorities on the
points made.” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived.” (Badie v. Bank of Am. (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785.) We are not required to examine
undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.
(Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984–985.)
       In its opening brief, Ramy cites one statute (to establish
appealability) and one appellate opinion (for the standard of
review). Although the errors asserted on appeal appear to
involve interlocking issues of contract interpretation, property
law, trusts, law of the case, civil procedure, and the impact of
prior judgments, Ramy does not discuss—or cite to authority that
discusses—any of these topics. We decline to do so on Ramy’s
behalf. (See Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994)

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30 Cal.App.4th 539, 546 [it is not the court’s function to serve as
the appellant’s backup counsel].)
       Appellants not only bear the burden of proof on appeal but
also bear the burden of providing us with a record that allows us
to resolve the issues they raise. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987)
43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296.) The record before us does not paint
a full picture of what happened in this case, much less assist us
in resolving Ramy’s claims of error.
       For example, Ramy claims the court misallocated the
referee fees between the parties. The court entered the order
confirming sale on January 11, 2019, after the referee filed an
application to confirm sale and Snyder filed a response. The
record does not contain either the application or the response.
Nor does the record contain a minute order or reporter’s
transcript of the status conference the court held on the issue.
From this record, we cannot discern how the order came to be
modified from 50/50 to 75/25 or why. We cannot tell whether
Ramy objected to this modification. All we know is that a
proposed order was filed and was changed. This is insufficient to
establish reversible error. (Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003 [“Without the proper record, we
cannot evaluate issues requiring a factual analysis.”].)10

10    As we decide the case for the reasons stated in the opinion,
we need not address respondent’s argument that the judgment
should be affirmed because the trial court’s orders were
consistent with the equitable powers the parties had bestowed on
him.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Darryl Snyder shall
recover his costs on appeal.

                                                 RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                 BAKER, J.             KIM. J.

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