Court Opinion

ID: 9929264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 06:05:47.484941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:29.402043
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

TATIANA PROZHOGA,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       February 1, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 361910
                                                                       Genesee Circuit Court
DORIAN JACKSON,                                                        Family Division
                                                                       LC No. 19-922654-DS
               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order awarding her physical custody of the
parties’ minor child, awarding the parties joint legal custody, and awarding defendant parenting
time. Although it is clear that the trial court invested substantial care and attention into this case,
its decision to award defendant joint legal custody was against the great weight of the evidence
and failed to consider the child’s custodial environment when awarding defendant parenting time.
Therefore, we vacate the provisions of the order awarding defendant joint legal custody and
parenting time and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                       I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff and defendant had one child together, who was born in September 2011. Plaintiff
left the parties’ home in September 2018, following an incident of domestic violence that occurred
in the presence of the child. Afterwards, plaintiff allowed defendant to see the child only in public
places, generally the child’s sporting events. In August 2019, defendant filed a motion for custody
and parenting time, seeking joint physical and legal custody, and equal parenting time.

        The court referred the issues of child support, custody, and parenting time to a referee for
an evidentiary hearing and entered an interim custody order giving plaintiff sole physical and legal
custody, with parenting time “as the parties agree,” until further order of the court. After a two-
day evidentiary hearing and after interviewing the child, the referee issued a report recommending
that plaintiff have sole physical and legal custody and that defendant have supervised parenting
time “until he undergoes a psychological evaluation and completes extensive anger management

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and parenting classes,” after which he “may file to expand his parenting time.” Defendant objected
to the report and recommendation, specifically challenging many of the referee’s factual findings.

         As a result of defendant’s objections, the trial court held a de novo hearing that lasted four
days. After the hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion and final custody order, in which
the court found that the child had an established custodial environment with plaintiff. With respect
to the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23, the court found the parties equal on factors (a), (b),
(c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j). The court found that factor (d) favored plaintiff because of the length
of time the child had been residing primarily with her. The court stated that it interviewed the
child and found that factor (i) favored plaintiff, but the court had concerns about “coaching.” The
court determined that factor (k) favored plaintiff but that domestic violence was not a current issue.
The court also determined that factor (l) favored defendant. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interests to award the parties joint legal custody
and that it was in the child’s best interests for plaintiff to have primary physical custody. The court
also awarded defendant parenting time every other week from Thursday after school until Monday
morning, and overnight parenting time every other week on the weeks he does not have weekend
parenting time. In addition, the court awarded the parties alternating weekly parenting time during
the school summer recess, alternating parenting time on major holidays, and one-half of the
Christmas and Easter/spring break school vacations. This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        With respect to issues involving child custody, “ ‘all orders and judgments of the circuit
court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great
weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major
issue.’ ” Yachcik v Yachcik, 319 Mich App 24, 31; 900 NW2d 113 (2017), quoting MCL 722.28.
We will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact “unless the facts clearly preponderate in the
opposite direction.” Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 21; 805 NW2d 1 (2010). “Discretionary
rulings, including a trial court’s decision to change custody, are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Brown v Brown, 332 Mich App 1, 8; 955 NW2d 515 (2020). “In child custody cases
specifically, an abuse of discretion retains the historic standard under which the trial court’s
decision must be palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

         “This Court reviews the trial court’s determination regarding a child’s best interests for
clear error.” Id. at 8-9. Clear legal error occurs when the trial court “incorrectly chooses,
interprets, or applies the law.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This Court gives
deference to the trial court’s factual judgments and special deference to the trial court’s credibility
assessments.” Id. at 9. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Spectrum
Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 333 Mich App 457, 477; 960 NW2d 186 (2020).
“A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” Id. at 477-478 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Preliminary and
underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 478. The trial court necessarily abuses
its discretion when its determination is not legally correct. Id.

                        III. MODIFICATION OF THE INTERIM ORDER

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        First, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by modifying the parenting-time provision
of the interim order issued pending the de novo hearing to address defendant’s objections to the
referee’s report and recommended order. We disagree.

        The de novo hearing is governed by MCR 3.215(F), under which the hearing “must be held
within 21 days after the written objection is filed, unless the time is extended by the court for good
cause.” “To the extent allowed by law, the court may conduct the judicial hearing by review of
the record of the referee hearing, but the court must allow the parties to present live evidence at
the judicial hearing.” MCR 3.215(F)(2). A trial court has the power to, “by an administrative
order or by an order in the case, provide that the referee’s recommended order will take effect on
an interim basis pending a judicial hearing.” MCR 3.215(G)(1).

         A child-custody determination under the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., includes
orders about physical custody and parenting time. MCL 722.1102(c). This case involves an initial
custody determination and does not involve modification of a custody determination;
consequently, plaintiff’s reliance on authority governing modification of a parenting-time
determination is misplaced. The March 2, 2021 order was an interim order pending a de novo
hearing to resolve the issues of custody, parenting time, and child support, and defendant’s
objections to the referee’s recommendation. There was nothing permanent about the trial court’s
order. The trial court undoubtedly had the authority to disregard the referee’s recommendation,
and nothing prohibited the court from modifying any aspects of the parenting-time provision.
Indeed, the court stated at the hearing on defendant’s objection to the referee’s recommendation
that it would review the issue of parenting time at a review hearing on April 6, 2020, to determine
whether to enter a different interim order regarding parenting time.

        The court recognized that the parties’ child had the right to have parenting time with their
parents in accord with the child’s best interests. See MCL 722.27a(1) and (3). The court also
presumably recognized the potential for delay of the de novo hearing because of the COVID-19
pandemic. The court regularly scheduled and provided notice of review hearings to review
parenting time pending the de novo hearing. The court appointed a legal guardian ad litem
(“GAL”) to represent the child’s interests, perform a full investigation, and give reports and
recommendations to the Court “regarding disputes that may arise” on a number of issues, including
parenting time and changes in parenting time. The record demonstrates that plaintiff clearly had
notice that the issue of parenting time would be addressed at each review hearing pending the de
novo hearing and that the GAL would make recommendations regarding parenting time.
Plaintiff’s argument that the review hearings deprived her of due process because she was unaware
that the court would consider modifying parenting time at the review hearings is belied by the
record, and the trial court did not err by modifying the parenting-time provisions of the interim
order pending de novo review.1

1
  Moreover, even if the court erred by modifying the interim order, any error would not require
reversal of the custody order because a de novo hearing was held. See, e.g., Mann v Mann, 190
Mich App 526, 533; 476 NW2d 439 (1991) (“Our conclusion that the trial court committed clear

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                                     IV. LEGAL CUSTODY

        “[T]he Child Custody Act draws a distinction between physical custody and legal
custody . . . .” Merecki v Merecki, 336 Mich App 639, 647; 971 NW2d 659 (2021). “Thus, the
Legislature divided the concept of custody into two categories—custody in the sense of the child
residing with a parent and custody in the sense of a parent having decision-making authority
regarding the welfare of the child.” In re AJR, 496 Mich 346, 361; 852 NW2d 760 (2014),
superseded in part by statute as stated in In re AGD, 327 Mich App 332, 342; 933 NW2d 751
(2019). “Physical custody pertains to where the child shall physically reside, whereas legal
custody is understood to mean decision-making authority as to important decisions affecting the
child’s welfare.” Merecki, 336 Mich App at 647 n 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                      A. ESTABLISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT

         “Before making a custody determination, the trial court must determine whether the child
has an established custodial environment with one or both parents.” Bofysil v Bofysil, 332 Mich
App 232, 242; 956 NW2d 544 (2020). Here, the trial court found that the child’s established
custodial environment was with plaintiff. MCL 722.27(1)(c) states that a trial court “shall not
modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the
established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing
evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” See also Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich
353, 361; 683 NW2d 250 (2004) (stating that where an established custodial environment exists,
the court is required to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard regardless of whether it
is making an initial custody determination or modifying a previous custody order). Accordingly,
the trial court was prohibited from issuing a new order changing the child’s established custodial
environment unless there was clear and convincing evidence that such a change was in the child’s
best interests. See MCL 722.27(1)(c); see also Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 86; 782 NW2d
480 (2010) (explaining that a trial “court may not change the established custodial environment of
a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the
child”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                               B. CONDUCT OF TRIAL COURT

        Initially, plaintiff argues that the trial court “prejudged” the facts before the de novo
hearing. She contends that “as a matter of law the trial court could not have reached its conclusion
regarding the ‘mutual’ conflict before the trial because the court did not have an evidentiary record
during those two years.” Therefore, she contends, the court must have been improperly acting on
its “impressions” or “gut reactions.” She maintains that the court’s decision was “overwhelmed
by its focus on conflict.” She also argues that the court’s findings regarding mutual conflict were
against the great weight of the evidence because she contends that the “evidence showed that the
conflict was primarily caused by [defendant].” The court had judicial notice of the entire lower
court file. Further, the trial court presided over the proceedings in this case for more than two

legal error does not, however, compel us to reverse the court’s final order changing custody,
because a hearing de novo was eventually held.”).

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years and was fully aware of the disputes and conflicts between the parties. Indeed, throughout
the proceedings, the court admonished both parties to put aside their differences and focus on the
best interests of the child. Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court had an “early jump to the
conclusion that both parties were at fault for the conflict” is, therefore, not supported by the record.

                                  C. BEST-INTEREST FACTORS

        Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court’s findings regarding the best-interest factors,
particularly factors (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (j), and (l), were against the great weight of the
evidence. With respect to the best-interest factors, the trial court’s “findings and conclusions need
not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties.”
MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 449, 452; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). “A court need not give
equal weight to all the factors, but may consider the relative weight of the factors as appropriate
to the circumstances.” Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 184; 729 NW2d 256 (2006).
MCL 722.23 states:

               As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of the
        following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:

               (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
        involved and the child.

                (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
        love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child
        in his or her religion or creed, if any.

               (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
        with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
        under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.

               (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
        environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

              (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
        home or homes.

                (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

                (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.

                (h) The home, school, and community record of the child.

                (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to
        be of sufficient age to express preference.

               (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
        encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and

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       the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively
       for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a
       child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child’s other
       parent.

               (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
       against or witnessed by the child.

               (l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
       child custody dispute.

        In connection with the best-interests considerations relevant in this case, joint legal custody
under MCL 722.26a means that “the parents shall share decision-making authority as to the
important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” “In order for joint custody to work, parents
must be able to agree with each other on basic issues in child rearing—including health care,
religion, education, day to day decision-making and discipline—and they must be willing to
cooperate with each other in joint decision-making.” Bofysil, 332 Mich App at 249 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Under MCL 722.26a(1), when joint custody is considered, the trial
court shall determine whether joint custody is in the best interests of the child by considering the
best-interest factors in MCL 722.23 and “[w]hether the parents will be able to cooperate and
generally agree concerning the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” Joint legal
custody may be appropriate even though the parties harbor personal animosity and have in the past
had difficulty communicating if both parties demonstrate that their communications have recently
improved. Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 326-327; 729 NW2d 533 (2006).

         In awarding joint legal custody, the trial court found that the parties were able to agree and
communicate regarding the child’s needs. The trial court recognized the longstanding conflicts
between the parties but found that despite them, the parties were able to reach a consensus after
the de novo hearing regarding allowing the child to attend a Muslim afterschool program despite
defendant’s decision to no longer practice the faith. However, as explained in more detail in
relation to best-interest factor (l), this one instance of cooperation was insufficient to support a
finding that the parties would be able to “cooperate and generally agree concerning the important
decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” See MCL 722.26a(1). The record shows that despite
one instance of cooperation, which took place after significant involvement with the trial court,
the parties were not able to generally cooperate, and the evidence heavily preponderates against
the trial court’s conclusion that the parties are capable of communicating and cooperating to make
joint decisions regarding health care, religion, education, day-to-day decision-making, and
discipline. See MCL 722.23; Bofysil, 332 Mich App at 249. The trial court, therefore, abused its
discretion by awarding the parties joint legal custody.

                                          1. FACTOR (A)

        Factor (a) requires consideration of “[t]he love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parties involved and the child.” MCL 722.23(a). The trial court found that both
parties loved the child, “but the unending conflict between these two parties has always
overshadowed the affection and emotional ties the child either has or is allowed to have with the
father.” While the testimony showed that both parents love the child and show him affection, the

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testimony clearly showed that the child had a greater emotional bond with plaintiff. The evidence
also demonstrated that defendant would bully, tease, and physically intimidate the child, and the
GAL testified she never saw any physical interaction between the two. The trial court’s finding
that the parties were equal on factor (a) was clearly against the great weight of the evidence.

                                          2. FACTOR (B)

        Factor (b) requires consideration of “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved
to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the
child in his or her religion or creed.” MCL 722.23(b). The trial court found this factor weighed
equally. The trial court found that despite the conflict between the parties, they both have deep
love and affection for the child and that “they are both very capable parents, and even better since
they have ended their relationship.” The trial court’s findings focused only on love and affection.
The evidence presented also showed that plaintiff had primary involvement with the child’s
education, religious training, and extracurricular activities, and that there was a reasonable
likelihood that plaintiff would continue to guide, educate, and nurture the child in the future. While
the record showed that defendant was not involved in the child’s education or religious upbringing
in the past, he was involved in the child’s sporting events. Moreover, plaintiff acknowledges that
defendant participated in some extracurricular activities, took the child to some sporting events,
and began participating in school activities. The trial court’s determination that factor (b) weighed
equally was, therefore, not against the great weight of the evidence.

                                          3. FACTOR (C)

        Factor (c) relates to “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the
laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.” MCL 722.23(c). This factor
is “intended to evaluate the parties’ capacity and disposition to provide for the children’s material
and medical needs,” and looks to the future. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d
336 (2008). The trial court found that this factor weighed equally, observing that the parties were
employed and were capable of meeting the child’s needs.

         However, at the time of the de novo hearing, defendant was $2,132 in arrears in child
support and had only agreed to pay previous arrearages because he was going to be arrested. But
this merely establishes that he had the capacity, not necessarily the disposition, to support the
child. In contrast to defendant, plaintiff paid for all of the child’s numerous extracurricular
activities, except hockey, for which defendant paid one-half of the expenses. Plaintiff obtained
health insurance for the child and took him to medical appointments. Plaintiff also obtained
housing near the child’s school. The evidence clearly demonstrates that factor (c) weighed in favor
of plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was against the great weight of the evidence.

                                          4. FACTOR (E)

       Factor (e) considers the “permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.” MCL 722.23(e). This factor considers the home’s permanence, not its
acceptability or stability. See Kuebler v Kuebler, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)

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(Docket No. 362488), slip op at 24 (stating the trial court erred when it considered the acceptability
of the children’s bedrooms under factor (e) because such consideration did not concern the home’s
permanence). Considerations such as stability are not part of the analysis under factor (e) because
the “stability, health, or safety of the environment provided by a party is considered in other
factors.” Brown, 332 Mich App at 21. The trial court found the parties equal on this factor, stating
that plaintiff resided in a home with the child, that she was in a relationship with a man who lived
out of state, and that the man was involved in the child’s life. The court found that defendant
shared a home with his girlfriend and her minor child and that the girlfriend was involved in the
child’s life.

         Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to recognize that her custodial environment
consisted only of her and the child, whereas defendant has formed a new family custodial
environment “in circumstances that have no indicia of stability, in that [defendant] has quickly
moved the child to an environment with a new ‘family,’ but without a marriage or other indicia of
stability.” However, factor (e) does not address the stability of the home, but rather its permanence,
Brown, 332 Mich App at 21, and at the time of the de novo hearing, defendant and his girlfriend
had been in a relationship and living together for more than two years. Plaintiff confuses
permanence with stability and has presented no evidence defendant’s home lacked permanence
and has not demonstrated the trial court’s conclusion that factor (e) weighed equally was against
the great weight of the evidence.

                                          5. FACTOR (F)

        Factor (f) relates to the “moral fitness of the parties involved,” MCL 722.23(f), and more
specifically the parties’ moral fitness as parents. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 887; 526
NW2d 889 (1994) (“[T]he question under factor f is not ‘who is the morally superior adult;’ the
question concerns the parties’ relative fitness to provide for their child, given the moral disposition
of each party as demonstrated by individual conduct.”). The court found the parties equal on this
factor. The court noted that the factor “is also dominated by the constant conflict between the
parties.” The court questioned “the moral fitness of both parties who have mutually created a level
of animosity that is completely irrational and also completely unnecessary.” The court did “not
find either party morally unfit, other than the conflict they create.”

        Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, evidence that defendant lied and was dishonest when
dealing with third parties is not relevant where there was no evidence that it affected his parenting
ability. See id. at 886-887 (“[Q]uestionable conduct is relevant to factor f only if it is a type of
conduct that necessarily has a significant influence on how one will function as a parent.”). For
example, in Fletcher, the defendant’s extramarital affairs were not relevant to how the defendant
functioned as a parent and were, therefore, not relevant to the court’s analysis under factor (f),
especially where it was shown that the children had no knowledge of the affairs. Id. Similarly
here, even if plaintiff established that defendant was dishonest in his dealing with third parties,
there was no evidence that defendant’s conduct impacted his parenting ability or that the child had
any knowledge of it. Likewise, plaintiff has not presented any factual support for her contention
that defendant attempts to “encourage” the child to lie and actually bullies the child into lying. In
sum, plaintiff has not shown that the trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the
evidence with respect to factor (f).

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                                          6. FACTOR (G)

       Factor (g) concerns the “mental and physical health of the parties involved.” MCL
722.23(g). The trial court found the parties equal on this factor. The court found that “[t]here have
been many public displays of hostility by both parties that are concerning to this Court. There has
been prior involvement of [CPS] and a substantiated risk to the child. The parties were provided
resources and the case was closed.” The court also found that the parties did not have any limiting
physical health issues.

        Plaintiff argues that the evidence showed that defendant has “mental health problems, as
evidenced by the orders requiring [defendant] to attend extensive anger management and parenting
classes and to obtain a psychological evaluation.” However, such orders, standing alone, are not
evidence of a mental health issue. Further, the record is replete with examples of both parties
acting improperly, as noted by the court when it addressed the hostility between the parties. Thus,
plaintiff has not shown that the trial court clearly erred by finding that factor (g) was equal.

        Plaintiff also raises an evidentiary issue in the context of factor (g), arguing that the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing testimony about defendant’s mental health after denying
plaintiff’s request that she be allowed discovery of the underlying data related to defendant’s
psychological evaluation. Plaintiff’s argument is based on the GAL’s testimony that, after reading
the report from defendant’s psychological evaluation, the GAL did not have concerns about his
mental health. The GAL did not testify about the contents of the psychological evaluation, and
the trial court sustained plaintiff’s objection to defense counsel questioning the GAL about the
contents of the report. The trial court did not refer to the GAL’s testimony when makings its
findings. Therefore, even if the court erred by allowing the GAL’s testimony, any error in the
admission of the evidence was harmless. See MCR 2.613(A).

                                          7. FACTOR (H)

         Factor (h) involves the “home, school, and community record of the child.” MCL
722.23(h). Typically, trial courts will examine the degree and type of involvement of each of the
parties in these aspects of the child’s life. See Diaz v Davey, 307 Mich App 366, 394; 861 NW2d
323 (2014) (stating that the factor favored the defendant-mother where the plaintiff was “not as
‘active’ in the children’s preschool and he did not frequently attend parent-teacher conferences.”);
Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 668; 811 NW2d 501 (2011) (stating in the context of
factor (h) that the “plaintiff had not enrolled the child in summer enrichment programs, nor had
she met with the child’s teachers to discuss her concerns. In contrast, defendant had enrolled the
child in robotics classes, computer animation classes, and other extracurricular activities.”). The
trial court concluded that factor (h) weighed equally because the child was doing well academically
and was involved in athletics at the direction of the parties. Plaintiff contends that the trial court
should have found that factor (h) favored her because she was the parent who “consistently
followed and promoted [the child’s] day-to-day academics and enrichment.” While the evidence
revealed that in the past plaintiff was the parent who was most heavily involved in the child’s
education and extracurricular activities, the evidence showed that defendant was actively involved
in the child’s sporting activities. And plaintiff acknowledges that defendant became more involved
in the child’s education and in his school and extracurricular activities after initiating the custody

                                                 -9-
dispute. The record is clear that the child is thriving academically in school and is very involved
in sporting activities. The trial court’s finding that the parties were equal on this factor was not
against the great weight of the evidence.

                                          8. FACTOR (J)

         Factor (j) requires consideration of “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the
other parent or the child and the parents.” MCL 722.23(j). In finding the evidence weighed equally
on this factor, the court reasoned:

                This factor is the key to this case. The parties have mutually created a
       conflict between themselves that should not work to the benefit of one party or to
       the detriment of the other party. The parties lived together as a family unit for the
       first eight years of the child’s life, and this Court is convinced that in spite of the
       conflict, the Court is not concerned that either parent is incapable of being an
       appropriate parent. In fact, this Court finds that both parties are very capable and
       loving parents to the child. [Emphasis added.]

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s finding was on factor (j) was clearly erroneous and
that the court should have found that factor (j) favored her. She asserts that the evidence showed
that defendant created the conflicts, but abundant evidence was presented to support the trial
court’s finding that both parties were responsible for constant conflicts. Throughout the
proceedings neither party demonstrated a willingness to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent. The trial court’s
finding that the parties were equal on this factor was, therefore, not against the great weight of the
evidence.

                                         B. FACTOR (L)

        Factor (l) allows the trial court to consider “[a]ny other factor considered by the court to
be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.” MCL 722.23(l). The court found that this factor
favored defendant and favored an award of joint legal custody. The court found that the constant
conflict between the parties should not benefit only plaintiff by an award of sole legal custody to
one parent. The court expressed concern that an award of sole legal custody would result in a
change in domicile because plaintiff had a significant other in another state and “moving the child
away from an appropriate and very involved father would not be in the child’s best interest.” The
court noted that after the de novo hearing, defendant consented to plaintiff’s request that the child
attend an afterschool Muslim school program even though he was no longer a practicing Muslim,
which demonstrated to the court that, in spite of conflict, the parties could reach consent on a
religious issue “that is contemplated in a joint legal custodial environment.” The court found that
a strong bond existed between the child and defendant and that “testimony that the child has
conflict in his relationship with his Father centers almost entirely upon issues of conflict between
the parties. That conflict, which is in part the responsibility of the Mother as well, should not work
to the detriment of just the Father.”

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        Plaintiff asserts that it was speculative and erroneous for the court to find that plaintiff
might attempt to file a change of domicile to Maryland if she were awarded sole legal custody.
We agree. While evidence was presented that plaintiff’s boyfriend lived in Maryland and that she
took vacations with the child to visit him, no evidence was presented that plaintiff was
contemplating moving. There was no evidence, other than speculation, to support the trial court’s
findings that plaintiff may someday want to relocate to Maryland. The trial court, therefore, clearly
erred by finding that plaintiff’s hypothetical and speculative move to Maryland was relevant to
factor (l).

         The trial court also found that factor (l) favored defendant because after the de novo
hearing, he consented to plaintiff’s request that the child attend an afterschool Muslim program
even though defendant was no longer a practicing Muslim. While this may be a consideration in
whether to grant joint legal custody, the court’s reliance on this as ground for weighing factor (l)
in favor of defendant was erroneous. On this basis of this one incident, and in spite of substantial
evidence that the parties could not agree and communicate regarding the child’s needs, the court
found that it was in the best interests of the child that the parties share joint legal custody. The
countervailing evidence included the child’s counselor’s testimony that the parents lacked the
ability to cooperate and that she would not recommend joint custody, the GAL’s testimony that
she would not recommend joint custody, and plaintiff’s testimony that the parties quarreled over
everything. The fact that the parties agreed on one matter after the de novo hearing was not
sufficient to award defendant joint legal custody, and the trial court’s finding that factor (l) favored
defendant was against the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the
trial court’s order granting the parties joint legal custody and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

                                      V. PARENTING TIME

         Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court applied an incorrect burden of proof and
improperly shifted to her the burden of proof regarding parenting time. The trial court framed the
issue as one in which plaintiff was requesting that defendant’s parenting time be suspended or
supervised and that plaintiff must show that this change is in the best interest of the child by a
preponderance of the evidence. As we previously noted, however, this case involves an initial
custody and parenting-time determination. Therefore, MCL 722.27(1)(c) applies and provides that
a trial court “may not . . . issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment
of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of
the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The trial court failed to consider whether the parenting-time order
would modify the child’s existing custodial environment with plaintiff. If the order amounted to
a change in the established custodial environment, the burden would be on defendant, not plaintiff,
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the parenting-time order—and change in established
custodial environment—would be in the best interests of the child. See Vodvarka v Grasmeyer,
259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (“The movant, of course, has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that either proper cause or a change of circumstances exists
before the trial court can consider whether an established custodial environment exists (thus
establishing the burden of proof) and conduct a review of the best interest factors.”). The trial
court did not make the relevant best-interest findings when makings its parenting-time
determination. We therefore vacate that portion of the June 6, 2022 order affecting parenting time

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and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court will be required to “consider up-
to-date information in making its parenting-time determination.” Fletcher, 447 Mich at 889.

                               VI. PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND

         Lastly, plaintiff argues that the case should be assigned to a different judge on remand
because the trial judge has “a settled disposition regarding the cause of the conflict between the
parties” and that it would therefore be impossible for the judge to fairly address the issues before
it. “The general concern when deciding whether to remand to a different trial judge is whether the
appearance of justice will be better served if another judge presides over the case.” Sparks v
Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 163; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). This Court “may remand to a different judge
if the original judge would have difficulty in putting aside previously expressed views or findings,
if reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and if reassignment will not
entail excessive waste or duplication.” Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595, 602-603; 691 NW2d
812 (2004). A party challenging the impartiality of a judge must overcome a heavy presumption
of judicial impartiality. Van Buren Twp v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 598; 673 NW2d
111 (2003). “In general, the challenger must prove a judge harbors actual bias or prejudice for or
against a party or attorney that is both personal and extrajudicial.” Id.

         Here, the trial court found that both parties were responsible for the conflicts between them.
The court’s comments regarding conflict were genuine and nonprejudicial and do not suggest that
the trial judge would be unable to fairly adjudicate the case if this case were remanded to the same
trial judge. This Court’s review of the record shows that the trial court invested significant time,
care, and attention into this case, despite our finding of reversible error. Plaintiff has failed to
overcome the burden to show that the trial judge harbors actual bias or prejudice for or against
either party.

        The trial court’s order awarding defendant joint legal custody and parenting time is vacated
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Upon remand, the
trial court shall reexamine the issue of legal custody, allowing the parties to update the record to
account for any recent developments. The trial court shall further reconsider parenting time, if
applicable per the court’s legal custody order. We do not retain jurisdiction. Neither party having
prevailed in full, no costs are awarded. MCR 7.219 (A).

                                                               /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                               /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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