Court Opinion

ID: 9384914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:03:36.601225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.457876
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                        CHARLES WEISBLAT,
     as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF SOL WEISBLAT,
                               Appellant,

                                      v.

                            JANICE FELDMAN,
                                Appellee.

                               No. 4D22-525

                               [April 5, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; John B. Bowman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE19-026498.

    Ken Taninaka of Salomon, Kanner, Damian & Rodriguez, P.A., Miami,
for appellant.

   Mark Perlman of Mark Perlman, P.A., Hollywood, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

   In this quiet title action, the defendant estate appeals from three circuit
court orders: (1) the final judgment granting the plaintiff’s summary
judgment motion to quiet title to the subject property in the plaintiff’s
favor; (2) an earlier order denying the estate’s amended summary
judgment motion on the plaintiff’s quiet title action; and (3) an order
denying the estate’s motion for reconsideration of that earlier order. We
reverse these orders, and direct that the circuit court enter a final
summary judgment in the estate’s favor on the plaintiff’s quiet title action.

                            Procedural History

    The procedural history is straightforward and undisputed. In 1995,
the decedent and the plaintiff’s mother took title to the subject property
pursuant to a warranty deed, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
In 2006, the decedent issued a quitclaim deed to himself, stating that the
quitclaim deed’s purpose was to “terminate the Joint Tenancy with Right
of Survivorship” and to create a tenancy in common. In 2014, the decedent
died. In 2018, the plaintiff’s mother conveyed her interest in the property
to the plaintiff. The decedent’s estate then claimed a one-half interest in
the property arising from the decedent’s 2006 quitclaim deed.

   The estate’s claim prompted the plaintiff, in 2019, to file the instant
quiet title action in which she claimed to be the property’s sole owner.
Pertinently, the complaint alleged:

         There was no consideration for the [d]ecedent’s … 2006
      [quitclaim] [d]eed to himself, and the joint owner, [the
      plaintiff’s mother], did not join in the execution of this deed.

         ….

         A joint tenancy with right of survivorship can only be
      terminated by a conveyance to a third party or upon mutual
      agreement of both owners. Kozacik v. Kozacik, 26 So. 2d 659
      (Fla. 1946)[.]

         ….

          Accordingly, the … 2006 [quitclaim] [d]eed is a nullity, and
      upon the death of [the decedent], his interest passed to [the
      plaintiff’s mother] pursuant to the … 1995 [d]eed creating a
      joint tenancy with right of survivorship.

(paragraph numbering deleted).

   The estate filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim for
partition (count 1) and use and occupation (count 2). After an amendment,
one of the estate’s affirmative defenses alleged the plaintiff’s claim failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. According to the estate:

         [The decedent’s] 2006 … quitclaim deed [to himself] … had
      the effect of terminating the joint tenancy with right of
      survivorship and creating a tenancy in common between [the
      decedent] and [the plaintiff’s mother]. See Countrywide
      Funding Corp. v. Palmer, 589 So. 2d 994, 995 (Fla. 2d DCA
      1991) (joint tenant may terminate joint tenancy with right of
      survivorship by his conveyance of his interest to himself
      without a straw man).

   Based on this affirmative defense and the estate’s other affirmative
defenses, the estate filed a motion for summary judgment, which the estate
later amended. The estate’s amended summary judgment motion relied

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on the Second District’s Countrywide opinion and our opinion in
Schlossberg v. Estate of Kaporovsky, 303 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020),
which had cited Countrywide with approval.

   The plaintiff filed a response to the estate’s amended summary
judgment motion. Pertinently, the plaintiff’s response argued:

         [The estate’s] … argu[ment] that the [d]ecedent could
     lawfully terminate a [j]oint [t]enancy with right of survivorship
     and create a Co-tenancy without survivorship rights by
     executing a Quit Claim Deed to himself [.].. is contrary to …
     Kozacik …, 26 So. 2d [at 661, … in which] the Florida Supreme
     Court stated the general rule pertaining to the termination of
     a [j]oint [t]enancy with right of survivorship as follows:

           [A] joint tenancy may be terminated by any act which
        destroys one or more of its unities, provided the act of
        the joint tenant who severs his interest is such as to
        preclude him from claiming by survivorship any interest
        in the subject matter of the joint tenancy.               …
        Accordingly, it is settled that a joint tenancy will be
        terminated by the alienation or conveyance by a joint
        tenant of his interest in the realty to a stranger, [f]or by
        such … act, the unity of title is destroyed and the unity
        of possession is gone.

         The Fourth District … followed this general rule in Wittock
     [v. Ramponi, 446 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984),] … when it
     held: “The law is clear that the creation of a joint tenancy with
     a right of survivorship can be terminated by the conveyance
     of an interest of any joint tenant to a stranger.” [Id. at 271.]

(paragraph numbering deleted).

  The plaintiff’s response further argued:

        Th[e] Second District[’s] … Countrywide [decision] …
     cannot overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Kozacik or
     the Fourth District’s decision in Wittock that rights of
     survivorship can only be terminated by conveyance to a
     stranger.

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         Further, the [Fourth District’s 2020 opinion in] Schlossberg
      cannot retroactively destroy the vested property rights that
      Plaintiff and her [mother] enjoyed since 1995.

(paragraph numbering deleted).

  After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying the estate’s
amended motion for summary judgment, reasoning:

          [A]t the time that [the decedent] entered into the … 2006
      Quit Claim Deed for estate planning purposes, the applicable
      law was that [the decedent] had to destroy one or more unities
      of title such as by a conveyance of his interest in the subject
      property to a stranger (rather than to himself) in order to
      terminate the joint tenancy with right of survivorship.

   The estate filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its
amended motion for summary judgment. The circuit court denied the
estate’s motion for reconsideration.

   The plaintiff then filed her motion for summary judgment, arguing she
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because—as she had argued
in her response to the estate’s summary judgment motion—the decedent
could not “lawfully terminate a [j]oint [t]enancy with right of survivorship
by executing a Quit Claim Deed to himself without the joinder of his joint
tenant.”

   The estate filed a response which mirrored the arguments which the
estate made in its own summary judgment motion.

   After a hearing, the circuit court entered a summary final judgment
quieting title in the plaintiff’s favor:

         The Court finds that at the time [the decedent] entered into
      the … 2006 Quit Claim Deed, the applicable law was that [the
      decedent] had to destroy one or more unities of title such as
      by a conveyance of his interest in the subject property to a
      stranger (rather than to himself) in order to terminate the joint
      tenancy with right of survivorship. Kozacik v. Kozacik, 26 So.
      2d 659 (Fla. 1946); Wittock v. Ramponi, 446 So. 2d 271 (Fla.
      4th DCA 1984)[.] The joint tenancy with right of survivorship
      between [the decedent] and [the plaintiff’s mother] was not
      terminated upon [the decedent’s] conveyance of his interest in
      the [property] to himself via the recorded … 2006 Quit Claim

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      Deed. The recorded … 2006 Quit Claim Deed under which
      the Defendant … Estate … claims to have an undivided 50%
      interest in the foregoing [property] constitutes a cloud on title.

                                This Appeal

   This appeal followed. The estate argues the circuit court erred in
granting the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and denying the estate’s
amended summary judgment motion. Relying on the Second District’s
opinion in Countrywide, the estate argues the 2006 quitclaim deed—
pursuant to which the decedent conveyed his interest in the property to
himself—effectively terminated the joint tenancy with right of survivorship
and created a tenancy in common.

    The estate also argues Kozacik and Wittock do not conflict with
Countrywide, as those earlier cases did not preclude the possibility of a
joint tenancy being terminated by a self-conveyance without the use of a
strawman. See Kozacik, 26 So. 2d at 661 (“[A] joint tenancy may be
terminated by any act which destroys one or more of its unities, provided
the act of the joint tenant who severs his interest is such as to preclude
him from claiming by survivorship any interest in the subject … of the
joint tenancy.”) (emphases added); Wittock, 446 So. 2d at 271 (“[T]he
creation of a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship can be terminated
by the conveyance of an interest of any joint tenant to a stranger.”)
(emphases added).

   The estate further argues that this court—albeit on a different set of
facts—has adopted Countrywide’s reasoning. See Schlossberg, 303 So. 3d
at 986-87 (“Applying the principle of [Countrywide] to this case, … when
the quitclaim deed was executed by both trustees and by the settlor
individually, [transferring the property to themselves,] the deed
accomplished with a single conveyance the same requirements as two
separate conveyances.      We see no need to demand two separate
conveyances.”).

   We agree with the estate’s arguments. Countrywide and Schlossberg
are dispositive. Further, Kozacik and Wittock do not hold that rights of
survivorship can only be terminated by conveyance to a stranger, as the
plaintiff apparently led the circuit court to rule below.

    As in the instant case, the question in Countrywide was whether a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship could be terminated by a deed from one
joint tenant to himself. The deeded property had been owned by a mother
and son with right of survivorship. 589 So. 2d at 995. Through a

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quitclaim deed, the property was conveyed to the son individually, but it
was shown that the mother’s signature was forged. Id. Therefore, only the
son conveyed to himself. Id. Pertinently, the trial court concluded:
“Because the quit claim deed included a conveyance directly from the son
to himself and the son did not first convey his interest to a strawman who
then conveyed back to the son, under Florida law the conveyance to the
son was ineffective; therefore, the quit claim deed did not terminate the
joint tenancy with right of survivorship.” Id.

   On appeal, the Second District disagreed that conveyance to a
strawman was necessary:

          We recognize, as did the trial court, that a joint tenant
      under a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is entitled to
      terminate the joint tenancy by the conveyance of his interest
      to a third party. However, Ratinska v. Estate of Denesuk, 447
      So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), held that although, in the
      creation by a person of a joint tenancy with right of
      survivorship in that person and another, the use of a
      strawman to whom to first convey that person’s interest
      before the time of the conveyance creating the joint
      tenancy is “an acceptable method of obtaining the desired
      result,” that “does not make it the only available or even
      the most desirable method.” 447 So. 2d at 243. As
      Ratinska added, “We see no point in requiring that property
      be conveyed twice when a single conveyance is just as
      effective and has the virtues of economy and efficiency.”
      Id. Although Ratinska was concerned with the creation of a
      joint tenancy, we see no reason why the rationale of that case
      would not also apply to the termination of a joint tenancy.

         Thus, we conclude that a joint tenancy with right of
      survivorship can be, and was in this case, terminated and a
      tenancy in common created by a conveyance by one joint
      tenant of his interest to himself.

Id. at 995-96 (emphases added; other internal citation omitted).

   In Schlossberg, we adopted Countrywide’s reasoning. See Schlossberg,
303 So. 3d at 986-87 (“Applying the principle of [Countrywide] to this case,
… when the quitclaim deed was executed by both trustees and by the
settlor individually, [transferring the property to themselves,] the deed
accomplished with a single conveyance the same requirements as two

                                     6
separate conveyances.       We see no need to demand two separate
conveyances.”).

   Here, as in Countrywide, the joint tenancy with right of survivorship
could be, and was, terminated and a tenancy in common created by a
conveyance by one joint tenant—the decedent—of his interest to himself.
Countrywide, 589 So. 2d at 995-96.

                                 Conclusion

    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the summary final judgment
quieting title in the plaintiff’s favor, the order denying the estate’s amended
motion for summary judgment, and the order denying the estate’s motion
for reconsideration. We remand with directions to the circuit court to enter
final summary judgment in the estate’s favor on the plaintiff’s quiet title
action, and to conduct further proceedings on the estate’s counterclaims
for partition (count 1) and use and occupation (count 2). The estate’s
alternative arguments on appeal lack merit, without further discussion.

   Reversed and remanded with directions.

WARNER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                             *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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