Court Opinion

ID: 9914189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 19:04:08.135407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:29.320655
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221752-U
                                            No. 1-22-1752
                                     Order filed December 29, 2023

                                                                                       Sixth Division
 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                               )     of Cook County, Illinois.
           Respondent-Appellee,                                )
                                                               )
     v.                                                        )     No. 19 CR 15898
                                                               )
 OSTRANDA BROOKS,                                              )     The Honorable
                                                               )     Neera Lall Walsh,
           Petitioner-Appellant.                               )     Judge, Presiding.

           JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Tailor concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

Held: We affirm the circuit court’s summary dismissal at the first stage of post-conviction
      proceedings where the petition failed to state the gist of a claim necessary to advance to
      second stage of post-conviction proceedings.

¶1        This appeal derives from the circuit court summary dismissal of Petitioner Ostranda

Brooks’ petition at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings. Brooks argues that the summary

dismissal was error because the petition stated the gist of a claim that his guilty plea was
No. 1-22-1752

involuntarily due to the “coercive effect” of (1) counsel’s ineffective assistance and (2) the circuit

court’s questioning during the hearing on Brooks’ request to proceed pro se. For the following

reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶2                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶3       In a seven-count indictment, Brooks was charged with first-degree murder, aggravated

discharge of a firearm, aggravated domestic battery, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Under a fully negotiated plea agreement, Brooks pled guilty

to the offenses of aggravated discharge of a firearm and aggravated domestic battery in exchange

for two concurrent terms of seven years’ imprisonment and dismissal of the remaining charges.

The circuit court accepted Brooks’ guilty plea and sentenced him pursuant to the plea agreement.

Seven months later, Brooks filed a pro se post-conviction petition. The court summarily dismissed

the petition at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings. Brooks now appeals.

¶4                                          A. Pre-Plea Proceedings

¶5       On December 2, 2019, the circuit court appointed the public defender’s office to represent

Brooks. The parties tendered some discovery in February 2020, and the case was continued from

March through July as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. On August 28, 2020, Brooks and his

counsel, Assistant Public Defender (APD) Amy Weisberg, appeared in court via Zoom. During

the Zoom hearing, the parties discussed scheduling a 402 conference, Brooks conferred with

Weisberg in a breakout room, 1 and the case was continued for further discovery. During a Zoom

hearing on October 27, 2020, Brooks asked Weisberg if “there any chance I could talk to you

         1
            “Breakout rooms are sessions that are split off from the main Zoom meeting. ***. In the courtroom
setting, the breakout room can serve as a room where a party can confer with his or her attorney or a witness can
wait to testify, without having access to the main meeting.” In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027,¶ 45, n. 1.

                                                        -2-
No. 1-22-1752

about, like, this whole discovery? I haven’t been able to reach you.” Weisberg responded she

would schedule a Zoom call to talk with Brooks.

¶6     During a Zoom hearing on December 16, 2020, Weisberg stated she received medical

records from the State, would be filing an unspecified motion, and would be “setting it in the

holding pattern for trial.” By the next court hearing on February 16, 2021, APD William Woelkers

was assigned to Brooks’ case. Two days later, the State filed a motion to allow evidence of Brooks’

other crimes. During a Zoom hearing on May 27, 2021, Woelkers stated he had visited Brooks at

the jail and would be visiting again. He also stated that he was assessing whether to file a motion

to suppress evidence. Brooks asked if he could get an earlier court date because he was ready to

“get this thing moving.” The court explained to Brooks that his counsel needed time to investigate

and file documents and that there were many cases on the call due to COVID-19. At the end of the

hearing, Brooks conferred with Woelkers in a breakout room. On July 16, 2021, Brooks informed

the court that he was not “seeing eye to eye” and “having a problem” with his counsel. Because

Woelkers was in another courtroom, the case was continued.

¶7     A few days later, Woelkers filed a response to the State’s motion to allow evidence of other

crimes. During a Zoom hearing a few months thereafter, Woelkers stated he intended to file a

motion to suppress evidence but wanted to resolve the motion to allow evidence of other crimes

because “that may have an effect on which direction we go from here.” After the call, Brooks

conferred with Woelkers in a breakout room. In December 2021, the parties informed the court

that they were in plea negotiations, but an agreement depended on the court’s ruling on the State’s

motion to allow evidence of other crimes. After a hearing, the court granted the State’s request to

introduce evidence of Brooks’ other crimes at trial.

                                               -3-
No. 1-22-1752

¶8     On February 18, 2022, Brooks filed a notice indicating he would be “going pro-per with

an assistant to help [him]” and attached a “Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel.” The motion was stricken on the basis that Brooks’ ineffective assistance

claims were premature. The court then inquired into Brooks’ request to proceed pro se. The court

questioned Brooks about his background, experience, and knowledge of the legal system. The

court advised that it will not explain anything that is unfamiliar to Brooks, and that the prosecutors

have tried many cases, gone to law school, knew the Rules of Evidence, and may have an

advantage over him. Once the trial began, Brooks could not change his mind and the court would

not provide standby counsel. The court further explained that “[p]resenting a defense is not a

simple matter of telling one’s story but requires adherence to various technical rules.” If Brooks

was found guilty, he could not say he did not know what he was doing.

¶9     The court also explained Brooks would not receive any special consideration or extra time

to use the library for being pro se. Brooks responded, “I don’t feel comfortable with that then

because I need extra time. I don’t know how I am going to proceed with it if that’s the case.”

Brooks then asked if he could get another attorney appointed to represent him, and the court stated

that Brooks could hire a private attorney, but Woelkers would remain his court-appointed attorney.

After further questioning, Brooks stated “I don’t know about the whole situation because you are

saying now that I can’t get any extra time to the library which I need so I mean it’s pretty much

pointless at this point for me to do.” The court asked Brooks if he decided whether he wanted to

represent himself, and Brooks responded no.

¶ 10   Thereafter, Woelkers stated he informed Brooks of the State’s plea offer of eight years in

prison. Woelkers wanted to “make it clear for the record” that he “never tell[s] any client the

                                                -4-
No. 1-22-1752

certainty of an outcome at trial.” Woelkers also stated he advises clients based on his experience

and the case evidence, his clients “are free to make any decision,” and he informed Brooks of the

charges and “ramifications of a guilty verdict.” Woelkers then stated that Brooks was going to

reject the State’s eight-year sentence offer and he “would file a motion to suppress the gun today.”

The State clarified that its offer is a seven-year sentence in exchange for Brooks pleading guilty.

The court passed the case to allow Brooks to discuss the seven-year sentence offer with his counsel.

¶ 11                                 B. Guilty Plea Proceeding

¶ 12    When the case was recalled, Brooks informed the court that he wished to accept the State’s

offer. The court admonished Brooks of the charges, possible penalties, and the rights he was

relinquishing by pleading guilty. Brooks stated that he had not received any threats or promises

and was pleading guilty of his own free will. The court inquired about a factual basis for a guilty

finding, and the parties stipulated to the following:

                “If the State were to proceed to trial [it would] present the testimony of Treasure

       Hilliard, ***, who would identify the defendant in open court and testify that on the date

       of October 24th, 2019 at approximately 1:00 p.m. Near the location of 2030 South State

       Street, Chicago, Cook County, Ms. Hilliard and the defendant were in a dating relationship.

       They have a child in common, and on that date and at that time that they got into a verbal

       argument that quickly escalated into a physical argument.

                During that argument the defendant grabbed Ms. Hilliard about the neck and

       squeezed affecting and impeding her normal breathing.

                                                -5-
No. 1-22-1752

                 Once Ms. Hilliard was able to get some distance from the defendant, the argument

       continued at which time the defendant removed a black revolver from his pocket, pointed

       the revolver in the direction of Ms. Hilliard, and discharged one shot.

                 Ms. Hilliard was able to eventually leave the apartment and she contacted the

       police.

                 The defendant was later placed into custody without incident.”

¶ 13   The court found the factual basis sufficient, found Brooks’ guilty plea was made

intelligently and voluntarily, and entered guilty findings on the offenses of aggravated discharge

of a firearm and aggravated domestic battery. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court

sentenced Brooks to two concurrent terms of seven years’ imprisonment, and the State dismissed

the remaining charges.

¶ 14                               C. Post-Conviction Proceeding

¶ 15   On October 5, 2022, Brooks filed a post-conviction petition. The petition alleged Weisberg

“did nothing” and Brooks did not talk to counsel from March to October 2020. Furthermore,

Woelkers did not (1) send an investigator to interview the victim, (2) request a “change in venue,”

and (3) look at video footage. Brooks requested to proceed pro se with assistance but the court

“denied all of these requests because she felt I didn’t know the law” and “insisted [Woelkers] be

appointed my defender after I ask her not to.” Brooks accepted the plea offer because he felt he

had no other choice and did not have a fair chance to defend himself “because of Covid.” Lastly,

the petition alleged that Brooks’ convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule. The circuit court

summarily dismissed the petition at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings, determining that

it had “no basis” and “no affidavit.” This appeal follows.

                                                -6-
No. 1-22-1752

¶ 16                                     II. JURISDICTION

¶ 17    On October 19, 2022, the circuit court summarily dismissed Brooks’ petition at the first

stage of post-conviction proceedings. Brooks filed a notice of appeal on November 14, 2022.

Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the Illinois

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (eff. July 1,

2017), which governs appeals in post-conviction proceedings.

¶ 18                                       III. ANALYSIS

¶ 19    On appeal, Brooks argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his petition

at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings where the petition stated the gist of a claim that

his plea was involuntarily due to the “coercive effect” of (1) counsel’s ineffective assistance and

(2) the circuit court’s questioning during the hearing on Brooks’ request to proceed pro se. The

State argues that Brooks’ guilty plea waives his claims. The State further asserts the circuit court’s

summary dismissal was warranted because Brooks failed to attach evidentiary affidavits to his

petition in accordance with section 122-2 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2

(West 2022)) and the petition failed to state the gist of a claim that counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness

and the circuit court’s questioning had a coercive effect on Brooks’ decision to plead guilty.

¶ 20                                          A. Waiver

¶ 21    We begin by addressing the State’s waiver argument. It is well established that “a voluntary

guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional errors.”

People v. Townsell, 209 Ill.2d 543, 545 (2004). “ ‘When a criminal defendant has solemnly

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred

                                                 -7-
No. 1-22-1752

prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’ ” People v. Smith, 383 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1085 (2008) (quoting

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759

(1970)).

¶ 22   There are exceptions to this waiver rule. For instance, the rule does not apply to claims of

actual innocence (People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940), claims that the defendant’s plea was based on

faulty admonishments (People v. Kimmons, 2022 IL App (2d) 180589, ¶ 38), and claims that

“ ‘attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice [the

defendant] received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann.’ ” Smith, 383

Ill. App. 3d at 1085 (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267, citing McMann, 397 U.S. 759).

¶ 23   None of these exceptions are applicable here. Brooks does not argue a claim of actual

innocence, that the court gave faulty admonishments, or that counsel’s advice led him to

involuntarily plead guilty. Instead, Brooks alleges that it was the “coercive environment”—i.e.,

counsel’s failure to provide effective assistance, the trial court’s questioning after Brooks

requested to proceed pro se, and that the State’s offer was set to lapse—that influenced his guilty

plea. However, “waiver and forfeiture are limitations on the parties and not on the court, and a

court may overlook forfeiture where necessary to reach a just result or maintain a sound body of

precedent.” Walworth Investments-LG, LLC v. Mu Sigma, Inc., 2022 IL 127177, ¶ 94. As such, we

will consider Brooks’ post-conviction claims.

¶ 24                              B. Post-Conviction Hearing Act

¶ 25   Brooks argues that the petition stated the gist of a claim necessary to advance to the second

stage of post-conviction proceedings. Specifically, the petition alleged counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by (1) failing to investigate the potential that Treasure Hilliard, the

                                                -8-
No. 1-22-1752

complaining witness, fabricated her allegations against him; (2) failing to file a motion to review

body camera footage and file a motion to suppress the gun evidence; (3) failing to file a motion

for “change of venue” or substitution of judge; and (4) having little to no contact with Brooks. The

petition further alleged that counsel’s ineffectiveness was compounded by the trial court’s

questioning during the hearing on his request to proceed pro se, leading to a “coercive effect” that

“rendered his plea involuntary.”

¶ 26    The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)) provides a

mechanism by which a criminal defendant can assert that his conviction and sentence were the

result of a substantial denial of his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois

Constitution, or both. The Act provides a three-stage process for adjudicating post-conviction

petitions. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. At the first stage, a trial court considers whether

the post-conviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d

175, 184 (2010). The trial court reviews the petition on its own, without input from the parties. Id.

The court may review the court file, the transcripts, and any appellate court actions. Id. The court

treats the allegations of fact as true so long as those allegations are not positively rebutted by the

record. Id. at 189.

¶ 27    Any petition deemed frivolous or patently without merit must be dismissed. 725 ILCS

5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2022). A petition is frivolous or patently without merit where it has no

“arguable basis either in law or in fact” in that it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory”

or “fanciful factual allegations.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). “An indisputably

meritless legal theory is one which is completely contradicted by the record.” Id. “Fanciful factual

allegations include those which are fantastic or delusional.” Id.

                                                  -9-
No. 1-22-1752

¶ 28    A pro se petitioner is not required to allege facts supporting all elements of a constitutional

claim. People v. Mars, 2012 IL App (2d) 110695, ¶ 32. Because a pro se petitioner will likely be

unaware of the precise legal basis for his claim, the threshold for survival is low, and a pro se

petitioner need allege only enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for

purposes of invoking the Act. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. However, the petition must “ ‘clearly set

forth the respects in which the petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.’ ” Id. (quoting 725

ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2022)). We review de novo the dismissal of a post-conviction petition at the

first stage. Id.

¶ 29    Brooks’ ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is evaluated under the two-part

test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by our supreme court

People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). Under Strickland, defense counsel was ineffective if

(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s

error prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “We assess counsel’s performance

using an objective standard of competence under prevailing professional norms.” People v.

Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 433 (2010). We assess prejudice by determining whether petitioner

showed a “reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, he would have pled not guilty and

insisted on going to trial.” People v. Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 14. The petitioner must show that

“he would have been better off going to trial because he would have been acquitted or had a viable

defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 26. In the context of a first-stage post-conviction

claim, a defendant need show only that he can arguably meet those two standards, i.e., it is arguable

that his counsel was deficient, and it is arguable that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. “A defendant’s failure to establish either prong of the

                                                - 10 -
No. 1-22-1752

Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Henderson, 2013

IL 114040, ¶ 11.

¶ 30                   1. Failure to Investigate Potential Witness Fabrication

¶ 31   The petition alleged counsel was ineffective where Brooks “asked [his] new attorney ***

to send an investigator to interview [his] victim because she was going to tell them she did all of

this out of spite.” We reject this argument for several reasons. First, Brooks failed to comply with

the evidentiary requirements of section 122-2 when he did not attach an affidavit regarding

Hilliard’s recantation to the petition. Section 122-2 provides, “The petition shall have attached

thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same

are not attached.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2022). “The requirement of an evidentiary affidavit or

other evidence *** shows that the verified allegations are capable of objective or independent

corroboration.” People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 26. Brooks failed to show that the allegations

were “capable of objective or independent corroboration” by attaching an affidavit from Hilliard

or explaining the reasons for its absence in the petition.

¶ 32   Moreover, the absence of Hilliard’s affidavit hinders our review of the ineffective

assistance claim. Our supreme court held, “ ‘[a] claim that trial counsel failed to investigate and

call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed witness.’ ” People v. Harris,

224 Ill. 2d 115, 142 (2007) (People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 380 (2000)). The court explained that

“ ‘[i]n the absence of such affidavit, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the proposed

witness could have provided testimony or information favorable to the defendant, and further

review of the claim is unnecessary.’ ” Id. The lack of an affidavit precludes us from assessing the

claim at issue.

                                                - 11 -
No. 1-22-1752

¶ 33   Citing People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, Brooks argues that the allegations are supported

by his sworn and notarized verification affidavit wherein he avers that all the allegations are true

and correct. However, Allen is distinguishable from this case. In Allen, the court considered

whether a petitioner’s failure to notarize a corroborating document attached to the petition

warranted summary dismissal. Id. ¶ 31. Adhering to the principle that courts consider the petition’s

substantive virtue rather than procedural compliance, the court found the lack of notarization did

not “prevent the court from reviewing the petition’s ‘substantive virtue,’ as to whether it ‘set[s]

forth a constitutional claim for relief.’ ” Id. ¶ 34. Unlike Allen, we are not concerned with the

validity of an evidentiary affidavit attached to Brooks’ petition. Rather, Brooks failed to attach an

evidentiary affidavit to the petition altogether, preventing this court from meaningfully assessing

whether Hilliard would provide information favorable to petitioner and whether counsel’s failure

to obtain the information demonstrates prejudice. See Harris, 224 Ill. 2d at 142. Our supreme court

held “the failure to either attach the necessary ‘affidavits, records, or other evidence’ or explain

their absence is ‘fatal’ to a post-conviction petition.” People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2002).

Therefore, we find the petition failed to state the gist of a claim that counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate the potential that Hilliard fabricated the allegations against Brooks.

¶ 34            2. Failure to Review Body Camera Footage and File a Motion to Suppress

¶ 35   The petition alleged counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to

review body camera footage and file a motion to suppress the gun evidence. These allegations fail

to demonstrate Brooks was arguably prejudiced. Brooks failed to attach an evidentiary affidavit

about the contents of the body camera footage pursuant to section 122-2. Without corroboration,

any allegations that Brooks was prejudiced because counsel failed to file a motion to suppress

                                                - 12 -
No. 1-22-1752

based on the evidence provided in the footage is speculative, and such “broad conclusory

allegations are never enough even under the low threshold of the first stage.” People v. Roman,

2016 IL App (1st) 141740, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (2008)).

¶ 36   Assuming the footage provides a basis for a motion to suppress, and the court granted the

motion, the suppression of the gun would not lead to a more favorable result for Brooks. Because

four of the seven counts associated with the gun were all dismissed under the plea agreement, the

outcome is the same whether Brooks was acquitted of the four counts based on insufficient

evidence or, as here, entered a plea agreement dismissing the four counts. Brooks would still stand

trial on the remaining charges of aggravated discharge of a firearm, aggravated domestic violence,

and possibly attempted first degree murder where he faced a 26-to-50-year sentence. See 720 ILCS

5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2022) (attempt to commit first degree murder is a Class X felony with 20-

year enhancement); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25 (West 2022) (Class X felony sentencing range is 6 to 30

years). Notably, the suppression of the gun would not automatically result in acquittal of the

aggravated discharge of a firearm and attempted first degree murder charges where the parties

stipulated that Hilliard would testify that Brooks removed a black revolver from his pocket and

discharged a shot. People v. Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 52 (“The positive, credible testimony of a

single witness, even if contradicted by the defendant, is sufficient to convict a defendant”).

Additionally, the gun is irrelevant to the charge of aggravated domestic violence for strangulation.

Faced with a significantly higher sentence, it is unlikely that Brooks would have chosen to proceed

to trial under the circumstances. Thus, the petition failed to state the gist of a claim that counsel

was ineffective for failing to review body camera footage and filing a motion to suppress.

¶ 37                           3. Failure to Seek “Change in Venue”

                                               - 13 -
No. 1-22-1752

¶ 38   The petition alleged counsel rendered ineffective assistance by neglecting to file a motion

for “change in venue” or substitution of judge because “Judge Walsh told me back in 2016 on a

theft charge that I plead guilty to that if she sees me in her court room again ‘I’m not going to like

the results’ which I felt she had it out for me.” This claim fails to show counsel, particularly

Woelkers, who is the counsel claimed to be ineffective in the petition, was arguably deficient in

his performance. A request to substitute judge as a matter of right must be made within 10 days

after the case is placed on the judge’s trial call (724 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2018)), and Woelkers

did not appear until 14 months after the case was assigned to Judge Walsh. “Counsel cannot be

considered ineffective for failing to make or pursue what would have been a meritless motion or

objection.” People v. Rogers, 2021 IL 126163, ¶ 32. Furthermore, as previously stated, Brooks

failed to show that he was arguably prejudiced where it is unlikely Brooks would have chosen to

proceed to trial given the circumstances. Thus, the petition fails to state the gist of a claim that

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for “change in venue” or substitution of judge.

¶ 39                   4. Counsel’s Alleged Insufficient Effort and Communication

¶ 40   The petition alleged a claim of ineffective assistance because counsel gave “little to [no]

effort” to “properly look into [his] case and to set it for trial” and communicate with Brooks from

March to October 2020. The petition does not allege any facts delineating a different outcome had

counsels put in more effort in their representation and, therefore, fails to establish arguable

prejudice. See People v. Valladares, 2013 IL App (1st) 112010, ¶¶ 61-64 (finding petitioner’s

ineffective assistance claim failed because petitioner did not show how further communication

would have changed the outcome). Significantly, the record shows counsel’s communication was

hindered by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court issued various administrative continuances due

                                                - 14 -
No. 1-22-1752

to COVID from March to August 2020, and Brooks even admits that “COVID understandably

inhibited counsel’s ability to contact petitioner starting that March.” Furthermore, the parties were

still tendering discovery in October 2020, and counsel was not in a place to set the case for trial.

Therefore, the petition fails to state the gist of a claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance

based on insufficient effort or communication.

¶ 41   5. Circuit Court’s Questioning During The Hearing on Brooks’ Request to Proceed Pro Se

¶ 42   Brooks argues that the circuit court coerced him by repeatedly telling him “how bad things

would be for him if he did not continue working with an attorney that had done next to nothing for

him in over a year and then how bad they would be if he did not accept the offer.” We disagree

with Brooks’ argument because the petition’s allegations surrounding the claim that the circuit

court’s questioning had a “coercive effect” on Brook’s decision to plead guilty are rebutted by the

record. Our assessment of the hearing reveals the court’s admonishments aligned with the rule that

a court must conduct “[a] careful inquiry *** to determine defendant’s ability to conduct his own

defense, focusing on age, level of education, mental capacity, and prior experience with the legal

proceedings.” This inquiry entails that a defendant “be made aware of the dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is

doing, and his choice is made with eyes open.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Baez,

241 Ill. 2d 44, 117 (2011). “The requirement of knowing and intelligent choice calls for nothing

less than a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of

the decision to abandon it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 43   Here, the circuit court properly informed Brooks of the disadvantages of proceeding pro

se. The court questioned Brooks about his background, experience, and knowledge of the legal

                                                - 15 -
No. 1-22-1752

system. The court stated that it will not explain anything that is unfamiliar to Brooks, and that the

prosecutors have tried many cases, gone to law school, knew the Rules of Evidence, and may have

an advantage over him. Once the trial began, Brooks could not change his mind and the court

would not provide standby counsel. The court further explained that “[p]resenting a defense is not

a simple matter of telling one’s story but requires adherence to various technical rules.” If Brooks

was found guilty, he could not say he did not know what he was doing. The court also explained

Brooks would not receive any special consideration or extra time to use the library for being pro

se and, while Brooks could not seek another appointed attorney, he could hire a private attorney.

We observe no coercion in the circuit court’s inquiry. Therefore, the petition failed to state the gist

of a claim that the circuit court’s questioning contributed to the “coercive effect” leading to

Brooks’ involuntary plea.

¶ 44                                    IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 45   We find Smith’s post-conviction petition failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim

that his guilty plea was involuntarily due to the “coercive effect” of (1) counsel’s ineffective

assistance and (2) the circuit court’s questioning during the hearing on Brooks’ request to proceed

pro se. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s summary dismissal of the petition at the first

stage of post-conviction proceedings.

¶ 46    Affirmed.

                                                - 16 -