Court Opinion

ID: 9517234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:10:41.04484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:57.028419
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The principal opinion examines an accumulation of error on evidentiary rulings, but concludes that such were not prejudicial. In the light of the complex circumstances of this case, and the long period of concurrent disability unrelated to the collision, I cannot agree. Within some ten months of the collision decedent was the victim of severe influenza and associated infections. Symptoms thereafter persisted leading to almost immediate diagnosis of lung cancer. Three months thereafter he underwent cancer surgery and the radiation therapy incident thereto and, in fact died from such conditions about three years later. The trial court concluded that since the collision did not induce the cancer defendant should not be permitted to cross-examine the plaintiffs physician concerning the effect of the cancer surgery and the ensuing therapy upon decedent’s state of well-being, activities and general condition thereafter. The principal opinion remarks that there was no independent proof of such factors tendered, but disregards the act of a denial of offer of proof as to matters to which the examining physicians could testify. It appears that Dr. Wright did not examine the decedent concerning the injuries alleged to be received from the collision until the surgery and radiation therapy, but defendant was not permitted to inquire concerning the effect of such upon symptoms found at the examination. The discretion of the trial court as to limitations upon cross-examination should not be applied in a restrictive manner as to experts who speak of opinions concerning matters not within the knowledge and experience of laymen. Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill. 2d 548, 170 N.E.2d 564; City of Chicago v. Avenue State Bank, 4 Ill. App. 3d 235, 281 N.E.2d 66; Horwitz v. Michael Reese Hospital, 5 Ill. App. 3d 508, 284 N.E.2d 4. The plaintiff decedent was free from the impact of the cancer surgery and its sequelae for less than one-fourth of the period considered by the jury. Where the proper elements of compensable damage are so commingled between the proximate result of the injuries and the development of the cancer and its attendant treatment, it appears that the court’s ruling forestalled any isolation of the symptoms of the original injury from the effect of the cancer. I would hold that the error in limiting defendant’s cross-examination óf the physicians, together with the other errors in evidentiary rulings found by the opinion, were so prejudicial as to require reversal of the judgment and remandment for a new trial upon the issues of damages.