Court Opinion

ID: 9860674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:29:05.738722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:21.748774
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting: I agree with the majority that the term “municipality” in the Fire Protection District Act is ambiguous. However, I do not agree with its interpretation because I believe it is illogical, imposes an unconstitutional classification, and unduly burdens property owners in the Wauconda Fire Protection District who also live in unincorporated Lake County. As used in section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act (70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002)), the term “municipality” is ambiguous. “A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways.” Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395-96 (2003). In this case, “reasonably well-informed persons” believe that, by using the term “municipality,” the legislature intended to exclude cities, villages, and incorporated towns, but not counties. Yet, there is no rationale that I can perceive, nor has one been presented to this court, that distinguishes these entities. There is no reason that municipalities protected by fire protection districts should have supremacy over the districts but counties should not. In the alternative, if there is any rationale that suggests that a fire protection district is more capable than a county to enact and enforce fire codes, then there is no reason of record to explain why fire protection districts should not also be more capable than municipalities protected by fire protection districts. The more logical interpretation is that the legislature intended that all entities that supervise the construction of buildings, impose safety codes, and have the apparatus to enforce them in their jurisdiction should be included in the definition of “municipality.” I believe the legislature intended to include counties in the definition of “municipalities.” Before the legislature enacted the Fire Protection District Act, it had already granted counties the authority to enact fire codes. See 55 ILCS 5/5 — 1063 (West 2002). There is nothing in the Fire Protection District Act itself, or in its history, indicating that the legislature intended to dimmish a county’s express authority to enact fire codes by giving concurrent jurisdiction to a fire protection district. In fact, I believe the legislative history supports my interpretation. When the sponsor of the bill said it was “permissive,” I think he meant that the statute applied only where there was a vacuum, i.e., only where a comity, village, or city had not enacted a fire code. I also note that, contrary to the majority’s position, there is a conflict between the Wauconda Fire Protection District ordinance and the Lake County fire prevention code. The first requires sprinklers while the latter does not. Ironically, because the Wauconda Fire Protection District ordinance requires sprinklers, the county then requires the owner to install a generator to insure functioning of the sprinklers. I do not believe the legislature intended to burden owners in this way. It is well settled that, where the language of a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court should select the interpretation that leads to a logical result and reject that which would lead to an absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. See In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 517 (2002). I believe the majority has failed in its attempt to achieve the most reasonable interpretation. In my opinion, contemporaneous jurisdiction will create myriad problems not yet experienced or foreseen by the majority. Requiring county residents to comply with two jurisdictions rather than one will result in unequal treatment of county residents vis-a-vis municipal residents, without any rational basis. Finally, the majority interpretation violates the equal protection clause (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) regardless of which test is applied (strict scrutiny or rational basis). See Puffer-Hefty School District No. 69 v. Du Page Regional Board of School Trustees, 339 Ill. App. 3d 194, 201-02 (2003) (strict scrutiny will be applied to legislation that operates to the disadvantage of a suspect classification or infringes upon a fundamental right, otherwise the legislation must simply bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest). Ultimately, the appellate or supreme court will have to reconcile which entity has supremacy in conflicts between county and fire protection district ordinances. If not, further improvements built in those areas of conflict will be subject to duplicative coverage and costs relating thereto, both in enforcement and compliance, and in probable litigation of each conflict. Thus, I respectfully dissent.