Court Opinion

ID: 9884816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:15:39.789419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:40.952047
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant was found guilty by a jury in the circuit court of Rock Island County of the crime of indecent liberties with a child, and was sentenced to a term of not less than 10 nor more than 20 years in the penitentiary. The victim was a four-year-old girl. Her mother had taken her to the home of a babysitter at about 6:00 A.M. At about noon, the child left that home to go to the Head Start School. There was an election on that day, the place where school was held was used as a polling place, and school was not in session. One of the election judges saw the child and told her there was no school. The defendant then came up and said that he knew the child; that he was a neighbor, and that he would take her home. The defendant and James Harvey then got into the car with the child and the defendant drove away. One of the election judges took down the license number of the car. The defendant and the child returned in the car at about 2:30 P.M. They were alone. When let out of the car, she was carrying a pop bottle, was dressed the same, but her hair was wet and she walked with her legs wide apart in a straddle position. A few minutes later, the child returned to the home of the babysitter, who testified that her hair was damp and messed up, her dress wrinkled, and that she was carrying the bottle of pop and two quarters, which she did not have in the morning. The babysitter took her back to the building where the Head Start School normally held sessions. One of the ladies removed the child’s panties and observed a thick mucus secretion there, and noticed that the child’s vaginal area was red and scratchy. The babysitter testified that the rectum was red and irritated, and that there was a trace of blood on her underpants. James Harvey, the man who had been in the car with the defendant and the little girl on the day in question, testified that he had known the defendant for many years, and that after leaving the polling place, the defendant dropped him off at the Campbell Hotel, and the child was still in the car. Two witnesses saw the defendant and Harvey in the car with the child. Harvey asked them if they knew the child and they answered that they did not. Another witness who saw the defendant carrying the child, asked if he had found a lost child and he answered, “No,” and stated that he knew her. The child was taken to the hospital where she remained for three or four days. Her mother observed that her hair had been wet and dried stringy; that she looked like she had been crying, and was sullen and quiet, which was unusual. The child was examined by two doctors. They found a bruising, reddening and swelling in the vaginal area and the area between the vagina and anus. There were superficial lacerations in the perianal area and the anus was dilated and enlarged. An employee of the F.B.I. testified as an expert, relative to hair and fibre identification. He testified that hair found in the child’s panties matched that taken from the head of the defendant; that the hair on the defendant’s clothing matched that taken from the child; that hair may be identified by race and when compared with that from an individual may be identified as not coming from that individual; and that it is not possible to state that a designated strand of hair came from a particular individual. He also matched fibres from the defendant’s clothing on the child’s clothing and, likewise, fibres from her clothing on the defendant’s clothing. The defendant contends that he was denied due process of law by the denial of discovery; that there was a total failure of proof of his age; that the court committed error in certain statements made to the jury; that the trial court should have ordered a pyschiatric examination pursuant to the statute (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 23, par. 2402); that opinion evidence was improperly admitted; and that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request that a 1955 conviction not be used for impeachment purposes. We find it necessary to consider only the contention relative to denial of due process by reason of the court’s refusal to permit the defendant any discovery. The defendant, prior to trial, requested the court to order the State to disclose any evidence favorable to him. He also requested the court to direct the State to advise him of any tests which were made to determine whether spermatazoa was in or on the person of the victim, and if such tests were made, the results of such tests, and the results of any other medical reports concerning the condition of the victim. In People v. Hoffman, 32 Ill.2d 96, the defendant was found guilty of murder. The victim had checked in at a hotel with the defendant. His defense was that he had left the victim at 6:00 in the evening and returned at 6:00 the following morning to find her dead. A police report had indicated that a pair of men’s shorts, wet in the frontal area, had been found by the police in the closet. The defendant requested the production of the shorts, and this request was denied. We noted that their importance to the defense was obvious, and at pages 99 and 100 stated: “In Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194, the Supreme Court held that ‘*** the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ***.’ 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196.” The defendant here correctly points out that the absence of spermatazoa in or on the person, or on any of the articles of the child’s clothing, might be strong circumstantial evidence on his behalf. Without examining the results of any spermatazoa or blood tests, the defendant could not know whether such evidence was favorable or unfavorable to him. The State contends that the testimony was only that such tests were “requested”; that there was nothing in the record to establish that “results” were ever obtained or that such results were in existence and capable of being discovered. That is hardly a satisfactory answer. The prosecution could have, and should have, candidly stated whether or not results had been obtained, and if obtained, what they disclosed. The circumstances of this case compel an inference that tests had been made and results obtained which were not disclosed. In People v. Moses, 11 Ill.2d 84, 89, we stated: “Where it appears that there is evidence in the possession and control of the prosecution favorable to the defendant, ‘a right sense of justice demands that it should be available, unless there are strong reasons otherwise.’ People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140.” The State cites People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, for the rule that it is not reversible error to fail to disclose results of scientific tests absent intimation that such results were contrary to testimony at the trial. In Hester, we held that the notations jotted down by the crime laboratory technicians need not be turned over absent intimation that they were contrary to their testimony. However, in Hester, the defendant had been given “prior statements of all State witnesses, copies of his written confession and the complete records of the board of education concerning him, copies of the autopsy and crime laboratory test results, as well as the opportunity on two occasions for his own experts to perform independent experiments on the physical evidence at the police laboratory, although the results of these tests were never offered at the trial.” (39 Ill.2d at 516.) We there observed that the defendant was not deprived of any right because he failed to obtain the notations jotted down particularly in view of the broad discovery granted to him. The circumstances in this respect in Hester are a far cry from those in the case at bar, where all discovery was denied. We also note that the defendant should have been granted a pretrial request for a list of witnesses to the extent allowed by statute (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 114 — 9), and that he should have been allowed to examine the physical evidence, e.g., the clothing and hair samples, which the prosecution intended to introduce in evidence at the trial. (People v. Tribbett, 90 Ill.App.2d 296, aff’d 41 Ill.2d 267.) Likewise, where no privilege exists and where the relevancy and competency of pretrial statements or reports shall have been established, the trial judge should order that the reports or pretrial statements of the prosecution witnesses in the possession or control of the State be made available to the defendant for his inspection and use for impeachment purposes upon a proper showing of their existence. “The State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons. (People v. Johnson, 31 Ill.2d 602, 605; People v. Wolff, 19 Ill.2d 318, 327; People v. Moses, 11 Ill.2d 84, 89.) The rule relative to the production of pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses also applies to police reports. People v. Cagle, 41 Ill.2d 528, 534. The totality of the denial of the discovery and access to information to which the defendant was entitled constituted a denial of due process and necessitates a retrial of this case. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the complete denial of discovery to the defendant was the breadth of the discovery which he sought. As his counsel puts it, his request was “unprecedented.” He clearly sought much by way of discovery to which he was not entitled. Nevertheless the complete denial of discovery resulted in a violation of due process. We find it necessary to discuss only certain of the other alleged errors in the conduct of the trial and we presume that upon remand such errors will not recur. Section 2 of “An Act to provide for trial in a circuit court for a psychiatric examination of persons charged with sexual crimes against children” (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 23, par. 2402) provides that the court require a psychiatric examination of the person charged. Also, under the facts of this case, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request for a bill of particulars. (People v. Curtis, 41 Ill.2d 147, 148; People v. Sims, 393 Ill. 238, 242.) And, in exercising its discretion as to whether or not the 1955 conviction of the defendant for armed robbery should be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes, the trial court should be guided by the considerations noted in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510. For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.