Court Opinion

ID: 9643191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:28.618494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.030592
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffin, Judge, dissenting. I, like the majority, agree that there were no circumstances in this case that justified a nighttime search. However, I join Judge Neal’s dissenting opinion because I wholeheartedly disagree with the majority view that the search in this case was permissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The testimony by Investigator Richard Norris, which is cited in Judge Neal’s dissenting opinion, demonstrates that the police knew they had no justification for conducting a nighttime search. Norris testified that “to pay someone overtime to sit over there ’til the next day would have been a burden that we just — that we couldn’t do at that time.” In the face of that testimony, and absent any authority citing administrative convenience as a basis for allowing a search under the good-faith exception, the majority opinion declares that: Although we hold that a lack of manpower to secure the residence overnight to prevent a danger to anyone who entered is not a sound basis for a nighttime search warrant, nevertheless, we hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable in the present case because as in Crain, we believe that a reasonable, well-trained officer could have believed that a nighttime search was justified under the facts of this case. The majority relies upon our court’s decision in Crain v. State, 78 Ark. App. 153, 79 S.W.3d 406 (2002), in affirming the trial court, but this case is a far cry from even what was upheld in Crain. In that case, there was at least pre-search information above what we held was the “bare-bones” or boilerplate language of the affidavit submitted with the application for the search warrant. This case contains no similar proof. As I wrote in my dissenting opinion in Crain, supra, “our courts have resisted the temptation to lower the threshold for nighttime searches. This decision flies in the face of that reluctance.” Id. at 162, 79 S.W.3d at 413. The majority’s rationale mocks the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment and would leave the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusions entirely dependent upon such factors as administrative convenience and the budget of law enforcement agencies, when it should turn on objective facts related to the challenged search. Our federal courts, and the United States Supreme Court in particular, recognize that the Fourth Amendment does not exist for the convenience of the government. See McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (reversing conviction on Fourth Amendment grounds where no reason, except the inconvenience of the officers and delay in preparing papers and getting before a magistrate, explained the officer’s failure to seek a search warrant). See also United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that an individual’s interest outranks government convenience in balancing Fourth Amendment interests). Further, the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is one of the fundamental values of our civilization, which means that it can neither be treated lightly nor trod upon. Guzman v. State, 283 Ark. 112, 117, 672 S.W.2d 656 (1984). It follows, then, that the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment cannot be made to depend upon the changing standards of administrative convenience or fiscal solvency of law enforcement agencies. The danger with today’s decision is that it appears to give judicial license for law enforcement officers to conduct a nighttime search based on an after-the-fact assertion that waiting for daylight “would have been a burden.” The very idea runs counter to the notion of the Fourth Amendment guarantee as a “fundamental” guarantee. Whatever else the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was intended to do, I categorically reject the idea that it justifies nighttime searches for reasons of administrative convenience. By affirming, the majority has used the good-faith exception to excuse conduct plainly prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. My respect for the civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights compels me to respectfully dissent from this decision and the mischief that it will cause. Our decision in Crain, supra, went too far; I certainly am unwilling to extend it. I am authorized to state that Judge NEALjoins in this dissent. Neal, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the decision affirming the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress because I do not believe that the good-faith exception applied. We use an objective standard when evaluating whether an officer acted in good faith. See Carpenter v. State, 36 Ark. App. 211, 821 S.W.2d 51 (1991). It has been said that “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1290 (2004) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)). Furthermore, it is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachment thereon. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). When asked why he did not wait to execute the search warrant between the hours of six a.m. and eight p.m., Investigator Norris replied: From the way that we were operating at that time, it wouldn’t have been possible to — either a police officer or to pay someone overtime to sit over there ’til the next day would have been a burden that we just — that we couldn’t do at that time. And without actually having somebody sitting there at the residence, you know, I can’t [guarantee] security from anybody that comes up to want [sic] to get in there, to break in the residence, or anything like that. The police department’s lack of man power is not one of the enumerated reasons that justify a nighttime search. If I were to agree that the officers acted in good faith, I would be disregarding my duty to safe guard against the encroachment on the constitutional rights of our citizens. I am authorized to state that Judge Griffen joins in this dissent.