Court Opinion

ID: 9964260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 16:03:40.230796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:15.619135
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            Apr 29 2024, 9:06 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                             Emad Abed,
                                         Appellant-Defendant

                                                     v.

           Andrea ElSharif and Surayyah Seif ElSharif, Co-Personal
           Representatives of the Estate of Seif ElSharif, and Samirah
                                  Realty, LLC,
                                          Appellees-Plaintiffs

                                             April 29, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CT-1486
                              Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
                        The Honorable Bruce D. Parent, Special Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         45D11-2105-CT-459

                                 Opinion by Judge Kenworthy

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024     Page 1 of 21
                          Chief Judge Altice and Judge Weissmann concur.

      Kenworthy, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Emad Abed appeals the trial court’s judgment setting aside quitclaim deeds and

      other written instruments purportedly executed by his late uncle, Seif ElSharif

      (“Seif”), to transfer ownership of all Seif’s assets to Abed, and ordering Abed to

      pay Seif’s estate over $3 million dollars in damages and attorney fees. On

      appeal, Abed contends the trial court (1) erred in denying his demand for a jury

      trial, and (2) abused its discretion in denying his motion for the trial judge to

      recuse. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Seif died intestate on September 25, 2019, leaving one adult and two minor

      daughters as his heirs. Seif’s longtime attorney had prepared estate planning

      documents and delivered them to Seif on June 20, but Seif never executed

      them. On October 1, Seif’s estate was submitted to probate. His ex-wife and

      mother of his children, Andrea ElSharif (“Andrea”), and oldest daughter,

      Surayyah ElSharif (“Surayyah”), were appointed co-personal representatives.

[3]   Prior to his death, Seif owned personal real estate and held ownership interests

      in several adult entertainment enterprises in Indiana and Illinois. His assets

      included all interest in Indiana companies Samirah Realty, LLC and Seif, LLC.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024         Page 2 of 21
      Seif owned a residence on Killarney Drive in Dyer, Indiana (“Killarney

      residence”), and through Samirah Realty, LLC, he owned commercial real

      estate on Summer Street in Hammond, Indiana (“Summer Street property”)

      (collectively, “Indiana Real Estate”). Seif also owned a vacant parcel of land

      on Shannon Bridge Drive (“Shannon Bridge lot”).

[4]   According to a probate inventory filed in August 2020, Seif’s property also

      included the following assets: (1) stock in four Indiana corporations: MIJ, Inc.,

      Saharah Inc., Surayyah Inc., and Benedict Inc.; (2) a BMO Harris bank account

      with approximately $54,000 cash; (3) interest in two Indiana limited liability

      companies: Swan Condos, LLC, and 601 Killarney LLC; (4) interest in two

      Illinois limited liability companies: SSNN Realty, LLC, and ElSharif, LLC; and

      (5) interest in Chicago Title Land Trust Number 1113203 (collectively,

      “Additional Assets”). Ex. Vol. 6 at 122–24. 1 Most of these entities owned real

      estate or operated businesses associated with adult entertainment venues in the

      Chicago region. 2

[5]   On December 5, 2019, the probate court held a hearing to determine ownership

      of certain bank accounts related to Seif’s businesses. Abed attended the probate

      hearing but made no claim to Seif’s assets.

      1
       The probate inventory also included a right to proceeds from the closing of a real estate sales contract in
      Lansing, Illinois, but that interest is not at issue in this case.
      2
       Throughout this decision, we refer generally to the Indiana Real Estate, Shannon Bridge lot, Seif, LLC
      membership interest, and Additional Assets as “Seif’s assets.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                                 Page 3 of 21
[6]   During the estate administration, the estate paid bills associated with Seif’s

      property and businesses as it was able. Scott Wheaton, an attorney and

      certified public accountant for all Seif’s businesses since 2017, advised the

      personal representatives about certain financial and tax matters related to Seif’s

      assets. The period for making claims against the estate closed on June 25,

      2020. 3 Sometime thereafter, the estate sold the Shannon Bridge lot.

[7]   Then, in March and April 2021, Abed recorded quitclaim deeds showing Seif

      (individually or on behalf of Samirah Realty, LLC) transferred ownership of the

      Indiana Real Estate to Abed in June 2019, prior to Seif’s death. In April 2021,

      Andrea received notice through her attorney in Illinois that Abed was claiming

      ownership of some of Seif’s assets in an Illinois court case. The estate had listed

      the Killarney residence for sale for $1.59 million but took it off the market after

      learning the estate was no longer the owner of record.

[8]   On May 11, 2021, Andrea and Surayyah, as co-personal representatives of the

      estate, and Samirah Realty, LLC (collectively, “ElSharif”) brought an action in

      the Lake Superior Court to quiet title to the Indiana Real Estate and for

      declaratory judgment that the quitclaim deeds Abed recorded were void.

      ElSharif also sought declaratory judgment regarding the ownership of the Seif,

      LLC membership interests.

      3
          See Ind. Code § 29-1-7-7(e) (2019) & I.C. § 29-1-14-1 (2001).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024        Page 4 of 21
[9]    In the six-count complaint, ElSharif alleged Abed had created and forged Seif’s

       signature on documents purporting to transfer ownership of the Indiana Real

       Estate and all interest in Seif, LLC, from Seif to Abed on June 3, 2019.

       ElSharif attached to the complaint the quitclaim deeds recorded by Abed,

       which showed Seif allegedly signed the documents on June 3 in front of a

       notary in Minnesota. ElSharif alleged Seif was in Indiana and Illinois on June

       3, the notary’s commission had not begun by that date, the notary stamp used

       was not created until after Seif’s death, and Seif did not disclose or discuss any

       such transfers with his estate planning attorney or business accountant prior to

       his death. In Counts 4 through 6, ElSharif alleged Abed committed the crime

       of forgery 4 and sought treble damages, plus attorney fees and expenses, under

       the Indiana Crime Victims Relief Act (“CVRA”). 5

[10]   On September 9, 2021, Abed filed a response, counterclaims, and jury demand.

       Abed denied generally the allegations of the complaint. In Counterclaim 1,

       Abed alleged he possessed an unrecorded quitclaim deed giving him ownership

       of the Shannon Bridge lot. He sought damages arising from its sale. In

       Counterclaim 2, Abed sought a declaratory judgment that he was the owner of

       all Seif’s assets. Abed attached to the response a May 30, 2019, agreement

       between Seif and Abed giving Abed the option to purchase Seif’s assets and a

       4
           I.C. § 35-43-5-2 (2016).
       5
        Under the CVRA, any person who suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of Indiana Code Article
       35-43 (offenses against property) may recover an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages
       suffered, plus costs, reasonable attorney fees, and other expenses. See I.C. § 34-24-3-1 (2019).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                             Page 5 of 21
       receipt for one dollar consideration for the option. In the response, Abed

       demanded “trial by jury upon all issues triable to a jury.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2

       at 217.

[11]   In March 2022, while this action was pending, Abed attempted to exercise

       control over the Indiana Real Estate by entering the Killarney residence and

       trying to lease the Summer Street property. ElSharif moved for a temporary

       restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting Abed or anyone acting

       on his behalf from accessing or interfering with the Indiana Real Estate.

       Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order barring Abed and “all

       friends, family members, and confederates” of Abed from entering or holding

       themselves out as the owner of the properties. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 67. The

       order also barred either party from listing, selling, or leasing the Indiana Real

       Estate unless the parties agreed.

[12]   ElSharif moved to strike Abed’s jury demand arguing the case sounded in

       equity. ElSharif also moved to amend its complaint to add Count 7, in which it

       requested a declaratory judgment that any other documents purporting to

       transfer Seif’s assets to Abed were void as forgeries and the estate was the

       rightful owner. ElSharif alleged Abed forged additional transfer documents on

       June 3 as part of the same transaction in which Seif purportedly transferred the

       Indiana Real Estate and Seif, LLC interests to Abed. In Count 7, ElSharif also

       sought preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Abed or any associates

       from asserting any rights or interests in Seif’s assets. The trial court granted

       both the motion to strike the jury demand and the motion to amend the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024         Page 6 of 21
       complaint. Abed then filed an amended counterclaim, and ElSharif filed an

       amended answer.

[13]   On October 14, 2022, Abed filed a pro se motion for the recusal of Judge Bruce

       Parent arguing the judge expressed “personal bias and prejudice” and could no

       longer hear the case “in a fair and impartial manner.” Id. at 112. The trial

       court denied the motion to recuse on November 16.

[14]   The case proceeded to a bench trial, but not without substantial delay. Abed

       removed the case to federal court in the Northern District of Indiana three times

       in 2022. Each time the district court remanded the case to state court because

       removal was untimely. 6 In late 2022, Abed moved for a stay pending the

       resolution of a potential criminal case, which the trial court also denied. In

       January 2023, one day prior to a scheduled trial date, Abed filed for Chapter 13

       bankruptcy in Minnesota, resulting in an automatic stay. In March, again the

       day before a scheduled trial date, Abed filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in

       Illinois, causing the trial court to cancel the trial. Throughout 2022 and 2023,

       Abed filed numerous motions to stay for various medical reasons including an

       ankle injury.

[15]   The trial court held a bench trial over two days on April 21 and 28, 2023. On

       the first day, Abed was not present but appeared by recently retained counsel.

       6
         The third time Abed removed the case to federal court was the Friday before a Monday trial date. The trial
       court proceeded to hold a bench trial, which it later vacated for jurisdictional reasons related to the timing of
       the removal and remand order.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                                   Page 7 of 21
       At the outset, Abed’s counsel moved for a continuance because his client and

       witnesses were unable to attend. After summarizing the various delays, the trial

       court denied the motion, stating: “Unfortunately, it’s time for this one to go.”

       Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. Later that morning, the trial court recessed to accommodate

       Abed’s counsel’s hearings in other courts. The trial court also allowed Abed to

       cross-examine a witness beyond the scope of direct testimony for efficiency,

       stating, “And the truth is, do I want him to call [the witness] back later this

       afternoon? Let’s get [the witness] done so he can go.” Id. at 31. When it

       became apparent the trial could not be concluded in one day as planned, the

       trial court continued the trial until the next Friday.

[16]   On day two, the trial court began the day stating, “Lawyers, we gotta have it

       done today. I mean, I don’t have another day for you. We gotta squeeze it in.

       You asked for a day. I’m giving you a day plus. We need to get this completed

       today.” Id. at 174. Throughout the day, the trial court stressed time was of the

       essence. For example, the trial court admonished Abed’s counsel after a long

       pause in questioning, “I need you to ask some questions. We really only have

       three hours, counsel. We really do.” Id. at 184. At a midmorning break, the

       trial court informed counsel for both parties:

               We’re going to take a break. And the two of you need to make
               alternate plans for your weekend because we’re staying here, I’m
               going to say, until midnight tonight. We’re going to pick up at
               8:30 tomorrow. We’re going to cook all day tomorrow, if we
               have to, and we’re going to cook all day Sunday.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024        Page 8 of 21
       Id. at 198. Later, after ElSharif called Abed to testify, Abed’s counsel declined

       the opportunity to cross-examine Abed. He informed the trial court he instead

       intended to re-call Abed later in his case-in-chief. Although ElSharif protested

       Abed’s approach would be less efficient, the trial court stated: “You know

       what? I’m going to let him. . . . He can try his case the way he wants to try it.”

       Id. at 222. But the trial court reiterated, “We’re going to stay to midnight. . . .

       We’re going to finish this trial.” Id.

[17]   During the day, several witnesses were late. By the parties’ agreement and in

       the interest of efficiency, Abed’s testimony was interrupted twice so the trial

       court could hear testimony as witnesses became available. The court recessed

       for two and one-half hours in the afternoon while Abed’s counsel attended a

       hearing in another court. The trial resumed, and when testimony continued

       into the early evening, the trial court admitted, “I’m starting to get tired. And

       so, when I get tired, I get cranky. And it’s, you know, it’s past 5:30 on a

       Friday.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 154. At the close of trial, the trial court apologized to

       both parties, saying, “And if I was snarky this afternoon, I apologize. I got

       tired and I got snarky. I think I was—I’m not proud of this, but I think I was

       equally snarky both ways and I apologize. . . . Thank you all.” Id. at 172–73.

       The trial concluded at 6:13 p.m.

[18]   On June 2, 2023, the trial court issued its ruling. The trial court declared all

       transfer documents void ab initio as the product of fraud, thus quieting title to the

       Killarney residence for the estate and the Summer Street property for Samirah

       Realty, LLC. The trial court further found Abed’s forgery deprived ElSharif of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024         Page 9 of 21
       the value of the Killarney residence, or $950,000. Thus, ElSharif was entitled to

       three times the value of the property under the CVRA, or $2.85 million. 7 The

       trial court also awarded the estate attorney fees of $253,209.21, for a final

       judgment of just over $3.1 million. Abed now appeals.

       1. The suit sounds in equity and therefore Abed had no right
       to a jury trial.
[19]   Abed argues the trial court violated his state constitutional right to a jury trial.

       Whether certain claims are entitled to a trial by jury presents a pure question of

       law; therefore, we review the issue de novo. Lucas v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 953 N.E.2d

       457, 460 (Ind. 2011).

[20]   Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution states: “In all civil cases, the

       right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” This constitutional provision

       preserves the right to a jury trial only “‘as it existed at common law’ at the time

       Indiana adopted its current constitution.” State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220

       N.E.3d 542, 545 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63

       (Ind. 2002)) (emphasis omitted). By contrast, for equitable cases or claims, it is

       well-settled that a party is not entitled to a jury trial. Id.

[21]   To give effect to these principles, Indiana Trial Rule 38(A) provides:

       7
         The trial court found ElSharif failed to demonstrate loss of value from the Summer Street property since it
       continued to operate and earn income as a gentleman’s club. No evidence was presented as to the value of
       the Seif, LLC membership interest and Additional Assets, so the trial court awarded no damages related to
       those.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                               Page 10 of 21
               Causes triable by court and by jury. Issues of law and issues of
               fact in causes that prior to the eighteenth day of June, 1852, were
               of exclusive equitable jurisdiction shall be tried by the court;
               issues of fact in all other causes shall be triable as the same are
               now triable. In case of the joinder of causes of action or defenses
               which, prior to said date, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction
               with causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date, were
               designated as actions at law and triable by jury—the former shall
               be triable by the court, and the latter by a jury, unless waived; the
               trial of both may be at the same time or at different times, as the
               court may direct.

       Thus, to determine whether the right to a jury trial under Article 1, Section 20

       applies,

               we first ask whether the cause of action existed in 1851. If so,
               then history settles the matter. But if the cause of action did not
               exist in 1851, we must decide whether the claim is analogous to
               one at law or one in equity, as those terms were then understood.

       $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d at 545 (citations and footnote omitted).

[22]   Further, in interpreting Trial Rule 38(A), our Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f

       the essential features of a suit as a whole are equitable and the individual causes

       of action are not distinct or severable, the entitlement to a jury trial is

       extinguished.” Songer, 771 N.E.2d at 68. On the other hand, if a single cause

       of action in a multi-count complaint is plainly equitable, and the other causes of

       action purely legal and sufficiently distinct and severable, Trial Rule 38(A)

       requires a jury trial on the legal claims. Id. In suits that contain both legal and

       equitable causes of action or defenses:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024            Page 11 of 21
               The appropriate question is whether the essential features of the
               suit are equitable. To determine if equity takes jurisdiction of the
               essential features of a suit, we evaluate the nature of the
               underlying substantive claim and look beyond both the label a
               party affixes to the action and the subsidiary issues that may arise
               within such claims. Courts must look to the substance and
               central character of the complaint, the rights and interests
               involved, and the relief demanded. In the appropriate case, the
               issues arising out of discovery may also be important.

       Id. However, the Songer test is not “the endpoint of the inquiry.” Lucas, 953

       N.E.2d 457, 465. As our Supreme Court has explained, the factors enunciated

       in Songer “rather serve to help answer the overarching question of whether the

       legal claims are related enough to the [equitable] action to be drawn into equity

       or are sufficiently distinct and severable to require a jury trial.” Id. Therefore,

       if a lawsuit contains both equitable and legal causes of action or defenses,

               the trial court must decide whether core questions presented in
               any of the joined legal claims significantly overlap with the
               subject matter that invokes the equitable jurisdiction of the court.
               If so, equity subsumes those particular legal claims to obtain
               more final and effectual relief for the parties despite the presence
               of peripheral questions of a legal nature.

       Id. at 465–66. Lucas preserves the “equitable clean-up doctrine,” which “under

       certain circumstances, involves drawing legal claims into equity, thus

       extinguishing the right to a jury trial on those legal claims.” Id. at 460.

[23]   In Counts 1 and 2, ElSharif seeks to quiet title to the Indiana Real Estate and

       asks the trial court to declare void the recorded quitclaim deeds. In Count 3,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024        Page 12 of 21
       ElSharif requests a declaratory judgment that (1) the assignment of Seif’s

       interest in Seif, LLC to Abed is a forgery and thus void, and (2) the estate is the

       rightful owner. In Count 7, ElSharif seeks declaratory judgment that (1) all

       other documents purporting to transfer Seif’s assets are forgeries and void, (2)

       Abed has no right, title, or interest in Seif’s assets, and (3) the estate is the

       rightful owner. ElSharif also demands injunctive relief preventing Abed or any

       of his associates from claiming any interest in Seif’s assets. Finally, in Counts 4

       through 6, ElSharif alleges Abed committed the crime of forgery and seeks

       damages, attorney fees, and expenses under the CVRA. In Abed’s two

       amended counterclaims, he seeks (1) damages from the sale of the Shannon

       Bridge lot, and (2) declaratory judgment he is the owner of all Seif’s assets.

[24]   ElSharif captions two causes of action “quiet title.” But the essence of the suit

       is for judicial declaration the quitclaim deeds and other transfer documents

       should be set aside as forgeries. In Monnett v. Turpie, plaintiffs alleged

       defendants fraudulently and without consideration induced plaintiffs’ late father

       to execute warranty deeds conveying his real estate to defendants prior to his

       death. 32 N.E. 328, 328 (Ind. 1892). Plaintiffs sued seeking cancellation of the

       instruments, and the trial court refused defendants’ request for a jury trial. Id.

       On appeal, our Supreme Court explained if the action was to quiet title, the

       action was triable to a jury; but if, “on the contrary, the action was for the

       cancellation of the deeds, it was one that, prior to the 18th day of June, 1852,

       would have fallen within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity, and was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024           Page 13 of 21
       triable by the court.” Id. at 329. 8 The Monnett Court concluded the complaint

       was for equitable, rather than legal, relief, in part because the primary object of

       the action was cancellation of the conveyances. Id.

[25]   In McClamroch v. McClamroch, plaintiffs sought to rescind a deed allegedly

       procured by undue influence. 476 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans.

       denied. On appeal, this Court held “a suit to set aside a deed is submitted to the

       equitable jurisdiction of the trial court” and thus there was “no constitutional

       right to a jury trial.” Id. at 519. And in Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, the

       trial court entered a declaratory judgment voiding numerous recorded

       instruments purporting to be common law liens. 483 N.E.2d 749, 759 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1985), trans. denied. This Court on appeal held the “claim for relief, that

       [recorded] liens be declared void and that they be removed from the record, is

       quite clearly an equitable one[.]” Id. Accordingly, a suit to set aside deeds and

       other instruments related to real property is equitable in nature and there is no

       right to a trial by jury.

       8
         In a recent case, our Supreme Court provided historical context helping to explain the distinction between
       legal and equitable actions where property ownership is in dispute:
             Before abolition of the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, the common-law
             courts traditionally decided disputes over the ownership of property simply by determining
             which party held “good title at law.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(1), at 586 (2d ed.
             1993). This limited the relief available to a plaintiff who, for example, had been unjustly
             induced to give away title. In the face of such injustices, the courts of equity sidestepped legal
             formalities by acting “upon the person of the defendant” rather than deciding the question of
             title. Id. § 4.3(1), at 587. While the law “declared rights in things,” equity “commanded the
             defendant’s conscience to act” by ordering them, for example, to reconvey the property they had
             inequitably acquired. Id. § 2.2, at 74.
       $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d at 558.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                              Page 14 of 21
[26]   Early decisions of our Supreme Court have similarly held suits to rescind

       contracts for fraud sound in equity. In Songer, our Supreme Court neatly

       summarized the holding of Hendricks v. Frank, 86 Ind. 278 (1882):

               In Hendricks v. Frank, a debtor conveyed his only unencumbered
               property to avoid payment to his creditors, and the creditors filed
               suit to rescind the conveyance. The case was tried before a jury,
               to which a creditor objected. This Court concluded that a jury
               trial was improper, endorsing the opinion of Supreme Court
               Commissioner John Morris, who wrote, “Upon the general
               subject of fraud courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with
               courts of law; but in a cause or suit to rescind a contract for
               fraud, [courts of equity] had, in June, 1852, exclusive
               jurisdiction.”

       Songer, 771 N.E.2d at 64 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Fish v.

       Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 75 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 1947) (“An action to rescind

       and cancel a written instrument is one in equity.”); Towns v. Smith, 16 N.E. 811,

       812 (Ind. 1888) (holding a “proceeding in the nature of a creditors’ bill to set

       aside and cancel a fraudulent conveyance . . . belongs exclusively to the

       procedure and jurisdiction of chancery”).

[27]   In Counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, ElSharif seeks to have the quitclaim deeds and other

       written instruments transferring Seif’s assets to Abed declared void and set aside

       due to forgery. A close review of the complaint’s substance and character, the

       rights and interests involved, and the relief requested, demonstrates the essential

       features of ElSharif’s suit are equitable. Songer, 771 N.E.2d at 68. Accordingly,

       there is no right to a jury trial on ElSharif’s claims in Counts 1, 2, 3, and 7.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024         Page 15 of 21
[28]   As to ElSharif’s claims for damages under the CVRA (Counts 4 through 6), and

       Abed’s counterclaim for damages arising from the Shannon Bridge lot sale,

       claims for money damages were exclusively legal actions in 1852. See Gates v.

       City of Indianapolis, 991 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

       Moreover, the CVRA creates a civil remedy, but because it relies on proof of a

       predicate criminal offense, it is “inherently quasi-criminal.” Wysocki v. Johnson,

       18 N.E.3d 600, 605 (Ind. 2014); see also Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040,

       1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (observing “[w]hile the statute contains both

       remedial and punitive elements, we have characterized [a prior version of the

       CVRA] as largely a penal measure”). Neither criminal nor quasi-criminal

       actions were historically equitable in nature, and thus normally a jury trial is

       required. Cunningham v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),

       trans. denied.

[29]   However, ElSharif’s claims for damages under the CVRA and Abed’s

       counterclaims are not sufficiently distinct from the equitable issues to be

       severable. In Lucas, a bank brought an equitable action to foreclose on

       mortgaged property. 953 N.E.2d at 461. The property owner raised a host of

       legal defenses and counterclaims, including several requests for treble damages

       under the CVRA. Id. at 461–62. Our Supreme Court compared the core issues

       presented by the legal defenses and counterclaims to those presented by the

       equitable foreclosure action. Id. at 466. The Court held the legal defenses and

       counterclaims were so “intertwined” when viewing the suit “as a whole” to

       invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the trial court and extinguish the right to a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024        Page 16 of 21
       jury trial. Id. Here, the core issue presented by the equitable claims is whether

       Abed forged the quitclaim deeds and other transfer documents. ElSharif’s legal

       claims under the CVRA and Abed’s counterclaims depend entirely on

       resolution of the same issue. In other words, the joined legal claims here

       “significantly overlap with the subject matter that invokes the equitable

       jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 465. As in Lucas, the equitable claims in this

       case subsume the legal claims “to obtain more final and effectual relief for the

       parties despite the presence of peripheral questions of a legal nature.” Id. at

       466.

[30]   Because essential features of ElSharif’s suit to set aside fraudulent deeds and

       instruments are equitable, and the legal claims asserted in the complaint and

       answer are not severable from the equitable subject matter, the suit was triable

       to the bench. Abed had no right to a jury trial under Article 1, Section 20 and

       Trial Rule 38(A). 9

       2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
       Abed’s motion to recuse.
[31]   Abed argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for the

       judge to recuse. We review a judge’s decision about whether to recuse for an

       abuse of discretion. L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1071 (Ind. 2018). “An abuse

       9
        Because we conclude Abed had no right to a jury trial, we do not address the parties’ arguments concerning
       whether granting the motion to strike and holding a bench trial constituted harmless error.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                            Page 17 of 21
       of discretion occurs when the judge’s decision is against the logic and effect of

       the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[32]   The law presumes a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. Id. To overcome this

       presumption, the moving party must establish the judge has personal prejudice

       for or against a party. Id. “Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an

       undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the

       controversy before [the court].” Id.

[33]   Abed first contends the trial court’s use of the word “confederates” in its

       preliminary injunction order reveals the “the trial court’s predisposition of the

       entire case one year prior to the trial[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 17. Abed cites

       dictionary definitions of “confederate” and “confederacy” showing the words

       carry connotations of illegality or secrecy. He seems to argue the trial court

       expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy by using the term.

[34]   However, by barring Abed and his associates from the Indiana Real Estate, the

       preliminary injunction order merely kept possession with the party that had

       exercised control over it for the past two years: the estate. The trial court

       further enjoined both parties from listing the property for sale or lease unless

       they jointly agreed, in which case any proceeds should be placed in trust and

       dispersed only under the trial court’s order. Rather than expressing an opinion

       on the merits, the trial court’s order maintained the status quo until the

       respective property rights of the parties could be adjudicated. Accordingly,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024           Page 18 of 21
       Abed has not shown personal prejudice arising from the use of the word

       “confederates.”

[35]   Abed next argues the trial court showed bias and prejudice by issuing a

       “cavalier denial” of Abed’s motion to stay this case during potential criminal

       proceedings in another court. Appellant’s Br. at 20. 10 Abed also contends the

       sum of the trial court’s rulings that were adverse to Abed would cause “an

       objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, [to] have a rational

       basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality[.]” Id. at 21.

[36]   We disagree. “Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge are not sufficient

       reason to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” L.G., 88 N.E.3d at

       1073. During the nearly two years this case was pending before trial, the trial

       court entered rulings in favor of both parties. Notably, as ElSharif points out on

       appeal, “the trial court denied the ElSharifs’ motion for partial summary

       judgment, requiring them to take their claims to trial.” Appellee’s Br. at 25. The

       trial court granted many of Abed’s motions for continuances. And the trial

       court often held a hearing to consider the merits before ruling on the parties’

       motions. Overall, nothing in the trial court’s decisions on the pre-trial motions

       indicates a pattern of adverse rulings showing bias or prejudice toward Abed.

       10
          Abed sets forth the factors a trial court should consider when deciding whether to stay a civil case because
       a related criminal matter is pending or imminent. However, Abed’s claim on appeal is not that the trial
       court’s ruling on the motion to stay was erroneous. Rather, he argues the trial court’s adverse ruling on that
       motion is evidence of the trial judge’s bias and prejudice.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024                                Page 19 of 21
[37]   Finally, Abed points to the trial court’s demeanor during day two of trial,

       arguing it is evidence of bias or prejudice toward him. Trial judges have a

       responsibility to direct trials in a manner that facilitates ascertaining the truth,

       ensures fairness, and obtains economy of time and effort commensurate with

       the parties’ rights. Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. 2013). “Trial

       courts enjoy wide discretion in the management and conduct of trial

       proceedings.” State v. Van Cleave, 681 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ind. 1997); see also

       Terpstra, 483 N.E.2d at 761 (“A trial judge has control over the proceedings in

       his [or her] court, and his [or her] duty is to conduct business expeditiously

       consistent with orderly procedure and the administration of justice.”).

[38]   From the beginning of day two, the trial court’s concern over managing the trial

       within the time constraints of its docket was paramount. The trial court

       directed both parties to keep up the pace. Abed now complains the trial court

       interrupted his testimony twice to accommodate late-arriving witnesses. But he

       did not object to the court’s time management practices during trial. At one

       point, the trial court allowed Abed’s attorney to cross-examine ElSharif’s

       witness outside the scope of direct testimony for expediency. The trial court

       also accommodated Abed’s counsel’s schedule during trial. And even though it

       was not as efficient, the trial court ultimately allowed Abed to present his case

       in the order and manner he desired. At the close of trial, the trial court

       admitted to being “cranky” and “snarky” at times, but apologized to both

       parties before instructing them on how and when the court would rule. Based

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024          Page 20 of 21
       on our review of the record, the trial court’s demeanor and time management

       strategies during trial did not show a personal prejudice for or against Abed.

[39]   Because Abed did not establish the trial court had personal bias or prejudice

       against him, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Abed’s

       motion to recuse.

       Conclusion
[40]   Because the essential features of the suit were equitable, and any legal claims so

       significantly overlapped with the equitable features of the suit to be subsumed

       by the equitable claims, Abed did not have a right to a jury trial. Further, the

       trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Abed’s motion to recuse.

[41]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       D. Eric Neff
       Crown Point, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
       Nancy J. Townsend
       J. Brian Hittinger
       Krieg DeVault LLP
       Merrillville, Indiana
       Alexandra Wilson Pantos
       Krieg DeVault LLP
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1486 | April 29, 2024      Page 21 of 21