Court Opinion

ID: 9696912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:01:30.284686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.624719
License: Public Domain

opinion of the court
HUTCHINSON, Justice.
We have before us three petitions: one filed by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (Board) on July 1, 1985, recommending that respondent, Judge Bernard Snyder, be removed from the office of Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and two petitions filed by Judge Snyder.1
The Board’s recommendation is based on its findings: that in the case of Edgehill v. Municipal Publications, Inc., C.P. Philadelphia, May Term, 1972, No. 2371, respon*145dent held frequent ex parte conferences with counsel for the plaintiff without informing defense counsel; that these discussions centered on evidentiary and other legal issues involved in this bench trial; that respondent permitted both counsel to engage in unprofessional conduct during the trial, without sanction or disciplinary action; that respondent entered an exceptionally large award of damages for the plaintiff without an evidentiary hearing and based those damages on information obtained outside the record and that respondent presided at a hearing on a motion for his own recusal, acting simultaneously as judge and as witness.2 These actions caused the Board to conclude that respondent, by violating Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 455 Pa. xxx (1973), had violated Article V, Section 17(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution3 and that the appropriate sanction for such behavior would be removal from the office of Judge.
Observance of these canons by judges is essential to public faith in the justice of our Commonwealth’s judicial system. They are positive commands, adopted by this Court, with the force of law. They bind all judges and justices and will be enforced by this Court’s imposition of discipline when appropriate. In this case, our de novo review of the record persuades us, as ultimate fact finder, that the Board’s findings are correct and the recommended discipline of removal appropriate. Respondent has, therefore, forfeited any possibility of holding judicial office in accordance with Article V, Section 18(i) of our Pennsylvania Constitution.
Specifically, the Board concluded that Judge Snyder had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides:
*146A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
455 Pa. at xxx (1973).
The Board concluded that Judge Snyder had “brought discredit to himself and the judiciary in general by the manner in which he presided at the Edghill [sic] trial” and the ancillary recusal hearing.4 Board’s Report, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations, filed July 1, 1985, (Board’s Report), Conclusion of Law No. 14. In this regard the Board explicitly cited Judge Snyder’s action in “presiding at the hearing on the recusal motion, knowing that he had been subpoenaed as a witness at that hearing, and thus, that he would be called upon to make evidentiary rulings on objections to his own testimony.” Id., Conclusion of Law No. 12.
The Board further concluded that Judge Snyder had violated Canon 2, which provides in pertinent part:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he *147convey or knowingly permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.
Commentary: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. He must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
The testimony of a judge as a character witness injects the prestige of his office into the proceeding in which he testifies and may be misunderstood to be an official testimonial. This Canon, however, does not afford him a privilege against testifying in response to an official summons.
455 Pa. at xxx-xxxi.
Here the Board cited five specific acts which each represented a violation of this Canon: (1) the rendition of a verdict in the Edgehill case while a request for his recusal or disqualification from further action in the proceeding remained pending, Board’s Report, Conclusion of Law No. 9; (2) the rendition of a verdict in the Edgehill case upon learning that defense counsel had requested the assignment of a judge from another county to hear argument on their recusal motion, Id. Conclusion of Law No. 11; (3) Judge Snyder’s action in presiding over the recusal motion knowing that he would be a witness, Id., Conclusion of Law No. 12, see text supra at 3; (4) the manifestation of bias in his refusal to admit the testimony of one of his former law clerks on the issue of his bias and partiality at the recusal hearing, Id., Conclusion of Law No. 13, and (5) Judge Snyder’s “socializing with the attorney for plaintiff in the Sentner case,5 prior to the entry of a decision in that case,” Id., Conclusion of Law No. 15.
*148Finally, the Board concluded that Judge Snyder had violated the following 'sections of Canon 3:
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: A. Adjudicative Responsibilities
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control.
Commentary: The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Courts can be efficient and businesslike while being patient and deliberate.
455 Pa. at xxxi-xxxii.
In support of its conclusion concerning these violations, the Board cited Judge Snyder’s failure “to maintain order and decorum during the Edghill [sic] trial”, Board’s Report, Conclusion of Law No. 1, and his failure “to take appropriate disciplinary measures against counsel for both parties for their unprofessional conduct toward each other and the court” during that trial, Id., Conclusion of Law No. 2.
Canon 3 A.(4) provides:
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized *149by law, must not consider ex parte communications concerning a pending proceeding.
455 Pa. at xxxii.
The Board’s conclusion that this subsection had been violated was based on the Judge’s entry of a verdict, including an award of punitive damages, in the Edgehill case, without reviewing the trial transcript and “without the benefit of any record evidence on the issue of punitive damages,” Board’s Report, Conclusion of Law No. 7 (emphasis in original). This conclusion was also bolstered by the Judge’s assessment of punitive damages “without affording counsel the opportunity to present evidence, make argument, and proffer findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of plaintiff’s entitlement to such damages, and the amount of such damages, if any, as [Judge Snyder] had previously agreed he would do,” Id., Conclusion of Law No. 8, by his refusal to admit testimony on the issue of his own bias and partiality, Id., Conclusion of Law No. 13, see text supra at 4, and by his socializing with the attorney for the plaintiff in the Sentner case, supra, prior to the entry of his decision, Id., Conclusion of Law No. 15, see text supra at 4. In our judicial system, judges do not enter judgments without a full record or without giving the parties an opportunity to present their arguments on the issues presented by that record. Respondent ignored these basic requirements.
Canon 3 C. addresses the issue of recusal:
C. Disqualification
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the mat*150ter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(iv) is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
455 Pa. at xxxv-xxxvi (emphasis added).
In support of the Board’s conclusions under these subsections, the Board cited: Judge Snyder’s failure to disqualify himself in the Edgehill recusal hearing in view of the personal bias manifested by his refusal to admit the testimony of a former law clerk, Board’s Report, Conclusion of Law No. 13, see text supra at 4, Judge Snyder’s resumption of authority over the Edgehill case and his rendition of a verdict upon learning that defense counsel had requested the assignment of a judge from another county to hear argument on their recusal motion, Id., Conclusion of Law No. 11, see text supra at 4, and his action in “presiding at the hearing on the recusal motion, knowing that he had been subpoenaed as a witness at that hearing, and thus, that he would be called upon to make evidentiary rulings on objections to his own testimony,” Id., Conclusion of Law No. 12. See also Municipal Publications v. Court of Common Pleas, 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985), supra at n. 2. Although Municipal Publications was not decided until after respondent’s actions in the recusal hearing, our earlier opinions had already indicated that a judge should not and could not continue to preside over his own recusal when he felt his own testimony or explanation was necessary to disposition of the recusal motion. Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983).6 In any event, *151the record, taken as a whole plainly shows bias which should have led respondent to grant recusal. Therefore, reliance on Crawford’s Estate, 307 Pa. 102, 160 A. 585 (1931), which respondent interprets as in conflict with Municipal Publications, supra, would be unavailing if, indeed, a conflict does exist.
This Court heard argument on the Board’s Recommendations on December 2, 1985. Since then, we have carefully studied the entire record, including the eighty-five (85) volumes of Notes of Testimony from the Edgehill trial, the twenty-eight (28) volumes of Notes of Testimony from the Edgehill recusal motion and the nine (9) volumes of Notes of Testimony from the Board’s hearings, and deliberated over the issues and the sanctions which are appropriate to this case.
In November of 1985, before we heard argument, the electors in the City of Philadelphia denied Judge Snyder’s quest for retention as a Common Pleas judge, thus rendering moot the question of whether this Court should remove him from judicial office. Curry v. Parkhouse, 468 Pa. 542, 364 A.2d 326 (1976); Meyer v. Strouse, 422 Pa. 136, 221 A.2d 191 (1966). The election results, however, have not ended our responsibility where other issues remain. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977). This Court is responsible for maintaining the integrity of judicial administration so as to uphold public respect for the rule of law. Once instituted, our jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings is thus only at an end when we issue a final order. Accord In re Hunt, 308 N.C. 328, 302 S.E.2d 235 (1983); In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978) cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2859, 61 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979).
Article V, Section 18(d) of our Constitution provides that justices and judges “may be suspended, removed from office or otherwise disciplined for violation of section 17 of *152this article ... or conduct which prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute....” (emphasis added). The Constitution of Pennsylvania has placed responsibility for judicial discipline in our hands and we cannot avoid the obligation to demonstrate, both to the profession and to the public, that bias and arrogance prejudice the proper administration of justice and bring a judicial office into disrepute. Respondent’s conduct can not and will not be tolerated on the bench of any court in Pennsylvania and, while we shall not be hasty in any case, our discipline will assuredly be certain.
Article V, Section 18(h) directs: “The Supreme Court shall review the record of the board’s proceedings on the law and facts and may permit the introduction of additional evidence. It shall order suspension, removal, discipline or compulsory retirement, or wholly reject the recommendation, as it finds just and proper.” Thus, it is plain that this Court has the responsibility for disciplining justices and judges. To discharge that responsibility, we must review de novo the record created by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board and ourselves determine whether it presents clear and convincing evidence of such conduct and, if so, the discipline appropriate.
We find the evidence of respondent’s derelictions clear and convincing on this record. Taking all of them together, we also find that their cumulative effect is so serious that removal, as recommended by a majority of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, would be the only appropriate sanction. Though Judge Snyder has already been removed from office by the voters, it remains for us to impose the judicial sanction which will render the intended operation of Section 18 complete. Otherwise the action of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board would have no legal effect.
Through Section 18 the people have entrusted to this Court the task of finally determining whether a judge should be disciplined and, if so, the extent of that discipline and its consequences. Those consequences are not neces*153sarily restricted to the term for which the judge has been elected or retained when he engages in improprieties which require discipline. In most cases, when this Court acts to remove sitting justices or judges, the language of Section 18(Z)7 itself bars them from further judicial service. In this instance, the electors have removed Judge Snyder from office. It is only this Court, however, which can sanction respondent for his conduct by finding him ineligible hereafter to hold any judicial office. On this record, it is our duty to do so. It is so ordered. The recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board is adopted and respondent’s petitions are denied.
NIX, C.J., files a concurring opinion in which he joins the majority.
FLAHERTY, J., joins the majority opinion and NIX’s, C.J., concurring opinion.
McDERMOTT and PAPADAKOS, JJ., file concurring and dissenting opinions.

. On September 9, 1985, Judge Snyder filed a request for a Writ of Mandamus against the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, seeking access to documents in the Board's files. This petition is hereby denied. After receiving two extensions of time from this Court, Judge Snyder filed his Petition to Reject or Modify the Recommendation of the Board on September 11, 1985 as permitted under J.I.R.B. Rule 17. These three petitions all came on for argument under our No. 108 J.I.R.B. Docket 1985, relating to an earlier petition for a Writ of Prohibition filed by Judge Snyder on June 26, 1985. Since that petition has already been denied, we have entered an order amending the caption to reflect the title and docket numbers assigned to the Board’s petition. Our disposal of that petition compels denial of Judge Snyder’s later petition for mandamus and his application to reject the Board’s recommendation. It is so ordered.

. We have already decided that Judge Snyder was disqualified from deciding this recusal motion in Municipal Publications v. Court of Common Pleas, 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985).

. Article V, Section 17(b) provides:
Justices and judges shall not engage in any activity prohibited by law and shall not violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court.

. Although the great bulk of the recorded testimony before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board concerns the Edgehill trial, the record also contains testimony concerning respondent’s handling of other cases. See, e.g., Record at 696-699, 757-779, 1186-1239, 1769.

. Sentner v. William L. Crow Construction Company, C.P. Philadelphia, March Term, 1977, No. 2232.

. Municipal Publications, supra, reversed a Superior Court order granting a writ of prohibition precluding respondent from continuing to preside in the Edgehill matter. Superior Court’s opinion stated that a new judge was required to hear recusal motions in all cases. We *151granted plenary jurisdiction and held, instead, that a judge could not testify and continue to preside in his own recusal.

. Section 18(l) provides:
A justice, judge or justice of the peace ... removed under this section 18 shall forfeit automatically his judicial office and thereafter be ineligible for judicial office.