Court Opinion

ID: 9352528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:19.779595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.584243
License: Public Domain

J-S39003-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.F.S., A          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 916 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 26, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): A-9107

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                     FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

      T.S. (“Father”) appeals the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas’

decree involuntarily terminating his parental rights to A.M.F.S. (“Child”).

Father primarily argues the orphans’ court abused its discretion by terminating

his parental rights because the court failed to consider that he participated in

certain parenting and drug and alcohol programs while he was incarcerated.

We discern no such abuse of discretion, and we affirm.

      Child was born in December 2017. Child’s natural parents are Father

and A.S. (“Mother”). Mother’s parental rights to Child, along with her parental
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rights to Child’s half-sibling, were also involuntarily terminated. Mother has

filed a separate appeal from that decree.1

       The facts leading up to Father’s termination are largely undisputed. Child

was placed in the care of the Agency pursuant to an emergency shelter care

order on May 31, 2019. At the time, Child lived with Mother and the location

of Father was unknown. At the subsequent adjudication hearing, Father was

ordered to submit to the Agency for a full assessment upon his location. It

was later discovered Father was incarcerated.

       The Agency eventually filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental

rights on January 7, 2021. At the time of the filing of the petition, Child had

been in placement with her half-sibling and the same foster family for 19

months. The orphans’ court held hearings on Father’s termination petition,

along with the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights also filed by the

Agency on January 7, 2021. The hearings took place on July 28, 2021,

September 15, 2021, January 31, 2022 and March 7, 2022.

       At the hearing on January 31, 2022, the Agency presented the testimony

of Anthony Bellizia, a caseworker for the Agency who had been involved with

Child’s case since August 2019. Bellizia testified that when he assumed

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1Luzerne County’s Children and Youth Services Agency (“Agency”) mistakenly
believes Father’s and Mother’s appeals have been consolidated. They have
not, and we decline to do so now sua sponte. Mother’s appeal involves
separate facts, separate issues, and an additional child. Father is, to be clear,
not the biological father of that additional child.

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responsibility for Child’s case, Father was incarcerated. He further testified he

received a letter from Father asking about Child’s location. See N.T., 1/31/22,

at 10. According to Bellizia, he attempted to respond to Father’s letter by mail

but his letters were returned to the Agency by the prison mail system. See

id. at 10.

      Bellizia testified that Father was released from prison in May 2020.

Father participated in a permanency review hearing for Child in June 2020,

although Bellizia was unable to attend that hearing. See id. at 11. Bellizia

subsequently learned that Father indicated during that hearing that he would

contact the Agency to begin services and visitation. Father, however, never

contacted the Agency, and Bellizia had no way of contacting Father. See id.

at 11-12, 24.

      Paul Guido, a supervisor at the Agency who supervised Child’s case and

who had attended the June 2020 permanency review hearing, expanded on

Bellizia’s testimony regarding that hearing. He explained that Father was

asked to provide his telephone number and address at the meeting, but Father

did not provide that information. See id. at 46. Instead, Father stated he

would contact the Agency following the hearing, but never did so. See id. at

46. Guido acknowledged that this occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic,

but testified that, even when the Agency’s building was closed, he was able to

receive communication from clients. Moreover, Guido testified, there was a

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security officer outside the building to take written messages from anyone

who appeared at the building when it was closed. See id. at 51.

      Guido also emphasized that during the hearing, the hearing officer

stressed to Father and Mother that Child had already been in care for twelve

months. According to Guido, the officer “really took that opportunity to

encourage both parents to take that opportunity to engage or re-engage .. in

services at that point based upon the time line.” Id. at 48.

      Bellizia testified that Father did not reach out to the agency, have any

contact with Child, or seek any services following that hearing and before he

was arrested again in November 2020. See id. at 24, 37. The parties

stipulated that Father was charged at that time with, inter alia, endangering

the welfare of children, fleeing or attempting to elude officers, manufacturing,

delivery and possession with intent, reckless driving, and driving with a

suspended license, in addition to a slew of summary offenses.

      Bellizia recounted he was finally able to locate Father in December 2020

at Columbia County Prison. See id. at 10-11. He called Father at the prison

and was able to speak with Father and basically do an assessment at that

time. See id. at 11. Bellizia reported that during their conversation, Father

told Bellizia he had attended a drug and alcohol program and an Inside Out

Dad program while he had been in prison. See id. at 12, 25-26. Father did

not, however, provide any documentation related to those programs. See id.

at 12. Bellizia testified that, following their conversation, he attempted to mail

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Father a copy of Child’s permanency plan, but that mail was also returned to

the Agency. See id. at 11.

         Bellizia also testified that he attempted to set up visitation for Father

and Child while Father was incarcerated. However, he was unable to do so in

light of the third-party visitation procedure used by the prison. See id. at 12-

13, 24.

         Bellizia reported that the conditions that led to Child’s placement

continue to exist. He further opined that he does not believe Father could or

will remedy those conditions given that he has been incarcerated for all but

six months of the life of this case. See id. at 11, 28-29. And, during that six

months, Father did not contact Bellizia or have any contact with Child. See id.

at 24.

         Father also testified at the hearing on January 31, 2022. He stated he

was incarcerated in the Columbia County Prison in May 2019, when Child, he

later learned, was taken into custody. See id. at 55. He reported he was at

Columbia County Prison until December 2019, when he was transferred to the

State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Pine Grove (“SCI Pine Grove”). See

id. at 55. He testified that he participated in a drug and alcohol program called

Therapeutic Community, along with some other programs, while at SCI Pine

Grove. See id. at 56, 66-67. He stated he began the Inside Out Dad program,

but was unable to complete the program because he was transferred to

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Columbia County Prison on a writ for a period of time during the course of the

program. See id. at 63.

      Father reported he was incarcerated at SCI Pine Grove until May 2020,

when he was released. Father stated he was out of prison from June 2020 to

December 2020. Father testified that he participated in a permanency review

hearing for Child in June 2020, and maintained that he did, contrary to what

was reported by the Agency, provide his phone number to the Agency at that

time. See id. at 60, 61. According to Father, following that hearing, he

attempted to contact the Agency, but the Agency’s building was not accessible

to the public during July and August 2020 due to COVID-19. See id. at 60.

Father maintained he went to the building at one point but nobody was there.

See id. at 61-62. However, Father was not able to give the address of the

building or describe what the building looked like. See id. at 69, 71. Father

also maintained he left voicemails at the Agency but did not receive any return

phone calls. See id. at 61-62. He stated that although he was in contact with

Mother at least initially after his release, he did not ask Mother for the contact

information for Bellizia. See id. at 75.

      Father testified he was currently incarcerated at SCI Rockview for a

parole violation but believed he would be released in October 2022. See id.

at 68, 73. Following Father’s testimony, the court set the next hearing date

for March 7, 2022. Bellizia told the court he would attempt to set up visitation

for Father and Child. Bellizia stated he had previously been told by SCI

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Rockview that Father was at SCI Pine Grove, and he had not yet had a

response to his inquiries there. See id. 97-98. Father’s attorney clarified that

Father had actually been in Columbia County Prison, transferred to SCI

Smithfield, and then transferred again to SCI Rockview “so there could have

been some problems there.” Id. at 98.

      At the hearing on March 7, 2022, Bellizia testified that Father had been

able to have two phone visits with Child since the previous hearing. See N.T.,

3/7/22, at 68. Bellizia stated he was unable to say whether there was any

bond between Father and Child. See id. at 62, 65, 66.

      Father also testified at the March 7, 2022 hearing. During this

testimony, Father shed some light on his history with Child. He reported that

he did not see Child for a time after Child was born but did see her before her

first birthday and before he was incarcerated. See id. at 91. He testified that

before the two recent phone visits, it had been “more than two years” since

he had seen Child. See id. at 88. He maintained, however, that the phone

visits had gone well and he believed he and Child share a bond. Id. at 87.

      Following the hearings, the orphans’ court entered a decree terminating

Father’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2) and (b). Father filed a

timely notice of appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court

found it had not abused its discretion by terminating Father’s rights given that

Father had been incarcerated for all but six months of Child’s dependency;

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failed to make efforts to see Child or obtain services during the six months he

was out of prison; and that, even if Father had participated in classes while in

prison, he did not benefit from those classes as he had been rearrested on

drug charges. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/27/22, at 28, 29, 33. Father

now challenges the orphans’ court termination decree with the following three

issues:

   1. Does the failure of the Court to consider the services Father
      completed in prison constitute reversible error?

   2. Was the Court’s determination against the weight of the evidence
      when the Agency did not assess the services performed by Father
      while incarcerated?

   3. Did the Court err by granting a termination under circumstances
      whereby the Agency failed to provide services to Father, despite
      Father seeking the assistance of the Agency?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

      When this Court reviews an order of an orphans’ court terminating

parental rights, we must accept the findings of fact and credibility

determinations of the court as long as the record supports them. See In the

Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. 2020). If the findings of

fact are supported by the record, this Court may only reverse the order if the

orphans’ court made an error of law or abused its discretion. See id. We may

not reverse merely because the record could support an alternate result. See

id. Instead, we give great deference to the orphans’ court because those

courts often have the opportunity to observe the parties first-hand over the

course of multiple hearings. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662,

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670 (Pa. Super. 2019). Further, the orphans’ court, as the fact-finder, is free

to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to

resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See id.

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Under Section 2511, the orphans’

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.

See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Initially, the court must

find that the party seeking termination has proven by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies any one of the eleven statutory

grounds set forth for termination under Section 2511 (a). See id.; 23 Pa.

C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1-11). If the orphans’ court finds that one of those

subsections has been satisfied, it must then, pursuant to Section 2511(b),

make a determination of the needs and the welfare of the child under the best

interests of the child standard. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511; 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(b).

      Here, regarding the first prong of the analysis, the orphans' court found

that the Agency had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s

conduct met the grounds for termination of his parental rights under Section

2511 (a)(2), which provides that parental rights may involuntarily be

terminated on the grounds that:

      The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
      of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
      care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental

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      well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
      neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

      Under Section 2511(a)(2), then, parental rights may be terminated if it

is shown that: 1) there was repeated and continued incapacity of the parent;

2) such incapacity caused the child to be without essential parental care; and

3) the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d

95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Significant to this appeal, our Supreme Court evaluated the relevance

of a parent’s incarceration to an orphans’ court decision to terminate parental

rights under Section 2511(a)(2) in In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa.

2012). There, the Supreme Court held that “incarceration is a factor, and

indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for

termination exist under Section 2511 (a)(2) where the repeated and continued

incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes of the

incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.” Id. at 828.

      Here, as the orphans’ court pointed out and Father concedes, Father

was incarcerated for much of the life of this case. See Appellant’s Brief at 5.

The orphans’ court acknowledged that Father was not in prison for six months

of the relevant time - from May 2020 to November 2020. The court looked at

that period of time and found that Father, although out of prison, did not reach

out to Bellizia or see Child during that time. See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

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7/27/22, at 29. While the court acknowledged Father’s testimony that he

made efforts to contact the Agency so that he could see Child during this six-

month period, the court did not find Father’s testimony to be credible. See id.

at 33. The court also highlighted that Father was then rearrested and charged

with drug and other offenses and was once again incarcerated. See id. The

orphans’ court determined that this conduct provided sufficient grounds to

terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511 (a)(2), and we see no abuse of

discretion or error of law in this determination.

      Father argues, however, that termination was improper because the

Agency barely communicated with him during Child’s time of dependency and

failed to provide him with any services or make reasonable efforts to reunify

him with Child. In the first place, this argument ignores the fact that Father’s

whereabouts were at times unknown to the Agency, that Father was

incarcerated for a large portion of the relevant time, and that the Agency did

not have contact information for Father during his period of non-incarceration.

Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that Section 2511(a)(2) does not

require “a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior

to termination of parental rights.” In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 2014)

(holding that the provision of reasonable efforts to reunite parents and

children is not a requirement for termination). Accordingly, we are

unpersuaded by Father’s argument in this regard.

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      Father also asserts that it is “unclear what further efforts Father could

have engaged in to ensure he was able to resume his parental duties in a

timely manner.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. In support, he points to his testimony

that he gave his phone number to the Agency at the single permanency review

hearing he attended, attempted to call the Agency on several occasions, and

even went to the Agency’s offices during the COVID-19 pandemic but was not

able to speak to anyone. See id. at 18–19. Again, the trial court did not credit

Father’s testimony, as was its prerogative to do as the fact-finder, and we

reject this claim on that basis alone. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d

at 670.

      We therefore conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its

discretion or commit an error of law when it found that the Agency met its

burden of establishing grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511 (a)(2).

      Turning to the second part of the termination test, which involves a

needs and welfare analysis under Section 2511(b), we note that Father did

not include any challenge regarding this section in his statement of questions

involved or in his statement of matters complained of on appeal. Any

argument regarding Section 2511(b) is therefore waived. See in re

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that “issues not

included in an appellant’s statement of questions involved and concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal are waived”).

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      Even if not waived, we see no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that termination of Father’s rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of Child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

      “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved

in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). In determining a child’s

needs and welfare, the orphans’ court is required to consider “whatever bonds

may exist between the children and [the natural parent], as well as the

emotional effect that termination will have upon the [child].” In re Adoption

of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). At the

same time, the court should also consider the intangibles, such as the “love,

comfort, security, and stability,” the child might have with the foster parent.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      Here, as the orphans’ court pointed out, Father has never had custody

of Child. He has been incarcerated for much of the time Child has been in

placement and had no contact with Child during the short time he was not

incarcerated during this placement period. The orphans’ court noted that

Bellizia testified he was not able to determine if Father and Child had a bond.

And although Father asserted he and Child do have a bond, even if this

assertion had otherwise been substantiated, the mere presence of a parent’s

emotional bond with a Child does not preclude a finding that termination is in

a child’s best interests. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103.

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      The orphans’ court highlighted the love, comfort, security, and stability

Child has with her foster parents, with whom Child has spent the majority of

her life and who wish to adopt Child. The court noted Bellizia’s testimony that

Child lives with her half-sibling, and the two children are assimilated into the

foster family’s home. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/27/22, at 21. The court

also noted Bellizia testified that the foster family meets the physical,

developmental, and emotional needs of Child, and there is a bond between

Child and her foster family. See id. Child calls the foster parents “Mom and

Dad,” and seeks them out for comfort and security. See id. The court further

noted Bellizia opined that termination of Father’s rights would not have a

detrimental impact on Child. See id.

      Based on the above, along with testimony from the foster father and a

case manager who has worked closely with Child while in her foster home,

see id. at 22-24, the orphans’ court concluded that it was in Child’s best

interests to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Again, we see no abuse of discretion or error of law in this conclusion, even

had Father properly raised a challenge to it.

      Decree affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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