Court Opinion

ID: 9812611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:43:15.03925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:31.845577
License: Public Domain

OiARK, C. J.,
dissenting: The plaintiff, a boy nearly 14 years old at the time, had his foot cut off by a freight train on Sunday, 17 July, 1910. The train, according to defendant’s evidence, consisted of forty-five sealed box cars and a “shanty” car, and was a “double-header,” i. e., it had two engines in front. The extra engine was in use because the defendant had too much “power” in Selma, and wanted the extra engine in Spencer.
*596The injury occurred shortly after noon, in the cut 285 feet west of Boylan Bridge in the city of Raleigh and in the yard limits of the defendant. At that point there are two tracks running parallel, one belonging to the Seaboard Air Line, on which the plaintiff and a friend were walking, going west, and the defendant’s train on its own track came up behind, going in the same direction. The evidence on both sides was that these tracks and the space between had been greatly and constantly used by the public, and more used by pedestrians on Sunday than on any other day. There was some conflict of evidence whether there was any notice posted against the use of the tracks, or the space between them, by the public, but it was uncontradicted that, if so, no attention had been j>aid, and that the defendant had never undertaken to enforce such warning.
The plaintiff and a companion were going west on the Seaboard track in said cut. The end of the Seaboard ties- are 5 feet 4 inches from the end of the defendant’s ties and the inside rails of the two roads 8 feet 4 inches apart. The evidence for the plaintiff is that he was walking on the end of the Seaboard ties nearest to the defendant’s train; that he was 5 feet or more from the ears of said train as it passed; that his companion said to him. that the train was coming up on the other track from behind; that the usual rate of speed at that point within the yard and city limits did not exceed 8 or 10 miles an hour, and that, at such speed he was in no danger, and, expecting the usual speed, he did not turn around until just as the train shot by him at a speed of 25 or 30 miles an hour; that such was the impetus of the air caused by two engines and a long train at that speed that he was knocked down, and by the suction was drawn under the cars and his leg cut off above the ankle.
The defendant’s evidence was that its train was not running at the time more than 6 or 8 miles an hour, and there was evidence tending to show, as the defendant contended, that the plaintiff attempted to swing up on one of the cars'as it passed and, falling, lost his foot under the wheel, which passed over it. The defendant’s conductor testified that the train was running from Selma to Spencer and had run the 27 miles from Selma to Raleigh in 55 minutes, but that at the time of the injury to the plaintiff the train was running about 8 miles an hour; and further, that even if it had been running at the high speed claimed by the plaintiff, there was no suction which would have drawn him under the train.
The court charged, among other things, that the only duty of the defendant was to run its train with ordinary care and in conformity to the established custom — customary speed. If it did that, it could not be liable in any aspect of this case, and the jury would answer the issue of negligence “No.”
*597But that if the defendant did not do this, and the jury should find the other contentions of the plaintiff to be true (that is, that the great speed at which the train was moving caused the windage to knock the plaintiff down and the suction threw him under the cars), and that the defendant’s conduct on that occasion was the proximate cause of the injury, to answer the issue of defendant’s negligence “Yes.” That if the jury found that the proximate cause of the injury was the plaintiff attempting to board the moving train, to find the defendant guilty of contributory negligence.
Upon the evidence and arguments presented and the charge of the court the jury found the defendant guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury, that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, and assessed the damages which the plaintiff should recover.
The plaintiff tendered the court a judgment in accordance with the verdict. The defendant moved the court to set aside the verdict and to enter a judgment of nonsuit. The court set aside the verdict as a matter of law and entered a nonsuit against the plaintiff.
If the court had set aside the verdict as a matter of discretion, it would have been irreviewable, but it could not then have entered a non-suit. Eevisal, 539; Riley v. Stone, 169 N. C., 421. The court, however, set aside the verdict as a matter of law; that is, he adjudged that the facts alleged in the complaint and proven (as the jury found) did not constitute a cause of action, and that the charge was erroneous that such facts, if found, made defendant guilty of negligence. If this was correct, the nonsuit was properly entered.
There was evidence upon the issues, and the finding of the jury thereon is conclusive as to those facts. The only question is whether the facts alleged in the complaint and found to be true by the jury justified, as a matter of law, judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
There was evidence that the defendant was rushing its train with two engines at a high rate of speed within city limits and along and parallel to the track of the Seaboard road where people were accustomed to walk and where the engineer must have seen the plaintiff with his companion walking. There was evidence not only that such high rate of speed would knock a man down, but that it did knock the plaintiff down, who must have been more than 5 feet distant from the defendant’s train, and who was in no danger of being thus injured if the train had been running at the ordinary rate of speed in town limits, of some 8 or 10 miles an hour; and that being thus knocked down, the suction from such a train moving at such high speed could, and in fact did, roll the plaintiff under the car wheel, causing him to lose his leg.
There was no evidence which satisfied the jury that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in walking along the parallel track of *598the Seaboard Eailroad on that occasion, and the burden was on the defendant to prove this. Eevisal, 483.
The defendant insists that it was contrary to physical law that the plaintiff could have been knocked down by the rush of air caused by the train, or that the suction could have rolled him under the cars. But that was a matter of fact for the jury to determine. The evidence was conflicting, and the jury found that the fact was as contended by the plaintiff. We do not feel called upon to distinguish the cases of Graney v. R. R., 157 Mo., 666, and R. R. v. Lawson, 161 Ky., 39, though we think that they went off upon the question of contributory negligence, because the ruling of those courts as a matter of law cannot control the finding of fact by the jury. “We cannot argue against a fact.”
The plaintiff relies' upon Munroe v. R. R., 85 N. J., 688, which set aside the nonsuit in a case where the deceased was standing on a depot platform, 3 feet from its edge, when a through express train ran by at 60 miles an hour, creating a current of air which threw him down and killed him. That Court was of the opinion that although the express train was going at its customary rate of speed, its failure to give reasonable signal of approach to the depot was sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury. In Trieber v. R. R., 134 N. Y. App. Div., 661, the Court set aside a nonsuit where the decedent, 6'feet off, was swept under the car by suction, and killed.
In this case the plaintiff was not on the defendant’s track nor in an obviously dangerous position. The jury found that he was not guilty of contributory negligence, but that the proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the defendant in rushing this train at 25 or 30 miles an hour by the plaintiff when the usual speed of trains at that place, where the public were accustomed to walk, was from 6 to 10 miles an hour.
It is a novelty in the law of this State to suggest that this Court can take our own estimate of the weight of the evidence as against the finding of the jury. The well recognized maxim of English law is, “To issues of law the court responds, but to issues of fact, the jury.” If the jury find contrary to the weight of the evidence, the presiding judge has the authority to set aside the verdict on that ground. This he has refused to do, showing that he thought the verdict was not in violation of the evidence. This Court has always refused to assume jurisdiction to review the action of the judge in such case. It cannot be necessary to cite the numerous authorities to this effect, for it is an elementary principle of our law and dangerous to disturb.
The expression of the plaintiff, that he was “pushed out,” shows that he was speaking of being pushed out from the track on which he'was walking, for he said that he was sucked under the train on the other track. This is the natural law in such cases.
*599We know tbat when by tbe passage of a rapidly moving body a vacuum is created, tbe air rushes in to fill tbe vacuum. Here, if, as tbe witness testified and tbe jury found to be tbe fact, tbe train was moving at great speed, it drove aside tbe air in front of it and tbe vacuum tbus created was necessarily filled by tbe inrusb of tbe air from tbe sides, as can be seen in any rapidly moving train picking up chips and paper and small articles at any time. Tbe inrusb of tbe air is often terrific.
We know tbat tbe terrible tornadoes and hurricanes which destroy forests and cities and shipping and oftentimes cause great loss of life are caused by tbe tropical sun rarefying tbe air which rises, leaving a semi-vacuum into which tbe air rushes from long distances. At tbe battle of Sharpsburg (or Antietam) tbe writer of this opinion was in tbe act of speaking to General Armistead (who afterwards found a soldier’s death at Gettysburg), who, drawn sword in band and on foot, was leading bis brigade into action, when a huge shell passing at tbat instant just to tbe other side of tbe General, be plunged forward, bis sword flying one way and bis bat tbe other. His staff officers, thinking both legs bad been shot off at tbe knees, sprang forward to raise him up, when they found tbat be wa.s uninjured and without a scratch even, except where bis face bad struck tbe ground. Tbe force of tbe air rushing in to fill tbe sudden vacuum bad knocked him down just'as if be bad been felled by a blow from a heavy stick on tbe back of bis bead.
Tbe evidence of tbe witness is in accordance with tbe well known action of air in such cases, and can be found illustrated in any work on physics under tbe bead of “Ballistics.” Tbe air was split open by tbe bead of tbe engine, leaving a vacuum along tbe track into which tbe air rushed, pushing tbe plaintiff under tbe train, if bis evidence is to be believed, which was a matter solely for the jury, not for us. Water is somewhat denser than air, but any boy who has thrown a large stone into a shallow millpond knows tbat, in like manner, it will create a vacuum, laying bare tbe bottom of tbe pond, which tbe water rushes in to fill.
It will be a dangerous innovation if tbe courts on appeal begin to take their own estimate of what a jury should believe or should not believe, instead of accepting their verdict as tbe lawful triers of tbe fact, as final, when tbe trial judge refuses to disturb it.
Though modem research has demonstrated that we do not owe trial by jury to Magna Carta, and tbat it originated years after, still for long centuries it has been tbe great bulwark of right in Anglo-Saxon law tbat every citizen, however bumble, could have tbe facts in controversy found by a jury of bis peers. Tbe plaintiff in this contest with tbe defendant was entitled, like all others, to have tbe disputed fact, the vital fact, tbe material fact, whether or not be was swept under tbe train and injured, as be alleges, by tbe suction caused by tbe negligence *600of the defendant in running its train at an excessive speed in close proximity to the plaintiff, decided by a jury of his peers, and to have the historic Twelve, “The Great Twelve,” stand between him and the defendant. A disputed matter of fact is no more in the province of this Court to determine than it is in the province of the trial judge.
It was also in evidence by defendant’s witnesses that the train was running from Selma to Spencer on Sunday, carrying forty-five cars of freight, and that there was no live stock or fruit or other perishable freight. Under Revisal, 3844, the defendant was indictable and subject to a fine of not less than $500. There was no evidence which withdrew the defendant from liability for misdemeanor under said section, or under Revisal, 2613, and under the amendment thereto, Laws 1909, ch. 285. It is true that the defendant’s conductor testified that the cars had come from Pinner’s Point, Y a.; but this train had been made up at Selma, and he said that some of the cars were going beyond Spencer. This matter was considered in S. v. R. R., 119 N. C., 814, and it was held that the act was constitutional, and not an interference with interstate commerce, cited since in S. v. R. R., 149 N. C., 470. It is true that in an indictment under this statute a new trial was granted below in S. v. Ry., 145 N. C., 570, but it was for the use of the expression, “If the jury find from the evidence,” which has been repeatedly held since not reversible error. Walker, J., in Holt v. Wellons, 163 N. C., 131, and cases there cited. If the defendant was running in violation of the statute it was guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, as has often been held. However, this point was not pressed below, and there was no ruling upon it and no exception upon that ground.
The judgment setting aside the verdict and entry of a nonsuit ought to be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court, that judgment might be imposed upon the verdict according to law. Wood v. R. R., 131 N. C., 48; Shives v. Cotton Mills, 151 N. C., 294; Ferrall v. Ferrall, 153 N. C., 179. The defendant will then be entitled to enter its appeal and have the statement of the case made up on appeal setting out the exceptions, if any, which it caused to be entered by the judge during the trial, Revisal, 536, 591, and its assignments of error, should it choose to appeal.
It will be noted that more than five years have elapsed since this injury occurred. There i.s no indication that either party is in any wise to blame for this delay. But the frequency with which cases come to this Court, after similar or even longer delays, makes it proper, as we have done, to call the matter again to the attention of the lawmaking body. Such delays cause heavy costs to accumulate and witnesses die or their memory becomes indistinct. One of the pledges of Magna Carta was that “justice should not be delayed.”
Hoke, J., concurs in dissent of Ciauk, C. J.