Court Opinion

ID: 9702715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:21:43.597469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.762293
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Retired Justice
(concurring in result).
SDCL 23A-44-5.1 requires, “Every person indicted, informed or complained against for any offense shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days [.] ” Said period commences to run from the date the defendant first appeared before a judicial officer on the matter. In Jason Jones’ case, the starting date was July 13,1991; however, his *675trial did not begin until August 10,1992, well over 180 days after Ms initial appearance.
Certain periods of time are excluded from the SDCL 23A-44-5.1 180-day window. Juvenile proceedings, however, do not appear on this list. In my opimon, Jones’ juvenile proceeding was a function of the criminal prosecution and is subject to the 180-day right to a speedy trial guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution. Thus, I cannot join the majority opinion on its respective rationale.
Rather, my justification for the delayed .trial arises from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), cited by the majority opimon. Various tests, evaluations, and the debate to try Jones as an adult, along with two months of delays requested by Jones, were necessary to insure Jones’ rights. He was not prejudiced by these delays. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. As Barker supports the delay, there is no need to create another exception to the 180-day rule.
During trial, State blatantly violated a pretrial ruling that information from Jones’ psychological evaluations would only be admissible for impeaching Jones. State asked several questions based upon information taken from these evaluations. Although it is possible that some of the information could have been found through admissible sources, State failed to make that diligent effort. State’s argument, that the issue of past drug use was raised when Jones testified he did not black out on the mght in question, is weak at best.
Although I find it repugnant that State improperly utilized information from confidential psychological evaluations already deemed inadmissible by the trial court, I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty absent this error. State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732 (S.D.1994); State v. Younger, 453 N.W.2d 834 (S.D.1990). Bluntly, the sizeable tear in the complainant’s vagina suggests forcible entry and had to greatly influence the jury. Witnesses heard her screaming. One witness testified there was blood all over the bed and complainant’s legs. A physician testified that when he examined her later that morning, she was bleeding profusely from the vaginal area. All of tMs evidence established a forcible rape.