Court Opinion

ID: 9527127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:27:44.830503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:35.162185
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting). Defendant, Jeffrey Lee Hilber, was convicted of possession of amphetamines1 and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver,2 in part as a consequence of seizure of these substances from his automobile.
The people appeal from the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant’s conviction based on that Court’s view that the trial court erroneously failed to suppress the seized evidence.
We reverse as to the suppression of evidence issue and remand to the Court of Appeals.3
I. Facts
On April 19, 1975, defendant Hilber was stopped by two state troopers for speeding. Trooper Olson approached the vehicle, advised defendant that he had been speeding and requested his driver’s license and registration.
*331Trooper Olson testified at trial that "[a]s I was talking to the subject I got a distinct odor of what appeared to me as marijuana”. The other trooper, Officer Lahde, testified that as he approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, defendant was standing outside the car and Trooper Olson asked him if he could smell anything and "[a]t that time I leaned forward toward the vehicle and I smelt [sic] the strong odor of marijuana coming from the interior of the vehicle, apparent marijuana”. Both officers had been trained and experienced in visual and olfactory detection of marijuana.
Defendant Hilber was told by Officer Olson "that * * * there was a strong odor of marijuana in the car” and then the officer "asked him if he * * * had any more marijuana in the car”. At that point defendant reached onto the dashboard of the car and produced a cigarette package which contained four rolled marijuana cigarettes.
Defendant Hilber was turned over to Officer Lahde who took him to the patrol car and arrested him while Officer Olson proceeded to search the vehicle. The search uncovered more marijuana cigarettes, a large number of pills which were later found to be amphetamines, a marijuana (roach) pipe and a brown paper bag containing over five pounds of marijuana.
The trial court found the original cigarette package inadmissible because it was the product of improper questioning of defendant without advice of his Miranda rights, but found the other evidence admissible because the strong odor of marijuana justified probable cause for a search of the vehicle.
The Court of Appeals agreed that the cigarette package was inadmissible but reversed as to the failure to suppress the other evidence. People v *332Hilber, 69 Mich App 664; 245 NW2d 156 (1976). Application for rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals on August 5, 1976, and delayed application for leave to apeal was granted by this Court March 24, 1977.
II. Issue
We granted leave to consider whether the evidence discovered in the car was admissible as a result of a proper search.
We find that the evidence was admissible and therefore reverse the Court of Appeals, reinstate defendant’s conviction and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of other issues raised in but not addressed by that Court.
III. Search of the Automobile
All persons in Michigan are protected against unreasonable search and seizure by both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution4 and the Constitution of the State of Michigan.5 Because of the exclusionary rule developed to enforce this right, evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible as *333evidence against an accused whose rights were violated. Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963); Alderman v United States, 394 US 165; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969). Further, the basic constitutional rule, subject to certain exceptions, is that searches conducted without authority of a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 454-455; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971); People v Whalen, 390 Mich 672, 677; 213 NW2d 116 (1973).
Under the facts of this case, it is one of these exceptions, specifically the automobile exception, which precludes the presumption of unreasonableness normally attendant upon warrantless searches and which supplies the applicable standards:
"1. Reasonableness is the test that is to be applied for both the stop of, and the search of moving motor vehicles.
"2. Said reasonableness will be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case.
"3. Fewer foundation facts are necessary to support a finding of reasonableness when moving vehicles are involved, than if a house or a home were involved.
"4. A stop of a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes may be based upon fewer facts than those necessary to support a ñnding of reasonableness where both a stop and a search is conducted by the police.” (Emphasis added.) People v Whalen, supra, 682, cited as authority in People v Lillis, 64 Mich App 64, 68; 235 NW2d 65 (1975).
The evidentiary quality of odor was brought out in Johnson v United States, 333 US 10; 68 S Ct 367; 92 L Ed 436 (1948), in which a defendant appealed her conviction of violation of a Federal narcotics law. Based on information supplied by an *334informant, police went to defendant’s hotel room, independently verified that the odor of burning opium was emanating therefrom, and knocked on the door. Upon being admitted, the police announced to defendant, the sole occupant of the room, that she should consider herself under arrest and proceeded to search the room.
The Court found that:
"At the time entry was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant. We cannot sustain defendant’s contention, erroneously made, * * * that odors cannot be evidence sufficient to constitute probable grounds for any search. * * * If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character.” Johnson, supra, 13.
That Court held that under the facts of Johnson, the requirement of a warrant prior to search could not be dispensed with because inconvenience and slight delay were the only countervailing considerations and no exigent circumstances were present.
"No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes which we suppose in time would disappear. But they were not capable at any time of being reduced to possession for presentation to court. The evidence of their existence before the search was adequate and the testimony of the officers to that effect would not perish from the delay of getting a warrant.” (Emphasis added.) Johnson, supra, 15.
*335Therefore, the United States Supreme Court both acknowledged that odor can be sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant,6 a more difficult standard to meet than the standard of reasonableness required in automobile cases generally, and further acknowledged that such odor in a movable vehicle could obviate the necessity of a warrant.7
We need only decide, therefore, under the standards of reasonableness applicable to searches of automobiles, Whalen, supra, whether the odor emanating from defendant Hilber’s car created a sufficient basis for the officers to believe that marijuana might be present,8 and therefore permit search of the vehicle.9
Defendant asserts that in so determining, this Court should distinguish among the odors of unburned, burning and burned marijuana and, although the first two odors may be sufficient to establish reasonable cause for search, the third does not.
*336We find no basis in this case for drawing such a distinction. Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned” marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning” marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant to the issue considered herein, 393 Mich 31; 222 NW2d 757 (1974); People v Christensen, 2 Cal App 3d 546; 83 Cal Rptr 17 (1969), and the odor of "burned” marijuana, Hicks v State, 534 SW2d 872 (Tenn Crim App, 1976); State v Kern, 295 Minn 580; 205 NW2d 509 (1973).
We find these terms, however, not to be determinative or necessitate differing results for two reasons. First, because in many of the above cases as well as others cited infra, the type of odor perceived and giving rise to cause for search can only be guessed at by a reading of the facts to discover the type of marijuana which was subsequently found during the search. In other words, the language employed by courts generally makes no distinction as to the classification of marijuana odor involved. See, e.g., State v Hughes, 544 SW2d 99 (Tenn, 1976); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); Ford v State, 37 Md App 373; 377 A2d 577 (Ct Spec App, 1977); State v Binns, 194 NW2d 756 (ND, 1972); State v Compton, 13 Wash App 863; 538 P2d 861 (1975); State v Benson, 198 Neb 14; 251 NW2d 659 (1977).
Second, we are not in a position to take judicial *337notice of the lengths of time the differing odors linger; we are in no position to know that a "burning” odor may remain for a certain number of minutes or hours at which point it becomes a "burned” odor. Although defendant claims that the odor of burned marijuana may linger and, therefore, there is no cause to believe the substance was still present, there is the same possibility that the odor of "unburned” or "burning” marijuana may linger in a small area such as an automobile for a period of time10 beyond the actual presence of the substance. This creates a factual as opposed to legal conflict and that conflict was resolved by the finding of the trial court that the search was supported by reasonable cause. We do not find that conclusion contrary to the evidence before this Court and agree that the strong odor of marijuana, detected by an officer trained in olfactory detection of marijuana, provides reasonable cause to believe that marijuana was present in the automobile and that the search was justified.11
Beyond strong legal precedent for the finding of the trial court that there was reasonable cause to search12 we feel that finding is supported by com*338mon sense. It is not necessary to have proof beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy the exceptions to constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure. Because of the exigencies of this case, it is not even necessary that there be probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant. All that is required is a reasonable belief. If courts are to bind police activity by the limits of reason, so must they allow the police to function freely within those limits, rather than requiring unrealistic exercises in caution in the performance of their duties.
The officers in the instant case detected a strong odor of marijuana, reasonably believed that the marijuana was present and, as ultimately demonstrated, their belief was well founded. They relied on their training and experience, and under these circumstances, violated no constitutional right in the search of the automobile.
IV. Conclusion
Because the odor of marijuana provided the police officers with reasonable cause to believe that marijuana was present in violation of the laws of this state, we reinstate the conviction of defendant and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of issues not considered on prior hearing.
Reversed and remanded.
Coleman and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.

 MCL 335.341(4)(b); MSA 18.1070(41)(4)(b).

 MCL 335.341(l)(c); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(c).

 Defendant raised six issues on appeal to the Court of Appeals. That Court, finding the one issue considered herein dispositive, did not address the other five. We, therefore, remand for consideration of those five issues.

 United States Constitution, Am IV states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

 Michigan Constitution 1963, art 1, § 11, states:
"The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.”

 See, also, United States v Ventresca, 380 US 102; 85 S Ct 741; 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965); United States v Solis, 536 F2d 880 (CA 9, 1976); and United States v Burrow, 396 F Supp 890 (D Md, 1975), all holding that odor may be sufficient probable cause upon which to issue a search warrant.

 Professor Jerold H. Israel of the University of Michigan School of Law, in analyzing recent United States Supreme Court decisions in the area of criminal procedure, finds the necessity for a search warrant inapplicable to most automobile searches. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Mich L Rev 1319, 1392 (1977).

 Although there is much authority for the proposition that odor of marijuana alone is sufficient for probable cause to search an automobile subsequent to a routine border stop, see, e.g., United States v Andrade, 545 F2d 1032 (CA 5, 1977); United States v Parron, 472 F2d 1215 (CA 9, 1973); United States v Powman, 487 F2d 1229 (CA 10, 1973), because of the different standards often applied to border cases, we do not rely on that authority in this case.

 There is no allegation that the subsequent search of the vehicle was tainted by the original failure to give Miranda warnings. The reasonableness of cause for the search was separate from the arrest and evidence of the cigarette package resulting in that arrest.

 In Ford v State, 37 Md App 373, 380; 377 A2d 577, 581 (Ct Spec App, 1977), the defendant called an expert witness in an attempt to discredit the testimony of the officer who detected the odor on the person of defendant and in his automobile. The expert
"* * * acknowledged, however, that the odor of marihuana smoke was such as might permit one to 'be able to smell it for an hour.’ She acknowledged also that under some conditions the odor of drying marihuana is 'much stronger than the smell of the smoke.’ ”

 Although there is some authority for the development of a "plain smell” doctrine analogous to the "plain view” doctrine, see United States v Solis, 536 F2d 880, 881 (CA 9, 1976); United States v Curran, 498 F2d 30, 33 (CA 9, 1974); United States v Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F2d 808, 810 (CA 9, 1974); Commonwealth v Stoner, 236 Pa Super 161, 166; 344 A2d 633, 635 (1975), we need not decide in this case whether such a doctrine should be recognized in Michigan.

 Defendant Hilber cites the recent Montana Supreme Court decision in State v Schoendaller, — Mont —; 578 P2d 730; 23 Cr L Reporter 2185 (1978), which held that the odor of burned marijuana *338was not reasonable cause to search an automobile. We find the opinion of dissenting Justice Harris on more persuasive.