Court Opinion

ID: 9792393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:28:49.853076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.583246
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
BIRDSALL, Judge.
Both the appellant and the appellee find fault with our disposition of the claimed error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the narcotics. The appellee agrees that although our reasoning has the strength of logic it is at odds with the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981). We find that decision inapposite because, unlike the facts here, no search was conducted incident to that defendant’s arrest. The arresting officer in Cruz took •both the defendant and her purse to the immigration office without even searching the purse at the scene. He had no knowledge that the contents of the purse offended any law. He searched it one hour after the arrest and found false registration documents.
In the instant case the appellant’s suitcase was searched at the scene of and *533incident to his arrest. That search produced the narcotics. The appellant’s custodial arrest was based on probable cause and was therefore a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. Since that intrusion was lawful, the search required no additional justification. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). From this it follows that the appellant no longer had any reasonable expectation of privacy in that suitcase. The fact that the officer placed the items back in the suitcase after he had examined them does not restore any expectation that the contents are again private to him. We are not concerned with a later search after the appellant regained possession of his suitcase. Both the suitcase and the automobile were in the custody of the police at all times material hereto. If we were to agree with the appellee, then if the officer in Cruz had searched the defendant’s purse at the scene, discovered the incriminating documents and replaced them in the purse, he could not have seized them later without a warrant. Surely the Fourth Amendment requires no such superfluous act. Cf. People v. Richards, 32 Crim.L.Rep. (BNA) 2398 (Jan. 24, 1983).
We found it unnecessary to discuss the other issues presented concerning the issuance of the warrant. We adhere to that decision.
We also have not discussed the appellant’s argument that the search incident to arrest was too far removed in time and space from the arrest since we found the facts brought it well within Belton and the following cases: See United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108, 102 S.Ct. 2909, 73 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1982); Government of Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir.1981); United States v. Enriquez, 675 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.1982) and United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585 (D.C.Cir.1982).
The motion for rehearing is denied.
HOWARD, C.J., and HATHAWAY, J., concur.