Court Opinion

ID: 9687580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:37:46.789741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:13.209919
License: Public Domain

MARCIA PHILLIPS PARSONS, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that this appeal is neither moot nor impermissibly seeks a advisory opinion, and that it presents a dispute ripe for review, I respectfully dissent. Additionally, as discussed below, I respectfully would reverse the order of the *871bankruptcy court on the merits of this appeal.
As to the ripeness issue, the majority divides the bankruptcy court’s order into two parts: the conclusion that B-Line violated Rule 9011 in the instant case and the court’s directives regarding the filing of future proofs of claim. According to the majority, the former is final although moot because no sanctions were levied, while the latter is not final and thus not appealable because it addresses hypothetical situations that may or may not occur in the future.
In my view, the bankruptcy court’s order is not so readily divisible. Rather than the directives being separate and apart from the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that B-Line violated Rule 9011, the directives appear to be a type of nonmone-tary sanction imposed because of B-Line’s rule violation. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. Rule 9011(c)(2) (“Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule ... may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature....”) (emphasis supplied); Stoecklin v. United States, No. 89-182-CIV-OC-16, 1997 WL 1039239, *3 (M.D.Fla.1997) (stating that sanctions under Rule 11 can take the form of monetary fines or nonmonetary directives and that in extreme cases, such nonmonetary directives can include a court order barring the offending party from asserting particular claims or defenses); May v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 442, 449 (Fed.Cl.2008) (stating that nonmonetary directives are permitted by Rule 11 and ordering that pro se plaintiff must obtain permission of court before filing any future complaint).
The majority implicitly reject this view, stating that the bankruptcy court did not “direct B-Line to take, or refrain from taking, any specific action.” According to the majority, the bankruptcy court’s discussion was merely “a recommendation of best practices' — what creditors ought but are not necessarily required to do to avoid potential Rule 9011 trouble.” This conclusion, however, ignores the mandatory language used by the bankruptcy court:
[T]he court finds that when the debtors have not scheduled any claim listing the originating creditor or any direct or indirect assignee of the originating creditor, Rule 9011 requires a claim purchaser, before filing a proof of claim with a bankruptcy court, to obtain originating documents or, when such documents are not available, a clear understanding of the nature of the original dealings that support the assertion of a claim against the particular debtor. Having obtained those documents or that clear understanding, the claim purchaser should then attach to the proof of claim form the originating documents or an affidavit explaining the non-availability of such “media” to the proof of claim form so the debtor and other interested parties are given fair notice of the source and particulars of the claim.
In re Wingerter, 376 B.R. 221, 224 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 2007) (emphasis added).
If originating documents cannot be obtained, and the assignee decides to file a proof of claim notwithstanding the absence of such documents, the assignee must comply with Rule 3006[sic] and Official Form 10 by providing a clear explanation (which would include all non-confidential information in the hands of the assignee) of how the initial obligation arose and setting forth the warranties and representations in the chain of transfers that the assignee relies upon in asserting its claim.
Id. at 239 (emphasis added). While the bankruptcy court did at times use the more permissive verb “should,” it was clear from the court’s discussion that the *872statements were not merely “best practices recommendations,” but were instead explicit directives detailing what the court will require in the future. As stated by the bankruptcy court:
As a prospective matter, B-Line and other purchasers in the claims trading industry should understand that this Court views the filing, without review of originating documents, of a proof of claim by an assignee/purchaser to fall short of reasonable inquiry under Rule 9011 when the obligation has not been scheduled by the debtors and the purchase of the claim was not accompanied by reliable representations of claim validity.
Id. at 238.
Moreover, this language contradicts the majority’s conclusion that B-line is not at risk for future sanctions because “the bankruptcy court engaged in an exhaustive investigation ... before finding B-Line in violation of Rule 9011” and will presumably do so in other cases in the future. To the contrary, rather than indicating that the court will undertake such an exhaustive investigation again, the above-quoted language demonstrates that if B-Line fails in the future to comply with the court’s directives, sanctions will be imposed by the court. As such, the bankruptcy court’s order was a final order in all respects, subject to review on appeal.
Alternatively, even if the majority is correct that the bankruptcy court’s order is, in effect, two orders, one addressing past behavior and the other future, both are reviewable by this Panel. With respect to the portion of the order that pertains to the finding that B-Line violated Rule 9011, the majority maintains that the issue is moot and therefore non-reviewable because no monetary sanctions were imposed on B-Line. While there is no Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case directly on point, the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in Sterling Consulting Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Indian Motocycle Co., Inc.), 452 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.2006). In Indian Motocycle, protracted bankruptcy litigation between two companies over the rights to the Indian Motocycle trademark and a settlement of that litigation led to a dispute with the IRS regarding respective taxes due from the receivership and bankruptcy estates following the sale of assets. The district court, which had withdrawn the order of reference, was troubled by the IRS’s maintenance of inconsistent tax assessments against the parties. The IRS asserted that the inconsistent assessments were necessary to protect itself until final determinations were made regarding total taxes due on the asset sale, a tactic regularly used by the IRS.
Concluding that the IRS had willfully engaged in presenting meritless arguments for purposes of delay, the district court formally declared as a sanction that the IRS’s conduct was unacceptable and inappropriate, but did not impose any punishment. Id. at 27. The IRS appealed but prior to consideration on appeal, the controversy between the trustee and the IRS settled, bringing the proceedings in the district court to an end. Upon review, the First Circuit Court of Appeals initially questioned whether any injury currently existed that was reviewable. The court answered the question in the affirmative, explaining:
On appeal, the government has referred briefly to two different interests that its says are impaired or threatened by the sanctions order. One is the IRS’s reputation; the other is the risk that the findings of misconduct could be used against it as part of an “unclean hands” defense in related litigation.... *873Reputational interests can be cognizable; that is what defamation and expungement of record cases are about. But merely to refer to reputation does not in this case denote a concrete threat, as it might if a lawyer were sanctioned and bar discipline was in prospect....
Perhaps, where the conduct of a party (or counsel) is expressly condemned as improper by a formal sanction order, that ought to be enough for review. At least by implication, however, our own case law may be more demanding even in the presence of a formal order. But where a formal order has been entered, we hold that it is sufficient for standing to appeal, and enough to refute any charge of mootness, that the sanction order continues to have potential real-world impact upon the sanctioned party. That test is met in this case.
The conduct condemned by the district court is not some idiosyncratic event; we know (from case law) that the IRS regularly uses [these tactics]. Nor was the district court making a passing negative comment; it formally declared in a sanction order that the regular practice of the IRS, an institutional litigant, amounts to willful misconduct that invites penalties.
The IRS has a self-evident concrete interest in maintaining practices of this kind. The ... sanction order is a disincentive for the IRS to repeat its conduct in the same or any sister court; if nothing else, the IRS would have to consider the peril to which doing so would expose its own lawyers. We hold that foreseeable practical consequences give the IRS adequate and justifiable incentive to litigate these appeals and that the government has Article III standing to proceed.
Id. at 29-30 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the appeal is not moot. B-Line’s conduct that the bankruptcy court found sanctionable was not an idiosyncratic event. Rather, it represented the customary business practices of a company whose entire business is purchasing claims against individuals who are debtors in bankruptcy court. Moreover, the bankruptcy court was not making a passing comment, but was issuing a formal ruling that these customary business practices are sanctionable as violations of Rule 9011. Undeniably, the bankruptcy court’s order has a real-world impact upon B-Line: if it continues business as normal, the court will almost certainly sanction B-Line again for the very same conduct. On the other hand, if B-Line modifies its practice to address the conduct the court found sanc-tionable, its cost of doing business, according to B-Line, will be substantially increased Accordingly, I would hold, in the words of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, that “foreseeable practical consequences” give B-Line “adequate and justifiable incentive to litigate” this appeal.
As to the second component of the bankruptcy court’s order, the court’s directives regarding future filings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that in determining whether a claim is ripe, an appellate court should examine:
(1) the likelihood that the harm alleged will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to allow for adjudication; and, (3) hardship to the parties if judicial review is denied. Adult Video Ass’n v. United States, 71 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir.1995). For pre-enforcement challenges, a case is ordinarily ripe for review ‘only if the probability of the future event occurring is substantial and of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’ Nat'l Rifle *874Ass’n of America v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir.1997) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir.2002).
This standard is met here. The likelihood that B-Line will file other proofs of claim is certain given the nature of its business.1 The factual record is sufficiently developed for review by an appellate court; there is an extensive record with detailed testimony from the parties. Lastly, B-Line faces certain punishment if its proofs of claim fail to have the necessary attachments in cases where the debtors have not scheduled the claims. Therefore, based on the foregoing, I would find that this appeal is ripe for review.
Turning now to the merits of this appeal, I respectfully would reverse the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that B-Line violated Rule 9011. In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court used an erroneous legal standard and relied upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact.
With respect to the legal standard, the bankruptcy court held that a claims purchaser must review a debtor’s schedules before filing a proof of claim to determine whether the debtor has scheduled a claim that resembles the purchased claim. According to the bankruptcy court, if a debt- or has not scheduled a claim, “Rule 9011 requires” a claims purchaser to attach originating documents to its proof of claim. If such documents are not available, the claims purchaser “must” attach to the proof of claim an affidavit explaining the absence and setting forth how the initial claim arose, along with the warranties and representations in the chain of transfers that the purchaser is relying upon in asserting its claim. The court held that this process is necessary to meet Rule 9011’s requirement of a reasonable pre-filing inquiry.
While I respect the bankruptcy court’s desire to formulate a procedure for the filing of purchased claims, I believe that the process demanded by the court is not required by Rule 9011 and exceeds the court’s authority. Rule 9011 provides in pertinent part that:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,—
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery....
Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9011(b)(3) (emphasis added). As explained by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in addressing the question of whether an attorney violated Rule 11 by commencing a particular bankruptcy ease:
In this circuit, the test for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether the individual attorney’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The relevant inquiry is whether a specific finding was, if not successful, at least well founded....
*875The [trial] court, however, is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signor’s conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion or other paper was submitted. The attorney’s conduct must be tested by an objective standard of reasonableness. The determination of whether an attorney conducted “reasonable inquiry” is judged by objective norms of what reasonable attorneys would have done. Id. That is, what was reasonable for the attorneys to believe at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed? This of course is a fact-oriented inquiry.
In determining whether an attorney had or had not conducted a reasonable inquiry, a court undoubtedly should consider a variety of pre-filing factors. In this case, for example, what information about the client’s business did the attorneys have? Was the information verified? How involved had these attorneys been in their client’s business? For how long? Were other professionals, such as accountants or bankers consulted? What independent investigation, if any, did the attorneys undertake prior to the filing? What did their clients tell them? Were they justified in believing what their clients told them? Did a time problem exist when a decision to file was made? What was the business (and legal) sophistication of the clients and the
attorneys? These along with a myriad of other factual details would be crucial to have in hand before determining whether the action taken or not taken by the attorneys prior to filing the bankruptcy petition was or was not reasonable.
In re Big Rapids Mall Assocs., 98 F.3d 926, 930-31 (6th Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted).
It is clear from this discussion that the “reasonable inquiry” mandated by Rule 9011 turns on a consideration of all the facts present in each particular case. As such, it was erroneous for the bankruptcy court to conclude as a matter of law that a “reasonable inquiry” for a holder of an unscheduled, purchased claim always requires the holder to attach the originating documents to its proof of claim, or set forth in an affidavit attached to the proof of claim an explanation for the documents’ absence, a statement of how the claim arose, and all warranties in the chain of title. Granted, Rule 3001(c) and the proof of claim form, Form 10, direct attachment of documentation of a claim based on a writing.2 As interpreted by the courts, such information, along with the other requirements of the rules, is necessary in order for the claim to have prima facie effect under paragraph (f) of Rule 3001. See In re Perron, 350 B.R. 628, 2006 WL 2933827, *5 (6th Cir. BAP 2006) (unpub. table op.) (holding that creditor’s failure to *876comply with Rule 3001 is not grounds to disallow claim; result of failure to comply is to lose prima facie evidence of validity and amount); In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424, 436 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (same); In re Dove-Nation, 318 B.R. 147, 152 (8th Cir. BAP 2004) (same). Loss of prima facie effect, however, or even disallowance of a claim for failure to supply this information, is a far cry from the bankruptcy court’s holding that the failure to supply this information or explain its absence when the claim is unscheduled is a violation of Rule 9011, sanctionable by the court.3
Moreover, I would respectfully reverse the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that B-Line violated Rule 9011 in the present case, and would hold to the contrary that B-Line made a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances sufficient to satisfy Rule 9011. The bankruptcy court’s primary basis for this holding was that B-Line was asserting a claim that it had purchased from another party, not only without possession of the originating documents, but also without any representation or warranty from the seller as to the validity or enforceability of the claim. This finding, however, is clearly erroneous.
Paragraph 5 of the Purchase Agreement between B-Line and Covenant sets forth the Seller’s Representations and Warranties. In Paragraph 5.7, Covenant as Seller represents and warrants that “[a]s of the Closing Date ... [it] has used reasonable efforts in accordance with industry standards to create Computer Files which set forth each Account designated in the Term Agreement, each of which meets the Eligibility Requirements as of the Cutoff Date.” (Sealed App. at Tab 1, p. 5.) (emphasis supplied). “Eligibility Requirements” is a term defined under Paragraph 1.14 of the Agreement as “the requirements set forth in Paragraph 9.1 through 9.9 with respect to each Account.” (Sealed App. at Tab 1, p. 2.) Paragraph 9.4(h) provides that “the Account represents a legal, valid and binding obligation of the related Debtor.” (Sealed App. at Tab 1, p. 7.) Similarly, Paragraph 9.1(h) states that “the debt is not disputed by the Debtor or Trustee,” while Paragraph 9.1(iv) provides that “no proof of claim has been or will be rejected or successfully objected to by any person.... ” (Sealed App. at Tab 1, p. 7.) Thus, there were explicit representations and warranties from Covenant that the accounts purchased by B-Line were valid obligations of the account debtors, including the Debtor herein.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that B-Line’s reliance on Covenant’s warranties and representations was unreasonable. At the time the proof of claim at issue was filed, B-Line had been purchasing claims from Covenant for nearly two years. Of the 1,017 proofs of claim filed by B-Line as the result of purchases from Covenant, only five, including the claim at issue in this case, had been disputed, with three of the five having been resolved in B-Line’s favor.
Additionally, the evidence presented at the hearing in this matter established that Covenant’s warranties and representations were based on its own reasonable investigation and prior successful experiences. According to the undisputed evidence presented at the hearing, Covenant had purchased the Debtor’s account from Professional Recovery Systems, LLC (“PRS”), a company from whom it had previously purchased valid claims. As a part of its stan*877dard business practices, Covenant first inquired into the origin and nature of the purchased accounts. Covenant then employed collection agencies to contact the account debtors, including the Debtor herein, by mail to validate the account and to inform the account debtors that they had 30 days to dispute the account should they wish to do so. Per Covenant’s instructions, if the collection agency received a dispute, Covenant would be notified, the file would be temporarily closed, and a determination whether to contest the dispute would be made. Covenant’s Chief Executive Officer testified that the account of the Debtor herein had been placed with at least two collection agencies for collection prior to its sale to B-Line. Notwithstanding the collection efforts by these two agencies, the Debtor never disputed the indebtedness and none of the mail sent by those agencies to the Debtor was returned.
In In re Cassell, 254 B.R. 687, 692 (6th Cir. BAP 2000), this Panel held that a reasonable inquiry for purposes of Rule 9011 may include reliance on the personal knowledge of a third party. See also Dubois v. United States Dept. of Agric., 270 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir.2001) (“signer’s obligation personally to comply with the requirements of Rule 11 clearly does not preclude the signer from any reliance on information from other persons”). The bankruptcy court herein rejected B-Line’s reliance upon Cassell because:
[NJeither B-Line nor Covenant can point to any actor who has personal knowledge that Debtor Gerald Wingerter has an unfulfilled obligation to GTE, nor has B-Line or Covenant produced any custodian for business documents evidencing such an obligation. In the absence of anyone with such personal knowledge or reliable business records, and given that the Debtors did not schedule any obligation relating to GTE, the Court finds that a reasonable inquiry into the facts should have included possession and review of alleged transactional documents between Mr. Wingerter and GTE or some reliable proxy for those documents.
In re Wingerter, 376 B.R. at 235-36.
B-Line argues that the bankruptcy court’s reference to the failure to produce a custodian for business documents evidencing a claim against the Debtor is misleading and somewhat inaccurate. B-Line indicates that the record shows that two of B-Line’s witnesses at the show cause hearing, one from B-Line and one from Covenant, were qualified to authenticate the computer files that contained the claim at issue as ordinary business records of their respective companies. According to B-Line, the procedural posture of the case, a show case hearing initiated by the court rather than an adversary proceeding with opposing counsel, obviated the need or the opportunity for B-Line to lay a foundation for its business records, which it could have readily done if there had been an objection to its business records.
Upon a review of the record, I would attach no significance to B-Line’s failure to authenticate its business records since its does not appear that any party challenged the admission of its business records. Further, it is insignificant that neither B-Line nor Covenant was able to identify a actor with “personal knowledge” of the Debtor’s alleged obligation. For authentication purposes, “[pjersonal knowledge is not strictly limited to activities in which the declarant has personally participated.... Personal knowledge' can come from review of the contents of business records, and [a witness] may testify to acts that she did not personally observe but which are described in business records.” AT & T Corp. v. Overdrive, Inc., No. 1:05CV1904, 2006 WL 3392746, *2 *878(N.D.Ohio 2006) (internal citations omitted). See also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546 (D.Md.2007) (“[I]t is not required that the authenticating witness have personal knowledge of the making of a particular exhibit if he or she has personal knowledge of how that type of exhibit is routinely made.”) The bankruptcy court’s rejection of B-Line’s records as “unreliable” simply because it was ultimately established that Debtor did not owe B-Line was based on “hindsight” and a demand for certainty rather than Rule 9011’s reasonableness standard. See Dubois v. United States Dept. of Agric., 270 F.3d at 82-83 (Rule 11 does not require absolute certainty); Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); H.J. Rowe, Inc. v. Spiegel, Inc. (In re Talon Holdings, Inc.), No. 97 B 37535, 1999 WL 150337, *5 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1999) (law does not require standard of perfect knowledge under Rule 9011).
In this regard, it must be noted that in addition to relying on the information it obtained from Covenant, B-Line conducted its own brief investigation. Before purchasing the portfolio of claims containing the Debtor’s account, B-Line received a computer file for the account from Covenant which contained the Debtor’s name, address, Social Security number, name of the original creditor on the account, original account number, original principal balance, current balance, rate of interest, date the account was opened, date the original creditor charged off the account, date the bankruptcy petition was filed and its case number, the chapter under which it was filed, and the name of the Debtor’s counsel. B-Line then reviewed that information for obvious flaws, such as an obviously incorrect Social Security number (i.e., all zero’s or nine’s or not enough, or too many numbers), or an address which does not exist, and compared it to the electronic records of the bankruptcy court to determine if the data matched. B-Line also searched available electronic databases to determine whether the Debtor had filed any prior bankruptcy cases in which the debt at issue had been discharged.
After completing this process and finding no inconsistencies, B-Line purchased the Debtor’s account along with ten others. Subsequent to the purchase, B-Line essentially repeated the above process, and confirmed that the bankruptcy case had not been dismissed, converted from a chapter 13, or that the bar date for filing proofs of claim has passed in the interim. Only then did it prepare and file the proof of claim in question.
The bankruptcy court summarily dismissed these undertakings by B-Line as a focus on “proofreading.” While there was certainly a proofreading element to B-Line’s actions, they were nonetheless relevant to the reasonableness inquiry because they indicate that B-Line appropriately wanted to ensure that it had the correct individual referenced in the documents obtained from Covenant and that the obligation had not been discharged. When these legitimate steps are combined with B-Line’s past successful experience with claims purchased from Covenant, Covenant’s activity regarding the account and Covenant’s representations and warranties, the conclusion is inescapable that B-Line filed the proof of claim after conducting a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances. See Glatter v. Mroz (In re Mroz), 65 F.3d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir.1995) (sanctions are warranted where party has absolutely no evidence to support allegations); Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 536-37 (11th Cir.1990) (whereas complete lack of evidence may justify sanctions, simply weak evidence will not usually justify sanctions).
The only factual basis in support of the bankruptcy court’s conclusion to the con*879trary was the Debtor’s failure to schedule the debt. According to the bankruptcy court, the Debtor’s mere failure to schedule the debt at issue was a “red flag” rendering B-Line’s reliance unreasonable and demanding further inquiry. Cf. In re McAllister, 123 B.R. 393, 396-97 (Bankr. D.Or.1991) (Rule 9011 sanctions imposed where Oregon taxing authority filed proof of claim for income taxes allegedly owed by debtor during years where no returns were filed without first determining whether debtor had obligation to pay such taxes; debtor did not list Oregon as creditor on schedules and was not an Oregon resident during years in question). However, it is not unusual for debtors to fail to initially schedule a debt, even though such schedules are filed under the penalty of perjury. See Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Papers, 73 Am. Bankr.L.J. 653 (Summer 1999) (“[T]he lack of care and understanding of the debtors and attorneys in fulfilling the disclosure requirements [of the bankruptcy schedules and statements] is palpable and disturbing.”). As such, when all of the circumstances of this case are considered, the Debtor’s failure to schedule the debt did not, in and of itself, render B-Line’s otherwise reasonable inquiry unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, I would respectfully reverse as clearly erroneous the bankruptcy court’s holding that B-Line violated Rule 9011 by failing to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry.

. As the bankruptcy court noted in its opinion, B-Line’s business centers on purchasing consumer bankrupt accounts. According to its website, B-Line has purchased and serviced more than $45 billion of bankruptcy receivables since its founding in 1997. In re Wingerter, 376 B.R. at 221 n. 1.

. Rule 3001(c) provides as follows:
(c) Claim based on a writing. When a claim, or an interest in property of the debtor securing the claim, is based on a writing, the original or a duplicate shall be filed with the proof of claim. If the writing has been lost or destroyed, a statement of the circumstances of the loss or destruction shall be filed with the claim.
Official Bankruptcy Form 10, entitled “Proof of Claim” states at paragraph no. 7: Documents: Attach redacted copies of any documents that support the claim, such as promissory notes, purchase orders, invoices, itemized statements of running accounts, contracts, judgments, mortgages, and security agreements. You may also attach a summary. Attach redacted copies of documents providing evidence of perfection of a security interest. You may also attach a summary. (See definition of "redacted” on reverse side.)
DO NOT SEND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS MAY BE DESTROYED AFTER SCANNING.

. In reaching this conclusion, I do not intend to suggest that failure to comply with Rule 3001 can never be a factor in determining whether Rule 9011 has been violated. I simply do not agree that failure of a claims purchaser to comply with Rule 3001 is a per se violation of Rule 9011 where the debtor has not scheduled the debt in question.