Court Opinion

ID: 9908257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:03:18.315943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:03.993745
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

              CINDY STUART, CLERK and COMPTROLLER
              FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

                                 Appellant,

                                     v.

                         STATE OF FLORIDA and
                                B.S.D.,

                                 Appellees.

                              No. 2D22-2192

                             December 8, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Samantha L.
Ward, Judge.

Kristen M. Fiore of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, and Christine B. Gardner
of Akerman LLP, West Palm Beach; and Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman
LLP, Tallahassee (substituted as counsel of record); and Mark J. Ware,
Legal Counsel, for Appellant.

Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm, P.A.,
Orlando; and Dayna Maeder and Camille Infantolino, of Maeder
Infantolino, LLC, Jupiter, for Appellee, B.S.D.

No appearance for Appellee State of Florida.

ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
     Cindy Stuart, Clerk and Comptroller for the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit (the Clerk), appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to vacate
that portion of an expunction order requiring her to refund court costs,
fines, and fees to B.S.D. Agreeing with the Clerk that the court lacked
authority to order that relief, we reverse and remand for vacatur of that
portion of the order.
     B.S.D. filed a petition under section 943.0583, Florida Statutes
(2021), to expunge an offense that she had committed while a victim of
human trafficking. She served that petition on the state attorney and
arresting agency and made the State of Florida a party to the action—all
as prescribed by statute. She and the State then submitted a stipulated
order that the trial court duly entered.
     Consistent with section 943.0583, the order declares B.S.D.'s
underlying conviction "vacated due to a substantive defect in the
underlying criminal proceedings" and directs her criminal history record
expunged. The order, however, also directs that the Clerk refund to
B.S.D. the $1,323 that B.S.D. previously had paid to satisfy the costs,
fines, and fees imposed under the original (but now vacated) criminal
judgment.
     Upon learning after the fact that she had been ordered to issue
B.S.D. a refund, the Clerk then filed a motion under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540 to vacate that portion of the order. She argued that the
trial court had erred in ordering the refund without first providing her
notice and an opportunity to be heard. She also argued that that portion
of the order was void because the trial court lacked authority under
section 943.0583 to direct such monetary relief. The court summarily
denied the Clerk's motion without a hearing.
                                Discussion
     A nonparty who has not been given notice that monetary relief is
sought against it may move under rule 1.540 to vacate a judgment

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granting such relief.1 See, e.g., Meyer v. Scutieri, 539 So. 2d 602, 603
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (reversing trial court's refusal under rule 1.540(b) to
vacate an order requiring nonparties to pay attorney's fees); Davis v. M &
M Aircraft Acquisitions, Inc., 76 So. 3d 1066, 1066–67 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) (holding that nonparty to original action had standing to be heard
on the merits of a rule 1.540(b) motion to vacate a final judgment
procured by collusion between the parties because "the final judgment
directly affected [the nonparty's] rights"). Whether a judgment or order is
void under rule 1.540(b)(4) presents a question of law that we review de
novo. Regions Bank v. Big Bend Invs. Grp. of Fla., LLC, 311 So. 3d 181,
184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
     We readily conclude that the portion of the order directing the
Clerk to issue a refund to B.S.D. was void because it was entered without
first providing the Clerk notice and an opportunity to be heard. See
Purdue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 259 So. 3d 918, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA
2018) ("[A]n order or judgment that was entered without notice and an
opportunity to be heard is void as a violation of due process."); Richard v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 258 So. 3d 485, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ("Generally,
due process requires fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard and

     1 B.S.D. does not dispute the applicability of rule 1.540, and

caselaw supports the conclusion that her petition to expunge criminal
records under section 943.0583 seeks civil relief. See State v. Greenberg,
564 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that the
"expungement statute as a whole is a remedial statute providing
remedies which are civil in nature" (citing Capuano v. State, 347 So. 2d
629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977))); cf. Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Tr. Co.
(Cayman), 450 So. 2d 1157, 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ("Although Section
812.035, Florida Statutes, the civil remedies section of the theft statute,
is quite clearly incorporated in a statute which defines and prohibits
crimes, it does not follow that rules pertaining to criminal cases apply to
the civil action brought thereunder.").

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defend in an orderly procedure before judgment is rendered." (quoting
Viets v. Am. Recruiters Enters., Inc., 922 So. 2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006))). We are unpersuaded by B.S.D.'s suggestion that the Clerk was
not entitled to notice and opportunity because issuing refunds to
criminal defendants is supposedly just another of the Clerk's many
duties. Chapter 28, Florida Statutes (2021), provides a litany of
ministerial responsibilities that clerks must fulfill, but issuing a refund
that they have no authority to issue is not among them. And that brings
us to our more fundamental point: the portion of the order requiring the
Clerk to issue B.S.D. a refund is void because the court had no authority
under section 943.0583 to order that relief.
     Section 943.0583 provides, in pertinent part:
     (2) . . . [U]pon the filing of a petition as provided in this
     section, any court in the circuit in which the petitioner was
     arrested, so long as the court has jurisdiction over the class
     of offense or offenses sought to be expunged, may order a
     criminal justice agency to expunge the criminal history record
     of a victim of human trafficking who complies with the
     requirements of this section. . . . This section does not confer
     any right to the expunction of any criminal history record,
     and any request for expunction of a criminal history record
     may be denied at the discretion of the court. The clerk of the
     court may not charge a filing fee, service charge, or copy fee
     or any other charge for a petition filed under this section. . . .
     (3) A person who is a victim of human trafficking may
     petition for the expunction of a criminal history record
     resulting from the arrest or filing of charges for one or more
     offenses committed or reported to have been committed while
     the person was a victim of human trafficking, which offense
     was committed or reported to have been committed as a part
     of the human trafficking scheme of which the person was a
     victim or at the direction of an operator of the scheme,
     including, but not limited to, violations under chapters 796
     and 847, without regard to the disposition of the arrest or of
     any charges. . . . Determination of the petition under this
     section should be by a preponderance of the evidence. A

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      conviction expunged under this section is deemed to have
      been vacated due to a substantive defect in the underlying
      criminal proceedings.
      Per its plain language, therefore, section 943.0583 neither
authorizes a petitioner to seek nor a court to order a refund of any costs,
fines, or fees paid by that petitioner in a prior criminal proceeding.2 The
sole directive concerning money forbids a clerk from charging a petitioner
for filing or pursuing the expunction petition.
      Rather, the legislature has authorized under section 943.0583 only
limited relief: vacating the convictions of human trafficking victims and
expunging their criminal history records of offenses they committed while
victims of human trafficking. See id. If the legislature had intended that
a petitioner under that section receive not only expunction but also a
refund of what he or she paid to satisfy the underlying criminal
judgment, the legislature would have said so. But it did not, and "[w]e
are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by
the Legislature." Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999). The trial
court simply had no statutory authority to order the Clerk to issue
B.S.D. a refund. See Suntrust Bank v. Arrow Energy, Inc., 199 So. 3d
1026, 1028–29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (concluding that an underlying
judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction to award
interest to be paid by the garnishee); Cardoza v. State, 98 So. 3d 1217,
1218–19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (determining that a bond forfeiture final
judgment was void because the statutory condition to the exercise of the
clerk's authority to send the forfeiture to judgment had not been
satisfied).

      2 Nor does the general expunction statute permit reimbursement

for the costs, fines, or fees imposed as part of an underlying conviction
and judgment. See § 943.0585.

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     Contrary to the trial court's conclusion and B.S.D.'s contention,
Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128 (2017), did not provide some
independent constitutional basis for the court to sidestep this absence of
legislative authorization. The Supreme Court held in Nelson that a state
is "obliged to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the
defendant" following invalidation of a criminal conviction by a reviewing
court, see id. at 130, and may only impose "minimal procedures"
consonant with due process for the return of such funds, see id. at 139.
In particular, the Supreme Court held invalid on due process grounds
Colorado's statutory scheme for reimbursing those who had been
wrongfully convicted. Id. Colorado imposed on the wrongfully convicted
defendant the burden of proving "actual innocence" to obtain a refund of
fines or fees paid to satisfy the original criminal judgment even if that
judgment was later vacated. Id. at 134. The Supreme Court reasoned
that this "actual innocence" requirement impermissibly turned the
principle of "innocent until proven guilty" on its head. See id. at 135–36.
     Yet it hardly follows from Nelson that B.S.D. must be permitted as
a matter of constitutional law to obtain a refund from a clerk of court in a
statutory expunction proceeding. Although section 943.0583 certainly
provides that in a human trafficking expunction, the underlying
conviction is "vacated due to a substantive defect in the underlying
criminal proceedings," that does not mean that the filing of a petition
under this section initiates a turnkey operation. After all, even Nelson
permits states to enact "minimal procedures" to issue refunds to criminal
defendants whose convictions have been overturned. 581 U.S. at 139;
see Brewster v. State, 250 So. 3d 99, 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding
that the statutory deadline in section 961.03, Florida Statutes (2017), for

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a petitioner to seek monetary compensation for wrongful incarceration is
a permissible "minimal procedure" under Nelson).
     Indeed, Florida has statutes that are purpose-built to reimburse
criminal defendants in certain circumstances. Section 939.06, Florida
Statutes (2021), for example, permits an acquitted or discharged
defendant to recover previously paid court costs and fees. See Wolf v.
County of Volusia, 703 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 1997) (explaining that
section 939.06 permits reimbursement for witness fees, sheriff expenses,
and clerk of court expenses). And section 961.06 permits, among other
things, recovery of monetary compensation and a refund of any fines,
penalties, or court costs by those who were wrongfully incarcerated. We
do not opine here whether these statutes could afford B.S.D. relief or
whether they comply with Nelson; neither of those questions is before us.
Rather, we reference these reimbursement statutes merely to explain
why we think this case—centered as it is on an expunction statute that
is wholly silent as to any right to refund or other reimbursement—is the
wrong vehicle to decide the contours of Nelson.
     Moreover, as a practical matter, the Clerk does not have B.S.D.'s
money to refund, the discretion to have retained it in the first place, or
the authority to retrieve it now from the State's coffers. Each year,
clerks' offices in Florida establish their budgets based on a detailed
statutory formula, see generally § 28.36, and each year, a clerk must
remit to the Department of Revenue any revenue that exceeds that
authorized budget, see § 28.37(4)(a). Clerks simply do not—and
cannot—hold onto fines, fees, or costs just in case a defendant seeks a
refund in the future.
                                Conclusion

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     In sum, we refuse to engraft a right to a refund on section
943.0583. The trial court had no authority to direct the Clerk to provide
monetary relief in this instance, and it compounded that error by
ordering such relief without first providing the Clerk with notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, we reverse the court's denial of the
Clerk's motion to vacate that portion of the expunction order requiring
the Clerk to issue the refund and remand for vacatur of that portion of
the order.
     Reversed and remanded.

CASANUEVA and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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