Court Opinion

ID: 9624324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:58:17.320788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:43.485822
License: Public Domain

CALLISTER, Justice
(dissenting).
By means of adroit legalistic legerdemain, the majority opinion has caused the words “owner of any interest in land” to disappear completely from the statute. By nonreference thereto, it conceals the trial court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and scholarly memorandum decision.
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, observed that there was but one issue to be determined, namely, “Was the defendant the owner of any interest in the land upon which plaintiff’s equipment was installed?” It opined that the beneficiary of the improvement need not be the owner of a fee title but must own an interest in the land, a lease being sufficient.1 The court continued by stating that the word “interest” in common parlance in connection with land includes all varieties of titles and rights and comprehends estates in fee, for life, and for years; mortgages, liens, easements, and attachments, and every kind of claim on land which can form the basis of a property right.
The court stated that it was well settled that one relying on a statute creating a lia*49bility or enforcing a new remedy, not known to the common law, must conform strictly to statutory requirements. Plaintiff had a duty to determine the interest possessed by a purported owner before it delivered the material. Plaintiff insists that the contractor and supplier had the right to expect and believe that defendant was the owner of or the owner of an interest in the land. There was no testimony that the contractor or supplier ever made any inquiry concerning ownership or interest; the record was equally silent concerning any representations of ownership by the defendant.
As to the facts, the trial court found that:
(a) The land upon which the kiln was constructed was owned by either one of two partnerships, which one was not determined.
(b) Defendant did not own any interest in either tract of land upon which the kiln may have been constructed and did not have either a written or verbal authorization or permission of any of the partners of either partnership to construct the kiln upon the site.
(c) The owners of the land received no benefit from installation of the kiln upon their property.
(d) Defendant had no interest in the land either in fee or under any leasehold estate but held, if anything, only a license at sufferance of the true owners, having been permitted to go upon the land without the objection of the true owners thereof.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, amply supported by the evidence, the legal question to be resolved is whether a licensee is “the owner of any interest in land” as prescribed in 14-2-1, U.C.A.1953. In the opinion of the trial court, with which I am in agreement, it is not.
In the jungle of the semantics of the property law a license is not an “interest” in property. It is a mere privilege or permission. * * * 2
******
* * * A license is to be distinguished from other property concepts in that it creates no legal right in the land itself. It is thus differentiated from freehold interests, leases, easements and corporeal hereditaments. * * *
A licensee differs from a lessee in that the latter has a possessory interest. There is no right of possession in the licensee. There is a plain difference between a license and a lease. * * * A lease differs from a license in that a lease of land passes an interest in the land, requires a writing to comply with the Statute of Frauds, although not always a seal, and transfers possession, while a license merely excuses acts done *50by one on land in possesion of another that without the license would be a trespass, conveys, no interest in the land, and may be contracted for or given orally. A tenancy implies some interest in the land leased, while a license gives only a temporary privilege in the use of the property, usually revocable at the pleasure of the licensor. * * * 3
Plaintiff concedes that had this action been brought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien under 38-1-3, U.C.A.1953, and defendant did not own an interest in the land, then it would have no remedy. It contends that the court should render a general judgment in this personal action, since it would not affect the land of the two partnerships, and no one but the defendant would be obligated to pay the judgment.4
Although plaintiff’s contention appears reasonable, it is contrary to the express provisions of 14-2-1, 14 — 2-2, U.C.A. 1953.
Because of the common purpose of these lien and contractor bond statutes, and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the proper application of the latter.5
Therefore, the law concerning mechanic’s liens is relevant to the instant action.
Under mechanic’s lien statutes it has been held that no lien will arise for materials furnished or labor performed in the construction of improvements upon the land under a contract with a licensee, who has no authority, express or implied, to bind the licensor.6
I am in agreement with the majority’s statement that this court has allowed a materialmen’s lien to attach to interests less than fee simple, such as leasehold estates, and equitable interests. However, its opinion fails to cite any case dealing with a mere license such as the trial court found to exist in this case. Although not involving a license situation, this court in Sanford v. Kunkel 7 (cited by the majority as authority for its opinion) had this to say:
* * * The cases cited by respondents do not support such a doctrine. They are to the effect that where a building is constructed on ground not owned by the person with whom the contract of construction was entered into and for whom the building was erected no lien *51attached to either the land or the building, on the theory that the lien law contemplated that a party for whom a building is erected and against whom and whose interest the lien is to be enforced, shall have some estate or interest in the land upon which the building is erected. * * * These cases do not avail respondents, because the facts upon which they are founded do not here exist. Appellants made their contracts with and performed labor and furnished materials for Kunkel [respondent], the ozvner of the land upon which the building in question was constructed. The case at bar is, therefore unlike one where a building is constructed for one on ground not owned by him and zvhere no lien at all existed and attached. (Emphasis added.)
Section 14-2-1, 14-2-2, U.C.A.19S3, specifies that this statutory remedy is available solely against "the owner of any interest in the land.” The trial court found the defendant was a licensee.8 A licensee has no title or interest in the land; and, therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the action against defendant for plaintiff's failure to prove the statutory elements of its cause of action.
I further dissent from the concurring opinion of Justice Ellett for the reason that the issue which he has raised was neither pleaded nor proved in the instant action. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CALLISTER, J.

. The majority opinion relies heavily upon Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1904), which involved a situation where-iu the defendant bank had a 10-year lease and, therefore, is distinguishable from the instant case and has no relevancy or bearing upon it.

. 1A Thompson on Real Property (1964 Replacement) § 217, p. 194.

. Ibid. § 223, pp. 214-216.

. Adopted by the majority opinion.

. King Bros., Inc., v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962).

. Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Bickel, 42 Idaho 245, 245 P. 92, 45 A.L.R. 575 (1926); Hoag v. Hay, 103 Iowa 291, 72 N.W. 525 (1897); Westport Lumber Co. v. Harris, 131 Mo.App. 94, 110 S.W. 609 (1908); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 66, p. 566 ; 36 Am.Jur. 83; 45 A.L.R. 581.

. 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, 1012 (1906).

. The majority opinion ignores its prior pronouncements relating to the respect which this court must give to a trial court’s findings of fact.