Court Opinion

ID: 9558896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:18:36.629298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:39.442906
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent on the basis of the evidence of another, unrelated crime, which evidence necessitates reversal of this conviction.
The appellant alleges that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Leonard Reames regarding another crime allegedly committed by the appellant. Reames testified on rebuttal that the appellant held up his liquor store in Blanchard, Oklahoma, at 8:20 p. m. on January 13, 1978. The defense’s objections were overruled.
As a rule, a defendant put on trial for one offense is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of that offense only. Atnip v. State, Okl.Cr., 564 P.2d 660 (1977); Hawkins v. State, Okl.Cr., 419 P.2d 281 (1966); Roulston v. State, Okl.Cr., 307 P.2d 861 (1957).
The five exceptions to the general rule recognize that evidence of other crimes may be admitted to show (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime for which the accused is put on trial; and (5) the presence of a common scheme or plan embracing two or more separate crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. Burks v. State, Okl.Cr., 594 P.2d 771 (1979); Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 432 (1958); Hawkins v. State, supra; Atnip v. State, supra. Even then, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
The State contends first that the questionable testimony was properly admitted under the “common scheme” exception. The “common scheme” exception applies when the crimes are so clearly related that proof of one tends to establish the other or when the first crime is committed in preparation for the second. See Roulston v. State, supra.
The instant case does not indicate that the first robbery was perpetrated to facilitate the second robbery nor that both were part of an overall criminal scheme. Without an adequate foundation, Reames’ testimony was improperly introduced into evidence as proof of a common scheme.
The State additionally argues that Reames’ testimony could be admitted under the identity exception. See Warner v. State, Okl.Cr., 568 P.2d 1284 (1977). While an examination of recent decisions by this Court indicates that the application of this exception to the case at bar is tenuous, it does have some probative value. Reames’ testimony regarding appellant’s whereabouts at 8:20 p. m. refutes the appellant’s alibi, which attempts to establish a misiden-tification of him as the perpetrator of the crime by placing him at a concert during the period of time covering both the robberies of the convenience store and the liquor store.
In Warner v. State, supra, the defendants were charged with the armed robbery of a private residence, where an inscribed pistol was stolen. At trial, a witness testified that he had recovered and turned over to a police officer the pistol at the site of a subsequent armed robbery, which he had witnessed, to establish the identity of the defendants in the former offense. This Court affirmed the conviction on appeal and found the evidence properly admitted to connect the defendants with the first robbery under the identity exception.
The decision in Burks v. State, Okl.Cr., 568 P.2d 1311 (1977), also illustrates an ap*1325propriate situation for the use of the identity exception. In Burks, the defendant was charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and the owner of the stolen automobile testified that a spare set of keys to his stolen car had been taken from his home in a burglary for which the defendant stood convicted. This Court held the testimony admissible to establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the car theft.
A review of these cases evidences the factual distinction between the present case and those discussed. The evidence of other crimes was properly admitted in those cases where a logical nexus existed between the two crimes. There was a “visible connection” in the words of this Court. See Byers v. State, 78 Okl.Cr., 267, 147 P.2d 185 (1944). In the ease at bar, the State did not establish such a nexus between the robberies of the liquor store and the convenience store. As this Court pointed out in Roulston, supra, at 869, the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes should be used with the “utmost caution” and doubts as to admissibility should be “resolved in favor of the defendant.”
According to the State, Reames’ testimony was “proper in that it corroborated the victim’s identification of the accused.” While Reames’ testimony fails to support the victim’s identification of the accused as the person who held up the convenience store at 7:15 p. m. on January 13, it does refute the appellant’s claim that he was at the concert the entire evening. However, probative value alone does not render evidence of another crime admissible. It must also be shown that the prejudicial effect of such evidence does not outweigh what proof it may offer, which is to say that the evidence must be not only logically relevant but that it must also be legally relevant. See McCormick on Evidence, Second Edition, 1972, pp. 440-441. The State’s purpose would have been accomplished had Reames simply testified that the appellant was in his store at the time he claimed to have been at the concert. Then, had the appellant wanted to cross-examine Reames, he would have done so at his own risk of eliciting testimony regarding the robbery. In the case of People v. Deal (1934) 357 Ill. 634, 192 N.E. 649, it was not error for the State to contradict the defendant’s alibi by placing him at another scene; but the Supreme Court of Illinois held that it was “highly prejudicial” to show that he was committing another crime at that location. See also People v. Fuerback, 66 Ill.App.2d 452, 214 N.E.2d 330 (1966).
An additional point has entered my decision to dissent, and that involves the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the limited value of Reames’ testimony. Although the appellant failed to request such instruction, this Court has modified a sentence in spite of overwhelming evidence of guilt when such instruction was not given despite defendant’s failure to request it. See Rathbun v. State, Okl.Cr., 506 P.2d 983 (1973). While modification was appropriate in Rathbun, it is not appropriate here, where the evidence of guilt is not overwhelming and where the alibi could easily have been rebutted without mentioning the other crime. In fact, in a more recent opinion establishing guidelines for the use of evidence of other crimes, the trial court judge has been directed to provide a limiting instruction whether or not it is requested. See Burks v. State, Okl.Cr., 594 P.2d 771 (1979).1
There can be little doubt that the admission of Reames’ testimony was highly prejudicial to the appellant. In Burks v. State, Okl.Cr., 594 P.2d 771 (1979), the improper admission of testimony of other crimes was ground for reversal for one defendant, where the evidence connecting him to the crime was not great. The evidence against the defendant in the present case was less than overwhelming. Furthermore, the jurors were not instructed on the use of the State’s rebuttal evidence. The evidence of that liquor store robbery cannot be said not to have influenced the jury, who gave the appellant a fifteen (15) year sentence in*1326stead of the ten (10) years requested by the State. On the use of evidence of an unrelated crime, the conviction should fall.
Of further consequence is the refusal of the trial court to admit prior recorded testimony of Don Pickle, in light of the appellant’s diligence to secure his presence and in the face of the State’s opportunity to cross-examine him at the preliminary hearing. I cannot conclude, as does the Majority, that the testimony of Pickle would have been cumulative in that he was with the appellant for a greater length of time than were the other witnesses. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. Although the automatic rule of Burks has no retrospective effect, it is indicative of the trend.