Court Opinion

ID: 9570676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:06.36965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:37.052867
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion with the exception of the portion dealing with the reference to appellee’s willingness to take a polygraph test. I strongly feel that all the testimony concerning the polygraph test was inadmissible and highly prejudicial. The ultimate result of the questioning was to bolster the truthfulness and veracity of the appellee. The court’s refusal to grant a mistrial was fundamental error.
It is well settled in Oklahoma1 that in criminal cases the results of a lie detector test are not admissible and because results of such a test cannot be admitted against one as evidence of guilt or admitted on his behalf as proof of innocence, his willingness or unwillingness to take such a test ought not to be considered probative. Reception of evidence of willingness to take the test could not have added any real proof on the issues for the jury although it might have accentuated passion and prejudice against appellant.2
The Supreme Court of Michigan in Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951), said:
“In People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503, 139 A.L.R. 1171 (1942) we held it was not error to refuse admission in evidence of the result of such tests for the reason that such tests used in ascertaining the truthfulness of a witness are still too much in the experimental field for courts to approve of their general use. We find no reason why a different rule should be followed in civil cases than in criminal cases.”
The mention of the willingness or refusal to take a polygraph test is analogous to the mentioning of insurance in a negligence action. We have repeatedly held that the suggestion by plaintiff, plaintiff’s counsel or any of plaintiff’s witnesses that the defendant had insurance whether accomplished inadvertently or unintentionally is improper and prejudicial to defendant.4.
The admission of evidence tending to establish that a person has been willing or unwilling to take a lie detector test is also improper and prejudicial.5 I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that BARNES and SIMMS, JJ., concur in the views herein expressed.

. See Henderson v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 45, 230 P.2d 495, 500 (1951).

. See Aetna Insurance Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30, 34 (8th Cir. 1961) a civil case.

. Matchen v. McGahey, 455 P.2d 52 (Okl.1969); Million v. Rahhal, 417 P.2d 298 (Okl.1966); Lakeview, Inc. v. Davidson, 166 Okl. 171, 26 P.2d 760 (1933).

. Several jurisdictions permit introduction of polygraph results by stipulation of the parties. See Annot., “Admissibility of Lie Detector Test Taken Upon Stipulation That The Result Will Be Admissible in Evidence,” 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973).
However, in State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975) the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the results of polygraph examinations are admissible in evidence without stipulation if sufficient foundation has been laid to show that: the polygraph operator is an expert; the particular testing technique used is reliable and approved by authorities in the field; and the test results are valid for the particular subject tested. This decision overruled a series of decisions holding that polygraph results are generally not admissible. The New Mexico Rules of Evidence and the new Federal Rules of Evidence are essentially identical. See L. Romero, “The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence under The New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence,” 6 N.M.L.Rev. 187, 188 (1976).