Court Opinion

ID: 9364561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 17:08:48.74803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.092701
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 RICCO J. SEARS                           :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 408 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 10, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0005395-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                          FILED: January 19, 2023

      Ricco J. Sears appeals from the March 10, 2022 judgment of sentence,

which imposed an aggregate term of six to twelve months of imprisonment

and a concurrent nine months of probation stemming from his convictions for

driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked (third offense),

graded as a third-degree misdemeanor, and the summary offense of following

too closely. Appellant argues that the sentencing statute pertaining to driving

while operating privilege is suspended (third offense), 75 Pa.C.S. §

1543(b)(1)(iii), is unconstitutionally vague.      Since the statute is not

unconstitutionally vague, we affirm.

      On March 11, 2020, the Wilkins Township Police responded to the scene

of a two-vehicle accident. Appellant’s vehicle had struck a vehicle that was

on the back of a tow truck stopped at a red light on William Penn Highway.

Appellant’s license was suspended as a result of a prior conviction for driving
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under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. He also had two prior

convictions for driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked.

Accordingly, Wilkins Township Police arrested Appellant for driving while

operating privilege is suspended or revoked (third offense) and following too

closely.

        On March 10, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial,

at which he was convicted of both charges. Thereafter, the court imposed a

term of not less than six months nor more than twelve months in jail, a

concurrent nine months of probation, a $2,500 fine, and ordered Appellant to

not operate a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license. No further penalty

was imposed for the following too closely conviction. Appellant did not file a

post-sentence motion but did submit the instant timely notice of appeal. Both

Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        Appellant raises the following issue for our review:     “Whether the

absence of a maximum term renders the sentencing provision for driving

under      a   suspended   license   under   75    Pa.C.S.   §   1543(b)(1)(iii)

unconstitutionally vague violating state and federal due process provisions?”

Appellant’s brief at 3.

        On appeal, Appellant asserts that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1)(iii), a

provision of the Motor Vehicle Code that addressed the grading, fine, and

minimum term of imprisonment to be imposed following a third conviction for

driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked, is unconstitutionally

vague.     See Appellant’s brief at 8.   “Analysis of the constitutionality of a

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statute is a question of law and, thus, our standard of review is de novo.”

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 268 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). “Our scope of review, to the extent necessary to resolve the legal

question before us, is plenary.” Id. (brackets, ellipses, and citation omitted).

       Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

       (iii) A third or subsequent violation of this paragraph shall
       constitute a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon conviction
       of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of
       $2,500 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than six months.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(B)(1)(iii).

       Appellant argues that § 1543(b)(1)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague based

on his interpretation of Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021).

The trial court disagreed, finding that Commonwealth v. Rollins, 270 A.3d

1152 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision), appeal granted, 280 A.3d

861 (Pa. 2022), was directly on point and should control. We agree with the

trial court.1

       In Eid, the defendant was found guilty of the summary offense of driving

while operating privilege is suspended by a person who refused a breath test.

____________________________________________

1  See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be
cited for their persuasive value). We recognize that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in Rollins; however, for the
reasons stated in the body of this memorandum, we are persuaded by the
rationale expressed in Rollins until the High Court rules otherwise.

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See     75   Pa.C.S.    §   1543(b)(1.1)(i).2    Our   Supreme   Court   analyzed

§ 1543(b)(1.1)(i) and held that due to the “absence of a maximum term,”

§ 1543(b)(1.1)(i) was “unconstitutionally vague and inoperable[.]”           Eid,

supra at 1044.         The Court explained that it would not infer a maximum

sentence because doing so would force the court to “engage in sheer

speculation as to which sentence the General Assembly intended.”           Id. at

1043.

        In Rollins, supra, a defendant challenged his incarceration sentence of

six to twelve months under § 1543(b)(1)(iii) on the grounds that, under Eid,

that subsection was also unconstitutionally vague. However, applying Eid to

§ 1543(b)(1)(iii), this Court affirmed the sentence in Rollins because the

Crimes Code expressly mandates a one-year maximum sentence for third-

degree misdemeanors. We reasoned as follows:

              Though the “not less than” language is identical in both
        Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i), which was at issue in Eid, and Section
        1543(b)(1)(iii), they are distinguishable by way of grading.
        Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) is graded as a summary offense while
____________________________________________

2   75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i) provides:

        A person who has an amount of alcohol by weight in his blood that
        is equal to or greater than .02% at the time of testing or who at
        the time of testing has in his blood any amount of a Schedule I or
        nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled substance . . . or its
        metabolite or who refuses testing of blood or breath and who
        drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this
        Commonwealth at a time when the person’s operating privilege is
        suspended . . . shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a
        summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000
        and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.

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      Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is graded as a misdemeanor of the third
      degree. The grading is significant because 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(c)
      provides that the Crimes Code’s provisions regarding fines and
      imprisonment do not apply to summary convictions under the
      Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(c) (“Title 18 (relating to
      crimes and offenses), insofar as it relates to fines and
      imprisonment for convictions of summary offenses, is not
      applicable to this title”).

             No such provision exists for misdemeanors under the
      Vehicle Code. As a result, the sentencing provisions of the Crimes
      Code apply. Rollins was found guilty of a misdemeanor of the
      third degree, and relevant provisions of the Crimes Code provide
      a maximum sentence of one year.                 See 75 Pa.C.S.
      § 1543(b)(1)(iii); 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(8) (“A crime is a
      misdemeanor of the third degree if it is so designated in this title
      or if a person convicted thereof may be sentenced to a term of
      imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more than one
      year.”).       Therefore,    Section    1543(b)(1)(iii)   is    not
      unconstitutionally vague, pursuant to Eid.

Id. (non-precedential decision at *2); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(3) (“A

person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to

imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by the court and shall

be not more than one year in the case of a misdemeanor of the third degree.”).

Thus, the Rollins court distinguished Eid by differentiating between statutes

criminalizing summary offenses, which have no statutory maximum, from

those punishing misdemeanor crimes, which do have maximum sentences set

by statute.     Id.    Since § 1543(b)(1)(iii) is graded as a third-degree

misdemeanor, the Rollins Court determined that it was not unconstitutionally

vague. Id.

      Here, like the defendant in Rollins, Appellant was also convicted of

violating   §   1543(b)(1)(iii)   and,   on    appeal,   seeks   to   challenge   the

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constitutionality of the statute based on the same principles articulated by our

Supreme Court in Eid.        See Appellant’s brief at 8.        The language of

§ 1543(b)(1)(iii) classifies a third violation of driving while operating privilege

is suspended or revoked as a third-degree misdemeanor and contemplates

imprisonment for not less than six months. While the Motor Vehicle Code does

not specify a maximum sentence, for the reasons expressed in Rollins, we

read the Crimes Code’s one-year maximum for a third-degree misdemeanor

in conjunction with § 1543(b)(1)(iii). See Rollins, supra (non-precedential

decision at *2); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(8) (setting the maximum

sentence for a third-degree misdemeanor at one year.). Phased differently,

unlike the situation in Eid, where the High Court declined to engage in

speculation to infer a maximum term of imprisonment for a summary offense,

in the case at bar, the one-year maximum for a third-degree misdemeanor is

mandated    by   the   Crimes   Code.      Thus,   we   continue   to   hold   that

§ 1543(b)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally vague. Id.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2023

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