Court Opinion

ID: 9790945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:01:51.561194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.762159
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
I dissent.
Respondent, while operating a motor vehicle, was involved in an accident resulting in the death of two persons. There was no charge of drinking or intoxication, although there was evidence of the violation of traffic laws which might rise to the level of culpable neglect or criminal carelessness or conscious disregard of the safety of others.
Respondent was charged with involuntary manslaughter under § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, which provided:
“Whoever unlawfully kills any human being * * * involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, except as provided in W.S. 31-5-1117, or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty (20) years.”
Respondent contended that he could only be charged with homicide by vehicle pursuant to § 31-5-1117(b), W.S.1977, which provided:
“(b) Whoever, except when the violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, unlawfully and unintentionally, but with a conscious disregard of the safety of others, causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set forth in subsection (a) of this section, is guilty of homicide by vehicle when the violation is the proximate cause of death and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both.”
The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, holding that he could only be charged with homicide by vehicle under § 31-5-1117(b), W.S.1977, supra, citing in support of its decision our previous holdings in Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 (1977) and Lopez v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 157 (1978). The majority opinion acknowledges the correctness of the district court’s ruling when it states:
“The logic of the district court judge is in accordance with our former holdings. There is no discernible difference between the standard of ‘reckless disregard’ (which was held to be the equivalent of ‘culpable neglect or criminal care*540lessness’) and ‘conscious disregard’ which is used in the context of ‘unlawfully and unintentionally’ doing that which is proscribed by the vehicular homicide statute. Therefore, if this were the only aspect of this issue, we would uphold the district court’s ruling.”
For me the case should end here. The decision of the district court should be affirmed. No other issues were raised for our determination.
The majority, however, proceeds from here to consider the constitutionality of § 31-5-1117(b). This is an issue not raised, nor briefed, nor argued, nor contended for by any of the parties to this appeal. We have long held that we will not ordinarily inquire into the constitutionality of a statute on our own motion, nor will we declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is absolutely necessary. State, ex rel. Keefe v. McInerney, 63 Wyo. 280, 182 P.2d 28 (1947). Nor will we inquire upon our own motion where the case can be completely and effectively disposed of without such a decision. Markey v. Connelly, Wyo., 367 P.2d 964 (1962). This case has been decided in accordance with the law we have stated in our prior decisions. It has been disposed of completely and effectively. There is no justification under our existing rules for undertaking a determination of the constitutionality of this statute.
The majority, however, has chosen in this case, upon their own motion, to determine the constitutionality of the statute. I find myself in disagreement also with the determination that § 31 — 5—1117(b), supra, is unconstitutional. It is clear from the legislative history of these enactments that the legislature long ago determined that it would treat homicide by vehicle separately and differently from manslaughter. It enacted at different times several successive separate statutes providing different penalties for “negligent homicide” and “homicide by vehicle” where death resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle. These special statutes were entirely proper and within the enacting authority of the legislature. This court has a duty, in construing the statutes, to attempt to effectuate the intent and purpose of the legislature. Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 (1979). Thus, I would construe the exception found in § 31-5-1117(b), supra, “when the violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness” to be applicable only to violations of law not involving the use or operation of a motor vehicle. I would hold the statute constitutional, giving effect to the clear intent of the legislature that where death results from the use or operation of a motor vehicle with conscious disregard for the safety of others, the penalty upon conviction is one year in jail and a $2,000 fine as provided by the statute. This result satisfies the following general rules of construction:
“In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law * * *. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. * * * ” (Footnotes omitted.) 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 249.
The result I suggest means respondent cannot be tried for manslaughter but only for vehicular homicide with the resultant effect that respondent, upon conviction, can be imprisoned for not more than one year and fined not more than $2,000. Perhaps the penalty for conviction of vehicular homicide is not as severe as some think it should be. That is for the legislature; not for this court to determine, for it is said that:
“The power to prescribe the penalty to be imposed for commission of a crime rests with the legislature, not with the courts. This power is not a special grant or limited authority; it is part of the sovereign power of the state to maintain *541social order and to take life and liberty and the rights of both when necessary. As the Supreme Court has stated, whatever views may be entertained regarding the severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” (Footnotes omitted.) 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 589.
There was an obvious intent by the legislature to treat death resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of traffic laws separately and differently from death resulting from other causes such as the use of a gun or knife. The different treatment accorded by the legislature should be given considerable weight in determining the status of these statutes. Drivers are licensed at sixteen years of age and can receive a special permit to drive before that age. Almost everyone drives or wants to drive an automobile. It is often considered a necessity for traveling to work and in everyday living.
“ * * * [Njegligent homicide statutes were adopted after the manslaughter acts had proved ineffective as a means of repressing the negligence in motor vehicle operation which was causing deaths upon the public thoroughfares. Possibly the success of the new legislation, if it in truth achieved any, resulted from the fact that in common understanding manslaughter acts deal with brutal killings by a debased type of individual, whereas the motorist is generally a reputable citizen, and the wrong committed by him which brought someone to his death finds its counterpart in the driving of many others. * * * ” State v. Wojahn, 204 Or. 84, 282 P.2d 675, 701 (1955).
The different treatment accorded by the legislature is reasonable. These penal statutes, therefore, should be
“ * * * construed with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. If the statute contains a patent ambiguity and admits of two reasonable and contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. * * ” (Footnote omitted.) 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 295.
It would be a gross injustice that this defendant, upon § 31-5-1117(b) being found unconstitutional, be tried for manslaughter when the legislature obviously intended that not occur where death results from a violation of a statute or ordinance while operating a motor vehicle.