Court Opinion

ID: 9526794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:24:13.200995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:18.006499
License: Public Domain

Arterburn, J.
The State indicted appellant with a charge of murder in the first degree in the killing of one William Earl Holland. Trial was had by jury, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. He appeals and claims error by reason of the overruling of his motion for a new trial, with the specifications that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. The only substantial question appellant raises is the contention that the killing was not done purposely and maliciously. For that reason we must review the evidence briefly. When an appellant in a criminal action raises the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will only consider that evidence most favorable to the State, together with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn *502therefrom. Greenwalt v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 608, 209 N. E. 2d 254. Ponos v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 411, 184 N. E. 2d 10.
It appears that the appellanUEmery, the decedent-Holland, Waymond Dyer and another man by the name of Decker left a tavern about 12:00 o’clock midnight and went to the home occupied by the appellant and Holland. They played some poker and apparently drank some beer, and while thus engaged Holland noticed that the appellant-Emery had a semiautomatic-rifle in his hands. Holland, the decedent, took the rifle from Emery and said: “You know it’s loaded” and put the rifle in a closet. Approximately ten minutes later Emery went to the closet, picked up the gun and was squatting in the closet with the rifle pointed towards Dyer. Dyer jumped out of the chair, and Emery shot him in the right hip. Then the decedent-Holland got up unarmed, with nothing in his hands and rushed Dyer and was shot three times. Holland grabbed for Emery and had his hands around him as they fell back in the closet. Decker finally grabbed the rifle from Emery after he had shot Holland three times. The time of the shooting was approximately thirty minutes after the four men had arrived at the apartment.
It is first argued that the appellant was not capable of forming an intent due to intoxication. Although the evidence is in some conflict, there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the appellant was not intoxicated to the degree urged. There was evidence that the appellant was sober at the time he arrived at the apartment before the shooting; that he walked straight and talked normally. After the police arrived following the shooting, the testimony at that time was that his manner and talk did not reveal any intoxication.
It is next urged that there is no evidence of malice and purpose to kill, primarily because there is no antecedent evidence of any altercation or quarrel between the parties. The appellant relies upon Miller v. State (1962), 242 Ind. 678, 181 N. E. 2d 633. An examination of that case shows there is a distinction between that and the instant appeal. This Court there *503found that the evidence showed that the appellant did not intend to kill because of the uncontradicted evidence that his shot was directed at the hand of the decedent, who held a knife. It is stated there (at p. 688 of 242 Ind. and at p. 637 of 181 N. E. 2d):
“The present case is distinguished from Taylor v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 241, 167 N. E. 133, in that there the victim, Cook, was shot in the ‘breast above his heart’, . . .”
and quoted there from Taylor v. State:
“Appellant’s act of shooting Cook in a vital part of . . . Cook’s body with so powerful a pistol that the shot passed through Cook’s body shows a deliberate intent to bring about the probable consequences of the act. And. the presumption of malice stands until rebutted by competent evidence.”
The Miller case also stated (at p. 687 of 242 Ind. and at p. 637 of 181 N. E. 2d) :
“It is true that the deadly weapon was intentionally used here, but in our judgment it was not used in such a manner as was calculated to, or was likely to cause death.”
In the case before us the evidence is uncontradicted that the appellant first shot Dyer, who was unarmed, and then turned the g*un on the decedent, who was also unarmed, and continued to shoot, placing three shots into the body of Holland, one of them penetrating a vital portion of the body, namely, the breast, and the main artery leading to the heart.
In Schlegel v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 374, 377, 150 N. E. 2d 563, 564, we stated:
“. . . intent and purpose to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to produce death and malice may be inferred from the use of the shotgun which caused the death as charged in the indictment herein. Pitts v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 168, 170, 171, 23 N. E. 2d 673; Myles v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 129, 133, 124 N. E. 2d 205.”
*504In Bridgewater v. State (1899), 153 Ind. 560, 563, 55 N. E. 737, 738, we stated:
. . suddenness and ferocity, the weapon used, the number and character of the wounds, and their location, unmistakably indicated a relentless purpose to kill, coupled with intense malice. . . .”
Malice is one fact for the jury to decide in the prosecution for second degree murder, and the law presumes that a person intends the natural consequences of his act. The appellant’s use of a deadly weapon which he knew was loaded and which had previously been taken away from him with a warning, is a fact which the jury had a right to consider. It has been said a number of times that the use of a deadly weapon against an unarmed person substantiates the essential elements of malice. Sparks v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 245, 195 N. E. 2d 469.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Lewis, C. J., and Hunter, J., concur. Mote, J., dissents. Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.