Court Opinion

ID: 9599019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:50.33131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:15.096207
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the trial court used the wrong test to determine the reasonableness of the stop and must reconsider the motion in light of Whren v. United States, 517 U. S._(116 SC 1769, 135 LE2d 89) (1996).
The trial court, after stating the facts it had derived from the only witness, the officer, gave as the reason for granting the motion: “I find the testimony on why the defendant was stopped to be not credible.” In Whren, the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the subjective pretext test to determine reasonableness of a motor vehicle stop under the Fourth Amendment. The officer’s personal motivation, the “why” of the stop, is not determinative of its constitutionality. It does not depend on whether an officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given by the officer who stopped the accused.
Instead, the Court retained the objective test of whether the police had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred.1 Ulterior motives do not invalidate justified conduct. As stated by the Court: “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘rea*742sonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” (Emphasis in original.) Whren, supra, 135 LE2d at 98. Thus, the trial court’s credibility determination, which rejected the articulated reason for the stop in favor of one not permitted by law and concluded the stop was illegal, constituted an ill-founded basis for granting Aguirre’s motion.
Moreover, the trial court could not simply disregard the unrebut-ted testimony of the officer. “ ‘The direct and positive testimony of an unimpeached witness which is not inherently improbable, incredible or unreasonable and which is not contradicted, cannot be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact. (Cits.)’ Nesbit v. Nesbit, 241 Ga. 351 (2) (245 SE2d 303) (1978).” Roberts v. State, 267 Ga. 669, 676 (10) (d) (482 SE2d 245) (1997); see State v. Stokes, 185 Ga. App. 718, 719-720 (365 SE2d 477) (1988). Compare Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 56 (3) (440 SE2d 646) (1994) (pre-Whren, plus majority detected some evidence to support finding that officer’s testimony was not credible).
Because it is only arbitrary disregard that is prohibited, this does not conflict with the rule that, on a motion to suppress, “the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony rest with the trier of fact, who is under no obligation to believe a witness, even in the absence of contradictory testimony. The factfinder may accept part of a witness’ testimony and reject another part, and in the absence of evidence of record demanding a finding contrary to the judge’s determination, the appellate court will not reverse the ruling sustaining a motion to suppress.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 118 (2) (475 SE2d 629) (1996). The rule is one of respect for the superior knowledge gained by the person who can observe and hear the witness directly. The point in this case is that the trial court’s disbelief of the officer’s stated motivation does not mean that the stop was unreasonable. The issue of reasonableness does not pivot on the validity or invalidity of subjective motivation. The trial court in this case must reconsider the evidence, governed by its own sense of weight and credibility, and apply the WArere-articulated test to what it finds.
The evidence presented to the trial court does not foreclose denial of the motion as a matter of law, so this Court cannot affirm the grant of the motion under the “right for any reason” doctrine. Compare Frederick v. State, 226 Ga. App. 540, 542 (1) (487 SE2d 107) (1997); Hunt v. State, 212 Ga. App. 217, 219 (441 SE2d 514) (1994). To the contrary, there is ample evidence to support denial of the motion.
The officer could see that the vehicle had a temporary tag but could not see the handwritten expiration date; that would give a reason to stop it, to assure compliance which was- not readily ascertainable just by looking at the tag. The law provides that, with *743respect to vehicles required to be registered in Georgia, “[i]t shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license plate legible at all times.” OCGA § 40-2-41. The officer at some point realized that the tag was from Ohio, which may have subjected the vehicle’s operation to OCGA § 40-2-90 (b) (3) instead. It must be assumed that the law of Ohio would prohibit operation past the expiration date of the tag, as nothing contrary is shown in the record and Aguirre has not suggested otherwise. See Danzell v. Cannon, 224 Ga. App. 602, 603 (481 SE2d 588) (1997) (“Absent proper introduction and proof of the law of a sister state, it is presumed that such foreign law is identical to Georgia’s. [Cit.]”). Moreover, if Ohio law does not require that the license tag be kept legible at all times, the officer’s mistake of law would not invalidate the investigative stop. State v. Webb, 193 Ga. App. 2, 4 (1) (386 SE2d 891) (1989) (“a mistaken-but-honest belief [as to law] may nevertheless demonstrate the existence of ‘at least an articulable suspicion and reasonable grounds for the stop.’ [Cit.]”); State v. Wright, 224 Ga. App. 753, 754-755 (482 SE2d 441) (1997) (same principle as to mistake of fact).
The point is not that the plastic covering did not obscure the tag, as stated on p. 738 of the majority opinion, but that the handwritten expiration date was not visible from a police car close to it. The trial court even found that “The officer could not have seen the fine print because he wasn’t in position to see fine print.” The court also found the officer could see the tag numbers. But that is not what the officer was concerned about; he was concerned about the expiration date of this obviously temporary tag, and the only way to check was to stop the vehicle and either look at the tag close up or ask the driver for the registration document.
The majority opinion distinguishes Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239 (3) (464 SE2d 851) (1995), and Burtts v. State, 211 Ga. App. 840 (440 SE2d 727) (1994), but there is little difference in the key factual circumstances. The real difference is that the trial judge in those cases believed the officer, as to the precise nature of what he saw and why he stopped the vehicle. In Aguirre’s case the trial judge did not, as to the “why,” and pivoted the ruling on that fact. Whren refused to adopt a test which depended on whether “a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.” Whren, supra, 135 LE2d at 94.
In Burtts the vehicle was not one which “failed to display any license tag,” as the majority opinion states. It had a drive-out license plate, which itself is valid so long as it is not used for more than 21 days. As recognized in that case, about the only way to assure that the vehicle is validly on the road is to stop it and check the documents the driver must carry. So the stop of a vehicle with such a license tag would be valid, as it is necessary in order to assure the *744vehicle is in compliance with the law. That is not so with a permanent tag, which has the current year displayed in numerals large enough and clear enough to read without stopping the vehicle.
In Edwards, as in Burtts, the vehicle was not one which “failed to display any license tag,” as the majority opinion states. Edwards’ vehicle had the authorized temporary tag but it was hanging in the rear window rather than on the rear license plate area. The officer did not see it until after he stopped the car. The stop was valid because there was a reasonable belief that the vehicle did not have a “license plate . . . fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a position so as not to swung and ... at all times plainly visible.” OCGA § 40-2-41. Also, because Edwards was traveling 45 mph in a 65 mph zone on the interstate and it was just before midnight, the slow speed and late hour raised a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver might be under the influence. The combination of these factors legitimized the stop. “[W]hile probable cause is necessary for an arrest, it is not for an investigative stop”; an investigative stop is justified by “ ‘specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. [Cit.]’ ” Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105 (475 SE2d 580) (1996), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). The specific reasonable articulable suspicion must be based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417-418 (101 SC 690, 66 LE2d 621) (1981).
Aguirre, too, was traveling late at night well below the speed limit in the center lane of the interstate highway (at 12:14 a.m. going 49 mph in a 70 mph maximum, 40 mph minimum zone). The officer was concerned that the driver might be impaired and, having noticed as the vehicle went by him that it bore a temporary tag, he determined to check its validity. When the officer pulled up beside Aguirre, he “threw his hand up covering up his face ... he took his hand like this (indicating) trying to cover up his face like that wdth his hand,” and the officer dropped back to look at the tag but when he looked at it he could not see the writing on the temporary paper tag, “the handwritten numbers wdth an ink pen” which showed “the expiration date or whatever.” These five factors, i.e., time, speed, location, effort to conceal, and possible expired tag, caused the officer to stop the vehicle to determine at least whether the tag had expired, and secondarily to warn that by driving so slow in the center lane Aguirre would “get run over,” in the officer’s words. A vehicle being driven so slow under these circumstances in addition roused his suspicion of criminal activity beyond the license plate possible expiration. According to Whren, that would not invalidate the stop.
The trial court’s findings and decision on a motion to suppress must have a substantial basis. Chastain v. State, 196 Ga. App. 50 (1) (395 SE2d 570) (1990). The judgment should be reversed and the *745case remanded for a new ruling based on the law in force.
Decided December 5, 1997.
H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, Robert T. Gilchrist, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
J. Converse Bright, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.

 Although the Court referred to “probable cause,” it cited Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979), which recognized that an investigative stop is valid if there is “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” of a violation. Id. at 663. See Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (2) (443 SE2d 474) (1994). For a case applying the now-rejected pretext basis, see Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 244 (3) (464 SE2d 851) (1995).