Court Opinion

ID: 9384913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:03:35.701829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.372727
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                        DOMINICK R. WALKER,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D22-349

                              [April 5, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Lawrence M. Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
562019CF000804A.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C. Geraghty,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Paul Patti III, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

   Defendant moved to withdraw his plea after sentencing pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l), claiming that his counsel was
ineffective for withdrawing a motion to suppress, which led to defendant’s
plea. The trial court summarily denied defendant’s motion without a
hearing, finding that defendant’s plea was voluntary. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the trial court was required to appoint conflict-free counsel
to assist him in preparing his rule 3.170(l) motion. We agree.

   “A motion to withdraw plea is considered a critical stage of a criminal
proceeding, and thus a defendant is entitled to counsel.” Stephens v.
State, 141 So. 3d 701, 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). “If it becomes apparent
during a hearing on a motion to withdraw that counsel and the client are
taking opposing and thus adversarial positions, it is incumbent on the
court to provide the defendant with conflict-free counsel.” Tommie v. State,
945 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). “[T]he trial court is not required
to appoint conflict-free counsel unless both an adversary relationship
exists and the defendant’s allegations are not conclusively refuted by the
record.” Nelfrard v. State, 34 So. 3d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
(emphasis omitted).

    In this case, where defendant asserted ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant was asserting an adversarial relationship between him and
counsel. See Newsome v. State, 877 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
It is evident from the transcript that defendant and counsel continued to
have conflicting positions with respect to the merits of defendant’s motion
to suppress, constituting an adversarial relationship. Further, defendant’s
allegation that he did not commit a traffic violation entitling the officers to
stop him is not conclusively refuted by the record. Defendant’s motion to
suppress was not discussed during the plea colloquy, and the record does
not deny or refute his allegation that he did not commit a traffic violation.

   Because the motion to withdraw is a critical stage of the proceedings,
defendant is entitled to the assistance of conflict-free counsel in drafting a
new motion to withdraw. Thus, we reverse and remand for the limited
purpose of the trial court appointing conflict-free counsel to assist
defendant in preparing a new motion to withdraw plea. See Rose v. State,
199 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). This opinion is without comment
on the merits of defendant’s motion to withdraw or defendant’s motion to
suppress.

   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

WARNER and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                             *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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