Court Opinion

ID: 9537215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:16.301047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:12.007303
License: Public Domain

WARDEN, P. J.,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that claimant was en route to the office of her treating chiropractor when she sustained a cervical injury in a collision, I respectfully dissent.
Claimant sustained her injury in May, 1982, when she made a side trip off the public way to Dr. Rabin’s office and into a service station, to obtain gasoline for her vehicle. While she was parked in the station another vehicle backed into hers, causing the injury. Assuming’that claimant’s trip to Rabin’s office for chiropractic treatment of her compensable low back injury was equivalent to a trip made for the purpose *84of employer’s business, she had deviated from that course and was on an errand of her own at the time of the collision. In cases involving such deviations “a split of opinion appears * * * with the majority still denying compensation, and the minority granting it.” 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 19.35, 4-387 (1985).
“[T]he minority cases are weakened by the fact that the rule often serves merely as an alternative ground of decision which the court thinks desirable on other grounds as well, and by the fact that the deviations are often rather small and come very near being independently justifiable.” 1 Larson, supra, § 19.35, 4-390. (Footnote omitted.)
The majority appears to conclude that the deviation in this case is small and independently justifiable. Cases with factual circumstances similar to this case and in which compensation has been denied include: Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Spears, 125 Ind App 21, 118 NE2d 813 (1954) (insurance salesman parked in front of an account’s house, crossed the street to get a piece of wood at a cabinet factory and sustained a fatal fall on re-crossing the street); Colwell v. Mosley, 309 SW2d 350 (Ky 1958) (coal-truck driver, on his route between the mine and the tipple, was killed when his truck was struck by another truck as he maneuvered to get into position to pull his brother-in-law’s stalled car); Mills v. Standard Parts Service Co., 269 Minn 501, 131 NW2d 546 (1964) (claimant fell after leaving a restaurant where he had had lunch en route between two of his employer’s business sites); Lumbermen’s Mut. Cars. Co. v. Dedmon, 196 Tenn 94, 264 SW2d 567 (1951) (lumber inspector, en route from a mill to his hotel, was struck by a car when re-crossing a street after visiting a sporting goods store); and Hill v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 173 Wash 575, 24 P2d 95 (1933) (street car operator was struck by a car while crossing from his stopped street car to mail a letter at a post office along his route).
When claimant sustained her injury in May, 1982, she was not on her way to the chiropractor for treatment; she had stopped on a side trip of her own to buy gasoline. In Wood v. SAIF, 30 Or App 1103, 1108, 569 P2d 648 (1977), rev den 282 Or 189 (1978), we said:
“The principle we glean from LarsonIs that the Workers’ Compensation Act concept of compensability for injuries sustained in the course of and arising out of employment includes *85injuries during activities which are the direct and natural consequence of the original injury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Claimant’s act of stopping for gasoline was not a “direct and natural consequence of [her] original injury.” Because it was not, the injury sustained in the collision in the service station is not compensable. The Board should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.1

 The majority notes, almost in passing, that medical and personal injury benefits would be paid by the other driver’s insurance carrier and that a “settlement was proposed.” It fails to mention that claimant settled her claim with the carrier for $10,000 and executed a release discharging the other driver and his carrier and
“any other other person, firm or corporation charged or chargeable with responsibility or liability * * * from and all claims, demands, damages, costs, expense, [and] loss of services * * * arising from any act or occurrence up to the present time and particularly on account of all * * * loss or damages of any kind already sustained or that I may hereafter sustain in consequence [of the May, 1982, collision].”