Court Opinion

ID: 9582948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:04.56039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:46.686380
License: Public Domain

DenNY, J.,
concurring in result: I have come to the conclusion that in view of our decisions which hold that a municipality may be held liable for its acts of negligence in connection with the construction and maintenance of a golf course, Lowe v. Gastonia, 211 N.C. 564, 191 S.E. 7; an airport, Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E. 2d 371; streets, Hunt v. High Point, 226 N.C. 74, 36 S.E. 2d 694; a water and light plant, Munick v. Durham, 181 N.C. 188, 106 S.E. 665; wharves, Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 132 S.E. 25, etc., that municipalities may be properly held liable for acts of negligence committed by its agents and employees in the operation and maintenance of its parks and playgrounds.
*479A municipality may in certain instances be liable in tort even though it be engaged in a governmental function as well as when it is engaged in a proprietary function, although such governmental function is for a public purpose and may be maintained as a necessary governmental expense.
The construction and maintenance of streets by a municipality is a governmental and not a proprietary function; but since the decision in Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884), it has been uniformly held in this jurisdiction that municipalities may be held liable in tort for failure to maintain their streets in a reasonably safe condition, and they are now required by statute to do so. G.S. 160-54; Hamilton v. Rocky Mount, 199 N.C. 504, 154 S.E. 844; Speas v. Greensboro, 204 N.C. 239, 167 S.E. 807; Whitacre v. Charlotte, 216 N.C. 687, 6 S.E. 2d 558, 126 A.L.R. 438; Hunt v. High Point, supra.
A city may establish and maintain a water plant and operate such plant in its governmental capacity in so far as it uses the water for extinguishing fires, washing streets and the like, Klassette v. Drug Co., 227 N.C. 353, 42 S.E. 2d 411, but it operates such plant in its proprietary capacity when it sells water to its citizens. Even so, the expenditure of money derived from taxes for the construction and maintenance of such plants is held to be for a public purpose and a necessary governmental expense. Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029. Likewise, a municipal light plant is held to be a necessary expense and may be constructed without a vote of the people. Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, supra. A municipality is held to be acting in its governmental capacity in distributing electric current for lighting its streets, Baker v. Lumberton, 239 N.C. 401, 79 S.E. 2d 886, and in the operation and maintenance of its traffic signals, Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N.C. 737, 200 S.E. 889. However, a municipality acts in its proprietary capacity when it establishes an electric distribution system and sells electric current for profit. Rice v. Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 69 S.E. 2d 543.
Our Court, in Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. 1, 40 S.E. 2d 702, speaking through Seawell, J., said: “The Constitution plainly lays upon all agencies concerned with administration, including the courts, the duty to put first things first; not to lose perspective in spending tax money, which is said to be the lifeblood of government. So long as our conception of municipal power is such as to permit those who fight the battles of industry in crowded cities to be regarded as dispensable, and the casualties of accident and disease, directly caused or greatly augmented by congested living, as of no direct concern of municipal government, it is difficult to see how playgrounds and recreational facilities can be regarded as a necessary municipal expense.
“Independently of any question as to the degree of social necessity, we believe that the activities proposed, however qualifying as a public *480purpose for which the municipality may provide by approval of the people, are too remote from the governmental function to be classed as objects of necessary public expense.”
I do not consider the incidental charges made for the use of the facilities at Pullen and Chavis Parks to be determinative on the question of governmental immunity. The total receipts from these sources amounted to only $22,648.99 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1953, in comparison with the over-all cost of $158,247.95 to operate and maintain all the parks in Raleigh, including its recreational program, for that period. The profit motive it would seem could not have been a substantial factor in the operation and maintenance of the defendant's parks or in the maintenance of its recreational program.
Ordinarily, when a city engaged in a business for profit it is one that will not only pay the expenses in connection with its operation, but will earn substantial income that will go into its treasury for the benefit of all its citizens and taxpayers. In the instant case, the income from Pullen Park, during the period under consideration, lacked $6,593.87 of being sufficient to operate and maintain that particular park. Anno.— Parks- — Liability of Municipality, 99 A.L.R. 694, et seq.
In light of the decisions I have cited, and in view of the fact that the trend in this country is to limit rather than to extend the doctrine of governmental immunity, Municipal Corporation Law by Antieau, Volume 2, section 11.11, page 34; McQuillin’s Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 18, section 53.112, page 453, et seq.; Augustine v. Town o f Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 163 N.E. 732, I am constrained to support the rule to the effect that municipalities are liable for express acts of negligence of their agents and employees in the operation and maintenance of municipal parks and playgrounds, when such negligence is the proximate cause of injury or damage. This view is supported by many authorities. See 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, section 907(b), page 314; Anno.: — Parks—Liability of Municipality, 142 A.L.R. 1350; McQuillin’s Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 18, section 53.112, page 445, et seq., and cases therein cited.
I believe, however, it would be wise and proper for the General Assembly to limit recovery for injuries sustained in a municipal park or playground to those injuries proximately caused by the negligent acts of the city’s employees, and also to put a reasonable limit on the amount recoverable in such actions. Flynn v. Highway Commission, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E. 2d 571.