Court Opinion

ID: 9681617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:53:24.626773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.833019
License: Public Domain

SHRUM, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion in all respects except its holding that the value of client advances is too speculative to constitute marital property suitable for division.
I would not reach that issue. Wife’s first point relied on does not claim that the alleged misclassification of advances to clients as non-marital resulted in an unfair distribution of property. Apparently, Wife assumes that a trial court’s misclassification of property is reversible error as a matter of law. Any such assumption by Wife would be incorrect.
It is well settled that “the mere erroneous declaration of what is or is not marital property, where the decree is nonetheless fair, *206will not require a reversal.” In re Marriage of Garrett, 654 S.W.2d 313, 316[1] (Mo.App.1983). See also Spidle v. Spidle, 853 S.W.2d 311, 316[4] (Mo.App.1993); Stephens v. Stephens, 842 S.W.2d 909, 915[5] (Mo.App.1992). Appellate courts do not reverse any judgment unless they find that the error committed by the trial court against the appellant materially affected the merits of the action. Spidle, 853 S.W.2d at 316; In re the Marriage of Jennings, 910 S.W.2d 760, 765[7] (Mo.App.1995); Rule 84.13(b).
I agree with the principal opinion’s conclusion that “[e]ven if the trial court misdenomi-nated the advances, there was no prejudicial error.” Consequently, I would resolve Wife’s first point adversely to her on that basis alone.