Court Opinion

ID: 9753495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:15:44.888044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:41.292402
License: Public Domain

*342SAYLOR, Justice,
Concurring.
Although I join the majority’s disposition, my reasoning is different in several material respects. First, I do not agree with the majority’s assessment of trial counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous calculations of FBI Agent Richard Reem, the Commonwealth’s expert. Agent Reem testified that: saliva found on the victim’s body was from a person with type AB blood who was also a “secretor”; only one in 143 African-Americans possesses both of those characteristics; and one of them is Appellant. In his closing argument, the prosecutor described Appellant’s inclusion in this serological category as “the critical piece of evidence” and emphasized to the jury that “[y]ou can exclude 99.3% of the black population from having left this sample of saliva [but] you can’t exclude [Appellant].”
It appears, however, that Agent Reem miscalculated: 17.6 percent of the African American population, or roughly 1 in 6 — not 0.7 percent, or 1 in 143 — are type AB secretors. Given the magnitude of the witness’s error and the predictable use made by the Commonwealth of the erroneous statistic, I do not view trial counsel’s failure to challenge the witness’s testimony as a legitimate trial tactic. Trial counsel’s expectation of offering DNA evidence that would exculpate Appellant was no reason not to point out the flaw in the Commonwealth’s serological evidence. Failing to do so risked the possibility (later realized) that the DNA evidence would prove less . convincing than expected, while Agent Reem’s testimony remained unchallenged. Nevertheless, although I consider the case a very close one, upon a review of the record, in light of the other substantial evidence against Appellant, and with due consideration to the defense evidence presented at tidal, I would ultimately conclude that Appellant has failed to meet his present burden of establishing the degree of prejudice necessary to obtain post-conviction relief.
Second, in light of the potential significance of mental health evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial, see generally Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 248-49, 732 A.2d 1167, 1189-90 (1999), I would not dispose of Appel*343lant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure the adequate presentation of such evidence simply by concluding that trial counsel might have had valid concerns regarding a jury’s reception of such evidence. Appellant’s particularized claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to learn, and to inform Appellant’s expert, mental health witness, Dr. Allen Tepper, an attorney and licensed clinical psychologist, that Appellant had been physically and emotionally abused by his father and that he had been raped while incarcerated as a juvenile. In support of this argument, Appellant has attached to his brief, inter alia, copies of affidavits from Appellant’s mother, attesting to the paternal abuse, and from Dr. Tepper, stating that if he had been provided with the information at issue, he would have diagnosed Appellant as suffering from intermittent explosive disorder and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder and would have concluded that, at the time of the current offense, Appellant’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.
Dr. Tepper testified as a defense expert during the penalty phases of Appellant’s first and second trials. At the first trial, in 1990, Dr. Tepper testified that he had evaluated Appellant during five hours of interviewing and testing; had spoken with members of Appellant’s family; and had reviewed documents pertaining to the present case, an earlier case in which Appellant had been convicted of third-degree murder, and “other non-legal situations of [Appellant].” At the second trial, in 1994, Dr. Tepper referred to another three and one-half hours spent interviewing and testing Appellant, as well as separate interviews with Appellant’s mother and father. On the basis of this information, Dr. Tepper opined that Appellant did not suffer from a mental illness, major thought disorder, or organic brain dysfunction, but that he kept very tight control over his emotions and might lose control intermittently. Dr. Tep-per also noted that Appellant had apparently had a stable family background, with no evidence of physical or psychological abuse.
In view of the preparation undertaken by Dr. Tepper, including interviews with Appellant and his mother, I do not *344believe 'that the affidavits provided establish a factual basis for attributing the non-disclosure of this information to omissions on the part of trial counsel. While certainly courts emphasize the obligation of capital defense counsel to undertake an adequate penalty-phase investigation of potential mitigating circumstances, see generally Commonwealth v. Michael, 562 Pa. 356, 377, 755 A.2d 1274, 1285 (2000)(Saylor, J., dissenting)(citing cases), this case is distinguishable from those in which trial counsel failed to investigate critical aspects of a mitigation defense that a competent attorney would have presented at the penalty phase of trial. See, e.g., Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 711 (5th Cir.2000). Here, trial counsel’s investigation/preparation subsumed extensive interviews between Appellant and an attorney and licensed clinical psychologist with particularized expertise in the mitigation arena, as well as interviews between the expert and Appellant’s central family members. Although it may be that facts were concealed from Dr. Tepper by Appellant and his family in the pre-trial interviews, I do not believe that the brief and affidavits presented establish a basis for faulting trial counsel for any such omissions.1 Accordingly, I am able to join in the majority’s disposition of this claim.