Court Opinion

ID: 4051021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 01:26:44.786333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:04:38.223080
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                     04-14-00827-CV
                                                                          FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                               SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
                                                                                4/10/2015 5:26:37 PM
                                                                                       KEITH HOTTLE
                                                                                              CLERK

                             No. 04-14-00827-CV

                                                               FILED IN
                                                        4th COURT OF APPEALS
         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                                          SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
                          AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS         04/10/2015 5:26:37 PM
                                                            KEITH E. HOTTLE
                                                                 Clerk
    PT INTERMEDIATE HOLDING, INC. AND PERSONAL TOUCH HOLDING CORP.,
                                        Appellants,

                                       v.

                            LMS CONSULTING LLC,
                                         Appellee.

        On Appeal from the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County
      Honorable Peter Sakai of the 225th Judicial District Court, Presiding

          SURREPLY OF APPELLEE LMS CONSULTING LLC

Taylor Dunham and Rodriguez LLP          Law Offices of Alejandro Mora PLLC
David E. Dunham                          Alejandro Mora
State Bar No. 06227700                   alejandro@morahealthcarelaw.com
ddunham@taylordunham.com                 7000 North Mopac Expressway
Jennifer Tatum Lee                       Suite 200
State Bar No. 24046950                   Austin, Texas 78731
jtatum@taylordunham.com                  Telephone 512.514.6683
Isabelle M. Antongiorgi                  Facsimile 888.320.0589 (fax)
State Bar No. 24059386
ima@taylordunham.com
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1050
Austin, TX 78701
Telephone 512.473.2257
Facsimile 512.478.4409
                   Counsel for Appellee LMS Consulting LLC

                     ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

	
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... i 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 

A.  The Phrase “As Set Forth in Detail Above” Does Not Exclude Appellants
    from the Breach of Contract Allegations .............................................................. 2

B.  Appellee Pled Jurisdiction Based on More than the Alter Ego Theory ............... 3 

C.  Appellee Made No Judicial Admissions Negating Jurisdiction over
    Appellants ............................................................................................................. 6

D.  Appellants’ Arguments Fail because any Ambiguities Must Be
    Interpreted in Appellee’s Favor ............................................................................ 7

E.  Specific Jurisdiction Exists Based on the Tortious Interference Claim ............... 8 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................ 9 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 11 

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                                                   Page (i)
                                        TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

                                                                                                                   Page(s)

Cases

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984)................... 9

Coleman v. Klöckner & Co., 180 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.—Houston
  [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) ................................................................................. 4, 5

CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.1996) .......................................................... 9

Favour Leasing LLC v. Mulligan, Cause No. 05-13-01000-CV, WL
  4090130 (Tex. App.—Dallas, Aug. 19, 2014, no pet.) .................................... 4, 8

Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1998) .................................................. 7

Haskell v. Border City Bank, 649 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.—El Paso
  1983, no writ) ........................................................................................................ 7

Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000)...................... 6

Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
  2005, pet. denied).............................................................................................. 3, 7

Ji-Haw Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Broquet, No. 04-07-00622-CV,--S.W.3d--,
   2008 WL 441822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Feb. 20, 2008, no
   pet.) ...............................................................................................................3, 5, 7

Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const. Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010)........................... 5, 7

Luxury Travel Source v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.
   App.—Fort Worth, 2008) ..................................................................................... 9

Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp. v. Lamb, 273 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App.—
   Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) ............................................................... 7

San Pedro Impulsora de Inmuebles Espciales SA de CV v. Villareal,
   330 S.W.3d 27, 39 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.) ....................... 3, 7

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                                                   Page (ii)
Sherman v. Merit Office Portfolio, Ltd., 106 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App.—
   Dallas 2003, pet. denied) ...................................................................................... 6

SITQ EU Inc. v. Reata Restaurants Inc., 111 S.W.3d 638 (Tex.
   App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) ................................................................... 9

Stauffer v. Nicholson, 438 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no
   pet.) ....................................................................................................................... 3

Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept. v Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ..................... 7

Wright v. Sage Eng'g, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
  Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)........................................................................................ 3

Rules
Tex. R. Civ. P. 90 ....................................................................................................... 7

Tex. R. Civ. P. 91 ....................................................................................................... 7

Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3) .............................................................................................. 3

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                                                    Page (iii)
      In Appellants’ Reply Brief, PT Intermediate Holding Inc. and Personal

Touch Holding Corp. do not point to any evidence to negate the trial court’s

implied finding that they, acting under the name “Personal Touch Home Care

Inc.,” contracted with Appellee for the recruitment of employees in Texas and

tortiously interfered with contracts performable in Texas. Instead, by selectively

citing (and selectively ignoring) excerpts of Appellee’s pleadings, they argue that

Appellee failed to adequately plead and present these arguments to the trial court.

      Appellants’ arguments fail for the following reasons:

   A. The phrase “as set forth in detail above” does not limit the scope of
      Appellee’s allegations that all Defendants—including Appellants—breached
      the recruitment and staffing contracts;

   B. Any defect in Appellee’s pleading was waived because Appellants failed to
      challenge the same by special exception before the trial court;

   C. Any ambiguity in the pleadings must be interpreted liberally in Appellee’s
      favor and any findings necessary to support the judgment inferred;

   D. Appellee more than satisfied its pleading burden by expressly alleging that
      Appellants did business in Texas and that Appellants, using the name
      “Personal Touch Home Care Inc.,” entered into and breached the parties’
      recruitment contracts;

   E. Appellee’s allegations regarding the Texas entities’ contractual obligations,
      do not contradict the allegations that Appellants contracted with Appellee or
      that Appellants recruited employees in Texas; and

   F. Texas law supports the exercise of specific jurisdiction based on Appellants'
      intentional interference with contracts performable in Texas.

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                 Page 1
A.     The Phrase “As Set Forth in Detail Above” Does Not Exclude
       Appellants from the Breach of Contract Allegations
       In Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition, Appellee pleads breach of contract

allegations against all Defendants, both before and after the “as set forth in detail

above” phrase upon which Appellants rely. See CR 277 at ¶ 20, CR 279-80 ¶¶ 31,

33, 35, 37.        The definition of “Defendants”—which expressly includes

Appellants—appears on page one of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, CR 269,

and is thus “set forth in detail above” the Appellee’s breach of contract claims,

which read as follows:

              As set forth in detail above, Defendants entered into valid
              and enforceable Staffing Agreements with LMSC. . . .

              Defendants, however, breached their obligations to pay
              LMSC amounts due under the Staffing Agreements. . . .1

              As set forth in detail above, Defendants entered into valid
              and enforceable Recruiting Agreements with LMSC. . . .

               Defendants breached their obligations to pay LMSC
              amounts due under the Staffing Agreements. . . . .

CR 279-80, ¶¶ 31, 33, 35, 37; see also CR 277 at ¶ 20 (”Defendants, however,

have failed and refused to pay to LMSC amounts due and owing to LMSC under

the Staffing Agreements.”). Therefore, Appellants’ attempt to defeat jurisdiction

based upon the phrase “as set forth in detail above” is unavailing.

       1
          The phrase “as set forth in detail above” does not appear in Paragraph 33 or 37 which
allege that Appellants breach their obligations by refusing to pay amounts owed.

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                          Page 2
B.     Appellee Pled Jurisdiction Based on More than the Alter Ego Theory
       Appellants ignore Appellee’s statement in its Second Amended Petition

asserting that “[t]he court has jurisdiction over [Appellants] also because both of

these entities purposefully availed themselves of the privileges and benefits of

conducting business in Texas.” CR 272 ¶ 11. This general allegation alone is

sufficient to satisfy Appellee's minimal pleading burden. Ji-Haw Indus. Co. Ltd. v.

Broquet, No. 04-07-00622-CV,--S.W.3d--, 2008 WL 441822, * 2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio, Feb. 20, 2008, no pet.) Stauffer v. Nicholson, 438 S.W.3d 205, 212 n. 5

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); (“The plaintiff is not required to detail all

theories or basis of personal jurisdiction relied upon.”); Huynh v. Nguyen, 180
S.W.3d 608, 619 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (same).

       In addition to this jurisdictional allegation (CR 272 ¶ 11), and the express

assertion that Appellants breached staffing and recruitment contracts with

Appellees (CR 277 ¶ 20; CR 279-80 ¶¶ 31, 33, 35, 37), Appellee repeatedly

asserted in its responses to the special appearances2 that Appellants did business as

“Personal Touch Home Care Inc.,” that Appellee contracted with “Personal Touch

Home Care Inc.,” and that Appellants recruited employees in Texas. CR 180-81

       2
          see also Wright v. Sage Eng'g, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238, 249 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (responsive pleadings considered in assessment of plaintiff's pleading
burden); Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3) (“The court shall determine the special appearance on the basis
of the pleadings, such stipulations made by the parties, any affidavits and attachments filed by
the parties.”); San Pedro Impulsora de Inmuebles Espciales SA de CV v. Villareal, 330 S.W.3d
27, 39 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.) (hereinafter “Villareal”)(same).

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                          Page 3
¶¶ 1, 5; CR 233-239 (recruitment contracts); CR 248-256 (correspondence

reflecting Appellants' recruitment of employees); CR 257-259 (employment

application from Texas resident); CR 260-61 (employment offer to Texas

resident); CR CR 328-330 ¶¶ 1, 6, 7; CR 49-50 ¶¶ 3, 5-6, 8-10, 14, 17, 18; CR 60-

65.

       Coleman v. Klöckner & Co., 180 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, no pet.), on which Appellants rely3 is distinguishable in two respects.

First, the Coleman plaintiff's burden was greater than that imposed on Appellee.

Coleman involved a single-business-enterprise veil piercing theory, which is not

assessed under the general burden shifting analysis applicable here. For veil

piercing theories, the burden is always with the plaintiff. Appellee’s claims against

Appellants are not limited to veil piercing claims, but rather include direct contract

and tort claims, as well. See CR 269-88 ¶¶ 11, 20, 31, 33, 35, 37-42. Thus,

Appellee needed only satisfy the minimal pleading burden to shift the burden to

Appellants.

       Secondly, where the plaintiff in Coleman failed to expressly plead veil

piercing, Appellee expressly alleged that Appellants did business in Texas, CR 272

¶ 11, directly breached the contracts calling for performance in Texas, CR 278-80,

       3
        Favour Leasing LLC v. Mulligan, Cause No. 05-13-01000-CV, WL 4090130 (Tex.
App.—Dallas, Aug. 19, 2014, no pet.), on which Appellants also rely, is inapposite as there was
no allegation of waiver of jurisdictional arguments.

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                          Page 4
¶¶ 20, 31, 33, 35, 37, and tortiously interfered with the contracts of Texas residents

that called for performance in Texas, CR 280 ¶¶ 38-42.

      Further, the record reflects that the court considered Appellants’ identity as

the contracting party “Personal Touch Home Care Inc.” See 2 RR 45:2-46:15. In

Coleman, the court expressly noted that “there [wa]s nothing in the record to

suggest that the trial court either expressly or implicitly considered the relevant

factors of the single business enterprise.” Coleman, 180 S.W.3d at 587.

      Here the trial court considered all the evidence and properly interpreted

Appellee’s pleadings and responses liberally in Appellee’s favor. See Ji-Haw

Indus. Co. Ltd., 2008 WL 441822, at * 2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Feb. 20, 2008,

no pet.) (citing Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept. v Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.

2004)).

      The trial court’s implicit finding that Appellants acted as “Personal Touch

Home Care Inc.” with respect to the contracts at issue in this case is more than

adequately supported by the record. See Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const. Inc., 301
S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2010) (“[A]ll facts necessary to support the judgment and

supported by the evidence are implied.”).

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                  Page 5
C.    Appellee Made No Judicial Admissions Negating Jurisdiction over
      Appellants
      Appellants’ judicial admissions argument fails. “A judicial admission must

be a clear, deliberate, and unequivocal statement,” and “occurs when an assertion

of fact is conclusively established in live pleadings.” Horizon/CMS Healthcare

Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 905 (Tex. 2000).

      Appellants fail to establish two necessary elements: (1) that the statements

on which they rely were “deliberate, clear, and unequivocal;” and (2) that the

statements are “not destructive of the opposing party’s theory of recovery.”

Sherman v. Merit Office Portfolio, Ltd., 106 S.W.3d 135, 140 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2003, pet. denied) (listing 5 elements).

      Appellee never alleged that it did not contract with Appellants and never

stated that Appellants did not recruit employees in Texas pursuant to the contracts

at issue. Just as the assertion that the American flag is red does not contradict the

assertion that it is also blue, the allegation that Appellants’ subsidiaries entered into

contracts with Appellants does not contradict and is not the “opposite” of the

allegation that Appellants entered into those same contracts with Appellees. Cf.

Reply at p. 5. Both Appellants and their Texas subsidiaries may be found to be

parties (even breaching parties) to the recruitment and staffing contracts at issue,

without any contradiction. In fact, this is precisely what Appellee’s pleadings

allege and what the evidence in the record supports, CR 269-88 ¶¶ 20, 31, 33, 35,

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                    Page 6
37; CR 180-81 ¶¶ 1, 5; CR 233-239; CR 248-256; CR 257-259; CR 260-61; CR

CR 328-330 ¶¶ 1, 6, 7; CR 49-50 ¶¶ 3, 5-6, 8-10, 14, 17, 18; CR 60-65.              There are

gaps and assumptions in Appellants’ reading of Appellee’s pleadings, which could

have been addressed, if truly warranted, by way of special exception, but never

were.

D.      Appellants’ Arguments Fail because any Ambiguities Must Be
        Interpreted in Appellee’s Favor
        To the extent any ambiguity existed in Appellee’s pleadings, on appeal any

such ambiguities must be construed in Appellee’s favor. Id.; see also Kelly, 301
S.W.3d at 657.

        “In determining jurisdictional pleas asserted by a defendant, [courts] take as

true the pleadings and allegations of the plaintiff and review the pleadings and

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pulmosan Safety Equip.

Corp. v. Lamb, 273 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.

denied); see also Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d at 226; Villarreal,
330 S.W.3d at 38; Ji-Haw Indus. Co., 2008 WL 441822, at *2; Huynh, 180 S.W.3d

at 619.

        Additionally, Appellants waived any alleged defect in Appellee's pleadings

by failing to address it via special exceptions.4 Tex. R. Civ. P. 90; Haskell v.

        4
        Even if the trial court had sustained special exceptions, Appellee would undoubtedly be
given an opportunity to amend to correct any alleged deficiency. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91; e.g.
Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998).

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                          Page 7
Border City Bank, 649 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1983, no writ) (on

appeal of a special appearance, holding that any defect in the plaintiff's pleadings

was waived by the defendants’ failure to challenge the same by special

exceptions).

E.     Specific Jurisdiction Exists Based on the Tortious Interference Claim
       Appellee adequately pled specific jurisdiction arising out of Appellants’

tortious interference with Appellee’s contracts with Texas residents; Appellants

recruited these Texas residents and induced them to breach their contracts with

Appellee. CR 272 at ¶ 11; CR 280 ¶¶ 38-42. Appellants presented no evidence in

the trial court to negate these allegations. On this basis alone, the trial court’s

denial of Appellants’ special appearance should be affirmed.5

       Appellants’ reliance on Favour Leasing LLC v. Mulligan, 2014 WL
4090130, is misplaced. In Favour Leasing LLC, the plaintiff alleged that the

appellants/defendants were recipients of fraudulent transfers occurring entirely

outside of Texas. Id. at *9. Unlike Favour Leasing, this case involves intentional

interference with the contracts entered into with Texas residents, where such

contracts being performable in Texas.

       Presuming for the sake of argument that Appellants’ recruitment of Texas

residents was conducted through the computers and phones of their New York
       5
          Appellee regrets the typographical error in Appellee LMS Consulting LLC's Brief. The
trial court did not "dismiss" Appellants but rather denied their special appearance challenges.
See Appellee's Br. p 1.

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                          Page 8
office, their tortious conduct purposefully directed at Texas would be sufficient to

support specific jurisdiction. “It is not necessary that the nonresident defendant's

conduct actually occur in Texas, as long as the defendant's acts were purposefully

directed towards Texas.” Luxury Travel Source v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 276 S.W.3d
154, 162-63 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2008); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 789–90, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925
S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex.1996); SITQ EU Inc. v. Reata Restaurants Inc., 111 S.W.3d
638, 646 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

                              PRAYER FOR RELIEF
      Appellee LMS Consulting LLC respectfully asks this Court to affirm the

trial court's orders denying Appellants PT Intermediate Holding Inc. and Personal

Touch Holding Inc.'s special appearances and that the Court grant it such other and

further relief to which it may be entitled.

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                Page 9
                                   Respectfully submitted,

                                   TAYLOR DUNHAM AND RODRIGUEZ LLP
                                   301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1050
                                   Austin, TX 78701
                                   512-473-2257
                                   512-478-4409 (fax)

                                   By: /S/Isabelle M. Antongiorgi
                                       David E. Dunham
                                       State Bar No. 06227700
                                       ddunham@taylordunham.com
                                       Jennifer Tatum Lee
                                       State Bar No. 24046950
                                       jtatum@taylordunham.com
                                       Isabelle M. Antongiorgi
                                       State Bar No. 24059386
                                       ima@taylordunham.com
                                   Counsel for Appellee LMS Consulting LLC

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                           Page 10
                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
      On April 10, 2015, the undersigned certifies that she served a copy of this
Brief of Appellees on the following by e-service, in compliance with Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure 9.5 and 25.1(e):

Monte James
mjames@jw.com
Kimberly Gdula
kgdula@jw.com
Josh Romero
jromero@jw.com
Jackson Walker LLP
100 Congress Avenue
Suite 1100
Austin, Texas 78701
Counsel for Appellants

                                          /S/Isabelle M. Antongiorgi
                                          Isabelle M. Antongiorgi

Surreply of Appellee LMS Consulting LLC                                Page 11