Court Opinion

ID: 9788829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:19:30.441554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:01.464792
License: Public Domain

*698MORENO, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I join in the majority’s holding that the double jeopardy clause of the California Constitution provides slightly broader protection than its federal counterpart. I write separately because, in my view, the Court of Appeal was correct that retrial is barred in the present case under the double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution.
In Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667 [102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416], the high court held that when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment bars a retrial only if “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” (Id. at p. 679 [102 S.Ct. at p. 2091].) Despite the trial court’s contrary finding, I agree with the Court of Appeal that there is no doubt the prosecutors knew their intentional misconduct would provoke a mistrial.
As the majority opinion recounts in greater detail, defendant Tracy Batts was tried in 1998 for the murder of Brian Jones in a gang-related shooting. The victim’s brother, Benczeon Jones, was wounded during the attack and identified the shooters as Batts and Terrance McCrea, who had not been apprehended. Batts was convicted but was granted a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Prior to the retrial, Benczeon was murdered in March, 1999.
Also prior to the retrial, McCrea was apprehended. At the second trial against both defendants, Benczeon’s testimony at the first trial was admitted as to Batts alone under Evidence Code section 1291, which permits the former testimony of an unavailable witness to be admitted against a party to the earlier proceeding. Benczeon’s former testimony also was admitted as to both defendants under Evidence Code section 1231, which under specified circumstances allows admission of a decedent’s prior statements in a gang-related prosecution if the decedent “died from other than natural causes.”
Evidence Code section 1231.4 provides: “If evidence of a prior statement is introduced pursuant to this article, the jury may not be told that the declarant died from other than natural causes, but shall merely be told that the declarant is unavailable.” Accordingly, the trial court instructed the attorneys on several occasions prior to and during trial that the jury would not be informed that Benczeon was dead. Instead, the jury would be told only that he was unavailable. The prosecutors were told to instruct their witnesses not to mention that Benczeon was dead.
Prosecution witness Detective Marvin Branscomb testified on cross-examination that he visited Benczeon in the hospital hours after Benczeon had *699been shot and his brother had been killed. Benczeon was reluctant to cooperate with the police out of fear for the safety of his family. Detective Branscomb told Benczeon that the witness relocation program would pay the cost of the first and last month’s rent if his family wished to relocate to a residence in another neighborhood. Defense counsel established that Benczeon testified on June 8, 1998 at Batts’s first trial. Four months later on October 6, 1988, Detective Branscomb gave Benczeon a check for $1,500 under the witness relocation program. Cross-examination included the following exchange:
“[Defense counsel] Well, you didn’t give him this money, is that correct, until October 6th, 1998, right?
“[Detective Branscomb] Yes.
“Q . . . It is after he already testified then, right?
“A Right.
“Q That is the only time he testified in connection with any of these cases, right?
“A Yes.
“Q He never showed up and testified at Tracy Batts’ preliminary hearing, right? . . .
“A Correct.
“Q He didn’t show up and testify in Terrance Me Crea’s first preliminary hearing. . . .
“A Correct.
“Q And he didn’t testify in Terrance Me Crea’s preliminary hearing on May 10, 1988. . . .
“A Correct, m . . . ffl
“Q At the time you give him this $1500 cash he testified just one time, right?
“A Yes.
“Q And then four months after he testifies you pay him $1500 cash?
*700“A Yes. [1] . . . m
“Q Isn’t it trae that you guys gave him this $1500 as a payoff?
“A No.”
On redirect examination, the prosecutor returned to the subject of the witness relocation program. After having Detective Branscomb describe how the program operates, the following exchange took place:
“[Prosecutor] . . . Before I go on, why relocate a witness?
“[Detective Branscomb] Because witnesses get murdered.
“Q Relocation has some affect upon that?
“A Yes.”
A short time later, following a brief recess, the crucial exchange took place:
“[Prosecutor] ... On May 10th, 1999, there was another preliminary hearing; is that correct?
“[Detective Branscomb] Yes.
“Q On that date, did Benczeon Jones testify? Did he testify? Simply that.
“A No.
“Q Why not?
“A He was murdered.”
Defense counsel asked to approach the bench and suggested that the jury be excused for the day. After the jury had left the courtroom, the bailiff reported that one juror “broke down,” saying “this is too much for her.” This juror was examined outside the presence of the other jurors and said she had cried because of the “comment that was made about the death or the murder of Benczeon.”
*701After all the jurors had left for the day, the following proceedings took place:
“The Court: . . . Now, let me ask, first of all, just preliminary of the district attorney when you asked that question, did you expect that answer?
“[Prosecutor]: Yes, your honor.
“The Court: All right.
“[Prosecutor]: The answer—I said if I ask you this question, I want you to tell the truth as to why he was not there. I said before he answered the question, make a significant pause to see if counsel wanted to object to the question. If they don’t object to the question, then answer truthfully as to why it was he was not there.”
When asked by the court for any other reason the information about Benczeon’s death was elicited, the prosecutor stated: “[Defense counsel] opened the door and specifically implied that Benczeon did not show up and . . . that it was intentional.”
Defendants moved for a mistrial and, the following day, one of the prosecutors argued that they had been forced to respond to defense counsel’s implication that Benczeon had been paid for his testimony and then intentionally failed to appear to testify because “this attack essentially if accepted by the jury completely devastates any credibility that Benczeon Jones’ testimony has. It destroys any credibility of this detective in testifying in this matter, and it impugns both of us as prosecutors in this case suggesting that we have not only paid the witness off in the first trial but then are taking further actions to present the jury that is perjured testimony that is bought and paid for testimony and making sure the witness isn’t here.” Reiterating that the detective was instructed to, and did in fact pause before answering, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel did not object because “[t]hey wanted the opportunity to ask for a mistrial.”
In granting defendants’ motion for mistrial, the court observed that defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Branscomb might have given the jury the mistaken impression that Benczeon had chosen not to appear to testify, but the prosecutors easily could have addressed this problem by approaching the bench and asking the court to instruct the jury. The trial court then stated: “Now what is most perplexing of all in this analysis as I went through it for hours last night and hours this morning, I kept asking *702myself one thing. Why? Why? Why on earth—why on earth would the district attorney in this circumstance not come before the court and follow that procedure? Although I painfully struggled with that question, I have absolutely no insight into that as I sit here today. None. I can’t imagine that such a thing could have happened under any reasonable scenario. ... I was shocked. I sat there stunned when I heard it. ... I have come to the conclusion that there was reckless disregard to the rights of the defendants in posing this question under the circumstances without it being screened. . . . That is where it went wrong and irretrievably wrong, defying the order of the court, specifically defying the orders of the court.”
Prior to the retrial, defendants moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds before the same judge that had presided over the mistrial. One of the prosecutors who had represented the People at the mistrial argued his “tactical decision” to instruct the witness to reveal that Benczeon had been murdered was a “mistake” and admitted he had acted emotionally, but asserted that causing a mistrial was “the farthest thing from [his] mind.” He believed the trial had been going “extremely well” and the prosecution “had a good chance of obtaining a conviction.”
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that “the case was going very well for the People.” The court added: “[Although as I have said their conduct was perplexing to me . . .1 honestly do not believe that their conduct occurred because they wanted a mistrial. I think their conduct occurred because they let their emotions run far beyond where they should have ran. And I think they realize that.”
The United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667, 676, footnote 7 [102 S.Ct. 2083, 2090], recognized that appellate courts should grant deference to a trial court’s findings concerning a prosecutor’s intent, stating: “It seems entirely reasonable to expect, therefore, that appellate judges will continue to defer to the judgment of trial judges who are ‘on the scene’ in this area, and that they will not inexorably reach the same conclusion on a cold record at the appellate stage that they might if any one of them had been sitting as a trial judge.” The majority in the present case acknowledges this standard, but then erroneously relies upon two Court of Appeal decisions that apply a far more stringent standard. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 682-683.)
The court in Barajas v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 30, 33, footnote 4 [196 Cal.Rptr. 599], without citation to authority, admitted to “some discomfort with the trial court findings” that the prosecutor had not *703intended to cause a mistrial, but held: “Nonetheless, because we are precluded from weighing the facts, we conclude substantial evidence supports the findings made by the trial court.” Relying upon this footnote in Barajas, the court in People v. Valenzuela-Gonzales (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 728, 736 [241 Cal.Rptr. 114], stated that the trial court’s “findings on the issue are supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, dispositive.”
The Courts of Appeal in Barajas and Valenzuela-Gonzales misstate the standard of review established in Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667, 676, footnote 7 [102 S.Ct. 2083, 2090]. As the high court held, we must defer to the trial court’s findings but, as we have noted in other contexts, deference is not abdication. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 541 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035].)
In the present case, as the Court of Appeal correctly noted, there is no doubt the prosecutors knew their misconduct would provoke a mistrial. Several factors make this case unusual. First, the prosecutor’s misconduct was deliberate and calculated. This was not a rash decision or improper question blurted out in the heat of battle. During a recess, the prosecutor instructed a police officer witness to disregard a direct court order that had been reiterated several times.
Second, the prosecutor’s deliberate misconduct violated not only a direct court order, but a statute. Evidence Code section 1231.4, of which the prosecutor was aware, requires that when a decedent’s statement is admitted under Evidence Code section 1231, as was Benczeon’s prior testimony, “the jury may not be told that the declarant died from other than natural causes, but shall merely be told that the declarant is unavailable.”
Third, it was obvious that this revelation would be a bombshell. The trial court stated it was “shocked” and “sat there stunned.” A juror broke down in tears upon hearing that Benczeon had been murdered.
Finally, although the trial court concluded that the prosecutor did not intend to cause a mistrial, it admitted that it could not understand the prosecutor’s intentions. Before granting the mistrial, the court questioned why the prosecutor did not approach the bench to discuss the issue, rather than instruct the witness to disobey the court order, stating: “Why? Why? Why on earth—why on earth would the district attorney in this circumstance not come before the court and follow that procedure? Although I painfully struggled with that question, I have absolutely no insight into that as I sit here today. None. I can’t imagine that such a thing could have happened *704under any reasonable scenario. . . Prior to denying the motion to dismiss, the court repeated that the prosecutor’s conduct “was perplexing to me.”
Under these circumstances, I have no doubt that the prosecutor intentionally violated both the trial court’s order and Evidence Code section 1231.4 knowing it would provoke a mistrial. Accordingly, retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution.
The petition of appellant Tracy L. Batts for a rehearing was denied July 30, 2003. George, C. J., and Brown, J., did not participate therein.