Court Opinion

ID: 9832582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:01:10.478976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:48.431066
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Upon original hearing we sustained the trial court’s judgment which awarded .recovery to appellees of an undivided one-sixth of the 47-acre tract out of the 64-acre tract, but refused recovery to such interest out of the remaining 17 acres in .said 64-acre tract. Upon consideration of appellant’s motion for rehearing we conclude we were in error in affirming so much of the judgment as awarded recovery to appellees of said undivided interest in the 47-acre tract. As appears from our original opinion, we concluded that the deed by Andrew Herod, one of the surviving children of Sarah Herod, to S. C. Spence, in 1909, conveying the 47-acre tract wrought an ouster of Andrew Herod’s co-tenants. As will be noted from our original opinion, by mesne conveyance from S. C. Spence the legal title to this 47-acre tract became vested in Theodore Hicks, the husband of Jane Herod Hicks, in 1911. Jane Herod Hicks being the sister of Andrew Herod, and a co-tenant of .appellant’s grantors with reference to said 47-acre tract, we have concluded that we erroneously held that the fact Theodore Hicks and Jane Herod Hicks went into possession upon receiving the deed to the 47-acre tract (which was never placed of record until shortly before this suit had been filed) placed their co-tenants, the Simpsons, on notice that they were holding the 47 acres adversely to the Simpsons. Jane Herod Hicks, as an heir of Sarah Herod, had the right to go into possession of the 47-acre tract; and her possession would not put her co-tenants on notice that she was claiming the 47-acre tract adversely. She and her husband, Theodore Hicks, became the undoubted record title owner to five-sixths of the title to the 64-acre tract (inclusive of the 47-acre tract), and had the right to the possession of the same. “It is elementary that possession alone by one cotenant is not of itself notice of an adverse claim -to the other cotenants. It is equally well settled that the registration of a deed from one cotenant or even a stranger to the property will not operate as constructive notice of the ad*210verse claim of the grantee. His possession is yet a friendly one in the eyes of the law. It requires a repudiation of the rights of the other cotenants actually brought to their notice in order to start the statute of limitations. Towery v. Henderson, 60 Tex. 291; Lynch v. Lynch, Tex. Civ. App., 130 S.W. 461 (writ refused); Liddell v. Gordon, Tex.Com.App., 254 S.W. 1098; McCoy v. Long, Tex.Com.App., 15 S.W.2d 234.” Arrington v. McDaniel, Tex. Com.App., 14 S.W.2d 1009, 1012. As appears from our original opinion, the court found that the right of the Simpsons (under whom appellants claimed) to some interest belonging to the Herod Estate was always recognized by Jane Hicks. It was upon that finding that we sustained the judgment awarding appellant an undivided interest in the 17-acre tract. Such finding is inconsistent with the judgment awarding appellees the entire interest in the 47-acre tract. Since we were in error in holding that the deed conveying the legal title of the 47-acre tract to Theodore Hicks, followed by his possession (which he had the right, as a cotenant of, and the husband of a cotenant of the Simpsons to do) worked an ouster of the Simpsons, we were in error in holding the possession of the Hickses — which was consistent with the recognition of the rights of the Simpsons, was an adverse one. The finding by the court that Jane Hicks always recognized some right in the Simpsons to the Herod Estate cannot, under the fakts of this case, be isolated to the 17-acre tract. The same inference which the court drew from the facts to support his judgment awarding appellant an interest in the 17-acre tract, must be applied to the 47-acre tract. And we were in error in holding otherwise on original hearing.
For the reasons given, appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, the former judgment of this . court is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed in so far as it awarded the entire interest in the 47-acre tract to appellees, and in this respect the judgment of the court below is rendered so as to award to appellant an undivided one-sixth interest in said 47-acre, and the judgment of the trial court as to the remaining 17 acres in the 64-acre tract is in all things affirmed.
Reversed and rendered in part and in ■part affirmed.
Rehearing granted, former judgment set aside and judgment reversed and rendered in part and in part affirmed.