Court Opinion

ID: 9748571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:06:22.013405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:37.108841
License: Public Domain

*145ORTEGA, J., Dissenting.
This is the most frivolous case with which I have ever had to deal. Imagine the great contribution this case will make to our quality of life and to justice in America. Why, it may eventually protect us all from war, pestilence, famine and death. A new day will dawn from which time no one will ever again be fooled by a promotion touting a movie as the greatest artistic accomplishment of the ages. From that day on, all persons will be able to absolutely rely on the truth and accuracy of movie ads. No longer will people be seen lurching like mindless zombies toward the movie theater, compelled by a puff piece. What a noble and overwhelming undertaking. The only losers will be those poor souls who do not go to the movies. But, such is life. Someone always gets left behind.
While the vast majority of actions taken by lawyers contribute to the public good, counsel here are providing nothing even approaching rectification of a legitimate wrong. I cannot see breathing life into this farce. We should be occupying ourselves with resolving legitimate disputes instead of laughable cases designed not to gain anything for the plaintiffs, but rather to generate fees for the only true beneficiaries of this disgrace, the attorneys. That said, it now becomes necessary to discuss the merits of the SLAPP motion, which should have been granted and upheld on appeal.
The anti-SLAPP statute was intended “to provide a mechanism for the early termination of claims that are improperly aimed at the exercise of free speech or the right of petition. (See Paul for Council v. Hanyecz [(2001)] 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1364 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864] [‘the anti-SLAPP legislation found in section 425.16 provides an efficient means of dispatching, early on in a lawsuit, a plaintiff’s meritless claims’].)” (Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 841 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 582].)
“The basic two-prong framework for analyzing an anti-SLAPP suit motion is well established. First prong: Has the defendant shown that the causes of action he or she is attacking arise from acts in furtherance of the right of free speech or petition? [Citation.]” (Lam v. Ngo, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 845.) “The second prong focuses on the ‘probability’ that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim [citation], which case law has refined into an inquiry as to whether the plaintiff has made a ‘prima facie showing of facts’ that, if proved at trial, would support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. [Citation.] Thus an important substantive aspect of the law is that, once it has been shown a cause of action is based on the defendant’s exercise of free speech or petition, it is the plaintiff who has the burden of making a prima facie case of prevailing.” (Ibid.)
In my view, defendant has prevailed under both prongs, and the antiSLAPP suit motion should have been granted.
*146The Movie Advertisements Are Protected Speech
It is undisputed that movies such as Vertical Limit, The Animal, A Knight’s Tale, and Hollow Man are works of fiction and, as such, are a form of constitutionally protected speech.1 It is also undisputed that movies are of significant public interest. “It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.” (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952) 343 U.S. 495, 501 [96 L.Ed. 1098, 72 S.Ct. 777], fn. omitted.) The fact that movies are made for private profit does not diminish the fact movies are “a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.” (Id. at pp. 501-502, fn. omitted.)
Considering the disputed David Manning movie reviews/advertisements purely for their substance or content—that Heath Ledger was the “Hottest New Star,” that The Animal was “another winner,” that Hollow Man was “a scary ride” with the “summer’s best special effects”—reasonable minds must agree the substance of the advertisements was neither false, misleading, nor likely to deceive the reasonable consumer. The substance or content of the David Manning advertisements, consisting of either opinion or “ ‘rhetorical hyperbole [which] cannot be proven true or false[,]’ was not actionable. [Citation.]” (Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1232 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 781].)
“[Advertising statements which were true, or were opinion or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ and thus were not verifiably false or misleading,” are not actionable under the Unfair Practices Act. (Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231.) “ ‘ “[R]hetorical hyperbole’ ” [citation] or ‘loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language’ which would ‘negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining’ a proposition that *147was ‘sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false’ is protected. [Citation.]” (Lam v. Ngo, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.)
The David Manning advertisements were undeniably false, but only in one regard—there was false attribution in that David Manning is not a film critic for The Ridgefield Press. The majority assumes that because the attribution was false, that is the end of the discussion. There is, however, much more to be considered.
Quotations are used to convey what the speaker said. “More accurately, the quotation allows the subject to speak for himself.” (Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 496, 519 [115 L.Ed.2d 447, 111 S.Ct. 2419].) While the misuse of quotations generally “diminish[es] to a great degree the trustworthiness of the printed word and eliminatefs] the real meaning of quotations” (id. at p. 520), it cannot be overemphasized that here, the content of the David Manning quotations, consisting entirely of either opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, was neither verifiably false nor potentially misleading to rational consumers.
In the context of consumer protection laws and their goal of protecting the public from potentially misleading advertising, the fact that David Manning is not a film critic for The Ridgefield Press is of so little significance as to have no effect, as a matter of law, upon a reasonable consumer. (See People v. Cole (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 955, 979-982 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 333].) David Manning is an unknown, perhaps even fictitious, person, with no public following in the movie world or any other realm, to my knowledge. This is not a case where the defendant has falsely attributed favorable reviews to a recognized film critic whose opinion might carry weight with some movie viewers.
In this unique situation, where the substance of the quotations is neither misleading nor actionable, the misattribution of the quotations, while false, was not materially deceptive to the reasonable consumer. Accordingly, despite the misattribution, the advertisements may not be considered materially false or potentially misleading, because the misattribution could not possibly have had a material effect on the mind of the reader. (Cf. Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 676, 687 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 547] [“Even assuming it does, unless Pilgrim’s premise is the rankings are false, we do not see how attributing the rankings to Tipper would change the effect of the. article on its readers. ‘[T]he statement is not considered false unless it “would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.” [Sack, Tibel, Slander, and Related Problems (1980) p. 138]’ (Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., supra, 501 U.S. at p. 517.)”].)
*148None of the cases cited by the majority are on point; all are distinguishable. In particular, Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1220, is distinguishable because it involved advertisements containing verifiably false statements of fact, and not the sort of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole involved in this case. Because this case involves only statements of opinion and rhetorical hyperbole that are not actionable, there is no danger that granting the special motion to strike would permit false advertisements containing verifiably false statements of fact.
Plaintiff Has No Probability of Success
As stated above, no reasonable consumer could possibly be misled by the false attribution of the nonactionable quotations to David Manning for The Ridgefield Press. Contrary to the majority opinion’s implication, moviegoers are not such morons. Plaintiff has no probability of succeeding on the merits. (See People v. Cole, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 979-982; Lam. v. Ngo, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 848-849.)
Accordingly, I would reverse the order and direct the trial court to grant the special motion to strike.
On February 26, 2004, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

 “It is clear that works of fiction are constitutionally protected in the same manner as political treatises and topical news stories. Using fiction as a vehicle, commentaries on our values, habits, customs, laws, prejudices, justice, heritage and future are frequently expressed. What may be difficult to communicate or understand when factually reported may be poignant and powerful if offered in satire, science fiction or parable. Indeed, Dickens and Dostoevski may well have written more trenchant and comprehensive commentaries on their times than any factual recitation could ever yield. Such authors are no less entitled to express their views than the town crier with the daily news or the philosopher with his discourse on the nature of justice. Even the author who creates distracting tales for amusement is entitled to constitutional protection. [Citations.]” (Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions (1979) 25 Cal.3d 860, 867-868 (conc. opn. of Bird, C. J.) [160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454], fn. omitted.)