Court Opinion

ID: 9707920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:24:43.283059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:39.957123
License: Public Domain

UHLENITOPP, Justice
(dissenting from divisions II and III and result).
Chemical tests for intoxication involve two distinct situations: those in which the implied consent law is used to obtain a test, and those in which that law is not used. The present case is of the latter kind.
With the advent of the automobile and the safety problem created by the intoxicated driver, chemical tests for intoxication came to be widely used by law enforcement officers. The results of such tests, like other scientific tests, were universally held competent evidence and cogent proof when a proper foundation as to accuracy was laid. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 830 at 920-923; 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 645(3) at 528-529. Such tests were approved by court decision in Iowa on numerous occasions and became an important tool in law enforcement. State v. Morkrid, 286 N.W. 412 (Iowa); State v. Haner, 231 Iowa 348, 1 N.W.2d 91; State v. Werling, 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W.2d 318; State v. Koenig, 240 Iowa 592, 36 N.W.2d 765; State v. Slater, 242 Iowa 958, 48 N.W.2d 877; State v. Kindschuh, 248 Iowa 440, 80 N.W.2d 750; State v. Sampson, 248 Iowa 458, 79 N.W.2d 210.
Two problems, however, existed. One problem, or burden, was the necessity of scientific proof in every case of the amount of alcohol in the blood or other body substance which will produce intoxication. See State v. Fox, 248 Iowa 1394, 85 N.W.2d 608. Reference to that problem will be made later. The other and major problem was constitutional. A number of courts forbade the introduction of the results of such tests unless the motorist voluntarily submitted to the test. People v. Kraft, 3 Cal.App.3d 890, 84 Cal.Rptr. 280; Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419, 444 P.2d 263; Washburn v. Commonwealth, 433 S. W.2d 859 (Ky.); Turvey v. State, 95 Okl. Cr. 418, 247 P.2d 304. This was apparently the rule in Iowa. State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148. Dean Ladd’s views to the contrary were not adopted in Weltha, although they were subsequently vindicated in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. See Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 Iowa L.Rev. 191, 225-232.
Because of the voluntariness requirement, tests could not be obtained or used in *491a substantial number of cases. Schmerber had not yet been decided, and ways were sought to induce more motorists to give a body substance.
The rule was and is that the use of the highways by a motorist is a privilege and not a vested right. Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52. Hence, a statute was enacted in Iowa (and in numerous other states) that a person who refuses a test loses his privilege to drive — the fiction was employed that obtaining a driver’s license constitutes “implied consent” to a test. 60 G.A. ch. 114, §§ 37-50. The implied consent statute, though it involves a degree of compulsion to consent to a test, was held constitutional. State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 135 N.W.2d 518. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407, 1413. The statute contained and still contains a number of procedures relating to requesting and taking tests, such as a request in writing. Code, 1971, §§ 32IB.3, 321B.4.
Does the implied consent statute dealing with the reluctant motorist abolish the standing rule that voluntary chemical tests not under the statute are competent evidence? The trial court in the instant case thought not, and its ruling seems right. The implied consent law does not contain a word or hint that it abolishes the general rule of admissibility in the voluntary test case. The “declaration of policy” in the statute states, “The general assembly hereby determines and declares that the provisions of this chapter are necessary in order to control alcoholic beverages and aid the enforcement of laws prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.” (Italics added.) Code, 1971, § 321B.1.
Moreover, § 321B.12 of the statute provides, “The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing on the question of whether the person was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.” This court construed § 321B.12 in State v. Charlson, 261 Iowa 497, 154 N. W.2d 829. There the test was voluntary, but the written request prescribed by the implied consent statute was not made. The defendant sought to suppress evidence of the test for this non-compliance with the statute. This court held the test admissible, quoted § 321B.12, and said (261 Iowa at 505, 154 N.W.2d at 833):
The evidence sought to he suppressed here fairly falls within the term “any other competent evidence”, etc. to which 321B.12 refers. Further, this section expresses a legislative intent the chapter is not to be construed as limiting the introduction of competent evidence bearing on whether an accused was intoxicated. (Italics added.)
See also reference to tests at the request or with the consent of the accused in State v. Boner, 186 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa).
Of course, if an implied consent statute provides that results of tests shall only be admissible if the procedures in that statute are followed, or if the statute provides such procedures must be followed in obtaining tests, then those procedures must be employed or tests cannot be obtained or used. Statutes of that sort are involved in Jones v. Forrest City, 239 Ark. 211, 388 S. W.2d 386; Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110, 108 N.W.2d 737; and State v. Hood, 184 S.E. 2d 334 (W.Va.). Our statute contains no provisions of that nature but, on the contrary, contains provisions looking in the other direction, and falls more within the rationale of People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E.2d 211 (when voluntary test, procedural requirements of license revocation statute are not involved); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 656, 112 S.E.2d 887 (where test on defendant’s request, results admissible although statutory procedures not employed); State v. Groulx, 109 N.H. 281, 249 A.2d 690 (if test shown accurate, results admissible although statutory provisions not employed) ; State v. Slater, 109 N.H. 279, 249 A.2d 692 (same). In addition, statutes of the kind involved in Jones, Otte, and Hood frequently are *492comprehensive in nature and themselves specify the percentage of alcohol in the body substance which presumptively causes intoxication. The Iowa implied consent statute does not do so. Iowa does, however, have a statute creating a presumption of intoxication when a specified percentage of alcohol is shown. Code, 1971, § 321.281. But that statute was enacted independently and at a different time and does not amend the implied consent law. 63 G.A. ch. 205, § 1. Thus, our statutory presumption is not made to depend upon the test’s being obtained under the implied consent law. It would seem that if all tests must be obtained under the implied consent law, the presumption would be in that law, as, for example, it is in the West Virginia law. State v. Hood, 184 S.E.2d 334, 337 (W. Va.).
Obviously, if the State has proceeded under the implied consent statute, then the State must show it has substantially followed the provisions of that statute. Thus, if the State is seeking to revoke a motorist’s license under the implied consent statute for refusal to take a test which was demanded pursuant to that statute, the State must show it substantially complied with that statute. Or, if the State, in seeking to convict a motorist for driving while intoxicated, offers evidence of a test which was obtained by making a written request for it under the implied consent statute on pain of license revocation for refusal, then, too, the State must show its substantial compliance with the procedures in that statute. But when, as in the present case, the officer does not proceed under the implied consent law, knows he cannot invoke that law, and does not mention, threaten with, or make written request under that law, then the implied consent law is not involved; and if the motorist voluntarily gives or offers a body substance, the test results should be admitted in evidence under the standing rule that such tests constitute competent proof.
The motorist’s subsequent testimony that he thought he had to take a test — although the officer did not so say or infer — does not prevent the test from being voluntary. That was held in State v. Werling, 234 Iowa 1109, 1111, 13 N.W.2d 318, 319-320 (“Nobody told me that I had to take one, I thought you did but they didn’t tell me that I had to. I thought it was the law.” — test results admissible).
Safety on the highways is too important and the problem of the intoxicated driver is too critical to warrant a holding that the standing rule of admissibility in the voluntary test case is abolished by implication, especially since the indications in the implied consent statute are that such statute was intended to increase rather than diminish law enforcement in this area. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.