Court Opinion

ID: 9574894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:09:26.113777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:23.881550
License: Public Domain

*306Corrigan, C.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. While I do not condone the trial court’s experiment, I would hold that its failure to follow the jury selection procedure prescribed in the court rules was harmless error under the circumstances of this case.
In People v Miller, 411 Mich 321, 324; 307 NW2d 335 (1981), the defendants challenged the trial court’s use of a form of the “struck jury method”1 whereby the court called and examined seventy-three prospective jurors before allowing the prosecutor and defense attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges. When eleven prospective jurors remained, the trial court called and questioned an additional thirty-seven prospective jurors. The prosecutor and defense attorneys then exercised their remaining peremptory challenges, with the fourteen prospective jurors with the lowest juror numbers constituting the jury.
Miller did not hold that the “struck jury method” was unconstitutional, but, rather, merely held that it did not comport with GCR 1963, 511, now MCR 2.511.2 The Court determined nonetheless that the *307trial court’s failure to follow the jury selection procedure set forth in the court rules was error requiring reversal:
Although the defendants’ claims of confusion in the jury selection process are not implausible, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is nothing in this record from which one could affirmatively find prejudice to the defendants from the selection process. However, given the fundamental nature of the right to trial by an impartial jury, and the inherent difficulty in evaluating such claims, a requirement that a defendant demonstrate prejudice would impose an often impossible burden. See People v Gratz, 35 Mich App 42; 192 NW2d 304 (1971). A defendant is entitled to have the jury selected as provided by the rule. Where, as here, a selection procedure is challenged before the process begins, the failure to follow the procedure prescribed in the rule requires reversal. The “struck jury method” or any system patterned thereafter is disapproved and may not be used in the future. [Miller, supra at 326 (emphasis added).]
This Court has consistently followed Miller's directive and reversed convictions where the defendant did not waive his objection to a jury selection procedure that did not comply with the court rules. See, e.g., People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521, 535; 586 NW2d 766 (1998); People v Paasche, 207 Mich App 698, 702; 525 NW2d 914 (1994); People v Key, 121 Mich App 168, 179; 328 NW2d 609 (1982); People v *308Adkins, 117 Mich App 583, 586; 324 NW2d 88 (1982). Our Supreme Court has, however, repeatedly stated in recent years that it does not favor rules of automatic reversal. See, e.g., People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 481; 581 NW2d 229 (1998); People v Belanger, 454 Mich 571, 575; 563 NW2d 665 (1997). This Court ordinarily will not reverse a conviction on the basis of nonconstitutional error if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict. Graves, supra at 482-483. Courts have concluded, however, that errors affecting peremptory challenges require reversal because it is virtually impossible to demonstrate prejudice from errors surrounding the selection of jurors. Miller, supra at 326; Schmitz, supra at 530-532.
Applying these principles in reviewing the trial court’s deviation from the court rules, this Court must first ascertain whether the trial court employed the “struck jury method” of jury selection. If so, Miller requires reversal. If not, this Court must consider whether the jury selection procedure affected the defendant’s right to exercise peremptory challenges. Cf. id. An error affecting peremptory challenges requires reversal, whereas other deviations from the court rules may be harmless.
In this case, the trial court did not employ the “struck jury method” rejected by Miller. The trial court impaneled thirteen prospective jurors before selecting six additional prospective jurors who would, in the order that they were called, replace those removed from the panel. The court conducted voir dire of all nineteen prospective jurors. The court excused for cause four of the prospective jurors on the panel and three of the additional ones. The three *309remaining prospective jurors from the original group of six additional prospective jurors took the places of the three who were excused from the panel. The trial court then randomly selected seven new prospective jurors, with the first called taking the vacant seat on the panel and the other six forming the pool of replacements. The court conducted voir dire of the seven new prospective jurors, excusing two of the replacements for cause. The parties then alternately exercised peremptory challenges. After each challenge, a replacement (in the order they were called) took the place of the excused person on the panel. When the prosecutor excused a prospective juror from the panel and no preselected replacements remained to take the empty seat, the trial court randomly selected seven more prospective jurors, with the first called taking the vacant seat on the panel. As before, the trial court conducted voir dire of the new prospective jurors and considered challenges for cause. The process continued, with the court twice having to randomly select a new group of seven additional prospective jurors, until defendant exercised his second-to-last peremptory challenge. At this point, only three prospective jurors remained in the venire.
The trial court directed that the first of the three prospective jurors take the vacant seat on the panel, with the others forming the pool of replacements. The court conducted voir dire of the three prospective jurors, excusing none of them for cause. The prosecutor then passed. Defense counsel likewise passed even though he would have preferred to excuse one of the members of the panel. Counsel reasoned that if he had excused that member, the prosecutor would have exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse the *310member’s replacement, who was the director of Prison Legal Services, a nonprofit corporation that provides legal services for prisoners. The sole remaining replacement would then occupy the vacant seat on the jury panel. Counsel, having no remaining challenges, would not have been able to excuse that prospective juror, whom he believed was more objectionable than the prospective juror he would have excused with his final peremptory challenge.3
Because the trial court did not employ the “struck jury method,” this Court must determine whether the trial court’s deviation from the court rules affected defendant’s right to exercise peremptory challenges. Cf. id. The court rules protect a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury through three procedural mechanisms designed to ensure the effective use of peremptory challenges. First, the court rules contemplate the sitting and examination of a panel of prospective jurors equal to the number of jurors who will hear the case.4 MCR 6.410(A); MCR 6.411; Miller, supra at 325-326. Second, under MCR 2.511(E)(3), the parties alternately exercise peremptory challenges until either they both pass on the panel as it is constituted or they exhaust their challenges. Schmitz, supra at 529-530. Third, MCR 2.511(F) requires that the trial court replace an excused prospective juror *311before considering further challenges. Miller, supra at 325-326; Adkins, supra at 587.
On scrutiny, the jury selection method employed in this case violated the court rules in two respects. First, the trial court randomly preselected replacements in groups rather than individually selecting them after it excused a member of the panel. Second, the trial court conducted voir dire of, and considered challenges for cause to, all the original nineteen prospective jurors instead of only the thirteen on the panel. Consistent with this procedure, the trial court called seven new prospective jurors after exhausting the original pool of preselected replacements and, as before, examined them and considered challenges for cause against them. Importantly, neither of these violations concerned the procedural mechanisms designed to ensure the effective use of peremptory challenges.
The trial court’s failure to comply with the court rules was harmless error because its deviation did not dilute the effectiveness of defense counsel's use of peremptory challenges. The trial court’s decision randomly to preselect the replacements aided counsel in using his challenges because, on all but three occasions, counsel knew who would replace the excused person. The court’s decision to conduct voir dire of the potential replacements in groups after selecting them, instead of individually examining them after they replaced a person on the panel, likewise assisted counsel in exercising his challenges by providing him with additional information about the prospective jurors. That counsel had to keep track of nineteen prospective jurors instead of merely the thirteen who constituted the panel was not so confusing as to *312render the selection process defective. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court’s deviation from the court rules was harmless error.

 Several forms of the “struck jury method” exist. See, e.g., United States v Morris, 623 F2d 145, 151-152 (CA 10, 1980) (the trial court qualified twenty-two prospective jurors and the parties exercised all their peremptory challenges, with the six remaining jurors constituting the jury); Amsler v United States, 381 F2d 37, 44 (CA 9, 1967) (the trial court qualified thirty-seven prospective jurors and the parties exercised their peremptory challenges, with the first twelve of the remaining sixteen jurors constituting the jury and the other four serving as alternates); see, generally, 50A CJS, Juries, § 4, pp 134-135. Historically, the “struck jury method” consisted of the parties striking names from a list of prospective jurors until twenty-four remained and then proceeding normally regarding those persons. Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 217, n 21; 85 S Ct 824; 13 L Ed 2d 759 (1965), overruled on other grounds Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986); People v Miller, 88 Mich App 210, 217, n 1; 276 NW2d 558 (1979), rev’d 411 Mich 321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981).

 The jury selection procedure set forth in MGR 2.511 is not constitutionally mandated. Cf. Pointer v United States, 151 US 396; 14 S Ct 410; 38 *307L Ed 208 (1894); Morris, n 1 supra at 152 (collecting cases holding that the struck jury method does not deprive a defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury). A defendant, in fact, has no constitutional right to exercise peremptory challenges. Swain, n 1 supra at 219; People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521, 528; 586 NW2d 766 (1998). Nevertheless, peremptory challenges are an important tool for ensuring a fair trial. Id. The United States Supreme Court long ago characterized the peremptory challenge as “one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.” Pointer, supra at 408. Therefore, errors affecting peremptory challenges require reversal. Schmitz, supra at 530-532.

 The trial court reduced the number of jurors to twelve shortly before closing argument by excusing a juror who could not attend the trial that day because her child was ill.

 The court rules provide for the examination of prospective jurors randomly selected from the jury venire. MCR 6.412(A); MCR 2.511(A). In a criminal case cognizable in the circuit court, the jury must consist of twelve jurors unless the parties and the court agree to a lesser number. MCR 6.410(A). The trial court may, however, impanel more than twelve jurors, provided that before deliberations begin the court reduces the number of jurors to that required to decide the case. MCR 6.411.