Court Opinion

ID: 9825158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:11:46.46986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:17.498405
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The petition in this case is a direct attack upon a judgment taxing costs upon plaintiff on the motion of defendant. It was not merely a motion to, retax costs, but a motion made to the court to alter the judgment rendered and to render judgment against the other party. Noland v. Lock, 16 Ala. 52.
[3] The case presented by this petition is as if a plaintiff had brought suit against a defendant, and the sheriff, without actually *315serving the process, made false return, that the process was regularly served. Not having notice, the defendant .apparently makes default and judgment is rendered against him. The judgment in all things appears regular, but, in fact, the court had no jurisdiction of the person. There have been so many cases involving the validity of judgments on collateral attack that the decisions have become somewhat confused as to how far courts would or could exercise their inherent power in going behind judgments rendered by courts of general jurisdiction, where the proceedings all appear to be regular. But if we confine ourselves to proceedings where the judgment is subject of direct attack, the question is not so difficult. It is elementary law that in order for a eourt to have jurisdiction of the person there must be service of process or voluntary appearance, and in 15 R. C. L. p. 850, § 324, the rule as to default judgment is declared as follows:
“Jurisdiction to enter a judgment against a defaulting defendant rests upon the fact of service itself and the return of service is simply the evidence of the jurisdictional fact.”
[4] Where, as a matter of fact, a judgment has been rendered without the court having jurisdiction of the person, courts of superior and general jurisdiction have the inherent power, independent of statutes fixing designated periods of time within which applications should he made to have judgments vacated, to annul and set aside its final .judgment after the close of the term at which it was rendered, either for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter -or of the parties. 15 R. C. L. p. 629, § 144; 4 Cyc. 1065. This has been done after the lapse of 12 years. People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400, 16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448. Mr. Justice Simpson, writing for the court in Winkler Brokerage Co. v. Courson, 160 Ala. 374, 379, 49 South. 341, 343, said:
“It is also clear from these authorities [authorities cited by him] that, when a judgment has been rendered by confession, by an unauthorized attorney, or attorney in fact, the remedy is either direct application to the court which rendered the judgment, or by bill in equity.”
[5] This doctrine was quoted and followed by the present Chief Justice in the recent case of L. & N. R. Co. v. Tally (Sup.) 83 South. 114-117.1 This announcement of a rule as to the remedies of parties privy to a judgment is made with due recognition of the rule stated in Sweeney et al. v. Tritsch, 151 Ala. 245, 44 South. 184, to the effect that courts were without power to alter or change judgments after the adjournments of the courts, except in certain instances there stated, and is based upon the doctrine recognized in Pettus v. McClannahan, 52 Ala. 55, Winkler Brokerage Co. v. Courson, supra, L. & N. R. R. v. Tally, supra, 1 Black on Judgments, § 307, to the effect that where fraud has entered into the judgment it may be set aside and annulled by the court rendering it. 1 Black on Judgments, § 306, p. 468, and authorities, supra; Dunham Lumber Co. v. Holt, 123 Ala. 36, 26 South. 663.
“The rule that a record is conclusive evidence of its own verity is not applicable in a direct proceeding instituted for the purpose of showing its own falsity as to a matter which, if false, shows that the eourt pronouncing it as a judgment had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and consequently what purports to he a record is no record at all.” 1 Black on Judgments, § 288.
[6] When, therefore, the court has apparently obtained jurisdiction of the person through fraud, and such fact is made known to the court by motion or petition for an appropriate writ, the court rendering the judgment will grant the proper relief. This on account of a due regard for its own dignity and the preservation of the judgments it may rightfully render. The same with equal force may be said of a mistake, which would have the same effect as a fraud and comes within the same rule. Mastick v. Thorp, 29 Cal. 444; Darling v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 1; Alford v. Moore, 15 W. Va. 597; Black on. Judgments, § 335.
Opinion extended. Application overruled.

 203 Ala. 370.