Court Opinion

ID: 9634686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:20:54.534087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:05.186939
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
CAVANAUGH, Judge:
I respectfully disagree with the decision of the majority that a district attorney, as an elected official in a county, is bound by the representations made by any police officer also working within that county to a criminal suspect that prosecution will not occur for a particular offense if the suspect complies with conditions set out by the police officer. This usurpation of the statutory authority of the district attorney should not be condoned by this court.
It is important to note what issues are not presented by this case. This case is not about 1) a prosecutor’s non-observance of a duly negotiated plea agreement with a criminal defendant; or 2) the suppression of evidence seized by pólice in violation of a criminal suspect’s constitutional rights, or 3) detrimental reliance by a criminal suspect upon misrepresentations made by a police officer. Rather this case involves an issue of arrogation by a township police officer of the exclusive authority conferred upon the county district attorney.
*467The defendant is this case had no plea agreement with the district attorney’s office. He dealt with a township police officer and twice took a lie detector test upon the representation of the police officer that no prosecution would ensue should he pass the lie detector test. The majority concludes that “fundamental fairness” requires that any subsequent action against the defendant be dismissed. I disagree and would find that the defendant has not been prejudiced by the ultra vires representations made by the police officer.
As noted by Judges Olszewski and Popovich in their dissenting opinions in Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 423 Pa.Super. 427, 621 A.2d 606 (1993) the district attorney is entrusted with conducting the criminal litigation of the county on behalf of the'electorate. See, Commonwealth v. Stipetich, supra, dissenting opinion by Olszewski, J. at -, 621 A.2d at 613; 16 P.S. § 4402(a). I adopt the cogent reasoning of Judge Popovich’s dissent, as well, particularly his reliance upon the instructive case of People v. Gallego, 430 Mich. 443, 424 N.W.2d 470 (1988). The authority to charge persons with violations of the criminal law resides solely with the district attorney. This power is conferred by statute and may not be impugned by either the judiciary or other arms of law enforcement machinery. As made clear by the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Schab, 477 Pa. 55, 383 A.2d 819 (1978) (recognizing the broad and exclusive power in the office of elective district attorneys when created in 1850), not even the Attorney General has a common law or statutory right to supercede the charging authority of the district attorney without the explicit approval of the president judge of the county. A fortiori, an unelected, police officer has no authority to bind the district attorney to agreements which touch upon the charging function of that office. The majority’s holding to the contrary creates the untenable situation described by Judge Popovich of endowing, “untold thousands of police throughout this Commonwealth with this sensitive, fundamental power.” See, Stipetich, supra, dissenting opinion by Popovich, J. at -, 621 A.2d at 615.
*468The majority in this case, and in Stipetich, engages in the enunciation of a new precept of Pennsylvania law, beyond our authority as an intermediate appellate court. See, Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Pa.Super. 553, 559, 591 A.2d 730, 733 (1991) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321 (1992). Our supreme court has given no indication that it would condone the encroachment upon the statutory authority conferred upon the office of the district attorney contemplated by the majority decision. Rather, as indicated by the holding in Schab, supra, the supreme court has closely limited the means by which the charging function of the district attorney may be compromised.
The appellee has suffered no actual prejudice by the Commonwealth’s filing charges against him. The surprise he may have experienced at being charged some four years after-the-fact of the commission of the offenses does not constitute legal prejudice. He is not entitled to any “benefit of the bargain” because the consideration tendered by him was illusory and nonexistent. He agreed to take polygraph tests in return for no prosecution if he passed. Ab initio, a person has no right not to be charged with a criminal offense if there exists probable cause. The results of a polygraph test are not admissible for any purpose in a court of law, see, Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 343 Pa.Super. 486, 495 A.2d 569 (1985), including the preliminary hearing stage at which the Commonwealth must make out a prima facie case. Therefore, the fact that the appellee took the polygraph tests is of no legal significance regarding the burden borne by the Commonwealth in establishing either a prima facie case or in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, appellee is currently in the same position vis a vis the retention of his rights in defending the charges had he never agreed to take the polygraph tests. He has relinquished no rights or protections which he would otherwise enjoy had he not taken the tests.
The fact that in these cases it appears to be unfair to a defendant that the courts would not enforce as binding on the Commonwealth an agreement with a law enforcement officer containing an unauthorized, indeed, illicit, “deal” should cause *469us no pause in our adherence to fundamental principles of governmental authority. Depending upon the circumstances, our system of law might give relief to the unfairness in other forms such as suppression of evidence wrongfully collected, prosecutorial restraint, or accepted avenues of judicial nullification. See, Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288, 590 A.2d 1240 (1990) (A trial court may rectify errors “in the interest of justice” which would otherwise result in unfairness.)1
Because the majority decision is an incursion into the sole rule-making authority of the supreme court and is contrary to the statutory law of this Commonwealth, I dissent and would remand for trial.
ROWLEY, President Judge, and OLSZEWSKI and POPOVICH, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. In order to clear up any possible misunderstanding concerning the scope of judicial nullification, I do not interpret this concept to include authority of the trial court to enter an interlocutory order which results in usurpation of the prosecutorial function. Rather, by judicial nullification is meant accepted modes of the exercise of judicial discretion at the adjudicatory or dispositional phases, as was done in Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288, 590 A.2d 1240 (1990). Other examples of judicial nullification might be direction of a verdict, entry of a not guilty verdict in a nonjury case, arrest of judgment, or a finding of de minimus infraction.