Court Opinion

ID: 9391538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 16:09:12.857736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.147607
License: Public Domain

J-A03003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ABDULLATEEF MUHAMMAD                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :     No. 1676 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 5, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0000335-2019

BEFORE:       KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                                 FILED MAY 2, 2023

        Abdullateef Muhammad (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence of four to eight years’ incarceration entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County after the court revoked his probation for multiple

technical violations of his probation.             Herein, Appellant challenges the

discretionary aspects of his sentence, and the Commonwealth contends that

this Court should quash the present appeal as untimely filed. After careful

review, we affirm on the merits.

        The revocation court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history,

as follows:

        [Appellant] entered a negotiated guilty plea to robbery as a felony
        in the first degree in exchange for a sentence of eleven and a half
        to twenty-three months of incarceration, with immediate parole,
        followed by two years’ probation on November 15, 2019.
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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     [The trial court] accepted Appellant’s plea, but deferred
     sentencing and ordered a pre-sentence investigation and mental
     health evaluation. [The trial court] imposed the negotiated
     sentence on January 17, 2020, but, based on the contents of the
     mental health and pre-sentence investigation reports, imposed
     additional probation conditions.

     Specifically, [the trial court] ordered Appellant to complete
     parenting classes and grief counseling and to submit random drug
     screens. At the sentencing hearing, [the trial court] explained to
     Appellant that if he failed to complete any of those additional
     conditions, he would be in violation of his probation and [the trial
     court] would be able to re-sentence him to up to twenty years of
     incarceration. Appellant verbally confirmed that he understood.
     See [N.T., 1/17/20, at 14-15].

     [Fourteen days later,] Appellant tested positive for THC on
     January 31, 2020, and [tested positive for THC again on] February
     20, 2020. On February 20, 2020, [the trial court] continued
     Appellant’s supervision with the additional requirements that
     Appellant submit to random drug screens that included testing for
     K2 and PCP and that he complete grief and parenting counseling.

     Appellant tested positive for THC and benzodiazepine on March 6,
     2020. [The trial court] ordered Appellant to complete a mental
     health evaluation on September 4, 2020.

     [The trial court] found that Appellant was not complying with the
     court-ordered conditions of his probation on November 13, 2020.
     On December 16, 2020, Appellant was found to be in technical
     violation of his probation after his probation officer reported that
     he did not comply with [the trial court’s] orders by failing to
     appear at the courthouse for the collection of a DNA sample and
     undergo parenting classes. He also failed to appear for his court-
     ordered mental health evaluation and ignored the probation
     officer’s repeated attempts to contact him. Upon the joint request
     of the Commonwealth, the probation officer, and counsel for
     defense, [the trial court] issued a bench warrant at that hearing.
     N.T., 12/16/20.

     On June 11, 2021, [the trial court] revoked Appellant’s probation
     and imposed a new sentence of four years of reporting probation.
     On July 15, 2021, Appellant was further ordered to participate in

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      outpatient substance abuse treatment at a CHANCES and to stay
      at a recovery house.

      On July 20, 2021, Appellant was again found to be in technical
      violation of his probation and a detainer was issued. On July 28,
      2021, this court ordered Appellant to be transported to the Joy of
      Living Recovery Program when a bed became available. [The trial
      court] again ordered Appellant to complete grief and parenting
      classes on August 26, 2021.

      Appellant was once again found to be in technical violation on
      September 21, 2021, for failing to comply with [the trial court’s]
      orders to stay at Joy of Living Recovery Center and get and
      maintain employment. A detainer was issued. On April 5, 2022,
      [the trial court, hereinafter “revocation court”] revoked
      Appellant’s probation and imposed a new sentence of four to eight
      years of incarceration with credit given for time served.

      Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence on April
      8, 2022. The docket reflects that [the revocation court] entered
      two orders denying Appellant’s motion to reconsider: one dated
      April 12, 2022, and one dated May 31, 2022. Appellant filed a
      notice of appeal to the Superior Court on June 28, 2022, and a
      concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on July 1,
      2022.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 1-3.

      Appellant raises the following questions for this Court’s consideration:

      1. Was the sentence of Judge Perez of four to eight years of
         incarceration on a probation violation plus two years’
         probation, excessive, harsh and an abuse of discretion? Did
         the excessive sentence present a substantial question and
         issue since it exceeded the normal sentencing guidelines? Was
         the sentence extremely harsh under the circumstances when
         there was an offense gravity score of 10 and a prior record
         score of 0 on the underlying robbery case, with a sentencing
         guideline range of 22-36 months of incarceration plus or minus
         12? Was this an abuse of discretion since the sentence was
         above the guidelines, at the top of the aggravated range, far
         above the recommendation of the District Attorney’s Office,
         where there were only technical violations and was this an
         abuse of discretion by the trial judge? Did Judge Perez fail to

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         state adequate reasons in support of this sentence, particularly
         since there were only technical violations and did the Judge
         failed [sic] to properly discuss and weigh the factors in 42
         Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(B)? Did Judge Perez err by stating she earlier
         promised a four-to-eight years sentence? Should this sentence
         be reversed as an abuse [of] discretion and excessive, and
         should the sentence be remanded to another Judge for
         resentencing?

      2. Did the Superior Court err in suggesting the appeal should be
         dismissed since the appeal was filed within 30 days of the
         denial of the Motion to Modify the Sentence, since the Judge
         did not decide the Motion until 30 days had passed from the
         sentencing date?    Should this Honorable Court treat Mr.
         Stretton’s Answer to the Rule to Show Cause, issued by this
         Honorable Court, as a request to grant a Nunc Pro Tunc appeal
         and allow this appeal to continue?

Brief for Appellant, at 10-11

      We begin by determining whether we have appellate jurisdiction over

Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.         Our

jurisdiction to hear such a challenge is discretionary, and we may not exercise

our discretion to review such an issue unless we first determine that: (1) the

appeal is timely; (2) Appellant preserved his issue; (3) Appellant's brief

includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentences, as required

by Rule 2119(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure; and (4) that

concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentences were

inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Flowers, 149

A.3d 867, 870–71 (Pa. Super. 2016). Only if the appeal satisfies each of these

prerequisites may we accept jurisdiction and proceed to the substantive merits

of the case. Id.

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      Appellant has satisfied the second, third, and fourth threshold

requirements by, respectively, having filed below a timely post-sentence

motion challenging the discretionary aspects of his revocation sentence,

providing separately in his appellate brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise

statement of the reasons relied upon in seeking our review of the discretionary

aspects of his sentence, and asserting therein a substantial question with the

claim that the revocation court failed to state on the record during sentencing

adequate reasons to support the aggravated range sentence imposed.

See Commonwealth          v.   Lucky,    229   A.3d   657,   664   (Pa.   Super.

2020), citing Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super.

2000) (“On appeal from a revocation proceeding, ... a substantial question is

presented when a sentence of total confinement, in excess of the original

sentence, is imposed as a result of a technical violation of parole or

probation.”). See also Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064-65

(Pa. Super. 2011) (“[A] claim that a sentence is excessive because the trial

court relied on an impermissible factor raises a substantial question.”)

(citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (en banc) (“an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factor—raises a

substantial question.”)

      However, the first threshold requirement that the appeal must be timely

is an open question raised for our consideration in the second enumerated

issue in Appellant’s brief. Specifically, the parties dispute whether this Court

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has jurisdiction over the present appeal because Appellant filed, through

counsel, a facially untimely June 28, 2022, notice of appeal from the

revocation court’s April 5, 2022, judgment of revocation sentence of

probation.

      It is beyond dispute that a defendant has no more than 30 days from

the date of imposition of a revocation sentence in which to file a direct appeal,

regardless of whether they have filed a timely motion to modify sentence.

See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 708(E) governs motions to

modify sentence filed after a violation of probation, intermediate punishment,

or parole, and it provides, “A motion to modify a sentence imposed after a

revocation shall be filed within 10 days of the date of imposition. The filing of

a motion to modify sentence will not toll the 30-day period.” (emphasis

added); See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 721 A.2d 798, 799, fn. 2. (Pa.

Super. 1998); Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929 (Pa. Super.

2003) (an appellant has 30 days to appeal their revocation-of-probation

sentence from the day the sentence is entered; even if an appellant files a

motion to modify their revocation sentence, the appellant does not receive an

additional 30 days to file an appeal from the date their motion is denied).

      Because Appellant’s counseled notice of appeal is patently untimely, this

Court raised the issue sua sponte in our order issuing a Rule to Show Cause

why we should not quash this facially untimely appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). Counsel filed an Answer to the Rule to Show Cause in

which he argued that quashing the present appeal would result in an

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unfortunate delay of merits review of what he believes is an unjust and

excessive four-to-eight-year revocation sentence imposed upon a defendant

with demonstrated addiction and grief issues and to whom the Commonwealth

originally offered a negotiated plea deal of 11 ½ to 22 months incarceration.

       Counsel explained that he was unaware that a timely filed motion to

reconsider a revocation sentence did not toll the 30-day appeal period, and

he maintained that he simply did what he always has done in his 49-years’

post-trial practice experience, which is to file a motion to modify sentence

and, under the assumption that the filing tolls the appeal period, wait for the

Judge to act on the motion before deciding whether to file an appeal. On

November 9, 2022, we issued an order deferring resolution of this issue to a

panel of this Court.

       In the Brief for Appellant, Counsel reiterates that he did not know that

a motion to modify a revocation sentence fails to toll the 30-day appeal period

pursuant to Rule 780(E). This admission, he contends, supports Appellant’s

position that Counsel provided an inaccurate advisement1 of appeal rights at

the conclusion of the April 5, 2022, sentencing hearing when he informed

Appellant, “You have 30 days from today’s date or if I file a petition to modify

____________________________________________

1The revocation court directed Counsel at the end of the hearing to advise
Appellant of his post-trial and appeal rights. N.T. at 17-18.

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or reconsider the sentence, 30 days to file an appeal to the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania.” N.T., 4/5/22, at 17-18.2

        Counsel also disputes that he received service of the revocation court’s

April 12, 2022, docketed order denying Appellant’s April 8, 2022, motion for

reconsideration. Instead, he claims, he received service of only the revocation

court’s May 31, 2022, order denying his April 5, 2022, motion. It was from

this order, Counsel asserts, that he timely filed notice of appeal on June 28,

2022.

        The Commonwealth responds that this Court lacks jurisdiction because

Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal more than 30 days after the

imposition of sentence or, in the alternative more than 30 days after the

revocation court filed its April 12, 2022, order denying Appellant’s motion for

reconsideration.     It posits that we should reject Counsel’s claim of lack of

service because the First Judicial District of Philadelphia is an electronic filing

jurisdiction in which attorneys are required to have an e-filing account and,

thus, presumed to receive service of all criminal case papers, motions, and

orders submitted through the electronic filing system.          To this end, the

Commonwealth cites to several subsections of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure, including Rule 576.1(D)(2), which provides that an attorney with
____________________________________________

2 Counsel insists that the transcription of this exchange is “garbled” and
represents an incomplete recording of the latter part of his advisement, as he
asserts that he advised incorrectly that if he filed a timely motion to reconsider
the revocation sentence on Appellant’s behalf, the 30-day appeal period would
commence from the date of a trial court order denying the motion.

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an e-file account consents to participate in electronic filing and accepts

electronic service of documents filed in the system, and Rule 576.1(H)(1),

which acknowledges that filing papers in an electronic filing system satisfies

service requirements set forth under Rules 114(B) (pertaining to service of

court orders and court notices) and 576(B) (pertaining to service of party

filings).

       Consequently, the Commonwealth contends that because Appellant,

through Counsel, received notice of the revocation court’s April 12, 2022,

order denying his April 8, 2022, motion for reconsideration, his June 28, 2022,

notice of appeal should be deemed untimely and his present appeal quashed.

       After careful consideration of this jurisdictional issue, we decline to

quash the present appeal, as we identify grounds to conclude that a

breakdown in the process of the revocation court occurred both at Appellant’s

revocation sentencing hearing and when the revocation court’s April 8, 2022,

order denying his motion for reconsideration was docketed.       Generally, an

appellate court cannot extend the time for filing an appeal, but it may grant

relief when there is a breakdown in the process of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498–99 (Pa. Super. 2007). A

breakdown in the processes of the court occurs “when the trial court or the

clerk of courts depart[s] from the obligations specified in” Rules of Criminal

Procedure. See id. at 499; accord Parlante, 823 A.2d at 929 (declining to

quash the appeal because of a breakdown in the court's operation).

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       We first address whether Appellant received at the conclusion of the

revocation sentencing hearing a clear and correct advisement of the time

within which he was required to file a direct appeal.         Under our Rules of

Criminal Procedure, “The judge shall advise the defendant on the record ... of

the right to file a motion to modify sentence and to appeal, [and] of the time

within which the defendant must exercise those rights.”              Pa.R.Crim.P.

708(D)(3)(a) (emphasis added).             The record reveals, however, that the

revocation court delegated to Counsel the responsibility to advise Appellant of

such rights, and it thereafter remained silent during what the record shows

was either an incoherent or incorrect advisement.

       While we are unable to discern definitively whether the transcription

accurately recorded an incoherent advisement or inaccurately omitted

essential portions of a clear but incorrect advisement,3 we are satisfied from

the record that one of these two possibilities occurred without remedial action

taken by the revocation court. Therefore, in either case, the advisement was

inadequate to satisfy the revocation court’s obligation under Pa.R.Crim.P.

708(D)(3)(a) to advise Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights and

corresponding filing time periods. Consequently, we may not rely on this basis

____________________________________________

3 On the latter possibility of an incomplete transcription of a clear but incorrect
advisement, which Counsel claims occurred, we note that the transcribed
advisement’s apparent transition from identifying the general 30-day appeal
period commencing at the imposition of sentence to noting another 30-day
period relating to a motion for reconsideration does allow for the reasonable
inference that Counsel mistakenly advised that two distinct 30-day periods,
commencing at different times, existed.

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to quash. See Flowers, 149 A.3d at 871 (holding a sentencing advisement

providing misinformation regarding appeal deadline constituted breakdown in

judicial process and excused the defendant’s late filing of appeal).

      As noted, supra, the Commonwealth offers an alternate argument for

quashal. Because Counsel presumptively received service of the revocation

court’s April 12, 2022, order denying his April 8, 2022, motion for

reconsideration through Philadelphia County’s electronic filing system, and the

certified record reflects that a corresponding entry of the order was docketed,

his failure to file an appeal to this Court within 30 days of such service should

result in quashal. We disagree that the record supports this claim.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 114(C), “Docket Entries”,

requires, in relevant part, that “The docket entries shall contain: . . . (c) the

date of service of the order or court notice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c). A

court's compliance with Rule 114 is not discretionary. See Commonwealth

v. Hess, 810 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Pa. 2002). Our review of the certified record

reveals that while the revocation court’s April 8, 2022, order itself was entered

on the docket, the order bears no indication of the date of service.

Accordingly, we find no merit to the Commonwealth’s argument that the

revocation court’s order complied with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

      Turning, then, to the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we observe that he

claims his four to eight year revocation sentence reflects an abuse of the

revocation court’s discretion and raises substantial questions because it

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resides in the sentencing guideline’s aggravated range,4 exceeded the

Commonwealth’s original negotiated deal of a county sentence (11 ½ to 23

months), and was entered not in consideration of Appellant’s rehabilitative

needs or recent changes he had made in his life but, instead, simply to keep

the court’s previous promise of a four to eight year sentence if he violated his

probation one more time.

       Our standard of review for the revocation of probation is an abuse of

discretion.   See Commonwealth v. Giliam, 233 A.3d 863, 866-67 (Pa.

Super. 2020). Our scope of review is limited to reviewing whether the reason

for the revocation proceeding is valid, the legality of the sentence, and the

discretionary aspects of sentencing. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d

1030, 1033-34 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

       This Court has discussed the reasons supporting our deferential

standard of review of sentences imposed following revocation of probation:

       [A] trial court has broad discretion in sentencing a defendant, and
       concomitantly, the appellate courts utilize a deferential standard
       of appellate review in determining whether the trial court abused
       its discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence. The reason
       for this broad discretion and deferential standard of appellate
       review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to
       measure various factors and determine the proper penalty for a
       particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
       circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court
       sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of
       sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
____________________________________________

4 The standard guideline range applicable to Appellant was 22 to 36 months
of incarceration, plus or minus 12 months. The court’s imposition of a 48-
month minimum sentence was within the aggravated range of the guidelines.

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     used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court
     enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to
     its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should
     not be lightly disturbed.

     The sentencing court's institutional advantage is, perhaps, more
     pronounced in fashioning a sentence following the revocation of
     probation, which is qualitatively different than an initial sentencing
     proceeding. At initial sentencing, all of the rules and procedures
     designed to inform the court and to cabin its discretionary
     sentencing authority properly are involved and play a crucial role.
     However, it is a different matter when a defendant reappears
     before the court for sentencing proceedings following a violation
     of the mercy bestowed upon him in the form of a probationary
     sentence. For example, in such a case, contrary to when an initial
     sentence is imposed, the Sentencing Guidelines do not apply, and
     the revocation court is not cabined by Section 9721(b)’s
     requirement that “the sentence imposed should call for
     confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public,
     the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of
     the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of
     the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721.

     Upon revoking probation, “the sentencing alternatives available to
     the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial
     sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent
     serving the order of probation.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9771(b). Thus,
     upon revoking probation, the trial court is limited only by the
     maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the
     time of the probationary sentence, although once probation has
     been revoked, the court shall not impose a sentence of total
     confinement unless it finds that:

           (1) the defendant has been convicted of another
           crime; or
           (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
           likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
           imprisoned; or
           (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
           authority of the court.

     42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9771(c).

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     Moreover, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721(b) specifies that in every case
     following the revocation of probation, “the court shall make as a
     part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of
     sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
     imposed.” See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 708([D])(2) (indicating at the
     time of sentence following the revocation of probation, “[t]he
     judge shall state on the record the reasons for the sentence
     imposed.”).

     However, following revocation, a sentencing court need not
     undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a
     sentence or specifically reference the statutes in question. Simply
     put, since the defendant has previously appeared before the
     sentencing court, the stated reasons for a revocation sentence
     need not be as elaborate as that which is required at initial
     sentencing. The rationale for this is obvious. When sentencing is
     a consequence of the revocation of probation, the trial judge is
     already fully informed as to the facts and circumstances of both
     the crime and the nature of the defendant, particularly where [ ]
     the trial judge had the benefit of a [presentence investigation
     (“PSI”) report] during the initial sentencing proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27-28 (Pa. 2014) (case citations,

footnote, and some quotations omitted). Furthermore, “[t]echnical violations

can support revocation and a sentence of incarceration when such violations

are flagrant and indicate [a resistance] to reform.”    Commonwealth v.

Carver, 923 A.2d 495, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007).

     The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the revocation court could not

have engaged in a full consideration of Appellant’s rehabilitation needs and

mitigating circumstances, or of what minimum sentence was required to

protect the community, when it acknowledged at the revocation hearing that

the sentence was a fulfillment of the promise made at the previous hearing to

impose a revocation sentence of four-years’ incarceration on the underlying

armed robbery charge should he violate again. After review of the record

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before us, however, we do not agree that the court’s statement manifests a

snap judgment unmoored from a careful contemplation of Appellant’s entire

relevant history.

         There is before us a lengthy record of the court’s repeated efforts to

afford Appellant opportunities for drug treatment only to learn time and again

that Appellant was testing positive for banned substances. Indeed, Counsel

acknowledges that “Judge Perez was certainly trying to help [Appellant ,]” but

that “[Appellant] was not dealing with [his drug problem] well enough.” Brief

for Appellant at 33.     He continues, “Unfortunately, the Judge kept bringing

him back for status hearings and essentially set him up to fail. There were

technical violations along the way over the last two years of changing the

halfway house, not completing the drug program, etc.           There were also

multiple times where he tested positive for marijuana. He had been sentenced

originally on an armed robbery, so it was a serious case.” Brief for Appellant

at 33.

         At the outset of the revocation sentencing hearing, the revocation court

observed that it was quite familiar with Appellant’s history and had taken

“copious notes, especially with Mr. Muhammad.          We’ve spent some time

together.” N.T. at 6. It listened to Appellant’s exchange with Counsel in the

form of an allocution in which Appellant explained what he had learned from

trying to cope with his drug addiction, living both in prison and out of prison

on probation, dealing with compliance problems in halfway houses, making

bad choices in the company he kept, and the resulting effects on his family

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relationships—particularly with his young son, and he indicated he realized

now that he needed to change. N.T. at 5-12.

     At the conclusion of Appellant’s allocution, the revocation court shared

the reasons that informed its sentencing decision:

     The Court:        Mr. Muhammad and I have been together for
     quite some time now. In fact, my entire file is just about him
     going in and out [of] noncompliance and I agree 100 percent with
     [The prosecutor] because this [Appellant’s] last chance. I said
     that to Mr. Muhammad multiple times. I never particularly liked
     the terms of this plea to begin with. I didn’t like the facts of this
     case and I took a chance on Mr. Muhammad and sometimes you
     take a chance on people and they step up.

     I put every service in place. My file has dual diagnosis FIRs as
     recently as last year, and all I hear is what Mr. Muhammad wants
     to do versus what he doesn’t want to do. [“]I don’t want to be in
     a halfway house. I sometimes behave and other times I do just
     to get through probation, and other times I just walk away and
     told you and my probation officer that I don’t have time for you.[”]

     Here's where you and I are fundamentally different, Mr.
     Muhammad. I’m going to keep my promise. I let you know what
     the consequences were going to be for your actions of continuing
     to walk away from myself and the probation officer and you made
     a choice that that is what you were going to do. You want to make
     choices about where you want to lay your head down at night.
     You want to make choices as to whether or not you want to
     participate in drug treatment. What happens, though, is that you
     decide whether or not I’m going to be involved in your life.
     Frankly, I should have been terminating your supervision. You
     could have been done with me.

     In the end, life is about the choices that we make. So, the
     question is, was being at the halfway house when I court
     mandated it so important that you leave that you were willing to
     risk a state sentence, and you said yes. I have over here multiple
     times as recently as June of last year that if you did not comply,
     you and I had a conversation that I would sentence you to 4 to 8
     years of state incarceration.

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      ...

      Your guidelines were 22 to 36 months plus or minus 12. Eleven
      and half to 23 was below the guidelines. Four to eight is
      aggravated, but in the guidelines.

      I have seen nothing in the time that we’ve been together, Mr.
      Muhammad, that tells me that you are an individual who benefits
      from community supervision. At this point, based on the previous
      revocation, based on the technical violations that were outlined
      previously, and that, I believe, if I recall correctly, I’ll double check
      my file, Mr. Stretton, do you agree that he was in technical
      violation due to his discharge, his lack of anger management and
      grief counseling completion, as well as his walking away from the
      halfway house. Am I correct?

      Mr. Stretton:       Unfortunately, I have to agree.

      The Court:        Based on all of those things, I am going to, on
      the robbery F1, issue a new sentence of 4 to 8 years of state
      incarceration. All supervision is to be done by the state. Credit
      for time served.

N.T. at 13-16.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the revocation court

in imposing an      aggregate     sentence      of   4    to   8   years’   incarceration

following revocation of Appellant's probation.           The record of the revocation

sentencing hearing shows the revocation court possessed a full understanding

of the relevant facts of this case as they related not only to his noncompliant

behavior while under supervision but also to how his revocation sentence

would affect his family. Indeed, the revocation court had been surprisingly

lenient with Appellant.

      Moreover, though not stated explicitly, it is apparent that the revocation

court imposed a sentence of total confinement because it was essential to

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J-A03003-23

vindicate the authority of the court.        See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c)(3);

Commonwealth v. Cappellini, 690 A.2d 1220, 1226 (Pa. Super. 1997)

(finding trial court was “not required to parrot the criteria of the Sentencing

Code” so long as record supported determination that sentence was essential

to vindicate its authority).

      Appellant's poor choices and failures to comply with court orders while

under long-term supervision showed that he would not respect the authority

of the court or fully commit to his own recovery.       His flagrant technical

violations thus demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to reform that

supported the revocation court's sentence of total confinement.           See

Carver, supra. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2023

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