Court Opinion

ID: 9866348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 04:27:34.52837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:21:11.213480
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In his motion for rehearing, defendant in error reiterates and re-argues matters contained in his original brief, at the same time asserting some additional points and arguments not contained therein. One of these points is that in our main opinion in the present case, *823we say that after plaintiff had given the mortgage on his farm for $6187.85, Meistrell called np yonng Henry Enorp and had him turn over the bank stock in question. Defendant in error now argues that, therefore, this bank stock did not enter into the transaction and was no part of the consideration for the same, and this court erred iii( holding that it had to be tendered back; that the bank stock was not contracted for.
It is clear from this situation that the bank stock was a part of the general transaction, that it was accepted by defendant in error and held by him. We think therefore he is in no position to urge this point. There was conflicting testimony offered by the parties as to the value of this stock, thus presenting a question for the jury to solve. This being a suit at law the trial court, after verdict, was without right to determine the question of value and required a remittitur.
In the motion for rehearing defendant in error again insists that no tender was necessary prior to the institution of the suit, because the mortgages, notes, etc., received by him were worthless. The main opinion fully covers this point and we think correctly, against the contention of defendant in error. The main opinion states clearly the distinction between the rule applicable to eases at law and eases in equity. Defendant in error leans heavily on the cases of Winter v. Cable Co., 160 Mo. 159, 61 S. W. 606, and Arnold v. Bank, 285 S. W. 161, 163. The Winter case was one in equity and has no application to the case at bar which is a law case and comes under a different rule. As to the Arnold case we merely held that tender of the notes received under the facts in that case was not a condition precedent to bringing a suit in assumpsit for money had and received. To say there is nothing in the nature of a given action for money had and received that requires a tender as a condition precedent is a statement too general to be controlling here. Such an action covers too many different kinds of transactions to be limited to a ruling in any certain case. In this case a tender back was a prerequisite because the evidence shows plaintiff was seeking a return of his money which he paid under a contract which he claims he had the right to rescind, because the contract was obtained through fraud and duress. We think, however, plaintiff should have tendered back everything he received except the chattel mortgage; but as it was no longer in existence, its return was not possible or necessary. [Green v. Insurance Co., 159 Mo. App. 277, 140 S. W. 325; Paquin v. Milliken, 163 Mo. 79, 107, 63 S. W. 1092.]
In this view of the case we hold the judgment should be reversed and it is so ordered.
Bland, J., concurs; Trimble, P. J., absent.