Court Opinion

ID: 9652266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:21:26.939186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:49.754224
License: Public Domain

Conford, P. J. A. D.,
Temporarily Assigned, dissenting I respectfully take issue with the Court’s conclusion that the changes in the transaction at bar effected by the municipal resolution of April 22, 1976 did not constitute an amendment of the bond ordinance “substantially altering matters re*176quired by [the bond law] to be contained in the bond ordinance.” See N. J. S. A. 40A:2-17. Cf. 40A:2-16, permitting all matters not required to be contained in the bond ordinance to be determined by resolution- of the governing-body.
There is no dispute that the bond law requires a bond ordinance to contain, inter alia, a statement “in brief and general terms sufficient for reasonable identification [of] the purpose or purposes for which the obligations are to be,issued, a statement of the estimated maximum amount of bonds or notes to be issued and the estimated cost of any such purpose or purposes, * * The instant bond ordinance discharged the obligation of stating the purpose of the ordinance as follows:
the acquisition, by purchase or condemnation, of lands for passive open space public recreation and park purposes consisting of approximately 294 acres of an area commonly known as the East Hill of the Borough of Tenafly and further consisting of the following tracts or parcels: (1) Lots 3B and 5A in Block 229 and Lots 1, 2, 3 and 8 in Block 236 formerly owned by Norman E. Blank-man, now owned by Centex Homes Corporation; (2) Lot 29 in Block 227 formerly owned by Ellen Ann-Dunham; and (3) Lot 30 in Block 227 formerly owned by .the-New. Early Christian Church; all the same being in accordance with the application for said contribution from the State of New Jersey under said Green Acres Local Matching Assistance Program.
The estimated maximum amount of bonds or notes to be issued was stated as $7,000,000, and -the estimated cost of the project was set forth as $7,576’,0'0'0'.'
The changes in these required specifications made by the resolution of April 22, 1976 did not affect estimated maximum amount of bonds and notes to be issued, but did alter the statements of the purpose and of the estimated cost.
As to change in statement of purpose, the bond ordinance specified as the purpose the acquisition of approximately 294 acres of the East Hill of Tenafly, whereas the resolution reduced the area to be purchased to 239 acres. I cannot- understand, how such a difference is not to be deemed a “sub*177stantial” alteration of the declared purpose, particularly since the outlay by the municipality for the reduced amount of land to be acquired was not. also reduced under the changed transaction terms. The Court attempts to minimize the reduction in the quantity of land to be acquired by including the purchase by Nature Conservancy of 11 acres as “practically tantamount to an outright purchase by the municipality.” But this ignores the fact that the resolution called only for a lease of the land to the town, with an ultimate conveyance to the town contingent upon redemption of pledges by private citizens in the amount of $355,000. If payment of the whole sum is not forthcoming, the conveyance need not be made. But even if the eleven acres is counted as part of the revised acquisition, the resulting total of 250 acres is still 15% less than that originally advertised to the public by the published ordinance as intended to be acquired. When it is considered that the net cost to the municipality for less land was not reduced, but, in fact, was increased by virtue of the tax abatement granted Nature Conservancy for the period of the lease, it becomes distinctly clear that a substantial alteration of a required item of the bond ordinance has been effected, within the public policy underlying the statutory requirement of republication and further public hearing in the event of such alteration.
The approach to satisfaction by municipalities of statutory fiscal requirements manifested by the Court in this case is at odds with the philosophy heretofore expressed by our courts with respect to analogous statutes regulating municipal expenditures and contractual undertakings. - Illustrative is Murphy v. West New York, 132 N. J. L. 595, 597-598 (Sup. Ct. 194-5).1
*178These are peremptory legislative mandates designed to incorporate sound business principles and practices into the fabric of the local economy, with particular reference to the avoidance of waste, extravagance and ill-considered spending, and thus to safeguard the interests of those laden with the tax burden and otherwise to serve the common good; and it is axiomatic that they cannot be evaded by any pretense or device whatsoever. Vide Frank Grad & Son, Inc. v. Newark, 118 N. J. L. 376. Though not an insurance against local maladministration, action by ordinance is a reflective process that also affords an opportunity for the expression of public opinion; and this is manifestly the rationale of the statutory provisions under consideration.
(emphasis added).
See also 405 Monroe Co. v. Asbury Park, 40 N. J. 457, 471-472 (1963); Middlesex Concrete Corp. v. Carleret, 28 N. J. 208, 213 (1958).
Another required provision of the bond ordinance which was substantially altered by the impugned resolution was that as to the estimated cost of the undertaking. As originally stated, this was $7,576,000. Under the resolution it was $8,147,000 ($7,495,000 payment to Centex, $427,000 for the Dunham and Church parcels and $225,000 for legal and other expenses). The Court cannot gainsay that the amended cost substantially exceeded-' the original estimated cost, and that the statutory requirement for an amendatory ordinance was therefore literally applicable, but it undertakes to palliate the violation by observing that the “cost to the Borough of Tenafly” was not increased but that the increase was to be met from contributions, pledges by private citizens and the $350,000 grant from the State Department of Environmental Protection.2 But this circumstance is irrelevant. The statute mentions “estimated cost” of the improvement, not estimated net cost to the municipality. The Legislature is presumably aware of the fact that contributions by the state *179and federal governments, and sometimes by others, are frequently made to assist municipal bonded projects, and if the intent of the bond statute was to require a statement of only estimated net cost to the municipality, it would presumably so have specified.
In my view, the policy underlying N. J. S. A. 40A:2-1 et seq. suggests that when a municipality undertakes issuance of bonds for an acquisition or capital improvement, the bond 'ordinance should contain information describing the entire transaction and the total cost thereof, so that the taxpayers may have an opportunity to assess the economic wisdom of the project for which they are asked to incur indebtedness. In this regard it may be noted that N. J. 8. A. 40A.-2-12 does not expressly limit the description of “purpose” or “cost” to that portion of the transaction which will be financed by bonds. Moreover, Section 12 clearly states that a bond ordinance must set forth, as two distinct items, the estimated maximum amount of bonds or notes to be issued, and the estimated cost of the purpose described in the ordinance.
Thus, for this additional reason, the bond act required republication and public hearing as to this additional substantial alteration of a required item of the bond ordinance.
Finally, as I appraise the complex multi-party arrangements purported to have been authorized by the April 22, 1976 resolution, an ordinance was preeminently required for the effectuation thereof, entirely independently of the strictures of the bond act — an ordinance, so that the public could be apprised and afforded an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the vastly altered transaction. It is to be kept in mind that Centex stipulated it would not sell the town any of its land unless all of it were taken. Thus, since the town now could not afford to take- all, it had to enlist Nature Conservancy, Palisades Interstate Park Commission and the Jewish Community Center of Englewood to take and pay for the acreage which the town could not itself *180pay for. Under the contractual arrangements agreed upon, no part of the “settlement” could be effected unless all of it was.
Of particular significance in this regard was the departure from the original intended use of the property in substantial particulars. The bond ordinance recited this project was being undertaken under Green Acres auspices, which limited the use of all the property, under Green Acres regulations, to “passive open space” and strictly confined the use of the land to environmental protection and conservation purposes. However, the arrangements concluded with the Palisades Interstate Park Commission and the Jewish Community Center of Englewood freed the lands taken by those parties from Green Acres regulations. Of the 29 acres taken by the latter organization, 3 acres are permitted to be used for construction of a large community center building, with a swimming pool, athletic facilities and a nursery school, while the other 26 acres are zoned “open zoning,” which, while proscribing structures, allows many kinds of use forbidden by the Green Acres restrictions to passive open space.
Enough has been said to establish that these far-reaching changes in the purposes, arrangements and financing of the project as originally communicated to the public by the publication of the bond ordinance and the public hearing held thereon were required to be effected by an amendatory ordinance, rather than by resolution, so that the same opportunities of the taxpayers for apprisal of, and to be heard with respect to, the newly formulated arrangements and purposes of the project, could be afforded them.
It is obvious that the five-party interrelated contractual arrangements ultimately arrived at are so different from the relatively simple two-party deal contemplated by the bond ordinance, that there is plainly invocable the principle that an ordinance can be amended only by an ordinance, not by a resolution. Am. Malleables Co. v. Bloomfield, 83 N. J. L. *181728, 734 — 735 (E. & A. 1912); Albigese v. City of Jersey City, 129 N. J. Super. 567, 569 (App. Div. 1974).
An additional incidental right of the citizenry of Tenafly was forfeited by the improper effectuation of the revised arrangements by resolution rather than ordinance'. This was the right to petition for a referendum on any ordinance “authorizing the incurring of any indebtedness.” N. J. S. A. 40:49-27. See Retz v. Mayor and Council of Tp. of Saddle Brook, 69 N. J. 563 (1976). There may well have been citizens of Tenafly satisfied with the terms of the project as originally fixed by the bond ordinance who would want a referendum on the revised terms and conditions authorized by the resolution.
The judgment of the Law Division should be reversed.
For affirmance — Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford and Schreiber and Judge Carton — 6.
For reversal — Judge Conford — 1.

 lnvolving the predecessors of N. J. S. A. 40A:4r-57 and 40:50-6. The former mandates budget appropriations for incurrences of liabilities or expenditures. The second forbids contracts for which there is no appropriation.

 I have noted above that actual cost to Tenafly was increased by at least the tax abatement on the Nature Conservancy property. There was also a- substantial abatement of taxes on the Centex holdings under the final arrangements.