Court Opinion

ID: 9849780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:46:17.94916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.988649
License: Public Domain

Judge LEWIS
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse and remand and I would vote to affirm the award of the Industrial Commission. In its opinion, the majority states that the authority of the Commission is invoked at the time a voluntary settlement is submitted for approval. I agree. However, the majority’s opinion fails to address the issue of whether the Commission loses its authority to act if one of the parties withdraws its consent before the settlement agreement is approved. The answer to this question is essential to the resolution of this case because defendants strenuously argue that they withdrew their consent before the agreement was filed on 9 January 1990, leaving nothing to be approved.
It has been said by this Court that an agreement is binding on the parties when approved by the Industrial Commission. Buchanan v. Mitchell County, 38 N.C. App. 596, 248 S.E.2d 399 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 583, 254 S.E.2d 35 (1979). Conversely, it has also been said that an agreement not approved by the Industrial Commission is not binding on the parties. See Baldwin v. Piedmont Woodyards, Inc., 58 N.C. App. 602, 293 S.E.2d 814 (1982). It logically flows from these statements that until an agreement is approved by the Industrial Commission, either party is free to withdraw its consent. That is what one party believed it had done in this case.
The record indicates that defendants’ counsel placed a phone call on 14 December 1989 and wrote a letter on 18 December 1989 to B. H. Whitehouse, Jr., Executive Secretary of the North *51Carolina Industrial Commission requesting that the settlement agreement not be approved and that the Form 21 Agreement be returned. For some reason unexplained, however, neither the telephone message nor the letter was matched with the Commission file which contained the settlement agreement. The phone call which defendants’ counsel placed to Mr. Whitehouse was received by Mr. Whitehouse’s secretary. I am of the opinion that Mr. Whitehouse’s secretary was an agent of the Industrial Commission and that by communicating his clients’ desire to withdraw their consent to the settlement agreement to Mr. Whitehouse’s secretary, defendants’ counsel acted sufficiently to put the Industrial Commission on notice that one of the parties no longer consented to the agreement. Having withdrawn their consent, and communicating such to the Industrial Commission, there was thus no settlement for the Commission to approve on 9 January 1990. See Morgan v. Town of Norwood, 211 N.C. 600, 191 S.E. 345 (1937) (establishing necessity of consent).
The majority’s opinion has the effect of penalizing defendants for the faulty record keeping and the lapse in clerical assistance of the Industrial Commission. Defendants discovered new evidence indicating that Glenn’s injury was not compensable and then made reasonable efforts to communicate with the Industrial Commission. It would be neither reasonable nor practical to require counsel to have gone to any further lengths. To so hold would mean that parties dealing with the Industrial Commission can never assume communications have been received unless they get a “filed” copy or speak directly with one of the Commissioners and record the conversation, with, of course, their knowledge.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.