Court Opinion

ID: 9627329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:42:22.341138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:35.110813
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT
concurs and specially concurs in the judgment.
I agree with the majority that Douglas Birdsong’s plea was valid and, therefore, the trial court correctly revoked Birdsong’s pro1 bation. Thus, the court of appeals, I agree, must be reversed. However, I would do so because Birdsong had actual knowledge of the sex offender treatment program. Unlike the majority, though, in my view, it is unnecessary to the resolution of this case that we analyze whether the fact that Birdsong’s probation would be revoked if he continued to maintain innocence is a direct or collateral consequence of the conviction. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the majority. While I agree with much that the majority opinion states, I do not join in parts IIB and IIC of the majority opinion.
Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea was made voluntarily and knowingly. See also People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo.1987); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391, 393 (Colo.1985). Here, Birdsong voluntarily and knowingly entered into an Alford plea. At the January 12,1995, providency hearing, Birdsong admitted to inappropriately touching his daughter, and acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. The trial court made detailed findings as to the factual basis for Birdsong’s plea, and accepted it.
As part of the plea agreement, the court imposed a four-year sentence of probation conditioned upon, among other things, successful completion of a sex offender treatment program. At the time that Birdsong entered his plea and as part of a court-ordered treatment in an earlier dependency and neglect action, Birdsong had already attended approximately one year of sex offender treatment at the Aurora Community Mental Health Center. To comply with the conditions of probation in this case, Birdsong *1131continued with that treatment. - Birdsong, therefore, had actual knowledge of the details of the sex offender treatment program before he entered his Alford plea. That is, Birdsong had actual knowledge at the time of his plea that the program required participants to admit that they engaged in inappropriate sexual contáct. Therefore, because Birdsong voluntarily and knowingly entered his guilty plea with actual knowledge of the details of the sex offender treatment program, and then violated the plea agreement by not’ completing the program, he cannot now disavow such knowledge and claim that the trial court erred in revoking his probation.
It follows, therefore, in my view, that further analysis as to whether Birdsong’s probation is a direct or collateral consequence of the conviction is unnecessary to a resolution of this case. While I do not disagree that such analysis would certainly be appropriate if Birdsong did not have actual knowledge of the conditions of his sentence and of the requirements of the treatment program, in this ease, I would not reach that discussion.
People v. Walters, 164 Misc.2d 986, 627 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Cty.Ct.1995), is illustrative. There, the court reversed an order revoking Walter’s probation for failure to admit to guilt in a sex offender treatment program. Walters was originally charged with a felony sex offense but entered an Alford plea of guilty to a misdemeanor sex abuse charge. The defendant attended court-ordered sex offender treatment until he was terminated for persisting in his denial of guilt. Noting that at the time he entered his plea the defendant had not been advised that he-would be required to admit to guilt in order to successfully complete the sex offender treatment program, the Walters court- reasoned that the acceptance of defendant’s Alford plea was “directly inconsistent” with a finding that his refusal to admit guilt in counseling constituted a probation violation. Walters, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
The - court of appeals assumed that the instant ease was factually similar to Walters. The court concluded that in both cases, defendant was not informed- that admitting guilt was a necessary prerequisite for successful completion. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that in such a scenario: “it [i]s the trial court’s obligation to advise the defendant of that requirement before the court accept[s] the Alford plea.”
Walters, however, is distinguishable. While in both cases the trial court failed to give the proper advisement, here, Birdsong was not in need of such an advisement. Unlike the defendant in Walters, Birdsong had actual knowledge of the requirements of the sex offender treatment program; in fact, he was already an active participant in the program at the time of his plea.
In sum, in my view, even though Birdsong may not have been specifically informed of the probation requirement at issue, because he had actual knowledge, the absence of such an advisement should be of no legal consequence. Generally, of course, the trial court should have informed Birdsong of the details of the program — specifically, that the program required him to-admit that he engaged in inappropriate sexual contact — -whether or not such details constituted direct or collateral consequences of the conviction. • But where a defendant has1 actual knowledge, I would not fault a trial court for its failure to undertake a futile act. Only where an accused has not been informed, and has no actual knowledge of the requirement at issue, is further analysis regarding direct or collateral consequences of the conviction necessary.
Accordingly, I see no need to join in a discussion of direct or collateral consequences, but, nonetheless, join in the judgment of the majority.