Court Opinion

ID: 9427204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:01.411223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:05.449095
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution’s Art. IY, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as to the constitutional validity of disparities, as between residents and nonresidents, in a State’s hunting license system.
I
Appellant Lester Baldwin is a Montana resident. He also is an outfitter holding a state license as a hunting guide. The majority of his customers are nonresidents who come to Montana to hunt elk and other big game. Appellants Carlson, Huseby, Lee, and Moris are residents of Minnesota.1 They have hunted big game, particularly elk, in Montana in past years and wish to continue to do so.
In 1975, the five appellants, disturbed by the difference in the kinds of Montana elk-hunting licenses available to nonresidents, as contrasted with those available to residents of the State, and by the difference in the fees the nonresident and the resident must pay for their respective licenses, instituted the present federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and for reimbursement, in part, of fees already paid. App. 18-29. The defendants were the Fish and Game Commission of the State of Montana, the Commission’s director, and its five com*373missioners. The complaint- challenged the Montana elk-hunting licensing scheme specifically, and asserted that, as applied to nonresidents, it violated the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IY, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court was convened and, by a divided vote, entered judgment denying all relief to the plaintiff-appellants. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (Mont. 1976). We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 1089 (1977).2
II
The relevant facts are not in any real controversy and many of them are agreed:
A. For the 1975 hunting season, a Montana resident could purchase a license solely for elk for $4. The nonresident, however, in order to hunt elk, was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $151; this entitled him to take one elk and two deer.3
For the 1976 season, the Montana resident could purchase a license solely for elk for $9. The nonresident, in order to hunt elk, was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $225; 4 this entitled him to take one elk, one deer, one black bear, and game birds, and to fish with hook and line.5 A *374resident was not required to buy any combination of licenses, but if he did, the cost to him of all the privileges granted by the nonresident combination license was $30.6 The nonresident thus paid 71/2 times as much as the resident, and if the nonresident wished to hunt only elk, he paid 25 times as much as the resident.7
B. Montana, with an area of more than 147,000 square miles, is our fourth largest State. Only Alaska, Texas, and California, in that order, are larger. But its population is relatively small; in 1972 it was approximately 716,000.8 Its 1974 per capita income was 34th among the 50 States. App. 56-57.
Montana maintains significant populations of big game, including elk, deer, and antelope. Tr. 191. Its elk population is one of the largest in the United States. Elk are prized by big-game hunters who come from near and far to pursue the animals for sport.9 The quest for big game has grown in *375popularity. During the 10-year period from 1960 to 1970 licenses issued by Montana increased by approximately 67% for residents and by approximately 530% for nonresidents.10 App. 56-57.
Owing to its successful management programs for elk, the State has not been compelled to limit the overall number of hunters by means of drawings or lotteries as have other States with harvestable elk populations. Tr. 243. Elk are not hunted commercially in Montana.11 Nonresident hunters seek the animal for its trophy value; the trophy is the distinctive set of antlers. The interest of resident hunters more often may be in the meat. Id., at 245. Elk are now found in the mountainous regions of western Montana and are gen*376erally not encountered in the eastern two-thirds of the State where the plains prevail. Id,., at 9-10, 249: During the summer the animals move to higher elevations and lands that are largely federally owned. In the late fall they move down to lower privately owned lands that provide the winter habitat necessary to their survival. During the critical midwinter period elk are often supported by ranchers. Id., at 46-47, 191, 285-286.12
Elk management is expensive. In regions of the State with significant elk population, more personnel time of the Fish and Game Commission is spent on elk than on any other species of big game. Defendant’s Exhibit A, p. 9.
Montana has more than 400 outfitters who equip and guide hunting parties. Tr. 295. These outfitters are regulated and licensed by the State and provide services to hunters and fishermen. It is estimated that as many as half the nonresidents who hunt elk in western Montana utilize outfitters. Id., at 248. Three outfitter-witnesses testified that virtually all their clients were nonresidents. Id., at 141, 281, 307.
'The State has a force of 70 game wardens. Each warden district covers approximately 2,100 square miles. Id., at 234. To assist wardens in law enforcement, Montana has an “equal responsibility” statute. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 26-906 (Supp. 1977). This law makes outfitters and guides equally responsible for unreported game-law violations committed by persons in their hunting parties. The outfitter thus, in a sense, is a surrogate warden and serves to bolster the State’s warden force.
Ill
In the District Court the majority observed that the elk once was a plains animal but now roams the mountains of *377central and western Montana. About 75% of the elk taken are killed on federal land. The animal’s preservation depends upon conservation. 417 F. Supp., at 1007. The majority noted that the appellants conceded that Montana constitutionally may charge nonresidents more for hunting privileges than residents. Id., at 1007-1008.13 It concluded, however, that on the evidence presented the 7%-to-l ratio in favor of the resident cannot be justified on any basis of cost allocation. Id., at 1008.
After satisfying itself as to standing14 and as to the existence of a justiciable controversy, and after passing comment upon the somewhat controversial subject of wild animal legal ownership, the court concluded that the State “has the power to manage and conserve the elk, and to that end to make such laws and regulations as are necessary to protect and preserve it.” Id., at 1009. In reaching this result, the majority examined the nature of the rights asserted by the plaintiffs. It observed that there were just too many people and too few elk to enable everyone to hunt the animals. “If the elk is to survive as a species, the game herds must be managed, and a vital part of the management is the limitation of the annual kill.” Ibid. Various means of limitation were mentioned, as was the fact that any one control device might deprive a particular hunter of any possibility of hunting elk. The right asserted by the appellants was “no more than a chance to engage temporarily in a recreational activity in a sister state” and was “not fundamental.” Ibid. Thus, it was not protected as a privilege and an immunity under the Constitution’s Art. IV, § 2. The majority contrasted the nature *378of the asserted right with educational needs at the primary and college levels, citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973), and Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD Wash.), summarily aff’d, 414 U. S. 1057 (1973), and said: "There is simply no nexus between the right to hunt for sport and the right to speak, the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to pursue a calling.” 417 F. Supp., at 1009. It followed that it was necessary only to determine whether the system bears some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. Then:
“We conclude that where the opportunity to enjoy a recreational activity is created or supported by a state, where there is no nexus between the activity and any fundamental right, and where by its very nature the activity can be enjoyed by only a portion of those who would enjoy it, a state may prefer its residents over the residents of other states, or condition the enjoyment of the nonresident upon such terms as it sees fit.” Id., at 1010.
The dissenting judge took issue with the “ownership theory,” and with any “special public interest” theory, and emphasized the absence of any cost-allocation basis for the license fee differential. He described the majority’s posture as one upholding discrimination because political support was thereby generated, and took the position that invidious discrimination was not to be justified by popular disapproval of equal treatment. Id., at 1012.
IV
Privileges and immunities. Appellants strongly urge here that the Montana licensing scheme for the hunting of elk violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause15 of Art. IY, § 2, *379of our Constitution. That Clause is not one the contours of which have been precisely shaped by the process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation over the years since 1789. If there is any significance in the fact, the Clause appears in the so-called States’ Relations Article, the same Article that embraces the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Extradition Clause (also in § 2), the provisions for the admission of new States, the Territory and Property Clause, and the Guarantee Clause. Historically, it has been overshadowed by the appearance in 1868 of similar language in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 and by the continuing controversy and consequent litigation that attended that Amendment’s enactment and its meaning and application.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause originally was not isolated from the Commerce Clause, now in the Constitution’s Art. I, § 8. In the Articles of Confederation, where both Clauses have their source, the two concepts were together in the fourth Article.17 See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 660-661 (1975); Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562, 627 (1860) (opinion of Wright, J.). Their separation may have been an assurance against an anticipated narrow reading of *380the Commerce Clause. See Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430-432 (1871).
Perhaps because of the imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment upon our constitutional consciousness and the extraordinary emphasis that the Amendment received, it is not surprising that the contours of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, are not well developed,18 and that the relationship, if any, between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the “privileges or immunities” language of the Fourteenth Amendment is less than clear. We are, nevertheless, not without some pronouncements by this Court as to the Clause’s significance and reach. There are at least three general comments that deserve mention:
The first is that of Mr. Justice Field, writing for a unanimous Court in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869). He emphasized nationalism, the proscription of discrimination, and the assurance of equality of all citizens within any State:
“It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to *381constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.” 19
The second came 70 years later when Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for himself and Mr. Justice Black in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 511 (1939), summed up the history of the Clause and pointed out what he felt to be the difference in analysis in the earlier cases from the analysis in later ones:
“As has been said, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there had been no constitutional definition of citizenship of the United States, or of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured thereby or springing therefrom.. ..
“At one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights which, according to the jurisprudence of the day, were classed as 'natural rights’; and that the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the United States by guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition of this group of rights by every other State. Such was the view of Justice Washington.
*382“While this description of the civil rights of the citizens of the States has been quoted with approval, it has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does not import that a citizen of one State carries with him into another fundamental privileges and immunities which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the State first mentioned, but, on the contrary, that in any State every citizen of any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own.” (Footnotes omitted.)
The third and most recent general pronouncement is that authored by Mr. Justice Marshall for a nearly unanimous Court in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 660-661 (1975), stressing the Clause's “norm of comity” and the Framers’ concerns:
“The Clause thus establishes a norm of comity without specifying the particular subjects as to which citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction of another are guaranteed equality of treatment. The origins of the Clause do reveal, however, the concerns of central import to the Framers. During the preconstitutional period, the practice of some States denying to outlanders the treatment that its citizens demanded for themselves was widespread. The fourth of the Articles of Confederation was intended to arrest this centrifugal tendency with some particularity. ...
“The discriminations at which this Clause was aimed were by no means eradicated during the short fife of the Confederation, and the provision was carried over into the comity article of the Constitution in briefer form but with no change of substance or intent, unless-it was *383to strengthen the force of the Clause in fashioning a single nation.” (Footnotes omitted.)
When the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been applied to specific cases, it has been interpreted to prevent a State from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of other States in their pursuit of common callings within the State, Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871); in the ownership and disposition of privately held property within the State, Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898); and in access to the courts of the State, Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (1920).
It has not been suggested, however, that state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distinguish among persons. Suffrage, for example, always has been understood to be tied to an individual’s identification with a particular State. See, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). No one would suggest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a State to open its polls to a person who declines to assert that the State is the only one where he claims a right to vote. The same is true as to qualification for an elective office of the State. Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U. S. 891 (1974); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (NH), summarily aff’d, 414 U. S. 802 (1973). Nor must a State always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do. Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, supra; cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those “privileges” and “immunities” bearing upon the vitality of The Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally. Here we must *384decide into which category falls a distinction with respect to access to recreational big-game hunting.
Many of the early cases embrace the concept that the States had complete ownership over wildlife within their boundaries, and, as well, the power to preserve this bounty for their citizens alone. It was enough to say “that in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of [a] state, the legislature is [not] bound to extend to the citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own citizens.” Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3,230) (CC ED Pa. 1825). It appears to have been generally accepted that although the States were obligated to treat all those within their territory equally in most respects, they were not obliged to share those things they held in trust for their own people. In Corfield, a case the Court has described as “the first, and long the leading, explication of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause,” see Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S., at 661, Mr. Justice Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, although recognizing that the States may not interfere with the “right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to- reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal,” 20 6 F. Cas., at 552, none*385theless concluded that access to oyster beds determined to be owned by New Jersey could be limited to New Jersey residents. This holding, and the conception of state sovereignty upon which it relied, formed the basis for similar decisions during later years of the 19th century. E. g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896).21 See Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 67 Mont. 558, 216 P. 776 (1923). In Geer, a case dealing with Connecticut’s authority to limit the disposition of game birds taken within its boundaries, the Court roundly rejected the contention “that a State cannot allow its own people the enjoyment of the benefits of the property belonging to them in common, without at the same time permitting the citizens of other States to participate in that which they do not own.” 161 U. S., at 530.
In more recent years, however, the Court has recognized that the States’ interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim to “own,” including wildlife, is by no means absolute. States may not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources, even their wildlife, to their own people whenever such hoarding and confinement impedes *386interstate commerce. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911). Nor does a State’s control over its resources preclude the proper exercise of federal power. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S. 265 (1977); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529 (1976); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920). And a State’s interest in its wildlife and other resources must yield when, without reason, it interferes with a nonresident’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948). See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).
Appellants contend that the doctrine on which Corfield, McCready, and Geer all relied has no remaining vitality. We do not agree. Only last Term, in referring to the “ownership” or title language of those cases and characterizing it “as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction,” the Court pointed out that that language nevertheless expressed “ ‘the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.’ ” Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S., at 284, citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S., at 402. The fact that the State’s control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal regulation and certain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their absence.
We need look no further than decisions of this Court to know that this is so. It is true that in Toomer v. Witsell the Court in 1948 struck down a South Carolina statute requiring nonresidents of the State to pay a license fee of $2,500 for each commercial shrimp boat, and residents to pay a fee of only $25, and did so on the ground that the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. , Id., at 395-403. See also Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415 (1952), another commercial-livelihood case. Less than three years, however, after the decision in Toomer, so heavily relied upon by appellants *387here, the Court dismissed for the want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota holding that the total exclusion from that State of nonresident hunters of migratory waterfowl was justified by the State’s assertion of a special interest in wildlife that qualified as a substantial reason for the discrimination. State v. Kemp, 73 S. D. 458, 44 N. W. 2d 214 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U. S. 923 (1951). In that case South Dakota had proved that there was real danger that the flyways, breeding grounds, and nursery for ducks and geese would be subject to excessive hunting and possible destruction by nonresident hunters lured to the State by an abundance of pheasants. 73 S. D., at 464, 44 N. W. 2d, at 217.
Appellants have demonstrated nothing to convince us that we should completely reject the Court’s earlier decisions. In his opinion in Coryell, Mr. Justice Washington, although he seemingly relied on notions of “natural rights” when he considered the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, included in his list of situations, in which he believed the States would be obligated to treat each other’s residents equally, only those where a nonresident sought to engage in an essential activity or exercise a basic right. He himself used the term “fundamental,” 6 F. Cas., at 551, in the modern as well as the “natural right” sense. Certainly Mr. Justice Field and the Court invoked the same principle in the language quoted above from Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., at 180. So, too, did the Court by its holdings in Ward v. Maryland, Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, and Blake v. McClung, all supra, when it was concerned with the pursuit of common callings, the ability to transfer property, and access to courts, respectively. And comparable status of the activity involved was apparent in Toomer, the commercial-licensing case. With respect to such basic and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union, the States must treat residents and nonresidents without unnecessary distinctions.
*388Does the distinction made by Montana between residents and nonresidents in establishing access to elk hunting threaten a basic right in a way that offends the Privileges and Immunities Clause? Merely to ask the question seems to provide the answer. We repeat much of what already has been said above: Elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is a recreation and a sport. In itself — wholly apart from license fees — it is costly and obviously available only to the wealthy nonresident or to the one so taken with the sport that he sacrifices other values in order to indulge in it and to enjoy what it offers. It is not a means to the nonresident’s livelihood. The mastery of the animal and the trophy are the ends that are sought; appellants are not totally excluded from these. The elk supply, which has been entrusted to the care of the State by the people of Montana, is finite and must be carefully tended in order to- be preserved.
Appellants’ interest in sharing this limited resource on more equal terms with Montana residents simply does not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union. Appellants do not — and cannot — contend that they are deprived of a means of a livelihood by the system or of access to any part of the State to which they may seek to travel. We do not decide the full range of activities that are sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation that the States may not interfere with a nonresident’s participation therein without similarly interfering with a resident’s participation. Whatever rights or activities may be “fundamental” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we are persuaded, and hold, that elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is not one of them.
V
Equal protection. Appellants urge, too, that distinctions drawn between residents and nonresidents are not permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend*389ment when used to allocate access to recreational hunting. Appellees argue that the State constitutionally should be able to charge nonresidents, who are not subject to the State’s general taxing power, more than it charges its residents, who are subject to that power and who already have contributed to the programs that make elk hunting possible. Appellees also urge that Montana, as a State, has made sacrifices in its economic development, and therefore in its tax base, in order to preserve the elk and other wildlife within the State and that this, too, must be counted, along with actual tax revenues spent, when computing the fair share to be paid by nonresidents. We need not commit ourselves to any particular method of computing the cost to the State of maintaining an environment in which elk can survive in order to find the State’s efforts rational, and not invidious, and therefore not violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
A repetitious review of the factual setting is revealing: The resident obviously assists in the production and maintenance of big-game populations through taxes. The same taxes provide support for state parks utilized by sportsmen, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1; for roads providing access to the hunting areas, Tr. 156-158, 335; for fire suppression to protect the wildlife habitat, id., at 167; for benefits to the habitat effected by the State’s Environmental Quality Council, id., at 163-165; for the enforcement of state air and water quality standards, id., at 223-224; for assistance by sheriffs’ departments to enforce game laws, Defendants’ Exhibit G, p. 13; and for state highway patrol officers who assist wildlife officers at game checking stations and in enforcement of game laws. Forage support by resident ranchers is critical for winter survival. Tr. 46-47, 286. All this is on a continuing basis.
On the other side of the same ledger is the great, and almost alarming, increase in the number of nonresident hunters — in the decade of the 1960’s, almost eight times the increase in resident hunters; the group character of much non*390resident hunting, with its opportunity for license “swapping” when the combination license system is not employed, id., at 237;22 the intermingling of deer and elk in the wild and the inexperienced hunter’s inability to tell one from the other; the obvious limit in the elk supply; the supposition that the nonresident occasional and short-term visitor is more likely to commit game-law violations; the need to supervise hunting practices in order to prevent violations and illegal overkill; and the difficulties of supervision in the primitive areas where the elk is found during the hunting season.
All this adds up, in our view, to no irrationality in the differences the Montana Legislature has drawn in the costs of its licenses to hunt elk. The legislative choice was an economic means not unreasonably related to the preservation of a finite resource and a substantial regulatory interest of the State. It serves to limit the number of hunter days in the Montana elk country. There is, to be sure, a contrasting cost feature favorable to the resident, and, perhaps, the details and the figures might have been more precisely fixed and more closely related to basic costs to the State. But, as has been noted, appellants concede that a differential in cost between residents and nonresidents is not in itself invidious or unconstitutional. And “a statutory classification impinging upon no fundamental interest . . . need not be drawn so as to fit with precision the legitimate purposes animating it. . . . That [Montana] might have furthered its underlying purpose more artfully, more directly, or more completely, does not warrant a conclusion that the method it chose is unconstitutional.” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 813 (1976).23
*391Appellants also contend that the requirement that nonresident, but not resident, hunters must purchase combination licenses in order to be able to obtain a single elk is arbitrary. In the District Court the State introduced evidence, largely uncontradicted, that nonresident hunters create greater enforcement problems and that some of these problems are alleviated by this requirement. The District Court’s majority appears to have found this evidence credible and the justification rational, and we are in no position to disagree. Many of the same factors just listed in connection with the license fee differential have equal pertinency for the combination license requirement. We perceive no duty on the State to have its licensing structure parallel or identical for both residents and nonresidents, or to justify to the penny any cost differential it imposes in a purely recreational, noncommercial, nonlivelihood setting. Rationality is sufficient. That standard, we feel, has been met by Montana. So long as constitutional requirements have been met, as we conclude is the case here, “ [protection of the wild life of the State is peculiarly within the police power, and the State has great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its protection.” Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 552 (1924).24
*392The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

 Montana statutorily defines one’s place of residence. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §83-303 (1966 and Supp. 1977). It imposes a durational requirement of six months for eligibility to receive a resident’s hunting or fishing license. §26-202.3 (2) (Supp. 1975). Appellants, other than Baldwin, make no claim to Montana residence and do not challenge §§ 83-303 and 26-202.3 (2) in any way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40.

 We note, in passing, that most States charge nonresidents more than residents for hunting licenses. E. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 16.05.340 (1977) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-4-102 (Supp. 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 2401 (Supp. 1977); Wis. Stat. §§ 29.10, 29.105, 29.109, 29.12 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. Stat. § 23.1-33 (Supp. 1977). Others are listed in the Appendix to the Brief for Appellees.

 1973 Mont. Laws, ch. 408, § 1, and 1969 Mont. Laws, ch. 172, § 2.

 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§26-202.1 (4) and (12), and 26-230 (Supp. 1977). A nonresident, however, could obtain a license restricted to deer for $51. §§ 26-202.1 (9) and 26-230.

 We were advised at oral argument that Montana’s method of use of a combination license is unique among the States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. See Reply Brief for Appellants 29.

 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§26-202.1 (1), (2), and (4) and 26-230 (Supp. 1977).

 There are similar disparities between Montana resident and nonresident hunting licenses for all other game, except wild turkey and as to bow-hunting. The present litigation-, however, focuses only on licenses to hunt elk.
Disparity in rates has not been without criticism. U. S. Public Land Law Review Comm’n, One Third of the Nation's Land 174 (1970); Norman, Are Nonresident Hunters Getting a Fair Deal?, Outdoor Life, Sept. 1949, p. 21; Yeager, The Federal Take-Over, Montana Outdoors, Jan./Feb. 1975, p. 43; Editorial, Field & Stream, June 1974, p. 4.

 App. 56. Its estimated population in 1976 has been said to be 753,000. The World Almanac 695 (1978). Of the 50 States, Montana consistently has ranked 42d or lower in population since statehood. App. 56.

 It has been said that Montana is the State most frequently visited by nonresident hunters. All Outdoors, Michigan Natural Resources 27-28 (Sept.-Oct. 1975).
For the license year 197-3H975, Montana licensed hunters from each of the other 49 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 11 foreign countries. Defendants’ Exhibit A, p. 8 (part of deposition of Don L. Brown). Approximately 43,500 nonresident hunting licenses for deer and *375elk were issued during that year. Id., at 7. The District Court found that elk hunting is recreational in nature and, “except for a few residents who live in exactly the right place,” expensive. 417 F. Supp., at 1009. There was testimony that for a typical seven-day elk hunt a nonresident spends approximately $1,250 exclusive of outfitter’s fee and the hunting license. Tr. 283-284. Thus, while the nonresident combination license fee is not insubstantial, it appears to be a lesser part of the overall expense of the elk hunt.

 The number of nonresident big-game combination licenses is now restricted to 17,000 in any one license year. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 26-202.1 (16) (f) (Supp. 1977). This limitation was imposed by 1975 Mont. Laws, ch. 546, § 1, effective May 1, 1976.
The number of nonresident hunters has not yet reached the 17,000 limit. There are no similar numerical limitations on resident elk or deer licenses.

 The District Court concluded: “The elk is not and never will be hunted commercially.” 417 F Supp., at 1007. Appellants do not deny that the activity which they wish to pursue is pure sport. The hunter is entitled to take only one elk per year, Montana Department of Fish and Game, Deer, Elle, Bear, and Mountain Lion Regulations, Feb. 27, 1977, and statutory restrictions are placed on the buying and selling of game animals, or parts thereof, taken in Montana. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 26-806 (1967).
The Supreme Court of Montana has said: “In Montana, big game hunting is a sport.” State ex rel. Visser v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 150 Mont. 525, 531, 437 P. 2d 373, 376 (1968).

 “[A] property owner in this state must recognize the fact that there may be some injury to property or inconvenience from wild game for which there is no recourse.” State v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 242, 100 P. 2d 86, 93 (1940).

 The concession, was repeated orally in this Court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.

 The District Court made no specific findings or conclusions about the standing of each of the five appellants. It ruled, however, that two of the nonresident plaintiff-appellants, Lee and Moris, had sufficient standing to ma.int.a.in the suit. 417 F. Supp., at 1008. We agree, and find it unnecessary to make any further inquiry on standing. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 189 (1973).

 “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”

 “All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

 “The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free' citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . . .”

 For a description of four theories proffered as to the purpose of the Clause, see S. Doc. No. 92-82, pp. 831-832 (1973).

 The opinion goes on to read:
“Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists.
“But the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, express or implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer must, therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent of other States to their enjoyment therein be given.” 8 Wall., at 180-181.

 It is possible that this is the language that Mr. Justice Roberts in the quotation, supra, at 381, from Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S., at 511, rather critically regarded as relating to “natural rights.” We suspect, however, that he was referring to the more general preceding sentences in Mr. Justice Washington’s opinion:
“The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and *385sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.” 6 F. Cas., at 551-552.

 The rationale of these cases seems not to have been affected by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the inclusion therein of a new protection for “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Appellants do not argue that the State of Montana has deprived them of anything to which they are entitled under this provision, so we need not consider here the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S., at 511 (opinion of Roberts, J.); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); R. Howell, The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship (1918).

 It is, of course, possible for residents, with single-animal licenses, hunting in groups to engage in license swapping.

 The appellants point to the facts that federal land in Montana provides a significant contribution to the elk habitat, and that substantial apportionments to the State flow from the Federal Aid in the Wild Life Restoration Act, 50 Stat. 917, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §§ 669—669i (1976 *391ed.). We fad to see how these federal aspects transform a recreational pursuit into a fundamental right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or how they impose a barrier to resident-nonresident differentials. Congress knows how to impose such a condition on its largess when it wishes to do so. See 16 U. S. C. § 669 (1976 ed.). See also Pub. L. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1314, adding § 6 (f) (8) to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U. S. C. § 460l-8 (f)(8) (1976 ed.).

 The dissenting opinion in the District Court ascribes to the majority there a holding that “an otherwise invidious discrimination against nonresidents is justified because the state may rationally consider the discrimination necessary to induce residents to support the state program required to conserve the herd.” 417 F. Supp., at 1011. We agree with that dissent that the State’s need or desire to engender political support for its conservation programs cannot by itself justify an otherwise invidi*392ous classification. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 266 (1974). But, in our view, the record, that is, the case as proved, discloses that the classification utilized in Montana's licensing scheme is not “otherwise invidious discrimination.''