Court Opinion

ID: 9596559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:14.505954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:35.566461
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority purports to apply a strict construction to the Dram Shop Act, but instead inserts words the legislature never intended, I dissent.
*516In 1985, this Court held that under the common law of this State, a person who furnished alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person under the legal drinking age, knowing that the minor would soon be driving a car, is liable in tort to a third person injured by the negligence of the intoxicated minor.1 Following that decision, the legislature enacted a statute that broadened the common law remedy. Under the common law rule, no liability attached unless the provider of alcohol had actual knowledge that the purchaser was underage and would be driving soon, but under the statute implied knowledge is sufficient.2 Additionally, the legislature permitted the imposition of liability for furnishing alcohol to noticeably intoxicated persons of legal drinking age and not just to minors.3 Because the legislature has broadened the scope of the common law remedy, the majority errs in purporting to use a strict rule of construction, which applies only when the statute is in derogation of the common law.
Instead, we should “apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe a statute according to its terms, [and] to give words their plain and ordinary meaning.”4 Additionally, “legislation intended to promote the public safety should receive a reasonable and practical interpretation to that end.”5 Finally, the majority’s strict construction is plainly at odds with the construction given to the very same statute in Riley v. H & H Operations, in which this Court liberally construed the statute by looking to the policy behind it, and concluded that a narrow construction would render the Act an ineffective sanction against the evils of drunk driving.6
The Dram Shop Act, OCGA § 51-1-40 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that a
person... who knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such . . . person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is the proximate cause of such injury or damage.
*517Decided June 16, 2005
Reconsideration denied June 30, 2005.
Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Richard B. North, Jr., Clinton F. Fletcher, for appellant.
Winburn, Lewis & Stolz, Gene M. Winburn, Irwin W. Stolz, Jr., Eason, Kennedy & Associates, Richard B. Eason, Jr., for appellee.
The plain language of the statute would clearly apply to a person serving alcohol anywhere. Nothing in the Act even remotely supports the majority’s rule limiting its application to a “traditional land-based supplier.”
In order to amend the statute as it deems appropriate, the majority relies on numerous factors that fit the facts of this case, but simply make bad law. While this case involved an international airport in a large city, there are smaller airports in this State that are not connecting hubs and that allow passengers to have immediate and direct access to their vehicles upon deplaning. But now all airplanes are excluded. While the commercial objective of flying is not the consumption of alcohol, it is also true that the consumption of alcohol is not the commercial objective of many restaurants, concerts, charitable balls, and business meetings. But under the majority’s opinion, a plaintiff states a cause of action only if the commercial objective of the supplier of alcohol was the provision of alcohol. While it is true that an airline may not know whether a passenger is going to be operating a car soon, the same can be said for most other providers of alcohol in large settings. Whether the provider of alcohol had knowledge that the customer would soon be operating a vehicle, as opposed to calling a taxi, taking public transportation, or riding home with a friend has previously been a question of fact, rather than decisive of whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted.7
Under the majority’s interpretation, the only cases under the Act that will survive a motion to dismiss are ones brought against the homeowner who hosts a small dinner party, greets his guests at the door, mixes the martinis himself, and when the party is over, stands at the door, and waves good-bye to his departing guests. It may seem unlikely that the plaintiff in this case could ultimately meet his burden of proof to establish liability, but that is not the standard for deciding a motion to dismiss. As the plain language of the statute does not support the majority’s result, I dissent.
*518King & Spalding, Benjamin F. Easterlin IV, John P. Brumbaugh, Alan A. Stevens, amici curiae.

 Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 (327 SE2d 716) (1985).

 See Riley v. H & H Operations, 263 Ga. 652, 654 (436 SE2d 659) (1993).

 OCGA § 51-1-40 (b).

 Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 (587 SE2d 24) (2003); OCGA § 1-3-1.

 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625, 627 (604 SE2d 175) (2004).

 Riley, 263 Ga. at 654.

 Sugarloaf Café, Inc. v. Wilbanks, 279 Ga. 255 (612 SE2d 279) (2005) {summary judgment appropriate where evidence did not create an issue of fact to show that owner knew intoxicated patron would soon be driving).