Court Opinion

ID: 9476514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:57:47.713771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:21.670627
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I would give due deference to the Bureau of Prisons policy and uphold the clear intent of the sentencing judge.
I.
Following conviction on seventeen counts of conspiracy, making false statements, and diversion of federally insured housing project funds, Norris could have been sentenced to more than fifty years incarceration if the statutory maximum penalties had been imposed consecutively. In the exercise of his discretion, the sentencing judge sentenced Norris under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651 (West 1985)1 to a total of nineteen years suspended on the service of 1,190 days followed by three years probation.
Norris moved for reduction of his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, acknowledging that:
This sentence was imposed for the purpose of not allowing the defendant to become eligible for parole and the court in its wisdom felt that this sentence was appropriate under the circumstances then and there existing.
Norris stated that he had “no quarrel with the court’s assessment of this sentence,” *25but asked the court to impose a “term certain” so that he would be eligible for parole. The sentencing judge refused to impose a “term certain,” but did reduce Norris’ confinement to 850 days. Norris then filed a second Rule 35 motion which was denied.
Having exhausted his avenues of relief in the sentencing court, Norris filed this action challenging the validity of the Bureau of Prisons policy which renders him ineligible for parole. The district court hearing the petition found that the Bureau had incorrectly interpreted 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3651 and 4205 (West 1985) and ordered that Norris be afforded a parole hearing. In doing so, it completely disregarded the intent of the sentencing judge.
II.
Under Section 4205(a), only a prisoner “confined and serving a definite term or terms of more than one year” is eligible for parole. (Emphasis added.) The Bureau of Prisons policy prohibiting parole eligibility on split sentences is logically based on the reasoning that a Section 3651 sentence is not a “definite term” since the prisoner is released from confinement subject to satisfactory completion of a probationary period.
A Section 3651 split sentence is nothing more than the imposition of a suspended sentence followed by probation with a period of incarceration required as a special condition of probation. The period of incarceration is not a “definite term” since the sentencing court retains jurisdiction over a probationer until the expiration of the entire term of probation and has the power to revoke probation and to require service of all or any part of the suspended sentence if the probationer violates any condition of his probation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3653 (West 1985).
The majority relies on scant legislative history to support its conclusion. This history is void of any intent that split sentences not be imposed consecutively on multiple counts, and it is certainly not prohibited by the statute. Indeed, the Bureau of Prisons policy which interpreted Sections 3651 and 4205 was established in 1972. In 1976 Congress reenacted Section 4205(a) without change and without comment on the Bureau of Prisons’ longstanding interpretation. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 222 (1976); see S.Rep. No. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 335, 343. This is persuasive evidence that the interpretation was not contrary to the intent of Congress. See N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). The Board of Prisons’ interpretation is a reasonable one and is therefore entitled to considerable deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Talley v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir.1977).
III.
The majority cites the rationale of Burnett as applicable. To the contrary, Burnett dealt specifically with a sentencing judge who, given parole considerations, attempted to use a “split sentence” to require a defendant to serve more time than if the statutory maximum sentences had been imposed consecutively on a multiple count indictment. Clearly, this is not the case before us. It is undisputed that the sentencing judge was fully aware of the Bureau of Prisons policy and that he intended for Norris to serve 850 days, less good-time credits. The sentencing judge could have elected to sentence Norris to a definite term of seven years which would have made him eligible for parole after serving approximately 850 days. Instead, he chose to use split sentences to accomplish this same result. The majority disregards this clear intent by ruling that Norris is eligible for parole after only serving approximately 283 days. Such a potential windfall is unjustified in light of the clear and unambiguous intent of the district judge.
The sentencing judge imposed a legal sentence on Norris. The longstanding and *26reasonable Bureau of Prisons policy renders him ineligible for parole.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3651, 3653 and 4205 are repealed effective November 1, 1987. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, §§ 212, 218(a), 98 Stat.1987, 2027 (1984).