Court Opinion

ID: 9704196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:26:36.387662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:17.756838
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
I agree with the majority that Act 144 established the definitive date for eliminating the opportunity for Pennsylvanians to enter into common law marriages. I write separately because I do not believe that Act 144 overruled this Court’s holding in PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). Rather, I believe Act 144 implemented our holding in PNC Bank Corp.
The majority states that in abolishing common law marriage, this Court intended that the PNC Bank Corp. holding “would be applied prospectively to any common law marriages entered after that date,” i.e., the date of the PNC Bank Corp. decision. Majority Opinion at 1244. However, a date certain for implementation of the PNC Bank Corp. holding does not appear anywhere in that decision.
We did say that the effect of the PNC Bank Corp. holding should be prospective. In the first paragraph of the decision, the following was said:
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the time has come to abolish the doctrine, [of common law marriage], but that this decision should be given purely prospective effect.
PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1272. We explained our reasons for making the abolition of common law marriage prospective as follows:
On balance, we believe these factors favor purely prospective application in this case ... Finally, prospective application will give our Supreme Court an opportunity to review our holding, and minimize any disruption that might result should we have somehow misunderstood that body’s intention.
Id. at 1283 (emphasis added). Our order in PNC Bank Corp. did not provide a date of application; the order stated as follows:
AND NOW, this 17th day of September, 2003, the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in the above captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
Id. at 1286. In sum, in not one of these critical statements does a specific date appear for the implementation of the PNC Bank Corp. holding.
We did not specify a date of implementation so that (1) the Supreme Court could review our decision and (2) the disruption caused by such a dramatic change in the law could be minimized. Id. at 1283.1 The *1250General Assembly responded to these concerns by establishing that the date for “prospective” application of PNC Bank Corp. would be January 1, 2005.2
In any case, I agree with the majority’s holding that Act 144 is the sole basis for determining the date on which common law marriage ended in Pennsylvania. That date is January 1, 2005, and it is the legislature’s date that is dispositive in this appeal.

. A court has discretion to delay the effective date of its holding. In County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 517 Pa. 65, 76, 534 A.2d 760, 765 (1988), the Supreme Court stayed its judgment voiding county funding of the judicial system "to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to enact appropriate funding legislation consistent with this holding.” In PNC Bank Corp., there was a disconnect between the judgment and the holding. We affirmed the award of workers’ compensation benefits to a common law spouse, finding that he had satisfied the demands of the common law marriage doctrine. We deferred an effective date of the holding to allow the Supreme Court to review our decision. Before it did so, the General Assembly enacted Act 144. The majority's reliance on Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 634, 643, 757 A.2d 842, 847 (2000) is misplaced. The issue in Fiore was whether a *1250new rule of law had been effected. Fiore did not address when a holding becomes effective.

. Section 1 of the Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 954 (Act 144) stated:
No common-law marriage contracted after January 1, 2005, shall be valid. Nothing in this part shall be deemed or taken to render any common-law marriage otherwise lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005, invalid.
23 Pa.C.S. § 1103.