Court Opinion

ID: 9941980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 13:05:54.013665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:34.047227
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                  No. COA22-1063

                               Filed 20 February 2024

Wake County, Nos. 18 CRS 215678-79

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

              v.

ERIC RAMOND CHAMBERS, Defendant.

        Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 April 2022 by Judge Rebecca W.

Holt in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January

2024.

        Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Caden W.
        Hayes, for the State.

        Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Heidi
        Reiner, for defendant-appellant.

        DILLON, Chief Judge.

        Defendant Eric Ramond Chambers appeals from judgments entered following

jury verdicts convicting him of certain felonies.    Based on precedent from our

Supreme Court, we conclude that Defendant’s right under our state constitution to a

properly constituted jury was violated. Therefore, we vacate Defendant’s convictions

and remand this case for a new trial.

                                 I.     Background

        Defendant was tried for various crimes in connection with a 21 August 2018
                                 STATE V. CHAMBERS

                                  Opinion of the Court

shooting at a Raleigh motel which left a man dead and a woman injured. Defendant

represented himself at trial.

      After jury deliberations began, Juror #5 informed the trial judge that he could

not return the next day because of a scheduled doctor’s appointment. The trial court

dismissed Juror #5, replaced him with an alternate juror, and instructed the jury to

begin its deliberations anew with the alternate juror. Defendant was not in the

courtroom at the time of the substitution.

      The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder and assault with a

deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. He was sentenced to life

in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and 110 to 144

months for the assault conviction.

                           II.   Appellate Jurisdiction

      Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The State filed a motion to

dismiss the appeal. In our discretion, we allow Defendant’s petition for writ of

certiorari to consider the merits of the case and deny the State’s motion to dismiss.

                                 III.   Analysis

      Defendant makes several arguments on appeal. We, however, address only his

argument that his right to a properly constituted jury was violated, as our resolution

of that issue is dispositive. Specifically, for the reasoning below, we agree with

Defendant’s argument that the trial court’s substitution of an alternate juror after

jury deliberations had begun constitutes reversible error.

                                         -2-
                                 STATE V. CHAMBERS

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Our North Carolina Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be convicted

of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court[.]” N.C. Const. art.

I, § 24.   Our Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to preclude juror

substitution during a trial after the commencement of jury deliberations. State v.

Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 255–57, 485 S.E.2d 290, 291–93 (1997).

      In Bunning, shortly after jury deliberations had begun, a juror informed the

court that she could not continue with jury deliberations due to a medical issue; she

was, therefore, excused and replaced with an alternate juror. Id. at 255, 485 S.E.2d

at 291. The trial court then instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew. Id. On

appeal, our Supreme Court held that the defendant’s right under our state

constitution to a properly constituted jury was violated by this substitution:

             In this case, the jury verdict was reached by more than
             twelve persons. The juror who was excused participated in
             the deliberations for half a day. We cannot say what
             influence she had on the other jurors, but we have to
             assume she made some contribution to the verdict. The
             alternate juror did not have the benefit of the discussion by
             the other jurors which occurred before he was put on the
             jury. We cannot say he fully participated in reaching a
             verdict. In this case, eleven jurors fully participated in
             reaching a verdict, and two jurors participated partially in
             reaching a verdict. This is not the twelve jurors required
             to reach a valid verdict in a criminal case.

Id. at 256, 485 S.E.2d at 292.

      The present case is strikingly similar to Bunning. Here, like in Bunning, a

juror was excused and replaced with an alternate, after which the trial court

                                         -3-
                                 STATE V. CHAMBERS

                                  Opinion of the Court

instructed the jury to restart its deliberations. Consequently, following the reasoning

in Bunning, the verdict here was also impermissibly reached by thirteen people.

      Thus, we must apply the Bunning analysis to this case and conclude that

Defendant’s constitutional right to a properly constituted jury of twelve was violated

when the trial court substituted an original juror with an alternate juror after the

commencement of jury deliberations.

      We note Defendant’s failure to object to the juror substitution at trial.

Notwithstanding, based on Supreme Court precedent, this error is not waivable and

is, therefore, appropriately before our Court for review. See State v. Hudson, 280 N.C.

74, 78–79, 185 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1971) (ordering a new trial ex mero motu when the

defendant was convicted by eleven jurors, rather than “by the unanimous consent of

twelve jurors[,]” even though the defendant failed to assign the improperly

constituted jury as error); Bunning, 346 N.C. at 257, 485 S.E.2d at 292 (“A trial by a

jury which is improperly constituted is so fundamentally flawed that the verdict

cannot stand.”). See also State v. Hardin, 161 N.C. App. 530, 533, 588 S.E.2d 569,

571 (2003) (holding that the defendant’s failure to object to the alternate juror’s

substitution after the commencement of jury deliberations did not preclude appellate

review).

      We further note that, in 2021, our General Assembly amended a statute to

provide that “[i]f an alternate juror replaces a juror after deliberations have begun,

the court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. In no event shall

                                         -4-
                                       STATE V. CHAMBERS

                                        Opinion of the Court

more than 12 jurors participate in the jury’s deliberations.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

1215(a). However, where a statute conflicts with our state constitution, we must

follow our state constitution. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787). Our General

Assembly cannot overrule a decision by our Supreme Court which interprets our state

constitution. See State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 473,

479 (1989) (“[I]ssues concerning the proper construction and application of North

Carolina laws and the Constitution of North Carolina can only be answered with

finality by [our Supreme] Court.”).1

                                      IV.     Conclusion

       Under existing precedent, Defendant’s right to a properly constituted jury

under our state constitution was violated. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to a

new trial. We need not address Defendant’s remaining arguments.

       NEW TRIAL.

       Judges MURPHY and CARPENTER concur.

       1 Although not raised by Defendant, we note that federal courts have held that substitution of

a juror with an instruction for the jury to begin deliberations anew does not violate the federal
constitution. See Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1575–76 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). However,
our Supreme Court is free to construe our state constitution in a manner which affords rights greater
than that afforded under the federal constitution. State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 648, 503 S.E.2d
101,103–104 (1998) (“States remain free to interpret their own constitutions in any way they see fit,
including constructions which grant citizen rights where none exist under the federal Constitution.”).

                                                -5-