Court Opinion

ID: 9928846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 01:00:45.61811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:40.215403
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10498        Document: 00517051545             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/31/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                     ____________                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                      No. 23-10498                              January 31, 2024
                                    Summary Calendar                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________                                      Clerk

   Christina Traudt,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Data Recognition Corporation,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 3:21-CV-2703
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Plaintiff Christina Traudt claims that Data Recognition Corporation’s
   termination of her employment was the result of discrimination on the basis
   of sex. The district court granted the company’s motion for summary judg-
   ment. We AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 23-10498        Document: 00517051545             Page: 2      Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                        No. 23-10498

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
           Data Recognition Corporation (“DRC”) provides various education,
   assessment, and document services to public entities, primarily K-12 schools.
   DRC hired Traudt, a white woman, as an Assessment Solution Representa-
   tive in January 2018. Traudt was responsible for selling DRC’s products to
   school districts and various adult education organizations such as community
   colleges, prisons, and adult education buildings. Her sales territory included
   Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and North Texas. Traudt had
   both a salary and an Incentive Plan for compensation. The Incentive Plan
   contemplated the payment of monetary awards to employees based on
   “achievement in sales.” Incentive Plan, however, provided that it could be
   “changed or terminated without notice at the sole discretion of [DRC],” and
   that it granted no contractual rights.
           In 2019, DRC entered into an exclusive contract with the Texas Edu-
   cation Agency (“TEA”). This contract made DRC the exclusive statewide
   provider of an English language proficiency test to identify students who
   would qualify for English as a Second Language assistance. Traudt claims
   that she played a key role in securing this contract. Traudt contends that
   through this exclusive contract and her own significant work efforts, she was
   personally responsible for $3,625,886 in sales for Fiscal Year 2019. These
   sales, she claims, should have entitled her to $165,508 in commission under
   the Incentive Plan.
           Instead, Traudt only received $14,628 for the third quarter of the fis-
   cal year, bringing her cumulative commission payments to $18,814 through
   the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 2019. 1 Traudt claims that on multiple

           _____________________
           1
            There was evidence that Traudt was paid an additional $15,000 for her efforts in
   securing the exclusive TEA contract.

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   occasions she raised concerns over the smaller-than-expected commissions
   for her and fellow Assessment Solution Representative Gina Davis. She
   brought these concerns to Bill Bernys, the Vice President of Sales. Bernys
   allegedly responded that if Traudt and Davis were paid according to the In-
   centive Plans, they would earn more than him and David Seitter, the Senior
   Vice President of Sales, Marketing & Product Development — which Seitter
   might disallow. Traudt further alleges that Bernys told her to “leave it alone
   for now or you won’t have a job.”
          With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Traudt received a letter
   in May of 2020 explaining that commissions for the first and second quarters
   of Fiscal Year 2020 would be deferred. Then, in July 2020, DRC terminated
   her employment, ostensibly as part of a workforce reduction resulting from
   lost contracts and revenue during the pandemic. DRC terminated Gina Da-
   vis’s employment as well. Traudt filed suit in November 2020.
          At the district court, Traudt asserted two claims: (1) violation of the
   Equal Pay Act, and (2) sex discrimination, in violation of “Title VII and/or
   the Texas Human Rights Act, Texas Labor Code § 21.001.” Traudt’s claims
   centered around her smaller-than-expected commissions and the termination
   of her employment by DRC. DRC moved for summary judgment, which the
   district court granted. Traudt timely appealed.
                                  DISCUSSION
          We review a district court’s summary judgment de novo, using the
   same standard as the district court. Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480,
   484 (5th Cir. 2014). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
   shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
   is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A
   genuine dispute of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a

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   reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Davis, 765
   F.3d at 484 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
   I.     Traudt’s compensation
          Traudt claims that DRC discriminated on the basis of sex by failing to
   pay higher commissions for her sales.
          To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the Equal
   Pay Act, a plaintiff “must show that (1) her employer is subject to the Act;
   (2) she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, and
   responsibility under similar working conditions; and (3) she was paid less
   than the employee of the opposite sex providing the basis of comparison.”
   Badgerow v. REJ Props., 974 F.3d 610, 617 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks
   and citation omitted). Similarly, “[a] plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
   of wage discrimination under Title VII when she shows that she is a member
   of a protected class who was paid less than a non-member for work requiring
   substantially the same responsibility.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
   omitted). A Title VII claim of wage discrimination will usually parallel a
   claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act. Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health
   Sci. Ct. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Traudt argues that she was discriminated against on the basis of her
   sex because, while she sold significantly more product than male Assessment
   Solution Representatives, she only “received substantially the same
   commission total amount as her male comparators.”
          DRC asserts that Traudt failed to establish both the second element
   (that she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, and
   responsibility under similar working conditions) and the third element (that
   she was paid less than the employee of the opposite sex providing the basis of

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   comparison). We need to consider only the second element, 2 which requires
   that the male employees with whom she compares herself are proper
   comparators.
           DRC claims that Traudt’s compensation was smaller than anticipated
   in part because of the circumstances in which she made her sales. Traudt
   sold the language-testing product under an exclusive, statewide distribution
   contract with the TEA.           Although Traudt asserts that she performed
   extensive work during the period before the contract was obtained, DRC
   introduced evidence that Nina Trigger led the team responsible for securing
   the exclusive contract, including creating some of the materials presented to
   the TEA and helping present DRC’s proposal to the TEA. DRC concludes
   from Nina Trigger’s involvement in securing the distribution contract that
   she, not Traudt, was entitled to commissions from the sales made under the
   exclusive contract. DRC stated: “[c]ommissions were not ‘diverted’ to
   Trigger. She earned them.” 3
           Traudt responds that male employees Jon Weiss and Robert LaGrassa
   were paid in accord with their expectations under the Incentive Plan. The
   discrepancy between their payments under the Incentive Plan and hers, she
   alleges, is due to sex discrimination. She further claims they are appropriate
   comparators “because they held the same job title, were in the same
   department, reported to the same manager, joined in the same commission
   plan, sold the same product, and had exceeded their quotas in the past so as
           _____________________
           2
             We do not reach the district court’s alternative holding that Traudt’s Title VII
   claim for pay discrimination was untimely, even if she could plead a prima facie case.
           3
             We restate here that the Incentive Plan provided both that it granted no
   contractual rights and that it was subject to change at DRC’s discretion. Even if Traudt is
   correct that she (and not Nina Trigger) had the better entitlement to commissions for the
   Texas sales of the language testing product, the Incentive Plan by itself did not bind DRC
   to pay her those commissions.

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   to be in the accelerator areas of the commission plan.” She concludes from
   these similarities that “they are ‘close enough,’” such that “[i]t is for a jury
   to determine whether Weiss and LaGrassa . . . are distinguishable as
   comparators.” We disagree.
          For Weiss and LaGrassa to be appropriate comparators, Traudt
   needed to show she “performed work in a position requiring equal skill,
   effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions” as those two.
   Badgerow, 974 F.3d at 617. Although Weiss and LaGrassa shared with Traudt
   the title of Assessment Solution Representative, that does not establish that
   they performed similar work under similar conditions. Instead, we consider
   it dispositive that Traudt identifies no evidence that Weiss and LaGrassa also
   made their sales under DRC’s exclusive contract with Texas. Titles are not
   critical for comparison purposes. It is the nature of the work and the context
   in which it is performed that control. See id. Without downplaying Traudt’s
   efforts on behalf of DRC, the ability to make sales under an exclusive contract
   that effectively eliminated competitors’ alternatives is a decisive difference
   between her working conditions and those of Weiss and LaGrassa.
          Because Traudt cannot show that she performed work requiring equal
   skill and under similar working conditions as her purported comparators, her
   prima facie case of wage discrimination fails. See Badgerow, 974 F.3d at 617.
   DRC is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of Traudt’s
   compensation.
   II.    Traudt’s termination
          Traudt claims that DRC committed sex discrimination by terminating
   her and Gina Davis’s employment instead of terminating male employees.
          To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show
   that she “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the
   position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment

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   action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside [her]
   protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
   employees outside the protected group.” Roberson-King v. La. Workforce
   Comm’n, Office of Workforce Dev., 904 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation
   omitted). Once the plaintiff makes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to
   the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse
   employment action against the plaintiff. Id. The employer’s burden “is only
   one of production, not persuasion, involving no credibility assessments.”
   Russel v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). The
   burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the purportedly
   nondiscriminatory reason is “merely pretextual.” Roberson-King, 904 F.3d
   at 381 (citation omitted). In doing so, the plaintiff must offer “substantial
   evidence” of pretext; “a mere shadow of a doubt is insufficient,” and the
   employee’s subjective belief alone is not enough. Auguster v. Vermilion Parish
   Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          Traudt argues that DRC discriminated against her and Gina Davis
   because “both she and Gina Davis were let go despite having better
   performance numbers than comparable male employees.” DRC responds
   that it terminated Traudt’s employment as part of a reduction in workforce
   of more than fifty employees due to lagging sales from the COVID-19
   pandemic. Traudt and Gina Davis were among those included in the
   workforce reduction because of (1) their relative lack of seniority with the
   company and (2) the ability of other, more senior employees to absorb their
   responsibilities. DRC emphasizes that even after the workforce reduction,
   over 70 percent of its sales team remained female.
          Although Traudt offers several reasons why DRC’s termination
   decision was pretextual, we agree with the district court that, assuming for
   the sake of argument that Traudt has established a prima facie case of

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   discrimination, she has not met her burden to show that DRC’s given reasons
   for her termination are pretextual.
           Traudt states that “men were shown preferential treatment, because
   one would think sales would be the principal method of evaluating sales
   employees, and the two female employees who were let go were the top two
   sales performers.” This assertion by itself is not responsive to DRC’s
   explanation that its workforce reduction was guided by seniority and
   coverage overlaps. Nina Trigger and Genevieve Olvera, the two remaining
   Texas sales team members, started with DRC in 2007 and 2006, respectively.
   Traudt and Gina Davis, on the other hand, were hired in 2014 and 2018,
   respectively. Further, DRC’s Senior Vice President Seitter testified that
   Trigger and Olvera were able to absorb Traudt’s and Davis’s responsibilities
   because they also worked in sales, had experience with the language testing
   product that Traudt and Davis sold, and had business relationships in Texas.
           Traudt’s efforts to rebut the seniority and coverage overlap
   explanations are unpersuasive.            Traudt asserts the coverage overlap
   explanation is pretextual because DRC hired a “Brand Ambassador” not
   long after terminating her employment. Her declaration before the district
   court claimed that “[t]he job description [for the new Brand Ambassador
   position] was virtually identical to what Gina [Davis] and I had been doing,
   but was not commissioned.” 4 This attempted rebuttal fails for two reasons.
   First, the position of Brand Ambassador was filled by a woman, Felicia
   Taylor. Traudt is alleging that DRC discriminated against her because of her
   status as a female. The hiring of another female does not rebut a company’s
   explanation that it was not motivated by sex discrimination. Second, this
           _____________________
           4
             Gina Davis’s declaration contained exactly the same charge against DRC’s
   creation of the Brand Ambassador position: “The job description was virtually identical to
   what Christina [Traudt] and I had been doing, but was not commissioned.”

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   sparse allegation — that the new position was “virtually identical” to what
   Traudt had been doing, but without commission — is not enough to survive
   summary judgment. We have nothing more than this statement to compare
   Traudt’s role as Assessment Solution Representative with the new role of
   Brand Ambassador.       As we stated, “[a] party cannot defeat summary
   judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a
   scintilla of evidence.” Davis, 765 F.3d at 484. This assertion by Traudt is
   not “substantial evidence” of pretext that would rebut DRC’s explanation.
   See Auguster, 249 F.3d at 402–03.
          Traudt also asserts that DRC hired another sales representative to
   work in Texas. In their declarations, both Traudt and Gina Davis stated that
   they “also later learned from DRC employees that Chastity Wright was
   rehired as a sales representative to work in Texas, but only to sell the TABE
   product, not the” language-testing product. This sparse assertion, like the
   one pertaining to the Brand Ambassador position, is insufficient to show that
   DRC’s explanation of coverage overlap in Texas was pretextual. DRC was
   entitled to summary judgment on the issue of Traudt’s termination.
   III.   Retaliation against Traudt
          Traudt also claims her termination amounted to wrongful retaliation
   in violation of Title VII. She asserts that DRC fired her as an act of retaliation
   after she complained about sex discrimination in the payment of
   commissions.
          To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show
   “(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse
   employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected
   activity and the adverse employment action.” Saketkoo v. Administrators of
   Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and
   citation omitted). An employee “has engaged in activity protected by Title

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   VII if she has either (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
   practice’ by Title VII or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
   in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.”
   Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
   2000e-3(a)). Demonstrating all three elements “gives rise to an inference of
   retaliation,” at which point the burden “shifts to the employer to articulate
   a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
   Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation
   marks and citations omitted).
          Traudt argues that she engaged in protected activity because she
   “complained about the pay inequity” to Bill Bernys. In her declaration, she
   alleges that she “inquired about where the rest of my hard-earned money
   was”; later, she “confronted [Bernys] about it during a weekly Texas sales
   meeting,” and “pointed out and restate[d] our Texas sales numbers, and that
   everyone else on the sales team had been paid according to the Plan.”
          The problem for Traudt is that her declaration’s own recounting of
   the confrontations with Bernys give no indication that she suggested an
   inequity problem based on a worker’s sex. Although her declaration supports
   that she complained about not being paid enough under the Incentive Plan, a
   complaint by a member of a protected class is not inherently an assertion that
   the complainant is being discriminated against because of their membership in
   the protected class. We agree with the district court: “Plaintiff’s complaint
   about her commissions did not reference any unlawful discrimination or
   express the view that men were receiving their full commissions while
   women were not.”
          Traudt responds that “Bernys seemed to understand the complaint
   had gender discrimination overtones, because he pointed out that if they were
   paid according to the Plan, Davis and Traudt would be paid more than him

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   and David Seitter (i.e. two women would be paid more than two men), and
   he didn’t know if David would allow that.” Her own recounting of the
   confrontations with Bernys, though, belies a claim that she raised the issue of
   a discrepancy based on an employee’s sex with him. Traudt’s declaration
   states that she told Bernys “everyone else on the sales team had been paid
   according to the Plan”; the sales team included females other than Traudt
   and Gina Davis. In light of Traudt’s complaint that “everyone else on the
   sales team,” which necessarily included women, had been paid, the only
   reasonable interpretation of Bernys’s alleged response is that David Seitter
   might not allow two sales representatives (Traudt and Davis) to make more
   than the Senior Vice President of Sales, Marketing & Product Development
   (Seitter) and the Vice President of Sales (Bernys). The implausible inference
   that Traudt would have us draw — that Bernys understood the nature of her
   complaint because she indeed complained to him about the sex disparity —
   does not amount to more than an “unsubstantiated assertion” or “scintilla
   of evidence.” See Davis, 765 F.3d at 484. We conclude that DRC is entitled
   to summary judgment on the issue of retaliation.
          AFFIRM.

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