Court Opinion

ID: 9648122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:03:51.224769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.598537
License: Public Domain

TomliNSON, Justice
(dissenting).
The obvious purpose of Chapter 216, Public Acts of 1959, carried in the 1959 T.C.A. Code Supplement commencing with Section 23-1532, is to provide a practical way of eliminating the guess as to the amount which should be paid a landowner for the taking by condemnation proceedings of some of his land for use as a right of way in the building of a highway. Such compensation consists of two elements of damages, to wit, (1) the value of the land actually taken, and (2) the amount of incidental damages, if any, to the rest of his land in *12excess of incidental benefits happening to the rest of his land by reason of the building of the highway.
There is, of course, no difficulty in ascertaining at the time of the taking the value of the land actually taken. But the question of whether the rest of the land will be damaged at all, or a little, or in a large amount is a question not susceptible of definite ascertainment at the time of the taking. It must await the happening of such damage.
Obviously, an award based on mere guess or conjecture creates the danger of a great waste of public funds. As is commonly known, public funds in large amounts have heretofore been so wasted by the wrong guess as to what, if any, incidental damages would be inflicted.
To meet that situation, the 1959 Act requires the officials of the condemner to deposit with the Clerk of the Court at the time the condemnation proceedings are instituted a sum of money which, in the opinion of these officials, will be sufficient to fully compensate the landowner. We must assume that these officials will act in good faith in the amount which they think should be deposited. That landowner may collect this money at once.
This statute then provides that further proceedings in the case may not be had until six months after the project, in so far as that landowner’s property is concerned, has been completed, unless two years have passed since institution of the suit. In such event, the suit shall be proceeded with whether the project has, or not, been completed in so far as that owner’s land is concerned. If it is then determined that the amount of damages is more than the amount previously deposited with the *13clerk, the landowner shall he paid that balance with interest from the institution of the suit. If it is less, he will refund the excess to the condemner. This provision certainly takes the guesswork out of the ascertainment as to the amount of incidental damages, and is calculated to prevent a large waste of public funds.
This method of compensating the landowner certainly cannot he labeled as unfair to him. The method provided by the 1959 statute for ascertaining the amount to he awarded by reason of events which may happen in the future is not new. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 3, Section 8.5(4), pages 27-28, says that the Supremé Court of the United States has held that the law has sufficient flexibility to accommodate itself to such uncertainties by awaiting for that uncertainty to become a certainty. This text quotes the Supreme Court as saying:
‘ ‘ The usual rule for ascertaining value at the time of the taking is not disrespected if one item is made a function of the future because only then can it be known whether that item forms a part of what has been 'taken’. * ** The factors on which such a forecast must be based are too contingent, too unique for guidance by experience, to permit rational assessment. This is a situation where the law should express 'a judgment from experience as against a judgment from speculation’.”
The author cites Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 386, 36 S.Ct. 379, 60 L.Ed. 691, and Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698, 53 S.Ct. 736, 77 L.Ed. 1449.
This 1959 statute provides that unless twenty-four months have passed since the suit was instituted further *14proceedings shall be stayed until six months after the project has been completed. It, of course, means a completed project in so far as a particular landowner’s property is involved. The amount of incidental damages, if any, can be definitely ascertained as well the day after such project is completed as it can six months thereafter. I am in accord, therefore, with the majority opinion that this six months provision is an arbitrary exercise of the police power of the State; hence invalid. However, this statute has a very broad separability clause, and the elimination of the six months provision in no way affects the efficacy of the statute. So, it may be elided, Davidson County v. Elrod, 191 Tenn. 109, 232 S.W.2d 1.
With the six months provision elided, the statute provides that after the institution of the suit no further proceedings shall be had until the highway is completed, in so far as it affects the particular landowner’s property, unless twenty-four months have elapsed. In that event, the suit may be proceeded with Section 23-1532, 1959 T.C.A. Code Supplement, notwithstanding the highway is not completed in so far as it affects this particular owner’s property.
The majority opinion holds this delay a violation of Article 1, Section 17 of our Constitution providing that every man “for an injury done him in his lands * * * shall have * * * justice administered without * * * delay”. I cannot agree with that conclusion.
It is an undisputable fact that the subject matter is one of public interest. The police power of this State “covers everything relating to the public interests, and in its exercise a large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature, which, in the first instance, is presumed *15to know, not only what the welfare of the public requires, but also what measures are necessary for its advancement”. Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 442, 53 S.W. 955, 960, 56 L.R.A. 316. The only limitation is that such police power must not be exercised arbitrarily.
This reasonable exercise of police power of the State is as applicable to Article 1, Section 17 of our Constitution as it is to any other subject. In the text of 16A C.J.S. Constituional Law sec. 719, page 1227, there is this statement:
“Nevertheless, the right to prompt justice is subject to the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of the general welfare (citing cases) * * *.
“Reasonable regulations in regard to the commencement and prosecution of suits do not violate the constitutional guaranty which declares that justice shall be administered without delay; (citing cases) and the proper exercise of discretionary power to stay proceedings does not violate the guaranty.” (Citing-eases.)
The majority opinion recognizes the soundness of the principle which the 1959 statute seeks to activate. That opinion makes the statement that “a reasonable delay in allowing the landowner his full right in court as to compensation is perfectly satisfactory * * *.” That being so, it seems clear to me that the Legislature in the exercise of its police power may provide for such delay. And if it does, as it here has, the only authority of this Court, in my opinion, is to determine whether the delay required by the statute is unreasonable. Unless it is unreason- *16• able, it is not the function of this Court, in my opinion, to interfere with the legislature’s act.
In the West Virginia ease of Simms v. Dillon, 119 W. Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331, 334, reported in 113 A.L.R. 787, at page 791, with reference to this question the Court said:
“What criterion shall be used in determining what is a reasonable time is not disclosed by the cases. We think, however, that, if there is a reasonable basis for postponing the time of the determination and payment of the compensation due the owner, the legislative determination of what such time is will not be unconstitutional.”
This appears in the West Virginia case, supra, 193 S.E. at page 334, 113 A.L.R. at page 791:
“The Legislature of West Virginia, by the act in question, has established that the time for the determination of the damages for the land taken and the benefits and damages to the residue is after a reasonable time for the completion of the work has passed. There is no doubt that so far as determining the benefits and damages to the residue the time fixed by this act is the most appropriate, because it will be possible to determine with accuracy just what the work will amount to as affecting the remaining property. ’ ’
That Court thought this a reasonable delay; hence, within the power of the Legislature.
Our 1959 statute is practically to the same effect as the West Virginia statute, Code, 54-2-14. It provides that the proceedings for determination of the value in excess of that already paid, if there be any such excess, *17be determined when the construction of the highway with reference to such owner’s property has been completed, bnt that if it is not completed within two years from the institution of the suit no further delay may be had, even though the project has not been completed. I think this is a reasonable exercise by the Legislature of its police power; hence, that it is a valid enactment. I have been unable to find any case on all fours with the case at bar which holds otherwise.
The majority opinion says that the Kentucky case of Commonwealth ex rel. Tinder v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214, 216, is to the contrary, and uses that case in support of its conclusion. I respectfully disagree with the statement that this case is in point.
It appears from the face of this decision that the Constitution of Kentucky with reference to the requirement that justice shall be administered without delay is the same as that provision appears in our Constitution. It is carried at its Section 14. The Kentucky Court in this Commonwealth ex rel. Tinder v. Werner case, supra, made this statement: “While it must be conceded that Section 14 is not a limitation on the legislature to define ‘due course of law’ ”, yet in the light of Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution the legislature is without authority to delay proceedings until the damages are ascertained, and makes this statement: “We conclude, as did the trial court, that section 14, when construed in the light of section 26, prohibits ’ ’, this legislation. Its Section 26 is this:
‘ ‘ To guard against transgression of the high powers which we have delegated, We Declare that everything in this Bill of Rights is excepted out of the general *18powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and all laws contrary thereto or contrary to this constitution, shall be void. ’ ’
There is no such provision in the Tennessee Constitution.
" The other two authorities relied upon by the majority opinion are Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. 1, and a remark made in Nashvill Housing Authority v. Doyle, 197 Tenn. 555, 276 S.W.2d 722.
The statute involved in Townsend v. Townsend purported to delay the issuance of an execution upon a judgment until two years after its rendition unless the judgment creditor elected to receive payment in certain bank notes. I am unable to see any connection between the statute purporting to require a judgment creditor to wait two years to collect his judgment and the statute involved here providing for a delay of proceedings for the award of damages until those damages have actually been inflicted unless two years have passed since the proceedings were instituted.
The statement quoted from Nashville Housing Authority v. Doyle, 197 Tenn. 555, 558, 276 S.W.2d 722, 724, is this:
“Under this Act if we should hold that The Housing Authority could take the property of the land owner without the latter being paid immediately this would offend Article 1, Section 21, of the Constitution of Tennessee, and would render the Act invalid.”
I think the author meant to say Article 1, Section 17, the constitutional provision involved here. This opinion, prior to making that statement, defines the question for decision in the case as follows:
*19“The only question before ns is the question of interest, that is whether the property owner is entitled to interest on the amount paid into court by The Housing Authority pursuant to the declaration of taking filed by the condemner.” 197 Tenn. at page 557, 276 S.W.2d at page 723.
It is apparent, therefore, that the statement on page 558 of 197 Tenn., on page 723 of 276 S.W.2d has no bearing whatever upon what the Court says the question is. It cannot be labeled otherwise than as dictum.
PRewitt, Chief Justice, joins in this dissent.