Court Opinion

ID: 9716636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:46:39.3496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.411176
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: Since the filing of our decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), both this court and our appellate court have been beset with appeals which continue to raise questions concerning the proper application of Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) once a plea agreement has been accepted by the circuit court. The procedural history of this case is typical of these appeals. See 186 Ill. 2d at 69-71. See also People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261, 264-65 (1998) (noting procedural history of the case). That these questions continue to arise indicates, to me at least, that our previous opinions have provided inadequate guidance in this area for either bench or bar. I am concerned that today’s opinion does not go far enough in interpreting the motion-to-reconsider provisions contained in the language of Rule 604(d) so as to provide this needed guidance. I, therefore, write separately to explain why I believe both of the defendants in this consolidated appeal must move to vacate their pleas in order to challenge their sentences. In Evans, this court concluded that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) are inapplicable to situations where a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State’s agreement to (i) dismiss other charges and (ii) recommend a specific sentence, a plea arrangement which we characterized as “negotiated.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Under these circumstances, a defendant who attempts to reduce the agreed-upon sentence seeks “to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentence” earlier agreed upon. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. We noted that such a practice “flies in the face of contract law principles” (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327) because “the guilty plea and the sentence ‘go hand in hand’ as material elements of the plea bargain.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Therefore, in order to avoid “gamesmanship of a most offensive nature” (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327), we held that, in such situations, a defendant must first move to vacate the plea even if he or she only wishes to challenge the imposed sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. In reaching this decision, we contrasted the “negotiated” plea at issue with an “open” guilty plea. An open guilty plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty “without receiving any promises from the State in return.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Because the defendant receives no inducements to plead guilty from the prosecutor in such cases, “[b]oth good public policy and common sense dictate that defendants who enter open guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only their sentences without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. We then held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) apply only to open guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Unfortunately, our use of the term “negotiated” plea, without elaboration on its meaning beyond the facts in Evans, has led to a certain amount of confusion in our lower courts. The reason is simple — not all “negotiated” pleas are the same. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308 (1997) (and cases cited therein). In my view, there are four distinct plea scenarios that usually occur whenever a defendant decides to forgo the right to trial: (a) The “open” or “blind” plea — defendant pleads guilty without any inducement from the State, and the circuit court exercises its full discretion and determines the sentence to be imposed at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing. (b) The “negotiated as to charge” plea — defendant pleads guilty solely in exchange for the State’s dismissal of remaining or outstanding charges. This type of plea can also include situations in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State’s reduction of the original charge to a lesser offense. In either case, the circuit court exercises its full discretion and determines the sentence to be imposed at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing. Under this scenario, despite the existence of the agreement, the State retains its ability to argue at the sentencing hearing for a sentence from the full range of penalties provided for in the Code of Corrections including maximum sentences and extended terms. (c) The “negotiated as to charge and/or sentence” plea— defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the State’s dismissal of remaining or outstanding charges and recommendation of a sentencing cap or range. In certain cases, defendant will only agree to plead guilty as charged in exchange for a sentence recommendation or range. Under this scenario, the State’s ability to argue at the hearing for a sentence within the full range of penalties provided for in the Code of Corrections is limited by the parameters of its agreement with defendant. (d) The “fully” negotiated plea — defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the State’s dismissal of charges and agreed upon sentence, and trial court accepts plea and sentences according to the agreement. This is the situation addressed in Evans. These four scenarios, by and large, represent the many variations of plea agreements which come under the scrutiny of a court of review. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 20.1 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing history of plea bargaining and giving examples). The above scenarios demonstrate that several plea bargaining options can fall under the generic label of a “negotiated” plea. A review of Illinois decisional law postdating Evans indicates that the appellate court has found the application of Rule 604(d)’s motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions problematic in cases which involve “negotiated” pleas which fall under the second and third scenarios. See People v. Sanders, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1042 (1997); People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1997); People v. Leach, 284 Ill. App. 3d 4 (1996). The present case concerns negotiated pleas which arise under the third plea bargain scenario identified above. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that to allow defendants in that situation to seek reconsideration of their sentences without also moving to withdraw their pleas “unfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while giving the defendant[s] the opportunity to avoid or modify those terms.” 186 Ill. 2d at 74. The majority reaches this conclusion because “[b]y agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a defendant is, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds that it is excessive. [Citation.] While the defendant may not like the sentencing court’s ultimate disposition, that is a risk he assumes as part of his bargain. A defendant who is unwilling to accept that risk should not agree to a cap rather than a fixed term.” 186 Ill. 2d at 74. I have no quarrel with this rationale; however, I believe that the majority’s decision to focus primarily on defendant’s view of the bargain does not go far enough in addressing the question presented for our review. Equally critical to the analysis, if not more so, are the sentencing concessions, if any, the State agrees to make as part of its bargain with a defendant. It is the existence of a sentencing concession which triggers the application of the holding in Evans to the agreements at issue today, as I explain below. Here, the State’s sentence cap recommendations, in addition to its agreement to drop certain charges, are part and parcel of its agreements with defendants. As a result, the State, by virtue of its bargain with defendants, had limited its ability to argue at sentencing for a sentence from the full panoply of penalties contained in the Code of Corrections. Thus, when a defendant only seeks reconsideration of this type of bargained-for sentence, such actions “fl[y] in the face” of the contract principles enunciated in Evans and should not be condoned. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Just as the specific sentence and plea went “hand in hand” as material elements- of the plea bargain in Evans, so too does the sentence cap and plea at issue here. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. As such, defendant has received a sentencing benefit from the agreement — the State has not sought a sentence above the cap. Thus, it is the State’s sentencing concession, clearly a material component of its bargain with defendant, which distinguishes the “negotiated” plea in the third scenario from the “negotiated” plea contemplated in the second scenario identified above. In the latter scenario, the State has not made any facet of sentencing an element of its bargain with defendant. Stated differently, defendant in such situations pleads guilty without receiving any promises from the State with respect to sentencing in return. When the State does not provide any sentencing inducement for a defendant in its plea bargain, such a “negotiated” plea,- at least for purposes of the sentencing hearing, more closely resembles the “open” plea than the “negotiated” plea at issue in Evans. Therefore, in such cases, a defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence would not run afoul of his or her agreement — the parties never made the sentence a part of their bargain — and all contract principles are honored. None of the concerns of Evans arise in such cases, and its holding necessarily is inapplicable to them. On the other hand, the holding in Evans applies to all plea agreements in which the State, as part of its agreement, forgoes or limits its ability at sentencing to seek a sentence from the full range of penalties set forth in the Code of Corrections. These negotiated agreements raise the same type of “gamesmanship” concerns that were present in Evans. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28. Thus, even if a defendant wishes to challenge only the sentence imposed, he or she must first move to vacate the plea. If the court grants the relief, both parties would then be returned to the status quo as it existed prior to the acceptance of the plea. As I noted at the beginning of this special concurrence, our decision in Evans has generated considerable questions about its applicability to various types of plea bargains. The majority today unfortunately misses the opportunity to distinguish definitively those “negotiated” pleas that fall under the Evans rule from those that do not. As a result, I fear that today’s opinion regarding the current motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) will not be our last.