Court Opinion

ID: 9566284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:36:08.180306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:33.395459
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice.
Appellant Linda Matney, seller, sought specific performance of a contract for the sale and purchase of real estate she owned in Rawlins, Wyoming. The trial court found against her because she had not allowed the buyer, appellee Bruce Webster, a reasonable time to perform a condition of the contract.
We affirm.
Matney raises these issues:
“I. May a standard purchase offer, acceptance and receipt agreement provision requiring the purchaser to pay any costs required to repair a home heating system be interpreted to allow the purchaser to replace the system, in his discretion, pri- or to closing?
“II. Was a sufficient time afforded to the purchaser to provide repairs under the facts and circumstances of this case?”
On July 27, 1989, Matney and Webster entered into a contract for the purchase of a house Matney owned at 109 East Buffalo in Rawlins, Wyoming for $55,000. Under the terms of the contract, the purchase was to be financed with a Wyoming Community Development Authority (WCDA) loan, and Webster was to be responsible for any repairs required as a condition for the loan.
A WCDA loan requires approval from the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). On September 11, 1989, HUD set the appraised value of the property at $50,100. HUD also required repairs to the heating system and improvement to the drainage around the house.
Because the HUD appraisal was less than the contract’s purchase price, Webster had the option, under HUD regulations, of cancelling the contract. That contract was cancelled, and Matney and Webster entered into a new contract on September 20, 1989, for the purchase of the property at its appraised value of $50,100. As with the parties’ original contract, the purchase was to be financed with a WCDA loan, and Webster was to be responsible for the cost of the required repairs.
Webster did get estimates on repairing or replacing the heating system and improving the drainage, but by late October the repairs had yet to be made. On October 27, 1989, Matney’s attorney sent a letter to Webster threatening a lawsuit if the repairs were not made. Matney filed a lawsuit demanding specific performance of the contract on November 13, 1989. Mat-ney’s attorney, on November 17, 1989, sent Webster a second letter demanding performance. Webster’s answer also contained counterclaims asking the contract to be terminated.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied both motions except to find that a contract existed between the parties. The contract provided no date for closing or for completing the repairs. Following a trial to the court on May 30, 1990, judgment was entered in favor of Webster, the court concluding that Webster was entitled to a reasonable time to complete repairs and that he had not been afforded that reasonable time.
In her first issue, Matney claims the trial court incorrectly held that Webster could have replaced as well as repaired the heating system even though the contract only provided that Webster was responsible for repairs. Repair in this context means “to restore to a sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction.” Wyoming Coal Mining Co. v. Stanko, 22 Wyo. 110, 128, 138 P. 182, 183 *214(1914) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary). Replacement of the heating system would have certainly restored it to “a sound or good state.” We find no error in the trial court recognizing that Webster could have met the repair requirement by replacing the heating system. See Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Frazier, 183 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir.1950).
Matney’s second issue challenges the finding that Webster had not been afforded a reasonable time to perform his repair obligation.
“Where no time for performance is specified, the law implies performance must be within a reasonable time and what is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each case.” Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, 546 P.2d 436, 439 (Wyo.1976).
What constitutes a reasonable time in any particular case is a question of fact. Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 907 (N.D.1975).
The contract for purchase was entered into September 20, 1989. The suit demanding specific performance was filed on November 13, 1989. The rights of the parties to an action are determined as of the time the action is commenced. 1A C.J.S. Actions § 234 (1985). Thus, we examine the record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the 54-day period between the signing of the contract and commencement of suit did not afford Webster a reasonable time to perform. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaves out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the successful party’s evidence and gives the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 315 (Wyo.1989).
One of Matney’s witnesses was Lynda Klouda, assistant vice president of commercial and real estate loans at the Rawlins National Bank. Klouda worked with Webster in his effort to finance the purchase of the property. Klouda’s testimony demonstrated a familiarity with these types of real estate transactions. She testified that Webster met with her four or five times during September and October; that he obtained estimates from a number of contractors for replacing or repairing the heating system and correcting the drainage problem, and discussed the alternatives and cost with her. She stated Webster never indicated a desire to not complete the purchase but always acknowledged his obligation and desire to proceed. In October, Webster advised Klouda that Matney was pressuring him to close because she had signed a contract to purchase another property and needed the money. He asked if they could close before repairs were complete, and Klouda started to work on getting permission from HUD to allow Webster and Matney to close completing firm commitments for the repairs. Before that process could be completed, Matney brought her suit.
Another of Matney’s witnesses was the real estate salesman who was handling the purchase of the other property Matney contracted to purchase. He testified that some closings take longer than others and when that happens closing dates are changed. He testified that the closing date on the new property was changed to accommodate Matney.
HUD’s commitment upon the loan to Webster did not expire until March 11, 1990. Webster had until that date to satisfy HUD’s requirements and qualify for the loan. Matney sued Webster in November, three and one-half months before HUD’s loan commitment expired. Although the record demonstrates Matney’s eagerness to close, nothing suggests that a reasonable time for Webster to perform had passed. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that a reasonable time had not been afforded Webster to perform and that he did not breach the contract.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Webster which included judgment in his favor upon the counterclaim asking termination of the contract. As a result of the judgment, the contract is terminated and *215no longer of force or effect. See 6A Cor-bin, Corbin on Contracts § 1318 (1962).
Affirmed.
GOLDEN, J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.