Court Opinion

ID: 9572406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:28.313685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:53.091630
License: Public Domain

*774SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
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This is a stamp. It is a 29 cent stamp.1 It is all that was necessary to eliminate the need for this appeal.
This contract of insurance provides in part:
A person claiming any coverage of this policy must also:
1. Assist us in any claim or suits;
2. Promptly send us any legal papers received relating to any claim or suit [•]
(Emphasis added.) All attorneys Fuller and Gordon had to do was mail a copy of the Schmit summons and complaint to American to comply with the aforementioned policy provision. Instead, they did almost everything they could to keep American from getting notice and defending the “default” judgment. For their efforts of concealment and deception, we should reverse this case and require a trial instead of affirming a “hidden default judgment.”
The trial court was clearly erroneous in finding American had sufficient notice of the suit against Schmit. While almost every pleading document generated in Kremer v. Schmit, Civ 89-31, was served upon Schmit by mail, no pleading documents' were sent to American even though Kremer’s attorneys knew they were going to seek uninsured motorist benefits from American as early as the spring of 1989. Both Attorney Gordon and Mrs. Kremer admitted that they never told anyone at American, including agent Ramsey Kendall, that the Kremers were going to look to American for uninsured motorist benefits. Instead, Kremers played “hide the ball” so that they could obtain a default judgment and then spring it upon American. As the majority opinion points out, they even went so far as to “purposely wait[] 78 days after taking the default judgment before notifying American that the default judgment had been entered and requesting $100,000 under the ‘uninsured motorist’ provisions of the policy.” American attempted to show, by offer of proof, that Attorney Fuller admitted the reason he did not give notice of the Default Judgment was that he did not want American to be able to appeal. SDCL 15-26A-6.2
In order for there to be any repudiation of liability, as Kremers assert, American must first be adequately informed of the filing and pendency of the claim so that it can take appropriate action. Without full notice, there can be no repudiation of liability. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Souras, 78 Md.App. 71, 552 A.2d 908 (1989), the court noted, “[i]t is settled law that considerations of due process require notice in order for an insurer to be bound by the outcome of the tort action.” Id. 552 A.2d at 911 (citation omitted).
The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.
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An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.
*775Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); First Nat’l Bank of Eden v. Meyer, 476 N.W.2d 267, 270 (S.D.1991).
Kremers ignore the fact that Lisa Serck’s understanding was that Mrs. Kremer was “suing the other company.” Arguably, American received notice of the hearing on October 16, 1989, when Gordon called Serck for a list of medical expenses paid by American. This conversation, limited as it was, occurred less then two hours before the default hearing. In Erickson v. Bennett, 409 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.App.1987), the insurance company received a copy of the summons and complaint but had only one day’s oral notice of the default hearing. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying the insurance company’s motion to intervene and to vacate the default judgment and stated:
St. Paul should have the right to dispute the questions which make it liable on its contract and should not be penalized when it was put on notice of the default hearing in an untimely manner
Id. at 887. Kremer’s notice to American was not notice but deception and it was not legally sufficient to satisfy due process standards.
In this case, Mrs. Kremer obtained a default judgment in the amount of $150,000 without an adversarial determination of liability and damages. An uninsured motorist carrier cannot be bound by a default judgment without an adversarial determination of liability and damages. MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 245 Ark. 95, 431 S.W.2d 252 (1968). As the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted in Erickson:
A significant dispute exists here as to both the issues of liability and damages. The default hearing was marked by a complete absence of the adverse relationship essential to fully and fairly litigate these issues, including the strongly contested issue of comparative negligence. St.. Paul has a substantial interest in this action and is entitled to answer Erickson’ complaint, asserting any defenses that may exist to the claim.
409 N.W.2d at 888.
American asks, “[w]hy, if in the spring of 1989 when Mrs. Kremer’s attorneys knew that they were going to look for uninsured motorist benefits from American Family, did they not merely send a letter and a copy of the pleadings so that American Family could take appropriate action?” Is it possible they didn’t have a stamp? It is apparent that this was not done because every attempt was going to be made to get a judgment, whether by confession of judgment or by default, so that American would have to pay. It is also apparent that Mrs. Kremer and her attorneys did not want American to be fully informed about the situation! Why not? Because American could have intervened and litigated the case in an adversarial setting.
If this court affirms this judgment, we are, in effect, ratifying concealment, deception, and a planned violation of due process. I will have no part of it. This case should go back to square one.3 Kremers should *776have to prove liability and damages against Schmit in a legal setting with bona fide opposition. The foundation of the American legal system is notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to defend. These are the bare essentials of the American judicial process and they apply to insurance companies as well as to individuals. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881, n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, n. 9, 84 L.Ed.2d 751, 761, n. 9 (1985) (citation omitted). Anything less is a violation of due process.
We should reverse and remand for a fair trial and an opportunity to defend.

. At the time that a copy of the Schmit summons and complaint should have been mailed to American Family in 1989, it would have only required a 25 cent stamp.

. SDCL 15-26A-6 provides in part:
An appeal from the judgment must be taken within sixty days after the judgment shall be signed, attested, filed and written notice of entry thereof shall have been given to the adverse party.

. Judge Erickson’s writing claims we do not have authority to send this case back to "square one.” As the moderator in "Evita ” sings "That’s not the point, my friend,” I must reply similarly to Judge Erickson.
If we hold as a matter of law, as we should, that there was insufficient notice, the plaintiffs default judgment will not be binding on American Family. The plaintiff will have to go back to "square one”, to make her judgment binding on American Family. She will have to give American Family notice first and then have an adversarial hearing. As stated in Erickson, “[ajlthough St. Paul sought to vacate the default judgment against Bennett, technically the judgment need not be set aside in order for the issues of liability and damages to be litigated. The matter may proceed with Erickson as party plaintiff and St. Paul as party defendant.” 409 N.W.2d at 888.
Judge Erickson says he "would have been inclined to relieve the default and order a new trial.” The point is that the default was taken against Schmit but not American .Family because of lack of notice. What is wrong with making plaintiff do it right? No one is entitled to a free ride, at someone else’s expense.
The attorneys’ conduct does constitute "concealment, deception and a planned violation of due process” as to American Family. If this statement is “overblown” as Judge Erickson claims, then why did Kremer’s attorneys:
*776(1) fail to send American Family a copy of the Schmit summons and complaint;
(2) fail to send American Family copies of other significant correspondence and documents;
(3) go to such lengths to attempt to get Schmit to "secretly” confess judgment;
(4) fail to send American Family timely notice of the "default” judgment hearing;
(5) purposely wait 78 days after taking the secret "default” judgment before notifying American Family? Because they did not want American Family to even be able to appeal.
I submit the conclusion is obvious, not overblown. All they had to do was put a stamp on the Schmit summons and complaint and mail it to American Family and notify American Family of the time and place of the "default" judgment hearing. If we reward this conduct with an affirmance of $100,000, the entire State, Bench and Bar will pay the price.