Court Opinion

ID: 9755974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:01:27.8815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.489134
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that the trial court has discretion to sentence a defendant for a lesser-included offense that merges with a greater offense for purposes of sentencing.
Twenty-five years ago, Former Chief Justice Nix aptly recognized the illogie of sentencing a defendant for a lesser offense that is an ingredient of a greater offense that he also committed. In Commonwealth v. Nelson, 452 Pa. 275, 305 A.2d 369 (1973), the Court applied the merger doctrine where a defendant was convicted of simple assault and battery and the act of resisting arrest.1 After finding that the crimes merged for sentencing purposes, the majority of the Court held that the defendant may only be sentenced on the simple assault and battery.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Nix found that the majority improperly merged the greater offense— resisting arrest—into the lesser-included offense of simple assault and battery. He explained that the majority assumed that assault and battery was the greater offense because it had a greater penalty. Justice Nix stated that the test for merger is not a comparison of the penalties, but whether the lesser crime is a necessary ingredient of the greater crime. Since simple assault and battery was a necessary included element of resisting arrest, resisting arrest was the greater offense for which the defendant should have been sentenced. Justice Nix properly noted that in the unusual event that the lesser-included crime has the greater penalty, the error should *318be remedied by the legislature—not by treating the lesser offense as the greater.
The majority’s decision in Nelson departs from other Supreme Court precedent. In an earlier merger case, the Court stated that “[i]t follows that the [defendant] having been sentenced for the most serious crime charged in the indictment could not also be sentenced for the lesser crimes which were only constituents of the major felony.” Commonwealth v. Ashe, 340 Pa. 286, 289, 17 A.2d 190, 191 (1941)(emphasis added). More recently, in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20 (1994), the Court defined the merger doctrine in terms of whether the crimes involved are greater and lesser-included offenses based upon whether the elements of one crime are components of another crime. However, since Nelson, the Superior Court has stated that when crimes merge, a defendant may be sentenced for the crime carrying the greater penalty. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505, 422 A.2d 583 (1980)(relying upon Nelson).
The legislature has done exactly as Justice Nix suggested with respect to sentencing for aggravated assault and attempted murder. As the majority recognizes, the legislature amended the statute related to attempted murder. It is no longer graded as a second-degree felony with a lesser sentence than aggravated assault. See 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§ 1102, 1103 (stating sentences for attempted murder and felonies). In cases such as the present, where the amended statute does not apply, the Court should not treat the lesser-included offense as the greater offense. The defendant should only be sentenced for attempted murder and not aggravated assault.

. When Nelson was decided, simple assault and battery was defined at 18 Pa. Stat. § 4708 and resisting arrest was defined at 18 Pa. Stat. § 4314.