Court Opinion

ID: 9672820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:00:51.767507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.549434
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority’s opinion appears to contradict a long line of well-reasoned precedent and policy.1 Furthermore, it ignores the practicalities and intricacies of legitimate and effective law enforcement. Today’s holding severely limits an age-old exception to the search and seizure warrant requirement, the right to search incidental to a lawful arrest.2
The majority opinion concludes that a police officer, after effectuating a full custodial arrest, may only "pat down” an arrestee in a search for *274weapons and fruits of the offense which resulted in the arrest.
The procedure set forth in the majority opinion is analogous to the procedure prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in "stop and frisk” cases.3
However, the policy considerations underlying the search procedures to be employed by police officers in "stop and frisk” cases are readily distinguishable from the policy considerations to be weighed when analyzing search procedures in full custodial arrest cases.
’’Terry v Ohio, supra [392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)], did not involve an arrest for probable cause, and it made quite clear that the 'protective frisk’ for weapons which it approved might be conducted without probable cause. Id., at 21-22, 24-25.
This Court’s opinion explicitly recognized that there is a ’distinction in purpose, character, and extent between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons. ’
" 'The former, although justified in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, Preston v United States, 376 US 364, 367 [84 S Ct 881; 11 L Ed 2d 777] (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 310 [87 S Ct 1642; 18 L Ed 2d 782] (1967) (Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring). Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others *275nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a "full” search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
" ' * * * An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.’ Id., at 25-26. (Footnote omitted.)
"Terry, therefore, affords no basis to carry over to a probable-cause arrest the limitations this Court placed on a stop-and-frisk search permissible without probable cause.” United States v Robinson, 414 US 218, 227-228; 94 S Ct 467; 38 L Ed 2d 427 (1973). (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority concludes that the State of Michigan via the interim bail statute, MCLA 780.581; MSA 28.872(1), has imposed greater restrictions on police activity than those deemed constitutionally necessary by the United States Supreme Court.4 The majority bases its opinion on the premise that the interim bail statute restricts a police officer to a "Terry-type” pat-down search after effectuating a full custodial arrest of an individual who is charged with a traffic violation.
The legislative policy underlying the interim bail statute is to avoid the "unwarranted and unnecessary inconvenience, embarrassment and risk attendant incarceration for a minor traffic offense”. People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691, 705-706; 222 NW2d 749 (1974). It does not circumvent the *276right of a police officer to guarantee his own safety by restricting his right to search an individual who is under full custodial arrest.5
A police officer has every right to insure that the individual he has arrested does not possess any instrument which could be used as a weapon to harm the officer or effectuate an escape.
To support its presumption that the interim bail statute restricts a police officer’s ability to search incidental to a lawful arrest, the majority relies upon People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222 NW2d 749 (1974).
However, the Dixon case, supra, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Dixon, supra, there were two searches, one at the scene of the crime, and another at the station house. The latter search produced the evidence upon which Dixon was convicted. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the second search was in violation of Dixon’s statutory right to bail. MCLA 780.581; MSA 28.872(1). The Court reasoned that the second search was an inventory search which did not stem from the objective of protecting the arresting officer. Hence, there was no need to search Dixon unless he was to be incarcerated.
In the instant matter, the search in question was conducted at the scene of the crime by the arresting officer for his own protection. Therefore, the Dixon case is not applicable to the facts in the instant matter.
The majority, while recognizing this factual distinction, extends Dixon to cover the initial search incidental to an arrest in order "to shore up what would otherwise be a gaping loophole in the law”. *277I cannot condone what I perceive to be an improper extension of the Dixon case, supra.
It should be noted that the Dixon Court carefully distinguished the facts in that matter from the United States Supreme Court cases of United States v Robinson, supra, and Gustafson v Florida, 414 US 260; 94 S Ct 488; 38 L Ed 2d 456 (1973).
"Discovery of the heroin is not validated by the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in United States v Robinson, 414 US 218; 94 S Ct 467; 38 L Ed 2d 427 (1973), and Gustafson v Florida, 414 US 260; 94 S Ct 488; 38 L Ed 2d 456 (1973).

"The Court predicated the right to search there as an incident of the arrest and the need of the officer to protect himself.

"Dixon had already been searched for weapons before even entering the police car. The station house procedures were not intended nor could they be justiñed as a further search for either weapons or possible fruits of the crime. ” Dixon, supra, at 706. (Footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.)
The Dixon Court restricted its holding so as to render it inapplicable to initial searches incidental to a lawful arrest. The majority’s abolition of this limitation disregards the fact that the Dixon Court carefully avoided issuing an opinion that conflicted with the holdings of the Robinson and Gustafson cases, supra.
Hence, the majority is attempting to extend the holding of the Dixon case to an area expressly avoided by the Dixon Court. Such an extension is unwarranted and is not supported by the interim bail statute or the Dixon case.
Therefore, I would deem the search conducted in the instant matter a valid exercise of a police officer's right to search without a warrant incidental to an arrest.
*278Accordingly, I would admit the contraband taken from defendant’s person into evidence and affirm his conviction.

 See United States v Lefkowitz, 285 US 452; 52 S Ct 420; 76 L Ed 877 (1932), Harris v United States, 331 US 145; 67 S Ct 1098; 91 L Ed 1399 (1947), Trupiano v United States, 334 US 699; 68 S Ct 1229; 92 L Ed 1663 (1948), United States v Rabinowitz, 339 US 56; 70 S Ct 430; 94 L Ed 653 (1950), Preston v United States, 376 US 364; 84 S Ct 881; 11 L Ed 2d 777 (1964), Chimel v California, 395 US 752; 89 S Ct 2034; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969).

 The majority holds that a police officer may only conduct a "Terrytype” pat-down search even though the individual is under full custodial arrest. In order for a police officer to conduct a more intensive search he must have further justification (probable cause) to believe that the person arrested possesses a weapon. Hence, where a police officer feels an item which he cannot identify, which is the case here, he is precluded from searching further unless he has probable cause to believe it is a weapon.

 See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). It should be noted that "Terry-type” searches are permitted incidental to an investigative stop based upon less than probable cause to arrest. In the instant matter we are dealing with a full custodial arrest.

 A state is free to adopt greater restrictions on police activity than those that the Supreme Court deems to be necessary in respect to Federal constitutional standards.

 This writer fails to see how the purpose of the interim bail statute is undermined by allowing a police officer to insure that an individual who is under full custodial arrest does not possess any weapon which might be used to harm the officer.