Court Opinion

ID: 9479924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:33:00.145843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:22.386620
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge,
joined by KEITH and NATHANIEL R. JONES, JJ., dissenting.
I adhere to the views expressed in the original panel opinion in the instant case, which is reported at 853 F.2d 1340. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The original panel decision held that a state court’s failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, even in a non-capital case, raises a constitutional question that is cognizable on habeas corpus review. Based upon the Supreme Court’s opinions in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), and Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982), the original panel held that “failure to give a requested instruction [of a lesser included offense] could deprive the defendant of the fundamental right to a fair trial secured by the fourteenth amendment.” 853 F.2d at 1342. The majority today concludes that “the Supreme Court’s opinion in Beck is grounded upon Eighth Amendment concerns, rather than those arising from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” I disagree.
In Beck the Supreme Court held that the death sentence may not constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilty of a capital offense where the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense. 447 U.S. at 633-46, 100 S.Ct. at 2387-94. Two years later, in Hopper, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in a habeas case, which posed the following question:
[Wjhether ... a new trial is required in a capital case in which the defendant’s own evidence negates the possibility that ... an instruction [on a lesser included offense] might have been warranted.
456 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 2050.
The Court concluded:
Beck held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. But due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction.
Id. at 611, 102 S.Ct. at 2052. I believe that although Beck and Hopper, as capital cases, required a heightened scrutiny of what process is due, the dispositive issue was whether the failure to give the lesser included offense instruction made the trial fundamentally unfair.
I continue to adhere to the view that due process is the appropriate analysis and that the lesser included offense instruction rule of Beck and Hopper applies to non-capital as well as to capital cases. This court has consistently applied the rationale of Beck and Hopper in non-capital cases. See, e.g., Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610 (6th Cir.1988); Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418 (6th Cir.1987); Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772 (6th Cir.1986); Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967 (6th Cir.1984). In these cases, this court found that the evidence did not *803warrant the giving of a lesser included offense instruction. However, as stated in Prather, if the evidence had warranted it, the constitution would require the giving of the lesser included offense instruction.
Thus, if a reasonable jury, on the evidence presented, could have convicted Prather of attempted second-degree (unarmed) robbery and acquitted him of the attempted first-degree (armed) robbery charge, then Prather’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial court refused to give the lesser-included offense instruction and the habeas writ should issue.
822 F.2d at 1423. I believe that it is consistent with previous pronouncements of this court to find that due process requires the giving of a lesser included offense instruction when warranted by the evidence in a non-capital case.
The original panel majority also held that a lesser included offense instruction was warranted under the circumstances of the instant case. Analogizing this case to Reed v. Commonwealth, 738 S.W.2d 818 (Ky.1987) and Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 338, 224 S.W.2d 152 (1949), the original majority found that several facts support this conclusion.
In the instant case, although petitioner did not take the stand himself, he presented an alibi defense. The victim testified on direct examination as follows with respect to the question of penetration:
Q. Had you as far as any injury that you, no, let me ask you first, was there any penetration, did he, tell what happened about the sexual act.
A. Yes, he had intercourse with me. Yes he did.
Q. Alright, now the second time on the bed was there any penetration at that time?
A. Yes, he was trying, he was drunk.
Q. Now, when you say he was trying because, was he trying for penetration or do you—
A. He was trying[.]
Q. Well did he actually insert his penis inside?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind? A. No.
On redirect examination she testified as follows:
Q. I realize the statement that you said, you know, that you were afraid, I mean, even his condition, do you know, was it a normal intercourse act or—
A. I don’t know. I haven’t had sex enough to tell you what exactly.
Q. Well, is there any doubt that he did have his penis inside of you?
A. There is no doubt.
Dr. Shipp, the doctor who examined the victim after the incident also testified at trial. On direct examination, he stated that he could not say technically that intercourse did or did not take place. He stated that judging from a slide he made it would appear that ejaculation in the vagina had not taken place. Dr. Shipp also testified concerning the effects of alcohol on a man’s ability to perform sexually:
Q. Doctor in your medical studies, you know, in medical school and residency and also in your speciatly [sic] can you state with any degree certainity [sic] as to the affects [sic] of alcohol on a man’s ability to ejaculate if he’s under the influence?
A. Yes, it’s a well know [sic] fact that somebody, a man that’s been drinking say, or not necessarily intoxicated but just had several drinks, a it [sic] cuts down on the chances, the chances of ejaculation and also performance as far as actually achieving erection and so on. Alcohol directly affects that. It can depend on the amount that, a few drinks, a person could still perform but may or may not ejaculate. A person who is intoxicated can not perform at all.
Q. Depending on the degree of a persons [sic] ability, if they had a certain amount they might have an erection but have intercourse but have no ejaculation but then at some point and time they wouldn’t even be able to have an erection.
*804A. If they were intoxicated enough. On Cross-examination, Dr. Shipp testified that the victim sustained no genital trauma.
Police Officer Shirley Carter testified that the lab analyses of the rape kit and the victim’s clothes were negative.
Reed and Blankenship make it clear that Kentucky law requires petitioner in the instant case to have received a jury instruction on first-degree sexual abuse. The victim’s testimony concerning the act of penetration was equivocal. Additionally, none of the experts were able to opine that penetration had occurred. Dr. Shipp’s testimony on the effects of alcohol on a man’s ability to perform sexually and the negative results of the lab analyses raise further doubt on the question of penetration. Therefore, the state court should have given an instruction on the lesser offense of first-degree sexual abuse.
853 F.2d at 1344-45.
I remain convinced that the facts of the instant case warranted a lesser included offense instruction. The victim’s equivocal testimony constituted the only evidence of penetration. Several examinations and procedures performed by police and various health care professionals were unable to corroborate the victim’s testimony. Finally, petitioner introduced evidence of his intoxication and of the debilitating effect which intoxication may have on the ability to perform sexually.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court’s judgment insofar as it relates to petitioner’s conviction of first-degree rape and remand this case to the district court with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the Commonwealth of Kentucky grants Bagby a new trial within a reasonable time.1

. I would affirm the district court’s judgment insofar as it relates to petitioner's conviction of second-degree burglary and conviction under the persistent felony offender sentencing statute for the reasons stated in the original panel opinion.