Court Opinion

ID: 9859446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:43:31.106014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:00:50.024359
License: Public Domain

Heher, J.
(concurring in reversal). Related as it is to the issue of malice and punitive damages, N. J. S. 2A:43-2, I hold the view that the sufficiency of the “retraction” was peculiarly the province of the jury in the particular circumstances. See, e. g., Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394, 47 P. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1896). In Risk Allah Bey v. Johnstone (1868) 18 L. T. N. S. 620, Cockburn, Ch. J. said, charging a jury, that it was for them to consider whether the retraction was “fairly sufficient.” See also Osborne v. Troup, 60 Conn. 485, 23 A. 157 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1891).
But I concur in the holding that the privilege granted by N. J. S. 2A:81-10 was waived by the defense of fair comment and good faith, followed by testimony of the defendant editor and writer of the allegedly libelous article that the content of the writing came from “a reliable source.” The *156defendants could not, by way of defense, justify the publication as emanating from a “reliable source,” and then refuse to identify the source and thus preclude the qualitative assessment pertinent to the sufficiency of the defense in this regard. The defendant cannot invoke the statutory privilege to render conclusive their own evaluation of the character and quality of the source. This is basic to due process. Otherwise, cross-examination relevant to a crucial issue would be denied. The statute has no such sweep. It was not designed to reach this situation.
Hehee, J., concurring in result.
For reversal and remandment— Chief Justice Vandebbilt, and Justices Heheb, Olippiaht, Jacobs and Beenhan — 5.
For affirmance — Justice Wacheheeld — 1.