Court Opinion

ID: 9739057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:07:55.424672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.735362
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE H. LEWIS, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I believe, as does the majority, that a person held to answer for a crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary is entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing. Under section 109 — 3.1(b) of the Code, effective January 1, 1984, “[e]very person in custody in this State for the alleged commission of a felony shall receive either a preliminary examination *** or an indictment by Grand Jury *** within 30 days from the date he or she was taken into custody.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 109 — 3.1(b).) A “prompt” preliminary hearing is thus one which is held within 30 days. Until 1984, no constitutional or statutory remedy existed for the violation of a defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights to a prompt preliminary hearing. However, effective January 1, 1984, section 114— l(aXll) of the Code was enacted. It provides that where a defendant makes a written motion prior to trial, either before or after a plea has been entered, the court may dismiss the indictment, information, or complaint against the defendant for failure to provide a preliminary hearing in accordance with the requirements of section 109 — 3.1. The majority relies heavily on that portion of section 114 — l(aXll) which states the court “may” dismiss. Section 114 — 1(a) recites a litany of reasons why a court may dismiss a case, one of which, set forth in section 114 — l(aXll), is that the requirements of section 109 — 3.1 have not been complied with. I believe that under section 109 — 3.1(b), unless one of the exceptions applies, dismissal without prejudice is mandatory. Section 109 — 3.1(b), providing for preliminary examination or indictment within 30 days, says “shall” and means “shall.” The legislature also provided an “out” for the State when it did not preclude the State from the opportunity to return a new indictment or to file a new charge. The majority hypothesizes that “a delayed preliminary hearing of only 10 days without dismissal of the charge worked to shorten the aggregate length of time defendant would have been held in custody without a preliminary hearing if a new charge had to be brought, defendant’s custody was continued, and a new preliminary hearing date had to be reset.” (Emphasis in original.) (231 Ill. App. 3d at 508.) What the trial court may or may not have done had it granted defendant’s motion requires speculation well beyond the purview of this court. The majority also says that it does not mean to give wholesale approval to any attempt to ignore the time limitations specified by the statute. I am sure it does not, but what it is saying is that, unless the trial court abuses its discretion, this court will not reverse. However, I believe the statute is clear. Unless a preliminary hearing is conducted within 30 days, in the absence of an applicable exception, the cause shall be dismissed without prejudice. In this case, clearly, none of the exceptions apply. The trial court found that the preliminary hearing had been set within the 30-day period but, due to a snowstorm, it was not possible to have the hearing. This incident does not fall within any exception. I also believe, contrary to the majority’s view, that the cases involving the running of the speedy-trial period and those cases involving faulty indictments give us guidance. See People v. Meier (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 490, 585 N.E.2d 232. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge against him without prejudice for failure to hold a prompt preliminary hearing within the statutorily mandated period of time. I would reverse the defendant’s conviction.