Court Opinion

ID: 9497874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:02:16.928426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:28.401287
License: Public Domain

BEA, Circuit Judge,
with whom KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:
The question presented in this case is whether an assignee of an accrued cause of action for copyright infringement, who has no legal or beneficial interest in the copyright itself, has standing to sue for copyright infringement. Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. (“Sony”) appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss Nancey Silvers’s (“Silvers”) claim for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) for lack of standing under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). After rehearing en banc, the Majority now holds such assignees do not have standing to sue for copyright infringement and reverses the district court’s order denying Sony’s motion to dismiss.
I believe that the text, purpose and history of the 1976 Copyright Act (“1976 Act”) allow such assignees of an accrued copyright claim to sue for infringement. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*896I.
I quite agree with the Majority that the starting point in this case is necessarily the statute under which Silvers brought suit. See op. at 884. Section 501(b) of the 1976 Act provides, in pertinent part:
The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411,1 to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.
17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976).
Turning to first principles, then, it is well-established that courts should interpret a statute according to its plain meaning. See United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.1996) (“If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”). However, where a statute is ambiguous, courts should consult a statute’s legislative history to discern Congressional intent. See United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir.1999). Here, as the Majority acknowledges, the statute does not address the present question and is therefore ambiguous.2 See op. at 885-86 (“[w]e recognize that [Section 501(b)’s] omission explicitly to address the present question may create an ambiguity.”).
The key to understanding the legislative history of the 1976 Act, then, is an understanding of the history of standing to sue under copyright law as it existed prior to the 1976 Act. When read in context with copyright law that existed before the 1976 Act, and the portions of the law that were not changed by such Act, a conclusion different from the Majority’s reading emerges.
A. History of the 1909 Copyright Act
Under the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) (codifying copyright law before the enactment of the 1976 Act), the “proprietor” of a copyright was afforded the right to sue for copyright infringement.3 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1909). While the 1909 Act did not define the term “proprietor,” courts interpreted that term to mean the “sole owner” of the copyright. See, e.g., Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 777-778 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing the general history of the 1909 Act and holding that a sublicensee of a copyright lacked standing to sue under the 1976 Act).
The 1909 Act was predicated on the “doctrine of indivisibility.” Id. at 778. That is, under the Act, a copyright owner possessed an indivisible “bundle of rights” which were “incapable of assignment in part.” Id. Accordingly, assignment under the 1909 Act included “the totality of rights commanded by copyright.” Id. *897Transfer of “[ajnything less than an assignment was considered a license.” Id. Regardless the particular use of the copyright, “only the copyright proprietor (which would include an assignee but not a licensee) had standing to bring an infringement action.” Id. (emphasis added).
Even though the statute granted standing solely to the “proprietor” of the entire copyright, courts nevertheless allowed assignees of an accrued cause of action for copyright infringement to sue for infringement of their property rights.4 See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir.1969) (assignee of accrued cause of action had standing to sue for copyright infringement); see also Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir.1987) (noting that courts applying the 1909 Act held that assignees had standing to sue for copyright infringement). The infringement claim, like any other contingent asset,5 could be sold, much like the copyright holder’s claim against a trade debtor or a coupon clipped from the copyright holder’s bond portfolio.
Moreover, all defenses against the assignor were valid against the assignee, who “stood in the shoes” of the assignor. See T.B. Harms & Francis, Day & Hunter v. Stern, 231 F. 645, 647 (2d Cir.1916) (holding that plaintiffs, as assignees of composer’s rights under the contract, “stand in [the] shoes” of the assignor and could assert the defense of lack of mutuality of contract). See also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1976) (“[tjhe owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner.”).
B. History of the 1976 Copyright Act
The 1976 Act was the result of 15 years of debate on proposed legislation and was precipitated by Congress’s recognition that the nature of copyrighted works had changed. Congress noted that, during the half-century since the passage of the 1909 Act, “a wide range of new techniques for capturing and communicating printed matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use.” H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 at 159, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5775. For example, no longer was an opera performed only in a theater, but such a work could be performed in movies, television, videos, records, and other forms. Such technical advances “generated new industries and new methods for the production and dissemination of copyrighted works, and the business relations between authors and users have evolved new patterns.” Id.
Toward that end, Congress recognized the commercial need to divide and “infinitely subdivide” copyright uses in recognition of increasing technologically driven varieties of means of reproduction and distribution. Thus, one main purpose of the 1976 Act was, for the first time, to recognize the principle of “divisibility” of uses of a copyright, and the ability to convey the rights to uses separately to various reproducers, which divisible rights did not exist under the 1909 Act. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 at 159, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5775, infra.
*898Congress further recognized that allowing for “divisibility” of the copyright required a mechanism whereby heretofore barred owners of exclusive licenses could now sue for copyright infringement. Accordingly, Congress enacted Section 501 of the 1976 Act to provide access to the courts for the owner of one or more rights to exclusive use, but did not mention the right of the owner of the overall copyright to sue. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
Indeed, in providing for the right of exclusive licensees to sue, the drafters of the 1976 Act stated:
The principle of the divisibility of copyright ownership, established by section 201(d), carnes with it the need in infringement actions to safeguard the rights of all copyright owners and to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Subsection (b) of section 501 enables the owner of a particular right to bring an infringement action in that owner’s name alone, while at the same time insuring to the extent possible that the other owners whose rights may be affected are notified and given a chance to join the action.
H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 at 159, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5775 (emphasis added).6
Far from “suggesting] strongly that Congress intended to limit the class of persons who may sue for infringement,” op. at 886 (emphasis added), the statement above in italics — and omitted from the Majority Opinion — demonstrates that Congress intended to enlarge the ability to bring suit to the owners of exclusive rights.7
Read in context with provisions of the 1909 Act (to the extent the acts are not inconsistent), and contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, the 1976 Act’s Section 501(b) was an enlargement of infringement action rights. Henceforth, standing was not limited only to the “proprietor”8 of the original copyright; a legal or beneficial owner of exclusive rights severed by assignment from the original copyright also had standing to sue for infringement. However, nothing in the 1976 Act eliminat*899ed the rights of copyright owners under Section 101 of the 1909 Act to their remedies, nor the right of property owners to enjoy the property rights granted by the statute, including the assignment and enforcement of accrued causes of action.
That, I believe, is the way — and the only way — to read Section 501(b).
II.
The Majority concludes that because the statute does not expressly grant standing to assignees of an accrued cause of action, such persons do not have standing. See op. at 885-86. Rather, the Majority reasons that, applying the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius exclusio al-teñus est, “Congress’ explicit listing of who may sue for copyright infringement should be understood as an exclusion of others from suing for infringement.” Op. at 885 (emphasis in original). In my view, the Majority misapplies this maxim of statutory construction.
First, such maxims of statutory construction are to be used only when Congressional intent cannot be discerned. Indeed, we have noted:
Most strongly put, the expressio unius, or indusiounius, principle is that ‘[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.’ This is a rule of interpretation, not a rule of law. The maxim is ‘a product of logic and common sense,’ properly applied only when it makes sense as a matter of legislative purpose.... [T]he expressio unius principle describes what we usually mean by a particular manner of expression, but does not prescribe how we must interpret a phrase once written. Understood as a descriptive generalization about language rather than a prescriptive rule of construction, the maxim usefully describes a common syntactical implication. ‘My children are Jonathan, Rebecca and Seth’ means ‘none of my children are Samuel.’ Sometimes there is no negative pregnant: ‘get milk, bread, peanut butter and eggs at the grocery’ probably does not mean ‘do not get ice cream.’ ”
Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted). See also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) (“This principle of statutory construction reflects an ancient maxim — expressio unius est exclusion alterius ... But even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.”). Here, Congressional intent is readily discernible, and, as demonstrated above, contrary to the Majority’s application of the maxim.
Second, commentators have noted that the use of maxims of statutory construction such as “expressio unius ” are problematic insofar as there is no hierarchy of maxims of statutory interpretation. Why choose expressio unius rather than another maxim, indeed, the exact opposite: that listing some cases may include others? (see fn. 9, infra). In his recent book, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia wrote, “[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”9 An-*900tonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, 14 (1997) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)).
Third, while maxims of statutory construction may, indeed, be helpful in interpreting statutes, they are not binding. The Founders, including Alexander Hamilton, recognized as much. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 83 at 464 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in the construction of laws. The true test of a just application of them is its conformity with the source from which they are derived.”).
Hence, rather than be guided by a Latin maxim nowhere mentioned by the 1976 Act or our jurisprudence as hierarchically preferable to other means of statutory interpretation, we should be guided by plain legislative intent, which, as our Supreme Court reminds us, trumps the ancient Latin maxim underpinning the Majority Opinion’s conclusion. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. at 459, 94 S.Ct. 690.
Indeed, it should be noted that where Congress chooses to expressly prohibit assignment, it knows how to do so explicitly. See, e.g., Federal Anti-Assignment Act of 1862, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (expressly prohibiting public contract claims against the U.S. government from being assigned); Federal Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (expressly prohibiting assignment of federal claims against the U.S. government from being assigned); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (expressly prohibiting the assignment of pension benefits). Here, that Congress did not prohibit assignment of infringement claims may well carry a negative pregnant that it intended not to prohibit assignment.
A second consideration in statutory interpretation is practicality, or put another way, the avoidance of an absurd result. See Royal Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings Inc., 252 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.2001) (courts will not interpret a statute in a way that results in an absurd or unreasonable result). Here, were the statute to be read literally, it would result in absurd or unreasonable results.
It has long been recognized that assignment of the copyright does not automatically include assignment of accrued causes of action for earlier infringements of the copyright. See Prather, 410 F.2d at 700 (“ ‘a mere assignment of a copyright does not itself transfer to the assignee any cause of action for infringements that occurred prior to the assignment. Unless the assignment of copyright contains language explicitly transferring causes of action for prior infringements, the assignee cannot maintain a suit for infringements which happened before the effective date of the assignment.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). See also DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.Supp. 184, 192 (M.D.Fla.1962) (holding that the assignment of copyright under 1909 Act does not include the right to sue for “infringements antedating the assignment” and since the assignment as written failed to contain such a grant, “no such right is conferred by the assignment”).
The recognition that the right to an accrued cause of action did not (in the absence of an express contractual assign*901ment of such rights) automatically follow the assignment of the copyright is necessarily a recognition that the two rights should be capable of being separate assets. As separate assets, like any other property right, the two rights can be separately alienated. That much was squarely decided in Prather, supra.
Similar to the 1909 Act, courts have interpreted the 1976 Act to mean that an assignment of a copyright does not automatically carry with it accrued claims unless such claims are specifically named in the contract of assignment. For example, in Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., Inc., 830 F.Supp. 614 (N.D.Ga.1993), in interpreting the 1976 Act, the court held “the case law clearly states that a transfer of interest for accrued damages must be stated in no uncertain terms. It follows that the transfer of interest to past infringements did not pass from [assignor] to [plaintiff assignee] in the first assignment despite the alleged intent to transfer any and all accrued damages.” Infodek, 830 F.Supp. at 620 (citing Prather, 410 F.2d at 700).
The recognition under both the 1909 and 1976 Acts that an accrued cause of action for copyright infringement is an asset separate from the copyright or the exclusive uses of the copyright saves 501(b) from some absurd results.
Read as the Majority does, Section 501 of the 1976 Act converts a claim for relief for infringement into a life estate, by providing a cause of action for copyright infringement but only for the person who owned the exclusive right at the time of the infringement. The statute would preclude an assignee of the copyright and accrued causes of action from suing on an accrued cause of action — which infringement, by definition was not “committed while he or she was the owner of it.”
■ The following result would obtain: if a copyright owner instituted suit for copyright infringement (“while he was the owner”), and then assigned the copyright after instituting such suit, the assignee of the copyright and the accrued cause of action could not maintain such suit, for the as-signee was not the owner when the infringement occurred. In addition, the text would have to be read such that when the “he” or “she” who owned the exclusive right at the time of the infringement of the copyright dies, “his” or “her” heirs cannot institute the infringement action, for the same reason.
Luckily, Section 501(b) has not been so interpreted. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Rather, the section has been interpreted to allow the post-1976 assignee ! of the accrued cause of action to maintain the suit for accrued causes of action. Indeed, courts have recognized that assignees of a copyright may maintain an action instituted by the previous owner during which such previous ownership the infringement claim arose. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.1991) (allowing plaintiff to bring suit for copyright infringement that had occurred prior to plaintiffs owning any copyright interest where plaintiff was assigned the right to accrued causes of action); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1976) (“[t]he owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner.”).
Accordingly, if individuals can bring suit on an accrued infringement claim that did not accrue while he or she was the owner, there is no reason the accrued cause of action cannot be assigned here.
Other fundamental principles lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preclude owners of a bare assignment of *902accrued causes of action from having standing to bring suit.
First, it is well-established that contract rights are assignable at common law. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 317(2)(b) (1979) (contract rights assignable unless the assignment is “forbidden by-statute”). See also TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, 913 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir.1990) (noting that “the presumption is in favor of assignment [of contract]”). Here, the assignment of an accrued cause of action for copyright infringement to an assignee is nothing more than “simple assignment of a chose in action.” See Prather, 410 F.2d at 699-700.
As a general matter, common law rights existing prior to the enactment of a statute remain in vigor unless expressly abrogated by statute. “[Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 123 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993) (holding that states remain subject to common-law prejudgment interest liability where the federal debt collection legislation did not directly speak to the common law right of the federal government to collect prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the states) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that “in such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean slate.” Id. Rather, “to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
That is, courts will not construe a statute “in derogation of common law” unless there is express Congressional intent:
The courts have consistently held legislation derogative of the common law accountable to an exactness of expression, and have not allowed the effects of such legislation to be extended beyond the necessary and unavoidable meaning of its terms. The presumption runs against such innovation.
Scharfeld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340, 341 (D.C.Cir.1942). See also In re Chateaugay Corp., 94 F.3d 772, 779 (2d Cir.1996) (“there is nothing, either in the language of the statute or in its legislative history, that would lead us to believe that Congress meant the statute to abrogate common law rights of setoff against refunds....”); Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 128 (2d Cir.2001) (construing civil RICO statute to preserve the common-law doctrine known as the “revenue rule,” which prohibits one sovereign from enforcing tax judgments or claims of another sovereign, “absent clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate it.”).
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the 1976 Act which expressly forbids the assignment of the basic contract right at issue here.
Accordingly, the Majority errs in reasoning that copyright “is a creature of statute, and the only rights that exist under copyright law are those granted by statute.” Op. at 883-84. See also op. at 885. (“Copyright is a creature of statute, so we will not lightly insert common law principles that Congress has left out.”). This conclusion is in tension with the principle that common law rights will be deemed to be retained except where there is statutory language and purpose to the contrary. This principle militates in favor of the court’s retention of the common law right to assignment of contract. Accordingly, the Majority’s reluctance to “insert common law principles” is unfounded here *903and it errs in abrogating the right to assign contract rights.10
Second, courts have interpreted other federal statutes which expressly confer standing on certain persons also to grant standing to assignees of the rights. For example, courts have held that assignees of antitrust claims that accrue under the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, have standing to sue for antitrust violations. The act provides that “any person who shall be injured” can sue and yet courts have interpreted the statute to confer standing on assignees of antitrust claims. See, e.g., Gulfstream III Associates, Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 438-40 (3d Cir.1993) (Though the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides that “any person who shall be injured” can sue, antitrust claims are assignable).
Other federal statutes have been similarly interpreted. See, e.g., Lerman v. Joyce Int’l, Inc., 10 F.3d 106, 112-113 (3d Cir.1993) (RICO statute provides that “any person injured in his business or property” may sue; court held that RICO claims are assignable); see also Misic v. The Building Service Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (ERISA statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), prohibited the assignment of pension benefits, but did not expressly prohibit the assignment of health and welfare benefits; though the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), provides that: “A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary ... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,” (emphasis added), health and welfare claims are assignable).
III.
Next, the Majority argues that the case law that has developed in the area of patent law is analogous here. With respect, it is not. In particular, the Majority asserts that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1923 decision in Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 43 S.Ct. 254, 67 L.Ed. 516 (1923) (per Taft, C.J.), dealing with the question of whether an accrued cause of action for patent infringement, is analogous and, indeed, controls here. I respectfully disagree.
In Crown Die, inventors Wright & Hubbard invented a machine for forming a screw-thread cutting device. Id. at 25, 43 S.Ct. 254. Wright & Hubbard assigned the patent to the Reed Manufacturing Company (“Reed”). Id. Thereafter, Nye Tool & Machine Works (“Nye Tool”), first obtained from Reed “all claims recoverable in law or in equity, whether for damages, profits, savings, or any other kind or description which the Reed Manufacturing Company has against the Crown Die & Tool Company arising out of the infringement by the Crown Die & Tool Company.” Id. at 26, 43 S.Ct. 254. Nye Tool then brought suit to prevent Crown Die & Tool Company (“Crown Die”), a tool company and competitor, from using the screw-thread cutting device. Id. at 24, 43 S.Ct. 254. While not stated in the opinion, it stands to reason that plaintiff Nye Tool brought suit under the Patent Act of 1874, which provided that a “patentee, assignee, or grantee” could bring suit for patent infringement.11
*904Crown Die moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Nye Tool did not have standing to bring suit, for Reed owned the patent and had only granted Nye Tool a portion of its rights thereunder. Id. at 27, 43 S.Ct. 254. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss and the U.S: Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Id. at 36, 43 S.Ct. 254. In reversing the court of appeals and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, Chief Justice Taft reasoned that the common law doctrine of assignment of a cause of action does not apply to patent law because patent law is a creation of statute. Id. More specifically, Chief Justice Taft reasoned that the patent right was “created by the act of Congress; and no rights can 'be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes.” Id. at 40, 43 S.Ct. 254 (quoting Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 494, 10 How. 477, 13 L.Ed. 504 (1850)).
In so holding, the court reasoned that there was no legislative intent to permit splitting of the claim from the underlying right because to do so would result in an aftermarket in patent claims.12 The court reasoned that:
[I]t was obviously not the intention of the Legislature to permit several monopolies to be 'made out of one, and divided among different persons within the same limits. Such a division would inevitably lead to fraudulent impositions upon persons who desired to purchase the use' of the improvement, and would subject a party who, under a mistake as to his rights, used the invention without authority, to be harassed by a multiplicity of suits instead of one, and to successive recoveries of damages by different persons in the same place.
Id. at 38, 43 S.Ct. 254 (quoting Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 494, 10 How. 477, 13 L.Ed. 504 (1850)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
First, in contrast to the Chief Justice’s 1923 reading of an 1874 Patent Law, it clearly was the intent of the 1976 Legislature to “permit several monopolies to be made of one,” insofar as the six individual *905and separate uses of a single copyright (Section 201(d)) could not only be “divided among different persons,” but subdivided infinitely. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
Second, avoidance of fraud upon purchasers of “several” copyright uses was to be avoided by regulation: copyright registration. See 1909 Act, Section 12 (1909) (“no action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with”).13 Accord, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1976) (“[n]o action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”).
Third, the concern of multiplicity of suits14 because of several owners of copyright uses seems expressly overcome by allowing suit by the owner of “an” (not “all”) exclusive right (§ 501(b)) to bring suit.
Moreover, while the notion of severability of the incidents of ownership of property was in its infancy in 1928 at the time Crovm Die was decided, such is not the case today. Indeed, the underlying premise upon which the Majority relies is that there should not be an aftermarket in causes of action for copyright infringement. Given the growth of an aftermarket in derivative rights such as puts, calls and credit insurance against bankruptcy risks on corporate debt, the notion that an aftermarket in accrued causes of action for copyright infringement is to be prohibited is at best passe and at worst an unwarranted restraint on alienation. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir.2003) (Posner, J.) (“restraint[s] on alienation are traditionally disfavored.”). Indeed, such limitations, on those able to bring suit, harken back to the Tudor Kings of England who limited inheritance to primogeniture and descent by fee tail.
Here, the market will account for the fact that a copyright holder is selling accrued causes of action and not the underlying copyright. To be sure, prices will fluctuate depending on whether the copyright itself is included.
Finally, while courts have recognized that “[wjhere precedent in copyright cases is lacking, it is appropriate to look for guidance to patent law ‘because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law,’ ” (see op. at 887) (internal citation omitted), courts have also recognized that “[these] two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-218, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954) (declining to apply patent law to copyright law due to differences in bodies of law). For these reasons, Crown Die does not compel a contrary result here.15
*906IV.
Unlike circumstances in which the proliferation of lawsuits has been restrained on the basis of public policy, such as the prohibition on assignment of personal injury claims in tort, here there is no reason to prevent the assignment of a copyright claim. Indeed, the court in Prather expressly held there was no such public policy. See Prather, 410 F.2d at 700 (“[tjhere is no public policy against such assignments.”).
Courts have upheld restrictions on the assignment of claims where such assignment has been deemed to be in violation of public policy. This anti-assignment policy was rooted in the common law prohibition on champerty.16 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Arizona Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1986) (noting that assignment of personal injury claims is prohibited by common law in Arizona); See also DeSenne v. Jamestown Boat Yard, Inc., 968 F.2d 1388, 1390 (1st Cir.1992) (noting that anti-assignment of personal injury claims rooted in prohibition on champerty).
Similarly, courts have held that legal malpractice claims are not assignable for public policy reasons. See, e.g., Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc., 93 F.3d 758, 760 (11th Cir.1996) (“[a] majority of jurisdictions prohibit the assignment of [legal malpractice] actions because the personal nature of legal services which involve highly confidential relationships”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, courts have upheld restrictions on in-person attorney solicitation, enacted to prevent the public’s perception of attorneys from falling in further disrepute, as rooted in the common law doctrine of barratry.17 See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). See also Bailey v. Morales, 190 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir.1999) (legal profession barred from soliciting under ancient doctrine prohibiting barratry).
In addition, courts have upheld restrictions on assignment of certain federal claims where assignment of such claims would result in nuisance suits. For example, in Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946, 950 (5th Cir.1992), the plaintiff shareholder brought suit under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides that “purchasers or sellers” of securities may bring suit. The plaintiff had been granted an express assignment of the claim. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing and the district court granted the motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that such a result was warranted by (1) the fact that “Congress was concerned with blackmail, nuisance, and strike suits, and drafted the act to circumscribe the class of plaintiffs who may sue under the Act for the very purpose of eliminating such suits” and (2) “the evidentiary problems inherent *907in allowing a non-purchaser or non-seller to bring a Rule 10b-5 action.” Id. at 950 (internal citations omitted).
None of such policy concerns underlie the Majority’s opinion. Nor indeed is there a reasoned policy consideration given for prohibiting suit upon an accrued cause of action for infringement.18
V.
In reaching its conclusion, the Majority argues that this circuit should follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.1982) to avoid the creation of a circuit split. See op. at 889-90. In my view, Eden Toys is inapposite. To avoid the creation of a circuit split, this circuit should rather follow the rationale of Prather.
A. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc.
In Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (1969), the Fifth Circuit squarely held that an assignee of an accrued cause of action is a proper party to bring suit for copyright infringement. In my view, this case provides persuasive authority that this circuit should follow.
Plaintiff Prather (“Prather”) was the author of several books. Prather held the copyright on one of the books and the copyright to the remaining books was held by Prather’s publisher, Fawcett Publications. Prather discovered that the copyright on one of the books (the rights to which were owned by Fawcett) had been infringed by book publisher Neva Paperbacks, Inc. (“Neva”). After discovering the infringement, Prather obtained some of the copyright rights and an assignment of all present, past and future causes of action.19 Significantly, however, Fawcett “simultaneously” with assigning the copyright to Prather, retained an exclusive license to the English language rights for books throughout the world. Id. at 699 n. 1.
Prather brought suit against Neva for copyright infringement. Neva moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff Prather did not have standing to bring suit because Prather was not the “proprietor” of the copyright as required under the 1909 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1952). Rather, Neva argued that because the copyright rights had been “split,” Prather was a mere “licensee” and not the sole “proprietor” under Section 101.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and held that Prather did, in fact, have standing to sue. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the assignment was simply a “simple assignment of a chose in action” — a contract — that contained express language of assignment. See Prather, 410 F.2d at 699-700. The court concluded:
As an assignee of the causes of action for infringement damages past, present and future, Prather has the right to maintain the action under 17 U.S.C.A. [§ ] § 101 et seq. For infringement. There is no public policy against such assignments and under F[ed].R.Civ.P. 17 such assignee of all choses in action for infringement, whether a ‘proprietor’ or not, has standing to sue and the court *908has effective power to avoid altogether the risk of double suit or double recovery.
Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
Under Prather, then, courts will not require plaintiff to hold ownership of one or more of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner to have standing.
The Majority states that Prather is “unhelpful” authority for two reasons: (1) it was decided under the 1909 Act, and not the 1976 Act; and (2) “the assignment in Prather involved both accrued causes of action and some of what we now call exclusive rights.” Op. at 889 (emphasis in original). The Majority argues “the Prather court was not faced, as we are, with a situation in which the owner of all the exclusive rights and the owner of the accrued causes of action are two different people.” Op. at 889. Neither distinction is persuasive.
First, the Majority’s attempt to distinguish Prather as predicated on the 1909 Act is unpersuasive, given that courts have recognized that “[i]n enacting § 501(b)’s standing provision, Congress ‘merely codified the case law that had developed [under the 1909 Act] with respect to the beneficial owner’s standing to sue.’ ”20 Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir.1987) (internal citation omitted). See also Gardner, 279 F.3d at 778 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that a sublicensee of a copyright lacked standing to sue under the 1976 Act on the ground that the pre-1976 law so prohibited).21 Accord, H.R. 94-1476 at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660 (“[t]he present copyright law, title 17 of the United States Code, is basically the same as the act of 1909.”).
Second, that Prather owned rights to the books (other than the English language rights), Neva argued, made Prather a licensee of book rights — not the owner of what we would now call “exclusive rights.” An assignee could not be the owner of book rights because the “exclusive right” to republish could not be split away from the copyright under the 1909 Act; that is precisely what the 1976 Act changed. Licensees did not have standing to bring suit under the 1909 Act. Therefore, Prather, as a (mere) licensee, could not have had standing to sue but for his standing as the assignee of an “accrued cause of action for infringement.” See, e.g., Gardner, 279 F.3d at 778 (“only the copyright proprietor (which would include an assignee but not a licensee) had standing to bring an infringement action.”).
Moreover, the assignment to Prather of “some rights” did not help Prather establish his right to sue; just the opposite. The fact that he got “some” but not “all” rights of copyright was used by the defendants to undermine his standing and was in no sense a grounds used by the Prather court to validate the assignment. Indeed, *909the court rejected this argument and refused to get into the “metaphysical dialectic” of the “button game” of determining who had the copyright. Prather, 410 F.2d at 699.
In my view, to interpret Prather as holding that an assignee of an accrued cause of action was required to be an assignee of some rights under the copyright would be a profound misreading of the case. Rather than essential to establish standing, having (only) some rights made out what defendant Neva urged as an affirmative defense.
B. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc.
By contrast, the Second Circuit’s decision in Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.1982) involves a different factual situation and thus is entitled to little weight here.
In Eden Toys, Paddington Bear & Company, Ltd. (“Paddington Bear”) held the copyright to children’s books which featured the fictional character Paddington Bear. Id. at 29. In 1975, Paddington Bear entered into an agreement with Eden Toys, Inc. (“Eden Toys”), an American corporation, whereby Eden Toys was granted an exclusive license to use licensor Paddington Bear’s copyright and characters in North America. Id. In 1980, that agreement was amended to grant Eden Toys exclusive North American rights to all Paddington products except books, tapes, records, stage plays, motion pictures, radio and television productions. Id. at 30. Under the agreement, Padding-ton Bear retained the right to sue for copyright infringement on Eden Toys’ license. Id. In particular, the agreement allowed Paddington Bear to sue, or choose not to, but let Eden Toys bring suits on Paddington’s behalf.22 Id. at 30 n. 2.
Eden Toys brought suit against Florelee Undergarment Co. (“Florelee”), alleging copyright infringement, and seeking to enjoin Florelee’s use of the Paddington Bear image. Id. at 31. Florelee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Eden Toys lacked standing to sue under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976). Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim, holding that “[the court] do[es] not believe that the [1976] Copyright Act permits holders of rights under copyrights to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf.” Id. at 32 n. 3.
The Majority contends that the court in Eden Toys “made plain the basic principle, which we also have derived from § 501(b) and its context and history, that only the owner of an exclusive right under the copyright is entitled to sue for infringement.” Op. at 889.
I respectfully disagree. In my view, the holding of Eden Toys is far more narrow. The court in Eden Toys held that a copyright holder who maintains ownership of the exclusive right to reproduce cannot assign to a third party the bare right to sue should the copyright holder choose not to do so. It does not hold that a copyright holder may not assign the accrued cause of action, on which a new owner can sue.
*910Indeed, the specific contractual agreement between Eden Toys and Paddington Bear did not (as it does here) assign all rights to any claims, but merely assigned the right to sue where Eden Toys or its licensees was “exposed to competition, direct or indirect, from infringers of the copyright or trademark rights which are licensed hereunder.” Id. at 30 n. 2. There was no assignment to Eden Toys of preexisting accrued causes of action. Accordingly, there was no real “assignment” of any accrued cause of action. Rather, the Eden-Paddington Bear agreement was interpreted as an agreement merely designating Eden as the agent for purposes of suit. Thus, Eden Toys merely holds that the proper party plaintiff, the “real party in interest,” is the owner of the cause of action for infringement, not some handpicked stand-in.
C. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.
Finally, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s reading of the Second Circuit’s decision in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.1990). Far from “reaffirming] the principle of Eden Toys that a party that has no ownership interest has no standing to sue,” as the Majority asserts (op. at 889-90), in my view, the decision clearly holds that copyright ownership is not the sine qua non of standing, but that assignees of accrued causes of action may sue for copyright infringement.
In 1971, Bright Tunes Music Corporation, which owned the copyright to a song entitled “He’s So Fine,” sued musician (and Beatles band member) George Harrison and Harrisongs Music claiming that Harrison’s tune “My Sweet Lord” infringed Bright Tunes’ copyright. The trial court agreed and ruled in favor of Bright Tunes, but reserved judgment on the issue of damages. Id. at 975.
In 1971, at the time Bright Tunes sued Harrison, ABKCO Music, Inc. and its president served as business manager for the Beatles. Id. at 975. In 1978, ABKCO purchased all of Bright Tunes’ interest in “He’s So Fine” including the copyright and “any and all rights assertable under copyright against the infringing composition (“My Sweet Lord”) in any part of the world which may have heretofore arisen or which may arise hereafter.” Id. at 980. Accordingly, ABKCO was substituted as the sole party plaintiff in the action against Harrisongs Music. Id. at 975. However, Harrison had claims against ABKCO and its principal Klein which required ABKCO to convey the old Bright Tunes copyright to “He’s So Fine” to Harrison on the payment of a sum.
On appeal, ABKCO claimed that if it conveyed the old Bright Tunes “He’s So Fine” copyright to Harrison, it could not participate in the 1980 foreign settlements and it would lose its pre-1970 infringement claims.
As concerns us, the dispositive question was a determination of what rights were at issue in the 1980 foreign settlements: AB-KCO’s possession of the copyright to “He’s So Fine” or merely its ownership of the infringement claims. The Second Circuit held it was merely the ownership of the infringement claims, and held that AB-KCO’s right to bring the claims derived from its ownership of the accrued infringement claims.
In so holding, the Second Circuit noted that although ABKCO now owned the copyright and the accrued infringement claims, it need not continue to own the copyright to enforce its accrued-in-1970 causes of action for copyright infringement arising from the 1980 settlement. The court reasoned:
*911Hence, the claims had already accrued when ABKCO purchased all of Bright Tunes’ rights in “He’s So Fine.” As a consequence, ABKCO’s right to bring the claims arises not out of its ownership of the copyright, but from its ownership of the claims themselves which it purchased, along with the copyright, in 1978. We therefore conclude that AB-KCO’s ownership of the “He’s So Fine” copyrights was not a necessary predicate to its participation in the 1980 settlements. ABKCO could participate in the 1980 settlements because it owned the infringement claims accrued in 1970, not because it owned the copyright. Thus, ABKCO’s ownership of the copyright was not affected by the 1980 settlements, and ABKCO must surrender the copyright to the Harrison Interests upon proper payment.
Id. at 980-981 (emphasis added).
Thus, under the holding in ABKCO, ownership of the copyright is not a requirement for the enforcement of accrued claims assigned to the assignee (ABKCO) so long as the claims arose during the period when the assignor (Bright Tunes) was the owner of the copyright. Moreover, ABKCO could continue to assert such accrued copyright infringement claims even though it would be forced to give up the copyright.
According to the Majority, “[t]he Second Circuit [in ABKCO] made clear that its decision was limited to the situation in which the same entity purchased both the copyright and accrued claims; the only issue was one of timing, whether ownership of the copyright and occurrence of the infringement had to coincide.” Op. at 890. I respectfully disagree. In ABKCO, ownership of both the copyright and the accrued causes of action was merely coincident — not required — for ABKCO to have standing to sue.
Indeed, ABKCO, like Silvers, did not own the copyright to “He’s So Fine” when George Harrison and the Beatles plagiarized it into “My Sweet Lord.” The copyright to “He’s So Fine” was owned by Bright Tunes; the infringements took place before 1970.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Frank & Bob Films II owned the copyright when the alleged Sony infringement took place and that they, like Bright Tunes, assigned those accrued infringement claims to Silvers. Thus, like AB-KCO, Silvers has standing to pursue those accrued infringement claims.
Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the Majority: to avoid the creation of a circuit-split, op. at 889-90, this court should follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Prather, rather than the Second Circuit’s decision in Eden Toys, as the facts in Eden Toys are clearly distinguishable. In addition, in ABKCO, a more recent decision, the Second Circuit expressly held that ownership of both the copyright and the accrued causes of action is not necessary for the owner of those claims to bring suit.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district court’s denial of Sony’s motion to dismiss Silvers’ complaint against Sony for the alleged infringement of the copyright of her script, “The Other Woman.” I respectfully dissent.

. Section 411 provides that no action shall be commenced unless the copyright has been registered. 17 U.S.C. § 411.

. Indeed, the language of the statute cannot be all that clear, even to the Majority, since even it eschews "plain meaning” rules of interpretation and recurs to legislative sources. Op. at 885-87.

. The 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1909), provided, in pertinent part:
§ 101. Infringement
If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable:
(b) Damages and profits; amount; other remedies.
To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement. ...
17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1909) (emphasis added).

. In addition, courts denied standing to mere licensees of partial rights or uses of the copyright. See Prather, 410 F.2d at 700.

. Contingent liability is defined as "an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain [] or loss [] to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur of fail to occur.” Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies ¶ 1 (FASB March 1975).

. See also Testimony of George D. Cary, Copyright Office, Copyright Law Revision Part 4: reprinted in George S. Grossman, Omnibus Copyright Revision Legislative History, Vol. 3 (2001) ("Committee Report”) at 116 (stating that "[s]ubsection (b) provides for the institution of an action by "any owner of an exclusive right. This section was so worded in an effort to take care of the problem of divisibility.") (emphasis added). This statement was in reference to Section 35(b) of an earlier draft of the 1976 Act. Like the enacted Section 501(b), Section 35(b) provided that the "legal or beneficial owner” could bring suit. See Committee Report at 116-117.

. To the extent the statute purports to limit those persons able to bring suit, it limits the rights of non-exclusive licensees from bringing suit. This is consistent with the purpose of the 1976 Act. See Staff of Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Study No. 11: Divisibility of Copyrights, 71, Statement of Ralph S. Brown (Comm. Print 1960) ("[ajlleged in-fringers should probably be protected against multiple suits by nonexclusive licensees.”); See Staff of Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Study No. 11: Divisibility of Copyrights, 71, Statement of Ernest S. Meyers (Comm. Print 1960) ("[t]he law should include a provision permitting an exclusive licensee to sue without joining his grantor; Provided, That such a provision is restricted to an exclusive license of enumerated rights.”) (emphasis in original).

.Note that the 1909 Act did not create a private right of action or give standing to the "proprietor” by any such language as did Section 501(b) of the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1909). Rather, it enumerated the "remedies” which the "proprietor” had under the 1909 Act. As any other "proprietor” — a person owning property — it was implied he had a right to sue for damages to his property-

. See Stephen J. Safranek, Scalia’s Lament, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 315, 316 (Spring 2004) (noting the lack of hierarchy among maxims of statutory interpretation; “in the cases where judges apply interpretive aids, the aids are often used in isolation and are not necessarily the controlling method by which the statute is interpreted.”); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarles on the Theory of Appellate Decision and The Rules or Canons About How *900Statutes Are to Be Construed., 3 Vand L. Rev. 395, 405 (1949-1950) (noting that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point”; and noting that the opposing canon for the expressio unius exclusio alterius est is "[t]he language may fairly comprehend many different cases where some only are expressly mentioned by way of example”).

. Although the court in Crown Die does not apply the baseline principle that common law rights survive unless expressly abrogated by statute, it does so on the ground that there was express legislative intent that there be no assignment. Here, the legislative history cuts the other way. See discussion of Crown Die, infra.

. The first Patent Act was passed in 1793. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 *904(1980). Later patent acts were passed in 1836 (5 Stat. 117), 1870 (16 Stat. 198), 1874 (18 Stat. 78) and 1952. Id. Presumably, therefore, litigation commenced in or around 1923 would have been brought under the Patent Act of 1874. That Act provided, in pertinent part: "[d]amages for the infringement of any patent may be recovered by action on the case, in the name of the party interested, either as patentee, assignee, or grantee." Patent Act of 1874, 18 Stat. 78, Section 4919. Accord, Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 281 ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”).

. Indeed, Amicus Curiae in this case, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., argues this precise point. In its brief, it argues:
Should an assignee of nothing more than a naked infringement cause of action have standing to sue, the number of copyright infringement lawsuits could increase markedly ... one can envision a market developing in which speculators with no relationship to the copyrighted work pay a small sum to the copyright owner — who might have no belief in the merits of an infringement claim and no incentive to sue — in exchange for the ability to pursue a high volume of nuisance settlements or unwarranted jury verdicts.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc. at 4 (emphasis added).
Amicus leaves a faint whiff of nostalgia for the restrictions of the Age of Guilds. Imagine what mischief would ensue if cafes across the street from the Burbank studios were to be trolled by risk-seeking men clutching cash. Why, the next thing that would happen would be to allow something similar to what did happen in London: non-ship owners being paid to take the risks of shipwreck, and, by subrogation, gaining the right to sue negligent captains and owners, all of this mendacious money-grubbing taking place at Lloyd’s Coffee House!

. See also 17 U.S.C. § 30 (1952) ( "[ejvery assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the copyright office”); 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (“any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office.”).

. This has never been made very clear. Why should an alleged patent infringer not be protected against all five partners who owned a patent, if he had a defense judgment of no infringement in an action brought by one of them?

.Similarly, the Majority's reliance on Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2000) is misplaced. See op. at 888. That case does not involve the standing *906of an assignee of an accrued cause of action under patent law. Rather, the Federal Circuit held that non-exclusive licensees of patent right did not have standing to sue. The case is therefore inapposite.

. Champerty is defined as "[a]n agreement between an officious inlermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) at 246.

. The common law prohibited barratry, which was defined as "the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits” because such litigation was for the benefit of the promoter rather than for the benefit of the real party in interest. Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F.Supp. 526, 530 (D.Mass.1939).

. As noted above, (see fn. 7), there is a public policy rationale for limiting standing to holders of exclusive licensees and prohibiting nonexclusive licensees from suing. That rationale, however, is absent here.

. Prather was assigned "all ... right, title and interest in and to the copyright” and was further assigned "any and all causes of action that may have heretofore accrued in [the holder's] favor for infringement of said copyright.” Id. at 699 n. 1.

. Indeed, Congress relied upon this principle in drafting another section, Section 201(a). See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) ("[c]opyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”). Regarding the provision, Congress stated: "There is [] no need for a specific statutoiy provision concerning the rights and duties of the co-owners of a work; court made law on this point is left undisturbed.” H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5737.

. In Gardner, the court concluded:
Although neither party's plain language arguments is dispositive, the fact that Congress chose not to explicitly address this issue in the 1976 Act and the limiting ‘protection and remedies’ language of § 201(d)(2) indicates that the state of the law remains unchanged. Thus, we hold that the 1976 Act does not allow a copyright licensee to transfer its rights under an exclusive license, without the consent of the original licensor.
Id. at 780.

. The EdenToys-Paddington Agreement provided, in pertinent part:
(a) In the event that Eden or its licensees shall be exposed to competition, direct or indirect, from infringers of the copyright or trademark rights which are licensed hereunder ... Paddington shall, at its option, take all necessary legal action to enjoin such infringement and protect Eden and its licensees.
(b) In the event such infringement and Pad-dington's election to take no legal action ... Eden shall have the right, at its option: (i) to institute appropriate legal action against the infringer....
Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 30 n. 2.