Court Opinion

ID: 9727035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:17:47.732272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.969314
License: Public Domain

Liacos, C.J.
(concurring). Although I join in the court’s substantive interpretation of the relevant statutes, I write separately because I believe it may be appropriate to comment on some issues not fully discussed by the court.
The plaintiffs contend that:
1. The Governor’s withholding of $210,000,000 of Chapter 70 aid appropriated for fiscal year 1990 is an invasion of the General Court’s authority to appropriate funds for a specific purpose;
2. If G. L. c. 29, § 9C (1988 ed.), authorizes the Governor’s action, the statute constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power to appropriate, and a circumvention of the General Court’s power to override a veto;
3. Section 9C may be construed in a manner which removes all doubts about its constitutionality;
*3864. If the power to withhold appropriated funds may be delegated by the General Court, that delegation must contain appropriate standards, and § 9C does not;
5. Chapter 70 aid is not subject to the allotment procedures under G. L. c. 29, § 9B (1988 ed.);
6. Section 9C was unconstitutionally adopted as an outside section in an earlier general appropriation act (St. 1976, c. 283, § 3F), is invalid, could not bind future legislative sessions, and may not serve as a basis for the Governor’s withholding of Chapter 70 aid;
7. The Governor’s use of § 9C to allocate Chapter 70 aid on a per capita' basis is an unconstitutional application of the statute;
8. Section 6 of the general appropriation act for fiscal year 1990 (St. 1989, c. 240, § 6), an outside section, unconstitutionally purports to amend the statutory scheme and formula for distribution of lottery revenues which do not require legislative appropriation; and,
9. The court should enforce the provisions of G. L. c. 29B.
In my view, the plaintiffs have no standing to raise issues 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 for the following reasons.
Standing. The plaintiffs are municipalities, as well as individuals who are plaintiffs in their official capacities, and as they are residents of, and taxpayers in, those municipalities.
a. Municipalities. We have held that a municipality cannot challenge the constitutionality of State statutes. Trustees of Worcester State Hosp. v. The Governor, 395 Mass. 377, 380 (1985) (governmental entities may not challenge the constitutionality of State statutes); Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604, 608 (1983) (city may not invoke certain constitutional challenges). When considering whether a school committee had standing to challenge a statute, we said: “In general, the constitutionality of a statute may be *387litigated only by persons whose interests are affected.” Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 328 (1982).1 The municipalities do not have standing to present constitutionally-based challenges to the statutes at issue.2
b. Municipal officials. Municipal officials lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes, unless their private rights are involved. Id. at 329. Trustees of Smith College v. Assessors of Whately, 385 Mass. 767, 771 & n.3 (1982) (local assessors lack power to challenge constitutional validity of granting exemptions to real estate owned by charitable or educational institution because of alleged violation of State law). Assessors of Haverhill v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 332 Mass. 357, 362 (1955) (public officer whose private rights are not involved may not question the constitutionality of a statute). The officials in this case have not made the requisite showing.
Thus, neither the municipalities nor the individuals who are plaintiffs in their official capacities (such as selectmen, mayors, and school committee members) have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes at issue.
c. Individuals. The plaintiffs in their individual capacities as residents and taxpayers must have suffered, or be in danger of suffering, legal harm in order to compel the courts to pass on the validity of the acts of a coordinate branch of government. Doe v. The Governor, 381 Mass. 702, 704 (1980). This requirement is not avoided by a prayer for declaratory relief. Id. Over sixty years ago this court described as a “general principle” the concept that only one whose rights are impaired may question in court the constitutionality of a statute. The court stated: “It is only when some person in*388vokes [the] aid [of the courts] to protect him in his liberty, rights or property as secured under the Constitution against invasion through the operation of a statute, that the courts examine objections to its constitutionality.” Horton v. Attorney Gen., 269 Mass. 503, 513-514 (1929). The court added that, in order to question the validity of a statute, one must be directly affected as to some personal interest. Id. at 514. The principle that strangers have no standing in the courts is considered to be “a part of the very fabric of our law.” McGlue v. County Comm’rs of Essex, 225 Mass. 59, 60 (1916).
Additionally, for plaintiffs to invoke the remedy of declaratory judgment under G. L. c. 231A (1988 ed.), there must be more than controversy in the abstract; there must be a legally cognizable injury entitling a person to initiate judicial resolution of the controversy. Massachusetts Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977). See G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 9. Only one who can allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute under which the injurious action has occurred has standing. Id. In declaratory judgment proceedings this court has required that one who seeks declaratory relief must allege a breach of any duty owed to him. Penal Inst. Comm’r for Suffolk County v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 532 (1981).
The plaintiffs point to “the severe reductions of local services they and others . . . suffer as a result of . . . the Governor’s withholding of local aid”; mention “cutbacks in education, public works, police, fire and general government services”; and claim that these are particularized injuries directly affecting each plaintiff.
The argument is not so persuasive as to warrant a grant of standing in the individual plaintiffs. While reductions of local services may occur, I am not persuaded that the plaintiffs in their individual capacities have suffered, or are in danger of suffering, legal harm; that a personal interest is directly affected; that their rights have been impaired; that they have demonstrated legally cognizable injury; or shown a breach of any duty. Moreover, any reductions in local services may be *389attributable, at least in part, to other factors such as a lack of additional local revenue or the absence of expenditure adjustments which could contribute to an ability of the Commonwealth to continue to provide a comparable level of services.
Although, in the past, the court has recognized variations on these principles, they are not ones which aid the plaintiffs in this case. Individuals who were citizens and qualified voters had standing to argue that a measure commonly known as Proposition 2xh was not constitutionally adopted. Massachusetts Teachers Ass’n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 214 (1981). See Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 354 Mass. 384, 387 (1968), and cases cited (standing shown to question whether proposed initiative amendment contains excluded matter). It is true that the court has considered actions brought by “private parties who are legitimately concerned in the performance by public officers of a public duty.” Quinn v. School Comm. of Plymouth, 332 Mass. 410, 413 (1955), quoting Cape Cod S.S. Co. v. Selectmen of Provincetown, 295 Mass. 65, 69 (1936), and cases cited. See Police Comm’r of Boston v. Boston, 279 Mass. 577, 585 (1932), and Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93 (1926). However, the opportunity is applicable to actions for relief in the nature of mandamus; these plaintiffs request declaratory relief from this court. See Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 224-225 (1907).3
d. Summary. I conclude that neither the municipalities nor their officials have standing to challenge the constitutionality *390of the statutes and actions at issue. The plaintiffs in their individual capacities as residents and taxpayers do not have standing to challenge any of the statutes or actions on constitutional grounds.

In Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, supra at 329, the court did consider the issues raised by the Attorney General because he had standing to raise those challenges and was a party.

If the allegation of injury is insufficient, the municipality may lack standing even where it claims to act in a representative capacity. Slama v. Attorney Gen., 384 Mass. 620, 624-625 (1981). See Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 296-298 (1977).

The court has expressed itself in some declaratory proceedings in which the issue of standing was a significant question. For example, in School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 697 (1967), the court decided to indicate its views in a declaratory proceeding “involving questions of pressing public importance” and “where a vista of avoidable litigation ... is disclosed and the issues have been fully argued.” The court noted that this is a matter of discretion for the court and observed that both the plaintiffs and the defendants had expressed the hope that the constitutional issues would be decided. Id. at 696-697. See Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731 (1943). Apparently the court does not rely on this principle of discretion in its present decision.