Court Opinion

ID: 9811284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:15:28.208848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:27.822086
License: Public Domain

Cx.ARK, C. J.,
concurs in the conclusion and in the opinion, but dissents from the following dictum: “The action having-originated in the court of a justice of the peace, and that court having no equitable jurisdiction in actions for reformation of written instruments, the first ground of relief is not open to plaintiff.”
1. The Constitution, Art. IY, sec. 1, provides: “The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, shall be abolished; and there shall be in this State but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs which shall be denominated a civil action.” This provision is not restricted to the Superior Court, but applies to all courts. Section 27 of the same article confers upon justices of the peace jurisdiction “of civil actions founded on contract wherein the sum demanded does not exceed $200; and wherein the title to *177real estate shall not be in controversy”; and authorizes the General Assembly to confer upon justices of the peace “jurisdiction of other civil actions wherein the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50.” Accordingly the Legislature has conferred such additional jurisdiction in Revisal, 1420. The phrase, “property in controversy,” has been held to mean the value of the injury complained of or the amount in controversy. Malloy v. Fayetteville, 122 N. C., 480; Watson v. Farmer, 141 N. C., 453; Duckworth v. Mull, 143 N. C., 464. There is nothing therefore in either the Constitution or the statute which denies a justice of the peace jurisdiction of a controversy within the amounts above specified on the ground that an action is equitable in its nature, the only exception is “when title to real estate is in controversy.” It has been held that the justice has jurisdiction of an equitable defense within the prescribed amount. Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C., 494. If so, he necessarily has jurisdiction of an equitable cause of action within that limit.
2. Even if the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction, the case having gone by appeal to the Superior Court, that court has full jurisdiction. This has been held in McMillan v. Reeves, 102 N. C., 559, wherein Smith, C. J., says: “It is not material to inquire into the question of the jurisdiction invoked in initiating the suit, since any objection on this account is obviated by the removal of the cause into the Superior Court presided over by the judge, and the submission of all the parties thereto to his exercise of jurisdiction in the premises, as fully as if the action had there originated. As, then, the court, assuming to exercise jurisdiction, did possess it fully over the subject-matter of the action and the parties to it, in which all the heirs were represented by counsel, the cause was, in a strict sense, coram judice, on the ruling in West v. Kittrell, 8 N. C., 493; and Boing v. R. R., 87 N. C., 360, even without the aid of Laws 1887, ch. 276, which sustains the jurisdiction thus acquired and authorized the court fio proceed and hear and determine all matters in controversy in such action,’ etc.”
In Boing v. R. R., 87 N. C., 363, it was held that where the subject-matter of the action is one of which the court of the *178justice of tbe peace and tbe Superior Court bave concurrent jurisdiction, and tbe case is carried by appeal to tbe Superior Court, tbe latter will retain jurisdiction though tbe proceedings in tbe court of tbe justice of tbe peace are void for irregularity. This can only be sustained upon tbe ground that tbe ease having gotten into tbe Superior Court which has jurisdiction, tbe notice of appeal has tbe same efficacy as tbe service of a summons in bringing tbe defendant into court. In West v. Kittrell, 8 N. C., 493, it was held that where a case was irregularly carried to tbe Superior Court from tbe county court tbe former will retain jurisdiction, if it was a subject-matter of which tbe Superior Court would bave bad jurisdiction if tbe action bad originally been instituted in that court.
Tbe jurisdiction of tbe Superior Court is fixed by tbe Constitution, and when it has jurisdiction of tbe controversy, upon tbe above authorities, it has it fully, regardless whether tbe cause originated in a lower court or in tbe Superior Court. Tbe doctrine of derivative jurisdiction (though sustained by some cases), whereby a case brought by appeal to that court is dismissed in order that it may straightway be brought back by a summons, has no foundation in tbe Constitution or in reason.
No plaintiff will subject himself to tbe delay and expense of bringing an action before a justice of tbe peace when tbe jurisdiction is clearly in tbe Superior Court. A judgment by a justice of tbe peace when be has no jurisdiction would be a nullity. But when by appeal tbe cause gets into tbe Superior Court, nothing is to be gained by dismissing tbe action. Tbe trial should proceed. If amendments, or tbe defense set up, bring in matters of which tbe justice would not bave bad jurisdiction, that is no reason why tbe Superior Court having obtained jurisdiction by tbe notice of appeal, should not proceed with tbe trial.