Court Opinion

ID: 9627838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:56:34.231688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:46:12.272615
License: Public Domain

VAN CISE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that the five-year statute of limitations in the 1967 act did not bar petitioner from bringing this action. I do not agree that petitioner’s action is barred by the UPA’s five-year statute of limitations.
When the 1967 act was in effect, a putative father had no statutory right to commence an action to establish either his paternity or his non-paternity. Only the child’s mother or guardian or the county department of social services were so authorized, and that right was limited to a proceeding to establish paternity. R. McG. v. J. W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980); 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22-6-1(1). See Jefferson County Department of Social Services v. D.A.G., 199 Colo. 315, 607 P.2d 1004 (1980); People in Interest of R.D.S., 183 Colo. 89, 514 P.2d 772 (1973); W.R.S. v. E.R., 41 Colo.App. 414, 588 P.2d 379 (1978).
The UPA, § 19-6-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), was enacted effective July 1, 1977: It creates remedies for putative fathers which they did not previously possess. Under § 19-6-107(1) of the UPA, a man presumed to be the father because he and the child’s mother were married to each other when the child was born may bring an action at any time to declare the existence of the father-child relationship, but only within five years after the child’s birth to declare the nonexistence of that relationship. Petitioner is such a presumed father. However, the time for bringing an action to establish non-paternity had already expired before the effective date of the statute. Therefore, as in Jefferson County Department of Social Services v. D.A.G., supra, this section of the statute did not provide him with a cause of action and, hence, is inapplicable to his situation.
In view of the above, even though petitioner meets the definition of a presumed father under § 19-6-105(l)(a) of the UPA (child born in wedlock), that fact should not be held against him so as to bar his action when he qualifies under another section of the same statute. Section 19-6-107(2) of the UPA provides that: “Any interested party ... may bring an action at any time *1229for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under section 19-6-105(l)(d)_”
Under § 19-6-105(l)(d), a presumption of paternity arises if, “[w]hile the child is under the age of majority, [the putative father] receives the child into his house and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” It is undisputed that petitioner is an “interested party.” Also, the record demonstrates that, during the twelve year period of the marriage, petitioner’s actions were such as to create the presumption defined in § 19-6-105(l)(d). Therefore, his petition was timely filed, and the trial court erred in dismissing his petition based on the five-year statute of limitations.
Since petitioner is entitled to bring his action at any time, it is not necessary to address his contention that the differences between § 19-6-107(l)(a) (“at any time” to declare the existence of the father and child relationship) and § 19-6-107(l)(b) (not later than five years after the child’s birth to declare the nonexistence of the relationship) deny him equal protection and violate the Colorado equal rights amendment.
As to the parties’ other contentions, the guardian correctly admits that, since paternity was not specifically raised or decided in the dissolution of marriage action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on judicial admissions is inapplicable. Res judi-cata also does not apply because the procedures of the UPA were not followed in the dissolution action, and, therefore, any order determining paternity, by implication or otherwise, finding him to be the child’s father was void. In re Marriage of Burkey, 689 P.2d 726 (Colo.App.1984).
Accordingly, in view of the admissions by the mother, the guardian, and the petitioner that petitioner is not the natural father of the child, the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition should be reversed, and the cause should be remanded with directions to grant the petition.