Court Opinion

ID: 9704374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:33:15.75719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:01.351284
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from my Brother Bashara’s opinion.
The Michigan statute on usury provides that interest on money shall be at a rate of 5%, except that parties may stipulate in writing to a rate not to exceed 7% per annum. MCLA 438.31; MSA 19.15(1). An exception to the act is made for "any time price differential which may be charged upon sales of goods or services on credit”.
In determining whether a transaction is usurious, Michigan courts have wisely used a cautious and open approach:
"Whether a particular transaction is usurious is a fact question, where the evidence is conflicting. Decision is not to be made according to any hard and fast test. The case is not to be determined simply by what the parties represent the transaction to be, but by considering the whole evidence to ascertain whether or not it is in substance a contracting to receive usurious interest for a loan or forbearance of money. The process involves looking through the form to the substance. No device or shift may be employed to conceal the true character of the transaction.” Hillman’s v Em ’N Al’s, 345 Mich 644, 652; 77 NW2d 96 (1956).
Frankly, I am not satisfied by the terms of the sale that the "time charge” of $13,250.45 was not actually a usurious charge for interest rather than a time-price differential.
Certainly some unsettling conflict does appear on the record. Specifically, the increase in price *576here was a percentage of the cash price amounting to $7 per hundred for five years on the unpaid balance on exactly 7%. Such evidence that the credit price was calculated in terms of interest or percentage speaks strongly to finding an interest charge rather than a time-price differential. J. Boyles, dissenting, Bird Finance Corp v Lamerson, 303 Mich 422, 434-435; 6 NW 732 (1942). See 14 ALR3d 1065, § 17, p 1140.
Where motion for summary judgment is made on grounds that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact”, GCR .1963, 117.2(3), the trial court should give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party, and should not grant summary judgment unless it finds that "it is impossible for the claim * * * to be supported at trial because of some deficiency which cannot be overcome”. Sanders v Clark Oil Refining Corp, 57 Mich App 687, 691; 226 NW2d 695 (1975), Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 372; 207 NW2d 316, 320 (1973).
Because I believe a factual question does reasonably exist as to whether the "time charge” was interest, which in the absence of written stipulation would be usurious under the statute, and not a time-price differential, I would reverse and remand this case for trial.