Court Opinion

ID: 9411670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 16:02:06.415135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:14.063324
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 27 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FORTUNATO DE JESUS AMADOR                       No.    18-71987
DUENAS,
                                                Agency No. A205-318-278
                Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                               Submitted July 20, 2023**
                               San Francisco, California

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas petitions for review of an order from the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen removal

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
petition for review.

      1.     In a published opinion issued concurrently with this memorandum

disposition, we hold that the appointment and removal process for Immigration

Judges and members of the BIA comports with the Constitution. These officials are

inferior officers of the United States, see Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051–53

(2018); Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010), so the Constitution’s

Appointments Clause permits their appointment by the Attorney General. U.S.

Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.

And Amador Duenas has identified no impermissible restriction on the Attorney

General’s ability to remove these officials. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493,

495–96.

      2.     The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Amador Duenas’s

motion to reopen the removal proceedings. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,

986 (9th Cir. 2010). A petitioner must support a motion to reopen with “previously

unavailable, material evidence.” Id. Amador Duenas accompanied his motion with

declarations from him and his attorney regarding his attorney’s failure to file the

documents necessary to receive a briefing schedule for his appeal to the BIA. This

evidence does not affect Amador Duenas’s eligibility for relief from removal.

Because it would not “change the result in the case,” it cannot support reopening

removal proceedings. See Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008).

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      3.     We will not consider Amador Duenas’s argument that the agency erred

in denying his application for cancellation of removal. Amador Duenas never sought

review of the BIA’s on-the-merits dismissal of his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s

determination that he was ineligible for cancellation because he failed to provide

evidence showing ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States.

He petitions for review only of the BIA’s later decision to deny his motion to reopen

the removal proceedings. “Our review is, therefore, limited to consideration of that

order, rather than the merits of [Amador Duenas’s] underlying claim for cancellation

of removal.” See Hernandez-Velasquez v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir.

2010); see also Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1257–58 (9th Cir. 1996).

      Nor will we address Amador Duenas’s argument that his waiver of the right

to appeal the Immigration Judge’s decision to the BIA was ineffective. This

argument is misplaced—the BIA determined that Amador Duenas did not waive his

right to appeal before dismissing his appeal on the merits.

      In his briefing to this court, Amador Duenas separately argues that the Notice

to Appear that initiated the removal proceedings against him was defective because

it did not include the date and time of his initial removal hearing. He thus maintains

that his time of continuous physical presence in the United States has not ended

under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2109–10 (2018), and that he is now

eligible for cancellation of removal. Although the BIA could exercise its discretion

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to reopen Amador Duenas’s removal proceedings sua sponte to consider this

argument, see Menendez-Gonzales v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019), we

will not consider it because Amador Duenas did not raise it in the motion to reopen

at issue in this appeal. See Hernandez-Velasquez, 611 F.3d at 1077.

      PETITION DENIED.

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