Court Opinion

ID: 9376898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-05 08:10:52.565573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.099288
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 28, 2023.

                                       In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-21-00679-CR

                  KHRISTOPHER EARL WHITE, Appellant

                                         V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 482nd District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 1567849

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Khristopher Earl White appeals his conviction for murder.
Evidence at trial demonstrated that appellant stabbed the complainant repeatedly
and the complainant later died due to complications from the stab wounds. A jury
found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at 99 years in prison. In two
issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and asserts the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on concurrent causation. We affirm.
                                      Discussion

      Appellant admitted at trial and acknowledges in his appellate brief that he
stabbed the complainant during an altercation, but appellant insists that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant
caused complainant’s death. Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on concurrent causation. As will be discussed, evidence
showed that complainant died due to complications resulting from the stabbing
after being in the hospital for several days.

                             Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his first issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all
the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom,
whether any rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). We do not sit as a
thirteenth juror and may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by
reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d
633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Rather, we defer to the factfinder to fairly
resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
from basic to ultimate facts. Id. This standard applies equally to both
circumstantial and direct evidence. Id. Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the appellant’s guilt so long as the cumulative effect of all
incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      As charged in this case and submitted to the jury, a person commits the
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offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an
individual or if he intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code §
19.02(b)(1), (2). Under either of these provisions, murder is a result-oriented
offense, meaning the proscribed conduct must have caused the death of the victim.
See, e.g., Martin v. State, 570 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet.
ref’d). As stated, appellant focuses his sufficiency challenge on the element of
causation. Specifically, he contends that there is insufficient evidence to support
the conclusion that the stab wounds he inflicted on complainant resulted in
complainant’s death.

      “The scope of causation under the Texas Penal Code is broad, allowing
courts to find causation where ‘the result would not have occurred but for [the]
conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause.’” Cyr v. State,
No. PD-0257-21, 2022 WL 17825857, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 21, 2022)
(quoting Tex. Penal Code § 6.04(a)). However, if a concurrent cause other than the
defendant’s conduct “was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct
of the actor clearly insufficient,” then causation is not established. Tex. Penal Code
§ 6.04(a); see also Quintanilla v. State, 292 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. App.—Austin
2009, pet. ref’d).

      In a murder prosecution, “but for” causation must be established between the
accused’s conduct and the death of the decedent. See Wooten v. State, 267 S.W.3d
289, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); see also Martin, 570
S.W.3d at 434 (citing Reeves v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 560, 101 S.W.2d 245, 246
(1937), and Hutcherson v. State, 373 S.W.3d 179, 187 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2012, pet. ref’d)). When concurrent causes are present, the “but for” requirement is
satisfied when either (1) the accused’s conduct is sufficient by itself to have caused

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the harm, or (2) the accused’s conduct coupled with the other cause is sufficient to
have caused the harm. Wooten, 267 S.W.3d at 296 (citing Robbins v. State, 717
S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). If an additional cause, other than the
accused’s conduct, is clearly sufficient by itself to produce the result, and the
accused’s conduct by itself is clearly insufficient, then the accused cannot be
convicted. Id. (citing Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351).

      Under this issue, appellant emphasizes that complainant initially survived
the stabbing, the trip to the hospital, multiple surgeries, and approximately ten days
in the hospital before he was diagnosed with acute sepsis. Appellant further notes
that the pathologist who conducted complainant’s autopsy explained that the sepsis
was likely the result of a bacterial infection that had spread throughout
complainant’s blood vessels and internal organs. And appellant highlights that the
pathologist also conceded it had not been determined exactly what kind of
microorganism had infected complainant because he had been on antibiotics when
admitted to the hospital. Appellant asserts the pathologist was merely speculating
in concluding that the acute sepsis and complainant’s death were caused by
appellant stabbing complainant and not by another source during complainant’s
hospitalization.

      Dr. Lucile Tennant, an assistant medical examiner at the Harris County
Institute of Forensic Sciences, is the pathologist who conducted complainant’s
autopsy and prepared the autopsy report, which was admitted into evidence. In her
testimony, Tennant described her procedures as well as the course of treatment
administered to complainant as recorded in his medical records. She explained that
he suffered multiple sharp force injuries including a stab wound to the left chest
that perforated a rib and his diaphragm, pierced his stomach, and came very close
to his heart and the pericardial sac which covers the heart. Tennant concluded that

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the cause of complainant’s death was complications from the sharp force injuries,
including stab wounds, and the manner of death was homicide, meaning at the
hands of another. The most immediate cause of death was multiple organ system
failure caused by the septic infection. Within a reasonable medical certainty, death
was caused by infection from the site of the chest wound; in other words, the
infection that killed complainant resulted from the stab wound to the chest. She
stated more simply that the stab wounds caused complainant’s death.

      Tennant further explained that when an unsterilized foreign object, such as a
knife, enters the body, it “can always bring in bacteria.” She stated that the medical
records supported her conclusions, including the notation that purulent fluid or pus
was present in the pericardium and that the pericardial sac was very “thickened and
shaggy and rough” when it normally should appear “glistening pink/red.” She
stated that “almost certainly” there was bacteria in that area. Tennant described the
care that complainant received for his injuries as “standard” and asserted that
stabbing someone is an act clearly dangerous to human life which can cause and
did cause serious bodily injury in this instance.

      On cross-examination, Tennant acknowledged that after his admission to the
hospital, complainant’s “apparent condition” improved and his wounds were
sutured and healing, but she explained that this does not necessarily mean that he
was actually recovering. She noted that his heart rate and blood pressure remained
elevated and “there were laboratory tests that were trending the wrong way.”
Eventually the treating physicians discovered an infection around the heart that
was likely not present at admission. She stated the infection was likely bacterial
but acknowledged that there was no culture obtained of the microorganisms
because complainant was on antibiotics which “probably killed whatever
bacterium was there so it didn’t culture out properly.” Contrary to appellant’s

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assertion on appeal, Tennant did not suggest that complainant was already on
antibiotics at the time of his admission to the hospital. Tennant also acknowledged
the possibility complainant could have become infected in the hospital as such
infections are not uncommon, but she reemphasized that within a reasonable
medical certainty, death was caused by infection from the site of the chest stab
wound and all of complainant’s infections, indeed, all the problems he was
experiencing, derived from the stab wounds.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant admitted to stabbing complainant. Tennant
directly tied complainant’s death to appellant’s conduct. Appellant does not point
to any evidence suggesting complainant’s death was attributable to any factor that
was sufficient to cause death in the absence of appellant’s conduct. As Tennant
explained, the fact that complainant initially survived the stabbing and his
condition appeared to improve at one point does not mean that the stabbing did not
cause his death. Although organ failure resulting from bacterial infection was the
immediate cause of death, the infection was likely caused by the stabbing. Tennant
fully supported her testimony with references to her autopsy report and
complainant’s medical records. Based on the evidence presented, a rational
factfinder could have concluded that complainant’s death was caused by
appellant’s charged conduct. See Jones v. State, 582 S.W.2d 129, 133–34 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (holding defendant was criminally responsible for death
resulting from complications arising out of injuries inflicted by defendant); Martin,
570 S.W.3d at 434-35 (holding evidence, including medical examiner’s testimony,
was sufficient to support murder conviction where complainant died from
complications from gunshot wounds); Quintanilla, 292 S.W.3d at 234-35 (holding

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evidence, including treating doctor’s testimony, was sufficient to support
manslaughter conviction where complainant died from complications from injuries
sustained in vehicle collision). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

                        Concurrent Causation Instruction

      In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying
his requested jury charge instruction on concurrent causation under section 6.04(a)
of the Texas Penal Code. In reviewing claims of jury charge error, we use a two-
step process. First, we determine whether error exists in the charge. Ngo v. State,
175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If error exists, we then determine
whether it was harmful using the framework outlined in Almanza v. State, 686
S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). See Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

      We review a trial court’s refusal to include a defensive issue in the charge
for an abuse of discretion. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000). An accused is entitled to an instruction on every defensive issue raised
by the evidence. Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
This is true whether the evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted,
and regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the
evidence. Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Indeed,
the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s
requested submission. Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).

      Under section 6.04(a), a defendant may be entitled to an instruction on
concurrent causation if a concurrent cause was clearly sufficient, operating alone,
to produce the result and the accused’s conduct alone was clearly insufficient to do
so. Fish v. State, 609 S.W.3d 170, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,
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pet. ref’d) (citing McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 516 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996)). “Concurrent causation” means that more than appellant’s conduct was
involved in causing the result at issue, that is “another cause” in addition to
appellant’s conduct. Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 297 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994); Puckett v. State, No. 14-14-00313-CR, 2015 WL 5093197, at *3 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). To be entitled to such an instruction, the defendant must specifically
show that (1) an agency in addition to the actor was a “but for” cause of the result
charged, and (2) some evidence demonstrates the defendant’s conduct was clearly
insufficient to cause the harm and the other, concurrent cause was clearly sufficient
to cause the harm. Cyr, 2022 WL 17825857, at *5.

      Under this issue, appellant references Dr. Tennant’s acknowledgement that
the infection that ultimately resulted in complainant’s death hypothetically could
have come from a different source while he was at the hospital. Appellant argues
that Tennant had no objective test, examination, report, or analysis to say for sure
that the infection was from the stabbing. As discussed above, however, Tennant
explained her procedures and methodology as well as the evidence that supported
her conclusion that within a reasonable medical certainty, complainant’s infection
and death were caused by the stabbing. Beyond citing the possibility—however
unlikely it may be in Tennant’s view—that the source of the infection was other
than appellant’s stabbing complainant, appellant does not cite any evidence that
another cause was clearly sufficient to cause complainant’s death or that
defendant’s conduct was clearly insufficient to cause the harm. Accordingly,
appellant has failed to establish his entitlement to an instruction on concurrent
causation. See id.; see also Guo v. State, No. 05-19-01178-CR, 2022 WL 224815,
at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

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publication) (holding trial court did not err in refusing concurrent causation
instruction where complainant died of complications from brain injury suffered in
attack by defendant and there was no evidence that anything other than the brain
injury led to the complications); Puckett, 2015 WL 5093197, at *3 (explaining that
trial court was not required to provide concurrent causation instruction because no
evidence suggested any other possible cause was clearly sufficient to have caused
complainant’s death or that defendant’s stabbing was clearly insufficient where
decedent died in hospital due to complications from stabbing). We therefore
overrule his second issue.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                      /s/       Frances Bourliot
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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