Court Opinion

ID: 9784399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:43:54.610696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:53.866569
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
I fully concur in the majority’s determination that as to both defendants the search of their residence cannot be justified by a parole search condition of which the officers were ignorant at the time. I write separately because I question the majority’s references to—and ostensible reliance on—the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule to support its analysis of the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 324, 334.)
“The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands . . . .” (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405].) The *339exclusionary rule “thus operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Accordingly, “[w]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case”—and hence the relevance of its deterrence purpose—“is ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) This distinction logically follows from the fact that an exclusionary remedy presupposes some illegality. (See United States v. Peltier (1975) 422 U.S. 531, 539 [45 L.Ed.2d 374, 95 S.Ct. 2313]; Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 447 [41 L.Ed.2d 182, 94 S.Ct. 2357].) In other words, until police officers conduct an unlawful search or seizure, the question of sanction or deterrence does not arise.
A review of United States Supreme Court decisions discussing the purpose of the exclusionary rule confirms this premise. In each case, the court was not determining if the defendant had suffered a constitutional violation but whether—given a violation—illegally obtained evidence could nevertheless be admitted, i.e., whether under the circumstances exclusion would advance the goal of deterring future police misconduct. For example, in United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, the court considered whether the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule justified extending its scope to evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid warrant later found unsupported by probable cause. (See id. at pp. 908-912, 918-919.) In United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338 [38 L.Ed.2d 561, 94 S.Ct. 613], the question was whether the exclusionary rule should apply to grand jury proceedings. Similarly, in United States v. Janis (1976) 428 U.S. 433 [49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021], the court considered its application to federal civil proceedings where evidence had been illegally seized by state officials.1
*340Here, we confront a threshold Fourth Amendment question: whether the officers conducted an illegal search because they were unaware at the time that Kenton Michael McDaniel was subject to a parole search condition, which would have otherwise validated their conduct. (See People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 681-682 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019]; People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445]; cf. In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 89-90 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519].) Until we know they acted unlawfully, deterrence is not at issue because the matter of sanction has not yet arisen. And the fact that deterrence is the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule does not assist in analyzing the predicate question.
Until In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, and People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311], this court’s search and seizure jurisprudence was generally consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s view that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was relevant to the scope of the remedy, not the contours of the constitutional right itself.2 Both of these decisions concerned the legality of the officers’ conduct, not the appropriateness of excluding the evidence. In Tyrell J., however, the court’s analysis for the first time—perhaps to shore up a constitutionally suspect result—included reference to the “primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment” as part of its rationale. (Tyrell J., at p. 89.) The misstep instigated by Tyrell J. was compounded in Robles with a similar discussion. (Robles, at pp. 799-800.)
Now, once again, the majority embraces the same misdirected reasoning. Error, however, does not improve with repetition. The third time is not the charm. The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not a consideration in assessing the totality of the circumstances affecting the reasonableness of a search. While conflating Fourth Amendment principles does not produce an incorrect result in this case, we should avoid sloppy analysis that could cause future mischief.

 See Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340 [94 L.Ed.2d 364, 107 S.Ct. 1160] (question whether exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on statute subsequently found unconstitutional); Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431 [81 L.Ed.2d 377, 104 S.Ct. 2501] (question whether to adopt inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule); United States v. Payner (1980) 447 U.S. 727 [65 L.Ed.2d 468, 100 S.Ct. 2439] (question whether to extend exclusionary rule to evidence seized from third party); Rakas v. Illinois (1979) 439 U.S. 128 [58 L.Ed.2d 387, 99 S.Ct. 421] (question whether exclusionary rule extends to evidence seized in automobile in which defendant had no property or possessory interest); United States v. Ceccolini (1978) 435 U.S. 268 [55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054] (question whether scope of exclusionary rule should extend to witness’s testimony); Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684] (question whether exclusionary rule applies in state court proceedings); Walder v. United States (1954) 347 U.S. 62 [98 L.Ed. 503, 74 S.Ct. 354] (question whether exclusionary rule extends to use of illegally seized evidence to impeach defendant’s trial testimony); cf. United States v. Johnson (1982) 457 U.S. 537 [73 L.Ed.2d 202, 102 S.Ct. 2579] (question whether decision construing Fourth Amendment should apply retroactively); Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465 [49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 96 S.Ct. 3037] (question whether exclusionary remedy extends to federal habeas corpus proceedings).

 See, e.g., People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 79 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 568, fn. 17 [221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 709 P.2d 1287]; Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 38-39 [196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110]; People v. Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822, 837-838 [180 Cal.Rptr. 617, 640 P.2d 753]; People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67, 82-83 [148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 583 P.2d 130]; see also In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 882-883 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; Dyas v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 628, 632-633 [114 Cal.Rptr. 114, 522 P.2d 674]; but see People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 219, 226 [101 Cal.Rptr. 860, 496 P.2d 1228]; Mann v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 1, 8 [88 Cal.Rptr. 380, 472 P.2d 468].