Court Opinion

ID: 9704924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:52:08.264434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.602280
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the opinion of the court overruling Barkley v. United States, 455 A.2d 412 (D.C.1983), and in the holding that the instructional failure was harmless constitutional error.1 I understand the court’s opinion to say that of all theoretical possibilities the most likely and logical by far is that the jury was unanimous in convicting on the spray guns. That was the thrust of my concurring opinion. Scarborough v. United States, 496 A.2d 277, 283 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring).
Under Supreme Court decisions, this court may couch the harmlessness conclusion in terms of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), or that there exists no substantial probability of a different result. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, —, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Various other language has been used to describe this harmlessness test, e.g., “ ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 473 U.S. at —, 105 S.Ct. at 3384.
Perhaps the most cogent statement on the nature of harmless constitutional error appears in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. -, -, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3108 n. 11, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), where Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, answered Justice Black-mun’s dissent:
We think the dissent, and not the Court, “asks and answers the wrong question” in this case. Post, at - [106 S.Ct. at 3116], 92 L.Ed.2d [at] 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). We agree that the determination of guilt or innocence, according to the standard of proof required by Winship and its progeny, is for the jury rather than the court. See id., at - [106 S.Ct. at 3114-3115], 92 L.Ed.2d [at] 480-481. Harmless-error analysis addresses a different question: what is to be done about a trial error that, in theory, may have altered the basis on which the jury decided the case, but in practice clearly had no effect on the outcome? This question applies not merely to Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)] violations, but to other errors that may have affected either the instructions the jury heard or the record it considered— including errors such as mistaken admission of evidence, or unconstitutional comment on a defendant’s silence, or erroneous limitation of a defendant’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness. All of these errors alter the terms under which the jury considered the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and therefore all theoretically impair the defendant’s interest in having a jury decide his case. The dissent’s argument — that the Sixth Amendment forbids a reviewing court to decide the impact of a trial error on the outcome, Post [478 U.S.] at - [106 S.Ct. at 3114], 92 L.Ed.2d [at] 480, logically implies that all such errors are immune from harmless-error analysis. Yet this Court repeatedly has held to the contrary. E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. -, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986) (limitation on defendant’s cross-examination); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 103 S.Ct. 1974 (1983) (improper comment on defendant’s failure to testify); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 54 L.Ed.2d 424, 98 S.Ct. 458 (1977) (admission of improperly obtained witness identification). In*876deed, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065) (1967), the beginning of this line of cases, applied harmless-error analysis to an error that placed an improper argument before the jury. Id., at 24-25, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 [at 828-829], 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (finding comment on defendant’s silence harmful). See also Hopper v. Evans, 466 U.S. [605] at 613-614, 72 L.Ed.2d 367, 102 S.Ct. 2049 [at 2054 (1982)] (citing Chapman, and finding error in jury instructions harmless). These decisions, ignored by the dissent, strongly support application of harmless-error analysis in the context of Sandstrom error.
We are today following this majority analysis in treating this instructional error as one that “in practice clearly had no effect on the outcome” though “in theory, [it] may have altered the basis on which the jury decided the case.” Id. MACK, Associate Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part:
I find the majority’s factual analysis (as to what a reasonable juror could have believed) to be “speculative and tortured.” I would reverse. The omission of the unanimity instruction under the circumstances of this case constituted an error of constitutional magnitude. I cannot find this violation of the sixth amendment to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

. The effect of our holding is dictated by Griffith v. Kentucky, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (constitutional holding applicable to all cases pending direct appeal).