Court Opinion

ID: 9388438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 16:11:05.745475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.279866
License: Public Domain

J-S07016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF W.R.S.         : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :       PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
APPEAL OF: L.M., FATHER               :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      : No. 1036 WDA 2021
             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 9, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Orphans’ Court at
                          No(s): 32-20-0414

BEFORE: OLSON, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. *

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                       FILED: April 20, 2023

        Before us is an appeal by L.M. (Father) from a decree entered by the

Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Orphans’ Court (orphans’ court)

granting a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights filed by M.T.

(Mother) and her husband B.T. (Stepfather) to terminate Father’s parental

rights to his daughter W.R.S. (Child) born in June 2016. Stepfather is the

proposed adoptive father of the Child. We vacate and remand.

                                               I.

        Our review of the certified record reflects the following factual and

procedural history. Mother and Father had a brief non-committed relationship.

When Mother informed Father of her pregnancy, Father did not participate in

Mother’s medical appointments prior to Child’s birth and was not present at

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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the birth of the Child. He is not listed on the Child’s birth certificate. Prior to

Child’s birth, Father was convicted and sentenced for drug-related and

domestic violence offenses and was incarcerated in June 2016.

        Shortly after Child’s birth, Mother began a relationship with Stepfather.

They began living together in June 2017 and married in July 2020. Stepfather

has assisted in raising Child and supporting her financially and has been the

sole paternal figure in her life.

        Father had no contact with Mother until approximately one year after

Child’s birth when he sent a letter to Mother from prison. Father remained in

prison until April 2, 2019.         He had no contact with Child while he was

incarcerated but spoke with Mother on the phone and wrote her approximately

15 letters over that three-year period.          Father’s only contacts with Child

occurred following his release from prison.          According to Mother, at her

invitation, Father attended a birthday party for Child in July 2019 and “got her

some birthday presents and cupcakes, and he just talked with [Stepfather]

mostly.” See N.T., 7/26/21, at 15.1 Father saw Child a second time “maybe

three or four weeks later,” again at Mother’s invitation.           Id.   Mother’s

recollection of this interaction is that Father “got to see [Child] and have a

conversation with her and she just kept on playing.” Id. Father has not seen

Child since those visits.

____________________________________________

1   The notes of testimony incorrectly bear the date July 26, 2020.

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       Father generally blamed Mother for his lack of contact with Child,

indicating that he reached out to Mother in “March and May” of 2020 to try to

see Child, but Mother blocked him on her phone and on her Facebook account.

Id. at 41, 42, 50-51. Father contends that he did not make any other efforts

to have a relationship because he was afraid Mother would pursue criminal

charges if he continued to seek contact. Id. at 40-51.

       Mother admitted that she became unwilling to permit Father to have

contact with Child; she blocked Father on her Facebook account 2 and her

phone; she would not have allowed Father to have even supervised contact

with Child if he had requested it; and that Father did not know the address

where she resided for the last two years. Id. at 17, 21-26. Mother indicated

that her last contact with Father involved an exchange of heated text

messages that occurred sometime in 2020, after which she “just blocked him.”

Id. at 23.

       In the months following the last exchange of text messages, Father

learned of Mother’s new address from a third party. Id. at 41. He then filed

a complaint for custody and a complaint to establish paternity/request for

genetic testing.     Father’s custody and paternity pleadings are not in the

____________________________________________

2At the termination hearing, Mother asserted that she was no longer blocking
Father on Facebook but did not indicate when the blocking ended. See N.T.,
7/26/21, at 22. At the hearing, Father said that he was still blocked from
Mother’s Facebook account. Id. at 41. Mother did not indicate that she had
ever stopped blocking Father on her phone. Id. at 23.

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certified record, but the orphans’ court indicates that Father filed these

pleadings on or about October 14, 2020.3         See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

9/17/21, at unnumbered 1. One week later, on October 21, 2020, Mother and

Stepfather filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights

as well as a petition for adoption of Child by Stepfather. After a continuance,

the orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing on April 13, 2021, and

entered a decree on April 16, 2021, granting the petition to involuntarily

terminate Father’s parental rights to Child.

       On April 20, 2021, despite the involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights, the orphans’ court conducted a hearing on Father’s complaint

to establish paternity/request for genetic testing.    At the hearing, Father

claimed that although he was aware that the original termination hearing had

been continued, he did not receive notice of the rescheduled hearing date of

April 13, 2021. Considering this information, the orphans’ court vacated the

April 16, 2021 decree and scheduled a new termination hearing.

____________________________________________

3 Father’s custody complaint was filed at docket number 11801 CD 2020,
whereas Mother and Stepfather filed the termination petition at docket
number 32-20-0414.      Because the orphans’ court proceeded with the
termination proceedings at docket number 32-20-0414, the record for the
custody proceedings at docket number 11801 CD 2020 was not transmitted
to this Court.

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       On July 26, 2021, the orphans’ court conducted a second termination

hearing at which Mother, Stepfather and Father testified.4 The orphans’ court

denied Father’s request for genetic testing because Mother did not dispute

that Father was Child’s biological father. On August 9, 2021, the orphans’

court entered a decree granting Mother and Stepfather’s petition to

involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to Child.

       Father’s counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal. Father’s counsel also filed a statement of

intent to file a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

The orphans’ court then ordered Father to file a second concise statement and

Father timely complied.5 The orphans’ court then authored a Rule 1925(a)

opinion.

       On appeal, Father’s counsel filed an Anders brief and a petition to

withdraw from representation. We denied counsel’s petition to withdraw and

____________________________________________

4 The orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent Child’s legal interests.
Child’s counsel joins with Mother and Stepfather in urging that Father’s appeal
be dismissed.

5 The orphans’ court docket indicates that Father filed his second concise
statement on September 13, 2021; however, it is absent from the orphans’
court record. Father’s notice of appeal is not in the orphans’ court record.
Upon review, it appears that the orphans’ court transmitted the original notice
of appeal to this Court, rather than a copy. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(b) (providing
that “[t]he clerk [of the orphans’ court] shall immediately transmit to the
prothonotary of the appellate court named in the notice of appeal a copy of
the notice of appeal”).

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directed counsel to file an advocate’s brief on Father’s behalf.        Counsel

complied with our directive and this matter is now ripe for our review.6

       Father raises the following general issues for our review:

       1. Whether Mother and Stepfather failed to prove by clear and
       convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed pursuant
       to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

       2. Whether Mother and Stepfather failed to prove by clear and
       convincing evidence that the best interests of the Child would be
       served by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
       Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

____________________________________________

6 Our standard of review of a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights
is as follows:

       The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the [orphans’] court if they are
       supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
       appellate courts review to determine if the [orphans’] court made
       an error of law or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be
       reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
       manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
       The [orphans’] court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
       merely because the record would support a different result. We
       have previously emphasized our deference to [orphans’] courts
       that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
       multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). “The [orphans’] court is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d
68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence
supports the [orphans’] court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could
also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387,
394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

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Father’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

                                      II.

                                      A.

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.   See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.       “Subsection (a) provides eleven

enumerated grounds describing particular conduct of a parent which would

warrant involuntary termination.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343,

359 (Pa. 2021); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In this case, the

orphans’ court terminated father’s parental rights to the child pursuant to

subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

             (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
      six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
      has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to
      a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

                                    ****

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b); see also In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.

Super. 2008).

      Though we do not adhere to any strict definition of “parental duty,” a

child has a right to essential parental care, and our jurisprudence reveals

certain irreducible qualities of a parent’s attendant obligation. C.M., 255 A.3d

at 364. Foremost, it is a positive duty requiring an affirmative performance.

Id. As our Supreme Court has explained:

      Parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and
      maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. A parent must
      exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the
      path of maintaining the parent-child relationship, or his rights may
      be forfeited. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a
      more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
      responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
      physical and emotional needs.

Id. (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

      However, even if a parent has failed to perform affirmative parental

duties for a period in excess of six months, the court must examine the

individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to

determine if that evidence, under the totality of circumstances, clearly

warrants permitting the involuntary termination of parental rights.          The

totality of the circumstances includes evaluation of the following:     (1) the

parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact

between the parent and child, if any, including any efforts made by the parent

to reestablish contact with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of

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parental rights would have on the child pursuant to subsection 2511(b). Id.

at 365.

      It is within this framework that an orphans’ court determines whether a

parent has faced barriers that prevented the parent from maintaining the

parent-child relationship. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 593

(Pa. 2021).   What may constitute a “barrier” in the context of a Section

2511(a)(1) analysis will vary with the circumstances of each case. Id. “In

some instances, obstructive behavior by the child’s custodian presents a

barrier to the parent’s ability to perform parental duties, which mitigates the

parent’s failure to maintain the parent-child relationship.”       Id.   In other

instances, orphans’ courts have found substance abuse, mental health issues,

homelessness, joblessness, criminal charges or a confluence of some or all

these issues created barriers to the maintenance of the parent-child

relationship. Id.

                                       B.

      In his first issue on appeal, Father contends that under C.M. and L.A.K.,

his filing of a custody complaint within six months of the filing of a termination

petition, without more, constitutes the affirmative performance of a parental

duty, preventing Mother and Stepfather from meeting their evidentiary burden

under subsection 2511(a)(1). That is an overly-broad reading of those cases

because in each of those cases, there was much more. Let us examine each

of those cases in more detail.

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      In C.M., our Supreme Court considered the significance and effect of

custody-related legal filings by a parent in a subsection 2511(a)(1) analysis.

In that case, before the child’s birth, father and mother lived in Texas. Father

was present at the hospital for C.M.’s birth in Pennsylvania in January 2016

and purchased a crib and changing table for use at maternal grandparents’

home.   He went back alone to Texas and mother and child resided with

maternal grandparents in Pennsylvania. Father returned to Pennsylvania in

the spring or summer of 2016. Initially, he had difficulty reaching mother,

but through his consistent efforts to contact her, he arranged six visits

between August and early October of that year.        Mother then refused to

schedule further visits, hung up the phone when father called, and did not

allow him to deliver Christmas presents. After more than two years, father

filed a custody action. Two months later, mother and maternal grandparents

sought the termination of father’s parental rights. The orphans’ court denied

the petition to terminate.

      Our Supreme Court held that because father had initiated and actively

pursued a complaint for custody in the two months prior to the filing of the

termination petition, including attending      court-ordered mediation and

conciliation proceedings, the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in

holding that his actions demonstrated an “affirmative performance of [his]

parental duties to the maximum extent apparent at the time under the

circumstances.” C.M., supra, at 368. It explained that a parent’s efforts to

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enforce his or her legal custody rights unquestionably establishes the

affirmative performance of a positive parental duty. When such action is taken

in the face of a custodial parent’s efforts to thwart access to the child, the

attempts to enforce custodial rights provide evidence that is “highly relevant”7

to the question of whether the requirements of subsection 2511(a)(1) have

been met. Id. at 367.

       Our Supreme Court held that “because . . . [f]ather continuously

exercised parental duties during the two months preceding the filing of the

[termination] petition, appellants did not meet their burden to establish by

clear and convincing evidence he failed or refused to perform parental duties,

or a settled purpose of relinquishment, for a period of at least six months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition.”      Id. (internal citations

omitted).

       A few months after deciding C.M., our Supreme Court again considered

the significance and effect of custody-related legal filings in a subsection

2511(a)(1) analysis. See L.A.K., supra. In L.A.K., mother and father were

married and shared two children. Largely as a result of father’s alcoholism,

mother and father separated in 2015 and divorced in 2017.           When they

separated, L.A.K. was three years old and A.L.K. was seven months old and

____________________________________________

7That Father’s custody petition was filed with a request for genetic testing
undercuts its relevancy as an exercise of his parental duties.

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mother retained custody of the children.        Father last saw the children in

January 2016 and never exercised his rights under a custody order.              He

refrained from contact with his children until he had attained a year of sobriety

and then instituted a legal action to modify the existing custody order so that

he could begin to establish a relationship with them. Approximately one week

later, mother and stepfather filed petitions to involuntarily terminate father’s

parental rights, which the trial court denied. Our Supreme Court concluded

that the trial court acted within its discretion by denying termination because

“[i]t is crystal clear, and of vital importance . . . that a parent’s legal efforts

to enforce custodial rights demonstrate affirmative performance of a positive

parental duty.” Id. at 594 (citing C.M., supra, at 367).

      Here, Father argues that under C.M. and L.A.K., the mere filing of a

custody complaint, without more, constitutes the affirmative performance of

a parental duty which prevents Mother and Stepfather from meeting their

evidentiary burden under subsection 2511(a)(1) that he evidenced a settled

purpose of relinquishing parental claim. However, those cases do not hold

that the mere filing of a custody proceeding in the six months before a

termination proceeding conclusively establishes that the parent was carrying

out his parental duties.      Rather, the custody proceedings only provide

evidence that is “highly relevant” to the question of whether the requirements

of subsection 2511(a)(1) have been met under a totality of the circumstances

analysis. C.M., supra, at 367.

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      Both C.M. and L.A.K. involve whether the trial court abused its

discretion in denying the termination petition by giving weight to the filing of

the custody proceeding in the totality of the circumstances analysis. However,

that is not the only factor that is relevant. In L.A.K., our Supreme Court did

not halt its analysis once it determined that father had performed a parental

duty by filing a custody complaint during the statutory six-month period. It

went on to analyze the totality of the circumstances by explaining that father

had a relationship with the child prior to the six months at issue, had ceased

contact to address his alcoholism and had attempted to reestablish the

relationship through a custody petition when he had achieved sobriety.

L.A.K., supra, at 595.

      That leads us to Father’s contention that the orphans’ court abused its

discretion in concluding that he evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing

his parental claim rather than finding that he was precluded from engaging in

his parental duties because of obstacles placed by Mother.

                                      C.

      Father contends that Mother erected barriers to his exercising his

parental responsibilities because she blocked him from contacting her through

her phone and Facebook account and he was unable to ascertain her address.

      There is no dispute that Father has no relationship with Child and Child

would not recognize Father if he saw him.      When Child was born in 2016,

Father was incarcerated. He has only visited Child on two occasions: in July

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2019 when Mother invited him to Child’s birthday party and again at Mother’s

home three to four weeks later. He purportedly sent Christmas presents one

year, but Mother testified that they were not delivered. He has not provided

or offered to provide financial support for Child.

      Nonetheless, Father contends that his failure to maintain a relationship

with Child after he was released from prison was because Mother erected

barriers to an extent that excuses his failure to carry out his parental

responsibilities. One of the impediments that he alleges is that Mother blocked

him on her Facebook account.       Mother admitted that she blocked him on

Facebook because he stated that he wanted to “take [Child] back to Cleveland”

and he “texted [her] a lot of negative names.” N.T., 7/26/21, at 23. Father

also asserts that Mother blocked him from calling her on the phone. Mother

disagreed, pointing out that he was able to contact her by phone multiple

times during and after his incarceration from 2016 through 2019, see N.T.,

7/26/21, at 37-38, and that they texted on multiple occasions in 2020, id. at

17, 41. Mother’s phone number did not change throughout Child’s life. Id.

at 18.   Moreover, the testimony showed that Father could have contacted

Child’s Stepfather through Facebook or obtained Stepfather’s phone number

from his Facebook account. Id. at 35.

      Father also relies on his inability to ascertain Mother’s current address.

Ignoring whether being unable to ascertain her address is an “active”

interference, there is no evidence of what steps Father took to determine the

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address. Mother and Stepfather testified that they have lived in the small

town of Clymer, Pennsylvania for several years, and only moved a few houses

away on the same street since the time when Father had visited their home

in 2019. Further, Stepfather still owned the previous home where Father had

visited, and the tenants at that home could have easily directed Father to

Mother’s new house several doors away. Id. at 31.

      The question then is whether Father has sufficiently established that

there were active barriers to his exercising his parental responsibilities. Our

Supreme Court, again in L.A.K., supra, at 592-93, has stated that parties

claiming that “barriers” prevented them from meeting their responsibilities

must show that they exercised diligence in overcoming them. “[T]he question

whether a parent has failed or refused to perform parental duties must be

analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of the case.” In re Burns,

379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977); see also Matter of Adoption of David C.,

387 A.2d 804, 807 (Pa. 1978). Our Supreme Court has explained that:

        [a] finding of abandonment, which has been characterized as
        “one of the most severe steps the court can take,” Sarver
        Adoption Case, 281 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. 1971), will not be
        predicated upon parental conduct which is reasonably
        explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the
        parent’s control. It may only result when a parent has failed
        to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental
        relationship.

      Burns, 379 A.2d at 540. Decades ago, this Court clarified that
      “[a] parent’s efforts are always considered ‘in light of existing
      circumstances.’” In re D.J.Y., 408 A.2d 1387, 1390 (Pa. 1979)
      (quoting David C., 387 A.2d at 807). Thus, the focus of the
      inquiry is on whether, under the circumstances, the parent has

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       acted with reasonable firmness in refusing to yield to the obstacles
       that have prevented the performance of parental duties. In re
       M.A.K., 414 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. 1980); see also C.M., 255
       A.3d at 365 (providing that inquiry focuses on whether under the
       circumstances, the parent has utilized all available resources to
       preserve the parent-child relationship).

L.A.K., supra, at 592-93 (cleaned up).

       However, the trial court has never addressed whether there were

barriers    that    substantially     impeded      Father’s   exercise   of   parental

responsibilities. Because this is an issue of fact for it to address in the first

instance, we must remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether

there were substantial barriers preventing Father from exercising his parental

responsibilities, whether those barriers were reasonable and whether he took

appropriate actions, with “reasonable firmness” to overcome those barriers.8

Id.

       Decree vacated and remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

       Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

       Judge Sullivan files a concurring memorandum.

Judgment Entered.
____________________________________________

8 Based on our disposition, we need not address Father’s second issue on
appeal. Nevertheless, he has waived his argument challenging the orphans’
court’s analysis under subsection 2511(b) for failure to develop it in his brief.
See Green v. Green, 69 A.3d 282, 285 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013).

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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2023

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