Court Opinion

ID: 9581000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:10:56.977341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:38.962663
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
concurring.
I concur fully in the finding in the opinion of the court that, as a matter of law, the award of damages in this case was clearly excessive and that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.
In my opinion it is a very close question as to whether the cause should be remanded with directions to dismiss the petition because the evidence established that the negligence of the plaintiff’s decedent, Dan L. Crewdson, was more than slight as a matter of law.
The record shows that the plaintiff’s decedent was guilty of substantial negligence which was directly contributory to the accident.
Crewdson lived near the crossing and was very familiar with it and knew of its dangerous nature and the high volume of railroad traffic. Jody Jones, who successfully (rather than “safely”) crossed just ahead of Crewdson, testified that she heard the train whistle and saw the glare of its headlight as she approached the crossing. The physical facts were such that her automobile had to be brightly illuminated by the headlight of the approaching eastbound train as she was on the crossing in front of Crewdson, and the headlight should have been apparent to him if he exercised only the slightest of care.
As the opinion points out, all of the positive testimony was that the flagman, Michael Smith, was in position in front of Crewdson and flagging the crossing with a lighted lantern when Crewdson approached the crossing. It seems to me that the circumstances in this case are so different from the facts in Anderson v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 229 Neb. 321, 426 N.W.2d 518 (1988), that the Anderson case has but little application here.
But if it be conceded that the comparison of Crewdson’s *647negligence to that of the defendant was a question for the jury, it was, and on remand will be, the duty of the jury under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185 (Reissue 1989) to diminish or mitigate the damages to be recovered by the plaintiff in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff’s decedent. To me, it is clear on this record that the jury made no allowance for the negligence of the plaintiff’s decedent in fixing the amount of the damages it awarded.
Hastings, C. J. Joins in this concurrence.