Court Opinion

ID: 9889521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 16:11:14.387299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:03.770696
License: Public Domain

J-S16035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                v.                                :
                                                  :
                                                  :
  BRANDON SMITH                                   :
                                                  :
                       Appellant                  :   No. 1600 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0004956-2015

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                                FILED OCTOBER 10, 2023

       Brandon Smith (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 after his jury convictions of

second-degree        murder,   robbery,        conspiracy    to   commit   robbery,   and

possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).2 On appeal, Appellant claims trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his statement

made to police on the grounds that he was illegally arrested. We affirm.

       On March 12, 2015, Appellant — who was 15 years old at the time ─

Appellant’s 14-year-old brother, Alston Zou-Rutherford (Brother),3 and their
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(i), 903(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively.

3 Appellant and Brother are not biological siblings, but referred to each other

as such because they share the “same guardian,” Victoria Zou (Mother), and
had “lived together for a number of years.” N.T., 4/20/17, at 63-64.
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15-year-old friend, Tyfine Hamilton, planned to commit a robbery together.

See N.T., 4/20/17, at 67; Trial Ct. Op., 2/22/18, at 5 n.6.       Brother was

carrying a gun inside his bookbag, which he later gave to Hamilton. See N.T.,

4/20/17, at 67, 72-73. After about 20 minutes of searching for a potential

victim in the area of 6400 Woodcrest Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the

three saw an “old man,” James Stuhlman (Victim), walking a dog.             N.T.,

4/19/17, at 205, 208.          Appellant and Hamilton approached Victim while

Brother stood behind them as a lookout. Id. at 205. Hamilton was “waving

[the] gun” and told Victim to “empty out his pockets[.]” N.T., 4/20/17, at 76.

When Victim attempted to grab the gun, Hamilton shot Victim and the three

assailants ran from the scene. See id. at 77-78.

       The PCRA court summarized the following relevant underlying facts:

             [On March 17 and 18, 2015, Philadelphia] Police Officers
       [Thomas D’Alesio and Tritz4] reviewed surveillance footage of the
       incident . . . and noted that the suspects were three young males.
       One was carrying a very distinctive bright red backpack with a
       black bottom and black cords hanging down the center. The other
       two males were wearing blue sneakers, one pair a brighter blue
       than the other.

              [O]n March 18, 2015, [after viewing surveillance video, the
       o]fficers observed a group of young males walking a short
       distance from the scene of the crime. One of the males was
       carrying a bright red backpack that [“looked like the exact, same
       backpack” as] the one in the surveillance video. Another male
       was wearing bright blue sneakers that matched those worn by one
       of the males on the surveillance video.

____________________________________________

4 Officer Tritz’s first name is not apparent from the record.

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            The males stopped at a property on the 6500 block of Girard
       Ave. Police stopped the males[ and took them] in for questioning.
       [The male carrying the bright red backpack was identified as
       Brother].

             A few hours later, [while officers were holding the house for
       a search warrant,] Appellant walked into [the home on the 6500
       block of] West Girard Ave., approached police officers, and asked
       them for the whereabouts of [B]rother. [Appellant], who was also
       a young male, was then brought in for questioning.

PCRA Ct. Op., 8/19/22, at 2-3 (paragraph breaks added); see also N.T.,

4/19/17, at 144-47, 155.

       Police brought Brother to the Southwest Detectives Division at 55th and

Pine Streets to be questioned.           See N.T., 4/20/17, at 20.   During this

interview, Brother confessed to robbing Victim with two other males, whom

he initially identified as “Jay” and “Nick.” See id. at 28. Toward the conclusion

of the interview, which ended at 9:15 p.m., Brother admitted “Jay” and “Nick”

were, in fact, Hamilton and Appellant, respectively. See id. at 25-26, 28-30.

       Meanwhile, at approximately 6:30 p.m., officers transported Appellant

to the Homicide Unit at 8th and Race Streets. See N.T., 4/19/17, at 188-89.

Around 9:30 p.m. that same night — after the completion of Brother’s

interview — Philadelphia Police Detectives Thomas Gaul and Thorsten Lucke,

questioned Appellant.5 Id. at 189-90. The officers read Appellant Miranda6

____________________________________________

5 Philadelphia Police Sergeant Robert Wilkins was also present for portions of

the interview. N.T., 4/19/17, at 189.

6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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warnings and he confessed to conspiring with Brother and Hamilton to commit

a robbery with a firearm. Id. at 190-91, 194-96, 203-09.7

       Appellant was then charged with second-degree murder, conspiracy to

commit third-degree murder,8 robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and

PIC. Joshua E. Scarpello, Esquire (Trial Counsel) entered his appearance and

filed a motion to suppress Appellant’s statement to police, arguing Appellant

did not receive Miranda warnings, and the police did not allow him to speak

with an attorney or an interested adult before interrogating him.                 See

Appellant’s    Motion     to   Suppress        Physical   Evidence,   3/28/17,   at   2

(unpaginated).

       The trial court held a suppression hearing on April 18, 2017, where

Detective Gaul, Detective Lucke, and Appellant testified.              Detective Gaul

stated that on March 18, 2015, Appellant “was brought into the homicide unit

with multiple other individuals” “for investigation” and noted “[h]e wasn’t free

to leave.” See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. 1, 4/18/17, at 5-6, 174. Around 9:30 p.m.,

Detective Gaul had “information that [Appellant] was possibly one of the

individuals involved” in the incident. Id. at 7. The detectives read Appellant

his Miranda rights and contacted Mother to inform her Appellant was a

____________________________________________

7 In his statement to police, Appellant refers to Tyfine Hamilton as “Tavon”

and Brother (Alston Zou-Rutherford) as “Austin.” See N.T. 4/19/17, at 211,
222.

8 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903/ 2502(c). This charge was later nolle prossed. See Trial
Disposition and Dismissal Form, 9/19/17, at 1.

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“suspect” in the murder and obtain her permission to interview him. Id. at 8,

163-64.    After Appellant waived his Miranda rights and Mother gave

detectives permission to speak with him, Appellant proceeded to explain the

events leading up to Victim’s murder. Id. at 8, 172-73, 180. Between 10:20

p.m. on March 18th and 12:30 a.m. on March 19th, the detectives

documented Appellant’s statement in writing and on video. Id. at 8, 158.

During the detective’s testimony, the following exchange occurred:

     [Trial Counsel]: When you were done completing the interview,
     did you start the formal arrest process? Did you tell [Appellant]
     he was formally under arrest and charged with robbery and
     murder at that point?

     [Detective Gaul]: As far as doing a[n arrest] report, that wasn’t
     completed but it was my intention to arrest [Appellant] at that
     time but I had to go through the process of reviewing it with [the
     Commonwealth.] He might have been charged at a later time.
     He was probably charged either later that day or the next day.

Id. at 174-75.

     Detective Lucke then testified that he spoke with Mother on the phone

while he was at the police station. N.T., 4/18/17, at 183-84. Detective Lucke

stated he informed Mother he needed “her permission to speak with

[Appellant] in reference to the ongoing investigation” of Victim’s murder. Id.

at 184. He also told Mother the police were not only speaking with Appellant,

but that he “was one of the young men [they] were looking to speak to . . . in

an effort to determine everybody’s involvement in [the] incident.” Id. at 185.

     Appellant then testified several times that he “wanted to talk to the

police[,]” and would have spoken with them regardless of Mother’s

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permission. See N.T., 4/18/17, at 263, 265-68, 277. Appellant “want[ed] to

get this off [his] chest” and stated, “I believe the truth will set you free. So

that is why I was [at the police station], to tell the truth and hopefully I will

get a second chance[.]” Id. at 271, 278. Over the course of the hearing,

Appellant also attested multiple times that he “turned [himself] in[.]”9 See

id. at 263, 265-66, 270, 277-78.

       The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, and this matter

proceeded to a two-day trial commencing on April 19, 2017.10 The jury found

Appellant guilty of second-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit

robbery, and PIC. On September 19th, the trial court sentenced Appellant to

an aggregate term of 30 years to life incarceration followed by a term of 10

years’ probation.

       On October 18, 2017, Trial Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and a

motion to withdraw from representation, which the trial court granted. See

Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, 10/18/17, at 2 (unpaginated);

Order, 10/24/17. The court then appointed Karl Schwartz, Esquire (Appeal

Counsel), to represent Appellant on direct appeal.

____________________________________________

9 Despite Appellant’s insistence that he “turned [himself] in[,]” Detective
Gaul’s testimony reflects police took Appellant into custody. See N.T.
4/18/17, at 6, 263.

10 The order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress does not appear in the

certified record. The criminal docket reflects the trial court denied this motion
on April 18, 2017. See Criminal Docket at 10.

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     On direct appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court’s order denying his

motion to suppress and argued his sentence was unconstitutional under the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.      Commonwealth v.

Smith, 210 A.3d 1050, 1057 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 296 EAL 2019

(Pa. Oct. 28, 2019).    On May 14, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later denied his

petition for allowance of appeal. See id. at 1054.

     On January 21, 2020, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The

PCRA court appointed Gina Amoriello, Esquire (PCRA Counsel) to represent

him. PCRA Counsel then filed an amended petition raising the following claim:

Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Appellant’s

statement to police on the grounds that he was arrested illegally and without

probable cause.     Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 11/16/20, at 3

(unpaginated). On February 23, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a response

whereby it acknowledged “the record is unclear regarding the circumstances

of [Appellant] being stopped and transported” to the police station and it

believed an evidentiary hearing was necessary.         See Commonwealth’s

Response Not Opposing An Evidentiary Hearing, 2/23/22, at 1.

     On May 12, 2022, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing.          The

Commonwealth presented Philadelphia Police Officer Ryan Daut who testified

that on March 18, 2015, he was securing the West Girard Avenue home where

Brother and other individuals were taken in for questioning, while other

officers applied for a search warrant. See N.T., 5/12/22, at 5-6. While there,

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Appellant approached the home “looking for his brother[.]” Id. at 6. After

obtaining Appellant’s name, Officer Daut called the Homicide Unit and was

instructed “to bring [Appellant] down to” the police station. Id. at 6-7. Officer

Daut stated that at that point, Appellant was not free to leave. Id. at 15-16.

The officer patted Appellant down and transported him to the station in a

police vehicle. Id. at 15, 21. Officer Daut noted he only filled out a “transport

48” police form “to take him down” to the station. Id. at 12. Additionally, he

stated he did not fill out a “75-48A[,]” form, which the police use when they

“are stopping an individual for reasonable suspicion[.]” Id. at 12-13. Officer

Daut explained: “I don’t think we were stopping to detain [Appellant] or arrest

him. I think it was more so to take him down, to give a statement to Homicide

or be interviewed by Homicide.” Id. at 12.

      PCRA Counsel then presented Trial Counsel, who stated he represented

Appellant leading up to and during his trial. See N.T., 5/12/22, at 25. Trial

Counsel testified that he filed a motion to suppress challenging “the

voluntariness of [Appellant’s] statement primarily because of [his] age and

the fact that he didn’t speak with [M]other prior to the interview.” Id. at 26.

He recalled that at the time Appellant was taken into custody, “he was brought

in, along with other juveniles that were there, for questioning, not under arrest

but for questioning[.]” Id. at 30.

      When PCRA counsel asked Trial Counsel why he only filed a motion to

suppress based on voluntariness, he stated: (1) Brother admitted he and

Appellant were involved in the robbery before officers interviewed Appellant;

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(2) he believed the officers interviewing Brother informed the officers

interviewing Appellant of this statement; (3) based on Brother’s statement,

he believed police had reason to question Appellant; (4) he “was more focused

on the bright-line issue of the fact that [M]other was trying to speak with

[Appellant] and that never happened[;]” (5) he “argued what [he] thought

was the stronger issue[;]” and (6) he did not think a motion to suppress

Appellant’s statement based on an illegal arrest would have been successful.

See N.T., 5/12/22, at 32-33, 36, 40. Lastly, Trial Counsel acknowledged that

if Appellant’s statement was suppressed at trial “it would have made the case

better[,]” but conceded he “was working under the constraints of [Brother]

being a cooperating witness[.]” Id. at 35.

      Appellant then testified at the hearing that the police “already had

statements from all of the codefendants” by the time he spoke to police, and

“there was nothing [he] could argue at the time.” N.T., 5/12/22, at 56. He

also claimed he “never wrote a statement[,]” “the cops wrote the

statement[,]” and he “never signed the statement with [his] signature[.]” Id.

at 56-57.

      The Commonwealth and PCRA Counsel stipulated at the hearing that if

the   trial   court   had   suppressed    Appellant’s   statement   at   trial,   the

Commonwealth would have called Brother to testify as a rebuttal witness. See

N.T., 5/12/22, at 23.

      After the hearing, the PCRA court issued a notice of dismissal pursuant

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not file a response. On June 15, 2022, the

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PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Order, 6/15/22. This timely appeal

follows.11

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following claim:

       Did the trial court err in denying post-conviction relief after an
       evidentiary hearing when Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing
       to move to suppress Appellant’s statement on the grounds [of]
       illegal arrest when police lacked probable cause to effectuate the
       arrest?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

       Our standard regarding PCRA appeals is well-settled:

       When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court
       must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by
       the record and free of legal error. Generally, a reviewing court is
       bound by a PCRA court’s credibility determinations and its fact-
       finding, so long as those conclusions are supported by the record.
       However, with regard to a court’s legal conclusions, appellate
       courts apply a de novo standard.

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (footnotes &

quotation marks omitted).

       Because Appellant’s claim concerns ineffective assistance of counsel, we

also are guided by the following:

       To prove that counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must
       demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit;
       (2) that no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure
       to act; and (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of
       counsel’s error. To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
       reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not
       chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
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11 Appellant complied with the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement.

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      the course actually pursued. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a
      petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
      that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
      but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be
      effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness the
      petitioner must adduce sufficient evidence to overcome this
      presumption.

Drummond, 285 A.3d at 634 (footnotes & quotation marks omitted). We

further note: “Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of

the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Commonwealth v.

McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 70 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      Relevant to Appellant’s claim, we note:

      Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of
      three categories of interactions between citizens and the police.
      The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
      information) which need not be supported by any level of
      suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.
      The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a
      reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
      of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
      constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest
      or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted). Probable cause is

      made out when the facts and circumstances which are within the
      knowledge of the officer at the time of the [stop], and of which he
      has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant
      a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has
      committed or is committing a crime. The question we ask is not
      whether the officer’s belief was correct or more likely true than
      false. Rather, we require only a probability, and not a prima
      facie showing, of criminal activity. In determining whether
      probable cause exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances
      test.

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Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205 A.3d 1264, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted & emphasis in original).

      Further:

         The test for determining whether a suspect is being
         subjected to custodial interrogation so as to necessitate
         Miranda warnings is whether he is physically deprived of
         his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation
         in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action
         or movement is restricted by such interrogation.

      Said another way, police detentions become custodial when,
      under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or
      duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the
      functional equivalent of arrest.

             The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality
      of the circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive
      as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the
      basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the
      suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and why;
      whether restraints were used; whether the law enforcement
      officer showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative
      methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019-20 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citations omitted).   “Custodial interrogation does not require that police

‘make a formal arrest, nor that the police intend to make an arrest.’”

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 889 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citations & emphasis omitted).

      In his sole claim on appeal, Appellant avers Trial Counsel was ineffective

for failing to file a motion to suppress his statement on the grounds of an

illegal arrest. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant claims that “[b]ased

on the testimony presented both at trial and at the suppression hearing, the

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Commonwealth could not have established probable cause” for his arrest. Id.

at 11. Appellant maintains the PCRA court’s statement that “even if the initial

arrest was illegal, Appellant would have inevitably been taken into custody

anyway . . . is clearly not the standard” to apply to an arrest made without

probable cause. See id. at 12. Appellant insists his statement should have

been suppressed as “fruit of the poisoned tree.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The PCRA court concluded Appellant was not entitled to relief.

Specifically, relying on its findings of fact from the May 12, 2022, evidentiary

hearing, the court noted when police brought Appellant in to be interviewed,

they were aware he was related to Brother — who was brought in earlier that

day. Id. at 5. Based on Brother’s initial statements, police “believed [Brother

committed the crime] with somebody . . . in his family[.]” Id. The court

determined it was “reasonable” for police to take Appellant to the police

station as a “material witness[.]” Id. It then pointed out that police did not

begin their interview with Appellant until after Brother named him as a co-

conspirator, thus, Appellant’s involvement in the incident was “inevitable

discovery[.]” Id. at 5-6. The court stated that “in the end” the police would

have interviewed him “no matter what[.]” Id. at 5. Regarding Trial Counsel’s

motion to suppress, the court detailed that counsel “focused on the point that

he believed was the strongest” and did not think he would be successful if he

had argued that Appellant was illegally arrested. Id. The court confirmed

that had Trial Counsel filed a motion on these grounds, it would not have

prevailed.   Id. at 6.   Lastly, the court found Appellant failed to establish

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prejudice “since there was evidence independent of [his] statement[;]”

namely, Brother’s confession identifying Appellant as a co-conspirator. Id. at

5-6.

       We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim

must fail, and he is not entitled to relief.       We note Appellant presents his

argument solely from the purview that police illegally arrested him. 12      The

record demonstrates that he was not arrested until after he made his

statement. However, while Appellant may not have been under arrest prior

to this, the totality of the circumstances support that he was subject to a

custodial interrogation — which requires police to have probable cause that a

crime has been or is being committed. See Bozeman, 205 A.3d at 1277;

Downey, 39 A.3d at 405; Baker, 24 A.3d at 1019-20. Officer Daut testified

at the May 12, 2022, evidentiary hearing that he was “instructed” by the

Homicide Unit to transport Appellant to the station for questioning. See N.T.,

5/12/22, at 6-7. Officer Daut proceeded to pat Appellant down and transport

him in a police vehicle to be questioned. See id. at 21. The officer admitted

that at that point, Appellant was not free to leave.           See id. at 15-16.

____________________________________________

12 Notably, Appellant does not point to anywhere in the record to support his

contention that he was placed under arrest before the completion of his
custodial interview with the detectives. He simply states that the suppression
hearing and trial testimony do not support a finding of probable cause for
arrest. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, the record — which also
includes the May 12, 2022, evidentiary hearing testimony and Appellant’s
arrest report dated after the interview — belies this assertion.

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Accordingly, Appellant was in police custody. See Baker, 24 a.3d at 1019-

20.

      The Commonwealth did not present any evidence at the hearing that

the officer possessed probable cause to place Appellant in custody. Homicide

“instructed” Officer Daut to transport Appellant to the police station at

approximately 6:30 p.m. See N.T., 5/12/22, at 6-7, 16. At that time, police

had not yet secured Brother’s confession wherein he identified Appellant as a

co-conspirator. See N.T., 4/20/17, at 25-26, 28-30. When Officer Daut took

Appellant in for questioning, he had the following information: (1) Appellant

approached officers and asked where Brother was; (2) Officer Daut called the

Homicide Unit “to try and ascertain some information as to who was stopped”

earlier that day; (3) Officer Daut gave Homicide Appellant’s name; and (4)

Homicide instructed the officer to transport Appellant to the station. See N.T.,

5/12/22, at 6-7, 10-11, 21. Based on this explanation, the totality of the

circumstances did not support a reasonable belief that Appellant was

committing or had committed a crime. See Bozeman, 205 A.3d at 1277.

Thus, the officer lacked probable cause to subject Appellant to a custodial

interrogation.

      Even though police lacked probable cause to interrogate him, we still

conclude Appellant’s claim does not merit relief.    Appellant’s statement to

police falls under an exception to the exclusionary rule. The remedy for an

illegal search or seizure in a criminal case is “exclusion of the fruits of the

illegal police conduct[.]”   Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187

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(Pa. 2014).   However, this remedy is subject to exceptions; namely the

doctrine of inevitable discovery. The inevitable discovery doctrine

      permits the introduction of evidence that inevitably would have
      been discovered through lawful means, although the search that
      actually led to the discovery of the evidence was unlawful. [This
      doctrine] considers what would have happened in the absence of
      the initial search.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 A.3d 611, 618-19 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(emphasis omitted).

      Here, Brother confessed his involvement in the robbery, identifying

Appellant as a co-conspirator, before police interviewed Appellant. See N.T.,

4/20/17, at 28-30. Additionally, Appellant has not averred or demonstrated

that he would have not given a statement to police confessing his involvement

in the robbery absent the purported unlawful questioning. In fact, at the April

18, 2017, suppression hearing Appellant testified that he intended to speak

with the police and take responsibility for his actions notwithstanding the

circumstances of his seizure or interrogation. See N.T., 4/18/17, at 263, 265-

268, 277 (Appellant testifying that he wanted to speak with the police

regardless of police gaining Mother’s permission to question him); see id.

271, 278 (Appellant indicating he wanted to “tell the truth” and “get this off

[his] chest”); see also id. at 263, 265-66, 270, 277-78 (Appellant claiming

multiple times that he “turned [himself] in”).

      Thus, the police would have either brought Appellant in for questioning

or arrested him shortly after Brother identified him as a co-conspirator.

Accordingly, this argument would grant him no basis for relief.           See

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Drummond, 285 A.3d at 634; McGarry, 172 A.3d at 70; Williams, 2 A.3d

at 618-19.

      Additionally, Appellant failed to establish the remaining two prongs of

the ineffectiveness test, and for these reasons, his claim also fails.     See

McGarry, 172 A.3d at 70. Regarding the reasonable basis prong of the test,

our Supreme Court has “explained that courts should not inquire as to whether

there were other, more logical courses of action counsel could have pursued;

rather, the appropriate question is whether counsel’s decision had any

reasonable basis.”   Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa.

2023). Trial Counsel demonstrated he had a reasonable basis for failing to

file a motion to suppress on the grounds of an illegal arrest. He chose to focus

on what he believed to be a stronger argument — that Appellant was

interviewed without an interested adult present. See N.T. 5/12/22, at 33, 36.

Further, as noted above, the PCRA court stated it would not have granted a

suppression motion on this basis. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 6. Thus, Appellant

has not “prove[n] that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success

substantially greater than the course actually pursued.” See Drummond,

285 A.3d at 634.

      Lastly, Appellant has not established that he was prejudiced by Trial

Counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his statement based upon a purported

illegal arrest. Again, as mentioned above, the PCRA court confirmed it would

not have granted such a motion.      See PCRA Ct. Op. at 6.      Further, PCRA

Counsel and the Commonwealth stipulated that if Appellant’s statement was

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suppressed, the Commonwealth would have called Brother as a rebuttal

witness at trial. See N.T., 5/12/22, at 23. Brother made a statement to the

police whereby he identified Appellant as a co-conspirator in the robbery

resulting in Victim’s death. Accordingly, the Commonwealth would have still

introduced evidence with the same content as Appellant’s statement.

      Because Appellant failed to establish any of the prongs of the

ineffectiveness test, his claim fails, and no relief is due.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 10/10/2023

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