Court Opinion

ID: 9840805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 14:08:20.213632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:23:58.038054
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1173

                             SOEP PAINTING CORP.

                                       vs.

             GRAYCOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., & others. 1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant appeals from an amended separate and final

 judgment, entered pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 365 Mass.

 820 (1974), awarding the plaintiff $299,538.46 on its breach of

 contract claim.      The judgment resulted from the allowance of the

 plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, which was based

 on its claim that the defendant had violated the Prompt Payment

 Act, G. L. c. 149, § 29E.        In essence, the defendant's argument

 on appeal is that, even assuming that it violated the provisions

 of the Prompt Payment Act, judgment should not have entered

 until its impossibility defense had been adjudicated. 2

 1 Office Tower Owner LP, Pacific Theatres Exhibit Corp., Podium
 Developer LLC, and Podium Owner GP LLC, none of which are
 involved in this appeal.
 2 The defendant did not assert impossibility as an affirmative

 defense in its answer. "Affirmative defenses are waived when
 they are not raised in the first responsive pleading."
     To begin with, we note that the defendant failed to furnish

an adequate record to support its arguments on appeal.    See

Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019);

G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 397 n.13 (2018).

Specifically, the defendant did not include in the appellate

record the motion for partial summary judgment, the opposition

thereto, the statement of undisputed facts, or the verified

complaint.   Nonetheless, on our own initiative, we have obtained

the relevant filings directly from the trial court, and

therefore proceed to the merits of the appeal.

     In Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. v. Lantern 18, LLC, 491 Mass.

144, 151–152 (2023) (Le Fort), the Supreme Judicial Court

recently explained the doctrine of impossibility in the context

of the COVID-19 pandemic.

     "The modern impossibility doctrine provides:

     '[W]here from the nature of the contract it appears
     that the parties must from the beginning have
     contemplated the continued existence of some
     particular specified thing as the foundation of what
     was to be done, then, in the absence of any warranty
     that the thing shall exist, the contract is to be
     construed not as a positive contract, but as subject

Aronovitz v. Fafard, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 8 (2010). That said,
the defendant's thirteenth affirmative defense asserted
frustration of purpose which is a "companion rule" to
impossibility. Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 409
Mass. 371, 374 (1991), quoting Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-
Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 129 (1974). Accordingly,
for the sake of argument in this appeal, we will treat the
defense as having been timely raised.

                                 2
     to an implied condition that the parties shall be
     excused in case before breach performance becomes
     impossible from the accidental perishing of the thing
     without the fault of either party . . . . The
     misfortune which has occurred releases both parties
     from further performance of the contract and gives no
     right to either to claim damages from the other'
     (ellipses in original)."

Id., quoting Boston Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John Bowen Co.,

335 Mass. 697, 700 (1957).    The question here is whether the

summary judgment record could sustain the defendant's burden to

show that its performance was rendered impossible because of the

COVID-19 pandemic.   See Le Fort, supra at 154.    The defendant

failed to meet its burden because, as in Le Fort, the "absence

of a causal link is fatal."    Id. at 155.   Specifically, the

summary judgment record did not raise a triable issue of fact

that the owner's financial difficulties made it impossible for

the defendant, who was the general contractor, to perform its

obligations under the contract to the plaintiff, who was the

subcontractor.

     "The fact that one is unable to perform a contract because
     of the inability to obtain money . . . will not ordinarily
     excuse nonperformance in the absence of a contract
     provision in that regard. . . . [S]imply positing two facts
     -- that the pandemic has occurred, and that a party finds
     it very difficult or even impossible to perform its
     contractual obligations -- is not enough." (Quotations and
     citations omitted.)

Id. at 156.

                                  3
     Because the defendant did not raise a triable issue of fact

concerning impossibility of performance in this case, we need

not decide whether -- as an abstract matter -- an impossibility

defense must always be adjudicated before rendering judgment on

a subcontractor's breach of contract claim based on violation of

the Prompt Payment Act.   Where, as here, the record was

insufficient to establish an impossibility defense, the judge

was correct to conclude the court's decision in Tocci Bldg.

Corp. v. IRIV Partners, LLC, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 133 (2022),

controlled in all material respects.

     The amended separate and final judgment entered pursuant to

Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) on August 1, 2022 is affirmed, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings. 3

                                     So ordered.

                                     By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                       Shin & Ditkoff, JJ. 4),

                                     Clerk

Entered:   September 20, 2023.

3 We deny the plaintiff's request, made under Mass. R. A. P. 25,
as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019), for attorney's fees and
costs on appeal. The legal issue presented on appeal was not
frivolous.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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