Court Opinion

ID: 9400891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 17:11:16.459695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.711366
License: Public Domain

J-A29039-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    CHURCHILL COMMUNITY                        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    DEVELOPMENT, L.P. AND PARADIGM             :        PENNSYLVANIA
    CONSULTANTS, LLC                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :   No. 58 WDA 2022
                                               :
    CHURCHILL CROSSINGS, LLC AND               :
    CHURCHILL CROSSINGS PARTNERS,              :
    L.P.                                       :

               Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2021,
               in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
                     Civil Division at No(s): G.D. 21-001097.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                               FILED: June 9, 2023

        Churchill Community Development, L.P., et al. (“Seller”) appeals from

the order denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor

of Churchill Crossings LLC (“Buyer 1”) and Churchill Crossings Partners, L.P.

(“Buyer 2”) in this breach of contract case.       Upon review, we affirm.

        On May 17, 2012, Seller1 acquired the George Westinghouse Research

Park, consisting of approximately 135 acres and improvements, located in

Churchill Borough, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (“Property”).              While

attempting to develop the Property, Seller ran afoul of various environmental

laws.
____________________________________________

1   The principals of Seller are Vikas Jain and Ramesh Jain.
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        As a result, in 2017, Seller asked a real estate group, NAI Pittsburgh to

manage and remediate the property. The owners of NAI Pittsburgh, Charles

DiLoreto and Nicole Deluca, eventually formed a separate company, Buyer 1,

to handle all issues related to the Property. As problems continued, Seller

talked with Buyer 1 about acquiring the Property.

        In March 2018, Seller and Buyer 1 entered into an Agreement of Sale

(“Agreement”)2 for the sale of the Property. Seller and Buyer 1 also executed

an Addendum3 to the Agreement. In relevant part it provided:

        Any time within 2 1/2 years from the date of the closing on the
        Property, Seller or the current officers or directors of Seller, shall
        have the right to acquire ninety-two (92%) percent of the
        membership units of [Buyer 1], provided that Seller pays to the
        members of [Buyer 1], any and all current debt and the purchase
        price that [Buyer 1] has incurred and used in the Sale, Leasing,
        Development, Management, or Maintenance of the Property
        ("Option").

Arbitration Ex. 4, ¶ 6.4

        The owners of Buyer 1, along with another individual, formed another

entity, Buyer 2. Subsequently, the Agreement was amended several times.

Notably, one of the amendments, dated July 23, 2018, which addressed

various terms regarding the Property’s closing, indicated that it was entered
____________________________________________

2   Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 refer to this as the “Initial” Agreement of Sale.

3According to Buyer 1 and Buyer 2, Seller hoped to become reinvolved in the
Property at some point in the future which was the purpose of this document.

4“Membership units” are interests issued to a person or entity that makes a
capital contribution to an LLC.

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into between Seller and Buyer 2. It was signed by Seller and Buyer 2 but not

Buyer 1. Thereafter, none of the documents involved Buyer 1.

       On August 14, 2018, Seller and Buyer 2 closed on the Property. Buyer

2 executed a note and mortgage for the Property and another amendment to

the Agreement.5 Subsequently, the Property was transferred to Buyer 2 by

special warranty deed, effective November 2, 2018.

       In July of 2019, Buyer 2 executed a document for the potential sale of

the Property to another developer who planned to develop it as a large-scale

fulfillment site for Amazon.

       On December 4, 2020, Seller sent a letter to Buyer 2 indicating its intent

to exercise the Option in the Addendum. In response, Buyer 2 stated it would

not honor the Option. It set forth two reasons for refusing to do so: 1) the

Option had been terminated,6 and 2) the Agreement and its Addendum only

pertained to Buyer 1, not Buyer 2. Buyer 2 noted that an amendment to the

Agreement identified Buyer 2 as the buyer, and because the Agreement with

the Option was never exercised, Seller had no right to acquire any interest in

Buyer 1.
____________________________________________

5 It appears that Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 refer to this as the “Final” Agreement
of Sale although it is titled “Amendment.”

6 This reason for refusal appears to be based, in part, on a handwritten
document that DiLoreto asked Seller to execute confirming that Seller had no
ownership interest in the Property prior to DiLoreto’s testimony in federal court
on a separate action involving the environmental issues at the property. We
glean this information from Buyer 1 and Buyer 2’s emergency motion and
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted for the arbitration
and is used solely for information purposes.

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       As a result of Buyer 2’s refusal to honor the Option, Seller filed a lis

pendens against the Property by filing a praecipe for writ of summons

involving real estate. Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 sought to strike the lis pendens

and filed an emergency motion. No complaint was filed in the civil action, but

the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute, in accordance with 72 Pa.C.S.A.

section 7341, Common law arbitration.            To accommodate a sale of the

Property, the trial court temporarily lifted the lis pendens pending the outcome

of the arbitration.

       At the outset of the arbitration, the chief arbitrator stated, “I perceive

this to be like any other type of court proceeding and it’s going to be up to the

parties to present their cases.”        N.T., 7/14/21, at 3.   Seller proceeded to

present its case. Notably, Seller only introduced various documents pertaining

to the transaction; it presented no witnesses to explain anything or testify

about the documents or transaction. Seller then rested.

       Before presenting any evidence, Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 moved for a

“directed verdict”7 and argued: "[Seller] has not submitted evidence of a valid

option, excuse me, there is no evidence they exercised the option." They

further argued: "There is no evidence either that the exercise of the option

was prevented by [Buyer 1 or Buyer 2]. There's no proof of a breach, there’s

no damages or proof of damages that have been submitted to the [c]ourt . .

____________________________________________

7 Although this was termed a “directed verdict,” it was treated as a motion to
dismiss or nonsuit.

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. . The Addendum speaks only of an interest in [Buyer 1], not in the ownership

. . . in [Buyer 2].” Id. at 24-25.

      Following argument from both sides and deliberation by the panel, a

majority of the arbitrators announced to the parties that they found that the

documents submitted by Seller were ambiguous, and Seller failed to explain

or clarify those ambiguities by presenting any evidence or testimony.

Consequently, the majority concluded that Seller did not establish any of the

rights it claimed under the Option.

      In response, Seller argued:

      Except that we’re on a motion to dismiss, and you were acting as
      a court. On a motion to dismiss every part of the document was
      to be construed in our client’s favor. So if you found an ambiguity,
      that ambiguity on a motion to dismiss is always construed in favor
      of the party who had presented. So you’re doing the opposite of
      what case law requires.

Id. at 62. The chief arbitrator disagreed, and the proceedings concluded.

      Subsequently, a majority of the arbitrators issued a written award

granting Buyer 1 and Buyer 2’s motion for “directed verdict.” Specifically, the

majority permanently struck the lis pendens and concluded that Seller failed

to prove the existence of and its exercise of the Option.

      Thereafter, Seller filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award with the

trial court; Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 filed a motion to confirm the award. Upon

review, the trial court concluded that Seller failed to assert any irregularity in

the arbitration proceedings. Consequently, the court denied Seller’s motion

and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Buyer 1 and Buyer 2.

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      Seller filed this timely appeal.

      On appeal, Seller raises the following issues:

      1. Whether an appropriate standard of review was applied when
      reviewing a non-unanimous arbitration award where the
      arbitration record and written decision of the majority arbitrators
      reflects that the arbitrators did not honor or observe the
      procedural process the [panel] established?

      2. Whether an inappropriate standard of review was applied when
      reviewing a non-unanimous arbitration award where the
      arbitration record and the written decision of the majority
      arbitrators reflected ignorance of procedural and contract law; a
      record existed of the arbitration proceeding; and the decision
      rested on misreading of documents which documents were
      undisputed and consented to as authentic and admissible?

      3. Whether the [c]ourt erred in finding that the arbitration
      proceeding had the necessary essentials of due process when the
      majority arbitrators determined issues that had not been raised
      by the other side and otherwise misconstrued uncontested
      documentary evidence as if there had been testimony from the
      [Buyer 1 and Buyer 2] thereby denying [Seller] the necessary
      essential of due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard
      and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of
      the arbitration.

      4. Whether the [c]ourt erred in failing to find that the arbitration
      and the majority's arbitration award imported such bad faith,
      ignorance of the law and indifference to the justice of the result
      as to constitute an "other irregularity" leading to an unjust,
      inequitable, or unconscionable award requiring a vacation of the
      award.

Seller’s Brief at 2-4.

      Judicial review of a common law arbitration award is very narrow. It is

prescribed by statute, under a provision of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code:

      § 7341. Common law arbitration

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        The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration ... is
        binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is
        clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing or that
        fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity
        caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or
        unconscionable award.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341 (emphasis added). Arbitrators are the final judges of law

and fact and their award will not be disturbed for mistakes of either. Vogt v.

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotations

and citations omitted) (emphasis added). This Court has stated:

     [A]n appellant bears the burden to establish both the underlying
     irregularity and the resulting inequity by “clear, precise and
     indubitable evidence.” In this context, irregularity refers to the
     process employed in reaching the result of the arbitration,
     not the result itself. A cognizable irregularity may appear in the
     conduct of either the arbitrators or the parties. Our Supreme Court
     has stated that the phrase “other irregularity” in the process
     employed imports such bad faith, ignorance of the law and
     indifference to the justice of the result as would cause a court to
     vacate an arbitration award.

F.J. Busse Co. v. Zipporah, L.P., 879 A.2d 809, 811 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(some quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Neither this Court nor the trial

court may “retry the issues addressed in the arbitration proceeding or review

the tribunal's disposition of the merits of the case." D'Amelia v. Toll Bros.,

235 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2020). On appeal, we review a trial court’s

order confirming a common law arbitration award for an abuse of discretion

or an error of law. Andrew v. CUNA Brokerage Services, Inc., 976 A.2d

496, 500 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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      Although framed in multiple issues and arguments, Seller’s challenge on

appeal is that the trial court erred when it concluded that there were no

irregularities in the arbitration proceedings.   To the contrary, Seller claims

that the arbitration majority engaged in an irregular process when it

conducted the arbitration, thereby denying its right to due process, and

further, that the majority misapplied relevant contract law when it decided the

case. According to Seller, these irregularities led to an unjust, inequitable,

and unconscionable result and required the trial court to vacate the award.

      In its first and second issues, Seller argues there were several

procedural irregularities which occurred at the arbitration. It sets forth three

main reasons in support of its position.

      First, Seller claims the panel failed to follow its own established

procedure that it would treat the arbitration as “any other court proceeding.”

Specifically, Seller argues that it made out a prima facie case; the burden then

shifted to Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 to defend against it.       According to Seller,

Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 should have claimed that the documents were ambiguous

and put on evidence to prove this but did not. Seller further argues that, in

deciding the motion for a “directed verdict” and determining there was an

ambiguity, the arbitrators failed to give it the benefit of the doubt as the non-

moving party and instead, construed the ambiguity against it. As such, Seller

maintains that the majority disregarded the “court proceeding” procedure it

established. Seller’s Brief at 25-26.

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      Next, Seller claims that the majority erred in not considering the parties’

course of performance to establish their intent and resolve any ambiguity. In

particular, Seller argues that the subsequent execution of various documents

established a course of performance showing that the parties intended to

substitute Buyer 2 for Buyer 1 but keep Seller’s right to exercise the Option

under the Addendum as it did. Id. at 31-32.

      Lastly, Seller claims that the majority improperly considered whether

any payment had been made. According to Seller, that issue should not have

been raised at that point in the proceedings. Rather, Seller maintains that the

lack of payment was an affirmative defense which Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 needed

to assert and prove. Seller further maintains that because Buyer 2 rejected

the Option, payment was not required; the Addendum provided that the

ownership interest was to be transferred “without objection or demand for

money.” Id. at 33-36.

      In confirming the arbitration award, the trial court concluded that

Seller’s claims were all matters of law.         The court found no glaring

improprieties, violations of due process or bad faith or indifference to justice

on the part of the arbitrators. As such, it could not reverse the award on those

grounds. Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/21, at 3, 5.

      Upon review, we observe that Seller repeatedly states that the

arbitrators did not follow the established procedure and couches its claims in

terms of procedural irregularities that warrant vacating the arbitration award.

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However, Seller’s claims actually are allegations that the majority committed

various errors of law, which the trial court astutely observed. Id.

       In general, interpretation of a contract is a matter of law. Integrated

Project Servs. v. HMS Interiors, Inc., 931 A.2d 724, 732 (Pa. Super.

2007). Likewise, the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a

question of law to be decided by the court. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal

Corp., 519 A.2d 385 (Pa. 1986). Thus, Seller’s assertion that the manner in

which the panel analyzed the documents and its conclusion that the

documents were ambiguous were procedural errors is erroneous; rather they

are errors of law, if at all.8

       Further, as the trial court observed, “the arbitrators could have

interpreted the agreement for themselves as factfinder, or they could have

requested additional parole evidence despite [Seller’s] claim that they had

rested.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/21, at 3. The “failure of the majority to

choose those alternatives would be an error of law.” Id.

       Seller is correct that the parties' course of performance after the

execution of a contract is relevant when interpreting a contract. See Atlantic

Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 741, n. 6 (Pa. 1978). However,

any failure to apply this principle likewise constitutes an error of law.

       Additionally, as the trial court stated, “the arbitrators were within their

discretion to interpret the contract to find that a payment was due [to exercise
____________________________________________

8 We note that we do not render any opinion regarding the propriety of Seller’s
claims.

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the option] and that plaintiff had not submitted evidence on this point to meet

their burden of proof.” Again, interpretation of a contract is a matter of law.

      Lastly, Seller’s assertion that the panel failed to apply the correct

standard in granting Buyer 1 and Buyer 2’s motion for a “directed verdict” is

also an allegation that the panel committed an error of law.

      None of Seller’s claims constitutes an irregularity in the arbitration

proceeding that would warrant a court to set aside the arbitration award.

Instead, our caselaw indicates that the only claims which may warrant

vacating an arbitration award are procedural issues which sound in due

process.

      Arbitration, while not surrounded by the technical procedural
      safeguards incident to litigation, is not a wholly informal process
      and requires for its validity the observance of certain minimum
      standards indispensable to the securing of a fair and impartial
      disposition of the merits of a controversy. These minimum
      standards require that both parties are provided with notice, all
      the arbitrators must sit at the hearing, each side is entitled to be
      heard and to be present when the other party's evidence is being
      given . . . . Once a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the
      parties are entitled to a hearing with the necessary essentials of
      due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend
      in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before
      a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause . . . . [T]he basic
      principles of hearing conduct must be adhered to, with the
      arbitration process requiring for its validity the observance of
      certain minimum standards indispensable to the securing of a fair
      and impartial disposition of the merits of a controversy, i.e., a full
      hearing with the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

                                      ***

      [A]djudicatory action cannot validly be taken by any tribunal,
      whether judicial or administrative, except upon a hearing, wherein

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      each party shall have the opportunity to know of the claims of his
      opponent, to hear the evidence introduced against him, to cross-
      examine witnesses, to introduce evidence in his own behalf and
      to make argument. Therefore, where a matter is submitted to
      arbitration, arbitrators are obliged to abide by the minimal
      procedural    requirements    necessary     for   common      law
      arbitration which entails granting the parties a full and fair
      hearing.

Andrew, 976 A.2d at 501–02 (citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he right

to a fair hearing comprises the right to notice and the right to an opportunity

to be heard.” McKenna v. Sosso, 745 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation

omitted).

      In Andrew, the arbitration panel granted CUNA’s motion to dismiss

based upon the statute of limitations without hearing any testimony. The trial

court confirmed the arbitrators’ decision, concluding that Andrew responded

to the motion, participated in a lengthy telephone conference, argued his

opposition, and submitted a lengthy written response. This Court reversed.

We held that because Andrew raised the discovery rule, the arbitrators should

have considered material evidence and testimony about when the cause of

action arose. Failure to consider this evidence constituted the denial of a full

and fair hearing. Id. at 502-503.

      In reaching that decision, this Court considered Smaligo v. Fireman’s

Fund Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1968).           There, counsel for plaintiff

requested additional time to present expert testimony regarding the

decedent’s future earning ability and capacity, but the arbitrators deemed said

testimony “unnecessary.”     Upon review, our High Court stated that the

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arbitrators’ refusal to hear this testimony “was not a mere mistake of law or

of fact binding upon all parties and the court.”     Id. at 580.    Instead, the

Court noted that the arbitrator's failure to consider the expert’s testimony

resulted in the Smaligos being denied a full and fair hearing. Id. This Court

has stated several times that an award is not binding where there has been a

denial of a hearing. “Though the arbitrator's conduct in this case may not

have constituted fraud, misconduct, corruption or some other irregularity ‘of

this nature’, . . . it was conduct which amounted to a denial of a full and fair

hearing of Smaligos' cause of action.” Id. at 579.

      Conversely, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fioravanti, 299 A.2d 585 (Pa.

1973), our Supreme Court considered a request to set aside an arbitration

award where the application of Smaligo where counsel was not permitted to

present a memorandum on a controlling legal issue, but had the opportunity

to argue the issue before the arbitrators. The Court distinguished Smaglio

noting that while the arbitrator's decision in Smaligo led to the “complete

omission of critical factual evidence,” the appellant in the instant case had, “at

most, one [f]orm of argument ... closed off by the arbitrators.” Id. at 588.

Because the arbitrator did not preclude all argument on the issue, the

Fioravanti Court “found no denial of a full and fair hearing.” Id. The High

Court did not vacate the award even though it found that the arbitrators were

very cavalier in handling the case and the decision lacked wisdom. Id. at 589.

      Here, as in Fioravanti, Seller had the opportunity for a full and fair

hearing with the opportunity to be heard. It had notice of the hearing and

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was in attendance. Unlike the parties in Andrew and Smaglio, Seller had

the opportunity to present evidence in support of its case but chose to rest its

case solely on the admitted documents. Seller chose not to present any other

evidence or have any witnesses testify; the arbitrators did not prevent Seller

from doing so. Seller extensively argued its position to the panel. Its strategy,

however, yielded an unsuccessful result, which was subject to very limited

review.9 Although Seller attempts to argue a due process violation because

the panel granted a non-suit, we view this as a substantive rather than

procedural defect, if any, because it was a ruling on the merits of Seller’s

claim. As the trial court correctly held, “the alleged failure to ‘honor or observe

the very procedural process they established’” was not a valid basis to

overturn the decision. No relief is due on Seller’s first two issues.

       In its third and fourth issues, Seller claims that the majority displayed

such an ignorance of the law as to constitute an irregularity. According to

Seller, “the arbitrators mangled most of the substantive law of contracts.”

Seller’s Brief at 40. Seller argues:

       If [Buyer 1 and Buyer 2] had defenses, then [they] should have
       been put to the task of presenting them versus the arbitrators not
       only making the case for them but also writing a cavalier account
       of contract law to justify their decision and denying the [Seller]
____________________________________________

9 Notably, the parties could have elected to proceed with statutory arbitration,
rather than common law arbitration, where the grounds for review are much
broader. The parties here, however, chose to proceed with common law
arbitration where the standard of review is much narrower.

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      due process. Nothing was fair or procedurally proper about ending
      the matter abruptly without first requiring [Buyer 1 and Buyer 2]
      from meeting their defense burdens and then permitting [Seller]
      to respond.

                                      ***

      [T]he arbitration was supposedly to operate as a "court
      proceeding", which position gave [Seller] notice of how they could
      proceed, but then [Seller] was denied their rights as two
      arbitration members decided to act differently, never informing
      the parties that the court proceeding standard would not be
      followed until conclusory analysis was proffered after the fact. This
      failure of acting as represented was a denial of fundamental due
      process . . . .

Id. at 41, 44.

      Seller’s arguments essentially rehash what has been addressed already.

As discussed above, Seller was given the opportunity for a full and fair hearing.

Furthermore, the trial court found:

      [T]he arbitration panel served diligently and in good faith. Its
      members reviewed the documents submitted by [Seller] and
      presided at an extensive hearing with counsel for both parties, the
      transcript of which exceeds sixty pages. That transcript, as well
      as the opinions issued by the panel’s majority and dissenting
      members, show that the arbitrators grasped the arguments
      offered by both sides. At base, their dueling opinions reflect a
      good-faith difference of opinion as to whether [Seller’s]
      documentary evidence was ambiguous on its face.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 3. Although a court has the ability to set

aside a common law arbitration award where there is such an ignorance of the

law, we conclude the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in refusing

to do so in this case.

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      Seller essentially asked the trial court and this Court to re-examine

factual and legal determinations reached by the arbitration panel, which we

are not permitted to do when reviewing a common law arbitration award.

Mistakes of judgment and mistakes of either fact or law are among the

contingencies parties assume when they submit disputes to arbitrators.

Fiorvanti, 299 A.2d at 589. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order which

denied Seller’s request to vacate the arbitration award.

      Having concluded that Seller’s appeal is without merit, we now address

Buyer 1 and Buyer 2’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs. In support of

this request, the Buyers contend that Seller’s appeal is completely frivolous

and is dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious. Buyer 1 and Buyer 2’s Brief at 43.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2744 empowers an appellate

court to grant reasonable attorneys' fees "if it determines that an appeal is

frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against

whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious." Pa.R.A.P.

2744. “In determining the propriety of such an award, we are ever guided by

the principle that an appeal is not frivolous simply because it lacks merit[;]

[r]ather, it must be found that the appeal has no basis in law or fact.” U.S.

Claims, Inc. v. Dougherty, 914 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa. Super. 2006) (imposing

sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744 based upon a pro se appellant's

undeveloped arguments on appeal and “total inability to produce any evidence

that fraud or misconduct resulted in the denial of a hearing or caused an

inequitable [arbitration] award”).

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      Based upon our review of the issues and record, we decline to grant the

Buyers’ request for attorney’s fees in this matter. We do not find that Seller

unreasonably extended these proceedings or appealed in bad faith given the

complexity and significance of the transaction involved.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2023

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