Court Opinion

ID: 9580472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:05:16.928521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:18.072172
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I. By timely motion plaintiff’s counsel sought to limit certain evidence which might be presented by defendant. A court order was accordingly entered.
Basically a motion to limit evidence is a recognized method by which to suppress, in advance of trial, any reference to possible evidence, the mere mention of which would for some reason be prejudicial to the moving party. See address by Ross H. Sidney, Motion “In Limine”, Workshop Outlines, Ninety-Second Annual Meeting of the Iowa State Bar Association, June 23, 24, 25, 1965, and 5 Washburn Law Journal 232.
The self-evident motivating purpose of plaintiff’s counsel in seeking the limiting order was to prevent defense counsel from questioning the police officer, who had arrived at the scene of the accident after its occurrence, concerning point of impact of car with pedestrian. Basis of the motion was the fact the officer had previously admitted he could not answer such a question without relying on in-process-of-investigation-statements given by plaintiff and defendant. See section 321.271, Code, 1962, and Pinckney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa 144, 154, 116 N.W.2d 258, and citations.
Discussion by the majority as to what transpired during direct, cross and redirect examinations, up to the point at which the allegedly prejudicial question was asked by defense counsel, while essential to an understanding of the case, should not be allowed to control or materially influence its disposition.
Rather it would appear attention should focus on the following portion of the record. During redirect examination, defense counsel asked the officer, “I think Mr. Pinegar has made reference to your report where you checked ‘residential district’. I notice you have a check ‘out of crosswalk’.” Plaintiff’s counsel promptly objected as highly improper and leading, moved it be stricken, counsel be admonished and the jury cautioned to give no consideration to the statement. The trial court then said, “Yes, it may go out and the jury will pay no attention to the statement.”
This comment by defense counsel was in direct violation of the court order limiting *502evidence to be offered during trial. As the author of one article explains, the motion to limit evidence should stand, “ * * unless and until permission of the court is first obtained outside the presence and hearing of the jury”, to disregard it. 5 Wash-burn Law Journal 232.
In my humble opinion an order in limine means what it says, or it means nothing at all.
In this case defense counsel did not ask a question, but rather made a statement. In any event he had not then obtained and in fact never did secure permission of the trial court to make that statement or ask any such question.
I submit defense counsel’s violation of the order limiting evidence, in and of itself, constituted a compelling cause for a mistrial in this case.
II. Regardless of the foregoing it is submitted that at the moment defense counsel made reference to a check out of crosswalk, all possible damage had been done. Plaintiff’s case was then prejudiced beyond any power of the trial court to remedy it by a simple jury caution. In this regard 39 Am.Jur., New Trial, section 65, page 81, states the general rule as follows: “ * * * in many instances of misconduct in propounding questions concerning matters which counsel has no right to inquire into, the opposing counsel, if he makes objection, is necessarily placed in the false light of suppressing significant evidence and attempting to deceive the jury into rendering an unjust verdict. The good or bad faith of counsel, and the extent of his bad faith where it exists, are elements to be taken into consideration, but are not necessarily controlling; good faith is not a shield to a litigant whose counsel seriously errs in the matter under consideration.” See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Kelley, 8 Cir., 74 F.2d 80, 86, and Annos. 109 A.L.R. 1089, 1093-1094.
Although there was no competent direct evidence introduced to the effect plaintiff was out of the crosswalk at time of impact the jury, in answer to special interrogatories, found plaintiff was not in the crosswalk when the accident occurred, which was a proximate cause of her injury. The jury’s conclusion in this regard must have rested, either entirely or in substantial degree, on defense counsel’s statement as to what the officer’s report showed concerning plaintiff’s location with respect to the crosswalk at time of the accident. To me this discloses prejudice of the most obvious kind, upon which a new trial should have been granted.
In addition I do not believe the fact that this case has twice been tried to different juries without a verdict for plaintiff should here be controlling.
The first trial resulted in a hung jury.
On the second trial defendant obtained a verdict substantially on the basis of introduction of prejudicial testimony known to have been proscribed by order of court.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
BECKER, J., joins in this dissent.