Court Opinion

ID: 9723270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:09:22.390487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:46.412714
License: Public Domain

WHELAN, J.
I dissent and would affirm.
The majority opinion reverses on the ground the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion of defendants, made two days before the trial date, set by stipulation some two months earlier, for a continuance of an unspecified length of time so that they might have access to an undetermined amount of money whose contingent availability was in the uncertain future, for the purpose of obtaining new counsel whose name or names were not mentioned and with whom no negotiation had ever been made, so far as was shown.
The right of a criminal defendant to counsel of his own choice, and the circumstances in which the denial of a motion for continuance may or may not be a denial of that right, need not be discussed further. Because of varying circumstances, the cases generally have been decided on an ad hoc basis. (See People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal.2d 199 [53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868]; In re Hochberg, 2 Cal.3d 870 [87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1]; In re Watson, 6 Cal.3d 831 [100 Cal.Rptr. 720, 494 P.2d 1264]; People v. Manchetti, 29 Cal.2d 452 [175 P.2d 533]; People v. Johnson, 5 Cal.App.3d 851 [85 Cal.Rptr. 485]; People v. Smyers, 261 Cal.App.2d 690 [68 Cal.Rptr. 194].)
The reasonableness, reality and sincerity of the motion for continuance on the grounds specified enter into the question whether there was an abuse of discretion in the circumstances that existed.
If the reasons stated by the district attorney in opposition to the motion for continuance on March 5 had no validity, that should not impeach the soundness of the court’s ruling on the motion; and if the opposition of the district attorney then or in earlier stages of the proceeding were thought to be pointless and intransigent obstructiveness, impatience with and disapproval of such conduct should not inevitably compel a reversal.
There could be no doubt that the trial court’s denial of the motion for continuance would have been proper if the motion for continuance had not been related to the fund involved in the interpleader action. Had that factor not been introduced, the expressed request to obtain other counsel would have been untimely when made on March 5 since the trial date of March 7 had been set by stipulation on January 15, 1973.
*364The entire record, including that of the criminal proceeding, the inter-pleader action, and the mandate proceeding, demonstrates that Vermouth and Buker claimed no interest in the fund, but claimed they had assigned it to Mr. Tarlow in payment of attorney fees not only for themselves but for their codefendants Robinson and Weisner who had joined in the assignment;1 and demonstrates that Mr. Tarlow had performed services which reasonably had already exhausted the credit of the four defendants.
Any expectation Vermouth and Buker had that Mr. Tarlow would obtain other counsel for either or both of them could only have been as an exercise of magnanimity on his part, a magnanimity that could have as well been displayed in the period before the motion for continuance was made as afterward.2
*365Regardless of that, the judge who denied the motion for continuance was not required to ássume a result favorable to Mr. Tarlow in the inter-pleader action.3
With perfect hindsight, we see that in the interpleader action a judgment was entered on September 24, 1973, adjudging Mr. Tarlow to be owner of the fund, but that fact could not have been foreseen at the time the motion for continuance was made.
Although the United States was not represented at the trial of the interpleader action on August 15, 1973, its recorded notices of lien were based upon taxes assessed against Vermouth and Buker; its answer set forth the nature of those claims. After answering, the United States, on May 18, 1973, served upon Vermouth and Buker and upon Mr. Tarlow, a notice of intention to take the deposition of each of them on June 14 at the federal courthouse in San Diego.4 There is no reason to believe those depositions were not taken.
The obvious purpose of taking those depositions would be to determine to the satisfaction of the United States whether the assignment to Mr. Tar-low was made on the date it bore, and was absolute, final and was for a sufficient consideration. If the depositions satisfied the attorney for the United States that the assignment dated July 30, 1971, had those characteristics, then the United States had no reason to attend the trial.
At the same time testimony that would establish those facts could not cohere with any idea that the assignment to Mr. Tarlow made him a trustee of the fund for the use of the defendants in obtaining other counsel, or that the defendants had any further interest in the fund. The cases mentioned in footnote 3 indicate that Mr. Tarlow’s right would be choate only if the full amount had been assigned as a retainer.
The denial of the motion for continuance on March 5, 1973, should not be held an abuse of discretion because sheriff’s officers on July 28, 1971, had taken possession of money found in the premises where the arrest was made; nor should it be so held because the superior court had ordered that the holder of the money interplead the claimants to the fund, *366one of which was the United States under its claim of lien filed August 12, 1971, long before any ruling had been sought from the superior court for recovery of the fund.
The trial court and the district attorney should not be held guilty of lése majesté for doubting the mandate of this court conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to adjudicate the lien claims of the United States without reference to the governing federal statutes.
The United States, without its consent, given by the Congress, is not subject to suit (Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 [80 L.Ed. 1331, 56 S.Ct. 848]; People v. United States, 307 F.2d 941; Livermore v. Beal, 18 Cal.App.2d 535, 545 [64 P.2d 987]); and its officers cannot waive its privilege in this respect (Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. (98 Otto.) 433 [25 L.Ed. 209]). Nor can a state pass a valid law for making the United States suable in its courts (Carr v. United States, supra).
The standing of a lien of the United States for taxes cannot be impaired by state action without the consent of Congress. (United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 [98 L.Ed. 520, 525, 74 S.Ct. 367, 370].)
Even in the federal court system the court in a criminal proceeding is not the forum to determine the validity of a federal tax lien on money claimed by the criminal defendant. (United States v. Rubio, 404 F.2d 678, 681.)
Chapter 26, United States Code Annotated, section 6323, declares the persons against whom its tax lien is not valid.
Chapter 28, United States Code Annotated, section 2410 is the statute giving authority to name the United States as a party in a state court action to test the validity or priority of a lien claimed by the United States.
An inchoate lien which becomes certain as to amount only subsequent to the date federal liens attach cannot then be permitted to displace such federal liens. (United States v. New Britain, supra, 347 U.S. 81.)
Mr. Tarlow’s activity on behalf of Vermouth and Buker and their co-defendants was in fact enormous. The reasonable value of those services, of which the trial court could and we can take judicial notice, was such that there would have been nothing left for other counsel by the time the motion for continuance was made even if the full amount had not been assigned in payment of a retainer.5
*367The assertion of a denial of the right to counsel is a free card, often drawn and held for ño other reason than the chance the bluff may win. The constitutional right itself is of such value and dignity that its use only as a pawn should be discouraged, when such use is obvious, as in the case at bench.

For that purpose it is unnecessary to consider just what the interests of the four defendants were in the fund at the date of the assignment to Mr. Tarlow. Phyllis Robinson and Charles F. Weisner obtained dismissals on the section 995 motion argued by Mr. Tarlow on February 7, 1972.
All four defendants signed the assignment, which stated it was made “as payment of legal fees for representation of the undersigned,” and that it assigned “each and every interest held by the undersigned and each of them.” Mr. Tarlow represented all four defendants at the preliminary hearing on October 7, 1971. The information was filed on October 21, 1971.
On December 7, 1971, all four defendants united in a motion for an order that the funds be returned, in which it was stated:
“Each of the defendants in the above-entitled case moves the court to authorize the return of the $6,424 that was seized at the time of the arrest so that defendants might use such funds to obtain an attorney of their choosing. The grounds for this motion are as follows: ■
“1. At the time of the arrest, $6,424 was seized from the residence. This amount of money has been designated as evidence and the municipal court would not release the money.
“2. Each of the defendants desires to be represented by an attorney of his or her own choosing and not by the same attorney and not by an attorney appointed by the court.
“3. Each defendant desires to use the funds which were seized for the purpose of obtaining such representation.
“4. Each defendant does not have other funds available to obtain a separate attorney of his own choosing to represent them.”
That motion was denied on December 17, 1971.
All four of the original defendants in the criminal case were named defendants in the interpleader action along with Mr. Tarlow and the United States of America. Mr. Tarlow filed a verified answer for all but the United States. That answer alleged that the $6,424 seized on July 28, 1971 was the property of defendants Vermouth, Buker, Robinson and Weisner. It alleged those four made no claim to the funds as against Mr. Tarlow; they did claim as against the United States.

In fact Mr. Dubin was the attorney who appeared for defendants at the trial on March 7.

See United States v. Clinton, 260 F.Supp. 84, where an attorney’s lien for fees was held to have been inchoate on the date of the filing of the lien of the United States on funds that had been seized by city police; and see United States v. First National Bank of Memphis, 458 F.2d 560, for a case holding an attorney had no priority because of an assignment for services rendered and to be rendered in a criminal case.

The notices were served upon Vermouth and Buker at a residence which it may be assumed they shared.

Mr. Tarlow, whose office is in Hollywood or West Los Angeles, personally represented the four defendants in the preliminary hearing; in the superior court he presented and on different days argued motions for a release of the seized money and *367to dismiss the information, on behalf of all four defendants. Weisner prior thereto had replaced Mr. Tarlow with John McCabe, but Mr. Tarlow represented Mr. McCabe on the motion to dismiss. In preparation for the motions to dismiss, Vermouth, Robinson and Buker each made a statement that he/ she waived any conflict of interest and stated his desire to have Barry Tarlow represent him/her. On behalf of Buker and Vermouth, Mr. Tarlow argued motions to sever trial of certain counts, and, on the same day, motions to obtain release of the seized funds and to obtain an evidentiary hearing to lay a foundation for the use of polygraph evidence in his motion to suppress made on a later date; there were also motions for continuance. In all Mr. Tarlow appeared in the San Diego County Superior Court on seven different days. He was represented by other counsel on 13 different other days before the motion for continuance of March 5. One of those counsel, Mr. Dubin, was present during the seven-day evidentiary hearing, followed on the seventh day by Mr. Tarlow’s motion to suppress evidence, all of which occupied January 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 15, 1973. The transcript of that hearing fills 798 typewritten pages. In preparation for that hearing, Vermouth and Buker each had two polygraph examinations, the purpose of which was to show the truthfulness of their answers that the police entered without prior announcement and that their presence at the door was unknown to defendants. Of the witnesses called by the defendants, five were polygraph examiners from Los Angeles or Orange Counties, and one a doctor of psychology from the University of Utah. Mr. Tarlow was present on January 15 when witnesses were sworn and examined as to the circumstances of the search and seizure, and argued the motion to suppress. There were written notices of motions and supporting papers, running to nearly 200 pages; and the petition for writ of mandate in this court, which was argued orally by counsel for Verm.outh and Buker.