Court Opinion

ID: 9618252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:09:39.260827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:26.777349
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
I write separately to address the privilege which exists between physician and patient. As correctly explained by Judge Brett, only communications which are not intended to be disclosed to third parties fall within this privilege. See 12 O.S.1981, § 2503. Because this is a statutory privilege, and in derogation of common law, the legislation creating this privilege must be strictly construed. See State v. George, 575 P.2d 511, 515 (Kan.1978).
Hammonds v. State, 366 P.2d 111 (Okla.Crim.App.1961), which was decided under the old statute, involved a similar incident. In Hammonds, the defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter while engaged in the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. The attending physician testified that the defendant “smelled like whiskey.” This Court reasoned that the defendant’s condition was not confidential, but was open to the public. Therefore, it did not fall within the information protected by the physician-patient privilege.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the appellant’s condition was known by several individuals other than the doctor. As this condition was observed by third persons, it cannot be considered confidential. Accordingly, I agree with the result reached by the majority.
However, I am unwilling to state that the smell of alcohol is always a condition which is open to the public. In order to give effect to the language enacted by the legislature, the trial court should focus on the “confidentiality” requirement rather than applying a “per se” rule.