Court Opinion

ID: 9659792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:54:46.57708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.564756
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
In this case, the court ordered the wife to pay attorneys’ fees to the attorney who represented her in this suit for divorce. I would reform the decree to delete this provision.
As pointed out in Douthit v. Anderson, 521 S.W.2d 127,128-29 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1975, no writ), there is a serious question as to whether an attorney representing a client in a suit against a third party is in a position to assert in the same suit a claim for attorneys’ fees against a client who is not represented by counsel.
The parties agree that the judgment contains language that amounts to a judgment for attorneys’ fees in favor of appellant’s trial counsel. However, there are no pleadings by the attorney seeking relief from his client. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 124 (“In no case shall judgment be rendered against any defendant unless upon service, or acceptance or waiver of process, or upon an appearance by the defendant ...”). Neither *280party signed the decree as an agreed judgment, nor did the attorneys sign on their behalf, so as to justify the judgment for attorneys’ fees on the basis of contract. See, e.g., McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979). The attorneys signed as to form only. Further, the fact that the wife may have created a form of judicial estoppel, when she asked in her motion for new trial that the decree in all other parts remain the same, does not confer jurisdiction on the court to render a judgment on behalf of one who is not a party to the suit. As stated in Douthit, “The divorce court had no power to make a valid adjudication between attorney and client because no pleadings raised any issue or controversy between them.” Douthit, 521 S.W.2d at 128.
I would find that this provision is void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court and is not enforceable.
I would reform the divorce decree to delete the award of attorney’s fees. In all other aspects, I concur with the majority’s result.
I respectfully dissent.