Court Opinion

ID: 9496914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:39:01.36565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:53.523220
License: Public Domain

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Court rightly points out that on review of an application from a state prisoner for a writ of habeas corpus the writ “shall not be granted unless the state adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ or (2) ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ ” Ante at 639. The Court also rightly acknowledges that the central question in our current review is whether the trial judge’s denial of Mr. Alidani’s mistrial motion was contrary to existing Supreme Court precedent. Ibid., and see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.”).
Unlike the Court, however, I believe the South Dakota trial judge’s denial of the motion for mistrial contradicts Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The statute requires, in order to satisfy the “contrary to” portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that the petitioner must show that the state courts in his case reached a result different from governing precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States “on materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). I do not contest the Court’s factual summary of Quercia, but I do question the Court’s attempt at distinguishing the legal conclusions reached by that case. Quercia stands not merely for the minimal claim that a trial judge is prohibited from making only “extremely egregious and prejudicial” comments as to the credibility of a witness. Ante at 640. Instead, the case holds that it is almost always reversible error for a trial judge, by injecting his own opinion into the analysis, to intrude on, and thus take away from, the defendant’s right to have the jury weigh the credibility of a witness. Quercia, 289 U.S. at 471, 53 S.Ct. 698.
In the present case, by declaring in front of the jury that he knew the victim-*643witness would tell the truth, the trial judge exceeded his role as “governor of'the trial,” and took on the jury’s assigned task. Id. at 469, 471, 53 S.Ct. 698. Comments of a trial judge as to a witness’s credibility are “of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence.” Id. at 472, 53 S.Ct. 698. There could be exceptions to this rule, of course. There are always exceptions. For example, if the witness as to whom the offending comment was made has his testimony stricken for some reason, or if the witness is on the stand only briefly and gives truly inconsequential testimony, I could see a basis for letting the conviction stand notwithstanding the comments of the trial judge. Nothing of the kind occurred here, however.
What are the factors that might serve to distinguish Quercia from the present case? The Court seems to place considerable weight on the trial judge’s subjective intention — he did not mean to affect the jury’s deliberation. I do not believe that this factor can be controlling or even relevant in this context. The important thing is what the jury heard. That is all they know about the judge’s intention. I would look to what was said, and not to what the •judge intended. There are some things that a trial judge should just not say, whatever his intent. The case at hand is a good example. It is not for trial judges to weigh credibility in jury cases. The comment here intruded on the defendant’s right to have the issue of credibility determined by the jury only. It is important to remember that this case came down to a swearing match. Was the defendant telling the truth, or was the prosecuting witness? So the judge’s comments went straight to the heart of the key issue that the jury had to decide.3
It may be true, as the Court says, that the facts in Quercia were “worse” than the facts here.4 In Quercia, the comment related to the credibility of the-defendant himself, not to another witness, and was made directly to the jury, not to the witness. I don’t see why these differences make a legal distinction. The important thing is that the jury heard the comment, and, in the present case, the testimony of the alleged victim was virtually the only evidence the government offered.
The trial court gave the jury cautionary instructions. This was also done in Quer-cia, as the Supreme Court’s opinion notes.
*644The trial court explained .that it intended only to remind the child witness that she was still under oath. This is a routine aspect of trials. When witnesses who have earlier testified on direct take the stand on rebuttal, they are routinely told that they are still under oath. There is no need to repeat the oath. What happened here went far beyond that, though I accept the trial judge’s comments that he did not intend to go beyond it. I have never-heard of a judge’s making a statement like this in front of the jury.
It is said that the trial court’s comments could not have been prejudicial, because they were in the future tense, directed solely to the witness’s rebuttal testimony to come, which testimony was peripheral to the main issue in the case, whether the abuse had occurred, and whether defendant had committed it. This explanation won’t wash. When the trial court said to the witness that it believed she would tell the truth, it must have had, or thought that it had, some basis for the statement. The basis, most likely, was the impression that the witness had made on the trial court during her direct testimony. Thus, the trial court was saying, in effect, that the witness would tell the truth on rebuttal because she had done so as part of the government’s case-in-chief.
It is said that the comment was not prejudicial, and the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, making that finding, is cited in support as a finding of fact. I do not believe that whether a Certain comment was prejudicial is a “fact” as that term is used in the law. Prejudice is to be determined from all of the surrounding circumstances! There is and probably can be no direct evidence of the jury’s mental reaction to the comment. Rather, we have to look to the words of the comments themselves and to their natural tendency to persuade a juror. If you look at the portion of the Quercia opinion dealing with prejudice, you will find that it is fairly cursory.. The Court evidently thought that comments of this kind were nearly always prejudicial, if not literally always.
What is the rule of Quercia ? I suggest that the following sentence can be taken as a capsule of the Court’s holding: “The influence of the trial judge on the jury is ‘necessarily and properly of great weight’ and ‘his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.’ ” I believe that what happened here is a violation of that rule.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The trial court, in stating its intention the morning after the comments were made, said that one of his reasons for making the statement was to let the witness know that "we trust you.” This comment reinforces the position I am taking, I think. It is not for judges to say out loud, in front of a jury, that they trust one witness or another. Here, of course, the comment was out loud but not in front of the jury, but it was indicative of the judge's intention in making the comment the previous day, which the jury did hear.

. The Court cites and discusses United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431 (1983) (en banc). I am not sure if citation to a circuit opinion is relevant in applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The statute seems to limit our consideration to previous Supreme Court cases. However, it may be that a court-of-appeals interpretation of a Supreme Court case, especially when it is the same court en banc, is relevant in determining what a subsequent panel believes that case means. The Court distinguishes Singer on the ground that the trial judge’s comments were pervasive throughout the trial. In this way, the Court argues, Singer was "worse” than the present case. I was the author of Singer for the Court en banc. I will say, for what it’s worth, that Singer, not involving a direct comment on a witness's credibility in front of the jury, is by no means "worse” than the present case. I acknowledge, however, that, even though T wrote Singer, I have no more legal competence to interpret it than any other member of this Court.