Court Opinion

ID: 9774674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:29:26.261451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:12.960528
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On its motion for rehearing, appellant Warrilow contends that established Texas law does not permit our adoption of the concurrent causation doctrine of Partridge. We disagree. Warrilow cites three Texas cases in support of its argument.1 These cases involve property loss coverage under first-party insurance policies and are distinguishable from both the facts of Partridge and the facts of the case at bar.
Partridge did not involve first-party property insurance coverage; it involved third-party liability insurance coverage.2 Partridge never considered in what manner concurrent causation might apply to first-party property insurance disputes, and its holding was not extended to that context.

The Distinction Between Liability and Property Insurance

Warrilow fails to differentiate between property loss coverage under a first-party insurance policy, typically an all-risk homeowner’s policy, and tort liability coverage under a third-party insurance policy, as the Peacemaker policy in the present case. This distinction is critical. The California Supreme Court recently elaborated on its Partridge rationale, “Liability and corresponding coverage under a third-party insurance policy must be carefully distinguished from the coverage analysis applied in a first-party property contract. Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability.” Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 48 Cal.3d 395, 257 Cal.Rptr. 292, 298, 770 P.2d 704, 710 (1989) (citation omitted).
Coverage in a property policy is commonly provided by reference to causation, such as “loss caused by ...” certain enumerated forces. Garvey, 257 CahRptr. at 298, 770 P.2d at 710. It is precisely these physical forces that bring about the loss. Id. Frequently, as in the cases cited to us by Warrilow, property losses occur from more than one legally significant physical force; poultry house destroyed by wind and snow in McKillip; home rendered uninhabitable by contamination and an exterminator’s negligence in Auten, and building damaged by rain and wind in Matchoolian. In Texas, if one force is covered and one force is excluded, the insured must show that the property damage was caused solely by the insured force, or he must separate the damage caused by the insured peril from that caused by the excluded peril. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d at 162. The coverage analysis in the property insurance context examines the relationship between perils, those that are covered under the policy and those that are excluded, focusing on the exclusions that limit loss coverage. Garvey, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 298, 770 P.2d at 710.
The Partridge rationale is not proper in the first-party property insurance context because, in most cases, the insured can point to some arguably covered contributing factor. Garvey, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 299, 770 P.2d at 711. The presence of such a cause, regardless of how minor, would give rise to coverage under Partridge. Id. The reasonable expectations of the parties would not be served when the efficient and predominating cause of the loss is expressly excluded by the terms of the policy, and nevertheless, coverage is extended.
*528Conversely, in the third-party liability insurance context, the right to coverage is established by traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause, and duty. Garvey, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 298, 770 P.2d at 710. By insuring for personal liability and agreeing to cover the insured for his own negligence, the insurer agrees to cover the insured for a broader spectrum of risks. Id. Thus, the focus is on the insured’s legal obligation to pay for an injury or damage arising out of a certain occurrence, and coverage should extend to an insured risk, negligence, which constitutes a concurrent proximate cause of the injury. Id. By finding coverage for an injury resulting from the insured’s negligence, the reasonable expectations of the parties to the insurance contract are not frustrated. Our application of Partridge does not expand the insurer’s potential liability, as would be the case in the first-party property insurance context.
The cases cited to us by Warrilow involve disputes over first-party property insurance coverage. In the case at bar, the dispute is over third-party liability insurance coverage. We believe the distinction is necessary and appropriate. Both appellant’s and appellees’ motions for rehearing are OVERRULED.
NYE, C.J., concurs.

. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.1971); Auten v. Employers National Insurance Co., 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986), writ denied, 749 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1988); United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Matchoolian, 583 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

. In first-party insurance coverage, the insured is covered for his own loss. In third-party insurance coverage, the insured is covered for his liability to another for their loss.