Court Opinion

ID: 9859271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:35:09.848104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:22:17.359856
License: Public Domain

*611Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion upholds the issuance of a writ of prohibition in restraining a municipal justice from proceeding in a case involving the village’s transient merchants’ or peddlers’ ordinance. It does so despite its finding that the primary issue raised “could be determined by the procedure suggested by the appellant,” to wit: mandamus to the chief of police requiring him to issue the permit, trial of the alleged ordinance violation and declaratory judgment to challenge the constitutional validity of the ordinance. To which we would add only the availability of a trial de novo in the circuit court on appeal of any judgment entered in the justice court.
Actually, the question of whether prohibition is available as a matter of right to defendants in justice courts in village ordinance cases is not to be reserved as the majority suggests. It has been decided in a case to which this dissenting opinion will refer more than once.1 We should not infer now that this short-cut route may never be traversable again, when we said earlier that, except in cases of extraordinary hardship, it was being closed to all justice court traffic.
The majority opinion does put up at least a “Slow. Proceed With Caution” warning, perhaps even a “Stop. End of Road” sign to the use of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition in the justice court area. It reserves “. . . for future determination whether a litigant in the position of the respondent is entitled to the remedy of prohibition as a matter of right in a like situation.”
In determining if or when prohibition lies to stop actions in a justice court that seeks enforcement of village ordinances, we deal with art. VII, sec. 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution which grants to the circuit courts “supervisory control” over “inferior courts” and the right to *612issue writs “necessary ... to give them a general control over inferior courts.” A thorough discussion of this power and the manner in which it is to be exercised appears in an early case.2 It makes clear that such supervisory power of circuit courts “. . . is fenced about, so to speak, by the functions, in the aggregate, of the ancient writs used to exercise it prior to the constitution, and preserved thereby for the same purpose.” 3 Such ancient writs were stated to be those of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari.
In the case before us it could be said as was said in the Kiekhaefer Case, “The fundamental issue presented on this appeal is whether this is a proper case in which to have invoked the extraordinary remedy of resort to a writ of prohibition.”4 In Kiekhaefer, the parties primarily debated as to whether prohibition may be invoked against a judge of a lower court except in a situation where the judge is exceeding his jurisdiction. This court held that prohibition may be invoked in case of non jurisdictional error “in a situation where appeal from the judgment would come too late for effective redress and great hardship would result if such writ were not issued.” 5 However, the court went beyond the limited issue stressed by litigants and set down two limiting requirements governing circuit judges issuing writs of prohibition against inferior courts, particularly village or municipal j ustices:
(1) “In order to entitle a party to a writ of prohibition, the results of the error attacked must not only be prejudicial to him, but must involve extraordinary hardship. [Citations omitted.] ” (Emphasis in the original.) 6
*613(2) “It is a further well-established principle that prohibition will not lie where there is an adequate remedy by appeal (citations omitted).” 7
We would apply these sound limits to the use of prohibition here as the court did in Kiekhaefer. Both cases involve a charged violation of a village ordinance. Both cases involve the right of a municipal justice to proceed to hear a charge of violation of such village ordinance. In both cases, the defendant has the right to a trial de novo in the circuit court if he is found guilty in the justice court. In Kiekhaefer this court found such right to a trial de novo to be an adequate remedy at law, thus barring the right of a defendant to seek and secure a writ of prohibition against the municipal justice.
The position of respondent that a writ of prohibition is preferable to appeal is based solely on the argument that litigation can be protracted. This is true enough, although not so likely at the village justice court level. However, it remains in the realm of possibility, not probability, in the absence of any affidavits that support the naked assertion. Where there is no more than the relator’s claim that “The ordinance is inapplicable to him, or, if applicable, is unconstitutional” coupled with a claim that litigation “could be protracted” this does not justify his seeking and securing a writ of prohibition against justice court proceedings. Something more is needed to establish the required “extraordinary hardship” or “inadequacy” of alternatives. The importance of the issue involved is not such additional factor because prohibition is not to be used solely to establish a governing guideline for future cases of the same type.8
*614The defendant has an adequate remedy in law were he to be found guilty of violating the village ordinance by the village justice. That remedy is the trial de novo in the circuit court to which he is entitled on appeal. That there may be reasons why the relator may well prefer prohibition to such appeal and trial de novo or other alternative remedies does not make appeal or such alternatives “inadequate remedies” nor constitute a showing of “extraordinary hardship.” If a trial de novo — a starting over with the slate wiped clean — is not an adequate remedy against any imperfection in a municipal justice court proceeding, the word “adequate” is being given a new and strange meaning.
It is important to keep in mind the type of appeal assured defendants in cases involving the charge of violating a village ordinance after trial by a municipal justice. Sec. 306.17, Stats., provides for a trial de novo in appeals from justice courts in all civil cases. Prom an early date, such trial de novo has been assured appellants on appeals to the circuit court from justice courts in all criminal cases.9
Does such right on appeal to the circuit court from any adverse judgment Municipal Justice Lawrence M. Wittig may enter against defendant, with a trial de novo, provide the relator, Dennis M. Gall, with an adequate remedy, assuming that such judgment was claimed to be procedurally, jurisdictionally or constitutionally imperfect? We believe that it does, if relator be admitted to bail pending trial of the appeal.10
*615Where a circuit judge has issued a writ of prohibition against a municipal justice barring further proceedings in a case including violation of a village ordinance we would hold, to quote Kiekhaefer “It is, therefore, our determination that the writ should not have been issued for the twofold reason that there was no showing of undue hardship, and appeal provided an adequate remedy.” 11
So we would conclude that the writ of prohibition should not here have been issued and would reverse and remand with directions to enter a writ of consultation authorizing the defendant municipal justice to proceed in the original ordinance violation action as if no writ of prohibition had been issued exactly as was done in the Kiekhaefer Case.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley joins in this dissent.

 State ex rel. Kiekhaefer v. Anderson (1958), 4 Wis. 2d 485, 90 N. W. 2d 790.

 State ex rel. Milwaukee Medical College v. Chittenden (1906), 127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500.

 Id. at page 512.

 Kiekhaefer v. Anderson (1958), supra, at page 488.

 Id. at page 490.

 Id. at page 490.

 Id. at page 491.

 See Drugsvold v. Small Claims Court (1960), 13 Wis. 2d 228, 108 N. W. 2d 648, quoting with approval from 42 Am. Jur., Prohibition, p. 141, sec. 6: “Nor will a court issue prohibition in a case where it is not justified, for the sole purpose of establishing a principle to govern other eases.” See also State ex rel. Kowaleski *614v. District Court (1949), 254 Wis. 363, 372, 36 N. W. 2d 419, stating: “ ‘Prohibition . . . should be issued only in cases of extreme necessity . . . Nor will a court issue prohibition . . . for the sole purpose of establishing a principle to govern other cases. Nor will it ordinarily be issued in a doubtful case.’ ”

 Kiekhaefer, supra, page 491 and cases cited therein.

 This is directly quoted from the Kiekhaefer Case, at page 491; the court there saying: “Does the right of appeal to the circuit court from any adverse judgment Justice of the Peace Neuser may enter against defendant, with a trial there de novo, *615provide the relator Kiekhaefer with an adequate remedy, assuming that the defendant committed error ... ? We believe that it does if relator be admitted to bail pending trial of the appeal. [Citation omitted.]” This language was quoted with approval in State ex rel. Beaudry v. Panosian (1967), 85 Wis. 2d 418, 423, 151 N. W. 2d 48.

 Id. at page 491.