Court Opinion

ID: 9928370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:04:35.726387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:08.482250
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Jan 31 2024, 8:56 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT-                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
MOTHER                                                      Theodore E. Rokita
Kay A. Beehler                                              Attorney General of Indiana
Terre Haute, Indiana
                                                            Monika Prekopa Talbot
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT-                                     Indianapolis, Indiana
FATHER
Michael G. Moore
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of N.E., Minor                                January 31, 2024
Child Alleged to be a Child in                              Court of Appeals Case No.
Need of Services;                                           23A-JC-996
C.E. (Mother) and S.E. (Father),                            Appeal from the Vigo Circuit
                                                            Court
Appellants-Respondents,
                                                            The Honorable Lakshmi B. Reddy,
        v.                                                  Special Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
Indiana Department of Child                                 84C01-2212-JC-1185
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

                                   Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                 Judges Pyle and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                           Page 1 of 42
      Case Summary
[1]   The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that N.E.,

      the child of C.E. (“Mother”) and S.E. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”), was

      a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and the trial court granted the petition.

      Parents appealed the trial court’s CHINS adjudication, and the adjudication

      was reversed on appeal. DCS then filed a second CHINS petition. The trial

      court again found that N.E. is a CHINS and also found Parents in contempt.

[2]   In this consolidated appeal, Mother argues that: (1) the second CHINS petition

      was barred by res judicata; (2) Mother’s due process rights were violated; (3) the

      trial court abused its discretion by considering child hearsay; and (4) the

      evidence does not support a finding that N.E. is a CHINS. Father argues: (1)

      the second CHINS petition was barred by res judicata; (2) the trial court

      committed fundamental error by admitting certain evidence; (3) the evidence

      does not support a finding that N.E. is a CHINS; and (4) the trial court erred by

      finding Father in contempt. We disagree with Parents’ arguments except for

      Father’s arguments regarding the contempt finding. Accordingly, we affirm in

      part and reverse in part.

      Issues
[3]   Parents raise numerous issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

                   I.       Whether the second CHINS petition was barred by res
                            judicata.

                   II.      Whether Mother’s due process rights were violated.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024         Page 2 of 42
                     III.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion or
                              committed fundamental error by admitting certain
                              evidence.

                     IV.      Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial
                              court’s finding that N.E. is a CHINS.

                     V.       Whether the trial court erred by finding Father in
                              contempt.

      Facts
[4]   Mother and Father have one child together, N.E., who was born in January

      2021. Mother has two other biological children, F.C. and D.T. 1, and Father

      has four other biological children, including M.E. Several of these children

      have been the subject of CHINS petitions, and Parents have a history of

      hostility toward DCS and failure to cooperate with DCS. This particular case

      concerns only N.E.’s status as a CHINS.

[5]   On October 14, 2021, DCS filed a petition alleging that N.E. was a CHINS

      (“First Petition”). DCS alleged that Parents were involved in an “argument

      and/or domestic violence incident” during which N.E. was in Mother’s arms.

      Ex. Vol. VIII p. 209. Parents left N.E. in the care of a neighbor while Parents

      allegedly went to the hospital. When a stranger arrived at the neighbor’s house

      to take N.E., the neighbor contacted law enforcement. Law enforcement

      1
          D.T.’s father has custody of him.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024               Page 3 of 42
      discovered that Parents’ residence did not have functioning toilets, electricity,

      or water, and was extremely cluttered. DCS was unable to locate Parents and,

      thereafter, removed N.E.

[6]   Shortly after N.E. was removed from Parents’ care, DCS also removed F.C.

      from Mother’s and F.C.’s father’s care. DCS filed a petition alleging that F.C.

      was a CHINS due to Mother’s intoxication and the fact that F.C.’s father was

      homeless. As part of these proceedings, Parents refused to participate in drug

      screens. The trial court adjudicated both N.E. and F.C. as CHINS on

      December 13, 2021, and issued a dispositional order on January 13, 2022.

      Parents appealed this determination.

[7]   During the pendency of the appeal, Parents did not comply with court-ordered

      services and did not begin visiting N.E. until April 2022. Even after Parents

      began attending the supervised visits, they participated inconsistently. Parents

      often appeared late or did not appear at all for the visits. On one occasion,

      Father brought a large hunting knife and a “set of nunchucks” 2 to a visit. Tr.

      Vol. III p. 155. On another occasion, Parents argued during the visit, which

      upset the children, and the children hid under a table. In November and

      December 2022, Father smelled of marijuana during visits. Father often argued

      with visitation supervisors and behaved aggressively and erratically.

      2
       Nunchucks are “a weapon that consists of two sticks joined by a short length of cord, chain, or rawhide.”
      https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nunchuck [https://perma.cc/XDB3-HB98] (last visited Jan.
      8, 2024).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                           Page 4 of 42
      Ultimately, multiple supervised visitation providers refused to work with

      Parents further. Additionally, Parents refused to participate in other services

      offered by DCS.

[8]   In April 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging that Father’s four-year-old child,

      M.E., was a CHINS. 3 DCS alleged, in part, that: (1) M.E. was living with

      Parents; (2) M.E. had “unexplained bruises all over her body;” (3) the home

      does not have running water and M.E. “had not been bathed in recent days or

      weeks”; (4) M.E. reported that Father and Mother (M.E.’s stepmother) fight

      verbally and physically; (5) M.E. reported that Mother “has choked her”; and

      (6) M.E. “does not feel safe in Father’s home.” Ex. Vol. VIII p. 153. Parents

      refused to open the door when DCS made multiple attempts to interview them

      and view the residence.

[9]   The trial court found M.E. to be a CHINS due, in part, to ongoing domestic

      violence in the home of Parents. As part of the dispositional order in M.E.’s

      CHINS case, the trial court ordered Parents, in part, to submit to random drug

      screens, participate in a domestic violence assessment and programs, and allow

      DCS to make announced and unannounced visits to the home. Parents,

      3
          M.E. was also the subject of CHINS petitions in 2017 and 2020.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 5 of 42
       however, refused to participate in services except for supervised visitations, and

       Mother participated only in a few months of home-based case work. 4

[10]   On May 2, 2022, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and a

       petition for a protection order. In the petition for a protection order, Mother

       stated, under the penalties of perjury, that: (1) Father “would slap [her] in [her]

       face, choke [her], and not let [her] out of the house;” (2) during sexual

       intercourse, Father “started choking [her] so hard it broke blood vessels in [her]

       face;” (3) Father “left [her] tied up so long [she] urinated on [herself];” and (4)

       while Mother was at a shelter, Father kept circling around the building waiting

       for her to exit. Ex. Vol. VIII p. 61. The trial court granted Mother’s petition for

       a protection order.

[11]   On May 15, 2022, Mother was charged with battery, domestic battery, and

       residential entry after she entered Father’s residence and battered Father and

       two others. The trial court issued a no contact order, which ordered Mother to

       have no contact with Father and the two others.

[12]   On June 12, 2022, Mother requested that the dissolution petition and protection

       order be dismissed. Mother claimed that the dissolution petition and protection

       order were being “cited in a juvenile court case against [her]” and were

       complicating “almost everything in our day to day lives.” Id. at 71, 73. Mother

       4
        Father and M.E.’s mother appealed the CHINS determination, and this Court affirmed. See In Matter of
       M.E., No. 22A-JC-2373 (Ind. Ct. App. June 28, 2023) (mem.).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                          Page 6 of 42
       stated that Parents “decided to work things out and go to [counseling].” Id. at

       73. The trial court then dismissed the dissolution petition and protection order.

[13]   On October 24, 2022, another panel of this Court reversed the First CHINS

       determinations as to both N.E. and F.C. See In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2022) (with J. Vaidik dissenting). As to N.E., the panel held:

                  DCS has not presented evidence that N.E. has been harmed or
                  endangered because of Mother’s mental health or inadequacy of
                  the family home. While Mother had a mental breakdown and
                  the family home was found to be inadequate on October 13,
                  2021, these conditions were voluntarily and without court
                  coercion remedied by the parties, and therefore they are
                  insufficient to support a CHINS determination.

       Id. at 392. As to F.C., the panel held: “Even if we are persuaded by DCS’s

       allegation of Mother’s intoxication on this one occasion, DCS did not present

       evidence that F.C. had been impacted in any way, let alone seriously

       endangered.” Id. at 393. Further, F.C.’s father had arranged for adequate

       housing. 5

[14]   DCS did not seek rehearing or transfer. Rather, DCS filed a second CHINS

       petition on December 7, 2022 (“Second Petition”). The Second Petition

       alleged, in part, that the following occurred after N.E. was first found to be a

       CHINS: (1) Mother and Father failed to participate in visitation with N.E. for

       5
           After the reversal of the CHINS finding, F.C.’s father apparently received custody of F.C.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                              Page 7 of 42
       eight months; (2) once Parents began to participate in visitation with N.E. and

       their other children, they were often late, missed visitations, failed to follow

       rules of visitation, argued with and threatened visitation supervisors, and

       appeared for visitation under the influence of substances; (3) in October 2022,

       Father allegedly pointed a gun at a man 6; (4) in October 2022, Father and

       maternal grandmother posted concerning matters on social media; (5) in May

       2022, Mother allegedly broke into Father’s residence and assaulted Father and

       two others, and Mother was charged with domestic battery, battery resulting in

       bodily injury, and battery; (6) in May 2022, Mother filed a petition for

       dissolution of marriage and requested a protection order due to concerning

       domestic violence, which was granted; and (7) Parents have persistently failed

       to comply with trial court orders in the CHINS cases of their other children.

[15]   Mother and Father denied the allegations of the Second Petition, and Father

       indicated that he intended to represent himself in the action. Mother, however,

       requested an appointment of counsel. The trial court judge recused himself,

       and a special judge was appointed to hear the Second Petition.

[16]   Mother filed a motion to dismiss the Second Petition. Mother argued that the

       Second Petition was barred under the “claim preclusion branch of the doctrine

       of res judicata.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 126. According to Mother, the

       Second Petition was based upon evidence from “the flawed determination by

       6
         In October 2022, the Terre Haute Police Department received a report that Father harassed a man, drove by
       the man’s house repeatedly, threatened to kill the man, and pointed a firearm at the man.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                            Page 8 of 42
       DCS and the trial court that parents’ actions in October 2021 endangered the

       child in a manner requiring the coercive intervention of the court.” Id. at 127.

       Mother requested that the trial court dismiss the Second Petition or,

       alternatively, strike any allegations related to or flowing from the First Petition.

       The trial court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss and found:

               The second Petition filed by DCS on December 6, 2022, does
               contain new allegations of material fact which are separate from
               what was available to DCS at the [time] of the original fact
               finding hearing back in 2021. As such, the principle of res
               judicata does not apply and there is no basis to dismiss the
               Petition filed on December 6, 2022.

               Mother also requests that the Court strike any allegations in the
               second Petition that are relating to or flowing from the October
               2021 Petition. There is no basis to strike these allegations.
               “Evidence of a parents’ past involvement with DCS or the
               criminal justice system is usually relevant to the central question
               of a CHINS proceeding.” In re Eq.W[.], 124 N.E.3d [1201, 1210
               (Ind. 2019)]. See also Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-5. While
               the allegations contained in the October 2021 Petition cannot be
               used as a basis for a CHINS finding regarding the second
               Petition, the allegations can be factored in to make a
               determination after the fact finding hearing. For this reason,
               Mother’s request to strike allegations is also denied.

       Id. at 132-33.

[17]   On January 25, 2023, Parents were evicted from their residence. The trial court

       conducted a fact-finding hearing on the Second Petition on January 27, 2023,

       February 1, 2023, and February 2, 2023. During Mother’s testimony, she

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024           Page 9 of 42
       denied filling out or signing the petition for protection order, which contained

       accusations of abuse by Father. Mother testified that DCS is “ruthless” and just

       wants to take the children “so they can get their check or whatever bonus that

       they want and they don’t care.” Tr. Vol. II p. 180. On February 2, 2023, the

       trial court ordered Parents to participate in a hair and nail follicle drug test and

       alcohol test by February 6, 2023.

[18]   On February 14, 2023, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and

       conclusions thereon and determined that N.E. is a CHINS. On March 8, 2023,

       the trial court entered a dispositional order. The trial court again ordered

       Parents to submit to a hair follicle test.

[19]   At the dispositional hearing, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”)

       testified that N.E. has a mass on her back that doubled in size during the fall of

       2022. Doctors at Riley Children’s Hospital recommended that an MRI be

       conducted under sedation to examine the mass. Parents, however, disputed the

       necessity of an MRI and requested a second opinion. A second opinion was

       obtained on March 14, 2023, and the second doctor also recommended an

       MRI. Although Parents were informed of this second appointment, they did

       not attend.

[20]   On May 10, 2023, the trial court conducted a review hearing and a hearing

       regarding N.E.’s medical issue. Parents did not appear at the hearing, but their

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024        Page 10 of 42
       counsel were present. 7 As for N.E.’s medical matter, the trial court granted

       DCS’s request for the MRI under sedation at Riley Children’s Hospital. DCS

       reported that Parents had twice been ordered to submit to a hair follicle test but

       had failed to do so. DCS requested that the trial court find Parents in contempt

       of court. The trial court set the matter for a contempt hearing on May 31, 2023.

       The trial court sent another referral for Parents to complete a hair follicle test.

[21]   The trial court also issued an order regarding the review hearing on May 11,

       2023:

                  The Court hereby holds [Parents] in contempt for violating Court
                  Orders dated February 2nd and 27, 2023, instructing them to take
                  hair follicle drug tests and for failing to appear for the hearing
                  scheduled for May 10, 2023, which was not only a review
                  hearing but a hearing to address a medical issue involving [N.E.].
                  A contempt hearing to impose sanctions is hereby scheduled for
                  May 31, 2023, at 8:00 a.m. . . .

                  [ ] The Court has issued another Referral for Hair Follicle Drug
                  Testing which permits the parties to take such test through May
                  30, 2023, giving them an opportunity to come within compliance
                  prior to the contempt hearing. The parents are reminded that
                  sanctions for a contempt finding may include monetary
                  sanctions, community service and/or jail time.

                  [The] Court orders Mother and Father to obtain a 10[-]panel hair
                  follicle drug test at Right Choice D.A.T. by no later than May 30,

       7
           Although Father was pro se during the fact-finding hearing, he was now represented by counsel.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                             Page 11 of 42
               2023. A Referral Sheet is attached and the costs of the test will
               be paid for by the Department of Child Services.

       Appellants’ Amended Consol. Suppl. App. Vol. II p. 14. 8

[22]   Parents failed to complete the hair follicle test and did not appear for the May

       31, 2023 hearing because they claimed that Mother was in the emergency room.

       The trial court rescheduled the hearing for June 7, 2023.

[23]   On June 7, 2023, Parents and their counsel appeared for the “rule to show

       cause” hearing. Tr. Vol. VI p. 105. DCS reported that it still had not received

       any hair follicle test results regarding Parents. Father and Mother both testified

       that they went to the testing facility a few days earlier but that the referral had

       expired. The trial court then stated:

               I will also let the record reflect that prior to this hearing starting I
               had my court reporter call Right Choice D.A.T. to see if either
               party had taken a test or appeared and the response was no
               [Parents] had not appeared to take a test. So, court having
               already found them in contempt they are found in contempt for
               their failure to appear at the review hearing on May tenth (10th).
               Which was not only a review hearing but also a hearing to
               determine whether or not the court should authorize DCS . . . to
               proceed with an important medical procedure for their child.
               [T]hey didn’t appear for the contempt hearing scheduled last
               week but I understand [Mother] was in the hospital and they
               couldn’t show up. They’re also found in contempt [of] court

       8
        This Appendix was marked received by the Clerk’s office on September 25, 2023, but Parents failed to
       correct defects and the document was not filed. We will, however, consider the trial court’s orders which are
       available to us on Odyssey.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                             Page 12 of 42
               because the court ordered a hair follicle drug screen on February
               first (1st), February twenty-seventh (27th), it was also in the order
               dated March eighth (8th) and then again most recently on or
               about May thirtieth (30th). Not only that they have not complied
               with the orders DCS . . . take their random drug screens or other
               procedures. Sanction is forty-five (45) days for each of them in
               jail starting immediately.

       Id. at 117-18.

[24]   The trial court then issued a written order on the contempt finding, in part, as

       follows:

               In the May 11th Order, this Court found the parties in contempt
               for failing to appear at the May 10th hearing and for violating the
               Court Orders instructing them to take hair follicle drug screens.
               Another referral was provided giving the parties until May 30th
               to take a drug screen to get in compliance.

               Just minutes prior to the hearing on June 7, 2023, the Court
               Reporter contacted Right Choice DAT to see if the parties had
               appeared for a drug test and they had not. During the hearing,
               Father testified that they did appear for a drug screen, but that
               the Referral had expired. Allegedly, Mother went inside Right
               Choice DAT and was informed that the Referral had expired so
               the test was not given. Father could not recall which day and/or
               time they showed up which is unbelievable to this Court that the
               parties could not remember when this took place within the last
               seven (7) days. At one point, Father indicated they showed up
               on Friday, but that would have been June 2nd and the Referral
               would have still been valid. Mother then testified vaguely that it
               was maybe a Saturday, Sunday or Monday. However, Right
               Choice DAT is not open over the weekend. Moreover, because
               this Court routinely orders hair follicle drug tests at Right Choice
               DAT, it is aware that if a family shows up for a drug test and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024        Page 13 of 42
        there is a discrepancy in whether the Referral is valid, the
        organization calls the Court Staff to confirm whether the test
        should be given since the tests are paid for through grant funds.

        The Court has no reason to believe that the parents attempted to
        take the drug screens and get in compliance with the Court
        Order, despite being given numerous chances. Both parties also
        had hair which was dyed bright red and orange which can often
        skew drug test results. The Court also has suspicion that both
        parties were under the influence of some type of substance during
        the hearing based upon their facial expressions and responses to
        questions.

        When asked why the parties did not appear for the May 10th
        hearing, Father testified that he did not realize that he had to
        appear for just a review hearing. Then, he indicated that he was
        not getting notices. Both public defenders stated as officers of the
        Court that they advised the parties of the hearing date.
        Additionally, the parents are involved in numerous CHINS cases
        and have routinely attended review hearings. The suggestion
        that they did not realize they had to be present is not credible.

                                                *****

        For this reason and based upon the evidence presented during
        this contempt hearing, the Court imposes sanctions to be for each
        of them to serve an individual sentence of forty-five (45) days in
        the Vigo County Jail. . . .

                                                *****

        The Court will consider suspending the jail sentence sanction
        under the following conditions. First, both parents must now
        take either a nail bed or body hair 12 panel drug test since their

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024          Page 14 of 42
        head hair has been dyed. . . . If the drug tests results are negative,
        the Court may consider purging the jail sentence if the parties
        also submit to the other conditions. If the drug test results are
        positive, then the Court may suspend the jail sentence if the
        parties will voluntarily participate in an in-patient drug
        addiction/recovery program that is at least 28 days at a
        minimum and which will be paid for by the State. The second
        condition is that the parties sign a document agreeing to
        participate in the services recommended by DCS. So long as
        they participate in all the services recommended and ordered by
        the Court, then the jail sentence will remain suspended, but if
        they fail to participate then they will be required to complete the
        entire jail sentence.

        IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED ADJUDGED AND
        DECREED that [Parents] are hereby sanctioned for being in
        contempt of Court and ordered to each serve forty-five (45)
        consecutive days of jail time at the Vigo County Jail. The terms
        upon which this jail sentence may be suspended and/or purged
        are set forth above. To be clear, the finding of contempt and
        imposed jail sentence sanction is for failure to appear on
        5/10/2023 and failure to comply with orders dated 2/1/2023,
        2/27/2023, 3/8/2023, 5/10/2023 and 5/30/2023 for drug
        testing.

Appellants’ Amended Consol. Suppl. App. Vol. II pp. 18-21. Parents appealed

the second CHINS determination and later filed an amended notice of appeal

to add the contempt order.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024        Page 15 of 42
       Discussion and Decision
       I. Res Judicata

[25]   Parents argue that the Second Petition was barred by res judicata. Res judicata

       operates “to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the

       same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties

       and their privies.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019). This

       doctrine applies “where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the

       same issue between the same parties.” Id. Similar to double jeopardy in the

       criminal context, res judicata operates to prevent a party from receiving the

       proverbial “second bite at the apple.” Id.

[26]   We begin by noting that, although Mother filed a motion to dismiss the Second

       Petition on res judicata grounds, Father, who was pro se, did not. Our

       Supreme Court has held that res judicata “must be raised by a party to the

       proceeding so as to bring it to the court’s attention for review.” Id. at 1213.

       “[T]he best practice for the moving party is to move for dismissal on res

       judicata grounds at the earliest opportunity.” Id. at 1214. Accordingly,

       although Father waived the issue by failing to bring it to the trial court’s

       attention, we will address res judicata because Mother raised the issue.

[27]   There are two branches of res judicata: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

       Id. at 1209. Claim preclusion, which is at issue here, can be used to bar a

       successive lawsuit when “a particular [claim] is adjudicated and then put in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 16 of 42
       issue in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action between the same

       parties or their privies.” Id.

               Before a court can find that claim preclusion applies to bar a
               subsequent action, four essential elements must be met:

                    (1) The former judgment must have been rendered by a court
                    of competent jurisdiction;

                    (2) The former judgment must have been rendered on the
                    merits;

                    (3) The matter now in issue was or might have been
                    determined in the former suit; and

                    (4) The controversy adjudicated in the former suit must have
                    been between the parties to the present action or their privies.

       Id.

[28]   It is undisputed that the order on the First Petition was rendered by a court of

       competent jurisdiction; that judgment in the first CHINS proceeding was

       rendered on the merits; and that the first CHINS proceeding concerned the

       parties to this action. Accordingly, only the third element—whether the matter

       at issue in this action “was or might have been determined” in the First

       Petition—is at issue here. Id.

[29]   Our Supreme Court has recently addressed a similar issue in two opinions.

       First, in Eq.W., DCS filed a CHINS petition but failed to present sufficient

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024         Page 17 of 42
       evidence at the fact-finding hearing, and the trial court dismissed the first

       petition without prejudice. The day after the first petition was dismissed, DCS

       filed a second CHINS petition. The trial court later found that the children

       were CHINS.

[30]   On appeal, our Supreme Court held that “the claim preclusion branch of res

       judicata applies to CHINS proceedings.” Id. at 1211. “[I]nvocation of this

       doctrine could prevent repeated filings by DCS with no new factual basis until

       one petition finally sticks. It could also prevent repetitive litigation of issues

       that have been or could have been decided in an initial CHINS filing.” Id.

       “[T]o escape the preclusive effect of res judicata in a CHINS proceeding, the

       State’s subsequent petition must include new allegations of material fact

       separate from what was available to DCS to use at the original fact-finding

       hearing.” Id. at 1212.

               Practically speaking, if the parent or guardian is successful in
               showing claim preclusion applies to bar a subsequent petition,
               the CHINS petition must be dismissed. However, this dismissal
               does not mean the State is forever barred from filing a subsequent
               CHINS petition or even from using a parent’s prior actions as
               evidence in support of a new filing. As long as there are no other
               procedural bars to the filing and the State demonstrates that the
               subsequent petition contains new allegations of conduct that took
               place after the dismissal of the prior proceeding, the State may
               file a new CHINS petition.

       Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the second CHINS determination

       because the parents failed to raise the issue of res judicata in the trial court.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024         Page 18 of 42
[31]   Then, the Supreme Court decided R.L. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs. & Child

       Advocs., Inc., 144 N.E.3d 686, 687 (Ind. 2020). There, the trial court first

       determined that the child was not a CHINS. Five days later, DCS filed a

       second petition alleging that the child was a CHINS, which the trial court

       eventually granted. On appeal, our Supreme Court found that “[t]he

       subsequent petition was largely duplicative of the first and enunciated three

       new, weakly supported allegations.” Id. at 691. Our Supreme Court held that

       the mother’s motion to dismiss the second petition should have been granted

       because the second petition was barred by res judicata.

[32]   Here, the First Petition, which was filed in October 2021, alleged that Parents

       left N.E. with a neighbor after they were involved in an “argument and/or

       domestic violence incident” during which N.E. was in Mother’s arms. Ex. Vol.

       VIII p. 209. Law enforcement also discovered that Parents’ residence did not

       have functioning toilets, electricity, or water and was extremely cluttered. Fact-

       finding hearings were held in early December 2021, and the First Petition was

       granted on December 13, 2021. That CHINS finding was reversed by this

       Court, and DCS filed the Second Petition on December 7, 2022.

[33]   The Second Petition mentioned some of Parents’ history with DCS. The

       Second Petition, however, also alleged multiple issues that occurred after N.E.

       was first found to be a CHINS in December 2021. Specifically, DCS alleged

       that: (1) Mother and Father failed to participate in visitation with N.E. for eight

       months; (2) once Parents began to participate in visitation with N.E. and their

       other children, they were often late, missed visitations, failed to follow rules of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 19 of 42
       visitation, argued with and threatened visitation supervisors, and appeared for

       visitation under the influence of substances; (3) in October 2022, Father

       allegedly pointed a gun at a man; (4) in October 2022, Father and N.E.’s

       maternal grandmother made concerning social media posts regarding Father’s

       and Mother’s conduct; (5) in May 2022, Mother was charged with domestic

       battery, battery resulting in bodily injury, and battery based on an incident with

       Father and two others; (6) in May 2022, Mother filed a petition for dissolution

       of marriage and requested a protection order due to concerning domestic

       violence, which was granted; and (7) Parents have persistently failed to comply

       with trial court orders in the CHINS cases of their other children. The trial

       court found that res judicata was inapplicable because the Second Petition

       “does contain new allegations of material fact which are separate from what

       was available to DCS at the [time] of the original fact finding hearing back in

       2021.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 132.

[34]   We agree with the trial court. The Second Petition included allegations of

       conduct that occurred after the First Petition was filed and after the fact-finding

       hearings on the First Petition. Accordingly, the Second Petition included “new

       allegations of material fact separate from what was available to DCS to use at

       the original fact-finding hearing.” Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1212. Mother failed to

       demonstrate that the matters now at issue in the Second Petition were or might

       have been determined in the First Petition. We, thus, conclude that the trial

       court properly denied Mother’s motion to dismiss on grounds of res judicata.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 20 of 42
       II. Mother’s Due Process Rights

[35]   Next, Mother argues that her due process rights were violated by DCS’s failure

       to perform a second investigation before filing the Second Petition. “Due

       process requires ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

       meaningful manner.’” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (quoting

       Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)). Due process at all

       stages of a CHINS case is vital because “‘procedural irregularities, like an

       absence of clear findings of fact, in a CHINS proceeding may be of such import

       that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to a potential

       subsequent termination of parental rights.’” Id. at 1258 (quoting In re J.Q., 836

       N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). Due process in a CHINS adjudication

       turns on balancing the three Mathews factors: (1) the private interests affected by

       the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and

       (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged

       procedure. Id. at 1257.

[36]   Mother argues that “[t]he absence of a Form 310 report of abuse or neglect, and

       the required Form 311 following investigation of allegations contained in a

       Form 310 report, deprived Mother of any opportunity to administratively

       appeal the ‘substantiation’ of abuse or neglect because there were admittedly no

       such reports, and no substantiation.” Mother’s Appellant’s Br. p. 18. DCS is

       statutorily required to assess all reports of child abuse and neglect. In re F.S., 53

       N.E.3d 582, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). According to DCS, a DCS Form 310 is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024        Page 21 of 42
       completed after an initial report from the child abuse “hotline.” 9 Tr. Vol. II p.

       206. The DCS Form 311 is then completed after a caseworker conducts an

       assessment of the report. See § 19:16. Assessment and determination, 15A IND.

       PRAC., FAMILY LAW—CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES § 19:16 (2023-2024

       ed.) (“As the initial report is documented in the so-called ‘310,’ the Department

       documents its assessment, including the ‘substantiated/unsubstantiated’

       determination, in a ‘311.’”).

[37]   Our review of the Mathews factors reveals no due process violation. Mother

       claims that her private interests were impacted because she was denied the

       ability to administratively appeal a substantiation of neglect or abuse by DCS’s

       chosen procedure. The governmental interest in the assessment, however, is

       described in Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-6, which provides: “The primary

       purpose of the assessment is the protection of the child.” (emphasis added). As

       for the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure, DCS was well

       aware of Parents’ behaviors after the fact-finding hearing on the First Petition,

       and those behaviors were documented in the multiple on-going CHINS

       proceedings. DCS determined that a Form 310 and, thus, a Form 311 were

       unnecessary. DCS proceeded straight to filing the Second Petition regarding

       N.E. Given the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearings, even if DCS

       9
         DCS has a special hotline for reporting allegations of child abuse. In re Ju.L., 952 N.E.2d 771, 774 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 2011). “Once a person makes an allegation to the hotline, a member of DCS creates a narrative
       summary of the allegation in a report called a 310 report. Then, an investigative case manager investigates
       the allegations described in the 310 report and determines whether the allegations are substantiated.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                               Page 22 of 42
       had utilized the Form 310/311 procedures and Mother had been able to

       administratively appeal a substantiation of neglect or abuse, her administrative

       appeal would likely have been unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, a

       balancing of the three Mathews factors reveals no due process violation.

       III. Admission of Evidence

[38]   Next, both Mother and Father challenge the admission of certain evidence

       during the fact-finding hearings. Our standard of review of a trial court’s

       admission or exclusion of evidence is an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. State, 31

       N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015). A trial court abuses its discretion only if its

       decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances

       before the court. In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “It is

       well-established that ‘errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded

       as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.’” Id.

       (quoting Sibbing v. Cave, 922 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind. 2010)). To determine

       whether the admission of evidence affected a party’s substantial rights, we

       assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the finder of fact. Id.

       “Likewise, reversible error cannot be predicated upon the erroneous admission

       of evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence that has already been

       properly admitted.” Id.

       A. Mother’s Arguments

[39]   Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibits 6,

       14, 15, 17, and 19 over Mother’s objection. Mother, however, does not even

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 23 of 42
       identify the content of these exhibits and only makes a brief argument

       concerning the foundation of photographs and messages from Father’s social

       media page, which were included in DCS Exhibits 19 and 21.

[40]   We conclude that this argument is waived. First, Mother has failed to make a

       cogent argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Loomis v.

       Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the

       failure to present a cogent argument waives the issue for appellate review),

       trans. denied. Moreover, Mother did not argue to the trial court that the exhibits

       lacked foundation. Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town of

       Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 438 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“An appellant who

       presents an issue for the first time on appeal waives the issue for purposes of

       appellate review.”). Accordingly, this argument is waived.

[41]   Mother next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

       hearsay statements from M.E. without conducting a hearing under Indiana

       Code Section 35-37-4-6. 10 Again, Mother fails to specifically identify the

       statements at issue here. We note that Bailey Poore, an assessment worker with

       DCS, testified that she conducted an assessment regarding M.E. in April 2022,

       which resulted in a CHINS petition regarding M.E. Mother objected to any

       testimony regarding M.E.’s statements to Poore, and the trial court sustained

       10
         Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6 allows for the admission of a statement made by a protected person under
       certain circumstances, but a hearing on the matter must be held.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                          Page 24 of 42
       the objection. Poore testified only to her observations of M.E., not M.E.’s

       statements to Poore.

[42]   Later during the fact-finding hearing, Father questioned DCS employee Heidi

       Deckard regarding who was responsible for M.E.’s April 2022 bruising, and

       Deckard responded that “the child reported that [Mother] caused the injury.”

       Tr. Vol. V p. 47. Mother did not object. DCS’s attorney then asked Deckard if

       “the family case manager talk[ed] to M.E. about how she got the bruises,” and

       Mother objected. Id. at 48. The trial court pointed out that M.E.’s statement

       had already been elicited by Father and that Mother did not object to Father’s

       question. Accordingly, Mother waived any objection to the admission of

       M.E.’s statement.

[43]   Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court stated that it would not consider M.E.’s

       statements, and in its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, the trial court

       did not find that Parents abused M.E. Because the trial court did not consider

       M.E.’s statements, any error in the admission of M.E.’s statements was

       harmless.

       B. Father’s Arguments

[44]   Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain

       evidence. Father, however, concedes that he did not object to any of the

       evidence and contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by

       admitting the evidence.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 25 of 42
[45]   “On rare occasions, appellate courts may analyze an issue under the

       fundamental error doctrine to examine an otherwise procedurally defaulted

       claim.” Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1214. “[T]his review is extremely narrow and

       ‘available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and

       elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied,

       and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a

       fair trial impossible.’” Id. (quoting Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind.

       2008)).

[46]   Father identifies the admission of the following evidence as fundamental error:

       (1) the allegations from the First Petition; (2) the police report and probable

       cause affidavit from Mother’s May 2022 arrest and the trial court’s questions of

       Mother regarding the same; (3) “[h]earsay included within a report of abuse or

       neglect included in a petition for rule to show cause,” Father’s Br. p. 25; (4)

       Facebook posts of third parties regarding Parents; (5) an April 2022 Facebook

       post that “included comments about ‘cps’ [sic] and included a video of [Father]

       drinking what appeared to be a bottle of alcohol,” id.; (6) a May 2022 Facebook

       post that included a video of a verbal altercation between Father and another

       person; (7) “[a] series of provider Reports that included a large amount of

       hearsay,” id.; (8) a May 2022 Facebook post that included rap lyrics; (9) two

       October 2022 police reports regarding altercations between Father and other

       persons; (9) hearsay statements in an eviction filing; and (10) Father’s

       conviction at the age of sixteen and other criminal charges that were dismissed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024        Page 26 of 42
[47]   Father provides little or no analysis of his claims that this evidence was

       inadmissible. Further, Father claims, without explanation, that the admission

       of this evidence cumulatively resulted in the denial of a fair trial. “We will not

       become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or

       too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d

       957, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Given Father’s lack of cogent analysis, we

       conclude that this issue is waived.

       IV. CHINS Determination

[48]   Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

       determination that N.E. is a CHINS. CHINS proceedings are civil actions;

       thus, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a

       CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind.

       2010); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence

       nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78

       (Ind. 2017). Here, the trial court sua sponte entered findings of fact and

       conclusions thereon in granting the Second CHINS petition. “As to the issues

       covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the

       evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the

       judgment.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). We review the

       remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a

       judgment “‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported

       by the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 27 of 42
       1997)). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous.

       D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578.

[49]   DCS must prove three elements for a juvenile court to adjudicate a child a

       CHINS: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) that one of eleven

       different statutory circumstances exist that would make the child a CHINS; and

       (3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he or she is not

       receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive

       intervention of the court. Id. at 580.

[50]   Here, the trial court found N.E. was a CHINS under the general category of

       neglect as defined in Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which provides:

               A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
               eighteen (18) years of age:

               (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
               or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
               neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
               child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
               education, or supervision:

                        (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially
                        able to do so; or

                        (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent,
                        guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other
                        reasonable means to do so; and

               (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024             Page 28 of 42
                        (A) the child is not receiving; and

                        (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
                        coercive intervention of the court.

       The statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent’s actions or inactions

       have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child’s needs are unmet; and (3)

       those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at

       1287.

[51]   “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish

       parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a

       determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in

       need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without intervention of

       the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the

       child . . . . [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that

       creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS

       finding should consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed,

       but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[52]   Before addressing Parents’ arguments, we note that Parents seem to contend

       that the trial court could not rely upon evidence of their acts prior to the

       adjudication of the First Petition. Our Supreme Court has held that “past acts

       by parents can be relevant to new CHINS filings involving the same parents

       and children.” Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1211. In fact, Indiana Code Section 31-

       34-12-5 provides:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 29 of 42
               Evidence that a prior or subsequent act or omission by a parent,
               guardian, or custodian injured or neglected a child is admissible
               in proceedings alleging that a child is a child in need of services
               to show the following:

               (1) Intent, guilty knowledge, the absence of mistake or accident,
               identification, the existence of a common scheme or plan, or
               other similar purposes.

               (2) A likelihood that the act or omission of the parent, guardian,
               or custodian is responsible for the child’s current injury or
               condition.

       Accordingly, the trial court was not required to ignore evidence of Parents’ acts

       prior to the adjudication of the First Petition. That evidence was relevant to the

       adjudication of the Second Petition, although the Second Petition could not be

       based solely upon allegations adjudicated in the First Petition. See supra Part I

       (discussing res judicata).

       A. Seriously Endangered

[53]   Parents challenge the trial court’s finding that N.E. is seriously endangered.

       Parents argue that they could not have seriously endangered N.E. because she

       was in foster care during the relevant time period. Parents seem to contend

       that, unless N.E. was in their direct physical care, they could not seriously

       endanger her.

[54]   The trial court found N.E. seriously endangered due to unexplained bruising to

       several of Parents’ children and domestic violence between Parents and other

       violence committed or threatened by Parents. N.E., M.E., and another sibling
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 30 of 42
       were observed to have “unexplained marks, abrasions and bruising, including a

       bruise on [M.E.’s] throat which looks like a hand[,] and a black eye, all at

       different times.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 182. The bruises to M.E. occurred

       after the First Petition was adjudicated. Moreover, after the First Petition was

       adjudicated, Mother filed a petition for a protection order and alleged serious

       and disturbing abuse by Father; Mother was arrested for domestic violence and

       battery; and Father was accused of pointing a gun at and harassing another

       man. Despite evidence of these events, Parents have refused to participate in

       domestic violence services. Although Parents denied many of these events, the

       trial court did not find Parents credible, and we cannot reweigh that

       determination.

[55]   The CHINS statute does not require that a court “wait until a tragedy occurs to

       intervene.” Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 838. A child cannot be returned to parents

       where there is continuing abuse and/or violence in the home. Given the

       significant evidence of domestic violence and other violence by Parents and

       their refusal to participate in domestic violence services in M.E.’s CHINS case,

       the trial court’s finding that N.E. is seriously endangered is not clearly

       erroneous.

       B. Needs Unmet

[56]   Father argues that DCS failed to demonstrate that N.E.’s needs were unmet.

       The trial court found that “[t]here is evidence that [N.E.’s] needs are not met

       and/or that the parents are not capable of meeting her needs.” Appellants’

       App. Vol. II p. 185. In support of this finding, the trial court noted that the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024          Page 31 of 42
       following occurred after the First Petition was adjudicated: (1) Parents were

       evicted from their residence; (2) prior to the eviction, CASA observed that the

       residence was in deplorable condition and Parents refused to allow DCS to

       inspect the residence; (3) the trial court had concerns regarding Parents’ ability

       to care for N.E.’s medical needs due to their repeated allegations of car

       problems; and (4) the trial court had concerns regarding drug abuse by Parents

       due to their repeated refusal to take drug screens.

[57]   Father argued that he would secure new housing; it is speculative that Parents

       would be unable to transport N.E. to medical appointments; and “[t]he issue of

       substance abuse was settled in the previous appeal.” Father’s Br. p. 19. We

       disagree that the issue of substance abuse was “settled” in the previous appeal.

       Rather, concerns of Parents’ substance abuse persisted after the adjudication of

       the First Petition due to their refusal to submit to drug screens in M.E.’s

       CHINS case, Father smelling of marijuana at visitations with the children, and

       Parents’ behaviors. Parents’ lack of housing also raises a significant concern

       regarding their capacity to meet N.E.’s needs. We conclude that evidence of

       Parents’ conduct after the First Petition was adjudicated demonstrates that

       Parents are not capable of meeting N.E.’s needs, and the trial court’s finding is

       not clearly erroneous.

       C. Necessity of Coercive Intervention

[58]   Finally, Father challenges the trial court’s finding that N.E.’s needs were

       unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. This “final

       element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 32 of 42
       that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their

       children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s

       needs.’” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Family & Children

       Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[59]   The trial court found “[t]here is abundant evidence that [N.E.’s] needs cannot

       be met by the parents without S[t]ate coercion.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p.

       187. The trial court noted that Parents refused to participate in domestic

       violence services; refused to submit to random drug screens despite multiple

       court orders; refused to communicate with DCS except by email; and refused to

       allow DCS to inspect their residence. The trial court, thus, concluded: “There

       is a preponderance of evidence that [N.E.’s] needs cannot be met by the parents

       without State coercion as the parents have proven that by their past actions, by

       their refusal to participate in services and denial that they require services, and

       by testifying during the fact finding hearing that they will not participate

       without a Court Order.” Id. at 188.

[60]   Father argues that the trial court placed the burden on Parents to “disprove”

       allegations by DCS by forcing them to show participation in domestic violence

       programs and forcing them to submit to drug screens. Father’s Br. p. 20. To

       the contrary, DCS demonstrated Parents’ persistent and adamant refusal to

       participate in services except for supervised visits with the children despite

       Parents’ clear need for such services. Even during the fact-finding hearing,

       Mother stated that she does not feel like she needs DCS services and she does

       her “own therapy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 105. The trial court’s finding that N.E.’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 33 of 42
       needs are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court is not

       clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s grant of the

       Second Petition is not clearly erroneous.

       V. Contempt Finding

[61]   Next, Father argues that the trial court erred by finding him in contempt.

       Mother does not challenge the contempt finding on appeal. Father, however,

       argues that: (1) the trial court failed to follow the procedures outlined in Indiana

       Code Section 34-47-3-5 for indirect contempt; (2) Parents were held in contempt

       without prior notification or the opportunity to be heard; (3) the trial court

       relied upon information from the testing facility collected by its court reporter;

       and (4) Parents were not afforded a meaningful way to purge the contempt.

       DCS, however, argues that the contempt finding involved both direct and

       indirect contempt; the lack of strict compliance with the indirect contempt

       statute is excused; Father failed to object to the trial court’s reliance upon the

       court reporter’s unsworn statement; and Parents were given the opportunity to

       purge themselves of contempt.

[62]   “Trial courts maintain considerable discretion in determining whether a party

       should be found in contempt of court,” and these determinations are reviewed

       for an abuse of discretion.” In re Paternity of B.Y., 159 N.E.3d 575, 577 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020). Our court will reverse a finding of contempt only if there is no

       evidence or inferences drawn therefrom that support it. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 34 of 42
[63]   “Contempt of court generally involves disobedience of a court or court order

       that ‘undermines the court’s authority, justice, and dignity.’” Reynolds v.

       Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129, 131

       (Ind. 2014)). There are two kinds of contempt: direct contempt and indirect

       contempt. Id. “Indirect contempt involves those acts committed outside the

       presence of the court which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass

       or prevent the due administration of justice.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

       Direct contempt involves “acts which are committed in the presence of the

       court or in such close proximity to it so as to disrupt its proceedings while in

       session.” A.S., 9 N.E.3d at 132.

[64]   The trial court here found Father in contempt for two reasons—his failure to

       appear at the May 10, 2023 review hearing and his failure to submit a hair

       follicle drug test despite multiple court orders to do so. DCS argues that the

       failure to attend a hearing amounts to direct contempt. We have held, however

       that “a litigant’s failure to appear at a hearing (as opposed to an attorney’s

       failure to appear) constitutes indirect contempt that requires compliance with

       the procedural protections now found in Section 35-47-3-5, not direct

       contempt.” In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d 447, 452 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2007) (emphasis added); see also Rice v. State, 874 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2007) (holding that, although an attorney can be found in direct contempt

       for failure to appear for a scheduled court hearing, a layperson litigant cannot

       be held in direct contempt for failure to appear); cf. Bellamy v. State, 952 N.E.2d

       263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that, although the defendant was a layperson,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 35 of 42
       the trial court’s finding that the defendant was in direct contempt for failure to

       appear was not an abuse of discretion where the defendant had been expressly

       warned that any subsequent failure to timely appear would result in a contempt

       finding), trans. denied. Accordingly, Father’s failure to appear at the review

       hearing does not constitute direct contempt, and we must determine whether

       the proper indirect contempt procedures were followed to find Father in

       contempt for his failure to appear at the review hearing and failure to obtain the

       hair follicle test.

[65]   Indiana Code Chapter 34-47-3 governs indirect contempt and provides several

       bases for a contempt finding. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-47-3-2 (“A person who

       willfully resists, hinders, or delays the execution of any lawful process, or order

       of any court of record is guilty of an indirect contempt of court.”). Father does

       not dispute that he willfully resisted a court order. Rather, Father first argues

       that he did not receive “prior notification or opportunity to be heard” as

       required by Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5. Father’s Appellant’s Br. p. 28.

[66]   Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5 provides the procedures to follow in cases of

       indirect contempt as follows:

               (a) In all cases of indirect contempts, the person charged with
               indirect contempt is entitled:

                        (1) before answering the charge; or

                        (2) being punished for the contempt;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024       Page 36 of 42
                 to be served with a rule of the court against which the
                 contempt was alleged to have been committed.

        (b) The rule to show cause must:

                 (1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged
                 to constitute the contempt;

                 (2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable
                 certainty, as to inform the defendant of the nature and
                 circumstances of the charge against the defendant; and

                 (3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is
                 required to show cause, in the court, why the defendant
                 should not be attached and punished for such contempt.

        (c) The court shall, on proper showing, extend the time provided
        under subsection (b)(3) to give the defendant a reasonable and
        just opportunity to be purged of the contempt.

        (d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until
        the facts alleged to constitute the contempt have been:

                 (1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an
                 information; and

                 (2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers
                 of the court or other responsible person.

Further, Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-6(c) provides that, if the defendant

appears at the rule to show cause hearing, and:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024            Page 37 of 42
               If the defendant’s answer to the rule does not sufficiently deny,
               explain, or avoid the facts set forth in the rule, so as to show that
               no contempt has been committed, the court may proceed to
               attach and punish the defendant for the contempt, by:

               (1) fine;

               (2) imprisonment; or

               (3) both fine and imprisonment.

[67]   The statute, thus, requires the service of a rule to show cause on the defendant.

       The rule to show cause must specify the allegations against the defendant and

       set the matter for a hearing where the defendant must demonstrate why he

       should not be “attached and punished for such contempt.” Ind. Code § 34-47-

       3-5(b)(3). If the trial court finds the defendant in contempt, the trial court may

       then “attach and punish the defendant for the contempt.” I.C. § 34-47-3-6(c).

[68]   The trial court here did not follow the procedures set forth in Indiana Code

       Chapter 34-47-3. The trial court stated at the May 10th hearing that it was

       setting the contempt matter for hearing. The May 11th order, however, stated:

       “The Court hereby holds [Parents] in contempt for violating Court Orders

       dated February 2nd and 27, 2023, instructing them to take hair follicle drug

       tests and for failing to appear for the hearing scheduled for May 10, 2023 . . . .”

       Appellants’ Amended Consol. Suppl. App. Vol. II p. 14 (emphasis added). The

       order then provided that the May 31st hearing was to impose sanctions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024         Page 38 of 42
[69]   At the rescheduled June 7th hearing, the trial court stated that the hearing was a

       “rule to show cause” hearing. Tr. Vol. VI p. 105 (emphasis added). Parents

       were then allowed to testify regarding their failure to appear at the May 10th

       hearing and their failure to comply with multiple orders to obtain the hair

       follicle drug testing. Also during the hearing, the trial court stated: “So, court

       having already found them in contempt they are found in contempt for their

       failure to appear at the review hearing on May tenth (10th).” Id. at 117

       (emphasis added). The trial court’s order then stated: “In the May 11th Order,

       this Court found the parties in contempt for failing to appear at the May 10th

       hearing and for violating the Court Orders instructing them to take hair follicle

       drug screens.” Appellants’ Amended Consol. Suppl. App. Vol. II p. 18

       (emphasis added).

[70]   Although under Indiana Code Chapter 34-47-3 the trial court should have

       issued a rule to show cause and set the matter for hearing to determine whether

       Parents were in contempt, the trial court appears to have found Parents in

       contempt and then held a rule to show cause hearing to impose sanctions.

       “Generally, a court’s authority to find a person in contempt rests on whether a

       trial court has strictly complied with the statutory requirements set forth in the

       rule to show cause statute.” 11 Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 833. Because the trial

       11
          Our Supreme Court has noted that strict compliance with the statute may be excused if “it is clear the
       alleged contemnor nevertheless had clear notice of the accusations against him or her.” Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d
       at 833. “Examples of this ‘clear notice’ exception include when a contemnor receives a copy of an original
       contempt information that contains detailed factual allegations of contempt or if the contemnor admits the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                            Page 39 of 42
       court did not issue a rule to show cause prior to finding Parents in contempt, we

       conclude that the trial court erred by failing to follow the statutory procedures.

[71]   Father also argues that the trial court erred by relying upon information

       obtained from the testing facility by its court reporter. During the rule to show

       cause hearing, the trial court stated: “[P]rior to this hearing starting I had my

       court reporter call Right Choice D.A.T. to see if either party had taken a test or

       appeared and the response was no [Parents] had not appeared to take a test.”

       Tr. Vol. VI p. 117. In its order from the June 7th hearing, the trial court found:

       “Just minutes prior to the hearing on June 7, 2023, the Court Reporter

       contacted Right Choice DAT to see if the parties had appeared for a drug test

       and they had not.” Appellants’ Amended Consol. Suppl. App. Vol. II p. 118.

       Father contends that, because the court reporter did not testify, the court

       reporter was not subject to cross-examination. Father, however, did not object

       at the hearing to the trial court relying upon the information obtained by the

       court reporter.

[72]   The failure to object to the trial court “normally results in waiver and precludes

       appellate review.” Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 834. Waiver notwithstanding, we agree

       that the trial court abused its discretion by using this procedure. “At all times

       the trial court must maintain an impartial manner and refrain from acting as an

       factual basis for a contempt finding.” Id. (quoting J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d at 451). Because the trial court here did
       not issue a rule to show cause before finding Parents in contempt, we conclude that strict compliance with
       the statute is not excused.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024                               Page 40 of 42
       advocate for either party. A violation of due process occurs where a trial judge

       combines the roles of judge and advocate.” Chappey v. Storey, 204 N.E.3d 932,

       939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotes omitted), trans. denied. The evidence

       from the court reporter was obtained at the trial court’s request, and the court

       reporter did not testify under oath and was not subject to cross-examination.

       Because Parents were not given the opportunity to cross-examine this evidence,

       which the trial court sua sponte considered, we conclude that the trial court

       erred by considering this evidence.

[73]   Finally, Father argues that Parents were not given the opportunity to purge the

       contempt. “[T]he ‘purge’ portion of [Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5 ] has

       typically only applied to cases where the trial court has ordered jail time to

       coerce action by the contemnor.” Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 835. A jail sentence

       for civil contempt must be coercive or remedial rather than punitive in nature.

       In re Paternity of C.N.S., 901 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “To avoid

       being purely punitive, a contempt order must offer an opportunity for the

       recalcitrant party to purge himself or herself of the contempt.” Id. The trial

       court’s order here, however, did include provisions for Father to purge himself

       of the contempt. The order provided that the contempt could be purged if

       Parents submitted to either a nail bed or body hair twelve-panel drug test and

       participate in other services. See Appellants’ Amended Consol. Suppl. App.

       Vol. II p. 20.

[74]   Although Father was given the opportunity to purge himself of contempt, the

       procedure used by the trial court did not comply with the statutory

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 41 of 42
       requirements. Further, the trial court abused its discretion by considering

       evidence obtained by the court reporter. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial

       court erred by finding Father in contempt.

       Conclusion
[75]   We conclude that the Second Petition was not barred by res judicata; Mother’s

       due process rights were not violated; Parents have failed to establish an abuse of

       discretion in the admission of evidence at the fact-finding hearing; and the trial

       court’s grant of the Second Petition was not clearly erroneous. The trial court,

       however, abused its discretion by finding Father in contempt because the trial

       court failed to follow the statutory procedures and considered improper

       evidence. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

[76]   Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

       Pyle, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024      Page 42 of 42