Court Opinion

ID: 9904783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 21:02:57.777293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:25.742152
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 Levy v. Levy CA2/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of
rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION ONE

ESTHER LEVY,                                                    B321095

        Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. LC107051)
        v.

AVRAHAM LEVY,

        Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.
                                      _______________

        Esther Levy, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
        No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
                                      _______________
       Plaintiff and appellant Esther Levy appeals from the
judgment following a court trial on her claims against defendant
and respondent, her brother Avraham Levy.1 The court below
concluded that all of appellant’s claims—for fraud, intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract—were
time-barred. Appellant’s claims are based in part on a purported
oral promise by respondent that, at some time in the future, he
would transfer certain real property to her as compensation for
services she would provide, including working at respondent’s
business for little or no wages and assisting his family with
childcare. Appellant did not identify any specific length of time she
was to perform these services under the purported agreement.
       Appellant contends that her claims did not accrue until
respondent sold the property to a third party in August 2017,
and thus that her March 28, 2018 complaint is not time-barred.
We agree with the trial court that her claims accrued no later
than November 19, 2013, and that her claims are thus barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations, the longest of which is four
years.2
       A “cause of action [for fraud] is not deemed to have accrued
until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting
the fraud” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d)), meaning “ ‘when the
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered all facts essential to
his cause of action.’ ” (April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 805, 826; accord, Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox) [cause of action accrues when “the

      1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant
to California Standards of Judicial Administration, standard 8.1.
      2 Because we affirm on this basis, we need not and do not
opine on the merits of any of her claims.

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plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action”].)
At what point this occurs is a factual issue we review for
substantial evidence. (April Enterprises, supra, at p. 833.)
Appellant testified that, in November 2013, she gave respondent
$6,000 at his request to assist him in paying the mortgage on
the property, but insisted that in return he execute a written
agreement memorializing their mutual understanding that the
property would ultimately be hers, and that they agreed to meet
with a lawyer the next day to put the property in her name.3
The court found appellant forged her brother’s signature on
what she presented to the court as this written agreement, and
appellant does not challenge this finding on appeal. Appellant
further testified that, no later than November 19, 2013, she knew
respondent was not going to honor the written agreement and
“told her that she would have to pay him another $100,000 for him
to agree to put the house in her name.” This testimony constitutes
substantial evidence that, at the latest by November 19, 2013,
appellant had information “sufficient to make a reasonably prudent
person suspicious of fraud” in connection with any agreement to
give her the property for services rendered (Bedolla v. Logan &
Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 130), and that a cause of action
based on such fraud accrued at that time.
       “A cause of action for [IIED] accrues, and the statute of
limitations begins to run, once the plaintiff suffers severe emotional
distress as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the
defendant.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th

      3 Appellant also testified that she had given respondent
$2,000 for the mortgage earlier in November 2013, but that she
did not insist on the written agreement and immediate transfer
of the property in connection with that $2,000 payment.

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857, 889.) Appellant’s IIED claim stems from the distress she
experienced as a result of respondent not making good on his
promise to give her the property, and thus accrued at the time she
knew or should have known he would not do so. (See Fox, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 807 [“[a] plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of
action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis
for its elements’ ”].) Appellant’s testimony identified above provides
substantial evidence that she should have known no later than
November 2013—when respondent began asking for money as a
prerequisite for his giving her the property—that he did not intend
to honor any oral promise or written agreement to give her the
property in exchange for services rendered and/or money she had
already paid him.
       As for appellant’s breach of contract claim, the parties
modified any oral agreement on which appellant might base such
a claim when, as appellant testified occurred, she and respondent
agreed that respondent would transfer the property into appellant’s
name in November 2013 once she gave him $6,000 to assist with
paying the mortgage. Appellant performed under the modified
agreement by paying that sum in early November 2013, triggering
respondent’s duty to transfer the property to her. He thus breached
any agreement that may have existed when he failed to transfer the
property in November 2013, and appellant was aware of this breach
no later than November 19, 2013, when respondent informed her
he would not transfer the property unless she gave him $100,000.
Thus, appellant’s breach of contract claim, like her other claims,
accrued no later than November 19, 2013.
       The court did not err in concluding that the applicable
statutes of limitations barred appellant’s claims, all of which
accrued no later than November 2013. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 338, subd. (d) [three-year statute of limitations for fraud]; id.,

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§ 335.1 [two-year statute of limitations for IIED claim]; id., § 339
[two-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a contract,
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing”];
see also id., § 337, subd. (a) [four-year statute of limitations for
breach of a written contract].)

                          DISPOSITION
      For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment. The parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  BENDIX, J.

                  WEINGART, J.

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