Court Opinion

ID: 9766583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:53:53.079147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:23.853057
License: Public Domain

Wolcott, Chief Justice
(dissenting) : I concur in the rule of law announced by the majority to the effect that any business transaction between attorney and client is presumptively invalid in law, and that the presumption of invalidity may only be overcome by the attorney by showing by the clearest and most convincing evidence that he made full and complete disclosure of all the facts and that there was absolute independence of action on the part of the client.
I disagree, however, with the action of the majority in sending this cause back for trial. I cannot agree by reason of 10 Del.C. § 4302, *252which prohibits a party in any action by or against an administrator from testifying as to any transaction with the intestate.
This statute, I believe, would prohibit either of the appellants from testifying as to what took place between Julia Nelling Clay, the client, and the Melsons. Since the issues of fact which the majority now want resolved after full trial could only be determined upon the testimony of the Melsons and Mrs. Clay, and since Mrs. Clay is now dead and represented in this cause by her administrator, it seems to me nothing more can be produced upon these issues than is now before us.
Consequently, a remand for trial, in my opinion, is only a useless and time-consuming gesture. We should decide the cause upon the record before us.