Court Opinion

ID: 9352385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 23:01:36.507059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:03.751681
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/23 P. v. Bridges CA2/3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                       B308894

            Plaintiff and Respondent,                                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                                   Super. Ct. No. BA240172)
            v.

 THOMAS BRIDGES,

            Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Remanded for
resentencing.
      Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                   ________________________
       In 2004, a jury convicted Thomas Bridges of first degree
special circumstance murder and robbery, with gang and firearm
enhancements. In 2020, Bridges petitioned for vacation of his
murder conviction and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6.2 After appointing counsel for Bridges and
considering briefing from the parties, the trial court denied the
petition. We affirmed that order denying the petition. (People v.
Bridges (Oct. 18, 2021, B308894 [nonpub. opn.].) Bridges
appealed. Our California Supreme Court granted review and has
now transferred the matter back to us with the direction to
vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). Doing so, we conclude
that remand is required.
                        BACKGROUND3
I.    The offenses, Bridges’s conviction, and original appeal
      In 1998, Tiasha Croslin was Bridges’s girlfriend, and they
were living together. Reginald Howard, Jesse Singleton, Amar
Mobley, Rollin Denem, Claudell Hatter, and Wardell Joe were all
members of the 69 East Coast Crips criminal street gang.

1
     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

3
      We derive the background in part from this Division’s
unpublished opinion in this case, which is in the record, and of
which we take judicial notice on our own motion. (Evid. Code,
§§ 451, 459.)

                                 2
Bridges was a member of a related gang, the West Covina
Neighborhood Crips.
       On the morning of November 3, 1998, Bridges, Denem,
Hatter, Joe, Singleton, Howard, Mobley, and Croslin met at
Hatter’s house in Los Angeles. Hatter said he needed money to
get a car out of impound, and the group discussed committing a
robbery. When the meeting ended, Bridges told Croslin to get
into a Buick Regal automobile with Hatter, and she did so.
Hatter drove the Buick to the Big Saver Foods Market near
Slauson and Compton Avenues in Los Angeles. Croslin
understood they were going to commit a robbery. Joe drove to the
market in an Oldsmobile Cutlass and waited outside the market.
Mobley drove to the market in a Trans-Am automobile and
parked nearby.
       When they arrived at the market, Croslin and Hatter went
inside and Hatter said, “ ‘This is where we’re going to hit.’ ”
Croslin and Hatter made a purchase and then left.
       Thereafter Bridges, Howard, Denem and Singleton entered
the market. Denem produced a gun, ordered everyone to get on
the floor, and fired a shot into the ceiling. Howard and one of the
other robbers struggled with the security guard, Juan
Hernandez; Howard shot and killed him. One of the robbers took
Hernandez’s gun.
       Cashier Marissa A. saw Hernandez struggling with the
robbers, and then heard a shot. She ran to the manager’s office,
but the manager had locked the door before she could enter.
Bridges then forced her, at gunpoint, to empty the contents of two
cash registers into a plastic bag.
       After the robbery, the entire crime team returned to
Hatter’s residence. Howard, who appeared jittery and nervous,

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paced and repeatedly said, in a scared manner, “ ‘I killed him, I
killed him.’ ” The robbers argued among themselves, and Bridges
and Hatter loudly urged Howard to calm down. Bridges
complained that they would have gotten more if Howard had not
been “ ‘so trigger happy.’ ” The robbers divided the loot obtained,
which included money and food stamps. An associate of the 69
East Coast Crips gang, Leonard Jackson, arrived at Hatter’s
home just as the robbers returned from the crime scene, and they
gave him some food stamps obtained in the robbery. When the
robbers saw television news reports of the robbery, Bridges and
Denem said the police sketches did not look like them, and
Denem laughed. Hatter told Singleton to get rid of the Trans
Am. After the loot was divided, the perpetrators left the house.
       Croslin did not learn Hernandez had been killed until she
saw the news on television that night. When Bridges returned
home that evening, she confronted him about it. He said,
“ ‘Howard was tussling with the security guard and shot him.’ ”
Bridges explained that Howard’s job in the robbery had been to
distract the security guard while Bridges and Denem or Singleton
got money from the safe in the store’s office. Bridges said that
Denem had worn a hat and a curly wig as a disguise. Hatter’s
role had been to drive along 58th and indicate to the others that
it was okay to rob the market.
       Two days after the robbery Croslin was arrested on a
federal bank robbery charge, and Jackson was arrested for
violating parole.
       The crime went unsolved for two years until Jackson, who
was at that point serving a 17-year federal drug term, contacted
the United States Attorney and offered to assist in hopes of
obtaining a reduction of his term. A detective interviewed

                                4
Jackson in March 2001, and he identified the participants in the
robbery. Several months later, Jackson and Bridges were
incarcerated together, and Bridges discussed the Big Saver Foods
crimes. Bridges said Hatter and Croslin entered the store first to
“ ‘check the move out[.]’ ” Bridges and Denem intended to force
the manager to open the safe at the back of the store, but the
manager locked himself inside a room. Bridges heard a shot,
then ran with Denem to the front of the market and saw that
Howard and Singleton already had fled. Bridges then took food
stamps from the cash register. Howard had been armed with
a .45-caliber handgun.
       Market employees identified Singleton, Bridges, and
Howard as the perpetrators. A man who lived nearby when the
crimes occurred had observed the three cars parked near the
market and saw four men go inside. He identified Croslin,
Hatter, and Joe as the persons he had seen in the Buick Regal
and the Oldsmobile Cutlass, respectively.
       In May 2001, a detective interviewed Croslin, who was in
federal custody in Connecticut. She admitted her role in the Big
Saver Foods case and identified the participants. She
subsequently pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and
robbery in exchange for a 12-year prison term and her truthful
testimony. Both Jackson and Croslin ultimately testified at trial.
       The jury convicted Bridges, along with Denem, Hatter, and
Joe, of special circumstance first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and two counts of robbery (§ 211). As to
the murder and one of the robbery counts, the jury found true a
gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), as well as the allegation
that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, proximately causing Hernandez’s death (§ 12022.53,

                                 5
subds. (c), (d), (e)(1)). The court sentenced Bridges to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life.
      In 2006, a different panel of this Division modified
Bridges’s sentence but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People
v. Bridges (Jan. 30, 2006, B176263) [nonpub. opn.].)
II.    Bridges’s 2017 habeas petition
       In 2017, after the California Supreme Court’s decisions in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) —cases that substantially
narrowed and clarified the class of defendants who are major
participants who act with reckless indifference to human life
during a felony—Bridges filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the trial court, apparently asserting the evidence was
insufficient to support the special circumstance finding because
he was not a major participant in the robbery who acted with
reckless indifference to human life, under Banks and Clark. The
trial court considered the factors articulated by Banks and Clark,
and the facts as set forth in this Division’s opinion in codefendant
Howard’s direct appeal (People v. Howard (June 1, 2007,
B186175) [nonpub. opn.]) and concluded that Bridges was a major
participant in the robberies who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. Accordingly, it denied the petition.
III.   The section 1172.6 petition
      In July 2020, after passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Bridges filed a petition for
vacation of his murder conviction and resentencing. Using a
preprinted form, he checked boxes stating that he had been
convicted of murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; he was not the

                                 6
actual killer; he did not, with the intent to kill, aid and abet the
actual killer, nor was he a major participant in the offense who
acted with reckless indifference to human life; the victim was not
a peace officer; and he could not now be convicted of murder in
light of changes to section 189 effectuated by Senate Bill 1437.
He also checked a box requesting that counsel be appointed for
him. In a five-page document appended to the petition, Bridges
averred that there was no evidence he had acted with malice
aforethought.
       In support, he attached this court’s opinion in People v.
Howard, which discussed evidence that Bridges told Jackson the
killing was “ ‘messed up’ ” and was not supposed to have
happened. He also attached the trial court’s 2017 order denying
his Banks/Clark habeas petition, and the trial court’s order
denying an earlier habeas petition that had asserted ineffective
assistance of counsel and instructional error. As relevant here,
that order observed that Bridges was tried on a felony murder
theory, not a natural and probable consequences theory.
       The trial court appointed counsel for Bridges.
       The People filed an opposition to the petition, primarily
arguing that the jury’s special circumstance finding rendered
Bridges ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. The People attached
this Division’s opinion in People v. Bridges, supra, B176263, and
the trial court’s 2017 order denying the 2017 Banks/Clark
habeas petition as exhibits.
       Bridges, through counsel, filed a responsive brief, arguing
that the evidence did not show he was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference. He claimed he was not actually
present at the scene, the planned robbery was not supposed to
involve violence but went awry, the eyewitness identifications of

                                 7
him were inconsistent, and a special circumstance finding
rendered before Banks and Clark does not preclude section
1172.6 relief.
       On October 8, 2020, after considering the petition, the
parties’ briefs, the “entire court file,” and the opinion in People v.
Bridges, supra, B176263, the trial court denied the section 1172.6
petition. It reasoned: “Among other crimes, petitioner was
convicted of first degree murder. The sole basis of the murder
conviction was felony murder as an aider and abettor. A felony-
murder special circumstance was found true. In instructing the
jury, the court instructed re former CALJIC [No.] 8.80.1. The
language in the instruction was pursuant to Penal Code section
190.2(c) and (d). Thus, by their finding, the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that petitioner was, at the least, a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. This has been found sufficient to
summarily deny a petition under Penal Code section [1172.6]; i.e.,
the petitioner cannot challenge the sufficiency of evidence under
Penal Code section [1172.6]. [Citations].” “The fact that the case
was tried prior to [Banks and Clark] does not entitle petitioner to
relief [citations].” The court cited then-recent authority so
holding and acknowledged the existence of contrary appellate
authority. It continued: “Although the court is of the opinion
that the [former line of authority is] better reasoned, it is noted
that on March 1, 2017, the court denied petitioner’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus under Banks/Clark grounds. . . . [¶] As a
matter of law petitioner is not entitled to relief.”
       Bridges appealed the order denying his petition, and this
Division affirmed the order, concluding that the jury’s true
finding on the special circumstance allegation precluded section

                                  8
1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (People v. Bridges, supra,
B308894.)
       Thereafter, our California Supreme Court issued Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, which further clarified the scope of section
1172.6. Specifically, Strong held that a special circumstance
finding predating Banks and Clark does not preclude eligibility
for resentencing under section 1172.6. As we now explain and as
the People concede, remand is now required.
                          DISCUSSION
       Senate Bill 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019,
limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder, to ensure that a person’s sentence is
commensurate with his or her individual criminal culpability.
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) As relevant
here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding
section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in
the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony murder
only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual
killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and
abettor; or (3) the person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile, at
p. 842.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6, which created a
procedure whereby persons convicted of murder under a now-
invalid felony-murder theory may petition for vacation of their
convictions and resentencing. A defendant is eligible for relief
under section 1172.6 if the defendant meets three conditions:
(1) the defendant must have been charged with murder under a

                                 9
theory of felony murder, (2) must have been convicted of first or
second degree murder, and (3) could no longer be convicted of
first or second degree murder due to changes to sections 188 and
189 effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a
petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief,
the trial court shall issue an order to show cause (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the
prosecution bears the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder” under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3)).
       As noted, Bridges’s jury found true the special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during a
robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) In denying the section 1172.6
petition, the trial court observed that Bridges’s jury had been
instructed with CALJIC No. 8.80.1, which provides in pertinent
part: “If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a
human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the
defendant was the actual killer or an aider or abettor, you cannot
find the special circumstance to be true as to that defendant
unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such
defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor
in the commission of the murder in the first degree, or with
reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted in the commission of the crime” which
resulted in the victim’s death.
       Bridges has challenged the trial court’s order denying his
petition on the ground it erred by finding him ineligible for

                                10
resentencing based on the jury’s special circumstance findings
that predated Banks and Clark, which, as we have said,
substantially clarified what it means for an aider and abettor
defendant like Bridges to be a major participant in a crime who
acted with a reckless indifference to human life for the purposes
of the special circumstance statute, section 190.2, subdivision (d).
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pages 719 to 720, held that a pre-
Banks and Clark finding that the defendant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life
during a felony does not preclude the defendant from making a
prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6, even if the trial
evidence was sufficient to support the findings under Banks and
Clark. Strong, at page 720, footnote five, further noted that
“section 1172.6 relief is not necessarily confined to those who
might have been able to obtain relief through sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claims raised on direct appeal or through functionally
similar claims raised on habeas corpus.” The People accordingly
concede that the denial of Bridges’s habeas corpus petition does
not preclude relief and that Strong requires remand.
       We agree that, under Strong, Bridges is entitled to
appointment of counsel and to an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

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                         DISPOSITION
      The order denying Thomas Bridges’s petition is reversed,
and the matter is remanded with the direction to the trial court
to appoint counsel for Bridges, to issue an order to show cause,
and to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Penal
Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                  EGERTON, J.

                  RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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