Court Opinion

ID: 8655819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 21:15:49.846011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:56:42.578748
License: Public Domain

ERICK, J,
(dissenting).
I regret my inability to agree with the conclusions reached by my associates. I cannot do so for the reason that, if the judgment in this case becomes the settled law in this jurisdiction, much unnecessary litigation as well as much injustice must inevitably result between the owners of adjoining buildings, one of which, as in this case, is made uninhabitable through its destruction by fire. My asso*102ciates base their conclusions entirely upon the one fact found by the court that the wall in question was not entirely destroyed by the fire, but that a portion sufficient for the purposes of respondent was left standing, although such portion is entirely useless as a wall for the proposed building which appellant intends to erect, or for a building similar to the one that was destroyed. It is conceded upon all sides that the wall in question stands entirely upon the land of appellant; that the respondent never had nor now has any interest in the soil on which the wall rests; and that, if it has any rights whatever, it is merely an easement in the remaining wall, and nothing more. It is also conceded that appellant’s building was accidentally destroyed by fire, and that the remaining walls are wholly insufficient to support another building, and are therefore practically useless to him. My associates also concede, stating the fact in their own language:
“The authorities practically all agree that, where a party has acquired an easement of support in a party wall, the accidental destruction of the wall terminates the easement, and extinguishes all rights arising thereunder.”
In view of this concession, so frankly stated, I need not refer to the authorities upon the subject. They, however, seek to exclude this case from the consequences stated above for the reason, they say, that the remaining wall is just as valuable and available as a support to its (respondent’s) building as it was before the destruction of appellant Eceles’ building. In this statement, therefore, is contained the theory upon which my associates approve the judgment of the court below. This theory in my judgment is wholly fallacious. By the enforcement of it the loss occasioned by the fire is placed wholly upon appellant, and the respondent is permitted to escape from the consequence^ thereof, although it is conceded that appellant’s building, as such, and his walls for every purpose that he could use them for walls, are destroyed. Moreover, it is in effect held that, while respondent had a right or easement in the building that was destroyed by fire, it nevertheless has sustained no loss. From *103sucb bolding it follows that if the wall in question bad suffered greater destruction, or if it bad been entirely destroyed, then respondent’s rights or easement thereunder would have been extinguished. From this I am authorized to assume that if respondent had been so unfortunate as to have its building destroyed-by the fire in question, or by another, it would have lost all right to join another building to any new building that appellant might choose to erect, but since it had the good fortune not to lose all therefore it has lost nothing, and appellant must not only stand the whole loss, but in case he chooses to improve and use his own property by erecting thereon a suitable building he must yield a portion thereof to the use of respondent without any consideration whatever. I say without consideration since it must be conceded that all respondent purchased was an easement in one of the walls of appellant’s building, and when that building was destroyed the easement, in my judgment, was also destroyed. If this be true, how can respondent claim a right in an entirely different wall from that in which it purchased the easement? It seems to me that the fact which in my judgment is controlling is entirely overlooked. This fact is that respondent acquired an easement in a wall only while it was and continued to be a part of a building, and that when the wall from any cause over which the appellant had no control was so affected that it no longer was fit to support the building of which it was a part, so that the building ceased to exist, then the wall must also be held to have ceased to exist for the purposes of the easement. When, therefore, the building was destroyed, the wall for all practical purposes was also destroyed, and hence the easement in the language of my associates was extinguished.
If respondent desires to obtain an easement for all time in any’.building that appellant might erect in place of the old one, if that should be destroyed, it should have entered into a contract to that effect. Would any one familiar with the record in this case seriously contend that the respondent could have obtained what my associates now hold it did ob*104tain for the amount it paid for tbe alleged easement in the old wall, namely, an easement in a new wall which may continue for an indefinite period, or for so long as the building may last, and, if the old walls happen to continue to stand, that the easement would continue for all time?
But it is contended that, if respondent is not permitted to attach its building to the new one, it means a practical confiscation of- its property fights in the remaining wall. This assumes that the respondent acquired a right in a wall which continued after it had been destroyed to such an extent that it could no longer be used as appellant’s building, or as a part of any new one he might erect upon the ruins of the old. Respondent is thus given a right in a thing that has ceased to exist for the purposes contemplated by the parties when the easement was acquired, and has ceased to exist for every purpose except a pile of brick or stone and mortar which by accident, merely, is left large enough to answer the purpose of respondent, although it answers no other purpose whatever. The mere fact that the wall has to be removed by the wrecker instead of having been consumed by the fire cannot change its character either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. Nor can any amount of words make that a wall which merely constitutes the debris of a ruined building. Neither was it contemplated by the parties that it should be so. The fact that the respondent now claims that the wall is sufficient for its purpose is the result of mere accident and is not based upon any contractual rights. For the purposes of the easement the wall was destroyed when it no longer could' be used as a part of appellant’s building or as a part of any building he might choose to erect. Had appellant willfully destroyed the building, or torn it down for the purpose of erecting another, with the intention of preventing the respondent from using the wall, the conclusion reached by my brethren might be justified. Under the undisputed facts in this case the conclusion reached, in my judgment, is not only unsound, but it takes from one and gives to another that which the court has no right to take or grant. In my judgment adjoining own*105ers should be permitted to make their own arrangements, if they can, with respect to the rights one may obtain in the property of the other.
The judgment should therefore be reversed and the action dismissed.