Court Opinion

ID: 9619905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:34:46.023471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:45.527373
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES T. HARRISON:
I dissent.
In this case the record discloses that on June 17, 1960, the blue Oldsmobile automobile which was the subject of the larceny charged in this case was the property of a corporation. On that morning it was located on the corporation’s parking lot. It disappeared. Law enforcement officers were notified and later in the day the automobile was located. The automobile had been driven about two miles off the main highway into the back country among rolling hills with some timber ridges, in rough terrain, and had been parked off the side road up a draw on the grass. Parked right beside the blue Oldsmobile was a yellow and brown but otherwise identical, Oldsmobile. The defendant was working on the blue Oldsmobile with his head underneath the hood when the officers arrived. Inspection at that time disclosed that on the left-hand side of the ear the spring and arm which raises the hood had been removed, together with about six bolts along the left-front fen*249der, and the shroud or splash pan back of the grill had been loosened by the removal of six or eight bolts across the front.
About fifteen feet up the coulee from the cars a young man was sitting under a shade tree watching defendant working on the blue Oldsmobile. This young man named Molmar stated he was the owner of the yellow and brown Oldsmobile. An examination of that car disclosed there was some damage to the front end of the grill and the hood was dented in. Both defendant and Molmar were arrested and taken to Helena and the blue Oldsmobile and the parts which had been removed were returned to its owner.
The majority upon this state of the record hold the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of the jury. The discussion in the majority opinion of the rule with regard to recent possession of stolen property in my opinion is incomplete and should be supplemented. It must be remembered that in both State v. Smith, 135 Mont. 18, 334 P.2d 1099, and State v. Babbitt, 117 Mont. 26, 156 P.2d 163, the defendants testified and explained their possession. Such is not the fact here where defendant offered no explanation.
Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven, and the burden is upon the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, R.C.M.1947, § 94-7203, and for that reason the burden of proof is at all times upon the State, yet there is a distinction between the burden of proof and the burden of evidence. In criminal cases the burden of proof never shifts, but the burden of the evidence may shift frequently. Under-hill, Criminal Evidence, § 50, p. 78 (5th ed.). Such is the situation here. The State presented sufficient evidence in my opinion, though not in the opinion of the majority, to make out a prima facie case and rested. Defendant being caught in the act of stripping the automobile when apprehended, in my opinion, is inconsistent with the idea that his possession was honest.
In State v. Evans, 60 Mont. 367, 373, 199 P. 440, this court stated:
*250“* * * It lias been many times held by this court that mere possession of property recently stolen is not sufficient of itself to justify conviction. When, however, this fact is supplemented by other facts inconsistent with the idea that the possession is honest, a case is made sufficient to submit to the jury. State v. Sparks, 40 Mont. 82, 105 Pac. 87, 135 Am.St. Rep. 608, 19 Ann.Cas. 1279; State v. Willette, 46 Mont. 326, 127 Pac. 1013.
“The United States Supreme Court has gone even further, wherein it is held: ‘Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission justifies inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight, unless explained by the circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence.’ Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 619, 16 Sup.Ct. 895, 898 (40 L.Ed. 1090). Although there was not any direct and positive evidence that the defendant stole the animal described in the information, the possession by the defendant of the meat of the animal and his exercise of ownership over it under the circumstances here indicated, furnish a basis for the inference that he killed the animal, and the evidence was sufficient to justify the court in submitting it to the jury. In connection with the authorities above referred to, we may here call attention to the provisions of section 7853, R.C. [1907, now R.C.M.1947, § 93-301-10.]’’
In an earlier case, State v. Sparks, 40 Mont. 82, 86, 105 P. 87, 88, this court stated:
“* * * It bas been held by this court, following the rule recognized by the courts generally, that mere possession of property recently stolen is not sufficient to convict the possessor of a larceny of it. Territory v. Doyle, 7 Mont. 245, 14 Pac. 671; State v. Sullivan, 9 Mont. 174, 22 Pac. 1088; State v. Wells, 33 mont. 291, 83 Pac. 476. When, however, this fact is supplemented by other facts inconsistent with the idea that the possession is honest, such as the giving of a false or im*251probable explanation of it, or a failure to explain, when a larceny of the property is charged, or the possession of a forged bill of sale, or the giving of a fictitious name, or the like, a case is made sufficient to submit to the jury. Territory v. Doyle, State v. Sullivan, State v. Wells, supra. The rule as to the materiality of such evidence is well-stated by the Supreme Court of Maine, in State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, as follows: ‘If a person accused remains silent when he may speak, he does so from choice, and the choice he makes upon such occasion has always been regarded competent evidence. It is the act of the party. From time immemorial the reply or the silence of the accused person, when charged, has been regarded as legitimate evidence on his trial for the consideration of the jury. Any act of his, when charged, tending to sustain the charge, may be proved. Fleeing from arrest, giving contradictory, untrue, or improbable accounts of the matters in issue, and refusals to account for the possession of stolen property, are evidences of guilt admitted upon the trial of the persons accused. These are proofs derived from the prisoner’s acts, sayings and silence.’ ”
While the majority comment on the failure of the State to call a certain witness, in my opinion there exists no requirement that it do so. See State v. Vandervoort, 57 Mont. 540, 189 P. 764; State v. Parr, 129 Mont. 175, 283 P.2d 1086, 55 A.L.R.2d 1313. This witness was available to the defendant and if the matters, about which the majority opinion contends the record is silent, would have assisted the defendant he was at liberty to clarify them.
In my opinion, it is immaterial whether defendant or Molmar stole the automobile and drove it to the place where it was found. That Molmar could likewise be guilty of larceny does not exculpate the defendant. These facts remain: The automobile was stolen, it was found deep in the hills off the road, in the possession of defendant who was engaged in dismantling it. The affidavit of the chief deputy county attorney states that Molmar gave a written statement regarding the *252facts in the case and by reason of all tbe evidence in tbe county attorney’s possession he does not believe Molmar was an accomplice of defendant.
In view of my opinion tbat tbe State proved a prima facie case it then became incumbent upon defendant to explain bis being found witb recently stolen property under tbe circumstances as heretofore related. Tbis be failed to do.
I would affirm tbe conviction.
Tbe HONORABLE CHARLES B. SANDE, District Judge, sitting in place of MR. JUSTICE CASTLES.
I concur in tbe above dissent.