Court Opinion

ID: 9863821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:54:45.667494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:21.056797
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Justice
(concurring in part . and disssenting in part) :
I concur in the opinion that the order of dismissal be affirmed on the ground that Mrs. Jordan has not established grounds for reversal.
I dissent from the portion of the opinion which declares that the trial court was without power to modify its previous order "terminating alimony payments.
It should be recalled that during the greater part of the 19th century, in both this country and in England, marriages were not dissolved by judicial fiat. The legislative bodies were the only authorities who exercised the power to grant an absolute decree of divorce. Jones’ Blackstone, Vol. 1, Husband and Wife, § 594, p. 620.
In 1875 our territorial legislature conferred upon the district courts the exclusive jurisdiction to grant a divorce from the bonds of matrimony. Rev.Laws of Idaho, 1874-1875, p. 639. In section 7 of this act the courts were given power to make allowances for the support of a former wife, as follows:
“In any action for a divorce, the court may, during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing or after-wards, make such order for the support of-the wife, and the maintenance and education of the children of the marriage as may be just, and may at any time thereafter annually vary or modify such order, as the interest and welfare of the children may require.”
In 1887 this statute was altered to its present form (Rev.Stat. of Idaho, § 2474) as follows:
“Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the husband, including a divorce granted upon the husband’s complaint, based upon separation with*440out cohabitation for five (5) years, the court may compel him to provide for the maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable allowance to the wife for her support as the court may deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively; and the court may, from time to time, modify its orders in these respects.” (Emphasis and parenthesis added.). I.C. § 32-706.
Assuming the power to award alimony in cases of absolute divorce rests solely with the legislature and that, a fortiori, the court may not provide for the maintenance of a former wife unless such power is conferred by statute, we must ascertain whether this statute, properly interpreted, entitled a district court to hear and determine the merits of appellant’s motion for modification. In Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App.D.C. 334, 45 L.R.A. 806 (1898), the court of appeals was confronted with the task of interpreting an act of congress which authorized the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to grant decrees of absolute divorce and award alimony to the wife. The statute governing alimony read as follows:
“Section 745 provides that ‘in all cases where a divorce is granted, the court allowing the same shall have power, if it see fit, to award alimony to the wife, and to retain her right of dower.’ ” 13 App.D.C. at 342.
In his search for legislative intent, Justice Morris discussed the jurisdiction of the old ecclesiastical courts and of the courts of •chancery, in the matter of awarding alimony, at and before the time of the passage, of the act of congress. He noted,
“The decree for a separation was final;. the adjudication that alimony to some-extent was payable may have been, final; but it was never contended or-maintained that the amount of alimony-then fixed was absolutely final and conclusive for all time and could not after-wards be modified; on the contrary, the authorities appear to be unanimous to the effect that the adjudication was a continuing one, and that the courts retained the whole subject under their control, increasing or diminishing the amount of alimony from time to> time, as might seem just under changed or changing circumstances; and this without reference to the fact that the original decree might have been entirely silent in regard to the reservation of right to the parties, or either of them, thereafter to apply to the court for a modification.” 13 App.D.C. at 346.
and posed the question of,
“whether in the allowance of alimony in cases of divorce from the bond of *441matrimony the character of the de•cree is of more rigid and absolute finality than that of the decree in cases of divorce from bed and board.” 13 App.D.C. at 347.
:and concluded,
“The statute contains no intimation of any difference. On the contrary the intimation is quite the reverse. The implication is that alimony in cases of divorce from the bond of matrimony is placed precisely on the same basis as alimony in cases of divorce from bed and board. Nor is there any good ground in reason for the application of a different rule in the different classes of cases.” 13 App.D.C. at 347.
I agree with the thinking of Justice Morris. It seems clear from the language of our statute that the legislature, in transferring to the courts the power to grant divorces from the bonds of matrimony, professed to annex those incidents of continuous jurisdiction which our district courts had previously exercised over allowances for separate maintenance. For other authorities supporting the theory that alimony, in its nature, is not final, see: 71 A.L.R. 700, Anno. III. b. 5, 738-740.
Unfortunately, this court in Mathers v. Mathers, 42 Idaho 821, 248 P. 468 (1926), and McDonald v. McDonald, 56 Idaho 444, 55 P.2d 827 (1936), in following the rationale of Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45, 37 P. 770 (1894), has given our statute a highly technical and restrictive interpretation. We note that in New York, where the restrictive construction has prevailed, the legislature has been forced to amplify the statute so as to indicate with overexacting precision its will to give the courts continuous jurisdiction over the economic welfare of a former wife. Clevenger’s Practice Manual, 1957, Civil Practice Act, Matrimonial Actions, § 1170.
Provisions of the compiled laws in this state are to be liberally construed “with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.” I.C. § 73-102. Further, in Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756 (1957), this court repudiated the theory that power to award alimony, in absolute divorce, rests solely on statute. In that case we held that I.C. § 32-706, supra, did not prohibit the district court from exercising its discretion in awarding alimony in a case where a divorce is granted to the husband for the fault of the wife.
The California court in McClure v. McClure, 4 Cal.2d 356, 49 P.2d 584, 587, 100 A.L.R. 1257 (1935), in my opinion, has extended the rule, widely accepted, that where the original decree makes no provision for alimony none may thereafter be allowed. The rationale of the rule was that where no alimony was allowed, there *442was no order to be modified, within the contemplation of the statute. The statute may be arguably open to such construction. However, a mote reasonable basis for the rule has been advanced. In such cases the courts have said that where alimony was an issue in the divorce action, the failure of the court in its decree to allow alimony is to be regarded as a determination by the court that the wife is entitled to none. Usually in such cases it is found that the wife has sufficient separate estate or income, or a sufficient estate is settled upon her by the decree, by division of community property, or otherwise, to provide for her support. Duvall v. Duvall, 215 Iowa 24, 244 N.W. 718 (1932), 83 A.L.R. 1242, Anno. 1248.
In the McClure case, the original decree provided for alimony. The holding that the trial court could by subsequent order permanently divest itself of authority to modify its previous orders in respect to alimony appears to overrule the statute and deny the authority granted by the legislature. Furthermore, in the McClure case there was a suggestion that the wife had remarried, which in that state was a statutory ground for cancellation of alimony.
In McDonald v. McDonald, 55 Idaho 102, 39 P.2d 293 (1934), and 56 Idaho 444, 55 P.2d 827 (1936), the parties had entered into a property settlement agreement prior to the entry of the divorce decree. Neither the property rights of the parties, nor the-right of the wife to alimony were litigated in the divorce action or concluded by the decree. Hence, the decree in that case was-to be regarded as a judgment to the effect that the wife was not entitled to alimony because she had acquired by contract a. sufficient estate for her support. In that case this court held (56 Idaho 457, 55 P.2d 827) that the district court was without jurisdiction to reopen the divorce decree after it had become final. However, the statute (§ 32-706, supra) was not referred to in that' opinion. The court cited Mathers v. Mathers, 42 Idaho 821, 248 P. 468 (1926), and Justice Budge in a concurring opinion also cited the Mathers case-but likewise did not refer to the statute-here considered.
In the Mathers case it was held that' where a divorce decree made no provision for alimony and the decree had become-final, the court had no jurisdiction thereafter to reopen the decree for the purpose-of modifying it by the allowance of alimony. In that case the court called attention to the fact that a share of the community property had been awarded to the-wife. Again the court did not refer to or construe the statute here considered. It did, however, cite the case of Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45, 37 P. 770, 43 Am.St. 70 (1894). In the cited case the California court construed California Civil Code, *443§ 139 (the same as our I.C. § 32-706, here involved), saying:
“But the latter section clearly contemplates that the right to alimony, as well as other financial and property rights, shall have been presented and litigated in the action for divorce, and established by the judgment; and the provision is that, where the right to alimony has been thus established, the amount may be changed by a modification of the order. But in the case at bar there was nothing to 'modify.’ ” Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45, 37 P. 770, at 771.
In this case Mrs. Jordan’s right to alimony was litigated and established by the original decree. The husband’s motion for modification was based upon the ground that at the time the decree was entered, allowing $175 per month alimony, the wife was ill and unable to support herself, and that at the time of the motion she was well and able to provide for herself; and the order modifying the decree by providing for the termination of alimony payments on April 6, 1959, was based upon that change in her condition. Here there was no remarriage and no provision by way of property division or settlement to support a permanent and final termination of the issue of alimony. Furthermore, the court in its order expressed a doubt regarding Mrs. Jordan’s ability to support herself, to wit:
“provided, however, upon adequate showing of the defendant of her inability to support herself, the Court shall, upon proper representation on or before the 6th day of April, 1959, reconsider the question of alimony.”
I do not think this order is properly construed as expressing an intent to permanently relieve the husband of the obligation to support his former wife.
“Doubtless all that the court intended was such a cessation of payments, and not an annulment of the order itself.” Ross v. Ross, 1 Cal.2d 368, 35 P.2d 316, 317 (1934).
In any event, the record reveals no ground upon which the court could permanently divest itself of jurisdiction over the issue of alimony, and, in the face of the statute, it should not be held to have done so. Anno. 71 A.L.R. 723, at 728-740; Anno. 100 A.L.R. 1262.
The rule here adopted will deprive the courts of this state of the power to grant relief in any case no matter how worthy or meritorious. The intent of the legislature was to leave the courts free to exercise a sound discretion, and to do equity in such case, to the end that a wife, even though without fault, need not become an object of charity.