Court Opinion

ID: 9773011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:59.380494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.690256
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring. The result reached by the majority is correct. However, I believe the majority opinion does not correctly address the central issue in the case. That issue is whether a lessee, by a provision in a lease contract, may confer upon the lessor the “right” to enter which, according to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1503 (Supp. 1985), exempts the landlord from liability for forcible entry. The majority opinion adequately describes the policies behind the forcible entry and unlawful detainer statutes. However, in applying those policies to invalidating the provisions of the lease which are contrary to them the only discussion is about whether one part of the statute may be “waived” and not the others. If that were the issue, I believe a strong argument could be made that, by contract, the parties might create a landlord’s “right” to enter but might not be able to create a right to commit the criminal acts stated disjunctively in § 34-1503. We should say simply that the General Assembly has stated a strong public policy against forcible entry by a landlord, and a contract by which the parties seek to avoid that policy is invalid. In Ladd v. Ladd, 265 Ark. 725, 580 S.W.2d 696 (1979) we held an agreement invalid for violation of public policy. See also Hultsman v. Carroll, 177 Ark. 432, 6 S.W.2d 551 (1928); Swann v. Swann, 21 F. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1884); Woodson v. Kilcrease, 7 Ark. App. 252, 648 S.W.2d 72 (1983). The Arkansas General Assembly has made our public policy clear in the area of landlord-tenant relations. We need not go beyond that policy to find the contract invalid and unenforceable. Hickman, J., joins.