Court Opinion

ID: 9449927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:27:58.996238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:03.274546
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge
(dissenting).
This dissent is predicated on my belief that the apparent simplicity of the physical embodiment of the claimed invention has been mistaken for obviousness, both in the Patent Office and in the majority opinion of this court.
It is true that each of the elements of appellant’s claimed invention, save one, is disclosed by the references. But the missing element, the successive dat*1012ing of the horizontally perforated memorandum panels, is an essential feature of appellant’s invention. In my opinion, the absence of any suggestion of this feature in the prior art should lead to the conclusion that appellant has claimed a patentable invention. The hinged cover, the hidden record portion, the vertical perforations separating the permanent portion from the disposable portion, and the horizontal perforations are, individually, old concepts. Appellant, however, has assembled them into a new combination by the addition of the new feature which is not shown in the prior art.
The majority opinion states, “the successive dating feature of appellant’s' book would be a matter of common sense and would be particularly obvious to makers of memorandum books.” [Emphasis added.] It seems to me the emphasized words point up the precise difficulty which is frequently encountered in dealing with relatively simple inventions: that is to dismiss the act of conception as merely “a matter of common sense” when viewed after the fact. As was said by Mr. Justice Story in Ryan v. Goodwin, 21 Fed.Cas.No.12,186, pp. 110, 111 (No. 12186) (C.C.D.Mass.1839):
“ * * * The combination is apparently very simple; but the simplicity of an invention, so far from being an objection to it, may constitute its great excellence and value. * * * ”
These words, written so long ago, have continuing validity today. E. g., In re Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 49 CCPA 1039.
I feel that, notwithstanding the fact that what appellant did seems simple when viewed after the event and perhaps may even be “a matter of common sense” now that he has done it, it cannot be fairly said that appellant’s claimed invention would have been obvious in view of what had been done prior to the time he made it. It appears to me that the treatment of this case by the Patent Office and by the majority is not unlike that decried by this court in In re Rothermel and Waddell, 276 F.2d 393, 396, 47 CCPA 866, 870-71, where we said:
“The examiner and the board in rejecting the appealed claims did so by what appears to us to be a piecemeal reconstruction of the prior art patents in the light of appellants’ disclosure. * * *
“It is easy now to attribute to this prior art the knowledge which was first made available by appellants and then to assume that it would have been obvious to one having the ordinary skill of the art to make these suggested reconstructions. While such a reconstruction of the art may be an alluring way to rationalize a rejection of claims, it is not the type of rejection which the statute authorizes. 35 U.S.C. § 103 is very specific in requiring that a rejection on the grounds the invention ‘would have been obvious’ must be based on a comparison between the prior art and the subject matter as a whole at the time the invention was made.”
I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the board.