Court Opinion

ID: 9408548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 00:00:54.523232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.210019
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30721         Document: 00516818798             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/12/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                               FILED
                                                                             July 12, 2023
                                        No. 22-30721                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                               Clerk

   Walter Daigle,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 2:21-CV-764
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Walter Daigle appeals the Commissioner’s decision to deny him
   disability benefits. We AFFIRM.
                                               I.
          In May 2019, Plaintiff-Appellant Walter Daigle filed an application for
   disability insurance benefits alleging disability since August 2018. His alleged
   ailments include major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30721     Document: 00516818798           Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/12/2023

                                    No. 22-30721

   disorder (“OCD”), fatty liver, irritable bowel syndrome, high blood
   pressure, and acid reflux. In December 2020, an administrative law judge
   (“ALJ”) denied Daigle’s application and found him not disabled within the
   meaning of the Social Security Act. Daigle then requested a review of the
   ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council, which denied his request;
   accordingly, the ALJ’s December 2020 decision became the Social Security
   Commissioner’s (the “Commissioner”) final administrative decision.
          Daigle then appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the district
   court. In July 2022, the magistrate judge assigned to the case recommended
   that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. In October 2022, the district
   court adopted this recommendation and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Daigle
   appeals, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding that Daigle’s condition does
   not meet the requirements of Listing 12.06 and that the ALJ’s decision is
   unsupported by substantial evidence.
                                         II.
          “Our standard of review of social security disability claims is
   exceedingly deferential and limited to two inquiries: whether substantial
   evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and whether the ALJ applied the
   proper legal standards when evaluating the evidence.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706
   F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When substantial
   evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, these findings “shall be conclusive”
   and must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[T]he threshold for such
   evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a
   mere scintilla.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting
   Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “It means—and
   means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
   adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at
   229). We cannot “reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de

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                                     No. 22-30721

   novo, nor substitute” our own judgment for that of the Commissioner’s.
   Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Bowen,
   864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988)). It is the role of the Commissioner, not the
   courts, to resolve any conflicts in evidence. Id.
                                          III.
                                          A.
          To determine whether a disability exists, the ALJ follows a five-step
   evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The claimant carries the
   burden of proof at the first four steps of the process. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d
   558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled at
   any step, the inquiry ends. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
          This appeal primarily concerns the third and fourth steps of this
   process. The third step asks whether the claimant’s impairment meets or
   medically equals a listed impairment; if so, the ALJ will find the claimant is
   disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the third step is inconclusive, the
   fourth step asks whether the impairment and resulting residual functional
   capacity prevent the claimant from performing his past relevant work. Id.
   § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If they do not, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not
   disabled. Id.
                                          B.
          Daigle first argues that the ALJ erroneously found at the third step
   that his condition does not meet the requirements under listing 12.06 of 20
   C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which addresses anxiety and
   obsessive-compulsive disorders. The ALJ found that Daigle did not meet the
   criteria for disability under Listing 12.06(B) because he did not exhibit the
   required “[e]xtreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two . . . areas
   of mental functioning,” including (1) understanding, remembering, or

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   applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating,
   persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. With
   respect to anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders, a “marked” degree
   of impairment reflects “seriously limited” function on a “sustained basis,”
   while an “extreme” degree of impairment constitutes “not able to function
   in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained
   basis.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)(d)–(e).
          The ALJ properly found that Daigle was only mildly to moderately
   impaired in these areas.1 Daigle reported he was able to shop in stores, handle
   his own money, leave the house alone, eat out, prepare meals, and perform
   household chores. Daigle’s ability to handle such tasks is inconsistent with
   his argument that he exhibited extreme limitations on his ability to
   concentrate, persist, and maintain pace. And such findings are also consistent
   with Daigle’s medical records, which show improvement in his symptoms,
   as well as normal attention, concentration, and memory function at an
   August 2019 examination. The ALJ’s finding at the third step is adequately
   supported by substantial evidence.
                                            C.
          Daigle next argues that the ALJ’s non-disabled determination at the
   fourth step is unsupported by substantial evidence. On appeal, Daigle brings
   numerous scattershot challenges to this finding. None compels reversal.
          First, he contests the ALJ’s conclusion that his completion of minimal
   daily activities is probative of his ability to work. The ALJ properly
   considered such daily activities. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 565 & n.12 (“It is
   appropriate for the Court to consider the claimant’s daily activities when
          _____________________
          1
            “Mild” reflects “slightly limited” functioning and “moderate” a fair level of
   functioning. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2).

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                                    No. 22-30721

   deciding the claimant’s disability status.”); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)
   (considering how the symptoms affect an applicant’s “activities of daily
   living” and “ability to work”). And the ALJ’s characterization of Daigle’s
   daily activities is supported by the record. Contrary to Daigle’s conclusory
   assertions of “extreme OCD behavior,” Daigle reported that he was able to
   care for himself, drive, shop, handle his own funds, and visit with others
   during the relevant period.
          Second, Daigle makes three separate arguments that rely on the
   treatment notes of Dr. Jonathan Rynning. He argues that the ALJ erroneously
   concluded that treatment with the drug Paxil improved Daigle’s condition
   while ignoring Dr. Rynning’s belief that Paxil was ineffective. He also argues
   that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Rynning’s opinions regarding Daigle’s
   functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence. And finally, he
   argues that, contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, Dr. Rynning’s opinions are
   entirely consistent with the treatment notes. All three challenges fail.
          The ALJ properly found Dr. Rynning’s notes to be inconsistent with
   the remainder of the record. “ALJs are no longer required to give controlling
   weight to a treating physician’s opinion, as was mandated by federal
   regulations and our caselaw in the past.” Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715,
   718–19 (5th Cir. 2021). “The most important factors in determining the
   persuasiveness of a medical source are whether the source’s medical opinion
   is based on ‘objective medical evidence and supporting explanations’ and the
   ‘consistency’ of the source’s opinion with the evidence from other medical
   and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Id. at 719. Here, the ALJ properly
   found that the extreme mental limitations Dr. Rynning identified were not
   consistent with the record. The record shows Daigle traveled numerous
   times and went out to eat. Daigle himself testified that he was able to drive
   and drove himself to medical appointments. Furthermore, the record is
   replete with medical evidence of improvements in Daigle’s condition.

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          Per the ALJ’s findings, the extreme limitations described by Dr.
   Rynning are unpersuasive as inconsistent with other record evidence. And as
   we have held, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
   for that of the Commissioner; we will find “no substantial evidence” only
   where there is a “conspicuous absence of credible choices” or “no contrary
   medical evidence.” See Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343–44 (quoting Hames v.
   Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). Neither is present here; the ALJ
   made a credible choice, finding Dr. Rynning’s opinion unpersuasive in light
   of multiple other pieces of medical evidence. Accordingly, Daigle’s
   challenges based on Dr. Rynning’s notes fail.
          Third, Daigle argues that the ALJ inadequately explained how
   Daigle’s statements regarding his symptoms are inconsistent with medical
   and other evidence. Daigle does not specify which statements he believes the
   ALJ incorrectly disregarded, but as discussed above, the ALJ repeatedly cited
   evidence to resolve any inconsistencies between the record and Daigle’s
   statements.
          Fourth, Daigle argues that the ALJ’s referenced treatment notes
   showing improvement by Daigle are contradicted by the record. But, as
   discussed above, the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion of improvement
   in multiple places.
          Fifth, Daigle argues that the ALJ placed undue emphasis on the fact
   that Daigle’s mental status exams showed appropriate decision making and
   thought processes. The ALJ properly used mental status examinations as part
   of his decision-making process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(1) (objective
   medical evidence includes medical signs); id. § 404.1502(f)–(g) (signs
   include observable facts that can be medically described); id. § 404.1529(a)
   (“We will consider . . . any description your medical sources or nonmedical

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                                    No. 22-30721

   sources may provide about how the symptoms affect your activities of daily
   living and your ability to work.”).
          Sixth, Daigle argues that, contrary to the ALJ’s findings, the residual
   functional capacity determined by the Commissioner is inconsistent with the
   medical record. Instead, he argues that the treatment notes characterize him
   as “significantly dysfunctional.” He does not cite to any portion of the record
   for such characterizations. To the extent he means to reference Dr.
   Rynning’s treatment notes, the ALJ properly found these unpersuasive as
   discussed above.
          Seventh, Daigle contests the ALJ’s conclusion that he can work now
   given that he worked with OCD for a period of time. But he does not cite any
   authority contravening established precedent that working for years despite
   impairments (as he did) can support a finding of non-disability. See Villa v.
   Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990) (working for years despite
   impairments supports a finding of non-disability where condition did not
   worsen at or near the time work ceased). And Daigle’s argument that he
   could not perform certain requirements from past jobs does not preclude the
   ALJ’s finding that he can perform his past job as it is generally performed in
   the national economy. See Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564 (claimant’s inability “to
   perform certain ‘requirements of his past job does not mean that he is unable
   to perform “past relevant work” . . .’; rather, the Commissioner may also
   consider the description of the claimant’s past work as . . . generally
   performed in the national economy” (quoting Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524,
   527 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam))).
          Eighth, Daigle challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that his OCD
   “rituals” did not take too much of his time. The ALJ’s conclusion here is
   supported by treatment notes indicating that Daigle himself denies that his
   OCD-checking rituals take too much of his time.

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                                          No. 22-30721

           Ninth, Daigle argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the statement of
   Daigle’s fiancée, Cristina DeMichiel. The ALJ considered DeMichiel’s
   statement but noted that, as a lay witness, she was “not competent to make
   a diagnosis or argue the severity of [Daigle’s] symptoms.” DeMichiel’s other
   statements concerning the extent to which Daigle was limited are consistent
   with the record and the ALJ’s findings of mild to moderate limitations.2
                                               IV.
           For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           2
             Daigle also challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that his limitations have not reduced
   his available occupational base. Specifically, he disputes the ALJ’s conclusion that his
   “limitations had little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all
   exertional levels.” But the ALJ made this conclusion as part of “alternative findings for step
   five” of the disability evaluation process (emphasis added). Challenges to this alternative
   step five finding are moot because the ALJ (properly) determined at step four that Daigle
   was not disabled; accordingly, the evaluation process terminated at that step. See 20 C.F.R.
   § 404.1520(a)(4). We thus need not and do not reach Daigle’s challenge to the ALJ’s
   alternative step five findings.

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