Court Opinion

ID: 9760371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:50:20.622593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:11.206814
License: Public Domain

WATKINS, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Each judgment note specified that judgment could be confessed for an amount “appearing due as of any time past, present, or future”. Since all of the judgment notes arose out of one transaction, I find that this wording clearly supports the conclusion reached by the court below. As stated by the court below:
“The confession of judgment clauses in question also authorize the Prothonotary ‘to admit the maturity (of the notes) hereof by acceleration or otherwise.’ An instrument payable in installments containing a warrant to confess judgment can, absent a specific provision for default, be entered at any time. Whitney v. Hopkins, 135 Pa. 246, 19 A. 1075 (1890). However, in the instant case it is clear that the parties intended that the maker of the note must fail to pay an installment or commit a default before the acceleration provision would take effect. A clause providing for acceleration of the entire indebtedness in the event of failure to pay an installments) as they become due is legal and will authorize the confession of judgment for the entire amount. Grant Construction Co. v. Stokes, 109 Pa.Super. 421, 167 A. 643 (1933). Furthermore, under these circumstances and in this context, default in any installment of the judgment notes in their respective order would accelerate the entire amount due under all the notes. This becomes even more evident in light of the confession clause which provides that the Prothonotary shall admit the maturity by acceleration ‘for the amount appearing due as of any term, past, present or future.’ The notes when viewed in light of all the circumstances would appear almost identical except for dates, and are clearly a part and parcel of the same transaction.” (Emphasis—the opinion writer below).
*471It is also clear from appellant’s attorney’s letter of December 2, 1977 that the appellant had no intention of making any future payments on the notes. It would serve no purpose to require appellee to wait three (3) years before confessing judgment on all three notes when any defense appellant has to the matter could be raised in one proceeding now via a petition to open the judgments. Thus, I feel that this is a clear case of anticipatory breach and I would permit this theory to be applied to situations involving promissory notes. See Corbin on Contracts, Section 963 (1951).
I would affirm the order of the lower court.
On Reconsideration
PRICE, Judge:
On December 1,1980, this panel, with Watkins, J., dissenting, filed its opinion striking the judgment entered December 8,1977 and reducing the judgment of December 27,1977 by the amount of $262,599.00. This case was then remanded for disposition of appellant’s petition to open.
Appellee filed a petition for reargument and, on April 23, 1981, a majority of the judges than in service ordered this panel to reconsider the disposition of the second judgment. This action was taken, we assume, on the mistaken assumption that there may have been a delinquency in the payment of interest, which delinquency might require a different result.
The record clearly reflects that appellee never claimed such a delinquency in interest1 and the judgment entered was for the principal sum, less installments paid, of $306,-365.50. Accordingly, we hold that appellee’s claim of a default in payment of the interest on all four notes, advanced for the first time in its petition for reargument, was never a proper issue for consideration, either by the trial court or this court.
*472Accordingly, we reaffirm our opinion and order of December 1, 1980.

. See Confession of Judgment attached to appellee’s Complaint.