Court Opinion

ID: 9919056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 15:02:45.599475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:59.620670
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

               GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

                       Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                   v.

SUPERIOR AUTO GLASS OF TAMPA BAY, INC. as Assignee of MATTHEW
                          DICK,

                       Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                            No. 2D21-2833

                           January 17, 2024

Appeal from the County Court for Hillsborough County; Joelle Ann Ober,
Judge.
Lindsey R. Trowell, Ariane J. Smith, and Chloe A. Orta of Smith,
Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., and Amy S. Farrior of Buell & Elliget, P.A.,
Tampa; David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte & Gilbert, P.A., Tampa;
Anthony T. Prieto of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Tampa; and Christopher P.
Calkin and Mike N. Koulianos of The Law Offices of Christopher P.
Calkin, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

ATKINSON, Judge.
     GEICO General Insurance Company appeals the final judgment—
entered notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of GEICO—awarding
Superior Auto Glass of Tampa Bay, Inc., $438.72 as damages for GEICO
breaching the insurance contract between GEICO and its customer,
Matthew Dick, who assigned his benefits to Superior. The trial court
concluded that GEICO presented no evidence from which a jury could
find GEICO proved its defenses of waiver and that it paid the prevailing
competitive price for the windshield replacement, which undisputedly
was a covered loss under the policy. Superior cross-appeals requesting
that we reinstate either of the two county court final summary judgments
reversed by the circuit court in prior appeals1 or that we remand for a
new trial.
      On the main appeal, we reject GEICO's arguments regarding its
waiver defense and its Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act claim without
further comment. But because it cannot be said that no view of the
evidence, or inferences made therefrom, could support a verdict for
GEICO on its defense that it paid Superior the prevailing competitive
price for the windshield replacement, we conclude that the trial court
erred by granting Superior's motion for judgment in accordance with its
previous motion for directed verdict. On the cross-appeal, we reject
Superior's request to reinstate either of the prior final summary
judgments, as that would amount to a second appeal. We do not reach
the merits of Superior's request for a new trial because the trial court
reasoned that the motion was moot and therefore never ruled on the
merits of the motion. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's final
judgment in favor of Superior and remand for the trial court to enter

      1 Prior to January 1, 2021, circuit courts had jurisdiction over

appeals from county court orders and judgments. See Davis v. Clark,
326 So. 3d 781, 782 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ("[T]he legislature amended
section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (2020), to eliminate circuit court
jurisdiction over appeals of county court orders and judgments, effective
January 1, 2021." (citing ch. 20-61 § 3, Laws of Fla.)).
                                     2
judgment in favor of GEICO in accordance with the jury's verdict and to
rule on the merits of Superior's motion for new trial.
                               Background
      On February 17, 2015, Superior replaced the windshield on Mr.
Dick's 2010 Ford Escape. Superior sent GEICO, Mr. Dick's insurer, an
$818.60 invoice for the windshield replacement pursuant to an
assignment of insurance benefits that Mr. Dick signed. Included in this
amount was the cost of the windshield glass at $442.05, labor of 2.6
hours at $85.00 per hour, and two fast-cure urethane kits at $51.00
each, in addition to tax of $53.55.
      Linda Rollinson, the owner of Superior, explained at trial that she
charges customers based on the recommendations issued by the
National Auto Glass Specifications (NAGS), which is updated several
times throughout the year. She testified that NAGS is the industry
standard, relied upon by repair facilities as well as insurance companies.
Rollinson, who serves on several national windshield-related boards and
committees, provided the following testimony:
      NAGS will provide every windshield that will fit that specific
      year, make, and model. It will provide what is needed for a
      windshield replacement. It will provide the standard labor
      hours to replace that windshield. And it will tell you whether
      you need one or two, or one and a half, two and a half kits of
      urethane.
NAGS does not suggest an hourly labor rate, just the number of hours to
complete the replacement. Rollinson sets Superior's prices at 100% of
the NAGS suggested rates.
      GEICO also utilizes NAGS in setting pricing parameters for the
approximately 100,000 to 150,000 windshield claims it processes each
year in Florida. GEICO's corporate representative, Susan Eberling,
testified that

                                      3
      for windshield replacement[,] it is 50 percent off the NAGS list
      price[,] it is $40 per hour for labor and the number of labor
      hours is assigned by NAGS[,] and the kits are generally $15
      per kit for your standard kit and those are the usual
      components that are necessarily for windshield replacement.
GEICO paid Superior $379.88 in accordance with those parameters.
      Both Superior and GEICO contend that their price constituted the
"prevailing competitive price," which, under the insurance policy with Mr.
Dick, is the limit of liability for the loss:
      The limit of our liability for loss:
         1.   Is the actual cash value of the property at the time of
              the loss;
         2.   Will not exceed the prevailing competitive price to
              repair or replace the property at the time of loss, or
              any of its parts, including parts from non-original
              equipment manufacturers, with other of like kind and
              quality and will not include compensation for any
              diminution of value that is claimed to result from the
              loss. Although you have the right to choose any
              repair facility or location, the limit of liability for repair
              or replacement of such property is the prevailing
              competitive price which is the price we can secure
              from a competent and conveniently located repair
              facility. At your request, we will identify a repair
              facility that will perform the repairs or replacement at
              the prevailing competitive price.
(Emphasis in original.). GEICO admitted that a covered loss occurred.
The sole dispute at trial was the amount GEICO was required to pay
Superior for the windshield replacement under the terms of the policy.
      Among other things, GEICO asserted as affirmative defenses (1)
that it "paid in full the prevailing competitive price for the repair at issue
and [Superior's] invoice exceeds the prevailing competitive price" and (2)
that Superior "intentionally relinquished any right to an amount in
excess of the amount paid." The county court twice granted final

                                         4
summary judgment in favor of Superior, concluding that Superior's price
did not exceed the prevailing competitive price. The circuit court, sitting
in its appellate capacity, reversed each of the judgments.
      In the first reversal, the circuit court concluded that the "prevailing
competitive price" was a question of fact and held that the test for that
determination "is what the service would cost in a competitive market in
a normal, arms' length non-insurance transaction." Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.
v. Superior Auto Glass of Tampa Bay, Inc. (Dick I), 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
876a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2018). In the second reversal, the
circuit court concluded that Superior's evidence did not meet its
summary judgment burden to establish the prevailing competitive price
under the test set forth in Dick I and, therefore, that genuine issues of
material fact remained. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Superior Auto Glass of
Tampa Bay, Inc. (Dick II), 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 785a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct.
Oct. 2, 2020). In response to what Superior labeled a "protective cross
appeal" that asked the circuit court "to determine which party bears the
burden of proof," the circuit court in Dick II also concluded, "Where
GEICO effectively admitted coverage while relying on its policy language
as a defense to further liability, . . . GEICO, not Superior, will have the
burden to show that GEICO's payment is consistent with the policy's
prevailing competitive price." Id.
      In its opening statement at trial, GEICO acknowledged Dick II's
holding as to the burden of proof. GEICO called Ms. Eberling, who
testified that GEICO was "very much aware of the claims we're receiving
and the amounts that we're paying, so we're aware that we can secure a
price that does not exceed 50 percent of the NAGS price." Ms. Eberling
said that GEICO has its finger on the pulse of the market given the high
volume of windshield claims that it processes each year. She explained

                                      5
that GEICO transacts business with "hundreds of shops" in a given year
for windshield claims, some of which are network, affiliate shops and
others are nonnetwork, nonaffiliate shops. Network, affiliate shops are
members of an insurance network that GEICO selects for windshield
claims and who bill GEICO at or below its pricing parameters.
Nonnetwork, nonaffiliate shops, on the other hand, are selected by
GEICO's policyholders, are not members of any insurance network, and
have no contractual relationship with GEICO.2 When asked whether
there are more nonaffiliate shops that bill GEICO at its pricing
parameters than do not, Ms. Eberling responded, "Yes."
     With respect to the competency of the nonaffiliate repair shops
selected by the insureds, Ms. Eberling explained that
     generally after their claim, there are surveys that we do. . . .
     [W]e do surveys with our customers to determine if there's
     any issues and so forth so they can report issues with any
     shop and certainly the policy holders generally do not hesitate
     to contact us to let us know if they're unhappy with a given
     shop.
She was asked whether "GEICO [would] hear from their insured if they
were unhappy with the service they received," and she answered
affirmatively. When asked whether "there [is] any other way that GEICO
can identify whether there is a shop that doesn't perform competent
work, an independent shop, in their claims information," she replied, "We
might see an instance if there was perhaps multiple replacements on the
same claim." She was asked, "And based on your testimony about the
information GEICO would have about these shops of choice, do you have
any reason to believe that the independent shops that transacted

     2 Throughout the record, the parties interchangeably refer to these

shops as "nonnetwork" shops, "nonaffiliate" shops, or "independent"
shops, all three of which appear throughout this opinion.
                                     6
business with GEICO in or around this claim were not competent?" She
replied, "No."
      During cross-examination, Ms. Eberling reiterated GEICO's
payment parameters: "50 percent off the NAGS list price for the
windshield, $40 per hour for labor, and the kits are $15 per kit, and
there's a . . . 20 percent discount on the molding." These parameters
constitute "our limit of liability, so that's the ceiling of what we pay." And
she confirmed that when an insured selects a nonaffiliate shop, GEICO
pays the majority of the claims to nonaffiliate shops at these parameters.
She was unaware of the factors that led to the parameters but testified,
"Certainly, in 2015, I know that we could secure an amount that does
not exceed 50 percent off the NAGS windshield list price."
      To further show that GEICO could secure a price at its parameters,
GEICO attempted to introduce a claims history spreadsheet into evidence
that contained various data points for its windshield claims in 2015. The
spreadsheet was limited to claims involving nonnetwork repair shops and
showed, among other things, the amount billed by the shop and the
amount paid by GEICO. GEICO explained: "We're going to present
evidence of what GEICO pursuant to our policy secures in the market
. . . . [T]he standard here is GEICO transacts business at its parameters
with hundreds of shops and that's what [the spreadsheet] shows."
GEICO expounded that the spreadsheet showed transactions in which
nonnetwork repair shops "sent GEICO a bill at GEICO's prevailing
competitive price and GEICO paid at that prevailing competitive price."
In using the term "prevailing competitive price," GEICO clarified that Ms.
Eberling would testify the amounts billed and paid as shown on the
spreadsheet were in accordance with GEICO's pricing parameters.

                                      7
      Without allowing a proffer and based solely on argument of
counsel, the trial court excluded the spreadsheet from evidence.
      Well, see, I just -- I don't feel comfortable with this. I feel it is
      too misleading, too confusing, and [the jury is] not going to
      know what to do with this, even based on testimony, that
      you're not provided with it. I just don't think they're going to
      know what to do with this, and I just don't see it being
      relevant, I really don't. So that's my ruling . . . .
The trial court reserved ruling on the admissibility of testimony about the
information in the spreadsheet.
      Later, GEICO requested reconsideration and proffered testimony
from Ms. Eberling to establish that the spreadsheet is GEICO's business
record. The trial court agreed that Ms. Eberling authenticated the
document and that it was GEICO's business record but reiterated its
prior ruling, explaining that "the information is so monumentally
misleading and confusing to the jury[,] . . . [and] that outweighs its
probative value. . . . [I]t's not relevant because . . . the confusion and the
misleading outweighs the probative value."
      GEICO then called Dr. Jim McClave, an econometrician who
applies statistical analyses to economic issues. Superior objected to the
admissibility of his testimony because it was based upon a review and
analysis of GEICO's claims data that the trial court had excluded from
evidence. GEICO proffered his testimony, following which the trial court
allowed him to testify.
      Dr. McClave "concluded that GEICO's payments for windshield
replacements according to the data[] are fully consistent with prevailing
competitive prices." He utilized GEICO's claims history data, focusing on
the 115 nonaffiliate shops located in the Tampa Bay area that did
business with GEICO in 2015. He limited his analysis to these
nonaffiliate, "independent" shops because they "had no affiliation or

                                        8
relationship with GEICO" and, as such, "no obligation to take the work."
He analyzed 6,500 transactions with those limitations, comparing the
amounts the shops invoiced with the amounts GEICO paid. If the figures
matched within 5%, he concluded that GEICO was able to secure a price
at its parameters based on his understanding that GEICO typically pays
according to those parameters.3 In other words, if the amount billed by
the shop and paid by GEICO matched, he opined that "there is strong
reason to believe that they were both using the same formula."
According to his calculations, 55% of the independent shops in the
Tampa Bay area had their invoices paid in full 90% of the time.
Superior, in contrast, "consistently invoiced at significantly higher
amounts than what they got paid." Dr. McClave concluded:
     [I]n my opinion, GEICO is indeed able to secure work at
     conveniently located locations independent shops that don't
     have to take the work at prevailing competitive prices[,] or we
     wouldn't see, in my opinion, we wouldn't see thousands of
     transactions taking place right at the GEICO price. It
     wouldn't make rational sense. If shops are losing money or
     anticipating losing money if they take GEICO work, they have
     a choice. They don't have to take GEICO work. And yet,
     thousands of times they are taking the work, invoicing,
     understanding exactly what they're going to get paid, and to
     me that is strong economic evidence that GEICO is indeed
     paying at a prevailing competitive price.
     ....
     . . . [I]f a shop doesn't have to take the work and looks at that
     invoice and says, "I can't do it for that price," they could turn
     it down. But if the shop says I'll replace the windshield
     knowing that that is what I'm going to get paid and actually
     invoices at that [price], then to me that is an arm's-length

     3 Dr. McClave included transactions in his calculations in which

the invoiced and paid amounts matched within 5% because he
understood there were variables that could explain those small
differences, such as discounts for early payments or electronic payments.
                                     9
     transaction. Willing buyer, willing seller that neither of which
     had to do the work or pay for the work.
     At the close of GEICO's case-in-chief, both Superior and GEICO
moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied both motions,
providing, in pertinent part, the following explanation:
     I feel like all these things that you're arguing to the [c]ourt
     regarding the evidence presented in the trial can certainly be
     argued to the jury. I believe both sides have presented
     sufficient evidence to let the trier of fact decide their position
     on the case and certainly narrow down the issues for them as
     best we could and all that is happened in the case. But I feel
     all motions for directed verdict should be denied and the jury
     as the trier of fact should decide this matter.
The jury returned a verdict for GEICO on its defenses of payment of the
prevailing competitive price and waiver.
     Superior filed a posttrial "Motion to Set Aside Verdict and for
Judgment in Accordance with Motion for Directed Verdict, or for New
Trial." The court granted the motion in part, concluding that GEICO
presented no admissible evidence upon which the jury could rely to find
that GEICO paid Superior the prevailing competitive price. The court
cited two reasons: (1) there was no evidence that the amounts paid by
GEICO in the pricing data utilized by its expert statistician were based
on an open, competitive market because they were based entirely upon
GEICO's claims and use of GEICO's pricing formula and (2) there was no
evidence that GEICO's pricing data was based on "competent" repair
facilities. The court set aside the jury verdict and entered judgment in
favor of Superior for $438.72, representing the difference between what
Superior billed and GEICO paid. Given its decision to enter judgment in
Superior's favor, the court noted that Superior's motion for new trial was
rendered moot.

                                    10
                                  Analysis
     GEICO contends that the trial court erred by entering judgment in
Superior's favor in accordance with its motion for directed verdict, an
issue we review de novo. See Martinez v. Lobster Haven, LLC, 320 So. 3d
873, 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ("We review de novo the trial court's
decision to grant the motion for judgment in accordance with the motion
for a directed verdict."). "[T]he rules governing a posttrial motion for
judgment in accordance with a previous motion for directed verdict are
the same as a motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence
. . . ." Cooper Hotel Servs., Inc. v. MacFarland, 662 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla.
2d DCA 1995) (quoting Greene v. Flewelling, 366 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1978)). The motion "should be resolved with extreme caution," id.,
and "should be granted only where no view of the evidence, or inferences
made therefrom, could support a verdict for the nonmoving party,"
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Rey, 313 So. 3d 698, 702 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
(quoting Sims v. Cristinzio, 898 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).
"[T]he court must evaluate the testimony in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and every reasonable inference deduced from the
evidence must be indulged in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (quoting
Sims, 898 So. 2d at 1005).
                                      I.
     The framework against which the evidence must be evaluated bears
discussion. GEICO's defense was that it paid Superior the "prevailing
competitive price," which, under the policy, "is the price [GEICO] can
secure from a competent and conveniently located repair facility." The
circuit court held in Dick I that the prevailing competitive price is "what
the service would cost in a competitive market in a normal, arms' length

                                     11
non-insurance transaction" and then held in Dick II that GEICO bore the
burden of proof.
     The circuit court's opinions in Dick I and Dick II are the law of the
case. See City Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. City of Tampa, 67 So. 3d 293, 299
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ("We agree with the Third District that a decision by a
circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, becomes the law of the case
on issues which were necessarily presented and decided in the prior
action."). We are constrained by the law of the case unless a " 'manifest
injustice' will result from a strict and rigid adherence to the rule." Tiede
v. Satterfield, 870 So. 2d 225, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Strazzulla
v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)); see also United Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Comprehensive Health Ctr., 173 So. 3d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
("[A] question of law decided on appeal will seldom be reconsidered or
reversed, even when it appears to have been erroneous."). As neither
party has argued that such an injustice will result here, we are obligated
to adhere to the framework set forth in Dick I and Dick II.
     What also bears discussion is the trial court's construction and
application of the policy language and the framework articulated in Dick I
and Dick II. In setting aside the verdict, the trial court reasoned that
there was no evidence that the amounts GEICO paid in its various
transactions were "rooted in a competitive market" because the evidence
"was based entirely on GEICO claims" and "the GEICO formula." The
corollary to the trial court's rationale is that GEICO needed to present
evidence of non-GEICO claims without use of the GEICO formula to
establish the prevailing competitive price. That cannot be the case.
According to the plain language of the policy, the prevailing competitive
price is the price that GEICO can secure. Therefore, evidence of the
prevailing competitive price inherently must be based upon GEICO's

                                     12
claims. Even the circuit court in Dick II recognized that evidence of what
other insurers paid could not necessarily establish the prevailing
competitive price. See Dick II, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 785a ("Evidence
that invoices were paid in full by other insurers can only be relevant if
the policy language of those insurers is the same as GEICO's policy.").
Given the policy language and the affirmation of it by Dick I and Dick II,
the only logical way to interpret the use of the phrase "normal, arms'
length non-insurance transaction" in those opinions is that it was meant
to exclude consideration of those transactions involving prices "set in an
agreement between GEICO and a particular provider." Dick I, 26 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 876a; Dick II, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 785a.
      The trial court's rationale created a standard that is inconsistent
with the language of the policy and absent from the circuit court
appellate opinions that control this case. That rationale, and Superior's
defense of it on appeal, constitute an unjustified extension of the
holdings of Dick I and Dick II. In those opinions, the circuit court
affirmed the policy language that allowed GEICO to limit its obligation to
prices that it alone could negotiate, agreeing that the prevailing
competitive price is "the price [GEICO] can secure from a competent and
conveniently located repair facility." Dick I, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
876a; Dick II, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 785a. What the circuit court
opined that GEICO could not do was "say 'prevailing competitive price' is
the limit of its liability and then effectively limit its exposure to a lower
price it alone could obtain through a non-open-market transaction." Id.
The distinction the circuit court was drawing was not between those
prices GEICO alone could obtain and those that could be obtained by
other insurance carriers or windshield purchasers. Rather, the
distinction was between those prices that GEICO "alone could obtain

                                      13
through . . . non-open-market transaction[s]" and those that GEICO
alone could obtain through open market transactions—which the trial
court characterized as what the service would cost "in a competitive
market in a normal, arms' length non-insurance transaction." Dick I, 26
Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 876a (rejecting GEICO's interpretation in the trial
court that the prevailing competitive price is "any price it elects to pay
that can get the repair done" (emphasis added)). Thus, while Superior
and the trial court would have us believe that we are required by Dick I
and Dick II to ignore any transactions in which GEICO negotiated prices
by imposition of its formula, that requirement imports an elevated
standard unsupported by those decisions' analysis of the "prevailing
competitive price."
     In other words, the circuit court's reasoning in Dick I and Dick II
makes it evident that not all of GEICO's claims are to be excluded from
consideration in determining the prevailing competitive price, only those
that conform to those opinions' conception of non-open-market
transactions—transactions with prices that GEICO obtained through
agreements negotiated with its network providers. It follows that while
GEICO cannot rely on any such "non-open-market transaction[s]" as
evidence to limit its exposure to a lower price under the policy's
"prevailing competitive price" limitation, it can rely on those transactions
meeting the criteria of open-market to limit its exposure—even if the
prices secured might be those that only GEICO could obtain. The trial
court's conclusion that there was no evidence of open-market,
competitive transactions simply because GEICO limited its evidence to
that of its own claims based on its own pricing parameters was therefore
incorrect. In resolving Superior's motion, the trial court was required to
evaluate whether, consistent with Dick I and Dick II, there was evidence

                                     14
from which the jury could have determined that GEICO secured prices in
open-market, competitive transactions from competent and conveniently
located facilities.
                                    II.
      GEICO contends there was evidence from which the jury could
conclude that GEICO paid Superior the prevailing competitive price.
GEICO presented testimony from Ms. Eberling that based on her twenty-
one-year career with GEICO that included involvement and experience
with thousands of the high volume of claims GEICO processes each
year—over 100,000—she knew GEICO could secure a price for a
windshield replacement in 2015 at its pricing parameters: 50% of the
NAGS suggested rate, $40 per hour for labor, and $15 per kit. She
testified that GEICO transacts business with hundreds of shops in a
given year and more shops bill at or below GEICO's parameters than do
not. GEICO therefore sought to establish the prevailing competitive price
by reference to the pricing for each component of a windshield
replacement, which can vary based upon the type of vehicle, the number
of labor hours required, and the time of year as the NAGS suggested
rates are updated. Ms. Eberling's testimony did just that. It provided an
evidentiary basis from which the jury could conclude that GEICO could
secure a price at its parameters in 2015 more often than not—the same
parameters within which GEICO paid Superior.
      Ms. Eberling's testimony also provided a basis from which the jury
could conclude that the prices GEICO secured at its parameters in 2015
were in an open, competitive market, within the meaning of that phrase
according to Dick I and Dick II, involving "normal, arm's length non-
insurance transaction[s]." She specified that GEICO secured those
prices from nonnetwork repair shops, which are chosen by GEICO's

                                    15
policyholders and have no affiliation or contract with GEICO. Ms.
Eberling explained that the nonnetwork shops chose to take work on
GEICO claims without any obligation to do so and, more often than not,
chose to bill and accept payment at GEICO's pricing parameters.
Contrary to the flawed formulation of Superior and the trial court, just
because nonnetwork repair shops bill and accept payment at GEICO's
parameters does not make those transactions "non-open-market" or
noncompetitive. In fact, the competitive nature of the market is further
illustrated by the fact that sometimes GEICO secures pricing from
nonnetwork shops at its parameters, and sometimes it does not.4 What
Ms. Eberling's testimony provided was evidence from which it could be
inferred that GEICO could secure a price at its parameters in 2015 and
could do so in a preponderance of the transactions, allowing the jury to
conclude that this pricing was not only possible but "prevailing." See,
e.g., Prevailing, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011) (defining

     4 If not for Dick I and Dick II, GEICO would not need to confine its

evidence to nonnetwork repair shops or otherwise because even that
requirement finds no basis in the ordinary meaning of the policy
language. The prevailing competitive price is what the policy language
says it is, "the price [GEICO] can secure from a competent and
conveniently located repair facility," and there is no exception in the
event GEICO can routinely secure lower prices through a network of
repair shops or other agreement. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011) ("In interpreting an insurance
contract, we are bound by the plain meaning of the contract's text.").
Nothing in the policy indicates that GEICO's use of effective negotiating
strategies to secure lower prices—relying, for instance, on volume as a
potential means of achieving some degree of market hegemony—renders
those prices noncompetitive. In other words, competing successfully to
reduce costs does not—as the circuit court appellate opinions suggest—
remove the resulting lower-cost transactions from the realm of "a
competitive market." See Dick I, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 876a. But even
under the Dick I and Dick II strictures, which this court is bound to
follow as the law of the case, GEICO met its evidentiary burden.
                                    16
"prevailing" as "[g]enerally current; widespread"); see also Prevailing,
Oxford English Dictionary Online (2023), https://www.oed.com/
(defining "prevailing" as "[p]redominant in extent or amount; most widely
occurring or accepted").
      While Ms. Eberling's testimony was sufficient to support the verdict
as to the prevailing competitive price, GEICO also adduced testimony
from Dr. McClave to buttress its case. Dr. McClave performed a
statistical analysis of GEICO's claims data, searching for instances where
the amount billed to GEICO matched the amount GEICO paid. He found
that, through approximately 6,500 transactions, 55% of 115 nonnetwork,
independent shops in the Tampa Bay area who did business with GEICO
in 2015 had their invoices paid in full 90% of the time. Dr. McClave
concluded that the transactions in which the amounts billed and
GEICO's payments matched were reflective of GEICO's ability to secure a
price in competitive and arm's length transactions, otherwise he would
not see thousands of transactions taking place with shops that have no
obligation to take the work. This evidence satisfies the meaning ascribed
to the term "competitive" by the circuit court in Dick I. Thus, even
presuming for the sake of analysis that Dr. McClave's testimony—relying
as it did on Ms. Eberling's assurance that the preponderance of claims
were paid within GEICO's parameters—provided no support that any
particular transaction itself constituted the prevailing competitive price,
his testimony was relevant to GEICO's theory that the transactions on
which it based its case were of the competitive and open-market type
that satisfied the test set forth in Dick I and Dick II.
      Superior argues that Dr. McClave's testimony was inadmissible
because it was premised upon the claims history spreadsheet that the
trial court excluded from evidence. By allowing Dr. McClave to testify as

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he did, it would appear as if the trial court implicitly overruled itself, at
least in part. More importantly, any possible error in admitting Dr.
McClave's testimony due to its basis in the excluded spreadsheet is
inconsequential given this court's determination, explained more fully
below, that the exclusion itself was erroneous.
      GEICO correctly argues that the trial court erred in excluding the
claims history spreadsheet from evidence. See Sottilaro v. Figueroa, 86
So. 3d 505, 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (providing that "a trial court's ruling
on the admissibility of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion
standard of review," except that an erroneous interpretation of the
evidence code and applicable case law is reviewed de novo). The trial
court excluded the spreadsheet on the basis that it would confuse or
mislead the jury and, in doing so, reasoned that "it's not relevant
because . . . the confusion and the misleading outweighs the probative
value." We note that the trial court improperly conflated relevance with
the balancing test set forth in section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2021).
Balancing the spreadsheet's probative value with the danger it might
confuse or mislead the jury is only necessary if it is, in fact, relevant.
Compare § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2021) ("Relevant evidence is evidence
tending to prove or disprove a material fact."), with § 90.403 ("Relevant
evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of . . . confusion of issues [or] misleading the jury . . . ."
(emphasis added)). The trial court's conclusion that the evidence was not
relevant because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value is
contrary to both law and logic: if the evidence has probative value against
which to weigh potential prejudice, then it is manifestly relevant. The
trial court's rationale for excluding the spreadsheet as not relevant was
therefore based on an erroneous interpretation of the evidence code.

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      Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
spreadsheet on the basis that it would confuse or mislead the jury. It
offered no explanation why or how the spreadsheet would do so other
than to say the jury was "not going to know what to do with this."
Notwithstanding, it cannot reasonably be said that the probative value of
a document listing the prices GEICO secured from its 2015 windshield
claim transactions with nonnetwork repair shops—in a case in which the
core issue is determining what price GEICO could secure for a
windshield replacement—is "substantially outweighed" by the danger of
misleading or confusing the jury. See § 90.403 (emphasis added). And
we reject Superior's arguments under the Tipsy Coachman doctrine that
the spreadsheet was inadmissible for other reasons.
      The trial court's evidentiary error aside, the claims spreadsheet
itself, on this record, does little if anything to support the verdict. While
Ms. Eberling explained that GEICO pays the majority of its windshield
replacement claims at its pricing parameters, she also explained other
unique circumstances that may at times lead GEICO to pay a different
price. There is nothing on the face of the spreadsheet that denotes
whether the amount GEICO paid in each transaction was according to its
pricing parameters or was a different price based on some unique
circumstance. We realize that GEICO may have presented additional
testimony had the trial court not excluded the spreadsheet prior to its
case-in-chief. In fact, GEICO argued to the trial court that Ms. Eberling
would testify that the spreadsheet reflects transactions in which
independent shops bill, and GEICO pays, according to GEICO's
parameters. However, because the testimony Ms. Eberling did provide
supports the verdict, the possibility that the information in the excluded
spreadsheet—and the expert testimony based thereon—might have

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added nothing of any probative value over and above that provided by
Ms. Eberling is of no consequence.
      Finally, the trial court also concluded that GEICO's evidence could
not support the verdict because there was no evidence that GEICO
secured pricing from "competent" repair facilities. Ms. Eberling testified
that she had no reason to believe the nonnetwork repair shops were not
competent. She explained that, after each claim, GEICO transmits a
customer satisfaction survey to its insureds, and GEICO would hear from
its insureds if they were unhappy with the services received pursuant to
those surveys. She also explained that GEICO might see multiple
windshield replacements being performed on the same claim if a shop
did not perform competent work. When reviewing an order granting a
motion for directed verdict in accordance with a previous motion for
directed verdict, we must indulge every reasonable inference from the
evidence in favor of GEICO. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 313 So. 3d at
702. In doing so, there is evidence supporting the verdict because it can
be reasonably inferred that the lack of dissatisfactory responses from the
surveys and lack of multiple replacements on the same claim indicated
that the nonnetwork repair shops GEICO did business with were
competent. When determining whether to deprive the jury of its province
by directing a verdict, it is not the prerogative of this court or the trial
court to consider whether or how a litigant could have better supported
its defense at trial. Even if another view of the evidence is equally
compelling or more so, the question is whether "no view of the evidence,
or inferences made therefrom, could support a verdict for the nonmoving
party." See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sims, 898 So. 2d at 1005).
Assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to GEICO and
considering all reasonable inferences in its favor, see Sims, 898 So. 2d at

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1005, it cannot be said that there is no view of the evidence that could
support a verdict that the entities from which GEICO was able to secure
a price within the parameters it paid Superior were "competent" repair
facilities.
      In sum, although a different jury may have come to a different
conclusion, there was admissible evidence presented upon which the
jury could reasonably conclude that GEICO established it paid Superior
the prevailing competitive price. Because viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in favor of GEICO could support the jury's verdict,
the trial court erred in granting Superior's motion for judgment in
accordance with prior motion for directed verdict and entering final
judgment in favor of Superior.
                                    III.
      In its cross-appeal, which Superior conditions upon the court
reversing the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Superior first
requests that we reinstate either of the county court's prior final
summary judgments in its favor. We cannot do this. Both of the county
court's final summary judgments were previously appealed to the circuit
court, and the circuit court reversed them both. The circuit court's
decisions now constitute the law of the case and, as described above,
receding from them would not be justified absent a manifest injustice.
City Nat'l Bank of Fla., 67 So. 3d at 299; Tiede, 870 So. 2d at 228.
Reinstating either of the county court's final summary judgments would
therefore violate the law of the case doctrine and impermissibly afford the
parties a second plenary appeal.
      Superior alternatively requests that we remand for a new trial
based upon the admission of inadmissible evidence, an erroneous jury
instruction on the prevailing competitive price, and because the verdict

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was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, when the trial
court granted Superior's motion for judgment in accordance with its
motion for directed verdict, it did not rule on the merits of Superior's
alternative motion for new trial. Instead, the trial court reasoned that
"[t]he alternative portion of the motion for new trial is rendered moot."
Therefore, given our decision to reverse on GEICO's main appeal, the
trial court shall rule on the merits of Superior's motion for new trial on
remand. Cf. Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc., 648 So. 2d 168,
173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994 ("[W]here the trial court has ruled upon a motion
for judgment in accordance with prior motions for directed verdict, but
not upon the motion for new trial, the appropriate procedure upon
reversal is to instruct the trial court on remand to rule upon the motion
for new trial."); Kilburn v. Davenport, 286 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA
1973).
                                Conclusion
     Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's final judgment
entered notwithstanding the jury verdict. We remand for entry of a
judgment in favor of GEICO in accordance with the jury's verdict and for
the trial court to rule on the merits of Superior's motion for new trial.
     Reversed and remanded with instructions.

KHOUZAM, J., Concurs in result only.
CASANUEVA, J., Concurs with opinion.

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CASANUEVA, Judge, Concurring.

      And the last shall be first. I concur with the conclusion reached in
the majority opinion that the trial court erred by entering a final
judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict and that this cause should be
remanded to the trial court to enter a final judgment in favor of GEICO
that comports with the jury verdict. Likewise, I also concur that on
remand, the trial court should rule on the merits of Superior's motion for
a new trial.
      Because the issue presented by this case is one likely to generate
additional litigation in the future, I hasten to add that as to the primary
opinion, I additionally concur with sections I and III of the analysis.
      However, as to section II of the analysis, I do not concur in the
second, third, or seventh paragraph; nor do I join in the content of
footnote four.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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