Court Opinion

ID: 9852086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:24:08.428633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:21.796025
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree that there was no violation of the provisions of MCLA 780.131; MSA 28.969(1) and that the defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to commit murder should be affirmed.
However, I dissent from the Court’s action in judicially creating three new conditions which in future cases, if found to exist in the announced combination, will trigger the running of the 180-day period.
MCLA 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), which has come to be known in the lexicon of criminal jurisprudence of this state as the 180-day rule, is unambiguously plain on its face. It is an expression of legislative will that in those cases in which the specific circumstances delineated in the statute obtain, there is a duty imposed upon the prosecuting attorney to bring an accused person to trial within 180 days. The essentially operative conditions precedent to the commencement of the running of the 180 days are: 1) that the Department of Corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state an untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint, 2) against an inmate of a penal institution, 3) that the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint sets forth a criminal offense for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, 4) that the Department of Corrections causes written notice of the place of the inmate’s imprisonment to be delivered to the prosecutor of the county wherein the charge is pending, and 5) the Department of Corrections requests a final disposition of the pending case.1 *285There is no justification for a judicial rewriting of this statute simply because the legislative mandate of trial within 180 days does not speak to those cases in which none of the required notices are given, but it is concluded that the prosecuting attorney should have known of the inmate’s status or the Department of Corrections should have known of the pendency of the untried charges. That is an undertaking entirely beyond our authority.
There are other means to assure prompt disposition of pending criminal charges against a prison inmate in this state, not the least of which is recognition of an accused person’s right to speedy trial. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCLA 768.1; MSA 28.1024.
The Court’s understandable concern that the statute in question may be insufficient to meet a factual situation which may arise in another case on another day should be addressed when that case is before us, not in the abstract fashion of today’s dictum.
Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 The concluding sentences of the statute describe additional infor*285mation which is to be included in the notice to be delivered by the Department of Corrections, to wit:
"The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail.”