Court Opinion

ID: 9776297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:29:49.3769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:36.685292
License: Public Domain

*75KENNEDY, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot think my colleagues have come out right in this case. I dissent.
As an appendix hereto, I attach my own opinion, which my colleagues did not accept. It explains my thinking about the case. I would affirm the judgments.
If, however, the plaintiffs’ judgments are to be reversed, we should remand to the trial court to allow proof of the prevalence of crime in the vicinity such as to place the landlord upon notice of the danger of criminal assaults — notice which the majority opinion says was absent. The following evidence was offered by plaintiffs and excluded by the trial court. If admitted, it would have shown the landlord’s notice of the prevalence of crime in the immediate vicinity of this assault:
1. In addition to the subject row town-homes, defendant controlled or owned two other townhouse properties on Broadway one-half block away, where a burglary had occurred, and a large apartment complex one-half block south at the foot of Washington, where Mee and Kopoian originally lived, in which there had been four robberies, three burglaries, and an assault prior to the incident at issue, and also owned another large apartment building one block west.
2. Directly adjacent to these properties or in the area immediately surrounding them, 10 robberies, 11 burglaries, and 8 assaults occurred, all within the three years preceding this attack. As early as 1981, tenants in the Miller Apartment complex one-half block away had served management with a petition demanding better lighting, locks and deadbolt locks because of “robbers, muggers and the like.” Adequate night lighting was specifically demanded. A letter to the property .manager from tenants demanding better locks was offered. In 1982, defendant contracted with off-duty police officers for foot patrol at its building one-half block way. 8. A property management survey performed in May, 1984 on a Miller property just around the corner from plaintiffs’ townhouse stated “a number of break-ins and muggings have occurred in the month of May ... the police have been contacted yet the problem still exists.” The foot patrol mentioned above recommended in late 1984 to Lilly Womack, the resident manager, that Miller increase lighting and trim bushes one-half block away from the Releford assault because it was so dark.
4. Another document suggested that foot patrol was at one time hired for the townhouses in which plaintiffs lived. A flier from the WestporWPlaza Homes Association was delivered to the resident manager’s address, asking for help because assaults in the area were up 225%. Plaintiffs’ expert Cole authenticated the crime reports and his report was offered.
5. Grace Kopoian’s deposition testimony that she spoke with the resident manager and maintenance man on the subject of increasing crime, as well as her testimony regarding the witnessing and reporting of an assault one-half block away were excluded. Her testimony that the maintenance man reported a burglary around the corner was excluded. Testimony that defendant hired a private guard service the day after the incident was offered to tie into their 1984 acknowledgement that calling the police was doing nothing.
6. An Offer of Proof was made regarding a conversation between the resident manager and Jackie Cook, which occurred in the 1984-1985 time frame in which Ms. Womack indicated they were aware of the burglary from the Cooks’ garage and another one across the street, and that they had hired a security company who would be going around at night watching the premises.
7. Plaintiff offered the testimony of the neighbor across the street, Eldon Cook, that, in response to his report of a burglary, the resident manager had told him a security service had been hired and they had shined a light in his window in 1985. His testimony was also offered to prove there had been a burglary up the street and the wheels stolen from a car by the townhouses.
8. Plaintiffs offered testimony from the president of Westport Plaza Neighborhood *76Association that he was aware of a shooting and robbery between 46th and Pennsylvania and where plaintiffs resided; he was aware of various car burglaries and assaults in the neighborhood; and that the Association met in the mid-1980s to establish a neighborhood watch program and report on crime. Lilly Womack testified she attended some of those meeting but this testimony was still excluded.
In Moss v. National Super Markets, 781 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Mo. banc 1989), the Supreme Court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, on the ground plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case. It remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to present evidence which plaintiff had not offered at trial. Plaintiffs’ position in this case is stronger than the plaintiffs position in Moss, because here the plaintiffs offered the evidence at trial, and it was excluded. The following language in Moss is applicable to this ease: “Numerous cases hold that an appellate court should reverse a plaintiffs verdict without remand only if persuaded that the plaintiff could not make a submissible ease on retrial. The preference is for reversal and remand _ Here, ... the plaintiff was the respondent on appeal. She was not obliged to anticipate reversal, or to raise conditional points.... ”
I would affirm. But if the plaintiffs’ judgment is to be reversed, it should be remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability only.

APPENDIX TO DISSENT

Defendant George W. Miller & Company, Inc., appeals from judgments against it upon jury verdicts in favor of the respective plaintiffs, growing out of a criminal assault at the townhome residence occupied by the plaintiffs as defendant’s tenants. The verdicts and judgments were: for plaintiff Callicotte, $75,000; for plaintiff Grace Kopoian, $150,-000; and for the estate of Jerry Mee, $400,-000.
Plaintiff Harry Callicotte and his mother (plaintiff Grace Kopoian) and her fiancee (plaintiff Jerry Mee) lived together in a townhouse at 4507 Washington in Kansas City. The townhouse was one of ten located in a row along the east side of Washington Street. The townhomes were owned by defendant George W. Miller & Co., which also owned ten townhomes across Washington Street, on the west side of the street. Plaintiffs’ unit and 4505 Washington shared a single front porch, from which entry was made into both by their respective front doors.
Callicotte, a law student, was returning home in his car at 1:80 a.m. on December 7. He parked his car at the curb in front of the house. It was raining. Carrying a stack of books in his arms, he got out of his car and hurried to the door of his house. As he was standing on the small porch, or stoop, unlocking the single lock on the door, a robber came up behind him and struck him on the head with a baseball bat.
Callicotte fell against the front door, which sprang open. He fell inside the entryway of the house. The robber struck him again inside the hall, breaking his arms raised to defend against the attack with the bat.
Callicotte’s mother, plaintiff Grace Kopoi-an, and her fiancee, Jerry Mee, who were inside the house, came to Callicotte’s aid. The robber attacked them, too, with the baseball bat, injuring both of them. He stole Callicotte’s wallet and fled.
The robber was apprehended and he confessed. He had been seeking money for crack cocaine. He had followed plaintiff Cal-licotte to his home. As Callicotte arrived home, the robber parked his car in a driveway down the street and north of plaintiffs’ residence, his lights off. Armed with a baseball bat, he came across the narrow (from sidewalk to porch) lawn in front of plaintiffs’ residence and overtook Callicotte on his porch.
Plaintiff Jerry Mee, after he had filed suit on December 4, 1990, committed suicide on February 6, 1991. Plaintiff Kopoian was appointed by the probate court as Mee’s personal representative, and she was substituted for Mee as a plaintiff.
Upon trial of the case, the submissions of negligence, on behalf of Callicotte, were “either, the bush near the porch was taller than *7724 inches high and as a result the porch area was not reasonably safe, or the porch light was defective and did not illuminate the porch area and as a result the porch area was not reasonably safe.” Mee’s and Kopoi-an’s submissions were the two foregoing and a third one, to wit: that “the door to the townhome did not have a deadbolt and as a result the door was not reasonably safe.”
It should be noted at this point that the porch and the lawn, where the bush was located, were common areas, under the control of the landlord. The condition of the light, and the absence of the deadbolt, were also under the control of the landlord. Repairs to the premises were the duty of the landlord.
Had defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and on appeal had asked for reversal and remand for a new trial, it would be our duty to examine whether the evidence supported each of the three submissions. MAI 1.02, Committee Comment (1991). If one or more of the submissions were supported by the evidence, we still would remand for a new trial if we found any one or more of the three were unsupported by the evidence. See, e.g., Bostic by Bostic v. Bill Dillard Shows, 828 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Mo.App.1992). Defendant, however, did not file a motion for a new trial, but only a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal it has asked for outright reversal, not for remand for a new trial. We will not reverse outright if any one of the three submissions was supported by the evidence.
We have determined, as we explain hereinafter, that the defective light submission was supported by the evidence, and we do not consider the absence of deadbolt submission or the overheight bush submission.

SUBMISSIBILITY

Miller attacks the submissibility of plaintiffs’ case at three points. It says, first, that Miller had no duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal attacks of third persons. It says, second, if Miller did have such a duty, Miller’s acts and omissions, charged by plaintiffs to have been negligent, did not fall below the standard of reasonable care. It says, third, that any such acts or omissions, if negligent, were not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.
Defendant’s argument is that one is hable for another’s injuries at the hands of a third-party criminal only in two instances. One such instance is where there is a special relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, in which plaintiff has relied upon the defendant to provide safety. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.App.1987). Such relationships include innkeeper-guest, school-student, and employer-employee. Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo.App.1990). The relationship of landlord-tenant is no such relationship, Miller says, citing Advance Rental Ctrs. v. Brown, 729 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Mo.App.1987). The other situation where defendant may be hable for injuries suffered at the hands of a third-party criminal, says Miller, is where there have been other crimes which would place the landlord on notice that the tenant was in danger of a violent criminal attack. In order to place the landlord on notice of the danger of violent criminal attacks, according to Miller’s argument, the other crimes must have been violent, numerous, recent, on the premises, and of a similar nature to the attack upon the plaintiff. It cites Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 273-74; and Conroy v. Solon Gershman, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 381 (Mo.App.1989). Plaintiffs, Miller says, show neither a special relationship between themselves and Miller, nor the other crimes which would place Miller upon notice of plaintiffs’ danger from a criminal’s violent attack.
Our case is ruled, however, by Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo.1988) and by Stubbs v. Panek, 829 S.W.2d 544 (Mo.App.1992). In those cases, the respective landlords made the same arguments as Miller makes in the present case. Our Supreme Court in Aaron rejected the landlord’s formulaic approach in that case. To quote from the opinion: “The owner of an apartment building has a recognized duty to use due care to make common premises safe, as against foreseeable risks....” Aaron, 758 S.W.2d at 447-48.
*78The evidence (stated most favorably to the verdict, of course, see, Osborn v. Orthopaedic Ass’n of Kansas City, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 86, 39 (Mo.App.1992)), was as follows:

DEFECTIVE PORCH LIGHT

1

There was evidence which supported the submission of the defective light as a ground of negligence. The porch was common to plaintiffs’ residence and the adjoining residence, in the same building, occupied by Dan Lawson. There was a light on the porch, but it was not on at 1:30 a.m. on December 7, 1986, when Callicotte was attacked and robbed. The light was controlled by switches in plaintiffs’ residence and the other residence. The light could be turned on from plaintiffs’ residence, but it could be overridden by the switch in the other residence. On the evening before the assault, Mrs. Kopoian had turned on the porch light, but Mr. Lawson had turned it off later. The light was off and the porch was dark when Callicotte came home and was assaulted.
Callicotte before the assault had asked that the light be fixed. Miller’s maintenance man had tried to fix it, but he told Callicotte he was unable to do so because of the wiring. There is no evidence that Miller called an electrician to fix the light, although Miller had an electrician “on call,” and electrical repairs were given priority treatment.
There was evidence that Miller was aware of the importance of fighting as a security measure, as evidenced by additional lighting which it had installed behind the buildings, and which it had considered but had not done because of wiring problems. The importance of lighting had also been discussed in a property management course which had been attended by Miller’s property manager.
Plaintiffs’ experts testified to the need for adequate lighting as a security measure. They testified that lighting had the dual effect of deterring crime, and also giving the victim an opportunity to see the approach of an attacker and to defend himself or to flee. The jury could believe from the evidence that Miller was negligent in failing to repair the fight, so that the porch fight could be controlled by the occupants of plaintiffs’ residence.
The jury could also believe from the evidence that, if the porch and the surrounding area had been lighted, Callicotte would have seen the approach of the robber in time to defend himself. Callicotte was young and strong, and schooled in hand-to-hand combat, and could very likely have overpowered the robber. The darkness gave the robber the advantage of surprise. Callicotte saw only a shadow over his left shoulder in the instant before he was struck on the head with a baseball bat.

OTHER CRIMES

Defendant argues that there was no proof of other similar crimes on the premises, and that, in the absence of such proof, it had no duty to its tenants to take the security measures which plaintiffs say were lacking. The occurrence of other crimes bears upon the foreseeability of criminal attacks, and landlord’s duty to take reasonable preventive measures.
The plaintiffs showed only one other crime. This was in April, 1986, when a burglar came through a back window, while the occupant was sleeping, and stole her handgun. This occurred in another of the Washington Gardens townhomes, and the jury could infer that Miller had notice thereof. Plaintiffs offered to prove a number of other crimes in the general vicinity (the Plaza-Westport *79area), including Miller properties, and a general community alert about the risk of crime, but the proof was excluded by the court. If it had been admitted, it would undoubtedly have strengthened plaintiffs’ contention that Miller had notice of the risk of criminal conduct on the premises. Its absence weakened plaintiffs’ contention. Still, we think the evidence was sufficient to make a submis-sible issue of Miller’s notice of the danger of criminal conduct harmful to the tenants, sufficient to give rise to a duty on Miller’s part to take reasonable measures to protect them.
On the issue of notice, we have the evidence of the single unauthorized entry which was allowed to be proved. We have evidence of security measures and precautions which Miller had taken, indicative of its awareness of the danger of criminal conduct. There is evidence that security was a matter of discussion at property management forums. These two items of proof simply add support to the dictum in Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salv. Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo.App.1983): “In a practical sense, crime (violent or non-violent) is regrettably foreseeable in today’s society any place, any time.” Miller can hardly be heard to say that in a mid-city urban area, where it had a number of rental units, and where security precautions had been a matter of concern both to residents and to Miller personnel, it was unaware of the prevalence of crime.
The heightened awareness of crime, on the part of landlord and tenant alike, increased the foreseeability of plaintiffs’ injuries. It placed upon the landlord a more urgent duty to take such protective measures as were within the area of his responsibility. This area of responsibility, as we have noted, included the common areas, and included the repairs and maintenance over which he had retained control. The precautions required of the landlord by the standard of reasonableness may vary from one place to another, but that is for the jury to resolve, under proper instructions. We are not dealing here with the violent crimes exception, noted in Faheen, to the general rule that landlords are not Hable for assaults upon their tenants by third persons. Proof of other violent crimes is not essential in a case like the present one, according to the holding of Aaron.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

Allowing for present purposes that it was negHgent in the particulars submitted, MUler argues that such negHgence was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. It is speculation, MiHer argues, to say that its negHgent acts and omissions, if they were in fact negHgent, were “substantial factors” 2 in the injuries to the plaintiffs. If MiHer had cut down the bush to 24 inches in height, if it had fixed the Hght, the robber’s assault would stiU have probably occurred in the same way. And if it had installed the deadbolt, the time it took CaUicotte to unlock the second lock would make him more vulnerable to attack on the porch. The safety of the people inside would have been purchased at the cost of increased risk to the person outside.
As we are taught in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosptial, 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1993), there is the threshold requirement that the proof show prima facie that the injury would not have happened “but for” the negHgence of the defendant. As Judge Thomas said in Callahan: “Some lawyers and judges have come to look upon the ‘but for’ test as a particularly onerous and difficult test for causation. Nothing could be further from the truth. ‘But for’ is an absolute minimum for causation because it is merely causation in fact. Any attempt to find HabiHty absent actual causation is an attempt to connect the defendant with an inquiry or event that the defendant had nothing to do with. Mere logic and common sense dictates there be some causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the injury or event for which damages are sought.” We take it that Callahan did not do away with the “substantial factor” test; that case simply shows that both criteria are *80involved in “proximate cause” (Prosser), or “legal cause” (Restatement (Second)). Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861. It must be shown prima facie that the injury would not have happened “but for” defendant’s negligence, and also that the defendant’s negligence was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the plaintiffs injury.
The evidence in this case survives both tests. The jury could have believed in this case, that, “but for” the defendant’s negligence in failing to repair the light, the assailant would have had the opportunity to defend himself against the attack, or to flee. (There was evidence to the contrary, which was argued to the jury. The jury rejected that position. The question before us, of course, is only whether there was evidence to support the jury’s verdict.) They could have believed that defendant’s negligence in failing to repair the light was a “substantial factor” in the plaintiffs’ injuries.
The following language (untouched by the overruling decision of Callahan) from Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co., Inc., 708 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Mo. banc 1986), is appropriate here:
“This case would be characterized by Professor Wright as one of ‘doubtful’ causation, akin to a case involving a public swimming pool in which a child drowns while the lifeguard is absent. It is extremely difficult to prove that the drowning would not have occurred if the lifeguard had been present, but it would certainly be reasonable for a jury to conclude that the presence of a lifeguard would make the chances of rescue ‘more likely than not.’ Professor Wright argues that no more should be required and his view has substantial support. There are obvious difficulties in this case in setting up a counterfaetual situation which definitively projects the sequence of events under the assumption that a safety bump had been in place. Striving for certainty is a tour de force. The jury must deal in terms of probabilities.” Id. at 667.
Proximate cause is assessed by viewing the event after the fact. Schaffer v. Bess, 822 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Mo.App.1991). If after the fact, the injuries are rationally traceable to the act of negligence, the jury may find the proximate cause link between the negligence and the injury, even though the injury might have occurred in an unexpected and an unforeseeable way. Id. at 876.
We hold that the evidence made a submis-sible case of proximate causation.

MEE’S PERSONAL INJURIES vs. WRONGFUL DEATH

Defendant George Miller & Co., as another reason it should have judgment against the Jerry Mee estate claim, says that, since Mee’s personal representative claimed that Mee’s death resulted from the injuries, Mee’s cause of action did not survive to the personal representative under Section 537.020, RSMo 1986. That statute specifically includes only those “causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death....” If the injuries resulted in death, says defendant, then it is a wrongful death claim, under Section 537.080, RSMo 1986.
If a person sustains injuries resulting in his death, the claim must be presented as a wrongful death claim under Section 537.080, RSMo 1986. If he sustains injuries and later dies, not as a result of the injuries, his claim for damages for the injuries survives to his personal representative. Section 537.020, RSMo 1986. The two claims are inconsistent and mutually exclusive. Damerel v. Sabina Realty Corp., 603 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo.App.1980); Long v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 159 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.1942). Jerry Mee’s personal representative, Grace Kopoian, after Mee’s death by suicide, amended Mee’s petition to substitute herself as personal representative as plaintiff. She alleged, in the amended petition, that Mee’s suicide was caused by his injuries. There was also evidence, in the form of an expert’s opinion, that Mee’s injuries contributed to cause his suicide. This evidence was not amplified.
Miller’s position is that there was an issue whether Mee’s death by suicide resulted from his injuries. That being the case, Miller says, it was incumbent upon the personal representative, in order to establish the survival of Mee’s personal injuries claims, to plead, prove and submit to the jury the ques*81tion whether the death did not result from the injuries. See Damerel, 603 S.W.2d at 98. That Mee’s death did not result from the injuries we think was not a “truly controverted issue.” See Long, 159 S.W.2d at 623. While plaintiff presented some evidence that Mee’s suicide was caused by his injuries, she struck that allegation from her petition before the case was submitted. Plaintiff told the jury in argument they could give no damages for Mee’s suicide; the damages stopped at that point. The Mee damage instruction submitted “such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate the estate of Jerry Mee for any damages you believe Jerry Mee sustained between the time of the assault up to the time of his death as a direct result of the occurrence mentioned in evidence.” The court’s language in Long is applicable to this case. Plaintiff elected to proceed on the theory that the death did not result from the injuries. Defendant’s liability and the measure of damages were the same as if Jerry Mee had not died. The court so understood it, the jury so understood it, and the defendant so understood it. It was held in Long that, in such a ease, it was not necessary for plaintiff to allege, prove and submit to the jury the fact that Mee’s death was not caused by his injuries. Id. at 622. In agreement, see Damerel, 603 S.W.2d at 98-99.
The judgments are affirmed.
NOTE: THE FOREGOING IS NOT THE OPINION OF THE COURT, BUT IS AN APPENDIX TO A DISSENT.

. When the evening closed in, the difficulty and danger of walking about London became serious indeed. [M]ost of the streets were left in profound darkness. Thieves and robbers plied their trade with impunity.... [I]n the last year of the reign of Charles the Second, ... [a]n ingenious projector, named Edward Heming, obtained letters patent, conveying to him, for a term of years, the exclusive right of lighting up London. He undertook, for a moderate consideration, to place a light before every tenth door, on moonless nights, from Michaelmas to Lady Day, and from six to twelve of the clock.... The friends of improvement extohed him as the greatest of all the benefactors of his city. What, they asked, were the boasted inventions of Archimedes, when compared with the achievement of the man who had turned the nocturnal shades into noon day?
—Macauley, History of England

. See Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co., Inc., 708 S.W.2d at 669; Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 431(a) (1965).