Court Opinion

ID: 9395786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 16:11:35.281528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.161400
License: Public Domain

J-S07011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NUNZIO MATTERA                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 550 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 24, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-23-CR-0000642-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                   FILED MAY 18, 2023

        Appellant, Nunzio Mattera, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on January 24, 2022,

following his conviction for Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License.1

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress physical

evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

        On December 4, 2020, at approximately 8:30 AM, several police officers

arrived at Appellant’s home in response to an anonymous call claiming that a

male and female were arguing and that the male had a gun. Officers later

determined that the anonymous caller was Appellant’s adult son.

        As the officers approached, Appellant exited the house.       The officers

patted Appellant down and did not find any weapons on his person.

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(2).
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Subsequently, officers walked Appellant down the driveway to where

Appellant’s wife stood. The trial court found that the body camera footage

revealed that Appellant admitted, during his interaction with his wife, that he

knew a firearm was inside his vehicle.

      During this timeframe, officers conducted a protective sweep inside and

outside the house to determine if anyone else was at the residence. As part

of the sweep, and important to our analysis, Officer Matthew McCusker used

his flashlight to look inside the window of a Chevrolet Tahoe, parked in the

driveway and registered to Appellant. Officer McCusker observed a pistol in

the center console and informed Patrolman First Class (“PFC”) Brian Gilmore,

who was the acting supervisor.

      The officers then cleared the scene and left the property. Neither

Appellant’s wife nor his son wished to press charges. After leaving Appellant’s

house, PFC Gilmore drove approximately 1,000 yards to a church parking lot,

which was not in view of Appellant’s residence. While parked, he investigated

the status of Appellant’s license to carry a concealed firearm, which he

determined had expired in October 2019. Soon thereafter, at approximately

9:02 AM, PFC Gilmore saw Appellant drive by the parking lot in the Tahoe.

      PFC Gilmore followed Appellant to his place of business and activated

the patrol car’s lights and siren as Appellant parked behind the building. With

weapons drawn, officers instructed Appellant to exit the car and handcuffed

him. PFC Gilmore then observed a firearm in the vehicle’s center console,

where Officer McCusker had seen it when the car was parked at the residence.

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After removing the firearm from the vehicle, PFC Gilmore determined that it

was loaded.

        The Commonwealth charged Appellant with Firearms Not to be Carried

Without a License, which applies to “[a] person who is otherwise eligible to

possess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any

vehicle . . .without a valid and lawfully issued license[.]”2

        Appellant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion, on May 3, 2021, in which he

sought, inter alia, to suppress the firearm.     The court held a suppression

hearing on July 26, 2021, at which PFC Gilmore and Officer McCusker testified

and the Commonwealth presented body and dash camera video.                  On

September 22, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the

firearm. On January 24, 2022, the trial court conducted a stipulated bench

trial and found Appellant guilty of Firearms Not to Be Carried Without a

License. The court sentenced him to two years of probation.

        On February 14, 2022, Appellant filed both his notice of appeal and his

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.3 The trial

court entered an order on June 24, 2022, providing findings of fact and

____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(2).

3 Appellant’s Notice of Appeal claims to appeal from the order denying
suppression. However, the appeal properly lies from the judgment of
sentence. Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa.
Super. 2001) We have corrected the case caption accordingly.

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conclusions of law related to its denial of Appellant’s Omnibus Motion to

Suppress. Several days later, the court filed its Rule 1925(a) Opinion.

      Before this Court, Appellant raises the following question:

      Did police officers have probable cause to believe that the
      defendant was in possession of a firearm inside his vehicle prior
      to placing him under arrest?

Appellant’s Br. at 2.
                                       A.

      This Court’s review of a trial court’s denial of suppression “is limited to

determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.”

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017). While “[w]e

are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings” if supported by the

record, we review questions of law de novo. Id. In reviewing the denial of

suppression, “we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope

of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record

and excludes evidence elicited at trial.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

      We reiterate that “[b]oth the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

guarantee individuals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted). A warrant stating probable cause for a search or seizure is

generally required unless one of the “few clearly delineated exceptions”

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applies, such as the automobile exception or the plain view exception. Id. at

1072.

        “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the

officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth

v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1252 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). “Probable cause

does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable

inference,    not    necessarily      even     the   most   reasonable   inference.”

Commonwealth v. Brogdon, 220 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).     In considering probable cause, we look to the totality of the

circumstances. Id. Where officers are working in a team and one officer does

not hold all the information necessary to establish probable cause, courts may

consider the knowledge of other officers in the team, especially where the

officers have communicated the relevant information. Commonwealth v.

Yong, 177 A.3d 876, 888–90 (Pa. 2018).4
____________________________________________

4   The Supreme Court explained:

        Pennsylvania adheres to the vertical approach of the collective
        knowledge doctrine, which instructs that an officer with the
        requisite level of suspicion may direct another officer to act in his
        or her stead. However, where, as here, the arresting officer does
        not have the requisite knowledge and was not directed to so act,
        we hold the seizure is still constitutional where the investigating
        officer with probable cause or reasonable suspicion was working
        with the officer and would have inevitably and imminently ordered
        that the seizure be effectuated.

Yong, 177 A.3d at 889-90.

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       Turning to the plain view doctrine, courts allow “the admission of

evidence seized without a warrant when: (1) an officer views the object from

a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object

is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.”

Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 471 (Pa. Super. 2022) (emphasis

omitted). As applied in cases involving vehicles, this Court opined that “where

police officers observe incriminating-looking contraband in plain view in a

vehicle from a lawful vantage-point, the lack of advance notice and

opportunity to obtain a warrant provides the officers with a lawful right of

access to seize the object in question.” McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1074 (citation

omitted).5

                                               B.

       Appellant challenges the court’s denial of his suppression motion,

asserting that the officers did not have probable cause to stop him after he

drove past PFC Gilmore in the church parking lot, claiming that the officers

had only “an inarticulate hunch" that the firearm was still in his vehicle.

Appellant’s Br. at 9 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23, 29

(Pa. Super 2000)). Appellant asserts that “[p]rior to pulling [him] over, police

officers did not observe [him] committing any motor vehicle code violations,
____________________________________________

5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that the Pennsylvania
Constitution demands that “warrantless vehicle searches require both
probable cause and exigent circumstances[.]”      Commonwealth v.
Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 207 (Pa. 2020). This Court, however, held that
Alexander did not apply to cases involving the plain view exception.
McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073.

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nor did they know whether [he] had removed the pistol from his vehicle after

the protective sweep of his residence had been cleared.” Id. at 2.6 After

review, we conclude that the court did not err in denying suppression.

       Upon considering the totality of the circumstances, the suppression

court concluded that the officers had probable cause to conclude that

Appellant “was engaged in the illegal act of concealing [a] firearm in his

vehicle off of his property.” Tr. Ct. Order, 6/24/22, at 4. The court explained

its conclusion:

       [T]here was a strong probability of criminal activity for several
       reasons: (1) Officer McCusker is well trained and knows how to
       spot firearms; (2) [h]e found out [that Appellant] had his license
       to carry concealed firearms revoked; (3) [h]e found that the car
       that contained the firearm was registered to [Appellant]; and (4)
       observed [Appellant’s] conversation with his wife in which he
       revealed he knew the gun was in the car.

____________________________________________

6 Appellant tangentially questions Officer McCusker’s authority to look into the
Tahoe parked in the driveway, citing to Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196
A.3d 253 (Pa. Super. 2018). Appellant’s Br. at 9-10. In Chesney, officers
searched a vehicle after viewing a drug container through the vehicle’s
window, which was parked within the curtilage of a house. This Court reversed
the denial of suppression, concluding that the officers were not in a lawful
vantage point because the trial court had invalidated the warrant that initially
brought the officers to the residence. Chesney, 196 A.3d at 260. Appellant’s
reliance on Chesney is inapt because the instant case does not involve a
defective warrant but, instead, an unchallenged protective sweep of the
property based upon a report of a male with a firearm.

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Id. at 4.7 Based upon these facts, the court concluded that PFC Gilmore “had

probable cause to stop [Appellant].”8 Id.

       After reviewing the record before the suppression court, we agree that

PFC Gilmore could reasonably infer that Appellant was carrying an unlicensed

firearm in a vehicle, in violation of Section 6106(a)(2). Specifically, Officer

McCusker observed a firearm in plain view in Appellant’s vehicle and informed

PFC Gilmore, who then determined that Appellant’s firearm license had

expired. Within minutes of making that determination, PFC Gilmore observed

Appellant drive past him in the same vehicle. Thus, PFC Gilmore had probable

cause to stop Appellant. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err

in denying suppression.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2023

____________________________________________

7 While the court misstated that Officer McCusker rather than PFC Gilmore
determined that Appellant’s license had expired, this discrepancy does not
impact our analysis.

8 The court additionally concluded that PFC Gilmore had probable cause to
arrest Appellant upon observing the firearm in the vehicle in plain view and
after determining that the firearm was loaded. Tr. Ct. Order at 4-5.

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