Court Opinion

ID: 9674874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:36:45.084863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:30.018707
License: Public Domain

SPARLING, Justice,
dissenting.
I join in dissenting.
The gist of this offense is that the appellant received money for construction, and he fraudulently failed to disburse these funds to his laborers—despite his duty as a fiduciary to do so. In short, the State must prove he didn’t pay his laborers, rather than how he did spend the money.
Yet the majority1 has imposed an unprecedented duty2 upon the State to trace the funds from the complainant to the appellant to appellant’s bank account, to, and through, the hands of third persons. I would hold that the State has no such burden. Therefore, the fact that the State tried imperfectly to do that which was not required is of no consequence. In any event, what would the records of the liquor store, apartment complex, or telephone company realistically have proved? If the records indicated that cash had been received from, for instance, the telephone company, the information would have been valueless unless the State further proved how the cash was spent. If the telephone records indicated that appellant’s check paid a telephone bill, that too would have been valueless unless the calls were traced to determine that their purpose was not related to this construction project. The majority has imposed an unrealistic burden upon the State.
Further, instead of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the majority apparently has championed the defense espoused by appellant. For example, they write: “Appellant testified that he made many of his business pay-*876merits with cash,” and “For example, appellant testified that he delivered the $1,006 cashier’s check to B & B Liquor ...” Thus, it appears that the majority has viewed the sufficiency of the evidence from the appellant’s perspective—ignoring the fundamental truth that the jury does not have to believe anything to which the appellant testifies. In sum, it appears that the majority has swapped its robe for a jury badge.
Another example of the majority’s empathy with the accused may be found in their statement, “The record reflects that appellant surely made some payments with cash because numerous materials were purchased which were not paid for by check.” Again, the majority adopts appellant’s testimony. It is just as reasonable for the jury to believe from the evidence that appellant left a path of unpaid materialmen, as he did unpaid laborers. Yet the majority chooses to assume that the proceeds from a check written to an apartment house may have ended up in the hands of a lumberyard.
The majority further declares insufficient the evidence of “intent to defraud.” Intent is intangible and, with few exceptions, is inferred from words spoken and acts done. Intent may be inferred from performing the overt acts of the prohibited conduct—in the present case, the receipt of the money by the trustee and the subsequent failure to pay the beneficiary laborers. The “intent” cases relied upon by the majority are theft cases,3 which are distinguishable from this offense because of the language of the theft “by deception”4 statute that states that the accused’s failure to perform after promising to perform is insufficient to prove intent “without other evidence of intent or knowledge” (emphasis mine). We are reminded that (1) the present case is not a theft case; (2) there is no language in article 5472e that requires “other” evidence of intent or knowledge; and (3) the appellant is, by law, a fiduciary.
If however, this is a case in which intent may not be inferred from the criminal act, an extraneous offense may be admitted to prove intent. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Yet, the majority has concluded that an extraneous offense—the appellant’s similar conduct of failing to pay a plumber, his subcontractor—was no proof of intent.5 In so holding, the majority has effectively ignored a long line of criminal jurisprudence to the contrary. Rogers v. State, 598 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Reger v. State, 598 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Christiansen v. State, 575 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Crawley v. State, 513 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); White v. State, 632 5.W.2d 752 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1981, no pet.).
I encourage the reader to reread that portion of the majority opinion declaring “reasonable overhead” to be an “exception” rather than a “defense.” I find no case cited nor rationale offered that would logically lead one to that conclusion. I conclude that reasonable overhead is not an exception because the statute does not label “reasonable overhead” exception and because there are only two “exceptions” in the entire penal code,6 which indicates the hesitancy of the legislature to place the label “exception” on a defensive issue. It *877is a credit to the majority to have arrived at such an imaginative conclusion.
. If all else fails, a concurring opinion has declared the statute unconstitutional. We must presume a statute to be constitutional and construe it in a way to uphold its constitutionality. Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). That we are not benefited by precedent defining “reasonable overhead” does not mean that we are incapable of understanding its meaning. I see nothing unconstitutionally vague about the statute.
Sometimes we, as professional fault-finders, look for perfection when none exists. The majority, in its opinion, has created precedent that makes it all but impossible to prosecute a case under article 5472e. One is led to believe, from the majority footnote, that the purpose of 5472e is “debt collection”7 or a recourse for “shabby workmanship.8 Thus, I feel that it is the statute, not this case, that most offends the majority. I would hold that a repeal of article 5472e would best be performed by the legislature, rather than by judicial emasculation.
I dissent from the majority opinion and would, accordingly, affirm.
STEWART, J., joins in this opinion.

. Although there is actually no majority in this case, I use the word in reference to the opinion by Associate Justice Storey.

. Tracing of funds is required by Compton v. State, 607 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Watkins v. State, 438 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), both cited by majority, but these cases only require that the State prove that the check was cashed or deposited—nothing more.

. The majority does cite Stuebgen v. State, 547 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), a case of passing a forged instrument, which does impose an abnormal burden upon the State to prove intent (not tracing, however). Thus far, the requirements of Stuebgen have not been extended beyond that particular offense.

. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(2)(E) (Vernon 1974).

. This extraneous "offense” was also a remodeling job, occurring about the same time, for about the same price, and likewise resulted in a structural mess. When appellant was confronted by the plumber with an unpaid invoice, appellant’s response was "[I haven't] been paid yet,” although appellant had received 100% of the contract price. This lie is evidence of fraudulent intent. Phillips v. State, 488 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), Golden v. State, 475 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

. See TEX.PEN.CODE ANN. §§ 37.10(b), 38.04 (Vernon 1974).

. This quote is a footnote by Chief Judge Onion that related to facts in a theft by deception case in which there was no “other evidence of intent or knowledge.”

. The "shabby workmanship," in my view, is relevant as a circumstance tending to prove that appellant did not use complainant’s money to put "quality” into the structure. To the contrary, there was overwhelming evidence that the structure was an unfinished mess.