Court Opinion

ID: 9959224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 07:13:27.455525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:53.035061
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                         EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                              EL PASO, TEXAS

    WILMA MARIE WILSON,                                         §       No. 08-23-00221-CV

                                         Appellant,             §          Appeal from the

    v.                                                          §    120th Judicial District Court

    AUDREY JO BIFFLE,                                           §     of El Paso County, Texas

                                         Appellee.              §       (TC# 2021DCV3005)

                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

           Appellant Wilma Wilson is appealing the trial court’s grant of no-evidence summary

judgment in favor of Appellee, Audrey Jo Biffle. Wilson filed a negligence suit against Biffle

seeking damages for personal injuries. Because Wilson produced more than a scintilla of evidence

establishing a genuine issue of material fact existed on causation and pain and suffering, but did

not similarly do so for medical expenses or mental anguish damages, we will affirm in part and

reverse and remand in part.

                                                    BACKGROUND

           On August 28, 2019, Wilson and Biffle, who are mother and daughter, rode together in a

vehicle driven by Biffle. Wilson was over the age of 90.1 At an intersection, Biffle collided with

1
    Wilson’s birthday is listed in her answers to interrogatories.
another vehicle. In August 2021, Wilson sued Biffle alleging claims of negligence and negligence

per se arising out of the collision. Wilson’s petition alleged that Biffle ran a red light and struck

another vehicle, resulting in a collision of great force and violence. The collision, she contended,

caused her “to be forcibly thrown with violence about the inside of the automobile . . . resulting in

painful and permanent [] bodily injuries to her and headaches.” Lastly, she claimed there was

reasonable probability that she would continue to suffer pain, mental anguish, and headaches.

       Biffle timely answered by entering a general denial and naming various defenses. Biffle

later served Wilson with requests for discovery and the case was set for trial. On March 14, 2023,

Biffle filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment asserting that, despite an adequate

amount of time, Wilson had failed to produce discovery in support of her claims. As grounds for

no-evidence summary judgment, Biffle alleged the following:

       1.   There is no evidence that [Biffle] committed any negligent acts or omissions
            in connection with the subject accident.

       2.   There is no evidence that [Biffle] committed any act or omission resulting in
            bodily injury to [Wilson].

       3.   There is no evidence that [Wilson] has required any medical care in the past as
            a result of the subject accident, or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or
            omissions.

       4.   There is no evidence that [Wilson] will require any medical care in the future
            as a result of the subject accident, or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or
            omissions.

       5.   There is no evidence that [Wilson] has incurred reasonable and/or necessary
            expenses for any medical care in the past as a result of the subject accident, or
            as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or omissions.

       6.   There is no evidence that [Wilson] will incur reasonable and/or necessary
            expenses for any medical care in the future as a result of the subject accident,
            or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or omissions.

       7.   There is no evidence that [Wilson] has suffered pain and suffering in the past
            as a result of the subject accident, or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or
            omissions.

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         8.    There is no evidence that [Wilson] has suffered pain and suffering in the future
               as a result of the subject accident, or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or
               omissions.

         9.    There is no evidence that [Wilson] has suffered mental anguish in the past as
               a result of the subject accident, or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or
               omissions.

         10. There is no evidence that [Wilson] has suffered mental anguish in the future
             as a result of the subject accident, or as a result of any of [Biffle’s] acts or
             omissions.

         On April 4, 2023, Wilson filed her response to Biffle’s motion for summary judgment,

attaching her own affidavit, signed as an unsworn declaration, her answers to interrogatories, and

a copy of the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report.2 In her affidavit, Wilson attested that Biffle ran

a red light and struck another vehicle. She stated the collision was of “great force and violence”

and she required medical care. Specifically, Wilson described her injuries as bruises to her whole

right side, her face, around her eyes, her hand, and she had a cut on her hand. Also, Wilson attested

she had four pulmonary embolisms and an injured knee. She stated her injuries caused her mental

distress and that she was worried about her recovery and the medical expenses incurred. Wilson

described that immediately following the accident, she was taken to Del Sol Medical Center, where

she stayed for two weeks, and then she was transferred to a nursing home. At the nursing home,

she contracted pneumonia and went back to Del Sol Medical Center for 6 days. She was transferred

to a Long-Term Acute Care Hospital for two weeks and then to Highlands Rehabilitation Hospital.

After her discharge from Highlands, she received home health care once every 6 weeks for two

months. She also saw her regular family doctor.

2
  Biffle objected to Wilson’s summary judgment evidence on the basis the evidence was conclusory, that it did not
meet the requirements of Rule 166a(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and that it contained hearsay. Our record
contains no ruling by the trial court on Biffle’s objections, and Biffle does not complain on appeal of the court’s failure
to rule. Accordingly, we will consider Wilson’s affidavit and the other summary judgment evidence in deciding this
case. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

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       Additionally, in her answers to interrogatories, Wilson described that she paid medical bills

in the range of $1,500. Wilson stated she was in good health prior to the accident. Before the

accident, she had COPD, asthma, macular degeneration, and two knee surgeries on each knee. She

claimed that, because of her injuries, her usual living activities were impaired for two years. She

noted that sitting up straight was difficult and her muscles were weak.

       On April 10, 2023, Biffle filed objections with her reply to Wilson’s response to her motion

for no-evidence summary judgment. She objected to Wilson’s affidavit, her answer to

interrogatories, and to the accident crash report, contending these items were not competent as

summary judgment proof. In her reply, she argued that Wilson improperly relied solely on lay

opinion to substantiate her claims.

       By written order, the trial court granted Biffle’s no-evidence summary judgment motion,

and further ordered that Wilson take nothing by her claims and causes of action against Biffle.

Wilson appealed.

                                      STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Under Rule 166a(i), after an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of

proof may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that no

evidence supports an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. Tex. R. Civ. P.

166a(i). The motion must specifically state the elements for which no evidence exists. Id.; Timpte

Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The nonmoving party must then present

evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to each element specified in the summary

judgment motion. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

       We review de novo a no-evidence summary judgment. See Starwood Mgmt., LLC v.

Swaim, 530 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. 2017). Accordingly, we “examine the entire record in the light

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most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts

against the motion.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005). We review a no-

evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to

differ in their conclusions. Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (citing City of

Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors

could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not.

Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310. If the nonmovant brings forward more than a scintilla of

probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, then a no-evidence summary

judgment is not proper. Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc.

v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).

                                                DISCUSSION

        In her sole issue on appeal, Wilson contends the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment. In briefing, she urges her response to Biffle’s no-evidence motion for summary

judgment established genuine issues of material fact as to (1) Biffle’s negligence in the operation

of her automobile; and (2) Wilson’s resulting injuries caused by the collision.3 We consider each

ground in turn.

        A. Negligence

        To prevail on a negligence cause of action, Wilson must establish the existence of a duty,

a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. See W. Invs. v. Urena, 162

S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005); IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Texas, Inc. v. Mason, 143

S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004).

3
  Biffle does not challenge that Wilson’s summary judgment evidence raised a genuine fact issue on the duty and
breach elements of Wilson’s negligence claim. Similarly, our review of the record shows there is a genuine issue of
material fact on these elements.

                                                        5
       The Supreme Court of Texas has held that, to prove causation, a plaintiff must present

competent evidence that proves that a condition exists and that the condition is causally related to

the event sued upon. Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. 2007). Expert testimony is

necessary to establish causation for medical conditions outside jurors’ common knowledge and

experience. Id. at 665. But the Court has also explained that a finding of causation without expert

evidence can be sufficiently supported by the “existence and nature of certain basic conditions,

proof of a logical sequence of events, and temporal proximity between an occurrence and the

conditions[.]” Id. at 667. Nonexpert evidence alone is “sufficient to support a finding of causation

in limited circumstances where both the occurrence and conditions complained of are such that the

general experience and common sense of laypersons are sufficient to evaluate the conditions and

whether they were probably caused by the occurrence.” Id. at 668. “[L]ay testimony establishing

a sequence of events [that] provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event and

the condition is sufficient proof of causation.” Id. at 666 (quoting Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp.,

675 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1984)).

       Notably, Texas courts have held that lay testimony is sufficient to create a genuine fact

issue on causation in certain instances. See id. at 669 (“Non-expert evidence of circumstances

surrounding the accident and [plaintiff]’s complaints is sufficient to allow a layperson of common

knowledge and experience to determine that [plaintiff]’s immediate post-accident condition which

resulted in his being transported to an emergency room and examined in the emergency room were

[sic] causally related to the accident.”); Kelley & Witherspoon, LLP v. Hooper, 401 S.W.3d 841,

849–50 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (concluding that the jury could causally connect car

accident to plaintiffs’ immediate head and neck pain and medical treatment for that pain without

expert testimony); Devoti v. Delaney, No. 14-11-00497-CV, 2012 WL 3677050, at *4

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that plaintiff’s

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testimony showed “a logical sequence of events and temporal proximity from which a factfinder

properly could infer, without the aid of expert testimony, that the [car] accident caused” the

plaintiff’s back and leg pain).

        Thus, lay testimony can support a finding of causation between an “automobile accident

and basic physical conditions which (1) are within the common knowledge and experience of

laypersons, (2) did not exist before the accident, (3) appeared after and close in time to the accident,

and (4) are within the common knowledge and experience of laypersons, caused by automobile

accidents.” Guevara, 247 S.W.3d at 667. Moreover, there is no specific requirement that injuries

or pain be obvious or immediately manifested at the time of the accident to otherwise rely on lay

testimony as courts recognize it can be within the common knowledge and experience of

laypersons that delayed pain or injury was caused by a car accident. Devoti, 2012 WL 3677050, at

*3.

        Here, Wilson’s lawsuit alleged Biffle’s negligence caused the collision that resulted in her

suffering bodily injury after she was “forcibly thrown with violence” inside the vehicle. Her

summary judgment evidence included her affidavit describing the sequence of events and a variety

of conditions including bruises and cuts, an injured knee, weakness in her muscles, and pulmonary

embolisms. Wilson averred she was riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by her daughter,

Biffle. Suddenly, Biffle passed through a traffic signal emitting a red light in her direction of travel.

As a result, Biffle struck another automobile driven by a third party. She detailed that Biffle failed

to keep a proper lookout, failed to timely and properly apply brakes, failed to stop her automobile

in compliance with a traffic control device, and failed to yield the right of way to another vehicle

that had the right of way. Wilson further described that the resulting collision was of great force

and violence causing her to suffer personal injuries and mental anguish which required medical

care. She suffered bruises on her face, around her eye, injured her hand, and her whole right side

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was bruised. She immediately sought medical care after the accident and was taken by ambulance

from the scene to a hospital. From there, she described a series of lengthy hospital and

rehabilitation stays for the next few months.

       At the summary judgment stage, Wilson does not bear the burden to “prove” causation.

She need only point to evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Perez v. Johnson,

No. 02-19-00082-CV, 2020 WL 5552139, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 17, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.); Devoti, 2012 WL 3677050, at *3. Here, we conclude that Wilson sufficiently showed

a logical sequence of events from which the fact-finder could infer that the accident caused her to

suffer bodily pain—bruises, cuts, knee pain, and weak muscles.

       After reviewing the summary judgment evidence, we conclude that Wilson presented

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether her injuries were

proximately caused by Biffle’s negligence. See Perez, 2020 WL 5552139, at *4 (concluding

plaintiff’s lay witness testimony evidence sufficiently showed a logical sequence of events from

which a fact-finder could infer the accident caused plaintiff’s neck, elbow, and back pain and such

was sufficient to overcome a no evidence motion); Devoti, 2012 WL 3677050, at *4–5 (concluding

that the back and leg pain plaintiff suffered very shortly after the accident can be “within the

experience and knowledge of laypersons as being caused by car accidents” and expert testimony

was not needed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element of causation).

       B. Damages

           (1) Pain and suffering

       “The presence or absence of physical pain is an ‘inherently subjective question.’” Devoti,

2012 WL 3677050, at *5 (quoting Enright v. Goodman Distrib., Inc., 330 S.W.3d 392, 397

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)). As the nonmovant, Wilson need only present

some evidence that her pain and suffering was proximately caused by the collision. A plaintiff’s

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lay testimony that she suffered and continues to suffer from bodily pain after a collision and did

not suffer from the pain before the accident, is legally sufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact on pain and suffering. See Perez, 2020 WL 5552139, at *4; Devoti, 2012 WL

3677050, at *4–5.

         Wilson presented evidence that she rode as a passenger in Biffle’s vehicle until a collision

of “great force and violence,” caused her to suffer personal injuries. She further showed that she

felt pain after the accident. Wilson also showed that she still had “weak” muscles and had difficulty

sitting up straight. From this affidavit testimony, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to

raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding physical pain and suffering.

              (2) Medical expenses

         To prove medical expenses, plaintiffs must present evidence of expenses that are related to

medical treatment of injuries caused by the defendant. JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, 466 S.W.3d

157, 162 (Tex. 2015). Of note, billing records related to medical treatment, standing alone and

without more, are insufficient to establish the necessary causal connection. See Burroughs

Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the opinions in the medical

records did not indicate they were independent conclusions); Smith v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 101

S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (noting that medical billing records alone

do not establish causation).

         Here, the only responsive evidence regarding Wilson’s medical expenses is her answer to

an interrogatory wherein she states she has paid medical bills “in the range of $1,500.” There are

no itemized medical bills for this charge, no explanation of the necessity or purpose of the service,

and no explanation of reasonableness.4

4
 Although Wilson did not attach any medical bills to her response to Biffle’s no-evidence summary judgment motion,
we note here that she produced a number of medical bills directly to Biffle prior to the trial setting. Biffle then filed a

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         Here, expert testimony was necessary to establish causation between the accident and the

injuries resulting in medical expenses. Moreover, a party cannot rely on its own interrogatory

answers to raise a fact issue. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 197.3 (stating that interrogatory answers may be

used only against the responding party); Yates v. Fisher, 988 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex. 1998).

Accordingly, as to her claim for medical expenses, Wilson failed to present more than a scintilla

of evidence establishing a factual issue. Thus, the trial court did not err by granting summary

judgment against Wilson regarding damages for medical expenses.

             (3) Mental anguish

         Texas authorizes mental anguish damages in the following types of cases: “(1) as the

foreseeable result of breach of duty arising out of certain special relationships, such as the

relationship between a physician and a patient; (2) for some common law torts that generally

involve intentional or malicious conduct such as libel . . . and (3) in virtually all personal injury

cases where the defendant’s conduct causes serious bodily injury.” Verinakis v. Med. Profiles, Inc.,

987 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). “Even when an

occurrence is of the type for which mental anguish damages are recoverable,” an award of mental

anguish damages must be supported by “direct evidence that the nature, duration, and severity of

mental anguish was sufficient to cause, and caused, either a substantial disruption in the plaintiff’s

daily routine or a high degree of mental pain and distress.” Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d

221, 231 (Tex. 2011). Mental anguish requires a showing that a plaintiff suffered a “high degree

of mental pain . . . [meaning] more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.”

motion to exclude the medical bills from evidence at trial. Biffle alleged the medical bills were produced outside the
discovery period, they did not show the amount actually paid or incurred, and they were not supported by an affidavit.
On the same day the trial court granted Biffle’s no evidence summary judgment motion, the trial court also granted
Biffle’s motion to exclude medical expenses.

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Saenz v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Parkway Co.

v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)).

       Here, Wilson did not produce evidence that she suffered from a “high degree of mental

pain and distress” arising to “more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.”

Id. In Wilson’s affidavit, she testified that her injuries “caused a great deal of mental distress and

anguish as [she] was worried about recovering from [her] injuries.” Given that Wilson failed to

detail the nature, duration, and severity of the mental anguish claimed, we cannot conclude the

evidence presented would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions.

See Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426. Absent the required level of detail, Wilson failed to raise a

genuine issue of material fact of a “substantial disruption” in her “daily routine,” or high degree

of mental distress, resulting from the motor-vehicle collision. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d at 231.

Although Wilson described that she worried about recovering from her injuries, her testimony

lacked any evidence of emotion rising to a “high degree of mental pain and distress.” Saenz, 925

S.W.2d at 614. Accordingly, as to her claim for mental distress damages, Wilson failed to present

more than a scintilla of evidence establishing a factual issue. Thus, the trial court did not err in

granting a no-evidence summary judgment with regard to damages for mental anguish.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We conclude that Wilson produced more than a scintilla of evidence of causation, bodily

injury, and pain and suffering. However, Wilson failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence

of her medical expenses and compensable mental anguish damages. We reverse the trial court’s

grant of no-evidence summary judgment on Wilson’s negligence claims with respect to causation,

bodily injury, and pain and suffering, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the no-evidence summary judgment.

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                                            GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

April 4, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
Alley, C.J. concurring

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