Court Opinion

ID: 9519773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:24:43.710958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:53.313629
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting: For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Department of Public Health Standards referenced in section 11 — 501.2(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 — 501.2(a)(1)) were inapplicable to the prosecution of defendant for the offense of reckless homicide. The factual background of defendant’s initial arrest for DUI and the law enforcement officer’s request for an defendant’s submission to a blood test pursuant to the provisions of the implied-consent statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 — 501.1) make this case distinct from the situation before the supreme court in People v. Murphy (1985), 108 111. 2d 228, 483 N.E.2d 1288, relied on by the majority, where the defendant was neither initially arrested for DUI nor was the blood test taken pursuant to the implied-consent provision. I must acknowledge that in Murphy there is language which is susceptible to the broad construction that section 11 — 501.2 was applicable only to circumstances where the ultimate prosecution was for DUI as defined in section 11 — 501. However, upon closer analysis, it is apparent that the court in Murphy was not specifically faced with ascertaining whether section 11 — 501.2 is applicable where the blood test arises out of defendant’s initial arrest for DUI and his submission to the test follows a request by a law enforcement officer who advised him from a card of the provisions of the implied-consent statute. Section 11 — 501.2, in pertinent part, states: “(a) Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 — 501 or a similar local ordinance, evidence of the concentration of alcohol, other drug or combination thereof in a person’s blood or breath at the time alleged, as determined by analysis of the person’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance, shall be admissible. Where such test is made the following provisions shall apply: ***.” In Murphy, the defendant was not arrested for DUI. Thus, section 11 — 501.2 makes it clear that in that case the provisions in section 11 — 501.2(a)(1) do not apply because the reckless homicide proceeding did not arise out of an arrest for an offense defined in section 11— 501. However, in the case at bar, the reckless homicide proceeding clearly did arise out of defendant’s initial arrest for DUI, an offense defined in section 11 — 501, and the blood test results were obtained as a direct result of the law enforcement officer’s request under the implied-consent statute. The plain language of section 11 — 501.2 reads that “[u]pon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 — 501 [DUI] ***.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95^2, par. 11 — 501.2(a).) It is the practice to give statutory language its customary meaning, unless doing so would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. (People v. Christensen (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 321, 328, 465 N.E.2d 93.) The implied-consent statutory scheme indicates a purpose to provide restrictions on chemical testing and analysis of a person’s blood, urine, or breath as a safeguard to one who by driving on the Illinois highways implicitly consents to being chemically tested when he is charged with DUI. (See People v. Hartwick (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 272, 275, 470 N.E.2d 606.) It is logical and reasonable that the legislature intended the requirements of section 11 — 501.2 to apply when: ever a law enforcement officer places a person under arrest for DUI and obtains a test pursuant to his request under the implied-consent statute. Whether a defendant is ultimately tried for DUI or for the more serious offense of reckless homicide, the same facts remain that the test was obtained by a law enforcement officer through the application of the implied-consent statute. The reckless homicide prosecution here falls squarely within the statute’s definition of a “proceeding arising out of an arrest [for DUI],” and the further requirements of section 11 — 501.2(a)(1) are applicable. As the State has not contested on appeal the defendant’s contention that Rule 11.01(5) of the Department of Public Health was not complied with concerning-the delivery of the blood sample taken from defendant, the trial court erred in admitting the test results into evidence and the defendant must be given a new trial.