Court Opinion

ID: 9788083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:29:56.378291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:04.120321
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — In 2006, the Legislature and then, in an identical fashion, the electorate, reformed provisions of California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) concerning the procedures for releasing sexually violent predators from civil commitment and permitting them to rejoin society.1 The issue before us is whether these reforms are constitutional.
The majority holds that the reforms do not violate defendant’s ex post facto and due process rights. I agree. But, because the Legislature and electorate did not make similar changes to other civil commitment schemes, the majority also holds that an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the changes violate equal protection principles. I disagree. Consistent with the unanimous view of all seven panels in five Courts of Appeal that have considered this precise question in originally published opinions, and of all the decisions in other states that have rejected this or similar equal protection contentions, I would find no equal protection violation. I would uphold the legislative and electoral reforms against all of the constitutional challenges of this case.
The equal protection question comes down to this: May society treat sexually violent predators — those who have committed and been convicted of sex crimes — differently from persons who did not commit sex crimes? To ask the question should be to answer it. As the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized, sexually violent predators are different from other *1212criminals; they are “particularly” (Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 364 [138 L.Ed.2d 501, 117 S.Ct. 2072] CHendricks)) or “ ‘extremely’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654]) dangerous. We do not need an evidentiary hearing to conclude that they present a unique danger to society that warrants specific remedies.
A community may take action to protect its children and other vulnerable members from violent sex offenders, even if that action does not apply to persons subject to other civil commitment schemes. The Legislature or electorate may, without running afoul of equal protection principles, address one societal problem even if it does not simultaneously address other problems. Society has long treated sexual predators differently from others. Good reason exists for this different treatment. Sexual predators are different. And their sexually predatory conduct has a uniquely traumatizing effect on their victims. The Legislature or the electorate or, as here, both, may address the dangers that sexually violent predators pose separately from other societal problems, and craft remedies to protect society from their depravations that differ from remedies crafted for nonsex offenders.
I. Background
A historical review is necessary to place this issue fully into context.
“Historically, the states have exercised a power of involuntary civil commitment involving the care and treatment of dangerous mentally disordered individuals.” (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584] (Hubbart).) “In recent years, lawmakers across the country have perceived a link between certain diagnosable mental disorders and violent sexual behavior that is criminal in nature. Through passage of the SVPA, California is one of several states to hospitalize or otherwise attempt to treat troubled sexual predators apart from any criminal sanctions they might receive, and apart from civil commitment schemes targeting other mental health problems. (Kansas v. Hendricks[, supra,] 521 U.S. 346, 388-389 . . . (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.) [identifying 17 states with such statutes] (Hendricks).)''’ (Hubbart, supra, at p. 1143, italics added.)
One early statute dealing specifically with sexual predators is a Kansas law enacted in 1994 entitled, much like the California statute at issue here, the Sexually Violent Predator Act. (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq.) In 1997, the United States Supreme Court considered — and rejected — a constitutional challenge (that did not include an equal protection challenge) to that law. (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346.) The high court explained that the “Kansas Legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act... in 1994 to grapple *1213with the problem of managing repeat sexual offenders. Although Kansas already had a statute addressing the involuntary commitment of those defined as ‘mentally ill,’ the legislature determined that existing civil commitment procedures were inadequate to confront the risks presented by ‘sexually violent predators’ ” (Id. at pp. 350-351, fn. omitted, italics added.)
The court quoted with approval the preamble to the Kansas law, where the Kansas Legislature explained that a “ ‘small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment statute] .... In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under the [general involuntary commitment statute], sexually violent predators generally have anti-social personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment procedure ... is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long term and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the [general involuntary civil commitment statute].’ ” (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 351, italics added.)
The Kansas statute defined a “sexually violent predator” as “ ‘any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.’ ” (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 352.) Under that law, a person could be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator only after prescribed procedures were followed, including “a trial [that] would be held to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the individual was a sexually violent predator.” (Id. at p. 353.) After that determination was made, “[c]onfined persons were afforded three different avenues of review: First, the committing court was obligated to conduct an annual review to determine whether continued detention was warranted. [Citation.] Second, the Secretary [of Social and Rehabilitation Services] was permitted, at any time, to decide that the confined individual’s condition had so changed that release was appropriate, and could then authorize the person to petition for release. [Citation.] Finally, even without the Secretary’s permission, the confined person could at any time file a release petition. [Citation.] If the court found that the State could no longer satisfy its burden under the initial commitment standard, the individual would be freed from confinement.” (Ibid.)
*1214In upholding the Kansas law, the high court found that “the Kansas Legislature has taken great care to confine only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals . . . .” (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 364, italics added.) It recognized “that psychiatric professionals are not in complete harmony in casting pedophilia, or paraphilias in general, as ‘mental illnesses.’ ” (Id. at p. 360, fn. 3.) Reiterating what it had said in an earlier case, however, the court stated that “[t]hese disagreements ... do not tie the State’s hands in setting the bounds of its civil commitment laws. In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the widest latitude in drafting such statutes.” (Ibid., citing Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 365, fn. 13 [77 L.Ed.2d 694, 103 S.Ct. 3043].) The court added that “when a legislature ‘undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.’ ” (Hendricks, supra, at p. 360, fn. 3, quoting Jones v. United States, supra, at p. 370.)
Justice Breyer, speaking for four members of the court, dissented in Hendricks, but only on the ex post facto point. (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 373-374 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.).) Speaking for three members of the court, Justice Breyer expressly agreed that, other than the ex post facto concern, the Kansas act was constitutional. (Id. at pp. 374-37S.)2 He noted that the “Constitution does not require Kansas to write all of its civil commitment rules in a single statute or forbid it to write two separate statutes each covering somewhat different classes of committable individuals.” (521 U.S. at p. 377.)
California’s SVPA was enacted a year after Kansas’s, and took effect January 1, 1996. (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 3, p. 5922.) In many respects, California’s SVPA is similar to the Kansas act. (See Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153.) As originally written, the SVPA required that, to qualify as a sexually violent predator, a person had to have been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims. (See Hubbart, supra, at p. 1144, fn. 6.) Today, only one victim is required. Accordingly, the SVPA today defines a “ ‘sexually violent predator’ ” as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) This definition is similar to that of the Kansas law reviewed in Hendricks, supra, *1215521 U.S. 346, except that California requires the person to have been convicted of, and not merely charged with, the sexually violent offense. Under the original SVPA, and still today, a person can be confined as a sexually violent predator only after a jury trial (if either party requests a jury) where the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the person is, in fact, a sexually violent predator. (See Hubbart, supra, at p. 1147.) Any civil commitment as a sexually violent predator was for a two-year period and could be extended for additional two-year periods only if the state filed a new petition for extended commitment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt at another jury trial (if requested) that the person remained a sexually violent predator. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1185.)
The California SVPA was accompanied by legislative findings similar to those stated in the preamble to the Kansas law. (See Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153.) In an uncodified statement, the California Legislature found and declared “that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders ... are not safe to be at large and if released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921; quoted in full in Hubbart, supra, at p. 1144, fn. 5.)
In Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, this court upheld the SVPA’s constitutionality against a broad-based attack, including an equal protection challenge. We relied heavily on Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, and explained that equal protection and due process analysis regarding the SVPA is the same under both the United States and the California Constitutions. (Hubbart, supra, at p. 1152, fn. 19.) We noted that “Hendricks emphasized the importance of deferring to the legislative branch in an area which is analytically nuanced and dependent upon medical science.” (Id. at p. 1156.) We also explained that the “SVPA is narrowly focused on a select group of violent criminal offenders who commit particular forms of predatory sex acts against both adults and children .... The problem targeted by the [SVPA] is acute, and the state interests — protection of the public and mental health treatment — are compelling.” (Id. at p. 1153, fn. 20.)
The year 2006 saw the enactment of a number of reforms in the law’s treatment of sexual predators. “On September 20, 2006, the Governor signed the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006, Senate Bill No. 1128 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1128). (Stats. 2006, ch. 337.) Senate Bill 1128 was urgency legislation that went into effect immediately. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 62.) Among other things, it amended provisions of the SVPA to provide the initial commitment set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6604 was for an indeterminate term. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 55.) All references to an extended commitment in sections 6604 *1216and 6604.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code were deleted. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, §§ 55, 56.)” (Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280-1281 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 142].) In an uncodified statement, the California Legislature found and declared that “[t]he primary public policy goal of managing sex offenders in the community is the prevention of future victimization,” and that the Legislature enacted the legislation “[i]n order to accomplish these goals . . . .” (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 2(a), (d).) The bill passed by a 40-to-zero vote in the Senate and a 75-to-zero vote in the Assembly. (Sen. Daily J. (Aug. 31, 2006) pp. 5554-5555; Assem. Daily J. (Aug. 30, 2006) pp. 7324-7325.)
The majority correctly explains that “[o]n November 7, 2006, California voters passed Proposition 83, entitled ‘The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law’ amending the [SVPA] effective November 8, 2006. Proposition 83 is a wide-ranging initiative that seeks to address the problems posed by sex offenders. It increases penalties for sex offenses, both by altering the definition of some sex offenses and by providing longer penalties for some offenses as well as modifying probation and parole provisions: it requires a GPS tracking device for felons subject to such registration for the remainder of their lives; it prohibits a registered sex offender from living within 2,000 feet of schools and parks; and it changes the [SVPA] by reducing the number of sexually violent offenses that qualify an offender for [sexually violent predator] status from two to one. (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 43-44.)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1186.)
Proposition 83 also “ ‘requires that [sexually violent predators] be committed by the court to a state mental hospital for an undetermined period of time rather than the renewable two-year commitment provided for under existing law.’ (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, p. 44.)” (Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281.) As relevant to the issues before us, Proposition 83 enacted the same reforms as had the Legislature the previous September. (Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 1281-1282; People v. Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559, 562-563 [65 Cal.Rptr.3d 922].)
Proposition 83’s findings include the following: “The People find and declare each of the following: [][]... [f] (b) Sex offenders have very high recidivism rates. According to a 1998 report by the U.S. Department of Justice, sex offenders are the least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend, and they prey on the most innocent members of our society. More than two-thirds of the victims of rape and sexual assault are under the age of 18. Sex offenders have a dramatically higher recidivism rate for their crimes than any other type of violent felon. [][]... (k) California is the only *1217state, of the number of states that have enacted laws allowing involuntary civil commitments for persons identified as sexually violent predators, which does not provide for indeterminate commitments. California automatically allows for a jury trial every two years irrespective of whether there is any evidence to suggest or prove that the committed person is no longer a sexually violent predator. As such, this act allows California to protect the civil rights of those persons committed as a sexually violent predator while at the same time protect society and the system from unnecessary or frivolous jury trial actions where there is no competent evidence to suggest a change in the committed person.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, § 2, p. 127; see Historical and Statutory Notes, 47C West’s Ann. Pen. Code (2008 ed.) foil. § 209, pp. 52-53.)
Proposition 83’s intent clause provides as relevant: “It is the intent of the People of the State of California in enacting this measure to strengthen and improve the laws that punish and control sexual offenders.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 83, § 31, p. 138; see Historical and Statutory Notes, 47C West’s Ann. Pen. Code, supra, foil. § 209, p. 53.)
Proposition 83 was approved by a 70.5 percent majority of the voters casting votes on the proposition. (See Cal. Sect, of State, Votes For and Against November 7, 2006 Statewide Ballot Measures <http://www.sos.ca.gov> [as of Jan. 28, 2010].)
As relevant here, the majority accurately summarizes the substance of the 2006 reforms: “In short, under Proposition 83 [and also under the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006], an individual [sexually violent predator’s] commitment term is indeterminate, rather than for a two-year term as in the previous version of the [SVPA]. [A sexually violent predator] can only be released conditionally or unconditionally if the [Department of Mental Health] authorizes a petition for release and the state does not oppose it or fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still meets the definition of [a sexually violent predator], or if the individual, petitioning the court on his own, is able to bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer [a sexually violent predator]. In other words, the method of petitioning the court for release and proving fitness to be released, which under the former Act had been the way [a sexually violent predator] could cut short his two-year commitment, now becomes the only means of being released from an indefinite commitment when the [Department of Mental Health] does not support release.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1187-1188.)
Two recent Court of Appeal opinions have held that the 2006 reforms apply to sexually violent predators who were already civilly committed under *1218the SVPA. (Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1275; People v. Shields, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 559.) But various sexually violent predators, including defendant Richard McKee, who was convicted in 1991 of committing lewd acts against an 11-year-old babysitter and in 1998 of committing lewd acts against his eight-year-old niece, have challenged the reforms’ constitutional validity. In an opinion originally certified for publication, the Court of Appeal in this case upheld the reforms against defendant’s challenges, including an equal protection challenge. We granted review. Since then, six other unanimous Court of Appeal opinions, representing five of California’s six appellate districts, have upheld the reforms against all challenges, including equal protection. We have granted review in each case and are holding each pending resolution of this case. (People v. Johnson, S164388, review granted Aug. 13, 2008; People v. Riffey, S164711, review granted Aug. 20, 2008; People v. Boyle, S166167, review granted Oct. 1, 2008; People v. Garcia, S166682, review granted Oct. 16, 2008; People v. Johndrow, S175337, review granted Sept. 17, 2009; People v. Rotroff, S178455, review granted Jan. 13, 2010.) Although our grants of review effectively depublished these opinions (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1)), we may judicially notice our own records. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) These records show that each of the seven Court of Appeal panels that have decided this issue found that sexually violent predators subject to the SVPA are not situated similarly to persons subject to other civil commitment programs for purposes of the 2006 reforms.
Thus, seven originally published Court of Appeal opinions rejected constitutional challenges to the 2006 reforms, including the equal protection challenge at issue here. Until today, no court has reached a contrary result.
II. Discussion
Although the majority upholds the 2006 reforms against due process and ex post facto challenges, it finds they potentially violate equal protection principles. I disagree. The reforms are constitutional in all respects.
I will discuss (1) whether the law must treat sexually violent predators the same as others in deciding when to release them into society; (2) the majority’s apparent view that every detail of every civil commitment program is subject to strict scrutiny (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1197-1198, 1210); (3) out-of-state cases which, as will be seen, unanimously reject this or closely similar equal protection contentions; and (4) the evidentiary hearing the majority has mandated.
A. Equal Protection
“ ‘ “The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate *1219purpose of the law receive like treatment.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ [Citation.]” (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.)
An express purpose of the SVPA in general, and the 2006 reforms specifically, is to protect society from sexually violent predators. This is certainly a legitimate purpose. “The problem targeted by the [SVPA] is acute, and the state interests — protection of the public and mental health treatment — are compelling.” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20.) The question before us is whether sexually violent predators are situated similarly regarding this legitimate purpose to persons who are not sexually violent predators.
The majority finds that sexually violent predators are similarly situated for these purposes to persons civilly committed under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act) (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) and that, because the 2006 reforms did not extend to the MDO Act, those reforms potentially violate equal protection.3 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1203.) It orders the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to “determine whether the legislative distinctions in classes of persons subject to civil commitment are reasonable and factually based . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1210.) If the court on remand finds that the distinction in classes, i.e., the distinction between sexually violent predators subject to civil commitment and others subject to civil commitment, is not reasonable and factually based, the court presumably is to declare the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006 and Proposition 83 unconstitutional. I disagree. Society can reasonably determine that sexually violent predators present an acute danger that situates them differently than nonsex offenders. As it relates to the 2006 reforms, they are situated differently for purposes of the procedures whereby they are released into society.
The MDO Act, enacted in 1985 (People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 97 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557]), provides for the civil commitment of mentally disordered offenders who were convicted of one or more of a wide range of crimes. Some of the eligible crimes are sexual offenses, but most are *1220not. (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (e)(2).) For example, one of the eligible crimes is “[a] crime in which the perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened another with the use of force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm in such a manner that a reasonable person would believe and expect that the force or violence would be used. For purposes of this subparagraph, substantial physical harm shall not require proof that the threatened act was likely to cause great or serious bodily injury.” (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q).)
The MDO Act is thus very broad and includes in its coverage a wide range of violent offenders. It is California’s general involuntary civil commitment program for mentally disordered offenders. “In contrast, the SVPA,” enacted a decade after the MDO Act, “narrowly targets ‘a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders [who] can be identified while they are incarcerated.’ (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921.)” (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.) Thus, sexually violent predators are a particularly dangerous subset of the broader group of persons who may be civilly committed under the MDO Act. The Legislature and electorate, or both, may validly enact specific provisions concerning this particularly dangerous subset that do not apply to the broader range of persons subject to the MDO Act. Specifically, the Legislature and the electorate may enact rules for releasing sexually violent predators into society that are different than the rales that apply to the general civil commitment program.
The majority cites virtually no authority addressing the question actually before us — whether society may treat sex offenders differently, and less favorably, than nonsex offenders. It relies almost exclusively on general authority that, as relevant here, merely stands for the obvious proposition that civil commitment programs are subject to equal protection principles.4 In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457 [149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097], for example, involved the opposite situation from this case: treating nonsex offenders less favorably than sex offenders. (Id. at p. 466.) I will focus, instead, on the specific issue presented.
*1221Society — speaking usually through its elected representatives and sometimes directly or, as here, both — has long considered sex offenders different from others and has long prescribed specific remedies for the specific problem they present. For example, many lifetime registration requirements apply to sex offenders that do not apply to other offenders. (Pen. Code, § 290.) Failure of a sex offender to obey these registration requirements can have serious consequences. As the majority opinion recognizes, Proposition 83 itself “is a wide-ranging initiative that seeks to address the problems posed by sex offenders.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1186.) It requires GPS tracking of sex offenders and prohibits them from living within 2,000 feet of schools and parks. These requirements do not apply to nonsex offenders. All of these requirements are reasonably based on the perception that sex offenders are particularly dangerous. None of them violate equal protection.
The 2006 reforms were limited to addressing the danger that sex offenders pose. They do not address other societal problems, such as those posed by mentally disordered offenders governed by the MDO Act. But that circumstance does not make the reforms unconstitutional. Addressing some societal problems but not others in a single piece of legislation does not violate equal protection. “[B]oth the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized the propriety of a legislature’s [or, presumably, the electorate’s] taking reform ‘ “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A] legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.’ [Citation.]” (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 488 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581].) Society reasonably believes that sex offenders pose a particularly “acute” problem. (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20.) It can validly address that problem without attempting at the same time to address all other problems.
Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, the high court decision that upheld Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, did not specifically address an equal protection challenge. But that does not make the decision irrelevant. Rather, Hendricks is instructive. The high court noted that the Kansas Legislature had enacted its act “to grapple with the problem of managing repeat sexual offenders” and had determined that existing civil commitment programs were inadequate to confront that problem. (Hendricks, supra, at pp. 350-351.) It also noted that “the Kansas Legislature has taken great care to confine only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals . .. .” (Id. at p. 364.) In the portion of his separate opinion agreeing with the majority, Justice Breyer added that “[t]he Constitution does not require Kansas [or presumably *1222California] to write all of its civil commitment rules in a single statute or forbid it to write two separate statutes each covering somewhat different classes of committable individuals.” (Id. at p. 377 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.).) It should be obvious that if a state enacts a new civil commitment program to deal specifically with sexual offenders because the existing civil commitment programs are inadequate to do so, then the new program will not be identical to the existing programs. Creating a new program identical to an existing inadequate program would accomplish nothing. Rather, the new program will necessarily be different and, in some respects at least, less favorable to sexual offenders than the existing programs. So was the case in Kansas; so is the case in California.
In short, the SVPA seeks to protect the public from sexually violent predators. This purpose is entirely legitimate. Regarding this legitimate purpose, those predators are situated differently from others. The Legislature and the electorate may prescribe rules for their release into society that are different from the rules that apply to California’s general, much broader, civil commitment program.
B. Strict Scrutiny
I question whether the 2006 reforms are subject to strict scrutiny rather than review under the more deferential rational basis test. (See generally People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836-838 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 94 P.3d 551].) I recognize that “this court has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional review . . . .” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20.) But this court has never considered, in an adversarial setting, whether every detail of involuntary civil commitment procedures should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The belief that strict scrutiny adheres to commitment proceedings like the SVPA can be traced to In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 465, which in turn cited People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375]. Olivas involved commitment of juveniles to the California Youth Authority, so it is not on point. But it invoked strict scrutiny because “personal liberty,” a “fundamental interest,” was at stake. (Olivas, supra, at p. 251.) Moye cited Olivas and said that strict scrutiny applies “[bjecause petitioner’s personal liberty is at stake.” (Moye, supra, at p. 465.) In Moye, the People had conceded that strict scrutiny applied. (Ibid.) Because of this *1223concession, this court has never really grappled with the question. Here, the Attorney General argues that strict scrutiny does not apply, and that the rational basis test should apply. He makes a strong case.
Recently, in People v. Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th 821, we rejected the notion that strict scrutiny applies whenever a statutory classification would subject a person to a greater period of incarceration. (Id. at pp. 837-838.) Wilkinson was a criminal case and involved a criminal classification. This case involves civil commitments. Nevertheless, Wilkinson teaches that we cannot simply say that a classification is subject to strict scrutiny merely because it touches on personal liberty. A person may have a fundamental interest in his or her liberty, but I question whether this fundamental interest extends to all procedures whereby decisions involving personal liberty are made. As I will show in part II.C, post, courts from other states that have considered the question have overwhelmingly concluded that strict scrutiny does not apply to equal protection challenges to civil commitment programs.
Sexually violent predators are certainly not a suspect class. Additionally, I question whether a person has a fundamental interest in any particular burden or standard of proof leading to a possible finding that he no longer qualifies as a sexually violent predator. Penal classifications that can lead to greatly enhanced prison sentences are subject to the rational basis test. (People v. Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838.) Similarly, a strong argument exists that matters regarding the burden and standard of proof in deciding whether a person is no longer a sexually violent predator should be governed by the rational basis test. To say that a person has a fundamental interest in a particular burden or standard of proof trivializes the concept of what is fundamental.
The majority notes that the imposition of lifetime registration requirements on sex offenders, but not others, is subject to rational basis review. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1211, fn. 14.) But, because the stigma attached to the requirements may be great and the penal consequences of failure to register immense, the registration requirements can have a far greater impact on a sex offender’s life than the exact procedures of a civil commitment program. To say that the former is subject to rational basis review but the latter to strict scrutiny seems contrived at best.
Ultimately, we do not have to decide the exact test that applies here, because, as I have explained, sexually violent predators are not situated similarly to other offenders for equal protection purposes. Moreover, the high court has not yet expressly decided the point. (See Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 318-319 [125 L.Ed.2d 257, 113 S.Ct. 2637].) If and when it does *1224so, this court will presumably follow its lead, as we have stated that equal protection analysis in this regard is the same under both the United States and California Constitutions. (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1152, fn. 19.)
C. Cases from Other States
Every case outside of California of which I am aware (neither defendant nor the majority cite any to the contrary) that has considered this or a closely similar equal protection contention has found no violation in treating civilly committed sex offenders less favorably than persons committed under other civil commitment programs. I discuss some of the cases in alphabetical order by state.
The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to Arizona’s version of the SVPA despite the fact that personal liberty is involved: “We conclude that the rational basis test applies. Petitioners have viewed too expansively the interest at stake. . . . [Tjhey have not pointed us to, and we have not found, a fundamental right to have particular procedures apply. The courts that have analyzed equal protection challenges based upon the application of differing sets of rules have applied the rational basis test, even in cases such as this one, where liberty may ultimately be at stake. [Citations.]” (Martin v. Reinstein (Ct.App. 1999) 195 Ariz. 293 [987 P.2d 779, 796].) The court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the Arizona act’s treating sex offenders differently from those committed under Arizona’s general civil commitment statutes. Noting that the Arizona “legislature has found that members of Petitioners’ class [i.e., sex offenders] tend to repeat their criminal acts and pose a higher risk of danger to the public than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally disabled persons,” the court held “that it was not irrational or unreasonable for the legislature to create a different classification for Petitioners.” (Id.., 987 P.2d at p. 797.)
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to the Ryce Act, Florida’s version of the SVPA, despite the fact that personal liberty is involved: “[Petitioner] contends that his fundamental right to liberty is at issue here and, thus, strict scrutiny is the proper standard by which the statute should be measured. However, we conclude that [petitioner] mischaracterizes the nature of his equal protection claim. Even though [petitioner’s] liberty may ultimately be at stake, his claim challenges the Legislature’s decision to create a special classification for sexually violent predators and to apply special procedures to such involuntary civil commitments. Thus, we conclude that [petitioner’s] equal protection claim should be evaluated under the rational basis test.” (Westerheide v. State (Fla. 2002) 831 So.2d 93, 111, citing Martin v. Reinstein, supra, 987 P.2d at pp. 795-798.)
*1225The Florida Supreme Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the Ryce Act’s treating sex offenders differently from those subject to the Baker Act, another civil commitment program. “The Ryce Act serves the dual state interests of providing mental health treatment to sexually violent predators and protecting the public from these individuals. Further, the act applies equally to all members of the statutory class of ‘sexually violent predators.’ [Petitioner’s] equal protection argument rests on the false premise that individuals subject to commitment under the Ryce Act are similarly situated to mentally ill persons committed under the Baker Act. The Legislature has clearly stated the reasons for distinguishing sexually violent predators from other mentally ill persons.” (Westerheide v. State, supra, 831 So.2d at p. 112, italics added.) After citing legislative findings comparable to those concerning California’s SVPA, the court “concludefd] that the specialized treatment needs of sexually violent predators and the high risk that they pose to the public if not committed for long-term control, care, and treatment justify the Legislature’s separate classification and treatment scheme. Thus, we find no equal protection violation . . . .” (831 So.2d at p. 112.)
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois equivalent of California’s SVPA “is subject to the rational basis test. . . . The statutory classifications assailed by defendant are not based on race, national origin, sex or illegitimacy, nor do they implicate fundamental rights.” (In re Detention of Samuelson (2000) 189 Ill.2d 548 [244 Ill.Dec. 929, 727 N.E.2d 228, 236].) It also rejected an equal protection challenge to Illinois’s treating sex offenders differently than those subject to commitment under a broader civil commitment act. It held that those who qualify as sexually violent persons “present different societal problems than those whose conduct is subject to the larger, more inclusive class as defined by” the broader civil commitment act. (Id., 727 N.E.2d at p. 237.) “Accordingly, we cannot say that the classification formulated by the legislature is unreasonable.” (Ibid.)
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to Iowa’s version of the SVPA, despite the fact that personal liberty is involved: “As the Arizona Court of Appeals recently observed, governmental classifications of the mentally ill have historically been analyzed under the rational basis test even when individual liberty was at stake.” (In re Detention of Williams (Iowa 2001) 628 N.W.2d 447, 453, citing Martin v. Reinstein, supra, 987 P.2d at p. 796.) It also rejected an equal protection challenge to Iowa’s treating sex offenders differently from those subject to commitment under other laws. “The legislation under review plainly states the reasons for distinguishing between mentally ill sex offenders and other mentally ill persons.” (Williams, supra, at p. 453.) After citing legislative findings comparable to those concerning California’s SVPA, the court concluded that the distinction between sexually *1226violent predators and those committed under another provision “dictates different treatment, both in method and duration. As this court noted in [another case], ‘[t]he particularly devastating effects of sexual crimes on victims, and the offenders’ need for specialized treatment provide a rational basis for the classification.’ [Citation.] So also here, the specialized treatment needs of [sexually violent predators], when compared to others who suffer from different mental abnormalities, justify the different classification and treatment chosen by the legislature.” (Williams, at p. 454.)
The Missouri Supreme Court was one of the few to subject a law comparable to the SVPA “to strict scrutiny because it affects the fundamental right of liberty.” (In re Care and Treatment of Coffman (Mo. 2007) 225 S.W.3d 439, 445.) Nevertheless, the court rejected an equal protection challenge similar to the one here. In that case, the petitioner, who had already been determined to be a sexually violent predator, sought to be released from civil commitment. Under the Missouri law, in order to obtain a jury trial, he had to either (1) receive authorization from the director of the department of mental health, or (2) show by a preponderance of the evidence that he should be released. (Id. at p. 443.) The petitioner argued “that the requirement that he demonstrate his entitlement to release by a preponderance of the evidence violates equal protection because ‘[n]o other person involuntarily civilly committed must make a preliminary showing to a trial court of facts “warranting” a second trial[.]’ ” (Id. at p. 445.) The court disagreed. “This argument ignores the fact that persons who are committed as sexually violent predators are committed because they are ‘distinctively dangerous’ to society. [Citation.] Because the basis for commitment of sexually violent predators is different from general civil commitments, there is no requirement that sexually violent predators be afforded exactly the same rights as persons committed under the general civil standard. [Citation.] The requirement that a sexually violent predator demonstrate his initial right to release by a preponderance of the evidence is narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in keeping people committed if it is more likely than not that they will commit sexually violent crimes if released. The .. . statute does not violate the equal protection clause.” (Ibid.)
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not decide what level of scrutiny North Dakota’s equivalent of the SVPA should receive because the North Dakota law “survives [the] equal protection challenge under even the highest level of scrutiny.” (In re P.F. (2008) 2008 ND 37 [744 N.W.2d 724, 731].) “There are important differences between those committed because the court has determined they are sexually dangerous and those committed because of mental illness or chemical dependency.” (Id., 744 N.W.2d at pp. 731-732.) “The potential level of danger these two groups pose to society is different. Sexually dangerous individuals are distinctively dangerous due to the high *1227probability that they will commit further acts of sexually predatory conduct if not confined in a secure facility.” (Id. at p. 732.) “The State has a compelling interest in protecting the public, and that interest justifies treating sexually dangerous individuals differently.” (Ibid.) “The heightened risk sexually dangerous individuals pose and the State’s compelling interest in protecting the public justify the classification and differences in the treatment of sexually dangerous individuals, and the distinct procedures and safeguards further the State’s interest in protecting the public.” (Id. at p. 733.) Accordingly, the court found no equal protection violation in treating sexually dangerous persons differently than others. (Ibid.)
The South Carolina Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to an equal protection challenge to South Carolina’s equivalent of the SVPA. (In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh (2002) 351 S.C. 122 [568 S.E.2d 338, 351].) Citing with approval In re Detention of Williams, supra, 628 N.W.2d 447, the court also rejected the challenge. “To require the Legislature to treat the two groups [sexually violent predators and those committed under another civil commitment process] similarly would require overruling a rational determination that sexually violent predators have certain characteristics which make their treatment needs different from other involuntarily committed individuals. The potential danger to the community provides a rational reason why sexually violent predators should be treated differently than other committed patients. The classification is not plainly arbitrary, but, instead, is reasonable in light of the differences between the two groups. [Citation.]” (Luckabaugh, supra, at p. 352.)
Washington applies the rational basis test to equal protection challenges to its version of the SVPA. (In re Detention of Stout (2007) 159 Wn.2d 357 [150 P.3d 86, 96].) The Washington Court of Appeals rejected an equal protection challenge quite similar to the one of this case. “[Appellant] argues that the differences ... in the release procedures violate his right to equal protection. ...[][] There is a rational basis for treating sexually violent predators and other mentally ill persons differently with respect to release procedures. . . . [Differences in dangerousness, treatment methods, and prognosis for the mentally ill and violent sex offenders justify treating the two groups differently. [][]... [Allowing those committed under [the civil commitment statute for other mentally ill persons] to be released solely on the recommendation of the superintendent but requiring a show cause and a full evidentiary hearing before sexually violent predators are released does not violate equal protection.” (Petersen v. State (2000) 104 Wn.App. 283 [36 P.3d 1053, 1057], fns. omitted.)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to decide whether strict scrutiny or rational review applies to an equal protection challenge to Wisconsin’s *1228version of the SVPA because it was not necessary to do so. (State v. Post (1995) 197 Wis.2d 279 [541 N.W.2d 115, 130].) It considered an equal protection challenge to the release procedures that apply in Wisconsin to sexually violent persons, which are closely similar to the California procedures challenged in this case, and which, like the analogous California procedure, are more stringent than the procedures under Wisconsin’s general civil commitment statute. (Id., 541 N.W.2d at p. 128, fn. 22.) It then rejected that challenge: “[T]he people can choose, through their duly elected representatives, to address complex social problems in more than one way. ... [][].. . The legislature has determined that, as a class, persons predisposed to sexual violence are more likely to pose a higher level of danger to the community than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally disabled persons. This heightened level of dangerousness and the unique treatment needs of sexually violent persons justify distinct legislative approaches to further the compelling governmental purpose of protection of the public.” (Id. at p. 130.)
D. The Evidentiary Hearing
The majority today orders a superior court judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether society may take steps to protect itself from sexually violent predators that differ from steps it takes regarding persons subject to California’s general involuntary civil commitment program. At the hearing, “[t]he trial court may, if appropriate, permit expert testimony.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1209.) The purpose of the hearing, according to the majority, is to give the government the opportunity to demonstrate that the 2006 reforms are “based on a reasonable perception of the unique dangers that [sexually violent predators] pose rather than a special stigma that [sexually violent predators] may bear in the eyes of California’s electorate.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1210.) (The majority opinion should, but does not, add “and the California Legislature.”)
At the evidentiary hearing, however, the court apparently is not to resolve any factual dispute in the way courts normally do. The majority adds that “mere disagreement among experts will not suffice to overturn the Proposition 83 amendments [and, presumably, the Legislature’s amendments]. The trial court must determine whether the legislative distinctions in classes of persons subject to civil commitment are reasonable and factually based — not whether they are incontrovertible or uncontroversial.” (Mai. opn., ante, at pp. 1210-1211.)
Fortunately, I will not be the trial judge who has to try to make sense of these pronouncements on remand, but apparently the trial court will not be allowed to resolve a factual dispute among experts. Indeed, the majority seems to give the trial court discretion to prohibit expert testimony entirely, *1229for it says that the court “may” admit such testimony “if appropriate.” The majority does not suggest under what circumstances expert testimony might be inappropriate, but noting that expert testimony might be admitted if appropriate implies that nonexpert testimony might be appropriate instead. If expert testimony is found inappropriate, what kind of testimony would be appropriate? Anecdotal evidence about particular sexually violent predators who, in the view of the witness, either are or are not as dangerous as sexually violent predators? Or, conversely, anecdotal evidence about particular persons subject to the MDO Act who, in the view of the witness, either are or are not as dangerous as sexually violent predators? Or perhaps testimony from a person who was (or was not) the victim of a sexual crime that, in the witness’s view, sexually violent predators in general either are or are not particularly dangerous? None of this would be helpful, and surely either side could find plenty of witnesses to supply whatever testimony of that kind it desired.
The majority states it is not contemplating the use of nonexpert testimony. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1209-1210, fn. 12.) That is reassuring, but if so, it seems the hearing on remand will necessarily turn on expert testimony. Whether society should treat sex crimes and their perpetrators differently from those who commit other crimes, however, is a judgment call for society to make, not a “fact” for a judge to determine after an evidentiary hearing. In Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514 [20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 88 S.Ct. 2145], the United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to making public intoxication a crime. There, the trial court, in invalidating the law, purported to make factual findings that alcoholism is a disease that a person cannot control. The high court rejected those findings: “Whatever else may be said of them, those are not ‘findings of fact’ in any recognizable, traditional sense in which that term has been used in a court of law ... .” (Id. at p. 521.) Similarly, whether the California Legislature, the California electorate, and legislatures throughout the country may reasonably treat sex offenders as a separate category with separate remedies is not a fact comparable to other facts that trial courts determine. Neither sociology nor penology is an exact science. This court and the high court have already described sexually violent predators as “ ‘extremely dangerous’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253) or “particularly dangerous” (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 364). An evidentiary hearing cannot change that.
Moreover, the victims of sexual crimes are especially likely to be traumatized because, as the Iowa Supreme Court noted, sexual crimes have “ ‘particularly devastating effects’ ” on the victims. (In re Detention of Williams, supra, 628 N.W.2d at p. 454.) The exact nature of these effects and this *1230traumatization cannot be quantified at an evidentiary hearing, but I reject the notion that a single judge could conclude that it is unreasonable to view the traumatizing effects of sexual crimes as different from the effects of other crimes.
In upholding Kansas’s version of the SVPA, the high court stressed that legislatures must be given the widest latitude to legislate in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainty. (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 360, fn. 3, 370.) That describes this situation. How to treat sex crimes is “analytically nuanced” and, as such, we must defer to the legislative branch. (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1156.) The California Legislature and electorate must be given the widest latitude to legislate in this area, which is why the high court upheld Kansas’s SVPA, and why courts throughout the nation have upheld their states’ versions of the SVPA.
The majority cites some specific factual statements by Proposition 83’s proponents and the proponents’ reference to a “1998 report” as also warranting an evidentiary hearing. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1206.) I disagree for two reasons. First, the issue before us is whether society may treat sex offenders differently from other offenders, not whether specific factual claims by proponents of legislation are correct. Second, the Legislature did not rely on those findings and that report when it enacted the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006. Thus, even if a perceived inaccuracy in the factual findings cited by Proposition 83’s proponents would provide a reason to overturn that initiative measure, the inaccuracy would provide no reason to overturn the Legislature’s identical provisions.
The majority acknowledges only obliquely, in a footnote near the end of its opinion, that the Legislature also enacted the reforms the majority finds potentially invalid. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1209-1210, fn. 12.) Then it gets technical. It says, “The People have not addressed whether the legislative history of that statute contains any justification for treating [sexually violent predators] differently from [mentally disordered offenders] and may do so on remand.” (Id. at p. 1210, fn. 12.) (However, the majority also directs the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, i.e., for an evidentiary hearing. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1211.) Thus, it is not clear when the People are supposed to have the opportunity to defend the Legislature’s actions.) I agree the People have not made a separate argument that the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006 is valid even if Proposition 83 is invalid. Such an argument would seem unnecessary given that the two provisions are identical as relevant here. But at least the People have noted that both the Legislature and the electorate enacted the reforms at issue. Defendant never even cites *1231the Legislature’s actions. If we are to get technical, I suppose we would have to say that defendant challenges only Proposition 83, and not also the Legislature’s enactment of the same reforms. If so, today’s opinion only could endanger Proposition 83 and not also the Legislature’s reforms. It may seem absurd to invalidate one but not the other, given that they are identical, but that seems to be the necessary consequence of the majority’s refusal to confront directly the fact that the legislation it finds potentially unreasonable was enacted by both the Legislature and the electorate.
The majority confidently asserts that any ruling invalidating the reforms of 2006 would not endanger the constitutional validity of other ways in which society has treated sex offenders differently from others, for example, by imposing lifetime registration requirements. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1211, fn. 14.) I hope future potential litigants and courts will heed this assertion. But if the result of the mandated evidentiary hearing is the trial court’s finding that the 2006 reforms are not “based on a reasonable perception of the unique dangers that [sexually violent predators] pose,” but rather are based on “a special stigma that [sexually violent predators] may bear in the eyes of California’s electorate [and the Legislature]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1210)— and thus the 2006 reforms violate equal protection guarantees — it is hard to imagine how society could reasonably impose lifetime registration requirements on those same persons that are not imposed on others.
I need not resolve this conundrum, because I believe the law may use different procedures for deciding when to release sexually violent predators into society than it uses regarding other civilly committed persons. No evidentiary hearing can invalidate this legislative choice.
III. Conclusion
The majority has empowered a single superior court judge to find unreasonable all of the following: the unanimous judgment of both branches of California’s Legislature; the overwhelming judgment of the California electorate; the judgment of legislatures throughout the nation; and the decision of the United States Supreme Court approving of the Kansas Legislature’s determination that sexually violent predators present risks that the state’s general involuntary commitment procedure was inadequate to address. This action is contrary to the unanimous judgment of all seven Court of Appeal opinions that considered this precise question in originally published opinions, as well as the judgment of courts around the nation that have rejected equal protection challenges to their states’ equivalent of the SVPA. I cannot agree. Whether sexually violent predators present a distinct danger warranting unique remedies is for society to determine, not a trial judge.
*1232Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s equal protection holding. I would affirm entirely the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Baxter, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 10, 2010. Baxter, J., and Chin, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 The majority opinion briefly acknowledges the Legislature’s action (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1209, fn. 12), but otherwise it discusses only what the electorate did and largely ignores the fact that the Legislature acted first.

Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent on the ex post facto point and expressed no opinion regarding the other issues. Thus, “at least eight justices found no basis on which to conclude that the act violated Hendricks’s due process rights.” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1155, fn. 22.)

Defendant and the majority also discuss to some extent other civil commitment programs such as those for persons found not guilty of a crime due to insanity. Because these programs are even farther removed from the SVPA than the MDO Act, and the majority concentrates on the MDO Act, I will not discuss the other civil commitment programs. What I say about the MDO Act applies even more strongly to other programs.

The majority cites only one case finding an equal protection violation that actually involves treating sexually violent predators less favorably than others. (In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 315]; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 1203.) Calhoun found an equal protection violation in permitting persons committed under the MDO Act, but not sexually violent predators committed under the SVPA, to refuse antipsychotic medication. (In re Calhoun, supra, at pp. 1350-1351.) I need not consider whether Calhoun was correct in this regard because it hardly applies here. The exact criteria for medicating mentally disordered offenders is an entirely different matter from the procedures adopted for releasing them into society.