Court Opinion

ID: 9689382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:29:37.531446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:47.546547
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3). Defendant received concurrent sentences of fifteen to thirty-five years for each conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and ten to fifteen years for the conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant appeals as of right and we reverse.
The prosecution made a pretrial motion to admit testimony by defendant’s half sister regarding uncharged prior criminal sexual conduct perpetrated upon her involving acts similar to those charged in this prosecution. The victim here was defendant’s stepdaughter, nine years old at trial, and less than seven when the sexual abuse took place. The accusations were not made until two years after the events. The motion revealed that the half sister would testify about innumerable sexual acts including “rape” having been inflicted upon her by defendant over a period when she was age four to age thirteen (according to defendant-appellant’s brief), or when she was age three to adult (according to the prosecutor’s brief). We conclude that these allegations of similar acts were so horrendously prejudicial as to require *648their suppression as being more prejudicial than probative. This was not a skunk in the jury box. It was a pig farm. No trier of fact could have been unswayed by the depiction of this depravity in assessing discrete claims of the “bad man’s” guilt. We decry permitting the effect of this testimony under any rubric, including an instruction by the court that the prior acts were introduced in accordance with MRE 404(b)(1) for purposes of establishing a scheme or plan, or absence of accident or mistake.
Due process is the constitutional guarantee of federal and state government that crimes charged against the most hateful among us are entitled to be indicted, examined, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise we have given in to prosecutorial tyranny. The effect here was to try the defendant for uncharged criminal acts of monstrous repugnance without the bother of due process. The trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). The prosecution’s argument that because of defendant’s general denial all elements of the offenses were at issue is correct under VanderVliet, but the situation surrounding the alleged contacts was so inflammatory and so prejudicial that the probative value was clearly outweighed.
Reversed.
Doctoroff, C.J., concurred.