Court Opinion

ID: 9836805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:07.502693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.941334
License: Public Domain

*273Chief Judge CRAWFORD
(concurring in part and in the result):
I concur with Part I of the opinion. As my colleague’s excellent historical analysis demonstrates, if there is any “tension” created by the necessity of placing military judges within an officer personnel structure, I am fully confident that their judicial independence will allow them to make any and all rulings that are necessary in the interests of justice.
As I said in my dissent in United States v. Tulloch, 47 MJ 283, 289 (1997), our Court is bound by Supreme Court precedent. When challenged by defense counsel to articulate a gender-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge of Major Fox, trial counsel responded with two gender-neutral reasons. Nothing more was required. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). Trial counsel’s explanations, that Major Fox had “far greater court-martial experience than any other member” and had been engaged in disputes with the legal office, are attributes that are not characteristic of either gender. I have also been unable to discover any differences between civilian trials and courts-martial that would cause me to eschew the standards set forth by the Supreme Court and create a new test for assessing the validity of race or gender neutral reasons offered in support of any peremptory challenge. Accordingly, I disassociate myself from any test that examines the genuineness of a peremptory challenge in a manner other than as set forth by the Supreme Court in Purkett v. Elem, supra.