Court Opinion

ID: 9687360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:26:16.679877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:26.634056
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). The Paternity Act, before being amended, impermissibly discriminated against illegitimate children by denying them the opportunity accorded legitimate children for modification of agreements providing for their support.1 “[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.” Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535, 538; 93 S Ct 872; 35 L Ed 2d 56 (1973). Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision and *283remand the case for further consideration of the parties’ arguments pertaining to retroactivity.2
Section 3 of the statute at issue provided:
a) An agreement or compromise made by the mother or child or by some authorized person on their behalf with the father concerning the support and education of the child shall be binding upon the mother and the child only when the court having jurisdiction to compel support and education of the child shall have determined that adequate provision is reasonably secured by payment or otherwise and has approved the agreement or compromise.
b) The performance of the agreement or compromise, when so approved, shall bar other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of the child. [Emphasis added.]
A
Plaintiff brought an equal protection challenge to § 3. As the majority has indicated, any one of three different standards of review applies to equal protection challenges, depending on the nature of the alleged classification. Ante, p 259.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that it is equally reasonable to apply the rational basis standard of review to § 3 as to apply an intermediate or heightened scrutiny standard. Ante, p 264. Intermediate or heightened scrutiny applies to claims of disparate treatment based on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a person. Mills v Habluetzel, 456 US 91; 102 S Ct *2841549; 71 L Ed 2d 770 (1982); Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1; 103 S Ct 2199; 76 L Ed 2d 372 (1983).
The majority states that one could reasonably characterize § 3 as treating children differently on the basis of whether paternity has been established. Ante, p 266. That view focuses on the fact that illegitimate children whose paternity has been established are not affected by the statute. Then, it supports a rational basis standard of review, because a classification based on paternity invokes neither intermediate nor strict scrutiny. See Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 216-217; 102 S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 2d 786 (1982) (identifying situations in which strict scrutiny applies); Mills, supra (identifying situations in which intermediate scrutiny applies).
The majority’s view is flawed. It is unreasonable to find that the statute did anything except distinguish the treatment of children on the basis of legitimacy. Although not all illegitimate children received disparate treatment under § 3, the dominant reality is that illegitimate children, and they alone, received disparate treatment. The majority acknowledges that “[t]here is no apparent set of circumstances under which a legitimate child would be the object of an enforceable, nonmodifiable support agreement.” Ante, p 266.3
The United States Supreme Court has held intermediate or heightened scrutiny to apply under similar circumstances. Clark v Jeter, 486 US 456; 108 S Ct 1910; 100 L Ed 2d 465 (1988); see also Williams v *285Lambert, 902 F Supp 460 (SD NY, 1995); Gerhardt v Estate of Moore, 150 Wis 2d 563; 441 NW2d 734 (1989). In Clark, the Court considered a Pennsylvania statute that required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. It required that a suit to establish paternity be brought within six years of the children’s birth. Clark, supra at 457.
In contrast, legitimate children could seek support from their parents at any time. Id. The statute did not affect all illegitimate children by blocking their attempts to obtain support from their fathers. It affected only those illegitimate children who had not established paternity within six years of birth.
Thus, as here, children could have been identified as those whose paternity had been determined and those whose paternity had not. However, the Court was not concerned about that fact, instead it applied intermediate scrutiny to a review of the statute. It stated:
“First, the period for obtaining support . . . must be sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims." [Clark, supra at 462, quoting Mills, supra at 99-100 (emphasis added).]
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional on the basis that it was not substantially related to an important state interest. Id. at 464.4
*286I reach the same conclusion as did the United States Supreme Court in Clark. Even though § 3 did not include every illegitimate child, intermediate scrutiny must apply where the statute affected any child’s right to receive parental support on the basis of illegitimacy. Accordingly, intermediate or heightened scrutiny should be the only standard used in considering the constitutionality of § 3. Clark, supra at 461.5
*287B
In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a statute that results in the treatment complained of must be “substantially related to an important governmental objective.” Clark, supra at 461. The majority attempts to show that, even when intermediate scrutiny is applied, § 3 passes constitutional muster. Ante, p 281. It relates the important government objective of § 3
to address paternity proof problems in the support context ... in order to afford the mother of an illegitimate child the opportunity to bind the child’s putative father to a support order, without a final determination of paternity, and thereby to afford enhanced opportunities for the support of illegitimate children. [Ante, p 278.]
I recognize the importance of the state’s interest in enhancing the opportunity for illegitimate children to obtain support from their fathers. However, I disagree with the majority that § 3 is substantially related to that purpose.
While the Supreme Court in Clark did not rest its decision on such grounds, it recognized that the need for child support changes over time.
A mother might realize only belatedly “a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child,” Pickett, supra [p 12]. Furthermore, financial difficulties are likely to increase as the child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical care. . . . Thus it is questionable whether a State acts reasonably when it requires most paternity and support actions to be brought within six years of an illegitimate child’s birth. [Clark, supra at 463-464.]
*288How much more unreasonable is it for a state to preclude any modifications to support agreements entered into shortly after a child’s birth in light of those same factors? The Wisconsin Supreme Court answered that question when it decided the case of Gerhardt, supra, on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Clark.6
In Gerhardt, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a statutory provision that authorized lump-sum payments to encourage the settlement of paternity cases. The provision forbade the revision or alteration of such settlements, unless the father failed to comply with their terms. Gerhardt, supra at 571.7 The court concluded:
Because marital children are not precluded from seeking additional child support notwithstanding a prior court order setting the amount of support, we conclude that prohibiting nonmarital children involved in lump-sum settlement agreements from seeking additional support amounts to a denial of equal protection. [Id. at 565.]
In Gerhardt, the defendant argued, as the majority concludes here, that the statutory provision gives illegitimate children an additional option in the form of a lump-sum settlement provision. Id. at 571; ante, p 279. The Gerhardt court, however, recognized the error in that argument.
*289[I]t is an option that has in reality worked to the detriment of many nonmarital children. It is, at best, an illusory benefit amounting to no benefit at all. It is, in reality, an additional burden. Similar to the procedural bars invalidated in the Clark line of cases, the lump-sum settlement provision deprives certain nonmarital children the opportunity to obtain adequate support. Although Clark and the cases cited therein deal with statutory limitation bars to the filing of actions, the bar to seeking additional child support that results from a iump:sum agreement works in precisely the same manner. Regardless of the label attached to the statutory bar, the result is the same. The nonmarital child, unlike the marital child, is barred from seeking additional support, regardless of need. That is hardly fair to the nonmarital child, much less constitutional. That is what the United States Supreme Court recognized in remanding this action, and that is what we recognize today. [Id. at 571-572 (emphasis added).][8]
*290I agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that statutes such as § 3 violate an illegitimate child’s right to equal protection of the law. Similar to the Wisconsin statute, § 3 actually limited the opportunities for illegitimate children to receive support from their putative fathers. It did so by foreclosing any opportunity for support orders to be modified beyond what was agreed to under conditions very likely unfavorable to both mother and child.9 It is unreasonable to believe that an agreement entered into at the onset of a child’s life can accurately anticipate and provide for all the contingencies that child will face until reaching adulthood. Thus, I conclude that § 3 worked against and failed to be substantially related to the *291state’s interest in procuring adequate child support for illegitimate children.10
In a somewhat analogous situation, our Court of Appeals declared that a noncustodial father could not avoid his obligation to support his child by voluntarily terminating his parental rights. Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). It recognized that “[a] child has an inherent right to parental support” and “parents may not bargain away a child’s right to receive adequate support.” Id. at 175-176 (citations omitted):
*292To accept defendant’s position would be to allow a parent to voluntarily release parental rights in order to escape the child support obligation where the child remains in the custody of the other biological parent. Such a result is not supported by statute, case law, or sound public policy. [Id. at 176.]
CONCLUSION
In this case, § 3 of the Paternity Act presented a father with the same opportunity, that of evading his child support obligation, as was rejected by the Court of Appeals in Evink. The act allowed a father to voluntarily enter into a child support agreement that the mother could not modify, even if the child’s needs increased. The act allowed a father to escape his responsibility to provide for his child, and the child was deprived of that to which it was entitled.11 No similar “loophole” exists in the law for the benefit of fathers of legitimate children.
Accordingly, I conclude that § 3 violated the right of illegitimate children to equal protection under the law. In so doing, I align myself with the position of three different panels of the Court of Appeals,12 the *293Illinois Supreme Court,13 and the Wisconsin Supreme Court.14 The majority decides to proceed down a different path. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further consideration of the parties’ arguments concerning retroactivity. I cannot follow the majority down a path that leads to a position contrary to the constitution.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493 was part of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq.-, MSA 25.491 et seq. It was repealed by the Legislature, effective June 1, 1997, after the Court of Appeals declared it unconstitutional in Dones v Thomas, 210 Mich App 674; 534 NW2d 221 (1995). See 1996 PA 308.

 I do not treat the arguments concerning retroactivity, because that issue was not considered by the Court of Appeals majority in this case. 232 Mich App 284, 297; 591 NW2d 277 (1998) (Fitzgerald, J., concurring) (Crego III).

 The Paternity Act’s description stated that its provisions only apply to illegitimate children: “An act to confer upon circuit courts jurisdiction over proceedings to compel and provide support of children bom out of wedlock . . . .” 1956 PA 205 preamble.

 The majority states that, in Clark, the Court never determined whether the challenged statute actually created a classification on the *286basis of illegitimacy. Ante, p 268, n 11. It fails to recognize that there was no other issue in Clark that would have compelled the Court to apply the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Thus, I conclude that the Court did find that the statute created a classification on the basis of illegitimacy.

 The majority quotes from Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484; 94 S Ct 2485; 41 L Ed 2d 256 (1974), to support its position. Ante, p 265. However, cases that have followed Geduldig indicate that it is not applicable here. See Eberts v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 581 F2d 357, 360, n 1 (CA 3, 1978) (“[Geduldig] is an insurance case and simply allows the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer’s disability benefits plan”). The Sixth Circuit wrote the following regarding the footnote now cited by the majority: “It is apparent from our reading of footnote 20 that the Court’s observations are made in the particular and narrow confines of the state’s power to draw flexible and pragmatic lines in the social welfare area.” Satty v Nashville Gas Co, 522 F2d 850, 853 (CA 6, 1975).
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the Sixth Circuit decision in Satty, made the distinction between Geduldig and this case even more clear:
Here, by comparison, petitioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics. We held in [General Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125; 97 S Ct 401; 50 L Ed 2d 343 (1976) (based on Geduldig)], that [the statute] did not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other “because of their differing roles in the ‘scheme of human existence,’ ” 429 US 139, n 17. But that holding does not allow us to read [the statute] to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different role. [Nashville Gas Co v Satty, 434 US 136, 142; 98 S Ct 347; 54 L Ed 2d 356 (1977).]
Similarly, here, § 3 is not a statute that results in an underinclusive offering of insurance or social program benefits. Rather, § 3 imposes a *287burden on illegitimate children and their mothers by foreclosing any opportunity to modify child support agreements. See Gerhardt, supra at 572.

 The remand order appears at: Gerhardt v Estate of Moore, 486 US 1050; 108 S Ct 2814; 100 L Ed 2d 915 (1988).

 The Court stated the issue as follows: “[W]hether a statutory provision denying nonmarital children involved in lump sum child support settlements the ability to seek additional support from the father, a right not denied marital children, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the law.” Id. at 735.

 The Wisconsin Supreme Court is not alone in its conclusion. A New York federal district court believed that a New York appellate court would strike down a substantially similar New York statute on the basis of Clark or construe the statute so that it would permit an illegitimate child to seek modification of a support agreement. Williams, supra at 463, n 5.
The Illinois Supreme Court, on the basis of Clark and Gerhardt, took the second approach. In Dep’t of Public Aid ex rel Cox v Miller, 146 Ill 2d 399, 408-410; 586 NE2d 1251 (1992), that court considered “whether a settlement order and dismissal entered in a paternity action bar a subsequent action brought by or on behalf of the illegitimate minor for support.” Id. at 403. The court identified that previous appellate court decisions held that the Illinois Paternity Act did not “ ‘permit the mother, alleged father, or a public agency which has supported the child to bring an action after a court-approved settlement has been reached.’ ” Id. at 402 (citation omitted). The court agreed with the analysis of Gerhardt. It held that equal protection of the law would be violated if illegitimate children were unable to seek modification of child support agreements when legitimate children had that opportunity. Id. at 411. To salvage the statutory scheme, the court read the act to allow illegitimate children to bring an action to modify child support agreements. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the “plain language of the statutory scheme” allowed a child to bring an action at any time only to ascertain paternity. Id. It said nothing of a child’s right to modify otherwise nonmodifiable support agreements. Id:
The majority attempts to discredit my citation to Cox by identifying it as dicta and trying to distinguish the instant case from it. See ante, *290pp 276-277, n 15. In Cox, the statute did not allow modification of child support agreements until the court interpreted it to do so. That was in the face of a constitutional challenge on the basis of Clark and Gerhardt. Thus, the case is similar to the instant case, and its discussion of Clark and Gerhardt were essential to its resolution.

 The United States Supreme Court identified the difficult situation that a mother faces when deciding whether to file a paternity suit.
“It requires little experience to appreciate the obstacles to such suits that confront unwed mothers during the child’s first year. Financial difficulties caused by child-birth expenses or a birth-related loss of income, continuing affection for the child’s father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child all encumber a mother’s filing of a paternity suit . . . .” [Mills, supra at 103.]
Those factors are present when an unwed mother must decide, shortly after her child’s birth, whether to accept a settlement from the putative father. How could she be certain of the support needs of her and her child for the next eighteen years? See Cox, n 8 supra at 407. It is readily apparent that, under such circumstances, a mother and child may not receive the “enhanced opportunities” that the majority asserts § 3 provides to them. See ante, p 278.

 The majority fails to give appropriate weight to the fact that settlement agreements result in a burden on the mother and the child when they provide inadequate child support. See ante, p 275.
In addition, the majority attempts to draw a distinction between this case and Gerhardt because the statute in Gerhardt allowed nonmodifiable child support agreements in all paternity actions. Also, in Gerhardt, there was an admission of paternity. Id. Each is a distinction without a difference. The fact that the statute in Gerhardt applied to all paternity actions does not diminish the fact that both it and § 3 had disparate effects on illegitimate children. There is, as the majority asserts, a clear relationship in Michigan between our statute and paternity proof problems. However, it is also true that § 3 discriminates against illegitimate children in the same manner as the statute at issue in Gerhardt.
Neither is it of any significance that there was an admission of paternity in Gerhardt. That fact was irrelevant to the court’s determination that the statute was not substantially related to an important government objective. Gerhardt, supra at 574; see also Coa;, supra at 408. One would expect that, had paternity not been admitted or established in Gerhardt, as it has not been here, the Gerhardt court would have reached the same conclusion.
In an effort to justify the statute, the majority reaches to find a benefit in the fact that “putative fathers who agreed to nonmodifiable support are precluded from taking advantage of advances in technology to disprove paternity, just as the mothers are to prove paternity.” Ante, p 280.1 fail to see how that is a benefit, because one of our major goals is to ascertain the truth. The state clearly does not have a substantial state interest in furthering falsehood and avoiding the truth. Although the majority names additional benefits that the statute provides, none of them outweigh the substantial interest our state has in ensuring that our youngsters receive adequate support throughout childhood.

 Contrary to the assertion by the majority, Evink illustrates precisely why we should not allow illegitimate children to be burdened by nonmodifiable child support agreements. See ante, p 274, n 13. The majority fails to acknowledge that a putative father may very well know that he is the father of a child. However, he may be able to profit from the difficult situation the mother faces to procure a settlement he finds favorable. The majority identifies the statute as providing an illegitimate child with an opportunity to obtain child support from someone who might not otherwise provide it. However, it also allows someone who might otherwise have been responsible for adequate child support to avoid that obligation.

 See Dones, n 1 supra; Crego v Coleman, 226 Mich App 815 (1997) (Crego II); Crego v Coleman, n 2 supra (Crego III).

 Cox, n 8 supra.

 See Gerhardt, supra.