Court Opinion

ID: 9954111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:09:57.939874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.055908
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jenkins, 2024-Ohio-1094.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                      LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. 2023 CA 00058
 LEONARD J. JENKINS

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Licking County Court of
                                                Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 00486

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        March 22, 2024

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 JENNY WELLS                                    BRIAN A. SMITH
 Licking County Prosecuting Attorney            123 S. Miller Road, Suite #250
                                                Akron, Ohio 44333
 KENNETH W. OSWALT
 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
 20 S. Second Street, 4th Floor
 Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    2

Hoffman, P.J.
       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Leonard J. Jenkins appeals the judgment entered by

the Licking County Common Pleas Court convicting him following jury trial of having

weapons while under disability (R.C. 2923.13(A)(3)), receiving stolen property (R.C.

2913.51(A)),    two   counts     aggravated   possession   of   methamphetamine       (R.C.

2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a)), and possessing a defaced firearm (R.C. 2923..201(A)(2)), with a

forfeiture specification as to the firearm (R.C. 2981.02(A)(1)(C), 2941.1417(A)), and

sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of eight and one-half years. Plaintiff-

appellee is the state of Ohio.

                           STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}    On July 7, 2022, police in Newark, Ohio, were conducting surveillance of

Appellant’s house for suspected drug activity. Detective Benjamin Martens of the Licking

County Sheriff’s Office conducted a traffic stop on a black pickup truck in which Appellant

was a passenger, when the truck turned into Appellant’s driveway without using a turn

signal. A K-9 alerted on the vehicle, and methamphetamine was found in the truck,

between the passenger seat and the center console. Appellant admitted to police the

drugs belonged to him, and estimated their weight at about 2 grams.

       {¶3}    Appellant complained of having medical issues related to diabetes, and an

emergency medical squad was called to the scene. Appellant began screaming at the

emergency medical technicians, and refused treatment.

       {¶4}    Detective Todd Green of the Newark Police Department asked Appellant if

he could speak to him. Appellant stated he needed to go inside the home for the air

conditioning, a glass of cold water, and medicine for the issues he was experiencing. Det.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    3

Green asked if he could come inside to talk to Appellant. Appellant initially responded

no, but then stated the officer could come inside.

       {¶5}   After entering the house, Det. Green asked for consent to search the house.

Appellant responded negatively. Det. Green told Appellant he would have to secure the

house to get a warrant, which would take three to four hours, during which time Appellant

and others inside the home would have to leave the house. Appellant then agreed to

allow Det. Green to search the house, and Appellant personally selected the two officers

he would allow to search with Det. Green. Officers found a .38 caliber revolver in a

dresser drawer in Appellant’s bedroom. The serial number had been filed off the firearm.

Police were able to recover the original serial number from the gun, and determined the

weapon had been reported stolen.

       {¶6}   On September 14, 2022, Appellant was arrested by Officer Derrick Beach

of the Newark Police Department pursuant to a warrant. Methamphetamine weighing

more than three grams was found in Appellant’s pocket.

       {¶7}   Appellant was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury for two counts of

aggravated possession of drugs, with the count stemming from September 14, 2022,

including a special finding the weight of the methamphetamine exceeded 3 grams; having

a weapon under disability; possessing a defaced firearm; and receiving stolen property.

The indictment included a forfeiture specification.

       {¶8}   Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges of having a weapon under

disability and possessing a defaced firearm, as well as the forfeiture specification, on the

basis R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), which Appellant was not charged with violating, violates the

Second Amendment. The trial court overruled the motion. Appellant also filed a motion
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     4

to suppress, arguing his consent to search the house was not voluntary. Following an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress.

       {¶9}   The case proceeded to jury trial. Appellant testified at trial the gun found in

his bedroom was not his. He testified he loaned a friend money to buy the gun, and when

the friend was unable to pay Appellant back, the friend put the gun in Appellant’s dresser

drawer. Appellant testified when the officer showed him the firearm during the search of

the house, the serial number was on the firearm. He testified his admission the drugs

found in the car belonged to him was sarcasm, not a confession.

       {¶10} Appellant was found guilty on all counts, and the trial court convicted

Appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of incarceration of eight and one-half years. It is from the July 14, 2023

judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:

              I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR COUNT ONE OF THE

       SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT, HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER

       DISABILITY,     CONSTITUTED         PLAIN     ERROR       AND     VIOLATED

       APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS UNDER THE SECOND AND

       FOURTEENTH          AMENDMENTS          TO      THE     UNITED       STATES

       CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 OF THE OHIO

       CONSTITUTION,            BECAUSE           R.C.        2923.13(A)(3)        IS

       UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BOTH ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED TO

       APPELLANT, FOR VIOLATING THE SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                5

      UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 OF THE

      OHIO CONSTITUTION.

            II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S

      MOTION TO SUPPRESS, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT

      AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES UNDER THE

      FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES

      CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO

      CONSTITUTION.

            III. THE FAILURE OF APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL TO FILE A

      MOTION TO SUPPRESS CHALLENGING THE EVIDENCE DERIVED

      FROM THE JULY 7, 2022 TRAFFIC STOP ON THE BASIS THAT

      OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE

      SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO CONDUCT A TRAFFIC STOP

      OF THE VEHICLE CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

      COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL

      UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

      UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE

      OHIO CONSTITUTION.

            IV. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS UNDER COUNTS TWO,

      THREE, AND FIVE OF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENTS WERE

      AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                 6

                                                 I.

       {¶11} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court committed

plain error in failing to find R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) unconstitutional pursuant to the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387.

       {¶12} Appellant was charged and convicted of having a weapon under a disability

pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3):

              (A) Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal

       process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm

       or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:

              (3) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any

       felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration,

       distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been adjudicated a

       delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an

       adult, would have been a felony offense involving the illegal possession,

       use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.

       {¶13} However, in the trial court, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss challenging

the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2):
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    7

              (A) Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal

       process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm

       or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:

              (2) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any

       felony offense of violence or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the

       commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been

       a felony offense of violence.

       {¶14} The error does not appear to be merely typographical in the recitation of the

statute number, because in his motion, Appellant quotes the language of subsection

(A)(2), recites he was charged with violating (A)(2), and argues the provision prohibiting

possession of a weapon by felons has no historical basis. Pursuant to Bruen, the burden

is on the State to demonstrate the “regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical

tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 142 S.Ct. at 2126. The State filed

its response, focusing on restrictions on felons possessing firearms pursuant to

subsection (A)(2), rather than focusing specifically on prohibitions on persons indicted for

or convicted of felony drug offenses pursuant to subsection (A)(3).

       {¶15} At the hearing, Appellant rested on his motion without making argument to

the court. The State argued to the trial court based on Appellant’s challenge to subsection

(A)(2) relating to felony offenses of violence. Because throughout the proceedings in the

trial court Appellant failed to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), we

agree with Appellant we must find plain error to reverse.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     8

       {¶16} Under the plain error standard of review, the Appellant bears the burden of

showing but for a plain or obvious error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

otherwise, and reversal must be necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

State v. West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605, 2022-Ohio-1556, 200 N.E.3d 1048.

       {¶17} The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit summarized the

plain error standard of review of a Bruen challenge as follows:

               But because we review this case for plain error, we must determine

       only whether the challenged statutes are “obviously unconstitutional.”

       United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in

       original). Therefore, we need not decide today whether they comply with

       Bruen’s mandate.

       {¶18} United States v. Ramadan, 2023 WL 6634293, (6th District October 12,

2023), p. 2.

       {¶19} In Bruen, the challenged statute prohibited a person from carrying a firearm

without a license, and to obtain a license the person must prove “proper cause,” defined

as demonstrating a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the

general community.     In finding the “proper cause” requirement violated the Second

Amendment, the court held to justify a firearm regulation, the burden is on the government

to demonstrate the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition. 597 U.S.

at 17. However, throughout the opinion the court repeatedly referred to the Second

Amendment’s protection of the rights of law-abiding citizens. The court noted the Second
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    9

Amendment elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible

citizens to use arms for self-defense. Id. at 26. While the court chose not to provide an

exhaustive list of the features which would render a current regulation relevantly similar

to a historical regulation under the Second Amendment, the court pointed toward two

metrics: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-

defense.” Id. at 29. The court took note of the fact the petitioners in Bruen were ordinary,

law-abiding, adult citizens.    Id. at 31-32.    In reviewing New York’s proper-cause

requirement, the court noted apart from a few outliers, American governments have not

required law-abiding, responsible citizens to demonstrate a special need for self-

protection to possess a firearm. Id. at 70. The ultimate holding of the court found New

York’s proper cause requirement violates the Second Amendment in that it prevents law-

abiding citizens of ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and

bear arms. Id. at 71.

       {¶20} Concurring separately, Justice Alito noted the Bruen holding decided

nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm, but merely decided the Second

Amendment protects the right of law-abiding people to carry a gun outside of their home

for self-defense. Id. at 72, 76. Similarly, Justice Kavanaugh also concurred separately,

noting nothing in Bruen should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons. Id. at 81.

       {¶21} Although it appears no post-Bruen case law exists in Ohio on the

constitutionality of any of the provisions of R.C. 2923.13, numerous federal courts have

considered the constitutionality of similar United States Code provisions. Although 18

USC 922 does not have a provision which, like R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), prohibits gun
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                   10

possession by a person convicted of a felony drug offense, it does prohibit possession of

a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year

in prison, and also prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who is an unlawful user

or addicted to any controlled substance. 18 USC 922(g)(1),(3).

       {¶22} A few federal cases have found these provisions of the United States Code

unconstitutional pursuant to the Bruen test. In United States v. Daniels, the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals found the ban on firearm possession unconstitutional in a case where

the defendant, who was sober when arrested, admitted to using marijuana multiple times

a month. 77 F. 4th 337 (Fifth Cir. 2023). The Fifth Circuit also held a federal statute

prohibiting firearm possession by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining

order unconstitutional. United States v. Rahimi, 61 F. 4th 663 (Fifth Circ. 2023). The

Third Circuit Court of Appeals found the provision prohibiting a felon from possessing a

weapon unconstitutional as applied to a person convicted of making a false statement to

obtain food stamps, but noted the decision was narrow, and only as applied to the

defendant, given his specific prior violation. Range v. Atty. Gen. United States of America,

69 F.4th 96, 106 (Third Cir. 2023).

       {¶23} However, the overwhelming weight of federal authority upheld federal

prohibitions on possession of weapons by felons and/or persons using controlled

substances as constitutional under Bruen, as summarized by the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Iowa:

              This Court is not alone in reaching the conclusion that Section

       922(g)(3) does not violate the Second Amendment. Numerous other district
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                11

      courts have reaffirmed the conclusion that Section 922(g)(3) is

      constitutional after Bruen. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 8:22-CR-291,

      2023 WL 3932224, at *5 (D. Neb. June 9, 2023) (rejecting post-Bruen

      challenge to Section 922(g)(3), finding the Seay case controlling); Le, 2023

      WL 3016297, at *5 (rejecting a post-Bruen constitutional challenge to

      Section 922(g)(3)); United States v. Posey, Case No. 2:22-CR-83 JD, 2023

      WL 1869095, at *9-10 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 9, 2023) (denying as applied and

      facial post-Bruen challenge to Section 922(g)(3)); United States v. Lewis,

      Case No. CR-22-368-F, 2023 WL 187582, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2023)

      (rejecting a post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Section 922(g)(3));

      United States v. Sanchez, W-21-CR-00213-ADA, 2022 WL 17815116, at *3

      (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2022) (holding that Section 922(g)(3) is “consistent with

      this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation”); Fried, 2022 WL

      16731233, at *7 (“At bottom, the historical tradition of keeping guns from

      those the government fairly views as dangerous—like alcoholics and the

      mentally ill—is sufficiently analogous to modern laws keeping guns from

      habitual users of controlled substances .... The challenged laws are

      consistent with the history and tradition of this Nations’ [sic] firearm

      regulation.”); United States v. Seiwert, Case No. 20 CR 443, 2022 WL

      4534605, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2022) (holding that Section “922(g)(3) is

      relevantly similar to regulations aimed at preventing dangerous or

      untrustworthy persons from possessing and using firearms, such as

      individuals convicted of felonies or suffering from mental illness”); United
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    12

         States v. Daniels, 610 F.Supp.3d 892, 897 (S.D. Miss. 2022) (finding

         Section 922(g)(3) constitutional after determining that “analogous statutes

         which purport to disarm persons considered a risk to society—whether

         felons or alcoholics—were known to the American legal tradition”).

         {¶24} United States v. Ledvina, 2023 WL 5279470, *6.

         {¶25} Based on the substantial authority finding regulations similar to R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) are not facially unconstitutional, we find Appellant has not demonstrated

the statute is obviously unconstitutional, and the trial court therefore did not commit plain

error.

         {¶26} We also find Appellant has not demonstrated plain error as to his argument

the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. At the hearing on his motion to dismiss,

which was combined with the suppression hearing, the State presented evidence

Appellant had prior convictions in 1997 of two counts of possession of cocaine and one

count of aggravated funding of drug trafficking. In 2010 Appellant was convicted of two

counts of aggravated trafficking in methamphetamine and illegal assembly to

manufacture drugs.       In 2019, Appellant was convicted of aggravated trafficking in

methamphetamine and aggravated possession of methamphetamine. In the context of

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the right to frisk a suspect, Ohio has long

recognized the connection between gun violence and drug trafficking. See, e.g., State v.

Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 407, 618 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1993); State v. Minyoung, 3rd Dist.

Van Wert No. 15-11-11, 2012-Ohio-411; State v. Wiegand, 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA-

24, 2017-Ohio-9143. With multiple felony convictions for trafficking and activities related
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     13

to trafficking, we find the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to find R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.

       {¶27} Appellant next argues the Ohio Constitution provides expanded rights to

those found in the United States Constitution.        Again, Appellant failed to raise this

argument in the trial court, and we therefore must find plain error to reverse.

       {¶28} The language of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides, ““[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the

right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Article I, Section 4 of

the Ohio Constitution sets forth a similar guarantee: “The people have the right to bear

arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous

to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the

civil power.” In the past, the Ohio Supreme Court has distinguished its analysis of claims

arising under the Ohio Constitution on the basis that, unlike the United States

Constitution, Ohio's Constitution guaranteed the right to bear arms to individual citizens.

Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). However, even prior to

Bruen, the United States Supreme Court has found the Second Amendment likewise

guarantees the right to bear arms to individual citizens. See District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (holding the Second

Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear arms to individuals); McDonald v.

Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (holding the Second

Amendment is fully applicable to the States by application of the Fourteenth Amendment).

Because the United States Constitution now equally protects the right of the individual to

bear arms, we see no obvious distinction between the Ohio Constitution and the United
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     14

States Constitution. For the reasons stated in our consideration of Appellant’s claims

under the United States Constitution, we find Appellant has not demonstrated R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) is obviously unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution, and we therefore

find no plain error.

       {¶29} Finally, in his brief Appellant argues his convictions on both count one

(having a weapon under disability) and count four (possessing a defaced weapon), as

well as the forfeiture specification, should be reversed because R. C. 2923.13(A)(3) is

unconstitutional. Brief of Appellant, p. 15. However, Appellant did not assign error

alleging R.C. 2923.201(A)(2), possessing a defaced weapon, is unconstitutional, nor did

he argue the statute is unconstitutional in his initial brief. For the first time in his reply

brief, Appellant argues R.C. 2923.201(A)(2) is unconstitutional.     We will not consider an

issue raised for the first time in a reply brief. State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464,

2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 18.

       {¶30} In summary, we find Appellant has failed to demonstrate plain error, as R.C.

2923.13(A)(3) is not obviously unconstitutional either facially or as applied to Appellant.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 II.

       {¶31} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress because his consent to allow the officers to enter the

house was not voluntary. Appellant argues he only consented to officers entering the

residence because he was under duress from his medical emergency, and needed to

have cold water, medicine, and air-conditioning because of his medical situation.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    15

       {¶32} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988;

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19,20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio

App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142,

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the

applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,

116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial

court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas, supra.

Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident

judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.

       {¶33} A warrantless search based upon a suspect's consent is valid if his consent

is voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, either express or implied.

Schnecklofth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973);

State v. Dunwoody, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2004CA49, 2005-Ohio-219, ¶ 18.                 The
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                   16

voluntariness of a consent is a question of fact determined from the totality of the

circumstances. Id.

       {¶34} As noted by the trial court, the evidence presented at trial through the

testimony of Detective Green, and the evidence presented via the audio recordings of the

detective’s conversation with Appellant at the scene, demonstrate Appellant did not

request treatment, nor did he take any medication upon entering the home. He did not

take the opportunity to leave with the EMTs for treatment. Although Appellant initially

said police could not enter the home, he relented quickly when Det. Green asked to follow

Appellant inside so Appellant could get a drink of water. After consenting to the search

of the home, Appellant personally selected the officers he would allow inside the home

with Det. Green. The trial court specifically found:

              The defendant was never subject to duress or coercion, nor did he

       appear to be intimidated or coerced by any show of authority. In fact, it

       appeared the defendant was the person attempting to coerce the medical

       staff and law enforcement officers into behaving in the manner in which he

       wished them behave.

       {¶35} Judgment Entry, April 14, 2023, A-3.

       {¶36} This finding of the trial court is supported by the record before this Court on

appeal. We find the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress.

       {¶37} The second assignment of error is overruled.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                       17

                                                  III.

       {¶38} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress challenging the basis for the traffic stop.

Appellant argues the State did not present video evidence to prove the driver of the pickup

truck did not use a turn signal, and the allegation was based solely on the officer’s alleged

observation of the failure to use a signal.

       {¶39} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37

Ohio St.3d 153, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d

373 (1989). In other words, Appellant must show counsel’s conduct so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

       {¶40} While no video evidence was presented to prove the driver of the pickup

truck failed to use a turn signal, thus justifying the traffic stop of the vehicle in which

Appellant was riding, the State had no obligation to demonstrate the legality of the traffic

stop because it was not challenged by Appellant in the trial court. Further, even in the

absence of video evidence, the trial court could find from the testimony of the officer the

driver failed to use a left turn signal. While Appellant testified at trial the driver used a

turn signal, the trial court, as the judge of credibility, could find the traffic infraction

occurred based solely on the testimony of the officer.           We find Appellant has not
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    18

demonstrated a reasonable probability had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress based

on the validity of the traffic stop for failure to use a turn signal, the motion would have

been granted. Appellant has accordingly not demonstrated trial counsel was ineffective.

       {¶41} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                IV.

       {¶42} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the judgment convicting

him of receiving stolen property and aggravated possession of drugs are against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶43} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678

N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).

       {¶44} Receiving Stolen Property: Appellant argues the jury lost its way in

finding he knowingly possessed the firearm found in his dresser drawer. He further

argues the evidence did not support a finding he knew or had reason to know the firearm

was stolen.

       {¶45} Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C.

2913.51(A), which provides, “No person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of

another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has been

obtained through commission of a theft offense.”
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                      19

       {¶46} The testimony at trial demonstrated the firearm was recovered from a

dresser drawer in Appellant’s bedroom. Det. Green testified during the search of the

house, Appellant said, “Todd, you better go over and search that dresser.” Tr. (I) 131.

The State called Det. Green to testify again in rebuttal, and the detective again testified

Appellant told him to check the dresser. After finding the gun, the detective told Appellant

he wasn’t allowed to own a gun. Det. Green testified Appellant responded, “I needed the

gun because you guys won’t protect me.” Tr. (II)285. When asked to clarify what he

meant by this statement, Appellant responded, “Well, I got people out here all night

stealing stuff out of my back yard and stuff like that.” Id. While at trial Appellant testified

the gun did not belong to him and he did not have control over the gun, we find the jury

did not lose its way in believing the testimony of Det. Green and concluding Appellant

possessed the firearm.

       {¶47} Appellant also argues the mere fact the serial number was filed off the

weapon is insufficient to demonstrate he knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was

stolen. He argues he may not have noticed the serial number was filed off the gun.

       {¶48} Det. Green testified when he took the gun out of the dresser, he immediately

noticed the serial number was filed off the gun, and asked Appellant if the gun was stolen.

The detective testified, “[A]nybody in their right mind that handled this and saw this filed

off gun would know it’s stolen.” Tr. (I)130. Further, Appellant did not testify he failed to

notice the serial number was filed off the gun, but instead Appellant testified the serial

number was visible when Det. Green took the gun out of the dresser, and Det. Green was

lying when he said the serial number was not on the butt of the gun the day it was

recovered. Tr. (II)266.      Although the jury apparently rejected Appellant’s claim the
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                    20

number was on the gun when recovered by police, from Appellant’s testimony, the jury

could infer Appellant knew where the serial number on a firearm was located, and

therefore would be aware if the number was filed off, and by implication had reasonable

cause to believe the firearm was stolen.       We find the jury did not lose its way in

disbelieving Appellant’s claim the serial number was filed off the gun after it came into the

possession of the police, and drawing the inference Appellant was aware the serial

number was not on the gun. We find the jury could conclude from all of the evidence

surrounding Appellant’s possession of the firearm, including Appellant’s own testimony,

Appellant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the gun was stolen.

       {¶49} The judgment convicting Appellant of receiving stolen property is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶50} Aggravated Possession of Drugs – July 7, 2022: Appellant argues the

jury lost its way in concluding he possessed the drugs found in the vehicle on July 7,

2022, as he was merely a passenger in the vehicle.

       {¶51} Appellant was convicted of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), which provides, “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a

controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.”

       {¶52} Appellant argues the drugs were found on the driver’s side of the vehicle.

Appellant mischaracterizes the evidence. Although the drugs were initially seen by an

officer looking under the seat from the driver’s side of the truck, the drugs were actually

located between the center console and the passenger seat, where Appellant had been

seated. Further, Appellant admitted to Det. Green the drugs in the car were his, and

totaled about “two grams or so.” Tr. (I) 134. Although Appellant testified his admission
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                  21

to owning the drugs was sarcasm and not a confession, we find the jury did not lose its

way in finding Appellant possessed the drugs found in the truck on July 7, 2022. The

judgment convicting Appellant of aggravated possession of drugs is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶53} Aggravated Possession of Drugs – September 14, 2022: Appellant

argues the jury lost its way in finding the bulk amount of the drugs found on his person on

September 14, 2022, was 3 grams or more. He argues his reweighing of the drugs by an

independent lab showed the drugs weighed around 2.8 grams, less than the 3.04 weight

determined by the State’s lab.

       {¶54} Ashley Nutter, the forensic scientist who tested the drugs at the Central

Ohio Regional Crime Lab, testified after weighing the bulk amount of the material, a small

amount is taken out and placed in a test tube to be tested. Tr. (II)222. Therefore, the

bulk weight would decrease. Further, the drugs taken from Appellant on September 14

were in two separate bags, one weighing 1.3473 grams, and one weighing 1.6924 grams,

for a total of 3.0397 grams. Nutter testified a bit of the material had to be removed from

each of the bags for analysis, thus reducing the bulk amount.

       {¶55} Nutter testified when Roger Pryor from the outside lab came in for the

reweigh, he was not able to get everything out of the bag. She testified after she samples

an item, she places it into a Ziploc bag, and throughout the process, some of the

substances tend to stick to the bag from the static in the bag, making it nearly impossible

to get everything out of the bag for the reweigh. Roger Pryor, who performed the reweigh,

testified when you reweigh as opposed to the original, some of the sample has been taken

for testing, and a negligible amount is left inside the container. He testified this could
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                       22

explain the difference between the original weight of the methamphetamine in this case,

and the lower weight on his reweigh. Pryor also testified he found Nutter’s findings

scientifically valid in this case. We find the jury did not lose its way in finding the original

weight of the drugs, which exceeded three grams, was valid. The judgment is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶56} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Licking

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Baldwin, J. concurs
King, J. concurs separately
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                  23

King, J. concurs separately,

       {¶ 57} Although I agree with Judge Hoffman's opinion on the second, third, and

fourth assignments of errors, I concur in judgment only because I view the Second

Amendment issue in the first assignment of error differently. The trial attorney's argument

below was based on R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), not (A)(3), thus denying the state an opportunity

to carry its burden under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597

U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022). Moreover, ineffective assistance of trial

counsel was not assigned as an error on this issue. While I believe, for the reasons stated

below, there is a viable argument that R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), as applied to appellant, is

unconstitutional, I do not find it rises to the level of plain error in this case.

       {¶ 58} As described in the lead opinion, a .38 caliber firearm was found in

appellant's dresser drawer. This firearm was found after appellant consented to a search

of his home. Because the Second Amendment applies to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, we are required to apply Supreme Court precedent.

       {¶ 59} In Bruen, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a two-step test that had

become common in the circuit courts of appeals. The Court also rejected any test that

included a means-ends scrutiny. Bruen at 17. Instead, the Supreme Court held the

Second Amendment required a different analysis (Id.):

       * * * [W]e hold that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an

       individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.

       To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the

       regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     24

       demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical

       tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with

       this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's

       conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's "unqualified command."

       Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50, n. 10, 81 S.Ct. 997, 6

       L.Ed.2d 105 (1961).

       {¶ 60} Thus, the threshold question is whether appellant's                conduct    is

presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. We are required to answer this

question in the affirmative. Previously, the Supreme Court held that the Second

Amendment permitted individuals to possess a handgun inside the home. District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). Here,

the handgun was found stored inside appellant's home. But for R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), there

would be no serious question appellant was entitled to store a handgun in his home. Prior

to Bruen, this court would have been obligated to employ intermediate scrutiny. See State

v. Weber, 163 Ohio St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-6832, 168 N.E.3d 468, ¶ 13. But this test did

not survive Bruen.

       {¶ 61} Instead, when a defendant challenges a regulation such as R.C.

2923.13(A)(3), the government is obligated to defend the regulation through evidence

that shows the challenged regulation is "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of

firearm regulation." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387. See also

State v. Parker, 5th Dist. Licking No. 23CA00009, 2023-Ohio-2127, ¶ 29, and State v.

Philpotts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107374, 2023-Ohio-213, ¶ 4.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                 25

       {¶ 62} Here, appellant was charged and then convicted under the "Having

weapons while under disability" statute, R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), which states:

       (A) Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process,

       no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or

       dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:

       (3) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony

       offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration,

       distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been adjudicated a

       delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an

       adult, would have been a felony offense involving the illegal possession,

       use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.

       {¶ 63} In reviewing the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which is a

federal analogue to our statute, the Third Circuit sitting en banc thoroughly

reviewed the historical tradition in disarming citizens who were not "law-abiding"

and found the government did not carry its burden. Range v. Attorney General United

States of America, 69 F.4th 96, 98 (3d Cir.2023). The Third Circuit held that those who

commit petty misdemeanors or summary offenses do not lose their right to bear firearms.

Id. at 102. Two aspects of the court's holdings are relevant here: whether the Second

Amendment is limited to only law-abiding, responsible citizens, and whether the similar

statutory restriction was consistent with the Nation's tradition.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     26

       {¶ 64} In addressing the first issue, the court went on to hold that at the time of the

framing of the Constitution, felonies were such a serious class of crimes they were

punishable by estate forfeiture and death. Id. It also cited recent Supreme Court

precedent holding "a felon is not always more dangerous than a misdemeanant." Id. citing

Lange v. California, --- U.S. ---, 141 S.Ct. 2011, 2020, 210 L.Ed.2d 486 (2021). The court's

purpose in doing so was to demonstrate that per se categorical approaches based on

legislative labels was "hopelessly vague" and such deference would contravene Heller's

reasoning that "the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy

choices off the table." Range at 103, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 554, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171

L.Ed.2d 637. See also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (warning

against "judicial deference to legislative interest balancing"). This led to the court's

conclusion that the "people" who are protected by the Second Amendment are not

exclusively "law-abiding, responsible citizens." Range at 103.

       {¶ 65} After concluding the defendant was not categorically excluded from his right

to bear arms, the court in Range turned to evaluating the evidence the government

produced to support the statute. The version at issue precluded any individual convicted

of a crime allowing for punishment of imprisonment of one year or more from possessing

a firearm. Id. at 104. The prior version of the statute had only precluded a limited set of

violent criminals from possessing firearms. Id. The court went on to observe that

Founding-era laws might provide for firearm forfeiture without generally affecting a

defendant's right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 105.

       {¶ 66} Finally, the court addressed the government's argument implicitly adopted

by the lead decision, i.e., "an argument from authority." The Third Circuit acknowledged
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                  27

there were cases that did not employ a means-ends test to uphold 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1),

but observed district courts are bound by their circuit's precedent and Bruen was a major

change in precedent. Id. at 106.

       {¶ 67} The fact that the government in Range failed to find appropriate historical

evidence suggests there indeed is an absence of historical evidence for legislatures to

create broad categories of citizens subject to disarmament based broadly on a prior illegal

act. This makes the breadth of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) suspect, but the state of Ohio did not

get the opportunity to meet its burden. Accordingly, it is our obligation to consider the

scope of Second Amendment protection in relation to the evidence presented by the state

and its impact on the statute at hand. In an appropriately framed challenge, the state may

be able to argue that Ohio's statute is drawn narrower and thus is constitutional, unlike

the federal analog.

       {¶ 68} Though, there is reason to think that might not be the case. In United States

v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337, 339 (5th Cir.2023), the Fifth Circuit considered the

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) which prohibits an unlawful user of controlled

substances from possessing a firearm. In finding the statute unconstitutional, the crux of

the Fifth Circuit's holding was that there was no history of disarming those who use

substances at one point but possessing a firearm arm at a different point. Id. at 340. The

court summarized its holding as follows: "In short, our history and tradition may support

some limits on an intoxicated person's right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify

disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more

generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on

nonviolent drug users." Id.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                     28

       {¶ 69} Similar to the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the disqualifying

conduct (in Range, fraud, and in Daniels, marijuana use) did not remove the presumption

the defendant was entitled to possess a firearm. Id. at 342. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged

there was some difficulty in applying the "historical test" because the drug trade was not

present in its modern form. Id. at 344. Ultimately, the government argued to sustain the

statute from three broad categories of analogues: "(1) statutes disarming intoxicated

individuals, (2) statutes disarming the mentally ill or insane, and (3) statutes disarming

those adjudged dangerous or disloyal." Id.

       {¶ 70} After finding the first two categories provided no support for the statute, the

Fifth Circuit turned to the issue of dangerousness. The court first observed "no one piece

of historical evidence suggests that when the Founders ratified the Second Amendment,

they authorized Congress to disarm anyone it deemed dangerous." Id. at 350. In response

to this evidence of absence, the government relied on evidence disarming political

dissidents and religious minorities. Id. at 350-351.

       {¶ 71} The Fifth Circuit was willing to assume these restrictions supported a

prohibition on dangerous persons, but that assumption still failed to answer the question

the Third Circuit similarly wrestled with, "dangerousness" can be ascertained at varying

levels of abstractions; so, how should it be defined for purposes of the Second

Amendment? Id. at 353. The search for an answer ultimately brought the court back to

analyzing the history of regulatory traditions. Id. at 354. The court rejected that a general

notion of dangerousness allowed it to sustain a regulation. Id. And, again, the government

failed to demonstrate a history of regulation that would support denying a marijuana user

the right to possess a firearm. Id. See also United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 448
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                                 29

(5th Cir.2023), cert. granted, 143 S.Ct. 2688, 216 L.Ed.2d 1255 (2023) (holding 18 U.S.C.

922(g)(8) unconstitutional under a facial challenge).

      {¶ 72} Returning to the case at hand, an application of Heller, absent any other

constitutionally permissible restriction, means Jenkins would have the right to possess a

firearm in his home. By its own terms, R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) does not carve out an exception

for keeping a firearm in the home; instead, it is complete prohibition. At a minimum, the

facts before us (if they had been probably preserved below) present an as-applied

challenge. Consistent with Range and Daniels, the state would have to demonstrate a

reasonably close fit between the history of regulation of firearms and section (A)(3) as

applied to Jenkins. Bruen holds that judges are to employ reasoning by analogy, and

when doing so, judges are to consider "how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding

citizen's right to armed self-defense." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d

387 In contrast to the analysis mandated by Bruen, a mere general allegation from the

state that someone who is not a "law-abiding citizen" may be denied the right to possess

a firearm inside the home under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) will not prevail.

      {¶ 73} Previously, this court addressed an as-applied challenge to R.C.

2923.13(A)(1) under Bruen. Parker, 5th Dist. Licking No. 23CA00009, 2023-Ohio-2127,

¶ 21. The trial court in Parker granted a motion to dismiss, which the state subsequently

appealed. Id. ¶ 12-14. This court found the state failed to meet its burden and thus

overruled the assignment of error. Id. ¶ 36. The same could be said here, except that the

state was denied the opportunity to create such a record because trial counsel

inexplicably argued (A)(2) was unconstitutional, despite appellant being charged under
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00058                                           30

(A)(3). Appellant here cannot create the circumstance that denies the government its

opportunity to carry its burden and then benefit from that action on appeal.

      {¶ 74} Accordingly, I concur in judgment only.