Court Opinion

ID: 9665519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:50:19.92741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.324617
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The defendants were entitled to a testimonial hearing on their allegations *447that their defense was prejudiced by inadequate representation at trial. Their claims were not merely "asserted” upon "bare allegation” as stated by the majority.
In their delayed motion for a new trial the defendants alleged:
"That the in-court identification of both defendants by each of the witnesses was tainted by pre-court observation of the defendants at the police station prior to showup, and no objections were made to such in-court identification by counsel for defendants.
"That the lineups of defendants were tainted by observations made by witnesses of defendants in the police station, several minutes prior to the showup, and no objections were made thereto.”
The motion goes on to ask that testimony "be taken by the trial court in order to ascertain the facts raised by this motion to conform with People v Jelks, 33 Mich App 425, 431 (1971)”.
In the Jelks ease we said (p 431):
"A convicted person who attacks the adequacy of the representation he received at his trial must prove his claim. To the extent his claim depends on facts not of record, it is incumbent on him to make a testimonial record at the trial court level in connection with a motion for a new trial which evidentially supports his claim and which excludes reasonable hypotheses consistent with the view that his trial lawyer represented him adequately.”
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial the defendants’ lawyer said:
"On 464 the witness testified all of the young men went to the police station at the show-up at the same time. I have evidence to substantiate the fact that the defendants were taken to the police, to the police station, for the show-up by their counsel and all of these *448young men were sitting there in the police station at the time that he walked in and they saw the defendant.”
In response the judge said that this issue was not raised at the trial. Defendants’ lawyer acknowledged that this was true, and said that it was because the issue was not raised at the trial that he was raising it now, and that he was prepared evidentially to support his claim: "I am making it now which evidentially supports his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and excludes reasonable hypothesis that the trial lawyer represented him adequately. I raise this on the fact that this wasn’t done.”
The judge then asked the defendants’ lawyer: "Do you want a hearing on that issue?” The lawyer responded that there were a number of other issues raised in his motion for a new trial and that he would ask the court to pass on those first and if the defendants did not obtain a new trial on those grounds then he would ask the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. The hearing being conducted on that day then proceeded to a conclusion.
A few weeks later the parties again appeared before the judge, and he announced his decision denying the motion for a new trial. The defendants’ lawyer then said, "Now, may I have a hearing?” The judge responded: "I am not inclined to grant a rehearing on the issues which were raised. I think I have indicated that I thought that having tried the case, and having seen counsel who represented the defendants, I thought they were adequately represented by counsel. Counsel did a good job in representing them.”
The judge applied the sham-trial standard which *449focuses attention on the entire representation of the accused person by his lawyer. See People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702, 711 (1969). While the defendants asserted that they had not received the "effective assistance of counsel”, the essence of the claim1 advanced in this case was that their trial lawyer had made a major mistake — a mistake of such importance that, even if they were not deprived of the constitutional right to counsel, they were entitled to a new trial.
"The sham trial standard is applicable only where the defendant asserts deprivation of his constitutional right to counsel and seriously seeks to demonstrate that he was represented by a bad lawyer. It is not the correct standard by which to judge a claim that the defendant is entitled to a new trial because of a serious mistake made by a good lawyer.
"The sham trial standard focuses attention on the lawyer and the totality of his representation of his client. A claim that a constitutionally adequate lawyer made a serious mistake and that the court should relieve the client of that error focuses our attention on the mistake itself and its significance in bringing about the defendant’s conviction.” People v Degraffenreid, supra, p 717.
Earlier in Degraffenreid we said (p 716):
"Where the lawyer’s mistake is of such serious proportion that it may have been decisive, where but for the lawyer’s mistake the defendant might not have been convicted, the court may, despite failure to have preserved the error by timely objection, grant a new trial.”
Not infrequently claims of inadequate representation depend on facts not of record, as in this case *450where it is claimed that the eyewitnesses saw the defendants before the lineup.
The importance in this case of the identification testimony of the eyewitnesses is apparent without a testimonial record. However, without a testimonial record we do not know whether the defendants can establish that the eyewitnesses did in fact view them before the lineup, nor do we know whether this could have been or was brought to the attention of their trial lawyer at or before the trial and, if this was brought to the lawyer’s attention, why he failed to object to the testimony of the eyewitnesses.
If the defendants can prove at a testimonial hearing, as their appellate lawyer claims they can, that the eyewitnesses viewed them before the lineup, such a viewing, not in the presence of their lawyer, without that safeguard may very well have effectively deprived them of their Wade rights.2 In such event, if the in-court identifications did not have an independent origin and if the failure to object to the in-court identifications was due to a mistake of their lawyer then the defendants might indeed be entitled to a new trial.3
I find it difficult to understand the majority’s refusal to require a testimonial hearing. I cannot imagine what more a defendant’s appellate lawyer *451could reasonably be expected to do before the actual holding of such a hearing to indicate the substantiality of his client’s claim.
In their motion for a new trial the defendants also rely on the failure of their trial lawyer to move "to suppress the shotgun shells and/or the pistol”. I therefore must also express my doubts about the correctness of the majority’s ruling that the arrest of the defendant Spencer made without a warrant was valid. Again, this issue was not raised at the trial. The record is incomplete. A complete record might support the majority’s conclusion; the present record does not — again, a Jelks hearing is required.
On the present record it appears that the only information which the police had when they arrested Spencer was that earlier on the day of the shooting he had visited the police station and complained about a resident of the house where the fatal shooting occurred. The eyewitnesses identified the assailants as Negro males, heavy build, one age 34, 6 feet; the other age 33, 5 feet 11 inches. Spencer was 47 years of age, 5 feet 2-1/2 inches tall, and weighed 145 pounds.
There were other items of identification information, but the record does not indicate whether they fit Spencer.
Shortly before they arrested Spencer at his home the police observed him place a pistol on a buffet in the dining room. Since the police knew that the victim had been killed with a shotgun that added nothing to their previous information.
Again, since the defendants’ trial lawyer did not question the validity of the arrest, the issues of probable cause to arrest and lawfulness of the seizure of the shotgun shells and pistol were not squarely presented at trial. There is the appear*452anee of serious error on the part of the defendant’s trial lawyer for failing to question the validity of the arrest, which defendants also ought to be able to explore in a Jelks hearing.
There is ample basis for requiring a testimonial hearing in connection with the issues raised in defendants’ delayed motion for a new trial.

 Cf. Hileman v Indreica, 385 Mich 1, 10 (1971), refusing to allow a too narrow reading of an "effort of counsel”.

 United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S a 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967).

 As indicated in Degraffenreid, Jelks, and other cases, merely because a mistake has occurred the defendants would not necessarily be entitled to a new trial. It might be possible for the people to establish, as indicated in People v Young, 21 Mich App 684 (1970), cited by the defendants’ appeUate lawyer at the time of the hearing on the motion for a new trial, that the in-court identifications were of independent origin and thus not irretrievably tainted by any error in the procedures followed at or before the lineup identification, or for other reasons it may appear that the lawyer’s mistake, if there was a mistake, did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial — that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.