Court Opinion

ID: 9540171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:19.549628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:41.124690
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision that the trial court was within *681its discretion in granting a mistrial because it determined that the jury verdiets were inconsistent. As to the remaining issues, I fully concur.
In Cedars ex rel. Cedars v. Waldon, 706 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), cited by the majority, we said that courts should "indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of the verdict" which should be overturned only "if it is legally or logically inconsistent, contradictory or repugnant such that no judgment can be pronounced upon it." Here, the jury was provided with verdiet forms and instructed that it must decide two claims-the defamation claim and the tortious interference with contract claim. It returned two verdict forms. The one clearly stated that it found for the plaintiff on the tortious interference claim. The other stated that it found for the defendant without reference to either claim. From these two forms, it may be reasonably inferred that the jury intended to return a verdict for the plaintiff on the tortious interference claim and against the plaintiff on the defamation claim. Indeed, it is the only logical conclusion that can be drawn. Thus, I do not believe the verdict is legally or logically inconsistent, nor is it so contradictory or repugnant that no judgment can be pronounced upon it. Indulging every reasonable presumption in favor of the verdict, I would hold that it is not inconsistent and that the trial court erred in granting a mistrial on this basis.