Court Opinion

ID: 9576234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:22:06.722227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:06.098174
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, Jr., P.J.,
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I concur in the propriety of summary disposition of the defamation *645claim, I am unpersuaded by the majority’s holding that a claim for malicious prosecution may be maintained on the theory that the actor failed to disclose exculpatory facts that came to light only after the instigation of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. More particularly, I fail to see any support in Michigan law for the proposition that fraudulent concealment after the onset of criminal proceedings is actionable on the basis of the actor’s passive role in continuing the prosecution. Accordingly, I would apply the holding in Hall v American Investment Co, 241 Mich 349, 355; 217 NW 18 (1928), that lack of probable cause as an element of malicious prosecution is determined by "those facts and circumstances as were known to the complainant at the time of instituting the criminal prosecution . . . and not facts which subsequently appeared,” and would affirm.
As the majority acknowledges, the Restatement position does not support their holding:
Active participation required. In order that there may be liability under the rule stated in this Section, the defendant must take an active part in their prosecution after learning that there is no probable cause for believing the accused guilty. It is not enough that he appears as a witness against the accused either under subpoena or voluntarily, and thereby aids in the prosecution of the charges which he knows to be groundless. His share in continuing the prosecution must be active, as by insisting upon or urging further prosecution. The fact that he initiated the proceedings does not make him liable under the rule stated in this Section merely because he intentionally refrains from informing a public prosecutor, into whose control the prosecution has passed, of subsequently discovered facts that clearly indicate the innocence of the accused, even though they have the effect of convincing him that this is the fact. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 655, comment c, p 414.]
*646Whether or not the imposition of liability under the facts of this case would be good social policy is better left undecided. The question of whether tort liability should be expanded in this fashion should be reserved for our Supreme Court to decide.