Court Opinion

ID: 9412380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-30 08:10:32.833419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:14.620960
License: Public Domain

Affirmed as Modified in Part, Remittitur Suggested in Part, and Memorandum
Opinion filed July 27, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00197-CV

    ZHEN QIN, AKA NICK ZHEN QIN OR NICK QIN; ELINA QIN;
      RIVERSTONE TOURS, INC.; US-CHINA PROFESSIONAL
  TRANSPORTATION, INC; US-CHINA PROFESSIONAL TRAVEL &
  TOURS, INC. F/K/A CHINESE PROFESSIONAL TRAVEL & TOURS,
 INC.; US-CHINA PROFESSIONAL TOURS, INC. (NEW JERSEY); US-
      CHINA PROFESSIONAL TOURS (NY), LLC; ARENDELLE
 MANAGEMENT, INC., AND US-CHINA PROFESSIONAL TOURS, INC.
                       (TEXAS), Appellants
                                       V.

                        YUANYUAN YANG, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 268th District Court
                           Fort Bend County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 16-DCV-235702

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellee Yuanyuan Yang entered into an agreement with appellant Nick Qin
to obtain a United States immigration visa in exchange for a $1 million investment
in the United States economy. After Qin used Yang’s investment for purposes other
than creating a business for her to obtain a U.S. visa, Yang sued Qin asserting claims
of fraud, breach of contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, money had and
received, and conspiracy. Yang obtained favorable jury findings on all causes of
action and elected to recover on her fraud claim, which provided the greatest
recovery. Qin, his wife Elina Qin, and several businesses owned by Qin appeal the
trial court’s judgment raising multiple issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment
of liability for fraud against Qin and his businesses. We reverse the judgment
assessing fraud damages against Elina. Because the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the total amount of consequential damages awarded for fraud, we suggest
a remittitur to an amount supported by the evidence. If a remittitur of the unsupported
damages is timely filed, we will modify the trial court’s judgment in part and affirm
as modified. If it is not, we will reverse the judgment as to the fraud claims and
remand those claims for a new trial.

                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Trial Testimony

      In 1990 Congress created the Employment-Based Fifth Preference Visa (EB-
5) classification to encourage foreign investment in the United States economy, and
to create jobs in the U.S. Jennifer Mizulski, an immigration attorney, testified about
the EB-5 immigration program at trial. The program requires a minimum investment
for an area the size of Houston of $1 million. A petition under the EB-5 program
takes between three and five and a half years to process. The EB-5 program has three
components: (1) monetary investment used to (2) create a company that will (3)
create at least ten new jobs.

      The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) requires a business plan as part of the
initial EB-5 application. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (“To show that a new commercial
                                          2
enterprise will create not fewer than ten (10) full-time positions for qualifying
employees, the petition must be accompanied by: . . . A copy of a comprehensive
business plan showing that, due to the nature and projected size of the new
commercial enterprise, the need for not fewer than ten (10) qualifying employees
will result, including approximate dates, within the next two years, and when such
employees will be hired.”). According to Mizulski, it is a violation of federal law to
use EB-5 investment funds in a manner that differs from that set out in the business
plan.

        In 1995, appellant Nick Zhen Qin created a travel company in Atlanta called
China Professional Tours (Tours-Atlanta). Qin expanded his travel company to
California (Tours-Riverstone), New York (Tours-New York), New Jersey (Tours-
New Jersey), and Houston (Tours-Texas). Qin solicited investors, primarily from
China, to fund his expansion. Some of his investors participated in the EB-5 visa
program. An attorney named Deacon Zhang helped the investors with their EB-5
applications.

        Appellee, YuanYuan Yang, testified that she met Qin in November 2014 in
Athens, Greece to discuss Yang’s participation in the EB-5 visa program. Shuyang
Wu is a friend of Yang’s and the father of her two children. Wu traveled with Yang
in 2014 to Greece to discuss Yang’s participation in the EB-5 program. Qin told
Yang he would use her investment to establish a new company, buy a building to be
used for the business, and create ten new jobs in the U.S. Qin also told Yang that her
company’s profit margin would be 20 percent and she could obtain a U.S. visa within
one year. Yang believed Qin’s representations, and decided to invest $1 million with
him. Over the course of two months Yang had $1 million transferred to Qin.1 Qin

        1
          Due to limitations on currency exchange by the Chinese government, the $1 million had
to be split into $50,000 increments sent by twenty different people.

                                              3
instructed Yang to work with Zhang, the immigration attorney, on the EB-5
application. Yang submitted her EB-5 visa application with Zhang’s help.

      In February 2015, Wu, who lived in the U.S., traveled to Los Angeles to meet
with Qin and Zhang. Zhang presented a business plan for Yang’s investment and
promised the business would be run according to the plan. The company Qin created
with Yang’s investment was called US-China Professional Training and Consulting
Company, Inc. (Training).

      In exchange for her investment Yang received a stock certificate reflecting
90-percent ownership in Training. Yang subsequently asked Wu to obtain the
company’s financial statements and operation status. Yang wanted to learn about
Training’s operation status because Qin had not communicated anything about the
company or its finances. After more than a year, in June 2016, Wu spoke with Qin
and learned that the $1 million investment had been spent. Qin communicated to
Yang, through Wu, that Yang would need to invest more money to allow Training
and her EB-5 application to continue.

      In September 2016, after Yang’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain financial
records, Yang filed suit. Up until that time Yang lived in China and had no way to
interfere with the business or learn of its operation except through Qin.

      In October 2016 Qin met with Wu and promised to return Yang’s $1 million
investment in two installments. Yang, who participated by phone, accepted Qin’s
offer, and agreed to withdraw the suit if Qin made the payments. Qin handwrote an
agreement in which he stated that he agreed to return $500,000 to Yang before
December 31, 2016, and the remaining $500,000 before the end of June 2017. Qin
failed to make either payment. After Qin refused to repay Yang’s investment, she
withdrew her EB-5 application because she could not comply with the program.
There was no way to create ten jobs through Training, and she “would not want to
                                          4
cheat USCIS.”2

       In January 2017, as an attempt to “save [her] company,” Yang called for a
shareholders’ meeting of Training. Yang gave Qin notice of the meeting, but Qin did
not attend. As a 90-percent shareholder, Yang voted to remove Qin as the sole
director of Training, and appointed herself as sole director, president, and secretary.

       Qin testified that he owned several businesses in the U.S., several of which
were created pursuant to the EB-5 program. Qin created two other businesses in
Houston: Arendelle Group, a real-estate company, and US-China Professional
Transportation, Inc. (Transportation). Qin created Transportation for the purpose of
owning the other companies’ vehicles. Qin intended to use Training as an entity to
help Chinese citizens come to the U.S. and train in Houston’s Medical Center and
oil community. Despite having three separate entities in Houston, Qin testified he
treated them as “just one business.”

       After receiving Yang’s investment, Qin spent the money on vehicles and
attempted to hire drivers for the vehicles. Qin admitted using Yang’s investment to
pay off car loans on cars owned by Transportation, another business. Qin asserted
that Transportation was a subsidiary of Training, but could not produce
documentation to establish the relationship.

       Qin also used Yang’s investment to purchase an “office condo,” which he
intended to use for all of his Houston businesses. Qin intended to buy the
condominium in the name of one of the companies and allow the other company to
lease it back. Qin admitted that he used Yang’s investment to purchase the
condominium, but titled it in Arendelle’s name. Qin further admitted, “I should have

       2
         The United States Citizen and Immigration Service (USCIS) has a fraud unit that conducts
regular audits to ensure that the investment is being spent in the manner required by the EB-5
program.

                                               5
purchased the condo only for the Training purpose for the EB-5 for the investment
for the future.” After learning he was in violation of the EB-5 program, Qin
transferred the title to Training.

      Qin admitted that he used Yang’s money for other businesses and that he
freely transferred funds between businesses. Transfers of money were made without
formal loan agreements or interest charges. For example, Training paid a franchise
fee to Tours-Atlanta despite the lack of any franchise agreement. When Qin
purchased vehicles for the companies, he did not pay attention to which company
was being placed on the title. Qin admitted that he used invoices for some companies
but credited the accounts to other companies. Qin “supposed” that Training paid
insurance for vehicles owned by Transportation, another entity. Qin also paid
hospital charges for family members from Training’s account, but had not
reimbursed Training. Qin admitted using Yang’s $1 million investment to buy a
home for Wu and transfer $400,000 to Tours-Atlanta, another one of his businesses.
A balance sheet for Training reflected expenses of just over $498,000. Qin was
unable to explain where the remaining $502,000 was spent.

      Professor Danielle Cheek, a certified fraud examiner, testified that she
reviewed several of Training’s documents including bank statements, stock
certificates, and a business plan. Professor Cheek also reviewed QuickBooks files,
which revealed that bookkeeping entries were not being made contemporaneously
with expenditures, and funds were being commingled among different entities. The
QuickBooks data entries reflected spikes in entries when corresponding court events
happened such as Yang requesting records or entry of a temporary injunction. The
implication was that bookkeeping entries were only made in response to events in
Yang’s suit against Qin.

      Cheek also reviewed the business plan and testified that Yang’s $1 million

                                         6
investment was not spent according to the business plan. Qin promised the
immigration attorney that he would spend Yang’s investment according to the
business plan, but he did not do so. Within six weeks of Yang’s last transfer,
$400,000 was transferred to the Tours-Atlanta account with no memo of a business
purpose. Out of $270,000 designated as payroll expenses, $134,000 was shown to
be distributed to Qin or his daughter. Payments on a Sprinter van purchased in
another company’s name (Transportation) were debited to Training’s account. Of all
these expenses, the payroll expense was the only one included in the business plan.
Training’s account was used to make a $598,000 purchase, which was originally
routed through an account called “Atlanta 8086,” but was actually used to buy a
house for Wu. By January 2017, Training’s bank accounts had been depleted to
between $5,000 and $10,000.

      Through her investigation Cheek saw evidence that Qin used Training’s funds
for his personal gain and for his other companies’ gain. As an example, Cheek
testified that Qin used Training’s funds to purchase his daughter’s health insurance.
Cheek’s investigation revealed several transactions from Training’s account that
were simply movement of funds between Qin’s businesses. Qin’s other businesses
were complicit in the misappropriation of Yang’s investment.

B.    Directed Verdict on Declaratory Judgment

      Before the charge was submitted to the jury Yang moved for directed verdict
on her declaratory judgment. In addition to her claims for damages Yang sought
declaratory judgment declaring that she was sole director, president, and secretary
of Training, and was entitled to sole possession of Training’s corporate records as
well as Training’s assets. Yang asserted that she complied with the shareholders’
agreement in calling a shareholders’ meeting in January 2017, and there was no
evidence to the contrary. Yang presented evidence that the meeting was held, and

                                         7
that Qin was given notice of the meeting. Qin admitted in his testimony that he
received notice of the shareholders’ meeting but chose not to attend. The trial court
granted Yang’s motion for directed verdict on the declaratory judgment.

C.    The Jury’s Liability Findings

      Yang sued Qin, his wife, Elina, and Qin’s businesses asserting claims against
Qin for breach of the settlement agreement, breach of contract, promissory estoppel,
fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Yang also asserted claims against all defendants for conversion, unjust enrichment,
money had and received, and civil conspiracy. Yang asserted a claim of tortious
interference with a contract against Qin’s entities. After a multi-day trial, the issues
were submitted to the jury through a lengthy and complex charge.

      The jury found in Yang’s favor on all claims 3. The jury found that Qin agreed
to pay Yang two $500,000 payments in exchange for her dropping the suit, and that
Qin failed to comply with the settlement agreement. As to the breach of contract, the
jury found that Qin and Yang agreed that Qin would invest Yang’s funds in a new
business venture for the purpose of Yang’s EB-5 immigration visa, and that Qin
breached the agreement by failing to use those funds in accordance with the business
plan. The jury further found that Qin committed fraud against Yang, and fraudulently
induced her to enter into the agreement in which she invested $1 million. As to
conspiracy, the jury found that Qin and his business entities (Riverstone, Tours-
Atlanta, Transportation, Arendelle, Tours-New York, and Tours-New Jersey,
collectively “the Entities”) conspired to damage Yang. Finally, the jury found that
the harm to Yang resulted from malice or fraud.

      3
          We detail only those findings necessary to the discussion of this opinion.

                                                 8
D.    The Jury’s Damage Findings

      On the fraud claim the jury was asked two questions on damages. The first
question instructed the jury to consider the difference between the value of the funds
Yang parted with and the value actually received, to which the jury answered, $1
million. The jury was also asked to determine Yang’s economic damages that, in
reasonable probability would be sustained in the future, to which the jury answered,
$850,000.

      The jury further found $150,000 in exemplary damages should be assessed
against Qin, and $21,428 each against the Entities.

E.    The Trial Court’s Judgment

      The trial court rendered judgment for Yang against Qin, Elina, Riverstone,
Tours-Atlanta, Transportation, Arendelle Group, Arendelle Management, Tours-
New York, and Tours-New Jersey. The court awarded $1,850,000 in actual damages
jointly and severally on Yang’s fraud claims against Qin, Elina, and the Entities. The
trial court awarded a total of $299,996 in exemplary damages including $150,000
against Qin, and $21,428 each against the Entities.

      In addition to the monetary recovery, pursuant to the court’s directed verdict
on Yang’s declaratory judgment, the trial court granted Yang a constructive trust
over all right, title, and interest of the defendants in and to the property of Training,
including (1) a 2016 Mercedes-Benz Metris van; (2) a 2010 Volkswagen Routan;
and (3) the Riverside Office Condominium.

      Qin, Elina, and the Entities appealed the trial court’s judgment.

                                     II. STANDING

      In Qin’s eighteenth issue, and the Entities’ thirteenth issue appellants
challenge the trial court’s partial summary judgment on the issue of standing.
                                           9
Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s partial summary judgment on any other
affirmative defenses.

      Yang filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of
all of appellants’ affirmative defenses, including standing. and breach-of-contract
claims. In Yang’s reply, as to standing, Yang asserted that Qin’s fraud was
perpetrated on her, not on Training, and Qin entered into a settlement agreement
with her, not Training. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the issue
of standing.

      Qin and the Entities challenge the portion of the trial court’s summary
judgment order that found Yang had standing and capacity to pursue her claims of
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, money had and received,
and conspiracy. We therefore limit our review of the summary judgment to
appellants’ claim that Yang lacked standing or capacity to assert claims in her
individual capacity for conspiracy. Appellants did not claim Yang lacked standing
or capacity to assert a claim of fraud.

      A no-evidence summary-judgment motion serves the same function as a
motion for pretrial directed verdict: it points out that there is no evidence of one or
more essential elements of a claim or defense on which the nonmovant bears the
burden of proof. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d
306, 310 (Tex. 2009). To defeat such a motion, the nonmovant must present
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested
in the motion. Timpte Ind., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (citing Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez,
206 S.W.3d 572, 581–82 (Tex. 2006)). On appeal, we “review the evidence
presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that
party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless

                                          10
reasonable jurors could not.” Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582 (citing City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 827); Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 208 (Tex.
2002). We will affirm a no-evidence summary judgment when (a) there is a complete
absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of
evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c)
the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 816.

      The trial court did not award damages based on Yang’s conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, or money had and received claims. For that
reason, we limit our analysis to appellants’ contention that Yang lacked standing or
capacity to assert a conspiracy claim in her own name. Appellants alleged that the
conspiracy claim belonged to Training, not to Yang individually. Because
conspiracy is a derivative tort, we look to Yang’s standing to bring her fraud claim
as an individual to determine whether Yang had standing to assert her conspiracy
claim. See Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff had standing to assert civil
conspiracy claim because he had standing to assert alleged Election Code violations
on which the conspiracy claim was based).

      In asserting affirmative defenses appellants did not challenge Yang’s standing
to assert fraud claims. Because appellants did not challenge Yang’s jurisdictional
facts to support standing for fraud, we hold Yang had standing to assert conspiracy.
See id. To the extent appellants challenge the trial court’s partial summary judgment
on Yang’s standing and capacity to assert a claim of conspiracy, we overrule Qin’s
eighteenth issue and the Entities’ thirteenth issue.

                                          11
                                         III. FRAUD

      In issue one Qin and the Entities assert the trial court erred in entering
judgment on Yang’s fraud claims because Yang elected to enforce performance of,
rather than to rescind, the settlement agreement. In issues six and seven Qin
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
findings of fraud. In issue eight Qin challenges the jury’s findings of fraud based on
a contract that was not admitted into evidence. In issue nine, Qin contends Yang’s
fraud claims are barred by section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code.
In issue ten Qin challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury’s findings on damages for fraud.

A.    The jury’s findings that there was a valid settlement agreement do not
      preclude recovery for fraud.

      Appellants assert that because the jury found the settlement agreement was
valid, the jury necessarily found that all other claims by Yang were released. The
jury made no such finding. The jury found that the parties entered into a settlement
agreement and that Qin breached the agreement. In that regard, the jury found in
Yang’s favor on a breach-of-contract claim. When a party receives favorable jury
findings on two or more theories of recovery that yield different damage amounts,
that party may elect the measure of damage upon which the party wishes to recover.
See Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987). In
this case, Yang elected to recover on her fraud claims rather than the breach-of-
contract claims. The fact that Qin breached a settlement agreement does not affect
Yang’s right to elect the greatest recovery. Contrary to appellants’ argument, Yang’s
claims were not released by the settlement agreement because Qin breached the
agreement. We overrule appellants’ first issue.4

      4
          In issue two Qin and the Entities assert that Yang failed to prove damages under the
                                              12
B.     The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s
       findings of fraud.

       1.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the fact-finding and considering any undisputed or conclusive contrary
evidence, a reasonable factfinder could find the challenged fact to be true. See
Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613 (Tex. 2016).
Evidence of a vital fact’s existence is legally insufficient if (a) no evidence in the
record supports it, (b) rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight
to the only evidence offered to prove it; (c) there is no more than a scintilla of
supporting evidence, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the converse. See
id. at 613. When reviewing for factual sufficiency, we consider and weigh all of the
pertinent evidence, and we will set the finding aside only if “the credible evidence
supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all
the evidence, that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered.” Id. at 615.
Whether reviewing the evidence for legal or for factual sufficiency, we defer to the
jury’s reasonable credibility determinations. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 820 (Tex. 2005); Noble Drilling (US) LLC v. Deaver, 596 S.W.3d 482,
487 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

       The jury was charged that fraud occurs (1) when a party makes a material
misrepresentation, (2) the misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or
made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, (3)
the misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be acted on by the
other party, and (4) the other party justifiably relies on the misrepresentation and

settlement agreement. Having overruled appellants’ first issue we need not address their second
issue.

                                              13
thereby suffers injury. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.
1990). “Misrepresentation” was defined in the charge to include:

           • A false statement of fact; or
           • A promise of future performance made with an intent, at the time
             the promise was made, not to perform as promised; or
           • A statement of opinion based on a false statement of fact; or
           • A statement of opinion that the maker knows to be false; or
           • An expression of opinion that is false, made by one who has, or
             purports to have, special knowledge of the subject matter of the
             opinion.

The jury was further instructed that “‘Special knowledge’ means knowledge or
information superior to that possessed by the other party and to which the other party
did not have equal access.” We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against these
instructions, to which there was no objection. See JJJJ Walker, LLC v. Yollick, 447
S.W.3d 453, 459–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

      2.     Qin represented that he would create a business for Yang that
             would comply with the EB-5 visa application program.
      A material representation is one that a reasonable person would attach
importance to and would be induced to act on in determining her choice of actions
in the transaction in question. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011). When Qin met with Yang in Greece, Qin
told Yang he would use her investment to establish a new business, buy a building
to be used for the business, and create ten new jobs in the U.S. Qin further
represented that the new business would comply with the U.S. EB-5 visa program,
and would enable Yang to obtain a visa to emigrate with her children to the U.S. Qin
further represented that the business’s profit margin would be twenty percent. Based
on Qin’s representations Yang entered into an agreement with Qin to transfer $1

                                         14
million in exchange for his creation of a business that would comply with the EB-5
program.

      Qin does not dispute having made these representations, but argues there is no
evidence that the representations were false.

      3.     Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding
             that Qin’s representations were false, and he did not intend to
             comply with his agreement with Yang.

      Evidence of the actions taken by Qin after receiving Yang’s $1 million is
legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that Qin never intended to use
Yang’s investment to create a new company that would create ten new jobs. In fact,
Qin admitted using Yang’s investment to purchase a home for Wu, aid his other
businesses, including Tours-Atlanta and Arendelle, pay himself a salary, and pay
health costs for his daughter. None of these expenditures included those Qin
represented as expenditures he would make on behalf of Yang’s business.

      The record further reflects that Qin did not follow the business plan that
accompanied Yang’s EB-5 application. The business plan, which was filed as part
of the EB-5 application, stated that Training was owned by Yang and Tours-Texas,
with Yang owning a 90-percent interest, and Tours-Texas owning ten percent. The
plan noted that a majority of Yang’s funds would be used to purchase approximately
six Mercedes-Benz vans to transport “high-end business travelers to visit and study
different locations in the U.S. for the potential business opportunities.” The business
plan stated that Training would hire three employees for “startup sales, operations,
and administrative needs over [the] first few months.” By the end of the first year it
was projected that Training would have hired seven full-time employees.

      The record reflects that Qin told Zhang he would spend Yang’s investment
according to the business plan. The record further reflects Training purchased only

                                          15
two vans, paid for a condominium that it did not own, transferred $400,000 to
another one of Qin’s businesses, and paid for Wu’s home.

      Qin admitted knowledge of all of these transactions. He attempted to excuse
the transactions by testifying that he treated all of his businesses as one large entity
and that he freely transferred funds between businesses. Transfers of money were
made without formal loan agreements or interest charges, and were not re-paid.

      Qin admitted that he purchased the business condominium with Training’s
funds but titled it in Arendelle’s name, then made lease payments from Training’s
account to Arendelle. Qin admitted that he planned this purchase even before
receiving all of Yang’s transfers of funds:

      Q. Now, three days after the money hits the bank account, you spent
      $207,963.63 to purchase the Riverstone condo, correct?
      A. Yes. That’s the closing date. Maybe that is the closing date.
      Q. Yeah. So this was in the works even before Ms. Yang sent her
      money, right?
      A. Yeah, investment was planned when we know money was coming.

      Qin asserts on appeal that he did not intend to make false misrepresentations,
but was, at worst, negligent. Direct proof of intent to defraud is rare, but breach of
the contract coupled with slight circumstantial evidence of fraud is sufficient to
support a fraud finding. Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768,
775 (Tex. 2009); see also Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E & P, Inc., 455 S.W.3d 558,
565 n.15 (Tex. 2014) (“Regarding whether the representation was fraudulent, this is
an inquiry typically left to the jury as it often involves proof of intent by
circumstantial evidence.”). Although intent is determined at the time the
representation is made, it may be inferred from the party’s subsequent acts.
Aquaplex, 297 S.W.3d at 775; Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432,
434 (Tex. 1986). A promise of future performance constitutes an actionable
                                          16
misrepresentation if the promise was made with no intention of performing at the
time it was made. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers &
Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998).

      Considering the evidence recited above, the jury reasonably could have
concluded that Qin never intended to comply with the business plan or the agreement
he made with Yang. The record reflects that Qin used Yang’s investment to enrich
his other businesses, not on the promised business for Yang, which would have
complied with the EB-5 program.

      4.        Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding
                that Yang relied on Qin’s misrepresentations.
      Fraud also requires that the plaintiff show actual and justifiable reliance.
Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tex.
2010). The plaintiff must prove that based on the alleged misrepresentation, she
either took an action or failed to take an action, which caused her harm. O & B
Farms, Inc. v. Black, 300 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,
pet. denied).

      Yang testified that during her meeting with Qin in Greece she believed Qin
“was truthful” when he told her he would establish a new company, buy a business
building, and create ten new jobs. She further believed his representation that the
profit margin would be twenty percent and her children could emigrate to the U.S.
to study. Yang testified she “placed tremendous trust” in Qin. Based on Qin’s
representations that she would receive a U.S. visa through a program where her
investment would be used to start a new business capable of supporting ten new jobs
in the U.S., Yang transferred $1 million to Qin. Yang suffered harm from Qin’s
misrepresentations in that Qin spent her $1 million on a business condominium for
another one of his businesses, a home for Wu, cash disbursement to another of Qin’s

                                           17
businesses, several vehicles for his other businesses, and salaries to himself and
family members. Qin’s actions risked rejection of Yang’s EB-5 application for fraud.

      Qin asserts that Yang could not have relied on his oral representations because
the representations were contradicted by an express, written agreement. The written
agreement to which Qin refers is the “Agreement on Investment/Immigration and
Cooperation” (Training Agreement), which was excluded from evidence. When we
review sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s findings, we analyze whether
the evidence at trial would have enabled reasonable and fair-minded people to reach
the verdict that is under review. Brazos Contractors Dev., Inc. v. Jefferson, 596
S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). We cannot
review the jury’s finding based on evidence that was not admitted before the jury. 5

       Qin further asserts Yang could not have justifiably relied on representations
contained in the business plan to make her investment because the business plan was
prepared months after she made the investment. However, the evidence supports a
finding of detrimental reliance without reference to reliance on the business plan.
Moreover, the business plan recorded the representations made by Qin in his meeting
with Yang. Qin represented himself to Yang as an expert on EB-5 visa applications,
which require a business plan. The jury reasonably could have concluded that Yang
relied on Qin’s representations when she agreed to invest $1 million.

       Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings of
fraud and considering any undisputed or conclusive contrary evidence, we conclude
a reasonable jury could have concluded that Qin engaged in fraud. Considering all
of the evidence, we cannot say that the credible evidence supporting the jury’s
findings is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence,

      5
         Qin challenges the trial court’s ruling excluding the Training Agreement, which we
review below.

                                            18
that the answers should be set aside. Concluding that legally and factually sufficient
evidence support the jury’s fraud findings, we overrule Qin’s issues six, seven, and
eight.

C.       The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support most of the
         damages found by the jury to be attributable to Qin’s fraud.

         In Qin’s tenth issue he challenges the jury’s findings of damages for fraud.
The trial court awarded Yang $1,850,000 in fraud damages. This award was based
on the jury’s answers to Questions 11 and 12 in the court’s charge. In Question 11
the jury was asked, “What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly
and reasonably compensate Yang for her damages, if any, that resulted from Qin’s
fraud?” The jury was given two choices under Question 11 as to the measure of
damages:

         a.    The difference between the value of the funds Yang parted with
         and the value actually received.
         b.    The difference between the value as represented to Yang and the
         value received.
The jury answered “$1,000,000” to each portion of Question 11. In Question 12 the
jury was asked to consider “Yang’s economic damages that, in reasonable
probability, will be sustained in the future.” The jury answered, “$850,000.”

         In Qin’s brief on appeal, he asserts (1) the $850,000 is speculative and not a
recognized measure of damages; and (2) the $1 million award is flawed because
Yang still owns Training.

         Actual damages for fraud may be either direct or consequential. J & D
Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. 2016). Direct
damages compensate for a loss that is the necessary and usual result of the tortious
act. Id. By contrast, consequential damages, also known as special damages,

                                           19
compensate for a loss that results naturally, but not necessarily, from the tortious act.
Id. In Question 11, the jury was asked about damages that directly resulted from
Qin’s fraud. In Question 12, the jury was asked about consequential damages. We
first address the jury’s findings under Question 11 attributing $1 million in direct
damages.

      1.     Direct Damages

      Texas recognizes two measures of direct damages for common-law fraud: the
out-of-pocket measure and the benefit-of-the-bargain measure. Formosa Plastics,
960 S.W.2d at 49. The out-of-pocket measure computes the difference between the
value paid and the value received, while the benefit-of-the-bargain measure
computes the difference between the value as represented and the value received. Id.
Out-of-pocket damages “derive from a restitutionary theory,” while benefit-of-the-
bargain damages “derive from an expectancy theory.” Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen,
221 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tex. 2007).

      The jury was instructed on both out-of-pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain
measures of damages. We will address the benefit-of-the-bargain standard. Under
this measure of damages, the defrauded party may recover the value of what she
would have received if the bargain actually struck had been performed as promised.
See Formosa Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 50.

      The record reflects that Yang invested $1 million in exchange for a promise
of a visa under the EB-5 program. Mizulski, Yang’s expert, testified that the EB-5
program required a minimum $1 million investment, a new business, and the
creation of ten new jobs. She further testified that the CFR requires the filing of a
business plan explaining how the business will spend money and create ten new jobs.
The CFR requires a timetable for creation of the jobs and financial projections for
two years. Mizulski reviewed the business plan submitted and testified that by
                                           20
diverting Yang’s investment to the Entities and himself, Qin failed to comply with
the plan, which violated federal law. Mizulski further testified that if an investor’s
funds are not used as represented to the U.S. government, the EB-5 visa will be
denied.

         The evidence supports the jury’s finding of $1 million in direct damages
because Qin represented to Yang that if she invested $1 million she would obtain a
visa under the EB-5 program. Due to Qin’s misuse of Yang’s investment, he did not
comply with the law governing the EB-5 program, and Yang did not receive the visa
for which she had bargained.

         Qin asserts, however, that Yang received a benefit for her investment because
the trial court awarded Yang a constructive trust in the assets of Training. The
portion of the trial court’s judgment that awarded Yang a constructive trust in two
vehicles and the “business condo” was in addition to the monetary recovery found
by the jury and was the result of the court’s directed verdict on Yang’s declaratory
judgment action. Yang sought declaratory judgment that, pursuant to the Texas
Business Organizations Code, and the actions taken at the January 19, 2017 Special
Meeting of the Shareholders of Training, she was entitled to immediate and
exclusive possession and control of Training’s original corporate records and
documents, together with Training’s tangible and intangible assets.

         The trial court granted directed verdict on Yang’s declaratory judgment and
awarded a constructive trust in Training’s assets. On appeal Qin has not challenged
the trial court’s grant of directed verdict on Yang’s declaratory judgment other than
to contend that the grant of a constructive trust amounted to double recovery for
fraud.

         As to Qin’s “double recovery” argument asserting that the monetary recovery
should be offset by the assets Yang received, there was no evidence presented at trial
                                           21
on the value of the assets. The right of offset is an affirmative defense. Brown v. Am.
Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 936 (Tex. 1980); Wheelbarger v. Landing
Council of Co-Owners, 471 S.W.3d 875, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,
pet. denied). The burden of pleading offset and of proving facts necessary to support
it are on the party making the assertion. Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 936.

      In this case, Qin asserted as an affirmative defense that Yang’s claims for
damages were “barred, in whole or in part, by setoff and recoupment.” Yang filed a
motion for no-evidence summary judgment alleging that Qin failed to present
evidence of his affirmative defenses. The trial court granted Yang’s motion for no-
evidence summary on several affirmative defenses including “setoff and
recoupment.” On appeal Qin has not challenged that portion of the trial court’s
summary judgment. Even if we determined Qin properly pleaded offset, Qin must
have proved facts necessary to support an offset of damages. Here, there is no
evidence of the value of Training’s assets; therefore Qin’s claim of offset fails.

      Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings of
direct damages for fraud and considering any undisputed or conclusive contrary
evidence, we conclude a reasonable jury could have concluded that Yang’s damages
were $1 million. Considering all the evidence, we cannot say that the credible
evidence supporting the jury’s findings is so weak, or so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the answers should be set aside. We
conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s award
of direct benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraud. We overrule that portion of Qin’s
tenth issue that challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury’s finding of $1 million in direct damages.

      2.     Consequential Damages

      Qin further asserts that the jury’s finding of $850,000 “is completely
                                          22
speculative, but even if it were correct, it would not be a recognized measure of
damages.” When properly pleaded and proved, consequential damages also may be
recoverable. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812,
816–17 (Tex. 1997) (“At common law, actual damages are either ‘direct’ or
‘consequential.’”). For consequential damages to be recoverable, they must be
foreseeable and directly traceable to and result from the fraud. Arthur Andersen, 945
S.W.2d at 816 (“[I]f [consequential] damages are too remote, too uncertain, or purely
conjectural, they cannot be recovered.”).

      In Question 12 the jury was asked “What sum of money, if any, if paid now
in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Yang for her damages, if any, that
were proximately caused by Qin’s fraud?” The charge then instructed the jury on the
definition of proximate cause and instructed them to answer each damages question
separately. Finally, the charge instructed the jurors to consider “Yang’s economic
damages that, in reasonable probability, will be sustained in the future.”

      Consequential damages are recoverable only if the misrepresentation is a
producing cause of the loss, i.e. if the losses are foreseeable and directly traceable to
and result from the misconduct. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 817; see Formosa
Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 49 n. 1 (“When properly pleaded and proved, consequential
damages that are foreseeable and directly traceable to the fraud and result from it
might be recoverable.”). And, unlike direct damages, consequential damages may
include subsequent losses if those losses were reasonably foreseeable and have the
requisite nexus to the wrong. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 817.

      The jury found $850,000 in consequential damages proximately caused by
Qin’s fraud. Mizulski, Yang’s expert, testified that if Yang wanted to seek an EB-5
visa she would need to begin the application process again. Mizulski testified that
the “EB-5 modernization rule” raised the minimum investment from $1 million to

                                            23
$1.8 million, almost double what Yang paid Qin. Therefore, it would cost Yang an
additional $800,000 to pursue an EB-5 application and to be restored to the same
position as she would have been had the fraud not occurred. The record does not
reflect any other evidence of consequential damages to Yang. Qin did not object at
trial that Mizulski’s testimony was speculative or that she testified to an incorrect
measure of damages.

      On appeal Qin does not challenge the foreseeability of the consequential
damages or whether those damages have the requisite nexus. Qin asserts that the
fraud damages amount to a windfall for Yang because she also received the assets
of Training. However, as discussed above, Qin failed to provide proof of the value
of Training’s assets and failed to request an offset of that value from the damages
awarded by the jury.

      Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings of
consequential damages for fraud and considering any undisputed or conclusive
contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
jury’s finding of $850,000 in consequential damages, but is sufficient to support an
award of $800,000 in consequential damages proximately caused by Qin’s fraud.
We sustain that portion of Qin’s tenth issue that challenges the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding of $850,000 in consequential
damages.

      3.     Remittitur

      A court of appeals may exercise its authority to suggest a remittitur when there
is insufficient evidence to support the full amount of an award, but sufficient
evidence to support a lesser award. Tex. R. App. P. 46.3; see Larson v. Cactus Util.
Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (“If part of a damage verdict lacks sufficient
evidentiary support, the proper course is to suggest a remittitur of that part of the
                                         24
verdict. The party prevailing in the trial court should be given the option of accepting
the remittitur or having the case remanded.”).

      Here, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s combined
award of $1,850,000 in direct and consequential damages for fraud. The evidence,
however, is sufficient to support an award of $1,800,000. Accordingly, we suggest
to Yang a remittitur of $50,000. If timely accepted, we will modify the trial court’s
judgment to reflect the remittitur and an award of $1,800,000; otherwise, Yang’s
fraud claim shall be reversed and remanded for a new trial as to liability and
damages. Tex. R. App. P. 46.3; see Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641; see also Tex. R.
App. P. 44.1(b) (appellate court “may not order a separate trial solely on unliquidated
damages if liability is contested”); Rancho La Valencia, Inc. v. Aquaplex, Inc., 383
S.W.3d 150, 152 (Tex. 2012) (applying Rule 44.1(b)).

D.    Qin did not preserve error on his argument that section 21.223 of the
      Business Organizations Code bars Yang’s fraud claim.
      In Qin’s ninth issue he asserts that Yang’s fraud claims are barred by section
21.223 of the Business Organizations Code, which provides in part:

      (a) A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or
      a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or any
      affiliate of such a holder, owner, or subscriber or of the corporation,
      may not be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect to:
      ...

      (2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating
      to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder, beneficial
      owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation
      or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a
      fraud, or other similar theory. . ..
      ...

      (b) Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a holder,

                                          25
       beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates that
       the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate caused the
       corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate
       an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit
       of the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate.
Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.223.

Subsection (a)(2) prevents an individual from being held individually liable for
certain claims unless the additional elements found in subsection (b) are proved.
TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Group, Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 596–97 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

       A complaint that section 21.223 bars a claim must be preserved for review by
raising the issue in the trial court. See Dodd v. Savino, 426 S.W.3d 275, 290–91
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We conclude that appellants failed
to preserve error on this issue. Qin did not raise the alleged bar under section 21.223
in the trial court or in his motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33. Because Qin
failed to preserve error for review, we overrule Qin’s ninth issue. 6

                                 IV. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

       In Qin’s third issue he asserts the trial court erred in awarding a constructive
trust of Training’s assets in addition to monetary recovery for fraud. The Entities
and Tours-Texas also challenge the trial court’s award of a constructive trust in their
third issue.

       A party is entitled to sue and seek damages on alternative theories, but it is
not entitled to a double recovery. Waite Hill Servs., Inc. v. World Class Metal Works,

       6
          Because we have upheld the jury’s findings on fraud liability, and most of the damage
award, we need not address appellants’ issues challenging the breach-of-contract claims. See
Birchfield, 747 S.W.2d at 367 (the trial court should utilize the findings affording the prevailing
party the greater recovery and render judgment accordingly). We therefore overrule Qin’s fourth
and fifth issues and the Entities’ eighth and ninth issues.

                                                26
Inc., 959 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. 1998). A double recovery exists when the plaintiff
recovers twice for the same injury. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Garza, 371 S.W.3d 157,
162 (Tex. 2012); Jang Won Cho v. Kun Sik Kim, 572 S.W.3d 783, 805 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). “Under the one-satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is
entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered because of a particular
injury.” Utts v. Short, 81 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. 2002); accord Tony Gullo Motors
I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. 2006).

      Appellants assert the trial court improperly awarded Yang a constructive trust
in the assets of Training in addition to monetary damages for fraud. The flaw in
appellants’ argument, however, is that the constructive trust was not awarded as a
remedy for fraud, but as a consequence of the declaratory judgment action.

      In Yang’s live pleading she sought a declaratory judgment declaring that she
was the “sole Director, President, and Secretary of Training, whereby she is entitled
to the exclusive corporate governance and management of Training.” Yang further
sought “immediate and exclusive possession and control of Training’s original
corporate records and documents, together with Training’s tangible and intangible
assets.” The trial court granted a directed verdict on Yang’s declaratory judgment
claim. On appeal appellants have not complained about the trial court’s directed
verdict, but allege the court erred in awarding a constructive trust of Training’s
assets.

      A court of appeals may not reverse a trial court judgment on a ground not
raised. Sonat Expl. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex.
2008). “The rule that points not argued will not be considered is more than just a
prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases,
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.” United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). This principle

                                          27
extends to unchallenged rulings regarding damages. Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC,
610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020).

      The trial court’s judgment awarded a constructive trust in Training’s assets to
Yang based on the court’s directed verdict on Yang’s declaratory judgment. We may
not reverse the trial court’s judgment on declaratory judgment because appellants
have not challenged the trial court’s ruling on the directed verdict. We therefore
overrule appellants’ third issues.

                                     V. CONSPIRACY

A.    Legally and factually sufficient evidence support the jury’s conspiracy
      findings.
      In Qin’s fifteenth issue he contends Yang’s conspiracy claim must fail
because it is not supported by an underlying tort, the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support each element of conspiracy, and Yang failed to properly prove
damages against each appellant. The Entities assert an identical challenge in their
tenth issue.

      In Question 24, the jury was asked to answer the question if they had answered
“Yes” to the questions on fraud, conversion, or tortious interference. Question 24
read as follows:

      Were two or more Defendants part of a conspiracy that damaged Yang?
         To be part of a conspiracy, two or more Defendants must have had
         knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common objective or course
         of action that resulted in the damages to Yang. One or more persons
         involved in a conspiracy must have performed some act or acts to
         further the conspiracy.
      Answer “Yes” or “No” for each.
          1. Nick Qin                                       Yes
          2. Elina Qin                                      No

                                          28
          3. KL International Insurance                      No
          Services, Inc.
          4. KL Tours Group, Inc.                            No
          5. Qindom, LLC                                     No
          6. Riverstone Tours, Inc.                          Yes
          7. US-China Professional Travel &                  Yes
          Tours (Atlanta), Inc.
          8. US-China Professional                           Yes
          Transportation, Inc. (“Transportation”)
          9. Arendelle Group, LLC                            Yes
          10. Arendelle Management, Inc.                     Yes
          11. US-China Professional Tours                    Yes
          (New York), LLC
          12. US-China Professional Tours                    Yes
          (New Jersey), Inc.

      Appellants first assert that the jury’s conspiracy findings are not supported by
sufficient evidence because there is legally and factually insufficient evidence of an
underlying tort. Conspiracy is a derivative tort because a defendant’s liability for
conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort for which the plaintiff
seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable. Tilton v. Marshall, 925
S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996). Having found legally and factually sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s findings of fraud, we reject appellants’ first contention that there
was no proof of an underlying tort.

      Appellants next assert the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support all elements of conspiracy. Civil conspiracy is a theory to secure joint and
several liability against members of a conspiracy for the harm caused by any one
member of the conspiracy. Comcast Corp. v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 627
S.W.3d 398, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. dism’d). A
defendant’s liability for conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort
                                           29
for which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable. Id.
To prevail on a claim for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a
combination of two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished (either an
unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means); (3) a meeting of the minds
on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5)
damages as the proximate result. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005). An
actionable conspiracy must consist of acts that would have been actionable against
the conspirators individually. Four Bros. Boat Works, Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Cos.,
217 S.W.3d 653, 668 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Once a
civil conspiracy is proved, each conspirator is responsible for all acts done by any of
the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 921
(Tex. 1983).

      Appellants specifically challenge the evidence to support that they had a
meeting of the minds to pursue an object or course of action that was unlawful.
Citing Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d
854 (Tex. 1968), appellants argue there was legally and factually insufficient
evidence of a preconceived plan or unity of design and purpose.

      As noted by the court in Schlumberger, proof of a conspiracy must usually be
made by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 858. Conspiracy liability is sufficiently
established by proof showing concert of action or other facts and circumstances from
which the natural inference arises that the unlawful, overt acts were committed in
furtherance of common design, intention, or purpose of the alleged conspirators. Int’l
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 581 (Tex. 1963). It is not
required that each and every act of a conspirator be shown to have been in concert
with the others or that it be established by direct evidence that all combined at a
given time prior to each transaction. Id. at 582. Inferences of concerted action may

                                          30
be drawn from joint participation in the transactions and from enjoyment of the fruits
of the transactions. Id.

      There is abundant evidence that the Entities, acting through Qin, enjoyed the
fruits of Qin’s fraud. For example, Qin admitted that he purchased the business
condominium with Yang’s investment funds and that he arranged the real estate
transaction before he received her final installment. Qin further admitted using
Yang’s investment to fund the Entities and purchase vehicles for use by those
Entities.

      The circumstances in this case are substantially different from the
circumstances in Schlumberger. The alleged conspirators in Schlumberger were
independent entities who presumably were dealing with each other in arms-length
transactions entered into for the parties’ mutual benefit. 435 S.W.2d at 857. The
alleged conspirators in this case were Qin and the entities he controlled.

      Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings of
conspiracy and considering any undisputed or conclusive contrary evidence, we
conclude a reasonable jury could have concluded that Qin and the Entities engaged
in conspiracy. Considering all the evidence, we cannot say that the credible evidence
supporting the jury’s finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight
of all the evidence, that the answer should be set aside.

      Finally, under these issues appellants assert Yang failed to prove damages for
conspiracy because she failed to obtain a separate jury finding on the amount of
damages caused by the conspiracy.

      “The gist of a civil conspiracy is the damage resulting from commission of a
wrong which injures another, and not the conspiracy itself.” Schlumberger, 435
S.W.2d at 856. The trial court awarded Yang damages jointly and severally on her

                                          31
fraud claims from Qin, Elina, and the Entities. Although the conspiracy question in
the charge was predicated on affirmative answers to fraud, conversion, and tortious
interference, the trial court only awarded damages based on fraud.

      Citing THPD, Inc. v. Cont’l Imports, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 593, 605 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2008, no pet.), appellants assert Yang was required to obtain a separate jury
finding of damages that resulted from the conspiracy. We disagree. The damages
recoverable in an action for civil conspiracy are those damages resulting from the
commission of the wrong, not the conspiratorial agreement. See Agar Corp., Inc. v.
Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019).

      The cases cited by appellants are distinguishable in that in those cases the
evidence suggested that divisible damages arose from multiple underlying torts only
some of which were the subject of the conspiracy, see THPD, Inc., 260 S.W.3d at
605, or a separate damage question was required to reflect the timing and scope of
the conspiracy. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514
S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. 2017).

      When the evidence shows that all conspiracy defendants were involved from
the very beginning as to the underlying tort, a separate finding of causation and
damages for each conspiracy defendant is not required. Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 224.
Because in this case all damages were caused by the underlying tort of fraud, a
separate finding of damages caused by the conspiracy was not required. We overrule
Qin’s fifteenth issue and the Entities’ tenth issue.

B.    The trial court erred in assessing damages against Elina.

      In Elina’s fifth and sixth issues she asserts the trial court erred in entering
judgment against her because the jury only found liability and damages caused by
Elina on Yang’s conversion claims. In the final judgment the trial court ordered

                                           32
recovery of damages jointly and severally on Yang’s fraud claims from Qin, Elina,
and the Entities. In a footnote, the trial court stated that “Defendant Elina Qin shall
be jointly and severally liability for up to $111,111.00 in actual damages.” As noted
above, the trial court did not render judgment on the jury’s findings of conversion.
On the fraud claims the jury was asked whether Qin committed fraud and whether
Elina and the Entities conspired to commit an underlying tort. The jury found that
Qin committed fraud and that the Entities conspired with Qin. In answer to the
question on the conspiracy claim, the jury found that Elina had not conspired with
Qin and the Entities.

      A finding of civil conspiracy further imposes joint and several liability on all
conspirators for actual damages resulting from acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Greenberg Traurig of New York, P.C. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 90 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Because the jury did not find that Elina
participated in the conspiracy, she is not jointly and severally liable for fraud. See
id. The trial court’s award of damages for which Elina is jointly and severally liable
is not supported by the jury’s verdict. See Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d
78, 101 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (jury finding on direct
liability theory did not support trial court’s judgment of joint and several liability).
We sustain Elina’s fifth and sixth issues. We modify the trial court’s judgment to
delete the assessment of damages against Elina.

                              VI. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

      Having addressed appellants’ issues that if sustained would require rendition
we now turn to their issues challenging exclusion of certain evidence, submission of
an issue to the jury, and grant of a no-evidence summary judgment.

                                          33
A.     Appellants did not preserve error with regard to exclusion of the
       Training Agreement.

       In Qin’s sixteenth issue he challenges the trial court’s exclusion from evidence
of the Training Agreement. The Entities raise the same complaint in issue eleven,
and Tours-Texas raises the same complaint in its first issue, but all parties refer to
Qin’s brief for argument on the issue.

       Before trial Yang filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the Training
Agreement from evidence, and any mention of the agreement or the dismissed
breach-of-contract claim. Yang asserted in her motion that admission of the Training
Agreement or mention of it in testimony would be unduly prejudicial. 7 Qin argued
at the hearing on the motion in limine that admission of the Training Agreement was
probative because it set out Yang’s percentage interest in Training, and stated that
Yang would not interfere in the management of Training. The trial court granted the
motion in limine on the Training Agreement.

       After Yang testified, Qin called her back to the stand for the purpose of a bill
of exception on exclusion of the Training Agreement. Yang explained that the
immigration attorney rejected the agreement because it gave only 51 percent of the
shares to Yang, which would not satisfy the EB-5 process. For the EB-5 program to
be satisfied Qin had to create a new company for Yang. At the end of the proffer,
the following exchange occurred:

       [Qin’s counsel]: Okay. Your Honor, just so we’re clear on that, because
       I don’t think I’ve ever formally offered it and the Court’s formally
       rejected it. He addressed it in a motion in limine, but that’s a little
       different. But as I understand the Court’s ruling, you’re disallowing this

       7
         Although neither party referenced the Rules of Evidence in seeking admission or
exclusion of the Training Agreement, we presume from the hearing on the motion in limine that
Yang objected pursuant to Rule of Evidence 403, which would act to exclude evidence the trial
court deemed relevant, but more prejudicial than probative.

                                             34
      as evidence.
      THE COURT: I’m disallowing this as evidence.

      Qin asserts in his brief that exclusion of the Training Agreement “precludes
an alleged preceding oral contract on the same subject matter.” Qin does not, on
appeal, complain as he did at trial, that the Training Agreement is probative because
it shows the parties’ percentage shares in Training or Qin’s mandate to “operate”
Training. In fact, Qin admitted in his deposition that he did not follow the Training
Agreement’s allocation of shares on the advice of counsel because allocation of only
51 percent of the shares to Yang would not comply with the requirements of the EB-
5 program. Appellants failed to preserve error for appeal because their issues on
appeal do not comport with the complaint raised in the trial court. See Doan v.
TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP, 542 S.W.3d 794, 807 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). We overrule Qin’s sixteenth issue, the Entities’ eleventh
issue, and Tours-Texas’s first issue.

B.    Appellants did not preserve error regarding exclusion of testimony about
      a $90,000 check.
      In Qin’s seventeenth issue and the Entities’ twelfth issue, appellants contend
the trial court erred in excluding testimony relating to a cashier’s check from
Training payable to the law firm of Nguyen and Chen. In both appellants’ opening
briefs, this issue is raised but neither brief presents an argument for why testimony
about the $90,000 check should have been admitted.

      Although we construe briefs liberally and require only substantial compliance
with briefing rules, see Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.9, if an appellant’s
issues are unsupported by clear and concise legal argument with appropriate
citations to authorities, the appellant waives error. Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of
Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). It

                                         35
is not our duty to fashion a legal argument for a party. See Canton-Carter, 271
S.W.3d at 931-32; see also Smith v. Smith, 541 S.W.3d 251, 260-61 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). A party must not only cite relevant authority
and the record but must also provide substantive legal analysis. Burton v. Prince,
577 S.W.3d 280, 292 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Appellants
failed to provide substantive legal analysis as to why testimony about the check
should not have been excluded. We overrule Qin’s issue seventeen and the Entities’
issue twelve.

C.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony.

      In Qin’s twelfth issue he asserts the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
Mizulski to testify that “federal immigration law created a duty between Nick Qin;
that Nick Qin had breached that duty; Yang was damaged because of the breach of
that duty; Yang was damaged by $1.85 million dollars by that breach of duty; and
that Nick Qin had ‘converted’ funds belong[ing] to Yang[.]”

      Before trial Qin filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Mizulski on
the grounds that her testimony was inadmissible because she planned to testify about
questions of law, and her opinion was unreliable. At trial, Qin repeated his
objections, and the trial court overruled them. On appeal Qin does not complain
about the reliability of Mizulski’s testimony but asserts only that her testimony was
inadmissible because she testified on questions of law.

      The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule of Evidence 702.
Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is qualified and (2) the testimony is
relevant and based on a reliable foundation. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez,
204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. 2006). Qin does not challenge Mizulski’s qualifications
or the reliability of her testimony, but challenges whether her testimony was
admissible on legal issues. We review the trial court’s determination that expert

                                          36
testimony is admissible for abuse of discretion. Greenberg Traurig, 161 S.W.3d at
93–94 (citing Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002)). The
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any
guiding rules or principles. Id.

      An expert may state an opinion on a mixed question of law and fact if the
opinion is limited to the relevant issues and is based on proper legal concepts. GTE
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 619–20 (Tex. 1999). An issue involves a
mixed question of law and fact when a standard or measure has been fixed by law
and the question is whether the person or conduct measures up to that standard. Mega
Child Care, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 29 S.W.3d 303,
309 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). An expert, however, may not
testify on pure questions of law. Id. at 309. Thus, an expert is not allowed to testify
directly to her understanding of the law, but may only apply legal terms to her
understanding of the factual matters in issue. Greenberg Traurig, 161 S.W.3d at 94.

      Qin does not complain about Mizulski’s testimony as it relates to fraud, but
asserts that Mizulski inappropriately testified that Qin breached a fiduciary duty
owed to Yang under federal law. We disagree. The record reflects that Mizulski
testified generally to the requirements of the EB-5 visa immigration program. She
testified that investments under the EB-5 program “require a high level of trust . . .
because of the amount of money that’s involved[.]” Mizulski testified that federal
case law requires a business plan outlining how the investment funds will be used.
Mizulski testified that Qin was required to use Yang’s investment funds according
to the business plan prepared in conjunction with the EB-5 application.

      In testifying about the legal requirements of the EB-5 program Mizulski
permissibly testified about the standard or measure that is fixed by law. Mizulski
then opined that Qin failed to follow that standard. In that regard Mizulski offered

                                          37
an opinion on a mixed question of law and fact regarding whether Qin’s actions
violated federal law. See, e.g. Mega Child Care, Inc., 29 S.W.3d at 309–10
(testimony on whether day care center violated Human Resources Code was
admissible as mixed question of law and fact).

       We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mizulski’s
testimony at trial and overrule Qin’s twelfth issue.

                           VII. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       In Tours-Texas’s second issue, it challenges the trial court’s grant of no-
evidence summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claim filed against Yang.
Tours-Texas filed a petition in intervention in which it alleged, inter alia, that Yang
entered into an agreement with Tours-Texas, not Qin, regarding Yang’s investment
in Training. Tours-Texas’s breach-of-contract claim was based on the Training
Agreement. Yang filed a motion for no-evidence summary judgment in which she
alleged that Tours-Texas furnished no evidence that the Training Agreement was a
valid contract, that Yang or Qin were to perform under the Training Agreement, that
Yang breached the agreement before Tours-Texas, or that Tours-Texas suffered any
damages.

       Among the elements needed to defeat Yang’s no-evidence summary judgment
motion on Tours-Texas’s breach-of-contract claim, Tours-Texas needed to present
evidence creating a fact issue on whether it performed or tendered performance
under the Training Agreement. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd.,
574 S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. 2019). Even if we assume, without deciding, that the
Training Agreement was a valid contract, 8 we conclude that Tours-Texas failed to

       8
          Tours-Texas never produced an agreement signed by both parties. The agreement
contains a typed signature from Yang but was not signed by Qin or another representative of Tours-
Texas. In response to the motion for summary judgment Tours-Texas relied on the bankruptcy
court’s Order Confirming Plan in which the court ordered that Tours-Texas assumed the Training
                                               38
produce evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact that Tours-Texas
performed under the contract before Yang’s alleged breach. Although, in response
to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant “is not required to
marshal its proof” on a challenged element, it must still “point out evidence that
raises a fact issue on the challenged element[ ].” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) cmt.; see
Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002).

       The Training Agreement required Tours-Texas to:

           • Prepare “all ground works” to be ready for Yang’s investments
             in the branch office and register and incorporate the branch office
             company at the local government;
           • Hire professional accountants to prepare 3 year and 5 year
             financial budgets for the company according to US government’s
             requirements;
           • Hire US immigration attorneys and professional business
             attorneys and adequately prepare all required documents;
           • Be responsible “to operate and manage the Company
             independently and will provide 10 employment positions at all
             time[s] in accordance with USCIS accepted standards”; and
           • Assist Yang, after being immigrated, in contacting schools,
             providing transportation, and other requirements during
             settlement in the U.S.
The Training Agreement required Yang to:

           • Prepare “all ground works” for the investment and provide proof
             of investment and all other documents required by USCIS;
           • Timely, accurately, and truthfully provide Tours-Texas and the
             immigration attorney with personal, financial, and other

Agreement. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy trustee to assume or
reject executory contracts and prescribes how that authority is to be exercised. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
Although the statute does not include a definition of executory contract, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that “Congress intended the term to mean a contract ‘on which performance is
due to some extent on both sides.’” NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522, n.6 (1984).

                                                39
               information to meet the requirements of USCIS;
           • Pay all attorney’s fees necessary to process the immigration
             application; and
           • Provide no less than $1 million in investment funds and pay all
             necessary fees for the immigration program.

       In response to Yang’s motion, Tours-Texas focused on Yang’s attempts to
obtain control of the operations of Training. Tours-Texas failed to present evidence,
however, that it complied with its obligations under the Training Agreement before
Yang called a shareholders’ meeting. In fact, Qin, Tours-Texas’s owner, admitted in
his deposition that he purchased a “business condominium” with Yang’s investment
funds, but put the title of the business condominium in Arendelle’s name. Qin further
admitted that he did not use Yang’s investment to create a business for her that would
create ten new jobs, but he used her investment to fund his other businesses in
addition to personal expenses. “It is a fundamental principle of contract law that
when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that contract, the other
party is discharged or excused from further performance.” Bartush-Schnitzius Foods
Co. v. Cimco Refrigeration, Inc., 518 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. 2017) (quoting
Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004)).
Yang’s alleged breach of the Training Agreement did not occur until after Tours-
Texas failed to perform under the contract. Not only did Qin fail to present evidence
of Yang’s prior breach, he admitted that he breached the contract. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in Yang’s
favor on Tours-Texas’s breach-of-contract claim. We overrule Tours-Texas’s
second issue.9

       9
          We need not address appellants’ issues challenging the jury’s findings on conversion,
breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a contract, or money had and received because
the trial court did not render judgment on those findings. We therefore overrule Qin’s issues
eleven, thirteen, and fourteen and the Entities’ issues four, seven, and ten.

                                               40
                                 VIII. CONCLUSION

      Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s
fraud findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of fraud. Because the jury did
not make any findings justifying an award of damages against Elina, we sustain
Elina’s fifth and sixth issues and delete the trial court’s award of joint and several
liability as it pertains to Elina. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

      Because the evidence is insufficient to support the total amount of
consequential damages the jury awarded, we sustain that portion of Qin’s tenth issue
that challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
finding of $850,000 in consequential damages. In this situation, we may suggest a
remittitur, and we do so here. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v.
Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 124 (Tex. 2009). If Yang files a
remittitur within twenty days from the date of this opinion, we will modify the trial
court’s judgment accordingly and affirm the judgment as modified. If the remittitur
is not timely filed, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and remand this
case for a new trial on the claims. Tex. R. App. P. 46.3; see Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(b)
(“The court may not order a separate trial solely on unliquidated damages if liability
is contested.”).

                                               /s/ Tracy Christopher
                                               Tracy Christopher
                                               Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bourliot and Wilson.

                                          41