Court Opinion

ID: 9711567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:34:35.761143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.996012
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, J.,
dissenting. As appears in Commonwealth v. Stanton, 479 Pa. 521 at 525, 388 A.2d 1053 at 1055 (1978), reversing the Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Stanton, supra.
The appellant was charged with intent to deliver marijuana. Yet, the trial court found none of the evidence on the person of the appellant. The record clearly establishes that no controlled substances were found on appellant’s person. The contraband found by the police officers was in the livingroom, kitchen, basement, and in appellant’s bedroom.
It is clearly established that regardless of one’s proprietary interest in the dwelling where the controlled substances are found,6 if the contraband is not found on the person of the defendant, the Commonwealth must prove constructive possession. Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 223 Pa.Super. 7, 296 A.2d 854 (1972); Commonwealth v. Schuloff, 218 Pa.Super. 209, 275 A.2d 835 (1978); Commonwealth v. Chenet, 237 Pa.Super. 226, 352 A.2d 502 (1976); Commonwealth v. Samuels, 235 Pa.Super. 192, 340 A.2d 880 (1975).
Constructive possession requires not only the ability to control a substance but the intent to do so. Commonwealth v. Stephens, 231 Pa.Super. 481, 331 A.2d 719 (1947).7
*633Trial counsel incorrectly requested a charge for possession, rather than constructive possession. The court followed trial counsel’s suggested instruction and original counsel compounded his error by failing to object to the absence of a constructive possession instruction.
Therefore, appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel for two reasons: First, the proposed charge did not request the definition of constructive possession. Second, once the inadequate charge was given, counsel should have objected to the judge’s failure to adequately define an essential element of both actual and constructive possession. On the intent to exercise control, see: Commonwealth v. Updegrove, supra; Commonwealth v. Schuloff, supra.
There is no “reasonable basis designed to effectuate [appellant’s] interest,” in requesting an incorrect charge and then failing to object: Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, supra. Hence, appellant’s conviction of possession of marijuana is reversed and we remand for a new trial as to that charge.
In light of the prior holdings, a disposition on the merits of appellant’s third claim is unnecessary.
Judgment of sentence reversed as to the possession of amphetamines charge. We remand for a new trial on the possession of marijuana charge.
PRICE, J., concurs in the result.

. As in the present case, “It is true that the fact of possession loses persuasiveness if persons other than the accused had equal access to the place in which the contraband was found. Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971).

. The element of intent to control is essential not only to constructive possession, but also actual possession. If a person is to possess a controlled substance, he must have the power to control and the intent to control that substance. Commonwealth v. Santana, 460 Pa. 482, 333 A.2d 876 (1975).