Court Opinion

ID: 9571757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:53.428596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:55.226010
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) provides, in relevant part, that, “[i]f an answer is filed, a [forfeiture] hearing must be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause. . . .” The issue presented for resolution in the instant case is whether this statutorily prescribed 60-day time limit is mandatory or directory. Other statutorily prescribed time limits in the forfeiture statute have been construed as mandatory rather than directory. See State of Ga. v. Luke, 183 Ga. App. 182 (358 SE2d 272) (1987); State of Ga. v. Vurgess, 182 Ga. App. 544 (356 SE2d 273) (1987); State of Ga. v. Waters, 173 Ga. App. 274 (326 SE2d 243) (1985). However, OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) has never been previously construed and the issue of whether, in the absence of a continuance, a forfeiture hearing may validly be held more than 60 days after service of the complaint is, therefore, one “of first impression.” Henderson v. State of Ga., 205 Ga. App. 542 (422 SE2d 666) (1992).
Although the issue may be one of first impression, the applicable rule of statutory construction is one of long-standing.
“ ‘[L]anguage contained in a statute which . . . commands *512the doing of a thing within a certain time, when not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing of the thing afterward, will generally be construed as merely directory and not as a limitation of authority, and this is especially so where no injury appeared to have resulted from the fact that the thing was done after the time limited by the plain wording of the Act.’ [Cits.] ... ‘A statutory provision is generally regarded as directory where a failure of performance will result in no injury or prejudice to the substantial rights of interested persons, and as mandatory where such injury or prejudice will result.’ ”
Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., 237 Ga. 406, 410 (229 SE2d 66) (1976) (construing a statutorily prescribed time limit within which the juvenile court is authorized to hold a hearing in connection with an allegedly deprived child).
OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) provides that the forfeiture hearing “must” be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause. “Must” is certainly generally considered to be a word of command, synonymous with “shall.” When employed in connection with a statutorily prescribed time limit, however, a word of command is generally construed to be directory “ ‘when not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing of the thing afterward. . . .’ [Cits.]” Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra at 410. In OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), there are no “negative words” precluding the holding of the forfeiture hearing more than 60 days after service of the complaint. Accordingly, the mere employment of the word “must” in that statute does not compel a construction of the 60-day time limit as mandatory.
Likewise, however, the mere lack of “negative words” precluding the holding of a forfeiture hearing more than 60 days after service of the complaint does not compel a construction of the 60-day time limit as directory. Although a statutory time limit expressed in words of command unaccompanied by negative words of limitation is generally regarded as directory, there is an exception. Such a statutory time limit is to be construed as mandatory if the failure to comply can be said to result in “ ‘injury or prejudice to the substantial rights of interested persons. . . .’” Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra at 410. Accordingly, the appropriate construction of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) as mandatory or directory is ultimately dependent upon the determination of whether the failure to hold the forfeiture hearing within the statutorily prescribed 60 days injures or prejudices the substantial rights of interested persons. See Butler v. State, 207 Ga. App. 824 (429 SE2d 280) (1993).
Applying this applicable rule of statutory construction, compli*513anee with OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) must be construed as mandatory rather than directory. A failure to comply with the statutorily prescribed 60-day time limit “does prejudice or. injure the rights of the [claimant], primarily the right to possession of the [seized property].” Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra at 410. The forfeiture
Decided November 8, 1993.
Michael C. Eubanks, District Attorney, Richard E. Thomas, Daniel W. Hamilton, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Hawk, Hawk & Lyons, Victor Hawk, Christopher G. Nicholson, Groover & Childs, Denmark Groover, Jr., for appellees.
Van C. Wilks, amicus curiae.
statute sets out and balances two legislative intentions: (1) the prompt disposition of property subject to forfeiture under the statute ([cit.]); and (2) the protection of property interests of innocent owners, as defined by the statute. [Cit.]
(Emphasis supplied.) State of Ga. v. Jackson, 197 Ga. App. 619, 621 (1) (399 SE2d 88) (1990).
The public interest requires that all suits in our Courts should be determined as speedily as possible, and the interest of the party, whose property is seized . . ., also requires that there should be no delay on the part of the [trial court], in [conducting the forfeiture hearing].
Birdsong & Sledge v. Brooks, 7 Ga. 88, 89 (1849) (cited and relied upon by the Court of Appeals as authority in the instant case).
Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s construction of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) as mandatory, since the claimant’s right to possession of his seized property is prejudiced if the forfeiture hearing is delayed, without continuance for good cause, beyond the 60 days within which the state is otherwise statutorily authorized to withhold the claimant’s property from him. Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra; Birdsong & Sledge v. Brooks, supra. Compare Hopping v. Cobb County Fair Assn., 222 Ga. 704, 706 (2) (152 SE2d 356) (1966); Butler v. State, supra; Israel v. Cofer, 152 Ga. App. 248 (3) (262 SE2d 545) (1979).
I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher joins in this special concurrence.