Court Opinion

ID: 9852955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:39:52.518622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.473583
License: Public Domain

Elder, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that once a stop is justified, police officers may maintain the status quo while searching for weapons when reasonably necessary to assure their safety and the safety of any bystanders. I disagree, however, with their conclusion that “ ‘a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances [presented in this case] would be warranted in the belief that his safety . . . was in danger,’ ” based on the unknown contents of the black velvet pouch. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes the following: Officer Pennypacker observed Pierson driving his automobile on Atlantic Avenue with an *206open container of beer in his hand.2 Officer Pennypacker verbally requested Pierson to pull over and he complied. Officer Tosloskie, who was with Officer Pennypacker, saw a suspicious exchange whereby Pierson passed something in a closed fist to the passenger, who attempted to conceal the item under her arm before dropping it onto the floor. I would hold that it was unreasonable for Officer Tosloskie to think that the black velvet pouch—-just large enough to hold an ordinary teabag—could contain a weapon.
The situation here is similar to one in which an officer discovers a container in the suspect’s pocket during a pat-down search for weapons. Here, however, Officer Tosloskie admitted that he “didn’t [even] think it was necessary” to conduct a patdown of the passenger, Ms. Wolcott. In fact, after he saw the bag fall from under Wolcott’s arm, he allowed her to remain in the car while he looked for the bag. Pier-son, the driver, had exited the vehicle and was under the control of Officer Pennypacker. The record indicates that, except for the actions associated with the black pouch, Pierson and his passenger were cooperative and compliant. Clearly, the scope of Officer Tosloskie’s search should have been no greater than that allowed during a patdown search for weapons.
In Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191 (1991), it was held that the opening of a film canister located pursuant to a patdown search for weapons exceeded the scope of a Terry search. While the officer in this case testified that the “drawstrings” at the “top of the bag” were open, he did not know that it “contained Baggies . . . [of] white powder” until he “picked it up.” This is exactly the kind of search and seizure not permitted by the fourth amendment without probable cause unless it reasonably relates to the officer’s safety. We recently discussed the limitations to be placed on such searches in Bolda v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 315, 423 S.E.2d 204 (1992). We held that “[a] bare assertion that an item is believed to be a weapon will not justify a seizure of any item, particularly when the size, character or configuration of the item reasonably could not support the conclusion that the item was a weapon.” Id. at 318, 423 S.E. 2d at 206. I would reach the same conclusion in this case.
Furthermore, the facts in this case, as in Bolda, are distinguishable from those in several other Virginia cases where the objective reasonableness of a challenged patdown search was upheld. In Lansdown v. *207Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 213, 308 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984), for example, the Court held that the officer could reasonably have believed that the hard, rectangular brass box might have been or contained a weapon. In Simmons v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 552, 231 S.E.2d 218 (1977), the Court held that the officer could reasonably have concluded that the “warm-up jacket sagging in the front” contained a weapon, id. at 556, 231 S.E.2d at 221, and, accordingly, he was justified in removing a “hard object,” even though it proved ultimately to be a tape recorder. Id. at 553, 231 S.E.2d at 219-20. In Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 354 S.E.2d 79 (1987), we held that the officer could reasonably have believed that a hard ‘ ‘object that felt big and . . . was bulging out of [Williams’] pocket” was a weapon, even though it was in reality a large roll of one hundred dollar bills. Id. at 67, 354 S.E.2d at 87.
In this case, by contrast, a police officer could not reasonably have believed that the black velvet bag the size of a teabag contained a weapon. Tosloskie knew it was small enough to have been passed by Pierson in a “closed hand” and then placed by Wolcott “under her left armpit.” He then observed the pouch on the floorboard of the car. In my judgment, his explanation that he thought it might contain a weapon was inherently unreasonable. It is significant to note that no basis for seizure of the bag was offered except for the officer’s concern that the bag contained a weapon. Viewed in this light, I would hold that Tosloskie’s seizure of the bag at issue was “a search for evidence rather than a protective search for weapons.” See Commonwealth v. Silva, 318 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Mass. 1974).
Courts in several other jurisdictions have reached this same conclusion when confronted with similar facts:
[T]he container should not be [seized or] opened unless it might contain a weapon, a judgment which the officer should be expected to make on the basis of its size, weight and feel. Thus it is improper for an officer to open a small zippered coin purse weighing only a few ounces, for it ‘ ‘could not conceivably have contained a gun nor could any officer reasonably have considered that it contained a dangerous weapon of any kind.” . . . [S]ome courts have improperly upheld the examination of the contents of containers found on the person by engaging in ‘ ‘fanciful speculation’ ’ about what would be useable as a weapon in such a situation.
*2083 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(d), at 525-26 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) (footnotes omitted). In People v. Martinez, 801 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1990) (en banc), an officer conducted a patdown search of the appellant during a search of his home pursuant to a warrant. On the appellant’s person, the officer found two small pocket knives, a spoon, and a pouch. After feeling several pointed objects through the pouch, the officer opened it and found two screws and two small plastic bags containing methamphetamine. Id. at 543. In granting appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that it was not reasonable for the officer to have believed that the pouch contained a weapon. Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Colorado agreed, emphasizing that the officer “failed to establish specific and articulable facts sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the contents of the pouch posed a threat to his or others’ safety.” Id. at 545. “[N]o reasonable person,” concluded the Court, “could believe that the pouch was a weapon or that it contained a weapon.” Id.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts reached the same conclusion in Commonwealth v. Silva, 318 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 1974), a case also involving a search for weapons. In that case, a police officer saw Silva bend down as if to place something under the front seat of his automobile. Id. at 897. Another officer then found a small black packet containing heroin under that same seat. Id. The trial court denied Silva’s motion to suppress the heroin, but the Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, the Court noted that the packet, which weighed no more than two ounces, was made of opaque black plastic and was about three inches in diameter and one inch deep, with a zipper running almost its entire circumference. Id. at 901. On that basis, the Court concluded that “[the packet] could not conceivably have contained a gun, nor could an officer reasonably have considered that it contained a dangerous weapon of any kind. The unzipping of the packet, and examination of its contents, were clearly a search for evidence rather than a protective search for weapons.” Id. For that reason, it reversed Silva’s conviction.
I would hold that Officer Tosloskie could not reasonably have believed that the black velvet pouch contained a weapon. Accordingly, his action in picking up the bag from the floorboard of the car amounted to an unconstitutional search and seizure, and appellant’s motion to suppress should have been granted.

 The offense for which Officer Pennypacker stopped appellant is a Class IV misdemeanor.