Court Opinion

ID: 9644553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:59:15.203621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:14.796613
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I adopt by reference Justice Brown’s analysis of the luminol issue and join in his opinion to that extent. As to the testimony of Larry McGuire, I find no error in the admission of that evidence at trial. The trial court’s ruling violated neither Rule 403 or 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, nor appellant’s Due Process rights. Appellant relies on Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Neither is especially pertinent to this case. In Kastigar, a defendant had been granted immunity in a state court proceeding and the court held that in a federal proceeding the burden was on the prosecution to show that its evidence was obtained independently. Similarly, in Murphy, the petitioners had been granted immunity under state laws and they had refused to answer questions in a proceeding before the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor on grounds that it would incriminate them under federal law. In their appeal from a civil contempt penalty the Supreme Court held that, absent an immunity provision, one jurisdiction may not compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under the laws of another jurisdiction. Unlike the case before us, in neither of those had the defendant violated his agreement to give full and truthful information and testimony on which the immunity agreement was based. Appellant has cited nothing that would sustain the right to breach an immunity agreement by giving false statements and then object to the use of any information which was given. The argument is comparable by analogy to Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed 2nd 1 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with first degree murder who agreed to testify against co-defendants in exchange for a plea agreement to second degree murder was not protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause against reinstatement of the first degree murder charge when he reneged by refusing to testify against co-defendants in their retrial where such a consequence was part of the agreement. As to Rule 403, the theft of Larry McGuire’s dog was relevant to prove the plan of appellant and his accomplice which led to the murder of Raymond Jacobs. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing this evidence. I believe the judgment of conviction should .be affirmed.