Court Opinion

ID: 9376579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:25.627039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.499331
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                    UNPUBLISHED
In re E. O. BEY, Minor.                                             March 2, 2023

                                                                    No. 362066
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                    Family Division
                                                                    LC No. 2021-001011-NA

Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights to his
daughter, EOB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (j). Under MCL 712A.19a(2), because there
are no aggravating circumstances, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services, was
required to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with EOB. Petitioner did not do so.
Instead, the primary “service” provided to respondent was a suggestion from a caseworker that
respondent should seek mental-health treatment on his own. In light of petitioner’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and EOB, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

        Respondent and EOB’s mother divorced in October 2018. Pursuant to their judgment of
divorce, EOB’s mother had sole physical custody of EOB, respondent and EOB’s mother shared
joint legal custody, and respondent had supervised visitation every other weekend at EOB’s
paternal grandmother’s house.1 At one point, EOB became distressed while at the grandmother’s
house. Her mother decided to put her in therapy based upon EOB’s comments that if she told her
mother something her mother would be hurt. Subsequently, in August 2021, EOB’s mother saw
EOB lying on a bed and “rubbing” her vagina. When asked what she was doing, EOB—who was
six years old at the time—stated that she did not know. When asked where she learned to touch

1
 The visits were supervised because in 2017 respondent attempted to commit suicide while EOB
was present. The record reflects that respondent does not continue to have suicidal ideation.

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herself, she indicated that respondent had showed her. EOB’s mother scheduled a medical
examination and called the police.

        During a Kids Talk interview, EOB disclosed that when she was five years old respondent
touched “her girl” with one finger over her underwear while she was at her grandmother’s house.
She described “her girl” as where “pee” comes from. EOB said that respondent told her not to tell
anybody and that he told her that she could do it to herself. After that incident, she began touching
“her girl” “a lot.”

        In October 2021, petitioner filed a petition seeking termination of respondent’s parental
rights. Following a preliminary hearing, the court authorized the petition. The court ordered
supervised visitation, but stated that it would not begin until after the pretrial hearing. Thereafter,
at the pretrial hearing, a caseworker recommended that visitation remain suspended unless
recommended by EOB’s therapist because EOB was having nightmares and exhibiting trauma-
based behaviors. The court agreed and suspended parenting time pending a recommendation from
EOB’s therapist.

        On March 1, 2022, following a Tender Years’ hearing,2 the court admitted as substantive
evidence EOB’s statements during her Kids’ Talk interview. The court then held a combined
adjudication trial/termination hearing. At that hearing, respondent denied sexually abusing EOB.
He also presented evidence that his divorce from EOB’s mother was because he had cheated on
her with another woman and that, since he had a child with the other woman, EOB’s mother’s
relationship with him had further deteriorated. He argued that EOB’s mother was alienating him
from EOB and suggested that the allegations were the product of EOB’s mother’s negative
influence.

        At the end of the trial/hearing, respondent conceded that the evidence was sufficient to
establish jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b), but argued that petitioner had not proved that there
were statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3). Respondent
contended that the evidence showed that there was a need for a “serious Treatment Plan.” The
trial court found that respondent had touched EOB’s vagina over her underwear when she was five
years old and that the contact was sexual abuse under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). Based upon that
finding, the court found that there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The court set the matter for a best-
interests hearing and continued its order suspending parenting time pending a recommendation by
EOB’s therapist. The court also ordered respondent and the child to be evaluated at the Clinic for
Child Study.

       The best-interests hearing was held on May 11, 2022. EOB’s mother testified to behavioral
changes in EOB following her disclosure of the sexual abuse, including that she was now timid
and was worried more about her mother being absent from her. In addition, a caseworker testified
that when the case started, respondent attended a family team meeting. She stated that during that
meeting, she suggested that respondent should seek therapy, but she clarified that she only

2
    See MCR 3.972(C)(2)(a).

                                                 -2-
informed him that he could find a therapist by calling the number on the back of his insurance
card. Respondent was not provided with referrals for any services. The caseworker opined that
there were no services available for someone in respondent’s situation.

         The trial court also admitted into evidence the clinician report prepared by the Clinic for
Child Study. According to the report, EOB reported that she sometimes wanted to see respondent,
but that she was afraid to see him again “because he might do the same thing.” As it relates to
respondent, the report identified several areas of concern, including respondent’s parenting
abilities, housing status, mental-health issues, substance use, and domestic violence. The report
stated that respondent disclosed that he attempted suicide seven times, with the last time occurring
in 2017. He explained that he had previously been diagnosed with major depression and anxiety.
He had received mental-health treatment, including medication, but he was not currently taking
any medication. Respondent also reported that he used marijuana and alcohol,3 that he was
homeless, and that he was unemployed. He denied sexually abusing his daughter. The report
suggested that, in light of respondent’s problems, termination of his parental rights would be in
EOB’s best interests. However, the report also indicated that a caseworker assigned to
respondent’s case had reported that no services had been provided to respondent because he had
not been “adjudicated.”

         Following the best-interests hearing, the trial court found that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in EOB’s best interests. Further, the court found that reasonable efforts had
been made to prevent EOB’s removal from respondent’s care because there was a family team
meeting, a Kids Talk interview, therapy was provided for EOB, and respondent was “encouraged
to participate in therapy.” The court found that “the main thing” that petitioner did was to
encourage respondent to “engage in mental health services,” but that he did not do so. The court
noted that, given respondent’s mental-health history, he should have not needed a caseworker to
tell him that he needed to engage in mental-health services. The court found that “offering
[respondent] a case service plan” would “cause more harm” to EOB, and the court expressly stated
that it had “no reason to believe that if he was offered a case service plan that anything would be
different.” Accordingly, the court determined that—notwithstanding that no case service plan had
been offered and although there were no aggravating circumstances so as to justify the denial of
reasonable efforts—termination of respondent’s parental right was in EOB’s best interests.

                                  II. REASONABLE EFFORTS

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Respondent argues that termination of his parental rights was premature because petitioner
did not prepare a case service plan for him. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding
that petitioner make reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with his or her child. In re
Atchley, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket Nos. 358502 & 358503); slip op
at 3.

3
  Although the report indicated that respondent used marijuana and alcohol, there does not appear
to be any indication that respondent was abusing those substances.

                                                 -3-
                                           B. ANALYSIS

        Absent aggravated circumstances not present in this case, “[r]easonable efforts to reunify
the child and family must be made in all cases . . . .” MCL 712A.19a(2) (emphasis added); see
also In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “Reasonable efforts must include
‘a service plan outlining the steps that both [the Department] and the parent will take to rectify the
issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.’ ” In re Taylor-Jones, 509 Mich
935, 935 (2022), quoting In re Hicks, 500 Mich 79, 85-86; 893 NW2d 637 (2017) (alteration in
original).4 See also MCL 712A.18f(2) and (3).

         In this case, petitioner did not provide respondent with a case service plan outlining the
steps that it and respondent would take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to
achieve reunification. Nor did it make any reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child. Indeed,
despite being aware that respondent had mental-health issues—including prior suicide attempts—
petitioner did not refer respondent for a psychological evaluation or mental-health counseling.
Rather, it encouraged him to seek such services on his own, and then used his failure to seek
services on his own to argue that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Despite knowing that respondent was unemployed and homeless, no services were offered to
rectify those conditions. At the best-interests hearing, the caseworker justified the lack of services
by speculating that no services were available for someone in respondent’s position. Yet, she did
not explain why respondent would be unable to benefit from services, which arguably could have
included referrals for mental-health treatment, housing and employment assistance, and parenting
classes. Instead, she speculated that because there was evidence that respondent sexually abused
his child he was, essentially, beyond rehabilitation so no services could ever benefit him. Although
the caseworker might not have believed any services would be effective, the legislature determined
that petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to reunify parents in respondent’s position
with their children. See MCL 712A.19a(2). That is, even if petitioner itself believes that such
services will ultimately be futile, it must nevertheless make the statutorily mandated reasonable
efforts to achieve reunification.

        We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by finding that a case services plan was not
necessary because it would not have “made any difference.” Our Legislature made the
determination that reasonable efforts to achieve reunification must be made in all cases except
those involving enumerated aggravating circumstances. Those aggravating circumstances are not
present in this case, and so the trial court erred by excusing petitioner from making reasonable
efforts. Moreover, to the extent that the court found that petitioner, in fact, made reasonable efforts
by “encouraging” respondent to seek therapy on his own, the trial court clearly erred. See In re
Taylor-Jones, 509 Mich at 935 (2022) (holding that the trial court erred by finding that “the mental

4
  Orders from our Supreme Court are binding if they are a final disposition of an application
containing a concise statement of the applicable facts and the reason for the decision. DeFrain v
State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369; 817 NW2d 504 (2012).

                                                 -4-
health services that [the respondent] sought and received on her own amounted to reasonable
efforts by the Department.”).

                                       III. CONCLUSION

        In conclusion, because there are no aggravating circumstances in this case, petitioner was
required to make reasonable efforts to reunify EOB with respondent. See MCL 712A.19a(2). As
part of the required reasonable efforts, petitioner had to create a case services plan “outlining the
steps that both it and [respondent] will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and
to achieve reunification.” In re Hicks, 500 Mich at 85-86. It did not do so. The trial court clearly
erred by excusing petitioner from its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts. Reversal and
remand for further proceedings is, therefore, required. On remand, petitioner must make
reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with EOB, including by creating a case service plan
outlining the steps he must take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve
reunification.5

       Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                              /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan

5
  In light of our determination, we do not address whether the trial court erred by finding statutory
grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights and that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in EOB’s best interests.

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