Court Opinion

ID: 9627055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:31:59.160686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:06.991522
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the decision of the majority that when plaintiff cross-examined Mrs. Guyton, it thereby waived the bar of A.R.S. Section 12-2251, and that therefore the testimony of Mrs. Guyton relating to transactions with the decedent was properly admissible. The majority’s partial reliance on the allegedly corroborative testimony of Clementine Billingsley, however, underscores a disparity in Arizona case law in relation to the interpretation of A.R.S. Section 12-2251, otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute, set out in full in the majority opinion. This is illustrated by the case of Davey v. Janson, 62 Ariz. 39, 153 P.2d 158, cited in the majority opinion. A case which, in my opinion, should be expressly disaffirmed insofar as its interpretation of this statute is concerned.
The problem is posed by the following language, fin part, from A.R.S. Section 12-2251:
“In an action by or against executors * * * in which judgment may be given for or against them as such, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with * * * the testator * * * unless * * * required to testify thereto by the court.”
Clearly, the prerogative in this matter lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stewart v. Schnepf, 62 Ariz. 440, 441, 158 P.2d 529. The fundamental question, however, relates not to the undisputed existence of this discretion, but to the circumstances upon which the exercise of said discretion must be predicated. The preJanson view is demonstrated by our decision in Johnson v. Moilanen, 23 Ariz. 86, 201 P. 634. In that case, this Court was faced with the question whether the trial court had abused its discretion in denying plaintiff the chance to testify after plaintiff had introduced certain witnesses who testified to alleged admissions against interest made by the decedent, in their presence. In affirming the trial court, we cited without disapproval the ruling of the trial court that other witnesses should testify first in order that it might then determine whether it could exercise its discretion relieving plaintiff from the bar of the statute, then Arizona Civil Code 1913, paragraph 1678. We referred to the case of Goldman v. Sotelo, 7 Ariz. 23, 60 P. 696, wherein the trial court had permitted plaintiff to testify because two other witnesses had testified to the same facts testified to by the plaintiff.
“From this it would appear that the facts to which the two witnesses and the plaintiff Sotelo testified were the same, and not that the plaintiff testified to the transaction itself and the two *354witnesses to an admission of it by the deceased, * * 201 P. at page 635.
The following lengthy passage from the Johnson case is worthy of quotation as an example of this Court’s acceptance of the underlying principle that foundation testimony is required before the court may consider the possible exercise of its discretion to allow a party to testify:
“ * * * Remembering that the purpose of paragraph 1678 * * * is to place, so far as possible, executors, administrators, and guardians in actions in which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, on the same plane as the other party to the suit, it is apparent that a trial court, upon, whose wise use of its discretion so much depends, should weigh very carefully all testimony concerning admissions of the deceased whose mouth is closed in death before allowing them to serve as á basis for permitting the living party to give his version of the transaction out of which the action arose, or else the statute will fail in the accomplishment of that which gave it life. We do not say that evidence of admissions against interest of a deceased person as to a transaction in controversy should not be received, nor that in some instances they might not serve as a basis for the exercise by the court of its discretion to permit the living party to give his version of a transaction upon which an action might be based, yet the possibilities of fraud and perjury are so great, if the bars are thrown down, that it is incumbent on the trial court to act with the greatest precaution in order that estates of deceased persons may be protected against unjust claims. * * ”
The Montana statute, R.C.M.1947, Section 93-701-3, subdivision 3, provides in terms substantially similar to' our own statute and adds that where, without testimony of a party, injustice will be done, the admission or rejection of the testimony resides in the sound discretion of the trial court. In interpreting this statute, the Montana Supreme Court has said that the trial court should not admit the testimony of a party until sufficient other testimony has been admitted to warrant the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to render a ruling in favor of the questionable testimony. Wunderlich v. Holt, 86 Mont. 260, 283 P. 423; Pincus v. Pincus’ Estate, 95 Mont. 375, 26 P.2d 986; Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 512, 227 P.2d 614. An examination of Montana’ cases indicates that the required foundation testimony must itself be corroborative of the offered testimony of the witness.
We may take it, therefore, that prior to the decision in Davey v. Janson, supra, it was the rule in this state, exemplified by decisions of this Court and reinforced by decisions of the Supreme Court of Montana in regard to a very similar statute to ours, that *355while the trial court has discretion to allow a party to testify as an exception to the Dead Man’s Statute, the decision to exercise that discretion must be founded upon prior corroborative testimony of independent witnesses relating to the transaction in issue. By this standard, the testimony of Mrs. Billingsley relating to a rather vague declaration against interest made by the decedent, would be open to serious doubt as a sufficient foundation for an exercise of the discretionary power of the court under A.R.S. Section 12-2251.
In Davey v. Janson, 62 Ariz. 39, 153 P.2d 158, this Court sustained the action of the trial court admitting the testimony of plaintiff who was the sole witness against the decedent’s estate. Plaintiff obtained a verdict and defendant appealed, contending the trial court had abused its discretion. This Court said:
“Appellant timely objected to the testimony given by the appellee, but the court practically throughout the trial of the case overruled the objections, so evidently the court in its discretion overruled the obj ections and had a right to do it under the above quoted section. And it was equivalent to requiring the appellee to testify * * 62 Ariz. at page 46, 153 P.2d at page 161.
In his dissent, Judge Ross termed the action of the trial court an abuse of discretion, relying on the fact that plaintiff produced no corroborating evidence whatsoever.
The net effect of Davey v. Janson is to give the trial court an unfettered right to “require” plaintiff to testify by merely overruling defendant’s objections. If the trial court can be said to have discretion to do this, then it is an unreviewable discretion; for if it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court in the Davey v. Janson case, supra, to require plaintiff to testify when plaintiff failed to produce one whit of supporting testimony, then I fail to see when this Court could ever declare the trial court guilty of an abuse of discretion in this type of case. I suggest that the Court avail itself of the opportunity in the instant case to disavow Davey v. Janson, supra, and consign it to a well-deserved and long-delayed oblivion. I would apply to the facts of this case the familiar rule that in order for the trial court to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to require plaintiff to testify, plaintiff must first produce some corroborating testimony to the precise facts of the transaction forming the basis of the litigation; and arrive at the conclusion that the testimony of Clementine Billingsley is an insufficient foundation under the rule and decide the case on the basis that plaintiff in its cross-examination waived the statutory bar.
STRUCKMEYER, J., concurs in the views of JOHNSON, J.