Court Opinion

ID: 9363290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 19:02:28.358712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.234343
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                           OF THE
                                 STATE OF DELAWARE
VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA                                             LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
        JUDGE                                                   500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                       WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733
                                                                         TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626

                                     January 12, 2023

William R. Adams, Esquire                           Sean A. Dolan, Esquire
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C.                    Mintzer, Sarowitz, Zeris, Ledva &
222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1040                     Meyers
Wilmington, DE 19801                                919 N. Market Street Suite 200
                                                    Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: McConnell Transport LTD v. Rolando Moyano C.A. No.: N21C-07-049 VLM

Dear Counsel:

    On January 5, 2023, the Court held a virtual hearing on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

                         Relevant Facts & Procedural History

       This case arises out of an accident that occurred on May 15, 2020, where
Plaintiff’s truck operator was driving on an interstate highway,1 and hit a vehicle in the
middle of the road, 2 after the vehicle’s engine stopped working due to mechanical
defects.3 Per the police report, Defendant owned/insured the vehicle, and it was driven
by someone named Luis Mendez,4 who was cited for driving without a valid license.5
Plaintiff alleges its truck was damaged in that accident and caused by Defendant’s
negligence and negligent entrustment of his vehicle to Mr. Mendez.6

1
  Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 3.
2
  Id.
3
  Plaintiff’s Response Brief, Ex. A, at 1.
4
  Id.
5
  Id. at 2.
6
  Although the Complaint only uses the term “negligence” and does not use the term “negligent
entrustment,” the Complaint has a “negligence” claim and a “negligent entrustment” claim. See
       On August 15, 2022, Plaintiff took the deposition of Defendant with the
assistance of an interpreter. No other witnesses have been deposed. Mr. Mendez cannot
be found. Defendant testified vaguely that he had purchased the inoperable vehicle for
the sole purpose of using parts.7 He could not recall when. He stated that he had never
driven the vehicle,8 and admitted he never used the vehicle for its parts.9 Instead, he
recalled that he entered into an agreement with Mendez after Mendez approached him
and expressed interest in buying it from him, also for its parts.10 They came up with a
purchase price of about $200, yet Defendant gave the title to Mendez without getting
paid.11 Defendant could not remember when the transaction occurred,12 or whether he
signed the title over to Mendez.13 Defendant described Mendez as “irresponsible.”14

                                      Standard of Review

       The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment under Superior Court
Civil Rule 56 falls on the moving party to demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 15 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must
sufficiently establish the “existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact.”16
Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute or if “it
seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the application
of the law to the circumstances.” 17 “All facts and reasonable inferences must be

Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 7 (“Defendant, Rolando Moyano, was negligent in that he: (a) negligently
entrusted his vehicle to a third party without an operating driver’s license; (b) failed to maintain
and/or ensure that his vehicle was able to operate safely; (c) failed to make the necessary steps to
confirm that the third party in question could safely and legally operate his vehicle; (d) was
otherwise negligent in the inspection, maintenance and/or granting of permissive use of his
vehicle.”).
7
  Defendant’s Opening Brief, Ex. B. at 6.
8
  Id. at 6–7.
9
  Id. at 7.
10
    Id. at 8.
11
   Id. at 9.
12
    Id. at 10.
13
    Id. at 9.
14
    Id. at 12.
15
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
16
    Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 663 A.2d 488, 1995 WL 379125, at *3–4
(Del. 1995); see also Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979).
17
    Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469–70 (Del. 1962). See also CNH Indus. Am. LLC v.
Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 2015 WL 3863225, at *1 (Del. Super. June 8, 2015).
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considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”18 On this vague factual
record, it is improper to rule as a matter of law. 19 With the unavailability of Mr.
Mendez, it is likely that the record may never be fully developed. But what little we do
know still survives under Rule 56.

                                           Discussion

       The elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of an automobile are: “(1)
entrustment of the automobile, (2) to a reckless or incompetent driver whom, (3) the
entrustor has reason to know is reckless or incompetent, and (4) resulting damages.”20
The crucial element in the negligent entrustment tort is “the foreseeability of the harm,
and not ownership of the chattel or control of the tortfeasor.”21

        Here, Defendant is listed as both the owner/insured of the vehicle. Although he
claims he no longer owned the vehicle at the time of the accident, he acknowledges that
Mendez called Defendant after the accident to tell him that he had moved the car and
that the car had stopped.22 It is unclear why Mendez would have reason to communicate
with Defendant if the vehicle was no longer Defendant’s concern. Ownership remains
a genuine issue of material fact. And if a jury finds that Defendant owned the vehicle
at the time of the accident, it is also for them to determine whether Defendant’s conduct
meets the elements of negligent entrustment when he turned over his vehicle to someone
he described as irresponsible.

       For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

                                                              Sincerely,

                                                              /s/ Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                              Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                              Judge
oc:    Prothonotary

18
   Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Plamer, 343
A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975); Allstate Auto Leasing Co. v. Caldwell, 394 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. Super.
1978)).
19
   See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 2015 WL 3863225, at *1 (Del. Super.
June 8, 2015) (“If, however, the record reveals that material facts are in dispute, or if the factual
record has not been developed thoroughly enough to allow the Court to apply the law to the factual
record, then summary judgment will not be granted.”).
20
   Perez-Melchor v. Balakhani, 2006 WL 3055852, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 26, 2006).
21
   Id.
22
   Defendant’s Opening Brief, Ex. B. at 12.
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