Court Opinion

ID: 9915066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 16:12:23.416039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:01.738238
License: Public Domain

FILE                                                                    THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                                   FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                                        JANUARY 4, 2024
       IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
       JANUARY 4, 2024
                                                                                      ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                   SUPREME COURT CLERK

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

        CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED                  )
        STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR                    )     No. 101045-1
        THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              )
                      IN                               )     En Banc
                                                       )
        MADELEINE BARLOW,                              )
                                                       )     Filed: January 4, 2024
                              Plaintiff,               )
                                                       )
               v.                                      )
                                                       )
        STATE OF WASHINGTON, d/b/a                     )
        WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY,                   )
                                                       )
                              Defendant.               )
                                                       )

               JOHNSON, J.—This case involves two questions certified to this court by

        the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The first certified

        question asks whether Washington law recognizes a special relationship between a

        university and its students, giving rise to a duty to use reasonable care to protect

        students from foreseeable injury at the hands of other students. The answer to that

        question is yes, and in the context of the questions presented, that relationship is
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

defined and anchored in the common law as provided in Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 344 (Am. L. Inst. 1965). The duty exists where a student is on campus,

similar to a business invitee, or involved in university sponsored activities.

       The second certified question asks, if yes to the first, what is the measure

and scope of that duty? This question asks for the “measure and scope” of the duty,

but we do not see any difference between the two words for the purpose of this

question and so have spoken to both in the same manner. The answer, as

recognized by cases addressing this question, is that the duty exists within the

campus confines or university sponsored and controlled events. The scope of the

duty is based on a student’s enrollment and presence on campus.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

       Plaintiff Madeleine Barlow moved to the Washington State University

(WSU) main campus in Pullman, Washington, in August 2017, to start studies as a

freshman. On August 20, 2017, Thomas Culhane, a fellow WSU student, raped

Barlow at a party she attended at his off-campus apartment. Culhane was expelled

from WSU and was later convicted of second degree rape.

       Culhane had been a student at WSU’s Vancouver campus until spring

semester 2017. While there, WSU received two complaints of sexual misconduct

       1
         The facts are from the “Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment”
from the United States District Court from the Western District of Washington. Excerpts of Rec.
at 3-23.

                                               2
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

against Culhane. One student made a complaint that Culhane sent her sexual

comments via electronic communication. Another student reported that while on a

university bus for a school trip, Culhane sat next to her and put his hands on and

between her legs. He continued even when she told him to stop. The student

reported the events to the school, and the Office of Student Conduct conducted a

hearing and found Culhane responsible for violating student conduct, under WAC

504-26-221 (sexual misconduct), WAC 504-26-220 (discrimination and

discriminatory harassment), WAC 504-26-227 (sexual harassment), WAC 504-26-

209 (violation of policy), and WAC 504-26-204 (abuse of others). During the

investigation, Culhane requested to transfer to the Pullman campus, which was

granted. As a result of the hearing, on August 1, 2017, WSU suspended Culhane

for nine days and assigned him to write a paper on his understanding of consent.

       On January 28, 2020, Barlow filed suit against WSU in the superior court for

Thurston County, bringing a number of claims, including, most relevant for this

analysis, a claim for negligence. WSU removed the case to federal court. Barlow’s

negligence claim rested on WSU having a special relationship with its students,

alleging a duty to both control and protect the students, with the knowledge of

Culhane’s past sexual misconduct making the harm foreseeable.

       WSU motioned for summary judgment, arguing that Barlow’s claims failed

as a matter of law because her injury occurred off campus where the school had no

                                          3
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

control and no duty. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment.

Barlow appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and that court certified two questions

regarding the negligence claim to this court.

                                CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

       The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the

following questions: (1) “Does Washington law recognize a special relationship

between a university and its students giving rise to a duty to use reasonable care to

protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of other students?” and (2) “If

the answer to question 1 is yes, what is the measure and scope of that duty?” Ord.

Certifying Questions to the Wash. Sup. Ct. at 2 (9th Cir. June 23, 2022).

                                     ANALYSIS

       This court may answer a question of law certified from the federal court “if

the question of state law is one which has not been clearly determined and does not

involve a question determined by reference to the United States Constitution.”

RAP 16.16(a); see RCW 2.60.020. Certified questions are determined de novo.

The questions are not considered in the abstract but based on the certified record

from the federal court. Carlsen v. Global Client Sols., LLC, 171 Wn.2d 486, 493,

256 P.3d 321 (2011).

       While the facts establish the context of the underlying case, the certified

questions here involve purely legal determinations. The certified questions focus

                                           4
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

on duty. The determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law, which is

reviewed de novo. See Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc’ns Ctr., 175 Wn.2d

871, 877, 288 P.3d 328 (2012); Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wn.2d 844, 852,

133 P.3d 458 (2006). When considering whether a duty exists, this court weighs,

“‘considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.’” Stalter v.

State, 151 Wn.2d 148, 155, 86 P.3d 1159 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Keates v. City of Vancouver, 73 Wn. App. 257, 265, 869 P.2d 88 (1994)).

Guiding our determination involves reference to the principles reflected in

Restatement of Torts.

       The general rule is that people and businesses have no duty to aid or protect

others from harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314. Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 315 acknowledges the same general rule—that there is no duty to protect

others from third-party conduct—but outlines two exceptions, including when a

special relationship exists between the actor and the perpetrator or between the

actor and the plaintiff/victim.

       Barlow argues that such a special relationship exists between students and

universities and asks that we expand the common law duty of K-12 schools to

universities. She then proposes that we combine two related but distinct duties,

based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a) and (b), to establish that WSU

had a duty to both protect her and control Culhane. We have never recognized such

                                          5
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

a special relationship and duty between a university and its students. Rather, the

proper analysis can be found in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344.

       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 recognizes an exception to the general

rule, relevant here, which the State acknowledges exists:

       A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
       business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public
       while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm
       caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of
       third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to
       exercise reasonable care to
              (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be
       done, or
              (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the
       harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.

Under this rule, a university, as a business operator and possessor of land, owes a

duty and would potentially be liable to members of the public, including students,

who are on campus for school related purposes. Restatement (Second) § 344

creates a type of special relationship, but the duty is limited to university property

and activities controlled by the university. 2

       Barlow first asks that we apply the duty to protect students established under

our cases between K-12 schools and students, and expand that duty to universities.

Our cases have developed a common law duty and special relationship, with

       2
          The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 40 (Am.
L. Inst. 2012) also recognizes that all schools, including universities, have a special relationship
with their students. However, comment l from that section states that “[a]s with the other duties
imposed by this Section, it is only applicable to risks that occur while the student is at school or
otherwise engaged in school activities.”

                                                 6
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

reference to Restatement (Second) § 320, between K-12 schools and their students,

but no basis exists to expand that same level of special relationship to universities.

The duty of K-12 schools stems from the school’s care and custody of the student,

the fact that the child must attend school and the relationship is not voluntary, and

the protective custody that teachers undertake being a mandatory substitution for

that of the parent. McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wn.2d 316, 319,

255 P.2d 360 (1953). Our cases rely on the nature of the relationship, where K-12

schools have almost complete control over their students and their activities, to

establish that duty. K-12 schools generally operate as closed campuses, with the

school monitoring closely all who enter the premises. A K-12 school has more

ability to exclude members of the public as a safety precaution. Students’ time on

campus is carefully structured, controlled, and monitored, and they have little

choice in class offerings. K-12 schools control their young students and are

standing in as parents during the school day, and that control gives rise to the duty

that the school owes children. That same control and relationship does not exist in

a university setting.

       Universities do not have similar protective custody over their adult students.

University students are not under the complete control of the university or

otherwise dependent in the same way as K-12 students. Universities do not have

mandatory attendance. University students have the ability to choose how to spend

                                           7
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

their time. The student can decide whether they will attend class in a traditional

setting or online. Students choose what classes to enroll in and whether and when

to attend. The class hours are often limited, and when not in class, students spend

their time as they wish. They can take part in extracurricular activities, work, live

independently, marry, take up hobbies, and choose with whom to interact. A

university is distinct from a K-12 school, lacking the requisite control over

students’ decisions.3

       Barlow proposes that we look to Restatement (Second) § 315(b) to establish

the special relationship and duty of a university to protect its students. Though we

have recognized special relationships and broad liability in some contexts, the

cases do not support applying the duty of Restatement (Second) § 315(b) to a

university. Our cases have identified the nature of a Restatement (Second) § 315(b)

special relationship giving rise to a duty under limited circumstances. For example,

in Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 929 P.2d 420 (1997), we held

that a group home had a special relationship with a vulnerable adult in its care.

Based on the fact that Niece was totally dependent and unable to care for herself,

and Elmview was fully responsible for her care, that responsibility gave rise to a

       3
          Restatement (Third) § 40 also acknowledges that the duty owed to elementary-school
students is substantially different from that owed to college students. “And because of the wide
range of students to which it is applicable, what constitutes reasonable care is contextual—the
extent and type of supervision required of young elementary-school pupils is substantially
different from reasonable care for college students.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40 cmt.
l.

                                                8
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

duty to protect Niece from a wide array of harms. Elmview’s control was critical to

applying the duty. That level of control simply does not exist here. Ms. Barlow was

not a vulnerable adult lacking the faculties to care for herself. The university had

no power to control her decisions or actions away from campus. The existence of a

Restatement (Second) § 315(b) duty requires control over a vulnerable person’s

actions, essentially a complete dependence in order to live.

       We have more recently explained what creates a “special relationship” and

rejected an invitation to broaden the common law duty. In Turner v. Department of

Social & Health Services, 198 Wn.2d 273, 286-87, 493 P.3d 117 (2021), we stated

that Restatement (Second) § 315(b) creates a heightened duty to protect someone in

a situation where that person is “helpless, totally dependent, or under the complete

control of someone else for decisions relating to their safety.” The duty is not

based on custody but on the dependence of the victim. Where this type of special

relationship is formed, it is accompanied by a heightened duty of care to protect the

person from any foreseeable harm, equating that duty to strict liability. If the

relationship lacks the traits of dependence and control, we held that no liability

exists. No similar duty exists between a university and its students under which a

Restatement (Second) § 315(b) special relationship is implicated.

       Barlow emphasizes that the Restatement (Second) § 315(b) duty is based on

entrustment, that the school was entrusted with her care and she did not assume the

                                           9
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

risk of sexual assault when she enrolled in school. She states that failing to

recognize the school’s responsibility to care for her is essentially victim blaming.

We place no blame on Barlow. But a lack of blame on the victim does not establish

blame and duty on a third party. The blame lies on Culhane.

       As an alternative to Restatement (Second) § 315(b), Barlow advances an

argument relying on Restatement (Second) § 315(a) and Restatement (Second) §

319 to advocate for a duty on the part of a university to control Culhane based on

what the university knew about him. We disagree. Such a duty does not apply here

because of the nature of the relationship between a school and its students.

       In Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wn.2d 241, 256, 386 P.3d 254 (2016), we said

that a Restatement (Second) § 315(b) duty of reasonable care exists “on a showing

that a definite, established, and continuing relationship exists between the

defendant and the third party.” We also remarked that in order for a special relation

under Restatement (Second) § 315(a) to exist, the ability to control the third party

must exist. Volk, 187 Wn.2d at 264. We then held that a mental health professional

and a patient have a special relationship pursuant to Restatement (Second) §

315(a), and thus the professional has a duty to take reasonable precautions to help

any foreseeable victims. We acknowledged that the nature of the doctor-patient

relationship gave the doctor insight into the dangerousness of the patient and

provided the doctor with the identity of possible victims, but it also gave the doctor

                                          10
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

sufficient control of the third party to manifest the duty. Such a relationship does

not exist between a university and its students, where interactions are far less

intimate and consistent. Looking at this case, the university did not have sufficient

insight into the potential dangerousness of Culhane, the university would not have

been able to identify Barlow as a potential victim, and the university could not

exercise sufficient control of Culhane to manifest the duty.

       In Volk, we also expressly rejected a Restatement (Second) § 319 duty, and

noted the limitations that our prior decisions have placed on a take charge

relationship. “As we have interpreted § 319, a take charge duty to act for the

benefit of reasonably foreseeable victims exists in certain relationships, including

the parole officer/parolee relationship, the probation officer/probationer

relationship, and the corrections officer/community custody offender relationship.”

Volk, 187 Wn.2d at 259. Restatement (Second) § 319 has not been applied outside

of the officer/offender context.

       Barlow has cited a number of Washington cases where an officer was found

to have a Restatement (Second) § 319 duty to the perpetrator’s foreseeable victims.

See, e.g., Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992). Drawing

comparisons to cases involving the officer/offender relationship is not helpful here.

In those cases, the officer had significant control over the offender, such that the

officer could dictate the movement and actions of the offender. Further, the

                                          11
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

officers had statutory authority to supervise those in their care, allowing officers to

require offenders to report in, to impose conditions on them, and to generally

monitor their behavior, a general power to control that a university cannot exercise.

The university simply has no authority to dictate the actions of students away from

campus.

       Ms. Barlow has attempted to establish that based on what WSU knew about

Culhane’s past behavior, WSU must have had a duty to control him and protect

her. She argues that the university had knowledge of his prior bad acts, and thus

the negligence of the university was based on the foreseeability that Culhane

would do harm again. However, foreseeability does not establish duty. Even if a

party knows that a person may commit a crime against another, that party has no

duty to act unless a special relationship exists with the victim or the perpetrator.

Our cases have recognized such a special relationship in only limited

circumstances, none of which apply in the situation presented here, at an off-

campus party.

       Cases from the California and Massachusetts Supreme Courts are consistent,

matching closely to the duty that we recognized in Restatement (Second) § 344.

Those cases do not support the expansive duty advocated here. In Helfman v.

Northeastern University, 485 Mass. 308, 149 N.E.3d 758 (2020), the

                                          12
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

Massachusetts court did recognize a special relationship between a university and

its students. It stated,

       [W]e conclude that a university has a special relationship with its
       students, and a corresponding duty to take reasonable measures to
       protect students from harms associated with alcohol-related
       emergencies, in the following, narrow circumstances. When a college
       or university has actual knowledge of conditions that would lead a
       reasonable person to conclude that a student on campus is in imminent
       danger of serious physical harm due to alcohol intoxication, and so
       intoxicated that the student is incapable of seeking help for him- or
       herself, the college or university has a duty to take reasonable
       measures to protect that student from harm.

Helfman, 485 Mass. at 321 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the duty is

limited—it applies only when the university is aware that a student on campus is at

imminent risk, and it requires the university only to act reasonably under the

circumstances, striking an appropriate balance between respecting the student’s

autonomy and protecting their physical well-being. The case concludes that the

university had no liability under the facts. This case cannot be read to support

expanding the duty to university students when they engage in off-campus

activities.

       Similarly, in Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.

5th 607, 413 P.3d 656, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415 (2018), the court placed the college-

student relationship within the paradigm of a special relationship but again limited

the resulting duty. The court recognized that a duty exists when it comes to

activities that the university sponsors or facilities that it controls, and the

                                           13
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

relationship is limited to enrolled students. In that case, a duty on the part of the

university existed where the harm occurred in an on-campus classroom. There, a

student was stabbed in class by another student with known violent tendencies.

       The court expressly recognized the limit of the special relationship stating,

“[W]e conclude postsecondary schools do have a special relationship with students

while they are engaged in activities that are part of the school’s curriculum or

closely related to its delivery of educational services.” Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 624-

25. The court went on to further define the scope of the duty. “The special

relationship we now recognize is similarly limited. It extends to activities that are

tied to the school’s curriculum but not to student behavior over which the

university has no significant degree of control.” Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 627. The

court made clear

       there is generally no duty to protect others from the conduct of third
       parties. The “special relationship” doctrine is an exception to this
       general rule. Accordingly, as a consequence of the special relationship
       recognized here, colleges generally owe a duty to use reasonable care
       to protect their students from foreseeable acts of violence in the
       classroom or during curricular activities.

Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 627 (citations omitted). The limitation applies here and is

consistent with our cases recognizing the scope of the duty. See, e.g., Turner, 198

Wn.2d 273; Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy’s Corner, 133 Wn.2d 192, 943 P.2d 286 (1997);

Niece, 131 Wn.2d 39.

                                           14
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

       An assertion is made that because a university is involved in aspects of

student life outside of the academic sphere, such as providing basic necessities, it is

acting as a guardian or in the place of a parent. But the examples of nonacademic

offerings noted—on-campus housing, providing food, opportunities for social

interaction—generally occur on campus, where a university has potential liability

based on Restatement (Second) § 344. Also, it is argued that because a code of

conduct exists that addresses off-campus behavior, the university is taking

measures to control that behavior, and its duty should also extend off campus. We

disagree. The code of conduct does not create control of students’ behavior in a

preventative way. The code may provide the university the ability to academically

punish students after the fact, with suspensions, academic probation, or even

expulsion. The code of conduct is irrelevant to establishment of a duty.

       While sexual assaults are horrific, a university simply has no power to

dictate students’ movements off campus and away from the oversight of campus

security and administration. While a special relationship exists between a

university and its students, that duty is to use reasonable care as recognized in

Restatement (Second) § 344. Because no ability to control off-campus, non-school-

sponsored interactions exists, the duty does not extend to the choices or activities

under a student’s control. A university’s duty is limited to where a student is on

campus for school related purposes or participating in a school activity.

                                          15
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1

                                   CONCLUSION

       We answer the first certified question, yes, a type of special relationship

exists, but that relationship is defined and anchored in Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 344. The duty exists where a student is on campus, similar to a business

invitee. The measure and scope of the duty is based on a student’s enrollment and

presence on campus or participation in university controlled activities.

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                                          16
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

                                       No. 101045-1

       MONTOYA-LEWIS, J. (dissenting)—I disagree with the majority’s

conclusion that the special relationship between a university and their students is

akin to that between a land possessor and its invitees, and therefore exists only when

a student is on campus or involved in university sponsored activities. Universities

are far “more than mere landlords” to their students; they are stewards of student

growth and success and provide a home and a space for students to develop their

professional, social, and cultural identities. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 4

Cal. 5th 607, 625, 413 P.3d 656, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415 (2018). I would hold that a

university has a special relationship with its students giving rise to a duty to use

reasonable care to protect students from foreseeable harm associated with alcohol-

and other substance-use-related emergencies, and that such a duty arises when the

university has actual knowledge of conditions that would lead a reasonable person

to conclude that a student is in danger of serious physical harm. With respect to the

measure and scope of such a duty, I would hold that the contours of the duty are

shaped by the nature of the relationship and the foreseeability of the danger, so the

duty is not confined to the campus borders if the harm is reasonably foreseeable. As

                                               1
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

a result of these differing conclusions, I dissent.

       The legal relationship between a university and its students has steadily

evolved with society over the past century. See Nathan F. McGuire, When Does a

University Have a Duty To Protect Students from Campus Harms? The Fall of the

Bystander Era and the Rise of a Special-Relationship Theory of Duty, 55 SUFFOLK

U. L. REV. 405, 406 (2022). The premises liability approach employed by the

majority reduces such a relationship to one that is sterile and transactional and, as

such, disregards the significance of historical context in addressing the nature of the

relationship. Until the mid-1900s, universities acted in loco parentis (“in the place

of a parent”)—meaning that schools assumed parental responsibility over their

students’ lives in a way that surpassed academics and focused on physical safety and

moral welfare. Id.; Philip Lee, The Curious Life of In Loco Parentis at American

Universities,      8     HIGHER       EDUC.        IN   REV.   65,   66-67     (2011),

https://www.scholar.harvard.edu/files/philip_lee/files/vol8lee.pdf

[https://perma.cc/YWW9-798P]. During this time, courts gave great deference to

universities to unilaterally discipline and remove students when students acted with

“‘[o]ffensive habits,’” John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637

(1924), or in a way that compromised the “moral atmosphere,” Anthony v. Syracuse

Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435, 440, 224 A.D. 487 (App. Div. 1928). See Lee, supra, at 70;

see also Cori Smith, Comment, The Civil Rights Approach to University Negligence

                                               2
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

Liability Arising Out of Student-on-Student Misconduct, 126 PENN ST. L. REV. 243,

248 (2021).

       In the 1960s, with the rise of the civil rights era, university students mobilized

against racism and other forms of social injustice and advocated for greater due

process rights. See Lee, supra, at 72. The landmark case Dixon v. Alabama State

Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 151, 159 (5th Cir. 1961), marked the first time a

court of appeals held that universities were required to provide students with notice

and an opportunity to be heard before expelling them. Dixon “signaled that courts

were willing to intervene in a university’s decision about disciplining its students;”

thus, it “opened the door to questions of the extent and contours of a university’s

duties to its students.” Smith, supra, at 249; see also Peter F. Lake, The Rise of Duty

and the Fall of in Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doctrines in Higher

Education Law, 64 MO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). As a result of recognizing greater due

process protections for students, courts became reluctant to impose a duty to protect

students solely on the basis of their enrollment status. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 151;

Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 987-88 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff’d, 418 F.2d 163

(7th Cir. 1969); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178-79 (M.D. Tenn.

1961). Yet, these judicial limits on a university’s disciplinary jurisdiction over its

students gave rise to the question of when a university may be liable for failing to

prevent a student’s misconduct that harms another student. Smith, supra, at 250.

                                               3
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

In the decades following, this ultimately led to the “bystander” era for universities,

where courts limited university liability for student-on-student misconduct. See

Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, The Emergence of New Paradigms in Student-

University Relations: From “In Loco Parentis” to Bystander to Facilitator, 23 J. OF

COLL. & UNIV. L. 755, 780-81 (1997); see also Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135,

138-39 (3d Cir. 1979).

       Since the late 1990s, the bystander approach has become increasingly rare in

cases where a university student harms another student. See Lake, supra, at 21; see

also Smith, supra, at 251. Over the last three decades, the reality of the frequency

of sexual assault and alcohol and substance use in universities has become more

understood and addressed by universities and students. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL.,

ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL

ASSAULT AND MISCONDUCT, at vii (2020); 1 see also Justine W. Welsh et al.,

Substance      Use     among      College      Students,   17   FOCUS      117     (2019),

https://focus.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.focus/20180037.               Today’s

university experience is defined in part by these dangers, as students are required to

attend trainings on these risks, universities provide counseling and peer support, and

studies identifying these issues are plentiful. We should be responsive to these

       1
                       https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Campus-
Safety/Revised%20Aggregate%20report%20%20and%20appendices%201-7_(01-16-
2020_FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/WY2K-MQ3D]
                                               4
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

changes and reassess a middle ground between universities operating in a pseudo-

parental role and as mere bystanders toward students. See McGuire, supra, at 409-

12.

       With such dangers garnering significant public attention and student activists

pushing for more stringent measures to protect students against sexual assault, courts

have become increasingly open to recognizing a limited tort duty based on a special

relationship. Id. at 406-12; see Helfman v. Ne. Univ., 485 Mass. 308, 317-18 149

N.E.3d 758 (2020); Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 613, 625-27. After all, the relationship

between a university and its students is not limited only to academics but extends

also to providing “access to basic necessities such as housing and food, along with

the ‘social, athletic, and cultural opportunities’ that form the foundation of a

collegiate ‘community.’” Helfman, 485 Mass. at 318 (citing Dzung Duy Nguyen v.

Mass. Inst. of Tech., 479 Mass. 436, 451, 96 N.E.3d 128 (2018)). With this history

in mind, I disagree with the majority that a special relationship exists only within the

confines of premises liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (AM. L.

INST. 1965) (hereinafter § 344). 2 I proceed to analyze the rules around special

       2
         The COVID-19 pandemic has also shown us that college campuses are not restricted to
campus borders. See generally Rucha Tulaskar & Markku Turunen, What Students Want?
Experiences, Challenges, & Engagement during Emergency Remote Learning amidst COVID-19
Crisis, 27 EDUC. AND INFO. TECHS. 551 (2021). The concept of what constitutes a university
campus has expanded greatly due to classes and activities being held virtually. See generally id.;
see also Karen Swan et al., Building Knowledge Building Communities: Consistency, Contact and
Communication in the Virtual Classroom, 23 J. EDUC. COMPUTING RSCH. 359, 380 (2000)
(emphasizing the responsibility to build virtual communities long before the pandemic).
                                                5
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

relationships that more precisely reflect this history.

       A.     A University’s Duty to Its Students

       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (hereinafter § 315), which has been

previously adopted by this court, states that as an exception to the general rule, an

institution has a duty to prevent a person from physically harming others when

              (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
       which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s
       conduct, or
              (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
       gives to the other a right to protection.

See Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 218, 822 P.2d 243 (1992); see also N.L. v.

Bethel Sch. Dist., 186 Wn.2d 422, 430, 378 P.3d 162 (2016) (citing Niece v. Elmview

Grp. Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 43, 929 P.2d 420 (1997)). In other words, an institution

has a duty to prevent a person from physically harming others when they have a

special relationship with the perpetrator of the harm or a special relationship with

the victim of the harm. See § 315.

       This court has long held that under § 315, K-12 school districts have a duty

“to protect their students from the foreseeable risk of harm the students may inflict

on each other.” N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 430; Christensen v. Royal Sch. Dist. No. 160, 156

Wn.2d 62, 67, 124 P.3d 283 (2005); McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42

Wn.2d 316, 320, 255 P.2d 360 (1953); Briscoe v. Sch. Dist. No. 123, 32 Wn.2d 353,

361, 201 P.2d 697 (1949). This duty is based on the foreseeability of the harm and

                                               6
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

the school’s protective custody over the student. N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 430-31 (citing

McLeod, 42 Wn.2d at 319).

       Moreover, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm §

40(b)(5) (AM. L. INST. 2012) (hereinafter § 40) explicitly recognizes that all schools,

including universities, have a special relationship with their students. This special

relationship gives rise to “a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise

within the scope of the relationship.” § 40(a) (emphasis added). Comment l, further

explaining the duty of schools, states that “[t]he relationship between a school and

its students parallels aspects of several other special relationships—it is a custodian

of students, it is a land possessor who opens the premises to a significant public

population, and it acts partially in the place of parents.” (Emphasis added.) The

duty of reasonable care is “contextual—the extent and type of supervision required

of young elementary-school pupils is substantially different from reasonable care for

college students.” Id.

       Consistent with both § 315 and § 40, I would hold that the duty extends to

universities and their students. While “[t]he Second Restatement of Torts contained

no provision that specifically identified the school-student relationship as special,”

§ 40 specifically recognizes a number of special relationships, including the one

between schools and their students. § 40 cmt. l. The comments to § 40 illustrate the

nature of such special relationships. Comment l recognizes that the relationship

                                               7
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

between a school and its students mirrors defining characteristics of several other

special relationships. For instance, schools are more than mere land possessors who

open the premises to the public; schools build communities for students and cultivate

a culture of holistic growth. See id. In turn, schools assume a caretaking function

as custodians of students and act partially in the place of parents; schools are trusted

with the responsibility of providing a safe environment where such community

building and growth can take place. See id.

       While I agree with the majority that the extent and type of supervision and

corresponding reasonable care differs between K-12 school districts and universities,

there is nevertheless a special relationship between all schools and their students.

Id. Indeed, students and, often, their parents invest their financial resources to attend

universities with the expectation that “[u]niversities are clearly not bystanders or

strangers in regards to their students.” Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 450.

Rather, university involvement spills into many aspects of student life beyond the

academic sphere, including the provision of basic necessities, such as housing, food,

and opportunities for interpersonal and cultural development. See id. at 450-51; see

also McGuire, supra, at 419-22. Moreover, universities staff campuses with security

guards and dorms with resident advisors who are in positions to aid students in

danger. See Helfman, 485 Mass. at 322 (recognizing universities employ staff who

may have knowledge of a student in danger of harm); see also McGuire, supra, at

                                               8
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

422-23. As a result of such efforts by universities, it is foreseeable that students will

reasonably rely on the university for assistance, especially those living away from

their parents or guardians for the first time. See Helfman, 485 Mass. at 320; Dzung

Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 455. While universities do not take the place of guardians

in a one-to-one relationship, they do more than simply offer classes for students to

attend. As in the case of Barlow, a student’s life at a university can be all

encompassing as young people transition to adulthood.

       The unique and nuanced nature of the special relationship between a

university and their students requires taking a holistic approach when recognizing a

tort duty.    As a court, we must recognize and change with our increasing

understanding of how universities have responded to the crises of sexual assault and

alcohol and substance use. Just as we have noted in our juvenile cases, we

understand that brain development continues up through about age 25. E.g., In re

Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 319-22, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality

opinion); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Dodge, 198 Wn.2d 826, 828-30, 502 P.3d

349 (2022); State v. Haag, 198 Wn.2d 309, 320, 495 P.3d 241 (2021); State v.

O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 695, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). It is reasonable to apply that

knowledge to students who attend universities and to acknowledge that this special

relationship should be recognized. While § 315 focuses on a duty turning on

“control” or “protection,” § 40 comment l recognizes that control and protection are

                                               9
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

not the only “aspects of several other special relationships” that characterize the

relationship between a university and its students. Likewise, § 40(a) considers the

duty in proportion to the “risks that arise within the scope of the relationship,”

creating an opportunity to weigh the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

       A university has a special relationship with its students giving rise to a duty

to use reasonable care to protect students from certain foreseeable harms. In

determining that such a duty exists, the majority acknowledges that we weigh

“‘“considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.”’”

Majority at 5 (quoting Stalter v. State, 151 Wn.2d 148, 155, 86 P.3d 1159 (2004)

(quoting Keates v. City of Vancouver, 73 Wn. App. 257, 265, 869 P.2d 88 (1994))).

In my view, this includes (1) the significant shift in knowledge over the last few

decades regarding the dangers of sexual assault and alcohol and other substance use

at universities, (2) § 315’s recognition of a special relationship with the perpetrator

and the victim, and (3) the precedent around special relationships based on § 40 and

its application to universities and their students in other jurisdictions.

       1.     Shifts in Knowledge Supporting Special Relationship

       The majority’s rigid premises liability approach does not comport with the

modern reality of university student life. This case would allow us to respond in a

timely way to the reality of the prevalence of sexual assault and alcohol and other

substance use in universities.         According to a recent national study by the

                                               10
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

Association of American Universities, 13 percent of all university students

experience rape or sexual assault. CANTOR, supra, at vii. For undergraduate

students, 26.4 percent of women, 23.1 percent of transgender, genderqueer, and

nonbinary individuals, and 6.9 percent of men experience sexual assault. Id. at xi.

In the last five years, Washington’s six public universities adjudicated at least 492

reports of sexual misconduct. Asia Fields, Nothing Should Have Happened to Any

of Us, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 6, 2022, 6:00 AM). 3 These are just the reported cases,

and this does not include the hundreds of reports these universities received but

denied for investigation as outside the scope of individual university policies. Id.

Given that nearly 80 percent of acts of sexual violence go unreported,4 we can

       3
                https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/sexual-assault-case-at-
washington-state-university-shows-gaps-in-campus-misconduct-systems-title-ix/. The following
is the breakdown of the 492 reported cases by university, from highest to lowest: 186 at Central
Washington University, 99 at Eastern Washington University, 75 at the University of Washington,
68 at Washington State University, 40 at Evergreen State College, and 24 at Western Washington
University. Id.
         4
           Numerous studies have demonstrated the underreporting of sexual assaults across the
United States. For additional information on this subject, see the Bureau of Justice Statistics at the
United States Department of Justice (BJS). For example, the BJS study on rape and sexual assault
reporting to police and medical professionals from 1992-2000 found that 26 percent of sexual
assaults were reported to the police. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BJS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:
REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000, at 1 (Aug. 2002),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3LW-57SQ]. Another BJS
study on rape and sexual assault victimization among women attending universities from 1995-
2013 found that only 20 percent of sexual assaults were reported to the police. SOFI SINOZICH &
LYNN LANGTON, BJS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE
FEMALES, 1995-2013, at 1 (2014), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf
[https://perma.cc/27H9-M5XN]. Additionally, according to another BJS study on women who
were victims of sexual assault between 1994-2010, the most common reason for not reporting
sexual assaults to the police was fear of reprisal. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., BJS, FEMALE VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010, at 7 (2013), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2PL-Z3UK].
                                                 11
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

extrapolate that these numbers far underreport the actual experiences of students

being sexually assaulted while attending universities. See Chiara Profenna, Sexual

Assault Often Underreported on College Campuses, BEACON (Dec. 8, 2021, 11:06

AM). 5

         Moreover, alcohol and other substance use are “strong predictor[s] of an

increased risk of committing and experiencing sexual assault among college

students.” Welsh et al., supra, at 119. In fact, “about half of sexual assaults on

college campuses involve a situation in which the perpetrator, the victim, or both

were consuming alcohol.” Md. Collaborative To Reduce Coll. Drinking & Related

Problems, Sexual Assault and Alcohol: What the Research Evidence Tells Us

(2016).6 In response, many universities have begun providing resources to students,

such as providing education and training, physical and mental health services, and

self-help suggestions—demonstrating an awareness of the need for intervention.

See, e.g., Compliance and Civil Rights, WASH. STATE UNIV.; 7 Sexual Assault

Resources, UNIV. OF WASH. 8

         As we can see in the record, Washington State University requires students to

         5
              https://www.upbeacon.com/article/2021/12/sexual-assault-often-underreported-on-
college-
campuses#:~:text=It's%20estimated%20that%20nearly%2080,of%20reporting%20a%20sexual%
20assault [https://perma.cc/B5YR-LXJ8]
       6
         https://nida.nih.gov/sites/default/files/sexualassault.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA5N-J8EF]
       7
         https://ccr.wsu.edu/resources/
       8
         https://www.washington.edu/sexualassault/
                                               12
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

complete two mandatory trainings: “‘Count on Cougs’” and “‘eCHECKUP TO

GO.’” Def.’s Br. at 53 n.12 (citing Mandatory Programs, WASH. STATE UNIV. 9).

“Count on Cougs” is a violence prevention program that seeks to improve campus

safety by encouraging bystanders to recognize and act on warning signs and

instances of gender-based violence. Id. “eCHECKUP TO GO” is an interactive web

survey that provides students personalized information about the negative

consequences of alcohol consumption.                Id.   The university also has a policy

prohibiting discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual misconduct, which

acknowledges that such behavior “destroys mutual respect and a trusting

environment, can bring substantial harm to individuals, and violates individual

rights.” Excerpts of Rec. (ER) at 387. This policy also breaks down investigation

procedures, enforcement, and disciplinary sanctions and extends to conduct

occurring off campus. Moreover, the university has a code of conduct, which sets

out the university’s “long-standing commitment to providing students with a holistic

learning experience” and requires students to be accountable to the standards of

conduct “to foster a safe, healthy, and inclusive campus community.” WAC 504-

26-001.      The university’s code of conduct explicitly applies to activities “off

university premises and not in connection with university-sponsored activities”

where there is an impact on the health or safety of the community or a violation of

       9
           https://deanofstudents.wsu.edu/health-promotion/mandatory-programs/#count-on-cougs
                                               13
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

the university’s values. WAC 504-26-015(2). Such trainings, policies, and codes

of conduct indicate that the university is aware of such dangers and undertakes some

reasonable measures to protect students from harm associated with alcohol- and

other substance-use-related emergencies. Students reasonably rely on the university

for aid in those kinds of emergencies. See Helfman, 485 Mass. at 320.

       In light of our robust knowledge around the dangers university students are

facing and the response by some universities, reducing the relationship to that

between a business owner and a business invitee, as the majority opinion does,

would excuse universities from accountability and would be inconsonant with the

reality of the college experience and universities’ roles in students’ lives. In

declining to find this special relationship, effectively we allow universities to

commit to codes of conduct and other requirements of students, but we do not allow

those hurt by fellow students to undertake enforcement actions or suits that recognize

the very real harm they have experienced. Universities actively engage in supporting

students as whole human beings by providing housing, food, cultural and social

development, recreation, and physical and mental health services. See Helfman, 485

Mass. at 318; see also Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 625 (“Colleges provide academic

courses in exchange for a fee, but a college is far more to its students than a business.

Residential colleges provide living spaces, but they are more than mere landlords.”).

This relationship is not akin to that between a business owner and a business invitee,

                                               14
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

and our approach should accurately reflect the essence of such a relationship. See

Helfman, 485 Mass. at 318; see also Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 625.

              2.     Special Relationship with the Perpetrator and the Victim

       The majority rejects the existence of the university’s special relationship with

the perpetrator “because of the nature of the relationship between a school and its

students.” Majority at 10. Again, I disagree. A special relationship exists with a

perpetrator, for instance, “when one takes charge of a third person whom he or she

knows or should know is likely to cause bodily harm to another if not controlled,

and the actor has a duty to control the third party to prevent him or her from doing

such harm.” Bishop v. Miche, 137 Wn.2d 518, 524, 973 P.2d 465 (1999) (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (hereinafter § 319)).               The majority

acknowledges that this “take charge” duty has been recognized in the parole

officer/parolee and corrections officer/offender relationships. Majority at 11-12; see

Joyce v. Dep’t of Corr., 155 Wn.2d 306, 310, 119 P.3d 825 (2005); Hertog v. City

of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 284, 979 P.2d 400 (1999); Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 217.

       However, the majority concludes that this duty is inapplicable in this instance

because the relationship between the university and a student perpetrator is

incomparable to that between an officer and an offender due to insufficient control.

I disagree. I would recognize a special relationship with the student perpetrator

where the duty to take reasonable care is proportional to the university’s degree of

                                               15
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

custody and control. Particularly I would do so where, as here, the university has

identified someone as a risk for harming other students, intervened, and understood

him to be a continuing threat.

       If we look closely at the “take charge” doctrine, it is clear that it should apply

in a case like this. In Taggart, the “take charge” duty between parole officers and

parolees was characterized by the parole officers’ ability to keep watch on the

parolees’ compliance with release conditions and overall progress, as well as the

knowledge of the parolees’ criminal histories. 118 Wn.2d at 219-20. Through such

observations and knowledge, when a parolee’s criminal history and behavior

indicate that it is reasonably foreseeable that they will inflict injury on others, the

parole officer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the parolee. Id. at

220. Although a university does not control students the same way a parole officer

controls a parolee, universities do have control over students, as evidenced by their

power to enforce student conduct policies and impose disciplinary sanctions for

violating such policies. See Def.’s Br. at 53 n.12; ER at 387; supra at 12-13 (noting

the university’s policy prohibiting sexual assault and two mandatory trainings to

prevent violence and the negative consequences of alcohol consumption); cf. N.L.,

186 Wn.2d at 427, 430 (where the court found it significant that the school knew the

student perpetrator posed a risk and had some level of control over him). In this

case, the university imposed sanctions and monitored Culhane’s compliance with

                                               16
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

them before, during, and after the assault on Barlow. See Ord. Certifying Questions

to the Wash. Sup. Ct. (Order) at 6.

       Moreover, a “take charge” duty turns on knowledge of the likelihood that a

perpetrator will cause bodily harm to another. See § 319. In Taggart, the “take

charge” duty was characterized by the knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal

history and the ability to keep watch on their progress. 118 Wn.2d at 219-20.

Similarly, once a university has actual knowledge of the risk a student poses to other

students, it has the ability to keep watch on that student’s progress and intervene

when necessary, exactly as the university did here. Here, the university had actual

knowledge of the perpetrator’s multiple instances of sexual misconduct and his

apparent confusion regarding the concept of consent. Cf. N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 427,

430. Namely, Culhane demonstrated that he did not understand the concept of

consent, particularly where a person lacks the mental capacity to consent. Order at

6. The university required him to write a reflection paper as part of his sanctions for

his prior sexual misconduct. Id. The university knew he continued to misunderstand

consent, and instructed him to rewrite the paper. Id. But it appears he never

completed all the terms of his sanctions. Id.; see ER at 57-58. Two weeks after the

sanctions were imposed, Culhane raped Barlow. Order at 6. Since this occurred

two weeks after his student conduct officer rejected his paper about consent because

he failed to understand the concept, I find it hard to conclude that his actions were

                                               17
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

not predictable. See id. I would hold that the university’s actual knowledge of

Culhane’s dangerous propensities triggered the duty to “take charge” of him—to

take steps to prevent him from assaulting other students (or, at a minimum, warn

students of the risk he presented).

       Apart from the “take charge” duty, this court has found that a special

relationship exists when the nature of the relationship “warrants social recognition.”

Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wn.2d 241, 258, 386 P.3d 254 (2016).               In Volk, a

psychiatrist’s former client killed two people and attempted to kill a third after

expressing suicidal and homicidal ideations to the psychiatrist. Id. at 246. Though

the court declined to analyze the duty there as a “take charge” duty, it held that the

psychiatrist and her former client had a special relationship due to a doctor’s “unique

insight into the potential dangerousness” of a patient as well as a doctor’s

professional knowledge, giving rise to a duty to protect the client’s foreseeable

victims from their conduct. Id. at 261-66.

       The university asserts that it does “not share an intimate doctor/patient

relationship with each and every one of its students, giving it the same insight into

their potential dangerousness or their foreseeable victims.” Def.’s Br. at 31-32

(emphasis added). The majority agrees. Majority at 10-11. Though they are correct

that it would be unreasonable to expect an institution with thousands or tens of

thousands of students to have an intimate relationship, akin to that of a doctor and

                                               18
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

patient, with every one of its students, it is reasonable to expect a university to foster

an intimate relationship with particular students, specifically, students that pose

risks of harm to other students that are known to the university. See Helfman, 485

Mass. at 321.         For instance, if a faculty member approaches a university

administrator to express a concern about a particular student posing a danger to other

students, with that knowledge, it is reasonable to expect the university to actively

take steps to prevent the potential perpetrator from inflicting harm on other students.

       In my view, such a duty increases with knowledge because it strengthens the

relationship between the university and the student, as well as the level of control

the university has over the student. See § 40. For example, if a university learns of

a student posing reasonably foreseeable danger to other students and requires the

student to attend therapy, the university should confirm that the student is actually

attending therapy. This knowledge of the risk the student poses is the university’s

unique opportunity to mitigate the risk of harm by providing support to work through

their behavior. The student may be expressing, either directly or indirectly, a need

for help, and the university should respond either with more supervision or

services.10 See, e.g., Helfman, 485 Mass. at 320 (finding that university undertaking

       10
           The university alleges that the imposition of a special relationship under § 315(a) may
detract from restorative justice efforts. Def.’s Br. at 36. “Restorative justice is best understood as
a relational theory of justice.” Jennifer Llewellyn et al., Imagining Success for a Restorative
Approach to Justice: Implications for Measurement and Evaluation, 36 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 295
(2013). For millennia, Indigenous peoples have been practicing restorative justice as a community
effort, and they recognize that “‘justice involves far more than what you do after things have gone
                                                 19
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

responsibilities to provide medical amnesty for students engaged in underage

drinking leads to reasonable reliance on university to assist in the event of such

emergency).

       Here, again, the university knew of Culhane’s multiple instances of sexual

misconduct and required him to work with a student conduct officer in hopes of

bringing the misconduct to a halt. In the process, the university learned that Culhane

continued to misunderstand the concept of consent, yet it still allowed him to transfer

to the Pullman campus. In doing so, the university created a risky situation by

allowing Culhane to become a part of that campus community while an active

disciplinary case was open against him. See ER at 87 (student victim of Culhane’s

prior sexual misconduct warned university investigator that Culhane should not be

wrong . . . instead it involves creating the social conditions that minimize such wrongdoing.’”
Indigenous Roots of Restorative Justice, BRATTLEBORO CMTY. JUST. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2019)
(alteration in original) (quoting MAY LEUNG, THE ORIGINS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Apr. 4,
2001),            https://cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/17445-restorative_justice.pdf)
http://www.brattleborocjc.org/blog/indigenous-roots-of-restorative-justice
[https://perma.cc/VZ4E-ELYF]. Relatedly, Diné people have long approached restorative justice
through the lens of “K’e,” meaning respect— “‘to restore my dignity, to restore my worthiness.’”
Id. (quoting Laura Mirsky, Restorative Justice Practices of Native American, First Nation and
Other Indigenous People of North America: Part One (Apr. 27, 2004),
https://www.iirp.edu/images/pdf/natjust1.pdf). Recognizing a special relationship between a
university and student perpetrators does not unravel restorative justice efforts. In fact, if a victim
student and/or other students from the university community want to engage in a restorative justice
approach (e.g., a mediated conversation with the student perpetrator, community circling, etc.),
this may be an appropriate way for the university to intervene so long as the victim student is both
willing and comfortable with that approach. Such a special relationship could help to establish the
social conditions that minimize harm to begin with, and could create opportunities for students at
risk of perpetrating sexual assault to restore and repair. While the term “restorative justice” has
become significantly attenuated from its roots in tribal customary law and practices, communities
like universities could benefit from such practices both to address harm that has already been
caused and to prevent it.
                                                 20
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

allowed to transfer to a campus “where there are dorms [and] more access to

alcohol”).     Such knowledge of the risks Culhane posed to other students

strengthened the relationship between him and the university, as well as the level of

control the university had over him to provide support and intervention. See ER at

4-5; Order at 6 (university received two complaints about Culhane, held a conduct

hearing, suspended him, ordered him to write and re-write a reflection paper, and

expelled him). This is precisely the kind of special relationship with a student

perpetrator that ought to give rise to a duty. See Volk, 187 Wn.2d at 261-66.

       The majority likewise rejects the existence of the university’s special

relationship with the victim, determining that such a “duty requires control over a

vulnerable person’s actions, essentially a complete dependence in order to live.”

Majority at 9. But this court has routinely recognized that the foundation of a special

protective relationship under § 315(b) is based on “entrustment for the protection of

a vulnerable victim,” not complete dependence. H.B.H. v. State, 192 Wn.2d 154,

173, 178, 429 P.3d 484 (2018) (citing Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 50); see C.J.C. v. Corp.

of Cath. Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 721-22, 725-26, 985 P.2d 262 (1999).11

       11
           The majority mentions that this court examined whether and when a § 315(b) duty arises
in Turner v. Department of Social & Health Services, 198 Wn.2d 273, 276, 493 P.3d 117 (2021).
Majority at 9. But that case is distinguishable. There, plaintiff sued the Department of Social and
Health Services for negligence for allowing her husband to be placed in independent living despite
having multiple sclerosis, which had caused general functional limitations. He later died in a fire
in his independent living apartment. Id. at 276-77, 282. This court found that there was no special
relationship between the department and the plaintiff’s husband because he made the decision to
transition from a nursing home to living in an independent apartment and, in doing so, “he accepted
                                               21
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

We have yet to define a “vulnerable victim,” and I would be loath to do so because

doing so necessarily reinforces the idea that a victim has some responsibility for their

assault. That is categorically incorrect. As a result, our focus should not be on the

age of the university student but rather on the situation in which they find

themselves.

       This court has long held that K-12 school districts have a special protective

relationship with their students and some of this is instructive here. McLeod, 42

Wn.2d at 320. In N.L., a 14 year old student was raped by an 18 year old student.

186 Wn.2d at 425-26. The students were at track practice together when they met,

exchanged phone numbers, and began texting. Id. at 426. The school principal was

aware that the student perpetrator was a registered sex offender but did not inform

teachers or coaches, and the student was permitted to mentor younger students on

the track team. Id. at 427. The student perpetrator invited the student victim to lunch;

she agreed, and when they skipped track practice, he drove her to his house where

he raped her. Id. at 426. Even though the injury took place off campus, this court

noted that it was not unforeseeable that students would leave campus together and

held that a special protective relationship existed between the student victim and the

school district. Id. at 426, 436.

certain risks.” Id. at 276, 290. Here, Barlow’s decision to attend the university is not in dispute;
instead, this case is about the duty to use reasonable care to keep students safe from third parties—
student perpetrators.
                                                22
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

       The majority’s conclusion that the university does not have a special

protective relationship with Barlow because she “was not a vulnerable adult lacking

the faculties to care for herself” fails to take into account the complex nature of

sexual assault and the manner in which perpetrators identify, manipulate, and attack

their victims. Majority at 9. That said, the assertion that Barlow should be

considered an adult not in need of protection at 18 years old is defeated by modern

neurological science. Studies on young people’s brain development indicate that

“biological and psychological development continues into the early twenties, well

beyond the age of majority.” Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a

Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85

FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 642 (2016); see also Kathryn Monahan et al., Juvenile

Justice Policy and Practice: A Developmental Perspective, 44 CRIME & JUST. 577,

582 (2015); Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult?

Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 769, 786 (2016). Indeed, this

court has recently issued a series of opinions recognizing that given such insights in

modern neurological science, the age of majority is inherently and necessarily

“flexible” in the context of juvenile justice. E.g., Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 319-22;

see also Dodge, 198 Wn.2d at 828-30; Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 320; O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d

at 695. As Washington law has already recognized that a young person’s brain

continues to develop into their early 20s, I would also recognize that university

                                               23
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

students in that developmental stage should be under some protection of their

universities. Many students, like Barlow, are living away from home and parental

supervision for the first time. In Barlow’s case, she was 18 years old and had only

been on campus for a few days before being raped. Just a few months prior, as a

high school senior, Barlow would have been protected by the special relationship

with the school district. I would find it imperative that Washington tort law reflects

modern neurological science.

       I would also focus this approach on the behavior of the perpetrator, rather than

the status of the victim. Modern student development theory does not isolate

developmental stages by age. SUZANNE DEGGES-WHITE & CHRISTINE BORZUMATO-

GAINEY, COLLEGE STUDENT MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING: A DEVELOPMENTAL

PERSPECTIVE 8 (2013). Rather, it studies the stages of development as students

(whether traditional or not) begin and move through higher education. While the

victim in this case was an 18 year old student with little exposure to college life, I

would not limit such a doctrine to those under a certain age. Rather, I would focus

on the relationship of the university to a person they know to be a threat.12

       12
         This footnote represents my own personal experience as a faculty member and does not
and cannot be attributed to any other signatory to this dissent. Due to the importance of the issue,
I am compelled to include this brief narrative as it is instructive and informative of the overall
approach I believe is necessary to resolve this case. As a former faculty member at Western
Washington University, I heard from multiple students about other students who had attempted or
completed sexual assaults on campus. Most of the time, the victim did not want to report what
happened to them, and they did not want me to do so either. But when they did ask me to intervene,
both times I was told by administrators at the university that absent a direct report from a student
                                                24
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

       Moreover, many university students, like Barlow, are also vulnerable due to

the prevalence of alcohol and other substances embedded into the university

experience. Barlow had very little experience with alcohol, and after consuming

between 9 and 12 drinks, she was intoxicated to the point at which she was struggling

to stand and speak. A student in this situation may be particularly vulnerable,

regardless of age. See Helfman, 485 Mass. at 318-21 (Intoxication does not preclude

the existence of a special relationship, and universities recognize these foreseeable

risks and take reasonable steps to protect students in the event of an alcohol-related

emergency.).

       Thus, I would conclude that under § 315, a university has a special

relationship with both student victims and students known to be potential

perpetrators that gives rise to a duty to protect other students from the potential

perpetrators’ conduct. I would limit this inquiry, however, and primarily focus on

the actions of the university as it applies to the perpetrator.

       3.     Shifts in the Law Supporting Special Relationship

       The majority concludes that cases from the California and Massachusetts

Supreme Courts are consistent with the duty recognized in § 344 and do not support

the duty recognized in § 315 and § 40. Majority at 12. I disagree. The finding of a

or a witness, they would not intervene. This seems to me to be a fundamental failure of the
university to protect students from a known danger, particularly when there are multiple reports
about the same alleged perpetrator as was the case when several students so reported to me.
                                               25
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

special relationship beyond that of a mere land possessor and invitee is not only

compelled by “‘considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and

precedent,’” Stalter, 151 Wn.2d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Keates, 73 Wn. App. at 265), but it is also consistent with the approach modern

courts have taken. See, e.g., Helfman, 485 Mass. at 317-18; Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at

613, 625-27. This consistency matters because the law should comport with reality,

and today’s university experience is defined in part by the dangers of sexual assault

and alcohol and other substance use. See McGuire, supra, at 409-12. In my view,

it is detrimental to not acknowledge the nuanced nature of the relationship between

a university and its students as stewards of student growth and success in the face of

such known dangers.

       In recent years, courts have begun to recognize a special relationship in the

university context. As discussed above, the Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes

that all schools, including universities, have a special relationship with their students

that gives rise to “a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the

scope of the relationship.”          § 40 (emphasis added).       The California and

Massachusetts Supreme Courts have led the way in adopting an approach modeled

after the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Helfman, 485 Mass. at 317-18; Regents, 4

Cal. 5th at 613, 625-27.

       The majority focuses on Regents and Helfman solely for purposes of limiting

                                               26
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

the scope of the duty to activities on campus or those that are university sponsored.

Majority at 12-15. But there was no occasion to analyze the duty beyond the campus

borders in those cases because both of the injuries occurred on campus. See Regents,

4 Cal. 5th at 613; see also Helfman, 485 Mass. at 309-10. Moreover, the courts told

us far more about the nature of the relationship between a university and its students

in modern day society than the majority acknowledges. 13

       In Helfman, where a university student allegedly sexually assaulted another

student in the dorms, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that there is a special

duty between a university and its students, but that duty is triggered only when it is

reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer a criminal act by a third party

or other physical harm due to her intoxication. 485 Mass. at 309-10, 315. The court

acknowledged that the duty was rooted in the “‘distinctive relationship between

colleges and their students,’” which includes both students’ reasonable expectations

that the university will take reasonable care to protect them from foreseeable harm,

and the general voluntary undertaking by universities to protect students from

criminal acts by third parties. Id. at 316. (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 389

Mass. 47, 56, 499 N.E.2d 331 (1983)). It also concluded that voluntary intoxication

       13
           For instance, in Regents, the court told us that “colleges provide a discrete community
for their students,” and “[a]lthough college students may no longer be minors under the law, they
may still be learning how to navigate the world as adults.” 4 Cal. 5th at 625. As a result, students
“are dependent on their college communities to provide structure, guidance, and a safe learning
environment,” and, as such, the colleges “have superior control over the environment and the
ability to protect students.” Id.
                                                27
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

did not extinguish the special relationship because “the contemporary paradigm of

the university-student relationship recognizes that students’ ‘right to privacy and

their desire for independence may conflict with their immaturity and need for

protection.”’ Id. at 316-18 (quoting Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 451-52).

Consequently, the court determined that the dangers associated with voluntary

intoxication were foreseeable risks, and, as universities have taken reasonable

measures to protect students in alcohol-related emergencies, it was foreseeable that

a student would reasonably rely on the university for aid in the event of an alcohol-

related emergency. Id. at 319-20.

       Ultimately, the court held that “a university has a special relationship with its

students, and a corresponding duty to take reasonable measures to protect students

from harms associated with alcohol-related emergencies,” which extends to

circumstances where the “university has actual knowledge of conditions that would

lead a reasonable person to conclude that a student on campus is in imminent danger

of serious physical harm due to alcohol intoxication, and so intoxicated that

the student is incapable of seeking help for him- or herself.” Id. at 321. Thus, the

university had a special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect students, limited

to foreseeable harms.

       I would adopt a rule similar to Massachusetts and hold that a university has a

special relationship with its students giving rise to a duty to use reasonable care to

                                               28
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

protect students from foreseeable harm associated with alcohol- and other substance-

use-related 14 emergencies. That rule, however, is too limited and focuses solely on

the victim. As discussed above, I would also focus on the university’s knowledge

of the perpetrator. Namely, a duty arises when the university has actual knowledge

of conditions that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a student is in

danger of serious physical harm. Similar to the special relationship K-12 school

districts have with its students, universities have a special relationship with students

when they have custody and control over students. N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 430. “[W]hat

constitutes reasonable care is contextual.” § 40 cmt. l. While the degree of custody

and control may differ in a university context, the special relationship nevertheless

exists.

          B.   Measure and Scope of Duty

          The majority holds that the duty is limited to “the campus confines or

university sponsored and controlled events.” Majority at 2. I disagree with such a

limitation. I would hold that the measure and scope of the duty extends to reasonably

foreseeable harms to currently enrolled students, which are not limited to the four

corners of campus so long as the harm was reasonably foreseeable. The harm may

          14
          I would include in this duty such foreseeable harms associated with both alcohol- and
other substance-use-related emergencies because over the last decade, “college campuses have
witnessed a national increase of cannabis, stimulant, and illicit drug use among students.” See
Welsh et al., supra, at 117. Research shows that this substance use is associated with an increased
risk of committing and experiencing sexual assault. Id.
                                               29
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

be particularly foreseeable if prescribed by the university’s code of conduct.

       As discussed above, under § 315, a special relationship giving rise to a duty

to students turns on control and entrustment of care. See, e.g., Taggart, 118 Wn.2d

at 217 (control); H.B.H., 192 Wn.2d at 173 (entrustment of care) (citing Niece, 131

Wn.2d at 50). Control is characterized by the knowledge of a perpetrator’s history

and ability to keep watch on their progress. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 219-20.

Entrustment of care is characterized by an “‘assumption of responsibility for the

safety of another,’” not physical custody. H.B.H., 192 Wn.2d at 173 (quoting Niece,

131 Wn.2d at 46).

       Neither a student victim’s entrustment to a university’s care nor a university’s

requisite ability to control the foreseeable conduct of a student perpetrator is

confined to the four corners of campus. Universities create a “discrete community

for their students” and therefore have a responsibility to protect those communities.

Regents, 4 Cal. 5th at 625.          Community is not just a physical space—it is

relationships, connection, shared interests and values. “Although college students

may no longer be minors under the law, they may still be learning how to navigate

the world as adults” and rely on their university communities for safety and

guidance; thus, universities “have superior control over the environment and the

ability to protect students.” Id. (emphasis added).

       We have already recognized that a school’s duty to its students is not limited

                                               30
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

to the four corners of campus in N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 435. Even though the rape took

place off campus when students skipped track practice, we held that “[w]hile the

location of the injury is relevant to many elements of the tort, the mere fact the injury

occurs off campus is not by itself determinative.” Id. at 426, 435. The court

reasoned that “‘[f]oreseeability is the most important variable in the duty calculus,’”

rather than the location of the injury itself, and it was not unforeseeable as a matter

of law that students would leave campus together. Id. at 434-36 (quoting Eisel v.

Bd. of Educ., 324 Md. 376, 386, 597 A.2d 447 (1991) (holding that a school district

had a duty to a student who died by suicide off campus on a school holiday where

the student’s friends reported the suicidal ideations to officials and officials failed to

take any other action)); see also Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist., 22

Cal.3d 508, 515, 520, 585 P.2d 851 (1978) (holding that a school district had a duty

to a student who was injured by a motorcycle off campus where the school failed to

supervise the student and he wandered off). Consequently, I would find that the rule

is one of foreseeability rather than location.

       Foreseeability is just as crucial a variable in the duty calculus in the university

context. Foreseeability flows from the responsibility assumed by a university and

an evaluation of the factual circumstances. See, e.g., Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 50-51

(sexual abuse by staff at a residential care facility may be foreseeable based, in part,

on facility’s policies against unsupervised contact with residents). For instance,

                                               31
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

when a university’s code of conduct extends off campus, the university’s

corresponding self-imposed responsibility to students follows.            Wherever a

university requires its students to comply with the code of conduct, it should foresee

that students rely on the university to enforce it. See ER at 4-5 (another student

victim relied on the university to discipline Culhane for his off-campus sexual

misconduct).     The majority states that “[t]he code of conduct is irrelevant to

establishment of a duty.” Majority at 15. I disagree.

       Recently, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a school’s Title IX duty to its

students is not limited to the four corners of campus where a university maintains

control over that context, for instance, through a code of conduct. Brown v. Arizona,

82 F.4th 863, 874-80 (9th Cir. 2023). The majority does not acknowledge that case.

There, a student athlete assaulted three students off campus. Id. at 866. The

university knew about the student perpetrator’s history of assaults on two of those

students and did not take any steps to protect the third student from harm. Id. at 866-

67. The third student victim sued the university under Title IX, and the court found

a genuine issue of material fact on the university’s liability because it had sufficient

control over the student perpetrator and the “context” in which the assault occurred.

Id. at 866, 875. A university has control over the context of the assault when the

student perpetrator “‘is under the school’s disciplinary authority.’” Id. at 875

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,

                                               32
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

647, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1999)). If the conduct occurs in this

context—one where the university has sufficient oversight over the perpetrator and

university officials knew the perpetrator was likely to commit certain conduct—the

university has substantial control and may be held liable for deliberate indifference

under Title IX even where the conduct takes place off campus. Id. at 866-67 (citing

Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 688 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that

a university has substantial control over an off-campus context when it has some

ability to identify the student perpetrators and the ability to take action to prevent the

conduct from occurring)). Like the university here, that university had a student

code of conduct that extended off campus because of the belief that misconduct,

regardless of the location, impacts student health, safety, and security and should be

prevented from happening.          Id. at 878.      Some element of “‘school sanction,

sponsorship, or connection to a school function is required’” for a school to control

an off-campus context, and the court found that the university’s code of conduct

created such a connection. Id.

       Here, the university, through its code of conduct, assumes a responsibility “to

foster a safe, healthy, and inclusive campus community” and requires students to

read and be familiar with the standards of conduct and to abide by them under

penalty of educational sanctions. WAC 504-26-001. The university’s code of

conduct explicitly applies not only to activities on campus but also “to conduct that

                                               33
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

occurs off university premises and not in connection with university-sponsored

activities, if the conduct adversely affects the health and/or safety of the university

community or the pursuit of the university’s vision, mission, or values.” WAC 504-

26-015(2) (emphasis added). Similar to Brown, this rule creates a connection to an

off-campus context that establishes sufficient control by the university. 82 F.4th at

878. Other higher education institutions in Washington maintain similar codes of

conduct that apply to off-campus activities. E.g., WAC 106-125-005 (Central

Washington University); WAC 172-121-040 (Eastern Washington University);

WAC 174-123-150 (Evergreen State College); WAC 478-121-040 (University of

Washington); WAC 516-21-030 (Western Washington University). Universities

cannot impose a code of conduct that applies to off-campus activities and then wash

their proverbial hands of those activities when the university’s liability comes into

question. 15

       I would find that the duty encompasses an injury such as the rape in this case.

Sexual assault gravely affects the safety of the university community and the pursuit

of the university’s long-standing values to provide a safe, healthy, and inclusive

experience for students; thus, it is precisely the type of conduct contemplated by the

code of conduct and a kind of harm the university is responsible for protecting

       15
           I would not hold that codes of conduct alone create liability or a duty to act; rather, I
would hold that the existence of these codes underscores the university’s recognition of its
authority to control off-campus behavior.
                                                34
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

students from based on the special relationship. See § 40. Moreover, this danger

was foreseeable. Barlow was raped by a student about whom the university had

actual knowledge of two prior instances of sexual misconduct against other students.

Yet, the university, despite warning by one of the student victims, allowed Culhane

to transfer to the Pullman campus, where there was access to dorms and greater

access to alcohol. ER at 87. The university required Culhane to work with a student

conduct officer, tested his understanding of consent, and found he continued to

misunderstand how a person may lack the mental capacity to consent. Just two

weeks later, Culhane raped Barlow, when she was incapacitated by alcohol.

       The mere fact that Culhane raped Barlow at a party off campus is not by itself

determinative. See N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 435; see also ER at 4 (the university

previously disciplined Culhane for off-campus sexual misconduct during a student

recreational trip). Rather, foreseeability is determinative, N.L., 186 Wn.2d at 434-

36, and it was foreseeable that Culhane would sexually assault another student under

these circumstances. Relatedly, sufficient control over the context of the assault is

determinative, and the university had sufficient control over Culhane because he was

subject to the university’s heightened disciplinary authority given his prior

misconduct. Brown, 82 F.4th at 875-76. The university had sufficient oversight and

actual knowledge of the danger Culhane posed and had a duty to protect Barlow—a

freshman who had been on campus just a few days and was dangerously

                                               35
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

intoxicated—from foreseeable harm.             Accordingly, since the university had a

relationship with both students and the danger was reasonably foreseeable based on

what it knew about Culhane’s dangerous propensities, the university had a duty to

control Culhane’s conduct and protect Barlow from harm even though the assault

took place off campus.

       In sum, universities are far from mere bystanders or landlords when it comes

to their students. Rather, students attend universities with reasonable expectations

of attaining far more than a degree—universities build communities where students

seek a sense of purpose, belonging, and, at a minimum, safety. Given the realities

of modern university life and the law of special relationships, I would answer the

certified questions as follows: First, I would hold that a university has a special

relationship with student perpetrators and student victims giving rise to a duty to use

reasonable care to protect students from foreseeable harm associated with alcohol-

and other substance-use-related emergencies. Second, I would hold that the duty

extends to currently enrolled students beyond the four corners of campus so long as

the harm was reasonably foreseeable, particularly if prescribed by the university’s

code of conduct. Accordingly, I would find that the university had a special

relationship with both Barlow and Culhane, which gave rise to a duty that extended

to this foreseeable harm at an off-campus party.

       I respectfully dissent.

                                               36
Barlow v. State, Washington State University
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

                                               37
                                    No. 101045-1

      STEPHENS, J. (concurring in dissent)—I agree with the dissent that a

university’s duty to use reasonable care to protect students from foreseeable injury

at the hands of other students arises from the special relationship between the

university and its students. That relationship is not defined by the geographical

boundaries of a particular college campus, and the duty is therefore independent of

premises liability. In the context of this case, that duty arises from both the

relationship between Washington State University (WSU) and Thomas Culhane and

the relationship between WSU and Barlow. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 315(a) (AM. L. INST. 1965).

      With respect to the special relationship between WSU and Culhane, a duty to

exercise reasonable care arises when a university knows or should know that a

student perpetrator of harm who is currently subject to university discipline is likely

to cause harm to others if not controlled. See id. § 319. The measure and scope of

the university’s duty to use reasonable care is limited by the scope of its undertaking
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1
(Stephens, J., concurring in dissent)

and the foreseeability of harm. Contrary to the majority’s exaggerated concerns, this

“take charge” duty is not limitless.

       With respect to the relationship between WSU and Barlow, a duty to exercise

reasonable care arises with respect to foreseeable harms that a university knows or

should know a student in its community is likely to encounter. See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 (AM. L.

INST. 2012).     Again, the scope of this duty is bounded by the extent of the

undertaking and is not limitless. The majority seems to doubt the ability of courts

to define the boundaries of reasonableness in the context of a particular scenario, as

it posits two extremes—either no duty or total control. As the dissent correctly

recognizes, the world is more nuanced than that. Categorical thinking denies the

genius of the common law.

       I write separately to highlight that the certified questions do not require us to

opine on liability and that it should be left to the trier of fact to determine the standard

of care owed by WSU and whether the university breached its duty. In my view,

portions of the dissent’s analysis drift into the province of the jury. For example,

though modern brain science certainly demonstrates that an 18-year-old’s brain is

still developing and while alcohol and drugs pervade university campuses, the extent

to which these circumstances affect the vulnerability of a student victim and

questions of factual foreseeability fall within the purview of the jury. Dissent at 22-

                                             2
Barlow v. State, No. 101045-1
(Stephens, J., concurring in dissent)

24. Similarly, the university’s actual knowledge of the particular risks posed by

Culhane in light of his prior conduct is a question for the jury. Id. at 34-35.

        Additionally, I agree that a code of conduct can contextualize the scope of the

duty the university owes to students. On this point, I would emphasize the dissent’s

footnote 15: the code of conduct demonstrates that a university recognizes its

authority to control off campus conduct and its knowledge of how off campus

conduct can impact the well-being of a students in the university community—on

and off campus. Id. at 34. I am hesitant, however, to join the dissent in applying the

code of conduct to assess Culhane’s past behavior, as I believe this suggests the

conclusion that the university breached its duty. That remains a question for the

jury.

        In conclusion, I would hold, as the dissent does, that the answer to the first

certified question is yes and that the answer to the second certified question turns on

legal foreseeability within the scope of the university’s undertaking with respect to

its students. The specific contours of the standard of care animating the university’s

duty with respect to student victims and student perpetrators, as well as questions of

factual foreseeability and ultimate liability, are not before us.

                                           3