Court Opinion

ID: 9895625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 02:03:36.86624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:41.311958
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/7/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                              FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN,
                                                                             F086308
          Petitioner,
                 v.                                             (Super. Ct. No. BF191473A)

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY,
                                                                            OPINION
          Respondent;
 ROBERT PERNELL ROBERTS et al.,
          Real Parties in Interest.

        ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; application for writ of mandate. Elizabet
Rodriguez and Tiffany Organ-Bowles, Judges.

        Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke and Sarah E. Burns for Petitioner.
        Katie Townsend for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Californians
Aware, California News Publishers Association, CalMatters, Center for Investigative
Reporting doing business as Reveal, Cityside Journalism Initiative, E.W. Scripps
Company, Embarcadero Media, First Amendment Coalition, Gannett Co., Inc., Hearst
Corporation, KPPC/LAist, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, The McClatchy
Company, Media Guild of the West, NewsGuild-CWA Local 39213, MediaNews Group,

        *Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of part I of the Discussion.
Inc., The Foundation for National Progress doing business as Mother Jones, Informed
California Foundation doing business as Open Vallejo, Pacific Media Workers Guild,
San Diego Union-Tribune LLC, Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., Society of Professional
Journalists of Northern California, and Tribune Publishing Company as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Petitioner.
       No appearance for Respondent.
       Peter Kang, Public Defender, and Alexandria Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, for
Real Party in Interest Robert Pernell Roberts.
       Cynthia Zimmer, District Attorney, and John D. Allen, Deputy District Attorney,
for Real Party in Interest The People.
                                          -ooOoo-
       This writ proceeding arises from a criminal prosecution. The People of the State
of California (the People) and Robert Pernell Roberts (Roberts) are real parties in interest.
Roberts is currently awaiting trial on charges that include murder committed under
special circumstances.
       The case against Roberts is based in significant part on the allegations of his
codefendant, Sebastian Parra (Parra), who testified at Roberts’s preliminary hearing as an
uncharged prosecution witness. The People later sought and obtained a murder
indictment against Parra in connection with the same underlying homicide. The cases
against Parra and Roberts were then consolidated.
       Following his indictment, Parra was interviewed in jail by a reporter from The
Bakersfield Californian newspaper (the Newspaper), i.e., petitioner herein. The
Newspaper published an article based on Parra’s interview statements. Soon thereafter,
Roberts served the Newspaper with a subpoena demanding all unpublished material
relating to the interview. The Newspaper unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena
and was later adjudged in contempt for disobeying an order to produce the subject
material.

                                             2.
       The Newspaper’s motion to quash relied on the newspersons’ shield law (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070) (the shield law), which protects a
newsperson from being adjudged in contempt “for refusing to disclose any unpublished
information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for
communication to the public.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070,
subd. (a).) However, as held in Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 793
(Delaney), shield law immunity “must yield to a criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to a fair trial.” The Delaney court articulated a two-part test for determining whether a
criminal defendant’s rights and discovery needs outweigh the protections of the shield
law in a given case.
       The Newspaper contends respondent, the Kern Superior Court (superior court),
erroneously denied its motion to quash and consequently based the contempt judgment on
an invalid order. We agree the adjudication of contempt was invalid, but for reasons
unrelated to the merits of the motion ruling. The published part of the opinion explains
why the motion to quash was appropriately denied.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Death of Benny Alcala, Jr.
       On August 24, 2022, at approximately 8:26 p.m., Bakersfield police began
receiving reports of a shooting near a shopping center on Stockdale Highway.
Investigating officers located the body of decedent Benny Alcala, Jr. (the victim). He
was found lying face up on a sidewalk just beyond the front parking area of a Target
store. According to police testimony, the parking lot is shared by multiple businesses
including Target and a McDonald’s restaurant. “Next to the McDonald’s in that shared
parking lot there is a charging station for electric vehicles,” which has six charging stalls.
“Between [stall] number two and [stall] number three there is a cement walkway that
leads up to the sidewalk” where the victim’s body was discovered.

                                              3.
       Six expended nine-millimeter bullet casings were found near the victim’s body, as
was a Target shopping bag containing merchandise. A receipt showed the items were
purchased at 8:19 p.m. Inside the victim’s pants pockets were his wallet, an iPhone, and
the keys to an electric car registered in his name. The vehicle was plugged into the
charging station (in stall “number three”), and the Target bag was found “at the beginning
of that walkway that led up to the sidewalk.”
       An autopsy confirmed the victim died from a bullet wound. He had been shot
once in the back and once in the arm. According to media reports, the victim was 43
years old.
Homicide Investigation
       The victim’s family told police he had gone out that night to charge his car. There
was no evidence of theft or vehicle burglary. However, an eyewitness reported seeing
three men interacting near the charging station in a way that “seemed kind of peculiar.”
Two of them “were in close proximity to each other” “in the little walk path between the
parking lot and the sidewalk.” The third man had been standing “about 10 to 15 yards
away from the other two.”
       A second witness reported hearing gunshots and turning to see two people on the
sidewalk. One of them, described as a Hispanic male wearing a white shirt, had “his
hand raised up as if holding a gun” or pointing something. The witness did not actually
see a gun.
       Surveillance video obtained from a bank across the street reportedly showed
“somewhat grainy” footage of a man with a shopping bag walking toward the charging
station at 8:22 p.m. A person in a white shirt followed behind him, coming into view at
approximately 8:24 p.m. According to police testimony, there was “motion between two
subjects walking in between where the walkway leads to Stockdale [Highway].” The
person in the white shirt “disappear[ed] momentarily and re-appear[ed] at [8:26 p.m.],
walking towards McDonald’s.”

                                            4.
        In viewing footage from Target’s security cameras, police were able to confirm
the victim had walked out of the store at approximately 8:20 p.m. At or about 8:21 p.m.,
two people entered the store and apparently caught the attention of the security staff. An
employee “zoomed the camera in” on them, obtaining close-up views of a Black male in
a white shirt and a lighter-complected, possibly Hispanic male wearing a maroon shirt.
At approximately 8:22 p.m., those men exited Target and walked across the parking lot
toward the electric vehicle charging station.
        After contacting other nearby businesses and obtaining more videos, police
constructed a timeline of the suspects’ movements. The Black male had entered a
BevMo! store sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. and spent $21.21 on alcoholic
beverages. (Conflicting information in the record puts the time of purchase at either 5:15
p.m. or 5:55 p.m.) He returned to the store at approximately 7:40 p.m., this time
accompanied by the lighter-skinned man in the maroon shirt, and he spent $11.90 on a
bottle of vodka. The pair left BevMo! at approximately 7:47 p.m. and went to
McDonald’s. At approximately 8:02 p.m., they appeared on a Target security camera
walking past the building and into an adjacent park. They exited the park at 8:18 p.m.
and proceeded into Target. After leaving Target at 8:22 p.m. and heading toward the
charging station, they next appeared on camera at 8:28 p.m. walking back toward the
park.
        The Black male wore a white shirt throughout the videos. The other suspect wore
a maroon shirt most of the time, but he was occasionally seen in a white tank top and
carrying a backpack. However, the Target videos from 8:22 p.m. and 8:28 p.m. showed
him in the maroon shirt.
        On or about August 26, 2022, a tipster contacted the Bakersfield police department
regarding some odd text messages the tipster had received on the night of the shooting.
Detectives investigated and verified the information. The tipster had received both a
phone call and a text message at 10:54 p.m. A second text message followed one minute

                                                5.
later. Because the tipster did not recognize the phone number, the tipster did not answer
the call or respond to the messages. The first message said, “I just killed somebody.”
The second said, “Watch the news.”
       The tipster’s information led police to one of the real parties in interest: Roberts.
Released from prison in December 2021, Roberts was on postrelease community
supervision (PRCS) at the time of the shooting. He had recently updated his contact
information with his PRCS supervisor, and the phone number he provided matched the
one from which the text messages originated. The tipster, however, denied knowing
Roberts.
       Upon further investigation, it was determined that the Black male in the
surveillance videos was Roberts. The record does not explain how, but the other suspect
was identified as Sebastian Parra.
Parra’s First Police Interview
       On August 29, 2022, Parra was taken into custody and questioned about the
shooting.
       Part 1
       Parra explained that despite being employed, he was homeless and essentially
resided in a park near where the shooting had occurred. At first he claimed to have
merely “heard that there was a shooting,” but then added, “I mean, possibly I could tell
you who did it.” He then referred to someone who “was saying he needed a ride home.”
A detective asked, “[H]ow did that turn into a shooting?” Parra replied, “I don’t know.”
       As the interview progressed, Parra described meeting a man on the night of the
incident who matched Roberts’s description. This person, who had called himself
“AWOL,” initiated contact with Parra near an amphitheater in the park. AWOL was a
stranger to him, but Parra accepted his invitation to sit down and consume some alcoholic
beverages. When detectives showed Parra video surveillance images of Roberts, he
confirmed that Roberts and AWOL were the same person.

                                             6.
       After finishing the drinks, Roberts had wanted to buy more alcohol. When Parra
told him he was “broke,” Roberts offered to pay. In Parra’s initial telling of the events,
they purchased a bottle of liquor from BevMo!, bought sodas at McDonald’s, and then
returned to the park. After “chilling for a bit,” Roberts “ended up leaving the park again,
… [saying] he had to get back to the East Side or something like that[,] or to the [h]ood.”
       Parra revised his story after detectives told him, “[W]e got you at Target.”
However, he recounted only partial details of the incident. After being urged to “tell the
truth” and “[not] go down for this,” Parra finally alleged that Roberts had said “he wanted
to rob the guy.” Parra later added that Roberts had commented about the victim
presumably having money since he drove an electric car.
       Parra’s account of the shooting was vague. He claimed to have been standing
about 12 feet away when Roberts first interacted with the victim. The sound of a gunshot
followed, but Parra allegedly saw nothing due to the darkness outside and shrubbery
blocking his view. Roberts soon reappeared and was mumbling to himself about the
victim “walking away.” Parra told detectives he got “spooked” by the gunfire and
immediately departed from the scene. Roberts followed him. Parra went on to say, “So,
at that point, I’m pretty sure I go into the park and try to lose him.” A detective sought
clarification: “So, you just went back into the park, and you saw him trailing you, and
you lost him?” Parra replied, “Yeah.”
       Part 2
       Following a break, the detectives asked Parra to retell his story from the
beginning. Parra described meeting Roberts outside of a restroom next to an
amphitheater in the park. After accepting his offer to share a “12 pack,” Parra listened as
Roberts described “his situation” and made statements about “how he had to get back to
… the hood.” Roberts allegedly revealed that he had previously been convicted of
robbery and “GTA” (presumably meaning grand theft auto), and spoke of plans to “turn

                                             7.
himself in.” At some point Roberts received a phone call, supposedly from a girlfriend,
and he again made comments about “turning [himself] in.” When Roberts offered to pay
for the bottle of liquor, he allegedly said, “I have to spend this little money that I have
left.”
         After going to BevMo! and McDonald’s, the men returned to the amphitheater and
drank there until Roberts wanted to “refill … his cup.” Parra’s language was imprecise,
but it seemed to indicate they intended to return to McDonald’s. On the way there,
Roberts had wanted to stop at Target to use the restroom (a detail consistent with the
surveillance video). During the same general timeframe, Roberts seemed drunk and was
mumbling “about how he had to get back to the East Side, or to the hood, and then that he
would like basically do whatever [it took to get there].” When detectives asked if he was
quoting Roberts, Parra said, “I mean, not necessarily like said would do whatever it took,
but … he was just saying, ‘If I have to take somebody’s car,’ [and was] listing his GTA
and like his robbery and like all that stuff.” Parra further alleged that Roberts had “tried
to get an Uber” but “didn’t have enough on his Uber” for a ride.
         While discussing what happened between their departure from Target and the
encounter with the victim, Parra alleged, “[J]ust out of nowhere he pointed out like the
car, and he was like, ‘That car. … I’ma take it.’” Parra also repeated the allegation that
Roberts had said, “‘[H]e’s got to have money.’” When Roberts contacted the victim,
Parra “kept a distance” because he “didn’t really want any part in that.” Parra continued
to deny witnessing the shooting or ever seeing Roberts in possession of a gun.
         When requestioning Parra about what happened after the shooting, detectives
reminded him that “there’s cameras all over the place.” In response, Parra told a story
about walking to a Walmart on Rosedale Highway. Roberts had allegedly followed him,
stopping a few times along the way to try to arrange for an Uber ride. When Parra
reached Walmart, he sat down and “ended up dozing off” for about 20 to 30 minutes
before “walking back.”

                                              8.
       Parra’s statements about separating from Roberts were as follows: “The last time
I saw him was once I already left [Walmart], like, because like I said, I had dozed off,
and then I woke up, and I’m pretty sure he was asleep too. [¶] … [¶] So then, I ended up
walking away. Like, I didn’t wake him up, I didn’t tell him anything. I just ended up
walking away. [A]nd then after that I … never saw him again.”
       The interview concluded with Parra formally identifying Roberts from a
photographic lineup. He was subsequently released from custody.
Prosecution of Roberts
       On September 1, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed a criminal
complaint charging Roberts with first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189;
count 1), attempted second degree robbery (id., §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 664; count 2),
and unlawful firearm possession (id., § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3). Count 1 included a
special circumstance allegation of murder committed during an attempted robbery. (Id.,
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) A firearm enhancement was alleged pursuant to Penal Code
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
       A preliminary hearing on the charges began on October 5, 2022, and concluded
the next day. Parra was subpoenaed as a prosecution witness. Facing no charges at the
time, he appeared without counsel and testified about the night of the shooting.
Parra’s Testimony
       Parra identified himself and Roberts as the men in the Target videos. Parra also
confirmed he is Hispanic. He was 21 years old at the time of the shooting.
       Direct Examination
       Parra testified to the same basic story he had told to the detectives, but there were
many inconsistencies. For example, he denied Roberts had made any direct statements
about wanting to rob the victim or steal his car. He also struggled to recall anything
Roberts may have said after exiting Target and prior to the shooting. After much effort to
refresh his recollection with the police interview, Parra testified that Roberts said the

                                              9.
victim “might have had money because he was there charging his vehicle.” Parra also
testified to Roberts’s alleged remark about needing to get “‘back to the hood,’” claiming
the statement was made “sometime throughout the night.”
       Regarding their post-shooting activities, Parra testified that he and Roberts
“walked through the park” and then “headed towards Walmart [on] Rosedale.” Parra
estimated it took them 30 to 45 minutes to get there, and he claimed to have fallen asleep
after they arrived. Parra further testified, “Once I woke up, I didn’t see [Roberts]
anymore.” The prosecutor asked, “After going to sleep, did you ever see him again that
evening?” Parra answered, “No.”
       Cross-examination
       The questioning by Roberts’s attorney reflected a theory of Parra being the actual
killer. This was most apparent in questions concerning the unrecovered gun used in the
shooting. Counsel first elicited Parra’s admission to being the registered owner of a nine-
millimeter firearm. That led to questions such as, “And you told [Roberts] that you had a
firearm, didn’t you?” “Didn’t you have a firearm with you on that date?” and “Didn’t you
load a firearm in front of [Roberts] on that date?” Although Parra denied the accusations,
counsel’s intended message was conveyed.
       When pressed on the issue, Parra testified to having given his firearm to a friend
for “safekeeping” in approximately May or June of that year. In other words, three to
four months prior to the shooting. Parra identified the friend by name and said the person
lived in another part of the state. Defense counsel asked, “Does he still have [the gun] to
this date, as far as you know?” Parra replied, “As far as I know, yeah.”
       Parra was also questioned about a defense exhibit reportedly showing Roberts
incurred charges for using a Lyft ridesharing application on his phone after the shooting.
This line of questioning served a dual strategy. First, defense counsel wanted to show
Roberts had the ability and financial means to obtain a ride that night. Second, and more

                                            10.
subtly, it helped establish a timeline to support a theory that it was Parra who sent the
incriminating text messages from Roberts’s phone. (See further discussion, post).
       Parra admitted that after the shooting, Roberts had tried to obtain a Lyft ride while
they were near a Yard House restaurant “on the opposite side of the shopping center
compared to the McDonald’s.” Parra estimated this was around 9:00 p.m. and possibly
as late as 9:30 p.m., which would mean he and Roberts remained in the area for 30
minutes to an hour before heading to Walmart. When confronted about his inconsistent
stories regarding Roberts’s whereabouts at the end of the night, Parra disclaimed the
version he had told to police. Similar to his testimony on direct examination, Parra stated
that Roberts was with him when he fell asleep but gone when he woke up.
       Impeachment of Gun Testimony
       On the second day of the hearing, Roberts’s attorney produced the “friend” to
whom Parra had allegedly given his firearm for safekeeping. A defense investigator
managed to locate the witness the previous evening, and the witness had agreed to drive a
considerable distance to testify. The witness unequivocally denied Parra’s story. He
testified that he knew Parra but had “cut all ties with him almost a year ago” and had no
knowledge of Parra owning or possessing a firearm.
Further Proceedings
       The preliminary hearing concluded with Roberts being held to answer all charges
in the complaint. A conforming information was filed on October 13, 2022. On
December 19, 2022, the People waived pursuit of the death penalty.
Prosecution of Parra
       Subsequent to Roberts’s preliminary hearing (the record does not say when), the
Kern County District Attorney initiated grand jury proceedings regarding Parra’s
involvement in the shooting. On December 22, 2022, the grand jury returned a true bill
on two counts alleged in a second amended indictment: first degree murder and
attempted robbery.

                                             11.
Relevant Media Coverage
         On December 29, 2022, the Newspaper published an article under the headline,
“Prosecution’s key witness indicted, arrested in death of [the victim].” Although Parra’s
indictment was discussed in the opening paragraphs, the article focused on Roberts’s
preliminary hearing. There were quotes from witness testimony and a sentence that read,
“Parra owns a 9mm gun but left it at a friend’s house outside Bakersfield for ‘safe
keeping’ and believes it’s still there, he testified.” The article also reported on the
holding order issued at the end of the preliminary hearing. However, there was no
mention of how Parra’s testimony about the nine-millimeter gun was impeached by the
very person he had identified as an exculpatory witness.
         On February 23, 2023, Parra was interviewed in jail by the reporter who had
written about his indictment. On February 27, 2023, the Newspaper published another
article (“the article”) by the same reporter. The headline read, “‘I didn’t commit the
crime’ [¶] Man indicted in shooting death … denies he had any part in killing.”
         The opening paragraph of the article said, “Parra doesn’t have a clue why he’s
been indicted in the shooting death of [the victim].” Subsequent paragraphs stated, in
pertinent part, “He told The Californian he ‘didn’t do anything’ to kill [the victim]….
[¶] … [¶] And, Parra said, it was unfathomable for him that he would be arrested on
suspicion of gunning down [the victim].”
         The article continued: “The Californian has learned conflicting testimony from
Parra may explain why prosecutors sought an indictment.” This statement foreshadowed
a discussion, several paragraphs later, about the defense witness who testified Parra’s
story regarding the location of his firearm was a lie. Although other parts of the article
quoted from the preliminary hearing, the information concerning the impeachment of
Parra’s testimony was attributed to “a motion by [defense counsel] filed in Roberts’
case.”
         For our purposes, the most important statements in the article were as follows:

                                              12.
         • “[Parra] lived at The Park at River Walk and was on his way to the
           restroom when he was stopped by Roberts, Parra told The
           Californian. They struck up a conversation about their life
           circumstances and then started drinking alcohol together in the park,
           he testified.”

         • “In court, Parra said he heard a gunshot but saw no muzzle flash.
           [¶] Frightened, Parra began to walk away and Roberts caught up to
           him, he said in court. Parra also said to a reporter he didn’t want to
           question or anger Roberts after hearing the gunshots, so he hung
           around with him that night. [¶] Parra said during the jailhouse
           interview he walked away from Roberts later that night, after
           Roberts had fallen asleep.”

         • “After the preliminary hearing, Parra told a reporter he was
           interviewed again by police. That’s when officers asked him about
           the gun, and Parra said he admitted to police he carried a gun with
           him and it wasn’t at his friend’s house. He added police never asked
           him about the gun when he was first interviewed about the incident.”

         • “Parra recalled to The Californian leaving his backpack behind when
           walking to the restroom and first running into Roberts. The
           backpack is where the gun was stored, Parra said, theorizing that’s
           how Roberts could have gotten a gun. [¶] But Parra said he didn’t
           know it was missing until the next day when he opened the backpack
           to pull out a change of clothes—he said he never opened the bag to
           see if the firearm was still inside the day [the victim] died. He also
           said he didn’t kill [the victim] and carried a gun because he was
           living on the streets.”

         • “‘I didn’t commit the crime and didn’t know the weapon was gone
           until the next day,’ Parra said.”

         • “Police also said a phone number associated with Roberts sent a text
           message saying ‘I just killed someone’ and to turn on the news.
           Parra denied to a reporter ever physically touching Roberts’ phone,
           and only looked at it for 30 seconds while trying to get on a Wi-Fi
           hot spot.”
Further Procedural Background
      On February 1, 2023, a prosecution motion to consolidate the cases against
Roberts and Parra was granted. A new charging document, entitled “Consolidated

                                          13.
Indictment/Information,” was filed the same day. The substantive charges were
unchanged.
       In March 2023, Roberts’s counsel served a subpoena duces tecum upon the
Newspaper for the following items: “The complete recording, both audio and video, of
the interview with Sebastian Parra at the Kern County Jail in February 2023. If no
recording exists, a copy of the complete notes from the interview as well as a list of all
questions asked to Sebastian Parra.”
       The Newspaper moved to quash the subpoena based on the newspersons’ shield
law. In a supporting declaration, the reporter who wrote the article attested she “did not
create an audio or video recording of the interview.” She further declared any responsive
documents “would have been obtained or created in the course of reporting the [a]rticle”
and thus constituted “unpublished, confidential journalistic work product.”
       Roberts later filed a “Motion for Release of Records,” which effectively served as
an opposition to the motion to quash. The briefing alleged the subpoenaed records were
“necessary and material” to Roberts’s defense, but no further explanation was provided.
Citing a fear of “‘revealing possible defense strategies and work product to the
prosecution,’” Roberts’s counsel requested an in camera hearing “to present [the
defense’s] theories regarding the relevancy and entitlement to the subpoenaed records.”
       The competing motions were heard on April 4, 2023. The hearing focused on
Roberts’s burden to “make a threshold showing that there is a reasonable possibility the
information sought will materially assist with the defense.” (People v. Parker (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1, 33, citing Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 808.) The conclusory assertions in
Roberts’s briefing were ruled insufficient to meet the standard. The superior court
declined to conduct in camera proceedings, and it denied Roberts’s motion without
prejudice. The Newspaper’s motion to quash was granted. However, in anticipation of
further discovery efforts by Roberts, the court ordered the Newspaper to preserve all
material requested in the subpoena.

                                             14.
       On or about April 10, 2023, defense counsel served another subpoena duces tecum
upon the Newspaper for the previously requested items. The Newspaper filed another
motion to quash, which was supported by an almost identically worded declaration from
the reporter who wrote the article. The defense again responded with its own “Motion for
Release of Records” in lieu of opposition papers.
       Roberts attempted to meet his threshold burden by alleging (1) he “has been
falsely accused by [Parra] of committing this crime,” and (2) Parra “is the person who
shot [the victim].” Roberts further accused Parra of perjuring himself at the preliminary
hearing and continually “trying to cover up his own involvement and lying to try to
escape culpability.”
       Focusing on Parra’s various statements about the nine-millimeter firearm and
allegations of a robbery motive, Roberts argued “the number of times [Parra] has changed
his story is highly relevant and material to … Roberts’ defense.” In other words, since
the People’s ability to prove the charges and allegations against Roberts “will revolve
around [Parra’s] credibility,” it is reasonably possible that Parra’s unpublished statements
to the reporter will materially assist the defense in impeaching his credibility.
       Roberts again claimed there were “additional theories of relevancy” that could not
be disclosed without revealing “defense strategies and work product to the prosecution.”
An in camera hearing was requested to allow his attorney to “thoroughly explain” why
the subpoenaed material was/is important to his defense. The Newspaper, however, was
adamantly opposed to any in camera proceedings. Although Roberts had not suggested
it, the Newspaper’s briefing argued the superior court “also should not review the
subpoenaed information in camera.”
       The motions were heard on May 10, 2023. The superior court did not conduct in
camera proceedings, but it did take judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript.
Following arguments by the parties, Roberts was found to have satisfied his threshold
burden. The court then heard argument on the remaining issues, i.e., “(1) whether the

                                             15.
unpublished information is confidential or sensitive; (2) whether the interests sought to be
protected by the shield law will be thwarted by disclosure; (3) the importance of the
information to the defendant; and (4) whether there is an alternative source for the
information.” (People v. Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 33–34, citing Delaney, supra,
50 Cal.3d at pp. 810–811.)
       Regarding the threshold burden, the superior court said, “Clearly [defense counsel]
does not know what’s in the reporter’s notes since they have not been disclosed. So
there’s no way for [counsel] to actually tell the Court [‘]I know that those answers that he
gave will in fact assist.[’] [But] there is no requirement that [counsel] in fact prove that
the notes will be helpful.” Further remarks by the court suggested the finding of a
reasonable possibility that the material sought will support the defense theory of Parra
being the true killer and/or provide additional impeachment evidence. As for the factor
test, the court found (1) the information sought is neither confidential nor sensitive; (2)
disclosure “[will] not hinder the news gathering ability of the reporter”; (3) the
information sought is “highly important to the defense” and “could potentially exonerate”
Roberts; and (4) the defense has “no other alternative means” by which to obtain the
information.
       On May 11, 2023, the superior court ordered the Newspaper to comply with
Roberts’s subpoena within six days. On May 15, 2023, the Newspaper petitioned this
court for writ relief in relation to that order. On May 16, 2023, the petition was denied as
premature because there was no adjudication of contempt. (See New York Times Co. v.
Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 453, 459–460.) The order denying the petition noted
that “‘[t]o avoid confinement under a judgment of contempt that may subsequently be set
aside, a trial court should stay its judgment of contempt to allow the contemner
newsperson sufficient time in which to seek writ relief if the trial court believes there is
any colorable argument the newsperson can make against the contempt adjudication.’”
(Quoting id. at p. 460.)

                                             16.
       On May 19, 2023, the superior court issued an order shortening time with regard
to a motion filed that day by Roberts entitled, “Motion to Address the Fact That [the
Newspaper] Has Refused to Comply With the Court’s Previous Order.” (Some
capitalization omitted.) The moving papers gave notice of a hearing set for May 24,
2023, and of Roberts’s intention to “ask the [superior court] to find [the Newspaper] in
contempt of court.” A supporting declaration by Roberts’s attorney alleged the
Newspaper had failed to comply with the order issued on May 11, 2023. According to an
attached proof of service, the notice of motion and supporting documents were served
upon the Newspaper’s legal counsel via e-mail.
       On the same day the motion was filed, the Newspaper filed a response. It stated,
in pertinent part: “[I]n light of its desire to have appellate review of this Court’s May 11,
2023 Order, [the Newspaper] respectfully requests that, at the May 24 hearing, this Court
hold [the Newspaper] in contempt of its May 11 order to produce its unpublished
newsgathering materials so that the Court of Appeal may review this order. Consistent
with the Court of Appeal’s May 16 order, [the Newspaper] also respectfully requests that
this Court stay its judgment of contempt by 10 days to allow the Court of Appeal to
decide whether to issue an extraordinary writ.”
       On May 24, 2023, the superior court signed and filed a written order prepared by
Roberts’s attorney. The portion drafted by counsel read: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that [the Newspaper] be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the May 11,
2023, court order to comply with defense counsel’s subpoena in the above-entitled case.”
(Boldface omitted.) The signed order also contained a handwritten sentence:
“Imposition of judgment stayed 10 days until 6/5/23[.]”
       On or about the day the contempt order was issued, Roberts’s counsel served a
trial subpoena upon the reporter who wrote the article. Although the trial subpoena is
relevant to the present dispute, its enforceability is not at issue here.

                                              17.
       On May 25, 2023, the Newspaper petitioned this court for “a writ of mandate,
prohibition, and/or review, or other appropriate relief, directed to [the superior court],
requiring [the superior court] to immediately vacate [the orders issued on May 11, 2023,
and May 24, 2023,] and to issue an order quashing the subpoena.”
       On May 30, 2023, this court issued an order to show cause why the Newspaper’s
petition should not be granted. The order directed Roberts and the People to file written
returns. In addition, all trial court proceedings were ordered stayed pending the
resolution of this matter.
       Roberts argues that the petition should be denied. The People, as stated in their
return, take “no position on the substantive issue[s] … and only assert their right to have
the matter addressed expeditiously to effectuate the People’s right to a speedy trial.”
According to the People’s return, the murder trial was scheduled to begin on June 28,
2023. The People’s return also states that Parra has never “joined or otherwise taken
action in support or opposition to [Roberts’s] motions/subpoenas to obtain the
unpublished notes from the [Newspaper].”
       In July 2023, this court granted a joint request by The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press and 22 additional media organizations to file an amici curiae brief
in support of the petition.
                                       DISCUSSION

I.     The Contempt Judgment Is Procedurally Defective*
       “When the court orders counsel or a party to do something that counsel or the
party does not wish to do, there are two choices: (1) Attack the order immediately by a
petition for writ of prohibition or mandate, or (2) violate the order and mount a collateral
attack on it by seeking review of the resulting contempt judgment or order, usually by a
petition for a writ of review … or habeas corpus.” (1 Cal. Civil Writ Practice

       *See footnote, ante, page 1.

                                             18.
(Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2022) § 16.130, p. 16-91; see In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543,
558 [“An order of contempt cannot stand if the underlying order is invalid”]; In re M.R.
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 65 [“The proper method to challenge a contempt order is to
seek extraordinary writ relief”].) However, “[b]ecause the shield law provides only an
immunity from contempt, there is nothing from which to seek [writ] relief until a
newsperson has been adjudged in contempt.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 459.) Therefore, “a newsperson’s petition for extraordinary relief
is premature until a judgment of contempt has been entered.” (Id. at p. 460.) This is why
the Newspaper’s first attempt to obtain writ relief in connection with the denial of its
motion to quash was rejected.
       The Newspaper’s desire for immediate review of the motion to quash ruling
explains why it responded to Roberts’s compliance motion by affirmatively requesting to
be held in contempt. But in the parties’ haste to initiate this writ proceeding, several
mistakes were made. The parties fail to address the problems in their briefing, but we
cannot ignore those issues. “In reviewing a civil contempt order, the appellate court does
not presume the order to be correct. Rather, because of the summary nature of civil
contempt, all presumptions are drawn against the validity of the contempt order.” (In re
D.W. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 491, 501, italics added; accord, Mitchell v. Superior Court
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1256.)
       Disobedience of a subpoena or any lawful court order is punishable as civil
contempt (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. (a)(5), (10)) or, if initiated by a public
prosecutor, as criminal contempt (see In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 14 [“a
‘violation of section 166 of the Penal Code is a misdemeanor and as such it is to be
prosecuted in the same manner as other misdemeanors’”]). The contempt proceedings in
this case were civil in nature. “A civil contempt may be punished by a fine or
imprisonment or both (Code Civ. Proc., § 1218) or, under appropriate circumstances,
performance may be compelled by indefinite imprisonment (Code Civ. Proc., § 1219).”

                                             19.
(City of Palo Alto v. Service Employees Internat. Union (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 327, 339.)
Although civil contempt is “quasi-criminal” in nature, the applicable law is Code of Civil
Procedure sections 1209 through 1222. (People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816;
Kim v. R Consulting & Sales, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 263, 274.)
       An act of civil contempt is either direct or indirect (also known as constructive).
(In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 10, fn. 2.) “‘Direct contempt is that committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court or of the judge at chambers; all other
contempts are indirect ….’” (Fine v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 651, 665.) A
direct contempt may be punished summarily and requires only a written order “reciting
the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person
proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he or she be punished as
therein prescribed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211, subd. (a).) The record before us contains
no evidence of a direct contempt. We note that different judges signed the order directing
the Newspaper to comply with Roberts’s subpoena and the order finding it in contempt
for failure to do so. (See Hanson v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 75, 82 [direct
contempt must be adjudicated by the judge who witnessed the contemptuous conduct].)
       “Violating a court order is a ‘“common example”’ of indirect contempt.” (Moore
v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 441, 456.) The essential elements consist of a
valid court order, the contemner’s knowledge of the order, the contemner’s ability to
comply with the order, and the contemner’s willful disobedience. (Ibid.; Board of
Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1736.) Adjudication of an
indirect contempt requires “a sequential series of steps: (1) an affidavit is presented to the
court of the facts constituting the contempt; (2) a warrant of attachment or order to show
cause is issued; (3) service of the warrant or order; (4) if there is a warrant (not applicable
here), arrest and bail may occur; (5) a hearing, at which the judge investigates the charge
and hears any answer, including witnesses; and (6) findings and punishment.” (Moore,
supra, at p. 454; accord, Arthur v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 404, 407–408 [noting

                                             20.
this “more elaborate procedure” requires an affidavit, an order to show cause, and a
hearing].)
       An affidavit or declaration and personal service of the order to show cause upon
the alleged contemner are jurisdictional prerequisites. (Cedars-Sinai Imaging Medical
Group v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286-1288 (Cedars-Sinai); see
Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1016 [the ordinary rules of service “do not apply to the service of a
summons or other process, or of any paper to bring a party into contempt”], 1211, subd.
(a), 1212.) Roberts presented a declaration but evidently did not seek or obtain an order
to show cause. As in Cedars-Sinai, where contempt orders were vacated due to
jurisdictional defects, Roberts attempted to initiate the contempt proceedings by filing a
noticed motion. (Cedars-Sinai, at p. 1284.)
       We are unaware of any authority for obtaining an indirect contempt judgment
without the issuance of a warrant of attachment or an order to show cause. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 1212; Arthur v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 408 [stating that in
cases of indirect contempt, “an order to show cause must be issued”].) The order to show
cause is what “commences a ‘separate action’ on the contempt charges.” (In re M.R.,
supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 58, quoting People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 816.)
Furthermore, the declaration/affidavit was served upon the Newspaper’s attorney via
e-mail, and it is unclear whether inadequate service was, or even could be, waived by the
Newspaper’s subsequent participation through counsel. (See Koehler v. Superior Court
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169 [“[A] contempt citation must be served personally.
Service of an order to show cause to bring a party into contempt is insufficient if made by
mail on the party’s attorney of record”]; Cedars-Sinai, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1287–1288.)
       Apart from the issues discussed above, the contempt order is defective in its
failure to specify the punishment to be imposed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211, subd. (a); see
In re Ringgold (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1011 [“A valid written contempt order

                                            21.
consists of three elements … [including] a statement of the punishment”].) In addition, a
valid judgment of indirect contempt must address the contemner’s ability to comply with
the subject order and the contemner’s willful disobedience. (Koehler v. Superior Court,
supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169.) While this may seem like a technicality, the party
subject to the subpoena and compliance order was not the reporter whose personal notes
were sought; it was the Newspaper. Although the existence of the notes was certainly
implied at various times, the Newspaper’s ability to produce them was never actually
alleged or adjudicated in the contempt proceedings.
       Moreover, the order ambiguously states, “Imposition of judgment stayed 10
days ….” This could be read to indicate a deferral of the entry of judgment rather than a
stay of the unspecified punishment, which would require us to again deny the
Newspaper’s petition as premature. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 51
Cal.3d at p. 460.) We will construe the order as a judgment, but also conclude it is
procedurally invalid.
       As noted in other decisions, the standard of review “places the burden on the
[superior] court to ‘dot all the “i’s” and cross all the “t’s.”’” (In re D.W., supra, 123
Cal.App.4th at p. 501; see Cedars-Sinai, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.) “Because
civil contempt is generally the last arrow in the judicial quiver, it is not a routine and
familiar exercise for most courts. On the rare occasion when a court is called upon to
invoke its contempt authority, the court is well advised to stop and refresh its recollection
as to the intricacies of the requirements placed on the judge. Otherwise, the order may
not fare well under the appellate microscope.” (In re D.W., at p. 501, fn. omitted.)
       The question remains whether we should address the ruling on the Newspaper’s
motion to quash. Unlike in New York Times Co., doing so would not deprive the superior
court “of the opportunity to decide in the first instance whether the shield law applies to
the facts of [this] case.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p.
459.) Nor would it “allow [the Newspaper] to avoid the responsibility of choosing

                                              22.
between disclosing information or being held in contempt.” (Id. at p. 460.) The
Newspaper has already made its choice by failing to comply with Roberts’s subpoena and
affirmatively requesting to be held in contempt.
       The parties rightfully view the controversy as ripe for adjudication and are eager
for a decision on the merits. Also, in addition to the current dispute between Roberts and
the Newspaper, the same issues are expected to arise when Roberts’s counsel attempts at
trial to examine the reporter who wrote the article. (The Newspaper’s motion to quash
included a request for “an order preventing Roberts from issuing a trial subpoena to [the
reporter who wrote the article].”) We will therefore consider, and ultimately deny, the
request in the petition to compel the superior court to vacate the order denying the motion
to quash. (Cf. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 461 [“Under
these circumstances, no purpose would be served by remanding the case to the trial court
merely for the purpose of entering a contempt judgment”].)
II.    The Motion to Quash Was Properly Denied
       A.     Legal Overview
       California’s shield law traces back to 1935, when the Legislature enacted statutory
protections to ensure “that newspaper employees could not be adjudged in contempt for
refusal to disclose their sources to courts or legislative or administrative bodies.”
(Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 795, paraphrasing Code Civ. Proc., former § 1881, subd.
6.) “When the laws of evidence were codified in 1965, the newspersons’ shield law
became Evidence Code section 1070.” (Rosato v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d
190, 217.) The statute underwent subsequent revisions, “most notably in 1974, when the
Legislature added a protection for the refusal to disclose unpublished information.” (In
re Willon (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090.)
       “The most significant development in the evolution of California’s shield law took
place in 1980, when the voters passed Proposition 5, thereby incorporating the shield law

                                             23.
into the state Constitution.” (In re Willon, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090.) Today, the
California Constitution provides that newspersons, including publishers, editors, and
reporters, “shall not be adjudged in contempt … for refusing to disclose the source of any
information procured” for publication in a newspaper “or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication to the public.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b).) These
protections also remain codified in Evidence Code section 1070.
       “The shield law is both expansive and narrow.… [¶] … Most significantly, it only
provides an immunity against contempt, rather than a more expansive privilege against
testifying, as exists in other states.” (Rancho Publications v. Superior Court (1999) 68
Cal.App.4th 1538, 1543; accord, Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 797, fn. 6 [“the shield
law provides only an immunity from contempt, not a privilege”].) “The shield law is, by
its own terms, absolute rather than qualified in immunizing a newsperson from contempt
for [not] revealing unpublished information obtained in the newsgathering process.”
(Miller v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 883, 890.) “Nonetheless, … the protection of
the shield law must give way to a conflicting federal constitutional right of a criminal
defendant,” e.g., the right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 891; accord, People v. Frederickson
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1015.)
       A party seeking to invoke the shield law has the initial burden to demonstrate its
applicability. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 806, fn. 20.) This includes establishing
that the information sought was obtained during the newsgathering process and remains
unpublished. (Id. at p. 805, fn. 17; see Rancho Publications v. Superior Court, supra, 68
Cal.App.4th at p. 1544.) However, “the shield law’s protection is not contingent on a
showing that a newsperson’s unpublished information was obtained in confidence.”
(New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 456.) The term
“unpublished information” is broadly defined as information “not disseminated to the
public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, … [including but] not limited to,

                                              24.
all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself
disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not
published information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070, subd. (c).)
       Once the entitlement to immunity is shown, “[t]he burden then shifts to the
criminal defendant seeking discovery to make the showing required to overcome the
shield law.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 806, fn. 20.) At the threshold, the
defendant “must show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his
defense.” (Id. at p. 808.) “[T]he defendant’s showing need not be detailed or specific,
but it must rest on more than mere speculation.” (Id. at p. 809.)
       The concept of material assistance does not require that the information could lead
to exoneration. Materially helpful evidence “may establish an ‘imperfect defense,’ a
lesser included offense, a lesser related offense, or a lesser degree of the same crime; [or]
impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness …. A criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair trial includes these aspects of his defense.” (Delaney, supra,
50 Cal.3d at p. 809.)
       “If the defendant overcomes this threshold showing, the court then balances four
factors to evaluate disclosure, including: (1) whether the unpublished information is
confidential or sensitive; (2) whether the interests sought to be protected by the shield law
will be thwarted by disclosure; (3) the importance of the information to the defendant;
and (4) whether there is an alternative source for the information.” (People v. Parker,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 33–34.)
       B.     Standard of Review
       “We generally review a trial court’s ruling on matters regarding discovery under
an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299.) The
denial of a motion to quash, like other discovery orders, is reviewed for abuse of

                                              25.
discretion. (Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 359.)
Accordingly, the same standard governs review of a “trial court’s application of the
shield laws.” (People v. Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 33; see, e.g., People v. Von Villas
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, 232.)
       In its petition, the Newspaper relies on O’Grady v. Superior Court (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1423 to argue for de novo review. There, however, the “controversy
turn[ed] on questions of statutory interpretation.” (Id. at p. 1456; see Christensen v.
Lightbourne (2019) 7 Cal.5th 761, 771 [“We review questions of statutory interpretation
de novo”].) Resolution of the present matter does not require statutory interpretation.
Furthermore, O’Grady did not arise from a criminal prosecution and thus did not involve
the Delaney test for determining whether shield law immunity must yield to a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights.
       In its reply to Roberts’s return, the Newspaper contends different standards of
review should apply depending on whether the issue is presented in a writ proceeding or
on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. The Newspaper again cites to O’Grady
v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at page 1456, which is not supportive. The
Newspaper also purports to rely on Delaney, but there the California Supreme Court
declined to decide the applicable standard of review. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p.
816 [“We need not and do not decide the issue”].)
       In People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, a criminal defendant’s shield law claim
was framed in terms of whether the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to require
[a reporter] to produce his interview notes.” (Id. at p. 525.) In Parker, the California
Supreme Court cited Ramos in support of the following statement: “We review for abuse
of discretion the trial court’s application of the shield laws.” (People v. Parker, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 33.) We may not simply disregard the high court’s plain statement of the
law. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

                                             26.
       A ruling based on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion, and the
existence of legal error is determined by independent review. (In re Tobacco II Cases
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 311; Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 1534, 1550.) However, Delaney’s two-stage inquiry is predominately
factual, and the balancing of a criminal defendant’s rights against the protections of the
shield law is inherently discretionary. As such, the “relative weight of [the Delaney]
factors in a particular case is for the trial court to decide.” (People v. Charles (2015) 61
Cal.4th 308, 325, citing Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 813.)
       “A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described as one that is
‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773; see
People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371 [“A court abuses its discretion when its ruling
‘falls outside the bounds of reason’”].) “Where there is a basis for the trial court’s ruling
and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for
that of the trial court.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612.)
This does not mean, however, that we are bound by the superior court’s stated reasoning
or lack thereof. “Generally, ‘we will affirm a judgment or order if it is correct on any
theory of law applicable to the case, even if it is right for the wrong reasons.’” (Cape
Concord Homeowners Assn. v. City of Escondido (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 180, 193; accord,
D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.)
       C.     Pertinent Case Law
       Prior to Delaney, the California Supreme Court had “never determined the
substantive scope” of the shield law, nor had it ever “decided a case involving the
application of the shield law in a criminal prosecution.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
pp. 803, 805.) The seminal decision arose from a prosecution for misdemeanor
possession of brass knuckles. (Id. at p. 793.) The defendant, Sean Patrick Delaney, had

                                             27.
been sitting on a mall bench when he was contacted by a group of police officers. Also
present were two reporters from the Los Angeles Times who were gathering information
for an article on the Long Beach Police Department. (Ibid.)
       According to the officers, Delaney consented to a search that resulted in the
discovery of brass knuckles. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 793.) The defense moved
to suppress the evidence, and the reporters were subpoenaed to testify at the motion
hearing. “Their testimony established that each of them observed the events leading to
the seizure and that each was situated in a position to observe whether Delaney had
consented to the search of his jacket,” but they “refused to answer any questions relating
to whether Delaney had consented.” (Id. at p. 794.) Both reporters were cited for
contempt. (Ibid.)
       The California Supreme Court held “that the reporters’ observations of the police
search [constituted] ‘unpublished information’ within the scope of [the shield law].”
(Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805.) However, it also concluded “Delaney was clearly
entitled to the reporters’ testimony as to whether he consented to the police search of his
jacket.” (Id. at p. 814.) As we have discussed, the decision established the following
principles:

       “In order to compel disclosure of information covered by the shield law, the
       defendant must make a threshold showing of a reasonable possibility that
       the information will materially assist his defense. The showing need not be
       detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation.
       [Citation.] If the threshold showing is made, the court then balances
       various factors in determining whether to compel disclosure of the
       information.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 820, citing
       Delaney, at pp. 808–813.)
       The facts of Delaney were such that the defendant easily “met and surpassed the
required threshold showing.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 815.) Consequently,
Delaney offers little guidance on how to differentiate between “mere speculation” and a
nonspecific showing that still adequately demonstrates a “reasonable possibility” the

                                            28.
information sought will be materially helpful. There are few published decisions on the
issue, and none factually analogous to this case, but the following authorities do provide
some insight. As will be seen, in camera proceedings can resolve the problem of having
to guess what the unpublished information may or may not reveal. Where defendants
often have difficulty is in showing that the prospect of the information making a
difference in their case is not entirely speculative.
              1.      People v. Von Villas, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 201 (Von Villas)
       In Von Villas, two police officers were charged with numerous crimes including
attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. A “key prosecution witness,”
referred to throughout the opinion as “Mr. Adams,” had cooperated with investigators to
help build a case against the defendants. (Von Villas, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 229,
222-224.) Mr. Adams also provided “certain materials, including notes and audiotapes,”
to a journalist who wrote two magazine articles about the defendants’ crimes and other
police corruption. (Id. at pp. 228-230.)
       The Von Villas defendants attempted to obtain from the journalist, through a
subpoena duces tecum, “all unpublished information acquired by [the journalist] in the
preparation of both articles.” (Von Villas, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) The
journalist invoked the shield law in a motion to quash the subpoena. In response, the
defendants “claimed that their rights to a fair trial, particularly their rights to obtain
discovery of prior statements of Mr. Adams that might be appropriate material for
impeachment as prior inconsistent statements, would be violated if they were denied
access to the notes and tapes.” (Ibid.) The defense attorneys “were denied their request
to review [the journalist’s] materials in camera with the court, but the trial court, [the
journalist], and his counsel did review [most of the] materials in camera to determine
whether or not discovery of the materials was warranted.” (Id. at p. 230.)

                                               29.
       Following the in camera review, express findings were made that some of the
material was irrelevant and the rest was devoid of any impeachment value. The trial
court also found “there was nothing in the tapes qualifying as an inconsistent statement
by Mr. Adams not already made available to [the defendants] from the record.” (Von
Villas, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 230.) The journalist’s motion to quash was granted,
and the ruling was upheld on appeal. The appellate court reasoned, “Since the sole
objective of [the defendants] was to acquire material to impeach Mr. Adams, the trial
judge appropriately granted the motion to quash.” (Id. at p. 235.)
              2.     People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1 (Sanchez)
       The Sanchez defendant participated in a double murder and a separate third
murder. (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 17–19.) It was a capital case, and he was
sentenced to death. After his arrest but prior to trial, the defendant made incriminating
statements to a cellmate, a police investigator (Investigator Stratton), a homicide
detective (Detective Boggs), and a newspaper reporter. (Id. at pp. 19–21.)
       The Sanchez defendant admitted culpability to the cellmate and to Detective
Boggs. (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 20–21.) In his statements to Investigator
Stratton, he placed himself in the vicinity of the double murder but did not admit guilt.
However, his statement to Investigator Stratton conflicted with details he had shared with
the cellmate. (Id. at p. 20.) The defendant spoke to the newspaper reporter on five
separate occasions, and the reporter wrote several published articles based on their
conversations. (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 21, 48–49)
       One of the earlier articles “reported that defendant ‘did not actually kill’ [the
double homicide victims] but felt ‘he deserves to die because he was present when the
slaying happened, because he helped the killers and because he didn’t intervene to save
the couple ….’” (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 49.) The defendant was quoted as
describing how one of the killers had stabbed the female victim, and of accusing another

                                             30.
alleged perpetrator of beating the male victim. “The article also stated that defendant told
[the reporter] ‘they all had been smoking PCP’ before committing the crimes.” The
defendant had allegedly denied murdering anybody and, in reference to the third
homicide, claimed he was “‘“not guilty of that.”’” (Ibid.)
       In a later article entitled “Accused Asks for Own Death, System Says No,” the
reporter wrote, “‘[The defendant] says he’s a murderer, a triple murderer,’ and that all
three victims ‘were killed for their social security checks.’” (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th
at p. 48.) The statement of motive was relevant to multiple robbery counts and robbery-
murder special-circumstance allegations. (Id. at pp. 17, 58.) “The article also revealed
defendant’s feelings of guilt: ‘I am not an innocent man. If a man feels guilty he should
be allowed to plead guilty, … I should go straight to the gas chamber.’” (Id. at pp. 48–
49.)
       The defendant waived his right to a jury for the guilt phase. He also “moved to
submit the guilt and special circumstance phases on the preliminary hearing transcript.”
(Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 23.) The motion was “a compromise made by defendant
at [his attorney’s] request. Defendant originally had wanted to plead guilty to the capital
charges, but [his attorney] would not consent to such a plea, believing that a guilty plea
would amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at p. 24.)
       The prosecution supplemented the preliminary hearing evidence with testimony
from the newspaper reporter. The reporter’s motion to quash a trial subpoena was denied
“[a]fter the prosecutor assured the court she intended to limit questioning of [the reporter]
to published statements” in the “Accused Asks for Own Death …” article. (Sanchez,
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 49.) On direct examination, the reporter testified “that defendant
told him he was ‘a triple murderer’ and that ‘all three [victims] were killed for their social
security checks.’” (Id. at p. 50.)
       “Defense counsel moved the court either to strike [the reporter’s] testimony or to
order [the reporter] to furnish defendant with all unpublished information regarding the

                                             31.
interviews.” (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 50.) The defense “argued that application
of the shield law to protect unpublished information in [the reporter’s] possession would
deny [the defendant] his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and his Sixth
Amendment rights to confrontation and to the effective assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.)
The trial court allowed the defense to cross-examine on “‘any published article.’” (Ibid.)
In other words, the reporter could be asked about the defendant previously saying he was
not guilty and not a murderer. However, the request for unpublished material was
denied. (Id. at pp. 49–51.)
       In his automatic appeal, the defendant claimed to have “met Delaney’s threshold
test for defeating a claim for immunity.” (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 54.) “In
attempting to meet his burden, defendant attack[ed] his own credibility by claiming he
made inconsistent statements during the course of the interviews that would have exposed
his confused state of mind at the time the interviews took place.” (Id. at p. 57.) Among
other contentions, he argued evidence of his unpublished interview statements “could
have been used to impeach [the reporter’s] testimony that defendant had told him he was
a ‘triple murderer’ and that ‘all three were killed for their social security checks.’” (Ibid.)
Put differently, “‘[the reporter’s] unpublished material might have shown that his “triple
murder” testimony was his own interpretation of [the defendant’s] account, not an actual
admission.’” (Ibid.)
       The Sanchez court rejected the defendant’s claim. The opinion notes his failure to
show “how the information he sought would materially assist his defense, or how it
differed in content from the testimony and published information available for cross-
examination, including defendant’s statements that he was scared, that he had taken
phencyclidine (PCP), and that he had not murdered anyone.” (Sanchez, supra, 12
Cal.4th at p. 57, italics added.) Based on the defendant’s explanation of what he had
hoped to obtain, the high court described the unpublished material as “consist[ing] of
nothing more than self-serving statements that a court could reasonably conclude were

                                             32.
either too speculative to assist defendant or would harm, rather than materially assist, the
defense.” (Ibid., disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th
390, 421, fn. 22.)
       We observe that the “speculative” showing was deficient not with regard to the
content of the unpublished material, but as to the possibility of it providing material
assistance to the defendant’s case. (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 57.) Furthermore,
considering the questions of guilt were decided in a bench trial, the judge ruling on the
threshold requirement had unique and especially keen insight into the potential value of
any impeachment evidence. Elsewhere in the Sanchez opinion, it is noted that the trial
court ultimately “rejected [the reporter’s] statements as proof that defendant killed the
victims for their Social Security checks. Moreover, the court found untrue the special
circumstance allegations that the [double] murders … were committed during a robbery
and found defendant not guilty of the robbery in connection with that crime. Thus, it
appears the court afforded little weight to [the reporter’s] testimony.” (Id. at p. 58.)
              3.      People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th 494 (Ramos)
       The Ramos defendant pleaded guilty to multiple murders. The only issue at trial
was his punishment. A defense expert testified the defendant suffered “from a paranoid
personality disorder due to the influence of several factors, including an abusive
childhood and time spent fighting in Vietnam as a soldier during the Vietnam War.”
(Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 504.) However, the expert “noted that defendant’s
disorder does not mean that he is insane or that he does not appreciate the gravity of his
acts; indeed, defendant knows what he is doing.” (Ibid.) The jury returned a verdict of
death. (Id. at p. 502.)
       The defendant was previously interviewed by a newspaper reporter, and the
reporter had written a published article entitled, “I’ll Get Death Penalty.” (Ramos, supra,
34 Cal.4th at p. 523.) The article quoted the defendant as saying, “‘“I figure I’ll get the

                                             33.
death penalty. I knew that before any of this happened. But like I said, I weighed all that
before I did anything.”’” (Ibid.)
       “Prior to the penalty trial, the prosecution subpoenaed [the reporter] as a witness.
[The reporter] and the newspaper filed a motion to quash the subpoena, on the ground
that the information the prosecution sought was protected by the California shield law.”
(Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 523.) After clarification from the prosecutor that no
questions would be asked about unpublished material, the trial court tentatively ruled to
deny the motion. (Id. at pp. 523–524.) When the reporter claimed he was unable to
recall “exactly what defendant told him during the interview,” defense counsel objected
based on the defendant’s “cross-examination rights.” (Id. at p. 524.)
       The trial court in Ramos conducted two in camera hearings. The first was with the
defendant and his attorney “in order to explore what would assist in defendant’s cross-
examination.” (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 524.) The defense specified it was
seeking the reporter’s notes and “‘(1) The context of [defendant’s] statements; (2) the
flow of conversation; (3) the specific words [defendant] used; (4) the intensity of
[defendant’s] voice; (5) how long [defendant] spoke about matters which in his mind
justified his action without interruption; (6) whether [defendant] presented his
justifications logically; and (7) whether [defendant] evidenced a strong belief in what he
was saying.’” (Ibid.)
       The second in camera hearing was attended by the reporter and his attorneys, the
prosecutor, and defense counsel. (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 524.) “During the
hearing, [the reporter] indicated he had no independent recollection of the interview,
except the information provided in his notes. The notes indicated that defendant made
the reported statements …, appeared calm and spoke in a monotone, discussed very
seriously his life philosophy, did not appear delusional, presented his arguments
logically, and believed what he was saying.” (Ibid.) The trial court declined to order
production of the notes, but it allowed cross-examination on the reporter’s “observations

                                            34.
of defendant’s demeanor, mental status, and the manner in which defendant answered
questions.” (Ibid.)
       The reporter’s trial testimony alleged the defendant had said, “‘I consider
everything before I do it. I weigh all the angles, make my decision and I go ahead and do
it.’” (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 525.) On cross-examination, the reporter “testified
that throughout the interview, defendant spoke in a stern voice and was calm, and that at
times his eyes stared intently through the glass.” The defendant’s psychiatric expert was
later asked about the reporter’s testimony, and the expert testified it did not change his
diagnosis. (Ibid.)
       In his automatic appeal, the Ramos defendant claimed the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the reporter to withhold his interview notes and by limiting the
scope of cross-examination “to describing defendant’s demeanor and perceived mental
state.” (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 525.) The California Supreme Court gave the
following reasons for rejecting the claim:

       “The evidence defendant asserts would have materially assisted his mental
       state defense consists of nothing more than mere speculation on his part.
       Defendant has made no attempt to show that the notes reveal anything
       different from [the reporter’s] testimony, and the record does not suggest
       the notes contain anything of substance that the jury had not already heard.
       In addition, the only matters in the notes to which [the reporter] did not
       testify (whether defendant was promised confidentiality and the interview’s
       duration) do not bear on defendant’s mental state at the time of the
       murders. [The defendant’s psychiatrist] did testify that nothing in [the
       reporter’s] testimony changed or contradicted his diagnosis of paranoid
       personality. But defendant has failed to meet Delaney’s threshold test, and
       we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s use of the shield law in
       protecting [the] notes.” (Ramos, at p. 527, italics added.)
              4.      People v. Vasco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 137 (Vasco)
       Adriana Vasco was the “former mistress and long-time confidante” of a
“prominent Huntington Beach osteopathic physician.” (Vasco, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at
p. 142.) The doctor had long wished to be rid of his wife but “feared a divorce would

                                             35.
financially ruin him.” (Id. at pp. 145, 143.) Sometime after Vasco’s affair with the
doctor had ended, she learned her new boyfriend (the hitman) “had experience as a hired
assailant.” (Id. at p. 142.) Vasco put the men in touch with each other, and arrangements
were made for the wife to be murdered. In a “Shakespearean” turn of events, the hitman
killed both the unsuspecting wife and her perfidious husband. (Ibid.) Vasco was
prosecuted for her role in the murders and sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP).
       Vasco gave a jailhouse interview to a reporter from the Orange County Register,
“and excerpts from that interview were subsequently published in the newspaper the
following day. The published material included either a paraphrased account by [the
reporter] or defendant’s direct quotations.” (Vasco, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.)
The article portrayed Vasco as someone who believed in her innocence but also felt bad
about what happened. Vasco “claimed she had nothing to do with the killings and could
not stop them, because [the doctor] was obsessed with killing his wife and [the hitman]
threatened to kill her if she interfered.” (Ibid.)
       In a familiar sequence of events, the prosecutor subpoenaed the reporter to testify
at trial and the reporter filed a motion to quash. “The trial court denied the motion to
quash but preliminarily limited any inquiry to published information only. The court
reserved ruling on whether defendant could ask [the reporter] about unpublished
information protected under the shield law.” (Vasco, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.)
Following an “extensive pretrial hearing,” the trial court ruled to prohibit cross-
examination on any unpublished material. (Ibid.)
       These excerpts from the appellate court decision summarize Vasco’s arguments
and why she failed to meet Delaney’s threshold requirement:

              “As in Sanchez, defendant complains the reporter paraphrased her
       statements, and argues cross-examination would have revealed her exact
       statements, which, in turn, might have bolstered her lack of intent defense.
       She argues disclosure of any notes or tape-recorded interview of defendant

                                              36.
       may have revealed her exact statements. She also asserts cross-examining
       [the reporter] about her demeanor would have corroborated defendant’s fear
       of [the hitman] and the description of his threats [against her]. She
       surmises cross-examination may have revealed [the reporter] used other
       information sources besides defendant. Finally, she argues cross-
       examination may have shown [the reporter] coerced her into making
       involuntary admissions. [¶] … [¶]

               “Defendant’s assertions parrot those the defendants lodged in
       Sanchez and Ramos, and amount to nothing more than rank speculation.
       Much of the information she sought to elicit was cumulative of other
       admitted evidence. [The reporter] recounted defendant’s statements
       describing her fear of [the hitman] and his violent conduct. Other witnesses
       corroborated [the hitman’s] violent character, and defendant’s expert
       explained her battered women’s syndrome defense. Defendant never
       claimed [the reporter’s] account of his interview with her was untruthful or
       inaccurate. Thus, defendant’s argument, stripped of its gloss, is merely a
       request to elicit additional corroborating information …. As in Sanchez,
       defendant failed to explain how this information would have assisted her
       defense, or how it differed from other mitigating evidence presented at trial.
       Finally, we note defendant filed no declarations or investigative reports to
       support her Delaney showing.” (Vasco, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 155,
       italics added.)
              5.     People v. Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 963 (Frederickson)
       The capital defendant in Frederickson admitted his guilt to numerous people.
Within hours of killing an employee inside of a crowded store, the defendant called the
establishment and said over the phone, “‘You need to tell your employees that money is
not worth getting killed over. [¶] … [¶] … He didn’t do what I told him. Do you
understand?’ … ‘While I pointed the gun at him and told him to put the money in the
bag, he just started counting the money. I told him not to count the [expletive] money. I
told him to put the money in the box. He just closed the safe and started walking away.
… I got mad, flustrated [sic], so I shot him.’” (Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
The defendant thought he was speaking to a store employee, but the person on the phone
was a police officer. (Ibid.)

                                            37.
       Following his arrest, the Frederickson defendant waived his right to remain silent
and again confessed to killing the victim during an attempted robbery. (Frederickson,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) He also admitted to making the phone call described
above. (Id. at p. 972.) The day after his custodial interrogation, the defendant granted an
interview to a newspaper reporter. During the interview, he again “admitted that he was
attempting to rob the store and shot [the victim] during the attempt.” (Ibid.) The Orange
County Register (Register) published an article based on his statements. (Id. at p. 1014.)
       Trial was separated into guilt, insanity, and penalty phases. The defendant
represented himself at the guilt phase but had advisory counsel for the insanity and
penalty phases. He was convicted of special circumstance murder and was found to have
been sane at the time of the offense. The jury returned a verdict of death. (Frederickson,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 970, 973–974, 976.) The procedural history of the shield law issue
was as follows:

       “The prosecution subpoenaed [the reporter] to testify at trial. Defendant in
       turn subpoenaed the Register for any notes and materials it had regarding
       [the reporter’s] interview. The Register provided a copy of the published
       article. After defendant argued that the Register wanted to ‘quash the
       unpublished’ notes, the trial court issued an order to show cause why the
       Register should not produce the requested documents. In response, the
       Register, on its own behalf and on behalf of [the reporter], moved for a
       protective order limiting the scope of subpoenas to information not
       protected under the California reporter’s shield law and also the First
       Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant opposed the
       motion, arguing that statements he made during the interview would
       establish mitigating circumstances relative to the penalty determination,
       might establish that the murder was not in furtherance of a robbery, and
       might be relevant for the sanity phase. He further argued that [the reporter]
       published his statements out of context, and he needed the ability to
       impeach her credibility and to show that she was acting as a government
       agent.” (Frederickson, at p. 1014.)
       The trial court ruled “that defendant could cross-examine [the reporter] regarding
the circumstances surrounding the interview, including statements he may have made that

                                            38.
were not published. The court also concluded, however, that it would not order [the
reporter] to turn over her notes at that time, stating that making such an order would
depend on her testimony and whether she relied on those notes in refreshing her
recollection while testifying.” (Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1014, italics added.)
The reporter never confirmed the existence of any notes, and she testified to refreshing
her recollection “by reviewing the published newspaper article and watching a videotape
of a televised interview.” In light of her testimony, the court ruled that any notes were
protected from disclosure by the shield law. (Id. at pp. 1014–1015.)
       In his automatic appeal, the Frederickson defendant complained of his inability to
obtain the reporter’s notes. The California Supreme Court rejected the claim for failure
to satisfy Delaney’s threshold requirement:

       “[H]e has not established that such notes even existed. Although he
       asserted in his motion that he had been misquoted in various passages of
       the article, the statements attributed to him in the article were consistent
       with his statements to the investigators. Defendant’s vague assertion that
       he needed the notes to ‘test her credibility’ does not show a reasonable
       possibility that the notes would have materially assisted his defense. He
       has not made an adequate showing that any notes made by [the reporter]
       contained anything different from her testimony or from what the jury had
       already heard. [¶] Further, the trial court permitted defendant to cross-
       examine [the reporter] on ‘all of the circumstances’ surrounding the
       interview, including statements defendant may have made that were not
       published. As the court told defendant during the hearing, ‘Considering the
       interview was of you, I think there is significant areas of testing the
       credibility available to you.’” (Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1016.)
       D.     Analysis
              1.     Roberts’s Threshold Burden
       It was Roberts’s burden to show a “reasonable possibility” the reporter’s notes
from her interview with Parra contain information materially helpful to Roberts’s
defense. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 808.) Although Roberts’s attorney is unwilling
to disclose the finer points of the anticipated defense case, key aspects are readily

                                              39.
inferable from our record. Again, we note the superior court took judicial notice of the
preliminary hearing transcript.
        The People’s evidence puts Roberts at the crime scene when the shooting
occurred. His basic defense is that Parra was the shooter and Parra has “falsely accused”
him of committing the charged offenses. Evidence tending to show (1) Parra killed the
victim with his own nine-millimeter firearm, (2) Roberts never had possession of Parra’s
gun, and/or (3) Parra lied about Roberts making statements suggestive of attempted
robbery, could all materially assist Roberts in defending against the charges. Such
evidence need not have the potential to fully exonerate him. It would be enough if it
could help him avoid being convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm (count 3) or a
true finding on the firearm enhancement allegation. (See Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p.
809.)
        Roberts must also overcome the ostensible admission of guilt in the text message
sent from his phone. Although his briefing avoids disclosing strategy on this topic, the
record strongly implies that Roberts is accusing Parra of sending the “I just killed
somebody” message from Roberts’s phone. Evidence supportive of this theory, even if
only to impeach Parra’s prior testimony on the subject, could materially assist Roberts.
        It is reasonably possible the reporter’s notes reflect unpublished statements by
Parra concerning pivotal elements of Roberts’s defense case. The conclusion rests on
more than “mere speculation.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.) One paragraph
from the article states, “Police also said a phone number associated with Roberts sent a
text message saying ‘I just killed someone’ and to turn on the news. Parra denied to a
reporter ever physically touching Roberts’ phone, and only looked at it for 30 seconds
while trying to get on a Wi-Fi hot spot.” The quoted excerpt all but confirms the reporter
talked to Parra about the text message.
        The article indicates the theory of Parra being the shooter was also discussed.
Such conversations are implied by these excerpts:

                                             40.
          • “A theory may explain why Parra was arrested, he told a reporter—
            what gun killed [the victim]?”

          • “[Parra] lived at The Park at River Walk and was on his way to the
            restroom when he was stopped by Roberts, Parra told The
            Californian.”

          • “Parra recalled to The Californian leaving his backpack behind when
            walking to the restroom and first running into Roberts. The
            backpack is where the gun was stored, Parra said, theorizing that’s
            how Roberts could have gotten a gun. [¶] … He also said he didn’t
            kill [the victim] and carried a gun because he was living on the
            streets.”

          • “After the preliminary hearing, Parra told a reporter he was
            interviewed again by police. That’s when officers asked him about
            the gun, and Parra said he admitted to police he carried a gun with
            him and it wasn’t at his friend’s house.”
       The superior court was within its discretion to conclude it is reasonably possible
the reporters’ notes reflect unpublished statements by Parra that could materially assist
Roberts at trial. Here again, the conclusion is not entirely speculative. One reason is
because many of the published statements attributed to Parra directly contradict his
preliminary hearing testimony. For example, Parra testified he did not possess his nine-
millimeter firearm on the day of the shooting because “I didn’t want to have it with me
on the streets.” According to the article, Parra told the reporter he did have his gun that
day and “carried a gun because he was living on the streets.” (Italics added.) The article
also speaks of Parra “theorizing” his nine-millimeter firearm was used to kill the victim,
but he previously testified his gun was not used in the shooting.
       Another example is Parra’s testimony on direct and cross-examination that
Roberts was with him when he fell asleep but gone when he woke up. According to the
article, Parra told the reporter that “he walked away from Roberts later that night, after
Roberts had fallen asleep.” Given Parra’s history of changing his story every time he
tells it, with new details and in ways that cast doubt over his accusations against Roberts,

                                             41.
there is a likelihood he made unpublished statements with similar evidentiary value to the
defense as those contained in the article.
       To be clear, our analysis distinguishes between the impeachment value of the
published statements and the reasonable possibility of additional, materially helpful
content in the unpublished material. The article introduces a new theory reportedly
advanced by Parra that Roberts removed a nine-millimeter firearm from Parra’s backpack
without Parra’s knowledge. However, Parra was asked on cross-examination to confirm
that “from the moment [he] saw [Roberts],” the two of them “stayed together throughout
the rest of the night, including walking over to the Walmart area on Rosedale.” Parra
answered the question affirmatively. Considering his prior testimony, Parra’s statements
about first encountering Roberts near a restroom are significant, and it is reasonably
possible he made additional unpublished statements on the subject that have
impeachment value.
       When questioned by detectives, Parra told conflicting stories about whether he
first spoke to Roberts before or after using a bathroom near an amphitheater in the park.
In one version, he first noticed Roberts sitting near a water fountain on the opposite side
of a fence. Parra later testified Roberts stopped him while he (Parra) was on his way to
the bathroom, at which point they “started talking for a bit [and] hung out a little bit.”
The prosecutor asked, “Did you, prior to hanging out with him …, actually use the
restroom?” Parra answered, “Um, I don’t remember. I think I did end up going to the
bathroom in the park.”
       The article reports Parra “was on his way to the restroom when he was stopped by
Roberts.” Several paragraphs later, it ambiguously contends he recalled “leaving his
backpack behind when walking to the restroom and first running into Roberts.” The
reader can only guess where Parra claimed to have left the backpack, when that occurred
in relation to meeting Roberts, and what opportunity Roberts allegedly had to steal the
gun. It is reasonably possible there is unpublished material clarifying what Parra told the

                                             42.
reporter, and those statements could assist Roberts in convincing a jury he did not
surreptitiously remove a firearm from Parra’s backpack.
       The “I just killed somebody” text message was sent at 10:54 p.m. Parra testified
to leaving work at 4:30 p.m. and first encountering Roberts around 5:00 p.m. or 5:30 p.m.
However, Parra also said Roberts already had the 12-pack of alcoholic beverages when
they met, and the video evidence put the time of that purchase between 5:15 p.m. and
5:55 p.m. These times are important in relation to any unpublished statements Parra may
have made about Roberts’s phone.
       During the preliminary hearing, Roberts’s attorney questioned a police witness
about Roberts’s phone records. Counsel asked the witness about a “large gap in call and
text message usage” preceding the “I just killed somebody” message, and the witness
confirmed an estimated gap of six hours. In other words, the records reportedly showed
no texts or calls between approximately 4:53 p.m. and 10:53 p.m. Parra has already
made conflicting statements about whether he saw Roberts talking on the phone between
approximately 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. He also testified to seeing Roberts texting early
in the night. If the subpoenaed material shows Parra made unpublished statements about
Roberts texting or talking on his phone at other times, it could provide additional and
potentially stronger impeachment evidence on this topic.
       Parra’s statement to the reporter about having “walked away from Roberts later
that night, after Roberts had fallen asleep,” indicates Parra was awake and with Roberts
while Roberts was sleeping. This could explain how Parra might have gained access to
Roberts’s phone and sent the “I just killed somebody” text message without Roberts’s
knowledge. In any event, Roberts’s defense could materially benefit from any evidence
showing he and Parra were together at or near 10:54 p.m. Parra has vaguely testified to
separating from Roberts sometime prior to 12:00 a.m. or 1:00 a.m. It is reasonably
possible the reporter’s notes indicate Parra made unpublished statements indicative of

                                            43.
how long he and Roberts were together after the shooting and when he finally “walked
away from Roberts.”
       At the preliminary hearing, Roberts’s counsel made a deliberate effort to establish
when Parra and Roberts were together at the Yard House restaurant. Parra’s testimony
(and other evidence) place them there sometime between approximately 8:45 p.m. and
9:30 p.m. Parra estimated it took them 30 to 45 minutes to walk to Walmart, where they
both allegedly fell asleep, but the reliability of his estimate was never established. Any
unpublished statements by Parra concerning his activities between the time of the
shooting (8:26 p.m.) and the text message (10:54 p.m.) could help Roberts’s defense case.
According to the article, Parra denied “ever physically touching Roberts’ phone” but also
said he “looked at it for 30 seconds while trying to get on a Wi-Fi hotspot.” The
reporter’s notes may clarify what the latter statement means or indicate when and where
the event occurred.
       The Newspaper’s arguments concerning Roberts’s threshold burden either
misstate or misconstrue the case law. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly said
the required showing “‘need not be detailed or specific.’” (E.g., People v. Parker, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 33, quoting Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.) Yet the Newspaper
asserts “the defendant must make a specific showing as to how the unpublished
information will ‘materially’ assist his defense.” The Newspaper purports to rely on In re
Willon, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 1080.
       We have cited Willon for its helpful discussion of the shield law’s history. (In re
Willon, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090–1091.) However, Willon articulates a test for
use only in one scenario: where a newsperson refuses to identify the source of leaks to
the press occurring in violation of a “‘gag’” order issued in a criminal prosecution. (Id. at
pp. 1084–1085.) The opinion states, “Unlike Delaney, we are not confronted with a
request by a defendant for information that would directly assist in his or her defense;
here it is the trial court that seeks disclosure in order to preserve its ability to control the

                                               44.
judicial process and maintain an unbiased jury pool.… We thus agree with the parties
that the threshold showing and balancing test formulated in Delaney are not controlling
here.” (Willon, at p. 1093, italics added, fn. omitted.)
        The Willon opinion holds “that the shield law protects the news media from
contempt absent a specific showing that nondisclosure of the source will create a
substantial probability of injury to the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.” (In re
Willon, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085, italics added.) The Newspaper’s briefing
quotes this language three separate times, but with an ellipsis in place of the words “of
the source” and fails to acknowledge the contextual distinction. It is quite clear Willon
does not support the Newspaper’s argument that Roberts needed to make a “specific
showing” of how the subpoenaed material will assist his defense.
        Next, the Newspaper dismisses as “dicta” the statement in Delaney that
impeaching a prosecution witness is both materially assistive and an aspect of a criminal
defense case that is embodied in the right to a fair trial. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p.
809.) According to the Newspaper, “no court has ever found that potential impeachment
is sufficient to meet Delaney’s threshold burden.” Moreover, it claims Frederickson,
Sanchez, and Von Villas collectively demonstrate it is “well established that the
possibility that unpublished news material might uncover impeachment information is an
insufficient basis to support a criminal defendant’s threshold burden.” These arguments
fail.
        Impeachment is the process of calling into question a witness’s credibility and/or
the believability of their testimony. (People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 208; Gallo v.
Peninsula Hospital (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 899, 904; see Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (e);
People v. Turner (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 397, 410.) To say “no court has ever found that
potential impeachment is sufficient to meet Delaney’s threshold burden” is to overlook
the facts of Delaney itself. “According to the [arresting] officers,” Sean Patrick Delaney
was asked for permission to search his jacket and he consented. (Delaney, supra, 50

                                              45.
Cal.3d at p. 793.) “Following testimony by the officers at the suppression hearing, the
reporters were called to testify by the prosecution to demonstrate the legality of the
seizure [of what the search produced].” (Id. at p. 794.) The reporters were not the only
other people who knew whether the search was consensual. But as between them and
“Delaney’s companion, who was present at the time of the search, and four other officers
who might have been within hearing distance of the search,” the reporters were the only
disinterested witnesses. (Id. at p. 815.) The reason why it was reasonably possible the
reporters’ unpublished information would materially assist Delaney was because of its
potential impeachment value. (See id. at pp. 814–815.)
       In Von Villas, the trial judge conducted in camera proceedings. (Von Villas,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 230.) The judge “was intimately familiar with the facts of the
case” and “had carefully reviewed the unpublished information” before ruling on whether
to order production of the material. (Id. at p. 235.) The Von Villas defendants did not fail
to meet their threshold burden because they were seeking impeachment evidence; it was
because the unpublished material was found to have no impeachment value. (Id. at pp.
230, 235.) “Since the sole objective of [the defendants] was to acquire material to
impeach [a prosecution witness], the trial judge appropriately granted the motion to
quash.” (Id. at p. 235.)
       The Sanchez opinion notes “Delaney did not and could not specify what evidence
would meet its threshold test.” (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 56.) The opinion then
describes the examples provided in Delaney as “instructive,” including evidence that may
“‘impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness.’” (Sanchez, at pp. 56–57, quoting
Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.) The Sanchez defendant made inconsistent
statements to a reporter over the course of five interviews and was permitted to cross-
examine the reporter about those inconsistencies. His failure in seeking to obtain the
reporter’s unpublished notes was not because impeachment evidence is categorically
insufficient to satisfy the threshold burden. The defendant’s claim on appeal was rejected

                                            46.
because the unpublished material consisted of “nothing more than self-serving statements
that a court could reasonably conclude were either too speculative to assist defendant or
would harm, rather than materially assist, the defense.” (Sanchez, at p. 57, italics added.)
       In Frederickson, the defendant was partially successful in overcoming a reporter’s
shield law immunity. The trial court ruled to allow cross-examination on published and
unpublished statements made to the reporter during her interview with the defendant.
(Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 1014, 1016.) The issue on appeal concerned
unpublished notes that were never even shown to exist. (Id. at pp. 1014–1016.) The
defendant claimed he was “misquoted in various passages of the article” and made a
“vague assertion that he needed the notes to ‘test [the reporter’s] credibility.’” (Id. at p.
1016.) He never explained how the misquotations were substantively inconsistent with
what he had told the reporter or with his numerous prior admissions of guilt. Moreover,
as the interviewee, he was able to know if anything in the reporter’s article or testimony
materially conflicted with what he had actually said. (Ibid.) As with Sanchez and Von
Villas, the outcome in Frederickson was based on the particular facts and circumstances
of the case.
       The Newspaper further contends Roberts needed to somehow establish the
unpublished material is not “cumulative of other evidence already in the record.” A few
cases discuss the issue of cumulative evidence, e.g., Ramos and Vasco, but the
Newspaper’s broad assertion is unfounded. To the extent those cases are marginally
supportive of the Newspaper’s argument, they are distinguishable.
       In Ramos, for example, the trial court held two in camera hearings. One was to
determine what the defense hoped to glean from a reporter’s interview notes, and the
other was to determine the content of the notes. (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 524.)
Here, Roberts’s attorney requested an in camera hearing to “thoroughly explain” how the
subpoenaed material could materially assist Roberts. The Newspaper opposed the
request, arguing that excluding it “from any hearing with defense counsel about the

                                              47.
factual basis for the subpoena is unconstitutional and will severely prejudice the
newspaper’s rights.” The Newspaper went a step further by preemptively objecting to in
camera review of the subpoenaed material by the superior court. The superior court did
not conduct in camera proceedings, leaving Roberts with no realistic way of knowing
whether, or to what extent, the unpublished material is cumulative of evidence “already
in the record”—which at this point means the preliminary hearing evidence. Under these
circumstances, Roberts cannot be faulted for his inability to show the unpublished
material is not unduly cumulative.
       The Newspaper also complains of Roberts’s failure to “explain why [the
Newspaper] would not have published critical statements by [Parra] had he made them.”
The explanation is rather obvious. What a reporter and her editors see fit to include in an
article written for the general public does not necessarily encompass all information an
experienced defense attorney would recognize as materially helpful to her client’s case.
(See Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1686 [“A trained attorney is more
qualified to recognize and analyze legal needs than a lay client”].)
       The superior court’s ruling on Roberts’s threshold showing was not an abuse of
discretion. Insofar as reasonable minds could differ on where the dividing line between
“reasonable possibility” and “mere speculation” should be drawn under these facts, it
only shows the determination was valid. “[T]he circumstance that the trial court arguably
could have exercised its discretion differently does not establish that the manner in which
it did exercise its discretion falls outside the bounds of reason.” (Meeks v. AutoZone, Inc.
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 868; see Braman v. State of California (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 344, 351 [“The very essence of discretion is the power to make
‘comparisons, choices, judgments, and evaluations’”].) We cannot say the showing was
unduly speculative as a matter of law.

                                            48.
              2.     The Factor Test
       “By meeting the threshold requirement, a defendant is not necessarily entitled to a
newsperson’s unpublished information. The trial court must then consider the
importance of protecting the unpublished information. [Citation.] This determination
may properly be characterized as a balancing of the defendant’s and newsperson’s
respective, perhaps conflicting, interests.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.)
       The balancing process involves four factors. No one factor or combination of
factors is determinative, and “their relative importance will likely vary from case to
case.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 813.) We address the criteria under the same
headings used in the Delaney opinion.
                     a.     Whether the unpublished information is confidential or
                            sensitive
       The Newspaper concedes the unpublished material is not confidential but argues it
is “sensitive.” Unpublished information is “sensitive” if “its disclosure would somehow
unduly restrict the newsperson’s access to future sources and information.” (Delaney,
supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 810.) The Delaney opinion provides an example of
“nonconfidential but sensitive information”:

       “Assume a reporter is investigating corruption in city government. He
       obtains information from a city employee who agrees to be quoted and
       identified. Even so, disclosure of this information in some circumstances
       might unduly restrict the reporter’s ability to complete the story. If he were
       forced to disclose the source’s identity before the articles were published
       and the source’s employment was terminated as a result, other sources
       might cease to cooperate. That the information sought is not confidential
       does not necessarily mean it is not sensitive and equally worthy of
       protection from disclosure.” (Id. at p. 810, fn. 25.)
       The Newspaper argues information can be sensitive regardless of whether a
source’s identity is at issue, but it does not explain how the notes from Parra’s interview
fall into that category. Instead, the Newspaper makes a broad policy argument that
compelling the disclosure of any unpublished interview notes in any case where the

                                            49.
source is a criminal defendant awaiting trial would have a chilling effect on future
newsgathering efforts.
       The Delaney court discussed the first factor in terms of “the information sought,”
i.e., the specific material at issue. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 810 & fn. 25.) The
Newspaper fails to explain how the information sought by Roberts is confidential or
sensitive in the way contemplated by Delaney. We will address the Newspaper’s policy
arguments in our discussion of the second factor.
       The superior court found the subpoenaed material is neither confidential nor
sensitive. The finding is supported by the record, which contains no evidence to support
a different conclusion. “Generally, nonconfidential or nonsensitive information will be
less worthy of protection than confidential or sensitive information.” (Delaney, supra, 50
Cal.3d at p. 810.) As such, there was a reasonable basis to conclude this factor weighed
in favor of disclosure.
                     b.     The interests sought to be protected by the shield law
       In evaluating the second factor, “a trial court must determine whether the policy of
the shield law will in fact be thwarted by disclosure.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p.
811.) There are two related considerations. First is whether the need to avoid disclosure
is mooted by the surrounding circumstances. The example provided is if “the criminal
defendant seeking disclosure is himself the source of the information, it cannot be
seriously argued that the source (the defendant) will feel that his confidence has been
breached.” (Id. at p. 810.) Second is whether compelled disclosure “would impinge on
[the subpoenaed party’s] future news-gathering ability or other interest.” (Id. at p. 815.)
       The primary purpose of the shield law is to protect a newsperson’s “future ability
to gather news.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 810.) The Newspaper argues
“compelled disclosure would give future criminal defendants a reason to decline to
cooperate with journalists.” The argument continues: “If codefendants routinely can

                                            50.
obtain material that a journalist chose not to include in an edited report, including notes
from interviews, potential sources are likely to refuse to be interviewed at all, to avoid
having their unguarded comments become the subject of a fishing expedition into any
potential avenue for impeachment.” The Newspaper further speculates about the press
being dissuaded from reporting on “high-profile incidents” for fear of litigation costs
associated with resisting discovery efforts by criminal defense attorneys.
       In making its arguments, the Newspaper contends “[r]eporters and sources
routinely come to agreements about which information the reporter can publish, and
which information the source is providing on background or off the record.” But here
there is no evidence or allegation that Parra’s interview was granted with conditions or
stipulations, that he asked for any statements to be considered “off the record,” or that he
otherwise had any expectation of confidentiality. We agree with Roberts’s observation
that defendants who are willing to grant jailhouse interviews without conditions are
presumably aware that whatever they say “is fair game to be published.” Unless the
interviewee makes statements “off the record” or negotiates some form of content
control, the interviewee does not know what information will be selected for publication.
       Furthermore, indulging the presumption that criminal defendants keep abreast of
legal developments in this area, this class of potential interviewees is already aware that
reporters can be compelled to testify about statements attributed to a criminal defendant
in a published article. (See, e.g., Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 1014–1016;
Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 523–525; Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 49–50;
Vasco, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 149–151.) The Newspaper fails to explain why a
defendant who is otherwise willing to grant an interview without any promise or
expectation of content control—and is thus without knowledge of what information the
newsperson will choose to publish—would make a different choice because of the
possibility the journalist’s unpublished notes might be discoverable. The superior court

                                             51.
did not abuse its discretion by giving little credence to this undeveloped and
unsubstantiated theory.
       The Newspaper’s argument regarding the deterrent effect of potential litigation
costs is similarly undeveloped and unsubstantiated. Although this case presents a novel
fact pattern, the California Supreme Court declared in 1990 that “a newsperson’s
protection under the shield law must yield to a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
a fair trial when the newsperson’s refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe
on that right.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 793.) This is not the first time a
defendant has attempted to overcome the protections of the shield law. In a scenario like
this one, where one defendant is facing LWOP based on the accusations of a codefendant,
discovery efforts in response to the codefendant’s jailhouse interview with a reporter are
highly likely. Such efforts may even be required by the defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel. The Newspaper’s argument necessarily posits that a different
outcome here would dissuade competent defense attorneys from making similar
discovery efforts in future cases, which we do not find persuasive.
                     c.     The importance of the information to the criminal
                            defendant
       “A defendant in a given case may be able not only to meet but to exceed the
threshold ‘reasonable possibility’ requirement. … If so, the balance will weigh more
heavily in favor of disclosure than if he could show only a reasonable possibility the
evidence would assist his defense.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 811.) The
Newspaper argues this factor weighs in its favor because the likelihood of Roberts
finding anything materially helpful in the reporter’s notes is low.
       The Newspaper confuses the “importance of the information” with the probability
of it being helpful to the defense. Although the Delaney reporters were subpoenaed by
defense counsel, it was the prosecutor who first sought their testimony as to whether the
defendant had consented to a search. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 794.) Later,

                                             52.
“Delaney and the People … filed a joint petition in the Court of Appeal seeking to vacate
the orders of the superior court that granted the reporters’ habeas corpus petitions.”
(Ibid.; see id. at p. 816, fn. 34 [“This case is somewhat unusual in that both Delaney and
the prosecutor are seeking the reporters’ testimony”].)
       The facts of Delaney did not show a high probability of success for the defense.
Indeed, the odds of the testimony helping Delaney may have been low. But the potential
benefit was high, which is why the information was deemed important. (Delaney, supra,
50 Cal.3d at pp. 811, 814–815.) Roberts is facing LWOP. His threshold showing may
have been weaker than the showing in Delaney, but the information he seeks is not
unimportant. The superior court’s conclusion in that regard was not outside the bounds
of reason.
                     d.     Whether there is an alternative source for the
                            unpublished information
       Prior to Delaney, appellate courts required defendants seeking to overcome shield
law immunity to show the unpublished material was not available by “less intrusive”
means. (E.g., Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 388, 399.) A
concurring opinion in Delaney endorsed a similar two-part threshold burden, with the
second part requiring “that no alternative source of information is available.” (Delaney,
supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 820 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) However, the Delaney majority held
“that a universal and inflexible alternative-source requirement is inappropriate in a
criminal proceeding.” (Id. at p. 812.)
       “The obvious purpose of the alternative-source requirement is to protect against
unnecessary disclosure of a newsperson’s confidential or sensitive information. Where
the information is shown to be not confidential or sensitive, the primary basis for the
requirement is not present and imposing a rigid requirement would be to sustain a rule
without a reason.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 811–812.) Accordingly, the
existence of an alternative source is only one of several factors in Delaney’s balancing

                                            53.
test. “In considering whether the requirement is appropriate in a given case, the trial
court should consider the type of information being sought (e.g., names of potential
witnesses, documents, a reporter’s eyewitness observations), the quality of the alternative
source, and the practicality of obtaining the information from the alternative source.” (Id.
at pp. 812–813.) “In short, whether an alternative-source requirement applies will
depend on the facts of each case.” (Id. at p. 813.)
       Roberts construes this factor narrowly. He argues the information at issue is
Parra’s statements to the reporter, and there is no alternative source. In the proceedings
below, he submitted evidence of his attempts to obtain a recording of the interview from
the Kern County Sheriff’s Office (which operates the jail where the interview took place).
This evidence showed there was a surveillance camera in the room where the interview
was conducted, but no audio was recorded.
       Roberts does not address the possibility of the reporter being an alternative source.
However, the Newspaper’s motion to quash included a request for “an order barring
Defendant Roberts from issuing a trial subpoena to [the reporter].” Therefore, obtaining
unpublished information from the reporter was not a practical option without judicial
intervention.
       The Newspaper construes this factor broadly, arguing it weighs against compelled
disclosure when there are “alternative sources for the same kinds of information.” (Italics
added, boldface omitted.) In essence, the Newspaper contends all impeachment evidence
has equal value. Therefore, because Parra’s credibility can be impeached with the
preliminary hearing transcript, Roberts has no real need for any impeachment evidence
reflected in the reporter’s notes.
       The Newspaper’s position is not persuasive. There is one source, however, that
the superior court should have asked about. According to the article, Parra was
interviewed by police a second time following the preliminary hearing. This alleged
second interview was basically ignored during the motion proceedings. Roberts’s

                                            54.
briefing to this court includes a footnote alleging as follows: “While [Parra] had told a
District Attorney investigator after the preliminary hearing that he had his firearm with
him at the scene, in that same interview, he first concocted new excuses about where his
firearm was and initially denied that he had his firearm with him at the scene.”
       Our record does not confirm Parra was in fact interviewed a second time. (See In
re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11 [“the unsworn statements of counsel are not
evidence”].) The record is also silent as to whether a transcript of the alleged interview
was available during the motion proceedings. If such evidence was available, it would
have allowed the superior court to make a more informed decision in balancing the
parties’ respective interests. On the other hand, since it appropriately found the
Newspaper’s unpublished material is neither confidential nor sensitive, the superior court
had discretion to give less weight to the fourth factor. (See Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
pp. 811–812.) For all the reasons discussed, we conclude the superior court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the Newspaper’s motion to quash.
III.   In Camera Proceedings Were Warranted
       For the guidance of all concerned in this matter, and for trial courts and litigants in
future cases, we make the following observations regarding in camera review.
       “When a defendant has issued a subpoena to a person or entity that is not a party
for the production of books, papers, documents, or records, or copies thereof, the court
may order an in camera hearing to determine whether or not the defense is entitled to
receive the documents.” (Pen. Code, § 1326, subd. (d).) “‘[T]he defense is not required,
on pain of revealing its possible strategies and work product, to provide the prosecution
with notice of its theories of relevancy of the materials sought.’” (Kling v. Superior
Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075.) “Instead, a defendant may make ‘“an offer of
proof at an in camera [and ex parte] hearing.”’” (Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court
(Touchstone), supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 357, fn. 14, quoting ibid.)

                                             55.
       Roberts’s briefing to the superior court alleged the need to “present his theories of
relevancy” in camera “to avoid the ‘Hobson’s choice of going forth with his discovery
efforts and revealing possible defense strategies and work product to the prosecution, or
refraining from pursuing [those] discovery materials to protect his constitutional rights
and prevent undesirable disclosures to his adversary.’” (Quoting People v. Superior
Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1321.) The request could have been
granted. (Pen. Code, § 1326, subd. (d); see, e.g., Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 524.)
The superior court did not explain why it denied the request, but the Newspaper’s strong
opposition to it may have influenced the decision.
       In camera proceedings are not required if the information protected by the shield
law is neither confidential nor sensitive. “When a criminal defendant, however, seeks
confidential or sensitive information, the practical need for an in camera hearing is
obvious. The shield law would be illusory if a reporter had to publicly disclose
confidential or sensitive information in order for a court to determine whether it should
remain confidential or sensitive.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 814.) “The court has
discretion in the first instance to determine whether a newsperson’s claim of
confidentiality or sensitivity is colorable. If the court determines the claim is colorable, it
must then receive the newsperson’s testimony in camera.” (Ibid.)
       In its briefing on the motion to quash, the Newspaper described the subpoenaed
material as both “extremely sensitive” and “confidential.” If the Newspaper genuinely
held this belief, it should have been arguing for rather than against in camera review of
the material. The Delaney opinion emphasizes “that a trial court need not waste its
valuable resources for an in camera hearing based on a specious claim of confidentiality
or sensitivity.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 814.) We would add that parties who
invoke the shield law should not be allowed to blow hot and cold on the issues of
confidentiality/sensitivity and the propriety of in camera review.

                                             56.
        The superior court was not required to review the Newspaper’s unpublished
material in camera, but it had discretion to do so. (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 814;
Pen. Code, § 1326, subd. (d)). Production of the material for that purpose would not have
waived any protections of the shield law. (Sci-Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 654, 661.) “Moreover, the better policy is to encourage parties to allow
disputed materials to be examined by the trial court in camera, because the court’s review
may resolve the matter expeditiously and short of a contempt adjudication.” (Id. at p.
662.)
                                       DISPOSITION
        The petition is granted in part. Let a writ of mandate issue directing the
respondent court to vacate its order of May 24, 2023, adjudging petitioner in contempt.
In all other respects, the petition is denied. All parties shall bear their own costs in this
proceeding.

                                                                                      PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                              57.