Court Opinion

ID: 9602357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:53:32.765128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:43.544160
License: Public Domain

Judge Parker
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but for a different reason. In my view plaintiffs evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to raise the inferences that plaintiff (i) was coerced into buying his gasoline from defendant, (ii) was prohibited from setting his own prices for gasoline and (iii) was forced out of his lease with defendant for not paying his account. If these facts were found by the jury, they would, in my judgment, be sufficient to constitute a violation of G.S. 75-1.1. See Wilder v. Squires, 68 N.C. App. 310, 315 S.E. 2d 63, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 769, 321 S.E. 2d 158 (1984); Kent v. Humphries, 50 N.C. App. 580, 275 S.E. 2d 176 (1981), affirmed and modified on other grounds, 303 N.C. 675, 281 S.E. 2d 43 (1981).
I do not agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to establish a per se violation of G.S. 75-5(b)(2) and (b)(7). From the record in this case, I find no evidence that defendant sold gasoline to plaintiff “on condition” that plaintiff not deal in the goods of a competitor, a finding necessary to support a violation of G.S. 75-5(b)(2); nor do I find evidence of any “contract, obligation or agreement” as required by G.S. 75-5(b)(7).