Court Opinion

ID: 9644730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:03:09.318664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:17.230585
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result achieved by the majority but wish to state my reasons for accepting the results of the DNA testing evidence.
The trial judge held a hearing at which the prosecution presented two witnesses, Drs. Adams and Goldman. The defense did not present any evidence although it vigorously cross-examined both of the expert witnesses.
Dr. Adams is a special agent of the F.B.I. with the DNA analysis unit. The trial judge recognized him as an expert in DNA analysis. Dr. Adams testified extensively and recognized that there are some individuals who disagree with some parts of the DNA process, but stated that the consensus in majority opinion is that the R.F.L.P. technology is capable of producing reliable results when performed accurately. Dr. Goldman, a geneticist at the National Institute of Health and a medical doctor who is chief of a genetics research section was also recognized, without objection, as an expert in the fields of molecular biology and population genetics. He testified that the procedures used are variance of procedures that are in extremely wide use, that there are no substantial, distinguishing differences in the techniques and that the techniques have undergone extensive peer review. He concluded that the procedures are widely accepted in the scientific community and when carried out correctly, are extraordinarily accurate.
A trial judge correctly followed the standards expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) and held that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence that the DNA testing procedure and analysis has become widely accepted among scientific community as reliable and accurate. The trial court noted that the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported that 38 states have found DNA testing to be accepted among the scientific community.
The courts of last resort in nine states have held that both DNA testing results and probability calculations are admissible: Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Arkansas, Indiana and West Virginia. State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991); State v. Smith, 248 Kan. 217, 807 P.2d 144 (1991); State v. Wimberly, 467 N.W.2d 499 (So.Dak.1991); State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990); State v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989); Prather v. State, 50 Cr.Law 1254 (Ark.1991); Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind.1991); State v. Woodall, 182 W.Va. 15, 385 S.E.2d 253 (1989). In Georgia, Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990), the Supreme Court held that DNA testing results were admissible but allowed only reduced probability calculations. Intermediate appellate courts in seven other states have held that both DNA testing and probability calculations are admissible, Florida, Maryland, Colorado, California, Illinois, Ohio and Texas. (Citations omitted.) Trial courts in New York have held DNA testing results and probability calculations are admissible. Three federal courts have held that DNA testing results in probability calculations are admissible.
Two states have not admitted the DNA evidence. They are Massachusetts and Minnesota. Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991) and State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.1989). It is obvious that the overwhelming weight of medical and legal authority accepts the results of properly conducted DNA testing.
I can find no reason to adopt the procedure ordained by the majority which calls *683for the trial court to make a redundant inquiry into further scientific evidence where none might exist. There is no need to further burden the taxpayers by such a superfluous inquiry when a valid standard currently exists which requires the trial judge to conduct a hearing to determine if the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence that a particular scientific procedure has become widely accepted in the scientific community as reliable and accurate. I can see no reason to further burden the defense by requiring it to challenge the experts by producing other experts. The defense should have the opportunity to vigorously and extensively cross-examine and handle the case as it decides. The adoption of a standard from California as expressed in the majority opinion is unnecessary and unduly burdensome on the people and trial courts of this Commonwealth.
SPAIN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.