Court Opinion

ID: 9468996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:29:00.638531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:09.233897
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
In a number of important respects, I agree with the sentiments expressed in Judge Van Dusen’s dissenting opinion. For example, I subscribe to the view that “a fundamental tenet of the national labor policy is that a Board-supervised, secret ballot election is ‘the preferred method of selecting bargaining representatives.’ ” Dissenting opinion at 3. Similarly, I believe that a “bargaining order is an extraordinary remedy ... [and] is appropriate only when the harmful effects of [the] disenfranchisement [of workers] are outweighed by the positive advancement of the policies underlying federal labor law.” Id. at 1210 (quoting NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (3d Cir. 1981)). Finally, I am in accord with the position that one responsibility of a court of appeals charged with reviewing bargaining orders issued by the NLRB is to “draw[ ] the line at what it believes to be the point where the factual similarity between the present case and [NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969)] is so tenuous, and the danger to employee free choice so strong, that applying the rule of [Gissel] is not justifiable.” Dissenting opinion at 5. To do less, it seems to me, would be to adopt a “toothless” standard of review and to ignore our statutorily-imposed obligation to ensure that administrative bodies proceed rationally, fairly, and legally.
*1215Unlike the dissent, however, I do not believe that we are justified in “drawing the Gissel line” so as to prevent the Board from imposing a bargaining order to remedy the unfair labor practices that were found to exist in this proceeding. There are three reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, I am persuaded that virtually all of the elements deemed significant by our previous eases in determining whether a bargaining order should have been issued were present in the record here. See, e.g., Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1980) (in banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981); Electrical Products Division of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 987 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 210, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980). Second, I am convinced that this dispute is not on all fours with K & K Gourmet Meats, supra, which represents the limiting case with respect to the power of the Board in this regard. In my view, the dissent unjustifiably dismisses the Board’s explicit finding that the presence of post-strike violations on the part of United Oil contributed significantly to an atmosphere that, in the Board’s expert evaluation, could not be addressed by a more traditional remedy.1 Finally, precisely because whether there are enough facts in the record to justify a bargaining order may be viewed as a close issue, it is appropriate to recognize what the Supreme Court has declared, namely, that in matters of this type, “the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own” and thus deserves to be accorded “special respect” as to its “choice of remedy.” Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 n.32, see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).
In sum, despite my identification with many of the principles advanced in the dissenting opinion, I cannot conclude, after reviewing the record in this case, that the Board erred as a matter of law in imposing a bargaining order, given the “exceptional” circumstances involved here. Similarly, I cannot conclude that the Board somehow abused its discretion in determining that United’s “serious unfair labor practices ... ma[de] a fair election doubtful, if not impossible” and that “the use of traditional remedies [would] not suffice.” Appendix at 50-51. Accordingly, while recognizing the question to be extremely close, I concur.

. The dissent suggests that legal effect be given to the ALJ’s decision not to impose a bargaining order despite the presence of post-strike violations because such a decision, “if not solely [a] question[] of fact, at the very least [is] uniquely suited to determination by the ALJ.” Dissenting opinion at 7 n.2. However, the primary authority cited by the dissent, Eastern Eng’r & Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added), stands only for the proposition that “great weight” should be attached to “the credibility resolutions of an administrative law judge” — a proposition with which I agree, as apparently does Judge Sloviter. The Board’s conclusion in this proceeding that a bargaining order is necessary simply represents the Board’s application of the law to facts adduced by the ALJ, and consequently neither overturns a “credibility determination” of an ALJ nor undermines that official’s essential fact-finding function.