Court Opinion

ID: 9617511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:56:43.465104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:51.223303
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur specially with the majority because, in contrast with the majority’s holding in Division 1, I find that the trial court correctly granted judgment in Southern General’s favor on the basis that proper service was never obtained on the uninsured motorist, Gregory Scott Kelly, in the underlying action.
The record reveals that in their suit against Kelly, the Chitwoods had a copy of the action served on Southern General pursuant to OCGA § 33-7-11 (e) and sought to serve Kelly on July 30, 1986, by having the marshal leave a copy thereof with a woman at Kelly’s notorious place of abode. At the time service was notoriously made, the Chitwoods’ attorney wrote a letter to Southern General informing it that there were problems with the service on Kelly, noting that the woman on whom service was made had stated that Kelly had been gone over a year. The record contains an affidavit submitted by Southern General from the woman residing at the address named in the return of service, in which she stated that Kelly had not lived there since June 1985, and that to the best of her knowledge, Kelly had lived outside of Georgia since June 1985 and never received any of the legal papers left for him at her address. Although the letter to Southern General shows that the Chitwoods knew service on Kelly was inadequate, the Chitwoods did not initiate service by publication on Kelly as set forth in OCGA § 33-7-11 (e). Southern General filed no answer in that suit either on behalf of Kelly or on its own behalf. The suit against Kelly subsequently went into default; the Chitwoods then instituted the instant suit against Southern General.
The Uninsured Motorist Act, OCGA § 33-7-11, provides that all policies issued or delivered in this state must contain a provision rendering the insurer liable to pay the insured “all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1). This language created a “condition precedent” requiring an insured, before instituting suit against his uninsured motorist carrier, to first sue and recover a judgment against the uninsured motorist tortfeasor. Wallis v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 147, 148 (354 SE2d 842) *703(1987); Norman v. Daniels, 142 Ga. App. 456, 459-460 (2) (a) (236 SE2d 121) (1977). As the language in the Uninsured Motorist Act indicates, the Act is primarily directed to situations where the uninsured motorist tortfeasor is unknown or, as is the case here, where the tortfeasor is known but cannot be located because he resides out of the state, has departed the state, cannot be found within the state, or has wilfully concealed himself to avoid service. OCGA § 33-7-11 (e). Despite the unavailability of the known tortfeasor, the insured cannot proceed directly against the insurer but instead, in order to pursue his claim against his own insurer, must obtain a nominal judgment either by a John Doe proceeding or by means of service by publication, so as to fulfill the statutory condition precedent. As the courts have acknowledged and indeed stressed in the service by publication cases, such a judgment provides absolutely no foundation for an in personam judgment against the tortfeasor: the sole purpose of the “judgment” is to fulfill the condition precedent in OCGA § 33-7-11. Wentworth v. Fireman’s Fund &c. Co., 147 Ga. App. 854, 855 (I) (250 SE2d 543) (1978); Norman, supra at 460 (2) (b and c).
In this case, the Chitwoods do not assert that they obtained a valid in personam judgment against Kelly. Nor do the Chitwoods claim they followed OCGA § 33-7-11 (e) and obtained a “judgment” by means of service by publication before they instituted suit against Southern General. Their appeal is based on the argument that Southern General waived all objections to the validity of the personal service on Kelly, an argument I find meritless, as addressed below. In turn, Southern General does not challenge Kelly’s tort liability nor does it seek to set aside the earlier judgment. Rather, Southern General claims it is not liable under the policy to the Chitwoods because they uncontrovertedly failed to satisfy the requirements 'of OCGA § 33-7-11. The propriety of the personal service on Kelly and the absence of service by publication were not raised in order to attack the underlying judgment, but to show that the condition precedent to Southern General’s liability “to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle,” OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1), had not been met. Southern General has not collaterally attacked the Chitwoods’ judgment against Kelly: It has merely demonstrated the absence of any questions of fact that the Chitwoods did not follow the procedure necessary under OCGA § 33-7-11 to obtain the type of “judgment” required as a condition precedent to suit against Southern General. Thus, the question whether the underlying judgment could be collaterally attacked is not relevant: the only issue here is whether the Chitwoods complied with the Uninsured Motorist Act.
The majority holds that because the judgment against Kelly was not void on its face, Southern General will have to return to the court *704rendering the judgment, OCGA § 9-11-60 (b), and move to have it set aside pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), because the Uninsured Motorist Act “is not an exception to the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-60.” This reasoning misses the mark. It would be untenable to suggest that had the Chitwoods obtained a judgment against Kelly by means of service by publication, Southern General could have avoided its liability as the Chitwoods’ uninsured motorist carrier by attacking the underlying judgment for its lack of in personam jurisdiction by a motion pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60, even though the courts have repeatedly stressed such a “judgment” is not valid, Wentworth and Norman, supra, and OCGA § 9-11-60 authorizes attacks on such judgments. The reason why such a suggestion is untenable is that, notwithstanding the apparent “exception” to OCGA § 9-11-60 created by OCGA § 33-7-11 (e), the validity of the underlying judgment is not an issue: only the judgment’s status as the qualifying “condition precedent” is in issue, so that the judgment’s defects are irrelevant in the sole context of an action under OCGA § 33-7-11. Thus, OCGA § 33-7-11 (e) is not an “exception” to OCGA § 9-11-60: despite the fact that a collateral attack on a judgment happens to share several characteristics in common with an uninsured motorist carrier’s procedural defense based on the insufficiency of an insured’s compliance with OCGA § 33-7-11, the purposes for which the two statutes were enacted simply do not overlap here. Since the General Assembly has statutorily rejected a collateral attack by an uninsured motorist carrier on a judgment obtained in compliance with OCGA § 33-7-11, so that an insurer cannot use OCGA § 9-11-60 to attack a judicially-acknowledged invalid judgment because it qualifies as a “condition precedent” under OCGA § 33-7-11, it follows that the insurer should not be required to question a judgment’s uncontroverted failure to qualify as a “condition precedent” under OCGA § 33-7-11 solely by means of OCGA § 9-11-60.
The majority asserts that because Southern General elected not to file an answer in the Chitwoods’ suit against Kelly, it must abide by the legal consequences of its decision. I cannot agree with this any more than I can agree with the Chitwoods’ argument that because Southern General knew personal service as to Kelly was inadequate but failed to raise that issue in the suit against Kelly, Southern General waived its objections and could not defensively assert that issue in the case sub judice to avoid liability under the contract of insurance between the parties. OCGA § 33-7-11 (e) “accords to the insurer issuing a policy providing uninsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff . . . the right at its election to participate” directly or indirectly in the insured’s suit against the uninsured motorist. Home Indem. Co. v. Thomas, 122 Ga. App. 641 (178 SE2d 297) (1970). Although once an insurer elects to participate in the suit, its actions are governed by the *705applicable rules of practice and procedure, id., an insurer is not required to participate but may elect not to participate in the proceedings and not be a party defendant. See Fisher v. Womack, 128 Ga. App. 62, 63 (1) (195 SE2d 753) (1973); see generally Hartford Acc. &c. Co. v. Studebaker, 139 Ga. App. 386, 387 (1) (228 SE2d 322) (1976). Regardless of what the result of such nonaction on the insurer’s right to contest the tort liability of the uninsured motorist or to assert its own defenses, see generally Public Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wheat, 100 Ga. App. 695, 701 (5) (112 SE2d 194) (1959); United States Fid. &c. Co. v. Bishop, 121 Ga. App. 75, 77 (172 SE2d 855) (1970), it is clear that responsibility for jurisdictional, procedural and other errors in the underlying suit does not rest on a non-party insurer. It follows that where a party, insurer or otherwise, is not involved in a suit, not obligated to answer the suit, and not required to respond to errors made therein, it cannot waive such errors as are made.
In the case sub judice, while Southern General had the right to participate and raise the jurisdictional issue if it so chose, see State Farm Mut. &c. Ins. Co. v. Glover, 113 Ga. App. 815, 820 (149 SE2d 852) (1966), the record is uncontroverted that Southern General chose not to exercise that right and did not participate, either directly or indirectly, in the Chitwoods’ suit against Kelly. Therefore, since Southern General had no obligation to answer the suit, the adequacy or inadequacy of service on Kelly was not a matter with which the insurer had to concern itself until the moment when its insureds, the Chitwoods, instituted suit against it based on the judgment in the Kelly suit. Thus, in answer to the Chitwoods’ argument, Southern General did not waive objection to the lack of service on Kelly in the underlying suit. As to the majority’s assertion that Southern General’s decision not to participate in the underlying suit means it must “abide by the legal consequences of its election,” i.e., must now return to the court rendering that judgment and have it set aside pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), Southern General was informed by letter regarding a suit in which it had little interest, that its insureds had experienced problems obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the uninsured motorist tortfeasor. There was no reason for Southern General to believe its insureds would not follow in this commonplace situation the standard practice of seeking an order for service by publication under subsection (e). To require Southern General to return to the court rendering the underlying judgment to correct a mistake made by the Chitwoods in a suit in which Southern General had no involvement and where the Chitwoods had a specific statutory method for handling just such a matter, which they chose to ignore, would in essence penalize the insurer for the incompetence of its insureds.
Therefore, Southern General having established by uncontro*706verted and unobjected to affidavits that the Chitwoods did not obtain any type of “judgment” required under OCGA § 33-7-11 (e) in order to subject Southern General to liability under the policy, I would affirm the trial court’s order. Accordingly, I do not consider it necessary to reach the release issue addressed in Division 2 of the majority’s opinion.
Decided December 5, 1988 —
Rehearing denied December 20, 1988
William R. Hurst, for appellants.
Warner S. Fox, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Birdsong, Presiding Judge Deen, and Presiding Judge Banke join in this special concurrence.