Court Opinion

ID: 9897971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:28.462624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:07.115461
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                            Washington State
                                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                                             Division Two

                                                                                              June 13, 2023

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                           DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                               No. 56086-1-II

                                 Respondent,

         v.

    PHILLIP RENELLE JARVIS,                                       PUBLISHED OPINION

                                 Appellant.

        Cruser, J. - Phillip Renelle Jarvis appeals his jury trial convictions for three counts of first

degree assault and one count of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm and his life without

parole sentence under the “Persistent Offender Accountability Act”1 (POAA). He argues that (1)

the superior court violated his constitutional rights by forcing him to repeatedly appear in restraints

at 23 pretrial hearings and his sentencing hearing without first conducting the required

individualized assessment, (2) the jury instructions read as a whole required the State to prove that

he intended to assault the victims named in counts II and III and there was insufficient evidence

of this element, (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by arguing facts

outside of the record and by encouraging the jury to convict him on an improper basis, (4) the

POAA is unconstitutional because it is administered in a racially disproportionate manner, (5) the

1
    RCW 9.94A.570.
No. 56086-1-II

POAA is categorically unconstitutional, and (6) the POAA is unconstitutional because it violates

the proportionality doctrine.

       We hold that (1)(a) Jarvis has demonstrated that he was improperly shackled at his

sentencing hearing and the State fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that this improper

restraint was harmless, (1)(b) the remainder of Jarvis’ shackling arguments fail either because the

State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that any potential improper restraint was harmless or

because Jarvis does not establish on this record that he was restrained, (2) the jury instructions did

not require the State to prove that he intended to assault the victims named in counts II and III,

therefore we need not reach the sufficiency argument, (3) Jarvis fails establish that the prosecutor’s

arguments were improper or overcome waiver as to his prosecutorial misconduct claims, and (4)

Jarvis’ POAA arguments may be raised at resentencing. Accordingly, we vacate the sentences and

remand for a full resentencing hearing at which Jarvis may also present his arguments regarding

the constitutionality of the POAA. We otherwise affirm.

                                               FACTS

                                            I. BACKGROUND

       On the night of October 5, 2018, a group of friends and acquaintances gathered at Jason

Ashworth and Diane Cooper’s backyard bar to socialize and drink. Everyone there had either been

drinking at the backyard bar all evening or had arrived after drinking at a nearby pub.

       In the early morning hours of October 6, Jarvis was asked to leave following a dispute with

some of the others present. Jarvis left, but he quickly returned and shot into the bar approximately

six times, hitting Micah Phillips, William Capers, and Stephen Jones. Phillips and Capers were

injured; Jones’ phone stopped the bullet.

                                                  2
No. 56086-1-II

                                           II. PROCEDURE

A. CHARGES

        On October 12, 2018, the State charged Jarvis with three counts of first degree assault and

one count first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Count I was for the assault of Phillips,

count II was for the assault of Jones, and count III was for the assault of Capers. The State also

filed a persistent offender notice, advising Jarvis that if he was convicted of or pleaded guilty to

first degree assault, he would be classified as a persistent offender because he had previously been

convicted of two most serious offenses and, thus, would be subject to a sentence of life without

the possibility of parole.

B. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

        Jarvis identifies 23 pretrial hearings that occurred between October 12, 2018, and the start

of Jarvis’ trial in April 2021. None of the pretrial hearings in this case were conducted by the judge

who eventually conducted the trial and sentencing hearing.

        The only record suggesting that Jarvis was restrained at any of these hearings is a notation

on the order issued following the October 12, 2018 probable cause and bail hearing stating that

Jarvis was unable to sign the order because he was “shackled.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 222.

        On March 23, 2020, in the midst of these pretrial hearings, the Acting Presiding Judge of

the Pierce County Superior Court issued Emergency Order 20-09 (Emergency Order #9)2

addressing the emerging public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Emergency

2
  Emergency Ord. No. 20-09, Public Health Emergency Order Regarding Pierce County
Corrections Restraint Procedures (Pierce County Superior Ct., Wash. Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/COVID19_Pierce/Pierce%20County%20Super
ior%20Court%20Emergency%20Order%20_9_0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT6Q-M35M].
                                                  3
No. 56086-1-II

Order #9 stated that in an attempt to reduce close contact between jail staff and in-custody

defendants and to protect both staff’s and the defendants’ health in light of the “existing emergency

conditions,” jail staff who transported in-custody criminal defendants were “not required to change

restraints in order to escort a defendant into courtrooms.” Emergency Order #9, at 1-2. This order

was effective until “April 24, 2020, unless specifically addressed by the Pierce County Superior

Court Presiding Judge.” Id. at 2. On July 29, 2020, the superior court extended Emergency Order

#9 until further notice of the court. Revised Emergency Order 20-18,3

C. TRIAL

       1. JURY SELECTION AND RELEVANT TRIAL TESTIMONY

       The jury trial began on April 12, 2021.

       During voir dire, the State questioned the prospective jurors about things that could affect

a person’s memory. The State asked the prospective jurors if anyone had experienced being “in an

accident or . . . a fight, something that was really adrenaline charged,” and then questioned

individual jurors about how such situations affected their memory of such an event. Verbatim Rep.

of Proc. (VRP) (Apr. 12, 2021) at 42. The State then asked the prospective jurors if they would

expect that “everyone who’s in an adrenaline-charged situation will remember everything or the

opposite.” Id. at 43-44. Several of the prospective jurors responded that they would not expect

everyone to remember such an event the same way. And when the State asked if any of the

3
  Emergency Ord. No. 20-18, Public Health Emergency Order Regarding Pierce County
Corrections Restraint Procedures (Amending Emergency Order #9) (Pierce County Superior Ct.,
Wash.                         July                      29,                         2020),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/COVID19_Pierce/Pierce%20County%20Super
ior%20Court%20Revised%20Emergency%20Administratvice%20Order%2020-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EL4R-6XFH].
                                                 4
No. 56086-1-II

prospective jurors did not agree that such a situation could impact someone’s memory of an event,

none of the jurors responded.

        At trial, the witnesses testified as described above. In addition, several of the witnesses

identified Jarvis as the shooter in the courtroom and in photographic lineups.

        2. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

        The superior court provided the jury with to-convict instructions for each charge. The

superior court also defined assault, and instructed the jury that under certain circumstances, a

defendant’s intent to assault one person could be transferred to another person. Jarvis did not object

to these instructions. These instructions are set out in full in section II of the analysis.

        3. CLOSING ARGUMENTS

        In its closing argument, the State argued that the key issues were whether it was Jarvis who

had fired the shots and whether he intended to inflict great bodily harm.

        During its argument, the State acknowledged that when the shooting happened, “everyone

at the . . . [b]ar had been drinking” and everyone was intoxicated to different degrees. VRP (May

11, 2021) at 60. The State also attempted to explain why some witnesses might have remembered

the events differently by acknowledging that most of the witnesses were not paying particular

attention to what was going on around them and asserting that others’ memories might be different

due to having been involved in a traumatic event.

        Specifically, the State argued:

               This night, I submit to you it’s clear no one paid any undue attention to what
        they were doing or what others were doing, because it’s something they had done
        countless times before. No one expected trouble. No one was on alert. No one was
        hypervigilant to their surroundings or to the people around them. No one was
        paying particular attention to anything or anyone, because they had no reason to.
        No one was expecting anything to happen. Imagine having to describe something

                                                   5
No. 56086-1-II

       after the fact that you didn’t know you were going to have to describe, like who
       you were talking to before something happened and how much you had to drink.
       There was no reason to keep track of these things or to even notice them, because
       they didn’t expect trouble.

               Everyone also had their own perspectives. This was a relatively large group
       of people in a relatively small space. Their perspectives would have been different
       depending where they were seated or standing, who they were talking to, what they
       were doing, and, yes, how much they had to drink. But they were all in different
       areas experiencing different things. Some people didn’t even notice that [there] was
       anything going on for quite some time. But then there were gunshots in place where
       they didn’t expect to hear gunshots. And for [Phillips] having a gun pulled on him,
       right in front of him, w[h]ere he didn’t expect that to happen. Surprising. I submit
       to you, frightening.

                But, again, remember what this atmosphere was like when you’re reflecting
       on, well, people said different things, people remembered things differently, and
       they were all drinking. Yes, all true. But everybody was certain about this
       defendant. Everyone knew that there was a gun. The people that saw the gun saw
       it in his hand.

               And that there was a very good and valid reason why other things might be
       confusing. They had no reason to commit anything to memory. And when
       something chaotic like this is happening -- remember it came up in voir dire.
       There’s no reason they would remember things, details that happened leading up
       to this event at all, because they had no reason to remember them. But people
       remember traumatic events differently. It affects them differently. And, again,
       everyone had their own perspectives wherever they were. Some people tried to help
       [Capers] and [Phillips]. Others went outside. And [two witnesses] left. . . . I mean,
       there are reasons why you can’t expect everyone to have the same exact memory.

Id. at 66-68 (emphasis added). Jarvis did not object to this argument.

       At the end of its closing argument, the State argued,

               All of the evidence that you’ve heard at this trial points directly to the
       defendant. Please hold him responsible for these actions. For losing his temper, for
       pulling a gun where he did not need to so at a gathering of friends. Hold him
       responsible for the injuries suffered by [Phillips] and [Capers]. They were hurt.
       [Phillips] had part of his intestines removed because of the defendant’s actions.

               Hold him responsible for that, and find him guilty as charged. Thank you.

Id. at 77 (emphasis added). Jarvis did not object to this argument.

                                                 6
No. 56086-1-II

       The jury found Jarvis guilty of all three first degree assault charges and the first degree

unlawful possession of a firearm charge.

D. SENTENCING

       At sentencing, the State argued that because Jarvis had prior convictions for a 1994 second

degree assault and a 1998 first degree assault, the court had no discretion but to impose life without

parole sentences for the current first degree assault convictions. Regarding the first degree

unlawful possession of a firearm conviction, the State requested an 89-month sentence, which was

at the top of the standard range for that offense based on Jarvis’ offender score.

       The State presented fingerprint comparison evidence and photographs demonstrating that

Jarvis was the defendant in the 1994 second degree assault case and the 1998 first degree assault

case. Jarvis objected to the admission of the fingerprint comparison report and briefly questioned

the witness who wrote the report about the comparison process. The court admitted the fingerprint

comparison report.

       Jarvis’ counsel argued that a life sentence based on a second degree assault for which Jarvis

served “a couple of months on,” was not “acceptable.” VRP (Aug. 12, 2021) at 44. But Jarvis did

not contend that the sentence was disproportionate or racially biased or attempt to present any

evidence to support such claims. And counsel did not otherwise challenge the POAA sentencing.

Jarvis’ counsel did not request any sentence for the first degree unlawful possession of a firearm

conviction or respond to the State’s request for an 89-month sentence.

       The superior court found that Jarvis had been convicted for a 1994 second degree assault

and a 1998 first degree assault, that these prior offenses had not washed out, and that these

convictions were strike offenses. Accordingly, the superior court sentenced Jarvis to life in prison

                                                  7
No. 56086-1-II

as a persistent offender. The court also sentenced Jarvis to 89 months for the first degree unlawful

possession of a firearm conviction and ran this sentence concurrent to the other sentences.

                         III. NOTICE OF APPEAL AND ADDITIONAL RECORD

       Jarvis appealed his convictions and his sentence.

       In his original opening brief, Jarvis attached a declaration from a private investigator who

had interviewed jail staff about the jail restraint procedures and a declaration from Jarvis stating

that he had been restrained at several pretrial hearings and at sentencing. Jarvis moved to “expand

the appellate record” to include the two declarations under RAP 9.11 and RAP 1.2. Mot. to Expand

Appellate R. (July 5, 2022). The State argued that neither declaration could be considered as

supplemental evidence that could be added to the record under RAP 9.11 because they related to

facts that were outside the record.

       Commissioner Schmidt “added” Jarvis’ declaration to the appellate record under RAP 9.11.

Comm’r’s Ruling (July 21, 2022). He also denied Jarvis’ motion as to the private investigator’s

declaration and the State’s motion to strike portions of Jarvis’ brief. But the commissioner further

ruled that the State could “address its concerns in its brief.” Id. Neither party moved to modify the

commissioner’s ruling.

                                            ANALYSIS

                                           I. RESTRAINTS

       Jarvis first argues that the superior court violated his constitutional rights by forcing him

to appear in restraints at 23 pretrial hearings and at his sentencing hearing without first conducting

the required individualized inquiry into whether restraints were necessary. Jarvis also argues that

                                                  8
No. 56086-1-II

the State cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional use of restraints was

harmless.

        The State concedes that Jarvis was subject to unconstitutional restraint at the October 12,

2018 hearing and at his sentencing hearing.

        We hold that (1) Jarvis establishes that he was unconstitutionally restrained at sentencing

and that the State fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was harmless, (2) the

State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful use of restraints at the October 12,

2018 hearing was harmless, and (3) Jarvis fails to establish on this record that he was restrained at

the remaining hearings.

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

        A defendant’s right to a fair trial is protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution.4 State

v. Jackson, 195 Wn.2d 841, 852, 467 P.3d 97 (2020). This right entitles a defendant to appear at

“every court appearance,” including nonjury proceedings, “ ‘free from all bonds or shackles except

in extraordinary circumstances.’ ” Id. at 852, 854 (quoting State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 842,

4
  Amici American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation, Fred T. Korematsu Center for
Law and Equality, Disability Rights Washington, and Washington Defender Association, have
filed an amicus brief describing the long history of the use of shackling as a form of oppression
and discussing the effects of shackling in the courts on defendants and judges. Amici argue that,
particularly when there are blanket orders permitting restraints in the courts, the courts should
apply the more stringent constitutional harmless error standard rather than the less stringent
nonconstitutional harmless error test and that the State cannot establish harmless error in this case.
          We agree that the constitutional harmless error standard applies here, and we acknowledge
“that . . . the systemic control of persons of color remains in society, particularly within the criminal
justice system.” State v. Jackson, 195 Wn.2d 841, 851, 467 P.3d 97 (2020). But Amici’s assertion
that the State cannot show harmless error based solely on implicit bias is not persuasive; this issue
requires more analysis than that provided by amici.
                                                   9
No. 56086-1-II

975 P.2d 967 (1999) (plurality opinion)). But a court has the discretion to require restraints in court

if it first conducts an individualized inquiry into whether the use of restraints is necessary. Id. at

852-53.

       Once an appellant demonstrates that he or she was unconstitutionally physically restrained

during a court proceeding, the State must establish that any error was harmless. Id. at 855-56. In

this context, “the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional

violation was harmless as set forth in [State v.] Clark, 143 Wn.2d [731,] 775-76, 24 P.3d 1006

[(2001)].” Id. at 856. Clark provides that to establish harmless error, it must appear from an

examination of the record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or that the

evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that no rational finder of fact could find the

defendant not guilty. 143 Wn.2d at 775-76. “The likelihood of prejudice is significantly reduced

in a proceeding without a jury.” State v. Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d 388, 395 n.2, 429 P.3d 1116

(2018); State v. E.J.Y., 113 Wn. App. 940, 952, 55 P.3d 673 (2002).

B. APPLICATION

       In his amended opening brief, Jarvis identifies 20 pretrial hearings that occurred before the

superior court issued its emergency COVID-19 orders in mid-March 2020, and he asserts that he

was restrained without the superior court first conducting an individualized inquiry as to whether

restraints were justified at these hearings. He also identifies 3 pretrial hearings at which he asserts

that he was unconstitutionally restrained that occurred after the emergency order #9 was issued.

And he asserts that he was unconstitutionally restrained at his sentencing hearing.

                                                  10
No. 56086-1-II

       The State concedes that Jarvis was restrained and that the superior court failed to engage

in the required individualized inquiry before allowing him to be restrained at the October 12, 2018

hearing and at his sentencing.

       1. UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHACKLING CONCEDED

                 a. OCTOBER 12, 2018 HEARING

       Jarvis asserts that he was restrained without the superior court first conducting an

individualize inquiry at the October 12, 2018 hearing, during which the court found probable cause

and set bail and conditions of release. The State concedes that Jarvis was restrained without the

court first conducting an individualized inquiry into whether restraints were necessary at this

hearing. The notation on the October 12, 2018 order that Jarvis could not sign the order because

he was shackled supports the State’s concession.

       Thus, Jarvis establishes that he was unconstitutionally restrained at the October 12, 2018

hearing, and we need only address whether the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this

admitted error was harmless. We hold that the State meets this burden.

       At the October 12, 2018 hearing, a superior court commissioner found probable cause

based on the declaration for determination of probable cause, set Jarvis’ bail at $750,000, and

established conditions of release. The record clearly supports the superior court’s probable cause

determination.

       “Probable cause for arrest as it is normally understood is defined in terms of circumstances

sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or was

committing a crime.” State v. Parks, 136 Wn. App. 232, 237, 148 P.3d 1098 (2006). Jarvis was

charged with the first degree assaults of Phillips, Jones, and Capers and with first degree unlawful

                                                11
No. 56086-1-II

possession of a firearm. The declaration for determination of probable cause describes the

shooting, including that Jarvis was identified as the person who had intentionally shot into the

group of people in the bar, hitting Phillips, Jones, and Capers. It also alleged that Jarvis used a gun

to commit the assaults and that his criminal history included prior felony convictions. Because the

facts in the declaration for determination of probable cause clearly support the commissioner’s

probable cause finding, the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Jarvis’ appearance in

restraints at this hearing did not contribute to this determination or, as neither jury nor the trial

court saw Jarvis in restraints at this hearing, to the jury’s verdict or his sentence in any way.

        And as to the bail and conditions of release, in setting bail and establishing the conditions

of release, the commissioner relied on the fact Jarvis “ha[d] four cases with warrant activity;” the

fact his prior offenses were serious crimes, including first and second degree assault; and the fact

his current offenses involved multiple first degree assaults caused by Jarvis’ dangerous behavior

of shooting at least six times into the group of people. VRP (Oct. 12, 2018) at 44. Given these

facts, the commissioner’s bail and conditions of release decisions were reasonable. Thus, the State

has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional restraint that occurred at the

October 12, 2018 hearing was harmless because not only were the commissioner’s decisions

reasonable, but neither the jury nor the trial court saw Jarvis in restraints at this hearing so the fact

he was in restraints could not have influenced the jury’s verdict or his sentence in any way.

                b. SENTENCING HEARING

        The State also concedes that Jarvis was unconstitutionally restrained at his sentencing

hearing. The State fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional restraint

was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse Jarvis’ sentences and remand for resentencing.

                                                   12
No. 56086-1-II

       As to the life sentences, the superior court based its conclusion that the State had proven

the two prior strike offenses were committed by Jarvis on the fingerprint and photograph

evidence.5 Although the life sentences would be mandatory if the two prior strike offenses were

proven, in determining whether this evidence established that Jarvis committed the prior offenses

the superior court had to make factual determinations, evaluate witness credibility, and make its

own comparisons of photographs to Jarvis. Given the nature of the evidence and the superior

court’s role in evaluating the evidence, the State cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

Jarvis’ appearance in restraints at sentencing had no impact on the court’s decision that Jarvis had

committed the two prior offenses.

       As to the sentence for the first degree unlawful possession of a firearm conviction, the

superior court did have discretion. Because Jarvis’ appearance in restraints at the sentencing

hearing could have influenced the court’s decision to sentence Jarvis at the top of the standard

range, the State fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Jarvis appearing in restraints was

harmless.

       Accordingly, we reverse Jarvis’ sentences and remand for full resentencing at which Jarvis

can raise any and all issues related to his sentencing.6

5
   We note that the State asserts that Jarvis stipulated to his prior offenses. The State
mischaracterizes this stipulation. Jarvis stipulated to the prior serious felony offenses for the sole
purpose of establishing the existence of the prior serious offense conviction element of the first
degree unlawful possession of a firearm charge. In fact, the stipulation states that “[t]he stipulation
is to be considered evidence only of the prior conviction element.” CP at 49. Furthermore, the
record clearly shows that the parties and the superior court did not rely on this stipulation to prove
the existence of the prior strike offenses at the sentencing hearing.
6
 Jarvis also mentions that his appearance in restraints could have influenced the superior court’s
decision not to set conditions for release pending his appeal. Because we reverse the sentences, we
do not address this issue.
                                                  13
No. 56086-1-II

        2. OTHER PRETRIAL HEARINGS

        Jarvis next asserts that he was unconstitutionally restrained at 22 additional pretrial

hearings. The record is insufficient to allow us to review these claims.

        It is Jarvis’ initial burden to establish that he was unconstitutionally restrained, and he

cannot do so on this record. See Jackson, 195 Wn.2d at 855-56 (examining whether error was

harmless after first determining that the appellant established unconstitutional shackling). The

clerk’s papers and the reports of proceedings before us do not mention whether Jarvis was

restrained at any of these 22 pretrial hearings. And, although Jarvis’ declaration was accepted by

our commissioner, we hold that the commissioner’s acceptance of the declaration was in error and

decline to consider it.

        The commissioner accepted Jarvis’ declaration under RAP 9.11, which permits us to

“direct that additional evidence on the merits of the case be taken” if certain requirements are

established. But Jarvis’ declaration, which contains his assertions about whether he was shackled

during certain hearings, is not “evidence on the merits of the case.” RAP 9.11. Jarvis’ declaration

is, instead, an attempt to reconstruct an inadequate record, without providing an opportunity for

the State to challenge the statements in the declaration, and it does not fall under RAP 9.11. Thus,

the commissioner erred when he accepted Jarvis’ declaration under RAP 9.11, and we will not

consider it. We acknowledge that neither party moved to modify the commissioner’s ruling. But

we construe the language in the commissioner’s ruling that permitted the State to “address its

concerns in its brief,” as an acknowledgement that this ruling could be challenged directly in the

appeal. Comm’r’s Ruling (July 21, 2022).

                                                14
No. 56086-1-II

       Because we hold that Jarvis fails to establish unconstitutional restraint at these 22 hearings

based on this record, we do not examine whether any potential error was harmless with respect to

these hearings. 7 If Jarvis has evidence from outside the record regarding whether he was restrained

at any of these additional hearings, he can raise these issues in a personal restraint petition. State

v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

7
  Jarvis also asserts that the Pierce County Jail has a blanket policy requiring all defendants facing
conviction for a third strike to be restrained in belly chains and leg irons in all proceedings other
than jury trials unless the court orders otherwise. But Jarvis’ support for this assertion was the
private investigator’s declaration that was not admitted and his own declaration, which, as
discussed above, we decline to consider. Accordingly, Jarvis’ claim that there was a blanket policy
is not supported by this record.
                                                 15
No. 56086-1-II

      II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF ADDITIONAL ELEMENT

       Jarvis next argues that reading the to-convict instructions for the assault counts related to

Jones and Capers (counts II and III)8 together with the jury instruction defining assault,9 required

the State to prove that he intended to shoot Jones and Capers and that the State failed to meet this

burden. We disagree.

8
 These two to-convict instructions provided:
               To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the first degree as
       charged in Count II, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved
       beyond a reasonable doubt:
               (1) That on or about October 6, 2018 the defendant assaulted Stephen Jones;
               (2) That the assault was committed with a firearm, or a deadly weapon or
       by a force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death;
               (3) That the defendant acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm; and
               (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
CP at 61 (Jury Instruction 7) (emphasis added).

                To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the first degree as charged
        in Count III, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a
        reasonable doubt:
                (1) That on or about October 6, 2018 the defendant assaulted William Capers;
                (2) That the assault was committed with a firearm, or a deadly weapon or by a
        force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death;
                (3) That the defendant acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm; and
                (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
Id. at 62 (Jury Instruction 8) (emphasis added).
9
  Jury instruction 9 provided:
                An assault is an intentional shooting of another person that is harmful or
        offensive, regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the person. A
        shooting is offensive if the shooting would offend an ordinary person who is not
        unduly sensitive.
                An assault is also an act done with intent to inflict bodily injury upon
        another, tending but failing to accomplish it and accompanied with the apparent
        present ability to inflict the bodily injury if not prevented. It is not necessary that
        bodily injury be inflicted.
Id. at 63 (Jury Instruction 9) (emphasis added).
                                                  16
No. 56086-1-II

       “[C]onstitutional due process requires that the State prove every element of the [charged]

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. France, 180 Wn.2d 809, 814, 329 P.3d 864 (2014).

Jury instruction not objected to become the law of the case, and the State has the burden of proving

any additional elements included in such instructions. State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 755, 764-

65, 399 P.3d 507 (2017). We “review [ ] challenged jury instruction[s] de novo, within the context

of the jury instructions as a whole.” State v. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d 736, 743, 132 P.3d 136 (2006).

       Jarvis contends that because the to-convict instructions for counts II and III required the

jury to find that he assaulted Jones and Capers, and the instructions defined assault as an intentional

shooting of another, the jury could only convict him of counts II and III if it found that he had

intentionally shot Jones and Capers.

       Even if Jarvis were correct that the to-convict instructions for counts II and III read in

conjunction with the instruction defining assault required the State to prove that he intended to

shoot Jones and Capers, this argument fails because Jarvis ignores jury instruction 13.10

       Jury instruction 13 provided,

               If a person acts with intent to assault or cause great bodily harm to another,
       but the act harms a third person, the actor is also deemed to have acted with intent
       to assault or cause great bodily harm to the third person.

CP at 67. So, even if the State had to prove that Jarvis intentionally shot Jones and Capers, jury

instruction 13 would permit the jury to deem Jarvis to have acted with intent to shoot Jones and

Capers if it found that Jarvis acted with intent to shoot Phillips. And Jarvis does not assert that the

10
  Although Jarvis suggests that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to an unintentional
shooting, Jarvis does not mention jury instruction 13 or argue that jury instruction 13 was
improper.
                                                  17
No. 56086-1-II

evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with intent to shoot Phillips or with intent to inflict

great bodily harm upon Phillips.

        Because the jury instructions as a whole did not require the State to prove that Jarvis

intended to shoot Jones and Capers, this argument fails.

                                 III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

        Jarvis further argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument

by arguing facts outside the record and by encouraging the jury to convict him on an improper

basis. Specifically, he argues that (1) the prosecutor’s reference to the effect of trauma on memory

was argument based on facts outside the record, and (2) the prosecutor’s plea to the jury to hold

Jarvis responsible was an improper argument that appealed to the jury’s passion and prejudice.

Because Jarvis does not show that these arguments were improper and fails to show that the alleged

misconduct, to which he did not object, was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it could not have

been cured, we reject these arguments.

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

        To establish prosecutorial misconduct, Jarvis must show that the prosecutor’s conduct was

both improper and prejudicial in the context of all the circumstances of the trial. State v. Zamora,

199 Wn.2d 698, 708, 512 P.3d 512 (2022). Because Jarvis failed to object to the alleged

misconduct at trial, a heightened standard of review requires him to show that any alleged

misconduct was “ ‘so flagrant and ill intentioned that [a jury] instruction would not have cured the

[resulting] prejudice.’ ” Id. at 709 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State v. Loughbom, 196 Wn.2d 64, 70, 470 P.3d 499 (2020)). The focus of this heightened

standard is whether an instruction would have cured the prejudice. State v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d

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No. 56086-1-II

282, 299, 505 P.3d 529 (2022). If Jarvis fails to make this showing, the prosecutorial misconduct

claim is waived and we need not consider its merits.

B. ALLEGED REFERENCE TO FACTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD

       A prosecutor commits misconduct during oral argument by arguing facts not in evidence.

In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 705, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). Jarvis argues that

the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by arguing facts outside the record when it

attempted to explain any discrepancies in the intoxicated witnesses’ testimonies by arguing that

their lack of memory was due to trauma rather than their alcohol consumption when there was no

evidence presented at trial regarding whether trauma could affect memory.

       Although Jarvis is correct that there was no evidence presented regarding whether trauma

could affect memory, the State’s argument was not that the discussion during voir dire was

evidence. Instead, taken in context, it was a reference to the fact that individual witnesses will

remember events differently for a variety of reasons. The prosecutor also commented at length

about the multiple other reasons the witnesses could have conflicting or imperfect memories of the

shooting, including that they had been drinking, that they were not paying attention, and that they

were all viewing the incident from different perspectives. This argument was simply an appeal to

the jury to use their common sense when evaluating the inconsistencies in the witnesses’

testimonies.

       Furthermore, even if this argument was improper, Jarvis does not argue, let alone show,

that this allegedly improper argument was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that a curative instruction

would not have cured any potential prejudice. Jarvis argues only that there is a substantial

likelihood the misconduct led the jury to convict on an impermissible basis. We hold that a curative

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No. 56086-1-II

instruction would have cured any potential prejudice. Thus, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct

is waived.

C. IMPERMISSIBLE BASIS ARGUMENT

       Jarvis also argues that the State urged the jury to convict him on an impermissible basis

when it urged the jurors to convict Jarvis in order to hold him responsible and that this was an

appeal to the jury’s passion and prejudice. Citing State v. Anderson, 153 Wn. App. 417, 220 P.3d

1273 (2009), he compares this argument to arguments asking the jury to “declare the truth,” which

he asserts also exceeds the scope of the jury’s role — “determining whether [the] State proved

allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.” Am. Br. of Appellant at 49.

       First, asking the jury to hold a defendant responsible is more akin to asking the jury to find

the defendant guilty, which is permissible. It is not the same as asking the jury to declare the truth,

which is akin to telling the jury that its role is to solve the crime and conduct an investigation, and

is a misstatement of the jury’s true duty of determining whether the State had proved its allegations

against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d

653 (2012). Asking the jury to hold a defendant responsible by finding them guilty in no way

misstates the jury’s duty.

       Additionally, Jarvis does not argue or show that this argument, even assuming that it was

improper, was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that a curative instruction would have cured any

potential prejudice. He argues only that there is a substantial likelihood that the alleged misconduct

led the jury to convict on an improper basis. We hold that a curative instruction would have cured

any potential prejudice because the superior court could have instructed the jury to disregard any

potential improper argument and re-instructed the jury that its purpose was to determine whether

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No. 56086-1-II

the State had met its burden to prove all the elements of the charged offenses. Thus, this claim of

prosecutorial misconduct is also waived.

                                IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POAA

       Finally, Jarvis argues that the POAA is (1) unconstitutional because it is administered in a

racially disproportionate manner, (2) categorically unconstitutional, and (3) unconstitutional

because it violates the proportionality doctrine.

       Because we reverse Jarvis’ sentences and remand for a full resentencing hearing, we

decline to address these issues because Jarvis can now raise these issues at the resentencing

hearing.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We hold that Jarvis has demonstrated that he was improperly shackled at his sentencing

hearing and that the State fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that this improper restraint

was harmless. Accordingly, we vacate Jarvis’ sentences and remand for resentencing at which he

can raise his POAA challenges. We otherwise affirm.

                                                         CRUSER, J.
 We concur:

LEE, J.

GLASGOW, C.J.

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