Court Opinion

ID: 9606514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:50:31.812527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:16.758639
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Defendants rely upon the affidavit of defendant Schulman which sets forth a summary of the underlying circumstance and actions taken to perfect service upon the defendant in plaintiff’s motor vehicle collision case. Defendant Schulman also gives his own expert opinion that “there are no grounds for a finding that I failed to exercise reasonable care in handling the plaintiff’s claim, or that I was negligent in filing the plaintiff’s complaint four days before the statute of limitations expired, and that my conduct at all times fell within the parameters of acceptable professional conduct applicable to attorneys practicing in Georgia and in the profession generally.”
“[I]n a legal malpractice case, the presumption is that the legal services were performed in an ordinarily skillful manner.” Hughes v. *426Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 349 (247 SE2d 107). In view of the presumption that the legal services were performed in an ordinarily skillful manner, together with the expert opinion of the defendant Schulman, plaintiff was required to produce in rebuttal an expert’s affidavit. Rose v. Rollins, 167 Ga. App. 469, 471 (2) (306 SE2d 724). However, in order for plaintiffs expert’s affidavit to be sufficient it must contain more than a mere naked conclusion but must provide some comparison between what was done and what should have been done. Loving v. Nash, 182 Ga. App. 253, 255 (1) (355 SE2d 448); Beauchamp v. Wallace, 180 Ga. App. 554 (349 SE2d 791); Bushey v. Atlanta Emergency Group, 179 Ga. App. 827 (348 SE2d 98).
In his affidavit, plaintiffs expert lists various documents which he has reviewed and deposes “that the Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in handling Plaintiffs claim in [the automobile collision case] and as a result of such failure Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed and it is my opinion that Defendants were negligent in waiting until some four days before the expiration of the statute of limitations expired to file Plaintiff’s complaint and were negligent in failing to exercise diligence in perfecting service.” Thus, plaintiffs expert’s affidavit failed to state the particulars necessary to establish the parameters of acceptable professional conduct, and is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the legal services were performed in an ordinarily skillful manner, and is not sufficient to carry the burden required of a plaintiff when a defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment. Loving v. Nash, 182 Ga. App. 253, 256, supra.
Additionally, the majority’s reliance upon our approval of the factual finding of the trial court in Elwell v. Haney, 169 Ga. App. 481 (313 SE2d 499) is misplaced. That case is not res judicata to the defendants in the case sub judice who were not parties to that action. Thus, the factual findings derived from conflicting evidence by the trial judge in the collision case, should not be deemed to be “equally established” in the case sub judice.
Nor is the case sub judice one involving “clear and palpable” negligence so as to obviate the plaintiffs need for expert opinion testimony. The instant case is not a case in which the defendant attorneys negligently failed to file the plaintiffs action before the applicable statute of limitation expired, such as referenced in a parenthetical example in Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 345, supra, and Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 172 Ga. App. 263 (322 SE2d 897).
For the above stated reasons, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge Banke and Judge Benham join in this dissent.
*427Decided December 2, 1987
Rehearing denied December 18, 1987
Kyle Yancey, for appellant.
E. Clayton Scofield III, A. Paul Cadenhead, for appellees.