Court Opinion

ID: 9720746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:40:42.317158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.969597
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting). On the record here presented, the paramount issue is whether, at time of execution of the 1959 will, testator intended the then existing 14 typewritten pages to be his will. As the majority opinion intimates, if it was testator’s intent to keep the instrument ambulatory in *563character, so that from time to time he could substitute pages for any except the last, which bore the signature of himself and witnesses, then this instrument would not qualify as his last will and testament because the requisite testamentary intent would be lacking. The crucial piece of evidence on this issue is testator’s letter of June 21, 1959, to Mrs. Burleigh forwarding for retyping the two pages on which he had made alterations. If this letter was written before testator and the witnesses affixed their signatures, it would carry great weight in establishing that testator had intended an ambulatory instrument.
The June 21st letter was written on Columbia University stationery. A reasonable inference is that he procured this stationery at the apartment of his friend, Professor Forcey, a member of the Columbia University faculty, and the host of the June 21st party given in honor of testator. However, Professor Forcey, who testified as a subscribing witness to the 1959 will, was asked no questions about furnishing stationery to testator or about whether he possessed any knowledge concerning the writing of the June 21st letter.
Forcey did testify that both Howard Kennedy Beale, Jr., and Henry Barton Beale were present with their father in the Forcey apartment at the June 21st party. Neither of these two sons of testator was called as a witness at the trial. The general rule is that failure of a party to call a material witness within his control, or whom it would be more natural for such party to call than the opposing party, raises an inference against such party. Feldstein v. Harrington (1958), 4 Wis. (2d) 380, 388, 90 N. W. (2d) 566; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), p. 162 et seq., secs. 285, 286. This rule is applicable in situations of family relationship, such as parent and child. Anno. 5 A. L. R. (2d) 893, 934. Thus, the failure to call either of these two sons as a witness raised an inference against the proponents of the 1959 will. However, the trial court’s memorandum opinion does not com*564ment upon the fact that these two older sons were not called to testify as to their knowledge with respect to the writing of the June 21st letter.
It may very well be that the guardians ad litem for all three sons interviewed the two older sons about the June 21st letter and found they possessed no knowledge or recollection with respect to their father’s writing it. However, this is a situation where the trial court might very well have drawn the opposite inference from that which it did. Additional testimony with respect to the June 21st letter might have tipped the scales the other way. This is very important considering the fact that a ten-year-old boy, who is a ward of the court, has been virtually disinherited by his father’s will.
Under these circumstances I would exercise our discretionary power under sec. 251.09, Stats., to reverse and remand for the purpose of taking the testimony of the two older boys with respect to the June 21st letter.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Dieterich joins in this dissenting opinion.
Hallows, J., also dissents.