Court Opinion

ID: 9391170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 14:07:08.088678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.911438
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-1426.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. Nos.      22CA011887
                                                                     22CA011890
        Appellee

        v.
                                                      APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ISAIAH HARRIS                                         ENTERED IN THE
                                                      COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
        Appellant                                     COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
                                                      CASE Nos. 08CR076357
                                                                 08CR075721
                                                                 08CR077230

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 1, 2023

        HENSAL, Judge.

        {¶1}     Isaiah Harris appeals an order of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas that

denied his petition for postconviction relief. This Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     In 2009, Mr. Harris was convicted of rape, aggravated burglary, intimidation,

domestic violence, and violating a protection order. The charges against him arose from three

incidents involving the same victim, and the cases were consolidated into a single bench trial. The

trial court sentenced him to 23 1/2 years in prison. Mr. Harris appealed, and this Court affirmed

his convictions. State v. Harris, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 09CA009605, 09CA009606, 09CA009607,

2010-Ohio-1081. On July 15, 2022, Mr. Harris petitioned the trial court for postconviction relief.

The trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing. Mr. Harris appealed, raising four

assignments of error for this Court’s review.
                                                 2

                                                 II.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED [MR.
       HARRIS’S] PETITION WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR
       [FINDINGS OF FACT] AND CONCLUSION[S] OF LAW.

       {¶3}    In his first assignment of error, Mr. Harris argues that the trial court erred by

dismissing his petition for postconviction relief without a hearing and by doing so without issuing

findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court does not agree.

       {¶4}    Revised Code Section 2953.21(A)(2)1 provides that a petition for postconviction

relief must be filed within 365 days of the date on which the transcript is filed in a direct appeal

or, if no direct appeal is taken, within 365 days of the expiration of the time for filing an appeal.

The transcript in Mr. Harris’s direct appeal was filed on September 28, 2009, but he filed his

petition on July 15, 2022, well after the deadline provided by Section 2953.21(A)(2) passed.

       {¶1}    “A petitioner * * * who files a petition more than 365 days after the trial transcript

was filed in the court of appeals in his direct appeal * * * must satisfy the jurisdictional

requirements in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) or (2) for an untimely, second, or successive petition for

postconviction relief.” State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 37, citing State v.

Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 20. See also State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d

358, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 22. A trial court may only entertain an untimely or successive petition

for postconviction relief when:

       Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from
       discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for

       1
         Mr. Harris filed his petition on July 15, 2022, so the versions of the postconviction
statutes effective on that date apply in this case. See State v. Stephens, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 27957, 2016-Ohio-4942, ¶ 6. See also State v. McManaway, 4th Dist. Hocking No.
16CA8, 2016-Ohio-7470, ¶ 11 (explaining that “the triggering event is the filing of the
postconviction petition, which determines the applicable version of the statute.”).
                                                  3

       relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21
       of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme
       Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in
       the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.

R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).2 A petitioner, other than one who challenges a sentence of death, must

also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence “that, but for constitutional error at trial, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner

was convicted[.]” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). When the requirements of Section 2953.23(A)(1) have

not been met, a trial court cannot consider an untimely or successive petition. See Apanovitch at

¶ 36. “[W]hether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely, second, or

successive petition for postconviction relief is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

Hatton at ¶ 38.

       {¶2}       In this case, Mr. Harris argues that his petition was timely filed because he was

unavoidably prevented from discovering evidence that forms the basis for his claims for relief

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, Mr. Harris maintains that a number

of police reports documenting occasions when the victim falsely alleged he had committed other

offenses against her were not disclosed by the State. Mr. Harris acknowledges that his defense

attorney had the reports by the time his trial commenced. Nonetheless, he argues that the State’s

failure to produce the evidence meets the standard articulated in Section 2953.23(A)(1)(a) under

Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783.

       {¶3}       In Bethel, the defendant claimed that an investigation report that had been

suppressed by the State indicated that someone else committed the offenses. Id. at ¶ 2. The

defendant moved leave to file a motion for a new trial and filed a successive petition for

       2
           The exception provided by Section 2953.23(A)(2) is not at issue in this case.
                                                 4

postconviction relief based on the alleged Brady violation. The trial court determined that it did

not have jurisdiction to consider the petition for postconviction relief, and the court of appeals

affirmed that decision. Id. at ¶ 15.

       {¶4}    The Supreme Court noted that in order to meet the standard articulated in Section

2953.23(A)(1)(a), “courts in Ohio have previously held that a defendant ordinarily must show that

he was unaware of the evidence he is relying on and that he could not have discovered the evidence

by exercising reasonable diligence.” Id. at ¶ 21. Observing that the court of appeals rejected the

defendant’s arguments because “[the defendant] should have conducted his own investigation to

discover” the existence of the information at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that the burden

placed upon the defendant by the lower courts “[was] inconsistent with Brady.” Id. at ¶ 23-24.

The Supreme Court rejected the requirement that a defendant exercise due diligence in Brady

cases, holding that “when a defendant seeks to assert a Brady claim in an untimely or successive

petition for postconviction relief, the defendant satisfies the ‘unavoidably prevented’ requirement

contained in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) by establishing that the prosecution suppressed the evidence

on which the defendant relies.” Id. at ¶ 25.

       {¶5}    Mr. Harris’s petition is distinguishable from the one at issue in Bethel, however,

because he acknowledges that he had all of the information upon which his petition relies at the

time of his trial. Although Bethel rejected application of a due-diligence standard under Section

2953.23(A)(1)(a), it did not excuse untimely petitions when the defendant is in possession of the

evidence in question. See Bethel at ¶ 21. Compare United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)

(noting that a Brady violation involves “the discovery, after trial[,] of information which had been

known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”).            Mr. Harris, therefore, did not

demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which his petition
                                                  5

relies. See R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). His petition for postconviction relief was, therefore, untimely.

See R.C. 2953.21(A)(2).

       {¶6}    Mr. Harris has also argued that the trial court erred by failing to issue findings of

fact and conclusions of law and by failing to conduct a hearing on his petition. Section 2953.21(H)

requires trial courts to “make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law” when they “do[ ]

not find grounds for granting relief[.]” When a trial court dismisses an untimely petition for

postconviction relief, however, findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required. State ex

rel. Ashipa v. Kubicki, 114 Ohio St.3d 459, 2007-Ohio-4564, ¶ 4. “This rule applies even when

the defendant * * * claims, under R.C. 2953.23, that he was unavoidably prevented from discovery

of the facts to present his claim for post-conviction relief.” Id. quoting State ex rel. Hach v. Summit

Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 102 Ohio St.3d 75, 2004-Ohio-1800, ¶ 9. Similarly, the trial court

was not required to conduct a hearing on the motion. See State v. Sparks, 9th Dist. Summit No.

27292, 2014-Ohio-5017, ¶ 10.

       {¶7}    The trial court did not err by dismissing Mr. Harris’s petition for postconviction

relief or by doing so without issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr. Harris’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

                         ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR II, III, AND IV

       PETITIONER’S     TRIAL   &   APPELLATE    COUNSELS    WERE
       CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE WHERE COUNSEL FAILED TO
       BRING PETITIONER AWARE OF: (2) THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE’S
       [SECTION] 2953.21 POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING; AND (3) THAT
       POST-CONVICTION WAS THE PROPER VEHICLE TO RAISE THE
       CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION(S) THAT WAS DEPENDENT ON
       MATERIAL WHICH EXISTED OUTSIDE THE RECORD [AND] (4) TRIAL
       COUNSEL DID NOT ADHERE TO CRIM. R. 16’S RECIPROCAL
       DISCOVERY CLAUSE.
                                                 6

       {¶8}    Mr. Harris’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error appear to argue that his

trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective.        Mr. Harris has not separately argued these

assignments of error, however, and “[this] Court may disregard [them]” on that basis. App.R.

12(A)(2). See also State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28982, 2019-Ohio-518, ¶ 3. To the

extent that Mr. Harris’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error allege error in connection

with the trial court’s order dismissing his petition, they are also moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

                                                III.

       {¶9}    Mr. Harris’s first assignment of error is overruled. His second, third, and fourth

assignments of error are moot. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
                                          7

      Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                              JENNIFER HENSAL
                                              FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ISAIAH HARRIS, pro se, Appellant.

J.D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.