Court Opinion

ID: 9723606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:22:56.591878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:50.377150
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 19. (dissenting). This is a case about stereotypes. It involves a group of patients civilly committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1999-2000).1 The question is whether the Department of Health and Family Services can place all patients in restraints *267when transporting them, or whether DHFS must consider individual circumstances before placing a patient in restraints for transport.
¶ 20. The question is one of statutory interpretation. It involves a statute, Wis. Stat. § 51.61 entitled "Patients rights." The statute begins: "[E]ach patient shall." What follows is a comprehensive list of requirements that DHFS must follow. Getting closer to the issue at hand, § 51.61(1)(i)l begins: "... have a right to be free from physical restraint and isolation except for emergency situations or when isolation or restraint is a part of a treatment program." Then comes a comprehensive list of requirements for DHFS to follow when using isolation or restraints.
¶ 21. One cannot help but notice the emphasis the legislature has put on the limited situations when restraints can be used: "Isolation or restraint may be used only when less restrictive measures are ineffective or not feasible and shall be used for the shortest time possible." Id.. And "Isolation or restraint may be used for emergency situations only when it is likely that the patient may physically harm himself or herself or others." Id. Other parts of the statute speak to the required use of physicians or psychologists to order the use of restraints.2
*268¶ 22. The statute then continues with exceptions to its policy limiting the use of restraints. There are really only two sentences that specifically speak to the case we decide today. One sentence reads: "Patients who have a recent history of physical aggression may be restrained during transport to or from the facility." Id. The only reasonable interpretation of this sentence is that DHFS is permitted to use restraints if a patient has a recent history of physical aggression. The second sentence reads: "Patients who are committed or transferred under s.51.35(3) or 51.37 or under ch. 971 or 975, or who are detained or committed under ch. 980, may be restrained for security reasons during transport to or from the facility."
¶ 23. Both sentences concern themselves with the use of restraints during transport. If we look at the first sentence alone, it seems obvious that DHFS must make an individual inquiry as to each ch. 980 patient it intends to transport to determine whether the patient has a recent history of physical aggression. The second sentence permits a patient to be restrained for security reasons during transport.
¶ 24. The majority's method of dealing with these two sentences is to ignore the first sentence because the second sentence doesn't require DHFS to consider individual reasons for restraints during transport. The majority holds that by doing this, it can conclude that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(i)l unambiguously permits DHFS to transport all patients in restraints without an inquiry into whether the restraints are needed.
¶ 25. Initially, one might ask: "Why not ignore the second sentence? It isn't any better or any worse *269than the first one." But ignoring any part of a statute is judicially frowned upon. "Moreover, in interpreting a statute, courts must attempt to give effect to every word of a statute, so as not to render any portion of the statute superfluous." Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶ 16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893. So, I would start with an intent to give meaning to both sentences. When confronted with a statutory inconsistency, a court's duty is to construe two statutes on the same subject matter in a manner as to harmonize these provisions in order to give each full force and effect. Ahrens v. Town of Fulton, 2002 WI 29, ¶ 28,251 Wis. 2d 135, 641 N.W.2d 423 (citation omitted).
¶ 26. First, of course, I must determine whether the two sentences, and therefore the statute, is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in more than one way or in more than one sense by reasonably well-informed persons. State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 94, ¶ 29, 245 Wis. 2d 310, 630 N.W.2d 164.3 The majority concludes that the two sentences, and therefore the statute, are not ambiguous. But the way the majority does this is to ignore the first sentence.
¶ 27. I don't think it's that easy. A sentence in a statute permitting restraint during transport only if a patient has a recent history of physical aggression is difficult for me to ignore when the question is whether *270DHFS can uniformly use restraints on all ch. 980 patients during transport. Initially, therefore, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(i)l is ambiguous because reasonably well-informed persons could interpret the statute in two ways, depending upon which of the two sentences the reasonably well-informed person focused on. At least, the statute is unclear.
¶ 28. It is also well understood what courts are to do when confronted with an ambiguous statute. If a statute is unclear or ambiguous, courts use extrinsic aids for guidance. Kaminski, 2001 WI 94 at ¶ 29. When reasonable minds could differ as to the meaning of a statute, the court examines the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose of the statute in question. Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 99, ¶ 17, 245 Wis. 2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662.
¶ 29. Any ambiguity disappears when considering the scope, subject matter and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 51.61 as a whole. This is a statute which, in lengthy detail, outlines "Patients rights." That is its title. Reading this lengthy statute, one cannot help but note that the Wisconsin legislature has gone to great lengths to protect civilly committed patients. The first sentence I have considered, which the majority concludes it can ignore, is very much consistent with the remaining parts of this lengthy statute, and consistent with the purpose of the statute — to grant real and extensive rights to individual patients confined in a hospital against their will. I cannot ignore a statute which permits restraint during transport only if the patient has a history of recent physical aggression.
¶ 30. But I must, if I can, harmonize the first sentence, and the balance of the statute with the last sentence in Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(i)l. I find this possible. The last sentence of the statute tells DHFS that it can *271restrain a patient during transport only for security reasons. This is an exception to the rights given patients earlier in the statute. Exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 411, 438 N.W.2d 589 (1989). It makes common sense in a statute granting patients' rights that restraints during transport are limited to what is an overriding concern —the safety and security of the patient and the persons transporting the patient. It seems irrational to me to recognize that restraints during transport would serve no rational purpose in an individual case, but to still require the restraints.
¶ 31. The first sentence tells us how DHFS is to determine when security requires transport restraints. The answer is clear: Only when the patient has shown a recent history of physical aggression. This too makes common sense. A docile patient whose history in the institution is one of compliance and flexibility is unlikely to threaten his security or that of his transporters.
¶ 32. DHFS has interpreted Wis. Stat. § 51.61 to require an individual assessment of a patient before placing him or her in restraints for transport.4 DHFS Policy No. 3-1-8-P provides: "In accordance with Wis. Stat. 51.61(l)(i), Patients may be restrained during transport to or from the facility. The least restrictive restraint necessary to protect the patient and others ° should be used."
¶ 33. The majority discounts this policy order by noting that Policy No. 3-1-8-P was promulgated before *272a recent amendment to Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(i)l. The statutory amendment, however, only added ch. 980 patients to a list of patients to whom the policy applied. DHFS did not repeal the policy after the statutory amendment. I conclude that DHFS's policy reflects the agency's interpretation of the statute, and that the majority should have deferred to this reasonable interpretation. Hillhaven Corp. v. DHFS, 2000 WI App 20, ¶ 12 n.6, 232 Wis. 2d 400, 606 N.W.2d 572.
¶ 34. The requirement of individual assessment of patients to determine whether they are transport risks fits perfectly with this harmonization of the two sentences in Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(i)l. The second sentence I have considered tells its readers that patients may be restrained for security reasons during transport. The first sentence explains what those security reasons are: A history of recent physical aggression. While the two sentences could have been written to more succinctly convey this meaning, that is not the test. In my view, it is not possible to read these two sentences as giving DHFS carie blanche to place transported patients in restraints for any reason or no reason.
¶ 35. It is always easier to stereotype individuals and ascribe perceived traits of the group to all the individuals in the group. "Irish need not apply" and "Women belong in the home" are stereotypes that once existed, permitting what we now see as irrational classifications. Government is prone to stereotyping because it is easy, it sets out a rule that all must follow, and it limits the discretion of individual decision makers. "Everyone is treated alike" is an easily defended policy. Transporting a comatose patient in full restraints is therefore defensible.
*273¶ 36. But as with more pernicious stereotypes, individuals can fit the stereotype but not exhibit the behavior ascribed to the group. It is only by examining the individual that one can determine his or her individual qualities or detriments. So, when a statute focused on protecting patients' rights extending over five pages in the Wisconsin Statutes must be interpreted, I do so in favor of an interpretation comporting with the intent of the statute as a whole, and not one which flies in the face of that intent by permitting DHFS to stereotype patients. That is the easy way out, but not the right one. That is why I respectfully dissent.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.

 The majority also finds Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(e) inapplicable, because it does not specifically apply to restraints during transportation. While the observation that § 51.61(l)(e) does not specifically apply to transport is of course correct, the majority does not recognize that courts are to consider all parts of a statute when harmonizing ambiguous parts of the statute. Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶ 16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893. Section 51.61(l)(e) is useful in determining the overall intent and scope of the statute. It is evidence that the legislature disfavored the use of restraints except when no other *268choice existed. In that respect, § 51.61(l)(e) applies to the issue we decide today. It gives ch. 980 patients the right to the least restrictive conditions necessary for their treatment.

 An alternative test leads to the same result. A statute is ambiguous if both parties argue that a "plain reading" of statutes supports their respective positions. Appointment of Interpreter in State v. Le, 184 Wis. 2d 860, 867, 517 N.W.2d 144 (1994). However, assigning different interpretations to the scope and meaning of a statutory exception does not lead to the same result. State ex rel. Girouard v. Jackson Circuit Ct., 155 Wis. 2d 148, 154-55, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990).

 The administrative interpretation of a statute is of great assistance in interpreting the meaning of a statute. Indeed, we are to defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute unless it is unreasonable. Theuer v. LIRC, 2001 WI 26, ¶ 14, 242 Wis. 2d 29, 624 N.W.2d 110.