Court Opinion

ID: 9710810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:18:03.478808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.041474
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MANNING, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s conviction in this case. My disagreement with the result stems from the admission into evidence of certain photographs which defendant contends, and I agree, are extremely prejudicial and outweigh any possible probative value. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs into evidence and publishing them to the jury. When evidence is received which is totally irrelevant to the issues before the court, we must cautiously determine the prejudicial effect of such evidence. While the majority readily acknowledges the immateriality of the photographs in question and the inflammatory nature thereof, and it concedes that the State’s star witness was in the position of an accomplice or codefendant, it then proceeds, nevertheless, to affirm the admission of the photographs by concluding that their admission does not require a reversal of defendant’s conviction, citing People v. Peterson (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 730, 736, 525 N.E.2d 946. It is my view that the admission of these photographs denied defendant due process. The crucial difference between this case and the Peterson case hinges on the Peterson court’s characterization of the evidence. It stated that "in the face of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, we cannot conclude that the admission of the photographs constituted reversible error.” (171 Ill. App. 3d at 737.) In the instant case, there is no overwhelming evidence. There is a major State witness whose status is that of an accomplice or codefendant. The photographs to which the defendant objected, as the majority so aptly points out, were both grisly and cumulative of the testimony presented by the State. However, there was no issue before the court contesting the nature or extent of injuries, nor was there any issue challenging the testimony of the pathologist or of any other witness. The majority further points out, as an example of the inflammatory nature of the photographs, the one photograph which depicted a gunshot wound to a victim’s penis, and indeed, questions how such a photograph explains the testimony describing the wound. Other examples of the inflammatory nature of the scenes depicted in the subject photographs include the front view of a torso of a person lying on the sidewalk, with his shirt raised up to disclose an apparent bullet hole under his left breast and what appears to be blood; the body of a person lying on the sidewalk, with a stream of what appears to be blood on the pavement originating from the head and flowing from the mouth and nose; a person, similar to the above described photograph, but in closer view, from just below the waist up, showing graphically what appears to be a river of blood on the pavement streaming from the face and mouth; a head only view showing what appears to be severe scalp injuries, and what appears to be blood all over the ear and scalp, and coming from the mouth and nose as well; a photograph of what appears to be a staged scene of the victim’s pelvic/pubic area, with the shirt raised and the pants pulled down, with what appears to be a rubber-gloved hand holding up the victim’s injured penis, which appears to have sustained a slash/tear injury, against a backdrop of a white object which has the effect of more graphically depicting the injury, and showing apparent blood around the pelvic/pubic area; and finally, another scene which appears to be staged, depicting rubber-gloved hands holding down the victim’s pants to reveal what appears to be a bullet hole in the lower torso area, in the area of the belt-band on the pants. Many of these photographs appear to be staged, totally irrelevant to any issues before the court and, because of their grisly nature, inflammatory and prejudicial. The State contends that the defendant has waived any objections since he did not specify each and every instance of alleged error. I agree with the majority that, in the interest of justice, this issue must be addressed, given the circumstances of this appeal. While the decision to allow a jury to view photographs of a decedent rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge (People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 319, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 1263), I would hold that the trial court abused such discretion in the case at bar as the photographs are extremely prejudicial and inflammatory and outweigh their probative value. (See, e.g., People v. Lefler (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 216, 221, 230 N.E.2d 827.) Additionally, this case does not present overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial.