Court Opinion

ID: 9673828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:19:09.105753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.339721
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
SMITH, Justice.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. This is not a “one man-one vote case, nor is there any constitutional requirement for equality in commissioners precincts. Article V, Section 181 of the Texas Constitution governs the organization of commissioners precincts. It is well settled by Texas cases that the phrase “for the convenience of the people” in said Article, confers on commissioners courts the discretion to divide precincts in some physically convenient way, and that there is no requirement for equality of population, and no duty to provide precincts which are equal in population. This is an “abuse of discretion case,” the only question before this Court being whether a single private citizen, as here, has a vested right and cause of action to revise and review a commissioners court precinct order to achieve equality in population. The trial court in its judgment, made several findings of fact, as the Court has indicated, but the decretal portion of the judgment only relates to the finding in regard to population disparity. The judgment directs the commissioners court to use equal distribution of population as the dominant factor in redistricting the County. The judgment rendered by this Court is meaningless. If the Court remands the cause generally for a new trial, citizen Avery has accomplished nothing. On the other hand, if the judgment of the trial court striking down the commissioners court order is upheld, still nothing has been accomplished, except to create additional chaos and confusion. This is true, because Avery, as a single individual and private citizen, has no right or standing in court to question the way the government is run or organized, including the location of commissioners precinct boundaries in Midland County Texas, unless and until he can show some personal loss, damage or harm to his private interests resulting from the governmental operation. See Meredith v. Sharp, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 870 (1953, writ refused, no reversible error) with Per Curiam opinion, 152 Tex. 437, 259 S.W.2d 172. This case was one wherein mandamus was sought to require a commissioners court to create the office of Justice of the Peace, Place No. 2 of Justice of the Peace, *430Precinct One of Gregg County, Texas. I think the Court would have made the same holding had the cause been before the appellate courts on appeal.
The Court upheld the judgment of the trial court that Article V, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution “confides in the Commissioners’ Court the authority to create a justice of the peace court as here sought; that the convenience of the people is the basic purpose for designating such an additional justice court; and that the creation of such additional justice of the peace court is a discretionary act of the Commissioners’ Court and not a ministerial function of such court.” [Emphasis added.] The Court then said:
“We cannot escape the import of the use of the term ‘for the convenience of the people’ in Sec. 18, supra; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 23. The latitude so granted the Commissioners’ Court to create not less than four and not more than eight such precincts, and the power to change the boundaries of such precincts from time to time emphasizes the intent to vest discretionary powers in the Commissioners’ Court in determining whether or not the creation of such additional court would be for the convenience of the people, that is suitable, appropriate or advisable to meet the needs of the people. This discretionary power on the part of the Commissioners’ Court is fully recognized in Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, by our Supreme Court, which involved an affirmative act of the Commissioners’ Court in creating such an additional Justice Court, and in the holdings in Lewis v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 48 S.W.2d 730, and Ward v. Bond, Tex.Civ.App., 10 S.W.2d 590, 594, which dealt with the discretionary powers of a Commissioners’ Court as related to the latter clause of Sec. 18, supra, in altering a Commissioners’ Precinct.
“ ‘Mandamus will not lie to control or review the action of an official or board upon matters involving the exercise of discretion or judgment confided to such official or board.’ Lewis v. Harris, supra, 48 S.W.2d at page 732 ; 28 T. J. (Mandamus), Sec. 33.”
This holding in regard to discretionary power to create justice courts is equally applicable to this case where the commissioners court has exercised its discretion in changing its boundary lines.
If it can be said that the judgment of the trial court is based upon a finding of abuse of discretion and that Avery has a justiciable interest, I nevertheless maintain that the trial court confined its holding to require a redistricting of Midland County into commissioners precincts upon the basis of population alone.
Avery is in no position to individually attack or set aside the order creating Midland County commissioners precincts because of a disparity in the population of the several precincts in the absence of a showing of some damage, harm, inconvenience, or financial loss to himself personally. This he has failed to do. There being no duty to provide Avery with equally populated commissioners precincts, no legal wrong has been done to him by refusal to divide in that way; there has been no invasion of his personal rights by including him in a commissioners precinct with a population larger than the other precincts.
Avery attempts to also bring this suit in terms of a class action. In this attempt he completely fails. In his petition he states his capacity as follows:
“Plaintiff files this petition on behalf of himself and other persons similarly situated in the City of Midland, Precinct No. 1, Midland County, Texas, and states that he is a resident, taxpayer, and legally qualified voter and elector of the City of Midland, Precinct No. 1, Midland County, Texas, and that, as such, he is legally qualified to vote for municipal, precinct and county offices in Midland County, Texas.”
*431The right which he sought was as follows:
“The Plaintiff has a right and interest to see that his civil rights and liberties and in particular his right and interest in an equitable apportionment of voting power for members of the Commissioners Court are protected in accordance with the terms of the Texas Constitution and Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
The pleadings in this case upon which Avery went to trial are completely void of allegations which would qualify as a class action. The petition fails to comply with any of the provisions of Rule 42,2 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Only a quick glance at the rule is required to conclude that Avery does not seek to qualify under subdivision (1) of the rule, because the rights which he seeks to enforce are his rights and liberties and his right to equitable voting power. Such right is not joint or secondary and on its face could not be the proper subject of a class action under subdivision (1) of the rule. Subdivision 2 is out, because there is no specific property involved in this action. Avery’s petition fails to qualify him as representing a class, in that it fails to state that there are persons constituting a class. The petition on which he went to trial does not allege that there are other persons having a common interest with Avery in an adjudication of a common question of fact or law. In fact, the record shows that public officials and many others who publicly refused to support Avery, were all citizens of Midland. The evidence and the proceedings fail to show any support of Avery’s position from the City of Midland or the residents of the City as a group. The petition does not describe any identifiable class of persons nor state or show that they are so numerous as to make their j oin-der in the suit impracticable. There is nothing in the petition to show that there are others “smilarly situated.” The pleadings are lacking and Avery produced no evidence to warrant a valid class judgment. See Schenker v. City of San Antonio, Tex.Civ.App., 369 S.W.2d 626 (wr. ref., n. r. e. 1963).
Since the subject matter of Avery’s complaints in this Court is the disparity of population, and since that subject is a matter of public not private concern, and since Avery did not properly allege or prove a class action in the trial court, so as to represent the public, the result is that he never reaches or gets to the question of substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, or his asserted claims to alternative 3 relief.
*432Avery has no standing in this Court to complain of the action of the Court of Civil Appeals on his substantial evidence and alternative relief claims. I would dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction. In no event does the Constitution of the United States or the Texas Constitution require that Midland County he divided into four equally populated precincts. The Court’s view, if finally adopted, will lead to great *433confusion and uncertainty not only in Midland County, but in every county in Texas with citizens who have a desire to substitute their judgment for that of the commissioners courts. It seems to me that this is not the proper case in which to extend the doctrine of the one man-one vote rule to the governing bodies of local governments such as commissioners courts. Perhaps, in a proper case, the federal courts will in the future take jurisdiction under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but I cannot imagine a situation, much less the one presented in this case, where the Texas Constitution or the case law would warrant a holding that there must be equality of population in Commissioners precincts.

. “Sec. 18. Each organized county in the State now or hereafter existing, shall be divided from time to time, for the convenience of the people, into precincts, not less than four and not more than eight. Divisions shall be made by the Commissioners Court provided for by this Constitution. In each such precinct there shall be elected one Justice of the Peace and one Constable, each of whom shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified; provided that in any precinct in which there may be a city of 8,000 or more inhabitants, there shall be elected two Justices of the Peace. Each county shall in like manner be divided into four commissioners precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shaE exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed. As amended Nov. 2,1964.”

. “(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, in behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
“(1) joint, or common or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
“(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
“(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
“(b) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed nor compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court requires it. Amended by order of September 20, 1941, effective December 31, 1941.”

. The prayer, reflecting the relief sought, reads as follows:
“Wherefore, premises considered, Plaintiff prays that Defendants be cited to appear herein and that upon final hearing Plaintiff have judgment as follows:
“(a) That the Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, and Osborne, consti*432tuting a majority of the members of the Commissioners’ Court of Midland County, Texas, acted arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably, unfairly and wrongfully and in abuse of their discretion in passing and approving the Order of August 31, 1963, dividing Midland County into Commissioners’ Precincts and that said Order, and all prior Orders dividing said county into Commissioners’ Precincts, be set aside and that said Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, Osborne and Culver, as members of the Commissioners’ Court, be directed to pass a new Order dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts for the convenience of the people.
“(b) In the alternative, that the Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, and Osborne, constituting a majority of the members of said Commissioners’ Court, acted arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably, unfairly and wrongfully and in abuse of their discretion in passing and approving the Order of August 31, 1963, dividing Midland County into Commissioners’ Precincts and that said Order, and all prior Orders dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts, be set aside and that said Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, Osborne and Culver, as members of the Commissioners’ Court, be directed to pass a new Order dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts for the convenience of the people, giving proper consideration to equality of population, qualified voters, land area, tax values, miles of County roads, and other pertinent things among said Commissioners’ Precincts.
“(c) In the alternative, that the Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland and Osborne, constituting a majority of the members of the Commissioners’ Court of Midland County, Texas, acted arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably, unfairly, and wrongfully and in gross abuse of their discretion in passing said Order and that it and all prior Orders dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts be set aside and that writ of mandamus issue compelling the Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, Osborne and Culver, as members of the Commissioners’ Court, to pass a new Order dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts for the convenience of the people and in so doing to establish, as nearly as possible and practicable, such Precincts so that each will have substantially the same number of people, qualified voters, square miles, and other pertinent things.
“(d) In the alternative, that the Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, and Osborne, constituting the members of the Commissioners’ Court of Midland County, Texas, acted arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably, unfairly and wrongfully and in abui.e of their discretion in passing said Order and that it and all prior Orders dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts be set aside and that writ of mandatory injunction issue restraining and enjoining the Defendants Gideon, Bryant, Moreland, Osborne and Culver, as members of the Commissioners’ Court from continuing said Order in effect or calling or conducting any election thereunder and directing said Defendants to pass a new Order dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts for the convenience of the people and in so doing to establish, as nearly as possible and practicable, such Precincts so that each will have substantially the same number of people, qualified voters, square miles, and other pertinent things.
“(e) In the alternative, that the Order of said Defendants on August 31, 1963, dividing Midland County into Commissioners’ Precincts was and is repugnant to and in conflict with one or more of the following: The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, and 19, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, for the reason that it deprives Plaintiff and others similarly situated of their constitutional rights, privileges, liberties, and guarantees, and that it and all prior Orders dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts be set aside and that said Defendants, as members of the Commissioners’ Court be directed to pass a new Order dividing said County into Commissioners’ Precincts for the convenience of the people and in so doing to establish, as nearly as practicable and possible, such Precincts so that each will have substantially the same number of people and qualified voters.”