Court Opinion

ID: 9884964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:26:19.692662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:42.870589
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial. The majority states, correctly, that the denial of defendant’s motion for severance was error but holds it harmless for the reasons that defendant had confessed to the crime and the testimony of three witnesses proved his presence at the scene. With respect to the confession, the record shows that the trial court, in my opinion erroneously, foreclosed cross-examination which bore directly on the voluntariness of the confession and which affected its credibility, and which might have demonstrated prejudice on the part of the police officer who testified concerning defendant’s oral admissions of guilt. Officer Fitzgerald had testified on direct examination to an oral confession made by defendant in which he admitted that he and his co-defendant, Wilson, had gone to the deceased’s store to rob him, that when Wilson announced that it was a “stickup” the deceased started to throw shoes and Wilson shot him. The record reflects that during the cross-examination of Fitzgerald the following ensued: “Q. Now, do you know how many members of the family there are, of the deceased? A. Do I know how many members — would you repeat that? Q. Do you know who the members of the deceased’s immediate family are? A. Not all of them, sir, no. Q. Well, do you know who his sons are and daughters were, if any? MR. WOLFF: Object, I don’t understand the relevancy. THE COURT: Objection sustained. I don’t see the relevancy. MR. FOWLKES: Well- MR. WOLFF: Object to any statements. MR. FOWLKES: If your Honor will permit me I’ll connect it up. MR. SCHREIER: May we go in chambers? THE COURT: We’ll go in chambers. I don’t see any relation at this time. (The following proceedings were had outside the presence and hearing of the jury.) MR. FOWLKES: The relation is, your Honor— * * * MR. FOWLKES: The question is this: One of the deceased’s sons is a police officer— MR. GERBER: So what? Why bring it up? MR. FOWLKES: And my client tells me that Fitzgerald told him that if he didn’t give them information that they wanted that this person was going to blow his brains out and they were going to take him to where he lives to blow his brains out. MR. SCHREIBER: Well, this has already been denied on a pretrial motion, secondly, your Honor, the only way that this could be properly brought forward would be if the defendant took the stand and introduced his own testimony that that is the reason, that that is why he confessed. THE COURT: That is the only way. I will still sustain the objection.” In approving the trial court’s ruling the majority says: “Unless the question is followed by evidence of the threats, as in the case of impeachment, the interrogation merely creates an innuendo unsupported by evidence. This court' has condemned this manner of interrogation by the prosecutor when the insinuations thereby made are not supported by the proof. (People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill.2d 375, 393; People v. Black, 317 Ill. 603, 617.) Again, we must apply the same standard to the defendant’s cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses. Whether the claimed purpose of the proposed interrogation was impeachment or showing the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, the questions which defendant sought to ask would not have furthered the purpose. The witness had previously denied the making of the threats and the defendant was aware of this denial. The leading questions were to be asked for the purpose of creating in the minds of the jury an unjustified inference. The objection to this line of questioning was properly sustained.” In my opinion, the trial court and the majority are in error and the ruling was erroneous for two reasons. First, the defendant had the right to ascertain whether the fact that the deceased was the father of a colleague might cause the witness to be prejudiced and was entitled to have the jury apprised of that fact so it could be considered in weighing the credibility of the officer’s testimony. (People v. Savage, 325 Ill. 313, 319.) Secondly, the defendant was entitled to lay a foundation for impeachment of the officer’s testimony. Neither the court nor counsel was possessed of the degree of prescience essential to know that the cross-examination would not elicit testimony upon which the witness could be impeached. The authorities cited by the majority are not in point since the factual situations were so different from that here presented and for the obvious reason that in none of the cases were the people required to waive one constitutional right to exercise another. I cannot agree with the majority that McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 28 L. Ed. 2d 711, 91 S. Ct. 1454, is supportive of its position, and assuming, arguendo, that as stated in the majority opinion, the language of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 88 S. Ct. 967, “was substantially narrowed in scope,” a careful reading of the opinions shows no recession from the holding of Simmons that a defendant cannot be forced to sacrifice one constitutional right in order to exercise another, and I find no authority anywhere to support the proposition that a defendant in a criminal case must, during the presentation of the People’s case, waive his fifth-amendment right not to testify in order to exercise his sixth-amendment right of confrontation of the witnesses. With respect to the second ground for holding the Bruton error (Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620) to be harmless, the majority states that “In view of the confession and the identification by the three girls the jury ‘would not have found the State’s case significantly less persuasive had [Wilson’s testimony] been excluded.’ ” In so doing it notes that the procedure during the lineup in which the three girls identified defendant was “questionable” and that “The identification by each witness in the presence of the others was suggestive.” The record shows that the lineup procedure, in fact, was so suggestive as to raise a serious question as to the reliability of the identifications based upon observation of the man who fled the scene of the crime. If the lineup and identification questions presented the only error in this case they could perhaps withstand the test of People v. Fox, 48 Ill.2d 239, but the combination of the improper limitation of cross-examination, the Bruton error and the lineup procedures prejudiced defendant to the extent that he did not receive a fair trial. Finally, I disagree with the majority that a sentence is not to be modified on appeal unless the trial court, in imposing it, abused its discretion. Judicial discretion is abused “ ‘when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.’ [Citation.] ” Peek v. United States (9th cir.), 321 F.2d 934, 942.) Neither the statutory provision which originally authorized reduction of sentences nor our Rule 615 (50 Ill.2d R. 615) requires that there be an abuse of discretion shown as a prerequisite to the exercise of the power, and a reviewing court should review the propriety of the sentence in the same manner as other errors. MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER joins in this dissent.