Court Opinion

ID: 9674210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:24:50.783242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:26.098378
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 61. In the course of explaining why Wisconsin should follow federal law, the writer of the opinion observed that "there is presently no Wisconsin case law governing predatory pricing claims under § 133.03(2)." Id., ¶ 16. "The dearth of state antitrust precedent is not surprising because the scope of Chapter 133 is limited to intrastate transactions. See Reese v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 526, 532, 173 N.W.2d 661 (1970)." Id.
¶ 62. Two years later, the same writer was forced to withdraw the phrase "the scope of Chapter 133 is limited to intrastate transactions" because the court unanimously upheld the application of Wisconsin's Little Sherman Act to interstate commerce in some circumstances. Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, ¶¶ 13, 74, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 700 N.W.2d 139.
¶ 63. Having opened the door to interstate antitrust enforcement in some circumstances, the court *329thought it ought to comment briefly on what those "circumstances" were, even though that question had not been briefed.
¶ 64. Early in the opinion, the court quoted Professor Herbert Hovenkamp to the effect that "a state antitrust law of general application can virtually always be applied to a practice having sufficient effects within the state." Id., ¶ 14 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Then we added, "State law is precluded from regulating interstate commerce only if it 'unduly burden[s]' interstate commerce." Id. (citing Von Kali-nowski, Antitrust Laws & Trade Regulation § 100.03 (2d. ed. 2004)).
¶ 65. At the end of the opinion, the court said:
A civil plaintiff filing an action under Wisconsin's antitrust act must allege that (1) actionable conduct, such as the formation of a combination or conspiracy, occurred within this state, even if its effects are felt primarily outside Wisconsin; or (2) the conduct complained of "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state, even if the illegal activity resulting in those impacts occurred predominantly or exclusively outside this state. [State v.] Allied Chemical [& Dye Corp.], 9 Wis. 2d [290,] 295[, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960)]. Operating with lesser standards would jeopardize the action, undermine the validity of our antitrust statute, and create the spectacle of Lilliputian harassment in Wisconsin courts. Questions of provincialism, favoritism, and undue burden on interstate commerce should be determined by resort to contemporary federal commerce clause jurisprudence.
To say more is beyond the scope of this opinion.
Id., ¶ 85.
¶ 66. Four things should be noted about this paragraph. First, the words "substantially affects" were •borrowed from Allied Chemical. Second, the words *330"substantially affects" imply a higher standard than "sufficient effects," quoted earlier in the opinion. Third, the second point is underscored by the following sentence: "Operating with lesser standards would jeopardize the action, undermine the validity of our antitrust statute, and create the spectacle of Lilliputian harassment in Wisconsin courts." Fourth, the paragraph requires "impacts in this state."
¶ 67. In interpreting the phrase "jeopardize the action," it should be remembered that the court had recently considered two cases exploring the reach of Wisconsin jurisdiction. See State v. Derek Anderson, 2005 WI 54, 280 Wis. 2d 104, 695 N.W.2d 731; and Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R., 2003 WI 61, 262 Wis. 2d 217, 663 N.W.2d 734. The court did not want to encourage litigation that exceeded the jurisdiction of the state. As for the phrase "undermine the validity of our antitrust statute," Olstad discussed such issues as federal preemption and burden on interstate commerce in the opinion, and that context gives the phrase meaning. "Lilliputian harassment" conveys the image of a commercial Gulliver tied down by a multitude of antitrust litigants across the country.
¶ 68. Olstad speaks of "actionable conduct, such as the formation of a combination or conspiracy. .. within this state." Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85. Surely, our statute is most potent when "actionable conduct" is formed within this jurisdiction. Conversely, when "illegal activity" occurs predominantly or exclusively outside this jurisdiction but has impacts in Wisconsin, the impacts in Wisconsin ought to be more substantial than what is "sufficient" for a purely Wisconsin "combination or conspiracy." Olstad did not intend to convert every *331antitrust violation anywhere into a violation of Wisconsin law simply because the violation affected some people in Wisconsin.
¶ 69. Because I am unable to discern from the discussion in the majority opinion any meaningful limitation on antitrust suits against illegal activities outside this state, I respectfully dissent.