Court Opinion

ID: 9695517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:38.388837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.456304
License: Public Domain

ORIE MELVIN, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
¶ 11 concur in the Majority’s disposition of the excited utterance and Kloiber charge issues. However, I disagree this Court should address the weight of the evidence issue when it was never properly addressed by the trial court in post-trial motions or in an opinion. Accordingly, because the Majority is espousing a new rule of law for appellate review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 I believe the trial court should first make a determination of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177 (1994), our Supreme Court defined the boundaries of the appellate court and trial court functions in reviewing weight of the evidence claims:
An appellate court by its nature stands on a different plane than that of a trial court. Whereas a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial is aided by an on-the-scene evaluation of the evidence, an appellate court’s review rests solely upon a cold record. Because of this disparity in vantage points an appellate court is not empowered to merely substitute its opinion concerning the weight of the evidence for that of the trial judge. Rather our court has consistently held that appellate review of the trial court’s grant of a new trial is to focus on whether the trial judge has palpably abused his discretion, as opposed to whether the appellate court can find support in the record for the verdict.
Brown, 538 Pa. at 436, 648 A.2d at 1190 (emphasis added). Therefore, when the trial court has not provided any analysis regarding a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court has generally remanded the case for an explicit trial court determination. See Commonwealth v. Ragan, 439 Pa.Super. 337, 653 A.2d 1286 (1995) (holding where appellant challenged the weight of the evidence but the trial court did not address the issue, we could not take silence as an implicit denial of the claims but were required to remand for proper consideration); See also Commonwealth v. Perez, 444 Pa.Super. 570, 664 A.2d 582 (1995) (holding remand necessary where trial court did not address whether counsel was ineffective for failing to raise weight of the evidence claim).
¶ 3 In the present case, I recognize the trial court judge would not be able to address the weight of the evidence claim upon remand because he is no longer a sitting judge. See Armbruster v. Horowitz, 744 A.2d 285 (Pa.Super.1999) (Del Sole, J.) (Grillo, P.J.E. dissenting), appeal granted, 563 Pa. 625, 758 A.2d 659, 2000 Pa. Lexis 1065 (April 28, 2000) (holding appellate review of weight of evidence claim proper where remand impractical now that the trial judge was no longer sitting in the Court of Common Pleas). However, in light of the Supreme Court’s grant of allowance of appeal in Armbrus-ter, and our limited scope of appellate review of these matters as delineated in Brown, I believe this case should be remanded to allow another sitting judge on *79the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to address the weight of the evidence claim.
¶ 4 Moreover, the Majority’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Cannon, 387 Pa.Super. 12, 563 A.2d 918 (1989), appeal denied sub nom, Commonwealth v. Reap, 525 Pa. 597, 575 A.2d 564 (1990), as support for reviewing the weight of the evidence claim is misplaced. In Cannon, the judge who presided over the trial and heard oral argument on post-trial motions was relieved of his duties before ruling on the motions. Another trial court judge then reviewed the transcripts and entered an order disposing of the motions. In finding this procedure was proper this Court stated:
The court is a tribunal or judicial agency of government that is separate from the individuals who compose it; it is a continuing body that survives the death of its members. An order entered by a judge other than the one who heard the case is not thereby rendered void. The death, disqualification or absence of a judge will not deprive the surviving or remaining judges of authority to hold court and transact the business of the court and in fact to exercise all functions pertaining to the particular court.
Id. at 923-924 (citations omitted).
¶ 5 Contrary to the Majority, I am unable to conclude Cannon authorizes this Court to address the Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. Instead, I believe Cannon gives credence to the proposition that in the event a presiding judge is no longer available, another sitting judge on the Court of Common Pleas of that county may be assigned to conduct certain outstanding matters pending before the court. See Bonavitacola v. Cluver, 422 Pa.Super. 556, 619 A.2d 1363, 1366, 1368, fn. 2. (1993), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 652, 634 A.2d 216 (1993), (overruled on other grounds by Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Construction Corp., 441 Pa.Super. 281, 657 A.2d 511 (1995) (en banc )) (where judge who presided over trial had left the bench prior to drafting an opinion addressing his order denying post-trial motions, another judge was authorized to draft opinion in support of order in light of fact the case was tried before a jury, so presiding judge had made no credibility determinations or factual findings); See also Commonwealth v. Zietz, 364 Pa. 294, 72 A.2d 282 (1950) (stating “[wjhen a judge before whom an action was tried is disabled, resigns or dies, a motion for a new trial may be made to, and determined by another judge of the same court or a special judge designated to act”).
¶ 6 The Majority has failed to cite to any authority supporting its contention that absent a determination by the trial court, an appellate court may review a weight of the evidence claim for the first time on appeal. Because I do not favor an appellate court substituting its judgment for that of the trial court in these matters, I respectfully dissent.