Court Opinion

ID: 9847695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:05:26.09224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:27.475853
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Clark
specially concurring.
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Court, but I would add thereto a specific holding that the statutes therein under consideration are not in violation of “due process” nor of any other right assured a defendant in criminal prosecution by any constitutional provisions of this State or of the United States. Notwithstanding my adherence to the belief that the 1951 Act, unless amended, doubtless will lead to confusion and uncertainty in *368the trial of criminal cases and result in the commission of numerous and grievous errors in many thereof, yet I am convinced that the order of trial which the legislature has seen fit to prescribe is a matter limited to procedure only and does not involve any basic right under constitutional protection.
I first make reference to a general rule that “Every statute, duly passed, must be declared constitutional unless the contrary appear beyond reasonable doubt.” Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 547, 218 P. (2d) 498.
The 1951 Act was borrowed from the state of California and is substantially identical with the procedural statutes in that respect of that state. For over twenty years the courts of the jurisdiction of California have labored diligently in an effort to stabilize the procedure under the California statute, the decisions pertaining to which disclose wide diversity of opinion and illustrate the difficulty of administering the Act in the manner proposed by our present legislation. It is a fact, however, that during the course of this extensive litigation in California the constitutionality of the Act has been determined by the Supreme Court of that state and in at least three instances efforts to secure a different interpretation thereof by the United States Supreme Court have proven futile. In the case of People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767, it would appear that every possible constitutional question was raised in the California court and determined adversely to the defendant. Appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court and dismissed “for the want of a substantial federal question.” 280 U.S. 524, 74 L. Ed. 592, 50 S. Ct. 87. Constitutional questions were again raised in People v. Coleman, 20 Cal. (2d) 399, 126 P. (2d) 349, appeal of which to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed “for want of a substantial federal question.” citing Troche v. People, supra. 317 U.S. 596, 57 L. Ed. 487, 63 S. Ct. 162. In People v. Wells, 33 Cal. (2d) 330, 202 P. (2d) 53, practically all of the *369previous attacks made against the statute in California were reiterated and again reviewed by the supreme court of that state. Appeal therefrom was attempted to the United States Supreme Court and ceriorari denied. 338 U.S. 836, 94 L. Ed. 510, 70 S. Ct. 43.
In our own jurisdiction the statute in effect immediately preceding the enactment and adoption of the 1951 Act provided that the issue of insanity could be raised in a criminal proceeding only by special affirmative plea. Following attack similar to that made in the instant case, its constitutionality has been confirmed by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 523, 22 P. (2d) 1109, the court said that: “The substance of the defendant’s right to a jury trial on the question of insanity has been preserved; the procedure only has been changed. The constitutional provision concerning the inviolability of jury trials does not prohibit the Legislature from changing the method of raising the question of insanity. Nor does the requirement that in order to raise the question of insanity, the defendant must plead it in the specified manner, offend against the due process clause of the Constitution.” citing cases.
I furthermore would respectfully call attention to the fact that the quotation from the Ingles case, supra, contained in the opinion of the Court to the effect that evidence of insanity may be introduced for the purpose of “reducing the grade of the crime from murder of the first degree to murder of the second degree,” may not presently be ¡accepted as the rule of law in this jurisdiction because of its qualification and modification in Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 593, 199 P. (2d) 897, quoted with approval and adhered to in Berger v. People, 122 Colo. 367, 385, 386, 224 P. (2d) 228. In the Battalino case, supra, it was held “thiat the basis of admissibility of evidence as to insanity on the issue of the degree of homicide is not dependent upon its relevancy to insanity as such, but rather on its relevancy to wilful*370ness and deliberation in the killing.” We departed from the minority rule that partial insanity may be a mitigating element in determining the degree of crime, and adopted in the Battalino case, the majority rule that “a claim of insanity cannot be used for the purpose of reducing a crime of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree or from murder to manslaughter. If the perpetrator is responsible at all in this respect, he is responsible in the same degree as a sane man; and if he is not responsible at all, he is entitled to acquittal in both degrees.” Evidence of insanity before and at the time of the commission of the alleged offense may not be introduced for the express purpose of reducing the degree of the crime, but testimony relating to the condition of mind is always admissible on the issues of intent, deliberation and premeditation. Insanity, as such, is in itself an element of crime and becomes pertinent in a criminal proceeding only when interjected by special pleas. Where proven, the accused cannot be convicted of any crime, for the reason that he is unaccountable for his actions. There doubtless are borderline cases where a criminal might be said to be legally sane and yet his mental faculties so impaired as to prevent that degree of premeditation and deliberation which would subject him to conviction of first degree murder, but in no wise can this situation be said to be in “mitigation,” notwithstanding that the effect would be to lessen the degree of the crime.