Court Opinion

ID: 9534264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:05.414244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:05.270049
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA delivered the opinion of the court: Thome has filed a petition for rehearing. Of the points raised in his petition, only the question regarding the admissibility of the unsigned exclusive listing agreements merits further comment.  The trial court refused to admit the documents into evidence on the grounds that they were “self-serving,” although inadmissibility of such documents is actually based on the hearsay rule. (McCormick, Evidence §290, at 688 (2d ed. 1972).) Thorne has cited no authority that would allow the admission of unsigned contracts as evidence of the terms of an oral agreement. In an analogous case, Owen v. Pret’ A Porter Boutique, Inc. (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 438, 302 N.E.2d 672, the court held that it was error to admit into evidence a written lease signed only by the plaintiff where the original lease had expired and plaintiff sought to establish that the lease had been extended. The court reasoned that the purported lease was merely a memorandum relating to the terms of an oral contract and was not admissible because it had not been prepared and signed in defendant’s presence. In the instant case, Thome prepared the exclusives and brought them first to O’Donnell and then to Elmore. They were never signed. Therefore, they were not admissible to establish the terms of the oral agreement but could be used only to refresh the recollection of a witness. (Owen v. Pret’ A Porter Boutique, Inc.; Juilliard v. Friedman (1912), 174 Ill. App. 259.) Thorne’s recollection obviously needed no assistance, for he testified as to the terms of the alleged oral agreement. However, that testimony was admitted only as to Elmore and, as we stated in our original opinion, the actions of Muncaster and Royal do not support Thome’s contention that there was an implied agreement for an exclusive listing arrangement. With regard to Elmore, all of the previous negotiations as well as the signed memorandum of December 11, 1973, were merged in the contract of December 22,1973. That contract contained no provision that Elmore would pay Thome’s commission for the sale of the Muncaster and Royal properties. The terms cannot be altered by Thorne’s testimony (20 East Cedar Condominium Association v. Luster (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 532, 349 N.E.2d 586; Mertke v. Kracik (1969), 122 Ill. App. 2d 347, 259 N.E.2d 328), and we can find no other evidence to support the contention that Elmore had orally or impliedly agreed to pay Thome’s commission for the sale of O’Donnell’s Muncaster and Royal properties. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied. SULLIVAN, P. J., and WILSON, J., concur.