Court Opinion

ID: 9900771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 15:00:46.567463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:17.712730
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11993    Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/20/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11993
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        BARRY WAYNE HOOVER,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00046-CEH-TGW-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11993      Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/20/2023     Page: 2 of 11

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11993

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Barry Hoover was indicted and found guilty of theft of
        government funds and making false statements. He now
        challenges several of the district court’s rulings relating to motions
        in limine, sentencing, and restitution. Because Hoover has failed
        to show that the district court erred in any of these rulings, we
        affirm.
                                          I.
               Barry Hoover is a Navy veteran who has been receiving
        disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs since
        1997. The VA awards benefits based on the severity of one’s
        disability.    According to the government, Hoover falsely
        represented his disability to the VA to receive disability benefits
        that he would otherwise not be entitled to. Nearly a decade passed
        before the VA became suspicious and investigated Hoover. As part
        of the investigation, a special agent for the VA’s Office of the
        Inspector General called Hoover, spoke with him, and recorded
        the conversation. The agent introduced himself as being “with the
        Department of Veterans Affairs”; he did not provide his real name,
        position, or title.       During this call, Hoover explicitly
        misrepresented his disabled status and even claimed that his
        disability had gotten worse.
             Hoover was later indicted for theft of government funds and
        making false statements to a government official in violation of 18
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        22-11993              Opinion of the Court                       3

        U.S.C. § 641 and 18 U.S.C § 1001 respectively. He pleaded not
        guilty and proceeded with trial. Before trial, Hoover filed motions
        in limine to suppress the recorded phone call with the VA agent.
        According to Hoover, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
        under doctor-patient privilege because he thought he was speaking
        to a medical clinician. The district court overruled Hoover’s
        objection at trial, finding that Hoover did not have a reasonable
        expectation of privacy because the VA agent never identified
        himself as a clinician, and that Hoover willingly discussed his
        medical information on the call.
               Hoover asserted in his opening statement that he was being
        prosecuted in retaliation for refusing to cooperate with the
        government and testify against another defendant in a separate
        case. The government brought a motion in limine, arguing that
        there was no good faith basis for this argument. It stated that
        Hoover’s retaliatory prosecution argument amounted to selective
        or vindictive prosecution, which must be raised in a pretrial
        motion. Because Hoover failed to make such a motion, he waived
        this argument and could not raise it at trial. The district court
        agreed and granted the government’s motion.
               Hoover was found guilty. The probation officer revised the
        original presentencing investigation report, and neither party
        submitted objections. The report concluded a Guidelines
        imprisonment range of 27 to 33 months and calculated that Hoover
        owed $429,578.09 in restitution.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11993

               Hoover later objected to the PSI’s Guidelines range and
        restitution calculations at sentencing. He claimed that the loss
        amount in the PSI was inaccurate because his disability had not
        been objectively determined. He also argued for a downward
        variance and 2-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility
        under Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1(a) (Nov. 2018). Hoover
        provided a written statement accepting responsibility.
              The district court overruled Hoover’s acceptance of
        responsibility objection because he failed to show responsibility in
        a timely manner. The court also concluded that, based on the
        evidence, the PSI calculation was a reasonable estimate of loss.
        Ultimately, it imposed a total sentence of 27 months’
        imprisonment and restitution of $429,568.09.
               Hoover now argues that the district court erred by denying
        his motion in limine regarding his phone call with the VA agent, by
        granting the government’s motion in limine to preclude him from
        mentioning retaliation during the trial, by rejecting his acceptance
        of responsibility, and by determining the government’s actual loss
        to be $429,568.09.
                                         II.
               We generally review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for
        abuse of discretion. United States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1441 (11th
        Cir. 1996). Under this standard, we reverse a district court’s ruling
        only if it applied an “incorrect legal standard,” followed “improper
        procedures in making the determination,” or made “findings of fact
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        22-11993               Opinion of the Court                         5

        that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908,
        911 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
               We review for clear error a district court’s findings about
        acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Andres, 960 F.3d 1310,
        1318 (11th Cir. 2020). We also review for clear error a district
        court’s loss determination and the factual finding regarding the
        amount of restitution. United States v. Cobb, 842 F.3d 1213, 1218
        (11th Cir. 2016). Though deferential, clear error still requires that
        findings of fact be supported by substantial evidence. Id.
                                         III.
                Hoover challenges both of the district court’s orders on the
        motions in limine. He first contends that the district court abused
        its discretion when it denied his motion in limine to exclude
        evidence of his recorded phone call with the VA representative. He
        next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
        granted the government’s mid-trial motion in limine regarding his
        retaliation argument. The record, however, contains sufficient
        evidence to support both rulings.
               Motions in limine are made with the purpose of excluding
        anticipated prejudicial evidence before it is actually offered because
        such evidence would be inadmissible at trial. Luce v. United States,
        469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). They are often confused with motions
        to suppress, which are used to prohibit the introduction of illegally
        obtained evidence at a criminal trial. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d
        1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Though technically distinct, both
        motions are used to exclude certain evidence at trial and are
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11993

        reviewed for abuse of discretion. Andres, 960 F.3d at 1315; Sellers v.
        Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 968 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020).
                We construe Hoover’s motion in limine regarding his phone
        call with the VA agent as a motion to suppress because it is based
        on an argument that the evidence was illegally obtained.
        According to Hoover, he thought he was speaking to a medical
        clinician rather than an informant. He thus argues that he has a
        reasonable expectation of privacy over the contents of the phone
        conversation, and that the government unlawfully recorded that
        phone call without his consent.
                To start, the government did not unlawfully record
        Hoover’s phone conversation. While 18 U.S.C. § 2511 generally
        prohibits a person from intentionally intercepting a wire
        communication, there are exceptions to this general prohibition.
        The inquiry for determining whether a recording was improper
        under § 2511 is the same as that used for the Fourth Amendment.
        United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir. 1993). Under
        this standard, the question is “whether a reasonable or justifiable
        expectation of privacy exists.” Id. And that depends on (1) whether
        the defendant has a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2)
        whether that expectation is also objectively reasonable. Id.
               A defendant who willingly shares information with a third
        party does not meet this standard. That is because a defendant has
        “no legitimate expectation that the person to whom he is speaking
        will not relate the conversation to the legal authorities, either by
        repetition or by the recording of the conversation.” United States v.
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        22-11993              Opinion of the Court                        7

        Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1582 (11th Cir. 1984). It does not matter
        for Fourth Amendment purposes that the defendant did not know
        his conversation would be recorded or transmitted. United States v.
        Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 1982). So long as the
        defendant willingly relayed information to a third party, he
        knowingly took the risk that it may be shared. Id.
               In that same vein, § 2511 allows a person acting under the
        color of law to record a call in which they are “a party to the
        communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). That means the
        government does not violate § 2511 when its informant records a
        conversation with a defendant, even if the defendant does not
        know that they are speaking with an informant. Shields, 675 F.2d
        at 1158.
               Those points show that the recording here was proper. The
        VA agent was acting under the color of law because he acted as an
        informant for law enforcement by knowingly calling Hoover and
        recording their conversation. See United States v. Davis, 799 F.2d
        1490, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1986). While Hoover argues that he
        thought the agent was a medical clinician, the agent never actually
        identified himself as a doctor; rather, he merely stated that he was
        “with the Department of Veterans Affairs.” And the fact that
        Hoover did not know that the agent would record their
        conversation or share its contents with the government does not,
        by itself, show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See
        Shields, 675 F.2d at 1158. Instead, he took a risk by willingly
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11993

        speaking with the agent. Id. The district court did not err in
        denying Hoover’s motion in limine with respect to the phone call.
              Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by granting the
        government’s motion in limine blocking Hoover’s retaliation
        argument. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A)
        requires a motion alleging a “defect in instituting the prosecution”
        to be made before trial. This includes selective prosecution claims,
        which allege a defect in the prosecution process and thus have “no
        bearing on the determination of factual guilt.” United States v.
        Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
                Hoover’s retaliation claim is essentially a selective
        prosecution claim and was thus improperly raised during trial.
        Hoover first made his retaliation argument in his opening
        statement during trial, stating that he was prosecuted in this case
        because “he would not play along in another federal prosecution.”
        As his counsel explained, Hoover’s retaliation argument was being
        used not “in the criminal sense, but rather in the biased sense.”
        Because Hoover’s retaliation claim essentially alleges bias by the
        prosecution and does not go towards the merits of criminal
        liability, it must be raised by pretrial motion and cannot be raised
        for the first time at trial. See Scrushy, 721 F.3d at 1305. The district
        court thus did not err in granting the government’s motion in
        limine precluding further argument regarding retaliation.
                                          IV.
               Hoover also disputes his sentencing and restitution
        calculation. First, he contests the district court’s denial of a
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        22-11993                Opinion of the Court                          9

        reduction based on acceptance of responsibility. Second, he argues
        that the district court improperly calculated the loss due to his
        fraud. Because the district court did not clearly err on either point,
        we aﬃrm.
               The Sentencing Guidelines allow for a two-point reduction
        of a defendant’s oﬀense level if he “clearly demonstrates
        acceptance of responsibility for his oﬀense.”             Sentencing
        Guidelines § 3E1.1(a) (Nov. 2018). “This adjustment is not intended
        to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of
        proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is
        convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.” Id.
        § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.2. Only in rare circumstances, such as when a
        defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues not related to
        factual guilt, may acceptance of responsibility still apply after trial.
        Andres, 960 F.3d at 1318.
                The district court did not err in denying Hoover’s request for
        a reduction based on acceptance of responsibility. Hoover’s pretrial
        statements do not suggest acceptance of responsibility; Hoover
        only accepted responsibility after trial. This is also not a rare
        circumstance where acceptance of responsibility applies despite
        trial because nothing in the record suggests that Hoover pursued
        trial only to preserve challenges. See Andres, 960 F.3d at 1318–19.
        The district court was well within its discretion to deny Hoover’s
        request for reduction based on his late-breaking acceptance of
        responsibility.
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                 22-11993

                Lastly, the district court did not clearly err in its loss
        calculation. “The amount of restitution must be based on the
        amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct.” United
        States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 728 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation
        omitted). The determination of this amount is an “inexact
        science.” Id. (quotation omitted). So while the government must
        establish the actual loss by a preponderance of the evidence, the
        district court “may accept a reasonable estimate of the loss based
        on the evidence presented.” Id. (quotation omitted).
               Hoover disputes the district court’s loss calculation of
        $429,568.09 because the level of his disability has still yet to be
        determined. But that fact is irrelevant because the court found that
        Hoover essentially committed fraud by misrepresenting his
        disability to the VA to obtain beneﬁts, and “any person who
        commits fraud forfeits all rights to beneﬁts under all laws
        administered by the Department of Veteran Aﬀairs.” 38 C.F.R. §
        3.901(b). So even if Hoover had a genuine disability, he forfeited
        any right to VA beneﬁts by committing fraud.
               The record shows that the district court’s loss calculation
        was based on suﬃcient evidence. The district court relied on
        testimony calculating the actual loss from Hoover’s fraud to be
        $429,568.09. That calculation was determined by examining the
        excess beneﬁts Hoover received from the date of his ﬁrst
        fraudulent disability rating until the VA discovered his fraud and
        adjusted his disability rating accordingly. The fact that Hoover’s
        true disability was unknown during that time is irrelevant to this
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        22-11993                Opinion of the Court                         11

        calculation because, as stated above, he lost all rights to VA beneﬁts
        when he intentionally misrepresented his disability. Thus,
        $429,568.09 was a reasonable estimate of the loss based on the
        evidence presented, and the district court did not err in its
        restitution calculation. See Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 728.
                                    *      *      *
                Hoover has failed to show that the district court erred. The
        district court did not improperly deny Hoover’s motion in limine
        regarding the phone call because Hoover did not have a reasonable
        expectation of privacy. Nor did the court abuse its discretion when
        it granted the government’s motion in limine regarding Hoover’s
        retaliation claim because Hoover raised this claim too late. And the
        district court did not clearly err in its calculation of restitution, or
        in its denial of Hoover’s requested reduction based on acceptance
        of responsibility. We thus aﬃrm the district court on all of
        Hoover’s claims.
               AFFIRMED.