Court Opinion

ID: 9700263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:17:46.140485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:04.981586
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The question presented to this court is whether the all-terrain vehicles owned by the insured and stolen from his property were “used solely for the service of the insured location”1 and therefore covered under the insured’s homeowner’s policy. The record establishes that the insured location was a 75-acre tract of land. In addition, the record substantiates that the ATVs were used for basic work, recreation and travelling on the property. The majority is correct in noting the lack of Pennsylvania appellate eases which interpret the meaning of the provision in question. Unfortunately, in reaching its determination, the majority analyzes and correctly concludes that four cases from other jurisdictions are inapposite while declining to accept the reasoning in Strand v. State Farm Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App.3d 97, 517 N.E.2d 265 (1986), the only ease in the country which is exactly on point and addresses the identical policy language and factual scenario before us.
In Strand, an ATV was stolen and the court determined the term “used solely for the service of the insured location” to be ambiguous and subject to broad interpretation. That court concluded that the use of the ATV on three acres for both maintenance and recreation was within the policy language. However, the majority of this court finds the policy language unambiguous and concludes that non-maintenance-related activities remove the ATVs from coverage.
I agree with the Strand court in its result. I do not agree with the majority that in the language “used solely for the service of the insured location” the term “service” limits the ATV use to maintenance. There is no rationale for finding that “service,” in reference to a 75-acre tract of land, is limited to maintenance, and the majority fails to conclusively argue this point. Rather, the majority, relying upon Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary to define the word “service” mistakenly states that “service” is a verb. In this provision of the policy, “service” is not a verb, it is a noun. In Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary the noun “service” has twenty-six different definitions while the verb “service” has four definitions. This itself should be sufficient to convince this court to follow the Strand court and find the language in question to be ambiguous and subject to broad interpretation.
However, the majority suggests that “the Strand court presents a myopic view of the issue.” Myopic is defined in Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary as “a narrow view of something.” By incorrectly defining and restricting the word “service” to exclude all meanings but maintenance, I suggest the majority’s interpretation of the exclusion is a “narrow view.” In my reading of the policy, I consider the “service” provided by the motor vehicles in question to be similar to the common usage of the word “service” in reference to other motor vehicles. For example, the statement that a particular location “has bus service” means that buses provide transportation in that location. Likewise, a taxi used for the “service” of a certain area refers to transportation access via a taxi in that area. Consequently, “service” is used to denote the existence of transportation and we should not limit the word to maintenance.
Additionally, the purpose of the word “solely” is , to limit the vehicle’s use on the “insured location,” not the type of use required of the vehicle. Therefore, “solely” limits where the service is performed, not what service is performed. Interestingly, State Farm never argues that the nature of the use of the vehicle on the insured location, either recreation or maintenance, increases its responsibility for risk of loss in this theft policy. I believe a vehicle, in service of its owner’s insured location, performs that function by transporting the owner or others, as long as it is done on the premises.
*633It is axiomatic that contracts are interpreted against the drafter, in this case, State Farm. Had the insurer desired to limit the service of motor propelled vehicles insured for theft purposes to those only engaged in maintenance, rather than- all other use on an insured location, it could have unequivocally done so. We should not do it for them.
Service does not equal maintenance, and location does not equal land. Consequently, “service of the insured location” is not limited to maintenance of the land. I would find the term “service” includes recreational activities on the insured property and, as a result, the terms of the policy should be applied in favor of the insured.
Finally, I disagree with the majority conclusion that the trial court properly denied the insured’s motion to amend the complaint. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that, under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033, amendments to pleadings will be liberally allowed to secure the determination of cases on their merits. Capobianchi v. BIC Corp., 446 Pa.Super. 130, 666 A.2d 344 (1995). However, an amendment should not be allowed where there is an error of law or resulting prejudice to an adverse party. Werner v. Zazyczny, 545 Pa. 570, 681 A.2d 1331 (1996). Neither is present in this case.
Instead, the insured presented in the amended complaint a proper allegation of bad faith. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the amendment. This is amplified by the fact that the statute of limitations under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law is six years. Gabriel v. O’Hara, 368 Pa.Super. 383, 534 A.2d 488 (1987). The record shows that the theft occurred in January 1991. The original complaint was filed in April 1992; the motion to amend was filed in December 1994, less than four years from the original loss, and two and one half years from the original complaint. Thus, the amendment was within the statute of limitations.
Moreover, the facts support a bad faith claim. State Farm’s refusal to pay is not supported by any caselaw. As the majority explains, there is only one ease in the nation which addresses this issue and that case supports the insured’s interpretation of the clause. Strand was decided in 1986 and State Farm, a party in the case, was aware of the outcome. However, State Farm had chosen not to change this provision of the policy since the Strand ruling. Obviously, since that time, the policy language and its meaning under Strand have been satisfactory , to State Farm. Therefore, its choice to now ignore the Strand determination and not pay under the policy supports a claim of bad faith and I would allow the amendment.

. Throughout its opinion, the majority alters the language of the policy provision in an effort to support its argument, thus ignoring the rule that we cannot rewrite a contract.