Court Opinion

ID: 9747688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:27:47.285231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.328978
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Price, J.:
I dissent. The information supplied to the magistrate was more than adequate to satisfy the requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Aguilar mandates that the magistrate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that criminal activity was taking place, and (2) the basis for the affiant’s conclusion that the informant is reliable.
The first requirement may be met where the affidavit either sets forth the manner in which the informant obtained his information or describes the criminal activity in detail. Commonwealth v. Samuels, 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 192, 340 A.2d 880 (1975). Where the informant states, as he does here, that he personally observed the criminal activity, the requirement is met.
The second requirement is met where (1) it is shown that past information given resulted in convictions; (2) the informant’s story is corroborated by some other source; (3) the informant’s statements were a declaration against interest; or (4) the defendant’s reputation supports the informant’s tip. Commonwealth v. Ambers, *452225 Pa. Superior Ct. 381, 310 A.2d 347 (1973). In the instant case, the information given by Sergeant Brown to Sergeant Buchan on January 12, 1973, corroborated the information given by the confidential informant on January 16, 1973. This satisfies the second requirement.
I cannot agree that the warrant issued on the basis of stale information. Following the initial discovery of the drug transactions, there was a continuing investigation. The police determined that appellants had moved from one apartment to another in the same building complex, and were awaiting notice that the anticipated drug shipment had arrived. As soon as they received such notice, they obtained the warrant and conducted the search.
While it is true that a search warrant will not issue if the information supporting the warrant is stale, if it is demonstrated that criminal conduct has in fact continued, then the relevant information, in spite of its age, may not be deemed stale. Commonwealth v. Eazer, 455 Pa. 320, 312 A.2d 398 (1973). Here the police were informed that a new shipment of drugs would be arriving soon and were later notified that the shipment had been received. These facts distinguish this case from a situation where information is received and, after an extended wait fails to reveal any further criminal activity, a warrant is obtained on the first information. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Shaw, 444 Pa. 110, 281 A.2d 897 (1971).
Appellants also argue that the warrant was fatally defective because it failed to describe with particularity the place to be searched. Specifically, appellants contend that the search was invalid because the warrant lists the place to be searched as apartment number 32, when in fact apartment number 35 was searched.
There is no question that the apartment listed on the warrant was not the one searched. However, in light of our holdings in Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 234 Pa. Superior Ct. 102, 339 A.2d 86 (1975), and Commonwealth *453v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Superior Ct. 88, 195 A.2d 119 (1963), this alone will not invalidate the warrant. As our court in Commonwealth v. Kaplan stated:
“In Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Superior Ct. 88, 195 A.2d 119 (1963), we held that it is not necessary to a valid description of an apartment that its location within a particular building be given. To the contrary, a search warrant directing a search of an apartment house occupied by a number of different tenants, which states the name of the person occupying the apartment to be searched is valid.” 234 Pa. Superior Ct. at 104, 339 A.2d at 87-88.
Here, the warrant clearly states the names of the persons occupying the apartment. These persons, appellants here, lived in apartment 35 which was the apartment searched. No reversible error was committed.
Appellants’ final contention is that the police did not execute the warrant in a proper manner. Appellants argue that the officers failed to identify themselves before entering the apartment. There is absolutely no merit to this contention.
The officers, one of whom was in full uniform, knocked on the apartment door and announced their identity and purpose. Although they observed a figure at the apartment window, no one answered their knock. One of the policemen went to enlist the aid of the manager in gaining entrance to the apartment. After entering, they again announced their identity and purpose and read the warrant to appellants. There was a time span of approximately ten minutes between the first knock and the entry. The actions of the police were absolutely correct.
I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.