Court Opinion

ID: 197456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2011-02-07 03:30:41+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:19:29.027042
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                        

No. 96-2213

               ROBERTO TIRADO-ACOSTA, ET AL.,

                   Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                             v.

             PUERTO RICO NATIONAL GUARD, ET AL.,

                   Defendants, Appellees.

                                        

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]

                                        

                           Before

                    Selya, Circuit Judge,

                 Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

                 and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

                                        

Rafael F.  Castro Lang with whom  F. Castro Amy was  on brief for
appellants.
Sylvia Roger Stefani, Assistant  Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, 
                with 
                    whom 
                         Carlos
                               Lugo Fiol, Solicitor General, and Edda Serrano
Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.

                                        

                        July 9, 1997
                                        

     BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.   Plaintiffs in this action,  all

members of  the Puerto Rico  National Guard,  were called  to

active 
                  duty 
                       in the Persian Gulf War.  Prior to active duty and

briefly upon their return, they were employed full-time in  a

National Guard program  to assist in drug interdiction.   Not

long after their return,  the plaintiffs' assignment to  this

program 
                   was 
                      terminated 
                                 by the Puerto Rico National Guard.  When

the 
               plaintiffs sued, the district court ruled that they had no

statutory 
                     right to reemployment in such a program.  We affirm.

     The  basic facts are  not in dispute.   The Puerto  Rico

National Guard, like the National Guards in all 50 states, is

a hybrid organization.  National Guards are ordinarily  under

the  control  of state  (or,  in  the case  of  Puerto  Rico,

Commonwealth)
                         officials, but are organized pursuant to federal

statute, 
                    and 
                        in war time or other emergencies, Guard units may

be brought under federal  control.  See U.S. Const., art.  I,

sec. 8, cl. 16; 32 U.S.C. S 101, et seq.

     In 
                   1989, 
                        Congress 
                                 authorized federal funding to permit the

local National Guards to support drug interdiction and  other

counter-drug activities.    32 U.S.C.  S  112.   Section  112

provided 
                    that each state desiring to participate would draw up

its own plan subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense.

Despite this and other authority over the program granted  to

the Secretary  of  Defense,  the statute  required  that  the

National 
                    Guard personnel involved in these operations be under

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local 
                 control and "not in Federal service," id. S 112(c)(1), a

requirement  apparently  designed  to  mesh  with  the  Posse

Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1385, limiting the use of  federal

troops for domestic law enforcement purposes.

     Most National Guard  members ordinarily serve only  part

time, but there are exceptions.  Section 112 itself  provided

that  subject to  Secretary  of  Defense  regulations,  local

National Guard members  could, pursuant to a state plan,  "be

ordered 
                   to 
                      perform full-time National Guard duty under section

502(f)  of this title  for the purpose  of carrying out  drug

interdiction 
                        and counter-drug activities."  32 U.S.C. S 502(f)

allows  National Guard  personnel to  be assigned  additional

duties, apart from ordinary drills and field exercises,  with

the provision appropriate for "pay and allowances."

     Beginning 
                          in 
                             1989, 
                                  the 
                                      Puerto Rico National Guard used the

federal funds  provided under section  112 for  a variety  of

counter-drug projects.   In one of the projects, Puerto  Rico

National Guard personnel assisted the U.S. Customs Service in

inspecting cargo containers arriving and leaving Puerto  Rico

ports and airports.  Each of the plaintiffs in this case is a

Puerto Rico National  Guard member who  was assigned to  work

full-time in 1989 to  1990 in this phase of the  counter-drug

program.  Minor variations aside, each plaintiff worked under

orders couched in the following terms:

          You are  ordered to  Active Duty  special
          work (ADSW) for the period indicated plus

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          allowable 
                               travel time.  Upon completion of
          the period of ADSW unless sooner relieved
          or extended by proper authority you  will
          return 
                            to 
                               the place where you entered ADSW
          and are relieved from such duty.

     According to the memorandum of understanding between the

Puerto Rico National Guard and the Customs Service, "National

Guard personnel employed in support of [the Customs  Service]

for counter-drug operations will be under the command of, and

directly 
                    responsible to their military chain of command."  The

memorandum also  said  that "all  missions will  be  executed

through 
                   the 
                      military 
                               chain of command; i.e., tactical direction

of the troops . . . will be left solely to the National Guard

Officers in Charge/Noncommissioned Officer in Charge."

     Thus, the plaintiffs  working in  the drug  interdiction

program 
                   were 
                       ultimately 
                                  commanded and controlled by Puerto Rico

National Guard officers, and they were paid for their work by

the Puerto  Rico National Guard  from funds  provided by  the

federal government.  However, much of the plaintiffs' day-to-

day work was directed by Customs Service officials.  The work

itself 
                  did 
                      not 
                         entail 
                                the use of any specialized military skill

but  consisted  mainly  of  unloading  and  reloading   cargo

containers or inspecting their contents.

     The 
                    plaintiffs' pay and allowances for full-time National

Guard duty in  the program were substantial (e.g., $1,400  to

$2,000  per  month).   Each  plaintiff  worked  under  orders

assigning 
                     him such duty for a relatively brief period, ranging

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from 
                2 
                  days 
                       to 61 days, but the orders were regularly renewed.

At 
              trial 
                    the 
                       plaintiffs 
                                  testified that they believed that these

orders 
                  would 
                        be 
                          renewed 
                                  indefinitely so long as funding for the

drug interdiction program continued.  They said that they had

been given assurances that they would not be dismissed unless

they failed to perform their work satisfactorily.

     In January 1991, all of the plaintiffs were called  into

active service  on account of the  Persian Gulf War and  left

their  positions  in the  drug  interdiction  program.    The

plaintiffs completed their  active federal  military duty  in

early 
                 July 
                      1991 
                          and 
                              were 
                                   reassigned by the Puerto Rico National

Guard 
                 to 
                    the 
                        drug interdiction program for the period July 11,

1991 
                to 
                   September 
                            30, 
                                1991.  On October 1, 1991, the plaintiffs

were released from  full-time duty in the program, and  their

positions taken by other Guard personnel.

     In 
                   September 
                             1992, the plaintiffs brought suit in federal

district court in Puerto Rico seeking reinstatement and  back

pay.   The principal claim  brought against  the Puerto  Rico

National Guard "and/or the United States of America" was that

defendants  had violated  the  plaintiffs' rights  under  the

Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act ("the Veterans' Act"), then

codified 
                    at 
                       38 U.S.C. S 2021 et seq., by not retaining them in

their full-time  drug-interdiction positions following  their

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return  from the  Gulf  War.   The  United States  was  later

dismissed as a defendant.1  

     The Puerto  Rico  National Guard  moved to  dismiss  the

complaint on  several grounds, including  failure to state  a

claim, non-justiciability, Eleventh Amendment immunity,  non-

exhaustion of administrative remedies, and untimeliness.  The

district 
                    court deemed most of these defenses lacking in merit;

and it  said that  the merits could  not be resolved  without

developing 
                      a 
                       factual 
                               record.  Accordingly, after discovery, the

district 
                    court 
                         conducted 
                                   a bench trial in August 1995 and heard

testimony from both sides.  

     In 
                   a 
                     written 
                            decision 
                                     issued August 16, 1996, the district

court dismissed the complaint.  It ruled that the  plaintiffs

did not  have  reemployment rights  under the  Veterans'  Act

because their drug  interdiction positions were "military  in

nature" and therefore beyond the statute's intended coverage;

the 
               court 
                     did not reach or resolve the defendants' alternative

statutory 
                     defense 
                            that 
                                 the plaintiffs be excluded from coverage

because 
                   their 
                         posts 
                              were 
                                   "temporary."  See 38 U.S.C. S 2021(a).

The district court entered  judgment for the defendants,  and

this appeal followed. 

     1The complaint also alleged that two individual Guard
officers had violated 42 U.S.C. S 1983 by refusing to retain
the plaintiffs in the program; but this claim was contingent
on a showing of violation of the Veterans' Act and requires
no further discussion.

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     In our view, the district court was clearly right in its

construction of the  federal statute, and  we affirm on  that

ground without addressing other  defenses.  Where the  result

would 
                 be 
                    the 
                        same, this court has often rejected claims on the

merits without resolving possible jurisdictional  objections.

Hachikian
                     
                     v. 
                        FDIC
                           , 
                             96 
                                F.3d 502, 506 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996).  Here,

the case ought to be  decided promptly, in view of the  delay

already 
                   suffered by the plaintiffs, and the legal issue is one

that can be decided definitively only by a federal court.  

     We begin  with the  terms of  the Veterans'  Act.   This

statute, enacted  in 1978,  carried forward  the policy  that

Congress 
                    first 
                         adopted 
                                 in 1940 to provide employment protection

for veterans  returning  from military  service.   Monroe  v.

Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1981).  Although  the

Veterans' Act has itself been superseded by a new enactment--

the 
               Uniform 
                      Services 
                               Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C.

S 4301 et seq.--the new statute applies only to reemployments

initiated on or after October 13, 1994.  110 Stat. 3336.

     The Veterans'  Act  main section  granting  reemployment

rights is  38 U.S.C. S  2021, which  provides protection  for

anyone "inducted into the Armed Forces of the United  States"

under the selective service statute.  A companion section, 28

U.S.C. S 2024, extends similar protection, by cross-reference

back to  section 2021, to  several other  classes of  persons

including reservists and others called to "active duty (other

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than 
                for 
                    the 
                        purpose of determining physical fitness and other

than for training) . . . ."  Concededly, the plaintiffs  were

called to active duty in 1991.

     Section 2021(a) provides that an inductee (or by  cross-

reference a reservist  called to active  duty) "who leaves  a

position 
                    (other 
                           than 
                               a 
                                 temporary position) in the employ of any

employer" 
                     is 
                        entitled to reemployment if sought within 90 days

after  release  from  the  military.    The  conditions   and

obligations  vary somewhat  depending  on whether  the  prior

employer was governmental or private, but it is common ground

that the  statute protects  prior employment  by the  federal

government, the states, and the Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico.

See  38  U.S.C.  S  2021(a);  id.  S  101(20)  (defining  the

Commonwealth as a state for this purpose).

     Although 
                         the 
                             Veterans' Act covers "a position (other than

a temporary  position) in the  employ of  any employer,"  the

defendants argue that  the statute was  not meant to  protect

prior employment in a military position.  We consider at  the

outset whether the statute,  which contains no such  limiting

term, 
                 should 
                        be 
                          so 
                             construed; and, finding that it should be so

read, we then return to the question whether the  plaintiffs'

former positions in the  drug interdiction program should  be

regarded as unprotected military  positions.  Both are  legal

questions, but of slightly different character.  

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                                         -8-

     As we have noted,  no express term in the Veterans'  Act

limits a  protectible  former  "position" to  a  position  in

civilian  employment  or   excludes  from  the  category   of

protectible 
                       positions a military assignment.  Nevertheless, it

is 
              apparent 
                       to 
                         us 
                            that 
                                 the statute must be thus construed.  The

evidence for this conclusion is provided by the structure and

purpose of the statute, by extrinsic policy safeguarding  the

autonomy  of  military organizations,  and  by  the  lack  of

precedent  extending  reemployment  protection  to   military

positions.

     First, the very design of the Veterans' Act makes  clear

its  central aim was  to protect those  who were inducted  or

otherwise drawn  into military life  and thereby required  to

surrender 
                     their 
                          civilian 
                                   jobs.  The Supreme Court, for example,

has  spoken of  the Veterans'  Act as  relating to  "military

service after which a member of the Armed Forces retains  the

right to civilian employment."  King v. St. Vincent's  Hosp.,

502 
               U.S. 
                    215, 
                        216 
                            (1991).  Congress probably did not insert the

word "civilian" before  "position" simply  because it  seemed

unnecessary to add a term made almost redundant by context.  

     Each of the provisions providing reemployment protection

is 
              directed 
                       at 
                         persons 
                                 who cross the barrier from civilian into

military life:   the  inductee (section  2021), the  enlistee

(section 2024(a)), the  reservist entering  upon active  duty

(other than  for physical  fitness testing  or for  training)

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(section 2024(b)), and certain persons who enter upon  active

duty for training or inactive duty training (subsections  (c)

and 
               (d)). 
                      
                      It 
                        is 
                           persons 
                                   who leave "a position" to perform such

duties and thereafter seek to "be restored to such  position"

who are protected.  38 U.S.C. S 2021(a).

     There is simply no  hint in all this that when  Congress

sought to  protect prior employment,  it intended to  protect

prior  employment in a  military capacity.   It is true  that

civilian 
                    employees of state and federal military organizations

are 
               themselves 
                         protected 
                                   if called to active duty.  See Panigua

v. Department  of  the Air  Force,  13 M.S.P.R.  306,  307-09

(M.S.P.B. 1982).  But such civilian employees of the military

are akin  to civilian employees  of any  other department  of

government.  Military employees are a different matter.

     This brings us  to a further, reenforcing reason why  we

decline to  read the  Veterans' Act  to protect  reemployment

rights 
                  in 
                    former 
                           military positions.  The courts have long been

reluctant to interfere with internal military decisionmaking,

including 
                     personnel decisions.  With only rare exceptions, the

courts 
                  have 
                       taken 
                            the 
                                view that assignments within the military

structure 
                     are matters to be decided by the military and not by

the  courts.  See  Orloff v. Willoughby,  345 U.S. 83,  93-94

(1953).  The reasons are too obvious to need elaboration.

     In some situations, this view is expressed by deeming  a

controversy to be nonjusticiable, Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586,

                            -10-
                                        -10-

589-91 
                  (1st 
                       Cir. 1993); in others, it takes the form of giving

great deference to  the military's judgment on the matter  at

hand.  Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996).

But  the  underlying  notion  is  that  matters  of  military

organization,
                         personnel and operations are extremely sensitive

and that courts will do more harm than good by  interfering. 

Congress 
                    can 
                        provide otherwise by statute, but rarely does so.

     Thus, we conclude that Veterans' Act protections do  not

extend to affording anyone reemployment rights in a  military

position.    However generously  the  Veterans'  Act  may  be

construed  to protect  prior civilian  employment, Tilton  v.

Missouri P.R.R., 376  U.S. 169, 181 (1964), Congress did  not

intend 
                  that 
                      anyone 
                             should have a preemptive claim to his former

position  as an air  force pilot or  an army tank  commander.

Whether the plaintiffs' positions in the Puerto Rico National

Guard 
                 drug 
                      interdiction program should be viewed as sharing in

this 
                "military" character is a different issue to which we now

turn.

     It 
                   is 
                      clear 
                            from section 112 and the orders issued to the

plaintiffs that their participation in the drug  interdiction

program 
                   was 
                      the 
                          performance of "full-time National Guard duty."

The 
               drug 
                   interdiction 
                                statute, 32 U.S.C. S 112(b), provides for

Guard personnel  to perform such  National Guard duty  "under

section 502(f)" to carry  out drug interdiction; and  section

502(f) 
                  allows Guard members to be ordered to perform "training

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                                        -11-

or  other  duty"  in addition  to  assembly  for  drills  and

encampment. 
                        
                        The 
                           orders 
                                  issued to the plaintiffs made reference

to section 502(f) and, in certain cases, section 503 which is

a companion provision involving joint exercises with the army

or the air force.

     In addition, the evidence shows that the plaintiffs were

participating in the  drug interdiction  program pursuant  to

military 
                    orders and were subject to the command and control of

Guard 
                 officers. 
                            
                           Indeed, 
                                   it appears likely that the plaintiffs'

full-time 
                     positions 
                              in 
                                 the drug interdiction program might have

allowed 
                   them 
                        to claim reemployment rights in any civilian jobs

they 
                held 
                     at 
                       the 
                           time 
                                they entered upon full-time duty.  See 38

U.S.C. S 2024(c)(d); id. S 101(22)(C).  In all events,  full-

time National  Guard duty by  a Guard  member under  military

orders appears to us quintessentially military in character. 

     It 
                   is 
                      quite 
                            true that the physical tasks performed by the

plaintiffs could have been,  and commonly were, performed  by

customs 
                   officers 
                           who 
                               were not in military service.  But this is

common:  one can be a cook or a pilot or a  radio operator in

either military  or civilian  life.   National Guard  members

called to duty to  build up the dikes  in a flooded area  are

still part  of the military even  though they are engaged  in

construction work.  Given  Congress' intent to protect  prior

civilian jobs  for those serving in  the military, it is  the

nature 
                  of 
                     the employment--not its functions--that is decisive.

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     The same result follows from extrinsic policy.  It would

directly offend the tradition of non-interference in military

assignments  for a  court to  direct that  the plaintiffs  be

restored to performing  specific functions as National  Guard

members assigned to full-time  duty in the drug  interdiction

program.  The Puerto Rico National Guard cited as reasons for

its reshuffling of personnel  "unity of command" and  "rank."

The 
               plaintiffs 
                          say 
                             that 
                                  these objectives could have been met by

a 
             different 
                      reorganization that retained their jobs; but making

these evaluations is just what courts are reluctant to do.

     It remains  to refer  briefly to  cases involving  Guard

employees governed by the  National Guard Technicians Act  of

1968,  32 U.S.C.  S 709.   These  technicians are  "full-time

civilian 
                    employees 
                             of 
                                the National Guard" who are also, in most

cases, required to hold "concurrent National Guard membership

as a condition for their civilian employment."  H.R. Rep. No.

90-1823, at 2 (1968).  E.g., Wright, 5 F.3d at 587 (full-time

aircraft maintenance specialist).

     In 
                   a 
                     number 
                            of 
                              cases, 
                                     a 
                                       National Guard technician has been

called to active service and forced to surrender his civilian

technician duties with  the Guard.   The question has  arisen

whether  this technician  position  is  protected  under  the

Veterans' 
                     Act 
                        after 
                              active duty ends.  One district court ruled

in 
              favor 
                    of 
                       coverage, although it assumed rather than analyzed

the statutory-coverage issue,  and several other courts  have

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                                        -13-

been willing to assume such coverage          in denying  th

technician's reemployment protection on other grounds.2

     H
                                                 arguendo               e
                  ow 
                    this 
                         court 
                              would 
                                    decide such a case is unclear.  There

is  language  in  Wright v.  Park  that  would  lean  against

protection, although the rights claimed by the technician  in

that 
                case 
                     were not under the Veterans' Act but under the Civil

Rights 
                  Act, 
                       42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1985, and the federal and state

whistle-blower  statutes.   On  the  other  hand,  a  passing

reference in the new reemployment statute that has supplanted

the Veterans'  Act may give  some support  to National  Guard

technicians who claim reemployment protection.  See 38 U.S.C.

S 4304(4)(B);  see also H.R. Rep.  No. 103-65, at 21  (1994).

However such cases  might be decided, we think that  National

Guard  technicians  are  clearly  distinguishable  from   the

plaintiffs in this case. 

     National Guard technicians are employed full-time by the

Guard in  a civilian  capacity.   In this  respect, they  are

arguably protected  under the  Veterans' Act  like any  other

civilian 
                    employees 
                              of 
                                a 
                                  federal or state military organization.

The difficulty,  where such  civilian positions  are tied  to

membership in the National Guard, is that reinstatement would

require either that the  military tie-in be waived or that  a

     2See Witter v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard, 462 F. Supp.
299, 305-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also Polos v. United States,
621 F.2d 385, 389-90 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Leistiko v. Secretary of
Army, 922 F. Supp. 66, 76 (N.D. Ohio 1996).

                            -14-
                                        -14-

military  position also  be made  available.   The issue  was

avoided in Witter  because plaintiff in  that case no  longer

sought reemployment but merely monetary compensation.  462 F.

Supp. at 306.

     In 
                   any 
                       event, the plaintiffs in the present case were not

employed 
                    as 
                       technicians with the curious dual capacity of that

position:   full-time  civilian  employment with  an  adjunct

military role.  The plaintiffs' only status was as "full-time

National Guard" members assigned, under a state plan approved

by the Secretary of Defense, to work under military orders in

the drug interdiction program.  Even assuming that this court

might 
                 follow 
                        Witter
                              
                              and 
                                  extend protection to technicians--which

is far from clear--this would not affect our decision in  the

present case  that the plaintiffs  are not  protected by  the

Veterans' Act.

      To 
                    this 
                         point, we have said little about the new federal

statute 
                   which, as of October 1994, supplants the Veterans' Act

and provides  a  new  framework for  reemployment  rights  of

veterans. 
                      
                      This new statute does not apply to the present case

and is not direct evidence of the intent of the Congress that

enacted the Veterans' Act.  But the new statute is in certain

respects 
                    a 
                     reenactment 
                                 of the Veterans' Act in somewhat clearer

language, 
                     and 
                         it 
                           would 
                                 certainly be deserving of mention if the

new 
               version 
                      were 
                           strongly favorable either to the plaintiffs or

the defendants.

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                                        -15-

     The 
                    fact 
                         is 
                            that the new statute carries forward the same

ambiguity 
                     in 
                        literal language that afflicts the Veterans' Act.

It protects, subject to certain conditions, "any person whose

absence 
                   from 
                        a 
                         position 
                                  of employment is necessitated by reason

of service in the uniformed services . . . ."  About the most

to be said is  that the new statute provides that  "full-time

National 
                    Guard duty" is included in the definition of "service

in the uniformed services," 38 U.S.C. S 4303(13), reenforcing

our view that the plaintiffs here passed over to the military

domain 
                  when 
                      they 
                           accepted full-time National Guard duty as part

of the drug interdiction program.

     Affirmed.

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