Court Opinion

ID: 9574085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:02:10.508981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:05.178590
License: Public Domain

*200Justice Orr
dissenting.
The practical effect of the majority opinion in this case sends a chilling message regarding the State’s lack of accountability for its negligent conduct and resulting injuries to innocent third parties. Regardless of the fact that the legislature has imposed a duty on the State either directly through legislation or indirectly through administrative rule, regardless of the evidence of negligence by the State in carrying out such duties, regardless of the severity of injury to an innocent third party or parties, and regardless of the fact that the legislature has removed state immunity from suit under the Tort Claims Act, the majority holds that the public duty doctrine allows the State to escape liability for its negligence, and injured parties are thus left with no means of recovery against the State. This was clearly not the law before Stone, nor should it be now. Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (1998).
In my dissent in Stone, I concluded that the majority had incorrectly extended the public duty doctrine to protect the State from lawsuits, with the result being that the Tort Claims Act’s protection of the public was seriously eroded. Suffice it to say, I am still convinced of the correctness of my dissent in Stone, particularly in light of the petition for rehearing and accompanying affidavits filed by the plaintiffs in Stone. (The petition for rehearing was denied by this Court on 2 April 1998.) However, for purposes of this dissent, I will not repeat those earlier arguments against the majority’s unwarranted extension of the public duty doctrine.
The majority, relying on Stone, has determined in this case that the public duty doctrine applies to the State and concludes that plaintiff’s claim is barred. According to the record, plaintiff, an eleven-year-old child, was seriously injured in a collision that occurred while he was riding a go-kart at the Ride ’N Slide amusement park. Plaintiff was secured in the go-kart by an improper seat belt. Tony Brewer, a North Carolina Department of Labor elevator and amusement ride inspector, had inspected the go-karts in June of 1993 within the course and scope of his employment. Brewer negligently and incorrectly informed the manager of the Ride ’N Slide that only lap belts needed to be installed on each go-kart, when in fact a three-point shoulder-type harness was required on the go-karts under the North Carolina Administrative Code. 13 NCAC 15 .0429(a)(3)(B) (May 1992). Because of this failure to inform the manager about the seat-belt requirement, the proper belts were never installed, and the *201eleven-year-old rode a go-kart with only a lap belt, suffering severe internal injuries when the go-kart crashed.
Whether this evidence was sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the State and what damages, if any, plaintiff would be entitled to recover should, according to the majority, never be reached. By applying the public duty doctrine, the majority concludes that the State owed only a general duty to the public and that the Amusement Safety Act did not impose a duty upon the State for the protection of individuals, in many cases minors, who operate go-karts at these facilities. The majority thus concludes that plaintiffs claim should be dismissed because of the protection now afforded the State under the public duty doctrine.
In addition to my disagreement with the application of the public duty doctrine to this case, I find no basis for the majority’s conclusion that article 14B of chapter 95 of the General Statutes, the Amusement Device Safety Act of North Carolina, imposes no legislative duty upon those who inspect go-karts. This article begins with N.C.G.S. § 95-111.1, which provides in pertinent part: “It is the intent of this Article that amusement devices shall be designed, constructed, assembled or disassembled, maintained, and operated so as to prevent injuries.” N.C.G.S. § 95-111.1(c) (1985). The article concludes some eight pages later with N.C.G.S. § 95-111.18, which provides in pertinent part: “This Article and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall receive a liberal construction to the end that the welfare of the people may be protected.” N.C.G.S. § 95-111.18 (1985). Contained within the article is a lengthy list of powers and duties of the Commissioner of Labor, which includes the power to adopt rules and regulations for enforcement of article 14B and authority to inspect and test devices subject to the article. N.C.G.S. § 95-111.4 (1985). As a result, the Commissioner of Labor adopted administrative rules, including:
.0405 INSPECTIONS
An inspector shall inspect each amusement device at each location to determine if the device:
(1) has been soundly constructed and properly erected,
(2) has been modified to comply with any changes in safety requirements prescribed by the manufacturer,
(3) has complied with the rules and regulations of this Section, and
*202(4) has in existence a policy of insurance as required by G.S. 95-111.12.
13 NCAC 15 .0405 (Aug. 1987) (emphasis added). This would certainly appear to impose a duty on the State for the specific protection of individuals operating go-karts.
Let there be no misunderstanding of the breadth and logical extension of the holdings in Stone and now in Hunt. This is not limited just to inspections of the workplace as in Stone, or to inspections of go-karts as in the case before us. Every device regulated by the Department of Labor requiring inspection falls within the scope of these holdings. When the State Fair comes to Raleigh or when small, independent amusement operators set up rides in communities all across North Carolina, and the State agency required by law to inspect those amusement rides is negligent and injuries to innocent third parties occur, the State is now shielded from liability by the majority’s holdings.
If, as in Stone, there can be no claim for failing to follow the law and inspect a workplace, and if, as in Hunt, there can be no claim for failing to follow the law and correctly inspect an amusement ride facility, then the myriad requirements throughout the General Statutes and Administrative Code requiring various types of inspections by State officials are meaningless to innocent third parties injured by the State’s negligence. Without exhausting the possibilities, one need only contemplate some of the types of inspections provided by the State. For example, regulations are in place dealing with inspections involving day-care centers, hazardous-waste facilities, nuclear energy systems, mines and quarries, meat and poultry products, and milk production, as well as sanitary and health inspections involving epidemics and other communicable diseases. The list could go on and on, and if the State negligently performs its duties, then those injured must look elsewhere for relief. The doctrine of sovereign immunity — “the King can do no wrong” — has been reimposed by judicial extension of the law. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
Although the two cases now decided on this issue deal with questions of negligent inspection, I find no language in the decisions limiting the application of the public duty doctrine only to those cases involving inspections by state agents. The potential ramifications of these holdings to negligent acts of the State beyond the realm of inspections would appear to be without limit.
*203The underlying basis of the majority decision is: A duty to all is a duty to none. According to the majority, no duty was owed to the workers who perished or were injured in the Hamlet fire, and no duty was owed to eleven-year-old Jason Hunt when he sat down in a go-kart and put on an improper seat belt. The public duty doctrine should never have been extended to the State by this Court in Stone and further applied in this case. I dissented then, and I dissent now.
Justice Frye joins in this dissenting opinion.