Court Opinion

ID: 9724538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:00:34.900408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.184507
License: Public Domain

DEVICH, J.
While I concur in the result, I write separately to emphasize how simple it would have been to avoid dismissal of this criminal action.
In 1982, our Supreme Court said in no uncertain terms that when a criminal jury deliberating a charge that contains lesser included offenses is not afforded an opportunity to render a partial verdict, any subsequently declared mistrial is without legal necessity and retrial is therefore barred under the double jeopardy clause. (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 514, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].) Thus was created a rule whose violation has particular significance. When a trial court errs by failing to provide the opportunity for a partial verdict, the error cannot be measured by any standard of prejudice. The error does not allow for reversal and retrial. Rather, to put it in the vernacular, the defendant walks.
*1125The CALJIC committee responded promptly to Stone. In 1982 it created instruction No. 8.75 (“Jury May Return Partial Verdict—Homicide”).1 The extensive “Use Note” and “Comment” to this instruction explain that, as contemplated by Stone, it may be used either before jury deliberations have commenced or after the jury advises the court it cannot reach a verdict.
*1126Delivery of this instruction insures that when the jury is deadlocked, a potentially guilty defendant will not be set free.2
Jury deliberations in Carolyn Chaney’s trial took place in 1986, four years after Stone and CALJIC No. 8.75. Upon hearing that the jury was deadlocked, the court, without any reference made to either Stone or CALJIC No. 8.75, commented that “it probably would not serve any great purpose [to continue deliberations] further.” The prosecutor, who offered no legal assistance to the court regarding Stone and CALJIC No. 8.75, stated, “I can’t in good conscience say that there is really anything else for the court to do but to declare [a mistrial] at this time.” Defense counsel, when arguing the plea of once in jeopardy at a later date, claimed that at the time of deliberations he was ignorant of Stone and CALJIC No. 8.75.
The result: Carolyn Chaney walks. Whether that was justice is left open to debate.
It might be of some consolation that the jury in this case appears to have been divided with 10 votes for involuntary manslaughter and 2 votes for voluntary manslaughter. But the result of dismissal compelled here by Stone would have been the same had the jury been split 10 for first degree murder and 2 for second degree murder.
The lesson to be learned from this case is quite clear; the solution to the problem when faced by any members of the bench and bar is readily available in CALJIC. Hopefully, the majority and this concurring opinion will heighten an awareness of Stone and CALJIC Nos. 8.75 and 17.12 so that the unnecessary dismissal of a criminal action such as the one that occurred here will not be repeated.

 CALJIC No. 8.75 provides: “In this case, defendant is charged [in Count_] with the offense of murder. Murder is divided into two degrees—murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. Voluntary manslaughter [and involuntary manslaughter] [is an] [are] lesser and necessarily included offense[s],
“The court [has provided] [will provide] you with verdict forms for each count charged and for each lesser and necessarily included offense. You should determine whether defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense of first degree murder [charged in Count_] [and any special finding you are directed to make]. If you unanimously agree that defendant is guilty of said offense [charged in Count_] [and any special finding you are directed to make], you will have your foreman date and sign the guilty verdict [and return with it into court]. Nothing further will be then required of you as to Count__
“If you unanimously agree that defendant is not guilty of murder in the first degree, you will have your foreman date and sign the not guilty verdict of the offense of murder in the first degree and you will determine whether defendant is guilty or not guilty of murder in the second degree. If you unanimously agree that defendant is guilty of the offense of murder in the second degree, you will have your foreman date and sign the guilty verdict of murder in the second degree and nothing further will be required of you as to the offense of murder [charged in Count_]. If you unanimously agree that defendant is not guilty of the offense of murder in the second degree, you will have your foreman date and sign the verdict not guilty of murder in the second degree and you will determine whether defendant is guilty or not guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter [or said lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter]. If you unanimously agree that defendant is guilty or not guilty of said lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter [or said lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter], you will have your foreman date and sign such guilty or not guilty verdict [and return it into court together with the not guilty verdict on the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder [charged in Count_] [as well as any special finding you are directed to make]].
“You will note from this instruction that you must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder before you may find defendant guilty or not guilty of second degree murder. If you are unable to unanimously agree on the charge of first degree murder, your foreman shall report such fact to the court. If you are unable to unanimously agree on the charge of second degree murder, your foreman shall report such fact to the court.
“You must unanimously agree that defendant is not guilty of second degree murder before you find him guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
“If you unanimously agree that defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder [charged in Count_], but after due and sufficient deliberation you cannot agree that defendant is guilty or not guilty of either voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, your foreman shall report such fact to the court and then return to the court the signed not guilty verdict of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder [charged in Count_].
“You will note from this instruction that if you unanimously agree that defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder [charged in Count -], you must have your foreman date and sign such verdicts and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offense[s] of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter."

For nonhomicide cases involving uncharged lesser included offenses, the CALJIC committee created instruction No. 17.12 (“Jury May Return Partial Verdict—Non-Homicide”).