Court Opinion

ID: 9580739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:08:19.095038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:29.213141
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As noted by the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has recognized the inexactitude often presented by the criterion of materiality in motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Bell v. State, 227 Ga. 800 (183 SE2d 357) (1971). In Bell, the Supreme Court held that a new trial should have been granted because the newly discovered evidence “might well authorize a different verdict, which is about as much probability as can be obtained under the evidence.” Id. at 808. The court in no way held that the newly discovered evidence must demand a different verdict. In the instant case, however, the majority opinion prescribes such a requirement, and I must respectfully dissent.
In establishing this requirement that newly discovered evidence *820must demand a different verdict before new trial may be granted, the majority opinion emphasizes the trial court’s declaration that the new evidence did not change his mind. At least with regard to non-jury cases, that reasoning, followed to its logical conclusion, would jeopardize appellate review of a ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. As a practical matter, this court will not likely find that newly discovered evidence demands a different verdict, where the actual trier of fact has already and unequivocally intimated that in his view the evidence makes no such demand. The only workable standard is that applied in Bell v. State, supra, and even the majority opinion implicitly acknowledges that the newly discovered evidence in this case meets that burden.
Decided January 28, 1986
Rehearing denied February 14, 1986
Thomas E. Maddox, Jr., for appellants.
Alan L. Martin, Solicitor, Robert J. Nesmith, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
A new hearing with the presentation of this new evidence would also, for the first time, provide the trial court the benefit of the confrontation of the victim with her prior inconsistent statement, and consideration of all the relevant, admissible evidence available. Under these circumstances, while the new evidence would not require a different verdict, it might well authorize one, and a new trial should have been granted.
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley joins in this dissent.