Court Opinion

ID: 9578240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:18.660875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:22.748803
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the decision to reverse, though my reasoning differs slightly.
Wike argues that the use of the DeSorbo’s conviction for violation of AS 04.15.-020(d) at Wike’s trial to prove DeSorbo’s age violates the hearsay rule and deprived Wike of the right to confront the witnesses against him, guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions (United States Constitution, Amendment VI and Alaska Constitution, Article I, § 11). The court agrees and reverses, citing Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899).1 The state defends the admissibility of the conviction, citing three hearsay exceptions: (1) the business records or official records exceptions, see Alaska Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8)(a); (2) the declaration against penal interest exception, see Rule 804(b)(3); and (3) the catch-all exception for evidence otherwise sufficiently verified, see Rules 804(5) and 803(23).
*359The official and business records exceptions would excuse the absence of the person or persons preparing the record, i. e., the district attorney who prepared the complaint and the judge who signed the judgment, but it would not excuse any DeSorbo statement included therein since the source of the information, DeSorbo’s trustworthiness, is not established. See Rule 803(8)(b) (v). Where hearsay is included within hearsay, each part must comform with an exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 805. Thus, neither the business records exception or the official records exception is a complete answer to the hearsay objection.
The two other exceptions cited by the state seem equally inapplicable. As the majority points out in its footnote 4, supra, no specific declarations by DeSorbo regarding his age were offered in evidence; rather the state sought to prove DeSorbo’s “declarations” circumstantially by offering the complaint charging DeSorbo with being under the age of nineteen on premises licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages. It then offered his conviction to show that DeSorbo pled guilty to the charges in that complaint, inferentially affirming their truth. While a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defenses, Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978), Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974), it is not an unambiguous assertion that the facts alleged in the complaint are true. A defendant may plead guilty for a number of reasons other than his belief that he is guilty. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171 (1970). This is particularly so where the crime is relatively minor, carries no social stigma, and a substantial sanction is unlikely. Compare Pennington v. Snow, supra, with Scott v. Robertson, 583 P.2d 188, 191-192 (Alaska 1978). It is true that the trial court should not accept a guilty plea without assuring itself that there is a factual basis for that plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, supra, but the two documents introduced in evidence do not establish that such an inquiry took place, or if it did that the information furnished was sufficiently verified to satisfy the hearsay rule.
Consequently, I do not believe that the complaint, coupled with the conviction, constituted a sufficient foundation to support an inference that DeSorbo made a declaration against penal interest. I therefore agree with the majority that the two documents were not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.2 Consequently, I do not find it necessary to determine whether a declaration of DeSorbo which would qualify as against his penal interest would satisfy Wike’s confrontation rights if used at the latter’s trial.
For the same reason, I do not believe the evidence is sufficiently verified to satisfy the requirements of Rule 804(5) and 803(23). I therefore concur in the judgment of the court.

. I recognize that when Kirby v. United States was decided in 1899, the federal courts, in company with the great majority of state courts, did not recognize declarations against penal interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See, e. g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272-277, 33 S.Ct. 449, 459-467, 57 L.Ed. 820, 832-834 (1913). I also recognize that Kirby did note dying declarations, a then recognized exception to the hearsay rule, as not violating the confrontation clause. Given the change in federal law regarding declarations against penal interest, Kirby does not provide a complete answer to the state’s arguments. See Fed.R. Evid. 804(b)(3) and the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of the interplay between the hearsay rule and the constitutional right to confrontation in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-156, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-1934, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495-496 (1970). It is also possible to view Kirby as depending more upon the law of judgments, i. e., res judicata and collateral estoppel, than on the law of evidence. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98, 91 S.Ct. 210, 224, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 232 (1970) (concurring opinion of Justice Harlan); J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1079, at 189 (Chadboum rev. ed. 1974). I do not believe that DeSorbo and Wike are sufficiently in privity that a judgment against the latter should be deemed a judgment against the former. See Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, at 375-376 (Alaska 1970).

. I find it unnecessary to determine (1) the extent to which hearsay exceptions in general satisfy the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions, see California v. Green, supra, and Ohio v. Roberts, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); (2) whether the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule specifically satisfies the confrontation clause, compare People v. Kennedy, 166 Cal.Rptr. 456 (Cal.App.1980) with Jacobs v. State, 45 Md.App. 634, 415 A.2d 590 (1980); (3) whether the state established a sufficient good faith attempt to present DeSor-bo at Wike’s trial to establish his unavailability for purposes of the hearsay rule, see Rule 804(a)(5), or the perhaps more stringent requirements of unavailability of the confrontation clause, see Ohio v. Roberts, supra, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) and especially Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); and (4) whether hearsay admitted pursuant to an exception satisfies the confrontation clause even though the evidence admitted is central to the prosecution’s case, see People v. Kennedy, supra, and compare Ohio v. Roberts, supra, with Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970).