Court Opinion

ID: 9738619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:58:35.66906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.337023
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, J.
(dissenting). The plaintiff, Mrs. Brooks, left her husband and two children to live in an adulterous relationship with the deceased, a much older man who was also married. They maintained an intimate sexual relationship until his health no longer permitted it. The “services” she performed for the deceased were owed to her husband under her solemn marriage vows. After the deceased became ill, she took care of him and performed some of the farm work. But this was not a separate undertaking. It was a continuation of the meretricious relationship she had established earlier.
The majority claims that Mrs. Brooks provided the decedent with “excellent nursing care during his lengthy last illness.” Moreover, they claim that the decedent’s son testified that when he visited his father’s home he found it was kept in good condition and that Mrs. Brooks was taking good care of his ill father. I find, after a thorough examination of the record, no evidence to substantiate the majority’s opinion that Mrs. Brooks provided “excellent nursing care,” but rather she provided “intermediate care” as he was not totally independent in taking care of his own needs. Secondly, the record also fails to substantiate that the decedent’s son testified that Mrs. Brooks “took good care of his ill father,” but rather he testified as follows:
“Q. And what’s the condition of the house when you were here ?
“A. It was in good shape.
“Q. And did she cook meals for you at that time ?
*516“A. Yes.
“Q. And your father?
“A. Yes.
“Q. When was the last time that you saw your father ?
“A. I saw him about the first week in May of 1976.
“Q. And that was at his home ?
“A. Right, that was at the south house.
“Q. And did you observe Mary Lou Brooks do anything for him at that time?
“A Yen T did
“Q. And what did she do ?
“A. She cooked dinner and she cooked meals for us.
“Q. Did she assist him in any way in getting around?
“A. She prepared his food for him and gave him a fork and he ate with his left hand.
“Q. Did she have to help him walk ?
“A. No, not on that date.
“Q. He was able to walk all by himself ?
“A. Yes.”
Out of a misguided sense of fairness, the author of the majority opinion implies a promise to pay from the “circumstances relating to the plaintiff’s entry into and her stay in the Steffes household.” I have examined the circumstances cited and can only reach the conclusion that sexual intimacy, in violation of their marriage vows, was the underlying motivation for Mrs. Brooks’ entry into and stay in the home of the deceased. In Estate of Fox, 178 Wis. 369, 190 N.W. 90 (1922) this court said that:
“Courts are practically unanimous in holding that when a woman voluntarily and knowingly lives in illicit relations with a man she cannot recover on an implied contract for services rendered him during the period of such relationship. 29 L.R.A.n.s. 787.” Id. at 371.
The majority opinion says Mrs. Brooks testified she expected compensation. I disagree. Her actual testimony was as follows:
“Q. Did you receive any wages from Mr. Steffes?
“A. No sir.
*517“Q. From July of’74 until his death?
“A. No sir.
“Q. Did you expect to receive any money for the work that you did ?
“A. No.
“Q. Pardon?
“A. No, but he always told me that—
“By Mr. Antoine: I would object to what he said. That’s hearsay and she’s not competent to testify to it.
“By the Court: I’ll sustain the objection.

“By Mr. Urban:

“Q. Did you understand that question ?
“A. No.
“Q. Let me ask you differently. Did you expect to receive anything for the services you performed for Virgil Steffes from July 17, 1974, until the time of his death ?
“By Mr. Antoine: Object to that. It’s already been answered.
“By the Court: No, the previous question was a little different. The other question was, do you expect to receive any money, and this question is, do you expect to receive anything, and that’s a different question. Answer the question.
“A. Yes.”
In Estate of Detjen, 84 Wis.2d 46, 148 N.W.2d 745 (1967) this court held that:
“Whether the claim involves services rendered to the decedent or payments made for her benefit, the foundation for recovery generally is the same — a contract express or implied. And, whatever the initial presumptions may be, the final determination, we have said in the Estate of Kuepper (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 577, 107 N.W. (2d) 621, depends not on a rule of law which awards or denies compensation for services rendered depending on the family relationship of the parties or the house they live in, but upon the existence or non-existence of an express promise, or one implied in fact, that the services were to be paid for.” Id. at 52, 53.
Furthermore, in In the Matter of Guardianship of Kordecki, 95 Wis.2d 275, 290 N.W.2d 693 (1980) this court, *518quoting- from Estate of Detjen, supra, held, with regard to the general rule of implied-in-fact contracts, that:
. a promise to pay will not be implied if a benefit is conferred with no expectation of payment but is conferred from motives of friendliness, neighborliness, kindliness or charity.” Id. at 280.
In this case, Mrs. Brooks did not expect to be paid, although it should be pointed out that Mrs. Brooks did not go uncompensated, she received clothing, board, food, lodging, plus $7,200 from the sale of horses and cattle and $3,200 towards the purchase of a car while living with the deceased. She expected the deceased to leave her the farm, but he sold it before his death and did not leave her the proceeds. Of this fact she was well aware, but still did not leave and return to her husband and children she had abandoned. Now the majority gives her money compensation she never expected as a consolation prize. The amount of money compensation that the majority awards to the plaintiff is minor in comparison to the total value of the decedent’s gross estate. However, the fact that the plaintiff’s recovery is small when compared to the gross value of the estate does not support the court’s holding because the total value of the estate is immaterial. Likewise, the amount of money taken in an armed robbery or the amount of money obtained in a check forgery scheme are immaterial, but the underlying principle of law is this court’s granting of a consolation prize to a woman who has abandoned her family and entered an adulterous relationship with a married man in violation of the laws of this state. In affirming the trial court’s award of $14,600 from the estate to Mrs. Brooks, are we not depriving the decedent’s lawful heirs, his children, of their just and complete inheritance? Is she also allowed to inherit from her own lawful husband should he predecease her *519and before a lawful divorce? Is she entitled to her dower-elective share rights ? Within the past six months, the Illinois Supreme Court, when confronted with a similar problem, commented in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill.2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) as follows:
“The issue of unmarried cohabitants’ mutual property rights, however, as we earlier noted, cannot appropriately be characterized solely in terms of contract law, nor is it limited to considerations of equity or fairness as between the parties to such relationships. There are major public policy questions involved in determining whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to accord some type of legal status to claims arising from such relationships. Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage. Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages can be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into what have heretofore been commonly referred to as ‘illicit’ or ‘meretricious’ relationships encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society? In the event of death shall the survivor have the status of a surviving spouse for purposes of inheritance, wrongful death actions, workmen’s compensation, etc.? And still more importantly: what of the children born of such relationships? What are their support and inheritance rights and by what standards are custody questions resolved ? What of the sociological and psychological effects upon them of that type of environment? Does not the recognition of legally enforceable property and custody rights emanating from nonmarital cohabitation in practical effect equate with the legalization of common law marriage — at least in the circumstances of this case? And, in summary, have the increasing numbers of unmarried cohabitants and changing mores of our society . . . reached the point at which the general welfare of the citizens of this State is best served by a return to something resembling the judicially created common law marriage our legislature outlawed in 1905 ?” Id. at 1207-08.
*520In the case at bar, there could not be a common-law marriage without a lawful divorce. Mrs. Brooks and the deceased were content to maintain their prior marital status while living together in open defiance of their vows and the laws of the state of Wisconsin. This court ought not to allow Mrs. Brooks to assert a right to compensation growing out of a relationship which offends the standards of decency of any age. Their lifestyle has not been condoned, but has been rejected by our legislature. Moreover, the majority’s decision contravenes the intent and policy of “The Family Code” of this state as recited in sec. 245.001(2), Stats., which reads in part as follows:
“(2) Intent. It is the intent of chs. 245 to 248 to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of the marriage contract are more significant to society than those of other contracts, and the public interest must be taken into account always. . . .”
The majority, in its opinion, cites a California Supreme Court case, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), as establishing the existence of certain mutual property rights between parties living together outside of marriage. California, unlike Wisconsin, has repealed its statute imposing criminal sanctions for sexual activity between unmarried, consenting adults. Thus, in California there is no barrier to adults living together out of wedlock. However, where a state has established a statutory barrier to cohabitation between unmarried adults that law should be given full force and effect and not be undermined. Attempts have been made in Wisconsin, in fact as recently as the current legislative session to abolish or eliminate the *521statutory barrier preventing consenting adults who are married to another person from living together and engaging in adulterous behavior but these attempts have been unsuccessful. In a recent tax case, Ensminger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 610 F.2d 189 (1979) the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a taxpayer could not claim as a dependent a 21 year old woman, not his wife, with whom he lived and supported because their relationship “was in violation of local law.” In that case North Carolina had a statute holding that lewd and lascivious cohabitation between a man and woman not married to each other was a misdemeanor. The court also stated that:
“The regulation of marriage, family life and domestic affairs ‘has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the states.’ ” Id. at 191.
I believe the majority has resorted to an unfortunate form of judicial surgery that can only serve to accelerate the growth of the self-destructive cancer of the ’70’s “immorality” and the decline of the family. If there is to be a direct, frontal assault on the traditional values, principles, ideals and pattern of family life, the very lifeline and backbone of our American society, it should be accomplished within the confines of the legislative halls — not in the courts. The judicial system is ill equipped to deal with a social change of this magnitude because we are without the benefit of up-to-date economic, social and psychological data in the field of domestic relations and the far reaching implications of court approved abandonment and the problems accompanying fatherless and motherless children in the decades ahead. With this decision are we not condoning abandonment? broken homes? Are not 95% of all juvenile law violators from broken homes? Are not by *522far the vast majority of welfare problems directly attributable to abandonment? If there is a need for a change in this far reaching public policy question, and I fail to see the necessity, let it be done after a legislative fact-finding hearing where a more thorough discussion can only lead to greater knowledge and expertise in the solving of this most delicate question. The Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt, supra, held that the decision of whether the present law should be changed so.as to grant legal rights or status to a non-marital relationship, such as existed in this case, is best left to the legislature:
“. . . The question whether change is needed in the law governing the rights of parties in this delicate area of .marriage-like relationships involves evaluations of sociological data and alternatives we believe best suited to the superior investigative and fact-finding facilities of the legislative branch in the exercise of its traditional authority to declare public policy in the domestic relations field.” Id. at 1209.
Therefore, I would reverse.