Court Opinion

ID: 9702520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:15:13.831323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.320776
License: Public Domain

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority that Sections 8(3) (12) (13) are unconstitutional and that enforcement thereof should be enjoined. I also agree that many of the other provisions of the Act do not present a justiciable controversy at this time and that we should therefore refrain from passing upon them, notwithstanding that all the parties would like to have us do so. I proceed upon the assumption that it is agreed that Section 3, which requires a license of a business agent — whatever the definition of a business agent may be — places a burden upon the exercise of the right of free assembly and of free speech, and that Section 4, which requires the filing of the Constitution and by-laws, and Section 8(7) (8), which make it a criminal offense for one to act as business agent without a license or to act as business agent for a labor organization whose constitution and by-laws are not on file likewise impose burdens upon the exercise of these same rights. These sections either do or do not burden the right of speech and of peaceable assembly, and if they do, it is our duty to pass upon the reasonableness thereof. If compliance with these sections is not required before one may exercise the right of free speech and of peaceable assembly, we should so state in clear language, and make it the basis for our refusal to issue the injunction. There is language in the majority opinion from which an inference might be drawn that an interpretation of the term “business agent” and of what activities fall within the scope of his employment might be necessary before we could determine whether these sections impinge upon these constitutional rights. I discard that possibility as a basis for the decision of the majority, because in that event we should stay our hand and require the parties to obtain that interpretation in the state courts before we decide whether these provisions violate the constitutional rights of free 'speech and of free assembly. While the opinion of the majority does not state that these provisions do or do not constitute an unwarranted interference with the right of free speech and peaceable assembly with the same degree of definiteness of language that is used in passing upon the constitutionality of Section 8(3) (12) (13), I conclude that the refusal of the majority to enjoin interference with the right of free speech without complying with these sections means that the majority holds that these provisions do not violate these constitutional guarantees. This is the basis of my dissent.
It is without doubt true that the protection of the rights of individuals, as well as the general welfare of the community as a whole, justifies the imposition of many burdens and restraints upon one in the exercise of his constitutional rights of free speech or of peaceable assembly. These rights are not absolute. In organized society there is no such thing as absolute freedom of action, whether by means of free speech, free assembly, or in any other way. Organized society is made possible only by the relinquishment of individual rights. The more complex society becomes, the more regulation of our conduct toward each other becomes necessary. All of this is accomplished through constitu*63tional legislative enactments under the great reservoir of implied power generally spoken of as the police power of a state, Emergencies or new complexities do not create power to legislate. They merely occasion the right to use the existing power, In the absence of such new situations, the exercise of the power would be unreasonable and unwarranted.
No one can intelligently challenge the right of government to regulate labor unions. It may regulate chambers of commerce, church organizations, or any of the innumerable associations formed for the. mutual benefit of the members, when such activities come into conflict with public interest or the reasonable rights of others, So the State may, by appropriate regulation, protect laborers eligible to membership in unions against exploitation by unscrupulous agents, against exaction of unreasonable dues, or against fraud, or in many other’ ways, the same as it may protect the public against quacks of all kinds or as it may protect one business man against unfair trade practices by his competitor.
Freedom of worship is one of the most sacred of our constitutional guarantees and is most zealously guarded by the courts, But that does not mean that a church society may hold a revival on a summer night in a populous residential district and sing hallelujahs and shout hosannas until 2:00 o’clock in the morning. Neither does it warrant a congregation in blocking the pub-lie streets or the private driveways in the vicinity of the church and in denying to the public or to the individual residents ingress or egress thereto. What I am trying to say is that all individual rights are relative, and subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of the community as a whole. No one would contend that a regulation prohibiting the holding of a revival in a thickly populated residential section at 2 o clock in the morning was unconstitutional because it challenged the right of free speech or free assembly. Neither would anyone contend that such a regulation of a revival in a rural area, five miles from any residence, was constitutional. It is not enough that there is power to regulate or even need for regulation, but the regulation m every m-stance must be reasonable and must reasonably tend to accomplish a permissible attainment. ■
The Alabama Supreme Court, in the case referred to in the majority opinion, as well as the majority in this case, stress the well-recognized principle of law that there is a presumption of constitutionality and that courts are loath to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature, and that they will not strike down legislation unless it can clearly be said that there is no constitutional authority for the same. With this wholesome principle I am in full ac-cor<^'
But is has no application when sacred constitutional guaranteed rights are involved. Then an entirely different principle must guide us. That is the conclusion I draw from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Thomas case. The court points out that these constitutional guarantees have a sanctity and solemnity which it not accorded to general rights arising by operation of statutory law. When a regulation impinges one of these rights, it must not only be justified by a clear public interest and be passed to meet a clear and present danger to such right, but it must also be reasonable and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished. In such case, there is no presumption of constitutionality. There is rather a suspicion in the minds of the courts, the guardian of our constitutional liberties, and the burden is upon him who would uphold the interference with such rights to carry the burden of justifying the interference within the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the Thomas case, As stated by the Supreme Court, when the right to restrict the exercise of free speech is the subject of inquiry, it is our “tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction.” [323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323.]
Our ;nqUiry then is to ascertain the reasonableness of the restraints placed upon constitutional rights of free speech and free assembly by these provisions of the aC£ w¡thin the definitions as laid down, "pbere can be no imminent danger to the public or to the rights of others in the mere exercise of the rights of peaceable assembly or 0f free speech. Peaceable assembly neg-ativeS danger to the rights of others, Neither can danger be implied from the mere exercise of the right of free speech, The dang-er t0 the pu.biic or t0 others comeS) if at all, from the time, the manner, or the way in which these rights are exer_ cised. The State has a right to regulate the time, the manner, the place, the means, and the conditions under which these *64rights are exercised. It may not burden the right itself. The State may not require anything as a condition precedent to the exercise of the right to strike. It may, by appropriate legislation, regulate the manner in which a strike is carried on. The distinction is between the right to speak and the way in which the right is exercised. The one is subject to regulation — the other is not. It is, of course, obvious that the one shades into the other. In a way, regulating the time and the manner in which a speech is delivered is a regulation of the right to speak. There is, however, a valid distinction. The fact that the two are so interrelated accentuates the necessity of inquiry to make sure that any burden placed upon the right to speak is passed for the purpose of accomplishing permissible regulation of the manner in which that right is exercised, and that it reasonably tends to accomplish that purpose.
What -abuses does the act seek to regulate, what public interest is sought to be promoted, what pernicious labor activities are sought to be controlled- or prohibited by the sections of the Act that burden the right of free speech or of free assembly? The answer is, none. How do the requirements for a license or the prohibition to act as a labor representative when the constitution and by-laws are not on file tend to protect the public against any unfair labor practices in addition to the protection that is afforded by the penal sections of the Act? The requirement of a license, the filing of the constitution and by-laws, in no way relate, directly or remotely, to the provisions regarding strikes, picketing, unlawful seizure or occupancy of other’s property during a labor controversy. Doing any of these things does not affect the right to a license or the right to speak or peaceably assemble. The remedial provisions of the act are as effective without the provision of a license Or the filing of the constitution and by-laws as with them. Under these circumstances, conditioning the right to speak upon the procurement of a license or upon the filing of the constitution and by-laws is an unwarranted and unreasonable burden upon the right of free speech and of peaceable assembly. It is not necessary to decide whether the State may, by appropriate legislation, require an association to file its constitution and by-laws, or whether it may require a license of a business agent of an association before he may operate in the state. For the purpose of this dissent this right may -be conceded. It is sufficient to say that it may not, in the manner in which it has in this Act, thus condition the right to speak or to peaceably assemble.
The majority attempt to make a distinction between a person acting in a purely individual capacity and as a representative of a collective group or association. It is stated that one acting as the representative of an association is not exercising his personal rights. That such distinction exists in many instances is of course obvious. A good illustration is apparent from the facts 'upon which rest the decision in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542. But if by that is meant or implied that the right to speak, when exercised in behalf of an organization which the speaker represents, may be burdened otherwise than when he speaks for himself, I cannot agree. Thomas was a paid organizer and represented his union and was speaking as such and in behalf of the union when he made the speech in which the injunction was issued and which the Supreme Court struck down.
If the State may say to a labor organizer that he may not address a meeting called in the interest of his union and being conducted in a proper manner, because he has no license or because the constitution and by-laws of the organization are not on file, it may likewise say to a minister of the Gospel that he may not speak to a church meeting if he does not have a license or if the constitution and by-laws of the church are not on file. Freedom of speech is no more sacred and is just as subject to proper regulation when exercised in behalf of religion as for any other lawful purpose.
The provisions of the statute prohibiting the doing of certain things and regulating the doing of others are just as effective without the provisions requiring the license or the filing of the constitution and -by-laws as with them, and the burden which they impose upon the constitutional right of free speech and of free assembly is therefore unreasonable and unwarranted.
We cannot shrug these burdens off by saying that the means to be employed was for the consideration of the Legislature and we will not substitute our judgment or interfere with its exercise of discretion. These matters burden constitutional rights. The State may not do this unless it clearly shows the danger to be prevented and the reasonableness of the measures employed. *65The State has failed to show that there is imminent grave danger to the public which requires the imposition of these burdens. Furthermore, the State has wholly and completely failed to show that these burdens, as they are set out in the statute, have any reasonable or substantial relation to any remedial object sought to be obtained by the remedial provisions of the statute.
I would enjoin the enforcement of all the provisions of the statute that are made a condition precedent to the right to speak or peaceably assemble.