Court Opinion

ID: 9749302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:32:35.878751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:46.185673
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Chidsey:
These cases came before the Court on the pleadings. Preliminary objections filed by the plaintiffs in the nature of a demurrer, were sustained. It was admitted by the defendants that the plaintiffs who were sheriff’s officers employed at. the salary of $3,250 per annum, were discharged without notice of the charges against them or an opportunity- to be heard. -The. crux - of- the case therefore is whether- such notice-.and- opportunity to be heard were -a prerequisite to the action taken -by the sheriff. If they were, then-no ex post facto showing of cause can cure the failure to perform this condition precedent.
It was claimed on behalf of the plaintiffs that the sheriff had-no right-to peremptorily dismiss them because they fell within .-the-procedural-provisions pre*327liminary to dismissal established by the civil service regulations. To my mind the language of these regulations does not embrace the plaintiffs; and if it did, then the plaintiffs’ remedy would be by appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
In my opinion the plaintiffs enjoyed the right to be notified of the cause for their dismissal and an opportunity to be heard, irrespective of any express legislation or regulation providing therefor, and that the same would be true in the case of employes enjoying full civil service status if there were no such provisions.
Concededly if the plaintiffs enjoyed no tenure and were merely employed at the will of the sheriff, as was formerly the case, the latter could summarily discharge them. But the City Charter provided that they should be retained until they were afforded a qualifying test. In Carrow v. Philadelphia, 371 Pa. 255, 89 A. 2d 496, we held that the class of employes to which plaintiffs belong must be continued in their positions until such qualifying test was given. Thus unquestionably they were given tenure of position.
It is argued that we stated in the Carrow case that such employes could be discharged for cause. This of course is true, and so can employes enjoying full civil service status. But that is not the point. The question is whether an employe of either class can be summarily dismissed without notice of the charges against him and the opportunity to be heard. It is asserted that this privilege or right applies only to those employed for a stated term. With this I do not agree. The tenor of textbook authorities and decisions on the subject is to the effect that tenure is the basis for the rule, which in turn rests upon the fundamental concept that one enjoying tenure of office should not, as a matter of ordinary fairness, be subjected to the opprobrium and *328other adverse consequences of discharge without the opportunity to know and meet the charges against him.
In McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Yol. 4, Sec. 12.255, pp. 332, 333, it is stated: “. . . Where power to remove is conferred and the procedure thereof is not specified, the law will imply authority to do whatever is proper to execute the power, consistent with the right of the accused to a fair and impartial hearing, which action must provide for notice, charges and opportunity to be heard. In such case the substantial principles of the common law should be observed. But if the officer is appointed during pleasure, or if the power of removal is discretionary, as explained elsewhere, the power to remove may be exercised without notice" or hearing. However, where the appointment is ■ during good behavior, or where the removal must be for 'cause, the power of removal cam only be exercised when charges are made against the accused, and after sufficient notice to afford him a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the officer or body having the power to remove him.”.* Among numerous cases cited to the text is the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Board of Street Com’rs of Hagerstown v. Williams, 96 Md. 232, 53 A. 923. There the board of street commissioners were authorized to appoint policemen “subject to removal for cause”. The policemen received no definite term of employment. A policeman summarily dismissed brought a mandamus proceeding for reinstatement because he had been given no notice or opportunity to be heard. The Court upheld the plaintiff’s contention, and in the course of its opinion said: .“. . . A removal for cause is, therefore, the only limitation fixed by the statute to their tenure. This being so an appointment is in legal effect an appointment dur*329ing good behavior, or so long as the appointee is competent to discharge the duties of the office or efficient in the performance of them. The term is not, therefore, indefinite, nor is it determinable at the mere will of the appointing power. True the term may be put an end to, but when terminated it must be terminated for cause. . . As the tenure of the policemen appointed under the charter of Hagerstown can be cut short only Tor cause,’ it is clear that it cannot be terminated without cause. The phrase Tor cause’ does not mean the arbitrary will of the appointing power, for that might be the outgrowth of mere whim, caprice, prejudice or passion, which would, in reality, be no cause at all. But the phrase ‘for cause’ must mean some cause affecting or concerning the ability or fitness of the incumbent to perform the duty imposed upon him. ‘The cause must be one affecting the officer’s capacity or fitness for the office.’ 21 Am. & Eng. Ency.'L. (2nd ed.) 850. Hence it must be inefficiency, incompetency, or other kindred disqualification. This being the case the appointee does not hold at the will of the appointing power, and the doctrine laid down in State ex rel. O’Neill v. Register and in Townsend v. Kurtz, supra, does not apply. When the right to remove can be exercised only for specific cause, or for cause generally, the appointing power cannot arbitrarily remove the officer, and where the removal is to be had for cause the power cannot be exercised until the officer has been duly notified and an opportunity has been given him to be heard in his own defense; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (1st ed.) 562G- and note 5, or, as tersely put by the Supreme Court of Missouri: ‘Where the appointment is during good behavior, or where the removal must be for cause, the power of removal can only be exercised when charges are made against the accused, and after notice, with a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the *330officer or body haying the power to remove. . . .’ The reasoning and conclusion reached in this case comport with the basal elements of justice upon which our system of jurisprudence is founded.
For the reason stated, I join in affirming the action of the court below.

 (Emphasis supplied).

 (Emphasis supplied).