Court Opinion

ID: 9716209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:30:55.798339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:55.465972
License: Public Domain

MORAN, J., dissenting: While the majority opinion has been ably prepared by my colleagues, I feel compelled to dissent from the conclusions reached by them relative to the reversal of the trial court’s order dismissing count I of the complaint. My reasons for doing so are as follows: The Dram Shop Act, while it is remedial in purpose, still is penal in character and therefore should be strictly construed so as not to enlarge its language by interpretation. Rittmeyer v. Anderson, 49 Ill App2d 71, 75, 199 NE2d 463 (1964); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill App2d 412, 420, 199 NE2d 300 (1964), appeal denied, 30 Ill2d 627. The opinion today not only liberally construes the Act but enlarges its language through interpretation. I question the premise that the wrong contemplated by the Act is singular and limited to the giving or selling of liquor to any person, which giving or selling causes the intoxication of such person. It is my opinion that the wrong contemplated by the Act is twofold, one being the intoxication of a person and the other being an injury caused by that person as a result of the intoxication. Either one standing alone would not be actionable. It is necessary that a combination of the two would have to take place in order to reap the benefits of the right created by the Act. Therefore, contrary to the majority opinion, the place of the injury becomes relevant and, consequently, is a proper subject for legislative determination. The right as created by the legislature was unknown to the common law. If the Act need be enlarged to in-elude extraterritorial effect, then it should be the legislature and not the courts that should extend or modify its present limitations. See, Maki v. Frelk (Ill2d), 239 NE2d 445 (1968). This is especially true in light of the fact that our court has continually and consistently held that the Dram Shop Act is without extraterritorial effeet. See, Rubitsky v. Russo’s Derby, Inc., 70 Ill App2d 482, 216 NE2d 680 (1966); Liff v. Haezbroeck, 51 Ill App2d 70, 200 NE2d 525 (1964); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill App2d 392, 187 NE2d 292 (1963); Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill App2d 578, 153 NE2d 106 (1958); Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill App 151, 95 NE2d 512 (1950). It should be further noted that the Rubitsky case was not brought under the Dram Shop Act; in the Butler case both plaintiffs were citizens of Illinois, as was the plaintiff in the case at bar, and, in both the Eldridge and Colligan cases, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. A further consideration is that, since the rule was first annunciated in the Eldridge case in 1950, there have been five amendments, by the legislature, of the section involved, none of which fostered extraterritorial effect. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the trial court was correct in dismissing count I of the complaint. I concur with the majority opinion as to count II of the complaint and, therefore, I would affirm the order of the trial court in all respects as to the complaint filed by the plaintiff herein.