Court Opinion

ID: 9546460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:29:37.204501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:28.868163
License: Public Domain

*178SPEAR, Justice
(dissenting) :
The majority apparently concedes that “Griffin was totally and permanently disabled from continuing in his former employment." Yet despite this “permanent disability,” the majority would still limit the Board’s none-too-generous 75% award to an award of 50% partial permanent disability. With this conclusion I cannot agree. If claimant is permanently disabled, he is entitled to 100% permanent disability compensation, not to 50 or 75 percent permanent partial disability compensation.
As Professor Larson has stated in his treatise on Workmen’s Compensation:
“The total effect of two successive injuries may be much greater than the sum of schedule allowances for the parts
“The successive-injury problem arises from the obvious fact that the combined effect of two physical disabilities is often far greater than would be reflected by merely adding together the schedule allowances for each injury existing separately. The loss of a leg, which would ordinarily mean only partial disability to a normal person, results in total disability to the man who has already, from whatever cause, lost the other leg.” 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§ 59.00, 59.10 (1968).
In the case at bar, the effect of the doctors’ testimony is that claimant lost one leg prior to January 7, 1965, and lost another leg as a result of the accident he suffered on that date. Yet, by the majority’s reasoning, the claimant is to be compensated as though he still had one good leg.
Since both of claimant’s injuries occurred while employed by the same employer, questions of apportionment and second injury fund liability are not involved. The general rule, that the employer is liable for the entire disability resulting from a compensable accident, becomes operable. I.C. § 72 — 315(b); McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 203 P. 1068 (1921) ; Kelley v. Prouty, 54 Idaho 225, 30 P.2d 769 (1934); 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law § 59.-10 (1968). See also, Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18, 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Poehlman v. Leydig, 194 Kan. 649, 400 P.2d 724 (1965); Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 S.2d 731 (Fla.1967). See generally, Sowell v. Travelers Insurance Co., 374 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1963); Goodman v. Margolis, 8 A.D.2d 864, 187 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1959).
From the evidence presented to the Board it should have found either 50% or 100% disability, not compromised at 75%, depending upon which evidence the Board determined was the more credible or trustworthy. The majority opinion has settled on the 50%; but I feel respondent-cross-appellant is entitled to 100% particularly in view of the principle long followed in Idaho that:
“This court has repeatedly held that the Workmen’s Compensation Law must be liberally construed with the view to effect its purpose and promote justice.”
Manning v. Win Her Stables, 91 Idaho 549, 428 P.2d 55 (1967); Collins v. Moyle, 83 Idaho 151, 358 P.2d 1035 (1961). Additionally this court has stated that
“ * * * all courts are agreed that there should be accorded to the Workmen’s Compensation Act a broad and liberal construction, that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation, and that the humane purposes which these acts seek to serve leave no room for narrow technical construction.” Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946).
quoted in Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). Likewise, when the facts are about equally balanced in either of two ways, the one favoring the injured employee should be preferred. The petition should be returned to the Board with instructions to award 100% permanent disability.