Court Opinion

ID: 9584748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:22.462407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:56.081487
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I fully concur in Division 2 of the majority opinion and I fully concur in the analysis and holding of Division 1,1 do not agree with that portion of Division 1 that the release of the records did not present a jury issue that HMC and Jackson’s conduct was “malicious, wilful, or wanton.”
First, this case is about the unauthorized release of psychiatric hospital treatment records without subpoena or court order. Second, the unauthorized release of psychiatric records is expressly prohibited under OCGA §§ 24-9-21 (5) (patient-psychiatrist privilege); 37-3-166 (psychiatric hospital records); 43-39-16 (patient-psychologist); 42 USC § 290dd-2 (confidentiality of drug and alcohol treatment records); or 42 CFR Part 2, §§ 1-2.23, pp. 7-18 for any hospital patient treated for drug, alcohol, or psychiatric condition, and such privilege of confidentiality is the most restrictive in the discovery and evidence codes. Such psychiatric privilege is so restrictive that even the constitutional right of confrontation of a prosecution witness will not overcome the privilege where there exists a substantial equivalent source of information available that is not privileged or the privilege has been waived. See Bobo v. State, 256 Ga. 357, 358-360 (3) (349 SE2d 690) (1986). The facts and circumstances of this case show such conscious indifference to the consequences of such statutory duties as to constitute wanton misconduct.
“Conscious indifference,” “reckless disregard of the rights of others,” and “wilful and wanton misconduct” refer to essentially the same degree of culpability. See Arrington v. Trammell, 83 Ga. App. 107, 110-112 (62 SE2d 451) (1950). There are two elements to “wilful and wanton misconduct”; first, the defendant must be actually aware of the plaintiff as subject to the risk of harm, i.e., the potential presence of psychiatric records in a request for all the patient’s medical records in response to a request for production of documents in a lawsuit; second, the defendant must recognize and appreciate as a reasonably prudent person the substantial probability of harm to the former psychiatric patient if their psychiatric records are released. See generally Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 217 Ga. 438, 443 (1) (123 SE2d 261) (1961); Poole v. City of Louisville, 107 Ga. App. 305, 307-308 (1) (130 SE2d 157) (1963); Arrington v. Trammell, supra; Ga. Power Co. v. Deese, 78 Ga. App. 704, 708 (51 SE2d 724) (1949). “Disregard of general consequences is a part of wanton behavior.” Ford v. Whipple, 225 Ga. App. 276, 278 (483 SE2d 591) (1997).
*209First, it has long been recognized that wilful and wanton conduct is not a form of negligent conduct but is a separate and distinct degree of conduct that more closely equates to intentional conduct. “There is an element of intent, actual or imputed, in wilful and wanton conduct which removes such conduct from the range of conduct which may be termed negligent.” (Punctuation omitted.) Martin v. Gaither, 219 Ga. App. 646, 652 (466 SE2d 621) (1995).
McEachern v. Muldovan, 234 Ga. App. 152, 157 (2) (b) (505 SE2d 495) (1998).
“To state a cause of action for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury, no actual damages need be shown where wilful, wanton, voluntary or intentional misconduct is alleged. Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer &c., 252 Ga. 149, 150 (311 SE2d 818) (1984).” Whitehead v. Cuffie, 185 Ga. App. 351, 353 (364 SE2d 87) (1987).
[W]hen the claim is for intentional misconduct, damages for mental distress may be recovered without proof of physical injury. Tuggle v. Wilson, 248 Ga. 335, 337 (282 SE2d 110) (1981). That principle has its corollary in this: reckless and wanton disregard of consequences may evince an intention to inflict injury. Carr v. Woodside Storage Co., [supra at 443]. “(I)t is equally well established that for a reckless disregard of the rights of others, equivalent to an intentional tort by the defendant, the injured party may recover for the mental pain and anguish suffered therefrom.” Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408 (1) (193 SE 102) (1937), quoted with approval in McCoy v. Ga. Baptist Hospital, 167 Ga. App. 495, 498 (306 SE2d 746) (1983).
Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer &c., supra at 150. “[T]hat entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to the consequences . . . relates to an intentional disregard of the rights of another, knowingly or wilfully disregarding such rights.” Gilman Paper Co. v. James, 235 Ga. 348, 351 (219 SE2d 447) (1975); accord Bowen v. Waters, 170 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (316 SE2d 497) (1984); Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 168 Ga. App. 754, 755 (1) (309 SE2d 921) (1983). Such standard of wilful misconduct applies to punitive damages and is applicable here, because OCGA § 51-12-6 prior to 1987 was a species of punitive or vindictive damages where the entire injury was directed to the peace and happiness of the plaintiff, but the General Assembly changed the nature of such dam*210ages from punitive to general damages.2 Clearly, the unauthorized release of this patient’s psychiatric records may be considered by a jury to be a wilful and wanton act directed at the plaintiffs. Thus, an intentional tort was directed at the plaintiffs alone, allowing recovery for mental pain and suffering where the entire injury is to the peace and happiness. SeeRyckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828 (412 SE2d 826) (1992); Ob-Gyn Assoc. &c. v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665 (2) (A) (386 SE2d 146) (1989); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein &c., supra at 150; Westview Cemetery v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540 (216 SE2d 776) (1975); Jordan v. Atlanta Affordable Housing Fund, Ltd., 230 Ga. App. 734, 736-738 (2) (498 SE2d 104) (1998); Ford v. Whipple, supra at 278.
Decided July 16, 1999
Dozier, Lee, Graham & Sikes, Joel M. Grist, Jr., for appellants.
Jones, Cork & Miller, Wendell K. Howell, C. Ashley Royal, for appellees.
For the defendants to confess that they were negligent as a lesser degree of culpability does not eliminate the jury issue that the conduct was wilful and wanton. It was for the jury to decide if the defendants were negligent or wilful and wanton and not for the trial court. Arrington v. Trammell, supra at 113.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.

 Ga. L. 1987, p. 915, § 6, codified as OCGA § 51-12-6, repealed vindictive damages as a punitive damage and recreated such damages to the peace and happiness as a general damage, measured in the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors. The descriptive content title, id. at 916, reads “to provide for injuries to peace, happiness, or feelings.” The body of OCGA § 51-12-6 expressly states that in such action punitive damages are not recoverable.