Court Opinion

ID: 2715239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-06 17:20:09.972921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:12.986987
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON                                          t. •

                                    DIVISION ONE                                    CS>    —4 C-

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                                 w         —n

                                                No. 69692-1-
                                                                                      O
                      Respondent,

               v.

                                                                                          94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). A

claim of insufficient evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and all

inferences that reasonably can be drawn from it. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192,

201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct

evidence. State v. Vermillion, 66 Wn. App. 332, 342, 832 P.2d 95 (1992).

       Vieau argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

because no one saw him take the wallet and there were other people in the church

that day. This argument ignores substantial evidence that he had both the motive

       1A person is guilty of second degree theft "if he or she commits theft of. . .
[a]n access device." Former RCW 9A.56.040(1)(c) (2009). An access device is
defined as "any card, .. . account number, or other means of account access that
can be used ... to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value."
RCW9A.56.010(1).
                                              3
No. 69692-1-1/4

and opportunity to take the wallet, that he acted dishonestly when he told

Cunningham his wife was in the hospital and took her money, and that he exhibited

guilty knowledge when he hurriedly exited the church. Viewed in a light most

favorable to the State, this evidence, and the reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from it, were sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Vieau

committed the offense.

       Vieau also argues that his judgment and sentence should be remanded to

correct a scrivener's error. Specifically, he contends the statutory provision under

which he was charged, RCW 9A.56.040(1)(c), proscribes the theft of metal wire, not

access devices. Although that statute was amended after Vieau's offense, the

version of the statute in effect when he committed his offense proscribed theft of an

access device. See former RCW 9A.56.040(1)(c) (2009). That version of the statute

controls. State v. Snedden, 166 Wn. App. 541, 543, 271 P.3d 298 (2012). There

was no scrivener's error.

       Affirmed.

                                            FOR THE COURT:

                                          MAi