Court Opinion

ID: 9363245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:58:11.853072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.147200
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     DEC 20 2022
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAHMOUD SAQQA,                                  No.   21-16617

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,          D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-00331-WBS-AC
     v.

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN; KRIS                     MEMORANDUM*
BALAJI,

                  Defendants-Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of California
                     William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022
                              San Francisco, California

Before: LUCERO,** BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

          Plaintiff-Appellant Mahmoud Saqqa appeals the district court’s decision

granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees San Joaquin County

and Kris Balaji. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

*
   This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
   The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
      Saqqa is a Jordanian-born, Caucasian engineer who worked in the County’s

Department of Public Works. Throughout Saqqa’s tenure, the County’s Director of

Public Works, Kris Balaji, repeatedly criticized Saqqa and made harsh remarks.

When Saqqa and another engineer sought the same promotion, neither was awarded

the position. After resigning in 2019, Saqqa brought against the County and Balaji

a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 race discrimination claim based on the defendants’ failure to

promote him, and an age-based harassment claim under California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).            The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims.

      We review de novo. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 965 (9th

Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When determining whether a genuine dispute

exists, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Santillan v. USA Waste of Cal., Inc., 853 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2017).

      The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the § 1981

race discrimination claim because Saqqa failed to establish a prima facie case under

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Generally, in

failure-to-promote cases, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination by satisfying the following elements: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a

protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for the promotion; (3) despite

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his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) the position was filled by someone

outside the plaintiff’s class, or alternatively, after rejecting the plaintiff, the employer

continued to seek other applicants with comparable qualifications. Dominguez-

Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002).

It is undisputed that Saqqa satisfied the first three elements, and that he cannot meet

the fourth element as traditionally applied because the County did not continue its

search or consider other candidates, and the position was subsequently eliminated

without anyone ever filling the role.

       Instead, Saqqa argues this court should either not apply the McDonnell

Douglas framework or interpret the fourth element of the test in a more expansive

way. See Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 2017). He

relies on the version of the fourth element laid out in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard

Co., which allows the plaintiff to show that “similarly situated individuals … were

treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment

action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir.

2004). Assuming without deciding that Saqqa’s proposed test is appropriate, he still

cannot prevail. Saqqa has presented no evidence that an employee of another race

was treated more favorably with respect to the promotion he sought. Nothing in the

record gives rise to an inference of racial discrimination.

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      Nor did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Saqqa’s FEHA

age-based harassment claim, because the harassment was not “sufficiently severe or

pervasive.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To establish a

prima facie case of a hostile work environment under FEHA, a plaintiff must show:

(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment;

(3) the harassment was based on his protected status; (4) the harassment

unreasonably interfered with plaintiff’s work performance by creating a hostile,

intimidating, or offensive environment; and (5) the defendants are liable for the

harassment. Ortiz v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 12 (Cal. Ct. App.

2019). Language that is merely annoying or offensive is not actionable, Harris, 510

U.S. at 23, because “[n]ot every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile

work environment.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000).

      California courts weigh the following factors to determine whether

harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive: “the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 311 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Here, Saqqa describes a total of four age-related

remarks from Balaji. Only one was directed at Saqqa specifically. While offensive

comments may be “hurtful,” “[f]our comments over several months does not

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establish a pattern of routine harassment creating a hostile work environment,

particularly given that the comments were not extreme.” Id. Here, Saqqa presents

four comments over the course of multiple years. And because three of the four

comments were not directed at Saqqa, the “severity” of the harassment is lower.

Without more, Saqqa has not presented evidence of “sufficiently severe or

pervasive” conduct.

      Finally, while Saqqa also argues that the district court did not consider the

“totality of the circumstances,” it would be improper for this court to attribute “the

entire record of Balaji’s demeaning tirades” to age-related bias, since Saqqa fails to

present a “nexus” between his protected status and Balaji’s outbursts about his job

performance. See Ortiz, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 11–12 (explaining there must be a

“nexus” between an employee’s protected status and the supervisor’s conduct under

the third element of the FEHA prima facie case).

      AFFIRMED.

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