Court Opinion

ID: 9583101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:50.105156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:51.077853
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Defendant Waldrop was convicted by a jury of the offense of criminal damage to property in the second degree. This conviction is supported by proof that defendant stopped his pickup truck in a vacant area, exited the vehicle, and fired several rounds from a pistol into three out-of-service transformers owned by Georgia Power. Company. Billy Wilhite, a Georgia Power security investigator, testified that the damaged transformers were leaking coolant; that a team of Georgia Power employees was dispatched to clean up the mess, and that, although the damaged transformers were not in service, replacing them would cost over $4,000. Mr. Wilhite also authenticated Georgia Power business records showing that the clean-up operation cost over $1,000.
1. Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for criminal damage to property in the second degree because the State failed to prove that the damage to Georgia Power’s transformers exceeded $500, an essential element of the crime under OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1).
I do not believe that proof of damage to Georgia Power’s transformers is the controlling issue in the case sub judice. “ ‘ “(D)amage to personal property [under OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1)] means all injuries which one may sustain in respect to his ownership of personal property.” ’ Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Smith, 3 Ga. App. 644, 648 (60 SE 353) (1907).” Bembry v. State, 155 Ga. App. 847 (1) (273 SE2d 208). In the case sub judice, Billy Wilhite authenticated a business record (which was admitted into evidence without objection) indicating that Georgia Power expended over $1,000 in labor expenses to clean the mess precipitated by defendant’s criminal act. It is my view that this evidence, even without proof as to the cost of damage to Georgia Power’s transformers, authorizes the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant’s criminal acts caused damage in excess of $500 in violation of OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1). Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560).
2. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State’s circumstantial proof that he committed criminal damage to property in the second degree does not exclude his explanation and the reasonable hypothesis that a passenger in defendant’s truck shot Georgia Power’s transformers. Defendant asserts that his explanation is not only consistent with the proved facts, but is also supported by a physician’s testimony that defendant is too weak to aim and fire a pistol.
“ Although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable *168hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused (OCGA § 24-4-6), if the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. Whether this burden has been met is a question for the jury. When the jury is authorized to find the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt, the verdict will not be disturbed unless the verdict is insupportable as a matter of law.’ (Citations, punctuation and indention omitted.) Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) (405 SE2d 747) (1991).” Harris v. State, 223 Ga. App. 661 (478 SE2d 458).
Decided March 12, 1998
David J. Walker, Sr., Thomas J. Ousley, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Clifford A. Sticher, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
While a physician opined in the case sub judice that defendant is too weak to aim and fire an unsupported pistol, this doctor admitted on cross-examination that it is not impossible for defendant to fire a pistol. Further, an arresting officer testified that he observed defendant at the crime scene sitting alone in the driver’s seat of a pickup truck; that he observed liquid leaking from bullet holes in Georgia Power’s nearby transformers; that he found a pistol in the seat next to where he observed defendant sitting, and that he observed pistol shell casings on the ground outside the .driver’s side of defendant’s truck. This officer also testified that he observed no other person at the crime scene; that a search of the area revealed no evidence of any other person, and that a pile of debris next to the passenger’s door inside the truck’s cab indicated to the officer that no person had recently exited defendant’s truck. I believe this evidence is sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of criminal damage to property in the second degree. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, supra. See Johnson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 747, 748 (1) (431 SE2d 737).
3. I also dp not believe the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to charge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass because there is no proof refuting the State’s evidence that Georgia Power expended over $1,000 to clean up the mess precipitated by defendant’s criminal acts. Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313, 315 (2) (444 SE2d 767).
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this dissent.