Court Opinion

ID: 9702758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:22:47.875948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.335633
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
Once again, we must decide whether the statute of limitations is properly tolled in light of Lamp v. Heyman, 469 Pa. 465, 366 A.2d 882 (1976). Suit was commenced by complaint filed on April 29, 1994, well before the statute tolling date for the accident in question which occurred on August 13, 1992. The majority states, “Service on the day the complaint was filed proved unsuccessful, as did a second attempt the following day.” I agree with the majority that in order to effectively toll the statute of limitations service need not be completed. Rather a good faith effort must be made to effect service. Had my review of the record concluded that there was such an attempt at service during the thirty days following the filing of the complaint, i.e., during the life of the process, I would join.
Unfortunately, the record does not show a good faith attempt at service. No return of service, as required by Pa. R.Civ.P. 405, was filed detailing the attempts to serve Defendant on April 29 and 30, 1994. Absent such a docket entry, I *397cannot conclude, as the majority suggests, that service was attempted within the life of the process.
While I admire the majority’s attempt to suggest that there was a good faith effort at service, I hasten to point out that the docket entries are important and that exhibits attached to the briefs are not part of the record. In footnote 1, the majority concludes, “Exhaustive efforts were made by the plaintiff to serve the defendant before the statute of limitations expired.” Unfortunately, these efforts are not documented on the docket or in the record except as allegations in the plaintiffs brief. The majority misreads Exhibit D to the brief as an attempt at service when in fact all it describes are efforts to locate an address for the defendant. Unlike the majority, I cannot accept this as fact. Statements that are made in a party’s brief which are not otherwise established by the record are not facts.
Furthermore, the response to the motion for judgment on the pleadings details only an attempt to locate the defendant by an individual identified only as Raymond Kosyla. In order to effect proper service against Defendant, whose address is in Willow Grove in Montgomery County,1 Appellant had to serve Defendant pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 400.1(a)(2), which requires service “by deputized service as provided by Rule 400(d) or by a competent adult forwarding the process to the sheriff of the county where service may be made.” Only in Philadelphia County may service be made under Rule 400.1(a)(1) which allows service by a competent adult. See, Dubrey v. Izaguirre and Centennial Trans./Academy Cab, et al., 454 Pa.Super. 504, 685 A.2d 1391 (1996) (service invalid on its face where Bucks County corporation served by private process server). Had Appellant followed this rule, the sheriff of Montgomery County would have filed, as required, a return of service showing that Defendant could not be found.
Our court has held, “At a minimum, the good faith effort required in Lamp v. Heyman, supra, mandates compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure.... ” Feher by *398Feher v. Altman, 357 Pa.Super. 50, 53, 515 A.2d 317, 319 (1986). Appellant here has not complied with the rules of service set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. She has not therefore satisfied the Lamp v. Heyman good faith standard.

. We may take judicial notice of the fact that Willow Grove is in Montgomery, not Philadelphia, County.