Court Opinion

ID: 9396244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 21:03:06.330941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.407123
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
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         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                              _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0560
                                _________________________

                                     Douglas P. Byrne

                                                  v.

                                           Vera Fisk

                       Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
                                 (CV-20-901659)

BRYAN, Justice.

       Douglas P. Byrne appeals from a summary judgment entered by the

Madison Circuit Court in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-

liability negligence claim against Fisk. For the reasons explained below,
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we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand this cause for further

proceedings.

                              Background

     On December 8, 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the

United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a

delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver

mail to Fisk's residence in Huntsville. Although Fisk's home was not on

his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before,

including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was

raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing

a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip-

resistant boots, as required by his employer.

     Byrne traversed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front

porch, where her mailbox was located. According to Byrne's testimony,

he was holding the handrail and being careful. However, Byrne slipped

and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his

right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine

days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work

in May 2019.

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     In December 2020, Byrne commenced this action against Fisk and

fictitiously named parties. Byrne alleged that there were defects in Fisk's

premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk

should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or

guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence

claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Byrne sought awards of

compensatory and punitive damages.

     Fisk answered Byrne's complaint and, in March 2022, moved for a

summary judgment. Fisk attached evidence in support of her summary-

judgment motion. Byrne responded to Fisk's summary-judgment motion,

attaching evidence in support of the response.       Fisk filed a reply to

Byrne's response. On May 1, 2022, the circuit court entered an order

granting Fisk's summary-judgment motion without specifying the

precise reason or reasons for its judgment. Byrne appealed to this Court.1

     1As noted above, Byrne's complaint also included fictitiously named
defendants. However, at the time of the entry of the circuit court's
judgment, Fisk was the only defendant who had been served; Byrne did
not substitute parties for the fictitiously named defendants set out in his
complaint.

     " 'When there are multiple defendants and the summons or
     other document to be served and complaint has been served
     on one or more, but not all, of the defendants, the plaintiff may
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                           Standard of Review

           "This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo.
     Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
     (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial
     court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the
     movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
     of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a
     judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue
     Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
     952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a determination, we must
     review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986).
     Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is
     no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the
     nonmovant to produce 'substantial evidence' as to the
     existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v.
     SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
     (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. '[S]ubstantial
     evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-
     minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
     reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'

     proceed to trial and judgment as to the defendant or
     defendants on whom process has been served and if the
     judgment as to defendants who have been served is final in all
     other respects, it shall be a final judgment.' Rule 4(f), [Ala. R.
     Civ. P.,] as amended March 1, 1982.

          "Under Rule 4(f), service on the other defendants must
     be completed, not merely attempted, before it can be said the
     pending action involves other active defendants."

Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1387, 1388 n.2 (Ala.
1984). See also Ex parte Harrington, 289 So. 3d 1232, 1237 n.5 (Ala.
2019)("A judgment that disposes of fewer than all the defendants is final
when the defendants as to whom there has been no judgment have not
yet been served with notice.").
                                   4
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     West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870, 871
     (Ala. 1989)."

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004).

                                Analysis

     Before turning to the parties' appellate arguments, we first note

that Byrne concedes on appeal that a summary judgment was proper

regarding his "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Therefore, we will not

consider the propriety of the judgment on that claim, and the following

analysis addresses only the propriety of the judgment on Byrne's

negligence claim.

           " 'In [a] premises-liability case, the elements of
     negligence " 'are the same as those in any tort litigation: duty,
     breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate or legal cause, and
     damages. ' " ' Ex parte Harold L. Martin Distrib. Co., 769 So.
     2d 313, 314 (Ala. 2000)(quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
     Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 969 (Ala. 1985), quoting in turn David G.
     Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's
     Conduct, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 267, 270 (1968))."

Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002).

     Regarding the duty element of a premises-liability negligence

claim, this Court has explained:

          "The duty owed by a landowner to an injured party
     depends upon the status of the injured party in relation to the
     landowner's land, i.e., is the injured party a trespasser, a

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     licensee, or an invitee. … A person who enters land with the
     landowner's consent to bestow some material or commercial
     benefit is an 'invitee,' and a landowner owes an invitee the
     duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and,
     if the premises are unsafe, to warn of hidden defects and
     dangers that are known to the landowner but that are hidden
     or unknown to the invitee."

Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So. 3d 93, 98 (Ala. 2010)(footnote omitted).

     The parties agree that Byrne was an invitee on Fisk's premises at

the time of Byrne's fall. Consequently, regarding Byrne, Fisk had a

general duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and, if

the premises were not reasonably safe, to warn Byrne of defects and

dangers that were known to Fisk but that were hidden or unknown to

Byrne. Id.    The parties' arguments focus primarily on the evidence

produced regarding whether the condition of Fisk's premises was

defective or unreasonably dangerous and whether that condition

proximately caused Byrne's fall.      Fisk also argues that, under the

circumstances present at the time of Byrne's fall, any danger posed by

the condition of her premises was open and obvious as a matter of law,

thereby relieving her of any duty to warn Byrne. We address each issue

in turn.

I. Allegedly Dangerous Condition

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     Fisk argues that no defect or unreasonably dangerous condition

existed on her premises, the presence of which is an essential element of

Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim. See Davis, 58 So. 3d at 98.

                       " ' " 'If the burden of proof at trial
                 is on the nonmovant, the movant may
                 satisfy the Rule 56[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
                 burden of production either by
                 submitting affirmative evidence that
                 negates an essential element in the
                 nonmovant's claim or, assuming
                 discovery has been completed, by
                 demonstrating to the trial court that
                 the       nonmovant's       evidence      is
                 insufficient to establish an essential
                 element of the nonmovant's claim. ' "
           " '[Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903,
           909 (Ala. 1999)](quoting Justice Houston's special
           concurrence in Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686,
           691 (Ala. 1989), overruling Berner and adopting
           Justice Houston's special concurrence in Berner as
           the accurate statement of the law)(emphasis
           omitted).'
     " Locke v. City of Mobile, 851 So. 2d 446, 448 (Ala. 2002)."

City of Gadsden v. Harbin, 148 So. 3d 690, 696 (Ala. 2013). Citing her

own deposition testimony and Byrne's deposition testimony, Fisk notes

the following.

     Fisk's porch and the steps leading to the porch were constructed in

the 1950s. The tile covering the steps and the porch was installed in 2010
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or 2012. Fisk testified that she was unaware of any other slips or falls

on the porch before Byrne fell in December 2018. Byrne testified that,

before his fall, he was not aware of anyone else who had complained about

the condition of Fisk's porch, that he had not complained about the

condition of the porch, and that, as far as he knew, he was the only person

who had ever fallen on the porch. Fisk also testified that she had never

had any problem with the tile covering the porch and the steps being

slicker when wet.

      In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Fisk produced sufficient

evidence to make a prima facie showing that no defect or unreasonably

dangerous condition existed on her premises at the time of the incident.

See Harbin, 148 So. 3d at 696. Thus, the burden shifted to Byrne to

produce substantial evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact regarding that issue. See Dow, 897 So. 2d at 1038-

39.

      In opposition to Fisk's summary-judgment motion, Byrne produced

an affidavit executed by Hal K. Cain, a professional engineer, who

averred that he possessed, among other credentials, a contractor's

license. Cain's affidavit averred that he had reviewed transcripts of the

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parties' depositions and photographs of Fisk's premises, including

photographs depicting certain measurements of her steps and porch

landing. Cain's affidavit indicated that two defects likely existed on

Fisk's premises. First, Cain averred:

          "Determination as to the type of tile in place on the
     porch as of December 8, 2018, would likely require some
     destructive testing. However, based upon the testimony of …
     Byrne, the precautions taken by him[,] and the equipment
     being used[,] it would appear that the tile in question would
     not meet the minimum requirements for outdoor tile to be
     used in an outdoor setting for steps and/or porch covering."

     Second, Cain noted that the five steps leading to Fisk's porch were

uneven in height and depth, which he averred did not comply with the

requirements of the 1991, 1994, 1997, and 1999 Standard Building Codes

or the 2009 International Residential Code, which codes Cain averred

were applicable in the City of Huntsville at the time of Byrne's fall and

in 2012.   According to Cain's affidavit, the applicable building-code

provision required the following:

           "Treads shall be of uniform depth and risers uniform
     height in any stairway between two floors. There shall be no
     variation exceeding 3/16 inch (4.8mm) in the depth of adjacent
     treads or in the height of adjacent risers and the tolerance
     between the largest and smallest riser or between the largest
     and smallest tread shall not exceed 3/8 inch (9.5mm) in any
     flight."

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Cain further averred:

           "Relative to the risers on Fisk['s] steps, such are not of
     uniform height[,] and the variation is 3 [and] 3/34th inches
     between the [fourth] and [fifth] risers, which are adjacent,
     which is greater than the allowable variation of 3/16 inch[,]
     pursuant to the code. The difference between the largest and
     smallest riser exceeds 3/8th inch in the flight. Relative to the
     treads on … Fisk['s] steps[,] such are not of uniform depth[,]
     and the variation is 4 [and] 11/16th inches between the [third]
     and the [fourth] treads, which are adjacent, [which] is greater
     than the allowable 3/16 inch pursuant to the code. The
     difference between the largest and smallest tread exceeds
     3/8th inch in the flight."

Cain's affidavit described the condition of Fisk's premises as "defective

and dangerous."    Cain's affidavit also included additional opinions

regarding other elements of Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim.

     In the circuit court, Fisk moved to strike much of Cain's affidavit,

arguing that portions were based on speculation, that portions were

contrary to Byrne's deposition testimony, that portions would preempt

the role of the jury, and that portions were irrelevant, immaterial, and

would be misleading to a jury. However, the circuit court did not rule on

Fisk's motion to strike the affidavit. Therefore, we must assume that the

circuit court considered the affidavit when ruling on Fisk's summary-

judgment motion. See Fogarty v. Southworth, 953 So. 2d 1225, 1233 (Ala.

2006).
                                   10
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     Moreover, we note that the circuit court's judgment in this case

explicitly stated that the circuit court had considered Fisk's summary-

judgment "motion, [the] matters submitted in support thereof and in

opposition thereto, argument[s] of counsel, and applicable law …." Thus,

the judgment indicates that the circuit court considered all materials

submitted by Byrne, including Cain's affidavit, in ruling on Fisk's

summary-judgment motion. Therefore, it appears that the circuit court

implicitly denied Fisk's motion to strike portions of Cain's affidavit. See

Barnwell v. CLP Corp., 235 So. 3d 238, 243 (Ala. 2017).

     " ' "[O]ur review of a summary judgment is de novo; that is, we must

examine all the evidentiary submissions that were presented to the trial

court. " ' Falls v. JVC America, Inc., 7 So. 3d 986, 989 (Ala. 2008)(quoting

Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992))." Barrett v.

Radjabi-Mougadam, 39 So. 3d 95, 97 (Ala. 2009). "Whether to strike an

affidavit is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Ex

parte Harris, 216 So. 3d 1201, 1207 (Ala. 2016).

     Several of the arguments that Fisk asserted in the motion to strike

that she filed in the circuit court were directed to portions of Cain's

affidavit that we find unnecessary to consider for the purpose of this

                                    11
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appeal. Thus, we do not address those portions of Cain's affidavit, and

we express no opinion concerning their admissibility as evidence.

     Regarding the portions of Cain's affidavit quoted above, Fisk

essentially asserts two arguments on appeal. First, she argues that

Cain's opinion that the tile covering her steps and porch was likely not

suitable for outdoor use is speculative because Cain did not personally

examine the tile and because determining the type of tile used would

require destructive testing. See Chatham v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 So.

3d 341, 343-44 (Ala. 1993)("Evidence submitted by a nonmovant in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be in a form

admissible in evidence; affidavits must be based on personal knowledge

and must contain information that allows more than speculative

inferences …. Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P."). Fisk's argument includes no

substantive analysis regarding the standards applicable to inferences

drawn by an expert witness. On that point, Rule 703, Ala. R. Evid.,

provides:

           "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
     expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
     by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of
     a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
     in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
     or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the
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     opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
     otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
     the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court
     determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
     evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
     prejudicial effect."

     Cain's opinion regarding the suitability of the tile covering Fisk's

porch and steps for outdoor use stated that it was based on Byrne's

deposition testimony explaining the precautions he had taken and the

equipment he had used when attempting to traverse Fisk's steps and

porch. In the absence of an argument from Fisk demonstrating that Cain

could not render such an opinion based on the evidence presented, we

cannot conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by failing to

strike that portion of Cain's affidavit. Thus, as did the circuit court, we

consider that portion of Cain's affidavit in our analysis. See Barnwell,

235 So. 3d at 246.

     Regarding Cain's opinion about the uneven construction of Fisk's

steps, Fisk notes that Cain's affidavit contains no evidence indicating

that her steps or front porch violated any applicable building codes when

they were constructed in the 1950s. Fisk asserts that Section 3401.2.1 of

the Standard Building Code

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      "specifically states that[,] while alterations, repairs, or
      rehabilitation work made to existing structures must conform
      to the requirements of the technical codes for new
      construction, the remaining building or structure need not
      comply with all the requirements of the technical code. The
      building official shall determine the extent to which the
      existing systems, including the building and structure, shall
      be made to conform with the requirements of the technical
      code for new construction."

Fisk's brief at 24.

      Fisk argues that, under the referenced section of the Standard

Building Code, her "steps were grandfathered in." Fisk's brief at 23.

Consequently, she asserts, Cain's opinion regarding the noncompliance

of the construction of her steps is irrelevant, immaterial, and potentially

confusing to the fact-finder. She argues that we should not consider

Cain's opinion in that regard on appeal.

      However, Fisk has presented no evidence in support of her

assertion that her steps were "grandfathered" into compliance under the

applicable building code.2 Although Fisk's motion to strike contained this

same assertion, " '[s]tatements of counsel are not evidence.' Prattville

Mem'l Chapel v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546, 558 (Ala. 2008)." Capitol Farmers

      2During  her deposition, Fisk testified that she did not know
whether the work done on her steps and porch in 2010 or 2012 had been
inspected by the City of Huntsville.
                                   14
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Mkt., Inc. v. Delongchamp, 320 So. 3d 574, 582 (Ala. 2020). Therefore,

we do not consider Fisk's assertion that her "steps were grandfathered

in[to]" compliance under the applicable building code as evidence in this

case, and we cannot conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion

by failing to strike the portion of Cain's affidavit regarding the

construction of Fisk's steps based on Fisk's assertion in that regard.

Thus, as did the circuit court, we also consider that portion of Cain's

affidavit in our analysis. See Barnwell, 235 So. 3d at 246.

     We now turn to Byrne's appellate argument regarding the

sufficiency of the portions of Cain's affidavit quoted above to create a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the allegedly dangerous

condition of Fisk's premises. Among other cases, Byrne's brief cites this

Court's decision in Mann v. Smith, 561 So. 2d 1112 (Ala. 1990). In Mann,

one of the plaintiffs, "during a steady, 'misty' rain, … stopped at a

roadside drapery boutique owned by [the defendant]. After browsing

through the store, she left by the same door through which she had

entered. As she was descending the steps, she slipped and fell onto the

pavement outside the building." Mann, 561 So. 2d at 1113.

          "[The defendant] moved for summary judgment, offering
     in support of his motion the depositions of the parties. In
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      opposition to [the defendant]'s motion, the [plaintiffs]
      presented the affidavit of … an engineer. [The] affidavit
      stated that the steps leading to the entrance of the building
      were unreasonably dangerous because of their physical
      structure and geometric shape."

Id. On appeal, this Court reasoned:

            "The [plaintiffs] have established sufficient evidence
      from which a jury could find that a defect existed in the steps
      leading to and from [the defendant]'s business. The evidence
      indicates that the steps at [the defendant]'s business were
      constructed of concrete and had been painted. Some of the
      steps were approximately five and one-half feet wide and two
      of the steps rose six inches high. The top step was not level
      with the door jamb, but was slightly below the jamb so that
      someone entering the store had to step from the top step up to
      enter the store. The first step at the bottom was 16 inches
      deep and the top step was 6 inches deep."

Id. at 1114. The Mann Court held that the plaintiffs had "established

evidence from which a jury could find that a defect existed in the steps."

Id.

      Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that

fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably

infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved. See Dow, 897 So. 2d

at 1038-39.    Cain's affidavit testimony is similar to the affidavit

testimony of the engineer in Mann. See also Bishop v. South, 642 So. 2d

442, 445 (Ala. 1994)("The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those

                                    16
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of Mann v. Smith …."). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

Byrne, Byrne produced evidence from which fair-minded persons

exercising impartial judgment could reasonably infer that Fisk's steps

and porch were defective and unreasonably dangerous as a result of the

tile used to cover them and the uneven construction of the steps.

Therefore, a summary judgment in Fisk's favor was not warranted based

on an absence of evidence regarding that aspect of the breach-of-duty

element of Byrne's negligence claim.

II. Fisk's Knowledge of the Allegedly Dangerous Condition

     In order to establish Fisk's liability for the allegedly unreasonably

dangerous condition of Fisk's steps and porch, Byrne must also prove that

Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defects. See Davis, 58 So. 3d at 98.

Both parties acknowledge the following principles from this Court's

decision in Mims v. Jack's Restaurant, 565 So. 2d 609, 610 (Ala. 1990):

     "[I]n cases where the alleged defect is a part of the premises
     …, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that a
     defect in a part of the premises has caused an injury, then the
     question whether the defendant had actual or constructive
     notice of the defect will go to the jury, regardless of whether
     the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant
     had or should have had notice of the defect at the time of the
     accident."

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The Mims Court reasoned that a "fixture … requires ordinary and

reasonable maintenance in order to provide safe premises …." Id. at 611.

     As noted above, Fisk produced evidence in the form of her

deposition testimony indicating that she had no knowledge that the steps

and the porch were defective or dangerous.           However, it is also

undisputed that the alleged defects in this case were part of Fisk's

premises. No issue has been raised in this case regarding the soundness

of the principles from Mims quoted above. Instead, Fisk argues that

those principles are applicable only if proximate causation is also proven.

The issue of proximate causation is addressed below.             However,

regarding the issue whether Fisk had actual or constructive knowledge

of the alleged defects, we conclude that, based on the reasoning of Mims,

which has not been challenged in this case, that issue should be resolved

by a jury.

III. Proximate Cause

     "Proximate cause is an act or omission that in a natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any new independent causes,

produces the injury and without which the injury would not have

occurred." Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994). Fisk argues

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that Byrne's deposition testimony negates the proximate-causation

element of his claim. See Harbin, 148 So. 3d at 696; and Sessions 842 So.

2d at 651. Specifically, Fisk argues that it is undisputed that Byrne fell

after ascending the steps leading to Fisk's porch.         Therefore, Fisk

essentially argues, even if a genuine issue of material fact exists

regarding whether the construction of her steps was unreasonably

dangerous, that condition did not proximately cause Byrne to fall.

     In analyzing this argument, we note that it is predicated on the

notion that the condition of Fisk's porch was not unreasonably

dangerous.     As noted above, however, Byrne produced evidence

indicating that the tile covering both the steps and the porch was likely

not suitable for outdoor use and that the uneven construction of the steps

was unreasonably dangerous.         Thus, we consider Byrne's deposition

testimony regarding proximate causation as it relates both to the uneven

construction of Fisk's steps and to the tile covering both the steps and the

porch.

     As Byrne notes on appeal, Fisk's argument does not address the

totality of Byrne's deposition testimony. In relevant part, Byrne testified

as follows during his deposition:

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             "I noticed [that] the steps were covered in tile with my
      headlamp, and it was not dark but fairly dark. There was a
      nice big puddle right at the bottom of the steps. I started up
      the steps [and] held onto the handrail[.] I had [mail for three
      residences] in my left hand. That's all of the mail [that] I had
      left to deliver[, so my mail] pouch is empty, not a problem. …
      When I got to the top step, I remember coming to full height
      and went to take a step toward the mailbox, released the rail,
      took that step, and[,] sometime in the process of that step,
      both of my feet came out from underneath me …. They
      slipped toward the house."

      When Fisk's attorney asked Byrne if he knew why he had fallen, he

testified:

            "No, sir, I don't. As a matter of fact, I run that through
      my head a thousand times, and I don't know what actually
      caused it besides that foot and my forward motion[. M]y foot,
      both feet, I had one foot in the process of taking a step[,] and
      both feet just went out from underneath me."

      When asked by Fisk's attorney whether the unevenness of Fisk's

steps "might have had nothing to do with it," Byrne responded: "I'm not

going to speculate either way, either one." He later responded in the

affirmative when Fisk's attorney asked: "But you made it all of the way

to the top, you made it all of the way to the porch with both feet standing

straight up before you fell; right?"

      Fisk's attorney asked: "You're not real sure of what part, if any, the

uneven steps played in your fall; is that fair?" Byrne responded:

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      "If I had to make an educated guess like I've tried to do here,
      I think the shortness of the top step kind of gave me a false
      sense of security because the others were even, and then I
      took a different stride, maybe longer[.] I don't know exactly[.]
      I know the steps were wet, but I don't remember any
      particular puddles or anything there that could have assisted
      to my slipping, but I think that caused me to take a different
      step at the top and possibly throw me off balance a little bit."

      When asked by Fisk's attorney what the unevenness of Fisk's steps

had to do with Byrne's fall, Byrne testified:

            "Well, in my personal experience, if you've got an even
      stride, you kind of subconsciously take those steps. If you can
      pick out, you know, that particular feature, then you would
      adjust for it, but I did not notice the steps that were different[.
      I]t was dark, [and] there were some leaves on them …."

Byrne also testified: "[W]hen I got to that top step, it was slick, I can't tell

you exactly what. I do know I don't believe in my opinion that there was

any ice on that porch and the temperatures had dipped down into the

[forties]."

      Fisk relies on selective portions of Byrne's deposition testimony in

support of her argument. As explained above, however, the applicable

standard of review requires that we examine all the evidentiary

submissions that were considered by the circuit court. See Barrett, 39

So. 3d at 97. When viewed in a light most favorable to Byrne, the totality

of his deposition testimony indicates that fair-minded persons exercising
                                      21
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impartial judgment could reasonably infer that the uneven construction

of Fisk's steps affected Byrne's stride in ascending the steps, thereby

causing him to lose balance upon reaching the top step or porch. Byrne's

deposition testimony also indicates that the slickness or slipperiness of

the tile covering the steps and the porch contributed to his fall.

     Therefore, Byrne's deposition testimony does not negate the

proximate-causation element of his claim, see Harbin, 148 So. 3d at 696,

and Fisk did not make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of

material fact exists regarding that essential element. See Dow, 897 So.

2d at 1038-39. Thus, the burden of production regarding that element

did not shift to Byrne, and a summary judgment was not warranted on

the basis that insufficient evidence existed regarding this element.

IV. Openness and Obviousness

     Byrne must also prove that Fisk's knowledge of the allegedly

dangerous condition of her premises was superior to his own. See Davis,

58 So. 3d at 98. Fisk argues that any dangers present on her premises

at the time of Byrne's fall were open and obvious. She contends that she

therefore had no duty to warn Byrne of such dangers.

           "A condition is 'open and obvious' when it is 'known to
     the [plaintiff] or should have been observed by the [plaintiff]
                                    22
SC-2022-0560

     in the exercise of reasonable care.' Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.
     2d 985, 989 (Ala. 1980). 'The entire basis of [an invitor's]
     liability rests upon [her] superior knowledge of the danger
     which causes the [invitee's] injuries. Therefore, if that
     superior knowledge is lacking, as when the danger is obvious,
     the [invitor] cannot be held liable.' Id. (citation omitted)."

Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., 844 So. 2d 1189, 1194 (Ala. 2002).

Moreover, "[an invitor's] argument that the condition that caused [an

invitee's] fall was open and obvious is an affirmative defense, on which

[the invitor] bears the ultimate burden of proof." Id. See also Barnwell,

235 So. 3d at 244.

     "If, as is the case when the movant is the defendant asserting
     an affirmative defense, ' "the movant has the burden of proof
     at trial, the movant must support his motion with credible
     evidence, using any of the material specified in Rule 56(c),
     [Ala.] R. Civ. P. ('pleadings, depositions, answers to
     interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
     affidavits'). " ' [Ex parte General Motors Corp.], 769 So. 2d
     [903,] 909 [(Ala. 1999)]. ' "The movant's proof must be such
     that he would be entitled to a [judgment as a matter of law] if
     this evidence was not controverted at trial. " ' Id. In other
     words, 'when the movant has the burden [of proof at trial], its
     own submissions in support of the motion must entitle it to
     judgment as a matter of law.' Albee Tomato, Inc. v. A.B.
     Shalom Produce Corp., 155 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir.
     1998)(emphasis added)."

Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1195. "Whether a condition is open and obvious

is generally a question for the jury." Id. See also Ex parte Kraatz, 775

So. 2d 801, 804 (Ala. 2000)(" 'Questions of openness and obviousness of a
                                   23
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defect or danger ... are generally not to be resolved on a motion for

summary judgment.' " (quoting Harding v. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, 628

So. 2d 461, 463 (Ala. 1993))).

     Fisk argues: "The only conditions that created a potential hazard

were darkness and rain, each open and obvious conditions as a matter of

law." Fisk's brief at 27. Fisk relies on portions of Byrne's deposition

testimony in support of her argument.         Thus, we must determine

whether, based on Byrne's deposition testimony, the dangers referenced

by Fisk were open and obvious as a matter of law. See Denmark, 844 So.

2d at 1195. We consider each in turn below.

     A. Darkness

     Fisk argues: "The fact that darkness may hide potential dangers is

open and obvious, as a matter of law." Fisk's brief at 29. As explained

above, the alleged hidden dangers in this case were the uneven

construction of the steps leading to Fisk's porch and the fact that the tile

covering the steps and the porch was not suitable for outdoor use. Thus,

the question presented is whether, as a matter of law, the darkness of

Fisk's premises was such that she could not reasonably be said to have

superior knowledge that such dangers may be present on her premises.

                                    24
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See Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1195. Put another way, was the darkness of

Fisk's premises "sufficient to put reasonable people on notice of a

substantial risk of concealed hazards"? See Owens v. National Sec. of

Alabama, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Ala. 1984).

     Byrne testified that "it was dark [and] had been for an hour and a

half, maybe," when he attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence. He

also stated: "I approached the house, [and] no porch light [was] on -- it

was very dark." However, Byrne also testified that, at the time, he was

wearing a "Black Diamond brand" headlamp, which he estimated emitted

"400 lumens" of light; he said that the headlamp was "very efficient to

light[] the way." Thus, as Byrne approached Fisk's porch, he "noticed

[that] the steps were covered in tile with [his] headlamp, and it was not

dark but fairly dark." He later answered in the affirmative when asked

by Fisk's attorney if he wears his headlamp because he knows that

houses where he is delivering mail may not have porch lights turned on

and will be dark. He said that he knew to expect conditions like darkness

when delivering mail and that that is why he came prepared for that

condition.

                                   25
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      Byrne testified that, "[t]o the best of [his] memory," he did not notice

that Fisk's steps were uneven before his fall. As noted above, when asked

by Fisk's attorney what the unevenness of Fisk's steps had to do with

Byrne's fall, Byrne testified:

            "Well, in my personal experience, if you've got an even
      stride, you kind of subconsciously take those steps. If you can
      pick out, you know, that particular feature, then you would
      adjust for it, but I did not notice the steps that were different[.
      I]t was dark, [and] there were some leaves on them, similar to
      the pictures that were taken … days later."

      Fisk's attorney pointed out Byrne's testimony that he had seen that

Fisk's steps were covered in tile with his headlamp and asked Byrne what

prevented him from also seeing that Fisk's steps were uneven. Byrne

testified as follows:

             "The two steps that are uneven [are] the bottom step[--]
      and I'm going to speculate [--] I mean, I don't remember
      exactly[,] but I'm going to speculate [that] the leaves and the
      water had most of that covered[. S]o you know, [I] t[oo]k[] a
      step, [and] the next four steps are roughly the same height.
      The top step is not. I'm not going to say whether I noticed[.]
      I don't remember whether I noticed the change in that top
      step, but I feel like that might have had something to do with
      it[. I]t might have something to do with the way I strolled to
      the top, you know, went to take that step, whatever."

                                      26
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When shown photographs of Fisk's steps that Byrne's friend had taken

in daylight a few days after Byrne's fall, Byrne agreed that, when looking

at those photographs, the unevenness of Fisk's steps was "obvious." 3

     On appeal, Fisk cites Owens, 454 So. 2d at 1387, and Ex parte

Industrial Distribution Services Warehouse, Inc., 709 So. 2d 16 (Ala.

1997), in support of her argument. In a case cited in Byrne's brief, Ex

parte Kraatz, 775 So. 2d at 804, this Court addressed both of those

decisions. The Ex parte Kraatz Court stated:

     "Each of the plaintiffs in Owens and Ex parte Industrial
     Distribution Services Warehouse … assumed a risk by
     walking inside a dark commercial warehouse under abnormal
     conditions. In haste and through expediency, Owens walked
     through the dark warehouse from an entrance where no light
     switch was available instead of going around to an entrance
     where he knew a light switch was available; and
     consequently, he tipped over 'the blade of a parked forklift.'
     Owens, 454 So. 2d at 1389. Jackson, the plaintiff in Ex parte
     Industrial Distribution Services Warehouse, … commercially
     undertook an emergency project in a darkened, flooded,
     storm-ravaged warehouse, where he fell off a loading dock."

     3In  her appellate brief, Fisk asserts that Byrne testified that he
noticed the unevenness of her steps on the night he fell. Fisk's brief at
11. However, as Byrne points out in his reply brief, during the deposition
testimony Fisk cites, Byrne was actually describing the appearance of
Fisk's steps when looking at photographs that were taken in daylight a
few days after the fall.
                                   27
SC-2022-0560

Id. Among other things, the Ex parte Kraatz Court reasoned as follows:

     "Partial or poor light, like that in the case before us, could
     mislead a reasonably prudent person into thinking that he or
     she would be able to see and to avoid any hazards. The
     variable factors which make openness-and-obviousness under
     partial or poor light conditions a fact question not appropriate
     for resolution by summary judgment are direction, level, color,
     diffusion, shadows, and like qualities of light, as well as the
     other physical features of the scene. See, e.g., Woodward [v.
     Health Care Auth. of Huntsville, 727 So. 2d 814, 816 (Ala. Civ.
     App.1998)]."

Id. The Ex parte Kraatz Court determined that a summary judgment in

favor of the defendant in that case had been inappropriate and reversed

the Court of Civil Appeals' decision affirming the summary judgment.

     In Ex parte Schaeffel, 874 So. 2d 493, 496 (Ala. 2003), this Court

again acknowledged Owens and Ex parte Industrial Distribution

Warehouse and further clarified the holding of Ex parte Kraatz by

stating: "In these types of cases, the real question is not whether some

light exists in some part of a room in which an injury occurs. Instead, we

must focus on the specific location of the cause of the injury …."

     In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude, based on Byrne's

deposition testimony, that darkness rendered any dangers posed by

Fisk's premises open and obvious to any reasonable invitee as a matter

of law. See Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1194. Byrne did not attempt to
                                    28
SC-2022-0560

traverse a totally dark area on Fisk's premises. Instead, Byrne was

equipped with a headlamp to illuminate his path.          His deposition

testimony indicates that the steps leading to Fisk's porch were at least

partially illuminated by the headlamp when Byrne attempted to traverse

them and subsequently fell.

     Thus, the question of how the darkness of Fisk's premises affected

or should have affected Byrne's knowledge of any potential dangers is a

fact question. Specifically, based on Byrne's deposition testimony, a jury

could reasonably conclude that, with the lighting conditions present at

the time of Byrne's fall and the appearance of Fisk's steps and porch

under those conditions, he knew or should have known that attempting

to traverse that path would be dangerous and that the danger presented

was, therefore, open and obvious. See Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1194.

Conversely, a jury could also reasonably conclude that Byrne did not

notice any hazard on Fisk's premises and that the illumination of Fisk's

steps and porch provided by Byrne's headlamp would have led an invitee

exercising reasonable care to believe that traversing that path would not

be dangerous. See Ex parte Schaeffel, 874 So. 2d at 496 ("[D]im light is

light sufficient to make one believe that he can sufficiently see and

                                   29
SC-2022-0560

identify dangers, but in reality he cannot properly make such

identifications.").

      "Whether a condition is open and obvious is generally a question for

the jury." Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1195. The lighting conditions present

on Fisk's premises at the time of Byrne's fall do not present an exception

to the general rule. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that, under the

circumstances presented by this case and based on Byrne's deposition

testimony, the darkness of Fisk's premises presented an open and

obvious danger as a matter of law such that Fisk was entitled to a

summary judgment on that ground. See Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1195.

      B. Water

      Fisk notes that, in Owens, 454 So. 2d at 1389-90, this Court also

stated: "[W]ater is an open and obvious danger, and hence no duty to

warn exists even where the water conceals dangers beneath the surface."

However, the case that Owens cited for that proposition was Alabama

Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So. 2d 823

(1964). Green discussed bodies of water, such as pools or ponds, and the

hazards associated with entering such bodies of water.

                                   30
SC-2022-0560

     In this case, the water at issue is not a body of water but instead

rainfall, and the danger Byrne allegedly encountered was the slickness

or slipperiness of the tile covering Fisk's steps and porch resulting from

the rainfall. As noted above, Byrne alleges that the tile was not suitable

for outdoor use, based on the precautions Byrne took and the equipment

he was using at the time.     In particular, Byrne testified during his

deposition that he was being careful and using the handrail and was

wearing slip-resistant boots, as required by his employer, when

traversing Fisk's premises.

     Byrne knew that it was raining and that Fisk's steps and porch

were wet from rainfall. Byrne also testified during his deposition that he

knew to be careful in the rain because one can slip and that he had

coworkers who had been hurt before. Further, he noticed that Fisk's

steps and porch were covered with tile. He agreed when asked by Fisk's

attorney whether most surfaces become more slippery when wet than

when dry.

     When asked by Fisk's attorney whether he would tread lightly and

be extra careful when encountering "what appears to be indoor tile

covered in rain out on the porch," Byrne testified: "You judge according[]

                                   31
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to whatever kind of surface you're on with experience." Byrne also agreed

with Fisk's attorney that "any kind of tile that has water, soap, anything

like that on it is going to be slick …." Byrne testified that he had likely

delivered mail on porches with wet tile before and that he had

encountered a different type of red tile used on residential porches "a

thousand times."4

     The most similar case that Fisk cites in support of her position is

Ex parte Neese, 819 So. 2d 584 (Ala. 2001). However, as Byrne points

out, Ex parte Neese is distinguishable. In Ex parte Neese, the invitee

slipped on a doormat that was wet from rainfall and fell, sustaining

injuries. The invitee had visited the premises a few times a year for 18

years before the accident. The doormat had been on the premises for the

preceding 8 to 10 years and was usually located in front of the door.

However, on the day the invitee fell, the doormat was lying upside down

     4In her appellate brief, Fisk cites this testimony and asserts that
Byrne testified that he had encountered tiled porches like Fisk's " 'a
thousand times.' " Fisk's brief at 8. However, as noted, Byrne was
actually referencing residential porches covered with a type of red tile
that was different from the tile covering Fisk's steps and porch on the
night of Byrne's fall. Similarly, at a different point in his deposition,
Byrne testified that he had been on "millions" of porches with "tile"
generally.
                                   32
SC-2022-0560

in the walkway and was about as wide as the walkway. On the day of

the accident, the invitee had "crossed safely over or immediately by the

doormat at least three times … during what she described as a

'monsoon[]'…" 819 So. 2d at 590. Moreover, the invitee had "removed

her shoes because she was 'afraid that they were probably slippery

because they were so wet.' She then walked outside, barefoot, and was

walking across the doormat when she slipped on it and fell."            Id.

Additionally, the invitee testified that, "halfway down the walkway[,] she

heard the door open, that she may have heard her name called, but she

was not sure, and that she turned around, and fell on the ground." Id.

The invitee "attribute[d] her fall to a 'combination of the wet upside-down

mat and turning to see what was going on. ' " Id.

      The Ex parte Neese Court held:

           "The upside-down doormat, lying out in the rain,
      constituted an open and obvious danger on [the] property,
      which [the invitee], in the exercise of reasonable care, should
      have recognized, as a matter of law. … The location of the
      doormat on the property and the fact that it had become wet
      from the rain would have been as obvious to [the invitee] as it
      was to [the premises owner]."

Id.

                                    33
SC-2022-0560

      In contrast to the invitee in Ex parte Neese, Byrne did not traverse

the alleged hazard, in this case Fisk's steps and porch, multiple times in

the rain on the day he fell. Additionally, unlike the invitee in Ex parte

Neese, Byrne testified that he was wearing slip-resistant footwear and

was proceeding carefully as he traversed the alleged hazard at issue.

Although it is undisputed that Byrne knew that Fisk's steps and porch

were covered in tile and that surfaces, including tile, are generally more

slippery when wet, Byrne did not testify that he identified the tile as

indoor tile, and therefore potentially more slippery than the types of tile

generally used in outdoor settings, before attempting to traverse the

steps and the porch.

     Based on Byrne's deposition testimony, we conclude that whether

Byrne noticed or whether a reasonable invitee in his position would or

should have noticed that Fisk's steps and porch were covered in indoor

tile, and therefore potentially more slick or slippery than outdoor tile, is

a question of fact. In the absence of evidence demonstrating Byrne's

experience with the particular wet surface at issue, like the invitee in Ex

parte Neese, we cannot conclude that the allegedly dangerous condition

presented by rainfall on Fisk's premises was open an obvious as a matter

                                    34
SC-2022-0560

of law. See Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1194. As with the darkness of Fisk's

premises addressed above, the rainwater on her premises does not

present an exception to the general rule that the question of openness

and obviousness of an allegedly dangerous condition is a question for the

jury. See Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1195. 5

     C. Byrne's General Knowledge Regarding Fisk's Premises

     It is undisputed that Fisk did not warn Byrne of the condition of

her steps and porch.      However, we must note Byrne's deposition

testimony that he had likely delivered mail to Fisk's residence on more

than one occasion before, including within the year preceding his fall;

that he had not fallen there before; and that nothing about her porch had

"stood out to [him] in any way" before.       It is unclear under what

conditions Byrne had previously traversed Fisk's premises. However, in

     5In  her brief in support of her summary-judgment motion, Fisk
argued that Byrne was contributorily negligent because, she said, the
danger posed by the wet tile covering her steps and porch was open and
obvious and Byrne knew of that danger. Fisk does not make this same
assertion on appeal. However, as explained above, Byrne's deposition
testimony does not establish that the slickness or slipperiness of Fisk's
steps and porch was open and obvious as a matter of law. Moreover, as
also noted, Byrne's deposition testimony does not indicate that he noticed
that the tile covering the steps and the porch was indoor tile and,
therefore, potentially more slippery or slick than outdoor tile, before
attempting to traverse them.
                                    35
SC-2022-0560

making a determination regarding whether the allegedly dangerous

conditions of Fisk's premises on the night Byrne fell were open and

obvious, the jury can take into consideration the evidence presented

regarding Byrne's previous experiences with Fisk's premises and how

those experiences affected Byrne's knowledge of Fisk's premises or would

or should have affected the knowledge of a reasonable invitee traversing

Fisk's premises on that night. See Barnwell, 235 So. 3d at 244 (" ' "[T]he

plaintiff's appreciation of the danger is, almost always, a question of fact

for the determination of the jury." F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Bradbury, 273

Ala. 392, 394, 140 So. 2d 824, 825-26 (1962).' " (quoting Howard v. Andy's

Store for Men, 757 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000))).

                                Conclusion

     We conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding

whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's

premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the

alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the

darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open

and obvious hazards. Consequently, the circuit court erred by entering a

summary judgment in favor of Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability

                                    36
SC-2022-0560

negligence claim. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment is reversed, and

this cause is remanded for further proceedings.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

                                   37