Court Opinion

ID: 9429703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:27:41.347761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.265150
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
It is common ground that in a prosecution for the making of false statements the Government must prove that the defendant actually knew that the statements were false at the *76time he made them. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64, 68-70 (1969). The question presented here is whether the Government must also prove that the defendant actually knew, that his statements were made in a matter within “the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” The Court concludes that the plain language and the legislative history of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 conclusively establish that the statute is intended to reach false statements made without actual knowledge of federal involvement in the subject matter of the false statements. I cannot agree.
The Court nonetheless proceeds on the assumption that some lesser culpability standard is required in § 1001 prosecutions, but declines to decide what that lesser standard is. Even if I agreed with the Court that actual knowledge of federal involvement is not required here, I could not agree with the Court’s disposition of this case because it reverses the Court of Appeals without determining for itself, or remanding for the lower court to determine, whether the jury instructions in respondent’s case were proper. I think that our certiorari jurisdiction is best exercised to resolve conflicts in statutory construction, and not simply to decide whether a jury in a particular case was correctly charged as to the elements of the offense. But here the Court, in a remarkable display of left-footedness, accomplishes neither result: reading its opinion from beginning to end, one neither knows what the congressionally intended element of intent is, nor whether the jury was properly instructed in this case.
I — I
I think that in this case, [a]fter seizing] every thing from which aid can be derived/ United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C. J.), we are left with an ambiguous statute.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971). Notwithstanding the majority’s repeated, but sparsely supported, assertions that the evidence of Congress’ intent not to require actual knowledge is “convincing,” and “unambiguous],” ante, at 69, and n. 7, 73, I believe that the *77language and legislative history of §1001 can provide “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). I therefore think that the canon of statutory construction which requires that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes . . . be resolved in favor of lenity,” Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), is applicable here. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that actual knowledge of federal involvement is a necessary element for conviction under § 1001.
The federal false-statements statute, 18 U. S. C. §1001, provides that
“[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both” (emphasis added).
The majority correctly begins its analysis with the language of the statute, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981), but in my view, it incorrectly concludes that the statutory language is unambiguous.
In drawing that conclusion, the Court does no more than point out that the “in any matter” language is placed at the beginning of the sentence in a phrase separate from the láter phrase specifying the prohibited conduct. The Court then concludes that under any “natural reading” of the statute, it is clear that “knowingly and willfully” modify only the phrase specifying the prohibited conduct. Ante, at 69-70. Although “there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing ‘plain’ or ‘unambiguous’ language” in a statute, United States v. Turkette, supra, at 580, the Court’s reasoning here amounts to little more than simply pointing to the ambiguous phrases and proclaiming them clear. In my view, it is quite impossible to tell which phrases the terms “knowingly and willfully” modify, and the magic wand of ipse dixit does *78nothing to resolve that ambiguity. I agree with the Court of Appeals that
“neither the grammatical construction nor the punctuation of the statute indicates whether the ‘knowingly and willfully’ phrase modifies only the phrase ‘makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements’ or the broader phrase ‘in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements.’” 708 F. 2d 365, 368 (CA9 1983) (emphasis in original).
Nor does the fact that the “in any matter” language appears as an introductory phrase at the beginning of the statute support the Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend that phrase to be modified by the culpability language. This is so because, before the 1948 revision of the statute— a housekeeping overhaul intended to make no substantive changes, United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 508 (1955) — the “in any matter” language in fact did not appear as an introductory phrase in the statute. Before the 1948 revision, the 1934 statute read as follows:
“[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations, ... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . -. shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996 (emphasis added).
Turning its attention, as it must, to that version of the statute, the Court again does no more than proclaim that the most “natural reading,” even of the 1934 statute, with the “in any matter” language at the end rather than at the beginning of the statute, is that “knowingly and willfully” modify only the making of false statements. Ante, at 69, n. 6. But the fact that the Court’s “natural reading” has not seemed so *79natural to the judges of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, nor for that matter to me, indicates that the Court’s reading, though certainly a plausible one, is not at all compelled by the statutory language. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §46.04 (4th ed. 1973 and 1984 Cum. Supp.).
The legislative history is similarly unclear, but in my view, slightly more supportive of respondent’s position than of the Court’s position. It is in any event certainly not the kind of clear expression of legislative intent which is sufficient to explain an otherwise ambiguous statute and to overcome the application of the rule of lenity.
As the Court points out, the 1918 Act was the first federal prohibition on the making of false statements, and that Act included language requiring that the prohibited false statements be made “for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department thereof.” Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015. All agree that that quoted language directly supports the Court of Appeals’ holding here, Brief for United States 10, and the Court rests its entire holding on the absence of that language in the current statute. Ante, at 71-74.
Examination of the evolution of the statute, however, reveals only meager support for the Court’s conclusion that Congress made “a conscious choice,” ante, at 71, to eliminate the requirement of actual knowledge of federal involvement when it deleted the quoted language. To me, the change in the statutory language is as readily explained by Congress’ desire to eliminate, not the intent requirement, but rather the “cheating and swindling or defrauding” language — language which this Court in United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339, 346-347 (1926), had relied on in construing the 1918 Act narrowly to apply only to “the fraudulent causing of pecuniary or property loss” to the Federal Government.
In Cohn the Court expressly rejected the Government’s argument that Congress intended the 1918 Act to go beyond *80merely protecting the Government from being cheated out of its own money or property, and in addition intended it to protect the Government from the interference with and obstruction of any of its lawful functions by deceitful or fraudulent means. Ibid. The Court specifically focused on the use of the word “defraud” in the statute and concluded that even when used in connection with the words “cheating and swindling,” the word “defraud” is only to be given its ordinary •meaning of “fraudulently] causing. . . pecuniary or property loss.” Ibid.
The restricted scope of the 1918 Act resulting from the Cohn decision became a serious problem with the advent of the New Deal programs in the 1930’s. Early in 1934 Secretary of the Interior Ickes contacted the Chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and proposed a false-statements bill, intended to be broader than the 1918 Act, that would fill a gap he perceived in the present Criminal Code. See H. R. Rep. No. 829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 2858-2859 (1934). In particular the Secretary was concerned that there were at present no statutes outlawing, for example, the presentation of false documents and statements to the Department of the Interior in connection with the shipment of “hot oil,” or to the Public Works Administration in connection with the transaction of business with that agency. See S. Rep. No. 1202, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934).
To address the Secretary’s concerns, both the House and the Senate tried their hands at drafting a bill penalizing the making of false statements in connection with areas of federal agency concern. The House version, H. R. 8046, which was the version finally passed, provided:
“[E]very person who with intent to defraud the United States knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false . . . statement, . . . concerning or pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of any department, establishment, administration, agency, office, board, or commis*81sion of the United States . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment for a term of not more than 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” ' 78 Cong. Rec. 3724 (1934) (emphasis added).
The language of the bill and the House Report accompanying the bill made clear that H. R. 8046 required proof that the defendant actually knew that his fraudulent statements were directed at the Federal Government. The House Report explicitly noted that the “rights of the accused are protected by the provision that the act must be committed willfully and knowingly and with intent to defraud the United States.” H. R. Rep. No. 829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (emphasis added). Statements made on the floor of both Houses during consideration of the bills indicate that the legislators understood that the purpose of the legislation was to deter those individuals “hovering over every department of the Government like obscene harpies, like foul buzzards” intending to deceive the Federal Government. 78 Cong. Rec. 2858 (1934); see id., at 3724.
In spite of the noble goals and colorful metaphors that H. R. 8046 carried with it, President Roosevelt vetoed the bill for what seems now to be a rather obvious reason. In his veto message President Roosevelt pointed out that the statute as drafted was superfluous — it prohibited the very same conduct that was already prohibited by the 1918 Act and it even specified lesser penalties for that conduct. Id., at 6778-6779. Indeed in comparing the bill with the 1918 Act, it is all too obvious that when Congress made the prohibition depend on an intent to defraud, it subjected the new statute to the same narrowing construction that the Court had given to the 1918 Act in Cohn — the very construction that had created the need for the new Act. Thus, to eliminate the President’s problems with the bill, Congress simply enhanced the penalties provision and omitted the limiting language. That language, of course, was the “intent to defraud the United States” language. Another bill, H. R. *828912, was then passed by both Houses, 78 Cong. Rec. 12452 (1934), and, for purposes of this case, the statute assumed its present form, except for the phraseology changes made in the 1948 revision previously discussed.
Of course the Court is correct that Congress could have made its intent clearer by rewriting the limiting language so as to require an “intent to deceive” rather than an “intent to defraud” the Federal Government. See ante, at 73, and n. 13. But the fact still remains that nowhere in the admittedly sparse legislative history is there any indication that Congress intended the postveto changes to alter the culpability requirement that had been a part of the Act since 1918. Indeed in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, 94 (1941), we pointed out that the purpose of the amendment simply was to “omi[t] the limiting words which had been deemed to make the former provision applicable only to cases where pecuniary or property loss to the government had been caused” (footnote omitted). It seems to me highly unlikely that, without so much as a hint of explanation, Congress would have changed the statute from one intended to deter the perpetration of deliberate deceit on the Federal Government, to one intended to criminalize the making of even the most casual false statements so long as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal agency function. The latter interpretation would substantially extend the scope of the statute even to reach, for example, false statements privately made to a neighbor if the neighbor then uses those statements in connection with his work for a federal agency.
Of course “[i]t is not unprecedented for Congress to enact [such] stringent legislation,” United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 709 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting). But I cannot subscribe to the Court’s interpretation of this statute in such a way as to “make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law,” Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286 (1982), when the legislative history *83simply “fails to evidence congressional awareness of the statute’s claimed scope.” Id., at 290. Thus, I would hold that the rule of lenity is applicable in this case and that it requires the Government to prove that a defendant in a § 1001 prosecution had actual knowledge that his false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction.
I — I h — I
Seemingly aware of the broad range of conduct that § 1001 could sweep within its scope under today’s interpretation, the Court apparently does not hold that the words “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States” are jurisdictional words only and that no state of mind is required with respect to federal agency involvement. Ante, at 68-69, and n. 5. Instead, the Court suggests that some lesser state of mind may well be required in § 1001 prosecutions in order to prevent the statute from becoming a “trap for the unwary.” Ante, at 75, n. 14. Accordingly, it expressly declines to decide whether the trial judge erred in its jury instructions in this case. Ibid.
In my view, the Court has simply disregarded the clearest, albeit not conclusive, evidence of legislative intent and then has invited lower courts to improvise a new state-of-mind requirement, almost out of thin air, in order to avoid the unfairness of the Court’s decision today. I think that the Court’s opinion will engender more confusion than it will resolve with respect to the culpability requirement in § 1001 cases not before the Court. And, unfortunately, it tells us absolutely nothing about whether respondent Yermian received a proper jury instruction in the case that is before the Court.
If the proper standard is something other than “actual knowledge” or “reasonable foreseeability,” then respondent is entitled to a new trial and a proper instruction under that standard. The Court seems to believe that the question of the proper culpability requirement is not before it, ante, at 68, n. 5, 75, n. 14, because it apparently concludes that that *84question is not embraced in the Governments’ petition for certiorari asking for review of the Court of Appeals’ holding with respect to the actual knowledge standard. See Pet. for Cert. I. Apparently the Court believes that respondent should have filed a cross-petition for certiorari if he wished to raise the issue of the proper standard and the propriety of the jury instructions in his case. But it is an elementary proposition that a “cross-petition is not necessary to enable a party to advance any ground, even one rejected or not raised below, in support of the judgment in his favor.” R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 478 (5th ed. 1978); see Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977). Here, respondent’s alternative argument for a “recklessness” standard, if accepted, mandates affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment below that he is entitled to a new trial. If the Court is unwilling to decide the issue itself, I believe that at a minimum it must remand for a decision on the issue, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475-476, n. 6 (1970) (dictum), rather than simply leaving the propriety of respondent’s conviction in a state of limbo.
I respectfully dissent.