Court Opinion

ID: 9570933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:27:36.470166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:28.331534
License: Public Domain

*151Kelly, J.
(concurring in reversal and remand). November 27, 1954, plaintiff suffered an injury resulting in a complete amputation of Ms left hand and the loss of his thumb, index, and middle fingers of his right hand.
The referee held that plaintiff had suffered an amputation of the left hand and the loss of industrial use of the right hand, but held that plaintiff did not qualify as a totally and permanently disabled person under part 2, §10, of the workmen’s compensation act, as written at the time of the injury,* and excluded him from differential benefits from the second injury fund.
The chairman of the appeal board held that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled and that the referee’s holding should be set aside, but he was overruled by the other two members of the board, who affirmed' the referee’s award.
Both appellant and appellee Chrysler Corporation agree that the employee is totally and permanently disabled. Appellant contends, however, that he is entitled to benefits from either the employer or the second injury fund, and appellee employer contends the employee is entitled to benefits only from the second injury fund. .
The appeal board members who affirmed the referee stated in their opinion:
“Prior to the Verberg Case [Verberg v. Simplicity Pattern Company, 357 Mich 636], I would have agreed with the chairman’s conclusions because at that time I, too, held to the opinion that the term ‘total and permanent disability’ referred to those who had qualified prior to the amendment the same as it did to those who would qualify under terms of the amendment. I, too, was of the opinion that the. primary purposes of these amendments ‘was to *152tie together any loose ends about which one might quibble as to when and where, if at all, you should draw the line between the loss of a member and the loss of use of same.’ I could not believe that it was the legislative intent to restrict the term ‘total and permanent disability’ to those who had lost so many pounds of flesh and exclude those who still had the flesh but had lost the capacity to use it. Í, too, could not believe that ‘it was the legislative intent to make a distinction as between them when determining * * * justification for the classification of being truly a totally and permanently disabled person.’ I so expressed myself in an opinion entered in Verberg, supra. The Supreme Court did not agree and I shall honor their holding.
.“Plaintiff’s loss does not fall within the restrictive definition which requires the loss of both hands to be ‘at or above the wrist.’ This was the definition of ‘total and permanent disability’ which was in effect at the time this employee’s cause of action accrued. The Supreme Court’s holding in Verberg, supra, that ‘the effect of this amendment to section 10 was to limit permanent and total disability in section 9 to the items defined in section 10’ is here controlling. . It was not until PA 1956, No 195, that an injury such as that suffered by plaintiff was again deemed to be a total and permanent disability. With reluctance, I dissent from the chairman’s holding but trust that he has expressed the legislature’s intent more clearly than I did previously. I vote to affirm the referee’s award.”
Appellee Chrysler Corporation, in its brief, disagreeing with the appeal board’s conclusion, does not even refer to Verberg v. Simplicity Pattern Company, supra, and appellant, claiming that “Verberg is not contrary to plaintiff’s position but is, indeed, supportive thereof,” states:
“Verberg’s injury date was December 10, 19471 His disability .was caused by inhalation of chrome *153and consisted of pulmonary injury. Verberg did not, at time of his injury or ever after, have a disability which was classified as total and permanent under any one of the 7 subsections of section 10. Justice Dethmers stated the question (pp 639, 640):
“ ‘The question on this appeal is whether a person who is permanently and totally disabled as a matter of fact, but not as defined in part 2, § 10, of the act, is entitled to the differential benefits under section 9(a) as above quoted.’
“The Court then proceeded to adopt the attorney general’s opinion which answered in the negative. The reasoning was that differential benefits from the second injury fund were due only to those persons who fell into the classifications provided for in section 10.
“ ‘We approve and adopt the quoted language from the attorney general’s opinion. As above quoted, section 10 provides that: “Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9 hereof means:” thereafter follows the list of specific injuries or losses as set forth in the above quotation of section 10.’ (Verberg, pp 641, 642.)
“It is assumed that Verberg would have been granted differential benefits if he had been properly classified. Clark was properly classified and is, therefore, entitled to such benefits.”
Verberg is not controlling in the instant case, and we agree with appellant and appellee Chrysler Corporation that the appeal board erred in not finding that plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled.
In determining the question whether plaintiff is entitled to benefits from the employer or the second injury fund, we consider the past legislative and judicial history in re total and permanent disability.
The 1954 legislature decided that henceforth it would define classifications which would constitute *154“total and permanent disability” and no longer allow such disability to be decided from such facts as the commission deemed advisable. The legislature listed in part 2, § 10, six classifications, namely:
“(1) Total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes.
“(2) Loss of both legs or both feet at or above the ankle.
“(3) Loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrist.
“(4) Loss of any of 2 of the members or faculties enumerated in (1), (2) or (3).
“(5) Permanent and complete paralysis of both legs or both arms or of 1 leg and 1 arm.
“(6) Incurable insanity or imbecility.” (PA 1954, No 175.)
To decide the' question here presented to this .Court, consideration must be given to an amendment provided by PA 1955, No 250, and an addition and amendment by PA 1956, No 195.
By PA 1955, No 250, a portion of part 2, § 9(a), of the act, was amended to read:
“Any person who is permanently and totally disabled and who is receiving payments of workmen’s compensation which are payable to such person un.der this - act in amounts per week of less than is presently provided in the workmen’s compensation schedule of benefits for permanent and total disability and for a lesser number of weeks than the duration of such permanent and total disability shall hereafter receive weekly, without application, from the second injury fund, an amount equal to the difference between what he is now receiving per week and the amount per week now provided for permanent and total disability.”
PA 1956, No 195, made two significant changes to portions of the workmen’s compensation act here *155pertinent. A seventh classification was added to section 10, as follows:
“(7) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury.”
Also, by PA 1956, No 195, the above quoted portion of part 2 § 9(a), was amended to read:
“Any permanently and totally disabled person as defined in sections 8a and 10 who, on or after June 25, 1955, is entitled to receive payments of workmen’s compensation under this act in amounts per week of less than is presently provided in the workmen’s compensation schedule of benefits for permanent and total disability and for a lesser number of weeks than the duration of such permanent and total disability shall after the effective date of this amendatory act receive weekly, without application, from the second injury fund, an amount equal to the difference between what he is now receiving per week and the amount per week now provided for permanent and total disability.”
In support of the claim that the law in effect as of November 27, 1954, the date of injury, provided for plaintiff’s classification as a totally and permanently disabled person, plaintiff calls attention to the fact that PA 1954, No 175, defined total and permanent disability to include: “(3) Loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrist,” but did not provide that the loss would have to be by amputation; that in Lovalo v. Michigan Stamping Co., 202 Mich 85, and, also, in Shumate v. American Stamping Co., 357 Mich 689, this Court stated that amputation is not a prerequisite to an award for loss of a hand; that this Court has repeatedly held *156that the workmen’s compensation act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed for the benefit of the injured workman and, plaintiff states:
“The language of the amendment could provide two possible constructions. The first is that the described loss must be by amputation. The second is that the described loss may be by amputation or by loss of use. Plaintiff urges the second construction because it • is in accord with prior Supreme Court constructions of the term doss of a hand’ and because it is the more liberal construction which the Court is- required to choose.”
In concluding that appellant is entitled to benefits for total and permanent disability payable from the second injury fund, we quote with approval the following from appellee Chrysler Corporation’s brief:
“By PA 1956, No 195 the legislature enlarged the definition of total and permanent disability to include loss of industrial use, as well as loss by amputation. The same amendatory act provided that persons who had these injuries before the amendatory act, and on or after June 25, 1955, should be entitled to differential benefits in amounts of compensation and in the number of weeks of compensation. We believe the legislative plan was to give the enlarged benefits to those who prior to the amendatory act did not qualify as totally and permanent [ly] disabled, and that these enlarged benefits should come from the second injury fund. The coupling of these two changes in the same amendatory act compels the conclusion.
“We do not agree with appellant’s contention that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because he met the statutory definition on the date he was injured, November 27, 1954. We believe that this contention is patently unsound because it would make meaningless the amendatory *157provisions of PA 1956, No 195. The definition of losses made total and permanent disability before this act named a particular physical point where the loss had to occur before the definition was met, vis: ‘at or above the ankle,’ ‘at or above the wrist.’ This clearly means a loss by amputation, for if not, why add the seventh category of industrial loss of use.
“We do not agree with appellant’s contention that the amendment of 1954, PA 1954, No 175, was not clear, and did not limit the definition of total and permanent disability to the first six classifications now spelled out in subsections (1) through (6) of section 10 of part 2. Appellant’s argument that the addition of subsection (7) by PA 1956, No 195 just further clarified the definitions made by PA 1954, No 175, totally ignores the fact that the addition of subsection (7) in the 1956 amendment was coupled with changes in section 9, subd (a) awarding differential benefits from the second injury fund. * * *
“When the legislature expanded the definition of total and permanent disability, and by the same amendatory act provided for payments of differential benefits for injuries existing at a particular time (June 25, 1955) prior to the effective date of the amendatory act it left the clear impression that it had no intention of making the expanded definition effective to a time prior to the particular time mentioned. If it did, why mention a particular date?
“The changes brought about by PA 1956, No 195 should be considered together. When so considered they compel the conclusion that appellant should receive total and permanent disability benefits from the second injury fund.
“Wherefore, appellee Chrysler Corporation prays that the determination of the workmen’s compensation appeal board be reversed, and the case remanded to the workmen’s compensation appeal *158board for eiitry of an order granting plaintiff benefits from the second injury fund as a person totally and permanently disabled.”
The determination of the workmen’s compensation appeal board is reversed and the case is remanded to the workmen’s compensation appeal board for entry of an order granting plaintiff benefits from the second injury fund as a person totally and permanently disabled. No costs.
Dethmers and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.

 CLS 1954, § 412.10 (Stat Ann 1955 Cum. Supp § 17.160).