Court Opinion

ID: 9385581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 14:07:01.56628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.954233
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCurty, 2023-Ohio-1158.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                      :
                                                    :
      Appellee                                      :   C.A. No. 29462
                                                    :
 v.                                                 :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 00314
                                                    :
 SHAQUONNE MCCURTY                                  :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                    :   Court)
      Appellant                                     :
                                                    :

                                               ...........

                                               OPINION

                                        Rendered on April 7, 2023

                                               ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

J. DAVID TURNER, Attorney for Appellant

                                              .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Shaquonne McCurty appeals from his convictions for

murder and related offenses. On appeal, McCurty challenges the trial court’s decision

overruling his motion to suppress statements he made after his warrantless arrest. For

the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                                                                         -2-

           I.   Procedural History and Relevant Facts

          {¶ 2} On February 5, 2021, McCurty was indicted on two counts of murder, in

violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), unclassified felonies; one count of felonious assault (serious

physical harm), in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree; two

counts of felonious assault (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), felonies

of the second degree; and two counts of having weapons while under disability, in

violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), felonies of the third degree. Except for the offenses of

having weapons under disability, the charges included three-year firearm specifications.

          {¶ 3} On March 29, 2021, McCurty filed a motion to suppress challenging the

pretrial identification of a witness, but this motion was later withdrawn. A second motion

to suppress was filed on May 3, 2021, alleging that evidence should be suppressed as

the result of a warrantless search and that McCurty’s statements were obtained in

violation of Miranda, or in the alternative, were the result of an improper warrantless

arrest.

          {¶ 4} A suppression hearing was held on August 16, 2021. At the hearing, the

State offered the testimony of two witnesses.         In his post-hearing brief, McCurty

specifically argued that, at the time he was arrested without a warrant, there had been no

probable cause to arrest him and, further, that the State did not demonstrate that it had

been impracticable to obtain a warrant or that exigent circumstances had existed. Thus,

he argued that his seizure had been unconstitutional. The trial court overruled McCurty’s

motion in its entirety, finding that there had been probable cause to arrest McCurty and

that it had not been practicable for the police to obtain a warrant prior to doing so. The
                                                                                               -3-

trial court also found that McCurty’s statements were admissible as they had been

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made after he validly waived his Miranda rights.

          {¶ 5} The case proceeded to a jury trial on the murder and felonious assault counts

with firearm specifications, and the two counts of having a weapon while under disability

were tried to the bench. The jury found McCurty guilty of two counts of murder and two

counts of felonious assault (and the firearm specifications) which related to the shooting

death of J.G.1 McCurty was found not guilty of the third felonious assault count related

to W.T., who was standing next to J.G. at the time of the shooting. The trial court found

McCurty guilty on both counts of having a weapon while under disability.

          {¶ 6} At sentencing, the trial court merged all the murder and felonious assault

counts and the State elected sentencing on count one, murder, on which the trial court

imposed a sentence of 15-years-to-life in prison with an additional mandatory 3-year

firearm specification. McCurty was sentenced to 18 months in prison on each of the

having a weapon while under disability counts, which were ordered to be served

concurrently to each other and concurrently to the murder count, for a total = prison term

of 18-years-to-life.

           II.   Motion to Suppress

          {¶ 7} McCurty timely appealed and raises the following single assignment of error:

          The trial court erred in overruling McCurty’s motion to suppress evidence

          because the state failed to show that obtaining an arrest warrant beforehand

          was impracticable under the circumstances. Because the police did not

1
    In order to protect the privacy of minors, we will use initials throughout this opinion.
                                                                                          -4-

       validly arrest McCurty, any statements made by McCurty must also be

       suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

       {¶ 8} The trial court found that there had been probable cause to arrest McCurty

and that it had been impracticable to obtain a warrant prior to his arrest. McCurty does

not challenge the trial court’s finding of probable cause. Rather, McCurty contends the

trial court erred because the State failed to show that obtaining an arrest warrant was

impracticable. McCurty asserts that the failure to demonstrate impracticability

necessitates reversal of his convictions.

       {¶ 9} McCurty relies on this Court’s prior decision in State v. VanNoy, 188 Ohio

App.3d 89, 2010-Ohio-2845, 934 N.E.2d 413 (2d Dist.), to support his position.             In

VanNoy, the defendant was under investigation by the Springfield Police Department drug

unit during the spring of 2008. Id. at ¶ 9. Several months later, a Springfield detective

observed the defendant as a passenger in a vehicle and conducted a traffic stop solely

to arrest the defendant for the prior drug offenses. Id. at ¶ 11-12. At the time of the stop,

there had been no arrest warrant issued for VanNoy, no charges had been filed against

him, and no indictment had been obtained. Id. at ¶ 10. Although the trial court overruled

VanNoy’s motion to suppress, this Court reversed, holding that “in order for an officer to

lawfully perform a warrantless arrest in a public place, the arrest must not only be

supported by probable cause, it must also be shown that obtaining an arrest warrant

beforehand was impracticable under the circumstances, i.e., that exigent circumstances

exist.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 23.

       {¶ 10} However, in 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly rejected the holding
                                                                                        -5-

in VanNoy that required the State to show that obtaining an arrest warrant before arresting

a suspect without a warrant was impracticable under the circumstances, in addition to the

arrest being supported by probable cause. State v. Jordan, 166 Ohio St.3d 339, 2021-

Ohio-3922, 185 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 29. The Supreme Court stated that VanNoy was “contrary

to precedent from both this court and the United States Supreme Court.” Id. at ¶ 32. The

Court then held “that neither the United States nor the Ohio Constitution requires a

showing of exigent circumstances or of the impracticability of obtaining an arrest warrant

to justify a warrantless public arrest supported by probable cause.” Id.

       {¶ 11} As the Court in Jordan explained, “[t]he constitutionality of an arrest

depends on whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause

to make it.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d

142 (1964). “An arrest that is based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under

the Fourth Amendment[.]” Id., citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94

S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Thus, so long as a warrantless arrest is based upon

probable cause and occurs in a public place, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at ¶ 28, citing State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶

66, citing U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598.

       {¶ 12} McCurty does not contest the trial courts’ determination that the arresting

officers had probable cause to arrest him. Furthermore, based on Jordan, the State was

not required to demonstrate that obtaining a warrant prior to his arrest was impracticable.

Therefore, McCurty’s warrantless arrest, conducted in public and with probable cause to

believe that McCurty had committed a felony, was reasonable and did not violate the
                                                                                       -6-

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio

Constitution. McCurty’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

       III.   Conclusion

      {¶ 13} Having overruled the assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

                                    .............

EPLEY, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.