Court Opinion

ID: 9587974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:28:30.879617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:46.820534
License: Public Domain

HON. DIANE G. BARZ, District Judge,
sitting for MR. JUSTICE MORRISON dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the result reached therein is contrary to the clear legislative enactment. Prior to 1973, any claim not presented within twelve months from the date of the happening of the accident was barred. In 1973, the legislature enacted Subsection (2) as follows: “The Division may, upon a reasonable showing by the claimant of lack of knowledge of disability, waive the time requirement up to an additional 24 months.”
The 1973 amendment strongly suggests that the legislature was attempting to deal with the latent-injury problem. Recognizing that Subsection (1) made no allowance in cases where a claimant was unaware that he had suffered a disability, the legislature, by the enactment of Subsection (2), specified that a claimant who lacked knowledge of his disability could be granted an additional 24 months in which to present a claim.
As a consequence of the majority’s holding, Subsection (2) is rendered meaningless. Forthwith, the Division may, upon a reasonable showing by the claimant of lack of knowledge of disability, waive the time requirement for an unlimited period of time. Such a result is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
I have no quarrel with the assertion that the Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the injured worker. However, the majority’s construction runs contrary to the express limitation of the statute.
The restraint exercised by the Supreme Court of our sister state, Wyoming, in the face of an undesirable result, is noteworthy in that it reminds us that our function as jurists is to interpret, and not to enact. In State ex rel. Director, Workers’ Compensation Division v. Wyo-Dak (Wyo 1979), 580 P.2d 835, an injured worker’s claim was denied because *321the filing time had expired, even though the disability was of a type that he could have no knowledge of until after the statute of limitations had run. Justice Rose, specially concurring, observed: “I agree with the result and reasoning of this decision, but I feel compelled to emphasize that I do so because I am not permitted, under the pretense of statutory interpretation, to rewrite a clear legislative enactment.” Wyo-Dak, 589 P.2d at 839. Because the statute was clear in meaning, the Court could not apply rules of construction — liberal or otherwise.
The legislation dealt with by the Wyoming Court in WyoDak was recognized as being particularly unfair, and the same recognition might be made of our own statute, which permits waiver of the time limit only up to an additional 24 months. Regardless, the legislature has spoken to the issue, and this Court should not question its wisdom in so doing.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court.
MR. JUSTICE GULBRANDSON concurs.