Court Opinion

ID: 9427087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:42.372038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.840618
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion because I read it as upholding the District Court’s view that respondent was dismissed for academic deficiencies rather than for unsatisfactory personal *93conduct, and that in these circumstances she was accorded due process.
In the numerous meetings and discussions respondent had with her teachers and advisers, see opinion of Me. Justice Marshall, post, at 98-99, culminating in the special clinical examination administered by seven physicians,1 mte, at 81, respondent was warned of her clinical deficiencies and given every opportunity to demonstrate improvement or question the evaluations. The primary focus of these discussions and examinations was on respondent’s competence as a physician.
Mr. Justice Marshall nevertheless states that respondent’s dismissal was based “largely” on “her conduct”:
“It may nevertheless be true, as the Court implies, ante, at 91 n. 6, that the school decided that respondent’s inadequacies in such areas as personal hygiene, .peer and patient relations, and timeliness would impair her ability to be 'a good medical doctor.’ Whether these inadequacies can be termed 'purely academic reasons,’ as the Court calls them, ibid., is ultimately an irrelevant question, and one placing an undue emphasis on words rather than functional considerations. The relevant point is that *94respondent was dismissed largely because of her conduct, just as the students in Goss were suspended because of their conduct.” Post, at 104 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
This conclusion is explicitly contrary to the District Court’s undisturbed findings of fact. In one sense, the term “conduct” could be used to embrace a poor academic performance as well as unsatisfactory personal conduct. But I do not understand Mr. Justice Marshall to use the term in that undifferentiated sense.2 His opinion likens the dismissal of respondent to the suspension of the students in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), for personal misbehavior. There is evidence that respondent’s personal conduct may have been viewed as eccentric, but — quite unlike the suspensions in Goss — respondent’s dismissal was not based on her personal behavior.
The findings of the District Court conclusively show that respondent was dismissed for failure to meet the academic standards of the Medical School. The court, after reviewing the evidence in some detail, concluded:
“The evidence presented in this case totally failed to *95establish that plaintiff [respondent] was expelled for any reason other than the quality of her work.” App. 44.3
It is well to bear in mind that respondent was attending a medical school where competence in clinical courses is as much of a prerequisite to graduation as satisfactory grades in other courses. Respondent was dismissed because she was as deficient in her clinical work as she was proficient in the “book-learning” portion of the curriculum.4 Evaluation of her performance in the former area is no less an “academic” judgment because it involves observation of her skills and techniques in actual conditions of practice, rather than assigning a grade to her written answers on an essay question.5
*96Because it is clear from the findings of fact by the District Court that respondent was dismissed solely on academic grounds, and because the standards of procedural due process were abundantly met before dismissal occurred,6 I join the Court’s opinion.

 As a safeguard against erroneous judgment, and at respondent’s request, App. 185, the Medical School submitted the question of respondent’s clinical competency to a panel of “seven experienced physicians.” Panel members were requested “to provide a careful, detailed, and thorough assessment of [respondent’s] abilities at this time.” Ibid. The Dean’s letter to respondent of March 15, 1973, advised her quite specifically of the “general topic [s] in the curriculum about which we are asking [the panel] to evaluate your performance . . . .” Ibid. Each member of the examining panel was requested to “evaluate the extent of [respondent’s] mastery of relevant concepts, knowledge, skills, and competence to function as a physician.” Id., at 209. The examinations by members of the pane] were conducted separately. Two of the doctors recommended that respondent be graduated although one added that “she would not qualify to intern at the hospital where he worked.” Id., at 40. Each of the other five doctors submitted negative recommendations, although they varied as to whether respondent should be dropped from school immediately. Ibid.

 Indeed, in view of Mr. Justice Marshall’s apparent conclusion that respondent was dismissed because of some objectively determinable conduct, it is difficult to understand his conclusion that the special examination administered by the seven practicing physicians “may have been better than ... a formal hearing.” Post, at 102. That examination did not purport to determine whether, in the past, respondent had engaged in conduct that would warrant dismissal. Respondent apparently was not called upon to argue that she had not done certain things in the past. There were no facts found on that point. Nor did the doctors who administered the examination address themselves to respondent’s conduct at the time, apart from her ability to perform the clinical tasks physicians must master. Mr. Justice Marshall says that this evaluation tested the truth of the assertions that respondent could not function as a doctor. Post, at 102-103, n. 14. This is a tacit recognition that the issue was an academic one, rather than one limited to whether respondent simply engaged in improper conduct.

 The District Court also found:
“Considering all of the evidence presented, the Court finds that the grading and evaluating system of the medical school was applied fairly and reasonably to plaintiff, but plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of the medical school to graduate from the medical school in June 1973.” App. 45.

 Dr. William Sirridge was the faculty member assigned to respondent as her “chief docent” (faculty adviser). ’ A portion of his testimony was summarized by the District Court as follows:
“He [Dr. Sirridge] emphasized that plaintiff’s [respondent’s] problem was that she thought she could learn to be a medical doctor by reading books, and he advised her [that] the clinical skills were equally as important for obtaining the M. D. degree. He further testified that plaintiff cannot perform many of the necessary basic skills required of a practicing physician . . . .” Id., at 35.

 Mr. Justice Marshall insists that calling this an academic judgment is an exercise in futility. Post, at 104^105, n. 18. As the Court points out, however, the distinction between dismissal for academic deficiency and dismissal for misconduct may be decisive as to the process that is due. Ante, at 89-90. A decision relating to the misconduct of a student requires a factual determination as to whether the conduct took place or not. The accuracy of that determination can be safeguarded by the sorts of procedural protections traditionally imposed under the Due Process Clause. An academic judgment also involves this type of objectively determinable fact — e. g., whether the student gave certain answers on an examination. But the critical decision requires a subjective, expert evaluation as to *96whether that performance satisfies some predetermined standard of academic competence. That standard, in turn, is set by a similarly expert judgment. These evaluations, which go far beyond questions of mere “conduct,” are not susceptible of the same sorts of procedural safeguards that are appropriate to determining facts relating to misconduct. Thus, the conclusion that a particular dismissal is academic — that it entails these expert evaluations — is likely to have controlling significance in determining how much and what sort of process is due.

 University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation. Contrary to the suggestion of" Mr. Justice Marshall, post, at 104-105, n. 18, the fact that a particular procedure is possible or available does not mean that it is required under the Due Process Clause. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), simply does not speak to that point.