Court Opinion

ID: 9855744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:30:16.184932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:57.325067
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
I concur in the reversal with respect to both counts, but I adhere to the views expressed in my concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 811 [330 P.2d 33],
There is a clear distinction between the present ease and the McShann case. Here defendant was not arrested until three months after the alleged offenses had been committed. Officer Eenty testified that defendant was the person who had made both sales. Defendant denied any participation in either sale. In other words, the defense was based upon the claim that Officer Eenty had been mistaken in identifying defendant as the person who had made the two sales. Under these circumstances the majority properly conclude that testimony of the informer as to the identity of the person involved could have been of material benefit to the defense.
In the McShann case, however, defendant was arrested at *361the time of the second offense, namely possession, while he actually had narcotics on his person. No question of identity was involved. Following the guiding principles declared in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 [77 S.Ct. 623,1 L.Ed.2d 639], as to the conditions which require the disclosure of the name of the informer, and “balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense" (p. 62), I am of the opinion that the balance is in favor of the “individual’s right’’ here but that the balance was in favor of the “public interest" in the McShann case insofar as the second count of possession was concerned.
Shenk, J., and MeComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 14, 1959.