Court Opinion

ID: 9838613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 06:00:23.233983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:46.561521
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JAMES A. CORRIVEAU, SR.,                        DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        PH-1221-14-0377-B-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: September 6, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James G. Noucas, Jr., Esquire, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for the
             appellant.

           Debra M. Evans, Esquire, Norfolk, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     which denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action
     (IRA) appeal.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, VACATE the remand initial decision, FIND that the appellant

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     made some protected disclosures that were contributing factors in certain
     personnel actions, and REMAND the case to the regional office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was a Pipefitter at the agency’s Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
     Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). Corriveau v. Department of
     the Navy, MSPB Docket No. PH-1221-14-0377-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1 at 2. On May 25, 2010, he and three of his coworkers sent a letter to
     U.S. Senators Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe alleging that their supervisors
     were illegally retaliating against them and requesting an investigation into their
     behavior.   IAF, Tab 49 at 33-36.      Approximately 3 days later, on or about
     May 28, 2010, the appellant contacted the NAVFAC Headquarters Inspector
     General (IG) Hotline and asserted that he and some of his coworkers in the Public
     Works Department believed that they were experiencing “endless harassment” at
     the hands of their supervisors. Id. at 17-19.
¶3        In response to the letter to Senators Collins and Snowe, the agency held a
     meeting on June 15, 2010, which was attended by all four signees, as well as the
     Production Division Manager, R.G.; a Labor Relations Specialist, C.M.; and the
     Chief Steward, C.R.     Id. at 40, 42; Hearing Transcript, Day 1 (HT1) at 159
     (testimony of R.G.); Hearing Transcript, Day 2 (HT2) at 316 (testimony of the
     appellant), 486 (testimony of C.M.).      On July 28, 2010, the appellant sent a
     follow-up letter to Senator Collins stating that R.G., who had been identified as
     one of the retaliators, was present at the meeting, that nothing was resolved at the
     meeting, and that he still was experiencing whistleblower retaliation.         IAF,
     Tab 49 at 46.
¶4        Thereafter, the appellant filed a Board appeal on July 21, 2010, challenging
     his nonselection for a Performance Assessment Representative (PAR) position
     and raising whistleblower retaliation. See Corriveau v. Department of the Navy,
                                                                                        3

     MSPB Docket No. PH-3443-10-0542-I-1, Initial Decision (0542 ID) (Sept. 27,
     2010); IAF, Tab 1 at 59-60. The administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal on September 27, 2010, finding that the appellant failed to
     allege any basis for the Board’s jurisdiction.    Id.   The appellant did not seek
     review and, as a result, the initial decision became the Board’s final decision. Id.
     at 3.
¶5           In the meantime, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC) in mid-September 2010. IAF, Tab 4 at 20. He alleged that the
     agency took several actions against him as a result of his protected disclosures.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 64-65, Tab 4 at 34. He also claimed that he overheard R.G. stating
     on July 28, 2010, that the four June 15, 2010 meeting participants had “bullseyes
     on their backs” and that he intended to “get every one of them.” IAF, Tab 1
     at 64-65.    On November 30, 2010, OSC issued a close-out letter advising the
     appellant that it had terminated its inquiry into his allegations and that he had the
     right to seek corrective action from the Board within 65 days after the date of the
     letter. IAF, Tab 4 at 10. He did not file a Board appeal at that time.
¶6           In September and October 2012, the appellant contacted several elected
     representatives and raised complaints concerning the alleged illegal practices of
     his supervisors.    IAF, Tab 49 at 52-55.    He then subsequently filed a second
     complaint with OSC on March 21, 2013. IAF, Tab 1 at 27. Therein, he named
     R.G. and the Head of the Public Works Department, J.W., as the responsible
     agency officials. Id. at 21. He included the personnel actions that he alleged in
     his 2010 complaint and also asserted the following: (1) he was denied training
     since February 2011; (2) he applied for and was offered a PAR position, but he
     declined the position because it was temporary; and (3) he was not selected for
     16 positions between December 4, 2011, and December 20, 2012. Id. at 38-40,
     101-29. In a September 16, 2013 letter responding to the complaint, OSC advised
     the appellant that it would “not revisit the allegatio ns and personnel actions
     that . . . [were] already analyzed in connection with [his] prior complaint.”     Id.
                                                                                        4

     at 11.     In its September 30, 2013 letter closing the file, OSC stated that the
     personnel actions included in the appellant’s complaint were nonselections for
     several positions, denial of the opportunity to serve as an acting supervisor, and
     the agency’s failure to pay him an on-the-spot award. Id. at 9.
¶7            On November 25, 2013, the appellant filed this IRA appeal. Id. at 1. The
     administrative judge held the requested hearing and issued an initial d ecision
     denying his request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 67, Initial Decision (ID). The
     appellant petitioned for review of the initial decision and the Board issued a
     Remand Order, vacating the decision.        Corriveau v. Department of the Navy,
     MSPB Docket No. PH-1221-14-0377-W-1, Remand Order (Sept. 4, 2015). In the
     Remand Order, the Board ordered the administrative judge, among other things,
     to identify the alleged personnel actions and protected disclosures properly before
     the Board in the appeal, to reexamine the contributing factor evidence, to make
     credibility findings of key witnesses, and to perform a clear and convincing
     analysis under Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
     paying special attention to the strength of the agency’s motive to retaliate in light
     of the apparent direct evidence and other circumstantial evidence of R.G.’s
     retaliatory animus. Remand Order, ¶¶ 13-15, 18-22.
¶8            On remand, the administrative judge did not open the record except to seek
     a copy of the appellant’s 2010 OSC complaint, and she issued a remand initial
     decision that again denied the appellant’s corrective action request. Corriveau v.
     Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. PH-1221-14-0377-B-1, Remand File,
     Tab 8, Remand Initial Decision (RID). She found that 6 of the 8 disclosures that
     the appellant made were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), that the appellant
     proved that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in 3 of the
     17 alleged personnel actions properly before the Board in the appeal, and that the
     agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
     3 personnel actions in the absence of his disclosures. RID at 7-26.
                                                                                          5

¶9         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
      primarily arguing that the administrative judge failed to comply with several of
      the Board’s instructions in the Remand Order, including its instructions to
      perform a sound credibility analysis of significant witnesses and to perform a
      clear and convincing analysis in accordance with Whitmore. Remand Petition for
      Review (RPFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response in opposition, to
      which the appellant has replied. RPFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶10        It is undisputed that all of the personnel actions at issue here took place
      prior to the December 27, 2012 enactment of the Whistleblower Protection
      Enhancement Act (WPEA). IAF, Tab 1 at 36-40, Tab 15 at 6-7. Therefore, the
      pre-WPEA standards concerning the scope of an IRA appeal apply to this appeal. 2
      See Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 7 (2016); Rebstock
      Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶¶ 7-8
      (2015).
¶11        Under pre-WPEA law, after establishing the Board’s jurisdiction, as the
      appellant did here, he then must establish a prima facie case of whistleblower
      retaliation by proving by preponderant evidence that he made a protected
      disclosure that was a contributing factor in a personnel action taken against him.
      Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 8. If the appellant meets that burden, then the
      Board shall order such corrective action unless the agency shows by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
      absence of the protected disclosure. Id.

      2
       During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
      Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
      December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of title 5
      of the United States Code. Our decision to remand this appeal and our findings herein
      would be the same under both pre- and post-NDAA law.
                                                                                       6

      The appellant established that he made disclosures protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).
¶12        Pre-WPEA law defined a protected disclosure as a disclosure of information
      that an appellant reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule, or
      regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
      or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.         5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2011); Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 11. A reasonable belief
      exists if a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to
      and readily ascertainable by the appellant could reasonably conclude that the
      actions of the Government evidence one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in
      section 2302(b)(8)(A). Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 11. To establish that he
      made a protected disclosure, the appellant need not prove that the matter
      disclosed actually established one of the types of wrongdoing listed under
      section 2302(b)(8)(A); rather, he must show that the matter disclosed was one
      that a reasonable person in his position would have believed evidenced any of the
      situations specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id.
¶13        The appellant identified the following eight protected disclosures, labeled
      Disclosures A-H, that he exhausted before OSC in connection with this appeal:
      (A) disclosures made in his May 25, 2010 letter to Senators Collins and Snow e
      and his May 28, 2010 complaint to the IG hotline; (B) disclosures made during
      the June 15, 2010 meeting held in response to the May 25, 2010 letter to Senators
      Collins and Snowe; (C) disclosures contained in the appellant’s July 7, 2010 letter
      to Senator Collins; (D) disclosures made during the course of the appellant’s 2010
      Board appeal and his 2010 OSC complaint; (E) disclosures made in his September
      and October 2012 letters to several elected representatives; (F) disclosures made
      during a discussion with the NAVFAC’s Head of Safety on September 15, 2010;
      (G) disclosures made during a meeting with the Shipyard Commander and J.W. in
      May 2011; and (H) disclosures concerning mold made in 2010 or 2011, and then
                                                                                            7

      again in an all-hands meeting on March 6, 2013. IAF, Tab 1 at 31-35, Tab 49
      at 4-5.

                The appellant has shown that Disclosures A, B, C, D, E, and F are
                protected.
¶14         Disclosure A consists of the appellant’s May 25, 2010 letter to Senators
      Collins and Snowe and his May 28, 2010 complaint to the IG hotline. IAF, Tab 1
      at 31, 45-58, Tab 49 at 17-19. 3 In these disclosures, the appellant complains of
      “endless harassment” by his supervisors in retaliation for “speak[ing] up,”
      including, among other things, denying them high pay for duties performed under
      hazardous conditions, denying them the opportunity to receive fill-in time, i.e.,
      the opportunity to be an acting supervisor, overlooking them for several positions,
      eliminating their break room, and yelling and screaming at them in certain
      instances. IAF, Tab 1 at 31, 45-48, Tab 49 at 17-19.
¶15         Concerning his complaint about high pay, the appellant failed to sp ecify the
      law, rule, or regulation the agency allegedly violated when he made the
      disclosure.    However, an employee need not identify a statutory or regulatory
      provision by title or number to receive protection under the whistleblower
      protection laws when the employee’s statements and the circumstances of those
      statements clearly implicate an identifiable law, rule, or regulation. See Langer v.
      Department of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The appellant
      only needs to show that he reasonably believed that his disclosure evidenced one
      of the conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Chavez v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18 (2013). In the May 25, 2010 letter to
      Senators Collins and Snowe, the appellant and the other signees wrote that an
      3
        Because pre-WPEA standards apply to this appeal, the appellant cannot obtain
      corrective action in this appeal for reprisal based on his 2010 complaint to the IG
      hotline as protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C); rather, the Board only may
      order corrective action for reprisal as a result of a prohibited personnel practice
      described in section 2302(b)(8). See Rebstock Consolidation, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 7;
      Colbert v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 7 (2014).
                                                                                          8

      employee is entitled to high pay when they are “asked to perform duties under
      hazardous conditions,” and they claimed that their supervisors would give it to
      other employees, but not to them. IAF, Tab 1 at 45. During the proceedings,
      C.M., a Labor Relations Specialist, testified that there is a specific regulation in
      the Code of Federal Regulations (5 C.F.R. § 532.511) that outlines when work
      situations warrant high pay and that he discussed the regulation with the union,
      the appellant, and some of his coworkers.           HT2 at 492-93.      Under these
      circumstances, we find that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable
      person in his position believed evidenced a violation of the regulation concerning
      high pay.   See Mogyorossy v. Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 652,
      ¶¶ 12-13 (2004) (finding that the appellant’s disclosure concerning the agency’s
      failure to give its employees breaks was protected despite his failure to identify
      the specific law, rule, or regulation that the agency allegedly violated ); Berkley v.
      Department of the Army, 71 M.S.P.R. 341, 351-52 (1996) (finding that the
      appellant made a protected disclosure when he complained to the IG and his
      supervisors that he improperly was denied overtime pay).
¶16         Further, an abuse of authority occurs when there is an arbitrary or
      capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or employee that adversely
      affects the rights of any person or results in personal gain or advantage to himself
      or preferred other persons. See Herman v. Department of Justice, 115 M.S.P.R.
      386, ¶ 11 (2011).     The Board has held that harassment by a supervisor may
      constitute an abuse of authority.    See, e.g., Ayers v. Department of the Army,
      123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶¶ 14-20 (2015); Herman, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶¶ 11-12; Murphy
      v. Department of the Treasury, 86 M.S.P.R. 131, ¶ 6 (2000).               Here, four
      employees signed the letter to the Senators requesting an investigation into their
      supervisors’ alleged retaliatory behavior, claiming that they believed that the
      ongoing harassment they were experiencing was illegal. IAF, Tab 1 at 45. They
      supported their assertions with several acts of alleged retaliation. Id. at 45-48.
      Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant disclosed a matter that a
                                                                                        9

      reasonable person in his position believed evidenced an abuse of authority.
      Herman, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶¶ 11-12.
¶17        Disclosure B includes disclosures that the appellant made during the
      June 15, 2010 meeting held in response to the May 25, 2010 letter to Senators
      Collins and Snowe. IAF, Tab 1 at 31. The appellant states that R.G. was present
      at the meeting and heard “first hand [their] complaints about his actions and
      practices that [they] felt were illegal and inappropriate from the way he treated
      [them] as employees to, more importantly, hiring and promotion practices .” Id.;
      HT2 at 318-19 (testimony of the appellant). R.G. testified that the signees voiced
      their concerns during the meeting, including their concerns about leadership
      training and advancement, a hostile work environment, and retaliation.        HT1
      at 159-62.   Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant disclosed a
      matter that a reasonable person in his position believed evidenced a violation of a
      law, rule, or regulation, or an abuse of authority. See Herman, 115 M.S.P.R. 386,
      ¶¶ 11-12; Murphy, 86 M.S.P.R. 131, ¶¶ 6-7.
¶18        Disclosure C consists of disclosures contained in the appellant’s July 7,
      2010 letter to Senator Collins. IAF, Tab 1 at 32, Tab 49 at 34. In the letter, the
      appellant referenced his May 25, 2010 letter to Senators Collins and Snowe, and
      stated that R.G., who had been identified as one of the retaliators, was present at
      the meeting and that nothing was resolved. IAF, Tab 49 at 34. He also stated
      that the whistleblower retaliation was ongoing, and he listed several personnel
      actions that he believed were retaliatory. Id. Under these circumstances, we find
      that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in his position
      believed evidenced a violation of whistleblower protection laws or an abuse of
      authority. See Herman, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶¶ 11-12; Mogyorossy, 96 M.S.P.R.
      652, ¶¶ 12-13; Murphy, 86 M.S.P.R. 131, ¶¶ 6-7.
¶19        Disclosure D consists of disclosures made during the course of the
      appellant’s 2010 Board appeal and his 2010 OSC complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 32-33.
      In his 2010 Board appeal, he challenged his nonselection for the PAR position
                                                                                        10

      and raised an affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal. IAF, Tab 1 at 32,
      59-60; 0542 ID. In his 2010 OSC complaint, he alleged that the agency took
      several actions against him as a result of his protected disclosures. IAF, Tab 1
      at 64-65, Tab 4 at 34.
¶20         Because pre-WPEA standards apply to this appeal, it is immaterial whether
      the appellant’s 2010 Board appeal and OSC complaint constitute protected
      activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) or (C). See Colbert v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 7 (2014). Nevertheless, the disclosures
      contained in his 2010 OSC complaint can be considered under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)(B)(i).      See id., ¶ 8 (explaining that, under pre-WPEA law,
      disclosures   contained    in   an    OSC    complaint   can   be   protected   under
      section 2302(b)(8)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B)(i) (2011). The appellant’s
      OSC complaint raised the substance of his disclosures contained in the May 25,
      2010 letter to Senators Collins and Snowe and detailed R.G.’s harassment. IAF,
      Tab 1 at 63-64, Tab 4 at 34.         For the reasons stated above, we find that the
      appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in his position believed
      evidenced a violation of the regulation concerning high pay or an abuse of
      authority. See Herman, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶¶ 11-12; Mogyorossy, 96 M.S.P.R.
      652, ¶¶ 12-13.
¶21         Disclosure E consists of disclosures made in his September and
      October 2012 letters to several elected representatives detailing the alleged illegal
      practices of his supervisors and requesting an investigation into their actions.
      IAF, Tab 1 at 33, 67-70, Tab 49 at 52-55. In these letters, the appellant voiced
      his concerns, among other things, about the illegal hiring practices within
      NAVFAC, including nepotism and the canceling and reposting of vacancy
      announcements when R.G.’s and J.W.’s preferred candidates did not make the
      certificate of eligibles. IAF, Tab 1 at 67-70. In his appeal, the appellant included
      a “Nepotism Chart,” in which he listed several individuals within NAVFAC who
      he claimed received their position as a result of nepotism. IAF, Tab 49 at 94 -95.
                                                                                      11

      Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant disclosed a matter that a
      reasonable person in his position believed evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
      regulation. See Becker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 76 M.S.P.R. 292, 297
      (1997) (explaining that disclosures that agency officials did not post job
      announcements, but instead hired friends and relatives, constituted claims of
      nepotism and violation of law that may form the basis for an IRA appeal); see
      also McDonnell v. Department of Agriculture, 108 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶¶ 10-13 (2008)
      (finding that the appellant had made a nonfrivolous allegation of statutory
      violations of law when she made a disclosure about hiring and selection
      improprieties).
¶22        Disclosure F includes disclosures that the appellant made during a
      discussion with the NAVFAC’s Head of Safety on September 15, 2010 , regarding
      safety concerns about unsafe scaffolding.     IAF, Tab 1 at 34.     The appellant
      testified that he informed the Head of Safety that the scaffolding as erected,
      which was approximately 27 to 30 feet above the work floor, was moving and not
      safe, and that the Head of Safety immediately agreed. HT2 at 333. J.W. testified
      that, partly as a result of the “scaffolding incident,” the appellant’s immediate
      supervisor, D.W., was removed from his supervisory position. Id. at 403. R.G.
      agreed that the scaffolding at issue was a reason for the supervisor’s downgrade
      and also agreed that that the scaffolding was “unsafe.” HT1 at 223-34.
¶23        Concerning a disclosure of a substantial and specific danger to public health
      or safety, the inquiry into whether a disclosed danger is sufficiently substantial
      and specific to warrant protection under whistleblower protection laws is guided
      by several factors, including (1) “the likelihood of harm resulting from the
      danger,” (2) “when the alleged harm may occur,” and (3) “the nature of the
      harm,” i.e., “the potential consequences.”      Chambers v. Department of the
      Interior, 515 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under these circumstances, we
      find that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in his position
      believed evidenced a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety
                                                                                          12

      because the appellant, or one of his coworkers, could have suffered substantial
      injury had he fallen off the scaffolding or had the scaffolding collapsed. See
      Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 21 (finding that disclosures regarding failure to
      change a patient’s dressings were protected, regardless of whether harm actually
      occurred, because the potential harm was readily foreseeable ).

             The appellant has failed to show that Disclosures G and H are protected.
¶24         Disclosure G concerns disclosures that the appellant made during a meeting
      with the Shipyard Commander and J.W. in May 2011. IAF, Tab 1 at 34. During
      the meeting, the appellant raised concerns that NAVFAC had not had a safety
      meeting since he joined. Id. Although the appellant claimed that the lack of a
      safety meeting violated an agency practice or polic y, he did not show that it
      violated a law, rule, or regulation. Id. Under these circumstances, we find that
      the appellant has failed to meet his burden of showing that this disclosure is
      protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).       See Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 24
      (finding that the appellant’s disclosure of a violation of agency policy or practice,
      as   opposed   to   a   law,   rule,   or   regulation,   is   not   protected   under
      section 2302(b)(8)).
¶25         Disclosure H consists of disclosures that the appellant made in 2010 or
      2011, and then again on March 6, 2013, regarding his concerns with mold in
      certain areas of Building 43 in the Public Works Shop. IAF, Tab 1 at 34; HT2
      at 335-36. Although the appellant generally claims that he discussed the mold
      problem with R.G. at various times starting in “roughly 2010, 2011,” he does not
      allege specifics regarding the conversations, including what he said and when he
      said it.   IAF, Tab 1 at 34; HT2 at 336.       An appellant’s disclosures must be
      specific and detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing.            See Linder v.
      Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 14 (2014). The appellant’s disclosures
                                                                                            13

      here during the 2010 and 2011 timeframe do not meet this standard and,
      therefore, we find that they are not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 4

      The appellant established that the agency took several personnel actions under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) against him.
¶26         Here, the appellant alleged that the agency took several personnel actions
      against him as a result of his protected whistleblowing, including numerous
      nonselections, denial of fill-in time and leadership training, and a delay or denial
      of an on-the-spot award.       IAF, Tab 1 at 36-40.         Under pre-WPEA law, the
      definition of “personnel action” included, among other things, the following: a
      promotion; a detail, transfer, or reassignment; and “a decision concerning pay,
      benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or
      training may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion,
      performance     evaluation,    or    other    [personnel]     action.”       5   U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), and (ix) (2011).
¶27         After reviewing the record, including documents related to the appellant’s
      two OSC complaints and his grievances, we find that the following 17 actions
      constitute personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) that are properly
      before the Board in this appeal because they were exhausted before OSC for the
      first time in his second complaint and were not the subject of a grievance:
      (1) nonselection for a Production Shop Planner position, which he applied to on
      November 30, 2011; (2) nonselection for a Production Control position, which he
      applied to on December 4, 2011; (3) nonselection for an Engineering Technician

      4
        As to his disclosure concerning the mold problem during an all -hands meeting held on
      March 13, 2013, we find this disclosure irrelevant, as it took place several months after
      the latest personnel action in this appeal and could not have been a contributing factor
      in any of the personnel actions at issue. See Davis v. Department of Defense,
      106 M.S.P.R. 560, ¶ 12 (2007) (holding that, because the complained-of personnel
      action predated the protected disclosure, there is no way that the disclosu re could have
      contributed to the personnel action), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 278 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Therefore, we will not address this
      disclosure further.
                                                                                       14

position, which he applied to on December 9, 2011; (4) nonselection for an
Industrial Engineering Technician position, which he applied to on January 20,
2012; (5) nonselection for a PAR position, which he applied to on February 10,
2012; 5 (6) nonselection for a Utilities Billing Analyst position, which he applied
to on February 14, 2012; (7) nonselection for an Engineering Technician position,
which he applied to on February 19, 2012; (8) nonselection for an Engineering
Technician position, which he applied to on May 16, 2012; (9) nonselection for
an Administrative Specialist position, which he applied to on May 22, 2012;
(10) nonselection for a Maintenance Supervisor position, which he applied to on
June 4, 2012; (11) nonselection for a PAR position, which he applied to on
September 9, 2012; (12) nonselection for a PAR position, which he applied to on
November 2, 2012; (13) nonselection for a Base Support Vehicles and Equipment
Site   Director   position,   which    he    applied   to   on   November 25,      2012;
(14) nonselection for a Utilities Billing Analyst position, which he appli ed to on
December 4, 2012; (15) denial of fill-in time; i.e., the opportunity to be an acting
supervisor, between November 2011 and August 2012; (16) denial or delay of an
on-the-spot award in September 2010; 6 and (17) denial of leadership training on
February 5, May 11, and August 9, 2011. 7 IAF, Tab 1 at 36-40, Tab 49 at 5-6, 57,
208-09.

5
  The appellant identified his nonselection for a temporary PAR position, which he
applied to on July 25, 2011, as a personnel action at issue. IAF, Tab 1 at 38. However,
we find that the appellant has not proven that the agency took a personnel action ag ainst
him here because he asserted that he voluntarily decided to decline the agency’s offer of
the position. Id.
6
  In his petition for review, the appellant claims, contrary to the administrative judge’s
conclusion, that his on-the-spot award was denied—not delayed. RPFR File, Tab 1
at 22-24. On remand, the administrative judge shall reexamine the evidence pertaining
to the on-the-spot award and, after making the relevant credibility determinations,
decide whether the personnel action at issue is a dela y or a denial of the award.
7
  In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge analyzed “harassment” as a
separate personnel action. RID at 26-27. Although the Board has found that the
                                                                                               15

      The appellant met his burden of showing that his protected disclosures were a
      contributing factor in four of the personnel actions taken against him.
¶28         An employee who establishes that he made a protected disclosure has the
      additional burden of proving by preponderant evidence that his disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the covered personnel actions. See Shibuya v. Department
      of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 22 (2013). The most common way of proving
      that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action is the
      knowledge/timing test. Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R.
      221, ¶ 23 (2014). Under that test, an appellant can prove the contributing factor
      element through evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the
      whistleblowing disclosure and took the personnel action within a period of time
      such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action. Id. An appellant may establish an
      official’s constructive knowledge of a protected disclosure by demonstrating that
      an individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official
      accused of taking the retaliatory action.        Aquino v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 19 (2014). The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the
      term “cat’s paw” to describe a case in which a particular management official,
      acting because of an improper animus, influences an agency official who is
      unaware of the improper animus when implementing a personnel action .                    Id.
      (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011)).

      creation of a hostile work environment may constitute a per sonnel action under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) if it meets the statutory criteria, i.e., constitutes a significant
      change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions , see Skarada v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16, we need not address that question here.
      Specifically, each of the actions alleged by the appellant that comprise a potential
      hostile work environment claim constitute individual personnel actions under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), and (ix), and have been analyzed as su ch. Accordingly, those
      actions would not also constitute “any other” significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xi) (2011).
                                                                                              16

¶29         Here, the appellant alleges that R.G. and J.W. were the retaliating officials.
      IAF, Tab 1 at 36. We found above that Disclosures A, B, C, D, E, and F were
      protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Based on the record, including witness
      testimony, we find that R.G. was aware of Disclosures A, B, and F prior to the
      dates of the personnel actions at issue and that J.W. was aware of Disclosures A
      and E prior to the dates of the personnel actions at issue. HT1 at 158-62, 168,
      170, 224 (testimony of R.G.); HT2 at 383-84, 404 (testimony of J.W.). As to
      Disclosures C and D, we find that the appellant did not show that either R.G. or
      J.W. was aware of the disclosures prior to the taking of the personnel actions at
      issue. HT1 at 168, 170 (testimony of R.G.).

            The appellant established that his protected disclosures                   were   a
            contributing factor in personnel actions 10, 15, 16, and 17.
¶30         The record shows, as to personnel action 10 (nonselection for a
      Maintenance Supervisor position), that R.G. was the chairman of the selection
      board and that J.W. was the selecting official.         IAF, Tab 36 at 25, 35; HT1
      at 198-200 (testimony of R.G.).       The appellant applied and the selection took
      place less than 2 years after Disclosures E and F. IAF, Tab 35 at 4, Tab 37 at 26 ,
      Tab 49 at 91. Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant has shown
      that his nonselection occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable
      person could conclude that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in
      the personnel action under the knowledge/timing test. 8 See Schnell v. Department
      of the Army, 114 M.S.P.R. 83, ¶ 22 (2010) (finding that a personnel action taken

      8
        Because we find that the decision makers had actual knowledge of the appellant’s
      protected disclosures regarding this nonselection, a cat’s paw analysis is not necessary
      for the appellant to meet his burden on contributing factor. Nevertheless, on remand,
      when the administrative judge performs her clear and convincing analysis, she shall
      consider the appellant’s arguments concerning the irregularities in the selection process,
      R.G.’s influence over the selection process and panel, and the likelihood that J.W.
      would accept R.G.’s recommendation without question. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 12 -13.
                                                                                           17

      within approximately 1 to 2 years of the appellant’s disclosures satisfies the
      knowledge/timing test).
¶31         As to personnel actions 15 (denial of fill-in time), 16 (delay or denial of an
      on-the-spot award), and 17 (denial of leadership training), R.G. testified that he
      made or had the discretion to make the decision to deny or delay these personnel
      actions, all of which took place within 2 years of the appellant’s protected
      disclosures. HT1 at 140, 142, 153, 185; IAF, Tab 1 at 36-38. We similarly find,
      therefore, that the appellant has shown that these personnel actions occurred
      within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that his
      protected   disclosures    were   a   contributing    factor   in   them    under   the
      knowledge/timing test. Schnell, 114 M.S.P.R. 83, ¶ 22.

            The appellant failed to establish that his protected disclosures were a
            contributing factor in personnel actions 1-9 and 11-14.
¶32         Although the appellant generally alleges that R.G. and J.W. played a role in
      all of the nonselections at issue, he has not shown that they were involved in
      taking personnel actions 1-9 and 11-14 or that they influenced the decision
      makers in any way. 9 RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4.
¶33         Concerning personnel actions 1 and 9 (his nonselections for a Production
      Shop Planner position and an Administrative Specialist position), he stated that
      he made the certificate of eligibles but was never interviewed for the positions.
      IAF, Tab 1 at 38-39. However, he did not present any evidence regarding the
      nonselections, including who made the decisions concerning interviews. In the

      9
        Although there are 14 nonselections at issue in this appeal, the administrative judge
      stated for the record prior to the start of the second day of the hearing that the
      appellant’s prime focus of his appeal was personnel action 10 (his nonselection for a
      Maintenance Supervisor position). HT2 at 298-99. The appellant’s attorney agreed
      with this statement and the appellant, during his testimony, agreed as well. HT2 at 299,
      306. As a result, the appellant focused much of the hearing on the Maintenance
      Supervisor nonselection and presented scant evidence concerning the other
      nonselections at issue in this appeal. HT1, HT2.
                                                                                        18

      absence of any evidence concerning either R.G.’s or J.W.’s involvement in or
      influence over the selection process, he fails to meet his burden that his protected
      disclosures were a contributing factor in the nonselections.         See Salinas v.
      Department of the Army, 94 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶¶ 10-12 (2003).
¶34         Concerning personnel actions 2-8 and 11-12 (his nonselections for a
      Production Control position, three Engineering Technician positions, an Industrial
      Engineering Technician position, a Utilities Billing Analyst position, and three
      PAR positions), he stated, without more, that he “[n]ever received an eligibility
      letter and [was] never interviewed.” IAF, Tab 1 at 39. Concerning personnel
      action 13 (his nonselection for a Base Support Vehicles and Equipment Site
      Director), the appellant stated that he was found ineligible even though his
      resume supported his eligibility for the position and, concerning personnel action
      14 (his nonselection for a Utilities Billing Analyst position), he stated that he was
      informed that there was a sufficient number of veterans who applied and that,
      therefore, his application was not rated. Id. at 40. He did not present any further
      evidence regarding these nonselections.
¶35         The agency, however, presented unrebutted testimony from a Human
      Resources (HR) Specialist that the appellant’s supervisors were not involved in
      determining whether an applicant was eligible for a position and whether an
      application package had been rated highly enough to be placed on a certificate of
      eligibles. HT2 at 408, 413-16, 421-22. Rather, such determinations were made
      exclusively by the agency’s HR Services Center for the Northeast . HT2 at 413.
      In the absence of any evidence concerning either R.G.’s or J.W .’s involvement in
      or influence over the selection process, he fails to meet his burden that his
      protected disclosures were a contributing factor in these nonselections.         See
      Salinas, 94 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶¶ 10-12.
                                                                                      19

      Remand is necessary to determine whether the agency showed by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken personnel actions 10, 15, 16, and 17
      in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures.
¶36        In determining whether an agency has met its burden of showing by clear
      and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions in
      the absence of the protected disclosures, the Board will consider all of the
      relevant factors, including the following (“Carr factors”): (1) the strength of the
      agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any
      motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the
      decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.
      Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see Carr v. Social
      Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does
      not view these factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove
      by clear and convincing evidence.      Rather, the Board will weigh the factors
      together to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole.
      McCarthy v. International Boundary and Water Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594,
      ¶ 44 (2011), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
¶37        In its Remand Order, the Board found that, although the administrative
      judge made no explicit credibility findings regarding R.G.’s testimony, she
      significantly relied on his testimony in making her findings. Remand Order, ¶ 18.
      The Board noted that it shared the appellant’s concern regarding the
      administrative judge’s finding that the “bullseye” comment, standing alone, was
      insufficient to establish a pattern of harassment from which reta liatory animus
      could be inferred, and it indicated that a single incident may have compelling
      evidentiary value. Id., ¶ 20. It also indicated that the context surrounding the
      “bullseye” comment was especially troubling. Id. It therefore concluded that the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show any retaliatory
      motive was overly dismissive and contrary to the guidance set forth in Whitmore.
                                                                                          20

      Id. As a result, the Board remanded the appeal and instructed the administrative
      judge to reconsider the strength of the agency’s motive to retaliate, examining the
      totality of the evidence presented in the appeal , and to address the credibility of
      key witnesses. Id., ¶ 18 n.9, ¶ 21. It further instructed the administrative judge
      to especially consider the appellant’s arguments in which he identifie d a series of
      acts that began shortly after his initial protected disclosure, including the letter of
      reprimand and the performance appraisal conducted by R.G. a few days after the
      “bullseye” comment. Id., ¶ 21.
¶38         In the remand initial decision, however, the administrative judge did not
      make any explicit credibility determinations regarding R.G. ’s testimony. While
      she did not credit his denial of making the “bullseye” comment, she nevertheless
      implicitly credited his testimony in finding either that the appellant failed to meet
      his burden on contributing factor or that the agency met its clear and convincing
      burden.   RID at 23-28.      Further, the administrative judge made no explicit
      findings as to the agency’s motive to retaliate in the remand initial decision, and
      she once again summarily concluded that the “bullseye” comment did not
      establish a pattern of harassment directed at the appellant. RID at 28; Remand
      Order, ¶ 20. In reaching her conclusion, she did not examine, as instructed, the
      appellant’s arguments in which he identified a series of acts that began shortly
      after making Disclosure A, including the letter of reprimand and the performance
      appraisal conducted by R.G. a few days after the “bullseye” comment. Remand
      Order, ¶ 21.      Therefore, we find that the administrative judge did not fully
      address the appellant’s arguments and evidence in this case that lend support to
      his claim that the agency did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of his disclosures.
      Accordingly, we remand the appeal for further adjudication c onsistent with this
      Remand Order. See Durr v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 195,
      ¶¶ 7-15 (2013).
                                                                                     21

¶39        On remand, the administrative judge shall examine, under Whitmore,
      whether the agency met its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
      that it would have taken the following personnel actions in the absence of the
      appellant’s protected disclosures:      (10) nonselection for a Maintenance
      Supervisor position; (15) denial of fill-in time; (16) delay or denial of an
      on-the-spot award; and (17) denial of leadership training.       In conducting her
      analysis, the administrative judge shall make explicit credibility determinations
      of key witnesses (especially R.G. and J.W.), perform an analysis of the Carr
      factors, reconsider the record as a whole, and make thoroughly reasoned findings
      that address both the evidence supporting her conclusions and the countervailing
      evidence. See Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374-76.

                                           ORDER
¶40        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this remand order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                               Jennifer Everling
                                               Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.