Court Opinion

ID: 9848678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:25:02.545612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:36.836958
License: Public Domain

*518M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I dissent for the reason that I cannot agree that the trial court’s finding of no entrapment as a matter of law cured the error of submission of the issue to the jury. The procedure in this case — ruling on entrapment after the defendant presented all of his case to the jury — forced the defendant to testify in order to present his entrapment defense. People v Sheline, 64 Mich App 193; 235 NW2d 177 (1975), lv granted, 395 Mich 817 (1975), held that this compelled self-incrimination was sufficient prejudice to require reversal.
The procedure outlined in People v Stanley, 68 Mich App 559; 243 NW2d 684 (1976), and in the dissenting opinion of Judge T. M. Burns in People v Cancino, 70 Mich App 90, 98; 245 NW2d 414, 418 (1976), would seem to me to be the only proper one. Its steps would be:

a. Pretrial assertion of entrapment defense.

b. Factual hearing on entrapment defense. The defendant should be able to testify as to police conduct without waiving his right to refuse to testify at trial.

c. Trial judge ruling on entrapment, accompanied by ñndings of fact.

d. Assuming a ruling of no entrapment, the defendant may demand a jury trial at which the state must prove all of its case. The defendant may present evidence that previously would be called "entrapment evidence” if material to intent or other elements of the crime.

I concur with the holding of the majority that under prevailing Michigan law, the trial court’s admission of evidence of prior and subsequent sales of heroin was not in error. Furthermore, unless a limiting instruction is requested, the trial court need not instruct the jury to consider the *519evidence for its limited relevance to show common scheme, plan, or motive. People v Kelly, 386 Mich 330; 192 NW2d 494 (1971), People v Nawrocki, 376 Mich 252; 136 NW2d 922 (1965). People v Kelly, supra, also commented favorably upon People v Anderson, 13 Mich App 247; 163 NW2d 793 (1968), which held that evidence of other, illegal drug sales is admissible under MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050 to show a "scheme, plan or system on the part of the defendant”. See also, People v Koehler, 54 Mich App 624, 634; 221 NW2d 398, 403 (1974), People v Peck, 39 Mich App 150, 155; 197 NW2d 346, 349 (1972), People v Jones, 38 Mich App 512; 196 NW2d 817 (1972), lv den, 388 Mich 792 (1972), People v White, 27 Mich App 432, 434; 183 NW2d 606, 607 (1970).
I find it regrettable that this Court has blindly followed the precedent of Anderson and has effectively destroyed the rule precluding evidence of other criminal transactions, at least in cases involving drug sales. I would not interpret the exception in MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050 so broadly. A more restrictive and preferable construction of "materiality” under this statute can be found in People v Spillman, 63 Mich App 256; 234 NW2d 475 (1975). Here, as there, the probative value of the evidence should have been weighed against its prejudicial impact. There was ample evidence to show the elements of this crime and the prejudicial impact of the evidence of similar transactions far outweighed its minimal, cumulative probative value.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand.