Court Opinion

ID: 9531191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:30.599321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:21.796167
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
Petitioner asks that this court by mandate direct respondents, the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Director of Motor Vehicles of this state, to “re-issue, return or reinstate Petitioner’s operator’s license and/or driving privileges to operate a motor vehicle in this State.” In September, 1948, respondents, without according petitioner a hearing, suspended his operator’s license under the then provisions of sections 419 through 420.9 of the Vehicle Code (Stats. 1947, eh. 1235). These provisions constituted chapter 3 of division VII of the code, entitled “Security Following Accident”; they became operative July 1, 1948.1 It is petitioner’s position that the application of this law to him denied him due process and equal protection (U.S. Const., Amendment XIV, §1; Cal. Const., art. I, §§11, 13) and vested judicial power in “a purely ministerial ‘department’ ” in violation of the state Constitution (art. Ill, § 1; art. VI, § 1). We have concluded that petitioner’s contentions should not be sustained and that upon the showing made the suspension of his license is legally tenable.
On July 1, 1948, petitioner held a valid license to drive a motor vehicle in California; on that date he operated a vehicle which was involved in a collision with another such vehicle at an intersection of public highways in this state. In August, 1948, petitioner received from respondents a written notice stating that because of the July 1 accident and because petitioner had “failed to otherwise meet the security requirements of Section 420 of the Vehicle Code,” *873he was required to deposit with respondent department, on or before September 11, 1948, security in the sum of $2,800. The notice further stated that petitioner’s “driving privilege and all licenses evidencing such privilege is [sic] hereby suspended as of” September 11, 1948, unless the deposit was made prior to that date, and that the suspension would “remain in effect until evidence satisfactory to the Department has been filed indicating that the security requirements of Section 420.2 of the Vehicle Code have been met.” Petitioner is a gardener by occupation and “requires the use of his automobile” and his license to operate it in order to “transport himself and his tools between his different places of employment . . . and to earn a livelihood for himself and his family [dependent wife and nine minor children].” He does not have $2,800 “or any like sum” to post as security, is unable to and did not post the security demanded by respondents and, pursuant to the provisions of section 420 of the Vehicle Code, his operator’s license was and now is suspended. The Highway Patrol has notified petitioner “that they intend to arrest and prosecute” him under the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (d) of section 338 of the Vehicle Code, which forbid possession of, and failure to surrender to the department on lawful demand, a suspended license.
The applicable provisions of chapter 3 of division VII of the Vehicle Code (Stats. 1947, ch. 1235) which were in effect at the time of petitioner’s accident and the suspension of his license are as follows:
Section 419 required that the operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in this state which resulted in personal injury, death or property damage exceeding $100 report the matter in writing to the Department of Motor Vehicles within 10 days after the accident. Section 420 (subd. (a) ) provided that “The department shall, within 60 days after the receipt of a report of [such] a motor vehicle accident . . . suspend the license of each operator . . . involved in such accident . . . unless such operator shall deposit security in a sum which shall be sufficient in the judgment of the department to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from such accident as may be recovered against such operator. Notice of such suspension shall be sent by the department to such operator not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of such suspension and shall state the amount required as security.” The deposit of security and suspension of license *874requirements did not apply if the operator or owner of the vehicle had an automobile or other public liability policy or bond covering $5,000 for injury or death of one person, $10,000 for injury or death of more than one person, and $1,000 property damage (Veh. Code, §420, subds. (b), (e) ), or to a person who had more than 25 vehicles registered in his name and qualified as a self-insurer (Veh. Code, § 420, subd. (b), par. (4), § 420.7); other situations in which the requirements did not apply are not here material. Suspension of license was to continue until security was deposited, or one year had passed without filing of an action for damages arising out of the accident, or until release from or satisfaction of liability, or final adjudication of nonliability. (Veh. Code, § 420.2.)
Specifically, petitioner urges that the above quoted or summarized sections of the Vehicle Code were unconstitutional in the following respects:
1. The statute violated the due process provisions of the federal Constitution (Amendment XIV, § 1) and the state Constitution (art. I, § 13) in that no provision was made for hearing before the department, or for recourse to the courts, before suspension of a license.
2. Judicial power was delegated to an admistrative body in violation of the state Constitution (art. Ill, § 1; art. VI, § 1), in that no sufficient standard was provided to guide the department in determining the amount of security.
3. The effect of the statute was an arbitrary discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution (Amendment XIV, § 1) and the uniform operation of laws provision of the state Constitution (art. I, § 11) in that: (a) The posting of security by a driver who might not be culpable was required, before his liability was judicially determined, (b) Those who were financially able to carry insurance or post security were favored as against those who were not. (c) The provisions permitting any person in whose name more than 25 motor vehicles were registered to qualify as a self-insurer created an arbitrary classification.

Rearing, Rue Process

There was no express provision in sections 419 through 420.9 of the Vehicle Code (Stats. 1947, ch. 1235) concerning hearing before determination by the department that security must be deposited or the operator’s license suspended. At the time petitioner’s license was suspended without hearing, *875section 315 of the Vehicle Code (Stats. 1947, eh. 431) provided that “A person shall be entitled to demand in writing a hearing before the director or his representative whenever the department ... [h] as given notice of the suspension ... of his privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon a highway or of an operator’s . . . license issued to such person,” but it further provided that “The . . . licensee shall not be entitled to a hearing under this section whenever such action by the department is made mandatory upon the department by the provisions of this code.”2 Since suspension of petitioner’s license for failure to deposit security was mandatory (Veh. Code, § 420) whenever it had been determined that a motor vehicle accident had occurred and damages exceeding $100 ensued which probably might result in “a judgment or judgments for damages . . . recovered against such operator,” it is apparent that it was not contemplated that the department necessarily should give an operator opportunity to be heard before it determined the amount of security required and notified him that his license would be suspended unless he deposited such sum. Thus we have for decision an aspect of the question expressly left open in Ratliff v. Lampton (1948), 32 Cal.2d 226, 233 [195 P.2d 792,10 A.L.R.2d 826]: “Whether such summary procedure might be justified under the police power ... in some instances ...”
Fundamentally it must be recognized that in this country “Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have . . . the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner, and subject to proper regulations as to the manner of use.” (13 Cal.Jur. 371, § 59.) “The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen, subject to legislative control or such reasonable regulations as to the traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the legislature may deem wise or proper to adopt and impose.” (19 Cal.Jur. 54, §407.) “Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by the public, and uses incidental thereto. Such travel may be for either business or pleasure . . . The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and *876individuals cannot rightfully be deprived . . . [A] 11 persons have an equal right to use them for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others.” (25 Am.Jur. 456-457, §163; see, also, 40 C.J.S. 244-247, § 233.) Notwithstanding such general principles characterizing the primary right of the individual, it is equally well established (as is recognized in the texts above cited) that usage of the highways is subject to reasonable regulation for the public good. In this connection, the constitutionality of various types of financial responsibility laws has been often upheld against contentions that they violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its constant dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.” (Reitz v. Mealey (1941), 314 U.S. 33, 36 [62 S.Ct. 24, 86 L.Ed. 21, 24]; see, also, State v. Price (1937), 49 Ariz. 19, 26 [63 P.2d 653, 108 A.L.R. 1156]; Surtman v. Secretary of State (1944), 309 Mich. 270 [15 N.W.2d 471, 474].)
The state, in the exercise of its police power, could constitutionally have required deposit of security by the owners of all vehicles as a condition to licensing them. (Opinion of the Justices, In re (1925), 81 N.H. 566 [129 A. 117, 39 A.L.R. 1023]; Opinion of the Justices, In re (1925), 251 Mass. 569 [147 N.E. 681]; Brest v. Comissioner of Insurance (1930), 270 Mass. 7 [169 N.E. 657]; Ex parte Poresky (1933), 290 U.S. 30 [54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152].) Instead, the state chose to allow financially irresponsible licensed operators to drive until they became involved in an accident with the consequences described in sections 419 and 420 of the Vehicle Code and their financial irresponsibility was thus brought to the attention of the department, and then to require suspension of their licenses.
Suspension of the license without prior hearing but subject to subsequent judicial review did not violate due process if reasonably justified by a compelling public interest. (Bourjois v. Chapman (1937), 301 U.S. 183, 189 [57 S.Ct. 691, 81 L.Ed. 1027, 1032]; see also Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Rev. (1931), 283 U.S. 589, 596-597 [51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289].) The compelling public interest here appears *877from the obvious carelessness and financial irresponsibility of a substantial number of drivers and from the following allegations of the petition: There are 3,879,931 motor vehicles registered in California. During the first four months after the effective date of the law now under consideration, 19,808 persons were ordered by the department to establish that they were adequately insured or deposit security. More than 6,567 operators’ licenses were suspended under the applicable law, and more than 1,300 “citations per month for suspension of license” were issued by the department. In these circumstances it is apparent that to require a hearing in every ease before suspension of a license would have substantially burdened and delayed if not defeated the operation of the law. The requirement of due process was recognized and accepted by section 317 of the Vehicle Code, which declared that “Nothing in this code shall be deemed to prevent a review or other action as may be permitted by the Constitution and laws of this State by a court of competent jurisdiction with reference to any order of the department refusing, canceling, suspending or revoking a license.” Such review can be had by application to the superior court for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1086). Also, an action for declaratory relief has been used in a comparable situation (Ratliff v. Lampton (1948), supra, 32 Cal.2d 226). General language concerning the requirement of a hearing in Carroll v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1940), 16 Cal.2d 164, 168 [105 P.2d 110]; Ratliff v. Lampton (1948), supra, p. 230 of 32 Cal.2d; and People v. Noggle (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d 14, 18 [45 P.2d 430], is not controlling here, for each of those cases concerned a statute which was construed to require opportunity to be heard before discretionary revocation of a license became effective.

Delegation of Power

Giving to the Department of Motor Vehicles the power and duty to find the facts on which suspension of license depended, and to exercise limited “judgment,” did not violate section 1 of article III or section 1 of article VI of the state Constitution (see Suckow v. Alderson (1920), 182 Cal. 247, 250 [187 P. 965]; Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty (1925), 196 Cal. 453, 483 [238 P. 697, 44 A.L.R. 1]). Although the Legislature did not provide detailed directions as to the manner in which the department was to reach a “judgment” as to the amount of security required, it specified as a guide *878the probable size of “any [court] judgment” which “may be recovered.” (Veh. Code, § 420.) The facts and legal principles governing the recovery of judgments for damages are a matter of public knowledge and provide a reasonable, sufficiently certain standard to be followed by the department. (Cf. Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty (1925), supra, pp. 485-486 of 196 Cal.; Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939), 13 Cal.2d 620, 652-657 [91 P.2d 577]; Housing Authority v. Dockweiler (1939), 14 Cal.2d 437, 461-462 [94 P.2d 794].)

Culpability

The statute did not require security of every operator who might be involved in an accident, but only of those against whom, in the opinion of the department, a judgment might be recovered. Inasmuch as the recovery of a judgment depends, in theory at least, upon culpability, it would seem that the statute, presumptively properly administered, was not open to the objection that under it the noneulpable were subject to arbitrary discrimination.

Financial Ability, Fgual Protection

Financial responsibility laws such as this do not unconstitutionally discriminate against the poor. (See Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles (1931), 212 Cal. 279, 284 [298 P. 481]; Rosenblum v. Griffin (1938), 89 N.H. 314, 319 [197 A. 701, 115 A.L.R. 1367].) Those damaged by the negligence of indigent drivers may be indigent also, and as little able as the drivers to bear the cost of such negligence. The fallacy of the argument that the law favored the rich over the poor “lies in the failure to distinguish between equality of opportunity and ability to take advantage of the opportunity which is offered to all. The equality of the Constitution is the equality of right, and not of enjoyment.” (Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles (1931), supra, p. 284 of 212 Cal.) Those who cannot afford to possess automobiles are as little able to enjoy the opportunity of driving on the public highways as those who cannot afford insurance or security.
Objection is made by petitioner that suspending his license after the accident did not make him more financially responsible ; indeed, in his case, suspending his license made him less financially responsible, for it deprived him of his means of livelihood for himself, his wife and nine children. This contention constitutes no more than an argument that the Legis*879lature acted unwisely in selecting a financial responsibility law of a lock-the-barn-door-after-the-horse-is-stolen type instead of a compulsory preinsurance law or some other method of treating the problem (see 1 Stanf.L.Rev. 263). Our concern, however, is with the validity of the law under attack and not with whether a better law could be devised. (See Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles (1931), supra, pp. 285-286 of 212 Cal.)

Self-Insurers

The provisions permitting persons in whose names more than 25 motor vehicles were registered to qualify as self-insurers (Veh. Code, § 420, subd. (b), par. (4), § 420.7) did not create an arbitrary discrimination. Inasmuch as the provisions were patently based upon the probable financial ability of such persons to respond in damages, the classification was one which the Legislature could reasonably make.
For the reasons above stated, the alternative writ of mandate heretofore issued is discharged, and the petition for the peremptory writ is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Effective July 7, 1949, the chapter was completely recast (although its general plan remains the same) by amendment of section 419, repeal of sections 420 through 420.9, and addition of new sections 420 through 423.1 (Stats. 1949, ch. 834).

In 1949 sections 314-316 of the Vehicle Code, concerning notice, hearing, etc., were repealed and new provisions (§§ 314-319.1) concerning these subjects were enacted (Stats. 1949, ch. 1467).