Court Opinion

ID: 9707786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:21:07.967987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:53.844865
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring.
The trial court found:
The Court is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Anthony Stamness made certain threats to Christian Svedberg, including a threat to his physical safety.
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The course of conduct followed by Anthony Stamness toward Christian Svedberg can only be characterized as cruel and insensitive. However, it goes further than that since it has also resulted in threats to the physical safety of Christian and the incessant teasing and harassing conduct has left Christian afraid to go to school, a completely unacceptable situation. The testimony also indicates that Christian suffers from depression as a result and has made suicidal statements.
The Court therefore finds that the conduct of Anthony Stamness [was] intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of Christian Svedberg, and that there was no constitutionally protected activity being pursued by ... Anthony Stamness.
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The evidence indicates, and the Court accepts as true, the fact that the Respondent made a direct threat against the life of the Petitioner. This statement would certainly constitute a direct threat and could incite an immediate breach of the peace. The other derisive names used by the Respondent against the Petitioner could also constitute a breach of the peace by reason of their taunting nature and incitement to a breach of the peace. Certainly, the conduct of Anthony Stamness cannot be justi*685fied under any constitutional! ] cloak of propriety.
Whether particular words constitute a serious threat is a question of fact. See State v. Zeno, 490 N.W.2d 707, 710 (N.D.1992):
In State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 466, 463 (N.D.1978), involving a similar factual situation, we indicated that the determination whether particular words constitute a threat is a question of fact:
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“As we said in State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 654 (N.D.1976),
“ ‘No precise words are necessary to convey a threat. It may be bluntly spoken, or done by innuendo or suggestion.... A threat often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken and words that are innocuous in themselves may take on a sinister meaning in the context in which they are recited....’” [Citations omitted.]
In my opinion, under NDCC 12.1-31.2-01, the evidence amply supports the trial court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the protective restraining order entered.
I agree with the trial court that the entire course of conduct, including vivid threats of harm and other menacing conduct, is not constitutionally protected. “Pure speech” and expressive conduct that accompany or follow a physical threat can be, as a matter of fact, part of the threatening conduct. Therefore, I concur in affirming.
' VANDE WALLE, C.J., concurs.