Court Opinion

ID: 9897262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:23.986467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:59.391713
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          Oct 11 2023, 8:37 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                                               and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke                                      Theodore E. Rokita
Brooklyn, Indiana                                          Indiana Attorney General

                                                           Megan M. Smith
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dylan T. Myers,                                            October 11, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-3022
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Montgomery
                                                           Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           54C01-2102-F1-365

                                Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                                Judges Riley and Pyle concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023                          Page 1 of 13
      Case Summary
[1]   Dylan T. Myers appeals his conviction for neglect of a dependent resulting in

      catastrophic injury, a Level 1 felony, pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4 (a)(1)

      and -4(b)(3), (the Neglect Statute). Myers claims that his conviction must be

      reversed because the jury reached inconsistent verdicts as to the charges that

      were brought against him. In the alternative, Myers contends that the evidence

      was insufficient because the State failed to show that he knowingly placed the

      victim in a situation that endangered her health and resulted in a catastrophic

      injury. Finally, Myers argues that his sentence violates the Proportionality

      Clause 1 of the Indiana Constitution.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In August 2019, Myers and Megan Marshall were living together in a

      Crawfordsville apartment along with C.M.—Marshall’s three-month-old

      daughter—and her other minor children. On August 22, Myers left for work at

      9:15 a.m., and Marshall left for her work at 2:00 p.m. Myers’s sister, Destiny,

      babysat C.M. and the other children while Myers and Marshall were at work.

      When Marshall left for work, C.M. seemed “perfectly normal” and was

      behaving “fine, like a normal baby.” Transcript Vol. II at 32. At approximately

      1
          Ind. Const. art. 1, § 16.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023     Page 2 of 13
      6:10 p.m., Destiny took a video of C.M. playing on the floor and sent it to

      Marshall.

[4]   Shortly after 7:00 p.m., Myers returned home from work. C.M. began to “fuss”

      and Myers carried her into a bedroom. Id. at 37. A few minutes later, Myers

      returned to the living room and told Destiny that he had changed C.M.’s diaper

      and put her to bed. C.M. started to cry again and Myers went back into the

      bedroom. A few moments later, Destiny heard C.M. make a loud whimpering

      noise “like when you step on a dog.” Id. at 39-40. Myers then walked out of

      the bedroom and handed C.M. to Destiny. C.M.’s breathing was labored, and

      her leg was trembling. Myers exclaimed that “something wasn’t right with

      [C.M.]” Id. at 88-89.

[5]   When Marshall returned from work a few minutes later, she noticed that C.M.

      was limp, unresponsive, and suffering from seizures. Marshall immediately

      called 911, and when the paramedics arrived just after 7:30 p.m., C.M. was

      suffering from respiratory distress and seizures. The paramedics also observed

      that there was some bruising on C.M.’s chest.

[6]   C.M. was transported to a local hospital where a CT scan showed fresh

      bleeding on C.M.’s brain. At that point, C.M. was intubated and placed on a

      ventilator to help her breathe. There was also evidence that C.M. had sustained

      prior bruising to her ribs, neck, chest, and inner thighs. One of the attending

      physicians was informed that C.M. had fallen from Marshall’s couch two days

      earlier.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023     Page 3 of 13
[7]   C.M. was then transferred to Riley Hospital in Indianapolis, where she was

      examined by a neurologist. It was determined that C.M. suffered hematomas,

      contusions, retinal hemorrhaging in all three layers of her retina, bruising on

      various parts of her body, and five fractured ribs.

[8]   On February 19, 2021, the State charged Myers with: Count I, neglect of a

      dependent resulting in a catastrophic injury, a Level 1 felony; Count II,

      aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; and Count III, battery resulting serious

      bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years old, a Level 3 felony. The

      charging information with respect to Count I provided as follows:

              On or about August 22, 2019, at Shady Knoll, Apt. D,
              Crawfordsville, Montgomery County, State of Indiana, one
              Dylan T. Myers, a person having the care of a dependent, to-wit:
              C.M., age three (3) months whether assumed voluntarily or
              because of a legal obligation knowingly or intentionally placed
              said dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent’s life
              or health, to-wit: shook, squeezed, and/or threw said infant, said
              Dylan Myers being at least eighteen (18) years of age and said
              acts resulting in the catastrophic injury of the dependent C.M.,
              who is a child less than fourteen (14) years of age. All of which is
              contrary to I.C. 35-46-1-4(a)(1) and I.C. 35-46-1-4(b)(3), and
              against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

      Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 16.

[9]   During Myers’s jury trial on October 17, 2022, Destiny testified that she did not

      harm C.M. in any way. Marshall also denied hurting C.M. and testified that

      Myers was occasionally “rough” with C.M., in that he “squeezed [C.M.] a lot”

      and dropped her onto the bed and couch, causing C.M. to cry. Transcript Vol. II

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023       Page 4 of 13
       at 140-41. Two physicians testified that C.M.’s alleged fall from the couch

       would not explain the extent of the August 22 injuries. Dr. Roberta Hibbard

       testified that C.M.’s injuries were representative of several different types of

       physical trauma. She explained that a “high energy acceleration/deceleration

       injury,” such as a slam, throw or drop, would have caused C.M.’s head and eye

       injuries and the bleeding to her brain. Transcript Vol. III at 11-12. The evidence

       further established that C.M. presently suffers from epilepsy and developmental

       delays. Additionally, C.M. cannot speak or walk independently because of her

       head injuries.

[10]   Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Myers guilty of Count I,

       neglect of a dependent resulting catastrophic injury, but not guilty on the

       remaining counts. The trial court subsequently sentenced Myers to thirty years

       of incarceration. He now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision

       I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11]   Myers challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, first claiming that the

       conviction must be set aside because the jury’s acquittal on the battery charges

       and its finding of guilt under the Neglect Statute amount to inconsistent

       verdicts. Notwithstanding Myers’s contention, we note that jury verdicts in

       criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are

       inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable. Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643,

       649 (Ind. 2010). The evaluation of whether a conviction is supported by the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023        Page 5 of 13
       evidence is independent from—and irrelevant to—the assessment of whether

       verdicts are contradictory and irreconcilable. Id. at 648. In short, the right of a

       criminal jury to exercise lenity and decline to convict is “well recognized” and

       an “important component of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 648-49.

[12]   In this case, it is not known why the jury acquitted Myers of the two battery

       charges. In reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to support Myers’s

       neglect conviction, it is immaterial that the jury found him not guilty on the

       battery counts. See id. Thus, we reject Myers’s claim that his conviction under

       the Neglect Statute must be set aside on the grounds that the verdicts were

       inconsistent.

[13]   Myers further claims that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed

       to prove he knowingly placed C.M. in a situation “that endangered her life or

       health and resulted in catastrophic injury.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. When

       reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the

       evidence nor reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d

       1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). Rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the

       verdict and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Willis v.

       State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We will affirm the conviction unless

       no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a

       reasonable doubt. New v. State, 135 N.E.3d 619, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We

       further note that the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

       innocence, but instead, “the evidence is sufficient if an inference may

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023      Page 6 of 13
       reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d

       144, 146 (Ind. 2007).

[14]   To support Myers’s conviction under the Neglect Statute, the State was

       required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Myers, an adult, had the care

       of C.M., a child under the age of fourteen, and knowingly placed C.M. in a

       situation that endangered her life or health and that resulted in her catastrophic

       injury. See I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3). “Catastrophic injury” is defined as a

       bodily injury “so severe that a person’s ability to live independently is

       significantly impaired for a period of at least one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-

       31.5-2-34.5. Catastrophic injury includes an “intellectual disability.” Id.

[15]   In this case, the evidence showed that C.M. was behaving “perfectly fine” while

       Destiny was babysitting the children. Transcript Vol. II at 36, 77. When Myers

       returned home from work shortly after 7:00 p.m. and was alone with C.M. in

       the bedroom, Destiny heard C.M. make a loud whimpering sound.

       Approximately one minute later, Myers brought C.M. into the living room and

       handed her to Destiny. Destiny observed that C.M.’s eyes were only half open,

       her breathing was shallow, and her leg was trembling.

[16]   The testimony of hospital physicians opined that C.M.’s immediate injuries—

       subdural hematomas, contusions to both sides of the cerebellum, and significant

       retinal hemorrhaging—would have occurred between 7:15 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.

       on August 22, 2019. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that

       C.M.’s injuries were sustained when Myers was alone in the bedroom with her.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023        Page 7 of 13
       Also, contrary to Myers’s contention, the evidence presented at trial supports

       the reasonable inference that it was Myers who injured C.M. The emergency

       room physician who initially treated C.M. testified that C.M. suffered from

       fresh bleeding in the brain and hemorrhaging in her eyes, both indicative of

       trauma or injury caused by force. Any prior alleged fall from the couch—or

       other accident—failed to explain those injuries. Dr. Hibbard described the

       force necessary to cause C.M.’s injuries as “a high energy acceleration,

       deceleration type of injury.” Transcript Vol. III at 11-12. Considering this

       evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Myers inflicted C.M.’s injuries

       because he was alone with C.M. immediately before she showed any symptoms

       of her injuries. See, e.g., Lush v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1191, 1196-97 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003) (holding that the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant

       inflicted the injuries on the victim when the evidence established that the victim

       was in the defendant’s exclusive care, and the injuries were recent upon arrival

       at the hospital).

[17]   Finally, we reject Myers’s claim that the State failed to show that his conduct

       was “knowing.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. In accordance with Ind. Code § 35-41-

       2-2(b), a person engages in conduct “knowingly if, when he engages in the

       conduct, he is aware of the high probability that he is doing so.” A defendant’s

       intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the factfinder can infer

       intent “from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to

       which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d

       1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023       Page 8 of 13
[18]   Here, the evidence established that Myers was alone with three-month-old

       C.M. immediately before C.M. sustained numerous traumatic injuries. Dr.

       Hibbard opined that C.M.’s severe injuries were the result of a slam, throw,

       drop, or high-speed motor vehicle accident. Given the brutality of the attack,

       the jury could reasonably infer that Myers acted knowingly. See, e.g., Vanryn v.

       State, 155 N.E.3d 1254, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the duration,

       brutality, and relative strengths of the defendant and victim are factors that can

       be considered by the jury as indications of the defendant’s intent).

[19]   For all these reasons, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to

       support Myers’s conviction.

       II. Proportionality Claim
[20]   Myers argues that his conviction must be set aside because the penalty for

       violating the Neglect Statute violates the Proportionality Clause of the Indiana

       Constitution. Myers asserts that he is entitled to reversal because the Neglect

       Statute “has identical elements but different punishments.” Appellant’s Brief at

       17.

[21]   We initially observe that when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged,

       we presume that the statute is valid, and a “heavy burden” is placed on the

       party challenging the statute to clearly overcome that presumption. State v.

       Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ind. 1997). The presumption of

       constitutionality will not be overcome absent a clear showing to the contrary.

       Mann v. State, 895 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Because criminal

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023     Page 9 of 13
       sanctions are a legislative prerogative, “separation-of-powers principles require

       a reviewing court to afford substantial deference to the sanction the legislature

       has chosen.” Id. We will not disturb the legislature’s determination “except

       upon a showing of clear constitutional infirmity.” Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d at

       111-12.

[22]   The Proportionality Clause of the Indiana Constitution provides that “all

       penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Ind. Const. art. 1,

       § 16. A sentence violates the Proportionality Clause when offenses with

       identical elements are given different sentences. Johnson v. State, 103 N.E.3d

       704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A sentence will only be found

       disproportionate if it is so severe and entirely out of proportion to the gravity of

       the offense committed that it “shock[s] public sentiment and violate[s] the

       judgment of . . . reasonable people.” Lane v. State, 953 N.E.2d 625, 631 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2011). In other words, the Proportionality Clause is violated only when

       the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the

       offense. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1289 (Ind. 2014).

[23]   The Neglect Statute provides that

               (a) A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed
               voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or
               intentionally:

                        (1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers the
                        dependent’s life or health;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023          Page 10 of 13
                        (2) abandons or cruelly confines the dependent;

                        (3) deprives the dependent of necessary support; or

                        (4) deprives the dependent of education as required by law;

               commits neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.

[24]   The Neglect Statue further provides for an enhancement of the offense if certain

       circumstances exist. That is, if the offense results in “serious bodily injury” to

       the dependent, the offense is a Level 3 felony. I.C. § 35-46-1-4(b)(2). Serious

       bodily injury includes an injury “that causes . . . permanent or protracted loss

       or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ. . . .” Ind. Code §

       35-31.5-2-292. And if the offense is committed by a person at least eighteen

       years of age and results in “death or catastrophic injury” to a “dependent under

       fourteen years old,” the crime is a Level 1 felony. I.C. § 35-46-1-4(b)(3).

       Catastrophic injury means bodily injury so severe that a person’s ability to live

       independently is significantly impaired for a period of at least one year, and

       “includes an injury causing paralysis. . . or an intellectual disability.” I.C. § 35-

       31.5-2-34.5.

[25]   Contrary to Myers’s claim, the Level 1 and Level 3 felonies under the Neglect

       Statute do not have different penalties for identical elements. That is, the

       offense may be enhanced to a Level 3 felony if it results in an injury that creates

       a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement,

       unconsciousness, extreme pain, permanent or protracted loss or impairment of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023       Page 11 of 13
       the function of a bodily member or organ. I.C. §§ 35-46-1-4(b)(2); I.C. § 35-

       31.5-2-292. The offense may then be elevated to a Level 1 felony only if the

       defendant was at least eighteen years of age, the victim was less than fourteen

       years of age, and the injury—which includes paralysis or an intellectual

       disability—was so severe that the victim’s ability to live independently was

       significantly impaired for a period of at least one year. I.C. §§ 35-46-1-4(b)(3);

       I.C. § 35-31.5-2-34.5. In short, the State must prove additional elements and a

       more severe injury before a defendant can be convicted of a Level 1 felony

       under the Neglect Statute.

[26]   To be sure, a goal of our legislature is to punish more severely those who inflict

       more severe harm. See Mann, 895 N.E.2d at 124. Because each elevation of

       the offense under the Neglect Statute requires an infliction of greater harm, the

       offenses do not have identical elements. Thus, the assignment of different

       sentences to those different offenses does not offend the Proportionality Clause

       of the Indiana Constitution. See id. (rejecting an argument that Class B felony

       aggravated battery and Class C felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury

       violate the Proportionality Clause because, despite the overlap in the types of

       injuries encompassed within both offenses, the elements for the offenses were

       not identical).

[27]   For all these reasons, we conclude that the sentence imposed on Myers’s

       conviction under the Neglect Statute as a Level 1 felony does not offend the

       Proportionality Clause of the Indiana Constitution.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023     Page 12 of 13
[28]   Judgment affirmed.

       Riley, J. and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3022 | October 11, 2023   Page 13 of 13