Court Opinion

ID: 9580989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:10:51.585259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:38.565869
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). No affirmative license or general permit has been issued for pesticides by the state or federal government. The federal and state laws which were grants of affirmative authorization were discussed as preemptions as analyzed in Wis. Environmental Decade, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978). If the federal government preempts, this will override the state's ability to act, but FIFRA, The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Apt, 7 U.S.C. sec. 136, et. seq., contemplates local regulations.
The Congressional Record contains a unanimously adopted committee report favoring preemption of local government regulation, but this recommendation came from only one house, the Senate, and not the entire Congress. See sec. 118 Cong. Rec. 32263 (1972). Indeed, the text of the transcript taken from the Congressional Record and relied upon by the respondents states only that committees from the Senate and House seemingly concurred on the local preemption issue. However, none of the specific Senate Agricultural Committee amendments read into the record clearly document this agreement and FIFRA's language does not document this.
*46The federal preemption test is whether legislation contains a clear, manifest intent. The United States Supreme Court expressed this test in the form of a starting-point assumption stating "that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."1 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).2
Implied preemption must also be clear. This is especially true in light of the United States Supreme Court's rule that a finding of implied preemption will be negated when there is no compelling congressional direction which justifies preemption of "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977); see also Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1983). Here, any doubt must be decided in favor of local authority to act; the preemption works for, not against, local governments.3
*47When attempting to determine whether an act is or is not preempted, the bottom line is that "Congress can act so unequivocally as to make clear that it intends no regulation except its own." Rice, 331 U.S. at 236 (citing Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947)).
FIFRA does not meet the clear manifestation of intent test above to prove, as respondents claim, that Congress unequivocally intended local governments to be preempted from acting on their local concerns as to pesticide use. To the contrary, in applying the test, I find that the end product of the congressional committee and the vote of the entire Congress appears to have been in favor of no preemption.
Specifically, a comparison of the end product language found in FIFRA at 7 U.S.C. sec. 136v(a) and (b), provides strong and persuasive proof that the federal government did not intend to preempt local governments from enacting ordinances affecting pesticide use.
Section 24(a), as amended, 7 U.S.C. sec. 136v(a)4 authorizes states to regulate and impliedly authorizes states to delegate authority to local governments.5 How*48ever, 7 U.S.C. sec. 136v(b)6 contains an express preemption provision which prohibits states from enacting labeling laws. It is obvious from this subsection that where the full Congress desired preemption, the law expressly provided for it. Although sub. (b) only expressly prohibits states from dealing with labeling, it impliedly includes preemption of local governmental units in this area also. Any other interpretation would create an absurd result.
Congressional intent to allow local governments to take action in this area is also fairly implied from the express language of FIFRA sec. 22(b).7 This section instructs the EPA administrator to cooperate with any agency of any political subdivision, i.e., city, village, town, of a state to secure uniformity of regulations. These instructions would be meaningless if local governments were not perceived as having the authority to adopt regulations in the fist instance. Obviously, the full Congress contemplated there would be the authority in *49local governments to adopt pesticide laws for which the goal of cooperative uniformity would be sought.
Although individual committee recommendations may be persuasive, they do not dictate what the intent of the law is when it is adopted by the full Congress. That Congress debated the issue at great length without providing clear indications of preemption leads to the conclusion that no federal preemption was intended. See Central Maine Power Company v. Town of Lebanon, No. 5365 (Me. March 6, 1990); People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Cty. of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1984) (neither the language of FIFRA nor the legislative history of FIFRA evidence a clear, manifest intent of Congress to preempt local government control of pesticide use).
The test of state preemption, as well as the analysis to be followed, coincides closely with the federal rules stated infra.8 See Wis. Environmental Decade v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d at 536 (analyzing sec. 144.025(2)(i), Stats., for clear legislative purpose). It is important to note that, in *50this case, the town of Casey ordinance expressly states that the town is exercising its powers via secs. 60.10(2)(c)9 and 60.22(3),10 Stats., to adopt powers otherwise granted to village boards under sec. 61.34(1), Stats.11
Having exercised this option, the town's enactment enjoys a presumption of validity which is lost only if it is found to be clearly illegal. See generally, State ex rel. Grand Bazaar v. Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 2d 203, 208-09, 313 N.W.2d 805 (1982); Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Tomah, 30 Wis. 2d 547, 554, 141 N.W.2d 299 (1966). In that the ordinance is expressly enacted to protect the *51health, safety and general welfare of the town's citizens, it also enjoys the protection of being limited only by express language. See sec. 61.34(1), Stats.
As was the case with the federal act, I find no express or implied preemption or any conflict or logical inconsistency between the Casey ordinance and Wisconsin laws governing pesticides. Sections 94.67-94.71, Stats., specifically provide for the possibility of state regulation of pesticides. These sections of ch. 94 are not applicable to the town. They merely authorize the Department of Agriculture to promulgate rules declaring, for example, certain pesticides to be toxic to humans. See generally, sec. 94.69.12
Chapter 94 is neutral as to what local governments may do. Even absent clear neutrality, if state law discussed the issue of affirmative pesticide permits or general licenses absent clear preemptive language, a local ordinance could still stand. Such rules may run on parallel tracks.13
*52This is especially true where the state and local laws do not conflict. Here, both the ordinance of the town of Casey and state law have the same spirit and purpose which is to protect human health and the environment. A specific example may be found in the comparison of sec. 93.07(9), Stats., which places upon the department the duty to comply with ch. 160 to protect groundwater supplies, and the laws of Wisconsin Act 410, Laws of 1984 secs. 19, 20 and 2114 which encourage counties, towns and cities, respectively, to act to protect groundwater resources.
It is interesting to note that sec. 94.709, Stats., the aldicarb pesticide section, expressly promotes department research into this pesticide's transport and mitigation into groundwater. See secs. 94.709(5)(a) 1 and 2. In that local governments are statutorily encouraged to protect their groundwater supplies, it stands to reason they are authorized to enact ordinances addressing, at least to this extent, local pesticide use.15 Since it is reasonable to *53assume municipalities may act to protect groundwater supplies, it would be an anomaly to find that these same municipalities cannot act to also protect their food supplies, homes, work and recreational areas from pesticide contamination. Where the state affirmatively authorizes emergency use permits or special local needs permits, local governments would be preempted from acting against such permits.16 Since this was not the case relative to the town of Casey ordinance, I find no form of state preemption which works to void the local effectiveness of this enactment.
I am further unpersuaded by arguments that a call for uniformity effectively preempts local action in this area. Specifically, sec. 93.07(15), Stats., speaks to uniformity only in that it expressly provides that the Department of Agriculture will cooperate with local governments to try and achieve the goal of uniformity. Similarly, while sec. 93.07(1) entrusts the department with the duty to enforce ch. 94, the accompanying sec. 93.06(11), contemplates the adoption of local regulations by "political subdivisions of the state," the uniformity of which is to be secured through cooperation with those subdivisions by the department. Such provisions are certainly an antithesis of local government preemption.
Chapter 106 Laws of 1977 sec. 1, Statement of Purpose, provides that state regulations should not exceed any federal standards in that state regulations may not *54be more strict than federal rules. This is not uniformity.17 Section 94.69 gives the Department of Agriculture authority to go beyond federal regulation.18 This is not uniformity. Uniformity is a desired goal achieved through cooperation. Uniformity is not preemption since it does not involve conflict.
The town ordinance is a permitting, not a prohibitive, ordinance. The town is acting under its police powers when it grants or denies permits. The ordinance has the reasonable goal of trying to minimize risks to protect the health, safety and general welfare of the local citizens. The town board is not superseding the EPA labeling rules when it acts. The label is a restriction, not a general permit, and it is one factor taken into consideration by the town as it reviews a permit application. The town of Casey ordinance is not a blanket prohibition of pesticide use in the town. Rather, it is a valid, affirmative act under a local government's police powers to keep tabs on activities that may have a negative impact on the welfare of its citizens. For these reasons, I would uphold the ordinance.
*55I am authorized to state that Justice William A. Bablitch joins this dissenting opinion.

 Congressional purpose to preempt may be manifested in a number of ways. First, Congress may expressly mandate preemption. Second, congressional language may impliedly preempt by adequately indicating an intent to fully occupy the field. Where both federal and state law occupy the same field, preemption may be found only when state and federal law so conflict that concurrent compliance is physically impossible or when state law frustrates accomplishment of the full purpose of the federal act. See generally Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. at 501.

 See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984).

 When analyzing a case for possible implied preemption, it is acknowledged that courts generally confine their studies to the language and legislative history of the statute in question. See Chevron, 726 F.2d at 491 n.10. As stated within the text of this *47dissent, however, I find neither language nor history in FIFRA to meet the test of clarity necessary to find implied preemption. This is especially true in light of what I find to be a local government's justifiably deep interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens through local control over pesticide use.

 7 U.S.C. sec. 136v(a), provides:
(a) A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.

 I am unpersuaded by arguments that the narrow definition of the term "state" at 7 U.S.C. sec. 136(a) constitutes clear Congressional intent by elimination to preempt local government *48action in this area. At no point in the language of the act are states prohibited from exercising their powers to delegate authority to local entities. Likewise, I am unconvinced that the clearly divisive disagreement that plagued the legislative history of this act was so easily and decisively resolved to the conclusion the proponents of a narrow reading of "states" might suggest.

 7 U.S.C. 136v(b) provides:
(b) Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.

 7 U.S.C. sec. 136t(b), reads:
(b) Cooperation
The Administrator shall cooperate with Department of Agriculture, any other Federal agency, and any appropriate agency of any State or any political subdivision thereof, in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter, and in securing uniformity of regulations.

 See Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Madison EOC, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 397, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984) which states the Wisconsin rule on preemption:
Where a municipality acts within the legislative grant of power but not within the constitutional initiative, the state has the authority to withdraw the power of the municipality to act. The tests for determining whether such a legislatively intended withdrawal of power which would necessarily nullify the local ordinance has occurred are:
(1) whether the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act;
(2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts with the state legislation;
(3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of the state legislation; or
(4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit of the state legislation.

 Section 60.10(2)(c), Stats., provides:
60.10 Powers of town meeting.
(2) DIRECTIVES OR GRANTS OF AUTHORITY TO TOWN BOARD .... By resolution, the town meeting may:
(c) Exercise of village powers. Authorize the town board to exercise powers of a village board under s. 60.22(3). A resolution adopted under this paragraph is general and continuing.

 Section 60.22(3), Stats., provides:
60.22 General powers and duties. The town board:
(3) VILLAGE POWERS. If authorized under s. 60.10(2)(c), may exercise powers relating to villages and conferred on village boards under ch. 61, except those powers which conflict with statutes relating to towns and town boards.

 Section 61.34(1), Stats., provides:
61.34 Powers of village board. (1) GENERAL GRANT. Except as otherwise provided by law, the village board shall have the management and control of the village property, finances, highways, streets, navigable waters, and the public service, and shall have power to act for the government and good order of the village, for its commercial benefit and for the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the public, and may carry its powers into effect by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing, taxation, special assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and other necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other grants and shall be limited only by express language.

 The following language from sec. 94.69(9), Stats., authorizes the department to promulgate rules governing the use of pesticides:
94.69 Pesticides; rules. The department may promulgate rules:
(9) To govern the use of pesticides, including their formulations, and to determine the times and methods of application and other conditions of use.
The language of this authority is permissive, however, and the corresponding Wisconsin Administrative Code sections speak only to restrictive uses of pesticides in that the rules promulgated expressly prohibit the use of certain pesticides (Ag 20.03), list those which may be used by special permit only (Ag 29.04), and explain procedures for receiving emergency use permits (Ag 29.06) and special local need registrations of otherwise prohibited pesticides (Ag 29.08).

 Although this court has stated that a municipality can *52neither forbid what state law sanctions nor sanction what state law forbids, it has also stated that municipalities can regulate in addition to state action. In Fox v. Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 546, 275 N.W. 513 (1937), we stated that:
As a general rule, additional regulation to that of the state law does not constitute a conflict therewith. The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith, unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescriptions. (Quoting 43 C.J. 219-20 sec. 220(b).)

 See Wis. Act. 410, Laws of 1984, sec. 19 (statute sec. 59.97(1)); Wis. Act. 410 Laws of 1984, sec. 20 (statute sec. 60.74(l)(a)7, now codified at sec. 60.61(1)(g), Stats., Wis. Act. 532, 538 Laws of 1983)); Wis. Act. 410, Laws of 1984, sec. 21 (statute sec. 62.23(7)(c)).

 Chapter 162, the Pure Water Act, stands in contrast to the clear encouragement to take action found in the statutes cited *53supra at note 14 and accompanying text. Chapter 162, the Pure Water Act, expressly preempts (with small exception) cities, towns and villages from regulating in the area of construction and reconstruction of wells and other methods of obtaining groundwater for human consumption. See secs. 59.067(5) and 59.06(1), Stats.; see generally ch. 162.

 See Ag. 29.04 Wis. Adm. Code; Ag. 29.06 Wis. Adm. Code, Ag. 29.08 Wis. Adm. Code.

 Chapter 106, Laws of 1977 sec. 1 Statement of Purpose reads:
The legislature finds the need to update the regulation of the use and application of pesticides. It is the intent of the legislature that the State's regulations shall not exceed any federal standards adopted under the federal insecticide, fungicide, and rodenticide act or regulations issued under the act.

 Section 94.69, Stats., illustrates that the legislature did not intend the extent of state regulations to be limited to a mirror image of federal regulations. Subsecs. (6), (7), (10) and (12) contemplate state regulations different and beyond areas covered by federal regulation.