Court Opinion

ID: 9626396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:10:45.028625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:26.696969
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Finding myself unable to agree with the majority’s decision that Ga. Electric Co. v. Rycroft, 259 Ga. 155 (387 SE2d 111) (1989), is not inconsistent with the Ajnericans with Disabilities Act, I must respectfully dissent.
The issue before the court is one of first impression, and we granted certiorari to provide guidance in this area to the bench and bar alike. Disagreeing with the majority’s approach, I write sepa*617rately to voice a concern that the main opinion creates disharmony and tension between the federal statutory law and this state’s case law as to the correct procedure for processing employment applications where a previous ailment or injury might be at issue.
When presented with the issue of whether false statements by a prospective employee concerning the employee’s medical condition should bar recovery of workers’ compensation benefits, the Rycroft court set out a three-part test for making this determination: (1) a knowing misrepresentation by the employee; (2) reliance by the employer on the misrepresentation which was a substantial factor in offering employment; and (3) causal connection between the misrepresentation and the subsequent injury. Id. at 158.
In viewing the standard outlined in Rycroft, we must take into consideration several factors. The Rycroft decision was rendered by a severely fractured court: the decision to establish the test for barring recovery of workers’ compensation was a 4-3 decision with the dissenting Justices not filing a written dissent. This test was established prior to the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Supreme Court of Georgia could not have taken into consideration what effect such a statute would have on the Rycroft decision. The public policy concerning the treatment of the disabled and injured in the work force is constantly evolving.
In considering the issue presented to this Court, there are three important statutes at the federal and state level that are designed to address the issue of injured employees in the workplace, all of which have humanitarian goals. Georgia’s Worker’s Compensation statute seeks to alleviate human suffering by providing compensation to those who are injured while engaged in work. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277 (9 SE2d 84) (1940). Under Georgia law, the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund statute seeks to encourage employment of persons with disabilities without imposing an undue financial hardship on the employer. OCGA § 34-9-350. The Americans with Disabilities Act also seeks to protect the disabled as they seek employment. 42 USC § 12112. Arrayed against these humanitarian statutes at the federal and state levels is the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Rycroft, which seeks to pursue the public policy goals of truthfulness in employment applications, prevention of fraud, and state statutory harmony. Unfortunately, and for reasons outlined herein, Rycroft falls miserably short in the pursuit of these laudable goals.
The Supremacy Clause in Art. VI of the U. S. Constitution requires that, in appropriate circumstances, federal statutes take precedence over state law in the same area. Except for occupational diseases, the Georgia legislature has chosen not to act in the area of false statements made by a prospective employee concerning pre*618existing ailments and injuries. In Rycroft, this Court chose to fill that void by interpreting public policy and imposing its three-part test as outlined above to bar recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia have the force of law, the same as statutory law. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, when court decisions are in conflict with federal law in this area they must yield to federal authority. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 (104 SC 615, 78 LE2d 443) (1984).
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers who meet the threshold requirement with regard to number of employees from making inquiries about disability before the job-offer stage, except as to matters relating to job performance. 42 USC § 12112 (d) (2) (B).4 Such an approach gives prospective employees an opportunity to be judged on their qualifications and not on their medical histories. The federal statute gives states a wide latitude in providing equal or greater protection than is provided under the federal statute, but it does not allow states to provide lesser protection. Wood v. County of Alameda, 875 FSupp. 659 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
We should find instructive the approach taken by our sister state of Alabama. There, certain inquiries regarding medical condition at the preemployment stage are prohibited, but misrepresentation of health or physical condition at the time of hiring acts as a bar to receiving compensation.5 Such an approach gives a prospective employer an opportunity to make relevant inquiries as to fitness for the job, but it does not give employers carte blanche authority to make improper searching and exhausting inquiries. The Alabama approach, unlike Rycroft, encourages honesty by prospective employees because they know they will be judged on their qualifications before the offer of employment is extended, and their medical condition will not come into play until the offer of employment has been extended.
Not only should Rycroft yield to the Supremacy Clause, it also must yield to common sense. Application of the Rycroft test at the pre-offer stage of employment encourages dishonesty, breeds fraud, and generates disharmony in federal and state law. The decision not only encourages probing and exhausting inquiries as to prior medical *619condition, especially at the preemployment level in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, it rewards the employer’s wrongdoing by allowing it to deny workers’ compensation benefits when false statements are made and they meet the Rycroft test. Such an approach unnecessarily and impermissibly frustrates and impedes the intent of Congress to provide access to jobs by the disabled, and it vitiates the public policy of encouraging employment of the injured which was expressed in the passage of the statute. This chilling effect on the employment process should not be tolerated.
Decided February 17, 1997
Reconsideration denied March 13, 1997.
Smith, Wallis & Scott, Christopher B. Scott, for appellant.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, John G. Blackmon, Jr., Marion H. Handley, Moore & Rogers, Robert D. Ingram, for appellees.
For these reasons, I would modify the holding in Rycroft to permit questions regarding medical conditions only at the job offer level, and would remand the case to the trial court for a determination of this case under the modified Rycroft approach.

 “A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.”

 No compensation shall be allowed if, at the time of or during the course of entering into employment or at the time of receiving notice of removal of conditions from a conditional offer of employment, the employee knowingly and falsely misrepresents in writing his or her physical or mental condition and the condition is aggravated or reinjured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment.
Ala. Code § 25-5-51.