Court Opinion

ID: 9537165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:13:38.06922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:08.818538
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice:
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur in the Court’s opinion except in that part holding that Taylor’s judgment was wholly satisfied and that Mascaro’s judgment was partially satisfied by the conveyance of the Weber County lots. As to that part of the Court’s opinion, I dissent.
The settlement agreement required that Baum and Chatillion should make certain improvements to the lots. An asphalt road was to be completed to each of the lots by August 2,1982. Chain link fencing was to be installed and paid for by the same date. Irrigation ditches were to be provided to each of the lots by July 15, 1982, and each lot was to be guaranteed the use of one-sixth of a share of water in an irrigation company. While I agree with the majority that the completion of these improvements were not conditions precedent to the settle*948ment agreement, they were material terms of the agreement and constituted part of the consideration to be received by Taylor and Mascaro.
The improvements were not made. Nevertheless, in November 1982, Baum and Chatillion brought a motion before Judge Dee to enforce the settlement agreement. Judge Dee, for reasons which do not appear in the record, excused the nonperformance of Baum and Chatillion, enforced the settlement agreement against Taylor and Mascaro, but rewrote their agreement to give Baum and Chatillion another sixty days to make the improvements, and if they failed again to do so, Taylor and Mascaro could sue them' and obtain a judgment for damages.
Judge Dee’s enforcement order was contrary to a principle of the law of contracts that a party in default cannot demand performance of the other contracting party. Taylor and Mascaro did not bargain for a judgment against Baum and Chatillion. They bargained for improved lots. The improvements to be made were set out in detail in the agreement, and a timetable was established. When Baum and Chatil-lion did not install the improvements, Taylor and Mascaro were not legally obligated to accept unimproved lots and then be put to the expense and trouble of a lawsuit to recover damages for the missing improvements. The majority glosses over the fact that the improvements were not constructed by stating that Taylor and Mascaro were given the right to sue Baum and Chatillion, but failed to “avail themselves of this remedy.” Of course, they failed to pursue that remedy. It was not what they had bargained for. The trial judge had no right to alter the performance required by the contract.
I cannot subscribe to the statement in the majority opinion and in the concurring opinion that this issue of uncompleted improvements was not raised in the trial court. As proof that the issue was raised, we have the trial judge’s order that recognized that the improvements had not been constructed in accordance with the settlement agreement, but erroneously gave Baum and Chatillion sixty days from the date of the order to complete them. However, if they were not completed within that time, Taylor and Mascaro still had to accept the lots in their unimproved state and were given the dubious right to sue Baum and Chatillion for the value of the missing improvements.