Court Opinion

ID: 9892605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 16:15:13.062834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:03.859770
License: Public Domain

J-S34036-23

                                   2023 PA Super 212

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHAEL RAMONE WILLIAMS                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 633 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 23, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0008310-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED: October 24, 2023

       Michael Ramone Williams (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered following his non-jury convictions of person not to possess

a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and public drunkenness.1 After

careful review, we affirm.

       The trial court described the underlying events:

       On August 24, 2020, police officers and medics were dispatched
       to the 1500 block of Barr Avenue for a report of an unresponsive
       male. When Officer [Nicholas] Mollo[2] arrived, he observed a blue
       Dodge Durango with its driver’s side door ajar and viewed a body
       from the waist down hanging outside the driver’s side of the
       vehicle. He also observed several pill bottles that were blue in
       color on the sidewalk and grassy area near the sidewalk[,] as well
       as a large sum of money. (Transcript, P. 4).

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 5505.

2 The trial court and parties spell the officer’s name as “Molo.”However, at
the suppression hearing, the officer spelled his name as “Mollo.” Therefore,
we use that spelling throughout.
J-S34036-23

              With the assistance of a flashlight, Officer Mollo observed
        Appellant, who appeared to be highly intoxicated, motionless[,]
        and lifeless inside of the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Appellant
        began to awaken somewhat and attempted to respond to Officer
        Mollo’s inquiries.     However, his speech was too slurred to
        understand his responses. Officer Mollo was unable to determine
        the Appellant’s name and the Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and
        glassy. (Transcript P. 5). Appellant needed assistance to exit the
        vehicle and stand on the ground[; Officer Mollo subsequently
        helped Appellant to sit on the ground]. Moments later[,] Officer
        [Frank] Scatena arrived at the scene and … Appellant continued
        to mumble incoherently and made statements indicating that he
        did not want to get shot. The officers made inquiries regarding
        the Appellant’s name and date of birth and the Appellant was
        frisked for identification without success.[3]     Officer Scatena
        obtained the Appellant’s consent to search his vehicle. During the
        search, Officer Scatena recovered [blue] prescriptive bottles,
        containing marijuana[,] and stacks of money totaling
        approximately $12[,]500.00. Additionally, the officers observed
        the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the Appellant’s red
        backpack [that police discovered next to him on the ground].
        Following a search of the backpack, the officers recovered
        additional pill bottles that contained suspected marijuana. Officer
        Mollo recovered a Glock 26 firearm from the backpack as well as
        the Appellant’s ID. Officer Mollo checked the Appellant for
        warrants, and he learned that the Appellant had an outstanding
        warrant for a probation violation. The Appellant was escorted to
        the hospital for medical evaluation and after he was cleared for
        incarceration, he was transported to the Allegheny County Jail.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/22, at 1-2 (footnotes added).

        On July 6, 2021, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to

suppress all physical evidence.            A suppression hearing took place on

____________________________________________

3 The  officers performed a license plate search that revealed the vehicle was
registered to a female.

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September 15, 2021. At the end of the hearing, the suppression court denied

Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion.4

       A stipulated non-jury trial took place on March 3, 2022. On March 7,

2022, the court found Appellant guilty of the above offenses. On May 23,

2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 4 – 8 years in prison,

followed by 18 months of probation. The instant, timely appeal followed.5

       On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue:

       Did the [suppression] court abuse its discretion in denying the
       motion to suppress evidence found in Appellant’s backpack insofar
       as the police seizure and search of the Appellant’s backpack
       without a warrant and without consent was unconstitutional in the
       absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify
       the search?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.6

       We begin by recognizing:
____________________________________________

4 The suppression court briefly explained its reasons for denying Appellant’s

suppression motion. N.T., 9/15/21, at 36-37. The suppression court issued
a written order that did not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Order, 9/15/21, at 1 (unnumbered). Following the suppression hearing, the
suppression judge retired without authoring an opinion in this matter.

5 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

6 Appellant does not specify whether he is claiming the trial court violated his

rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article
1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, or both. To the extent he is
challenging the denial of his suppression motion pursuant to Article 1, Section
8, Appellant does not distinguish his state constitutional rights as being
greater than his federal constitutional rights. See Commonwealth v.
Haynes, 116 A.3d 640, 644-55 (Pa. Super. 2015) (discussing the history of
Article 1, Section 8, and its differences and similarities to the Fourth
Amendment).

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      [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial
      of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
      suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
      and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
      correct.    Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
      suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
      supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
      findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
      erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the determination of the
      suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
      suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
      appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
      court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
      of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted).   “[I]t is the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the

credibility of witnesses,” and “the suppression court judge is entitled to believe

all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Blasioli,

685 A.2d 151, 157 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted).

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees,

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....”

U.S. Const. Amend. IV.      The Pennsylvania Constitution also protects this

interest by ensuring, “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures....”           Pa.

Const. Art. I, Section 8. Therefore, “[a]s a general rule, a search conducted

without a warrant is presumed to be unreasonable unless it can be justified

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under    a   recognized   exception   to   the   search   warrant   requirement.”

Commonwealth v. Agnew, 600 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Pa. Super. 1991)

(citations omitted).

        Appellant contends:

        the police lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances to
        conduct a warrantless seizure search of the Appellant’s zippered
        backpack and its contents. The evidence of the gun found in the
        backpack was not admissible under the inevitable discovery
        doctrine or justifiable as a protective sweep search.

Appellant’s Brief at 12. See also id. at 13-20.

        Our standard of review for determining probable cause is well settled.

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s

knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent individual in believing that an

offense was committed[,] and that the defendant has committed it.”

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 24 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation

omitted). We do not ask whether the officer’s belief was “correct or more

likely true than false. Rather, we require only a probability, and not a prima

facie showing, of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d

928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in

original). When assessing whether probable cause existed, “we must consider

the totality of the circumstances as they appeared to the arresting officer.”

Griffin, supra at 1042 (citation and quotation marks omitted).           Further,

police action under the Fourth Amendment is proper “regardless of the

individual officer’s state of mind, as the long as the circumstances, viewed

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objectively justify [the] action.    …     The officer’s subjective motivation is

irrelevant.”   Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis in original).

      Here, the suppression court judge explained:

      I went back over the transcript and back over your cases. What
      became readily apparent is [Appellant] was incapacitated at the
      time the police arrived. He was half in and half out of the car and
      pill [bottles] which ultimately contained marijuana were thrown
      around along with stashes of money. And I mean stashes. The
      total value of over $12,500.

            [Appellant] did not know where he was or what he was doing
      and the police were in the process of trying to ascertain what was
      happening. Based upon all of those facts, I’m going to deny your
      motion.

N.T., 9/15/21, at 36-37.

      In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 969 A.2d 565 (Pa. Super. 2009), this

Court stated, “[i]t is well-settled that exigent circumstances excusing the

warrant requirement arise where the need for prompt police action is

imperative.” Id. at 569 (citation omitted). In Johnson, police responded to

a radio call of a shooting; Johnson, the shooting victim, had already been

transported to the hospital. Id. at 566-67. The police and hospital personnel

were not able to identify the victim, so police searched Johnson’s clothing. Id.

at 567. While looking for identification, the police discovered illegal narcotics

and $302 in cash. Id. Johnson moved to suppress the physical evidence and

the trial court granted his request. Id.

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     On appeal, this Court reversed. Id. at 569. In holding that the search

was permissible, we noted there was no Pennsylvania law directly on point

and looked to several federal and state court decisions.      Id. at 570.   We

approved of a decision by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which

involved similar facts. Id. The Maryland court held a warrantless search was

reasonable “‘where the search is conducted for the purpose of ascertaining

identity of the victim and inadvertently contraband is discovered.’”        Id.

(quoting Floyd v. State, 330 A.2d 677, 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975)).

     This Court in Johnson also reviewed the decision of the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Vauss v. United

States, 370 F.2d 250 (D.C.Cir. 1966) (per curiam).       In Vauss, the police

searched the pockets of an unconscious man, who was lying in the street, for

identification. Johnson, 969 A.2d at 570 (citing Vauss, 370 F.2d at 251).

The police found narcotics but no identification. Id. We quoted approvingly

from Vauss,

           That … a search as occurred here happens to yield
           evidence of a crime as a by-product even though not
           so intended is irrelevant. A search of one found in
           an unconscious condition is both legally
           permissible and highly necessary. There is a
           positive need to see if the person is carrying some
           indication of a medical history, the rapid discovery of
           which may save his life; there is also a need to identify
           persons so found in order to notify relatives or friends.
           That the cause of appellant’s being unconscious was
           not known in no way impaired but rather enhanced
           the need and inherent power to search appellant.

Id. (quoting Vauss, supra at 251-52 (emphasis added)).

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     We further reviewed the decision of the United States District Court for

the District of Massachusetts in Griggs v. Lexington Police Dep’t., 672

F.Supp. 36 (D.Mass. 1987), which ruled the police search of an unconscious

woman’s handbag was reasonable. The Griggs Court stated, “‘many courts

have recognized that it is reasonable for the police to search persons to

determine their identity where police find that person unconscious, or where

the person is so seriously injured such that questioning would be impractical

or unproductive.’” Johnson, 969 A.2d at 570 (quoting Griggs, 672 F.Supp.

at 39). We mentioned that the South Carolina Supreme Court found no merit

to a claim that evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a critically

wounded defendant should have been excluded. Id. at 570-71 (quoting State

v. Patrick, 177 S.E.2d 545, 547 (S.C. 1970)).

     Lastly, the Johnson Court quoted the California District Court of

Appeals for the Fourth District, which recognized the need to identify

unconscious or injured individuals and noted:

     An officer who is making or is present at a reasonable search is
     not required to close his eyes to contraband he discovers simply
     because it is not connected with the initial purpose of the search.
     Even though a search was authorized for one purpose, the seizing
     of the contraband found in that search would not be a violation of
     defendant’s constitutional rights.

Id. at 571 (quoting People v. Gonzales, 5 Cal.Rptr. 920 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.

1960) (citation omitted)).   Thus, we concluded, “the need to identify the

unconscious victim was itself an exigent circumstance thus justifying the

warrantless search.” Id. at 572 (citations omitted).

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      There has been almost no discussion of Johnson since it was authored

over ten years ago.        The sole exception is this Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44 (Pa. Super. 2013). In Gatlos, the

police searched a purse found in a car at the scene of a multi-car accident to

identify one of the drivers (the appellant). Gatlos, 76 A.2d 48. Police found

appellant’s identification in the purse, as well as a box containing cigars later

determined to marijuana. Id. at 50. The trial court denied the appellant’s

motion to suppress, relying on Johnson, and finding the exigent medical

emergency of appellant’s incapacitated state necessitated the search to learn

her identity. Id. at 53-54.

      After discussing Johnson, the Gatlos Court rejected the “trial court’s

solitary reliance upon [it] in this case.” Id. at 54 (emphasis added). We

explained, “Johnson did not involve a vehicle search, but addressed the

search of one’s person.    Pennsylvania law is clear that warrantless vehicle

searches require probable cause and exigent circumstances, beyond mere

mobility of the vehicle.” Id. However, we determined that the search was

reasonable. Id. at 55-57. We looked to Johnson, in combination with the

purposes   underlying   the   inventory   search   exception   to   the   warrant

requirement, and to other states’ “emergency aid doctrine[s].”            Id.   We

explained that underlying all three exceptions to the warrant requirement was

the idea that these types of searches were not investigative but rather part of

the police’s “caretaking function[,]” and thus, “the conduct of the police will

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be viewed as reasonable under the Constitution.”          Id. at 56 (citations

omitted).   We therefore deemed the search of the appellant’s purse to be

permissible as an inventory search. Id. at 58-59.

      The instant matter is factually closer to the situation in Johnson than

that in Gatlos. Here, Officer Mollo was called to the scene for a welfare check.

N.T.. 9/15/21, at 4. At the suppression hearing, Officer Mollo testified that

when he arrived at the scene, he observed:

      Legs basically from the waist down of a person hanging outside
      the vehicle’s driver side door which was ajar. Walking up to the
      vehicle, I shined my flashlight and there was a male that was
      inside who appeared to be highly intoxicated. He was pretty
      motionless and lifeless upon my arrival, but as I shined my
      flashlight on him it created some type of stimulus. He started to
      wake up a little bit.

Id.   Officer Mollo stated Appellant’s eyes “were extremely glassy and

bloodshot and his speech was very slurred making him nearly impossible to

understand when I was asking him what was going on with him.” Id. at 5.

Officer Mollo could not understand what Appellant was saying when he asked

Appellant’s name. Id. Appellant was unable to get out of the vehicle without

assistance. Id. at 6.

      Officer Scatena confirmed Officer Mollo’s testimony, stating that, in

response to questions, Appellant “like mumble[d]. But we couldn’t understand

what he was saying.” Id. at 21. During cross-examination, Officer Scatena

reiterated that Appellant, “was either speaking a different language or there

was stuff coming out of his mouth. It was not words.” Id. at 23-24.

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      Both police officers affirmed “the goal was to try to identify this guy and

[they] could not find anything where [they] looked that did identify him. …

[They ran the license] plates … and [it] didn’t come back to him either.” Id.

at 22; see also id. at 14-15. Both police officers testified as to the importance

of identifying an individual who is in medical distress. Id. at 18-19, 22-24.

The suppression court credited their testimony, finding Appellant was

“incapacitated.”   Id. at 36.   The court specifically held the purpose of the

search was “to ascertain what was happening.” Id. at 37. We have no basis

to disturb these credibility and factual findings. Smith, 164 A.3d at 1257;

Blasioli, 685 A.2d at 157.

      Appellant does not address Johnson and ignores that it created an

exception to the normal probable cause analysis. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-

20. Here, the uncontradicted testimony of both police officers was that they

only searched Appellant’s backpack because he was unable to give his name

due to his incapacitated state, and they could not find any identification on his

person or in the limited consensual search of his car. While Appellant was not

unconscious, he was so incapacitated that it made no meaningful difference.

“A search of one found in an unconscious condition is both legally permissible

and highly necessary.” Johnson, supra at 569 (citation omitted). Thus, we

agree with the suppression court that the instant search was permissible as

an identity search because of the exigent circumstances of Appellant’s medical

emergency. See id. at 569, 572.

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      We are cognizant that in both Johnson and Gatlos, we addressed

situations where it was not clear until after the searches that the medically

compromised person had been involved in criminal activity. See id. at 566;

see also Gatlos, 76 A.3d at 550-58. Thus, we emphasized that the “need to

identify an unconscious victim” exigency exception was necessary because of

the absence of probable cause.       Johnson, 969 A.2d at 566.          However,

because the record demonstrates that police did not search Appellant’s

backpack for investigatory purposes, we find Johnson applicable.

      The search was also permissible as a search incident to arrest.

Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016). “The

search incident to arrest exception allows arresting officers, in order to prevent

the arrestee from obtaining a weapon or destroying evidence, to search both

the person arrested and the area within his immediate control.” Id. at 799

(citation and brackets omitted). The parameters of a search incident to arrest

includes containers and clothing that are in the arrestee’s possession at the

time of his arrest. See Commonwealth v. Guzman, 612 A.2d 524, 526-27

(Pa. Super. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by, Commonwealth v.

Bell, 645 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1994) (finding that police lawfully searched satchel

carried by arrestee at time of arrest); Commonwealth v. Trenge, 451 A.2d

701, 710 (Pa. Super. 1982) (holding police lawfully searched shoulder bag

that was on arrestee when he was arrested). A warrantless search incident

to an arrest must be “substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and [is]

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confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” Commonwealth v. Wright,

742 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa. 1999) (quotation omitted).

     Here, police found the backpack next to Appellant at the time of the

search. N.T., 9/15/21, at 6-7. Moreover, the search took place immediately

prior to the time Appellant was transported by ambulance, accompanied by

Officer Mollo, to the hospital for treatment, and then promptly arrested by

Officer Mollo once treatment was completed.    Id. at 8.   Accordingly, the

warrantless search was proper for this reason as well. Guzman. 612 A.2d at

526-27; Trenge, 451 A.2d at 710.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 10/24/2023

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