Court Opinion

ID: 9763000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:35:09.053742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:29.855136
License: Public Domain

*109WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my judgment a sentence of imprisonment for not less than fifty (50) years nor more than one hundred (100) years for homosexual acts committed by this thirty-eight year old pedophile was grossly excessive and unnecessary either to protect society or to punish the offender.
When the appeal was initially before a three judge panel of the Superior Court, our colleague, Judge Beck, wrote a dissenting opinion which, in my judgment, provides an excellent analysis and correct disposition of this appeal. Therefore, I adopt her opinion and incorporate the same herein.
“In its memorandum vacating the trial court’s original sentence of fifty (50) to one hundred (100) years imprisonment, [the panel] ordered the trial court to ‘correct [ ] its manifestly excessive sentence.’ The panel found that on the basis of the record before it, it was improper for the trial court to consign appellant to prison for what amounts to the rest of his life. The majority concludes that the prior panel did not intend to direct the court to reduce the original sentence. In the context of this case, I disagree.
“Clearly, the circumstance which factored most heavily and which ultimately persuaded the prior panel to find that the length of the sentence was manifestly excessive was the fact that the original sentence ‘effectively ensure[d] that appellant will spend at least the next fifty years of his life in jail.’ Further, the panel found that, in imposing this sentence, the trial court did not afford sufficient consideration to several ameliorating factors among which were appellant’s background, his mental illness and his prospects for treatment. [The Superior Court] noted that the record ‘suggested] that appellant, in a reasonable period of time and under proper treatment, may return to society as a contributing member.’ In my view, the import of our previous decision was that the trial court failed properly to weigh these factors and genuinely balance them against the undeniable gravity of these offenses in imposing its sentence. The record indicated that the sentence imposed was ‘nearly exclusively’ premised on the *110need to punish and achieve retribution for the considerable harm done to the young victims here. In imposing a sentence which ignored even the potential for rehabilitation and discounted entirely appellant’s psychological history, the panel found the court had abused its admittedly broad discretion.
“On remand, the trial court was presented with a report which outlined a sentencing plan for appellant. The report compared the original sentence given appellant to guidelines imposed in other jurisdictions for comparable offenses. The range of sentences suggested elsewhere, according to the report in evidence, [was] dramatically less severe than the original sentence imposed here. The report recommended a significant period of incarceration accompanied by treatment and followed by lengthy out-patient monitoring. It also argued for treatment as a reasonable alternative to salvage the life of appellant and allow him to successfully re-enter society eventually. However, despite the clear directive of this court to give adequate consideration to these indispensible features of the sentencing determination, the trial court reimposed its original sentence. This action was based on a record which did not significantly differ from the record upon which the panel was forced to remand in the first place. If anything, the record presented even greater support for the mitigating factors which this court found the trial court had originally ignored. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court’s sentence continues to constitute an abuse of discretion. For these reasons, I dissent.”