Court Opinion

ID: 9390315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:36.813512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.458719
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                          TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0579-MR

ANSHANIQUE M. LEAVELL                                                APPELLANT

                ON APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                            NO. 19-CR-00522

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

               OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER

                                  AFFIRMING

      A Christian County jury convicted Anshanique M. Leavell of one count

each of murder, receiving stolen property—firearm, and tampering with

physical evidence. Leavell received a total sentence of twenty-eight years in

prison. This appeal followed as a matter of right. See KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).

Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the

Christian Circuit Court.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

      Late on the night of June 6, 2019, Rajiana Tandy drove Leavell to meet

Amareya Freeman so that Leavell could purchase marijuana from Freeman.

When Leavell and Tandy arrived at the apartment complex where Freeman was

located, Leavell contacted Freeman who then came out to the car. Freeman

walked away from the car and then came back. Leavell and Freeman spoke
through Leavell’s rolled down passenger window. Leavell never left the car. At

some point, Tandy, while looking in her rearview mirror, saw Freeman run past

her car. She then heard a gunshot. When Tandy heard the gunshot, Leavell

was partially in the car and partially hanging out of the passenger side window.

Tandy and Leavell then left the apartment complex. Tandy never saw a gun but

later that night found out via social media that Freeman had been shot. Tandy

sent a screenshot of the social media post to Leavell but could not remember

what Leavell’s response had been. After seeing the post, Tandy went to the

police station with her mother to provide a statement.

      While investigating the scene, police searched Freeman’s apartment. In

that apartment, police found a Glock handgun case that did not contain a gun.

They also found a receipt for the purchase of a Glock 27 .40 caliber handgun

and a box of .40 caliber ammunition. The purchaser listed on the receipt was

Freeman. The gun had been seized during a police raid of the apartment the

previous January. A box of .40 caliber ammunition, however, was found in the

apartment on the night of the shooting, but nine rounds were missing. Police

also found two bags of marijuana—one containing twenty-five grams and the

other containing two grams.

      Police also conducted a cursory search of the apartment next door to

Freeman’s, where Dedrick Brodie, Brodie’s girlfriend, and Brodie’s son lived.

Brodie and Freeman had been hanging out together a short time before the

shooting, and police were looking for Freeman’s phone. Police did not find the

                                       2
phone and did not look for any other specific item in Brodie’s apartment,

including a gun.

       Approximately one to one and a half hours after the shooting, police

conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle in which Leavell was a passenger. Upon

smelling marijuana, police searched the vehicle. Police found a handgun in the

vehicle. The gun was wrapped in a t-shirt and in a pink bag in the center

console of the vehicle. The gun had been reported stolen on June 6, 2019, from

Livingston County, Kentucky. Leavell was then taken into custody and

interviewed.

       During her police interview, Leavell denied any involvement in Freeman’s

death for approximately the first thirty minutes of the interview. Police

detectives eventually told Leavell that guns have a “signature” and that the

“signature” of the gun found in the car was found at the scene of Freeman’s

shooting. At that point, Leavell admitted that the gun was hers and that she

fired it at Freeman. Leavell explained that she had met with Freeman to

purchase marijuana. She stated that Freeman was acting “strange” and trying

to get her to come into his apartment. She also stated that Freeman grabbed at

his waistband, like he was reaching for something, but that it was dark

outside. Although Leavell said that she acted in self-defense, she also explained

that Freeman took her $50, and asked rhetorically, “What was I supposed to

do?”

       Leavell was indicted and tried before a jury on the charges of murder,

receiving stolen property—firearm, and tampering with physical evidence. At

                                        3
trial, Leavell asserted that she acted in self-defense. Leavell relied heavily on

the medical examiner’s testimony to support her claim of self-defense. The

medical examiner testified that the bullet entered the upper middle of

Freeman’s chest, slightly to the right of the breastbone. The bullet hit a rib and

exited through Freeman’s upper left back. The medical examiner also testified

that Freeman had what appeared to be gunshot graze wounds on the back of

his right foreman, near the wrist. Based on the wounds, the medical examiner

testified that Freeman was most likely predominately facing the shooter with

his right arm stretched out straight in front of him with his palm facing down.

Leavell argued that Freeman could have been holding a gun in his right hand

and pointing it at her at the time he was shot.

      Leavell further asserted a theory that Brodie, after finding Freeman shot,

took Freeman’s gun and the $50 Leavell had given Freeman, prior to the police

arrival on scene. The jury, however, found Leavell guilty of all charges. This

appeal followed.

                                    II. ANALYSIS

      Leavell alleges several errors by the trial court and urges this Court to

reverse her conviction. First, she alleges that the trial court erred in admitting

testimony that Leavell did not act consistently with someone who truly acted in

self-defense in violation of Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762 (Ky.

2013). Second, she alleges that the trial court erred in denying her motions for

a directed verdict on the charges of murder and tampering with physical

evidence. Third, she alleges the trial court erred in admitting evidence that

                                         4
Leavell was potentially affiliated with a gang. Fourth, she alleges the

Commonwealth’s Attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, she

urges this Court to reverse her convictions based on cumulative error. We

address each of Leavell’s arguments in turn.

A. The trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Leavell did not
   act consistently with someone who acted in self-defense.

       Leavell first argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from

Hopkinsville Police Detective Jason Sears. In this testimony, Detective Sears

opined that generally when a person has acted in self-defense, he or she

immediately discloses to police that his or her actions were taken in self-

defense. In stating this, Detective Sears implied that Leavell did not act

consistently with someone who truly acted in self-defense. Leavell asserts that

this testimony violated our holding in Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d

762.

       In Ordway, the defendant was convicted of capital murder related to the

fatal shooting of two of his acquaintances. Id. at 771–72. Ordway claimed at

trial that he had acted in self-defense. Id. at 771. Responding to questioning

from the Commonwealth, an investigating detective testified that Ordway “did

not act like those who had lawfully protected themselves but, had instead acted

like those who were fabricating a self-protection defense.” Id. at 775. We held

that “a party may not introduce evidence of the habit of a class of individuals

either to prove that another member of the class acted the same way under

similar circumstances or to prove that the person was a member of that class

                                         5
because he acted the same way under similar circumstances.” Id. at 776

(citation omitted).

      We explained that in Ordway, “[t]he opinion of an experienced and

respected police detective that [Ordway]’s conduct did not match the

stereotypical conduct of an innocent person acting in self-defense

authoritatively portrayed [Ordway]’s defense as a fabrication.” Id. at 777. We

further explained that the detective’s testimony “in effect, urged the jury to

depend upon his apparent expertise as a police officer and his perception and

opinion about matters outside the realm of common knowledge.” Id. at 776–77.

Finally, we held that it was improper for a police detective “to authoritatively

suggest how innocent persons behave after they lawfully engage in an act of

self-defense, and to then, with some measure of certainty, exclude Appellant

from that class of persons based upon his conduct following the shooting.” Id.

at 775–76.

      The context of Detective Sears’s testimony in this case, however, is

distinguishable from the context of the testimony elicited in Ordway. In this

case, the Commonwealth first called Detective Sears to testify during its case-

in-chief. Leavell then recalled Detective Sears during her case-in-chief. During

re-re-direct of Detective Sears, the following exchange occurred between

defense counsel and the detective:

      Defense Counsel (Defense): Detective Sears, you said you’ve been
      doing this for, been an officer for, twenty plus years? Is that
      correct?

      Detective Sears (Detective): Yes, yes sir.

                                         6
Defense: Ok. And you’ve done so many interviews that you can’t
remember how many, correct?

Detective: I’ve done several. I’ve done a bunch.

Defense: Ok. Is it common for people when they start interviewing
you [sic] to kind of downplay what happened, or put it in the best
light?

Detective: Is it common for people, or me?

Defense: Is it common for people you interview?

Detective: People, uh, people want to minimize their—they do a lot
of times want to minimize their action that’s involved in the, the
crime, or [unintelligible] they got times they wanna give a, portray
themselves in a different mannerism, I should say.

Defense: Ok. That doesn’t make what they say later untrue, does
it?

Detective: Well, they leave out critical parts of it though, and just
sometimes they leave out the, um, I don’t know, I guess the meat
‘n taters of the real story.

Defense: Ok. So, when she said, “I know I acted in self-defense,”
what did she leave out?

Detective: Well, that’s down the, along the interview along the
ways, I mean, we’ve been into for a while, about thirty minutes,
because I had to go over the signature of the gun and everything
before she said that. No, that’s what she stated.

Defense: Ok. There’s nothing left out of that statement; that’s a
pretty clear declaration, “I acted in self-defense.”

Detective: It’s a—

Defense: That’s the meat and potatoes, correct?

Detective: It’s a declaration, but does that mean that it’s something
that’s not minimized, too?

Defense: Nothing further.

                                   7
Immediately after, the Commonwealth began its re-re-cross as follows:

      Commonwealth’s Attorney (Commonwealth): When people are
      interviewed routinely, that self-defense is their defense, they start
      off with that?

      Defense: Objection, speculation.

      Trial court: Overruled.

      Commonwealth: Is that not true, from your experience?

      Detective: Most times, when somebody comes in, that they had to
      be forced into a situation, that’s their first, that’s the first thing
      they’ll bring up. Now I’m not saying—

      Commonwealth: That’s right, they get it out quick?

      Detective: They get it out quick.

      Commonwealth: They don’t wait?

      Detective: Yes, they ain’t going to hold on to it until you have to pry
      it—bring it out.

While the testimony elicited by the Commonwealth from Detective Sears would

ordinarily violate Ordway, because Leavell first elicited testimony about the

way a typical suspect behaves, the trial court did not err in allowing the

Commonwealth to elicit similar testimony to rebut the evidence Leavell elicited.

      Ordway’s directive is equally applicable to any party. Id. at 776 (“[A]

party may not introduce evidence of the habit of a class of individuals either to

prove that another member of the class acted the same way under similar

circumstances or to prove that the person was a member of that class because

he acted the same way under similar circumstances.” (emphasis added)). As we

noted, “The determination of an individual’s guilt or innocence must be based

upon the evidence of the particular act in question; it cannot be extrapolated
                                          8
from an opinion, that his behavior after the event comports with some

standardized perception of how the ‘typical’ suspect behaves.” Id. This rule

applies with equal force to both a criminal defendant and the Commonwealth.

When the defendant attempts to extrapolate from a witness’s opinion about

suspects in general, it clears a path for the Commonwealth to fully rebut that

evidence. See Blair v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ky. 2004)

(‘“Opening the door’ . . . occurs when one party introduces an inadmissible fact

that opens the door for the opponent to offer similar facts whose only claim to

admission is that they negative, explain, or counterbalance the prior

inadmissible fact.”) (citations omitted). Here, the Commonwealth’s elicited

testimony did not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it was permissibly responsive to

similar testimony immediately preceding it. Based upon the foregoing, the trial

court did not err in admitting the testimony of Detective Sears.

      Finally, even if the trial court erred in admitting Detective Sears’s

testimony, this error was harmless. An error is harmless if a “reviewing court

can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by

the error.” Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009)

(citation omitted). In this case, evidence admitted at trial showed that Leavell

was evasive for the first thirty minutes of her interview. It further showed that

when telling Detective Sears what happened on the night of the shooting,

Leavell said, “He took my $50. What was I supposed to do?” Leavell did not

definitively state that she saw Freeman with a gun, and no gun was found on

the scene. The jury also heard that Leavell was potentially affiliated with a gang

                                        9
that had perpetrated other shootings in the area. Finally, Leavell only asserted

self-defense after being told that the police were able to match the gun found in

the car with her to the shooting. Given this evidence, we can say “with fair

assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Id.

B. The trial court did not err in denying Leavell’s motions for a directed
   verdict.

      Leavell next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motions for a

directed verdict on the charges of murder and tampering with physical

evidence. Our directed verdict standard was described in Commonwealth v.

Benham:

      On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purposes of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
      evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
      questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
      testimony.

      On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
      evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
      find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
      of acquittal.

816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citation omitted). “So long as the

Commonwealth produces more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the

charges, a defendant’s motion for directed verdict should be denied.” Taylor v.

Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d 321, 324 (Ky. 2020). With these standards in

mind, we address each of Leavell’s arguments in turn.

                                       10
   1. Murder

      Leavell argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a

directed verdict on the charge of murder. Under Kentucky Revised Statutes

(KRS) 507.020(1) and 503.050, a person is guilty of murder if (1) he or she

causes the death of another person, (2) “with intent to cause the death of

another person” or while “wantonly engag[ing] in conduct which creates a grave

risk of death to another person,” and (3) while not privileged to act in self-

protection. Regarding self-protection, under KRS 503.050,

      (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another
      person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such
      force is necessary to protect himself against the use or
      imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person.

      (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another
      person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant
      believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against
      death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse
      compelled by force or threat, felony involving the use of force, or
      under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055.

      Leavell argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient proof that

she was not privileged to act in self-protection. However, this Court has

previously explained, “Rarely is a defendant relying upon self-defense entitled

to a directed verdict. Only in the unusual case in which the evidence

conclusively establishes justification and all of the elements of self-defense are

present is it proper to direct a verdict of not guilty.” West v. Commonwealth,

780 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Ky. 1989) (emphasis added). In this case, we cannot say

that the evidence “conclusively establishe[d]” that Leavell acted in self-defense.

                                        11
      The evidence admitted at trial that supported a self-defense claim came

mostly from the medical examiner as described above and Hopkinsville Police

Department detectives who either interviewed Leavell after the shooting or who

had watched a video recording of this interview. Through the testimony of those

detectives, the jury heard Leavell’s statements that Freeman reached towards

his waistband and possibly pulled something out. However, nothing was found

at the scene to indicate that Freeman actually pulled anything out of his

waistband, let alone that he pulled out a gun. Further, Tandy testified that she

did not see or hear anything that caused her to believe that Leavell had a

reason to shoot Freeman.

      This Court has previously

      held that a defendant’s statement that he acted in self-defense or
      his description of events which show such to be the case need not
      be accepted at face value where the jury may infer from his
      incredibility or the improbability of the circumstances that one or
      more of the elements necessary to qualify for self-defense is
      missing.

Id. (citing Taul v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1952)). We have also

“held that if the evidence relied upon to establish self-defense is contradicted or

if there is other evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that

some element of self-defense is absent, a directed verdict should not be given.”

Id. (citing Townsend v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1971)).

      Given the conflicting evidence presented to the jury in this case, the trial

court did not err in denying Leavell’s motion for a directed verdict on the

charge of murder.

                                        12
   2. Tampering with Physical Evidence

      Leavell next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a

directed verdict on the charge of tampering with physical evidence. Under KRS

524.100(1)(a), as relevant to Leavell’s case,

      A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when,
      believing that an official proceeding is pending or may be
      instituted, he . . . conceals . . . physical evidence which he believes
      is about to be produced or used in the official proceeding with
      intent to impair its verity or availability in the official proceeding.

Leavell argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove both that she concealed

the handgun and also that she intended to impair the gun’s availability in an

official proceeding.

      Regarding concealment of the gun, Leavell relies in part on KRS

527.020(8), a subsection of the statute which defines the crime of carrying a

concealed deadly weapon. Under that subsection,

      A loaded or unloaded firearm or other deadly weapon shall not be
      deemed concealed on or about the person if it is located in any
      enclosed container, compartment, or storage space installed as
      original equipment in a motor vehicle by its manufacturer,
      including but not limited to a glove compartment [or] center
      console . . . .

(emphasis added). We need not determine the relevance of KRS 527.020 to our

tampering with physical evidence statute, however, because the handgun was

not found merely lying in the center console. Instead, it was found wrapped in

a t-shirt inside of a pink bag in the center console. The additional actions

required to wrap the gun in a t-shirt and place it in a bag before placing it in

the center console of the car make KRS 527.020 inapplicable in this case.

                                        13
      Leavell further argues that the detective who conducted the traffic stop

during which the gun was found did not testify that Leavell made any furtive

movements during the stop or that she wrapped up the gun and placed it in

the bag during the stop. She also argues that the center console is not an

“unconventional” location such that the gun was concealed there.

      Finally, Leavell argues that the Commonwealth presented no evidence

that she intended to impair the gun’s availability in an official proceeding. She

asserts that there is no indication that she knew Tandy would report the events

of that night to the police. She argues that because there was no evidence that

she knew there was a pending official proceeding, there was no evidence that

she intended to impair the gun’s availability in that proceeding.

      “It is well-settled that a jury may make reasonable inferences from the

evidence.” Blades v. Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Ky. 1997) (citations

omitted). In this case, the evidence was undisputed that the gun used in the

shooting was found wrapped in a t-shirt, in a pink bag, in the center console of

a car. Given the multiple layers the police were required to unwrap in order to

find the gun, the jury could have reasonably inferred both that the gun was

concealed, and that Leavell did so with the intent to impair its availability in an

official proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying her

motion for a directed verdict on the charge of tampering with physical evidence.

C. The trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Leavell was
   potentially affiliated with a gang.

      Leavell next argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that

she was potentially affiliated with a gang because it was improper character
                                        14
evidence. Specifically, she argues that the trial court erroneously admitted

testimony that her Facebook username was associated with a local gang

suspected of shootings in Christian County, that she was related to someone in

the gang, and that she had posted a music video on Facebook in which she

rapped about robbers and killers. Regarding the music video, Leavell failed to

object at the trial court, leaving this allegation of error unpreserved. Because

Leavell did not request palpable error review of the admission of this specific

piece of evidence, we will not review it standing alone. See Shepherd v.

Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008) (“Absent extreme

circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate

court will not engage in palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless

such a request is made and briefed by the appellant.”) (citation omitted).

Instead, we will only consider the admission of the rap video as an additional

piece of evidence suggesting Leavell was associated with a local gang.

      This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on the admission of evidence

for an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky.

2007); Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “The test for

abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (citing English, 993

S.W.2d at 945).

      Leavell argues that the gang affiliation testimony violated Kentucky Rules

of Evidence (KRE) 403 and 404(b). Under KRE 403, relevant evidence “may be

                                        15
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

undue prejudice . . .” Under KRE 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show

action in conformity therewith” unless it falls within certain exceptions.

Additionally, under KRE 404(a), “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of

character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity

therewith on a particular occasion.” One exception to that general rule,

however, allows for admission of “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character or

of general moral character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to

rebut the same.” KRE 404(a)(1).

      In this case, Leavell—not the Commonwealth—first injected the issue of

gang affiliation into the trial. Before the Commonwealth ever introduced any

evidence of Leavell’s potential gang affiliation, Leavell herself asked Tandy if

Leavell had any gang relations. Tandy responded in the negative. Leavell then

further elicited from Tandy that if Leavell was in fact in a gang, Tandy would

have known that information. Thus, by attempting to show her “good”

character, Leavell opened the door and “cannot complain if the Commonwealth

walked through that door and introduced character evidence not to [her]

liking.” Stansbury v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 293, 301 (Ky. 2015).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

evidence of Leavell’s potential gang affiliation.

                                         16
D. The Commonwealth’s Attorney did not commit prosecutorial
   misconduct.

      Leavell next argues that the Commonwealth’s Attorney committed

prosecutorial misconduct. Leavell asserts he did so in four ways. First, she

alleges that the Commonwealth’s Attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct

when he elicited testimony purportedly in violation of Ordway. See discussion

supra Subsection A. Second, she alleges the Commonwealth’s Attorney

committed prosecutorial misconduct when he elicited testimony about her

potential gang affiliation. See discussion supra Subsection C. Third, Leavell

asserts that the Commonwealth’s Attorney committed prosecutorial

misconduct when he posed hypotheticals to both the medical examiner and a

detective about the bullet trajectory, improperly implied the medical examiner

was not an expert on bullet trajectory, and used a detective that he never

qualified as an expert to discredit the medical examiner. Leavell asserts that

these actions were taken in order to mislead the jury and prejudice her.

Finally, Leavell argues that the Commonwealth’s Attorney committed

prosecutorial misconduct when he elicited testimony from a detective that

Freeman did not have a reputation in the community for violence and did not

have a reputation for carrying a gun. Leavell asserts that because that detective

did not even know if Freeman had ever purchased a gun, the prosecutor sought

to mislead and create a false impression for the jury by eliciting this testimony.

      “Prosecutorial misconduct is ‘a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act

involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or

assess an unjustified punishment.’” Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d
                                        17
731, 741–42 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Noakes v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 116,

121 (Ky. 2011)). One way in which the misconduct can occur is through

improper questioning. Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010)

(citation omitted). Any allegation of misconduct must be viewed in the context

of the overall fairness of the trial. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 742 (citing St. Clair

v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.3d 597, 640 (Ky. 2014)). To justify reversal, the

Commonwealth’s misconduct must be “so serious as to render the entire trial

fundamentally unfair.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004)

(quoting Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805 (Ky. 2001)).

      “If the misconduct is objected to, we will reverse on that ground if proof

of the defendant’s guilt was not such as to render the misconduct harmless,

and if the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a sufficient admonition

to the jury.” Duncan, 322 S.W.3d at 87. However, if no objection is made, the

Court “will reverse only where the misconduct was flagrant and was such as to

render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citations omitted).

      Leavell’s first two claims of prosecutorial misconduct—the purported

Ordway testimony and the gang affiliation testimony—are repetitive of other

issues already raised in this appeal. Having determined that the trial court did

not err in admitting the testimony Leavell now complains of, we cannot hold

that the Commonwealth’s Attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct in

eliciting said evidence. Further, as we have previously held, “Despite a

defendant’s characterization, ‘[i]ssues involving the admission of evidence or

                                        18
testimony, when ruled upon by the trial court, do not constitute prosecutorial

misconduct.’” Noakes, 354 S.W.3d at 122 (quoting Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 806).

      Leavell’s third claim of prosecutorial misconduct relates to questions the

Commonwealth’s Attorney asked to the medical examiner and to a detective

regarding the bullet trajectory and the positioning of Freeman’s body when he

was shot. Leavell asserts that when the Commonwealth’s Attorney posed

hypotheticals to both the medical examiner and a detective about the bullet

trajectory, implied the medical examiner was not an expert on bullet trajectory,

and used a detective that he never qualified as an expert to discredit the

medical examiner, he did so in order to mislead the jury. Most of this

questioning was not objected to, and the trial court overruled the single

objection Leavell made to the Commonwealth’s questioning of the detective.

Regarding the single objection, we hold there was not prosecutorial

misconduct, as it was merely an issue “involving the admission of evidence or

testimony” and was “ruled upon by the trial court.” Id. Regarding the rest of the

questioning that comprises this claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we hold

that the questioning and presentation of evidence did not cross the line from

zealous advocacy to misconduct.

      Leavell’s final claim of prosecutorial misconduct relates to testimony

from a detective that Freeman did not have a reputation in the community for

violence and did not have a reputation for carrying a gun. Leavell asserts that

because the detective did not even know if Freeman had ever purchased a gun,

the prosecutor sought to mislead and create a false impression for the jury by

                                       19
eliciting this testimony. Leavell could have objected on the basis that the officer

had insufficient knowledge to provide such an opinion on Freeman’s reputation

or could have cross-examined the detective about the basis of his opinion.

However, Leavell did neither. Further, there was nothing improper about this

question that would cause it to cross the line from zealous advocacy to

misconduct.

      Accordingly, all of Leavell’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct fail.

E. There was no cumulative error.

      Finally, Leavell argues that her conviction should be reversed due to

cumulative error. Under the cumulative error doctrine, “multiple errors,

although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative

effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313

S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Because we have found no errors, there cannot be

cumulative error. To the extent the admission of evidence that Leavell did not

act consistently with someone who truly acted in self-defense may have been

error, we found such potential error to be harmless. That potential error alone

did not render Leavell’s trial fundamentally unfair, and there are no other

errors to accumulate. “Where, as in this case, however, none of the errors

individually raised any real question of prejudice, we have declined to hold that

the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds up to

prejudice.” Id. (citing Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2002)).

Accordingly, we hold there was no cumulative error in this case.

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                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Christian

Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Robert Chung-Hua Yang
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Harrison Gray Kilgore
Assistant Attorney General

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