Court Opinion

ID: 9606220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:48:08.863919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:29.847502
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the improper use of criminal process may be remedied by civil actions for false or malicious arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. I also agree that the two-year statute of limitation on the claim of false imprisonment, which statute commenced on September 22, 1981, the day appellant was released from custody, had expired by the time she filed this lawsuit on November 19,1985. OCGA § 9-3-33; Meyers v. Glover, 152 Ga. App. 679 (2) (263 SE2d 539) (1979), overruled on other grounds, McCord v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 891 (311 SE2d 209) (1983). However, the consensus dissolves here because the majority concludes that appellant’s only cause of action was for false imprisonment. I, on the other hand, believe that appellant’s complaint stated a valid cause of action for false or malicious arrest, and that the two-year statute of limitation, which commenced upon the termination of the criminal proceedings against appellant (June 28, 1985), had not expired when appellant filed suit. OCGA § 9-3-33; McCord v. Jones, supra at 893.
Appellant Gloria Anita Reese was arrested at her workplace pursuant to a warrant issued for Gloria Ann Reese. The majority, citing Wilson v. Bonner, 166 Ga. App. 9 (303 SE2d 134) (1983); and Massey Stores v. Reeves, 111 Ga. App. 227 (141 SE2d 227) (1965), states that the warrant was void as to appellant because it was not issued for her. Wilson and Massey Stores are cases wherein the plaintiffs, wrongfully arrested pursuant to warrants due to mistakes in their identity by the law enforcement officers serving the warrants, filed lawsuits alleging malicious prosecution against the person or entity who had obtained the arrest warrants, i.e., the prosecutor. In each case, the court held that the suit for malicious prosecution based upon the warrants would not lie against the prosecutor because no warrant had issued on the prosecutor’s accusation for the arrest of the person bringing the mali*210cious prosecution action. Massey Stores v. Reeves, supra at 230; Wilson v. Bonner, supra at 10-11. “The fact that the defendants, with probable cause, obtained a warrant meant for another person having the identical name of plaintiff cannot be expanded to infer that the defendant intended maliciously for just any person of that name or this plaintiff to be prosecuted for the offense.” Massey Stores v. Reeves, supra at 228. It was in this context that the court declared the warrants void as to the plaintiffs.
Decided December 4, 1987.
Philip L. Ruppert, for appellant.
Gary H. Brakefield, James E. Ervin, George E. Glaze, for appellees.
The case before us concerns allegations of false arrest, not malicious prosecution. An action for false arrest may be directed against the prosecutor who maliciously obtained the warrant, or the police officer who negligently executed the warrant against the wrong person. See Smith v. Embry, 103 Ga. App. 375 (3) (119 SE2d 45) (1961); McCord v. Jones, supra; Standard Surety &c. Co. v. Johnson, 74 Ga. App. 823 (41 SE2d 576) (1947). If a person is arrested due to mistaken identity, the prosecutor may be liable to the person unlawfully arrested if a mistake is made as to the name inserted in the warrant. Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 488 (54 SE 1022) (1906). The arresting officer may be liable if he fails to exercise “due diligence in determining whether the person arrested bears the name specified in the warrant. ...” Id. If appellant had brought suit against the person who had obtained the warrant, I would be inclined to hold that such a suit would not lie because no warrant had issued on the prosecutor’s accusation for the arrest of appellant. See Massey Stores v. Reeves, supra; Wilson v. Bonner, supra. However, appellant has filed suit against the officers who arrested her, contending she was arrested despite her protestations that her name was not that which appeared on the warrant. In a false arrest action against the arresting officer, it is the negligence of the arresting officer for which recompense is sought. The warrant, as far as the arresting officer is concerned, is valid on its face. Whether he exercised due diligence in determining whether appellant bore the name appearing on the valid warrant is for a jury to determine.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.