Court Opinion

ID: 9561206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:10.887982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.324740
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
dissenting.
The stated purpose of the Uninsured Motorist statute is to protect these who are legally entitled to recover from the owner or operators of uninsured vehicles.1 According to 36 O.S.1981 § 3636 no policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death shall be issued unless it provides coverage therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death resulting therefrom.2
*585In Keel v. MFA, 553 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla.1976) we allowed stacking of uninsured motorist coverage holding that “other” insurance or excess escape clauses were void. Keel was premised on the rationale that such clauses were repugnant to § 3636 and foreclosed by public policy considerations because, among other things, the insured had paid a premium to the insurer and thus had a legitimate expectation of coverage. In Brown v. United States Auto. Ass’n., 684 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Okla.1984) we reiterated and reinforced the Keel philosophy holding that insurance policy provisions and definitions which purport to condition, limit, or dilute the provisions of the uninsured motorist statute are void and unenforceable.3
Title to 36 O.S.1981 § 3602 4 echoes general contract law by providing that an insurance policy includes all its clauses. Title 15 O.S.1981 § 157 dictates that the whole of a contract is to be taken together to give effect to every part with each clause assisting in interpretation of the others.5 Title 15 O.S.1981 § 1586 provides that even if there are several contracts relating to the same matters between the same parties which are made substantially one transaction, the contracts are to be construed together.
The policy under consideration parrots § 3636 — the insurer agreed to pay all sums the insured was entitled to recover as damages for bodily injuries, sickness, disease or death by the accident. Section II of the policy, the purported uninsured motorist clause, provides protection against bodily injuries caused by drivers of uninsured automobiles. Section II requires persons making a claim for bodily injuries under the policy to submit written proof, under oath if required, including full particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries and treatment. On the other hand, Section IV of the policy the purported medical payment clause limits the amount of payment and the time in which reimbursement may be received for treatment rendered — but it does not require submission of a claim for recovery of medical expenses. This requirement is found under the General Conditions No. 8. Obviously these clauses were intended to exist coextensively and of necessity must be construed coequally.
Section 3636 provides coverage for loss and damages resulting from bodily injury and death. Title 25 O.S.1981 § 17 and 15 O.S.1981 § 1608 provides that words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense. It is indisputable that damages for bodily injury include medical *586bills. Pursuant to 23 O.S.1981 § 39 any person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another may recover from the person at fault compensation in money damages. According to 23 O.S.1981 § 6,10 the measure of damages for breach of an obligation not arising from contract is the amount which will compensate for all detriment proximately caused thereby. In the absence of express contrary intent, whenever a word is defined in any statute the same definition is applicable wherever it occurs. 25 O.S.1981 § 2. Loss as defined by 51 O.S.Supp.1984 § 15211 includes death or bodily injury.
Here, the linchpin is not our decisional law, or even the public policy consideration, rather it is the unambiguous language of the statute and the insurance policy. The language of a contract governs its interpretation,12 and the courts of this state are bound by the statutory principles of construction of contracts to compare and harmonize the terms of the contract.13 The holding in Keel is just as viable today as it was ten years ago. The legislature could restrict coverage to only one policy — it has not done so; and in fact in 1979, it amended the statute to include “underinsured” motorists. Because the legislature has not narrowed the holding in Keel, there is no latitude in the statute for an insurer to limit its liability through “other insurance clauses.” 14 The language in § 3636 and the instant policy is broad enough to encompass medical pay coverage, and because of it, I am not persuaded by citations of authorities from foreign jurisdictions.
If the Keel principle is alive and well, stacking must be permitted. If the majority intends to erode or to overrule Keel, it should do so directly. Until Keel is overruled, I must dissent based on statutory construction, on the language of the policy, and on stare decisis.
I am authorized to state that WILSON, J. joins in the views herein expressed.

. Biggs v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 569 P.2d 430, 433 (Okla.1977).

. Title 36 O.S.1981 § 3636(A)(B) provides:
"(A) No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless the policy includes the coverage described in subsection (B) of this section.
(B) The policy referred to in subsection (A) of this section shall provide coverage therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom. Coverage shall be not less than the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a policy meeting the requirements of Section 7-204 of Title 47, Oklahoma Statutes, as the same may be hereafter amended; provided, however, that increased limits of liability shall be offered and purchased if desired, not to exceed the limits provided in the policy of bodily injury liability of the insured. The uninsured motorist coverage shall be upon a form approved by the State Board for Property and Casualty Rates as otherwise provided in the Insurance *585Code and may provide that the parties to the contract shall, upon demand of either, submit their differences to arbitration; provided, that if agreement by arbitration is not reached within three (3) months from date of demand, the insured may sue the tort-feasor."

. The Court also cited Uptegraft v. Home Insurance Company, 662 P.2d 681 (Okla.1983); Lake v. Wright, 657 P.2d 643 (Okla.1982); Chambers v. Walker, 653 P.2d 931 (Okla.1982); Porter v. MFA Mutual Insurance Company, 643 P.2d 302 (Okla.1982); Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 569 P.2d 430 (Okla.1977); Cothren v. Emasco Insurance Company, 555 P.2d 1037 (Okla.1976).

. Title 36 O.S.1981 § 3602 provides:
“ ‘Policy’ means contract of or agreement for effecting insurance, or the certificate thereof, by whatever name called, and includes all clauses, riders, endorsements and papers attached thereto and a part thereof.”

. It is provided by 15 O.S.1981 § 157;
"The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the others."

. Title 15 O.S.1981 § 158 provides:
"Several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together.”

. It is provided by 25 O.S.1981 § 1:
"Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary intention plainly appears, and except also that the words hereinafter explained are to be understood as thus explained.”

. See also 15 O.S.1981 § 160:
"The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.”

. Title 23 O.S.1981 § 3 provides:
"Any person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages."

. Title 23 O.S.1981 § 6 states:
"Any person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except during such time as the debt- or is prevented by law or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt."

. It is provided by 51 O.S.Supp.1984 § 152 in pertinent part:
" ‘Loss’ means death or injury to the body or rights of a person or damage to real or personal property or rights therein.”

. Title 15 U.S.1981 § 154 provides:
"The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.”

. Dooley v. Cordes, 434 P.2d 289, 294 (Okla.1967).

. Keel v. MFA Insurance Co., 553 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla.1976).