Court Opinion

ID: 9770355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:59:33.942543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.711574
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, J.,
delivered the concurring opinion.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately with respect to appellant’s twenty-fourth point of error. Appellant avers that, as an indigent, he was entitled to a court-appointed polygraph examiner paid for by the State. The polygraph examiner was to conduct a polygraph examination of appellant, the results of which, appellant contends, would have cast doubts on the reliability of police testimony regarding the taking of appellant’s confession.1
In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held an indigent defendant has a due process right to state-funded expert assistance where the defendant makes a preliminary showing the issue for which he seeks expert assistance is likely to be a significant factor at trial. In Ake, the Court held the indigent defendant was entitled to a state-paid psychiatrist to provide expert assistance as to the issue of future dangerousness at the punishment phase of his capital murder trial. Failure to provide such assistance, the Court held, violated Ake’s due process rights, particularly in light of the fact that the State offered expert testimony that Ake was both sane and a future danger, testimony that, unrebutted, was clearly harmful to Ake’s defense.
In Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), we held an indigent defendant is entitled to a state-paid expert, regardless of the expert’s specialty, where *483said defendant establishes a substantial need for such assistance and denial of said assistance would be fundamentally unfair.
Appellant, in my opinion, has not demonstrated that the assistance of an expert in this instance would be of assistance to the jury, the trier of fact. Simply put, appellant alleges Officer Brown’s testimony concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking of appellant’s statement was not truthful and the polygraph evidence would support this allegation. As determining the truthfulness of a witness is solely within the province of the jury, we have held that expert testimony regarding witness truthfulness is not admissible as it would not be of any assistance to the jury. Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 709-711 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Furthermore, expert opinion testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness is not admissible under Rule 702. Yount, supra, at 708.
Finally, I note that the United States Supreme Court recently held constitutional the ban against the use of polygraph evidence in military courts-martial. The Court noted the reliability of polygraph evidence is a subject of considerable controversy within the scientific community and thus its exclusion does not implicate constitutional concerns. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). While I would not necessarily label polygraph evidence as being the product of “junk science,” its reliability is sufficiently suspect, in my opinion, to continue the ban on its use in Texas courts. It is the jury that is the “lie detector.”
As polygraph evidence is not admissible, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant funds to retain a polygraph examiner.
With these comments I join the opinion of the Court.

. Appellant claims police officers, especially Officer Brown, misled him into making false statements about being paid to shoot the victim of the instant offense. Appellant testified the shooting was unintentional.