Court Opinion

ID: 9833914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:08:30.978287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:09.070273
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee, in his motion for a rehearing, complains that we erred in considering and sustaining appellant’s plea of res adjudicata found in paragraph' 3 of appellant’s answer to appellee’s controverting affidavit to appellant’s plea of privilege, and calling our attention to the fact that same had been waived by appellant at the time of the hearing of the plea.
In looking to the record and the pleadings of the parties, we failed to note that appellant had not insisted upon his plea of res adjudicata. It appears that same was waived, and therefore we here withdraw that portion of our opinion heretofore filed herein.
Appellee insists that we erred in holding that the controverting affidavit must itself contain allegations of the facts alleged in the petition, which are claimed to confer jurisdiction on the court where the suit is filed insisting that the controverting affidavit is sufficient when it refers to the allegations in the petition for such facts, thereby making the same a part of the controverting affidavit.
The proposition of law stated by appellee is correct. The trouble is that in his controverting affidavit he neither referred to his petition, requesting that same be considered in connection with his controverting plea, nor made his petition a part of the controverting affidavit. The only mention of his petition is:
“Because plaintiff’s cause of action as set forth in his original and first amended original petition, is founded upon a trespass, alleged' to have been committed by said defendant. * * * •>
Arid:
“That under article 1830, Complete Statutes of Texas, where the foundation of a suit is for a trespass such as has been alleged by plaintiff in his first amended petition.”
In our opinion we said:
“The law, article 2007 (1903), says: ‘If the plaintiff desires to controvert the plea of privilege, he shall, within five days after appearance *1039day, file a controverting plea under oath setting out specifically the fact or facts relied upon to confer venue of such cause on the court where the cause is pending.’ This requires that the controverting affidavit shall itself contain allegations of the facts which are claimed to confer jurisdiction on the court where the suit is filed, or at the very least refer to and make a part of the controverting plea the petition in which the allegations are made, or attach the petition to the controverting plea as an exhibit with reference thereto for that purpose. Penix v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 265 S. W. 718; Murphy v. Dabney (Tex. Civ. App.) 208 S. W. 984. The controverting affidavit did not refer to nor make part of same the petition of appellee, nor was the.petition attached to said controverting affidavit, nor did it contain allegations of any fact that would show venue in the court where filed. It was clearly insufficient.”
Appellee insists that the expressions, “because plaintiff’s cause of action as set forth in' his original and first amended original petition is founded upon a trespass,” and “that under article 1830“', Complete Statutes of Texas, where the foundation of a suit is for a trespass such as has been alleged by plaintiff in his first amended petition,” used in the controverting affidavit,1 are such references to the allegations in his petition as is necessary to meet the requirements of the law. We do not think so. The mere use of the expressions quoted is not a reference to the petition such as will make it a part of the controverting plea in contemplation of article 2007, supra. There is no statement that the allegations in the petition are referred to and asked to be considered as a part of the controverting affidavit, nor any statement that the petition is in any sense made a part of the plea so as to comply with the statute that the facts shall be alleged in the controverting plea.
We are cited to Shafer v. Swift (Tex. Civ. App.) 256 S. W. 309, and Gottlieb v. Dismukes (Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 792, and Bank v. Childs (Tex. Civ. App.) 231 S. W. 807, as supporting appellee’s contention. We do not believe that these cases support appel-lee’s contention, but that when properly construed they are in line with our holding. They are all by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals, and Judge Blair wrote the opinion in Shafer v. Swift. In that opinion he says, referring to Gottlieb v. Dismukes:
“We prefer to adhere to the opinion announced by Mr. Justice Brady, to the effect that, where the controverting plea refers to or adopts as a part of it the petition filed in the case as to its allegation of a specific fact or facts of fraud, the statute is, in- effect, complied with, in that it specifically sets, out the fact or facts relied upon to confer jurisdiction.”
This holding is not in conflict with our holding, but to the same effect, and we think a correct interpretation of the statute, tout if it can be said that there is any conflict, then we call attention to the case of Penix v. Davis, 265 S. W. 718, cited in our original opinion. This was also by the Austin Court of Civil^Appeals, and the opinion was also written The Judge Blair. In this case, in construing article 2007 (1903), he says:
“We are of the opinion that both grounds asserted as error by appellant should be sustained. In the construction of this article as to what the controverting plea contesting a plea of privilege should allege this court and several other Courts of Civil Appeals have held that the controverting plea of affidavit must itself allege facts conferring venue in the county in which the suit is filed, even though such would be a repetition .of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the petition. This court has held in this connection that, if the controverting plea or affidavit refers to and makes the pleadings in the case a part thereof, such is a compliance with this particular statute as to the necessary allegations of fact conferring venue:”
—and cites the very cases cited to us by ap-pellee in his motion. If it could at all be said that the authorities cited by appellee, supra, are in conflict with our holding here, then they are overruled by the later case of Penix v. Davis, discussed, supra, but we again say that there is no conflict.
The cases of Randals v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S. W. 528, and Perkins v. Texas Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 736, cited by appellee, do not support his contention, but are in complete harmony with our holding. In each of these cases the petition in the main suit was made a part of the controverting plea and it was therefore sufficient.
Appellee insists that we erred in holding that the allegations in his petition were insufficient to show such an act on the part of appellant as would amount in law to trespass under the statute prescribing venue. We said:
“The rule is well settled that the party, controverting the plea must allege and prove the facts necessary to bring him within the exception claimed. No sort of allegations are to be found in the controverting plea showing an act on the part of appellant constituting trespass within the meaning of the statute, article 1995 (1S30), Revised Statutes .1925, subd. 9. This would clearly render the controverting affidavit insufficient, but we will say that, in our opinion, if the allegations in the petition, which are not in any manner referred to as a part of the controverting affidavit nor attached thereto as an exhibit to be considered in connection therewith, are considered, we do not believe that they show any such act on the part of appellant as would, under the law, constitute trespass.”
We have again inspected the pleadings and considered the facts alleged, and do not believe that we erred in so holding.
That 'part of the original opinion sustaining appellant’s plea of res adjudicata is *1040withdrawn, because it appears same was waived. Otherwise, the motion for rehearing is overruled.