Court Opinion

ID: 9907860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:06:45.826183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:56.110088
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                     DOCKET NO. A-3472-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

      Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSE Y. MARTINEZ-MEJIA1,
a/k/a JOSE Y. MARTINEZ,
JOSE Y. MEJIA
and JOSE Y. YOBANI,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________

            Argued November 6, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023

            Before Judges Sabatino, Marczyk, and Chase.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 20-
            01-0028.

            Samuel Clark Carrigan, Assistant Deputy Public
            Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
            Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Samuel Clark
            Carrigan, of counsel and on the briefs).

1
   Under Rule 1:38-3(c)(9), records of criminal proceedings relating to child
victims of sexual assault are anonymized and excluded from public access in
order to protect the identity of the victims. As there was no actual child victim
in this case, such anonymization is not necessary here.
            Emily M. M. Pirro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
            cause for respondent (John P. McDonald, Somerset
            County Prosecutor, attorney; Emily M. M. Pirro, of
            counsel and on the brief).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

CHASE, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

      The main issue in this criminal appeal is whether the Luring, Enticing

Child by Various Means statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a), requires the State to prove

a defendant lured or enticed a "child," in this case an undercover law

enforcement officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl, into traveling or

accompanying the defendant to some location other than the victim's own home.

      We reject defendant Jose Y. Martinez-Mejia's contention that because he

enticed the "child" to meet him alone, and defendant traveled to the "child's"

home, a judgment of acquittal should have been entered. By its plain language,

the statute forbids an adult from "luring or enticing a child to meet or appear at

any other place." We hold that the child's home can be the "other place." Here,

that location is a place "other" than where the defendant was when he

communicated with the child.

      In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address unrelated

arguments raised by defendant on appeal alleging evidentiary issues. Having

found those arguments do not demonstrate plain error, we affirm defendant's

convictions and sentence.

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                                       2
                                       I.

      The prosecution in this matter originated in October 2019 when a team of

state, federal, and local law enforcement agencies participated in an undercover

operation to investigate adults using the internet to lure children into sexual

activity. Teams of officers were stationed in an apartment complex in Franklin

Township, Somerset County.

      Special Agent Cedro Cruz from the Department of Homeland Security

served as a "chatter," posing as a fourteen-year-old girl named "Angela." Agent

Cruz created a profile for Angela on SKOUT, a location-based social networking

and dating application emphasizing generalized user location. Because of age

restrictions on SKOUT, Angela's profile was created using a birthdate to reflect

that she was eighteen-years old. Angela's profile picture and other pictures

associated with her account were photographs of an adult female border patrol

officer. Agent Cruz used age-regression software to alter the photographs,

making Angela appear younger.

      At a jury trial, Agent Cruz testified solely as a fact witness that on the

afternoon of October 25, 2019, acting as Angela, he accepted a SKOUT chat

request from defendant, who went by the username "James." Defendant was

thirty-two years old at the time.      Defendant's first messages were "Hi,

sweetheart, how are you?" and "Hi, sweetheart, what are you doing?" When

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Angela replied with "nothing," he immediately followed up with, "[y]our

pictures turn me on, honey. Where are you from?" When Agent Cruz testified

about this first exchange with defendant, the following ensued:

            Q:   On October 25[,] of 2019, why was the
            conversation only minutes?
            A:    Because the defendant sent Angela a, I would say
            a lewd image, and I basically said gross and that
            discontinued the conversation.

            Q:    And by lewd image what do you mean?

            A:    So it was an image of a male in tight boxer shorts
            and you could see the contour of his – his penis.

      Defendant contacted Angela again via SKOUT the next afternoon in an

interaction that lasted approximately two hours. When defendant expressed a

desire to meet Angela, the following exchange ensued:

            Angela:     Yeah, but I'm mad young.

            Defendant: How old are you now?

            Angela:     Fourteen. You?

            Defendant: Oh, I see, 23.

            Angela:     Oh, okay, cool.

            Defendant: Yes, love, I like your body.

            Angela:     Aw, thanks.

            Defendant: I would like to see more pictures from you.

            Angela:     Why?

            Defendant: I like you.

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                                        4
During this exchange, and after Angela revealed her age, defendant sent Angela

multiple photographs of himself, including a picture of his erect penis.

      Angela revealed she was home alone because her grandmother had left

and would not be returning until the next day. Defendant asked Angela explicit

questions about sex and masturbation and said he wanted "more sexy pictures"

of her. When Angela asked if he wanted only pictures, he responded, "I want to

know you in person, baby." Defendant asked if Angela wanted to touch his body

and told her he wanted to perform oral sex on her.

      The prosecution admitted the photographs into evidence and published

them for the jury. Agent Cruz was asked to "describe to the jury what they're

seeing[.]" He replied, "The jury is seeing an image sent to Angela through

SKOUT on October 26[,] of a hand holding an erect penis."

      On re-direct, Agent Cruz testified as follows:

            Q:    During the course of those communications at
            any point in time did you threaten the defendant that he
            had to continue communicating with you?

            A:  No.     I was trying to dissuade him from
            communicating with me.

                  ....
            Q:    How did you do that?

            A:    Well, I asked if he was a pic collector, and if he
            would have said yes, I am just a pic collector, then he
            would have just been a pic collector. I said that I—I
            was [fourteen] years old, I would hope after somebody

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                                       5
            hears that, that they are communicating with a
            [fourteen]-year-old,      they    would     then   cease
            communications with that person. I said that I was
            alone, a fourteen-year-old alone in her house to which
            he asked me if there were any neighbors around and,
            you know, I lived with my grandmother and my
            grandmother was not home. That, any reasonable
            person, that's going to dissuade you and you are not
            going to travel. As a matter of fact, you might try to
            either report this person, which has happened in the
            past, but in this situation it didn't happen. And on top
            of that he sent a picture of his erect penis to a
            [fourteen]-year-old.

      When defendant offered to come to Angela at 4:00 p.m. that day, she gave

him the address of the apartment in Franklin and a phone number associated

with Agent Cruz's undercover phone.

      The communication then proceeded outside of SKOUT and directly

between defendant and the undercover phone, which recorded every call and

text message. Agent Cruz continued to send and reply to text messages; while

Detective Katie Feehan from the New Jersey State Police Internet Crimes

Against Children Unit ("ICACU") provided Angela's voice for phone calls.

      Detective Feehan testified to her role with the ICACU and the training

that she received in acting as a child in an undercover capacity; however, she

was not tendered as an expert witness. She testified to the details of her three

phone calls with defendant.

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                                       6
       During the first phone call, defendant asked Angela to confirm that she

was home alone. Angela told defendant her grandmother was in Atlantic City

and would not be returning for a couple of days. Angela said her grandmother

could not take her on the trip because she was not old enough to gamble. On a

second phone call, Angela confirmed no one else was in the house by saying,

"Just me and my grandma, and she isn't here. So I mean, I'm completely alone."

On the third phone call, the following exchange ensued:

             [Angela]: . . . I'm just trying to figure out if you're
             coming up. Because, if not, I'm probably just gonna go
             out.

             [Defendant]:     I mean, okay. So let me take a
             shower and then go – go over there.

             [Angela]:   You gonna come?

             [Defendant]:      Yes.
             [Angela]: Okay. Awesome. I'm gonna clean up a
             little bit then.

       When Angela asked defendant what he wanted to do when he arrived, he

repeated his desire to perform oral sex on her. She reaffirmed she was going to

clean the apartment to prepare for his arrival, and then she was going to wait for

him.

       Defendant hired an Uber to take him to Franklin and sent Angela a screen

shot of his phone's Uber application, showing that he was on his way to her

house. When defendant texted Angela that he had arrived, Agent Cruz could

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                                       7
see him standing outside through the apartment window.           Defendant was

arrested and was found to be in possession of a cell phone, a receipt with

Angela's address written on it, $184 dollars, and two condoms.

      At trial, Detective Feehan was asked on cross-examination about her

training on the topic of entrapment. Detective Feehan testified that she had

reviewed the relevant New Jersey law and that it closely matched the national

standard. She testified that she had been trained to allow the subject of the

investigation "to set the tone, pace, and subject matter of the conversation[.]"

She was presented with a portion of the investigative standards from the ICACU,

which was entered into evidence.

      On re-direct, the following exchange took place:

            Q: On cross-examination you were asked some
            questions about your training with regard to the topic
            of entrapment. Do you recall that?

            A: Yes.

            Q: And you testified that you received training about
            the federal and also State of New Jersey entrapment
            laws. Is that correct?

            A: Yes.

            Q: Did you follow the entrapment laws in this case?

            A: Yes.

                                                                         A-3472-21
                                       8
      Defense counsel re-crossed Detective Feehan on those points, asking

whether "[w]hat do you wanna do when you get here?" was a conversation topic

that defendant initiated, to which she replied in the negative.

      During an extensive charge conference, defense counsel raised no

objections to the language of the second-degree luring charge. The jury was

instructed that a guilty verdict on luring required the State to prove:

            1. That "Angela" was a child. When I say Angela I have
            that in quotes, or, that the defendant reasonably
            believed that Angela was a child.

            2. Defendant—that defendant attempted to lure or
            entice Angela into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated
            area, to meet or appear at any other place; and,

            3. That defendant had a purpose to commit a criminal
            offense with or against the child.

      The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of all charges: second-

degree luring, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a); second-degree attempted sexual assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3) and 2C:14-2(c)(4); third-degree attempted endangering

the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), 2C:5-1(a)(1) and (a)(3); and

third-degree attempted promoting obscene material to a minor, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-

3(b)(1), 2C:5-1(a)(1) and (a)(3).

      After merging the attempted endangering the welfare of a child count with

the attempted sexual assault count, the judge sentenced defendant concurrently

to five years of imprisonment on the attempted sexual assault charge; five years

                                                                           A-3472-21
                                        9
on the luring charge; and three years on the attempted obscene material charge.

Defendant was also subjected to Megan's Law registration requirements and

parole supervision for life.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following claims for the first time:

             I.    THE LURING CHARGE MUST BE VACATED
                   BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TRY TO
                   LURE A CHILD INTO GOING ANYWHERE.

             II.   THE    DEFENDANT'S     CONVICTIONS
                   SHOULD    BE   REVERSED    BECAUSE
                   INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION TESTIMONY
                   FROM     INVESTIGATING     OFFICERS
                   INTRODUCED UNFAIR PREJUDICE.

                                         II.

      When a party does not object to an alleged trial error, or otherwise

preserve the issue for the appellate record, it is reviewed for plain error. Review

for plain error requires determining: "(1) whether there was error; and (2)

whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' [under

Rule] 2:10-2; that is, whether there is 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the

error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v.

Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021) (quoting State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66,

79 (2016) (omission in original)). "To determine whether an alleged error rises

to the level of plain error, it 'must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of

the State's case.'" State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022) (quoting State v.

                                                                               A-3472-21
                                         10
Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)). "The mere possibility of an unjust

result is not enough." Funderberg, 225 N.J. at 79. Where there is a failure to

object, reviewing courts presume the newly minted objection on appeal is "not

error" and "unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." State v. Singleton, 211

N.J. 157, 182 (2012) (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333-34, (1971)).

      Statutory interpretations are legal determinations reviewed by an appellate

court "de novo, 'unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial court[.]'"

State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (quoting State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67

(2017)). A trial court's evidentiary rulings, by contrast, are reviewed for abuse

of discretion.   State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021) (citing State v.

Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015)). An appellate court "will not substitute

[its] judgment unless the evidentiary ruling is 'so wide of the mark' that it

constitutes 'a clear error in judgment.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Medina, 242 N.J.

397, 412 (2020)).

                                        III.

      Defendant does not claim the indictment should have been dismissed, nor

does he explicitly express that the trial court, sua sponte, should have found that

the State had not met the elements of the crime at the close of its case. Rather,

defendant's issue seems to be a conceptual one, where he believes we should

hold: (1) telling a child you want to meet for sex; (2) asking them to meet you

                                                                             A-3472-21
                                        11
to fulfill that desire; and (3) making sure a child is alone and vulnerable before

meeting them, is not luring or enticing the child into a sexual encount er so long

as the child makes the mistake of meeting the would-be predator at the child's

own house.

      Defendant emphasizes that the forbidden conduct element of the statute is

"to lure or entice" a child to go somewhere. Relying on the dictionary definition

of "lure," defendant argues its aim is "to lead someone into a dangerous or

difficult situation that they otherwise would not have entered."        Merriam-

Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, (11th ed. 2020). Therefore, defendant reasons,

the statute does not criminalize traveling to the child for the criminal purpose.

Defendant concedes a child may be "lured" into staying at a place that they

otherwise would have left, such as a school after-hours, but argues if a child

would be at home or school anyway, even without the defendant's enticement,

then luring has not taken place.

      Defendant argues, in the alternative, that even if the statutory language

was not clear, the only provision that could be considered ambiguous is the term

"to meet or appear at any other place." Defendant employs the canon of ejusdem

generis to argue that the phrase "any other place" must also refer to places where

a child must be lured to travel towards for the statutory elements to be met.

Defendant points to the luring statute's close relationship to the kidnapping

                                                                           A-3472-21
                                       12
statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(c), to support his theory. Defendant argues even if the

statutory language did not support his position, the principle of lenity should

apply in favor of interpreting the statute to require the child to be lured to travel.

      The State responds that defendant is asking us to create a "convenient

loophole" in the statutory scheme by finding that an adult traveling to a child's

location for the purpose of sex is not criminalized by the luring statute. The

State maintains that a complicated analysis of the text under ejusdem generis is

not required since the clause "to meet or appear at any other place" is

unambiguous on its face.

      The "ordinary meaning and significance" of statutory language is

acknowledged as "'the best indicator of [the Legislature's] intent.'" Tumpson v.

Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v.

Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). Only where the statutory language at issue is

ambiguous should a court "look to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history

[and] committee reports" to determine legislative intent. Tumpson, 218 N.J. at

468. Where the textual analysis and extrinsic aids both fail to resolve ambiguity,

the rule of lenity "requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the

defendant." State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451 (2011). Courts should "avoid

statutory interpretations that 'lead to absurd or unreasonable results.'" State v.

Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)).

                                                                               A-3472-21
                                         13
        The plain language of the statutory text in question provides in relevant

part:

              A person commits a crime of the second degree if he
              attempts, via electronic or any other means, to lure or
              entice-a child or one who he reasonably believes to be
              a child into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated area,
              or to meet or appear at any other place, with a purpose
              to commit a criminal offense with or against the child.

              [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a) (emphasis added).]

        One must look at the wording of the entire phrase in its context, which

prohibits to "lure or entice," and the entire dictionary definition of both words

to determine the statute's ordinary meaning. Defendant's argument only focuses

on the dictionary definition of "lure" to conclude that "to lead someone into a

dangerous or difficult situation that they otherwise would not have entered"

means to go to another location. The definition of "lure" includes "to lead astray

from one's true course."      Merriam-Webster's College Dictionary, (11th ed.

2020). And "entice" is defined as "to lure or induce; esp., to wrongfully solicit

(a person) to do something." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The

prohibited conduct is thus defined by its aim to lead someone into a dangerous

or difficult situation that they otherwise would not have entered. The course of

action Angela was lured into was staying alone, isolated, and vulnerable to meet

an adult male for an illegal sexual encounter.

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                                         14
      Here, the ordinary meaning of the phrase "to meet or appear at any other

place" also leads to the conclusion defendant engaged in prohibited conduct

when he enticed Angela to stay at her home and not go out with her friends.

There is no reason to construe the phrase of "any other place" as containing an

unwritten exception for places where the child is already located. Here, that

location is a place "other" than where the defendant was when he communicated

with the child. Defendant went through great pains to ensure Angela would be

alone before telling her he was coming over. Indeed, by requesting the child to

stay at her home, the abuse is all the easier to commit; since it lulls the child

into a false sense of security; creating the dangerous circumstance of isolation

and vulnerability that this statute is meant to punish. Neither the dictionary

definitions nor the language of the statute expresses a requirement of the victim

going to a different place.

      Although there is no need to make any further inquiry, our decision is also

supported by the legislative history, which suggests an intent to create an

expansive scheme to criminalize an increasing number of dangerous behaviors.

The original text, now thirty years old, was limited to luring a child into a motor

vehicle. By contrast, the current statute criminalizes two actions (luring and

enticing), by unlimited means (electronic or any other), with two categories of

victims (children or those reasonably believed to be children), a wide number of

                                                                            A-3472-21
                                        15
prohibited enticements (motor vehicles, structures, isolated areas, and meetings

or appearances at any other place), and a broadly stated purpose element (to

commit a criminal offense with or against the child).

      In addition, analyzing this statute in relation to our kidnapping statute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1, also undermines defendant's position. The kidnapping statute

was meant to address the kind of danger isolation poses to a child, and such

isolation and danger can certainly be present at the child's own home, especially

where, as here, the child is confirmed to be home alone. See State v. Cruz-Pena,

243 N.J. 342, 354-61 (2020) (kidnapping occurs when the victim is confined to

one place for a substantial period, citing to a litany of cases where kidnapping -

by-confinement occurs in places where the victim would still otherwise be);

State v. LaFrance, 117 N.J. 583, 592-93 (1990) (confining a victim to his own

bedroom for a substantial period in order to isolate the man's wife and sexually

assault her constituted kidnapping).

      Defendant's request that the principle of lenity support an interpretation

in his favor is similarly unavailing, and is not required, given the unambiguous

text and expansive legislative history. The fact that other statutes such as the

child endangerment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, might also criminalize a

defendant's behavior does not compel us to adopt a crabbed interpretation of

N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a).

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                                       16
                                        IV.

      The remaining arguments presented by defendant warrant no more than a

brief discussion.

                                        A.

      Lay witnesses may testify "in the form of opinions or inferences if [the

testimony]: (a) is rationally based on the witness's perception; and (b) will assist

in understanding the witness's testimony or determining a fact in issue."

N.J.R.E. 701. Perception "rests on the acquisition of knowledge through use of

one's sense of touch, taste, sight, smell, or hearing." State v. McLean, 205 N.J.

439, 457 (2011) (citations omitted). Lay opinion testimony is impermissible

when it constitutes "an expression of a belief in defendant's guilt" or "an opinion

on matters that were not beyond the understanding of the jury." Id. at 463. Lay

witnesses may not opine on a matter "as to which the jury is as competent as

[the witness] to form a conclusion[.]" Id. at 459 (second alteration in original)

(quoting Brindley v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 35 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1955)).

So long as the lay witness opinion is competent under N.J.R.E. 701, and is not

otherwise inadmissible, it will not be objectionable simply because it "embraces

an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." N.J.R.E. 704. See Biunno,

Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. on N.J.R.E. 704

(2023) ("[O]pinion testimony is not inadmissible solely because it includes the

                                                                             A-3472-21
                                        17
ultimate issue in question. If lay or expert opinion testimony is otherwise

competent under N.J.R.E. 701, 702 and 703, the fact that it may embrace the

ultimate fact issue in dispute does not render it incompetent.").

      Fact testimony, by contrast, is "ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness

with first-hand knowledge." McLean, 205 N.J. at 460. For a police officer, in

the context of a narcotics trial, such fact testimony may include:

            a description of what the officer did and saw, . . . that
            defendant stood on a corner, engaged in a brief
            conversation, looked around, reached into a bag,
            handed another person an item, accepted paper
            currency in exchange, threw the bag aside as the officer
            approached, and that the officer found drugs in the bag.

            Ibid.

      In McLean, our Supreme Court cautioned against admitting lay opinion

testimony by a police officer where the opinion is based on the officer's training

and experience, writing "the analysis of admissibility has been, as it must be,

firmly rooted in the personal observations and perceptions of the lay witness in

the traditional meaning of the Rule 701." 205 N.J. at 459. The McLean Court

considered the admissibility of a police officer's testimony in which he first

recounted his observations of an interaction between two individuals and then

testified as to his own belief, based on his experience, that what he had observed

was a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Id. at 446.

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                                        18
      The McLean Court found the second part of the officer's testimony

inadmissible because the police officer had not been qualified as an expert and

because the lay opinion rule could not provide a basis for admissibility. Id. at

463. The Court held such testimony "was impermissible both because it was an

expression of a belief in defendant's guilt and because it presumed to give an

opinion on matters that were not beyond the understanding of the jury." Ibid.

                                      B.

      Defendant argues testimony given by Detective Feehan included

inadmissible lay opinions with "zero probative" value, which introduced such

an unfair prejudice that a new trial is required. Specifically, defendant argues

Detective Feehan should not have been permitted to testify that she followed the

laws on entrapment. Defendant argues the entrapment statute requires the issue

to be settled by the factfinder. The State, meanwhile, contends the testimony

was proper.

      This testimony from Detective Feehan was offered on re-direct

examination, after detailed cross-examination squarely placed entrapment at

issue. Here, Detective Feehan's testimony was like that of the hypothetical

narcotics officer described in McLean. It was a factual recitation of her own

actions during the operation, namely that she followed protocol, not an opinion

about anything defendant did or did not do. The jury was free to find her

                                                                         A-3472-21
                                       19
statements credible or not. Detective Feehan was not asked for, and did not

offer, her thoughts or beliefs as to defendant's guilt or innocence. She only

recounted the actions she took that day.

      Even to the extent that Detective Feehan's testimony could be considered

a lay opinion on entrapment, such an opinion is not inadmissible simply because

it goes to an issue to be decided by the factfinder. It must be incompetent under

N.J.R.E. 701 or inadmissible on other grounds. The only argumen t defendant

advances on this point is that the statement had "zero probative value," possibly

an attempt to disqualify the statements under N.J.R.E. 701(b) or N.J.R.E. 401.

This position is untenable, given that entrapment and Detective Feehan's training

on the same were extensively explored in cross-examination by defense counsel.

      Detective Feehan's one-word answer of "yes" to the question, viewed in

light of the overall evidence against defendant, was not "clearly capable" of

producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. It was evidence to be weighed by the jury

under a preponderance standard if and only if they found guilt had been

established.

                                       C.

      Defendant maintains Agent Cruz's description of the photograph sent on

October 25 as "a lewd image" and pointing out the contour of the penis was

unnecessary and impermissibly purported to usurp the role of the jury. The State

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                                       20
believes the testimony was proper because Agent Cruz's description was

rationally based on his own perception, as required by N.J.R.E. 701(a).

      Agent Cruz's testimony that defendant "sent a picture of [an] erect penis

to a [fourteen-year-old]," his characterization of the photograph as a "lewd

image," and his description of the displayed photograph indicating the "contour

of the penis" are opinion testimony only to the extent that they reflect Agent

Cruz's beliefs about the images displayed for the jury. Our Court recently took

up the admissibility of lay        witness testimony providing subjective

interpretations of a video recording in State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023).

There, the Court held:

            A fact witness who participated in an event can of
            course testify about it and recount relevant evidence
            without resort to Rule 701. Rule 701, in its purest form,
            allows witnesses to offer lay opinion testimony based
            on their firsthand observation of events in real time.
            Beyond that, they can offer lay opinion testimony about
            parts of a recording that depict what they perceived in
            real time. In those instances, they plainly have
            sufficient personal knowledge within the meaning of
            Rules 602 and 701.

            [Id. at 599.]

      The Watson Court also addressed the helpfulness prong of N.J.R.E.

701(b), holding the analysis is "more straightforward and depends on the facts

of the individual case." Id. at 600. In contrast, in State v. Higgs the Court

disallowed narration evidence by a police officer who was not present on the

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                                       21
scene because "[t]he jury was as competent as the detective to view the video

and determine what the image did or did not show." 253 N.J. 333, 336 (2023).

Higgs is distinguishable from this case because Agent Cruz personally

participated in the chat to which he was testifying.

      Applying this same analysis to the photos before Agent Cruz, it is clear

he was permitted to testify as to his firsthand observations of the photographs.

To the extent his testimony included any subjective interpretation of the

photographs, it would still be an admissible lay opinion since he personally

participated in the chat and therefore, under Watson, "plainly [has] sufficient

personal knowledge" to satisfy N.J.R.E. 701(a). 254 N.J. at 599. And Agent

Cruz's testimony was helpful to the jury under N.J.R.E. 701(b) because this

testimony was offered to explain his interactions with defendant.

      Defendant posits Agent Cruz's testimony was inadmissible because by

stating that "any reasonable person" would not continue chatting with someone

who revealed themselves to be a fourteen-year-old, and by stating "you are not

going to travel" after learning of the child's age, Cruz impermissibly opined on

defendant's guilt. This opinion, according to defendant, impermissibly invaded

the province of the jury by embracing an ultimate issue.

      Agent Cruz's testimony constitutes opinion testimony in that it is not a

factual recitation of actions taken or observations made during the operation,

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but rather a subjective characterization of what defendant or others in

defendant's position might do. Therefore, to be admissible, the statement must

satisfy both the perception and helpfulness prongs of N.J.R.E. 701, and it must

not constitute expression of a belief about defendant's guilt or innocence.

      Here, Agent Cruz's testimony about the behavior of "any reasonable

person" and that such a person is "not going to travel" after learning of Angela's

age is more like the precluded evidence in McLean, in that it is a subjective lay

opinion of defendant's behavior, based on Agent Cruz's training and experience

in performing these types of operations in the past. These statements were

inadmissible lay opinions, and it was error for them to be admitted.

      However, considering the brevity of these comments compared to Agent

Cruz's overall testimony, the error does not rise to the level of being clearly

capable of producing an unjust result and was not plain error, given the overall

strength of the State's case and the clear evidence of defendant's continued

sexually explicit conversation with Angela after being told her age.

      Affirmed.

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