Court Opinion

ID: 9425830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:54.919329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:56.291852
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Mr. Justice White joins,
dissenting.
The Court today reads two separate statutes and our prior cases to reach a result contrary to the purposes underlying the enactment in 1968 of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. § 631 et seq., and to the conclusion of every other Court of Appeals which has had occasion to consider the matter.1
*475The Federal Magistrates Act was both “designed to create an upgraded lower tier judicial office/' S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1967), and “intended ... to cull from the ever-growing workload of the U. S. district courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of judicial officers.” H. R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1968). The Court’s holding that federal magistrates may not conduct evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases is both inconsistent with the new status of magistrates and deputy magistrates,2 and serves to defeat the objective of the Act, *476described by Senator Tydings, its principal sponsor, see n. 2, supra, “to provide district judges with more time to devote to the actual trial of cases and the writing of opinions.” 3 Hearings 3.
I
In its two-stage analysis, the Court finds first that under the terms of the Act it would be “inconsistent with *477the . . . laws of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 636 (b), to permit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus cases. This is so, it is said, because a procedural provision of the Habeas Corpus Act, Rev. Stat. § 761, was construed 33 years ago, long before the enactment of the Magistrates Act, to confine that function to judges alone. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342 (1941). The 1948 revision and recodification of the Judicial Code, which incorporated Rev. Stat. § 761 into 28 U. S. C. § 2243, is held to have carried forward this limitation despite a critical language change. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 (1952); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953). Neither the new statute, its drafting history, nor these latter cases, support the Court’s conclusion.
Section 2243 did, as the Court notes, import into its terms Rev. Stat. § 761, both of which provisions set forth in part what authority shall hear and determine the facts involved in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. And § 2243 changed the language of Rev. Stat. § 761, which originally read that the authority was to be the “court, or justice, or judge,” now to read simply the “court.” But the Court fails to note that § 2243 incorporated a second provision from the Habeas Corpus Act, Rev. Stat. § 755, which in part set forth what authority shall issue the writ of habeas corpus for which application was made. The authority to issue the writ set forth in Rev. Stat. § 755 was identical to that set forth in Rev. Stat. §761 to hear and determine the facts: the “court, or justice, or judge.” Unlike the language of Rev. Stat. § 761, however, the quoted language of Rev. Stat. § 755 was incorporated into § 2243 substantially unchanged; under the present statute, it is the “court, justice or judge” who shall issue the writ.
Congress sought to make certain that only a “court, justice or judge” could issue the writ; but by changing *478the authority to hear the facts from a “court, or justice, or judge” to, simply, a “court,” Congress must have intended to broaden the authority of the court, at least to the extent of permitting delegation to a magistrate to perform the preliminary hearing function, subject always to the approval of a district judge.4 To read the language change in any other way would impute to Congress an intent to alter statutory language, the meaning of which had already been finally determined by this Court, Holiday v. Johnston, supra, without the knowledge that the alteration would raise interpretive difficulties. Moreover, to change the language of Rev. Stat. § 761, but not to change that of Rev. Stat. § 755, cannot be said, as the Court does, ante, at 469 n. 9, to be a “[m]ere change of phraseology,” for such changes were undertaken only for purposes of uniformity. If, as Charles J. Zinn, counsel to the Law Revision Committee which revised the Judicial Code, testified, “we have changed the language to get a uniform style,” 5 then within the same statutory provision, surely Congress would have made only “courts” able to issue writs, as well as hear the facts of the claim.
Nor do the cases cited by the Court, ante, at 469, support its interpretation of § 2243. Brown v. Allen, supra, is plainly inapposite. The segment of Brown quoted by the Court is relevant to Brown’s discussion of whether a petitioner under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 had a right to a plenary hearing although an earlier petition of his which presented substantially the same federal issues was refused in the state court. When the Court quotes from Brown: *479“This has long been the law,” ante, at 469, it is referring to what the Brown Court called the “general rule” approved in Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 231 (1924). Brown, 344 TJ. S., at 463. Salinger in turn makes it clear that the “general rule” which has “long been the law” has nothing whatever to do with who may hear and determine the facts on an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Rather, it pertains only to that portion of § 2243 which Brown itself quoted, 344 U. S., at 462, and which Salinger also quoted, 265 U. S., at 231, that is, “to dispose of [the matter or party] as law and justice [may] require.” In Salinger, this rule meant each application for a writ of habeas corpus could be disposed of in the exercise of judicial discretion, which could in part give controlling weight to “a prior refusal [by a federal court] to discharge on a like application.” Ibid. In Brown, that rule was extended under certain circumstances to a prior state court refusal to issue the writ, in support of the Court’s conclusion there that a § 2254 petitioner had no right to a plenary hearing on his application for the writ. The rule the Court relies on today is thus one of discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing “as law and justice require,” which has no bearing on what official shall conduct the hearing once a decision is made to hold one. Brown is thus no authority for the proposition that the same limitation Holiday placed on Rev. Stat. § 761 (“court, or justice, or judge”) applies to § 2243 (“court”) enacted after Holiday.
The Court also relies upon United States v. Hayman, supra, to support its interpretation of § 2243. The issue in Hayman had nothing to do with who shall hear and determine facts upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Rather, the Court there was concerned solely with the question whether a district court may, upon an evidentiary hearing, decide factual issues pre*480sented by a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, where the movant was not notified and was not present. In the context of discussing an earlier case which had held that a district court must decide material issues of fact by taking evidence, not by ex parte affidavits, Hay man dropped a footnote stating simply “[n]or can the factual issues be heard before a commissioner,” citing Holiday, supra. 342 U. S., at 213 n. 16. Not only was this footnote completely irrelevant to the issue in Hay man, its citation to Holiday for support, without further discussion, makes manifest that the Court did not consider the effect of the subsequent language change in § 2243 on the statute (Rev. Stat. § 761) which Holiday construed. The fulfillment of the purposes of the Federal Magistrates Act should not hang on such a slim reed.
II
Even assuming that § 2243 was intended to carry forward the limitation of Holiday’s interpretation of its predecessor, by enacting the Magistrates Act, and particularly § 636 (b) thereof, Congress made clear its intent to eliminate that restriction. Thus, while Hayman may speak in terms of a “commissioner,” Congress changed not only the title of that office, but also the qualifications for and the functions of the office.
Section 636 (b) permits federal magistrates to “be assigned . . . such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” The section then sets forth in three subdivisions certain duties which district courts may authorize by rule, but the duties “are not restricted to” those set forth. The third illustrative subdivision provides that district courts may authorize the additional duty of
“preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal of*481fenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.” 28 U. S. C. § 636 (b) (3).
Subdivision (3), suggesting additional duties that maybe assigned to a magistrate in connection with federal habeas corpus cases, does not by its terms permit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings, but that subdivision is merely illustrative, not exclusive.
“The mention of these three categories is intended to illustrate the general character of duties assignable to magistrates under the act, rather than to constitute an exclusive specification of duties so assignable.” S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1967).
The House Report virtually tracks the language of the Senate Report. H. R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1968). Thus, there being no constitutional barrier to permitting magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings,6 nor any other legal barrier, see Part I, supra, § 636 (b) enables district courts, as did the District Court here, to establish rules which so permit.
Assuming, arguendo, that § 2243 does constitute a possible legal barrier to such rules, the legislative history of the Act reveals Congress to have intended the elimination of that barrier. The Court determines, in the second stage of its analysis, ante, at 469-473, that Congress intended the opposite result, but in this matter the Court’s perception is less than discriminating. The linchpin of the Court’s argument is the drafting evolution of the terms of subdivision (3), quoted above. In the change of language from preliminary “consideration” to preliminary *482“review,” 7 and in the addition of “as to whether there should be a hearing,” 8 the Court finds an intent to bar magistrates from conducting a hearing. But the language changes in the subdivision were made only due to a fear that magistrates would be thought to have been given final adjudicatory power, not to preclude them from conducting hearings when the district judges retained such power.9 Indeed, the latter was specifically intended. As the Senate Report stated, § 636 (b)
“contemplates assignments to magistrates under cir*483cumstances where the ultimate decision of the case is reserved to the judge . ..S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1967).
The concern about enabling magistrates to make the ultimate decision found early expression in the Senate hearings on the bill in a colloquy between Senator Tydings and then Assistant Attorney General Vinson. Mr. Vinson ultimately revealed his real concern in a letter to the Subcommittee that subdivision (3) as originally drafted would give the power of ultimate decision to the magistrate: “[I]f preliminary consideration is intended to involve adjudication, it should be handled by an Article 3 Judge.” Hearings 130. That the Senate viewed Mr. Vinson’s objections in this light is made clear by Senator Tydings’ testimony in the hearings before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. Hearings on S. 945 et al. before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 (1968).
In response to this objection, Senator Tydings stated to Mr. Vinson at the Senate hearings:
“We wouldn’t intend for the final decision to be made by the magistrate. But we would intend that . . . the magistrate [be able to] hold a preliminary [habeas] hearing .... We certainly intend that.” Hearings 112. (Emphasis added.)
Numerous other witnesses at the Senate hearings urged that the magistrates be permitted to hold hearings. See, *484e. g., id., at 52 (Chief Judge Northrop, supra, n. 3); id., at 94 (Chief Judge Walter E. Hoffman, of the Eastern District of Virginia).
As the Court points out, ante, at 470-471, the Judicial Conference objected to the original draft bill (S. 3475), but it did not originally object to subdivision (3), as the Court states. Instead, the Conference objected to § 636 (b) altogether, fearing it so broad as to be subject to constitutional attack. Although not specified, it seems clear that by speaking in terms of “delegation” the Conference initially shared Mr. Vinson’s concern about delegating the ultimate decisionmaking power of Art. Ill judges. Hearings 241n. The Judicial Conference therefore recommended both a modified version of § 636 (b), and the complete elimination of all three subdivisions. Ibid. When the revised draft bill (S. 945), which ultimately was enacted, was introduced, it did not follow the Judicial Conference recommendation, but continued to include the three subdivisions. As to subdivision (3), the Judicial Conference recommended the addition of the phrase “as to whether there should be a hearing,” see n. 7, supra, but again stressed that its concern was, as with S. 3475, over the “delegation to magistrates.” Hearings 245.
The tension established in this evolution is clear. On the one hand, Congress sought to enable district courts to authorize magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings. On the other hand, there was apprehension that the power of authorization granted to district courts might lead to a rule permitting magistrates to exercise ultimate deci-sionmaking power reserved exclusively to Art. Ill judges. To avoid the latter but accomplish the former, Congress persisted in retaining the broad language of § 636 (b), and in retaining subdivision (3). Not only, as set *485forth earlier, does the subdivision not limit the subsection, it was drafted in language to insure that it could not be read to preclude authorizing magistrates to conduct hearings in federal habeas corpus cases.10
Plainly, Congress could have used language that expressly precluded the latter. That this was not urged upon Congress by anyone, including the Judicial Conference, and that Congress did not include such language, alone suggests its intention to vest in district courts the power to authorize magistrates to hold hearings. Conversely, Congress would have taken certain risks had it expressly permitted magistrates to hold hearings, as revealed by the following colloquy between Chief Judge Hoffman and Senator Tydings at the Senate hearings:
"Judge Hoffman. ... And I have suggested in my statement . . . that the Federal magistrate could be assigned the task as a master to conduct plenary hearings. After all, [habeas corpus proceedings] are civil proceedings . . . not criminal proceedings.
“Senator Tydings. [Sjince we . . . don’t have [in § 636 (b)] ‘Including hearings’ or ‘Including plenary hearings,’ or ‘including the conducting of plenary hearings,’ it is not what we should have?
“Judge Hoffman. I am fearful that someone will say that this is merely an effort on the part of the judge to delegate his judicial function.
“Senator Tydings. I think that is a good point, Judge Hoffman.” Hearings 93-94.
In light of the need for Congress to avoid language suggesting an unconstitutional delegation of a judicial *486function to a magistrate, the ambiguous provision of § 636 (b) — unlimited by the provisions of subdivision (3) — should be interpreted to permit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases, § 2243 notwithstanding, because (1) to the extent the subject was expressly discussed in the legislative history, such permission was intended, and (2) such an interpretation would serve the two principal objectives of the Act. See nn. 2 and 3, supra.
Ill
The final limitation of the Act, that additional duties assigned to magistrates must not be “inconsistent with the Constitution,” needs little discussion here. The Court does not suggest that the conduct of an evidentiary hearing, where the district judge retains the power to make the final decision on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, would be unconstitutional either under Art. Ill or as a matter of due process of law. Where this situation obtains, the magistrate’s conduct of the hearing would be clearly constitutional.11
*487Not only would his report and recommendation to the district judge be subject to amendment or outright rejection, the district judge could, at the behest of the habeas corpus petitioner or on his own motion, conduct his own evidentiary hearing to judge for himself, for example, the credibility of witnesses if he deems their testimony essential to disposition of the application. To the extent a problem of constitutional magnitude may be foreseen in the particulars of the rules established by a district court, those rules can be construed to comport with constitutional requirements. In any event, now that the Court has construed the Magistrates Act contrary to a clear legislative intent, it is for the Congress to act to restate its intentions if its declared objectives are to be carried out.

 Two Circuits have ruled that federal magistrates may conduct evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases, O’Shea v. United *475States, 491 F. 2d 774, 778 (CA1 1974); Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F. 2d 642, 648 (CA8 1973); cf. Campbell v. U. S. District Court, 501 F. 2d 196, 205 (CA9 1974), while two Circuits have assumed magistrates have that power, United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Zelker, 477 F. 2d 797, 798 (CA2 1973); Parnell v. Wainwright, 464 F. 2d 735, 736 (CA5 1972).

 The Court makes clear, ante, at 473 n. 18, that it sees the function of the magistrate in dealing with habeas corpus petitions as being no more than that previously performed by law clerks. As Chief Judge Theodore Levin, of the Eastern District of Michigan, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, which under the chairmanship of Senator Joseph D. Tydings began the investigative hearings in 1965 which led to the enactment of the Act three years later, law clerks are not overworked, and are better able to perform such tasks. “In any event, this is a somewhat tedious job . . . and is not a function likely to entice a seasoned and competent lawyer to accept a magistrate’s job.” Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),p. 61 (hereinafter Hearings). The Act specifically sought to make “the position [of magistrate] more attractive to highly qualified individuals.” S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1967). The Department of Justice agreed that such a limited function would be inconsistent with the Act’s purpose, Hearings 130, and Chief Judge Robert C. Belloni and Dean Robert B. Yegge have noted that the magistrates “should not be simply high-paid law clerks.” Reports of the Conference for District Court Judges, 59 F. R. D. 203, 221 (1973). To limit a magistrate to a law clerk’s function surely undercuts what Senator Tydings *476stated to be “[t]he first goal of the Magistrates Act ... to [give the magistrate] qualifications and a stature higher than those of the present U. S. commissioner.” Hearings 26.

 No one would dispute the heavy burden on district courts represented by the applications for habeas corpus writs they receive, a large volume of which has been long recognized as “repetitious and patently frivolous.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 212 (1952) (footnote omitted). The Court would minimize the burden of these applications at the evidentiary hearing stage, ante, at 473 n. 20, but the beguiling simplicity of its statistical analysis obscures reality and is antagonistic to the interests of habeas petitioners. First, to average hearing days per judge per year evenly across the country fails to recognize the uneven number of habeas corpus applications received by the various district courts. In his testimony at the Senate hearings on the bill Chief Judge Edward S. Northrop, of the District of Maryland, reflected the unevenness experienced by his court, which at one time handled more “State prisoner habeas corpus petitions . . . than any other district in the country.” Hearings 52. Clearly Chief Judge Northrop’s burden would have exceeded “1.5 hearing days . . . per year.” Second, the habeas corpus applications which ultimately reach the hearing stage do not represent all those which might warrant a hearing. Senator Tydings stated:
“We say that the magistrate should be able to [hold] plenary, discovery hearings. Now, what happens ... as a practical matter, you get no hearings. The law clerk reviews the papers ... so we are giving the individual [petitioner] actually an opportunity ... for more consideration than he gets now.” Id., at 113.
Finally, even if no more applications would warrant an evidentiary hearing, given the other burdens on district judges those applications which would warrant hearings would receive more prompt attention if magistrates were to hold them. The virtues of speedy justice need not be elaborated here.

 As noted in Part II, infra, it is not urged by anyone that the magistrate may finally decide facts after conducting an evidentiary hearing. That ultimate decision is, without question, one reserved to the district judge alone.

 Hearings on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 (1947).

 No such barrier is suggested by the Court today, and properly framed, district court rules which so permit would not contravene the constitutional rights of federal habeas corpus petitioners. See Part III, injra.

 The two words were in fact used interchangeably in the legislative history. When the draft bill (S. 3475) used the word “consideration,” the Subcommittee Staff Memorandum in support of the bill used the word “review.” Hearings 34. When the draft bill was changed to use the word “review,” the Senate Report accompanying the new bill (S. 945) used the word “consideration.” S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1967).

 Despite the addition of this language, the House Report, in setting forth the enumerated examples of § 636 (b), stated of subdivision (3) only that “[m]agistrates may also be assigned the function of reviewing and reporting to district judges upon applications for postconviction relief.” H. R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1968). No limitation on the nature of the review or report was indicated. The language of the Senate Report also made no reference to decisions whether there should be hearings. S. Rep. No. 371, supra, at 26.

 The Court twice makes reference, ante, at 471 n. 11, and 472 n. 17, to Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1188-1189,and n.229 (1970),in support of its position. Both references are mistakenly addressed to final decisionmaking power, not the power to conduct hearings where the district judge makes the ultimate decision. The Note itself concedes that “[i]t is possible to argue [under § 636 (b)] that a plan to have magistrates actually hear eases is valid under the Act.” Id., at 1189 n. 229. It then argues the other way in reference to matters as to which magistrates have final power of decision. See 28 U. S. C. §636 (a)(3). That is the only power of magistrates circumscribed by the procedures to which the Court refers, ante, at 470-471, n. 11. *483To the extent the Court goes beyond the Note and argues that magis-: trates’ service as special masters, 28 U. S. C. § 636 (b) (1), is limited by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b), the early strictures upon employing special masters were developed before the existence of the judicial office of magistrate and arguably should not be applied to that new office. See generally Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 584 (1973).

 Even counsel for respondent agrees (contrary to the Court’s conclusion, ante, at 470) that subdivision (3) “could have been more clearly expressed.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 20.

 The commentators have generally agreed with this conclusion. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 365 (1973); Peterson, The Federal Magistrate’s Act: A New Dimension in the Implementation of Justice, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 62, 98 (1970); Doyle (District Judge and Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee charged with implementing the Act), Implementing the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J. B. A. Kan. 25, 69 (1970); Note, Proposed Reformation of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Federal Magistrates, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 1147 (1969). So, too, would the Judicial Conference appear to be in agreement. Proposed Amendments to the Proposed Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 11 (Preliminary Draft, Jan. 1973). Congress has given the magistrates power to conduct trials of a limited nature, 28 U. S. C. § 636 (a)(3), which grant of power, carefully limited, appears not to contravene any con*487stitutional prohibition. Cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973). A fortiori granting magistrates the power to conduct hearings where the district judge retains ultimate decisionmaking authority comports with constitutional requirements. Cf. Campbell v. U. S. District Court, 501 F. 2d 196 (CA9 1974) (hearings on motion to suppress); Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F. R. D. 551 (SDNY 1972) (hearings on discovery motion).