Court Opinion

ID: 9901706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 14:08:39.039656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:37.568448
License: Public Domain

J-S31011-23

                                2023 PA Super 241

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 LARRY RAY YAW JR.                        :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2643 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-39-CR-0001980-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2023

      Appellant, Larry Ray Yaw, Jr., appeals from the September 20, 2022

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County that denied his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      The PCRA court summarized the factual history as follows:

      On April 3, 2016, at approximately 8:00 [a.m.], Officer Raymond
      Seiling of the Whitehall Township Police Department [(“Officer
      Seiling”)] was dispatched to [a residence located in] Whitehall,
      Lehigh County, Pennsylvania[. Officer Seiling was] in full uniform
      and [driving] a marked police [cruiser when he responded to] a
      call of a break[-]in at [the] residence in which the [victim] was
      assaulted. When he arrived, Officer Seiling observed the victim[]
      lying on the bed in a bedroom, bleeding from his face[ and] the
      back of his head, [as well as] moaning and writhing in pain. [The
      victim] was unable to speak with the police and was immediately
      transported to [a hospital] for treatment of his injuries. In
      addition, Officer Seiling immediately noticed signs of forced entry
      into the [residence].          Subsequently, at approximately
      8:30 [a.m.], Detective Jeffrey Bruchak of the Whitehall Township
      Police Department [(“Detective Bruchak”)] arrived on scene.
      Detective Bruchak also observed signs of forced entry.           In
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     addition, a small [0].22 caliber casing was located outside [the
     victim’s] bedroom door.

     Detective Bruchak spoke with [the victim’s] roommate[. The
     roommate] indicated that [the victim] was in the apartment on
     the evening of April 2, 2016, with [a female acquaintance]. They
     spent most of the time in [the] bedroom, but [the victim] came
     out of the bedroom to ask for a towel so that [the female
     acquaintance] could shower. At approximately 11:45 [p.m. the
     victim] advised his roommate that he was taking [the female
     acquaintance] home to her residence in Gilbertsville[,
     Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. The roommate] and his
     girlfriend[] asked [the victim] if he could cash a lottery ticket for
     them, as well as grab a few grocery items for them at the store
     while he was out. [The victim and the female acquaintance] were
     in good spirits and were joking around at the time. [The victim]
     returned to the apartment in Whitehall between 1:30 [a.m.] and
     2:00 [a.m.] on April 3, 2016. He had cashed the lottery tickets,
     as well as purchased a few groceries with the money from the
     lottery ticket winnings. [The victim] gave his roommate[] the
     change and then retired to his bedroom. [The roommate and his
     girlfriend] made a pizza and then watched television until
     approximately 3:00 [a.m.]

     [The roommate and his girlfriend] were sleeping [in the
     roommate’s bedroom] in the [residence] when, at approximately
     8:00 [a.m.], they were awakened by a loud noise.               [The
     roommate] got out of bed just as [his] bedroom door was kicked
     in by a male who [the roommate] knows as "Larry." "Larry," later
     identified as [Appellant,] entered the bedroom holding a small
     black handgun in his right hand and a dark metal baseball bat in
     his left hand. [Appellant] stated, "Oh, wrong room," and left.
     [The roommate] then heard a loud noise, a gunshot[,] and a lot
     of commotion. Immediately thereafter, [the roommate] heard
     [Appellant] and [the victim] screaming. [The roommate] peeked
     out of his bedroom and observed [the female acquaintance]
     standing in the kitchen next to the refrigerator, and [Appellant]
     walk[ing] out of [the victim’s bed]room. As [Appellant] was
     leaving, he pointed the gun at [the roommate] and stated
     something to the effect of, "If you tell anyone I was here, I will
     come back for you." [The roommate] looked into [the victim’s
     bed]room and observed [the victim] unable to stand up,
     disoriented, and bleeding from the back of his head. [The
     roommate] instructed [his girlfriend] to call the police. After this
     incident, [the roommate and his girlfriend] went to the

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     headquarters of the Whitehall Township Police Department to give
     statements.

     Detective Bruchak also spoke with [the roommate’s girlfriend].
     [The roommate’s girlfriend] indicated that she too had seen [the
     female acquaintance] in the [residence] on April 2, 2016[,] with
     [the victim], and that she was aware of [the victim] taking [the
     female acquaintance] back to her residence. [The roommate’s
     girlfriend] also stated that she saw [Appellant] enter [the
     roommate’s] bedroom holding a baseball bat and a handgun.
     Overall, her version of events was consistent with that of [the
     roommate]. While at police headquarters, [the roommate and his
     girlfriend] were presented with two [] photo[graphic] arrays. Both
     [the roommate and his girlfriend] positively identified [Appellant]
     as the person who entered [the roommate’s] bedroom on April 3,
     2016, while they were sleeping.

     In addition, at trial, [the female acquaintance] confirmed that she
     spent the evening of April 2, 2016, with [the victim] in Whitehall
     doing methamphetamine and heroin, and watching the television.
     As background, she explained that on March 31, 2016[,] and April
     1, 2016, she and [the victim] exchanged [] messages [via a social
     media application] with each other regarding getting together.
     Ultimately, [the victim] picked [the female acquaintance] up from
     her residence [in] Gilbertsville[ on April 1, 2016,] at
     approximately 9:00 [p.m.] They hung out together until about
     3:00 [a.m.], at which time, [the victim] drove [the female
     acquaintance] back to her residence in Gilbertsville that she
     shared with [Appellant] and two [] other roommates. She arrived
     home at approximately 4:30 [a.m.] The next day, April 2, 2016,
     [the female acquaintance] and [the victim] exchanged more
     [social media] messages in order to facilitate their getting
     together. Again, [the victim] picked up [the female acquaintance]
     and drove her to his residence in Whitehall. There, they used
     methamphetamine and heroin, which caused [the female
     acquaintance] to feel sick and throw up. [The victim] drove her
     back to her residence at approximately 12:30 [a.m.] Upon her
     arrival home, [the female acquaintance] messaged [the victim]
     on [the social media application] requesting him to message her
     when he returned home. In compliance with her request, [the
     victim] messaged [the female acquaintance] around 1:54 [a.m.]

     When [the female acquaintance] arrived home, [Appellant] was
     not present. In fact, [Appellant] had yet to return home by
     4:00 [a.m.], despite exchanging [textual messages] with [the

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     female acquaintance] earlier in the morning. However, around
     6:30 [a.m., Appellant] arrived [at the residence intoxicated] and
     went through [the female acquaintance’s cellular telephone
     messages] during a verbal fight that had started. [Appellant]
     discovered that [the female acquaintance] had been
     communicating with [the victim], and getting high together. He
     became angry and began to punch [the female acquaintance] with
     a closed fist in the jaw and cheek area of her face. [The female
     acquaintance] told [Appellant] that she thought that she was
     pregnant, and [Appellant] proceeded to hit [the female
     acquaintance] in her stomach and threw her across the bed.
     [Appellant] then dragged her outside of the residence where he
     continued to beat her. Specifically, [Appellant] punched [the
     female acquaintance] along her body. [Appellant] then took her
     to the garage and continued to hit her in the face with a closed
     fist. [Appellant] subsequently left the garage area and locked the
     garage door. When he returned about one [] to two [] minutes
     later, [Appellant] had a firearm in his hand.

     [Appellant] began to question [the female acquaintance] about
     her relationship with [the victim].            When [the female
     acquaintance] admitted that she had slept with [the victim] the
     previous night, [Appellant] forced [the female acquaintance] to lie
     on a tarp[,] and he continued to beat her. He hit her in her head
     with the handgun. [Appellant] left the garage again and returned
     this time with a metal baseball bat. Then, [Appellant] induced
     [the female acquaintance] to tell him where [the victim] lived.
     [Appellant] forced [the female acquaintance] to get into his truck.
     While driving, [Appellant] continued to strike [the female
     acquaintance] in the face. [Appellant] threatened that if [the
     female acquaintance] tried to run or scream when they arrived at
     [the victim’s residence], he would kill her and her father. [The
     female acquaintance] indicated that [Appellant] arrived at [the
     victim’s residence] and entered with the handgun in his right hand
     and the baseball bat in his left hand. [The female acquaintance]
     heard [Appellant] break [open] the door to [the roommate’s]
     bedroom within the [residence]. She also heard [Appellant]
     discharge the firearm outside the door of [the victim’s] bedroom.
     [The female acquaintance] indicated that during the assault, she
     could hear the sound of the baseball bat hitting [the victim’s] skull.
     She further stated that after the assault, she and [Appellant] left
     the area in his [] truck.          During the trial, [the female
     acquaintance] testified for the first time that [Appellant] stopped
     somewhere in the woods and had non-consensual sex with her.

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     Afterwards, [Appellant] made another stop at his friend[’s] house,
     where he asked this friend to hide the baseball bat. [The friend]
     placed the baseball bat in his van that was situated on his
     driveway.         Subsequently, [Appellant and the female
     acquaintance] drove around for a while until ultimately [Appellant]
     drove himself and [the female acquaintance] back to the residence
     in Gilbertsville.

     Upon her return home, [the female acquaintance] talked with her
     roommate[] for a while and then fell asleep. She was awoken by
     [Appellant] when he placed a hand over her mouth advising her
     that the New Hanover Police were there and that she should not
     say anything.      Ultimately, [the female acquaintance] and
     [Appellant] emerged from their bedroom. When the [police]
     officers saw her bruises, cuts on her face, lumps on her head and
     body, scrapes on her knees, as well as other injuries, [the female
     acquaintance] told them that she had "fallen."

     [Appellant] was taken into custody and placed in a marked police
     unit. Subsequently, he was transported to the New Hanover Police
     Department.      In addition, the police took [the female
     acquaintance] into custody as a result of an outstanding warrant
     out of Berks County[, Pennsylvania,] for burglary charges. [The
     female acquaintance] was transported to the New Hanover Police
     Department. She was seated in a chair immediately outside the
     small holding room where [Appellant] was being held. [Appellant]
     attempted to talk to [the female acquaintance] through the closed
     door. She leaned in to hear [Appellant] tell her to state to the
     police that [the victim] drugged her, raped her, and beat[] her,
     and that was the reason for [Appellant’s] actions.

     Afterwards, Officer David Fugelo, a member of the New Hanover
     Police Department [(“Officer Fugelo”),] interviewed [the female
     acquaintance]. Fearful of [Appellant, the female acquaintance]
     complied with [Appellant’s] orders. Consequently, during this
     interview, for the first time, [the female acquaintance] stated to
     the authorities that [the victim] and she were using drugs
     together when he began to make unwanted sexual advances
     toward her. [The victim] then assaulted her and[,] ultimately[,]
     he raped her. After photographs of her injuries were taken, [the
     female acquaintance] was transported to her residence in
     Gilbertsville to retrieve her leggings and other clothing for a rape
     kit to be performed. After the articles of clothing were retrieved,
     [the female acquaintance] was transported to the Berks County
     Prison on her open charges.

                                    -5-
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     On April 5, 2016, Detective [] Bruchak [] attempted to speak with
     [the female acquaintance] at the Berks County Prison. At that
     time, [the female acquaintance] maintained that [the victim] had
     drugged, beaten, and raped her. She refused to talk with
     Detective Bruchak any further, and asked to be taken back to her
     cell. Later, on April 14, 2016, [the female acquaintance] was
     transported to the Lehigh County Jail. Detective Bruchak and
     Detective Richard Heffelfinger of the Lehigh County District
     Attorney's Homicide Task Force [(“Detective Heffelfinger”)]
     interviewed her. During this interview, they confronted her with
     evidence, including the [social media] messages between her and
     [the victim] that undermined her version of events.
     Consequently, [the female acquaintance] then admitted that [the
     victim] had not assaulted or raped her. She then recounted a
     version of events that was consistent with the incidents recounted
     by [the roommate and his girlfriend. The female acquaintance]
     even assisted the [police] officers in locating the baseball bat, by
     driving [] with them to [the friend’s] residence, whose precise
     address she was not familiar. [The female acquaintance] was able
     to identify [the friend’s] house as being located [in] Fleetwood,
     Pennsylvania.

     On April 5, 2016, [Appellant’s] truck was located in Pottstown[,
     Pennsylvania.]     Thus, a search warrant was obtained for
     [Appellant’s] truck. Corporal Troutman of the Pennsylvania State
     Police assisted with this search. The title to the [] truck was
     located within the vehicle, and established that the vehicle
     belonged to [Appellant].     Corporal Troutman processed and
     photographed the vehicle for evidence.        Ultimately, it was
     determined that [Appellant’s] blood was located on the interior
     door handle and exterior door handle of the driver's side door. In
     addition, Corporal Troutman searched and processed [the victim’s
     vehicle].   Nothing of any evidentiary value was seized or
     recovered [from the victim’s vehicle].

     [The victim] died on April 4, 2016, at 4:45 [p.m., while still
     hospitalized,] as a result of the injuries to the head that he
     suffered. An autopsy was performed on April 6, 2016, by Dr.
     Barbara Bollinger [(“Dr. Bollinger”)], an expert in the field of
     forensic, clinical, and anatomical pathology. As a result of the
     autopsy, Dr. Bollinger identified, inter alia, multiple blunt force
     injuries to [the victim’s] head, abrasions on his clavicle, bruises
     on his right hand, and scratches on his right forearm and right leg.
     Dr. Bollinger opined that the blunt force injuries to the head were
     the most severe injuries that [the victim] sustained. Dr. Bollinger

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     testified that she could identify at least two [] impact sites that
     were consistent with being struck[ or ]impacted in the head with
     a baseball bat with a significant amount of force. [The victim] had
     fractures to the skull, including to the base and the right parietal
     region.     The fractures represent[ed] trauma to the skull.
     Additionally, as a result of these strikes, [the victim] suffered
     substantial internal injuries. There were signs of bleeding and soft
     tissue hemorrhaging on the top of and within the brain, as well as
     significant swelling of the brain itself to the point where the brain
     was pushing outside of the cranial cavity. Dr. Bollinger opined
     that without medical treatment, [the victim] would have suffered
     a quick neurological death due to the crushed brain stem. The
     cause of death was determined to be blunt force injuries to the
     head. The manner of death was deemed to be homicide.

     While [Appellant] was incarcerated in Lehigh County Prison
     awaiting resolution of the [homicide] matter, [Appellant] made a
     plethora of telephone calls. In order to place a telephone call, a
     [personal identification number (“pin”)] specific to the prisoner
     must be utilized. [Appellant] used his pin[,] as well as the pin[s]
     of two [] other prisoners who were housed in either the same cell
     or in close proximity with him in an effort to circumvent
     [identification or detection].      As is policy, these prisoner
     [tele]phone calls were [] recorded. In these telephone calls placed
     between April 4, 2016[,] and May 14, 2016, [Appellant] initially
     stated that he assaulted [the victim] because [the victim] raped
     [the female acquaintance]. Also, on April 5, 2016, [Appellant]
     indicated that he did not regret his actions. Throughout his
     telephone calls, [Appellant] discussed possible defenses in this
     matter, as well as the importance of keeping [the female
     acquaintance] happy and on his side. [Appellant] also repeatedly
     inquired if [the friend] "got rid of the stuff." On April 25, 2016,
     [Appellant] admitted that he struck [the victim] two times with
     the baseball bat. On May 14, 2016, [Appellant] recounted a
     version of events on the morning of April 3, 2016, [as follows,]
     and it did not include [the female acquaintance] being raped by
     [the victim]:

        I came home and [the female acquaintance] was fuckin,
        high. And that's when I took her [cellular tele]phone and
        said, [“]who the fuck gave you heroin?[”] That's what I
        initially started with. I grabbed her and I fuckin drug her
        out of my house and threw her out and slammed the door
        shut and was like, get the fuck outta here, junkie. I have
        no fuckin time for you[,] and I threw her fuckin [tele]phone

                                     -7-
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           at her and fuckin, I just went back into my room. Do not,
           I'm not letting you back in my fuckin house and she's like,
           “just talk to me and just talk to me.” So, I fuckin, I, like, I
           sat her down and she's like, “I'm pregnant” and then, that's
           where I snapped. That's when I said, “you're pregnant with
           my fucking kid and you're shooting [f]ucking dope? Like,
           how did you even get the fuckin dope?” I smack her, “what
           are you fucking the dude?” And [the female acquaintance]
           said, “yeah, I'm fuckin him.” And I said, “yeah, I got somein
           for your fuckin ass” and put her down on the fuckin tarp,
           put a gun to her fuckin head and I couldn't shoot her. I
           shoulda fuckin shot her. And then fuckin, immediately
           snapped, dude. Couldn't get outta that line of thinkin.

       [At trial, t]he jury listened to approximately forty-two [] Lehigh
       County Prison telephone call[ recordings] in which [Appellant]
       participated.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/14/22, at 2-7 (original brackets, extraneous

capitalization, record citations, and ellipsis omitted).

       On March 8, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder,

burglary – overnight accommodation with person present, kidnapping - to

facilitate a felony, and kidnapping - to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the

victim.1   On March 9, 2018, during the penalty phase of the trial, a jury

sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for his first-degree murder

conviction. On April 16, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20

years’ incarceration for his burglary – overnight accommodation with person

present conviction, with the sentence set to run consecutively to the life

imprisonment sentence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20 years’

____________________________________________

1  18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3502(a)(1), 2901(a)(2), and 2901(a)(3),
respectively.

                                           -8-
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incarceration for his kidnapping – to facilitate a felony conviction, with the

sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed for his burglary

conviction. Finally, for his conviction of kidnapping - to inflict bodily injury or

to terrorize the victim, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20 year’s

incarceration, with the sentence set to run concurrently to the sentence

imposed for his conviction of kidnapping – to facilitate a felony. Appellant’s

aggregate sentence was life imprisonment to be followed by 20 to 40 years’

incarceration.

       This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on June 19, 2019.

Commonwealth v. Yaw, 2019 WL 2524586, at *1 (Pa. Super. filed June 19,

2019) (unpublished memorandum).                Appellant did not seek discretionary

review by our Supreme Court and, as such, his judgment of sentence became

final on July 19, 2019. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “[a] judgment

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review

in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review”); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (requiring a petition for allowance of appeal to be filed

within 30 days after entry of an order of this Court sought to be reviewed).

       On June 11, 2020, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first.

Counsel was appointed to represent Appellant.2 Counsel filed an amended
____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court initially appointed the Lehigh County Public Defender’s Office

to represent Appellant on his PCRA matter. PCRA Court Order, 6/25/20. Due

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PCRA petition on December 23, 2020.                The PCRA court conducted an

evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s amended PCRA petition on September 2,

2021, December 10, 2021, and May 2, 2022. Appellant submitted a brief in

support of his petition on August 16, 2022, and the Commonwealth submitted

a response brief on September 19, 2022. On September 20, 2022, the PCRA

court denied Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.3

       Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

       Did the PCRA court err, abuse its discretion, [and] make erroneous
       and unsupported findings of fact[] and conclusions of law with
       respect to whether trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate
       and present a diminished capacity defense at the guilt-phase [of
       the trial?4]

Appellant’s Brief at 1.

       Appellant’s issue raises a claim that trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance. Id. at 21-35. Specifically, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate and present a diminished capacity defense

during the guilt phase of Appellant’s trial. Id. Appellant contends that trial

____________________________________________

to a potential conflict of interest, however, the PCRA court, upon motion by
the Public Defender’s Office, appointed outside counsel to represent Appellant.
PCRA Court Order, 7/6/20.

3 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.

4 At trial, Appellant was represented by lead counsel, Matthew Potts, Esquire

(“Attorney Potts”) and co-counsel, Steven Mills, Esquire (“Attorney Mills”).
Unless otherwise noted, we collectively refer to both gentleman as “trial
counsel.”

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counsel failed to appreciate the need to raise a diminished capacity defense

and failed to consult with the correct medical expert who could opine on

Appellant’s diminished capacity to commit first-degree murder. Id. at 30, 34.

In developing this claim, Appellant explains that he suffers from brain damage

brought on by a head injury, that he has endured a lifetime of depression,

anxiety, and difficulties with impulse control, and that he has been subject to

sexual and physical abuse and neglect at the hands of his father. Id. at 24-25.

Appellant asserts that, due to these injuries and psychological impairments,

he was unable to engage in higher thought processes, such as formulating the

specific intent to kill another person. Id. at 21, 31. Appellant argues that

trial counsel failed to ask Appellant’s expert, Dr. Carol Armstrong,5 “if

[Appellant] met the criteria for a diminished capacity defense.” Id. at 27.

Appellant asserts that if trial counsel had asked such a question, trial counsel

“would have learned from Dr. Armstrong that she does not opine on such

matters and [trial counsel] could then have consulted with a different

expert[.]”    Id.   Appellant argues that trial counsel’s “[c]onsulting with Dr.

[Frank] Dattilio[6] alone on [the] topic [of diminished capacity] was insufficient

because [Dr. Dattilio] could not have conduct[ed] the neuropsychological
____________________________________________

5Dr. Armstrong was admitted as an expert in the field of neuropsychology
during the penalty phase of the trial. N.T., 3/9/18, at 45.

6 Dr. Dattilio testified on behalf of Appellant at the PCRA evidentiary hearing

on May 2, 2022. N.T., 5/2/22, at 212-295. As discussed more fully infra, Dr.
Dattilio evaluated Appellant before trial at the request of trial counsel to
determine Appellant’s mental health status.

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testing [necessary to formulate such an opinion] and [trial] counsel failed to

consult with [Dr. Dattilio] again when Dr. Armstrong’s [neuropsychological]

testing [results were] available.”        Id. at 30-31.    Appellant avers that Dr.

Dattilio’s opinion – that “Appellant’s behavior had its genesis in an [anti-social

personality    disorder]     rather    than    [Appellant’s]   myriad   [of]   mental

impairments – was incorrect because it was rendered “without the benefit of

the neuropsychological testing conducted by Dr. Armstrong.”               Id. at 25.

Appellant argues that if trial counsel had consulted with another expert, such

as Dr. Jethro Toomer,7 the expert Appellant consulted with for purposes of his

PCRA petition, trial counsel would have been able to offer a mental health

opinion related to Appellant’s diminished capacity to formulate specific intent

to kill, and this “could only have supported and furthered [trial] counsel’s

largely unsupported specific intent argument.” Id. at 34.

       In addressing Appellant’s issue, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper

appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,

992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”
____________________________________________

7 At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Dr. Toomer was admitted as an expert in

the field of forensic psychology and testified on Appellant’s behalf.           N.T.,
5/2/22, at 7-128; see also N.T., 9/2/22, at 5-152.

                                          - 12 -
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Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”     Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.      Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

      “It   is   well-established   that   counsel   is   presumed   effective[.]”

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984). To plead and prove a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the

underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an

objective[ly] reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from

counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701,

706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014). “A

claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to meet

any of these prongs.”     Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa.

2010). “In determining whether counsel's action was reasonable, we do not

question whether there were other more logical courses of action which

counsel could have pursued[. R]ather, we must examine whether counsel's

decision[] had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 927

A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). A petitioner establishes prejudice when he or she

demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

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[acts or omissions], the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).

      It is well-established that a defense of diminished capacity “is an

extremely limited defense available only to those defendants who admit

criminal liability but contest the degree of culpability based upon an inability

to formulate the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25

A.3d 277, 312 (Pa. 2011) (stating that, “[a]bsent an admission from the

defendant that he [, or she,] killed the victim, trial counsel [cannot present]

a diminished capacity defense” (original brackets omitted)), cert. denied, 566

U.S. 1035 (2012). “A diminished capacity defense does not exculpate the

defendant from criminal liability entirely, but instead negates the element of

specific intent” thereby mitigating first-degree murder to third-degree murder.

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d at 315 (citations and original quotation marks omitted).

“To establish a diminished capacity defense, a defendant must prove that his[,

or her,] cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation were so

compromised, by mental defect or voluntary intoxication, that he[, or she,]

was unable to formulate the specific intent to kill.” Id. “If a defendant does

not admit that he[, or she,] killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence

defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.”              Id.

Furthermore, “[e]vidence that the defendant lacked the ability to control his

or her actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to specific intent to kill, and

thus is not admissible to support a diminished capacity defense.”            Id.

“[D]iagnosis with a personality disorder does not suffice to establish

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diminished capacity.” Id. “[T]he authority to concede criminal liability and

to authorize the presentation of a diminished capacity defense rests solely

with the accused.” Id. at 313 (emphasis omitted), citing, Commonwealth

v. Weaver, 457 A.2d 505, 506-507 (Pa. 1983).

     In dismissing Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense, the PCRA court stated,

     Based on a careful review of the evidence in this case, the [PCRA]
     court found Appellant [] failed to demonstrate any of the required
     elements of ineffective assistance of counsel.           Appellant's
     underlying claim is not of arguable merit. He claims [trial] counsel
     should have advanced a diminished capacity defense. However,
     the record reflects that neither Dr. Dattilio nor Dr. Armstrong
     raised diminished capacity as a potential issue. As Dr. Toomer
     confirmed, if either Dr. Dattilio or Dr. Armstrong had noted
     [diminished capacity], even if they were retained for the penalty
     phase alone, they were ethically obligated to advise counsel that
     it was a perceived issue.

     [Trial] counsel's election not to pursue a diminished capacity
     defense was reasonably designed to advance Appellant's
     interests. [Trial] counsel did not have evidence to support a
     diminished capacity defense. [Trial counsel] had evidence which
     [trial counsel] reasonably believed might support an assertion that
     Appellant committed voluntary manslaughter rather than
     first[-]degree murder.       However, based on the evidence
     [presented] at trial, Appellant's apparent belief that [the victim]
     raped [the female acquaintance] was inaccurate. There was no[]
     adequate provocation by [the victim] towards Appellant [to
     support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Trial] counsel
     nonetheless attempted to argue for third[-]degree murder, which
     was the next best alternative. [Trial counsel] did not have
     evidence which would have supported a third[-]degree murder
     verdict based on reduction of the seriousness of the homicide
     charge stemming from a successful diminished capacity defense.

     Most significantly, there is no[] evidence of prejudice in this case.
     A diminished capacity defense had to be presented to
     counterbalance evidence of Appellant's intent. There was ample

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     evidence of Appellant's intent presented to the jury by the
     Commonwealth. The prosecution did not dispute that Appellant
     expressed repeatedly that he did not go to [the victim’s residence]
     specifically intending to kill [the victim]. The evidence though
     clearly reflected that Appellant intentionally went to [the victim’s
     residence] armed with both a gun and a metal baseball bat. After
     kicking in the door, Appellant was under control of his faculties
     sufficiently enough that he bypassed the others inside the
     [residence] when he went to the wrong bedroom at first. He fired
     the gun in the [residence], and he admitted during the prison
     [tele]phone recordings that he intentionally struck [the victim]
     repeatedly in the head with a baseball bat. He then took steps to
     hide the [baseball bat].

     The jury heard Appellant's statements in the prison recordings
     that he did not intend to kill [the victim], but it was within the
     province of the jury to reject that assertion. Appellant repeatedly
     struck a vital part of [the victim’s] body - his head - with a
     baseball bat.      A jury may properly infer intent to kill,
     notwithstanding what Appellant expressed during the prison
     [tele]phone recordings and through his counsel at both his
     opening and closing [statements made] during the guilt phase.

     In sum, Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective. There is no[]
     evidence from which the [PCRA] court could determine that [trial
     counsel] erred by failing to present diminished capacity as a
     defense. The evidence suggests that Appellant was fully capable
     of forming intent to kill. The expert analyses [trial] counsel had
     prior to the trial did not support pursuing diminished capacity as
     a defense at the guilt phase of trial. While the jury was apprised
     of Appellant's expressed intent only to hurt [the victim] as he
     stated in the prison recordings, the jury was free to [] weigh those
     statements against [] the other evidence. [Trial] counsel was not
     ineffective in this matter.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/14/22, at 19-21 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

     The record reveals that, at trial, Appellant was represented by lead

counsel, Attorney Potts and co-counsel, Attorney Mills.         At the PCRA

evidentiary hearing, Attorney Potts testified that, pursuant to his standard

practice when representing defendants in capital cases, he asked the trial

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court to appoint co-counsel and to provide funding authorization to retain a

mitigation specialist and to obtain a mental health evaluation of Appellant.

N.T., 12/10/21, at 30. In the case sub judice, upon obtaining the necessary

court approval, trial counsel retained the services of Dr. Dattilio, a clinical and

forensic psychologist.   Id. at 10.   Attorney Potts stated that, in seeking a

mental health evaluation of Appellant, he requested a “relatively unspecific

evaluation” of Appellant from Dr. Dattilio, meaning Attorney Potts did not pose

a specific referral question to Dr. Dattilio pertaining to a particular diagnosis

or legal defense, i.e., diminished capacity. Id. Attorney Potts stated he was

“essentially seeking to get the doctor’s opinion on what he [thought] and what

his ideas [were] regarding [Appellant’s] mental health.” Id. Attorney Potts

testified that it was his practice to rely on the mental health expert to tell him

if a defendant, such as Appellant, suffered from a mental health issue that

would be “helpful” in formulating a defense strategy. Id. at 32, 53. Attorney

Potts also stated that, based upon his own observations and interactions with

Appellant, if he observed what he believed amounted to a potential mental

health issue, he would have specifically brought that to the attention of Dr.

Dattilio prior to the evaluation. Id. at 34.

      In the case sub judice, Attorney Potts explained that, prior to Dr.

Dattilio’s evaluation of Appellant, he did not observe any characteristics in

Appellant that suggested a competency issue, a diminished capacity defense,

or that Appellant was unable to form specific intent to kill. Id. at 34, 42.

Rather, based upon the 30-plus meetings he had with Appellant, Attorney

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Potts thought Appellant was intelligent, a planner, and calculating because

Appellant was very aware of the issues in his case and would often come to

their attorney-client meetings with caselaw on specific issues. Id. at 22, 24

(stating, “I think [Appellant] thinks things through. I think he thinks things

out.”).     Attorney Mills expressed similar thoughts concerning Appellant,

stating that, based upon numerous meetings with Appellant, he thought

Appellant was intelligent, thought highly of himself, and thought he was an

“important deal” to people around him. Id. at 78, 81.

       Dr. Dattilio testified that he was retained by trial counsel to conduct a

mental health evaluation of Appellant.         N.T., 5/2/22, at 227.   Dr. Dattilio

stated that, as part of this evaluation, he, inter alia, met with Appellant on

three occasions, detailing a history of his life; administered a battery of

psycho-diagnostic assessments and appraisals; reviewed materials relating to

Appellant’s criminal case, such as the criminal complaint and the affidavit of

probable cause; conducted collateral interviews of Appellant’s family members

and neighbor; and listened to the recordings of Appellant’s prison telephone

calls. Id. at 227-230; see also Commonwealth PCRA Evidentiary Hearing

Exhibit 6 at 1-4. As part of his evaluation, Dr. Dattilio understood that, inter

alia, Appellant had been sexually and physically abused as a child, suffered

several head injuries, was hospitalized for psychiatric concerns, and has a

history of drug use. N.T., 5/2/22, at 232. Dr. Dattilio did not find, however,

that Appellant’s history had any effect on his cognitive ability to plan. Id. at

233.      Instead, Dr. Dattilio opinioned that Appellant met the criteria for a

                                      - 18 -
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“full-blown anti-social personally disorder” diagnosis with sadistic and

negativistic traits.   Id. at 252; see also Commonwealth PCRA Evidentiary

Hearing Exhibit 6 at 35. Dr. Dattilio stated that he felt Appellant’s issues were

more psychological issues rather than cognitive impairment issues.          N.T.,

5/2/22, at 254. Dr. Dattilio testified that he considered Appellant’s potential

for diminished capacity and whether Appellant possessed the ability to form a

specific intent to kill as part of his evaluation, but he did not find evidence of

a diminished capacity with Appellant. Id. at 285. Dr. Dattilio explained that

he did not find diminished capacity because Appellant was able to provide Dr.

Dattilio with details of the events leading up to the incident, including how

Appellant left his house with the specific intent to confront the victim, how

Appellant was able to go into the victim’s house and navigate through its

rooms, and how, upon finding the victim, Appellant struck the victim with a

bat four times before leaving the victim’s residence. Id. at 292. Dr. Dattilio

stated he did not “see anything that was interfering with [Appellant’s] flow of

thought” as he was explaining the events. Id.

      Attorney Mills described Dr. Dattilio’s mental health evaluation results

as “horrible” and “not helpful at all” to Appellant’s defense because of the

“sociopathic features” that were present in Appellant’s background.         N.T.,

12/10/21, at 71, 74. Attorney Mills shared Dr. Dattilio’s report and evaluation

findings with Attorney Potts.     Id. at 10.    Attorney Potts stated that he

understood that Dr. Dattilio’s evaluation of Appellant was not going to be

helpful in formulating a defense.     Id. at 11.   Because Attorney Potts and

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Attorney Mills understood Appellant suffered prior head injuries and brain

trauma, they retained the services of Dr. Armstrong, a neuropsychologist, for

the purpose of having Appellant evaluated to determine if potential mitigation

factors existed that could be presented during the penalty phase of the case.

Id. at 12, 14-15. When Attorney Potts spoke with Dr. Armstrong, his belief

was that Appellant’s case was no longer about presenting a diminished

capacity defense or other mental health issues during the guilt phase but,

rather, was about presenting mitigation factors “in an attempt to save

[Appellant’s] life in the penalty phase.” Id. at 15.

       Attorney Potts explained that, initially, the defense strategy was to

present a voluntary manslaughter defense relating to provocation (verses

self-defense) based upon the facts that Appellant became enraged after

learning that the female acquaintance (his girlfriend) indicated that she was

pregnant with his child, and that the victim raped the female acquaintance.8
____________________________________________

8 In general, “[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he[, or she,] is
acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
by[] the individual killed[, or] another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but
he[, or she,] negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual
killed.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(a)(1) and (2) (formatting modified).

During his opening statement, Attorney Potts stated, inter alia,

       What happened that morning was certainly unfortunate. This is
       not a case of a man who was intending to kill anybody. This is a
       guy whose girlfriend revealed to him [that] she had been
       unfaithful, perhaps raped, certainly under the influence of drugs,
       and he just loses it.

                                          - 20 -
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Id. at 17. Upon learning this information pertaining to the alleged pregnancy

and rape, Attorney Potts argued that Appellant did not form a specific intent

to kill the victim but, rather, was acting under the “heat of passion.” 9 Id.

Attorney Potts further explained that, after the defense rested, the trial court

denied a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter – provocation, which left trial

counsel to argue a lack of specific intent during the closing.10 Id. at 17-18.
____________________________________________

N.T., 3/5/18, at 41.

9 Our Supreme Court has defined the “heat of passion defense” as follows:

       A heat of passion defense, like the diminished capacity defense,
       is a partial defense, focused on the element of intent. A defendant
       accused of murder may establish that he or she is guilty, not of
       murder, but rather of voluntary manslaughter, by proving that, at
       the time of the killing, he or she was acting under a sudden and
       intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the victim.
       Emotions encompassed by the term “passion” include anger, rage,
       sudden resentment[,] or terror which renders the mind incapable
       of reason. Whether the provocation by the victim was sufficient
       to support a heat of passion defense is determined by an objective
       test: whether a reasonable [person] who was confronted with the
       provoking events would become impassioned to the extent that
       his[, or her,] mind was incapable of cool reflection.

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d at 314-315 (citations and some quotation marks
omitted).

10 During his closing argument, Attorney Potts asserted, inter alia,

       I think we do have a number of facts that make it pretty clear that
       [Appellant’s] intention was not to kill. His intention certainly was
       to beat [the victim.] It was certainly to harm [the victim].

                                           ...

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Attorney Potts explained that he thought the jury, at this point, might return

a verdict of third-degree murder because Appellant had both a gun and a

baseball bat when he entered the victim’s residence and that Appellant only

hit the victim with the baseball bat when he could have used the gun to shoot

and kill the victim. Id. at 19. Attorney Potts believed that Appellant’s decision

not to use the gun demonstrated that he did not have a specific intent to kill

____________________________________________

       Had [Appellant] intended to kill [the victim] there was nothing
       stopping him from continuing to beat him, or simply taking the
       gun that everyone said was in his right hand and just shooting
       [the victim]. But [Appellant] didn't do that. He left.

                                           ...

       [W]hat we're talking about is the intent to kill. As I indicated
       before, I don't believe that the Commonwealth can sustain its
       burden for first-degree murder. I think [Appellant’s] actions show
       he was not intending to kill [the victim].

                                           ...

       So when [Appellant] goes [to the victim’s residence] and, again,
       whether or not we believe the rape happened, [Appellant] goes
       there believing, certainly, that his girlfriend [(the female
       acquaintance)] is having an affair, certainly that she's been
       injected with drugs, but probably that she was raped. So that is
       his intention. His intention is just an angry guy. What that is?
       Third-degree murder. That's what's left. It's a third-degree
       murder case, ladies and gentlemen.          It's certainly not a
       first[-degree murder].

N.T., 3/7/18, at 15, 16-17, 27, 29-30.

                                          - 22 -
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the victim but only to maim the victim.11 Id. Attorney Potts testified that he

never believed diminished capacity was a viable defense because of the

Commonwealth’s evidence pertaining to Appellant’s prison telephone calls.

Attorney Potts explained that after reviewing the telephone call recordings

that the Commonwealth presented to the jury, he believed that Appellant,

during the course of the telephone calls, revealed that he carefully planned

the sequence of events leading to the victim’s death.       Specifically, in the

telephone calls, Appellant talked about how he placed the female acquaintance

on a tarp and put a gun to her head but could not kill her; that he made the

female acquaintance provide him a layout of the victim’s residence and drive

____________________________________________

11 Attorney Potts’ defense strategy was further supported by a prison
recording in which Appellant stated,

       I caved in his whole fuckin skull. I wanted him alive but not, I,
       you know, mentally retarded for the rest of his life.

Commonwealth PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit C-1, at 4/4/16 @ 1934
Recording.

       [M]y intention wasn’t to kill him. My intention was to harm him.
       Seriously. . . . I didn’t wanna kill him, obviously but because he
       didn’t die then, you, you only get, you only get fuckin homicide if
       like, you go there and kill him. . . . I didn’t go there with the
       intent to kill him. I went there with the intent to harm him and
       you can see it in my intentions because why would you bring a
       baseball bat, you see what I’m sayin, and a handgun? . . . Like,
       if I was tryin to kill him, I would’ve whacked him. That woulda
       been it. I woulda shot him in the fuckin face and that woulda been
       over with.

Commonwealth PCRA Hearing Exhibit C-1, at 4/5/16 @ 2146 Recording.

                                          - 23 -
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with him to the victim’s residence; that he took a gun and a baseball bat with

him to the victim’s residence; that he initially kicked in the wrong bedroom

door and upon realizing that the victim was not present, left the occupants

unharmed; and that Appellant moved to the bedroom where the victim was

located and the incident ensued. Id. at 44-45. Attorney Potts stated that the

telephone calls demonstrated “a lot of planning, in [his] opinion, for a jury to

believe that somehow [Appellant] was impaired, to the point where he couldn’t

form specific intent in this case.” Id. at 45. Although Attorney Potts believed,

based upon the experts’ evaluations, that Appellant’s mental disorder affected

his cognitive functioning, he believed the diminished capacity defense would

fail because Appellant’s cognitive impairments did not affect his ability to

deliberate and premeditate.      Id. at 58.    Attorney Potts explained that

presenting a mental health defense, such as diminished capacity, meant

“hav[ing] to make [the defendant] available to the Commonwealth to be

evaluated[, and that] always is something that [he does not] like to do[.]”

Id. at 60.

       Attorney Mills reiterated that the defense strategy was to pursue a

voluntary manslaughter – provocation defense and then, ultimately, to pursue

a third-degree murder verdict based upon a heat of passion defense. Id. at

82. Attorney Mills agreed that presenting a diminished capacity defense was

“destroyed” by the evidence of Appellant’s prison telephone calls. Id. at 85,

100.

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      At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Appellant presented the testimony of

Dr. Toomer, who was admitted as an expert in the field of forensic psychology.

N.T., 9/2/21, at 41-42. Dr. Toomer stated that he reviewed the penalty phase

transcript (Appellant’s PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit D-3), Dr. Armstrong’s

pre-trial evaluation report (Appellant’s PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit D-4),

and the trial court’s June 5, 2018 opinion pertaining to Appellant’s direct

appeal (Appellant’s PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit D-5). Id. at 43. Dr.

Toomer also conducted an in-person evaluation of Appellant on July 22, 2021,

which was several years after Appellant’s trial and ultimate conviction. Dr.

Toomer opined that based upon a totality of circumstances, which included

knowledge of Appellant’s sexual abuse, controlled substance abuse, and

traumatic brain injuries, Appellant could not form a specific intent to kill. Id.

at 76, 100; see also N.T., 5/2/22, at 118.         Dr. Toomer explained that

Appellant’s traumatic brain injury prevented Appellant from engaging in

reasoning, a higher order thought process, or executive functioning, which

equates to abstract reasoning.     N.T., 9/2/22, at 66, 68-69.      Dr. Toomer

explained that when a person suffering from an impairment cannot engage in

planning or higher order thought or reasoning, such as in the case of

Appellant, then the person cannot engage “in the process of necessarily

forming intent or planning to do something.” Id. at 77-78. Instead, a person,

such as Appellant, reacts in a basic, primitive, and aggressive manner because

that is the only thing the person knows to do. Id. at 78. Dr. Toomer stated

that he believed that it would never be possible for Appellant, due to, inter

                                     - 25 -
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alia, his traumatic brain injuries and history of substance abuse and toxic

stress, to be able to maintain the capacity to form specific intent. Id. at 100.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the

PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition. We concur with the PCRA court,

and the record supports, that there was no evidence “from which [Appellant’s]

trial counsel could have pursued a diminished capacity defense” because

despite Appellant being evaluated by two experts, “neither expert concluded

he suffered from diminished capacity” at the time of the incident. PCRA Court

Opinion, 9/20/22, at 16. Trial counsel relied upon the expert opinions of Dr.

Dattilio and Dr. Armstong in formulating a defense strategy, and neither

expert opinion presented a factual basis to support a diminished capacity

defense. While Appellant presented the testimony and evaluation results of

Dr. Toomer at the PCRA evidentiary hearing that indicated Appellant suffered

from mental health deficiencies such that he was incapable of ever formulating

an intent to kill, trial counsel was not obligated to disregard the conclusions

reached by Dr. Dattilio and Dr. Armstrong and continue to seek a mental

health expert, such as Dr. Toomer, who was willing to support a diminished

capacity defense. Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795 A.2d 935, 942-943 (Pa.

2001) (stating, “[trial] counsel was not required to disregard the findings of

his expert and continue to consult experts, at the expense of limited judicial

resources, until he found one willing to testify that [Bracey] was organically

brain damaged or manifested some kind of major mental illness”); see also

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1122 (Pa. 2012) (stating that,

                                     - 26 -
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a court, in assessing trial counsel’s performance in the context of a

ineffectiveness claim, must be careful to assess that performance “without the

distortion of hindsight, and must instead review the circumstances under

which [trial] counsel’s decisions were made”).

      Moreover, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that

trial counsel, without evidence to support a diminished capacity defense,

pursued a reasonable defense strategy of first seeking a voluntary

manslaughter conviction based upon provocation and, ultimately, arguing in

favor of a third-degree murder conviction in an effort to obtain a resolution of

the matter for Appellant that did not involve a sentence of death or life in

prison.   PCRA Court Opinion, 9/20/22, at 18.       As trial counsel indicated,

asserting a diminished capacity defense was not a viable option given the lack

of an expert opinion in support thereof and especially in light of the

overwhelming evidence of planning and premeditation demonstrated by the

Commonwealth’s evidence of Appellant’s prison telephone calls. Therefore,

we concur with the PCRA court that Appellant failed to demonstrate that trial

counsel’s actions lacked an objectively reasonable basis. See Martin, 5 A.3d

at 183 (holding that, an order denying a PCRA petition may be affirmed if the

petitioner fails to meet any one of the three prongs necessary to support an

ineffectiveness claim).

      Order affirmed.

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Date: 11/21/2023

                   - 28 -