Court Opinion

ID: 9950090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:04:42.142903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:34.596999
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 13, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                            No. 3D22-1727
                     Lower Tribunal No. F08-17481B
                          ________________

                           Kenneth Williams,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L.
Fernandez, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kseniya Smychkouskaya,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
     Affirmed. Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (adapting test

announced in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998) and Grosvenor v.

State, 874 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2004) and applying same in the context of a

plea, holding: “We likewise establish a similar two-prong test for determining

postconviction claims for newly discovered evidence relating to guilty pleas

which adopts the first prong of the Jones test and the second prong from

Grosvenor. First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court,

the party, or counsel at the time of the plea, and it must appear that the

defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of

diligence. Second, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability

that, but for the newly discovered evidence, the defendant would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. “[I]n determining

whether a reasonable probability exists that the defendant would have

insisted on going to trial, a court should consider the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the plea, including such factors as whether a

particular defense was likely to succeed at trial, the colloquy between the

defendant and the trial court at the time of the plea, and the difference

between the sentence imposed under the plea and the maximum possible

sentence the defendant faced at a trial.’”) (quoting Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at

1181-82). See also McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954 n. 4 (Fla. 2002)

                                      2
(comparing the standard of appellate review of a summary denial of a 3.850

claim and the standard of appellate review of a denial of a 3.850 claim

following an evidentiary hearing and noting that, in the latter, “the appellate

court affords deference to the trial court's factual findings.”); Blanco v. State,

702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (“In reviewing a trial court's application of

the above law to a rule 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing, this

Court applies the following standard of review: As long as the trial court's

findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, ‘this Court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise

of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the

evidence by the trial court.’”) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075

(Fla.1984)) (additional quotation omitted).

                                        3