Court Opinion

ID: 9614322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:24:22.328834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:35.098121
License: Public Domain

EHRLICH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I conclude that the trial court clearly erred by admitting evidence that the defendant previously had chained himself to a pole and spray-painted “Article 6” on the Commission’s wall. Accordingly, I would reverse the defendant’s convictions for criminal trespass and resisting arrest and remand the matter for a new trial.4
I take issue with the majority’s determination that the defendant’s prior acts properly were admitted to establish the intent required for criminal trespass, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct, or to prove the defendant’s motive. To the contrary, considering the facts presented when it ruled on the defendant’s motion in limine, the trial court had insufficient evidence from which to make admissibility determinations regarding the prior-act evidence. For instance, the state had provided the court with, at most, only skeletal facts describing the defendant’s earlier incidents. The prosecution did not submit the dates on which those acts occurred and failed to develop the manner in which they allegedly corresponded to the charged offenses.
Moreover, I am unable to discern the relevance of the prior-act evidence to the criminal charges. The evidence describing the defendant’s earlier behavior did riot indicate whether he had been asked to leave the premises and refused. Cf A.R.S. § 13-1502. Similarly, the state did not suggest that the prior incidents had resulted in an arrest which the defendant resisted. Cf A.R.S. § 13-2508. Finally, while the defendant was accused in the present case of intentionally disturbing the peace and quiet of a Commission employee by making unreasonable noise, at no time did the state explain that his prior acts concerned the same conduct. Cf A.R.S. § 13-2904. What the acts demonstrated was not the defendant’s intent on this occasion, but that, in the past, he had shown himself to be a difficult person in his dealings with tiie Commission. This is precisely what Rule .404(b) was intended to prevent.
To further compound the error, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion in limine without any weighing of the relevance of the prior-act evidence against its prejudicial effect as Rule 403 demands. See State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 125, 817 P.2d 488, 492 (1991) (Rule 403 balancing test important in any Rule 404(b) inquiry). Cf. State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 351, 681 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1984) (“In determining whether the probative value of evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and confusion, the trial court must examine the purpose of the offer. [Citation omitted.]”); State v. Salazar, 181 Ariz. 87, 91, 887 P.2d 617, 621 (App.1994) (“[T]he onus of showing that prejudice is over-balanced by need and good faith should rest on the Government.” [Citations omitted.]). Although I maintain that the prior-act evidence was irrelevant and thus inadmissible, the risk also was too great that the jury would use such evidence for an improper purpose, i.e., “if he did it before he probably did so this time.” Morris K. Udall et al, Arizona Prae*444tice—Law of Evidence § 47, at 90 (3d ed. 1991) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968)). I would reverse.

. Consequently, I would not have decided, as the majority does, the defendant’s remaining three issues on appeal.