Court Opinion

ID: 9950798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:03:01.013136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:46.395767
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 P. v. Franco CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B326109

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                     PA040557)

 JOHN ROMERO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B316835

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                     PA040557)

 RANDY FRANCO,

           Defendant and Appellant.
      APPEALS from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant John Romero.
      Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal
for Defendant and Appellant Randy Franco.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ______________________

       A jury convicted John Romero and Randy Franco in 2003 of
first degree murder with a special-circumstance finding (lying in
wait) and conspiracy to commit murder. Romero and Franco
appeal the postjudgment orders denying their petitions for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6).1 However, contrary to the superior court’s
findings, because of instructional errors relating to the special
circumstance of lying in wait and the conspiracy charge, the
jury’s findings do not preclude relief as a matter of law.
Determining whether those errors were harmless requires
factfinding not permitted under section 1172.6 at the prima facie
review stage. We reverse the orders denying Romero’s and

1     Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered as section 1172.6 with no change in the text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

                                2
Franco’s petitions and remand with directions for the court to
issue orders to show cause and conduct further proceedings in
accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Killing, Jury Instructions, Convictions, and Appeals
       Following the murder of Victor Flores, a Brown Familia
criminal street gang member, Romero, Franco, and other
members of the same gang gathered in an apartment to discuss
Flores’s death.2 They suspected Byron Benito, a member of the
rival gang, played a role in Flores’s death. The group devised a
plot to use an individual who was not a member of their gang to
lure Benito into an ambush. The attack went according to plan.
Benito arrived at a parking lot in a car with the decoy where
Benito was assaulted by waiting gang members. After initially
resisting, Benito attempted to flee, but someone tripped him. As
Benito lay on the ground, the group stabbed, beat, and kicked
him for 10 to 15 minutes before leaving the area and returning to
the apartment where they had met earlier. Early the next
morning police recovered Benito’s body.
       An amended information filed July 7, 2003 charged
Romero, Franco, and 14 others with first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)),
with a special-circumstance allegation the murder was committed

2     We include a summary of the facts taken from Romero’s
and Franco’s direct appeal for background purposes. (People v.
Romero (Oct. 3, 2006, B170885) [nonpub. opn.].) We do not rely
on the facts in resolving the issues presented in this appeal. We
consider Romero’s and Franco’s appeals together.

                                3
by lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and a further allegation
both offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
       Romero and Franco were tried together with three
codefendants. The trial court instructed the jury on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine with CALJIC No. 3.02 (7th
ed. 2003):3 “One who aids and abets another in the commission of
a crime or crimes is not only guilty of those crimes, but is also
guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a
natural and probable consequence of the crimes originally aided
and abetted. In order to find a defendant guilty of the crime of
murder, as charged in Count 1, you must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that: 1. The crime or crimes of assault, assault
with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury, or conspiracy to commit assault or assault with a
deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury were committed; 2. That the defendant aided and abetted
those crimes; 3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the
crime of murder; and 4. The crime of murder was a natural and
probable consequence of the commission of the crimes of assault,
assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury, or conspiracy to commit assault or
assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury.”
       With respect to the lying-in-wait special circumstance, the
trial court instructed the jury with the first three paragraphs of
CALJIC No. 8.80.1 on aider and abettor liability: “If you find a

3     All references to the CALJIC instructions are to the 2003
edition.

                                4
defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you
must then determine if the following special circumstance is true
or not true: The defendant intentionally killed the victim by
means of lying in wait in violation of Penal Code
section 190.2(a)(15). The People have the burden of proving the
truth of the special circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt
as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to
be not true. You must decide separately as to each of the
defendants the existence or nonexistence of the special
circumstance alleged in this case. If you cannot agree as to all
the defendants, but can agree as to one or more of them, you
make your finding as to the one or more upon which you do
agree.” The court further instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 8.81.15.1: “To find the special circumstance referred to in
these instructions as murder by means of lying in wait is true,
each of the following facts must be proved 1. The defendant
intentionally killed the victim, and 2. The murder was
committed by means of lying in wait.”
       As to the conspiracy charge, the trial court instructed the
jury with CALJIC No. 8.69: “In order to prove this crime, each of
the following elements must be proved: 1. Two or more persons
entered into an agreement to kill unlawfully another human
being; 2. At least two of the persons specifically intended to enter
into an agreement with one or more other persons for that
purpose; 3. At least two of the persons to the agreement
harbored express malice aforethought, namely a specific intent to
kill unlawfully another human being; and 4. An overt act was
committed in this state by one or more of the persons who agreed
and intended to commit murder.” The court also instructed
pursuant to CALJIC No. 6.11: “Each member of a criminal

                                 5
conspiracy is liable for each act and is bound by each declaration
of every other member of the conspiracy if that act or declaration
is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. . . . A member of
a conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his
or her knowledge his or her confederates agreed to and did
commit, but is also liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any crime or act of a co-conspirator to further the
object of the conspiracy, even though that crime or act was not
intended as a part of the agreed upon objective . . . . You must
determine whether the defendant is guilty as a member of a
conspiracy to commit the originally agreed upon crime or crimes,
and, if so, whether the crime alleged in Count 1 was perpetrated
by a co-conspirator in furtherance of that conspiracy and was a
natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon criminal
objective of that conspiracy.”
       The jury found Romero, Franco, and their codefendants
guilty of both charges with true findings on the special
circumstance and gang allegations. The trial court sentenced
both Romero and Franco for first degree murder to life without
the possibility of parole. On the conspiracy count, the court
imposed and stayed sentences of 25 years to life.
       We affirmed the judgments against Romero and Franco.
(People v. Romero (Oct. 3, 2006, B170885) [nonpub. opn.].)
Among the arguments advanced by the codefendants, in which
Romero and Franco joined, was that CALJIC No. 8.69 as given
permitted the jury to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder without finding that each of them (as opposed to
at least two of the multiple coconspirators) had the specific intent
to kill. We agreed the language of the instruction at issue—that
“[a]t least two of the persons to the agreement harbored express

                                 6
malice aforethought, namely a specific intent to kill unlawfully
another human being”—was intended to be used only in cases
where there was a feigned accomplice, and the instruction did not
“clearly or completely describe the specific intent element for
conspiracy to commit murder in this case.” Nonetheless,
reviewing the erroneous language in the context of the entire
instruction, the other instructions given, and the record, we
concluded there was not a reasonable likelihood the jury
misunderstood the requirement that, to convict a particular
defendant of conspiracy to commit murder, the jurors had to find
the defendant harbored both the specific intent to agree and the
specific intent to kill.

B.    Franco’s Petition for Resentencing
      On March 22, 2019 Franco filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95. On May 7, 2019 the superior
court summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel
based on “the overall trial evidence as well as Court of Appeal
decision,” which showed Franco possessed an intent to kill and
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The court also held former section 1170.95 was
unconstitutional.
      On October 27, 2020 Franco filed a second petition for
resentencing. After appointing counsel and receiving the People’s
response and Franco’s reply, the superior court issued an oral
tentative ruling denying the petition. The court found Franco
was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury had
been instructed with CALJIC No. 8.81.15.1 and, by “finding true
the special circumstance of lying in wait pursuant to Penal Code
Section 190.2(a)(15), by implication . . . made a determination

                                7
that the petitioner had an intent to kill.” Further, the jury
convicted Franco of conspiracy to commit murder, and the
murder charge and the conspiracy charge involved the same
victim, meaning the jury had “to find that [Franco] had possessed
in him an intent to kill.” Following the oral tentative ruling,
Franco filed a supplemental brief requesting an order to show
cause. After considering Franco’s supplemental brief, on
November 1, 2021 the court adopted its tentative ruling and
denied the petition. Franco timely appealed.

C.     Romero’s Petition for Resentencing
       On May 16, 2022 Romero filed a form petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95. After
appointing counsel and receiving the People’s response to the
petition, the superior court provided an oral tentative ruling to
deny the petition. The court found Romero was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law because the jury convicted him of “first
degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder,”
which involved the same victim, and the jurors found the special
circumstance of lying in wait to be true, which “require[d] that
they make a finding that the defendant intentionally killed the
victim; and, two, that the murder was committed by means of
lying in wait, and certainly therefore, by implication, the jury had
to necessarily find that the petitioner possessed the specific and
express intent to kill.” On September 21, 2022 the court adopted
its tentative ruling and denied the petition. Romero timely
appealed.

                                 8
                           DISCUSSION

A.     Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189,
subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
       If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon request. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
Further, upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, the court
must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c).) In
doing so, the superior court properly examines the record of
conviction, “allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, “the prima facie
inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous
prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘“the court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a

                                  9
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved”’
. . . . ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Ibid.)
         When a petitioner has carried the burden of making a
prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)

B.    The Superior Court Erred in Finding Romero and Franco
      Were Ineligible for Resentencing as a Matter of Law
      Romero and Franco contend their records of conviction,
including the jury’s findings, do not preclude relief as a matter of
law because of the flawed jury instructions associated with the
lying-in-wait special circumstance and conspiracy charge. We
agree.4

      1.     Lying-in-wait special-circumstance instruction
      It is undisputed the trial court instructed the jury on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine (CALJIC No. 3.02)
that Romero and Franco could be convicted of Benito’s murder if

4     For the same reasons articulated in this opinion, we
reversed a postjudgment order summarily denying a
section 1170.95 petition filed by codefendant Alfredo Hernandez.
(People v. Hernandez (Oct. 18, 2022, B313884) [nonpub. opn.].)
Romero’s request for judicial notice of our opinion in People v.
Hernandez is denied as unnecessary.

                                 10
they assisted in the assault on Benito or conspired with their
confederates to commit the assault, and Benito’s murder by one
of their confederates was a natural and probable consequence of
Romero’s and Franco’s participation in that crime. This
instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, if
given alone, would have entitled Romero and Franco to an order
to show cause under section 1172.6 because an evidentiary
hearing would be necessary to determine whether Romero and
Franco acted with malice aforethought (rather than imputed
malice) based solely on their participation in the aggravated
assault on Benito. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
       The superior court relied on the jury’s true finding on the
lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation to support its
conclusion that Romero and Franco were not eligible for
resentencing. Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15), defines lying in
wait as a special circumstance when “[t]he defendant
intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.”
Section 190.2, subdivision (c), further provides that a special-
circumstance finding may only be found true with respect to a
person who was not the actual killer (other than the felony-
murder special circumstance) where the person “with the intent
to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the
first degree.” CALJIC No. 8.80.1 and CALJIC No. 8.81.15.1 set
forth the elements for a special-circumstance finding for an aider
and abettor and the elements for a lying-in-wait special-
circumstance, respectively, including the requirement of intent to
kill. Thus, where the jury is properly instructed with CALJIC
Nos. 8.80.1 and 8.81.15.1, a true finding on the lying-in-wait
special circumstance allegation under section 190.2,

                                11
subdivisions (a)(15) and (c), means the defendant necessarily
acted with express malice.
       Here, however, the trial court did not properly instruct the
jury because the special circumstance instructions omitted the
essential element of intent to kill for an aider and abettor.
Specifically, the court omitted the fourth paragraph of CALJIC
No. 8.80.1, which states: “If you find that a defendant was not
the actual killer of a human being, or if you are unable to decide
whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider and
abettor or co-conspirator, you cannot find the special
circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the
intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested or assisted any actor in the commission of the
murder in the first degree.”
       The superior court, in denying Romero’s and Franco’s
petitions based on the jury’s lying-in-wait special-circumstance
finding found that the true finding required the jury to conclude
that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait, and
“by implication,” the jury had to determine that Romero and
Franco possessed an intent to kill. While it may be that the jury
reached that decision, the inference cannot be confirmed absent
an evidentiary hearing. The jury could have found Romero and
Franco guilty of first degree murder as the natural and probable
consequence of aiding and abetting the aggravated assault on
Benito. The jury was also instructed that an aider and abettor is
a principal in that crime and, regardless of the extent of
participation, is equally guilty as a direct perpetrator (CALJIC
No. 3.02). Thus, without the omitted language from CALJIC
No. 8.80.1 regarding an aider and abettor’s intent to kill, the jury

                                 12
could have found true the special-circumstance allegation as to
Romero and Franco on the mistaken belief that, as aiders and
abettors of aggravated assault, they were equally guilty as the
direct perpetrator who had committed first degree lying-in-wait
murder. The jury’s special-circumstance finding does not,
therefore, defeat Romero’s and Franco’s prima facie showing of
eligibility for resentencing.
       Contrary to the Attorney General’s position, the trial
court’s lying-in-wait instruction pursuant to CALJIC
No. 8.81.15.1 did not cure the defective instruction pursuant to
CALJIC No. 8.80.1. As given at trial, CALJIC No. 8.81.15.1
stated that to find the lying-in-wait allegation true, the jury had
to find “[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim,” which is
the same language in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15). This
language does not specify whether it is referring to the direct
perpetrator or the aider and abettor, and therefore, without the
additional language in the fourth paragraph of CALJIC
No. 8.80.1, the jury could have found Romero and Franco guilty
as aiders and abettors of murder based on the direct perpetrator’s
intent to kill.

      2.    Jury instruction for conspiracy to commit murder
      The Attorney General does not address Romero and
Franco’s argument that because the conspiracy instruction
(CALJIC No. 8.69) was likewise flawed, their convictions for
conspiracy do not make them ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law. (See People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480
[respondent’s failure to respond to appellant’s argument may be
considered a concession].) Regardless of whether the Attorney

                                13
General’s failure to address this argument is a concession,
Romero and Franco are again correct.
      As explained in our opinion affirming the convictions of
Romero, Franco, and their codefendants on direct appeal, the
reference in CALJIC No. 8.69 to “at least two of the persons”
rather than “each of the persons,” in defining the conspiracy’s
necessary specific intent elements, was error.5 More than a
decade after our decision, in People v. Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th
485, 516 (Garton), the Supreme Court explained that “[a]sking
the jury to find specific intent for ‘at least two’ conspirators in a
conspiracy with more than two members, none of whom is
feigning involvement, could potentially lead a jury to find an
individual conspirator guilty without finding that he or she
possessed a specific intent to agree or to kill.” In contrast to our
analysis in the direct appeal—in which we evaluated whether
there was a reasonable likelihood under People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 that the jury misunderstood the instruction—the
court in Garton held the error harmless under any standard
(Watson or Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18) because
the jury had been properly instructed pursuant to CALJIC
No. 8.80.1 that if the defendant “‘was not the actual killer of a

5     The Use Notes to CALJIC No. 8.69, at page 388, explain,
“The alternative bracketed wording has been provided in
elements 2, 3 and 4 to accommodate the situation where there is
a feigned accomplice. ‘The “feigned participation of a false
coconspirator or government agent in a conspiracy of more than
two people does not negate criminal liability for conspiracy, as
long as there are at least two other coconspirators who actually
agree to the commission of the subject crime, specifically intend
that the crime be committed, and themselves commit at least one
overt act.”’”

                                  14
human being, . . . you cannot find the special circumstance to be
true . . . unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
[the defendant], with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor
in the commission of the murder in the first degree.’” (Garton, at
p. 517.) On this basis, the Garton court concluded that “in
finding the special circumstances true, the jury necessarily found
that Garton possessed a specific intent to kill Carole and her
fetus.”6 (Ibid.)
       As discussed, the language the Garton court relied on from
the fourth paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 was the key language
the trial court omitted from the instruction given at Romero’s and
Franco’s trial. Absent that language, Romero’s and Franco’s
convictions for conspiracy to commit murder do not establish they
are ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

6     The special circumstances alleged and found true in
Garton, supra, 4 Cal.5th at page 485 were that the defendant
committed multiple murders, he committed the murders for
financial gain, and a principal in each offense was armed with a
firearm.

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                         DISPOSITION

       The postjudgment orders denying Romero’s and Franco’s
petitions for resentencing are reversed. On remand the superior
court is to issue orders to show cause and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                                        FEUER, J.
We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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