Court Opinion

ID: 9391894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 16:00:51.317285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.252294
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12562    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12562
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       JOHN KEILEY LUBIN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20046-CMA-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12562     Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023   Page: 2 of 5

       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-12562

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              John Lubin pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated
       identity theft. Because his 36-month wire fraud sentence is
       substantively reasonable, we affirm.
                                       I.
              In early 2021, Miami police arrested John Lubin at a traffic
       stop. During the stop, Lubin repeatedly reached into his bag,
       which the police discovered contained a firearm. When the police
       asked Lubin to give his name and birthday, he gave the name on
       his driver’s license and claimed that he did not remember his
       birthday. He later admitted that his real name was not the name
       on his license.
              Soon after, Lubin pleaded guilty to wire fraud under 18
       U.S.C. § 1343 and aggravated identity theft under § 1028A(a)(1). As
       part of his factual proffer, he admitted that his driver’s license
       featured his picture but included someone else’s personal
       information. He knew that this information matched a real person.
       With this fraudulent license, Lubin had purchased two luxury
       vehicles—then defaulted on the loans—and rented multiple
       apartments in Miami, for which he never fully paid.
             The presentence investigation report (PSI) applied the U.S.
       Sentencing Guidelines to recommend an advisory range for
       Lubin’s sentence. The PSI determined that he had an offense level
USCA11 Case: 22-12562     Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023   Page: 3 of 5

       22-12562              Opinion of the Court                       3

       of 13 and a criminal history category of II. Together, that
       amounted to an advisory Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months for
       the wire fraud count. By statute, the aggravated identity theft
       count added a mandatory 24 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
       Lubin did not object to anything in the PSI.
              After a hearing, the court sentenced him to 60 months
       imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The sentence
       included the mandatory 24 months for aggravated identity theft
       and 36 months for wire fraud—an upward variance of 15 months
       from the Guidelines recommendation. To explain the variance,
       the court first invoked the sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553. It considered the Guidelines range “inadequate in
       addressing the statutory factors” because of “the nature and
       circumstances of the offense conduct” and Lubin’s “history and
       characteristics.” The court focused on his extensive history of
       identity fraud, his knowledge of the wrongfulness of his acts, and
       the harms he had caused. And the court concluded that there was
       “a great need to deter Mr. Lubin from future wrongful conduct as
       well as to deter others.”
             Lubin now appeals the 36-month wire fraud sentence,
       claiming that it is substantively unreasonable.
                                       II.
              We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
       abuse of discretion. United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636
       (11th Cir. 2013).
USCA11 Case: 22-12562      Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 05/03/2023     Page: 4 of 5

       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12562

                                        III.
              When imposing a sentence, a court may exceed the
       Guidelines range based on the factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
       United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). We
       will not “second guess” the weight given to these factors as long as
       the sentence is “reasonable under the circumstances.” Id.
               Lubin’s sentence is reasonable. Echoing § 3553(a)(1), the
       court explained that he has “a history of taking liberties with other
       people’s identities to defraud, to steal,” and do so “without regard
       for those who he is hurting.” Our review of the PSI confirms this
       observation. If anything, the district court understated Lubin’s
       previous conduct. For example, the PSI contains convictions
       showing that he had used stolen credit card information a “large
       number” of times and already presented a fake driver’s license to
       police. It also summarizes arrest affidavits suggesting that Lubin
       cloned multiple credit cards for others, created fraudulent
       identification cards, and possessed a vehicle stolen using someone
       else’s identity. All this information is relevant. See Butler, 39 F.4th
       at 1355–56 (summarizing the “broad leeway” courts have to weigh
       criminal history (quotation omitted)); United States v. Williams,
       989 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that courts may
       consider “facts drawn from police reports” related to arrests when
       the defendant does not contest their reliability).
             We are also persuaded by the court’s characterization of
       Lubin’s offense as serious and the weight it placed on the need for
       both specific and general deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
USCA11 Case: 22-12562    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023   Page: 5 of 5

       22-12562              Opinion of the Court                      5

       Indeed, Lubin’s “economic and fraud-based crimes” are “prime
       candidates for general deterrence.” United States v. Martin, 455
       F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration adopted and quotation
       omitted). Finally, “a sentence imposed well below the statutory
       maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United
       States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2021). Lubin’s
       three-year wire fraud sentence is well below the statutory
       maximum of twenty years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
              Because Lubin’s sentence is reasonable given the statutory
       guidance and undisputed facts, the court did not abuse its
       discretion.
                                *      *      *
             We AFFIRM.