Court Opinion

ID: 9824709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:10:09.875913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:59.413151
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Among the points re-argued by appellant’s counsel in his 'brief in support of this application is the one pertaining to the designation of the deceased as “Epriam, alias Ephron Levert,” whereas deceased’s true name is Ephriam Levert.
As pointed out in the Original •opinion, the indictment designated the deceased as “Epriam, alias Ephron Levert”. In the written confession signed by the defendant and received in evidence, the deceased is designated as “Ephron." Thus •aside from whether “Ephriam” and “Epriam” are idem sonans, there was evidence •identifying the deceased specifically by one ■of the names by which he was designated in the indictment. In pointing this out we ■in no way mean to-depart from the view heretofore expressed that whether one name is idem sonans with another, notwithstanding a difference in the spelling of the two, raises a question of fact for the jury when it arises on evidence under a plea of the general issue, and is not a matter of law for the court. (See cases cited in original opinion).
It is further pointed out that nowhere is there a ruling asked or made which takes note of any variance between deceased’s name in the indictment and his allegedly real name. True, the name of the deceased must be correctly stated, and a material variance is fatal. But a mere inaccuracy where the identity of the person named in the indictment with the one named in the evidence is established, is not fatal. McCoy v. State, 232 Ala. 104, 166 So. 769.
In appellant’s brief in support of her application for rehearing counsel further earnestly argues that the cumulative effect of certain questions propounded by the Solicitor to State’s witness Cornelius on direct examination, coupled with an improper argument by the Solicitor should cause a reversal of this cause.
As to the examination of Cornelius the record shows the following: ,
“Q. What was the occasion of you going to Ephraim’s house that night ? A. To buy me some whiskey.
“Q. And did you buy some there? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Who did you buy it from? A. I bought it from Josephine.
“Q. Josephine Levert? A. Yes, sir.
“Mr.- Ewing: We object-to that, if the Court please.
“The Court: Well, you want to object to the question, Mr. Ewing.
“Mr. Ewing: We move to strike the answer.
“The Court: It is after the witness has testified. I don’t think it is competent testimony.
“Mr. Brobston: We ask the Court to charge the jury to disregard the answer.
“The Court: Where did the objection come in?
*528“(The reporter read the question, answer, and objection).
“Mr. Sullinger: Judge, this is the night of the killing.
“The Court: I understand. I don’t think that would be competent testimony, the sale of liquor. If the parties were drinking it might be a different proposition.
“Mr. Ewing: This is purely and simply a— ■
“The Court: T don’t see that it is material to the issue in this case on trial. I will sustain the objection.
“Mr. Sullinger: I want to show that the witness and defendant drank the liquor. I want to show that they did have some liquor.
“The Court: That is a round way. You can ask the direct question whether she was drinking or not. Sustain the objection to the last question, or rather, the motion to .exclude, that he bought it from Josephine. That is excluded. The jury must not consider that testimony or let it have any influence with you.
“Q. Frank, you went down to Josephine’s house about ten-thirty and you got some liquor there? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. How much did you get ? A. Well, I first got a -one dollar shot, and then turned around— ’ -/ ■
“Mr. Ewing: We move to exclude that, if your Honor please; about the one dollar shot.
“The Court: I- don’t think the quantity is material. Sustain the objection.
“Mr. Sullinger: You don’t think the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the killing that night is material?
“The’Court: 3 am not going to argue with you, Mr. Sullinger, but I don’t-think .the question brings that out. You asked him how much liquor he bought from her.
“Mr. Sullinger :s No, I didn’t.
“Q. How'much liquor did'you and Josephine have there, is what I am getting at?
“Mr. Ewing: Wé object. It calls for irrelevant, illegal incompetent and immaterial testimony. Sheds no light, and it is prejudicial.
“The Court: Sustain the objection. I think the testimony should be limited to the quantity of liquor, if any,' that the defendant drank at that time.
“Q. All right, Frank, we will go back. You and Josephine have any liquor down there at the house?
“A. That is the way I bought it—
“Mr. Ewing: I object to that.
“Q. Did you have any liquor down there? A. Yes, sir.
“Mr. Ewing: This Negro got more sense than that. This witness was a witness in the case before; we have talked to him before; and he never testified a thing about that before, like that.
“The Court: Mr. Ewing, if you have any objection to make, please make it.
“Mr. Ewing: I am objecting to his continuing to volunteer this statement. He is smart enough to know better than that.
“The Court: I don’t know. The witness is not apparently a college graduate of a high, degree.
“Mr. Ewing: I ask that he be instructed to answer the question.
“The Court: Lets proceed.
“Q. Did you and Josephine have some liquor down there that night? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you drink any of it? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did Josephine drink any of it? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. How much did you drink? 'A. Well, I drank a dollar shot.
“Q. How much did Josephine drink?
“Mr. Ewing: We move to exclude that.
“The Court: Overruled.
“Mr. Ewing: We except.
“A. Me and her drunk that whiskey together.
“Q. Can you -say about how- much, you had about, if in a water glass, or bottle; -how much liquor did you and Josephine drink between you? A. About a- hal-f pint.”
Also during the cross' examination of the appellant the record shows the following:
*529“Q. You do sell whiskey there don’t you?
“Mr. Ewing: I object to that.
“A. Sir?
“Q. You do sell whiskey there don’t you? A. No, sir.”
The improper argument complained of was the following statement by the Solicitor to the jury in his closing argument, the record showing the following:
“What does he find? He finds Screwworm out there buying whiskey as usual.
“Mr. Ewing: I object to that.
“The Court: I don’t think the evidence shows that he bought it as usual. I will exclude that. The jury will not consider it.”
This court has en banc given careful consideration to this application for rehearing. We have concluded there is merit in appellant’s contention.
Under all the evidence disclosed by this record whether there had been a sale of liquor by the appellant was irrelevant to' the issues. This line of improper testimony was however injected into this case by the Solicitor during the cross examination of Cornelius. It is true that the trial judge sustained objections where the same were interposed. This same line of questioning, though without objection being interposed, was persisted in during the cross examination of the appellant. The appéllant denied the sale of whiskey. The questions nevertheless carried their odium.
In the face of the court’s action in sustaining the objection to the questions pertaining to the sale of whiskey 'by' the appellant the Solicitor’s reference in his closing argument to -such sales cannot be regarded lightly.. The-court-did sustain the appellant’s objection to-'such line of argument, and instructed the jury rather perfunctorily to disregard same.
We of course cannot with certainty measure the substantive injury to appellant’s cause by the above occurrences. We are certain however that the possibility of substantial injury is real. This being so justice demands that this case be submitted to another jury free of- these extraneous influences. Birmingham Baptist Hospital, Inc., v. Blackwell, 221 Ala. 225, 128 So. 389; American Ry. Express Co. v. Reid, 216 Ala. 479, 113 So. 507; Blue v. State, 246 Ala. 73, 19 So.2d 11; Moore v. State, 30 Ala.App. 552, 9 So.2d 146.
We therefore conclude that the lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial. This application for a rehearing should therefore be granted and this cause reversed. It is so ordered.
Application for rehearing granted. Cause reversed and remanded.
After Remandment.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court reversing and remanding this -case to us for further consideration it is stated: “The Court of Appeals reversed on rehearing because of the ‘possibility of substantial injury.’ Unless the occurrence on which the motion was -based, which did not involve a ruling adverse to appellant, probably injuriously affected the substantial rights of appellant, there was no reversible error in overruling the motion.”
The full context of what we wrote is set out earlier in the opinion of the Supreme Court, and it is to be noted that the full context shows that what we said was that “the possibility of substantial injury is real.” (Italics ours).
The writer is of course fully aware that in determination of property interests exact phraseology and deft choice of words is of utmost importance. In -conveyances and instruments -dealing with rights of property certain words, with the gloss of judicial interpretation surrounding them, have acquired rigid meanings. Certainty of title is essential to property value, and necessitates rigid word connotation in this field of jurisprudence.
The writer has however never -considered exact or set terminology a necessary ingredient of decisions dealing with criminál cases, in which conclusions must rest in many instances on the particular facts of each individual case, so long as the words used reflected the spirit of the law. “For the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.” 2 Corinthians 3 :6. Absolute justice to the individual, rather ■ than - rigidity of word meanings growing out of pat expression's *530congealed in legal terminology, is the desired end in such cases.
The writer is, and was, familiar with the terminology of Supreme Court Rule 45, Code 1940, Tit. 7 Appendix, and that its exact terminology was that we should not ■base a. reversal on error unless, after an examination of the entire cause it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected the substantial rights of the parties.
Different shadings of meaning are of course attached to words by different individuals. In our opinion we stated “We are certain however that the possibility of substantial injury is real.” To the writer the meaning connoted by such words is that the error with which we consider this record infected probably injuriously affected the substantial rights of this appellant.
Upon further consideration of this cause, and after giving effect to the principles enunciated in Blue v. State, 246 Ala. 73, 19 So.2d 11; Kraas v. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278, 164 So. 565; Templeton & Son v. David, 233 Ala. 616, 173 So. 231; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Sullivan Timber Co., 126 Ala. 95, 27 So. 760, and Clendenon v. Yarbrough, 233, Ala. 269, 171 So. 277, it is our opinion that the error pointed out in our former opinion in this cause probably injuriously affected the substantial rights of this appellant and that this cause is due to be reversed and remanded. It is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.
BRICKEN, Presiding Judge, not sitting.