Court Opinion

ID: 9575080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:11:24.456684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:56.846741
License: Public Domain

FROEB, Judge
(concurring specially):
There is nothing in the Profit Sharing Plan-which renders the fact finding function of the Administrative Committee conclusive to the extent that it is beyond review in a court proceeding. Applying this principle to the facts of this case, the de*454termination by the Administrative Committee as to why Monseur terminated his employment was not immune from judicial review. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Monseur terminated his employment because of a dispute over a new method of compensating salesmen and not because of any purpose to engage in a competitive business. There is reasonable evidence in the record to support this finding. I would therefore affirm the judgment on this ground.
Whether the Administrative Committee acted in good faith or bad faith is important only to the question of the Administrative Committee’s construction and interpretation of the provisions of the Profit Sharing Plan. If there is ambiguity as to what the provisions of the Plan mean, the Committee must interpret them as provided by Article 9.4(b) which states:
“[The Committee shall have the right, power and authority] to construe all terms, provisions, conditions, and limitations of the Plan, and its construction thereof made in good faith shall be final and conclusive on all parties at interest.”
It is the interpretation function only which is beyond judicial review if made in good faith.
In my opinion the Administrative Committee incorrectly called into operation its interpretative function in deciding to forfeit Monseur’s interest under Article 8A(J)(1), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
“If a Participant’s employment is terminated for the purpose of engaging in a business . . . which is in direct competition with the Employer in such manner as to threaten economic loss to the Employer as a result of such Participant’s activity, . . . then . any such Participant shall forfeit his entire interest in the trust fund save and except any amounts which may be credited to him ... by reason of his personal contributions.”
The words “for the purpose of . . . ” cannot be ignored. No interpretation made by the Committee, even in good faith, can alter the plain language of the provision. It is clear that the forfeiture test is dependent upon the “purpose” of the employee in terminating his employment. It is not within the province of the Administrative Committee to substitute another standard, namely the “subsequent taking of employment with a competitive company.” It is for this reason that the question of whether the Administrative Committee made its “interpretation” in good faith or bad faith is of no importance to this case. It does not matter what its motives were. It was merely incorrect in undertaking to construe Article 8A(J)(1), since as written and as applied to Monseur it required no construction.
As the court found as a fact that Monseur did not terminate for the “purpose” of accepting competitive employment, there was no ground for forfeiture and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.