Court Opinion

ID: 9713643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:19:16.729506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:24.049703
License: Public Domain

Henderson, J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion, in which Delaplaine, J., concurred.
It is conceded in this case that the complainant was in a confidential relationship to the decedent on account of the age, illness and complete reliance of the decedent upon her. Under such circumstances the universal rule is that the burden is upon the dominant party to show not only that the transaction is fair, but also that the transferor is fully informed and clearly understands the legal import of the paper signed. Cook v. Hollyday, 185 Md. 656, 668, 45 A. 2d 761; Coburn v. Shilling, 138 Md. 177, 199, 113 A. 761, and cases cited. Where the transfer is testamentary in its nature i.e., to take effect upon death, considerations of fairness to the transferor are beside the point, for she parts with no present interest. Nor are considerations of fairness to the next of kin involved, for they would have no standing to complain if their expectations were wholly disappointed. But in all such cases the law is justly concerned with the possibility of imposition and overreaching, and imposes upon the dominant party the burden of showing affirmatively that the transferor has knowledge of the contents of the paper signed. The majority opinion in this case fails to state or glosses over this controlling principle.
' There is no testimony that the decedent, after she entered the hospital with a broken leg, ever mentioned to anyone an intention to make a testamentary disposition of all or any part of her estate. The testimony that *175in 1946 she had expressed the intention to will her house and other property to her attentive cousin, rather than to let it pass to her aged brothers and sister who were her next of kin, is not relevant to the present inquiry. Whether a trust has been effectually created “depends entirely upon the actual intention of the original owner of the fund at the time he had the entry in the bank book made”. Ragan v. Kelly, 180 Md. 324, 331, 24 A. 2d 289, 293, quoted in Bradford v. Eutaw Savings Bank, 186 Md. 127, 135, 46 A. 2d 284.
The testimony shows that Mrs. Duker was concerned about the payment of her hospital bills. The hospital had asked for payment. The cousin told the doctors that the patient had funds to pay the bills, and procured an order to transfer from the bank. This order was not read to the decedent, nor was she able to read it; she could not even see the line where she signed but her hand was placed on it. Dr. McDonnell testified: “It was explained she was signing the paper to make funds available to someone else. * * * She was signing over to Mrs. Hancock funds from her bank account.” The nurse testified that later Mrs. Duker inquired of Mrs. Hancock if the paper was all right at the bank. The bank had declined to accept the order because of the illegible signature and failure to specify the amount, but Mrs. Hancock did not say so. The nurse testified that Mrs. Duker “wanted to know if she had attended to the bills.” Mrs. Hancock said everything would be taken care of. No one testified that Mrs. Duker was told that the paper contained a printed clause to the effect that the whole balance would belong to the survivor. So far from proving knowledge the complainant proved a lack of knowledge.
This court has often commented on the fact that banks habitually use this stock form to cover a variety of situations to which it is inappropriate. Text writers have argued that even in the absence of a confidential relation no presumption should arise from the execution of the paper itself. This court has said that it makes *176a prima facie but rebuttable case. Here we have positive testimony in rebuttal that Mrs. Duker was not informed of the vital clause and could not read it. If any inference could be drawn, in the teeth, of the evidence act, that Mrs. Hancock told her about it, the short answer is that the chancellor, who saw and heard the witnesses, did not draw it. His conclusion that she did not intend to give.Mrs. Hancock more than a power of withdrawal to pay the bills is clearly supported by the weight of the evidence. I think the decree should be affirmed. Judge Delaplaine concurs in the views here expressed.