Court Opinion

ID: 9919182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 17:09:44.271066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:52.500228
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                In The Supreme Court

   The State, Respondent,

   v.

   William C. (Billy) Sellers, Petitioner.

   Appellate Case No. 2021-000910

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

               Appeal from Edgefield County
          Eugene C. Griffith Jr., Circuit Court Judge

                    Opinion No. 28188
        Heard March 30, 2023 – Filed January 17, 2024

                          AFFIRMED

   Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
   Columbia, for Petitioner.

   Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
   General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
   Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior
   Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, of
   Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard III, of
   Lexington, all for Respondent.
JUSTICE FEW: The court of appeals affirmed Billy Sellers' conviction for murder
arising from the brutal killing of Johnny Hydrick. We granted Sellers' petition for a
writ of certiorari to address two questions. First, did the trial court's jury instruction
defining malice in part as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause
or excuse" shift the burden of proof to Sellers to provide justification or excuse for
his wrongful acts, or was that portion of the instruction otherwise contrary to law.
Second, did the State present evidence to support the trial court instructing the jury
as to Sellers' criminal liability under the doctrine of "the hand of one is the hand of
all." We affirm the court of appeals.

      I.     Background

Johnny Hydrick—disabled from a car accident—was widely known in his
hometown of Trenton, South Carolina, to keep large supplies of Oxycodone on hand
to alleviate the pain associated with his disability. Hydrick often illegally sold
Oxycodone to others, including Sellers. At trial, the State presented strong evidence
Sellers personally murdered Hydrick in his home on October 10, 2014, during the
course of burglarizing his home and robbing him of Oxycodone, guns, and cash. A
pathologist testified the cause of death was "multiple blunt-force injuries" to the head
"due to a beating." While the State's primary theory was Sellers personally beat
Hydrick to death,1 the State presented the alternative theory Sellers was guilty under
the doctrine the hand of one is the hand of all because he and a man named "Gee"
agreed to carry out the burglary and robbery, during the course of which Gee beat
Hydrick to death or did so jointly with Sellers.

The jury convicted Sellers of murder. Because Sellers had a prior conviction from
Florida for burglary of a dwelling while armed with a deadly weapon, "an offense
that would be classified as a most serious offense" under subsection 17-25-45(C)(1)
of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2023), the trial court was required to sentence
him to life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to subsection 17-25-
45(A)(1) (2014). The court of appeals' opinion affirming the conviction is
unpublished. State v. Sellers, Op. No. 2021-UP-254 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 7,
2021).

1
 Because the strength of the State's evidence that Sellers personally beat Hydrick to
death is not an issue on appeal, we do not discuss most of that evidence.
      II.    Malice Jury Instruction

Sellers contends that, by including the language "the intentional doing of a wrongful
act without just cause or excuse" in the definition of malice in its jury charge, the
trial court violated his due process rights by shifting the burden to him to prove he
acted with just cause or excuse. We begin our discussion of Sellers' burden-shifting
argument by pointing out the trial court gave the jury a thorough and complete
instruction on the State's burden of proving "all of the elements, each of them,
beyond a reasonable doubt." Among multiple specific references in its jury charge
to the State's burden of proof, the trial court instructed the jury that "to sustain a
conviction for murder the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the
defendant killed another person with malice . . . ." The trial court then defined
malice "as hatred, ill will, hostility toward another person. It is the intentional doing
of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse . . . ."

Under the State's clearly-articulated burden of proof and the trial court's definition
of malice, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sellers
acted "without just cause or excuse." Thus, we find the trial court's jury instruction
on malice could not have been reasonably interpreted by the jury as shifting the
burden of proof to Sellers. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S. Ct.
2450, 2456, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 47 (1979) (analyzing whether a jury instruction violated
the Due Process Clause because of improper burden shifting as whether "a
reasonable jury could well have interpreted" the instruction to relieve the State of its
burden of proof); see also State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 19, 406 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1991)
(holding a jury instruction defining malice as "the doing of a wrongful act
intentionally and without just cause or excuse" was not "an unconstitutional burden-
shifting" instruction).

Sellers also argues the malice instruction was "needlessly confusing" and violated
"this Court's modern pattern of disapproving of jury instructions on how the jury
should interpret certain evidence." On this point, the court of appeals stated,

             We understand Sellers' argument that a reasonable jury
             could apply the phrase equating malice with "intentional
             doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" in
             problematic ways. We are not sure what the challenged
             phrase adds to a malice charge and can see the wisdom in
             not charging it. We are also not sure how a wrongful act
              can be said to be done with malice if all that is proven is
              that the act was done with intent . . . . Nor are we sure how
              an intentional act that is justified or excusable by law
              could be a crime.

Sellers, Op. No. 2021-UP-254, at 2-3.

Instructing a jury on any point of law is difficult, but it can be particularly so on the
principle of malice. In some cases, such as where there is evidence the defendant
acted in self-defense, it is true the State must prove the defendant acted without just
cause or excuse. See State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011)
(holding "when a defendant claims self-defense, the State is required to disprove the
elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt"). Here, however, there was no
evidence of self-defense or any other legal justification for the killing of Hydrick.
The only question in this case was whether it was Sellers who committed the crime.
Thus, like the court of appeals, we question what the phrase "without just cause or
excuse" added to the jury's understanding of the legal principle of malice. While we
caution our trial courts to carefully consider whether to include any phrase in a jury
instruction, however, we do not believe the phrase "without just cause or excuse" in
this case could have caused the jury to be confused, nor could have improperly
guided the jury on how to interpret specific evidence. We find no error.

In his brief to the court of appeals, Sellers argued for the first time the trial court did
not connect the phrase "the intentional doing of a wrongful act" to an act that
proximately caused Hydrick's death. He argued the jury instruction could thus lead
the jury to conclude the State proved malice merely by showing Sellers engaged in
the "wrongful act" of buying or selling drugs, burglarizing Hydrick's home, or
robbing Hydrick, unless Sellers showed "just cause or excuse" for those acts. "There
was," counsel wrote in his brief to this Court, "a variety of . . . unlawful or wrongful
acts that this jury instruction impermissibly called upon [Sellers] to show 'just cause
or excuse' for . . . ." At oral argument before this Court, Sellers argued for the first
time—in connection with the hand of one is the hand of all—the instruction
permitted the jury to find the State proved Sellers' malice merely by showing another
person committed one of these wrongful acts.

Neither of these arguments is preserved for appellate review, however, as neither
argument was presented to the trial court. See State v. Field, 429 S.C. 578, 582, 840
S.E.2d 548, 550 (2020) ("As we have repeatedly held, 'A party need not use the exact
name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the argument
has been presented on that ground. A party may not argue one ground at trial and
an alternate ground on appeal.'" (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587
S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))).

      III.   The Hand of One is the Hand of All Jury Charge

Ordinarily, the State convicts a defendant of a crime by proving that he personally
committed the criminal act. As discussed above, the State's primary theory in this
case was Sellers committed the murder by personally beating Hydrick to death.
Under the doctrine we refer to in South Carolina as "the hand of one is the hand of
all," the State proves the defendant guilty by proving he had a mutual plan or
agreement with another person to commit one crime, and during the course of
committing that initial crime, the other person committed a second crime they had
not agreed to commit. State v. Harry, 420 S.C. 290, 299, 803 S.E.2d 272, 276
(2017); see also Butler v. State, 435 S.C. 96, 97-98, 866 S.E.2d 347, 348 (2021)
("Under the theory the 'hand of one is the hand of all,' when two people join together
to commit a crime, and during the commission of that crime one of the two commits
another crime, both may be criminally liable for the unplanned crime if it was a
natural and probable consequence of their common plan to commit the initial
crime."). In this case, the State's alternative theory was that Sellers and Gee mutually
planned to burglarize Hydrick's home and rob him of Oxycodone, guns, or cash, and
while the two of them were carrying out those initial crimes, either Gee beat Hydrick
to death or the two of them mutually beat Hydrick to death.

In most cases in which the State attempts to convict a defendant of murder under the
hand of one doctrine, the factual scenario involves a gunshot, not a beating. In such
a typical case, two or more people agreed to commit the initial crime, and during the
course of that crime a person who is not the defendant shot and killed a victim. This
typical scenario is that one of them—not both of them—fired the shot that killed the
victim. In cases where the evidence is clear the other person—not the defendant—
fired the fatal shot, the hand of one doctrine clearly applies and the trial court will
instruct the jury on the doctrine without hesitation. In many cases, however, the
evidence is not clear as to one of three points: (1) whether there was a mutual plan
or agreement, (2) whether the person who might have fired the fatal shot was part of
that plan or agreement, or (3) whether the other person in the plan or agreement is
the person who fired the fatal shot. If the evidence is unclear as to any one of these
points, it can be quite difficult for the trial court to determine whether to instruct the
jury on the hand of one doctrine.

As to the first point, the trial court must determine whether there is any evidence the
defendant had a mutual plan or agreement with another person to commit an initial
crime. In Harry, for example, the propriety of the hand of one jury instruction
depended on whether the State presented evidence the defendant agreed with the
others in his group to use illegal force if that force became necessary to retrieve his
television. Compare 420 S.C. at 300, 803 S.E.2d at 277 (majority concluding "the
evidence yielded a reasonable series of inferences . . . that Petitioner devised a plan
to retrieve, by force if necessary, his television from Victim" and, "The State
therefore presented sufficient evidence that Petitioner was engaged in a scheme to
commit an illegal act, the result of which was Victim's shooting death"), with 420
S.C. at 301, 803 S.E.2d at 278 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (concluding "the record
contains no evidence of an illegal plan").

As to the second point, the trial court must determine whether there is any evidence
the other person who might have fired the fatal shot was a person included in the
mutual plan or agreement to commit the initial crime. In State v. Washington, 431
S.C. 394, 848 S.E.2d 779 (2020), for example, there was evidence another person—
Kinloch—joined together with the defendant to harass and assault Manigault (the
initial crime), and there was evidence another person—not the defendant—fired the
shot that killed Manigault. 431 S.C. at 406-07, 848 S.E.2d at 785-86. But there was
no evidence Kinloch fired the shot, 431 S.C. at 409, 848 S.E.2d at 787, and there
was no evidence the other person who might have fired the shot was part of the
agreement to commit the initial crime, 431 S.C. at 407, 848 S.E.2d at 786. This
Court found the hand of one jury instruction should not have been given because
"there was no evidence Kinloch shot Manigault," 431 S.C. at 409, 848 S.E.2d at 787,
and "Kinloch is the only possible person who could fall into the category of
Petitioner's accomplice," 431 S.C. at 407, 848 S.E.2d at 786.

The third point requires the trial court to determine whether there is evidence the
defendant fired the fatal shot and evidence the person with whom the defendant had
a mutual plan or agreement is the person who fired the fatal shot. In Barber v. State,
393 S.C. 232, 712 S.E.2d 436 (2011), for example, three witnesses testified the
defendant shot two victims, killing one. 393 S.C. at 234-35, 712 S.E.2d at 438.
However, the trial court also instructed the jury it may find the defendant guilty on
the alternative "hand of one" theory that one of his co-defendants was the gunman.
393 S.C. at 235, 712 S.E.2d at 438. The defendant argued on appeal there was no
evidence a co-defendant was the person who fired the fatal shot, and thus the trial
court erred by charging the hand of one theory. See 393 S.C. at 237, 712 S.E.2d at
439 (stating "the question is whether there is any evidence that another co-
conspirator was the shooter").

Barber is the classic example of this third type of case because there was evidence
the defendant fired the shot, but the question was whether there was also evidence
the other person fired the shot. This is the scenario in which we said the "alternate
theory of liability may only be charged when the evidence is equivocal on some
integral fact." 393 S.C. at 236, 712 S.E.2d at 439. In other words, Barber requires
the trial court to determine whether—in addition to evidence the defendant fired the
shot—there is any evidence the person with whom he agreed to commit the initial
crime fired the shot. By stating the evidence must be "equivocal," we simply meant
the evidence must support both alternative theories as to which person was the
shooter. If all the evidence indicates the defendant was the only shooter, the hand
of one theory must not be charged.

This case is unlike Harry, Washington, and Barber because determining whether it
was proper to charge the hand of one doctrine here requires addressing all three
points—whether there was evidence (1) Sellers mutually agreed with Gee to
burglarize Hydrick's home and rob him, (2) Gee participated with Sellers in the
burglary and the robbery, and (3) Gee administered a fatal blow to Hydrick during
the beating.

We turn, therefore, to the testimony and evidence the State introduced at trial, and
begin with the testimony of several inmates Sellers met while incarcerated at the
Edgefield County jail awaiting trial. Dennis Amerson testified he did not know
Sellers before meeting him during "rec" time when they were let out of their cells
for one hour a day. Sellers told Amerson he and two of his friends were "scrapping
metal" across the street from Hydrick's house earlier on the day the murder occurred.
Sellers told Amerson he tied up the victim and beat him, and that some pills and
other items were stolen from the victim. As to the stolen items, Sellers told Amerson
"they had got [sic] rid of them."

Phillip Griffin testified he and Sellers were cellmates beginning with Griffin's arrest
on November 21, 2014, and Sellers started talking about the charges against him. At
first, Griffin testified, Sellers denied he committed the crime. As they continued
talking, however, "His story would change a little bit and he kind of started putting
himself involved in the case." Griffin testified Sellers' story "got to the point to
where he told me that he actually went out there to commit a robbery," and then "him
and a friend . . . drove down Highway 19 to go to the guy's house and they was [sic]
going to pull a lick and rob him." Griffin then explained "pull a lick" meant, "They
were going to rob him or steal." Sellers told Griffin he knew Hydrick "just got his
prescriptions filled and [Sellers] was gonna [sic] go get his pills. If he had any
money, [Sellers] wanted it too." Griffin then summarized what Sellers told him,

             They were in his van and they drove down 19 and went
             close to his house, like an abandoned lot about a hundred,
             a hundred and fifty yards away from where Johnny lived
             and that's where they parked and they went to his house.
             They parked there. They went to his house and they taped
             him up and was asking him where the pills were and they
             were pistol-whipping him until he told them where the
             pills were.

When asked whom Sellers said he was with, Griffin testified Sellers said "a guy
named Gee."

Wesley Brown testified he and Sellers were cellmates after Brown was arrested in
January 2015. Sellers initially told Brown he had an alibi. Brown testified that after
he told Sellers the supposed alibi witness was a close friend of Brown's, "I guess he
lightened up a little bit, like he felt like he could trust me a little more." As they
continued to talk, Sellers described committing the crime with "some other person"
he did not name. Sellers told Brown, "We did it with a .38." Brown also testified
Sellers told him that sometime after Hydrick's murder "a guy named Gee" was using
Sellers' phone and "while he was using [Sellers'] phone, he was putting text messages
or something in his phone, I mean, I guess to make it look like [Sellers] did it."

The State called Jeremy Hembree, an investigator with the Aiken Department of
Public Safety, who testified he performed a "phone extraction" to download all the
data from Sellers' phone on November 6, 2014, one week after the Edgefield County
Sheriff's Department arrested Sellers for Hydrick's murder. Investigator Hembree
testified Sellers' phone records showed multiple calls the evening of the murder to a
contact in Sellers' phone named Gee. Investigator Hembree testified, however, that
when he did another phone extraction of Sellers' phone just before trial, the "Gee"
contact had been deleted, along with all calls and text messages to and from Gee.

We find this evidence supports the trial court's decision to charge the hand of one
doctrine to the jury. First, Sellers' statement to Griffin was specific that he and Gee
agreed to jointly enter Hydrick's home for the purpose of robbing him. This
statement is supported by the fact Sellers made phone calls to Gee just before the
crime and deleted Gee's contact information from his phone after he was arrested.

Second, Sellers' statement to Griffin was specific that he and Gee jointly tied up
Hydrick and pistol-whipped him to accomplish the robbery. This statement is
further supported by Sellers' telling Brown "we" did it with a .38 caliber pistol and
his telling Amerson "they" had gotten rid of the items stolen from Hydrick. Thus,
there is evidence Gee was part of Sellers' criminal plan.

Finally, as to the third point, unlike in Barber and other cases, the State was not
required to offer evidence Gee killed Hydrick instead of Sellers doing so. Rather,
the evidence they jointly beat Hydrick supports the State's position that either one or
both of them could have administered the fatal blow or blows. Therefore, the Barber
idea of "equivocal" evidence—which we applied in Barber because the shooting
must have been done by one but not both of the co-defendants—is not applicable
here. In addition, Sellers told Griffin that when Sellers left Hydrick's home, Hydrick
was still alive. This statement clearly supports an inference it was Gee who delivered
the final or fatal blows to Hydrick after Sellers left the crime scene.

Thus, if the jury believed Griffin's testimony about what Sellers told him, or if it
believed Amerson's and Brown's testimony, then it could find Sellers guilty based
on Gee's actions beating Hydrick during the burglary and robbery the two of them
agreed to commit without speculating and without having to rely on finding evidence
to be not credible. See Washington, 431 S.C. at 411, 848 S.E.2d at 788 (reversing
because the hand of one charge "invited the jury to speculate"); 431 S.C. at 409, 848
S.E.2d at 787 (holding "an alternate theory of liability may not be charged to a jury
'merely on the theory the jury may believe some of the evidence and disbelieve other
evidence'" (quoting Barber, 393 S.C. at 236, 712 S.E.2d at 438)).

      IV.    Conclusion
Because the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof,
the phrase "intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" did not
shift the State's burden of proof or confuse the jury. Because the State presented
evidence Sellers agreed with Gee to commit the burglary and robbery and evidence
both Sellers and Gee beat Hydrick during the course of the two initial crimes, the
hand of one jury instruction was supported by the evidence.

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Stephanie P.
McDonald, concur.