Court Opinion

ID: 9675556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:57:42.960967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.561122
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). Defendant was con*429victed by a jury of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; MSA 28.798, and was subsequently sentenced as a habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. On appeal defendant claims that the trial judge erred reversibly by allowing certain items to be admitted into evidence and by failing to follow the procedures required by GCR 1963, 785.7 in accepting defendant’s guilty plea to the habitual offender charges. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge did not err in allowing this evidence to be admitted, I do not agree with the holding that the judge erred reversibly by failing to comply with GCR 1963, 785.7 in accepting defendant’s plea to the habitual offender supplemental information.
Stated simply, the issue to be resolved is whether GCR 1963, 785.7 applies to proceedings under MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085. GCR 1963, 785.7 is silent as to whether it applies to habitual offender proceedings. This silence is ambiguous. A defendant at a habitual offender proceeding is pleading to a supplemental information and this, at first glance, tends to support the conclusion that this proceeding is a stage of a criminal prosecution to which GCR 1963, 785.7 applies. However, this information does not charge defendant with committing a criminal offense, but rather, it merely informs the court of the fact of defendant’s prior convictions, see People v Shotwell, 352 Mich 42; 88 NW2d 313 (1958), cert den 356 US 976; 78 S Ct 1141; 2 L Ed 2d 1149 (1958), People v Palm, 245 Mich 396; 223 NW 67 (1929). Also, Justice Levin’s concurring opinion in People v Rial, 399 Mich 431, 438; 249 NW2d 114 (1976), which describes GCR 1963, 785.7 as "governing acceptance of an accused person’s plea of guilty to an information charging commission of a criminal offense”, supports the *430conclusion that the rule does not apply to habitual offender proceedings. The habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not create a separate criminal offense, but rather provide for an enhanced punishment for the current offense, People v Hendrick; 398 Mich 410; 247 NW2d 840 (1976).
The idea that proceedings under the habitual offender provisions do not charge a crime separate from the current felony charge has long been recognized, see Graham v West Virginia, 224 US 616; 32 S Ct 583; 56 L Ed 917 (1912), People v Hendrick, supra, People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302; 181 NW2d 912 (1970), People v Shotwell, supra, People v Judge of Recorder’s Court, 251 Mich 626; 232 NW 402 (1930), People v Fountain (After Rem), 77 Mich App 71; 257 NW2d 671 (1977), People v Holbrook, 60 Mich App 628; 231 NW2d 469 (1975), People v Ungurean, 51 Mich App 262; 214 NW2d 873 (1974). The placement of the habitual offender provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq.; MSA 28.841 et seq., rather than in the Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq.; MSA 28.191 et seq., reflects this idea, see People v Shotwell, supra.
Under the original statute,1 the accusation of a previous conviction was charged in the indictment and admitted or subject to proof at trial. When the Code of Criminal Procedure, supra, was enacted in 1927, it provided for an alternative method to determine whether a defendant had been previously convicted of a felony, see MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085. This procedure was established to avoid prejudicing the defendant by exposing the jury to evidence of his prior criminal offenses. It is no longer required that the defendant be indicted and *431convicted as a previous offender in order to receive the increased punishment, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, sets up a separate post-trial procedure. That section allows the prosecutor to file a supplemental information after a conviction and requires the judge to inform the defendant of the accusations, of his right to .trial according to law, and to ask the defendant whether he is the same person as charged in such information. The section then provides for a jury trial on the factual questions involved if defendant remains silent or denies that he is the same person. Although this section is silent on this matter, if defendant acknowledges that he is the person who was convicted of the earlier felonies, this is viewed as an admission of those convictions. These admissions by the defendant, after being advised of the charges and his right to trial, are sufficient to support the application of habitual offender sentencing provisions.
Although this procedure does not grant defendant the full panoply of rights guaranteed in proceedings charging the commission of a separate criminal offense,2 it does adequately preserve the right to a jury trial and is not constitutionally infirm, see People v Parker, 50 Mich App 537; 213 NW2d 576 (1973). Also, the statute implicitly provides that an acknowledgment by the defendant that he is the same person who was convicted of the earlier crimes constitutes a sufficient waiver of defendant’s right to a trial by jury. Even though MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085 does not require a recital of the rights defendant would be waiving by admitting the previous convictions, as is required *432in pleas to criminal offenses, this procedure was upheld in People v Parker, supra, in the face of Jaworski3 challenges. If a judge is not constitutionally required to advise a defendant of his Jaworski rights at a habitual offender proceeding, then, a fortiori, he would not be constitutionally required to advise defendant of his non -Jaworski rights, Cf. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 122; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). As a constitutional matter, the difference in the requirements and protections accompanying a trial for the commission of a criminal offense and for habitual offender proceedings is justified on the basis of the more limited nature and scope of the issues involved in habitual offender proceedings and on the basis that the habitual offender provisions do not create a separate crime distinct from the current felony. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Graham v West Virginia, supra, at 627, "To repeat, the inquiry is not into the commission of an offense; as to this, indictment has already been found and the accused convicted. There remains simply the question as to the fact of previous conviction.” The issue of whether defendant was convicted of an earlier felony is a very narrow one, is usually limited to questions of identification and is normally not difficult to prove.
Considering that the habitual offender provisions do not charge defendant with a separate criminal offense but only provide for the enchancement of punishment for the current offense, People v Hendrick, supra, and that advice on the full panoply of rights constitutionally guaranteed in the trial of a criminal offense is not constitutionally required in habitual offender proceedings, People v Parker, supra, and the limited scope of *433the factual issues involved in habitual offender proceedings, I conclude that the Supreme Court did not intend GCR 1963, 785.7 to apply to habitual offender proceedings. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that probation revocation proceedings are distinguishable in many respects from proceedings under MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, I think the analysis used by the Supreme Court in People v Rial, supra, in holding that GCR 1963, 785.7 does not apply to probation revocation hearings is applicable to the issue involved in this case. The waiver of a jury trial in habitual offender proceedings is similar to the waiver of a full hearing at a probation revocation proceeding in that it is not necessarily unconstitutional for the defendant to waive these later hearings without being advised of his Jaworski rights. This similarity is relevant to the issue of whether GCR 1963, 785.7 applies. Many of the provisions of GCR 1963, 785.7 were inserted into the rule to explicitly require the judge to be certain that the proceedings complied with all the constitutional requirements applicable to a plea of guilty to a criminal charge. The fact that advice of all these rights is not constitutionally required in habitual proceedings, People v Parker, supra, demonstrates that one of the primary rationales supporting some provisions of GCR 1963, 785.7 does not directly apply to habitual offender proceedings. This does not necessarily indicate that the rule was not intended to apply to habitual offender proceedings but rather it demonstrates that one of the major purposes behind applying GCR 1963, 785.7 has already been fulfilled by the procedure required by MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, even if GCR 1963, 785.7 is not applied.
Another important similarity to People v Rial, *434supra, is the limited nature and scope of the issues involved at habitual offender proceedings. Although habitual offender proceedings are distinguishable from probation revocation proceedings by the fact that the right to a trial by jury is preserved, the scope of the factual issues involved in habitual offender proceedings is very narrow. In most cases, the fact issues involved in habitual offender proceedings are probably more narrow and easier to resolve than the issues presented in probation revocation hearings.
In summary, I conclude that GCR 1963, 785.7 does not apply to proceedings under MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085. This conclusion is based on the recognized principle that the habitual offender provisions do not create a separate offense but rather provide for the enhancement of punishment for the current offense. This conclusion is also supported by the procedure established by MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085 for resolving the limited issues involved in habitual offender proceedings. It is undisputed that the judge in this case fully complied with the procedures under MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, and since defendant does not claim that his admissions of the previous convictions and the waiver of his right to trial by jury were not knowingly, voluntarily or understanding^ made, I would affirm the conviction.

 1915 CL 15612, 15613; 1897 CL 11785, 11786; 1857 CL 5948, 5949.

 See People v Judge of Recorder’s Court, 251 Mich 626; 232 NW 402 (1930), People v Palm, 245 Mich 396; 223 NW 67 (1929); People v Holbrook, 60 Mich App 628; 231 NW2d 469 (1975); People v Ungurean, 51 Mich App 262; 214 NW2d 873 (1974).

 People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21; 194 NW2d 868 (1972).