Court Opinion

ID: 9474831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:10:14.72377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:22.032190
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree that no physician-patient relationship existed between Ewing and the Missouri physician. As a result, Ewing’s malpractice claim must fall. I agree further that Missouri collateral estoppel principles do not bar Ewing’s common law negligence claim. Thus, reversal in part with remand for further proceedings is required.
*688However, while I am largely in agreement with the result reached by the court, I am unable to join its opinion for two reasons. First, while I agree the two negligence actions brought by Ewing are separate and distinct actions, I believe the focus of the court’s collateral estoppel analysis should center on the status of the Missouri doctor and not on his potentially negligent acts. Second, while concluding the status of the Missouri doctor presents an issue distinct from the issues decided by the Illinois court in Ewing’s first action, I believe a determination of that status should in the first instance be made by the district court.
Under Illinois law, although an individual receives worker’s compensation, that person is not necessarily precluded from bringing certain claims that have arisen out of his or her injuries or treatment. Consequently, while Ewing has received $21,000 in worker’s compensation, he may still be able to prosecute his common law negligence claim against the Missouri doctor. The Missouri doctor will be immune from suit, however, if the doctor falls within a certain class of individuals protected from suit by Illinois worker compensation law. See Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 48, § 138.5(a).
Whether a particular defendant falls within a class of protected individuals presents a factual issue peculiar to each situation. Thus, the issue of whether the Missouri doctor is protected from suit under Illinois law is unique from, rather than identical to, the issue presented in Ewing’s prior action against the Illinois doctor. As a result, under Missouri law collateral estoppel presents no bar to Ewing’s negligence claim. See Oates v. Safeco Insurance Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo.1979) (en banc); Bi-State Development Agency v. Whelan Security Co., 679 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo.App.1984).
However, whether the defendant falls within a protected class under Illinois law is a factual question. That question should not be resolved by this court but rather should be resolved by the district court on remand. If on remand the district court were to find the defendant to be within a protected class, Ewing would then be precluded from maintaining his negligence claim. If, however, the defendant was found to fall outside the protective scope of the Illinois statute, Ewing’s negligence claim would not be barred and Missouri substantive law would be applicable.