Court Opinion

ID: 9489320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:11:56.084375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:27.515423
License: Public Domain

EDWARD S. SMITH, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the agency’s decision not to renew Mr. Schafer’s contract is not a “removal” under 5 U.S.C. § 7512. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of this case as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. I conclude we have appellate jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s award to the extent Mr. Schafer asserts a non-frivolous claim he was “removed” under § 7512. Upon invoking jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f), our concluding Mr. Schafer was not “removed” is a decision on the merits.

Confusion Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Our recent decisions seek to distinguish between lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, a decision on the merits, noting inconsistencies among our prior decisions. See, Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed.Cir.1996); Gould Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 929-30 (Fed.Cir.1995); Spruill v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 686-89 (Fed.Cir.1992); Do-Well Machine Shop, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637, 639-40 (Fed.Cir.1989). We commented,
The distinction between lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is an important one: “[T]he court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy. Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated ... by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”
Do-Well, 870 F.2d at 639-40 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). In Spruill, we explained, “[w]hile the practical result of a dismissal for want of jurisdiction may in some cases be the same as a dismissal for failure to state a claim, the legal consequences can be substantially different” such as the application of res judicata. Spruill, 978 F.2d at 687 n. 10.
Federal courts are not strangers to the confusion surrounding subject matter jurisdiction versus a decision on the merits, espe-*988daily federal question jurisdiction where courts navigate through a raging sea of confusion. The Second Circuit recently commented,
Generations of jurists have struggled with the difficulty of distinguishing between Rules 12(b)(1) [lack of jurisdiction] and 12(b)(6) [failure to state a claim] in federal question cases, described by Judge Friendly as a “lesson [that] has been taught as often in decision as it has been ignored in argument and dicta.”
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir.1996). Further confusion arises where jurisdiction is not only predicated upon a party asserting a federal question, but upon a party asserting a federal question within a limited subset of federal questions. That is the situation in the instant case where Mr. Schafer asserts he was “removed” which is one of the matters “covered under” 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303 and 7512 within our appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f). We may successfully navigate through this confusion by referencing general federal question jurisprudence.

Modem Treatment of Federal Question Jurisdiction

Regarding federal question jurisdiction, “the prevailing view is that, unless the claim is entirely frivolous, a court should assume jurisdiction and dismiss for failure to state a claim, since federal question jurisdiction exists once plaintiff has alleged even a colorable federal claim.” Northeast Erectors Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor, 62 F.3d 37, 39 n. 1 (1st Cir.1995). The Second Circuit recently explained,
Because of the more-than-occasional difficulties involved in parsing a claim alleging federal question jurisdiction to determine whether it fails to state a claim or fails to meet jurisdictional requirements, the federal courts have followed a general practice of granting jurisdiction in most cases and dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only under narrow circumstances.
Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1188.
The Ninth Circuit navigates through the confusion under a bright line rule:
In order to invoke federal jurisdiction “for the purposes of determining whether [the plaintiff] stated a cause of action on which relief could be granted,” the complaint must fulfill only two criteria: (1) it must “claim a right to recover under the Constitution and the laws of the United States,” and (2) the claim must not be “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”
Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, 457 U.S. 15, 21, 102 S.Ct. 2202, 2206, 72 L.Ed.2d 639 (1982) and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 775-76, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). The Second Circuit is guided by a similar rule. See Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1189. Moreover, we recently applied this rule in a case concerning subject matter jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims, stating
[A] complaint alleging that the plaintiff has a right to relief on a ground as to which the court has jurisdiction raises a question within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction as long as the asserted basis of jurisdiction is not pretextual, i.e., as long as the jurisdictional ground asserted in the complaint does not “appear[ ] to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.”
Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 603 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citing The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 411, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913) (no jurisdiction if “plaintiff was not really relying upon the patent law for his alleged rights”) and Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282, 287, 22 S.Ct. 681, 683, 46 L.Ed. 910 (1902) (no jurisdiction if jurisdictional allegations “were immaterial and made for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by the court.”)); see also, Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572 (“In deciding whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and jurisdiction is decided on the face of the pleadings.”); Romero v. United States, 38 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Where a district court’s jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on a non-frivolous claim under the Little Tucker Act, exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal lies in this court.”); Joshua v. United *989States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed.Cir.1994) (Summary disposition appropriate where “it is clear [the] complaint did not identify any substantive right, founded upon either a money mandating statute or the Constitution, which might form the basis for [the] claim.”); Spruill, 978 F.2d at 688 (“[S]ubjeet-matter jurisdiction existed ... as long as the petitioner asserted nonfrivolous claims.”); Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092 (Fed.Cir.1984) (Dismissing for lack of jurisdiction proper where “[n]othing in the language of [the jurisdiction] statute purports to give the Claims Court jurisdiction of this complaint for a declaratory judgment.”). Although the trial court in Lewis dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction because the “contractual basis for jurisdiction was ‘so clearly lacking as to border on the frivolous,’” we concluded that “[w]hile we have found Lewis’s claim to be meritless, we do not think it is so starkly frivolous that the trial court should have departed from the ordinary course of dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.” Lewis, 70 F.3d at 599, 604.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Mr. Schafer’s Claim

Seeking refuge in a sea of confusion, I suggest we apply a similar bright line rule in this case. Where our jurisdiction is limited to specific matters within a statutory scheme, we have jurisdiction to review a petitioner’s claim on the merits if the claim fulfills only two criteria: First, reviewing the claim on its face without considering whatsoever its legal or factual merits, the claim must seek relief for a matter within the limited statutory scheme. Second, upon cursory review of the claim’s merits, the claim must not be wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Regarding this second prong, the Supreme Court stated,
[T]he federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” “plainly unsubstantial,” or “no longer open to discussion.” ... The limiting words “wholly” and “obviously” have cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the sub-stantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-80, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (internal quotations omitted). We have used similar language concerning frivolous claims of jurisdiction. In Bobula v. Department of Justice, we held that, “[d]espite ... clear deficiencies in Bobula’s allegations relating to jurisdiction, we conclude that her appeal is not frivolous ... partly because prior to this decision there was no holding squarely precluding appellant’s precise arguments.” 970 F.2d 854, 862 (Fed.Cir.1992). We have also imposed sanctions for frivolous jurisdictional claims under Rule 38 which states, “If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” U.S.Ct. of App. Fed.Cir.Rule 38. In Beach-board v. United States, we imposed sanctions for a frivolous claim of jurisdiction because “[e]ven the most unsophisticated researcher untrained in law would with little effort find the authorities establishing the lack of jurisdiction here of the Claims Court.” 727 F.2d 1092, 1094 (Fed.Cir.1984). See also, Zuger v. United States, 834 F.2d 1009, 1010 (Fed.Cir.1987) (Imposing sanctions under Rule 38 because “[t]his is a manifestly frivolous appeal which never should have been taken. There was no arguable way of confronting Judge Yoek’s indisputable holdings that his court had no jurisdiction, and ... Zuger’s substantive position has been universally rejected by many courts.”)
Guided by this rule, I conclude we have appellate jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s award to the extent Mr. Schafer claims he was “removed” under § 7512. Applying the first prong without considering the merits of Mr. Schafer’s factual or legal assertions, it is undisputed Mr. Schafer claims he was “removed” under § 7512 which lies exclusively within our appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 7121. Cf., Gould, 67 F.3d at 929 (“[T]here is no question that Gould’s *990complaint alleges the existence of an express contract, albeit one entered into allegedly [illegally]. This is sufficient, however, to confer jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.”). This allegation alone is sufficient to satisfy the first prong.
Applying the second prong by conducting a cursory review of the merits, Mr. Schafer’s claim does not appear to be frivolous. Mr. Schafer initially filed an appeal with FLRA, but subsequently filed a motion to stay that appeal after FLRA ordered him to show cause why it should not dismiss the appeal. It is significant that FLRA issued the order because it appeared to be a “removal” within the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.1 Mr. Schafer claims his contract non-renewal was, in fact, a “removal for cause” because his contract would have been renewed “but for” his misconduct on March 8, 1994, and a communication from the agency itself characterized the non-renewal as “TERMINATION-INVOLUNTARY.” These assertions do not appear “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” nor do “prior decisions inescapably render the claim[ ] frivolous” as opposed to merely a claim “of doubtful or questionable merit.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-80, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, I conclude we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 7121 to review the arbitrator’s award to the extent Mr. Schafer claims he was “removed” under § 7512.
Firmly moored in the harbor of jurisdiction, I agree the non-renewal of Mr. Schafer’s contract is not a “removal” under § 7512. This is a decision on the merits which, unlike dismissal for want of jurisdiction, has a res judicata effect. See, Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572 (“[I]n the absence of subject matter jurisdiction there can be no preclusive findings or conclusions on the merits, and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice.”); Spruill, 978 F.2d at 688 (“Where an Act of Congress or an executive regulation arguably confers ... rights to relief upon the claimant, the court will assume jurisdiction and decide his case on the merits even though the defendant may ultimately prevail.”) (internal quotations omitted). Assuming Mr. Schafer can now turn elsewhere for further review of the arbitrator’s award (e.g., FLRA), he may do so only to the extent he does not claim a “removal.”

. Under 5 U.S.C. § 7122, “Either party to arbitration ... may file with [FLRA] an exception to any arbitrator's award ... other than an award relating to a matter described in section 7121(f)