Court Opinion

ID: 9711974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:43:17.398021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.804143
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: The opinion of this court bases the reversal of the defendant’s conviction on the admission into evidence of a statement made by the defendant almost six years before the murders involved in this case: “You white honky coppers are [expletive deleted] with us now, and we will get you later.” Under the case law of this State as noted below, the statement was admissible. The prosecution need not, and indeed should not, pull its punches and not present evidence it has simply because it may be damaging to the defendant’s cause. I must therefore dissent. A previously made threat, while it may not be general in nature, need not be directed at the person subsequently killed to be admissible in evidence. A threat is admissible if the person killed is a member of a class against whom the threat was made. In People v. Scott (1918), 284 Ill. 465, this court set forth the general proposition that a threat to commit a crime for which the accused is being tried is admissible to show intent if such threat imparts a hostile purpose on the part of the accused and the deceased is one who is encompassed within the scope of the threat. Trooper McCarter, a white police officer, clearly falls within the class of people encompassed by defendant’s threat against “white honky coppers.” In People v. Osborne (1917), 278 Ill. 104, 108, defendant made a similar threat when he said, “*.** I will shoot every damned policeman as fast as they come down ***.” The defendant was later convicted for attempting to shoot a police officer and claimed that testimony as to the above statement should not have been admitted at trial. In affirming his conviction, this court held the testimony admissible to show intent. (See Palmer v. People (1891), 138 Ill. 356, 367; see also People v. Lion (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 208; Painter v. People (1893), 147 Ill. 444; but cf. Bird v. United States (1901), 180 U.S. 356, 45 L. Ed. 570, 21 S. Ct. 403, and People v. Sorrells (1920), 293 Ill. 591 (where threats, which were of a general nature and the person injured was not within the scope of the threats, were held to be not admissible).) In Painter v. People (1893), 147 Ill. 444, this court held that the lapse of time intervening between a threat made by the accused and the subsequent killing went only to the weight to be given to the evidence of the threat, and not to the admissibility thereof. In People v. Griswold (1950), 405 Ill. 533, this court held that a similar objection went only to the credibility of the witness who was testifying as to the prior threat. Although the time period involved in the matter at hand is somewhat longer, the reasoning of Painter and Griswold is still applicable, and the evidence of defendant’s prior statement was properly admitted at the guilt phase of the trial. The jury was entitled to decide what weight to give to the evidence. The majority opinion complains that the prosecution commented on this threat in the opening statement and the closing remarks. The prosecutor, in the opening statement, had the right to inform the jury what the evidence would show and, in the closing remarks, had the right to comment on the evidence properly introduced and to draw legitimate inferences therefrom. The fact that the threat that the defendant had previously made to “get” white police officers later did not help his cause is no reason to require the prosecutor to refrain from mentioning or commenting on this evidence. Furthermore, my examination of the record discloses that not a single objection was made to these comments during the opening statement, the closing argument, or rebuttal. Also, I find nothing in the record to indicate that these issues were raised in a written post-trial motion, or that an oral motion was made raising these issues. The question of the propriety of the prosecutor’s comments has not been preserved for appeal. To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be raised at trial and in a post-trial motion. (People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245; People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350.) The reason for this requirement is judicial economy and fairness to the parties. “Timely and specific objection at trial affords the court an opportunity to prevent most errors by sustaining the objection or instructing the jury to disregard the answer or remark. [Citations.] And specific references in post-trial motions to the reasons why a trial judge’s actions or rulings were wrong enables him to reconsider their propriety in a less pressured environment. If an egregious error has actually occurred, the judge can order a new trial, thus avoiding the delay and expense of appellate review.” (People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350, 359.) See People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 425; People v. Pearson (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 210; People v. Lykins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 35; People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7; People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280. A defendant should not be permitted to have “two bites at the apple.” The waiver rule encourages timely objections to error at trial. If it is not applied, a defendant may intentionally permit erroneous comment to be made solely for the purpose of creating error to support him on appeal if the verdict is against him. He would thus be rewarded for his failing to act and permitting error. People v. Adkisson (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 1. My colleagues also see something sinister in the manner in which the evidence of this threat was presented, stating: “At trial the prosecution waited until near the close of its case in chief to call Officer Kunz to the stand. The defendant argues that this was done to place greater emphasis on the officer’s testimony.” My only response is, What is wrong with that? Are we now going to compel the prosecutor to present his evidence in a manner that will minimize its impact? Also, the criticism of Officer Kunz’ testimony in the opinion following the above-quoted statement does not go to its admissibility, but only to the weight to be given this testimony, which is not for us to determine. The opinion also highlights the fact that the prosecutor did not point out to the jury the factors that may detract from the weight to be given to the threat. This is no reason to fault the prosecutor. This trial, as are all trials, was an adversary proceeding. The defendant was represented by an attorney who could have commented on the weakness of this testimony if he felt that it was necessary to do so. The prosecutor was certainly not required to do so. I do not understand the majority’s reliance on People v. Wilson (1948), 400 Ill. 603. That case held that it was error to introduce evidence of similar conduct that occurred 17 years before the crime. In our case, we are not talking about 17 years, and we are not talking about similar conduct. We are here talking about a threat that the defendant made to kill white police officers, and the decedent was a white police officer. The previous threat is evidence of intent and motive. In my opinion, Wilson is irrelevant. The majority is also troubled by the fact that the jury was never told about the report of a blood analysis made by Farmed Dhawan which, the defendant contends, would have benefited his defense. The defendant’s attorney had a copy of this report but chose not to use it at trial. The prosecutor has neither the duty, nor the right, to conduct the defendant’s defense, nor to dictate his counsel’s trial strategy. Since a new trial has been ordered by the majority opinion, any discussion of the failure to grant a continuance is unnecessary. I wish to point out, however, that the court had originally set this case for trial on July 23, 1979. On July 5, 1979, defense counsel moved for a continuance and requested a new trial date of September 17, 1979. For reasons of convenience, the date of September 24, 1979, was agreed to by counsel. Although the defense counsel had over five months to prepare for trial on a date of his choosing, on September 19, 1979, and again on September 24, 1979 (the trial date), counsel sought continuances. Both motions were denied. The trial judge stated that taking into account the difficulty of the case and the length of time allowed for preparation, he believed the defendant had been given adequate time to prepare for trial. In People v. Lott (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 290, this court stated that a motion for continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court but that a refusal to grant a continuance which deprives the accused of a reasonable time to prepare for trial is reversible error. However, in Lott the defendant was denied a continuance which was sought after the State produced a surprise witness. Defendant sought time to discover additional information in an attempt to impeach this witness. This court determined that this denial of defendant’s motion for a continuance was prejudicial. This is simply not the case presented here. “There is no mechanical test, statutory or other, for determining the point at which the denial of a continuance in order to accelerate the judicial proceedings violates the substantive right of the accused to properly defend. The circumstances of each case must be weighed, particularly the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” (People v. Lott (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 290, 297.) I feel that the trial judge weighed the facts involved in this situation and did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance. See also People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551. The record is not clear as to the nature of defense counsel’s health problem which arose during the first day of voir dire examination. He, apparently, was admitted to the hospital and was released either the same day or the next morning. In any event, his ailment obviously was not serious. The defendant did hot contend that a continuance was sought after the seizure or that the court forced counsel to proceed in spite of his ailment. Nor is there any showing or contention that counsel’s performance as an attorney was impaired as a result of this incident. This discussion of counsel’s seizure in the majority opinion is totally irrelevant. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. UNDERWOOD and MORAN, JJ., join in this dissent.