Court Opinion

ID: 9792157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:13.969652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.807482
License: Public Domain

' HOWE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
. I concur in remanding the case to the trial court for the purpose of clarifying the duration of the award of rehabilitative alimony. I dissent, however, from the further remand to make findings of fact as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded. The trial court has already adequately done that in findings 44 to 50, which are set out in the majority opinion.
To summarize those findings, the court found that the case was routine; that the efficiency of the attorneys was not good and the number of hours spent was excessive; that the rate of $150 per hour is high but within reasonable range; that Ms. Willey’s attorney sought payment for 101 hours; that the net worth of the parties was nil; that the fees charged were “not reasonable”; that “the court finds it reasonable that plaintiff should pay an additional amount to defendant for attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000 that when added to the $5,000 previously awarded, the plaintiff will have $15,000 toward payment of her attorney fees”; and that “this is an equitable amount” considering the incomes of the parties and the other factors mentioned by the court. (Emphasis added.)
These findings of fact are much more detailed and the analysis of the factors to be considered in awarding fees is more complete than we usually see in divorce cases. I think the findings are completely adequate and *236that there is no point in having additional findings made as to the reasonableness of the fees awarded ($15,000). I frankly do not know what more the trial judge can state in support of the award made.
One other matter deserves comment. When this case was before the court of appeals the first time, the court wrote at 866 P.2d 556 that the trial court had not explained why it awarded Ms. Willey only approximately twenty-five percent of her requested attorney fees. In my opinion, no such explanation is necessary. In some cases, requiring each party to bear his or her own attorney fees is fair and reasonable. When fairness suggests that one party should financially assist the other party with his or her fees, there is no “presumption” or “inference” that the amount requested is reasonable, because in a divorce case many factors must be considered in determining a reasonable fee. The amount requested is just the starting point. That amount must be examined in light of factors considered by the trial judge in this case. This will often result in a substantial reduction, just as it did here. Lawyers who represent parties in divorce cases must be realistic: there is often a limit to what the parties can afford and what is justified by the worth of the marital estate. Lawyers should not expect to be as well paid in such divorce cases as they are paid in other matters they may handle. Here the parties had been married for a relatively short time, eight years. The marriage was the second for both of them, and they had no children together. At the time of the divorce, the marital estate had a negligible net worth. The primary issue in the divorce was the amount of alimony to be awarded to Ms. Willey. Why the determination of that amount should incur combined attorney fees in excess of $65,000, as observed by the trial court, is difficult to understand.
I commend the trial judge for being thoughtful and careful in his analysis of what is a reasonable fee and limiting his award to an amount that Mr. Willey realistically can pay without being financially burdened for years to come. (Compare the $15,000 awarded by the trial court with the $36,015 awarded by the court of appeals which amount is roughly one-third of Mr. Willey’s annual income before taxes.) There may be little courts can do about relieving the emotional distress suffered by parties to a divorce. But they should not add to that distress by saddling the parties with unrealistic attorney fees that they must struggle to pay in future years and thus frustrate the new start they seek.
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice HOWE.