Court Opinion

ID: 9840112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 07:09:54.235501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:53.127616
License: Public Domain

In The

                              Court of Appeals

                   Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                             __________________

                             NO. 09-22-00290-CR
                             __________________

                   CHARLES BRETT BOREN, Appellant

                                       V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
                       Jefferson County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 15-22594
__________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In 2015, a grand jury indicted Appellant Charles Brett Boren for possession

of a controlled substance (namely methamphetamine) in an amount of four grams or

more but less than two hundred grams, a second-degree felony. See Tex. Health &

Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d). In a plea agreement, Boren pleaded guilty to the

offense and waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court found Boren guilty,

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deferred adjudication, placed Boren on community supervision for ten years, and

imposed a $500 fine. 1

      On December 15, 2021, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated

Probation, alleging Boren violated two conditions of his community supervision. On

April 11, 2022, the State filed a First Amended Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated

Probation, alleging Boren committed seven violations of the terms of his community

supervision. At a hearing on August 4, 2022, Boren acknowledged that he had

previously pleaded true to one allegation (the sixth alleged violation) in the motion

to revoke, which alleged the following:

      . . . Boren provided a urine sample on or about the 29th day of March,
      2022, for scientific analysis that showed the presence of the metabolic
      by-products of Methamphetamine and Amphetamines, in violation of
      Condition (10) of Defendant’s Deferred Adjudication order.

At the hearing, the State announced it had abandoned the first three allegations, and

the State presented evidence in support of the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged

violations. 2 After hearing evidence, the trial court found Boren violated the terms of

his community supervision, found him guilty of the second-degree offense of

      1
         We note that the Order of Deferred Adjudication listed the incorrect statute
for the offense.
       2
         Because Boren pleaded “true” to one of the other alleged violations of the
conditions of his community supervision and proof of a single violation is sufficient
to support revocation, a discussion of this evidence is not necessary. See Garcia v.
State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
                                          2
possession of a controlled substance (namely methamphetamines), and imposed

punishment at ten years’ confinement. Raising six issues, Boren appeals. We affirm.

            Trial Court’s Finding of “True” to the Third Alleged Violation

         In his first issue, Boren argues that his conviction should be reversed and

remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court found the third alleged

violation in the State’s motion to revoke “true,” but the State had abandoned that

alleged violation. According to Boren, the trial court’s finding of “true” to the third

alleged violation was not supported by sufficient evidence and resulted in reversible

error.

         We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an abuse

of discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

(citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). To prevail

in a revocation hearing, the State must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the defendant violated at least one term or condition of the community

supervision order. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(noting that one violation is sufficient to affirm a trial court’s decision revoking an

order placing a defendant on community supervision). In general, “[a] plea of true,

standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision and

adjudicate guilt.” See Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

(citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)).

                                          3
Generally, establishing that a defendant violated a single condition of a community

supervision order allows an appellate court to affirm the trial court’s ruling revoking

the order used to place a defendant on community supervision. See Garcia v. State,

387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (stating that “proof of a single violation

will support revocation”).

      Even if the trial court erroneously found “true” to the third alleged violation

(which had been abandoned by the State), Boren pleaded “true” to the sixth alleged

violation. Because a plea of “true” to any one violation will support revocation of

community supervision, on this record, revocation was within the trial court’s

discretion. 3 See Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 31; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. Accordingly,

we overrule issue one.

                               Credit for Time Served

      In issue two, Boren argues the trial court erred in not awarding Boren “full

time served credit for his time spent undergoing rehabilitation with Cenikor” as part

of Boren’s sentence. 4 In his third issue, Boren argues the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to award Boren time served for his Cenikor service and SAFPF

      3
        As noted herein, the trial court, after hearing evidence, found “true” three of
the other alleged violations (the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged violations) that
were not abandoned by the State. On appeal, Boren does not challenge those
findings.
      4
        One of the agreed conditions of Boren’s community supervision was to
successfully complete the Cenikor Foundation Program.

                                          4
service, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution. Boren acknowledges that the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt

credited him with 921 days for the dates set out in the judgment, but he argues that

he was not credited for time spent participating in Cenikor for “at least the period

running from December 15, 2015 through December 16, 2016” and for time that

may not have been credited him for successfully completing a substance abuse

felony punishment facility (SAFPF) program. 5 According to Boren, not crediting

him time for time spent in Cenikor would “not only violate the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause, but would also constitute Cruel and Unusual

Punishment under the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.”

      Boren was entitled to receive credit for time spent in a substance abuse

treatment facility operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under

section 493.009 of the Texas Government Code or any other court-ordered

residential program or facility as a condition of his deferred adjudication community

supervision if Boren successfully completed the treatment program at that facility.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.03, § 2(a)(2), 42A.755(d). We have

authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth

      5
       On appeal, Boren does not state what dates he participated in a SAFPF
program, but he states he “may have been partially credited” for time spent in that
program. In his reply brief, he argues that certain dates can be inferred based on
assumptions.
                                         5
when we have the necessary date and information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P.

43.2(b); see also Warren v. State, No. 12-17-00363-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS

3674, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (because the appellate court had the necessary information, it modified

the judgment to credit appellant for dates the record showed appellant spent in

SAFPF that had not been credited in the judgment). In this case, however, the record

does not establish that Boren successfully completed treatment at Cenikor. Also,

Boren has not established, nor does the record reflect with certainty, the dates that

he spent in SAFPF that were not included in the time credited in the Judgment

Adjudicating Guilt. Accordingly, we overrule issues two and three.

                                  Drug Treatment

      In issues four, five, and six, Boren argues that, instead of sentencing Boren to

prison, the trial court should have evaluated drug treatment or rehabilitation

alternatives for Boren because he was a non-violent offender with chronic diabetes,

“high security” drug treatment was appropriate because he was “consistently an

informant[,]” and that Boren has a “right to treatment in the least restrictive

alternative environment[.]”

      Once sufficient evidence was presented of a violation of a condition set forth

in the order the trial court used when it placed Boren on deferred adjudication

community supervision, the trial court had broad discretion in choosing whether to

                                          6
continue, modify, or revoke his community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

arts. 42A.751(d), 42A.752(a), 42A.755(a); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). As stated above, because a plea of “true” to any

one violation will support revocation of community supervision, revocation was

within the trial court’s discretion. 6 See Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 31; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d

at 26. And the sentence the trial court imposed here is within the range provided in

the Penal Code for this offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (second-degree

felony offense of possession of a controlled substance carries a punishment range of

confinement from two to twenty years). We overrule issues four, five, and six.

      We note that the section of the judgment entitled “Statute for Offense[]”

recites “481.117(d)[.]” The indictment for the underlying offense listed the offense

as “possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)[,]” noted that the

statute for the offense was “SEC. 481.115[,]” and tracked the language of section

481.115(d) of the Texas Health & Safety Code. This Court has the authority to

reform a trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b);

Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We therefore reform the

      6
        As noted herein, the trial court, after hearing evidence, found “true” three of
the other alleged violations (the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged violations) that
were not abandoned by the State. On appeal, Boren does not challenge those
findings.
                                            7
judgment to reflect that the “Statute for Offense[]” is “Sec. 481.115(d) of the Texas

Health & Safety Code[.]”

      Having overruled Boren’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as

reformed.

      AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.

                                                         LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                              Justice

Submitted on June 30, 2023
Opinion Delivered September 13, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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