Court Opinion

ID: 9372390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 14:11:19.098894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.783839
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Athey and Callins

              JEREMY WAYNE LUCK
                                                                                MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0534-22-3                                           PER CURIAM
                                                                                  FEBRUARY 21, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
                                              Bruce D. Albertson, Judge

                               (David L. Parker; David L. Parker, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
                               Appellant submitting on brief.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Jeremy Wayne Luck (“Luck”) appeals the order from the Circuit Court of Rockingham

              County (“trial court”) revoking the remaining seven years of his previously suspended sentence.

              Luck argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “revoking an amount of time that vastly

              exceeded the recommended sentence.” After examining the briefs and record in this case, the

              panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without

              merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                         I. BACKGROUND

                     In December 2019, Luck entered an Alford1 plea to attempted malicious wounding of a

              law enforcement officer under an agreed disposition with the Commonwealth. Consistent with

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
                     1
                       “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
              consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
              participation in the acts constituting the crime.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37
the terms of the agreed disposition, the trial court sentenced Luck to eight years and six months’

imprisonment, with seven of those years suspended, conditioned upon the successful completion

of two years of supervised probation.

       Luck was released from incarceration on January 13, 2021. He resided with his father in

New Kent County and complied with probation by reporting as directed and maintaining

employment. However, on July 17, 2021, Luck was arrested in New Kent County on two counts

of domestic assault and two counts of destruction of property arising out of an altercation with

his father. While incarcerated, Luck was charged with an additional ten counts of violating a

protective order. Subsequently, on October 6, 2021, the New Kent County Juvenile and

Domestic Relations District Court convicted Luck on one count of domestic assault, one count of

destruction of property, and two counts of violating a protective order; the remaining charges

being nolle prossed. Luck was sentenced to a total of forty-eight months in jail, with thirty-six

months suspended, conditioned upon one year of supervised probation.

       Following Luck’s new convictions, his probation officer filed a major violation report

documenting the new convictions and requesting a show cause order. The trial court issued a

capias for his arrest, and, after several continuances, held a revocation hearing at which Luck

stipulated that he had violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. The trial court then

found Luck in violation of the terms of his suspended sentence.

       While addressing the question of an appropriate sentence, the Commonwealth presented

evidence including copies of Luck’s conviction orders from New Kent County, his criminal

history which included a conviction for attempted malicious wounding of a law enforcement

(1970). Alford pleas allow “criminal defendants who wish to avoid the consequences of a trial to
plead guilty by conceding that the evidence is sufficient to convict them, while maintaining that
they did not participate in the acts constituting the crimes.” Carroll v. Commonwealth, 280 Va.
641, 644-45 (2010) (quoting Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 565 (2006)).
                                                  -2-
officer, and other previous convictions for credit card fraud, driving under the influence,

revocation of a suspended driver’s license, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, assault, and

contempt of court.

           Luck testified that he had complied with probation upon his release from prison in January

2021, was employed, had no positive drug screens, and had been living with his sixty-five-year-old

father. Luck acknowledged that he had disagreements over his father’s girlfriend, who used heroin

and crack cocaine, and expressed concern about the girlfriend using drugs in the house because it

violated his probation. He further testified that after learning that his father’s girlfriend was

pregnant, he reiterated his concern to his father about her drug use and how a possible overdose

would “look bad” for him. The two counts of domestic assault and two counts of destruction of

property arose out of an incident on July 16, 2021, in which Luck and his father started arguing and

“shoving” each other. During the altercation, Luck “knocked the tv off the dresser,” and “it broke.”

Luck’s father then called the police, who arrested Luck. Luck explained that he had then violated

the protective order against his father when Luck called his father from jail and asked him to

retrieve phone numbers from Luck’s cell phone. Luck also testified that upon his release from jail,

he did not intend to return to his father’s house, but instead, intended to obtain employment at

George’s Chicken and reside in Rockingham County. Finally, Luck apologized to the court for his

actions.

           The Commonwealth argued for the trial court to deviate upward from the sentencing

guidelines. The guidelines recommended an active sentence up to six months in jail, but the

Commonwealth argued that because Luck was on probation for a “very serious and dangerous

crime” and had a “history of violence” that the guidelines were “woefully inadequate.”

           Luck argued that the guidelines were “adequate” and asked to be sentenced within them

because he had been doing well on probation and he and his father had only been involved in “a

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scuffle” where “nobody was really hurt.” He also claimed that his violations of the protective order

arose from telephone calls from the jail to his father, not any physical confrontation or interaction.

Finally, Luck promised to “finish out his probation [in Rockingham County] peacefully and do

well.”

         After considering the evidence and argument, the trial court determined that Luck had

violated the terms of his suspended sentence and had a “violent history.” The trial court found that

he violated his probation and that due to his “violent history” and the sentences entered for the

assault and battery against Luck’s father, that the incident was “not just a push.” The court then

revoked the balance of the previously suspended sentence and released him from further probation.2

Luck appealed.

                                              II. ANALYSIS

                                         A. Standard of Review

         “On an appeal of a probation revocation, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment

will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Heart v.

Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 453, 460 (2022) (quoting Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App.

69, 76 (2022)). “The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as the prevailing party below.” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013).

                   B. The trial court did not err in revoking Luck’s suspended sentence.

         Luck argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “vastly exceed[ing]” the sentencing

guidelines and revoking his entire suspended sentence for a first probation violation based on

misdemeanor convictions. Luck asserts that the trial court “arbitrarily decided” that the guidelines

were not appropriate. He further contends that the sentence was “too harsh” considering the

circumstances. We disagree.

         2
             The trial court denied Luck’s pro se motion for reconsideration.
                                                   -4-
        After suspending a sentence, a trial court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any

cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the

period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the court, after hearing, finds

good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the court may

revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.”

Code § 19.2-306(C). If the basis of the violation is that “the defendant was convicted of a criminal

offense that was committed after the date of the suspension,” the trial court “may revoke the

suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of that period previously suspended.”3 Code

§ 19.2-306.1(B).

        The record demonstrates, and Luck acknowledged, that he had incurred new criminal

convictions during the suspension period; therefore, the trial court had sufficient cause to revoke his

suspended sentence. See Booker v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 323, 338 (2012) (“A new

conviction certainly constitutes good cause to revoke the suspension of a previously imposed

sentence.”). It was equally within the trial court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors Luck

presented, such as his continuous employment, lack of drug use, cooperation with his probation

officer, acceptance of responsibility for his actions, and lack of prior probation violations. See

Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000).

        “The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the

trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of

all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740

        3
         The General Assembly amended Code § 19.2-306(C) and codified Code § 19.2-306.1
effective July 1, 2021. 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I ch. 538. Those amendments apply because
Luck violated his probation after July 1, 2021, and the revocation proceedings began after July 1,
2021. Green, 75 Va. App. at 84 n.4. The parties agree that Luck was convicted of new criminal
offenses that he committed after the date of his suspension. Accordingly, Code § 19.2-306.1
permitted the trial court to impose up to the entirety of Luck’s suspended sentence.
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(2007). While on probation, Luck was convicted of multiple misdemeanor offenses arising from an

altercation with his sixty-five-year-old father. Luck’s disregard of the terms of his suspended

sentence supports a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation. “When coupled with a

suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one

who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56

Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Luck

failed to make productive use of the period of grace that had been extended to him and continued to

engage in criminal conduct during the suspension period.

        Further, the probation violation guidelines, like the standard sentencing guidelines, “are not

binding on the trial judge; rather, the guidelines are merely a ‘tool’ to assist the judge in fixing an

appropriate punishment.” Belcher v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 44, 45 (1993). The discretionary

guidelines recommended an active sentence up to six months in jail. During the revocation hearing,

the trial court found the guidelines “absolutely inappropriate” considering Luck’s “violent history”

and the circumstances of his recent convictions. The trial court explained in writing that it deviated

from the guidelines because Luck was a “[v]ery violent person.” The trial court noted that Luck’s

criminal history included convictions for attempted malicious assault of a law enforcement officer

and a prior domestic assault and battery in addition to the most recent assault of his father. The trial

court recited Luck’s other criminal convictions for assault, “dangerous DUIs,” fraud, and contempt.

The trial court found that the guidelines did not “take into account this history or the underlying

charge.” Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in revoking Luck’s suspended sentence.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                                Affirmed.

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