Court Opinion

ID: 9915585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 20:01:55.426709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:57.486242
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/24 In re R.C. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re R.C. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 D082697
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES
 AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. Nos. J521249A-C)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 A.C.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
         Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      A.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing
her three children, then ages seven, four, and one, from her custody. She
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to support the dispositional

order under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361, subdivision (c).
      Although sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion
that there remained a substantial danger to the children’s well-being, it is
unclear from the record whether the juvenile court considered there were
reasonable means to protect the children short of removal from their Mother’s
custody. We therefore reverse the dispositional order and remand this
matter for further proceedings.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A.C. is the mother of R.C., R.G., and E.C., and Zachary C. (Zachary) is

the biological father of the youngest child E.C.2 Although they are no longer
romantically involved, Mother and Zachary dated and occasionally cohabited
and co-parented the children for three to four years. Their conduct during
those years triggered numerous referrals to child welfare services (CWS) and
calls to law enforcement. From June 2019 through April 2022, there were six
allegations of general neglect reported to CWS, one of which was
substantiated, and law enforcement responded to domestic violence calls on
five occasions from November 2022 through January 2023.

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2    The presumed father of R.C. is deceased, and the alleged father of R.G.
was not located by the Agency.
                                       2
      Police reports submitted by the Agency detail the domestic violence

history underlying this dependency case.3 On October 18, 2022, while
Mother was trying to get in the shower, Zachary struck her right thigh using
his knee. Zachary was arrested. On January 26, 2023, Zachary punched
Mother in the face with a closed fist approximately five times. Zachary fled
the scene and was not arrested. Although Mother sustained lacerations to
her nose and chin, she declined an emergency protective order (EPO).
      The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency)
became involved following an incident on June 7, 2023. Zachary reported
Mother threw a chair at him while he was holding E.C., while Mother
claimed it was Zachary who threw a chair at her and denied E.C. was in his
arms. Zachary had redness and swelling on his left forearm, and Mother was
arrested as the dominant aggressor. The officer reported Mother was yelling
and kicking the police vehicle while being transported to jail. After the
officer told her that he would be making a full report to CWS based on the
incident and her demeanor, she apologized and was transported without
further resistance.
      Following the incident, Zachary obtained an EPO that was scheduled to
expire on June 14, 2023, and worked with the Agency to create a safety plan.
However, Zachary did not follow the safety plan and permitted Mother to
return home after she was released from jail.
      On June 21, 2023, the Agency created a second safety plan with Mother
to which Zachary verbally agreed. Both parents agreed to remain safe and
sober while caring for the children. Mother agreed to not “feed into”

3      This is the first dependency case involving Mother, while Zachary had
two prior dependency cases in Riverside County that resulted in the removal
of his five other children.
                                       3
arguments with Zachary and call 911 if any arguments escalated. She also
agreed to go to a neighbor if she felt her safety was at risk, and her friend
would check on Mother and the children by phone and in person.
A. Dependency Petition and Detention Report
      On June 26, 2023, the Agency filed its dependency petition and
requested the children be detained “until the parents can demonstrate a
willingness to address the protective issues of domestic violence and
substance abuse.” The Agency’s detention report dated June 27, 2023,
reflects both parents had refused to participate in voluntary services, and
they accused each other of alcohol and drug use. Zachary admitted using
“everything except heroin” and Mother admitted using alcohol and
marijuana. Although Mother stated she had “never” used
methamphetamines, a prior Agency referral indicated she tested positive on
May 14, 2020, for methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana.
      The Agency expressed “more concern” over Zachary’s prior child welfare
history with his other children and it appeared the same patterns were

repeating.4 Although Zachary had agreed to remain outside of the home, the
Agency did not believe this was a viable safety plan “due to concerns of the
[M]other’s ongoing substance use, failure to follow previous safety plan, and
the parents[’] continued escalation since the [M]other returned back to the
home.”
      The following day, June 27, 2023, Mother obtained a temporary no-
contact restraining order protecting her and the three children from Zachary
and ordering him to move out of the home. Two days later, Mother reported

4     The safety concerns in Zachary’s two prior dependency cases involving
his other children included his abuse of controlled substances, inappropriate
discipline of the children, anger management issues, and verbal and physical
abuse of his live-in girlfriend in the presence of the children.
                                        4
Zachary attempted to enter her home and she was in fear for her safety.
Zachary fled the scene prior to the arrival of police.
      At the June 28, 2023 detention hearing, the juvenile court found there
was a substantial danger to the children if they remained in Mother’s home
and ordered them detained at the Polinsky Children’s Center.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
      The Agency’s July 19, 2023 jurisdiction/disposition report includes the
following: “The parents will work with their safety network and with the
Agency to develop the skills they will need to remain free from domestic
violence relationships, and to parent the CHILDREN in a safe environment
free from violence and substance abuse.” At that point, both parents tested
negative for all substances, but the Agency was still concerned “substances
play a significant role in the issues that have plagued this family.” The
Agency also expressed that it was “highly concerned” by Zachary’s
communication difficulties and the impact on his ability to engage in services,
and it continued to have “strong concerns” regarding the parents’ abilities to
maintain the children’s safety based on the significant history of domestic
violence between the parents.
      The Agency remarked that Mother was “very enthusiastic” to receive
services and pursue her restraining order against Zachary but noted that “[i]t
was only after the detention of the children the [M]other took firm actions to
protect herself and the children by obtaining a restraining order.”
Recognizing Mother had exhibited her protective capacity for only a brief
period of time and it had yet to observe Mother actually engaged in services,
the Agency concluded: “When assessed alongside the other complicating
factors still being evaluated by the Agency, there does not appear to be a

                                        5
viable way to maintain the children safely in the home in the immediate
future.”
C. Addendum Reports and Ex Parte Order
      The Agency submitted an addendum report dated July 26, 2023,
requesting placement for all three children in the home of E.C.’s aunt and
uncle in Riverside, California. The report mentioned Mother had informed
the Agency she was sober from drugs and alcohol, had changed the locks on
her home, and was pursuing a permanent restraining order against Zachary
to protect herself and the children.
      On August 1, 2023, the juvenile court granted the Agency’s ex parte
request to transition E.C. and R.C. from the Polinsky Children’s Center to
the home of E.C.’s aunt and uncle in Riverside and to have R.G. evaluated by
an allergist since the home contained three dogs. The allergist confirmed
R.G. was allergic to dogs and prescribed Zyrtec as needed. On August 10,
2023, over Mother’s objection, the juvenile court granted the Agency’s request
to place R.G. in the same home as his siblings and authorized the
administration of Zyrtec to manage his allergy symptoms.
      In its August 15, 2023 addendum report, the Agency reported Mother
was participating in services and maintaining regular visitation with the
children. In addition to changing her locks, Mother had created and
maintained a safety plan that included where she parked her car and where
she kept her purse, phone and keys, and a code word with neighbors if an

                                       6
incident occurred. She had also filed a police report after Zachary placed a

letter in her mailbox in violation of the restraining order.5
      The Agency reported it was “glad to see strong engagement from the
[M]other, both with the Agency and with her referred services. The
[M]other is communicative regarding her needs, and advocates for her
children. She has been visiting regularly and has good visits with the
children.”
      Conversely, the Agency reported it had poor communication with
Zachary, who continued “to present himself in concerning ways,” failed to
engage in services, and violated the restraining order on multiple occasions
by going to the Polinsky Children’s Center, and by leaving a letter in
Mother’s mailbox.
      In its August 23, 2023 addendum report, the Agency reported that
although Mother had not always communicated effectively with the Agency
and the caregiver, she continued to progress in her participation in services
and her visitation with the children was “good.” According to the family
support clinician’s report attached to the Agency’s addendum report, Mother
had secured part-time employment and demonstrated the ability to utilize
resources in the community to secure basic needs for her and her children.
She was dedicated to engaging in services and work toward reunification
with her children and demonstrated “insight to the risk of continued DV
exposure to her and her children’s overall health and well[-]being.” In

5     After obtaining a temporary restraining order protecting her and the
children from Zachary on June 27, 2023, Mother requested a permanent
restraining order. On August 3, 2023, the trial court issued a three-year
restraining order that extended only to Mother. Both orders included no-
contact between Mother and Zachary and ordered Zachary to move out of the
home.
                                        7
addition to securing a three-year restraining order, she was actively
engaging in services to support her overall functioning, including parent
partner services, in-home parenting education, domestic violence victim
support services, and individual therapy.
      The family support clinician assessed Mother’s “risk level” as
“extreme danger” based on the history of verbal, emotional, physical, and
sexual abuse during her relationship with Zachary, the increase in
severity and frequency of the abuse over the past year, the continuation of
domestic violence after their romantic relationship ended, and the
associated risk of homicide within violent relationships. The clinician
advised Mother of the danger and recommended “assertive action to protect
herself with highest level of sanctions against her ex-boyfriend [Zachary].”
Mother admitted she previously allowed Zachary to stay in the home after
they broke up, but after the Agency initiated the dependency case, she had
been determined to keep him away and had secured a restraining order to
protect herself and the children.
      The clinician observed Mother was committed to providing a safe
and domestic violence-free environment for her children. She had
demonstrated insight into the impact of continued domestic violence
exposure on herself and her children’s overall well-being and had secured
a restraining order to prevent continued violence in the home. She was
also actively engaged in various support services, and was receiving
spiritual support from her congregation. The clinician recommended
Mother continue participating in services and psychoeducation.

                                      8
        The Agency did not make any amendments to its assessment or

recommendations in its final addendum report dated August 23, 2023.6
Unlike the underlying July 19, 2023 jurisdiction/disposition report, none
of the addendum reports expressly addressed whether there was a viable
way to maintain the children safely in the home at any later point in
time.
D. Combined Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
        The juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing
on August 23, 2023. In addition to hearing arguments from counsel and
Zachary, who elected to represent himself, the juvenile court admitted the

following documentary evidence: the Agency’s June 27,7 July 19, July 26,
August 15, and August 23, 2023 reports and attachments, a three-page
packet submitted by Zachary, and a 29-page packet submitted by Mother
that included her written statement in lieu of testimony.
        In her statement, Mother asserted she had voluntarily complied with
all Agency recommendations and had instituted multiple safety precautions
to ensure the safety of her children and herself. She had obtained a three-
year restraining order with a move out order against Zachary, changed her
locks, maintained multiple safety plans, and utilized multiple local support
systems. She declared she had gained awareness of the patterns and
destructive impact of domestic violence on herself and her children and

6    The Agency submitted a second August 23, 2023 addendum report,
which was limited to its considerations regarding placement of the children.

7      The detention report is dated June 27, 2023, but is file-stamped
June 28, 2023. The juvenile court’s August 23, 2023 Minute Orders reference
the detention report using the June 27, 2023 and June 28, 2023 dates. We
refer to the detention report using the June 27, 2023 date listed in the footer
of each page of the report.
                                        9
asked the juvenile court to order family maintenance and allow her
children to return home with the safety precautions already in place
along with supervision by the Agency and the juvenile court.
E. Juvenile Court’s Ruling
      Following closing arguments, the court ruled:
            [T]he history of domestic violence in this case is long.
            There is a history of shutting that one person out and
            letting that one person back in.

            With domestic violence of this level, of this length of
            time, it’s not a matter of a couple months of decision-
            making. It’s a real journey that requires a lot of
            therapy, a lot of work to overcome, because the very
            thing that we’re dealing with is a cycle, a cycle of
            violence . . . always—it gets to a point where you
            have the insight, but what happens is[,] it very
            quickly moves to the next period where the
            honeymoon phase comes back, where you start
            thinking, “oh, well, things might be okay now.”

            And the thing is, it might not be in this one
            relationship. Those issues, having been someone who
            experienced these things, transfer to your next
            relationship and your next one after that, and I
            notice you sitting there . . . thinking, “I’m done with
            this and I’m done with [these] relationships,” . . . but
            the reality is that’s not what the science tells us
            about this type of life experience.

            And so what we want to do is ensure that both of you
            are given the services that you need to address the
            issues that got us here so that when we return the
            children home, it’s safe to do that.

      After acknowledging the parents’ negative substance test results and
its hope that they could be “sustained over a meaningful period,” the juvenile
court adopted the Agency’s recommendation for continued testing. The
juvenile court then proceeded to adjudicate the children as dependents

                                      10
pursuant to section 300 and issued its dispositional order removing the
children from both parents’ care and custody pursuant to section 361,
subdivision (c), stating: “Removal of [E.C.] from the parents and removal of
[R.C.] and [R.G.] from the [M]other is necessary under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1) by clear and convincing
evidence that there is a substantial danger to the children’s physical health
and there are no reasonable means by which the children’s physical health
may be protected without removing them.” (See § 361, subd. (c).)
      The juvenile court confirmed the placement of the children with E.C.’s
aunt and uncle, adopted the Agency’s recommendations, and scheduled the
six- and 12-month review hearings for February 20, 2023, and August 26,
2023, respectively.
      Mother appealed. She does not challenge the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional ruling, but argues the court erred by removing the children
from her custody in its dispositional order.
                                DISCUSSION
      The question before us is “whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996
(Conservatorship of O.B.)) that both (1) a substantial danger exists to the
well-being of the children if they were returned home, and (2) there are no
reasonable means to protect the children’s physical health without removing
the children from Mother’s physical custody (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)).
A. Standard of Review
      When reviewing the juvenile court’s dispositional order, the appellate
court must determine if it is supported by substantial evidence while
“ ‘bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof’ ” in the court below. (In re

                                       11
Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146 (Hailey T.).) Substantial evidence
must be meaningful and not merely speculative. (In re Ma.V. (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 11, 22 (Ma.V.).) We are mindful that the clear and convincing
burden of proof at the dispositional phase below is substantially greater than
at the jurisdictional phase and reflects the “ ‘constitutionally protected rights
of parents to the care, custody and management’ ” of their children. (Id. at
p. 24.) In conducting our review, we view the record in the light most
favorable to the Agency and give appropriate deference to how the juvenile
court may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.
(Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.)
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding of Substantial
   Danger to the Children

      We find the evidence presented at the contested dispositional hearing,
including the Agency’s June 28, July 19, August 15, and August 23, 2023
reports and attachments, constitutes substantial evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s finding that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to
the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
the minor if the minor were returned home[.]” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) In
making this determination, “the court may consider the parent’s past conduct
as well as present circumstances” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900,
917 (Cole C.)), and in this case, the reports contain detailed information
revealing a long-standing and escalating pattern of domestic violence
between Mother and Zachary in the presence of the children, a history of
substance abuse by both Mother and Zachary, and Zachary’s unwillingness to

                                       12
change his destructive behaviors and repeated violations of restraining
orders.
      The focus of section 361, subdivision (c), is to avert harm to children
(Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 917), and the juvenile court recognized
Mother was still early in the domestic violence recovery process and her
sobriety had not been “sustained over a meaningful period.” Mother had
been voluntarily participating in services and maintaining a safety plan for
approximately two months and had one negative drug test result. Although
the parents’ violence was not intentionally directed at the children and there
is no evidence Mother harmed the children when Zachary was not present,
the recent escalation of domestic violence, Zachary’s violation of restraining
orders, and the fact Mother was still early in the recovery process is sufficient
evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the children’s physical and
emotional well-being in accordance with section 361, subdivision (c)(1). (See
Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 146 [“The parent need not be
dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to
be appropriate[.]”].)
C. The Record Does Not Reflect Consideration of Reasonable Means to
   Protect the Children Short of Removal

     Although there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of
substantial danger to the children, before the juvenile court may remove the
children, it must also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that there are no
reasonable means to protect the minor’s physical health without removing
the children from the parent’s physical custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
      Preliminarily, the Agency argues Mother forfeited this issue by failing
to raise it below. Although Mother did not raise an objection or request a
more specific statement from the juvenile court, Mother preserved the issue
for appeal by contesting the Agency’s recommendation for removal and
                                       13
expressly requesting family maintenance in her statement based on specific
actions she had already taken to protect the children from future harm and
address the safety concerns raised by the Agency. (See In re Javier G. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464 [when merits of case are contested, parent is not
required to object to agency’s failure to carry its burden of proof].)
      Proceeding to the merits, we conclude the record does not adequately
reflect that the juvenile court considered whether there were less drastic
reasonable means to protect the children from future harm. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) The juvenile court did not specifically state there were no
reasonable means to protect the children absent removal at the hearing, and
the August 23, 2023 minute orders include conclusory statements that “there
are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be
protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical
custody” and that “[r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent or to
eliminate the need for removal of the child[ren] from the mother’s home and
to make it possible for the child[ren] to return to their home.” (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) Without more, these conclusory statements are insufficient.
      Subdivision (c)(1)(A) and (B) of section 361 require the juvenile court to
specifically consider, as a reasonable means to protect the children, the
option of removing the offending parent from the home and allowing a
nonoffending parent to retain physical custody as long as that parent
“presents a plan acceptable to the court demonstrating that he or she will be
able to protect the child from future harm.” (See also In re Vonda M. (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 753, 757 [“The more likely it is that the offending parent will
have further contact with the nonoffending parent, the more the child’s
welfare is jeopardized by being placed unsupervised with the nonoffending
parent.”].) The record does not reflect the juvenile court considered these

                                        14
options as it made no mention of Zachary’s removal from the home or the
three-year restraining order, nor did the court address the undisputed
evidence of Mother’s efforts to protect the children from future harm (i.e., she
had changed the locks on her home, created and maintained multiple safety
plans, voluntarily and actively participated in parenting and domestic
violence education, and reported Zachary’s violations of the restraining
order).
      The juvenile court is also statutorily required to determine “whether
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal
of the minor from his or her home.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) To aid the juvenile
court in determining whether the efforts were adequate, the California Rules
of Court require the Agency to submit a social study which “must
include . . . [a] discussion of the reasonable efforts made to prevent or
eliminate removal[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).) In this
case, the Agency submitted a total of six reports—the June 27, 2023
detention report, the July 19, 2023 jurisdiction/disposition report, the
July 26, 2023 addendum report, the August 15, 2023 addendum report, and
two August 23, 2023 addendum reports. Although the juvenile court
admitted all the reports into evidence, its minute orders only state that the
juvenile court “read and considered the report(s) of the social worker dated
06/27/23 and 07/19/23” but do not similarly state that the court considered
the July 26, August 15, or August 23, 2023 addendum reports. This is not a
distinction without a difference.
      In the assessment/evaluation section of the July 19, 2023
jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency stated “there does not appear to be
a viable way to maintain the children safely in the home in the immediate
future” despite Mother’s enthusiasm to receive services and maintain a

                                       15
restraining order against Zachary in light of the “brief period of time” in
which Mother had shown her protective capacity coupled with the fact that
the Agency had not yet been able to observe how Mother actually engaged
with services.
      The August 15, 2023 and August 23, 2023 addendum reports, on the
other hand, detail how Mother engaged in services and how she continued to
exhibit affirmative actions to protect the children from future harm, and yet
the Agency failed to address whether these changed circumstances impacted
its initial assessment. Unlike the initial July 19, 2023
jurisdiction/disposition reports, none of the addendum reports mention
whether there was, at any later point, a viable way to maintain the
children safely in the home. Similarly, the July 19, 2023
jurisdiction/disposition report contains a “reasonable efforts” section that lists
referrals to services and drug testing, but the Agency did not address
reasonable efforts in any of its addendum reports.
      At the time of the dispositional hearing on August 23, 2023, the
circumstances requiring the initial detention of the children were seemingly
less urgent as Zachary had been removed from the home by court order and
Mother had tested negative for substances, demonstrated some insight into
the destructive effects of the prior domestic violence on her children, and had
obtained and maintained a restraining order against Zachary. The Agency
did not address why Mother’s undisputed compliance with the Agency’s
recommendations and participation in the referrals failed to allay its
concerns for the children’s future safety. At a minimum, the Agency should
have explained at the hearing why strict supervision and active monitoring
during Mother’s continuation in services would not sufficiently protect the
children from future harm. Instead, the Agency concluded during closing

                                       16
argument that “[t]here are no reasonable means to prevent removal here if
we’re looking at the big picture.”
      Ultimately, the juvenile court was required to consider less drastic
alternatives to removal and could have considered stringent conditions of
supervision and close monitoring by the Agency including unannounced
visits, random drug testing, and continued monitoring of Mother’s
participation in the Agency’s case plan to ensure she continues to progress
and complies with the restraining order and safety plans. (See In re Steve W.
(1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [juvenile court has ability to provide stringent
conditions of supervision and close monitoring of children]; Hailey T., supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 148; In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809–
810 (Ashly F.).)
      On this record, it remains unclear whether the juvenile court
considered the Agency’s addendum reports, and if it did, whether it
considered permitting Mother to care for the children in the home with
alternative, reasonable protective measures in place. The juvenile court
made no mention of additional monitoring or supervision or other reasonable
means to protect the children from future harm at the hearing, nor did it
address Mother’s statement submitted in lieu of her testimony in which she
asserted she had voluntarily complied with all Agency recommendations and
had instituted multiple safety precautions to ensure the safety of the
children. The juvenile court’s statement that there are no reasonable means
by which the children could be protected absent removal are not sufficient.
(See § 361, subd. (e) [juvenile court is required to “state the facts on which the
decision to remove the minor is based”].)

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D. The Error was Prejudicial
      The failure to make the required findings supporting removal under
section 361, subdivision (c), can be either harmless or prejudicial error
depending on the circumstances. (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206,
1218 (Jason L.).) When the juvenile court violates a statutory mandate, reversal
is justified only when it is reasonably probable the court would have reached a
result more favorable to the appellant in the absence of the error. (In re
Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098–1099.) “[C]ases involving a
court’s obligation to make findings regarding a minor’s change of
custody . . . have held that the failure to do so will be deemed harmless where ‘it
is not reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of
continued parental custody.’ ” (See Jason L., at p. 1218.) Based on our review of
this record, we cannot conclude the error was harmless.
      “The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”
(Stanosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753].) Section 361 represents an
“effort to shift the emphasis of the [California] child dependency laws to
maintaining children in their natural parents’ homes where it was safe to do so,
and to clarify the conditions in which a minor could be removed from his or her
parents’ custody.” (Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1216.) It therefore
requires the juvenile court to consider less drastic measures than removal (see
Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012), and a clear record
satisfying this statutory requirement is especially needed in cases where the

                                       18
circumstances that caused the children’s initial detention are no longer urgent.
(See In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58, 65.)
      Out-of-home placement is a “last resort,” and “[t]he law requires that a
child remain in parental custody pending the resolution of dependency
proceedings, despite the problems that led the court to take jurisdiction over the
child, unless the court is clearly convinced that such a disposition would harm
the child.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 525 (Henry V.); see also
In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 959.) The requirement for a discussion by
the child welfare agency of its reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate removal
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i)) and a statement by the court of the
facts supporting removal (§ 361, subd. (e)) are important safeguards in the
dependency scheme. (See Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810.)
      We find the juvenile court’s failure to strictly follow applicable
statutory mandates was prejudicial in this case. We cannot deduce from our
review of the record whether the juvenile court considered less drastic
reasonable means to secure the children’s safety as required by section 361,
subdivision (c)(1), nor does the record reflect the juvenile court’s
determination of whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent the need
for removal of the children from their home and statement of facts upon
which the court’s decision was based as required by section 361,
subdivision (e). (See Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [failure to
comply with statutory mandate was prejudicial because “ample evidence
existed of ‘reasonable means’ to protect [the children] in their home” given
the mother’s expression of remorse and enrollment in a parenting class];
Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 529 [although juvenile court checked
box reciting findings required under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), it “did not
mention the existence of alternatives to out-of-home placement” and there

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was “ample evidence that appropriate services could have been provided . . .
in the family home”]; In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1067.)
Accordingly, we reverse the dispositional order and remand the matter for a
new disposition hearing.
E. Directions on Remand
     Nothing in this opinion is intended to foreclose the juvenile court from
considering new evidence or changed circumstances on remand that may have
arisen during the pendency of this appeal. (See In re Abram L. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 452, 464, fn. 6.) Because the record on appeal does not contain
information as to any factual developments or orders since the entry of the
August 23, 2023 dispositional order, and we cannot speculate as to their possible
effect on the children’s circumstances, we leave it to the sound discretion of the
juvenile court following remand to determine what specific procedural steps are

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appropriate in light of our disposition. (See In re Isayah C. (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 684, 701.)
                                  DISPOSITION
      The August 23, 2023 dispositional order is reversed, and this matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                       CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

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