Court Opinion

ID: 9411978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:07:23.301437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:22.457366
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/28/23 S.J. v. G.V. CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

S.J., Jr.,                                                           D079921

         Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. D561668)

G.V.,

         Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel S. Belsky, Judge. Affirmed.
         G.V., in pro. per., for Appellant.
         S.J., Jr., in pro. per., for Respondent.
         Appellant G.V. (mother) appeals from an October 2021 family court
order that, among other things, modifies parental visitation for their minor
child on the request of respondent S.J., Jr. (father). Mother contends the
family court erred in its custody order by ignoring her evidence showing that
detriment to the child would result from granting father’s request. She
further contends the court erred by assuming she had not properly filed
responsive papers, and deprived her of a fair hearing due to its partiality and
bias. Because mother has not met her burden to demonstrate error, and her
claims are otherwise unsupported by the record of the hearing, we affirm the
order.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         The parties in this appeal are self-represented litigants. Because
mother provides minimal record citations in her recitation of the factual and
procedural history, which does not set out an impartial summary of the facts
pertinent to the court’s order, we take the underlying facts and procedure
from the documents contained in the clerk’s transcript and the reporter’s

transcript of the hearing at issue.1 We state the facts in the light most
favorable to the family court’s order. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d
604, 614; Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 289, 300.) We
disregard assertions that are not supported by proper record citations or are
unsupported by the existing record. (See Young v. California Fish and Game
Commission (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1191; Harshad & Nasir Corp. v.
Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 523, 527, fn. 3 [“We are not
required to scour the record in search of support for a party’s factual
statements and may disregard such unsupported statements”].)
         The parties are the unmarried parents to the child, who was born in
2009. In 2016, father instituted family court proceedings to establish a
relationship with the child. By 2018, the parties were subject to a custody
and visitation order under which, among other things, mother had legal
custody of the child, who would primarily reside with her in Sacramento

1      Throughout her briefing, mother purports to recite facts concerning her
relationship with father and discusses proceedings that are not properly
before us. Our appellate jurisdiction is “ ‘limited in scope to the notice of
appeal.’ ” (Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 846.)

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County; father and the child would participate in conjoint therapy; and father
would have up to eight hours of supervised visitation each month, stepping
up to 16 hours each month upon the occurrence of certain conditions,
including specified notice to mother.
      In June 2021, father filed a request for an order seeking a change in
visitation to permit him overnight visits with the child, including visits in
San Diego. He submitted a supporting declaration recounting some
background and events occurring since the family court’s last visitation order.
      Mother filed a form responsive declaration in July 2021 with lengthy
attachments, including a visitation plan. She set out her detailed version of
events leading up to the filing, advising the court that she did not consent to
father’s requests.
      On the day of the October 14, 2021 hearing on father’s request, mother
filed a declaration regarding the family court services mediator’s report about

the parties’ matter.2 Both parties were self-represented at the hearing and
sworn in by the family court. At the outset of the hearing the court stated:
“We are here on [father’s] June 24, 2021 [request for order] regarding child
visitation. I didn’t see a proof of service, but there was a response.” The
court confirmed that the parties had attended the family court services
mediation, then elicited from father whether he agreed with or wanted
modifications to the mediator’s visitation recommendations. While father

2     Mother’s papers were initially file stamped October 13, 2021, but that
stamp appears to contain a handwritten note cancelling it and another file
stamp dated October 14, 2021. Mother had earlier filed a complaint about
the mediator handling their family court services session, claiming the
mediator had sided with father and did not treat the parties equally. Mother
repeats her criticisms on appeal, purporting to characterize the interactions
but citing only to her own declaration and complaint.
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answered, the court clerk interjected, asking whether mother was in the
court’s business office that morning. The following discussion occurred:
      “[Mother]: I was there. I was trying to get copies of the two
declarations that [father] wasn’t served with.
      “The court: That he wasn’t served with?
      “[Mother]: Right.
      “The clerk: She said it was you.
      “The court: Apparently, something was filed yesterday, but it’s late.
The court is not—doesn’t have time to review it.
      “The clerk: So I’m going to return this to you.
      “The court: All right. The court is ordering that it be stricken from the
register of actions because it wasn’t filed—
      “[Mother]: I have copies here, but I didn’t get a chance to serve him.
      “The court: You can refile it. But he doesn’t have it; the court doesn’t
have it; there is no time to read two inches of paper; and it’s late. So it won’t
be considered.”
      The court continued with the hearing, listening to father’s proposal
about modifications to the mediator’s visitation recommendations. The court
then summarized the mediator’s proposal, which included father visiting the
child in Sacramento for six months before visitation was permitted in San
Diego. Father asked that the court change that term to three months,
explaining he had been making visits in the meantime. Father also
confirmed he agreed the child should be in counseling, pointing out the child
had expressed fears about being homesick and about getting on an airplane.
The court suggested father fly with the child to San Diego for the first couple
of visits to keep the child comfortable. The court then turned to mother:
      “The court: . . . [¶] . . . [I]s that all agreeable to you?

                                         4
      “[Mother]: Yes, it is. It’s fine. I just—I think it would be good to stick
to the six-month [sic] just to allow [the child] that time to really get the time
with the therapist.” Mother explained she had told father she was trying to
set the child up with a more experienced and specialized adolescent therapist
who could work with the child’s fears: “the issue of the flying, the issue of the
overnight stays.” The court said, “Yeah. And another issue that could be
addressed is they could talk about when [the child] is ready to start going to
San Diego, if it is before six months. You know, maybe if [the child] is going
to regular therapy, [the child] will start feeling better about that and more
comfortable and . . . will express to the therapist that [the child] is
comfortable doing that before six months.” Mother responded, “That’s fair.”
      The court then proceeded to put its order on the record, adopting the
family court services mediator’s recommendations with modifications.
During the court’s recitation, father asked whether his visitation would be
limited to San Diego, or whether he could travel outside of California to visit
family in other states. The court asked mother: “How do you feel about
that?” Mother responded, “[Father] has—he drinks a lot of alcohol.” She told
the court father was “constantly drinking” and it was the “lifestyle he leads”
that “has not changed, from my observation.” The discussion continued:
      “[Mother]: “That’s the only thing. If it weren’t for that, I would be okay
with it. But it just makes me leery with [the child] being under his care
outside—
      “The court: That issue isn’t even discussed in the family court services
report, is it?
      “[Mother]: I brought it up to the mediator’s attention, and I had filed a
complaint with [family court services]. It’s one of the things that I had filed
with the court.

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       “The court: Is it in the report?
       “[Mother]: No. She left it out.”
       Mother advised the court, and father confirmed, that he had committed
a DUI in 2010. Father stated he had not had one since that time or any other
criminal history other than an arrest due to mistaken identity, after which
the case was dropped. The court asked about father’s employment and his
drinking habits, and if he drank around the child. Father said he would have
a beer while at dinner with mother and the child, but did not drink alcohol
when he was with the child. The court asked if father understood mother’s
concern, and father responded: “I understand anybody’s concern with
alcohol. I don’t understand where [mother’s] concern is coming from. I do
think that what she is going off of is fabricated, but I do understand
anybody’s concern if somebody was an overly-drinking person with a child.”
       The court again turned to mother: “So let me ask [mother]. [¶] Do you
have any evidence that [the child’s] health, safety, or welfare have ever been
put at risk when [the child] is in father’s care?” Mother replied, “No evidence,
no.”
       The court continued putting its order on the record, then told mother:
“Now, . . . if you ever have evidence you believe shows that [the child’s]
health, safety, or welfare are put at risk by father, you can always come into
court seeking an emergency order on an ex parte basis. You can contact
CWS, Child Welfare Services. You can contact law enforcement. [¶] I’m not
getting the feeling that that’s the case. [S.J., Jr.] impresses the Court as a
caring, loving father who clearly wants to have a good relationship with [the
child], which is in [the child’s] best interests. [¶] Okay?” Mother responded,
“Uh-huh.”

                                          6
      The matter proceeded with the court answering mother’s question
about father’s contact with the therapist and ability to schedule
appointments. It reiterated that mother had sole legal custody and clarified
that while the child was required to remain in therapy until released by the
therapist or a different court order, mother would be the one making
arrangements. The court concluded: “Now, if the therapist wants to speak to
you and/or father, he or she is certainly welcome to do that. You are both
ordered to cooperate in good faith with whatever the therapist thinks is best
for [the child].” Mother responded, “Got it. Okay.”
      The court wished the parties good luck, and both mother and father
thanked the court, concluding the hearing.
                                 DISCUSSION
          I. Standard of Review and Principles of Appellate Review
      We begin with the appropriate standards of appellate review. Mother
contends this court must undertake de novo review of the family court’s
custody ruling, review for clear error the court’s ruling concerning the late-
filing of her documents, and apply an abuse of discretion standard to her
claim of judicial bias and deprivation of a fair hearing. She cites a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure and out-of-state authorities for these propositions.
These authorities, which mother does not discuss or analyze in any
substantive manner, do not bind us. (See Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45
Cal.4th 467, 490 [“out-of-state decisions are not binding on this court”];
Hefczyc v. Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 518,
544 [only in the absence of relevant state precedent do California courts look
to federal rules for guidance], disapproved on another ground in Noel v.
Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 986, fn. 15.)

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      We typically review custody and visitation orders under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. (See Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249,
255; Ed H. v. Ashley C. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 899, 904; Chalmers v.
Hirschkop, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.) Under this standard, “we must
uphold the trial court ‘ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of
whether such basis was actually invoked.’ ” (Montenegro, at p. 255; Ed H. v.
Ashley C., at p. 904.) Reversal is only warranted “ ‘if there is no reasonable
basis upon which the trial court could conclude that its decision advanced the
best interests of the child.’ ” (Ed H. v. Ashley C., at p. 904.) “ ‘ “ ‘Broad
deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should
interfere only “ ‘if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most
favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could reasonably have
made the order that he did.’ . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) A court abuses its discretion if
it applies improper criteria or makes incorrect legal assumptions. (S.Y. v.
Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 324, 333.)
      We review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, in the
light most favorable to the order. (S.Y. v. Superior Court, supra, 29
Cal.App.5th at p. 334.) Under the substantial evidence standard, we are
required to accept all evidence supporting the family court’s order, completely
disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the order. (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 570, 581-582.) We independently review matters presenting
pure questions of law, not involving the resolution of disputed facts. (Ed H. v.
Ashley C., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 904.)
      As for the claim of judicial bias, an appellant must preserve such a
claim for appellate review by objecting below to the alleged improprieties or
asking the judge to either correct the assertedly offending remarks or recuse

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from the matter. (See Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218.)
      Mother’s appeal is subject to other settled principles of appellate
review. We presume the correctness of the family court’s order and it is her
burden as the appellant to affirmatively show error. (See Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 1467, 1484.) We also presume judicial duty is properly
performed; that the court below knows and applies the correct statutory and
case law, and will ignore material it knows is incompetent, irrelevant, or
inadmissible. (S.Y. v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 333; In re
Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526.) Mother must
provide cogent legal argument in support of her claims of error with citation
to relevant legal authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); see
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142,
153; Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520; Nwosu v. Uba
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) “We may and do ‘disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or
fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions
[s]he wants us to adopt.’ ” (United Grand Corp., at p. 153.)
      “[A]s a party appearing in propria persona, [mother] ‘is entitled to the
same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’
[Citations.] Accordingly, we may disregard factual contentions that are not
supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on information
that is outside the record.” (Tanguilig v. Valdez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p.
520; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 523 [“Although
[appellant] is representing herself in this appeal she is not entitled to special
treatment and is required to follow the rules”].)

                                        9
                         II. Challenge to Custody Order
      Mother challenges the court’s custody order, claiming the court ignored
her evidence that assertedly proved granting father’s request would be
detrimental to their child. Despite this contention in her heading, the
substance of mother’s argument is that the court treated her rudely and
unfairly, did not review her documents or prepare for the matter, and rushed
through so as to deny her a fair hearing. According to mother, the court
stated “off the record” that it only reviewed father’s documents, but did not
say whether it reviewed what she had submitted. She asserts that the court
“had no intention to hear anything [she] had to say, nor did [the court] care to
allow [her] to speak or advocate for [their] child.” She maintains, citing out-
of-state authority, that the court failed to do its judicial duty.
      The factual assertions, which are entirely unsupported by citations to
the record, do not abide by the standards summarized above. They are also
unsupported by the reporter’s transcript, which we have extensively
summarized above. It shows that the court at the outset acknowledged
mother had filed a response to father’s request for order. Though the court
was silent as to whether it had actually reviewed those papers, we presume it
did so in the absence of a showing otherwise. (S.Y. v. Superior Court, supra,
29 Cal.App.5th at p. 333.) Mother has not made such a showing by her bare
unsupported assertions. And mother’s contention, made in her heading
alone, that her evidence proved granting father’s request would be
detrimental, disregards the substantial evidence standard of appellate
review. Mother does not cite to any evidence that was before the court,
including evidence favoring her position, but if she had, we would accept all
evidence supporting its order and disregard contrary evidence. (Schmidt v.
Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581-582.)

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      Even if we could glean some salient points by mother about the
evidence relevant to the court’s visitation order, mother fails to support any
such point with reasoned argument and citations to relevant authority,
allowing us to treat the point as waived. (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1481 [“ ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived’ ”; reviewing court is “ ‘ “not bound to
develop appellants’ arguments for them” ’ ”].) There is no basis to overturn
the court’s October 2021 visitation order.
III. Challenge to Court’s Rejection of Mother’s Declaration Regarding Family
                           Court Services Mediation
      Mother’s contention that the family court erred by rejecting her
document filed on the day of the hearing fares no better. She claims the court
assumed the document she attempted to file was her response to father’s
June 2021 request for order, and as a result “[her] and [the] child’s concerns
were not taken into consideration at all.” Mother asserts, “Had the judge
looked at [her responsive declaration] prior to his outburst and accusations,
this hearing would have proceeded differently and would have had a different
outcome.”
      The record does not support mother’s argument, since, as stated, the
court acknowledged mother had filed a response to father’s request for order,
and we presume it considered those papers. The document rejected by the
court was mother’s complaint about the family court services mediator,
papers that the court advised mother she could refile. Mother otherwise
provides no reasoned argument or persuasive authority for the proposition
that this filing was timely or proper in the absence of a proof of service on

                                       11
father.3 Nor does the record support mother’s claim the court did not
consider her concerns; it shows the court asked for mother’s input and
listened to her position on father’s visitation requests. The court went so far
as to ask father whether he understood mother’s concerns about his alcohol
use and explored the issue with both parties. The court respectfully
addressed mother and advised her of the consequence of her having sole legal
custody of the child. Mother has not demonstrated error.
               IV. Mother’s Claims of Bias and Unfair Hearing
      Mother contends the family court deprived her of a fair hearing and
treated her with partiality, bias and prejudice. She again supports her
contentions with solely out-of-state authorities. According to mother, the
court demonstrated such bias and prejudice, mistreated her, and denied her a
fair hearing when it “scolded [her]” about her late-filed documents before
strangers in the courtroom; erroneously assumed the document she had
attempted to file that day was her responsive declaration, causing her “much
humiliation”; and cut her off, rushing the hearing and correcting her
grammar with the intent to “humiliate [her] before his courtroom.” None of

3     Mother cites Green v. Baca (C.D. Cal. 2003) 219 F.R.D. 485 without
discussion for the proposition that her document was filed in time for the
clerks to “scan it and rush it to the judge to review prior to the hearing the
next day . . . .” At the cited page in Green, the court discussed a magistrate’s
findings of fact and the standards for reversing such findings. (Id. at p. 489.)
We see no relevance to mother’s proposition.

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her claims are accompanied by citations to the reporter’s transcript of the

hearing.4
      Under the previously summarized principles of appellate review,
mother has forfeited any claim of judicial bias. The reporter’s transcript
shows she did not timely raise or object to what she perceived as bias in the
proceedings below. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th at p. 1218.) Additionally, her claims are conclusory and absent
substantive legal analysis showing prejudicial bias by the trial court
warranting reversal. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
Although elsewhere in her brief mother refers to certain canons of judicial
conduct regarding integrity, independence, fairness, impartiality, and
diligence, she does not present any substantive legal argument showing the
family court violated any of those canons. Rather, she merely claims it was
“clear” the court did not prepare for the hearing, review her response, or
review the history of their case, but instead “was just rushing through the
hearings without being careful as to what he was doing and how his decisions
were going to affect the lives of the people involved, especially children.”
      Having reviewed the reporter’s transcript, we find mother’s assertions
of bias, prejudice and misconduct unsupported. Mother claims the court
“stated [it] only reviewed [father’s] request and only allowed [father] to speak

4      In the factual and procedural history section of her brief, mother cites
to pages 10, 14 and 18 of the reporter’s transcript to support her assertion
that the family court, when granting something father had requested, “would
look over at [her] with a smirk on his face to see [her] reaction.” We see
nothing on those pages of the reporter’s transcript that objectively supports
mother’s subjective interpretation of the court’s actions. Mother intersperses
her bias arguments with claims that the court’s ruling “further caused [the]
child severe emotional harm.” She purports to describe the child’s negative
reaction to the hearing. We disregard these assertions, which are matters
outside the record.
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but not [mother].” She claims the court cut her off, interrupted her, or did
not allow her to completely finish her sentences. She further asserts the
court was “biased,” “rude,” “condescending” and “abusive” to not only her, but
other women in the courtroom. Mother’s observations are unsupported by
any record citation and constitute matters outside the record that we
disregard. Mother suggests the court mocked her speech because she was
Hispanic, but the record merely shows the court was trying to understand
what she was saying about adolescent therapy, and mother did not respond
with umbrage or otherwise express a negative reaction at the hearing during
that exchange. While the court may have interjected at that time and also
while mother was speaking about father’s asserted drinking issues, it
otherwise listened to her, respectfully addressed her, and included her
thoughts in its consideration of the matter.
      To the extent mother asserts the trial court showed its bias by agreeing
with the family court services recommendation to give father additional
overnight visits, including in San Diego, and otherwise by making findings
and decisions adverse to her, she does not show it acted outside the normal
function of a family court in considering and weighing the papers and
evidence and making findings of fact based on those matters. “The mere fact
that the [family] court issued rulings adverse to [mother] on several matters
in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does
not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual bias.”
(Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674; see
also Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 59-60 [mere
erroneous rulings do not show appearance of bias].) Likewise, “[m]ere
expressions of opinion, based on observation of the witnesses and evidence, do

                                      14
not demonstrate judicial bias.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
      Finally, to the extent mother claims she was denied her right to a fair
hearing due to the family court’s alleged bias, she has the burden to show
such bias was so prejudicial that it deprived her of a fair, as opposed to a
perfect, hearing. (See Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p.
589.) She must demonstrate the family court’s alleged bias was so great that
it became constitutionally intolerable. (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th
993, 1001.) As stated, we have reviewed the record on appeal. Contrary to
mother’s assertions, it demonstrates she received a fair hearing by an
impartial and unbiased court.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
                                                                 O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

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