Court Opinion

ID: 9913814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 20:07:06.634475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:03.902109
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mariucci, 2023-Ohio-4795.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    LUCAS COUNTY

City of Toledo                                        Court of Appeals No. L-23-1033

       Appellee                                       Trial Court No. CRB-22-05794

v.

Sean M. Mariucci                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

       Appellant                                      Decided: December 28, 2023

                                                *****

       Rebecca Facey, City of Toledo Prosecuting Attorney, and
       Jimmy Jones, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

       Tyler Naud Jechura, for appellant.

                                                *****

       ZMUDA, J.

                                            I. Introduction

       {¶ 1} Appellant, Sean Mariucci, appeals the February 15, 2023 judgment of the

Toledo Municipal Court, finding him guilty of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.

2903.21(A). Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the city to use

unauthenticated evidence to improperly impeach his testimony, that his conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                         II. Facts and Procedural Background

       {¶ 2} On June 21, 2022, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for appellant based

on the victim, S.B.’s sworn complaint that appellant engaged in conduct that constituted

aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A). The charge arose from a June 15,

2022 incident in which appellant, S.B.’s neighbor, threatened to kill her, stating that “she

would be in a body bag[.]” Appellant was arrested on September 17, 2022. Two days

later, on September 19, 2022, appellant entered a not guilty plea to the charged offense.

The matter was set for trial on February 2, 2023.

       {¶ 3} Prior to trial, the city provided appellant with copies of videos it received

from S.B. The videos came from a camera mounted on S.B.’s property and directed at

appellant’s residence. The city also produced photographs downloaded from appellant’s

social media accounts. None of the videos or photographs were taken on the date of the

underlying incident.

       {¶ 4} On the morning of trial, appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to

prohibit the introduction of the videos and photographs. Appellant did not allege that the

videos were unauthenticated in his motion and acknowledged that the videos included

him making “certain commentary” toward the S.B.’s cameras. He argued that the videos

were irrelevant to the underlying offense and constituted inadmissible “other acts”

evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) because there was no video depicting the incident for

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which he was charged. He also argued that the evidence was inadmissible because its

probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as

described in Evid.R. 403. Appellant renewed these arguments at an in-chambers hearing

just prior to trial. The city argued that the evidence did not constitute “other acts”

evidence but would be introduced to show S.B.’s state of mind regarding the June 15,

2022 incident, and her fear that appellant might actually cause her harm, an element of

the charged offense. The trial court took the motion under advisement and the matter

proceeded to trial where the parties elicited the following testimony:

                                    Testimony of R.M.

       {¶ 5} R.M. is S.B.’s grandson. He lived with S.B. at all times relevant to the

underlying incident. Although he could not recall the date of the underlying incident, he

described the details of what occurred. R.M. was in S.B.’s living room when he heard

appellant tell S.B. that he was going to kill her and her husband and put them both in the

same body bag. He also testified that he was familiar with appellant and recalled

overhearing additional interactions between appellant and S.B. He testified that these

interactions were not friendly. He then identified appellant in the courtroom for the

record.

       {¶ 6} On cross-examination, R.M. testified that he had prior friendly interactions

with appellant. He testified that appellant was nice to him “most of the time” but that

their friendliness ended with the underlying incident.

3.
                                     Testimony of S.B.

       {¶ 7} S.B. testified that she lived on Canevin Drive in Toledo, Lucas County,

Ohio, at the time of the underlying incident. She testified that while she was sitting on

her front stoop on June 15, 2022, at approximately 11:00 p.m., appellant walked up to his

neighboring front gate and told her “I’m going to kill you and your husband and put you

in a body bag.” She testified that she previously had a friendly relationship with

appellant but that it had ended a few years prior. She could not cite a specific incident

that led to the change in their relationship.

       {¶ 8} During her testimony, the city introduced its Exhibit A—a Facebook post in

which he complained about S.B.’s husband allegedly working with the IRS to shut down

appellant’s brother’s business. Appellant objected to the introduction of the exhibit,

arguing that it was irrelevant. The trial court admitted it “for the very limited purpose for

state of mind of the alleged victim in this case only.” S.B. testified that she received it

from one of appellant’s family members. Her initial reaction to the post was the

appellant’s mental health was “quickly declining.” She testified that her husband had

hired appellant’s brother’s business to move his daughter to Texas. She was unaware of

any additional contact between her husband and the business.

       {¶ 9} S.B. was next presented with city’s Exhibit B—a photograph of appellant

standing in his kitchen holding two firearms. Appellant again objected, without stating a

specific basis. The trial court overruled the objection. S.B. explained that she received

this photograph from one of appellant’s family members, and had seen the photograph on

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her neighbor’s and the “mother of [appellant’s] children’s” cell phones prior to the June

15, 2022 incident. S.B. stated that she found the photograph “kind of scary.” She

testified that she thought of both the Facebook post and the photograph at the time of the

June 15, 2022 incident. She stated that this caused her to believe that “[appellant] was

going to kill us.”

       {¶ 10} The city next introduced its Exhibit C—a flash drive containing videos S.B.

emailed to the state. S.B. stated that the drive included “some videos on that I had sent to

you.” The videos were of “the harassment that we put up with every day from my next-

door neighbor, [appellant].” Appellant objected to the admission of these videos into

evidence, again arguing that they depicted “other acts” and were not relevant to the

charged offense. The trial court allowed S.B. to give further testimony as to what the

drive actually contained before ruling on the objection. S.B. testified that the videos were

taken within the six months prior to trial and close to the time of the underlying incident

and depicted appellant yelling at S.B. Appellant then renewed his objection. The trial

court sustained the objections and the videos were not played during S.B.’s testimony.

S.B. then concluded her direct examination testimony by identifying appellant in the

courtroom.1

1
  The videos were not admitted into evidence at the close of the city’s case-in-chief in
light of the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s objection. Despite ultimately being played
as impeachment evidence during appellant’s testimony in his own defense, they were not
included as part of the record on appeal.

5.
       {¶ 11} On cross-examination, S.B. confirmed that she previously had a friendly

relationship with appellant. She testified that she contacted the police immediately after

the June 15, 2022 incident but that they did not arrive at her residence until

approximately 2:00 a.m. the following morning. The city stipulated that there was no

video of the June 15, 2022 incident despite her sworn affidavit stating that she had “video

evidence of the altercation.” S.B. also testified that she would not have suspected

appellant had mental health issues unless someone had shown her the Facebook post and

photograph. She also confirmed that appellant had not threatened her with physical harm

at any point prior to June 15, 2022 and that, although it had been discussed with counsel,

she had not sought a civil protection order from appellant since the incident.

                             Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion

       {¶ 12} The city rested its case at the conclusion of S.B.’s testimony and requested

admission of its Exhibits A and B into the record. The trial court admitted those exhibits

over appellant’s renewed objections. Appellant then made an oral motion for judgment

of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The trial court denied appellant’s motion, finding

that S.B.’s testimony, when viewed in a light most favorable to the city, was sufficient to

support each element of the offense.

       {¶ 13} Appellant then proceeded with his case-in-chief. Appellant elected to

testify on his own behalf. In light of that decision, the trial court advised him of his

constitutional right to remain silent and that he was not obligated to testify. Appellant

acknowledged that he understood these rights, that he was agreeing to waive them, and

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that he wanted to testify as part of his defense. Having waived his rights, appellant gave

the following testimony:

                                 Testimony of Appellant

       {¶ 14} Appellant is S.B.’s neighbor. He testified that on June 15, 2022, he had

participated in an argument with S.B., her husband, and her brother-in-law outside their

residence. He denied threatening S.B. He testified that the argument was about S.B. and

her husband having cameras pointed at his residence. He stated that he has been

diagnosed with PTSD and anxiety resulting from S.B. and her husband’s alleged

harassment of him.

       {¶ 15} On cross-examination, appellant confirmed that Exhibit A was a Facebook

post with his name on it. He stated that S.B.’s husband was “conspiring” against him but

did not offer any specific details. He also acknowledged that the city’s Exhibit B

contained a photograph of him holding two firearms. He was unaware of how S.B. came

into possession of the photograph.

       {¶ 16} As to the alleged harassment he suffered, appellant testified that having

three cameras pointed at his residence was inducing his anxiety and PTSD. He

confirmed that S.B. and her husband did not speak to him but also claimed that he did not

make any threats or harass them in any way. He indicated that he was unable to control

himself when his PTSD was induced and that he did speak with S.B. and her husband on

multiple occasions about the video cameras. He testified that this was in response to S.B.

and her husband’s harassment of him. He stated that he was not aware if S.B. and her

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husband were aware of his “erratic behavior” toward them prior to the June 15, 2022

incident.

       {¶ 17} The city, then, sought permission from the court to play the previously-

excluded videos in its Exhibit C to impeach appellant’s testimony that he did not know if

they S.B. and her husband were aware of his past behavior. The trial court held that

appellant opened the door to that impeachment through his testimony, and allowed the

videos to be played over appellant’s objections. A total of 7 videos were played during

appellant’s testimony. In response to each video, appellant claimed that the contents of

the video were blurry and he could not identify the male voice he heard. He did concede

that the videos included images of his property and at least one of them showed S.B. He

further acknowledged that the videos contained audio of someone yelling but he could

not confirm that he was the one yelling at S.B. and her husband. On redirect

examination, appellant again denied threatening S.B. on June 15, 2022.

                       Closing argument, verdict, and sentencing

       {¶ 18} Appellant rested his case at the close of his testimony and the parties

proceeded with closing arguments. The trial court then found appellant guilty of the

charged offense and sentenced him to a suspended jail term of 180 days, three years of

active probation, ordered him to undergo a mental health evaluation and to follow any

recommended treatment, and imposed a fine of $75 and court costs. The trial court’s

judgment was memorialized on February 15, 2023.

8.
                                III. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 19} Appellant timely appealed and assigns the following errors for our review:

              1. The trial court abused its discretion when it improperly allowed
              videographic evidence to be introduced against the [appellant] without
              authentication.

              2. The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed evidence to be
              admitted for impeachment purposes when it did not impeach the testimony
              of the [appellant].

              3. The trial court erred when it convicted [appellant] as the conviction was
              against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              4. [Appellant] received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense
              counsel failed to contact or subpoena any witnesses to testify on behalf of
              [appellant].

                                  IV. Law and Analysis

          a. The trial court did not err in finding that the videos played at trial were
             authentic pursuant to Evid.R. 901.

       {¶ 20} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the city’s Exhibit C

was not properly authenticated and, therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the city to

play the videos contained therein. Specifically, appellant argues that S.B.’s lack of

testimony regarding the precise nature of the videos on the drive precluded the trial court

from finding that they were authentic. We disagree.

       {¶ 21} At the outset, we find that appellant has forfeited all but plain error review

of this assigned error. At trial, appellant did not challenge the authenticity of the video

evidence the city sought to introduce. Instead, his challenge to the evidence was that the

videos were inadmissible “other acts” evidence as described in Evid.R. 404(B). Now, he

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asks this court, for the first time, to find that the trial court erred when it failed to find that

the videos were not properly authenticated.

       {¶ 22} “Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally barred. Such

arguments are barred by the doctrine of waiver for failure to raise these arguments before

the trial court. It is well-established that a party cannot raise any new issues or legal

theories for the first time on appeal[.]” State v. Talley, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-20-1131,

L-20-1132, 2021-Ohio-2558, ¶ 22, citing Cawley JV, LLC v. Wall St. Recycling, LLC, 35

N.E.3d 30, 2015-Ohio-1846 (8th Dist.) (emphasis added). When an argument is forfeited

on appeal for failing to make that argument at trial, the appellant waives all but plain

error review. State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶

23.

       {¶ 23} Crim.R. 52(B) states “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights

may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” “Under

Crim.R. 52(B), the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plain error affected

his substantial rights.” State v. Boaston, 2017-Ohio-8770, 100 N.E.3d 1002, ¶ 63 (6th

Dist.), citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14.

In order for a reviewing court to find plain error, it must make the following three

findings:

             “First, there must be an error, i.e. a deviation from a legal rule. * * *
       Second, the error must be plain. To be ‘plain’ within the meaning of
       Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an “obvious” defect in the trial
       proceedings. * * * Third, the error must have affected “substantial rights.”

10.
Id., citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). Affecting a

substantial right means “that the trial court’s error must have affected the outcome” of the

trial court proceedings. Id. Finding plain error must be done “with the utmost caution,

under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Id., citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).

       {¶ 24} Here, appellant argues that the videos were not properly authenticated

because S.B. did not expressly describe their contents. Appellant’s argument fails at the

first step of our plain error analysis because he cannot show that the trial court committed

any error in failing to exclude the evidence as unauthenticated. Authentication of

evidence is governed by Evid.R. 901, and requires the proponent of the evidence to

demonstrate “that the matter in question is what the proponent claims.” In re. C.G., 6th

Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1007, 2023-Ohio-4239, ¶ 44. The threshold for authentication is

very low, and “reflects an orientation of the rules toward favoring the admission of

evidence.” Id. at ¶ 46, citing State v. Giles, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1075, 2021-Ohio-

2865, ¶ 31. We previously outlined the proper procedure for authentication of evidence

in State v. Gibson, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-13-1222, L-13-1223, 2015-Ohio-1679, ¶ 45, in

which we stated:

       The showing of authenticity is not on par with more technical evidentiary
       rules, such as hearsay exceptions, governing admissibility. Rather, there
       need only be a prima facie showing, to the court of authenticity, not a full
       argument on admissibility. Thus, once a prima facie showing has been
       made to the court that the [evidence] is what its proponent claims, it should
       be admitted. At that point the burden of going forward with respect to
       authentication shifts to the opponent to rebut the prima facie showing by

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       presenting evidence to the trier of fact that would raise questions as to the
       genuineness of the [evidence]. * * * It is the trier of fact who will
       ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence[.]”

Id. (citations omitted).

       {¶ 25} S.B.’s testimony provided the basis for a prima facie showing that the

video evidence was authentic. This testimony included the following exchange:

       Q. Do you recall speaking to me in courtroom 4 on the arraignment? Do you

       recall me asking you to give me video for a couple days before the alleged

       incident date?

       A. Yes.

       Q. Is that what’s on the thumb drive?

       A. Some of them.

Put simply, S.B. testified that she was asked to provide videos to the city and confirmed

that she had provided those videos that were included on the flash drive. This testimony

was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the videos were authentic.

       {¶ 26} Appellant, in response to this showing, made no effort to show that the

videos were inauthentic. After successfully precluding their admission into evidence as

inadmissible under Evid.R. 404(B) during the city’s case-in-chief, appellant failed to

provide any evidence to dispute the authenticity of the videos when they were played for

impeachment purposes. Instead, appellant merely renewed his argument that the videos

were not related to the charged offense. Indeed, appellant had previously admitted to the

authenticity of the videos in his motion in limine when he noted that they depicted him

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yelling at S.B. and her husband. As a result, appellant did not satisfy his reciprocal

burden to introduce evidence challenging the authenticity of the videos.

       {¶ 27} For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not commit error, let alone

plain error, in failing to find that the videos played at trial were not authenticated

pursuant to Evid.R. 901. Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, found not

well-taken.

       b. The trial court did not err in allowing the city to impeach
          appellant with video evidence.

       {¶ 28} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

improperly allowed the city to impeach his credibility by playing the video evidence it

had previously excluded. Specifically, appellant argues that the videos did not challenge

the credibility of his testimony to the extent that he stated S.B.’s cameras being pointed at

his residence was harassment against him. Again, appellant failed to make this argument

at trial and, therefore, we are limited to plain error review. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502,

2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, at ¶ 23.

       {¶ 29} Evid.R. 613 provides for the impeachment of witnesses through prior

conduct. “During examination of a witness, conduct of the witness inconsistent with the

witness’s testimony may be shown to impeach.” Evid.R. 613(C). Appellant does not

dispute whether the city met the technical requirements of Evid.R. 613 before introducing

the videos. Instead, appellant argues only that the videos did not impeach his credibility

13.
because they did not refute any statements that he made during his testimony. Having

reviewed the record, we find that appellant’s argument is without merit.

       {¶ 30} Immediately prior to the city requesting permission to play the videos,

appellant testified that he did not know whether S.B. was aware of his prior “erratic

behavior.” More importantly, appellant specifically denied engaging in conduct captured

in the videos, namely, his harassment of S.B. In light of this testimony, and with the trial

court’s permission, the city played the videos for impeachment purposes. In his related

testimony, appellant identified the property shown in the video as his and, in at least one

of the videos, identified S.B. as the subject of harassment from a male. He stated that the

videos were too blurry to determine that he was the male in the videos. The trial court

ultimately concluded that it was appellant yelling in the videos.

       {¶ 31} Notably, we are precluded from reviewing the videos as appellant did not

ensure that they were included as part of the record in this appeal. See In re. D.T., 2023-

Ohio-2245, 220 N.E.3d 177 (6th Dist.) (holding that appellant bears the burden to ensure

that the record necessary to resolve its assigned errors is complete). For this reason, we

presume the validity of the trial court’s proceedings. Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61

Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). We are left, then, with an incomplete

record and, therefore, must presume that the trial court found that the videos showed

appellant engaged in conduct inconsistent with his testimony. Pursuant to Evid.R. 613,

the videos were properly introduced as impeachment evidence and the trial court did not

14.
commit plain error in allowing them to be played during appellant’s testimony. For these

reasons, appellant’s second assignment of error is found not well-taken.

              c. Appellant’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the
                 evidence.

       {¶ 32} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that his conviction was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that because the only testimony

regarding the argument on June 15, 2022, was his and S.B.’s, that the case was simply a

“he said/she said” and that there was “insufficient evidence presented” to support his

conviction.

       {¶ 33} We review whether the trial court’s judgment following a bench trial was

against the manifest weight of the evidence using the same standard as for a judgment

arising from a jury trial. See State v. Gates, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-03-015, 2003-Ohio-

5186, ¶ 13-17. When reviewing a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of

the evidence, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the [factfinder] clearly lost

its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We do not view the evidence in a light

most favorable to the state. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and scrutinize ‘the

factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony.’” State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-10-1369, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15, citing Thompkins at 388. Reversal on manifest

15.
weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶ 34} Here, appellant’s sole argument that his conviction was against the

manifest weight of the evidence is that the trial court heard only conflicting testimony.

That is, S.B. said appellant made the threat, appellant denied making the threat. This

alone, he argues, makes his conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. This

argument is invalid for two reasons. First, “it is well-established that ‘a conviction is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence solely because the [factfinder] heard

inconsistent testimony.’” State v. Talley, 2016-Ohio-8010, 74 N.E.3d 868, ¶ 23, citing

State v. Wade, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90029, 2008-Ohio-4574, ¶ 38. Second, this

argument ignores the trial court’s determination that appellant was not credible based on

his remaining testimony. That testimony included appellant saying that he acted

aggressively due to his “induced” PTSD and his “issue with the victim.” Based on that

testimony, the trial court expressly held “I do believe the alleged victim in this case. I

believe that something was said that day. And I do believe the threat was made.”

       {¶ 35} Put simply, the trial court performed the function of a factfinder and

resolved the conflicting testimony against appellant. The mere existence of that

conflicting testimony does not render appellant’s conviction to be against the manifest

weight of the evidence. As a result, this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence

16.
weighs heavily against conviction and appellant’s third assignment of error is not well-

taken.

                d. Appellant’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance.

         {¶ 36} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error argues that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to subpoena any witnesses to testify

on his behalf. In support of this argument, appellant attached an affidavit to his brief

stating that he had provided his attorney with a list of potential witnesses and a copy of

the message he allegedly sent to counsel identifying those witnesses. None of these

witnesses testified at trial. Appellant argues that the failure to call these witnesses

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and that his conviction should be reversed.

Because appellant relies on evidence outside the record, he cannot support his claim for

ineffective assistance as a matter of law in this direct appeal.

         {¶ 37} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an

appellant must show that counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just

result. State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 154.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show “(1) deficient

performance of counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of

reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119

Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204, citing Strickland v.

17.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Importantly,

“[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal must be established by

the evidence in the record.” State v. Perkins, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. L-S-18-010, 2019-

Ohio-2049, ¶ 11, citing State v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-7501, 96 N.E.3d 1046, ¶ 78 (7th Dist.)

(emphasis added). “If establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires proof

outside the record, then such a claim is not appropriately considered on direct appeal.”

Id., citing State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (2001) (emphasis

added).

       {¶ 38} Here, appellant’s entire argument is based on his counsel’s alleged failure

to call witnesses to testify on his behalf. The record is devoid of any mention of all but

one of these witnesses. Further, appellant does not identify any portion of the record that

shows trial counsel’s failure to call these witnesses fell below a reasonable standard or

resulted in prejudice to appellant. Appellant relies solely on the additional information

provided in this appeal to support this assigned error. Since he cannot establish his

alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claim from the record, it is not properly raised in

this direct appeal from his conviction. Perkins at ¶ 11. Therefore, we find his fourth

assignment of error not well-taken.

                                      V. Conclusion

       {¶ 39} For these reasons, we find appellant’s first, second, third, and fourth

assignments of error not well-taken and we affirm the February 15, 2023 judgment of the

Toledo Municipal Court.

18.
       {¶ 40} Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                         ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                               ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

19.