Court Opinion

ID: 9775961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:14:01.931621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.229101
License: Public Domain

RICHARDS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This case was remanded to permit us to consider whether defense counsel is entitled to review a witness’s written “victim impact statement” pursuant to Gaskin, after the witness testifies. The majority correctly held that defense counsel was entitled to that information in this ease.
My disagreement is with the majority’s view that the non-disclosure of the statement in this case was harmless error.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty. The sole issue the jury was called upon to decide was the appropriate punishment. State’s witness Shirley Mimms, the bank teller who was the victim of the aggravated robbery, testified at some length to the post-event trauma she experienced. Specifically, she testified that following the robbery she was hysterical, fell to her knees, and “just collapsed.” She also stated she believed she had a right to go to a work place and not be subjected to such conduct. It is easy to imagine the terror the victim suffered following the robbery and it is not unreasonable for the jurors to have concluded from the testimony that Ms. Mimms may have suffered long-term trauma as a result of the incident. Certainly, her testimony was very likely considered by the jurors, who ultimately set punishment at seventy-five years’ confinement.
Not known to defense counsel at trial or on appeal was that in the first paragraph of the *298victim impact statement completed two months following incident, Ms. Mimms indicated she had sought professional counseling as a result of the crime but, in retrospect, she regretted having sought counseling outside the approximate one hour she spent with a counselor at work. Her exact statement was, “Spoke with counselor at work for about an hour — regret seeking further help from private counselor of my choice.”
Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that we reverse the case unless we determine, under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the error had no effect on the punishment assessed. Because it is reasonable to believe a skilled defense attorney could have used the quoted portion of the victim impact statement to counter the logical inference that the trauma the victim suffered was severe, I cannot conclude the error was harmless.
In its harm analysis the majority applies the formulaic test set forth in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), i.e., the source of the error, the nature of the error, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and probable collateral implications, the probable weight the jurors placed on the error, and whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. I believe the Court of Criminal Appeals never intended the analysis employed in Harris, which concerned the improper introduction of extraneous offenses, to apply to all errors. Even the State admits in its brief, “because this case deals with nondisclosure of evidence, as opposed to improper admission of evidence, it is difficult to see how the State could have emphasized the error, how the error could have had collateral implications, or how the jury could have placed any weight on the alleged error.” Clearly, it is time to admit many of the factors in what has become known as the Harris “test” have no relevance to harm analysis for some errors, including Gaskin violations. The critical holding of Harris is that the reviewing court should focus on whether the error at issue might possibly have prejudiced the jurors’ decision making. Here, because it is reasonable to believe defense counsel could have used the victim impact statement to his advantage, I cannot conclude the error was harmless.
DAUPHINOT, J., joins.