Court Opinion

ID: 9960781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 06:12:19.974146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:52.283259
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed April 9, 2024

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-01196-CR
                               No. 05-22-01197-CR
                      MANUEL RUIZ REYNA, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
               Trial Court Cause No. F-2057445-P, F-2057444-P

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Reichek, Carlyle, and Miskel
                           Opinion by Justice Reichek
      Manuel Ruiz Reyna appeals his convictions for burglary of a habitation with

intent to commit a felony and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant

contends the trial court showed bias or prejudice in allowing the State to reopen its

case on punishment after resting. He additionally contends the judgments should be

modified to (1) accurately reflect the names of the prosecutor and defense counsel

and (2) delete references to a second enhancement paragraph.          We agree the

judgments should be modified in the manner requested by appellant. Additionally,

on our own motion, we conclude the judgments should be corrected to reflect that
punishment was assessed by the trial court rather than the jury. As reformed, we

affirm.

                                     Background

      Appellant was indicted for burglary and aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon after he broke into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and assaulted her then

boyfriend with a gun. A jury trial was conducted on both charges on May 4, 2023.

Appellant was found guilty in each case.

      After the jury returned its verdict on guilt, appellant elected to have the trial

court assess punishment. The punishment portion of the trial was reset to allow time

for a pre-sentencing report to be done.

      Trial resumed on October 22. When the cases were called, the State began by

offering State’s exhibit 77, which was appellant’s stipulation to a prior conviction

that was alleged as a punishment enhancement in the indictments for each case. The

stipulation was read into the record and admitted into evidence along with

appellant’s fingerprints, a certified judgment from the prior case, and appellant’s pen

packet. The State then rested.

      As the trial court began discussing the enhanced punishment range, defense

counsel interjected that, while he did not want to be “a stickler for the law,” the State

had rested its case without formally presenting the enhancement allegation or

allowing appellant the opportunity to enter his plea to the enhancement. Because of

this, defense counsel argued the State had technically abandoned the enhancement.

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The trial court agreed stating, “[U]nless the State is asking to reopen, then [defense

counsel] is absolutely correct.”

      The State responded that appellant’s stipulation showed he was notified of the

enhancement, and that he was pleading true to it. But, “just to make the record

clear,” the State asked to reopen the case for punishment purposes only. The trial

court restarted the punishment proceeding, and the State formally presented the

enhancement paragraph for each indictment. After noting his objection to allowing

the State to reopen the case, appellant pleaded true to the enhancement.

      Based on the evidence presented, the trial court sentenced appellant to thirty

years in prison for each offense. Appellant brought this appeal.

                                       Analysis

I. Judicial Bias

      In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court ceased to be a neutral arbiter

when it allowed the State to reopen its case on punishment after it failed to present

the enhancement allegation and obtain appellant’s plea. Appellant argues the trial

court stepped out of its neutral role when it “sua sponte told the State how to rectify

the situation with a motion to reopen.” A defendant is entitled to a fair trial before

a judge with no actual bias against him or interest in the outcome of his particular

case. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997). Due process requires the

judge be neutral and detached. Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006). Accordingly, a judge should not act as an advocate or adversary for any

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party. Dockstader v. State, 233 S.W.3d 98, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2007, pet. ref’d). To reverse a judgment on the ground of improper conduct or

comments of the judge, however, we must find (1) judicial impropriety was in fact

committed, and (2) probable prejudice to the complaining party. Id. Where, as here,

no extrajudicial source of bias is alleged, remarks will constitute bias only if they

reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make a fair judgment

impossible. Id. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration will not

support a charge of bias or partiality. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556

(1994).

      We first note that defense counsel’s argument at trial regarding the State’s

purported abandonment of the enhancement allegation was erroneous. There is no

requirement that enhancement paragraphs be orally read to the defendant when

punishment is assessed by the trial court alone. Garner v. State, 858 S.W.2d 656,

659 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d). Nor is an oral plea required when the

defendant has previously stipulated to the enhancement allegations and punishment

is not assessed by a jury. Id. It was not necessary, therefore, for the State to reopen

the case.

      As for the court’s reference to reopening the case, we conclude this was

nothing more than the trial court’s effort to maintain an orderly and technically

proper proceeding. Appellant’s stipulation was already in evidence showing he was

aware of the enhancement allegation and that he intended to plead true. The fact

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that the State offered the stipulation into evidence, along with other documents

showing appellant’s guilt of the prior offense, indicated the State had no intention of

abandoning the enhancement allegation. We review the entire record to determine

whether there has been a clear showing of bias. Dockstader, 233 S.W.3d at 108.

We conclude none is presented on this record. We resolve appellant’s first issue

against him.

II. Judgment Modifications

      In his second issue, appellant contends the judgment in each of his cases needs

to be modified to reflect the correct name of the prosecutor and defense counsel and

to delete any reference to a second enhancement paragraph. We agree. In addition,

the judgments improperly indicate that punishment was assessed by the jury rather

than the trial court. This Court has the power to modify a judgment to make the

record speak the truth when we have the necessary information before us to do

so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. Crim. App.

1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1991, pet.

ref’d). Accordingly, we modify the judgments in both trial court case number F-

2057445-P and trial court case number F-2057444-P in the following manner: The

“Attorney for State” portion of the judgment is modified to state “Samantha Jarvis,”

the “Attorney for Defendant” portion of the judgment is modified to state “Vickers

Cunningham,” the “2nd Enhancement Paragraph” portion of the judgment is

modified to state “N/A,” the “Finding on 2nd Enhancement Paragraph” portion of

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the judgment is modified to state “N/A,” and the “Punishment Assessed by” portion

of the judgment is modified to state “Trial Court.”

      As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                           /Amanda L. Reichek/
                                           AMANDA L. REICHEK
                                           JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
221196F.U05

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                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

MANUEL RUIZ REYNA, Appellant                 On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-01196-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. F20-57445-P.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Reichek. Justices Carlyle and Miskel
                                             participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      The “Attorney for State” portion of the judgment is modified to state
      “Samantha Jarvis,” the “Attorney for Defendant” portion of the
      judgment is modified to state “Vickers Cunningham,” the “2nd
      Enhancement Paragraph” portion of the judgment is modified to state
      “N/A,” the “Finding on 2nd Enhancement Paragraph” portion of the
      judgment is modified to state “N/A,” and the “Punishment Assessed
      by” portion of the judgment is modified to state “Trial Court.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered April 9, 2024

                                       –7–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

MANUEL RUIZ REYNA, Appellant                 On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-01197-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. F20-57444-P.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Reichek. Justices Carlyle and Miskel
                                             participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      The “Attorney for State” portion of the judgment is modified to state
      “Samantha Jarvis,” the “Attorney for Defendant” portion of the
      judgment is modified to state “Vickers Cunningham,” the “2nd
      Enhancement Paragraph” portion of the judgment is modified to state
      “N/A,” the “Finding on 2nd Enhancement Paragraph” portion of the
      judgment is modified to state “N/A,” and the “Punishment Assessed
      by” portion of the judgment is modified to state “Trial Court.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered April 9, 2024

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