Court Opinion

ID: 9884326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:53:06.649718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.705597
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur only in the decision by the majority of four (Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and Markman) that, in a negligence action against a governmental employee, the immunity available to governmental employees under the motor-vehicle exception is not available to a governmental employee who was grossly negligent and that a plaintiff can seek recovery for loss-of-consortium damages.
I dissent from the majority of four’s decision that the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, prohibits a claim for loss of consortium against a governmental agency. Because the statute does not bar a claim for loss of consortium as long as the plaintiff seeking damages for loss of consortium can show that the injured party sustained some legally cognizable harm or injury, I would hold that such damages may be awarded, and I dissent from that part of the majority opinion that holds otherwise.
Because the right of a plaintiff who was not physically injured to recover from a tortfeasor for loss of consortium as a result of injuries sustained by the injured plaintiff is well established in Michigan’s common law, I dissent from the majority of four’s decision that loss-of-consortium damages are not available in a claim brought under the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity.
*95A claim for loss of consortium is a separate legal claim for damages suffered not by the injured party, but by a spouse, parent, or child who claims damages for the loss of the injured party’s society and companionship. It is a derivative claim in that it does not arise at all unless the injured party has sustained some legally cognizable harm or injury. The right of a person to recover from a tortfeasor for loss of consortium as a result of injuries sustained by his or her spouse is well established in Michigan’s common law.1
A statute that expressly extinguishes a right established at common law is a proper exercise of legislative power; however, a statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed.2 Importantly, such a statute will not be extended by implication to abrogate an established rule of common law.3
The motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, provides:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948.
The statute does not define “bodily injury,” nor does it expressly state that a plaintiff who was not physically injured may not recover derivative damages for loss of consortium. The majority mistakenly alleges, ante at 87 n 12, my supposed disregard of MCL 691.1407(1), which states: “Except as otherwise provided in this act, a *96governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” (Emphasis added.)
There is no such disregard. As indicated by the language emphasized in the statute, it appears that it is in fact the majority that “misapprehends” the statute, because MCL 691.1405 is one of the exceptions to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1405 explicitly states that governmental agencies “shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage arising from the negligent operation” of a governmental vehicle. Thus, as long as the physically injured party can establish a legally cognizable claim for bodily injury, a plaintiff is entitled to recovery for all damages flowing from that injury, including damages for loss of consortium. Evidently, the majority does not understand the actual and inseparable connection between “bodily injury” and the damages that flow from that injury. The governmental agency is liable for damages that flow from bodily injury, including loss-of-consortium damages, which flow from bodily injury just as damages for medical expenses and lost wages also flow from a bodily injury.
Because the statute does not expressly abrogate the right to claim damages for loss of consortium under Michigan’s common law, the majority of four errs in abolishing this right by implication. The majority of four does so by creatively implying such a prohibition in its own definition of “bodily injury.” There is nothing in the language of the statute justifying the majority of four’s creative construction, and the majority’s decision to construe the language of the statute in this manner is another example of the majority of four’s judicial activism by unrestrained statutory interpretation.
*97CAVANAGH, J., concurred with WEAVER, J.

 Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 504; 309 NW2d 163 (1981).

 Id. at 507-508.

 Id. at 508.