Court Opinion

ID: 9940496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:10:59.524713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:55.256930
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         MEIGS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

        Plaintiff-Appellant,                       : CASE NO. 22CA13

        v.                                         :

ANGELA BARNHART,                                   : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellee.                        :

_________________________________________________________________

                                              APPEARANCES:

James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, Ohio,
for appellant.

James S. Sweeney, Powell, Ohio, for appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:2-8-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from a Meigs County Common Pleas Court

judgment that granted a motion to suppress statements that Angela

Barnhart, defendant below and appellee herein, made to police.                     The

State of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant herein, assigns one

error for review:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
                 GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”

        {¶2}     In August 2019, a Meigs County Grand Jury returned a one-

count indictment that charged appellee with one count of complicity

to burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                          2

felony.     Appellee pleaded not guilty.

    {¶3}    On November 7, 2022, appellee filed a motion to suppress

her oral statements.     At the hearing on the motion, Meigs County

Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Frank Stewart testified that on June

8, 2019, he responded to a burglary to collect DNA samples and

fingerprints.    The victims provided Stewart with a list of stolen

items that included a credit card.     Stewart later contacted the

bank and learned that someone used the stolen card in Athens.

Subsequently, the Sheriff’s Department posted the bank video on

social media, and a citizen identified Jacob White and Angela

Barnhart.     Stewart discovered that the pair resided at White’s

mother’s home, approximately one mile from the victim’s residence.

    {¶4}    After appellee’s July 21, 2019 arrest, “multiple

interviews” occurred, including at least one interview at the Meigs

County Sheriff’s Office.     However, the interviews that are the

subject of this motion to suppress occurred at the Middleport

Police Department, where Sgt. Stewart took a DNA sample from

appellee and made an audio recording of the interview.

    {¶5}    At the suppression hearing, the state played portions of

the recording.     Initially, appellee states, “I mean, I fu*ked up, I

did.”     Sgt. Stewart states, “It’s Sunday, July 21st 5:53 p.m. and

we are at the Middleport Police Department.     She is consenting to a

DNA swab in reference to a burglary on Burlingham Road.”       Appellee

replies, “Yes.”     While Stewart completes the DNA swab form,
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                           3

appellee asks, “can we take these [cuffs] off?      I mean, I’m not

going nowhere.     Like I said, I fu*ked up.”   Stewart presumably

leaves the room for a moment, then returns to assist appellee with

the DNA form.    Immediately after, at the recording’s 3:05 mark,

Stewart states, “If you want to talk to me, we’ll do a Miranda form

and then we’ll talk.”     Appellee replies, “Why do you have to read

me that?”    Stewart responds, “because I’m questioning you about a

criminal case that you are still suspected in and if your DNA comes

back on this, it could be used against you.”      Appellee stated, “Oh,

ok, I’m not worried about it.”

     {¶6}   At that point, Sgt. Stewart leaves the room and states he

will leave the recorder on and will “be right back.”      Stewart

leaves for 1 minute and 20 seconds, and when he returns, appellee

initiates the conversation, saying, “You’re a sheriff, you’re

bigger than them guys, can you help me with this?      Cause look, I

don’t have $500.     Yes, I fu*ked up.”   Stewart replies, “didn’t you

say they were dropping it?”    Appellee states, “well they dropped it

because they’re supposed to be calling somebody because my other

kids’ Dad is who supplies this town with meth.”      Stewart replies,

“who’s your other kids’ Dad?”     Appellee gives Stewart the name and

talks about another burglary that involved an assault.     Stewart

says he doesn’t know anything about that case.

     {¶7}   At 7:07 of the recording, Sgt. Stewart says, “you

mentioned something to somebody here about working.”     Appellee
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                         4

replies, “yes, because I want out of this * * * what you and me

talked about, I didn’t do.”    Stewart informed appellee that he:

     “talked to the director of the task force * * * and
     he’s willing to work with you as long as you’re honest
     with me. It kind of puts you in a better spot. * * *
     Let’s say for instance you had something to do with
     this burglary. Or you was there with Jacob, it was
     Jacob’s idea, blah blah blah blah, you went in with
     him, I get it, because that’s what Jacob is saying
     happened. So if that’s what happened, we would indict
     you and the prosecutor would be willing to work with
     you.”

Appellee responded, “On my kids, honest to God, I did not enter

that man’s home.”    Stewart stated, “Ok.    Were you outside the home

when Jacob did?”    Appellee replied, “No.    I was down the road at my

house * * * which isn’t far by his house, which isn’t far away, but

I wasn’t standing outside.”    Stewart stated, “because initially I

thought you told me you drove.”    Appellee replied, “No, * * * I

didn’t tell you that. * * * The only thing I told you * * * was I

know things.    I think I said I was there with the stuff, like I

know what was there. * * * I wasn’t physically at the home.      I

didn’t physically go in that man’s home.      I didn’t physically take

Jacob to that man’s home.”

     {¶8}   At 9:00 minutes into the recording, Sgt. Stewart asked

for appellee’s birthday, social security number, contact

information, and advised appellee of her Miranda rights. Appellee

signed the Waiver of Rights form at 10:05 of the recording.
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                          5

    {¶9}   After her Miranda warnings, appellee told Sgt. Stewart

that (1) she could not tell him much about the burglary itself, (2)

Jacob called her to come and get him at the scene, and (3) she

drove to a stop sign near the victim’s home and Jacob loaded the

vehicle with stolen items.     Stewart told appellee that Jacob said

he wore gloves at the scene, but appellee did not.     Appellee’s

response was, “DNA it. * * * No, I never went into that man’s

house. * * *    That’s the honest to God’s truth.”   Although appellee

said people threatened her online regarding talking about the

burglary and even threatened to torture her mother, appellee

continued to deny entering the victim’s home.     Appellee did,

however, confirm that she picked up Jacob and the stolen items near

the victim’s home and they drove to Jacob’s apartment.     Appellee

stated that Jacob always said he wanted to “hit that house,” and,

after the burglary, Jacob told her he “hit the mother load.”

    {¶10} When Sgt. Stewart asked about the location of the stolen

items, appellee stated that Jacob took some of the items to a pawn

shop and most of the weapons to drug dealers.     Appellee said she

could ask Jacob about the items when she talked to him.     Appellee

also stated that she has “been through the justice system” and

“been to prison. * * * I didn’t know he was going to do it, but I

did know that he did it.     But no, I didn’t enter that man’s home.”

    {¶11} After Sgt. Stewart informed appellee that she may be

charged with misuse of a credit card, he said he did not believe
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                          6

they would indict her other than for “obstructing.”     Stewart then

left to inquire whether the task force intended to work with

appellee and the tape concludes at 30:55.

     {¶12} Sgt. Stewart testified that he “was getting the Miranda

form and also getting ready to take a DNA sample,” when appellee

brought up the subject of her mother’s home in Paigeville, a

substantial distance from the burglary.     Stewart stated that “in

the previous interview * * * at the Sheriff’s Office, she had

mentioned that she would be willing to buy drugs for the Task Force

in exchange for a lesser sentence or lighter sentence or something

to that effect.   So I had spoken with * * * Director Bill Gilkey *

* * about using her * * * and we was [sic.] talking about that

during the interview.”   When asked if he had inquired of appellee

about this particular case, he said he did not.     Later, Stewart

said the appellee maintained that she did not enter the burglarized

residence, nor did she take Jacob to the residence.     Stewart did

not think he asked appellee a question to prompt that information.

     {¶13} Sgt. Stewart further testified that he asked appellee

“several questions” because he wanted to determine “her involvement

and then see if we could work with her through the Task Force.”

However, Stewart testified that in response to his questions

appellee did not admit anything.   Stewart asked appellee for her

name, birthday, social security number, and contact information to

complete the waiver of rights form, which appellee signed.     Stewart
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                         7

then related that, after he advised appellee of her Miranda rights,

she continued to state that she did not go to the scene of the

burglary, but believed “Jacob made several trips to the ditch line,

which is in front of the residence, uh, by the road, and dumped

items off there.”     Stewart also asked appellee about stolen

property, but did not recall the rest of the interview.

     {¶14} On cross-examination, Sgt. Stewart conceded that appellee

had been in custody in the Middleport Police Department at the time

of her interview and had not been advised of her Miranda rights

until 10 or 11 minutes into the video.    Stewart acknowledged that

he took the DNA sample before appellee’s Miranda rights, and

conceded that “in one of the interviews she [appellee] was talking

about being, um, under the influence.”    Stewart also agreed that,

at some point, he left and then returned and recalled that six or

seven minutes into the recording he talked about matters unrelated

to the burglary.    Stewart did acknowledge that, before he advised

appellee of her Miranda rights, he asked “two to three questions”

about the incident.    Stewart also admitted that he said something

to the effect that, if appellee had something to do with the

burglary, she would “be in a better spot” if she “worked with us.”

He also admitted that he told appellee something to the effect that

he would “talk to the Prosecutor to see if he would be willing to

work with her on that.”    Finally, Stewart acknowledged that, before

he advised appellee of her Miranda rights, he asked “if she was
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                           8

outside the home.”

     {¶15} Defense counsel asked Sgt. Stewart if he asked appellee

similar questions before and after he advised appellee of her

Miranda rights.   Stewart said he discussed appellee’s possible

cooperation with the investigation, both before and after.      Stewart

also acknowledged that he thought appellee initially told him that

she drove to the burglary scene.     Counsel stated, “[a]nd these

kinds of questions and talking, you know, this was all . . . you

had talked to her about the same topics after Miranda, correct?”

Stewart replied, “Correct, yes.”     When asked if he remembered

telling appellee that any statements she made before the Miranda

warnings could be used against her, Stewart replied, “I don’t

believe I did, no.”     When asked if he considered earlier advising

appellee of her Miranda rights, Stewart replied, “Um, no, not

really, because we were more so in a conversation about her working

for the Task Force at that time and then the conversation continued

to build, which was what we were trying to do was fill out a

Miranda waiver form.”    When defense counsel asked, “But * * * the

conversation shifted from strictly her on the Task Force * * *

working for the Task Force, possible to asking questions about the

burglary, correct?”     Stewart replied, “Correct.   The conversation

shifted to that, which is why we filled out the Miranda form eleven

(11) minutes into the video, once we realized that it was not going

to go, uh, in terms of her working for, uh, the Task Force buying
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                           9

drugs, we filled out the Miranda form.”

     {¶16} Once again, defense counsel asked Sgt. Stewart to admit

that he asked appellee questions about the burglary pre-Miranda, to

which Stewart replied, “Yes.”     Stewart then elaborated, “that was

why I reiterated the same questions, once she was actually

mirandized.”    Stewart stated that appellee gave the same answers

both before and after being advised of her Miranda rights.      After

the interview, appellee remained in custody due to the statements

that implicated her and her co-defendant.

     {¶17} On re-direct examination, Sgt. Stewart testified that, in

response to his first question pre-Miranda, appellee stated, “I’m

telling you on my kid’s life and I * * * I did not enter that man’s

home.”   When Stewart asked her if she was outside when Jacob

entered the home, appellee answered, no.     Appellee stated, “I ran

down * * * I was down the road by my house, which isn’t far away,

but I wasn’t standing outside.”     Stewart inquired, “I thought you

told me you didn’t drive there, but you were there, but didn’t go

in the house.”    Appellee said, “I didn’t tell you that.”

     {¶18} After hearing the evidence, the trial court granted the

motion to suppress.    The court ordered “[a]ll statements provided

to Sgt. Stewart by Defendant on July 21, 2019 are hereby SUPRESSED

[sic.] and therefore not to be testified about or offered as

evidence before the jury.”
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                         10

     {¶19} Pursuant to Crim.R. 12(K), the state filed its appeal to

challenge the trial court’s order to suppress appellee’s

statements.

                                   I.

     {¶20} In its sole assignment of error, the state asserts that

the trial court erred when it granted appellee’s motion to

suppress.     Specifically, the state contends that (1) the trial

court did not cite any legal authority to grant the suppression

motion, (2) although the post-warning portion of appellee’s

interview is an interrogation, the pre-warning portion of the

interview was not an interrogation, and (3) appellee’s post-warning

statement differed from her pre-warning statement, and, therefore,

should not be suppressed.

     {¶21} In general, “appellate review of a motion to suppress

presents a mixed question of law and fact.”     State v. Codeluppi,

139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8; State v. Bennett, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA4, 2021-Ohio-

937, ¶ 9.     The trial court is in the best position to evaluate

witness credibility at a suppression hearing.     State v. Dunlap, 73

Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), State v. Flanders, 4th

Dist. Washington No. 06CA16, 2007-Ohio-503, ¶ 11.     Therefore, we

must uphold the trial court’s findings of fact if competent,

credible evidence in the record supports them.     Dunlap, supra.
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                         11

However, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s

application of the law to the facts.     State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio

St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100, Burnside at ¶ 8,

State v. Anderson, 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034 (4th

Dist.1995).

     {¶22} In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

16 L.E.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court “established

procedural safeguards for securing the privilege against self-

incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.”   Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-

Ohio-5834, 92 N.E.3d 810, ¶ 8, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420,

106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).     A suspect in police custody

“must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to

remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a

court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,

and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for

him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”     Miranda at 479, 86

S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

     {¶23} Miranda safeguards apply “only when one is subjected to

custodial interrogation.”     State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358,

2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 26.    “If a suspect provides

responses while in custody without having first been informed of

his or her Miranda rights, the responses may not be admitted at

trial as evidence of guilt.”    Oles at ¶ 9, citing Miranda at 479.
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                         12

After Miranda warnings are given and an opportunity to seek counsel

afforded, “the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive

these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.”

Miranda at 479.    Here, the parties agree that appellee was in

custody at the time of the police interviews.

     {¶24} The state cites Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct.

1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) when the court considered whether the

Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires the

suppression of a confession, made after Miranda warnings and a

valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an

earlier voluntary, but unwarned admission.    In Elstad, the court

upheld a post-Miranda warning confession that followed a pre-

warning admission that an officer solicited while the suspect had

been in custody.   After police first questioned and obtained

admissions from an 18-year-old defendant at his home, later at the

police station the defendant waived his Miranda rights and made a

full, detailed confession.    The trial court admitted both

confessions into evidence at trial.

     {¶25} The Elstad court allowed the post-Miranda confession to

be admitted into evidence.    Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285,

84 L.Ed.2d 222.    The court held that the relevant inquiry is

“whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.”

Id. at 318.   Moreover, the court held that the failure of police to

administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                         13

received had been coerced, but only that courts will presume the

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been

intelligently exercised.     Elstad at 310, citing New York v.

Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, n. 5;

Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 457.    The Elstad court

observed:

     There is a vast difference between the direct consequences
     flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence
     or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's
     will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a
     “guilty secret” freely given in response to an unwarned
     but noncoercive question, as in this case.

Elstad at 312, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222.

     {¶26} Thus, Elstad held that in any such inquiry, in evaluating

the voluntariness of the statements the finder of fact must examine

the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police

conduct.    Id. at 318.   Accordingly, the Elstad court held that a

suspect, who responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning, is

not disabled from a waiver of rights and a confession after he

received the requisite Miranda warnings.     Id.

     {¶27} On the other side of the spectrum is Missouri v. Seibert,

542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), a more recent

case in which the United States Supreme Court considered whether

the technique of successive interrogations, first unwarned and then

warned, violated a defendant’s Miranda rights. In Seibert, after a

police officer questioned the defendant for 30 to 40 minutes
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
without Miranda warnings, the defendant made an admission.                After a

20-minute break, the officer returned, administered Miranda

warnings, obtained a signed waiver and resumed questioning.                During

the second interrogation, after the officer confronted the

defendant with her pre-Miranda statements, she repeated her

admission.          The Seibert court referred to this technique as

“question first” and stated that “[t]he object of question first is

to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a

particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has

already confessed.”                 Id. at 611, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159

L.Ed.2d 643.            The court determined that the post-warning statements

are inadmissible.               Id. at 617.

        The threshold issue when interrogators question and warn
        later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that
        in these circumstances the warning could function
        ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.     Could the warnings
        effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice
        about giving an admissible statement at that juncture?
        Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop
        talking even if he had talked earlier?      For unless the
        warnings could place a suspect who has just been
        interrogated in a position to make an informed choice,
        there is no practical justification for accepting the
        formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for treating
        the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the
        first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.”

Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-612, 135 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.

        {¶28} Two years after Seibert, the Supreme Court of Ohio

observed that “Elstad and Seibert stand on opposite sides of the
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
line defining where pre-warning statements irretrievably affect

post-warning statements.                      Still, that line cannot be said to be

bright or sharply defined.”                      State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519,

2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 22.

        {¶29} During a routine traffic stop in Farris, an officer

smelled marijuana and ordered the defendant to exit his vehicle.

Without administering Miranda warnings, the officer asked the

defendant about the smell of marijuana.                      The defendant stated that

his roommates smoked marijuana when he left the house.                      When the

officer told the defendant that he intended to search the car and

asked about drugs in the car, the defendant admitted that a

marijuana pipe could be found in the trunk. Id. at ¶ 3.                      The

officer then administered Miranda warnings, but did not tell the

defendant that previous admissions could not be used against him.

The officer then asked the same questions and obtained the same

responses regarding the location of the drug paraphernalia.                        Id. at

¶ 4.      After the trial court ruled that statements prior to the

Miranda warnings must be suppressed, but statements after the

warnings would be admitted into evidence, the defendant entered a

no-contest plea and appealed.

        {¶30} The Supreme Court of Ohio observed that no talismanic

incantation is required to satisfy Miranda, California v. Prysock,

453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981).                      Instead,
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a

suspect his or her rights as Miranda requires.                    Farris at ¶ 18,

quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.

Farris emphasized, however, that Seibert’s admonition that in the

“question first” scenarios, when circumstances show that the

Miranda warning could not reasonably be found effective, the post-

warning statements are inadmissible because “earlier and later

statements are realistically seen as parts of a single, unwarned

sequence of questioning.”                     Farris at ¶ 21, quoting Seibert at 612,

124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 543, fn. 5.                     Farris also pointed out

that Elstad and Seibert establish factors to consider in deciding

whether sequential interrogations are essentially one continuous

interrogation, and whether an intermediate Miranda warning can be

effective.          The court quoted Seibert:

        “The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series
        of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings
        delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish
        their object: [1] the completeness and detail of the
        questions and answers in the first round of interrogation,
        [2] the overlapping content of the two statements, [3] the
        timing and setting of the first and the second, [4] the
        continuity of police personnel, and [5] the degree to which
        the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as
        continuous with the first.        In Elstad, it was not
        unreasonable to see the occasion for questioning at the
        station house as presenting a markedly different experience
        from the short conversation at home; since a reasonable
        person in the suspect’s shoes could have seen the station
        house questioning as a new and distinct experience, the
        Miranda warnings could have made sense as presenting a
        genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier
        admission.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]

        At the opposite extreme are the facts here, which by any
        objective measure reveal a police strategy adapted to
        undermine the Miranda warnings. The unwarned interrogation
        was conducted in the station house, and the questioning
        was systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological
        skill. When the police were finished there was little, if
        anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid.        The
        warned phase of questioning proceeded after a pause of only
        15 to 20 minutes, in the same place as the unwarned segment.
        When the same officer who had conducted the first phase
        recited the Miranda warnings, he said nothing to counter
        the probable misimpression that the advice that anything
        Seibert said could be used against her also applied to the
        details of the inculpatory statement previously elicited.
        In particular, the police did not advise that her prior
        statement could not be used. Nothing was said or done to
        dispel the oddity of warning about legal rights to silence
        and counsel right after the police had led her through a
        systematic interrogation, and any uncertainty on her part
        about a right to stop talking about matters previously
        discussed would only have been aggravated by the way [the
        officer] set the scene by saying ‘we’ve been talking for a
        little while about what happened on Wednesday the twelfth,
        haven’t’ we?’ * * * The impression that the further
        questioning was a mere continuation of the earlier
        questions and responses was fostered by references back to
        the confession already given.         It would have been
        reasonable to regard the two sessions as parts of a
        continuum, in which it would have been unnatural to refuse
        to repeat at the second stage what had been said before.
        These circumstances must be seen as challenging the
        comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to
        the point that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes
        would not have understood them to convey a message that
        she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”

Farris, supra, at ¶ 28-29, quoting Seibert, at 615-617, 124 S.Ct.
2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.

        {¶31} The Farris court concluded that the defendant’s

interrogation resembled Seibert more than Elstad, and noted: (1)

although the whole process was extremely brief, it would have been
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a continuum, (2)

although the questioning was very simple, not in-depth, and not

lengthy, it covered exactly the same subject both before the

warning and after the warning, and (3) both statements were made in

the police cruiser to the same officer within moments of each

other.       Id. at ¶ 30.            Accordingly, the court held that temporally

and substantively, the questioning constituted a single

interrogation.             Id. at ¶ 31.

        {¶32} The Farris court also noted that, unlike Seibert, the

police employed no official strategy to intentionally bait the

suspect into talking before the Miranda warnings, then repeat the

damaging statements post-warning.                  However, Farris concluded that

Seibert left unclear whether the officer’s intent is relevant in

the Miranda analysis.                  Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined

that the suspect’s state of mind is key.                     Id. at ¶ 35.

Accordingly, Farris held, “[b]ecause the intent of the trooper was

irrelevant here, and because Farris’s post-warning statements were

the same as his pre-warning statements, we hold that Farris’s post-

warning statements were not the result of an informed choice and

are therefore inadmissible.”                  Id. at ¶ 36.

        {¶33} In the case sub judice, we presume from the trial court’s

judgment that it granted appellee’s suppression motion based on
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
Seibert and Farris.1                 The entry states:

        This matter came on for hearing November 29, 2022 on the
        Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. Present in court was the
        Defendant, Angela Barnhart, her attorney, James S. Sweeney,
        and the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Jeff Adkins.

        Defendant was taken into custody by the Meigs County
        Sheriff’s Department on July 21, 2019.      Sgt. Stewart
        communicated and asked questions of Defendant while in
        custody   and  prior   to   advising Defendant   of  her
        constitutional rights under Miranda.

        The Miranda warnings were eventually given to the Defendant
        by Sgt. Stewart. After the Miranda advisement, additional
        questions were asked of Defendant, including questions
        covering topics discussed prior to the reading of her
        Miranda rights.

        All statements provided to Sgt. Stewart by Defendant on
        July 21, 2019 are hereby SUPRESSED [sic.] and therefore
        not to be testified about or offered as evidence before
        the jury.

        {¶34} Although the interview process was relatively brief, it

is reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a continuum.

We note that Sgt. Stewart indicated that they conducted “multiple

interviews” with appellee, and “in one of the interviews [appellee]

was talking about being * * * under the influence.”      Further,

although Stewart first mentioned a Miranda waiver at 3:05 of the

        1
      The state observed that the trial court’s entry did not cite
authority. However, a trial court’s failure to cite to authority
or precedent in its opinion does not necessarily affect an
appellate court's ability to examine the issues presented on
appeal. See Green v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers'
Compensation, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 17CA17, 2018-Ohio-2618, ¶ 18.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
recording, he did not administer the warnings until 10:05 of the

30:55 minute recording.                       Second, like Farris, although the

questions in the case at bar appear to be simple and not lengthy,

the questions both before and after the warnings covered the same

subject and involved the same officer at the same location.

        {¶35} The state also contends that appellee’s post-warning

statement differed from her pre-warning statement because the post-

warning statement made criminally culpable admissions, whereas the

pre-warning statement denied criminal culpability.                      We disagree,

however.         In appellee’s pre-warning statement, she admitted she was

“there with the stuff” and stated, “I know things * * * like, I

know what was there.”                  Both the pre-warning and post-warning

statements implicated appellee in the burglary.

        {¶36} Moreover, applying the Seibert factors to the case sub

judice, the only factor that weighs in the state’s favor is the

first - the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in

the first round of interrogation.                      Regarding the other factors,

overlapping content exists in the two statements, the timing

between the two statements was virtually simultaneous, in the same

setting with the same officer, and the questions treated the second

round as continuous with the first.                      Thus, we agree with the trial

court’s conclusion that the Seibert factors weigh in favor of

suppression.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
        {¶37} The state cites State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-

Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, in support of its argument that

appellee’s pre-warning statement was not inculpatory.                   In Dixon,

police interviewed the defendant three times and the parties did

not dispute that the trial court properly suppressed the

defendant’s second interview statements.                    In concluding that the

other two interviews were admissible, the Supreme Court of Ohio

relied on Elstad, observed that four hours elapsed between sessions

two and three, and concluded that the breach of the Miranda

procedures involved no actual compulsion, promises, or coercive

tactics.         Id. at ¶ 26, 34.             Although we discern no evidence of

compulsion or coercive tactics in the case at bar, we believe Dixon

is distinguishable.                 Dixon involved a long break between the

interviews and, more importantly, the court decided Dixon two

months before Seibert and two years before Farris.                    Thus, we

believe Dixon has limited precedential value.

        {¶38} In State v. Jirac, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15-CR-756,

2016-Ohio-8187, the defendant’s initial encounter with police at a

UPS store resulted in a custodial interrogation before any Miranda

rights discussion.                The same officer conducted both pre- and post-

Miranda interviews, and the interrogator treated the second

interrogation as continuous with the first by asserting at the

outset that the post-warning interrogation was designed to review
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
the previous discussion and clarify discrepancies in the two

statements by asking the defendant to affirm the specific

statements he made during the first interrogation.                 The Second

District concluded that a defendant in similar circumstances

reasonably would not believe that, after being given a Miranda

warning, he had any choice but to affirm the statements already

made to police before that warning.                 The court concluded that the

statements were inadmissible because the defendant’s post-warning

statements did not result from an informed, voluntary choice to

waive his rights,.                Id. at ¶ 15.

        {¶39} In State v. Cook, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24524, 2012-

Ohio-111, the defendant’s pre-Miranda interview lasted

approximately five minutes, then, shortly thereafter, the police

transported the defendant to a building for a second interrogation.

Before the second interrogation, the same officer advised the

defendant of her Miranda rights.                 The officer testified that the

second interview, substantially longer than the first, covered the

same event, but “started at the beginning and went through to the

end.”       Id. at ¶ 17.            The Second District concluded that the case

“fell on the Seibert side of the Elstad/Seibert continuum” because

the content overlapped, the same officer elicited both statements,

and the interviews were designed to elicit incriminating

statements.           Id. at ¶ 29.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
        {¶40} Similarly, in State v. Bonnell, 5th Dist. Delaware No.

07CAA 01 0006, 2008-Ohio-28, when officers at a rest area checked a

vehicle’s license plates and ran the defendant’s license, they

learned that a rental company had reported the vehicle stolen.

When an officer patted down and handcuffed the defendant and then

attempted to confirm ownership, the officer asked if the defendant

owned the vehicle.                The defendant told him the vehicle was a rental

car.      When the officer asked if he knew why he had been detained,

the defendant responded that the rental car was overdue for several

months.        Id. at ¶ 6.           Officers then placed the defendant in their

cruiser while they awaited confirmation about the vehicle’s status.

        {¶41} After confirming that the vehicle had been stolen,

officers advised the defendant of his Miranda rights.                    At that

point, the defendant admitted that three months before he signed a

two week rental agreement.                    The trial court suppressed the

defendant’s statements made before officers placed him in the

cruiser and advised him of his Miranda rights, but allowed the

statements made post-Miranda.                    Id. at ¶ 7.

        {¶42} On appeal, the Fifth District reversed and held that the

trial court should have suppressed statements made after the

defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights.

        The statements were close in time to the statements
        appellant made prior to being given Miranda warnings, were
        elicited by the same deputy and overlapped in content with
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
        his earlier, pre-Miranda statements. * * * [B]oth the pre
        and   post-Miranda   interrogations    concerned   whether
        appellant had permission to use the vehicle and whether it
        was overdue.    While the first interrogation occurred
        outside of Deputy Pollock’s cruiser, the second occurred
        just minutes later while appellant was seated in the back
        of the cruiser. * * * [Thus], the court found that the
        ‘mid-stream’ Miranda warnings in this case were not
        effective enough to accomplish their objectives and that
        the trial court, therefore, erred in not granting
        appellant’s Motion to Suppress appellant’s statements.

Id. at ¶ 52.

        {¶43} In the case sub judice, the state argues that the

appellee offered some unsolicited statements and because an

unsolicited and spontaneous statement is not the product of

interrogation, Miranda does not apply.             State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio

St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 119.             We may agree

that arguably some statements, like the first statement pre-Miranda

“I mean, I fu*ked up, I did,” and later statement after Sgt.

Stewart reentered the room, “You’re a sheriff, you’re bigger than

them guys, can you help me with this?            Cause look, I don’t have

$500.       Yes, I fu*ked up,” are examples of unsolicited and

spontaneous statements, the appellee gave several statements in

response to questions, such as “Were you outside the home when

Jacob did [the robbery]?” and “because initially I thought you told

me you drove.”             Those questions clearly pertained to the burglary.

Further, Stewart’s statement at the suppression hearing reveals

that he asked appellee “several questions” because he attempted to
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
determine “her involvement and then see if we could work with her

through the Task Force.”                      When asked if he posed similar questions

before and after Miranda, Stewart replied, “Correct, yes.”

        {¶44} Accordingly, based on Farris and Seibert, we conclude

that the trial court did not err in its decision to suppress all

statements appellee provided to Sgt. Stewart on July 21, 2019.

Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                       JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
MEIGS, 22CA13                                                       26

                          JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellant bear
the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.