Court Opinion

ID: 9547260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:44:27.737812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:33.273664
License: Public Domain

James, J.
(concurring) — I agree that Proctor’s conviction should be affirmed. I believe, however, that a further comment is in order concerning the instruction on circumstantial evidence. In rejecting Proctor’s requested instruction, the trial judge observed that there was both direct and circumstantial evidence concerning Proctor’s guilt and that *279the instruction given was appropriate under the ruling of State v. Nabors, 8 Wn. App. 199, 505 P.2d 162 (1973). It was.
I should like to point out, however, that recently in State v. Gosby, 11 Wn. App. 844, 526 P.2d 70 (1974), we acknowledged that in Nabors we were guilty of making an over-broad generalization when we said:
In a case with both direct and circumstantial evidence, the jury should not be instructed concerning a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence alone.
State v. Nabors, supra at 203. If, as in State v. Douglas, 71 Wn.2d 303, 305, 428 P.2d 535 (1967) “[t]he evidence against the defendant is entirely circumstantial,” it is error to refuse to instruct that the evidence should be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. But, as is pointed out in Gosby, a similar instruction may also be appropriate in a case with both direct and circumstantial evidence.
It is conceivable that, in an appropriate case, the jury might be disposed to entirely disregard the direct evidence concerning an element of the crime charged. In such event, the jury would then be required to determine whether the State had met its burden of proof by circumstantial evidence. In such a case, a jury should be instructed that the circumstantial evidence in proof of the element must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
State v. Gosby, supra at 849 n.2.
While I am of the opinion that the substance of Proctor’s requested instruction was a correct statement of the law, its refusal did not constitute prejudicial error. The instruction given by the court afforded Proctor full opportunity to argue the principle involved, i.e., that the jurors could not be satisfied that the State had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by circumstantial evidence alone, if those circumstances were consistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
As discussed in State v. Gosby, supra, instructions on the *280subject might better be focused upon the quality of proof of the elements of the crime rather than the general issue of guilt or innocence. I suggest that an appropriate instruction might read as follows:
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is that given by a witness who testifies concerning facts to be proven which he has,directly observed or perceived through one or more of the five senses. This is commonly referred to as eyewitness testimony. Circumstantial ' evidence, sometimes called indirect evidence, consists of proof of facts or circumstances which according to the common experience of mankind give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the fact sought to be proved.
One kind of evidence is not necessarily more or less valuable than the other.
If upon a consideration of the whole case you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it does not matter whether such certainty has been produced by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence, or both.
In order to find that any element of the crime has been proved by circumstantial evidence alone, however, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts and circumstances relied upon are not only consistent with each other and with the hypothesis of guilt, but also that they are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Callow, J., concurs with James, J.
Petition for rehearing denied March 13, 1975.
Review denied by Supreme Court June 9, 1975.