Court Opinion

ID: 9898279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:37.941089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:01.474991
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        AUGUST 24, 2023
                                                                  In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                 WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
                                               )         No. 38671-6-III
                     Respondent,               )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
RAYMOND LAPEER BELL,                           )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
                     Appellant.                )

       SIDDOWAY, J.P.T. — Raymond Bell appeals his conviction for first degree assault

with a deadly weapon, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging a

violation of his right to a fair and impartial jury, evidentiary error, and an abuse of

discretion in denying his request for an exceptional mitigated sentence. The evidence

was sufficient, his standard range sentence is not appealable, and he fails to identify any

error or abuse of discretion. For those reasons, and because he raises no meritorious

issues in a statement of additional grounds, we affirm his judgment and sentence other

than to grant his request for relief from the victim penalty assessment based on a

recently-effective change in the law.

       
        Judge Laurel H. Siddoway was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time
argument was held on this matter. She is now serving as a judge pro tempore of the court
pursuant to RCW 2.06.150.
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On an evening in March 2019, a woman who identified herself as “Shanna” called

911 to report that she had just been assaulted. The call was transferred by the 911

operator to a Spokane police dispatcher. Shanna had just begun speaking to the

dispatcher when she abruptly told the dispatcher that her attacker had come back into the

apartment. She ceased responding to questions. All the dispatcher could hear were

muffled voices. Spokane police responded to the address provided to the 911 operator

and found Shanna Delcambre in an upstairs apartment with a deep head wound and her

right hand almost completely severed. She told police that Raymond Bell had repeatedly

attacked her with a machete.

       Mr. Bell was located in a first-floor hallway of the apartment building and was

taken into custody. The State charged him with first degree assault with a deadly

weapon, later amending the information to add a charge of attempted first degree murder.

       The case proceeded to trial in October 2021. Among Mr. Bell’s pretrial motions

in limine were several related to the then-ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)

pandemic. He moved for two additional alternate jurors, the explanation being, “There

should be additional alternates on the jury due to the risk of COVID-19 Delta infection.”

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 18. He requested “additional time to investigate juror biases and

strike jurors for cause,” including “for those who indicate they will be distracted by the

surrounding issues with the COVID[-]19 pandemic.” Id. at 19 (boldface omitted). He

                                             2
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

submitted that “[j]urors who concede that their ability to focus on the testimony is

impaired by the pandemic must be stricken for cause.” Id. at 22.

       He objected to witnesses wearing masks while testifying as violating his right of

confrontation. Finally, he objected to jurors wearing N95 or other face masks during voir

dire, asking that they wear face shields instead.

       It was the practice of the superior court at the time for witnesses not to wear face

masks when testifying. For jurors and prospective jurors, the practice was for them to

wear face masks. When the parties’ motions in limine were heard, Mr. Bell’s request that

the jurors not wear face masks was his only COVID-related request that was not

accommodated or resolved with defense agreement. The court explained:

               The record should reflect that—so sad I had to update this because it
       was the fourth wa[ve], now it’s the fifth wa[ve], our community is currently
       in what’s been characterized as the fifth [wave] of a global pandemic
       caused by the deadly Corona virus, which has killed—and back then it was
       over a half million, but I know that we are at 700-and-something-thousand
       U.S. citizens and infected millions more. Spokane County Health
       Department figures reflect, and this was yesterday’s numbers, so I’m sure
       that, or I would not be surprised if it did clear 67,000 cases because as of
       yesterday evening, it was 66,988 cases with 4,219 overall hospitalizations.
       Less than half of Spokane County is vaccinated.
              While the defendant has a right to a timely jury trial, I also have to
       weigh the safety of the citizens that the court is compelling to attend jury
       service. CDC[1] face shield provided sufficient protection while advising
       N95 mask with social distancing provides the best protection against
       transmission, particularly important with the even more contagious Delta

       1
           Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

                                              3
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       variant. And in addition to that, Governor Inslee has instituted an indoor
       mask mandate.
              For those reasons, I am going to deny defense number 9. I can’t tell
       you how much I wish we weren’t in this position still, but, unfortunately,
       we are.

1 Rep. of Proc. (1 RP) at 26-27 (emphasis added).2

       In jury selection the next week, the court began by talking to prospective jurors

about the pandemic-related safety protocols in place. Face masks were provided, and

jurors were told by the court that “[f]ace coverings are required for protection in the

courtroom.” 1 RP at 59-60. The court added, “I will not have my face covering on while

I’m talking during voir dire, and counsel will be allowed to remove their face covering

while speaking.” Id. at 60. When the time came for jurors to answer questions, the court

said, “[W]e’ll start with Juror No. 1. If you could lower your face covering while you’re

speaking. It will help with the court reporting.” Id. at 67. During the questioning,

prospective jurors were periodically reminded or requested to lower their face coverings

when speaking. See, e.g., 1 RP at 78, 81, 97, 109.

       After the jury was selected, three days of testimony ensued. There had been three

witnesses to the assault: the victim, Shanna Delcambre; the defendant, Mr. Bell; and

       2
         Our record on appeal includes three separately paginated reports of proceedings.
We refer to the volume that includes the hearing on the parties’ motions in limine and the
first day of trial (reported by Rebecca J. Weeks) as “1 RP.” We refer to the volume that
includes the remainder of trial, the sentencing hearing, and a couple of early pretrial
hearings (reported by Terri Rosadovelazquez) as “2 RP.” We refer to the volume that
includes other hearings discussed in addressing Mr. Bell’s statement of additional
grounds (reported by Korina C. Cox) as “3 RP.”

                                              4
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

Dorothea George, Mr. Bell’s longtime girlfriend and his roommate at the time of the

assault. Ms. George and Ms. Delcambre were called as witnesses in the State’s case.

       Dorothea George testimony

       Of the witnesses to the assault, Ms. George testified first. She testified that on the

day of the assault, Mr. Bell had been awake and upset for days, following a suspension

from work. For four days, he had been drinking and smoking crack cocaine. She

testified she had finally gotten Mr. Bell to sleep when, late in the afternoon, she heard an

altercation in a parking area below their upstairs apartment. She looked out a window

and saw Ms. Delcambre, who she recognized; she, Ms. Delcambre, and Mr. Bell had

been friends, decades earlier, in high school. Ms. George shook Mr. Bell awake and

together they went downstairs to calm down whatever was going on between Ms.

Delcambre and a man with whom she was arguing. After things settled, Ms. George and

Mr. Bell walked across the street to purchase beer and malt liquor and invited Ms.

Delcambre to join them upstairs. The three began drinking and smoking weed in the

apartment. Ms. George estimated that Ms. Delcambre was with them in the apartment for

about three hours.

       Ms. George testified that an argument started when Ms. Delcambre mentioned a

girl they had gone to school with and Mr. Bell commented that the girl had been “pretty

back in the day,” which Ms. Delcambre felt disrespected Ms. George. 2 RP at 38. When

Ms. Delcambre asked Mr. Bell how he would feel if Ms. George talked wistfully about

                                              5
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

her old boyfriend’s “stuff,” 2 RP at 38, Mr. Bell told her to be quiet, which made Ms.

Delcambre angrier. According to Ms. George, the argument between Mr. Bell and Ms.

Delcambre escalated and became a physical fight. Mr. Bell told Ms. Delcambre, “Get the

‘F’ out of my house,” but Ms. Delcambre did not leave. 2 RP at 40. Ms. George then

yelled for them both to leave, but only Mr. Bell walked out. Ms. Delcambre began to call

the police, while Ms. George pleaded with her not to.

       Ms. George assumed Mr. Bell heard Ms. Delcambre calling the police, because he

came back into the apartment and followed Ms. Delcambre into the bedroom. Ms.

George testified that she stayed in the living room until she heard Ms. Delcambre

screaming her name. When she entered the bedroom, she thought the two were fighting

like before, but she soon saw that Mr. Bell was “just chopping and chopping” at Ms.

Delcambre with a machete. 2 RP at 43. Ms. George jumped in front of Mr. Bell, yelling

at him to stop. She testified that his eyes were blank and he appeared not to hear her;

according to Ms. George, “[H]e didn’t know what the hell he was doing.” 2 RP at 79.

When she grabbed him and called him “Daddy,” he “stop[ped], froze, and looked around,

and he was like, What the . . . .” 2 RP at 80. Ms. George testified Mr. Bell then left the

apartment and never returned. Ms. George saw Ms. Delcambre was holding her wrist so

she wrapped her hand in a shirt while calling 911.3

       3
         No recording of this 911 call was offered as evidence, but a dispatcher testified
that the caller stated her friend needed help and then hung up.

                                             6
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       According to Ms. George, Mr. Bell “wasn’t even mentally there” during the

assault, and did not know what was going on. 2 RP at 42. She believed Mr. Bell was

“blacked out” that night. 2 RP at 55. She had seen Mr. Bell black out before and said he

would go entirely blank and be nonresponsive until he was shaken.

       Shanna Delcambre testimony

       Ms. Delcambre testified that she had been at the apartment building on the

afternoon and early evening of the assault with her cousin, who was helping to change

tires on the car of one of Ms. Delcambre’s friends. It took “at least a couple hours.”

2 RP at 116. The altercation that caused Ms. George to look out the window happened

when Ms. Delcambre’s friend’s boyfriend started flirting with Ms. Delcambre, and she

“told him off.” 2 RP at 113. According to Ms. Delcambre, Ms. George came to a

window and yelled down, “Oh girl, I thought that was you; I heard your voice.” 2 RP at

115. The two talked briefly from that distance and then Ms. George came down to the

parking lot. They shared a beer and chatted. Shortly after, Mr. Bell also came down and

briefly joined them before leaving to buy beer.

       When the tires were finally changed, it was about dusk and Ms. Delcambre needed

to use a bathroom. She accepted Ms. George’s invitation to use the bathroom in her and

Mr. Bell’s apartment and stayed to visit with them when she was done. Ms. George

offered Ms. Delcambre another beer and the three sat and talked, telling jokes and

laughing. According to Ms. Delcambre, Mr. Bell and Ms. George continued to drink

                                             7
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

heavily even though, by her account, they were already “pretty drunk.” 2 RP at 121. Ms.

Delcambre believed she only had two beers total that night.

       About an hour and a half into the visit, there was a sudden shift in the mood,

according to Ms. Delcambre. She recalled them all laughing at something Ms. George

said and then Mr. Bell stood up and “shook me really hard,” demanding to know what

Ms. Delcambre was laughing at. 2 RP at 123. Ms. Delcambre was irritated and said

something like, “Hey, don’t shake me like that. You know, keep your hands off me; I’m

not Dorothea.” 2 RP at 181. Ms. Delcambre acknowledged at trial that she has a strong

personality and does not back down easily.

       Ms. George told Ms. Delcambre, “Don’t pay him no mind, you know, don’t

leave,” so Ms. Delcambre decided to ignore Mr. Bell. 2 RP at 125. She shifted her

attention back to Ms. George while Mr. Bell got up and went to the bedroom. When he

returned, he was carrying a machete in a sheath. Initially, she assumed he was just going

to show it to them. However, she became worried when he took it out of the sheath,

started playing with it, and was laughing.

       Ms. Delcambre struggled to remember her 911 call, testifying she believed she

called 911 while running into the bedroom. The recorded 911 call was admitted into

evidence and played for the jury. On it, Ms. Delcambre sounds calm and reports that she

was just assaulted and Mr. Bell had a machete. She seems to say that Mr. Bell was

“jumping on” Ms. George as well. Ex. P-12, at 59 sec. to 1 min., 4 sec.; see also 2 RP at

                                             8
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

194 (“I’m calling because I think my friend is in danger.”). The recording ends as the

call is being transferred to dispatch and Ms. Delcambre says she was just “socked” in the

head multiple times. Ex. P-12, at 2 min., 2 sec. to 2 min., 6 sec.

       Ms. Delcambre did remember that after the call she ran to the bedroom and tried to

shut the door but was followed by Mr. Bell who kicked the door in. She described the

attack that followed:

       I went into the bedroom. He came in. I was trying to close the door. He
       kicked in the door. So when he came in, there was nowhere else to go, so I
       went towards the closet. I went into the closet. I was in the corner of the
       closet, and that’s—I just kept saying, Okay, Raymond, the police are on
       their way. You should just leave. Raymond, the police are on their way.
       And he started chopping at me. And when he hit my hand, I just was so
       puzzled that he had did it. He was still laughing. So I just was, like,
       Raymond, you really—like, you really did—like, my hand’s on the
       ground—or seemed like it was on the ground to me. I’m, like, it was gone
       from my wrist.
              So I just kept trying to talk him down and tell him that the police
       were leaving—I mean, were coming, whatever.
               And so he had attacked me. And I don’t know if the door closed,
       like, because I was in the closet, so I don’t know if it kind of closed or if it
       kind of came off of the track, but I kept trying to crawl in further and like,
       leave my—oh, God, I was so scared to have any limbs out. I just didn’t
       want him to cut another one off.
              So I was just trying to get in the closet as tight as I could. And it just
       seemed like he got tired and the door kind of got in his way, and he just
       walked away. And I just thought, Oh, God, it’s over, like, God, they should
       be here soon, like—and then the next thing I know, he was coming back.

2 RP at 132-33. She said Mr. Bell “looked like the Joker” and “act[ed] like he was

jousting and laughing” as he jabbed her. 2 RP at 183, 174. Following the blow to her

                                               9
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

wrist, Ms. Delcambre said it “just kept squirting like a faucet.” 2 RP at 143. She had

never seen so much blood.

       Ms. Delcambre estimated it was only minutes after he left that Mr. Bell came back

and started attacking her again. He chopped her in the head, cutting through her skull and

slicing off some of her hair. During the second attack, Ms. Delcambre “felt then that he

was trying to kill me,” so she pretended he had, after the first blow. 2 RP at 142. When

Mr. Bell struck her again, she kept her eyes closed and acted like she did not feel

anything even though she did. Mr. Bell finally left when Ms. George came into the

bedroom and told him to stop.

       Other State witnesses

       The State’s other witnesses were the Spokane Police Department dispatcher, three

Spokane police officers who responded to the 911 call, the assigned detective, an

emergency physician from Sacred Heart Hospital in Spokane, and a hand surgeon from

Harborview Medical Center.

       The first police officer to respond to the 911 call found Ms. Delcambre in the

Bell/George apartment, lying inside the back-bedroom closet blood soaked, and holding a

towel to her hand. He immediately applied a tourniquet, which her doctors testified

saved Ms. Delcambre from dying from loss of blood.

       Medical witnesses testified that Ms. Delcambre’s injuries were extensive and life-

threatening. Her right hand was nearly entirely cut off at the wrist and required multiple

                                            10
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

surgeries to reattach. She had a laceration on her left thumb and a laceration to her scalp

that was two and a half to three inches deep. Both required staples to repair. She

suffered a traumatic brain injury and continued to have memory issues.

       Responding officers found Mr. Bell in the first-floor hallway of the building.

Officers testified that he appeared intoxicated, but also described him as not incapacitated

in any respect. Corporal Brandon Lynch observed Mr. Bell’s communications with

others, and testified that Mr. Bell was responsive, cooperative, and not confused. Officer

Benjamin Yinger observed Mr. Bell comply with directions to show his hands and get on

the ground. He, too, testified that Mr. Bell did not appear confused. When Officer

Yinger interviewed Ms. George, she told him Mr. Bell had been on a four-day bender,

but did not tell Officer Yinger about any blackout.

       Detective Paul Lebsock testified that if Mr. Bell had needed medical clearance or

treatment for intoxication, it would have been documented, and there is no indication that

anything of that sort occurred. The topic of intoxication came up in the detective’s direct

examination. The prosecutor was questioning him about defenses he considers when

engaged in an investigation, and the following testimony is identified as an issue on

appeal:

       Q.     So in general, what types of defenses do you think of as part of your
              investigation?
       A.     Sure. Well, everybody has the right to defend themselves and
              another person from being attacked or unlawful injury, unlawful

                                            11
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

              assault. So you consider physical size. You do consider gender
              differences. You consider available weapons. You consider who
              might be the primary physical aggressor and then an appropriate
              level of defense to the point of self-defense without crossing the line
              into counteractive assault.
                      . . . Let’s say you have two individuals and one individual
              comes up and kind of shoulder bumps a kid in a hallway of the high
              school. . . . And the kid that gets shoulder bumped pulls a gun and
              shoots the guy. That’s an example of overstepping one’s boundary
              of self-defense.
       Q.     Pursuant to law enforcement evaluation?
       A.     Yes. The way we would interpret the law. We don’t write the law,
              but we try to interpret the law and work within the law with what the
              legislative branch has put forward.
       Q.     But these are the types of things you look—you consider when
              you’re going into any type of an incident such as one like this?
       A.     Sure. You evaluate levels of force that’s appropriate in defense of
              one’s self or another.
       Q.     And then what about intoxication, does that ever play into your
              analysis?
       A.     So our role is to look at the law the way the law is written, and,
              really, intoxication is not—
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. This is law that the
            judge is going to be instructing on, not testimony of this witness.
       THE COURT: Right. If we could shift to a different . . .
       [PROSECUTOR]: Will do.

2 RP at 292-94. Defense counsel did not move to strike the aborted testimony or request

any curative instruction.

                                             12
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       Raymond Bell testimony

       Mr. Bell was the only witness called in the defense case. He testified that he could

not remember what happened on the night he assaulted Ms. Delcambre because he was

drunk and had been binge drinking for a few days. He testified that he had also been

smoking crack cocaine for about a day.

       He recalled seeing Ms. Delcambre outside in the parking lot, and knew she came

up to his apartment with her dog. He remembered going to the store to buy beer. He

remembered sitting on the couch with Ms. George while Ms. Delcambre sat on a chair.

He remembered watching television, smoking a cigarette, talking, and drinking a beer.

He said the last thing he remembered before blacking out was the three of them just

talking.

       He testified he did not recall being snapped out of the blackout by Ms. George.

He claimed his next memory after just talking was someone putting handcuffs on him,

and sleeping in the jail for four days. He had no injuries from the incident. He testified

he had not wanted to hurt or kill Ms. Delcambre and did not intentionally assault her.

       Verdict, sentence and appeal

       The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge, but found

Mr. Bell guilty of first degree assault with a deadly weapon.

       At sentencing, Mr. Bell’s offender score of 8 resulted in a standard range of 209-

277 months. With the 24-month deadly weapon enhancement, his total standard range

                                            13
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

was 233-301 months. The State recommended a high end sentence of 301 months, while

Mr. Bell requested consideration of an exceptional sentence below the standard range.

       He offered five possible mitigating factors, the first being his age—55—which he

argued meant he had, or soon would, age out of criminal behavior. He argued that a

lengthy sentence would waste State resources by burdening it with medical expenses and

others costs, and fail to give Mr. Bell “the chance of an opportunity to improve himself.”

2 RP at 436. He submitted that the fact that he came from a low socioeconomic class,

was a person of color, and had a criminal history spanning the majority of his life, should

call into question “how the system and failures in our criminal justice system had affected

his offender score.” 2 RP at 437. He argued that the trial evidence revealed Ms.

Delcambre to be “an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.”

2 RP at 437-38. Finally, he expressed remorse and testified that the assault was “not

something he ever intended to do.” 2 RP at 439.

       The trial court denied the request for an exceptional sentence and sentenced Mr.

Bell to 250 months for the first degree assault conviction and 24 months for the deadly

weapon enhancement, for a total period of confinement of 274 months. Mr. Bell appeals.

He recently filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental assignment of error, and

we have granted him leave to assign error supplementally to the trial court’s imposition

of the $500 victim penalty assessment provided by former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) (2018).

                                             14
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

                                         ANALYSIS

       Mr. Bell makes four assignments of error. He challenges the denial of his motion

to require face shields rather than face masks for jurors, Detective Lebsock’s interrupted

answer to the question about intoxication, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s

refusal to impose an exceptional sentence.

I.     USE BY PROSPECTIVE JURORS OF FACE MASKS DURING VOIR DIRE DID NOT VIOLATE
       MR. BELL’S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY

       Mr. Bell’s first assignment of error is that the trial court violated his constitutional

right to a fair trial before an impartial jury by denying his objection to prospective jurors

wearing N95 or other masks during voir dire.4

       Both the United States and Washington State Constitutions provide a right to trial

by an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST.

art. I, § 22. Seating a biased juror violates the right. State v. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App.

2d 843, 851, 456 P.3d 869 (citing State v. Irby, 187 Wn. App. 183, 193, 347 P.3d 1103

(2015)). A juror demonstrates actual bias when he exhibits “a state of mind . . . in

reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged

person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of

the party challenging.” RCW 4.44.170(2). Voir dire, the part of jury selection wherein

       4
        He characterizes his motion as having objected to jurors wearing masks
throughout the entirety of the criminal case, but his motion in limine spoke only of voir
dire and relied on reasoning that applied only to voir dire. See CP at 24-26. Any
objection to jurors wearing face masks during trial is unpreserved. RAP 2.5(a).

                                              15
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

the parties ask questions and engage in discussion with potential jurors to draw out

potential bias, is central to securing the right to an impartial jury. State v. Bell, ___ Wn.

App. 2d ___, 529 P.3d 448, 454 (2023) (citing State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 152, 217

P.3d 321 (2009)). The ability to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals

who compose it, is a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and

qualifications of potential jurors. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 167

L. Ed. 2d 1014 (2007).

       A second purpose of voir dire is to “gain[ ] knowledge to enable an intelligent

exercise of peremptory challenges.” State v. Lupastean, 200 Wn.2d 26, 35, 513 P.3d 781

(2022) (quoting CrRLJ 6.4(b)). Unlike constitutionally-required challenges for cause,

however, peremptory challenges are “merely one rule-based component of the trial

process, which must be limited by courts and may be eliminated altogether.” Id. at 43.

       Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to see that voir dire is effective in

obtaining an impartial jury and that this result is obtained with reasonable expedition.

State v. Brady, 116 Wn. App. 143, 146-47, 64 P.3d 1258 (2003) (citing State v.

Frederiksen, 40 Wn. App. 749, 753, 700 P.2d 369 (1985)). The court’s discretion is

limited only by the need to assure a fair trial by an impartial jury. Brady, 116 Wn. App.

at 147 (citing Frederiksen, 40 Wn. App. at 752). We review a trial court’s ruling on the

conduct of voir dire for an abuse of discretion. Id.

                                              16
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       Mr. Bell provides no legal authority from any jurisdiction holding that requiring

face masks for public safety during voir dire violates a criminal defendant’s right to an

impartial jury. The issue has been addressed, as pointed out by the State’s response brief,

and the universal response has been that a defendant is able to assess a juror’s credibility

and demeanor while the juror is wearing a face mask. See Br. of Resp’t at 36-40

(collecting cases).

       Following the parties’ briefing on appeal, Division One of our court addressed an

identical challenge by a different defendant named Bell, who also moved his trial court to

employ face shields rather than face masks for the voir dire process. Bell, 529 P.3d at

454. Like the State’s briefing in this case, Division One observed that courts that have

seen challenges to their jurisdiction’s pandemic-induced jury selection procedures “have

uniformly rejected these challenges.” Id. at 456. Bell points out that a common theme in

courts’ treatment of such challenges, with which the Bell court agreed, is that “parties’

inability to see a juror’s mouth and nose deprives them of access to only a small part of

their demeanor.” Id. at 457 (citing cases). Another common theme with which Division

One agreed is the “countervailing need to provide for safety of all participants in the

midst of a pandemic.” Id. at 457-58 (citing cases).

       As recounted in Bell, Washington courts adopted a variety of strategies to ensure

that trials could go forward safely during the pandemic. In an order issued in June 2020,

the Washington State Supreme Court required courts to “conduct all [jury trial]

                                             17
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

proceedings consistent with the most protective applicable public health guidance in their

jurisdiction.” Ord. re: Modification of Jury Trial Proc., In re Statewide Response by

Washington State Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, No. 25700-B-631,

at 3 (Wash. June 18, 2020). As pointed out in Bell, the Supreme Court’s order

contemplated face masking and explicitly permitted the use of remote technology in jury

selection, a dramatic change to the usual voir dire procedure, to reduce the risk of

coronavirus exposure. Bell, 529 P.3d at 455.

       The reasoning of Bell is sound, and we follow it. Evaluated in light of its

reasoning, Raymond Bell’s is a particularly weak challenge. Since prospective jurors

were instructed before voir dire questioning began to lower their masks when speaking,

defense counsel was prevented from seeing only the lower faces of venire members who

were not speaking, but listening. The constitutional concern is with “for cause”

challenges, and it is hard to imagine that a venire member’s frowning, grimacing,

smiling, or laughing that was revealed only by their lower face, while listening to others,

would support a challenge for actual bias.

       It is also the case that safety concerns were very real at the time and place of

Raymond Bell’s trial. This was demonstrated by defense counsel’s own request for

additional alternate jurors and the ability to excuse for cause a juror whose ability to

focus on the evidence would be impaired by pandemic-related concerns. As pointed out

in the record made by the trial court, Spokane County had a low vaccination rate and was

                                             18
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

experiencing high numbers of Delta variant cases and hospitalizations. Like the trial

court in Division One’s Bell decision, the trial court in this case did not abuse its

discretion by requiring jurors to wear face masks during jury selection.

II.    NO TRIAL COURT ERROR IS IDENTIFIED BY MR. BELL’S SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

       Mr. Bell’s second assignment of error is that “[e]videntiary and constitutional

error . . . occurred” when the jury heard a statement from Detective Lebsock that Mr. Bell

characterizes as “intoxication does not matter to Mr. Bell’s guilt.” Appellant’s Opening

Br. at 1. What occurred was that after the detective answered questions about how he

evaluates the possibility that a suspect has a valid defense against a charge (and

specifically, a defense of self-defense), the prosecutor’s next question and the beginning

of an answer drew an objection:

       Q.     And then what about intoxication, does that ever play into your
              analysis?
       A.     So our role is to look at the law the way the law is written, and,
              really, intoxication is not—
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. This is law that the
            judge is going to be instructing on, not testimony of this witness.
       THE COURT: Right. If we could shift to a different . . .
       [PROSECUTOR]: Will do.

2 RP at 293. As can be seen, the question was never fully answered, and the defense

objection was sustained. There was no motion by defense counsel to strike the partial

answer. The State makes these points in its response brief.

                                              19
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       In reply, Mr. Bell baldly asserts that no one “was under any illusion that Officer

Lebsock’s opinion was one that mocked the idea that intoxication was pertinent to

wrongdoing,” that the partial statement was “improper opinion testimony on guilt,” and

that it was “manifest constitutional error.” Reply Br. at 9-11. None of these contentions

is adequately explained. We reject all of them.

       Given his decades of law enforcement work, Detective Lebsock could have been

familiar with how the jury would be instructed, and he might have been about to say

something like, “intoxication is not something that automatically relieves a person of

criminal responsibility, but it can be relevant to whether he acted with intent.”5 Of

course, if the detective was about to testify to whether intoxication was a defense, or how,

then anything he had to say would be objectionable. The objection was properly

sustained.

       Defense counsel could have asked the court to strike the partial answer and

instruct jurors that they would receive their instruction on the law from the court.6 The

       5
        The jury was later instructed by the trial court’s instruction 23, “No act
committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal because
⎯by reason of that condition. However, evidence of intoxication may be considered in
determining whether the defendant acted with premeditated intent and/or intent.” 2 RP at
368.

       6
         Before its deliberations, the jury was instructed, “It is also your duty to accept
the law from my instructions regardless of what you personally believe the law is or what
you think it should be. You must apply the law from my instructions to the facts that you

                                            20
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

court was not required to do either, because the defense did not ask it to. E.g., State v.

Severns, 19 Wn.2d 18, 20, 141 P.2d 142 (1943) (appellant did not see fit to move to strike

at trial, and could not complain on appeal); accord State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 728,

582 P.2d 558 (1978) (citing State v. Jones, 70 Wn.2d 591, 424 P.2d 665 (1967)). No

error by the trial court is shown.

III.   THE EVIDENCE OF FIRST DEGREE ASSAULT WAS SUFFICIENT

       Mr. Bell’s third assignment of error is that the evidence was insufficient to support

the jury’s verdict that he was guilty of first degree assault, and specifically insufficient on

the element of intent. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State to

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628

(1980). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all

reasonable inferences that a trier of fact can draw from the evidence. State v. Salinas,

119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence

are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We

defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and

decide have been proved and in this way decide the case,” 2 RP at 356, and later, “The
law is contained in my instructions to you. You must disregard any remark, statement, or
argument that is not supported by the evidence or the law in my instructions.” Id. at 358.
Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d
578, 586, 355 P.3d 253 (2015).

                                              21
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850

(1990), abrogated in part on other grounds, State v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d 282, 505

P.3d 529 (2022).

       To convict Mr. Bell of first degree assault, the State was required to present

evidence that with the intent to inflict great bodily harm, he assaulted Ms. Delcambre

with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). “Great bodily harm” means “bodily

injury which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent

disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function

of any bodily part or organ.” RCW 9A.04.110(4)(c). Evidence of intent to inflict great

bodily harm “‘is to be gathered from all of the circumstances of the case, including not

only the manner and act of inflicting the wound, but also the nature of the prior

relationship and any previous threats.’” State v. Ferreira, 69 Wn. App. 465, 468-69, 850

P.2d 541 (1993) (quoting State v. Woo Won Choi, 55 Wn. App. 895, 906, 781 P.2d 505

(1989)). “Specific intent cannot be presumed, but it can be inferred as a logical

probability from all the facts and circumstances.” State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217,

883 P.2d 320 (1994).

       Mr. Bell points to the evidence that he had experienced blackouts in the past and

that he had been up for four days, drinking and smoking crack cocaine, to argue that the

jury could not have found he was “capable of desiring and purposefully trying to achieve

the outcome of great bodily harm.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30. A further reason he

                                            22
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

argues the jury could not find that he acted with the specific intent to harm Ms.

Delcambre was because “[t]here was no showing of prior threats or altercations, or

enmity between the two.” Id. at 31. This was a plausible defense theory, and it was

reasonable for Mr. Bell to argue that he lacked the required specific intent based on the

evidence he identifies. But the State presented countervailing evidence and argument.

       Mr. Bell’s testimony and that of Ms. George that he was in a blackout state and

did not know what he was doing could have been viewed by the jury as biased and self-

serving. The jury could view police officers who dealt with Mr. Bell immediately after

the assault as more reliable witnesses to his condition. While the officers agreed that Mr.

Bell appeared intoxicated, they described him as not requiring medical intervention for

his intoxication and as fully able to cooperate with instructions, perform physical tasks,

and communicate with the officers. Officer Yinger was one of the first two officers to

arrive at the apartment building in response to the 911 calls, encountering Mr. Bell in the

first-floor hallway on entering the building. Asked by the prosecutor whether Mr. Bell

appeared “vacant,” or “blank,” as described by Ms. George, Officer Yinger answered, no

to both questions. 2 RP at 200.

       The jurors were presented with evidence that decades earlier, while in high school,

Mr. Bell had been friends with Ms. Delcambre, and before the night of the assault

nothing had happened to alter their relationship. More compelling to jurors, however,

could have been that on that March evening, Mr. Bell had been dressed down by Ms.

                                             23
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

Delcambre, had responded by telling her to be quiet, had told her to “[g]et the ‘F’ out of

my house,” 2 RP at 40, and, after fighting with her physically without his machete,

retrieved the machete, returned, and unsheathed it. Those facts, the severity of the

injuries inflicted, Ms. Delcambre’s testimony, and even Ms. George’s description of Mr.

Bell “chopping and chopping” at Ms. Delcambre, 2 RP at 43, was ample evidence from

which to find the required specific intent.

IV.    MR. BELL’S STANDARD RANGE SENTENCE IS NOT APPEALABLE

       Mr. Bell’s final assignment of error is that the court erroneously deemed the facts

he identified as supporting an exceptional sentence not to be compelling. He

acknowledges that by statute, a sentence within the standard range shall not be appealed.

But he argues that we should treat his case as presenting an exception that exists for

“categorical refusals” to impose such a sentence. He asks us to “deem” the court’s

findings that Mr. Bell’s case for mitigation was not compelling as “a categorical

statement that the factors could not support a sentence below the standard range.”

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 36.

       The fixing of legal punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function, and

includes the power of the legislature to provide a minimum and maximum term within

which a trial court can exercise discretion. State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 180, 713

P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986) (citing State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 169, 103 P. 27

(1909)). The power of the legislature in this respect “‘is plenary and subject only to

                                              24
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

constitutional provisions against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.’” Id.

(quoting State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360 (1937)).

       The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, provides that

“[t]he court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if

it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling

reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added). It

provides that “[t]he court may impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range

if it finds that mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the

evidence.” RCW 9.94A.535(1) (emphasis added). It provides a nonexclusive list of

mitigation circumstances, one being that “[t]o a significant degree, the victim was an

initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.” RCW

9.94A.535(1)(a).

       RCW 9.94A.585(1) provides that “[a] sentence within the standard range . . . for

an offense shall not be appealed.” As a matter of constitutional avoidance (given the

constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases)7, the Supreme Court held in Ammons that

the provision “only preclud[es] appellate review of challenges to the amount of time

imposed when the time is within the standard range,” and “[w]hen the sentence given is

within th[at] . . . range, then as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion.”

       7
        Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides, in part, “In
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases.”

                                              25
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

Ammons, 105 Wn.2d at 182-83; accord State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 126, 456

P.3d 806 (2020). A trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses categorically to

impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range under any circumstances or

consider it for a class of offenders—both are, effectively a failure to exercise discretion.

Id. Another example of an impermissible basis for denying such a sentence occurs where

the court operates under the mistaken belief that it lacks discretion. State v. McFarland,

189 Wn.2d 47, 56-57, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017). In cases in which an impermissible basis

for refusing to impose such a sentence is found, it is because the appellant is able to point

to evidence in the record that there was or could have been a categorical refusal or a

misapprehension by the court of its discretion.

       Mr. Bell does not point to any evidence that the trial court categorically refused to

consider the theories of mitigation he advanced, or that it misapprehended its discretion.

The court’s decision denying an exceptional sentence reveals that it was complying with

RCW 9.94A.535’s requirement that to impose a sentence outside the standard range, it

must “find[ ], considering the purpose of [the SRA], that there are substantial and

compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” The court explained:

       That body camera was some of the most horrific images I’ve ever seen. I
       appreciated the fact that you demonstrated remorse. And I actually believe
       it was genuine, as opposed to playing up to the jury, because it is so
       disturbing to watch.
              ....

                                             26
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

             . . . As it relates to the request for a downward, the aging out of
      criminal behavior, unfortunately, the past speaks for what you’ve done.
      And most folks age out before they’re 55. They’re not doing this when
      they’re in their mid 50s. So that’s not a particularly compelling argument
      for me.
             With release motivating—potential for an early release motivating
      you for an opportunity to improve yourself, as I went through the prior
      convictions, they sort of graduated in severity instead of taking the
      advantage of being out and not committing further crimes. And probably
      a good example of that is why I respectfully disagree with you on the
      washing out of the juveniles, because you couldn’t go five consecutive
      years without being convicted of another crime. And that’s problematic.
             It’s also problematic that you were on probation at the time, because
      the whole point of probation is serving your sentence outside the prison
      walls, so to speak, even though it’s a misdemeanor, to help people so that
      they can stop—they can fix whatever’s going on that’s making them make
      bad choices.
             So I don’t think that any of the mitigating circumstances support a
      substantial or a compelling reason to justify an exceptional downward.
             ....
             And I agree that the criminal—excuse me, the court system, I
      believe Ms. Delcambre said it, it’s not just, especially for people of color.
      And you do have to kind of wonder what it would be like if that weren’t the
      case. So that’s factoring into my mind too.
              I’m also taking into account—because I’m sure—I believe you when
      you say you didn’t intend to do that. I don’t think you intended to try to kill
      her or cut off her hand. So I think that, when you’re sober, you probably
      are a really good guy who has a lot of potential. And I hope that you take
      advantage of that.
             Unfortunately, I get to see people at their worst. But I am taking
      into account that there is some potential for you, especially—in my box that
      I have to work with, it’s a very lengthy sentence. And I’m well aware of
      that. In taking into consideration your age, starting at—what I do is I look
      at the midpoint, which is 242 months, and then sort of say, Okay, are there
      things that go either way, up or down. One of the things that doesn’t go
      down for me is that there was evidence at trial that the ruckus, for lack of a

                                            27
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       better word, in the living room had ceased and that it was the coming back
       that did it. Sort of like whatever beef you had with Ms. Delcambre
       stopped, and then it was a light switch, and I believe “going ballistic” was
       the testimony.
              And I know Ms. George has been supportive of you, and I
       understand that, but I remember her testimony in particular when she talked
       about how you kept chopping. And certainly, the crime scene was
       consistent with that. So that sort of puts it out.
               And like I said, that was one of the most horrific body-worn cameras
       that I had seen. Frankly, I was surprised—I had no idea that Ms.
       Delcambre’s hand was able to be reconnected after looking at the pictures.
       So when she came in to testify, I was, frankly, kind of surprised that she
       had a hand there. So this was a horrific, horrific situation. So that moves it
       up from the midrange.
             So I am imposing 250 months with the 24 months of—based on the
       deadly weapon enhancement.
             And I know that you folks—there’s never enough time that’s going
       to make you whole or make you unsee what you saw, but I am taking into
       account your age. It’s a significant sentence for a significant crime.

2 RP at 470-74.

       Mr. Bell’s argument that the court’s finding that his reasons were not compelling

is a “categorical refusal” would make the denial of an exceptional sentence appealable in

every case. His arguments on appeal are foreclosed by RCW 9.94A.585(1).

V.     SUPPLEMENTALLY ASSIGNED ERROR TO VICTIM PENALTY ASSESSMENT

       Following the effective date of Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1169, which was

passed by the Washington Legislature in its 2023 regular session, Mr. Bell requested

leave to file a supplemental assignment of error to the sentencing court’s imposition of

the $500 victim penalty assessment provided by former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a). The bill

                                            28
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

adds a new subsection (4) to the statute, which provides, “The court shall not impose the

penalty assessment under this section if the court finds that the defendant, at the time of

sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).” LAWS OF 2023,

ch. 449, § 1. The record reflects that the sentencing court found Mr. Bell to be indigent.

He is entitled to the benefit of the change, which became effective while his case was

pending on appeal. State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 749, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). We

granted Mr. Bell leave to assign error to the assessment, and we will remand to the trial

court with directions to make the ministerial correction striking the assessment.

                      STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

       In a pro se statement of “additional grounds” (SAG), Mr. Bell raises four.

       SAG 1: Inferior Degree Instruction

       Mr. Bell’s jury was instructed on the inferior degree offense of second degree

assault.8 Citing State v. Coryell, 197 Wn.2d 397, 483 P.3d 98 (2020), and State v. Foster,

91 Wn.2d 466, 589 P.2d 789 (1979), Mr. Bell argues that “[w]hen a crime has been

proven against a person and there exist[s] a reasonable doubt as to which of the 2 or

more degrees he or she is guilty, he or she shall be convicted only of the lowest degree.”

SAG at 2. Those cases discuss when a defendant is entitled to an inferior degree

       8
         The court’s instructions defined second degree assault, identified its elements,
and told jurors, “The defendant is charged in Count II with first-degree assault. If, after
full and careful deliberation on this charge, you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty, then you will consider whether the defendant is guilty
of the lesser crime of second-degree assault.” 2 RP at 368 (Jury Instruction 24).

                                             29
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

instruction and the notice required to subject a defendant to conviction of an inferior

degree offense. See Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at 400 (“This case concerns the test to be

applied when determining whether to instruct the jury on a lesser included or lesser

degree offense.”); Foster, 91 Wn.2d at 471-73 (holding defendant had sufficient notice,

in light of the charging documents and jury instructions).

       Since Mr. Bell’s jury was instructed on second degree assault, his SAG argument

appears to be, in substance, an argument that substantial evidence does not support the

verdict that he was guilty of first degree assault. That argument was adequately

presented by Mr. Bell’s counsel, and we have rejected it. See RAP 10.10(a) (SAGs are to

be addressed to matters not adequately addressed by counsel’s brief).

       SAG 2: Violation of CrR 4.7

       Mr. Bell argues that CrR 4.7 was violated because he did not receive any

paperwork on his case until 30 days after the third omnibus hearing. “CrR 4.7 is a

reciprocal discovery rule that separately lists the prosecutor’s and defendant’s obligations

when engaging in discovery.” State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 826, 845 P.2d 1017

(1993). Under CrR 4.7, prosecutors have “a duty to disclose and to preserve evidence

that is material and favorable to the defendant.” Id. “If the State fails to disclose such

evidence or comply with a discovery order, a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair

trial may be violated; as a remedy, a trial court can grant a continuance, dismiss the

action, or enter another appropriate order.” State v. Barry, 184 Wn. App. 790, 796, 339

                                             30
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

P.3d 200 (2014). To support a motion to dismiss based on a discovery violation, a

defendant must show not only that the State failed to act with due diligence and withheld

material facts, but also that the discovery violation “‘essentially compelled the defendant

to choose between two distinct rights’: the right to a speedy trial and the right to

adequately prepared counsel.” Id. at 797 (quoting State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 583,

23 P.3d 1046 (2001)).

       While Mr. Bell is not required to reference the record in an SAG, he must “inform

the court of the nature and occurrence of alleged errors.” RAP 10.10(c). He does not;

nevertheless, we identified two points in the record where Mr. Bell complained to the

court about delayed discovery. In December 2019, he complained about not receiving

discovery from his attorney, who he was asking the court to replace:

              THE DEFENDANT: . . . Well, I haven’t received no discovery,
       no—none of my paperwork’s—since I been here nine months, I haven’t
       received no police reports, no discovery, no kind of papers from them, even
       to come at me with any kind of offer. And I just feel that I need a new
       attorney to represent me.
               [THE STATE]: And, Your Honor, for clarification, I did sign off on
       an agreed order for—to provide redacted police reports to Mr. Bell. That
       was at Mr. Zeller’s request. Mr. Poston, I think, had initially asked for that,
       but then he left the public defender’s office and the case had to be
       reassigned. So that should be provided to Mr. Bell with the proper order
       that says that he can’t, you know, take back to his cell and whatnot. And
       we have made an offer to Mr. Zeller. Mr. Poston and I didn’t even get that
       far as far as negotiation.

                                             31
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

2 RP at 8-9. Five months later, and well more than a year before his October 2021 trial,

Mr. Bell presented another motion to replace his counsel and repeated similar discovery

grievances:

               THE DEFENDANT: I’m here today to exercise my constitutional
       rights to address the Court regarding this injustice inflicted upon me during
       these judicial proceedings. Time after time I have been stonewalled in my
       attempts to be involved in my case. I have been denied proper access to the
       last evidence against me and adequate counsel to represent me.
              ....
               On November—on November 22nd my attorney tried to persuade
       me to take a plea offer because the prosecutor gave me a two-week
       deadline. My last omnibus hearing was on 10/25/2019, trial readiness call
       on November 4th, 2019. I have not received a police report, affidavit of
       facts, bill of particular, or discovery. I got a speedy note on December 4th
       of 2019 saying I would be getting ready active police report. That’s a
       violation of my Criminal Rule 4.7 discovery and a violation of my
       constitutional rights to a fair trial. Conflict of interest, effective
       assistance—ineffective assistance by counsel, refusal to help me correct my
       offender score history because I pointed out in my juvenile records, 1984, I
       have been walking through it, he won’t correct it. And I’m—I’ve been
       asking him to fix it. . . .
              ....
              MR. ZELLER: . . . We got Mr. Bell’s police reports that he
       requested, I believe, in December of 2019. There’s a protective order on
       them, but they should be at the jail for him to access if he needs those.

3 RP at 4-6, 9.

       Nevertheless, we find no evidence that Mr. Bell ever filed a motion seeking a

remedy for an alleged violation of CrR 4.7, and he fails to identify resulting prejudice.

Any issue is unpreserved. RAP 2.5(a).

                                             32
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

       SAG 3: Prosecutorial Misconduct

       Mr. Bell next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by trying to force

a plea deal in October 2019 and that its amendment of the information in February 2020

to add the attempted first degree murder charge was “improper,” as “[o]vercharging.”

SAG at 4-6.

       The history and nature of plea negotiations is not reflected in the record. If Mr.

Bell has evidence to support a tenable claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct in

making the plea offer, his remedy is to seek relief by a personal restraint petition. See

State v. Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 27-28, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991).

       As for the amendment to the information, under CrR 2.1(d), “[t]he court may

permit any information or bill of particulars to be amended at any time before verdict or

finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” It is not evident if Mr.

Bell ever argued that his substantial rights were prejudiced when the amendment was

made. As for overcharging, we note that at least some of the jurors were prepared to find

Mr. Bell guilty of the attempted murder charge.

       We decline review because the nature and occurrence of the alleged errors are not

clearly identified. RAP 10.10(c).

       SAG 4: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Finally, Mr. Bell claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on four

occasions: (1) when counsel refused to argue wash-out for his juvenile convictions and

                                             33
No. 38671-6-III
State v. Bell

tried to persuade him to enter a plea agreement, (2) when counsel failed to provide

discovery in a timely manner, (3) when counsel “refuse[d] to work with me” at a trial

readiness hearing, and, (4) when counsel told him to “be quiet and let the prosecutor

amend an improper amendment.” SAG at 4, 7-8. The claim of ineffective assistance is

based on factual allegations outside the record. If Mr. Bell has evidence to support his

allegations, and can demonstrate the required prejudice, he may seek relief by a personal

restraint petition. See Norman, 61 Wn. App. at 27-28.

       Mr. Bell’s judgment and sentence are affirmed, with the exception of the

assessment of the $500 victim penalty assessment. We remand to the trial court with

directions to make the ministerial correction striking the assessment.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                                 Siddoway, J.P.T.
WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.                          Pennell, J.

                                            34