Court Opinion

ID: 9596576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:21.458641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:19.559290
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree that the evidence in this case would have authorized a finding that Ms. Greer possessed the requisite testamentary capacity when she executed a will in September of 1997. However, the jury found that she lacked such capacity, and we must decide whether the evidence supports that finding. I submit that, when the evidence is construed most strongly in support of the jury’s verdict in favor of the *495Caveators, it authorized the finding that Ms. Greer did not have sufficient intellect to enable her to make a decided and rational determination concerning the disposition of her estate. Therefore, I dissent to the affirmance of the trial court’s grant of the Propounder’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
When considering the grant of a motion for judgment n.o.v., “[t]he appellate standard of review ... is whether the evidence, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demanded a verdict contrary to that returned by the factfinder. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Bagley v. Robertson, 265 Ga. 144, 145 (454 SE2d 478) (1995).
A judgment n.o.v. ... is authorized when there can be only one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment; if there is any evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, viewing the evidence most favorably to the party who secured the verdict, it is . . . error to [grant] the motion. [Cit.]
Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 516 (1) (597 SE2d 571) (2004). The fact that Ms. Greer was elderly, sickly, eccentric or forgetful does not authorize a finding that she lacked the necessary testamentary capacity to make a valid will. See Irvin v. Askew, 241 Ga. 565, 566 (1) (246 SE2d 682) (1978); Brumbelow v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247, 255 (4) (29 SE2d 42) (1944). However, evidence that, as the result of her age or health, her mental condition had deteriorated to the extent that she was unable to form a decided and rational desire regarding the disposition of her property will authorize a finding that the instrument she executed is invalid. See Stanley v. Stanley, 211 Ga. 798 (596 SE2d 138) (2004) (will invalid where testator suffered from “severe dementia”); Horton v. Horton, 268 Ga. 846 (1) (492 SE2d 872) (1997) (will invalid where testatrix suffered from “underlying dementia”).
“Evidence of incapacity at a reasonable time prior to and subsequent to a will’s execution creates an issue of fact as to capacity at the time of execution. [Cit.]” Sullivan v. Sullivan, 273 Ga. 130, 131 (1) (539 SE2d 120) (2000). Because the jury found that Ms. Greer lacked testamentary capacity, “[o]nly the testimony favorable to [the] Caveator [s] need be considered, because the sole question before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. [Cit.]” Horton v. Horton, supra at 847 (1). Here, the Caveators presented expert medical opinion testimony showing that, at the time Ms. Greer executed the will, “she was in some form of the early to middle stages of a dementia of the Alzheimer’s type.” A year earlier, her own physician had expressed his belief that she exhibited “senile dementia ...” In January of 1998, a petition was filed which alleged *496that Ms. Greer was an “incapacitated” adult and sought the appointment of a guardian. This petition for guardianship was supported by the affidavit of her doctor, who stated his opinion that she had “dementia — Alzheimer’s type,” that she suffered from “poor memory, poor judgment, [was] difficult to reason with,” and that she was “incapacitated on a permanent basis.” The physician’s affidavit also indicated that Ms. Greer was in present need of a guardian for both her person and her property. With regard to the guardianship of her person, the doctor noted that she “lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make significant responsible decisions concerning... her person or is incapable of communicating such decisions.” As for the guardianship of her property, the physician indicated that she was “incapable of managing . .. her estate, and [her] property . .. will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided____” The Caveator’s expert testified that, if, as Ms. Greer’s own doctor expressed in his affidavit, she was
having profound problems in one month where [she] would be considered incapacitated or needing a guardian then you would be able to go backwards for a number of months, probably up to a year or two, at least, and say that [she] was having some sort of problem with [her] thinking.
It was only four months between the time she signed the instrument tendered for admission into probate and the petition alleging that she was “permanently incapacitated” due to “dementia” based upon Alzheimer’s disease.
In addition to the expert medical opinion evidence showing that Ms. Greer suffered from dementia attributable to Alzheimer’s disease shortly before, during and shortly after the time she executed the will, the Caveators introduced evidence which was indicative of the extent to which her mental acuity had been impaired. She had an irrational fear that her home was being flooded. She even refused to get into the bathtub, and insisted on sponge baths. Visitors to her home
couldn’t flush the commode, couldn’t really run the water in her kitchen sink .... [S] he had a phobia of water and when you went to [visit her] you dare not go in the commode, use the bathroom, you didn’t cut on the water to get a drink of water or anything so you just had to sit.
There was additional evidence showing that in mid-December of 1997, only three months after executing the will, Ms. Greer was disoriented as to time and, believing that it was March, she was *497unaware that Christmas was imminent. She did not know her own social security number. She had a list of first names and telephone numbers, but could not provide last names for any of those on that list. As the majority notes, she called the fire department to report a non-existent fire.
Decided June 6, 2005
Reconsideration denied June 30, 2005.
Moulton & Tarrer, Jeremy A. Moulton, for appellants.
Henry D. Frantz, Jr., for appellee.
“[A] court must allow the issue of testamentary capacity to go to the jury when there is a genuine conflict in the evidence regarding the testator’s state of mind. [Cit.]” Murchison v. Smith, 270 Ga. 169, 172 (508 SE2d 641) (1998). Here, the
testimony introduced by [C]aveators covering a reasonable period of time before and after the time of the execution of the will constitute [s] a genuine conflict in the evidence regarding the state of the testatfrix’s] mind on the date [s]he signed the will from which inferences could be drawn by a jury establishing a lack of the requisite mental capacity. [Cits.]
Mallis v. Miltiades, 241 Ga. 404, 405 (245 SE2d 655) (1978). While no single element of the Caveators’ proof, standing alone, might otherwise be a sufficient predicate for invalidating Ms. Greer’s will, when the totality of the evidence as to her mental condition during the relevant time period is considered, a jury certainly would be authorized to find that she suffered from serious dementia. If the evidence supports such a finding, then the jury was authorized to return a verdict holding that she lacked the requisite testamentary capacity. See Stanley v. Stanley, supra; Horton v. Horton, supra. Since the evidence supports the jury’s verdict in favor of the Caveators, the trial court erred in granting the Propounder’s motion for judgment n.o.v.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Hines join this dissent.