Court Opinion

ID: 9477538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:25:33.482659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:55.438397
License: Public Domain

RYAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
It is a wise and settled rule of law that a trial court’s findings of fact, especially those resting in substantial part upon the credibility of witnesses, are not to be disturbed on appeal unless “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting *126United States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)).
The review of bench tried litigation in particular challenges the reviewing court to discipline itself to defer to the trial court’s factual findings because such findings often rest largely upon matters of circumstantial evidence — not uncomjnonly, inferences drawn from sometimes vague or ambiguous testimonial assertions in the direct evidence. The trial court must, in such cases, sort through inferences of sexual or racial animus that are of a piece with ostensible business judgment decisions. It is frequently difficult for a trial court fact finder to distinguish between an employer’s judgment call to terminate the marginal employee for purely business reasons, and a judgment to do so for business reasons subtly poisoned by motivations of a sexual or racial nature. When such a case is under review — and this is one — special care must be taken to avoid the substitution of appellate assessment of witness credibility for trial court assessment.
I am not convinced, upon review of the record, that Ms. Few was terminated because she is black or because she is a woman. There is an abundance of evidence that despite her best efforts and unquestioned dedication to her responsibilities, complicated, it appears, by the counterproductive efforts of another employee, she was never able to perform her duties for any extended period of time above a range of performance characterized by her evaluators as “poor to fair” through “performance improvement needed” to “showing improvement” and “performing at about average levels.” There is certainly no direct evidence in this record that Ms. Few was terminated because of her race and sex rather than because of her sub-par to marginally acceptable performance. However, in his carefully drafted opinion, the trial court has detailed a number of matters of circumstantial evidence that appear to have convinced that court that the decision to fire Ms. Few was driven, in part, by racial and sexual considerations. While I do not see the matter as he did, I cannot say that the learned trial judge, whose perception of the witnesses and opportunity to assess their candor, demeanor, and persuasiveness was far superior to mine, was clearly erroneous in reaching the decision he has.
For that reason, alone, I concur in the judgment.