Court Opinion

ID: 9540534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:17:12.220825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:57.462673
License: Public Domain

Gordon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with everything said in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Carrico. My additional words go to the Rudee Inlet Authority’s power to conduct various business operations in competition with private enterprise.
The act creates the Authority by these words: “There is hereby created a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, with such public and corporate powers as are granted in this act, to be known as the Rudee Inlet Authority . . .” (§ 1). Tire powers granted to the Authority under § 6 of the act are powers that may be possessed by any private corporation, with one exception: the power of eminent domain granted under § 6(c) of the act.(1) The purposes of the Authority are nowhere described in the act. So no restriction of the Authority’s powers was accomplished by the words “necessary for its purposes”, running through § 6 of the act — if, indeed, any restriction was intended.
The majority concludes that the power to construct and operate facilities for watercraft “serve [s] to define the character of its [the Authority’s] uses”, and “[a]s so defined these uses are . . . for the use, accommodation and convenience of the public.” I disagree, for reasons given in Mr. Justice Carrico’s opinion. Furthermore, the range of the Authority’s permissible activities is much broader than the construction and operation of facilities for watercraft.
*916The Authority alleged in its petition “[t]he property to be taken in this proceeding is necessary for the construction, improvement, extension, maintenance and operation” of watercraft facilities and motels. The majority affirms the dismissal of the petition, but only because of the Authority’s power to sell or lease the property after acquiring it. The majority finds no constitutional prohibition against the Authority’s engaging in the business of operating a motel.
All powers conferred upon the Authority by the act may be exercised within an area in the borough of Virginia Beach beginning at the ocean front and comprising approximately twelve square miles (§ 2). With powers like those possessed by any corporation organized for profit, the Authority can compete with an indeterminate number of persons engaged in private business within that area and in adjoining areas. As is apparent from a reading of § 6 of the act, the Authority’s activities are not restricted to the operation of facilities for watercraft — the public purpose inferred by the majority — or to operations reasonably incident thereto.(2)
In my opinion, the act violates § 185 of the Constitution of Virginia because it permits “the State [to] become a party to or become interested in . . . [a] work of internal improvement . . .” This opinion is not contrary to that expressed in Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 764, 107 S.E.2d 594 (1959). We held § 185 inapplicable to the Virginia State Ports Authority because the act creating that Authority dedicated it to governmental functions. What has been said in these concurring and dissenting opinions should be sufficient to explain why I believe the Rudee Inlet Authority is not so dedicated.

(1) By comparing § 6 of the act with Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-3 (Repl. vol. 1964), we see that, apart from the power of eminent domain, the powers granted to the Authority are powers granted by general law to each stock corporation of Virginia, except that the powers granted under clauses (d) through (g) of § 6 are not specifically described in Code § 13.1-3. Those specific powers are appropriate, however, for exercise by a private corporation, particularly a corporation that operates a marina.

(2) For example, there is no restriction upon the type of facility that may be constructed by the Authority pursuant to the power granted under § 6 (f) “To construct for sale or lease, on such terms and conditions as it may deem proper, facilities and approaches to and appurtenances thereof.” A “facility” has been defined as “something that promotes the case of any action, operation, transaction, or course of conduct — usu. used in pi. (excellent facilities for graduate study)” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 812).