Court Opinion

ID: 9572843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:45:05.009676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:28.222539
License: Public Domain

Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON
dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority erroneously elevates form over substance in casting the dispositive issue in this case as the subsequently determined legal status of the aunt instead of the contemporaneous state of mind of the juvenile and police officers during interrogation, I respectfully dissent.
*557Our legislature has provided that “[a]ny juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning . . . [t]hat the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 (2005). Juveniles are awarded special consideration in light of their youth and limited life experiences. In re Stallings, 318 N.C. 565, 576, 350 S.E.2d 327, 333 (1986) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“Our criminal justice system recognizes that their immaturity and vulnerability sometimes warrant protections well beyond those afforded adults. It is primarily for that reason that a separate juvenile code with separate juvenile procedures exists.”).
This is why our courts have consistently recognized that “ ‘[t]he [S]tate has a greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.’ ” In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 575, 614 S.E.2d 296, 299 (2005) (“quoting State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 24, 305 S.E.2d 685, 699 (1983) (Harry Martin, J., concurring) (alterations in original)); see also In re Meyers, 25 N.C. App. 555, 558, 214 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1975) (stating that in a juvenile proceeding, unlike an ordinary criminal proceeding, the burden upon the State to see that a juvenile’s rights are protected is increased rather than decreased). Though not paramount, age is an important factor in assessing the possible violation of constitutional or statutory rights. See id. (“Although a confession is not inadmissible merely because the person making it is a minor, to be admissible it must have been voluntary, and the age of the person confessing is an additional factor to be considered in determining voluntariness.’’(internal citation omitted)).
“Once a juvenile defendant has requested the presence of a parent, or any one of the parties listed in the statute, defendant may not be interrogated further ‘until [counsel, parent, guardian, or custodian] has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ ” State v. Branham, 153 N.C. App. 91, 95, 569 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2002) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1406, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631, 636 (1986) (alterations in original)). In the past, our appellate courts have held that contravention of these juvenile rights is akin to Miranda violations. State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 106, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001). In Smith, we applied the rule requiring all interrogation to cease when an adult defendant requests an attorney to a juvenile who requests an attorney, parent, guardian, or custodian. Id; see also State v. Hunt, 64 N.C. *558App. 81, 86, 306 S.E.2d 846, 850 (holding that juvenile defendant’s Miranda rights were violated when the police continued to interrogate him after he requested that his parents be present), disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 824, 310 S.E.2d 354 (1983). The burden rests on the State to show the juvenile defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of such Miranda rights. State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 666, 477 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1996) (citing State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 367, 334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1985)).
In evaluating whether such a waiver was knowing and intelligent, we consider the relevant state of mind of reasonable actors during the situation, and not with the benefit of hindsight. See State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 410, 290 S.E.2d 574, 580-81 (1982) (describing the test for determining whether someone is in police custody as whether a “reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe that he had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action was deprived in any significant way” (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980))). Seen in this light, the detectives had no way of knowing the legal status of the juvenile’s aunt at the time of the taped confession.
It is telling that even appellate courts have not always construed the statute as narrowly as the majority seems to indicate is required. In a case in which the shoe was on the other foot and the State sought to have an aunt recognized as complying with this statute in an analogous situation, the Court of Appeals held that an aunt constituted a guardian for the purpose of admitting a defendant’s confession, even though she did not fall into any of the statute’s enumerated categories. State v. Jones, 147 N.C. App. 527, 539-40, 556 S.E.2d 644, 652 (2001) (finding aunt was guardian “within the spirit and meaning of the Juvenile Code,” even though she did not meet the legal definition set therein or fit into the enumerated categories), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 355 N.C. 351, 562 S.E.2d 427 (2002).
From a policy perspective, we have long held that whether evidence is admitted or excluded under Miranda depends on whether exclusion of the evidence would deter improper conduct by law enforcement. State v. May, 334 N.C. 609, 613, 434 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198, 114 S. Ct. 1310, 127 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1994). The majority’s holding effectively discourages police officers from complying with the strictures of the Juvenile Code. Since it is uncontested that (a) the juvenile’s confession in this case would be inadmissible if the individual requested had fallen into the requisite *559category, and (b) the detectives were not aware of the aunt’s precise legal status when they chose to press ahead in their interrogation, policy considerations also favor excluding the taped confession. Therefore, I would hold the confession inadmissible.2
A test centering on the circumstances of the aunt as known to the detectives during the interrogation, rather than following a subsequent legal determination, fits in better with the structure and stated objectives of the Juvenile Code.3 Such a test is more aptly geared to our oft-stated maxim that the burden of proof to show that the juvenile made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights lies with the State. Miller, 344 N.C. at 666, 477 S.E.2d at 920. Taking the majority’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, police could decline a defendant’s request for counsel and still use his subsequent statements as evidence if the requested attorney turned out to have unrelated professional licensing problems such as a shortfall in CLE credits or delinquency in Bar dues. Such a scenario would be self-evidently problematic. Yet I believe it is analytically indistinguishable from the majority’s current holding.
Since I believe the majority erroneously shifts the pivotal test from the contemporaneous knowledge of the police officers to the subsequently ascertained legal status of the aunt, I cannot agree with the majority’s reasoning as currently stated, and respectfully dissent.

. The majority’s holding is likely to have wider repercussions because of the large number of North Carolina minors in nontraditional households. See Child Welfare League of Am., North Carolina's Children in 2007, available at http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/statefactsheets/2007/northcarolina.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2007) (21.7% of the 10,077 children in North Carolina not in parental custody on 30 September 2004 resided with relatives.)

. The need for special protection is wellfounded since at least two empirical studies show that “the vast majority of juveniles are simply incapable of understanding their Miranda rights and the meaning of waiving those rights.” Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-Incrimination Privilege in the Juvenile Courts, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1035, 1050-51 (1999).