Court Opinion

ID: 9758933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:56:25.195367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:40.880670
License: Public Domain

*1199WAGNER, Chief Judge,
concurring in pai't and dissenting in part:
The majority concludes that AARP is exempt from coverage of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA)1 solely because it is a nonprofit corporation. With this aspect of the court’s opinion, I disagree. The language of the CPPA does not exclude nonprofit corporations from its coverage. Coverage under the Act depends on the status of the organization as a merchant and the nature of its trade practices, not whether its chai’ter designation is profit or nonprofit. The term “merchant” is defined broadly in the statute as
a person who does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods or services, or a person who does or would supply the goods or services which are or would be the subject matter of a trade practice[.]
D.C.Code § 28 — 3901Ca)(3). A “person” includes, among others, a corporation “or any other organization, legal entity, or group of individuals however organized.” D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(1). Thus, this broad definition does not exclude nonprofit corporations, but includes corporations generally without any modifier.
This court did not hold otherwise in Save Immaculata/Dunblane, Inc. v. Immaculata Prep. Sch., 514 A.2d 1152 (D.C.1986). In Save Immaculata/Dunblane, this court recognized that to recover under the CPPA, “it must be established that the [corporation] acted in the capacity of ‘merchants’ in operating the Immaculata and Dunblane schools.” 514 A.2d at 1159. Although in granting summary judgment the court held that the plaintiffs claim failed under the CPPA because “a non-profit educational institution is not a ‘merchant’ within the context of the [Act],” nothing in the opinion suggests that it was intended to interpret the statute to exclude all non profits, whatever their nature or trade practices. Moreover, the court acted upon a motion for summary judgment in Save Immaculata/Dunblane, and the opinion does not disclose what undisputed facts led to the result reached.
In the case now before the court, we consider dismissal of a complaint under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Schiff, as we must, it does not appear beyond doubt that he can prove no facts which would entitle him to relief. See Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104, 1105 (D.C.1993). Schiff alleged in his complaint that AARP, although purportedly a nonprofit corporation, sold insurance to its members for which it earned substantial commissions from the insurance company, realizing substantial profits. We have held previously that automobile liability insurance is among the type of goods and services covered by the CPPA. Atwater v. Department of Consumer & Reg. Affairs, 566 A.2d 462, 467 (D.C.1989). We have also observed that where “the purchaser is not engaged in the regular business of purchasing [the] type of goods or service and reselling it, then the transaction will usually fall within the [CPPA].” Weschler & Son, Inc. v. Klank, 561 A.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C.1989). The allegations of the complaint seem to place AARP in that category. The CPPA was “ ‘designed to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant relationships.’ ” Save Immaculata, supra, 514 A.2d at 1159 (citing Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C.1989). It would be contrary to the Act’s broad purpose to hold that all nonprofit corporations are exempted from its coverage even if they act as merchants and engage in prohibited trade practices. See Miller v. Risk Management Found., 36 Mass.App.Ct. 411, 632 N.E.2d 841, 845 (1994) (nominally charitable organization does not escape reach of consumer protection laws where, in fact, performing in a business way).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion of the court which so holds. I join the majority opinion in all other respects.

. D.C.Code §§ 28-3901 to 28-3908 (1996).