Court Opinion

ID: 9379909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 17:08:18.309426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.539383
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-808.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            Nos. 111606 and 111612
                 v.                                :

ANTHONY JOHNSON,                                   :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 16, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                Case Nos. CR-00-397780-ZA and CR-00-400550-ZA

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Gregory J. Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Ohio Innocence Project, University of Cincinnati College
                 of Law, Jennifer Paschen Bergeron and Mark Godsey, for
                 appellant.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                Defendant-appellant Anthony Johnson appeals the trial court’s denial

of his motion for a new trial. After a thorough review of the law and the facts, we

affirm.
Procedural History and Facts

             In 2001, Johnson was convicted in a bench trial of multiple offenses

involving four separate cases consolidated for trial. For purposes of this appeal, we

are concerned with two cases, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-00-397780-ZA (“court

reporting school robbery”) and Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-00-400550-ZA (“parking

garage robbery”). In the court reporting school robbery, Johnson was convicted of

two counts of kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery. In the parking

garage robbery, he was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery and one count

of kidnapping; both counts had notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender

specifications. The trial court sentenced Johnson to a total of 27 years in prison,

18 years of which were for the two cases at issue in this appeal. 1

             The following facts were adduced at Johnson’s bench trial; many are

summarized from Johnson’s direct appeal, State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 79831, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1616 (Apr. 11, 2002) (“Johnson I”).

             In the fall of 2000, Cleveland police were investigating a string of

robberies in downtown Cleveland. Two of the suspects developed by police were

Johnson and Frederick Norman (“Norman”). Norman was subsequently arrested

and convicted of several robberies.       At trial, Johnson claimed that Norman

committed the crimes for which he was on trial. In the years after his conviction,

      1    Johnson was also convicted of one count of possession of drugs
(Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-00-398577-A); one count each of robbery, kidnapping, gross
sexual imposition, and receiving stolen property (Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-00-399616-ZA).
In a fifth case, Johnson pleaded guilty to escape (Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-01-401332-ZA).
Norman submitted eight affidavits and other letters stating that it was him, not

Johnson, who committed the parking garage and court reporting school robberies.2

Parking Garage Robbery

             In the early evening hours of September 15, 2000, friends R.S. and B.B.

were at B.B.’s car after a birthday celebration. B.B. was bent over putting balloons

in the car and stood up to see a man wearing a green windbreaker-type jacket

holding a knife to R.S.’s throat. B.B. saw a second man approach, screamed, and

ran; the second man chased her.         Near the entrance to the parking garage,

B.B. tripped and fell, but the men fled after the knife-wielding man yelled, “We got

the money. Let’s go, man.”

             B.B. and R.S. reported the incident to police. Approximately ten days

later, B.B. viewed a photo array and identified Johnson as the man who attacked

R.S. B.B. also positively identified Johnson in court. According to R.S., the knife-

wielding man demanded her purse. She did not get a good look at him but reported

he was an African-American male wearing a green windbreaker. R.S. said the

second man was wearing a yellow polo shirt. R.S.’s purse, minus her money, was

      2 In March 2003, Cleveland police were contacted by the Cuyahoga County
Prosecutor’s Office, who had secured an affidavit from Norman confessing to the parking
garage robbery. Norman was subsequently charged with two counts of aggravated
robbery and kidnapping with specifications. In 2015, Norman pleaded guilty to one
amended count of aggravated theft and was sentenced to six months in prison to run
concurrent with his other cases. See State v. Norman, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-03-436751-
ZA.
recovered in a nearby alley later that evening. R.S. was unable to identify her

attacker but did identify the green windbreaker he was wearing.

Court Reporting School Robbery

            In the afternoon hours of October 9, 2000, three friends, S.B., H.P., and

B.C., were looking for something in H.P.’s car, which was parked in an alley, after

finishing class at the Academy of Court Reporting in downtown Cleveland. A man

wearing a green windbreaker came up behind S.B. and told her to get into the car.

S.B. initially refused but then saw the man had a knife, so she complied. He forced

the three women in the car.

             The assailant instructed H.P. to drive to the vicinity of Cedar Avenue

and East 30th Street. He told B.C. to hand over her purse, which she did. The man

also took S.B.’s purse, which contained $200, before getting out of the car.

             The women returned to the school and called police. S.B. viewed a

photographic array but was unable to identify a suspect. The day after the robbery,

S.B. viewed an in-person lineup, at which time she identified Johnson as the man

who kidnapped and robbed them. S.B. also identified Johnson in court.

              B.C. testified that the man who attacked them was very dark-skinned,

and that she looked at his face when he first approached the car, while they were

driving, and as he got out of the car. H.P. testified she looked at the man in the rear

view mirror several times while she was driving. At trial, the victims identified a hat

and a windbreaker as belonging to the man that robbed them.
             B.C. and H.P. separately viewed photo arrays at the police station the

same day as the robbery and both chose Johnson as the man who had robbed them.

B.C. and H.P. also separately viewed Johnson in an in-person lineup and identified

him. Both women identified Johnson in court.

Direct Appeal – Johnson I

             Johnson filed a direct appeal, challenging police identification

procedures, the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence, and the consecutive

nature of his sentence. This court affirmed his convictions but reversed in part and

remanded the case for resentencing. Johnson I.

              On March 6, 2002, Johnson filed a petition for postconviction relief,

which he later withdrew. On May 14, 2002, Johnson filed a motion for DNA testing

along with an affidavit from Norman, dated May 10, 2002, in which Norman stated

he alone committed the court reporting school robbery and that he had discarded

some clothing and a hat immediately following the robbery. The trial court denied

Johnson’s motion without a hearing. Johnson did not appeal that order.

Motion for a New Trial – Johnson II

             On October 1, 2002, Johnson filed a motion for new trial. In support

of his motion, Johnson attached a second affidavit from Norman, this one dated

August 14, 2002. In his affidavit, Norman averred he alone committed the parking

garage robbery. The trial court denied Johnson’s motion for new trial without a

hearing and Johnson appealed. This court affirmed, holding the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion for new trial without a hearing. In
reaching this decision, this court found that Norman’s affidavit did not disclose a

strong probability that the result would change if a new trial was granted. State v.

Johnson, 155 Ohio App.3d 145, 2003-Ohio-5637, 799 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.)

(“Johnson II”).

DNA testing and Johnson III

              On October 21, 2004, Johnson filed a pro se motion for DNA testing,

attaching two more affidavits from Norman: an affidavit dated November 6, 2002,

in which he stated he committed the “crimes for which Anthony Johnson was

convicted” and an affidavit dated December 27, 2002, in which Norman stated that

he would be willing to provide DNA samples. On October 29, 2004, the trial court

denied Johnson’s application for DNA testing without a hearing. Johnson did not

appeal.

              On February 8, 2013, after securing representation from the Ohio

Innocence Project, Johnson filed a third application for DNA testing. The state

opposed Johnson’s application, and the trial court denied the application without a

hearing, finding that it failed to satisfy statutory requirements and testing would not

be outcome determinative. On appeal, this court reversed the judgment of the trial

court and remanded the case, finding that DNA testing would be outcome

determinative.    State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-2646, 14 N.E.3d 482 (8th Dist.)

(“Johnson III”). A panel of this court reasoned:

      The case for which Johnson is requesting the DNA testing only
      concerned the robbery on October 9, 2000 [court reporting school
      robbery]. In that case, the victims testified that there was only one
      perpetrator and described the clothing he wore, which was later
      recovered. We understand that the victims picked Johnson out of a live
      line up and photo array, however, if his DNA is not on the clothing but
      Norman’s is, this would make the victims’ identification suspect,
      especially because Norman has confessed to committing this
      robbery.[3]

      Thus, we conclude that the DNA testing would be outcome
      determinative. If Norman’s DNA is located on the hat and jacket but
      Johnson’s DNA is not found on the hat and jacket, the DNA evidence
      along with Norman’s confession, would point to Norman as the
      perpetrator of the crime.

Id. at ¶ 25-26.

              The case was remanded, but the evidence that was to be sent for DNA

testing could not be located after a thorough investigation and evidentiary hearing

involving the Cuyahoga County’s Prosecutor’s Office, Clerk of Courts, Court

Reporter’s Office, Cleveland Police, and defense counsel.

Motion for Leave to File a Motion for New Trial – Johnson IV

              In July 2020, Johnson filed a motion for leave to file a motion for new

trial based on newly discovered evidence.         Johnson claimed that Norman’s

affidavits, an affidavit from Charles Goodsell, Ph.D. (Johnson’s proposed expert in

eyewitness testimony), and documentary materials concerning the lack of biological

evidence for DNA testing, constituted newly discovered evidence. The state opposed

the motion. The trial court denied Johnson’s motion for leave without a hearing,

and he appealed the decision.

      3 Each of the three victims also identified Johnson in court, “unequivocally and
without hesitation, as the person who had committed the crimes.” Johnson I at 19.
               This court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that Johnson

should have been granted leave to file a motion for new trial. State v. Johnson,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110163 and 110228, 2022-Ohio-523 (“Johnson IV”). In

deciding that the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s motion for leave, this court

focused on the unique circumstances of this case. Id. at ¶ 35. This court determined

that res judicata did not bar a successive motion for a new trial because, although

Johnson’s theory of the case was not new, he had not been afforded the opportunity

to present testimony from Norman or Goodsell to determine whether a new trial was

warranted:

       While the whereabouts of the missing evidence was thoroughly
       litigated — to no avail — at the trial court, the substance of Johnson’s
       argument that he is entitled to a new trial based on Norman’s
       confession as the perpetrator of his crimes has not been litigated.
       Therefore, Johnson’s motion for leave is not barred by res judicata.

Id. at ¶ 39.

               This court clarified that its decision was limited to the narrow issue of

whether Johnson should have been granted leave to file a motion for a new trial. Id.

               On February 8, 2022, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion for

leave to file a motion for new trial. On March 7, 2022, Johnson filed his motion for

new trial based on newly discovered evidence, attaching the same evidence he had

submitted in his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. The state opposed

his motion.

               The trial court denied Johnson’s motion for a new trial without a

hearing. This timely appeal followed.
Assignments of Error

      I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
      for new trial.

      II. The trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial without
      an evidentiary hearing where the paper filings are credible and
      exonerate appellant.

              We combine the assignments of error for review and disposition.

Law and Analysis

Motion for New Trial

              This court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of

discretion. State v. McFarland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111390, 2022-Ohio-4638,

¶ 20, citing State v. Sutton, 2016-Ohio-7612, 73 N.E.3d 981 (8th Dist.). An abuse of

discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way

regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah,

166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. In other words, “[a]

court abuses its discretion when a legal rule entrusts a decision to a judge’s

discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside of the legally

permissible range of choices.” State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-

6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 19.

              Recently, this court reiterated that an abuse of discretion may be

found where a trial court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct

legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” McFarland at id.,

citing Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d
454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). Importantly, when applying the abuse of discretion standard,

a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

McFarland at ¶ 21, citing Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716,

¶ 22 (8th Dist).

              Crim.R. 33(B) provides that when a defendant wishes to file motion

for new trial based on newly discovered evidence more than 120 days after a verdict

is rendered, they must seek leave from the trial court to file a delayed

motion. State v. Hale, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107782, 2019-Ohio-1890, ¶ 9. To

obtain leave, the defendant must show clear and convincing proof that they were

unavoidably prevented from filing their motion for a new trial. Crim.R. 33(B). A

person is unavoidably prevented from filing a motion for a new trial if the person

“had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting the motion * * * and

could not have learned of the existence of that ground within the time prescribed for

filing the motion * * * in the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Hale at id.,

citing State v. Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141, 145-146, 483 N.E.2d 859

(10th Dist.1984).

              In Johnson IV, a divided panel of this court found the state’s argument

that Johnson failed to show he was unavoidably prevented from timely filing his

motion for a new trial “unpersuasive” because it “ignore[d] the tortured procedural

and factual history that has brought us to this point.” Id. at ¶ 37. We are bound by

Johnson IV; therefore, Johnson has shown that he was unavoidably delayed in filing

his motion for a new trial.
               In addition to finding that Johnson was unavoidably prevented from

timely filing his motion, Johnson must also show that he is entitled to the new trial.

Johnson claims that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence

as set forth in Crim.R. 33(A)(6), which provides that a new trial may be granted

      [w]hen new evidence material to the defense is discovered, which the
      defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
      produced at the trial. When a motion for a new trial is made upon the
      grounds of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must produce at
      the hearing on the motion, in support thereof, the affidavits of the
      witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, and if time is
      required by the defendant to procure such affidavits, the court may
      postpone the hearing of the motion for such length of time as is
      reasonable under all the circumstances of the case. The prosecuting
      attorney may produce affidavits or other evidence to impeach the
      affidavits of such witnesses.

               To grant a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,

it must be shown that the new evidence (1) discloses a strong probability that it will

change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3)

is such as could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the

trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former evidence,

and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence. State v. Petro,

148 Ohio St. 505, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), syllabus.

Res Judicata does not Apply; no Hearing on Motion is Mandated

               As an initial matter, we dispense with the state’s argument that res

judicata bars Johnson’s arguments.4 In Johnson IV, this court held that res judicata

      4 The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment of conviction bars a
convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from “raising and litigating in any
does not bar Johnson’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. Following the

same reasoning, res judicata also does not bar Johnson’s motion for a new trial.

Although his motion for a new trial is not barred by res judicata, Johnson is not

automatically entitled to a hearing on his motion. A hearing on a motion for a new

trial is discretionary, not mandatory. Johnson II at ¶ 19. The standard of review is

the same as that for the denial of a motion for a new trial — the trial court’s decision

on whether the motion for a new trial warrants a hearing is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Id. at ¶ 15, citing Toledo v. Stuart, 11 Ohio App.3d 292, 293, 465 N.E.2d

474 (6th Dist.1983).

Exhibits in Support of Motion for New Trial

              As is germane to this appeal, Johnson submitted the following in

support of his motion for a new trial: (1) argument about missing evidence that could

have been tested for Norman’s DNA; (2) affidavit of Charles Goodsell, Ph.D.; and (3)

affidavits and letters from Norman.

DNA Evidence

               As mentioned in Johnson IV, the issue of the missing evidence was

already fully litigated; after a thorough search, the evidence Johnson wanted further

testing on (the hair, windbreaker, and hat) could not be located. Id. at ¶ 39.

proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due
process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant” at trial or on direct
appeal. Johnson IV at ¶ 38, citing State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108311, 2020-
Ohio-568, ¶ 15, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph
nine of the syllabus.
Granting a hearing on Johnson’s motion for a new trial to further discuss the missing

evidence would serve no purpose other than to relitigate the issue.

Goodsell’s Affidavit

              Goodsell was Johnson’s proposed expert witness in eyewitness

identification. In a 22-page affidavit dated February 7, 2019, Goodsell set forth his

concerns with eyewitness identification that “could indicate” the victims mistakenly

identified Johnson as the perpetrator.

              Goodsell’s proposed testimony does not meet the Petro factors. First,

Johnson has not shown that an expert in eyewitness testimony was not available to

him before trial; we note that many of the publications Goodsell relies on in his

affidavit were published prior to Johnson’s trial. Additionally, there is not a strong

probability that the results of the trial would have been different had Goodsell, or

another expert in eyewitness identification, testified at trial. Johnson himself

concedes that Goodsell’s affidavit is not in and of itself conclusive.

              In Johnson I, Johnson argued that he was denied due process because

the police employed suggestive identification procedures. This court overruled his

assigned error, finding, as to both robberies:

      The victims had ample opportunity to view the appellant’s face during
      the robberies. The victims’ prior description of the appellant to the
      police was relatively similar. The victims’ level of certainty about
      picking the appellant as their attacker was uniformly high. The length
      of time between the crimes and the identification procedures was short,
      from as little as a few hours, to a day or two, to at most a few weeks
      depending on the victim. Finally, each victim who testified at trial
      identified the appellant, unequivocally and without hesitation, as the
      person who had committed the crimes herein.
Id. at 19.

              Four victims separately identified Johnson as their assailant.

Approximately ten days after the parking garage robbery, victim B.B. viewed a photo

array and identified Johnson as the man who was holding a knife to R.S.’s throat.

B.B. also positively identified Johnson in court as the knife-wielding assailant. The

three victims of the court reporting school robbery each identified Johnson from an

in-person lineup and in court. Two of the victims, B.C. and H.P., viewed photo

arrays on the same day as the robbery and identified Johnson.

Norman’s Affidavits

              Norman filed eight affidavits dating from 2002 to 2018 claiming he,

not Johnson, committed the two robberies. Although each affidavit in and of itself

may be “new” because it was executed after Johnson’s trial, Norman’s affidavits do

not constitute newly discovered evidence under Petro.

              The affidavits are summarized as follows: (1) May 10, 2002: Norman

states he was the sole assailant in the court reporting school robbery and the police

never questioned him regarding the robbery; (2) August 14, 2002: Norman states

he was the sole assailant in the parking garage robbery and Johnson did not commit

the robbery; (3) November 6, 2002: Norman claims he committed both robberies;

(4) December 27, 2002: Norman offers to give samples of his DNA; (5) January 15,

2003: Norman states he met Johnson in prison and was surprised that Johnson

was convicted of the robberies when he (Norman) thought he had pled guilty to
those crimes; (6) April 2, 2003: Norman claims he committed the court reporting

school robbery but the police never questioned him; clarifies that he committed the

parking garage robbery alone but another man, not Johnson, accompanied him; he

was questioned by a police detective in November 2000 regarding the parking

garage robbery; he wore and discarded clothing similar to that described by the

victims; and (8) July 27, 2009 and May 10, 2018: Norman reiterates claims he

committed both robberies.

              In Johnson II, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny

Johnson’s first motion for new trial regarding the parking garage robbery, finding

that Norman’s affidavit did not disclose a strong probability that Johnson would be

found not guilty if a new trial was granted. Johnson II at ¶ 20. This court noted the

evidence presented at trial was that two men were involved in the robbery and

Johnson was identified as one of the involved men. Id.

               Johnson relies on State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94282, 2010-

Ohio-5842, wherein this court reversed the decision of the trial court to deny a

motion for new trial without a hearing on an aggravated murder conviction after a

witness recanted her testimony. Gray is distinguishable. In Gray, the defendant

was convicted “essentially” on the testimony of two witnesses who identified him as

the shooter. Id. at ¶ 25. One witness, who was also charged with the victim’s murder,

accepted a plea deal “to a significantly lesser crime” in exchange for testifying against

the defendant. Id. The other witness later recanted her testimony and submitted

an affidavit asserting the defendant’s innocence.
              This court found that the trial court should have held a hearing on the

motion for new trial because the trial court could not properly discredit the recanting

witness’s affidavit on its face “at least in the absence of internal inconsistencies in

the affidavit sufficient to destroy its credibility on its face.” Id. at ¶ 27. This court

further noted that the only objective eyewitness testimony contradicted the

testimony of the two witnesses who identified the defendant as the shooter. Id.

               This case is different. There is no recanting witness, nor is there a

witness who testified against Johnson in exchange for a reduced charge. Here, there

are five victims, three of which identified him in a photo array, three who identified

him in an in-person lineup, and four that identified Johnson at trial “unequivocally

and without hesitation, as the person who had committed the crimes herein.”

Johnson I at 19.

               There are also several inconsistencies in Norman’s affidavits, both

internal and inconsistent with testimony of other witnesses. The investigating

detective, Detective Michael Alexander, testified that when he interviewed Norman,

Norman denied involvement in either robbery, stating that he had never robbed

“any Black females.”5     In his May 10, 2002 affidavit, Norman stated that he

committed the “muggings in downtown Cleveland between September 27, 2000

through October 9, 2000” with “the crime I committed on October 9” (the court

reporting school robbery) being the last one. However, Norman also pleaded guilty

      5 The record reflects that the four victims who positively identified Johnson are
Black. R.S., who could not identify her attacker, is white.
in an unrelated case to committing an aggravated robbery that occurred on

October 14, 2000. See State v. Norman, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-01-402532-ZA. And

in later affidavits, he purports to admit to committing the parking garage robbery

on September 15, 2000.

              In his August 14, 2002 affidavit, Norman stated that he committed the

parking garage robbery alone. In his January 15, 2003 affidavit, Norman stated that

there was another man with him when he committed the robbery. In his April 2,

2003 affidavit, Norman identifies the other man but claims that the man was not

involved in the robbery. B.B. testified, however, that the second man pursued her

during the robbery and only stopped when the knife-wielding attacker yelled to him

that they should leave.

              Of more importance to this court, Norman’s alleged involvement in

the parking garage and court reporting school robberies was known to Johnson

before trial. Johnson contends that he did not know Norman until they met in

prison in late 2002 or early 2003. But defense counsel’s trial strategy relied on the

theory that Norman was the actual perpetrator of the robberies and Johnson had

been misidentified by the victims.

              Beginning with opening statement, defense counsel explained:

      Judge, it is our contention — and we’re not disputing these crimes
      occurred, but it is our contention that if anyone committed these crimes
      it would have been Fred Norman not Anthony Johnson, and we believe
      once these witnesses come into the court and they are able to see Mr.
      Johnson in person and in a better position than he was in at the time of
      the photo array and live lineup, they will indicate that Mr. Johnson is
      not the individual that robbed them on that day, that Mr. Johnson had
      nothing to do with it, and that Fred Norman was basically the person
      or other people that was involved in these robberies, and not our client.
      And we believe once all the evidence is heard and analyzed and
      evaluated by the Court, the Court will not find a sufficient basis to state
      that the State has proven these charges against my client beyond a
      reasonable doubt.

              During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Alexander

if he interviewed Norman:

      Q. Did you have an opportunity to investigate an individual in some
      other robberies that occurred downtown by the name of Frederick
      Norman?

      A. Yes, I did.

      Q. Okay. Through your investigation, did you learn whether Fred
      Norman was involved in any of the robberies that this defendant is
      charged with here in this case?

      A. No, he was not. As a matter of fact, when I spoke with him, he stated
      that he never robbed any Black females. * * * I showed Anthony
      Johnson’s photo array to several other victims that [were] related to
      Frederick Norman’s case, and they did not pick [Johnson] either.

              During    cross-examination,     defense    counsel    asked   Detective

Alexander:

      Q. The robbery of October 4 of 2000, that was not a robbery in which
      you charged Mr. Johnson with, is that correct?

      A. That’s correct.

      Q. In fact, you charge this Fred Norman with it?

      A. That’s correct. * * *

      Q. When you showed that victim photos or live lineup * * * with
      Anthony Johnson in it? * * * She failed to identify him?

      A. That’s correct.
      Q. But later on she did identify Fred Norman?

      A. That’s correct.

               Defense counsel also tried to establish that Norman lived near where

the robberies took place:

      Q. It was Fred Norman who lived in a homeless shelter in downtown
      Cleveland; isn’t that a fact?

      A. Yes, on Lakeside.

              Finally, during closing arguments, defense counsel reiterated the

theory that Norman committed both robberies. Counsel noted that there had been

a number of robberies committed in downtown Cleveland from September to

November 2000, argued that Johnson did not commit the robberies, and pointed

out that Norman had been “charged with a number of these crimes that were

committed during this period of time.”

              In light of the above, the evidence Johnson submitted in support of his

motion for a new trial does not meet the criteria of newly discovered evidence under

Petro. We recognize the “tortured procedural and factual history” of this case but

note that much of the history revolves around the DNA testing, which has already

been litigated. We are reminded that we may not substitute our judgment for that

of the trial court on the issues of this case — whether to grant the motion for a new

trial or whether hearing on the motion for a new trial is warranted; that discretion

lies with the trial court. Absent the trial court applying the wrong legal standard or

misapplying the correct legal standard, which it did not, or relying on clearly
erroneous findings of fact, which it also did not, we cannot say that the trial court

abused its discretion.

              The assignments of error are overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE III, P.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR