Court Opinion

ID: 9691723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 23:03:39.710635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:04.441857
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/24/23
                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                              SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re T.F.-G., a Person Coming Under the           H050112
 Juvenile Court Law.                               (Santa Clara County
                                                    Super. Ct. No. 21JV45239A)

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 T.F.-G.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

       In the midst of a group contacted by officers for smoking cannabis on the street,
16-year-old T.F.-G. witnessed first one and then another of his companions be restrained,
searched, and made to sit on the curb as the officers worked their way through the group.
Rather than submit in turn when the officers turned their attention to him, T.F.-G. ran.
Chased, tackled, and punched, he was arrested for resisting or delaying a peace officer
(Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)).1 In a search incident to that arrest, the police found a
loaded handgun in his pocket, which T.F.-G. was not licensed to carry.
       On appeal, T.F.-G. raises two constitutional challenges asserting the infringement
of individual rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Second Amendments.

       1
           Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
       The first constitutional challenge is personal to him and specific to his
circumstances, turning on the existence of probable cause for his arrest for resisting or
delaying a peace officer—the asserted basis for the eventual search that revealed his
possession of a loaded handgun in public. Because the alleged resistance was T.F.-G.’s
flight from officers intent on detaining him, the prosecution’s burden was to prove that a
reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood he was not free to leave.
The totality of the circumstances on this record satisfies that burden.
       T.F.-G.’s second constitutional challenge transcends the personal or particular. In
a facial challenge to the prohibition on the unlicensed public carrying of loaded firearms
(§ 25850), he does not dispute a state’s general authority to limit the public carrying of
loaded firearms to those it has licensed to do so, nor does he contend that all of the state’s
conditions for licensure are unconstitutional; instead, he targets the statutory provision
that permits the prosecution of any unlicensed person carrying a loaded firearm in public,
irrespective of the reason for their unlicensed status.
       Given the breadth of T.F.-G’s facial challenge, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111] (Bruen) does not avail
him. Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly
unconstitutional under Bruen, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement
does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional. We therefore affirm.
                                  I.     BACKGROUND
A.     The Arrest and Search2
       On the afternoon of June 13, 2021, two uniformed San Jose police officers—Jason
Villaruz and Joseph Ferrante—were traveling in an unmarked police car near the
intersection of Gridley Street and Percivale Drive when they came upon a group of five

       2
        We take these facts from the evidence the juvenile court admitted in hearing the
suppression motion.

                                              2
people in and around a red Ford Mustang parked curbside. Smelling what they described
as “[f]reshly burnt” marijuana or “marijuana being smoked” emanating from the group
through the open windows of the police car on an otherwise unoccupied street, the
officers stopped to investigate the smell.
         The officers parked their car in the lane of traffic near the group, then approached
on foot. Villaruz began with the individuals on the sidewalk. Identifying themselves as
San Jose police officers, Villaruz asked the group if they were “ ‘just hanging out
smoking weed.’ ” Some in the group responded in the affirmative. Villaruz made a brief
initial contact with T.F.-G., during which he neither told T.F.-G. that he was under
detention nor that he was free to go before moving on to contact other members of the
group.
         Ferrante’s initial focus was on the two young men in the Mustang. Ferrante,
“familiar with [T.F.-G.’s] family, his father, his older brother, and him,” recognized
T.F.-G. sitting in a chair next to the car and T.F.-G.’s older brother “rolling a marijuana
joint” in the car’s passenger seat. Ferrante adopted a congenial tone with the car’s
occupants but told T.F.-G.’s brother, “You wanna put it out” and asked the driver (later
identified only as “Alex”) whether there was “anything other than weed in the car.”3
After asking the question, Ferrante directed Alex to “come out of the car real quick” and
asked if Alex had anything on him that “could hurt me.” Ferrante proceeded to pat-
search Alex, using one hand to secure Alex’s hands together while using the other to
rummage over his outer clothing. As Ferrante “escorted” Alex by the arm to the sidewalk
and “told him to sit on the curb,” he directed E.L., a second member of the group who
was standing in front of the Mustang, to turn around; Ferrante then searched E.L. in the
same manner that Ferrante had searched Alex. When E.L. asked the reason for this law

        The trial court admitted the officers’ body-worn camera footage into evidence.
         3

Our video references are to that footage.

                                               3
enforcement attention, Ferrante did not respond. After completing the pat search,
Ferrante directed E.L. to sit on the curb, next to Alex.
           While E.L. was proceeding to the curb, Ferrante saw T.F.-G. and said, “Mr. [G.],
how you doin’, bud, it’s been a minute.” The following exchange ensued.
           Ferrante: “Can you come over here for a minute?”
           T.F.-G.: “For what?”
           Ferrante: “Huh?”
           T.F.-G.: “For what?”
           Ferrante: “Just come over here.”
           T.F.-G.: “For what?”
           Ferrante: “Because I asked you to. Don’t make this . . .”
           As Ferrante was beginning to say, “Don’t,” T.F.-G. took off at a sprint down the
street.4
           At the suppression hearing, Ferrante testified that T.F.-G. “would have been the
next one to contact and then have a seat.” Although he phrased the directive to “come
over here” as a request, Ferrante did not intend T.F.-G to have the option of leaving or
refusing; Ferrante only used the form of a request because, to avoid escalation, he “tr[ies]
not to give demands” when officers are outnumbered.
           Villaruz caught T.F.-G., tackled him to the ground, then punched him in the right
eye. T.F.-G. cried out as Villaruz commanded, “Stop! On the fucking ground
man! Don’t fucking run! Hands behind your fucking back!” while a woman off camera
protested, “Don’t hit him like that!” (Emphasis in original.) Villaruz handcuffed T.F.-G.
and performed a “quick” search, which included removing and inspecting all contents of

        T.F.-G.’s brother simultaneously fled in the opposite direction. Although he was
           4

not pursued, T.F.-G.’s brother later returned to the scene, apparently of his own accord.

                                                4
T.F.-G.’s jeans pockets. Villaruz then sat T.F.-G. against a truck, warning that he would
punch T.F.-G. in the face if he moved.5
       Later, when putting T.F.-G. in a patrol car for transport, Villaruz searched T.F.-G.
a second time.6 This time, Villaruz found a loaded unregistered handgun in the right
pocket of the basketball shorts T.F.-G. was wearing under his jeans.
B.     Procedural History
       Two days after T.F.-G.’s arrest, the Santa Clara County District Attorney
petitioned the juvenile court to declare T.F.-G. a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). The District Attorney alleged
as grounds for wardship T.F.-G.’s commission of the following offenses: (1) carrying a
loaded firearm not registered to him (§§ 11106, 25850); (2) carrying a concealed firearm
(§25400, subd. (a)(2)); (3) minor in possession of a firearm capable of being concealed
upon the person (§ 29610); and (4) resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer, a
misdemeanor (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
       Several months after the initiation of wardship proceedings, T.F.-G. moved to
suppress the firearm and other evidence, on the ground that law enforcement had violated

       5
         The body-worn camera footage from the incident shows two later exchanges
with T.F.-G., in which Villaruz states that he punched T.F.-G. in the eye “because
[T.F.-G.] ran[,]” thereby “disrespect[ing]” Ferrante and, by extension, Villaruz himself.
In his incident report, however, Villaruz wrote that he punched T.F.-G. “to provide . . .
the time and opportunity to gain control of [T.F.-G.’s] hands,” for officer safety.
Concern for officer safety, Villaruz wrote, warranted punching the minor, because the
officer’s training and experience led him to anticipate as early as the chase that T.F.-G.
might have a firearm. Though not central to our determination of whether probable cause
supported the arrest, we note that nothing in the body-worn camera footage explains
Villaruz’s decision to punch T.F.-G. in the eye, or the discrepancy between the officer’s
comments at the scene and his later report, or the discovery of a firearm on T.F.-G.’s
person only during transport.
       6
        The parties do not dispute that T.F.-G. by this point was under arrest. Villaruz
considered T.F.-G. to be under arrest for delaying the investigation by fleeing.

                                             5
his Fourth Amendment rights in searching him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
juvenile court issued a written order denying T.F.-G.’s motion.
       At the jurisdictional hearing, T.F.-G. admitted the violation of section 25850,
subdivision (a) (count 1)—which the court found to be a felony—and the misdemeanor
violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (count 4). The court dismissed the remaining
counts.
       At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged T.F.-G. a ward of the
court and placed him on probation. As one consequence of the wardship adjudication,
T.F.-G. “shall not own, or have in possession or under custody or control, a firearm until
[he] is 30 years of age.” (§ 29820, subd. (b).) T.F.-G. timely appealed.
                                   II.     DISCUSSION
A.     Motion to Suppress
       “ ‘The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.’ ” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 182 (Fayed); see also
People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125-126.) Absent a search warrant, “a search
is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.”
(Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 382.) Incident to a lawful arrest, for example,
“ ‘it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape.’ ” (Id. at p. 383; see also Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 182.)
       T.F.-G. argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because he was not searched incident to a lawful arrest as the officers lacked probable
cause to believe that he was resisting or delaying the lawful performance of their duties,
in violation of section 148, subdivision (a). T.F.-G.’s flight, under this theory, was no
more than his exercise of freedom to terminate what was purely a consensual encounter
with law enforcement. Because the record establishes that T.F.-G. was resisting what a
reasonable person would have recognized as Ferrante’s attempt to detain him, Villaruz
                                              6
had probable cause to arrest him. We therefore reject T.F.-G.’s challenge to the
lawfulness of the search incident to that arrest.
       1.      Consensual Encounters, Detentions, and Section 148
       “ ‘Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories
ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no
restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are
strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable
restraints on an individual’s liberty. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Linn (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 46, 57 (Linn).) Unlike consensual encounters, “[a] detention . . . is a seizure,
albeit a limited one, for which reasonable suspicion is required.” (Ibid.; see also People
v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981 (Brown).)
       “A person is seized by the police . . . when the officer, ‘ “by means of physical
force or show of authority,” ’ terminates or restrains [the person’s] freedom of
movement, [citation], ‘through means intentionally applied.’ ” (Brendlin v. California
(2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254, italics omitted (Brendlin).) In distinguishing a detention from
a consensual encounter, “a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the
encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer’s requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter.” (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439
(Bostick); see also Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 980; People v. Tacardon (2022) 14
Cal.5th 235, 241-242, 252 (Tacardon).)
       One who flees an officer’s lawful attempts to detain violates section 148,
subdivision (a)(1).7 (See People v. Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985-987; People v.

       7
         Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part, “Every person who
willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt
to discharge any duty of his or her office” commits a misdemeanor punishable “by a fine

                                                7
Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 601-602; see also In re Gregory S. (1980) 112
Cal.App.3d 764, 777-778; In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329
(Muhammed C.) [collecting cases].) The elements of the offense are: “ ‘ “(1) the
defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer
was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties.” ’ ” (Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th
885, 894-895; see also In re Chase C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107, 113; Garcia v.
Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 803, 818.) “ ‘ “[T]he lawfulness of the officer’s
conduct is an essential element of the offense” ’ of resisting a police officer” because the
police officer is not engaged in “ ‘duties’ ” if the officer is engaged in unlawful conduct.
(People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 676.)
       2.     Standard of Review
       On a motion to suppress, once the accused has established that the search or
seizure was without a warrant, “the burden is on the prosecution to prove evidence
seized . . . falls within a recognized exception” to the warrant requirement—here, that
T.F.-G. was lawfully arrested on probable cause to believe he resisted a lawful detention.
(See Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 182.) “Thereafter, a defendant can respond by pointing
out any inadequacies in that justification for warrantless search.” (Ibid.)
       On appeal, our standard of review is well established: “We defer to the trial
court’s findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In
determining whether . . . the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11
Cal.4th 354, 362; In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236 [applying same

not exceeding [$1,000], or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by
both that fine and that imprisonment.”

                                              8
standard in juvenile proceedings under Welf. & Inst. Code § 700.1]; In re Trinidad V.
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1077, 1079, fn. 1.)
       3.     T.F.-G.’s Flight as a Violation of Section 148
       T.F.-G. contends that the police officers had not detained or attempted to detain
him before he fled and that he consequently8 was not lawfully arrested pursuant to section
148, rendering unlawful the search of his basketball shorts incident to the arrest. The
totality of the circumstances persuades us that when T.F.-G. fled, “ ‘ “ ‘a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the
encounter.’ ” ’ ” (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241; see also Bostick, supra, 501
U.S. at p. 439.) Having observed the events unfolding around him, a reasonable person
in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood that the request to go to the officer was
mandatory. By the time T.F.-G. fled, the officers were at least attempting to detain him.
The officers therefore had probable cause to believe that T.F.-G. violated section 148.9
(See Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.)

       8
        On appeal, T.F.-G. does not dispute that the police officers could have lawfully
detained him—that is, that the police officers had a reasonable suspicion that he was
committing or had just committed a crime. (See Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 57.)
We note that, subject to specified exceptions, smoking marijuana in public and
possessing marijuana under the age of 21 are unlawful. (See Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11357, subd. (a), 11362.3, subd. (a).)
       9
         The juvenile court viewed the crux of the parties’ dispute as whether law
enforcement was justified in detaining T.F.-G., not the antecedent question of whether
T.F.-G. was detained. Although the court implicitly determined that the officers detained
T.F.-G. before he fled, it articulated no factual findings underlying this conclusion.
Nevertheless, the court relied on bodycam footage that, in its words, “clearly
documented” the interaction between T.F.-G. and law enforcement. T.F.-G. has not
suggested that there are any unaddressed factual questions to be resolved in the juvenile
court, nor do we discern any. (See, e.g., Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 253-256
[remand for new factual finding required where magistrate expressly endorsed improper
relevance argument pursuant to which it failed to consider and resolve a relevant factual
dispute].)

                                             9
       Our conclusion is grounded in the efficient and unmistakable escalation in the
officers’ intrusion into the group’s affairs. At the outset, stopping the car mid-lane to
approach the group on foot suggested an interest in more than a casual exchange of
pleasantries, even if this alone was not coercive. The officers’ inquiry as to a potential
cannabis offense then alerted the group that it was “the focus of the officer[s’]
particularized suspicion.” (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 791; see id. at
p. 790; see also In re J.G. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 412 (J.G.) [ascribing particular
significance to the fact that officers had “clearly conveyed” that they suspected
individuals of unlawful activity].) Although the drug offense was minor, it was
nonetheless an occasion for the bodily seizure of first one and then another of T.F.-G.’s
associates: Ferrante secured their hands, patted down their bodies, and directed them to
sit on the curb so that he could turn to the next member of the group—all in T.F.-G.’s
plain view. (Cf. Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 253-254 [remanding for trial court’s
determination whether defendant driver was aware that passenger, after leaving car, had
been detained.) “[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person. . . . [A] careful exploration of the
outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons . . . performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless . . . is a
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” (Terry v. Ohio (1968)
392 U.S. 1, 16-17, fns. omitted.) Thus, Ferrante had “ ‘ “restrained the liberty” ’ ” of the
driver and one of the individuals on the sidewalk “ ‘ “by means of physical force or show
of authority,” ’ ” effecting a “ ‘ “seizure of th[ose] person[s].” ’ ” (Tacardon, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 241.)

                                             10
       By the time Ferrante asked T.F.-G. to “just come over here,”10 T.F.-G. had
observed the unmistakable and methodical treatment of the group of which he was an
obvious member. Ferrante’s systematic physical intrusion and show of authority as to
Alex and E.L. would have objectively communicated to a reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s
position that he was not free to go. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 253-254 [“show
of authority towards others can communicate that the defendant is also not free to
leave”]; Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 257 [“a sensible person would not expect a police
officer to allow people to come and go freely from the physical focal point of an
investigation into faulty behavior or wrongdoing”].) This point was driven home when
Ferrante insisted that T.F.-G. come over after T.F.-G. questioned why this was warranted.
       T.F.-G.’s argument that the encounter reasonably appeared consensual finds
superficial support in a litany of cases holding under the totality of the circumstances that
a reasonable person would feel free to terminate an encounter with officers evincing
interest in their immediate activities, background, and mere presence at a particular
public location. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289 [a man sitting on
the hood of a parked car was free to leave officers on foot patrol who asked whether the
car was his, what his reason was for sitting on a car that wasn’t his, where his pool cue
was if he was waiting for friends to play pool, and whether he had identification]; see id.

       10
          Although T.F.-G. notes the officer’s decision to frame the request as a question,
he acknowledges that this framing is not independently dispositive. (Compare J.G.,
supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p., 412 [“the content or form of the question” may
“impart[] . . . compulsion to comply”] and Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 64, fn. 7
[“merely ‘ask[ing]’ [defendant] to put out her cigarette and put down her soda can . . .
does not negate the coercive nature of the request”] with People v. Cartwright (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1362, 1370, fn. 10 (Cartwright) [“a mere request to exit a vehicle, as
opposed to a command, is insufficient in and of itself to transform the contact into a
detention”].) “ ‘It is not the nature of the question or request made by the authorities, but
rather the manner or mode in which it is put to the citizen that guides us in deciding
whether compliance was voluntary or not.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Garry (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 1100, 1112.)

                                             11
at pp. 291, 294 (conc. opn. of Crosby, J.) [“In the real world . . . [y]ou are protected by
the Fourth Amendment only to the extent you are willing to risk the physical violation of
your person with armed officers.”]; Cartwright, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1364-1365,
1369-1371 [holding that passenger in a routine traffic stop was not detained until she was
told to sit on the curb, which occurred after law enforcement stopped the car, asked her
the driver’s name, asked her for identification, asked her if there was anything illegal in
the car, and—having received her response that someone had left methamphetamine in
her purse—asked for and received consent to search her purse]; People v. Gonzales
(1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1194, 1197 [uniformed officer requesting license and registration
of parked car’s occupants late at night was not a detention]; People v. Franklin (1987)
192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941 [asking that appellant remove his hands from his pockets did
not convert the encounter into a detention].) We need not resolve the extent to which the
hypothetical reasonable person’s sense of freedom to rebuff an investigating officer has
evolved in the intervening decades, because we find these authorities distinguishable
from the totality of the circumstances here.
       For example, in United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194 (Drayton), three
plain-clothes officers boarded a bus—during a scheduled stop and with the driver’s
consent—to conduct routine drug and weapons interdiction not targeted at any particular
passenger. (Id. at p. 197; see also Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 252-253 [discussing
Drayton].) Although two officers positioned themselves at the front and rear of the bus,
respectively, they did so without blocking the exit. (Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 197-
198.) The third officer spoke to the passengers in turn, starting from the rear of the bus
and proceeding forward, about their travel plans and their luggage: the officer displayed
his badge but positioned himself so he would not block the passenger’s access to the aisle
during questioning. (Id. at p. 198.) Addressing two people seated together, the officer
informed them that the police were “ ‘attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons being
transported on the bus,’ ” and received permission to check a bag, in which he found no
                                               12
contraband. (Id. at p. 199.) One of the two passengers then consented to a patdown,
which resulted in the discovery of contraband and his arrest. (Id. at p. 199.) The other
passenger then also consented to a patdown, which revealed objects similar to drug
packaging and resulted in his arrest. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court held that
there “were ample grounds for the District Court to conclude that ‘everything that took
place between Officer Lang and [the defendants] suggest[ed] that it was cooperative’ and
that there ‘was nothing coercive [or] confrontational’ about the encounter.” (Id. at
p. 204; see also Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 436 [“the mere fact that Bostick did not feel
free to leave the bus did not mean that the police seized him” because as “a passenger on
a bus that was scheduled to depart[] [h]e would not have felt free to leave the bus even if
the police had not been present” and “whether or not the police conduct at issue was
coercive”].) Here, in contrast, the officers interrupted their drive to engage with the
group about illegal activity in its midst that, although minor, was sufficient to commence
the successive detention and patsearch of the group’s members in turn.
        For the foregoing reasons, we find no fault with the juvenile court’s determination
that there was probable cause to arrest T.F.-G. for violation of section 148, subdivision
(a), following his flight in response to a mandatory demand. (See Muhammed C., supra,
95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) Accordingly, we uphold the juvenile court’s denial of
T.F.-G.’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered through the search incident to that
arrest and turn to the constitutional merits of the felony for which he was adjudicated a
ward.

                                             13
B.     Constitutionality of California’s Firearm Licensing Regime11
       Section 25850, subdivision (a), provides: “A person is guilty of carrying a loaded
firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in
any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or
on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory.”
       Although section 25850 in isolation appears broadly prohibitory, it exists within a
framework of numerous express exemptions, including a discretionary licensing regime
under section 26150 et seq. (See §§ 25900, 26000-26060, 26150, 26155, 26165, 26175,
26185; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 154, fn. 4.) Specifically, a person licensed
under section 26150 to carry a concealed handgun is exempt from section 25850’s
prohibition on carrying loaded firearms in public. (§ 26010.) Under section 26150, “the
sheriff of a county may issue a [concealed-carry] license to [an eligible applicant] upon
proof of all of the following: [¶] (1) The applicant is of good moral character.
[¶] (2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license. [¶] (3) The applicant is a resident of
the county or a city within the county, or the applicant’s principal place of employment or
business is in the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends a substantial
period of time in that place of employment or business. [¶] (4) The applicant has
completed a course of training [relating to firearms safety, handling, shooting, and
permissible usage].” (§ 26150, subd. (a); see also § 26155, subd. (a) [“the chief or other
head of a municipal police department of any city or city and county” may similarly issue
licenses].) “An applicant for a license is fingerprinted and must pass a background

       11
         In the juvenile court, T.F.-G. did not challenge the constitutionality of
section 25850. We nonetheless reach his facial constitutional challenge because it
presents a pure question of law subject to de novo review. (See In re D.L. (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 144, 150 (D.L.); see also People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364,
1370; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888-889; Tos v. State (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 184, 195.)

                                             14
check.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 155, fn. omitted, citing §§ 26185, subd. (a),
26195, subd. (a).)
       Fundamentally, T.F.-G. argues that if any requirement for issuance of a license to
carry a loaded firearm was unconstitutional, then the application of section 25850 to
punish any unlicensed person must also be unconstitutional. T.F.-G.’s facial
constitutional challenge requires a showing that the statute poses a “ ‘ “total and fatal
conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions” ’ ” or at least “is invalid ‘in the
generality or great majority of cases.’ ” (Compare Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9
Cal.4th 1069, 1084, 1102 (Tobe) [total and fatal conflict] with People v. Buenrostro
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 388 (Buenrostro) [explaining, in rejecting facial challenge, that the
“ ‘minimum our cases have accepted is a showing that the statute is invalid ‘in the
generality or great majority of cases’ ”]; see also T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County
of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 [noting divergent formulations of the
standard]; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157 [applying “ ‘ “ ‘total and fatal
conflict’ ” ’ ” standard].) T.F.-G. has not made such a showing. Notwithstanding the
conceded unconstitutionality of California’s “good cause” requirement for issuance of a
license as it was enforced pre-Bruen, California law continues to authorize the denial of
license applications on statutory grounds not implicated by Bruen. Accordingly, T.F.-G.
has not demonstrated that section 25850 is invalid in at least the generality or great
majority of cases, much less that it is in total and fatal conflict with the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments.
       1.     The Second Amendment
       The Second Amendment confers “an individual right to keep and bear arms.”
(District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 595 (Heller); see also McDonald v.
City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 791 (McDonald) [holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right, making it

                                              15
applicable to the states].)12 But “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 626.)
       In Heller, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia prohibition on the
possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment. (Heller,
supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 573, 635.) The court explained that “the inherent right of self-
defense has been central to the Second Amendment right” and the “handgun ban
amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by
American society for that lawful purpose.” (Id. at p. 628.) The court cautioned,
however, that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings,” all of which the court described as examples of “presumptively” valid
regulatory measures. (Id. at pp. 626-627, fn. 26.)
       In Bruen, the high court, in a six-to-three decision, extended Heller to recognize
“an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” (Bruen,
supra, 597 U.S. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2122], italics added.) Moreover, the court
ruled that the licensing regime in New York, one of six states in which “the government .
. . conditions issuance of a license to carry on a citizen’s showing of some . . . special
need,” violates the Constitution by requiring an applicant to demonstrate “a special need
for self-defense.” (Ibid.)
       Even so, the Bruen court allowed that the Second Amendment right remains
“subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at
p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2156].) The court provided a framework for evaluating whether a
gun regulation violates the Constitution: “When the Second Amendment’s plain text
       12
          The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.)

                                              16
covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’ ” (Id. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2129-2130].) Although the
court stopped short of providing “an exhaustive survey of the features that render
regulations relevantly similar under the Second Amendment,” it did point to “two
metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-
defense.” (Id. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2132-2133].)
       In a concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, wrote “to
underscore . . . the limits of the Court’s decision.”13 (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at. p. ___
[142 S.Ct. at p. 2161] (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.).) Bruen “does not prohibit States
from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-defense. In
particular, the Court’s decision does not affect the existing licensing regimes—known as
‘shall-issue’ regimes—that are employed in 43 States.” (Ibid.)14 “New York’s outlier
may-issue regime is constitutionally problematic because it grants open-ended discretion
to licensing officials and authorizes licenses only for those applicants who can show
some special need apart from self-defense. Those features of New York’s regime . . .
deny the right to carry handguns for self-defense to many ‘ordinary, law-abiding
citizens.’ ” (Ibid.)

       13
         Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh were two of the six members of
the majority. The three dissenting justices would not have struck down the licensing
regime “without considering the State’s compelling interest in preventing gun violence.”
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2165] (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.).)
       14
          “ ‘[S]hall issue’ jurisdictions” require “authorities [to] issue concealed-carry
licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting
licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or
suitability.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2123], fn. omitted.)

                                              17
       2.     Facial and As-Applied Challenges
       “A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance considers
only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an
individual. [Citation.] ‘ “To support a determination of facial unconstitutionality,
voiding the statute as a whole, petitioners cannot prevail by suggesting that in some
future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the
particular application of the statute . . . . Rather, petitioners must demonstrate that the
act’s provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable
constitutional prohibitions.” ’ ” (Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084; see also Regina v.
State (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 386, 401; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.) Put
differently, “[a] facial challenge seeks to void the statute as a whole by showing that
‘ “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” i.e., that the law is
unconstitutional in all of its applications.’ ” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157,
quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party (2008) 552 U.S.
442, 449.) “[T]he ‘minimum’ our cases have accepted is a showing that the statute is
invalid ‘in the generality or great majority of cases.’ ” (Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 388.)
       In contrast, “[a]n as applied challenge may seek . . . relief from a specific
application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals
who are under allegedly impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the
manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied.” (Tobe,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) Such a challenge “contemplates analysis of the facts of a
particular case or cases to determine the circumstances in which the statute or ordinance
has been applied and to consider whether in those particular circumstances the
application deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a protected right.
[Citations.] When a criminal defendant claims that a facially valid statute or ordinance
has been applied in a constitutionally impermissible manner to the defendant, the court
                                              18
evaluates the propriety of the application on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to
relieve the defendant of the sanction.” (Ibid.)
       3.     Analysis
       T.F.-G., in his words, “makes a facial challenge to the law he was found to have
violated.” Because T.F.-G. challenges the constitutionality of section 25850 on its face
and not as applied to him, his challenge does not turn on his personal characteristics—his
youth, his reasons for carrying the loaded firearm, or his reasons for fleeing the police.
He need not demonstrate that the hypothetical denial of a license—had he applied for
one—would have offended the Second Amendment. (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 157, fn. omitted [facial challenge to section 25850 “does not raise any question about
whether [a juvenile] was or would have been denied a license and, if so, why”].) Instead,
seeking to neuter California’s licensing regime in toto, he must show that enforcement of
the licensing regime infringes Second Amendment rights in at least the generality or great
majority of cases.
       T.F.-G. contends that section 25850 is unconstitutional if any part of California’s
licensing scheme is unconstitutional, and the Attorney General concedes that section
26150 is unconstitutional under Bruen insofar as it restricts access to licenses by
imposing a good cause requirement.15 Thus, T.F.-G. contends that section 25850 must
also be unconstitutional. As we explain, T.F.-G.’s facial challenge falls short because the
constitutional defect in California’s licensing scheme reaches only a narrower subset of
the cases to which section 25850 applies.

       15
          T.F.-G. also argues that a separate provision, section 29610, that makes it
generally unlawful for minors to possess guns is unconstitutional under Bruen because
there is no historical tradition of barring all minors from possessing guns. But, as T.F.-G.
recognizes, although he was charged with a violation of section 29610 that charge was
dismissed. Due to this dismissal, T.F.-G. lacks a beneficial interest in adjudicating a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 29610. (See Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 599 (Teal).)

                                             19
       As a threshold matter, we reject the Attorney General’s contention that T.F.-G.
lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 25850 unless he can
demonstrate that the “public-carry licensing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to
him”— meaning that T.F.-G. would have been able to obtain a license but for the
unconstitutional provision. 16 Citing Ellison v. Connor (5th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3d 247, 254-
255, the Attorney General argues that T.F.-G. lacks standing because he did not “ ‘submit
to the challenged policy.’ ” But T.F.-G. is not a member of the general public attempting
to challenge a regulatory regime that has done him no harm, he is challenging his
wardship adjudication under a penal statute—an enforcement mechanism of the
regulatory regime that he contends is unconstitutional. (See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at p. 161.) Moreover, he is subject to ongoing consequences of section 25850’s
application—leaving aside his juvenile probation status, the fact of the adjudication bars
him from possessing, owning, or controlling any and all firearms until his 30th birthday.
(See Teal, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 599 [standing requires concrete and actual beneficial
interest in a justiciable controversy].)
       Notwithstanding T.F.-G.’s standing to raise his claims, on the merits of his facial
challenge to section 25850, he is unable to meet the heavy burden of establishing that in
at least the generality or great majority of cases, it will be unconstitutional to criminalize
carrying a loaded firearm in public without satisfying one of the statutory exemptions,
such as complying with California’s licensing regime. (See Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 388; see also Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 156-158.)

       16
         In reply to this argument, T.F.-G. contended that he was prevented from
obtaining a license by the unconstitutional good cause requirement of section 26150.
Nevertheless, T.F.-G. reaffirmed in a supplemental letter brief that, as articulated in his
opening brief, his appeal raises only a facial challenge.

                                              20
       We begin with the conceded constitutional infirmity in California’s licensing
regime as it existed at the time of T.F.-G.’s offense. Under Bruen, New York’s “proper
cause” license requirement was unconstitutional because it prevented “law-abiding
citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear
arms.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2156].) The petitioners
included Koch and Nash, “law-abiding, adult citizens” whom at the first step of its
analysis the Bruen Court deemed to have a presumptively protected right to bear arms.
(Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2124-2125, 2134-2135].) Thus, the fundamental precept
of Bruen is that the “proper cause” requirement unconstitutionally operated “to prevent
law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from carrying arms in public for
that purpose.” (Id. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2150].) California’s good cause
requirement, as it existed, is undisputedly susceptible to the same challenge.
       Bruen, McDonald, and Heller did not involve facial constitutional challenges to
provisions criminalizing carrying firearms without a license, but only challenges to
particular restrictions on either the availability or utility of licenses. In Bruen, Brandon
Koch and Robert Nash successfully challenged the proper-cause requirement in New
York’s licensing scheme—under which they were denied for failure to demonstrate a
unique need for self-defense—because New York could not condition the issuance of a
license on such a showing. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at. p. ___ [142 S.Ct.142 S.Ct. at
pp. 2124-2125, 2138.) In Heller, Dick Heller applied for a registration certificate for a
handgun he wished to keep at home and, following denial, mounted a successful
challenge to bans on handgun possession in the home and rendering lawful firearms in
the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense. (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at
pp. 575-576, 635.) Similarly, in McDonald, Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen
Lawson, and David Lawson challenged city-level bans on the registration of most
handguns, which precluded them from keeping handguns in their homes. (McDonald,
supra, 561 U.S. at p. 750.)
                                              21
       T.F.-G.’s facial challenge is fundamentally different. He challenges neither the
application of a licensing requirement to unconstitutionally infringe his right to bear arms
nor the imposition of criminal penalties against him as a consequence of such
requirement, but instead the state’s authority to impose criminal penalties on any
individual who carries a loaded handgun in public in violation of the state’s license
regime, regardless of whether the noncompliance stemmed from a constitutionally sound
requirement.
       In Bruen, the state’s power to do so was not called into question. There, the
Supreme Court confirmed that states may impose “reasonable, well-defined” restrictions
on the constitutionally protected “right to bear commonly used arms in public” and set
forth the means by which courts may evaluate whether licensing requirements withstand
constitutional scrutiny. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2129-2130,
2134-2135, 2156]; see also Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 626-627.) Indeed, the Bruen
Court was “clear” that “nothing in [its] analysis should be interpreted to suggest the
unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which a
‘general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.] Because
these licensing regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-
defense, they do not necessarily prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ from
exercising their Second Amendment right to public carry. [Citation.] Rather, it appears
that these shall-issue regimes, which often require applicants to undergo a background
check or pass a firearms safety course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing
arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ [Citation.] And
they likewise appear to contain only ‘narrow, objective, and definite standards’ guiding
licensing officials, [citation], rather than requiring the ‘appraisal of facts, the exercise of
judgment, and the formation of an opinion,’ [citation]—features that typify proper-cause
standards like New York’s.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2138],
fn. 9; see also id. at p. ___ [142 S. Ct. at p. 2162] (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.).)
                                               22
       If a state may enforce a licensing regime, then a state may impose penalties for
noncompliance, as may be illustrated by examples drawn from several of the 43 “shall
issue” jurisdictions the Bruen majority expressly refrained from criticizing. (See, e.g.,
430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 65/14(c) (2022) [Illinois statute imposing criminal penalties as part
of licensing regime]; La. Stat. Ann. 14:95 (June 23, 2022) [Louisiana statute imposing
criminal penalties as part of licensing regime]; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1202 (2022)
[Nebraska statute imposing criminal penalties as part of licensing regime]; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-415.21 (2022) [North Carolina statute imposing criminal penalties as part of
licensing regime]; Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2124, 2138, fn. 9]
[identifying only New York, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey as jurisdictions whose licensing regimes posed the
constitutional infirmities the court identified].) To the extent that, under Bruen, a state
may impose a licensing regime because the Second Amendment right to bear arms may
be denied to some citizens—provided the reasons therefore are “reasonable” and
“well[]defined” (see Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2156])—it follows
that there are citizens who may constitutionally be subject to sanctions for the unlicensed
carrying of a firearm.
       We do not accept T.F.-G.’s premise that section 25850 is facially unconstitutional
if any licensing regulation in California may be invoked to unconstitutionally deny a
license. Although framed as a default prohibition, section 25850 is in effect the
enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime that grants licenses to those who may
lawfully carry firearms and withholds licenses from those who may not. As such, the
scope of section 25850 is inherently broader than the scope of a given licensing
regulation, including the unconstitutional good cause requirement. Although section
25850 may have unconstitutional application where denial of licensing turned on the
good cause requirement, T.F.-G. does not claim that it may not constitutionally apply
where the denial of a license turned on the applicant’s violent criminal history or failure
                                             23
to undergo firearms safety training. (Cf. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at
pp. 2134-2135] [discussing the rights of “ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens” to “ ‘bear’
arms in public for self-defense”].) To prevail on a facial constitutional challenge to
section 25850, it is not enough to show that a statute may have an unconstitutional
application to a hypothetical person lawfully carrying a firearm in public for self-defense
after failing to secure a license due to a “good cause” requirement.17 Instead, a facial
challenge succeeds only where a statute is unconstitutional in all or at least the generality
or great majority of cases. (See Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084; Buenrostro, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 388.)18
       To hold that section 25850, the enforcement mechanism of the licensing regime, is
facially unconstitutional, we would need to find that section 25850 has no significant
application in constitutionally valid circumstances—i.e., that it is unconstitutional in at
least the generality or great majority of cases. (See generally D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 165-166.) Although we can identify two theoretical pathways to such a conclusion,
neither is available here, because the constitutional defect is severable from the broader
licensing regime, and the state retains authority to regulate firearm possession via
licensure.
       First, if a particular licensing condition renders the entire licensing regime
unconstitutional, then it may become unconstitutional to impose penalties for failure to
obtain a license. But we follow the D.L. court’s persuasive determination that the “good
cause” licensing requirement is severable from the balance of California’s licensing

       17
         These are not, however, the facts before us. The likelihood that an affected
individual may be able to mount a successful as-applied challenge to an apparently
overbroad statute is distinct from facial unconstitutionality. (See Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 1084; Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 388.)
       18
         Like the minor in D.L., T.F.-G. has not made an argument based on overbreadth.
(D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 154, fn. 4.)

                                             24
requirements, such that a functioning licensing regime remains in place if the good cause
requirement were removed. (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 163-165.)19 Assuming
that the good cause requirement is susceptible to a facial constitutional challenge under
Bruen because it can never constitutionally be applied to deny a license, there are
independent licensing restrictions in California. Section 25850 imposes penalties not
only on individuals who are wrongfully denied licenses based on the unconstitutional
good cause requirement, but on individuals who cannot or do not obtain licenses due to
constitutionally valid restrictions and engage in prohibited conduct—i.e., carry a loaded
firearm in public where no exception makes it permissible to do so.
       Second, to the extent the unconstitutional condition is severable, T.F.-G.’s facial
challenge to the enforcement provision requires either an interpretation of the Second
Amendment that would bar California from requiring licenses at all or else a showing that
the remaining licensing conditions render section 25850 unconstitutional at least “in the
generality or great majority of cases.” Bruen does not support a categorical ban on a
state’s authority to require licenses. Indeed, T.F.-G. recognizes this, in framing the
inquiry as whether, post-Bruen, “there are any . . . provisions of California’s gun laws
that render . . . section 25850 constitutional.”20 And among California’s licensing

       19
          Like in D.L., the Attorney General asserts that, the day after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bruen was announced, the Attorney General issued an alert
recognizing that the good cause requirement was no longer constitutional, instructing
local officials not to enforce the good cause requirement, but advising local officials to
continue to apply and enforce all other statutory prerequisites to obtaining a public-carry
license. (See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147, 152.) T.F.-G. neither disputes this
factual proposition nor the legal proposition that the good cause requirement is severable.
       20
          In his initial framing of what he described as a facial challenge, T.F.-G.
appeared to invite us to narrow our focus to section 25850’s application to him, rather
than all applications of section 25850. T.F.-G. has subsequently agreed that the
resolution of the issues before us “requires no examination of the particular facts of” his
case.

                                             25
conditions, T.F.-G. stops short of challenging them all.21 (See D.L., supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at pp. 154-155.) Post-Bruen, courts have continued to hold that at least
some categories of convicted felons may be denied the right to bear arms, as is the case in
California. (See id. at pp. 158, fn. 8, 165-166; People v. Alexander (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 469, 480; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 447; see also United
States v. Jackson (8th Cir. 2023) 69 F.4th 495, 501-506; United States v. Cunningham
(8th Cir. 2023) 70 F.4th 502, 506; United States v. Davis (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2023) 2023
WL 2505039, at p. *4; United States v. Jackson (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2023) ___ F.Supp.3d
___, 2023 WL 2499856, at p. *18 [federal restriction on receiving or transporting
firearms while under a felony indictment is consistent with historical tradition on
regulating firearms].) We acknowledge that certain as-applied challenges have been
upheld by federal circuit courts. (See, e.g., Range v. United States (3d Cir. 2023) 69
F.4th 96, 106 (Range) [after rehearing en banc, holding “narrow[ly]” that individual
convicted of a felony for making false statements remained one of “ ‘the people’ ”
protected by the Second Amendment and that a federal statute preventing him from
receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce was unconstitutional under Bruen];
Atkinson v. Garland (7th Cir. 2023) 70 F.4th 1018, 1023-1024 (Atkinson) [remanding for

       21
          The historical test set forth in Bruen is intended to test the constitutionality of a
firearm regulation. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2129-2130].)
T.F.-G. has not challenged the state’s authority to require licenses nor each firearm
regulation that could prevent an individual from obtaining a license under California’s
regulatory scheme. Moreover, the two-step Bruen framework has limited utility in the
context of T.F.-G.’s facial challenge, because the first step of that framework presupposes
that the existence of a presumptive right to bear arms is situational—potentially
depending at least on the purposes for which arms are borne and the past conduct of the
person bearing arms. (See Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2134-2156].) T.F.-G.’s facial
challenge to the enforcement mechanism, as opposed to a particular licensing restriction,
would render the first step of the Bruen framework a nullity. Given the focus of T.F.-
G.’s facial challenge, we do not hold the state to the burden of demonstrating the
constitutional validity of its unchallenged regulations.

                                              26
historical analysis regarding federal statute prohibiting individuals convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from shipping or transporting
any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce or receiving any firearm or
ammunition shipped in interstate commerce]; United States v. Rahimi (5th Cir. 2023) 61
F.4th 443, 448 (Rahimi) [federal prohibition on possession of firearms by someone
subject to a domestic violence restraining order is unconstitutional].)22 Because these
were as-applied challenges, they do not assist T.F.-G. in his facial challenge to section
25850. Whatever fate may be in store for the long-standing prohibition on the possession
(public or private) of firearms (loaded or unloaded) by those with criminal histories
deemed disqualifying (see, e.g., §§ 29800, 29900 & 30305; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)),
T.F.-G. makes no attempt to argue that California’s requirement for fingerprint
identification or a criminal background check operates unconstitutionally in the
generality or great majority of unlicensed cases, and we have no basis to conclude that it
does. (See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 155 [background check required as a
condition of licensure “is intended to confirm the applicant is not disqualified from
possessing or owning a firearm”].)
       For the foregoing reasons, we reject T.F.-G.’s facial challenge to section 25850.

       22
          In a supplemental brief, the Attorney General argues that minors such as T.F.-G.
are not presumptively protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amendment right to bear
arms. We need not render an opinion on this unsettled issue to resolve T.F.-G.’s facial
challenge. (See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, fn. 8 [observing that as a minor
D.L. could not have obtained a concealed carry license while rejecting D.L.’s facial
challenge without addressing whether minors are presumptively protected].) Further, to
the extent that Range, Atkinson, and Rahimi suggest that care must be taken to assess
whether a particular person has lost the protection of the Second Amendment as a result
of a felony conviction, that underscores the fundamental point here. We have not been
asked to assess whether California’s decision to criminalize carrying a firearm without a
license is unconstitutional as applied to T.F.-G., but whether California’s decision to
criminalize carrying a firearm without a license is facially unconstitutional because some
individuals may have been denied a license for unconstitutional reasons even if other
individuals could constitutionally be denied a license.

                                             27
                            III.   DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

                                     28
                               ____________________________
                               LIE, J.

I CONCUR:

____________________________
GROVER, ACTING P.J.

People v. T.F.-G.
H050112
Bromberg, J., concurring
       I respectfully concur in the judgment. I agree with the majority’s analysis of the
motion to suppress and join in its conclusion that the police had probable cause to arrest
T.F.-G. for resisting a peace officer under Penal Code section 148. However, I would
decline to reach T.F.-G.’s Second Amendment challenge to the state’s firearms licensing
requirements.
       As the majority points out, although T.F.-G. failed to raise a Second Amendment
challenge in the trial court, we have discretion to consider this challenge on appeal
because it raises a pure question of law. (See, e.g., Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d
736, 742.) T.F.-G, however, has raised an unusual question of law. Under the Supreme
Court’s developing Second Amendment jurisprudence, to establish the validity of a
restriction on carrying firearms the government must show the restriction is “consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” (New York Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. ___, ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111, 2129-2130, 2138]
(Bruen); District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 592-595.) And in assessing
that tradition, the Supreme Court has analyzed difficult-to-obtain historical materials such
as state statutes and judicial opinion from the colonial, early republic, and antebellum
eras. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at. p.___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2138-2150].) Until case law
defines the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, I do not believe that we
should apply the Second Amendment without the benefit of such historical materials.
       T.F.-G. has not offered any historical materials or analysis in support of his
Second Amendment challenge. In addition to placing the government at an unfair
disadvantage on appeal, and depriving this court of the trial court’s views, the failure to
supply historical materials or analysis makes it difficult for this court to engage in the
historical determination that the Supreme Court now appears to require. Consequently, I
do not believe that we are in a position to properly evaluate T.F.-G.’s Second
Amendment challenge and therefore should not entertain it.
Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment.

                                     2
                    _____________________________________
                               Bromberg, J

People v. T.F.-G.
H050112
Trial Court:                             Santa Clara County
                                         Superior Court No.: 21JV45239A

Trial Judge:                             The Honorable Franklin E. Bondonno
                                         The Honorable L. Michael Clark

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant    Lori A. Quick
T.F.-G.:                                 under appointment by the Court
                                         of Appeal for Appellant

                                         Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright
                                         under appointment by the Court
                                         of Appeal for Appellant

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent   Rob Bonta
The People:                              Attorney General

                                         Lance E. Winters,
                                         Chief Assistant Attorney General

                                         Jeffrey M. Laurence,
                                         Senior Assistant Attorney General

                                         Eric D. Share,
                                         Supervising Deputy Attorney General

                                         Brady Baldwin,
                                         Deputy Attorney General

People v. T.F.-G.
H050112