Court Opinion

ID: 9833718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:57:56.032165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.145873
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[1] Upon further consideration, a majority of this court have reached the conclusion that ' there was error in holding that this case was removable, and have decided that the motion for a rehearing should be granted. That opinion is based upon what is considered the proper construction of the provisions of sections 1011 and 1035 of the U. S. Compiled Statutes (Federal Judicial Code, §§ 29, 53). Section 1011 was quoted in the original opinion and need not be here repeated. Those provisions of section 1035 material to be here considered are as follows:
“When a district contains more , than one division, every suit not of a local nature against a single defendant must be brought in the division where he resides. * ⅜ * In all cases of the removal of suits from the courts of a state to the District Court of the United States such removal shall be to the United States District Court in the division in which the county is situated from which the removal is made; and the time within which the removal shall be perfected, in so far as it refers to or is regulated by the terms of the United States courts, shall be deemed to refer to the terms of the United States District Court in such division.”
The conclusion is that since this case cannot, under the decision in the Wisner Case heretofore referred to, be removed to the District Court of the United States within the territorial limits of which the suit was filed, there is no authority for removing it to any other federal district, and therefore it becomes nonremovable. The writer d@es not concur in that conclusion.
Prior to the decision of the Wisner Case, the great weight of authority sustained the right of a defendant, when sued in a local court in a state of which neither of the parties was a resident, to have the case removed to the federal court of the district in which the suit was pending.
Judge Dillon, after discussing the various decisions on the subject, says:
“Accordingly, it is now well settled, where the parties are citizens of different states and the other conditions of removability are satisfied, the case may be removed to a federal court, notwithstanding the fact that neither plaintiff nor defendant is a citizen or resident of the state where the suit is brought, or the district within the territorial jurisdiction of the federal court to which it is transferred.”
Moon, in his work on the Removal of Causes (section 65), says:
“The clause of the removal act now under consideration refers to jurisdiction as such, and not to the venue of actions. A suit may be removed from a state court to the United States Circuit Court for the district in which the cause is pending in the state court, without regard to the question whether the venue of an original suit would properly be in the United States Circuit Court for that district.”
That conclusion seems to be the logical inference from the statutory provisions relating to the subject of removal. Section 1010 of the *549U. S. Compiled Statutes (Judicial Code, § 28), ■which confers upon a nonresident defendant the right to remove a case from a state court into a federal court, specifies the character of case in which that right may be exercised, and the only conditions required are that the defendant shall be a nonresident of the state in which he is sued, and the amount in controversy not less than $3,000. That section does not prescribe the mode of procedure or name the federal district into which the case shall be transferred when taken from the state court. It merely provides that it may be removed into the District Court of the United States for the “proper district.” Section 1011, previously quoted, prescribes the procedure and directs that the case shall be transferred to the District Court for the territory in which the suit is pending. Section 1035 specifies the division of that district to which the case shall be sent. Clearly, Congress had the power not only to confer upon the nonresident defendant the right to have a suit against him removed from a state court into a federal court and there tried, and to prescribe the conditions under which that right might be exercised, but it also had the power to designate the district into which the transfer should, be made. The question then is: Where did Congress intend to place the venue of cases transferred from state courts into federal courts'?
If there were no other provisions of the federal statute relating to venue besides those just referred to, the question would be easily answered, and no difficulty would arise in concluding that this is a removable case, and that upon proper application should be transferred to the federal court for the Eastern district of Texas and to that division of the district which includes Bowie county, where the suit was pending. That conclusion would be in harmony with the views of the text-writers quoted above and the authorities which they cite. The confusion upon that subject arose when the Supreme Court of the United States in the Wisner Case held that, when a nonresident defendant was sued in a state court situated in a federal district in which neither of the parties resided, the case could not be removed to the federal court of that district. That ruling was not based upon the ground that a suit, when filed in a district in which neither of the parties resided, thereby became nonremovable, but upon the ground that the district in which the suit was pending was not the “proper district” ¿referred to in section 1010 of the U. S. Compiled Statutes (Judicial Code, § 28). I have quoted in the original opinion the language of Chief Justice Fuller which makes that inference clear. He discusses and quotes section 1033, which fixes the venue of original suits between parties who reside in different states. Because of the language of that section, which fixes the venue of original suits between citizens of different states in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, he concluded that no other federal court except those there designated' had the judicial power to try the case, even though both parties consented that it mignt do so. The legal effect of that ruling after its modification in Re Moore, herein previously referred to, is to say that a suit otherwise removable pending in a state court situated in a district in which neither of the parties reside cannot be removed to the federal court of that district because it would not be the “proper district,” and not because that court would not have the judicial power to try the case by consent of the parties.
In determining which is the “proper district,” the court in the Wisner Case gives effect to the provisions of section 1033, ignoring sections 1010 and 1035. The diversity of opinion among the subordinate courts which followed the rendition of that decision is due to the varying constructions placed by them upon the ruling there made. If the Supreme Court in that instance intended to hotó. that, when a nonresident defendant was sued in the local courts of a state situated in a federal district where neither of the parties resided the case became one which is not removable, it had a most favorable opportunity for disposing of the case upon that ground; but, instead of so holding, it directed a remand of the case to the state court because the federal court to which it had been removed was not in the “proper district.” This ruling was made notwithstanding it was the district designated by section 1011 and because it was not the district specified in section 1033. If section 1011 may be ignored because in conflict with section 1033, it yields to the extent of that conflict and no further. Its remaining provisions must be given full effect, and so must all of the other provisions relating to the subject of the removal of cases. Again, if thoso provisions of section 1011 which designate the district to which the case should be removed are to be considered inapplicable to suit a suit, then the law upon the subject would be the same as if those provisions had never been enacted. But it cannot be contended with any show of reason that, if those provisions had been entirely omitted from the statute, this suit would not be removable to the “proper district.” The Wis-ner Case has been so radically modified by subsequent decisions of the federal Supreme Court that its value as a precedent has been seriously impaired, if not totally destroyed. It is by no means certain that it will not ultimately be overruled when the proper occasion arises. While differing with my Associates upon the question of removal, we all agree that upon its merits this case should be affirmed.
[2] The contention is made by the appellant that the evidence does not support the *550finding that appellee’s wife was injured to the extent and in the manner alleged by falling against some object protruding from the door, or that her injuries resulted in the consequences claimed; that is, the premature birth of a child. The evidence relating to those issues was conflicting, and we cannot say that the verdict of the jury is without support. Both the appellee and his wife testified to the essential facts; and, while there was other testimony tending strongly to impeach them, we cannot say that the issue was not one for the jury to decide. Neither dd we think that the verdict is excessive if the injuries inflicted were as serious as the testimony justified the jury in believing.
The motion for a rehearing is granted, and the judgment will be affirmed.