Court Opinion

ID: 9475466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:07.270943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.023821
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
A reader of the majority opinion may have some uncertainty over the precise question before this court. The term “visual body cavity” (VBC) search, used by the majority, could include the search of a prisoner’s ears, mouth, or nose. That, however, is not what this case is about. Nor does it concern the privilege of prison officials to conduct generalized strip searches, and thereby closely examine naked prisoners. This case concerns the routine use of visual anal cavity searches at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP). These anal searches are conducted by requiring prisoners to “put their hands on their buttocks, bend forward at the waist, and spread the buttocks for a visual inspection of the anal area.” See ISP Policy No. 84-3-2-567(B)(10)(b) (set forth in Appendix A). The ISP visual anal cavity search policy basically applies when a prisoner enters or leaves the institution, or the cellhouse if he is in one of the segregation units, before and after contact visits, or after the exposure to general population prisoners if the prisoner is in a segregation unit, and any other time when there is a reasonable suspicion that a prisoner is concealing contraband in his anal cavity.1 The district court concluded that the ISP’s routine use of visual anal cavity searches constituted an exaggerated response to security needs. It held that the searches were therefore unreasonable and in violation of those minimal fourth amendment rights that apply in a prison setting. The district court proceeded to enter carefully limited injunctive relief on behalf of the prisoners. See Appendix B. The majority, proclaiming the need to defer to the judgment of prison officials, reverses.
These searches are dehumanizing to the prisoners and must be revolting to the inspecting guards. This kind of procedure calls for exacting review by the courts if prisoners have any rights as human beings, and I believe they do. Here the district court’s findings are well grounded on the evidence and its application of the law correct. Yet, in my view, the majority, in a cavalier fashion, overrules the district court and gives its stamp of approval to these unnecessary, demeaning inspections by the prison authorities.
I.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Supreme Court articulated the balancing test to be used in determining the reasonableness of search procedures under the fourth amendment.2 The Court stated:
The test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In my view, the district court correctly applied this approach in the present case.3 It considered all of the elements in the balancing test, *373made specific factual findings, and arrived at narrowly drawn conclusions based on those facts.
The majority, however, simply reduces the Wolfish approach to an inquiry as to “whether the VBC search policy is reasonably related to the security of the prison.” Majority op. at 11. The majority seems willing, in applying this standard, to approve rigid visual cavity searches of the anus if it can imagine any colorable rationale for their use and to overlook the unlikelihood a closely-watched prisoner has any opportunity to hide contraband in his anal cavity.
In overturning the district court’s injunction against the routine use of visual anal cavity searches when segregated prisoners return from exercise, the majority states: “We cannot say that the record contains substantial evidence that VBC searches upon the inmates’ return from exercise will not deter or detect the passage of contraband.” Majority op. at 22. I believe this demonstrates that the majority’s approach improperly constricts the analysis required to determine the fourth amendment reasonableness of visual anal cavity searches.
In its analysis, the majority places little emphasis on the fact that the routine use of visual anal cavity searches at ISP was not established due to security concerns, but rather due to the discriminatory application of such searches by prison guards when the policy had been based on “reasonable suspicion.” It seems appalling to me that ISP officials made no effort to educate and discipline prison guards, but instead spread the humiliation of the discriminatory abuse of the old search policy by replacing it with a policy of routine anal searches. This approaches punishment for protest rather than concern for security.
The key element in the Wolfish balancing approach is the need for a particular search. In the present case, the actual reasons for ISP’s use of routine visual anal cavity searches belies the expressed concerns regarding security. See Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir.1985) (“security cannot justify the blanket deprivation of rights”). I take seriously the Supreme Court’s statement that “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974-75, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The loss of such rights are occasioned only by the legitimate needs of institutional security. Cf. United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir.1986). In the present case, I believe that the majority simply gives too much credence to ISP officials’ invocation of the spector of security-
At the same time, the majority pays too little attention to the invasion of prisoners’ personal rights resulting from the routine use of visual anal cavity searches. The district court found that such searches are intrusive, degrading, humiliating, and embarrassing. Furthermore, the court found that such searches greatly increase a prisoner’s feelings of vulnerability.4 626 F.Supp. at 739. The majority responds to these findings as follows: “While we do not doubt these characterizations, we seriously question the extent to which VBC searches contribute to these feelings which to some degree necessarily accompany imprisonment.” Majority op. at 14, n. 10. Thus the majority dilutes the district court’s factual findings based apparently *374on its own “hunch” regarding the effect of visual anal cavity searches on prisoners. In fact, the majority’s logic seems to be that prisoners generally suffer degradation as human beings, thus a little bit more debasement is of no consequence.
On this theme, the majority suggests that the prisoners overstate the extent of the invasion of their bodies by the anal search inasmuch as the prisoners do not object to the visual inspection of the crotch and the prisoner’s lifting of the genitals for that purpose. Majority op. at 13-14. I must reject that kind of reasoning. There is a substantial difference between a guard’s search of a prisoner’s frontside as opposed to a search of his backside; besides a heightened sensation of vulnerability, one’s ability to protect oneself from unexpected attack is put at a distinct disadvantage. A recent case suggests that a prisoner’s fear of physical abuse while his back is turned may not be unwarranted. See McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.1986). In Shimoda, a prisoner alleged that a guard attempted to plunge a riot stick into the prisoner’s anus during a strip search in which he was ordered to turn his back to the guard and spread his legs apart. Moreover, it could well be the fact it is the second of two humiliating search procedures that causes the anal cavity search to violate the fourth amendment. It may well be, as it were, “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”
In sum, then, I believe the majority subverts the balancing of interests as articulated in Wolfish. I would affirm the district court’s conclusion that routine visual anal cavity searches, in certain circumstances, were not necessary to prison security and were therefore unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
On review, this court is limited by the “clearly erroneous” rule. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). We may not reverse the district court’s findings of fact unless our review of the record leaves us with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541-42, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). The district court carefully considered the issue over many months, heard much testimony, toured the Iowa State Penitentiary, and tried the case on the Penitentiary grounds at Fort Madison, Iowa. The district court made specific factual findings based upon the record, and concluded that the routine use of visual anal cavity searches amounted to an exaggerated response to the prison administration’s security concerns. In my view, a significant flaw in the majority opinion rests on the failure to comply with the dictates of the clearly erroneous rule. The majority has substituted its view of the facts for those found by the district court. Based on my review of the record in its entirety, the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
II.
The majority’s willingness to accord judicial deference to prison administrators’ completely wide-open discretion in these searches undergirds its entire opinion. Therefore a brief comment is in order. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of judicial recognition of prison officials’ expertise, and the need for deference to their judgment, such discretion is not absolute.5
The rationale for deference loses its force where there is substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the need for a particular security measure is unreasonable, or that prison officials had exaggerated their response to security concerns. *375Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. at 1875 n. 23; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338, 343 (8th Cir.1985). Judicial deference “does not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose * * Whitley v. Albers, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Moreover, “a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance in valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect the constitutional rights.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807-08, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). As the Supreme Court stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 1846, there must be a “mutual accommodation” between the important institutional objective of security and the constitutionally protected rights of prisoners.
In this light, I am concerned about this court’s “apparent willingness to substitute the rhetoric of judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims in the prison setting.” Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3236, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). “[Cjareless invocations of ‘deference’ run the risk of returning us to the passivity of several decades ago, when the then-prevailing barbarism and squalor of many prisons were met with a judicial blind eye and a ‘hands off’ approach.” Id. at 594, 104 S.Ct. at 3236.
The Arkansas prison cases can well demonstrate the result of this sort of judicial attitude. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) and cases cited therein. As this court has previously recognized, in certain cases “judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates — not to mention considerations of basic humanity — are to be observed in the prisons.” Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 473 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2403, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original). This represents one of those cases.
III.
In its concluding paragraph, the majority implies that this case concerns only “an amorphous set of ‘basic human rights’” beyond the protection of the federal courts. This case is certainly about human rights; and if it is true, as has often been said, that the manner in which a society treats its prisoners is evidence of the essential character of that society, then this case may have broad connotations.
Consequently, regardless of the outcome of this litigation, I suggest that the prison administration review its policies in light of appropriate goals of correction. If the search policy, demeaning in nature to the inmates — and I am sure distasteful to the guards — is discovered unnecessary, the policy should be changed, without any intervention by the courts.
In any event, for the reasons previously stated, I strongly dissent.
APPENDIX A
Iowa State Penitentiary Policy No. 84-3-2-567, entitled “Strip Search Inmates,” reads as follows:
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this policy is to outline the procedures for conducting a strip search of an inmate and the circumstances for which the strip search is warranted.
APPLICABILITY:
This procedure applies to all inmates and to all staff conducting strip searches of inmates at the Iowa State Penitentiary Correctional Complex.
OBJECTIVE:
To retard passing of inmate contraband and lessen the possibility of an inmate to conceal a weapon upon his person. RESPONSIBILITY:
It is the responsibility of any staff member to conduct strip searches in this pre*376scribed manner whenever the situation demands or if the staff member has any reason to believe the inmate may be concealing contraband on his person.
PROCEDURE:
A. The strip search will be initiated under the following circumstances.
1. Whenever an administrative segregation inmate leaves his cell by escort.
2. Before and after all visits.
3. During a cell search of the inmate’s cell.
4. Entering or leaving the institution.
5. Any inmate being transferred from general population to administrative segregation.
6. Upon suspicion:
a. Suspicious acts.
b. Investigative reports.
c. Other pertinent information.
7. Other circumstances as warranted per approval of the Shift Supervisor or higher authority. (If this section is implemented a “blotter” entry will be made describing the circumstances and the findings).
B. The strip search will be conducted by member(s) of the same sex as the inmate.
1. The inmate will be informed that he will be strip searched.
2. The search will be conducted in an area, as private as is possible, without jeopardizing the safety of the searchers), or the effectiveness of the search.
3. The inmate will be instructed to remove all clothing and hand it to one of the searchers.
4. While remaining in visual contact with the subject, (to prevent discarding any contraband) the clothing will be thoroughly searched and then set aside.
5. Subject will face the searcher(s), holding both hands in the air, palms ahead, and fingers spread apart. Slowly inspect the inmate from head to toe, looking for concealed items and needlemarks, etc.
6. Have subject shake out his hair and turn his head to the side so that the ear canal can be inspected, then turn his head so that the process can be repeated.
7. Then have subject open his mouth, stick out his tongue, and roll upper and lower lips.
8. Have subject lift penis and scrotum to inspect the crotch area.
9. While keeping his hands in the air, have the subject turn around and lift one foot at a time so that the bottom of the foot, arch area, and the toes can be inspected.
10. Visual anal check per following rules:
a. The visual anal check procedure is not to be used except under the following conditions:
(1) If the searching officers have reasonably clear indication or suggestion that contraband is being concealed in the inmate’s body cavity, suspicious manners or movements by the inmate being searched, etc.
(2) Exiting the institution under staff supervision.
(3) Entering or returning to institution, if the inmate has not been under constant visual supervision or if inmate has been out of handcuffs.
(4) Inmate upon original placement, entering or returning to the cellhouse if the inmate has not been under continued visual supervision, has been out of handcuffs, and is in disciplinary status, Level A of Close Management, prosecutor’s hold, summary segregation, or suicide status. (This includes leaving and returning from exercise.)
(5) Before and after all contact visits.
(6) During placement into any administrative segregation status.
(7) When any administrative segregation inmate returns to his cell after being in the general population unes*377corted (i.e. Close Management, Level B, yard exercise, or meals)
b. The correct procedure for the visual anal check is: The subject will put their hands on their buttocks, bend forward at the waist, and spread the buttocks for a visual inspection of the anal area.
c. If the inmate refuses the visual anal check procedure, the searching officers will keep the inmate under constant visual supervision while simultaneously contacting the D.W.O., the Security Director, or the O.D. for further instructions. When contacting this supervisor, the searching officers shall inform this supervisor of the conditions and circumstances by which the visual anal check procedures were implemented. This superior will then give further instructions, i.e. write a report, proceed without visual anal inspection, note as a refusal, etc.
NOTE: The inmate is to be under close visual observation from start to finish during the strip search procedures. 1[1]. The inmate’s clothing is returned to him. Continue to observe him and do not permit him to pick up any item or disappear from your view before he is moved from the strip search location.
C. The strip search is an important duty for any staff that is charged with this responsibility. Failure to conduct the search in this prescribed manner could cause injury or death to other persons. Do not allow inmates to intimidate or compromise the effectiveness of the search. Failure of any inmate to be cooperative with all provisions of this policy is a violation of institutional rules and a disciplinary report must be written. If the strip search is being conducted in relationship to inmate movement and the inmate refuses to cooperate, the movement shall be suspended until proper authorities are notified. The subject will be kept under continual observation until instructions are received from those authorities.
D. If it is determined or reasonably ascertained that the inmate has contraband concealed in a body cavity, he will be placed in a sideroom of the hospital or an equally secure area until he can be examined by a Physician or a Physician’s Assistant. Criteria for this determination can include:
1. Visual observation during strip search.
2. Refusal of the inmate to cooperate with all or part of the search.
3. Investigative information.
APPENDIX B
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from conducting visual anal body cavity searches in the following situations:
1. Before or after contact visits with attorneys, legal interns with a notarized letter of introduction from a licensed attorney, clergy, the prison chaplain, or representatives of the prison ombudsman’s office.
2. Before going to or after coming from the prison infirmary.
3. Before leaving the prison on a trip to University of Iowa Hospitals. However, as a modification of the preliminary injunction, vbc searches can be conducted upon arrival at the Hospital and before leaving the Hospital.
4. Before or after attendance by inmates at court dates, whether on the prison grounds or in any other location, unless the inmate is out of restraints and actually beyond the visual supervision of ISP correctional officers. Private visits with attorneys shall not be considered as being outside the visual supervision or out of restraints.
5. Before going to or after coming from the exercise areas.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the practice known as “squat-and-cough” shall be permanently enjoined from being used under any circumstances at ISP.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that correctional officers and other ISP officials shall *378be enjoined from teasing, making abusive or rude comments, or otherwise verbally harassing inmates during a vbc search.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order does NOT prevent the defendants from conducting visual body cavity searches in the following situations:
(a) Before or after “contact” visits with any visitors coming to the prison except as set out above.
(b) Upon initial admission to the prison or before or after being outside the prison on furlough, transfer or work release.
(c) Before or after a segregated prisoner has mixed with the “general population” without supervision or restraints.
(d) Before or after an inmate, in any set of circumstances, has demonstrated activity which would give an official of the penitentiary of the status of Security Director or above a reasonably clear indication that an inmate is actually concealing something in his anal cavity. In any such situations, the burden will be on the Warden to show that the use of this exception was reasonable.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall apply to all inmates at the Iowa State Penitentiary, not only to cellhouse 20 and 319 inmates.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs shall submit their pleadings setting out their position on damages within twelve days from the date this Order is filed. Defendants shall respond in six days.
626 F.Supp. 736, 747 (S.D.Iowa 1984).

. The right to subject the prisoner to a visual search of the anal cavity on suspicion that the prisoner is secreting contraband items is not a subject of dispute here.

. The majority assumes for purposes of this case that prisoners retain some limited fourth amendment interest in bodily privacy. I would affirmatively hold that, at a minimum, society recognizes a prisoner’s expectation of privacy in his or her body as legitimate, and that therefore prisoners retain at least this small degree of fourth amendment protection. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

. I observe that the balancing test prescribed in Wolfish does not validate visual body cavity searches in prisons or detention settings per se. See Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir.1985).

. One of the prison’s expert witnesses, Dr. Barry Mintzes, a clinical psychologist and former warden of the State Prison at Jackson, Michigan, with a long career in corrections, stated:
Within a prison environment, one of the— one of the things that people fear is homosexual attack, and the visual body cavity search serves the purposes of requiring an inmate to bend over and spread his buttocks and in effect psychologically making him feel even more vulnerable because the one thing that most inmates tend to worry about in terms of going to prison. They tend to worry about homosexual assault more than they even worry about physical assault and psychologically tends to be more demeaning and tends to feel more humiliating and tends to leave inmates feeling more vulnerable.
Mintzes Deposition at 45-46.

. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Procurnier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807-08, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081-82, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-92, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).