Court Opinion

ID: 9607594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:00:28.662047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.433432
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that the Workers’ Compensation Act bars Dalton’s claim against Rogers Construction for indemnity under the High-voltage Safety Act. Although it is true that the Workers’ Compensation Act shields an employer, who has paid workers’ compensation benefits to an employee, from tort liability as a third-party defendant in a tort action brought by the employee, see Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co., 261 Ga. 822, 823 (1) (411 SE2d 871) (1992), the Workers’ Compensation Act does not absolutely bar all third-party claims against the employer. For example, it is well settled that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar a defendant, who is in contractual privity with an employer and has been sued by an employee, from enforcing a contractual right of indemnity in a third-party action against the employer. Gen. Telephone Co. &c. v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95 (311 SE2d 460) (1984); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Maverick Materials, 167 Ga. App. 160, 163 (305 SE2d 810) (1983).
I believe that the indemnity provision found in the High-voltage *823Safety Act should be given at least as much weight as a private indemnity agreement and, therefore, that it should be recognized as an exception to the workers’ compensation bar based on the clear statutory language found in the High-voltage Safety Act.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Rogers Construction failed to assure that Dalton had rendered its high-voltage line safe before Rogers Construction began work within ten feet of the line. As a result, based on the unequivocal language found in the High-voltage Safety Act, Rogers Construction has a statutory duty to indemnify Dalton “against all claims” including those for personal injury. OCGA § 46-3-40 (b). This statutory duty is similar to a contractual duty and just as binding because it is not based on an employer’s status as a joint tortfeasor or on any statutory, common law or other right that an employee might have against his employer absent the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Moreover, the phrase “against all claims” in the indemnification provision found in OCGA § 46-3-40 (b) and the penal nature of that provision manifest the legislature’s intent that the right to indemnity found in the provision not be abridged by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. To conclude otherwise renders the High-voltage Safety Act all but meaningless because it in large part negates any punishment for violation of the act.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Pappas v. Hill-Staton Engineers, 183 Ga. App. 258, 259-260 (358 SE2d 625) (1987), is not almost directly on point, and it clearly does not dictate that Dalton’s statutory indemnity claim against Rogers Construction be barred. That case is distinguishable from the instant case because it dealt with the predecessor to the High-voltage Safety Act, which was known as the Crane Act. The Crane Act, however, did not contain any indemnity provision. Instead, it only provided for criminal penalties against those who violated its safety provisions. Furthermore, Pappas involved a deceased employee’s representative’s attempt to recover damages for the employee’s death based on negligence and negligence per se in violating the Crane Act. Such claims properly were barred by OCGA § 34-9-11 (a) because they constituted claims based on common law, statute or otherwise that originally could have been asserted by the employee against his employer, but for the existence of the workers’ compensation bar, as opposed to a claim based on an independent duty that could not be asserted by an employee, of the type found in the High-voltage Safety Act or contractual indemnity provisions.
Based on the above reasoning, I believe the cases cited by Rogers Construction and those relied on by the majority also are distinguishable and not dispositive here. Moreover, because statutory remedies of the type found in the High-voltage Safety Act impose specific *824duties, the enforcement of which would never be available to an employee in a suit against its employer, I find no support for any argument that recognition of such remedies as exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act would result in a.flood of litigation.
Decided December 5, 1996
Leitner, Williams, Dooley & Napolitan, Sean A. Hunt, David W. Noblit, for appellant.
Bennett & Hamilton, Hubert E. Hamilton III, Finley & Buckley, Timothy J. Buckley III, for appellee.
In light of the above, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of Rogers Construction’s summary judgment motion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.