Court Opinion

ID: 9853977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:58:38.914001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:26.140972
License: Public Domain

TOAL, Justice:
The defendant Willie James Asbury appeals his convictions of murder and kidnapping, asserting, inter alia, that the court erred in refusing to suppress evidence improperly seized from Asbury’s home. I agree and must, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion.
*196On January 6, 1992, six officers went to Asbury’s trailer house to serve on him outstanding warrants and commitment orders unrelated to the present case. Asbury had been pinpointed as a suspect in the murder of Ezell Lawrence (“Victim”). The officers went to Asbury’s residence early in the morning. When they arrived, they did not see any vehicles outside. The doors of the trailer house were locked, and no noises could be heard coming from inside. An officer testified that a light could be seen inside the house. The officers claimed that they knocked on the front door and called to Asbury, but did not receive a response. They decided to enter the trailer through an open window. Two officers, one following the other, entered through the window, while the others had their weapons drawn in order to protect the entering officers. They then opened the front door from inside.
In checking the rooms for Asbury, the officers found in plain view an electric blanket with its electrical plug missing. Asbury himself was not at home. The officers left the residence, but did not remove any evidence. They procured a search warrant two days later on January 8th and returned to the residence in order to seize the electric blanket. On January 15th, the officers secured another search warrant and seized numerous appliances that had had their electrical cords cut off, as well as other items in the residence that could be used to cut electrical cord, including a pair of scissors.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the Supreme Court wrote that “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”1 Id. at 603, 100 S.Ct. at 1388, 63 L.Ed.2d at 661. The South Carolina Supreme Court *197applied this standard in 1981 when it decided State v. Loftin, 276 S.C. 48, 275 S.E.2d 575 (1981) (“A valid arrest warrant implicitly grants police the limited authority to enter a suspect’s residence “when there is reason to believe the suspect, is within.’ ”) (quoting Payton). In Loftin the Court found that there were no facts or circumstances from which the police could have entertained a reasonable belief that the defendant was in his apartment. No one appeared to be at home when the police arrived, no one answered when the officers knocked on the door, and no sign of the defendant was perceived, despite a stake-out of an hour and a half. Accordingly, the evidence which the police found after the apartment complex manager let them into defendant’s apartment was excludable as fruit of an illegal search.
Under the standard articulated in Loftin, the evidence in the present case would similarly be deemed as impermissibly seized because there was not reason to believe the suspect was within his trailer house. This is revealed by the testimony of one of the officers:
Q: And you got there and there was no evidence of anybody being present, was there?
A: When we first got there you really couldn’t tell if anyone was present or not....
Furthermore, the officers did not see any vehicles outside, did not notice any activity, did not hear any noises from inside, and did not get a response when they knocked on the door. Although the officers claimed that they saw a light inside the residence, this was called into question on cross-examination.2 *198When the officers found the doors locked, they decided to enter through a window. Under these circumstances, I conclude the officers did not have reason to believe that the suspect was within. Because the police did not have the authority to enter into the home, the evidence which was later seized was the fruit of this illegal entry and search; thus, it should have been excluded. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (where evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police, and the evidence has been obtained by the exploitation of that illegality, the evidence must be excluded); State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981).
Such a finding not only comports with our own holding in Loftin, but it is also consistent with the application of the Payton standard by other jurisdictions. For example, the Second Circuit in United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212 (2d Cir.1995) held that officers had reason to believe the defendant was present in his apartment when they sought to execute an arrest warrant.3 The officers had received information from a confidential informant that the defendant had moved into the windowless apartment during the weekend, that he was unemployed, and that typically he slept late. They found him asleep inside the apartment when they entered one morning at 8:30 a.m.
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the search subsequent to an entry pursuant to an arrest warrant was valid where prior to their entry, police observed a moving light in the apartment and heard noises from within. Hardaway v. *199State, 188 Ga.App. 310, 372 S.E.2d 845 (1988). Likewise, United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931, 103 S.Ct. 2095, 77 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983) held that agents had the right to enter the defendant’s home where they had verified the address through a phone listing and where upon arriving at the apartment building, they encountered a twelve-year old boy wearing a shirt with “Terry” on it, who told them that his parents lived in the apartment and did not indicate that his father was not at home. Further, agents arrived at 8:45 a.m. on a Sunday morning, a time they could reasonably believe Terry would be at home.
In contrast, the Payton standard was not satisfied in People v. Cabral, 147 Misc.2d 1000, 560 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1990), wherein police only had information that the defendant may have lived at the residence some six and one-half months earlier, where they had no additional information pointing to the presence of the defendant in the residence, and where someone whom the police recognized as not being the defendant answered the door; yet the police entered and searched the apartment anyway. The same conclusion was reached in State v. Roepka, 217 Neb. 139, 347 N.W.2d 857 (1984), in which police surrounded at 8:45 a.m. a trailer house, a location previously under surveillance. When they knocked on the door, a third-party answered the door and told the police the defendant was not within. The police, nevertheless, entered. The court found that based on these facts, the officers had no reason to believe the defendant was within the trailer house.
These cases are quite fact-specific; however, they do provide a general sense of what constitutes “reason to believe the suspect is within.” In the present case, the officers could not have entertained a reasonable belief that Asbury was in his home. The majority argues that the presence of three factors — general information that early mornings and late evenings were good times to find Asbury at home, the existence of a light, and an open window in the house — were sufficient to give police reason to believe the suspect was within his residence. Even if we accept the existence of these factors, in light of all the indicia weighing against Asbury’s presence at home, these factors would only give rise to a mere possibility, *200not a reasonable belief, that Asbury was in his residence. These factors must be weighed against the officers’ own testimony: “When we first got there you really couldn’t tell if anyone was present or not,” and against the facts that they found the residence’s doors locked, noticed no activity, heard no noises from inside, and got no response when they knocked on the door.
However, the task of determining whether the officers had a reasonable belief is much easier. A closer examination reveals that there were not three factors present, but really only one. First, the open window is veritably a non-factor, as it is customary for many people, particularly in small towns in South Carolina, to leave their house windows open. An open window does not point to a person’s presence at home, any more than a closed window suggests his absence. Second, I find that the record does not support the conclusion that the officers saw a light inside Asbury’s residence. The majority suggests that the officers saw a light, as evidenced by the testimony of Detective Thompson. It is true that Thompson did testify to seeing a light; however, when two other officers testified that they did not remember seeing a light, it is highly questionable whether the light was a factor which led the police to believe Asbury was at home. When the factors of the light and the window are eliminated, we are then left with only one factor, namely, the information from neighbors. This sole factor cannot justify a reasonable belief by the officers that the suspect was at home.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 352 S.E.2d 471 (1987). This is an instance in which Asbury’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Accordingly, I would reverse the circuit court’s denial of Asbury’s motion to suppress.
FINNEY, C.J., concurs.

. Although initially this language may have been viewed as dicta, since under the facts of Payton, the officers lacked an arrest wárrant, the Supreme Court has cited it with approval in subsequent cases, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), and it has been recognized as binding by the federal circuit and state courts that have considered the issue. See United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036, 104 S.Ct. 1309, 79 L.Ed.2d 707 (1984).

. One officer testified as follows:
Q: You testified there were no lights before, didn’t you?
A: I'm not sure on that. I might have. If I said no lights, then it may be an oversight.
Q: Well, you testified previously under oath in regards to your activities on the inside of his trailer house is that the only light that was available was a light, was light that was coming in from the sunlight, is that not correct sir?
A: Yes, sir, I believe so.
Q: There was no artificial light?
A: At that time I couldn't remember a light.
Further,
Q: Okay. Now you saw no lights at the trailer, correct sir?
A: I can’t recall whether there was lights on or not at the time.
*198Q: You can't recall?
A: No, sir.

. The majority posits that Lauter is indistinguishable from the circumstances in this case. A closer examination will reveal significant differences between the present case and Lauter. In Lauter, agents had received information from a confidential informant, whose father was the landlord of the apartment wherein the defendant resided. Further, Lauter had just moved into the apartment during the weekend. The agents had been informed that Lauter was unemployed. Moreover, they had been told that he typically slept late. Another distinguishing factor was that Lauter’s apartment was windowless; thus, unlike As-bury's home, it was not possible for the officers to see any possible ■ activity inside the residence.