Court Opinion

ID: 9524362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:52:05.658629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:42.714988
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
dissenting.
As a parent, I can imagine few nightmares worse that than that which Jelana Hobbs D’Angelo lived through on May 23, 2001. Coming upon an accident scene where her fourteen year-old son Joshua lay trapped beneath an automobile, trying in vain to free him, and watching him die in front of her, she sustained emotional distress which was every bit as much of a natural and direct consequence of the accident as Joshua’s death. That distress, with its attendant shock, and mortification, was a visceral reaction far beyond grief at the loss of a child and far beyond what any of us should ever have to endure.
There is no question but that Helen Goldey, the driver of the car which struck, ran over, trapped and ultimately crushed Joshua, was negligent. There is similarly no dispute that his mother Jelana suffered emotional distress. Indeed, State Farm concedes both.
What State Farm does not concede is that Jelana sustained an independent bodily injury as a result of this accident. But, if Jelana’s emotional distress — uncontrollable crying, loss of appetite, and inability to sleep and concentrate — is not a bodily injury, then what is it? Are not the neurotransmitters in her brain parts of her body as much as her arms and legs? Are not the electro-chemical impulses that they transmit bodily functions as much as circulation and respiration? And, if the neurotransmitters are parts of her body and if the electro-chemical impulses that they transmit are bodily functions, then doesn’t it follow that emotional distress which is caused by the impulses is a bodily injury?
Even if we were to require a physical component in order for emotional distress to constitute a bodily injury, would that requirement not be satisfied by the physical manifestations of the emotional distress that Jelana has sustained? We so held in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jakup-ko, 856 N.E.2d 778 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) trans. granted 869 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2007), in Elliott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 859 N.E.2d 696 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. granted 869 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2007) and in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. D.L.B., 862 N.E.2d 678 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Although our Supreme Court has granted transfer in Ja-kupko and Elliott thereby vacating their precedential value and transfer is pending in D.L.B., the logic underlying these decisions and similar decisions in other jurisdictions remains in tact.
In addition, our General Assembly has mandated that uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage for bodily injury include sickness and disease. See Indiana Code § 27-7-5-2. Thus, as the trial court correctly determined, State Farm cannot provide less coverage than that mandated by our General Assembly. Even if Jela-*801na’s emotional distress is not a bodily injury, should it not be classified under sickness or disease.
Finally, State Farm argues that Jelana’s emotional distress did not arise as a result of this accident, but from her coming on the scene afterwards. To accept this argument would require us to ignore that both Joshua’s death and Jelana’s distress were the proximate results of the collision caused by Helen Goldey’s negligence. This tragic accident did not end when the wheels of the car rolled over and stopped on top of Joshua. Rather, the sequence that began when Helen Goldey negligently struck Joshua and ran over him continued unbroken until Joshua’s death when Jelana and emergency personnel were unable to free him and keep him from being crushed by Goldey’s car. By State Farm’s logic, if Jelana’s emotional distress did not result from this accident, then neither did Joshua’s death.
Courts have long struggled with issues relating to the negligent infliction of emotional distress because of concerns over frivolous or false claims, a proliferation of litigation and issues of foreseeability. None of such concerns is present here. Goldey’s negligence in causing the accident is undisputed as is Jelana’s emotional distress. Jelana is Joshua’s mother. She was at the accident scene immediately after the collision occurred and directly involved in trying to free Joshua from the crushing weight of the Goldey’s car. Her emotional distress is severe, verifiable and goes far beyond the grief that any parent would experience at the loss of her child and far beyond the reaction that would be sustained by an unrelated bystander.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the .trial court’s decision in all respects.