Court Opinion

ID: 9576388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:23:56.323259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:48.743875
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.” This language plainly and unambiguously accords the people of this State the fundamental right to access the courts.6 The majority, however, follows the holding in Bloomfield v. Liggett & Myers, 230 Ga. 484 (198 SE2d 144) (1973) to deny the people of this State this fundamental right by constricting the scope of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII to a mere right to self-representation in the courts. The source for this constriction is not the plain language of the constitutional provision itself. It is not the official account of the 1877 Constitutional Convention, responsible for the 1877 Constitution in which the right to access the courts first appeared. See Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the People of Georgia (“Journal”). It is not even the personal recollections of a convention member, such as Mr. Nelson Tift, who proposed the resolution to add this language as a freestanding provision in the constitution, or Mr. John C. Key, who proposed adding virtually identical language as part of the due process clause. The sole basis for the majority’s interpretation of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII is a single passage in one source: Small’s A *43Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention Held in Atlanta, Georgia, 1877 (Constitution Publishing Company, Atlanta, 1877), see Bloomfield, supra at 485, even though, as the title page of that book reflects, its contents were “reported by Samuel W. Small for the Atlanta Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied.)7
Samuel W Small was not a member of the 1877 Constitutional Convention. Journal, supra, pp. 7-10 (initial role call); id. at 655-662 (index of members). He was neither one of the temporary secretaries at the Convention, id. at p. 7, nor the official secretary of that convention. See id. at 15 (election of Mr. Nisbet as convention secretary). Mr. Small was, instead, a reporter for the Atlanta Constitution, a newspaper that printed Mr. Small’s report in its daily edition, see the archives for that newspaper available at http://pqasb. pqarchiver.com/ajc_historic/advancedsearch.html?new= l,8 and whose publishing company,9 rather than the state printer and publisher,10 thereafter compiled the reports in the book on which the majority relies. Mr. Small attempted to compile in shorthand form an account of the discussions he overheard at the convention; the title page to his book asserts that it sets forth “debate in full on all questions before the convention.”11 However, contrary to the title page and the majority’s claim, the account Mr. Small compiled is demonstrably inaccurate, as readily exemplified by the errors in his report regarding the very resolution introduced to commend him and other members of the media at the conclusion of the convention.12 Nothing in that resolution *44commending Mr. Small recognizes him as “the official reporter of the Convention,” as the majority claims. Maj. Op., p. 26. Instead, all it reflects is a gesture of appreciation made by the convention members to the reporters covering their efforts, in the same manner the General Assembly has indicated its appreciation for the “quality comprehensive coverage of the Georgia legislative session” when commending the Lawmakers broadcast on Georgia Public Television. See Senate Resolution 564, adopted March 29, 2005.
The majority does not and, indeed, cannot deny that its interpretation of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII is based entirely upon the account of Mr. Small, a newspaper reporter for the Atlanta Constitution. I cannot agree to the use of Mr. Small’s demonstrably inaccurate book as a legitimate source to construe a constitutional provision contrary to its plain language. The majority’s reliance on an unofficial journalist’s account is in direct contravention of our precedent refusing to accept as authority even the actual videotaped recordings of statements made by legislators themselves because those recordings are not official accounts on which this Court may rely when interpreting our statutes. See, e.g., DeKalb Dev. Auth. v. State of Ga., 286 Ga. 36 (4), n. 4 (684 SE2d 856) (2009). We do not use those sources, notwithstanding their unquestioned accuracy, authenticity or validity, because they are not official. If all we require now is that a source look accurate and be cited by authorities other than courts, then we might as well just start relying on Wikipedia entries. Nor can the unfortunate reliance on Mr. Small’s account in other opinions of this Court ameliorate any reliance on this unofficial source. None of these other opinions acknowledge that Mr. Small was *45a journalist reporting for the Atlanta Constitution; none of them recognize that he was not the official reporter of the 1877 Constitutional Convention. Those opinions improperly relied on Mr. Small’s book. Because it is this Court’s purpose to correct errors, not sanctify and perpetuate them, I would disapprove the use of Mr. Small’s account in those other opinions for the same reason I reject it here.13
The majority tries to “have its cake and eat it, too,” by first denying a right to access the courts but then hedging its ruling by stating that, “even if’ such a right exists, Maj. Op., p. 28, the statute at issue here does not violate it. This is no way to interpret our State’s constitution. A right to access the courts is too important, too fundamental to the maintenance of all our other rights, to be accorded such casual treatment. Whether OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) violates our right to access the courts is a close question on which reasonable minds may well disagree.14 The existence of a right to access the courts, however, is not a close question at all. That right is clearly and plainly set forth in the unambiguous language of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII. Because the majority refuses to acknowledge the *46existence of that right by repudiating the improper reliance the Court in Bloomfield placed on a journalist’s unofficial account of the 1877 Constitutional Convention, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion.
Decided March 15, 2010
Reconsideration denied April 9, 2010.
Greenberg Traurig, Mark G. Trigg, Ryan C. Grelecki, for appellants.
Molden, Holley & Thompson, Regina S. Molden, Oni A. Holley, for appellees.
Powell Goldstein, Eric P. Schroeder, LeeAnn Jones, William V. Custer TV, Charles M. Cork, Jr., amici curiae.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins this dissent.

 Because a right to the courts would be rendered meaningless if it did not provide a right to access the courts, I cannot agree with the special concurrence’s interpretation of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII that is contrary to our rules of constitutional and statutory construction. See generally Blum v. Schrader, 281 Ga. 238 (2) (637 SE2d 396) (2006) (basic rale of constitutional construction that no provision is presumed to be without meaning).

 I would like to thank the Georgia State University College of Law Library for its loan of an original edition of Mr. Small’s report from its rare books collection. An accurate image of the report may also he viewed online at http://books.google.com/books?id=7vMaAAAAYAAJ& printsee=frontcover&dq=small-! stenographic-! report+of+the+proceedings+of+the+constitututional+convention-! held+in+atlanta,+georgia+1877&source=bl&ots=93rTNRtbCG&sig= Y6fgEaRj31AZGx2PniL8gi9zZUU&hl = en&ei = PyVXS_q-LdWztgelrpi-BA&sa=X&oi=book_ result&ct=result&resnum=l&ved=0CAcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=&f=false.

 A search using the search term “convention” with the date range of July-August 1877 will generate a synopsis of the articles published by the Atlanta Constitution setting forth their reporter’s account of the convention debates. Payment is required to view the articles themselves.

 See Ga. L. 1877, Part II, Local and Private Laws, Title 1, Corporations, Chap. 8, Publishing Companies, Act No. 227, approved February 27, 1877, p. 227 (authorizing creation of the Constitution Publishing Company for the purpose, inter alia, of publishing “the Atlanta Constitution, daily”).

 Compare the Journal of the Constitutional Convention, supra, published by “Jas. P Harrison & Co., State Printers and Publishers, 1877,” and Ga. L. 1877, also known as the Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, passed at the regular January Session, 1877 (published by same).

 The Journal, without any discussion, is 701 pages long. Mr. Small’s book, allegedly setting forth all the discussion, is only 502 pages long, including the index.

 According to the Journal, the resolution was as follows:
That the thanks of this Convention are due, and are hereby tendered, to Samuel W Small, Esq., stenographic reporter, for the very able, faithful and impartial manner *44in which he has reported the proceedings of this Convention; and also to the following gentlemen: Messrs. J.C. Jones, Macon Telegraph and Messenger; S. W Postell, Griffin News; Howard Williams, of the Columbus Times; E A. Stovall, Augusta Chronicle and Constitutionalist, and Sidney Herbert, of the Savannah News, which resolution was agreed to.
(Emphasis supplied.) Journal, supra at p. 566. According to Mr. Small, however, the following occurred:
Mr. SPENCE, of the 35th district, offered the following resolution:
Resolved, That the thanks of this convention are due and are hereby tendered to Samuel W Small, Esq., stenographic reporter, for the very able and impartial manner in which he has reported the proceedings of this convention.
Mr. NISBET. Mr. President, before this resolution is adopted, I would like to offer the following amendment:
And also to the correspondents of the state press represented on this floor.
Mr. SPENCE of the 35th. Very well, sir; I accept that amendment.
The resolution, as amended, was unanimously adopted.
(Emphasis supplied.) Small’s Stenographic Report, supra at p. 444. It thus appears that Mr. Small failed to report that Mr. Spence’s resolution included the word “faithful” as set forth in the Journal and he omits entirely the names of the other journalists and the newspapers for which they worked. These omissions are not corrected elsewhere in Mr. Small’s account.

 Moreover, even if Mr. Tift did indeed make the statements attributed to him by Mr. Small, neither the majority nor the Bloomfield Court takes into account the fact that the Journal (and Mr. Small) reflect that another convention member, Mr. Key, had proposed virtually identical language the previous day, seeking to add the right to access the courts as an explicit part of the due process clause. Journal, supra at 104-105. While his resolution on July 23, 1877 did not prevail, it is no stretch to conclude that the convention members who approved Mr. Tift’s resolution on July 24, the very next day, see id. at p. 119, must have remembered the concerns raised by Mr. Key (implicit in his resolution and explicitly “reported” by Mr. Small, who claimed that Mr. Key expressed concern that this right was “not too well guarded, and . . . occur to me as necessary to follow” the due process language. Small, A Stenographic Report, supra at 82). There is thus no basis to conclude that the convention’s approval of Mr. Tift’s stand-alone right to access the courts paragraph was based solely on the reason Mr. Small claims was set forth by Mr. Tift.

 I respectfully disagree with the majority that OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) does not violate Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII. Unlike parties subject to statutory penalties under OCGA §§ 9-15-14 and 13-6-11 because of their own actions in bringing frivolous suits or behaving stubbornly and unreasonably when litigating matters in the courts, OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) penalizes plaintiffs with meritorious causes of action for an impossibility, namely, their failure to see into the future so as to calculate the precise amount a factfinder may award them for the damages they reasonably believed they sustained at the hands of the defendants. Yet this impossible act is required of plaintiffs by OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) in order for them to decide whether to accept or reject a defendant’s settlement offer; this same impossibility applies to defendants under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2). No party intending to file a cause of action in tort can foresee whether she will recover “enough” money to avoid the effect of OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1). The chilling consequence of the impossible task OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) places on a person contemplating accessing a court to prosecute his or her legitimate cause of action is amply demonstrated by the facts in this case, in which plaintiffs, stung by the negative comments broadcast throughout metro Atlanta by the father of an unhappy customer, now face paying a staggering $53,087.15 in attorney fees and expenses because of the legal redress they sought. OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) does not merely “set forth certain circumstances under which attorney’s fees may be recoverable” as the majority holds, Maj. Op., p. 28: rather, as the trial court correctly held, OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1) serves to impede, if not outright deter, plaintiffs with meritorious causes of action from filing suit to obtain judicial resolution of their grievances because of the financial peril in which that statute places them.