Court Opinion

ID: 9720763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:41:04.824558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.079119
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff’s petition was filed in district court of Dallas County at Adel. The original notice (erroneously) notified defendants to “appear before said Court at the Polk County Courthouse in the City of Des Moines.” Summerlott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 253 Iowa 121, 111 N.W.2d 251, held such an error was a fatal defect which made the service void. The majority opinion concedes that holding is applicable to this original notice.
In both the case at bar and the Summerlott case, the two-year period of the statute of limitations terminated after the original notice was served but before the defect which made that service void came to the attention of counsel for plaintiff. In the Summerlott case no other notice was served on defendants. In the case at har another notice entitled “Amendment to Original Notice” thereafter was served.
The body of this so-called Amendment to Original Notice was three paragraphs in length. Paragraphs 1 and 2 were the same as in the original notice, except the amendment notified defendants to appear before said court at the Dallas County courthouse in the town of Adel. Paragraph 3, which occupied half the space of the instrument, notified defendants to disregard, as incorrect, the part of the original notice which had notified them to appear at Polk County courthouse in Des Moines, and it directed them to appear at the. Dallas County courthouse in Adel.
Defendants MeDivitt and Ure, by special appearances, had first attacked the jurisdiction of the court on the ground the original notice served upon them was void. After the service upon them of the amendment to original notice each of them again appeared specially to attack the jurisdiction of the court.
The trial court sustained the several special appearances and the amendment to special appearance. The majority opinion does not question the correctness of the part of this order sustaining the special appearances to the original notice. It con*767cedes the original notice was invalid under Summerlott. But the majority opinion does hold the service upon defendants of the amendment to original notice gave the court jurisdiction of defendants. The reason the majority gives for this conclusion is, that the name, Amendment to Original Notice, “if it be a defect, is not a fatal one.” In support of this statement it cites Pedersen v. Pedersen, 235 Iowa 708, 712, 17 N.W.2d 520, which states, with reference to the title of a pleading: “Of course, the name given it does not alone determine its character. We must look to its allegations.”
That statement is not applicable to the title, Original Notice. The noun pleading is a generic term. An original notice is a specific kind of instrument, defined and limited hy the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. R. C. P. 48 states: “A civil action is commenced by serving the defendant with an original notice.” R. C. P. 50, entitled Contents of Original Notice, definitely spells out what such contents shall be. This means no more as well as no less. The so-called amendment to original notice does not substantially comply with these requirements not only in name but also in that half of its contents are foreign to those listed in R. C. P. 50.
R. C. P. 88 and 89 govern amendments to pleadings. There is no like rule permitting amendments to an original notice. Moreover, it is conceded the original notice in this case was void. Hence, the majority decision necessarily is based upon the conclusion the so-called amendment to this void instrument created a valid original notice, the service of which upon defendants brought them into court.
No precedent is cited for the strange procedure adopted by plaintiff and approved by the majority opinion. I know of none and would disapprove it as an attempt to tinker with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Its apparent purpose was to remove the bar of the statute of limitations which had taken effect before plaintiff learned the original notice was void.
Unless the majority is prepared to hold this purpose was accomplished, its decision will be of no practical value to plaintiff who will doubtless be faced with such bar as a defense in the trial court. The decision of the trial court on this point may result in another appeal before the case may be considered *768on its merits. In any event, I fear the majority opinion will result in confusion rather than clarification of the procedural questions involved.
I agree with Division II of the majority opinion that the petition on its face does not show the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Garfield, C. J., and Snell, J., join in this dissent.