Court Opinion

ID: 9732252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:13:07.047046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:25.448796
License: Public Domain

*529ROLF LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent and would recognize the Commonwealth’s right to appeal any pretrial ruling which the Commonwealth has certified is likely to have the practical effect of terminating or substantially handicapping its prosecution, whether the pretrial ruling was entered in the context of a suppression hearing or otherwise. Thus I would extend the rule of limited appealability of pretrial rulings which we recognized in the suppression context in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963) and Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985).
In the instant case, the lower court’s ruling was a hybrid. It was not simply a pretrial severance ruling, nor was it simply a preliminary ruling on a motion in limine setting forth the “sense of the court” that evidence of the aggravated assault would probably not be admissible at the homicide prosecution. It was the combination of these intertwined erroneous rulings1 which, in practical effect virtually assured that the Commonwealth would be substantially handicapped in its prosecution of appellant for murder. The court’s ruling in limine, that the evidence of the aggravated assault would not be admissible in the murder prosecution, formed the justification for the court’s severance of the prosecutions to prevent the evidence of the former charges from entering the trial of the latter, and it is unlikely that the trial court will change its mind at trial.
Having erroneously rejected the Commonwealth’s proffer once before trial, and having severed the trial to keep the rejected evidence out of the trial for murder, it is extremely doubtful that, barring some last minute “Paul Drake” revelation, the lower court will change its mind at trial, and the Commonwealth should not be put in the position where it must proceed to trial and hope the court will have a change of heart. Without the right to appeal the lower court’s rulings at the pretrial juncture, the Commonwealth will be *530deprived of its only opportunity for appellate review of the validity of the exclusion of relevant evidence.
Former Chief Justice Roberts (sitting on the Superior Court as a Senior Judge) recognized the Commonwealth’s right to appeal in circumstances such as are present here in Commonwealth v. Barkley, 335 Pa.Super. 389, 484 A.2d 189, 190 (1984):
The Commonwealth, District Attorney of Allegheny County, appeals from a pre-trial order entered in the above matter which prohibits the Commonwealth’s use of evidence of an alleged robbery at appellee’s forthcoming trial on the charge of criminal homicide, “for the purpose of establishing the alleged robbery as the underlying felony in furtherance of any Commonwealth theory seeking to establish second degree or ‘felony’ murder....” The pre-trial order followed entry of a separate pre-trial order severing the charges of robbery and criminal homicide for purposes of trial. Because the order has the effect of terminating prosecution on a theory of felony-murder and “substantially handicaps” prosecution on the charge of criminal homicide generally, the Commonwealth has taken a direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
I would adopt the reasoning of the Superior Court in Barkley and in the instant case, and I would affirm the Superior Court’s determination herein that the pretrial rulings of the lower court were appealable under Bosurgi/Dugger, and were erroneous.

. These rulings were clearly erroneous, as Superior Court correctly held. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491 (1988).