Court Opinion

ID: 9707725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:19:40.229087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:37.103807
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that 42 Pa. C.S. § 6351 does not require that a child protective agency change its goal for a dependent child from reunification to adoption prior to seeking termination of parental rights. I write separately to set forth the analysis I would apply to reach this conclusion.
In that this case presents a question of statutory construction, the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (“Act”), 1 Pa.C.S § 1501 et seq., is controlling. The Act directs that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(1). In this regard, the Act sets forth two instructions. First, in 1 Pa.C.S.1921(b), the Act directs that “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Second, in 1 Pa.C.S.1921(c), the Act directs that “[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit,” the General Assembly’s intent may be ascertained by considering specified matters, which include the occasion and necessity for statute; circumstances of its enactment; mischief it remedies; object it seeks to attain; former law; *589consequences of particular interpretation; contemporaneous legislative history; and legislative and administrative interpretations of statute.
In the instant case, I could not discern from the majority opinion which one of 1 Pa.C.S.1921’s subsections is being applied to determine 28 Pa.C.S. 6351’s meaning. I conclude that the Fayette County Children and Youth Services correctly argues that the words used in subsection (f)(9), as to the matters the court is to determine at a permanency hearing, and in subsection (f.l), as to the additional determinations that are to follow, clearly state that a petition to terminate parental rights may be filed prior to a goal change to adoption. 23 Pa.C.S. 6315(f)(9),(f.1). (See Majority Opinion at 581-82, 901 A.2d at 1025-26). Therefore, I believe that this Court’s interpretation of 42 Pa.C.S. 6351 should focus on the statute’s language according to the rule set out in 1 Pa.C.S.1921(b) for the construction of statutes that are clear and unambiguous. In my view, the majority opinion should not include a consideration of the statutory factors in 1 Pa.C.S.1921(c) for the construction of statutes whose words are not explicit. See Commonwealth v. Packer; 568 Pa. 481, 798 A.2d 192, 196 (2002) (observing that only when the language of the statute is ambiguous does statutory construction under 1 Pa.C.S.1921(c) become necessary).
For this reason, I concur.