Court Opinion

ID: 2963458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:10:08.581811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:45.424398
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1987

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 MICHAEL R. SPECTOR,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                   [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                      and John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge.
                                           ____________________

                                 ____________________

            Peter E. Papps, First  Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
            ______________
        Paul M . Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellant.
        _______________
            Douglas  J. Miller,  with whom  Hall,  Morse, Anderson,  Miller  &
            __________________              __________________________________
        Spinella, P.C. was on brief for appellee.
        ______________

                                 ____________________

                                     May 26, 1995
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

                      CAMPBELL,  Senior  Circuit  Judge.   In  the  early
                                 ______________________

            1990s, the U.S. Department of Labor began an investigation of

            defendant  Michael Spector  and of  David Murray  and Bernard

            Mintz, suspecting them  of having submitted  false statements

            in connection with an employee  benefit plan.  The government

            notified counsel for all three men that it was conducting the

            investigation  and that it intended  to charge the three with

            criminal violations of 18 U.S.C.   1027 (1988) (ERISA) and 18

            U.S.C.      644   (1988).     Among   the  violations   under

            investigation were  a false statement  allegedly submitted to

            the   department  on  January   20,  1988,  and   an  act  of

            embezzlement allegedly occurring on February 19, 1988.  Since

            the  violations  were  subject  to  a  five-year  statute  of

            limitations, 18 U.S.C.   3282 (1988), the limitations periods

            for  the two violations above  were to expire  on January 20,

            and February 19, 1993, respectively.

                      On January 15, 1993,  defendant Spector and the two

            others  (whom   we  shall  collectively   call  "defendants,"

            although  this  appeal relates  to  Spector  only) asked  the

            government  to delay seeking  an indictment in  order to give

            them more  time to investigate and  additional opportunity to

            persuade  the government  to modify  its position  on certain

            issues.  The defendants entered into a written agreement with

            the government, under which the government agreed not to file

            an  information or to seek  an indictment before February 26,

                                         -2-
                                          2

            1993, in exchange  for the defendants'  agreement to waive  a

            statute  of limitations  defense  for charges  brought on  or

            before  March  5,  1993  (thereby  effectively  extending the

            limitations period  until March  5).  The  agreement provided

            that it would  be effective "upon execution  by all parties,"

            and was in fact signed by all parties.  The agreement went on

            to state "that  further extensions of  this agreement may  be

            agreed to subsequently, but only by a  further writing signed

            by all parties."

                      As the new March 5 deadline approached,  defendants

            again  sought  to extend  the  period  before the  government

            brought an indictment.   Defendants executed another  written

            agreement  on March  5.    Under  the  terms  of  the  second

            agreement, the government stated that  it had not yet brought

            an  indictment  against defendants  and  would  forebear from

            doing  so until April 9,  1993.  In  exchange, the defendants

            agreed to extend the limitations period until April 16, 1993.

            Like the first agreement,  the second agreement provided that

            it would be effective "upon execution  by Murray, Spector and

            Mintz,  and their respective counsel and the United States by

            its  counsel."   However,  unlike the  first agreement,  this

            second  agreement,  though  signed  by defendants  and  their

            counsel, was not signed by counsel for the government.

                      On  April  16, 1993,  the  grand  jury returned  an

            initial twenty-seven count indictment against defendants.  On

                                         -3-
                                          3

            September  1,  1993, the  grand jury  returned a  seven count

            superseding indictment.   Nearly a year later, on  August 15,

            1994,  Spector  moved  to  dismiss  the  two  counts  of  the

            indictment  that  were  based  on  the  false  statement  and

            embezzlement described above.  Spector argued that the second

            extension  of the  statute  of limitations  was not  binding,

            since  it  was not  signed by  the  government.   Without the

            extension provided by  the second agreement, Spector  argued,

            the  two counts were barred by the statute of limitations, as

            they were handed down  after March 5, 1993, the  deadline set

            by the first extension.

                      The  district court  agreed and  dismissed  the two

            counts as time-barred.  Although it found the first extension

            to be binding, the district  court determined that the second

            extension  was  ineffective,   having  been  an  offer   that

            explicitly   required   the   government's    signature   for

            acceptance,  and   not   permitting  alternative   forms   of

            acceptance.  The  court rejected the  government's contention

            that  an  oral  agreement   existed,  holding  that  such  an

            agreement would be contrary to the plain terms of the written

            agreements.     The   district   court   also  rejected   the

            government's argument based upon promissory estoppel, finding

            that any reliance  by the government on  the second extension

            was unreasonable,  given that the  first extension  expressly

            provided that any  additional extensions had to be in writing

                                         -4-
                                          4

            and  signed  by all  parties.   The  government  now appeals,

            pursuant to 18 U.S.C.   3731 (1988).

                      A  statute of  limitations  defense is  a  waivable

            affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar to prosecution.

            See Acevedo-Ramos  v. United States,  961 F.2d 305,  307 (1st
            ___ _____________     _____________

            Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992).  Failure to raise
                   ____________

            the defense in  a timely manner can result  in its waiver, as

            can an  unqualified guilty  plea or other,  similar "action[]

            obviously  constitut[ing] a waiver  of the  time limitation."

            Id. at 309.   Most relevantly  for present purposes,  several
            ___

            federal  courts of appeals have held that an individual under

            investigation may,  in order  to delay indictment,  expressly

            waive a statute of limitations defense prior to trial, indeed

            prior to indictment, so long as that waiver is made knowingly

            and  voluntarily.  See, e.g., United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d
                               ___  ____  _____________    ____

            418, 422-24 (D.C.  Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).1
                                      ____________

            In these cases, like the present, the defendant has typically

            entered   into  a   written  waiver   in  exchange   for  the

            government's agreement  not to indict before  a certain time,

            in hopes  that  further  discussion  may  result  in  a  more

            favorable  disposition or  prevent an  indictment altogether.

                                
            ____________________

            1.   See  also United  States v.  Del Percio, 870  F.2d 1090,
                 _________ ______________     __________
            1093-94 (6th  Cir. 1989); United  States v. Meeker,  701 F.2d
                                      ______________    ______
            685, 687-88 (7th  Cir.), cert. denied,  464 U.S. 826  (1983).
                                     ____________
            See  generally  Case  Comment,   Waiver  of  the  Statute  of
            ______________                   ____________________________
            Limitations in Criminal Prosecutions: United States v.  Wild,
            ____________________________________________________________
            90 Harv. L. Rev. 1550, 1555 (1977).

                                         -5-
                                          5

            The courts have  enforced such  agreements where  voluntarily

            and  knowingly made,  finding that  they  do not  violate the

            policies underlying the statute of limitations.

                      The issue  in this  appeal is whether  the district

            court  erred in  holding  that, because  of the  government's

            failure to  sign, the second  agreement was not  an effective

            waiver   of  defendant's   rights   under   the  statute   of

            limitations.  It is undisputed  that if the second  agreement

            is found binding, the defendant may not assert his statute of

            limitations  defense.   If not,  however, both  parties agree

            that  the defendant may assert  the defense and  that the two

            counts  of the  indictment were  properly dismissed  as time-

            barred, since they were handed down after the deadline set by

            the first agreement.          Reviewing the  district court's

            decision on  this issue of  law de  novo, Thrifty  Rent-A-Car
                                            ________  ___________________

            System,  Inc. v. Thrifty Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1181 (1st
            _____________    __________________

            Cir. 1987), we sustain the district court's  holding that the

            second  agreement was  ineffective and  did not  constitute a

            waiver  of the  defendant's statute  of  limitations defense.

            The  two agreements  carefully and  explicitly set  forth the

            conditions  under which  the  extensions  of the  limitations

            period  would become  effective.   The first  extension would

            become effective "upon execution  by all parties;" the second

            extension would  become effective "upon  execution by Murray,

            Spector,  and Mintz,  and  their respective  counsel and  the

                                         -6-
                                          6

            United  States by its counsel."   The agreements go so far as

            to  specify that acceptance by one of the defendants would be

            made  by fax.    Both agreements  limited  the extensions  to

            definite time periods.  Further extensions of the limitations

            period  were  permissible, "but  only  by  a further  writing

            signed  by all parties."  One obvious reason for spelling out

            these  requirements in such detail was to remove all doubt as

            to  the exact steps  by which  defendants' partial  waiver of

            rights and the government's agreement to forbear would become

            effective.    Creating  such a  road  map  told both  parties

            precisely what each had to do  and what each would receive in

            exchange,  thus minimizing the risk (or so it might be hoped)

            of  a future dispute over the consummation and meaning of the

            agreement.  Unfortunately, the  government failed to meet the

            explicit   condition  provided   to  effectuate   the  second

            extension:  it failed  to sign  the document.   Thus,  by the

            plain  terms of the  second agreement, the  extension was not

            effective.   Where the parties have so deliberately set forth

            in writing  the conditions necessary to  make their agreement

            effective, we  think it  inadvisable for a  court to  condone

            deviation from  one of the  explicit terms, absent  some good

            reason to do so.

                      We find unpersuasive the government's argument that

            contract or  estoppel principles warrant  enforcement of  the

            agreement,  despite the  government's failure to  comply with

                                         -7-
                                          7

            its plain language.  We assume that principles of contract or

            estoppel may sometimes be useful in analyzing agreements like

            this, cf.  United States  v. Baldacchino,  762 F.2d  170, 179
                  ___  _____________     ___________

            (1st Cir. 1985) ("Though  a matter of criminal jurisprudence,

            plea bargains are subject  to contract law principles insofar

            as  their  application  will  insure the  defendant  what  is

            reasonably  due him.").  But those principles do not help the

            government here.2  The  second agreement expressly called for

            acceptance  of the offer  in the form  of a  signature by the

            government attorney.  It  did not provide for any  other form

            of acceptance,  whether orally3 or through  performance.  See
                                                                      ___

            Restatement (Second) of Contracts   30 (1979).  The defendant

            was entitled not merely to forbearance from indictment, which

            he received, but to have  the government's binding promise to
                                                               _______

            forbear from indicting him,  which he did not receive.   That

            promise provided reassurance and  certainty that he would not

            be  indicted  prior  to the  time  period  set  forth in  the

                                
            ____________________

            2.   As in United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19 n.3 (1st
                       _____________    _______
            Cir. 1985), we need  not attempt to decide whether,  when and
            to  what  degree local  contract law  is  or may  strictly be
            applicable to such agreements, since the result here would be
            the same regardless.  

            3.   The government argues that Spector's alleged failure  to
            request  a   signed  copy  of  the   agreement  reflects  his
            understanding that an  agreement existed.   But this is  pure
            speculation.   Just as the record is devoid of any suggestion
            that  the defendant  sought return  of a  signed copy  of the
            contract,  it  is  also devoid  of  any  suggestion that  the
            government ever  informed the defendant that  it accepted the
            terms  of  the  agreement  and  was  going  to  forbear  from
            indicting him.

                                         -8-
                                          8

            agreement.  The  government's estoppel argument is  similarly

            without  merit.   The  government could  not reasonably  have

            relied upon  the defendant's offer  to extend the  statute of

            limitations  a  second  time,  in  the  face  of  the express

            language in  the second agreement conditioning  the waiver on

            the  signature of all parties and the express language in the

            first  agreement  allowing  extensions only  in  writing  and

            signed  by  all  parties.   The  government  has  provided no

            evidence of  any other statements or conduct by the defendant

            that could provide a separate basis for an estoppel.

                      Accordingly,  the second  agreement, by  its terms,

            was not  effective and the  defendant was entitled  to assert

            his  statute  of limitations  defense.    The district  court

            properly  dismissed  the  two  counts of  the  indictment  as

            untimely.  We recognize that the government's failure to sign

            the  agreement  was  likely  the result  of  some  unintended

            clerical error.   Nevertheless, where  the government reaches

            an agreement  with a potential criminal  defendant, and where

            both parties  expressly establish, in writing,4  the terms of

                                
            ____________________

            4.   We  emphasize  that  we  are  not  saying  that,  to  be
            enforced, an  agreement to extend the  statute of limitations
            must be made in writing, or must be signed by the government.
            See, e.g., United States  v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715,  718-19 (2d
            ___  ____  _____________     _____
            Cir.)  (suggesting  that   an  implicit   agreement  may   be
            sufficient  to  waive  the statute  of  limitations defense),
            cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843  (1965).  We say only that,  where
            ____________                                            _____
            the  parties themselves have chosen to set forth the terms in
            _____________________________________________________________
            writing, it makes sense  to hold them to those  terms, absent
            _______
            good reason to do otherwise.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            their  bargain and map out the conditions under which it will

            be effective, we think the parties are best held to the plain

            terms of that agreement, absent  some good reason to depart.5

            That policy  is more likely to increase  rather than diminish

            the  utility of  such  agreements.   Were  we to  accept  too

            lightly  deviations  from  the explicit  language,  we  would

            undermine the  certainty the  parties hope  to achieve.   See
                                                                      ___

            also Correale v. United  States, 479 F.2d 944, 947  (1st Cir.
            ____ ________    ______________

            1979) ("[T]he  most meticulous standards of  both promise and

            performance  must  be met  by  prosecutors  engaging in  plea

            bargaining.")   The  latter  is particularly  true where,  as

            here, the government  subsequently seeks specific performance

            of the defendant's agreement to waive a defense.

                      Affirmed.
                      ________

             

                                
            ____________________

            5.   We do not see our opinion as making agreements like this
            so  difficult to enforce as to cause the government to become
            reluctant  to  enter  into  them,  thereby  possibly  harming
            defendants seeking  to postpone  an imminent indictment.   To
            the contrary, we are signaling that agreements like this will
            be enforced as written,  giving the parties more  rather than
            less control over the  situation.  All the government  had to
            do  to protect itself  in this case  was to sign  the form in
            accordance with the agreed-upon terms.

                                         -10-
                                          10