Court Opinion

ID: 9908101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:06:25.810346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:30.371527
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 5 1 1

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    MARIA LOPEZ,                                        No. 84950-COA
                    Appellant,
                    vs.
                    PEDRO LOPEZ,
                                                                               MED
                    Respondent.                                                 NOV 3 0 202
                                                                               EL iO TH A. BRO'
                                                                          CL         UP            RT
                                                                          BY
                                                                                 EF DEPUTi CLERK

                              Appeal from a district court decree of divorce. Eighth Judicial
                   District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Dawn Throne, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   McFarling Law Group and Emily McFarling, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Leavitt Law Firrn and Dennis M. Leavitt and Frank A. Leavitt, Las Vegas,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                   O.PINION
                   By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.:
                              In this appeal, we examine the district court's authority in a
                   divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in
                   a revocable inter vivos trust. Our analysis brings us to an issue of first
                   impression: whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community
                   property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the
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                   divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settiors, and beneficiaries. Because we
                   conclude that the spouses are the materially interested parties, and that
                   divorce revokes every devise given by a settlor to their former spouse in a
                   revocable inter vivos trust, we hold that the parties are not required to name
                   such a revocable inter vivos trust as a necessary party in a divorce action
                   where the spouses are co-settlors, co-trustees, and beneficiaries. We
                   accordingly uphold the district court's distribution decisions and,
                   ultimatelY, affirm its decree of-divorce. -
                                   FACTS .AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               Appellant Maria Lopez and respondent Ped.ro Lopez were
                   married in Mexico in 1995. • After they were married-, the parties moved to
                   the United States and created the P & D Family Trust, a revocable inter
                   vivos trust over which they, as co-settlors and •co.-trustees, retained the right
                   to revoke, alter, or amend at any point •during their lifetimes.' During their
                   marriage, . the parties collectively placed eight properties into the P & D
                   Family Trust. Of those• eight.. properties, Maria. and Pedro had jointly,
                   ptirchased seven; -they rented out six and uSed one as their • marital
                   residence. Maria's father purchased the • eighth property And gave it to
                   Maria's brother. • That property is currently titled   the hathe of both.
                   Maria's brother and the family trust.2 Maria, a licensed realtor,: managed
                   the six rental properties and oversaw rent cOliection. •

                         'Maria and Pedro, and their children in. the co-trustees' discretion, are
                   the trust beneficiaries.
                         2 The district court excluded this jointlY titled property from itS
                   community property distributions, and we therefore do not include. it in our
                   references to trust property..
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                               Around 2008, Maria and Pedro defaulted on their mortgage
                   payments for three of the trust properties that they controlled (Grizzly
                   Forest, Abrams Avenue, and San Gervasio). After defaulting, Maria and
                   Pedro sold Grizzly Forest and Abrams Avenue via short sales to third-party
                   buyers with whom they had close relationships, and they financed these
                   short sales with personal funds. Specifically, Maria and Pedro gave Maria's
                   sister $280,000 to purchase Grizzly Forest and a close family friend $80,000
                   to purchase Abrams Avenue. Maria contends that the funds came from her
                   separate property, while Pedro argues that the funds came from their
                   community assets. Almost immediately after Maria's sisterand the partieS'
                   friend purchased the properties, they gifted the properties back to Maria, in
                   her name alone, titled as her sole and separate property.         As to San

                   Gervasio, Maria alleges that she used her inheritance to pay off the
                   mortgage, after which Pedro signed over his community interest• in. the
                   property to Maria.3 Pedro denies conveying his interest in San Gervasio tó
                   Maria and alleges that Maria forged his signature on the deed.4
                               Throughout the parties' marriage, Maria and Pedro each
                   maintained separate and joint bank accounts. The parties, particularly
                   Maria, were neither forthcoming nor transparent regarding their funds--

                         31n its decree of divorce, the district court referred to Maria as San
                   Gervasio's short sale buyer. However, it is undisputed that Maria paid off
                   the San Gervasio mortgage and did not purchase the property via a short
                   sale. Thus, the court's characterization of Maria as a short sale buyer is
                   inaccurate, but this does not change our analysis or conclu.sion.

                         4At trial, the district court questioned Pedro regarding a grant,
                   bargain, and sale deed that purported to convey Pedro's interest in . San
                   Gervasio to Maria. Notably, h.owever, the record does not contain this deed.
                   The only San Gervasio deed in the record is a subsequent quitclaim deed
                   that Maria signed but Pedro did not. •
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                   each made several transfers from the joint accounts to their separate
                   accounts without telling the other. Shortly before the divorce, Maria also
                   deviated from her historical practice of depositing rental payments into the
                   parties' joint accounts and instead began placing the proceeds in her
                   separate accounts.
                               Pedro filed for divorce in April 2021.        During the case
                   management conference (CMC), the district court urged the parties to
                   comply with their mandatory NRCP 16.2 financial disclosure requirenients
                   and produce accurate •and thorough financial disclosure forms (FDFs).5
                   Throughout the CMC and later hearings, Maria represented that the
                   Grizzly Forest, Abrams Avenue, and San Gervasio properties were her
                   separate property and should not be included in the court's community
                   property distribution decisions. She also argued that the district court did

                         5Pursuant to NRCP 16.2(c)(1), each party• must complete, file, and
                   serve a General Financial Disclosure Form "within 30 days of service of the
                   summons and complaint, unless" the court requires, or the parties request,
                   a Detailed Financial Disclosure Form (DFDF) pursuant to 16.2(c)(2). Here,
                   the district court did not require, and the parties did not request, a DFDF,
                   but NRCP 16.2 and the court's admonitions subjected the parties to relevant
                   discovery. Concurrent with the filing of the financial disclosure form, each
                   party must also provide "financial statement(s), document(s), receipt(s), .or
                   other information or evidence relied upon to support the figure represented
                   on the form." NRCP 16.2(d)(2). Specifically, each "party must provide
                   copies of all monthly or periodic bank, checking, savings, brokerage,
                   investment, cryptocurrency, and security aCcount statements in which . any
                   party has . . . an interest," as well as "credit card [and] debt statements,"
                   real property documents, property debt statements, loan applications,
                   promissory notes, deposits, receivables, retirernent assets, insurance and
                   insurance policies, the values of all real property, tax returns, proof of
                   income, personalty, and "a copy of every other document or exhibit . . . that
                   a party expects to offer as evidence at. trial in any manner." NRCP
                   16.2(d)(3)(A)- (P).
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                   not have the authority to make distributions of the family trust's_ assets
                   because it did not have jurisdiction over the family trust. Additionally,
                   Maria claimed a prenuptia] agreement existed that the parties signed in
                   Mexico; the agreement supposedly demonstrated that Maria had $80,00.0 in
                   personal savings and a $250,000 inheritance from her father that were to
                   remain her separate property throughout t.he marriage. Pedro denied the
                   agreement's existence and expressed his concern that Maria would attempt
                   to fabricate a document with her Sister: an attorn.ey in. MeXiCo, to use at
                   trial. The district court repeatedly cautioned Maria that she would need to
                   produce the prenuptial agreement before trial with an official translation
                   for the coUrt to admit it into evidence. The district court also expressed
                   frustration that neither party had engaged in sufficient discovery;
                   subpoenaed bank records; or obtained .formal appraisals for their real
                   property, which at that point had approximately $3 'million in equity..
                               Prior• to trial, the distriCt •court held a hearing •to resolve all
                   pending motions. At that hearing,. the district court found that.both Maria'S
                   and Pedro's FDFs were inadequate and did not provide -the court With a
                   sufficient basis from which it • could distribute the parties' CoMmUnity
                   assets. The district court noted that any party claiming family trust
                   property to be his or her separate property would need to overcome the
                   presumption.of community property by clear and convincing evidence. The
                   district court also acknowledged Pédro's concern that Maria had Yet to
                   produce the prenuptial agreement.
                               At trial, Maria argued that the GriZzly Forest, Abrains.Avenue,
                   and San Gervasio properties were her separate property because she
                   finan.ced the Grizzly Forest a.nd -Abrams .Avenue short sales with separate
                   propertY and 'paid off the San •Gbrvasio mortgage with funds from her

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                   inheritance. The district court was unconvinced and found that Maria had
                   not produced adequate tracing evidence (through her NRCP 16.2
                   disclosures or otherwise) sufficient to show that the funds used to finance
                   the short sales and pay off the mortgage came from anywhere other than
                   the parties' community assets.6 The district court also conveyed its strong
                   belief that the parties had used "straw-buyers" to engage in mortgage fraud.
                   The judge emphasized her distaste for the parties' behavior and expressed
                   her distrust for both parties.
                               During Maria's cross-examination of Pedro, she questioned him
                   about the alleged prenuptial agreement, and Pedro flatly denied its
                   existence. After Pedro's denial, Maria proffered an unsigned physical
                   document, written in Spanish, purporting to be a copy of the alleged
                   prenuptial agreement.      Pedro objected to its admission, and Maria
                   responded that she had been able to obtain the document from Mexico only
                   two days before trial. Maria did not explain why she did not disclose the
                   document to Pedro in those two days or how she was finally able to procure
                   it.   Pedro argued that the document was untimely• and not properly
                   authenticated. The district court agreed, stating that because Maria had
                   not produced the document prior to trial as the court had instructed, and
                   because the document was in Spanish, with no signatures, and without any
                   translation, the document was inadmissible. The district court explained
                   that allowing Maria to cross-examine Pedro on an unproduced document

                                                                         both parties' bank
                         6The district court also found that all assets in
                   accounts were community property because the accounts were created after
                   the marriage, there was significant commingling of community and alleged
                   separate funds in the accounts, and there was no tracing •evidence to
                   distinguish the alleged separate funds.
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                   that had not been properly authenticated or translated would amo nt to
                   trial by ambush.
                               When questioning Maria about the bank accounts, the d strict
                   court instructed Maria to open and display her online banking inform tion,
                   which revealed that Maria had understated the total amount i               the
                   accounts by almost $342,000 during her testimony.7          The district court
                   called this a material misrepresentation that Maria made in an atte pt to
                   defraud Pedro.
                               In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of di orce,
                   the district court deemed all family trust properties to be comi unity
                   property and ordered them distributed equally between the parties be ause
                   neither party offered a compelling reason for an unequal distribution. This
                   appeal followed.
                                                  ANALYSIS
                               On appeal, Maria argues that the district court (1) did no have
                   authority to distribute the P & D Family Trust's assets; (2) made an un :qual
                   distribution of property and abused its discretion because it distribut d the
                   Grizzly Forest, Abrams Avenue, and San Gervasio properties as comm nity
                   property and not Maria's separate property; and (3) abused its disc etion
                   when it did not allow Maria to question Pedro on cross-examination bout
                   the alleged prenuptial agreement. Maria also claims (4) that, on re,. and,

                   •    'Maria claimed at trial that one of her separate accounts had a ound
                   $80,000 in it and that her other separate account had $10,000 n it.
                   However, at trial, the district court challenged Maria to reveal her nline
                   banking records, which showed that her accounts contained $3 ] 1,83 and
                   $120,115, respectively.
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                   this case should be reassigned to a new judge because of alleged prejudicial
                   comments the district court judge made during the tria.1.8
                   The district court had authority to distribute the P & D Family Trust's assets
                               Maria argues that the district court erred when it exercised
                   authority over the family trust's assets. Because the trust was a revocable
                   inter vivos trust established after marriage, and the parties were co-
                   settlors, co-trustees, and beneficiaries, we conclude that the distri.ct Court
                   did .not err in concluding it had authority to distribute trust assets.   •

                         The trust's -distributions were 'immediately revoked upon divorce
                               Maria argues that. the district court did not have authority to
                   distribute the family - trust's assets because the trust was. not irrevocable.
                   Pedro responds that the family trust was revocable upon divorce and that

                   the district court automatically had authority to distribute the community
                   assets in the family trust upon its revocation.
                               NRS 111.781(1) establishes that.unless "otherwise provided by
                   the express terms of a governing instrument," divorce revokes any revocable
                   disposition òf• property made' to a former spouse, including diSPositions
                   made pursuant tò a trust. In re Colnian Family Revocable Living.Tr.; Dated
                   June*23, 2011, 136 Nev, 11.2, 113-14, 460 P.3d 452, 454 (2020) (suinmarizing

                         8Maria    additionally argues that the district court abused its
                   discretion when. it used Zillow estimates that Pedro,presented instead of
                   actual appraisal values as the basis for its property valuations. However,
                   despite the district court's pretrial warnings that without appraisal.. values
                   it would be forced to either order the sale of the properties and divide the
                   proceeds or use Zillow estimates in lieu of appraisals, neither party obtained
                   appraisal values for trial. At trial, therefore, the parties stipulated toAhe
                   use of Zillow estimates to avoid the sale of the properties. Maria, a licensed
                   realtor, also declined to offer her opinion .on the value of the properties.
                   Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
                   using th.e Zillow estimates.
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                   NRS 111.781); see also NRS 163.565 (stating that unless otherwise
                   provided, divorce "revokes every devise, beneficial interest or d.esignation to
                   serve as trustee given by the settlor to the former spOuse of the settlor in a
                   revocable inter vivos trust"); NRS 133.115 (stating the same as applied to
                   wills—namely, that divorce operates to revoke "every devise, beneficial
                   interest or designation to serve as personal representative given to the
                   testator's former spouse in a will"). The theory underlying this principle is
                   that revocable trusts with dispositions between spouses generally become
                   ineffective once there remains no surviving spouse to benefit post-divorce.
                   See Colman, 136 Nev. at 112-13, 460 P.3d at 453.           NRS 125.150(1)(b)

                   additionally grants courts in divorce actions express authority to make
                   equal dispositions of any community property transferred into irrevocable
                   trusts, which by their nature are much more restrictive than inter vivos
                   trusts.
                               Here, the parties did not offer the family trust as an exhibit at
                   trial, nor does it appear in the record on appeal, and we cannot verify its
                   provisions. Regardless, neither party argues that the trust's express terrns
                   would have precluded the district court from removing and distributing the
                   family trust's community property. Instead, Maria contends that, pursuant
                   to NRS 111.781 and NRS 125.150, district courts have express authority to
                   distribute community assets placed in irrevocable trusts but not those
                   placed in revocable inter vivos trusts.     Yet, Maria's argument fails to

                   account for the distinct nature of revocable inter vivos trusts that makes
                   these statutes inapplicable.    Unlike property transferred to irrevocable

                   trusts—and in contrast to the general principle that settlors no longer own
                   trust property once they transfer that property into a trust--property
                   transferred to or held in a revocable inter vivos trust is considered to remain

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                   with the settlor because "any interest of other beneficiaries is purely
                   potential and can evaporate at the settlor's whim." 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 254
                   (2020) (also noting that a "settlor may be the owner of property in a
                   revocable trust of which the settlor is the trustee"); see also Linthicurn v.
                   Rudi, 122 Nev. 1452, 1453, 148 P.3d 746, 747 (2006) (concluding that "a
                   beneficiary's interest in a revocable inter vivos trust is contingent at most");
                   see, e.g., Wishengrad v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 13, 529
                   P.3d 880, 886 (2023) (noting that, with respect to real property held in a
                   revocable inter vivos trust, the trustees "hold legal title"• and the
                   beneficiaries "are the equitable owners"). Further, dispositions between
                   spouses from a revocable trust are immediately revoked upon divorce unless
                   the instrument expressly states otherwise. Colman, 136 Nev. at 114, 460
                   P.3d at 454. Thus, the district court automatically assumed the authority
                   to distribute the family trust's community assets contemporaneous with
                   Maria and Pedro's divorce.
                         The trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action,
                               Maria also implies that the family trust should have been joined
                   as a necessary party in order to distribute the trust's assets. NRCP 19
                   requires that all necessary parties be joined in an action, so long as the
                   party's joinder does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. A
                   necessary party includes a party without whom the court cannot accord
                   complete relief and a party whose interest in the action is such that the
                   party's ability to protect its interests will be impeded if that party is not
                   joined. NRCP 19(a)(1).
                               In a divorce action, the spouses are the materially interested
                   parties.   Where the spouses are the co-settlors, co-trustees, and
                   beneficiaries of a revocable inter vivos trust, the court's distribution of the
                   trust's joint assets will not impede the trust's interests because the
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                   necessary parties are already named in the litigation.° See, e.g., Tsai v. Hsu,
                   No. 50549, 2010 WL 3270973, at *4-5 (Nev. Apr. 29, 2010) (Order of
                   Affirmance) (concluding that a revocable inter vivos trust between spouses
                   was not a necessary party to a divorce proceeding because the husband and
                   wife (both co-trustees) were already parties to the litigation, and the district
                   court's distribution of the trust's assets did not substantially affect the
                   rights of nonparties).
                                Here, neither PedrO nor Maria filed a motiOn under NRCP19

                   to join the trust separately as a necessary party, and this court is therefore
                   not required to consider the -argument on appeal. 'Die/mond-Enters., Inc. v.
                   Lau, 113 Nev. 1376, 1378, 951 P.2d 73, 74 (1997); see also Rose, LLC v.
                   Treasure Island, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 152-53, 445 P.3d 860, 866-67 (Ct. App.
                   2019) •(noting that in contrast to federal courts, Nevada . permits parties to
                   raise. NRCP 19 challenges for the first time on appeal, but only so long as
                   the parties raise the challenges in good •faith and not merely in resPOnse to
                   an adverse ruling);
                                However, even if considered on the merits, the trust in this case
                   is not a necessary party to the action because Maria and Pedro, like the co-
                   tnistees in Tsai, were both existing parties to the divorce action and . the
                   trust's co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The parties' status .as co-
                   trustees is particularly noteworthy. Legal proceedings involving a trust
                   must be "brought by or against the trustee§ in their own name[s]."

                          °This.case does not present a situation where the revo6.ble inter vivos
                   trust's settlor(s), trustee(s),. and beneficiary(ies) are unria:med third parties
                   who may have an interest in . the trust's assets if that trust were to become
                   sUbject to litigation. We therefore need not address whether a revocable
                   inter vivos trust would. be a necessary party to divorce Jitigation in that
                   scenario.
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                   Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 383 (2016).
                   Consequently, to join the trust would require naming Maria or Pedro in
                   their co-trustee capacities, which would be redundant because Maria and
                   Pedro were already parties to the litigation. See id.
                                Joining the family trust was also not a prerequisite for complete
                   relief, as neither Maria's nor Pedro's interests were impeded by not naming
                   the family trust as a separate party. In fact, the district court's disposition
                   of the trust's assets was a necessary part of the divorce's execution because
                   all revocable distributions between Maria and Pedro in the family trust
                   were revoked upon divorce. See NRS 111.781(1). Thus, we conclude that
                   the family trust was not a necessary party and failing to name the family
                   trust in the action did not preclude the district court's ability to distribute
                   the trust's assets.1()
                                Accordingly, we conclude that the district court had authority
                   to distribute the family trust's assets because the divorce revoked the trust's
                   distributions between Maria and Pedro, Maria and Pedro were the co-
                   settlors, co-trustees, and beneficiaries, and the trust was not a necessary
                   party.11

                         "'This conclusion is consistent with trust law, in which the United
                   States Supreme Court has clarified that "fflraditionally, a trust was not
                   considered a distinct legal entity, but a 'fiduciary relationship' between
                   multiple people." See Americold, 577 TJ.S. at 383 (quoting Klein v. Bryer,
                   177 A.2d 412, 413 (Md. 1962)).

                         11Maria also argues that the district court did not have authority to
                   distribute the family trust's assets because the trust was not a named party
                   pursuant to Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. 164, 394 P.3d 940 (2017). We
                   conclude that Klabacka is inapposite. Klabacka involved the jurisdictional
                   issue of whether a district court judge sitting in the family division had
                   subject matter jurisdiction over the divorcing parties' irrevocable self-
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                      The district court did not make an unequal distribution or abuse its
                      discretion when it distributed Grizzly Forest, Abrams Avenue, and San
                      Gervasio as community property
                                  Maria argues that the district court abused its discretion when
                      it deemed three trust properties that were allegedly purchased with her
                      separate property funds to be community property and then distributed
                      those properties as community assets. By doing so, Maria contends that the
                      court made an unequal distribution without a compelling reason. Because
                      Maria and Pedro purchased the properties while they were married and
                      Maria failed to overcome the community presumption by clear and
                      convincing evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
                      discretion—or make an unequal distribution—by distributing the three
                      disputed properties as community property.12

                      settled spendthrift trusts (SSSTs). Id. at 169, 394 P.3d at 945. Irrevocable
                      SSSTs are afforded special statutory protection in Nevada and are subject
                      to specialized proceedings that make them wholly distinct from the
                      revocable inter vivos trust at issue here. Id. at 173, 394 P.3d at 948.
                      Additionally, Klabacka is factually distinct from this case because the
                      parties in Klabacka voluntarily added the SSSTs as necessary parties in
                      their divorce proceeding. Id. at 165, 394 P.3d at 943. Consequently,
                      Klabacka has no bearing on whether the district court in this case acted
                      properly in distributing the family trust's assets, and we reject. this portion
                      of Maria's argument.
                            12 Maria also argues that the district court abused its discretion when
                      it included two of her separate bank accounts as part of its equalization
                      payment. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
                      including those accounts in the equalization payment primarily for the
                      same reason she could not overcome the community presumption for the
                      disputed properties—namely, as will be discussed below, the district court
                      could reasonably find that insufficient evidence supports a finding of
                      separate funds. Maria's evidence to support a separate property finding is
                      the fact that the accounts were titled in her name. However, an account's
                      titling is not determinative of the character of the funds contained therein,
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                         All P & D Family Trust properties were community property
                               Maria and Pedro purchased the properties in the family trust
                   jointly during their marriage, which raises a presumption that the
                   properties are community property. See NRS 123.220(1). Maria, however,
                   alleges that three of the properties—Grizzly Forest, Abrams Avenue, and
                   San Gervasio—were gifted to her by the new purchasers as separate
                   property prior to the parties' divorce. To that end, Maria argues that it was
                   Pedro's burden to show that these three properties were transmuted back
                   to community property from separate property. Pedro argues that Maria is
                   attempting to improperly shift the burden to him to prove transmutation
                   and that the burden is instead on Maria to overcome the initial presumption
                   of community property by clear and convincing evidence. We agree with
                   Pedro and conclude that the district court could reasonably find that Maria
                   did not meet her burden to overcome the initial presumption of community
                   property.
                               Properties acquired during marriage are presumed to be
                   community property, and this presumption can be overcome only by clear
                   and convincing evidence. Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 236, 495 P.2d 629,
                   631-32 (1972). Regarding marital rights, we will uphold the district court's
                   property characterizations, so long as those characterizations are supported
                   by substantial evidence. Waldman v. Maini, 124 Nev. 1121, 1128, 195 P.3d
                   850, 855 (2008).

                   and a separate account may contain solely community assets if there is no
                   tracing evidence to support otherwise. See Peters v. Peters, 92 Nev. 687,
                   690, 557 P.2d 713, 715 (1976) Other than her contested testimony, Maria
                   adduced no evidence that the funds contained anything but community
                   funds; therefore, the accounts were properly characterized as community
                   property.
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                               NRS 123.220(1) provides that "[a]ll property, other than
                   [separate property outlined] in NR.S 123.130, acquired after marriage by
                   either spouse or both spouses, is community property unless otherwise
                   provided by.. . [a]n agreement in writing between the spouses." When
                   reviewing tracing evidence to support a finding of separate property,
                   function takes precedence over form, and nominal changes from community
                   to separate property are not, without additional evidence, enotigh to
                   overcome the initial presumption of community property. See Peters v.
                   Peters, 92 Nev. 687, 690, 557 P.2d 713, 715 (1976). The appearance of a
                   signature on a stock transfer, for example, is not evidence of transmutation
                   from community to separate property without additional evidence. See
                   Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855 858, 878 P.2d 284, 286-87 (1994).
                               Regarding real property, sufficient tracing evidence• requires a
                   party to prove the source of purchasing funds by clear and convincing
                   evidence. See Colman, 136 Nev. at 114, 460 P.3d at 454 (citing Verheyden
                     Verheyden, 104 Nev. 342, 344-45; 757 P.2d 1328, 1330-31 (1988)). To that
                   end, even a deed that places title in one spouse as that sPouse's separate
                   property is insufficient to overcome the community presumption if the party
                   cannot also show that the honie was purchased with separate funds. Pascua
                   v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 135 Nev. 29, 33, 434 P.3d 287, 290 (2019);
                   see also Pryor v. Pryor, 103 Nev. 148, 150, 734 P.2d 718, 719 (1987) (holding
                   that a deed reciting that a husband owned his estate as separate propertY
                   was not, of itself, enough to overcome the community presumption).
                               Here, it is undisputed that the parties originally purchased the
                   properties jointlyWith community funds—during •their marriage, which
                   raises a Presumption that the properties are community property. Thus,•
                   Maria had the burden to overcome the community presumption by clear and

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                   convincing evidence.      In reviewing the record, the district court's

                   determinations will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence,
                   and when "conflicting evidence exists, all favorable inferences must be
                   drawn towards the prevailing party." Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181,
                   1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000) (quoting Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v.
                   Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 238, 955 P.2d 661, 664 (1998)).
                               As noted above, when Maria and Pedro defaulted on the
                   mortgages for three properties around 2008, they sold Grizzly Forest and
                   Abrams Avenue via short sales to third-party buyers who then gifted the
                   properties back to Maria as Maria's "sole and separate property." Maria
                   and Pedro financed those third-party purchases with their personal funds;
                   however, Maria argues that these funds came from her separate property,
                   and Pedro counters that the sales were financed with community assets.
                               To overcome the community property presumption, Maria
                   needed to show at the outset that the funds used to purchase the properties
                   at the short sales came from her separate property. However, Maria did
                   not proffer any tracing evidence, either during discovery or trial, sufficient
                   to show that her separate funds financed the short sales. If anything, the
                   parties' banking records show significantly commingled funds, with both
                   Maria and Pedro consistently transferring joint account funds to their
                   separate accounts. "Once an owner of separate property funds commingles
                   these funds with community funds, the owner assumes the burden of
                   rebutting the presumption that all the funds in the account are community
                   property." See Malmquist v. Malmquist, 106 Nev. 231, 245, 792 P.2d. 372,
                   381 (1990). Maria's FDFs failed to adequately account for her assets and
                   debts, and, as will be addressed 'below, the alleged prenuptial agreement
                   was inadmissible to support her separate property claims.        The district

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                   court also determined that all assets in every bank account—both joint and
                   separate—belonged to the community.
                                Additionally, because substantial evidence supports the district

                   court's findings that community funds financed the short sales, the fact that
                   the third-party buyers gifted the properties back to Maria as her "sole and
                   separate property" is of little consequence. Function takes precedence over
                   form, and without proof that the funds used to purchase the properties came
                   from a separate property source, nominally titling the properties as Maria's
                   separate property was insufficient for Maria to overcome the community
                   presumption. See Peters, 92 Nev. at 690, 557 P.2d at 715. This conclusion
                   is particularly relevant in this case because the district court found that the
                   third parties who purchased the homes were "straw buyers" who facilitated
                   the nominal changes in title.
                                As to San Gervasio, Maria alleges that she paid off the
                   mortgage with inherited funds and that, after the mortgage was satisfied,
                   Pedro transferred his interest in the property to Maria. Pedro disputes the
                   validity of the deed and argues that his signature was forged, as he testified
                   at trial.   The same findings that applied to Grizzly Forest and Abrams
                   Avenue regarding the insufficiency of Maria's tracing evidence apply to San
                   Gervasio as well. The district court determined that Maria used community
                   funds to pay off the San Gervasio mortgage and that Pedro's testimony was
                   more credible than Maria's at trial.13       Given Maria's lack of tracing

                         13To support   its credibility determinations, the district court found
                   that Pedro's testimony regarding the rental payment structure aligned with
                   the banking records, while Maria's did not, and that Maria materially
                   misrepresented the funds in her bank accounts. We will not reweigh the
                   district court's witness credibility determinations on appeal. See Castle v.
                   Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004).
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                   evidence, coupled with the district court's credibility determinations and
                   conclusion that Pedro did not voluntarily relinquish his community interest
                   to Maria, there is substantial evidence to support the finding that the funds
                   used to finance the two short sale purchases and pay off the San Gervasio
                   mortgage were derived from community assets.
                                Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
                   its discretion by characterizing the Grizzly Forest, Abrams Avenue, and San
                   Geyvasio properties as community property because its determinations are
                   supported by substantial evidence that Maria failed to overcome the initial
                   community property presumption. Therefore, because all of the property
                   was community property, Maria's argument that the district-court made an
                   unequal distribution absent a compelling reason necessarily fails.
                   The district court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed questiOning
                   about the alleged prenuptial agreement
                                Maria argues that the district court erred when it denied her
                   the opportunity to question Pedro about the alleged prenuptial agreement
                   on cross-examination because it was corroborative of her -claims regarding
                   her separate property, and once Pedro denied the agreement's existence, the
                   alleged prenuptial agreement was admissible as evidence of a prior
                   inconsistent statement.     Pedro responds that the alleged prenuptial
                   agreement was not properly authenti.cated and that to permit questioning
                   about the agreement would have amounted to trial' by ambush,
                   Additionally, Pedro asserts tb.at becau.se Marià did not atteMpt to introduce
                   the alleged agreement -as a prior in.consistent statement at trial, thiS cburt
                   need not consider that portion of her argument on appeal. See Old Aztec
                   Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (explaining
                   that iSsues not argued below are "deemed to have been waived and will not
                   be considered on appeal"). We agree with Pedro on all accounts.
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                         The alleged prenuptial agreement was not properly authenticated
                               Proper authentication or identification iS a condition precedent
                   to admissibility and requires the proponent to show that the documentary
                   evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. NRS 52.015(1). "[W]e review
                   a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
                   discretion." MC. Multi-Family Dev., LLC v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124
                   Nev. 901, 915, 193 P.3d 536, 545 (2008).
                                  We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
                   when it excluded evidence of the alleged prenuptial agreement. Maria had
                   ample time and opportunity to obtain and produce this document prior to
                   trial, yet she did not. Maria also knew that Pedro would likely object to the
                   document's authenticity; on multiple occasions at pretrial conferences,
                   Pedro indicated that he believed Maria was attempting to fabricate the
                   document with her sister, an attorney in Mexico. At trial, Maria presented
                   an unsigned document, written entirely in Spanish, and without any
                   translation.     NRS 123A.040 requires a premarital agreement to be in
                   writing and signed by both parties. Maria not only failed to offer any
                   authority to support or explain how the unsigned document would be
                   controlling, or even corroborative, but she also did not testify to the
                   document's authenticity in any meaningful way. Namely, she did not
                   explain the circumstances surrounding how she obtained the document or
                   the details regarding when and how she and Pedro entered into this alleged
                   agreement before their marriage.
                                  Further, Maria included neither the document nor a translatiOn
                   as proposed exhibits from trial in the record on appeal. See NRAP 30(b)(3)
                   (stating an appellant must include any "portions of the record essential to
                   determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal"); Cuzze v. Univ. &
                   Crnty. Coll. Sys. of Neu., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007)
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                      (providing that we presume the missing portion of the record supports the
                      district court's ruling); see also NRS 48.040(1)(b) (stating that error may not
                      be predicated on a ruling excluding evidence unless a substantial right of a
                      party is affected and the substance of the evidence was made known to the
                      court by offer of proof). Therefore, we cannot assess the alleged document's
                      authenticity or how it may have been a prior inconsistent statement.
                      Consequently, we will not disturb the district court's findings that the
                      alleged agreement was not properly authenticated and unduly prejudicial
                      because these findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Colman,
                      136 Nev. at 113, 460 P.3d at 454.
                            Maria's cross-examination of Pedro about the alleged prenuptial
                            agreement would have constituted trial by ambush
                                 The district court also ruled that Maria's use of the alleged
                      prenuptial agreement would have constituted "trial by ambush" and
                      therefore also excluded it on those grounds. NRCP 16.2(d)(3)(P)'s
                      mandatory disclosure requirement requires a party to provide a copy of
                      every document or exhibit "that a party expects to offer as evidence at trial
                      in any manner." This rule serves to prevent trial by ambush. "Trial by
                      ambush traditionally occurs where a party withholds discoverable
                      inforrnation and then later presents this information at tri 1, effectively
                      ambushing the opposing party through gaining an advantag by surprise
                      attack." Turner v. State, 136 Nev. 545, 553, 473 P.3d 43 , 447 (2020)
                      (quoting Land Baron Invs., Inc. v. Bonnie Springs Family Lt . P'ship, 131
                      Nev. 686, 701 n.14, 356 P.3d 511, 522 n.14 (2015)).14

                            14The surprise attack is one that is so fundamentally unfair as to
                      require a mistrial. See, e.g., Bubak v. State, No. 69096, 2017 L 570931, at
                      *4-5 (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2017) (Order of Reversal and emand). In
                      Bubak, the district court denied a motion to continue stem ing from the
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             ,41gDz
                               While we review a district court's decision to admit or exclude
                   evidence for an abuse of discretion, see Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. 164,
                   174, 394 P.3d 940, 94.9 (2017), we review decisions related to trial by
                   ambush for palpable error, see Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co.,
                   121 Nev. 481, 492-93, 117 P.3d 219, 226-27 (2005) (stating it waS not
                   palpable error for the district court to overrule an objection of "trial by
                   ambush" when it admitted the challenged document after finding the
                   document had been provided to the objecting party during diseOvery).
                   Judges 'may "exercise 'reasonable control over the mode and order of'
                   eVidence presentation and witness interrogation. NRS 50.115(1). We will
                   nOt disturb the *district court's findings if they are supported•by substantial
                   evidence. See Colman, 136 Nev. at 113, 460 P.3d at 454.
                                Here, Maria has not demonstrated that the district court
                   abUSed its discretion.     Maria's argument that she was attempting to
                   introduce or use the document solely on cross-exainination is. Unpersuasive
                   becaUse at no point 'did Maria explicitly mention impeachment. See, NRS
                   50.085(3). Maria also did not pkeserve the error for review on appeal or
                   otherwise explain how cross-examination about this unsigned docUment
                   would have changed the trial's result. See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446,
                   465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010) ("To establish that an error is prejudicial, the
                   movant must show that the error affects the party's substantial rights so
                   that, hut for the alleged error, a different. result might reasonably have been
                   reach6d.");. cf NRCP 61 (stating that an error in excluding evidence is not

                   late.discovery of inculpatory evidence. We concluded that trial by ambush
                         I • because the *denial directly undermined the defendant's ability to
                   occurred
                   cross-examine a witness and preclUded his right to.a fair trial. Id..-at *3, *5-
                   6.
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                       grounds for disturbing a judgment unless justice so requires). She did not,
                       for instance, argue that she could impeach Pedro's credibility with the
                       unsigned document itself, as he had previously denied its existence. Nor
                       did Maria attempt at trial to make an offer of proof or submit supplemental
                       briefirig to discuss the issue and argue how she would be prejudiced by the
                       distriCt court's denial. See NRS 47.040(1)(b) (stating that error may not be
                       predicated upon a ruling excluding evidence unless the offer made the
                       substance of the evidence known to the court).
                                   The district court's decision also acted as a permissible
                       discovery sanction because the court had previously ordered Maria to timely
                       disclose the agreement at the CMC and the January 2022 hearing on all
                       pending motions.15    See NRCP 37(b)(1)(B) (providing that a court may
                       disanow evidence as a discovery sanction); see also APCO Constr., Inc. v.
                       Zitting Bros. Constr., Inc., 136 Nev. 569, 576, 473 P.3d 1021, 1028 (2020).
                       Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
                       when it did not allow Maria to question Pedro on cross-examination about
                       the alleged prenuptial agreement.
                            1

                             15  At the July 2021 CMC, the district court said that the agreement
                       neede,d to be produced with an official translation before the court could
                       admit it •into evidence, and at the January 2022 hearing on all pending
                       motions, the court stated that it was "too late" for Maria to produce the
                       agreement, as she had already had ten months to obtain the document and
                       had not done so. See NRCP 16.2(j)(2)(E) (noting that each party must serve
                          a written list of all documents not provided under NRCP 16.2(d)" with an
                       ((
                          explanation as to why each document was not provided"); NR.CP
                       16.2(j)(4)(A)(viii) (providing that a CMC order may include any other
                       necessary orders); see also EDCR 5.404(a)(2) (providing that a CMC order
                       can direct disclosures and discovery requirements).
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10) 1947B    44fgry.
                     This case will not be reassigned to a new judge
                                 Maria argues that this case should be reassigned to a new judge

                     because the district court judge presiding over the case expressed a serious
                     personal distaste towards the parties' property transactions and found both
                     parties not credible, although she found Pedro to be more credible than
                     Maria.
                                 The reassignment issue is moot because we are affirming the
                     judgment of the district court.   However, even if these parties were to

                     appear before the district court again, reassignment to a new judge would
                     not be required. We presume judges are unbiased, and Maria has not shoWn
                     bias sufficient to warrant disqualification. See Millen u. Eighth Judicial
                     Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 1254, 148 P.3d 694, 701 (2006). Specifically,
                     because the judge's comments in this case reflected opinions the judge
                     formed during litigation—and did not originate from an extrajudicial
                     source—Maria has not demonstrated a basis for reassignment. See In re
                     Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789-90, 769 P.2d 1211, 1275
                     (1988) ("The personal bias necessary to disqualify 'must stem from an
                     extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
                     other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case."
                     (quoting United States u. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966))).
                     Additionally, regarding the judge's opinions, Maria has not established any
                     "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism." Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
                     Court, 138 Nev. 104, 105, 506 P.3d 334, 336 (2022); see also Carheron v.
                     State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998) (noting that
                     generally, a judge's remarks "made in the context of a court proceeding are
                     not considered indicative of improper bias or prejudice unless they show
                     that the judge has closed his or her mind to the presentation of all the
                     evidence"). Accordingly, this case need not be reassigned to a new judge.
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                                              ' CONCLUSION
                               Because we hold that the revocable inter vivos family trust did
                   not need to be named in the divorce action or joined as a necessary party,
                   we conclude that the district court had authority to distribute the trust's
                   assets between the parties as community property. We also conclude that
                   the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Maria failed to
                   overcome the community property presumption by clear and convincing
                   evidence and therefore had authority to equally divide the family trust's
                   assets.   Finally, we conclude that the district court did- not abuse its
                   discretion in denying Maria the ability to question Pedro about the alleged
                   prenuptial agreement on cross-examination because doing so would have
                   allowed the use of a properly excluded document and amounted to trial by
                   ambush. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decree of divorce.16

                                                                                      ,   C.J.
                                                         Gib ons

                   Vié concur: •

                                                    J.
                   Bulla

                   Westbrook

                      . 161.n light of this decision, the partial stay entered on. October 11, 2022,
                   regarding the trust and real property, is necessarily lifted.
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