Court Opinion

ID: 9746343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:12:55.416581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.372075
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join in the Court’s decision. The initial error, as I see it, lies in answering a question which has not been asked. In my review of the briefs and the record I find no indication that the Commonwealth has even remotely suggested that the holdings of Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978) and Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973), should be revised or overruled. Appellee Randall has certainly not done so. By broadly stating the matter — “the issue in this case concerns the use of prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching a defendant who testifies in his own behalf,” Majority Opinion at 412 (emphasis added) — the majority attempts to validate what is no more than a sua sponte reevaluation of a rule of evidence developed in prior cases. In seeking our review, the Commonwealth argued no more than that the trial court had properly applied Roots and Bighum and that Superior Court exceeded the proper scope of its review (abuse of discretion) in reversing. On this issue the briefs of the parties were confined to assessments of the record according to the Roots/Bighum factors.
We do a great disservice to the parties, their counsel, and our system of justice when we convert the cause presented into a vehicle for changing the law according to our perception of the need for change. The parties, though one may benefit and thus have no inclination to register complaint, can have no confidence in the stability of rules if the Court may dispense with them on its own motion. Counsel must wonder to what purpose they expend time and effort carefully crafting arguments by reference to prior cases and arguments of policy, if the Court will pay them no heed and decide a matter according to its own whim. Our entire process suffers when we deign ourselves sufficiently wise to choose from among the many schools of thought, without *421input through recognized channels but solely according to our own resources.
In Commonwealth v. Bighum, the appellant argued the unfairness of the traditional rule of Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468 (1961) which permitted rebuttal testimony of a defendant’s prior criminal record to impeach him if he took the witness stand in his own defense. Acknowledging the argument that the jury was entitled to know the background of the defendant who presented himself as a witness worthy of belief, Bighum responded that the potential for prejudicial misuse of such evidence to convict a defendant on the basis of his prior record was too great to risk its use. The Commonwealth answered by reviewing the historical development of the rule from the common law rule disqualifying convicted felons as witnesses, to statutory abrogations of that rule and statutory and case development of qualifications to it. The Commonwealth reiterated the policy behind the Butler rule and reasoned that the mandatory cautionary instruction as to the limited use of the evidence sufficed to mitigate any unfairness.
Thus directed by the parties to the issue and with the benefit of their insights and arguments, “we recognize[d] that the rule of evidence at issue here [had] been the object of much controversy in recent years, and we [felt] it [was] appropriate to discuss its propriety under our supervisory powers.” Bighum, 452 Pa. at 565, 307 A.2d at 262 (footnote omitted). Upon careful examination of the rule and its purpose, we determined that because the evidence was offered to test veracity, only crimes involving dishonesty or false statement had probative value. We cited Model Code of Evidence Rule 106(1)(b), Uniform Rule of Evidence 21, and McCormick on Evidence as being in accord with this approach, and cited comparatively Federal Rule of Evidence 609.
Even as to these convictions, however, we observed that other factors might diminish probative value so as to make them excludable in a proper case. In this regard we re*422ferred to Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.Cir. 1965), in which the court, interpreting a discretionary rule of evidence, offered a number of factors which might be relevant to a judge in exercising his discretion.1
It is apparent from reading Bighum that our decision was not made in a vacuum but reflected a careful weighing of the many policy considerations involved. Cases and commentators were widely split over the use of such evidence and its conditions, and they remain so today. By citing the federal rule only comparatively, and agreeing with the approach in a case which the federal rule rejected, we implicitly found that the federal rule did not properly accommodate all interests. We amplified on these findings in Commonwealth v. Roots, being particularly solicitous of the effect of the rule on defendants as witnesses in their own behalf. [It should be noted that the general rule in its classic formulation and in the federal rule is applicable to all witnesses.]
Today, however, the majority offers only the bald statement that “[w]e believe that by adopting [the federal] rule we can still accommodate the competing interests of full disclosure and fairness to the defendant, while at the same time affording more certainty to the litigants and the courts below.” No explanation is given why what was once rejected i§ now accepted.2
*423The sole clue as to the impetus for this substantial change is the reference to one other case wherein allocatur has been granted that also “concerns” the admissibility of prior convictions as impeachment. In Commonwealth v. Tangle, 349 Pa.Super. 574, 504 A.2d 193 (1986), allocatur granted, 511 Pa. 364, 513 A.2d 1381 (1986) (argued March 11, 1987), we granted allocatur on the Commonwealth’s request to determine whether Superior Court had exceeded the proper scope of its review in finding an abuse of discretion by the trial court. My research indicates that this is the first time in the fourteen years since Bighum was decided that this Court has found it appropriate to examine the way in which Superior Court is overseeing decisions committed to the trial court’s discretion. Of forty reported decisions of that court applying the rule of Big-hum or Roots, thirty-two affirmed the trial court’s exercise of discretion.3 In only six cases, duly noted by the majority, *424was it held that the trial court improperly balanced the factors;4 in two cases the court found the rule violated where the prior crime (rape) was held not to involve dishonesty or false statement.5 Moreover, in the five reported cases in which this Court has had occasion to address the issue, we have affirmed the trial court’s exercise of its discretion four times6 and reversed only once, the reversal being Commonwealth v. Roots. Under the circumstances I think the majority stretches the point in claiming that “the grant of that decision making ability has proven illusory, for we continually have cases where an appellate court acting on a cold record concludes that the trial judge’s on-the-spot judgment was wrong.” I hardly think the majority has demonstrated the necessity of re-evaluating our prior decisions. Even less have they provided reasons why those decisions should be altered.
The appellee was tried for third degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime for a 1981 shooting at a Reading social club. In addition to testimony of police officers and medical and other investigators, the Commonwealth’s case included testimony of two eyewitnesses to the shooting. These witnesses described an argument between the victim and the appellee, after which the appellee left the club, later returned, and again argued with the victim, *425eventually shooting him. The appellee’s only evidence was his own testimony that the victim had threatened him with a gun during the first argument, and that he had seen the butt of a gun in the victim’s jacket pocket immediately prior to shooting him. The Commonwealth introduced rebuttal testimony of a witness who was present at the club but had not seen the shooting, to the effect that prior to the shooting he had not seen any guns at the club that day. The Commonwealth also introduced the evidence which is the subject of this appeal to challenge the credibility of the appellant’s testimony, a conviction for burglary which had occurred six years before the present offense.
As mentioned previously, the parties did not dispute that the applicable law in this case is that derived from our decisions in Commonwealth v. Bighum and Commonwealth v. Roots. In Bighum we limited the evidentiary use of a testifying defendant’s prior convictions to crimes involving dishonesty or false statement and, repudiating the rule of automatic admissibility of such convictions, we noted some of the considerations to be accounted for in balancing the interests on either side of the admissibility question. These considerations include the age and nature of the prior crimes, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, most significant, the extent to which it is more important to determining the truth of the case for the jury to hear the defendant’s testimony than to know of prior offenses. In Roots we refined these considerations somewhat. We held that the court should consider “the degree to which the commission of the prior offense reflects upon the veracity of the defenant-witness,” 482 Pa. at 39, 393 A.2d at 367, noting that the age of the conviction and the nature of the prior offense must be taken into account. We observed by way of example that “a larceny accomplished by stealth or misrepresentation bears more directly upon veracity than a taking by force.” Id. at n. 4. We further illustrated some of the factors important in the balance:
the likelihood, in view of the nature and extent of the prior record, that it would have a greater tendency to *426smear the character of the defendant and suggest a propensity to commit the crime for which he stands charged, rather than provide a legitimate reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person; ... the strength of the prosecution’s case and the prosecution’s need to resort to this evidence as compared with the availability to the defense of other witnesses through which its version of the events surrounding the incident can be presented; and ... the existence of alternative means of attacking the defendant’s credibility.
Id., 482 Pa. at 39-40, 393 A.2d at 367. Recognizing the strong potential for prejudice in the mere existence of a criminal record, we required this examination to ensure that an accused may present a defense without being exposed to this stigma unless strong countervailing reasons appeared. “Where the defendant has no other means by which to defend himself, it would be particularly unjust to subject him to the introduction of prior convictions.” Bighum, 452 Pa. at 567, 307 A.2d at 263. As the proponent of the evidence the Commonwealth bore the burden of establishing that the need for impeaching the defendant’s credibility overcomes the potential of prejudice in the proposed evidence. Roots, 482 Pa. at 41, 393 A.2d at 368.
In assessing a claim that a trial court erred in ruling on the admissibility of such evidence, appellate courts were given a narrow scope of review. The determination was within the sound discretion of the trial court, to be upheld unless there was an abuse of that discretion. See Bighum, 452 Pa. at 567, 307 A.2d at 263. The Commonwealth argues that valid reasons exist to support the trial court’s discretionary ruling and therefore Superior Court erred in substituting its judgment based on its own analysis of the Big-hum/Roots factors. I disagree. Although the trial court acknowledged the factors to be considered and listed pertinent facts, it does not appear to have undertaken a “meaningful exercise of discretion” in balancing the need for the evidence against the potential for prejudice.
*427As to the nature of the offense, the court reasoned that because it was a property offense it did not carry the potential to Suggest that the defendant was disposed to commit a crime of violence against the person and therefore was not prejudicial. The court failed, however, to independently consider “the degree to which the prior offense reflects upon the veracity of the witness,” apart from noting cases in which burglary had been considered a crime involving dishonesty.7
The most important factor for the court appears to have been its determination that credibility was crucial to the case. In striking the balance on the need for the disputed evidence the court ignored the entirety of the Commonwealth’s case in chief and considered only the single rebuttal witness available to the Commonwealth to counter the defendant’s claim that the victim had a gun at the club that day. To my mind this was error. In assessing the needs of the parties for or against the admission of evidence, the entire case must be considered as a whole. The Commonwealth had presented two eyewitnesses and other investigators, the sum of whose testimony stood in direct contradiction to the defense offered. The appellee, on the other hand, had no means of establishing his claim of self-defense other than his own testimony. The effect of the court’s ruling was to taint the only defense evidence with potentially prejudicial collateral information, while a contrary ruling would have removed nothing from the substance of the Commonwealth’s case. Although it might be argued that the prior offense impeachment evidence was necessary to aid the jury in assessing the conflicting evidence, under the applicable law and on this record, such a conclusion can only follow if the Commonwealth’s need is given undue weight. *428It is notable that the Commonwealth was, of course, free to argue that the jury should be suspect of the defendant’s testimony in light of his self-interest and considering the volume of the evidence to the contrary. Any “need” to bolster this argument by alerting the jury to a six year old burglary conviction shrinks to obscurity when it is seen that to avoid having this conviction put in evidence the defendant would have had to refrain from testifying and thereby offer no defense.
For these reasons I would affirm the Order of the Superi- or Court.
NIX, C.J., joined in this dissenting opinion.

. This discretionary rule, 14 D.C. Code § 305 (1965), was shortly thereafter amended by Congress to provide that all felonies (i.e., crimes punishable by imprisonment greater than one year) and all crimes of dishonesty or false statement regardless of degree, were admissible, again a discretionary rule. The amended version of § 305 became the model for Fed.R.Ev. 609(a), but obviously did not survive without substantial change. As adopted, Rule 609(a) provides that evidence of prior convictions shall be admitted if the convictions are crimes of dishonesty or false statement, a balance of prejudice and probative value being employed for all other felonies.

. I again express my dismay at the tendency to adopt without analysis the federal resolution of an issue. By abandoning sound and reasoned decisions of state law to mere mimickery of federal rules, we reduce our laws and our Commonwealth Constitution to mere window-dressing.

. Commonwealth v. Nenninger, 359 Pa.Super. 444, 519 A.2d 433 (1986); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 355 Pa.Super. 145, 512 A.2d 1253 (1986); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 355 Pa.Super. 25, 512 A.2d 1191 (1986); Commonwealth v. Bailey, 354 Pa.Super. 51, 511 A.2d 180 (1986); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 350 Pa.Super. 595, 504 A.2d 1310 (1986); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 340 Pa.Super. 26, 489 A.2d 821 (1985); Commonwealth v. Bunch, 329 Pa.Super. 101, 477 A.2d 1372 (1984); Commonwealth v. Toomey, 321 Pa.Super. 281, 468 A.2d 479 (1983); Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa.Super. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983); Commonwealth v. Tabas, 308 Pa.Super. 43, 454 A.2d 12 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kaster, 300 Pa.Super. 174, 446 A.2d 286 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 290 Pa.Super. 254, 434 A.2d 740 (1981); Commonwealth v. Clark, 280 Pa.Super. 1, 421 A.2d 374 (1980); Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa.Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980); Commonwealth v. Woods, 275 Pa.Super. 392, 418 A.2d 1346 (1980); Commonwealth v. Dombrauskas, 274 Pa.Super. 452, 418 A.2d 493 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 272 Pa.Super. 505, 416 A.2d 570 (1979); Commonwealth v. Herman, 271 Pa.Super. 145, 412 A.2d 617 (1979); Commonwealth v. Epps, 270 Pa.Super. 295, 411 A.2d 534 (1979); Commonwealth v. Henson, 269 Pa.Super. 314, 409 A.2d 906 (1979); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 267 Pa.Super. 34, 405 A.2d 1290 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159, 401 A.2d 1148 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golson, 263 Pa.Super. 143, 397 A.2d 441 (1979); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 258 Pa.Super. 429, 392 A.2d 869 (1978); Commonwealth v. Quartman, 253 Pa.Super. 460, 385 A.2d 429 (1978); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 250 Pa.Super. 487, 378 A.2d 1253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jones, 250 Pa.Super. 98, 378 A.2d 471 (1977); Commonwealth v. Love, 248 Pa.Super. 387, 375 A.2d 151 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 247 Pa.Super. 386, 372 A.2d 880 (1977); *424Commonwealth v. Flores, 247 Pa.Super. 140, 371 A.2d 1366 (1977); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa.Super. 505, 368 A.2d 1299 (1976) and Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa.Super. 212, 361 A.2d 862 (1976). See also, Carlson Mining Co. v. Titan Coal Co., Inc., 343 Pa.Super. 364, 494 A.2d 1127 (1985) (Bighum analysis appropriate in civil case, no abuse of discretion by trial court).

. Commonwealth v. Canada, 308 Pa.Super. 494, 454 A.2d 643 (1983); Commonwealth v. Williams, 286 Pa.Super. 444, 429 A.2d 22 (1981); Commonwealth v. Williams, 273 Pa.Super. 389, 417 A.2d 704 (1980); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 272 Pa.Super. 16, 414 A.2d 646 (1979); Commonwealth v. Cobb, 258 Pa.Super. 91, 392 A.2d 698 (1978); and Commonwealth v. Sampson, 250 Pa.Super. 157, 378 A.2d 874 (1977).

. Commonwealth v. Benefiel, 254 Pa.Super. 248, 385 A.2d 1003 (1978); Commonwealth v. Moore, 246 Pa.Super. 163, 369 A.2d 862 (1977).

. Commonwealth v. Perrin, 484 Pa. 188, 398 A.2d 1007 (1979); Commonwealth v. Green, 477 Pa. 170, 383 A.2d 877 (1978); Commonwealth v. Kahley, 467 Pa. 272, 356 A.2d 745 (1976) and Commonwealth v. Miller, 465 Pa. 458, 350 A.2d 855 (1976).

. Amicus curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia advances the argument that burglary is not in all circumstances a crime involving dishonesty or false statement and should not be admissible to impeach credibility without specific evidence that the offense was committed by fraudulent or deceitful means. As noted, this issue is pending before the Court in Commonwealth v. Mullen, No. 52 M.D. Appeal Docket 1985, argued May 15, 1986, and need not be addressed in this case, where it is not in proper posture to be decided.