Court Opinion

ID: 9785881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:45:02.363027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:10.603356
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is not cognizable because there is no constitutional right to posteonviction counsel and its further conclusion that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), is not the applicable standard for determining ineffective assistance of statutory posteonviction counsel. While I see some inconsistency in the majority’s approach, I concur that the matter should be remanded on the issue of whether *1092defendant’s postconvietion counsel had a conflict of interest.
In this second motion for postconvietion relief, defendant, pro se, for the first time alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and postconvietion counsel. In his first motion for postconvietion relief he alleged, among other things, ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The majority holds that a claim of ineffective assistance of postconvietion counsel is not cognizable because defendants have no constitutional right to postconvietion counsel. In doing so, the majority declines to follow People v. Hickey, 914 P.2d 377 (Colo.App.1995). I authored Hickey. I dissent not from pride of authorship but because I remain confident that the opinion is correct in recognizing a limited statutory right of counsel in postconvietion proceedings and establishing Strickland v. Washington, supra, as the appropriate standard for evaluating the effectiveness of postconvietion counsel. For reasons that are not altogether clear, while concluding that a claim of ineffective assistance of postconvietion counsel is not cognizable, the majority nonetheless concludes that a right to conflict-free postconvietion counsel is cognizable and remands for further proceedings on that claim.
At the outset, the majority relies on a number of United States Supreme Court opinions for the proposition that there is no constitutional right to postconvietion counsel. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982)(per curium); Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375 (Colo.1994); Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 517 (Colo.1989); People v. Hickey, supra; People v. Duran, 757 P.2d 1096 (Colo.App.1988).
These cases, with the exception of People v. Duran, and People v. Hickey, do not address a statutory right to postconvietion counsel. Hickey turned on a statutory right.
The right to effective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 16 of the Colorado Constitution, and the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, supra, applies to both. See People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 406 (Colo.1990). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Our supreme court has expressed a preference that claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel be vindicated in postconvietion proceedings. See People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880 (Colo.1994).
Therefore, challenges to the effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel will, for the most part, be raised in postconvietion proceedings. As framed, the majority appears to accept the proposition that defendant is not entitled to effective assistance of counsel in vindicating his fundamental rights to effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. In my view, there is no right without a practical remedy. Denying the right to effective assistance of postconvietion counsel after counsel is appointed renders the right to effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel theoretical at best and ethereal at worst.
At the outset, I note that the division in Hickey was not the first division to recognize a statutory right to postconvietion counsel. See People v. Duran, supra. Hickey was the first case to posit that the right to counsel in postconvietion proceedings was “tenuously premised” on the state public defender statute. Sections 21-l-103(l)(b), (2); 21-1-104(l)(a), (b), C.R.S.2004. The tenuous nature of the right is premised on the language of the statute; the fact that a statute can be easily amended or repealed; and the fact that a defendant must file a motion, typically pro se, which has arguable merit before any right to appointed counsel arises.
As to the statutory language, the division said in People v. Duran:
However, a limited statutory right to counsel exists in such [postconvietion] proceedings. See §§ 21-1-103(1) and 21-1-104, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B); People v. Naranjo, supra. Section 21-1-103(1) provides that the state public defender shall represent indigent defendants who either re*1093quest or, on a court’s order therefore, do not reject such representation. Section 21-l-104(l)(b) further provides that the public defender shall “prosecute any ... remedies ... after conviction that he considers to be in the interest of justice.” However, under § 21-1-104(2), the public defender is not required to pursue such remedies unless he is “satisfied first that there is arguable merit to the proceeding.”
People v. Duran, supra, 757 P.2d at 1097.
The fact that a statute can be amended or repealed requires no discussion or authority. As to the last factor, prior to the appointment of postconviction counsel, a generally undereducated and untrained defendant with limited access to the record and a law library must prepare and timely file a posteonviction motion with specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, or other error of constitutional dimension, and must further demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced. This is not easily or frequently accomplished. Therefore, while a lot of motions without merit are filed, it is highly likely that valid claims are not adequately or fully articulated or addressed.
With respect to the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, the majority questions whether providing ineffective assistance of counsel is tantamount to not providing counsel and disagrees that Strickland v. Washington, supra, should be the standard for evaluating whether a defendant has been afforded effective assistance of counsel. The majority implies that constitutional rights and statutory rights cannot, or should not, have the same standard. I do not agree.
Many standards for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel have been formulated over the years. Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.1980) and Romero v. United States, 459 U.S. 926, 103 S.Ct. 236, 74 L.Ed.2d 187 (1982)(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) outline the history of the federal standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel and I borrow from the former unabashedly.
One pre-Strickland formulation, first announced in United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.1949), became known as the “farce and mockery,” “sham and mockery,” or “sham, farce and mockery” test. It stated: “A lack of effective assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice.” United States v. Wight, supra, 176 F.2d at 379. The Tenth Circuit articulated this standard as follows:
This circuit adheres to the well established principle that relief from a final conviction on the ground of incompetent or ineffective counsel will be granted only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation.
Dyer v. Crisp, supra, 613 F.2d at 276.
Prior to Strickland v. Washington, supra, Colorado employed the “farce and mockery” standard articulated as, “[t]he record does not disclose any flagrant shortcomings of the trial attorney from which we could conclude he was guilty of palpable malfeasance, or that the representation received at trial was so inadequate as to constitute a farce, mockery or sham.” Martinez v. People, 173 Colo. 515, 519-20, 480 P.2d 843, 845 (1971); see also People v. Pesis, 189 Colo. 52, 536 P.2d 824 (1975).
Several circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, abandoned the “sham, farce and mockery” test, and adopted the “reasonable competence” test which had a variety of formulations. “[A] defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.” United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C.Cir.1973). The quality of a defense counsel’s representation should be within the range of competence which normally prevails at the time and place. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.1970). “The Sixth Amendment demands that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney.” Dyer v. Crisp, supra, 613 F.2d at 278.
*1094These varying formulations and standards remained in place until the Supreme Court announced Strickland v. Washington, supra. The Strickland formulation is:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Viewed in light of the “reasonably competent” standard, Strickland was not all that revolutionary.
With respect to posteonviction counsel, the history is considerably shorter. In Hickey, the People urged the Indiana formulation for ineffective assistance of posteonviction counsel as announced in Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind.1989). That test is formulated as: “[I]f counsel in fact appeared and represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting which resulted in a judgment of the court, it is not necessary to judge his performance by the rigorous standard set forth in [Strickland].” Baum v. State, supra, 533 N.E.2d at 1201. In Graves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1193 (Ind.2005), the court characterized this standard as having been met if counsel did not abandon the defendant. With all due respect to the Indiana Supreme Court, I will refer to this as the “sentient counsel test,” “sentient” in this context meaning “capable of sensation and of at least rudimentary consciousness.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2069 (2002).
Missouri has concluded, as has the majority, that there is no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of posteonviction counsel. State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850 (Mo.1992).
However, a small but growing number of states have adopted the Strickland formulation. In Johnson v. State, 681 N.W.2d 769 (N.D.2004), the court, citing Hickey, held that Strickland v. Washington, supra, was the standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of appointed posteonviction counsel. The court quoted from Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 838-839, 613 A.2d 818, 821-22 (1992), wherein it was stated:
The right to effective assistance of counsel is predicated on the statutory right to ha-beas counsel pursuant to [statute] which provides for the appointment of counsel for an indigent person “in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter .... ” It would be absurd to have the right to appointed counsel who is not required to be competent. “[Cjounsel should be appointed in post conviction matters .... When counsel is so appointed he must be efféctive and competent. Otherwise, the appointment is a useless formality.” Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir.1965); see United States v. Wren, 682 F.Supp. 1237, 1241-42 (S.D.Ga.1988)(an indigent federal probationer’s statutory right to appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(l)(c) “would be meaningless if it did not embody a requirement that counsel be effective as well as merely present”). Indeed, [the statute] would become an empty shell if it did not embrace the right to have the assistance of a competent attorney.
In Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711, 800 A.2d 31 (2002), as in Colorado, the defendant’s right to appointed counsel derived from the public defender statute. The court held that that right was broader than the right to counsel guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and the standard for reviewing effective assistance of posteonviction counsel was Strickland v. Washington, supra. The court stated that it would not presume that the legislature mandated a “useless formality” by merely requiring the *1095presence of counsel as opposed to effective and competent counsel. Stovall v. State, supra, 144 Md.App. at 723, 800 A.2d at 38; see also Jackson v. Weber, 637 N.W.2d 19 (S.D.2001)(“Counsel” mandated by statute to be appointed to indigent prisoners in habeas corpus proceedings implicitly means competent counsel, which may be determined under Strickland’s effective assistance of counsel test).
So why the Strickland test? There are, in my view, at least three reasons:
• The Strickland test is an objective test which is not the case with the “sham, farce, and mockery” test.
• The Strickland test, while difficult to meet, is reasonably attainable, which cannot be said for the “sham, farce, and mockery” test, the “sentient counsel” test, or the “not cognizable” position of the majority. Therefore, it is possible under Strickland to vindicate fundamental constitutional rights with the assistance of reasonably competent counsel.
• There is a large and rapidly growing body of case law construing and applying Strickland which can, and will, permit a uniform application of the standard. I am confident that that body of case law will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. Both the majority and I take some comfort
from People v. Breaman, 939 P.2d 1348 (Colo.1997). In that case, the trial court appointed posteonviction counsel to “review [Breaman’s] submissions, consult with [Brea-man] and make further investigations as may be appropriate to determine if a meritorious issue exists.” People v. Breaman, supra, 939 P.2d at 1350. Appointed posteonviction counsel reported back, stating that the defendant’s claims were without merit. The supreme court reversed, concluding that the appointment of posteonviction counsel was improperly limited, as the purpose of appointed counsel was to represent the defendant, not to serve as the trial court’s factfin-der. In the role of posteonviction counsel, the court observed: “[a]n attorney appointed to represent a criminal defendant must not have a conflict of interest, see Murphy v. People, 863 P.2d at 304, and must provide the client with professionally competent assistance, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).” People v. Breaman, supra, 939 P.2d at 1351.
I recognize the need for finality. Indiana has finality with the “sentient counsel” test. Missouri and the majority have found finality by not recognizing any right to effective assistance of posteonviction counsel.
I am aware that the dockets of the trial courts and this court are cluttered, but not clogged, with motions for posteonviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and, as here, ineffective assistance of posteonviction counsel. I am also aware that in that clutter there are motions with merit. I am further aware that in resolving many of these motions the courts must frequently review the merits of the underlying claims which trial counsel failed to preserve; or appellate or posteonviction counsel failed to raise on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, under the cloak of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant can seek seemingly endless review of real and imagined errors arising in the trial court. In part, this seemingly endless review is the consequence of reading, taking seriously, and enforcing our constitutions, which is one of the many costs of a free and ordered society.
It seems to me that Strickland v. Washington, supra, strikes an appropriate balance between finality and the vindication of important, if not fundamental, rights. The majority does not, in my view, strike an appropriate balance. Therefore, I cannot bring myself to agree.
Finally, while I do not intend to analyze the issue extensively, I have always viewed a defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel as a subset of his or her right to effective assistance of counsel, not an independent right. See People v. Cross, 114 P.3d 1, 2004 WL 439361 (Colo.App. No. 02CA0151, Mar. 11, 2004) (“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, which includes the right to conflict-free counsel”).
As our supreme court said in Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17,19, 24 (Colo.1985):
*1096An accused in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel by the United States and Colorado Constitutions. U.S. Const, amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const, art. II, § 16. This right is fundamental to the concept of a fair trial in our adversary system. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Edüd 426 (1978). It serves both to protect the innocent from an unjust conviction and to maintain the integrity of the process by which society condemns a wrongdoer. See People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo.1983).
The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel may be violated when the accused is represented by counsel who simultaneously represents competing interests. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo.1983). Although joint representation does not per se violate the right to effective assistance of counsel, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482, 98 S.Ct. at 1177, and although a defendant may waive the right to conflict-free representation if such waiver is made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the actual conflict, it is recognized that representation by one attorney of two or more defendants in prosecutions arising from a single criminal episode invariably creates the possibility that a conflict of interest will arise. Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333.
As we have indicated, in cases in which the issue of the fundamental constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel arises from the fact of joint representation, when an accused demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest was present at trial and that the conflict adversely affected the representation provided by defense counsel, no further demonstration of prejudice is required to satisfy the “plain error” standard. Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Edüd 333; Castro, 657 P.2d 932. In such cases the prejudice is all pervasive, commencing with initial tactical and strategic decisions and continuing through preparation of what should be included in new trial motions. The Court of Appeals erred in suggesting that once a real conflict of interest is established, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel because of joint representation must not only demonstrate an adverse effect on defense counsel’s representation, but must also prove that such conduct affected the jury’s decision.
Following the majority’s line of reasoning, with which I disagree, if there is no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, what difference does it make that postconviction counsel suffered under a conflict of interest?
Therefore, I would remand for further proceedings on both of defendant’s claims or resolve the first and remand the second.