Court Opinion

ID: 9400050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 13:06:30.094518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.905898
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Kincaid, 2023-Ohio-1873.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                               :   APPEAL NOS. C-220628
                                                               C-220629
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                :   TRIAL NOS. B-1601516
                                                             B-2100598
     vs.                                      :

 CHISTOPHER KINCAID,                          :
                                                       O P I N I O N.
           Defendant-Appellant.               :

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 7, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Michael J. Trapp, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Christopher Kincaid appeals his sentences,

arguing that the trial court denied him his right to allocution. Because any error made

by the trial court was harmless, we overrule Kincaid’s sole assignment of error.

                            I.     Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   In 2016, Kincaid was indicted for one count of felonious assault. Kincaid

pleaded guilty. The trial court sentenced him to community control and inpatient

treatment.

  Kincaid was charged with arson while on community control for felonious assault

       {¶3}   The trial court revoked and restored Kincaid’s community control three

times within eight months. In February 2021, the state charged Kincaid with violating

community control for the fourth time due to his being indicted on an aggravated-

arson charge. Kincaid pleaded guilty to both a reduced charge of arson and violating

the terms of his community control on the felonious-assault charge.

                Kincaid interjected throughout the sentencing hearing

       {¶4}   During the sentencing hearing, it appears that the court was addressing

defense counsel when it initially asked, “Did you want to say anything?” Kincaid’s

counsel responded with an argument in mitigation. Kincaid interjected throughout the

sentencing hearing, asking if he can “say anything,” and explaining that he “was just

doing things” when he “was on crack.” Kincaid stated that he did not set a fire, but he

was “lighting papers for [his] crack because [he] didn’t have a lighter.”

       {¶5}   Kincaid continued to interject as the trial court directly addressed

Kincaid’s counsel and the probation officer. At one point during the hearing, the

                                           2
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

dialogue reflects both counsel and the deputy asking Kincaid to be quiet as counsel

continued the mitigation argument:

      THE COURT: We did cut him – I’m not maxing him out. We did give

      him a break. We reduced it from an [aggravated] arson down from an

      arson.

      MR. NEFF: It was reduced from an F2 to a felony of the third degree.

      THE COURT: [S]o you saved him a lot of time there because with

      initially an [aggravated] arson –

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      THE COURT: [H]e faced, wow, really a substantial amount of time.

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, two to eight years, yes, sir.

      THE COURT: Because originally it was a felony one.

      MR. NEFF: It was a felony two.

      THE COURT: Felony two, so it carries eight to 12 years in prison. All

      right. Anything else you want to add on this?

      THE DEFENDANT: Judge Ruehlman, I’ve been real good.

      THE COURT: You did a good job for him. You saved him some time. I’m

      just worried about society in general. I’ve taken a lot of chances on him.

      THE DEFENDANT: Give me a chance, Judge Ruehlman.

      MR. NEFF: Let me talk for a minute.

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, yes, sir, yes, sir.

      MR. NEFF: If you were to put him on community control, he tells us he

      can live with his mom.

      THE DEFENDANT: [S]ure can.

                                          3
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       MR. NEFF: His mother’s address is on the form that we provided, which

       is the notification. I did go over that with him and he signed it so he

       knows he has an obligation to register and then notify of change of

       address. I’ll submit on that.

       THE COURT: [W]e have to do the registration.

       THE DEFENDANT: Judge Ruehlman, I’ll do whatever time you want

       me to do if you give me a chance. Give me a chance, Judge Ruehlman.

       Give me a chance, Judge Ruehlman. If I don’t Judge Ruehlman, Judge

       Ruehlman. I won’t mess up and if I don’t --

       DEPUTY SHERIFF: [S]hhhh.

       {¶6}   Other than suggesting to Kincaid that he refrain from discussing his

drug use, the trial court did not directly address Kincaid until it explained his

requirement to register as a violent offender:

       THE COURT: * * * so right now I got you -- when you get out, it says you

       will be living at [address].

       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: [S]o if for some reason when you get out of prison that’s

       changed, you are going to -- when you come into this county after you’re

       released, within ten days of coming to this county, occupying a dwelling

       for no more than three days, so if you are in a dwelling then you have to

       do it for three days and then come to the sheriff’s department and

       register. And then a year from that date, you have to register again and

       you have to do this for the rest of your life. Do you understand that?

       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

                                           4
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       THE COURT: [O]kay. Good.

       THE DEFENDANT: I won’t mess up, Judge Ruehlman.

       THE COURT: [O]kay.

       {¶7}    The trial court responded to defense counsel’s question involving

waiving Kincaid’s registration fees. It was not clear to whom the court was speaking

when it asked whether “you” would like to add anything.

       MR. NEFF: Judge, there’s a number of fees included with the

       registration. Is it possible for the court to waive those fees?

       THE COURT: Yes, I was going to go over that next because I’m waiving

       all of the costs.

                                          ***

       THE DEFENDANT: I get social security, Judge Ruehlman. I can pay for

       that.

       THE COURT: Anything else you wanted to add then?

       MR. NEFF: Judge, there’s nothing else I can add. * * * And, again, I’d

       ask you to release him to the address that he has on the form. Put him

       on community control. I certainly understand the Court’s concerns.

After Kincaid’s counsel offered argument involving mitigation, the court stated, “All

right. And then defendant has already made a statement.”

       {¶8}    The trial court sentenced Kincaid to eight years on the felonious-assault

count and 36 months for the arson charge, to be served consecutively. On appeal,

Kincaid maintains that the trial court failed to directly address him and ask whether

he had anything to say before the court imposed the sentences.

                              II.     Law and Analysis

                                            5
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

    A. A trial court must directly address a defendant as to his right to allocution

       {¶9}   This court and the Ohio Supreme Court have held that “[t]rial courts

must painstakingly adhere to Crim.R. 32, guaranteeing the right of allocution.” State

v. Osume, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140390, 2015-Ohio-3850, ¶ 19, quoting State v.

Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 359-360, 738 N.E.2d 1208 (2000). When imposing

sentences, the trial court must address defendants personally to ask whether they wish

to make a statement on their own behalf or present any information in mitigation of

punishment. Osume at ¶ 19; see Crim.R. 32(A)(1); R.C. 2929.19(A). The right to

allocution includes defendants being sentenced following community-control

violations. R.C. 2929.19(A)(1); Crim.R. 32(A)(1); see State v. McAfee, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-130567, 2014-Ohio-1639, ¶ 14.

       {¶10} When trial courts impose sentences without first asking defendants if

they wish to exercise their right to allocution, resentencing is required unless the error

is invited error or harmless. Osume at ¶ 22; see McAfee at ¶ 14; State v. Jackson, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-140384, 2015-Ohio-2171, ¶ 8; State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d

320, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000), paragraph three of the syllabus. Accordingly, errors in

affording the right of allocution are subject to a harmless-error analysis. Campbell at

326.

       {¶11} Kincaid argues that although the trial court allowed Kincaid to “interject

at numerous points before pronouncing its sentences,” he was not given the right of

allocution. It appears that the trial court was addressing defense counsel when it

asked, “Anything else you want to add then?” Kincaid’s counsel, not Kincaid,

responded. Meanwhile, Kincaid was told by the deputy and his counsel to be quiet.

                                            6
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Although the record is unclear, it appears that Kincaid may have been denied his right

to allocution.

       {¶12} But assuming that Kincaid was denied his right to allocution, any such

error was harmless.

           Kincaid made unsworn statements during the sentencing phase

       {¶13} Courts have found harmless error where the defendant makes a

statement in mitigation of punishment despite the court not directly asking the

defendant for a statement. Cleveland v. Gholston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96592,

2011-Ohio-6164, ¶ 18.

       {¶14} In Osume, Osume’s mother made a sworn statement and the trial court

addressed defense counsel, the state, and probation. Osume, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

140390, 2015-Ohio-3850, at ¶ 4-7. But the trial court failed to address Osume before

sentencing him. Id. at ¶ 7. This court held that there were no unusual circumstances

to hold the error harmless where the trial court failed to address Osume personally

and ask if he wished to make a statement on his own behalf or present any information

in mitigation of punishment before imposing the sentence. Id. at ¶ 24.

       {¶15} In Reynolds, the Ohio Supreme Court found an unusual circumstance

and held that Reynolds took his opportunity to speak on his own behalf as he presented

evidence and made an unsworn statement in the “penalty phase” of his case. State v.

Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 684, 687 N.E.2d 1358 (1998). The court held that the

trial court’s denial of allocution was harmless and not prejudicial because Reynolds

had previously sent a letter to the trial court as to sentencing, Reynolds made an

unsworn statement during sentencing, and defense counsel made a statement on

Reynolds’s behalf. Id.

                                          7
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶16} Here, Kincaid spoke on his own behalf in mitigation by (1) explaining

his drug use being the cause of the fire, (2) saying that he had “been real good” and

had been taking his medication, and (3) repeatedly asking the court to give him

another chance. Defense counsel spoke on Kincaid’s behalf and requested that Kincaid

be put on community control for the arson conviction. See State v. Turjonis, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 11 MA 28, 2012-Ohio-4215, ¶ 10 (While the trial court failed to ask

appellant if he wanted to make one last statement, appellant gave his addiction to

heroin as the reason for mitigating his sentence. Thus, appellant spoke on his own

behalf in mitigation by explaining his drug-addiction history to the judge, and defense

counsel asked the court for community control.).

       {¶17} Because Kincaid had the opportunity to address the court and did

address the court, any error in failing to personally ask Kincaid if he would like to make

a statement before sentencing was harmless error. We overrule Kincaid’s sole

assignment of error.

                                  III.   Conclusion

       {¶18} Because Kincaid addressed the court throughout the sentencing

hearing, any error was harmless. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                                   Judgments affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

                                            8