Court Opinion

ID: 9834505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:38:36.132322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:16.559388
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOB BEHEAEING.
In connection with the motion for rehearing appellants have filed an application for a writ of certiorari to perfect the record, so as to show the date upon which their motion to quash the sheriff’s return on the citation to two of appellants, and the date upon which the amendment to said return was made and filed. The motion for certiorari, which is duly verified by affidavit of counsel, shows that appellants’ motion to quash the return of the sheriff of Tarrant County, upon the citation to appellants B. L. Crowdus and D. F. Eggleston, was filed in the trial court upon the 6th day of September, 1904, and that the amendment to the return was not made until September 25, 1904, and not filed in the court until the next day. It is hence insisted that a perfected record will establish error in our conclusion on original hearing, to the *5effect that it did not appear that the motion to quash had been filed prior to the filing of the answer of appellants, or that the amendment had not been made before the conclusion of the trial, which was on September 12, 1904.
The statute (Rev. Stats., art. 1410) provides for the delivery of the transcript to the party so desiring, and it has more than once been held that it is the duty of an appellant to see that the transcript is correct before the case is submitted. (Ross v. McGown, 58 Texas, 603; Railway Co. v. Scott, 78 Texas, 360; Hayslip v. Pomery, 32 S. W. Rep., 124.) It may therefore be well doubted whether a motion to correct the record should be granted on motion for rehearing in cases AA'here, as here, the omitted facts are, at least, apparently material in the consideration of the very assignment of error relied upon, and to Avhich they naturally relate. It is doubtless Avithin our power to do so, and, under certain circumstances, our duty as well (Railway Co. v. Cannon, 31 S. W. Rep., 498); but, however this may be, we are of opinion that the present motion should be overruled for the reason, if for no other, that the desired facts would not authorize an alteration of our original Conclusion on the question presented in the assignment of error, AAdiich assignment is to the effect that there was error in proceeding with the trial after having quashed the sheriff’s return on the citation, the proposition under the assignment being substantially that the court had “no jurisdiction” to proceed to trial after the quashal of the return.
Admitting that the motion to quash was filed on September 6, as stated in the motion for certiorari, there is yet nothing in the record to show that such filing was prior to the filing of the ansAver. The opening paragraph of appellants’ original answer, also filed September 6, is as folloAvs: “How comes H. D. BreAvster, R. L. Crowdus and D. F. Eggleston, defendants in the above entitled and numbered cause, subject to the right to file motion to quash citation and service in this case and the court’s action thereon, and ansAAer as folloAvsThis certainly justifies the inference indulged on original hearing that, at the time of the filing of the ansAver, no motion to quash had been filed. The reservation in the answer goes to “the right to file motion to quash citation and service,” and not to the right of insisting upon one already filed. Besides, while the action of the court was irregular, it appears from the record that it Avas the sheriff’s return that was defective. It is the proper service of the citation that gave the court jurisdiction, and not the return. The return is but the evidence that sendee of the citation has.been made, and, if defective, the court undoubtedly may permit the officer to amend it so as to accord Avith the true facts at any time during the term, which AA-as the case here. (Rev. Stats., art. 1239; Kitchen v. Crawford, 13 Texas, 519, 520.) There is no denial of proper service, nor is it asserted that the amendment "was false, or failed to show proper service, and its filing was during the term and before appellants’ motion for a new trial was acted upon. We therefore conclude that the court was not Avithout jurisdiction to proceed with the trial, as asserted in appellants’ proposition.
Appellants, in their motion for rehearing, also very vigorously attack our conclusion that no reversible error aa'us committed by the court in *6excluding the answer of Frank Langley, to the effect that his confinement in jail (drawn out by appellee on cross-examination) was on the charge of unlawfully carrying a pistol on or about his person. It is insisted that confinement on such a charge is not proper matter of impeachment, and that the testimony of this witness was important on the issue of Boley Langley’s age. It may be, as in effect conceded on original hearing, that the ruling was erroneous, but it confessedly went to the credibility of the witness only, and a re-examination of the record strengthens our conclusion that it should not cause a reversal. The only important issue to which his evidence related was that of Boley Langley’s age, and as to that he thus testified in part: “I have known Boley Langley ever since we were children together. I could not say just how old he is, but my best judgment is he is twenty-one or twenty-two years old. I base that on my own age.” Boley Langley testified: “I am seventeen years of age and a little over, the date of my birth being May 26, -1887.” Joe Langley, a brother, testified: “Boley is seventeen years old the 26th of last May. He was born in 1887.” Hiram Langley, the father, testified: Boley Langley was seventeen years old on the 26th of May," 1904.” Emiline Medline, an aunt by marriage, testified that Boley Langley was a “little baby, just crawling around — a sucking baby — in the spring of 1888.” Mrs. Joe Langley, sister-in-law, testified: “He (Boley Langley) is now about seventeen years old.” A. J. Hughes testified that Boley Langley was about sixteen. Mrs. Hughes to the same effect. The force of the testimony quoted was not materially weakened by cross-examination or otherwise, and we think it entirely improbable that any qualified juror would have been influenced to disregard it by the testimony of Frank Langley, which was very indefinite, and, at best, a matter of opinion, even though unimpeached. We therefore conclude as before, that the error was harmless.
The statement in our original opinion, that “we fail to find even a contention that the proof failed to show that Boley Langley was not permitted to enter and remain in appellant’s place of business within the meaning of the law,” is also assailed. The contention now is that the evidence only shows that Boley Langley remained in appellant’s saloon long enough to drink the beer sold to him. A careful re-examinatian of appellants’ brief fails to disclose a single assignment of error that calls in question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment, and, as the transcript presents the evidence, we think no such contention can be reasonably made. Boley Langley testified that he, with four other boys or young men, was in appellant’s saloon twice, in the morning and evening, on the’ day charged'. In the morning the party drank no beer, remained ten or fifteen minutes, had no business, but in the tongue of the witness, “just sot there awhile,” and went out. In the evening the party returned, bought two one-half gallon buckets of beer, and “just stood ’round there and drank it.” Was there on this occasion also some ten' or fifteen minutes. On cross-examination he seemed inclined to deny the imputation of being drunk in the morning; his language is: “I don’t think I was drunk when I was in there the first time that day.” Joe Langley testified that he was passing in front of the saloon, saw the party named “in there,” *7and went" in and talked with them “I guess ten or fifteen minutes,” when he went out, leaving the “boys” in the saloon. " He further testifying said: “I had no business in there, and just went in only because I saw the boys in there as I was passing along the street, and I went in there just to pass the time. I did not want to see them about anything in particular, and I do not remember what we talked about. I think I asked them what they were doing in there, and they said they were just having a time. I think they had been drinking some, and I thought I "could smell it on their breath, and they acted like they were drinking. I sat down in there on a beer keg, or on a plank there in the back room, I don’t remember which. I think J ess Smith was sitting on a plank in there. Bob and Hez and Boley and Jess Smith were the only ones in there, and we were all talking — just gabbing like other people would— but I don’t remember what we talked about. All I remember is that Jess wanted me to go in with them on the purchase of another bucket of beer, and I would not do it.”
Loftin Brewster, the barkeeper, testified that he was in charge during the entire day in question, and, “if I sold Boley Langley any beer on or about the 21st day of June, or at any time, I do not remember it. . . . Never saw those boys in the saloon at any time to remember it now. ... If he had come into the saloon I would have taken him to be twenty-one years old. As to this particular transaction I do not remember anything about it. ... I do not say that Boley Langley was not in there.” The appellant, H. D. Brewster, the proprietor, testified: “I do not recollect of ever seeing Boley Langley in the saloon there. If he was in there I do not remember it.”
We find no other witnesses testifying on the point under consideration, and think it is thus made perfectly apparent that the evidence not only supports the verdict and judgment, but justifies our original conclusion.
The motions for certiorari and rehearing are overruled.

Overruled.

Writ of error refused.