Court Opinion

ID: 9680110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:19:53.132871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:25.468628
License: Public Domain

CLAUDE WILLIAMS, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I agree with Associate Justice Akin that the trial court erred in rendering judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Bohart, Any possible liability on the part of the Boharts must flow from the guaranty agreement signed by them and attached to a promissory note which had been purportedly signed by Beneficiadora de Minerales de Tlaxcala, S.A., a Mexican corporation, and bearing the name of Universal Metals and Machinery, Inc., as payee. It subsequently de*286veloped, and was so found by the jury that the signature of the maker-corporation was a forgery.
I am convinced that the guaranty agreement executed by Mr. and Mrs. Bohart, and which is copied verbatim in the majority opinion, is ambiguous on its face and being ambiguous, we must construe such instrument in favor of the Boharts. Having done so, it necessarily follows that their liability as guarantors never came into existence because of the nonexistence of a maker of the note to be guaranteed.
The rules governing the question of ambiguity of instruments are well settled:
(1) The question of whether an instrument is ambiguous is one of law to be determined by the court and not by a finder of fact.
(2) After applying established rules of interpretation to the questioned agreement, if it remains reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning it is ambiguous, “but if only one reasonable meaning clearly emerges it is ■not ambiguous.” [Emphasis added.] Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (1951).
(3) The writing, as a whole, must be looked to and given its reasonable, natural and probable meaning. It must be interpreted according to the obvious import of its language without resorting to a subtle or a forced construction. One clause cannot be considered by itself, but every clause must be considered with reference to the whole instrument as well as with reference to every other clause. Brown v. Brown, 245 S.W.2d 995, 997 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1951, writ ref’d).
(4) Where the parol evidence admitted is undisputed, the question as to what the parties intended by the instrument is one of law to be determined by the court. Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1947, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
An examination of the guaranty agreement before us definitely compels the conclusion that one reasonable meaning does not clearly emerge therefrom. Thus, when one reads the words “primary obligor (s)” standing alone, it might be reasonably concluded that such words would import to the signers of the instrument the same liability as the maker of the promissory note. On the other hand, the words “unconditionally guarantee (s) the prompt payment of principal and interest on the foregoing promissory note . . . . ”, especially when considered in the light of .the words “guarantor (s)” appearing in two places under the signature lines following the body of the instrument, and also reference to “the maker of the foregoing promissory note” strongly indicates the purpose and intent of the parties to create a secondary obligation on the part of the signers of this instrument, as opposed to a primary obligation on the part of the maker of the note. Such words also clearly demonstrate the purpose and intent of the parties that there would be a “promissory note” which comprehends a valid note containing both a maker and a payee. A primary obligation is one which is the principal object of the contract. A guaranty, on the other hand, is an undertaking to answer for another’s liability and collateral thereto. In other words, it is a collateral undertaking to pay the debt of another in case such other person does not fulfill his obligation. These two legal relationships are different in character and the assumption of each leads to a different legal result. So, in this instance, we have an instrument which contains language which may reasonably be said to imply two different interpretations and two or more meanings and is, therefore, ambiguous. This fact of ambiguity appears very definitely and realistically from the position taken by Associate Justice Guittard in his dissenting opinion.
The diversity of opinion concerning the true meaning of the instrument is also clearly and convincingly demonstrated by the fact that appellee takes the position in *287his main thrust that the Boharts were primary obligors on the instrument and then, in defense to the usury claim by the Bo-harts, appellees blandly assume the position that the Boharts were really nothing more than guarantors.
I am convinced from reading the entire record in this case that it was the purpose and intent of the parties to the transaction that Mr. and Mrs. Bohart were to be nothing more than guarantors of the obligation of the Mexican corporation. At the outset of the transaction a promissory note was forwarded to the Mexican corporation and signed by it with no guarantors. Appellee being advised that the Foreign Credit Insurance Association would not accept this note without guarantors, another instrument was submitted and purportedly signed by the Mexican corporation and also by Mr. and Mrs. Bohart, as guarantors. At no place in this record do we find any indication of purpose and design on the part of the parties to impress upon the Boharts an original obligation independent of the forged promissory note. Had this been the intention of the parties, the Boharts would have signed, not as guarantors, but as comakers.
Being ambiguous, the instrument must be strictly construed in favor of the Boharts as guarantors. I, therefore, concur in the finding that such instrument was nothing more than a guaranty agreement signed by the Boharts and since there was never any primary obligation brought into existence by the execution of a maker then there can be no liability as to such guarantors. Being guarantors, the sine qua non of liability against them must be the existence of a primary obligor in the form of the maker of the note. The maker of the note did not sign the same and, hense, no valid promissory note ever came into existence. There being no primary obligation, there can be no secondary obligation against the Bo-harts. Associate Justice Guittard, in his dissenting opinion, admits that “the obvious purpose of the guaranty was to assure the bank and the agency that the guarantors would stand responsible for this particular note.” I agree with this statement but point out that it postulates the existence of a valid, primary obligation by the corporation before liability would be laid at the door of the guarantors, in this instance, the Boharts.
A reading of the lengthy and obviously strained effort on the part of my Brother Guittard in his dissent to demonstrate lack of ambiguity does precisely the reverse. As Chief Justice Calvert said in Daniel, supra, it is only when one meaning clearly emerges from the instrument that it is said not to be ambiguous. The dissent does more than anything else to vividly illustrate the absence of one clear meaning. To impose liability upon the Boharts based upon such an ambiguous instrument would result in serious injustice.
For these reasons, I join Justice Akin in reversing the trial court’s judgment and rendering judgment that appellee take nothing against appellants.