Court Opinion

ID: 9352234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 17:08:19.09076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:59:29.447198
License: Public Domain

J-S37009-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
               v.                         :
                                          :
                                          :
 JAMES HILLER                             :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :      No. 2206 EDA 2021

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0005931-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                            FILED JANUARY 05, 2023

      James Hiller appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a

jury convicted him of firearms not to be carried without a license and carrying

firearms in public in Philadelphia. We affirm.

      The trial court offered the following summary of the evidence offered at

Appellant’s trial:

            On or about June 4, 2019, at approximately 4:45 pm,
      Philadelphia Police officers arrived at Temple University Hospital
      after receiving a call that a gunshot victim was brought into the
      hospital by a private vehicle. Specifically, Appellant drove his
      friend Carlton to Temple University Hospital to be treated for a
      gunshot wound. Simultaneously, officers received information
      that a shooting occurred in the 2600 block of North 12 th Street.
      Officers responded to the shooting but were unable to locate a
      crime scene.

            Philadelphia Police Detective Mike Rocks went to the hospital
      to speak with the victim in order to gather more information.
      Detective Rocks first spoke with Appellant in the trauma bay
      outside of the hospital. Appellant told officers and detectives that
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     they were at 2600 N. 12th Street, when his friend Carlton was
     shot. Carlton was shot in the abdomen. Appellant told detectives
     the gunman fired four shots at his friend. Appellant stated the
     shooter used a revolver. Detective Rocks stated from personal
     knowledge that when a revolver is fired, the bullets come out of
     the front of the firearm and the spent casings stay inside the gun’s
     cylinder, as compared to a semiautomatic handgun, which expels
     the cartridge casings. This was consistent with a police radio call
     of an unknown individual reporting hearing four shots in the area
     of 12th and Huntingdon around the same time. The police,
     however, were unable to recover any ballistic evidence from that
     area.

            The officers testified that Appellant was cooperative, polite,
     and very open. Appellant told the police he lived with his wife at
     710 North 66th Street Philadelphia, PA. Detective Rocks spoke
     with Appellant about what happened and collected Appellant’s
     shirt as evidence - a white Philadelphia Eagles Super Bowl t-shirt.

           Approximately forty-five minutes after speaking with
     Appellant, Detective Rocks discovered and reviewed a surveillance
     video from the Catalina grocery store, located on the southwest
     corner of 12th and Huntingdon streets, and Frank’s restaurants on
     the northwest corner.

            In the video, Detective Rocks identified Appellant [and] also
     observed Appellant’s vehicle, a blue Buick, which Appellant used
     to drive Carlton to hospital.

            In the video, Appellant was observed running empty-handed
     towards the blue car and opening the driver’s side door. The video
     showed Appellant with a firearm in his hand, moving it up and
     down with smoke coming out of the muzzle – consistent with the
     firing of a gun. Detective Rocks testified [that] Appellant told him
     that, after he ran from where Carlton got shot, Appellant got back
     to his car and drove down a block or two where he ultimately
     found Carlton suffering from a gunshot wound. He subsequently
     helped Carlton into the car and drove him to Temple University
     Hospital.

           A compilation of videos, referred to as Commonwealth
     Exhibit C-1 and C-2, was created from the surveillance videos at
     the corner where the incident occurred. After reviewing the video,
     Detective Rocks asked officers to transport Appellant to Central

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     Detectives for questioning. There, Detective Rocks interviewed
     Appellant. He asked Appellant if, at any point after the shooting,
     he had a handgun and returned fire. Appellant stated he did not
     want to answer the question. Detective Rocks then showed
     Appellant a still shot of Appellant holding the firearm in the video,
     and Appellant stated he did not recognize the person in the still
     shot.

           After Appellant was arrested, he made a post-Miranda
     statement to the police, which was read into evidence at trial.
     Appellant stated, on the day in question, he went to a cookout
     with Carlton, Carlton’s girlfriend, and Carlton’s sister at 12th and
     Huntingdon Streets. They arrived at a house on 12th Street where
     Carlton stays sometimes. Two unidentified men walked out of the
     house as they arrived. Carlton started talking with the two men,
     and the three of them walked up the street, and turned left onto
     a small block. Appellant watched as an argument started between
     Carlton and a man with braids. Appellant subsequently heard the
     man with the braids accuse Carlton of bringing someone to their
     house who stole the man with the braids’ gun. Then Appellant
     saw the other man take his shirt off and square up with Carlton.
     Carlton then took his shirt off, and they both appeared as if they
     were about to fight. Appellant grabbed Carlton and told him to
     “come on.” Appellant could see that the man with the braids had
     a gun in his sweatpants pocket. The man with the braids told
     Carlton he was lucky it was light out or he would shoot him.
     Carlton told him “if you’re going to shoot, shoot.” Appellant
     subsequently told the girls to go to the car, and he attempted to
     get Carlton to leave. Carlton began to walk backwards away from
     the men; continuing to argue.

           Then the man with the braids pulled his gun out and shot
     Carlton.

            Appellant said everyone started to run, and then he saw
     Carlton fall. Carlton jumped back up, and said “Bro, I’m hit.” They
     all started running back to the car.

           There is no evidence on this record that the man shot at
     Appellant, or the girls. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any
     evidence that either Appellant or the girls were threatened by the
     man who shot Carlton.

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             The girls ultimately got into the car while Carlton kept
      running down 12th street. Appellant then told police he got into
      the car and drove down 12th Street and saw Carlton at the corner
      of 12th and Cumberland Streets. He said Carlton got into his car
      and Appellant drove him to Temple University Hospital. Appellant,
      in his post-Miranda statement to police, did not mention shooting
      at the men, or that he had a firearm.

            Appellant was not licensed to carry a firearm.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/22, at 2-6 (cleaned up).

      Appellant was charged with the firearms offenses indicated supra as well

as recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”). Appellant’s defense at

trial was self-defense. Upon the above evidence, the trial court charged the

jury as to self-defense in connection with the REAP charge, but not as a

defense to the firearms violations. The jury acquitted Appellant of REAP but

found him guilty of both firearms not to be carried without a license pursuant

to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, and carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia pursuant

to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. Thereafter, Appellant was sentenced to three and one-

half to seven years of imprisonment. He filed a timely notice of appeal, and

he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the

following questions for our consideration:

      1.    Was not [Appellant] erroneously convicted of 18 Pa.C.S.
      § 6106, as the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
      carried a firearm either in a vehicle or concealed on or about his
      person?

      2.    Where the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense
      regarding the charge of reckless endangerment, but refused to
      give that instruction as to the firearms charges, did it not usurp
      the role of the jury and violate [Appellant’s] constitutional rights
      to due process and to present a defense?

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Appellant’s brief at 3.

      Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his

conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license.     The following

principles govern our review:

      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
      finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up). Furthermore:

      The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
      need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubt raised
      as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder. We
      will not disturb the verdict unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(cleaned up).

      The criminal statute at issue herein, § 6106, provides as follows in

relevant part:

      any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who
      carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his
      place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and
      lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the
      third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

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       Appellant does not dispute              that the   Commonwealth’s evidence

established that he used a firearm for which he lacked a license. 1             His

contention is that the evidence was not sufficient to allow the jury to conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that he carried it in his vehicle or concealed upon

his person before he used it during the incident in question.          Specifically,

Appellant contests the accuracy of the trial court’s representation that the

video showed Appellant retrieve the firearm from his vehicle. See Appellant’s

brief at 12. Rather, Appellant asserts that it is just as plausible that the video

depicted that he “had bent down to pick up the gun that his wounded friend,

Carlton, had just dropped on the ground.” 2 Id. The Commonwealth, on the

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1  Hence, Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his conviction pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108 for carrying a firearm in
public in Philadelphia. See Appellant’s brief at 11 n.5.

2  Appellant further argues that the jury had reasonable doubt about whether
he collected the firearm from his car based upon a question it presented to
the trial court in connection with the § 6108 charge. See Appellant’s brief at
14. Appellant bases this claim on the fact that, during deliberations, the jury
asked the following question: “Does the act of picking up the gun constitute
carrying per the uniform firearm act[, i.e.,] walking down the street and
picking up the gun verses walking around with the gun on your person[?]”
N.T. Trial, 7/16/21, at 81. The trial court’s affirmative answer to the question
was not read to the jury before they found Appellant guilty of violating § 6108
because, when the crier returned to the jury room with the court’s response,
the jury indicated it was no longer confused. Id. at 85. Consequently, we
discern no foundation for Appellant’s suggestion that the jury found him guilty
of carrying the firearm in public in Philadelphia on the basis that he picked the
gun up off the sidewalk rather than from his vehicle. In any event, it is
axiomatic that a jury is permitted to reach inconsistent verdicts and such an
apparent inconsistency does not form the basis to overturn a conviction as
long as there is evidence to support the guilty verdict.              See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 120 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc).

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other hand, maintains that the surveillance camera footage “showed the

empty-handed [Appellant] standing directly next to his car, reach into or near

the driver’s side window of the car and then start firing a gun.”

Commonwealth’s brief at 6.

      Our review of the evidence comports with the Commonwealth’s

representations. The video footage reveals the events as Appellant described

them in his police statement, but for his omission of the fact that he returned

fire before gathering Carlton to take him to the hospital. In particular, the

prosecution’s Exhibit C-2, which is footage from what is identified as “Camera

6,” shows that at 4:33:15 p.m., Appellant drove through the intersection

covered by the camera and parked his car along the street.            A male,

presumably Carlton, got out of the front passenger door and walked back in

the direction from which the car had come. Two females, whom we take to

be Carlton’s paramour and Carlton’s sister, alighted from the back seat, and

along with Appellant, followed Carlton out of the camera’s range. At 4:37:31

p.m., Appellant and a shirtless Carlton came running back into the camera’s

view. Appellant, empty-handed, proceeded directly and purposefully toward

the driver’s side door of his car. Carlton, running alongside Appellant, was

holding his shirt in one hand and nothing visible in the other. While Appellant

and Carlton appeared to connect hands or come close to doing so in the street

before reaching Appellant’s car, there is no indication that any item changed

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hands or that Carlton dropped anything, or that an item left Carlton’s

possession with a trajectory towards the driver’s door of Appellant’s vehicle.

       Carlton sprinted past Appellant’s car without hesitation and ran down

the sidewalk in the opposite direction from which they had come. Appellant,

meanwhile, stopped next to the driver’s door of his vehicle, bent over slightly,

reached down, and then stood up with the firearm in his hand.3 Appellant

assumed a shooting stance and fired several shots while walking back toward

the peril. Without making any movement to dispose of the weapon, Appellant

returned to his car, got behind the wheel, and, after Carlton’s sister and

girlfriend also got back into the car, drove in the direction towards which

Carlton had fled.

       From this evidence, the jury was fully capable of using logic and

reasonable inferences, rather than conjecture or surmise, to conclude that

Appellant both drove his vehicle to the scene with a firearm concealed therein

within reach of his driver’s seat, and that he took the gun in the car with him

____________________________________________

3  Appellant in his closing argument posited that Carlton dropped the gun in
the street and that Appellant bent down, picked it up there before reaching
the car. See N.T. Trial, 7/16/21, at 31. However, we do not see that in the
footage. What we clearly see is that after this alleged in-stride gun scoop,
Appellant kept running to the car door and bent down there before drawing
the weapon and walking back towards the danger while returning fire. If
Appellant had obtained the gun at the time he suggested, his subsequent trip
to his car and dalliance there before he turned back to address the threat was
an unnecessary waste of time inconsistent with an urgent need to defend
himself. In short, the timing of Appellant’s possession of the weapon is
supported by neither evidence nor logic.

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as he drove away. That was sufficient to sustain the Commonwealth’s burden,

for it was not required to preclude any possibility of Appellant’s innocence.

See Cannavo, supra at 1290.         Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency claim

merits no relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in

refusing to charge the jury on self-defense as to both § 6106 and § 6108. Our

review of this claim is governed by the following legal principles.           “Our

standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of

deference—an appellate court will reverse a court’s decision only when it

abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. Yale,

150 A.3d 979, 983 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up).

      It is well-settled that, “[b]efore the issue of self-defense may be

submitted to a jury for consideration, a valid claim of self-defense must be

made out as a matter of law, and this determination must be made by the

trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa.Super.

2022) (cleaned up).     We have detailed the showing required to entitle a

defendant to a self-defense instruction as follows:

      In order . . . to be entitled to an instruction on justification as a
      defense to a crime charged, the actor must first offer evidence
      that will show:

            (1) that the actor was faced with a clear and imminent
            harm, not one which is debatable or speculative;

            (2) that the actor could reasonably expect that the actor’s
            actions would be effective in avoiding this greater harm;

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             (3) that there is no legal alternative which will be effective
             in abating the harm; and

             (4) that the Legislature has not acted to preclude the
             defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the
             values at issue.

       As with any offer of proof, it is essential that the offer meet a
       minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that if a
       jury finds it to be true, it would support the affirmative
       defense. . . . This threshold requirement is fashioned to conserve
       the resources required in conducting jury trials by limiting
       evidence in a trial to that directed at the elements of the crime or
       at affirmative defenses raised by the defendant. Where the
       proffered evidence supporting one element of the defense is
       insufficient to sustain the defense, even if believed, the trial court
       has the right to deny use of the defense and not burden the jury
       with testimony supporting other elements of the defense.

Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 659 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned

up).

       A defendant may meet his burden with “evidence from whatever

source.”   Green, supra at 1085 (cleaned up).           “Such evidence may be

adduced by the defendant as part of his case, or conceivably, may be found

in the Commonwealth’s own case in chief or be elicited through cross-

examination.”    Id. (cleaned up).    “However, such evidence from whatever

source must speak to three specific elements for a claim of self-defense to be

placed in issue for a jury’s consideration.” Id. (cleaned up). Those three

elements are as follows: (1) the defendant believed, reasonably, that the use

of deadly force was necessary to avert an imminent danger of death or serious

bodily injury; (2) the defendant did not provoke the incident; and (3) the

defendant did not violate a duty to retreat. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

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Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1231 (Pa.Super. 2018). “If there is any evidence

from whatever source that will support these three elements then the decision

as to whether the claim is a valid one is left to the jury and the jury must be

charged properly thereon by the trial court.” Green, supra at 1085 (cleaned

up).

       Noting that the Commonwealth agreed that a self-defense instruction

was appropriate on the REAP charge, and the trial court gave the instruction

as to that charge, Appellant does not detail what evidence offered at trial was

sufficient to warrant a justification instruction. See Appellant’s brief at 16.

Instead, relying on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Miklos, 159

A.3d 962, 968 (Pa.Super. 2017), he asserts that the trial court erroneously

concluded that justification was not available as a defense to possessory

offenses as a matter of law. See Appellant’s brief at 19-22.

       In Miklos, the defendant shot the victim during a drug deal gone bad.

At his non-jury trial, the defendant took the stand to provide evidence to

support his claim of self-defense.   Specifically, he testified that, when the

victim met him to purchase pills, the victim pulled a gun on the defendant and

began searching the defendant’s pockets. The defendant, who was prohibited

from possessing a firearm based upon a prior conviction, grabbed the gun,

which discharged as the two men struggled for it wounding the victim. While

the men continued to struggle, the defendant picked the fallen gun up off the

ground and fired another shot into the victim. The defendant then fled from

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the scene with the firearm and the shell casings, which he later threw into the

woods.   Despite this evidence, the trial court convicted the defendant of

person not to possess pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, concluding that, while

the defendant was justified in possessing the firearm during the initial struggle

and discharge, the defendant’s subsequent, unjustified possession supported

the conviction.

      On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain the conviction, arguing that the “brief possession of the firearm simply

to remove it from [the victim’s] control was justified,” and negated the intent-

to-possess element of the crime.      Miklos, supra at 967.       We began by

observing “that unlawful possession of a firearm is a continuing offense, and

thus, [the defendant’s] possession of the firearm may have been justified for

part, but not all of the time [that he] exhibited control over the weapon.” Id.

at 968. Considering the evidence before the fact-finder, we agreed with the

trial court that the defendant’s initial possession of the firearm during the

struggle with the victim was justified, but “his continued control over the

weapon after the altercation was not.” Id. at 969. Therefore, we affirmed

the conviction.

      Appellant maintains that, pursuant to Miklos, he was entitled to have

the jury consider justification as a complete defense to the charges of

possessing the firearm without a license and carrying a firearm in public in

Philadelphia, and to determine whether Appellant maintained possession of

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the weapon longer than was warranted.         See Appellant’s brief at 21.    He

further argues that even if a self-defense instruction was not warranted for

the § 6106 charge, it was appropriate as to § 6108 because the video depicted

him carrying the firearm in public only as long as necessary to defend himself.

We disagree for multiple reasons.

      First, as we detailed above, the evidence plainly showed that Appellant

possessed the firearm in his vehicle before he encountered any imminent

threat.   With no evidence suggesting a justification for the pre-altercation

possession, we have no hesitation in concluding that the trial court properly

declined to instruct the jury as to self-defense as to the § 6106 charge.

      Second, unlike the defendant in Miklos, Appellant did not testify or

otherwise proffer sufficient evidence to show that a justification instruction

was warranted. Appellant’s version of events came into evidence only through

his statement to the police.    In his statement, Appellant omitted from the

narrative any mention of his use of deadly force in response to Carlton’s

shooting, let alone why he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to

avoid that threat or why he could not have retreated. As the trial court stated

in its opinion:

      The core reason the court found Appellant without justification
      was that the record failed to show any credible evidence that
      Appellant was being shot at or needed any self-protection. The
      record, specifically, including Appellant’s . . . statement, includes
      no mention of Appellant being the target of the gunshots.
      Furthermore, Appellant was able to safely retreat to his vehicle for
      shelter after Carlton was shot. He could have simply driven away.

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       Instead, he reached into his car, pulled out an illegal firearm and
       discharged it.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/22, at 12 (cleaned up).

       Our review of the certified record confirms the trial court’s finding that

there was no evidence that would have permitted the jury to conclude that

Appellant did not violate his duty to retreat. As our summary of the video

indicates, Appellant not only elected to retrieve the firearm from the driver’s

seat area of his vehicle instead of getting into the car and driving away, but

he purposefully walked back toward the danger rather than away from it.4

Appellant did the exact opposite of retreating, with no evidence why he

reasonably deemed that necessary.              Thus, because there was insufficient

evidence to support a finding that Appellant did not violate a duty to retreat,

the trial court was within its right to refuse to burden the jury with the

justification instruction as to both of the firearm possession charges.        See

Clouser, supra at 659.

____________________________________________

4 Appellant characterizes the trial court’s rejection in its Rule 1925(a) opinion
of the evidentiary support for a self-defense to be “a perplexing about-face”
from its indication at trial “that there was ‘certainly enough evidence’ to
support a self-defense charge.” Appellant’s brief at 18 (quoting N.T. Trial.
7/15/21, at 14)).      From our review of the trial evidence, particularly
Appellant’s choice to go back and discharge a firearm down a public residential
street rather than get into his car and drive after his wounded friend, what is
perplexing to us is not the trial court’s subsequent rejection of the propriety
of a self-defense instruction as to the firearms offenses, but its earlier ruling
that the defense was available in connection with the REAP charge.

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      Therefore, having discerned no abuse of discretion or error of law on the

part of the trial court in declining to instruct the jury on justification, we have

no cause to disturb Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/5/2023

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