Court Opinion

ID: 9557493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:51:16.917767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:53.914948
License: Public Domain

HANSEN, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority holds, as a matter of law, that no duty whatsoever exists on the part of an establishment containing a bar to protect its customers from assaults by others. Perhaps the majority would rule differently if the attack here had occurred inside of the building rather than outside. That question, of course, is for another day.
*90None of the authority cited in the majority’s opinion deals with altercations outside a bar. In my view, athletic events, fast food restaurants and grocery store parking lots are not analogous to hotel bars.
Comment f to § 344 of the Restatement deals specifically with the “likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual.”
The majority discusses § 344, yet states “[t]he latter portion of Comment f has not been adopted by the OHahoma Supreme Court.” I know of no case which constrains this Court from applying comments to the Restatements, if the facts of a particular case so warrant their application. Moreover, The Court of Appeals previously has seen fit to recognize the latter portion of Comment f in Shelkett v. Hardee’s Food Systems, 848 P.2d 63 (Okla.App.1993). Therein, Judge Adams, writing for the Court, affirmed the fast food restaurant’s motion for summary judgment, holding the restaurant was not liable for a violent act by a third person which was not reasonably foreseeable. It found “[tjhere is nothing in the record which shows that based on ‘past experience’ or because of the ‘character of [Hardee’s] business,’ Hardee’s knew or should have known of a likelihood of harmful conduct by third persons which could compromise the safety of its patrons.”1 Such is not the case here.
As the majority points out, there is evidence of at least two other previous assaults in the parking lot. However, the majority reasons that because the assaults were factually dissimilar, they do not amount to “past experience.” Yet the assaults occurred in the parHng lot, as did the assaults in this ease. Additionally, one of the security guards on duty the night of the attack2 stated in his deposition that most “incidents” dealing with security occur at Russells between 12:00 midnight and 2:00 a.m. on the weekends, and that it was common to have altercations between patrons leaving Russells at closing time.
The majority misses the point when it claims these facts are “irrelevant because no material fact issue exists whether Hotel knew or had reason to know the acts of the assailants, in this case, were occurring or were about to occur, as required by Supreme Court precedent.” The threshold question is whether the harmful acts were foreseeable. Here, the acts certainly could be foreseeable, thus giving rise to a duty to the Folmars.
The majority’s reasoning that a duty arises only when the situation involves an immediate event which the proprietor knew was occurring or about to occur is too narrow, if there is evidence tending to demonstrate the place or character of the possessor’s business or his past experience is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time. To say Hotel has no duty whatsoever is not substantiated by OHahoma law.
It is a question of fact as to whether the harmful acts of the unknown assailants were foreseeable, which would then give rise to a duty to the Folmars. Foreseeability becomes a question of law for the Court when only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts. Bradford Securities v. Plaza Bank and Trust, 653 P.2d 188 (Okla.1982). Clearly, that is not the case under these facts. Because there is a substantial controversy regarding a material fact, the trial court erred in sustaining Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. I would reverse and remand for trial.

. In Shelkett, at 67, supra, Judge Adams pointed out that in Johnson v. Mid-South Sports, Inc., 806 P.2d 1107 (Okla.1991), “[t]he nature of Mid-South’s business and the fact that alcoholic beverages were sold and consumed on the premises, made the possibility of negligent or intentional misconduct reasonably foreseeable,” thus distinguishing it from Hardees' business.

. No security guard was on duty in the parking lot that evening. This in itself creates a question of fact regarding whether Hotel breached a duty.