Court Opinion

ID: 9463211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:00:45.398227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:59.005987
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I join in Judge Maris’ opinion up to the point in his analysis where he concludes that a gratuitous bailee has authority to surrender possession of a locked box, which he suspects contains contraband, to the authorities. At that point, however, I believe a more refined analysis of the various property and privacy interests at stake in this case is required.
In prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, the fourth amendment clearly protects both property and privacy interests.1 In this case, unlike many others, both interests are intimately involved and analytically separable. The property interest issue is whether or not a voluntary bailee who has been entrusted with a locked box, which he has reasonable cause to believe contains contraband, has a sufficient possessory interest that he can consent to a transfer of possession to authorities; i. e., consent to a seizure. The privacy interest issue is whether or not the defendant, who locked the box and kept the key, has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to its contents, which continues when the box is left with a gratuitous bailee and when it is subsequently transferred by the bailee to F.B.I. Agents.
I agree with Judge Maris that Defendant Diggs and Christine Mahone, by leaving the locked box containing the stolen money with the Bradleys for safekeeping, implicated them in the alleged bank robbery as possible accessories after the fact. The implicit terms of the Bradleys’ bailment enti*125tied them to exclusive possession of the locked box, but because Diggs retained the key they were allowed access to and could exercise control over only the exterior of the box. Given this limited possessory interest and Diggs’ reasonable expectation of privacy when he left the locked box with them, I believe the Bradleys could consent to a transfer of possession of the locked box to the F.B.I. Agents. But the Bradleys’ possessory interest, I submit, did not authorize them to surrender Diggs’ expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of the box which he certainly asserted by retaining possession of the key; i. e., the Bradleys could not consent to a search. Thus, unlike Judge Maris, I would adopt a narrower version of the Second Circuit rule announced in United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937, 87 S.Ct. 959, 17 L.Ed.2d 810 (1967), by limiting the scope of the bailee’s authority to consent to a search or seizure of defendant’s property to the scope of his authority under the terms of the bailment.2 Moreover, I would define and limit the Bradleys’ special relationship to the locked box for purposes of the third-party consent rule announced in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), in terms of the parties’ respective property and privacy interests.
The source of the F.B.I. Agents’ authority to search the contents of the box, then, must be found elsewhere than in the Bradleys’ interest in disassociating themselves from a potentially incriminating possession of stolen money and thereby removing a cause of considerable emotional turmoil. Since the voluntary bailees could and did lawfully surrender their property-possessory interest to the F.B.I. Agents, the focus of the inquiry must shift from the authority of the Bradleys to the authority of the agents. At this point in the sequence of events the facts3 indicate that there was unquestionably sufficient federal participation in the search to invoke the guarantees of the fourth amendment.4 Since the agents were lawfully in possession of the box, it seems to me that they were authorized to make an inventory search. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the police may conduct inventory searches of motor vehicles lawfully though involuntarily in their possession. South Dakota v. Opperman, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (per curiam); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). In the factual settings of Opperman, Harris and Cooper, as well as in this case, police possession of the movable chattel, which provided a place of concealment, was lawfully obtained without the consent of the owner. No principled distinction, I submit, can be made for inventory search purposes between lawful possession of a car and lawful possession of a box.5
South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, however, which is the Court’s most recent exposition of the inventory search exception to the fourth amendment protection of privacy, seems to me to require a finding not only that an inventory search could proper*126ly have been made, but also that the search in question was conducted for inventory purposes. The opinion of the Court6 and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell7 both emphasize that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to standard departmental procedures with respect to the care-taking of chattels lawfully in police custody. Significantly, in footnote 4 of the opinion of the Court, Justice Burger distinguishes federal searches:
In contrast to state officials engaged in everyday caretaking functions:
“The contact with vehicles by federal law enforcement officers usually, if not always, involves the detection or investigation of crimes unrelated to the operation of a vehicle.” Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at 440, 93 S.Ct. at 2527.8
I do not understand this quotation from Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), to be a suggestion that federal police officials cannot conduct inventory searches. Rather, I believe it is a recognition that the search, to be justified under the inventory exception, must in fact have been for that purpose, and not for an investigatory purpose.9
In this case, however, the government offered no evidence of standard F.B.I. procedures governing inventories of and receipts for personal property coming into the possession of its agents. Instead, the government chose to argue that the Bradleys possessed the authority to consent to the agents’ search of the locked box. In my view, as explained earlier, reliance upon that strategy could only have justified the Bradleys’ lawful transfer of possession of the locked box to the F.B.I. agents but not the subsequent search. Because the district court rejected the government’s consent theory entirely, it made no findings with respect to the agents’ purpose in searching the inside of the box. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that the agents were acting pursuant to standard F.B.I. procedures designed to safeguard the property coming into their possession as well as to protect the Bureau from any claims arising out of this caretaking function.
Since there was no finding on this critical issue by the district court, I cannot vote to reverse. I would vacate the judgment and remand for further findings in light of South Dakota v. Opperman, supra.
*127My position, that there must be a separate analysis of the property and privacy aspects at stake in this case, and that the inventory search exception applies only where the court finds that an inventory search, not an investigatory search, was in fact intended, is not attractive to any of my colleagues. But Judge Adams’ alternative approach, that the reasonableness of police conduct for fourth amendment purposes should be judged by a sort of totality-of-the-eircumstances test, is equally unattractive to me. There is already far too much unbridled discretion in law enforcement. To accept the police officer’s subjective evaluation of the reasonableness of his actions as the appropriate test for omitting a search warrant is, in my judgment, to eliminate the warrant requirement for all practical purposes. Possibly Judge Adams accurately forecasts the direction of fourth amendment jurisprudence.10 I am content, however, to await its arrival rather than to anticipate it.
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge (dissenting): “The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience. But petty eases are even more calculated to make bad law. The impact of a . . . little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to which the case gives rise.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68, 70 S.Ct. 430, 436, 94 L.Ed. 653 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1950).
Because I believe the rationales articulated in the opinions of Judges Maris, Gibbons and Adams conflict with the commands of the Fourth Amendment, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court judgment.
I.
It is important at the outset to emphasize certain findings of fact which, in my view, do not appear with sufficient clarity in the plurality opinion. These findings have not been challenged as clearly erroneous and are supported by the record. The findings and other relevant testimony are as follows:
(1) With respect to the availability of a search warrant, the district court found “that there was a United States Magistrate domiciled in New Bern and that it would take approximately two hours to obtain a search warrant and return to the Bradley home.” United States v. Diggs, 396 F.Supp. 610, 612 (M.D.Pa.1975).
(2) With respect to Rev. Bradley’s purported desire to make public the sealed contents of Diggs’ box in order to exculpate himself from possible implication in the alleged crime:
(A) Rev. Bradley himself testified:
“Q. [By the prosecutor] What concerns did you have about getting in contact [with the F.B.I.?]
A. About this, this right here. All of this.
Q. Getting you implicated?
A. Well, not necessarily me implicated, because, you know, I know I didn’t do anything. You know what I mean? But this. What we see here now.
Q. All right.
A. You see? So that’s what I was concerned about. The fact — well, O.K., Chrissy’s being personalized; and Chrissy’s my niece; and Chrissy and I were raised together.
Q. All right.
A. So I explained that to [a friend whom Bradley consulted and on whose advice he finally contacted the lawyer and the F.B.I.].”
Transcript at 102-03. See also id. at 119-20.
(B) The record establishes that Rev. Bradley’s “main interest . . was . to find out what was in the box,”1 so that he could finally confirm or dispel his suspicions and concerns about his niece.2
*128(C) Bradley had kept the box for several days and apparently felt safe with his possession of it as long as he did not tamper with it in the absence of witnesses.3
(D) In light of the testimony and despite the Government’s assertion that Rev. Bradley “was very apprehensive over his continual possession of the box” and “was most concerned about his own possible involvement,”4 the district court found “that the Agents felt that Rev. Bradley was honest, truthful, trying to do the right thing, and genuinely concerned about the box, its contents, and his niece’s possible involvement.” (Emphasis supplied.)5 United States v. Diggs, supra, 396 F.Supp. at 612.
(3) With respect to Rev. Bradley’s emotional state, the district court found:
“Rev. Bradley, despite his distress, would have been satisfied if the Agents left for two hours to procure a warrant.”
United States v. Diggs, supra, 396 F.Supp. at 612.
Rev. Bradley had already waited for several days without approaching his lawyer or law enforcement officials. He had not tampered with or opened the box during that time and would not have done so if the Agents had been unable to come to his house when he called.6 Although Rev. Bradley would have preferred the Agents to conduct the search without delay, he was not so insistent that he would not “go along” with a delay.
(4) With respect to the Agents, in contrast, the district court found that, although Rev. Bradley initiated the idea of the search and wanted the box opened:
(A) The Agents, after verifying the essential details of the alleged crime in an official call to Harrisburg,7 “strongly suspected that the box contained money or material related to the bank robbery.” United States v. Diggs, supra, 396 F.Supp. at 613.
(B) The Agents “practically monopolized the effort” to search the box. Id. at 614.
(C) “[The Agents] knew that the box was not [Bradley’s] and, ... he had not indicated to them that he had the owners’ permission to open the box. As a matter of fact, he promised that he would call and apologize if the contents were non-incriminating.” Id. at 613.
(D) “[T]he Bradleys did not give the Agents the impression that they had authority to open the box.” Id. at 612.8
(E) “[T]here was no reason to believe, and the Agents did not believe, that Rev. Bradley would open, secrete, or otherwise interfere with the box if the Agents decided to obtain a search warrant, a matter that would involve only two hours.” Id. at 613.
After making the foregoing findings of fact and considering the live testimony he had heard, the district judge concluded:
“Under the circumstances, unless the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to be reduced to a nullity, the Agents should have presented this matter to a magistrate. The inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay *129necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate are never very convincing reasons to bypass the Constitutional requirement. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).”
United States v. Diggs, supra, 396 F.Supp. at 613. I agree with the district court that a bailee’s preference to have the Government conduct a search of another person’s property without delay is insufficient reason to ignore the owner’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a search that has been approved in advance by a judicial officer based on a determination of probable cause.
With this background, I turn to a discussion of (1) the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, (2) the applicability of exceptions to that requirement, and (3) the exclusionary rule.
II.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Based on settled principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, any analysis of the warrantless search and seizure in this case should commence with the rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”9 But the plurality opinion fails to mention either this “most basic constitutional rule in [the Fourth Amendment] area”10 or its equally well-settled corollary that the exceptions to the warrant requirement are “jealously and carefully drawn.”11
The “reasonableness” standard endorsed by the plurality opinion is contrary to the above-quoted principles. It is, in essence, the Rabinowitz approach to the Fourth Amendment.11a See United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, 339 U.S. at 63, 66, 70 S.Ct. 430. But Rabinowitz, which is cited in the plurality opinion and in United States v. Botsch12 on which the plurality relies, was overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). And attempts to resuscitate it in the search context13 have been rejected.14 As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2135, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972):
*130“Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ the definition of ‘reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have argued that ‘[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable,’ United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 [70 S.Ct. 430, 435, 94 L.Ed. 653] (1950). This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language.”
The warrant requirement, in short, is not a formality or “an inconvenience to be somehow weighed” against conflicting rights or claims of police efficiency.15 Rather it is the crucial and fundamental directive of the Fourth Amendment to be dispensed with only when “the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”16 The danger of any view of the Fourth Amendment that turns solely on a determination of “reasonableness” was explained in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and repeated in United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 315 n. 16, 92 S.Ct. at 2136, in language that is particularly pertinent here:
“[A] general ‘reasonableness’ standard without reference to the warrant clause . [is] ‘founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach the evaporation point.’ ”
See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752-765, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, 339 U.S. at 83, 70 S.Ct. 430 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I respectfully suggest that the analysis employed by the plurality ignores the fact that the warrant requirement is the “very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive.”17 Since the policies underlying that requirement are fully applicable here,18 I turn immediately to the question of whether any of the few “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement apply in this case.
III.
As an alternative to its “reasonableness” analysis, the plurality concludes that the warrantless search and seizure in this case falls within the recognized exception for consent searches because Rev. Bradley had authority to consent to the search. To consent to a warrantless search affecting the interests of another, the consenting party must possess “common authority over or *131other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171,94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
“Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest on the law of property, . . . but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.”
Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993; see Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969).
Although it is clear that Bradley did not have authority to consent to the search under the “common authority” test enunciated in Matlock,19 the plurality concludes that Bradley had an “other sufficient relationship” to the interior of the locked box that empowered him to permit a search of its contents. The thrust of their view is that Diggs must be held to have “assumed the risk” that Bradley would consent to a search by Government officials. I cannot agree.
First, the plurality’s analysis ignores the fact that application of the “carefully delineated” common authority approach leads unequivocally to the conclusion that Diggs and Chris had not, for Fourth Amendment purposes, “assumed the risk” that Rev. Bradley might permit a warrantless search. By retaining the key, Diggs and Chris indicated to all who came in contact with the box that they maintained an expectation of privacy in the interior of the sealed container.20 The Supreme Court’s and this Circuit’s cases hold that such a clearly asserted privacy interest is worthy of the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961); United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970).
The principle that exceptions to the warrant requirements must be “zealously and carefully drawn,” Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958), applies with particular force in the case of third party consents. As we stated in United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970),
“It is fundamental- that the doctrine which recognizes the validity of a third party’s consent to a search must be applied guardedly to prevent erosion of the protection of the Fourth Amendment, since it makes no requirement of the existence of probable cause for the search and does not constitute an exception based on necessity.”
Id. at 843; see United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1971). Moreover, clear and unambiguous rules governing exceptions to the warrant requirement are prerequisites to the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, I would not interpret Matlock as endorsing a pure as*132sumption of the risk test for third party consents. See also part II above.
Second, the conclusion that Rev. Bradley had authority to consent to this search appears to conflict with Chapman v. United States, supra. In that case, all of the factors present here — a successful search, probable cause based on undisputable facts,21 and a search process initiated and encouraged22 by a consenting landlord who called the police and told the officers “ ‘to go in the window and see what[’s] what in there’ ” — concurred. Rejecting the contention that the landlord, who had no key, had an interest in admitting the police, the Supreme Court, with only one dissent, held the search unlawful.
“[T]o uphold such an entry, search and seizure ‘without a warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave [tenants’] homes secure only in the discretion of [landlords].’ ”
Id. 365 U.S. at 617, 81 S.Ct. at 780. In my view, Chapman is indistinguishable from the case at bar.
Third, the suggestion that Rev. Bradley had a “vital personal interest” in exculpating himself by permitting the authorities to search the interior of the box from which Diggs had excluded them does not, in my view, justify the conclusion that this warrantless search was valid.
As noted in part I above, the record does not support the assertion that either Rev. Bradley’s anxiety or his desire to see the contents of the box stemmed from a concern for his own legal position.23 Bradley’s “vital personal interest” was no greater than that of any bailee of sealed property which he believes may contain contraband or other evidence of a crime. And, if Bradley’s interest here is enough to empower him to permit a warrantless Governmental search, it is difficult to see how a rule authorizing such searches could be limited. Compare Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7 (1966) (en banc), overruling Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010, 86 S.Ct. 618, 15 L.Ed.2d 526 (1966). Are the constitutional rights of the bailor to be dependent, for example, on whether he paid 25<t for the bailment? Compare United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937, 87 S.Ct. 959, 17 L.Ed.2d 810 (1967).
Finally, it is difficult to see how Bradley’s “right” to exculpate conflicted with Diggs’ Fourth Amendment right to a search that had been approved in advance by an impartial magistrate. Whatever interest Bradley had in purging himself of any possible taint ceased to operate once Bradley had notified the authorities of the existence of the locked box, explained the circumstances surrounding his possession of it, and physically turned the box over to Government agents. I cannot find any support in the district court findings for the plurality opinion’s statements that Rev. Bradley insisted that the box be opened prior to the issuance of a search warrant. In any event, *133the Rev. Bradley exculpated himself when he turned the box over to the F.B.I. Agents. They did not believe that he would open it if they went to get a search warrant.
Because I cannot understand how a two-hour delay would denigrate Bradley’s purported “right” to exculpate himself or how an immediate search would further Bradley’s legitimate interests, I am unable to see how Bradley’s exercise of the “right” to exculpate has any bearing on the need for a warrant or can furnish any excuse for circumventing the warrant requirement. It is for this reason, as well as others discussed in the margin,24 that I am not persuaded by the reliance on United States v. Botsch in Judge Maris’ opinion.
With reference to the concurring opinion of Judge Gibbons, it should be stated that nothing in the record before us indicates that the only thing the Agents desired was an inventory of the contents of the box. To the contrary, the Agents here were actively seeking contraband, a far cry from the routine inventory search authorized by South Dakota v. Opperman, supra note 4. Opperman does not, in my view, justify a remand under the circumstances of this case.
The district court’s findings and the record indicate that before the locked box was opened, the Agents knew a crime had allegedly been committed. They knew that Diggs was a suspect, and they “strongly suspected,” after hearing and confirming Rev. Bradley’s story, that the box contained stolen contraband. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. The whole purpose of the search was exploratory: its entire object to determine whether the box contained contraband.25
Since I am not persuaded that any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable under the circumstances of this case, I must conclude that the disputed search was unlawful. I turn briefly to a discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.
IV.
As I understand it, Judge Adams’ view of this ease rests on the twin assertions that (1) the “contours of the present case are far from those to which the Supreme Court has typically addressed itself” and (2) “the activity [of the FBI] does not appear to be the sort of premeditated police intrusion which the exclusionary rule is meant to deter.” My difficulties with this analysis are twofold.
First, I believe the Supreme Court has addressed itself to a nearly identical factual situation in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961) and has concluded that the search was unlawful and that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule mandated suppression. As noted above, Chapman appears to be indistinguishable from the present case.26
*134Second, the Supreme Court has not limited the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement or the exclusionary rule to situations involving “premeditated police intrusions.” Even if there were a finding of fact that the F.B.I. Agents believed in good faith that it was lawful without a warrant to break into Diggs’ locked box in search of possibly stolen currency — and there is no such finding — the Supreme Court has not validated otherwise unconstitutional invasions of privacy on that basis.
“But ‘good faith on the part of the . officers is not enough.’ Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 [80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134.] If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).
Moreover, the Agents knew that Rev. Bradley had not been authorized to open the box. And it should have been clear to these Agents, who are trained in the law of search and seizure, that Rev. Bradley had no implied authority to ask or permit them to break into Diggs’ and Chris’ belongings. It is noted that the Justice Department’s Handbook on the Law of Search and Seizure27 states:
“Consent by a person having only limited custody [of personal property belonging to another], such as for storage or shipment, is not valid.”28
The disputed search here was not conducted under emergency conditions. The Agents had ample time to consider the matter. No exigencies mandated a hasty judgment. And the Agents could easily have explained to Rev. Bradley, who was not so insistent that he would not “go along,” that the proper procedure was to secure a warrant. Under these circumstances and as long as the exclusionary rule is the law, I think it must be applied in this case.
SEITZ, Chief Judge, and JAMES HUNTER, III and GARTH, Circuit Judges, join in this opinion.

. See, e. g., California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52-54, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 576, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 934 (3d Cir. 1976).

. See United States v. Botsch, supra at 550-51 (Smith, J. dissenting).

. Agent Shields took the initiative in trying to open the box but found it was locked. While the other agent was trying to locate a locksmith, Agent Shields tried to open the box with several keys of his own, found one that fit and turned it, and only then allowed Reverend Bradley to lift the lid. See Tr. at 27-30. The testimony of Reverend Bradley at the suppression hearing, which was credited by the district judge, indicates that the federal agents’ participation was the necessary and sufficient factor in the conduct of the search. See Tr. at 115-16.

. See, e. g., United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 4-6 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc). At the very least, the search must be deemed a joint enterprise by Bradley and the F.B.I. Agents, and thus a federal search for the purposes of the fourth amendment. Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927).

. But see United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 781-85 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3740 (U.S. May 27, 1976) (No. 75-1721).

. - U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. 3092.

. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (Powell, J. concurring).

. Id. at - n. 4, 96 S.Ct. at 3097.

. The Chief Justice concluded that just
[a]s in Cady, there is no suggestion whatever that this standard [caretaking] procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive, (footnote omitted).
Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. Justice Powell, amplifying this conclusion of the Chief Justice, wrote in his concurring opinion that:
The routine inventory search under consideration in this case does not fall within any of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. But examination of the interests which are protected when searches are conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may issue only upon “probable cause.” In the criminal context the requirement of a warrant protects the individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy against the overzealous police officer. “Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences [concerning probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 [68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436] (1948). See, e. g., United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 316-318 [92 S.Ct. 2125 at 2136]. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with established police department rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate, (footnote omitted).
Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 3103 (Powell, J. concurring). See generally Miles & Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 Seton Hall L.Rev. 105, 135-143 (1972); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 835, 848-853 (1974).

. See, e. g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).

. Transcript at 17, 26, 35-37, 39, 62, 102-03. See also id. at 101-02.

. Transcript at 88; see id. at 105, 116, 119.

. Transcript at 9-10, 119-20. Rev. Bradley did want witnesses present when the box was opened and had no interest in retaining the box if it contained contraband. Id. at 9-10, 31, 34.

. Government’s Brief in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, at page 2, Document 20 (M.D.Pa., Crim. No. 75-56). The Government has the burden of proving facts justifying an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).

. At no time was Rev. Bradley suspected of complicity in the alleged crime.

. Transcript at 115, 122-23.

. Agent Fanning asked the Agent in Harrisburg to send a list of the serial numbers of the bait bills taken in the alleged robbery in case the box contained money. Transcript at 23, 42-43.

. Rev. Bradley did not think he had been authorized to open the box and believed the box was personal to Christine and Diggs. Transcript at 122. Rev. Bradley was, however, willing to take the responsibility if the contents proved innocent, and in this sense believed he had “authority.” Id. at 87-88, 110-11.

. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), see, e. g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16, 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

. The difference between the Rabinowitz approach and the approach reflected by the quoted rules is a question of “semantics” only if we cast aside the notion that the exceptions are “specifically established,” “well-delineated,” “jealously and carefully drawn,” and generally based on absolute necessity. See note 16 infra and accompanying text. Separated from their narrow justifications, the exceptions would indeed be “enthroned into the rule.” United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, 339 U.S. at 80, 70 S.Ct. 430 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

. 364 F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937, 87 S.Ct. 959, 17 L.Ed.2d 810 (1967).

. Compare United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (warrantless arrest in a public place).

. The Rabinowitz approach did not attract a majority in South Dakota v. Opperman, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

. United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 2125, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
“The Fourth Amendment contemplates a pri- or judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised.”
United States v. United States Distrct Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 317, 92 S.Ct. at 2137. See note 18, infra.

. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); see Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 760-61, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The consent exception to the warrant requirement is predicated on a theory other than necessity.

. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n. 12, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).

. At least two interests are served by the warrant requirement. Where possible, it places discretionary decisions on whether to search in the hands of a neutral and detached party who is better able than those with personal interests at stake to determine whether the special facts justify an invasion of a citizen’s privacy. Prior authorization protects against “hindsight justification” and preserves “the effectiveness of post-search review.” South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, - U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 3103 (Powell, J., concurring); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Both of these interests play a significant role in cases of this nature.

. The cases have uniformly held that the consenting party must have joint access for most purposes to an area that has not been set aside for the exclusive use of another. See, e. g., United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 842-43 & n. 20 (3d Cir. 1970); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 262 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981, 89 S.Ct. 2140, 23 L.Ed.2d 769 (1969); United States v. Poole, 307 F.Supp. 1185, 1188-89 (E.D.La.1969); United States v. Brown, 300 F.Supp. 1285 (D.N.H.1969); United States v. White, 268 F.Supp. 998, 1001-02 (D.D.C.1966). Here there was no joint access to the interior of the locked metal box for any purpose, no common area, and no mutual use.

. See United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 843-44 (3d Cir. 1970); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc); United States v. Millen, 338 F.Supp. 747, 753 (E.D.Wis.1972); United States v. Brown, 300 F.Supp. 1285 (D.N.H. 1969).

. Consent searches have never turned on the existence of probable cause. See United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 843 (3d Cir. 1970). Nor does the probable cause factor assume importance because it subsequently turns out on judicial review that the facts constituting probable cause are undisputed. That is true in virtually hundreds of warrantless search cases. It is a “basic rule [that] ‘has never been questioned’,” Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970), that:
“[b]elief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed . . . furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are . unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.” Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 S.Ct. 4, 6, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925).

. Although Bradley was a continuing force, the Agents strongly suspected that the box contained contraband and actually initiated the physical search process when they asked Rev. Bradley to bring them the box. See note 7, supra and accompanying text.

. A rule which requires police officers and courts to examine the motives of consenting bailees seems impractical and subject to easy abuse. Moreover, by relying on the exculpation theory, the plurality opinion imports into the consent exception a factor akin to the concept of probable cause.

. United States v. Botsch relied on United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, which has since been overruled. See part II above. Botsch also derived its exculpation theory from Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010, 86 S.Ct. 618, 15 L.Ed.2d 526 (1966), a case that is virtually identical to the case at bar. Compare People v. Nunn, 55 Ill.2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973) (suppressing evidence on virtually identical facts). But after the decision in Botsch, Marshall v. United States was overruled by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc). Further, the majority in Botsch explicitly distinguished Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), on the ground that the landlord in Botsch, unlike the one in Chapman, possessed a key to the premises. United States v. Botsch, supra, 364 F.2d at 547-48. The landlord in Botsch had access to the shack and, by his fully authorized use of the key to go into the shack, became “inextricably intertwined with [the] alleged scheme.” “[He] was not an inactive landlord, aloof from his tenant’s activities and immune from any taint that inhered in them.” Id.; see United States v. Poindexter, 325 F.Supp. 786, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y.1971).

. For this reason, among others, I believe South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, is inapposite. See also note 18 supra and note 26 infra.

. See notes 21-22 supra and Chapman v. United States, supra, 365 U.S. at 617, 81 S.Ct. 776 quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1314 (1960). Any distinction between houses and “effects” for Fourth Amendment purposes was *134rejected in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 359, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In any event, Chapman does not appear to rest on such a distinction, for the District Court and the Court of Appeals in upholding the search had explicitly relied on the fact “that the property was not used as a residence” or a “private dwelling.” Chapman v. United States, 272 F.2d 70, 71-72 & n. 1 (5th Cir. 1959). Finally, no one of the reasons discussed in South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, note 4 (and cases there cited) for the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles as opposed to houses is applicable to “a suitcase or a box” which is immobile. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 n. 18, 463 n. 20, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Cf. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970); Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 351-52, 88 S.Ct. 507 citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960) and Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877).

. Legislation and Special Projects Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Handbook on the Law of Search and Seizure, Feb. 1971. The Handbook was “designed as a general set of guidelines for personnel performing law enforcement functions” in order “to assist agents” in the field.

. Id. at 44-45.