Court Opinion

ID: 9705798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:21:23.018803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:15.509122
License: Public Domain

Holden, J.,
dissenting. To my mind liability has been invoked against the defendant on conjecture rather than fact.
The agreement of the parties developed in three steps. At the outset, there was a mere listing of the Stern’s property with the plaintiff on five percent commission for sale at $150,000, without mention of the lease and option held by Frank Freeman. At a later date, when this complication was called to the plaintiff’s attention, he sought and obtained protection from a situation that might develop in the event the plaintiff produced a purchaser who was ready to purchase at a price acceptable to the defendant but was prevented from completing the transaction by Freeman’s meeting the proposed price and taking up his option. Lastly, the plaintiff inquired of the defendant’s president “if he had any objection to my contacting Mr. Freeman to see if I could make a sale to the Freemans. He said it was perfectly O.K. for me to go ahead and talk to Mr. Freeman.”
Although the agreement between these parties was loosely composed, one thing is clear. That is, the plaintiff was to be entitled to a commission of five percent of the sale price if he became the procuring cause of the sale. This was so whether the broker acted directly as an intermediary between the defendant and the final purchaser, or indirectly by producing a bona fide offer, acceptable to the defendant which forced the tenant Freeman into exercising his option. This is the plain import of the language -of the parties and this is the standard of performance required by the law. Dindo v. Cappelletti, 116 Vt. 403, 405, 77 A.2d 840; Home Realty Agency v. Nadeau, 96 *154Vt. 167, 169, 118 Atl. 523; Oben v. Ducharme, 93 Vt. 211, 218, 106 Atl. 777; 4 Williston Contracts, §1030 A (Rev. Ed.).
The case was apparently tried on the theory that the plaintiff’s procurement of the Poorvu offer of $90,000 was the efficient cause of the sale. In fact, the compensation recovered, as expressed in the verdict, was based on five percent of this offer. However that may be, the opinion of the majority recognizes that this effort by the plaintiff did not constitute performance. When measured against the terms of the agreement this was not an offer acceptable to the defendant nor was it in the same amount paid by Freeman. Neither can it be said that this offer contributed to the cause of the sale for the plaintiff’s evidence fails to show that Poorvu’s offer was ever communicated to Freeman.
The majority opinion diverts from this theory of the case and justifies the final result on the strength of the defendant’s permission to the plaintiff to try to make a sale to Freeman. In effect, the majority holds this to be a total relinquishment of the defendant’s right to negotiate with its own tenant and optionee, conferring upon the plaintiff the exclusive privilege of sale to this prospect. From this premise, it is concluded that when the plaintiff contacted Freeman, it was the same as though the property were being brought to the tenant’s attention for the first time.
In so doing, the majority reads into the oral contract between the parties important factors that are not in the record. Moreover, to credit the plaintiff with bringing these parties together for the first time is to ignore Freeman’s lease with the defendant and overlook the tenant’s interest in purchasing the property which is expressed in the option. It adopts a legal fiction that is not in keeping with the facts.
Yet even if the fiction prevails, the assumption that the broker first interested Freeman in buying the property is not enough to constitute him as the procuring cause of the sale. Strout v. Wooster, 118 Vt. 66, 77, 99 A.2d 689; Kacavas v. Diamond, 303 Mass. 88, 20 N.E.2d 936, 938; Leight-Benson Realty & Construction Corp. v. J. D. Stone & Co., 138 Va. 511, 121 S.E. 883, 43 A.L.R. 1100, 1101. Although the broker’s efforts need not be the sole cause of the sale, it is essential that they dominate the transaction and amount to something more than an incidental or contributing influence. If it were otherwise, every broker who has any concern with the property might *155earn separate commissions'on a single sale. John T. Burns & Sons, Inc. v. Hands, 283 Mass. 420, 186 N.E. 547, 548; 12 C.J.S. Brokers, §91, p. 209.
In the present case the most that has been shown is that the plaintiff talked to the tenant’s son, Martin Freeman, on two occasions. The substance of these conversations is not disclosed. Neither does it appear that they were communicated to the elder Freeman who held the lease and option.
The mere listing of property with one broker or conferring upon him the right to sell does not deprive the owner of the privilege of accomplishing a sale of the property through his own efforts, or those of another broker. Kimball v. Hayes, 199 Mass. 516, 85 N.E. 875, 876; Brinson v. Davies, 105 L.T.N.S. (Eng.) 134; 9 Am. Jur. Brokers, §57; see also collected cases in 10 A.L.R. 814 and 20 A.L.R. 1268. He will be liable only where he has interfered in bad faith with the broker’s efforts. Ritch v. Robertson, 93 Conn. 459, 106 Atl. 509, 513, 7 A.L.R. 81; 8 Am. Jur. Brokers §189, p. 1100; annotation 43 A.L.R. 1111. On the facts submitted there is no evidence of bad faith and the presumption is against it. Dunnett v. Shields and Conant, 97 Vt. 419, 430, 123 Atl. 626; Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 409, 165 Atl. 919; Kendall’s Admr. v. Roseberry, 120 Vt. 498, 501, 144 A.2d 836.
I fail to see how a jury could justly determine from the evidence at hand that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale to Freeman. The proof is equally deficient to justify a finding that the plaintiff achieved the sale to Freeman, but has been deprived of an earned commission by any wrongful interference by the defendant. In my judgment the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof and a reversal should be ordered.
On Motion for Reargument
Hulburd, C. J.
Upon the handing down of the opinion in the above case, the defendant moved for, and was granted, leave to re-argue.
The entire court is agreed that no points not previously considered have been presented. Let full entry go down.