Court Opinion

ID: 9641046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:21:42.276887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:34.710442
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Presiding Judge
(dissenting.)
I respectfully dissent. In concluding that the appellants are barred from recovery by reason of the Iowa guest statute the majority, I believe, have chosen to afford to the respondent a defense which should not be available to it in the courts of this State because this cause of action is not a tort action and I conclude that by this decision the majority has engrafted onto the contract of insurance the law of a foreign state which was not contemplated by the parties to the contract at the time it was entered into.
Since the advent of the uninsured motorist endorsement on automobile liability insurance policies issued for the protection of *192the insured motorist who, unfortunately, has fallen victim to the negligent and irresponsible tort-feasor who has carried no liability insurance to protect those whom he might injure or kill, much of the litigation has centered around the construction of the terms “legally entitled to recover damages.” How these terms are construed depends upon how the reviewing court understands the purpose for the uninsured motorist endorsement. I will not lengthen this opinion by attempting to review the history of this type of insurance coverage nor the statutory enactments requiring it, but the appellate courts of Missouri have decided that the purpose of the Missouri Uninsured Motorist Statute, § 379.203 RSMo.1969, V.A.M.S. is to afford to the person injured by an uninsured motorist the same protection he would have, had he been injured or damaged by an automobile being operated by an insured motorist. Crenshaw v. Great Central Ins. Co., 527 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.App.1975) and cases cited therein.1 Under this view, in order to prevail in what is admittedly a contract action, the injured insured suing on the contract to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of his automobile policy must establish (1) that the other motorist was in fact uninsured, (2) that at the time the litigation against the insurer was commenced he was legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or the operator of the uninsured vehicle, and (3) the amount of the damages caused by the uninsured motorist. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606, 609[1] (Mo.App.1968) and its progeny.
However, the crux of the problem is construction of the terms “legally entitled to recover.” While the uninsured motorist coverage required by the statute does not specify what, if any, defenses are available to the insuror, the Courts have construed it to mean that the defendant must be proved legally liable to the insured, Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra, and therefore the insuror is entitled to the same defenses to which the uninsured motorist would be entitled were the insured to pursue his remedies against the uninsured motorist rather than against the insuror. Reese v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205 (Mo.App.1970) implies that the insured, to recover, must be free of contributory negligence if raised by the insuror. Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533[5] (Mo.App.1967) barred the plaintiff-wife from recovering against her husband, the uninsured motorist, who rear-ended a car in which his wife was a passenger but whose owner and operator had uninsured motorist coverage with the defendant insuror. The basis for this decision was that since the wife could not maintain a civil action against her husband for a personal tort, therefore the uninsured motorist — her husband — could not be legally responsible to pay damages to the insured under the terms of the uninsured motorist policy. Crenshaw v. Great Central Ins. Co., supra, barred the plaintiff from recovering in a wrongful death case by reason of the two year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death actions. These cases are not controlling here because they do not involve any defense not afforded any motorist in Missouri under Missouri law.
The majority opinion relies on a series of choice of law decisions involving the application of the guest statute in personal injury actions against a defendant motorist and not those against the insuror on an uninsured motorist endorsement such as we have here. In resorting to choice of law cases where tort principles alone are involved I believe that the majority opinion has ignored other legal principles and considerations which have a more significant bearing on what law is to be applied in this *193case and what defenses should be available to this respondent.
The contract of insurance on which this cause of action is founded is a contract entered into within the State of Missouri by a Rhode Island corporation doing business in Missouri, through an agent whose offices are in Kahoka, Missouri, and purchased by a Missouri domiciliary, to cover her automobile which was registered and garaged in Missouri. The policy of insurance was required by the Uninsured Motorist Law of Missouri to contain an endorsement for the protection of persons insured under the policy of insurance who “are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury etc.” Pursuant to this statutory mandate the policy of insurance sold to the deceased insured contained that endorsement. The policy was written to afford the insured the protection required by Missouri law for a Missouri insured in every state of the United States, its territories or possessions, as well as Canada. It was not incorporated in the contract of insurance between the insured and the insurer for the purpose of affording the uninsured motorist free liability insurance. Missouri has no guest statute, and although the insurer is entitled to those defenses available to the Missouri uninsured motorist were he sued in a Missouri court, I seriously question whether this contract of insurance also entitles the insurer to any defenses not available to Missouri uninsured motorists in the courts of Missouri.
Since this is a contract action, I believe the choice of law principles controlling are those peculiar to contracts. In contract actions choice of law may be approached from different angles. The familiar rule is that the construction of the contract is governed by the law of the place where it was made. If that approach is employed in this case, then it would appear that the law of Missouri would be controlling because according to the terms of the policy of insurance it became effective at 12:01 a.m. on January 8, 1971, at the address of the named insured, which was stated in the policy of insurance to be R.R. # 3 Kahoka, Missouri, 63445. Or even under the most recently formulated theory of choice of laws, the “grouping of contacts” or “center of gravity” theory, certainly the most significant contacts with respect to the contract of insurance necessarily dictate that Missouri law be applied. The majority opinion has based its choice of laws on the contacts with the State of Iowa, i. e. the tort contacts. I would make the choice of law dependent upon the contract contacts. It is obvious that Iowa had no contacts if that approach is adopted, and therefore Iowa can have no interest in what law is applied. The uninsured tort-feasor, an Iowa resident, is not a party to this suit nor is his estate. And even though this contract contains a Trust Agreement provision, any suit against the estate of the deceased uninsured tort-feasor in Iowa would be barred by the Iowa guest statute, since it necessarily would have to be brought in Iowa where Iowa law, and the Iowa guest statute, would be applied. I do not view this inability of the insurer to recoup its losses as significant, for it is in the nature of this line of insurance that recovery against the uninsured motorist is unlikely at best. Were it otherwise, the insured would not proceed under the uninsured motorist endorsement but would sue the tort-feasor directly.
I am aware of the fact that Missouri has in tort cases continued to enforce against Missouri domiciliaries in some circumstances, the guest statutes of sister states, despite the fact Missouri has no statute so regressive and anachronistic to apply to cases arising in Missouri. However, that is no reason, in my opinion, to continue that favoritism shown foreign tort-feasors where the cause of action is not in tort but is in contract. The very purpose of § 379.-203 RSMo.1969, V.A.M.S., is to afford relief to Missouri residents where they were formerly without hope of compensation by reason of injuries and damage visited upon them by the negligence of irresponsible owners and operators of motor vehicles. In enacting the Uninsured Motorist Law of Missouri the General Assembly did not limit the coverage thereby afforded to the opera*194tion of motor vehicles within the four corners of the State of Missouri. In writing its policy of insurance the insurer did not limit the coverage to these same four corners of the State of Missouri; rather, it extended the coverage to each of the United States, its territories and possession, and even Canada. Nothing, however, was set forth in the policy to the effect that defenses peculiar to the several states, the territories and possessions of the United States and Canada would be interposed should a claim be made under the contract of insurance; the only inkling was inclusion of the terms “legally entitled to recover” in the contract of insurance. While this might alert the policy holder to defenses available to Missouri residents under Missouri law it did not notify them that defenses unavailable to Missouri residents by reason of accidents occurring in Missouri would be available to bar recovery were the injuries and damages sustained in a state having a guest statute.
I believe that the terms “legally entitled to recover” are ambiguous in this context. This court, in Reese v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., supra, came to this same conclusion in the posture of that case. The Kansas City District of this court, in Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, concluded that in the posture of that case they were not. If, as I believe, these terms are ambiguous, they must then be construed against the insurer — the drafter of the insurance policy — and in favor of the insured.
Turning then to choice of law as applied to contracts, I would hold that the insurer, under the statute and the terms of this insurance policy, is entitled to the same defenses against the claim of the appellants in this case available to any Missouri uninsured motorist had the accident occurred in Missouri; but that it is not entitled to interpose the defense of the Iowa guest statute to bar appellant’s recovery. This approach is, I think, consistent with either the “law of the place” or the “grouping of contacts” approach to choice of law. By reaching this conclusion, the purpose for which the Missouri Uninsured Motorist Law was enacted will be attained without taking advantage of the insurer, and by giving the insured the benefit of construing an ambiguous condition precedent against the party to the law suit who drafted the instrument, a familiar rule of construction in contract cases will have been observed.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter, in this court, a judgment for the appellants. Rule 84.14 V.A.M.R.

. There is another viewpoint, recognized by this court in Reese v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205 (Mo.App.1970) — the “fault” approach followed by Wisconsin, Michigan, Rhode Island, Oregon, Louisiana, Tennessee and DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966). However, even Reese impliedly, at least, indicated that contributory negligence would be a defense for the insurer in a suit on the uninsured motorist endorsement to his automobile liability insurance policy.