Court Opinion

ID: 9676686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:30:28.426105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:43.415352
License: Public Domain

McDONALD, Judge.
The City of Bowling Green, Warren County and the Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Board (“board”) appeal from the circuit court’s judgment dismissing their petition for condemnation of 24.59 acres of land owned by appellee, Roy G. Cooksey.
In October, 1989, members of the board began negotiating with Cooksey regarding the possibility of purchasing 24.59 acres of his 101-acre farm upon which he resides and raises beef cattle. Cooksey suggested he would be willing to enter into an agreement whereby he would “trade” the desired property in exchange for the same amount of property adjoining his farm. Apparently an attempt to accomplish this was made but fell through when the board refused to acquire the “trade” property at the price requested by its owner.
The board then voted to condemn the property “to establish a safety zone, among other public purposes and uses....” After that, the Warren County Fiscal Court and the Bowling Green Board of Commissioners passed a joint ordinance and order voting to condemn the land for a “public airport safety zone and other public purposes_” At this point, Cooksey offered to restrict the land to agricultural use, to give the airport a noise easement and/or an easement prohibiting trees, residential development, and the erection of any structures on the property up to the airport’s building restriction line. The board, although it offered to lease the property back to Cooksey with the same restrictions, refused to accept anything less than fee simple title to the property. Appellants then filed a condemnation petition. Upon Cooksey’s objection, a trial was conducted pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act.
The evidence revealed that Cook-sey’s land would be used solely for a buffer zone as no structures (not even a future proposed taxiway) would be located within the boundaries of his property.
*192The trial court made extensive findings of fact, clearly supported by substantial evidence of record. In its final factual conclusion the court stated:
There is no proof that the land in question is needed within the reasonably foreseeable future by the airport to provide use as a public purpose, a safety clear zone, a noise buffer zone, potential development, or any other purpose or cause. The Court finds that a taking of this property would bear an unreasonable relationship to the public interest. The Court finds that the burden of showing that the public agency is not permitted to take the property is upon the person objecting, in this case Dr. Roy Cooksey. The Court finds that he has carried this burden by clear and convincing evidence. The Court finds as a matter of law based upon the evidence and exhibits introduced at the trial of this action that there can be no taking of this property.
The Kentucky Constitution and the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky (KRS 416.540 et seq.) require that the taking of private property by government must be for a “public purpose.” Under KRS 416.-550 the condemnor cannot acquire the property in fee simple if it can obtain access or use of the property through other privileges or easements. The evidence not only reveals that there is no intended public use but also a willingness on the part of Cook-sey, the owner/condemnee, to give the airport an easement and restrict the area in question from any building. Cooksey even granted the airport authority to remove any and all trees that were considered offending and permission to replace the fence if it desired.
The evidence clearly revealed that the intended actual use of the land was to remain the same, i.e., for agricultural purposes, and the government was even prepared to lease it back to its current owner to continue using it in the present manner, i.e., raising beef cattle. The evidence further revealed that there was not a safety or noise problem associated with the land, and that obtaining the land for the claimed purpose of providing a clear zone or noise buffer zone was not truly the motive for the acquisition of the property. While “nonuse,” as urged by appellants, may serve a legitimate “public purpose,” the appellee has shown that the current use (to which the land would willingly be restricted) was completely compatible with the public purposes appellants are purportedly seeking to achieve. Importantly, the appellants and their experts all concede this fact to be true.
The constitution, statutes and case law of Kentucky necessarily imply the exercise of good faith by governmental authority in using its power to condemn and/or take private property from its citizens. While it has been concluded that the “necessity” for the exercise of eminent domain is one primarily and almost exclusively for the legislative branch, the question of whether the proposed condemned property is to be used for a “public” purpose is one to be determined by the judiciary. See e.g., Idol v. Knuckles, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 910 (1964); Jefferson County v. Clausen, 297 Ky. 414, 180 S.W.2d 297 (1944); Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1937).
In McGee v. City of Williamstown, Ky., 308 S.W.2d 795, 796 (1957), emphatically our highest Court says:
It is a general principle of law that the Legislature cannot authorize the taking of property by eminent domain in excess of the particular public need involved. (Emphasis added.)
McGee further states emphatically that “ordinarily the need for the taking of land for a public purpose ... is a question of law for the court....”
The right of eminent domain may be exercised if the condemnor cannot obtain from the property owner by agreement the property right or easement necessary. If unable to reach an agreement, the con-demnor must file a petition pursuant to KRS 416.570. The landowner having filed a response contesting the condemnation is entitled to a hearing before the trial court regarding the petitioner’s right to condemn. The Warren Circuit Court conducted a proper hearing in this matter and determined there was no public use intend*193ed for the land sought to be condemned, and that the taking of the property would bear an unreasonable relationship to the public interest.
In its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court thoroughly discussed the evidence presented. We must observe proper deference to the role of the trial court as factfinder. Commonwealth Transportation Cabinet Department of Highways v. Taub, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 49 (1989), and CR 52.01.
Because there is credible, competent and substantial evidence that the acquisition of this land by fee simple title is not necessary for an intended public purpose, this Court is unable to conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Thus, it is our conclusion that the dismissal of the petition for condemnation must be affirmed.
DYCHE, J., concurs.
SCHRODER, J., dissents by separate opinion.