Court Opinion

ID: 9898647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:05:16.350462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:37.715411
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 P. v. Figueroa CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324327

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. LA070082
       v.

BRIAN FIGUEROA,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Martin L. Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
      Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
  INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        In 2013, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Brian
Figueroa and his codefendant, Bronco Corzo, of the second degree
murder of Justin Dunlap. (Pen Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) The trial
court sentenced Figueroa to 30 years to life in state prison,
consisting of a term of 15 years to life, doubled based on a prior
strike conviction. On direct appeal, a different panel of this court
affirmed the judgments against both defendants. (People v. Corzo
et al. (Jul. 16, 2015, B254650 [nonpub. opn.].)
        In 2019, Figueroa filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).2 The trial court
appointed counsel for Figueroa and issued an order to show
cause. The prosecution filed a response, arguing although the
jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine (as an alternate theory to the prosecution’s main
argument that Figueroa was guilty of implied-malice murder),
the evidence summarized in this court’s opinion resolving
Figueroa’s direct appeal demonstrated he remained guilty of
second degree murder under current law. Figueroa filed a reply
arguing, among other things, the trial court should not consider

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. For the sake of
simplicity, we will refer to the statute by its new code section.
That section provides relief for certain individuals convicted of
murder under the felony murder rule, natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed-malice
liability. (See § 1172.6.)

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this court’s opinion resolving his direct appeal, and the
prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt Figueroa
is guilty of murder under current law. The prosecution filed a
brief clarifying that it was not only the facts contained in this
court’s opinion on direct appeal that showed Figueroa is guilty of
murder under current law – it was also the evidence presented at
Figueroa’s trial. In its brief, the prosecution requested the trial
court take judicial notice of the record from Figueroa’s trial, a
request the trial court ultimately granted.
       After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
Figueroa relief, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt he is guilty
of second degree murder under current law. Specifically, the
court found Figueroa is guilty of murder under current law as a
direct perpetrator (having participated in the brutal beating,
along with codefendant Corzo, that led to the victim’s death), and
alternatively, as a direct aider and abettor who harbored the
intent to kill.
       Figueroa timely appealed, and we appointed counsel to
represent him. On April 10, 2023, appellate counsel filed a brief
raising no issues and requesting discretionary independent
review of the record under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216. We granted Figueroa’s extension of time request, then, on
June 14, 2023, Figueroa filed a supplemental brief.3 In his
supplemental brief, Figueroa appears to challenge the trial
court’s ineligibility finding as being unsupported by substantial
evidence. He contends that, although he participated in the fight

3     On May 30, 2023, Figueroa filed a request for new counsel,
arguing his appellate counsel was ineffective in raising no issues.
We denied the motion on July 5, 2023, and directed the clerk to
send a copy of the motion to Figueroa’s appellate counsel.

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with the victim, he did so in self-defense, and he did not harbor
the intent to kill. He also challenges eyewitness testimony
presented against him at his original trial as being not credible.
We reject these contentions and affirm the order denying
Figueroa relief.

                          DISCUSSION

      We review the trial court’s finding that Figueroa is guilty of
murder under current law for substantial evidence. (See People v.
Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476.) In conducting this
analysis, we do not substitute our own evaluation of witness
credibility for that of the trial court. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) For this reason, we reject Figueroa’s
argument – that because the witnesses who testified he
participated in the fatal beating of Dunlap were not credible –
there is insufficient evidence in the record that he is guilty of
murder under current law. We also note the trial court found
Figueroa’s testimony that the killing was committed in heat of
passion not credible. We defer to that factual determination too,
as we are required to do by the Supreme Court. (Ibid.)
      Contrary to Figueroa’s assertions, the record from his
original trial contains evidence from which the trial court could
reasonably conclude he is guilty of murder under current law.
(See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [99 S. Ct.
2781; 61 L.Ed.2d 560] [in assessing sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
finding, assessing whether any reasonable trier of fact could
reach the finding being challenged on appeal].) “‘Second degree
murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought but without the additional elements, such as
willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support

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a conviction of first degree murder.’” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59
Cal.4th 121, 133.) “Thus, the mens rea required for murder is
malice, express or implied.” (Ibid.) In finding Figueroa guilty of
second degree murder under current law, the trial court noted its
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on the
circumstantial evidence presented, Figueroa harbored a conscious
disregard for human life (i.e., committed implied malice murder).
      The record supports this conclusion. As the trial court
observed, several neutral witnesses testified Figueroa
participated in the fatal beating of Dunlap.4 For example, one
witness testified Dunlap seemed drunk, and Figueroa and Corzo
had him on the ground as they punched and kicked him in the
head and chest, having rendered him defenseless almost
immediately after the fight began. That witness likewise testified
one of the two defendants produced a metal weapon (resembling
a crowbar or police baton) and handed it to the other defendant.
That defendant then struck Dunlap in the head with it 24 to 50
times. These facts reasonably support the trial court’s conclusion
that Figueroa is guilty of second degree murder under current
law, because they show he actively participated and assisted in
the killing while harboring a conscious disregard for human life.
(See In re James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810, 813 [substantial
evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences based on that evidence].)5

4     Although the trial court relied on the transcripts of
Figueroa’s original trial in denying relief, those transcripts were
not included in the record in this appeal. We therefore take
judicial notice of them. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
5     Although we need not reach the trial court’s alternate
finding, namely that Figueroa is guilty of murder under current

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      In addition to rejecting the arguments Figueroa raised in
his supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record, and we conclude no arguable
issues exist. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
232.)
                          DISPOSITION

      The order denying Figueroa section 1172.6 relief is
affirmed.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

law as a direct aider and abettor who harbored the intent to kill,
we note that the facts surrounding Figueroa’s participation in the
victim’s murder reasonably support this finding too.

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