Court Opinion

ID: 9850776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:50.796537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.159856
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent. As I shall explain, the statutory discovery scheme in question is invalid and therefore the challenged discovery order is unsupported as a matter of law.
I
At the June 5, 1990, Primary Election, the voters approved an initiative constitutional amendment and statute that was designated on the ballot as Proposition 115—the self-styled “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.”
Section 23 of Proposition 115 purportedly added chapter 10 to title 6 of part 2 of the Penal Code, entitled “Discovery,” comprising Penal Code sections 1054 through 1054.7. Within the chapter, section 1054.1 provides for discovery by the defense1 and section 1054.3 provides for discovery by the prosecution.2
*388On June 6, 1990, Proposition 115 purportedly became effective. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a) [statutory provisions]; id., art. XVIII, § 4 [constitutional provisions].)
Subsequently, the People filed an information in the Tulare Superior Court against petitioner, Javier Valle Izazaga, and a codefendant. The pleading charged the pair with the commission, on June 18, 1990, of two counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, former § 261, subd. (2)) and one count of simple kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)); it also alleged many and varied sentence enhancements.
The People made an informal request of Izazaga and his counsel for discovery pursuant to the procedural requirements of Penal Code section 1054.5, seeking all the information and material covered by Penal Code section 1054.3. Izazaga refused.
Thereupon, the People moved the superior court for an order under Penal Code section 1054.5 compelling Izazaga and his counsel to disclose the information and material they had informally requested.
Izazaga opposed the motion. He attacked the statutory discovery scheme, including especially Penal Code section 1054.3 permitting prosecutorial discovery, as violative of the following protections granted criminal defendants by tiie United States Constitution: the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment; the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; and the right to the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. He did not attack the scheme as violative of the California Constitution, evidently because of section 3 of Proposition 115.* *3
*389The superior court conducted a hearing on the People’s motion to compel. In its course, defense counsel unsuccessfully requested the court to hold certain proceedings in camera, outside the presence of the prosecutor, on the ground that all the information and material sought came directly and exclusively from Izazaga himself and hence that its compelled disclosure might violate his federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
After the hearing, the superior court granted the People’s motion to compel. It ordered the immediate disclosure of “(1) The names and addresses of persons, other than the Defendant, counsel or Defendant intends to call as witnesses at trial”; “(2) Any relevant written or recorded statements of the persons in #1 above and/or reports of the statements of such persons”; “(3) Any reports or statements of experts made in connection with this case, including, but not limited to, the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the Defendant or counsel intend[s] to offer as evidence at the trial of this case”; and “(4) Any ‘real’, i.e. tangible or physical, evidence which the Defendant or counsel intend[s] to offer in evidence at the trial.”
Thereafter, Izazaga submitted to the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District a petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandate against the superior court with a request for a stay, seeking to restrain the court from enforcing its order compelling prosecutorial discovery. He attacked the statutory discovery scheme, including especially Penal Code section 1054.3 permitting prosecutorial discovery, on the same federal constitutional grounds he relied on in his opposition to the People’s motion to compel. The Court of Appeal summarily denied relief solely on the procedural ground that this court was the appropriate forum.
Izazaga then petitioned this court for review with a request to stay enforcement of the superior court’s order compelling prosecutorial discovery pendente lite. He made the same federal constitutional attack he had made in the Court of Appeal. We stayed enforcement as prayed. Not long thereafter, we granted review. We then caused an alternative writ of mandate to issue.
In response, the People as real party in interest simultaneously submitted a return and a “Motion for Briefing and Argument of Additional Issue.”
In their motion, drafted in the wake of our decision in Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 349-355 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077], invalidating section 3 of Proposition 115, the People requested, in substance, that we consider the question whether the statutory discovery scheme is violative of a criminal defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination under *390article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. Izazaga subsequently joined in the motion. We granted the request.
In their return, the People maintain that Izazaga has not mounted a successful challenge based on the federal constitutional protections on which he has relied. They also maintain that he cannot mount a successful challenge based on any state constitutional protection, including the privilege against self-incrimination.
In a supplemental brief, Izazaga essentially makes an attack on state constitutional grounds—including the privilege against self-incrimination— parallel to the attack he had already made on federal constitutional grounds.
II
As noted above, Izazaga has raised several claims against the validity of the statutory discovery scheme, including especially Penal Code section 1054.3 permitting prosecutorial discovery. In my view, at least one is meritorious. As I shall show, the scheme fails muster under the privilege against self-incrimination of article I, section 15, of the California Constitution: “Persons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves . . . .”
Before undertaking the analysis properly so called, I shall set out the necessary legal background.
In Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213], we were presented with a petition for a writ of prohibition attacking an order compelling prosecutorial discovery.
On the day set for trial on a charge of rape, the defendant successfully moved for a continuance, stating that he had long been impotent and that he needed time to gather medical evidence in connection with certain injuries he had suffered. Subsequently, the People successfully moved for discovery of the following information and material: (1) the names and addresses of all physicians the defendant subpoenaed to testify about the injuries bearing on impotence; (2) the names and addresses of all physicians who had treated him; (3) all reports about his physical condition and the injuries bearing on impotence; and (4) all X-rays taken immediately after the injuries.
We restrained the trial court from enforcing the order compelling prosecutorial discovery as framed because it was violative of, inter alia, the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
*391A bare majority of this court held that prosecutorial discovery is not absolutely prohibited by the privilege. Speaking through Justice—later Chief Justice—Traynor, they stated that discovery “should not be a one-way street” (58 Cal.2d at p. 60), allowing the flow of information and material from the People to the defendant but not from the defendant to the People. They also stated that discovery could be ordered pursuant to rules of procedure promulgated under this court’s inherent power to provide for the orderly administration of justice, even in the absence of constitutional mandate or legislative authorization. (Id. at pp. 59-60.) They concluded: “Insofar as the trial court’s order herein requires [defendant] to reveal the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to call and to produce reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence to support his defense of impotence, it does not violate the privilege against self-crimination. ... It simply requires [defendant] to disclose information that he will shortly reveal anyway. Such information is discoverable. The order, however, is not limited to the discovery of such information, and therefore cannot be enforced in its present form.” (Id. at p. 62.)
In separate concurring and dissenting opinions, Justice Peters and Justice Dooling declared that prosecutorial discovery was totally barred by the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In Justice Peters’s words: “The ‘one-way street’ argument is obviously fallacious. The simple fact is that our system of criminal procedure is founded upon the principle that the ascertainment of the facts is a ‘one-way street.’ It is the constitutional right of the defendant, who is presumed to be innocent, to stand silent while the state attempts to meet its burden of proof, that is, to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, up until now, did not have to take an active part in the ascertainment of the facts. The majority opinion does not merely enlarge a simple judicial principle of pretrial procedure, it fundamentally alters our concepts of the rights of the accused, and forces him to come forward with information before the prosecution has presented a case against him.” (58 Cal.2d at pp. 64-65, italics in original (conc. & dis. opn. of Peters, J.).) Justice Peters also concluded (id. at pp. 67-68 (conc. & dis. opn. of Peters, J.)), as did Justice Dooling (id. at pp. 68-69 (conc. & dis. opn. of Dooling, J.)), that even if prosecutorial discovery was not totally barred, it could not be ordered absent constitutional mandate or legislative authorization.
Next, in People v. Pike (1969) 71 Cal.2d 595 [78 Cal.Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776], a majority of this court followed Jones in perfunctorily rejecting the defendant’s claim that an order compelling prosecutorial discovery of the names, addresses, and expected testimony of defense witnesses was violative of, inter alia, the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Peters again dissented.
*392The following year, in Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320 [85 Cal.Rptr. 129,466 P.2d 673], we effectively limited Jones to its facts (at p. 323) and expressly disapproved Pike (at p. 327, fn. 11).
We did so after considering, among other things, the United States Supreme Court’s expanding interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment, which had been held applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, two years after Jones, in Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489].
“. . . [I]f we analyze Jones in the light of the policy considerations [underlying the federal constitutional privilege], it is apparent that the principal element in determining whether a particular demand for discovery should be allowed is not simply whether the information sought pertains to an ‘affirmative defense,’ or whether defendant intends to introduce or rely upon the evidence at trial, but whether disclosure thereof conceivably might lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.” (2 Cal.3d at p. 326, fn. omitted.)
We made plain, however, that prosecutorial discovery was not absolutely prohibited by the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. “We do not intend to suggest that the prosecution should be barred from any discovery in this, or any other, case. A reasonable demand for factual information which, as in Jones, pertains to a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that information which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no substantial hazards of self-incrimination . . . .” (2 Cal.3d at p. 327, italics in original.)
Less than three months after Prudhomme was decided, the United States Supreme Court’s theretofore expanding interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination began to contract. In Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 90 S.Ct. 1893], a majority of the court—over the vigorous dissent of Justice Black—upheld a Florida rule of criminal procedure against a challenge based on the federal constitutional privilege. The rule required a defendant who intended to rely on a defense of alibi to disclose to the state the names of his alibi witnesses, and in turn required the state to disclose to the defendant the names of its rebutting witnesses. The majority found no violation of the privilege. In their view— clearly derived from the reasoning of Jones—“At most, the rule only compelled [defendant] to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the [defendant] from the beginning planned to divulge at trial.” (399 U.S. at p. 85 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 452].)
*393In Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470 [37 L.Ed.2d 82, 93 S.Ct. 2208], the court revisited the question of prosecutorial discovery. Oregon had a statutory notice-of-alibi rule. The rule required a defendant who intended to rely on a defense of alibi to disclose to the state both his whereabouts at the time of the offense and the names and addresses of his alibi witnesses. By contrast, it did not require any responsive disclosures to the defendant by the state. The court struck down the rule as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
“Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser. The Williams Court was therefore careful to note that ‘Florida law provides for liberal discovery by the defendant against the State, and the notice-of-alibi rule is itself carefully hedged with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant.’ The same cannot be said of Oregon law. . . .
“We do not suggest that the Due Process Clause of its own force requires Oregon to adopt such provisions. But we do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The State may not insist that trials be run as a ‘search for truth’ so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining ‘poker game’ secrecy for its own witnesses. It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State.” (412 U.S. at pp. 474-476 [37 L.Ed.2d at pp. 87-88], citations and fns. omitted.)
In Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834 [117 Cal.Rptr. 437, 528 P.2d 45], we turned yet again to the issue of prosecutorial discovery. On the People’s motion, the trial court issued an order compelling discovery, to the following effect: the defendant had to give the People at least three days’ notice in advance of calling any alibi witnesses, and had to disclose to them the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of such witnesses; for their part, the People had to disclose to the defendant any evidence they might possess or obtain that could impeach his alibi witnesses; failure to disclose a witness or evidence would result in exclusion. The defendant petitioned for a writ of prohibition against the trial court to restrain enforcement of the order. We directed issuance of the writ.
In an opinion for a unanimous court by Chief Justice Wright, we expressed our view that “such a procedural innovation as requiring defendants in criminal cases to give advance notice of alibis should be introduced, if at all, only upon the considered judgment of the Legislature. . . . [C]omplex *394and closely balanced questions of state and federal constitutional law are presented by a notice-of-alibi order. The gravity of these questions counsels against the exercise of our rule-making power so as to promulgate a notice-of-alibi procedure.” (12 Cal.3d at p. 837.)
“When the discovery order here in issue is viewed in the light of [Jones, Prudhomme, Williams, and Wardius] it is manifest that the order presents delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law, both state and federal. While Williams may have laid to rest the contention that notice-of-alibi procedures are inconsistent with the federally guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination, this privilege is also secured to the people of California by our state Constitution, whose construction is left to this court, informed but untrammelled by the United States Supreme Court’s reading of parallel federal provisions. [Citations.] The Supreme Court did not hesitate in Williams to send defendants with alibi defenses down the ‘two-way street’ mapped out in Jones for a defendant making the partially analogous claim of impotence in a rape case; but this court in Prudhomme has itself cast doubt on the analogical utility of Jones. Of course, Prudhomme's concern for the possible, collaterally incriminatory consequences to an accused of revealing in advance of trial the names of defense witnesses . . . was in part based on this court’s reading of pre-Williams federal law. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that Prudhomme put this court on record as being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law currently requires. Thus, there is no foregone answer to the question we would necessarily face were we to pass on the merits of the . . . court’s order: whether notice-of-alibi discovery procedures in general are permissible under the California Constitution.
“Consideration of the merits of the . . . court’s order would require us to decide not only this far-reaching issue of state law, but also whether the order is sufficiently reciprocal in scope to pass federal constitutional muster under the Wardius test of fundamental fairness.” (12 Cal.3d at pp. 842-843, fn. omitted.)
The next year, in United States v. Nobles (1975) 422 U.S. 225 [45 L.Ed.2d 141, 95 S.Ct. 2160], the United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue of prosecutorial discovery. During the defendant’s criminal trial in federal court, defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a defense investigator regarding statements he had previously obtained from them during interviews. Counsel called the investigator. The court told counsel he would have to submit the investigator’s report to the prosecution at the close of the investigator’s testimony. Counsel said he did not intend to comply. The court then ruled the investigator could not testify about the interviews. After conviction, the *395Court of Appeals concluded, inter alia, that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination prohibited imposition of the conditional disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court held to the contrary. It reasoned that the privilege is “personal to the defendant” and as such “does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial.” (Id. at p. 234 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 151].)
The year following, in Allen v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 520 [134 Cal.Rptr. 774, 557 P.2d 65], we were presented with yet another petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain a trial court from enforcing an order compelling discovery. On the day set for trial, the court ordered both the People and the defendant to disclose the names of their intended witnesses so that it could ascertain whether any of them was known to the prospective jurors. The court stated that it would not identify any of the witnesses as the People’s or the defendant’s, and that it would enjoin the People from contacting any of the defendant’s witnesses until the witness’s name was otherwise disclosed during trial. The defendant sought a writ of prohibition. We directed issuance of the writ.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Wright, we recalled at the outset that “In Prudhomme we concluded that the principal element in determining whether a compelled disclosure should be allowed is ‘whether disclosure thereof conceivably might lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.’ ” (18 Cal.3d at p. 524.)
Citing Nobles and Williams, we stated that we were “mindful that the trend of the federal high court’s decisions on questions of compelled defense disclosure to the prosecution is not wholly consistent with our interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination.” (18 Cal.3d at p. 524.)
But we declared that “It is established that our Constitution is ‘a document of independent force’ [citations], ‘whose construction is left to this court, informed but untrammeled [wc] by the United States Supreme Court’s reading of parallel federal provisions. [Citations.]’
“In Reynolds we noted that ‘Prudhomme put this court on record as being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law currently requires.’ [Citation.] We maintain that solicitude and affirm the continued vitality of the stringent standards set forth in Prudhomme for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination as embodied in article I, section 15.” (18 Cal.3d at p. 525.)
Applying Prudhomme, we concluded that the discovery order in question could not stand.
*396Justice Richardson and Justice Clark filed separate dissenting opinions. In Justice Richardson’s view, the court had “erect[ed] artificial barriers preventing two-way passage on the street” of discovery. (18 Cal.3d at p. 533 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).)
Next, in People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534, 23 A.L.R.4th 776], we proceeded beyond Prudhomme to generally disapprove of prosecutorial discovery, absent express legislative authorization, on the ground that such discovery would inevitably raise serious questions under the United States and California Constitutions, including the state charter’s privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at pp. 48, 49-56.) We made plain, however, that the prosecutorial discovery we deemed problematic was such as is directed at “testimonial evidence” (id. at p. 55, fn. 7) and not “nontestimonial evidence” (ibid.): “we leave intact the firmly established precedents that hold the self-incrimination privilege inapplicable to, and allow mandatory production of, nontestimonial evidence such as fingerprints, blood samples, breath samples, appearances in lineups, and handwriting and voice exemplars.” (Ibid.)
Justice Richardson concurred in the judgment. He disagreed, however, with the court’s analysis. “Today’s decision entirely blocks the People’s access to ‘Discovery Street’ by judicial fiat, leaving them without knowledge as to what constitutional principles, if any, have created the roadblock, or how the obstruction can be cleared.” (30 Cal.3d at p. 69 (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).)
Finally, in In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543 [213 Cal.Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637], we struck down Penal Code section 1102.5 as violative of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The statutory provision required the defendant and his counsel to disclose to the People, on their request, prior statements by defense witnesses after they testified on direct examination. Its sole apparent purpose was to facilitate the impeachment of such witnesses. (38 Cal.3d at p. 554.) We construed the privilege more broadly than we had in Prudhomme—concluding, in effect, that it barred prosecutorial discovery that could help the People carry the entire burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the compelled disclosure might serve to make the People’s case or to unmake the defendant’s. (Id. at pp. 554-558.)
Dissenting, Justice—now Chief Justice—Lucas criticized the court’s “holdings in the present case and prior cases,” which he claimed “creat[ed] a devastating ‘roadblock’ in the search for the truth.” (38 Cal.3d at p. 562 (dis. opn. of Lucas, J.).)
*397I now turn to the question presently before the court. When that issue is considered against the legal background set out above, the following conclusion is practically compelled: the statutory discovery scheme, including especially Penal Code section 1054.3 permitting prosecutorial discovery, is on its face violative of a criminal defendant’s state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
It matters not whether the privilege is construed narrowly, as in Prudhomme, or broadly, as in Misener. As noted, the former interpretation prohibits prosecutorial discovery when the compelled disclosure might conceivably lighten the People’s burden of establishing their case-in-chief, whereas the latter bars such discovery when the disclosure could help the People carry the entire burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, whether by making their case or by unmaking his.
It is clear that the intent underlying the statutory discovery scheme is to generally and broadly assist the People in obtaining the conviction of criminal defendants. It is clearer still that the effect of the scheme—indeed, its necessary effect—is to furnish just such assistance.
Certainly, we cannot reasonably construe the statutory discovery scheme in a such manner as to avoid conflict with the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The drafters of Proposition 115 declared in Penal Code section 1054.6 that “Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any materials or information . . . which are privileged pursuant to an express statutory provision, or are privileged as provided by the Constitution of the United States.” By so stating, they made plain that the Constitution of the State of California—including its privilege against self-incrimination— was not within their consideration. We cannot overlook their meaning or ignore its effect.
It is true that in Penal Code section 1054.7 the drafters declared that a “disclosure” may be “denied, restricted, or deferred” if “good cause” is shown. But in that same provision they added: “ ‘Good cause’ is limited to threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law enforcement.” (Italics added.) As so limited, “good cause” is clearly not broad enough to encompass a claim under the California Constitution generally or under its privilege against self-incrimination specifically.
The question, of course, arises whether the passage of Proposition 115 affects the foregoing analysis under the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. As will appear, the answer is negative.
*398It is manifest that those who drafted Proposition 115 had a tripartite intent as to the issue under consideration.
First, the drafters had an intent as to the past, viz., to remove the alleged “roadblock” to prosecutorial discovery assertedly established by the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Consider section 3 of Proposition 115, which would have added the following relevant text to section 24 of article I of the state charter: “In criminal cases the right[ ] of a defendant ... to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself . . . shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States . . . .”
Plainly, the design of the drafters was not simply to breach the alleged “roadblock,” as by overruling any one or more judicial decisions construing the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Rather, it was to remove the alleged “roadblock” altogether, by abrogating the privilege as a guaranty independent of its federal constitutional analogue. Recall Penal Code section 1054.6, which is quoted above: “Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any materials or information . . . which are privileged pursuant to an express statutory provision, or are privileged as provided by the Constitution of the United States.” The absence of any mention of the Constitution of the State of California evidences an assumption that the state constitutional privilege was, in fact, abrogated.
Second, the drafters had an intent as to the present, viz., to enact a statutory discovery scheme that would permit discovery for the People as well as for the defendant. We need look no further for proof than to section 23 of Proposition 115, which purportedly adds Penal Code sections 1054 through 1054.7.
Third, the drafters had an intent as to the future, viz., to require that henceforth all discovery must be a “two-way street” with each “lane” roughly the same width as the other. Section 5 of Proposition 115 adds section 30 to article I of the California Constitution. Subdivision (c) of the new section 30 of article I—hereafter new section 30(c)—declares, “In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initiative process.” The concept of reciprocity was evidently derived from Wardius. The notion, as defined in its source, describes both the direction of the flow of information and material—i.e., from the People to the defendant and from the defendant to the People—and the character of the flow of such information and material—i.e., balanced.
*399Not only is the tripartite intent of those who drafted Proposition 115 manifest. Manifest too is the means they chose to attain what they sought.
Thus, section 3 of Proposition 115, which would have added the text quoted above to section 24 of article I of the California Constitution, would have removed the alleged “roadblock” to prosecutorial discovery assertedly established by the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In the arguments they made before section 3 was invalidated in Raven, both the People and Izazaga impliedly recognized the point. In those arguments, neither party addressed the question whether the state constitutional privilege might have survived the passage of the measure.
Next, section 23 of Proposition 115, which purportedly adds Penal Code sections 1054 through 1054.7, would have enacted a statutory discovery scheme that would have permitted discovery for the People as well as for the defendant.
Finally, section 5 of Proposition 115, which adds new section 30(c), requires “discovery in criminal cases” to be “reciprocal in nature,” i.e., flowing to the People as well as to the defendant and also balanced in character.
The discussion set out above leads to the following conclusion: the passage of Proposition 115 does not affect the determination that the statutory discovery scheme, including especially Penal Code section 1054.3 permitting prosecutorial discovery, is on its face violative of a criminal defendant’s state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The reason is plain. The means chosen by the drafters of the initiative measure to remove the alleged “roadblock” to prosecutorial discovery assertedly established by the privilege failed to attain what they sought. As noted above, in Raven we invalidated section 3 of the measure.
It might perhaps be argued that new section 30(c) itself removes the alleged “roadblock.” Such an argument should be rejected out of hand. It is evidently based on an interpretation of new section 30(c) that would render it redundant in pertinent part to the text that would have been added to section 24 of article I of the state charter by section 3 of Proposition 115. An interpretation of that kind should be avoided. (City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935].) In any event, an argument such as the preceding would be unpersuasive.
First, new section 30(c) does not remove the alleged “roadblock” expressly. In accordance with the clear meaning of its plain terms, the provision invalidates each and every statutory discovery scheme that is not *400reciprocal. But it simply does not validate any such scheme—whether the scheme in question or any other—that happens to be reciprocal. Simply put, it does not immunize any statutory discovery scheme against attack under the California Constitution, including its privilege against self-incrimination.
Second, new section 30(c) does not remove the alleged “roadblock” by implication.
Of course, as we recently reaffirmed in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 249-250 [279 Cal.Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360], “ ‘the law shuns repeals by implication . . . .’ [Citation.] Indeed, ‘[s]o strong is the presumption against implied repeals that when a new enactment conflicts with an existing provision, “[i]n order for the second law to repeal or supersede the first, the former must constitute a revision of the entire subject, so that the court may say that it was intended to be a substitute for the first.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, to avoid repeals by implication ‘we are bound to harmonize . . . constitutional provisions’ that are claimed to stand in conflict.”
There is no conflict between the state constitutional requirement of reciprocity in discovery and the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. To be sure, the reciprocity requirement may be read to permit prosecutorial discovery. But as explained above, the privilege simply does not prohibit such discovery. Even as construed broadly, as in Misener, it allows prosecutorial discovery of at least nontestimonial evidence. It follows a fortiori that the reciprocity requirement does not amount to a revision of the entire subject covered by the privilege.4
*401An argument, I acknowledge, can be made to the effect that new section 30(c) works a restricted change by implication. One might perhaps read the provision as intended to foster substantial reciprocal discovery: “In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature . . . .” (Italics added.) Under such a reading, the provision might be deemed to impliedly reject MisenePs broad construction of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. But it certainly could not be held to extend further, as for example to affect Prudhomme’s narrow interpretation. Prudhomme could conceivably permit prosecutorial discovery not dissimilar to that which rules 12.1, 16, and 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (28 U.S.C.) currently allow in federal criminal proceedings. Such discovery would surely be “substantial” under any reasonable definition of the term.
I recognize that the drafters of Proposition 115 must have “intended” and “assumed” that the statutory discovery scheme would pass muster under the California Constitution. But they must have had a similar intent and assumption as to section 3 of the measure—which we struck down in Raven. Such an intent and assumption could not validate what was invalid there. Neither can they do so here.
In conclusion, the statutory discovery scheme, including especially Penal Code section 1054.3 permitting prosecutorial discovery, is on its face violative of a criminal defendant’s state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. As such, it is invalid. If the scheme could somehow be interpreted and given effect after Penal Code section 1054.3 had been severed—a dubious proposition, at best, in light of its comprehensive nature—it would be facially offensive to new section 30(c), which requires that “discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature . . . .” As such, it would be invalid on that separate and independent ground.
It follows that the challenged order compelling prosecutorial discovery is without the requisite support in law: it was not issued in accordance with valid legislative authorization. It is of no consequence whether the United States or California Constitution might possibly mandate some hypothetical order compelling some undefined prosecutorial discovery in some conceivable case. This is because neither the federal nor state charter imposes any such mandate here. In any event, the challenged order—as its very words reveal—is broad and unqualified, entered as it was in response to the People’s broad and unqualified motion to compel. Even under Prudhomme's narrow interpretation of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, it cannot stand.
*402III
For all the reasons stated above, I conclude that the statutory discovery scheme purportedly added by Proposition 115 is invalid. Further, I conclude that the challenged order compelling prosecutorial discovery is unsupported as a matter of law.
I would therefore discharge the alternative writ, vacate the stay, and reverse the order of the Court of Appeal with directions to cause the issuance of a peremptory writ as prayed.

“The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies:
“(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial. “(b) Statements of all defendants.
“(c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged.
“(d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial.
“(e) Any exculpatory evidence.
“(f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.”

“The defendant and his or her attorney shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney:
“(a) The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he or she intends to call as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the statements of those persons, including any reports or statements of *388experts made in connection with the case, and including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial.
“(b) Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial.”

Section 3 of Proposition 115 purported to add the following text to section 24 of article I of the California Constitution: “In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United *389States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States.”

The majority attempt to avoid the presumption against repeal by implication and its patent applicability in this matter. They appear to reason that the presumption does not cover repeal by implication that is limited or pro tanto. Such, however, is not the case. (See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 249-250.)
The majority also attempt to find a conflict between the state constitutional requirement of reciprocity in discovery and the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. They conclude that the latter prohibits the former. But as shown, that conclusion is unsound. Certainly, the majority’s assertion that the privilege, as narrowly construed in Prudhomme, bars prosecutorial discovery falls under its own weight. In discussing the federal constitutional privilege in Prudhomme, we implied that the state constitutional privilege might be implicated in a compelled disclosure that “conceivably might lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.” (2 Cal.3d at p. 326, italics added.) But we-also implied that the state constitutional privilege did not prohibit prosecutorial discovery: “We do not intend to suggest that the prosecution should be barred from any discovery in this, or any other, case. A reasonable demand for factual information which, as in Jones, pertains to a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that information which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no substantial hazards of self-incrimination . . . .” {Id. at p. 327, italics in original.)