Court Opinion

ID: 9366973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 15:06:51.518852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.503162
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Sovereign Empire, L.L.C. v. Akron, 2023-Ohio-201.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                     NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                 )

SOVEREIGN EMPIRE, LLC                                     C.A. No.   30186

        Appellant

        v.                                                APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                          ENTERED IN THE
CITY OF AKRON                                             COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                          COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellee                                          CASE No.   CV-2020-10-2848

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 25, 2023

        TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}    Sovereign Empire, LLC, (“Sovereign Empire”) appeals the judgment of the

Summit County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of the City of

Akron. We affirm.

                                                     I.

        {¶2}    Sovereign Empire is the owner of two properties in the City of Akron, one located

on Manchester Road and the other on Lake Street. The City of Akron provided water service to

both properties and billed Sovereign Empire, as owner of the properties, for both accounts. In July

2018, water service was discontinued at the Lake Street property at the request of Sovereign

Empire, and billing statements were issued for the past due balance on the account. In July 2019,

the City of Akron transferred the unpaid balance to Sovereign Empire’s Manchester Road account,

which also held a past due balance. The City of Akron notified Sovereign Empire that the past
                                                 2

due balance and fees would be certified to the Summit County Fiscal Officer to be added to the

tax roll for the property.

        {¶3}      In August 2019, because of the City of Akron’s action in transferring the Lake

Street balance and combining it with the Manchester Road account, Sovereign Empire filed a claim

with the City of Akron Claims Commission to dispute the Manchester Road account balance. In

November 2019, Sovereign Empire filed a complaint against the City of Akron in the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas, but voluntarily dismissed the complaint in September 2020. The

filing of the complaint terminated the claims process with the City of Akron Claims Commission.

Sovereign Empire refiled its complaint in October 2020, stating multiple claims based upon the

allegation that the City of Akron was without authority to combine the two accounts and that in so

doing, it violated stated policies and ordinances, as well as violating Sovereign Empire’s due

process rights.

        {¶4}      In November 2021, upon motion from the City of Akron, the trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of the City. Sovereign Empire now appeals raising two assignments

of error.

                                                 II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
        FAVOR OF THE CITY WITHOUT THOROUGHLY EXAMINING ALL
        MATERIALS SOVEREIGN FILED IN SUPPORT.

        {¶5}      In its first assignment of error, Sovereign Empire argues the trial court erred

because it did not thoroughly examine the materials Sovereign Empire filed in support of its

opposition to summary judgment. We do not agree.
                                                  3

       {¶6}    Appellate review of an award of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56

when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the

nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse

to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R.

56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must

resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356,

358–359 (1992). A trial court does not have the liberty to choose among reasonable inferences in

the context of summary judgment, and all competing inferences and questions of credibility must

be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Perez v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio

St.3d 215, 218 (1988).

       {¶7}    The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth the nature of this burden-shifting

paradigm:

       [A] party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party
       cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the
       basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate
       the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the
       nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden
       under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party
       has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to
       specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which
       affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the
       nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the
       motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving party has
       satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden
       outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
       issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if
       appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party.

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996).
                                                  4

       {¶8}    Sovereign Empire’s contention that the trial court did not thoroughly review the

affidavit and exhibits attached to its opposition brief is unsupported by the record. In its analysis,

the trial court stated “the Affidavit of Andre Jackson, Sovereign’s owner, contains mostly

unsupported legal conclusions and opinions. * * * The court finds that Mr. Jackson’s affidavit does

not bring any material facts into dispute.” Sovereign Empire does not point to any evidence

contradicting this statement, presenting only conjecture that the trial court did not thoroughly

review the affidavit and exhibits because the trial court’s order failed to mention the 66 pages of

exhibits attached to the affidavit. “[A]bsent an affirmative demonstration on the record that the

trial court failed to review all of the summary judgment materials before it, an appellate court will

presume that it did.” B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 9th Dist. Summit No. 20936,

2002-Ohio-5033, ¶ 42. Furthermore, Sovereign Empire has failed to demonstrate how it was

prejudiced. See App.R. 16(A)(7); State v. Mastice, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 06CA0050, 2007–Ohio–

4107, ¶ 7 (“An appellant has the burden of demonstrating error on appeal.”). Based upon the

record, this Court presumes that the trial court reviewed Sovereign Empire’s brief and exhibits.

       {¶9}    Sovereign Empire’s first assignment of error is therefore overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING
       SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY WHERE THE CITY
       ACTED IN VIOLATION OF CHAPTER III, SECTION 307, OF AKRON
       PUBLIC UTILITIES BUREAU RULES AND REGULATIONS BY
       COMBINING WATER BILLS FROM TWO DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS.

       {¶10} In its second assignment of error, Sovereign Empire argues the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment because it violated Chapter III, Section 307, of the Akron Public

Utilities Bureau Rules and Regulations (“Section 307”). Specifically, Sovereign Empire contends

that Section 307 provides that the City “must apply the debt to the taxes that acquired the debt”
                                                 5

and that “the certified amount or unpaid charges must be placed against the property served by

the connection.” (Italics added.) We do not agree.

       {¶11} Section 307 provides as follows:

       307. Collection Procedures for Delinquent Bills

       Owners of property are responsible for water used on premises they own.

       When water/sewer/trash collection charges are not paid when due, the Director of
       Public Service or designate may do either or both of the following:

       (A) Certify them, together with any penalties, to the County Auditor, who shall
       place the certified amount on the real property tax list and duplicate against the
       property served by the connection if the County Auditor also receives from the
       Director or other official or body additional certification that the unpaid rents or
       charges have arisen pursuant to a service contract made with the owner of the
       property that is served by the connection. The amount placed on the tax list and
       duplicate shall be a lien from the date placed on the list and duplicate and shall be
       collected in the same manner as other taxes, except that, nothwithstanding Section
       323.15 of the Ohio Revised Code, the County Treasurer shall accept partial
       payment for the full amount of such unpaid water rents or charges and associated
       penalties. The lien shall be released immediately upon payment in full of the
       certified amount. The County Treasurer shall place any amounts collected pursuant
       to certification under this division in the distinct fund established by Section 743.06
       of the Ohio Revised Code. Unless the Director or designate determines that a
       transfer of the property is about to occur, the Director or designate may only make
       a certification under this rule if the rents or charges have been due and unpaid for
       at least sixty days and the Director or designate has provided the owner of the
       property with written notice of the impending certification. However, no
       certification may be made directly with the owner of the property served.

       (B) Collect them by action at law, in the name of the City from an owner or any
       other person who is liable for these charges.

       At any time before certification as provided above, the Director or designate shall
       accept any partial payment of unpaid water rents or charges in the amount of ten
       dollars ($10.00) or more. account [sic] shall be charged for the use of water from
       the recorded date of the turning-off of the service.

       Any account subject to certification will be charged twenty-five dollars ($25.00)
       for additional collection efforts and handling.
                                                    6

       {¶12} “In statutory construction, the word ‘may’ shall be construed as permissive * * *

unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that they receive a construction other

than their ordinary usage.” Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102 (1971),

paragraph one of the syllabus. “The statutory use of the word ‘may’ is generally construed to make

the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary, at least where there is

nothing in the language or in the sense or policy of the provision to require an unusual

interpretation.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 107.

       {¶13} Section 307 states that “[w]hen water/sewer/trash collection charges are not paid

when due, the Director of Public Service or designate may do either or both of the following:” (A)

place the certified amount due on the real property tax list; or (B) collect them by action of law.

(Emphasis added.). Because there appears no intent that the word “may” should receive a

construction other than its ordinary usage, the use of “may” is construed as permissive; there is

nothing to suggest that the City must pursue the debt in either manner. We further note Sovereign

Empire has failed to develop or preserve any other argument that would show the City did not have

discretion to transfer the balance from one account to the other.

       {¶14} Sovereign Empire’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶15} Sovereign Empire’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
                                                 7

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
                                                     FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JAY E. KRASOVEC and BETSY L. B. HARTSCHUH, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.

EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and JOHN CHRISTOPHER REECE and VONSHEAY
V. BROWN, Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellee.