Court Opinion

ID: 9530073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:09.153876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.646245
License: Public Domain

Guy, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I respectfully dissent in part. In doing so, I state I would also overrule Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991). I agree that members of the parole board are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from suits raised by private citizens injured by parolees. I would, however, extend that immunity to the parole board's administrative employees,- inasmuch as the administrative employees are acting pursuant to the authority of the board in carrying out parole decisions of the board.
The majority holds that parole board decisions, being essentially judicial in nature, like judges' decisions, require freedom from personal fears of litigation. Independence of *235action and impartial judgment are important public policy concerns. Such, rationale also applies to parole officers.
My dissent in this case is based upon public policy concerns. The same rationale applies to the issues raised in Babcock. To hold such public employees hable for neghgence in the performance of their duties will not enhance performance but will enhance inaction. Legislative mandate to Department of Social and Health Services caseworkers is to apply services, protect children until the services have been apphed, and to reunite the family. Philosophically this policy assumes a concerned "family" having temporary problems. The reality is that often no family exists. The caseworker is directed to find placement for a child in a foster home with caring and conscientious foster parents. Foster parents' commitment is remarkable given the limited authority they have over the children and the knowledge that their care is temporary, the goal being to reunite the children with their natural parents. This goal seems to assume children are property. The reality is that there are too few foster parents and too many children to be placed. Sometimes, like in Babcock, caseworkers make mistakes and children who come from a sad environment go into a sadder one, with further victimization. If there is liability, then it is one we all share if adequate resources are not made available. We should not make the caseworker a scapegoat because there are limited resources and the caseworker makes an honest, time-pressured but faulted decision.
The same public policy argument applies to parole officers. The parole board employs the parole officers to implement its administrative decisions. The board will feel a responsibility to those officers and may not wish to place them in jeopardy by paroling a person eligible for parole if the officer employed by the board is going to be legally hable for the parolee's conduct. Thus, opportunities will be lost where parole might be warranted. Successful parole *236requires assisting a parolee in making his or her own decisions and thus allowing some freedom of action. If the parole officer has liability for the actions of a reoffending parolee, the supervision will not be sufficiently flexible to accomplish its rehabilitative goal. See Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1161-62 (Utah 1991).
Individuals on parole are generally not single offenders. They have been convicted of multiple felonies, and recidivism is high. To expect complete rehabilitation with no further offenses is unrealistic. Tb create liability on the parole officer is to place blame somewhere and thereby simplify a complicated social problem. The grant of "qualified" immunity by the majority is illusory and nothing more than a negligence standard wrapped like a gift box which contains sticks and ashes.
The majority opinion admits that generally one does not have liability for the criminal acts of a third party unless one "takes charge" over that person. The. issue is the parole officer's control over the parolee's actions. It is a naive fiction to say parole officers have control over convicted felons who are free on parole. A person who does not have the ability to control another's conduct should not have liability imposed upon him or her for the tortious acts of that other person. See, e.g., Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985); Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 372 S.E.2d 373 (1988); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 413 So. 2d 1360 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
Assuming services for the protection of children are valuable to society and parole services are valuable to society, we need public employees motivated, not fearful. Mistakes, lack of action, failure to deliver on promises made should, where warranted, result in discharge from public service. I would affirm the trial court, granting absolute immunity to the parole officers for supervisory actions.
My final point concerns duties of mental health professionals and involves the discussion of Petersen v. State, 100 *237Wn.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). I express no opinion as to the validity of the discussion. My objection to the discussion is that it was not required to be addressed, was not fully presented, and no opportunity was given to amicus to assist the court in this evaluation. It should be regarded as dicta, although it may reflect the position of the court when the issue is ultimately presented.
We have now created differing standards of immunity for three state employees: caseworkers (Babcock), parole officers (Taggart), and police officers )(Guffey v. State, 103 Wn.2d 144, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984)). The extent to which there is immunity for acts of public employees is a matter best examined by the Legislature for a uniform determination.