Court Opinion

ID: 9909417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 15:02:55.998642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.099677
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                      Opinion filed December 13, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1769
                        Lower Tribunal No. 17-3719
                           ________________

                          Miami-Dade County,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                       Anny K. Berastain, etc.,
                                  Appellee.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos
Guzman, Judge.

     Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Korissa
Lepore, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

     Law Offices of Geoffrey B. Marks, and Geoffrey B. Marks, for appellee.

Before EMAS, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

     EMAS, J.
     Appellant, Miami-Dade County (“the County”), appeals a final judgment

following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs below, Anny K. Berastain (“Ms.

Berastain”) and her daughter, Natalie A. Berastain (“Natalie”). The County

also appeals the trial court orders denying the County’s motions for directed

verdict, new trial, and remittitur in this negligence action filed by Ms.

Berastain and Natalie, following injuries suffered by Natalie while she was in

the care of the County’s after-school program.

     According to the allegations of the operative complaint, on May 13,

2015, Natalie (who was seven years old at the time) was injured as a result

of the County’s negligent supervision of the children, who were “engaged in

disorderly and dangerous practice.” The County denied that it breached any

duty to Natalie or that any such breach caused her injuries.

      Several witnesses testified at the three-day trial, including Natalie, Ms.

Berastain, and the County employee who was supervising Natalie on the day

of the incident, Monique Perez. Ultimately, the jury determined the County

was 95% negligent, and that Natalie was 5% negligent. It awarded damages

of $3,954.84 for past medical expenses, and $105,000 for Natalie’s past pain

and suffering.

     The County argues on appeal, as it did below, that Ms. Berastain failed

to present any evidence of breach of duty or causation at trial and that the

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verdict was against the manifest weight of evidence because Natalie’s

testimony was not credible. In addition, the County argues that the jury’s

verdict is excessive and against the manifest weight of the evidence because

the pain and suffering award is shocking to the conscience and unsupported

by the evidence. Upon our review of the record on appeal, including the

transcript of the trial, we conclude there was competent substantial evidence

to support the jury’s verdict, and affirm.

      As is well established, when we undertake review of an order on a

motion for directed verdict, we employ a de novo standard of review;

importantly, however, we “must evaluate the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference

flowing from the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, and ‘if there is

conflicting evidence or if different reasonable inferences may be drawn from

the evidence, then the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury

for resolution.’” Miami-Dade Cty. v. Guyton, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1500 at *1

(Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 2, 2023) (quoting Miami-Dade Cty. v. Eghbal, 54 So. 3d

525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)). Additionally, if the evidence submitted at trial,

viewed in the light most favorable to Natalie, supports the jury’s verdict, we

must affirm. Id.

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      Despite the County’s contention that there was no evidence to support

the jury’s finding of breach and causation, there was, in fact, direct evidence

that the employee supervising the children on the day of the incident wasn’t

paying attention to Natalie when she ran into a wall and injured herself.

Although Natalie was a child when the incident occurred (seven years old)

and when she testified at trial (fourteen years old), she testified clearly that

she and the other children were not properly supervised that day and that

the children were allowed to run around indoors. She testified there were

two supervisors for the after-school program—Monique Perez and Ivan De

Armas. She could not recall whether Perez or De Armas was present on the

day of the accident (Perez acknowledged during her testimony she was the

one present at the time), but that in either event the person was not

supervising or paying attention to her and the other children and that, as a

result, she ran and fell and broke her arm. The fact that the County

introduced conflicting testimony does not negate Natalie’s testimony,

because it was up to the jury to make credibility determinations on the

conflicting testimony. Compare School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty. v. Martinez-

Oller, 167 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (no evidence of negligent

supervision), Benton v. School Bd. of Broward Cty., 386 So. 2d 831, 833-34

(Fla. 4th DCA 1980) and Rodriguez v. Discovery Years, Inc., 745 So. 2d

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1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (where there was no evidence the children

engaged in dangerous activities in the teacher’s presence) with Miami-Dade

Cty. School Bd. v. A.N., Sr., 905 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

(distinguishing Benton and Rodriguez where there was evidence from which

the jury could conclude the school board was negligent). Although teachers

or supervisors may not be held strictly liable for injuries to children in their

care, they are held to the standard of care of a person of ordinary prudence,

charged with those duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.

Benton, 386 So. 2d at 834.

      Where there is a question of fact as to whether a person has breached

the duty of care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the

same circumstances, it should be submitted to the jury. O’Campo v. School

Bd. of Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); La Petite Acad., Inc.

v. Nassef by and through Knippel, 674 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

      Accordingly, because there was evidence that Perez was not paying

attention to the children when Natalie got up and ran with her friend,

something that was against the rules, resulting in her falling into a wall and

breaking her arm, there was at least a reasonable inference from which the

jury could conclude that Perez was negligent and that this negligence was

the legal cause of injury to Natalie.

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     As for whether the County’s contention that the trial court should

nonetheless have granted a new trial, we review such a determination for an

abuse of discretion and can reverse the court’s denial of the motion only if

the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Brown v. Estate

of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1999). In such a scenario, the evidence

supporting such a proposition ‘”must be clear and obvious, and not

conflicting. . . .’” Weatherly v. Louis, 31 So. 3d 803, 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)

(quoting Dewitt v. Maruhachi Ceramics of Am., Inc., 770 So. 2d 709, 711

(Fla. 5th DCA 2000)).

     In Weatherly this court said:

     Because a review of the record establishes that there was
     conflicting evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude that
     the trial court abused its discretion [in denying a motion for new
     trial]. . . . Indeed, when, as here, the evidence is in conflict, the
     weight to be given that evidence is within the province of the jury.
     “Reversal of a jury verdict is appropriate only in the absence of
     conflicting evidence, where there is no rational basis in the
     evidence to support the verdict.”

Id. at 805-06 (quoting Rosario-Paredes v. J.C. Wrecker Serv., 975 So. 2d

1205, 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)) (additional internal citation omitted).

     Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the

County’s motion for remittitur based upon the jury’s award of $105,000 for

pain and suffering. See Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So. 3d

268 (Fla. 2018). The County contends that Natalie’s injury was to her

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nondominant arm and that she suffered mostly a “ruined summer seven

years ago when she was seven years old.” It compares the jury award to the

median income in Miami-Dade County and asserts that because the amount

was twenty-six times what she was awarded for compensatory damages, it

“could only be driven by passion and sympathy for a child who had a less-

than-ideal summer, but did not experience significant suffering.” But the

County’s argument ignores the ample testimony from Natalie and her mother

regarding, for example: the intensity of the pain she suffered over a period

of many months; the fact that Natalie’s arm was cast three times, and

required surgery because she broke the radius and ulna bones in her arm;

that Natalie had a “wire with the metal thing” sticking out of her arm, and has

suffered bad memories from the surgery because her hand was swollen and

bleeding, and it was a scary time; Natalie has scarring from the pins that

were inserted into her arm; and that Natalie testified that it took about a year

before she could begin to engage in activities she used to do, and that “[t]o

this day, I’m still nervous to do a slight movement that could like easily break

the bone again.”

      Additional examples are available, but unnecessary. Simply stated,

the record evidences a proper basis for the jury’s award. Moreover, the

Florida Supreme Court has made it clear that the jury is in the best position

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to make this assessment, which “is not one of mathematical calculation but

involves an exercise of their sound judgment of what is fair and right” under

the circumstances. Id. at 275 (quoting Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.

Co., 80 So. 2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1955)). The Odom court emphasized:

     Because assessing the amount of damages is within the
     province of the jury, this Court has made clear that when
     reviewing a motion for remittitur, a court “should never declare a
     verdict excessive merely because it is above the amount which
     the court itself considers the jury should have allowed.” Bould v.
     Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Fla. 1977). And when a trial
     judge refuses to grant a remittitur, “[t]he correctness of the jury's
     verdict is strengthened.” Lassitter, 349 So. 2d at 627. As this
     Court explained in Lassitter:

           Two factors unite to favor a very restricted review of
           an order denying a motion for new trial on ground of
           excessive verdict. The first of these is the deference
           due the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to
           observe the witnesses and to consider the evidence
           in the context of a living trial rather than upon a cold
           record. The second factor is the deference properly
           given to the jury's determination of such matters of
           fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum
           of damages.

           The appellate court should not disturb a verdict as
           excessive, where the trial court refused to disturb the
           amount, unless the verdict is so inordinately large as
           obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a
           reasonable range within which the jury may properly
           operate.

     Odom, 254 So. 3d at 277 (emphasis added).

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        In light of the testimony at trial, the proper deference accorded to both

the jury (in making its determination) and the trial court (in reviewing that

determination and in denying remittitur), and because we cannot say “the

verdict is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of

a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate,” id., we must

affirm the order denying remittitur on the award of noneconomic damages in

this case.

        Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the final judgment as well as the

trial court’s orders denying the County’s motion for directed verdict, new trial,

and remittitur. 1

        Affirmed.

1
    We find no merit in any of the remaining issues raised on appeal.

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