Court Opinion

ID: 9477815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:31:55.609941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:03.783448
License: Public Domain

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that Jeffery’s allegation that the AU improperly evaluated her subjective complaints of disabling pain is without merit, I respectfully dissent. The questions for federal courts to consider in this kind of case are (1) whether the Secretary considered all of the evidence relevant to claimant’s complaints of pain, and (2) whether the evidence contradicted her account, so that the Secretary could discount her testimony for lack of credibility. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir.1987). In answering these questions, we are governed by the general principle that credibility findings in the first instance are for the AU. See Smith v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir.1985).
Under Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984), the AU must give full consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints, including the claimant’s prior work record, as well as to observations by third parties and treating and examining physicians on such matters as: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and inten*1134sity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions. The record establishes that in the present case the AU duly considered these factors.
Further, substantial evidence in the record is inconsistent with Jeffery’s allegations of constant, disabling pain. The AU noted several inconsistencies, and I agree that there is a sufficient basis upon which to discount Jeffery’s subjective complaints. Although we may have decided the issue differently in the first instance, our function is limited to determining whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Secretary’s determination. See Benskin, 830 F.2d at 885. I therefore would affirm the decision of the District Court.
Even assuming that the AU’s methodology somehow fell short of meeting the Polaski standards, the proper remedy would be to remand the case to the Secretary for further administrative proceedings under the correct legal standards. In the present case, such a remand would afford the AU an opportunity, inter alia, more fully to articulate his reasons for discrediting Jeffery’s testimony. I do not agree with the Court’s conclusion that “the record overwhelmingly supports a finding of disability,” ante at 1133, and thus I believe that the Court errs in bypassing the administrative process and ordering the Secretary to enter an award for Jeffery.