Court Opinion

ID: 9675053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:40:42.405501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.029684
License: Public Domain

Connolly, J.,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write *348separately to voice my disagreement with the part of the opinion which states: “It should be noted that although an opinion of the Court of Appeals which has been designated for permanent publication may be cited for whatever persuasive force it may have, see Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 2E(4) (rev. 1993), such an opinion does not constitute binding precedent.”
The majority correctly states that the answer to the question of whether a permanently published opinion of the Court of Appeals is binding authority “is to be found in a judicial analysis of the doctrine of stare decisis.” However, instead of conducting this analysis, the majority merely bases its conclusion upon the premise that this court is free to operate as it chooses. While this is true, the majority, by its choice, has gutted the common-law doctrine of stare decisis. Such a choice flies directly in the face of all persuasive authority.
“Vertical stare decisis” compels inferior courts to follow strictly the decisions rendered by courts of higher rank within the same judicial system. See, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App. 1987). It is my view that under the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, all tribunals in this state exercising inferior jurisdiction must follow the permanently published opinions rendered by the Court of Appeals unless overruled by this court. See Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 459 U.S. 1314, 103 S. Ct. 842, 74 L. Ed. 2d 924 (1983).
The principal case on the issue of vertical stare decisis is Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 369 P.2d 937, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1962). In that case, an inferior court recognized that a case decided by a California appellate court was directly on point, but refused to follow the rule of the case on the ground that it had been decided incorrectly. The California Supreme Court stated:
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense. . . . Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.
*349... It would create chaos in our legal system if these courts were not bound by higher court decisions.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 455-56, 369 P.2d at 939-40, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24.
In my search, I have not found any state which has ruled by case law or otherwise that inferior courts are free to ignore or overrule precedent set forth by the state’s intermediate appellate court. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992) (“a new principle of law announced by the Court of Appeals . . . becomes precedential law of this state, and all tribunals inferior to the Court of Appeals are obligated to abide by decisions issued by the Court of Appeals. To our knowledge, neither a district judge nor a trial judge has ever suggested not being bound by new principles of law, whether they emanate from this Court or from the Court of Appeals”) (emphasis omitted). See, also, Harrel v. Dillards Dept. Stores, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 537, 644 N.E.2d 448 (1994); Tart v. Com., 17 Va. App. 384, 437 S.E.2d 219 (1993); Adamowicz v. Ipswich, 395 Mass. 757, 481 N.E.2d 1368 (1985); Martin v. Dist. Ct., 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d 864 (1976); Bunn v. Bunn, 311 So. 2d 387 (Fla. App. 1975).
Stare decisis is the very basis of our judicial system and is inseparably linked to the hierarchial structure of the state and federal courts. See In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). “It played an important part in the development of English common law and its importance has not diminished today.” State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976).
Furthermore, there are compelling public policy reasons in support of recognizing permanently published decisions of the Court of Appeals as binding-authority, including reliance on equality, stability, and predictability in the law. A fundamental element of Anglo-American jurisprudence is the principle that the law should be stable, fostering both equality and predictability of treatment. See, Paul W. Werner, Comment, The Straits of Stare Decisis and the Utah Court of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-Application and the Charybdis of Over-Application, 1994 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 633 (1994); Brian E. Mattis and B. Taylor Mattis, Erie and Florida Law Conflict at *350the Crossroads: The Constitutional Need for Statewide Stare Decisis, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1333 (1994). In order to preserve equality, stability, and predictability in the law, trial courts must follow the holdings of higher courts regardless of whether they agree with the other court’s analysis or conclusion. See State v. Dwyer, supra.
The citizens of Nebraska, as well as Nebraska lawyers, should be able to expect, to the greatest extent possible, that trial courts will apply the same law in Scottsbluff, Grand Island, Lincoln, and Omaha, Nebraska. The fundamental value of equal treatment, requiring that persons in like circumstances be treated alike unless some relevant factor distinguishes their cases, is. central to traditional notions of Anglo-American justice. See Werner, supra. The majority’s statement to the contrary promotes the rule of individual judges rather than the rule of law and will foster unnecessary appeals.
“Any court, though required to follow precedent established by a higher court, can set forth the reasons why, in its judgment, the established precedent should be overruled but cannot, on its own, overrule the established precedent set by a higher court.” Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986). Trial judges are free to vigorously express their disagreement with controlling precedent from the Court of Appeals, but a workable system of jurisprudence requires that they obey that precedent until this court rules otherwise.
The majority has failed to give a rational explanation for its conclusion that permanently published opinions of the Court of Appeals do not constitute binding precedent on courts of inferior jurisdiction. In an attempt to justify its conclusion, the majority states that “[a] Court of Appeals decision cannot be said to have conclusively settled an issue of law because this court is the ultimate authority in fashioning precedential law for Nebraska.” Certainly, everyone would agree that this court is the ultimate authority in fashioning precedential law for Nebraska. However, this does not support the majority’s conclusion that inferior courts are free to ignore the permanently published opinions of the Court of Appeals.
The majority suggests that “[i]f binding authority were to be granted to published Court of Appeals decisions, then lower *351courts would be forced to follow a decision even though they were not certain whether this court might ultimately mle similarly.” It is self-evident to any first-year law student that nothing an intermediate appellate court says is set in jurisprudential concrete. If one follows the majority’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, then one could argue that binding authority should not be given to this court’s decisions on constitutional issues because lower courts would be forced to follow them even though they were not certain whether the U.S. Supreme Court might ultimately rule similarly. The same could be said of the circuit courts of appeals on the federal level.
The majority then states that “[r]eal and certain risks are associated with the grant of precedential authority to an intermediate appellate court” and cites Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich. 350, 343 N.W.2d 181 (1984). However, in Tebo, the court held that “[a] decision by any panel of the Court of Appeals is . . . controlling statewide until contradicted by another panel of the Court of Appeals or reversed or overruled by this Court.” 418 Mich, at 362, 343 N.W.2d at 185. Clearly, whatever risks the majority claims were of concern to the Tebo court were not real and certain enough to cause that court to ignore the doctrine of stare decisis.
The majority also asserts that conflicting decisions from different panels of the Court of Appeals is a risk that justifies their position. However, this alleged risk is simply nonexistent. The simple, risk-free solution to this scenario is that this court will decide the issue when it comes before us.
The majority also argues that the purpose for which a court was established can be discerned from the statutes creating it. They then cite Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1104 (Cum. Supp. 1994), which was amended to allow the Court of Appeals to decide what opinions to publish, and draw the conclusion that since this statute is silent as to whether those opinions are binding authority, the opinions do not have any such, authority. I am baffled by how a statute that is silent on the issue in question, and was amended to switch the power to determine which opinions will be published from this court to the Court of Appeals, supports the conclusion that such opinions should not be given precedential authority.
*352Finally, the majority makes reference to the unique stmcture of the appellate court in this state. The only thing unique about our appellate structure is that the majority of this court refuses to follow the common-law doctrine of vertical stare decisis.
Because there exists no rationale in support of the majority’s view, and compelling historical and policy reasons support the view that permanently published opinions of the Court of Appeals should be given the effect of law, I conclude that permanently published opinions should constitute binding precedent on this state’s trial courts until this court rules otherwise.
Wright and Gerrard, JJ., join in this concurrence.