Court Opinion

ID: 9375517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 23:00:16.654558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.413921
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LAWRENCE E. MATTISON,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          DC-0752-16-0350-I-3

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                           DATE: February 27, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lawrence E. Mattison, Hampton, Virginia, pro se.

           Timothy M. O’Boyle, Esquire, Hampton, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal.      For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administ rative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2         The appellant held the position of Housekeeping Aid (Leader) at an agency
     medical center in Hampton, Virginia.          Mattison v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-16-0350-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 12 at 10.      In August 2015, the agency indefinitely suspended him in
     connection with his arrest for violating a protective order and stalking another
     agency employee. 2 Id. at 36-40. Later, the agency proposed and effectuated his
     removal based on the same underlying circumstances. Id. at 10-34.
¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his removal. IAF, Tab 1.
     The administrative judge dismissed the initial appeal, without prejudice , while the
     appellant faced related criminal charges.      IAF, Tab 14.      The Board affirmed.
     Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-16-
     0350-I-1, Final Order (July 15, 2016). After the resolution of his criminal matter,
     the appellant requested additional time to refile his removal appeal. Mattison v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-16-0350-I-2, Appeal
     File (I-2 AF), Tab 1.     The administrative judge granted that request, and the
     appellant refiled in November 2016. I-2 AF, Tab 2; Mattison v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-16-0350-I-3, Appeal File (I-3 AF),
     Tab 1.
¶4         Because the appellant was convicted of his criminal charges, the agency
     requested that the administrative judge apply collateral estoppel and preclude the
     appellant from relitigating the administrative charges at issue in this removal
     appeal. I-3 AF, Tab 15. Over the appellant’s objections, e.g., I-3 AF, Tabs 11,
     25, the administrative judge granted that request, I-3 AF, Tab 44 at 2. Therefore,

     2
      The appellant unsuccessfully challenged his indefinite suspension in a separate appeal.
     Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492 (2016).
                                                                                               3

     she held a hearing that was limited to evidence pertaining to the agency’s choice
     of penalty and the appellant’s affirmative defenses.           Id.   After doing so, the
     administrative judge affirmed the appellant’s removal.           I-3 AF, Tab 59, Initial
     Decision (ID). She sustained the agency’s charges based on collateral estoppel
     and found no merit to the appellant’s various affirmative defenses and other such
     claims. ID at 4-15. Finally, the administrative judge found that removal was a
     reasonable penalty and that the appellant failed to establish his disparate penalty
     claim. ID at 15-19.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Mattison v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-16-0350-I-3, Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The agency has filed a response and the appellant has
     replied.   PFR File, Tabs 6-7.        The appellant has requested leave to submit
     additional pleadings, PFR File, Tabs 11-12, 17, but that request is denied. 3

     The administrative judge erred in applying collateral estoppel.
¶6         The agency removed the appellant based on two charges, conduct
     unbecoming and failure to follow supervisory instructions. IAF, Tab 12 at 11, 27.
     The administrative judge sustained the charges, finding that the appellant was
     collaterally estopped from relitigating the facts underlying his Virginia Circuit
     Court conviction under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60.3, stalking, and Va. Code Ann.
     § 18.2-429, causing telephone or pager to ring with intent to annoy. ID at 4 -9; I-3
     AF, Tab 15 at 14-15, Tabs 30, 43.

     3
       In his first request to submit additional pleadings on review, the appellant cites his pro
     se status and asserts that he intended to present “a potential illegal act in the initiation
     of criminal proceedings that would nullify the agency’s use of any outcome from those
     proceedings.” PFR File, Tab 11 at 4. In the second, the appellant appeared to indicate
     that an additional pleading he wished to submit was a request for subpoena. PFR File,
     Tab 12 at 4. In a much later filing, the appellant requested permission to present
     additional argument regarding collateral estoppel and to amend his request for relief in
     this appeal. We find no basis for allowing any pleadings beyond those already accepted
     into the record. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5) (limiting the pleadings parties may
     submit in connection to a petition for review, and providing that additional pleadings
     will not be accepted absent leave of the Clerk of the Board).
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¶7           Though not raised by either party on review, we find that the administrative
     judge mistakenly relied on the wrong standards for collateral estoppel. I -3 AF,
     Tab 8 at 2-3, Tab 30, Tab 43; ID at 4-9. As further detailed below, under the
     proper standards, the requirements for collateral estoppel are not satisfied in this
     case.
¶8           Under the Board’s standards for collateral estoppel, a party is barred from
     relitigating an issue that was previously litigated if: (1) the issue is identical to
     that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior
     action; (3) the determination on the issue in the prior action was necessary to the
     resulting judgment; and (4) the party against whom issue preclusion is sought had
     a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action, either as a party
     to the earlier action or one whose interests were otherwise fully represented in
     that action. McNeil v. Department of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 146, ¶ 15 (2005).
     However, in a case such as this, in which the prior action resulted in a criminal
     conviction in state court, the Board must apply that state’s collateral estoppel
     standards.      Mosby v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
     114 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶¶ 5-6 (2010) (applying District of Columbia collateral
     estoppel standards).
¶9           As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized, “[t]he
     Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution, as implemented by
     28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires that state court judgments be given the same
     preclusive effect in later federal actions as they would be given under the laws of
     the state in which the judgments were rendered.” Graybill v. U.S. Postal Service,
     782 F.2d 1567, 1571-73 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying Maryland collateral estoppel
     standards); cf. Miles v. Department of the Navy, 102 M.S.P.R. 316, ¶¶ 4, 9-10
     (2006) (applying the Board’s collateral estoppel standards in the context of a
     Federal court conviction for state and Federal crimes).            Accordingly, it is
     Virginia’s collateral estoppel standards that govern in this appeal.
                                                                                            5

¶10         Under Virginia law, collateral estoppel is appropriate if:         (1) the same
      parties or their privies were involved in both actions; (2) “the factual issue sought
      to be litigated [was] actually litigated in the prior action”; (3) the factual issue
      was necessary to the judgment rendered in the prior case; and (4) “the prior
      action . . . resulted in a valid, final judgment against the party sought to be
      precluded in the present action.” Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 491 (4th
      Cir. 2007); see Whitley v. Commonwealth, 538 S.E.2d 296 (Va. 2000). However,
      in Virginia, collateral estoppel also requires one additional element—mutuality. 4
      Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491.
¶11         The Supreme Court of Virginia discussed the mutuality requirement in
      Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579 (Va. 1987). The court
      recognized its longstanding conclusion that mutuality is lacking in the context of
      a criminal judgment and subsequent civil action arising from the same
      circumstances. Id. at 580-81. In doing so, the court explained, “[t]he principle of
      mutuality limits the influence of the initial adjudication by requiring that to be
      effective the estoppel of the judgment must be mutual.            Thus, a litigant is
      generally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless he
      would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the opposite
      result.” Id. at 581; see Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 494 (discussing the mutuality
      requirement).
¶12         Here, even if the other elements were satisfied, it is evident that the
      mutuality requirement is not met. The agency would not have been bound by the
      opposite result—a not guilty verdict in Virginia Circuit Court—so it may not
      invoke the preclusive force of the appellant’s conviction.         See Selected Risks

      4
        The administrative judge acknowledged the possibility of Virginia law governing in
      this case. I-3 AF, Tab 43 at 3 n.1. However, in doing so, she cited Whitley, a case that
      included no discussion of Virginia’s mutuality requirement. Id. Subsequent cases
      verify that Virginia still requires mutuality. E.g., Ayala v. Aggressive Towing
      & Transport, Inc., 661 S.E.2d 480, 482 (Va. 2008); Rawlings v. Lopez, 591 S.E.2d 691,
      692 (Va. 2004).
                                                                                             6

      Insurance Co., 355 S.E.2d at 581 (discussing the absence of mutuality in the
      context of a criminal action followed by a civil action because a criminal
      acquittal would reflect an inability to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt but
      would leave open the question of whether intent could be proven by preponderant
      evidence).    Accordingly, remand is required here for the agency to prove its
      charges without the benefit of collateral estoppel. 5
¶13         On remand, the administrative judge should allow the parties to further
      develop the record and hold a supplemental hearing, if the appellant requests
      one. 6 If appropriate, the administrative judge may incorporate her other findings,
      such as those pertaining to the appellant’s affirmative defenses, into a remand
      initial decision. 7

      The administrative judge did not commit any other procedural errors, nor did she
      exhibit bias.
¶14         The appellant’s petition for review raises other procedural matters from
      below. First, he argues that the administrative judge erred in denying his request

      5
        We recognize that the record already includes evidence pertaining to the agency’s
      charges. E.g., IAF, Tab 12. Nevertheless, we find that it would be premature for us to
      decide whether the agency proved those charges in this context, whe n both parties
      relied on the administrative judge’s collateral estoppel rulings in determining what
      evidence to submit and what testimony to elicit. See, e.g., IAF, Tabs 30, 37, 44.
      6
        On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in refusing to
      admit some of the evidence he submitted here. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-3, Tab 3 at 10, 17,
      22-23. The evidence he cites, “Appellant’s exhibit 9-1,” reportedly consists of text
      messages between the appellant and his accuser, as transcribed by the appellant in
      preparation for this appeal. I-3 AF, Tab 36 at 120-25. It appears that the administrative
      judge may have excluded this evidence, at least in part, because of her collateral
      estoppel ruling. Therefore, the administrative judge should on remand revisit the matter
      to explain whether and why she did or did not consider this evidence.
      7
        Because we are remanding for the agency to prove its charges, it would be premature
      for us to address the appellant’s arguments concerning the penalty and his various
      affirmative defenses.     See, e.g., PFR File, Tab 3 at 21-25.       However, if her
      misapplication of collateral estoppel contributed to these matters, the administrative
      judge should revisit her previous rulings on these issues.
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      for a courtesy copy of a hearing transcript, based on his indigence. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 18-19 (referring to I-3 AF, Tab 55). We disagree.
¶15         Pursuant to the Board’s regulations, a recording of the hearing is genera lly
      prepared by a court reporter and included in the appeal file as the official hearing
      record.     5 C.F.R. § 1201.53(a).   The Board’s regulations do not require the
      creation of a hearing transcript. Instead, they provide that a party may request
      that the court reporter (not the Board) prepare a transcript, at the requesting
      party’s expense.     5 C.F.R. § 1201.53(b).    The Board will provide copies of
      existing transcripts to the parties, free of charge.          5 C.F.R. § 1201.53(c)
      (emphasis added). Because there was no transcript created , neither the Board nor
      the agency are required to provide one to the appellant .
¶16         Throughout his petition, the appellant also refers to the fact that he
      repeatedly requested to certify issues for interlocutory appeal. E.g., PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 10-11, 16-17; I-3 AF, Tab 27, 34, 45-46, 57-58. To the extent that he is
      suggesting that the administrative judge erred in denying those requests, we
      disagree.     See Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533,
      ¶¶ 22-23 (2010) (explaining that an administrative judge did not abuse her
      discretion by denying the appellant’s request to certify for interlocutory appeal
      the administrative judge’s denial of his recusal motion); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.92
      (explaining the limited circumstances in which              certifying a ruling for
      interlocutory review is appropriate).
¶17         In addition to his procedural arguments, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge exhibited bias or otherwise acted inappropriately during the
      adjudication of his appeal. For example, he alleges that the administrative judge
      falsified the chronology of events to justify collateral estoppel. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 9. He also referred to the administrative judge as a “prosecutor or cohort for
      the agency” and alleged that she showed “extreme bias in favor of the agency.”
      Id. at 17-18.    The appellant further alleged that the administrative judge was
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      “colluding with the agency to deny [him the] right to work at any department of
      [the agency].” Id. at 21.
¶18        In making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative judge, a
      party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompani es
      administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R.
      382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct during the co urse of a Board
      proceeding will warrant a new adjudication only if her comments or actions
      evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
      impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed.
      Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Although
      we have considered the appellant’s allegations, we are not persuaded. We find no
      basis for concluding that the administrative judge exhibited bias or otherwise
      acted inappropriately.

                                          ORDER
¶19        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.