Court Opinion

ID: 9880903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:03:26.686911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:01.187045
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 P. v. Gildesgard CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                  A166203
 v.
 KYLE LEE GILDESGARD,                                             (Humboldt County
                                                                  Super. Ct.
           Defendant and Appellant.
                                                                  No. CR2003061)

          Defendant Kyle Lee Gildesgard1 challenges the sentence
imposed on him following a plea bargain, arguing that his
counsel was prejudicially ineffective and the trial court abused its
discretion during sentencing. We reject his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, but we find that the trial court abused its
discretion with respect to its sentencing determinations for
defendant’s misdemeanor sexual battery conviction. We remand
for further sentencing proceedings.

          1 Defendant is also known as Kyle Lee Gildesgaard.

                                                      1
                         BACKGROUND
      Defendant was charged in an information with kidnapping
(Penal Code2, § 207, subd. (a), count 1); six counts of domestic
battery causing corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a), counts 2, 5, 6,
8, 9, & 10); false imprisonment (§ 236, count 3); criminal threats
(§ 422, count 4); and rape by force (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), count 7).
The information alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) in connection with count 2 (the GBI
enhancement). The information also alleged that defendant
suffered a prior strike conviction in 2018 (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)).
      In June 2022, defendant entered guilty pleas to kidnapping
(count 1), two counts of domestic battery causing injury (counts 2
and 9), and to an amended offense of misdemeanor sexual battery
(§ 243.4, subd. (a), count 11). He admitted to personally inflicting
great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) in connection with count
2, and a prior conviction under section 667, subdivisions (b)–(i).3
Defendant stipulated to the aggravating factors that the crime
involved “great violence or great bodily harm or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness”;
he was “convicted of other crimes for which consecutive sentence
could have been imposed, but concurrent sentences were
imposed” (the People remarked that this factor depended on the
court’s sentencing choices); his “prior convictions as an adult
[were] numerous or of increasing seriousness”; he had “served a

      2 All further references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.
      3 We omit a factual summary of the underlying convictions

because such summary is not essential to our disposition.

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prior term in prison or county jail”; and “any other aggravating
factors that may be permitted by law.”
      The parties agreed that defendant was ineligible for, and
would not receive, probation. Defendant’s plea form did not set
forth a stipulated sentencing range, and the “open plea” box was
checked. However, as the parties appear to acknowledge on
appeal, defendant and the People expressed their agreement on
the record at the plea and sentencing hearings that “[defendant]
would be sentenced [to] not less than the midterm,” with a floor
of 14 years. The parties described the 14-year floor as the
midterm on the charged counts with a possible “abeyance” or
“stay” of the GBI enhancement. The People also stated on the
record that defendant’s maximum sentence would be 23 years.
      As a part of the agreement and before sentencing,
defendant was to take a Static-99R assessment4. Defendant’s
plea form states that the court “will consider [the] Static 99 at the
time of sentencing in [a] motion to dismiss PC 243.4.” At the plea
hearing, the People represented, “As a part of this agreement and
before sentencing, [defendant] will be taking the Static-99[R]
assessment. As part of that report, depending on the evaluation
and should the defendant score high, it will be up to the Court
regarding [c]ount [11] only. If he were to have a high
assessment, the misdemeanor would stay prior to sentencing and
be part of sentencing. If the assessment is in [defendant’s] favor,
if it’s a low score, it will be up to the Court’s determination to

      4 The Static-99R is an actuarial measure of risk for sexual

offense recidivism.

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dismiss that count, I believe in the interests of justice.”5 The
balance of the complaint was dismissed with a Harvey6 waiver.
      At defendant’s sentencing hearing, defendant presented a
video in mitigation addressing his mental health issues and
troubled childhood, and he submitted stories that he wrote and
illustrated while in custody. Defense counsel urged the court to
consider imposing the “middle term or the low term with
consecutive sentencing on the 273.5s[,]” to hold in abeyance the
GBI enhancement, and to dismiss count 11, explaining that there
were mitigating issues, including defendant’s mental health,
childhood abuse, age, and his insight and rehabilitation while in
custody. The People argued for a 23-year sentence.
      When announcing its ruling, the trial court first discussed
circumstances in aggravation and mitigation. “First, as to
circumstances in aggravation and mitigation — those are
discussed on pages 17 and 18 of the probation officer’s report —
the Court does find that the following circumstances in
aggravation are applicable to this case. The first would be
[California Rules of Court,7] [r]ule 4.421(a)(l). [Defendant]

      5 Respondent describes the plea as providing the court with

discretion to dismiss count 11 in the absence of a “high” Static-
99R score, but states that the court would otherwise “stay th[at]
conviction.” At the plea hearing, the People made the above-
described statements, and, at the sentencing hearing, the People
acknowledged that the “23 year” maximum sentence “would
make the 243.4 run concurrent.” The record thus does not
establish that the plea required the court to “stay” count 11.
      6 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

      7 All further references to rules are to the California Rules

of Court.

                                  4
admitted having committed great bodily injury against the victim
during the assault. Rule 4.421(b)(l), [defendant] sustained a
prior serious felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon
in addition to a conviction for assault likely to produce great
bodily injury. And we also have [r]ule 4.421(b)(2) in aggravation,
prior criminal convictions are — make that not prior but criminal
convictions are numerous and are increasing in seriousness.
Also, we have in aggravation Rule 4.421(b)(3), [defendant] has
served a prior prison term. [¶] The Court does find that there are
no circumstances in mitigation.” The court sentenced defendant
to serve 16 years on count one (the upper term of eight years,
doubled because of the prior strike), plus two-year consecutive
terms on counts 2 and 9 (one-third the middle term, doubled
because of the prior strike).
      Turning to the GBI enhancement, the court “f[ou]nd
applicable” a four-year middle term sentence, but “stay[ed], or
suspend[ed], this four years.” The court explained, “The reasons
for the Court staying, or suspending, this four years is in
consideration of the fact that the injury in question was relatively
moderate in nature. I do not diminish or disregard the fact that
there was a fractured nose and a—and that bruising occurred;
but given [defendant’s] efforts at rehabilitation while in custody
and in consideration of the extremely traumatic, difficult and
challenging childhood and upbringing that was experienced by
[defendant], the Court finds it equitable at this time to stay, or
suspend, the great bodily injury enhancement.”

                                  5
          Regarding count 11, the Static-99R evaluation indicated
that defendant was at an “above-average risk to reoffend.”
Defendant’s counsel urged the court to strike or dismiss count 11,
but if the court was unwilling to do so, counsel requested that the
court require registration under the Sex Offender Registration
Act (§ 290 et seq.) (the Act) “for the period of parole when
[defendant] is released from custody.” The court “[did] not find it
appropriate to dismiss Count 11; however, the period of
registration, . . . section 290, will be limited to the period, or
duration, of parole.” The court found that limiting the
registration requirement to that period was appropriate because
defendant had no prior history of sexual offenses. The court did
not impose any custody time for count 11. Defense counsel then
stated that section 243.4 “is a 290-registerable offense[,]” and
requested that the court find the lesser-included offense of
violation of section 242 if the court intended to impose
registration for the period of defendant’s parole. The People
objected, and the court denied the request.
          Defendant’s cumulative sentence was 20 years in state
prison, and the trial court imposed various fines and fees.
          Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                             DISCUSSION
I.        Ineffective Assistance
     A.    Additional Background
          Although it found no mitigating circumstances, the
probation report submitted for sentencing discussed defendant’s
childhood, mental health, and issues of substance abuse. At

                                    6
sentencing, defense counsel argued there were mitigating
circumstances, and defendant concedes that evidence of the
mitigating factors he raises on appeal was before the court. The
People conceded that defendant had been through a lot,
acknowledged defendant’s claim that he committed the crimes
“due to a troubling childhood,” but argued those facts should not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes.
The court stated that it found no circumstances in mitigation,
and it selected the upper term on count 1. Shortly thereafter,
however, the court stayed or suspended the GBI enhancement,
citing the moderate physical harm to the victim, defendant’s
rehabilitation in custody, and his “extremely traumatic, difficult
and challenging childhood.”
   B.    Analysis
        Defendant contends that this matter should be remanded
for resentencing due to his counsel’s prejudicial ineffective
assistance in failing to object when the court: 1) did not
understand what qualified as mitigating circumstances under
rule 4.423, when imposing the upper term on count 18; 2) made

        8 The mitigating circumstances that the court purportedly

failed to recognize were that defendant was “under 26 years of
age, or was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense” (rule 4.423(b)(6)); “defendant was suffering from a
mental or physical condition that significantly reduced
culpability for the crime” (rule 4.423(b)(2)); “defendant
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or
sexual violence and it was a factor in the commission of the
crime” (rule 4.423(b)(3)); and commission of the current offenses
was “connected to” defendant’s “prior victimization or childhood

                                 7
dual use of facts to support imposition of the upper term for count
1 and consecutive terms for counts 2 and 9; and 3) considered his
current convictions when finding that his convictions were
numerous and of increasing seriousness (as opposed to
considering only past convictions). Respondent disputes
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and we find
they lack merit.
      “To obtain relief, [defendant] ‘must prove “ ‘that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms, and that counsel’s deficient
performance was prejudicial, i.e., that a reasonable probability
exists that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been
more favorable to the defendant.’ ” ’ ” (In re Champion (2014)
58 Cal.4th 965, 1007.)
      Defendant’s first contention turns on the premise that the
trial court failed to understand the scope of the circumstances in
mitigation under rule 4.423, apparently due to the probation
report and its listing of mitigating circumstances from an
outdated version of rule 4.423.9 However, we presume on appeal
that the court correctly applied the law and considered relevant
sentencing factors. (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
608, 637.) “[U]nless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise,

trauma, or mental illness as defined by section 1385[, subd.] (c)”
(rule 4.423(b)(4)).
       9 The current version of rule 4.423, applicable at the time of

defendant’s August 2022 sentencing, became effective on March
14, 2022. Rules 4.423(b)(3), 4.423(4), and 4.423(6) were added,
and 4.423(b)(2) remained the same.

                                  8
the trial court will be deemed to have considered the relevant
criteria, such as mitigating circumstances, enumerated in the
sentencing rules.” (People v. Zamora (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1627,
1637.)
      Defendant has not overcome the above-described
presumption. Defendant presented relevant mitigating evidence
and argument regarding his childhood trauma, mental health,
and age, and the prosecution countered that defendant’s
childhood trauma did not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances. Although the court stated that it found no
circumstances in mitigation, its statements immediately
thereafter establish that it recognized and considered the
mitigating facts surrounding defendant’s traumatic childhood in
deciding that it was equitable to “stay or suspend” the GBI
enhancement. Mindful of the presumption that the trial court’s
judgment is correct and defendant must affirmatively show error,
on this record, we cannot conclude that the court’s seemingly
contradictory statements affirmatively demonstrate error.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, it does not seem reasonable to
read the record as establishing that the trial court understood
there were mitigating circumstances when ruling on the GBI
enhancement, but immediately prior thereto lacked precisely the
same understanding. The record before us thus does not
affirmatively show that the court failed to recognize and consider
circumstances in mitigation, as opposed to considered them, but
determined they were insufficiently weighty to dissuade the court
from its assessment that “circumstances in aggravation of the

                                9
crime . . . justif[ied]” deviation from the presumptive middle
term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2).) Because defendant has not
established that the court erred in this regard, he cannot
establish ineffective assistance.
      Defendant’s second contention — that the court made dual
use of the fact that his prior convictions were numerous or of
increasing seriousness — similarly fails. The record does not
show that the court used this factor to impose consecutive terms
on counts 2 and 9. Instead, the record clearly establishes that
the court properly doubled defendant’s sentence on counts 2 and
9 because of his prior strike.
      Finally, with respect to defendant’s claim that his counsel
impermissibly failed to object when the court considered his
current convictions to be aggravating under rule 4.421(b)(2), he
has not established prejudice. Defendant stipulated that his
prior crimes were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and this
stipulation undisputedly satisfies the proof requirements of
section 1170. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2) [allowing proof of facts
underlying aggravating factors by stipulation].) Given his
stipulation, defendant does not show that it is reasonably
probable he would have obtained a more favorable sentence had
the court restricted its consideration to defendant’s prior
convictions.
II.   Count 11
      The parties agree that a remand for resentencing is
warranted because the court abused its discretion by deciding not
to dismiss count 11 due to the mistaken belief that it could limit

                                    10
the duration of defendant’s registration under section 290 to his
period of parole. We accept their concession.
      The trial court did not have discretion to limit defendant’s
registration under section 290 to his period of parole.
Defendant’s misdemeanor sexual battery conviction required him
to register under the Act for a minimum of 10 years. (§ 290,
subd. (b), (c) & (d)(1)(A).)10 The Act “was created by the
Legislature to serve as a ‘comprehensive,’ ‘standardized,
statewide system to identify, assess, monitor and contain known
sex offenders for the purpose of reducing the risk of recidivism
posed by these offenders, thereby protecting victims and potential
victims from future harm.’ ” (People v. Eastman (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 638, 646 (Eastman).) “The very nature of a
‘comprehensive’ and ‘standardized, statewide system’ is that it is
not amenable to inconsistent directives crafted by individual trial
courts . . . on a case-by-case basis.” (Ibid.)
      In Eastman, the defendant admitted to six misdemeanors
pursuant section 290.006, and the court required him to register
for life under section 290.11 (Eastman, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at

      10 Section 290 provides that every person convicted of an

offense listed in subdivision (c), which includes section 243.4,
“shall register” in accordance with the Act. (§ 290, subds. (b) &
(c).) Section 290 designates a person that is required to register
for a conviction of a misdemeanor in subdivision (c) as a “tier one
offender.” (§ 290, subd. (d)(1)(A).) “A tier one offender is subject
to registration for a minimum of 10 years.” (Ibid.)
      11 Section 290.006 allowed the court to order registration

under section 290 for any offense not included in section 290 if
the court found at time of conviction or sentencing that the
person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or

                                  11
pp. 639, 642.) In doing so, the trial court rejected the suggestion
that it could limit the duration of registration to the defendant’s
period of probation. (Id. at p. 643.) The appellate court
concurred, holding that “[j]ust as a trial court may not order an
individual to register under section 290 when that individual
does not fall within the scope of the Act, a trial court may not
order an individual to register under section 290 under conditions
that are inconsistent with the requirements of section 290, such
as the Act’s duration provisions.” (Id. at p. 646.)
      The proper remedy for the error at issue here is to remand
for further sentencing proceedings. As set forth above, the
limited registration requirement attached to count 11 cannot
stand. (Eastman, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 646.) In addition,
the court had discretion to dismiss count 11, but its ruling
declining to dismiss that count was tied to the unauthorized
limited registration requirement. (See In re Esperanza C. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1061 [a decision resting on legal error is
an abuse of discretion].)

for purposes of sexual gratification. (§ 290.006, subd. (a).) At the
time of the Eastman decision, section 290 imposed a lifetime
registration requirement. (Eastman, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at
p. 640, fn. 3.) Commencing January 1, 2021, Senate Bill No. 384
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) restructured the registration requirement
to establish three tiers of registration, primarily based on the
offense of conviction, for periods of at least 10 years (tier one), at
least 20 years (tier two), and life (tier three). (Stats. 2017,
ch. 541, § 2.5; see § 290, subd. (d).)

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                                 DISPOSITION
       We reverse the court’s ruling declining to dismiss count 11,
and its ruling limiting defendant’s registration period under
section 290 to his period of parole is vacated. The matter is
remanded for further proceedings wherein the court will exercise
its discretion anew in deciding whether to dismiss count 11. If
the trial court declines to dismiss count 11 on remand, it must
order defendant to register under section 290 for the period
required by that statute.

                                               BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
HIRAMOTO, J.

People v. Gildesgard (A166203)

       
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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