Court Opinion

ID: 9859319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:41:34.544987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:18:53.208448
License: Public Domain

*51POLLOCK, J.,
concurring.
The Court declares invalid under federal law a warrantless automobile search conducted under circumstances where the police did not have “a specific particularized basis for an objectively reasonable belief that the defendants were armed and dangerous.” Ante at 48, 573 A.2d at 48. In reaching that result, the Court summarizes the testimony of the investigating officer:
He made no claim of having smelled marijuana or having seen drug paraphernalia in the car or suspicious objects in plain view. Indeed, he did not claim that he feared he was in danger but rather only that he was taking steps to make sure he could not be threatened. And the assistant prosecutor, who argued the suppression motion, was equally candid, saying at one point to the court: “It’s close. It’s close.”
Looking at the same facts and applying the same test, the dissent concludes that the search was necessary “to protect the safety of the state trooper.” Post at 55, 573 A.2d at 1387. The conflict between the results of the majority and dissenting opinions points up the fact-sensitive nature of search-and-seizure cases. It also illustrates the unavoidable uncertainty of relying solely on federal law to resolve those cases. Given the number of automobile searches that occur regularly in New Jersey, the issue is important not only for suspects, the police, and the public, but also for the administration of justice.
On the facts of this case, I believe that the Court is correct. Consequently, I join in its opinion, subject to the following reservations. I write separately because the Court’s opinion studiously avoids New Jersey law as an independent basis for its holding.
Just five years ago, in another search-and-seizure case, the United States Supreme Court reversed a judgment of this Court not because we had employed the wrong standard, but because we had misapplied it. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). In T.L.O., the High Court expressly acknowledged the substantial similarity between its test, “reasonableness, under all the circumstances,” and the one *52we adopted, “reasonable grounds.” Id. at 343, 105 S.Ct. at 743-44, 83 L.Ed.2d at 736. The reversal resulted solely from the Court’s perception that our opinion “reflect[ed] a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness.” Ibid., 469 U.S. at 344, 105 S.Ct. at 744, 83 L.Ed.2d at 736.
On matters of federal law, we owe allegiance and respect to the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court. Hence, in this case, as in all others, we are bound by its opinions on federal law. On matters of state law, however, we are obliged to provide our own interpretations. In T.L. 0., as in the present case, we have failed to fulfill that obligation.
Here, defendants rely not only on the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, but also on article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Like its federal counterpart, that article of the State Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. I believe the Court should address both parts of defendants’ argument. The failure to analyze defendants’ state-law argument may require us to review that argument in the future if the United States Supreme Court should agree that the dissent, not the Court, has correctly applied federal law.
As Justice Clifford wrote in State v. Hartley,
[w]e would be remiss were we to rest our decision exclusively on federal grounds when alternative state grounds exist. Failure to set forth clearly the independent state-law basis for a decision in a case in which federal constitutional law is also involved can lead to needless review in the United States Supreme Court, and could in fact require in some cases, subsequent redundant proceedings in our own courts. Such a disregard for concerns of judicial economy has been criticized. [103 N.J. 252, 285-86, 511 A.2d 80 (1983) (citation omitted).]
Under our federalist system, a state-law analysis manifests no disrespect for federal courts as partners in protecting fundamental rights. The United States Supreme Court, charged as it is with establishing a basic level of protection for the entire nation, often is obliged to establish a lowest common denominator of such protection. The federalist system contemplates that state courts may grant greater protection to fundamental *53rights than is accorded under the federal constitution. When a state supreme court grants such protection, it does no more than fulfill its obligation to uphold its own constitution.
As Justice Stein pointed out in State v. Novembrino,
It is an established principle of our federalist system that state constitutions may be a source of “individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”
This Court has frequently resorted to our own State Constitution in order to afford our citizens broader protection of certain personal rights than that afforded by analogous or identical provisions of the federal Constitution. Although the language of article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution is virtually identical with that of the fourth amendment, we have held in other contexts that it affords our citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the fourth amendment. [105 N.J. 95, 144-45, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (citations omitted).]
When protection under the State Constitution is clear and protection under the federal constitution is not, we may properly rely on the State charter to remedy the rights violation. “Compelled by principles of sound jurisprudence,” Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 284, 511 A.2d 80, we also rely on the State Constitution when confronted with issues not yet directly addressed by the United States Supreme Court. As explained in Hartley, the practice of relying on state law grounds is prudent even when we believe that the result is mandated by the federal constitution. Id. at 284-85, 511 A.2d 80. In the face of even a small doubt whether our decision correctly interprets federal law, we have a duty of providing guidance to state law-enforcement officials to settle the issue as a matter of state law. Id. at 285, 511 A.2d 80.
The present case is an appropriate example of one in which the Court should base its decision on both state and federal law. As a matter of federal law, the issue is controlled by Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In Long, the High Court held that police may conduct a “protective search” of the interior of a stopped automobile, “as long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.” Id. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 3482, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1221.
*54The problem, as the difference between the majority and dissenting opinions in the present case illustrates, is in determining whether arresting officers possessed such a belief. Even the prosecutor who opposed the motion to suppress in the trial court admitted that this case presents a “close call.”
Ironically, the case that is at the heart of today’s decision, Long, supra, is the leading decision for the proposition that a state court must make a plain statement that it is relying on state law as an independent ground for its decision. The failure of the Michigan Supreme Court in Long to make such a statement led in that case to a reversal and remand to that court.
In the present case, the Court assiduously follows one lesson from Michigan v. Long, that requiring that officers possess an objectively reasonable belief that defendants were armed and dangerous, and just as assiduously ignores the plain-statement requirement. By ignoring the second lesson, the Court repeats the error that Long sought to remedy.
In sum, important considerations compel reliance on state law as an independent basis for our decisions. Those considerations include the fact-sensitive nature of search-and-seizure cases, the different roles of state and federal courts in our federalist system, the need of law-enforcement officers for certainty, and our obligation to fairly and justly administer our Court system. I conclude that the Court would be well-advised to supplement its analysis of federal law with an independent analysis of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New Jersey Constitution.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this opinion.