Court Opinion

ID: 9926620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 15:08:46.909007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.022372
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rodney Austin and Kimberly                       :
Moser, husband and wife                          :
                                                 :
                       v.                        :    No. 355 C.D. 2022
                                                 :    Submitted: December 4, 2023
Lehigh and Northampton                           :
Transportation Authority and Chvon               :
Fenty                                            :
                                                 :
Appeal of: Rodney Austin                         :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                       FILED: January 25, 2024

       Rodney Austin (Austin) appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh
County’s (trial court) entry of judgment against him. Austin and his wife, Kimberly
Moser, sued the Lehigh and Northampton Transportation Authority (LANTA) and
Chvon Fenty (Fenty) for injuries Austin suffered after a LANTA bus, operated by
Fenty, struck a lift on which Austin was working. LANTA separately sued Austin,
Austin’s employer, Ryan Amato Painting, LLC (Amato), and another employee of
Amato, Efrain Gonzalez (Gonzalez), for damages to the bus on the basis that traffic
warning cones indicating the location of the lift were not properly placed. The trial
court consolidated the personal injury and property cases for trial.1 Austin argues he

       1
          There were two other lawsuits related to this accident filed by two passengers who also
suffered injuries, which were consolidated with the instant actions. One of the cases settled before
trial, and another case was severed due to COVID-19 related issues. (Trial Court Opinion (Op.)
at 4.) Austin’s case and LANTA’s case remained and were tried together.
is entitled to a new trial because under Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence
Law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, and the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act),2 the trial
court should not have consolidated Austin’s case with LANTA’s case; the trial court
should not have allowed LANTA to argue comparative negligence3 since Amato’s
negligence could not be imputed to Austin; and the trial court should have instructed
the jury that Amato’s negligence in LANTA’s property case may not be considered
or imputed against Austin in his personal injury case. Upon review, we affirm.

I.     BACKGROUND
       On November 5, 2015, Austin and Gonzalez, as employees of Amato, were
painting the exterior of a building on Hamilton Street in Allentown. (Trial Court
Opinion (Trial Ct. Op.) at 1.) Austin and Gonzalez were in a bucket approximately
50 feet in the air, which was attached to an articulating boom on a lift parked within
the right of way of the eastbound lane on Hamilton Street. (Id.) Austin placed traffic
cones in the roadway and around the lift. (Id.) Fenty was driving a bus owned by
LANTA that was traveling east on Hamilton Street and struck the lift, causing
injuries to Austin and Gonzalez. (Id. at 1-2.)

       2
           Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
       3
           Section 7102(a) of Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Law states:

       In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
       to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
       negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where
       such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or
       defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the
       plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to
       the plaintiff.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a).

                                                 2
      The parties agreed to consolidate their cases for purposes of discovery. (Id.
at 2.) On September 10, 2019, LANTA moved to consolidate the cases for trial.
(Id.) Austin did not file an opposition to this motion. (Id.) The trial court granted
LANTA’s motion to consolidate on October 11, 2019. (Id.) Austin subsequently
did not file a motion in limine concerning severance of the cases for trial. (Id.)
Austin did file a pre-trial memorandum and proposed voir dire, proposed verdict
slip, and proposed jury charge, all of which were silent on severing his case for
purposes of trial from LANTA’s case seeking to recover for damages to its bus. (Id.)
The matters were scheduled for a consolidated trial on September 7, 2021. (Id. at 2-
3.) After a request to continue the trial on the bases that the lead counsel for the case
was leaving the firm and the new lead counsel wanted additional time to prepare,
and COVID-19 restrictions in the courtroom would not allow for a fair trial was
denied, Austin filed a motion to sever his case from LANTA’s case on August 31,
2021. (Id. at 3.) Therein, Austin argued that LANTA’s liability expert did not
attribute any acts of negligence to Austin individually and the jury would be
confused because Austin would be introduced as both a plaintiff and defendant in
connection with the accident. (Id.) Austin further argued that the negligence of
Amato in LANTA’s case was likely to be imputed to Austin in his case, since Austin
was working for Amato at the time of the accident. (Id. at 3-4.) The trial court
denied the motion to sever on September 2, 2021, “citing judicial economy, the need
to prevent further delay, [and] the lateness of the request[,] and [because] Austin was
represented by separate lawyers,” one for his case and one for LANTA’s, and only
counsel for Austin’s case filed the motion to sever one week before the trial was to
begin. (Id. at 4.) The consolidated trial continued as scheduled.

                                           3
      At the charging conference, Austin requested that the trial court preclude
LANTA from arguing comparative negligence and Amato from appearing on
Austin’s verdict slip. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 198a, 205a-07a, 215a-21a,
285a.) Austin also presented a proposed verdict slip. (Id. at 207a-08a.) The trial
court partially granted Austin’s request and precluded Amato from appearing on
Austin’s personal injury verdict slip. (Id. at 229a-31a.) However, the trial court
allowed LANTA to argue comparative negligence and allowed comparative
negligence to appear on Austin’s verdict slip. (Id. at 228a-29a, 231a, 286a.)
      The trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows. The trial court
mentioned that LANTA and Austin agreed that Fenty was operating as an employee
of LANTA, and Austin and Gonzalez were operating as employees of Amato, and
Fenty, Austin, and Gonzalez were all acting within the scope of their employment.
(Id. at 318a-19a.) The trial court explained that the jury “must . . . decide whether
LANTA was negligent, whether [] Austin was negligent, and whether there was
negligence from Amato[.]” (Id. at 321a.) The trial court also explained that if
“Amato [] and/or its employees” violated various safety standards and regulations,
it is “evidence [the jury] must consider along with all the other evidence in deciding
whether [] Amato . . . and/or its employees were negligent.” (Id. at 324a-26a.) The
trial court distributed the two separate verdict slips to the jury, one for Austin’s
personal injury action and one for LANTA’s property damage case,4 and walked the
jury through each slip. (Id. at 335a-44a.) Before doing so, the trial court reminded
the jury:

      You’ve heard reference by the attorneys there are two separate cases
      here. We consolidated them for the trial in order to achieve judicial
      economy. That is, we didn’t think it was necessary to have separate

      4
          The trial court appended the two verdict slips to its opinion.

                                                  4
      trials, separate juries, and repeat a[] lot of the same evidence twice.
      So[,] we ordered that the cases be consolidated because all of the claims
      that we have really arise out of the same incident.

(Id. at 335a-36a.) After walking the jury through the verdict slips, Austin re-asserted
his position that the trial court should instruct the jury that any negligence found on
Amato’s part cannot be imputed to Austin. (Id. at 352a.) The trial court denied
Austin’s request and repeated to the jury: “[T]here are two separate cases. We
consolidated them for trial in order to avoid two separate trials. There are separate
verdict slips, one for each case. You need to follow the verdict slip literally. So just
follow the verdict slip, and I think you’ll be fine.” (Id. at 354a-55a.)
      In LANTA’s property damage case, the jury found Amato negligent and
LANTA not negligent. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4, 6.) In Austin’s personal injury case, the
jury found LANTA not negligent, barring Austin’s recovery. (Id. at 6.) Austin filed
the Motion for Post-Trial Relief (Motion) seeking a new trial and asserted four
issues: “(1) the denial of Austin’s pre-trial motion to sever; (2) the denial of Austin’s
trial motion to preclude defense argument on comparative negligence[;] (3) a
defective verdict slip[; and] (4) the failure to give a requested cautionary jury
instruction concerning comparative negligence.” (Id. (footnote omitted).) The trial
court denied Austin’s Motion and explained:

      In order to simplify matters for the jury, the parties agreed Austin and
      Gonzalez were employees of Amato working within the scope of their
      employment, and any finding of liability against them would be
      attributed to Amato. . . . The jury was presented with two verdict slips,
      one for LANTA’s case against Amato, No. 2017-C-3062 . . . and the
      other for Austin’s case against Fenty and LANTA, No. 2017-C-
      3335. . . .

      Each juror was given [] cop[ies] of the verdict slips and encouraged to
      follow along with the court as it explained them line-by-line. . . . In
      LANTA’s case against Amato . . . the verdict slip contained three

                                           5
questions. The first question was “Was . . . Amato, or any of its
employees negligent? Yes/No.” The verdict slip instructed the jury to
proceed to question 2 if its answer to question 1 was “Yes.” The jury
answered “yes” to question 1. The second question was “Was LANTA
or any of its employees negligent? Yes/No.” The jury answered “No”
to question 2. The verdict slip instructed the jury not to proceed any
further and return to the courtroom if its answer to question 2 was “No,”
and to proceed to question 3, which addressed comparative negligence,
only if its answer to question 2 was “Yes.” Since the jury answered
“No” to question 2, it did not proceed to question 3.[]

In Austin’s case against Fenty and LANTA[,] . . . the verdict slip
contained [eight] questions. The first question was “Did [] Fenty, while
acting as an employee of LANTA, violate a statute in the Pennsylvania
Vehicle Code[, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9805]? Yes/No.” The verdict slip
explained the consequence of a “Yes” answer to question 1 was that it
had found LANTA to be negligent and the jury should proceed to
question 3[,] dealing with causation; and if its answer was “No” to
question 1, then it should proceed to question 2. The jury answered
“No” to question 1, so it proceeded to question 2. Question 2 was “Was
[] Fenty, an employee of LANTA, negligent in the operation of the bus?
Yes/No.” The jury answered “No.” The verdict slip explained if its
answers were “No” to questions 1 and 2, then Austin could not recover
and it should not answer any of the remaining questions. Since the jury
answered “No” to questions 1 and 2, it did not answer any of the
remaining questions in accordance with the instructions by the court
and on the verdict slip.

The jury’s verdict in both cases were completely consistent with each
other. In LANTA’s case, it had found LANTA, through its employee
Fenty, was not negligent in causing the accident and that Amato, by
itself or through any of its employees, was negligent in causing the
accident, perhaps because it concluded the traffic warning cones had
been misplaced. In Austin’s case, it found LANTA, by itself or through
its employee Fenty, not negligent in causing the accident obviating the
need for it to determine if Austin was negligent. In order to ensure
clarity, the verdict slip in Austin’s case did not refer to Amato,
Gonzalez[,] or any other party; it referred only to Austin.
Consequently, the jury awarded LANTA the agreed-upon amount of
damages for the bus and awarded Austin nothing for his injuries
because it determined Fenty, and thus LANTA, had not been negligent.

                                   6
(Id. at 4-6 (internal citation and footnote omitted).)
       The trial court further explained that no party had “questioned the
consolidated trial and requested a severance of [its] case. Indeed, Austin’s Motion
to sever came one day after his application for a continuance of the trial had been
denied and one week before trial.” (Id. at 7.) In addition, the trial court found
“[w]hile [w]orkers’ [c]ompensation would preclude Austin’s negligence from being
an issue as to his employer, Amato, he was not suing his employer. He was suing
Fenty and LANTA and, therefore, his individual negligence is relevant to his lawsuit
against them.” (Id. at 8.) The trial court also found there was no indication that the
jury was confused, and that “[t]he jury concluded Fenty, and thus LANTA, had not
caused the accident, and that Amato or its employees had. . . . The jury followed the
instructions of the court and on the verdict slips.” (Id.) Therefore, the trial court
denied Austin’s Motion. The trial court entered a final judgment against Austin, and
Austin appealed.5

II.    DISCUSSION
       On appeal to this Court, Austin argues the trial court erred or abused its
discretion by consolidating Austin’s and LANTA’s cases, allowing LANTA to argue
comparative negligence in its case because Amato’s negligence should not be

       5
          The appeal was originally taken to the Superior Court, which transferred the appeal to
this Court by Order dated March 15, 2022. On January 4, 2024, this Court ordered Austin to file
a certified copy of the trial court’s docket entries to show that a judgment was entered, as it
appeared from the original record that no such judgment had been entered. “[A]n [a]ppeal lies
from the judgment entered and not the denial of post-trial motions, and a verdict d[oes] not become
final for purposes of appeal until properly reduced to and entered as a formal judgment under
Pa.R.C[iv.]P. [] 227.4.” Mitchell v. Milburn, 199 A.3d 995, 999 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Austin timely complied with this Court’s Order and filed a praecipe
to enter a final judgment on January 9, 2024, which the trial court entered that same day.

                                                7
imputed to Austin, and by not instructing the jury that Amato’s negligence in
LANTA’s case may not be considered or imputed against Austin. (Austin’s Brief
(Br.) at 27, 33, 40.) Essentially, Austin argues that Section 303(b) of the WC Act,
77 P.S. § 481(b), and Section 7102(a.2) of Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence
Law do not allow for Amato’s negligence to be considered in Austin’s case against
Fenty and LANTA for his personal injuries. (Austin’s Br. at 20-22.) Austin asserts
he was prejudiced by allowing the jury to hear evidence of Amato’s negligence in
LANTA’s property damage case alongside Austin’s personal injury case. (Id. at 27-
28.) Austin further argues that the trial court should not have allowed LANTA to
argue comparative negligence in Austin’s case because LANTA’s liability expert
did not opine that Austin was personally negligent, as opposed to Amato. (Id. at 34-
35.) Austin also contends the trial court should have given a jury instruction that
explained Amato’s negligence in LANTA’s case could not be imputed to Austin in
his case. (Id. at 40-41.)
      Where the trial court denies a motion for a new trial, our standard of review
is for an abuse of discretion. Ball v. Bayard Pump & Tank Co., Inc., 67 A.3d 759,
767 (Pa. 2013) (citing Stevenson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 A.2d 413, 419 (Pa.
1987)). “An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court has reached a
conclusion that overrides or misapplies the law, or when the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.”
Ball, 67 A.3d at 767.
      Preliminarily, we note the laws Austin cites for our analysis. Section 303(b)
of the WC Act states:

      In the event injury or death to an employe is caused by a third party,
      then such employe, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
      dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to receive

                                          8
          damages by reason thereof, may bring their action at law against such
          third party, but the employer, his insurance carrier, their servants and
          agents, employes, representatives acting on their behalf or at their
          request shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or
          indemnity in any action at law, or otherwise, unless liability for such
          damages, contributions or indemnity shall be expressly provided for in
          a written contract entered into by the party alleged to be liable prior to
          the date of the occurrence which gave rise to the action.

77 P.S. § 481(b). Section 7102(a.2) of Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Law
states:

          For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of
          any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the
          plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be
          transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by
          any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this
          section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is
          granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the . . . W[C]
          Act. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a.2).
          As our Supreme Court has recognized, “the purpose of [the WC Act] was to
restrict the remedy available to an employee against the employer to compensation,
and to close to the employee, and to third parties, any recourse against the employer
in tort for negligence.” Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 412 A.2d 1094,
1097 (Pa. 1980) (Tsarnas II). It has been recognized that “even though an employer
cannot be joined for the purposes of asserting or apportioning liability, non-employer
defendants may introduce evidence of the employer’s alleged negligence in an effort
to show it was the sole legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Carcaise v. Cemex,
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 396 A.2d 1241, 1244-45 (Pa. Super. 1978) (Tsarnas I), aff’d by Tsarnas

                                              9
II).6 In Dodson v. Beijing Capital Tire Company, Ltd., (M.D. Pa., No. 3:14-CV-
01358, filed September 27, 2017), 2017 WL 4284417, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed the very issue of whether
“the negligence of an employer is [] relevant in consideration of a claim brought by
an employee for injuries sustained as a result of the actions of a third-party
tortfeasor.” Id. at *5. Dodson cited Tsarnas II and explained:

       To wit, the W[C] Act . . . discussed in Tsarnas [II] opens with “[i]n the
       event injury or death to an employee is caused by a third party. . . [.]”
       See Tsarnas [II], 412 A.2d at 1096 (emphasis added). Causation
       remains a barrier to negligence consideration. Once causation is proven
       attributable to the third party, then employer negligence considerations
       are irrelevant. Until such a time, however, evidence bearing on
       causation should not be discounted.

Dodson, 2017 WL 4284417, at *6 (emphasis in original). Although the WC Act
precludes an employee or third party from recovery against an employer, there is no
preclusion from introducing evidence of the employer’s negligence in such an action
to show that the employer’s negligence was the cause of injury. Id.; Carcaise, 217
F. Supp. 2d at 608.
           We now address Austin’s arguments with the above provisions in mind.

       A.      Severance
               1.     Parties’ Arguments
       Austin first argues the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying his
application to sever his case from LANTA’s case.                   Austin contends he was

       6
         “Generally, decisions of federal district courts and courts of appeals are not binding on
this Court, . . . but they may have persuasive value.” GGNSC Clarion LP v. Kane, 131 A.3d 1062,
1069 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). “Unreported federal court decisions may also have persuasive
value.” Nagle v. TrueBlue, Inc., 148 A.3d 946, 959 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

                                               10
prejudiced by allowing the jury to “hear and weigh evidence of [Amato’s]
comparative negligence in a case brought by [Austin] against a third-party
tortfeasor[, LANTA]. . . .” (Austin’s Br. at 28.) Austin claims the jury was not
allowed to consider Amato’s negligence in his case because the negligence of an
employer may not be imputed to the negligence of an employee under the WC Act
and the Comparative Negligence Law. (Id.) Because of this prejudice, Austin
argues the trial court must have ordered separate trials. (Id. at 29.) Austin claims
“[i]t was highly foreseeable . . . that the jury would lump [] Austin in with the actions
of his employer[,]” and the “prejudice suffered by [] Austin resulting from a joint
trial with . . . Amato . . . clearly outweighed the procedural convenience of disposing
of all issues in one trial. . . .” (Id. at 31-32.)
       LANTA responds the trial court properly declined to sever Austin’s case
because the issues in the two cases were not complex and did not involve different
fact patterns. (LANTA’s Br. at 6.) LANTA argues Austin did not oppose LANTA’s
motion to consolidate, which was filed September 10, 2019, and Austin did not
contest consolidation until August 31, 2021, a week before the trial was to begin.
(Id. at 6-7.) LANTA further argues had the trial court granted Austin’s Motion,
LANTA would have been prejudiced because it would have had to alter its trial
strategy and update expert reports with limited preparation time. (Id. at 8.) LANTA
also contends that Austin did not file any motions in limine challenging the use of
LANTA’s expert, Dennis W. Eckstine. (Id.) Notwithstanding Austin’s untimely
challenges, LANTA argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
consolidating Austin’s and LANTA’s trials because Eckstine’s expert report found
that “Amato[], through its employees, ‘failed to properly use safety cones as a traffic

                                              11
control device around an aerial work platform,’ in violation of Federal and State
regulations.” (Id. at 11.) LANTA concedes:

       [T]hough it is true that Eckstine never specifically stated a conclusion
       that Austin acted negligently in setting up the area around the boom lift,
       Eckstine’s testimony supports a conclusion by the jury that Austin set
       up the cones, [that] the cones were set up negligently, and that the
       manner in which the cones were set up was the reason for the accident.

(Id. at 12.) Last, LANTA argues the WC Act restricts the remedies available to the
employee and third parties in an action for negligence, and it does not prevent
possible evidentiary prejudice against an employee. (Id. at 15.)
              2.     Analysis
       Rule 213(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states:

       The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may, on
       its own motion or on motion of any party, order a separate trial of any
       cause of action, claim, or counterclaim, set-off, or cross-suit, or of any
       separate issue, or of any number of causes of action, claims,
       counterclaims, set-offs, cross-suits, or issues.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 213(b). “The decision whether to sever or bifurcate under Rule 213(b)
is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate
the necessity for taking measures the rule permits.” Ball, 67 A.3d at 767 (citing
Gallagher v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 883 A.2d 550, 557 (Pa. 2005)). The trial court
has discretion in deciding whether to sever “in the furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice.” Ball, 67 A.3d at 771 (citing Rule 213(b)).
       In its discretion, the trial court denied Austin’s Motion because of judicial
economy, preventing further delay, the timing of the Motion, and the fact that Austin
was represented by two lawyers, one for his case and one for LANTA’s, and only
counsel for Austin’s case filed this Motion a week before the trial was to begin.

                                            12
(Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) The trial court also explained the parties agreed that Austin and
Gonzalez were employees of Amato at the time of the accident, and any negligence
on their part would be imputed to Amato. (Id.) Further, the expert opinion report
from Eckstine was produced on November 15, 2019, and Eckstine was deposed on
April 21, 2021. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, Austin had ample opportunity to challenge
consolidation, and the trial court did not err in denying Austin’s Motion based on
judicial economy and preventing further delay.
      The case of Kincy v. Petro, 2 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2010), is illustrative. In Kincy,
our Supreme Court explained that there are three types of consolidation:

      First, where all except one of the several actions are stayed until one is
      tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the
      others; second, where several actions are combined into one and lose
      their separate identity and become a single action in which a single
      judgment is rendered; and, third, where several actions are ordered to
      be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
      entry of a separate judgment. Failure in many cases to clearly
      distinguish between these various uses of the word has caused no little
      apparent confusion in the decisions. Where a technical consolidation
      takes place, the result is that one verdict is rendered which is conclusive
      of the entire subject[ ]matter of the litigation. Consequently, different
      actions cannot be consolidated unless between the same parties and
      involving the same subject[ ]matter, issues, and defenses. But where
      separate actions in favor of or against two or more persons have arisen
      out of a single transaction, and the evidence by which they are
      supported is largely the same, although the rights and liabilities of
      parties may differ, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to order
      all to be tried together, though in every other respect the actions remain
      distinct and require separate verdicts and judgments.

2 A.3d at 494 (quoting Azinger v. Pa. R. Co., 105 A. 87, 87-88 (Pa. 1918) (emphasis
omitted)). Here, the third definition of consolidation applies because the trial court
consolidated two cases, LANTA’s and Austin’s, and the jury returned two separate
verdicts. The evidence of the accident was largely the same, and although the rights

                                          13
and liabilities of LANTA, Amato, and Austin differed, the trial court had discretion
to order that LANTA’s and Austin’s cases be tried in one proceeding. Id.
      Austin still contends he was prejudiced by consolidation of his case and
LANTA’s case because the WC Act prevents the negligence of an employer to be
imputed to the negligence of an employee. As explained in Tsarnas II, the WC Act
only precludes an employee or third-party tortfeasor from joining the employer to
the suit to seek damages. 412 A.2d at 1097. The employer’s negligence is relevant
and permitted to be presented to show that it was the cause of the employee’s injury,
and not the third-party tortfeasor. Dodson, 2017 WL 4284417, at *6; Carcaise, 217
F. Supp. 2d at 608. Neither LANTA nor Austin joined or sought damages from
Amato in Austin’s personal injury suit, as such an action would be clearly barred.
However, it was permissible for LANTA to present evidence of Amato’s negligence
in Austin’s suit to show that LANTA was not the cause of Austin’s injury. Id. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austin’s Motion.

      B.     Comparative Negligence
             1.    Parties’ Arguments
      Austin argues the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying Austin’s
motion to preclude LANTA from arguing comparative negligence in Austin’s
personal injury case. (Austin’s Br. at 33.) Austin submits that Eckstine’s testimony
did not “assign[] any duty or breach of duty to [] Austin . . . but rather intertwined
[Austin] with [Eckstine’s] opinion of [Amato’s] comparative negligence in a manner
not permitted to be used by the jury against [] Austin in [his] case under
Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Law.” (Id.) Austin further contends that
no expert evidence was put forth that Austin was personally negligent “when he put

                                         14
the warning cones where he was directed to do so by his supervisor.” (Id. at 34.)
Austin argues LANTA “was able to backdoor evidence and argument of the
employer’s negligence into the trial of [] Austin’s case and thereby prejudice the
jury’s consideration of the issues against [] Austin when such negligence could never
have been heard, argued, considered[,] or instructed upon in [] Austin’s case[.]” (Id.
at 34-35 (emphasis omitted).) Lastly, Austin argues although the trial court removed
Amato from Austin’s verdict slip, “this was insufficient to cure the cumulative errors
from denying severance and allowing [Amato’s] negligence to be considered
alongside [] Austin’s claims.” (Id. at 37-38.)
       LANTA responds that the trial court properly denied Austin’s motion to
preclude comparative negligence arguments because this evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial. (LANTA’s Br. at 15.) LANTA also argues that Austin had ample time
to challenge the use of Eckstine’s testimony in Austin’s trial. (Id. at 16-17.)
              2.     Analysis
       The Superior Court addressed a similar issue in William Harter and Cleaver
Brooks, A Division of Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. Yeagley, 456 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super.
1983).7 In Yeagley, the appellants therein argued that “an employer . . . may not be
joined as [an] additional defendant[] even for the limited purpose of enabling the
jury to determine the comparative negligence of all parties to the transaction.”
Yeagley, 456 A.2d at 1022. The Superior Court agreed with the appellants, citing
Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 439 A.2d 674 (Pa. Super.), aff’d, 465
A.2d 609 (Pa. 1983), stating “[a]n employer’s liability for an industrial accident is

       7
         Pennsylvania Superior Court cases are not binding on this Court; however, when such
cases discuss analogous issues they offer persuasive precedent. Stahl v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (E. Hempfield Twp.), 242 A.3d 3, 13 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Lerch v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)).

                                             15
limited to an amount determined by the W[C] Act. If [an employer] assumes that
liability, . . . he cannot be made a party to his employee’s common law action for
negligence against a third person.” Yeagley, 456 A.2d at 1023. The Superior Court
thus held that “the Comparative Negligence Law does not permit joinder of an
employer as an additional defendant, even for the limited purpose of apportioning
liability.” Id. at 1024. Yeagley emphasizes that the WC Act and the Comparative
Negligence Law work hand-in-hand to prevent an employee or a third party from
joining an employer to its negligence suit to recover damages. Neither Austin nor
LANTA joined Amato to Austin’s suit. Thus, joinder of Amato is not an issue here.
      Austin still contends that Amato’s comparative negligence should not have
been considered in Austin’s case at all; thus, they should have been tried separately.
One of the purposes of the WC Act is to prevent LANTA from seeking contribution
or indemnity from Amato in Austin’s case against LANTA. Tsarnas II, 412 A.2d at
1097. Again, neither Austin nor LANTA attempted to join Amato as a defendant in
Austin’s case. Austin needed to prove the elements of negligence to hold LANTA
liable, including causation. As seen from Austin’s verdict slip, the jury found that
Austin did not prove LANTA was negligent in the accident, which barred his
recovery. Because the jury did not find LANTA negligent, all “evidence bearing on
causation” remained relevant, including Amato’s. Dodson, 2017 WL 4284417, at
*6; see also Carcaise, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Austin’s Motion.

                                         16
      C.     Jury Instructions
              1.    Parties’ Arguments
      Austin lastly argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by not
instructing the jury that Amato’s negligence could not be imputed to Austin.
(Austin’s Br. at 40.) Austin contends because Amato was not a party to Austin’s
action, the jury should have been instructed that it may not consider Amato’s
negligence in Austin’s case. (Id. at 40-41.) Austin explains that if a jury instruction
is misleading or confusing, it is a sufficient ground to grant a new trial. (Id. at 41.)
Austin further argues the trial court’s reasoning in denying Austin’s requested jury
instruction, that the verdict forms were clear, does not hold because “the jury does
not know what it does not know; as non-lawyers, it cannot become aware of its own
confusion about applying instructions it was never given. . . .” (Id. at 42-43.) Austin
argues the jury was not aware that it was “to apply only some of the evidence and
arguments against some parties and not others.” (Id. at 43.) Austin also points out
that the trial court instructed the jury in LANTA’s property damage case that it must
consider whether Amato or its employees were negligent.                Because of this
instruction, Austin argues the trial court made no distinction between Austin’s case
and LANTA’s case and that if the jury found Amato negligent, it was not evidence
that Austin was negligent. (Id. at 45-46.)
      LANTA responds the trial court properly instructed the jury and the
instructions did not mislead the jury or omit relevant law. (LANTA’s Br. at 18.)
LANTA argues that for it to be a reversible error, a jury instruction must be
erroneous and prejudicial. (Id.) LANTA points out that the trial court reminded the
jury that “there are two separate cases.” (Id. at 19 (citing R.R. at 354a-55a).)
LANTA also argues, in the alternative, that if the trial court did err in its jury charge,

                                           17
it was harmless error because the verdict would nevertheless be the same as the jury
found Amato, by and through its employees, was negligent. (Id. at 20.) LANTA
contends that “[i]f a ruling cannot be deemed to have affected the verdict, then it
cannot be grounds for interfering with the jury’s decision.” (Id. at 21.) LANTA also
argues that Austin, in his case, had the burden to prove LANTA was negligent and
the jury’s verdict shows Austin did not meet his burden. (Id. at 23.)
             2.    Analysis
      As this Court has recognized:

      “[T]he primary duty of a trial judge in instructing a jury is to clarify the
      issues so that the jury is able to comprehend the question they are to
      decide.” Chicchi v. S[e.] P[a.] Transp[.] Auth[.], 727 A.2d 604, 609
      (Pa. Cmwlth.[]), petition for allowance of appeal denied, . . . 747 A.2d
      371 ([Pa.] 1999). Where the jury instruction fairly and accurately
      apprises the jury of the relevant law, a new trial is not warranted. Id.
      A jury instruction, when considered in its entirety, must be not only
      erroneous but also prejudicial to the complaining party to constitute
      reversible error.

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 808 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
      The trial court instructed the jury on negligence, reminded the jury that there
were two separate cases, precluded Amato from appearing on Austin’s verdict slip
as LANTA requested, and walked the jury through the two separate verdict slips.
(R.R. at 321a-434a.) In Austin’s personal injury case, the verdict slip first asked
whether Fenty, and therefore LANTA, violated any traffic laws or was negligent in
operating the bus. Austin requested the trial court to instruct the jury that Amato’s
negligence could not be imputed to Austin and to preclude Amato from appearing
on Austin’s verdict slip. The trial court partially granted Austin’s request and did
not include Amato on Austin’s jury slip; but the trial court did not instruct the jury
that Amato’s negligence could not be imputed to Austin and instead reiterated that

                                          18
there were two separate cases and that the jury should follow the verdict slips
literally. (Id. at 354a-55a.) For a jury instruction to constitute reversible error, it has
to be erroneous and prejudicial. Johnson, 808 A.2d at 980. In Austin’s case, the
jury found that Fenty, and therefore LANTA, did not violate any traffic laws or was
negligent. As stated above, Austin had the burden to prove that LANTA was
negligent in his case. Because the jury found that LANTA was not negligent, Austin
was barred from recovery. Therefore, even if the trial court’s jury instructions were
erroneous, there was no prejudice to Austin because the jury did not find LANTA
negligent, barring recovery for Austin, and the jury did not reach the issue of whether
Austin was comparatively negligent. See Boyle v. Indep. Lift Truck, Inc., 6 A.3d
492, 497 (Pa. 2010) (holding “where a jury . . . finds no negligence on the part of a
defendant, any issue of comparative negligence no longer remains in the case, and
any purported error regarding a question on comparative negligence is non-
prejudicial, and does not serve as a basis for a new trial”).

III.   CONCLUSION
       In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austin’s Motion.
The trial court, in its discretion, consolidated LANTA’s and Austin’s cases. Further,
the trial court allowed evidence of Amato’s negligence to be considered in the
consolidated cases because it was relevant to whether LANTA was the cause of
Austin’s personal injuries. Last, Austin was not prejudiced by the trial court’s jury
instructions and, therefore, is not entitled to a new trial. As such, the entry of
judgment is affirmed.

                                         __________________________________________
                                         RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                            19
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rodney Austin and Kimberly             :
Moser, husband and wife                :
                                       :
                 v.                    :   No. 355 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Lehigh and Northampton                 :
Transportation Authority and Chvon     :
Fenty                                  :
                                       :
Appeal of: Rodney Austin               :

                                 ORDER

     NOW, January 25, 2024, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Lehigh County entered in favor of Lehigh and Northampton Transportation
Authority and Chvon Fenty, is AFFIRMED.

                                     __________________________________________
                                     RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge