Court Opinion

ID: 9536618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:03:25.575547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:50.914786
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the result of the majority opinion on applicability of the criminal trespass statute, and excusing a prospective juror. I dissent on affirmance of the conviction of Cutnose for assault in violation of § 40A-3-1, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6). The State of New Mexico did not have criminal jurisdiction in “Indian Country” within New Mexico to try Cutnose for aggravated assault. State v. Cutnose, 87 N. M. 307, 532 P.2d 896 (Ct.App.1974) (J. Sutin, dissenting). On December 20, 1974, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari in that case. A. What is meant by denial of certiorari? The denial of a petition for writ of certiorari by the court of last resort to review a decision of a court of intermediate appeal is not regarded as an affirmance of such decision which raises it to the dignity of final authority. The denial cannot be utilized as precedent or authority for or against the propositions urged or defended in such proceedings. It cannot be urged as approval of the rule announced in the court of intermediate appeal. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Bell, 116 So.2d 617 (Fla.1959); Campbell v. Schlaifer, 88 N.J.Super. 66, 210 A.2d 781 (1965); Fuller v. State of Alabama, 269 Ala. 657, 115 So.2d 118 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936, 80 S.Ct. 380, 4 L.Ed.2d 358; Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Bayles, 275 Ala. 206, 153 So.2d 639 (1963); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 198, pp. 349, 350. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491-92, 73 S.Ct. 397, 439, 97 L.Ed. 469, said: “The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion on the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times.” United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 43 S.Ct. 181, 182, 67 L.Ed. 361, 364. We have repeatedly indicated that a denial of certiorari means only that, for one reason or another which is seldom disclosed, and not infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do with the merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members of the Court who thought the case should be heard. Any departure from this fundamental rule in the type of case we are considering ought to be based on a showing that these denials of certiorari, unlike all the other denials, are in fact the essential equivalents of adjudication on the merits. In Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park Association, 4 Mich.App. 157, 144 N.W.2d 622, 627 (1966), Chief Judge Lesinski succinctly said: It is too basic to require a citation of authority that the denial of a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court is not authority for anything except that the Court has exercised its discretion to refuse to hear and decide the case on the merits. In American Motors Corp. v. Wisconsin Employ. Rel. Bd., 32 Wis.2d 237, 145 N. W.2d 137, 141, 30 A.L.R.3d 419 (1966), the court said: Certiorari may be denied for a number of reasons other than the merits of the case. Denial of certiorari is a way in which the United States Supreme Court controls its work load and only cases of great importance are handled. The denial of certiorari in State v. Cut-nose “imports no expression of opinion on the merits of the case”. B. Cases of first impression are matters of importance to be determined with finality. In the dissent of State v. Cutnose, I stated: The State’s jurisdiction involves one issue of Indian-State relations never before decided — the meaning of a “dependent Indian community”. Until finality of this issue is determined, Indian-State relationships will remain uncertain. “The problem of jurisdiction — the flow of power over Indian affairs from government to government — presents an unusual rich field for testing where and when it has been deemed critical for the dominant society to assert its laws and impose its judicial system over a fragmented minority.” Price, Law and The American Indian (Bobbs-Merrill, 1973, vii). The Congress of the United States declared that “the term ‘Indian country’ * * * means * * * all dependent Indian communities * * * whether within or without the limits of a state * * *” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (1966). Congress intended to broaden the scope of the meaning of “Indian Country”. The state and its Indian tribes should seek entry into the Supreme Court of the United States in search of finality of the meaning of “dependent Indian communities”. It will be a guiding light for all states and Indian tribes in this country. The failure to decide cases of first impression in Indian-State relationships, as well as other fields of law, leads to misunderstandings in district courts, intermediate courts of appeal, persons involved and their attorneys. It leads to conflicting decisions, diatribes, and unending confusion in the search for justice.'