Court Opinion

ID: 9740062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:27:12.203072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.827514
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: In the case at bar, defendant argues that his conviction for first degree murder based on the commission of a felony (felony murder) cannot stand because it is premised on the death of a cofelon at the hands of an innocent agent. He advocates that we abandon the proximate cause theory in favor of the agency theory for imposition of liability under the felony-murder rule. The majority reaffirms this court’s adherence to the proximate cause theory for imposing liability and affirms defendant’s conviction relying on People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247 (1998), wherein it was held that “denying liability when the decedent is a cofelon would conflict with the legislature’s adoption of the proximate cause theory.” Respectfully, I disagree. I joined Justice Bilandic’s dissent in Dekens and continue to maintain that application of the proximate cause theory does not compel us to impose liability for murder under the felony-murder rule when the deceased is a cofelon. Moreover, I find the proximate cause theory particularly inapplicable under the facts of the present case. In Dekens, Justice Bilandic presented cogent reasons for rejecting an interpretation of the felony-murder rule which would permit a defendant to be held liable for murder when the life that is taken in the course of a forcible felony is that of a coparticipant in the underlying felony. Justice Bilandic wrote: “When a defendant’s commission of a forcible felony proximately results in the death of an innocent party, I agree that charging the defendant with murder may comport with notions of justice and fairness. There is, however, simply a qualitative difference between that situation and the situation presented here, where the death which resulted was that of a coparticipant in the underlying felony. As one renowned treatise on criminal law has noted: ‘[I]t is now generally accepted that there is no felony murder liability when one of the felons is shot and killed by the victim, a police officer, or a bystander ***. A more plausible explanation [for this conclusion] is the feeling that it is not justice (though it may be poetic justice) to hold the felon liable for murder on account of the death, which the felon did not intend, of a co-felon willingly participating in the risky venture. It is true that it is no defense to intentional homicide crimes that the victim voluntarily placed himself in danger of death at the hands of the defendant ***. But with unintended killings it would seem proper to take the victim’s willing participation into account ***.’ W. LaFave & A. Scott, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 7.5, at 217-18 (1986). The majority provides no explanation for how the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is served by applying it in cases such as this. Rather, the majority’s holding is simply that the proximate cause theory ‘compels’ this result. *** I disagree with this conclusion. Where a cofelon is killed by a third party, the most direct cause of the death is the cofelon’s participation in the felony, not the defendant’s acts. Contrary to the majority’s characterization, this distinction does not go to the ‘guilt or innocence’ of the decedent. Rather, this distinction pertains to the ‘proximate cause’ of the death. Significantly, we are not here considering an issue of tort liability, hut an issue of imposing criminal liability for first degree murder with the severe consequences that entails. In my view, the distinction between a third party killing an innocent party and a third party killing a participant in the felony must be accorded weight. It is illogical to conclude that the same degree of guilt should attach where a defendant’s felony results in the death of an innocent party and where it results in the death of an active participant in the felony.” (Emphasis in original.) Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d at 256-57 (Bilandic, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.). Here, again, the majority fails to explain why the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is served by applying it in cases such as this. Moreover, the majority fails to properly analyze and apply the proximate cause theory, particularly under the facts of the present case. In the case at bar, defendant drove his friend Winters into Chicago, knowing that Winters intended to commit an armed robbery there. When they arrived in Chicago, Winters exited defendant’s car to look for a suitable robbery victim. Defendant waited in the car for Winters to return so that defendant could provide Winters with transportation out of the city. Winters never returned to defendant’s car, however, because after Winters committed an armed robbery, Winters was shot and killed by the victim, who happened to be an off-duty police officer. As recognized in Dekens, “the focus of the proximate cause theory is on the chain of events set in motion by the defendant.” Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d at 254. In the case at bar, defendant’s participation in the armed robbery was limited to providing transportation to Winters. While defendant’s involvement is sufficient to hold him accountable for the armed robbery, it is too attenuated to support a finding that his conduct set in motion the chain of events leading to Winters’ death. Here, even more so than in Dekens, the most direct cause of the cofelon’s death is the cofelon’s participation in the felony and not any conduct of the defendant. For all of the above-stated reasons, I believe that defendant’s conviction for first degree murder is not consonant with notions of justice and fairness and should be reversed. Accordingly, I dissent.