Court Opinion

ID: 9758963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:57:37.345856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:41.342542
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that it was error for the trial court not to inquire into Hatfield’s understanding of the legal process and the serious implications of self-representation. Thus, I, too, conclude that there was no knowing or intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. See Faretta v California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Bledsoe v. State, 337 Ark. 403, 989 S.W.2d 510 (1999). Where I part company with the majority is on whether Hatfield, after he decided to represent himself, relinquished his representation to standby counsel, Dave Harrod. The test for this determination is whether standby counsel’s assistance at trial was substantial such that counsel was effectively conducting a defense. Bledsoe v. State, supra; Oliver v. State, 323 Ark. 743, 918 S.W.2d 690 (1996); Calamese v. State, 276 Ark. 422, 635 S.W.2d 261 (1982). While Dave Harrod did assist as counsel for voir dire and the third day of the trial, I cannot conclude that he effectively conducted a defense. Accordingly, this case turns on whether Hatfield knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. As already stated, I do not believe he did. What the trial court created in this case was a hybrid situation. Harrod was not relieved as counsel. Yet Hatfield was allowed to try his own case because his defense strategy differed from that of his standby counsel’s: The Court: So you’re still Counsel on the case. Standby Counsel: Yes, sir. I just — I just want to [be] clear, Judge, that Mr. Hatfield’s desire is to proceed with the case in his own fashion. And his method does not match the Defense method and rather than appear at loggerheads I think his decision to go-forward is — is reasonable. And I — I think that sitting in a position where I can, you know, if he calls I can be of assistance. I don’t mind doing that a bit. If there’s any question that comes up on his part I don’t mind answering that at all. This is not personal it’s just — just a — The Court: Trial strategy. Standby Counsel: Trial strategy and case methodology management dis — disagreement. The result was that Hatfield represented himself in opening statement and through the first eleven witnesses. The results were catastrophic as evidenced by Hatfield’s admission that his footprints were at the crime scene: Hatfield: Okay. And, ah, what about the tracks? Deputy Sheriff: I made no reference to whose footprints they were. That’s a true statement. Hatfield: Sure you did. Sure you did. I’ve got a — I’ve got lab number 991202, ah, 9912060391K87. What that is — is a copy of my left and right shoe print. At trial, Hatfield questioned all of the State’s witnesses until the third day of the trial. All told, there were twenty-one witnesses. Of those witnesses, eleven were handled solely by Hatfield. Those eleven witnesses included seminal witnesses for the prosecution, including forensic witnesses: • Cordellia Ireland, victim’s mother; • State Police Trooper Dustin Rogers, regarding arrest; • FBI Agent Daniel Wehr, regarding 29 exhibits from crime scene; • Sheriff Detective Jack Allen, regarding fingerprints; • Sheriff Detective Terry Ward, regarding rape exam; • FBI fingerprint specialist, Kenneth Dunn, regarding fingerprints; • Sheriff Deputy Lonnie Massey, regarding transporting victim to hospital; • Sheriff Deputy Richard Houchin, regarding chain of custody for crime scene exhibits (20 exhibits admitted without objection); • Medical Resident Gwynetta Collins, regarding rape kit and rape exam; • FBI Lab Instructor Monica Knuckles, regarding chain of custody; and • State Police Criminal Investigator Lorelei Sellers, regarding victim interview and condition. It was the forensic evidence that was most damning in Hatfield’s case. Hatfield, of course, knew nothing about chain of custody, the handling of a rape kit, fingerprint matchups, or specialized scientific forensic testimony that the State adduced during the time Hatfield was at the helm of his own defense. As a result, I am hard-pressed to conclude that standby counsel effectively conducted a defense. Not only did he not make the opening statement or cross-examine the State’s first eleven witnesses, he called no witnesses for the defense at all. The majority relies heavily on the Oliver and Calamese cases, but the facts in those cases are easily distinguishable from the facts of this case. This court observed in the Bledsoe decision: In Calamese, supra, there was no evidence of any inquiry by the trial court into the appellant’s attempted waiver of counsel, but we determined that the appellant had been effectively represented at trial by the attorney appointed to assist her. We noted that the attorney “immediately assumed a fully active role as trial attorney, conducting the entire interrogation, cross-examination, making objections to evidence and exhibits, presenting a defense with numerous exhibits and four defense witnesses, including eliciting lengthy testimony from the defendant and making a forceful closing argument, all of which was done with evident familiarity.” Id. Under those facts, we held that appellant was not left to represent herself at any stage of the proceedings, and she was not denied her right to counsel. Id. Similarly, in Oliver, supra, no effective waiver was obtained when the defendant elected to proceed pro se and standby counsel was appointed to assist during trial. As in Calamese, we affirmed the conviction where, with the exception of the defendant’s cross-examination of the first State witness, standby counsel cross-examined each State witness, made objections during the State’s case, and presented a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the State’s case. Id. Further, standby counsel recalled the State’s first witness and examined him as well as the remaining six defense witnesses. Id. Counsel also made the closing argument. Id. Under such circumstances, we held that the defendant was not denied his right to counsel because standby counsel not only advised the defendant but “actively represented him during most of the proceeding,” and the defendant “effectively relinquished representation to his standby counsel” early in the trial. Id. (emphasis added). Bledsoe, 337 Ark. at 410-11, 989 S.W.2d at 514. Mounting a substantial and effective defense means more than cross-examining State witnesses the third day of the trial. In Calamese, defense counsel presented numerous witnesses and exhibits, made objections throughout the trial, and put the defendant on the stand. There can be little doubt that in Calamese, the standby counsel actively pursued a defense. Likewise, in Oliver standby counsel called six defense witnesses, recalled one of the State’s witnesses, and made objections throughout the State’s case. Looking at Calamese and Oliver, it is apparent from an inspection of those facts that defense counsel was involved in both cases sufficiently to have formed and implemented a defense strategy. In sum, Hatfield chose to represent himself, but he did so without being made sufficiently aware by the trial court of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Faretta v. California, supra. Thus, the record in this case fails to establish that he knew what he was doing and made his choice with eyes open. See id. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Imber and Thornton, JJ., join.