Court Opinion

ID: 9579489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:55:43.302785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:33.457496
License: Public Domain

Justice Copeland
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that the admission of testimony concerning the defendant’s employment in an adult bookstore four years before the trial was not prejudicial. I first would like to point out that the majority is correct in asserting that the failure to object *746to, or move to strike, immediately upon discovery of the objectional nature of the evidence, is a waiver of an objection to that evidence. State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 277 S.E. 2d 376 (1981). However, in our recent decision in State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E. 2d 375 (1983) we adopted the “plain error” rule to allow review of some assignments of error which are banned by waiver rules. While the “plain error” rule must be applied in only exceptional cases, it may be applied when the error results in the defendant being denied a fair trial. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E. 2d 375 (1983). I believe the evidence concerning the defendant’s employment in an adult bookstore did deny him a fair trial.
The case against the defendant was built around the testimony of an eight year old child. It was simply a question of who the jury would believe; and as a result the defendant’s credibility was a crucial aspect of the jury’s final decision. The introduction into evidence of the defendant’s employment in an adult bookstore made him, a person charged with a deviant sex act, appear to be a peddler of deviant sexual material. It would be difficult to conceive of evidence more damaging to defendant’s case than this. The majority shrugs this off by stating that the defendant’s credibility was already seriously damaged by his admission that he was convicted for making “harassing and annoying telephone calls.” The record does not indicate whether the harassing and annoying calls were of a sexual nature. As a result, I feel the evidence which depicted defendant as a man who had worked with deviant sexual material was so prejudicial that it made a large contribution to his conviction.
The majority seems to assume, and I agree, that the evidence was incompetent. Upon motion, the evidence would have properly been stricken. This is so because operating an adult bookstore and selling pornographic material, absent a showing that the material sold was obscene, is not an act of misconduct. Although not an act of misconduct and therefore not legally available for impeachment, this kind of activity would nevertheless weigh heavily on the minds of the jurors.
For these reasons I vote for a new trial.
Justice EXUM joins in this dissenting opinion.