Court Opinion

ID: 2964774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:54.691588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.319620
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                ____________________
       No. 94-1593 
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                 PASQUALE G. BARONE,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                      [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                     Campbell and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
            Bernard Grossberg for appellant.
            Cynthia A. Young, Attorney, United  States Department of Justice,
       with 
            whom 
                Donald 
                       K. 
                         Stern, United States Attorney, and Jeffrey Auerhahn,
       Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                    June 6, 1997
                                ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.   Defendant-appellant
            Pasquale 
                    G. 
                      "Patsy" 
                              Barone and seven co-defendants were charged
            in 
              a 
                sixty-five-count superseding indictment with a variety of
            RICO1 and other offenses.  The indictment charged Barone with
            RICO conspiracy in  violation of 18  U.S.C. S 1962(d)  (Count
            One); the underlying substantive RICO offense in violation of
            18 U.S.C.  S 1962(c) (Count  Two); conspiracy  to commit  the
            murder  of  Vincent  James "Jimmy"  Limoli,  Jr.  in  aid  of
            racketeering 
                        (Count Three), and the murder of Limoli in aid of
            racketeering (Count  Four), both  in violation  of 18  U.S.C.
            S 1952(B), now codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. S 1959.
                      Because of the pendency of the government's  appeal
            from the  district court's ruling in  favor of Barone on  his
            motion to suppress certain post-arrest statements, see United
            States v.  Barone, No. 89-289-WF,  1991 WL  353883 (D.  Mass.
            1.  RICO refers to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
            Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-1968.  The provisions
            pertinent to this appeal, 18 U.S.C. S 1962 subsections (c)
            and (d), read as follows:
                           (c) It shall be unlawful for any
                      person employed by or associated with any
                      enterprise engaged in, or the activities
                      of which affect, interstate or foreign
                      commerce, to conduct or participate,
                      directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
                      such enterprise's affairs through a
                      pattern of racketeering activity or
                      collection of unlawful debt.
                           (d) It shall be unlawful for any
                      person to conspire to violate any of the
                      provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)
                      of this section.
                                         -2-
                                          2

            Aug.  21, 1991), aff'd,  968 F.2d 1378  (1st Cir. 1992),  the
            district 
                    court 
                         ordered 
                                 that Barone be tried separately from his
            co-defendants (who,  with  the exception  of  one who  was  a
            fugitive at  the  time,  subsequently pleaded  guilty).    On
            October 20,  1993,  after a  nine-week  trial, the  case  was
            submitted 
                     to 
                        the 
                           jury. 
                                  
                                  On October 25, and again on October 27,
            1993,  the   district  court  gave   the  jury  a   "modified
            Allen charge"  in response  to communications  from the  jury
            indicating that it was deadlocked.  On October 28, 1993,  the
            district court, acting pursuant  to Federal Rule of  Criminal
            Procedure 23(b), dismissed  one of the jurors for just  cause
            after 
                 conducting 
                           a 
                             lengthy inquiry into the effect on the juror
            and the  jury of the  juror's unsolicited  receipt of  extra-
            judicial 
                    information 
                               from a Federal Protective Service Officer.
            Having determined that the  remaining jurors were capable  of
            continuing to deliberate fairly and impartially, the district
            court exercised its discretion under Rule 23(b) to allow  the
            remaining 
                     eleven 
                           jurors 
                                  to deliberate to a verdict, rather than
            declare a mistrial.  
                      On 
                        October 
                                29, 1993, the eleven-member jury returned
            verdicts of guilty as to Counts One through Three, but failed
            to agree as to Count  Four, the murder charge.  The  district
            court accepted the  jury's verdicts as to Counts One  through
            Three  and  declared  a  mistrial  as  to  Count  Four.    On
            December 
                    20, 
                       1993, 
                             Barone filed a motion for a new trial, which
                                         -3-
                                          3

            the district court denied on January 25, 1994.  United States
            v. Barone, 846 F. Supp. 1016  (D. Mass. 1994).  On April  25,
            1994, 
                 the 
                     court sentenced Barone to life imprisonment on Count
            Three and to twenty years on each of Counts One and Two, with
            each sentence  to  be served  concurrently with  the  others.
            Barone now appeals his conviction.  We affirm.
                                         I.
                      The  superseding  indictment  charged  Barone  with
            agreeing to participate  and participating  in the  following
            predicate 
                     acts 
                         of 
                            racketeering, see United States v. Saccoccia,
            58 F.3d 754, 764 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---,
            116 S.  Ct. 1322 (1996), as  an "associate" of the  Patriarca
            Family 
                  of 
                     La 
                        Cosa Nostra (also known as the Mafia; hereinafter
            "LCN"), alleged to  be the RICO enterprise: (i) assault  with
            intent to  murder, murder  of Anthony  "Dapper" Corlito,  and
            conspiracy 
                      to do the same; (ii) assault with intent to murder,
            murder of  Jimmy  Limoli on  behalf  of Vincent  M.  "Vinnie"
            Ferrara, 
                    and 
                        conspiracy to do the same; and (iii) assault with
            intent 
                  to 
                     murder Social Services Credit Union ("credit union")
            security guard  Kenneth McPhee,  assault with  intent to  rob
            Kenneth McPhee and credit  union employee Lucy LoPriore,  and
            robbery of Lucy LoPriore of property belonging to the  credit
            union.  The indictment  also charged Barone with a number  of
            overt acts of the racketeering conspiracy. 
                                         -4-
                                          4

                      We summarize the facts relating to these  predicate
            acts, 
                 insofar as relevant to the issues raised in this appeal,
            taking the evidence as the jury could permissibly have  found
            it,  and  viewing  the  record  and  drawing  all  reasonable
            inferences 
                      in 
                         the 
                            light 
                                  most favorable to the government.  See,
            e.g.
               , 
                 United 
                        States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1990).
                      The testimony of  expert and cooperating  witnesses
            established  the existence,  structure,  and  nature  of  the
            Patriarca Family -- as  an organized "enterprise" within  the
            meaning of 18 U.S.C. S 1961(4), conspiring to and engaging in
            loansharking,
                         bookmaking, drug trafficking, extortion, murder,
            obstruction of  justice, and  other illegal  activity --  and
            Barone's 
                    activities 
                              and 
                                  relationships to others as an associate
            of  the Patriarca  Family.   See generally  United States  v.
            Angiulo, 847 F.2d  956, 973-75 (1st Cir. 1988) (allowing  FBI
            agent to  testify as an  expert regarding  the structure  and
            operations of the Patriarca Family of LCN, and the nature  of
            the defendants' relationships to the organization).  
                      In the early 1980s, the Patriarca Family was run by
            boss  Raymond  Patriarca,  Sr.,  underboss  Gennaro   "Gerry"
            Angiulo, consigliere Vittore Nicolo Angiulo, and capo regimes
            including Donato F. "Danny"  Angiulo, Samuel S. Granito,  and
            Ilario 
                  M.A. 
                       Zannino.  When Raymond Patriarca, Sr. died in July
            1984, 
                 Raymond 
                        Patriarca, 
                                   Jr. became the boss and William Grasso
            became  the underboss.   In the late  1970s and early  1980s,
                                         -5-
                                          5

            Vincent Ferrara  was  an associate  of the  Patriarca  Family
            assigned to  the regime of Danny  Angiulo.  In 1983,  Ferrara
            became 
                  a 
                    "made member" and soldier in Danny Angiulo's regime.2
            Barone and  his close friend  Limoli were  associates of  the
            Patriarca Family who both wanted to become "made members"  of
            the organization, and who  began their efforts to  accomplish
            this goal  by selling illegal  fireworks for  Ferrara in  the
            1970s.
                      Walter  Anthony   Jordan   (hereinafter   "Jordan")
            testified for the government  at Barone's trial.  He and  his
            brother Chris  Jordan were also  associates of the  Patriarca
            Family.  Jordan met Barone  and Limoli in late 1981 or  early
            1982.  Barone later married Jordan's sister Kim.  Limoli  was
            Barone's 
                    best 
                         man 
                            at 
                               the 
                                   wedding and became godfather to Barone
            and 
               Kim's 
                     child.  Beginning in the summer of 1984, Jordan sold
            illegal 
                   fireworks, 
                             giving the money from the sales to Limoli or
            Barone.  Jordan testified  that Barone told him that all  the
            2.  According to the government's evidence, an LCN family is
            headed by a "boss," with an "underboss" as second in command. 
            The official counselor or advisor to the family is known as
            the "consigliere."  Below the underboss are "capo regimes,"
            or captains of the LCN family.  Assigned to each capo regime
            are "soldiers," who are "made members" of the family.  An
            individual who has been nominated for membership in the
            family is a "proposed member," and an "associate" is one who,
            although not a "made member," works for or performs services
            for the family.  Members and associates are required to obey
            their superiors in the family, to obtain permission from
            their superiors before engaging in criminal activity, and to
            commit criminal acts, including murder, as directed by their
            superiors.  
                                         -6-
                                          6

            money from these sales went to Ferrara, with Barone receiving
            a percentage,  along  with Ferrara's  loyalty.   Jordan  also
            testified that  Barone  told  him that  he  needed  Ferrara's
            permission 
                      in order to commit any illegal activities, and that
            he was "under [Ferrara's] wing," and would be a "made member"
            of the Patriarca Family one day, moving up in the ranks  with
            Ferrara.  
                      One 
                         of 
                            the 
                                predicate acts of racketeering with which
            Barone 
                  was 
                      charged 
                             is 
                                the murder of Anthony Corlito, who, along
            with Giacomo A. "Jackie" DiFronzo and others, was a member of
            a rival  North End gang.   Jordan testified that Ferrara  and
            DiFronzo "didn't get along" because DiFronzo had "ripped off"
            the Angiulos'  North End card  games during  the late  1970s.
            Elizabeth 
                     DiNunzio, 
                              Limoli's sister, testified that Limoli told
            her that Gerry Angiulo hired Ferrara -- who then enlisted the
            aid of Limoli -- to kill DiFronzo because DiFronzo "had a bad
            drug problem"  and "was robbing all  the people in the  North
            End."   DiNunzio  testified that  Limoli  told her  that,  on
            December 
                    11, 
                        1977, after fighting with DiFronzo at an Endicott
            Street club, Ferrara  shot DiFronzo in the head; that  Limoli
            thereafter 
                      kicked 
                            DiFronzo in the head; and that the two placed
            DiFronzo in a chair and set the chair and the club on fire.
                      Jordan testified  that Corlito  swore vengeance  on
            Ferrara  for the  murder of  DiFronzo, and  that Corlito  was
            murdered by  Ferrara, Limoli, and  Barone on  July 21,  1979.
                                         -7-
                                          7

            According to  Jordan, Barone told  him that  he, Limoli,  and
            Ferrara came upon Corlito and his girlfriend on Fleet  Street
            and 
               started 
                       shooting 
                               at 
                                  Corlito.  After Ferrara left the scene,
            Limoli 
                  continued to fire at Corlito and Barone urged Limoli to
            leave.  Eventually, Barone and Limoli ran to Hanover  Street,
            where they got into a car and drove off.  DiNunzio  testified
            that 
                Limoli 
                       told 
                           her 
                               that Ferrara paid Limoli and Barone $1,000
            each for killing Corlito.
                      Another racketeering offense with which Barone  was
            charged 
                   is 
                      the November 5, 1982 robbery of credit union teller
            Lucy 
                LoPriore 
                         of 
                           a 
                             bag 
                                 of cash belonging to the credit union as
            she and security  guard Kenneth McPhee walked from the  First
            National Bank  on Hanover Street to  the credit union at  the
            corner of  Parmenter  and Salem  Streets  in the  North  End.
            According 
                     to 
                        witnesses, the robbery occurred between 10:00 and
            10:30 a.m.  and was perpetrated  by two masked  men.  In  the
            course of the robbery, McPhee was shot in the calf and in the
            neck.  The owner of a Salem Street hardware store saw  Limoli
            run down Salem Street from Parmenter Street.  
                      Jordan testified that Barone  told him that he  and
            Limoli were responsible  for the robbery and that Barone  had
            shot the security  guard in the neck.   Barone said that  the
            stolen cash amounted to $30,000, with Ferrara taking $15,000,
            and Limoli and Barone splitting the rest between them. 
                                         -8-
                                          8

                      DiNunzio 
                              testified 
                                       that, 
                                             on the morning of the credit
            union robbery,  Limoli came to her  house carrying a box  and
            asked her for lemon juice, saying that if you wash your hands
            with lemon  juice, "they  can't tell  that you  shot a  gun."
            According to DiNunzio, after the robbery was reported on  the
            noontime news, Limoli admitted to her that he and Barone  had
            committed the robbery; that he had shot security guard McPhee
            in the  foot; and that  Barone had shot  McPhee in the  neck.
            DiNunzio testified that Barone and Chris Jordan later  joined
            Limoli 
                  at 
                     her house, at which time Barone admitted that he had
            shot the guard in the neck.
                      Barone was also charged with the murder of  Limoli,
            which had its origins in  a plan hatched by Limoli and  Frank
            Salemme, 
                    Jr. 
                        to commit another in a series of "drug rip-offs,"
            executed by passing off wood chips or peat moss as marijuana.
            Jordan 
                  and 
                     DiNunzio 
                              testified that in the spring of 1985, while
            Limoli was  in Florida,  Salemme, Jr.  and others,  including
            Walter Jordan,  went ahead with  the planned rip-off  scheme,
            although  Limoli had asked  Salemme, Jr. to  wait for him  to
            return to town before "doing the deal."  When Limoli  learned
            that 
                Salemme, Jr. and his cohorts had completed the rip-off by
            delivering peat moss in exchange for a $100,000 down payment,
            he 
              vowed 
                    to 
                       get even with Salemme, Jr. for cheating him out of
            $35,000.
                                         -9-
                                          9

                      Jordan testified that in September of 1985,  Barone
            told  him that Limoli  had stolen a  bag containing cash  and
            $100,000 
                    worth 
                         of 
                            cocaine that he believed belonged to Salemme,
            Jr., but  which  actually  belonged to  Antonio  L.  "Spucky"
            Spagnolo, a Patriarca Family  soldier.  According to  Jordan,
            Barone 
                  told 
                       him that Limoli gave $30,000 of the stolen cash to
            Barone and that Barone kept the cash in his freezer until the
            cash 
                and 
                    cocaine were eventually returned.  DiNunzio testified
            that Limoli told her that  he took the bag to his  girlfriend
            Lena  Chiuchiolo's house; that  he was seen  with the bag  by
            Lena's sister Annette, who was Salemme, Jr.'s girlfriend; and
            that 
                Annette 
                       told 
                            Salemme, Jr. what she had seen.  According to
            DiNunzio, Limoli told her that the story of his theft of  the
            bag 
               eventually reached Spagnolo, the true owner of the bag, as
            well as other, high-level Patriarca Family members.  
                      Limoli 
                            told 
                                DiNunzio 
                                         that he was questioned about the
            incident in separate meetings  with Samuel Granito and  Frank
            Salemme, Sr., and during an alleyway "meeting" with  Salemme,
            Jr., 
                Danny 
                      Angiulo, Ferrara, Spagnolo, and Peter "Doc" Limone.
            Limoli  told DiNunzio  that, in  the course  of the  alleyway
            meeting, he repeatedly denied taking the bag, but  eventually
            admitted 
                    it 
                       when 
                           he 
                              was 
                                  told that Annette had seen him with the
            bag 
               and 
                   had 
                      told 
                           Salemme, Jr. about it.  According to DiNunzio,
            Ferrara  told Limoli,  "I could  whack you  right here,"  but
            "[w]e'll forget about it and let's go on from here."   Limoli
                                        -10-
                                         10

            told 
                DiNunzio 
                        that 
                             "that's not the way the guys work," and that
            he knew that they were going to kill him.
                      Jordan testified that Barone told him that, because
            he 
              had 
                  stolen 
                        from 
                             a 
                               made member of the LCN, "Jimmy got the X,"
            meaning 
                   that 
                        he 
                          (Limoli) 
                                   would no longer be permitted to engage
            in LCN activities.  A  week or two later, Barone told  Jordan
            that  Ferrara  had ordered  Limoli  killed  because  of  this
            incident. 
                      
                      According 
                               to 
                                  Jordan, he was with Barone when Ferrara
            called 
                  Barone 
                         at 
                           home 
                                on 
                                   the evening of October 28, 1985 to say
            that 
                Limoli 
                       had 
                          to 
                             be 
                                killed.  On Barone's instructions, Jordan
            called Limoli to set up  a deal involving the sale of  drugs,
            with a meeting to take place at about 8:00 p.m. that night at
            D'Amore's  Restaurant in the  North End.   The two then  left
            Barone's 
                    house, each carrying gloves and Barone carrying a .38
            caliber revolver.  
                      Jordan testified that, on Barone's instructions, he
            called 
                  Limoli at D'Amore's from the nearby European Restaurant
            before  the two  went to  meet  him.   When they  arrived  at
            D'Amore's, Jordan went inside to get Limoli, and when  Limoli
            came 
                out 
                    of 
                       the restaurant and saw Barone, he told Jordan that
            he 
              had 
                  wanted him to come alone.  Limoli then talked privately
            with Barone, after which he returned to the restaurant  while
            Barone 
                  and 
                      Jordan 
                            left 
                                 to retrieve Barone's car, which they had
            parked  elsewhere.    When  Barone  and  Jordan  returned  to
                                        -11-
                                         11

            D'Amore's, 
                      Limoli left the restaurant and got into the waiting
            car, which then drove off, with Jordan driving. 
                      Maureen   Karpowicz-DiPietro,   Limoli's    cousin,
            testified that, shortly after 8:00 p.m. on October 28,  1985,
            she and a friend went with Limoli to D'Amore's, where  Limoli
            received a  telephone  call and  then  a visit  from  Jordan.
            According 
                     to 
                        Karpowicz-DiPietro, Limoli met Jordan outside the
            restaurant and  apparently became angry  when he saw  Barone.
            Limoli yelled at Jordan but then talked privately with Barone
            before returning to  the restaurant.  Jordan and Barone  then
            left, returning  to  D'Amore's shortly  after 10:00  p.m.  in
            Barone's car.  Karpowicz-DiPietro testified that Limoli put a
            cloth napkin in  a brown paper bag,  said "that will do  it,"
            asked her to meet him later, and then left the restaurant  to
            join Barone and Jordan.  DiNunzio testified that Limoli  told
            her that he was going to rob Barone and Jordan that night. 
                      Jordan testified that, after he parked the car next
            to  the cemetery  at the  intersection of  Snowhill and  Hull
            Streets, the  three men  got out of  the car.   According  to
            Jordan, Barone shot Limoli in  the back of the head at  about
            10:25 
                 p.m. 
                      as 
                        the 
                            three 
                                  men walked up Hull Street.  When Limoli
            fell to the ground,  Jordan grabbed the brown paper bag  that
            Limoli was carrying and  then ran back down Hull Street  with
            Barone. 
                    
                    After they crossed Snowhill Street, Jordan discovered
            that the bag contained only cloth napkins.  Jordan  testified
                                        -12-
                                         12

            that, after the  discovery, Barone ran  back up Hull  Street,
            followed by Jordan,  and that when he reached Limoli,  Barone
            leaned 
                  over 
                       him, shouted "Why, Jimmy?" and fired the remaining
            bullets into Limoli's  head.  Barone then directed Jordan  to
            search Limoli's body for money, which Jordan did, finding and
            taking 
                  a 
                    wad 
                       of 
                          $100 
                               bills and a .45 caliber gun, both of which
            he gave to Barone.  At this point Barone said, "Walter, let's
            go,"  and  the  two began  running  back  down  Hull  Street,
            eventually 
                      arriving 
                              at 
                                 Barone's house.  While there, Barone put
            the murder weapon into a plastic garbage bag, along with  his
            clothes 
                   and 
                       Jordan's clothes.  The next day, Barone and Jordan
            walked out onto a  pier with the bag  and the gun and  Barone
            threw them both into Boston Harbor. 
                                         II.
                      Barone argues that Limoli's out-of-court statements
            were 
                inadmissible hearsay and that the district court erred by
            admitting them  over his objection  through the testimony  of
            Maureen  Karpowicz-DiPietro  and  Elizabeth  DiNunzio.    The
            district 
                    court admitted the hearsay testimony largely pursuant
            to Federal  Rule  of  Evidence 804(b)(3),  which  creates  an
            exception to  the  hearsay rule  for statements  against  the
            declarant's interest, including penal interest.   
                      Barone argues that the statements were inadmissible
            under 
                 Rule 
                     804(b)(3) 
                               because they were (i) not against Limoli's
            penal 
                 interest; (ii) not sufficiently corroborated by properly
                                        -13-
                                         13

            admitted independent evidence;  and (iii) inadmissible  under
            Williamson v. United  States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), which  was
            decided  while  Barone's  appeal  was  pending,  because  the
            statements 
                      are not individually self-inculpatory.  Barone also
            objects   to  the   admission  of   Limoli's  statements   on
            constitutional grounds, arguing that the introduction of this
            evidence 
                    violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of
            the Sixth Amendment. 
                                         A.
                                         1.
                      The  out-of-court statements  of  a  non-testifying
            declarant ordinarily  are excluded as  hearsay if offered  to
            prove the  truth of the matter  asserted.  See, e.g.,  United
            States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 1993).  The
            rule   against   hearsay   reflects   concerns   about    the
            trustworthiness of out-of-court statements, arising from  the
            fact 
                that 
                    such 
                         statements are not subject to the tests normally
            applied  to in-court  testimony  to ensure  its  reliability.
            Exceptions to the hearsay rule permit courts to admit certain
            hearsay  statements that  bear  indicia  of  reliability  and
            trustworthiness sufficient to overcome these concerns.
                      One  such exception  is  Federal Rule  of  Evidence
            804(b)(3), which provides that,  if the hearsay declarant  is
            unavailable 
                       to 
                         testify 
                                 as an in-court witness (a point which is
            not in dispute here), the hearsay rule does not exclude
                                        -14-
                                         14

                      A statement which was at the time of  its
                      making so far contrary to the declarant's
                      pecuniary or proprietary interest, or  so
                      far tended  to subject  the declarant  to
                      civil or criminal liability, . . . that a
                      reasonable  person  in  the   declarant's
                      position 
                              would not have made the statement
                      unless  believing  it  to  be  true.    A
                      statement tending to expose the declarant
                      to  criminal  liability  and  offered  to
                      exculpate the  accused is not  admissible
                      unless 
                            corroborating circumstances clearly
                      indicate  the   trustworthiness  of   the
                      statement.
                      Barone 
                            moved 
                                  in
                                    
                                    limine
                                           
                                           to exclude Limoli's statements
            from 
                DiNunzio's testimony, arguing, as he does on appeal, that
            the  statements  do  not  meet  the  "against  interest"  and
            "corroborating circumstances" requirements of Rule 804(b)(3),
            and that the admission of these statements would violate  his
            confrontation
                         rights.  Barone raised no objection in limine to
            the testimony of Karpowicz-DiPietro.  
                      The  district  court  ruled  from  the  bench  that
            DiNunzio's proposed testimony regarding what Limoli told  her
            about his  criminal  activities, including  those  activities
            undertaken with Barone and others, was admissible under  Rule
            804(b)(3) as interpreted  by this court  in United States  v.
            Seeley
                 , 
                   892 
                       F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989), and that admission of this
            testimony would  not violate the  Confrontation Clause.   The
            court found that Limoli was unavailable; that his  statements
            regarding  his  participation in  crimes  on  behalf  of  the
            Patriarca Family  were against his  penal interest; and  that
            sufficient corroboration and indicia of reliability  attended
                                        -15-
                                         15

            the making  of the  statements.   The court  also ruled  that
            Federal Rule of Evidence  403 did not operate to exclude  the
            disputed evidence.
                      The  district court  found  that  the  context  and
            circumstances  in which  the  hearsay  statements  were  made
            demonstrated 
                        their trustworthiness and reliability.  The court
            reasoned  that Limoli  had made  the statements  to a  person
            (DiNunzio) with whom he had a very close relationship, rather
            than to the  police, and that he  therefore had no motive  to
            curry 
                 favor 
                       with law enforcement officials and no incentive to
            diminish his role  in the criminal activity described in  the
            statements 
                      by 
                        shifting 
                                 blame to Barone or to others.  The court
            also 
                found 
                      that the detailed nature of the statements, the in-
            court 
                 testimony 
                          of 
                             Walter Jordan and others, and other evidence
            (e.g.,   evidence  lawfully   obtained   through   electronic
            surveillance)  satisfied   the  corroborating   circumstances
            requirement 
                       of Rule 804(b)(3) and supplied the "particularized
            guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the  Confrontation
            Clause.    In addition,  while  noting  that,  under  Seeley,
            DiNunzio's  credibility was  not  part of  the  admissibility
            analysis but was a question for the jury, the district  judge
            nevertheless 
                        found 
                             that 
                                  DiNunzio had no reason to cast blame on
            Barone or to exculpate herself.     
                      The court recognized  that DiNunzio arguably  could
            have 
                been 
                     motivated to fabricate testimony by a desire to seek
                                        -16-
                                         16

            revenge for her brother's murder, but found it to be unlikely
            that someone who grew up  in the North End, as DiNunzio  did,
            would falsely accuse  Ferrara (who was well known and  widely
            reputed 
                   to 
                      be a dangerous Mafia killer) or his associates, and
            that  DiNunzio related  to  law enforcement  authorities  the
            essential elements of the challenged testimony before  Barone
            and 
               Ferrara 
                       were apprehended.  The court concluded that issues
            such 
                as 
                  DiNunzio's 
                             possible motive to fabricate ultimately went
            to  her credibility  (a jury  question), rather  than to  the
            trustworthiness  of the  hearsay  statements (a  question  of
            admissibility 
                         of 
                           evidence to be decided by the court), and that
            DiNunzio could be cross-examined on these matters.
                      The 
                         district 
                                 judge 
                                       concluded his ruling by cautioning
            that, 
                 although 
                          he 
                            would 
                                  admit the testimony generally, it would
            be 
              necessary 
                        to "go statement by statement to see if there are
            parts of it that are inadmissible."
                                         2.
                      Before  proceeding  to  our  analysis  of  Barone's
            evidentiary  challenge,  we must  iron  out  a  few  wrinkles
            concerning the extent to  which Barone may be deemed to  have
            preserved the issue  for appeal, and the related question  of
            what  standard  of review  under  Federal  Rule  of  Criminal
                                        -17-
                                         17

            Procedure 52  -- harmless error or  plain error -- should  be
            applied to this issue on appeal.3 
                      At 
                        trial, 
                              Barone 
                                     objected at the outset of Karpowicz-
            DiPietro's testimony (without stating the grounds), and  this
            objection  led  to a  side-bar  conference  that  included  a
            discussion  of the  admissibility of  Limoli's statements  as
            declarations  against penal  interest.    After  hearing  the
            government's 
                        outline 
                               of 
                                  Karpowicz-DiPietro's proposed testimony
            and 
               briefly 
                      entertaining 
                                   argument by both parties, the district
            court  ruled that  Limoli's  statements  were  admissible  as
            declarations against penal interest, but that his  statements
            regarding what Ferrara  reportedly said to  him would not  be
            allowed.    Barone  made  no  further  hearsay  objection  to
            Karpowicz-DiP
                        ietro's testimony, and failed altogether to renew
            his objection to the admission of Limoli's statements through
            DiNunzio's testimony, although  he objected several times  on
            other grounds.
                      We  find  Barone's  contemporaneous  objection   to
            Karpowicz-DiPietro's 
                                test
                                   imony to be sufficient to preserve the
            3.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 provides as
            follows:
                           (a)  Harmless Error.  Any error,
                      defect, irregularity or variance which
                      does not affect substantial rights shall
                      be disregarded.
                           (b)  Plain Error.  Plain errors or
                      defects affecting substantial rights may
                      be noticed although they were not brought
                      to the attention of the court.
                                        -18-
                                         18

            hearsay 
                   objection as to her testimony, and therefore the issue
            is subject  to harmless error  review under  Federal Rule  of
            Criminal  Procedure 52(a).    The question  whether  Barone's
            objection 
                     was properly preserved as to DiNunzio's testimony is
            a different matter,  however, because Barone did not, as  our
            case law requires, renew his hearsay objection at trial.4  
                      We have  repeatedly held that  a "motion in  limine
            without 
                   subsequent, 
                              contemporaneous objection at trial . . . is
            ordinarily insufficient to preserve an evidentiary ruling for
            appeal," and that,  absent a timely  objection at trial,  our
            review 
                  is 
                     solely 
                           for 
                               plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal
            Procedure 52(b).  United States v. Reed, 977 F.2d 14, 17 (1st
            Cir. 1992).  See United  States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170,  189
            (1st  Cir. 1995).   Our case law  thus directs that  Barone's
            objection 
                     to 
                       DiNunzio's 
                                  testimony ordinarily would be deemed to
            have 
                been 
                     forfeited 
                              and 
                                  therefore reviewable on appeal only for
            plain 
                 error. 
                         But the question whether harmless or plain error
            applies  is more  difficult here  than in  the ordinary  case
            because Barone's challenge  in this court is based, in  part,
            upon the narrowing interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3) set forth
            4.  Barone asserts that DiNunzio's testimony as to Limoli's
            statements was admitted over his objection, citing his motion
            in limine to limit or exclude this testimony.  Barone does
            not direct our attention to any hearsay objection to
            DiNunzio's testimony at trial and our review of the
            transcript reveals none.
                                        -19-
                                         19

            in 
              Williamson
                         v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), which was
            decided while this appeal was pending.  
                      It 
                        seems 
                              clear 
                                   that 
                                        Barone benefits from the new rule
            announced in Williamson because direct review was pending  at
            the 
               time 
                    it 
                      was 
                          decided. 
                                    See Johnson v. United States, No. 96-
            203, 1997  WL 235156,  *5 (U.S.  May 12,  1997); Griffith  v.
            Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987); Hines v. Davidowitz,  312
            U.S. 
                52, 
                    60 
                       (1941); United States v. Melvin, 27 F.3d 703, 706-
            07 n.4  (1st Cir.  1994).   Less  clear is  whether  Barone's
            forfeited hearsay objection -- to the extent that it turns on
            the application  of the rule  announced in  Williamson --  is
            subject 
                   to 
                     harmless 
                              error or plain error review.  After all, it
            seems unfair to fault Barone for failing to raise at trial an
            objection 
                     based upon a rule that was not announced until after
            the 
               trial 
                     was 
                        concluded. 
                                    See United States v. Collins, 60 F.3d
            4, 7 (1st Cir. 1995).
                      The question of  what standard  applies "where  the
            error was unclear at the  time of trial but becomes clear  on
            appeal because  the applicable  law has  been clarified"  was
            specifically reserved by the Supreme Court in its explication
            of 
              the 
                  plain 
                       error 
                             standard in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
            725, 734 (1993).   In the recently decided Johnson v.  United
            States
                 , 
                   1997 
                        WL 235156, however, the Supreme Court applied the
            Olano plain error test where the petitioner failed timely  to
            object at  trial,  based upon  a  right announced  in  United
                                        -20-
                                         20

            States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. ---, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995), which
            was decided while his case was pending on direct appeal.
                      Olano
                           
                           holds 
                                 that, in order for an appellate court to
            correct an error not raised at trial, it must first find that
            there  is  "'error'  that  is  'plain'  and  that  'affect[s]
            substantial  rights.'"  507  U.S. at 732.   When these  three
            elements are satisfied, an  appellate court may exercise  its
            discretion to correct the error under Rule 52(b) only if  the
            forfeited error "'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
            or public reputation  of judicial proceedings.'"  Id. at  736
            (quoting 
                    Unit
                        ed States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
                      In Johnson, the Court concluded that the petitioner
            was entitled to  the retroactive application of the new  rule
            announced in Gaudin, and therefore that the "error" prong  of
            the Olano test was satisfied.  Johnson, 1997 WL 235156, at *5
            (citing 
                   Griffith
                           
                           v. 
                              Kentu
                                   cky, 479 U.S. at 328).  The Court then
            held 
                that 
                     "in a case such as this -- where the law at the time
            of trial was settled and  clearly contrary to the law at  the
            time 
                of 
                   appeal -- it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the
            time of appellate consideration," and that, by this analysis,
            the Gaud in error met  the "plain" prong  of the Olano  test.
            Johnson
                  , 
                    1997 WL 235156, at *6.  Without deciding the question
            whether the error  had affected the petitioner's  substantial
            rights --  the third  prong of the  Olano test  -- the  Court
            declined to notice the  error under Rule 52(b) on the  ground
                                        -21-
                                         21

            that, even assuming that  the "substantial rights" prong  was
            satisfied, there was  no basis for concluding that the  error
            "seriously  affect[ed]  the  fairness,  integrity  or  public
            reputation 
                      of judicial proceedings."  Johnson, 1997 WL 235156,
            at *7.
                      Although Johnson  does not  purport to  do so,  the
            conclusion 
                      appears 
                              to 
                                us 
                                   to be inescapable that Johnson answers
            the 
               question 
                        left open in Olano and that, under Johnson, plain
            error 
                 review 
                        applies in the circumstances presented here, even
            to the extent  that the resolution  of Barone's challenge  to
            DiNunzio's testimony turns on the application of the rule  of
            Williamson.  In all  events, our review leads us to  conclude
            that 
                Barone's 
                        challenge 
                                  would not have succeeded even under the
            harmless error standard  because we find that, to the  extent
            that 
                the 
                    district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence --
            under Williamson or otherwise -- the error(s) did not  affect
            the 
               outcome 
                       of 
                         the 
                             trial, and therefore did not affect Barone's
            substantial rights.    See Olano,  507  U.S. at  734;  United
            States
                  
                  v. 
                     Marder
                          , 
                            48 
                               F.3d 564, 571 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --
            - U.S. ---, 115 S. Ct. 1441 (1995).
                                         3.
                      In Williamson v.  United States, the Supreme  Court
            clarified the  scope of  Rule 804(b)(3)  for statements  that
            inculpate the defendant  as well as subject the declarant  to
            criminal  liability.    At   issue  in  Williamson  was   the
                                        -22-
                                         22

            admissibility  of hearsay  statements made  by the  declarant
            Harris, 
                   who 
                       had been arrested after police found large amounts
            of cocaine in the car he was driving, and who made statements
            to 
              a 
                DEA 
                    agent 
                         while 
                               in 
                                  custody that indicated that the cocaine
            belonged to Williamson.  512 U.S. at 596-97.  
                      The Court first considered the question of what  is
            meant by  "statement" in light  of the  principle that  "Rule
            804(b)(3) 
                     is 
                        founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable
            people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest,
            tend  not to  make  self-inculpatory statements  unless  they
            believe them to be true."   512 U.S. at 599.  Reasoning  that
            this principle  points  clearly  to a  narrow  definition  of
            "statement" 
                       as 
                          "a 
                            single 
                                   declaration or remark," rather than to
            a broad definition as "a report or narrative," id., the Court
            concluded as follows:
                      In our view, the most faithful reading of
                      Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not  allow
                      admission     of     non-self-inculpatory
                      statements, 
                                 even if they are made within a
                      broader narrative that is generally self-
                      inculpatory.  The district court may  not
                      just 
                          assume 
                                 for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3)
                      that  a  statement  is   self-inculpatory
                      because 
                             it 
                                is part of a fuller confession,
                      and this  is  especially  true  when  the
                      statement implicates someone else.
            512 U.S. at 600-01.
                      The 
                         Court 
                               explained 
                                        that 
                                             "[t]he fact that a statement
            is self-inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the  fact
            that 
                a 
                  statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement
                                        -23-
                                         23

            says  nothing  at   all  about  the  collateral   statement's
            reliability."   512 U.S.  at 600.   Thus, the Rule  804(b)(3)
            inquiry  "is always  whether the  statement was  sufficiently
            against  the declarant's  penal interest  'that a  reasonable
            person in the  declarant's position would  not have made  the
            statement unless believing it to be true,' and this  question
            can  only  be  answered  in  light  of  all  the  surrounding
            circumstances."  512  U.S. at 603-04  (quoting Fed. R.  Evid.
            804(b)(3)) (footnote omitted).
                      At oral argument, counsel for Barone  characterized
            Williamson as standing  for the  proposition that  statements
            against 
                   interest 
                           that 
                                implicate anyone other than the declarant
            are not  admissible  under Rule  804(b)(3), arguing  that  "a
            statement 
                     that shifts the blame to another person has no basis
            for 
               reliability and should not be admissible under the hearsay
            exception."  While it  is probably true in the ordinary  case
            that a  statement  that shifts  blame  to another  should  be
            regarded as unreliable, we do not accept Barone's  contention
            that 
                Williams
                        on creates a per se bar to any and all statements
            against interest that also implicate another; nor do we  find
            that any of the hearsay challenged here shifts blame from the
            declarant Limoli to anyone else. 
                      Far from adopting a per se rule against  statements
            inculpating another, the Court stated that a totality of  the
            circumstances  test  should  be  applied  to  the  particular
                                        -24-
                                         24

            statement at issue in order to determine whether it  comports
            with 
                the 
                    rationale 
                             upon 
                                  which Rule 804(b)(3) is premised -- the
            assumption that  declarations against  interest are  reliable
            because people do not  make such statements unless  believing
            them to be true.   512 U.S. at  603-04.  A statement  against
            penal 
                 interest 
                          is 
                            not 
                                rendered inadmissible "merely because the
            declarant  names another  person  or  implicates  a  possible
            codefendant."   Williamson,  512  U.S. at  606  (Scalia,  J.,
            concurring); see id.  at 603.  Indeed,  the Court used as  an
            example 
                   of 
                      an admissible statement against penal interest "Sam
            and I went to Joe's house," 512 U.S. at 603, a statement that
            clearly implicates a person other than the declarant.5  
                      In addressing  the  issue under  the  Confrontation
            Clause,  the  Second  Circuit  has  held  that  a   statement
            inculpating both  the  declarant  and the  defendant  may  be
            sufficiently 
                        reliable as to be admissible in the circumstances
            that 
                obtain 
                       here 
                           -- 
                              i.e., where the statement is made in a non-
            custodial 
                     setting to an ally, rather than to a law enforcement
            official, and where the circumstances surrounding the portion
            of the  statement that  inculpates the  defendant provide  no
            reason to suspect that  this portion of the statement is  any
            less  trustworthy  than  the  portion  that  inculpates   the
            5.  The Court reasoned that this statement "might be against
            the declarant's interest if a reasonable person in the
            declarant's shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and
            Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's
            conspiracy."  512 U.S. at 603.
                                        -25-
                                         25

            declarant.  See United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 349  (2d
            Cir. 1995); United States  v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 546  (2d
            Cir. 1994).   We  find this  reasoning to  be persuasive  and
            equally  applicable  to a  Rule  804(b)(3)  analysis  of  the
            reliability of the statements challenged here.  
                      Finally,  applying  Williamson's  instruction  that
            courts  must determine  the  admissibility of  statements  by
            evaluating  them  in   context  and  in   view  of  all   the
            circumstances, 
                          512 
                             U.S. 
                                  at 603-04, we find that Barone's blame-
            shifting concerns are not implicated here because none of the
            challenged testimony shifts  blame or  exculpates either  the
            declarant Limoli or the defendant Barone.  And, to the extent
            that 
                any 
                    of 
                      the 
                          challenged statements may be so read, the force
            of 
              the 
                  argument 
                          is 
                             blunted by the fact that the statements were
            not made to law enforcement officials in a custodial setting,
            as 
              in 
                 Williamson
                           
                           (and 
                                as 
                                   in nearly all of the cases relied upon
            by 
              Barone), 
                       but to close relatives of the declarant.  On these
            facts, 
                  it 
                    cannot 
                           seriously be argued that any of the challenged
            statements 
                      implicate 
                               the 
                                   primary concern raised by Barone, that
            they 
                were 
                     intended 
                             to 
                                shift the blame for criminal conduct from
            the declarant  Limoli to another or  to curry favor with  law
            enforcement officials. 
                                         4.
                      We  now consider  the  testimony  to  which  Barone
            objects, bearing in mind the following additional  standards.
                                        -26-
                                         26

            First, the district court's construction of evidentiary rules
            is a question  of law which  we review de  novo.  See  United
            States v. Omar, 104 F.3d  519, 522 (1st Cir. 1997); see  also
            United States v. Costa,  31 F.3d 1073, 1077 (11th Cir.  1994)
            (the 
                question whether a statement is against penal interest is
            a  question  of  law,  reviewable  de  novo).    Second,  the
            application of  an evidentiary rule  to particular facts  "is
            normally tested by an  'abuse of discretion' standard,  which
            favors the prevailing  party."  Omar, 104  F.3d at 522.   See
            United 
                  States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1297 (1st Cir. 1996),
            cert.
                 
                 denied
                       , 
                        --- 
                            U.S. 
                                 ---, 117 S. Ct. 963 (1997).  Finally, we
            may affirm  the district court's  evidentiary rulings on  any
            ground apparent from the record on appeal.  See United States
            v. 
              Alzanki
                     , 
                      54 
                         F.3d 
                              994, 
                                   1008 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, --
            - U.S. ---, 116 S. Ct. 909 (1996).
                      Barone contends that the district court abused  its
            discretion in admitting  Limoli's statements to DiNunzio  and
            Karpowicz-DiPietro regarding  his criminal  associations  and
            activities during the 1970s  and 1980s because the  testimony
            does not  meet  the  requirements for  admission  under  Rule
            804(b)(3).  Barone does not object to particular  statements,
            but complains generally that the statements were not  against
            Limoli's 
                    penal interest, and that the "rambling narratives" of
            DiNunzio and Karpowicz-DiPietro contained statements that are
                                        -27-
                                         27

            inadmissible 
                        under 
                             Willia
                                   mson because they are not individually
            self-inculpatory.  
                      At trial,  the  district court  did not  admit  the
            hearsay 
                   testimony 
                            of 
                               these witnesses statement by statement, as
            Williamson  would  seem to  direct;  nor  did  Barone  object
            statement by  statement.6   Nevertheless, our  review of  the
            record leads  us to agree with  the government that the  vast
            majority of the challenged testimony was admissible under the
            declarations 
                        against 
                               interest exception; that other portions of
            the testimony were admissible under other hearsay exceptions,
            or 
              as 
                 the 
                    personal 
                             knowledge of the in-court witness; and that,
            to 
              the 
                  extent 
                        that 
                             the 
                                 district court erred in admitting any of
            the challenged  testimony, the  error(s) did  not affect  the
            6.  In his ruling on Barone's motion in limine, the district
            judge stated that he would deal with the admissibility of the
            disputed testimony "statement by statement to see if there
            are parts of it that are inadmissible," an approach that is
            fully consistent with Williamson.  During the colloquy with
            counsel that followed his ruling, the judge also invited
            Barone's counsel to object to specific portions of DiNunzio's
            proposed testimony, which Barone's counsel declined to do,
            given the court's ruling on the motion.  During this
            colloquy, the judge also stated, however, that "the mere fact
            that some of this comes in doesn't mean everything comes in. 
            But if they're the same conversation and . . . they tend to
            corroborate even though they're not in isolation against his
            penal interests, I'll let them in," an approach that is
            consistent with this court's precedents at the time of the
            ruling, see United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 252-53
            (1st Cir. 1976), but facially inconsistent with Williamson.  
                                        -28-
                                         28

            outcome 
                   of 
                      the 
                         trial 
                               and 
                                   so did not affect Barone's substantial
            rights.7
                      As to Barone's  contention that the district  court
            violated Williamson and  abused its  discretion in  admitting
            Karpowicz-DiP
                        ietro's testimony recounting what Limoli told her
            about the events that ultimately led to his murder, we  agree
            with the government  that any portions of the testimony  that
            were not admissible  as declarations  against Limoli's  penal
            interest were otherwise  admissible because they fall  within
            another 
                   hearsay exception (e.g., Rule 803(3)), or because they
            are 
               not 
                   hearsay 
                          at 
                             all, 
                                  but rather reflect Karpowicz-DiPietro's
            personal knowledge.
                      As to DiNunzio's testimony regarding the murder  of
            Jackie 
                  DiFronzo, 
                           Barone 
                                  asserts that Limoli's confession to the
            murder is the only statement against his penal interest.  The
            government responds  that Limoli's  statements regarding  why
            DiFronzo was killed, on whose orders, and his statement  that
            Ferrara  had enlisted  Limoli's  help are  also  declarations
            against 
                   Limoli's penal interest vis-a-vis the Patriarca Family
            conspiracy to  engage  in a  pattern  of racketeering.    The
            7.  The government does not argue that Barone's objection to
            DiNunzio's testimony was forfeited for failure to renew at
            trial the objection he made in limine, but assumes that our
            review is under the harmless error standard.  The government
            asserts throughout that any error in admitting the hearsay
            testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, employing
            the formulation of the standard applied to issues of
            constitutional dimension. 
                                        -29-
                                         29

            government argues  that the  statements demonstrate  Limoli's
            relationships to Ferrara,  Angiulo, and the Patriarca  Family
            hierarchy, as well as Limoli's participation and position  in
            the RICO enterprise; and that Limoli's statements link him to
            Ferrara 
                   and 
                      Angiulo, 
                               thereby inculpating him in a conspiracy to
            kill  DiFronzo  as  part of  a  pattern  of  racketeering  in
            association with the Patriarca Family.
                      We  conclude  that  Limoli's  statements  regarding
            DiFronzo's 
                      murder were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).  These
            statements 
                      are against Limoli's penal interest insofar as they
            inculpate 
                     him in criminal acts and conspiracies with others to
            commit criminal  acts.  See United  States v. York, 933  F.2d
            1343, 1360 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d
            548, 560 (9th Cir. 1983).   Moreover, to the extent that  the
            statements implicate Limoli in  the Patriarca Family and  its
            activities, they demonstrate  "an insider's  knowledge" of  a
            criminal  enterprise and  its criminal  activities, which  is
            sufficiently 
                        against 
                               Limoli's penal interest to come within the
            exception.  See United  States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244,  252
            (1st Cir. 1976); Williamson, 512 U.S. at 606-07 (Scalia,  J.,
            concurring).  Finally, all  of the statements that  inculpate
            Ferrara also  directly  inculpate  Limoli --  e.g.,  "And  he
            proceeded to go  and tell me that  it was Vinnie Ferrara  and
            himself had shot him and they said they set the club on fire,
            the club on Endicott Street."  Accordingly, we conclude  that
                                        -30-
                                         30

            the district  court's admission of  these statements did  not
            violate the rule of Williamson.  See Williamson, 512 U.S.  at
            603-04.   
                       As to DiNunzio's testimony regarding the murder of
            Corlito,  Barone argues  that  the  only  statements  against
            Limoli's 
                    penal interest are that he killed Corlito and that he
            was paid to  do so.  The  government counters that there  was
            nothing in Limoli's confession implicating Barone that  might
            have  decreased  Limoli's  own  criminal  liability,  thereby
            detracting 
                      from 
                          the 
                              self-inculpatory nature of his admission to
            DiNunzio that  he murdered  Corlito.   In addition,  Limoli's
            statement 
                     that 
                         Barone 
                                also received $1,000 from Ferrara for his
            participation  in  Corlito's  murder  demonstrates   Limoli's
            knowledge 
                     of 
                       and 
                           participation in the Patriarca Family, and the
            RICO conspiracy  generally, and in  the conspiracy to  murder
            Corlito.   The government also  contends that,  even if  this
            statement 
                     is 
                        judged to be insufficiently self-inculpatory, the
            admission of the statement  was harmless beyond a  reasonable
            doubt.   For the reasons stated  in our consideration of  the
            testimony concerning the DiFronzo murder, supra, we  conclude
            that 
                the 
                    testimony regarding the Corlito murder was admissible
            under  Rule  804(b)(3), and  that  any  Williamson  error  in
            admitting 
                     Limoli's 
                             statement regarding the payment of $1,000 to
            Barone did not affect Barone's substantial rights.  As is the
            case  with his  statements  regarding  the  DiFronzo  murder,
                                        -31-
                                         31

            Limoli's  statements inculpating  Ferrara and  Barone in  the
            murder of Corlito also directly inculpate himself.  
                      Barone's 
                              objections 
                                        to 
                                           DiNunzio's testimony regarding
            the credit  union robbery are  that only Limoli's  statements
            admitting 
                     to 
                        the 
                           robbery 
                                   and to shooting McPhee in the foot are
            against his  penal interest, and  that his  statement to  the
            effect that Barone shot McPhee in the neck was  inadmissible.
            The 
               government replies that DiNunzio's testimony regarding the
            robbery  was  otherwise  admissible  as  DiNunzio's  personal
            knowledge. 
                       
                       As 
                         to 
                            Limoli's statement that Barone shot McPhee in
            the neck, the government argues that, although the  statement
            may appear to shift the  blame from Limoli to Barone for  the
            more serious offense of attempted murder, the statement is no
            less 
                an 
                   admissible declaration against interest; it inculpates
            both Limoli and  Barone because the  shooting was within  the
            scope 
                 of 
                    the 
                        robbery conspiracy, and the statement was made to
            an ally in a non-custodial setting.  Finally, the  government
            argues 
                  that, 
                        even 
                            if 
                               the 
                                   admission of this statement was error,
            it 
              was 
                  harmless 
                          beyond 
                                 a 
                                   reasonable doubt in view of DiNunzio's
            testimony that when Barone and Chris Jordan came to her house
            after the robbery, Barone admitted that he had shot McPhee in
            the 
               neck, 
                     and 
                        in 
                           light 
                                 of Walter Jordan's testimony that Barone
            made the same statement to him.
                      We 
                        conclude 
                                 that 
                                     the 
                                         bulk of DiNunzio's testimony was
            independently
                         admissible as DiNunzio's personal knowledge, and
                                        -32-
                                         32

            that the  evidence  implicating  Barone in  the  robbery  and
                       that  Barone shot the guard  in the neck was  als
                                                                        r
            indicating                                                  o
            independently admissible  through  the  testimony  of  Walte
            Jordan.   We also  find  that, to  the extent  that  Limoli's
            statement regarding  Barone may  be understood  to raise  any
            blame-shifting  concerns,   we   are   satisfied   that   the
            circumstances
                         in which the statement was made demonstrate that
            the 
               portion 
                       inculpating Barone is no less trustworthy than the
            portion inculpating  Limoli.   See  Sasso,  59 F.3d  at  349;
            Matthews, 20 F.3d at 546.8  
                      Barone  challenges  the  admission  of   DiNunzio's
            testimony  regarding  events  and  circumstances  related  to
            Limoli's "problem" and "big mistake" in having stolen cocaine
            and 
               money 
                     from Spagnolo (which he thought belonged to Salemme,
            8.  For all the reasons stated thus far, we also reject
            Barone's more general arguments that Limoli's statements
            concerning his relationships with Ferrara, Barone, Jordan,
            and others were inadmissible because they shift the majority
            of the blame for certain activities from Limoli to others --
            e.g., Ferrara ordered Corlito's murder.  Limoli's statements
            concerning his relationship with Ferrara are against his
            penal interest, directly inculpating him in a RICO conspiracy
            with Ferrara (and Barone) and in the RICO enterprise, along
            with other criminal activities.  DiNunzio's hearsay testimony
            that Limoli was involved in criminal activities with Barone
            and with Chris and Walter Jordan is also against Limoli's
            penal interest, particularly in view of Walter Jordan's
            testimony that he, Limoli, and Barone together were engaged
            in criminal activity in association with the Patriarca
            Family.  Although, as the government concedes, Limoli's
            statements regarding Barone's criminal activities with Jordan
            should not have been admitted because they do not inculpate
            Limoli, the error did not affect Barone's substantial rights
            as Jordan himself testified about his criminal activities
            with Barone. 
                                        -33-
                                         33

            Jr.), and to the drug deal between Limoli and Barone that was
            to take place the night Limoli was murdered.  Barone contends
            that 
                a 
                  "mistake" cannot be classified as a declaration against
            penal interest, and that  there was no reasonable  likelihood
            that Limoli's statements  regarding, inter  alia, the  Prince
            Street alley meeting and the drug deal with Barone could have
            resulted in criminal liability.  The government responds that
            Limoli's statements regarding  his "big mistake" and  related
            events 
                  were 
                      admissible 
                                 under Rules 803(3) and 804(b)(3) because
            they reflect  Limoli's then  state of  mind; demonstrate  his
            knowledge 
                     of 
                        the workings of the Patriarca Family; incriminate
            him 
               in 
                  the 
                     possession 
                                of 
                                   narcotics and in a theft of money; and
            inculpate 
                     him 
                         in 
                           the 
                               Patriarca Family and RICO conspiracy.  The
            government 
                      contends further that Limoli's statements regarding
            his recognition of the mistake -- violating the LCN rules  by
            stealing from a made  member -- and how the Patriarca  Family
            responded  to  it  demonstrate  Limoli's  knowledge  of   and
            involvement with the Patriarca Family. 
                      We  conclude for  the reasons  already stated  that
            Limoli's  statements regarding  his  "big  mistake"  and  his
            resultant 
                     "problem" 
                              are 
                                  sufficiently against his penal interest
            as 
              to 
                 be 
                    admissible.  See, e.g., Barrett, 539 F.2d at 252.  We
            further find that the circumstances surrounding the making of
            these 
                 statements demonstrate their self-inculpatory nature and
            that a reasonable person in Limoli's position would not  have
                                        -34-
                                         34

            made  such statements  unless he  believed them  to be  true.
            See Williamson, 512  U.S. at 603 (explaining that "whether  a
            statement 
                     is 
                        self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by
            viewing 
                   it 
                      in 
                        context," 
                                  and that "[e]ven statements that are on
            their face  neutral may actually  be against the  declarant's
            interest").  
                      In this regard, the government wisely concedes that
            DiNunzio's testimony  regarding Limoli's  description of  how
            members of the  Patriarca Family learned  that he had  stolen
            Spagnolo's 
                      cocaine was inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3).  The
            government   also    correctly   asserts   that    DiNunzio's
            identificatio
                        ns of Annette and Lena Chiuchiolo were admissible
            as personal knowledge.   We find, however, that the  district
            court's 
                   error 
                        in 
                           admitting this hearsay evidence did not affect
            Barone's substantial rights, particularly given that Jordan's
            testimony  and  the  evidence  obtained  through   electronic
            surveillance  established the  same  facts,  which  were  not
            significant to  the case  against Barone,  as the  government
            points out. 
                      DiNunzio testified that Limoli told her that Barone
            had 
               "skimmed" cocaine from him.  The government maintains that
            this 
                statement inculpates Limoli in the possession of cocaine,
            but concedes  that  DiNunzio's testimony  regarding  Barone's
            actions 
                   was 
                       inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3).  The government
            argues, however, that because Barone elicited this  testimony
                                        -35-
                                         35

            for 
               the 
                   first time on cross-examination, he cannot be heard to
            complain 
                    about its admission, citing United States v. Angiulo,
            897 F.2d 1169, 1216 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Vachon,
            869 
               F.2d 
                    653, 
                        658-59 
                               (1st Cir. 1989), and that other statements
            elicited 
                    for 
                        the first time on cross-examination were harmless
            beyond a reasonable  doubt (DiNunzio's testimony that  Limoli
            said that Walter Jordan had robbed him of a gun and a  set of
            pearls; harmless  in  view of  Jordan's own  admissions),  or
            generally  admissible   as  prior   inconsistent   statements
            (DiNunzio's testimony regarding prior statements she had made
            to the police, the FBI, and the grand jury).  We agree.
                                         B.
                      Barone also  challenges the  admission of  Limoli's
            statements on  the  grounds that  they  do not  satisfy  Rule
            804(b)(3)'s 
                       "corroborating circumstances" requirement and that
            the  statements  lack   the  "particularized  guarantees   of
            trustworthiness" required by the Confrontation Clause.9 
                      The 
                         Rule 
                              804(b)(3) 
                                       and 
                                           Confrontation Clause inquiries
            are 
               not 
                   coterminous, and evidence that is admissible under the
            former 
                  may 
                      still be inadmissible under the latter.  See, e.g.,
            White  v. Illinois,  502 U.S.  346, 352-53  (1992); Idaho  v.
            Wright
                 , 
                   497 
                      U.S. 
                           805, 
                                814 (1990); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
            9.   The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
            provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all criminal
            prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
            confronted with the witnesses against him."  
                                        -36-
                                         36

            149, 155 (1970).  But the hearsay rules and the Confrontation
            Clause share the  purpose of permitting the use of  probative
            evidence that is trustworthy and excluding that which is not.
            See Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281.  Accordingly, we will consider
            Barone's 
                    "corroborating 
                                  circumstances" and Confrontation Clause
            challenges  together,  deeming   that  which  satisfies   the
            Confrontation  Clause  to  be  sufficient  to  satisfy   Rule
            804(b)(3)'s 
                       corroboration
                                    requirement as well.  Cf. Wright, 497
            U.S. at  821  ("Because evidence  possessing  'particularized
            guarantees 
                      of trustworthiness' must be at least as reliable as
            evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, we
            think 
                 that 
                      evidence admitted under the former requirement must
            similarly 
                     be 
                        so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add
            little to its reliability.") (citations omitted).    
                                         1.
                      Barone argues that  the district  court abused  its
            discretion  in  admitting  Limoli's  out-of-court  statements
            because the statements are insufficiently corroborated or are
            entirely lacking in corroboration.10  We disagree. 
            10.  By its terms, Rule 804(b)(3) requires corroboration only
            for statements "tending to expose the declarant to criminal
            liability and offered to exculpate the accused."  Fed. R.
            Evid. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).  See Fed. R. Evid.
            804(b)(3) advisory committee's note (explaining that
            declarations against interest "tending to exculpate the
            accused are more suspect and so should have their
            admissibility conditioned upon some further provision
            insuring trustworthiness").  The rule does not explicitly
            require corroboration for the type of statements at issue
            here, those offered by the government to inculpate the
                                        -37-
                                         37

                      First,   Barone   misconstrues   Rule   804(b)(3)'s
            corroboration                                               t
                                                                        s
                                11  The corroboration that is required by
            Rule 
                804(b)(3) 
                          is 
                            not 
                                independent evidence supporting the truth
            of 
              the 
                  matters 
                         asserted 
                                  by the hearsay statements, but evidence
            that clearly  indicates  that the  statements are  worthy  of
            belief, based upon the circumstances in which the  statements
            were 
                made. 
                       
                       S
                        ee United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 475
                          requirement to the  extent that he argues  tha
            there  is  a lack  of  evidence  "corroborating"  the  event
            described by Limoli.
            (1st 
                Cir. 
                     1993) ("'[F]or the declaration to be trustworthy the
            declarant must have known it was against his interest at  the
            time he  made  the statement.'")  (quoting Filesi  v.  United
            accused.  See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188,
            192 (1st Cir. 1989).  Nevertheless, a number of courts have
            interpreted Rule 804(b)(3) to require corroboration whether
            the statement inculpates or exculpates the accused.  See
            United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1351 (8th Cir. 1996);
            United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1995),
            cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 116 S. Ct. 1058 (1996); United
            States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir. 1989);
            United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir. 1988);
            United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978). 
            Although this court has not expressly extended the
            corroboration requirement to statements that inculpate the
            accused, see Fields, 871 F.2d at 192, we have applied the
            rule as if corroboration were required for such statements,
            see Seeley, 892 F.2d at 2.  The Supreme Court has not decided
            the issue, explicitly declining to do so in Williamson, 512
            U.S. at 605.
            11.  Barone asserts, inter alia, that DiNunzio's testimony
            regarding what Limoli told her about events relevant to the
            prosecution of this case comprises the only evidence against
            Barone regarding certain events, and that, while Karpowicz-
            DiPietro's testimony appears to corroborate some of
            DiNunzio's testimony, this testimony, like DiNunzio's, was
            also hearsay, improperly admitted at trial.  
                                        -38-
                                         38

            States,  352 F.2d  339, 343  (4th Cir.  1965) (alteration  in
            Innamorati); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141,  1170
            (2d Cir. 1989) (in determining whether a declaration  against
            penal 
                 interest is sufficiently trustworthy as to be admissible
            under Rule 804(b)(3),  "the district court  must look to  the
            circumstances in which  the declarant  made the  statement").
            Analysis 
                    of 
                      trustworthiness under the Confrontation Clause also
            focuses upon the circumstances surrounding the making of  the
            statement.  See Wright,  497 U.S. at 819 (in determining  the
            trustworthiness of hearsay  evidence under the  Confrontation
            Clause, the court should consider "only those [circumstances]
            that surround the making of the statement and that render the
            declarant 
                     particularly 
                                 worthy of belief"); Lee v. Illinois, 476
            U.S. 530, 544  (1986) (determining  trustworthiness from  the
            circumstances surrounding the making of the statement).
                      Second,  Barone  misapprehends  the   corroboration
            requirement 
                       to the extent that he argues that corroboration is
            required because DiNunzio is not credible.  The corroboration
            requirement 
                       is not concerned with the veracity of the in-court
            witness  but with  the  trustworthiness of  the  out-of-court
            statement; moreover, the credibility of witnesses is a matter
            for the jury.  See Seeley,  892 F.2d at 3 (agreeing with  the
            Second 
                  Circuit in United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769,
            777 (2d  Cir.  1983), that  neither  Rule 804(b)(3)  nor  the
            Confrontation Clause  "requires  the trial  court to  make  a
                                        -39-
                                         39

            special 
                   assessment of the credibility of a witness who relates
            an 
              out-of-court 
                          declaration against penal interest; rather, the
            credibility of an in-court witness is ordinarily a matter for
            the jury").   
                      Third,  the corroboration  requirement  "should  be
            construed in  such a manner as  to effectuate its purpose  of
            circumventing fabrication," Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)  advisory
            committee's note, and "[t]he fear that inculpatory statements
            are unreliable stems largely  from the presumption that  such
            statements are self-serving, offered only to shift the  blame
            from the declarant to another."  York, 933 F.2d at 1363.  See
            Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 474-75.  These concerns do not  arise
            where, as  here,  the portions  of  the statements  that  are
            inculpatory as to the defendant are also directly against the
            declarant's penal interest; where the statements were made to
            close 
                 relatives 
                           of 
                             the 
                                 declarant;12 and where we can discern no
            attempt on the part of the declarant to diminish his role  in
            the 
               criminal 
                        activity described in the statements.  See Sasso,
            59 F.3d at 349; Matthews, 20 F.3d at 546.  
                      We 
                        conclude 
                                 that the portions of the statements that
            are inculpatory as to Barone are in no way self-serving as to
            12.  While the fact that the challenged statements were made
            to allies has no bearing on the question whether the
            statement is against the declarant's penal interest, it is
            relevant to the determination of whether the circumstances
            indicate that the declarant was motivated to shift blame to
            the other individual inculpated by the statement.
                                        -40-
                                         40

            Limoli,  and therefore  we  see  no reason  to  question  the
            trustworthiness of any of the challenged statements on blame-
            shifting grounds.  See York, 933 F.2d at 1362-63  (explaining
            that the circumstances surrounding the declarant's statements
            inculpating  the  defendant  --  speaking  to   acquaintances
            unconnected  to law  enforcement  authorities  --  make  them
            "eminently 
                      trustworthy," 
                                   and noting that the advisory committee
            used that scenario as an example of an inculpatory  statement
            that "would have no  difficulty in qualifying" for  admission
            under Rule 804(b)(3)).  
                        In  the   final  analysis,  the  Rule   804(b)(3)
            corroboration
                         inquiry is concerned only with the admissibility
            of  hearsay  evidence  based  upon  its  trustworthiness,   a
            determination 
                         committed 
                                  to the sound discretion of the district
            court.  See United States  v. Vretta, 790 F.2d 651, 659  (7th
            Cir. 
                1986) 
                      ("A trial judge has considerable discretion, within
            the 
               parameters 
                          of 
                            the 
                                rules of evidence, in determining whether
            the hearsay statements  contain the necessary  circumstantial
            guarantees of trustworthiness.").  See also Barrett, 539 F.2d
            at 253.   Matters such as  the truth of  what is asserted  by
            hearsay  statements, the  credibility of  witnesses, and  the
            weight to be accorded evidence are for the finder of fact.   
                      Here,  the district  court, in  ruling on  Barone's
            motion in limine, determined that the challenged portions  of
            DiNunzio's  testimony  were  sufficiently  corroborated   and
                                        -41-
                                         41

            trustworthy as to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) and  the
            Confrontation Clause.  We agree with the district court  that
            the detailed  nature of  Limoli's statements;  the fact  that
            Limoli made  the  statements to  close  relatives in  a  non-
            custodial 
                     setting rather than to the police; and the fact that
            Limoli 
                  had 
                      no discernible motivation to lie to either DiNunzio
            or Karpowicz-DiPietro in  making these statements  constitute
            "corroborating  circumstances  [that]  clearly  indicate  the
            trustworthiness 
                           of 
                             the 
                                 statement[s]."  Accordingly, we conclude
            that 
                the 
                    district 
                            court 
                                  did not abuse its discretion in finding
            Limoli's statements to be sufficiently corroborated as to  be
            reliable and admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).   
                                        -42-
                                         42

                                         2.
                      Barone  argues  that  the  admission  of   Limoli's
            statements violated his confrontation rights.13  The  Supreme
            Court  has  explained that  "[t]he  central  concern  of  the
            Confrontation Clause  is  to ensure  the reliability  of  the
            evidence against  a criminal  defendant by  subjecting it  to
            rigorous testing  in the context  of an adversary  proceeding
            before the trier of fact."  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.  836,
            845 (1990).   See Zannino,  895 F.2d at  5.   When a  hearsay
            declarant  is   not   present  for   cross-examination,   the
            Confrontation
                         Clause requires a showing that (i) the declarant
            is 
              unavailable,
                         14
                            
                            and 
                                (ii) the statements sought to be admitted
            bear adequate "indicia of reliability."  Ohio v. Roberts, 448
            U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  
                      Where  the evidence  is  admitted under  a  "firmly
            rooted" 
                   hearsay exception, reliability may be inferred without
            more. 
                  
                  See
                      
                      id
                        . at 66; Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (explaining that
            "[a]dmission 
                        under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies
            13.  In Williamson, the Supreme Court did not reach the
            Confrontation Clause issue because it remanded the case,
            rather than declare any statements to be admissible under
            Rule 804(b)(3).  512 U.S. at 605.
            14.  Although unavailability is not in dispute here, we note
            that, while the unavailability of the declarant is required
            under Rule 804 as a matter of evidence law, a demonstration
            of unavailability (or production of the declarant at trial)
            is not always required by the Confrontation Clause.  See
            White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 353-57; United States v.
            Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-400 (1986); Manocchio v. Moran, 919
            F.2d 770, 774-76 (1st Cir. 1990).
                                        -43-
                                         43

            the constitutional requirement of reliability because of  the
            weight  accorded   longstanding  judicial   and   legislative
            experience 
                      in 
                        assessing 
                                  the trustworthiness of certain types of
            out-of-court statements"); id.  at 821 ("statements  admitted
            under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception are so  trustworthy
            that   adversarial  testing   would  add   little  to   their
            reliability").  Statements  that do not fall within a  firmly
            rooted 
                  exception 
                           are 
                               "presumptively unreliable and inadmissible
            for Confrontation Clause purposes," Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
            at 543,  and therefore "must be  excluded, at least absent  a
            showing  of particularized  guarantees  of  trustworthiness,"
            Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted).  
                      Barone maintains  that  the hearsay  exception  for
            declarations  against interest  is  not  firmly  rooted  and,
            therefore, such declarations are presumptively  untrustworthy
            and inadmissible in the absence of proof by the government of
            the reliability of the statements.  In making this  argument,
            Barone simply ignores the  fact that this court has held  the
            declarations against interest exception to be firmly  rooted.
            See
               
               Saccoccia
                        , 
                         58 
                            F.3d 
                                 at 779; Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 474 n.4.
                      We 
                        recognize 
                                  that 
                                      some 
                                           courts have questioned whether
            the declarations against interest exception is firmly rooted,
            and whether it should be treated as such where the  statement
            implicates another person in addition to the declarant.   See
            United States v.  Dean, 59 F.3d 1479,  1493 & n.24 (5th  Cir.
                                        -44-
                                         44

            1995), c ert. denied, ---  U.S. ---, 116  S. Ct. 794  (1996);
            Matthews, 20 F.3d at 545 (collecting cases); United States v.
            Flores
                 , 
                   985 
                      F.2d 
                           770 
                               (5th Cir. 1993).15  We find these cases to
            be inapposite to our analysis of the instant case because, in
            contrast  to  the  statements  at  issue  here,  the  hearsay
            statements in  these cases were  made under circumstances  in
            which the declarant had a "strong motivation to implicate the
            defendant  and to  exonerate  himself," thereby  raising  the
            concern that the statements were made in order to shift blame
            to 
              another 
                      or to curry favor with law enforcement authorities.
            See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. at 541.
                      We think that where, as here, it is clear that  the
            statements inculpating both  the declarant and the  defendant
            were not made in  order to limit the declarant's exposure  to
            criminal 
                    liability, 
                              the 
                                  declarations against interest exception
            is properly treated as firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause
            purposes.   See  York, 933  F.2d at  1362-64.   Nevertheless,
            because 
                   we 
                      agree 
                           with 
                                the district court that the statements at
            issue 
                 in 
                    this 
                        case 
                             bear 
                                  sufficient indicia of reliability as to
            be 
              admissible under the Confrontation Clause, we need not rely
            15.  Although the Williamson Court did not decide whether the
            declarations against interest exception is firmly rooted, the
            Court did point out that "the very fact that a statement is
            genuinely self-inculpatory -- which our reading of Rule
            804(b)(3) requires -- is itself one of the 'particularized
            guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement
            admissible under the Confrontation Clause."  512 U.S. at 605
            (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. at 543-45).
                                        -45-
                                         45

            upon the  firmly rooted status of  the exception in order  to
            sustain the district court's ruling.  
                      "The 
                          critical 
                                  inquiry 
                                          for determining 'particularized
            guarantees of trustworthiness' is whether 'the test of cross-
            examination would be of marginal utility.'"  United States v.
            Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 64 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Wright, 497
            U.S. at 820) (footnote  omitted).  We are satisfied that  the
            circumstances
                         surrounding the making of Limoli's statements to
            DiNunzio 
                    and 
                       Karpowicz-DiPietro demonstrate that the statements
            are "so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little
            to their reliability."  See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821.
                      In  arguing that  the  testimony  of  DiNunzio  and
            Karpowicz-DiPietro lacked  the corroboration  and indicia  of
            reliability required by Rule 804(b)(3) and the  Confrontation
            Clause, 
                   Barone relies heavily upon United States v. Mokol, 939
            F.2d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1991).  Citing Mokol, Barone urges us
            to consider  the  following factors:  "the character  of  the
            witness for truthfulness and honesty and the availability  of
            evidence 
                    on 
                       the issues and the witness' relationship with both
            the defendant and government and his motivation to  testify."
            Appellant's Br. at 28-29.  He invites us to conclude from our
            consideration of  these  factors that  DiNunzio16 was  not  a
            16.  Barone does not explicitly attack the credibility of
            Karpowicz-DiPietro, but does argue that her testimony was
            admitted in violation of his confrontation rights.
                                        -46-
                                         46

            credible witness  and, therefore,  that her  testimony as  to
            Limoli's statements lacks adequate indicia of reliability.  
                      Barone's reliance upon  Mokol is grossly  misplaced
            for a number  of reasons.  First,  Mokol did not address  the
            admissibility of hearsay  statements made  by an  unavailable
            declarant to an  ally under Rule 804(b)(3), but the  distinct
            question of  the admissibility of  prior testimony under  the
            residual 
                    hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(5).  In this regard,
            it is important to recognize that the Supreme Court has  held
            that the residual hearsay exception is not firmly rooted  for
            purposes of Confrontation Clause  analysis.  See Wright,  497
            U.S. 
                at 
                   817-18 (explaining that "[h]earsay statements admitted
            under the residual exception, almost by definition, . . .  do
            not share the same tradition of reliability that supports the
            admissibility  of statements  under a  firmly rooted  hearsay
            exception," and that "were we to agree that the admission  of
            hearsay statements under the residual exception automatically
            passed 
                  Confrontation Clause scrutiny, virtually every codified
            hearsay exception would assume constitutional stature, a step
            this Court  has  repeatedly declined  to  take").   See  also
            Government 
                      of 
                        Virgin 
                               Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1387 (3d
            Cir. 1992) (equating the state-law residual hearsay exception
            at issue in Wright with Rule 804(b)(5), and applying to  Rule
            804(b)(5) 
                     Wri
                        ght's holding that the residual hearsay exception
            is  not firmly  rooted and  therefore requires  a showing  of
                                        -47-
                                         47

            particularized guarantees  of trustworthiness); Trenkler,  61
            F.3d 
                at 
                   64 
                     n.32 
                          (explaining that the residual hearsay exception
            contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) is not a firmly
            rooted exception, citing Wright and Joseph).  But see  United
            States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 319 (1st Cir. 1990)
            (rejecting a  Confrontation  Clause  challenge  to  testimony
            admitted 
                    under 
                         the 
                             residual hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(5)
            on 
              the 
                  ground that Rule 804(b)(5) is a firmly rooted exception
            to the hearsay rule).  
                      Second,  Barone  errs   in  equating  the   hearsay
            declarant,  the  reliability  of  whose  testimony  in  prior
            proceedings 
                       was 
                           at 
                             issue 
                                   in Mokol, with DiNunzio and Karpowicz-
            DiPietro, whose live in-court testimony contains the  hearsay
            statements. 
                        
                        Moreover, and as we have stated, the focus of the
            trustworthine
                        ss inquiry is not on the in-court witness, but on
            the  circumstances  in  which  the  declarant's  out-of-court
            statements  were made.    See  Wright, 497  U.S.  at  819-20;
            Innamorati
                     , 
                      996 
                          F.2d 
                               at 
                                  475; Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1170.  Also
            as 
              noted 
                    previously, the credibility of the in-court witnesses
            DiNunzio and  Karpowicz-DiPietro  is not  an element  of  the
            admissibility inquiry  (as  a  matter of  Rule  804(b)(3)  or
            Confrontation
                         Clause analysis) but is a question for the jury.
            See Seeley, 892 F.2d at 3. 
                                        III.
                                        -48-
                                         48

                      On October 20, 1993,  after a nine-week trial,  the
            jury began its deliberations.  On October 25, 1993, the court
            gave a "modified Allen charge" in response to a note from the
            jury stating that it  had reached an impasse and seeking  the
            court's guidance.  See  Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.  492
            (1896) (approving a supplemental jury instruction designed to
            encourage a deadlocked jury to reach a verdict).
                      Prior 
                           to 
                             administering 
                                           the charge, the judge informed
            counsel 
                   of 
                      the 
                         language 
                                  he intended to use and deleted language
            in 
              response 
                       to 
                         Barone's 
                                  objection.  After the charge was given,
            Barone objected to the court's use of certain language  which
            the 
               judge 
                     had not mentioned in the pre-charge conference.  The
            judge responded by preserving the objection, stating that  he
            would 
                 give 
                      it 
                        further 
                                thought should he have occasion to repeat
            the charge.  At 3:15  p.m., the jury informed the judge  that
            there had been no change in their deliberations and asked the
            court's permission to return the following morning.
                      In the afternoon of the next day, October 26, 1993,
            the jury  communicated to  the court  that they  had made  no
            progress  and saw  "no potential  for coming  to a  unanimous
            decision on any of the four counts through continued rational
            discussion."  Barone  moved for a  mistrial, which the  court
            denied.  The court then  informed the jury that it would  not
            accept the  jury's  conclusion as  "the  final word  in  this
            matter," but would dismiss the jury for the remainder of  the
                                        -49-
                                         49

            day and  begin the next day  by repeating the modified  Allen
            charge.  Barone did  not object to the proposed second  Allen
            charge, but did object to the judge's statement to the effect
            that, in his experience, the jury had not deliberated for  an
            unusually 
                     long period of time.  He again moved for a mistrial,
            and the court denied the motion. 
                      The  following day,  October  27, 1993,  the  judge
            repeated the modified Allen charge, omitting the language  to
            which 
                 Barone 
                        had objected after the judge had administered the
            first Allen charge.  On October 28, 1993, the district  judge
            dismissed  a  juror pursuant  to  Federal  Rule  of  Criminal
            Procedure  23(b), see  infra, and  on October  29, 1993,  the
            eleven-member 
                         jury 
                             returned verdicts of guilty as to Counts One
            through Three, but failed to reach a verdict as to Count Four
            (charging Barone with Limoli's murder).
                      Barone contends that, in  giving the jury a  second
            Allen charge, the district court violated his Fifth Amendment
            right 
                 to 
                    due 
                        process of law and his Sixth Amendment right to a
            fundamentally
                         fair trial, arguing that the practical effect of
            the district court's dismissal of a juror after having  given
            two 
               modified 
                        Allen charges was to force the eleven-member jury
            to render coerced and suspect verdicts. 
                      Barone 
                            argues that a trial court should never give a
            second 
                  modified Allen charge.  Several circuits, including the
            Second Circuit in particular, have rejected the use of a flat
                                        -50-
                                         50

            ban, 
                and 
                    judge 
                         the 
                             propriety of a second charge in light of the
                                United States    Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289,
            1299
            circumstances.  See               v. 
                 (2d  Cir. 1991).17   The  Ninth Circuit,  over a  strong
            dissent, has  adopted a per  se rule  against multiple  Allen
            charges, although this rule is subject to at least one  major
            exception, 
                      permitting a successive charge if the jury requests
            a 
             repetition 
                        of 
                          the 
                              instruction.  United States v. Seawell, 550
            F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977). 
                      The danger with an Allen charge is that jurors  who
            hold a minority opinion  will feel that the judge is  putting
            pressure 
                    on 
                       them 
                           to 
                              surrender their viewpoint.  Even though the
            modified Allen charge  expressly warns that  this is not  its
            purpose,  many have  been concerned  that it  pushes in  this
            direction.  See United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37,  38-39
            (1st 
                Cir. 
                     1973). 
                            
                            Although the courts have held that the charge
            is  accepted  as  a  reasonable  compromise  of   conflicting
            interests, 
                      the problem is exacerbated when the charge is given
            a  second time,  after  the jury  has  already been  told  to
            reconsider  and  again  has found  itself  in  deadlock.    A
            successive 
                      charge 
                            tends 
                                  to create a greater degree of pressure,
            and one  could argue that  at this point  the limit has  been
            reached.
            17.  See also United States v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842, 850
            (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Reed, 686 F.2d 651, 653
            (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 485
            (5th Cir. 1979).
                                        -51-
                                         51

                      In the  present case, the  second charge came  very
                    after the first,  when the district court  apparently
            concluded  that the  jury  had  not  seriously  reconsidered.
             ollowing 
                     the 
                        first 
                              modif          charge, the jury deliberated
            quickly
            F                      ied Allen
            only for the  remainder of the day  on which it received  the
            charge and part way  into the next day before reporting  back
            that it remained deadlocked.  Given the length and complexity
            of the  case --  a nine-week trial  with very difficult  RICO
            instructions 
                        -- 
                          the 
                              district court was surely within its rights
            in thinking that the jury had not absorbed the message of the
            first Allen charge,  that the jury  should make a  reasonable
            effort to break the deadlock.18
                      Although we sustain the district court in this case
            without 
                   much 
                        difficulty and decline to adopt a per se rule, we
            do think  that caution needs to  be used before the  modified
            Allen charge is given for a second time.  At a minimum, there
            ought normally to be special circumstances, and not merely  a
            continued 
                     inability by the jury to decide, to justify a second
            charge. 
                    
                    But 
                        circumstances vary enormously; the trial judge is
            closer to the  facts, and with this  one note of warning,  we
            adhere to the majority view that each case must be judged  on
            its own facts.
            18.  See Reed, 686 F.2d at 652-53 (jury deliberated for only
            about one hour between first and second charge); United
            States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1977) (en
            banc) (jury deliberated for only three hours between first
            and second charge).
                                        -52-
                                         52

                                         IV.
                      Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b) commits to
            the 
               discretion of the district court both the determination of
            whether in the circumstances "just cause" exists to excuse  a
            juror after  the  jury has  retired  to deliberate,  and  the
            decision to proceed with a jury of eleven in the event that a
            juror 
                 is 
                    excused 
                           for 
                               just cause.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b).  See,
            e.g. ,     Casamento  ,      887     F.2d      at      1187. 
                      Barone contends that the district court abused  its
            discretion under Rule 23(b) and violated his Fifth  Amendment
            right  to due  process  of law  by  excusing a  juror  during
            deliberations
                         over his objection.  He asserts that the court's
            removal 
                   of 
                      the 
                         juror 
                               "irreparably altered not only the dynamics
            of the  jury, but its impartiality  as well."  Barone  argues
            further 
                   that, in permitting the eleven-member jury to continue
            to 
              deliberate 
                         after 
                              the 
                                  juror's dismissal, rather than granting
            his 
               motion 
                      to 
                        declare 
                                a 
                                  mistrial, the district court abused its
            discretion under Rule 23(b) and violated his Sixth  Amendment
            right to a unanimous verdict. 
                                         A.
                      On 
                        October 
                                27, 
                                   1993, 
                                         the 
                                             jury foreperson informed the
            court that, during the jury's lunch break that day, a Federal
            Protective Service  Officer ("FPO") told  one of the  jurors,
            Douglas Berger, that Berger's cousin had been represented  in
            another matter  by  one of  Barone's  attorneys.   The  court
                                        -53-
                                         53

            promptly met with counsel and discussed at length the problem
            and what ought to be done about it.  At several points during
            this discussion, Barone  moved for a mistrial, but the  court
            decided 
                   to 
                      question the jury foreperson, Berger, and the other
            jurors before ruling on the motion.19 
                      The  district  judge  first  spoke  with  the  jury
            foreperson.  Then, after  discussion with counsel, the  court
            called for Berger, instructing him as follows:  
                           I 
                            want 
                                 you 
                                     to listen to the questions
                      I'm going to ask you, carefully.  Try  to
                      answer those  questions fully, but  don't
                      tell 
                          me 
                             more 
                                  than I ask you about, because
                      there's some things  I need  to know  and
                      some things that  at the moment, I  don't
                      intend to get into.  Basically, I want to
                      know  what  happened  downstairs  in  the
                      lunchroom and how you  feel about it.   I
                      don't want to know what has been going on
                      upstairs in the jury room.  So, those are
                      sort  of  the  general  areas  that   I'm
                      interested in and with regard to what has
                      gone on upstairs, at the moment, I  don't
                      want you to tell me. 
                      After listening  to  Berger's recollection  of  his
            conversation with the  FPO, the judge asked Berger "And  what
            effect, if any, does this  have on your ability, or may  this
            have 
                on 
                   your 
                       ability 
                               to 
                                  deliberate and decide the case based on
            the evidence and the law and on nothing else, including  this
            information and event?"  Berger replied,
            19.   The district court's investigation into the matter is
            chronicled in greater detail in United States v. Barone, 846
            F. Supp. 1016 (D. Mass. 1994).  
                                        -54-
                                         54

                           Well, this is going to -- I have  no
                      problem with it.   It's just that  things
                      I'd have problems with if the jury,  say,
                      is  hung and  someone thinks  that I  had
                      something to  do with it.   I don't  want
                      someone to be pointing a finger at me and
                      saying, well, you know, he defended  your
                      cousin and you  were going with him,  and
                      you know, I don't  know what the deal  --
                      what happened with my cousin.  If someone
                      could 
                           say, 
                                well, it would be out of spite.
                      I just -- It's something I don't want  to
                      deal with.    I think  it would  be  very
                      difficult for everyone upstairs, also.
                      After asking  Berger to step  out, the judge  again
            conferred 
                     with counsel before recalling Berger to question him
            further regarding a discrepancy  between his version and  the
            FPO's version of events.  After Berger stepped out again, the
            judge  expressed doubts  about his  credibility, candor,  and
            ability  to continue to  serve as a  juror, but deferred  his
            decision as to how to resolve the matter until the next day.
                      On the morning of October 28, 1993, the judge began
            by stating his  view that Berger's ability to deliberate  had
            been 
                impaired and that he should be excused from the jury.  He
            also stated that, in order to decide under Rule 23(b) whether
            to declare a mistrial or proceed with eleven jurors, he would
            question each of the remaining jurors individually.  Barone's
            counsel 
                   stated 
                          that 
                              if 
                                 the court did not grant a mistrial, then
            Berger should not be excused.  
                      After further consultation with counsel, the  judge
            called 
                  for 
                      Berger. 
                              
                              The 
                                  judge reminded Berger that he was under
            oath and again instructed him that, in answering the  court's
                                        -55-
                                         55

            questions,  he  should take  care  not  to  reveal  anything,
            "directly or indirectly, about how you're voting up there, or
            how 
               the 
                   jury 
                        is divided, or what your view of the evidence is,
            or 
              anybody 
                      else's."  The judge then questioned Berger again in
            an effort to determine whether he was able to deliberate  and
            vote  solely on  the basis  of the  evidence and  the law  as
            instructed 
                      by 
                         the 
                            court. 
                                    In response to the court's questions,
            Berger 
                  stated that he would "have a hard time" and that he did
            not "feel right."  When asked whether he wished to be excused
            from 
                the 
                    case, Berger replied, "I wouldn't object.  I wouldn't
            say I  don't want to be, but I really don't feel I should  be
            here 
                anymore 
                        . 
                          . 
                           . 
                             I 
                               don't think it's right that I stay."  When
            the  court asked him  for his "most  candid responses" as  to
            whether he could avoid  being influenced in deliberating  and
            voting  by concerns  about how  it might  look later,  Berger
            replied, "I  don't know if  I can really  [d]o that and  that
            concerns 
                    me. 
                         
                        It 
                           concerns me a lot.  Maybe it shouldn't, but it
            does." 
                      The judge concluded that Berger's receipt of extra-
            judicial information had impaired his ability to continue  to
            deliberate 
                      as 
                        an 
                           impartial juror and, therefore, that there was
            just cause to excuse  Berger from the jury under Rule  23(b).
            Over  Barone's objection,  the  court  excused  Berger,  with
            instructions not to discuss the matter with anyone. 
                                        -56-
                                         56

                      The court then announced its intention to determine
            whether  the  remaining  eleven  jurors  could  continue   to
            deliberate fairly and impartially.  The judge stated that  he
            would not declare a mistrial without further inquiry  because
            the trial had been a long one and would require  considerable
            government, 
                       defense, and judicial resources to retry, but that
            he would let counsel be heard on how to proceed if, after his
            individual voir  dire  of  the eleven  remaining  jurors,  he
            determined that the jurors were impartial.  He explained that
            "[t]his is the type  of situation Rule 23(b) was intended  to
            address, 
                    according 
                             to 
                                the Advisory Committee notes, by allowing
            juries 
                  of 
                     eleven, in the court's discretion, and my overriding
            concern is with the fairness of the trial." 
                      After  further   consultation  with  counsel,   and
            following  counsel  for  Barone's  requests  regarding   what
            questions to ask, the court conducted an individual voir dire
            of each juror.   The court concluded  that no juror had  been
            affected by the  information that Berger  received or by  his
            dismissal; 
                      that each juror was fair and impartial; and that no
            evidence 
                    of 
                       pressure 
                               or 
                                  anxiety was discernible in the demeanor
            of any of  the remaining jurors.   Accordingly, the  district
            court 
                 denied 
                        Barone's motion for a mistrial, opting instead to
            continue deliberations with  eleven jurors  pursuant to  Rule
            23(b). 
                   
                   The 
                      jury 
                           returned its verdicts the following afternoon.
                                        -57-
                                         57

                      "When 
                           a 
                             non-frivolous suggestion is made that a jury
            may be biased or tainted by some incident, the district court
            must undertake an adequate  inquiry to determine whether  the
            alleged  incident  occurred  and   if  so,  whether  it   was
            prejudicial." 
                          
                         United 
                                States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436,
            442 
               (1st 
                    Cir. 
                        1993) 
                              (citations omitted).  See Angiulo, 897 F.2d
            at 1184-86.  The district  court is not, however, bound by  a
            rigid set of rules and procedures "that compel any particular
            form or scope of inquiry," but is "vested with the discretion
            to  fashion  an  appropriate  and  responsible  procedure  to
            determine whether misconduct actually occurred and whether it
            was 
               prejudicial."  Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d at 443 (citation
            omitted).   "Substantial deference is  due the trial  court's
            exercise of its  discretion in handling situations  involving
            potential 
                     juror 
                           bias 
                               or 
                                  misconduct," Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1185,
            and 
               the 
                   deference 
                            due 
                                the court's ultimate finding on the issue
            of  continued juror  impartiality  is enhanced  because  this
            determination is a question of fact, id. at 1186. 
                      Here, the trial judge promptly addressed the matter
            in 
              open 
                   court, and the inquiry was as thorough as the response
            was prompt.  The judge conferred with counsel at great length
            over 
                a 
                  period of two days, affording counsel ample opportunity
            to 
              express 
                     their 
                           concerns, and entertaining their arguments and
            suggestions regarding questions  to ask of jurors and how  to
            proceed.  The judge interviewed all the jurors -- taking care
                                        -58-
                                         58

            in his questions not to intrude upon their deliberations  and
            consulting 
                      with 
                          counsel 
                                  throughout -- and carefully weighed the
            testimony, demeanor, and credibility of Berger and the  other
            jurors.   A more careful and  thorough approach than the  one
            taken by the district judge here is difficult to imagine.  In
            the end, the district court reasonably concluded that  Berger
            could 
                 not 
                     continue 
                             to 
                                deliberate as a fair and impartial juror,
            but that his incapacity  had not impaired the ability of  the
            remaining  jurors  to carry  out  their  service  fairly  and
            impartially. 
                      The 
                         trial 
                               judge 
                                    has 
                                        substantial discretion under Rule
            23(b) to  remove a juror  after deliberations have  commenced
            where the judge  has determined that  the juror's ability  to
            perform her duties has  been impaired.  See United States  v.
            Walsh, 75 F.3d  1, 5 (1st Cir.  1996).  Barone protests  that
            "Berger's 
                     concerns were not about his ability to be impartial,
            but the  perceptions of  others"; that  Berger indicated  his
            ability to deliberate and vote based solely on the  evidence;
            and  that  the  district  court  "discounted  juror  Berger's
            assurances of his own capability to decide the case based  on
            the evidence."   Barone's argument seems to be that  Berger's
            initial representation  that  his receipt  of  extra-judicial
            information 
                       from the FPO had not affected his ability to serve
            as  an  impartial  juror  was  sufficient  to  establish  his
                                        -59-
                                         59

            competence to  deliberate  impartially  and,  therefore,  the
            district court acted improperly in dismissing him.  
                      But a juror's representations regarding her ability
            to perform  fairly and impartially  are not dispositive,  see
            Murphy
                  
                  v. 
                     Flo
                        rida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975); rather, the trial
            court 
                 must 
                      make 
                          its 
                              own 
                                  determination of the juror's ability to
            be 
              fair 
                   and 
                       impartial, see United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d
            757, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1992).  In all events, the question  is
            not whether the district court could have kept Berger on  the
            jury based upon his  initial representation, but whether  the
            court acted within  its discretion in  excusing him from  the
            jury.  See Casamento, 887  F.2d at 1187 ("Whether or not  the
            judge 
                 properly could have kept this juror on the jury based on
            her representation is not the  issue here.  Even if he  could
            have done so, it does not follow that he was obligated to  do
            so.").  
                      We 
                        conclude 
                                 that 
                                     the 
                                         district court did not abuse its
            discretion under  Rule 23(b)  in excusing  Berger after  jury
            deliberations 
                         had 
                            begun; 
                                   nor did the court violate Barone's due
            process  rights by  removing Berger.   In  this context,  due
            process demands no  more than what Barone received here,  "'a
            jury  capable and willing  to decide the  case solely on  the
            evidence 
                    before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent
            prejudicial occurrences and to  determine the effect of  such
            occurrences when  they  happen.'"   Olano,  507 U.S.  at  738
                                        -60-
                                         60

            (quoting  Smith  v. Phillips,  455  U.S.  209,  217  (1982)).
                       
                                         B.
                      Barone 
                            also 
                                 argues 
                                       that 
                                            the district court abused its
            discretion  under Rule  23(b),  and violated  Barone's  Fifth
            Amendment right to due process of law and his Sixth Amendment
            right to  a unanimous  verdict by  allowing deliberations  to
            continue (rather than declaring a mistrial), and in accepting
            verdicts 
                    returned 
                             by 
                               a 
                                 jury of less than twelve members.  In so
            doing, 
                  Barone 
                        contends, 
                                  the district court committed reversible
            error 
                 by 
                    depriving him of "one of the safeguards of liberty, a
            hung jury."
                      Rule 23(b) was amended in 1983 in order to  address
            the very problem presented here, that of how to deal with the
            necessity 
                     of 
                        excusing 
                                a 
                                  juror after deliberations have begun.20
            As amended, Rule 23(b) gives judges the discretion to  permit
            eleven-member juries to deliberate to a verdict if one  juror
            becomes unavailable.21   See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)  advisory
            20.  We note that under the federal rules the substitution of
            an alternate juror is not within the district court's
            discretion once the jury has begun to deliberate.  See Fed.
            R. Crim. P. 24(c) ("An alternate juror who does not replace a
            regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to
            consider its verdict."); Olano, 507 U.S. at 737-41 (treating
            the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations as a
            violation of Rule 24(c)); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1285-88
            (same).
            21.  The Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution
            does not require twelve jurors for conviction.  See Williams
            v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).  We have stated that Williams
                                        -61-
                                         61

            committee's 
                       note; 
                            United 
                                   States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 204 (3d
            Cir. 
                1986). 
                        
                        The amendment was intended to provide a preferred
            mechanism for avoiding  a mistrial where  a juror is  excused
            after 
                 deliberations have begun, United States v. Stratton, 779
            F.2d 
                820, 
                     831 (2d Cir. 1985), particularly "when the trial has
            been a lengthy  one and consequently  the remedy of  mistrial
            would  necessitate  a   second  expenditure  of   substantial
            prosecution, defense and court  resources," Fed. R. Crim.  P.
            23(b) advisory committee's note. 
                      The district court determined that, at the time  of
            Berger's dismissal, the trial had been in progress for nearly
            eleven weeks  and  would  require  "considerable  government,
            defense, 
                    and 
                       judicial 
                                resources to retry," and that each of the
            remaining  jurors could  continue  to deliberate  fairly  and
            impartially, based solely upon  the evidence and the  court's
            instructions. 
                      In United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 597  (D.C.
            Cir. 1987), the court held that "Rule 23(b) is not  available
            when 
                the 
                    record 
                          evidence 
                                   discloses a possibility that the juror
            believes that the government has failed to present sufficient
            evidence to support a conviction."  See also United States v.
            "effectively answers the claim that 11 jurors are too few,"
            Walsh, 75 F.3d at 6, and all courts to have considered the
            matter have held Rule 23(b) to be constitutional, see United
            States v. Ahmad, 974 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 1992); United
            States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1987); United
            States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1986); United
            States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 831-35 (2d Cir. 1985).
                                        -62-
                                         62

            Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988).  In this case  the
            record reveals that, during  his colloquies with Berger,  the
            district 
                    judge 
                         repeatedly instructed him not to disclose how he
            was voting or how  the deliberations had been going.   Still,
            some of Berger's responses to the court's questions  arguably
            suggest 
                   the 
                      possibility 
                                  that Berger may not have been persuaded
            that 
                the 
                    government had proven Barone guilty.  For example, on
            October 27, 1993, Berger stated:
                      It's just that  things I'd have  problems
                      with 
                          if 
                             the 
                                 jury, say, is hung and someone
                      thinks 
                            that 
                                 I had something to do with it.
                      I  don't want  someone to  be pointing  a
                      finger at me and saying, well, you  know,
                      he 
                        defended 
                                 your cousin and you were going
                      with him . . . .
            And on October 28, 1993, Berger said:
                      I don't feel  right. . .  . I don't  want
                      anybody, whether  it  be someone  in  the
                      general public finding out, or anybody up
                      in 
                        the 
                            jury. 
                                   I don't want to be looked at
                      as, well, you  know, he had a reason.   I
                      don't want anyone to think how I vote,  I
                      have a  reason to  do it  other than  the
                      evidence presented in court.
                      But, in  contrast  to Brown,  in which  the  record
            evidence "indicate[d]  a substantial  possibility that  juror
            Spriggs 
                   requested 
                             to 
                               be 
                                  discharged because he believed that the
            evidence  offered  at  trial  was  inadequate  to  support  a
            conviction," 
                        823 F.2d at 596, here the record contains no true
            evidence regarding Berger's views on the merits of the  case.
            Moreover, 
                     the 
                        district 
                                 judge in this case "did not construe any
            remark by Mr. Berger as a statement of how he was voting  and
                                        -63-
                                         63

            certainly did  not consider which  party he  might have  been
            supporting in deciding whether to excuse him."  United States
            v. Barone, 846 F. Supp. at 1020.
                      Thus,  in  contrast to  the  juror  in  Brown  (who
            indicated to  the judge that he  was unable to discharge  his
            duties 
                  because 
                         he 
                            disagreed with the RICO laws and was troubled
            by the presentation  of evidence), Berger  was excused for  a
            valid 
                 reason 
                        that 
                            was 
                                entirely unrelated to the issue of how he
            felt 
                about 
                      the sufficiency of the government's proof; i.e., he
            was excused  because the district  court determined that  his
            receipt 
                   of 
                     extra-judicial information from the FPO had impaired
            his ability to carry out his role fairly and impartially.  
                      We 
                        think 
                              that, 
                                   where, 
                                          as 
                                             here, a juror is removed for
            a just cause  that is unrelated to  the juror's views of  the
            sufficiency of the evidence, and there is no indication  that
            the 
               removed 
                       juror was a holdout juror, Brown's admonition that
            "a court may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if  the
            request 
                   for 
                      discharge 
                                stems from doubts the juror harbors about
            the 
               sufficiency 
                           of 
                             the 
                                 government's evidence," 823 F.2d at 596,
            does not apply.  We conclude that the district court did  not
            abuse its discretion in permitting the eleven-member jury  to
            deliberate 
                      to 
                         a 
                          verdict, 
                                   rather than declaring a mistrial.  See
            United States v.  Gambino, 598 F.  Supp. 646, 660-61  (D.N.J.
            1984) 
                 (stating 
                          that 
                              it 
                                 would have been "unthinkable" to declare
            a mistrial rather than proceed with eleven jurors, given  the
                                        -64-
                                         64

            investment of judicial resources in a six-week trial and over
            twenty hours of  jury deliberation), aff'd, 788 F.2d 938  (3d
            Cir. 1986).  See also United States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d  132,
            135 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the district court did  not
            abuse its discretion in  permitting an eleven-member jury  to
            render a verdict in a five-day trial).  
                      Finally,  we  reject  Barone's  argument  that  the
            verdicts 
                    in 
                       this 
                           case 
                                were not unanimous, and therefore violate
            the 
               Constitution, as merely a rephrasing of his constitutional
            challenge to the verdict  rendered by an eleven-member  jury.
            Although 
                    the 
                        Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutional
            permissibility 
                          of 
                            a 
                              less-than-unanimous verdict, see Apodaca v.
            Oregon
                 , 
                   406 
                       U.S. 404 (1972), we have stated that "rendition of
            a 
             verdict 
                     agreed 
                           to 
                              by 
                                 all jurors, after one juror with unknown
            views has been dismissed for cause, is a unanimous  verdict,"
            Walsh, 75 F.3d at 6.
                                        -65-
                                         65

                                         V.
                      For  the foregoing  reasons,  the judgment  of  the
            district court is affirmed.
                                        -66-
                                         66