Court Opinion

ID: 9366770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 21:01:52.460003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:55.048252
License: Public Domain

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
                                        No. 17-642V
                                 (Filed: January 10, 2023)
                               (Reissued: January 27, 2023)
                                  FOR PUBLICATION
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ELIZABETH DOLES,                      *
                                      *
                  Petitioner,         *
                                      *
v.                                    *
                                      *
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND               *
HUMAN SERVICES,                       *
                                      *
                  Respondent.         *
                                      *
***************************************
      Benjamin Alexander Christian, Maglio Christopher & Toale Law Firm,
Sarasota, FL, for Petitioner.
       Catherine Elizabeth Stolar, Trial Attorney, Torts Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. With her on
briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, C.
Salvatore D’Alessio, Director, Heather L. Pearlman, Deputy Director, and Alexis B.
Babcock, Assistant Director.
                                      ORDER
      Petitioner has moved for reconsideration of the portion of this Court’s
December 16, 2022 Opinion & Order directing reassignment of the case to a different
special master on remand. See Pet.’s Mot. for Recons. (“Mot.”) (ECF 116); U.S. Resp.
to Mot. for Recons. (“Resp.”) (ECF 118); Pet.’s Reply (“Reply”) (ECF 120); Op. & Order
(ECF 113); see also RCFC App. B, Rule 31. The motion is DENIED.


  This Order was issued under seal on January 10, 2023. The parties were directed to propose
redactions by January 24, 2023. No proposed redactions were submitted. The Court hereby releases
publicly the Order of January 10 in full.
       According to Petitioner, this Court’s statutory authority to “remand the
petition to the special master for further action in accordance with the court’s
direction” impliedly forecloses remand to another special master. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-12(e)(2)(C) (emphasis added). That argument is not unreasonable:
Ordinarily, a definite article (“the”) in a statute refers to a particular item or person.
See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2019); Work v. U.S. ex rel. McAlester-Edwards
Coal Co., 262 U.S. 200, 208 (1923); Otis v. Walter, 24 U.S. (1 How.) 192, 194 (1826).
But the usual restrictive reading yields when the text calls for a more inclusive one.
E.g., RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see
also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (the Dictionary Act, providing that “[i]n determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise[,] words importing the
singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things[.]”). Several
considerations militate against Petitioner’s interpretation.
       To begin with, this Court has reasoned in the past that “the Vaccine Act is not
a statute in which ‘the consistent use of the definite article in reference to something
indicates that there is generally only one[.]’” Day v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
129 Fed. Cl. 450, 452 (2016) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004))
(alterations omitted). In the very provision at issue here, Congress seems to have
used definite and indefinite articles almost interchangeably: “The court shall
complete its action on a petition within 120 days of the filing of a response [to a motion
for review] excluding any days the petition is before a special master as a result of a
remand[.]”). 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2) (emphasis added). There is no way to draw
firm conclusions from Congress’s choice of articles alone.
       If this Court could only remand to “the” special master who issued the original
decision — as Petitioner’s reading implies — the Court could not order reassignment
even in the event of special master misconduct, or if the special master left office
while review was pending. It is implausible that Congress could have wanted that.
See Witco Chem. Corp. v. United States, 742 F.2d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[A]n
absurd construction of a statutory provision should be avoided.”) (citing Oates v.
National Bank, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 239, 244 (1879)). A more practical reading is that
the Court’s authority to “direct[]” “further action” includes ordering reassignment.
See 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(e)(2)(C).
      This Court has in fact ordered reassignment in at least one published order.
Richardson ex rel. Richardson v. HHS, 89 Fed. Cl. 657, 660–61 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
Richardson is not binding, and it does not address Petitioner’s reading of the statute
one way or another. But the Federal Circuit later cited Richardson in concluding that
“fundamental fairness is best served by assigning the case to a different special
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master on remand.” Contreras v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 844 F.3d 1363, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
       Petitioner claims that reassignment in Contreras rested on 28 U.S.C. § 2106 —
which authorizes appellate courts to “remand the cause and … require such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances” — rather than the
Vaccine Act. Petitioner therefore argues that the Contreras court was not limited to
a remand to “the special master” who issued the decision under review. 42 U.S.C.
§300aa-12(e)(2)(C).1 Although the Federal Circuit has cited Contreras as an example
of “reassignment … to preserve the appearance of fairness[,]” Alta Wind I Owner
Lessor C v. United States, 897 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018), it does not follow that
Section 2106 was the sole basis for reassignment, or even the basis the panel intended
to rely on. The Contreras court, rather, cited not Section 2106 but Richardson and
this Court’s vaccine rules. Petitioner dismissed that citation as “unexplained,” Reply
at 1, but that only means that Petitioner cannot reconcile her argument with the
Contreras court’s actual reasoning. This Court must assume that the Federal Circuit
cited the authority it deemed relevant.
       It would be peculiar if reassignment may be ordered by appellate courts under
Section 2106 but not by this Court under the Vaccine Act. Petitioner’s rule would
mean that parties in Vaccine Act litigation could only obtain reassignment from the
Federal Circuit or, in theory, the Supreme Court. Supervision of the special masters
ought to be handled here rather than burdening appellate courts. Placing
reassignment authority in appellate courts would also create an unfair asymmetry
when this Court addresses motions for review: A party could obtain reassignment
after losing a motion for review, but not after winning. After all, if I had denied the
government’s motion for review, the government could have appealed to the Federal
Circuit and sought reassignment to a new special master. But the government could
not have appealed to the Federal Circuit from this Court’s grant of relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-12(f) (permitting appeals by parties “aggrieved by the findings or conclusions
of” this Court). If this Court cannot order reassignment, a party that prevails on a
motion for review would thus have no way to obtain it — even if the substantive
standard for reassignment were met.
      As a fallback, Petitioner also argues that the facts do not warrant
reassignment and that reassignment would obstruct efficient resolution of the case.

1 Section 2106 compares with this Court’s Vaccine Act authority to remand “for further action in
accordance with the court’s direction.” See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(C). If authority to reassign on
remand can be inferred from Section 2106, then it presumably could be inferred from the Vaccine Act,
provided — as explained above — the Act’s reference to “the” special master does not carry the weight
Petitioner argues.

                                                -3-
The standards for reassignment are simple: “fundamental fairness,” Contreras, 844
F.3d 1363, 1369, and “efficient administration of justice,” RCFC App. B, Rule 3(d).
Given that the original Special Master has interpreted the same evidence in two
inconsistent ways without explanation, it would be fairer and more efficient to place
the case before “fresh eyes.” Op. & Order at 7.
       The remands in Contreras and Richardson involved kinds of special master
error that do not appear in this case. Mot. at 5–6. It is also true that sometimes this
Court remands to the same special master repeatedly. Reply at 4. But then again,
those cases did not involve the highly unusual error presented here. Op. & Order at
7–8; contra Reply at 2–3 (arguing that the Special Master complied with this Court’s
instructions on remand). Contreras deserves a “faithful[]” application as binding
precedent, not a reading that limits it to its facts. SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884
F.3d 1160, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018). If Contreras and Richardson involved unique facts
justifying reassignment for reasons of fundamental fairness and efficiency, this case
does too.
       Although proceedings on the new 90-day remand will certainly be quick,
Petitioner’s concerns about efficient administration of the case seem overblown.
Ordinarily special masters are obligated to decide a case within 240 days after the
petition is filed, a period that includes developing the evidentiary record and holding
any necessary hearing. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii); RCFC App. B, Rule 10(b).
Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the record in this case — essentially, short reports
from two principal experts — is not especially voluminous. After the parties
completed briefing on Petitioner’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law
on December 4, 2020, see Pet.’s Reply in Supp. FFCOL (ECF 72), the original Special
Master issued his first entitlement decision on February 1, 2021 — only 59 days later.
Ruling on Entitlement (ECF 73). Besides, no remand can be for longer than 90 days,
see 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(e)(2), regardless of how large the record or how complicated
the issues to address might be.

                                         -4-
       Petitioner may claim in a future appeal to the Federal Circuit that
reassignment was in error, Mot. at 7, but the Federal Circuit can consider that
argument in the context of whether the new Special Master’s conclusions are
arbitrary and capricious. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f); Lozano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 958 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (while the Federal Circuit owes “no
deference to the trial court or the special master on questions of law,” it will “uphold
the special master’s findings of fact unless they are arbitrary or capricious”).
Ultimately, as explained in the Opinion & Order, inconsistencies in the original
Special Master’s decisions make it unproductive to remand to the same Special
Master once again. Op. & Order at 9. Reassignment on remand is still the more
efficient course, notwithstanding the possible challenges on remand and afterward.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.
                                               s/ Stephen S. Schwartz
                                               STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ
                                               Judge

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