Court Opinion

ID: 9582738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:45.948485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:16.899389
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment reached by the majority but cannot concur in the reasons given therefor and the adoption of the so-called “one publica*191tion rule.” However desirable the “one publication rule,” announced and adopted by the majority, might be, it is not the law of this State and this court is powerless to hold otherwise and to do so is nothing more than judicial legislation.
. The majority takes the position that there is no law or decision of the courts of this State which precludes the adoption of the one publication rule. The one publication rule depends upon the proposition that there is only one cause of action arising out of the publication and distribution of a libelous article by a newspaper. What is the law of Georgia on this subject? As was said by the Supreme Court of this State in Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204 (5) (48 AD 248), the laws of Georgia, with reference to their obligation or authority, are: “1st, The Constitution of the United States. 2d, Treaties entered into by the Federal Government before, or since, the adoption of the Constitution. 3d, Laws of the United States, made in pursuance of the Constitution. 4th, The Constitution of the State. 5th, The Statutes of the State. 6th, Provincial Acts that were in force, and binding on the 14th day of May, 1776, so far as they are not contrary to the Constitution, Laws and form of government of the State. 7th, The Common Law of England, and such of the Statute Laws as were usually in force before the revolution, with the foregoing limitation.”
“At common law a civil action for libel contained in a newspaper may be brought in any county or district in which the paper is circulated, although distant from that in which the paper is printed and/or in which the parties reside. Haskell v. Bailey (1894) 11 C. C. A. 476, 25 U. S. App. 99, 63 Fed. 873; Vitolo v. Bee Pub. Co. (1901) 66 App. Div. 582, 73 N. Y. Supp. 273; Pinkney v. Collins (1787) 1 T. R. 571, 99 Eng. Reprint, 1257; Blackburn v. Cameron (1871) 5 Ont. Pr. Rep. 341; Irvine v. Duvernay (1878) 4 Quebec L. R. 85.” 37 ALR 908. “At common law a libel printed in a newspaper was indictable in any place where the paper containing it had been circulated.” 37 ALR 914. It thus appears that under the common law there could be more than one publication or one cause of action arising out of the distribution and circulation of a libelous article. We know of no statute, nor has one been cited by the majority *192opinion, changing the common law of this State in this regard. Any doctrine of the common law of force prior to May 14, 1776, adopted by the Act of 1784, except where modified by statute or not adjusted to our situation, is the law of this State and is still operative unless expressly repealed by statute. Westmoreland v. Powell, 59 Ga. 256, 258 (3); Higdon v. Bell, 25 Ga. App. 54, 55 (4) (102 SE 546). English decisions rendered after May 14, 1776, may be considered as evidence of what the common law was on that date. Rogers v. Carmichael, 184 Ga. 496 (192 SE 39).
Furthermore, that the common law is still the law of this State, is evidenced by several opinions of this court and of the Supreme Court of this State in accordance therewith. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Vickers, 71 Ga. App. 204, 205 (5) (30 SE2d 440), it was held: “Where the plaintiff in an action for libel alleges publication of the libelous matter at certain designated times and places, he can not on the trial show publication at a different time and place from those alleged, since such testimony would tend to prove a separate cause of action, as each publication of matter shown to be libelous constitutes a separate cause of action.” In Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Sheftall, 118 Ga. 865 (45 SE 687), where an alleged libelous circular was distributed by the defendant railway, the petition alleged publication to certain designated individuals and this petition was sought to be amended by alleging a posting of the circular in a public place. In holding that the amendment should not have been allowed the Supreme Court of this State said (p. 867): “Every publication of matter which is shown to be libelous is a separate cause of action (Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 498), though all can be joined in one petition; but where the plaintiff brings suit for publication to designated persons, he can not thereafter, by an amendment, show a publication to other persons at a different time and place, since it would set up a new and distinct cause of action. Civil Code, § 3834. Here the original petition alleged that the circular was delivered to five conductors and a division superintendent in Bibb County. The amendment charges that the circular was posted on a bulletin, and thus published to the public at large. These are different *193transactions, and may involve different defenses. Civil Code, § 5099. The demurrer thereto should have been sustained.”
In Leavy v. State, 45 Ga. App. 574, 580 (165 SE 470), this court said: “Before concluding this opinion, we shall advert briefly to the contention of plaintiff in error that the venue was not proved, for the reason that the Brunswick News was published in Glynn County, and the prosecution was in McIntosh County, where that newspaper circulated. It is averred that the question of venue was raised by paragraph 1 of the demurrer to the indictment, which is as follows: ‘Said accusation does not allege on the part of this defendant the commission of any crime, misdemeanor, or offense under the laws of Georgia.’ We do not concur in this contention. The demurrer does not mention venue, and it nowhere appears from the record that the question sought to be raised was ever presented to the trial judge. . . However, the general rule in such cases is laid down in 17 R. C. L. 464, § 227, in this language: ‘It is generally held that a criminal prosecution for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where such article was written or printed.’ We are aware of the fact that in Florida and a few other states the rule is otherwise, but we think that the foregoing general rule is the proper one; and, even if it were granted that the question under consideration was properly raised, we would shape our ruling in accordance with the rule quoted.”
In Baker v. State, 97 Ga. 452 (6) (25 SE 341), involving a criminal prosecution for libel because of a letter published by the defendant in a newspaper, the Supreme Court in that case ruled: “Where, in such a trial, it appeared that the alleged libelous matter was published in a newspaper, and that at least one copy of that paper was sent to a given county, this was sufficient evidence as to publication therein, without showing that the paper in question had a general circulation in that county.”
The majority attempt to distinguish these cases on various grounds: (1) Some of them are criminal cases. (2) The question of venue was not raised in any of these cases. (3) None of these cases involves a suit against a newspaper. We must agree *194that the cases cited in this special concurrence differ from the case now before the court in these respects, but we do not agree that these differences amount to distinctions. If a crime is committed in each county in which a newspaper distributes a criminal libel, how can it be logically said that a civil tort is not also committed? The fact that the distribution of a newspaper in a particular county constitutes a criminal act does not distinguish it from the present case but rather shows a parallel, that is, that the publication in each county is a separate tort or cause of action. It is immaterial that the question of venue is not raised in the cases cited, this for the reason that the cases cited determine the basic rule upon which the decision as to venue is dependent; that is, that the publication in each county is a separate publication and constitutes a separate cause of action. The fact that in none of the cases cited was a newspaper the defendant can have no bearing upon the rules of law applicable thereto as hereinbefore stated. Until the legislature of this State, with valid legislation, provides for different rules of venue as against newspapers, this court is bound by the common law rule and the decisions previously rendered by this court and the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia.
So, we reach the conclusion that where a newspaper item is libelous, publication of the libel for the purpose of venue may occur in any place where the newspaper is distributed or circulated, Baker v. State, 97 Ga. 452 (6), supra, Leavy v. State, 45 Ga. App. 574 (7), supra, and is exhibited to, and read by, third persons. Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139 (2) (12 SE2d 414). The publication of the libel constitutes the origination of the tort and the cause of action thereon and the place of publication controls the venue in a suit against a domestic corporation based thereon under Code § 22-1102, which provides that, as against a corporation chartered under the laws of this State, “Suits for damages because of torts . . . may be brought in the county where the cause of action originated,” where there is also an agent upon whom service may be had at the place of publication. This rule is applicable even though the newspaper is printed and also published in another county, the home office of the publishing corporation, for the reason that *195a corporation may have more than one residence for the purposes of suit. See Martin & Thompson, Inc. v. Allen, 188 Ga. 42 (2 SE2d 668).
Even if it would be proper for this court to hold that the printing and distribution in numerous counties constitute only one publication and therefore that there is only one cause of action so as to avoid the claimed inequity of permitting numerous suits based upon separate causes of action in each county where the libelous article is distributed (although no such instance of separate suits having been brought as a matter of practice has been called to our attention), it does not necessarily follow that we also should hold that the one cause of action so resulting could be sued upon only at the principal office or place of business of the publishing corporation, and in so doing hold that the statutory permission to sue in the county where the cause of action originated has no application to cases of libel. The legislature made no such exception. Assuming that only a single cause of action exists by reason of the numerous acts of publication, such single cause of action is not limited by geographical boundaries any more than the numerous acts constituting the cause of action, and the cause of action may be said to originate in any geographical area where any of the acts of publishing occur.. So construed, we give effect to the legislative intent and permit the plaintiff to choose the venue in libel actions either at the principal office of the defendant corporation or in the county where the cause of action originates and the defendant has an agent upon whom service can be made. See, in this connection, Tingley v. Times-Mirror Co. (1904), 144 Cal. 205 (77 P 918); Vicknair v. Daily States Pub. Co. (1919), 144 La. 809 (81 S 324); Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Kendall (1923), 96 Okla. 194 (221 P 762); Louisville Press Co. v. Tennelly (1899), 105 Ky. 365 (49 SW 15); Cincinnati Times-Star Co. v. France (1901), 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1666 (61 SW 18); Belo v. Wren (1884), 63 Tex. 686; Bailey v. Chapman (1897), 15 Tex. Civ. App. 240 (38 SW 544).
I am authorized to say that Felton, C. J., Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., join me in this special concurrence.