Court Opinion

ID: 9735627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:26:12.698625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.479372
License: Public Domain

FILES, P. J. Dissenting.
This was a trial before a court *646sitting without a jury. The question is the admissibility of the victim’s testimony identifying the defendant.
The victim of the robbery, Lewis, observed the defendant’s face for an appreciable period of time. Defendant entered the office, stood at the counter, displayed a gun, demanded admittance through the locked counter gate, came behind the counter, escorted Lewis into “the maintainer’s room,” said it wasn’t big enough, then escorted Lewis down the hall before binding and gagging him. Later defendant returned and went through Lewis’ pockets and took his money. Lewis’ testimony includes this:
“Q. Now, for about how long altogether would you say that you had an opportunity to observe this man’s face altogether?
“A. About five minutes.
“Q. Approximately what would you say would be the minimum or maximum distance ?
“A. The maximum distance was when he walked in. About fifteen feet.
The minimum would be about two feet across the counter. ’ ’
Lewis ’ testimony describes 10 separate occasions when defendant spoke to him, and three occasions when Lewis overheard defendant speaking to a confederate.
In the police station Lewis tentatively identified defendant’s photograph, then identified him in a lineup without any verbal suggestion by the police. In court, Lewis positively identified defendant by his appearance and his voice.
At the time this ease was tried, any claimed unfairness in the lineup went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001]; People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804 [58 Cal.Rptr. 729, 427 P.2d 505].) In the light of that rule defendant’s counsel had the opportunity to and did cross-examine Lewis concerning the proceedings at the police station.
After hearing all of the evidence the trial court found defendant guilty. Under the law as it was understood at the time of trial, had the conscientious and experienced trial judge entertained any doubt that Lewis’ testimony was his own distinct recollection of the robbery, untainted by anything which had happened afterwards, the court could not have made its finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
An unfair lineup has always been unfair. In-court identification which is based upon any kind of deception, delusion or confusion, whether created by improper police tactics or *647otherwise, has never been credible evidence. This is not a rule of constitutional law, but of common sense. No court or jury, sworn to render a true verdict according to the evidence, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if it entertained any doubt about the credibility of the witness upon whose word the ease depended
The recent decision in People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183 [65 Cal.Rptr. 336, .436 P.2d 336], holds that the testimony of the victim is not to be received unless the prosecution proves, by “clear and convincing evidence,” that the victim distinctly recalls the defendant from his impressions during the robbery. In the case at bench, where the prosecution’s case rested entirely upon the victim’s testimony, the trial judge’s finding of guilty necessarily included a finding that the People had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the witness was testifying to an untainted recollection.
The Caruso opinion calls attention (at pp. 189-190) to the difSculty of determining whether the recollection of the witness has been tainted. This difficulty has always existed. Formerly it was exclusively the problem of the trier of the fact. Now the issue is for the court, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of the testimony.
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926], the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, in which the victim’s testimony would be excluded because there had been an improperly conducted lineup. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, and ordered the case remanded to the trial court, with instructions to the trial judge to determine whether the in-court identification had been tainted.
The kind of finding which the United States Supreme Court asked for in Wade, and which the California Supreme Court prescribed in Caruso, has already been made in the case at bench. There is no legal reason to reverse.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 21, 1968. Files, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 25,1968.