Court Opinion

ID: 9368160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 21:02:59.167545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.947503
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/23 P. v. Mathews CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,                                            B313909

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                      Los Angeles County
                                                       Super. Ct. No. NA113308
        v.

TONEY ROBERT MATHEWS,

        Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.

      Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       A jury convicted Toney Robert Mathews of attempted
murder and several other crimes after he struck his girlfriend
in the head with a machete, leaving her in a persistent vegetative
state. On appeal, Mathews argues his case should be remanded
for resentencing in accordance with Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) and Assembly Bill No. 518
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518), both of which
altered trial courts’ sentencing discretion. We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The People charged Mathews with attempted murder
(Penal Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1),1 injuring a spouse/
cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1); count 2), assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), two counts of contempt
of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 4 & 12), and battery on a
spouse/cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 11). On counts
1 and 2, the People alleged Mathews personally used a deadly
and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and on counts
1, 2, and 3, the People alleged Mathews inflicted great bodily
injury (GBI) under circumstances involving domestic violence
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).
       At trial, the People presented evidence showing the
following:
       On the morning of October 5, 2019, Alexis Nunez was
working at a gas station when she saw Mathews kicking and
punching his girlfriend, Jessica W. Jessica was on the ground
in a fetal position, covering her head and calling out for help.

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
Mathews said he was teaching Jessica a lesson because she
had not come home the night before.
       About a month later, on November 13, 2019, Cassandra
Anderson saw Mathews with his hand around Jessica’s throat.
Jessica yelled for help. Mathews struck Jessica with what
Anderson described as a two-foot long machete. Anderson ran
over to Jessica, who was bleeding from her mouth, nose, and ears.
Mathews got in a car and drove away. He later told someone
he hit Jessica with a metal pipe and thought she might be dead.
       When paramedics arrived, Jessica was lying on the ground,
unresponsive but breathing. She had a half-inch laceration
on her head that caused a traumatic brain injury. Paramedics
took her to a hospital, where surgeons removed part of her skull
and performed a tracheotomy. As of October 27, 2020, Jessica
remained hospitalized in a vegetative state. She continued
to be completely unresponsive, was unable to move her body,
and relied on a feeding tube.
       Mathews testified in his own defense. According to
Mathews, on the night of November 13, 2019, he started walking
toward Jessica and she yelled at him to get away from her.
Jessica ran across the street and an SUV hit her. Mathews
went over to the SUV and started beating on its window. The
SUV drove off. Some men approached Mathews with weapons,
so Mathews fled in his car.
       Mathews stipulated that he had two prior domestic
violence convictions, one in February 2016 and one in March
2019. In connection with the March 2019 conviction, a court
issued a 10-year criminal protective order prohibiting Mathews
from having contact with Jessica.

                               3
       The jury convicted Mathews as charged, and it found true
all the enhancement allegations except the weapon allegation
on count 2. The court sentenced Mathews to life with the
possibility of parole on count 1, plus the upper term of five years
for the GBI enhancement and one year for the weapon
enhancement. On count 11, the court imposed a concurrent term
of 364 days in jail. The court also imposed, but stayed under
section 654, the following: on count 2, the upper term of five
years plus the upper term of five years for the GBI enhancement;
on count 3, the upper term of four years plus the upper term of
five years for the GBI enhancement; on count 4, 364 days in jail;
and on count 12, 364 days in jail.
       The court explained that it chose to impose upper term
sentences because “this is a very aggravating set of events,”
Mathews had a history of abusing Jessica, and he has a
criminal history, including a prior misdemeanor and felony.
With respect to the GBI enhancement on count 1, the court
noted that it chose to impose the high term “because of
the gravity of the injuries” Mathews inflicted on Jessica.
       Mathews timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     The court’s failure to comply with Senate Bill 567
       was harmless
       Mathews contends his case must be remanded for
resentencing in accordance with Senate Bill 567.
       When the trial court sentenced Mathews, section 1170
provided, “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed
and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of
the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion
of the court.” (Former § 1170, subd. (b).) Under this provision,

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the trial court was free to impose an upper term sentence
based on any aggravating circumstances it deemed significant,
so long as they were reasonably related to the sentencing
decision. (People v. Moberly (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1191,
1195–1196.) “An aggravating circumstance is a fact that
makes the offense ‘distinctively worse than the ordinary.’ ”
(People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817 (Black).) The
California Rules of Court provide a non-exhaustive list of
aggravating circumstances, including that the crime involved
great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm,
or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
or callousness. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.)
       While Mathews’s appeal was pending, Senate Bill 567
took effect. It restricts a trial court’s discretion to impose an
upper term sentence. Effective January 1, 2022, “[t]he court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when
there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond
a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) The court also may “consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based
on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
       The parties agree—as do we—that, because Mathews’s
case was not yet final when Senate Bill 567 went into effect,
he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of the ameliorative
legislation. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745
(Estrada); People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.)

                                 5
The parties disagree, however, as to the proper disposition.
Mathews contends that, because—when imposing the upper
terms on counts 2 and 3 and the GBI enhancements on counts 1,
2, and 3—the trial court relied on aggravating circumstances
not stipulated to nor found true by the jury, we must remand
the case for resentencing. The Attorney General contends
remand is unnecessary because the trial court’s failure to
apply the new law was harmless.
        Courts of Appeal have articulated several harmless error
standards to determine whether remand is required when a trial
court failed to comply with the amended version of section 1170.
Under one standard—articulated in People v. Flores (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 495—the error is harmless if the reviewing court
determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have found true at least one aggravating circumstance. (Id. at
pp. 500–501.) Under another standard—articulated in People
v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez)—the reviewing court
first considers whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
would have found true all the aggravating circumstances. If so,
the error is harmless. If not, the reviewing court considers
whether it is reasonably probable the trial court would have
imposed a more favorable sentence had it not considered the
improper factors. (Id. at pp. 464–467.) More recently, the court
in People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, articulated a
modified version of the Lopez standard that also asks whether
it is reasonably probable the jury would have found true all
the aggravating circumstances. (Zabelle, at pp. 1110–1113;
see People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 405–410.)
        Both the Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 495, and Lopez
standards suffer from the same problem: they fail to account

                               6
for the fact that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 567
raises both federal constitutional and state statutory issues,
which are subject to different harmless error standards. Like
the court in Zabelle, we think the proper course is to analyze
those issues separately. To the extent there is a constitutional
violation, we apply the federal Chapman2 standard and ask
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would have
found true at least one aggravating circumstance. (See People
v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 838–839 (Sandoval).) If there
is a statutory violation, we apply the state Watson3 standard
and ask whether it is reasonably probable the jury would have
found true all the aggravating circumstances on which the
trial court relied. If so, the error is harmless. (See People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177–178 (Breverman).) If not,
we consider whether it is reasonably probable the court would
have imposed a more favorable sentence had it not relied on
the improper factors. (See People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216,
233.)
       We consider the constitutional issue first. In Cunningham
v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 (Cunningham), the United
States Supreme Court held that, with the exception of a
defendant’s prior convictions, the Sixth Amendment requires
that a jury determine the facts that render a defendant eligible
for an upper term sentence. (Id. at pp. 288–289.) The
California Supreme Court subsequently held that, so long as
one aggravating circumstance has been established consistently

2    Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
3    People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).

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with Sixth Amendment principles, the federal constitution does
not prohibit a trial court from relying on additional aggravating
circumstances to impose an upper term sentence. (Sandoval,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 838–839; see Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 813.)
       Here, it appears the trial court relied on three
aggravating circumstances to impose the upper term sentences:
(1) Mathews’s history of abusing Jessica; (2) Mathews’s
criminal history; and (3) the severity of Jessica’s injuries.
Because one of those circumstances concerns Mathews’s prior
convictions—and because the Sixth Amendment requires only
the existence of a single aggravating circumstance in order
to impose an upper term—the court’s selection of the upper
term sentences does not violate the federal constitution.
(See Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 288–289; Sandoval,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 839.)
       That Mathews’s sentence passes constitutional muster,
however, does not end our inquiry. We also must determine
whether the court complied with section 1170. Unlike the
federal constitution, the current version of section 1170 requires
all aggravating circumstances relied on by the court—except
for the defendant’s prior convictions, based on a certified record
of conviction—be found true by the trier of fact or stipulated to
by the defendant.4 (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), (3).)

4     Section 1170 does not explicitly forbid a trial court from
relying on its own factual findings in addition to those found true
by the trier of fact or stipulated to by the defendant. However,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) states, “the court may consider
the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing . . .
without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” This implies

                                 8
      At trial, Mathews stipulated that he suffered prior
domestic violence convictions, at least one of which involved
Jessica. Accordingly, the trial court’s reliance on two of
the three aggravating circumstances—Mathews’s history of
abusing Jessica and his criminal history—was consistent with
Senate Bill 567. Mathews, however, did not stipulate to the
severity of Jessica’s injuries, and the issue was not submitted
to the jury.5 The court’s reliance on that circumstance, therefore,
violated Senate Bill 567, and we must remand for resentencing
unless the error was harmless.

the court may not consider other factors that were not submitted
to the jury. (See In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209 [“the
expression of one thing in a statute ordinarily implies the
exclusion of other things”].) This interpretation is consistent
with the legislative history of Senate Bill 567. A number of
legislative committee reports and analyses of Senate Bill 567,
for example, state the bill requires the aggravating circumstances
relied on by the court at sentencing be found true by the trier
of fact or admitted by the defendant. (See, e.g., Sen. Com.
on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) April 13, 2021, p. 1; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of
Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021, p. 1;
Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 2021, p. 1;
Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021, p. 1.)
5      While the issue of the infliction of GBI was submitted to,
and found true by, the jury, it seems the trial court relied on
facts related to the severity of Jessica’s injuries that went beyond
the jury’s finding.

                                 9
       Section 1170’s requirement that all aggravating
circumstances relied on by the court (except for the defendant’s
prior convictions) be found true by the trier of fact or stipulated
to by the defendant is a purely state-created right. “[A]ny state
law right to a jury determination of particular issues is qualified
in turn by the appellate review standards set forth in article VI,
section 13 of the California Constitution,” and subject to the
Watson harmless error test. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th
at pp. 177–178.) Under that test, an error “is not subject to
reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes
a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.”
(Id. at p. 165; see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Therefore,
with respect to any aggravating factors on which the trial court
relied that should have been submitted to the jury, we must ask
whether it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found
them true and, if not, whether it is reasonably probable that
the court would have imposed the same sentence absent those
circumstances.
       Applying that test here, we conclude the court’s reliance
on the severity of Jessica’s injuries was harmless. The record
shows Jessica suffered a traumatic brain injury that caused her
to be in a persistent vegetative state. Surgeons had to remove
part of her skull and perform a tracheotomy. Nearly a year after
the incident, she remained hospitalized, completely unresponsive,
and unable to move her body. At trial, Mathews did not dispute
this evidence or in any way challenge the severity of Jessica’s
injuries. On this record, it is reasonably probable the jury
would have found Mathews caused Jessica to suffer injuries well
beyond that required for the offenses and the GBI enhancements.
(See, e.g., People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 464

                                10
[abrasions, lacerations, and bruising can constitute GBI]; People
v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 529 [injury that required
three stiches and “ ‘hurt for a few days’ ” was sufficient for a
GBI enhancement].) The trial court’s reliance on the severity
of Jessica’s injuries to impose the upper term sentences,
therefore, was harmless.
2.    Remand for resentencing under Assembly Bill 518
      would be futile
      Mathews contends his case must be remanded for
resentencing in accordance with Assembly Bill 518.
      When the trial court sentenced Mathews, section 654
provided that if an act or omission is punishable in different
ways by different provisions of law, the trial court may punish
the defendant only once, but must impose punishment under
the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment. (Former § 654, subd. (a).) Mathews’s convictions
on counts 1, 2, and 3 were premised on the same acts. The court,
therefore, imposed the punishment on count 1—a life term—
and stayed the punishment on counts 2 and 3—which provided
maximum terms of five years and four years, respectively.
      While Mathews’s appeal was pending, Assembly Bill 518
went into effect. It removed section 654’s requirement that trial
courts impose the provision that provides the greatest possible
sentence. Under the amended statute, “[a]n act or omission that
is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
(§ 654, subd. (a).) If Mathews had been sentenced under this
version of the law, the trial court could have stayed the sentence
on count 1 and imposed the sentence on either count 2 or count 3.

                                11
       The parties agree—as do we—that, because Mathews’s case
was not yet final when Assembly Bill 518 went into effect, he is
entitled to the retroactive benefit of the ameliorative legislation.
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–745; People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.) Once again, however, the parties
disagree as to the proper disposition. Mathews urges us
to remand for resentencing; the Attorney General contends
remand would be futile because it is apparent the court would
not change its sentencing decisions.
       Generally, “ ‘when the record shows that the trial court
proceeded with sentencing on the . . . assumption it lacked
discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may
have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at
a new sentencing hearing. [Citations.] Defendants are entitled
to “sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed
discretion’ of the sentencing court,” and a court that is unaware
of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed
discretion.’ [Citation.] But if ‘ “the record shows that the
trial court would not have exercised its discretion even if
it believed it could do so, then remand would be an idle act
and is not required.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. McDaniels (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.)
       People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, is instructive.
In that case, the defendant sought remand for resentencing
in response to a new law that gave trial courts discretion to
strike serious felony prior enhancements. (Id. at p. 272.) In
declining to remand the case, the court relied on the trial court’s
statements that imposing a lengthy sentence gave it “ ‘great
satisfaction,’ ” the defendant had “ ‘earned’ ” the sentence, and
there was “ ‘no shortage’ of aggravating factors.” (Id. at p. 274.)

                                12
The court also pointed out that the trial court chose to impose
the upper term on one of the counts, despite having already
imposed a life with parole sentence. (Ibid.) The court concluded
that, in light of the trial court’s statements and sentencing
decisions, remand would be futile. (Id. at pp. 274–275.)
       The same is true here. The trial court had no shortage
of opportunities to exercise leniency when it sentenced Mathews.
Among other things, the court had discretion to select from
the triad on count 2, count 3, and the three GBI enhancements.
In each instance, the court imposed the maximum possible
sentence, despite having already imposed a life term on count 1.
The court also expressed its belief that “this is a very aggravating
set of events,” and Mathews had committed a particularly serious
attempted murder. Given the court’s statements and sentencing
choices, it is apparent it would not impose a different sentence
if given the opportunity. Under these circumstances, remand
would be futile and a waste of judicial resources. (See People
v. McVey (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 405, 419 [declining to remand
case for resentencing related to a firearm enhancement,
noting the trial court imposed the highest possible term
for the enhancement].)

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                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the judgment.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                 EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

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