Court Opinion

ID: 9908755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 18:07:27.078788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:29.866140
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Chafin, 2023-Ohio-4477.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 9-23-10
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

      v.

THOMAS E. CHAFIN,                                         OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                 Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. 2022-CR-047

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: December 11, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        April F. Campbell for Appellant

        Raymond A. Grogan, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 9-23-10

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Thomas E. Chafin (“Chafin”), appeals the

judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. Chafin was found guilty

by a jury of one count of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition (“GSI”).

On appeal, he argues that the jury’s verdict as to the rape charge is based upon

insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

       {¶2} The genesis of this case is Chafin’s sexual activity with D.C., his seven-

year-old daughter in Marion County, Ohio on August 26, 2021.

       {¶3} On January 19, 2022, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Chafin

on the two criminal charges including Count One for rape in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b), (B), a first-degree felony, and Count Two for GSI in violation of

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), (C)(2). On January 24, 2022, Chafin appeared for arraignment

and entered not guilty pleas.

       {¶4} Chafin proceeded to a jury trial on November 7 and 8, 2022, wherein

he was found guilty of both counts in the indictment. The jury further found that

D.C. was less than 10 years of age at the time the rape offense occurred.

       {¶5} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 13, 2023. The trial

court found that the rape and GSI offenses were allied offenses of similar import

and merged them the purposes of sentencing with the State electing to proceed to

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Case No. 9-23-10

sentencing on the rape charge. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Chafin to life

imprisonment without parole.

      {¶6} Chafin filed a timely notice of appeal and raises two assignments of

error for our review, which we will address together.

                           First Assignment of Error

      The State’s evidence that Chafin committed rape was legally
      insufficient as a matter of law.

                          Second Assignment of Error

      The evidence weighed manifestly against convicting Chafin of
      rape.

      {¶7} In Chafin’s assignments of error, he argues that the jury’s finding of

guilt for rape (under Count One) is based upon insufficient evidence and is against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

                               Standard of Review

      {¶8} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are

clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389

(1997), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89

(1997). Thus, we address each legal concept individually.

      {¶9} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

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Case No. 9-23-10

St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional

amendment on other grounds, Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 89. Accordingly, “[t]he

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence was

sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of

witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 1st

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, citing State

v. Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110097, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25. See also State

v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19 (“Sufficiency of

the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the

evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.

       {¶10} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,

“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of

witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing

court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating

to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,

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Case No. 9-23-10

10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,

“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the

conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.

Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.

Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

                       Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Analysis

       {¶11} Chafin is challenging the jury’s finding of guilt for rape (under Count

One) arguing that it is insufficient as a matter of law. R.C. 2907.02 provides in its

pertinent parts:

       (A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is
       not the spouse of the offender * * *, when any of the following
       applies:

       * * *.

       (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not
       the offender knows the age of the other person.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).

       {¶12} Chafin argues that the jury verdict for rape under Count One is based

upon insufficient evidence and the State did not present any evidence of sexual

conduct. Specifically, he attacks whether the State presented sufficient evidence of

penetration.

       {¶13} “Sexual conduct” is defined to mean

       vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
       fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,

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Case No. 9-23-10

       without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part
       of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the
       vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is
       sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2907.01(A).

       {¶14} Since Chafin does not dispute any of the underlying elements of the

offense for which he was found guilty and sentenced, other than sexual conduct (as

it relates to the jury’s finding of guilt for rape), we need only address that issue.

       {¶15} Importantly, R.C. 2907.01 defines several forms of sexual conduct.

Specifically, and relevant to Chafin’s argument, the statute delineates digital

penetration as a form of sexual conduct.

       {¶16} Significantly, the State called the SANE nurse and the forensic

interviewer to testify at trial in its case-in-chief. The SANE nurse testified on direct-

examination that D.C. stated that he (Chafin) put his finger in her vagina; however

under cross-examination, she acknowledged that this information was not quoted in

the patient narrative of her report. (Nov. 7, 2022 Tr., Vol. I, at 181 191-192). (See

State’s Ex. 3). Moreover, she testified that during her examination of D.C. she

observed a linear abrasion (i.e., a long scratch on D.C.’s upper thigh) after D.C.

stated that Chafin scratched her with his fingernails, which was consistent with the

history provided by D.C. (Id. at 182). She further noted generalized redness near

D.C.’s labia majora and labia minora. (Id.). The forensic interviewer testified that

Chafin did not simply touch D.C.’s vagina with his hand, but rather put his hand in

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Case No. 9-23-10

her vagina.1 D.C.’s recorded interview was played for the jury and was consistent

with the forensic examiner’s testimony at trial. (See State’s Ex. 11). In that

interview, D.C. described how Chafin’s fingernails hurt her as he used his hand to

go in her vagina.

         {¶17} The State also called a forensic scientist from BCI to testify at trial to

the presence of male DNA located in D.C.’s upper mons pubis area above the labia.

(Nov. 8, 2022 Tr., Vol. II, at 343). She testified, however, that there was not enough

data present of sufficient quality for comparison with Chafin’s DNA.

         {¶18} Lastly, at trial, the State and defense agreed to the admission of

Chafin’s stipulated-polygraph examination into evidence. The polygraph examiner

testified that when he asked Chafin if he put his finger in D.C.’s vagina, forced his

finger into D.C.’s vagina, and put anything into her vagina, deception was indicated.

         {¶19} This evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the State,

reasonably supports the jury’s determination that Chafin engaged in “[s]exual

conduct” with D.C. Consequently, we conclude that Chafin’s rape conviction is

supported by sufficient evidence.

1
 In her forensic interview, D.C. never used the term “finger”, instead she stated that Chafin put his “hand” in
her “privates”. Regardless of whether Chafin penetrated D.C. with some combination of one or more of his
digits or his whole hand, her statements as well as the statement of the other witnesses support that vaginal
penetration occurred.

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Case No. 9-23-10

                     Manifest-Weight-of-the-Evidence Analysis

       {¶20} We now turn to Chafin’s argument that the jury’s verdict as to Count

One (for rape) is against the manifest weight of the evidence since he argues that

the SANE nurse only testified to sexual contact and not sexual conduct and that the

redness noted could have been the result of uncleanness rather than a sexual act.

We disagree.

       {¶21} As we highlighted in our resolution of Chafin’s sufficiency argument,

not only did the SANE nurse testify that D.C. disclosed that Chafin put his hand in

her vagina, but also so did the forensic examiner and her recorded interview with

D.C. was played for the jury. (Nov. 7, 2022 Tr., Vol. I, at 176, 180, 181, 197, 366).

(See State’s Ex. 11). Thus, his sexual-contact argument is wholly without merit.

       {¶22} Chafin’s redness argument is predicated on his assumption that the

jury should have found the SANE nurse not credible. It is clear to us from our

review of the record that the jury found the SANE nurse to be credible. “‘Although

we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the evidence, the

credibility of witnesses is primarily a determination for the trier of fact.’” State v.

Chute, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-22-02, 2022-Ohio-2722, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Banks,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96535, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13, citing State v. DeHass, 10

Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Indeed, the jury is “best able

‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections,

and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’”

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Case No. 9-23-10

Banks at ¶ 31, quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24,

citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80-81 (1984).

       {¶23} Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the

evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt for rape is of greater weight than the

evidence against it.    Additionally, we will not conclude that jury’s witness-

credibility determination is unreasonable. Therefore, we do not conclude that the

jury clearly lost its way, which created a manifest miscarriage of justice such that

Chafin’s rape conviction (under Count One) must be reversed and new trial ordered.

Consequently, we conclude that the jury’s finding of guilt for rape under Count One

is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶24} Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, Chafin’s first and

second assignments of error are overruled.

       {¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                 Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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