Court Opinion

ID: 9662000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:56:44.9542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:35.723861
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Judicial candor compels me to say that I have extreme difficulty in understanding § 27(c)(2),1 when read, as it must be, in connection with the rest of the Employment Security Act.
If the three-week period of layoff, as used in § 27(c)(2), must also be a period of unemployment as the term "unemployed” is defined in §482 the result reached in this case would of necessity be different from that reached by Judge Levin.
If the term "week” as defined in § 50(a)3 of the act is to be regarded as controlling in the computation of the three weeks of layoff required by § 27(c)(2) obviously the result reached by Judge Levin would also be changed.
As I grope for that elusive concept "legislative intent” in 27(c)(2) it seems to me the Legislature was trying to provide a benefit "in addition to any benefits otherwise payable”. If this be true, then to *599effect the legislative intention, the words "irrespective of any other provision of this act” must be read into 27(c)(2). If this be not true then the terms "unemployed” and "week” as elsewhere used must somehow be reconciled with their use in 27(c)(2).
I think what is troubling me most deeply is the distinction made by Judge Levin between the categories designated as the "Erves, Bloomer, and Kartsonas” group and the "Lawson and Griffith” group.
It’s all very well to speak about the "impact of the layoff in terms of wage loss” as to Erves, Bloomer or Kartsonas; and their "week” as the normally worked five days. As to them Judge Levin makes out a very pragmatic and commonsense result.
But what of Lawson and Griffith? They get not only the "back-to-work” benefit, but additionally two weeks of "short-week” benefits under the union contract. If we are to be "impact-of-layoff” oriented as to one group we ought to be so oriented as to the other. In fact it seems to me Lawson and Griffith have less entitlement to the back-to-work payments than do Erves, Bloomer, and Kartsonas. I sense almost an equal protection issue as between the two groups. Both groups ought to be eligible or not eligible instead of being distinguished on the basis of whether their layoff started on Friday or midweek.
General Motors speaks strongly to the point of an undeserved and, legislatively, uncontemplated windfall under the commission’s interpretation. The commission speaks to the point that windfall or no windfall, the section says what it says, and if the Legislature wanted to have prevented windfalls it should have said so in express terms. *600Further it possesses the continuing power of amendment to so speak again.
Personally, I am equipoised. I opt to follow the commission under the principle expressed in Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 380 Mich 513 (1968), that the construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to respectful consideration.
I vote to affirm as to all claimants, hopeful that the Supreme Court may address itself to the question or that the Legislature, which we presume is aware of our decisions, may want to make its intent somewhat less unclear.

 MCLA 421.27(c)(2); MSA 17.529(cX2).

 MCLA 421.48; MSA 17.552.

 MCLA 421.50(a); MSA 17.554(a).