Court Opinion

ID: 9529756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:53:56.931884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:54.647283
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The Court’s opinion opens with the concession that Lt. Taylor did not inform Mrs. Mitchell that he possessed a warrant for her arrest. This is true; he did not. More than that, however, he entered the privacy of her motel room for the very purpose of arresting her, and it was in this isolated environment that the interrogation took place — one middle-aged woman in varying degrees of drug and alcohol-induced incompetence vs. three skilled uniformed police officers.
For certain their beforehand knowledge that she had been drinking earlier in the day and their on-the-scene observation of her demeanor suggested to them that the opportunity to interrogate should not be ignored. A majority of the Court says that her confession was voluntarily given because she was both given the Miranda warnings orally and signed an acknowledgement of the written Miranda warnings. The majority devotes considerable time to the “novel approach” that she was so warned “too early,” but the majority shows little concern as to whether her voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights was intelligently and knowingly given where she was not further warned that a warrant for her arrest had issued, that it was then and there in possession of the officers, and that she was no longer free to move about — in short, that she was in custody. [This is to say nothing of the rights statutorily accorded to her by the Idaho legislature acting at the invitation of the Miranda Court, concerning which more will appear further on.]
Against the foregoing backdrop of nondisclosure the majority finds no merit in her *503arguments that statements made by her under such circumstances were inadmissible in evidence. Trial lawyers will see that this case bears a strong resemblance to State v. Monroe, 101 Idaho 251, 611 P.2d 1036 (1980), wherein that defendant insisted on having an attorney, but later submitted to interrogation. This Court affirmed, holding that the confession obtained at the ensuing interrogation was voluntary, although one dissenting member of the Court saw the issue not simply as one of waiver, but of a waiver made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” (Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), Bistline, J., 101 Idaho at 260, 611 P.2d 1036. The issue in Monroe primarily centered around “voluntarily.”1 Here, with Mrs. Mitchell, the issue is more central to “knowingly and intelligently.” Such is the crux of the real issue which should be but is not this day decided. This Court recently had occasion to be concerned with “knowingly and intelligently,” but such was in a different context, for which reason it may be assumed that the majority of the Court will not consider that which it said short months ago.2 Essentially, what the Court does is place its stamp of approval on the practice of hip-pocketing an arrest warrant in order to compromise an unsuspecting and uninformed defendant.
Of the fact that Mrs. Mitchell was defendant in a felony criminal action there can be no doubt. I mention this because Miranda, to the teachings of which I will next turn, is in many places couched in terms of the rights of an “individual” and not the rights of a “defendant” or of an “accused person.” The Pocatello police had laid their evidence of Mrs. Mitchell’s alleged guilt before a neutral and detached magistrate, and that magistrate found probable cause to issue a warrant for Mrs. Mitchell’s arrest on a charge of first degree murder. From that point on she was a defendant, and a wanted defendant at that. Any peace officer possessed of such knowledge was obligated to seize her and take her before the nearest magistrate, a point of Idaho law to which I shall also later return.
In Miranda is found language which, insofar as federal law is concerned, tells the state courts what is required to substantiate a holding that a defendant’s rights have been “knowingly and intelligently” waived. We begin our lesson by observing this passage:
“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (emphasis added).
At another place in its opinion the Miranda Court used the same language in discussing interrogation which takes place after proper warnings are given and the right to counsel is declined by the defendant whom the police are about to question:
“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, n. 14, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].”
384 U.S. at 375, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
That the warnings must be effective is then noted in Miranda where it speaks of the *504interrogation of the three defendants whose appeals were there examined:
“In none of these eases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process.”
384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added).
“Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.[3] In order to combat these pressures and to *505permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”
384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624 (emphasis added).
Part III of the Miranda opinion concluded with the caveat that the waiver, despite its appearance of being voluntary, must be “knowingly and intelligently” given:
“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against .him.” 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added).
Such was but a reiteration of the earlier statement, excerpted from Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962):
“ ‘Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ ”
384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
In discussing the deleterious effect that isolated and unfamiliar settings have on proposed interrogatees, as to defendants Stewart (California) and Miranda (Arizona), mentioned is that “[i]n other settings, these individuals might have exercised their constitutional rights. In the incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed.” 384 U.S. at 456, 86 S.Ct. at 1618. The Court unmistakably saw the need for appropriate safeguards at the outset, and further that statements given will be the product of the interrogatee’s free choice:
“In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart [California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694], in which the defendant was an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade. To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.
“It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles — that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” 384 U.S. at 457-58, 86 S.Ct. at 1618-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Thereafter, the Miranda Court, in discussing its earlier Escobedo decision, again in connection with the defendant’s choice to or not to speak to the police equated “competently” with “intelligently,” and said that a decision to speak could not be an independent decision if not made “knowingly or competently”:
“Our holding [in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 *506(1964)] stressed the fact that the police had not advised the defendant of his constitutional privilege to remain silent at the outset of the interrogation, and we drew attention to that fact at several points in the decision, 378 U.S. at 483, 485, 491, 84 S.Ct. at 1761, 1762, 1765. This was no isolated factor, but an essential ingredient in our decision. The entire thrust of police interrogation there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment. The abdication of the constitutional privilege — the choice on his part to speak to the police — was. not made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights; the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.”
384 U.S. at 465, 86 S.Ct. at 1623 (emphasis added).
There should be little doubt that the high Court has made it abundantly clear that that which appears to be a voluntary waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is not a waiver unless the prosecution demonstrates that it is made intelligently and knowingly, or, competently and knowingly, or, intelligently and understandingly; intelligently thus equates with competently and knowingly equates with understandingly. The interchange of words presents no problem. Miranda makes it clear that waiver is virtually synonomous with a “relinquishment of the privilege” of remaining silent and declining to be interrogated. 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. But the relinquishment must be voluntary in order to be effective, and to be voluntary the Court requires that a defendant’s submission to interrogation be an independent decision which is the product of his free choice. From Miranda we learn that there is no difference between the defendant’s consent to be interrogated and the defendant’s waiver of his right to not be interrogated. Either path arrives at the same destination. As noted in an excerpt above, an individual who has answered some questions, may thereafter desist, and there must be no further inquiries until and unless he “consents to be questioned.” 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Whether spoken of in terms of “consent to be questioned,” or intelligently and understandingly made voluntary waiver of constitutional privileges, or relinquishment of the privilege, the end result must be the same. It is not enough to go through the litany of reciting the Miranda warnings, nor will it suffice to obtain a signature to a written version of those warnings. The waiver or relinquishment of the privilege afforded by the fifth amendment, or, alternatively put, the consent to be interrogated, must be the individual’s intelligently and knowingly made independent free choice. In order to so make that choice, the defendant must be given “a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset ....” 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. “[T]he accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights .... ” 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624 (emphasis added). The Miranda warnings are not required to be given for the simple-minded purpose of educating the defendant that he has these constitutional rights, but the
“warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege.”
384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625 (emphasis added).
Can it seriously be urged that Mrs. Mitchell, who was not properly arrested as the law requires, and who was ignorant of the fact that she stood formally accused of first degree murder, was fully, effectively, and adequately made aware of the consequences of foregoing her constitutional right and privilege to remain, silent? Can it be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived *507and relinquished her constitutional rights when she was not warned that a magistrate had ruled that the evidence presented against her was sufficient to establish probable cause? Was she adequately, effectively, and fully warned that she was at the time of the interrogation actually in custody and restrained of her freedom? To all three questions the answer is no, to which must be added that both the spirit and the letter of Miranda were violated that day.
Obviously, Mrs. Mitchell’s arresting officers, who held off making the arrest until they first plied their wiles upon her, would not have expected any success in interrogating her if in compliance with the law they had made the arrest which would have informed her that she stood charged with first degree murder. While one cannot fault their endeavor, the fact still remains that she was entitled to a full disclosure so that she could make the “independent decision” which the Miranda Court declares to be essential, and which must be “truly the product of free choice.” When Mrs. Mitchell consented to be interrogated, not only did she not know that she had been charged with first degree murder, but she was purposefully kept ignorant. A person who is so led to believe that she is helping the police in their investigation of her husband’s death may be expected to and will cooperate with the law, but if that person is made aware that the officers are in fact there to arrest her on a first degree murder charge, in 99 cases out of 100, assuming competence, that person is going to want an attorney and all of the procedural safeguards afforded by the federal and state constitutions. The police knew it. Everyone knows it.
Recently, a unanimous Idaho Court full well understood that the surrender or waiver of constitutional rights must be obtained from an accused who makes his decision knowingly and intelligently, as well as voluntarily. Thus, in State v. Birrueta, 98 Idaho 631, 570 P.2d 868 (1977), there was no suggestion of the element of coercion where defendant entered a voluntary plea of guilty to second degree murder charges. The sole issue on appeal was the claim that Birrueta did not knowingly and intelligently understand the charges to which he had pled guilty. He had counsel, and obviously knew that he was charged with killing two men. In reversing the conviction entered on the guilty plea, this Court relied upon Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), where the Supreme Court recognized that a plea (waiving a constitutional right), to which may be added a waiver (relinquishing a constitutional right), must be “voluntary in a constitutional sense.”
“And clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.’ Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859.” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257-58, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).
Unlike the defendant in the Henderson case, Mrs. Mitchell was kept in. total ignorance of the charges against her, or even that any charges had been made. So kept uninformed, it is not surprising that she signed the waivers. Even in the less restrictive civil field of the law, it seems to be the general law that ignorance of a material fact negatives waiver. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 158 (1966).
Case law relied upon by the majority is poor footing indeed. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977), is readily distinguished. The defendant there was a witness before a federal grand jury — a far cry from “interrogation conducted by isolating the suspect with police officers.” 97 S.Ct. at 1819 n. 5. Not only was Mrs. Mitchell isolated with police officers, but they alone knew that she was detained — and hence in custody.
*508State v. Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731 (1968), is even more quickly put aside. A case which predated the “voluntary in the constitutional sense” language of Henderson, relied upon in Birrueta, the facts there were markedly different. There the defendant not only had been placed under arrest, but was taken into custody, and put in a jail cell. She was interrogated by the deputy sheriff who said she was “under the influence of alcohol” two and one-half hours before he went to her cell, who “awakened her with some difficulty,” orally gave her the Miranda warnings, and obtained a written waiver. 445 P.2d at 733. Although the stupefied condition of that defendant was not given any consideration— contrasted to the more enlightened approach of the trial court here — the Montana court saw little problem as to whether the waiver was made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,” mentioned briefly at page 735 of 445 P.2d, noting only that she was in jail and informed that she was charged with assault.4 The facts and circumstances of the Montana case are interesting — as are the divergent points of view expressed in the two opinions — but nothing more. The Lucero defendant was charged; she was in jail. Mrs. Mitchell, on the other hand, was not informed that she had been formally charged with murder. This is a difference — not a distinction.
Can it be said that police officers sent to make an arrest, and knowing of the formal charge5 of murder upon which their warrant is based can go through the Miranda litany, withhold the arrest, and thereafter stand on the waiver which has been obtained from a not wholly informed person? Not under federal law, and I would think not under Idaho law as well.
The Miranda Court opened its monumental decision with this language:
“We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution — that ‘No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ and that ‘the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel’ — rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured ‘for ages to come, and ... designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.’ Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 387 [5 L.Ed. 257] (1821).”
384 U.S. at 442, 86 S.Ct. at 1611.
Insofar as most of the western states are concerned, and Idaho for certain, the Miranda holding was not an innovation. Whereas other states had been rather backward, particularly with providing counsel to indigent defendants accused of felonies, Idaho was not behind, other than that our state law did not require appointment of counsel until after the preliminary hearing. Even prior to Miranda some enlightened prosecutors and magistrates were, in fact, providing counsel to indigent felony defendants even prior to the preliminary hearing — notwithstanding that statutory law did not then require it. Near the close of part III of Miranda, the Court declared that the basic procedural safeguards it that day mandated *509must be employed and would be required, leaving to the states the adoption of “other fully effective means” to protect the privilege. 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Miranda came in 1966. Idaho responded immediately. The 1967 legislature made the first substantial additions to the Criminal Code since the Criminal Practice Act of 1864 — all of which reflect Idaho’s acceptance of Miranda dictates, and some of which went beyond in spelling out the ways constitutional rights will be protected. So far as I can ascertain, these statutes have gone virtually unheeded. Adherence to the Idaho statutory procedures, both of great age and of 1967, would have prevented the arising of the controversy we pass upon today. I touch upon those which are applicable; others are solicitous of the protections to be afforded indigents.
I.C. § 19-507 sets forth the requirements of arrest warrants. Included is that the peace officer to whom it is directed or into whose hands it comes, is “commanded forthwith to arrest” the accused and take the accused to the issuing magistrate or the nearest or most accessible magistrate. I.C. § 19-508 requires that the arrest warrant “state the offense charged.” I.C. § 19-515 states that the accused (defendant) must be taken before the magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” I.C. § 19-608 requires that “[t]he person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of his intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it .... ”
I.C. § 19-801 requires an arrested person taken before a magistrate to be “immediately informed ... of the charge against him, and of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings.” I.C. § 19-802 requires the magistrate to “allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for counsel” and further that upon defendant’s request the magistrate shall “require a peace officer to take a message to any [local] counsel ... the defendant may name.” I.C. § 19-853(a)(l), in unequivocal terms, mandates that where a person is under formal charge of having committed a serious crime, and is not represented by an attorney under conditions in which a person having his own counsel would be entitled to be so represented, the law enforcement officers are required to clearly inform such person of his right to counsel and of the right of a needy person to be represented by an attorney at public expense. Section 19-853(a)(2) mandates that if the person so formally charged or so detained does not have an attorney, the officers must notify the public defender or trial court concerned, as the case may be, that he is not so represented.
Faithful compliance with these mandatory requirements of the law — all of which were enacted to fulfill constitutional requirements, some in early days and some responsive to the Miranda decision, would have allowed Mrs. Mitchell to intelligently and knowingly make her independent decision, of a free will, to consent to be interrogated. An intelligent decision is not based upon mental capacity, but upon being fully informed as to rights and consequences; it is a decision made intelligently, by whomever and with whatever mental endowment, with full knowledge of all the circumstances. Mrs. Mitchell was not only kept uninformed by the officers, but also suffered from varying degrees of incompetency, as found by the conscientious trial judge in his effort to ascertain at what point they went too far in that respect.
While it is understood that officers in the field may not fully comprehend Miranda, there is no excuse for their noncompliance with Idaho criminal statutes, compliance with which would provide the Miranda protections.6

. The judgment of the Supreme Court was vacated for reconsideration by the Supreme Court of the United States. 451 U.S. 1014, 101 S.Ct. 3001, 69 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981). Thereafter another opinion was issued reversing the district court. State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129, 645 P.2d 363 (1982).

. State v. Birrueta, 98 Idaho 631, 570 P.2d 868 (1977), hereinafter discussed.

. The Miranda Court also concerned itself with modern techniques of interrogation, and its discussion is directly applicable to the interrogation of Mrs. Mitchell, who was an accused defendant confronted by three police officers in the isolation of a motel room, a definite psychological advantage to the police officers, if we are to accept
“that the modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, ‘Since Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716, this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.’ Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S.Ct. 274, 279, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”
384 U.S. at 448, 86 S.Ct. at 1614 (emphasis added).
“The officers are told by the manuals that the ‘principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy —being alone with the person under interrogation.’ The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows.
“ ‘If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator’s office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law.’ ” 384 U.S. at 449-50, 86 S.Ct. at 1615 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
“The examiner is to concede him the right to remain silent. ‘This usually has a very undermining effect. First of all, he is disappointed in his expectation of an unfavorable reaction on the part of the interrogator. Secondly, a concession of this right to remain silent impresses the subject with the apparent fairness of his interrogator.’ ”
384 U.S. at 453-54, 86 S.Ct. at 1617 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
“From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must ‘patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained.’ When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.”
384 U.S. at 455, 86 S.Ct. at 1617 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
I seriously doubt that any member of this Court or of any court would venture to suggest that this was not an in-custody interrogation. The focus of suspicion had long since been relegated to the past. Mrs. Mitchell was a criminal defendant. She was isolated when confronted, and no matter what the degree of her competence, she was not adequately informed of her defendant status nor of the reason why she was being visited. This indeed was the psychological technique of interrogation which the Miranda court deplored, and the evils of which it sought to correct.

. Justice John C. Harrison’s dissent saw the facts more realistically:
“To take a statement from an obviously drunk, confused and semi-literate woman of Mexican descent who had been arrested several hours before and allowed two hours of sleep and awakened and told of her widowhood violates, to say the least, the spirit if not the substance of Miranda.”
State v. Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731, 738 (1968).

. This element was not present in either the Lucero or Washington case.

. Recently at oral argument in another case inquiry was made of deputy attorney general as to the views of the office of the attorney general in requiring police officers of this state to comply with the statutory law:
“FROM THE BENCH: Would you use some of that time to comment upon this *510proposition that I discussed briefly with Mr. Kofoed, that for 15 years now we’ve had statutes on the books here in Idaho which I think were enacted pursuant to the Miranda case which reflects the legislature’s sense at the time they passed it that these Miranda warnings be in writing, and before an interrogation takes place that there be some attempt made to get the interrogee to sign the thing and acknowledge that he’s well informed and that in the absence thereof that there be something written down by the officer explaining that this took place but he didn’t sign it.
“DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: I acknowledge that statute does exist. I don’t believe that there is anything that says that noncompliance with that statute automatically makes any statement not admissible.
“BENCH: Well, let me put it to you this way. Do you think that it’s wrong to come to the conclusion that that statute was the legislature’s sense of what the Miranda court said was a constitutional requirement?
“DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: I’d need to do some research on that before I’d reach any conclusion on it. That’s a possibility, but I would not agree to that without being able to do the research on it.
“BENCH: You think it’s just so much surplusage in the Idaho Code?
“DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: No, I wouldn’t say it’s surplusage. I would suspect that it was probably brought at the instigation of defense attorneys, the Idaho trial lawyers or something. But, I don’t know .. .
“BENCH: It wouldn’t make any difference who asked for the legislation, if the legislature passed it and said to the law officers, which they’ve done since 1864, this is how you make an arrest and now this is how you conduct an interrogation.
“DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: Unless it says that unless you comply with all of these all of your further action is not admissible into court, that would not make the admission or statement inadmissible in court. I’m not sure that is a consequence of not complying with that statute.
“BENCH: So what you’re saying is, to the law officers throughout the state of Idaho, it’s optional. If they want to do it that way, it’s fine.
“DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: If they were asking me for advice, I’d say ‘You follow the statute.’ What I’m saying to the Court today is I don’t believe that it is mandatory to follow those in order to make the statement admissible into court.
“BENCH: If you’re saying it to the Court, you’re also saying it to the people, to the law enforcement.
“DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: Not if they are asking me for advice. We could say, ‘yes, you did it wrong, but yet it is still going to be admissible.’ ...”