Court Opinion

ID: 9707532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:14:51.908252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:34.746076
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result of the majority Memorandum. There is a significant difference between the scope and application of the Protection From Abuse Act (PFAA), 23 Pa. C.S. § 6101 et seq., and Child Protective Service Law (CPSL), 23 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq. The Protection From Abuse Act is designed to prevent further abusive behavior by the members of a family unit to each other, including children therein, Lee v. Carney, 435 Pa.Super. 405, 645 A.2d 1363 (1994), Weir v. Weir, 428 Pa.Super. 515, 631 A.2d 650 (1993). The Child Protective Service Law is intended to prevent abuse to children only and to provide reporting to and supervision by Children and Youth Services for remedial services and ultimately bringing the child within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq. The PFAA does not entail state intervention resulting in removal of the child, whereas the CPSL can, in conjunction with the Juvenile Court, require a child to be “taken from its home and kept in protective custody in order to protect the child from further child abuse[.]” Miller on Behalf of Walker v. Walker, 445 Pa.Super. 537, 546-48, 665 A.2d 1252, 1257 (1995). Neither the PFAA nor the CPSL contain provisions that mandate counsel be provided in proceedings involving a child. It is the jurisdiction of juvenile court under the Juvenile Act that mandates legal counsel for the child. Section 6337, Right to counsel, provides:
Except as otherwise provided under this chapter a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings under this chapter and if he is without financial resources or otherwise unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel for him. If a party appears without counsel the court shall ascertain- whether he knows of his right thereto and to be provided with counsel by the court if applicable. The court may continue the proceeding to enable a party to obtain counsel. Counsel must be provided for a child unless his parent, guardian, or custodian is present in court and affirmatively waive it. However, the par*103ent, guardian, or custodian may not waive counsel for a child when their interest may be in conflict with the interest or interests of the child. If the interests of two or more parties may conflict, separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.
The CPSL, as a substantive act, is dependent upon the Juvenile Act, which is procedural in nature, to adjudicate abuse or dependency and does not mandate removal of the child from the custody of the parents without an Order of the juvenile court. Under the PFAA, even transfer of custody to one parent from the other is done for a limited time under exigent circumstances which may be followed by a petition filed in the Domestic Relations Court. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108, Relief, (4).
In Interest of J.R.W., 428 Pa.Super. 597, 631 A.2d 1019 (1993), this Court stated:
The Juvenile Act provides:
§ 6324. Taking into custody
A child may be taken into custody:
(1) Pursuant to an order of the court under this chapter.
... Section 6302 of the Act, Definitions, defines “dependent child” in relevant part as follows:
“Dependent child.” A child who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals[.]
By the doctrine of incorporation, as mandated by the Legislature, the definition of child abuse (the Law, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303) quoted above is incorporated into this definition of a dependent child. The Act provides:
§ 6341. Adjudication
(c) Finding of dependency. — If the court finds from clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent, the court shall proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing, which shall occur not later than 20 days after adjudication if the child has been removed from his home, to make a proper disposition of the case.
Thus, it is clear that under the Act, while incorporating the later additional legislation relating to child abuse provided under the Law, the Juvenile Court has the jurisdiction and the right to adjudicate child abuse and when such an adjudication is made pursuant to the Law, a “founded report” may be lodged with the Department of Welfare determining that the parents are the persons responsible for the abuse.
In summation, the Juvenile Court is the proper and only judicial body which has the capacity to make a determination that a child is abused and to affect a disposition of that child pursuant to the Act in conjunction with the Law. In doing so, that Court also had been given the right, pursuant to the Law, to establish on prima facie evidence whom the likely abusers would be under the circumstances. Thus, the standard of proof applied in determining abuse of the child for purposes of disposing of that finding in relation to placement of the child or supervision of the child is by clear and convincing evidence. By specific act of legislation, a determination as to who the abuser most likely would be is only required to be established by prima facie evidence. It is unquestioned in this case that the child was abused by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 608, 631 A.2d at 1024-25.
The implications of the above are clear. The finding by the court' that E.D. was “abused” was not equivalent to such a finding by the Juvenile Court pursuant to its jurisdiction as to dependent (abused) children under the incorporation of the CPSL in the juvenile definition of dependency. As stated by this Court, the definition of abuse under the PFAA is broader than that of abuse under the CPSL and, therefore, jurisdiction may be exercised to protect a child under the PFAA, which would not be possible in Juvenile Court under the CPSL. As we stated previously, the requirement for a guardian ad litem in a PFAA proceeding is not required because the CPSL is not incorporated *104m toto into the PFAA, since the court does not have the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to implement the CPSL.
In further amplification of the distinction between the proceedings, the standard of proof is by the preponderance of the evidence in PFAA cases, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107, Hearings, Snyder v. Snyder, 427 Pa.Super. 494, 629 A.2d 977 (1993), whereas the standard of proof in court proceedings under the CPSL is clear and convincing evidence, Interest of J.R.W., supra.
In Miller, supra, this Court stated:
[I]t is clear that the definition of abuse under the Protection from Abuse Act is broader than the definition of child abuse under the Child Protective Services Act.
The goal of the Protection from Abuse Act is protection and prevention of further abuse by removing the perpetrator of the abuse from the household.
Id. at 549, 665 A.2d at 1258 (emphasis added).
Thus, it would be error to incorporate all the requirements and procedures of the CPSL into the hearings and procedures under the PFAA, when clearly the legislature and our decisions have provided that the Juvenile Court alone may act to implement the requirements of the CPSL.
It is this aspect of child removal, operating through the joint interaction of the CPSL and the Juvenile Act, which requires appointment of counsel that is not present in the PFAA The PFAA does not require counsel for the child, as the child remains, in all eases, in custody of one of the parents. The action of the trial court in dismissing counsel for the child was proper and in compliance with the law.