Court Opinion

ID: 9868151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:00:36.772251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:01.953004
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _______________

                                      No. 22-3315
                                    _______________

                                 JOBANPREET SINGH,
                                          Petitioner

                                             v.

          ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          _______________

                      On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                                   (No. A208-794-978)
                          Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy
                                    _______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                on September 14, 2023

                Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges

                               (Filed: September 26, 2023)
                                    _______________

                                       OPINION*
                                    _______________
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

   Jobanpreet Singh, a Sikh from Punjab, India, belonged to the People’s (Aam Aadmi)

Party. Three times, supporters of rival political parties confronted him for supporting the

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
wrong party. The first time, five fellow students called him a traitor to Sikhs for supporting

the People’s Party, so they beat him, bloodying his nose and lips. After his parents reported

the beating, village councillors made the attackers apologize publicly to Singh.

   Five months later, a group of youths pushed him off the back of a bus for the same

reason, scraping up his forehead, arms, and knees. Singh was scared and did not report that

attack to the police.

   And eight months after that, ten supporters of rival parties showed up at his home, called

his family traitors, and beat him and his cousin, bruising and cutting them. Police responded

and came to his home but never arrested or prosecuted anyone for the beating.

   So Singh came to the United States on a six-month visa, falsely claiming that he was a

karate expert. Two years later, the U.S. government started proceedings to remove him

from the country. He admitted that he was removable but applied for asylum, withholding

of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

   The immigration judge denied his applications. As she noted, Singh did not argue that

his assailants were public officials, but rather supporters of a rival party. And he did not

bear his burden of proving that the government was unable or unwilling to control his at-

tackers. On the contrary, whenever the authorities were called, they responded properly.

Singh appealed the denials of asylum and withholding but not protection under the Con-

vention. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and dismissed his appeal.

   Singh now petitions for review. But he failed to exhaust two issues below: He never

appealed the immigration judge’s denial of his Convention claim. And he never argued or

presented evidence to the agency, as he now suggests in passing, that his attackers “were

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affiliated with the government” or were acting “under the instruction of government offi-

cials.” Pet’r’s Br. 11–12; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (statutory exhaustion requirement). The

only issue that he has preserved and raised is that the Indian government was supposedly

unable or unwilling to control the private actors who attacked him.

   We review the Board’s decision for substantial evidence, treating the agency’s findings

of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary.” § 1252(b)(4); see Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 91 (3d Cir.

2021). Substantial evidence showed that Indian officials were able and willing to stop the

attacks.

   When they were called, government authorities responded to the private violence. After

the first attack, village councillors summoned the assailants (as well as their parents) and

forced them to apologize. After the third one, police came to Singh’s house. Their failure

to track down, arrest, and prosecute the perpetrators does not prove that they were unable

or unwilling to do so. (Police can be able and willing to solve crimes and bring criminals

to justice even though they sometimes fail to do so.) And Singh never reported the second

attack, so the government’s failure to respond tells us nothing.

   In response, Singh cites various human-rights reports about conditions in India. But

none is apt. The reports’ generalized concerns about officials’ unaccountability, police

shortages, lax law enforcement, demands for bribes, crowded dockets, pretrial detention,

coerced confessions, and sedition and hate-speech prosecutions are unrelated to Singh and

the facts of his case.

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   Substantial evidence in the record shows that the Indian government was able and will-

ing to control the private actors who attacked Singh. So the Board properly affirmed the

denial of asylum and withholding of removal. We will thus deny his petition for review.

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