Court Opinion

ID: 9461365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:12:30.204166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:01.254993
License: Public Domain

BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
Although recognizing the keen riposte of the majority opinion on rehearing, I remain pursuaded to the original panel’s determination in respect to the damage claim. In this I assess as “clearly erroneous” the District Court’s implied finding that appellee Williams had not “unreasonably refused the alternative employment”.
There was no solid ground for his declination of the assistant principalship held out to him as alternative employment. That his objection was not really *1245based on loss of rank, prestige or stature is disclosed by his request “that my time be split between the two schools, assistant at the junior high school and assistant at the senior high school”. (Accent added.) Note that one of these is of lower grades than the Albemarle school in which he was to serve as assistant principal.
In giving the Superintendent of Schools his reasons, he said the “salary was fine but that he didn’t want to teach” for “he didn’t feel qualified to teach”. The new position did entail teaching 50% of the time in his own field (science). Williams’ subsequent conduct utterly repudiates his pose of teaching to account for his decision.
In the very next employment he obtained — at Barber-Scotia College for the session following his termination in Al-bermarle — he bound himself “to giving full time during the academic year [while Acting Registrar] to teaching the subjects assigned by the College Administration” at a salary of $2000.00 less than he would be paid at Albemarle. (Accent added.) Again, in the two immediately succeeding years — 1970-71 and 1971-72 — while he was principal in Pender Countv, he “sp'mt in teaching” three hours a day, divided between two schools1 Q.E.D.: thus he unreasonably refused the Albemarle employment. The finding of the District Court is plainly unfounded in predicating damages on the contrary argument.
Truth is that of the $6767.35 awarded Williams by the District Court as damages, $5723.56 consisted of expenses incurred in accepting and occupying teaching jobs, the very objection he interposed against the appointment suggested to him by Albemarle.
It is a misconception to expound the panel’s holding as requiring the appellee to accede to the demotion in order to mitigate damages or, put another way, the holding was that the available mitigation exacted of him, as a prerequisite to its receipt, his consent to the demotion. The tender and acceptance of it were not conditioned upon surrender of any claim he might have for injury incident to the demotion. His annual salary remained undiminished; his claim to the salary supplements of his previous office was not nullified. In addition, recovery for any harm done his reputation through assigning him to some teaching duties was not foreclosed.
The School Board should not be saddled with damages and costs on so tenuous and capricious assertions as appel-lee Williams’.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge, concurs in this dissent.

. His testimony is that in the Pender schools his salary was $1133.00 per month for 10% months — exceeding his Albemarle salary by more than $2000.00 annually. The District Judge made no finding on this item.