Court Opinion

ID: 9684955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:19:30.837875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.286342
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
ODOM, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of delivery of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals •reversed for failure to grant appellant adequate time to examine prospective jurors during the jury selection process. Reversible error was found under authority of De La Rosa v. State, 414 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). We find appellant has shown no harm and the trial court’s limitation of appellant’s jury voir dire to fifty minutes was not unreasonable.
In De La Rosa, supra, the record reflected that some of the prospective jurors whom the defendant had not had time to examine were seated on the jury that tried him. In this case appellant was able to individually examine twenty three members of the panel. The record does not reflect whether the jury was composed entirely from those he was able to examine, or whether it included veniremen he did not examine individually. Appellant therefore has not shown that he was harmed by the trial court’s action.
The trial court’s restriction of the voir dire examination was not unreasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The trial court should be allowed discretion, and counsel should have the responsibility to budget his time within the reasonable limits set by the trial court. Appellant’s counsel in this case was allowed almost twice the amount of time allowed defense counsel in De La Rosa. Also, in that case it was noted that the defendant sought time to ask, inter alia, “each prospective juror his name, address, marital status, place of employment, religious and educational back*782ground, [and] prior jury service.” Most of this information and other personal data on each prospective juror was provided counsel in this case approximately twenty-five minutes before voir dire of the panel began, by submission of jury information forms. Thus, counsel had a “head start” in obtaining information to aid in jury selection that had an effect equivalent to lengthening the voir dire time beyond the 50 minutes actually used, and that also facilitated preparation of questions seeking more specific information from specific veniremen according to counsel’s tactics.
A skilled lawyer can always find more questions that are proper to ask prospective jurors. The fact that counsel can think of one more proper question should not transform a reasonable time limit to an unreasonable one. In light of the advance information provided counsel from juror information forms and the reasonable length of time given counsel, we hold no abuse of discretion occurred.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for consideration of appellant’s other grounds of error.
McCORMICK, J., concurs in the result.