Court Opinion

ID: 9718788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:33:48.42085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:02.495180
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: It is clear that under sections 2 and 12(a)(5) of the Uniform Arbitration Act the ultimate determination of arbitrability is to be resolved by the court. However, there remains in Illinois the unresolved issue as to the point in the proceedings at which this ultimate determination should be made. The majority opinion adopts the position of Donaldson that the trial court, seemingly in all cases, should make the initial arbitrability determination. Based upon the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act itself and the public policy considerations that underlie arbitration in this State, I respectfully dissent. Section 2(b) of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides: “On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. That issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 102(b). Section 12(a)(5) of the Uniform Arbitration Act also deals with the question of whether a particular alleged factual setting is within the agreement of the parties to be arbitrated. That section provides: “There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by the circuit court is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 112(a)(5).) Section 12, however, applies only when no prior judicial determination under section 2 has been made. Thus, reading section 2 in conjunction with section 12 it necessarily follows that there are certain instances in which the trial court does not initially determine arbitrability, but rather makes the determination subsequently upon review of an arbitrator’s decision. A contrary interpretation requiring the trial court, rather than the arbitrator, to make all initial determinations under section 2 would in effect read section 12 out of the statute. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction, however, that the legislature intended meaning and effect to each provision enacted. The certain factual instances in which the trial court should make the arbitrability decision either initially or upon review were artfully set forth in Roosevelt University v. Mayfair Construction Co. (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 331 N.E.2d 835. There the court found that there are two situations in which the trial court should initially determine arbitrability; namely, where the matter is clearly within the scope of the arbitration provision or, alternatively, where the matter is clearly not within the scope of the arbitration provision. As for those cases falling within these two ends of the spectrum, the court stated: “If the parties present the issue of the arbitrability of a given matter in a section 2 proceeding and it appears to the court that a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the matter is or is not within the scope of the arbitration provision in the contract, then the court should refer the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator for initial decision, subject to ultimate judicial determination at the instance of either party in a section 12 proceeding *** .” Roosevelt University v. Mayfair Construction Co. (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1051, 331 N.E.2d 835. Although this position in Mayfair has not been followed in other Illinois Appellate Court decisions (Board of Trustees of Community Colleges v. Cook County College Teachers Union (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 617, 487 N.E.2d 956; Board of Education v. Williams (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 256, 454 N.E.2d 773; Consolidated Broadcasting Corp. v. American Arbitration Association (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 577, 450 N.E.2d 1252), I believe this procedure is not only the most practical method of handling arbitration but more importantly is the approach that was within the contemplation of the drafters of the Uniform Arbitration Act. In a case such as that before us, where the merits of the case are entwined with the determination of arbitrability, the court is faced with the cumbersome task of trying the entire matter before a decision as to arbitrability can be reached. This is neither desirable nor does it comport with the public policy that favors arbitration. (Schutt v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 136, 478 N.E.2d 644.) Moreover, as the court noted in Mayfair, referring the matter initially to the arbitrator enables the court in a subsequent section 12 proceeding to utilize the arbitrator’s expertise in the court’s ultimate judicial determination of the issue. Roosevelt University v. Mayfair Construction Co (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1051, 331 N.E.2d 835. Consequently, after considering sections 2 and 12, in light of the policies favoring arbitration and judicial economy, I believe the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.