Court Opinion

ID: 9457463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:22:25.983061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:21.506318
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion. The Youth Corrections Act (YCA) was enacted September 30, 1950 (64 Stat. 1086). As originally enacted it did not *1094apply to the District of Columbia (18 U.S.C. § 5024, 64 Stat. 1089). On April 8, 1952, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 5024 to apply the YCA “to youth offenders convicted in the District of Columbia of offenses under any law of the United States not applicable exclusively to such District. * * *" (66 Stat. 45). The effect of this 1952 amendment generally was to apply the YCA to those convicted of so-called federal offenses but to exclude youth offenders who violate the District of Columbia criminal code from the benefit of the YCA sentencing provisions. Congress took the final step on December 27, 1967 when it amended section 5024 to provide that the entire chapter (YCA) “shall apply in the States of the United States and in the District of Columbia” (emphasis added) (81 Stat. 741). This latter amendment eliminated the prior provision (66 Stat. 45) which had limited the application of the act in the District of Columbia to federal offenses. So the congressional intent is clear that it intended in 1967 to make the entire Youth Corrections Act applicable to all youth offenders of the criminal laws of both the District of Columbia and of the federal Government.
On the date the Youth Corrections Act was extended to youth offenders of the District criminal code, the code provided with respect to first degree murder as follows:
The punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death by electrocution unless the jury by unanimous vote recommends life imprisonment; or if the jury, having determined by unanimous vote the guilt of the defendant as charged, is unable to agree as to punishment it shall inform the court and the court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to impose and shall impose either a sentence of death by electrocution or life imprisonment.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of first degree murder and upon whom a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed shall be eligible for parole only after the expiration of twenty years from the date he commences to serve his sentence.
D.C.Code § 22-2404 (1967) (March 22, 1962, 76 Stat. 46). (Emphasis added).
As to the availability of a Youth Corrections Act sentence, for a youth offender convicted of first degree murder in the District of Columbia, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) authorizes a sentence under the Youth Corrections Act where the “offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than this subsection. * * * ”1 As previously noted, this Act applies to the District of Columbia (18 U.S.C. § 5024).2 *1095The statute of the District of Columbia prescribing the offense of which appellant was convicted, in effect, imposes, and thereby authorizes, punishment of life imprisonment upon conviction of murder in the first degree where the jury, as here is unable to agree as to punishment.3 Such provision for punishment satisfies the strict requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) for an “offense * * punishable by imprisonment.” The fact that life imprisonment is mandatory does not make it any the less “imprisonment.” It is argued that the statute authorizing Youth Corrections Act sentencing of youth offenders is “inconsistent” with the statute calling for mandatory life imprisonment as punishment for first degree murder. To the extent that the statutes conflict their inconsistency should be resolved in favor of lenity.4 I am also satisfied that this was the intent of Congress. When Congress desired to exclude young adult offenders who were convicted of offenses for which the statute provides a mandatory penalty from the more liberal sentencing provisions of the Youth Corrections Act, it provided: “This Act does not apply to any offense for which there is provided a mandatory penalty.” (18 U.S.C. § 4209, Sec. 7 of Pub.L. 85-752, 72 Stat. 846). This indicates that Congress was thoroughly familiar with the fact that some offenses called for mandatory penalties and with the means for excluding youth offenders convicted of offenses carrying mandatory penalties from the Youth Corrections Act. Its failure to create the same exclusion for youth offenders that it created for young adult offenders is indicative of an intent to have the Youth Corrections Act apply.
Another more recent instance when Congress spoke in a similar way occurred in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-358, July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 473). In that enactment Congress provided that any person who commits a crime of violence when armed may for the first conviction be sentenced to a period of imprisonment which may be up to life imprisonment but if he is convicted more than once of having so committed a crime of violence when armed that he shall be sentenced to a minimum period of imprisonment of not less than five years and a maximum period of imprisonment which may not be less than three times the minimum sentence imposed and which may be up to life imprisonment (D.C.Code § 22-3203). In dealing with this situation Congress spoke clearly with respect to the application of the Youth Corrections Act and provided that it “shall not apply with respect to any person sentenced under section 2 of subsection (a) [the second offense provision].” D.C.Code § 22-3202 (d) (1). By this provision Congress made YCA sentencing available to a youth offender on his first conviction of a crime of violence when armed but excluded all youth offenders convicted of their second such crime. A crime of vi*1096olence is defined by D.C.Code § 22-3201 to include the crime of “murder” so the statutes constitute a clear indication that Congress did not intend by this provision to exclude youth offenders convicted of murder from the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act where the murder conviction constituted their first conviction for a crime of violence while armed. Having so spoken specifically to not prohibit (and thereby permit) the application of the YCA to one convicted of murder as a first crime of violence while armed, it is completely consistent with the legislative intent so expressed to conclude that Congress intended to reach the same result in 1967 when it extended the YCA to the District of Columbia. Hence, it is my conclusion that the YCA is operative to confer authority upon the court to sentence Howard under the Youth Corrections Act if it finds him to be a proper subject for such sentencing.
The provision of the D.C.Code requiring twenty years’ imprisonment for first degree murder in order to be eligible for parole does not derogate from the foregoing interpretation because such provision is only applicable to a “person convicted of first degree murder * * * upon whom a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed * * ; 5 and if a Youth Corrections Act sentence were imposed the sentence need not be one to life imprisonment, though life imprisonment might be adjudged under the YCA. Section 5010(d) of the Youth Corrections Act does authorize the court, in sentencing a youth offender, to impose a sentence of life imprisonment where such sentence is one of the “other applicable penalty provision [s] ” 6 of the statute he was convicted of violating.
I indicate no opinion as to what sentence should be adjudged.

. 18 U.S.C. § 5010 in part provides:
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(c) of this chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to the expiration of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.

. 18 U.S.C. § 5024 provides:
This chapter shall apply in the States of the United States and in the District of Columbia.

. D.C.Code § 22-2404 (1967) in part provides :
The punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death by electrocution unless the jury by unanimous vote recommends life imprisonment; or if the jury, having determined by unanimous vote the guilt of the defendant as charged, is unable to agree as to punishment it shall inform the court and the court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to impose and shall impose either a sentence of death by electrocution or life imprisonment.

. See Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958) (“[The] policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”) ; Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955) (“When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of importing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.”) ; cf. United States v. Lewis, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 347-348, 435 P. 2d 417, 419-420 (1970) ; Irby v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 17, 390 F.2d 432 (1967).

. D.C.Code § 22-2404 (1967) in part provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of first degree murder and upon whom a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed shall be eligible for parole only after the expiration of twenty years from the date he commences to serve his sentence.

. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d). See note 1 supra.