Court Opinion

ID: 9689893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:20.912448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.715398
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 76. (dissenting). Today's decision is momentous. It is a break from the long line of decisions that have so watered down the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonable suspicion that this court has rarely held a search or seizure unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds.1
¶ 77. I join the majority in concluding that the no knock entry was deficient because neither the affidavit nor the circumstances at the time of entry supply particularized facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous or futile. As Justice Prosser wrote in State v. Ward:
Our law strongly favors searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. . . . The warrant process not only places a neutral and detached magistrate between *268government intrusion and the people but also obligates government officials to demonstrate to that magistrate a substantial basis for their proposed intrusive conduct. In this process, neutral oversight is pointless if the magistrate merely rubberstamps an affidavit based on generalizations instead of particulars.2
¶ 78. The majority opinion recognizes that "vague and somewhat outdated" information about prior arrests, lacking in detail, is not sufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.3 Likewise, the presence of "felony drug dealing and the officer's training and experience, cannot be relied upon without running afoul of Richards v. Wisconsin4 and Meyer.5 "6
¶ 79. My enthusiasm about the court's step forward in giving meaning to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of "reasonable suspicion" is immediately tempered, however, by the court's step backward in adopting a "Leore-plus" good faith exception, grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution, to Wisconsin's longstanding exclusionary rule.
¶ 80. I disagree with the adoption of this special good faith exception grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution for four reasons: (1) the majority opinion is *269disingenuous in requiring the State to show "that the process used in obtaining the search warrant included a significant investigation and a review by either a police officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney";7 (2) the exception betrays Wisconsin's long-standing commitment to excluding illegally seized evidence from use at trial; (3) the majority opinion's focus on deterring individual police misconduct mischaracterizes the nature of constitutional violations and ignores the role of magistrates, prosecutors, and judges, both trial and appellate, in protecting constitutional rights; and (4) the majority's cost-benefit analysis is inappropriate in the constitutional context and unpersuasive in its results.8
h — (
¶ 81. In an effort to sidestep the practical problems highlighted by commentators and the numerous other jurisdictions that have rejected the Leon9 good faith exception, the majority opinion adopts a "Leon-plus" good faith test under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The majority opinion imposes, along with the Leon requirement of good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant, the following two *270requirements: (1) "significant investigation," and (2) "review by a police officer trained in, or very knowledgeable of, the legal vagaries of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or [review by] a knowledgeable government attorney."10 These checks on the Leon good faith exception were apparently derived from a law review article by Professor Dripps, who was critical of the reasoning in the Leon opinion.11
¶ 82. I agree with the majority opinion that the search and seizure provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, although substantially the same as the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, can be interpreted as guaranteeing more protection to the people of the State of Wisconsin than the Fourth Amendment does.12
¶ 83. But what do these "Leore-plus" requirements mean? What constitutes "significant investigation" by a law enforcement officer? What standards does the court use to judge a law enforcement investigation? What training or knowledge meets the majority opinion's standard of "an officer trained in, or very knowledgeable of, the legal vagaries of probable cause and reasonable suspicion"? Who is a "knowledgeable government attorney" — every district attorney or assistant district attorney? A lawyer employed by the police department? A police officer who is a lawyer? Are attorneys deemed knowledgeable if they have law degrees or are members of the State Bar, or is more necessary? What is the knowledgeable officer or gov-*271eminent attorney reviewing? What kind of hearing must a circuit court judge conduct and what kind of record must be made to support the circuit court's decision that an officer or government attorney possesses these requirements and made the appropriate review?
¶ 84. The majority opinion does not address these concerns because the majority opinion is, I reluctantly conclude, disingenuous in setting forth its "Leon-plus" requirements. It is disingenuous because it fails to apply the "Leon-plus" good faith test that the newly invigorated Article I, Section 11 purportedly demands.
¶ 85. The majority opinion, without giving defense or prosecution counsel an opportunity to present evidence or make argument, concludes that the face of the affidavit in the present case, even though the officers researched only arrest records and not conviction records, reflects a significant investigation.
¶ 86. The majority opinion further finds that there was review by a knowledgeable police officer or government attorney. On what basis does the majority opinion make this finding? Who did the preapplication screening? When? How? Professor Dripps' discussion of internal preapplication screening refers to screening by a police superior or a government lawyer.
¶ 87. The majority opinion bases its finding of a requisite preapplication screening on inference from the record. The majority opinion finds that "[t]he warrant and affidavit reflect advanced legal training, beyond that given to a well-trained police officer," because "[t]he warrant and affidavit are replete with terms normally found in attorney-drafted documents including 'whereas,' 'curtilage,' 'to-wit,' and other such *272similar terms."13 This legalese touted by the majority opinion is often used by non-lawyers in an effort to sound like lawyers. Indeed, law students have been taught for at least the last 50 years to avoid this kind of legalese.
¶ 88. The majority opinion further infers that an attorney from the district attorney's office accompanied the police officer to the magistrate, even though the magistrate relied solely on an affidavit and took no testimony.14
¶ 89. The majority opinion ultimately concludes that the evidence should not be suppressed because the "Leore-plus" good faith exception the majority opinion adopts "was apparently followed."15 Inference and "apparently" are good enough for the majority opinion.
¶ 90. To rely on an inference that the necessary "Leore-plus" state constitutional safeguards are apparently followed, in the same breath in which these state constitutional safeguards are set forth, is to render these state constitutional safeguards all but meaningless. If this court intends that these new state constitutional safeguards serve as a viable check on the warrant process, it should expound on these requirements and remand the case for further fact finding. Otherwise in every case a court can find by inference that these "Leon-plus" state constitutional safeguards were apparently followed.16 What kind of test is this?
*273¶ 91. Moreover, Professor Dripps, the very source of the two safeguards adopted by the majority opinion, believes that these safeguards will not sufficiently protect Fourth Amendment rights.17 The professor's more recent writings suggest the need for additional safeguards.18 Indeed, Professor Dripps warns that "[t]he Leon regime, even now taking form in the lower courts, effects. . .systemic consequences, but *274at the cost of ceasing to speak honestly about the Constitution."19
¶ 92. I now turn to my objections to adopting any version of the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Most important, today's decision betrays Wisconsin's long-standing commitment to excluding illegally seized evidence from use at trial. As Justice Prosser has explained, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was one of the earliest state supreme courts in the nation to recognize the exclusionary rule. This state has a long history of treating the exclusionary rule as a substantive protection with constitutional, rather than judicial, underpinnings.20 In my opinion, today's court should be more circumspect in scaling back the protections provided by our state constitution.21 The majority's attempt to discredit decades of Wisconsin case law is not persuasive.22
HH I — I I — I
¶ 93. A third problem with the majority opinion is that Leon mischaracterizes the role of the exclusionary rule as focusing solely on the deterrence of police misconduct. This focus on deterring individual police misconduct minimizes the constitutional violation and ignores the role of magistrates, prosecutors, and judges, both trial and appellate, in protecting constitu*275tional rights. In framing the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to police misconduct, the majority opinion appears to lay all blame for Fourth Amendment violations at the door of individual officers.23 And in suggesting that absent police misconduct, there is no need to worry about the integrity of the rest of the system, the majority's analysis supplants this court's long-standing recognition that the exclusionary rule does not merely serve as a deterrent to police misconduct but rather promotes integrity in the entire process.24 By focusing on police misconduct, the majority ignores the other institutional players who are *276partners with law enforcement in protecting constitutional rights.25
¶ 94. I do not question the majority's conclusion that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not alter officers' incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment.26 But what about the incentives for the other persons in the system? The majority is silent about the potential effects on issuing magistrates.27 The majority is silent about the potential effects on prosecutors.28 The majority is silent about the potential effects on public confidence in a justice *277system that not only allows constitutional violations to go unaddressed, but also uses the fruits of those constitutional violations to convict those whose constitutional rights have been violated.29 Our justice system can do better. Our justice system has done better in the seventy-seven years since the Wisconsin Supreme Court first recognized the exclusionary rule.30
¶ 95. The majority opinion is also silent ábout the potential effects on the judiciary and the ways in which the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule distorts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.31 Under the good faith exception, the focus in a suppression hearing shifts from an inquiry into whether the search was constitutional to an inquiry into whether the police officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a search warrant. This shift risks stunting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: Since there will be little likelihood of exclusion in marginal cases, courts will be less likely to consider the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion in these cases.32 With the margi*278nal cases removed from the mix, courts will be called upon to grant suppression motions only for the most flagrant constitutional violations. And, to recoin the familiar adage, bad facts make worse law.
> HH
¶ 96. A fourth weakness in the majority opinion is the majority's reliance on the Leon Court's cost-benefit analysis.33 This cost-benefit analysis for Fourth Amendment violations has been roundly criticized by courts and commentators.34 Even if a cost-benefit analysis were an appropriate basis for implementing *279the good faith exception, how does the court purport to quantify the cost of constitutional protections?35 At present, few data support either side in the Leon debate, and empirical evidence on the question actually reveals that "the general level of the [exclusionary] rule's effects on criminal prosecutions is marginal at most."36
¶ 97. At any rate, viewing prosecutions that are lost due to an inability to use illegally seized evidence as a "cost" to be weighed against the "benefit" of constitutional protections seems contrary to the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.37 The majority opinion posits that there is "no real benefit" to the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence.38 Such language dangerously underestimates the value of our federal and state constitutional protections. Excluding illegally seized evidence restores the parties to the position they would have been in without the constitutional violation. In restoring the status quo as it existed before the consti*280tutional violation, the exclusionary rule recognizes that lost prosecutions cannot be viewed as a legitimate cost, since the conviction would have been illegitimate from a constitutional standpoint.
¶ 98. For these reasons, numerous states have rejected the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as a choice that would contradict the purpose of the exclusionary rule and their state constitution.39 Indeed, as the majority opinion recognizes, more states have rejected the Leon rule than have embraced it.40 Numerous additional states have declined to address whether their state constitution allows a good faith exception.41 I believe that Wisconsin, too, must reject the exception.42
¶ 99. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 100. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 768, 604 N.W.2d 517 (Prosser, J., dissenting).

 See majority op. at ¶ 26.

 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).

 State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998).

 See majority op. at ¶ 26 (citations added). The majority is unwilling to rely on a ten-year-old out-of-state arrest to find reasonable suspicion that Clinton Bentley might resort to violence. See majority op. at ¶ 21. The majority also refused to rely on the arrest record of another occupant because the affidavit lacked any specifics about the time or place of the arrests. See majority op. at ¶ 22.

 Majority op. at ¶ 3.

 The majority opinion concludes that the affidavit is "deficient only insofar as it fails to provide sufficiently particularized evidence to show that an unannounced entry would be dangerous or result in the destruction of evidence." See majority op. at ¶ 66. This "deficiency" is, of course, the basis for the constitutional violation that occurred in this case. See majority op. at ¶¶ 16-26.

 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

 Majority op. at ¶ 63.

 Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 932 (1986) ("Accordingly, in the absence of independent investigation and preapplicátion screening, the good faith exception should not apply.").

 Compare majority op. at ¶ 37 & n.12 with ¶¶ 60, 63.

 Majority op. at ¶ 71.

 See majority op. at ¶ 72.

 Majority op. at ¶ 72.

 Even as it insists that these state constitutional requirements are viable safeguards, the majority leaves plenty of wiggle room to avoid enforcing these safeguards in the future as well. See majority op. at ¶ 72 n.36 ("Whether there has been significant investigation may depend on reasonable inferences *273from the record "); id. ("[W]e expect that usually there will be testimony offered at the suppression hearing on such safeguards. ...") (emphasis added).

 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 933-34 (1986) ("[B]y withdrawing the exclusionary sanction from an entire category of Fourth Amendment violations for which no other sanction is available, even in theory, the Leon majority has rendered 'the constitutional language that all warrants be issued only on a showing of probable cause.. .a nullity.1 In effect, the Court maintains that searches pursuant to defective warrants violate the Fourth Amendment, but that nothing happens when such violations take place. This treats the amendment as a mere advisory norm rather than, as the supremacy clause commands, as the 'supreme Law of the Land.' For all practical purposes, a search unsupported by probable cause but pursuant to a facially valid warrant is now legal."); see also David Clark Esseks, Errors in Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six Years Later, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 625, 626 (1990) ("In an analysis of Leon defending its result, Professor Donald Dripps nevertheless criticized almost every line of Justice White's majority opinion.").

 Professor Dripps has recently proposed a more elaborate system in which the exclusionary rule is waived in return for government payment of a fixed amount of damages. See Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2001).

 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 907-08 (1986).

 See Orta v. Ruiz, 2000 WI 4, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 786-791, 604 N.W.2d 543 (Prosser, J., concurring).

 See Ward, 231 Wis. 2d at 763 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).

 See majority op. at ¶ 57 & n.25.

 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 60-61 (3d ed. 1996) (describing Leon's focus on deterring police misconduct as "a slick bit of burden-shifting" and suggesting that the good faith exception makes "some kind of comparative judgment of the malevolence level of judges generally versus police generally").

 See State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 988, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991) ("The purpose of the rule is not just to deter unreasonable searches and to maintain judicial integrity, but also to assure all potential victims of unlawful government conduct — that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.") (citation and quotation omitted); Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974) ("The rationale of the exclusionary rule is twofold: (1).. .to deter unlawful or undesirable or unconstitutional police conduct, and (2) to insure some integrity in the judicial process by not having the judicial process sanction, approve and be party to constitutional violations or undesirable or unlawful police conduct in allowing evidence to be used notwithstanding the manner in which it was seized.") (citation and quotation omitted).

 See Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85,109 (1984) ("The more important issue.. .is not the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the conduct of individual magistrates, but the extent to which the rule helps preserve the integrity of the warrant issuing process as a whole.").

 Other courts and commentators have questioned the effect of the good faith exception on officers, arguing that absent the deterrent device of the exclusionary rule, the police need not obtain a warrant that will pass muster upon review; rather, they need only obtain a warrant. See, e.g., State v. Masala, 579 A.2d 58, 67 (Conn. 1990); Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mer-tens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 109 (1984).

 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 60-61 (3d ed. 1996) (noting the empirical studies show a "substantial disparity between magistrates as to how much evidence is required to obtain a search warrant") (quoting L. Tiffany et al., Detection of Crime 204 (1967)).

 See Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 114 (1984) (noting that the good faith exception in Leon likely affects the role of prosecutors who often review warrants in order to avoid suppression).

 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 13 (1968) ("A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while the application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.").

 See Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).

 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 940 (1986) ("[T]he availability of the good-faith exception depends on. . .how far short of the traditional probable cause showing [the warrant application] falls. In effect, all the Court's decision accomplishes is to reduce the degree of suspicion which a warrant application must establish to insulate a search from the exclusionary rule.").

 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 63 n.37 (3d ed. 1996) (citing cases that reflect an appellate practice *278of skipping the constitutional question and only addressing the good faith reliance issue); see also Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85 at 111-12 (1984) ("[I]t is unlikely that overburdened trial and appellate courts will take the time and effort to write advisory opinions on fourth amendment law when they can just as easily admit the evidence under the good faith exception.").

 See majority op. at ¶¶ 31, 58.

 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(b) at 57-59 (3d ed. 1996) (describing Leon's cost-benefit analysis as a "cockeyed characterization which heretofore had been found almost exclusively in the least sophisticated anti-exclusionary rule diatribes"); Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 939 (1986) (noting that the language of costs and benefits "cannot inform police or judges of their errors, for it implicitly denies that error has occurred").
See also State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 at 65 (Conn. 1990) (in assessing costs, the majority in Leon erred in considering the aggregate costs of all exclusions, not just where police reasonably but mistakenly believed that their conduct was correct); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126 (Vt. 1991) ("There simply are insufficient empirical data for the costs and benefits of a good faith exception to be accurately assessed.").

 See State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 673-674 (Idaho 1992) ("All of the rules which limit the admission of relevant evidence [privileges, etc.] including the exclusionary rule, exist to protect values which are difficult to quantify, yet which are considered important by society.").

 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(c) at 58 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting T. Davis, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the 'Costs' of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ study and Other Studies of ’Lost’ Arrests, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 611, 622).

 See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 939 (1986) ("The rhetoric of the Leon opinion describes such illegal searches as morally valuable. The loss of evidence would be a 'cost,1 the actions of the police were 'objectively reasonable.' Language such as this cannot inform police or judges of their errors for it implicitly denies that error has occurred.").

 Majority op. at ¶ 58.

 1 use the data regarding other states' rejection of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for its persuasive value regarding the widely recognized shortcomings of Leon.

 See majority op. at ¶ 59. Eleven states, as well as the District of Columbia, have adopted a good faith exception under their state constitution through judicial opinion. Five states have adopted a good faith exception by statute. Fourteen states have rejected a good faith exception under their state constitution. Christopher Paul Fischer, Comment, I Hear You Knocking, But You Can't Come In: The North Dakota Supreme Court Declines to Decide Whether the State Constitution Precludes a Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 846, 76 N.D. L.Rev 123, 144-45 nn.201, 202, 203 (2000).

 See id. at 145 n.204.

 See Ward, 231 Wis. 2d at 761 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).