Court Opinion

ID: 9496961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:39:55.723098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:54.725797
License: Public Domain

B.D. PARKER, JR.,
dissenting.
According to the majority, Hemstreet is entitled to habeas relief for essentially three reasons: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective, (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, and (3) the state court’s determination that he was not deprived of effective assistance of appellate counsel was, under AEDPA, “objectively unreasonable” in light of clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Since I disagree with these conclusions, I respectfully dissent. I cannot find that Hemstreet has shown his appellate counsel’s performance to have been inadequate or that he suffered prejudice from a purportedly deficient performance. I conclude that he, therefore, could not meet the more stringent burden of showing that his appellate counsel’s performance was “objectively unreasonable” under AEDPA.
Since I do not believe the record establishes ineffectiveness of trial counsel, I do not believe appellate counsel can be faulted for not pursuing the claim on direct appeal. The majority concludes that trial counsel’s failure to pursue any remedy for the intimidation of a crucial witness was a violation of Hemstreet’s rights that clearly stood out in the trial record and that Appellate counsel’s failure to recognize and to pursue it as the most significant argument on appeal amounted to constitutionally inadequate representation. Since I believe the record was anything but clear, I do not believe the argument stood out or that appellate counsel was required by Strickland to raise it.
Under New York law, it is extremely difficult successfully to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and such claims are typically pursued on collateral attack under § 440.10, N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law. § 440.10.1 People v. Gil, 285 A.D.2d 7, 12, 729 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t 2001) (noting that it is a “rare case” that such a claim is appropriately pursued on direct appeal). This rule is driven by a need to examine facts and circumstances about the performance of counsel that lie outside of the trial record, which provides the only set of facts available on direct appeal. An ineffective assistance claim brought on collateral attack affords the court the ability to develop facts specifically concerning trial counsel’s performance and the circumstances of counsel’s decisions. In cases such as this one, where none of these types of information are available and the record concerning trial counsel’s motivations and reasoning is sparse, New York courts have routinely denied claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. See, e.g., People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 998, 1000, 457 N.Y.S.2d 238, 443 N.E.2d 486 (1982) (affirming conviction on direct appeal because “we cannot conclude that defen*144dant’s counsel was ineffective simply by reviewing the trial record without the benefit of additional background facts that might have been developed had an appropriate after-judgment motion been made pursuant to CPL 440.10” (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Jones, 55 N.Y.2d 771, 773, 447 N.Y.S.2d 242, 431 N.E.2d 967 (1981) (“Reviewing the record without the benefit of knowing, as might have been developed had an appropriate after-judgment motion been made, what was in defense counsel’s mind, we cannot conclude that defendant’s counsel was ineffective.”); People v. Zeh, 289 A.D.2d 692, 734 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308 (N.Y.App. Div., 3d Dep’t 2001) (noting that the “Court is being asked to decide the issue of effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when many of the claims would require us to resort to supposition and conjecture” and stating that “prudence dictates that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel be raised in a post-trial application” where a complete record can be made) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Figueroa, 254 A.D.2d 226, 679 N.Y.S.2d 304, 304 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t 1998) (finding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was inappropriate on direct appeal since it was based on facts not in the record and trial counsel had not had a chance to explain her trial tactics).
Here, I do not believe the trial record was sufficiently developed such that appellate counsel was compelled to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The record with respect to what actually occurred between Jeanette Bucci and the investigating officers and what trial counsel did and why is sketchy and inconclusive. The majority concludes that the record shows that, prior to trial, Hemstreet’s counsel knew that Bucci had material and exculpatory information regarding where, when, and with whom the murder victim was last seen. The majority goes on to conclude that Bucci was unavailable as a witness because she had been threatened by law enforcement officers and that trial counsel’s decision not to call her was not a strategic choice on his part.
However, the only material in the record as to what occurred is a statement by Hemstreet’s trial counsel raising the issue to the trial judge, saying of Bucci that “she told me that her family was visited, her mother and sister were visited by two police officers,” and “[one of the officers] had indicated to the mother and sister than if [Bucci] testifies they were in for a lot of trouble.” Tr. of Jury Selection, at 301-02. There is nothing in the record to indicate the context or background of this exchange, or why trial counsel or the court did not pursue the issue. In fact, during the District Court proceeding, trial counsel submitted an affidavit explaining that he had no recollection as to why the witness was not called. A number of explanations as to why this issue was not pursued at trial are possible: perhaps there were concerns about Bucei’s credibility; perhaps trial counsel was negligent; perhaps Bue-ci’s testimony would have been inconsistent with other defense evidence; or perhaps trial counsel decided not to pursue the issue for currently unknown tactical reasons. Each of these possibilities has one thing in common: it is speculative. Consequently, the record does not support any conclusions about why Bucci was not called.
Had the issue of trial counsel’s effectiveness been raised by way of a § 440.10 motion in the state trial court, as it should have been,2 a record concerning what actu*145ally occurred could have been developed. Then, the state courts would, in the first instance, have had an opportunity to determine — on a complete record — whether relief was appropriate. We would then, if necessary, have been in a position to determine whether constitutional violations occurred and what remedies were appropriate. Given such an inconclusive record, I am not prepared to conclude that Hem-street has overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052) (internal quotation marks omitted). We should be especially wary about eroding that presumption on a record such as the one before us where no other aspect of trial counsel’s performance in a long, emotionally charged murder trial has been challenged.
Thus, appellate counsel’s failure to pursue trial counsel’s supposedly ineffective assistance on direct appeal is not evidence of constitutionally deficient performance. To the contrary, it reflects a decision not only consistent with, but arguably compelled by, New York law, since the lesson to be drawn from the cases is that, given the state of the record, pursuit of an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal would almost surely have been futile.
Furthermore, even if there were a color-able argument that Hemstreet’s appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise trial counsel’s purported ineffectiveness, Hemstreet has failed to show prejudice. First, as shown above, Hemstreet should have pursued his ineffective assistance claim on a § 440.10 motion to the trial court as required by New York law. Caballero, 42 F.3d at 740; People v. Ramos, 63 N.Y.2d 640, 643, 479 N.Y.S.2d 510, 468 N.E.2d 692 (1984). As New York law clearly establishes that it would have been premature and probably futile to raise such a claim on direct appeal, petitioner could not have suffered prejudice from appellate counsel’s failure to do so. The fact that Hemstreet can still pursue a § 440.10 remedy is a pellucid reason why he has suffered no prejudice.
Additionally, the case against Hemstreet was independently strong. In April 1992, and again in September 1993, Hemstreet confessed to killing Kenneth Hiep. He told Nancy Wright, an old friend, that Hiep’s death was ordered by two individuals — Sal and Carmine Franco — and that “it had to be done; it was a contract.” Later, in September 1993, he told Robert Horne-man, whose father was an old business partner of Hemstreet’s, that “[Hiep] didn’t do the right thing ... I made my bones with [Hiep].” Both witnesses testified against Hemstreet at trial. In addition to these confessions, the state marshaled considerable circumstantial evidence establishing that Hemstreet and Hiep, once close friends, became estranged as a result of business dealings. Hemstreet had apparently complained to his friends that Hiep had stolen a considerable sum of money from a business they jointly owned. On the night of Hiep’s death, Hemstreet and Hiep were seen having a heated argument at a local bar. When Hiep’s son had to leave the bar early, Hemstreet offered to give Hiep a ride home. The state also presented evidence that Hemstreet’s *146hands displayed fresh cuts and injuries the day after Hiep’s death that were not present the night before. When asked about the cause of these cuts on two separate occasions, Hemstreet gave inconsistent explanations. Further, the state showed that Hemstreet’s Cadillac had substantial blood stains on the front passenger seat— stains that were then cleaned by Hem-street’s associate the day after Hiep’s disappearance. Hemstreet also inexplicably tried to dissuade Hiep’s family from calling the police to report Hiep’s disappearance, even though he himself had suggested that Hiep had been kidnapped. Finally, a search of Hemstreet’s Cadillac confirmed the presence of Hiep’s blood throughout the passenger seat area. Slash cuts in the passenger seat headrests and blood stains on the lining of the roof indicated that Hiep had been fatally assaulted inside petitioner’s car.
In light of the plethora of evidence against Hemstreet, I am not persuaded that, but for trial counsel’s failure to call Bucci and pursue the intimidation claim, a reasonable probability existed that Hemstreet would have been acquitted. I suggest that petitioner’s appellate counsel could easily have reached the same conclusion. As previously observed, this conclusion could have been reached in the context of New York law clearly dictating that ineffectiveness claims are properly raised on direct appeal only in “rare cases” and that a § 440.10 motion to vacate judgment on the grounds of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness remained open.3 In light of these factors, I do not believe Hemstreet has established a reasonable probability that, but for his appellate counsel’s performance, his appeal to the Appellate Division would have been successful. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). Therefore, he has not established prejudice.
The majority states that the District Court concluded that the Appellate Division’s rejection of Hemstreet’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). I disagree. In fact, the District Court failed even to mention, much less apply, the AEDPA standards anywhere in its opinion. In my view, AEDPA requires the denial of Hemstreet’s habeas petition. Hemstreet sought a writ of coram nobis in the Appellate Division, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not raise trial counsel’s supposed ineffectiveness in failing to demand a hearing, sanctions, or a mistrial as a result of prosecutorial interference with a potential defense witness. The Appellate Division denied the petition, concluding that “[t]he appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.” Hemstreet, 290 A.D.2d at 458, 738 N.Y.S.2d 583. This decision constitutes an adjudication on the merits *147entitled to fall AEDPA deference. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311-12 (2d Cir.2001). Under AEDPA, Hemstreet is not entitled to habeas relief unless he establishes that the Appellate Division’s conclusion amounted to an “objectively unreasonable” application of clearly established federal law, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), a test that falls somewhere in between “merely erroneous” and “unreasonable to all reasonable jurists,” Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir.2000). Thus, it is not enough to find, as the majority does, that appellate counsel, in their opinion, was ineffective. AEDPA requires a showing that the Appellate Division’s conclusion that petitioner had not received ineffective assistance of counsel “objectively unreasonable.” Because I conclude that Hemstreet failed to make even the minimal showing that appellate counsel’s performance was inadequate under Strickland, I also find that he failed to meet the more stringent burden of showing the state court’s decision to have been “objectively unreasonable.”
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The statute states, in relevant part: "At any time after the entiy of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the ground that ... the judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.” N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(l)(h).

. A motion in the trial court to vacate the judgment would not be barred on the basis of § 440.10(2)(b), which compels a court to deny such a motion based upon the defendant’s *145"unjustifiable failure to raise such ground or issue upon an appeal." N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(2)(c). This is because, as discussed below, I do not believe that "sufficient facts appear on the record of the proceedings underlying the judgment to have permitted, upon appeal ..., adequate review of the ground or issue raised upon the motion.” Id. Here, review of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim clearly required further factual development and, therefore, remains open.

. Additionally, Hemstreet's appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to file a § 440.10 motion in state trial court. A right to effective assistance of counsel only exists where a right to counsel exists in the first place. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982). Further, the right to counsel only extends to the first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Thus, Hemstreet had no right to counsel on collateral attack pursuant to § 440.10 and, therefore, could not have been deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his appellate counsel failed to pursue such a motion. See Chalk v. Kuhlmann, 311 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that a New York defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to file for discretionary appeal to the Court of Appeals because the defendant's right to counsel did not extend to a discretionary appeal).