Court Opinion

ID: 9732367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:18:07.77404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:26.692514
License: Public Domain

*470Justice EAKIN
concurring and dissenting.
I join the majority opinion with respect to appellant’s guilt, but dissent from the majority’s decision to remand for imposition of a life sentence.
The Commonwealth requested a court order extraditing appellant, but asked this extradition be stayed pending disposition of the Pennsylvania charges “including sentence, if applicable.” Extradition Hearing, 2/15/95, at 3. At the hearing, defense counsel reviewed all the extradition paperwork and acknowledged it was in order. Counsel did not object to appellant’s return to North Carolina and agreed to have the Pennsylvania charges disposed of first; the court granted the Commonwealth’s request. Id.
After the trial court granted appellant’s unrelated motion in limine> the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. There is no suggestion, much less evidence, that the Commonwealth filed this appeal in order to procure an aggravator. This appeal was necessary, as the trial court erred in precluding certain evidence which substantially handicapped the Commonwealth’s case. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (Commonwealth may seek appellate review of pretrial order which excludes Commonwealth evidence and thereby substantially handicaps its prosecution). Because of the appeal, the Commonwealth let appellant go to North Carolina, but did so without asking the trial court to lift the stay. The majority concludes these circumstances “introduced an impermissible element of arbitrariness into the eligibility decision.” Majority Opinion, 577 Pa. at 464-66, 846 A.2d at 101.
The good faith representation of the District Attorney, an elected official and an officer of the court, was necessary for the appeal, and was alone sufficient to dispel the unwarranted accusation of arbitrariness. Still, it is worth noting that the Commonwealth was successful on appeal, but not until nearly 19 months after appellant’s conviction in North Carolina. The nature of the appeal and the indeterminate amount of time it would (and did) take made it appropriate to release appellant to North Carolina, which was prepared to try appellant’s case, *471nearly 10 years in the making. The Commonwealth’s decision to forgo their priority position and allow his return to North Carolina was mere common sense, not arbitrariness, and was based upon sound reasoning and judicial economy.
The real issue is not extradition, but the unilateral disregard of the stay. Had the Commonwealth moved to lift the stay, there appears no reason it would not have been granted— there was no real opposition by appellant to extradition beyond assuring the paperwork was in order. The trial court heard appellant’s motion to quash the aggravating circumstance and concluded the extradition of appellant to North Carolina was based on a logical and sensible decision. Trial Court Opinion, 10/03/2000, at 9. The trial court saw nothing improper in the fact that extradition took place while the Commonwealth’s appeal was pending in Pennsylvania. Id., at 27. Appellant never objected at the pre-extradition hearing, nor did he at the time he was transferred to North Carolina. The trial court did not find the action contemptuous. “[I]t is axiomatic that a court has inherent power to enforce its own orders ... and that this Court will not interfere with enforcement absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 551 Pa. 622, 712 A.2d 749, 751 (1998) (plurality) (citing Commonwealth v. Carson, 510 Pa. 568, 510 A.2d 1233 (1986)). The trial court reviewed the violation of its own order and failed to find any sanction necessary; I see no reason to second-guess its discretion.
Appellant’s case in Pennsylvania was postponed for a valid reason and the Commonwealth’s action was not “clearly arbitrary.” I do not sanction the Commonwealth’s unilateral disregard of the stay, but it was a stay that the Commonwealth, not appellant, sought. Allowing the North Carolina charges to proceed expeditiously was the right thing to do. Speedy trial is a right inuring to the accused, not the Commonwealth, and delaying both trials for two more years was not the right thing to do.
Further, the remedy for violating a stay of extradition should not be vacating a valid penalty imposed by the Pennsyl*472vania jury. Hence I must dissent to the portion of my colleagues’ decision which reverses that penalty.