Court Opinion

ID: 9898115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:33.731823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:10.950110
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                        October 31, 2023
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                           DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No.56287-1-II

                                 Respondent,

         v.

 DENNIS RAY GIANCOLI,                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                 Appellant.

        GLASGOW, C.J.— Two men broke into Arlen Stebbins’s house, tried to abduct Stebbins

and his friend, John Fryer, at gunpoint, shot Stebbins, and tried to shoot Fryer. Stebbins and Fryer

escaped. After police arrested Dennis Ray Giancoli as a suspect in the case, they listed him on a

publicly available jail roster. Stebbins’s wife then looked up pictures of Giancoli on social media

and showed them to Stebbins. Stebbins later identified Giancoli to police as one of his attackers.

        Before trial, Giancoli sought to exclude evidence about Stebbins’s identification of him,

including any in-court identification, because Stebbins’s preview of social media pictures was

highly suggestive. The trial court admitted the pretrial identification evidence and Stebbins

identified Giancoli at trial as one of his assailants.

        The jury convicted Giancoli of multiple charges, including two counts of first degree

assault, one count of first degree burglary, and two counts of first degree kidnapping. Those

charges were also all most serious “strike” offenses under the Persistent Offender Accountability

Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570. The jury found Giancoli was armed with a firearm during the

assaults, burglary, and kidnappings. The jury also convicted Giancoli of first degree unlawful

possession of a firearm, attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, and witness tampering.
No. 56287-1-II

       Because Giancoli was convicted of multiple most serious offenses and his criminal history

included two prior most serious offenses, the trial court sentenced Giancoli to life without the

possibility of release as a persistent offender. The trial court also imposed 300 months of

consecutive firearm sentencing enhancements on top of the life sentence.

       Giancoli appeals. He argues that admitting Stebbins’s pretrial and in-court identifications

of him violated due process. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of

unlawful possession of a firearm. Giancoli raises numerous issues related to his burglary and

kidnapping convictions, and he asserts that the assault convictions merge into the kidnapping

convictions. Giancoli also challenges his firearm sentencing enhancements. Finally, he argues that

his mandatory life without the possibility of release sentence violates article I, section 14 of the

Washington Constitution because he committed his first most serious offense when he was 17.

Giancoli does not challenge his attempt to elude or witness tampering convictions on appeal.

       The State concedes that we should reverse the burglary and kidnapping convictions. And

it concedes that the assault convictions would otherwise merge with the kidnapping convictions if

the kidnapping convictions are not reversed.

       We accept the State’s concessions regarding the burglary and kidnapping convictions,

reverse those convictions, and remand for the trial court to vacate Giancoli’s convictions for first

degree burglary and first degree kidnapping. We also reverse the firearm sentencing

enhancements. We otherwise affirm.

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No. 56287-1-II

                                              FACTS

                                          I. BACKGROUND

       Stebbins owned a property on the Key Peninsula where he stored extra tools and vehicles.

He visited the property every few weeks. In November 2019, after noticing disturbances and

missing items at the property, Stebbins and his friend Fryer decided to sleep in a mobile home on

the property. The home had little furniture, so the two slept on couch cushions on the floor of the

dining room.

       Around 4:00 a.m., Stebbins and Fryer woke up to two men with guns standing over them.

The men were looking for someone named Larry. One man was taller and carried a handgun; the

shorter man carried a rifle. Giancoli was later identified as the tall man carrying the handgun and

Christopher Conklin was identified as the man with the rifle. The men ordered Stebbins and Fryer

outside, but told them to leave their wallets and cell phones behind in the trailer. The men directed

them to get into a black Escalade at the end of the driveway. Both Stebbins and Fryer thought the

men intended to kill them.

       Giancoli struck Stebbins in the head with the gun when Stebbins objected, causing Stebbins

to bleed profusely from a head wound. In the confusion, Fryer ran away and Conklin shot after

him with the rifle but missed. After Fryer escaped, Conklin shot Stebbins in the legs. Stebbins

somehow managed to flee and hide in the woods.

       Both Stebbins and Fryer were eventually able to contact law enforcement. Police later

pursued a black Escalade that wove in and out of oncoming traffic. After a flat tire disabled the

Escalade near an apartment complex, Giancoli and Conklin fled on foot into a wooded area. Police

recovered Giancoli and Conklin from the woods.

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No. 56287-1-II

                                        II. INVESTIGATION

       Police brought Fryer to the apartment complex, where he identified Conklin as the man

with the rifle, but he could not identify whether Giancoli was the man with the handgun. Stebbins

did not participate in the identification at the apartment complex because he was at the hospital.

Police arrested both Conklin and Giancoli.

       Shortly after these events, Stebbins’s wife looked up the names of the men arrested on a

publicly available jail roster, then researched their social media profiles. She showed Stebbins

pictures of Giancoli and Conklin from their social media pages.

       In early December 2019, roughly two weeks after the incident, a detective showed Stebbins

two photo montages to see if Stebbins could identify his assailants. The detective knew that

Giancoli and Conklin were the suspects in the case. Stebbins signed an admonition that the

montage may not contain a picture of his assailant and that he was not required to identify a

suspect.

       Each photo montage consisted of six jail booking photographs on a single page. One

montage contained images of Giancoli and five people with similar characteristics, the other

contained images of Conklin and five people with similar characteristics. Stebbins identified

Giancoli and Conklin as his assailants. Several months later, the detective learned that Stebbins

had previously seen their social media pictures.

       Stebbins’s DNA was found in several places inside the Escalade. Giancoli’s DNA was on

both the Escalade’s steering wheel and a cigarette butt found on the porch of the mobile home.

Law enforcement also recovered a .22 caliber rifle and several bullets from along the route that

police pursued the Escalade. And police found .22 caliber rounds in a backpack in the Escalade,

                                                   4
No. 56287-1-II

as well as discharged .22 caliber casings on Stebbins’s property. The handgun was never

recovered.

       The State charged Giancoli with two counts of first degree assault, one count of first degree

burglary, and two counts of first degree kidnapping, all with firearm sentencing enhancements.

The burglary charge alleged that Giancoli entered or remained unlawfully within a building with

intent to commit a crime therein, and that while doing so, Giancoli “or an accomplice[] was armed

with a firearm, to-wit: a rifle.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 67. The kidnapping charges alleged that

Giancoli abducted Stebbins and Fryer with intent to “hold [each victim] as a shield or hostage,” or

“to inflict bodily injury on [each victim],” or “to inflict extreme mental distress on [each victim]

or a third person,” while Giancoli or an accomplice was armed with a rifle. CP at 67-69. The State

also charged Giancoli with attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle and first degree unlawful

possession of a firearm. The State later added a charge of witness intimidation based on events

while Giancoli was in jail awaiting trial.

                       III. MOTIONS REGARDING IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE

       Before trial, the State moved to admit the photo montages shown to Stebbins. Giancoli

opposed the motion and moved to prohibit any pretrial or in-court identifications by Stebbins and

Fryer as “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification.” CP at 43. In particular, Giancoli argued that an in-court identification by

Stebbins would not be reliable. Giancoli reasoned that Stebbins’s wife’s research tainted the

pretrial photo montage identification, and that any in-court identification would be “highly

suggestive” while Giancoli sat at the defense table. CP at 44.

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No. 56287-1-II

       The State argued that Stebbins’s pretrial identification was not impermissibly suggestive

because no state actor directed him to view the social media pictures of Giancoli and Conklin.

“[L]aw enforcement did not show Mr. Stebbins the Facebook photos nor did they direct him or his

wife to conduct their own research.” CP at 58. And the State argued that there was “nothing unduly

suggestive about the photo montages” the detective administered. Id.

       The trial court reasoned based on State v. Knight, 46 Wn. App. 57, 729 P.2d 645 (1986),

that “due process principles regarding suggestive photographic identifications have no application

to pretrial photographic identification procedures engaged in by private citizens.” Verbatim Rep.

of Proc. (VRP) (July 12, 2021) at 87. Thus, it would be proper to suppress pretrial identification

evidence “only where the State in some manner instigated and encouraged or counseled or directed

or controlled the conduct.” Id. at 88. “[A]nd the evidence does not show that in this case.” Id.

       The trial court ruled that the photo montages and Stebbins’s pretrial identification of

Giancoli were admissible. And it denied Giancoli’s motion to prohibit an in-court identification.

The trial court found “that Mrs. Stebbins was acting on her own” when “she did her own research.”

Id. at 91. “[A]lthough the charging documents were generated by the State of Washington, the

[c]ourt doesn’t find that the State encouraged her in any way.” Id. The trial court also found that

Stebbins’s identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. The trial court stated

that defense counsel was free to cross-examine Stebbins about his wife’s research and the fact that

“he saw a photograph,” so “the objection goes more to the weight that the jury should give to the

evidence rather than its admissibility.” Id. at 90.

                                                      6
No. 56287-1-II

                                              IV. TRIAL

A.     Testimony about the Incident

       Giancoli and Conklin were tried as codefendants. At trial, Stebbins and Fryer testified

consistent with the sequence of events recited above. Stebbins testified that he woke up around

4:00 a.m. to a man standing over him with a gun in one hand. A kitchen light was on, so there was

some light allowing Stebbins to see. Although Stebbins was not familiar with firearms, he believed

the gun pointed at him was a revolver. He primarily recalled staring down the barrel.

       Fryer, who had personal experience with handguns, said that the gun was “a darkened

brass” color, looked like it was made of metal, and was roughly seven inches long and five inches

tall. VRP (July 29, 2021) at 453. He believed that it was a “.45 semiautomatic weapon” instead of

a revolver, but he agreed that the man carrying it needed only one hand to hold it. Id. at 449.

       Stebbins described the man with the handgun, who he later identified as Giancoli, as a

“[t]all guy, kind of grizzly” and wearing a “ball cap.” VRP (July 19, 2021) at 721. Fryer said the

man with the handgun was about six feet tall and possibly Caucasian, although he looked “Mexican

or Italian, [or] Greek.” VRP (July 29, 2021) at 451. He recalled that the man wore a beanie, “hadn’t

shaved in awhile,” and had gray facial hair. Id. at 452.

       Stebbins identified Giancoli in the courtroom as the man with the handgun. Stebbins also

explained to the jury that shortly after he got shot, his wife researched the jail roster for the names

of the men arrested. She then looked up their names on social media. Stebbins testified that after

looking at several pictures on social media, he believed both men were his assailants. This was

before he had identified the men from the photo montages for the police.

                                                  7
No. 56287-1-II

       Before the close of evidence, the parties stipulated that Giancoli had a prior conviction for

a serious offense that prevented him from lawfully possessing a firearm.

B.     Jury Instructions and Closing Arguments

       The trial court instructed the jury that it could decide what weight to give eyewitness

identification testimony. The trial court told the jurors that they could weigh credibility based on

factors including the witness’s “capacity for observation, recall[,] and identification,” their

opportunity to observe the perpetrator, their emotional state, their ability to describe the

perpetrator, and “[a]ny other factor relevant to this question.” CP at 131.

       The jury also received instructions about the elements and means of committing the

charged offenses. A person commits first degree burglary by unlawfully entering or remaining in

a building with intent to commit a crime therein, if they are armed with a deadly weapon or assault

a person. RCW 9A.52.020(1). Even though the State charged Giancoli only with first degree

burglary using a deadly weapon, the instructions stated that the jury could convict Giancoli of first

degree burglary if he “was armed with a deadly weapon or assaulted a person.” CP at 144

(emphasis added).

       Next, the instructions directed that the jury could convict Giancoli of first degree

kidnapping if it found that he abducted Stebbins and Fryer with intent to inflict bodily injury or

extreme mental distress. The instructions told the jury it did not need to be “unanimous as to which

of the alternative [means of kidnapping] has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as long as

each juror finds that at least one alternative has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” CP at

150, 152.

                                                 8
No. 56287-1-II

       Several instructions addressed Giancoli’s possession or use of firearms. To convict

Giancoli of unlawful possession of a firearm, the jury had to find that he had “previously been

convicted of a serious offense” and that he “knowingly had a firearm in his possession or control.”

CP at 170. “Possession means having a firearm in one’s custody or control.” CP at 174. The

instructions also stated that for the purpose of the special verdict forms for the firearm sentencing

enhancements, the State had to prove that Giancoli “was armed with a firearm at the time” he

committed the relevant offenses. CP at 190. The instructions explained that “If one participant in

a crime is armed with a firearm, all accomplices to that participant are deemed to be so armed,

even if only one firearm is involved.” Id. Even though the information alleged that Giancoli was

armed with a rifle for the firearm sentencing enhancements, the instructions did not direct the jury

that it had to find that Giancoli or an accomplice was armed with a rifle to convict him of the

firearm sentencing enhancements.

       The State mentioned Giancoli used a handgun several times during closing argument. First,

the prosecutor stated that the jury could convict Giancoli of unlawful possession of a firearm

because both Stebbins and Fryer “testified about how he had a pistol that day” before summarizing

their testimony describing the handgun. VRP (Aug. 3, 2021) at 657. And when discussing the

special verdict forms for the firearm sentencing enhancements, the prosecutor explained that the

relevant question was whether the State “proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Giancoli and

Conklin] were armed.” Id. at 666. “And you heard the evidence in the case that one had a pistol

and one had a rifle.” Id. The prosecutor then told the jury that if one participant is armed with a

firearm, all of the accomplices are also armed.

                                                  9
No. 56287-1-II

          During defense closing argument, counsel conceded that the State had proved that Giancoli

attempted to elude police in the Escalade. However, counsel argued that different men driving a

different black Escalade committed the offenses at Stebbins’s property. Counsel argued that

Stebbins’s identification was unreliable because of poor lighting in and around the mobile home,

and counsel emphasized inconsistencies between Stebbins’s initial description of the man with the

handgun and Giancoli’s appearance at trial. Counsel contended that Stebbins identified Giancoli

from the photo montage because of his wife’s social media search for the men arrested for the

attack.

C.        Verdict and Sentencing

          The jury convicted Giancoli of two counts of first degree assault, one count of first degree

burglary, and two counts of first degree kidnapping. It entered special verdicts finding that

Giancoli was armed with a firearm during those offenses. The jury also convicted Giancoli of

attempting to elude police, first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and the lesser included

crime of witness tampering instead of witness intimidation.

          Giancoli had two prior convictions for most serious or “strike” offenses. See RCW

9.94A.030(32).1 One prior conviction was for a second degree assault committed when he was 17

years old. Although Giancoli was a juvenile, he was convicted in adult court. The other prior

conviction was for a first degree burglary committed when he was 21. Because Giancoli’s current

convictions included most serious offenses, the trial court imposed a sentence of life without the

possibility of release. Giancoli argued at sentencing that the POAA was unconstitutional as applied

1
 The statutory list of most serious offenses has been codified as different subsections since
Giancoli’s offenses but the relevant language has not changed, so we cite to the current subsection.

                                                  10
No. 56287-1-II

because his first “strike” offense occurred when he was 17 years old, but the trial court rejected

this argument and did not believe it had discretion to impose a different sentence. Each most

serious offense, as well as the burglary conviction, also carried a 60-month firearm sentencing

enhancement that had to run consecutively to the life sentence and to the other enhancements for

an additional 300 months.

        Giancoli appeals his convictions and sentence.

        Conklin also appealed, and we transferred Conklin’s case to Division One. State v. Conklin,

No.   84634-5-I,     slip   op.   at    1   (Wash.    Ct.   App.   May     8,   2022)    (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/ pdf/846345.pdf. Division One concluded that Conklin failed

to show the pretrial and in-court identifications were improper. Id. at 8-9. It also accepted several

concessions from the State. That court first accepted the State’s concession that Conklin’s first

degree assault convictions merged with his kidnapping convictions. Id. at 3. Then Division One

reversed the kidnapping and burglary convictions, also based on State concessions. Id. at 3-5. That

court concluded that Conklin’s only remaining conviction was for unlawful possession of a

firearm. Id. at 6. It remanded for the trial court to vacate the other convictions for assault, burglary,

and kidnapping and to resentence Conklin on the remaining unlawful possession of a firearm

conviction. Id. at 1. The State moved to reconsider, arguing that Conklin’s assault convictions

should remain intact. Division One denied reconsideration.

                                              ANALYSIS

                                       I. IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE

        Giancoli argues that Stebbins’s identifications violated Giancoli’s right to due process

because the identification was obtained through impermissibly suggestive procedures and lacked

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No. 56287-1-II

reliability. He contends that the photo montage was impermissibly suggestive because it should

have been administered in a double-blind procedure and Stebbins should have been shown the

images sequentially, not simultaneously. In contrast to his arguments below, Giancoli now argues

that the social media search affected only the reliability of Stebbins’s identification. He asserts that

Stebbins’s in-court identification was tainted for the same reasons “as it had no independent

origin.” Br. of Appellant at 40. We disagree.

        As an initial matter, the State implies that Giancoli is confined to his argument below about

only the social media research tainting the identifications. The case Giancoli uses to challenge

other aspects of the photo montage procedure, State v. Derri, was published a year after his trial.

199 Wn.2d 658, 511 P.3d 1267 (2022). Although we may decline to consider new issues raised

for the first time on appeal, the same is not true for new authority. Walla Walla County Fire Prot.

Dist. No. 5 v. Washington Auto Carriage, Inc., 50 Wn. App. 355, 357 n.1, 745 P.2d 1332 (1987)

(“There is no rule preventing an appellate court from considering case law not presented at the

trial court level.”). Giancoli argued below that the pretrial identification procedure was

impermissibly suggestive and unreliable; he maintains that claim on appeal, buttressed by authority

that the Washington Supreme Court published after his trial. Thus, we consider Giancoli’s

arguments that are based on the analysis in Derri.

A.      Principles of Eyewitness Identifications

        It is well established that “the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels

exclusion of eyewitness identification evidence” that “was obtained by an unnecessarily suggestive

police procedure” and “lacks reliability under the totality of circumstances.” Derri, 199 Wn.2d at

673; see State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 118, 59 P.3d 58 (2002). If a pretrial identification

                                                   12
No. 56287-1-II

procedure is inadmissible, a later in-court identification by the same witness is admissible only if

the in-court identification “has an independent origin” from the tainted procedure. State v. Hilliard,

89 Wn.2d 430, 439, 573 P.2d 22 (1977). Whether an identification procedure was impermissibly

suggestive or was unreliable are conclusions of law that we review de novo. Derri, 199 Wn.2d at

676.

       To exclude evidence of a police identification procedure, a defendant must first show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Id. at 674.

Without that showing, the inquiry ends. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 118. If the procedure was

impermissibly suggestive, we then consider whether there was “‘a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification’” under the totality of the circumstances. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432

U.S. 98, 116, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.

377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968)). Factors that affect reliability include the

witness’s opportunity to view the person at the time of the crime, the witness’s degree of attention,

the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the person, the level of certainty demonstrated at

the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 114-15. Further,

“the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself” can weigh against reliability. Id. at

114.

       The Supreme Court recently held in Derri that a court examining whether an identification

procedure was impermissibly suggestive “must apply relevant, widely accepted modern science

on eyewitness identification at each step of the test.” 199 Wn.2d at 675.

       [W]e now know that identification procedures should be administered in double-
       blind fashion, meaning the administrator does not know who the suspect is. Police
       should give preidentification admonitions informing the witness that the perpetrator
       may or may not be in the montage and the witness should not feel compelled to

                                                 13
No. 56287-1-II

        make a selection. They should never show the same suspect to the same witness
        over the course of multiple identification procedures. They should construct a
        photomontage in such a way that the suspect is not the only individual pictured who
        closely matches the description of the perpetrator. And they should avoid giving
        feedback to witnesses that might inflate confidence levels.

Id. at 677. These factors are each “potentially suggestive,” but not automatically dispositive. See

id. at 679, 682.

        A combination of several factors rendered the identification procedure in Derri

impermissibly suggestive. Among other issues, a detective administered the montages while

knowing which image was the suspect, one witness was shown two montages where the defendant

was the only common photo, the detective discussed the montages with the witnesses, and a federal

agent who attended the identifications made comments “suggest[ing] unconscious confidence-

bolstering.” Id. at 682. The Supreme Court held that “each identification procedure” was

impermissibly suggestive “for one or more of the reasons discussed above,” but the identifications

were nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 685.

B.      Whether the Photo Montage Procedure in This Case Was Impermissibly Suggestive

        Giancoli asserts that the photo montage procedure was impermissibly suggestive because

it was not administered in a double-blind fashion and because Stebbins viewed the photos

simultaneously. We disagree.

        The Derri opinion originally said that police should “present photomontages sequentially,

rather than simultaneously.” State v. Derri, No. 100038-3, slip op. at 21 (June 23, 2022),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1000383.pdf. That sentence has since been removed

from the opinion. Ord. Amending Op., State v. Derri, No. 100038-3, at 1 (Wash. Sept. 9, 2022),

                                                 14
No. 56287-1-II

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1000383.pdf. Thus, a witness simultaneously viewing

the images of a montage does not currently weigh in favor of suggestibility.

       Giancoli also argues that the photomontages were impermissibly suggestive because they

were not performed in a double-blind fashion. The Derri court found multiple factors contributed

to suggestiveness and it did not say that one factor is or should be dispositive. See 199 Wn.2d at

679. Here, the detective who administered the photomontages knew which people had been

arrested. But this is the only remaining Derri factor that Giancoli identifies as weighing in favor

of impermissible suggestiveness in this case. He points to no other factor, nor does he point to any

evidence that the lack of double-blind presentation made any difference here. We conclude that

the photomontages were not impermissibly suggestive here. We thus need not reach reliability.

Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 118. We affirm the trial court’s order admitting Stebbins’s pretrial and in-

court identifications of Giancoli.

                             II. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM

       Giancoli argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the unlawful

possession of a firearm conviction. He asserts that the State never proved that he “possessed a ‘gun

in fact’” because Stebbins and Fryer gave conflicting descriptions of the handgun. Br. of Appellant

at 66 (quoting State v. Olsen, 10 Wn. App. 2d 731, 737, 449 P.3d 1089 (2019)). He suggests the

State had to prove the handgun was operable. We disagree.

       To assess the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State, “‘any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” State v. Frahm, 193 Wn.2d 590, 595, 444 P.3d 595 (2019) (quoting State v. Salinas, 119

Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

                                                15
No. 56287-1-II

admits the truth of the State’s evidence, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State.

Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v.

Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 266, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).

       A person is guilty of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm when they own, possess,

or control “any firearm after having previously been convicted . . . of any serious offense.” Former

RCW 9.41.040(1) (2019). “Possession means having a firearm in one’s custody or control.” CP at

174. A “firearm” is “a weapon or device from which a projectile or projectiles may be fired by an

explosive such as gunpowder,” but excludes distress signals and construction tools. Former RCW

9.41.010(11) (2019). We recently dismissed an argument that the State had to prove a firearm was

operable to convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm. Olsen, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 738.

       Here, sufficient evidence supported the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm.

Stebbins and Fryer both said that Giancoli held a handgun. Stebbins, who was unfamiliar with

firearms, thought that the gun was a revolver but clearly recalled the sight of the gun’s barrel

pointed at his face. Fryer, who was more familiar with firearms, believed the gun was a

semiautomatic and .45 caliber, described its approximate size, and stated that it was made of metal

and not plastic. Giancoli offered no evidence that the gun was a toy. Taking the State’s evidence

as true and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could

find that Giancoli possessed a firearm. And the parties stipulated that he had previously been

convicted of a serious offense. We hold that sufficient evidence supports Giancoli’s conviction for

first degree unlawful possession of a firearm.

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No. 56287-1-II

                             III. FIRST DEGREE BURGLARY CONVICTION

        Giancoli asserts that we must reverse his conviction for first degree burglary because the

information charged him with only one alternative means of committing the burglary but the jury

was instructed on two. And he raises several other grounds for reversing the burglary conviction.

The State concedes that we should reverse the burglary conviction because the jury was instructed

on an uncharged alternative means. Thus, the State does not address Giancoli’s other arguments.

We accept the State’s concession.

        A person commits first degree burglary if they enter or remain unlawfully in a building

with intent to commit a crime therein, and the person or an accomplice is either “armed with a

deadly weapon” or “assaults any person.” RCW 9A.52.020(1). “It is error to instruct the jury on

alternative means that are not contained in the charging document.” State v. Brewczynski, 173 Wn.

App. 541, 549, 294 P.3d 825 (2013). But if “other instructions clearly limit the crime to the charged

alternative,” the error is harmless. Id.

        Here, the jury was instructed on an uncharged alternative means. The information alleged

that Giancoli committed a burglary only while armed with a deadly weapon. But the jury was

instructed that it could convict Giancoli if he or an accomplice “was armed with a deadly weapon

or assaulted a person.” CP at 144 (emphasis added). And the other instructions did not clearly limit

the jury to considering whether Giancoli was armed with a deadly weapon during the burglary, as

opposed to assaulting a person. We accept the State’s concession and remand for the trial court to

reverse Giancoli’s burglary conviction and the attached firearm sentencing enhancement.2

2
  Giancoli also argues that we must reverse the burglary conviction because insufficient evidence
supported the alternative means that he entered the building with intent to commit a crime and the
jury did not receive a unanimity instruction. Entering and remaining unlawfully in a building are

                                                 17
No. 56287-1-II

                           IV. FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING CONVICTION

       Giancoli next argues that we must reverse his convictions for first degree kidnapping. He

asserts that there was not sufficient evidence to support the extreme mental distress alternative

means that the State charged for each kidnapping count and the jury did not receive a unanimity

instruction. The State concedes that we must reverse Giancoli’s kidnapping convictions for those

reasons. We agree and accept the State’s concession.

       When a jury is instructed about alternative means of committing a crime, “[a] general

verdict satisfies due process only so long as each alternative means is supported by sufficient

evidence.” State v. Woodlyn, 188 Wn.2d 157, 165, 392 P.3d 1062 (2017). “If there is insufficient

evidence to support any of the means, a ‘particularized expression’ of jury unanimity is required.”

Id. (quoting State v. Owens, 180 Wn.2d 90, 95, 323 P.3d 1030 (2014)). In other words, we must

“revers[e] if it is impossible to rule out the possibility the jury relied on a charge unsupported by

sufficient evidence.” State v. Wright, 165 Wn.2d 783, 803 n.12, 203 P.3d 1027 (2009).

       First degree kidnapping occurs when a person abducts another with intent to commit

another offense, such as inflicting bodily harm or extreme mental distress. RCW 9A.40.020(1).

Here, the State expressly told the jury that it did not have to be unanimous about whether bodily

injury or extreme mental distress supported the first degree kidnapping conviction. Under the

extreme mental distress means, the State must prove the defendant intended to inflict more mental

distress than a reasonable person would feel when restrained by deadly force. State v. Garcia, 179

Wn.2d 828, 843, 318 P.3d 266 (2014). The State points to no testimony in the record to support

not alternative means of committing burglary. State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 2d 146, 157, 484 P.3d
550 (2021), review denied, 198 Wn.2d 1005, 493 P.3d 747. Because we reverse the burglary
conviction on other grounds, we need not address this argument further.

                                                 18
No. 56287-1-II

this means, and the State concedes that sufficient evidence did not support the extreme mental

distress alternative means. Thus, we accept the State’s concession and remand for the trial court to

reverse Giancoli’s kidnapping convictions and the attached firearm sentencing enhancements.3

                      V. REMAINING FIREARM SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS

       Two firearm sentencing enhancements remain attached to the assault convictions after the

reversal of the burglary and kidnapping convictions. Giancoli contends that the jury instructions

and the State’s closing argument allowed the jury to find the firearm sentencing enhancements

based on the handgun, but his information charged only enhancements based on the rifle. Thus,

according to Giancoli, the enhancement findings could have improperly relied on an uncharged

factual basis. For the first time in his reply brief, Giancoli contends that if we reverse the firearm

sentencing enhancements we must also reverse the underlying assault convictions. The State

contends that “any discrepancy between the information and the jury instructions was harmless.”

Br. of Resp’t at 22. We reverse the firearm sentencing enhancements but affirm the assault

convictions.

       “Defendants must be informed of the charges against them, including the manner of

committing the crime.” In re Pers. Restraint of Brockie, 178 Wn.2d 532, 536, 309 P.3d 498 (2013).

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. As we explained above with regard to

Giancoli’s burglary conviction, it is error to instruct the jury on alternatives that are not contained

in the information. Brewczynski, 173 Wn. App. at 549. But the error is harmless if “other

instructions clearly limit the crime to the charged alternative.” Id.

3
 Giancoli has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the other alternative means
of committing first degree kidnapping, abducting another with intent to inflict bodily harm.

                                                  19
No. 56287-1-II

       For example, in State v. Jain, the information charged the defendant with two counts of

money laundering related to two specified properties in Granite Falls and Mill Creek. 151 Wn.

App. 117, 122-23, 210 P.3d 1061 (2009). The trial court then admitted evidence of money

laundering activities related to five other properties that were not identified in the information, and

the jury instructions “did not require . . . the jury to find that Jain’s money laundering involved any

specific properties.” Id. at 123. Division One reversed because the jury “could have returned a

guilty verdict by finding that Jain committed acts not charged in the information, specifically acts

relating to properties other than the Granite Falls and Mill Creek properties.” Id. at 124.

       Here, the information charged that, while committing the attached offenses, Giancoli or an

accomplice was “armed with a firearm, to-wit: a rifle.” CP at 66-67. The information did not

mention the handgun, but there was extensive testimony at trial describing the handgun’s size and

color. The instructions explained that if one participant in a crime was armed with a firearm, all

accomplices were also considered armed, even if there was only one firearm. But the jury

instructions did not specify that the jury could convict Giancoli for the firearm sentencing

enhancements based only on the rifle. And during closing arguments, the prosecutor implied that

the jury could find that Giancoli was armed based on either the rifle or the handgun. VRP (Aug.

3, 2021) at 666 (“[Y]ou heard the evidence in the case that one had a pistol and one had a rifle.”).

We cannot tell whether the jury found, for purposes of the firearm sentencing enhancements, that

Giancoli was armed with the handgun, which was not charged in the information, or the rifle,

which was.

       Had the State not elected to specifically identify the rifle as the firearm supporting the

firearm sentencing enhancements in the charging document, there would be no error. Nothing in

                                                  20
No. 56287-1-II

the firearm sentencing enhancement statute requires the State to specify an individual firearm in

the charging document. See former RCW 9.94A.533(3) (2018). But the decision to specify a

firearm in the information led to an error in this case. Although Jain addressed crimes, not

enhancements, the State’s charging decision here created an analogous situation because the State

elected to identify the rifle as the relevant firearm in the information, then argued based on both

the rifle and the handgun in closing argument, and did not limit the jury to relying on the rifle in

the instructions about the enhancement. The State has not shown that other instructions were

limited to the charged alternative, the necessary showing for harmless error in this context.

Brewczynski, 173 Wn. App. at 549.

        Giancoli’s assertion that we must also reverse the underlying assault convictions is a novel

argument raised for the first time in his reply brief. “An issue raised and argued for the first time

in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.” Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118

Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); see RAP 10.3(c). We therefore remand for the trial court to

vacate the firearm sentencing enhancements but affirm the underlying assault convictions.

                                       VI. SENTENCING ISSUES

A.      Merger

        Giancoli argues that his convictions for first degree assault merge with his convictions for

first degree kidnapping. He reasons that the State used the threat of deadly force that constituted

the assault to also elevate the kidnapping charges to the first degree. “Absent the evidence of the

assault,” he “could have only been convicted of the lesser crime of kidnapping in the second

degree.” Br. of Appellant at 47. Thus, he asserts that we must vacate the assault convictions. The

State initially conceded this issue in its briefing. But the State clarified at oral argument that, if we

                                                   21
No. 56287-1-II

reverse the kidnapping convictions, the State would no longer concede that the merger doctrine

applied. As discussed above, we reverse the kidnapping convictions. We agree with the State that

the merger doctrine no longer applies.

        “[T]rial courts merge crimes to avoid doubly punishing behavior.” State v. Wilkins, 200

Wn. App. 794, 805, 403 P.3d 890 (2017) (emphasis added); see also State v. Whittaker, 192 Wn.

App. 395, 411, 367 P.3d 1092 (2016) (explaining that the merger doctrine applies at sentencing to

correct double jeopardy violations). As discussed above, the State concedes that there was not

sufficient evidence to support the extreme mental distress alternative means of kidnapping and that

we must reverse Giancoli’s kidnapping convictions. On remand, there will be no kidnapping

convictions for the assaults to merge with. See State v. Aguilar, __ Wn. App. 2d ___, 534 P.3d

360, 376-77 (2023) (declining to reach double jeopardy arguments after reversing the convictions

that implicated double jeopardy on other grounds). And Giancoli does not otherwise prevail on

any challenge to his assault convictions.

       We hold that our reversal of the first degree kidnapping convictions renders the merger

doctrine inapplicable. We acknowledge that Division One reversed Conklin’s assault convictions

and that it would be ideal for codefendants to receive the same treatment. Although Division One

declined to reconsider its opinion, here, the State clarified its position at oral argument and

expressly limited the concession on the merger issue. We affirm Giancoli’s convictions for first

degree assault.

B.     POAA Sentence

       Giancoli asserts that his life without the possibility of release sentence under the POAA is

cruel punishment that violates article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution because he

                                                22
No. 56287-1-II

committed his first most serious offense when he was 17 years old. He also argues that the POAA

sentence is categorically unconstitutional and disproportionate because POAA sentences are

imposed in a racially disproportionate manner. We disagree.

       The procedural basis for Giancoli’s POAA sentence is functionally identical to State v.

Reynolds, ___ Wn.2d ___, 535 P.3d 427, 431 (2023) . In that case, the Washington Supreme Court

addressed the constitutionality of a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release

under the POAA that was predicated on a “strike” offense that Reynolds committed when he was

17. Id. Reynolds pleaded guilty to first degree assault in adult court when he was 17 years old. Id.

He committed his second set of “strike” offenses, first degree burglary and robbery, when he was

21 years old. Id. And he committed his third set of “strike” offenses, first degree burglary and

second degree attempted rape, when he was 33 years old. Id. at 431-32.

       Reynolds appealed his POAA sentence under article I, section 14 of the Washington

Constitution, arguing that the sentence was categorically barred and unconstitutionally

disproportionate when imposed on offenders who committed their first most serious offense as a

juvenile. Id. at 432. The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that Reynolds’ previous criminal

conduct aggravated his sentence but “his punishment is for his adult conduct.” Id. at 438 (relying

on State v. Moretti, 193 Wn.2d 809, 826, 446 P.3d 609 (2019), which held that a reviewing court

considers the defendant’s culpability at the time of the third most serious offense, not the first).

Thus, the life without possibility of release sentence was not categorically unconstitutional nor

unconstitutionally disproportionate.4 Id. at 436-37.

4
 Because article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court
did not separately discuss Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment claim. Reynolds, 535 P.3d at 438 n.11.

                                                23
No. 56287-1-II

       Like Reynolds, Giancoli was prosecuted in adult court for the “strike” offense he

committed when he was 17, second degree assault. He then committed two other most serious

offenses at the ages of 21 and 49, second degree burglary and first degree assault. And he raises

many of the same arguments that Reynolds did before the Supreme Court. See Reynolds, 535 P.3d

at 432(explaining that Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14 challenges were

based “on the fact that he committed his first strike as a juvenile rather than as an adult”). Thus,

Reynolds and Moretti control. Giancoli has not established that his sentence was unconstitutional

on the basis that he committed his first most serious offense as a juvenile prosecuted in adult court.

       Giancoli also asserts that life without the possibility of release sentences are imposed in a

racially disproportionate manner and do not comport with evolving standards of decency,

rendering the sentences unconstitutional. Giancoli relies on State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427

P.3d 621 (2018), which ruled the death penalty unconstitutional on these grounds. Gregory held

that the death penalty was unconstitutional largely because the penalty was “unequally applied—

sometimes by where the crime took place, or the county of residence, or the available budgetary

resources at any given point in time, or the race of the defendant,” and failed to serve “any

legitimate penological goal.” 192 Wn.2d at 5. In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Reynolds that

life without the possibility of release sentences for serious offenders satisfy the penological goals

of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. Reynolds, 535 P.3d at 436. And the Supreme Court’s

remedy in Gregory was to convert all death sentences to life without the possibility of release. 192

Wn.2d at 35-36. As a result, we cannot conclude that life sentences without the possibility of

release offend our evolving standards of decency in the same way that death sentences do without

contradicting the Supreme Court’s resolution of Gregory. Id.; Reynolds, 535 P.3d at 437-38.

                                                 24
No. 56287-1-II

        In sum, a mandatory life without the possibility of release sentence is not unconstitutional

when the defendant was convicted or pleaded guilty to all three most serious offenses in adult

court. We therefore affirm Giancoli’s sentence.

                                         CONCLUSION

        We remand for the trial court to vacate Giancoli’s convictions for first degree kidnapping

and first degree burglary, as well as the firearm sentencing enhancements. We otherwise affirm

Giancoli’s convictions and sentence.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                       Glasgow, C.J.
 We concur:

 Lee, J.

 Price, J.

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