Court Opinion

ID: 9897416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:17.414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.775670
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Apr 28 2023, 10:07 am

                                                                                       CLERK
                                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                        and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
      Dan J. May                                                  Whitney K. Beck
      Kokomo, Indiana                                             Kokomo, Indiana

                                                   IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      C.M.,                                                       April 28, 2023
      Appellant-Petitioner,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                  22A-PO-1743
              v.                                                  Appeal from the Howard Circuit
                                                                  Court
      J.M.,                                                       The Honorable Douglas A. Tate,
      Appellee-Respondent                                         Special Judge
                                                                  The Honorable Cheyenne P.
                                                                  Shepherd, Magistrate
                                                                  Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                  34C01-2206-PO-1230

                                        Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                     Judges May and Bradford concur.

      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   C.M. (“Mother”) appeals the Howard Circuit Court’s order dismissing an ex

      parte order of protection that was previously issued by the White Circuit Court

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023                                   Page 1 of 8
      against J.M. (“Father”). Mother raises three issues for our review, which we

      restate as:

               I. Whether Mother preserved for appellate review her claim that
               the magistrate lacked authority to preside over the order of
               protection hearing.

               II. Whether the trial court erred when it issued a written order
               five days after the dismissal was noted on the chronological case
               summary (“CCS”).

               III. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify or enforce
               custody of the parties’ child and parenting time.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Father and Mother were married and have one minor child (“Child”).1 They

      divorced in Howard County in 2018. In May 2022, Mother filed a petition for

      an order of protection against Father on Child’s behalf with the White Circuit

      Court. That court granted an ex parte order of protection against Father on

      May 24.

[4]   On May 26, Father filed an “Objection to Venue and Lack of Jurisdiction and

      Motion to Transfer” alleging that, because the parties’ dissolution decree was

      entered in Howard County, the Howard Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the

      1
       Although there is no dispute that Child is a minor, the parties do not state Child’s age, and we cannot
      discern her age from the record on appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023                                 Page 2 of 8
      order of protection. The White Circuit Court agreed and transferred the matter

      to the Howard Circuit Court (hereinafter the “trial court”).

[5]   Father then filed with the trial court in Howard County a request for a hearing

      and motion to terminate the order of protection. On June 8, the parties

      stipulated that Howard Superior Court Judge Douglas Tate would serve as

      special judge in the matter. Judge Tate assumed jurisdiction on June 10 and set

      a fact-finding hearing for June 23 “in the Howard Magistrate Court.”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 22.

[6]   At the conclusion of the June 23 hearing, with the magistrate presiding, the trial

      court ruled from the bench and stated that:

              a) the protective order should be terminated immediately; b) . . .
              Father should be permitted to resume his parenting time; and c)
              . . . Mother is ordered to pay $2,730.00 in attorney’s fees to
              Father’s counsel. [And the trial court] indicated to the parties
              that the foregoing would be reduced to a written order.

      Appellee’s Br. at 8.2 Also on June 23, according to the CCS, the trial court

      entered an order dismissing the ex parte order of protection. Then, on June 28,

      the trial court issued its written order, which included the court’s findings and

      conclusions. In that order, the trial court concluded as follows:

              19. The Ex Parte Order for Protection is hereby DISMISSED.

      2
       Mother has not included a copy of the transcript in the record on appeal. Mother does not dispute Father’s
      description of the court’s ruling from the bench.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023                               Page 3 of 8
              20. [Mother] is ordered to immediately transfer the child to
              [Father’s] care to begin his summer parenting time. For the
              remainder of the summer, the child shall reside with [Father] as
              primary custodial parent. [Mother] shall exercise parenting time
              with the child every other weekend. When school starts, and the
              summer visitation is over, the parties shall revert to the parenting
              time established in the dissolution case.

              21. [Mother] is ordered to pay [Father’s] attorney’s fees to
              Whitney K. Beck in the amount of $2,730.00.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 8. This appeal ensued.5566

      Discussion and Decision
      Issue One: Magistrate

[7]   Mother first contends that Magistrate Shepherd did not have “jurisdiction” to

      preside over the hearing on June 23, 2022. Appellant’s Br. at 10. In particular,

      Mother asserts that “[t]here is no written court order, CCS entry, nor other

      evidence that the Magistrate was appointed Judge Pro Tempore as required by

      law. Magistrate Shep[he]rd just appeared in the courtroom and announced that

      she was hearing the case.” Id.

[8]   In support of her contention, Mother cites Indiana Trial Rule 79(I)(2)(a), which

      provides:

              In the event that a special judge assumes jurisdiction and is
              thereafter unavailable for any reason on the date when a hearing
              or trial is scheduled:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023             Page 4 of 8
                (a) the special judge may, as appropriate, appoint a judge pro
                tempore, temporary judge, magistrate, or senior judge of the
                court where the case is pending, provided such judge or
                magistrate is otherwise eligible to serve and has not previously
                had jurisdiction of the case removed from them pursuant to the
                Rules of Trial Procedure[.]

       And Mother argues that an appointment under Trial Rule 79 must be made in

       writing pursuant to Trial Rule 63(E).

[9]    Mother’s argument misses the mark. As Father points out, in the trial court’s

       June 10 order setting the June 23 hearing, the court stated that the hearing

       would be “in the Howard Magistrate Court.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 22.

       And Mother did not object to the magistrate presiding over the hearing at any

       time before or, more significantly, during the hearing.3 Father contends that

       Mother has waived this issue for our review, and we agree.

[10]   In Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind. 2001), the defendant in a post-

       conviction proceeding argued that “a magistrate who issued several orders in

       his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings because a special

       judge had been assigned to hear the case.” Our Supreme Court held that the

       defendant had “waived any claims in regards to the magistrate’s authority

       because he failed to object.” Id. (citing Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind.

       3
         Mother contends that the trial court’s minute entry did not indicate that the magistrate would preside over
       the hearing. Rather, she thought that Judge Tate would preside in the magistrate’s courtroom. But that
       contention is neither here nor there, as Mother did not object during the hearing.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023                                 Page 5 of 8
       1994) (“[I]t has been the long-standing policy of this court to view the authority

       of the officer appointed to try a case not as affecting the jurisdiction of the

       court. Therefore, the failure of a party to object at trial to the authority of a

       court officer to enter a final appealable order waives the issue for appeal”)).

[11]   Likewise, we hold that Mother waived any claim that the magistrate did not

       have jurisdiction over the order of protection hearing.

       Issue Two: Written Order

[12]   Mother next contends that “the court lost all jurisdiction to enter orders after

       dismissal of the case as case law clearly holds that the case is no longer pending

       for any purpose and that the dismissal disposed of the PO case in its entirety.”

       Appellant’s Br. at 12. In support, Mother cites case law holding that “after [a]

       cause is dismissed and judgment of dismissal entered by the court, the cause of

       action is no longer pending for any purpose.” Id. (quoting Fair Share Org. v.

       Kroger Co., 132 Ind. App. 160, 170, 176 N.E.2d 205 (1961)). Thus, Mother

       argues that the court’s written findings and conclusions, entered five days after

       the ex parte order of protection was dismissed, are a nullity. Mother is

       incorrect.

[13]   In Fair Share Org., the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its complaint. This Court

       noted that the voluntary dismissal was “the equivalent of a nonsuit.” 132 Ind.

       App. 160, 170, 176 N.E.2d 205 (1961). Here, in contrast, Father moved for

       dismissal of Mother’s petition. Thus, our analysis in Fair Share Org. is

       inapplicable here. Moreover, here, the trial court expressly stated in open court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023            Page 6 of 8
       that it dismissed the ex parte order of protection; that Father’s parenting time

       was to resume; and that Mother was to pay $2,730.00 in attorney’s fees to

       Father’s counsel. Those orders were merely reduced to writing after the hearing.

       Mother has not shown any error, let alone reversible error, on this issue.

       Issue Three: Custody and Parenting Time

[14]   Finally, Mother contends that, in the context of the order of protection

       proceeding, the magistrate “had no jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or

       adjudicate any of the issues of custody or parenting time which were pending

       before Judge Tate as special judge of the Howard Circuit Court in the

       dissolution action.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. In support, Mother cites State ex rel.

       Meade v. Marshall Superior Court II, 644 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 1994). In that case, our

       Supreme Court held that, “where no emergency situation exists, . . . the court

       where the divorce, custody, and visitation matters were heard retains

       continuing jurisdiction over the case. A party should go to that court to secure a

       protective order, absent some extraordinary circumstance.” Id. at 90.

[15]   Here, Mother filed her petition for order of protection in the wrong court. It was

       subsequently transferred to the trial court, which is the same court with

       jurisdiction over the parties’ dissolution, including custody and parenting time

       matters. Mother’s argument here is without merit.

[16]   For all of the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[17]   Affirmed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023          Page 7 of 8
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PO-1743 | April 28, 2023   Page 8 of 8