Court Opinion

ID: 9643536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:32:21.118064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:01.251870
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
Mr. Justice Chattin :
Respondents have filed a. very forceful and dignified petition to rehear. It is insisted we overlooked and, “failed to pass upon the question raised by them to the effect that the grantor, Nathan Gregg, who created this estate upon condition subsequent, specifically provided *360that upon a breach of same the title to said property should revert back to his assigns,” and thus the rule of common law that a right of re-entry on condition subsequent-broken was inalienable was inapplicable.
In other words, it is insisted Gregg-, who created the condition, had the right to designate the person or persons who would have the right of re-entry upon condition broken.
In support of this insistence respondents rely on the following headnote quoted from Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1924):
“To defeat 'estate upon condition,’ some act, such as making entry, must be done, but happening of specified event itself terminates 'estate upon conditional limitation,’ and estate thereupon goes at once to grantor by reverter, or to person to whom limited on happening of such contingency. ’ ’
This headnote is apparently made up from the last two sentences of the last paragraph on page 229 of the opinion 269 S.W. p. 38. When the entire paragraph is read it will be seen it distinguishes an estate upon condition and an estate upon conditional limitation. The paragraph reads:
“The distinction between an estate upon condition and a conditional limitation is thus drawn by Mr. Washburn:
“ ‘In this and many other respects, an estate upon condition, properly speaking, differs from what is known as a conditional limitation. In either case, the estate is a conditional one. But in the one, though the event happen upon .which the estate may be defeated *361it requires some act to be done, such as making an entry, in order to effect this. In the other, the happening of the event is, in itself, the limit beyond which ' the estate no longer exists, but is determined by ,the ' pperation of the law, without requiring any act to be done by.any one. In case of a condition at common ...law, the grantor or his heirs, alone can defeat the estate by entry for condition broken. In a conditional limitation, the estate determines, ipso facto, upon the happening of the event,'and goes over at once to the grantor by reverter, or to the person to whom it is limited upon the happening of such contingency.’ ”
Respondents also cite the case of Banner Baptist Church v. Watson, 193 Tenn. 290, 246 S.W.2d 17 (1952); as authority for their contention, but a careful reading of that ease the common law rule that a right of re-entry upon condition broken was inalienable is not discussed. Nor is the question of whether at common law a grantor could designate some third person other than himself or his heirs who would have the right to re-enter on condition broken.
In any event the common law rule, as we pointed out in our original opinion, is that a right of re-entry on condition broken is inalienable. If it is inalienable, a grantor’s purported assigns of the right could take nothing. That is what we said in our original opinion.
Respondents again insist we should hold the right of re-entry upon condition broken to be alienable; and also that we should decree an abandonment of the property by Sullivan County notwithstanding the fact the County was not made a party to the suit.
*362We considered these matters in onr original opinion.
“The office of a petition to rehear is to call attention of the court to.matters overlooked, not to those things which the counsel supposes were improperly decided after full consideration.” Louisville & N. R. R. Co., v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 125 Tenn. 658, 148 S.W. 671 (1911).
Respondents’ petition to rehear is denied at their costs.