Court Opinion

ID: 9385805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 08:08:35.063243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.806681
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 6, 2023.

                                        In The

                                Court of Appeals
                                       For The

                           First District of Texas
                              ————————————
                                NO. 01-22-00288-CR
                             ———————————
                        ANDREW MARTINEZ, Appellant
                                           V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 22nd District Court
                             Hays County, Texas1
                      Trial Court Case No. CR-16-0994-A

1
      The Texas Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this Court from the Court of
      Appeals for the Third District of Texas, pursuant to its docket-equalization
      authority. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001 (“The supreme court may order cases
      transferred from one court of appeals to another at any time that, in the opinion of
      the supreme court, there is good cause for the transfer.”). We are unaware of any
      conflict between the precedent of the Court of Appeals for the Third District and
      that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Appellant Andrew Martinez guilty of the first-degree felony

offense of murder and assessed his punishment at forty-five years’ imprisonment.

In a single issue, Appellant argues that the evidence supporting the jury’s finding

during the punishment phase of trial that he did not act under the influence of sudden

passion is legally and factually insufficient. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                      Background

      On September 14, 2016, Appellant Andrew Martinez (“Appellant”) shot and

killed Jacob Lambert (“Lambert”) in Kyle, Texas. Appellant was charged with first-

degree murder. Appellant’s first trial resulted in a hung jury. At his second trial,

Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the charge by reason of self-defense.2 This time,

the jury rejected Appellant’s claim of self-defense and found him guilty of

first-degree murder. During the punishment phase of his second trial, Appellant

argued that the jury should assess his punishment for a second-degree felony, as

opposed to a first-degree felony, because he had proven by a preponderance of the

evidence that “he caused the death [of Lambert] under the immediate influence of

2
      Appellant appeals from the final judgment in the second trial. All references to trial
      testimony and arguments raised concern the second trial, unless otherwise noted.

                                            2
sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.”3 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(d).4

The jury rejected Appellant’s assertion of sudden passion and assessed his

punishment for a first-degree felony offense. On appeal, Appellant challenges only

the jury’s rejection of his claim of sudden passion. Although sudden passion is

relevant only with respect to punishment, we consider all evidence adduced at trial

when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to this issue. See

generally Atkinson v. State, 404 S.W.3d 567, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2010, pet. ref’d) (“By operation of law, the evidence admitted during the guilt-

innocence phase of the trial is also before the jury at the penalty phase, and the jury

may consider all the evidence adduced at the guilt-innocence phase in assessing a

defendant’s punishment.”).

A.    State’s Witnesses5

      The State called Brandon Corey Tyner, Ebony Esquivel, Aimee Johnson, and

Victoria Gonzalez to testify during the guilt-innocence phase of Appellant’s trial.

3
      The punishment range for first degree felony is life or a term not more than ninety-
      nine years or less than five years. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32(a). The punishment
      range for second degree felony is not more than twenty years or less than two years.
      TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.33(a).
4
      Texas Penal Code §19.02(d) provides that at “the punishment stage of a trial, the
      defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate
      influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves
      the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a
      felony of the second degree.” TEX. PENAL CODE §19.02(d).
5
      The State called thirty-one witnesses during the guilt-innocence phase of
      Appellant’s second trial, but only four of them witnessed the shooting: Victoria
                                           3
      1.     Brandon Corey Tyner

      Brandon Corey Tyner (“Tyner”), Lambert’s friend, testified at trial. Tyner

testified he knew Bradley Wood (“Wood”) and that he would provide him with

marijuana and cocaine. Wood would then sell the drugs and return the proceeds to

Tyner.

      On September 14, 2016, Tyner, Lambert, and Tyner’s cousin, Blake Ladd

(“Ladd”), drove to a gas station in Lambert’s white Impala where Tyner fronted

Wood $50 worth of cocaine. Wood was driving a blue Mustang. Tyner testified

that as he walked up to the Mustang to give Wood the cocaine, he saw Appellant

sitting in the front passenger seat. After leaving the gas station, Tyner, Lambert, and

Ladd drove to Ladd’s home at 120 Myrtle Street in Kyle, Texas. Myrtle Street runs

approximately north to south and dead ends at Tower Drive. Ladd’s home is the

second home from Tower Drive on the left. At trial, the State introduced Exhibit

No. 1 depicting Myrtle Street at the intersection of Tower Drive:6

      Gonzalez, Brandon Corey Tyner, Ebony Esquivel, and Aimee Johnson. Appellant,
      who testified in his own defense, called an expert witness to testify on his behalf.
      With respect to the punishment phase of trial, the State called twelve witnesses, but
      none of them witnessed the shooting, and Appellant did not call any witnesses. We
      thus limit our analysis to testimony provided during the guilt-innocence phase by
      Victoria Gonzalez, Brandon Corey Tyner, Ebony Esquivel, Aimee Johnson, and
      Appellant.
6
      State’s Exhibit 1 does not depict the intersection, the location of Wood’s Mustang,
      or the location of Lambert’s Impala on the day of the shooting.

                                            4
State’s Exhibit 1.

      Tyner and Wood arranged to meet later that evening a few houses down the

street from 120 Myrtle so that Wood could give Tyner the proceeds from the drug

sales. When Wood arrived at Myrtle Street that evening, he parked his Mustang

facing Tower Drive on the left side of Myrtle Street between 130 Myrtle Street and

140 Myrtle Street. Wood was in the driver’s seat and Appellant was in the front

passenger seat. Tyner did not notice if anyone was in the backseat.

      Tyner exited Ladd’s house to meet Wood outside. According to Tyner,

Lambert was either with him when he walked out of the house or close behind.

Tyner testified that he and Lambert approached Wood’s Mustang and stood together

at the driver’s side window and were leaning in slightly. Tyner denied that Lambert

hid behind anything when he approached the Mustang.          According to Tyner,

Appellant and Lambert began arguing and both men “sounded angry, and they were

                                         5
yelling at each other and cursing at each other.” Tyner did not recall who started the

argument. According to Tyner, Appellant and Lambert were gesturing with their

hands as they argued, and the two men appeared to be “equally mad.” Tyner testified

that neither he nor Lambert had any kind of gun with them that day and Tyner had

never seen Lambert with a gun. He also denied that Lambert was “holding anything

up, either out of his clothing or in his clothing, with either of his hands” during the

argument. Tyner, who had a good view of Lambert’s waistband, testified he did not

see anything sticking out of Lambert’s waistband or “anything on his person that

could have been a weapon, like, a lump or something in his pocket.” Lambert also

did not have “any kind of, like, backpack or hiding place when he came out of the

house and approached the car with you where he could have hid[den] a weapon.”

Tyner testified that Lambert told Appellant that “he wanted to fight him” but

Lambert did not threaten to use a weapon against Appellant and Lambert never

mentioned a gun, knife, or club. According to Tyner, Lambert was only proposing

a fistfight. Tyner testified that Appellant appeared angry and upset during the

argument, but he never appeared to be afraid of Lambert and he did not say he was

afraid of Lambert.

      Tyner testified that based on his observations of Appellant’s and Lambert’s

interaction, he did not see a reason other than the proposed fistfight for Appellant to

fear Lambert, fear for his life, or fear Lambert would use deadly force. According

                                          6
to Tyner, the argument ended when Wood drove away in his Mustang towards

Tower Drive. He testified that although Lambert swore at the Mustang, he did not

try to stop it from leaving. When the Mustang drove off, Tyner and Lambert started

walking back towards Ladd’s house on 120 Myrtle. Lambert, who was walking in

front of Tyner, was “throwing up middle fingers” in the Mustang’s direction.

According to Tyner, when the Mustang reached the intersection of Myrtle Street and

Tower Drive, the Mustang made a U-turn and drove back down the street in Tyner’s

and Lambert’s direction. Tyner testified that the Mustang slowed down and he then

heard four or six shots and saw “flashes” coming from the Mustang’s passenger side,

and Lambert was shot. According to Tyner, Lambert was “just holding up a middle

finger” right before he was shot. Tyner testified that Lambert was swearing but he

was not reaching in his pocket or towards his waistband or doing or saying anything

threatening before the shots were fired.       Tyner testified that based on his

observations, Lambert was not doing anything when the shooting occurred that

“would justify another person being in fear for their life.” After the shooting, the

Mustang sped up and drove away.

      2.    Bradley Wood

      Wood testified that he delivered drugs for Tyner in exchange for gas money

or drugs. On September 14, 2016, Wood drove to Myrtle Street in his Mustang to

meet with Tyner because he needed to give Tyner the proceeds from a drug delivery

                                         7
he had completed earlier that day. Appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat

of the Mustang and Ebony Esquivel (“Esquivel”) and Aimee Johnson (“Johnson”)

were sitting in the backseat. When they arrived at Myrtle Street, Wood parked his

Mustang next to the curb on the left side of Myrtle Street, facing Tower Drive. Tyner

exited Ladd’s house and walked up to the driver’s side window of the Mustang,

where he and Wood completed their transaction. According to Wood, he and Tyner

spoke for about a minute before Lambert walked up to the driver’s side window of

the Mustang, at which point Lambert got into an argument with Appellant.

According to Wood, Lambert did not hide behind anything as he approached the

Mustang. Wood, who did not know what Lambert and Appellant were arguing

about, did not recall what Lambert or Appellant said during their argument.

According to Wood, Lambert and Appellant were both upset and angry and the

argument lasted about a minute.

      Wood testified that Lambert never put his body inside the Mustang. He also

did not see Lambert with a gun or see anything suspicious in Lambert’s pockets or

waistband. He did not recall hearing Lambert threaten Appellant with a firearm and

Appellant did not appear to be scared of Lambert. According to Wood, Appellant

never told him he was scared of Lambert. Wood testified that he did not “observe

anything that would lead you to believe [Appellant] had some reason to be afraid

that [Lambert] was going to seriously harm him.”

                                         8
      The argument ended when Appellant told Wood to leave, and Wood drove

away in the Mustang down Myrtle Street toward Tower Drive. Wood denied that

Lambert was hanging on to the Mustang yelling “Come back here, you pussies,”

when he drove away. Wood, who did not know the neighborhood very well, testified

that he could have turned left on Tower Drive to leave the neighborhood, but he was

unaware of that possibility the night of the shooting. Instead of turning onto Tower

Drive, Wood made a wide U-turn at Tower Drive and drove back down Myrtle Street

so that he could take the same route out of the neighborhood. Wood denied hearing

Appellant telling him to turn left on Tower Drive.

      After making the U-turn and as he was driving back down Myrtle Street,

Wood saw Lambert and Tyner walking towards Tower Drive and towards the

Mustang. Wood then heard Appellant, who was sitting in the front passenger seat,

fire several shots out the passenger side window. Wood did not recall Appellant

saying anything before the shooting and believed the Mustang had already driven by

Tyner and Lambert when the shooting occurred.

      Wood testified that Lambert and Tyner were not doing “anything threatening”

as they walked towards Tower Drive and the Mustang, and he did not “perceive any

reason that [Appellant] would have to be fearful” of either Tyner or Lambert.

According to Wood, Lambert was not holding anything, making threatening

                                         9
gestures, or reaching into his pockets when Appellant fired the shots. Wood agreed

that Appellant “would have been just fine” if he had not shot Lambert.

      After the shooting, the Mustang fled the scene. Appellant began giving Wood

directions and telling him where to drive. Wood testified that he was scared and just

followed Appellant’s instructions. At some point, Appellant threw the gun out the

window.    The police stopped the Mustang shortly after and detained Wood,

Appellant, Esquivel, and Johnson.

      3.     Ebony Esquivel

      Esquivel, who was sitting in the backseat of the Mustang when the shooting

occurred, testified that Wood and Appellant picked her up at her home on September

14, 2016, and then they picked up Esquivel’s friend, Johnson.          According to

Esquivel, Wood was driving his Mustang, Appellant was sitting in the front

passenger seat, she was sitting behind Wood, and Johnson was sitting behind

Appellant. After making a few stops, the group drove to Myrtle Street where

Esquivel believed Wood was going to meet a friend.

      Esquivel testified that when they arrived at Myrtle Street, Tyner walked up to

the Mustang’s driver’s side window and started talking to Wood. Esquivel, who was

talking to Johnson in the backseat, was not paying attention to Tyner’s and Wood’s

conversation. At some point, Lambert walked up to the driver’s side window.

According to Esquivel, Lambert leaned in the car and said hello to her and Johnson

                                         10
before he started talking to Appellant. She described Appellant’s and Lambert’s

conversation as “aggressive” and she testified that Lambert, who initiated the

conversation, was “just kind of angry” and his voice was raised. Esquivel testified

that Appellant told her earlier that night that he did not like Lambert because

Lambert had robbed his brother. Lambert and Appellant were “equally upset” and

they were swearing and threatening one another. When asked what threats Lambert

was making, Esquivel testified, “Like, that he’ll mess [Appellant] up, or something

like that.” Appellant retorted that “he wasn’t scared.” When asked what she thought

Lambert meant when he said he wanted to mess Appellant up, Esquivel testified that

she thought Lambert was referring to a fistfight.

      On cross-examination, Esquivel testified that Lambert called Appellant “a

bitch” and threatened him, saying, “This is not my first time. I can fuck you up.”

Esquivel agreed that “it seemed like [Lambert] wanted to get [Appellant] out of the

car.” When asked if she thought Lambert was “trying to scare” Appellant, Esquivel

testified that Lambert was “just trying to, like, fight him, like, fistfight him.”

      According to Esquivel, Lambert never mentioned a gun or a firearm of any

kind or threatened deadly force against Appellant. When asked if it appeared to her

that Lambert was “holding anything up or securing anything in his clothing with his

hands,” Esquivel testified that he was not, and she never saw Lambert with a gun

                                           11
that night. She also never feared for Appellant’s life or was “afraid that [Lambert]

was going to use any kind of deadly force against him.”

      According to Esquivel, the argument ended when she told Wood that it was

time to go, and Wood drove away on Myrtle Street towards Tower Drive. Esquivel

testified that Lambert tried unsuccessfully to hang on to the Mustang to stop them

from leaving. Wood made a U-turn at Tower Drive and drove back down Myrtle

Street. Esquivel testified that Appellant did not say anything to anyone when Wood

made the U-turn. Esquivel saw Lambert standing in the driveway of 120 Myrtle

after the Mustang turned around and Lambert had “his hands up, like, stretched out.”

When asked how she interpreted Lambert’s gesture, Esquivel testified, “He wanted

to know why we left, I guess.” Esquivel also did not see Lambert “reach for his

waistband” or “point anything at the car.” She also did not “see any gestures that

someone could have interpreted as reaching for a weapon.” When asked if she

thought Lambert was “threatening any kind of force against [her] or any other person

in the car,” Esquivel answered, “No.” According to Esquivel, Lambert “just had his

hands up in the air.” Esquivel testified that if Lambert “had pulled a gun out at that

moment,” she would have seen it “because she was “looking at him when we were

driving down the street.”

      Esquivel testified that, as the Mustang drove back down Myrtle Street,

Appellant “pulled out a gun out of his backpack and fired several shots out the

                                         12
passenger side window.” As the Mustang drove by Lambert on its way out of the

neighborhood, Esquivel did not fear for her personal safety or the personal safety of

Wood, Johnson, or Appellant. She also did not perceive any reason why Appellant

would have been fearful of Lambert when he shot him. She testified that Lambert

did nothing that evening to lead her to believe Appellant was “in fear for his life”

when he shot Lambert.

      When asked if Appellant said anything “either before or immediately after the

shooting,” Esquivel testified that after he shot Lambert, Appellant stated that

Lambert “deserved it.”

      4.     Aimee Johnson

      Johnson testified that Wood, Appellant, and Esquivel picked her up in Wood’s

Mustang on September 14, 2016. According to Johnson, Wood was driving,

Appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat, Esquivel was seated in the backseat

behind Wood, and she sat behind Appellant. Johnson testified that they stopped at

Sonic for slushies and then drove to Myrtle Street where Johnson believed they were

going to pick up another passenger. After the Mustang parked on the left side of

Myrtle Street next to the curb, Tyner walked out of one of the homes and approached

the Mustang’s driver’s side window. According to Johnson, Tyner spoke to Wood

for “a minute or two” before Lambert approached the car. Johnson did not see

Lambert until Tyner moved to the side and made room for him beside the driver’s

                                         13
side window. Lambert placed his arms on the window’s ledge and leaned into the

Mustang slightly to see who was in the car. Lambert, who knew Esquivel and

Johnson, said hello to the two women and then Lambert noticed Appellant. Johnson

testified that she could feel the tension in the air when Lambert saw Appellant sitting

in the front passenger seat. According to Johnson, Lambert’s “face kind of dropped”

and he seemed surprised to see Appellant. Lambert began arguing with Appellant.

According to Johnson, Lambert “said something about there [being] some drama

with his brother, and then [Appellant] [] said something else about the drama with

his brother.” Johnson did not otherwise know what the men were arguing about.

Both Appellant and Lambert were “upset,” “hostile,” and “angry,” and although their

voices were “elevated, they were not shouting.” At some point during the argument,

Lambert stood up, but he still had his hand on the driver’s side windowsill.

      Johnson testified that she did not see Lambert with “any kind of gun” or a

weapon that night or see Lambert “make any movements like he was reaching for a

weapon.” Johnson could see Lambert’s waistband when he stood up and if Lambert

had anything in his waistband, she would have been able to see it. She also did not

recall seeing “any suspicious lumps or items in the waistband that would lead [her]

to believe or anyone to believe that [Lambert] had a weapon on him.” According to

Johnson, Lambert did not “threaten to harm the [Appellant] with a gun” during their

argument or make any specific threats against Appellant. Johnson testified that

                                          14
Lambert did not mention a gun or tell Appellant to do anything, and she denied

hearing Lambert call Appellant “a bitch,” or telling Appellant, “This isn’t my first

time. I can fuck you up.” Johnson, who was seated behind Appellant, testified that

Appellant did not sound fearful during the argument, just upset, and he never

mentioned anything about being afraid of Lambert. Based on her observations,

Johnson did not think there was “any reason for the [Appellant] to be in fear from

[Lambert].”

         Johnson testified that the argument ended when Wood drove away in the

Mustang. According to Johnson, Lambert “tried to wrap his arm into the window

onto the door as the car was taking off.” Lambert hung on for no more than ten

seconds and Johnson assumed he fell. Johnson denied hearing Lambert yell, “Don’t

leave, you pussies.”

         Johnson also testified that she did not hear anyone in the Mustang say

anything before Wood made a U-turn at Tower Drive. On cross-examination,

however, Johnson acknowledged that she told the police the night of the shooting

that she heard Appellant tell Wood to “[t]urn left” as the Mustang approached Tower

Drive.

         As the Mustang drove back down Myrtle Street in Lambert’s and Tyner’s

direction, Johnson heard Wood say, “Get him.” Appellant then “pulled out his gun”

and said, “You better not say shit.” Appellant pointed the gun out the passenger side

                                         15
window and fired several shots and, as the Mustang was driving away, Appellant

“pointed [the gun] into the sky and shot a couple more times.” When Appellant

started shooting out the window, Johnson did not feel in danger or feel that Appellant

was in any danger. Johnson, who did not see Lambert after the Mustang made the

U-turn, did not believe that Appellant was “justified in doing what he did.”

      Johnson testified that she and Esquivel were terrified after the Mustang left

the scene, and Wood “was kind of freaking out” and “[h]e kept telling everyone to

shut up.” According to Johnson, Wood was “just driving” and he did not seem to

have a destination in mind. Johnson testified that at some point, while they were

still driving, Appellant “eventually ends up saying, ‘It was me. It was me.’ Like,

‘It’s fine.’” She testified Appellant also stated that he “need[ed] to find water to

throw the gun.” When asked if Appellant said anything about Lambert, Johnson

testified that Appellant said, “Fucking Lambert. Fucking Lambert” and “That’s

what he gets for messing with my family.”

      5.     Victoria Gonzalez [3 RR 64]

      Victoria Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) lived at 111 Myrtle Street in Kyle, Texas,

which is located at the corner of Myrtle Street and Tower Drive. Gonzalez’s home

is catty-corner from the home at 120 Myrtle Street, where the shooting occurred.

      On September 14, 2016, Gonzalez was returning home from the store at 10:00

p.m. when she heard people arguing across the street. Gonzalez looked out her front

                                         16
window and saw a Mustang make a U-turn at the intersection of Myrtle Street and

Tower Drive, and she saw Lambert standing in the driveway of 120 Myrtle Street.

As the Mustang drove back down Myrtle Street, Gonzalez heard six gunshots and

saw muzzle flashes coming from the car’s passenger side. Although she could not

recall if Lambert was doing anything with his hands before he was shot, Gonzalez

testified that she probably would have noticed if Lambert had been doing “something

unusual or threatening with [his] hands.” Gonzalez testified that to the best of her

recollection, Lambert was not “doing anything threatening.” Gonzalez testified that

Lambert was not pointing anything at the Mustang when it drove by and the shots

were fired.

B.    Appellant’s Witnesses

      Appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant, a small-time drug dealer,

did not have a car when the shooting occurred. On September 14, 2016, he texted

Wood and asked him to pick him up so that Appellant could give Wood gas money

for helping Appellant deliver marijuana. After Wood picked him up, they made one

delivery and then drove to Taco Bell where Wood bought $20 of cocaine from Tyner.

Appellant noticed that Tyner was driving Lambert’s white Impala and Lambert, who

was in the car, shot Appellant the middle finger. Appellant and Wood met up with

Tyner later at Gregg-Clarke Park because Wood wanted Tyner to front him more

cocaine. Wood planned to sell the cocaine and later to return the proceeds to Tyner.

                                        17
After Tyner gave Wood the cocaine, Appellant noticed that Lambert was at the park

as well and Lambert shot Appellant the middle finger. Appellant testified that this

time, he “shot the finger at [Lambert], and I just kind of, like, brushed him off, you

know.” Later that day, Wood and Appellant picked up Esquivel and Johnson and

they went to Sonic for slushies. While they were at Sonic, Wood received a phone

call and they then drove to Myrtle Street.

      According to Appellant, Wood parked the Mustang on the left side of the

street between 130 Myrtle and 140 Myrtle. Wood, who was already outside,

approached the parked Mustang first and Lambert joined Tyner a short time later.

Although the interaction was initially friendly, things took an “unsettling” turn when

Appellant saw a door at 120 Myrtle open and close. Appellant testified that out of

the corner of his left eye, he saw someone sneaking around a vehicle parked in the

driveway of 130 Myrtle and approaching the Mustang. Appellant testified that he

became scared when he realized it was Lambert because Lambert was “acting

sneaky” and “being weird.” According to Appellant, Lambert pushed Tyner aside

and stuck his head through the Mustang’s driver’s side window. Lambert noticed

Esquivel and Johnson in the back seat first and then he noticed Appellant in the

passenger seat and locked eyes with him.

      According to Appellant, Lambert immediately threatened Appellant stating,

“You’re the punk ass motherfucker that tried to check me at the convenience store.”

                                         18
Appellant testified that this made him feel “scared” and “nervous” and he tried to

tell Lambert he did not want to fight him, he had only wanted Lambert to fight his

brother when they met up at the corner store. According to Appellant, Lambert

responded, “Fuck that. Get your bitch ass out of the car. I’m gonna get you right

now.” Appellant testified that as Lambert was making his threat, Lambert was

“pointing to me and he’s - - when he does that, he shows me a handle of what I

believed to be at the time a sawed-off shotgun. It looked like a - - the handle that

I’ve seen before on - - in a photo of him.” Appellant testified that he told Wood to

drive away when he thought he saw the shotgun’s handle. At that point, Lambert

said something to Tyner, and Tyner walked away. Lambert, who had begun pacing

outside the driver’s side window, stuck his head in the window and stated, “This is

not the first time -- this is not my first time. I’ve done this before.” According to

Appellant, he told Wood they needed to “get out of here before something bad

happens to us.”

      According to Appellant, Wood drove away quickly as Lambert briefly hung

on to the side of the Mustang’s window in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the car

from leaving. As they were driving away in the Mustang, Appellant pulled out his

cell phone to get the address for the next marijuana delivery. Appellant testified

that, as they approached the intersection of Myrtle Street and Tower Drive, Wood

stated that Lambert had “called us some fucking pussies,” and announced, “Man,

                                         19
fuck that. I’m turning around.” Appellant’s “stomach turn[ed]” and his “heart

drop[ped]” when he realized Wood was going to make a U-turn at Tower Drive to

head back down Myrtle Street, and Appellant, who knew the way out the

neighborhood, testified that he told Wood, “No. Go left. Go left.”

      As the Mustang made the U-turn, Appellant claims he saw Lambert waving

his hands in the air and “[a]cting erratically.” Appellant retrieved a loaded, and

cocked handgun from his backpack on his lap. After he saw Lambert “real quickly

reach for his waistband with his right hand,” Appellant “just start[ed] shooting”

because he believed Lambert was reaching for the sawed-off shotgun he had flashed

earlier at Appellant. Appellant testified that he was “just trying to neutralize”

Lambert and “make him just stop what he was doing.” Appellant testified that he

shot once or twice and as the Mustang passed Lambert. He testified he saw Lambert

“pulling something out” and “fumbling for something” that Appellant believed was

the shotgun, so he continued shooting. Appellant admitted, however, that he never

actually saw Lambert with a gun before shooting. Appellant denied saying, “Y’all

better not say shit,” right before he shot Lambert.

      As the Mustang fled that scene, Appellant, Wood, Esquivel, and Johnson were

“scared” and “panicking.” Appellant testified that he tried to calm everyone down

and told them, “It’s going to be okay. I didn’t shoot him for no reason. He deserved

it.” Appellant explained that Lambert “deserved it” because he “reached for his

                                          20
waistband.” Although he admitted that he said, “Fucking Lambert,” Appellant

denied saying, “You messed with the wrong family.” Appellant testified that while

they were driving around after the shooting, the Mustang passed a Hays County

Deputy who turned around and ultimately stopped the car. The Deputy detained

Appellant, Wood, Esquivel, and Johnson. Appellant testified he threw the gun out

the window after he saw the deputy turn his car around to follow the Mustang.

      On cross-examination, the State questioned Appellant about discrepancies

between his current testimony and the testimony he gave during his first trial.

Appellant acknowledged that although he had just testified that Lambert showed him

the handle of what Appellant thought was a sawed-off shotgun, Appellant testified

at his first trial that he had not seen a firearm. When asked about Lambert’s reference

to an incident that had happened earlier at the corner store, Appellant testified that

he, his brother, and some friends encountered Lambert and others at a Shell

convenience store. Appellant approached Lambert and tried to arrange for Lambert

to fight Appellant’s brother at a nearby park. At some point, a man Lambert had

been talking to pulled out a knife and Appellant responded by brandishing his

handgun.

C.    Punishment

      The jury rejected Appellant’s self-defense claim and found Appellant guilty

of first-degree murder. During the punishment phase of trial, Appellant argued that

                                          21
the jury should access his punishment for a second-degree felony, as opposed to a

first-degree felony, because he had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that

“he caused the death [of Lambert] under the immediate influence of sudden passion

arising from an adequate cause.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(d).

      The State called twelve witnesses, none of whom witnessed the shooting.

Appellant did not call any witnesses to testify on his behalf. In the jury charge, the

trial court instructed the jury about the mitigating circumstance of sudden passion:

      The defendant contends he committed the murder under the immediate
      influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Before
      you assess punishment, you must first determine whether the defendant
      has proven this contention.

      A defendant convicted of murder may raise the issue of whether he
      caused the death under immediate influence of sudden passion arising
      from an adequate cause. This is called the doctrine of sudden passion.

      If the defendant proves that he acted under the influence of sudden
      passion, this offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment for no
      fewer than 2 years and no more than 20 years and a fine of no more
      than $10,000.7

      If the defendant does not prove he acted under the influence of sudden
      passion, this offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment for no
      less than 5 years and no more than 99 years or for life and a fine of no
      more than $10,000.8

7
      This is the punishment range for a second-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE
      § 12.33(a) (stating punishment range for second degree felony is not more than
      twenty years or less than two years).
8
      This is the punishment range for a first-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32(a)
      (stating punishment range for first degree felony is life or term not more than ninety-
      nine years or less than five years).

                                            22
      You must all agree on whether the defendant has proved that he acted
      under the influence of sudden passion.

      The burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of
      evidence, that he acted under the influence of sudden passion.

      Sudden passion means passion directly caused by or -- and arising out
      of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person
      killed, which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely
      the result of former provocation.

      Adequate cause means cause that would commonly produce a degree
      of danger -- excuse me -- anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person
      of ordinary temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool
      reflection.

      The term preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of the
      degree -- and degree of the credible evidence.

      You must determine whether the evidence has -- excuse me -- the
      defendant has proved, beyond a preponderance of evidence, that he
      acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an
      adequate cause.

      You must also agree on whether the defendant has proved sudden
      passion before you may assess punishment.

      Your resolution of the special issue will determine which of the verdict
      forms you will use.

The jury rejected Appellant’s assertion of sudden passion and assessed his

punishment at forty-five years’ imprisonment for a first-degree felony offense.

                                  Sudden Passion

      In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence supporting the jury’s

negative finding on his claim of sudden passion is legally and factually insufficient.

Appellant argues that “the evidence given at trial unequivocally establishes that his

                                         23
actions were directly caused by and arose out of provocation by Jacob Lambert; and

that the Appellant did not have the opportunity to even attempt to engage in a cool

reflection.” Appellant further contends that “the provocation giving rise to sudden

passion was entirely what happened after the Appellant pulled out his phone” to get

directions for the next marijuana delivery.

A.    Applicable Law

      At the punishment phase of a murder trial, a defendant may reduce a murder

charge from a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony by establishing he

committed the murder under the immediate influence of sudden passion. Pursuant

to Texas Penal Code section 19.02(d), a “defendant may raise the issue as to whether

he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from

an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a

preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.” See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(d); see generally McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stating “[s]udden passion is a mitigating circumstance” that

can be raised during punishment phase).

      “Sudden passion” is defined as “passion directly caused by and arising out of

provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which

passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former

provocation.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(a)(2). “Adequate cause” is defined as

                                          24
“cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror

in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool

reflection.” Id. § 19.02(a)(1); see also McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569 (stating sudden

passion requires proof of adequate provocation, that “passion or an emotion such as

fear, terror, anger, rage, or resentment existed[;] that the homicide occurred while

the passion still existed and before there was reasonable opportunity for the passion

to cool; and that there was a causal connection between the provocation, the passion,

and the homicide”).

      Ordinary anger or fear alone does not rise to the level of sudden passion

arising from adequate cause. Moncivais v. State, 425 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see also Gonzales v. State, 717 S.W.2d 355,

357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“For a claim of fear to rise to the level of sudden

passion, the defendant’s mind must be rendered incapable of cool reflection.”).

“Anticipation of an event and preparation of a response indicates a defendant had

time to deliberate over an action and did not act under the immediate influence of

sudden passion.” Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 407; see also Nance v. State, 807

S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d) (stating evidence of

premeditation is sufficient to support finding of no sudden passion). Although

sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from

former provocation, the “victim’s past conduct . . . can help place in context the

                                         25
victim’s provocation at the time of the offense.” Romine v. State, No. 03-03-00330-

CR, 2006 WL 903730, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 6, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication).

B.    Legal Sufficiency

      1.     Standard of Review

      In Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the Court of

Criminal Appeals held that the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) standard of

review is the only standard a court may apply to determine whether the evidence is

sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense on which the State bears the

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895 (citing

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). When as here, however, the defendant bears the burden

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, we use a different standard and apply

the civil legal sufficiency standard. See Rankin v. State, 617 S.W.3d 169, 184–85

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (applying civil standard to legal

sufficiency review of jury’s rejection of sudden passion claim). “Although the issue

of sudden passion is a punishment issue, it is analogous to an affirmative defense

because the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Gaona v. State, 498 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d).

      The civil legal sufficiency standard involves a two-step analysis. See Rankin,

617 S.W.3d at 185; Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 407. First, we review the record for

                                         26
any evidence that supports the jury’s negative finding while ignoring all evidence to

the contrary. Rankin, 617 S.W.3d at 185. Second, if no evidence supports the

negative finding, then we examine the entire record to determine whether the

evidence establishes the affirmative defense. Id. We defer to the fact finder’s

determination of the weight and credibility to give the testimony and the evidence at

trial. Id.

       2.    Briefing Waiver

       To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities

and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on appeal

if he does not provide supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record. See id.; Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384,

393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An appellate court has no obligation to construct and

compose issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and

the record for the appellant. See Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017). A brief that does not apply the law to the facts does not comply with

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 and presents nothing for our review. See

Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

       Although Appellant states in the “Issues Presented” section of his brief that

the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s negative

                                         27
finding on his claim of sudden passion, his brief focuses exclusively on his argument

that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding. Appellant

does not identify the standard of review for a challenge to the legal sufficiency of

the evidence with respect to sudden passion or attempt to apply the law to the facts

of this case. We thus hold that to the extent Appellant seeks to raise a legal

sufficiency challenge, he waived the issue and presented nothing for our review. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 100.

      3.     Analysis

      Even if Appellant had preserved his legal sufficiency challenge, he still would

not prevail. The holding in Gaona v. State, 498 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2016, pet. ref’d), where the court held there was legally sufficient evidence

supporting the jury’s negative finding on the defendant’s claim of sudden passion,

is instructive. Id. at 711. In that case, an eyewitness testified that the angry victim

approached the defendant’s car and insisted the defendant get out and fight him. Id.

at 707. When the defendant refused, the victim called the defendant a “chicken,”

slapped the defendant’s windshield, and cursed as he walked away. Id. The

defendant got out of his car brandishing a pistol, walked towards the victim, and shot

him seven times. Id. at 708. A second eyewitness corroborated the first witness’

testimony. Id. Both witnesses testified that the victim’s hands were empty when he

was shot and neither witness heard the victim threaten to kill the defendant. Id.

                                          28
      At trial, the defendant testified that after he refused to fight the victim, the

victim threatened to kill him and “reached for his hip pocket as if to grab a gun, but

nothing was there.” Id. The victim then turned away and as he was walking towards

the house, he stopped at a parked car and tried to open the door, but it was locked.

Id. The victim then looked back at the defendant and threatened to kill him. Id. The

defendant testified that he knew the victim owned a gun because he had seen it

months before. Id. After concluding there was no way to leave, the defendant

grabbed his gun and got out of his car. One of the eyewitnesses tried to take the gun

from the defendant and when the victim “stepped forward” towards the defendant,

the defendant shot him. Id. The defendant testified that “he did not know whether

[the victim] had a gun because [the victim] was unable to get into the car, but he shot

[the victim] because he saw [the victim] was coming towards him and ‘feared’ what

[the victim] would do.” Id.

      In analyzing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s

negative finding on the defendant’s claim of sudden passion, the appellate court

relied on the eyewitnesses’ testimony that the victim demanded to fight the

defendant and walked away cursing after the defendant refused. Id. at 711. At that

point, the defendant got out of his car, approached the victim, and shot him seven

times. Id. at 711. Neither eyewitness saw the victim with a gun nor heard him

threaten to kill the defendant. The appellate court held that the undisputed evidence

                                          29
that the victim “yelled at, argued with, cursed at, and demanded to fight” the

defendant did not amount to an adequate cause to support a finding of sudden

passion. Id.; see McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570 (concluding victim’s yelling at and

pushing of defendant did not “rise to the level of adequate cause”). Based on the

eyewitnesses’ testimony, the appellate court held there was legally sufficient

evidence supporting the jury’s negative finding on the claim of sudden passion.

Gaona, 498 S.W.3d at 711.

      We hold the same is true here. Wood testified that he saw Lambert and Tyner

as he drove back down Myrtle Street after making a U-turn, and Lambert was not

holding up anything, making threatening gestures, or reaching into his pockets.

According to Wood, neither Lambert nor Tyner did anything Wood would perceive

as threatening, and Wood did not see any reason why Appellant would have to be

fearful of either man.

      Esquivel testified that after the Mustang made a U-turn at Tower Drive, she

saw Lambert standing in a driveway with “his hands up, like, stretched out.” When

asked how she interpreted Lambert’s gesture, Esquivel testified, “He wanted to

know why we left, I guess.” Esquivel testified that she did not see Lambert “reach

for his waistband,” “point anything at the car,” or make “any gestures that someone

could have interpreted as reaching for a weapon.” Esquivel testified that after he

shot Lambert, Appellant stated that Lambert “deserved it.” Like Wood, Esquivel

                                        30
did not perceive any reason why Appellant would have been fearful of Lambert when

he shot him, and Lambert did not do anything that evening that led her to believe

Appellant was “in fear for his life” when he shot Lambert.

      Tyner testified that Lambert was cursing and “just holding up a middle finger”

right before he was shot. According to Tyner, Lambert was not reaching in his

pocket or towards his waistband or doing or saying anything threatening. Tyner

testified that based on his observations, Lambert was not doing anything when the

shooting occurred that “would justify another person being in fear for their life.”

      Gonzalez, who witnessed the events from across the street, testified that she

saw Lambert standing in the driveway of 120 Myrtle when the Mustang turned

around. She testified that Lambert was not doing anything unusual or threatening

with his hands.

      Wood, Esquivel, Gonzalez, and Tyner—the four eyewitnesses who saw

Lambert immediately before he was shot—testified that Lambert was not holding

anything in his hands, reaching into his pockets or waistband, or making threatening

gestures that someone could have interpreted as reaching for a weapon. It is

undisputed that no weapon was ever found on Lambert, and, as Appellant

acknowledges on appeal, Lambert was unarmed when the shooting occurred. At

most, the evidence reflects that Lambert was just cursing and “holding up a middle

finger” before he was shot. This is insufficient to establish adequate cause. See

                                          31
Gaona, 498 S.W.3d at 711 (holding victim’s yelling at, arguing with, cursing at, and

demanding to fight defendant did not “amount to an adequate cause to support a

finding of sudden passion”); see also McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570 (concluding

victim’s yelling at and pushing of defendant did not “rise to the level of adequate

cause”). The trial testimony from Wood, Esquivel, Gonzalez, and Tyner concerning

Lambert’s conduct immediately prior to the shooting is some evidence that

Appellant was not acting in response to adequate provocation when he shot Lambert.

See id. at 569 (stating sudden passion requires proof of adequate provocation).

      Wood, Esquivel, and Tyner also agreed that Lambert did nothing after the

Mustang made a U-turn at Tower Drive to give Appellant or anyone else in the

Mustang a reason to fear for their life when the shooting occurred.9 This testimony,

which reflects that an ordinary person would not have perceived Lambert’s conduct

as threatening, is further evidence that Appellant was not acting in response to

adequate provocation when he shot Lambert. See id. (stating sudden passion

requires proof of adequate provocation); see also TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(a)(1)

(defining “adequate cause” with respect to “a person of ordinary temper”).

9
      Although Appellant contends that any testimony concerning his thoughts and
      feelings with respect to the shooting “should be ignored or treated as speculation,”
      Appellant either did not object to such testimony at trial, or, if he objected, he is not
      challenging the overruling of such an objection on appeal. Therefore, we can
      consider such testimony for purposes of our sufficiency analysis.

                                             32
      Johnson, who did not see Lambert after the Mustang made a U-turn, testified

that as the Mustang drove back down Myrtle Street in Lambert’s direction, Johnson

heard Wood say, “Get him.” Appellant then took his already cocked handgun from

his backpack and warned the other occupants that they “better not say shit.”

Johnson’s testimony indicates that Appellant made a deliberate decision to shoot

Lambert, and Appellant had sufficient forethought to anticipate the consequences of

his actions by warning Wood, Esquivel, and Johnson not to talk to the police. See

Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 407 (“Anticipation of an event and preparation of a

response indicates a defendant had time to deliberate over an action and did not act

under the immediate influence of sudden passion.”). Esquivel also testified that

Appellant told her earlier in the evening that he disliked Lambert because Lambert

had robbed Appellant’s brother, and after he shot Lambert, Appellant exclaimed

Lambert “deserved it.” Johnson also testified that after the Mustang fled the scene,

Appellant said, “Fucking Lambert,” and “That’s what he gets for messing with my

family.” The jury could have reasonably inferred from Johnson’s and Esquivel’s

testimony that Lambert’s shooting was the result of a premeditated murder

motivated by the ongoing animus between Appellant and Lambert, and not an act of

sudden passion. See Nance, 807 S.W.2d at 863 (stating evidence of premeditation

is sufficient to support finding of no sudden passion); see also Hernandez v. State,

127 S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (“Sudden

                                        33
passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former

provocation.”).

      Although disputed, the testimony from Wood, Esquivel, Gonzalez, Johnson,

and Tyner is some evidence that, if believed, supports the jury’s negative finding on

the issue of sudden passion. As sole judge of the weight and credibility of the

witness testimony, the jury was entitled to credit the testimony of Wood, Esquivel,

Gonzalez, Johnson, and Tyner over Appellant’s testimony, and, in doing so,

reasonably conclude that Appellant was not acting under the immediate influence of

sudden passion when he shot Lambert. See Rankin, 617 S.W.3d at 185 (stating

courts defer to fact finder’s determination of weight and credibility of testimony and

evidence).

      We hold that the evidence is thus legally sufficient to support the jury’s

negative finding of the issue sudden passion. See id. (stating first prong of legal

sufficiency review requires court to review record for any evidence supporting jury’s

negative finding while ignoring all contrary evidence).

C.    Factual Sufficiency

      1.     Standard of Review

      Although the Court of Criminal Appeals “abolished factual-sufficiency

review as it applies to criminal convictions” on issues on which the State bears the

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a fact finder’s negative finding on an

                                         34
issue on which the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the

evidence, such as sudden passion, may still be reviewed for factual sufficiency. See

Butcher v. State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (upholding court of

appeals’ application of factual sufficiency standard of review to issue defendant bore

burden to prove by preponderance of evidence); Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662,

671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating civil standards of factual-sufficiency review

apply to issues for which burden of proof is that of “preponderance of the evidence,”

because “preponderance of the evidence” is “same burden as in civil proceedings”);

see also Rankin, 617 S.W.3d at 185–86 (“In reviewing an issue on which the

defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, we apply the

factual-sufficiency standard in Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154–55 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1990) (en banc).”).

      In Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), the Court of

Criminal Appeals held that in criminal cases in which a defendant challenges the

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s negative finding on an issue

on which the defendant bears the burden of proof, the standard of review is the same

as the one used in civil cases. Id. at 154–55. We review all of the evidence in a

neutral light to determine whether the verdict is so against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence as to be “manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or

clearly biased.” Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671. We must defer to the fact finder’s

                                         35
determination of the weight and credibility to give the testimony and the evidence at

trial. See Rankin, 617 S.W.3d at 185; see also Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 409 (“We

may not, however, intrude on the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight

and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.”).

      2.     Analysis

      Relying exclusively upon his own trial testimony, Appellant argues that the

evidence establishes he believed Lambert, who had just “curse[d] [at] him,

threaten[ed] him [with] bodily harm, and attempt[ed] to stop a moving car,” was in

possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and “acting erratic and motioning his arms” as

the Mustang drove towards Lambert. Appellant further contends that although he

initially thought “he was out of danger and that they were leaving” when Wood

drove away towards Tower Drive, that changed when Wood made a U-turn at Tower

Drive, causing Appellant to “immediately [be] thrust back into a state of fear and

confronted with an individual he knew wanted to physically hurt him and who he

believed both had and was going for a sawed-off shotgun.” According to Appellant,

he “never had an opportunity for cool reflection” because it was only a matter of

seconds between the time the Mustang made the U-turn and the shooting. “Having

been thrust back into the path of the deceased, through no fault of his own, the

Appellant formed the erroneous belief that Jacob Lambert was attempting to shoot

him with a sawed-off shotgun. With only seconds to act and no opportunity to reflect

                                         36
or contemplate the danger he perceived, the Appellant under the immediate influence

of sudden passion shot and killed the deceased.”

      Appellant testified that he took out his cell phone to get the address for their

next drug delivery after Wood drove away towards Tower Drive. As the Mustang

approached the intersection, Wood said he was going to turn the car around because

Lambert had called them “pussies.” Appellant testified that his “stomach turn[ed]”

and his “heart drop[ped]” when he realized Wood was going to make a U-turn

because that meant they were “going back into a situation [he] just tried to avoid

with a man -- a dude that’s just acting very, very hazardous, very erratic.” Although

Appellant told Wood to take a left at the intersection, Wood made a U-turn and drove

back towards Lambert. Appellant claims he saw Lambert waving his hands in the

air and “[a]cting erratically” as the car was making the U-turn.

      Appellant, who retrieved a loaded and cocked handgun from his backpack on

his lap, claimed that he only had a moment to think after he saw Lambert “real

quickly reach for his waistband with his right hand.” Appellant testified that he “just

start[ed] shooting” because he believed Lambert was reaching for the sawed-off

shotgun. Appellant testified that he was “just trying to neutralize” Lambert and

“make him just stop what he was doing.” According to Appellant, he continued to

shoot because he saw Lambert “pulling something out” and “fumbling for

something” that Appellant believed was the shotgun. Appellant admitted, however,

                                          37
that he never actually saw Lambert with a gun that night. Appellant also denied

saying, “Y’all better not say shit,” right before he shot Lambert.

      Appellant testified that he was “scared” and “panicking” after the shooting

and he tried to calm everyone down by telling them, “It’s going to be okay. I didn’t

shoot him for no reason. He deserved it.” Appellant explained that Lambert

“deserved it” because he “reached for his waistband.” Although he admitted that he

said, “Fucking Lambert,” Appellant denied saying, “You messed with the wrong

family.”

      As previously discussed, Wood, Esquivel, Gonzalez, and Tyner testified that

Lambert, who was unarmed, was not holding anything in his hands, reaching into

his pockets or waistband, or making threatening gestures that someone could have

interpreted as reaching for a weapon. According to Tyner, Lambert was just cursing

and “just holding up a middle finger” before he was shot. Wood, Esquivel, and

Tyner also agreed that Lambert did nothing after the Mustang turned around at

Tower Drive that would give Appellant or anyone else in the Mustang a reason to

fear for their life when the shooting occurred. Thus, the jury heard two conflicting

versions of events surrounding the shooting: Appellant’s version and everyone

else’s version. As sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witness testimony,

the jury was entitled to credit the testimony of Wood, Esquivel, Gonzalez, Johnson,

and Tyner over Appellant’s testimony. See Trevino v. State, 157 S.W.3d 818, 822

                                          38
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (“The jury was free to make its own

determination of appellant’s credibility and reject appellant’s version of events if it

did not believe he was telling the truth”). We must defer to the jury’s resolution of

these issues. See Rankin, 617 S.W.3d at 185 (stating courts defer to fact finder’s

determination of weight and credibility of testimony and evidence).

      Viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury’s

determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence, we cannot

say that the jury’s negative finding on the issue of sudden passion is so weak as to

be “manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased” or against the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671; Rankin,

617 S.W.3d at 187.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Countiss and Rivas-Molloy.

Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                          39