Court Opinion

ID: 9483298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:16:24.125334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:32.408043
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Senior District Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the outcome in this case, but differ to some extent with the reasoning. The district court and the majority take the position that Yellow Cab’s duty to notify the excess carrier, Atlanta International Insurance company, arose upon receipt by the defendant of a complaint which contained an ad damnum clause seeking damages that would penetrate the excess coverage. I respectfully disagree.
Ad damnum clauses have notoriously had little if any bearing to reality. Indeed, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 2-604 (1983) was amended to preclude plaintiffs from pleading an ad damnum in personal injury suits because:
The pendency of a suit asking large damages was thought to have a tendency to impair a defendant’s credit and make obtaining or renewing insurance more difficult, and the existence of a large dollar figure on the claim was in addition believed to have a tendency to increase the size of the verdict in the particular case and the verdicts in personal injury cases generally. Prohibiting the statement of damage claims was an effort to remove these consequences of prior practice, without depriving the plaintiff of any right necessary to the establishment of his actual damages.
Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 2-604, Historical and Practice Notes (Smith-Hurd 1983). The Illinois Court of Appeal recently expressed a similar opinion in Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 231 Ill.App.3d 143, 152-153, 172 Ill.Dec. 641, 646-647, 595 N.E.2d 1311, 1316-1317 (1992). While that decision is not binding on this court, I believe the court’s analysis is consistent with existing state law.
I find only one distinguishing factor in the Hartford Accident case, one which is *753ultimately dispositive. As the majority correctly notes, “the Hartford court placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the excess insurer was not prejudiced by the delayed notice because in Hartford the trial ‘did not take place for several months after Hartford was given notice.at 751. In the present case, the defendant clearly learned of the excess carrier’s potential exposure during trial — at that point it had an unquestionable and absolute duty to notify the excess carrier even under the broad discretionary language of the policy. Its failure to do so until after a verdict had been rendered was prejudicial to the plaintiff and unreasonable as a matter of law.