Court Opinion

ID: 9760460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:55:57.589048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.523805
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
dissenting.
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of the State of New Jersey requires that we reverse this child sexual-abuse conviction.
[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. [479,] 485 [104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532] 81 L.Ed.2d 413 [ (1984) ]. * * * That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence. In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and “survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” [Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146-47, 90 L.Ed.2d 636, 645 (1986) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 666 (1984)).]
*542That proposition stated by the United States Supreme Court in the context of evidence pertaining to the credibility of confession is generally applicable here.
The critical question that we must decide then is whether the proffered evidence is “central to the defendant’s claim of innocence.” Id. at 690, 106 S.Ct. at 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d at 645. I fail to see how forcing this child-victim to relive her traumatic experiences can be thought to be central to defendant’s claim of innocence.
The relevance of this evidence is so marginal to defendant’s case' that its exclusion should not cause a reversal of his conviction. The apparent thesis of defendant’s argument is that he should be excused from liability for this criminal offense on the basis that the youthful victim not only consented to the sexual encounters but initiated them. The law affords no such defense. New Jersey’s Criminal Code proscribes the kind of sexual contact alleged in this case, whether or not the victim had consented, when the victim is less than thirteen-years old. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(1). That a child may have initiated such contact makes no difference under our law. See J. Cannel, N.J. Code of Criminal Justice 2C:14-2 Comment 1 (1991) (“There was no desire to allow [an under-age girl] to make this decision at all. Thus, the volition of the girl was not being protected and was irrelevant.”). Even apart from our own statutory guidelines on relevancy, “[i]n most cases, the relevancy, if any, of such evidence will be minimal. A jury is unlikely to consider a witness’s ability to describe sexual conduct as an independent factor supporting a conviction. This ability, unlike pregnancy, semen or disease, need not be acquired solely through sexual conduct.” People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 12, 330 N. W. 2d 814, 818 (1982). This evidence of prior abuse is far from being “central” to defendant’s “claim of innocence.”
Beyond that, I believe that the Court now imposes greater barriers in the trial of child sexual-abuse cases than is required *543by the Constitution. A good model for analysis may be found in the exceptions to the Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the federal rape-shield law. That law codifies the types of exceptions that perhaps would be constitutionally required. For example, the Rule allows a defendant to submit evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior to explain how another might be the source of the injury or semen. Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(2)(A). Also, in some circumstances the prior conduct may show a possible motive to accuse falsely. State v. Jalo, 27 Or.App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976).
What does defendant seek to prove by his offer of evidence in this case? Defendant is not attempting to show that another may have sexually abused the child; in fact, defendant admits that sexual contact did occur between himself and the victim. Defendant apparently seeks to dispel some unproven myth that young children are so sexually naive that they could not possibly use explicit language to describe sexual contact absent the experience. Defendant argues, therefore, that to overcome that assumption on the part of jurors we must permit the admission of the evidence of the child’s past.
In our society, the child rape victim suffers so much. First, the child suffers the personal violation that is the rape. (I use that word even though the Criminal Code does not use that expression; the Code uses other terms to describe the sexual acts.) Then the child suffers the traumatic ordeal of the trial. See Note, Victimizing The Child Victim: Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and Trauma in the Courtroom, 11 Vt.L.Rev. 631, 644-52 (1986). To allow a reexamination of past sexual abuse in order to dispel unproven assumptions only adds to the child’s suffering. I cannot believe that the Constitution requires such suffering in order to dispel what is at best the supposition of lawyers and judges. Unless we are very careful in the application of this doctrine, the “child subjected to victimization [will be] victimized a second time by the system that is supposed to be fashioning a remedy to protect the child.” *544Schretter, Laws to Protect the Child Victim in the Courtroom, 5 N.J. Trial Lawyer 25, 25 (July 1991).
We are perhaps a bit too removed from the modern world to realize the changes that have taken place. The young prosecutor who presented this case to us, himself the father of a young child, informed us of the startling change in youthful knowledge of sexual matters. One need glance only at the material that passes before their eyes at a supermarket checkout counter to know what many children observe of life. Add to that the constant barrage of explicit sex that pervades popular entertainment. We cannot safely assume that children necessarily learn such words or such actions from a single sexual contact.
In many ways the attitude of courts (not just the New Jersey Supreme Court), see ante at 534-35, 593 A.2d at 791-92, with respect to child sexual-abuse cases appears to be a repetition of the mythology that once pervaded the jurisprudence of rape. See Steinmetz, State v. Oliver: Children with a Past; The Admissibility of the Victim’s Prior Sexual Experience in Child Molestation Cases, 31 Ariz.L.Rev. 677, 680-81 (1989). As one court put it, “ ‘The underlying thought here is that it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent * * * than a virtuous woman.’ [People v. Collins, 25 Ill.2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962).] * * * [T]he premise of this rationale was based on the presumption that ‘[t]ruthfulness and chastity in women were thought to be virtues that were found only together. No “unchaste” woman was expected to be truthful.’ ” People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill.2d 159, 168, 142 Ill.Dec. 135, 139-40, 552 N.E.2d 726, 729-30 (quoting Murphy, Rape Shield Statute Upheld by Illinois Appellate Court, 69 Ill.B.J 110, — (1980)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 343, 112 L.Ed.2d 307 (1990). The result was that defense counsel were permitted to subject the victims of sexual crimes to “pointless and cruel foraging into sexual history, thus subjecting the complainant to needless psychological or emotional abuse.” Note, United States v. Shaw: What Constitutes an “Injury” *545under the Federal Rape-Shield Statute?, 43 U.Miami L.Rev. 947, 951 (1989).
We have heretofore stressed the need to shield child victims of sexual abuse from unnecessary intrusion into their lives. “Our criminal justice system recognizes fully a defendant’s right to prepare a defense and have complete discovery. However, allowing a defendant to forage for evidence without a reasonable basis is not an ingredient of either due process or fundamental fairness in the administration of the criminal laws.” State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 28, 514 A.2d 1287 (1986) (denying psychological examination of child-victim witnesses except on substantial showing of need). We noted that
defendants charged with sexual offenses against female victims of all ages have historically based attacks against witness reliability on unsound stereotypical notions of the nature of women. See, e.g., 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 924(a) (3rd ed. 1940). We totally repudiate such thinking. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984). Contemporary understanding springs from very different perceptions and knowledge of temperament and gender. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 (Rape-Shield statute). [Id. at 30 n. 4, 514 A.2d 1287.]
This is not the case in which to depart from that commitment. To begin with, the use of what essentially is character evidence to impeach a witness is almost unheard of in the law. With rare exceptions, as in the case of evidence of traits concerning honesty or veracity, the evidence of past character is simply not admissible to impeach the testimony of a witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 608; Evid.R. 22. There are five traditional techniques or modes of impeachment: first, “the credibility of a witness may be attacked by proving that the witness made prior statements that are inconsistent with her or his trial testimony”; second, “credibility may be undermined by proof that the witness is biased or interested”; third, “evidence of a witness’s character may be offered to prove that the witness is unworthy of belief”; fourth, “testimony may be impeached by proof of defects in a witness’s capacity to observe, remember, or relate”; and finally, “extrinsic evidence may be used to contradict a witness’s testimony.” Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination, and Impeach*546ment, 18 Pac.L.J. 801, 910-11 (1987). However, those circumstances in which evidence of a witness's character may be offered to prove that the witness is unworthy of belief are sharply limited by the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. Only evidence of the traits of “honesty or veracity or their opposites” can be used for that purpose. Evid.R. 22. Proof of specific acts of sexual activity with persons other than the defendant “is ordinarily insufficiently probative * * * of [a victim’s] general credibility as a witness * * * to outweigh its highly prejudicial effect.” United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 1267, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1979); see also People v. Wilson, 678 P.2d 1024 (Colo.Ct.App.1983) (in sexual-assault case, deletion of portions of child-victim’s diary relating prior sexual acts with others was proper), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 843, 105 S.Ct. 148, 83 L.Ed.2d 87 (1984).
Moreover, the “insult and intimidation” that women endure “during rape trials prompted states to enact ‘rape shield’ laws, designed to control or prohibit the use of evidence relating to the victim’s general sexual behavior.” The Supreme Court— Leading Cases — Sexual Harassment — Hostile Work Environment, 100 Harv.L.Rev: 276, 284 n. 44 (1986). Courts had previously permitted defense counsel to ask victims questions about their use of birth control, attendance at bars, illegitimate children, and number of prior sexual experiences. Berger; Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 14 (1977). It would be the cruelest paradox if the rape-shield laws enacted to protect women from those indignities and to counteract myths that women consent to forcible sex would now be interpreted to require the admission of just such evidence of prior sexual conduct when, due to the age of the victim, consent is not even an issue.
In the vast majority of cases involving adult victims in which consent may be considered to be critical to the defense, the evidence sought to be introduced here would be totally inadmissible. Evidently, because of an assumption that children are *547naive or innocent, the majority believes that we must counteract that assumption by permitting the very indignities to be inflicted on this child victim that we would not inflict on an adult victim. The Constitution does not require that myths be dispelled in that way. There may be a situation in which a prosecutor seeks to present a case on the basis that the victim could not have learned the sexual terms used from any source other than the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 249 N.J.Super. 246, 592 A.2d 291 (App.Div.1991). Absent some attempt by the State to do that, the court need only instruct the jury that it should not draw any inferences from the language used by the child and that it should not in any sense attribute the child’s sexual knowledge to the defendant. The court could explain to the jury that there are many sources of such information in our society, and that whether defendant sexually assaulted the victim remains for it to determine. See Eatman, Minor Victims of Sexual Assault, 26 N.H.B.J. 199, 205 (1985) (court could instruct jury that child is familiar with sexual terminology and concepts and that it is not to presume that child is naive).
At most, the evidence here supports the factual proposition that the victim initiated the event, something that is irrelevant in the case of sexual relations with a child. The law of child sexual abuse is very strict. Victim initiation is simply no defense when a defendant admits having had a sexual encounter with a child who is less than thirteen-years old. This defendant was not a helpless victim; he was a competent and knowing adult. An adult cannot engage in the kind of conduct that has been alleged in this case.
The majority emphasizes that defendant denies that he had vaginal intercourse with the child. Ante at 534, 593 A.2d 791. But by his own account defendant engaged in conduct involving oral sexual contact by the child. That constitutes aggravated sexual assault. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1c (defining sexual penetration to include both vaginal and oral forms of sexual contact). Although defendant claims that he did not initiate the *548encounters with the child, he testified that the time during which the contact occurred “could have been five seconds, it could have been four seconds, it could have been a minute and a half, it could have been thirty seconds.” Even accepting defendant’s statements as true, his conduct constituted aggravated sexual assault.
Only one other argument can be made for the admissibility of the evidence: that the description of the prior incident with the victim’s stepfather so closely paralleled the description of this incident that it suggests possible fabrication. We might concede some relevance to the prior experience if there were something unusual about the event described, rather than the regrettably dreary sameness to almost every such act with a child. This was far from any type of “signature” crime. See People v. Sandoval, supra, 135 Ill.2d 159, 142 Ill.Dec. 135, 552 N.E.2d 726 (suggesting that that quality in a prior offense might establish relevance). Even if some relevance were accorded to the evidence in those circumstances, a court must still decide if the probative worth of the evidence to the defendant bears sufficiently on what is at issue to overcome its prejudicial effect. The Legislature, in enacting the rape-shield law, has said that in admitting evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity, there is prejudice per se. Even if the child were the initiator of the encounter with defendant, that is not sufficiently probative in my mind to dispel criminal liability. The whole purpose of the rape-shield law is to get rid of prejudicial inferences such as “she asked for it.” To test the majority’s logic we must ask: in an adult case if a woman were to have given a graphic description of a brutal rape on a prior occasion in the same way that she described the incident at issue, would that ever be considered a reason to circumvent the rape-shield law? I should think not. The evidence should not be admissible in this child’s case.
Moreover, the trial court exercised its discretion to permit the jury to know that a prior criminal complaint had been filed against the stepfather, and in closing arguments counsel for *549defendant was free to comment on those matters. A reasonable accommodation of defendant's interest in having that information before the jury was made in the circumstances of this case.
The respected constitutional scholar, Laurence H. Tribe, expressed to Congress his support for the passage of the federal rape-shield act:
No reform is without its costs and difficulties; [this act] is no exception. But nothing in the proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence would override the defendant’s due process right in extraordinary circumstances to adduce crucial evidence of innocence; only the occasional loss of marginally relevant evidence can plausibly be attributed to the amendment, and that seems an eminently reasonable price to pay for an important humanization of the trial process in cases where the charge is rape. [Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearing on H.R. 14666 Before The Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976) (letter from Prof. Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School).]
Those concerns resound as well in the case of a child victim. “A child no less than an adult [should be] protected from having her prior sexual history paraded in public and from having unfair inferences drawn therefrom.” Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, 388 Pa.Super. 172, 177, 565 A.2d 170, 172 (1989).
The judgment of conviction should be reinstated.
Justice HANDLER joins in this opinion.
For affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 5.
Justices HANDLER and O’HERN, dissenting — 2.