Court Opinion

ID: 9612700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:10:45.469028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:22.401092
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion, which correctly holds “the terms of the agreement are not substantively unconscionable. ”
The majority’s opinion then reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor and holds “material issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff entered the agreement voluntarily.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority cites Tiryakian v. Tiryakian, and states “[t]he Court in Tiryakian recognized the confidential relationship of persons about to marry, and the corresponding ‘affirmative duty on the part of each perspective spouse to fully disclose his or her financial status.’ ” 91 N.C. App. 128, 132, 370 S.E.2d *28852, 854 (1988). While I completely agree with this statement, 1 disagree with the majority’s application of this rule to the facts before us to reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Plaintiff argues her husband failed to materially disclose all of his financial assets prior to her signing the premarital agreement. The majority’s opinion holds, “summary judgment was therefore improperly granted by the trial court.” I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that reverses the trial court’s judgment.
I. Standard of Review
Our standard to review the grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by: (1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case is nonexistent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense. Once the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmov-ing party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish aprima facie case at trial.
County of Jackson v. Nichols, 175 N.C. App. 196, 199, 623 S.E.2d 277, 279 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Defendants showed, through the plain language of the agreement and plaintiff’s deposition testimony, that plaintiff “voluntarily” executed the agreement when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to her. Plaintiff failed to meet her burden “to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that [s]he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.” Id. The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in its entirety.
II. Voluntariness
On appeal, the presumption remains that the trial court’s judgment is correct until overcome by the appellant. Id. The burden rests upon the appellant to prove the trial court erred. Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case at trial or to show any error in the trial court’s judgment. Id.
In Howell v. Landry, this Court stated, “[p]remarital agreements, like postmarital agreements, are generally formed within a confiden*29tial relationship. Accordingly, transactions between such parties . . . must be free of fraud, undue influence and duress, and furthermore must also be fair and reasonable.” 96 N.C. App. 516, 524, 386 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1989) (citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 482, 392 S.E.2d 90 (1990).
Here, the contract states, and plaintiff admitted she: (1) “voluntarily” signed the premarital agreement on 12 October 1990; (2) that it was “fair and equitable;” and (3) not the result of any “duress or undue influence.” Plaintiff signed the agreement before a notary public. The agreement was recorded in the Duplin County Register of Deeds a week later on 19 October 1990. Plaintiff waited until after her husband’s voice was silenced by his death to bring forward her unsubstantiated oral claims to impeach the written agreement she signed.
During plaintiff’s deposition, defendants’ attorney asked plaintiff whether she “voluntarily sign[ed] the premarital agreement.” She answered, “[y]es, sir.” Plaintiff was also asked whether she had ever read the premarital agreement. Plaintiff answered, “I’m sure sometime over the years I probably looked at it.” When asked, “[y]ou did read the premarital agreement sometime [after you signed it]”, she answered, “[y]ears later, yes.” Even though plaintiff: (1) admits she voluntarily signed the premarital agreement; (2) read the agreement; (3) retained all property and assets she owned prior to the marriage; and (4) received liquid assets exceeding three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) from her husband, she now orally contests the validity of the written agreement after her husband’s death.
Defendants’ attorney had plaintiff read that portion of the agreement, which states, “[e]ach party acknowledged that the agreement is fair and equitable.” Defendants’ attorney then asked plaintiff, “[i]s the fact that you didn’t read it your only reason for claiming that it was not fair and equitable?” Plaintiff responded, “[i]t’s unfair, yes.” This is insufficient evidence or grounds to reverse the trial court’s judgment.
In her sworn affidavit, plaintiff admitted she was familiar with a substantial portion of her future husband’s assets prior to the marriage. She testified:
At the time I married Byard Komegay, I knew that he owned the farm upon which we lived and that there were four hog houses on the farm (which had been recently constructed) and knew that he *30had some other farm land. At that time I also knew that he farmed land around Scott’s Store, but did not know if he owned or leased that property.
In her deposition, plaintiff also acknowledged and testified she was familiar with how to use the Register of Deeds office and the tax supervisor’s office and had researched property information prior to and during the marriage.
Plaintiff now contends she did not “voluntarily” sign the premarital agreement “due to totality of the circumstances existing at the time of execution of the Agreement.” Plaintiff argues her lack of legal counsel and lack of an opportunity to obtain legal counsel “are important elements in the circumstances surrounding her execution of the Agreement.” Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition she never requested: (1) additional time to read the agreement; or (2) another attorney to be present to explain the agreement before she signed it. This case fits squarely within the facts and holding of Howell. 96 N.C. App. at 524, 386 S.E.2d at 615.
This Court has held contract rules apply to premarital agreements.
“[Ajbsent fraud or oppression . . . parties to a contract have an affirmative duty to read and understand a written contract before signing it.” Park v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 159 N.C. App. 120, 126, 582 S.E.2d 375, 380 (2003). And, when “interpreting contract language, the presumption is that the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the contract must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean.” Stewart v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 236, 240, 541 S.E.2d 209, 212 (2000) (discussing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1946)).
Roberts v. Roberts, 173 N.C. App. 354, 357, 618 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2005). (emphasis supplied).
Plaintiff’s argument that her execution was not voluntary because she did not read the agreement is without merit. Plaintiff had “an affirmative duty to read and understand [the premarital agreement] before signing it.” Park v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 159 N.C. App. at 126, 582 S.E.2d at 380. Plaintiff provided no evidence she was prevented from reading the agreement or that she sought separate counsel prior to signing the agreement. Howell, 96 N.C. App. at 524, 386 S.E.2d at 615. Plaintiff *31admitted both in the agreement and at her deposition that she “voluntarily” signed the agreement.
The Tiryakian case, relied upon by the majority, decided prior to the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, is readily distinguishable from the facts here. 91 N.C. App. at 130, 370 S.E.2d at 853. Tiryakian addressed a prenuptial agreement within the context of an equitable distribution. Id. Both parties to the agreement were alive at the time of trial and testified to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the premarital agreement. Also, Tiryakian was not before this Court on a ruling for a motion for summary judgment, but rather the husband appealed that portion of the trial court’s order that voided the premarital agreement. Id.
Here, plaintiff and defendant were both previously married and had children by those marriages. Defendant had six children. Both plaintiff and defendant owned substantial real property assets prior to the marriage that remained non-marital property under the agreement. Plaintiff asserts no inequality in education or business experience between her and her husband. Plaintiff did not assert she made any disclosures to defendant of her pre-marital assets to any greater extent than her knowledge of defendant’s assets on the date of the agreement.
In the agreement, plaintiff acknowledged:
Each of the parties waives, releases, and relinquishes any right or claim that he or she now has or may acquire, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 29 of the North Carolina General Statutes, [“Intestate Succession,” including “Share of Surviving Spouse”] as such sections now exist or may hereafter be amended, to take such property of the other party through intestate succession or pursuant to any present or future laws of any State of the United States to elect to take any of such property of the other party in contravention of the terms of any last will of the other, including any last will not executed or which may be executed hereafter, or any disposition of such property made by the other during his or her lifetime or otherwise. Further, each of the parties shall refrain from any action or proceeding that may tend to void or nullify to any extent or in any particular the terms of any such last will of the other.
Plaintiff breached the agreement when she filed the underlying action in this case. Plaintiff signed the agreement over fifteen years ago. She *32failed to .challenge the voluntariness of her execution of the agreement until after her husband’s death. She now seeks to take an additional one third of decedent’s estate away from his six children from a prior marriage, after enjoying the benefits of the marriage and receiving over three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) of decedent’s personal property, while also retaining all her premarital property. Plaintiff’s assertions that the agreement is “unfair” does not create a genuine issue of material fact that her execution of the agreement was not voluntary. We all agrée that the agreement is not “substantively unconscionable.” Plaintiff’s chief complaint of “unfair” appears to be based upon the current value of her husband’s assets, from which she has received and enjoyed the income over the fifteen years of their marriage, and not her knowledge of the nature and extent of the decedent’s assets on the date of the agreement.. The value of decedent’s assets on the date the contract was signed controls. Plaintiff’s bootstrapped claim that her execution of the agreement was not voluntary does not create any genuine issue of material fact to overcome the plain language in the agreement and her sworn admissions during her deposition. The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in its entirety.
TTT- Conclusion
Based upon the plain language of the agreement, and plaintiff’s sworn testimony at her deposition, plaintiff failed to carry her burden to show genuine issues of material fact are present to warrant a reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
The result reached by the majority opinion is especially damaging in light of its disregard of the sanctity of a solemn written agreement, probated before a notary public, promptly recorded in the public land records of the county, and unchallenged for over fifteen years. The ruling is a wholesale disregard of the bargained for and settled expectations of parties of equal bargaining power in preference to wholly unsupported parol averments in direct contradiction to the terms of the written agreement. No regard is shown for the plaintiff’s and decedent’s clearly stated bargain, long after the decedent is no longer able to explain or defend the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement. This result will only cause great uncertainty into the finality and enforceability of an admittedly voluntary agreement entered into lawfully.
The six children of the decedent are forced to suffer further delays and great expense to quiet title to the real property inherited *33from their father, while plaintiff continues to enjoy all the benefits she retained under the agreement and the assets she received during her marriage to the decedent. The fact that the decedent’s assets grew during the marriage does not make the agreement unconscionable or unfair. It can be presumed that the value of plaintiffs retained premarital assets also increased, and the record shows plaintiff acquired virtually all of the decedent’s personal and intangible assets during the marriage.
I vote to concur that the agreement was not unconscionable and affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. I respectfully dissent from any holding that plaintiff did not voluntarily execute the agreement.