Court Opinion

ID: 9378796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 17:01:22.657584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.527481
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OMAR SHARRIEFF GAY,                       No. 21-16906
         Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                            D.C. No.
 v.                                      3:16-cv-05998-
                                              CRB
AMY PARSONS, Senior
Psychologist; GREGORY S.
GOLDSTEIN, Psychologist,                    OPINION
              Defendants-Appellants,

and

JENNIFER SHAFFER, Secretary,
Board of Parole Hearings; CLIFF
KUSAJ, Chief Psychologist,
              Defendants.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Northern District of California
       Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

       Argued and Submitted November 14, 2022
               San Francisco, California

                  Filed March 13, 2023
2                   OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

     Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Richard A. Paez,
     Circuit Judges, and Donald W. Molloy, * District Judge.

                  Opinion by Judge McKeown

                          SUMMARY **

                           Civil Rights

   In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
panel affirmed the district court’s denial of absolute
immunity to California Board of Parole Hearings
psychologists who prepare comprehensive risk assessment
reports for the parole board.
    Plaintiff Omar Sharrieff Gay brought a civil rights suit
alleging that he was asked racially and religiously biased
questions in a psychological evaluation required for his
parole review. He claimed that the psychologists were
prejudiced against him as an African-American, Muslim
man, which influenced their conclusion that Gay presented a
“high” risk of future violence. The psychologists contended
that they were absolutely immune from suit because they
performed a discretionary function integral to the Board of
Parole Hearings’(“Board”) quasi-judicial decision-
making.

*
 The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                  3

    Applying the functional approach laid out in the
watershed case Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S.
429 (1993), the panel declined to extend absolute immunity
in this case. The panel held that the psychologists’
assessments, while informative, were neither binding nor
controlling in any way nor did the psychologists function in
a judicial decision-making capacity. Thus, while the
psychologists provided a risk level based on their clinical
experience, they had no power of decision in the judicial
sense; the psychologists were not members of the Board and
the Board made its own determination about an inmate’s
current risk of dangerousness if released to the community.
The panel did not address whether qualified immunity was
available, leaving the question for the district court to
consider.

                       COUNSEL

Iram Hasan (argued) and Michael J. Quinn, Deputy
Attorneys General; Neah Huynh, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General; Monica N. Anderson, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General of
California; Office of the California Attorney General; San
Francisco, California; for Defendants-Appellants.
Alexandra S. Farley (argued), Carolee A. Hoover, and Kevin
B. Frankel, McGuireWoods, San Francisco, California;
Jamie D. Wells, Scale LLP, San Francisco, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                    OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

                             OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

    This appeal concerns whether California Board of Parole
Hearings psychologists who prepare comprehensive risk
assessment reports for the parole board are entitled to
absolute immunity. 1 Omar Sharrieff Gay brought a civil
rights suit alleging that he was asked racially and religiously
biased questions in a psychological evaluation required for
his parole review. He claimed that the psychologists were
prejudiced against him as an African-American, Muslim
man, which influenced their conclusion that Gay presented a
“high” risk of future violence. The psychologists contend
that they are absolutely immune from suit because they
performed a discretionary function integral to the Board of
Parole Hearings’ quasi-judicial decision-making. The
district court rejected their claim of absolute immunity.
Applying the functional approach laid out in the watershed
case Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429
(1993), we affirm. The psychologists’ assessments, while
informative, were neither binding nor controlling in any way
nor did the psychologists function in a judicial decision-
making capacity. This appeal does not address whether
qualified immunity is available, which we leave to the
district court.

1
  A review of the case law on absolute immunity for non-judicial
personnel reveals that the terms “absolute immunity,” “quasi-judicial
immunity,” and “quasi-judicial absolute immunity” have been used
interchangeably. For clarity, we follow the choice in Antoine v. Byers &
Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), and refer to the immunity at issue
here as absolute immunity.
                  OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                  5

                     BACKGROUND
    This case began with a parole eligibility interview. Omar
Sharrieff Gay is an inmate in the custody of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Gregory
Goldstein and Amy Parsons (collectively, the
“psychologists”) were employed by the Board of Parole
Hearings (the “Board”) as a Forensic Psychologist and a
Senior Psychologist, respectively.        The psychologists
interviewed Gay to prepare a Comprehensive Risk
Assessment (“CRA”) report for his parole suitability
hearing. The report found that Gay posed a high risk for
future violence.
    Gay alleges that the psychologists discriminated against
him because of his race and religion. Gay describes an
evaluation conducted “in the manner of a military or police
style interrogation.” He claims that the psychologists asked
him hostile questions and made prejudicial comments,
including, “Why do you hate White People and Jews?” and
“With everything going on in the world, at home with
[Muslims], we don’t know if you are just another radical
Islamic terrorist.” When Gay took offense at their “racially
charged anti-Islamic questions” and asked if they would be
asking those questions if he were a white Christian,
Goldstein allegedly replied, “You’re a high risk for violence
with that sarcastic attitude.”
    Despite the relatively straightforward allegations, this
case has a winding procedural history. In 2016, Gay filed a
pro se complaint against the psychologists. Liberally
construing the pleadings, the district court found that Gay
properly raised equal protection and retaliation claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ordered the United States Marshal to
serve process on the psychologists. The psychologists then
6                 OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

moved for summary judgment and claimed that they were
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied
summary judgment on Gay’s equal protection claim,
concluding that the psychologists were not entitled to
qualified immunity “at this stage in the proceedings” but
held that the psychologists were entitled to summary
judgment and qualified immunity on the retaliation claim.
Gay v. Parsons, 2018 WL 2088297, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 4,
2018).
    The psychologists tried again, this time moving for
judgment on the pleadings on Gay’s equal protection claim,
arguing that, as psychologists for the Board, they were
entitled to absolute immunity. The district court denied the
motion, explaining that immunity turned on whether the
psychologists “exercised discretion functionally comparable
to that of a judge” in preparing the CRA report, and that it
could not make that determination on the pleadings. Gay v.
Parsons, 2019 WL 3387954, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2019),
aff’d, 810 F. App’x 552 (9th Cir. 2020). The psychologists
appealed. We affirmed in a memorandum disposition and
remanded the case to the district court, concluding that “Gay
had alleged that [the psychologists] ‘did not participate in the
parole hearing—the most judge-like component of the
parole process . . . but rather [they engaged in] a fact-
gathering process similar to that of a police officer.’” Gay
v. Parsons, 810 F. App’x 552, 553 (9th Cir. 2020).
    Following remand, the parties developed a factual record
on the CRA report process and its relationship to the Board’s
hearing. According to the record, the psychologists in the
Board’s Forensic Assessment Division prepare CRA reports
for use in parole hearings. In doing so, the psychologists
review the inmate’s file, interview the inmate, and employ
structured risk assessment tools used by mental health
                  OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                   7

professionals to determine the risk of violence in
incarcerated individuals. Based on this information, the
psychologists classify the inmate as a “low, moderate, or
high risk of danger to society.” The CRA report provides
“circumstances about the crime, and the person’s prior
history and record,” as well as “expert analysis” on risk
assessment. The CRA report “does not substitute for the
panel’s determination of an inmate’s current risk of
dangerousness if released to the community.” When asked
in his deposition whether “the [Forensic Assessment
Division] psychologist[s] decide whether the prisoner or the
inmate has the right to go out on parole,” Goldstein
unequivocally replied, “No. We provide a risk assessment
of violent risk. We don’t make a determination, like, yeah,
let this guy go, or, no, don’t let this guy go.”
    After engaging in discovery, the psychologists moved
for summary judgment on the basis that there was no genuine
dispute of material fact that preparing a CRA report is a
function entitled to judicial immunity as a matter of law. The
district court denied the motion, agreeing with Gay that the
psychologists “failed to demonstrate that preparing CRA
reports involves a level of discretionary judgment
comparable to that exercised by judges.” Gay v. Parsons,
2021 WL 4806321, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021).
                        ANALYSIS
   Under the collateral order doctrine, the district court’s
decision was immediately appealable. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985). We review de novo
whether a public official is entitled to absolute immunity.
See Brown v. Cal. Dep’t Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir.
2009).
8                 OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

    We begin by tracing the Supreme Court’s principles and
teachings on immunity. The Court has long connected the
level of immunity to the nature of the official’s role rather
than title, explaining that “[j]udges have absolute immunity
not because of their particular location within the
Government but because of the special nature of their
responsibilities.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511
(1978). “It is the functional comparability of their judgments
to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors
and prosecutors being referred to as ‘quasi-judicial’ officers,
and their immunities being termed ‘quasi-judicial’ as well.”
Id. at 512 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423
n.20 (1976)).
     The focus on judicial function is a common thread
throughout the Court’s immunity jurisprudence, although
the language used to describe the inquiry has varied. In
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985), the Court
explained that it has “extended absolute immunity to certain
others who perform functions closely associated with the
judicial process.” Id. at 200. But the Court has held that
even judges do not always enjoy absolute immunity. In
“attempting to draw the line between truly judicial acts, for
which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen
to have been done by judges,” the Court recognized once
again that “immunity is justified and defined by the functions
it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.”
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (denying
absolute immunity to a judge acting in an administrative
capacity).
   By the time the Court decided Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478 (1991), it cautioned that its “decisions have also
emphasized that the official seeking absolute immunity
bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified
                  OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                     9

for the function in question,” and “[t]he presumption is that
qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to
protect government officials in the exercise of their duties.”
Id. at 486–87. Justice Scalia, in a partial concurrence and
partial dissent, invoked history and dove into the categories
of immunity at common law. Id. at 496–506 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
He distinguished judicial immunity, “an absolute immunity
from all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions,”
from quasi-judicial immunity, “official acts involving policy
discretion but not consisting of adjudication.” Id. at 499–
500 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
    In Antoine, the Supreme Court returned to Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Burns, clarified its functional approach,
and shifted the lens for evaluating judicial immunity. 508
U.S. at 435–38. In the Ninth Circuit opinion below, we
relied on earlier precedent in concluding that court reporters
were absolutely immune because “the making of the official
record of a court proceeding by a court reporter is part of the
judicial function,” a step “inextricably intertwined with the
adjudication of claims.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
950 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court reversed
our decision because it was “unpersuaded” that its
“functional approach” to immunity shielded an officer just
“because they are ‘part of the judicial function.’” Antoine,
508 U.S. at 435 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 486). Indeed,
the Court held that “some of the tasks performed by judges
themselves, ‘even though they may be essential to the very
functioning of the courts, have not . . . been regarded as
judicial acts.’” Id. at 437 (alteration in original) (quoting
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228). Rather, the “touchstone” of the
doctrine is the “performance of the function of resolving
10                OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating
private rights.” Id. at 435–36 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at
500 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part)). “When judicial immunity is extended to
officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are
‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges—that is,
because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a
part of their function.” Id. at 436 (alterations in original)
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20).
     Following Antoine, our court had the opportunity to
address the Supreme Court’s absolute immunity doctrine. In
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
we reconsidered earlier circuit authority on immunity for
social workers because the Supreme Court’s revised
approach was “fundamentally inconsistent with” our earlier
reasoning. Id. at 892. The case concerned a social worker
who informed the juvenile court of her proposed placement
for a foster child with a known history of abusing other
children. See id. at 893. The juvenile court approved the
social worker’s recommendations. See id. The plaintiffs
alleged that the social worker failed to inform the court of
critical facts, including that the selected foster home had
young children who would be at risk of abuse by the foster
child. See id. Acknowledging Antoine, we concluded that
“actions taken with court approval or under a court’s
direction are not in and of themselves entitled to quasi-
judicial, absolute immunity.” Id. at 897 (citing Antoine, 508
U.S. at 435–36). Instead, we instructed the district court to
consider whether the social worker made judicial or
prosecutorial decisions that would have enjoyed common
law immunity. See id. at 898. Importantly, we explained
that “[t]o the extent, however, that social workers also make
discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not
                   OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                     11

functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions,
only qualified, not absolute immunity, is available.” Id. We
noted that “[e]xamples of such functions may include
decisions and recommendations as to the particular home
where a child is to go or as to the particular foster parents
who are to provide care.” Id.
    Shortly after Miller, we decided Swift v. California, 384
F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2004), in which we described Antoine as
“work[ing] a sea change in the way in which we are to
examine absolute quasi-judicial immunity for nonjudicial
officers.” Id. at 1190 (quoting Curry v. Castillo (In re
Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002)). We clarified
that “[t]he relevant test now is whether the official is
‘performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which
officials were rendered immune at common law.’” Id.
(quoting Miller, 335 F.3d at 897). We acknowledged that
“[t]he relation of the action to a judicial proceeding . . . is no
longer a relevant standard.” Id. (quoting Miller, 335 F.3d at
897) (alterations in original). Hence, we declined to extend
absolute immunity to parole officers for “conduct distinct
from the decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole.” Id. at
1186. In doing so, we contrasted a social worker’s “decision
to institute proceedings to make a child a ward of the state,”
which is “likely entitled to absolute immunity,” with “a
parole officer recommend[ing] that a senior official initiate
parole revocation proceedings.” Id. at 1192 (quoting Miller,
335 F.3d at 898). Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in
Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1998), we
explained that while “the senior official who makes the
discretionary decision to issue the warrant” is absolutely
immune, the recommending officer was only entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. (citing Scotto, 143 F.3d at 112–13).
After clarifying the parameters of our absolute immunity
12                OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

doctrine, we turned to the facts of Swift. There, the parole
officers were required to report suspected violations of
parole conditions to the board, but those officers were not
decisionmakers. See id. at 1191. The board, however, had
discretion to issue a warrant. See id. at 1192. We concluded
that “[t]he board, therefore, not the officer, play[ed] a quasi-
judicial role.” Id.
    Our understanding of Antoine and the distinctions made
in subsequent precedent are illuminating here. In this case,
the psychologists conduct objective assessments of inmates’
risk of violent behavior, which they report to the Board. The
psychologists, however, are not decisionmakers. Rather, it
is the Board, not the evaluating psychologist, that has the
discretion and authority to determine the inmate’s eligibility
for parole. While non-judicial “officials performing the
duties of advocate or judge may enjoy quasi-judicial
immunity for some functions,” id. at 1188 (cleaned up), the
psychologists were neither acting as advocates nor as judges.
    The psychologists reviewed Gay’s files, interviewed
him, and looked to a multifactor risk instrument to reach a
risk level recommendation. Their report, which was passed
on to the Board, does not include a recommendation of
whether an inmate should be released; it is instead a “tool”
that the Board can use to guide its own determination.
Though the psychologists emphasize that they exercise
discretion in recommending a risk level of low, moderate, or
high, Miller instructs that exercising some discretion is not
enough where it is not functionally comparable to a judge’s
decision. See 335 F.3d at 897. While the psychologists
provided a risk level based on their clinical experience, they
“ha[d] no power of decision in the judicial sense.” Id. at 898.
                  OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                   13

    This is not to say that the reports were not helpful to the
Board’s decisions.       Jennifer P. Shaffer, the Board’s
Executive Officer, called the assessments “invaluable
information.” But Antoine denied absolute immunity to
court reporters who, “despite being ‘indispensable to the
appellate process,’ do not exercise the sort of judgment for
which there is quasi-judicial immunity.” Id. (quoting
Antoine, 508 U.S. at 437). The psychologists were not
members of the Board and the Board “made its own
determination” about “an inmate’s current risk of
dangerousness if released to the community.”               The
psychologists’ analysis was an information-gathering aid to
the Board’s decision, but not a judicial decision or even a
parole recommendation itself. Adhering to the approach laid
out in Antoine, Miller, and Swift, we decline to extend
absolute immunity in this case.
    We are not persuaded that our pre-Antoine decision in
Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curium),
requires a different result. The psychologists ask us to
recognize that Burkes remains good law or reaffirm it, as
Burkes granted absolute immunity to psychiatrists who
provided court-ordered reports to judges. See id. at 319. In
Burkes, we reasoned that “[t]his circuit has repeatedly held
that judges and other officers of government whose duties
are related to the judicial process are immune from liability
for damages under section 1983 for conduct in the
performance of their official duties.” Id. (emphasis added).
The court-appointed psychiatrists who prepared and
submitted medical reports to the state court acted within the
scope of absolute immunity because that immunity
“extend[ed] to acts committed in the performance of an
integral part of the judicial process.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
14                OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

    Thus, the Burkes decision rested on a now-outdated test
of “related to” the judicial process. That reasoning was
categorically rejected in Antoine. See 508 U.S. at 436–37
(“Nor is it sufficient that the task of a court reporter is
extremely important or, in the words of the Court of Appeals,
‘indispensable to the appellate process.’” (quoting Antoine,
950 F.2d at 1476)).
    As we made clear in Swift, to the extent our earlier case
involving parole officers, Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1983), “applied a ‘relates to’ test, as opposed to a
functional test, Antoine overruled it.” 384 F.3d at 1190.
Stated succinctly, “Antoine adopted a functional approach,
under which we must determine not whether an action
‘relates to’ the decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole . . .
but whether an action is taken by an official ‘performing a
duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were
rendered immune at common law.’” Id. (quoting Miller, 335
F.3d at 897). Intervening Supreme Court authority dictates
the result in this appeal: “[W]here the reasoning or theory of
our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the
reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-
judge panel should consider itself bound by the later and
controlling authority, and should reject the prior circuit
opinion as having been effectively overruled.” Miller, 335
F.3d at 893.
    Our recent decision in Fort v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141
(9th Cir. 2022) does not change the calculus. The parties in
Fort agreed that the Washington parole board was entitled to
absolute immunity for its discretionary actions. See id. at
1144. Following our rationale in In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940
(9th Cir. 2002), we confirmed that scheduling an inmate’s
parole hearing was “part and parcel of the decision process”
and also warranted absolute immunity. See id. at 1145–46.
                  OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                   15

Both In re Castillo and Fort provide absolute immunity for
administrative actions taken in the immediate leadup to the
judicial action—the act of scheduling, without which there
would be no hearing—on the theory that docket management
is a part of the judicial function. See Fort, 41 F.4th at 1145.
Fort noted that the parole board scheduled the hearing, and
this administrative act taken by those same officials
performing functionally comparable tasks to judges was
“‘inexorably connected’” with a judicial function.” Id. at
1146 (quoting Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th
Cir. 1996)).
    The psychologists argue that their risk assessment
reports are also “part and parcel of the judicial process,”
insofar as the Board considers the risk assessment reports in
deciding whether the inmate is safe to release into society.
We disagree. This interpretation misreads Fort’s narrow
question and would restore the overruled “relates to” test, an
elastic band that could fit almost any circumstance.
    In holding that the Board psychologists are not entitled
to absolute immunity, we part ways with the Third Circuit in
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2006). The
Third Circuit did not address whether psychologists are
exercising judge-like discretion in their evaluations to parole
boards, instead reasoning that “the only way to ensure
unvarnished, objective evaluations from court-appointed
professionals is to afford them absolute immunity from suit
for performing evaluations, regardless of whether those
evaluations are ultimately found dispositive by the entity that
requested them or are ultimately found lacking.” Id. at 179.
Though Williams postdates Antoine, the Third Circuit does
not cite Antoine, relying instead on Burns—decided two
years earlier—for the rule that “absolute immunity attaches
to those who perform functions integral to the judicial
16                OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS

process.” Id. at 178 (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 484). Because
Antoine—not Burns—provides the controlling standard, we
decline to follow this approach.
    The psychologists urge us to adopt the same policy
reasoning as Williams, namely, that objectivity will suffer
without absolute immunity. This argument ironically puts
the psychologists in a position of hypothetically violating
their professional principles and standards. See Am. Psych.
Ass’n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct 4 (2017) (“Psychologists recognize that fairness
and justice entitle all persons to . . . equal quality in the
processes, procedures, and services being conducted by
psychologists. Psychologists exercise reasonable judgment
and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, the
boundaries of their competence, and the limitations of their
expertise do not lead to or condone unjust practices.”). But
just as importantly, an abstract fear of vexatious litigation
was not enough to persuade the Court in Antoine and it is not
enough here. The Court in Antoine understood that cases
against court reporters were “relatively rare,” and the
respondents in that case did not provide “empirical evidence
demonstrating the existence of any significant volume of
vexatious and burdensome actions against reporters, even in
the Circuits in which reporters [were] not absolutely
immune.” 508 U.S. at 437. Similarly, the district court here
found that the psychologists “offer no evidence ‘of any
significant volume of vexatious and burdensome actions
against [them].’” Gay, 2021 WL 4806321, at *6 (quoting
Antoine, 508 U.S. at 437).
    Although we decline to extend absolute immunity to the
psychologists, we emphasize that this is not game over.
When the district court considered the psychologists’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings, it denied qualified immunity
                 OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS                17

“at this stage in the proceedings.” We therefore leave the
question of qualified immunity to the district court.
   AFFIRMED.