Court Opinion

ID: 9964681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 17:01:17.70644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:39.253075
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS MERCER PELL,                            No. 23-55188

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                               2:22-cv-03732-
    v.                                           MWF-RAO

AMY NUÑEZ, Director of
Admissions, State Bar of California,              OPINION

                  Defendant-Appellee.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Central District of California
         Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

                  Submitted February 15, 2024*
                     Pasadena, California

                      Filed April 30, 2024

    Before: Richard C. Tallman, Sandra S. Ikuta, and John B.
                    Owens, Circuit Judges.

                     Opinion by Judge Ikuta

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2                          PELL V. NUÑEZ

                          SUMMARY**

      Fourteenth Amendment/California State Bar

    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s dismissal of a law student’s action against the
California State Bar’s Director of Admissions alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and California’s
Unruh Act, and remanded.
    The State Bar summarily denied plaintiff’s petition for a
hearing to excuse his delay in taking the First Year Law
Students Exam (FYLSX), a prerequisite to bar admission for
students attending an unaccredited law school, and to waive
the resulting forfeiture of credit for law school courses he
had completed. Rather than petitioning the California
Supreme Court to review the State Bar’s decision, plaintiff
filed a complaint in federal court.
    The panel agreed with the district court that the State
Bar’s action did not cause plaintiff to suffer a cognizable
deprivation under federal law. Because the California
Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
matters of admission, and because the FYLSX is part of the
admissions process, challenges regarding the FYLSX or its
authorizing statute must be brought by original petition to
the California Supreme Court. The State Bar’s denial of
plaintiff’s petition for a hearing and a waiver of his credit
forfeiture was taken in the Bar’s advisory role and did not
result in a cognizable deprivation of a protected right or
property interest.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         PELL V. NUÑEZ                        3

    The panel held that because the federal claims arose
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the
district court erred by dismissing the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. However, because plaintiff did not
adequately allege a deprivation of rights, the panel
concluded that his federal claims must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim and affirmed the district court on that
basis. Because the district court erroneously ruled that it
lacked original jurisdiction, however, it dismissed plaintiff’s
state law Unruh Act claim without exercising its
supplemental jurisdiction discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). The panel reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s
Unruh Act claim, and remanded to the district court so that
it could exercise its discretion over whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction or dismiss the claim without
prejudice so that it may be pursued in state court.

                         COUNSEL

Susan Barilich, Susan Barilich PC, Glendale, California, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jean R. Krasilnikoff, Assistant General Counsel; Robert G.
Retana, Deputy General Counsel; Office of the General
Counsel, The State Bar of California, San Francisco,
California; Kirsten R. Galler, Assistant General Counsel;
Ellin Davtyan, General Counsel; Office of the General
Counsel, The State Bar of California, Los Angeles,
California; for Defendant-Appellee.
4                              PELL V. NUÑEZ

                                OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

    In this case, a law student petitioned the State Bar of
California for a hearing to excuse his delay in taking the First
Year Law Students Exam (FYLSX), a prerequisite to bar
admission for students attending an unaccredited law school,
and to waive the resulting forfeiture of credit for law school
courses he had completed. When the State Bar denied the
petition, the student brought this action against its Director
of Admissions, alleging that the denial violated the student’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because the California
Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
matters of admission, the State Bar’s actions did not result in
a cognizable deprivation of rights. Therefore, the federal
law claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
                                      I
    Douglas Pell is an 81-year-old law student enrolled at the
American Institute of Law, an unaccredited law school. He
is an applicant to be licensed as an attorney in the State of
California.
   “To be certified to the [California] Supreme Court for
admission and a license to practice law” in the state, students
who attend an unaccredited law school must pass the
FYLSX after their first year of law study. Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 6060(h)(1), (h)(2)(A).1 Students who pass the

1
    Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 6060 provides:
           To be certified to the Supreme Court for admission and
           a license to practice law, a person who has not been
           admitted to practice law [elsewhere] shall . . . . (h)(1)
                           PELL V. NUÑEZ                           5

examination within its first three administrations after they
become eligible to take the exam “receive credit for all law
studies completed to the time the examination is passed.”
§ 6060(h)(1). Students who do not pass the FYLSX within
the first three administrations but subsequently pass the
exam “shall receive credit for one year of legal study only.”
Id.
    Pell did not attempt the FYLSX until his sixth
opportunity to do so, in November 2020. According to Pell’s
complaint, exigent circumstances made it impossible for him
to take the exam during one of the prior opportunities after
he completed his first year of law school. Specifically, after
his wife had a liver transplant, Pell’s caregiver role and
responsibilities, combined with his age, prevented him from
taking those exams. Once his wife’s condition stabilized,
Pell immediately turned his attention to taking the FYLSX.
Pell passed the exam in his first attempt. But because he did

        Have passed a law students’ examination administered
        by the examining committee after completion of their
        first year of law study. Those who pass the
        examination within its first three administrations [or
        within the first four administrations if an exception
        inapplicable here applies], upon becoming eligible to
        take the examination, shall receive credit for all law
        studies completed to the time the examination is
        passed. Those who do not pass the examination within
        the number of administrations allowed by this
        subdivision, upon becoming eligible to take the
        examination, but who subsequently pass the
        examination, shall receive credit for one year of legal
        study only.
Section 6060(h)(2)(A) exempts students of accredited law schools from
this requirement if they had “completed at least two years of college
work prior to matriculating in the accredited law school.”
6                            PELL V. NUÑEZ

not pass the exam within the first three opportunities to do
so, under the State Bar’s interpretation of section 6060(h)(1),
he forfeited 39 credit hours for courses he successfully
completed after his first year of law school.
    After Pell became aware of this problem, he contacted
the State Bar. According to Pell’s complaint, the State Bar’s
representatives did not provide any assistance. Pell then
petitioned the Director of Admissions for the State Bar of
California, Amy Nuñez. His written petition asked for a
hearing to request an exception to the denial of credit hours
for courses taken during his second year in law school, and
included a declaration under penalty of perjury describing
the exigent circumstances that prevented him from taking the
FYLSX before the November 2020 exam. The State Bar
summarily denied his petition without explanation. Pell did
not petition the California Supreme Court to review the State
Bar’s decision.
     Pell filed a complaint against Nuñez in federal court. His
first amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging that Nuñez, in her official capacity, violated
Pell’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection,
substantive due process, and procedural due process.2 It also
sought damages from Nuñez individually for an alleged

2
  While not entirely clear, Pell’s equal protection claim appears to be
based on alleged age discrimination and discrimination against those
who attend unaccredited law schools. As to substantive due process, Pell
alleges that Nuñez “arbitrarily deprived Plaintiff of property in the form
of law school credits by misinterpreting and misapplying Cal. Bus. &
Professions Code § 6060(h)(1) and thereby delaying significantly his
ability to complete law school and take the California Bar Exam.” Pell’s
procedural due process claim is based on the “constitutionally
inadequate” “procedures for notice and a hearing before the deprivation
of Plaintiff’s property interest in his earned law school credits.”
                        PELL V. NUÑEZ                       7

violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 51, 52.
    Nuñez moved to dismiss the first amended complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim. The district court determined that because Pell failed
to petition the California Supreme Court to review the State
Bar’s application of a rule relating to admissions, he did not
suffer any cognizable deprivation under federal law.
Relying on Giannini v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the
State Bar of California, 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam), the district court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and granted Nuñez’s motion to
dismiss on that ground. It did not reach Nuñez’s argument
that Pell failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. Although the district court granted Pell leave to
amend to bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
section 6060(h)(1), Pell failed to file a second amended
complaint and the district court entered judgment for Nuñez.
Pell timely appealed.
                              II
    We agree with the district court that the State Bar’s
actions did not cause Pell to suffer a cognizable deprivation
under federal law.
    The California Supreme Court has “exclusive ‘original
jurisdiction over the . . . process’” of admission to the
practice of law in California. Kohn v. State Bar of Cal., 87
F.4th 1021, 1034 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (quoting Smith v.
Cal. State Bar, 212 Cal. App. 3d 971, 978 (1989)). The
California State Bar, on the other hand, “is the
‘administrative arm’ of the California Supreme Court ‘for
the purpose of assisting in matters of admission and
discipline of attorneys.’” Id. at 1024 (quoting In re Rose, 22
8                        PELL V. NUÑEZ

Cal. 4th 430, 438 (2000)). “As part of its role . . . the State
Bar examines candidates’ qualifications, administers the bar
exam, and certifies candidates to the California Supreme
Court” as having met the admission requirements. Id. (citing
Cal. R. Ct. 9.3; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6046, 6060(g)).
Although some State Bar functions are executed “pursuant
to powers directly granted by the [California] Legislature,”
Saleeby v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 3d 547, 559 (1985), “[n]either
the State Bar of California nor its Board of Governors nor its
Committee of Bar [E]xaminers has any power to grant or to
deny admission to the bar. That power is vested in the
California Supreme Court alone,” Chaney v. State Bar of
Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1967). Because of this, the
State Bar’s certification of a candidate for admission, or its
refusal to so certify the candidate, “is legally simply a
recommendation to the [California Supreme] Court.” Id.
     Because the State Bar’s role “is advisory only,” id., when
the California Supreme Court reviews a State Bar action, it
does not “exercise [a] restricted appellate function” over a
decision having the force of law, but rather exercises its
“original jurisdictional power” in the first instance, id.
(citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 254
(1957)). Thus, “[t]he court has exclusive authority to admit
an applicant regardless of the [State Bar’s] refusal to certify
him or her.” Margulis v. State Bar of Cal., 845 F.2d 215,
216 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). On this basis, we have held
that the State Bar’s “refusal to certify an applicant does not
deprive an applicant of any rights until the supreme court
‘expressly or impliedly approves the [State Bar’s] refusal . . .
so as to . . . have the effect of a denial of admission.’” Id.
(quoting Chaney, 386 F.2d at 966). “Petitioning the supreme
court for review, therefore, ‘is not a matter of exhausting
state remedies in respect to an alleged federal right but of
                        PELL V. NUÑEZ                       9

there being no basis for any alleged federal right to exist as
to the [State Bar’s] actions until the California Supreme
Court in the exercise of its original power over admissions
has allowed these actions to serve as a deprivation.’” Id.
(quoting Chaney, 386 F.2d at 966).
    The California Supreme Court’s inherent authority over
admission to practice extends to direct review of
“[d]eterminations and recommendations of the [State Bar] in
matters of . . . admission” generally. Saleeby, 39 Cal. 3d at
557; cf. id. at 558–59. For instance, the California Supreme
Court has authority to consider a challenge to the
administration of admission fees. Smith, 212 Cal. App. 3d
at 978. In Smith, the plaintiff argued that his claim against
the State Bar for refusing to transfer or refund his admission
fee should have been heard in the trial court instead of being
dismissed for failure to seek relief in the California Supreme
Court. Smith rejected this argument, holding that because
the “[a]dministration of admissions fees obviously is part of
the admissions process” it was a matter of the California
Supreme Court’s inherent power. Id. The suit therefore fell
within the California Supreme Court’s “original jurisdiction
over the admissions process” and could be brought only “by
original petition to the [California] Supreme Court.” Id.
Because the California Supreme Court’s authority over the
admissions process is plenary, Smith held that it did not
matter whether administration of admission fees was
“preliminary to rather than part of the admissions process.”
Id. Similarly, the fact that admission fees were also
authorized by statute did not eliminate “the Supreme Court’s
control of the fees as part of its inherent power over
admissions.” Id. (citing Hersh v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 241
(1972) (direct review of annual bar membership fees)).
10                       PELL V. NUÑEZ

    Like admission fees, the FYLSX is a matter of
admission. For students who attend unaccredited law
schools, passing the FYLSX is one of the requirements “[t]o
be certified to the [California] Supreme Court for admission
and a license to practice law.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code.
§ 6060. The same statute mandating passage of the FYLSX
also sets out the admission requirements of good moral
character, legal education, and passage of the bar exam. Id.
As in Smith, it does not matter whether the FYLSX
procedures are “preliminary to rather than part of the
admissions process,” or that the procedures are authorized
by statute. 212 Cal. App. 3d at 978. As Pell acknowledged
in his complaint, the application of section 6060(h)(1) is part
of the admissions process because it affects his ability to take
the California Bar Exam and secure a California law license.
     Because the FYLSX is part of the admissions process, it
falls within the California Supreme Court’s “inherent power
and original jurisdiction.”       Id. Therefore, challenges
regarding the FYLSX or its authorizing statute must be
brought by original petition to the California Supreme Court.
If a decision by the State Bar to deny a student full credit for
his studies resulted in “a refusal of certification by the
Committee [of Bar Examiners],” it would “legally [be]
simply a recommendation” to the California Supreme Court.
Chaney, 386 F.2d at 966. The State Bar’s action would “not
deprive an applicant of any rights until the supreme court
‘expressly or impliedly approves the [State Bar’s] refusal’”
so as to deny the applicant of admission. Margulis, 845 F.2d
at 216 (quoting id.). Therefore, the State Bar’s denial of
Pell’s petition for a hearing and waiver of his forfeiture of
39 credit hours did not deprive Pell of any rights or property
interest.
                        PELL V. NUÑEZ                       11

                              III
   Because Pell’s claim does not adequately allege a
deprivation of rights, it is not one for which relief can be
granted. This conclusion is mandated by our decision in
Margulis.
    In Margulis, the plaintiff sued the State Bar and
Committee of Bar Examiners, “rais[ing] a plethora of
constitutional challenges to California Bar Examination
procedures” after he failed the California Bar Examination
and the Committee “refus[ed] to certify him as qualified to
practice law.” Margulis, 845 F.2d at 215–16. The plaintiff
did not petition the California Supreme Court for review. Id.
at 216. Given that “the California Supreme Court alone has
the power to admit someone to the California Bar,” we stated
that the “Committee’s decision not to certify” the plaintiff
was “simply of no legal significance.” Id. We held that
“because [the plaintiff’s] failure to petition for review
deprived the California Supreme Court of an opportunity to
rule on his application, his complaint allege[d] no cognizable
deprivation of federal rights.” Id. at 217. In other words, the
plaintiff “fail[ed] to state a claim.” Id. at 216 n.2.
    That conclusion was correct. A failure to state a claim
may result from the lack of a “cognizable legal theory” or
from “an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a
cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless
Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Because the claims in Margulis challenged actions by the
Committee of Bar Examiners that were “simply of no legal
significance,” Margulis, 845 F.2d at 216, those claims did
not invoke a cognizable legal theory, and the plaintiffs did
not have a cause of action.
12                       PELL V. NUÑEZ

    As in Margulis, Pell’s first amended complaint asserts
several federal law claims against Nuñez in her official
capacity as the Director of Admissions of the California
State Bar. Because Pell has not alleged that he petitioned the
California Supreme Court to review the State Bar’s actions,
however, nor identified any other manner in which the court
approved of the State Bar’s decision, Pell has not adequately
alleged a deprivation of a protected right. See Margulis, 845
F.2d at 217. By the same token, Pell does not state a claim
for declaratory or injunctive relief, as his allegations
regarding the State Bar’s interpretation and application of
the statutory requirements for admission do not involve “a
power of deprivation.” See Chaney, 386 F.2d at 966.
Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of his federal law claims.
     Gianinni, on which the district court relied, is not to the
contrary. As in Margulis, the plaintiff in Giannini sued the
Committee of Bar Examiners for the State of California after
it denied his petition for admission to practice law. Giannini,
847 F.2d at 1434–35. Like the plaintiff in Margulis, the
plaintiff in Giannini claimed that the Committee’s denial
violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 1435. We resolved
the case just as we had Margulis, holding that because the
plaintiff had not petitioned the California Supreme Court to
review the Committee’s decision, “no deprivation ha[d]
taken place,” and he therefore had “no basis for any claim of
deprivation under federal law.” Id. We concluded that
“[t]his prerequisite to federal deprivation operate[d] as a bar
upon [the plaintiff’s] suit in federal court.” Id.
    Although the district court read this language as resting
on jurisdictional grounds, that reading is not compelled by
Giannini itself. Giannini did not explain the ground on
which it affirmed dismissal, much less offer “a ‘close
analysis’” of “the critical differences between jurisdictional
                         PELL V. NUÑEZ                       13

and non jurisdictional limitations on causes of action.” U.S.
ex rel. Air Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720
F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc.
v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010)). Giannini’s lack of
reasoning places it in the category of “‘drive-by
jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no
precedential effect’” on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511
(2006) (citation omitted). Given that Margulis preceded
Giannini and therefore constituted binding precedent,
Giannini is better read as reaching the same conclusion as
Margulis had: that the plaintiff failed to state a claim. See
Margulis, 845 F.2d at 216 n.2.
    By contrast, a holding that we lack subject matter
jurisdiction would be contrary to long-standing precedent.
Within the scope granted by the Constitution, “only
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction,” Eldee-K Rental Props., LLC v.
DIRECTV, Inc., 748 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2014) (brackets
omitted) (quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 211
(2007)), and “[f]ederal courts have a[n] . . . obligation to
exercise the jurisdiction given them,” United States v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 988 F.3d 1194, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021)
(cleaned up). The Constitution grants federal courts
authority to hear cases involving a federal question, that is,
those “arising under th[e] Constitution [or] the Laws of the
United States,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, and Congress has
lodged “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution [or] laws . . . of the United States” in the
federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
   For purposes of § 1331, a district court has jurisdiction
over an action “arising under” federal law “when a federal
question appears on the face of the complaint.” City of
14                           PELL V. NUÑEZ

Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). Pell’s first amended complaint raised
several questions of federal law, as it alleged that “the
Defendant’s interpretation and application” of Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 6060(h)(1) violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights to equal protection, substantive due process, and
procedural due process. “[B]ecause this case arises under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,” the “district
court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.” Tuscon Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 538
(9th Cir. 2004). The district court also had supplemental
jurisdiction over Pell’s state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
      We therefore conclude that the district court erred in
holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.3 But that “the
district court incorrectly indicated that it lacked jurisdiction
. . . does not compel a reversal.” Janicki Logging Co. v.

3
  The district court also held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar consideration of Pell’s
claims even if he had unsuccessfully petitioned the California Supreme
Court before filing the present suit. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
“prohibits [lower] federal courts from adjudicating cases brought by
state-court losing parties challenging state-court judgments.” Reed v.
Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 235 (2023). Rooker-Feldman has no application
here. First, Pell does not allege that he petitioned the California Supreme
Court to review Nuñez’s adverse determination regarding his law school
credits, so there is no sense in which he is a “losing part[y] challenging
[a] state-court judgment[].” Id. Second, to the extent that Pell’s
complaint challenges the “interpretation and application of a statute”
(that is, California Business & Professions Code § 6060(h)(1)) such
challenges do not implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id.
(rejecting invocation of Rooker-Feldman where plaintiff’s claims “d[id]
not challenge . . . adverse state-court decisions themselves, but rather
target[ed] as unconstitutional the [State] statute they authoritatively
construed” (cleaned up)). Therefore, Rooker-Feldman did not eliminate
the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
                         PELL V. NUÑEZ                        15

Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1994). “If the decision
below is correct, it must be affirmed, even if the district court
relied on the wrong grounds or wrong reasoning.” Cigna
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp., 159 F.3d
412, 418 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Because we
conclude that Pell’s federal law claims must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of those claims.
                               IV
    In addition to his claims under federal law, Pell sued
Nuñez in her individual capacity for violations of
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–
52. Because the district court had original jurisdiction over
Pell’s federal law claims, it had supplemental jurisdiction to
decide this related state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
When a district court “has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction,” it “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction” over remaining state law claims.
§ 1367(c)(3).
    Here, because the district court ruled that it lacked
original jurisdiction, it dismissed all of Pell’s claims without
having exercised the discretion afforded by § 1367(c)(3).
We may not affirm the district court’s dismissal of Pell’s
Unruh Act claim because “[t]he decision to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the
district court and that court must be given an opportunity to
make that decision.” Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238,
1244 (9th Cir. 1998) (remanding case to district court to
“determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over the
state law claims”). We therefore reverse the dismissal of
Pell’s Unruh Act claim and “remand to the district court so
that it can exercise its discretion over whether to retain
16                           PELL V. NUÑEZ

jurisdiction . . . or whether to dismiss [the state law claim]
without prejudice so that [it] may be pursued in state court.”
Koepping v. Tri-Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 120 F.3d
998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
  AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and
REMANDED.4

4
 The costs on appeal are taxed against Pell. See Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).
Nuñez’s unopposed motion for judicial notice is granted.