Court Opinion

ID: 9947214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 12:10:04.310186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:14.638912
License: Public Domain

In the
                    Court of Appeals
            Second Appellate District of Texas
                     at Fort Worth
                  ___________________________
                       No. 02-23-00172-CV
                  ___________________________

               SUNBELT RENTALS, INC., Appellant

                                  V.

W.O.E. CONSTRUCTION, INC. F/K/A WASHED OUT ENTERPRISES, INC.
               AND CALEB CHALMERS, Appellees

               On Appeal from the 48th District Court
                      Tarrant County, Texas
                  Trial Court No. 048-317068-20

              Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.
                Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      After two partial summary judgments and a nonsuit order, the trial court

assessed attorney’s fees and expenses against Appellant Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. as a

discovery-related sanction. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.3, 215. Sunbelt contends that the

sanctions order was void because it was entered 12 days after the trial court’s plenary

power ostensibly expired and, alternatively, that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering sanctions. We will affirm.

                                      Background

      In January 2008, Appellee W.O.E. Construction, Inc. f/k/a Washed Out

Enterprises, Inc. executed a credit application with Sunbelt that enabled W.O.E. to

lease equipment from Sunbelt on credit. Appellee Caleb Chalmers, W.O.E.’s

president, signed the application on the company’s behalf and personally guaranteed

it.

      W.O.E. rented a street sweeper from Sunbelt in September 2018. In late May

2019, a W.O.E. employee ran over a coworker with it, killing him. Roughly a week

later, on June 4, Sunbelt took possession of the sweeper and in this lawsuit claimed

that W.O.E. was obliged to (but did not) pay some $60,000 in rental fees that had

accumulated before the agreement ended by its own terms in December 2019.

                                            2
         Sunbelt sued W.O.E. and Chalmers1 for “breach of contract/breach of

personal guaranty” and for quantum meruit and sued W.O.E. for failing to defend,

indemnify, and hold harmless Sunbelt as the rental agreement required. In addition to

damages, Sunbelt prayed for attorney’s fees, pre- and postjudgment interest, and court

costs.

         Through two partial-summary-judgment motions, W.O.E. obtained judgment

as a matter of law on Sunbelt’s claims. First, on November 29, 2022, the trial court

signed an order granting the first partial-summary-judgment motion and decreeing

that Sunbelt take nothing on its “breach of contract/breach of personal guaranty and

quantum meruit claims to the extent those claims seek rental fees from [W.O.E.]

based on any time after June 4, 2019.” A few months later, on March 30, 2023, the

trial court granted the second partial-summary-judgment motion and ordered that

Sunbelt take nothing on its claims that W.O.E. must defend, indemnify, and hold

Sunbelt harmless. Also on March 30, the trial court entered an order denying a partial-

summary-judgment motion that Sunbelt had filed.

         Shortly before the trial court signed the second summary-judgment order,

W.O.E. filed an amended sanctions motion, seeking death-penalty sanctions,

         We will refer to W.O.E. and Chalmers collectively as “W.O.E.”
         1

                                          3
attorney’s fees and costs, and monetary sanctions against Sunbelt for bad-faith

litigation tactics.2 That amended motion was set for a May 18, 2023 hearing.

      While the sanctions motion was pending, on April 17, 2023, Sunbelt filed a

notice of “nonsuit without prejudice with respect to [Sunbelt’s] claims and causes of

action for rentals, if any, that were not disposed of by” the first summary-judgment

order of November 29, 2022. On April 18, 2023, the trial court signed an order

reflecting that Sunbelt had nonsuited those claims without prejudice. Like all

preceding orders in this case, the nonsuit order had no finality language to indicate

that all parties and pending claims were thereby disposed of and that the order was

appealable, nor did it mention the extant sanctions motion.

      On May 17, 2023, Sunbelt filed a notice of appeal stating that it was appealing

from the trial court’s “final order on Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment,

signed on March 17, 2023.”3

      2
       The trial court had earlier denied W.O.E.’s initial sanctions motion.
      3
        No summary-judgment order was actually signed on March 17, 2023, but both
the second summary-judgment order and the order denying Sunbelt’s own partial-
summary-judgment motion state that the respective motions were considered on that
date. It’s not clear why Sunbelt’s notice of appeal referred to a “final order” on
“Plaintiff’s” (Sunbelt’s) motion for partial summary judgment, since denials of
summary-judgment motions are not ordinarily appealable. See Lancer Ins. Co. v. Garcia
Holiday Tours, 345 S.W.3d 50, 59 (Tex. 2011) (“The denial of summary judgment is an
interlocutory order over which an appellate court typically lacks jurisdiction absent
some special statutory grant.”).

                                           4
         The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the amended sanctions motion

on May 18, 2023, 30 days from the nonsuit order and the date on which the parties

assumed that the trial court’s plenary power would expire without a postjudgment

motion extending it. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b. At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial

court said that it would deny the requests for death-penalty and monetary sanctions of

$25 million but that it would grant the request that Sunbelt pay all W.O.E.’s attorney’s

fees and costs as sanctions. 4 The trial court signed an order reflecting these rulings

12 days later, on May 30, 2023.

         In its appellate briefing, and unlike what its notice of appeal said, Sunbelt does

not attack any summary-judgment rulings but complains only about the sanctions

order.

                                        Discussion

A. The April 18 nonsuit order was not a final one; rather, the May 30 sanctions
   order was the last component of a final, appealable judgment.

         Sunbelt’s first issue—that the May 30 sanctions order is void because plenary

power expired on May 18—posits that the April 18 nonsuit order fully disposed of all

parties and claims and was final and appealable.5 See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,

       Based on our disposition of Sunbelt’s second issue, we need not recite the
         4

evidence elicited at the hearing about Sunbelt’s litigation conduct.

       W.O.E.’s briefing accepts this faulty notion, arguing instead that Sunbelt’s
         5

notice of appeal failed to invoke our jurisdiction to consider the stand-alone sanctions
order or, alternatively, that the trial court’s oral pronouncement on May 18, 2023—in

                                             5
39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) (“[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on

the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually

disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states

that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.”). But Sunbelt—and W.O.E.—are

incorrect.

fact not the last day of plenary power, as we explain—was timely and controls over
the later written order that was “merely an administrative act.”

        At the sanctions hearing, the trial court stated that May 18 “seem[ed] to be the
last day of this Court’s plenary power” but that it “[had] not done any research on”
the outstanding sanctions issue’s effect on its plenary power. W.O.E.’s counsel stated
that, also without having researched it, he was “fine” with the trial court’s “proceeding
under that assumption.” Sunbelt’s counsel stated, “Candidly, I don’t know about a
sanctions motion. I don’t know whether that would be separate. I haven’t looked at
the issue.” We assume that the trial court later realized that its April 18 nonsuit order
had not fully disposed of all parties and claims, so it was comfortable waiting to sign
the sanctions order—the last-placed piece in the finality puzzle.

        Whatever the explanation, the parties’ respective positions on appeal are
offtrack, including W.O.E.’s assertion that sanctions were orally rendered on May 18.
See, e.g., State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex. 2015) (“A trial court renders
judgment orally when it announces rendition as a present act and not as an intention
to render judgment in the future.” (cleaned up)). Here, the trial court stated that it was
“going to grant” attorney’s fees as a discovery sanction against Sunbelt, a forward-
looking statement, and asked W.O.E.’s counsel to prepare an order, which it signed
on May 30. See James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 558, 561–62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2000, no pet.) (holding that trial court’s statement that it was “going to grant the
divorce in this case” did not “express a present intent to render judgment”; moreover,
later written judgment expressing that judgment had been orally rendered at the
hearing “is not dispositive”); Able Cabling Servs. v. Aaron-Carter Elec., Inc., 16 S.W.3d 98,
100–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding that court’s
statement that “judgment will be rendered in accordance with the terms dictated into
the record” did not indicate a present intent to render judgment).

                                             6
       In viewing the April 18 order as the final judgment, Sunbelt relies on

authorities that are either inapposite or predate the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions

in Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2009), and Crites v. Collins,

284 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. 2009)—decisions that, building upon Lehmann, unquestionably

yield the opposite conclusion. 6

       In the first of those two cases, the supreme court dealt with a nonsuit order

that was entered while the defendant’s sanctions motion was pending. Crites,

284 S.W.3d at 840. About a month after the nonsuit order, the trial court denied the

defendant’s sanctions motion; the defendant’s notice of appeal came within 30 days of

that denial order but more than 30 days after the nonsuit. Id. Raising the issue of its

jurisdiction sua sponte, the supreme court considered “whether the order of nonsuit

or the order denying sanctions triggered the thirty[-]day filing period.” Id.

       In holding that it was the latter, the supreme court noted that the nonsuit order

had no finality language and did not mention the outstanding sanctions motion:

       Because the order of nonsuit itself does not unequivocally express an
       intent for the order to be a final and appealable order, and because it
       does not address all pending claims, the order was not final. Only when
       the trial court issued its second order denying sanctions was a final order
       entered, and only at that point did the case become appealable.

       6
        Neither party cited any of these cases, leaving it to us to locate and apply those
outcome-determinative opinions. Cf. Standards for Appellate Conduct, Lawyers’ Duties
to Court ¶ 4, Texas Rules of Court (State) 324–25 (West 2023) (“Counsel will advise
the Court of controlling legal authorities, including those adverse to their position,
and should not cite authority that has been reversed, overruled, or restricted without
informing the court of those limitations.”) (available at http://www.txcourts.gov/
media/1437423/standards-for-appellate-conduct.pdf).

                                            7
Id. at 841 (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200, and Villafani v. Trejo, 251 S.W.3d 466,

468 (Tex. 2008) (holding that “the trial court’s denial of Villafani’s motion for

sanctions and dismissal and Trejo’s nonsuit collectively disposed of all the claims

between the two parties”)).

       Unifund followed several months later. There, Unifund argued that a sanctions

order entered against it was void “because the trial court’s plenary power [had]

expired before it signed the order nine months after the order dismissing Unifund’s

suit.” 299 S.W.3d at 95. After reciting the familiar principle that “[t]he expiration date

for a trial court’s plenary power is calculated from the date the court enters a final

order disposing of all the claims and parties,” id., the supreme court explained why

Unifund was wrong to say that the plenary-power clock had started ticking with the

earlier order, see id. at 95–97.

       First, unlike those of Unifund’s cited cases in which a sanctions motion was

filed after a judgment dismissing the case—most notably, Lane Bank Equipment Co. v.

Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 310, 312 (Tex. 2000), and Scott & White

Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n.2 (Tex. 1996)—Villa’s sanctions

motion was pending when Unifund moved to dismiss its case against him. Unifund,

299 S.W.3d at 96. Because the dismissal order did not specifically refer to the

sanctions motion, “the order did not necessarily dispose of Villa’s motion.” Id. (citing

Tex. R. Civ. P. 162 (stating that dismissal based on a nonsuit “shall have no effect on

any motion for sanctions”)); see Crites, 284 S.W.3d at 840 (“A judgment dismissing all

                                            8
of a plaintiff’s claims against a defendant, such as an order of nonsuit, does not

necessarily dispose of any cross-actions, such as a motion for sanctions, unless

specifically stated within the order.”); see also Youboty v. Youboty, No. 14-20-00557-CV,

2022 WL 1548535, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 17, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding nonsuit order, entered while sanctions motion was pending, did

not affect plenary power where “the trial court did not dispose of all claims and

parties in the case or state with unmistakable clarity that the court was rendering a

final judgment”); Walter v. Teller, No. 02-12-00028-CV, 2013 WL 5966351, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Nov. 7, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g) (rejecting argument

that sanction order was void because it was signed more than seven months after a

nonsuit order that “did not specifically reference [Wife’s] motion for sanctions or

otherwise unequivocally express any intent to dispose of the motion; therefore, the

order was not a final order that disposed of the motion for sanctions”).

      Second, although a dismissal or nonsuit order can be final even when a

sanctions motion is pending and unremarked upon in the order—thus setting the

plenary-power timetable—that order must be unequivocal in its intent to be final.

Unifund, 299 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Crites, 284 S.W.3d at 840–43). The Unifund nonsuit

order manifestly did not purport to be final, as the supreme court explained. “The

dismissal order was entitled ‘ORDER OF DISMISSAL,’ stated ‘the above styled and

numbered cause be and it is hereby dismissed with prejudice,’ and did not specifically

address Villa’s pending motion for sanctions.” Id. at 96–97. Because it was “apparent”

                                           9
from its language that this dismissal order was “not intended to be, and was not, a

final order disposing of all pending matters and thus appealable,” plenary power had

not expired before the trial court entered the sanctions order nine months later. Id. at

97. As a result, “[t]he sanctions order was not void.” Id.

      Just so here. Similar to the Unifund dismissal order, the trial court’s “Order of

Nonsuit Without Prejudice” decreed that “[Sunbelt’s] claims and causes of action for

rentals, if any, that were not disposed of by [the court’s November 29, 2022 partial-

summary-judgment order] . . . are hereby nonsuited without prejudice.” That order

said nothing about the pending sanctions motion. Nor did the order contain any

recognized finality language such as “This judgment finally disposes of all parties and

all claims and is appealable.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206. The trial court thus

possessed plenary power on May 30, 2023; that was the date on which all theretofore

interlocutory orders were merged into one final judgment, because only then did no

parties or claims remain unaddressed. As a result, that order was not void as outside

the trial court’s plenary power, and we overrule Sunbelt’s first issue.

      This case does present a twist in that Sunbelt’s notice of appeal was early—that

is, because the May 30 final order triggered the appellate timetables, Sunbelt did not

have to file its notice of appeal on May 17. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (providing that

with certain exceptions, notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after judgment

signed). Rule 27.1(a) of our appellate-procedure rules provides that “a prematurely

filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event

                                            10
that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.” Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(a); see In re J.M.,

396 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. 2013).

      We interpret the appellate rules “liberally in favor of preserving appellate

rights.” Higgins v. Randall Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 257 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2008). The

supreme court has “repeatedly held that the right of appeal should not be lost due to

procedural technicalities.” Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. 2011).

Before May 30, 2023, although we could have dismissed Sunbelt’s appeal because,

technically, it was from an unappealable—not simply nonfinal—interlocutory order,

we did not. But once the trial court rendered a final appealable order, all preceding

interlocutory orders were merged into it, and at that point Sunbelt’s premature notice

of appeal was deemed filed. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle

Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (citing Roccaforte, 341 S.W.3d at 924).

      As to its contents’ sufficiency under Rule 25.1(d), however, a far closer

question exists. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d) (detailing what a notice of appeal must

contain). Sunbelt sought to appeal from the “final order on Plaintiff’s Partial Motion

for Summary Judgment” (a nonfinal and unquestionably unappealable denial of

summary judgment) “signed on March 17, 2023” (an incorrect date). Problems

abound, but W.O.E. argues only that the sanctions order was a “separate, stand-alone

judgment” that Sunbelt was obliged to, but did not, separately appeal, such that

Sunbelt never invoked our jurisdiction, a position we rejected above.

                                            11
       Despite the self-evident shortcomings of Sunbelt’s notice of appeal, in the

interest of justice we will construe it as sufficiently invoking our jurisdiction to resolve

Sunbelt’s appellate complaint about the sanctions order. 7 A recent case from our sister

court in Houston summarizes why:

       The supreme court advocates for a policy that “appl[ies] rules of
       procedure liberally to reach the merits of the appeal whenever possible.”
       Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 244 S.W.3d
       838, 839 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).

               Applying this precept, this court also takes a liberal approach
       when evaluating alleged errors in notices of appeal. See, e.g., Human
       Biostar, Inc. v. Celltex Therapeutics Corp., 514 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tex. App.—
       Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (rejecting the appellee’s
       argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because appellants’ notices of
       appeal listed the wrong order); Lackshin v. Spofford, No. 14-03-00977-CV,
       2004 WL 1965636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 7,
       2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (notice of appeal was not defective despite
       listing incorrect date for final judgment); Griggs v. Wood, No. 14-00-
       00226-CV, 2001 WL 987906, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
       Dist.] Aug. 30, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (declining
       to dismiss notice of appeal because it did not state the date of the
       judgment or the order appealed from).

Wolfe’s Carpet, Tile & Remodeling, LLC v. Bourelle, No. 14-22-00579-CV,

2023 WL 4770069, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2023, no pet.). We

thus proceed to Sunbelt’s second issue, the propriety of the trial court’s awarding

W.O.E. its attorney’s fees and costs as sanctions for Sunbelt’s litigation conduct.

       7
        Future litigants should not rely on our relative lenience here as license to be
less than punctilious in perfecting appeals.

                                            12
B. Sunbelt did not preserve the sanctions complaint it briefed, but even so, the
   trial court did not abuse its discretion.

      At the outset, we note that Sunbelt’s discussion of its second issue does not

match its framing. Sunbelt presented this issue as “[w]hether [W.O.E.’s] motion for

sanctions against [Sunbelt] satisfies the Court’s requirements for imposing sanctions

of the nature requested, when [W.O.E.] presents no evidence of intentional bad faith

by [Sunbelt] or counsel.” But its argument rests entirely on a claim that W.O.E. failed

to segregate its attorney’s fees. 8 We hold that any evidentiary-sufficiency complaint

has been waived by Sunbelt’s failure to provide argument with appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record to support any such contention and will limit our review

to Sunbelt’s segregation argument. See Petras v. Criswell, 248 S.W.3d 471, 475 n.1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); see also Schulze v. Cap Collection JV7, No. 03-03-00390-CV,

2004 WL 2108730, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 23, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“Schulze reported his ‘Issues Presented’ differently than he argued them in the body

of his brief. We will address them as actually argued.”).

      8
        For unexplained reasons, Sunbelt casts its issue-two argument in terms of an
equitable and just fee recovery under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009. It also relies on inapposite caselaw
concerning a party’s obligation to segregate recoverable attorney’s fees allowed by
statute or contract from nonrecoverable ones, citing Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411,
427 (Tex. 2017), and Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310, 314 (Tex.
2006). Neither case involved an attorney’s-fee award as a sanction for discovery abuse,
and the case before us has no declaratory-judgment requests in it. We take it that
Sunbelt complains that the trial court did not limit its attorney’s-fees award to
amounts that W.O.E. incurred in pursuing sanctions, rather than the entirety of
W.O.E.’s attorney’s fees.

                                           13
       The trial court awarded W.O.E. the entirety of its attorney’s fees ($48,189.77)

and costs ($612.77) as sanctions “in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

191, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215, and/or the Court’s inherent power to impose

sanctions.” The trial court declined W.O.E.’s invitation to also sanction Sunbelt

$25 million dollars for its litigation conduct and the “flagrant bad faith” and “callous

disregard” for its discovery obligations that the trial court found.

       W.O.E.’s amended sanctions motion requested, among other things, an order

that “Sunbelt pay all W.O.E.’s attorney’s fees and expenses in defending against

Sunbelt’s claims and pursuing these sanctions.” At the May 18 hearing, for the first

time, W.O.E. provided Sunbelt with copies of its attorney’s-fees invoices. Although

Sunbelt had apparently indicated beforehand, off the record, that it would object to

attorney’s-fees evidence, its counsel stated that

      [W.O.E.’s counsel] did hand me a stack of bills during the break, and so
      I may still assert my objection, but, I mean, I’m certainly prepared to at least
      ask a few questions of [W.O.E.’s counsel], and I think in the purpose of
      everything, I certainly don’t want to stop a train with respect to -- to
      getting that information out there. [Emphasis added.]

      W.O.E.’s counsel then testified in narrative form and offered the billing records

into evidence. The trial court asked if there were any objections to those exhibits;

Sunbelt said no.

      In cross-examining W.O.E.’s counsel, Sunbelt asked about any attempts to

segregate fees relating to “any of the alleged discovery abuse versus the amounts that

[counsel] billed in this lawsuit.” W.O.E.’s counsel explained that he had “looked to

                                            14
try” but “didn’t find it to be feasible,” referring back to his narrative testimony on

direct that carving out only those fees relating to the sanctions motion was “difficult

because the whole Motion for Sanctions and the Amended Motion for Sanctions all

stem from the original conduct in this case to begin with.”9 The following colloquy

occurred about possible segregation:

             Q.    What are the costs associated with the motion – the
      original Motion for Sanctions?

             A.     I have to go back and look and pull them up.

            Q.   Okay. As we’re sitting here right now -- I don’t want to
      waste anymore of the Court’s time, but you can’t tell us that number, can
      you?

             A.      Well, there was a lot of work that went into the motion.
      First of all, again, it’s hard to segregate that. That’s part of the point.
      There were -- there were years of discovery issues and discovery
      problems associated with the case, and then ultimately you have to do
      the research, the analysis, the writing, pull it together. We’ve already had
      one hearing. So I can go back and break down that number for you but I mean
      we --

             Q.    As we sit here right now though, [W.O.E.’s counsel], you
      cannot give us the number associated with preparing, filing the initial --
      original Motion for Sanctions, can you?

             A.     No. It’s all contained in [the two billing-records exhibits].

            Q.     Okay. Likewise, you can’t tell us the amounts involved with
      respect to the amounts associated with the Amended Motion for
      Sanctions, can you?

      9
        In its closing remarks, W.O.E. recapped that it was “seeking sanctions based
on all the sanctionable conduct that has occurred. We have false statements, untrue
testimony, manufacturing evidence, spoliation of a key document and relying on false
contract documents.”

                                           15
             A.     I could if we wanted to take the time to go through it. It’s all
       contained in Exhibits 1 and 2. [Emphases added.]

       Sunbelt never objected to the lack of segregation, asked that W.O.E.’s counsel

do what he said was possible, or moved for a continuance. Later in the hearing,

Sunbelt argued simply that “Under Rohrmoos Ventures,[10] they have the burden to

segregate which fees are potentially related and which ones aren’t. They haven’t done

that.” At the hearing’s end, Sunbelt did not object when the trial court announced its

ruling awarding all undifferentiated fees and costs shown in the billing records and did

not move for reconsideration or for a new trial after the trial court later reduced its

ruling to writing.

       Although W.O.E. has not raised the issue, “[p]reservation of error is a systemic

requirement on appeal,” and “a court of appeals should review preservation of error

on its own motion.” Osman v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-21-00117-CV,

       10
         Rohrmoos Venture did not involve fee segregation but instead clarified the legal
and evidentiary standards for establishing reasonable attorney’s fees in a fee-shifting
situation. See Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469,
492 (Tex. 2019). The supreme court later extended Rohrmoos Venture to the sanctions
context, holding that “[b]efore a court may exercise its discretion to shift attorney’s
fees as a sanction, there must be some evidence of reasonableness because without
such proof a trial court cannot determine that the sanction is ‘no more severe than
necessary’ to fairly compensate the prevailing party.” Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp.,
576 S.W.3d 707, 709 (Tex. 2019) (quoting PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. State,
251 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex. 2008)). The Nath court remanded the attorney’s-fees issue
because the only evidence of reasonableness came in the form of counsel’s conclusory
affidavits; billing records were not introduced. See id. at 710. Here, of course, W.O.E.’s
counsel not only testified but put into evidence, without objection, all the billing
records.

                                            16
2022 WL 187984, at *5 n.9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 20, 2022, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (quoting Knoderer v. State Farm Lloyds, 515 S.W.3d 21, 44 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2017, pet. denied)); see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. 2012)

(“When a party fails to preserve error in the trial court . . . an appellate court may not

consider the unpreserved or waived issue.”); cf. Mitchell v. Wilmington Sav. Funds Soc’y,

FSB, No. 02-18-00089-CV, 2019 WL 150262, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 10,

2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[B]efore we consider whether an abuse of discretion has

occurred, the error must be preserved for our review.”).

      Error preservation generally requires that a party present its complaint to the

trial court by timely request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to make

the trial court aware of the complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Daniels v. Daniels,

No. 02-19-00387-CV, 2021 WL 832648, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 4, 2021,

no pet.) (mem. op.). If the party fails to do this, the complaint is waived on appeal,

and “[c]omplaints regarding alleged error in awarding attorney’s fees are subject to

this rule.” Daniels, 2021 WL 832648, at *2 (quoting Dinkins v. Calhoun, No. 02-17-

00081-CV, 2018 WL 2248572, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 17, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.)).

      “[I]f no objection is made to a failure to segregate attorney’s fees . . . at the time

evidence of attorney’s fees is presented . . . , the error is waived.” Fire Ins. Exch. v.

Kennedy, No. 02-11-00437-CV, 2013 WL 441088, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan.

31, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Am. Homeowners Pres. Fund v. Pirkle,

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475 S.W.3d 507, 529 & n.29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied). “In a bench

trial, the objection that attorney’s fees are not segregated as to specific claims must be

raised before the trial court issues its ruling.” Huey-You v. Huey-You, No. 02-16-00332-

CV, 2017 WL 4053943, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (citing Rule 33.1(a)(1) and holding that because appellant did not object based on

a failure to segregate before the trial court issued its ruling, any error was waived); see

also Spriggs v. Gonzales, No. 07-16-00418-CV, 2018 WL 3193746, at *10 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo June 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that even if appellants had no

opportunity to object and obtain a ruling at the sua sponte Rule 13 sanctions hearing

sprung on them by the trial court, they could have preserved their sanctions-related

complaint with a motion for rehearing or motion for new trial specifying their

complaints). This principle applies as well to attorney’s fees awarded as sanctions.

Werley v. Cannon, 344 S.W.3d 527, 535 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (failing to

object that trial court did not require plaintiffs to segregate attorney’s fees awarded as

sanction waived complaint on appeal). We do not consider Sunbelt’s passing reference

to Rohrmoos Venture to cut the error-preservation mustard and thus overrule its second

issue.

         But even if Sunbelt preserved its failure-to-segregate complaint, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in awarding W.O.E. all its attorney’s fees.

         We review a trial court’s decision on sanctions for a clear abuse of discretion.

Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., Inc., 520 S.W.3d 848, 884 (Tex. 2017)

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(citing Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004)). The test is not whether, in

our opinion, the trial court acted appropriately on the facts presented but “whether

the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Cire,

134 S.W.3d at 838–39 (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,

241 (Tex. 1985)). We will reverse only if the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at

839. Sanctions awarded must be “just.” TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d

913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).

         Sunbelt does not challenge the evidence underpinning the trial court’s findings

that, upon considering Sunbelt’s conduct “during the entirety of this litigation,”

(1) the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed were directly related; (2) “the

offensive conduct is attributable to Sunbelt and its counsel”; (3) the sanctions and

their amount “are based on legitimate purposes for sanctions”; (4) “Sunbelt’s conduct

constitutes flagrant bad faith”; (5) Sunbelt had callously disregarded its discovery

responsibilities under the rules; and (6) the sanctions were not excessive. These

unchallenged findings, entered after an evidentiary hearing, support the sanctions

award.

                                       Conclusion

         Having overruled Sunbelt’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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                                    /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                    Elizabeth Kerr
                                    Justice

Delivered: February 29, 2024

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