Court Opinion

ID: 9756136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:09:35.019418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:12.826112
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
The majority opinion makes it necessary to clarify that the mere minority of the victim has never been construed as preventing the crime from being common law rape, either in its original form or as it has been codified under section 3121 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121, provided that the requisite forcible element is present on the record. “... [U]nlawful carnal knowledge of any female, regardless of age, which is procured by force and accomplished against the will of the victim, is the crime of rape.” See Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 332, 362 A.2d 227, 231 (1976). Moreover, the force necessary to constitute that crime has been described as force sufficient to overcome the will of the victim. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 294 Pa.Super. 93, 439 A.2d 765 (1982). This test has a subjective aspect which takes into account the immaturity of the victim as well as all other factors bearing upon the will of the victim to resist.
The attempt by the majority to suggest the age of the victim alone can eliminate the requirement of force distorts the traditional distinction between statutory and common law rape. The offense of statutory rape is only applicable when the victim is under age, whether or not she has consented to the entry. This is a distinction that our legislature has evidenced a clear intent to preserve in the drafting of sections 3121 and 3122. The fact that the legislature chose to distinguish between the punishment given for a violation of section 3121 as opposed to section 3122 is a judgment that is theirs to make. This Court has no right to overrule that judgment by attempting to obliterate that distinction through case law.
Moreover, the focus by the majority on the force used to accomplish carnal knowledge in this case was gratuitous. *566Here there has not been the slightest suggestion that this victim consented to the penetration. The Superior Court, sua sponte, raised this question as a basis for justifying its decision to reverse the rape conviction under section 3121. The law is clear in this Commonwealth that a reviewing court should not address issues that have not been previously advanced by the parties. See, e.g., Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 507 A.2d 323 (1986); Estep v. Estep, 508 Pa. 623, 500 A.2d 418 (1985); Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 478 A.2d 800 (1984); In re: Duncan Trust, 480 Pa. 608, 391 A.2d 1051 (1978); Coleman v. Board of Education of School District of Philadelphia, 477 Pa. 414, 383 A.2d 1275 (1978); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975). It is for this reason that I join in the mandate reversing the Order of the Superior Court.