Court Opinion

ID: 9850971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:05:06.814201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.226471
License: Public Domain

Hallows, J.
(dissenting). I heartily agree with the language of the majority opinion that a finding of unfitness of a young mother to have custody of her child is drastic and severe and should be supported by substantial evidence and that such a finding should not be made to bolster up granting custody to the father. Certainly, a finding of unfitness should not forever bar custody where *304there has been a rehabilitation or such change in circumstances as would bring the presumption that young children are best taken care of by the mother. That truism accords with experience and the nature of human beings. I agree the finding of fitness or unfitness should be subject to circumstances existing at the time of the hearing.
I disagree with the majority because these rules have not been applied to the facts of this case. The evidence used, especially in reference to the report of the welfare department, was old and outdated and did not reflect conditions existing at the time of the hearing. Even the findings were entered some six months after the hearing, but more important, a reading of the record compels the conclusion that the appellant was found unfit and was penalized for her moral indiscretion and the child taken away from her as a penalty. I find no substantial evidence that the one proven act of moral indiscretion contributed to the neglect of the child or will in the future adversely affect its best interests. If these facts call for a finding of unfitness, the state through its social agencies would be justified in seizing custody of the second child because the appellant also must be unfit to have custody of that child. Stating a finding of unfitness is only tantamount to finding the best interest of the child lies with the other parent is an euphemism. There are not sufficient facts in the record to justify a finding that the best interest of this five-year-old girl will now be better served by granting her custody to her twenty-six-year-old father to be brought up in his parents’ home.
I think the best interest of the child, which we have repeatedly said is the goal to be sought in the determination of custody, requires at least a new hearing in the interest of justice on current evidence before we affirm an order transferring the custody of the child.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice Heffernan joins in this dissent.