Court Opinion

ID: 9830112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:52:58.965063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:03.772469
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
There is nothing new set up in the motion filed for rehearing, either by appellant or by appellee. Replying to appellant’s motion, we feel constrained by what we regard the settled law of this state, to adhere to our holding, that, as a condition precedent to the right to sue the county on any kind of a claim or allow a set-off by cross-bill, the claim must have been .first presented to the commissioners’ court for its action. Clearly the commissioners’ court is under as high an obligation and duty to do right and act honestly as any individual.
The facts seem to be conceded that appellant paid the excess fees to the county, when, ás a matter of law, it was not entitled to them, though it has retained them. The trial court cannot enlarge its powers to administer equity, without proper pleading, if it could 'do so at all, when the commissioners’ court had full and the sole power, on a proper request and showing, to grant the relief, if appellant be entitled to the credit.
There was no plea presented for equitable relief, in the trial court, such as would compel the appellee to allow the credits, as a condition, before it could recover the proper amount that appellee would then be entitled to recover. State v. Morgan, 52 Ark. 150, 12 S. W. 243; Commonwealth v. Owensboro Ry. Co., 81 Ky. 572; Halsey v. Jones, 86 Tex. 488, 25 S. W. 696; Donaldson v. Meyer (Tex. Com. App.) 261 S. W. 369.
It is said in State v. Morgan, supra:
“The court can render no judgment against the state, but it may impose equitable terms in administering relief, and make a full compliance with them a condition precedent to its enjoyment. If the plaintiff shall amend its complaint, and supply the omission we have indicated, the court will hear the cause, have an account stated of the amount which plaintiff should pay the defendant, crediting him, as in other similar suits, by the purchase money, amount paid for taxes, and the value of improvements on the land, and charging him with the rents and profits, and upon the payment of'said sum render a decree canceling the patent. If such amendment is not made, the cause will be dismissed. As the plaintiff may not be able to comply with equitable terms until the Legislature meets, and provides, if it so desires, the fund necessary, it would perhaps be well for the court to continue the cause until that time.”
In the Morgan Case, supra, the state was seeking to recover land it had illegally sold after having received the purchase price.
It will thus be seen that the state can be estopped, at least, the parties can be left in statu quo, for, as said in the case of Commonwealth v. Owensboro & Nashville Railway Company, 81 Ky. 572, the court, speaking through Judge Pryor:
“Where the commonwealth undertakes to litigate with a citizen or corporation, the latter may, by set-off or counterclaim, defeat the recovery of the state; but in the absence of some special legislative authority, the defendant cannot have judgment over against the commonwealth.”
In the ease of Halsey v. Jones, supra, suit was instituted to recover land under an alleged void purchase by the administrator, in which the defendant sought to compel, as a condition precedent, the return of the purchase price paid by him to the estate, and the court said:
“In this case the order of the court recognized the claims of the administrator" as subsisting debts against the estate; and tlley were charges upon the property in the hands of the administrator. The .defendants are therefore entitled to be reimbursed for the amount which was credited upon the claims in the transaction, before th.e plaintiffs can recover the land. They are also entitled to interest. Mayes v. Blanton, 67 Tex. 245.
“The judgment will therefore be reformed so as to allow the plaintiffs in the court below to recover the land, conditioned, however, upon their paying to the defendants within six months from this date the sum of $80, with interest thereon from the 4th of April, 1840. The plaintiffs in error will recover the costs of the appeal and of„the writ of error.”
And in Donaldson v. Meyer, supra, a more recent case, and we rather think the rule there was extended to the very breaking point, being a suit to set aside a void conveyance of a homestead made by an insane man, who had no power whatever to contract and sell his homestead, the Commission of Appeals held:
‘“We recommend that the judgment of the district court and that of the Court of Civil Appeals be reversed, and that judgment be *231here rendered as given by said courts, save that if plaintiffs below, that is, Meyer and wife, fail within six months to deposit with tie clerk of the district court, for benefit of defendant Donaldson, the sum of $3,000, with interest from November 4, 1918 at 6 per cent., then order of sale shall issue for the sale of the land in controversy in this suit to satisfy said judgment in favor of defendant Donaldson, and costs of sale.”
This holding was approved by the Supreme Court.
Appellant never, by plea or otherwise, sought the equitable powers of the trial court, but stood upon his legal defense to set off his claim. The reply of appellant to motion of appellee for a rehearing that the statute of limitation does not run against the county is well presented, wherein appellant says:
“The only case in Texas cited by appellee is that of Coleman v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 514, which we submit is not applicable in the present case. In the above cited ease, the suit was to recover land held by the county in trust for the state and it was representing the state as its alter ego and as its agent for the recovery of property the true title to which was in the state. In the present case the state has no interest in excess fees paid; those fees are paid directly to the county for its use and benefit and are not payable by it to the state and the state has no control over the expenditure of same by the county. The Legislature has not seen fit to exempt the county from the running of the statutes of limitation on any demands it may have for any moneys due it.”
Appellee, by separate motion, calls our attention to an error committed in the statement of certain amounts allowed appellant by way of recoupments, credits, or set-offs amounting to $3,727.41, during the fiscal year beginning December 1, 1917, and ending November 30, 1918; whereas, the trial court also allowed the appellant, by way of set-off as against the amount recovered by the county of Bexar for fees for the fiscal year beginning December 1, 1918, and ending November 30, 1919, the further sum of $4,523.-78, which respective amounts of $3,727.41 and $4,523.78, being same in status should not have been allowed appellant as set-offs. The total of said two amounts aggregate $8,251.19. It is therefore ordered that the judgment be so corrected by adding to the appellee’s recovery the further sum of $4,-523.7S, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent, from December 1, 1919.
Appellant’s motion for a rehearing is overruled, and likewise appellee’s motion for a rehearing is overruled. Appellant’s motion to correct the judgment is granted, and the correction is made as above stated, by adding such additional sum of $4,520.78, with interest, to the judgment.