Court Opinion

ID: 9542949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:36.600815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:20.533923
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that, “[g]iven the extent of the class and the wide range of issues presented in this case, the [trial] court should have more carefully delineated the nature of each claim for relief and the categories of plaintiffs who could ask for such relief.” At 794. For this reason, remanding the case in order to define the classes of litigants more carefully is the appropriate conclusion at this time. I also agree that section 27-10-116 of the Care and Treatment Act, as modified by Senate Bill 120, applies both to voluntary and involuntary patients, and that neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor passage of Senate Bill 120 deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to implement a remedial plan up to the amount of available appropriations. See at 801.
I.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in Part II.B.l that “the trial court prematurely and unnecessarily addressed the issue of whether persons afflicted with chronic mental illness have rights created by the Care and Treatment Act [prior to passage of Senate Bill 120] that must be satisfied without regard to the amount of money appropriated by the legislature for that purpose.” At 798. The trial court’s determination of the possibility of ordering monetary relief in excess of available appropriations is no more “premature and unnecessarily addressed” prior to passage of Senate Bill 120 than it is after passage of Senate Bill 120, yet the majority does not hesitate to reach the propriety of the latter issue in Part II.B.2. If anything, the trial court’s determination of the extent of relief under the Care and Treatment Act prior to passage of Senate Bill 120 is more pressing because the claims in this case arose and will be determined under the law in effect prior to passage of Senate Bill 120. By failing to address the propriety of the trial court’s holding that the right to care and treatment under section 27-10-116 was not limited to the amount of available appropriations, the majority leaves open the possibility that the trial court could implement a remedial plan pursuant to section 27-10-116 in excess of the amount appropriated by the General Assembly. I believe that such a possibility is foreclosed because whatever benefits may be conferred by a statute such as section 27-10-116 are limited to the amounts appropriated by the General Assembly even in the absence of express language to that effect.
*811The circumstances under which Senate Bill 120 was passed indicate that the General Assembly intended to limit the relief that could be ordered for violation of section 27-10-116 to the amount of available appropriations. Senate Bill 120 was a response to the trial court’s invitation to the General Assembly to make “crystal clear” its intent concerning availability of monetary relief for violation of the Care and Treatment Act. The title of Senate Bill 120, though not controlling, supports the view that the General Assembly intended to limit monetary relief to the amount of available appropriations. Senate Bill 120 is entitled “An Act Concerning Clarification That Any Right To Mental Health Services Is Subject To The General Assembly’s Right To Establish, By Appropriation, The Level Of Service To Be Rendered.” Ch. 210, § 4, § 27-10-116, 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 1010, 1011 (emphasis added). I conclude from the title that the General Assembly prior to passage of Senate Bill 120 intended to limit any right to mental health services pursuant to the Care and Treatment Act to available appropriations. Finally, restrictions placed by the General Assembly on disbursements made in payment of liabilities incurred on behalf of the state indicate that monetary relief for implementation of section 27-10-116 could not be ordered in excess of available appropriations. Section 24-30-202(3) provides:
In no event shall the head of any state department, institution, or other agency or the controller, either by himself or through any assistant designated by him, approve any commitment voucher involving expenditure of any sum in excess of the unencumbered balance of the allotment to which the resulting disbursement would be charged. No person shall incur or order or vote for the incurrence of any obligation against the state in excess of or for any expenditure not authorized by appropriation, allotment, and approved commitment voucher except as expressly authorized by this section. Any such obligation so raised in contravention of this section shall not be binding against the state but shall be null and void ab initio and incapable of ratification by any administrative authority of the state to give effect thereto against the state. But every person incurring or ordering or voting for the incurrence of such obligation and his surety shall be jointly and severally liable therefor.
10 C.R.S. (1982).1 Under this statute, department officials may not approve an expenditure in excess of the amount appropriated by the General Assembly. To do so could subject them to personal liability for the amount of excess appropriations. The interpretation adopted by the trial court would place these public officials in the untenable position of being compelled to release funds they are statutorily prohibited from releasing. That the General Assembly intended such a result is unthinkable.
II.
The remaining issues addressed by the majority are not properly before the court because of its disposition of the case for failure to comply with various subsections of C.R.C.P. 23. I would refrain from offering what amounts to an advisory opinion on the issues addressed in Parts II.C, II.D, II.E, and II.F of the majority opinion. This court is not empowered to give advisory opinions based on hypothetical fact situations. Tippett v. Johnson, 742 P.2d 314, 315 (Colo.1987); Kemp v. Empire Sav., Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 660 P.2d 899, 901 (Colo.1983); People v. Campbell, 196 Colo. 390, 392, 589 P.2d 1360, 1361 (1978); see also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969). As we said recently, statements concerning issues not necessary to the disposition of the case “should be recognized as dictum without precedential effect.” See People in the Interest of Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381, 1385, (Colo.1988).
*812I therefore concur as to Part II.A and as much of Part II.B.2 that conforms to this special concurrence. I express no opinion as to Parts II.C, II.D, II.E and II.F, and dissent as to Part II.B.l.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON joins in this concurrence and dissent.

. Section 24-30-202(3) was amended in 1988 by deleting the word "allotment” and inserting the word "appropriation." Ch. 170, § 1, § 24-30-202(3), 1988 Colo.Sess.Laws 908, 912. The amendment was effective March 18, 1988, and applies to appropriations and expenditures for the 1988-89 fiscal year and thereafter. See editor’s note to § 24-30-202, 10A C.R.S. (1988).