Court Opinion

ID: 9643844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:41:39.938628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:04.357956
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification, [footnote omitted] Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: ‘What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is preverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials. These instances are recent — not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal procedure.’ The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927). A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the de*518gree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. * * * And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the witness’ opportunity for observation was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the greatest.”1
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-229, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).
With those truisms in mind, I join Judge Odom in his dissenting opinion, for it is clear enough that the incourt identification of appellant by the two witnesses was based on his being presented to them by peace officers in the manner about which there is no dispute. But for certain statements in the majority opinion and the expression of wholehearted concurrence with “approval of a one-on-one confrontation” in a concurring opinion, I would be content with the sound reasons given by Judge Odom for dissenting.
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) implicitly approved was the proposition that “the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification ... has been widely condemned,” and properly so, id., U.S. at 302.2 In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)—a pre-Stovall “showup” seven months after the offense — and Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)—a single photograph viewed two days later — identification was tested by Biggers factors, which are outlined by the majority in this instant case. However, the Supreme Court has not withdrawn its aversion to the confrontation practice addressed in Stovall.3 Rather, to the extent it applies, Manson v. Braithwaite, supra, has shifted the focus of the due process analysis to “reliability ... in determining the admissibility of identification testimony,” so that the Biggers factors are weighed against “the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself,” Manson, id., U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253. The import of Manson lies not in any material conceptual change, but in the analytical approach to be taken in determining claims such as appellant raises here.
Accordingly, I would not apply here the questionable proposition concerning the confrontation practice reviewed in Stovall that is restated in the majority opinion: “in many situations its use is necessary.” The testimony of the identification witnesses in the case at bar belies the notion that “the witness is allowed to test his recollection while his memory is still fresh and accurate,” for all they had in mind were clothing and physical build. There was neither “the quick confirmation [nor] denial of identification” of appellant, yet he was not released in order that investigating officers “continue their search for the criminal.” Finally, exposure of possible prejudice “by rigorous cross-examination of the witness” is of no avail when the issue is, as here, admissibility vel non of identification testimony.4
*519To be contrasted with the facts of the situation outlined in the panel opinion 5 are those that ultimately weighed in favor of admitting the testimony of Trooper Glover, a “specially trained, assigned and experienced” undercover officer, in Manson.6 Thus, the concern of the Supreme Court in Stovall, see note 3, ante, was not truly implicated in Manson.
Finally, since the issue is admissibility of testimony rather than its credibility and weight, I part company with the majority in its treatment of the “duty” of the jury to assess reliability of identification evidence.7 Along its way to holding that a state criminal court is not constitutionally required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in every case to conduct an identification hearing out of the presence of the jury, Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 345-349, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981), the Supreme Court made the observation to which the majority alludes in a context of pointing out the distinction between its rejection of “the usual presumption that a jury can be relied upon to determine issues according the trial judge’s instructions,” that gave rise to the constitutional requirement that a Jackson v. Denno hearing 8 be held to determine admissibility of a challenged confession, and an identification hearing. Thus it was written:
“Where identification evidence is at issue, however, no such special considerations justify a departure from the presumption that juries will follow instructions. It is the reliability of identification evidence that primarily determines its admissibility.... And the proper evaluation of evidence under instructions of the trial judge is the very task our system must assume juries can perform. Indeed, as the cases before us demonstrate, the only duty of a jury in cases in which the identification has been admitted will often be to assess the reliability of that evidence [emphasis in original].” Id., at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 658.
Patently, the Supreme Court had reference to the fact that it had already accepted the finding of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in each case that there was no “impermissible suggestiveness” in Watkins’ case, id., at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 656, and “no semblance of impermissible suggestiveness” in Summitt’s either, id., at 345, 101 S.Ct. at 657. Thus, assessment of reliability was the “only duty” for the jury to discharge in finding guilt — following appropriate instructions from the trial court. However, again, the whole discussion was to differentiate the due process considerations in a Jackson v. Denno hearing, in order to find that while “such a determination may be constitutionally necessary” in some cases, “it does not follow that the Constitution requires a per se rule compelling such a procedure in every case,” id., at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 659.
In my judgment there is much mischief in upholding the manner of identifying a citi*520zen that has been “widely condemned,” and for the additional reasons set forth, as well as those given by Judge Odom, I must dissent.

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.

. The Supreme Court did not fault the “immediate hospital confrontation” at issue because under the circumstances — the only eyewitness had just undergone surgery to save her life and it was not known how long she might live — the “one-on-one” confrontation was found to be “the only feasible procedure” and, as such, “imperative,” id., at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972.

. Indeed, the Manson Court recognized the concern in Stovall and its two companion decisions was with respect to problems of eyewitness identification, viz:
“Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness’ recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances of later actions of the police. Thus, Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability.” Id., U.S. at 112, 97 S.Ct. at 2252.

. In Neil v. Biggers, supra, opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Powell, noted that both the confrontation at issue and the trial preceded Stovall, the decision in which was “when we first gave notice that suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to be argued to the jury.”

. “Within minutes appellant and his companion were stopped a few blocks from the scene because they matched the general description given by the witnesses, and were immediately returned to the scene for possible identification. Before they arrived at the scene, however, the officer told them that two suspects were being brought back, and asked them if they were sure about the age of the suspects. Garcia testified they told the officer they could not say the age for sure because they did not get a clear view of the offenders...”

. “[W]e find in the instant case little pressure on the witness to acquiesce in the suggestion that such a [single-photograph] display entails. D’Onofrio had left the photograph at Glover’s office and was not present when Glover first viewed it two days after the event. There thus were little urgency and Glover could view the photograph at his leisure. And since Glover examined the photograph alone, there was no coercive pressure of another. The identification was made in circumstances allowing care and reflection.” Id., U.S. at 116, 97 S.Ct. at 2254.

. Though in the instant case the issue is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress identification testimony on grounds it was tainted by the on site confrontation, 1 perceive that the extensive discussion by the majority of evidence admitted at trial and of the role of a jury as factfinder is but an early harbinger of the end of the Martinez identification hearing in Texas. See Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842, 847-848 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).