Court Opinion

ID: 9530883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:04:52.026484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:16.589579
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE ROMITI, dissenting: I fully agree with the majority that great weight should be accorded the factual findings of the trial court. It appears to me, however, that the unusual posture of this case is that those findings support the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. The sole disputed issue in the trial was whether the defendant knew that the tires were stolen at the time that he was transporting them with Dokins. The applicable statute cited in the majority opinion requires that the acts be done “knowingly.” Section 4 — 5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 4 — 5), states: “A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of: (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the defendant is to be held to a standard of actual knowledge. This is to be contrasted with the test for obtaining control of stolen property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(d)), which allows a finding of guilt when a person obtains control over stolen property “under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen * 0 In the light of this standard of actual knowledge, it is important to set out in full the findings of the trial court: “The question is whether there has been proof that defendant knowingly or — well, it’s circumstantial and — where the statement — the question is whether he knew or should have known that they were stolen. The charge here is exerting unauthorized control. From what I have heard the time of night this was that the defendant the circumstances under which this happened without other explanation as to how the other individual got in possession of the tires I would feel that all the circumstances indicated that if Cortez Lofton didn’t know, he should have known these were stolen tires. Accordingly, he will be found guilty.” (Emphasis added.) This finding of fact clearly reveals that the trial court did not determine that the defendant had the actual knowledge required by statute for his conviction. He, therefore, was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and his conviction should be reversed. Even if we were to overlook the trial court’s factual findings and independently determine the issue of reasonable doubt, the judgment should not be affirmed. In the main the majority opinion is bottomed on two incriminating factors, (1) the late hour at which these events took place, and (2) the fact of defendant’s flight. This court has previously noted that in an urban setting it is not unusual for people to be about the streets and alleys at late hours. (People v. Thompson (1975), 35 Ill. App. 3d 105, 340 N.E.2d 631.) The defendant explained that he was returning from his sister’s house when he encountered Dokins, an explanation which is not incredible on its face. The fact of defendant’s flight when the police arrived is also cited. In this regard, the police officer at trial testified that he was not in uniform and was in an unmarked car when he approached the defendant. While Dokins testified that he recognized the car as that of a detective, the defendant’s uncontradicted testimony was that he (defendant) only heard the approach of a car and then ran on Dokins’ instruction, without ever seeing the car. Even if he had seen it, or observed the officer in it, there was no showing at trial that he too would have been aware that a police officer and a police car were involved. Therefore, defendant’s flight cannot fairly be described or characterized as “flight from the police.” In addition, flight is evidence of guilt only when the accused knows that a crime has been committed and that he may be a suspect. (People v. Harris (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 270, 178 N.E.2d 291; People v. Reyes (1970), 131 Ill. App. 2d 134, 266 N.E.2d 539.) Yet in this case that flight is cited as evidence of the very knowledge which is required to constitute the crime thereby making flight evidence of guilt. In my view, under this analysis, the two crucial factors in this case become weak support for that which they allegedly prove. Further, defendant’s conviction was based on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. The explanation he presented at trial was uncontradicted by any direct evidence. Given the urban setting of these events, his explanation was a credible one and reasonably consistent with innocence. The police officer at trial testified that when defendant was apprehended on the scene he then gave the same explanation that he gave at trial; he was just helping a friend with the tires. Dokins, who had already been convicted for theft of the tires, testified that he had not informed defendant prior to their arrest that the tires were stolen. At the conclusion of the evidence the trial judge indicated that he could not determine that defendant actually knew that the tires were stolen. It seems clear, then, that the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant. People v. Branion (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 70, 265 N.E.2d 1, cert, denied (1971), 403 U.S. 907, 29 L. Ed. 2d 683, 91 S. Ct. 2213; People v. Robinson (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 24, 337 N.E.2d 356. It is my opinion that based on the trial court’s findings of fact, or even based on an independent evaluation of the evidence at trial, defendant’s conviction should be reversed.