Court Opinion

ID: 9916415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 22:08:30.520607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:21.414171
License: Public Domain

01/09/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT KNOXVILLE
                                  June 21, 2023 Session

       SARAH ELIZABETH PARKER v. KENTON STONE PARKER

            Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sullivan County (Bristol)
                     No. 20-CB-27358C E.G. Moody, Chancellor
                      ___________________________________

                            No. E2022-00644-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate
as marital property. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

      Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
                           Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Harold Wayne Graves, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kenton Stone Parker.

Jeremy E. Harr, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Sarah Elizabeth Parker.

                                         OPINION

                                    I. BACKGROUND

        Sarah Elizabeth Parker (“Wife”) and Kenton Stone Parker (“Husband”) became a
couple and began residing together in 2005; they were married on February 7, 2009. Two
children were born to the marriage. The parties filed for divorce in 2020. After mediation,
all issues involving the children were resolved; additionally, most of the property and debt
issues were addressed. The only issues to be addressed in this appeal are what interest Wife
may have in two parcels Husband acquired prior to the marriage. The trial in this matter
was conducted on July 7, 2021.
                            BAYWOOD DRIVE PROPERTY

       While living together and prior to their marriage, the parties found and purchased,
via mortgage, a home located at 469 Baywood Drive, Kingsport (“Baywood Drive
Property”). Husband titled the Baywood Drive Property, purchased for the sum of
$102,000, solely in his name because, at that time, Wife was unemployed and had
outstanding student loan debt which made it difficult for her to obtain financing. Wife
related that Husband planned to add her name to the property deed when possible. Husband
asserted that he intended to keep the property separate and denied Wife’s claim; he
acknowledged that the couple intended to enter into the joint venture of home ownership.
After purchasing the Baywood Drive Property, the parties began renovating and expanding
it.

       Wife testified that she contributed $20,000 to the Baywood Drive Property
renovations from the sale of a house she had inherited in 2014. Additionally, Wife
contributed another $20,000 that she was awarded in 2011 from a wrongful termination
settlement to assist in the remodeling and improvement of the property. She claimed to
have paid off approximately $20,000 of credit card debt that arose out of transactions used
for the property renovations and family debt. Additionally, Wife provided receipts for
checks she wrote from her personal accounts toward the renovations and improvements.
Further, she testified that she paid for two heat pumps and a blower in the amount of $6,475
and for termite services. Wife also contributed “sweat equity” with her physical labor,
caulking, painting, supervision of the remodeling and design work on the Baywood Drive
Property. She purchased a family vehicle for $25,000 out of additional funds from her
inheritance. For the duration of the marriage, Wife has been employed, including being a
stay-at-home mother for a period of time.

       Wife resided in the home during the marriage, and she and the children have lived
there exclusively since the separation in 2019. Throughout the marriage, both Husband and
Wife paid household expenses by various means and methods. As noted above, the
Baywood Drive Property was encumbered with a mortgage paid with marital funds during
the entire term of the marriage.

       Husband testified that household and family expenses such as utilities, clothes, and
groceries were sometimes charged to credit cards, and both he and Wife paid on the credit
cards prior to their separation. He asserted that Wife never made a mortgage payment, paid
the taxes, or used any of her money toward the house.

       An appraisal conducted in 2010, just one year after the marriage, valued the home
at $320,000. The couple stipulated that the Baywood Drive Property has a current value of
$442,000 and a mortgage of $48,000. They agreed that Wife will have the children 70% of
the time; she would like to finish raising the children in the marital residence.

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                           BOATDOCK ROAD PROPERTY

       Prior to the marriage, Husband bought a 50% interest in the property at 120
Boatdock Road (“Boatdock Road Property”) with a business partner. Husband testified that
the deed reflects the owners as tenants in common with sole right of survivorship. Wife
related that at numerous times throughout the marriage, marital funds were used for taxes,
maintenance, and upkeep for the Boatdock Road Property. She claimed that Husband paid
his business partner, out of marital funds, approximately $2,000 per year for taxes and
maintenance for the property, totaling approximately $25,000. Husband disputes Wife’s
contention.

       After a full hearing, the trial court determined that Wife’s contributions for the
improvements to the Baywood Drive Property were substantial and greater than $100,000.
The court concluded that (1) the Baywood Drive Property had been transmuted to marital
property and ordered it to be sold upon the youngest child reaching eighteen years of age
and graduating high school, with the equity to be divided 50/50 between the parties at that
time; and (2) Wife was entitled to a judgment against Husband in the amount of $12,000,
representing one-half of the amount Husband spent from marital funds during the marriage
on the Boatdock Road Property. Wife is to be reimbursed one-half of the money paid for
its upkeep. The Boatdock Road Property remains the separate property of Husband.
Husband filed a timely appeal.

                                       II. ISSUES

      We restate the issues presented by Husband in this appeal as follows:

      A. Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the Baywood Drive
      Property had been transmuted to marital property, with each party having
      50% ownership, and ordering that when the youngest child reaches eighteen
      years of age and graduates from high school, the property shall be sold and
      its equity be divided equally, 50/50, between the parties.

      B. Whether the trial court was correct in finding that Wife was entitled to a
      judgment of $12,000 as remuneration for one-half of the amount of marital
      funds that Husband had spent towards maintaining the Boatdock Road
      Property during the span of their marriage.

                            III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Courts review a non-jury trial’s judgment de novo upon the record, accompanied by
a presumption of correctness as the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the

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evidence is to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692
(Tenn. 2014). “In order for the evidence to preponderate against the trial court’s findings
of fact, the evidence must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.”
Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). A trial court’s conclusions
of law are subject to a de novo review without a presumption of correctness. Kelly, 445
S.W.3d at 692. The trial court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to
great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011).

        During a divorce proceeding, the classification of whether property is either marital
or separate property is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court upon
consideration of all relevant circumstances. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 245
(Tenn. 2009). The trial court has broad discretion when classifying and dividing the marital
estate, and its findings are entitled to great weight on appeal. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 107
S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Unless a trial court’s decision concerning the
classification or division of property is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence or is
based on an error in law, courts will not interfere with the trial court’s decision on appeal.
Id.

                                    IV. DISCUSSION
       Because separate property is not subject to division in divorce proceedings, as noted
above, the division of a marital estate begins with the classification of the property as
separate or marital property. Miller v. Miller, 81 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
Generally, marital property is “all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible,
acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the
final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a
complaint for divorce[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). Separate property is
defined in part as “all real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage,
including, but not limited to ... property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest,
devise or descent[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D).

       “[S]eparate property may be deemed marital by operation of law under theories of
commingling or transmutation.” Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 247 (citing Langschmidt v.
Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 2002)). Id. Separate property becomes marital
property by commingling if inextricably mingled with marital property or with the separate
property of the other spouse. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 256. Transmutation results when
separate property is used in a manner as to give evidence that it become marital property.
Id. A rebuttable presumption that one spouse has given a gift to the marital estate arises
when that spouse takes affirmative steps to change the separateness of the property owned
before the marriage. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2002) (citing 2

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Homer H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 16.2 at 185 (2d
ed. 1987)). Thus, when separate property is transmuted into marital property, it is divisible
by both spouses at divorce. Id. We have further recognized:

       Four of the most common factors courts use to determine whether real
       property has been transmuted from separate property to marital property are:
       (1) the use of the property as a marital residence; (2) the ongoing
       maintenance and management of the property by both parties; (3) placing the
       title to the property in joint ownership; and (4) using the credit of the non-
       owner spouse to improve the property.

Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Fox v. Fox, No.
M2004-02616-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2535407, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2006)).

       Title alone is not dispositive of the intent of the parties in the use of the property;
“whether a particular asset is marital or separate depends on the conduct of the parties, not
the record title of the asset. An asset separately owned by one spouse will be classified as
marital property if the parties themselves treated it as marital property.” Fox, 2006 WL
2535407, at *5.

        Husband argues that the Baywood Drive Property was separate property purchased
by him before the marriage that he intended to remain separate. He asserts that it was error
for the trial court to find that the residence became marital property through the doctrines
of commingling and/or transmutation. Wife contends that the trial court properly found
that the Baywood Drive Property is marital property.

       As we recently discussed in Booker v. Booker, No. E2022-01228-COA-R3-CV,
2023 WL 7016215, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2023), “[T]ransmutation often occurs
when a spouse purchases real property prior to the marriage and the parties then use the
property as the marital residence and undertake significant improvements to the property
during the marriage.” See Dover v. Dover, No. E2019-01891-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL
7224368, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2020) (collecting cases).

       In the present case, the Baywood Drive Property was used as the family residence
throughout the marriage. Wife made significant contributions to the maintenance and
improvements to the property. The term “substantial contribution” is defined to include,
but is not limited to “the direct or indirect contribution of a spouse as homemaker, wage
earner, parent or family financial manager, together with such other factors as the court
having jurisdiction thereof may determine.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(D). In the
matter before us, Wife provided physical labor in the remodeling of the home. She
contributed funds from her separate property of approximately $93,819 for renovations,
maintenance, and improvements to the home. Additionally, Wife contributed to the

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improvements and maintenance of the property by paying off credit card debt that arose
out of property renovations and family expenses. Furthermore, Wife maintained the home
and cared for the children. Tennessee law “does not discount the contributions made by the
homemakers to property.” Richardson v. Richardson, No. E2019-02108-COA-R3-CV,
2020 WL 7343028, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2020). The state’s policy is to recognize
“the equal dignity and importance of the contributions to the family of the homemaker and
the breadwinner.” Shackelford v. Shackelford, No. M2018-01170-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL
2151684, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2019); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-
121(c)(5)(a) (providing that contributions of the homemaker and wage earner are given the
same weight in the division of property if each party fulfills their role).

      Accordingly, we agree with the findings of the trial court. The parties treated the
Baywood Drive Property as marital property and maintained it with marital funds. Even
though the property was titled separately, the preponderance of the evidence is that
Husband intended for the Baywood Drive Property to be marital property. The record
supports the trial court’s factual findings and application of the doctrine of transmutation.

       Further, the evidence establishes that approximately $25,000 of marital funds were
used toward payment of property taxes, upkeep, and maintenance to the Boatdock Road
Property. Thus, the trial court’s award of $12,000 to Wife for her contributions and
improvements to this property must be affirmed.

      In the “Conclusion” paragraph of Wife’s brief, a request was made for an award of
reasonable attorney fees and expenses related to this appeal. We must deem the request
waived as Wife failed to include it in her statement of issues. See Hodge v. Craig, 382
S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012); Brunetz v. Brunetz, 573 S.W.3d 173, 185-86 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2018).

                                    V. CONCLUSION

        The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the property
at issue is marital property. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The
case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this
opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the appellant, Kenton Stone Parker.

                                                  _________________________________
                                                  JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE

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