Court Opinion

ID: 9460798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:00:40.040666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:47.332152
License: Public Domain

*1381WINTER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I think that my brothers are persuasive that defendant received effective assistance of counsel. But the fact remains that he was not permitted to have counsel of his choice, and on that ground I would reverse.
In United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-740 (4 Cir. 1973), we said explicitly “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes . . . the right of any accused, if he can provide counsel for himself . . . to be represented by an attorney of Ms own choosing.” (Emphasis added.) This is the law of this circuit unless Inman is now being overruled.
In the instant case, promptly after defendant was arraigned and his trial scheduled for a date approximately 60 days thereafter, defendant employed counsel having, in his view, special expertise in defense of the crime with which defendant was charged. Although the district court adjusted its schedule to permit this new attorney to participate in pretrial motions which would generate rulings having a controlling effect on the trial of the case, it declined a continuance to permit this attorney, who had a previous trial commitment, to participate in the trial of the case. In oral argument, we were told that a continuance of a few days would have been all that was required to permit defendant to be tried, represented by the lawyer of his choice.
There is no warrant in this record for saying that defendant’s desire to be represented by the lawyer who was excluded was confined to representation on pretrial motions. Defendant asserts, and the record supports him, that he wanted this lawyer for trial. There is no basis on which to conclude that defendant’s request to substitution of counsel was made in bad faith for purposes of delay. There is no basis on which to say that defendant’s request to substitution of counsel was belated. If either of the latter, we could well conclude that defendant had forfeited or waived his right to counsel of his choosing. United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182 (4 Cir.), cert. den., 393 U.S. 840, 89 S.Ct. 118, 21 L.Ed.2d 111 (1968); United States v. Lisk, 454 F.2d. 205 (4 Cir. 1972); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648 (4 Cir. 1972).
I do not question that defendant received competent representation at trial by his original attorney whom he was forced. to retain. ' But effectiveness of substitute counsel is not a relevant consideration when he is not counsel of choice. Davis v. State, 292 Ala. 210, 291 So.2d 346 (1974).
Under Inman, effectiveness of representation is not enough. Inman requires reversal because defendant was not represented by the lawyer of his choice, even though defendant could have provided that representation for himself, and there was absent any valid reason to deny him the right to choose.