Court Opinion

ID: 9953857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 21:01:28.713411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:53.419901
License: Public Domain

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                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 22-2095

        JEROME L. JOHNSON,

                    Plaintiff – Appellant,

              v.

        BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT; KEVIN DAVIS; FRANK BARLOW;
        DANIEL BOONE; GERALD GOLDSTEIN,

                    Defendants – Appellees.

                                                No. 22-2134

        JEROME L. JOHNSON,

                    Plaintiff – Appellee,

              v.

        BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT; KEVIN DAVIS; FRANK BARLOW;
        DANIEL BOONE; GERALD GOLDSTEIN,

                    Defendants – Appellants.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
        Ellen Lipton Hollander, Senior District Judge. (1:19-cv-00698-ELH)

        Argued: December 5, 2023                                        Decided: March 21, 2024
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        Before AGEE, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Judgment in No. 22-2095 affirmed and appeal in No. 22-2134 dismissed by unpublished
        opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion in which Judge Agee and Judge Benjamin
        join.

        ARGUED: Kobie Alan Flowers, BROWN GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP, Baltimore,
        Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Michael Patrick Redmond, BALTIMORE CITY
        LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ON
        BRIEF: Andrew D. Freeman, Neel K. Lalchandani, BROWN GOLDSTEIN & LEVY,
        LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Ebony M. Thompson, Acting
        City Solicitor, Kara K. Lynch, Chief Solicitor, Michael Redmond, Director, Appellate
        Practice Group, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland,
        for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

               Roughly thirty-five years ago, a Baltimore jury convicted Jerome “Lamont”

        Johnson and two others for the July 14, 1988 murder of Aaron Taylor. Johnson was

        sentenced to life for first degree murder plus a twenty-year consecutive sentence for use of

        a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Some thirty years later, the Baltimore

        City State’s Attorney’s Office and Johnson jointly petitioned for a writ of actual innocence.

        The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted that petition, vacating Johnson’s convictions.

        Johnson then sued the Baltimore Police Department and several investigating officers

        under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that due to the officers’ failure to disclose exculpatory

        evidence and other actions, he served several decades in prison for a crime he did not

        commit.

               After discovery, the police officers and the police department moved to dismiss

        Johnson’s complaint as a litigation sanction, alleging he knowingly used false and

        fabricated evidence to secure his exoneration and intentionally tampered with potential

        witnesses to influence their testimony in connection with efforts to vacate his convictions.

        They also moved for summary judgment on the merits of Johnson’s § 1983 and related

        claims. In a comprehensive order, the district court granted the sanction motion dismissing

        the complaint, and, alternatively, granted the motion for summary judgment on all pending

        counts. Johnson timely appealed and the officers and police department cross-appealed,

        asking us to remand for the district court to consider and award attorneys’ fees. For the

        reasons stated below, we affirm the district court’s well-reasoned order granting summary

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        judgment for the officers and the police department on the merits. We dismiss the officers’

        and police department’s cross-appeal seeking a limited remand.

                                                      I. 1

               Just after 1:00 a.m. on July 14, 1988, a group of men approached Taylor on a

        basketball court. An argument ensued. Taylor fled into the nearby Night Owl Tavern, a

        neighborhood bar and store. One of the men on the basketball court—Alvin Hill, also

        known as “Poopie”—and several others from the basketball court followed him into the

        bar. While inside, Hill fatally shot Taylor with a handgun.

               The first two Baltimore Police Department officers on the scene were Robert Mays

        and Kenneth Jones. Homicide detective Kevin Davis arrived later. At the scene, Officer

        Jones and Detective Davis encountered Lakeisha Snead, Taylor’s 15-year-old cousin and

        a key witness to the crime. The information Snead provided to the police officers at various

        times and her testimony to the grand jury and at trial are central to Johnson’s claims. So,

        we describe that information and testimony in some detail.

               In an affidavit signed in 2021, over 30 years after the murder, Officer Jones said he

        interviewed Snead the night of the incident. He said the interview took place not at the

        scene, but at police headquarters. In his affidavit, Officer Jones said, after the interview, he

               1
                 The complete facts and procedural history are extensive and thoroughly set forth
        in the district court’s order. We describe the portions of those facts and procedural history
        necessary for this opinion.
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        left Snead at police headquarters and told a member of the department, who he thought was

        a detective, that Snead was at the homicide unit.

               Although he said he did not take any notes during Snead’s interview, Officer Jones

        said that he memorialized the interview in a handwritten “supplemental report.” J.A. 787.

        That report, dated “14 Jul 88,” indicates that Snead said she was present in the bar with

        Taylor. J.A. 938. According to the report, Snead said four men came into the bar. One

        pulled a black and brown gun from his waistband and held it down to the floor. She said

        Taylor grabbed a bar patron and used him as a human shield. Eventually, that patron freed

        himself and fled, leaving her cousin to face the man with the gun. According to the report,

        Snead “then ran out and heard 5 shots,” and the three men who came into the bar with the

        man holding the gun also fled. J.A. 938. Snead described the physical appearance of the

        man holding the gun but indicated that she did not know his name. She indicated, however,

        that she had seen him in the area. She also said she knew the names of two of the other

        men but did not want to give Officer Jones that information because she feared for her life.

               Detective Davis also prepared a typed report on July 14, 1988. The report says

        Officer Jones interviewed Snead but does not say where that interview took place. It also

        describes Snead as “extremely excited.” J.A. 746. According to the report, and potentially

        in conflict with Officer Jones’ handwritten report, Snead said she was in the bar when

        Taylor was shot. The report indicates that the “witness will be interviewed by Homicide

        Investigators as soon as possible.” J.A. 746.

               Detective Davis’ records also include a piece of paper with his handwritten notes.

        These notes document several events related to the investigation on various dates. Under

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        July 14, 1988, one note appears to read, “Lakisha – upset briefly interviewed at scene,

        released,” J.A. 1069, which is seemingly inconsistent with Officer Jones’ affidavit, J.A.

        1069.

                Other handwritten notes from Detective Davis indicate that he interviewed Snead

        on July 19, 1988. These notes provide more detailed information about what Snead

        purportedly did and saw on July 14. Presumably from information provided by Snead, the

        notes indicate that Taylor told Snead’s mother he was going to the store to get snacks.

        Snead followed a minute later with a friend and her mother’s friend. In a list of five

        suspects, the notes identify “Lamont” as someone who “had a little gun gave it to Poopie.”

        J.A. 1076. The notes also document that “Lamont gave Poopie a small gun at the crack in

        [the] fence, Poopie shot at V gun clicked 2 times, V ran into store, [Snead] ran in with her

        mother’s friend . . . .” J.A. 1076–77. The notes indicate that Snead heard four shots and

        that she was in the store at the time of the shooting.

                From his handwritten notes, Detective Davis prepared another typed report, this one

        dated July 19, the date he interviewed Snead. That report recounts Snead’s statement that

        she observed a man named “Lamont” give Poopie a small handgun outside of the Night

        Owl and that Poopie pointed the handgun at Taylor but it did not fire. It indicates that Snead

        followed Taylor into the store, where she saw Poopie holding a large black handgun and

        heard a man she knew as “Buttons”—Buttons’ real name is Reginald Dorsey—tell Poopie

        to shoot. The report contains the names and physical descriptions of four of five suspects,

        including “Lamont,” that Snead provided. While Detective Davis’ notes indicate that Snead

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        went to the Night Owl with a friend and her mother’s friend, the report does not mention

        whether anyone went with Snead.

               Less than two weeks later, on July 28, 1988, Snead testified before the grand jury.

        She testified that she was with Taylor, her friend and her mother’s friend around 1:00 am

        at a home near the Night Owl. J.A. 1083–84. She said that, after Taylor left to go to the

        Night Owl, she followed about five minutes later. She testified that, when she approached

        the Night Owl, she saw Johnson—whom she called “Lamont”—give Hill—whom she

        called “Poopie”—a gun that misfired when Hill pointed it at Taylor. She said she went

        inside the bar, where Taylor had fled, and saw Hill with a different, larger gun with a brown

        handle. Snead testified that she then ran out of the store and heard four gunshots.

               Referencing statements from witnesses, Detective Davis secured a warrant for

        Johnson’s arrest for his role in Taylor’s murder. Johnson was later arrested, indicted and

        tried with several co-defendants by a Baltimore City Circuit Court jury.

               At the 1989 trial, Snead testified that she went to the Night Owl to get chips with

        her friend and her mother’s friend. She said she saw Taylor, her cousin, in front of the

        Night Owl near the basketball court talking to Hill. She said she also saw Johnson, Reginald

        “Buttons” Dorsey, Thomas “Tommy” Carroll, and another man she did not know with

        Taylor and Hill. She positively identified Johnson and his co-defendants Hill, Dorsey and

        Carroll in court. “They was standing there talking, and as we was walking in the bar, my

        cousin ran in the store and Poopie pulled out a gun, got it from behind his back.” J.A. 526.

        She testified that Johnson was there when the handgun that Hill aimed at Taylor misfired,

        and that Johnson handed him another gun that Johnson retrieved from his pants.

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               The jury found Johnson, Hill and Dorsey guilty of murdering Taylor. It found

        Carroll not guilty. After being convicted, Johnson was sentenced to life for first degree

        murder plus a twenty-year consecutive sentence for using a handgun while committing a

        crime of violence.

               Johnson unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on direct appeal. He was also

        denied post-conviction relief. Some years later, in 1997, Johnson sought additional post-

        conviction relief, this time arguing that newly discovered evidence, testimony of two

        witnesses, established Johnson’s actual innocence. In an affidavit, Paul Burton 2 testified

        that sometime after midnight on July 14, 1988, Burton was involved in a minor traffic

        accident with another vehicle near the murder scene. He said that he saw a friend, “Aaron,”

        whose last name he did not know, involved in an argument at a nearby basketball court

        with “four or five men and a female [he] did not know.” J.A. 1247. He said he walked up

        to Aaron to ask what was going on when a light-skinned man he heard Aaron call “Poopie”

        pulled out a gun and pointed it at Aaron. Aaron purportedly hit the gun out of Poopie’s

        hand, and Burton picked it up and handed it back to Poopie. Burton said that Aaron then

        started running, and the men with whom he had been arguing chased after him. Burton said

        that he learned the next day that Aaron had been shot. Burton testified that at the time of

        the incident, he did not know Johnson, although he stated that “Johnson was not present

               2
                 Johnson also submitted an affidavit from Alvin Morgan. Morgan stated that he
        was with Johnson in the early morning hours near the scene of the murder. Morgan said he
        saw men running after a man he did not know in the direction of a nearby bar. Morgan said
        after he heard four or five popping sounds, he talked Johnson out of going toward the bar
        to find out what was going on.
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        during the incident described.” J.A. 1248. He said he met Johnson while they were serving

        their prison sentences, explaining, “I felt bad, because I knew that he was not involved, and

        that in fact I was the person who had handed ‘Poopie’ a gun (which he had dropped) during

        the incident.” J.A. 1248.

               It turns out this affidavit was false. Although Burton did meet Johnson while in

        prison, Burton was in prison for an unrelated crime on July 14, 1988. So, he could not have

        been in a car accident near the scene or have handed off the gun. Concluding that the new

        facts raised in the petition failed to exonerate him, the state court denied Johnson’s request

        for post-conviction relief.

               But he persisted. In seeking leave to file a successive petition to our Court in 2000

        after an initial effort was denied in 1995, Johnson added another affidavit, this time from

        Hill—the man who shot Taylor and who was in prison for that crime. That affidavit

        repeated the same story of Taylor knocking the gun out of Hill’s hands and Burton, a man

        Hill concedes he did not know at the time, handing it back to him. Hill said that Johnson

        was not present during that incident. We denied this petition. Undeterred, in 2012, Johnson

        petitioned the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a writ of actual innocence. That effort

        also failed.

               Eventually, however, Johnson’s fortunes turned. Using the Hill affidavit—which to

        repeat, mirrored the Burton affidavit—as well as other evidence, the Baltimore City State’s

        Attorney and Johnson jointly petitioned for a writ of actual innocence. In July 2018, the

        Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the joint petition and vacated Johnson’s

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        convictions. The court awarded Johnson a new trial, but the state entered a nolle prosequi

        on each count of the indictment, leading to the dismissal of all charges.

                                                      II.

               Following the vacatur of his convictions, Johnson filed the underlying lawsuit in

        2019 in federal district court. And, in an amended complaint, he asserted against the officer

        defendants § 1983 claims for failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence,

        fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution and failure to intervene, as well as claims

        under Maryland law for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional

        distress. He also asserted a Monell 3 claim against the Baltimore Police Department. J.A.

        54.

               After discovery, the officers and the police department moved to dismiss the entire

        case and for reimbursement of fees as a litigation sanction, alleging Johnson used the

        Burton and Hill affidavits to secure his exoneration and influenced the testimony of at least

               3
                   Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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        three potential witnesses. 4 They also moved for summary judgment on all claims. 5 The

        district court, in a 153-page opinion, dismissed the case as a litigation sanction but denied

        the request for fees. In an abundance of caution, the court considered the summary

        judgment motions and in the alternative to dismissing the case as a litigation sanction,

        granted the motions for summary judgment on all counts. Johnson timely appealed the

        dismissal of his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the denial of their request for

        attorneys’ fees.

               4
                First, Johnson suggested to a friend and accomplice that they show Snead’s friend
        some “love” for stepping up with favorable testimony. S.A. 73. Second, Johnson sent
        Carroll money and offered to pay for his lawyer. Third, in a phone call with Dorsey
        recorded on January 18, 2020, Johnson said:

               What we got right now, Butt, is that what you told me about they told you
               about that statement. Yo, you can’t never say that. I’m going to tell you
               why. Yo, listen to what I’m saying, because the way my case, the reason I’m
               out of prison, and the reason I got a $ 60 million lawsuit against the police,
               is because we saying they withheld that statement. Now, if you saying they
               said something to you about it when they got – when you got locked up, right,
               but I’m telling you, don’t say nothing about that, yo, in this case right now.

        J.A. 2105 (emphasis added).
               5
                Johnson did not oppose summary judgment on the fabrication count. And he
        requested that one of the officer defendants, Frank Barlow, be dismissed. That grant of
        summary judgment and dismissal are not subjects of these appeals.

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                                                    III.

               In considering these appeals, we affirm the district court’s alternative holding 6

        granting the officer defendants and the police department summary judgment on the

        merits. 7

               Johnson argues that the officer defendants failed to turn over Officer Jones’ July 14,

        1988 report and Detective Davis’ July 19, 1988 notes and his report of that same date.

        According to Johnson, by withholding this information, the officers violated his Fifth and

        Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by defying Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

        (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the government’s suppression of “material

        exculpatory evidence,” which has a reasonable probability of producing a different

        outcome, violates the due process clause. Gilliam v. Sealey, 932 F.3d 216, 238 (4th Cir.

        2019). To prove a § 1983 claim against police officers based on a Brady violation, the

        plaintiff must demonstrate and ultimately prove that: “(1) the evidence at issue was

        favorable to him; (2) the Officers suppressed the evidence in bad faith; and (3) prejudice

        ensued.” Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396–97 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (footnote omitted). Police officers, unlike prosecutors, commit constitutional violations

        only when they suppress exculpatory evidence in bad faith. Id. at 396 n.6.

               6
                In affirming on the alternative ground, we of course, do not condone witness
        tampering or using false evidence. But in these appeals, we need not determine whether
        dismissal of this action was an appropriate sanction.
               7
                Appellate review of summary judgment decisions is de novo. Stanton v. Elliott,
        25 F.4th 227, 234 (4th Cir. 2022). “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
        genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
        law.” French v. Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 2006).
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               The parties first disputed whether the information was withheld. The prosecutor said

        it would have been his practice to turn over the Jones report, but it is not clear from his file

        that was done, especially since Officer Jones was not called to testify at trial. As for the

        Davis report and notes, the prosecutor said those documents were in his file and that

        defense counsel had access to them. Giving Johnson the benefit of the doubt, the district

        court assumed these documents were not produced prior to trial.

               The parties also dispute the materiality of this information. For his part, Johnson

        contends the evidence is exculpatory and would have provided valuable impeachment

        information. Johnson points out that the Jones report, written on the date of the murder,

        does not mention his name or indicate that anyone was with Snead. And he adds that while

        the Davis notes mention that Snead said she was with two other people, the Davis report

        does not contain that information. But the district court agreed with the prosecutor that

        none of this evidence was material nor was it exculpatory. True, the Jones report does not

        identify Johnson. But the district court pointed out that it does not identify anyone by name.

        So, the court found it did not reveal any lack of consistency with respect to Snead’s

        statements. The report just captures Snead’s unwillingness to identify any one at that time.

        And similarly, while the Jones report does not indicate that Snead said she was with others

        at the Night Owl, the district court explained that there is no indication that Snead was

        asked a question that would have elicited that response. In fact, the court reasoned that the

        Davis notes’ identification of others being with Snead suggests the opposite is true—when

        asked by Detective Davis, Snead responded that others were with her. According to the

        court, the Davis report and Jones report were not inconsistent or exculpatory evidence; they

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        were just less complete documents. What’s more, the district court explained that Johnson

        had complete access to all this information from Snead’s grand jury testimony. See United

        States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Brady Rule does not

        apply if the evidence is available to the defendant from other sources or the defendant knew

        or should have known of the facts permitting him to take advantage of exculpatory

        evidence).

               The district court also found no bad faith on the part of the officers, either by their

        actions or with respect to potential deviation from police policies. It concluded that there

        was no evidence the officers fabricated evidence; that the Davis notes indicated that Officer

        Jones interviewed Snead, so there was no evidence that the officers tried to cover up the

        Jones report; and that the mother of Snead’s friend whom Snead said accompanied her to

        the Night Owl did not permit her daughter to speak with the officers. That means that the

        officers had no more information than Johnson had about that potential witness.

               In its comprehensive analysis, the district court carefully considered Johnson’s

        claims and arguments. The court correctly applied the applicable law to those claims. We

        see no reversible error in the court’s order granting summary judgment on the § 1983

        claims. 8

               8
                  Johnson also alleged that the officers failed to disclose a non-identification of
        Johnson in a photo array. But as the district court concluded, the record contained no
        evidence of a known non-identification. The court credited Johnson with demonstrating
        that the documented use of photos was sloppy but properly rejected Johnson’s speculative
        assumption that he must have been in a photo array and that the witnesses failed to identify
        him. And the court rejected Johnson’s allegation that some other interview of Snead by a
        detective occurred and was suppressed, finding the allegation unsupported by the record.
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                 We also affirm the district court’s rulings with respect to the remaining causes of

        action. Johnson’s federal and state law claims for malicious prosecution, what is properly

        understood as a claim for unreasonable seizure, fail. See Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 323–

        24 (4th Cir. 2019); Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959, 970 (Md. 1993). The record

        evidence, including the underlying criminal investigation and witness statements known to

        Detective Davis, shows that there was ample probable cause for Johnson’s arrest. See

        Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 407–08 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that probable cause to

        justify an arrest means the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge

        sufficient to warn a prudent person that the suspect had committed an offense). Next,

        because Johnson fails to establish an underlying constitutional violation, his § 1983 failure

        to intervene claim and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

        necessarily fail. See Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 202–03 (4th Cir.

        2002); Caldor, Inc., 625 A.2d at 963 (setting forth elements of state law IIED claim).

        Finally, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s Monell claim. Because

        municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated solely upon a respondeat superior

        theory, liability arises only where constitutionally offensive acts of city employees are

        taken in furtherance of municipal policy or custom. Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743

        F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984). “[A] municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its

        policies are the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” City of Canton v. Harris,

        489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (cleaned up). Johnson’s Monell claim fails without “a predicate

        constitutional violation to proceed.” See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 (4th Cir.

        2012).

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                                                    IV.

               For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment in No. 22-2095.

        We grant no appellate relief to the officers and the police department on their cross-appeal

        and dismiss the appeal in No. 22-2134.

                                                                                    SO ORDERED

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