Court Opinion

ID: 9710497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:48.114088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.189684
License: Public Domain

(Dissenting Opinion)
Hunter, J.
— I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons.
The only question before this court may be stated as follows. Does this court have the jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the removal statute? This question is the major premise of the issue before this court. If this question is not answered in the affirmative, this case must be transferred to the Supreme Court.
It should be noted that on January 25, 1966 the relator, James E. Ulrich and certain of the respondents appeared specially and specifically raised the question of the jurisdiction of this court to pass on the constitutionality of the so-called “Removal Act.”
They requested this court to transfer the cause to the Supreme Court. In so doing, the said respondents have directly challenged the constitutionality of said Act with specific *210reference to Article I, Section 12 and Article IV, Sections 22(3), 22(4), and 23 of the Constitution of Indiana and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The majority opinion in my view erroneously attempts by the device of assuming this court’s jurisdiction to determine whether or not this court has jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of the removal statute and I quote from said opinion:
“Since jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be waived, it is our duty to determine whether jurisdiction, in fact, exists.” (citing cases)
Thus, by a very simple statement the majority opinion disposes of the question of whether or not this court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act in question. It also cites the Supreme Court case of Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick (1940), 217 Ind. 493, 498, 29 N. E. 2d 405 and says we are called upon to construe the Constitution of the State of Indiana as a necessary adjunct'to the judicial administration of justice. In support of the proposition, the majority cites the case of In re Talbot (1915), 58 Ind. App. 426, 108 N. E. 240. The applicable part of the opinion as cited is quoted as follows:
“. . . If any jurisdiction is conferred on the respective judges of this, court by the act in question, it is original and not appellate, and hence such jurisdiction is not controlled by §§ 1391, 1392 Burns 1914, supra.” (my emphasis)
The opinion further cites in support of its assumption of jurisdiction cases involving administrative agencies of state government and cites the Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. case (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 26 N. E. 2d 399. The applicable part of this opinion is quoted as follows:
“While the Appellate Court is primarily a court of appeals, it is a creature of the Legislature, and it was well within the power of the General Assembly to give it orig-*211indi jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the Industrial Board.” (my emphasis)
In the Warren case, swpra, the court discusses the right of the General Assembly to confer jurisdiction upon the Appellate Court to review the proceedings of the Industrial Board and has declared the Appellate Court in such a case to be the first court of judicial review of the record and orders of an administrative agency.
Likewise in the cases of Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Railroad Com., etc. (1906), 38 Ind. App. 439, 457, 78 N. E. 338; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Watkins (1902), 157 Ind. 600, 607, 62 N. E. 443; In re Petitions to Transfer Appeals (1931), 202 Ind. 365, 385-386, 174 N. E. 812.
It should be noted however that there is no provision in the so-called removal statute granting any person or the Attorney General the right to commence an original or initial action in the Appellate Court. , •
It should require no citation of authority to establish the fact that Superior Court Room No. 1 of Marion County, Indiana is a .nisi prius court of general jurisdiction and as such is an integral part of the judicial department of the State of Indiana. It is not an administrative board or agency. Such boards, bureaus and commissions perform only limited and specific quasi judicial functions as distinguished from the exercise of purely judicial functions. Therefore, as has been stated appeals so-called from state boards, bureaus and agencies to the Appellate Court are in the nature of proceedings in judicial review as indicated in the Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. case, supra, and the Board of Review cases cited in the majority opinion. Hence, the majority assumes the Appellate Court in this instance to be a court of original jurisdiction.
In the instant case there is no provision in the removal act which .would have permitted any citizen to seek direct relief in the Appellate Court as a court of initial, original juris*212diction, by way of injunctive process, to restrain or prevent a public official from performing an unconstitutional act pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. It should be noted that the Act itself only confers jurisdiction upon the Attorney General to remove a cause to this court where a court of general jurisdiction has already passed upon the question of the performance of an unconstitutional act by an official or officials pursuant to a statute found by said court to be unconstitutional, or where an action has been filed pursuant to and seeking relief as outlined in Section 3 of the Act.
Therefore, it seems conclusively clear that no matter what the language employed in the statute itself that the instrumentality of the removal statute as utilized by the Attorney General in the instant case must be construed to be an appeal from a judgment and order of a duly constituted court exercising general jurisdiction.
The history of the acts defining the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court from the date of its inception in 1891 provides as follows: Acts 1891, ch. XXXVII, § 1 (approved February 28, 1891):
“SECTION 1 . . . Provided, however, that if the validity of a statute of this State, or the United States, is involved, said Court shall so certify, and thereupon the transcript and all papers in such cause shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court, with such certificate, and filed therein, and all proceedings conducted thereafter as if said cause had been originally appealed to the Supreme Court.” (my emphasis)
Acts 1893, ch. XXXII, § 1 (approved February 16, 1893) provides in part:
“In all cases where there is jurisdiction the decisions of the Appellate Court shall be final. The exceptions to which the foregoing grant of jurisdiction is made are these:
First. The Appellate Court shall not have jurisdiction of any ease where the constitutionality of a statute, Federal or State, or the validity of an ordinance of a municipal corporation is in question and such question is duly presented.” (my emphasis)
*213Acts 1901, ch. CCXLVII, § 8 (approved March 12, 1901) provides as follows:
“Every case in which there is in question, and such question is duly presented, either the validity of a franchise, or the validity of an ordinance of a municipal corporation or the constitutionality of a statute, State or Federal, or the proper construction of a statute, or rights guaranteed by the State or Federal Constitution, and which case would be otherwise unappearable (unappealable) by virtue of Section six (6) or Section seven (7), shall be appealable directly to the Supreme Court, for the purpose of presenting such Question only.” (my emphasis)
Acts 1907, ch. 148, § 9 (approved March 9, 1907) provides: (Appeals — Supreme and Appellate Courts).
“. . . Hereafter all appeals in appealable cases in the following classes shall be taken directly to the supreme court, viz.:
First. All cases in which there is in question, and such question is duly presented, either the validity of a franchise or the validity of an ordinance of a municipal corporation, or the constitutionality of a statute, state or federal, or the rights guaranteed by the state or federal constitution.” (my emphasis)
Thus, it appears to me that the clear and plain intent of the Legislature in all the various enactments conferring jurisdiction of causes in this court have carried with them a very specific prohibition against the right to determine the constitutionality of a statute when such question is direct, duly presented and explicit in the pleadings before this court. Indeed, Acts 1965 (2nd Spec. Sess.), ch. 7, § 13 further clarifies the determination of the issues presented in this case in the following manner:
“Nothing herein contained is intended to have the effect of withdrawing from the Supreme Court or limiting any jurisdiction the Supreme Court now possesses.”
It would seem that the entire opinion of the majority is based on the premise that by the terms of the removal statute *214this court is one of original jurisdiction. The reasoning of the majority in syllogistic form can be simply stated as follows :
(1) A court of original jurisdiction can decide constitutional questions.
(2) Under the removal statute this court is one of original jurisdiction.
(3) Therefore, this court may decide the constitutional question.
However, it is my belief that the majority opinion is an example of erroneous syllogistic reasoning in that an erroneous premise can only lead to an erroneous conclusion. As previously noted and for the reasons stated hereinbefore, this court is not a court of initial, original jurisdiction under the removal statute. Consequently, as the majority has erred in one of its premises, they have also erred in their conclusion.
The proper form of this attempted reasoning should be as follows:
(1) A court of original jurisdiction may decide constitutional questions.
(2) Under the terms of the removal statute we are not a court of original jurisdiction.
(3) Therefore, we may not decide the constitutional question.
For all the foregoing reasons this court should transfer this cause to the Supreme Court for determination of the constitutionality of the “Removal Statute.”
Carson, J., concurs in this dissent in addition to the reasons expressed in separate dissent filed by him.