Court Opinion

ID: 9883509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:44:09.223369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:24.255259
License: Public Domain

JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting.
I cannot accept the majority’s reading and application of ORCP 68C(4) in respect to the award of attorney fees or its view of the sufficiency of the evidence in respect to the award of the expert witness fee expense. I do not agree, either, that “the challenge on appeal concerns only the reasonableness of the attorney fees and of Rothrock’s witness fees.” (Slip opinion at 3.) That is, of course, the ultimate question; but the important question is one of pleading and proof.
ORCP 68C(4) is a rule about how attorney fees, costs and disbursements can come to be allowed as part of a judgment. That is all that it can be: a rule of pleading and procedure. The majority would, in essence, treat it as also being a rule establishing the sufficiency of proof. ORCP 68C(4)(a) was satisfied. Had plaintiff done nothing after the filing of the statement by defendants, the rule would have permitted the amounts claimed to have been entered as part of the judgment. However, once plaintiff had filed an objection pursuant to ORCP 68C(4)(b), the entitlement of defendants to fees, costs and disbursements was at issue on the law and the facts. In short, issue had been joined for trial.
With respect to the attorney fees, defendants offered *522no testimony in response to the plaintiffs evidence of what would have been reasonable in the circumstances. Defendants’ counsel simply told the court that he believed that the time he spent on the case was “necessary.” I trust that the majority is not saying that “necessary” is the same as “reasonable,” which is the statutory standard under ORS 35.346. The only evidence presented in the hearing was that presented by plaintiffs witness. The majority would permit defendants to recover merely on the basis of their pleading, contrary to the rules of Tiano v. Elsensohn, 268 Or 166, 170, 520 P2d 358 (1974), State ex rel Dept. of Transp. v. Stafford, 34 Or App 983, 580 P2d 574 (1978), and State v. Grandy, 52 Or App 15, 627 P2d 895 (1981). The majority is simply wrong when it says that ORCP 68 provides that “proof of attorney fees may be established by a verified and detailed statement of the claimed fees.” (Slip opinion at 6; emphasis in original.) ORCP 68C(4)(c), which is quoted by the majority, but then ignored, provides for a trial on “all issues of law or fact raised by the statement and objections.” The statement is not evidence (any more than are the objections); it is but a pleading. The trial judge awarded defendants attorney fees without any evidence.
Essentially the same error permeates the majority’s upholding of the award for expert witness’ fee. All that existed in the record before any testimony was taken was the witness’s itemized billing of 54 hours at an hourly rate of $75. In this instance, there was not even any pleading that the amount claimed was reasonable. The only evidence the court heard was that the claim was unreasonable. The point is not that the trial court made a finding that was against the weight of the evidence. That would not be remediable by us. The point is that the trial court made the award without having received any evidence to support its conclusion. The pleading was not evidence, and the majority should not treat it that way.