Court Opinion

ID: 9961010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 18:01:00.063636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:09.415504
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11111    Document: 74-1      Date Filed: 04/17/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11111
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        STEVEN ABBOUD,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cr-00057-PGB-LHP-2
                            ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                     22-11111

        Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Steven Abboud appeals his conviction for criminal contempt
        and his sentence of supervised release. After a bench trial, the dis-
        trict court found Abboud guilty of willfully violating an injunction
        issued by the court. Abboud maintains he was entitled to a judg-
        ment of acquittal because he was not bound by the injunction and
        because the evidence did not support a finding of guilt beyond a
        reasonable doubt. He also contends that supervised release was
        not authorized because his contempt violation qualifies as a petty
        offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3). After careful review, we con-
        clude that Abboud was bound by the injunction and that sufficient
        evidence supports his conviction. We also hold that Abboud in-
        vited any error with regard to his supervised release.
                                                I.
               Briefly stated, the relevant history is as follows. 1 From 2009
        through 2017, Abboud ran the day-to-day operations of Phazzer
        Electronics, a company that sold conducted electrical weapons,
        also known as stun guns. Abboud’s cousin was the named owner
        of the company but did not actively participate in its operations.
        Phazzer Electronics also employed Diana Robinson, who took di-
        rections from Abboud.

        1 A more complete factual background is presented in the related case of United

        States v. Robinson, 83 F.4th 868, 874 (11th Cir. 2023).
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        22-11111                Opinion of the Court                      3

               In 2016, TASER International 2, a stun gun manufacturer,
        sued Phazzer Electronics for trademark and patent infringement,
        among other claims. In July 2017, the district court entered judg-
        ment for TASER and awarded several remedies, including a per-
        manent injunction that barred Phazzer Electronics from producing
        and selling certain stun guns and stun-gun cartridges. After the in-
        junction was entered, Abboud resigned from the company as an
        employee, but he continued to be involved as a consultant.
                The injunction applied to “Phazzer [Electronics] and its of-
        ficers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other
        persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer or
        its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys.” It prohib-
        ited not only manufacturing, selling, and distributing enjoined
        products, but also “causing” enjoined products to be manufac-
        tured, sold, or distributed. The Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed
        the district court’s judgment and injunction.
               In May 2018, the district court found Phazzer Electronics
        and Abboud to be in civil contempt of the 2017 injunction. TASER
        presented evidence that Phazzer Electronics sold and shipped an
        enjoined stun gun to TASER’s investigator and that Abboud con-
        tinued to conduct demonstrations of enjoined products. The court
        declined to impose monetary sanctions, but it notified Phazzer
        Electronics and Abboud that any continued violations of the
        court’s injunction would result in criminal-contempt proceedings.

        2 TASER is now Axon Enterprise, Inc.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11111

               After the civil contempt finding, Abboud enlisted an ac-
        quaintance, Uriel Binyamin, to form a new company, called
        Phazzer-USA, LLC, to sell Phazzer products. Robinson helped set
        up the company’s operations, including connecting Binyamin with
        a manufacturer in Taiwan named Double Dragon, a company as-
        sociated with Phazzer Global, Inc., for which Abboud served as
        president. Around the same time, Robinson emailed Phazzer Elec-
        tronics to revoke its license to sell Phazzer products. Phazzer Elec-
        tronics shut down soon after as a result. Robinson also facilitated
        Phazzer-USA’s purchases from Double Dragon, which included
        enjoined products. Robinson was Abboud’s secretary or adminis-
        trator across various Phazzer entities.
               In March 2019, a retired law-enforcement officer working as
        a consultant for TASER received an unsolicited email from
        Phazzer-USA asking about his interest in purchasing a “law en-
        forcement kit.” The consultant placed an order for the kit, which
        contained enjoined Phazzer products. Based on this incident,
        TASER moved for an order to show cause why Phazzer Electron-
        ics, Abboud, and Robinson should not be held in criminal contempt
        of the 2017 injunction.
               The district court issued a notice of criminal contempt pro-
        ceedings and a show-cause order for Phazzer Electronics, Abboud,
        and Robinson to respond to charges that they willfully violated the
        2017 injunction by “continu[ing] to sell infringing products.” The
        notice stated that the court would conduct a bench trial, so if
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        22-11111              Opinion of the Court                        5

        Abboud or Robinson were found guilty, their maximum penalty
        would not exceed six months’ imprisonment.
               After trial, Abboud moved for a judgment of acquittal. He
        argued that he was not bound by the injunction against Phazzer
        Electronics, which ceased operations in 2018, and that, even if
        bound, he did not violate the injunction or do so willfully.
               The district court denied Abboud’s motion and found him
        guilty of criminal contempt. First, the court found that the injunc-
        tion was lawful and reasonably specific. Next, the court found that
        Abboud—the “de facto owner” of Phazzer Electronics—violated
        the injunction. The court explained that, after the 2017 injunction
        was entered, Abboud recruited Binyamin “to form a new entity to
        pick up where Phazzer Electronics left off,” and then “supervised
        the distribution of Phazzer products via Phazzer-USA,” the new en-
        tity. In the court’s view, this conduct amounted to causing
        Phazzer-USA to offer for sale, sell, and distribute enjoined prod-
        ucts, in violation of the injunction. Finally, the court found that
        Abboud willfully engaged in “a pattern of activity that violated the
        injunction” by selling the enjoined products and consciously taking
        steps to circumvent the injunction. So the court found Abboud
        guilty of criminal contempt and set a separate date for sentencing.
               Before sentencing, the probation office prepared Abboud’s
        presentence investigation report (“PSR”), which noted that Ab-
        boud was subject to a maximum of six months in prison or five
        years of probation and a maximum fine of $5,000. It also said that,
        under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3), the court could impose a one-year
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11111

        term of supervised release. Abboud filed a sentencing memoran-
        dum, requesting a sentence of “no more than 30 days incarceration
        followed by a term of supervised release.”
               At sentencing, defense counsel reiterated Abboud’s request
        for no more than 30 days of imprisonment and “one year of super-
        vised release.” Ultimately, the district court sentenced Abboud to
        five months’ imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised re-
        lease. Abboud did not object to the sentence. He now appeals the
        denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, as well as his sen-
        tence of supervised release.
                                         II.
               We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of
        acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
        conviction. United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1026 (11th Cir.
        2007); United States v. Evans, 473 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2006).
        Sufficient evidence supports a conviction when the evidence, con-
        strued in the light most favorable to the government, permits a rea-
        sonable factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
        doubt. United States v. Robinson, 83 F.4th 868, 878 (11th Cir. 2023).
        We review the district court’s factual findings and credibility judg-
        ments for clear error. Id.
                                        III.
               A district court may fine or imprison those in contempt of
        its authority, including disobedience or resistance to its lawful or-
        der. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). To support a conviction for criminal con-
        tempt, “the government must prove: (1) that the court entered a
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        22-11111               Opinion of the Court                         7

        lawful order of reasonable specificity; (2) the order was violated;
        and (3) the violation was willful.” United States v. Maynard, 933 F.2d
        918, 920 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted).
               Abboud challenges only the second and third requirements.
        Regarding the second requirement, he contends that he was not
        bound by the injunction and that, even if bound, he did not violate
        the injunction. He also disputes that any violation was willful. We
        take each argument in turn.
        A.     Abboud is bound by the injunction.
                By the time of the infringing conduct in 2019, Abboud “was
        no longer an employee, officer, or agent of Phazzer Electronics,
        [so] we cannot consider him a named party to the injunction.” Rob-
        inson, 83 F.4th at 882. While an injunction against a company binds
        its current employees, even if they did not appear before the court,
        we held in Robinson that former employees are bound only if they
        fall into one of three nonparty categories, Robinson, 83 F.4th at 880–
        82: (1) those who aid or abet a bound party, id. at 881; (2) those in
        privity with a bound party, including successors in interest or non-
        parties otherwise identifiable with the enjoined party, id.; and (3)
        those who aid or abet a party in privity with a bound party, id.
               Abboud falls into the second nonparty category. As we ex-
        plained in Robinson, a nonparty individual can be bound by an in-
        junction when “that person can be legally identified with an en-
        joined party.” Id. at 884. To satisfy due process, there must be
        “extremely close identification between the enjoined party and the
        nonparty legally identified with it.” Id. (cleaned up). In practical
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11111

        terms, that means the evidence must “establish[] a very close iden-
        tity of interest and such significant control over the organization
        and the underlying litigation that it is fair to say that the nonparty
        had his day in court when the injunction was issued.” Id. (quota-
        tion marks omitted). In determining whether a nonparty satisfies
        this threshold, we consider “the officer’s position and responsibili-
        ties in the enjoined corporation, his participation in the litigation
        that preceded the entry of the injunction, and the degree of simi-
        larity between his activities in the old and new businesses.” Id.
        (quotation marks omitted).
                In Robinson, we held that the record lacked evidence that Ab-
        boud’s codefendant, Robinson, “so controlled Phazzer Electronics
        and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would
        be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction.” 83 F.4th
        at 884. So we concluded that she could not be bound as a party in
        privity with an enjoined party.
                Here, in contrast, the record shows that Abboud had sub-
        stantial discretion and control over Phazzer Electronics both in
        general and with respect to the injunction proceeding. See Robin-
        son, 83 F.4th at 884. He was, in the district court’s words, the “de
        facto” owner of that company, running day-to-day operations for
        several years. He also controlled Phazzer Electronics during the
        civil proceeding that led to the injunction, determining its litigation
        strategy and making decisions about who participated in hearings
        or depositions. Plus, as the district court found, Abboud effectively
        carried on the same business after leaving Phazzer Electronics,
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        22-11111                Opinion of the Court                            9

        recruiting a third party “to form a new entity to pick up where
        Phazzer Electronics left off.” This evidence is sufficient to establish
        that Abboud had “a very close identity of interest and such signifi-
        cant control over [Phazzer Electronics] and the underlying litiga-
        tion that it is fair to say that [he] had his day in court when the
        injunction was issued.” Id.
               Accordingly, we conclude that Abboud remained bound by
        the 2017 injunction as a nonparty in privity with an enjoined party.
        B.     Sufficient evidence shows that Abboud violated the injunction.
               Next, sufficient evidence shows that Abboud violated the in-
        junction by causing enjoined products to be sold or distributed. In
        the light most favorable to the government, the record shows that,
        after the 2017 injunction and 2018 civil contempt finding, Abboud
        sought a new company through which to sell Phazzer products.
        To that end, he recruited and assisted an acquaintance, Binyamin,
        to form the company Phazzer-USA; he and Robinson connected
        Binyamin with Double Dragon, the manufacturer and distributor
        of Phazzer products; and he arranged for and supervised the web-
        site Phazzer-USA used for customer orders.
              The government also offered evidence that Robinson, who
        worked for Abboud, “acted as a facilitator for Phazzer-USA’s pur-
        chases from Double Dragon,” which included enjoined products.
        Robinson, 83 F.4th at 875. Emails from November 2018 through
        May 2019 between Robinson—on behalf of Phazzer Global and an-
        other Phazzer entity—and Binyamin, reflect orders from Double
        Dragon of multiple enjoined products. And enjoined products
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                       22-11111

        made it to at least one consumer who purchased a “law enforce-
        ment kit” from Phazzer-USA’s website in March 2019. This evi-
        dence, considered as a whole, supports a conclusion beyond a rea-
        sonable doubt that Abboud caused enjoined products to be sold or
        distributed in violation of the injunction.
        C.     Sufficient evidence shows that the violation was willful.
                Sufficient evidence also supports the district court’s conclu-
        sion that Abboud acted willfully. “Willfulness is defined as a delib-
        erate or intended violation, as distinguished from an accidental, in-
        advertent, or negligent violation of an order.” Maynard, 933 F.2d
        at 920.
               In arguing that any violation of the injunction was not will-
        ful, Abboud focuses on the March 2019 sale that triggered the crim-
        inal-contempt proceeding. He points to evidence that the enjoined
        product at issue was likely acquired by Binyamin before the injunc-
        tion, and then mistakenly shipped by Binyamin to the consumer
        because of lax inventory practices. And he claims that Binyamin
        operated the business and fulfilled customer orders independently.
               But the district court found that there was “evidence of a
        pattern of activity that violated the injunction, not an isolated sale.”
        And the court reasonably attributed that pattern to a “scheme to
        circumvent the injunction,” even if Binyamin was an “unwitting
        participant.” Abboud recruited Binyamin to set up a new com-
        pany, Phazzer-USA, not long after Abboud and Phazzer Electronics
        were found in civil contempt of the injunction, which evinces “con-
        scious steps to avoid the injunction,” as the court found. Abboud
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        22-11111               Opinion of the Court                       11

        and entities or persons under his control then connected Binyamin
        with Double Dragon, which supplied products covered by the in-
        junction. And Binyamin’s purchases from Double Dragon, includ-
        ing enjoined products, were overseen and facilitated by Robinson,
        who worked for Abboud. Viewed in the light most favorable to
        the government, the evidence supports the reasonable inference
        that Abboud caused Binyamin to create Phazzer-USA in a willful
        attempt to circumvent the injunction and to continue to distribute
        and sell products covered by the injunction.
              For these reasons, we affirm Abboud’s conviction for crimi-
        nal contempt.
                                        IV.
               Abboud also challenges the imposition of a term of super-
        vised release, arguing that no supervised release could be imposed
        under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3) because he was convicted of a “petty
        offense.”
               But “[i]t is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party
        may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited
        by that party.” United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir.
        2006) (quotation marks omitted). “The doctrine of invited error is
        implicated when a party induces or invites the district court into
        making an error.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Where invited
        error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule
        and reversing.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
              In Love, for example, a defendant convicted of criminal con-
        tempt challenged his five-year term of supervised release on appeal,
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 22-11111

        arguing that no supervised release was authorized or that the max-
        imum term was one year. Id. at 1156–57. We declined to consider
        the merits of those arguments, reasoning that the defendant had
        “induced or invited the district court to impose a sentence that in-
        cluded a term of supervised release.” Id. at 1157. The defendant
        did so by acknowledging that supervised release could be imposed,
        requesting a term of supervised release in lieu of additional jail
        time, and suggesting a term of two years’ supervised release. Id.
                Here, Abboud induced or invited the district court to impose
        a sentence that included supervised release. In his sentencing
        memorandum, he specifically asked the court for a sentence of no
        more than 30 days’ imprisonment “followed by a term of super-
        vised release.” And at sentencing, he reiterated his request for a
        sentence with less than 30 days’ imprisonment and “one year of
        supervised release.” Thus, as in Love, he is precluded from claiming
        the court erred in sentencing him to a term of supervised release.
        See id. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
              AFFIRMED.