Court Opinion

ID: 9463187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:00:09.234134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:58.174922
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING *
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:
Appellees have presented to us a petition asking that we vacate our ruling herein,1 and to the full court a suggestion that the case be reheard en banc. We find nothing in the petition warranting change in our decision.2 In the course of considering the suggestion, however, members of the court at large have raised questions as to the intent of our earlier opinion in particular respects. These, in the interest of maximum clarity, we deem it appropriate to address.
We held in part that appellant’s dismissal must be reviewed on the basis of his public statements,3 upon which the Metropolitan Police Department predicated the dismissal,4 rather than on the basis of his observations during the interview,5 which the Department utilized merely for “verbal [] reinforce[ment]” of the “accuracy” of the public utterances;6 that the dismissal rested on speech, though attributed to an attitude manifested by the content of the speech;7 and, in consequence, that appellant as a probationary officer was in position to complain of the dismissal,8 and that the Department had the burden of showing a compelling governmental interest justifying the dismissal because of the speech.9 The first question is whether that burden can be discharged by proving a material decrease in appellant’s efficiency as a police officer — one having that sort of speech-reflected attitude. Our answer is that it surely can.
In our prior opinion, we pointed to “the relationship of departmental discipline, harmony and morale, and as well of individual loyalty and respect, to the proper functioning of a police force”,10 and to the pivotal question whether ap*851pellant’s public expressions “actually-had a deleterious effect on police operations.” 11 We recognized, too, that the governmental interest in an efficient police department necessitates consideration not only of the effect of appellant’s public remarks on his fellow officers12 but also on his own performance ;13 we emphasized that the Department would prevail on “a factual demonstration that appellant’s statements detrimentally affected his efficiency as a police officer or the Department’s efficiency as a police force.” 14 The insuperable difficulty in the case at bar, however, is that the District Court like the Department, never properly resolved “[t]he crucial question . whether appellant’s remarks, in the particular circumstances surrounding them, actually impinged upon qualities making for an effective police force in such manner as to imperil its efficiency.”15
The second question is whether appellant bore any burden of coming forward with evidence tending to show that the purpose underlying his public declarations was innocuous in terms of the constitutional inquiry.16 We think that in particular adversarial contexts a discharged employee may well have such a burden, with the overall burden of justification remaining on the governmental employer, but we are satisfied that the question does not properly arise here. Appellant was a probationary officer, and at the administrative level there was no hearing to ascertain cause for dismissal,17 and consequently no adversary proceeding addressed to the purpose or effect of his public statements. The informal interview18 focused instead on verifying that the public observations reported in the press as appellant’s were in fact made, and on appellant’s personal opinions on “sick-in’’ which largely had not been communicated publicly.19 Similarly, in the District Court there was no trial, and long prior to the grant of appellees’ motion for summary judgment appellant filed an affidavit asserting, as earlier he had insisted at the interview, that he had never acted on the opinions he held, or encouraged or attempted to influence other police officers to do so.20 Our remand for a trial leaves the District Court free to allocate — even to the party not having the ultimate burden of justification — the burden of going forward with particular lines of evidence.
The final question relates to the proper role of summary judgment in this case, and to the scope of evidentiary presentations following remand. Undoubtedly, summary judgment is often appropriate — indeed, ideal — for resolution of issues reviewed on an administrative record, but the obstacles here are severalfold. The administrative record, which primarily is the interview, does not portray the circumstances in which appellant’s utterances were made. Beyond that, appellees and the District Court perceived no First Amendment problem,21 saw no burden of justifying a dismissal traceable to speech,22 and made no Pickering23 balance or determination.24 Our remand is for a trial at which these and other administratively-unaddressed matters can be dealt with on an evidentiary record, to which each side, within the usual rules, will be at liberty to contribute.

Petition denied.

 Senior Circuit Judge Bastían sat as a member of the court during deliberations on the petition for rehearing, but died before the court’s^ order and supplemental opinion were pre- ' pared.

. Tygrett v. Washington, No. 72-1876 (D.C. Cir. 1974), hereinafter cited “Op.”

. Senior Circuit Judge Bastian dissented from our holding. Id. He also voted to grant the petition for rehearing but died before this supplemental opinion was prepared.

. See Op. n. 4.

. Op. text at ns. 42-51.

. See op. text at ns. 4-9 & ns. 6-8.

. Op. text at n. 47.

. Op. text at ns. 27-32.

. Op. text at ns. 32-41.

. Op. text at ns. 72-83.

. Op. text at n. 59.

. Op. text following n. 59.

. Op. text following n. 59 to n. 62.

. Op. text at ns. 72-83.

. Op. text at n. 72. _

. Op. text at n. 63. See also Op. text at ns. 66-83.

. See Op. text at n. 60, where we adverted to the possibility that “appellant’s statements may have amounted to no more than a lobbying maneuver, instead of a serious exhortation to strike action.”

. See Op. text at ns. 4-11.

. See Op. text at ns. 4-6.

. See Op. text at ns. 4-9 & ns. 6-8.

. Op. ns. 70-71 and accompanying text.

. See Op. text at ns. 18-26.

. See Op. text at ns. 22-26.

. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 E.Ed.2d 811 (1968), discussed Op. text at ns. 52-62.

. Op. text at ns. 64-77.