Court Opinion

ID: 9858683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:34:50.574916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:27.341503
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
If a construction of a statute creates an irreconcilable (or even a reconcilable) conflict with another statute, then by definition that construction is patently incorrect. In such a case, it is the construction which must be sacrificed, viz: Toney v. State, 586 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) — not the clear unambiguous words of the statutes. Rather than undertake to make our own determination of a better procedure, I believe the problem is purely one of statutory interpretation and construction; perceiving no conflicts — irreconcilable or otherwise— between the statutes implicated in this cause I would adhere to the legislative scheme of things.
The straightforward question before us is, “When is the accused required to make his election to have the jury assess his punishment?”1
Article 37.07, § 2, which speaks to cases tried to a jury on a plea of not guilty,2 provides in relevant part:
“(b) * * * (2) in ... cases where the defendant so elects in writing at the time he enters his plea in open court, the punishment shall be assessed by the same jury. If a finding of guilty is returned the defendant may, with the consent of the attorney for the state, change his election of one who assesses the punishment.”3
Article 26.01, Y.A.C.C.P., provides:
“In all felony cases, after indictment, and all misdemeanor cases punishable by imprisonment, there shall be an arraignment.”
Article 26.02, V.A.C.C.P., states the purpose of arraignment:
“An arraignment takes place for the purpose of fixing his identity and hearing his plea.”
Article 28.01, V.A.C.C.P., provides in part:
“Sec. 1. ⅜ * * The pre-trial hearing shall be to determine any of the following matters:
*466(1) Arraignment of the defendant, if such be necessary; and appointment of counsel to represent the defendant, if such be necessary;
(2) Pleadings of the defendant; * *
Article 27.02, V.A.C.C.P., provides in part:
“The pleadings and motions of the defendant shall be:
He ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ sfs ‡
(2) A special plea as provided in Article 27.05 of this code;
(3) A plea of guilty;
(4) A plea of not guilty;
(5) A plea of nolo contendere...;
⅝ sfe ⅜ ⅜: * ⅜
(7) An election, if any, to have the jury assess the punishment.” 4
Finally, Article 36.01, V.A.C.C.P., provides for the proper order of proceeding at trial once a jury has been impaneled, in pertinent part as follows:
1. The indictment or information shall be read to the jury by the attorney prosecuting. * * *
2. The special pleas, if any, shall be read by the defendant’s counsel, and if the plea of not guilty is also relied upon, it shall also be stated.”5
Reading those statutes together, I find it clear the Legislature contemplated the accused should be prepared to assert his right to have the jury assess his punishment at the time of arraignment or pretrial hearing at which a plea is entered, or lose that option as a matter of right.6
The trouble with adopting carte blanche the opinion in Ceaser v. State, 624 S.W.2d 669 (Tex.App. Beaumont 1982) no PDR history, is that it requires an election be made at a pretrial hearing at which the accused may not be called on to plead, thereby ignoring the dictate of Article 37.07, § 2(b)(2).
Furthermore, unlike Judge Miller, I do not see practical obstacles to such a plain reading of all germane statutes; it seems that everyone — the State, the accused, the court and society as a whole — has an interest in knowing whether punishment will be a fact determination to be submitted to the jury, before the panel is questioned. Indeed, under that procedure, the accused maintains control over whether the venire may be questioned about punishment. But see Toney, supra.
By affirmatively electing at such time to have the jury assess the punishment, as a practical matter, an accused is merely preserving that right by not waiving it. (It is even arguable that nothing precludes him from waiving that election at any later time up to the point at which a guilty verdict is returned,7 see Article 1.14, V.A.C.C.P.,8 and compare Article 1.13, V.A.C.C.P. [which addresses the statutory right to waive trial by jury on the issue of guilt/innocence ], but we need not decide that today.) If, as Judge Miller sees it, the defense is concerned about the “inability ... to voir dire the jury panel on the question of punish*467ment,” the obvious solution is — unlike what was done here — to invoke the right to have the jury assess punishment from the beginning.9
If the jury finds him guilty and the defendant no longer desires its assessment of his punishment, he may change his election if he can obtain the prosecutor’s agreement. See Article 37.07, § 2(b), supra.
In the instant case, there is no indication from the record that appellant ever attempted to change his election at any time after he made it; without a showing that he attempted to obtain the State’s consent to change his election after a verdict of guilty was returned, no indication of that desire was given. In my view, it is not sufficient to establish reversible error that he objected to the trial court’s requiring him to file his election for jury at the pretrial hearing, without also showing he (1) wanted to change his pretrial election; (2) attempted to avail himself of the statutory vehicle to change his election; and (3) was denied a jury trial on the issue of punishment.
Without any of these showings, I must agree with the court of appeals, that appellant has demonstrated no harm which would necessitate a reversal of his conviction.10
In any event, the majority and the dissenters both continue to create conflicts in our own statutory law by adhering to dubious observations of that law contained in a Fifth Circuit opinion; we should acknowledge the error of Toney, supra, and overrule it.11
*468Though I thus disagree with the rationale of the majority and the position of the dissents, ultimately my views lead to agreement with the result — an affirmance of the judgment of the court of appeals.12
Accordingly, I join just the judgment of this Court.

. It is important that the issue is framed in this way, for there is no requirement that an affirmative election be made to have the court assess the punishment.

. All the discussion on this case is in the context of a not guilty plea which is to be tried to a jury. The law governing not guilty pleas to the court, or guilty pleas, is wholly different and unique to those procedures.

.As initially written in 1965, § 2(b) provided that the judge was to assess punishment "except when the defendant, upon the return of a finding of guilty, requests that punishment be assessed by the jury." (All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.) Acts 1967, 60th Leg., Ch. 659, p. 1739, § 22, rewrote § 2(b)(2) to read as it appears in the text above.

. This item was also added by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., Ch. 659, p. 1738, § 17. See note 3, ante.

. To be accorded some significance is that a plea of not guilty is merely "stated” — not "entered" — and implicitly by counsel rather than by the defendant personally. The plea had been "entered” at arraignment, pursuant to Article 26.12, V.A.C.C.P.

. In his opinion Judge Miller alludes to an observation made by the trial judge to the effect that appellant "waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty on July 6, 1982.” Since the making, as well the entry of a plea, is a primary part of “formal arraignment,” exactly what appellant "waived” is unclear.

. The Article 37.07, § 2 requirement that the accused elect the assessor of punishment is phrased so as to place an affirmative duty on the accused only if he wishes to elect the jury. If he wants the court to assess punishment, he need do nothing.
Thus, his failure timely to elect the jury (or his gratuitous affirmative election of the court) does operate under the terms of the statute to preclude the accused from thereafter changing his choice until after a guilty verdict has been returned, and then he may do so only with the consent of the State.

.“The defendant in a criminal prosecution may waive any rights secured him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case.” Article 1.14, supra.

. Appellant insists the trial court forced him to “elect to go to the Court" for punishment at the pretrial and his objection is to "having to file a motion to have the Judge assess punishment at this time.” In fact a review of the record clearly reflects the trial judge’s argument to defense counsel was that the court would assess punishment “unless the defendant in writing elects prior to commencement of the trial that the jury assess the punishment.”
Thus, the trial judge did not, under any construction, force appellant affirmatively to waive his right to trial by jury on the issue of punishment at the pretrial.

. In that connection, however, I cannot agree with the majority’s construction of § 2, Article 28.01, V.A.C.C.P., for when legislative history is examined its construction is demonstrably erroneous.
As initially enacted in 1965 the pertinent part provided that when a criminal action is set for a pretrial hearing contemplated by § 1, “the defendant shall have five days after notice of setting in which to file his motions, pleadings and exceptions ...” Characterizing the prescribed pretrial hearing as an “innovation,” the Court left implementing it with respect to "notice” and other aspects largely to the discretion of a trial court. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 468 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Barbee v. State, 432 S.W.2d 78, 84 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) and Bosley v. State, 414 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
In 1979 Senator Tati Santiestaban introduced S.B. No. 449 to amend § 2; in part its caption states that it is an act "relating to the time for notice of a pretrial hearing in a criminal case and the time for filing motions, pleadings, and exceptions after such notice ..." Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 113, p. 204, § 1. It passed the Senate on voice vote. The House "Bill Analysis" contains a section stating what the bill proposes to do and a section entitled “Bill Synopsis;” each states: "In any event the defendant must have enough notice to allow him not less than 10 days in which to raise or file preliminary matters. ” The analysis recounts that only one witness, a named representative of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, spoke in favor of the bill, testifying "that the extended times for filing preliminary matters would result in more fairness toward defendants relative to pretrial procedure.” Finally passed without modification over one recorded vote, amended § 2 reads as quoted in the majority opinion.
Coupled with the discretion to set the case for pretrial hearing granted a trial court by § 1, legislative history makes plain that the proviso in § 2 means that the trial court must give an accused sufficient notice of the hearing day to allow him ten days in which to prepare and file his motions and other preliminary matters, and that they must be filed seven days before the hearing to be considered by the trial court unless for good cause shown the trial court grants leave to file thereafter.

.The issue in the Federal case was whether applying the 1967 amendment to Article 37.07, see note 3, ante, was ex post facto in nature. The Fifth Circuit found, “as did the United States District Judge,” that petitioner "still had the opportunity to make an election because we interpret ‘open court’ as used in Article 37.07 subd. 2(b)(3) to connote the time the defendant makes his plea to the indictment before the jury in ‘open court.’ ” Donald v. Jones, 445 F.2d 601, 604 (CA 5 1971). It cited no Texas authority, *468nor had the United States District Judge in Donald v. Decker, 318 F.Supp. 563 (N.D.Texas 1970). Neither noticed that 'before the jury" is not included in the amendment nor that the same act had amended Article 27.02 to include among pleadings an election to have the jury assess punishment, which in turn made it a matter for pretrial hearing under Article 28.01. Without some indication of consideration of such related matters, the respective findings of those Federal courts are not too persuasive.
Furthermore, even the reasoning of Toney is highly questionable. There, the accused did not invoke his right to jury assessed punishment at arraignment. When the State attempted to question the jury panel on punishment issues, the accused objected on the ground that, by operation of Article 37.07, § 2(b), his failure to invoke the right rendered punishment an issue for the court only and was of no concern to the jury. The trial court nevertheless permitted the State to voir dire the jury on the issue of punishment.
In upholding the conviction, two judges of a panel reasoned that, since the time for invoking the right was after the jury was selected, the State should not be precluded from questioning the panel on punishment since it was still a possibility it would be a jury issue.
Such reasoning seems most dubious in light of the defendant’s objection.

. Also I do not subscribe to notions that a constitutional right to trial by jury “does not encompass the right to have the jury assess punishment” and that such right "in Texas is purely a creature of statute.” A valid case against both may be made, especially since right to trial by jury is part of what the Texas Declaration of Independence was all about. However, I shall await the occasion when that issue is squarely presented.