Court Opinion

ID: 9779828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:49:55.122157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:42.468320
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
Read, J.
In this appeal, we are called upon to resolve issues of interpretation of article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, the key component of the recently enacted Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) (L 2007, ch 7). We hold that in order to pursue civil management under article 10, the Attorney General must file the required petition against an individual in a court of competent jurisdiction before that individual’s release from State custody or supervision. We also hold that Penal Law § 70.30 is not relevant to the question of which sentences make someone eligible for civil management under article 10.
I
On January 6, 1992, respondent Mustafa Rashid pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery (Penal Law § 160.15), and single counts of first-degree burglary (Penal Law § 140.30), first-degree rape (Penal Law § 130.35), and first-degree sodomy (former Penal Law § 130.50). This plea satisfied charges arising from two separate criminal incidents—the robbery of a gas station attendant and a home invasion—for which *5Rashid was arrested and indicted separately in 1988. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 8 to 16 years, running from his arrest.
Rashid was released to parole supervision in July 1999, after serving 11 years and eight months of his sentence. But on May 19, 2000, he was arrested and indicted separately for three robberies. On December 12, 2001, he pleaded guilty to two counts of third-degree robbery (Penal Law § 160.05), for each of which he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01), for which he was sentenced to prison for one year. The indictment satisfied by Rashid’s plea to the weapon-possession count also accused him of sexual abuse. These sentences ran concurrently to each other but consecutively to the undischarged portion of the indeterminate sentence imposed on Rashid in 1992 (see Penal Law § 70.25 [2-a]; see also People ex rel. Gill v Greene, 12 NY3d 1, 6 [2009]). He was subsequently released to parole supervision on January 6, 2006.
Rashid was returned to prison for violating the conditions of his parole in July 2006. He was released to parole supervision again in April 2007, but went back to prison after violating the conditions of his parole in August of that year. Rashid was next released to parole supervision in early 2008. He was arrested for the misdemeanor crimes of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25) and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 165.40) on May 6, 2008. Upon pleading guilty to petit larceny, Rashid received a definite sentence, which he served at Rikers Island, a local correctional facility. Rashid remained subject to the supervision of the State Division of Parole (the Division) throughout his time at Rikers Island, but his parole was not revoked, apparently because his jail sentence ended days before his parole expiration date: Rashid was freed from Rikers Island on October 31, 2008, and his parole supervision ended on November 4, 2008, when he reached the maximum term (20 years) of his consecutive indeterminate sentences.
On November 5, 2008, the Attorney General filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking sex offender civil management of Rashid pursuant to article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law. SOMTA and article 10 are designed to reduce the risks posed by and to address the treatment needs of those sex offenders who suffer from mental abnormalities that predispose them to commit repeated sex crimes (see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 10.01,10.03 [i]). To these ends, whenever an individual “who may be a *6detained sex offender” is “nearing an anticipated release”1 into the community, an “agency with jurisdiction”2 other than the Division must notify the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Mental Health (the Commissioner), while the Division may elect to do so (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05 [b]). As relevant to this appeal, a “detained sex offender” is
“a person who is in the care, custody, control, or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction, with respect to a sex offense or designated felony, in that the person is either:
“(1) A person who stands convicted of a sex offense as defined in subdivision (p) of this section [10.03], and is currently serving a sentence for, or subject to supervision by the division of parole, whether on parole or on post-release supervision, for such offense or for a related offense; . . .
“(4) A person who stands convicted of a designated felony that was sexually motivated and committed prior to the effective date of this article [10].” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [g] [1], [4].)
Again as relevant to this appeal, a “sex offense” includes felonies defined in article 130 of the Penal Law and any felony attempt or conspiracy to commit those crimes, as well as “a designated felony ... if sexually motivated and committed prior to” article 10’s effective date (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [p]). The list of “designated felon[ies]” encompasses a broad range of felony crimes, including assault, gang assault, stalking, manslaughter, murder, kidnaping, burglary, arson, robbery, various prostitution and obscenity offenses, crimes involving sexual performance by a child, and any felony attempt or conspiracy to commit the enumerated crimes. “Related offenses” include “any offenses that are prosecuted as part of the same criminal action or proceeding, or which are part of the same criminal *7transaction, or which are the bases of the orders of commitment received by the department of correctional services in connection with an inmate’s current term of incarceration” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [Z]).
Upon receipt of section 10.05 (b) notice, the Commissioner is authorized to “designate multidisciplinary staff’ at the Office of Mental Health (OMH) to conduct “a preliminary review” of the need for “the person who is the subject of the notice” to be evaluated by a three-member “case review team,” at least two of whose members must be “professionals in the field of mental health or the field of developmental disabilities, as appropriate, with experience in the treatment, diagnosis, risk assessment or management of sex offenders” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05 [a], [d]). If the staff decides after preliminary review to make a referral to a case review team, notice must be given to the individual whose case is to be referred (whom the statute identifies as “the respondent” at this point)3 (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05 [e]).
The case review team considers a variety of records, may arrange for a psychiatric examination, and ultimately determines whether the respondent is a “sex offender requiring civil management”—i.e., is both “detained” within the meaning of section 10.03 (g) and suffers from a “mental abnormality” as defined by section 10.03 (i)4 (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [q]). If the case review team determines that the respondent is not a sex offender requiring civil management, it notifies the respondent and the Attorney General, who then “shall not file a sex offender civil management petition” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05 [f]). If, however, the case review team reaches the contrary conclusion, written notice is given to the respondent and the Attorney General, “accompanied by a written report from a psychiatric examiner that includes a finding as to whether the respondent has a mental abnormality” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05 [g]).
*8After receipt of section 10.05 (g) notice, the Attorney General may elect to file an article 10 petition against the respondent in the Supreme Court or County Court of the county where the respondent is located (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 [a]). Within 30 days after a petition is filed, Supreme Court or County Court must “conduct a hearing without a jury to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 [g]). If probable cause is established, the respondent may be confined, pending completion of a jury trial to be conducted within 60 days thereafter (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 [k]; § 10.07 [a]). The jury (or judge, if jury trial is waived) must then determine “by clear and convincing evidence whether the respondent is a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [d]). The Attorney General bears the burden of proof, and any jury determination must be by unanimous verdict (id.).
If the jury (or judge, as the case may be) concludes that the respondent is a “detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality,” then the court must “consider whether the respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or a sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [f] [emphasis added]). If the court “finds by clear and convincing evidence” that the respondent is afflicted with
“a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that [he] is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility, then the court shall find the respondent to be a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement,” who “shall be committed to a secure treatment facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he or she no longer requires confinement” (id.).
Alternatively, if the judge “does not find that the respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement,” the court “shall make a finding of disposition that the respondent is a sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision, and the respondent shall be subject to a regimen of strict and intensive *9supervision and treatment” in accordance with article 10’s provisions (id.).5
Here, the Division sent section 10.05 (b) notice to the Commissioner and the Attorney General on September 29, 2008, stating that Rashid had been “identified . . . as a person who is a detained sex offender . . . warranting] notice to [OMH] of [impending] release”; and that he was under the Division’s supervision until his sentence expired on November 4, 2008. On the attached case review worksheet, the Division specified that first-degree sodomy was the “qualifying sex offense or sexually motivated designated felony offense,” and that Rashid exhibited a “pattern of sex offense.”
On October 6, 2008, OMH gave section 10.05 (e) notice to Rashid; and on October 17, 2008, OMH issued section 10.05 (g) notice to Rashid and the Attorney General. The section 10.05 (g) notice set out two findings made by the case review team: that Rashid was “a sex offender requiring civil management as defined by SOMTA”; and—in contrast to the SOMTA-qualifying offense flagged in the referral from OMH (i.e., first-degree sodomy)—that Rashid’s “sex offense was a designated felony that was sexually motivated.”6 As noted previously, Rashid was released from jail on October 31, 2008, his parole expired on November 4, 2008, and the Attorney General filed a sex offender civil management petition against him the next day, November 5, 2008.
Supreme Court directed that Rashid be confined pending the probable-cause hearing. Upon Rashid’s motion, the court dismissed the first petition for improper service, but denied *10Rashid’s application for immediate release from custody in light of the Attorney General’s representation that a second petition would be filed the same day.
At the probable-cause hearing held on November 19, 2008, the Attorney General argued that Rashid was a detained sex offender because he was subject to State custody or supervision for his 1992 convictions for rape and sodomy by operation of section 70.30 of the Penal Law. The Attorney General also suggested, in the alternative, that Rashid’s SOMTA-qualifying offense was a sexually motivated designated felony because “even though [Rashid] only pled to a misdemeanor [i.e., his plea in 2001 to weapon possession] the misdemeanor was ... on the indictment with the sexually motivated robbery as well.” When the judge asked the Attorney General “When did you begin the Article 10?” he responded, “on October 6, 2008, we served notice to the respondent pursuant to 10.05 of the Mental Hygiene Law.” The Attorney General immediately added that he was referring to section 10.05 (e).
The judge concluded that Rashid was a detained sex offender. He explained that
“[i]n doing so the Court relies on Article 70.00 of the Penal Law, which relates to consecutive sentences . . .
“Under Article 70.00 [the 1992 and 2001] sentences combined so that the minimum and maximum instead of being 8 to 16 is 10 to 20. And that if this proceeding was commenced prior to the expiration of the 20 years during which time [Rashid] was still incarcerated, accordingly under the definition of a detained sex offender, [he] is a detained sex offender” (emphasis added).
Additionally, the judge concluded that Rashid suffered from a mental abnormality, relying on the testimony of the State’s expert, a licensed psychologist and psychiatric examiner for OMH.
Accordingly, the court determined that there was probable cause to believe that Rashid was a sex offender requiring civil management. Because of Rashid’s “long history of criminality going back to his youth,” the court further determined that there was probable cause to believe that Rashid was dangerous enough to require confinement pending trial, and that lesser conditions of confinement were insufficient to protect the public *11since his behavior while incarcerated was “exemplary,” but once released he reverted to substance abuse and violent crime (see Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Spitzer, 2007 WL 4115936, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 85163 [SD NY 2007], affd sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v Paterson, 2009 WL 579445, 2009 US App LEXIS 4492 [2d Cir 2009] [imposing preliminary injunction requiring specific, individualized judicial finding with respect to portion of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 (k) addressing pretrial detention]). The judge ordered Rashid to be committed to a secure treatment facility pending completion of trial, which he scheduled. The case was then adjourned to another judge to handle further proceedings.
Rashid next moved to dismiss the petition on several grounds, including that his conviction for a weapon-possession misdemeanor was not a sexually motivated designated felony. On June 5, 2009, the judge granted Rashid’s motion because, as he subsequently explained, Rashid’s “conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (a class A misdemeanor) does not qualify as a ‘designated felony’ under the statute” and “[t]he only allegations in the second petition which asserted that [Rashid] was a detained sex offender arose from this misdemeanor conviction” (see 25 Misc 3d 318, 326 [Sup Ct, NY County 2009]).7 The court granted the State leave to re-plead and file another petition, however.
The Attorney General then filed a third petition—the subject of this case—on June 10, 2009. This petition relied upon People v Buss (11 NY3d 553 [2008]) (handed down after the probable-cause hearing) and Penal Law § 70.30 to argue that Rashid was a “detained sex offender” because he was serving an aggregate maximum sentence that encompassed the 1992 convictions for rape and sodomy. Further, the Attorney General also asserted in the third petition that the relevant date to determine whether Rashid was a detained sex offender was September 29, 2008, *12the date on which the Division gave section 10.05 (b) notice to the Commissioner and the Attorney General.8
Rashid moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that he was not a detained sex offender for two reasons: first, that at no relevant time was he serving a sentence or subject to parole or postrelease supervision for a “sex offense” or a “related offense,” as those terms are defined in article 10; second, that article 10 requires a respondent to be a detained sex offender when the petition is filed. Supreme Court did not rule on the latter issue. Instead, for purposes of Rashid’s motion to dismiss, the court assumed that the State’s position was correct (25 Misc 3d at 330).
Turning to the first issue, the judge concluded that Buss did not govern which sentences, in addition to sex offenses, make an individual eligible for civil management because the Legislature “obviously inserted” the definition for “related offenses” into the statute for this very purpose (id. at 332). By contrast, SORA “provide[d] no clear answer regarding the sentence calculation question . . . addressed ... in Buss,” making application of the general rule in Penal Law § 70.30 reasonable (id. at 331).
Applying article 10’s definitions for a “detained sex offender” and “related offenses” to the facts of this case, the judge observed that at the time Rashid received the section 10.05 (b) notice, he was in jail for petit larceny; he was not an inmate incarcerated under orders of commitment received by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). And while Rashid was still subject to parole supervision for his 2001 convictions, those convictions were not for sex offenses, or for crimes that were part of the same criminal transaction as a sex offense. The judge concluded that because Rashid was therefore not “currently serving a sentence for, or subject to supervision by the division of parole . . . for [a sex] offense or for a related offense” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [g] [1]), he was not a detained sex offender at the time alleged by the Attorney General to be relevant—i.e., September 29, 2008. Accordingly, Supreme Court granted Rashid’s motion and dismissed the petition, declaring that Rashid was not a detained sex offender at *13the time of either the interagency notice under section 10.05 (b) or the case review team notice under section 10.05 (e).
The Appellate Division affirmed. The court concluded that the different consequences of SORA registration and article 10 involuntary civil commitment, as well as the definition in article 10 of the “related offenses” to be considered in determining eligibility for civil commitment, “render[ed] Penal Law § 70.30 inapplicable for the purpose of merging the sentence for the rape into [Rashid’s] subsequent sentence for the nonsexual offense” (68 AD3d 615, 616 [1st Dept 2009]). After granting the State permission to appeal (14 NY3d 711 [2010]), we denied Rashid’s motion to vacate the stay of his release originally put in place by Supreme Court and continued by the Appellate Division, and granted him a calendar preference (15 NY3d 801 [2010]). We now affirm.
II
We first consider whether an individual must be a detained sex offender on the date when the Attorney General files a sex offender civil management petition against him in order to remain subject to civil management under article 10. As a threshold matter, this issue is preserved for our review. Although not raised in the Appellate Division, Rashid contested timeliness on this basis in Supreme Court (see Matter of Seitelman v Lavine, 36 NY2d 165, 170 n 2 [1975] [“This court will consider a question that has been raised in the tribunal of original jurisdiction even though it may not have been argued in the Appellate Division”]; Telaro v Telaro, 25 NY2d 433, 437-438 [1969] [expressly rejecting argument that party “abandoned or waived” an argument by failing to raise it at the Appellate Division]).
Here, Rashid was not subject to State custody or supervision at the time the Attorney General filed any of the three petitions. But a petition must allege “that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 [a] [emphasis added]), which is defined as “a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [q]). Moreover, as relevant to this appeal, a “detained sex offender” must be “in the care, custody, control, or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction” and, when on parole, “currently . . . subject to [the Division’s] supervision . . . for [a sex] offense or for a related offense” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [g] [1] [emphasis added]; see also People ex rel. Joseph II. v Superintendent of Southport Correctional Facility, *1415 NY3d 126, 135 [2010] [remarking that Legislature could have, but did not, extend article 10’s coverage to sex offenders living unsupervised in the community]).
The Attorney General argues that the State may still pursue civil management in this case because Rashid, although not subject to parole supervision when the petitions were filed in Supreme Court, was a detained sex offender on September 29, 2008 when the Division gave interagency notice pursuant to section 10.05 (b). According to the Attorney General, the inter-agency notice marks the point in time “when this proceeding began” (emphasis added), even though Rashid was unaware of it. The State therefore asserts that filing the interagency notice somehow “locked in” or “froze” Rashid’s status as “detained”— apparently for all time. As a result, it is unimportant that he was, in fact, not detained within the meaning of article 10 when the petition was filed.9
This novel interpretation finds no support in the statutory text. In the first place, the interagency notice required by section 10.05 (b) refers to “a person who may be a detained sex offender” (emphasis added), not someone who is a detained sex offender. All of the notices called for by section 10.05, titled “Notice and case review,” simply denote milestones in an internal administrative review procedure that may—but usually does not (see n 5, supra)—result in a sex offender civil management petition. Thus, there is no actual “proceeding” against a respondent until the Attorney General elects to file a petition (see CPLR 304 [a] [“(a) special proceeding is commenced by filing a petition”]). In Joseph II., we described the issue as “whether [respondents] were detained sex offenders when the State began proceedings against them under article 10” (15 NY3d at 132 [emphasis added]), clearly referring to “proceedings” commenced with the filing of a petition. If the Legislature had intended to enact something as counterintuitive as the *15State claims to have been the case—i.e., that an individual forever remains a detained sex offender subject to civil management under article 10 once “an agency with jurisdiction” notifies the Commissioner and the Attorney General that this individual “may be” a detained sex offender—it surely would have made its wishes explicit.
Lacking any conspicuous textual support for its position, the State asks us to make inferences from section 10.06 (h) and (f) of article 10. Section 10.06 (h) provides that
“[i]f the respondent was released subsequent to notice under subdivision (b) of section 10.05 of this article, and is therefore at liberty when the petition is filed, the court shall order the respondent’s return to confinement, observation, commitment, recommitment or retention, as applicable, for purposes of the probable cause hearing.”
According to the State, this provision “underscores that the Legislature contemplated an offender’s release prior to the filing of the petition”; and “[t]hus, it is unmistakably permissible to file a petition against a convicted sex offender who is at liberty.”
The State’s interpretation of section 10.06 (h) assumes, however, that “at liberty” means free from both State custody and State supervision. The statuses to which a respondent may be “return[ed]” from “liberty” under this provision are, however, all custodial in nature and typically followed by a period of State supervision. This suggests that section 10.06 (h) is meant to deal with the circumstance where a petition is filed against someone “at liberty” because not confined, but who is still subject to State supervision;10 not a situation—such as we have here—where State supervision ended before the petition was filed. Section 10.06 (h) is not rendered “superfluous,” as the dissent contends, just because it does not cover every conceivable “release” subsequent to section 10.05 (b) notice (see dissenting op at 29).
*16Section 10.06 (f) authorizes the Attorney General to file a “securing petition” to protect the public safety at any time after receipt of section 10.05 (b) notice in order to prevent a respondent’s release “if it appears that the respondent may be released prior to the time the case review team makes a determination.” If a securing petition is filed, “there shall be no probable cause hearing until such time as the case review team may find that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management”; and “[i]f the case review team determines that the respondent is not a sex offender requiring civil management, the attorney general shall so advise the court and the securing petition shall be dismissed.” (Id.)
The State points out that a securing petition is discretionary; that “[t]he statute does not say that the failure to file a securing petition will terminate the article 10 process”; and that an individual held on a securing petition does not fall within the definition of a “detained sex offender” under Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (g). Again, the State simply assumes that this provision is directed at an individual whose parole has expired. The Legislature was far more likely to have been worried about someone scheduled to be released from State custody into the community who might threaten the public safety notwithstanding being subject to State supervision. And although there is nothing in the plain language of this provision to prevent the Attorney General from filing a securing petition to stop an individual’s release from parole supervision, it does not follow that the Attorney General may subsequently file a sex offender civil management petition against an individual subject to a securing petition once that individual’s parole expires.11 As the State correctly noted, the definition of “detained sex offender” does not cover a person in custody pursuant to a securing petition filed pursuant to section 10.06 (f).
In sum, we read article 10 to require the Attorney General to file a sex offender civil management petition while a *17respondent is in State custody or, if the respondent is not confined, still subject to State supervision. This interpretation is in keeping with the Legislature’s intent to create a special set of procedures in article 10 to deal with the civil management of mentally ill sex offenders who are completing their prison terms. Article 10 was not designed to cover such individuals once they pass beyond the purview of the criminal justice system. At that point, the involuntary commitment provisions in article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law might come into play in an appropriate case (see Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27 [a]).
Ill
In Buss, the defendant pleaded guilty in 1983 to one count of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree assault, and was sentenced to concurrent indeterminate sentences of 2 to 6 years’ imprisonment. While on parole in 1987, he attacked and stabbed an acquaintance. This time, Buss pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree in full satisfaction of an indictment that included first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy counts. He was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment.
When Buss was released from prison in 2002, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders determined that he was required to register under SORA, citing the 1983 conviction for sexual abuse, and recommended that he be designated a level three sex offender. Buss objected, arguing that SORA did not apply to him because his sentence of sexual abuse “was due to expire” before SORA took effect in 1996 (11 NY3d at 556). The People countered that, by operation of Penal Law § 70.30 (1) (b), Buss was still serving a sentence for his 1983 conviction when SORA took effect. Section 70.30 (1) (b) provides that when two or more indeterminate sentences are consecutive, the minimum and maximum sentences are added to form aggregate minimum and maximum wholes, subject to certain limitations.
We agreed with the People, holding that “for SORA purposes a prisoner serving multiple sentences is subject to all sentences, whether concurrent or consecutive, that make up the merged or aggregate sentence he is serving. Buss was therefore still serving a sentence for his 1983 sex crime at the time SORA became effective in 1996” (11 NY3d at 557-558). We noted that “the primary function” of section 70.30 was “to allow for the ready calculation of parole eligibility,” but considered it “reasonable” to consider this provision to decide “whether a prisoner who *18has been given multiple sentences is subject to all his sentences for the duration of his term of imprisonment” for purposes of determining SORA eligibility (id. at 557).
Here, the State argues that, by virtue of Penal Law § 70.30 (1) (b) and our decision in Buss, Rashid was on parole for a SOMTA-qualifying offense until November 4, 2008 when his aggregate indeterminate sentence of 10 to 20 years expired. This is so, they contend, because that sentence encompassed not only his convictions for robbery in 2001, but also his convictions for rape and sodomy in 1992. By contrast, Rashid reasons that although it made sense for us to look to section 70.30 when trying to figure out an inmate’s eligibility for SORA registration, we “did so in the absence of any statutory guidance within SORA itself as to the eligibility of persons serving multiple sentences”; and “[b]y contrast, Article 10 contains its own provision for determining which offenders subject to multiple sentences will be eligible for Article 10 civil commitment”; specifically, the definition for “[r]elated offenses.” The motion court and the Appellate Division agreed with Rashid on this point, and so do we.
“Related offenses” include (1) offenses “prosecuted as part of the same criminal action or proceeding” as a sex offense as defined in article 10; (2) offenses “which are part of the same criminal transaction” as a sex offense as defined in article 10; and (3) offenses “which are the bases of the orders of commitment received by the department of correctional services in connection with an inmate’s current term of incarceration” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [Z]). Individuals subject to State custody or supervision on account of an offense within the first two categories of “[r]elated offenses” are eligible for civil management under article 10; the third category covers “inmates” serving their “current term[s] of incarceration” in DOCS’s custody.12
Thus, the Legislature enacted in article 10 a comprehensive and complex scheme that defines which offenses “count” for *19purposes of eligibility for civil management: sex offenses, sexually-motivated designated felonies committed prior to article 10’s effective date, and those non-sex crimes that are related offenses. Superimposing Penal Law § 70.30 on article 10 for purposes of making eligibility determinations would distort this statutory scheme.
The State argues, in the alternative, that Rashid’s 2001 robbery convictions qualify as “related offenses” because “at the time the article 10 process began, [his] ‘current term of incarceration’ was that [20]-year aggregate maximum term, in connection with which [DOCS] had received the commitment orders related to his robbery convictions as well as to his rape conviction.” But Rashid was on parole and/or incarcerated at Rikers Island when “the article 10 process” was kicked off in the fall of 2008; the third prong of the definition of “related offenses” covers DOCS inmates, not a parolee or someone incarcerated for a misdemeanor in a local jail. In sum, when the Division notified the Commissioner and the Attorney General on September 29, 2008 that Rashid was an individual who might be a detained sex offender, he was not under the Division’s supervision on account of conviction for a sex offense (his 2001 felony convictions were for robbery); or a sexually-motivated designated felony committed prior to article 10’s effective date (the weapon-possession conviction was for a misdemeanor); or offenses which were prosecuted along with a sex offense or were part of the same criminal transaction as a sex offense; he was not an “inmate” serving his “current term of incarceration” for robbery in DOCS’s custody because his parole was not revoked. Hence, Rashid did not “stand[ ] convicted” of a SOMTAqualiiying offense, and so was not a detained sex offender.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

. “Release” and “released” mean “release, conditional release or discharge from confinement, from supervision by the division of parole, or from an order of observation, commitment, recommitment or retention” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [m]).

. An “[a]gency with jurisdiction” over a person means “that agency which, during the period in question, would be the agency responsible for supervising or releasing such person, and can include the department of correctional services, the office of mental health, the office for people with developmental disabilities, and the division of parole” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [a]).

. The statute defines “[r]espondent” as “a person referred to a case review team for evaluation, a person as to whom a sex offender civil management petition has been recommended by a case review team and not yet filed, or filed by the attorney general and not dismissed, or sustained by procedures under this article” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [n]).

. “Mental abnormality” is defined as “a congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [i]).

. The third annual report made by the Commissioner to the Governor and the Legislature pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.10 (i) (see http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/statistics/SOMTA_Report.pdfi states that, during the 12-month reporting period from November 1, 2008 through October 31, 2009, OMH handled 1,798 referrals (involving 1,686 unique offenders) from agencies with jurisdiction. Of these 1,686 offenders, 194 (11.5%) were referred for evaluation by a case review team, of which 63 (3.7%) were recommended for civil management. Further, from April 13, 2007, when SOMTA took effect, to October 31, 2009, there have been 185 decisions regarding civil management. Mental abnormality was found in 171 (92.4%) of the trials, 99 of which resulted in a finding that the respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, and 72 of which resulted in orders mandating strict and intensive supervision and treatment.

. Section 10.05 (g) of the Mental Hygiene Law states that where the notice “indicates that a respondent stands convicted of or was charged with a designated felony, it shall also include the case review team’s finding as to whether the act was sexually motivated.”

. The probable-cause court was likewise not won over by the Attorney General’s argument that Rashid was in State custody or under State supervision for a sexually motivated designated felony stemming from his 2001 convictions. In the motion court judge’s view, the effect of his dismissal of the second petition and the State’s subsequent filing of a third petition was therefore simply “to conform the pleadings in the petition to the allegations which both of the parties . . . had been assuming would constitute the basis for [Rashid’s] trial” (25 Misc 3d at 327 n 9).

. This was a shift of position. As already noted, the Attorney General represented at the probable-cause hearing that the relevant date was October 6, 2008, when OMH gave section 10.05 (e) notice to Rashid. The probable-cause court did not discuss the timeliness issue, but implicitly decided that the Attorney General had commenced a timely proceeding.

. The dissent principally argues that a petition may be filed against someone who is not in State custody or subject to State supervision because “the Legislature expressed an unmistakable intent throughout article 10 not to impose rigid deadlines for taking action” (dissenting op at 27). While it is true that the failure to meet article 10’s time lines does not defeat the subsequent filing of a petition, it does not follow that the Attorney General may seek the civil commitment of an individual over whom the criminal justice system no longer exerts authority. It also does not follow that, having timely commenced a proceeding by the filing of a petition, the subsequent trial has to be completed before that individual’s underlying sentence expires (see dissenting op at 30).

. This seems to have been the fact pattern in People ex rel. David NN. v Hogan (53 AD3d 841 [3d Dept 2008]) and Matter of State of New York v Millard (19 Misc 3d 283 [Sup Ct, Broome County 2008]), the two lower court cases relied on by the State and cited by the dissent to argue that section 10.06 (h) “expressly contemplates that a petition can be filed after a respondent has completed a sentence” (dissenting op at 29). In both David NN. and Millard, the sex offenders, recently released from OMH custody, were subject to parole supervision when the Attorney General filed the article 10 petitions against them.

. The Mental Hygiene Legal Service contested the facial constitutionality of this provision in federal court on due process grounds. The District Court Judge, although acknowledging “serious and legitimate concerns about the potential operation of [section] 10.06 (f),” ultimately “decline[d] to issue a preliminary injunction against a provision that [might] rarely, if ever be used, or if used, may be capable of being interpreted or applied [by New York courts] in a manner that does not offend the due process clause”; i.e., “[d]spending upon how New York courts interpret their own statute, there may be no need to reach any federal constitutional issue” (Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936 at *11, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 85163 at *36-38).

. This third category of “[r] elated offenses” is broadly worded, reflecting the Legislature’s apparent decision to give the State more leeway to pursue civil commitment against soon-to-be-released DOCS inmates than parolees (see also Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05 [b] [providing that an “agency with jurisdiction” must notify the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the impending release of a potential detained sex offender, while the Division may do so]). Thus, article 10 does not set out a “more favorable” eligibility rule for DOCS inmates about to be released on parole or postrelease supervision than Penal Law § 70.30 creates for purposes of assessing their SORA eligibility (cf. dissenting op at 34). A DOCS inmate does not even have to have been committed to DOCS’s custody for a sex offense in order to be a “detained sex offender.”