Court Opinion

ID: 9926594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 13:16:08.778514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.528014
License: Public Domain

In The
                                Court of Appeals
                       Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                      No. 07-23-00118-CR

                               JADE GUEVARA, APPELLANT

                                              V.

                             THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 144th District Court
                                     Bexar County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 2020CR1579B, Honorable Michael E. Mery, Presiding

                                      January 22, 2024
                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

          Jade Guevara appeals his conviction for capital murder via three issues. We

affirm.

          Issues One and Two

          Appellant’s first two issues implicate his Fifth Amendment right against double

jeopardy. Here, two deaths were involved, those of Krone and Campos. The State

accused appellant of killing both individuals via one count for capital murder and two

separate counts of murder. Though the jury found him guilty of all three counts, the trial
court sentenced and convicted appellant of only capital murder. Yet, appellant argues

the following: “The indictment states only one allowable unit of prosecution, so the

Appellant can be convicted of only one offense. The Fifth Amendment double jeopardy

protection against multiple punishments was violated, and the Appellant suffered harm.

Given this double jeopardy violation, the remedy is to vacate the judgment for Count Two

[and Three].”

       There are not multiple judgments at bar. Indeed, having been convicted of only

capital murder, appellant was neither convicted nor punished multiple times for the same

offense. Nor do we see how he was harmed even if we assumed arguendo that his right

was somehow violated; again, the court only convicted him of one crime. See Molina v.

State, No. 07-22-00004-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 728, at *12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb.

6, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (involving one conviction

and finding no harm because the remedy to a double jeopardy violation based on

subjection to multiple punishments for the same crime is to affirm the conviction for the

most serious offense and vacate the other conviction).

       Issue Three

       Via his third and last issue, appellant questions whether the trial court erred by

permitting the jury to convict him “without finding the necessary intent for capital murder.”

This purportedly occurred when it included within the abstract portion of its charge an

instruction on conspiracy under § 7.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. The latter provides

the following:

       [i]f, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another
       felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of
       the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the
       offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one
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       that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the
       conspiracy. In this subsection, “conspiracy” means an agreement between
       two or more persons to commit a felony.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b). The abstract instruction tracked that language. And,

the portion referring to “though having no intent to commit it,” relieved the jury from having

to find that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of his victims, according

to appellant. Reading the charge and researching the relevant law discloses otherwise,

and we overrule the issue.

       Multiple counts were presented to the jury through the document. They consisted

of capital murder, murder, manslaughter, and aggravated robbery. Via the application

paragraph pertaining to capital murder, the trial court explained:

       Now, if you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
       that on or about the 26th day of November, 2016, in Bexar County, Texas,
       the defendant, Jade Guevara, either acting alone or together as a party with
       Carlos Hernandez, did intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an
       individual, namely, Charles Krone, by shooting Charles Krone with a deadly
       weapon, namely, a firearm, and Jade Guevara, either acting alone or
       together as a party with Carlos Hernandez, did intentionally or knowingly
       cause the death of another individual, namely, Roger Campos, by shooting
       Roger Campos with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and both murders
       were committed during the same criminal transaction:

       Then you will find the defendant, Jade Guevara, guilty of the offense of
       capital murder as charged in Count 1 of the indictment.

As can be seen, nothing therein mentions “conspiracy,” the substance of § 7.02(b)(2), or

committing capital murder while conspiring to commit some other felony. Rather, the

court informed the jury that it could convict appellant of capital murder only if it found he

“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death” of Krone and Campos while “either acting

alone or together as a party with Carlos Hernandez.” In short, the trial court informed the

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jury it had to find the evidence satisfied the requisite mens rea for capital murder before

it could hold appellant guilty of that crime.

       And, even if the application paragraph included both reference to culpability for

capital murder as a party and through conspiracy per § 7.02(b), the instruction would have

been proper. Including both theories of culpability in an application was approved long

ago. See Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 932–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc)

(noting that “[t]he application paragraphs of the jury charge included language

incorporating the above-mentioned party and conspirator culpability instructions” and

holding that “[s]uch theories of culpability may be appropriately applied in a capital murder

setting”); Murkledove v. State, 437 S.W.3d 17, 22–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet

dism’d) (same); Ramirez v. State, No. 07-98-0277-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3909, at *2

(Tex. App.—Amarillo June 13, 2001, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(same).

       Having overruled appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                         Brian Quinn
                                                         Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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