Court Opinion

ID: 9568091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:00:35.369872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:20.108633
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, JUDGE:
SPECIALLY CONCUR
¶ 1 I concur in the Court’s decision in this case, but do so more on the facts not stated in the opinion than the facts which are stated. In addition, I believe the Court’s analysis of the revisions of the Oklahoma Criminal Discovery Code are accurate in both the interpretation of the language of the statute as well as the Legislative intent relating to the Discovery Code.
¶ 2 This case is a vivid example of why this Court needs to promulgate objective criteria for trial judges to utilize in evaluating the necessity of giving an instruction on a defendant’s theory of defense. See Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875 (Okl.Cr.1998) (Lumpkin, J. concurring in result). As I stated in Jackson, “by establishing clear, objective criteria in our analysis of issues on appeal, we provide the helpful guidance trial practitioners and judges deserve. At the same time, we discipline ourselves by providing a consistent method for reviewing the cases which come before us on appeal”. Id. at 902. The issue here is not whether the defendant can present his defense, but whether he is entitled to a jury instruction on that defense. “[Bjefore a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the defense ..., he must establish a prima facie case of the ... elements of that defense.” Michigan v. Lemons, 454 Mich. 234, 562 N.W.2d 447, 454 (1997). Prima facie evidence is defined as:
Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient ... to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue which it supports.
Id. at not. 20. See also Jackson, 964 P.2d at 901-2.
¶ 3 If I were to apply the procedure I suggested in Jackson to the limited facts set out in the opinion, I would find the trial judge correctly denied the request for the voluntary intoxication instruction and the testimony of Dr. Murphy in the first stage of the trial. The reason for that is, based on the facts related in the opinion, I would find Appellant failed to present sufficient competent evidence to support his defense and to warrant a jury instruction on that defense.
¶ 4 The opinion gives the impression that the only evidence supporting the defense of voluntary intoxication was Appellant’s statement that he had consumed alcohol and taken valium. However, that is not the fact situation the record presents. In addition to Appellant’s statement, the defense attempted to offer the testimony of a fellow inmate, Michael Coffman, and did present the evidence of another inmate, Darren Wasserman. Appellant’s self-serving statements, when coupled with the testimony of these two inmates, does establish competent evidence for the trier of fact to make a decision relating to the believability between Appellant’s evidence and the conflicting evidence presented by the State.
*313¶ 5 To establish his defense of voluntary intoxication, Appellant called inmate Darrin Wasserman, who testified Appellant took va-lium and drank vodka on the day of the homicide. However, on cross-examination, Wasserman conceded he did not actually see Appellant ingest the valium or drink the vodka. Wasserman did estimate Appellant had been drunk for four or five days preceding the homicide because he was staggering and said he was trying to stay away from Appellant because he did not want to get into trouble. In addition, Wasserman said he saw Appellant at the dining hall just prior to the homicide, but he did not have contact with him at that time.
¶ 6 On the Friday before trial began on Monday, defense counsel received a letter from inmate Michael Coffman saying he had information concerning Appellant’s ease. Appellant’s defense counsel at trial advised the court prior to jury selection that he had given Coffman’s name and address to the State and had filed for a writ to have Coff-man transported back to Craig County. Defense counsel further advised the court he had not been able to interview Coffman to know whether he would be a viable witness, but informed the court at that time if it developed that Coffman had relevant testimony, he would call him as a witness. At that time the State moved in limine to exclude Coffman's testimony due to the failure to list the witness at an earlier date, but at the same time acknowledged it was not defense counsel’s fault. The court issued the writ and had Coffman transferred to Craig County to allow the parties an opportunity to interview him to determine the relevancy of his testimony. Upon Coffman’s return to Craig County, both the State and the defense had the opportunity to interview him. At the time the State rested its case, defense counsel announced his intent to call Coffman as a witness to support Appellant’s voluntary intoxication defense. The offer of proof submitted by defense counsel stated that Coff-man would testify that he had dinner with Appellant the day of the homicide and that Appellant was very intoxicated. Coffman would also testify that Appellant had been drinking three days prior to the homicide. The court was also advised that Coffman had not come forward earlier because he was transferred from NEOCC shortly after the homicide and did not know who to contact until he saw a writ issued to another inmate at his current facility to testify at Appellant’s trial. The prosecutor agreed with the offer of proof and also added that Coffman had admitted that he was a good friend of Appellant. The State objected to the defense calling Coffman, stating “the indicia of reliability [of his testimony] is very suspect”. The trial court reserved its ruling until the defense presented most" of its witnesses. The trial court then ruled that Coffman would not be allowed to testify in the first stage of trial because of the lateness of the notice and because it did not believe Coffman was a credible witness whose testimony would affect the proceedings.
¶ 7 It is readily apparent from the offer of proof, and the State’s acknowledgement of it, that Coffman was a newly discovered witness who was a surprise to the defense as well as the State. Three inmates and two corrections officers, a deputy sheriff, O.S.B.I. agent and the bus driver who took Appellant back to the barracks testified that Appellant did not have any indicia of being intoxicated, based on their observations of his actions and his speech. Appellant’s self-serving testimony, in and of itself, when weighed against the testimony of the State’s witnesses would not have been competent evidence to warrant an instruction of voluntary intoxication. However, Appellant’s testimony, when taken together with the testimony of Wasserman and the proffered testimony of Coffman, created a question of fact which should have been presented to the jury to determine the believability of the witnesses. At that point, “the issues of whether the evidence has been rebutted or contradicted are questions of fact for the jury to decide under proper instructions by the Court”. 964 P.2d at 902.
¶ 8 This type of fact situation is the very reason this Court should provide objective criteria to aid the trial judge in evaluating the evidence presented to determine if an instruction on the theory of defense should be given.
*314¶ 9 I also believe further discussion is needed concerning the testimony of Dr. Murphy. After-the-fact experts are limited in the scope of testimony which is proper. Dr. Murphy interviewed and evaluated Appellant a substantial period of time after the incident on February 4,1995. Therefore, any opinion he might be able to provide to a trier of fact could not properly include an opinion as to whether or not Appellant was intoxicated on the night this murder took place. The limitations on this type of expert witness testimony provided the basis for our discussion in Hooks v. State, 862 P.2d 1273, 1278-79 (Okl.Cr.1993). Citing to Moore v. State, 788 P.2d 387, 399 (Okl.Cr.1990), the Court stated, “[i]n other words, ‘[ajlthough Section 2704 abolished the “ultimate issue” rule, Sections 2701, 2703, and 2403 should operate to bar admission ‘“of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach (cites omitted). Our analysis in Hooks is supported by Standard 7-6.6, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. That provision provides:
[ejxpert testimony as to how the development, adaptation, and functioning of the defendant’s mental processes may have influenced the defendant’s conduct at the time of the offense charged should be admissible. Opinion testimony, whether expert or lay, as to whether or not the defendant was criminally responsible at the time of the offense charged should not be admissible, (emphasis added).
¶ 10 In the commentary discussing this standard, the following analysis is set forth:
[tjhe proper limits to so-called ultimate issue testimony cannot be determined fully in the abstract. In the context of specific testimony (such as use of the word appreciate), courts must choose between the two important principles reflected in Standard 7-3.9(a): (1) that expert testimony should be admitted when it is based on a witness’s specialized knowledge and will assist the trier of fact; and (2) that expert witnesses should not be permitted to express opinions on “any question requiring a conclusion of law or a moral or social value judgment properly reserved to the court or to the jury.”
¶ 11 This analysis is consistent with our opinion in Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655 (Okl.Cr.1991), wherein we set out the perimeters for expert testimony relating to the child accommodation syndrome. As we stated in that case, it is proper for the expert to relate to the trier of fact the indicia and characteristics of the syndrome and allow the trier of fact to then determine whether or not the evidence presented supports an application of that concept in the case. Id. at 659-60.
¶ 12 In the present case, once competent evidence of the defense of voluntary intoxication was presented, Dr. Murphy’s testimony would have been relevant regarding the results of the tests conducted on Appellant by Dr. Murphy. These test results would have identified Appellant’s condition at the time of the testing as it related to Appellant’s actions on the night of the murder. This would allow the trier of fact to make the decision as to whether or not, based on the evidence, Appellant could have formed the intent to kill. However, Dr. Murphy, as the expert, should not and could not testify as to his opinion regarding whether Appellant had the intent or had the ability to form the intent to kill on February 4, 1995. Experts, especially those dealing with the art form of psychiatry and psychology, are humans with specialized knowledge, but do not possess the attributes of a deity. Therefore, their opinion regarding what might have taken place at the time of a crime is speculation based on éstimates and guesses within their area of specialized knowledge. It is for that reason that the content of their opinion should relate only to an interpretation of the tests administered on the defendant which indicate the condition of the defendant at the time of the testing and an explanation of the effect of those findings. This testimony can then be considered only if the triers of fact find those factors did exist pursuant to the evidence presented in the course of trial at the time of the offense. There cannot be a carte blanche authorization of expert testimony without appropriate restrictions being applied to its content.
¶ 13 In this case, it would appear relevant and appropriate for Dr. Murphy to have been allowed to testify regarding the tests *315administered, the results of those tests, and the effect alcohol and/or controlled substances could have had on Appellant if the jury found those substances had been ingested by Appellant. Our language in Hooks makes this very clear. As we stated:
[Bjecause a jury might need assistance in understanding and assessing mental disorders which would render an accused insane, expert testimony is routinely admitted when the defense of insanity is raised. When, as in this case, a defendant attempts to elicit expert testimony on the issue of whether he or she possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime in question, such testimony should be excluded. Here, as in Gabus, supra, “[njo special knowledge was needed to understand these facts and draw conclusions from them.” Id., 678 P.2d at 256. Anyone who has ever witnessed a temper tantrum or a fight, felt an urge to strike out at another person or attempted to explain away a bad deed could have appreciated the nature of Hooks’ actions before, during and after the murder: “[Wjhere the normal experiences and qualifications of laymen jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions Jfrom the facts and circumstances, expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible.” Id.
862 P.2d at 1279.
¶ 14 For the above reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court in this matter.