Court Opinion

ID: 9950706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:16:50.612854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:48.519144
License: Public Domain

J-A03002-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JENSUN CLAYCOMB                         :
                                         :
                      Appellant          :   No. 397 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 24, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-05-CR-0000001-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                       FILED: March 14, 2024

     Jensun Claycomb appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to fifteen

years of incarceration following his conviction for, inter alia, aggravated

assault. We affirm.

     We glean the following facts from the certified record. Appellant lived

with Julia Hadix, their six-month-old daughter G.C., and Ms. Hadix’s nearly

two-year-old son from a prior relationship, K.H.    On September 1, 2020,

Ms. Hadix was baking a cake in the kitchen with K.H. while Appellant was

playing a video game in the living room.     G.C. was on the sofa next to

Appellant. While in the kitchen, Ms. Hadix heard Appellant yell her name, and

she entered the room. Appellant was holding G.C., whose eyes were rolled to

the back of her head and whose breathing was a “whisper.”         N.T. Trial,

1/31/23, at 34. Ms. Hadix performed CPR on G.C. until paramedics arrived.
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The paramedics took over lifesaving measures, established a pulse after five

minutes of performing CPR, and transported G.C. to UPMC Bedford.

      A CT scan showed that G.C. had sustained a brain injury.         She was

intubated and placed on a ventilator, but nonetheless went into respiratory

and cardiac arrest.       However, after multiple hours of treatment in the

emergency room and in critical care, G.C.’s condition ceased being life-

threatening, and she was transported in a pediatric ambulance to Children’s

Hospital in Pittsburgh.

      Due to the nature of G.C.’s injuries, Keenan Walker, a nurse at UMPC

Bedford, reported the case as potential child abuse to Bedford County

Children, Youth, and Families. Since G.C. had bleeding inside of her skull,

Mr. Walker believed that G.C.’s condition was a result of shaken baby

syndrome rather than any previous falls or head injuries.

      Dr. Jennifer Wolford was the on-call physician at Children’s Hospital in

Pittsburgh who treated G.C. in the intensive care unit. Dr. Wolford stated that

the nature of G.C.’s brain injury could not have been caused by anything

except “violent shaking” and that all indications surrounding her injury “tell us

that [G.C.] was shaken in a violent manner.” Id. at 346-47. In coming to

this conclusion, Dr. Wolford ruled out the suggestion that other trauma could

have contributed to G.C.’s injury. Id. at 347. Indeed, Dr. Wolford testified

that the symptoms displayed by G.C. would have manifested within a few

minutes of experiencing the trauma. Id. at 403-05.

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      Appellant was arrested and charged with numerous crimes, including

aggravated assault. Before his trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine, wherein

he sought permission for an expert witness to testify remotely at trial. After

a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

      The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, found Appellant guilty of

aggravated assault, simple assault, endangering the welfare of a child, and

recklessly endangering another person. Appellant did not file a post-sentence

motion but did timely appeal. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

and Appellant complied. Thereafter, the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

      I.     Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence
             to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant injured
             the victim in this matter in any way?

      II.    Whether Appellant’s conviction was against the weight of
             the evidence?

      III.   Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request
             to have an expert witness testify virtually?

Appellant’s brief at 11.

      Appellant first contests the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his

conviction for aggravated assault. See id. at 23. We review a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence under the following guidelines:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

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      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all the evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(cleaned up).

      Our Crimes Code states that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if

he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious

bodily injury to a child less than [thirteen] years of age, by a person [eighteen]

years of age or older.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(9). “Serious bodily injury” is

defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which

causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of

the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. “A person

acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when . . .

it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such

a result[.]” Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948 (Pa.Super.

2012).   Since there is rarely direct evidence of the defendant’s intent, it

ordinarily must be proven through circumstantial evidence and inferred from

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acts, conduct, or attendant circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Fortune,

68 A.3d 980, 984 (Pa.Super. 2013).

      Appellant alleges that the Commonwealth did not show that he “ever

caused any bodily injury to the victim at all.” Appellant’s brief at 23. He

claims that nobody saw him harm G.C. and that she had shown behavioral

changes prior to the date when the incident in question occurred. See id. at

27-28.   In that vein, Appellant argues that G.C. had sustained prior head

injuries while under the sole care of Ms. Hadix, when G.C. fell from a bed and

K.H. landed on her head. Id. at 27. Appellant also avers that Ms. Hadix and

K.H. were around G.C. near the time when she was injured, suggesting they

may have caused the injury. Id. For these reasons, Appellant requests this

Court reverse his conviction.

      Upon review, the certified record contains ample evidence to sustain

Appellant’s conviction. Dr. Wolford testified that G.C.’s injuries were caused

by violent shaking within minutes of the symptoms manifesting. See N.T.

Trial, 1/31/23, at 346-47.       During the moments prior to G.C. exhibiting

symptoms, Appellant was the only person with her, as he was in the living

room playing a video game while Ms. Hadix and K.H. were in the kitchen

baking a cake. Id. at. 29. Furthermore, expert testimony eliminated any

previous events, such as G.C.’s fall from the bed, as contributing to her

hospitalization.   Id. at 348.    Finally, Dr. Wolford stated that the injuries

sustained by G.C. demonstrated that she was a victim of shaken baby

syndrome and that was the sole reason for her condition. Id. In sum, the

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evidence presented demonstrated that Appellant caused serious bodily injury

to G.C., as he violently shook her, resulting in her near death.

      Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the Commonwealth’s evidence was

neither so unreliable nor so weak and inconclusive as to make the verdict pure

conjecture. See Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540 (Pa.Super.

2017) (“Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-

finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law

no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances”).

      Next, Appellant contends that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. As explained infra, this issue is waived. In order to preserve such

a claim, “a defendant must present his challenge to the weight of the evidence

to the trial court for a review in the first instance.” Commonwealth v. Stiles,

143 A.3d 968, 980 (Pa.Super. 2016). A weight of the evidence claim must be

raised in a post-sentence motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or

orally prior to sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 556

(Pa.Super. 2016); Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. The failure to properly preserve a weight

claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its

opinion.   See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490–91

(Pa.Super. 2014). Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion contesting

the weight of the evidence, nor did he make an oral or written motion before

sentencing. Therefore, the claim is waived.

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      Finally, Appellant avers that the trial court erred in denying his motion

in limine, which sought leave to have his expert witness testify virtually. We

note that, “when reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply an

evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.”        Commonwealth v.

Sami, 243 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “An abuse of

discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but rather

exists where the court has reached a conclusion that overrides or misapplies

the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Christine,

125 A.3d 394, 398 (Pa. 2015) (cleaned up).

      At the hearing on Appellant’s motion in limine, counsel argued that

“travel to and from the courthouse may be an issue in some of the winter

months.” N.T. Motion in Limine Hearing, 12/20/22, at 4. Moreover, Appellant

stated that the ability to testify remotely would be “certainly convenient” since

Appellant’s expert lived in California. Id. When it denied Appellant’s motion,

the trial court indicated that it wished to have the expert testify in person to

more accurately assess his credibility. Id. at 6.

      Appellant asserts that, in so ruling, the trial court violated Article I, § 9

of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Compulsory Process Clause of the

United States Constitution, since the court had no cause to deny his request

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that his proposed expert testify virtually.1 Appellant’s brief at 29. Appellant

alleges that because of inclement weather at the time of trial and the difficulty

of travelling from California to Pennsylvania to testify, his expert could not

testify in person and, instead, was “only able to testify via contemporaneous

video testimony.” Id. at 31.

       The trial court was unconvinced by Appellant’s assertions, noting that

Appellant never claimed that his expert witness was unable to attend the trial,

only that it would be inconvenient for him to do so. See Trial Court Opinion,

8/15/23, at 7-8. Indeed, the certified record is devoid of any references or

assertions as to why Appellant’s expert was only able to testify remotely and

why he could not attend the trial in person.            Furthermore, contrary to

Appellant’s seeming contention, there is no indication in the record that

inclement weather prevented Appellant’s expert witness from travelling to

Pennsylvania from California.           Phrased differently, prior to this appeal,

Appellant never alleged that his expert was unable to attend trial, only that

it would be more convenient for him if he were granted the ability to testify

remotely. Moreover, the trial court’s stated justification during the motion in

limine hearing of wishing to more accurately assess the credibility of
____________________________________________

1 Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, in pertinent part, that

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . . . to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Pa.Const. Art. I, § 9. Similarly,
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” U.S. Const. Am. VI. However, since the
trial court did not deny Appellant the right to compel a witness to testify at
trial, these clauses are irrelevant to the matter sub judice.

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Appellant’s   expert   witness    was   not   manifestly   unreasonable.   See

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2011) (cleaned

up) (“It is the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of

witnesses.”). Hence, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s request

to allow his expert to testify virtually.

      In sum, none of Appellant’s three challenges warrants relief and, as

such, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 03/14/2024

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