Court Opinion

ID: 9752107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:36:45.727343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:07.645863
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue which the majority addresses1 is whether the testimony of the police investigators and the minors who consumed the beer was sufficient to establish a violation by appellants of Section 493(1) of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4-493(1). The majority holds that the testimony was insufficient to establish a violation beyond a reasonable doubt. I interpret the statute differently than the majority, and based on that interpretation I would affirm the judgments of sentence of the courts below.
The relevant portions of the Liquor Code read as follows:
§ 4-493. Unlawful acts relative to liquor, malt and brewed beverages and licensees
It shall be unlawful—
(1) For any licensee or the board, or any employe, servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages, or to permit any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to be sold, furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to *423any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits, (emphasis supplied).
47 P.S. § 4-493(1).
§ 1-102. Definitions
“Malt or Brewed Beverages” means any beer, lager beer, ale, porter or similar fermented malt beverage containing one-half of one per centum or more of alcohol by volume, by whatever name such beverage may be called, (emphasis supplied).
47 P.S. § 1-102.
Whenever we are confronted with a question of statutory interpretation we are guided in our analysis by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972.2 That Act provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 1903. Words and phrases.
(a) Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage ...
1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.
§ 1921 Legislative intent controls.
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly____
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
*424(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921.
The issue here is whether thé Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the fraternities furnished “malt or brewed beverages” to minors: by extension the issue becomes whether the appellants furnished beer to minors.
Appellants have asserted, and apparently the majority has accepted, that “the statute in question is specific in its definition of what is beer,” and in appellants’ minds such definition requires that the “beer” in question must be proven to contain at least “one half of one per centum or more of alcohol by volume.” I disagree.
The majority’s position requires that the alcohol content words in the statute (i.e. “containing one-half of one per centum or more of alcohol by volume”) be construed as modifying all the preceding words (i.e. “any beer, lager, lager beer, ale, porter or similar fermented malt beverage”). I believe that the proper interpretation is that the alcohol content words only modify the last described beverage, i.e., the “similar fermented malt beverage, ... by whatever such beverage may be called.” This interpretation becomes clear by enumerating the defined categories, to wit: “malt or brewed beverages means any [1] beer, [2] lager beer, [3] ale, [4] porter or [5] similar fermented malt beverage containing one-half of one per centum or more of alcohol by volume, by whatever name such beverage may be called.” In drafting the statute thusly the General Assembly credited the terms beer, lager beer, ale, and porter as having specific meanings within the spectrum of potables; and in an exercise of legislative caution then included a catch-all category to include any beverage which had not acquired a specific meaning but which nonetheless would qualify as a malt or brewed beverage, and contained the designated amount of alcohol.
In interpreting statutes our task is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. C.S. 1921(a). That intention may be ascertained, inter alia, *425by considering “the mischief to be remedied” and “the consequences of a particular interpretation,” 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(c)(3) and (c)(6). In the instant case, the mischief to be remedied is underage drinking: an ever-increasing problem too often manifested through the wreckage of cars, bodies and lives on our roads and highways. The majority’s interpretation of this statute creates another roadblock in the resolution of this pressing problem.
Additionally, the consequences of the majority’s decision on other state and local enactments may be far-reaching and problematic. For instance, will a municipality with a ban on the public drinking of beer or other spirits be required to conduct a chemical analysis of the contents of a beer can? To what purpose? Such contortions only serve to undermine respect for the legal process and to further the public perception that a clever lawyer is more important than the purpose of the law or the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
There is nothing complicated about the resolution of this case. The General Assembly banned the furnishing of “beer” to minors. The fraternities had a beer party to which they admitted minors. The minors requested and were furnished what they believed to be beer.3 By serving the beer to the minors, the fraternities violated the General Assembly’s ban. It is that simple.
I would affirm the trial court’s judgments of sentence.
LARSEN, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Because of its resolution of the sufficiency of the evidence question in favor of appellants, the majority did not address appellants’ second question, i.e., whether the investigators’ entry into the fraternities was illegal, thereby necessitating a suppression of evidence. Regarding this issue the suppression court found that the circumstances surrounding the officers entry into the fraternities were such that the fraternities could not have entertained a legitimate expectation of privacy. With this conclusion I agree.

. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. 630 Pa.Reports — 17

. The undercover officers in this case and some of the minors who were served testified that what they were served, looked, smelled and tasted like beer. At some point in this process, a jury should be allowed to conclude that if something walks like a duck, sounds like a duck, flies like a duck, and swims like a duck, then it is a duck, without having an ornithologist explain to it the biological intricacies that qualify a certain species of winged fowl as a duck.