Court Opinion

ID: 2964094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:25.059961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:50.542594
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 94-1372

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    TODD P. ISOM,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               Paul J. Klehm, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
               _____________
               Margaret E. Curran,  Assistant United States Attorney,  with
               __________________
          whom Sheldon Whitehouse, United  States Attorney, and Lawrence D.
               __________________                               ___________
          Gaynor,  Assistant  United States  Attorney,  were  on brief  for
          ______
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     June 7, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.  Defendant-Appellant Todd Isom
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.
                                ___________

          ("Isom") appeals  the district court's  denial of his  request to

          withdraw his plea of guilty.   For the reasons stated herein,  we

          affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    In November 1992, Isom, along with co-defendant Anthony

          McKinney  ("McKinney"),  was indicted  on  two counts.    Count I

          charged  the two men with conspiracy to distribute and to possess

          with intent to  distribute five  grams or more  of cocaine  base.

          See 21 U.S.C.   846.  Count II charged them  with possession with
          ___

          intent to  distribute five grams or more of cocaine base.  See 18
                                                                     ___

          U.S.C.   2;  21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B).  The testimony

          at  the probable cause and change of plea hearings indicates that

          the  circumstances of  arrest were  as follows.   On  October 26,

          1993,  a  confidential  informant, accompanied  by  several  Drug

          Enforcement Administration Task Force Agents, taped two telephone

          conversations  with  McKinney.    McKinney  agreed  to  meet  the

          informant in Providence and sell him two ounces of crack cocaine.

          The  rendezvous took  place  as  planned.   McKinney  joined  the

          informant and an agent in an undercover vehicle.  When  the agent

          asked  to see  the drugs  before allowing  McKinney to  count the

          money, McKinney said that  "his guy" was coming with  the "stuff"

          and directed the agent  to a nearby  parking lot.  McKinney  then

          got out of the car and flagged Isom, who took a clear plastic bag

          out of his pants and gave it to McKinney.   After McKinney showed

          the  agent some of  the contents of  the bag, the  agent gave the

                                         -2-

          arrest signal.   Both  co-defendants fled, and  were subsequently

          apprehended.    After  receiving  their  Miranda  warnings,  both

          defendants  made  statements admitting  possession  of  the crack

          cocaine.

                    At his arraignment, Isom pled  not guilty.  On  January

          14,  1994,  at his  change of  plea  hearing, the  district court

          accepted  Isom's1  change  of  plea  to guilty  on  both  counts,

          pursuant  to a plea  agreement, which provided,  inter alia, that
                                                           __________

          Isom  would plea  guilty  and the  government  would recommend  a

          sentence at the low end of  the sentencing guideline range or  of

          five years, whichever was greater.  At   the   March  18,   1994,

          sentencing  hearing, however,  defense  counsel indicated  to the

          court  that Isom had informed him that  he did not understand the

          change  of  plea,  the  attendant  colloquy,  or  even  the  plea

          agreement.   Isom then  addressed the  court  and made  a pro  se
                                                                    _______

          motion to  withdraw his plea.   Isom began his motion  by stating

          that he did not want to withdraw his plea:

                         MR. ISOM:  Good  morning.  I just want
                      to start  off, your Honor, by  saying I'm
                      not  trying to  change  the plea  that  I
                      entered the  day that  I said that  I was
                      guilty  of  taking  a  bag  from  my  co-
                      defendant.    Also  I  want   to  make  a
                      statement clearly that I also received it
                      from my  co-defendant  to bring  it  down
                      there, okay.  

          Immediately  following these statements,  however, Isom presented

          his  reasons to withdraw his plea:   his lack of understanding of

                              
          ____________________

          1   McKinney had already  pled guilty  to the two  counts of  the
          indictment.

                                         -3-

          the plea agreement and ineffective assistance of counsel.

                      I feel like this, I  came in here to this
                      courtroom  January  14th  to plead  under
                      that, but I  did not understand the  plea
                      agreement,  and  did  not  see  the  plea
                      agreement  until  that  day,  until  that
                      morning,  five  minutes before  I entered
                      the courtroom.  My lawyer states that  he
                      went  over  it with  me.    I don't  have
                      copies of nothing, your  Honor, anything,
                      not  even discovery package,  nothing.  I
                      don't have nothing.   He claims he  came,
                      he  discussed  this.    He  claims why  I
                      didn't  want copies  of  them.   I  don't
                      understand that, your Honor.  I feel like
                      this, if he  was -- if I  was supposed to
                      have copies  of them,  I  should have had
                      copies  of them.  I just feel -- I put in
                      a motion to withdraw the plea.  

          Isom concluded by pleading his innocence.

                      I    just    taking   --    taking   into
                      consideration and ask you, to beg you, to
                      beg  the   Court,  that  you   take  into
                      consideration and look at the motion, and
                      I'll  go with your decision, whatever you
                      decide to grant, whatever you decide your
                      go under,  but I really feel  as I should
                      have a  chance to  prove my  innocence in
                      this  case here.  I'm freely pleading out
                      to  something I didn't  even have nothing
                      to do with.  Just because I brung the bag
                      down  to him, with  the knowledge  of not
                      knowing what was in  it, doesn't say that
                      I was involved with a drug deal.  I'm not
                      a drug  dealer, and I feel I just go from
                      my heart that I  should just let you look
                      over the motion.  Thank you.

          (Sentencing Hearing, at 3-4).  The court refused Isom's motion:

                         THE COURT:   Well, it  comes too late,
                      to begin with.  I took your  plea here in
                      open court,  and  I  asked  you  all  the
                      questions,  and you  made  all the  right
                      answers --
                         MR. ISOM:  Yup.
                         THE COURT:  (Continued) -- to plead in
                      this matter.  
                         MR. ISOM:  Yes.

                                         -4-

                         THE  COURT:    And  you  told  me  you
                      understood the plea agreement.
                         MR. ISOM: Uh-hum.
                         THE  COURT:  And what the Government's
                      recommendation was going  to be.  So  I'm
                      not  going to  allow you  to pull  out at
                      this point.
                         MR. ISOM:  Okay.  No problem.

          (Sentencing Hearing, at 4-5).  Isom was sentenced to sixty months

          in  prison, to be followed  by four years  of supervised release,

          and a $100 assessment.

                    Ten days  following the sentencing  hearing, a  written

          motion  to  withdraw plea  was filed.    Isom's signature  on the

          motion, which was apparently  prepared by a paralegal clerk  at a

          detention  center,  was  notarized  on  March 15,  prior  to  the

          sentencing  hearing.  The written motion stated, inter alia, that
                                                           __________

          the plea should be withdrawn as it was entered without the proper

          advice of counsel, and that Isom did not understand the nature of

          the  charge, the  consequences  of the  plea,  or his  rights  in

          connection with the plea.   In support of these  contentions, the

          motion maintained that  Isom was a functional illiterate, that he

          was innocent, and that the  government would suffer no  prejudice

          from  withdrawal of Isom's guilty plea.  The reason presented for

          withdrawal  was ineffective  assistance  of counsel.   The  court

          denied the motion, on the grounds that it was untimely and lacked

          substance.  This appeal ensued.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    The sole issue before us  is whether the district court

          erred  in denying Isom's oral and written motions to withdraw his

          plea   of  guilty   without  an   evidentiary  hearing.     After

                                         -5-

          establishing  our  standard  of  review,  we  set  out  the legal

          framework and weigh the merits of Isom's appeal.  For the reasons

          discussed below, we affirm the district court.

                    A.   Standard of Review
                    A.   Standard of Review
                         __________________

                    The  timing  of a  motion  determines  our standard  of

          review:    we  apply an  abuse  of  discretion  standard to  pre-

          sentencing motions, see  United States  v. Gray, 63  F.3d 57,  60
                              ___  _____________     ____

          (1st Cir. 1995), and  a miscarriage of justice standard  to post-

          sentencing motions, see  United States v. Ruiz-del  Valle, 8 F.3d
                              ___  _____________    _______________

          98,  103  (1st Cir.  1993).    Isom made  two  motions, the  pre-

          sentencing  oral motion and  the post-sentencing  written motion.

          However, as  the written  motion was notarized  before sentencing

          occurred, and Isom referred  to it during his oral  motion before

          the  sentencing court, the  Government does not  contend that the

          more rigorous miscarriage of justice standard should apply to the

          written motion.  We  here apply the abuse of  discretion standard

          to  both motions without further comment, in part because we find

          that even under the  more lenient pre-sentencing standard, Isom's

          appeal  must  fail.   See  generally United  States  v. Parrilla-
                                ______________ ______________     _________

          Tirado, 22 F.3d  368, 371 (1st  Cir. 1994) (noting that  abuse of
          ______

          discretion  standard is  applied  out of  deference to  the trial

          judge's special insight into the dynamics of a case).

                    B.   The Legal Framework
                    B.   The Legal Framework
                         ___________________

                    It is by now well established that a defendant does not

          have  an absolute right to withdraw a  guilty plea.  See Gray, 63
                                                               ___ ____

          F.3d at  59; United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir.
                       _____________    ______

                                         -6-

          1991); see also United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 454 (1st
                 ________ _____________    ________

          Cir.  1983) (setting out logic behind premise).  Rather, the plea

          may be withdrawn "only upon  a showing of 'fair and just  reason'

          for  the request."  United  States v. Cotal-Crespo,  47 F.3d 1, 3
                              ______________    ____________

          (1st Cir.), cert. denied, __  U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 94  (1995); see
                      ____________                                      ___

          Fed. R. Crim.  P. 32(e); Austin, 948 F.2d at  786.  The defendant
                                   ______

          carries the burden of persuading the court that he has shown such

          a fair  and just reason.   Parrilla-Tirado,  22 F.3d at  371.   A
                                     _______________

          court  must  consider  several  factors  in  weighing  whether  a

          defendant meets this burden,

                      the most significant of which  is whether
                      the  plea  was  knowing,   voluntary  and
                      intelligent   within   the   meaning   of
                      [Federal Rule of Criminal  Procedure] 11.
                      The  other factors include:  1) the force
                      and plausibility of the proffered reason;
                      2) the  timing of the request; 3) whether
                      the  defendant  has  asserted  his  legal
                      innocence; and 4) whether the parties had
                      reached a plea agreement. 

          Cotal-Crespo,  47 F.3d at 3-4 (citation  omitted); see also Gray,
          ____________                                       ________ ____

          63 F.3d at 60;  Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at 371  (omitting fourth
                          _______________

          factor).   There  is "a  final barrier  that must  be surmounted:

          even if a defendant appears at first blush to meet the strictures

          of  this four-part test, the nisi prius court still must evaluate

          the  proposed plea  withdrawal  in relation  to any  demonstrable

          prejudice  that will accrue to the government if the defendant is

          permitted to alter his stance."   Id.; see Kobrosky, 711  F.2d at
                                            ___  ___ ________

          455.  

                    C.   Analysis
                    C.   Analysis
                         ________

                    In  essence,   Isom  claims  that  his   assertions  of

                                         -7-

          ineffective assistance of counsel, a lack of understanding of the

          plea agreement, and his professed innocence constitute a fair and

          just  reason sufficient that the district  court erred in denying

          his  motion to withdraw his  change of plea.   Having established

          our  basic legal  framework, we  address each  of the  factors in

          detail.

                      1.  The Rule 11 Colloquy
                      1.  The Rule 11 Colloquy
                          ____________________

                    As noted above, our  first consideration is whether the

          plea  was knowing,  voluntary  and intelligent  as understood  in

          terms of Rule 11.  "We  have identified three 'core concerns'  of

          Rule  11:     1)   absence  of   coercion;  2)   the  defendant's

          understanding of the charges; and 3) the defendant's knowledge of

          the  consequences of the guilty plea."   Gray, 63 F.3d at 60; see
                                                   ____                 ___

          Cotal-Crespo,  47 F.3d at  4.   Failure to  address one  of these
          ____________

          concerns  requires that the guilty  plea be set  aside.  Gray, 63
                                                                   ____

          F.3d at 60.  

                      In  determining whether there  has been a
                      core violation, we review the totality of
                      the circumstances surrounding the Rule 11
                      hearing, rather than apply  a "talismanic
                      test."  What is critical is the substance
                      of  what was  communicated  by the  trial
                      court,  and  what should  reasonably have
                      been understood by the  defendant, rather
                      than the form of the communication.

          Cotal-Crespo,  47  F.3d at  4-5  (citation  omitted); see  United
          ____________                                          ___  ______

          States v. Ribas-Dominicci, 50  F.3d 76, 78  (1st Cir. 1995).   In
          ______    _______________

          the absence of failure  to address a core concern,  "the question

          to be determined is  whether deficiencies in the Rule  11 hearing

          affected the defendant's 'substantial rights.'"  Gray, 63 F.3d at
                                                           ____

                                         -8-

          60.   We "review  the  record, including  the change-of-plea  and

          sentencing transcripts, with  a view to whether  the omission was

          harmless."   United States v. L pez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693, 696 (1st
                       _____________    ____________

          Cir.), cert. denied, __  U.S.__, 116 S. Ct. 259  (1995); see Fed.
                 ____________                                      ___

          R.  Crim. P. 11(h) ("Any variance from the procedures required by

          this  rule which  does  not affect  substantial  rights shall  be

          disregarded.").  "It is axiomatic that the procedures followed by

          the  district  court in  accepting a  plea  are crucial  in later

          determining  whether   the  plea  was  truly   understanding  and

          voluntary."  Ruiz-del Valle, 8 F.3d at 102.  In the present case,
                       ______________

          the court conducted  a comprehensive inquiry under  Fed. R. Crim.

          P.  11.  In response  to the court's  questioning, Isom confirmed

          that  he  had  a ninth-grade  education  and  was  not under  the

          influence  of any drug,  medication, or  alcoholic beverage.   He

          agreed  that  he  had received  a  copy  of  the indictment,  had

          discussed it fully with his counsel, and that he was satisfied by

          his counsel's  representation and  advice.  The  court instructed

          Isom  to  listen  carefully  as  the  Government  set  forth  the

          essentials of the  plea agreement; Isom  agreed that the  account

          corresponded to his understanding of  the plea agreement, that he

          had signed it  after a full discussion  of it with  his attorney,

          and that he  had read it prior  to signing it.   He attested that

          there had been no other promises or assurances made him to induce

          him to plead guilty, and that there were no attempts to force him

          or  coerce him into  doing so.   Isom  further confirmed  that he

          understood that he was charged with felony offenses, due to which

                                         -9-

          he  may be deprived of  certain civil rights;  that he understood

          the maximum penalties applicable and  that the guidelines may not

          establish the same penalty; that he had discussed  the guidelines

          with his attorney; and that he knew the judge would determine the

          applicable sentence after a presentence  report.  At the  court's

          questioning, Isom also agreed that he  knew he had the right to a

          trial with or without a jury, as well as the rights incidental to

          a trial, such as the right to counsel.  When the circumstances of

          his  arrest, as  described above,  were recounted,  the following

          colloquy ensued between the court and Isom:

                      Q  Did you hear all that, Mr. Isom?
                      A  Yes, I did.
                      Q  And are those the facts in your case?
                      A   Somewhat.   I  did not  pull anything
                      from out of my pants, and I did not -- it
                      was in  a plastic  bag, in a  napkin, and
                      they did not flee the area, either.
                      Q  I'm sorry, they did not what?
                      A  I  did not  flee  the  area like  they
                      said,  they chased  me.   I  did not  run
                      nowhere.
                      Q  But you delivered some crack cocaine?
                      A  Yes, I did.  Yes.
                      Q  You admit to that?
                      A  Yes, I do.
                      Q  Is there anything else you want to add
                      or  subtract  from  what  the  prosecutor
                      said?
                      A  No.  That's all.

          (Change  of Plea  Hearing,  at 12).    The court  reiterated  the

          charges against Isom, seeking his confirmation that he understood

          them and  that he was prepared to plead guilty to them.  Finally,

          finding that Isom's plea  of guilty was knowing and  voluntary as

          well  as supported  by an  independent basis  in fact,  the court

          accepted Isom's change of plea.

                                         -10-

                    In his motions  and on appeal,  Isom maintains that  he

          did  not  understand either  the plea  agreement  or the  Rule 11

          colloquy.   However, he  fails to point to  any specific error or

          point of confusion.  Our own examination of the record reveals no

          error.   See Ruiz-del Valle, 8 F.3d at 102 (examining  sua sponte
                   ___ ______________                            __________

          compliance with Rule 11).  The court directly addressed the three

          crucial aspects of the colloquy -- whether Isom had been coerced,

          whether  he understood the charges, and whether he understood the

          consequences of his plea.  Nothing in the  record indicates  that

          he  was  coerced  or did  not  understand  the  agreement or  the

          colloquy.    Rather,  Isom's  statements are  indicative  of  his

          understanding:    he  corrected   the  detailed  account  of  the

          circumstances  surrounding his arrest on three particular points,

          ultimately  agreeing  that  he   had  in  fact  delivered  crack.

          Further,  when the court asked him whether he and his counsel had

          come  to  a ballpark  figure  of what  the  applicable sentencing

          guidelines would be, he stated:

                      A  No  I haven't.    Have I  come to  any
                      agreement?
                         [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No.  Do you have a
                      ballpark figure as to --
                         THE WITNESS:  Five to forty.
                      Q  You  think you're probably going to do
                      five years in this case, Mr. Isom?
                      A  No.  It was  five to forty, that's all
                      I understood what it was.

          (Change of Plea  Hearing, at  8).  This  colloquy indicates  that

          Isom clearly  understood the possible implications  of his guilty

          plea.    Indeed,  defense  counsel testified  at  the  sentencing

          hearing that he had spent an hour  and a half going over the plea

                                         -11-

          agreement with Isom, and that Isom had refused to take any copies

          of the agreement or the pre-sentence report.  

                    At oral argument,  appellant's counsel argued that  the

          fact  that the colloquy consisted  of leading questions, to which

          defendant merely had to answer  "yes," indicates somehow that  it

          was insufficient:   the  court knew  Isom's  reading skills  were

          minimal,2 and so it  should have had Isom describe  the agreement

          in his own words.    Cf. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 6  ("The manner
                               ___ ____________

          in which the charge  is explained and the method  for determining

          the defendant's  understanding of the charge will  vary from case

          to  case  depending  upon  the complexity  of  the  charges,  the

          capacity of  the defendant, and  the attendant  circumstances.").

          We  find no merit in this position.   The charges here are fairly

          simple, and,  as appellant's  counsel admitted at  oral argument,

          there is no  evidence that  Isom's capacity is  diminished.   The

          fact that Isom has had little  formal education does not imply he

          is not  intelligent  enough to  understand  a Rule  11  colloquy.

          Indeed, his responses  to the court addressed  detailed points of

          the testimony, suggesting he was following the discussion in  the

          courtroom.  In fact, Isom did not simply agree to  everything the

          court asked him, as he now  contends his attorney told him to do:

          in the colloquy  quoted above, he  denied that he  had come to  a

          ballpark figure of what  the sentencing guidelines would require,

          confirming  that with his counsel.  Quite simply, Isom has failed
                              
          ____________________

          2  Defendant testified at the  change of plea hearing that he had
          a ninth-grade education.  At the sentencing hearing, however, the
          court stated that Isom had a second-grade reading level.

                                         -12-

          to  meet  his  burden of  demonstrating  that  the  plea was  not

          knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.    

                      2.  Force and Plausibility of Proffered Reason
                      2.  Force and Plausibility of Proffered Reason
                          __________________________________________

                    Isom  must  demonstrate  a  plausible  reason  for  the

          withdrawal  of his guilty  plea.  "In  this context, plausibility

          must rest on more than the defendant's second thoughts about some

          fact  or  point  of  law, or  about  the  wisdom  of his  earlier

          decision."  Parrilla-Tirado, 22  F.3d at 371 (citations omitted).
                      _______________

          The  reasons   Isom  offers   here  are   innocence,  ineffective

          assistance of counsel,  and failure to make a voluntary plea.  As

          the last reason  has already been discussed  and dismissed above,

          we address only the first two here.

                    First,  Isom  claims his  innocence.    In his  written

          motion,  he  alleges that  he  could  produce wholly  exculpatory

          evidence  at trial, but does  not specify its  nature.  Examining

          the  record,  we find  that  Isom's  eleventh-hour profession  of

          innocence lacks merit, and thus  does not rise to the level  of a

          "fair and  just reason" for withdrawal  of his claim.   In United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1987), we  found that the
          ______    _____

          defendant's claim  of innocence lacked  merit where, as  here, he

          did not assert  innocence at the change of plea hearing, but only

          at the sentencing hearing, when he had already been convicted for

          a  similar crime.   Id.  at 313.   Ramos,  like Isom,  claimed to
                              ___

          possess  exculpatory information  sustaining  his innocence,  but

          provided no insight into its substance.   In these circumstances,

          the court in Ramos held  that "the trial court did not  abuse its
                       _____

                                         -13-

          discretion  in  refusing  to   give  weight  to  a  self-serving,

          unsupported claim  of innocence  raised judicially for  the first

          time after the Rule 11 hearing."  Id.
                                            ___

                    That finding is  equally true here.   Indeed, Isom  not

          only failed to maintain his innocence  at the Rule 11 hearing, he

          clarified   specific  points   regarding  the   events,  agreeing

          immediately  afterwards that  he  delivered crack  cocaine.   His

          claim  of  innocence in  his  oral  motion  followed his  opening

          statement that he "received [a bag] from my co-defendant to bring

          it down there,  okay."   (Sentencing Hearing, at  3).   Appellant

          urges us  to read  this "obvious  confusion" as  highlighting his

          need  to  withdraw  his  plea  so  that  he  may  gain  a  better

          understanding  of  the legal  issues involved  in  his case.   We

          decline  the  invitation,  however,   for  we  interpret   Isom's

          contradictory statements as the  Ramos court did that defendant's
                                           _____

          inconsistent claims  of innocence,  and find Isom's  assertion of

          innocence lacks  merit.   Cf.  Parrilla-Tirado,  22 F.3d  at  373
                                    ___  _______________

          ("Courts   need    not   accept   a    defendant's   explanations

          uncritically.").

                    Isom   asserts  a   second  "fair  and   just"  reason:

          ineffective assistance of counsel.  This   court    applies   the

          Strickland  v.  Washington, 466  U.S.  668  (1984), standard  for
          __________      __________

          evaluating  an ineffective  assistance  of counsel  claim.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Ramos, 810 F.2d  at 314.  Thus, to successfully challenge a
          ____  _____

          guilty  plea,  a  defendant  must show  that,  first,  "counsel's

          performance in advising  guilty pleas fell below the  standard of

                                         -14-

          performance of  reasonable proficient counsel," and  second, that

          "by such  inadequate performance, Appellant was  induced to enter

          guilty pleas which he otherwise would not have entered."  Austin,
                                                                    ______

          948 F.2d at 786; see Ramos, 810 F.2d at 314.  
                           ___ _____

                    Isom  contends that  the  district court  erred in  not

          holding  an  evidentiary hearing  on  his ineffective  assistance

          claim.    As  he  points out,  this  court  has  refused to  hear

          ineffective  assistance claims for the first time on appeal where

          there is no record on which to rely.  In such cases, we have held

          that  such claims  should  be brought  in collateral  proceedings

          pursuant to 28  U.S.C.   2255, where  a record may be  developed.

          See, e.g., United  States v. Carter, 815 F.2d  827, 829 (1st Cir.
          ___  ____  ______________    ______

          1987)  (noting  that ineffective  assistance  charges "depend  on

          evidentiary  matters that  are  best considered  by the  district

          court in the first instance."); Kobrosky, 711 F.2d at 457.  
                                          ________

                      Fairness  to  the  parties  and  judicial
                      economy   both   warrant   that,   absent
                      extraordinary circumstances, an appellate
                      court  will  not consider  an ineffective
                      assistance  claim  where no  endeavor was
                      first made to determine  the claim at the
                      district level.

          Austin, 948 F.2d  at 785  (finding that the  appellate court  had
          ______

          jurisdiction to hear the  claim where it was confined  to matters

          in the record).  

                    Rather than  conclude that  a collateral  proceeding is

          appropriate  in the  present case,  however, Isom argues  that we

          should  remand for a  full evidentiary hearing on  his claim.  We

          remind him that evidentiary hearings are not an entitlement:

                                         -15-

                      [E]videntiary hearings on motions are the
                      exception,  not   the  rule.     We  have
                      repeatedly  stated  that,  even   in  the
                      criminal  context,  a  defendant  is  not
                      entitled  as of  right to  an evidentiary
                      hearing  on  a   pretrial  or   posttrial
                      motion.    Thus,   a  party  seeking   an
                      evidentiary hearing must  carry a  fairly
                      heavy burden of demonstrating a  need for
                      special treatment.

          United  States  v.  McGill, 11  F.3d  223,  225  (1st Cir.  1993)
          ______________      ______

          (upholding district court refusal  to hold evidentiary hearing on

          28  U.S.C.   2255 motion)  (citations omitted); see United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v.  Garc a, 954 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1992) (upholding district court
              ______

          refusal  to hold  evidentiary  hearing  on  sentencing  guideline

          issue); United States  v. Thompson, 906  F.2d 1292, 1298-99  (8th
                  _____________     ________

          Cir. 1990)  (finding  that  district  court  did  not  abuse  its

          discretion  in  denying  motion  to  withdraw  a  plea  based  on

          ineffective assistance without holding evidentiary hearing).   We

          also note  that in  neither his oral  nor his written  motion did

          Isom request  an  evidentiary  hearing.   See  United  States  v.
                                                    ___  ______________

          Tardiff,  969 F.2d 1283, 1286  (1st Cir. 1992)  (noting that "the
          _______

          failure to  ask  the district  court  to convene  an  evidentiary

          hearing ordinarily spells defeat for a contention that one should

          have been held" on sentencing guidelines issues).  

                    Isom's  request  that  we  remand  for  an  evidentiary

          hearing fails.  Simply  put, having considered the record  of the

          hearings as well as the written motion, we find that the district

          court's  decision not  to hold  an evidentiary  hearing does  not

          constitute an abuse  of its discretion.   See Ramos, 810  F.2d at
                                                    ___ _____

          314  (noting  that   current  counsel's  "conclusory,   factually

                                         -16-

          unsupported assertion that [previous]  counsel were negligent . .

          .  .  [was]  insufficient  for   us  to  require  an  evidentiary

          hearing."); Kobrosky, 711 F.2d at 457 (dismissing charge where no
                      ________

          extrinsic  evidence was  offered to  buttress the  allegations of

          ineffective  assistance or  to  counter the  government's protest

          that it  would be prejudiced).   Isom may,  of course,  bring his

          ineffective  assistance   of  counsel   claim  in  a   collateral

          proceeding  under 28  U.S.C.     2255,  where  a  record  may  be

          developed.

                    Isom makes the  alternative argument that he  presented

          enough information during  his oral  plea for  us to  be able  to

          determine that he should be able to withdraw his plea as a result

          of ineffective assistance  of counsel.  This argument also fails.

          First,  the ineffective  assistance claim  was made  sketchily at

          best:  Isom  claimed he did not see the  plea agreement until the

          morning,  and that he did not have  copies of any documents.  His

          counsel, in turn, stated to the court that he had spent one and a

          half hours  going over  the three-page  plea agreement,  and that

          Isom had  never asked  for copies  of anything,  but had  in fact

          refused copies.  Isom does not contest these representations.  We

          cannot  say that  the  district court  abused  its discretion  in

          denying the oral motion  when Isom's ineffective assistance claim

          was only  briefly made,  where there was  testimony contradicting

          his assertions, where he  had stated in his Rule 11 colloquy that

          he  signed the agreement  after a full discussion  of it with his

          attorney, and where there  was no evidence that Isom  had not, in

                                         -17-

          fact, understood  the Rule  11  colloquy.   Indeed, the  district

          court specifically commended counsel for doing "an excellent job"

          for  Isom,   winning  him  the  maximum   guideline  benefits  in

          sentencing.  

                      3.  Timing of the Request
                      3.  Timing of the Request
                          _____________________

                    We  have repeatedly  noted that  the more a  request is

          delayed -- even if made before sentence is imposed -- the more we

          will  regard it  with  disfavor.   See,  e.g., United  States  v.
                                             ___   ____  ______________

          Gonz lez-V zquez,  34  F.3d 19,  23  (1st  Cir. 1994);  Parrilla-
          ________________                                        _________

          Tirado,  22 F.3d at 373.  "The rule of thumb is that the longer a
          ______

          defendant  waits before  moving to  withdraw his  plea, the  more

          potency  his  motion  must  have  in  order  to   gain  favorable

          consideration."   Id.   Thus, we have viewed  unfavorably motions
                            ___

          to withdraw a  plea made  six months following  the guilty  plea,

          id.,  seven months later, United  States v. Doyle,  981 F.2d 591,
          ___                       ______________    _____

          595 (1st Cir. 1992),  three weeks later, United States  v. Keefe,
                                                   _____________     _____

          621  F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir.  1980), or thirteen days later, Ramos,
                                                                     _____

          810 F.2d at 313.   Clearly, Isom's two-month delay in  making his

          request  falls  well within  this range.    See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________

          Crosby, 714  F.2d 185,  192 (1st  Cir. 1983)  (upholding district
          ______

          court's refusal  to grant motion  to withdraw where,  inter alia,
                                                                __________

          motion was made  eight weeks following  sentencing).  "Given  the

          totality of  the circumstances  that pertain  here, [A]ppellant's

          lassitude serves  to cast considerable doubt  upon the legitimacy

          of his professed reason for seeking to change course."  Gonz lez-
                                                                  _________

          V zquez, 34 F.3d at 23.
          _______

                                         -18-

                    Isom argues on appeal that the district court erred  in

          stating  that the  oral motion  was not  timely.   Indeed,  as he

          points out, Fed. R. Crim. P.  32(e) allows a plea to be withdrawn

          any time prior to  sentencing if defendant shows a  fair and just

          reason.  However,  making a motion to withdraw a  plea two months

          following  a  Rule  11 hearing  "complies  with  the  letter, but

          certainly  not the  spirit" of Rule  32(e).  Crosby,  714 F.2d at
                                                       ______

          192.   Isom also emphasizes  that he  made both motions  prior to

          sentencing.   This, however, is not a factor courts assessing the

          timing of a change of motion plea have given great  weight:  more

          significant  has been the fact  that a withdrawal  of plea motion

          comes after a presentence report sets out the  possible sentence.

          See,  e.g.,   Parrilla-Tirado,  22  F.3d  at   373  (noting  that
          ___   ____    _______________

          defendant's "belated change of heart followed not  long after the

          PSI Report"); Doyle, 981 F.2d at 595 (commenting that motion came
                        _____

          shortly after discovery that  court was contemplating long prison

          sentence).  

                    Appellant's  next argument,  namely, that  given Isom's

          difficulties  with the written word, it was logical that he first

          raised  his  motion  to  withdraw   orally  at  his  first  court

          appearance following the change  of plea hearing, is inconsistent

          with his position that the written motion was actually made prior

          to  sentencing.  Indeed, Isom  referred to the  written motion in

          his oral motion.  

                      4.  Assertion of Innocence
                      4.  Assertion of Innocence
                          ______________________

                    An assertion  of innocence weighs the  balance in favor

                                         -19-

          of  withdrawal; the  failure to  do  so does  the opposite.   See
                                                                        ___

          Parrilla-Tirado,  22  F.3d  at   373.    Nonetheless,  "the  mere
          _______________

          protestation of legal innocence cannot in and of itself be issue-

          determinative,  for '[t]here are few  if any criminal cases where

          the  defendant  cannot  devise  some theory  or  story  which, if

          believed by a jury,  would result in his acquittal.'"   Kobrosky,
                                                                  ________

          711 F.2d at 455 (quoting N  ez-Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d
                                   _____________    _____________

          723, 726  (1st  Cir.  1976)).    Thus,  "if  defendant's  factual

          contentions  create  no  'legally   cognizable  defense'  to  the

          charges, 'he has not effectively denied his culpability,' and the

          motion can be  denied."  Ramos, 810  F.2d at 312 (quoting  United
                                   _____                             ______

          States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),  cert.
          ______    ______                                 _______    _____

          denied,  421 U.S. 1013 (1975)).  Isom's assertion of innocence is
          ______

          addressed above.  

                      5.  Other Factors
                      5.  Other Factors
                          _____________

                    Finally, we note  that Isom  did, indeed,  have a  plea

          agreement with the government, which was not breached.  

                    "Since all  the  critical integers  in  the  decisional

          calculus counsel affirmance, we need not embark upon an  analysis

          of possible prejudice to the government."  Doyle, 981 F.2d at 596
                                                     _____

          n.6.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For the  reasons discussed above, the  district court's

          refusal to grant Isom's motion to withdraw his plea is affirmed. 
                                                                 affirmed.
                                                                 ________

                                         -20-