Court Opinion

ID: 9774797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:33:48.524731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.918429
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Latoya L. Brickus (“Mother”) was not required to file a petition for modification of the child support order. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that the hearing officer had the authority to increase Raymond T. Dent’s (“Father”) support obligation absent a properly filed petition for modification, wherein Mother would have requested precise relief and would have specifically identified the alleged changes in circumstances upon which her petition was based. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the learned Judge John L. Hall.
The majority succinctly summarized the factual history and procedural posture of this matter, and it accurately stated our standard of review. I add only that as the petitioning party, Father was required to adduce competent evidence during the support hearing to sustain his burden of proving that a material and substantial change in circumstances warranted a reduction in his child support obligation. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 537 (Pa.Super.2009); Rule 1910.19(a) (“A petition for modification of a support order may be filed at any time and shall be granted if the requesting party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances”).
Herein, the trial court concluded that the hearing officer erred in perpetuating the local practice in Chester County of modifying a child support order in favor of a non-petitioning party. The trial court proffered a comprehensive analysis in support of its determination. However, in reversing the trial court, the majority concluded the court’s analysis “does not lead inexorably to the court’s conclusion under the circumstances of this case.” Majority *1290Opinion at 1288. Essentially, the majority found that Father received adequate notice that the hearing officer might elect to increase his support obligation even though Mother did not file a petition seeking an upward modification. The majority’s conclusion rests squarely upon the per curiam order that notified Mother and Father of the rescheduled support hearing. The second page of that notice provides as follows: “THE APPROPRIATE COURT OFFICER MAY ENTER AN ORDER AGAINST EITHER PARTY BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT REGARD TO WHICH PARTY INITIATED THE SUPPORT ACTION.” Order to Reschedule a Hearing, 11/6/08, at 2. Based on the foregoing language indicating that the hearing officer could enter an order against either party regardless of which party initiated the support action, the majority finds that Father had adequate notice of Mother’s claims, and it concludes that Mother was not obligated to comply with the petitioning requirements enumerated in Rule 1910.19(a). My analysis of the per curiam order does not lead to the same conclusion.
First and foremost, the per curiam order did not employ the notice provision the Supreme Court fashioned in Rule 1910.27(g) to apply specifically to petitions for modification. The correct provision reads, “THE APPROPRIATE COURT OFFICER MAY MODIFY OR TERMINATE THE EXISTING ORDER IN ANY MANNER BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.” See Rule 1910.27(g).
In light of the notice actually provided, Father could have expected that, as the obligor in this child support action, the hearing officer would enter an order against him regardless of whether his petition to modify was granted. It is axiomatic that unless the hearing officer terminated Father’s support obligation completely, which Father did not request, at the close of the support hearing, the hearing officer would enter an order against Father directing him to pay Mother some amount of child support. Even an order denying Father’s petition for modification would be considered an expected order against him and in favor of Mother. However, what the per curiam scheduling order clearly did not indicate to Father is that the hearing officer may not only deny his petition for modification but also elect to increase the support obligation based upon an unidentified change in circumstances.
Similarly, the portion of the per curiam scheduling order that referenced the “party initiat[ing] the support action” is unclear. While Father filed the petition to modify the existing child support order, Mother actually initiated the support action on August 9, 1999, when she filed the complaint for support. In fact, as the trial court accurately observed, the notice provision utilized in the per curiam scheduling order adopted the notice language that was intended to accompany an initial complaint for child support. Therefore, the notice included in the per curiam scheduling order did not clearly provide Father with notice that Mother might actually seek an increase during the hearing so that he could prepare to advocate a countervailing position. Accordingly, I find the notice provision of the per curiam scheduling order insufficient. See Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa.Super.2005) (addressing notice requirements for contempt and custody proceedings).
Moreover, in focusing on the notice provision that was employed in this case, the majority discounted the importance of the *1291petitioner’s ultimate burden to plead and prove a material and substantial change in circumstances. The Domestic Relations Code directs, “A petition for modification of a support order ... shall be granted if the requesting party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 4352 (emphasis added). Similarly, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(a) and authoritative case law dictate that “A petition for modification or termination of an existing support order shall specifically aver the material and substantial change in circumstances upon which the petition is based.” Rule 1910.10(a); Beegle v. Beegle, 438 Pa.Super. 285, 652 A.2d 376, 377 (1994). The 1981 explanatory comment to:Rule 1910.19 further elucidates, “Subdivision (a) sets forth a rule of pleading. It requires the petition for modification or termination to aver “specifically” the reasons for the relief sought.... Th[e] change in circumstances should be alleged specifically.” Indeed, under our reasoning in Beegle, a petitioner must state every ground he or she seeks to assert for modification in the petition and the trial court cannot consider any grounds for modification that are not asserted therein. Id. Thus, when properly applied, Rule 1910.19(a) allocates the burden of proof during the hearing and it provides the respondent notice of the exact claims that he or she will be expected to defend. See Calloway v. Calloway, 406 Pa.Super. 454, 594 A.2d 708, 711 (1991).
The case sub judice highlights the importance of the petitioning requirements contained in Rule 1910.19. Acting pro se, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to Rule 1910.19 for modification of the existing child support order. The petition averred that Father was entitled to decrease his existing support obligation due to a reduction in his income. Thus, when Mother attended the support hearing, she had actual knowledge of the discrete claim Father sought to assert, and pursuant to Beegle, she could be confident that the hearing officer would not consider any allegations that Father had not leveled in his petition. During the subsequent hearing, Father attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to adduce sufficient evidence to sustain his burden of proving the material and substantial change in circumstances that he pled in his petition.
Conversely, Mother, who was represented by counsel, did not file a petition for modification. Hence, Mother did not specifically aver that she was entitled to an increase in the existing support order based upon an alleged reduction in her income and her burdensome childcare expenses.1 While the per curiam notice of the rescheduled hearing included the ambiguous proviso quoted supra, when Father attended the support hearing, he lacked actual notice of any claims Mother intended to assert against him. Likewise, since Mother did not file a petition for modification, she did not identify the evidence she intended to adduce during the hearing to establish the undisclosed assertions regarding her monthly income and childcare expenses. Mother did not even request an increase during the support *1292hearing. Nevertheless, the hearing officer ignored prevailing legal precedent, considered Mother’s evidence, and increased Father’s support obligation. We can only speculate whether the hearing officer applied the correct burden of proof when it embraced Mother’s implicit request to increase Father’s support obligation.
Moreover, I point out that while the majority accurately stated that “nothing in Rule 1910.27 requires a party to file a cross-petition for modification of child support,” Majority Opinion at 1288, it is equally accurate that Rule 1910.27 does not require a moving party to file a petition for modification. See Majority Opinion at 1288. Indeed, Rule 1910.27 is silent on this requirement. It simply assumes the moving party has filed a petition pursuant to Rule 1910.19, which properly places the burden of pleading and proving grounds for relief on the moving party. Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the revisions to Rule 1910.19(a) alleviated the requirement that Mother file a petition for modification in this case because pursuant to that provision, “a new guideline amount resulting from new or revised support guidelines may constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(a). Nothing in Rule 1910.19 implies that a change to the guideline affects an existing support obligation automatically. Instead, Rule 1910.19(a) merely acknowledges that a change to the support guidelines may constitute a material and substantial change. I point out that the rule also identifies the existence of additional income sources or assets as circumstances that may constitute a material and substantial change. Thus, as applied herein, the changes in the child support guidelines or the existence of additional income sources or assets may have established a material and substantial change in Mother’s circumstances had she actually pled as much in a petition for modification. See Rule 1910.19 explanatory cmt. — 1993 (“The amended rule allows the trier of fact to consider new or revised rules as a change in circumstances where the change in the guidelines, either by itself or in combination with other factors, is material and substantial.”). Since Mother failed to file such a petition, I find the majority’s position unpersuasive.
Finally, in contrast to the majority, I believe that 23 Pa.C.S. § 4352(e), regarding the retroactive modification of arrears, supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother was required to file a petition to modify the child support order. The pertinent proviso directs, “If a petition for modification was filed, modification may be applied to the period beginning on the date that notice of such petition was given ... to the obligee or, where the obligee was the petitioner, to the obligor.” See 23 Pa.C.S. § 4352(e). I believe this provision clearly anticipates that the party seeking retroactive application of an order modifying an existing support order will be the party who actually filed the petition for modification. Thus, mindful of the parties’ respective duties to report material changes affecting the child support obligation and to file prompt petitions for modification, I believe that permitting the hearing officer to review a non-petitioning party’s complaints and grant relief retroactive to the date the petitioning party fulfilled his or her obligation to file a prompt petition for modification is counterintuitive to the statutory scheme.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. To the extent that Mother sought to modify Father’s support obligation based upon a purported material and substantial change in circumstances, she was obligated to file a prompt petition for modification. Krebs v. Krebs, 944 A.2d 768, 774 (Pa.Super.2008). In Krebs, Judge Gantman issued the cogent and well-reasoned opinion of this Court, wherein we observed, inter alia, “parties to a support proceeding are duty bound to report material changes affecting support ... [and][a] party seeking to modify a support order has the burden of proving a modification is warranted and that he/she promptly filed a modification petition.” (internal citations omitted).