Court Opinion

ID: 9492247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:36:01.827173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:12.166712
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting,
with whom WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, join.
The court’s opinion is directly contrary to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 100, 100 L.Ed. 761 (1955). In addition, the court now sets a new precedent not only in this circuit, but throughout the United States, in departing from uniform interpretation of federal law.1 The court now finds that regardless of state law as to vicarious liability, Congress has limited liability under the FTCA to a wooden interpretation of “scope of employment.”2
In Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492 (8th Cir.1995), this circuit included “apparent authority” within the terms of “scope of employment” under the FTCA. The court’s holding in the instant case appears to be in direct conflict with the holding in Tonelli, in which this court, applying Iowa law in an FTCA case, reversed summary judgment granted in favor of certain postal workers. The district court had found that the employees were not acting within the scope of employment when they pilfered some mail from the plaintiffs mailbox. In the section entitled “scope of employment,” this court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the *883postal employees acted within their apparent authority as defined by Iowa law. The court in Tonelli held:.
The Tonellis agree 'that opening and copying first class mail addressed to another person generally falls -outside of the scope of a postal worker’s employment. ... This determination, however, does not end our inquiry.' “ ‘The fact that the servant’s act is expressly forbidden by the master, or is done in a manner which he has prohibited, is tó be considered in determining what' the servant has been hired to do, but it is usually not conclusive, and does not in itself prevent the act from being within the scope of employment.’ Vlotho, .509 N.W.2d at 354 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70 at 502 (5th ed.1984)).
Tonelli, 60 F.3d at 495 (emphasis added).3
This court denies compensatory damages to a young woman who was unmercifully assaulted and raped by a United States police officer. After her car careened into a ditch, Ms. Primeaux was stranded on a cold winter night on a deserted stretch of highway in the middle of her reservation. The officer approached her in a police car with its red lights flashing, thereby displaying his-badge of authority, and offered her a ride. The officer had been authorized, to travel in the police car on an expense-paid trip to and from the- State of .New Mexico. He drove Ms. Primeaux to an isolated- spot, ordered her out of the car, and raped her. • The en banc court urges that the officer was not acting within the scope of his employment and that the United States was immune from liability under the FTCA.
In two trials and on two appeals, the government, with all its legal resources, has never claimed that the statutory phrase “scope of employment” as used in the FTCA' limits the' law of féspondeat superior as adopted by South Dakota law. In addition, the government never raised its alternative claim’that even if state law applied to its fullest extent, under South Dakota law the doctrine of apparent authority cannot be considered in measuring whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment. The first time the government raised these defenses was in its suggestion for rehearing en banc after the second 'appeal, after the dissent on that appeal had raised them for the first time.4 *884It is understandable that the government did not heretofore, rely on these defenses at trial and on the two appeals. There is no law which supports them. In fact, the law is universally to the contrary.
First, it is clear that the phrase “scope of employment” in the FTCA does not limit the state law of respondeat superior. See Tonelli, supra. In fact, this argument was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 100, 100 L.Ed. 761 (1955). In the lower court opinion, Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 800 (1954), the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase “scope of employment” within the FTCA as equivalent to “acting in line of duty” when applied to a member of the military forces. It reasoned that Congress had thus limited the rule of re-spondeat superior. The circuit court observed:
If Seabourn was not acting in line of military duty at the time he injured appellant, the rule of respondeat superi- or (as applied in orthodox “master and servant” cases) loses its .standardized force for that rule has been modified in the significant manner here noted. We need not stress the fact that when the sovereign waives its immunity from suit, it may, as here, do so on its own terms.
Williams, 215 F.2d at 808 (emphasis added). This is the same reasoning used by this court today. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court summarily vacated the Ninth Circuit opinion with the terse admonition: “This case is controlled by the California doctrine of respondeat superi- or.” Williams, 350 U.S. at 857, 76 S.Ct. 100.
The court’s position that the government’s liability does not follow the common law of respondeat superior applied by the state where the wrong takes place ignores the mandate of Congress that says “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, .... ” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (emphasis added).5 Furthermore, the legislative history of the FTCA supports the fact that the court’s narrow interpretation of scope of employment is misguided. When the FTCA was originally enacted in 1946, there was an exclusion for “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, de*885ceit, or interference with contract rights.” Federal Tort Claims Act § 421 (1946). This section was amended, however, in 1974 to provide that “investigative or law enforcement officers” can be held liable for “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.” 6 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994). According to the court’s strict, literal interpretation of scope of employment, these acts would not be included. Congress intended, however, to include these intentional torts within the liability of the government. It is evident from the legislative history of the FTCA and, more importantly, from the Supreme Court itself that scope of employment is defined by the fullest extent of state respondeat superior law.
The court urges an alternative argument: the state law of South Dakota does not recognize that scope of employment includes the rule on apparent authority. Although this argument was never raised by the government at trial or in the two prior appeals, the government now adopts this reasoning.
The court depends on the “unless” language included in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d)7 as support for its contention that apparent authority and scope of employment are two different theories. This overlooks the controlling law of South Dakota relating to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under South Dakota law, apparent' authority is an exception to scope of employment and is therefore part of the doctrine of respondeat superi- or,8 Furthermore, contrary to the court’s opinion, South Dakota is not the only state that includes apparent authority within scope of employment analysis.9 As we stated in the second panel decision:
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) provides: '
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: ... the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
*886The dissent also overlooks that South Dakota law has recognized that the distinction between actual authority and apparent authority simply pertains to the manner in which an agent obtains authority. See Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Sullivan, 430 N.W.2d 700, 701 (S.D.1988). “Actual authority is created by manifestations from the principal to the agent, ... while ostensible [or apparent] authority is created when the principal allows a third person to believe the agent has authority to act on the principal’s behalf.” .Id. (citations omitted).
“[I]n the measurement of its effects, authority is authority and the operation of apparent authority is of no lesser degree of effectiveness than is the operation of real authority.” See Harold Gill Reus-chlein & William A. Gregory, Handbook on the Law of Agency and Partnership 58 (1979). Where apparent authority exists, the third person has the same rights with reference to the principal as where actual authority exists. See Restatement § 8 cmt. a.
Primeaux v. United States, 149 F.3d 897, 902 n. 10. (emphasis added).
This circuit also has recognized that under South Dakota law foreseeability is “central” to the analysis, and is determined by the nexus between the agent’s employment and the activity which causes the injury. Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1102-3 (8th Cir.1995). In Red Elk, this court found the government liable under the FTCA where there was misuse of power by a tribal police officer who raped a thirteen-year-old child while the officer was on duty. The court in Red Elk relied on the South Dakota Supreme Court case of Leafgreen v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.1986), which stated:
We think it fairly stated that a principal is liable for tortious harm caused by an agent where a nexus sufficient to make the harm foreseeable exists between the agent’s employment and the activity which actually caused the injury; foreseeable is used in the sense that the employee’s conduct must not be so unusual or startling that it would be unfair to include the loss caused by the injury among the costs of the employer’s business.
Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 280-81.10
We discussed the foreseeability of thé officer’s actions -in our first panel opinion in this case:
[WJhile it is unfortunate and uncommon, sexual misconduct by an officer is in some circumstances reasonably foreseeable. It is no less foreseeable that such an abuse of authority could occur while the officer is not technically on duty, but *887rather possesses the apparent authority sufficient to cause a person to rely on or fear that authority and succumb to sexual advances. Cases holding employers liable for sexual assaults or excessive use of force by police officers reason that such conduct is foreseeable because of the unique position of trust held by such officers.
Primeaux v. United States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1463 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In the second case, the panel commented:
A police officer is a public servant given considerable public trust and authority. Our review of the jurisprudence indicates that, almost uniformly, where excesses are committed by such officers, their employers are held to be responsible for their actions even though those actions may be somewhat removed from their usual duties. This is unquestionably the case because of the position of such officers in our society.
Primeaux, 149 F.3d at 900-01 (quoting Red Elk, 62 F.3d at 1107).
There should be little doubt that Officer Scott while traveling the highway that evening was acting under the express authority of the BIA. As he approached Ms. Pri-meaux, (1) he was authorized to travel in the police car during an expense-paid trip to and from New Mexico, (2) Scott turned on his red lights atop the police car, (3) he told Ms. Primeaux he was a BIA officer, (4) Ms. Primeaux testified she followed Scott’s command to get out of the car because he was a “cop,” and (5) the trial court found that Scott accomplished the tort by the existence of his agency relationship.
As we previously observed:
Viewing this evidence through the eyes of the victim, we deem it obvious that any ordinary citizen would believe under similar circumstances that an officer of the law had stopped to render assistance.
The fact that the victim was not arrested, involuntarily stopped or detained is barely relevant under these circumstances. An officer’s duty is not limited solely to the arrest and apprehension of law violators. An officer of the law often displays his apparent or actual authority to offer assistance to citizens, especially those in distress. Any citizen, especially on a “dark, cold night in the middle of nowhere” would take more assurance in and place greater reliance on assistance offered by an officer of the law than by a complete stranger.
Id. at 899.11
The officer was also within the “scope of employment” even as narrowly defined by the court. The officer was authorized to travel to a training session in New Mexico. During his return trip, he was receiving per diem and mileage. He was authorized to drive his assigned police car with red lights affixed on top. He testified that he thought it part of his duties to offer a stranded motorist a ride. Ms. Primeaux testified that Officer Scott approached her and turned on his red lights on the police vehicle. The district court found all of these facts to be true.12 To hold that Officer Scott, under these circumstances, was not acting within the scope of his employment is inexplicable.13 The district *888court concluded, however, that the officer was not within his scope of employment because he was outside of his territorial jurisdiction and was not on duty for law enforcement purposes. This finding was a clear error of law. The fact that the officer was not in his jurisdiction does not mean he was outside his scope of employment at the time he offered Ms. Primeaux a ride. The officer obviously was operating a government vehicle under the authority of the BIA. As in Red Elk, it was foreseeable that he would stop and offer assistance to a stranded motorist. It was also foreseeable that he would commit an act of violence upon this motorist. The law is clear that even though a government employee commits an intentional tort, that employee can still be acting within the scope of employment, as was the case here. See Red Elk, 62 F.3d at 1107-08.
Under either theory, the undisputed record in this case shows that the government should be held liable, and it is a manifest injustice to hold otherwise.

. All of the circuits including this court have held that liability of the United States may be imposed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) if a private employer would be liable under state law respondeat superior where the wrongful conduct took place. See Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1995); Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir.1997); Richman v. Straley, 48 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir.1995); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir.1991); James v. United States, 467 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir.1972); United States v. Farmer, 400 F.2d 107, 109 (8th Cir.1968); O'Toole v. United States, 284 F.2d 792, 794 (2d Cir.1960).

. The court specifically holds: "Thus, even if state law extends a private employer's vicarious liability to employee conduct not within the scope of employment, the government’s FTCA liability remains limited to employee conduct within the scope of employment, as defined by state law. That is the situation we encounter in this case.”

. Other courts of appeals have also recognized that "scope of employment” can include apparent authority. For example, in Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343 (4th Cir.1995), the Fourth Circuit stated "under common law agency principles an employer is also liable for an employee’s wrongful acts, even if those acts are not committed within the actual scope of his employment, if the employee uses his apparent authority to accomplish the wrongful acts and so is acting within the ‘apparent scope’ of his employment.” Martin, 48 F.3d at 1352. See also Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir.1994) (applying common law agency principles and holding that ’"an employer is liable ... if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment ...”).

. The government claims that it is permitted to raise these issues for the first time on appeal because they affect this court's subject-matter jurisdiction. It argues'that the FTCA is only a limited waiver of the government's sovereign immunity and that this court has no jurisdiction, to impose liability under the FTCA for acts of government employees outside of the scope of- employment. I would agree that the issue of sovereign immunity can be raised at any time because it is a jurisdictional issue. United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 622 n. 7 (8th Cir.1988). The specific issue in this case, however, is not whether we have jurisdiction to impose liability outside the scope of employment, but rather is what constitutes scope of employment under South Dakota law. This is not an issue of sovereign immunity, but simply a question of state law relating to the doctrine of respon-deat superior. Because this is not a jurisdictional issue, the government is barred from raising it for the first time in its petition for rehearing. Lacy v. Lockhart, 697 F.2d 271, 272 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 841-42 (8th Cir.1981).
The Supreme Court stated in Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941), that the rule providing that a party cannot raise an issue for the first *884time on appeal is “essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues ... [and] in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.” Helvering, 312 U.S. at 556, 61 S.Ct. 719. This rule applies unless it would result in a “plain miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 558, 61 S.Ct. 719. This is not such a case. In fact, by allowing the government to argue this belated issue, there will be a plain miscarriage of justice with respect to Ms. Primeaux, the victim in this case. The arguments should, therefore, be considered waived.
As Justice Scalia has so appropriately observed: "The rule that points not argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring).

. The court's position also ignores the statutory terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b):
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994) (emphasis added).

. This subsection defines "investigative or law enforcement officer” as "any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994). The dissent on the second appeal made the argument that the BIA officer in this case was not acting within the scope of employment because he was not effecting an arrest. This is clearly incorrect as section 2680(h) only serves to define "investigative or law enforcement officer” and not to limit the definition of scope of employment. If anything, this section viewed in connection with the legislative intent supports the broad interpretation of scope of employment that I discussed above.

. South Dakota has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See e.g., Leafgreen v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 280 (S.D.1986) (relying on section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency); Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 903 (S.D.1991) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217C).

. This is true in other contexts. For example, the final judgment rule is a statutory rule allowing an appeal only from a final judgment. That is the general rule, but there are exceptions to that rule such as interlocutory appeals, extraordinary writs, and the collateral order rule. In order to understand the rule itself, the exceptions become part of the rule.

. See Sports Car Centre of Syracuse, Ltd. v. Bombard, 249 A.D.2d 988, 672 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (stating that ”[a]n employer may be vicariously liable for conversion by an employee where the employee is acting within the scope of his apparent authority”) (citations omitted); Borg-Warner Protective Serv. Corp. v. Flores, 955 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex.Ct.App.1997) (noting that "under common-law agency principles, an employer is. liable for an employee’s wrongful acts, even if, those acts are not committed within the actual scope of his employment, if the employee uses his apparent authority to accomplish the wrongful acts and so is acting within the ‘apparent scope’ of his employment”) (citation omitted); Rickborn v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 321 S.C. 291, 468 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1996) (acknowledging apparent authority and stating “a general agent's authority is determined by the nature of the business, and is coextensive with his scope of employment ...”); Leitch v. Switchenko, 169 Mich.App. 761, 426 N.W.2d 804, 806 (1988) (stating that “[Ijiability under this doctrine may also be based on a finding that the employee was *886acting within the apparent scope of his employment''); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 486, 575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (1991) (stating that federal courts have held that "where an employee is able to sexually harass another employee because of the authority or apparent authority vested in him by the' employer, it may be said that the harasser’s actions took place within the scope of his employment”) (citations omitted).

. The South Dakota Supreme Court also observed in Leaf green:
One way to determine whether a risk is inherent in, or created by, an enterprise is to ask whether the actual occurrence was a generally foreseeable consequence of the activity. However, "foreseeability” in Lhis context must be distinguished from "foreseeability” as a test for negligence. In the later sense "foreseeable” means a level of probability which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions whereas "foreseeability” as a test for respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conducL is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business, [citations omitted] In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was one "that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental” to the enterprise undertaken by the ■ employer.
Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 280 (quoting Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 124 Cal.Rptr. 143, 148-49 (1975)).

. The evidence is undisputed that there was reliance by Ms. Primeaux upon his apparent authority, or that he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. See Restatement of Agency § 219(2)(d).

. The district court found Ms. Primeaux’s version to be true. In fact, it held Ms. Pri-meaux’s testimony “much more credible than that of Mike Scott.’’ Trial Tr. at 251.

.Assume Officer ScoLL had an accidenl wilh anolher vehicle while driving Lhe police car back lo Rosebud Lhal evening, Lhere could be little question that he would be found, as a matter of law, lo be acting within Lhe scope of his employment. Scott was authorized to go Lo the training session, drive the government car, authorized Lo use a government credit card for the trip and paid his salary while on the trip.