Court Opinion

ID: 9825503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:15:03.848754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:55.180255
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
We stated in the original opinion that, though the failure to couple the air brakes may be negligence per se, there was no count which attributed the death of deceased to such failure, and that therefore the court should not have charged the jury as to such failure. We had just shown that the only counts which related directly to that subject did not allege that there was a breach of duty to the decedent in this respect, which proximately caused his death. Our attention is called to counts 1 and 2, which do not allege the quo modo of the negligence in operating the cars. This is not necessary, and the counts are sufficient therefore to sustain any nature of negligent operation of the cars, including negligence in the failure to couple the air brakes, if such negligence proximately caused the death of plaintiff’s intestate.
With more accuracy we should have stated, as we did on former appeal, in effect, that under no aspect of the evidence could the failure to couple the brakes have proximately caused the accident. Whether the air was coupled may have been a circumstance more or less material upon the inquiry of whether there was reasonable apprehension that decedent may be in a dangerous position in an effort to couple it, dependant upon other phases of the evidence. But the negligence involved in the failure to have the air coupled would not add materially tovthat inquiry, and a charge on such negligence would tend to lead the jury to a conclusion that it should affect their verdict. So that while the issues made by the pleading were broad enough to include such negligence, the evid’ence dispelled an inference that negligence in failure to couple the brakes proximately caused the aeciuent.
We have not stated, or consciously intimated, in any opinion that a violation of the Safety Appliance Act may not proximately cause injury to one not engaged in coupling the air. But in order that such be the fact, there must be shown circumstances which are sufficient to justify an inference of duty to the injured employee; and when the duty to another employee only is specifically alleged in the pleading we cannot assume from such allegation that there is a duty to decedent, unless, the facts are legally sufficient to support that assumption. No case has been cited or read by us taking a different view.
We are also reminded that in the opinion we stated that the court permitted appellee to show the earning capacity of money in Mobile on March 2, 1926, in the hands of a person without education and training; whereas the language of the question was “in the hands of a person without special education and training in that matter.” Our treatment of that‘aspect of the question propounded to a witness is shown to be based upon an erroneous statement of it. We are inclined to the view that such criticism is just. *412Through some oversight we misread the question so as'to eliminate the word “special.” We agree that the proper inquiry is the earning power of money iu the hands of one not “specially” educated and trained in its use, hut the inquiry does not embrace one without any education or training whatever in its use. We treated the question as though it referred to the latter class of people. A more careful study of it convinces us of our error in this respect. Counsel agree with us that our reasoning is correct, and we agree with them that our premise was erroneous. However, the other objection which we discussed serves to render the question an improper one. In this other respect we think that the objection was sufficient to show its impropriety.
We are persuaded that the discussion of the other questions treated by counsel in application for rehearing are sufficiently and correctly disposed of in the former opinion.
The application for rehearing must therefore be denied.
ANDERSON, C. J., and GARDNER and BOÜDDIN, JJ., concur.