Court Opinion

ID: 9946313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:10:47.598185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.325293
License: Public Domain

J-S42030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 DARRYL JENKINS                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 1140 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 20, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0004817-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 DARRYL JENKINS                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 1141 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 20, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0005615-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2024

      Appellant, Darryl Jenkins, appeals pro se from the order entered on April

20, 2023 in the Court of Common Pleas of Buck County (PCRA court), which

dismissed his petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act,

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely. Upon review, we affirm.

      The factual and procedural background is not at issue here. Briefly, a

jury convicted Appellant of unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of
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minors, and indecent assault – person less than 16 years of age.                On

September 22, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term

of 11½ to 23 years’ incarceration for all convictions. We affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence on May 23, 2019. On November 14, 2019, our Supreme

Court    denied    Appellant’s     petition    for   allowance   of   appeal.   See

Commonwealth v. Jenkins, No. 981 EDA 2018, unpublished memorandum

(Pa. Super. filed May 23, 2019), appeal denied, 219 A.3d 1106 (Pa. 2019).

        On February 21, 2020, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, and after

counsel was appointed, the petition was denied on August 24, 2021. Appellant

timely appealed to this Court on October 12, 2021. We affirmed the order

denying PCRA relief on July 14, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, No.

1968 EDA 2021, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed July 14, 2022).

Appellant did not seek further review before our Supreme Court.

        On January 19, 2023, Appellant filed the underlying petition,1 in which

he filed a motion for discovery and alleged the discovery of a Brady2 violation.

On February 22, 2023, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss,

noting that the PCRA petition was untimely and meritless, and that the motion

for discovery would be fruitless as the after-discovered evidence claim was

refuted in the petition itself. In response, Appellant refiled his second PCRA

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1 The petition was titled “Petition After-Discovered Evidence.”
                                                            The PCRA court
treated it as PCRA petition. Appellant does not challenge the PCRA court’s
characterization.

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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petition, along with the motion for discovery. On April 20, 2023, the PCRA

court denied Appellant’s petition and motion without a hearing. This appeal

followed.

       The issues raised before us all pertain to the merits, not the timeliness,

of the underlying petition.3 While it is difficult to make sense of Appellant’s

repetitive and verbose filings, we can discern, within the various arguments

raised by Appellant, some discussion about the timeliness of his claims. The

thrust of the argument is that the instant petition is timely under the newly-

discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar. The newly-

discovered fact is the information about Ms. Patterson (mother of the victim

and Appellant’s then-paramour).            Specifically, Appellant argues that the

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to inform Appellant

that Ms. Patterson was prescribed opioid narcotics. Appellant asserts that he

discovered the new fact on December 8, 2022, and filed the underlying

petition within 60 days (presumably referring to Section9545(b)(2))4 of the

disposition of his previous appeal.

____________________________________________

3 See PCRA petition, 1/19/23, at 5 (unnumbered).

4 We note that subsection 9545(b)(2) was amended, effective December 24,

2018, to provide petitioners with one year to invoke a timeliness exception
regarding “claims arising on Dec. 24, 2017 or thereafter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2); Section 3 of Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, effective in 60
days. Because the petition at issue here was filed on January 19, 2023, after
the effective date of the amendment, the amendment is applicable here. In
any event, the underlying petition was filed within 60 days of the discovery of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On appeal,

       [w]e review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
       light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
       Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
       2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
       the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
       ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
       error. Id. . . . We grant great deference to the factual findings
       of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they
       have no support in the record. Commonwealth v. Carter, 21
       A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011). However, we afford no such
       deference to its legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15
       A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d
       1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007). Further, where the petitioner raises
       questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
       of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874,
       886 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,” 5 unless an

____________________________________________

the new fact. Because, as explained infra, Appellant failed to meet the newly-
discovered facts exception, compliance with Section 9545(b)(2) is, however,
of no moment.

5 It is undisputed that the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.
Appellant was sentenced on September 22, 2017. On May 3, 2019, we
affirmed the judgment of sentence. On November 14, 2019, our Supreme
Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. If no petition for
writ of certiorari is filed with the United States Supreme Court, as in the instant
case, the judgment of sentence becomes final at the expiration of the 90-day
period available to petition the United States Supreme Court. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.1. Accordingly, Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA on February 12,
2020. Appellant had one year to file a timely PCRA petition (i.e., February 12,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).6              “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520,

522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (overruled on

other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)). As

timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of Appellant’s underlying

claims,     we   first   determine     whether   this   PCRA   petition     is   timely

filed.    Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008)

(consideration of Brady claim separate from consideration of its timeliness).

If it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the

petition. Id.

         As noted above, Appellant first claims that he discovered a Brady

violation and that he timely filed the underlying petition within the time-

restrictions of Section 9545(b)(2).

____________________________________________

2021). The underlying petition was filed on January 19, 2023, which is
approximately 2 years after his judgment of sentence became final. Thus, the
underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.

6 The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and

proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of
the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the
date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). At
issue here is the newly-discovered facts exception, Section 9545(b)(ii).

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      A Brady violation claim may qualify as a newly-discovered fact, as long

as petitioner establishes that: 1) “the facts upon which the claim was

predicated were unknown” and 2) the fact “could not have been ascertained

by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); see also

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271-72 (Pa. 2007). “If the

petitioner alleges and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has

jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection.”    Bennett, supra (citing

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 2005)).

      Regarding the first claim, the PCRA first court noted that, Appellant, in

his own petition, stated:

      The Facts in these violations are based in part of the respondents
      [sic] recollection of accounts that were not investigated by counsel
      of which the respondent did not find any relevance in at the time
      because of his lack of familiarity with the law.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/23, at 13 (quoting PCRA petition, at 10).

      The PCRA Court then concluded:

      [a]lthough Appellant allege[s] that the Commonwealth failed to
      disclose crucial witness information in that Ms. Patterson was
      prescribed opioid narcotics, the only person Appellant alleges
      knew that fact is himself. See [PCRA] petition, p. 13 (“I would
      not have known to bring it up to my counsel unless counsel asked
      me about it and I saw no [relevance] in it at the time.”).

PCRA Court 6/20/23, at 13.

      In light of the foregoing, because Appellant knew of Ms. Patterson’s

prescription medication, we agree with the PCRA court that there was no

Brady violation with respect to this information. See Lambert, 884 A.2d at

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856 (citing Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 696 (Pa. 2003) for the

proposition that no Brady violation occurs where appellant knew or could have

uncovered evidence with reasonable diligence). Moreover, because the facts

underlying this claim were known to Appellant, it does not qualify under the

newly-discovered fact exception and, thus, is untimely. Lambert, supra.

      Appellant   also   argues   extensively   (and   confusingly)   that   the

Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory information (i.e., statements

made by Ms. Patterson to Appellant to the effect that investigating officer did

not want Appellant in the residence) prior to or around the time of Appellant’s

arrest.

      While raised as a Brady violation (and possibly as a newly-discovered

fact), Appellant fails to recognize that he knew about these statements even

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before trial,7 and that as such, do not qualify as a Brady violation or a newly-

discovered fact. See Lambert, supra.8

____________________________________________

7 In his petition, Appellant stated (verbatim):

       After watching the encounter from the body cam footage
       respondant ’s counsel said he did not think [Appellant]’s would be
       suppressed. But at the time respondant did not think to tell his
       counsel about the statement from Ms Patterson and counsel did
       not ask about the breif interaction she and [Appellant] had at the
       house that day.

Appellant’s Brief at 19 (unnumbered). The PCRA court clarified the context of
Ms. Patterson’s statements as follows: “When Appellant arrived at home on
the date of his arrest, Ms. Patterson was waiting outside with [investigating
officer] and told Appellant [that investigating officer] did not want Appellant
to enter the residence.” PCRA Opinion, 6/20/23, at 14, n.12.

8 To the extent Appellant’s argument can be construed as alleging that Brady

violations he identified here qualify as governmental interference for purposes
of Section 9545(b)(1), we note that:

       The governmental interference exception permits an otherwise
       untimely PCRA petition to be filed if it pleads and proves that the
       failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference
       by government officials with the presentation of the claim in
       violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
       Constitution or laws of the United States[.]

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). This exception requires a petitioner to “show
that but for the interference of a government actor ‘he could not have filed his
claim earlier.’” Id. (quoting Stokes, 959 A.2d at 310).

Appellant, here, provides no facts that would remotely support a finding of
governmental interference. To the contrary, the record shows that Appellant
was fully aware of the alleged violations but never thought of pursuing them
as he did fully appreciate their relevance, if any.

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       Finally, to the extent that Appellant raises claims of ineffective

assistance of PCRA counsel suggesting that the PCRA court should have raised

sus sponte the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel under Commonwealth v.

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021),9 no relief is due. Nowhere in Bradley did

our Supreme Court introduce such a rule. To the contrary, Bradley reiterates

that the burden remains on petitioners to assert and prove PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness. See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402.

       Order affirmed.

Date: 2/29/2024

____________________________________________

9 “[A] PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after
obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Bradley,
261 A.3d at 401. “In some instances, the record before the appellate court
will be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness
claims[; h]owever, in other cases, the appellate court may need to remand to
the PCRA court for further development of the record and for the PCRA court
to consider such claims as an initial matter.” Id. at 402 (citations omitted).
“To be entitled to a remand, [appellant] must provide more than mere
boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. That is, he must
establish that there are issues of material facts concerning claims challenging
counsel’s stewardship and that relief may be available.” Commonwealth v.
Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1006 (Pa. 2022) (citing Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402)).

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