Court Opinion

ID: 9895855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:35.892738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:00.219830
License: Public Domain

J-A18038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant               :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 CYRUS SAM SUKHADIA                        :   No. 1230 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 23, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001889-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant               :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 CYRUS SAM SUKHADIA                        :   No. 1231 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 23, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002897-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED: November 8, 2023

     The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the order granting Cyrus

Sam Sukhadia’s motion to suppress in two cases. The suppression court found

that two search warrants for the contents of Sukhadia’s cell phone were

unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.
J-A18038-23

                                Case Posture

      This case began in 2014 with an investigation into Sukhadia, who was

then a police recruit. The suppression court found the following facts leading

up to the issuance of the first warrant:

            On October 17, 2014, Detectives James Simunovic and
      Jeffrey Abraham, of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department, met
      with [Sukhadia] in order to conduct an interview regarding his
      arrest on charges which alleged that [Sukhadia] provided alcohol
      to an underage female and communicated with her through
      Tinder, a social media communication application. [Sukhadia]
      was placed in a soundproof interview room.            After being
      administered Miranda warnings, [Sukhadia] chose not to speak
      with the officers and the interview was terminated.

            Simunovic also took custody of [Sukhadia’s] cellular
      telephone from the arresting officer and placed it on his desk.
      [Sukhadia] did not consent to a search of the phone’s contents.
      Abraham subsequently wrote an application for a search warrant
      to examine the contents of [Sukhadia’s] cellular telephone. The
      Honorable David Cashman of the Court of Common Pleas of
      Allegheny County signed the search warrant at approximately
      11:45 a.m. on October 17, 2014. After the warrant was signed,
      Abraham transferred the phone to another City of Pittsburgh
      police officer to conduct the search.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 9–10 (record citations and footnotes

omitted).

      This first search warrant authorized the police to search for and seize

“All electronic data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages,

emails, photos, videos, call log, instant messages and correspond[e]nce from

applications downloaded from [Sukhadia’s phone].”      Application for Search

Warrant and Authorization, 10/17/14 (First Warrant), at 1 (identifying the

“items to be searched for and seized,” being “as specific as possible”). The

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warrant confined the location of the search to the following content: “All

electronic data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages,

emails, photos, videos, call log, and instant messages from [Sukhadia’s

phone].” Id. (describing the “premises . . . to be searched”). It listed two

crimes: witness intimidation and selling liquor to a minor, with dates of

“10//2014-10/16/2014” [sic]. Id.; see 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4952, 6310.1.

     Attached to (and included with) the first search warrant was the affidavit

of probable cause.   The affidavit provided both detectives’ backgrounds as

well as the following information in support of probable cause:

           The information in this search warrant was [corroborated]
     and relayed to us from a report generated by Detective Brian
     Sellers, who is assigned to the Sex Assault and Family Crimes
     Unit. The report that he prepared, detailed an incident involving
     a female victim named [E.W.], and ACTOR Cyrus Sukhadia.

            The report [dictated] that on 10/16/2014, Detective
     Patterson and Detective Sellers received an underage drinking
     report from officers Matthew Mays and Michael Muehlbauer of the
     Point Park University Public Safety Department. The student was
     identified as 18 year old [E.W.] According to the report, [E.W.]
     disclosed that she had obtained the alcohol from a City of
     Pittsburgh Police officer. [E.W.] made a written statement of the
     incidents. Detective Sellers and Detective Patterson received a
     copy of the statement.

            [E.W.] knew the officer only as “Cyrus.” Through further
     investigation, it was discovered that a Cyrus Sukhadia was
     currently enrolled with the City of Pittsburgh Police Training
     Academy as a recruit. [E.W.] didn’t know the address of Sukhadia
     but was able to direct Sgt. Black (Point Park University) and Lt.
     Kudrav (A/Commander, Zone 2) to the apartment building in the
     Brookline section of the City of Pittsburgh. A silver Toyota Corolla,
     parked on the street in front of the building, was positively
     identified by [E.W.] as Cyrus’ vehicle. A check of the license plate

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     confirmed the owner as Sukhadia. The driver’s license photo was
     an exact match as to a photo on [E.W.’s] cell phone as Sukhadia.

           Detective Sellers and Detective Patterson then interviewed
     [E.W.] in SAFC room #263. The following is a summary of the
     interview and is not verbatim unless quoted.

           [E.W.] said that she is currently enrolled at Point Park
     University as a freshman. [E.W.] said that she met Sukhadia on
     “Tinder”. She explained that Tinder is a dating website for mobile
     phones. [E.W.] admitted that she put her age as 22 on the
     website and that she “needed booze.” On 10/2/2014, at 1842
     hrs, Sukhadia responded to [E.W.’s] post with “So i hear u want
     some booze.” The following is conversation between Sukhadia
     and [E.W.], as copied from [E.W.’s] cell phone:

        [E.W.] - “Yes please.”
        Sukhadia - “Lol and whats in it for me :p”
        [E.W.] - “Bring me two bottles, I’ll give you head and cash.”
        Sukhadia - “Lol sure, what do u want and where am i taking
             it?”
        [E.W.] - “First, are you okay with getting head in your car?”
        Sukhadia - “Yeah sure” “Actually ur only 3 miles away, we
             could prob head to my place real quick”

           By 1925 hrs., Sukhadia texted [E.W.] and said that he’d be
     there in 20 minutes. A short time later, Sukhadia called [E.W.]
     on her phone and told her that he was at the school. Sukhadia
     drove [E.W.] to a liquor store on Shiloh St. where she gave him
     $40.00. Sukhadia returned with a bottle of rum and a bottle of
     vodka. While en route, Sukhadia asked [E.W.] how old she was.
     [E.W.] told Sukhadia that she was 18 years old. She said
     Sukhadia replied “No wonder you asked me to get you alcohol.”
     They then drove to Sukhadia’s apartment.           While [E.W.]
     performed oral sex on Sukhadia, she noticed a bandage on
     Sukhadia’s knee. After she was done, she asked Sukhadia how
     he injured himself. Sukhadia told [E.W.] to look in his closet.
     [E.W.] complied and she said that when she opened the doors,
     she immediately saw Pittsburgh Police uniforms. [E.W.] said that
     she felt that she had been “busted.” She said Sukhadia said: “Just
     forget I’m a cop.” Sukhadia drove [E.W.] back to the dorms.

           [E.W.] said that the next time she and Sukhadia texted each
     other was on 10/7/2014. Sukhadia agreed to get [E.W.] alcohol.
     He told her that he had to go to a beer distributor because the

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     liquor stores were closed. Sukhadia picked up [E.W.] and took
     her to his house. After the oral sex was completed, Sukhadia
     drove [E.W.] back to the dorms. During the drive back to the
     dorms, Sukhadia asked [E.W.] if any of her friends would have
     oral sex for alcohol or intercourse for drugs. [E.W.] said that she
     didn’t reply. At the dorms, [E.W.] retrieved a 12 pack of [Four
     Loko] out of the trunk. [E.W.] said she paid Sukhadia $26.00. A
     short time later, [E.W.] received a message from Sukhadia
     accusing her of short changing him. [E.W.] said that there was
     no more communication between the two of them until the final
     meeting.

            On 10/15/2014, Sukhadia picked up [E.W.] and drove to his
     apartment. [E.W.] said that inside the apartment, she saw a
     pistol, vest and other police items.        [E.W.] said Sukhadia
     suggested that she put his “billy club” inside her vagina. [E.W.]
     said she refused. She performed oral sex on Sukhadia. He then
     drove Sukhadia [sic] back to the dorms. While driving [E.W.] back
     to the dorm, Cyrus Sukhadia told her that if she or some of her
     friends wanted drugs, he would get the drugs from the evidence
     locker. Sukhadia said he would get the drugs if [E.W.] or her
     friends would have sex with him.

           As they got closer to the school, Sukhadia and [E.W.]
     observed a heavy presence of police in the area (due to a movie
     being filmed in the area). Sukhadia told [E.W.] that if she gets
     caught, not to tell police she got the alcohol from him. [E.W.]
     asked Sukhadia why and he said: “I’d plant enough cocaine on
     you to get you in jail for 20 years.” [The police asked E.W.] how
     she felt about that statement. She said that she was scared and
     thought, “He could actually do that.”

           Based on this information, Detective Patterson obtained an
     arrest warrant for Sukhadia.

           On 10/17/14 Sukhadia reported to the Pittsburgh Bureau of
     Police Training Academy and was placed into custody by Sgt.
     Epler. [During a search] incident to arrest, Sgt. Epler recovered
     the white Iphone as described in the application for the search
     warrant.

           Based on the victim’s statement’s about correspond[e]nce
     VIA the cellular phone messaging between [E.W.] and Sukhadia,
     I am respectfully requesting a search warrant for all electronic
     data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages,
     emails, photos, videos, call log, instant messages and

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      correspond[e]nce from applications downloaded from a cellular
      phone recovered from Cyrus Sukhadia. The description of the
      cellular phone is white Apple Iphone [with specific descriptors].

First Warrant, at 2–4.

      The suppression court found the following facts about the execution of

the first warrant:

            Detective Timothy Cole is employed by the Computer
      Crimes Unit of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department and is
      tasked with processing and analyzing digital evidence, including
      conducting forensic examinations of cellular telephones. Cole was
      assigned to analyze data obtained from [Sukhadia’s] phone. Cole
      was not provided with a copy of the search warrant prior to
      conducting the search of the phone’s contents; but, rather, he was
      advised by other detectives of the information set forth in the
      affidavit of probable cause concerning conversations between
      [Sukhadia] and an underage female regarding [Sukhadia’s]
      provision of alcohol to her in exchange for sexual activity.

            The passcode to access the phone was deduced from
      [Sukhadia’s] badge number. Once access to the phone’s contents
      was obtained, Cole extracted all of the phone’s electronic data,
      referred to as a data “dump,” and entered it into a program to be
      decoded into a viewable file which is then searched and analyzed.
      Cole testified that he was required to review all of the downloaded
      messages and catalogs in order to locate those communications
      between [Sukhadia] and E.W. because detectives did not know
      the name that [Sukhadia] entered into his phone to identify E.W.
      or the name that E.W. used to identify herself on Tinder. [SCO n.8]
      As described by Cole, “We just had to look through it and see
      when we found a conversation relevant to the case.”              In
      conducting this search, Cole viewed actual conversations along
      with phone numbers, profile names, and timestamps.

         SCO n.8 Cole explained that he could not just ask E.W. for the

         name she used to identify her Tinder account because,
         “Even if they are cooperating witnesses, we don’t trust what
         they are saying is true. We have to look at all of the data.”
         [The suppression court] views this explanation as rather
         disingenuous in that the probable cause in [the first
         warrant] was largely based on information provided by E.W.

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         who appeared to be represented in the affidavit as a credible
         source.

             In his testimony, Cole acknowledged that it is possible to
      limit the search parameters. Cole testified, however, that he
      understood [the first warrant] to allow a general search of the
      entire phone and all of its contents and did not limit his search to
      any specific terms or boundaries, choosing instead to review all of
      the phone’s contents without limitation as to dates or names. It
      was while generally reading through [Sukhadia’s] chat messages
      that Cole discovered a message between [Sukhadia] and a person
      identifying themself as a fifteen-year-old female. Cole stopped
      his investigation and reported this new information to Detective
      [Aprill-Noelle ]Campbell. Based on this information extracted by
      Cole from [Sukhadia’s] phone and Campbell’s own search of
      [Sukhadia’s] phone using the additional information provided by
      Cole as a search term, Campbell secured a second search warrant.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 9–12 (footnotes and record citations

omitted).

      The second warrant authorized police to search Sukhadia’s phone and

seize “The contents of the Apple iPhone including pictures, videos, chat

messages, app content/data, MMS and SMS messages, contacts, call logs, and

website history.” Application for Search Warrant and Authorization, 10/23/14

(Second Warrant), at 1. The affidavit of probable cause described Detective

Campbell’s training and experience and then provided specific facts from the

investigation:

                         SPECIFIC PROBABLE CAUSE

            On 10/18/14 I, Detective Campbell, received a phone call
      from Lt. Herrmann of Major Crimes. Lt. Herrmann informed me
      that a Pittsburgh Police Recruit had been arrested for furnishing
      alcohol to a minor and during that investigation the Recruit’s
      (Cyrus Sukhadia) cell phone (white Apple iPhone) was seized and
      a search warrant was obtained for [its] contents. When [Detective
      Cole] began to forensically examine the contents of the phone for

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     evidence pertaining to messages that Sukhadia and the victim
     sent to each other through a mobile app, he saw a string of
     messages to a person who went by the user name and screen
     names of “Bob Marie” and “goatlover98”. The messages were
     sexual in nature, even though she told Sukhadia that she was 15
     years old. Det. Cole also saw pictures of Sukhadia exposing
     himself and of unknown females’ naked stomachs and of a group
     sex act. Lt. Herrmann requested that I follow up with the
     investigation in regards to Unlawful Contact with Minors.

            On 10/19/14 the R/Det. went to the Computer Crimes Unit
     and accessed the Cellebrite examination results to look for the
     chats between the suspect and “Bob Marie”. The R/Det. found the
     chat string and confirmed that on 9/2/14 at approximately 2245
     hrs. Bob Marie told Sukhadia that she was 15 years old. Sukhadia
     at first, said she was too young, but then he asked, “I will, r u a
     virgin haha”, then they continued with Sukhadia asking about
     having sex and when they could meet. When the R/Det. observed
     these messages[, the affiant] stopped the exam and on 10/20/14
     [the affiant] instructed Det. Cole to continue with his examination
     of the phone but to limit his analysis to potential evidence
     concerning the original victim and that [the affiant would] be
     obtaining a new search warrant for evidence of Unlawful Contact
     with Minors.

                               CONCLUSION

           Based on the above information the Affiant believes there is
     probable cause showing that PA Title 18 § 6318, has been
     violated. This Affiant requests authority to search the Apple
     iPhone forensically for potential evidence.

Id. at 2–3.

     The suppression court found the following facts about the investigation

once police obtained the second warrant:

           Cole did not complete his analysis of the information
     extracted pursuant to [the first warrant]. After securing [the
     second warrant], Campbell assumed the task of completing the
     search pursuant to [the first warrant] which had been started by
     Cole, taking over from the point where Cole had left off. Campbell
     searched for conversations between [Sukhadia] and E.W. without
     looking at messages with the newly identified victim which was

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      the basis for [the second warrant]. Campbell first carried out a
      search for keywords, but did not find anything.       She then
      extracted text messages from the Tinder database on
      [Sukhadia’s] phone and discovered the messages between
      [Sukhadia] and E.W.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 12 (record citations omitted).

      Sukhadia was ultimately charged at two docket numbers with different

offenses against E.W. and others. On November 30, 2018, Sukhadia moved

to suppress all evidence derived from the searches of his phone. Relevant

here, he argued that the first warrant was overbroad and that any evidence

from the examination under the second warrant was fruit of the poisonous

tree. Motion to Suppress Evidence, 11/30/18, at 9–11, 15–16.

                            Suppression Ruling

      The suppression court heard Sukhadia’s motion on February 28, 2019,

and December 3, 2021.      The Commonwealth presented the testimony of

Detectives Simunovic, Abraham, and Cole.       Sukhadia testified on his own

behalf and called James Swauger as an expert in digital forensic examination.

      The suppression court granted Sukhadia’s motion to suppress. As to

the first warrant, the court concluded that the attached affidavit established

probable cause to search for these specific pieces of digital evidence relating

to Sukhadia’s interactions with E.W.:

      [Sukhadia’s] communications using the Tinder application
      between the dates of October 2, 2014, and October 15, 2014, to
      gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.[; Sukhadia’s] text
      messages from that same time period to gather evidence of his
      contacts with E.W.; [Sukhadia’s] GPS location data from that
      same time period to gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.;
      [Sukhadia’s] call history and call logs from that same time period

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      to gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.; and the phone list of
      [Sukhadia’s] contacts to gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 21. The court found, however, that

nothing in the affidavit supplied probable cause to search for photographs and

videos. Id. at 21 n.13.

      The suppression court then compared the items for which there was

probable cause with the items that the warrant allowed the police to seize.

The court read the warrant to authorize the police to search “all electronic

data on [Sukhadia’s phone] for the time period of October 2, 2014, through

October 16, 2014, for communications and contacts between [Sukhadia] and

E.W.” Id. at 22. The suppression court interpreted the introductory phrase

“All electronic data to include but not limited to” to permit the police to search

the phone’s contents without limits. Id.

      Therefore, the suppression court concluded that the first warrant lacked

particularity and was unconstitutionally overbroad.          Id. at 23.       The

suppression court reasoned that the first warrant authorized a “sweeping

examination of [Sukhadia’s] phone into areas beyond those which were

supported by probable cause.” Id. For example, the court identified other

content on Sukhadia’s phone that the warrant allowed police to search without

having established probable cause:

      In addition to those areas for which a search was supported by
      probable cause, the warrant authorized a search through
      [Sukhadia’s] internet browsing history and websites visited[;] all
      web communication applications such as Instagram, Kik, Whisper,
      instant messaging, and FaceTime accessed and utilized through
      [Sukhadia’s] phone[;] any notes written and recorded on

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       [Sukhadia’s] phone[;] and a search of all emails which could be
       accessed through [Sukhadia’s] phone.

Id.

       In further support of its conclusion that the first warrant was overbroad,

the suppression court cited the executing officers’ testimony that they

understood the warrant to allow a “general search of the phone and all of its

contents.” Id.1 Detective Cole began his search pursuant to the first warrant

(which he had not read) without limiting the parameters by dates, names, or

keywords.      Id.   The court credited James Swauger’s testimony that the

software available at the time of the search could filter content by dates,

names, and keywords. Id. The court thus noted that the police shared its

view that the first warrant allowed a “general search.” Id.

       As to the second warrant, the suppression court concluded that it was

unconstitutional due to issues from the first search. Id. at 25. Initially, the

court concluded that the first search was illegal because it was conducted

pursuant to an overbroad warrant. Id. Alternatively, the court reasoned that

Detective Cole had exceeded the limits of the first warrant by searching

Sukhadia’s messages from outside the time period covered by the warrant

(October 2, 2014, through October 16, 2014). Id. The suppression court

____________________________________________

1 Detective Cole agreed on redirect examination that he thought it was “a
general search for specific information related to this investigation.” N.T.,
2/28/19, at 100. “I was looking for that specific conversation. But you are
going through and seeing other conversations that have to do with the same
thing and you have to read the conversation and figure out who the
conversation is with, what is going on.” Id.

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therefore ruled that the facts supporting the second warrant came from an

illegal search. Id.

        In the alternative, the suppression court reasoned that the second

warrant itself was unconstitutionally overbroad.     The court found that the

affidavit provided probable cause to “support[] a search of photographs,

videos and communications on September 2, 2014, between [Sukhadia] and

the minor female over an unidentified communication service.” Id. at 24. By

contrast, the suppression court found the warrant to authorize a search for

“pictures,   videos,   chat   messages,   content   and   dat[a]   derived   from

applications, MMS and SMS messages, call logs, contacts, and website history

found on [Sukhadia’s] phone.” Id. at 24–25. As with the first warrant, the

court concluded that the second warrant was overbroad because it authorized

the seizure of digital items unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 25.

        The suppression court thus granted Sukhadia’s motion to suppress. The

Commonwealth timely appealed, certifying that the suppression order would

terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution. The Commonwealth and

the suppression court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925.

        The Commonwealth presents one question for our review: “Did the

suppression court err in finding the search warrants for [Sukhadia’s] cell

phone text messages overbroad?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

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                                 Analysis

     This Court reviews an appeal of an order granting suppression according

to the following standard and scope:

     We review trial court suppression orders to determine whether the
     factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
     conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by
     the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are
     supported by the record.        In reviewing an appeal by the
     Commonwealth of a suppression order, we may consider only the
     evidence from the defendant’s witnesses along with the
     Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontroverted. Our
     scope of review of suppression court factual findings is limited to
     the suppression hearing record. We, however, are not bound by
     a suppression court’s conclusions of law; rather, when reviewing
     questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
     of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 276 A.3d 282, 292 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en

banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 39 (Pa. 2021))

(brackets omitted).

     All individuals have a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures by the police. The Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides:

     The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
     papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
     shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
     probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
     describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
     be seized.

U.S. Const. amend IV.

     Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

provides:

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      The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
      possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
      warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall
      issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
      probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
      the affiant.

Pa. Const. Art. I § 8.

      Both provisions require search warrants to “specifically list the things to

be seized.” Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989)

(citation omitted). Under Article I, Section 8, that description must be “as

particular as reasonably possible.” Id. “The requirement that warrants shall

particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under

them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant

describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left [to] the discretion

of the officer executing the warrant.” Id. (quoting Marron v. United States,

275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).

      A search warrant is overbroad if it authorizes police to search for and

seize items without establishing probable cause to search for and seize those

items. Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d 541, 550 (Pa. 2021). Thus, an

overbreadth analysis involves first determining “for what items probable cause

existed” and then measuring the “sufficiency of the description against those

items.” Grossman, 555 A.2d at 900. Suppression is required if there is an

“unreasonable discrepancy” between the items for which there is probable

cause and the description of the items the warrant authorizes police to seize.

Id.; see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 240 A.3d 575, 584–85 (Pa. 2020).

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      Recognizing the “fact-dependent nature of such claims,” our Supreme

Court has cautioned:

      [S]earch warrants should be read in a common sense fashion and
      should not be invalidated by hypertechnical interpretations. This
      may mean, for instance, that when an exact description of a
      particular item is not possible, a generic description will suffice.
      In that vein, we have held that where the items to be seized are
      as precisely identified as the nature of the activity permits and an
      exact description is virtually impossible, the searching officer is
      only required to describe the general class of the item he is
      seeking.

Green, 265 A.3d at 550 (quotations and citations omitted).

      In Pennsylvania, the same overbreadth standard applies to a search of

a digital device as for a physical space. Id. at 553–54. We thus recount

several cases involving both physical and electronic searches.

      In Grossman, a search warrant affidavit established probable cause to

search for files relating to three clients of an insurance agent, who had over

2000 clients. Grossman, 555 A.2d at 900. The warrant, however, authorized

the police to seize “All insurance files, payment records, receipt records, copies

of insurance applications and policies, [and] canceled checks.” Id. at 897.

Because the warrant allowed police to search for and seize all of the insurance

agent’s files, rather than just the files for the three clients described in the

affidavit, the warrant was overbroad. Id. at 900.

      By contrast, there was no defect in the warrant in Commonwealth v.

Walston, 724 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1998). Police were told that a man was growing

marijuana in the basement of a house, and they obtained a warrant to search

the entire house for marijuana and items related to drug trafficking. Id. at

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290. Because these items could be found anywhere in the house, the warrant

authorizing a search of the entire house was not overbroad. Id. at 293.

      [W]here a search warrant adequately describes the place to be
      searched and the items to be seized[,] the scope of the search
      extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may
      be found and properly includes the opening and inspection of
      containers and other receptacles where the object may be
      secreted.

Id. at 292 (quotation and citation omitted).

      A search of a cell phone was at issue in Green, 265 A.3d 541. There,

the affidavit gave police probable cause to seize evidence that a suspect was

sharing child pornography online. Id. at 554. The warrant authorized police

to search for and seize all computer hardware in the suspect’s home, including

cellular devices, and it stated: “These items will be seized and then later

searched for evidence relating to the production and/or distribution of child

pornography.” Id. at 546 (emphasis removed). Regarding the search of the

seized devices, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that this limiting

language was adequate to prevent the police from generally rummaging for

evidence of a crime.     Id. at 554–55.        The high court noted that this

overbreadth issue differs from the scope of access to a digital device. Id. at

555 n.7.

      We similarly found no overbreadth in Commonwealth v. Moser, 283

A.3d 850 (Pa. Super. 2022). There, police had probable cause to search for

and seize cell phone data relating to an alleged rape. Id. at 857–58. After

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seizing the suspect’s cell phone, they obtained a warrant to search for and

seize the following from the contents of the cell phone:

      Any and all calls/messages/conversations/photos/videos that
      establish or provide details regarding the nature of the
      relationship between [the suspect] and the [complainant] relating
      to violations of Title 18: Section 3121 A(1) – Rape by forcible
      Compulsion and Title 18: Section 6301A(1)(i) – corruption of a
      minor and other related charges.

Id. at 854. Because of this limiting language, we held that the warrant was

not overbroad.    Id. at 858.    There was no “unreasonable discrepancy”

between the files the police were authorized to seize and the files for which

there was probable cause; although the police could search the entire cell

phone, they could only seize files related to the relationship between the

suspect and the complainant as related to the listed crimes. Id. at 857–58.

      By contrast, we held warrants to search two cell phones to be overbroad

in Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907 (Pa. Super. 2022). There, the

affidavits established probable cause to search the cell phones for specific

evidence regarding a fraternity party.       See id. at 926.    The affidavits

concluded with a request to forensically recover that evidence. Id. at 925.

However, the warrants authorized police to search for and seize the cell

phones and all the data stored on them, without expressly limiting the search

and seizure to evidence from the fraternity party. Id. at 913. This Court

declined to impose the limiting language from the affidavits onto the warrants

authorizing the seizure of all the data on each phone. Id. at 927–31. Because

the warrants on their face authorized police to search for and seize every file

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on the phones, including files without probable cause, the warrants were

overbroad. Id. at 931.

      Here, with respect to the first warrant, the affidavit established probable

cause to search for and seize certain files relating to Sukhadia’s interactions

with E.W. However, the warrant authorized police to search for and seize “All

electronic data” from Sukhadia’s phone.       We agree with the suppression

court—the first warrant would not prevent the police from seizing any file from

Sukhadia’s phone, regardless of its connection to Sukhadia’s interactions with

E.W. Unlike in Green and Moser, there was no language to limit the object

of the search to the data for which there was probable cause. Rather, as in

Grossman and Young, the first warrant authorized the police to search for

and seize a vast amount of data unrelated to the crimes for which there was

probable cause. Therefore, the warrant was overbroad.

      The Commonwealth alleges several analytical errors by the suppression

court, which we address in turn. Primarily, it asserts that, given the nature of

digital information on a cell phone, it was reasonable to search Sukhadia’s

entire phone for evidence of his interactions with E.W. Cf. Walston, supra

(allowing a search of an entire house for drug items). This misses the mark.

The first warrant was overbroad because of what the police could search for,

not where they could search for it. See Green, 265 A.3d at 555 n.7. Because

the warrant authorized the seizure of all the files in Sukhadia’s phone, it is of

no moment where on Sukhadia’s phone they could search for those files.

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J-A18038-23

       The Commonwealth also argues that the suppression court should have

considered the language in the affidavit as limiting the files that the police

could search for and seize. It offers multiple reasons why this Court in Young

erred by refusing to consider an affidavit in defining the items to be searched

for and seized. We need not opine whether Young was correct2 because the

affidavit attached to the first search warrant in this case did not limit the

requested content to those files for which there was probable cause:

              Based on the victim’s statement’s about correspond[e]nce
       VIA the cellular phone messaging between [E.W.] and Sukhadia,
       I am respectfully requesting a search warrant for all electronic
       data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages,
       emails, photos, videos, call log, instant messages and
       correspond[e]nce from applications downloaded from a cellular
       phone recovered from Cyrus Sukhadia. The description of the
       cellular phone is white Apple Iphone [with specific descriptors].

First Warrant, at 4 (emphasis added).3             Like the face of the warrant, the

affidavit of probable cause anticipates a search to seize all electronic data on

Sukhadia’s phone.        Therefore, even if a reviewing court considered the

affidavit, it would not cure the unreasonable discrepancy between the object

of the search and the files for which there was probable cause.

       Relatedly, the Commonwealth criticizes the suppression court’s use of

Detective Cole’s testimony that he conducted a general search of Sukhadia’s

____________________________________________

2 Furthermore, a three-judge panel of this Court cannot overrule an opinion

from another three-judge panel of this Court. Commonwealth v. Beck, 78
A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013).
3 By contrast, the affidavit in Young differed significantly from the description

of the items to be searched for and seized. See Young, 287 A.3d at 925.

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phone. Because review of a search warrant is limited to the four corners of

the document, the Commonwealth suggests that Detective Cole’s description

of his search was not relevant. We observe that Detective Cole did not read

the search warrant and that he believed he was searching only for evidence

of Sukhadia’s interactions with E.W. Regardless, Detective Cole’s testimony

was not essential to the suppression court’s conclusion or ours. Based on the

language of the first search warrant, the police were authorized to search for

and seize all electronic data from Sukhadia’s phone, rather than just the data

for which probable cause existed. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s challenges

fail, and the first warrant was overbroad.

      With respect to the second warrant, the suppression court provided

three independent grounds for suppression: (1) the second warrant was the

fruit of an unconstitutionally overbroad first warrant, (2) the second warrant

stemmed from a search that exceeded the scope of the first warrant, and (3)

the second warrant itself was overbroad.      The Commonwealth limits its

argument against the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to contending that

the first warrant was not overbroad. Because the first warrant was overbroad,

the Commonwealth’s argument fails. As this is a sufficient basis to sustain

the suppression court’s ruling, we do not reach the Commonwealth’s

challenges to the alternative grounds for suppression of the second warrant.

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                                Conclusion

     Police had probable cause to search for certain communications between

Sukhadia and E.W. among the contents of Sukhadia’s cell phone.           They

obtained a warrant that, based on its plain language, authorized them to

search the entire phone and seize everything on it, with no limiting language.

The suppression court properly concluded that this warrant was overbroad.

     The second search warrant resulted from a search conducted to the first

warrant.   Because the first warrant was overbroad, the suppression court

properly granted suppression with respect to the second warrant. Therefore,

we will affirm the order granting Sukhadia’s motion to suppress evidence

obtained from both searches of his cell phone.

     Affirmed.

DATE: 11/8/2023

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