Court Opinion

ID: 9574618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:06:30.293714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:21.452849
License: Public Domain

*1215Opinion
LUCAS, C. J.
In Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854] (hereafter Gerstein), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of “probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime” as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest, (id., at pp. 114, 120 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 65, 69].) The court stopped short of mandating a specific timetable for making a “prompt” determination of probable cause.
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44 [114 L.Ed.2d 49, 111 S.Ct. 1661] (hereafter McLaughlin), the high court sought to further define the “promptness” requirement for making the probable cause determination mandated in Gerstein. The court held that, “Taking into account the competing interests articulated in Gerstein, we believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” (McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 56 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 63, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1670].)
Neither Gerstein nor McLaughlin was a juvenile detention case. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253 [81 L.Ed.2d 207, 104 S.Ct. 2403] (hereafter Schall) did directly address the constitutional parameters of a key provision of New York State’s juvenile pretrial detention statute. Schall was decided nine years after Gerstein but seven years prior to McLaughlin. Schall, and other decisions of the high court, make it abundantly clear that Fourth Amendment and related due process claims pertaining to the pretrial detention of juveniles following warrantless arrests for criminal activity cannot be viewed in the same light as similar challenges to adult detentions. This is so because, in the words of the Supreme Court, juvenile proceedings are “fundamentally different” from adult criminal proceedings, requiring that a “balance” be struck between the “informality” and “flexibility” that must of necessity inhere in juvenile proceedings, and the further requirement that those proceedings comport with the juvenile’s constitutional rights, and the “ ‘fundamental fairness’ demanded by the Due Process Clause.” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 263 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 216].)
In July of 1991, the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court, after consultation with county counsel, adopted the “official position” that McLaughlin’s strict 48-hour rule does not apply in juvenile detention proceedings,  We granted review in this case to determine whether that position passes constitutional muster, or whether McLaughlin’s 48-hour rule strictly applies to the *1216pretrial detention of adults and juveniles alike following warrantless arrest for criminal activity.1
It is beyond dispute that Gerstein's constitutional requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause for the extended pretrial detention of any person arrested without a warrant applies to juveniles as well as adults. However, for reasons to be explained, and having considered the comprehensive analysis the court invoked in Schall to scrutinize the constitutionality of the juvenile detention provisions there at issue, we have concluded that the high court did not intend that the strict 48-hour rule subsequently announced in McLaughlin—a ruling handed down in a case involving the pretrial detention of adults—should automatically apply in the juvenile detention setting. To conclude otherwise we would have to ignore the fundamental differences between adult and juvenile proceedings recognized in all of the high court’s cases that have specifically addressed juvenile detention issues.
As will be explained, California’s juvenile detention statutes basically afford juvenile detainees who have been arrested without a warrant a formal, adversarial “detention hearing” within 72 hours of a warrantless arrest, which proceeding incorporates the “probable cause” determination mandated under Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103. The relevant statutes also prescribe various other procedures designed to ensure that an arrested juvenile will be released, in accordance with well-established and codified policies, at the earliest possible time following arrest, preferably to the custody of a parent or legal guardian. Given the fundamental difference in purpose and procedure between the treatment of adult and juvenile detainees, we have further concluded that juvenile detainees are constitutionally entitled to a judicial “probable cause” determination within 72 hours of arrest, consistent with the integrated provisions of our juvenile detention statutory scheme.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On July 24, 1991, petitioner Alfredo A., a minor, was taken into custody without a warrant pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 *1217and 6252 on suspicion of having possessed cocaine base for sale on that date. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5.)
On July 25, 1991, petitioner sought his immediate release by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District. He based his challenge to his postarrest detention on the holding in McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44, alleging that he was a juvenile who had been arrested without a warrant the previous day for commission of a criminal offense, and that: “Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, petitioner is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for his continued detention within 48 hours of his arrest. No such judicial determination has been made, and no determination will be made within the 48-hour period. This is because the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Juvenile Court, has adopted as its ‘official position’ that a juvenile is not entitled to such a prompt probable cause determination.”
Several weeks prior to petitioner’s arrest, the Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court sent a memorandum to all juvenile court judges, commissioners, and referees, indicating that county counsel had furnished the juvenile court with an opinion concluding that McLaughlin's 48-hour rule does not apply in juvenile court proceedings. County counsel based that determination on the reasoning of Schall, supra, 467 U.S. 253, in which a New York juvenile “preventive detention” statute was found facially valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The presiding judge and supervising judges thereafter unanimously agreed to adopt county counsel’s position as the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court’s “offical position.”
By an order to show cause filed the following day, the Court of Appeal determined to treat the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a petition for a writ of mandate, and directed respondent Los Angeles County Superior Court to show cause why a peremptory writ of mandate should not issue ordering that judicial probable cause determinations for the extended post-arrest detention of juveniles be made within 48 hours of their arrest.
On that same day, July 26, 1991, a wardship petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging petitioner came within the provisions of section 602 *1218by having violated Health and Safety Code sections 11351 and 11351.5 on July 24, 1991. However, when petitioner appeared in court on the next “judicial day” (July 29, 1991), no detention report was provided to the juvenile court in preparation for the detention hearing, and petitioner was ordered immediately released. He thereafter waived the statutory time limitations for arraignment.
In the mandamus proceeding, petitioner acknowledged that his release after spending five days in custody rendered the petition moot as to him. The Court of Appeal nonetheless determined to hear and decide petitioner’s systemic challenge to the juvenile court’s “official position,” concluding that similar claims had proved “capable of repetition, yet evading review” because “review usually takes longer than the [challenged] temporary detention . . . .” (See Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 256, fn. 3 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 212]; Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 110-111, fn. 11 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 63].)
In its opinion, the Court of Appeal reviewed the relevant provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code governing pretrial detention of juvenile arrestees. After determining that the juvenile detention issue in this case must be evaluated in light of the constitutional analysis conducted in Schall, supra, 467 U.S. 253, the court concluded that California’s statutory postarrest juvenile detention scheme withstands constitutional scrutiny, reasoning that: “[The] statutes provide procedural safeguards that accommodate the individual’s right to liberty and the state’s duty to control crime. They reflect the balance that must be struck between the informality and flexibility of juvenile proceedings even as they comport with the fundamental fairness required by due process. The statutory scheme protects a minor’s right to freedom, consistent with the state interest in protecting the minor and society.” Implicit in these conclusions was the court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim that McLaughlin’s strict 48-hour rule applies to juvenile as well as adult postarrest detention proceedings.
II. Discussion
A. Mootness of Petitioner’s Claim
As noted, petitioner acknowledges that his release after spending five days in pretrial custody has technically rendered this proceeding moot as to him. The Court of Appeal nevertheless determined to hear and decide the claim. We agree that the issue, as presented in this case, is ripe for resolution. The high court reached a similar conclusion in Schall and Gersteim
“Although the pretrial detention of the class representatives has long since ended, . . . this case is not moot for the same reason that the class action in *1219Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110, [f]n. 11 (1975) [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 63, 95 S.Ct. 854], was not mooted by the termination of the claims of the named plaintiffs. ‘Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” ’ ” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 256, fn. 3 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 212].)
B. Relevant Statutory Provisions
In order to meaningfully examine and apply the controlling constitutional principles and case law, we need a brief overview of the relevant statutory provisions that govern juvenile detentions following warrantless arrests in California.
Under our juvenile criminal justice system, a peace officer can take a minor into temporary custody for violating a federal or state law, or a local ordinance. (§§ 602, 625, subd. (a); see, ante, at p. 1217, fn. 2.) When a minor is arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed a crime, the minor is not formally “charged” with the crime in the sense that adult arrestees are criminally prosecuted. Rather, a determination is made whether to commence wardship proceedings with the filing of a petition by the prosecuting attorney pursuant to section 602. (§ 650, subd. (c).)
Various official functions must be performed at the time of the juvenile’s arrest, and within the initial 24- to 48-hour period following the arrest—all patently designed to ensure that the detained minor is afforded every reasonable opportunity for his or her immediate release, preferably to a parent or guardian.
Hence, the arresting officer may release the minor outright (§ 626, subd. (a)), deliver him or her to a public or private shelter facility in contract with the city or county to provide shelter care, counseling, or diversion services to such minors (id., subd. (b)), or release the minor on his or her written promise to appear before a county juvenile probation officer, or to a parent, guardian, or other responsible relative, who may also be required to execute a written promise to appear along with the minor (id., subd. (c)). If the arresting officer elects instead to deliver custody of the minor directly to the county probation officer, the officer must prepare a concise, written statement of the probable cause for taking the minor into temporary custody, to *1220be furnished along with custody of the minor to the juvenile probation officer within 24 hours of the initial detention following the arrest. (Id., subd. (d).)
The policy underlying this choice of dispositions provided for in section 626 is expressly set forth in the statute: “In determining which disposition of the minor to make, the officer shall prefer the alternative which least restricts the minor’s freedom of movement, provided that alternative is compatible with the best interests of the minor and the community.” (§ 626, italics added.)
When custody of the minor is transferred to a probation officer at a juvenile hall or any other place of confinement, the detaining officer is further required to “take immediate steps to notify the minor’s parent, guardian, or responsible relative that such minor is in custody and the place where he is being held.” (§ 627, subd. (a).)
Section 628 requires the juvenile probation officer to “immediately investigate the circumstances of the minor and the facts surrounding his being taken into custody,” and further requires the officer to “immediately release the minor to the custody of his parent, guardian, or responsible relative unless one or more . . . [specified] conditions exist. . . .” (See post, at pp. 1221-1222.)
Like the arresting officer, the county juvenile probation officer is empowered with discretion at the intake-investigatory stage to “adjust the situation which brings the minor within the jurisdiction [or probable jurisdiction] of the court” by “delineating] specific programs of supervision for the minor,” or referring the case to another agency, arranging for informal supervision, or requesting the district attorney to prepare a wardship petition for filing. (§ 654.)
A minor taken into custody must be released within 48 hours, excluding “nonjudicial days,” unless a wardship petition is filed within that initial 48-hour period. (§631, subd. (a).) If a section 602 petition is filed, the minor must be afforded a formal, adversarial “detention hearing” in juvenile court “as soon as possible but in any event [no later than] the expiration of the next judicial day after a petition to declare the minor a ward . . . has been filed”—i.e., 48 to 72 hours after arrest (excluding “nonjudicial days”). (§ 632, subd. (a).)
If the offense for which the minor is taken into custody is “a misdemeanor that does not involve violence, the threat of violence, or possession or use of *1221a weapon, and if the minor is not currently on probation or parole,” then the minor must be released within 48 hours after having been taken into custody (again, excluding “nonjudicial days”) unless a wardship petition is filed and “the minor has been ordered detained by a judge or referee of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 635” within that initial 48-hour period. (§631, subd. (b).)
Most significantly, when a minor is detained on suspicion of criminal activity, in contrast to an adult detained under similar circumstances, the inquiry into the propriety of the extended detention is much broader in scope than a determination, in the strict Fourth Amendment sense, of whether “factual” probable cause exists to believe the minor committed the crime for which he was taken into custody. Section 628 lists seven “conditions,” one or more of which must be found to exist in order to warrant detaining the minor and scheduling a detention hearing within 72 hours of his or her arrest (again, excluding “nonjudicial” days). These conditions include whether:
“(1) The minor is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has no parent, guardian, or responsible relative; or has no parent, guardian, or responsible relative willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care or control; or has no parent, guardian, or responsible relative actually exercising such care or control.
“(2) The minor is destitute or is not provided with the necessities of life or is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode.
“(3) The minor is provided with a home which is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, depravity or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other person in whose custody or care he is.
“(4) Continued detention of the minor is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or reasonably necessary for the protection of the person or property of another.
“(5) The minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court.
“(6) The minor has violated an order of the juvenile court.
“(7) The minor is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.” (§ 628, subd. (a).)
Section 635 sets forth the factors to be considered by the juvenile court at the detention hearing, and the standard the court must apply, in evaluating *1222the probation officer’s findings pursuant to section 628 and determining whether to continue the minor’s detention or order his or her release from custody. The section provides:
“The court will examine such minor, his parent, guardian, or other person having relevant knowledge, hear such relevant evidence as the minor, his parent or guardian or their counsel desires to present, and, unless it appears that such minor has violated an order of the juvenile court or has escaped from the commitment of the juvenile court or that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of such minor or reasonably necessary for the protection of the person or property of another that he be detained or that such minor is likely to flee to avoid the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall make its order releasing such minor from custody, [fl] The circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense may be considered, in conjunction with other factors, to determine whether it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or reasonably necessary for the protection of the person or property of another that the minor be detained.” (§ 635.)
The minor and his or her parent or guardian have the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the detention proceedings. (§ 633.) If the minor or the parent or guardian is indigent or cannot otherwise afford an attorney, counsel will be appointed by the court. (§ 634.) In any case in which it appears to the court that there is a conflict of interest between a parent or guardian and the minor, separate counsel may be appointed for the minor and the parent or guardian. (Ibid.)
As is evident from the foregoing summary of the relevant statutory provisions, the determination whether to detain a minor following a warrant-less arrest for criminal activity is a complex one, requiring consideration of various factors personal to the minor and his family situation (§ 628), and the application of several important statutory presumptions favoring the minor’s early release to a parent, guardian or responsible relative (§§ 626, 628, 631, subd. (a)), or, if extended detention is warranted, selection of the detention alternative most “compatible with the best interests of the minor . . . ,” and “which least restricts the minor’s freedom of movement” (§ 626). These presumptions, and the policies they implement, are unique to juvenile detention proceedings and are not implicated when a judicial determination is made whether factual probable cause exists to extend the detention of an adult arrestee.
Bearing these distinctions in mind, we turn next to the opinions in Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854], Schall, supra, 467 U.S. 253 [81 L.Ed.2d 207, 104 S.Ct. 2403], McLaughlin, supra, 500 *1223U.S. 44, and, most recently, Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S__[123 L.Ed.2d 1,113 S.Ct. 1439] (hereafter Flores), to see if those decisions will support an inference that the high court intended the strict 48-hour rule announced in Mclaughin to apply in juvenile detention proceedings.
C. Applicability of McLaughlin’s 48-Hour Rule to Juvenile Detention Proceedings
In Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional Florida procedures under which persons arrested without a warrant could be kept in police custody for 30 days or more without a probable cause determination. The court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of “probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime” as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest. (Id., at pp. 114, 120 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 65, 69].)
In McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44, the court reiterated some of the competing policy concerns underlying its earlier holding in Gerstein:
“In reaching this conclusion we attempted to reconcile important competing interests. On the one hand, States have a strong interest in protecting public safety by taking into custody those persons who are reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal activity, even where there has been no prior opportunity for a prior judicial determination of probable cause. 420 U.S., at 112 [43 L.Ed.2d at page 64]. On the other hand, prolonged detention based on incorrect or unfounded suspicion may unjustly ‘imperil [a] suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.’ Id., at 114 [43 L.Ed.2d at page 65]. We sought to balance these competing concerns by holding that States ‘must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.’ Id., at 125 [43 L.Ed.2d at pages 71-72] (emphasis added).
“[We] thus established a ‘practical compromise’ between the rights of individuals and the realities of law enforcement. Id., at 113 [43 L.Ed.2d at page 65]. Under Gerstein, warrantless arrests are permitted but persons arrested without a warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause. Id., at 114 [43 L.Ed.2d at page 65]. Significantly, the Court stopped short of holding that *1224jurisdictions were constitutionally compelled to provide a probable cause hearing immediately upon taking a suspect into custody and completing booking procedures. We acknowledged the burden that proliferation of pretrial proceedings places on the criminal justice system and recognized that the interests of everyone involved, including those persons who are arrested, might be disserved by introducing further procedural complexity into an already intricate system. Id., at 119-123 [43 L.Ed.2d at pages 68-71], Accordingly, we left it to the individual States to integrate prompt probable cause determinations into their differing systems of pretrial procedures. Id., at 123-124 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 70-71].” (McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 53 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 60-61, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1668].)
In Gerstein, the court explained that the Fourth Amendment does not require that the arrestee be afforded the “full panoply of adversary safeguards—counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses” in connection with a judicial determination of probable cause. (Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 119 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 68].) The court delineated the scope of that determination as follows: “The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. . . . The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard—probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime— traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony . . . .” (Id., at p. 120 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 69], fn. omitted.)
In contrast, the constitutional parameters of juvenile detentions were directly at issue in Schall, supra, 467 U.S. 253, a case decided nine years after Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103. In Schall, the court found the juvenile “preventive detention" provisions of the New York Family Court Act facially valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The New York statute authorized the detention of a juvenile arrested for the commission of a crime when there is a “serious risk” the juvenile “may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 255 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 211], fn. omitted.)
Whereas the sole issue in Gerstein was whether there was factual probable cause to detain the adult arrestee pending further proceedings—i.e., the same standard as that for arrest: “probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime” (Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 120 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 69])—Schall makes it abundantly clear that, where juvenile detentions are concerned, such a factual probable cause determination is but one component of the broader inquiry implicated in the determination whether to extend the *1225pretrial detention of a juvenile arrested without a warrant for criminal activity.
In Schall, three juveniles were detained for more than six days before being afforded a “probable cause” hearing—the functional equivalent of a “detention hearing”—pursuant to the provisions of the New York Family Court Act. (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 257-260 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 212-214].) The juveniles were brought before the family court for an “initial appearance” within one day following their arrests. (Ibid.) Under New York law, at the “initial appearance” the family court judge makes a preliminary determination as to the jurisdiction of the court, appoints counsel, and advises the minor of his or her rights. (Id.., at pp. 257-258, fn. 5 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 212-213].) If the family court is not in session, the “initial appearance” must be conducted “within 72 hours or the next day the court is in session, whichever is sooner.” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 257-258, fn. 5 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 212-213], refering to the New York Family Court Act, § 307.3(4).)
The high court first explained in Schall: “There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 538-539, 87 S.Ct. 1428] (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles. See id., at 31-57 [18 L.Ed.2d at pages 548-563] (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068] (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 [44 L.Ed.2d 346, 95 S.Ct. 1779] (1975) (double jeopardy). But the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 [29 L.Ed.2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976] (1971) (no right to jury trial). The State has ‘a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,’ Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 [71 L.Ed.2d 599, 615, 102 S.Ct. 1388] (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance—to respect the ‘informality’ and ‘flexibility’ that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship, supra, at 366 [25 L.Ed.2d at page 377], and yet to ensure that such proceedings comport with the ‘fundamental fairness’ demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones, supra, at 531 [44 L.Ed.2d at page 356]; McKeiver, supra, at 543 [29 L.Ed.2d at pages 659-660] (plurality opinion).” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 263 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 216].)
The court in Schall did initially indicate, in a footnote to its opinion, that the propriety of any detention “prior to a juvenile’s initial appearance in Family Court” was not directly at issue in that case. (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. *1226at pp. 257-258, fn. 5 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 212-213].) This was so because the petitioners had been afforded an “initial appearance,” and therefore were not directly challenging the period of detention from arrest until their first appearance in court. But one must read on in Schall, for the high court had elected to decide the class members’ facial challenge to the constitutionality of the New York juvenile preventive detention statute even though petitioners’ individual cases were moot due to their release from custody. (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 256, fn. 3 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 212].) The court then went on to consider the “initial appearance” requirement along with the other procedural components of the statutory juvenile detention scheme. Acknowledging that the “initial appearance” could be adjourned for up to 72 hours, and that “the Family Court judge is not required to make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance,”3 the court nevertheless concluded that the lack of a requirement that factual probable cause be determined at the “initial appearance” “[did] not, under the circumstances, amount to a deprivation of due process.” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 275-276, and fn. 27 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 224-225].)
The high court went on to explain that New York’s preventive detention statute served the dual legitimate state objectives of protecting both society and the juvenile from the hazards of further criminal activity, by undertaking enforcement of the criminal law for the sake and protection of the community generally, while also serving as parens patriae for the benefit of the minor-detainee. (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 264-274 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 216-224].) The court ultimately concluded the procedural protections afforded postarrest juvenile detainees under the New York statute satisfied the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and found the statutory scheme facially valid. (Ibid.)
For purposes of responding to petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim in this case, it is important to note that the high court in Schall, in scrutinizing the constitutional claims of the class members therein, examined all the procedural components of New York’s statutory scheme—the “initial appearance” requirement (for appointment of counsel and advisement of rights); the formal “probable cause” hearing that followed 72 hours thereafter (analogous to our “detention hearing”); and the “factfinding hearing”* (analogous to our “jurisdictional hearing”)—and concluded that, taken together, they comprised “[such] flexible procedures [as] have been found constitutionally adequate under the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh-[supra, 420 U.S. 103], and under the Due Process Clause, see Kent v. United *1227States [(1966) 383 U.S. 541], at 557 [16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95, 86 S.Ct. 1045].” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 277 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 225], italics added.)4
Seven years after Schall was decided, the high court decided McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44. The court set out in McLaughlin to further define the “promptness” requirement for making the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination required under Gerstein. The court concluded: “[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” (McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 56 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 63, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1670].)
Unlike Schall, the facts in McLaughlin did not present the court with an opportunity to reach or discuss the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement in the specific context of juvenile detention proceedings. Critically, the court had no occasion in McLaughlin to consider the fundamental necessity, in the administration of juvenile criminal justice systems, to “strike a balance . . . respecting] the ‘informality’ and ‘flexibility’ that characterize juvenile proceedings [citation] . . . [while ensuring] that such proceedings comport with the ‘fundamental fairness’ demanded by the Due Process Clause. [Citations.].” (Schall, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 263 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 216].)
Most recently, however, the high court had the opportunity, in a post-McLaughlin case, to reaffirm some of the constitutional principles found relevant to juvenile detentions in Schall. In Flores, supra, 507 U.S._[123 L.Ed.2d 1], a class of alien juveniles who had been arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereafter INS) on suspicion of being deportable were detained pending deportation hearings pursuant to a regulation (8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1992)) providing for the release of detained minors only to their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians, except in unusual and compelling circumstances. Pursuant to a consent decree entered into in the litigation, juveniles who were not released under the regulation’s provisions had to be placed in juvenile care facilities that met or exceeded state licensing requirements for the provision of such services to dependent *1228children. The juvenile class members in Flores contended they had a right under the federal Constitution and immigration laws to be routinely released into the custody of other “responsible adults.”
Relying on principles reiterated in its earlier opinions in Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 [71 L.Ed.2d 599, 102 S.Ct. 1388] and Schall, supra, 467 U.S. 253, the court reaffirmed that the state’s parens patriae interest in “preserving and promoting the welfare of the child” (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 766 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 615]) renders juvenile proceedings fundamentally different from adult criminal proceedings. The court once again emphasized that “ ‘juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody,’ Schall, supra, [467 U.S.] at 265, and where the custody of the parent or legal guardian fails, the government may (indeed, we have said must) either exercise custody itself or appoint someone else to do so. Ibid.” (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at p._[123 L.Ed.2d at p. 17], italics in original.)
The high court in Flores therefore rejected the respondent class members’ “procedural due process” claim under the Fifth Amendment.5 :The court’s conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the INS juvenile detention procedures under scruntiny in that case bear repeating here, for they reinforce our conclusion that the high court’s analysis that gave rise to the strict 48-hour rule announced in McLaughlin does not, in isolation, adequately address all of the constitutional concerns that arise in juvenile postarrest detention cases.
The court in Flores explained that the deportation process ordinarily begins with a warrantless arrest by an INS officer who has reason to believe that the arrestee is in the United States in violation of an immigration law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at p._[123 L.Ed.2d at p. 20].) Arrested aliens are almost always offered the choice of departing the country voluntarily, and the great majority apparently take that course. By statute, however, before the INS can seek execution of a voluntary departure form by a juvenile arrestee, the juvenile must communicate with either a parent, adult relative, or friend, or with an organization found on the free legal services list. If the juvenile does not seek voluntary departure, the relevant statutes require that he or she be brought before an INS examining officer within 24 hours of his or her arrest. *1229The “examining officer” must be someone other than the arresting officer, but is still a staff member of the INS’s enforcement division, and is not a judge or magistrate. If the examiner finds prima facie evidence that the arrested alien is illegally in the United States, a formal deportation hearing is initiated through the issuance of an order to show cause, and within 24 hours the decision is made whether to continue the alien juvenile in custody or to release him. (Ibid.)
The INS must notify the alien juvenile of the commencement of a deportation proceeding, and of the decision as to custody, by serving a written form notice in English and Spanish. The front of the form notifies the alien of the allegations against him or her and the date of his or her deportation hearing. The back contains a section entitled “Notice of Custody Determination,” in which the INS officer checks a box indicating whether the alien will be detained in the custody of the INS, released on his or her own recognizance, or released under bond. The form also advises the alien that he or she may request the “Immigration Judge” to redetermine the custody decision. The “Immigration Judge” is a quasi-judicial officer in the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a division “separated” from the INS enforcement staff. The alien juvenile must check one of two boxes, indicating he or she does or does not seek such review, and sign and date the form. If the alien requests a hearing before the “Immigration Judge” and is dissatisfied with the outcome, he or she may obtain further review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, and by the federal courts. (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at pp. [123 L.Ed.2d at pp. 20-21].)
The high court in Flores rejected the conclusion of the United States District Court and the in bank Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the INS procedures are flawed because they do not provide for automatic review by an “Immigration Judge” of the initial deportability and custody determinations. The court explained: “At least insofar as this facial challenge is concerned, due process is satisfied by giving the detained alien juveniles the right to a hearing before an immigration judge.” (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at p._[123 L.Ed.2d at p. 21], italics in original.) The court further rejected respondents’ contention that the regulations were infirm because they failed to set forth a time period within which the hearing before the “Immigration Judge,” when requested, must be held. (Ibid.)
In rejecting respondents’ further claim that “the regulation is an abuse of discretion because it permits the INS, once having determined that an alien juvenile lacks an available relative or legal guardian, to hold the juvenile indefinitely,” the court explained: “That is not so. The period of custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation hearing, which must be concluded with ‘reasonable dispatch’ to avoid habeas corpus. 8 U.S.C. *1230§ 1252(a)(1); cf. [United States v. Salerno], 481 U.S. 739, 747 [95 L.Ed.2d 697, 708-709] (1987) (noting time limits placed on pretrial detention by the Speedy Trial Act). It is expected that alien juveniles will remain in INS custody an average of only 30 days [under the terms of the consent decree] .... There is no evidence that alien juveniles are being held for undue periods pursuant to regulation 242.24 [8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1992)], or that habeas corpus is insufficient to remedy particular abuses.” (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at p. _ [123 L.Ed.2d at pp. 24-25], fn. omitted.)
The court concluded in Flores'. “We think the INS policy now in place is a reasonable response to the difficult problems presented when the Service arrests unaccompanied alien juveniles. It may well be that other policies would be even better, but ‘we are [not] a legislature charged with formulating public policy.’ Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 281 [81 L.Ed.2d at page 228]. On its face, INS regulation 242.24 accords with both the Constitution and the relevant statute.” (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at p__[123 L.Ed.2d at p. 25].)
We recognize, of course, that the holding in Flores is of limited precedential value here, since that case arose under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (but see ante, at p. 1228, fn. 4), involved a class of deportable juvenile aliens who may not have enjoyed the same Fourth Amendment rights as juvenile citizens (see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) 494 U.S. 259, 265-275 [108 L.Ed.2d 222, 233-239, 110 S.Ct. 1056]), and involved the interpretation of immigration statutes as well as the terms of a consent decree. We nonetheless believe that the underpinnings of the high court’s constitutional analysis in Flores, supra, 507 U.S__[123 L.Ed.2d 1], and its express reliance in that case on several of the basic principles pertaining to juvenile detentions discussed in Schall, supra, 467 U.S. 253, reinforce our conclusion that, in the context of juvenile detention proceedings, the high court would not today find rigid application of the 48-hour rule of McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44, compelled under a strict application of Fourth Amendment principles.
We emphasize that we do not today suggest a juvenile arrestee facing postarrest detention has no Fourth Amendment liberty interest in a prompt determination of the legal cause for his or her extended detention. The Fourth Amendment principles at the core of the holding in Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103, apply to juveniles as well as adults. The high court expressly reaffirmed as much eight years ago in Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at pages 264, 276-277, and fn. 27 [81 L.Ed.2d at pages 217, 224-225], Indeed, although the court in Schall twice characterized its earlier holding in Gerstein to be “that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to any *1231extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime” (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 274-275 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 224], italics added), we think that such characterization cannot, in reason or fairness, be understood as an attempt by the court to limit the fundamental principles announced in Gerstein solely to adult detentions. The court subsequently made it clear in Schall that children have a protected liberty interest in “freedom from institutional restraints.” (Id., at p. 265 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 217]; see In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 27 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 545-546, 87 S.Ct. 1428].)
California’s postarrest juvenile detention statutes are plainly designed to protect the arrested minor’s Fourth Amendment rights. The arresting officer must, within 24 hours of the arrest, prepare a written summary of the probable cause for taking the minor into temporary custody. (§ 626, subd. (d).) In contrast to adult criminal proceedings, the statutory presumptions require “immediate release” of the minor to the custody of his or her parents or legal guardian unless specific factors warranting extended detention are found to exist. (§ 628.) Even when such factors supportive of further detention are found to exist, the juvenile arrestee must nonetheless be released within 48 hours unless a wardship petition is filed within that initial 48-hour period. (§ 631, subd. (a).) And, if a wardship petition is filed, a formal, adversarial detention hearing, which incorporates a probable cause determination, and at which counsel is provided for both the minor and his parents or guardian, must be conducted “as soon as possible but in any event [no later than] the expiration of the next judicial day after a petition to declare the minor a ward . . . has been filed” (i.e., no later than 72 hours after arrest, excluding “nonjudicial days”). (§ 632, subd. (a).) At that detention hearing, the juvenile court will consider “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense” in determining whether extended pretrial detention is warranted under all the facts and circumstances. (§ 635.)
In light of the foregoing, we therefore conclude that the United States Supreme Court’s adoption of the strict 48-hour rule in McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44, was neither foreseen nor intended by that court to be rigidly operable in juvenile postarrest detention proceedings. Given the fundamental differences between juvenile and adult detention proceedings recognized in a long line of that court’s decisions, we will not infer otherwise, absent an express and definitive ruling from the high court to the contrary.
As has been shown, our Legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme governing postarrest juvenile detention that is designed to implement specific policies and procedures deemed to be in the juvenile detainees’ best interests, while balancing their fundamental constitutional rights against the well-recognized need for “informality” and “flexibility” in juvenile criminal justice systems. (Schall, supra, 467 U.S. at p. *1232263 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 216].) Our juvenile courts, of course, are duty bound to comply with both constitutional and statutory requirements. Having examined the integrated components of California’s juvenile detention statutes, we conclude that the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court’s pertinent decisions reviewed herein, requires no more than that juvenile arrestees be afforded a judicial determination of “probable cause” for any postarrest detention extending beyond the 72-hour period immediately following a warrantless arrest.
 In light of these conclusions, it follows that the formal detention hearing provided for in section 632, subdivision (a), may also serve to fulfill the constitutional requirement when the court at such a hearing, where it is held within 72 hours of the juvenile’s arrest, makes a determination that sufficient probable cause exists for the extended postarrest detention of the juvenile. Consistent with our analysis and conclusions herein, if the 72-hour period immediately following arrest includes one or more “nonjudicial days,” such that the juvenile court is unable or unwilling to provide a full statutory detention hearing within that period, then the Constitution independently requires that the juvenile be afforded a separate, timely judicial determination of probable cause for any extended period of detention beyond the 72 hours following arrest.6
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
Panelli, J., and Baxter, J., concurred.

We filed our initial opinion in this case on May 4, 1993. Although neither party petitioned for a rehearing, we ordered a rehearing on the court’s own motion in order to clarify the operative effect of our holding on “detention hearings” which are mandated under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 632, subdivision (a). All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.

Section 602 provides, in pertinent part: “Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state . . . , is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.”
Section 625 provides, in relevant part: “A peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor: [¶] (a) Who is under the age of 18 years when such officer has reasonable cause for believing that such minor is a person described in Section . . . 602

At the “initial appearance,” the juvenile was entitled to challenge the sufficiency of the delinquency petition, thereby raising the issue of probable cause. (Schall, supra, at pp. 275-276 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 224-225].) This fact, however, does not appear essential to Schall’s analysis. The Schall majority emphasized that postponement of a probable-cause determination until the formal, adversarial probable-cause hearing did not offend due process. Moreover, as noted, the Schall majority expressed no concern that the “initial appearance” could itself be postponed for up to 72 hours after the juvenile’s arrest.

This court has likewise observed that in the context of juvenile wardship proceedings, a minor’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches, seizures and arrests derives not only from the guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, but also from the minor’s constitutional rights to privacy, and the guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. (See, e.g„ In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 557 [221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 709 P.2d 1287], and cases cited; Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 149 [81 Cal.Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485].)

The due process claim in Flores arose under the Fifth Amendment because aliens have a right to due process of law at deportation proceedings under the Fifth Amendment. (Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at p__[123 L.Ed.2d at pp. 19-20]; see The Japanese Immigrant Case (1903) 189 U.S. 86, 100-101 [47 L.Ed. 721, 725-726, 23 S.Ct. 611].) The discussion of Fifth Amendment procedural due process in Flores is functionally analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process discussed in Schall.

We note further that, in 1992, the Legislature added subdivision (c) to Code of Civil Procedure section 134, which specifically provides: “In any superior, municipal, or justice court, one or more departments of the court may remain open and in session for the transaction of any business which may come before the department in the exercise of the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the court, or both, on a judicial holiday or at any hours of the day or night, or both, as the judges of the court prescribe.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 460, § 2.)