Court Opinion

ID: 9915424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:07:46.136964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:00.485301
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0367-22

SIRIA HERNANDEZ and FELIX
PEREYRA, her husband,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LA FORTALEZA, INC., 1

          Defendant-Respondent,

and

JAMES ZANAKIS, GHI
CORPORATION, and GHI INC.,

     Defendants.
_______________________________

                   Submitted November 14, 2023 – Decided January 5, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2877-19.

1
  We note defendant-respondent is identified in the record as both La Fortaleza,
INC. and La Fortaleza Restaurant, INC.
             McHugh and Imbornone, PA, attorneys for appellants
             (Salvatore Imbornone, Jr., on the brief).

             Kenneth Lowell Rose, attorneys for respondent
             (Kenneth L. Rose, of counsel and on the brief; Jeffrey
             M. Zajac, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiffs Siria Hernandez (Hernandez) and Felix Pereyra (Pereyra), her

husband, appeal from a September 26, 2022 order dismissing with prejudice

their complaint, and an October 17, 2022 order awarding defendant La

Fortaleza, Inc.'s attorney's fees and costs. We affirm.

      We glean the facts and procedural history from the trial and motion

records. Hernandez alleges that she "was caused to slip and fall on an uneven

and raised defect [of] the walking surface" on defendant's property. The matter

proceeded to a virtual trial, with the issue of defendant's liability to be tried first.

      The trial began on July 26, 2022. In discussing some of the mechanics of

the virtual trial, the attorneys and the trial judge reviewed where witnesses could

be seated and the presentation of exhibits. Hernandez' attorney stated "she

w[ould] be the first witness and [he] w[ould] not talk to her about her testimony

at any time during the testimony, even if [they] br[oke] for lunch."

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      Hernandez was summoned as the first witness. The trial judge explained

to her "you must be alone in the room from where you provide your testimony,

except the co-plaintiff, your husband may also be in the room."

      During Hernandez' direct testimony, her attorney showed a photograph of

the restaurant and "the area where the fall occurred." The following exchange

transpired:

              Attorney: Now, do you see the area where you fell?

              Hernandez: Yes. On my way to the bench, on my way
              over there.

              Attorney: And where - - where did you fall in
              comparison to where the lady in red is standing?

              Hernandez: It was more or less on my way - - on my
              way to the bench, around there, right there.

              Attorney: Now, are you able, Ms. Hernandez, to use
              the cursor on your computer to point to the area where
              you fell?

              Hernandez: Let me see. Like that, on my way there, I
              tripped on my way there and that's when I fell, on my
              way.

At this point, the trial judge interjected:

              Trial judge: Okay. No one can tell you anything in
              your room. Is anybody speaking to you?

              Hernandez: Give me a second. My husband.

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                   ....

             Trial judge: Okay. I need your husband to stand behind
             you while you're doing this.

             Hernandez: Okay.

             Trial judge: And, Mr. Pereyra, you must remain quiet
             and not say anything or - - we need you to stand back,
             sir. Okay. Somebody is talking in the room that's not
             visible on the screen. Nobody can be telling Ms.
             Hernandez what to do.

Hernandez' attorney explained that Hernandez was having trouble manipulating

the cursor on the screen. Therefore, the court recessed the trial for lunch. The

trial judge instructed Hernandez' attorney to "straighten[] out" issues with the

exhibits and the utilization of the cursor.

      Defense counsel raised an objection asserting "[o]n [the] critical issue of

liability of this nature, no coaching is tolerable, zero coaching." The trial judge

reiterated the point to plaintiffs' attorney:

             Nobody else should be in the room but her husband. I
             made that clear. That was the oath. If anybody else is
             in that room, they must leave. Her husband must be
             visible meaning behind her. He is not to open his
             mouth, do you understand that, until it is his
             opportunity to testify.

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      During the recess the following conversation between Hernandez,

Pereyra, and their attorney was recorded2:

            [Attorney]: This is the important part of the case. You
            show this picture, okay? Okay? and I'm going to say,
            I don't know if we got this far already but do you
            recognize this picture? Yes. This side of the
            restaurant? Does it show – does it fairly and accurately
            show the way the restaurant looked on the day that you
            fell? Yes. You must say that or the picture cannot be
            good. Okay? So, I want you – and the answer has to
            be, yes, because if you say, no, we can't do it. But you
            will say the same thing, I'm going to ask you the same
            question later.

            Anyway, okay. Do you see – do you see the bench that
            you were going to at the time you fell? You're going to
            answer, yes, right. And I will say to you, I'm going to
            move the cursor – and I will say I'm going to move the
            cursor. You tell me where is the bench? So, when I get
            up here, just, right there. Okay? The bench, right next
            to the lady. Okay? Okay.

            Now in this picture, do you see where you fell and I'm
            going to put it right where the – where the bench – from
            where the bench it, where did you fall?

            I will move the map. It's out of the (indiscernible). So,
            after we identify the bench, I'm going to put the [cursor]
            right here now and say, do you see the area where you
            fell? Yes. Okay. Now, how do I have to move the –
            you – because it has to be her voice. How do I move

2
  The judge explained "Courtsmart . . . was not running . . . . [h]owever because
judiciary staff was in the courtroom, the[] back-up recording system . . . [was]
running . . . . [and] record[ed] the dialogue between [p]laintiff[s'] . . . trial
counsel . . . and [p]laintiffs."
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the cursor to find the place where you fell? So you
should - -

Pereyra: Back.

[Attorney]: Okay. So, down, right, like that?

[Attorney]: So, you say, move down. So, I'm going to
move it, move it, move it. You have to tell me when to
stop. Right there, right? Okay. How about this
distance from the curb? Would it be right this way or
further here? It would be in the middle?

Pereyra: Yeah.

[Attorney]: Okay. So, we're going to – first we find
the bench. That's the easy part. Then I'm going to say,
okay, I'm going to put the cursor right in front of the
bench. Now, tell me how to move the cursor to show
how you fell and what you would have to say, you have
to move – you could either say down or to the camera,
okay, which you prefer.

(Plaintiffs speaking in Spanish).

[Attorney]: Okay. So, you're saying down? So, I'll
say, okay, I'm going to start to move it down and tell
me when to stop. I'm going to go down, down, down,
down, down.

Hernandez: Stop.

[Attorney]: Okay. How about this way now, from
curb?

(Plaintiffs speaking Spanish).

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                           6
             [Attorney]: Well, here or further? Right in the middle?
             Okay. Good.

             Pereyra: You don't have to say exactly in the middle.
             When we move it like this, you say, stop. Stop right
             there like this here. It doesn't have to go exactly in the
             middle –

             [Attorney]: Okay.

             Pereyra: -- because the middle, how come she
             (indiscernible) exactly in the middle. She don't know

After the recess, the trial judge reiterated her instructions that Pereyra "remain

behind [Hernandez] in a chair" and "he should not be opening his mouth to say

anything."

      Defense counsel "continu[ed the] objection about coaching." Further,

defense counsel advised that plaintiffs' attorney's microphone was on during

recess and he "listened to [plaintiff's attorney] coaching the witness with the

witness' husband." Defense counsel requested a mistrial.

      In response to the trial judge's question regarding whether "there was any

additional coaching to the witness" "during the . . . break," plaintiffs' attorney

stated that he "did show the witness the scenario of moving the cursor along the

exhibit."

      The trial judge polled the jurors, to make certain they had not overheard

the recess conversation. The judge concluded the "jury itself was not tainted."

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          The parties returned to virtual court the following day. Defense counsel

renewed his request for a mistrial or, alternatively, a dismissal of plaintiffs'

complaint with prejudice. The trial judge, after listening to the recording, found:

(1) plaintiffs and their counsel had already been warned against coaching; (2)

she "had to direct plaintiffs not to offer each other advice or direct each other

how to answer"; (3) she "had to direct th[e] litigants to sit together on screen

so[] as to remove any resemblance of impropriety"; and (4) plaintiffs' attorney

"exacerbated the concerns of coaching by sharing his screen unmuted during a

recess and revealing conversations . . . to be coaching the witnesses, to direct as

to where the slip and fall occurred in the liability only portion of a bifurcated

trial."

          The trial judge concluded that she was compelled to declare a mistrial.

She determined a mistrial was necessary because Hernandez was in the middle

of her testimony and there was a "possibility of taint as to a critical issue in a

liability only bifurcated trial—where . . . Hernandez fell." Moreover, "[t]he

prejudicial effect in this circumstance [wa]s far too great and balance weigh[ed]

too heavy in [the] misadministration [of] justice, that there [wa]s nothing that

c[ould] be done other than to order a mistrial . . . ."

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      The trial judge ordered "[p]laintiffs and/or their [c]ounsel . . . to reimburse

the [c]ourt for the costs of the interpreter and court services, which is the

transcription . . . ." Further, the judge permitted defendant to file a "motion for

dismissal with prejudice . . . . due to the issues of fundamental prejudice . . . ."

      On September 23, 2023, the judge heard the parties' arguments on

defendant's motion for dismissal with prejudice. As part of her review, she noted

that her court clerk and two bilingual paralegals from defense counsel's office

heard the recess conversation. Therefore, in addition to the transcript of the

conversation, she considered the that "the court clerk confirmed that [plaintiffs'

attorney] was attempting to facilitate a response to generate a factual possibility

of liability."   Moreover, she noted one of the paralegals certified that

"Hernandez state[d] that she thought she tripped by the bench when shown a

photo by [plaintiffs' attorney] pointing out where she fell." Further, the other

paralegal certified that she "heard [Hernandez] state that it had been so long she

didn't remember where she fell, which had not been interpreted by the court

supplied interpreter."

      In considering plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss, the judge

noted plaintiffs did not rebut the paralegals' statements. Further, plaintiffs'

argument that "it was clear from [Hernandez'] deposition testimony and her

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                                         9
meeting with the expert that she was aware of the location of her fall" was

unavailing because Hernandez testified that she "did not go to where the incident

happened with the expert."

      On September 26, 2023, the judge entered an order dismissing plaintiffs'

complaint with prejudice; accompanied by a thoughtful and well-reasoned

written opinion. The judge explained:

            The record before this court is unambiguous, and this
            court finds cause to dismiss this action with prejudice.
            The conduct of the attorney here to invite a client to
            state that an accident occurred in a particular place
            when she had no independent recollection to resolve the
            issues of liability where she was the only witness to the
            fall itself introduces prejudice too great to present to the
            finder of fact. The well of information that could be
            presented to the jury has been forever poisoned. There
            is no way to sufficiently determine that [p]laintiff can
            testify, especially considering that [p]laintiff had no
            recollection of her own fall and her attorney invited her
            to perpetuate a falsity at his direction to create an issue
            of liability.

            Moreover, [p]laintiff and her counsel, as well as
            [p]laintiff's husband, had previously been corrected to
            refrain from coaching this witness during testimony.
            This court saw it appropriate at that juncture to provide
            a limiting instruction and then to direct [p]laintiff and
            her counsel that further coaching would not be
            tolerated. The directive from her trial attorney was
            clear: "this is where you fell." The directive was not
            for [p]laintiff to testify as to "where you know that you
            fell or answer that you do not know." The directive was
            to create a falsity and commit fraud on this court. Such

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                                       10
             is not tolerable.        The bell cannot be unrung;
             [p]laintiff[s'] testimony will be forever tainted by the
             directive of [p]laintiff[s'] trial counsel.

The judge required "[p]laintiff[s]' counsel to pay [defendant's] attorney's fees

and costs associated with trial and th[e] motion of [d]efendant." The judge

instructed defendant's attorney "to submit an affidavit of attorney's fees within

[fourteen] days and permitted [p]laintiff[s]' trial counsel . . . to file an objection

to the affidavit within [ten] days after its filing." Defense counsel filed an

affidavit in support of attorney's fees, which plaintiffs did not oppose.

Therefore, on October 17, 2022, the judge ordered plaintiffs' attorney to pay

defense counsel the sum of $20,640 within thirty days. 3

      Here, Hernandez argues the trial judge erred in the exercise of her

discretion because: (1) there was no fraud on the court and (2) the sanction of

dismissal is "too severe." We disagree.

      "Findings by [a] trial judge are considered binding on appeal when

supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort,

Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Therefore,

             our appellate function is a limited one: we do not
             disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
             trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so

3
  On May 4, 2023, we ordered a stay of the payment of attorney's fees pending
appeal. Plaintiff posted a supersedeas bond in accordance with Rule 2:9-5.
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                                         11
            manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
            competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
            as to offend the interests of justice, and the appellate
            court therefore ponders whether, on the contrary, there
            is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's
            findings and conclusions.

            [Ibid. (internal citations omitted).]

      The concept of fraud on the court applies to "a scheme to interfere with

the judicial machinery performing the task of impartial adjudication, as by

preventing the opposing party from fairly presenting his [or her] case or

defense."   Hyland v. Kirkman, 204 N.J. Super. 345, 374 (Ch. Div. 1985)

(quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.

1976)). "A finding of fraud on the court is justified only by the most egregious

misconduct directed to the court itself, such as . . . fabrication of evidence by

counsel . . . ." Ibid. In Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J.

Super. 237, 251 (App. Div. 2007), we held:

            [a] fraud on the court occurs "where it can be
            demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has
            sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme
            calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability
            impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly
            influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the
            presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense."
            Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st
            Cir. 1989); Perna Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F.Supp.
            388, 397 (D.N.J. 1995). Unlike common law fraud on
            a party, fraud on a court does not require reliance.

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                                       12
            Separate and distinct from court rules and statutes,
            courts possess an inherent power to sanction an
            individual for committing fraud on the court. See e.g.
            Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Perna,
            916 F.Supp. at 388.

      We conclude there is "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence" to

support the judge's finding that plaintiffs and their attorney committed a fraud

on the court. Rova, 65 N.J. at 484. Initially, Pereyra failed to comply with the

judge's instruction on coaching Hernandez.       Ultimately, the judge required

Pereyra to stay in screen view by standing behind Hernandez.            The judge

admonished plaintiffs' attorney that Pereyra "should not be opening his mouth

to say anything."

      Moreover, plaintiffs' attorney, after indicating he would "not talk to

[Hernandez] about her testimony at any time during the testimony, even if we

break for lunch," proceeded "to perpetuate a falsity" by inviting, indeed

directing, Hernandez to create an issue of liability by "stat[ing] that an accident

occurred in a particular place when she had no independent recollection ."

      This conduct "set in motion [an] unconscionable scheme calculated to

interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by

improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the

opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118.

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                                       13
      A dismissal with prejudice is a drastic remedy, to be employed "only

sparingly."    Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253 (1982).         In determining

whether a trial court has abused its discretion4 in dismissing an action with

prejudice, we are guided by the manner in which the trial court has balanced the

following factors:

              (1) the degree of the wrongdoer's culpability; (2) the
              extent of the client's blameworthiness if the wrongful
              conduct is committed by its attorney, recognizing that
              we seldom dismiss claims against blameless clients; (3)
              the prejudice to the judicial process and the
              administration of justice; (4) the prejudice to the
              victim; (5) the availability of other sanctions to rectify
              the wrong by punishing culpable persons,
              compensating harmed persons, and deterring similar
              conduct in the future; and (6) the public interest.

              [United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462
              (4th Cir. 1993)5]

In employing this standard, we find no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision

to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

4
  Abtrax Pharms. v. Elkins-Sinn, 139 N.J. 499, 517 (1995) ("[T]he standard of
review for dismissal of a complaint with prejudice . . . is whether the trial court
abused its discretion, a standard that cautions appellate courts not to interfere
unless an injustice appears to have been done.")
5
  The factors identified in Shaffer were relied upon in Perna which we cited
with approval in Triffin, and thus serve as a useful guide here.
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                                         14
      In determining culpability, the judge described the evidence as

"unambiguous."      She found plaintiffs' attorney provided a directive to

Hernandez, regarding the location of the accident despite Hernandez having "no

independent recollection" of where she fell. Moreover, the attorney's actions

followed the judge's warnings and corrective instruction involving Pereyra's

coaching Hernandez on this same subject.          Plaintiffs' and their attorney's

culpability are firmly established.

      Further, plaintiffs share the blame in the fraud.          Pereyra, despite

instructions from the judge, coached Hernandez during trial and recess regarding

the purported location of her fall. In addition, neither Pereyra nor Hernandez

resisted their attorney's coaching. Instead, they were willing participants in a

scheme to provide false testimony in an ongoing trial.

      Moreover, plaintiffs' and their attorney's actions "prejudice[d] . . . the

judicial process and the administration of justice." Ibid. Prejudice is self-

evident when an attorney directs a client to testify to the location of an accident

when the client has no independent recollection. From that point forward,

Hernandez' every utterance was suspect and her case, the "judicial process," and

"the administration of justice" were "poisoned" and "tainted" as a result.

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                                       15
      Similarly, defendant was prejudiced by the coaching and "falsified"

testimony. From its opening statement, defendant asserted that Hernandez'

testimony was "very inconsistent" and she "did not know where she fell."

Therefore, defendant suffered prejudice as a result of adverse counsel coaching

Hernandez and directing her testimony as to the location of the fall in a liability

only trial when Hernandez had "no independent recollection."

      Under these circumstances, plaintiffs' and their attorney's actions

compelled the judge to impose the ultimate sanction of a dismissal with

prejudice. As the judge explained, "the bell cannot be unrung; [p]laintiff's

testimony will be forever tainted by the directive of [p]laintiff[s]' trial counsel."

We find no monetary sanction or further corrective instructions could remove

the "taint," permeating throughout plaintiffs' claim.

      Plaintiffs' suggestion the "[t]rial [c]ourt could have imposed lesser

sanctions such as barring [Hernandez] from further testifying at trial and

allowing her case to proceed with the testimony of [Pereyra] and [the] expert to

prove liability," is unavailing. Pereyra was already implicated in the fraud, as

he coached Hernandez during trial and during the recess. Also, his testimony

was similarly tainted by his attorney's "directive." Further, Hernandez testified

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                                        16
that she "did not go to where the incident happened with the expert," so the

expert's testimony is similarly untrustworthy.

      Lastly, the public interest is served by a dismissal with prejudice. "A

misrepresentation to a tribunal 'is a most serious breach of ethics because it

affects directly the administration of justice.'" In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428, 437

(1999) (quoting In re Johnson, 102 N.J. 504, 510 (1986)). Therefore, dismissal

warns plaintiffs and their attorney that their behavior will not be tolerated and

that their conduct was so egregious as to cause them to suffer a "drastic

remedy"—the loss of their cause of action. Moreover, it informs other litigants

that they risk dismissal if they commit a fraud on the court. Finally, it confirms

for the public's benefit that the judicial system, while adversarial, requires

truthfulness and candor above all else.      See RPC 3.3 (Candor Toward the

Tribunal). The public is served by nothing less.

      Plaintiffs argue the judge abused her discretion in ordering them to pay

defendant's attorney's fees and costs. We note plaintiffs did not oppose the fee

application and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. "[A]ppellate courts

will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial

court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available . . . ." J.K. v. N.J.

                                                                              A-0367-22
                                        17
State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200

N.J. 1, 20 (2009)).

      Nonetheless, Rule 2:10-2 provides:

             Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the
             appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have
             been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but
             the appellate court may, in the interests of justice,
             notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial
             or appellate court.

"Relief under the plain error rule, R[ule] 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is

discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank,

161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)).

Further, the rule sets "a 'high bar,' requiring reversal only where the possibility

of an injustice is 'real' and 'sufficient . . . .'" State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 527

(2020) (first quoting State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019); and then

quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 326 (1971)).

      Since plaintiffs failed to oppose the application before the trial judge and

failed, here, to address "plain error," we decline to consider their arguments on

the award of defendant's attorney's fees and costs.

      Affirmed.       We hereby vacate our order of May 4, 2023 staying the

payment of the attorney's and costs.

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