Court Opinion

ID: 9796604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:00:41.795575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:40.035809
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.
Because the Wyoming Constitution contains no express provision conferring upon the governor veto power over a proposed constitutional amendment, I would answer the certified question in the negative. The process for amending the Wyoming Constitution is found in article 20 of that document, and nowhere does it require a proposed constitutional amendment be presented to the governor for his approval. Article 4, § 8 delimits the governor's veto power, and that provision includes no veto power over proposed constitutional amendments. Likewise, the legislative article, art. 8 (specifically § 41 of that article), contains no express provision requiring a proposed constitutional amendment be presented to the governor for his approval. For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Two important principles guide the interpretation of the constitution in this case. The first and
primary principle underlying an interpretation of constitutions or statutes is that the intent is the vital part, and the essence of the law. * * * Such intent, however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute or instrument under consideration. * * * If the language employed is plain and unambiguous, there is no room left for construction. It must be presumed that in case of a constitution the people have intended whatever has been plainly expressed. Courts are not at liberty to depart from that meaning which is plainly declared.
Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897)).
The second principle to be observed is that our constitution makes clear that no branch of government may exercise any power unless expressly permitted by the constitution. Article 2 provides:
§ 1. Powers of government divided into three departments.
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
(Emphasis added.) In respect to the separation of powers provision, this Court has rejected the "airtight compartment" approach. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413-15 (Wyo.1990). However, the question presented in this case is not whether one branch of government is infringing on another in an arena where both branches are permitted to act. Id. Instead, the question is whether the governor has any power to act at all, i.e., whether the governor has the power of veto over proposed constitutional amendments.
The first and clearest answer to this question is that Wyoming's Constitution includes a specific provision governing amendments to the constitution, from which submission to the governor is carefully excluded. Article 20, entitled "Amendments," provides in pertinent part:
*525§ 1. How amendments proposed by legislature and submitted to people.
Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this constitution.
Given the principles that guide the interpretation of our constitution, it is important to look at not only what that document says, but also what it does not say. Requirement of presentment of a proposed constitutional amendment to the governor requires that words be read into art. 20 that are not there. Indeed, reading such a requirement into art. 20 is contrary to the words that are there.
The words that are contained in art. 20, § 1 set out a rather simple process for amending the constitution. First, a proposal must be made in either branch of the legislature. Next, a vote is taken in both houses. If two-thirds of the members of both houses agree, the proposed amendment, with the yeas and nays thereon, is entered upon their journals. Publication is the next step, followed by submission to the electors at the next general election. If a majority of the electors ratify the amendment(s), the amendment(s) "shall become a part of thle] constitution." Nowhere in these words is a requirement of presentment expressed. Nor can such a requirement be implied, as if is not the place of this Court to create constitutional powers that are not expressly enunciated. Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1. However, because the other constitutional provisions must be read in pari materia, this does not end the analysis.
Article 4, concerning the executive power, includes a provision expressly delimiting the governor's veto power:
§ 8. Approval or veto of legislation by governor; passage over veto.
Every bill which has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, which shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the members elected, it shall become law; but in all such cases the vote of both houses shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the journal of each house respectively. If any bill is not returned by the governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after its presentation to him, the same shall be a law, unless the legislature by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall be a law, unless he shall file the same with his objections in the office of the secretary of state within fifteen days after such adjournment.
Clearly, nothing in this provision includes a specific veto power over proposed constitutional amendments.
Turning to the legislative article, art. 8, I do not believe the language of § 41 of that article can be tortured to permit, much less require, presentment. That section provides:
§ 41 Resolutions; approval or veto.
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, 'or relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses, shall be presented to the governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case of a bill.
*526Unmistakably, this section contains no express provision requiring "proposed amendments" be presented to the governor. Instead, such a requirement, if there is to be one, must be implied. See Warfield v. Vandiver, 101 Md. 78, 60 A. 538, 541 (1905) ("Unless the express language of the Constitution has unequivocally clothed the Governor with [veto] authority in relation to proposed constitutional amendments, * * * it cannot be borrowed from some other provision pertaining to a wholly different subject.") It is suggested that the amendment process contained in art. 20 includes a "vote," and that process thus falls within the parameters of § 41. However, I am of the opinion that the "vote" provision of § 41 refers to art. 3, § 25, entitled "Vote required to pass bill." Indeed, "bill" is not referred to in § 41, and I believe this interpretation of "vote" found in § 41 is sound and by no means renders that provision superfluous. However, even assuming a proposed amendment falls within the "vote" requirement, the "shall take effect" language found in § 41 separates it from the proposed amendment realm. Section 41 indicates that presentment is required of those votes that, upon the governor's approval, "shall take effect." Clearly, no amendment to the constitution takes effect until it is approved by a majority of the voting electorate.
After a review of the pertinent provisions, I can discern no clear intent on the part of the framers of the Wyoming Constitution that the governor hold the power of veto over proposed amendments. First, art. 20, the specific article governing amendments to the constitution, does not include a veto provision. In addition, art. 4, § 8, concerning the governor's veto power, does not permit or imply a veto over proposed constitutional amendments. Another clear indication of the framers' intent is that the two-thirds vote requirement found in art. 20, § 1 is the same proportion required to override the governor's veto under art. 3, § 41. For these reasons, after having read the various constitutional provisions in pari materia, I would conclude the framers did not intend that the governor have the power of veto in this instance.
Additional reasons support this conclusion. First, applying § 41 to the amendment process would place a proposed constitutional amendment on the same footing as a bill. However, there is a fundamental structural difference between general legislation, including bills, and the constitutional amendment process. In the case of general legislative action, the legislature proposes laws that are subject to gubernatorial veto. It is, therefore, those two authorities that control general legislative action. By contrast, constitutional amendments, although proposed by the legislature, are subject to the final approval of the electorate of this state. In this way, these two authorities, the legislature and the electorate, work together in amending the constitution. Instead of the governor, the people hold the power of veto over a proposed constitutional amendment. "Whilst the Governor is intrusted with power to protect the people against hasty legislation, he is not given a prerogative to guard them against themselves in the matter of amending the [constitution]. He is not superior to them. It is their will which he must obey; it is not his will which they must subserve." Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 A. at 541.
Application of § 41 of the legislative article should be rejected for another reason. The pertinent cases generally agree that "[the legislature, in taking any steps toward the framing of a constitution, does not act in its legislative capacity." Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140, 145 (1987); Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark,. 515, 241 S.W. 10, 12 (1922); Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1, 3-7 (1912); Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 53, 57 (Me.1970); State ex rel. Wineman v. Dahl, 6 N.D. 81, 68 N.W. 418 (18986). This conclusion is based on the following reasoning:
In submitting propositions for the amendment of the constitution, the legislature is not in the exercise of its legislative power, or of any sovereignity of the people that has been intrusted to it, but is merely acting under a limited power, conferred upon it by the people, and which might with equal propriety have been conferred upon either house, or upon the governor, *527or upon a special commission, or any other body or tribunal.
Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 71 P.2d at 147. The framers of Wyoming's Constitution must have recognized this distinction. Indeed, if the framers had viewed the task of proposing amendments to the constitution as simply another law-making function, they could have placed the amendment provision in the legislative article. However, the framers of our constitution did not do this. They recognized this distinction made a difference and placed the amendment process in a separate article, art. 20. It is this article that should control the outcome of this case, not the legislative article.
Along the same lines, we must not forget that, under our concept of government, sovereignty has its source in and represents a grant from the people who are governed. Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 822-23 (1897) The preamble to the Constitution of the State of Wyoming makes this clear;
We, the people of the State of Wyoming, grateful to God for our civil, political and religious liberties, and desiring to secure them to ourselves and perpetuate them to our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.
In setting out the process for amending the constitution, the people, pursuant to the constitution, have delegated a portion of this duty to the legislature under art. 20. At the same time, however, the people have retained the final power to amend the constitution by popular vote. Because nowhere does the constitution of this state clearly express that the people have delegated to the governor any involvement in the constitutional amendment process, I would not imply such a delegation.
The majority criticizes the case of Hollingsworth v. State of Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, 3 U.S. 378, 1 L.Ed. 644 (1798), while at the same time acknowledging that art. I, § 7 of the United States Constitution is "similar in many respects" to art. 3, § 41 of the Wyoming Constitution. Unlike the majority, I find this similarity significant for two reasons. First, Hollingsworth was decided in 1798. When the framers of the Wyoming Constitution convened over 90 years later, they employed essentially the same language in art. 3, § 41 as that found in the United States Constitution. Under the majority's view, despite use of the same language, the framers of the Wyoming Constitution intended an opposite result than that reached by the United States Supreme Court in Holl-ingsworth. Without clear language so indicating, I cannot agree that this was the framerg' intent. In addition, even assuming Hollingsworth initially stood on shaky ground, it has found solid footing in the opinions of the numerous courts that have followed its reasoning. In fact, the vast majority of courts deciding this issue have reached the conclusion that presentment is not required. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 A. 505, 510 (1900); Warfield v. Vandiver, 101 Md. 78, 60 A. 538, 545 (1905); Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 53, 57-58 (Me.1970); Kalber v. Redfearn, 215 S.C. 224, 54 S.E.2d 791, 796-98 (1949); Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515, 241 S.W. 10, 12-14 (1922); State v. Mason, 9 So. 776, 795-96 (La.1891); People ex rel. Stewart v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 128, 160 P. 1032, 1033 (1916); Collier v. Gray, 116 Fla. 845, 157 So. 40, 45 (1984); State ex rel. Wineman v. Dahl, 6 N.D. 81, 68 N.W. 418, 418-419 (1896).
Finally, it is insisted that great weight should be given to the legislature's longstanding practice of presenting proposed constitutional amendments for approval. However, even a long-continued practice of the legislature cannot have the effect of imposing duties upon the governor beyond those provided by the constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d at 58; Kalber v. Redfearn, 54 S.E.2d at 794-95; Warfield v. Vandiver, 60 A. at 541; see also Campbell County School District v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275 at 1282 (Wyo. 2000) ("If a statute is ambiguous, we will give some deference to an interpretation by the ageney charged with execution of the statute unless its interpretation is clearly erroneous. * * * Even then, however, we are not bound by an agency's interpretation; the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a question for the court.") Regardless, the governor's argument presents a double-*528edged sword. At its core, the argument is that the legislature's interpretation of the constitution, ie, that presentment is required, should be given deference. However, assuming the legislature's decision on presentment should be given deference, should not the same deference be given to the current legislature's decision to forgo presentment? In addition, the fact that the question presently before the Court has never been determined despite three (one in 1941, one in 1947, and Governor Geringer's 1998 veto) previous vetoes of proposed amendments is of little moment; it is not for this Court to investigate the cireumstances and motives surrounding those prior vetoes. Instead, this Court is only concerned with the question of law currently before it, a question I would answer in the negative.
THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I join without reservation in the dissenting opinion authored by the Chief Justice. I have some concerns, in addition to the views there set forth, that I choose to address. Primarily, I am concerned about the advisability of structuring a single person impediment to the control our citizens are entitled to maintain over their constitution. I also wonder how the secretary of state is to comply with mandatory, statutory language, relating to the ratification of an amendment in light of the majority resolution of this question. Furthermore, it seems to me that the majority opinion has ignored an exception articulated in Wyo. Const. art. 3, $ 41, even though the majority opinion essentially relies on that provision of the Constitution to justify its answer to the certified question.
My philosophical premise is that in our country and the State of Wyoming the citizens possess all the attributes of sovereignty. They have chosen to delegate those powers, in part, to both the state and federal governments, and the instruments by which that delegation is accomplished are the constitutions. More than a century ago this Court spoke to that principle in a case in which the intent of the first sentence of Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 9 ("[nlo person shall have the right to vote who shall not be able to read the constitution of this state.") was in issue. In the course of holding that, since the constitution was written in English, this sentence required an elector to have the ability to read it in English, the court said:
The subject-matter of the article in which it appears is "Suffrage." It prescribes the qualifications of electors. In gathering the intent from the language employed in a law covering that subject, there are certain additional rules of construction which should be observed. Statutes which confer or extend the elective franchise should be liberally construed. Suth. St. Const. 441. The voter must, without any undue straining of the language in any direction, come within the terms of the law, and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in his favor. "Such is the fair tendency of our institutions." People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 417. As a reasonable corollary of those principles, we think it should follow that any provision which excludes any class of citizens from the exercise of the elective franchise ought to receive a strict construction, without, however, doing violence to or distorting the language, to the end that none shall be held excluded who are not clearly designated. Such a rule would seem to be the natural and reasonable outgrowth of the fundamental principles of our form of government. The sovereignty resides in the people, although, by written constitutions, they have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to several departments. The people "retain in their own hands a power to control the governments they create as far as they have thought needful to do so; and the three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed, or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon." Cooley, Const. Lim. 598. "Participation in the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a right, and it is granted or denied on grounds of public policy; the prevailing view being that it should be as general as possible consistent with the public safety." Id. 599. The sovereign power residing primarily in all the people, but in fact and practically with those only who possess the *529right of suffrage, it would seem that none who are not clearly embraced in any restriction upon such right should be exelud-ed.
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 132-33, 50 P. 819, 822-23 (1897) (emphasis added).
In my judgment, the majority resolution of this case is antithetical to the retained power of the people to control their government in the mode previously agreed upon. The mode agreed upon in the Wyoming Constitutional. Convention clearly is articulated in Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1:
Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general cireulation, published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this constitution.
No mention is made in this Article of any participation by the Governor, and I cannot conceive that the Constitutional Convention could have intended that the citizens of Wyoming " 'retain in their own hands a power to control the governments they create as far as they have thought needful to do so * * *," and yet at the same time subject that sovereign power to the control of one person. Rasmussen, 50 P. at 822 (quoting Cooley, Const. Lim. 598). That result inverts the understanding that, " 'the three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed, or abolished by them.'" Rasmussen, 50 P. at 822 (quoting Cooley, Const. Lim. 598). Surely, the sovereign rights owned by the people are far too valuable to permit one single person to control the process.
The majority opinion claims that the process that it visualizes does not impose any significant burden on the process for amending the Wyoming Constitution. It is clear to me that the same rationale that the majority applies with respect to Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1 would apply with equal foree to the provisions of Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 3 providing for the legislature to call a constitutional convention. My vision is that politics being politics, a requirement that there be a second vote agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each house in order to override a gubernatorial veto of a proposed amendment probably makes the amendment of the Constitution not simply difficult, but in most instances impossible. I simply refuse to believe that the people, acting through their representatives at the Constitutional Convention, intended to sacrifice so easily their control over their sovereign rights.
The majority result certainly does not acknowledge the mandatory duties imposed upon the secretary of state and other officials with respect to ballot ratification of proposed amendments. For example, pertinent statutes require:
(a) A proposed amendment shall be transmitted to the office of the secretary of state by the house in which it originates or by a constitutional convention. The secretary of state shall letter each proposed amendment serially in the order received from the legislature or convention and shall endorse upon a proposed amendment, a brief statement of the purpose of the amendment. If the bill proposing the amendment provides this statement, it shall be adopted by the secretary of state.
(b) The letter and statement endorsed on a proposed amendment are part of the amendment for purposes of reference in submitting the amendment to the electors and shall constitute the ballot statement of the amendment.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2220-102 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).
The secretary of state shall mail a certified copy of a proposed amendment and statement of its purpose filed in his office to each county clerk not less than sixty (60) days prior to the election at which the *530proposed amendment is submitted to the electors. The county clerk shall immediately post in his office the copy of a proposed amendment and statement of its purpose received from the secretary of state. The copy shall remain posted until after the election at which the amendment is submitted to the vote of the electors.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-103 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).
(a) The secretary of state shall publish each proposed amendment and a notice that it will be submitted to the electors at the next general election, onee a week for at least twelve (12) consecutive weeks prior to the election in a newspaper of general circulation published in each county and, if possible, onee each week for three (8) consecutive weeks within thirty (80) days prior to the election in one (1) other newspaper of general circulation in each county.
(b) The clerk may supplement publication thereof by radio or television broadcasts or both. The broadcasts shall identify the proposed amendment or other question, by letter and statement of purpose as prescribed by law, and shall state the name of the newspaper in which the published notice will appear and the date on which it will appear.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-104 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).
The secretary of state shall print a reasonable number of pamphlets containing every proposed amendment and provide a copy of the pamphlet upon request to any person or organization.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-105 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).
The county clerk shall print on the official nonpartisan general election ballot for the next general election the statement of purpose of each proposed amendment certified to him by the secretary of state.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-107 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added). All of these statutes use the mandatory verb "shall," indicating that no discretion can be exercised with respect to the duties imposed. In Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-101 (Lexis 1999) no mention is made of any participation by the Governor in connection with the requirement that the amendment be transmitted to the secretary of state by the house in which it originated.
In the implementation of the process of ratification by these statutes, which are rather precise, it is strange that the legislature did not provide for the proposed amendment to be transmitted by the Governor to the secretary of state if the constitutional intent is that claimed by the majority opinion. It seems that when these statutes were adopted, there was no perception that the Governor would have a role in the process of the amendment of the constitution, other than the proclamation required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-4107.
Finally, I cannot help but wonder about the exception incorporated in the language of Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 41:
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two Rouses, shall be presented to the governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case of a bill.
(Emphasis added.) I am persuaded that Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1 describes legislative action "relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses * * *." Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 41. This constitutional provision reads:
Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, and cause the same to be published without delay for at least twelve (12) consecutive weeks, prior to said election, in at least one newspaper of general circulation, published in each county, and if a majority *531of the electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this constitution.
Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1 (emphasis added). This language clearly imposes a duty on the legislature to submit the amendment to the electors at the next general election, and its clear meaning is to describe a matter "relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses * * *." Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 41. The mandatory statutes quoted above were adopted to accomplish these duties imposed by the constitution.
I recognize that the majority must prefer the view that the exception found in Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 41 must be read in a limited way to describe the internal operating procedures of the legislature. The language, however, is not clearly so limited, and I see no reason why it could not be applied to the legislative duties set forth in Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1.
For these reasons, in addition to the rationale set forth in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, I would answer the certified question in the negative.