Court Opinion

ID: 9857338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:30:19.809545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:28.231641
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee contends that this court was without jurisdiction to consider appellant’s appeal in this case since the default judgment was rendered on January 8, 1976, and the motion for new trial was not filed until January 27, 1976, more than ten days after judgment and outside of the time prescribed by Rule 329b(l), T.R.C.P. Ap-pellee argues that although the trial court retains jurisdiction over its judgment for 30 days after rendition, that “since a motion for new trial filed late is a nullity, an order *762overruling such a motion presents nothing to appeal from,” citing A. F. Jones & Sons v. Republic Supply Co., 151 Tex. 90, 246 S.W.2d 853, 854, 855 (1952); Ferree’s Band Instrument Tools & Supplies, Inc. v. Claxton, 472 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ); Dean v. Warren, 464 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, no writ); Calk v. Gans & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1976, no writ); Selman v. Ross, 302 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1957, no writ). All of these cases involved the overruling of a motion for new trial following a trial on the merits and not a default judgment as in the present case. The rule in McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961), covers the present situation. In that case Chief Justice Calvert negated the claims of the ap-pellee in this case when he said:
“Our construction of the rule will give a diligent defendant with a meritorious defense every opportunity to protect himself against an unwarranted default judgment. If he is not served with citation and learns of the judgment within 30 days after its rendition, he may file a motion for new trial, which the court is at liberty to grant, and if his motion is overruled he may obtain relief by appeal. ...” 345 S.W.2d 706 at 710. [Emphasis added.]
We believe this case is controlling and appellee’s contention is without merit.
The trial court has plenary power over its judgments during thirty days after rendition of judgment or before a timely filed motion for new trial has been overruled. During the thirty-day period the trial judge retains plenary power and jurisdiction to take whatever action he may deem desirable including the granting of a new trial. Thompson v. Gibbs, 504 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, mandamus conditionally granted); Quintanilla v. Seagraves Ford, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
Moreover, even if appellant did not timely file his motion for new trial, appellant established his case as a proper bill of review under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939), as discussed in our original opinion. The case was treated by both parties before this court as a bill of review, the main point of contention being the elements set out in the Craddock case. It is immaterial how the plaintiff styles his petition if the averments are such as to require its consideration as a bill of review. It is the substance of the petition that will determine whether it is to be treated as a bill of review or merely as a motion for new trial. Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433 (1959); Carnes v. Kay, 210 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1948, no writ); Custer v. McGough, 184 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1944, no writ). We, therefore, hold that even if the motion in question was not timely filed as a motion for new trial, it could be considered as a bill of review and was so considered by the trial court; hence, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal therefrom.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.