Court Opinion

ID: 9353550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 01:47:39.197903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:23.760192
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 16, 2022

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                                          CR-21-0174
                                   _________________________

                                       Deborah R. Tisdale

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

                         Appeal from Covington Circuit Court
                                     (CC-20-312)

MINOR, Judge.

        In this appeal, we consider Deborah Tisdale's arguments (1) that

the circuit court should not have admitted during her trial a statement

she made to law enforcement and (2) that the circuit court lacked

authority to impose a jail sentence on her conviction for failure to bury a
CR-21-0174

dead animal, see § 3-1-28, Ala. Code 1975. We hold that Tisdale did not

preserve the first issue for review and that the circuit court had authority

to impose a jail sentence on Tisdale's conviction.

                 FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Tisdale was convicted in the Covington District Court of two counts

of failure to bury livestock and one count of cruelty to an animal. (C. 47-

48.) She appealed her convictions to the Covington Circuit Court for a

jury trial.

      At trial, the evidence showed that, two days before Christmas in

2019, police responded to Tisdale's home located on Nall Road in

Covington County to conduct a welfare check on Tisdale, who had been

unreachable for several days. Officers smelled a "foul odor emitting from

the residence and the general area," and they obtained a search warrant

for Tisdale's residence. (R. 310, 427.)

      Outside the residence, officers found horses in troubling conditions,

including a black stallion in a cramped trailer and a dead foal in a pen

with its mother. Testimony described the pen as so cramped that the

      1Tisdale does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and thus
only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary.
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mother could not turn around without stepping on her dead foal. (R. 248,

346, 392, 394-95, 467, 489.)

     Officers found a dead white horse that was "bloated" and appeared

to be "sunk down in the mud," which signified that "the horse had been

there for a few days." (R. 246, 259.) The horse was decomposing and was

surrounded by feces. Dr. Lynn Hall, a veterinarian, testified that the

horse appeared to have "been dead for several days because its head and

back and there was a lot of feces behind it, and the head was sunk down

into the ground." (R. 482.)

     Testifying in her own defense, Tisdale stated that she is a medical

doctor and that she rescues animals from "kill pens." (R. 551.) She denied

the allegations against her and stated that the white horse was alive on

the morning of December 23, 2019.

     The jury found Tisdale guilty of one count of failure to bury a dead

animal (white mare) and acquitted her of the other two charges. (C. 112;

R. 699-700.)     The circuit court sentenced Tisdale to 90 days'

imprisonment but suspended that sentence and placed Tisdale on 2

years' unsupervised probation. The circuit court also ordered Tisdale to

pay a $50 fine, court costs, and a bail-bond fee.

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                   I. MIRANDA RIGHTS VIOLATION

      Tisdale argues that "her rights were violated by the introduction of

a recorded statement in which she had clearly invoked her right to

counsel after having been given her Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966),] rights." (Tisdale's brief, p. 1.) In her statement, Tisdale stated

that the horse died "[t]he night before last," (R. 319), and that the

recorded statement was "cumulative" and prejudicial. (Tisdale's brief, p.

6.)

      At first, Tisdale objected only to the circuit court's admission of her

recorded statement that occurred after she had been Mirandized. (R. 622-

23.) Later, Tisdale objected to the statement "all together" and argued

that "the whole reason for Miranda is to prevent statements like this from

coming in when a person is asking for an attorney." (R. 626.) Tisdale then

argued that "[i]f the Court decides to let it in, … but I think that we are

okay with it starting here and just playing from 000 to 6:42." (R. 626-27.)

The circuit court admitted the statement. 2 Later, Tisdale argued: "We

think that it needs to be played from the beginning. In fact, the more we

      2In
        denying Tisdale's objection, the circuit court held that Tisdale's
statement was "spontaneously" made. (R. 629.)
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CR-21-0174

talk the more that I am leaning towards asking for the Doctrine of

Completeness and playing the whole thing." (R. 634.) Finally, Tisdale

argued that "we would ask for the Doctrine of Completeness and play it

all." (R. 639.) Tisdale's entire recorded statement was played for the jury.

     The record shows that Tisdale abandoned her objection to the

admission of the statement and asked for the statement to be admitted

in its entirety. Thus, Tisdale preserved nothing for our review. Tisdale

also cannot now argue the exact opposite—that the circuit court erred by

admitting Tisdale's recorded statement. See Robitaille v. State, 971 So.

2d 43, 59 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (" 'Under the doctrine of invited error, a

defendant cannot by his own voluntary conduct invite error and then seek

to profit thereby.' " (quoting Phillips v. State, 527 So. 2d 154, 156 (Ala.

1988))). Thus, because Tisdale withdrew her objection and asked for the

entire statement to be played, Tisdale is due no relief.

                   II. UNAUTHORIZED SENTENCE

     Tisdale argues that her "suspended jail sentence … was not

authorized." (Tisdale's brief, p. 1.) Tisdale asserts that the only

punishment that the court could impose is a $50 fine under § 3-1-28, Ala.

Code 1975:

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     "All owners or custodians of animals which die or are killed in
     their possession or custody, other than such as are
     slaughtered for food, within 24 hours shall cause the bodies of
     such animals to be burned or buried at least two feet below
     the surface of the ground. Hogs dying from cholera or any
     other disease whatsoever shall be burned. No such animal
     shall be burned or buried sufficiently near a residence or
     residences as to create a nuisance. Any person violating this
     section, whether by failure to burn or bury an animal dying or
     being killed in his possession or by causing the same to be
     burned in such proximity to a dwelling or in such other way
     as to become a nuisance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
     on conviction, shall be fined not more than $50.00."

(Emphasis added.)

     In response, the State cites § 13A-5-4(b):

     "The particular classification of each misdemeanor defined in
     this title is expressly designated in the chapter or article
     defining it. Any offense defined outside this title which is
     declared by law to be a misdemeanor without specification as
     to classification or punishment is punishable as a Class C
     misdemeanor."

(Emphasis added.) The State argues that § 13A-5-4(b) applies to § 3-1-28

and thus a violation of § 3-1-28 "is punishable as a Class C misdemeanor"

under § 13A-5-2(c), Ala. Code 1975.3

     3Section   13A-5-2(c) provides:

     "Every person convicted of a misdemeanor … shall be
     sentenced by the court to:

           "(1) Imprisonment for a term authorized by Section 13A-
                                       6
CR-21-0174

         "These principles guide our examination of what a
    statute means:

          " 'In determining the meaning of a statute, this
          Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as
          written by the legislature. As we have said:

               " ' " 'Words used in a statute must be
               given their natural, plain, ordinary,
               and commonly understood meaning,
               and where plain language is used a
               court is bound to interpret that
               language to mean exactly what it says.
               If the language of the statute is
               unambiguous, then there is no room for
               judicial construction and the clearly
               expressed intent of the legislature
               must be given effect.' "

          " 'Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d
          293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v.
          Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346
          (Ala. 1992)); see also Tuscaloosa County Comm'n
          v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 589 So. 2d 687, 689 (Ala.
          1991); Coastal States Gas Transmission Co. v.
          Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 524 So. 2d 357, 360
          (Ala. 1988); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins.
          Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ala.
          1984); Dumas Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Southern Guar.
          Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 534, 536 (Ala. 1983); Town of
          Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer, & Fire

    5-7; or

          "(2) Pay a fine authorized by Section 13A-5-12; or

          "(3) Both such imprisonment and fine."

                                   7
CR-21-0174

           Protection Auth., Inc., 376 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala.
           1979). It is true that when looking at a statute we
           might sometimes think that the ramifications of
           the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is
           our job to say what the law is, not to say what it
           should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational
           way to interpret the words as stated will we look
           beyond those words to determine legislative
           intent. To apply a different policy would turn this
           Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of
           course, would be utterly inconsistent with the
           doctrine of separation of powers. See Ex parte T.B.,
           698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997).' "

Pack v. State, 331 So. 3d 1179, 1181-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting

DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275-76

(Ala. 1998)).

     Tisdale argues that § 13A-5-4(b) does not apply if the offense

defined as a misdemeanor outside Title 13A includes either a

classification or a punishment. Tisdale correctly argues that § 3-2-28

specifies a punishment—a fine of not more than $50. See, e.g., § 15-18-

1(a) (“The only legal punishments, besides removal from office and

disqualification to hold office, are fines, hard labor for the county,

imprisonment in the county jail, imprisonment in the penitentiary, which

includes hard labor for the state, and death.”). Thus, Tisdale asserts that

§ 13A-5-4(b) does not apply.

                                    8
CR-21-0174

      The legality of Tisdale's jail sentence turns on what "or" means in

the phrase "without specification as to classification or punishment" in §

13A-5-4(b) (emphasis added). Typically, the word "and combines while

or creates alternatives." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116 (Thompson/West 2012). As

Scalia and Garner caution, however, "with negatives, plurals, and

various specific wordings there are nuances."

      The phrase at issue illustrates what Scalia and Garner label "the

disjunctive negative proof." They offer this hypothetical example:

      "To be eligible for citizenship, you must prove that you have
      not (1) been convicted of murder; (2) been convicted of
      manslaughter; or (3) been convicted of embezzlement.

      "An applicant proves #3—that he has never been convicted of
      embezzlement—but fails to prove that he has not been
      convicted of both murder and manslaughter. Is he eligible?
      (No.) Is the requirement that he not have done one of these
      things, or that he have done none? (He must have done none.)"

Id. at 120.

      Applying this principle to § 13A-5-4(b), the phrase "without

specification as to classification or punishment" means that § 13A-5-4(b)

applies to any misdemeanor defined outside Title 13A that does not

include a specification as to both classification and punishment. Thus, §

                                    9
CR-21-0174

13A-5-4(b) applies to a misdemeanor offense outside Title 13A if: (1) the

provision includes a punishment but does not classify that offense; (2) the

provision classifies that misdemeanor but does not include a punishment;

(3) the provision includes neither a classification nor a punishment.

     The principle of in pari materia also guides our construction.

           "Statutes are in pari materia where they deal with the
     same subject. Kelly v. State, 273 Ala. 240, 139 So. 2d 326
     [(1962)]. Where statutes are in pari materia they should be
     construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of
     each. City of Birmingham v. Southern Express Co., [164 Ala.
     529, 51 So. 159 (Ala. 1909)]. Where possible, statutes should
     be resolved in favor of each other to form one harmonious plan
     and give uniformity to the law. Waters v. City of Birmingham,
     282 Ala. 104, 209 So. 2d 388 [(1968)]; Walker County v. White,
     248 Ala. 53, 26 So. 2d 253 [(1946)]."

League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 131, 290 So. 2d 167, 169

(1974). See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law § 39 at 252 ("Statutes in

pari materia [dealing with the same subject] are to be interpreted

together, as though they were one law.").

     Section 13A-1-2(9), Ala. Code 1975, defines "misdemeanor" as "[a]n

offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment not in excess of

one year may be imposed." Section 13A-1-7(b) extends that definition

outside Title 13A under certain conditions: "Unless otherwise expressly

provided or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this

                                    10
CR-21-0174

chapter shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense

defined outside this title and committed after the effective date thereof,

as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution

for such an offense."

      Tisdale's construction of § 3-1-28, however, would create a separate

category of misdemeanor conviction for which a sentencing court may

impose only a fine, not a term of imprisonment. That construction

conflicts with § 13A-1-2(9), in which the very definition of a misdemeanor

is the possibility of imprisonment of not more than 12 months. Tisdale's

construction also conflicts with § 13A-5-2(c), Ala. Code 1975, which

provides as available punishment for a misdemeanor conviction (1) a

term of imprisonment, (2) a fine, or (3) both a term of imprisonment and

a fine.

      Applying the above principles to this case, we conclude that § 13A-

5-4(b) applies to § 3-1-28. 4 Thus, Tisdale's conviction under § 3-1-28 is a

      4The   Commentary for § 13A-5-4 provides:

      "Subsection (a) makes all felonies defined outside the
      Criminal Code for which no punishment is provided Class C
      felonies, the lowest category. Subsection (b) similarly deals
      with misdemeanors. Most existing crimes were covered in
      Title 13, Alabama Code of 1975, but most were repealed upon
                                    11
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conviction for a Class C misdemeanor. A conviction for a Class C

misdemeanor is punishable by a "term of imprisonment in the county jail

… not more than three months." § 13A-5-7(a)(3). Although § 13A-5-

12(a)(3) provides for a fine of "not more than $500" for a Class C

misdemeanor conviction, § 3-1-28 limits that fine to "not more than $50."

Finally, under § 15-22-50, Ala. Code 1975, a sentencing court has the

authority to "suspend execution of sentence and place on probation any

person convicted of a crime in any court exercising criminal jurisdiction."

     In sum, the circuit court could sentence Tisdale to up to three

months' imprisonment, if it so chose, and, under § 3-1-28, the circuit court

had to impose a fine on Tisdale of no more than $50. As noted above, the

circuit court sentenced Tisdale to 90 days' imprisonment and a $50 fine.

The circuit court suspended the jail sentence and placed Tisdale on two

years' unsupervised probation. Thus, Tisdale's sentence is authorized,

and she is due no relief.

     the effective date of the Criminal Code. To the extent that
     there are some crimes now found outside former Title 13
     which have not been subsumed by the Criminal Code and
     which are not repealed, it is desirable that they be
     incorporated into the Criminal Code, at least those which
     specify no particular punishment."
                                    12
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      The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

      AFFIRMED.

      Kellum and McCool, JJ., concur. Windom, P.J., and Cole, J., concur

in the result.

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