Court Opinion

ID: 9789416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:36:07.947179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.400840
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses this death penalty case in its entirety solely on the basis that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s pretrial motion to sever the two murder counts. In light of the broad discretion vested in the trial court regarding such matters, I would find no error and would affirm the judgment. Even assuming arguendo that error occurred, it clearly was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt of the offenses of which he was convicted.
Penal Code section 954 permits the charging of two or more different though unrelated offenses, provided they are “of the same class of crimes,” and the section authorizes the trial court “in its discretion” to sever such charges. It is uncontradicted that the House and Dunbar murders are offenses *434of the same class, and that the trial court, in denying the motion to sever, expressly stated that it was exercising its discretion. Nonetheless, relying on inapposite cases, the majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion because (1) the evidence underlying the two homicides lacked cross-admissibility, (2) such evidence as to the House murder was “extremely weak,” and (3) the case involves a capital offense. None of these reasons, separately or in combination, supports the majority’s ultimate conclusion.
Cross-admissibility has never, until today, been elevated to a prerequisite to joinder of criminal charges. Although the presence of cross-admissibility practically guaranteed that an order denying severance would be upheld (see Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 448 [204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699], and cases cited), the converse was not true. As Williams observed, cross-admissibility is merely “the first stage of our inquiry” and its absence neither requires severance of properly joined charges nor establishes any substantial prejudice to the defendant. (Id., at p. 451.) As I read the majority opinion, however, it is precisely the absence of cross-admissibility which supplies the otherwise missing element of prejudice here. As stated by the majority, in the absence of cross-admissibility, “the accused in most cases will be able to demonstrate at least some measure of prejudice from joinder.” (Ante, p. 426.) Thus, under the majority’s formulation only the presence of cross-admissibility can justify denial of severance. The majority magically transmutes an element guaranteeing proper joinder into a prerequisite to proper joinder.
The majority, citing the evidence presented at the preliminary examination and offered at the severance hearing, points to certain weaknesses in the People’s case which supposedly created a potential for a “spillover” effect, i.e., a situation where the evidence in one case reinforces weaknesses in another case. These matters may be relevant in determining whether the trial court erred in denying severance. (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 173-174 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 312 [208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669].) But when an appellate court attempts to determine whether an erroneous denial of severance resulted in actual prejudice to defendant, the relevant evidence is necessarily that which was actually admitted at trial. (Turner, at p. 312 [“what transpires at trial determines the prejudicial effect of an erroneous ruling on a motion for separate trials”].)
Here, the trial record indicates that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming in both cases. With respect to the House murder, eyewitness Arthur Spencer, an acquaintance of defendant, saw defendant talk with victim House, who motioned toward his pants pocket and pulled one pocket *435out, emptying it. Defendant thereupon pointed a gun at House’s head and fired once. Spencer heard two more shots as he fled the scene; he turned and saw defendant running away. Spencer was able to view defendant’s face clearly from 35 to 40 feet; he saw no other persons in the vicinity of the shooting. In addition to Spencer’s testimony, witness Kathy Hall confirmed that defendant stated he had a “piece” (a gun) and was going to “make some money.” Shortly thereafter, victim House walked by. Forty-five minutes later, Hall heard two or three shots and saw defendant standing over a body. That evening, defendant asked Hall to return to the scene of the shooting and find out what the police were saying. Subsequently, defendant complained to Hall that she should not “snitch” on him because “he wasn’t killing nothing but white people . . . .’’In what manner can it be said that the case against defendant was “extremely weak”?
The evidence underlying the Dunbar murder was no less strong. Again, eyewitness Spencer saw defendant raise a gun and kill Dunbar as he was driving away from Boy’s Market. A second eyewitness, Gagatch, also identified defendant as the killer. Witness Thompson told police officers that defendant admitted shooting a rich White man at Boy’s Market and taking some money from him. Although the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict regarding the Dunbar charges, the evidence certainly cannot be characterized as “weak.”
The fact that a single witness, Arthur Spencer, viewed both murders is a strong factor upholding joinder, and minimizing the likelihood of substantial prejudice to defendant, for it offered a single jury the opportunity to weigh and consider Spencer’s testimony regarding both crimes. Moreover, the jury’s inability to agree on the Dunbar murder, while convicting on the House murder, reinforces my conclusion that the jurors were quite capable of differentiating between the two offenses. No “spillover” occurred in this case.
Finally, the majority suggests that the trial court was required to undertake heightened scrutiny of the severance issue because this was a capital case. But section 954 of the Penal Code vests the trial court with “discretion” to deny severance of all properly joined charges, capital or otherwise. There is no provision calling for a higher or different standard merely because the defendant committed an offense so aggravated that it merited society’s greatest penalty.
The majority relies heavily upon Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d 441, and Coleman v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 129 [172 Cal.Rptr. 86], but those cases are inapposite. First, both of those cases involved pretrial review of severance rulings, and of necessity the courts *436in those cases were attempting to evaluate the potential for prejudice, rather than actual prejudice, resulting from the denial of severance. (See People v. Stewart (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1058 [212 Cal.Rptr. 90].) In the present case, by contrast, we have the benefit of a trial transcript which clearly demonstrates that defendant was not prejudiced by the joinder of the two murders. Second, unlike the situation in those cases, in the present case there were no inflammatory factors present, such as child molestation or gang membership and, as explained previously, the evidence as to both murders was equally strong, supported by eyewitness testimony. Moreover, unlike Williams, the joinder of the two charges did not itself make this case a capital one, for here each murder carried separate special circumstances allegations in addition to the multiple murder allegation which resulted from the joinder of two murders.
For all the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. In any event, any possible “error” was harmless in light of the overwhelming case against defendant.
I would affirm the judgment.
Mosk, J., and Panelli, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 16, 1986, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.