Court Opinion

ID: 9768526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:07:33.315585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.712400
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion on the ground that the judgment appealed from was not a final judgment. CR 54.01 defines a final judgment as “a final order adjudging all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding, or a judgment made final under Rule 54.02.” Here, appellant brought an action for declaratory relief and damages. After an interlocutory trial court order in favor of appellant, appellee was permitted to appeal to the Court of Appeals prior to any resolution of the damage claim asserted by appellant.
The majority has acknowledged that the CR 54.02 recitation is not outcome-determinative and that the court should look to the substance to determine whether or not a judgment is final. I regard this case as a serious departure from our heretofore inflexible rule that, in the absence of specific rules or statutory exceptions, appeals may be taken only from final judgments.
This case perfectly illustrates the reason for the final judgment rule. This litigation involves multiple parties and multiple claims with appellant’s claim being dependent upon the underlying liability claim. By its decision, however, the majority has decided that regardless of the outcome of the underlying claim, appellant will lose. Even if it is later determined that Spegal was a permissive user, a possibility quite properly left open by the majority, appellant, the reparation obli-gor, will lose its subrogation right.
Such a possibility could have been avoided by application of the final judgment rule discussed above. If all claims of all parties remained viable, liability could be properly allocated. By piecemeal litigation and appeals, however, such is impossible.
Finally, it is no answer that both appellant and appellees sought summary judgment. Simply because both ask doesn’t mean that one automatically receives. It is the duty of trial and appellate courts to properly determine when judgments should be entered, and affirmed or reversed, without regard to something akin to a waiver by virtue of having sought summary judgment.
LEIBSON and STUMBO, JJ., join this dissent.