Court Opinion

ID: 9784714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:52:12.891651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:58.280760
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, J.,
specially concurring.
[¶28] I would summarily affirm. The circumstances of this case do not indicate that Byrd's due process rights were ever threatened to the point of requiring this Court to consider the issues herein raised by Byrd when he never objected to the procedure below. Byrd's attempt to "play the system" failed, and this Court should not entertain his objections to cireumstances he created.
[¶29] Further, I see no reason for this Court to engage in an advisory opinion regarding U.R.D.C. 102(c). Since the majority opinion has done so, however, I am compelled to comment. An uncooperative client may create grounds to support an attorney's withdrawing his representation of that client. But, by itself, the fact that a client is uncooperative is not enough to constitute an "extraordinary cireumstance" as required by the rule. Without an "extraordinary circumstance," the trial court is without discretion to accept the withdrawal of an attorney of record without substitute counsel being in place, or at least acknowledgement from the *679client. The language of U.R.D.C. 102(c) is clearly mandatory in this regard.
[¶30] As the majority opinion emphasizes, this case had been pending for quite some time. The parties had at least four months notice of the final trial date. The client became uncooperative at some point early in the proceedings (appellee's brief suggests Byrd was uncooperative with his attorney from the beginning). Thus, Byrd's attorney had plenty of time to determine whether or not he wanted to continue to represent Byrd under the circumstances. While Byrd's uncooperativeness may have justified counsel's withdrawal, nothing in the record justifies counsel's withdrawal within two weeks of trial without providing some protection for his (ex)elient.
[¶31] I would hold that U.R.D.C. 102(c) was violated in this case. However, I would still affirm. Under the particular circumstances of this case, Byrd cannot prove that a substantial right was violated, and thus the error in violating the rule was harmless. W.R.A.P. 9.04.