Court Opinion

ID: 9632763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:24:39.89641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:22.502809
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
specially concurring.
In Moser v. Frohnmayer, 112 Or App 226, 230, 829 P2d 84, rev allowed 314 Or 391 (1992), we reaffirmed that, “unless the subject matter of a law falls within an historical exception, a content based restriction on speech is impermissible in Oregon.” The Oregon Supreme Court recently confirmed that rule in State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992), where it held that the first step in evaluating whether a law violates Article I, section 8, is to determine if the law is directed at the content of speech. If it is, the law is invalid, unless its subject matter falls within an historical exception. See also State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412, 649 P2d 569 (1982).1
Here, the ordinance is directed at the content of speech. It permits the use of a horn to communicate one message, a warning, but prohibits the use of a horn to communicate any other message. In that sense, it is no different than the statute in Moser v. Frohnmayer, supra, which permitted the use of a computer to communicate *193political and religious messages but prohibited the use of that same computer to communicate commercial messages. We held that that was an un constitutional, content-based restriction on speech. Similarly, an ordinance that permits horn-honking to communicate one message but not another is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. That is as far as our analysis needs to go.
The majority contends that the ordinance “is not a law that focuses on the content of speech,” because “[i]t is directed against the sound made by a mechanical device.” 116 Or App at 189. Apparently, the majority confuses this ordinance with the type of ordinance addressed in City of Portland v. Ayers, 93 Or App 731, 764 P2d 556 (1988), which prohibited the operation of a sound reproducing device so as to be plainly audible 50 feet or more from the device. That ordinance sought to prevent an effect of speech, annoying noise, regardless of the content of the speech. Although that may have been the city’s purpose here, the ordinance is not directed at prohibiting that effect. Instead, it prohibits an expressive act, except to communicate a favored message. That is the core defect of a content-based regulation.
Apart from erroneously concluding that the ordinance is not content-based, the majority also improperly analyzes the other constitutional issues. If, as the majority contends, the ordinance is not a law that focuses on the content of speech, then it must be directed at effects. The majority concedes that. 116 Or App at 189. The way to analyze such laws is clear. If a law focuses on an effect and expressly prohibits expression used to achieve that effect, we examine the law for overbreadth. State v. Plowman, supra, 314 Or at 164.If the law focuses on an effect but does not refer to expression, a defendant can assert an “as applied” challenge:
“[A] person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to article I, section 8." State v. Robertson, supra, 293 Or at 417. (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
*194Accord: State v. Plowman, supra, 314 Or at 164.
Although our ultimate inquiry when examining a law for overbreadth or “as applied” is the same, i.e., whether the law reaches protected expression, the procedures and results of the analyses differ. Because an overbreadth challenge tests the facial validity of a law, a factual record is unnecessary and such challenges can, but need not, be raised pretrial.2 If a law is overbroad, it is unconstitutional in toto, unless it can be construed not to reach protected expression. State v. Robertson, supra, 293 Or at 417.
In contrast, if a law does not on its face prohibit protected expression, a defendant can only assert that the law cannot be constitutionally applied under the factual circumstances.3 Consequently, an as applied challenge can only be resolved on the basis of facts. If a court finds that, under the facts, a law cannot be constitutionally applied, then the law is necessarily construed not to apply in that situation. However, the law is not invalid in toto, because the law, on its face, is constitutional.
The majority contends that the ordinance is a law that focuses “on an effect of speech without reference to expression.” 116 Or App at 189. (Emphasis supplied.) It then concludes that, because defendants honked their horns for an expressive purpose, the ordinance is overbroad. Because a law can only be overbroad if it refers to expression, the majority’s conclusion is a non sequitur. At best, if the majority correctly concludes that the ordinance does not refer to expression, the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied. There is no reason, under an applied challenge, to discuss whether the ordinance is subject to a narrowing construction. If the ordinance is *195invalid as applied, we should simply reverse defendants’ convictions, because the ordinance is not invalid in toto.4
Nevertheless, because I believe that the ordinance is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech, I concur in the majority’s result.5

 Plaintiff does not argue that the ordinance falls within an historical exception to Article I, section 8.

 In State v. Blocker, 291 Or 255, 261, 630 P2d 824 (1981), the court said: “[T]o the extent that an overbroad law forbids what may not constitutionally be forbidden, it is invalid as such without regard to the facts in the individual case.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)

 In State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225, 228, 611 P2d 1147 (1980), the court said: “If a law concerning free speech on its face violates this prohibition, it is unconstitutional; it is not necessary to consider what the conduct is in the individual case. If the law is not unconstitutional on its face, it nevertheless might be applied in a manner that would violate Art I, § 8. In this case the nature of the alleged conduct of the defendant is unknown to us and the question is whether the law on its face violates Art I, § 8.”

 The majority contends that City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 306 Or 547, 761 P2d 510 (1988), supports its view that “the ordinance must be examined for overbreadth, even though, on its face, it does not prohibit speech.” 116 Or App at 192. That assertion flatly contradicts our recent analysis of that case in Moser v. Frohnmayer, supra, where we said:
“A law is unconstitutional if it proscribes a constitutionally protected activity. State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 410, 649 P2d 569 (1982). All speech is constitutionally protected, unless it is an historically [unprotected] form. 293 Or at 412. Nevertheless, a law can protect against the harmful effects of permitted speech, City of Portland v. Tidyman, [306 Or 174, 759 P2d 242 (1988)], and it will withstand constitutional scrutiny, unless it sweeps too broadly in its attempt to eliminate those effects. In short, a law implicating the rights protected by Article I, section 8, is unconstitutional if it specifically prohibits protected speech, or if it burdens expression, but is not ‘limited to and contained by the consequences’ that it seeks to prevent. The latter was the defect of the ‘Green River’ ordinance.
“Because the ordinance did ‘not by its terms prohibit speech * * * [i]t [was] not unlawful as an outright prohibition on speech.’ 306 Or at 555. Nevertheless, it sought to control an effect of speech, i. e., fraud by unscrupulous and unethical solicitors. Because it burdened more expression than was necessary to control that effect, it was held to be overbroad.” 112 Or App at 232.
That view of Purcell falls squarely within the analytical rubric explained in Plowman and Robertson and does not support the majority’s analysis at all. Although the majority views that analytical method as dictum, I see it as settled doctrine that we lack the capacity to change. To the extent that City of Portland v. Gatewood, 76 Or App 74, 708 P2d 615 (1988), is inconsistent with that doctrine, it is wrong.

 Although I recognize that the state and its political subdivisions have a legitimate interest in preserving the utility of automobile horns as warning devices, that does not excuse the obligation to draft regulations that affect speech in a content-neutral fashion. Article I, section 8, does not permit legislative bodies or the courts to balance the importance of a state interest against the right of the people to speak freely on any subject whatsoever. That, however, does not preclude enactment of narrowly drawn, content-neutral regulations that courts can further narrow on an “as applied” basis.