Court Opinion

ID: 9673053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:05:22.065871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.961323
License: Public Domain

*87J. M. Batzer, J.
(dissenting). Respectfully, I dissent. The correct rale to be applied in this case is found in In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216, 229; 273 NW2d 35 (1978), and is quoted by the majority. After its brief genuflection to our Supreme Court’s authoritative construction of the statute controlling this case, however, the majority fails to adhere to Barlow. The majority instead fashions its own construction of the statute — one that obviously is more to its liking than the words given us by the Legislature and our Supreme Court. I believe that such a departure from the clear dictates of Barlow is unwarranted and will result in jurisprudential confusion, standing, as it does, in contravention of Barlow.
The probate court heard the evidence and made findings of fact. It found that the respondent made “some contribution” to “rental for [the mother’s] residence” during a portion of her pregnancy. The probate court further found that “[respondent] made some contribution to the purchase of groceries and meals at restaurants for Ms. Gaipa, and he also provided the use of his automobile for her personal use as well as travel to prenatal clinic visits and other matters.” The record supports the probate court’s findings. The probate court then applied Barlow and found that the actions of respondent constituted “some support” sufficient to satisfy the statute under Barlow. I agree with the probate court and see no need to vacate and remand for proceedings under an analysis and test that is without warrant in the statute as authoritatively construed by our Supreme Court.
While I would agree that not everything of de mini-mus economic benefit that one in respondent’s situation might do for the expectant mother of his child *88constitutes support, plainly those acts relied on by the probate court in its decision were support; that is, they were acts by the respondent that helped furnish the expectant mother a source or means of living or sustenance. Nothing more is required to put respondent into the category of parents who have established “some kind of custodial or support relationship prior to the notice of hearing.” Barlow, supra at 229. Accordingly, respondent father’s parental rights “are subject to termination only by proceedings under the general jurisdictional provisions of chapter 12A of the Probate Code.” Id.
I would affirm.