Court Opinion

ID: 9566092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:33:36.464759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:06.639139
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Chief Justice, specially concurring. I concur in the result and in most, but not all, of the rationale in the plurality opinion. The specific focus of this special concurrence relates to the “character” evidence discussed in Part III of the plurality’s opinion. First, I strongly agree that if Carmalita Long’s testimony that Defendant enjoyed anal sex was character evidence, then its admission was erroneous. For this reason, I also agree with the characterization in State v. Lucero (cited in the plurality opinion) of evidence of a “lewd and lascivious disposition” as “nothing more than a euphemism” for character evidence. See Lucero, 114 N.M. at 492-93, 840 P.2d at 1258-59. Indeed, I would go further than does the plurality and specifically disapprove the Court of Appeals’ subsequent holding in State v. Landers (cited in the plurality opinion) that evidence of a defendant’s “lewd and lascivious disposition” is admissible when offered to show the defendant’s behavior toward the victim of a sex crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted. As things stand now in New Mexico, evidence of a defendant’s lewd and lascivious disposition is admissible if directed toward a victim, Landers, 115 N.M. at 519, 853 P.2d at 1275, but not if the disposition is directed toward someone else, Lucero, 114 N.M. at 493, 840 P.2d at 1259. I believe that this distinction is indefensible and that if — again, if — the evidence is truly character evidence under Rule 404, it should be excluded in accordance with the rule (unless it is offered for some purpose other than to show that the defendant acted in conformity with his or her character on a particular occasion).1  Notwithstanding my agreement with the plurality on its rejection of the so-called “lewd and lascivious disposition” exception to Rule 404’s prohibition of character evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion, I disagree with the plurality over four points. First, I do not think that admission of Ms. Long’s testimony about Defendant’s enjoyment of anal sex — once again, if that testimony constituted character evidence — can properly be treated as harmless error. Using the plurality’s definition of harmless error (taken from State v. Moore, cited in the opinion), I cannot see that this evidence was so miniscule that it could not have contributed to the conviction. Using another, more recent, definition of harmless error from this Court, I certainly think that there is at least a reasonable possibility that this evidence contributed to Defendant’s convictions. See Clark v. State, 112 N.M. 485, 487, 816 P.2d 1107, 1109 (1991) (error in admission of evidence in criminal trial is prejudicial and not harmless if there is reasonable possibility that evidence might have contributed to conviction). The plurality’s own recitation of the facts shows that Ms. Long’s testimony might have contributed, and probably did contribute, to Defendant’s convictions. The plurality says, “Defendant stated his intention to have anal intercourse with Todaeheenie” and that she refused. How does the plurality know these facts? Answer: by indulging inferences that were undoubtedly drawn by the jury — inferences based on Ms. Long’s testimony that Defendant enjoyed anal sex and on the testimony of Sarah Woody (Todacheenie’s friend) that Todaeheenie didn’t. As Wigmore says, “A defendant’s character, ... as indicating the probability of his doing or not doing the act charged, is essentially relevant.” IA John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 55, at 1157 (Peter Tillers rev. ed. 1983). He elaborates on the same point in the context of character proved by specific “bad acts,” saying: “[Such evidence] is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too much. The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal— whether judge or jury — is to give excessive weight to [such evidence]----” Id. § 58.2, at 1212. Because Ms. Long’s testimony tended to show that Defendant attempted to have anal sex with Ms. Todaeheenie and, when she resisted, raped and then killed her, I am unwilling to agree with the plurality’s implicit conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that Long’s testimony might have contributed to Defendant’s convictions. The second point on which I disagree with the plurality is . a relatively minor one — a quibble, perhaps, but one that I believe has some analytical significance. I disagree that Rule 404(B) has any relevance to this case. Rule 404(B) — sometimes called the “other” or “specific” or “prior” “bad acts” provision of the rule proscribing character evidence— is simply inapplicable to the testimony in this case. Ms. Long did not testify to any prior acts of Defendant, whether “bad,” “specific,” or “other.” She simply testified, presumably based on her personal observations or knowledge, that Defendant enjoyed anal sex. The question this testimony raises is: Was that evidence, in the words of Rule 404(A) (A, not B), “[ejvidence of [Defendant’s] character or a trait of his character” and therefore “not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith” on the occasion in question? As one treatise on the law of evidence notes, with considerable understatement. “The Evidence Rules do not define ‘character.’ ” 22 Charles A Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5233, at 349 (1978). The treatise continues: That may seem quite justifiable; doesn’t everyone know what the word means in this context? Perhaps. But suppose the prosecution in a criminal case offers evidence that the accused is a “professional gambler” or that the victim of an attempted rape was a “virgin.” Is this evidence barred by Rule 404(a) when offered as circumstantial evidence of conduct? Or take a civil case in which it is proposed to prove that the defendant was “clumsy” or “color-blind” or “accident prone” or a “wealthy playboy.” Are any or all of these evidence of “character”? Id. at 349-50 (footnotes omitted). The Wright & Graham treatise does not immediately answer these questions. Similarly, there is a notable dearth of definitions of “character” in other standard works on the law of evidence. One exception — such as it is — is contained in Professor McCormick’s treatise (which is also quoted in Judge Weinstein’s work): “Character is a generalized description of a person’s disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness.” 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 195, at 825 (Practitioner Treatise 1992) (quoted in Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[01], at 404-12 (1990)). Obviously, this general definition, while perhaps helpful in suggesting the kinds of traits that are embraced within the popular — and perhaps the legal — meaning of the term, does not with any specificity establish what the term includes and what it does not. The Wright & Graham treatise does give some help in identifying characteristics that should not be regarded as “traits of character” within the meaning of Rule 404. It states: A person’s physical characteristics, e.g., color-blindness, clumsiness, or strength, should not be considered as part of his character for purposes of Rule 404. Such traits are capable of objective proof or disproof and present little danger of prejudice or,undue consumption of time. Some physical characteristics such as virginity or syphilitic infection, may imply something of the person’s morals but proof of the condition does not depend on a moral judgment. In such cases, admission or exclusion ought to be based directly on Rule 403 rather than attempting to read the elements of that rule into the definition of “character”. Wright & Graham, supra, § 5233, at 355 (footnotes omitted). See also IA Wigmore, supra, § 83 (distinguishing physical capacity, skill, and other similar attributes from character). A more difficult question of definition is presented by proof of mental characteristics. Insanity is not usually thought of as a question of “character” and Wigmore argues that other evidence of mental infirmity is admissible to prove conduct. While mental condition must be proved indirectly like character, weakness of mind does not usually have the prejudicial impact of a moral judgment. Wright & Graham, supra, § 5233, at 355 (footnotes omitted) (citing IA Wigmore, supra, § 86). My brief exposure to this problem convinces me that Wigmore is correct in observing that: The prohibition against “character evidence” is one of the great enigmas of the law of evidence. The practical implications of the rule are complex and convoluted. The theoretical underpinnings of the rule are obscure. The historical origins of the rule are poorly understood. IA Wigmore, sUpra, § 54.1, at 1150. I am unable to do what all the text-writers and other legal authorities have failed to do. I am unable to outline the contours of the term “character” in Rule 404(A) and to explain why Defendant’s penchant for anal sex lies within, or falls without, those contours. Nevertheless, I have concluded that this characteristic — Defendant’s enjoyment of anal sex — even if described as a “disposition” or a “propensity,” is more like a physical or mental characteristic, testimony concerning which is not precluded by Rule 404, than it is like a generalized trait similar to honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. It is capable of objective proof or disproof, and in fact was proved at the trial below by the testimony of a witness with first-hand knowledge. The witness did not base her testimony on an opinion or on Defendant’s reputation — the only kinds of evidence that are ordinarily permitted, under Rule 405, to be used to establish a person’s character. I would hold (as my third point of disagreement with the plurality) that Ms. Long’s testimony was not evidence of Defendant’s character or a trait of his character, forbidden under Rule 404(A) when offered to prove that he acted in conformity therewith, but was instead evidence of a personal characteristic capable of objective proof and therefore not precluded by Rule 404(A). For these reasons, I disagree with the plurality (as my fourth and final point of disagreement) that the trial court erred in admitting Ms. Long’s testimony about Defendant’s enjoyment of anal sex. It follows that, for the reasons set out above and those given in the plurality opinion (except Part III), I concur in affirming Defendant’s convictions.  . The anomaly of the Landers approach to “lewd and lascivious disposition” evidence — -which is character evidence — has been recognized, at least implicitly, in a number of cases that adhere to strict application of Rule 404(B) in all cases, including prosecutions for sex crimes. See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 733-34 (Del.1988) (rejecting blanket exception for propensity evidence); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky.1985) (overruling prior caselaw permitting admission of evidence to prove lustful inclination in accused); State v. Courier, 193 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo.Ct.App.1990) (holding evidence of prior sex crimes only admissible under specific exception categories in Rule 404(B)); State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1975) (rejecting admission of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct where sole purpose is to show accused's propensity to commit crime); Commonwealth v. Shively, 492 Pa. 411, 424 A.2d 1257, 1259-60 (1981) (overruling prior caselaw allowing different treatment under Rule 404(B) for sexual and non-sexual crimes); State v. Burchfield, 664 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn.1984) (declining to expand exceptions to Rule 404(B) to include sex crimes exception). See also Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 978 (Wyo.1989) (dissenting opinion); David J. Kaloyanides, The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of the Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 25 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 1297 (1992).