Court Opinion

ID: 9624342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:59:04.742618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:44.495516
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The Clark County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Sylvester J. Azbill, for the murder of his wife, Rose. The majority has ruled that the indictment must fall because the evidence presented to the grand jury is insufficient *354to show probable cause of the corpus delicti of the crime. I disagree.
The controlling Nevada statute is NRS 172.155,1 which defines the degree of the evidence necessary to warrant an indictment. In accordance with paragraph 2 of NRS 172.155, supra, the appellant, by application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court, objected to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the indictment for murder. The District Judge denied the application for the writ, and appellant appeals. I would sustain the District Judge and order the appellant, Azbill, to stand trial on the murder charge.
Rose Mapel had been married to Edward Mapel for over 44 years. Edward died in late July 1967, leaving a most substantial estate. In October 1967, Rose, who was then 61 years of age, married the appellant, many years her junior. Azbill moved into the palatial Mapel residence in Las Vegas, where the couple resided until Rose’s demise a few weeks later on December 27, 1967.
•As the majority opinion states, Rose was and had been a person of moderate habits. She did not smoke and rarely drank. She was apparently in excellent health. Yet the evidence indicates that after her marriage to Azbill she started drinking heavily and took drugs which were supplied by Azbill. This course of conduct dominated the relationship of the newly married couple.
Although the record shows that Azbill knew that Rose was very ill and dying, he did nothing to aid his wife in her illness, as he characterized it. Rather, he advised his lady friend, with whom he had relations the afternoon of Rose’s death, that Rose would soon die.2 Azbill’s prediction was correct. In fact, *355she died on the very same evening, when she and Azbill were alone in the house.
According to the two doctors (a pathologist and a toxicologist) who testified before the grand jury, Rose’s death could have been caused by a combination of excessive alcohol and barbiturates. The doctors could not “confirm or refute that death may have been caused by suffocation.” The pathologist did testify that the autopsy revealed “that death in this case was not due to one of the natural causes such as stroke or heart attack or cancer or one of the other major diseases, or minor diseases, for that matter. We found no evidence of disease process which would have caused death by natural means in this person.”
The doctors did rule out the possibility of death by burning “* * * because of the lack of soot particles in the lungs and also the determination of carbon monoxide in the blood of the deceased, * * Azbill had set fire to Rose as she lay in her bed later in the evening of December 27.3 Before the fire department arrived, Rose was badly burned and charred about the upper extremities of her body.
*356It is this lack of clear specificity in the record establishing the precise agency of Rose’s death that the majority finds insufficient to establish probable cause to believe an offense has been committed. It is on this point that I take exception.
The general rule has been well stated in People v. Aday, 38 Cal.Rptr. 199, 203 (Cal.App. 1964), “* * * that an indictment will not be set aside if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that the offense charged has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.”
“Our function is like that of the trial court, i.e., to determine whether the members of the grand jury, acting as men of ordinary caution or prudence, could be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a reasonable suspicion that defendants were guilty of the offense charged.” People v. Aday, supra.
As the majority opinion has pointed out, “The state need not eliminate all non-criminal inferences, but there must be an inference of a criminal agency even if there are also the equally plausible non-criminal explanations.”
It appears to me that this case is properly viewed as follows. The record is clear that Rose did not die a natural death. There are three possible agencies of death: accidental, suicidal, and criminal. The majority has said that it was only reasonable for the grand jury to find that the agency of death was either accidental or suicidal. Assuming, as apparently the majority does, that the medical cause of death was the combination of barbiturates and alcohol, the criminal agency of death is possible. Under the facts before the grand jury, I cannot say that the criminal agency thesis was not at least as reasonable as the others. The majority opinion itself states that “one plausible hypothesis of the death of Rose Azbill attributable to a criminal agency was that someone made available and encouraged her use of quantities of alcohol and barbiturates, knowing the lethal danger of the combined use of those two toxic substances.”
The majority contends that, since the District Attorney in oral argument before us did not specifically rely upon that theory, it has been eliminated from our consideration. I cannot agree. Our task on review is to determine whether or not the grand jury had before it sufficient evidence to justify the indictment. If the grand jury’s interpretation of the evidence before it is reasonable, we should not now disturb it. It is not our function to draw indictments, but only to assure that when they are returned they are within reasonable bounds. Even by the majority’s view of the evidence, it was reasonable for the grand jury to have concluded that the appellant had intentionally and by design brought about the death of Rose Azbill.
*357The majority is correct in not suggesting that one thesis for agency of death need be more plausible than the others. Indeed, as the court said in People v. Jacobson, 405 P.2d 555, 560 (Cal. 1965), which authority was relied upon by the majority:
“With two possible contrary inferences before it, the court did not err in ruling that a prima facie showing of corpus delicti had been made. To meet the foundational test the prosecution need not eliminate all inferences tending to show a noncriminal cause of death. Rather, the foundation may be laid by the introduction of evidence which creates a reasonable inference that the death could have been caused by a criminal agency * * * even in the presence of an equally plausible noncriminal explanation of the event.”
Appellant argues that the conduct of his burning Rose’s body is an implied admission and therefore may not be considered until after the corpus delicti has been independently established. Appellant’s contention is without merit. I know of no rule which, under a factual pattern such as we find in this case, requires the grand jurors to blind themselves to one of the most glaring and relevant circumstances in the case. The burning of Rose’s body by Azbill, as a fact, was a perfectly proper matter for the grand jury’s consideration.
The rule is well settled in People v. Spencer, 208 P. 380, 390 (Cal. 1922), that: “* * * the fact that death was produced by a criminal act may be shown ‘by means of circumstantial evidence, * * * including facts of conduct on the part of the accused, may be taken into consideration.’
“ ‘Nor, * * * is it essential that the corpus delicti should be established by evidence independent of that which tends to connect the accused with its perpetration. The same evidence which tends to prove one may also tend to prove the other, so that the existence of the crime and the guilt of the defendant may stand together inseparable on one foundation of circumstantial evidence.’
“The rules above stated are now so generally accepted in all the American states as well as in England that they have become elementary in the law.” See also People v. Mohr, 75 P.2d 616 (Cal.App. 1938).
An implied omission is conduct from which guilt of the accused can be inferred. To exclude such conduct when it also has independent significance as circumstantial evidence would appear most unreasonable.
“ ‘* * * Crimes, and especially those of the worst kinds, are naturally committed at chosen times, and in darkness and secrecy; and human society must act upon such indications as *358the circumstances of the case present or admit, or society must be broken up.’ ” People v. Spencer, supra, at 390.
The concealment or attempted destruction of the body of a person can properly be regarded as an incriminating circumstance and may be given positive force in connection with other facts. Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1227 (1919).
Appellant urges that the rule against admitting admissions and confessions prior to a prima facie showing of corpus delicti be extended to the factual situation before us. However, no persuasive policy reason has been offered in support of his contention. The circumstantial evidence here in question is not uncorroborated, fabricated testimony which might wrongfully establish a crime; rather, it is a factual occurrence from which reasonable inferences can be drawn. People v. Scott, 1 Cal. Rptr. 600 (Cal.App. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 471 (1960); 48 Calif.L.Rev. 849 (1960).
We have not been asked to pass on the guilt or innocence of the appellant, Sylvester J. Azbill. This would be the duty of the court or the jury before whom Azbill would stand trial. Our sole function at this juncture is to determine whether all the evidence before the grand jury, “taken together, establishes probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” NRS 172.155, supra.
It is my opinion that the action taken by the grand jury was not unreasonable and is supported by the record.
As this court ruled in Kelly v. State, 84 Nev. 332, 440 P.2d 889 (1968), probable cause is a standard of reasonableness which must be interpreted in a common-sense and realistic manner.
The order of the District Judge denying appellant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed, and the appellant, Sylvester J. Azbill, should be ordered to stand trial for the murder of his wife, Rose.

NRS 172.155. “Degree of evidence to warrant indictment; objection.
“1. The grand jury ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, establishes probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.
“2. The defendant may object to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the indictment only by application for a writ of habeas corpus. If no such application is made before the plea is entered, unless the court permits it to be made within a reasonable time thereafter, the objection is waived.”
(Added to NRS by 1967, 1409)

“Q [by Mr. Gripentrog] Now, you had indicated that you had had conversation in the guest house. Did any of the conversation relate to Rose Azbill?
“A [by Nancy Sue Lynch] Yes, it did.
“Q And would you recite that conversation, as you recall it?
“A The whole conversation?
“Q As it related to Rose Azbill.
*355“A He said she was sick and she was lying there dying and that they all knew that in three or four days she would be dead and then he would have all of that money.
“Q And anything else in addition?
“A He would have all of that money and the house, and then I would come back to him.”

“A [by Brad Azbill, the appellant’s young son] Well, see, then he [Azbill] asked for the lighter fluid and at that time I didn’t really know what he wanted it for, but I went and got it for him and he had it and then he went into the room and started dumping it on the bed, or wherever — the lighter fluid — and then—
íj* ^5
“A Well, then I had my face covered, and then he lit a match and then there was a little smoke and then there was a whole mess, and I ran out, and then he came out into the front room and the boys came in to see—
“Q Did he say anything to you when you got back up in the front room, Brad?
“Q What did he say?
“A He said just keep my mouth shut.
“Q Did he say, ‘Keep your mouth shut’?
“A You know, something like that; he just said, you know, be quiet or something like that.
*****
“The Juror: She [Rose] did not move at all?
“The Witness [Brad Azbill]: No, not that I knew, because when I came in he was in on his crutches and he leaned on — I guess he went down on the bed, you know, and started pouring, and I started saying, ‘No, no, no, don’t.’ And he lit a match and it started and I watched and just turned around and just kind of went out and my face — ”