Court Opinion

ID: 9617145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:52:38.108977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:06.063107
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting).
If we assume that the so-called dying declaration was admissible as such there were parts of it that were clearly inadmissible. To illustrate: Dr. Molloy was permitted to testify that Bishop, as a part of his declaration, stated that Morran was supposed to have turned off the pilot light in the water heater but that he did not, and “I think he left it on on purpose to catch Turk and destroy all the evidence.” It is elementary and hornbook law that dying declarations may not include opinions or conclusions where such opinions or conclusions would not be admissible from the lips of the living witness. People v. Alexander, 161 Mich. 645, 126 N.W. 837, and authorities therein cited.
Other statements equally as incompetent were admitted as a part of the declaration. But it is held in the majority opinion that there was not sufficiently specific objection to the evidence. With this I do not agree.
As was proper the court excused the jury to hear evidence laying the foundation for the statement and asked the state to present the statement. When it came to offering the statement defendant’s counsel made the following objection:
“We will object to it because it is not shown yet the boy knew he was going to die. I mean he had more sense, probably, than the fellows that were trying to get this statement because he wanted them to get out of there or he would have a nervous breakdown. He wasn’t thinking about dying*; he was thinking about living.”
The statement was then given in the absence of the jury after which defendant made the following motion to strike:
“We move to strike this evidence upon the grounds and for the reason that it is hearsay evidence. It is plainly shown that it wasn’t given in anticipation of death. It is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial as a dying declaration.”
Defendant was allowed a continuing objection as the evi*41dence was repeated before the jury. The objection that the statement was incompetent was all the objection that was necessary. The greater includes the less. An objection that the statement as a whole was incompetent was an objection to each and every part of the statement.
We come then to the question what should be the ruling of the court when evidence is offered, a part of which is competent and admissible (if we assume some parts of the statement were admissible as a dying declaration) and a part of which is incompetent and inadmissible. The rule is that it is not incumbent upon the trial court to separate the admissible from the inadmissible. Rather, the duty to make this separation rests upon the party offering the evidence. The court, when the evidence is offered in one package containing some good and some bad if unwilling to separate the good from the bad, should reject the whole. Such is the ruling of the courts throughout the country. Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Yol 1, section 17, page 320, states the rule as follows: “If several facts are included in the offer, some admissible and others inadmissible, then the whole (if properly objected to) is inadmissible; in other words, it is for the proponent to sever the good and the bad parts. ’ ’
In Wilson Storage & Transfer Co. v. Geurkink, 242 Minn. 60, 64 N.W. (2d) 9, 15, 48 A.L.R. (2d) 223, the court stated the rule as follows:
“It is a well-settled rule of law that where a general offer of evidence is made and some of the evidence is material and admissible and other parts of it are immaterial or inadmissible the whole may be rejected in the absence of a specific offer of the admissible portion.”
In Morey v. Redifer, 204 Or. 194, 197, 264 Pac. (2d) 418, 282 Pac. (2d) 1062, 1067, the court said:
“For the reason that the offer of proof contained testimony that was clearly objectionable, if for no other reason, the offer was properly rejected by the trial court. The objectionable por*42tions contaminated the whole. The trial court was not required to separate the good from the bad.”
The courts generally hold that where evidence is offered as a whole and part of it is inadmissible, it is discretionary with the trial court to either reject the entire evidence or receive those parts which are admissible and reject the rest, but it need not assume the duty of making the separation. 88 C.J.S., Trial, section 82, page 187. The same rule is applicable to criminal cases. 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 1031, page 408.
I think the so-called dying declaration contained inadmissible and highly prejudicial matter which should either have been excluded separately or the entire declaration rejected.
Furthermore I think the whole of the so-called dying declaration was inadmissible. The ultimate test .in determining the admissibility of such a declaration is: Did the declarant believe at the time of making the declaration that death was imminent? State v. Martin, 76 Mont. 565, 248, Pac. 176, and authorities therein cited. Here, I think, the declarant did not entertain that belief.
It is true that the attending physician thought declarant was about to die and told declarant so, the night before the statement was made, but it is not the doctor’s mind but that of declarant that determines the issue. Also last religious rites were conducted at the suggestion of the physician. But, after these rites were administered, declarant complained of being questioned and pestered for a statement and protested and asked to be left alone lest he have a “nervous breakdown” and stated, “I will tell it all when I get well.” This indicates to my mind that declarant expected to recover and not that he was certain imminent death was at hand.
It is true declarant also stated on the forenoon of June 20th, “I am going down for the long count”, and made the statement to his physician the night before the declaration was made “I am going to die”, but these statements, when considered with the'other statements made by him thereafter, *43do not indicate that at the time the declaration was made all hope of recovery had been abandoned.
“No matter how strong expression of the certainty of death may be, if there be any evidence of hope, in the language or actions of the declarant, his statements will be rejected.” Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193, 199.
In State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257, a man by the name of Ruth was found dead on the morning of April 27, 1871. The following note in his handwriting was found in a book lying upon his coat on the piano on April 27th:
“Darling: The Doctor — I mean Dr. Medlicott — gave me a quinine poivder Wednesday night, April 26. The effects are these: I have a terrible sensation of a rush of blood to the head, and my skin burns and itches. I am becoming numb and blind. I can hardly hold my pencil, and I cannot keep my mind steady. Perspiration stands out all over my body, and I feel terribly. The clock has just struck eleven, and I took the medicine about 10:30 p.m. I write this so that if I never see you again you may have my body examined and see what the matter is. Good-bye, and ever remember my last thoughts were of you. I cannot see to write more. God bless you, and may we meet in heaven. Your loving Hubbie, I. M. Ruth.”
The court held that declaration inadmissible as a dying* declaration since it did not clearly appear that when the statement was written the writer had lost all hope of life. That was a stronger case supporting the admissibility of the statement than the instant case, for there the statement was voluntarily made and without urging on the part of anyone.
In State v. Casey, 212 N.C. 352, 193 S.E. 411, 412, it was. held that the statement by deceased a short time before his death “ ‘if you don’t do something for me, I am going to die right now’ ” was not a sufficient foundation for a dying declaration. The court rested its conclusion on the statement from 1 R.C.L., page 539, paragraph 82, reading: “ ‘An undoubting belief existing in the mind of the declarant at the time the *44declarations are made, that the finger of death is upon him, is indispensible to that sanction which the law exacts and therefore if it shall appear, in any mode, that there was a hope of recovery, however faint it may have been, still lingering in his breast, that sanction is not afforded, and his statement cannot be received’.”
That this species of evidence should always be received with the greatest caution since declarant is not under oath or subject to cross-examination was pointed out by the court in People v. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72, 36 Am. Rep. 30, where the court held it was error to receive the following declaration in evidence though declarant died within an hour after making it:
“Dying statement of Mrs. Emma Downs. Believing I am very near death, and realizing that I may not recover, I wish to make this, my dying statement, as to the cause of my death; and I now, in the presence of these witnesses, charge Mrs. Hodgdon, on Howard street, between Sixth and Seventh streets, with having been the sole cause of my death; in that she did at three several times, and lastly, that on yesterday, the 14th day of March, 1878, did use an instrument or implement on my person for the purpose of and producing an abortion, and that she and no other person is to blame in the matter. This being my voluntary statement. Mrs. Emma Downs.
“Witness: F. B. H. Wing, M.D.; John Wagner, M.D.
“San Francisco, March 15th, 1878.”
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Shephard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22, 24, 78 L. Ed. 196, stated the requirement for admissibility as follows:
“Fear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail of itself to make a dying declaration. There must be a settled hopeless expectation’ [citing authority] that death is near at hand, and what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence. [Citing many authorities.]”
In that case there was evidence that declarant had said “ ‘She was not going to get well; she was going to die’.” *45Here the statement now relied on was not even considered as a dying statement by Dr. Molloy who related the statement before the jury. He testified, “It wasn’t taken as a dying statement as far as I am concerned the night before. He was just talking to his doctor.’’
In my opinion the so-called dying declaration was not in fact a dying statement and should have been excluded.
I express no opinion as to whether we should follow the case of People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230. All that I have to say in connection with that subject is that none of the cases cited in either of the foregoing opinions considers facts such as we have here.
In the Ferlin case, defendant had employed Hill to burn a building. Hill, without defendant’s knowledge took Skala in on the enterprise. Skala lost his life in the endeavor. The court, in effect, held that Ferlin was not guilty of murdering Skala. Similar facts are here involved. Defendant did not conspire with Bishop. Defendant and Bishop were not co-conspirators. Bishop injected himself into the case as a volunteer without the knowledge of the defendant. According to his own story he volunteered to furnish the courage which Freestone lacked. He was not an innocent bystander for whose protection R.C.M. 1947, section 94-2503, was enacted.
The conspiracy between defendant and Freestone did not contemplate the bringing in of volunteers to supply the courage to accomplish the arson. If we do not follow the Ferlin case here it is not because other courts take a contrary view on like facts. I know of no other case treating of similar facts.
In view of the majority opinion here, no useful purpose would be subserved for me to express any conclusion as to whether the opinion in the Ferlin case is sound.