Court Opinion

ID: 9368676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 17:07:15.771229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.232907
License: Public Domain

J-S43033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SPENCER LONG                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 492 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 26, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0001874-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 6, 2023

        Appellant Spencer Long appeals from the order dismissing his timely

first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA).2

Appellant contends the PCRA court erred in permitting PCRA counsel to

withdraw. After review, we vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

        The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history

of this matter as follows:

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 The record reflects that the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition was
dated January 4, 2022. See Order, 1/4/22. The record further reflects that
the order was entered on the docket on January 4, 2022, and again on January
26, 2022. In any event, Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on February 2,
2022, and it was therefore timely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that “the
notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order
from which the appeal is taken”).
J-S43033-22

     On January 19, 2017, Philadelphia Police Detective Michael Repici
     (hereinafter Detective Repici) testified at Appellant’s suppression
     hearing and stated that on December 18, 2015, he was assigned
     to investigate a shooting that occurred at 27th and Thompson
     Streets in the city and county of Philadelphia.         During the
     investigation, Detective Repici quickly learned that Appellant and
     the victim, Marquis McClain (hereinafter Mr. McClain), knew each
     other, the incident was over a girl, and prior to the shooting, the
     victim was arguing with Little Spence.

     Appellant was arrested on December 30, 2015. During the search
     incident to arrest, officers recovered a black LTE cellphone.
     Detective Repici proceeded to confirm the number associated with
     the LTE cellphone, which was found to be registered to Appellant,
     and that the LTE cellphone was operational.

     Detective Repici subsequently prepared a search warrant in order
     to obtain the subscriber information, call records, and GPS
     locations pertaining to Appellant’s cellphone. Detective Repici
     explained that the purpose of said warrant was to corroborate
     existing evidence that the victim and Appellant had been talking
     to one another just before the shooting occurred. Detective Repici
     also applied for search warrants pertaining to the victim’s phone
     and the phone number of Aleya Porterfield. Aleya Porterfield was
     romantically involved with both the Appellant and the victim. The
     victim’s phone records revealed that he was in fact, in contact with
     [Appellant] on that date and time shortly before and up until the
     shooting.

     Later, Detective Repici obtained a second search warrant in
     connection with Appellant’s cellphone.       The purpose of this
     warrant was for a dump of the physical phone itself to obtain
     everything physical out of the phone: texts, call logs, and
     subscriber information. For each search warrant, Detective Repici
     used the same language to identify the items to be searched and
     seized. More specifically, the warrants stated, incoming/outgoing
     call records duration, time and cell site tower locations, text
     messages and photos for the cellular phone number of 267-499-
     6993 from 12/16/15 to present time. On both warrants, Detective
     Repici identified phone records as the property to be seized.

     Devon Campbell (hereinafter Ms. Campbell), a Mobile Device
     Forensic Examiner for the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office,
     also testified at the suppression hearing. Ms. Campbell confirmed
     that her partner, with whom she works as a tag team, received

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     Appellant’s cellphone, as well as the search warrant.        Ms.
     Campbell’s partner extracted the data from the cellphone. Before
     the data was downloaded from the cellphone, the examiners did
     not check for the creation date of the data. Ms. Campbell
     explained, there is no way to limit what you get from that dump.
     On January 19, 2017, the Court denied Appellant’s Motion to
     Suppress.

     At the jury trial, the Commonwealth called Edward Dixon
     (hereinafter Mr. Dixon) to testify. Mr. Dixon worked as an auto
     mechanic at a garage located at the corner of Cabot and 27th
     Street. Mr. Dixon stated that he knew the victim, and the victim
     always call[ed him]pop. Mr. Dixon saw the victim on December
     18, 2015, when the victim pulled up and stopped in the street in
     front of the garage. Mr. Dixon testified that he spoke with the
     victim for maybe two minutes before the victim left and turned off
     Cabot Street onto 27th Street, in the direction of Thompson
     Street.    Following the victim’s departure, Mr. Dixon heard
     gunshots.

     Ten to fifteen minutes after Mr. Dixon heard the gunshots, he
     spoke to the victim on the phone. The victim told Mr. Dixon to
     call [the victim’s] mom. Approximately five minutes later, the
     victim again called Mr. Dixon and asked if Mr. Dixon had called the
     victim’s mother. The victim also said, Spencer shot me. The
     prosecutor asked, did you know who he was referring to when he
     said Spencer shot me? Mr. Dixon replied, yes. Mr. Dixon then
     indicated that the victim was referring to the Appellant and
     testified, that’s the only Spencer I know around there.

PCRA Ct. Op., 5/25/22, at 2-4 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

     On December 18, 2015, [Appellant] was arrested and charged
     with two counts each of attempted murder, aggravated assault,
     simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person
     [(REAP)], and single count[s] of possession of an instrument of
     crime, possession of firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried
     without a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets in
     Philadelphia.[FN1]
        [FN1]18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1); 18
        Pa.C.S. § 2701(a); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; 18 Pa.C.S. § 907; 18
        Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1); [and] 18
        Pa.C.S. §6108 (respectively).

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Id. at 1 (some formatting altered).

       Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on April 19, 2017, and at the

conclusion of trial on April 27, 2017, the jury found Appellant guilty of one

count each of attempted murder, aggravated assault, REAP, firearms not to

be carried without a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets in

Philadelphia.     N.T., 4/27/17, at 41.        On June 18, 2018, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of ten to twenty years of

incarceration. N.T., 6/18/18, at 13.

       Appellant filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Long, 3075 EDA 2018, 2020

WL 7028995 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 30, 2020) (unpublished mem.).              Our

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on June 8,

2021. See Commonwealth v. Long, 518 EAL 2020, 256 A.3d 427 (Pa. filed

Jun. 8, 2021). Appellant did not pursue a writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court.

       On August 17, 2021, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and

Douglas L. Dolfman, Esq. (PCRA Counsel), was appointed to represent

Appellant. On October 7, 2021, PCRA Counsel filed a Turner/Finley letter3

and motion to withdraw as counsel. On October 29, 2021, the PCRA court

sent Appellant its notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without

____________________________________________

3Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

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a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and Appellant filed a pro se response

on November 19, 2021. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition

without a hearing on January 4, 2022, and it granted PCRA Counsel’s motion

to withdraw. Appellant, through new counsel, David W. Barrish, Esq. (Current

Counsel), filed a timely appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

       A. Whether the PCRA court erred, when it accepted the Finley
       letter, filed by PCRA Counsel in this matter, and dismissed
       Appellant’s request for PCRA relief, as this Finley letter does not
       fulfill all of the requirements of Turner/Finley and Pitts?[4]

       B. Whether the PCRA court erred, when it accepted the Finley
       letter, filed by PCRA Counsel in this matter, and dismissed
       Appellant’s request for PCRA relief, as there were issues of
       arguable merit, that could have been raised, by PCRA counsel, in
       an amended PCRA petition?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (formatting altered).

       Appellant first contends that the PCRA court erred in granting PCRA

Counsel’s motion to withdraw because PCRA Counsel failed to satisfy the

requirements to withdraw under Turner/Finley. Appellant’s Brief at 20-21.

Specifically, Appellant asserts that PCRA Counsel’s Turner/Finley letter did

not explain the nature and extent of counsel’s review, it did not list issues

Appellant wanted to raise, and it failed to provide a basis upon which the PCRA

court could conclude that Appellant’s issues were meritless. Id. at 21-22.

____________________________________________

4   Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009).

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      The Commonwealth and the PCRA court agree with Appellant’s first

claim of error.    Moreover, both the Commonwealth and the PCRA court

concede that the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing

and granting PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw should be vacated and

remanded because PCRA Counsel failed to satisfy the requirements of

Turner/Finley. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 19-20; PCRA Ct. Op., 5/25/22,

at 7-9. We agree.

      Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “The PCRA

court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding

on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA

court’s legal conclusions.”    Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257,

1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

      As stated previously, the underlying PCRA petition is Appellant’s first

petition.   “A convicted defendant has a right under the Rules of Criminal

Procedure    to   the   assistance   of   counsel   on   a   first   PCRA   petition.”

Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206 A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted).     “The indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be

honored regardless of the merits of his underlying claims, even where those

claims were previously addressed on direct appeal, so long as the petition in

question is his first.” Id. (citations omitted).

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      Moreover:

      [i]f PCRA counsel seeks to withdraw on the ground that the issues
      raised by the PCRA petitioner are without merit, he must satisfy
      the following requirements: he must file a sufficient no-merit
      letter, send the PCRA petitioner copies of the application to
      withdraw and no-merit letter, and advise the PCRA petitioner of
      his right to proceed pro se or with a privately retained attorney.
      The no-merit letter must set forth: 1) the nature and extent of
      counsel’s review of the case; 2) each issue that the petitioner
      wishes to raise on appeal; and 3) counsel’s explanation of why
      each of those issues is meritless. Where PCRA counsel’s no-merit
      letter does not discuss all of the issues that the convicted
      defendant has raised in a first PCRA petition and explain why they
      lack merit, it does not satisfy these mandatory requirements and
      dismissal of the PCRA petition without requiring counsel to file an
      amended PCRA petition or a further, adequate no-merit letter is a
      deprivation of the right to counsel on the PCRA petition.

Id. (citations omitted).

      In Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, Appellant cites to pages twenty-

three through twenty-five of the notes of testimony from a pre-trial hearing

held on April 18, 2017. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 8/17/21, at 4. A review of

the record reveals that during the April 18, 2017 hearing, Ramsey Younis, Esq.

(Trial Counsel), argued an issue concerning the seizure of certain texts and

photographic evidence that was allegedly outside the scope of a search

warrant. See N.T., 4/18/17, at 23-25. The trial court informed Trial Counsel

that this issue is waived because it was not raised when Appellant’s

suppression motion was litigated. See id. at 23-24. Trial Counsel responded

that if this evidence was available to the defense at the time the suppression

motion was litigated, then he was ineffective for failing to raise the issue. See

id. at 25.

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      However, in the Turner/Finley letter, PCRA Counsel fails to address the

allegedly improperly seizure of evidence or the claim of ineffectiveness for

failing to move for suppression of that evidence. Rather, in the Turner/Finley

letter PCRA Counsel states: “it is my professional opinion that the issues raised

in [Appellant’s] pro se PCRA [petition] does not provide a basis for relief under

the [PCRA], and that there are no further issues which could be raised in a

counseled petition.”   Turner/Finley Letter, 10/7/21, at 1 (unnumbered).

PCRA Counsel then generally identifies the issues raised in Appellant’s pro se

PCRA petition as follows: “[Appellant] baselessly alleges his constitutional

rights were infringed and ineffective assistance of counsel.”          Id. at 2

(unnumbered).     PCRA Counsel fails to set forth in any detail the issues

Appellant wished to raise on appeal or explain why the issues are meritless.

Additionally, PCRA Counsel’s Turner/Finley letter does not include any

indication that Appellant was served with a copy of this document.

      After review, we conclude that the PCRA court erred in dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition and granting PCRA Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

See Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1242. The record reflects that PCRA Counsel neither

advocated for Appellant on the merits of the petition, nor did he file a no-merit

letter that meets the requirements of Turner/Finley. See Kelsey, 206 A.3d

at 1139. Accordingly, we agree with the parties and the PCRA court that the

order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and granting PCRA Counsel’s

motion to withdraw must be vacated and the matter remanded to the PCRA

court. On remand, Appellant shall be permitted to file an amended counseled

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PCRA petition, or should Current Counsel conclude that in the exercise of his

professional judgment “the issues raised in the PCRA proceeding are without

merit, counsel may file an adequate no-merit letter that addresses all of the

issues raised in Appellant’s PCRA petition and move to withdraw.”        Id.

(citations omitted).5

       Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/6/2023

____________________________________________

5 In light of our conclusion that the PCRA court’s order must be vacated and
the case remanded, we do not reach Appellant’s second issue in which he
asserts that the issues raised in his PCRA petition have arguable merit. See
Kelsey, 206 A.3d at 1139 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating “[b]ecause we
conclude that PCRA court’s order must be vacated on this ground, we do not
address any of the other issues raised by [a]ppellant in this appeal.”).

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