Court Opinion

ID: 9573807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:59:21.529221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:23.809565
License: Public Domain

Moon, J.,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority insofar as it finds that the “newly-discovered” evidence could not have been discovered for use at the trial. However, I would affirm the conviction because I do not believe that upon this record we should find that the trial judge should have been convinced that the complaining witness lied or abused his discretion in not granting a new trial.
In deciding whether the evidence might have produced a different result at a new trial, the trial judge weighed the testimony of Sergeant Davis in light of the testimony he heard at the trial. He observed the victim and Private Stodgel give their testimony and was in a position to weigh their appearance and credibility in comparison with that of Sergeant Davis who testified at a post trial hearing. Furthermore, if a new trial is held and Sergeant Davis testifies, the prior reports by the victim would be admissible as prior consistent statements to negate the impeaching effect of Sergeant Davis’ testimony. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72, 78-79, 278 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1981).
Approximately ten days after Whittington’s conviction, Sergeant Kathleen M. Davis stated in an affidavit that she had several conversations with the victim between July 4, 1984, and November 19, 1984. She claimed that the victim came to her duty station and told her that she was not raped by Sergeant Whittington. The critical part of her affidavit states:
That while on duty, I had several conversations with . . . [the victim], between July 4, 1984 and November 19, 1984. On the 20th day of October, 1984, on a Saturday night . . . [the victim] came to my duty station and told me that she was not raped by Sergeant Whittington. We often talked about this matter because I, was a former victim of an at*219tempted rape. She told me that Sergeant Whittington never pulled her pants down. She told me this on several occasions.
The reason I did not come forward before now is that I did not know that there was actually a rape charge. When I read the newspaper, I discovered that a man had been convicted of rape and had received 10 years. My conscious [sic] bothered me because I knew from the many conversations with . . . [the victim] that Sergeant Whittington never pulled her pants off. This is why I have now come forward.
At an ore tenus hearing concerning the motion for a new trial, Davis contradicted this statement in some respects. Davis testified at the hearing: “She said that he pulled her jeans, her pants and that she began to cry and say please take me back. Then she got upset, but they had moved to the ground. And that she became so upset and crying that he left her alone.” Davis also testified that she did not do anything for more than a week after she read the story in the newspaper.
Davis explained that she received a call from the post sergeant major who obtained her name from an individual whom she had met at the laundromat who had seen a notice in the newspaper about this case. When the sergeant major telephoned her about the case, Sergeant Whittington was present with him and talked to her on the phone and met her the next day. She then went to Whittington’s lawyer’s office and never informed the police. She could not recall how many times she talked to Sergeant Whittington before the hearing.
Both the Commonwealth’s attorney and defense counsel stipulated that Sergeant Davis should be given a polygraph examination and that the results would be admissible at a hearing for a new trial. The polygraph examiner testified that Sergeant Davis was deceptive regarding her testimony. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 341 S.E.2d 159 (1986), the Supreme Court strongly denounced the use of polygraph results in criminal trials. However, because the defendant failed either to object at trial or to raise the point on appeal, we should not use the trial judge’s conclusion to admit the results as a means of supporting the decision to reverse. Rule 5A:18. In addition, the result of Davis’ polygraph examination was not offered into evidence at a trial to de*220termine the guilt or innocence of Whittington, as was attempted in Robinsotv, thus there was no danger of removing from the jury one of its essential functions. Instead, we are considering its introduction before a judge at a hearing to determine whether a new trial was warranted, a setting where evidence is generally looked upon with special caution and careful scrutiny, as discussed in the majority opinion.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has consistently stated that motions for a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, are not looked upon with favor because of the obvious temptation that arises for fabrication of such evidence, must be considered with special care and caution, and should be granted only with great reluctance. Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 602, 608, 166 S.E.2d 248, 253 (1969).
The Supreme Court stated in Holmes v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 963, 157 S.E. 554 (1931):
The primary object in considering a motion for a new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence is to ascertain if an injustice has been done.
Id. at 968, 157 S.E. at 556 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court further stated:
In view of the temptation to obtain a rehearing after an adverse verdict, particularly in a criminal case, and in view also of the facility with which affidavits for this purpose can be obtained, all such evidence should be scrutinized with the greatest care and caution. It follows, therefore, that where affidavits and other proofs are produced for and against, which are conflicting and contradictory, and of somewhat even balance, so that it requires a precise estimate to determine as to the greater weight or preponderance, the trial court’s conclusions will not be disturbed, unless they result in manifest injustice.
Id. at 969, 157 S.E. at 556.
*221Furthermore, in the line of cases starting with Powell v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 741, 112 S.E. 657 (1922), the Supreme Court, dealing with allegations of perjury at trial by the principle witness, has stated that the trial court should be convinced that evidence exists that the witness perjured himself at trial before a new trial should be granted. Id. at 756, 112 S.E. at 661. The principle in Powell was reaffirmed in Fout v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 184, 192, 98 S.E.2d 817, 823 (1957).
Deducible from the authorities are these principles: There must be clear and convincing proof that the witness testified falsely at the trial, and not merely proof that by reason of conflicting statements his testimony is unworthy of belief. Application for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court which has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witness whose testimony is brought under attack, and the prime duty of determining whether he swore falsely at the trial.
Fout, 199 Va. at 192, 98 S.E.2d at 823 (emphasis added).
Based upon the evidence in the trial, the circumstances of Sergeant Davis coming forward, and the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, I cannot conclude that there was, as a matter of law, clear and convincing proof that the victim perjured herself at trial. Therefore, I cannot find that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule that a new trial should not be granted. I respectfully dissent.