Court Opinion

ID: 9963813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:01:30.025848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:00.919381
License: Public Domain

Rel: April 26, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
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         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0741
                                _________________________

                                  Carl Michael Seibert

                                                  v.

                           Lorri Stricklen and Zoe Aldige

                       Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
                                 (CV-18-901928)

SELLERS, Justice.

       Carl Michael Seibert appeals from a summary judgment entered by

the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Lorri Stricklen and Zoe Aldige on
SC-2023-0741

his claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process; moreover, he

appeals from an order granting Stricklen and Aldige's motion -- made

pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"),

§ 12-19-270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 -- for attorney fees and costs. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

with instructions.

                          Factual Background

     Seibert and Stricklen were married in Huntsville on February 14,

1999. After 13 years of marriage, they began discussing a divorce;

Stricklen moved out of their marital residence into a nearby property

owned by Seibert. On January 13, 2013, Stricklen filed a divorce

complaint in the Madison Circuit Court. Attached to the complaint was

a "standing pendente lite order," which provided, in relevant part:

           "The following pendente lite order is entered pursuant
     to the Standing Order of the circuit judges of the 23rd Judicial
     Circuit, and shall be binding on both parties during the
     pendency of the action, pending further orders of the Court.
     FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THESE PROVISIONS WILL
     SUBJECT THE DEFAULTING PARTY TO PENALTIES
     FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. Accordingly, with reference to
     the case noted above, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
     DECREED as follows:

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           "1. Injunction Against Harassment: Both parties are
     restrained and enjoined from contacting or going about one
     another at their respective residences or places of
     employment, or elsewhere, for the purpose of harassing,
     threatening, intimidating, or assaulting the other, directly or
     indirectly, in person or by means of telephone, computer, mail,
     or otherwise."

(Emphasis and capitalization in original.)

     In the months following the filing of the divorce complaint, Seibert

believed Stricklen was having an affair with another man, so Seibert

began to gather evidence for the divorce proceeding. One night in August

2013, Zoe Aldige, Stricklen's next-door neighbor, noticed someone

walking around Stricklen's home and peeking into the windows. Aldige

turned on her light, identified the person as Seibert, and asked him what

he was doing. Shortly thereafter, Aldige relayed to Stricklen what she

had seen and heard. Furthermore, on August 13, 2013, two private

investigators hired by Seibert followed Stricklen to a house occupied by

her supposed paramour; one of the investigators, Rick Johnston,

observed them for around 11 hours. Before leaving at approximately 5:00

a.m. on August 14, 2013, Johnston telephoned Seibert and notified him

of the location of the house. Thereafter, Seibert arrived at the house with

a camera and photographed Stricklen's automobile parked in the

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driveway. A few moments later, Stricklen and the man exited the house.

When Stricklen noticed Seibert standing in the street with his camera,

she quickly left.

     On August 26, 2013, Stricklen conferred with Huntsville Police

Department Investigator Angela DeNoon. After that interview,

Investigator DeNoon filed a criminal complaint against Seibert, and

Seibert was arrested the following day and charged with aggravated

stalking in the second degree, which is a felony. On December 6, 2013, a

grand jury indicted Seibert on that charge. After initially agreeing to a

plea deal, Seibert withdrew his plea. Thereafter, Seibert and Stricklen's

divorce case was tried, a divorce judgment was entered on July 10, 2014,

and a certificate of divorce was issued on July 11, 2014. In September

2016, Seibert was tried on the charge of aggravated stalking in the second

degree, but on September 17, 2016, a mistrial was declared due to a hung

jury. Because of the emotional and physical toll on Stricklen, the State

agreed to nol-pros the case against Seibert. On October 8, 2018, Seibert

filed his complaint alleging malicious prosecution against Stricklen and

abuse of process against Stricklen and Aldige.

                           Procedural History

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     On August 28, 2023, the trial court entered a summary judgment

in favor of Stricklen and Aldige. The trial court noted that Seibert's case

had effectively languished for 58 months, in large part due to Seibert's

failure to conduct any meaningful discovery or to otherwise prosecute the

case. Seibert even filed an affidavit conceding that he did not have

enough evidence to oppose the motion for a summary judgment. The trial

court found that if Seibert could not defeat a motion for a summary

judgment after 58 months, a trial on his claims would be useless, and,

accordingly, a summary judgment was entered in favor of Stricklen and

Aldige.

     Thereafter, on September 7, 2023, Stricklen and Aldige filed,

pursuant to the ALAA, a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs.

On September 14, 2023, Seibert filed a response to that motion, asserting

that Stricklen and Aldige were not entitled to such relief and requesting

that certain forms of discovery be made available to Seibert; specifically,

Seibert requested that Stricklen and Aldige be made available for

depositions. That same day, Seibert also filed a postjudgment motion,

pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting that the trial court vacate

its summary judgment. On October 5, 2023, the trial court granted in

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part Stricklen and Aldige's motion for an award of attorney fees and

costs; moreover, the trial court denied Seibert's postjudgment motion. A

few hours later, Seibert filed a notice of appeal.

                           Standard of Review

           " 'On appeal, this Court reviews a summary judgment de
     novo.' DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So.
     2d 454, 459 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5,
     8 (Ala. 2007)). In order to uphold a summary judgment, we
     must determine that 'there is no genuine issue as to any
     material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
     judgment as a matter of law.' Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
     'When the movant makes a prima facie showing that those
     two conditions have been satisfied, the burden then shifts to
     the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating a
     genuine issue of material fact.' Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
     Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952 (Ala. 2004).
     Substantial evidence is 'evidence of such weight and quality
     that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
     judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought
     to be proved.' West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida,
     547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989); see also § 12-21-12(d), Ala.
     Code 1975. In reviewing a summary judgment, we must view
     the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
     Johnny Ray Sports, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, 982 So. 2d 1067,
     1071 (Ala. 2007). 'Finally, this Court does not afford any
     presumption of correctness to the trial court's ruling on
     questions of law or its conclusion as to the appropriate legal
     standard to be applied.' DiBiasi, 988 So. 2d at 459."

Cartrett v. Baldwin Cnty. Elec. Membership Corp., 996 So. 2d 196, 199

(Ala. 2008).
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                               Discussion

     I.    Malicious Prosecution

     It is well settled that "[m]alicious prosecution is an action

disfavored in the law," Cutts v. American United Life Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d

1211, 1214 (Ala. 1987), because public policy demands " 'that a citizen

having reason to believe, or even suspect, that a crime has been

committed, be permitted to direct the attention of the prosecuting officer

towards its investigation, without exposure to the peril of being held

liable for malicious prosecution in case of a failure of conviction,' "

American Sur. Co. v. Pryor, 217 Ala. 244, 248, 115 So. 176, 179 (1927)

(quoting Ryan v. Orient Ins. Co., 96 Vt. 291, 119 A. 423, 425 (1923)).

Thus, to defeat the motion for a summary judgment on his malicious-

prosecution claim against Stricklen, Seibert needed to present

substantial evidence demonstrating (1) that Stricklen had initiated a

prior judicial proceeding; (2) that Stricklen had acted without probable

cause; (3) that Stricklen had acted with malice; (4) that the prior

proceeding had been terminated in Seibert's favor; and (5) that Seibert

had suffered damage as a consequence of the prior proceeding.

Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 831-32 (Ala. 1999). Although

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Stricklen asserts that Seibert has not marshalled substantial evidence in

support of any of those elements, the appeal as to this issue can be

resolved on the first element alone.

     "It is axiomatic that there can be no cause of action for malicious

prosecution unless the evidence shows that the judicial proceeding was

instigated by the defendant." Alabama Power Co. v. Neighbors, 402 So.

2d 958, 962 (Ala. 1981). Where, as here, a malicious-prosecution action

concerns the initiation of a criminal proceeding, we have held -- for nearly

a century -- that "[g]iving information of a crime to officers, or a request

that the officers investigate a crime[,] is not aiding or abetting or

instigating   a   prosecution,    unless    such    information    was    a

misrepresentation of the facts in order to induce action, or there was a

suppression of known material facts." Dismukes v. Trivers Clothing Co.,

221 Ala. 29, 32, 127 So. 188, 190 (1930). Indeed, so long as an " 'officer

acts solely upon his own judgment and initiative, the defendant [in a

malicious-prosecution action] would not be responsible ... even though he

were actuated by malice or other improper motive.' " Id. (quoting

Standard Oil Co. v. Davis, 208 Ala. 565, 567, 94 So. 754, 756 (1922)).

                                       8
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     Seibert's malicious-prosecution claim fails because there is no

genuine dispute regarding the first element. The record shows that,

following an interview with Stricklen on August 26, 2013, Investigator

DeNoon summarized in a charge sheet the following facts gleaned from

her interview with Stricklen:

     "[Seibert] has been served with three different documents:
     including a Standing Pendente Lite Order, Contempt of Court
     Order and a letter from [Stricklen's] attorney advising
     [Seibert] to stay away from [Stricklen]. [Seibert] has been
     seen since then looking into the windows at [Stricklen's] home
     at 11:30 at night and followed [Stricklen] to a friend's house
     where he waited and took pictures of her when she came out."

That same day, Investigator DeNoon signed a criminal complaint that

stated the following:

     "BEFORE       ME       THE         UNDERSIGNED
     JUDGE/CLERK/MAGISTRATE OF THE DISTRICT COURT
     OF MADISON COUNTY, ALABAMA, PERSONALLY
     APPEARED INV A DENOON WHO BEING DULY SWORN
     DEPOSES AND SAYS THAT HE/SHE HAS PROBABLE
     CAUSE FOR BELIEVING, AND DOES BELIVE THAT
     CARL MICHAEL SEIBERT[,] DEFENDANT, WHOSE
     NAME    IS  OTHERWISE    UNKNOWN        TO  THE
     COMPLAINANT, ... WITHIN THE ABOVE NAMED
     COUNTY AND ON OR ABOUT 8/14/13 ... VIOLATED THE
     PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13A-6-90.1 [OF THE CODE OF
     ALABAMA 1975] AND WHOSE CONDUCT IN DOING SO
     ALSO VIOLATED ANY COURT ORDER OR INJUNCTION,
     TO-WIT: DIVORCE DECREE WITH A PENDENTE LITE

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     ORDER ORDERING BOTH PARTIES RESTRAINED AND
     ENJOINED FROM CONTACTING OR GOING ABOUT ONE
     ANOTHER[;] ALSO A CONTEMPT IN VIOLATION OF
     SECTION 13A-6-91.1 OF THE CODE OF ALABAMA 1975 ...,
     AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE OF
     ALABAMA."

(Capitalization in original.) There is no dispute that Stricklen reported

the events of August 14, 2013, to Investigator DeNoon; that Seibert was

served with the documents described in the charge sheet; and that

Investigator DeNoon was the person to bring a criminal complaint

against Seibert. Nevertheless, Seibert contends that Stricklen "lied and

committed perjury by asserting that Seibert had been enjoined by a court

order that directed him to stay away from her." Seibert's brief at 17.

Essentially, Seibert believes that the standing pendente lite order --

which served as the basis for the charge against him -- had no injunctive

effect because (1) Stricklen never filed a motion pursuant to Rule 65, Ala.

R. Civ. P., seeking injunctive relief; (2) Seibert never received a hearing;

(3) no judge ever signed the order as required by Rule 58, Ala. R. Civ. P.;

or (4) the order was entered in violation of Rule 83, Ala. R. Civ. P. But

whether the standing pendente lite order actually had an injunctive

effect was, at the time Stricklen brought to Investigator DeNoon's

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attention Seibert's conduct, irrelevant. So even if we were to agree with

Seibert's conclusion, that conclusion still would have no bearing on

whether Stricklen misrepresented the facts to induce Investigator

DeNoon to act or whether Stricklen suppressed known material facts. See

Dismukes, 221 Ala. at 32, 127 So. at 190. It is undisputed that Stricklen

informed Investigator DeNoon of Seibert's conduct, of the existence of the

standing pendente lite order, and of the purported injunctive effect of the

order on the parties. None of this constituted a misrepresentation of the

facts at the time, nor could it be said that Stricklen suppressed known

material facts. The issue, then, was not whether the standing pendente

lite order was valid or effective, but merely whether the order existed.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment

in favor of Stricklen on Seibert's malicious-prosecution claim.

     II.   Abuse of Process

     To overcome the motion for a summary judgment on his abuse-of-

process claim against Stricklen and Aldige, Seibert had to present

substantial evidence demonstrating "(1) the existence of an ulterior

purpose; (2) the wrongful use of process; and (3) malice." Shoney's, Inc. v.

Barnett, 773 So. 2d 1015, 1024 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (citing C.C. & J., Inc.

                                    11
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v. Hagood, 711 So. 2d 947, 950 (Ala. 1998) (plurality opinion)). Regarding

the first element, Seibert avers that Stricklen and Aldige conspired by

fabricating false evidence to support the felony charge against him so

that Stricklen could acquire a favorable property settlement in the

divorce proceeding. In support of this contention, Seibert offers nothing

more than the bare statement that he had offered "in ... reply to the

summary judgment motion substantial evidence regarding this element

of an ulterior purpose." Seibert's brief at 33. Even assuming that Seibert

buttressed this assertion with substantial evidence, Stricklen and Aldige

are not liable simply because they allegedly had an ulterior purpose for

pursuing criminal charges against Seibert. "[W]hereas [malicious

prosecution] has to do with the wrong in the issuance of the process or in

causing the process to be issued," Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221, 1222

(Ala. 1979), abuse of process "rests upon the improper use of a regularly

issued process." Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 426, 165 So. 394, 396 (1936);

see also Hagood, 711 So. 2d at 950 ("[A]buse of process concerns the

wrongful use of process after it has been issued." (citing other cases)).

Therefore, Seibert was required to present substantial evidence

demonstrating that Stricklen and Aldige wrongfully used the criminal

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process against him to achieve an improper result. See Hagood, 711 So.

2d at 950. However, Seibert's arguments pertain solely to the issuance of

process and are thus relevant only to a malicious-prosecution claim and

not to an abuse-of-process claim. In fact, Seibert has presented no

evidence -- let alone substantial evidence -- demonstrating that Stricklen

and Aldige "performed any act to further the criminal complaint after the

issuance of process." Id. at 951. There is no evidence indicating that

Stricklen or Aldige promoted or encouraged the prosecution or that the

indictment was improperly used in the divorce proceeding to achieve a

property settlement that Stricklen would not otherwise have been

entitled to. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering a summary

judgment in favor of Stricklen and Aldige on Seibert's abuse-of-process

claim.

     III.   Administrative Order

     Seibert maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to strike Stricklen and Aldige's motion for a summary judgment because,

Seibert believes, the motion was filed outside the time limitations

imposed by a standing administrative order. That order required all

dispositive motions to "be filed at least 60 days prior to trial." There is no

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dispute that Stricklen and Aldige filed their motion for a summary

judgment 61 days before trial. Seibert's contention, however, is that their

motion was substantively deficient because, he says, it did not contain a

narrative summary or otherwise comply with Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., and

Stricklen and Aldige brought their motion into compliance with Rule 56

less than 60 days before trial.

     An    administrative    order   is   intended   to   assist   with   the

administration of a circuit court's docket by giving the circuit court ample

time to schedule motion hearings before trial. Thus, it is within the

circuit court's discretion to entertain even a "deficient" motion for a

summary judgment for the purpose of scheduling a hearing on the motion

so long as the motion complies with Rule 56(c)(1) and (2) upon service.

Indeed, Rule 56(c)(2) contemplates that a hearing on a motion for a

summary judgment might be set well ahead of service of all the materials

in support of the motion. Because Seibert was served with Stricklen and

Aldige's motion for a summary judgment and its supporting materials

more than 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing, see Rule 56(c)(2),

the trial court did not err in denying his motion to strike the motion for

a summary judgment.

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     IV.   Attorney Fees and Costs

     Finally, Seibert argues that the trial court erred in awarding

attorney fees and costs to Stricklen and Aldige under the ALAA. We

agree.

     "The plain language of § 12-19-270[, Ala. Code 1975,] states that

the court must make its award of attorney's fees under the [ALAA] as

part of its judgment on the merits of the case, 'in addition' to other costs

assessed against a frivolous litigant." Baker v. Williams Bros., Inc., 601

So. 2d 110, 112 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).

           "Additionally, we ... require a trial court making the
     'without substantial justification' determination [required for
     an award of attorney fees and costs under Ala. Code 1975,
     § 12-19-272, of the ALAA] to make its determination, the
     ground or grounds upon which it relies, and the legal or
     evidentiary support for its determination, a part of the record,
     either by drafting a separate written order or by having these
     findings transcribed for the official record."

Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA) v. Howell Petroleum Corp., 614 So. 2d 409,

418 (Ala. 1993).

     In its summary judgment in favor of Stricklen and Aldige, the trial

court noted "a claim pursuant to the ALABAMA LITIGATION

ACCOUNTABILITY ACT by DEFENDANT[S] against PLAINTIFF" and

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later stated "that DEFENDANTS have and are awarded judgment in

their favor as to all claims of the COMPLAINT, and as against

PLAINTIFF as to each claim in the above-styled case." (Capitalization in

original.) Thus, it appears that the trial court made its award of attorney

fees and costs as part of its judgment. But in a separate written order,

the trial court determined:

     "After consideration, the 'PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
     AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS,' as filed by
     DEFENDANTS, incorrectly labeled as 'plaintiffs' motion, is
     hereby GRANTED IN PART. As to the DEFENDANTS' claim
     under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, and the
     Court taking judicial knowledge of all pleadings and
     proceedings had in the above-styled matter, the PLAINTIFF
     is hereby taxed with the DEFENDANTS' attorney's fees, costs
     and out of pocket expenses incurred in the defense of the
     above-styled case in the amount of $12,318.78."

(Capitalization in original.) Because we cannot discern the grounds upon

which the trial court based its implicit determination that Seibert's

lawsuit was brought "without substantial justification," see § 12-19-272,

Ala. Code 1975, we must reverse the trial court's award under the ALAA

and remand the case for further proceedings. "[T]he trial court is

instructed, should it decide on remand to make a determination that the

[lawsuit] was filed 'without substantial justification,' to set forth its

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reasoning, based on the factors enumerated in Ala. Code 1975,

§ 12-19-273." Pacific Enters., 614 So. 2d at 419. Our court has

consistently held that to award attorney fees and costs under the ALAA

a trial court must provide detailed evidentiary support for its findings,

see, e.g., Williams v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of the City of

Prichard, 763 So. 2d 938, 942 (Ala. 1999), so that a reviewing court can

make a determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and

had a proper basis to support its conclusion that the lawsuit was filed

without substantial justification. Pacific Enters., 614 So. 2d at 418.

                                Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary judgment in

favor of Stricklen on the malicious-prosecution claim and in favor of

Stricklen and Aldige on the abuse-of-process claim; however, we reverse

the trial court's implicit determination that Seibert's lawsuit was filed

without substantial justification, and we remand the case to the trial

court with instructions to set forth its reasoning, based on the factors of

§ 12-19-273, Ala. Code 1975, as to why Stricklen and Aldige are entitled

to an award of attorney fees and costs under the ALAA.

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    AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

    Mendheim, Stewart, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur.

    Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion.

    Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.

    Wise, J., recuses herself.

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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

     I concur with the main opinion, except as to the analysis in Part I

of the Discussion section, and I concur fully in the result.

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