Court Opinion

ID: 9696673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:54:39.532466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:25.122702
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
BELL, C.J.
The majority holds that the empaneling, in a criminal case, of a jury, which includes a non-citizen, does not compromise the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial under either the United States or the Maryland Constitution, and, in any event, because the right is only statutory, not constitutional, by failing to inquire as to the citizenship status of the venire, the defendant waived the right to complain about the service of a non-citizen on the jury. I do not agree with either premise. On the contrary, I believe that Marcus Dannon Owens (“Owens”), the petitioner, did, and does now, have the constitutional right, federal and State, to a trial by jury composed only of citizens of the United States.1 I am also of the view that, even *433if the right to an all citizen jury is only statutory, Owens did not waive the right. To save this conviction, the majority holding, in that regard, imposes on criminal defendants a burden that is both unnecessary and unreasonable and, for good measure, misapplies our precedents. Therefore, I dissent.
I.
Whatever may be the case with respect to the constitutional right to jury trial, it is quite clear that Mr. Alade, a non-citizen, did not meet Maryland’s statutory requirements for juror qualification. Maryland Code (1973, Repl.Vol.2002) § 8-207(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) provides that, in order to serve on a jury, one must be, inter alia, an adult citizen of this State. As pertinent, it provides:
“(b) Grounds for disqualifications. — A person is qualified to serve as a juror unless he:
“(1) Is not constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where the court convenes;
*434* * * *
“(8) Is under 18 years of age[.]2
Section 8-207 also provides for limited instances of disqualification,3 specifically, where there is a language problem, an *435inability to speak, understand and/or write the English language, a documented disability which prevents satisfactory jury service and there is a disqualifying or pending disqualifying conviction.
Owens did not learn that one of the jurors who sat on his case, Mr. Alade, was a non-citizen until after he had been convicted. Indeed, if Mr. Alade had not informed the jury commissioner to the contrary,4 his citizenship status never would have become an issue; it undoubtedly would have remained undiscovered and, thus, unknown. That is not at all surprising, or should be: the majority points out that “[the jury commissioner’s office] does not review for accuracy the responses provided by juror candidates unless some information is missing,” 399 Md. 388, 400-01, 924 A.2d 1072, 1079 (2007), and, presumably because he had filled out the juror qualification form adequately, that office clearly did not verify Mr. Alade’s citizenship in this case. As it was required to do, pursuant to Maryland Code (2001) § 6-105 of the Criminal *436Procedure Article,5 the Circuit Court held a hearing to determine whether the non-disclosure, and/or the juror’s status, influenced the outcome of the trial, thus, entitling Owens to a new trial. The court found that neither denied Owens a fair trial. It, therefore, rejected Owens’ constitutional and statutory arguments. The court viewed Mr. Alade’s non-disclosure and consequent service on the jury to be purely a statutory matter, cognizable on voir dire. Because Owens did not pose a question, during voir dire, inquiring into the citizenship status of the venire, to include Mr. Alade, the court concluded that he had waived his objection to Mr. Alade’s service on the jury, notwithstanding his non-citizenship and the fact that, had that fact been known, he would have been required to have been struck for cause. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Like the trial court, it believed that voir dire, rather than post-judgment, was the proper time for Owens to have challenged unqualified jurors, and that his failure to inquire of the panel as to the citizenship of its members at that time is equivalent to a waiver of the challenge. Owens v. State, 170 Md.App. 85, 71-73, 906 A.2d 989, 1009-10 (2006). The majority concurs in that rationale. 399 Md. at 419-20, 924 A.2d at 1090.
II.
How the majority reaches the result it does is quite interesting and also most instructive. It acknowledges the three levels of screening that this Court has recognized potential jurors are subjected to ensure that they are minimally qualified to serve and, further, that each level of screening is performed by a different actor. 399 Md. at 418-20, 924 A.2d *437at 1089-90, citing and quoting Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 441, 671 A.2d 33, 38 (1996).6 Viewing those efforts as not much more than preliminary, certainly not conclusive, with respect to juror qualifications, the majority perceives the voir dire procedure, which it characterizes as “a proper procedural screening occasion to verify juror qualifications,” as the fall back position, “[i]n the event that the court’s internally-administered means of automatically disqualifying prospective jurors has failed to eliminate a disqualified juror.” Id. at 419, 924 A.2d at 1090. For that proposition, it relies on Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98, 112, 904 A.2d 534, 542 (2006); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 331, 825 A.2d 1008, 1035 (2003) and Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819, 823 (2000), in turn citing Boyd, 341 Md. at 435, 671 A.2d at 35, Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 191 A.2d 435, 436 (1963), Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995), and Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989). It is from this premise that the majority asserts “a defendant’s failure to pursue the opportunity to question prospective jurors as to citizenship during voir dire constitutes a waiver of the statutory means of *438protecting the right to a citizen jury.” Id. at 419-20, 924 A.2d at 1090.
The implications of the pre-screening process — that it is monitored by the jury commissioner’s office, an arm of the court, that a question on the juror qualification questionnaire specifically asked the citizenship question and that it was in this case answered albeit, and perhaps inadvertently, incorrectly — and the fact that voir dire inquiries into juror qualifications are not mandatory questions, see Boyd, 341 Md. at 446-47, 671 A.2d at 40-41, are not lost on the majority. Its response to the former is facile and predictable: “ ‘[w]hile [Owens] may have assumed that the venire panel had been pre-screened based on the jury questionnaire, it is easy to anticipate that mistakes do occur, which is why a questionnaire alone is not the sole tool used to select a jury.’ ” Id. at 419, 924 A.2d at 1090, quoting Owens v. State, 170 Md.App. at 73, 906 A.2d at 1010. It buttresses its logic by citing a ease, decided 113 years before Boyd and whose rationale is inconsistent with Boyd’s holding and rationale. Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215, 221-22 (1883)7
As to the latter, the majority confesses partial error, and, thus, overrules that portion of Boyd that made voir dire questions concerning minimum statutory qualifications for jurors discretionary, rather than mandatory. It pronounces *439itself satisfied “that it is in the better interests of justice to require trial judges to pose voir dire questions directed at exposing constitutional and statutory disqualifications when requested by a party.” 399 Md. at 422, 924 A.2d at 1092. Its explanation for why that is necessary is classic bootstrapping:
“The rule in Boyd that voir dire questions concerning minimum statutory qualifications are not mandatory when sought was animated, in part, by a belief that such questions duplicate needlessly the efforts of the pre-voir dire screening methods which focus on statutory disqualifications. That cases such as the present one occur demonstrate a correctable weakness in this reasoning. Because the prevoir dire screening methods failed to identify and excuse Alade, a non-citizen, it is evident that voir dire questions regarding minimum statutory qualifications are not always ‘redundant and unnecessary.’ In fact, our cases ruminate that the pre-voir dire processes of screening out disqualified jurors are not fail-safe.... ”
Id. at 422, 924 A.2d at 1091-92 (footnote and citation omitted). In support of the latter proposition, the majority again turns to Johns v. Hodge. And it directs our attention to the concession by the jury commissioner for Howard County, “that his staff did not confirm the veracity of the information contained on juror questionnaires and the orientation session also failed to address citizenship as a qualification.” Id. at 419-20 n. 42, 924 A.2d at 1090 n. 42.
The partial overruling of Boyd is prospective, of course, and does not, therefore, serve to make the question in this case mandatory. Nevertheless, presumably because, in the majority’s view, the defendant could, and probably should, have anticipated that there could be a failure of the screening process, thus allowing a non-citizen to slip through the cracks, the majority faults Owens for relying on the screening procedures and not asking the court to again ask the venire a question to which everyone of them already had responded, and consistently so with service on the jury. To it, because the trial court’s refusal to ask the question could have been *440reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Owens may only benefit from the jury deficiency if he asked the trial court to inquire of the venire concerning an issue as to which he had no basis for inquiring.8
At the outset, the voir dire process is not a back-up to the juror qualification process; its office is not to “verify juror qualifications.” None of the cases cited for this proposition support it. To be sure, in Williams, 394 Md. at 112, 904 A.2d at 542, we said that “[V]oir dire is the mechanism by which we give substance to the constitutional guarantee to criminal defendants of a fair and impartial jury trial,” which, we made clear, was accomplished by “exclud[ingj from the venire potential jurors for whom there exists cause for disqualification, so the jury that remains is capable of deciding the matter before it based solely on the facts presented, and uninfluenced by extraneous considerations.” Id. at 107, 904 A.2d at 539, citing *441Hill, 339 Md. at 279, 661 A.2d at 1166, in which we stated that the voir dire procedure is undergirded by the “single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: ‘to ascertain “the existence of cause for disqualification.” ’ ” Quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959), in turn quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952). See Jenkins, 375 Md. at 331, 825 A.2d at 1035-36 (“[0]ne of the ways to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury is to expose the existence of factors which could cause a juror to be biased or prejudiced through the process of voir dire examination”); Dingle, 361 Md. at 9, 759 A.2d at 823 (stating that voir dire is the process by which prospective jurors are examined to determine whether cause for disqualification exists); Boyd, 341 Md. at 435, 671 A.2d at 35 (same).
In Boyd, we explained the nature of the disqualification to which we had reference:
“In virtually all our previous cases ..., the proposed questions concerning specific cause for disqualification were related to the biases, such as racial or religious interests or prejudices, of the prospective jurors. As a result, in discussing what type of questions must be asked on voir dire, we have defined the proper focus of the voir dire examination to be only “the venireperson’s state of mind and the existence of bias, prejudice, or preconception, i.e., ‘a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification....’” Hill, 339 Md. at 280, 661 A.2d at 1167, citing Davis[ v. State], 333 Md. [27,] 37, 633 A.2d [867,] 872 [(1993)]. Although we did make a general statement in Davis that the minimum statutory qualifications for jurors would be included in the mandatory scope of voir dire, that case pertained solely to possible biases the venirepersons might have had in favor of law enforcement personnel, and our analysis and application of the rules of voir dire involved primarily the search for bias.”
341 Md. at 436-37, 671 A.2d at 36. Thus, Boyd and all of the cases the majority cites, with the exception of the over-broad statement in Davis v. State, addressed a process developed to ensure juror impartiality, not to verify juror qualification.
*442This is consistent with the elaborate system for vetting potential jurors that the Court identified and described in Part IV of the Boyd decision. 341 Md. at 441-45, 671 A.2d at 38-40. That system, whose origin is a statutory scheme of some sophistication, is implemented by Rules of this Court in which this Court plays a significant role. The Rule requires each circuit court to develop a jury plan, which must be approved by the Court of Appeals. The plan prescribes the procedures for compiling a list of potential jurors meeting the minimum statutory qualifications and for processing them. It assigns responsibility for the superintendence of the process to court personnel, including the bench or jury judge, and it contemplates that such personnel will gather the necessary information and do what is required to amass a venire, to develop a pool from which impartial juries may be selected. That system, I submit, contemplates that the litigants will rely on the results of the process. It simply is inconceivable that the majority’s view of the jury plans and the very important tasks assigned to court personnel in order to develop a venire is correct. That certainly is not how this Court viewed such systems in Boyd.
There, we construed the jury selection subtitle as being “concerned with the removal of unnecessary screening barriers,” so that mandatory voir dire of prospective jurors about matters (in that case, their physical limitations) already thoroughly covered earlier in the selection process “imposes an unnecessary screening barrier. Indeed, further questioning may embarrass or intrude upon the privacy of a prospective juror.” Boyd, 341 Md. at 446, 671 A.2d at 40 (emphasis in original). That is especially the case, we added, “when an affirmative answer does not by any means denote likely disqualification[.]” Id. We also said:
“The petitioners cannot specify a single reason why further questioning specifically on physical limitations is necessary. We acknowledge that a question on voir dire about physical limitations of jurors and addressed to all venirepersons might occasionally result in disqualification of a juror; but so might literally any other line of questioning. Defendants *443have not documented instances where the juror selection process failed completely to screen out physically incapable jurors, who would have been identified and excused had the question been asked on voir dire. In short, unless the judge has made some observations regarding possible physical problems, such questioning can become merely a general attempt to ‘fish’ about for more information than is necessary about prospective jurors. Certainly it is not reasonably likely to lead to cause for disqualification.”
Id., 671 A.2d at 40-41. These observations apply with at least equal force to the case sub judice, with the exception of the likelihood of disqualification. Owens had no reason to suspect that Mr. Alade was not a citizen and neither did anyone else. The trial judge, so far as the record reflects, had not made any observations concerning possible citizenship problems and certainly the pre-screening process had revealed none.9 Under these circumstances, there was no basis to ask the question, the screening already having been done, and there simply is no basis for believing that had it been proposed, it would have been met with anything but a refusal, in the absence of the proffer of some basis for doing so.
There is also in this case no showing of “documented instances” where the juror selection process has failed completely to screen out nor-citizens, just this case. That is not enough, I submit, not by a long shot. Nothing is perfect. There simply is no completely fail-safe system, no matter what it is intended to accomplish. Because this is so, one always can anticipate and expect mistakes. But this fact does not mean that the system is broken. It is not a reason to deny to a party the right to rely on the results of the process or to change the responsibility for inquiring, in hopes of discovering *444the pertinent information. It is not a basis for holding a party to a different standard or changing the jurisprudence.
Maryland is, and has prided itself on being, a limited voir dire State. See Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593, 602, 903 A.2d 922, 928 (2006); Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206, 216, 884 A.2d 142, 147 (2005); State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 215-17, 798 A.2d 566, 574-75 (2002); Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 40-43, 633 A.2d at 870, 873-75. There are, at present, only a few mandatory inquiries. Dingle, 361 Md. at 11 n. 8, 759 A.2d at 824 n. 8, listed those this Court has identified: “racial, ethnic and cultural bias,” Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 232, 742 A.2d 952, 967 (1999); Hill, 339 Md. at 285, 661 A.2d at 1169; Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 15, 595 A.2d 448, 455 (1991), religious bias, Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 606-07, 143 A.2d 627, 632 (1958), predisposition as to the use of circumstantial evidence in capital cases, Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343-44 (1946), and placement of undue weight on police officer credibility, see Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 349, 378 A.2d 1338, 1344 (1977). To these, we may add the inquiries approved in Thomas, 369 Md. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573 (bias due to the nature of the narcotics crime with which the defendant is charged) and Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 9-10, 806 A.2d 265, 271 (2002) (applying Thomas to sexual abuse related crimes). All of these categories involve “potential biases or predispositions that prospective jurors may hold which, if present, would hinder their ability to objectively resolve the matter before them.” Davis, 333 Md. at 36, 633 A.2d at 872. Ironically, this case expands those categories to each and every qualification category there is. Questions proposed as to any of them, whether there is basis for them or not, will have to be asked; there simply is no basis for doing otherwise. The jury commissioner is just as likely to make mistakes as to any one of them as he or she has done with regard to citizenship. Moreover, an attorney representing a defendant will be constrained to ask each of the questions for fear of later post-conviction — the failure to ask and there subsequently turns up information showing a juror was disqualified for failing to meet one of them would be incompe*445tency of counsel, as the defendant’s right to appeal would have been lost. This hardly seems to be productive of judicial economy. Just the opposite.
Judge CATHELL joins in the views herein expressed.

. On this point, I am not persuaded by the majority's analysis. I incline to the view advanced by and forcefully advocated by the petitioner. I do not address this issue specifically, however, believing that the petitioner is entitled to reversal even if the right is only statutory. I note, however, that it is well settled that a jury consists of one’s peers and that, as the Constitution required, see Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the General Assembly, by prescribing the qualifications for jury service, made clear that, for that purpose, a defendant's peers are his or her fellow citizens. Thus, while it may be true that neither Constitution explicitly states that only citizens may serve on juries, the implementing legislation, which necessarily is complementary and explanatory, does. Bear in mind that the legislature may not legislate in derogation of the Constitution. See Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140; Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979).
Although it was dismissed summarily as having no application to this case, 399 Md. 388, 442-43, 924 A.2d 1072, 1081-82 (2007), I believe Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be quite relevant *432and, indeed, that its application is dispositive with respect to the composition of an "impartial jury,” as consisting only of citizens. In this view, I am persuaded by Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.Supp. 134 (D.Md.1974). In that case, a non-citizen challenged [his/her] exclusion from jury service. In rejecting that challenge, the court enunciated principles that are just as, if not particularly, applicable to this case. The Perkins Court stated:
"This Court considers that grand and petit jurors in both state and federal courts are 'persons holding ... important nonelective ... judicial positions’, that they participate directly in the execution of the laws and 'perform functions that go to the heart of representative government.’ Blackstone [3 Blackstone Commentaries, Sec. 380] considered juries as ‘the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice.' The institution of jury trial, he said, 'preserves in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have in the administration of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy citizens.’ In No. 83 of The Federalist [at 562 (J. Cooke Ed. 1961) (Hamilton)], Alexander Hamilton, after referring to the 'high estimation’ in which he held the institution of jury trial, concluded that 'it would be altogether superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or essential in a representative republic, or how much more merit it may be entitled to as a defense against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch, than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious than beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty.’
370 F.Supp. at 137. The Court went on to state:
"In maintaining the jury system as ‘the very palladium of free government’ the states logically can anticipate that native-born citizens would be conversant with the social and political institutions of our society, the customs of the locality, the nuances of local tradition and language. Likewise naturalized citizens, who have passed through the citizenship classes sponsored by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, have demonstrated a basic understanding of our form of government, history and traditions. There is no corresponding basis for assuming that resident aliens, who owe allegiance not to any state or to the federal government, but are subjects of a foreign power, have so assimilated our societal and political mores that an equal reliance could be placed on their performing as well as citizens the duties of jurors in our judicial system.
"The nature or the operation of juries makes it apparent that persons unfit for jury service can work a great deal of harm, through inability or malice, to efficiency and fairness. Jury deliberations are perhaps the most secret form of decision-making in the nation; the means of persuasion used by jurors on each other are never revealed. A single juror who failed to understand the import of the evidence being presented or who lacked any concern for the fairness of the outcome could severely obstruct or distort the course of justice. A single persuasive and unprincipled juror could even direct the course of justice into channels deliberately chosen for their deleterious effect *433on this country. We conclude, therefore, that the state has a compelling interest in the restriction of jury service to those who will be loyal to, interested in, and familiar with, the customs of this country.”
Id. at 138. The court recognized, quite correctly, that "service on juries is the prime example of an instance ‘where citizenship bears some rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position.’” Id., quoting Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F.Supp. 906, 911 (D.C.N.Y.1971) (Lumbard, J. concurring); see Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291, 11 S.Ct. 770, 35 L.Ed. 510 (1891); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879) (recognizing the special relationship between citizenship and jury service).
Because I believe the right to an impartial jury requires the jury to consist of citizens and that right is constitutionally given, the standard for waiver is significantly different, it must be done "knowingly and voluntarily,” a proposition with which the majority does not disagree. 399 Md. at 404-05, 418-19 n.41, 924 A.2d at 1081, 1089-90 n.41. In this case, the record is clear, Owens was not aware that Mr. Alade was not a citizen until after his trial and, thus, he could not have waived his right to an impartial jury trial knowingly and voluntarily.

. It is perfectly clear that former Maryland Code (1973, Repl.Vol.2002) § 8-207(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article required a prospective juror to be a citizen of the United States, for in order to vote in any county of this State, one must be, pursuant to Maryland Code (2003) § 3-102(a)(l) of the Election Law Article, a United States citizen. The current iteration of § 8-207(b), codified at Maryland Code (1973, Repl.Vol.2006) § 8-103(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, is even clearer, using express language to that effect:
"(a) Requirements. — Notwithstanding § 8-102 of this subtitle, an individual qualifies for jury service for a county only if the individual:
"(1) Is an adult as of the day selected as a prospective juror;
"(2) Is a citizen of the United States; and
"(3) Resides in the county as of the day sworn as a juror.”
(Emphasis added).

. See CJP § 8-207(b), which provided:
"(b) Grounds for disqualification. — A person is qualified to serve as a juror unless he:
"(1) Is not constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where the court convenes;
"(2) Is unable to read, write, or understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;
"(3) Is unable to speak the English language or comprehend spoken English;
"(4) Is incapable, by reason of physical or mental infirmity, of rendering satisfactory jury service; any person claiming such a disqualification may be required to submit a doctor’s certificate as to the nature of the infirmity;
"(5) Has a charge pending against him for a crime punishable by a fine of more than $500, or by imprisonment for more than six months, or both, or has been convicted of such a crime and has received a sentence of a fine of more than $500, or of imprisonment for more than six months, or both, and has not been pardoned;
"(6) Has a charge pending against him for, or has been convicted of, an offense punishable under the provision of § 8-401(c) of this title.”
"(7) Is a party in a civil suit, except for those civil actions in which a party is not entitled to a jury trial, pending in the court in which he is called to serve;
"(8) Is under the age of 18 years of age;
"(9) Fails to meet any other objective test prescribed by the Court of Appeals.
*435This section now is codified at CPJ § 8-103(b), see Acts of 2006, ch. 372, and provides:
"Disqualifying factors
"(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and subject to the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, an individual is not qualified for jury service if the individual:
"(1) Cannot comprehend spoken English or speak English;
"(2) Cannot comprehend written English, read English, or write English proficiently enough to complete a juror qualification form satisfactorily;
“(3) Has a disability that, as documented by a health care provider’s certification, prevents the individual from providing satisfactory jury service;
"(4) Has been convicted, in a federal or State court of record, of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months and received a sentence of imprisonment for more than 6 months; or
"(5) Has a charge pending, in a federal or State court of record, for a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months.”

. Perhaps it is because Mr. Alade, on his own, advised the jury commissioner of his alien status that Mr. Alade's assertion that he did not intentionally misrepresent his status is not being challenged. What is troubling, of course, is the lack of verification or follow-up by the jury commissioner's office.

. Maryland Code (2001) § 6-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides, as relevant:
"(a) Timing of hearing on motion. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a court in which a motion for new trial in a criminal case is pending shall hear the motion:
"(l)within 10 days after the motion is filed; or
"(2) if an agreed statement of the evidence or a statement of the evidence certified by the trial judge is filed, within 10 days after the statement is filed.”

. The first level occurs when the juror qualification form is executed and returned and it is under the supervision of the jury commissioner's office, overseen by the jury judge. The second level occurs when the potential juror comes to court; he or she then is seen by, and may be interviewed by, the jury commissioner or the jury judge. At this stage, "upon the juror's appearance at the court," as Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 444, 671 A.2d 33, 39 (1996), makes clear, "the jury judge or commissioner [is authorized] to question the potential juror further on the information contained in the questionnaire.” The third level occurs in the courtroom during jury selection, when, in the superintendence of the process, the trial judge has the opportunity to observe the venire. The main purpose of the juror qualification questionnaire is the formation of a jury pool. Necessarily, therefore, the object of the inquiry largely relates to whether, at the threshold, the potential juror meets the minimum qualifications of a juror. It is still at issue, although, perhaps not so much as at the questionnaire stage, at the second screening, where deferrals or excuses from service take on a greater importance. As we shall see, infra, the jury pool having been set and two screenings having already occurred, the focus at the third screening is on empaneling a fair and impartial juiy, not determining whether the venire is properly constituted. At that stage, it is assumed to be, and reasonably so.

. In Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215, 221-22 (1883), our predecessors reasoned:
"The right of challenge itself is a safeguard provided by law in contemplation of the contingency that the officers whose duly it is to select only qualified persons have failed in the performance of that duty. It is a means specially provided by which a party to a suit may readily and effectually protect him self against any oversight or neglect committed in the original selection.”
That reasoning is the exact opposite of that employed by this Court in Boyd. Rather than applaud an inquiry aimed at checking the adequacy with which the jury commissioner or comparable official performed, we decried and discouraged the "redundancy.” 341 Md. at 438, 671 A.2d at 37 (indicating that the inquiry in that case, involving physical infirmity, one of the enumerated minimum qualifications, was "to be conducted at several earlier points in the juror selection process, rendering the requested questions unnecessary on voir dire.”).

. Self-servingly, the trial court indicated that, had Owens proposed a “citizenship” question, the court would in all likelihood have asked it, and Mr. Alade would have been excused. The majority accepts that speculation. That is all that is, speculation. And speculation is much too tenuous support for the denial of so important a right. There is, moreover, not even a guarantee that Mr. Alade would have responded to the question. After all, he had once, already, inadvertently failed to respond correctly to a rather straight-forward and unambiguous question.
It is curious that the majority believes that the respondent would have been helped by proposing the citizenship question to be put to the venire. That presupposes that the information now known either should have been known then or would become known during the voir dire process. Otherwise, because the exercise of discretion is judged on the basis of information known, and the facts and circumstances existing, when the discretion is exercised, the later discovery of the lack of citizenship on the part of Mr. Alade would not inform the decision on review. As the majority has correctly pointed out, that a juror provides false information does not guarantee relief. See 399 Md. at 423-24, 924 A.2d at 1092-93, citing Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 144—46, 691 A.2d 1255, 1265-66 (1997); Leach v. State, 47 Md.App. 611, 618-19, 425 A.2d 234, 238-39 (1981) (affirming the refusal to strike a juror, who upon cross-examination at trial, was discovered to be an old neighbor and acquaintance of a State's witness when the trial judge was satisfied that the juror had no bias and Burkett v. State, 21 Md.App. 438, 445, 319 A.2d 845, 849 (1974)(failure to reveal relationship to prosecutor)). The interest of justice could and probably would suffice as a basis for *441relief, I would have thought, but it is an avenue available in this case already.

. That the jury commission office did not verify Mr. Alade's citizenship or challenge his assertion that he was a citizen is not a basis for suggesting that Owens should have known to inquire. Just the opposite, the responsibility for developing the jury pool, which necessarily requires the screening of the potential jurors for eligibility, is placed on the jury commission office, not the defendant. This opinion shifts that responsibility and it does so unreasonably and unnecessarily.