Court Opinion

ID: 9481360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:16:45.849065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:15.980126
License: Public Domain

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge,
with whom PREGERSON, ALARCON, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
The majority acknowledges the indispensability in our criminal justice system of the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That high standard of proof is required by the due process clause of the Constitution for reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in In re Winship:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Court further emphasized that the standard must play an important instructive role for the jury.
To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’
Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072.
Nevertheless, the majority declines to require trial judges to give any explanation of the reasonable doubt standard to the jury other than stating the bare words “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because I believe the majority’s approach is inadequate, I respectfully dissent.
The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” conveys an important legal concept. It is not a common phrase used by lay people and does not have a self-evident meaning. True, each word in the phrase occurs regularly in common speech. However, placed together without further explanation, the words do not necessarily convey the high standard of proof that the due process clause requires. United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1981) (Anderson, J., concurring). It is not immediately obvious to individuals untrained in the law that proof beyond a reasonable doubt means a higher level of proof than a preponderance of the evidence. See David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, “Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice,” 59 Judicature 478, 481-82 (May 1976) (study shows high standard of proof not comprehended from the language “to the exclusion of and beyond every reasonable doubt”). Some explanation is necessary to alert the jurors that they must be almost certain before returning a verdict of guilty. See McBaine, *874Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif.L.Rev. 242, 265-66 (1944).
An instruction should explain to jurors that before they can convict, they must be firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. Simple repetition of the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” does not adequately communicate to jurors the degree to which they must be convinced. In addition, by taking the time to explain the meaning of reasonable doubt, the judge impresses upon the jury the importance and seriousness of the high level of proof demanded by the reasonable doubt standard. Moreover, an instruction that defines reasonable doubt provides a basis from which the defense attorney can argue, and the jurors can discuss, the convincing force of the evidence. Jurors need to be given a connection between the reasonable doubt language and their own more familiar decisionmaking processes. Cf. William W. Schwarzer, “Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies,” 69 Calif.L.Rev., 731, 741 (1981) (jurors better understand abstract statements of legal principles when somehow connected to their prior experience or placed in a concrete context).
A model instruction that furthers this purpose has been suggested by Edward J. Devitt and Charles B. Blackmar:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense — the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
Edward J. Devitt & Charles B. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 3d ed., § 11.14 (1977). The Supreme Court approved similar language in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). Other definitions of reasonable doubt developed from trial experience may serve to instruct the jury just as well as Devitt and Blackmar’s suggestion. See, e.g., Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit § 3.03 (West 1989) (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty.”).
Of course, trial judges should be discouraged from deviating substantially from standard definitions of reasonable doubt approved by experience. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 68-69 (2d Cir.1983). The Supreme Court has pointed out that many attempted definitions do not make the term more understandable. Holland, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 137 (quoting Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312, 26 L.Ed. 481 (1880) (“Attempts to explain the term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.”)). There is a real danger that a judge’s novel formulation will dimmish rather than emphasize the government’s burden of proof, requiring reversal. See, e.g., Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 889-91 (10th Cir.1990) (judge’s “willingness to act” language, and language equating “reasonable” doubt with “substantial” doubt, imposed “a less stringent burden of proof on the government than is constitutionally required”). See also, Cage v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).
Nevertheless, no definition at all leaves the jury without sufficient guidance on the extent of the government’s burden. As the original panel in this case noted,
[Explaining the meaning of the term reasonable doubt could be of considerable assistance to a jury and could well increase the chances that the verdict will be consistent with the mandates of the constitution_ Accordingly, we conclude that the better practice is for the district court to give a reasonable doubt instruction in all cases.
Due process principles require that guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, due process principles require a judge to define that standard adequately for the jury — the group charged with the solemn task of determining guilt or innocence. I believe that failure to do so con*875stitutes plain and reversible error.1

. Four circuits agree that the failure to define reasonable doubt constitutes reversible error. Blatt v. United States, 60 F.2d 481, 481 (3d Cir.1932); Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir.1967); United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143-44 (10th Cir.1974); Mundy v. United States, 176 F.2d 32, 32-33 (D.C.Cir.1949).
Four circuits agree with the majority that the decision to define reasonable doubt should be left to the trial court’s discretion. United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 644-46 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1739, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 68-69 (2d Cir.1983); Thompson v. Ly-naugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1035, 108 S.Ct. 5, 97 L.Ed.2d 794 (1987); Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869, 871-73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843, 104 S.Ct. 141, 78 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983).
Two additional circuit courts leave the decision to define with the trial court, but strongly condemn the use of any definition. Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-79 (4th Cir.1985), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1037-39 (7th Cir.1988).
The eleventh circuit has not yet considered the question.