Court Opinion

ID: 9599738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:21:09.728123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:46.715147
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority of the court holds that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial when conduct by an Alaska State Trooper revealed to the jury that Hines was in custody. I disagree.
In Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1974), the Alaska Supreme Court stated:
A defendant is presumed innocent throughout the trial, and he should be permitted to face the jury with the appearance and dignity of a free and innocent man.... We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that:
It is inherently unfair to try a defendant for crime while garbed in his jail uniform_ No insinuations, indications or implications suggesting guilt should be displayed before the jury other than admissible evidence and permissible argument.
Aside from being allowed his own attire, the defendant upon retrial should also be permitted to make himself clean and presentable. He should be allowed to shave and to shower before appearing in court. In the courtroom guards should remain outside the observation of the jury, and should deliver the defendant to the counsel table before the jury’s arrival if necessary; manacles, shackles and other physical restraints are, of course, to be avoided.
Id. at 495-96 (footnotes omitted), quoting Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir.1967) (emphasis added).
In Dunn v. State, 653 P.2d 1071, 1086 (Alaska App.1982), this court had occasion to consider the extent to which Anthony governed the conduct of uniformed guards and officers who are present in the courtroom to maintain control over the defendant during trial. We held, in relevant part:
We believe that, in assessing questions concerning the appearance before jurors of defendants who are incarcerated, our focus must be fixed upon a practical assessment of whether a defendant’s treatment in the individual case would reasonably have led a jury to conclude that he was being held in custody, subjected to restraints or kept under a level of supervision indicating a belief on the part of the court in the defendant’s guilt.
In the present case it is difficult to tell from the record exactly what the trooper did or to gauge the precise impact on the jury of his conduct. It is sufficient to note, however, that those who are present and actually saw what happened — Hines’ trial counsel, the prosecutor and the trial judge — all apparently recognized that the trooper’s actions probably communicated to the jury the fact that Hines was in the trooper’s custody. On appeal, the state does not contend otherwise.
Under the circumstances, I think it is evident that the trooper’s conduct violated the holdings of Anthony and Dunn: it is in effect undisputed that his conduct “would reasonably have led a jury to conclude that [Hines] was in custody, subjected to restraints or kept under a level of supervision indicating a belief on the part of the court in the defendant’s guilt.” Dunn, 653 P.2d at 1086. Thus, the primary question remaining in this case is whether a mistrial was necessary in light of the violation.
In resolving this question I think it is crucial to note at the outset that the conduct giving rise to an appearance of custody here could readily have been avoided by a clear policy, adopted in advance of trial, establishing appropriate procedures for the handling of the accused. Both this court and the Alaska Supreme Court have consistently emphasized that the trial court bears the primary responsibility for adopting procedures to avoid jeopardizing the accused’s right to rely on the presumption of innocence throughout trial. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 629 P.2d 54, 57 (Alaska 1981); Dunn v. State, 653 P.2d at 1086; Thomae v. State, 632 P.2d 236-41 (Alaska App.1981). In this case the trial court did *1182not carry out its responsibility. Instead, the court apparently allowed the troopers to determine and follow their own procedures for supervising prisoners in the courtroom.
There is no reason to believe that inadvertent disclosure to the jury of the fact that a defendant is incarcerated should be an inevitable, or even a frequent, occurrence. In any event, this is not a case in which it is even arguable that such a disclosure occurred despite reasonable precautions; nor is there any reason to believe that a similar disclosure would be made upon retrial.
The evidence in this case was extremely close at trial. The issue of guilt turned almost exclusively on whether the jury would believe Hines’ testimony or the testimony of the victim. The victim’s testimony was substantially impeached. In these circumstances, even the slightest indication that Hines was in custody could have led to significant jury prejudice. Jurors could readily have inferred that, if Hines was apparently in custody, it must be because he was dangerous or because the court believed him to be guilty. Any juror drawing such an inference might understandably become reluctant to believe Hines’ version of events. The point bears emphasis that the type of prejudice at issue in this case lies in the inherent psychological impact on the jury which is engendered by any appearance that the defendant is actually in custody during the course of trial: Cf. Williams v. State, 629 P.2d at 57-58 (prejudice to a defendant of requiring witness to appear in handcuffs lies in inherent psychological impact, not merely in the fact that the jury might suspect witness committed a crime).
Nor do I view the trial court’s offer of a curative instruction to be sufficient in this case to eliminate or reduce the potential for prejudice. Cf. McBeth v. State, 652 P.2d 120, 126 (Alaska App.1982) (failure to object to a question was not significant where the question itself was prejudicial and an objection, if sustained, would not have cured the potential prejudice). Once the jury saw that Hines was in custody an instruction would have done little to cure the damage. To the contrary, an instruction to the jury would have served only to emphasize, in unmistakable terms, the fact that Hines was in custody.
In summary, I believe the record demonstrates a violation of the rule in Anthony. Given the extreme closeness of the evidence at trial, the avoidable nature of the violation, and the trial court’s failure to take precautions in advance of trial to avoid such a violation, I would hold that denial of Hines’ motion for a mistrial was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 237 (Alaska 1967); Dyer v. State, 666 P.2d 438, 453 (Alaska App.1983); Roth v. State, 626 P.2d 583, 585 (Alaska App.1981).