Court Opinion

ID: 9713956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:27:27.93887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.093987
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, J.,
Dissents.
Dissenting Opinion by MURPHY, J.
In my opinion, neither Mr. Diggs nor Mr. Ramsey is entitled to a new trial. From my review of the records, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, “the judge’s egregious and repeated behavior reflecting partiality and bias during these trials denied Diggs and Ramsey their right to fair and impartial trials[.]”

State v. Diggs

In this case, the jurors were entitled to know whether Sherienne Diggs had ever provided an agent of the State with the information she provided during her direct examination. I would not grant a new trial on the ground that the Circuit Court asked questions that the prosecutor was clearly entitled to ask. In United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729 (4th Cir.1967), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated:
[The trial judge] is not a bump on a log, nor even a referee at a prizefight. He has not only the right, but he has the duty to participate in the examination of witnesses when necessary to bring out matters that have been insufficiently developed by counsel. He is in charge of the trial and may exercise his control to assure that the jury is not mislead by unfair phrasing of questions by counsel. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54, 68 S.Ct. 391, 92 L.Ed. 468 (1948) [Frankfurter, J., dissenting]; United States v. Godel, *296361 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.1966); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 412, 86 L.Ed. 555 (1941). “A trial judge, who is after all ‘the only disinterested lawyer connected with the proceeding’, has the duty to help make clear to the jury the facts and circumstances pertinent to the case. ‘He should not hesitate to ask questions for the purpose of developing the facts; and it is no ground of complaint that the facts so developed may hurt or help one side or the other.’ ” United States v. Godel, supra, 361 F.2d at 24 [quoting from Simon v. United States, supra, 123 F.2d at 83].
Id. at 732.
Moreover, the jurors who convicted Mr. Diggs received the following instructions:
... [A]ny comments that I make about the facts, if I do make any comments about the facts, are not binding upon you and are advisory only. It is your duty to decide the facts and apply the law as I give it to you to those facts.
* * *
During the trial I may have commented on the evidence or I may comment now, or I may have asked a question of a witness. Do not draw any inference or conclusions from my comments or my questions, either as to the merits of the case or as to my views regarding the witness or my views about the case.
In my opinion, the fact that the jury “hung” on the “possession with intent to distribute” charge reinforces the presumption that the jury followed those instructions. I would therefore affirm on the basis of this presumption even if the “partiality” issue had been preserved for appellate review. I would also reject the argument that we should apply the “repeated and egregious behavior” exception to the rule “that defense counsel must object in order to seek correction by the judge and preserve the issue for appeal.”
It is clear that Mr. Diggs’ trial counsel did not object to the questions asked by the Circuit Court during (1) Detective *297Giganti’s testimony, or (2) Sherienne Diggs’ direct examination. It is anything but clear, however, “that continuous objections would have been futile and unprofessional and created more hostility and tension.” The record shows that, after an objection was finally interposed during Ms. Diggs’ cross-examination, the Circuit Court did not ask any more questions of that witness. The record also shows that Ms. Diggs, who insisted that she be permitted to “finish” her answers, was not intimidated in the least by the Circuit Court’s questions.
I disagree with the conclusion that Mr. Diggs’ trial counsel did not “adequately represent” her client. Whatever might be said about defense counsel, the record shows that she was not afraid to request appropriate relief on behalf of her client. In addition to engaging in a sharp exchange with the Circuit Court at the bench conference that occurred during Ms. Diggs’ cross-examination, defense counsel made the following comments during closing argument:
The judge in this particular case was unable to treat those people equally on the witness stand. In other words, when the officers were on the stand even the judge was like, oh, officer, you don’t remember, that was so long ago. Very, you know, smoozey and polite to those particular witnesses, but when [Mr. Diggs and his sister] got on the stand it was .. . almost to the point of bullying. Those groups of people were treated differently and they weren’t supposed to be. Why? Why did that happen? Well, he’s a human being. Something in his past or the way he feels caused him to treat two different people differently. It’s not supposed to be that way. Every person is supposed to be treated the same by the Court with the same dignity and respect. But it’s a perfect example that even though we would like to believe that human beings don’t let their hatred cause them to do wrong things, it does happen. It does happen and you saw it here during this trial.
In overruling the prosecutor’s objection to that argument, the Circuit Court exhibited exceptional restraint. I would affirm the judgment of conviction on the ground that defense *298counsel’s “failure to object [to the questions about which Mr. Diggs now complains] was [nothing] more than a matter of trial tactics, which [should] afford no ground for reversal.” Woodell v. State, 223 Md. 89, 97, 162 A.2d 468, 473 (1960).

State v. Ramsey

Mr. Ramsey, who testified during the suppression hearing but did not testify at trial, conceded at sentencing that he had indeed been in possession of the drugs seized by Officer Torbit, but told the Circuit Court that he was a “user” who stole them from where they had been “stashed” by a “seller.” During the sentencing proceeding, it is clear that the Circuit Court treated Mr. Ramsey with respect, and expressed sympathy for Mr. Ramsey’s addiction. The majority, however, agrees with Mr. Ramsey’s argument “that he was denied a fair trial as a result of judicial bias that began during a pre-trial suppression hearing, continued during voir dire and examination of witnesses and culminated during the course of instructing the jury.”
Defense counsel’s opening statement covers five pages of the trial transcript, two and one half pages of which were taken up by “the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes.” Defense counsel’s closing argument covers six and one half pages, during which she argued that (1) Officer Torbit exhibited a “convenient memory,” and (2) the Officer’s testimony was not corroborated by any “video footage” from the police department’s surveillance cameras that recorded activity at the locations where he claimed that he had observed Mr. Ramsey. At no point, however, did defense counsel argue that the State’s evidence was consistent with the statement Mr. Ramsey made at sentencing.
The record shows that the Circuit Court would not permit Officer Torbit to give nonresponsive answers to defense counsel’s questions. For example, the following transpired during Officer Torbit’s cross-examination:
Q. Okay. Then finally you say that Mr. Ramsey had the bag prior to stopping him in the 1800 block of Pennsylvania?
*299A. Exact, yes.
Q, Okay. And there are also cameras in the 1800-block of Pennsylvania, is that correct?
A. Cameras don’t cover everything. They just cover certain parts of the block—
THE COURT: Officer—
THE COURT: . .. Just answer her question.
THE WITNESS: I’m sorry.
THE COURT: The question was I think are there cameras in the 18—
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And the answer is yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The 1800-block of Pennsylvania?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Taking action to prohibit a State’s witness from giving non-responsive answers during cross-examination is the antithesis of hostility toward the defendant or defense counsel.
Rather than infer “hostility toward defense counsel” from the Circuit Court’s decision to impanel the jury before holding the suppression hearing, we should compliment the Circuit Court for its efficiency. The court’s time is a valuable public commodity, and the only reasonable inference that can be drawn in this case is the inference that the Circuit Court wanted to have a jury ready to begin the trial at 9:30 a.m. on the following morning.
As to what occurred during jury selection, the Circuit Court did not “reseat” the juror whose “striking” the Circuit Court found to be “racially biased.” From my review of the record, that finding was not clearly erroneous, and the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in raising the Batson issue sna sponte.
*300Although Mr. Ramsey complains about what occurred during Officer Torbit’s direct examination and Dr. Majid’s redirect examination, the record shows that defense counsel did not object to any of the Court’s questions. Defense counsel did, however, preserve for our review the issue of whether the Circuit Court erred or abused its discretion when it stated to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, most lawyers, good lawyers, talk to their witnesses.... Most lawyers talk to a witness before they put them on the stand.... It’s perfectly appropriate for any lawyer to talk to any witness before they put them on the witness stand, and to review their testimony with them. It’s absolutely appropriate.
In State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990), this Court stated:
Attorneys have not only the right but also the duty to fully investigate the case and to interview persons who may be witnesses. A prudent attorney will, whenever possible, meet with the witnesses he or she intends to call.
Id. at 170, 571 A.2d at 1234. In United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated:
Thorough preparation demands that an attorney interview and prepare witnesses before they testify. No competent lawyer would call a witness without appropriate and thorough pre-trial interviews and discussion. In fact, more than one lawyer has been punished, found ineffective, or even disbarred for incompetent representation that included failure to prepare or interview witnesses. United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1983) (defense counsel ineffective for failing to interview witnesses); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir.1974) (same); In re Warmington, 212 Wis.2d 657, 668, 568 N.W.2d 641 (Wis.1997) (lawyer disbarred for, among other things, “failing to supervise the preparation of an expert witness”); In re Wolfram, 174 *301Ariz. 49, 847 P.2d 94, 96 (Ariz.1993) (failure to interview witnesses cited among reasons for suspending attorney).
Id. at 319.
When the cross-examination of a witness insinuates that the witness’ testimony was impermissibly influenced by the direct examiner, it is appropriate for the trial judge to instruct the jury about the lawyer’s duty to meet with the witnesses who will be called to testify.1 From my review of the record, I am persuaded that defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Torbit “opened the door” to this instruction.
As to Mr. Ramsey’s complaint about the “additional language” in the Circuit Court’s “credibility” instruction, (1) everything added to MPJI Cr 3.10 is a correct statement of the law, and (2) on the basis of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Torbit, the decision to include the additional language did not constitute an unfairly prejudicial abuse of discretion.
For the reasons stated above, I would hold that Mr. Ramsey is not entitled to a new trial.

. See, e.g. 7th Ctr PJI Modern Federal Jury Instructions—Criminal § 1.07, which recommends that, if there has been testimony regarding prior interviews, the jury be instructed: "It is proper for an attorney to interview any witness in preparation for trial." This type of instruction has been "interpreted to be an attempt to offset the ancient trick in which an attorney questions a witness as to his interview with opposing counsel, often stated in a way to imply to the witness and jurors that this is an impropriety.” People v. Manley, 222 Ill.App.3d 896, 165 Ill.Dec. 298, 584 N.E.2d 477, 490 (1990).