Court Opinion

ID: 9386411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:04:08.796414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.258314
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                       CARLINE CLERGE LEGER,
                              Appellant,

                                     v.

                             JAMES LEGER,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D22-1669

                             [April 12, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach  County;    Karen    M.     Miller,   Judge;   L.T.    Case    No.
502019DR002288XXXXNB.

  Chadwick M. Layton of Mindful Divorce, P.A., Palm Beach, for
appellant.

   Craig J. Trocino, Coral Gables, for appellee.

KUNTZ, J.

   The former wife appeals the trial court’s final judgment of dissolution
of marriage. She raises three issues on appeal. We affirm the final
judgment but write to briefly address one issue. On that issue, we affirm
but remand to allow the trial court to add that the judgment must be
carried out “in accordance with all federal laws and regulations.”

    At issue is the distribution of radio stations and related assets
belonging to the parties. The parties do not dispute that the radio stations
and the related assets are marital property subject to equitable
distribution. Based on testimony at trial, the trial court found the former
husband created and managed the radio stations. The trial court also
found that the parties agreed to put the radio stations’ broadcast licenses
in the former wife’s name because the former husband is not a United
States citizen, and the licenses cannot be held in a noncitizen’s name. The
trial court then awarded the former husband the radio stations and related
assets. The trial court ordered the former wife to “transfer” the radio
stations and related assets to the former husband within ten days.
    The former wife argues that Federal Communications Commission
regulations prohibit the transfer of the radio stations’ broadcast licenses
without FCC approval. She also argues that the former husband is not
allowed to own the radio stations because he is not a citizen.

    We affirm the trial court’s distribution of the marital assets. “A state
court does . . . have the power to adjudicate issues involving FCC licenses
as long as the state court does not affirmatively interfere with the authority
of the FCC to authorize the transfer, assignment or other disposition of
licenses.” In re Marriage of Hunt, 933 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(citing Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 530 (Utah 1979)).

   But the trial court ordered the former wife to “transfer all rights, title,
ownership, interest, assets, financial accounts and the like in [the radio
stations]” to the former husband without conditioning the transfer on the
compliance with federal laws and regulations.                  The Federal
Communications Act controls the transfer of a radio station license and
specifically requires FCC approval. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2022). The trial
court exceeded its authority when it ordered the immediate transfer of the
radio stations’ licenses without conditioning the transfer on the
compliance with federal laws and regulations. See Radio Station WOW v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 132 (1945) (“We think that State power is amply
respected if it is qualified merely to the extent of requiring it to withhold
execution of that portion of its decree requiring retransfer of the physical
properties until steps are ordered to be taken, with all deliberate speed, to
enable the Commission to deal with new applications in connection with
the station.”).

   We remand the final judgment for the trial court to add a provision that
the transfer of the radio stations’ licenses must be done “in accordance
with all federal laws and regulations.” The trial court’s final judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

   Affirmed and remanded.

MAY, J., concurs.
CIKLIN, J., dissents with opinion.

CIKLIN, J., dissenting.

   I must respectfully dissent. There is no trial transcript in this case and
so our review is constrained because our only reference to the trial court’s
discretionary findings and conclusions of law is contained in its sixteen-
page, forty-four-paragraph written final judgment. The former wife has

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not prepared a statement of the record as she could have done and as she
was permitted to do by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(5).

   Clearly, from a review of the final judgment, the trial court considered
the FCC issue. Based on an approved methodology that the former
husband had previously utilized—by transferring ownership of a radio
station from the former husband to his sister as a third-party who was
permitted to hold the property in intermission for the sole purpose of
eventually transferring it back to the former husband—the trial court
ordered the former wife to repeat the procedure for purposes of effectuating
the trial court’s equitable distribution plan.

   Apparently now, for the first time on appeal, the former wife alleges that
the former husband’s previous successful methodology was not an
approved FCC technique.

    Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the trial court specifically found
that, during the trial in this case, the former wife failed and refused “to
answer most questions and repeatedly stated she owned all of the marital
assets except the marital residence.” The trial court specifically found
“little of the [former] [w]ife’s testimony [was] credible.”

   The standard of review of the trial court’s determination of equitable
distribution is abuse of discretion. As we held in Whelan v. Whelan, 736
So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), “[a]bsent a trial transcript, this court
may reverse only if an error of law appears on the face of the final
judgment.” No such error exists on the face of the final judgment, and
therefore I must respectfully dissent.

                            *        *         *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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