Court Opinion

ID: 9564430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:00:27.539763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:24.281635
License: Public Domain

Madsen, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent as to Mr. Grove’s case (appeal from the dependency disposition) and Mr. Peterson’s case (discretionary review of the interlocutory trial court order) because I do not agree that the Legislature has provided a statutory right to review at public expense in these cases.
The majority’s resolution of these two cases is founded on an assumption which does not withstand scrutiny, that is, if a statute provides counsel "at all stages” of a court proceeding, then there is a right both to appointed counsel on appeal or interlocutory discretionary review, and a right to review at public expense. Without this assumption, the entire majority analysis in these two cases unravels.
The majority places heavy reliance on the policy set forth in RCW 10.101.005, which, according to the majority, justifies the conclusion that "if there is a statutory right to counsel 'at all stages’ of a particular court proceeding, that right should include representation through an appeal as of right”. Majority, at 233.
RCW 10.101.005 was never cited by any of the parties. It establishes no substantive rights. It does not provide that the language "at all stages of a proceeding” includes the appellate stage; nor does anything else in RCW 10.101. RCW 10.101.005 is a statute which says that if there is a *243right to counsel, that right is a right to effective counsel. That is all the statute says.
The majority fails to adequately consider the impact of RCW 4.88.330 and RCW 2.32.240, statutes which are cited by the parties and which are relevant to these cases.
The majority’s conclusion that Mr. Peterson has a statutory right to appointed counsel and review at public expense is strange for another reason: Mr. Peterson never argues at all that he has a statutory right to appointed counsel to represent him in seeking discretionary review of the trial court’s interlocutory order.
The ramifications of the majority’s opinion extend far beyond the facts of these cases. Under the majority opinion, indigents’ motions for discretionary review must be funded at public expense whenever a statute provides for appointment of counsel at "all stages of the proceeding”. This means, for example, that all motions for discretionary review of dependency orders not appealable as of right will be publicly funded regardless of their merits, at the expense of the Indigent Defense Fund.
I believe that examination of the relevant statutes leads to the conclusion that neither Mr. Grove nor Mr. Peterson has a statutory right to review at public expense or to appointed counsel for appellate review. Accordingly, I believe this court should address the significant constitutional issues raised in these two cases.
Statutory Analysis
RCW 10.101.005,1 as the majority itself concedes, does not address whether there is a right to counsel, and plainly says nothing about any right to counsel on appeal or for discretionary review. The statute instead directly speaks to the right to effective counsel if, and when, there is a *244right to counsel in the first place.2 It has nothing to do with whether there is such a right. It is not surprising that no party cited the statute in briefing to this court, as it simply does not answer the questions before the court.
Moreover, nothing in the definition of "indigent” in RCW 10.101.010(1) indicates that the language "at any stage of a court proceeding” includes appellate review, although the majority relies upon that definition as supporting its conclusion.
In relying on RCW 10.101.005 for a general statement of legislative policy, the majority has failed to recognize that the general statutes expressly addressing funding of indigent appeals require that the existence of a constitutional right to review be judicially determined as a prerequisite to public funding. RCW 2.32.240; RCW 4.88.330. In Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 740, 557 P.2d 321 (1976), the court explicitly recognized the public policy expressed in these statutes. If there is no judicially determined constitutional right existing, then there must be specific statutory authority for expenditure of public funds for appellate review.
The specific statutes said by the majority to provide for such funding here are RCW 13.34.090 and RCW 71.09.050. In Grove’s case, RCW 13.34.090(2) provides for appointed counsel for indigent parents "[a]t all stages of a proceeding in which a child is alleged to be dependent . . .”.3 In Peterson’s case, RCW 71.09.050 provides for appointed *245counsel "[a]t all stages of the proceedings under this chapter . .
The primary objective in construing a statute is to carry out the intent of the Legislature. State v. Pacheco, 125 Wn.2d 150, 154, 882 P.2d 183 (1994). Neither RCW 13.34.090(2) nor RCW 71.09.050 indicates in any way that appellate review is a stage of a court proceeding within the meaning of the statute.
If the Legislature had intended to provide for counsel at the appellate stage, it could have drafted the statutes to this effect. It has, in fact, done so in other statutes where legal representation is concerned. In RCW 7.68.270, the Legislature provided that, notwithstanding other statutory provisions, funds paid to defendants in connection with information about their crimes (for movie rights, for example) may be used for "retaining legal representation at any stage of the proceedings against such person, including the appeals process”. (Italics mine.) Thus, where the appeals process was intended to be included within the phrase "at any stage of the proceedings”, the Legislature expressly so provided. RCW 7.68.270. The absence of any such language in either statute now before this court strongly indicates the absence of legislative intent to include appellate review as a "stage” at which appointed counsel is mandated.
Moreover, the Legislature has expressly distinguished "any stage of the proceedings” from "appeal” in another statute having to do with appointed counsel for indigents. For good cause shown, or in cases involving a crime of widespread notoriety, RCW 36.26.090 provides for the appointment of counsel other than the public defender to represent the indigent accused "at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal . . .”. (Italics mine.) The language "or on appeal” should not be considered superfluous. See Cossel v. Skagit County, 119 Wn.2d 434, 437, 834 P.2d 609 (1992). Manifestly, the Legislature did not intend the language "at any stage of the proceedings” to include an appeal. This court should not assume it meant to do so in either RCW 13.34.090 or RCW 71.09.050.
*246Moreover, neither Mr. Grove in the dependency action nor Mr. Peterson in the sexually violent predator proceeding cites any other statutory provisions in support of an argument that the respective statutes containing the "at any stage of the proceedings” language include appellate review. In fact, in his petition for review and reply, Mr. Peterson has not argued he has any such statutory rights. RCW 71.09 contains nothing pertaining to seeking discretionary review of interlocutory trial court orders, and thus the language in the statute "at all stages of the proceedings under this chapter” is further evidence of legislative intent that such review is not within the meaning of the language "at all stages of the proceedings”. (Italics mine.) RCW 71.09.050.
As the State in Mr. Grove’s dependency action points out, nothing in RCW 13.34 pertains to appellate review. Thus, not only does RCW 13.34.090 itself not mention an appeal or the appellate stage, nowhere else does RCW 13.34 suggest that an appeal or the appellate stage is included within proceedings as the term is used in RCW 13.34.090. Instead, RCW 13.34.090(2) provides that "[a]t all stages of a proceeding in which a child is alleged to be dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(2)”4 there is a right to appointed counsel for indigent parents.
Nor do I think that this court should conclude that RCW 13.34.090 implies a right to counsel on appeal. I agree with the majority’s observation that "[i]t is the Legislature’s prerogative, as the taxing and appropriating branch of government, to determine what actions other than those which are constitutionally mandated will be publicly funded”. Majority, at 236. This court should not usurp that legislative function by reading any implication into the statute. Moreover, it is not within the power of the court to add words to legislation. Vita Foods Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978). In my view *247it would require adding to the statute to make it read as the majority assumes it reads.
The majority’s holding will result in expanded public funding of indigents’ legal actions. The majority opinion requires the State to fund both appeals and motions for discretionary review in any case in which the party has a statutory right to counsel at "all stages of the proceeding”. This means, for example, that parents in dependency cases would be able to obtain appointed counsel and other public funds to challenge every dependency review order, as well as the original finding of dependency. However, most dependency orders are nonappealable orders subject to review only at the discretion of the court. Under RAP 2.2(a) and RCW 13.34.130 an appeal of right lies only as to "the disposition decision following the finding of dependency or to a marked change in the status quo, which in effect amounts to a new disposition”. In re Chubb, 112 Wn.2d 719, 725, 773 P.2d 851 (1989).
Funding of motions for discretionary review under the majority opinion will include funding for motions for discretionary review of interlocutory orders in all cases where there is a statutory right to counsel "at all stages of a proceeding”. Again, such orders are only reviewable at the discretion of the court.
Moreover, under the majority’s reasoning, funding and appointment of counsel in such cases is automatic. The indigent need not prove either a constitutional right to review or establish that the claim has probable merit. See majority, at 233. While it is true, as the majority opinion says, that the majority of motions for discretionary review are denied, the majority opinion nonetheless requires that filing and arguing the motion be at public expense. Moreover, costs to be paid at public expense include expenses of the preparation of the report of proceedings and clerk’s papers, and reproduction of briefs. Majority, at 233-34, 236.
As the majority acknowledges, public funds for all indigent appeals, civil and criminal, are disbursed from *248the Indigent Defense Fund, a fund appropriated by the Legislature. Majority, at 228 n.5. Public funding of all motions for discretionary review where a statute provides a right to counsel at "any stage of the proceeding” is likely to be at substantial cost to the fund, thus reducing available funds for other cases.
I am at a loss to understand why the majority throws open the coffers of the Indigent Defense Fund where no statute so requires, without regard to constitutional rights or the probable merit of motions for discretionary review.
I do not believe that either Mr. Grove or Mr. Peterson has any statutory right to appointed counsel on appellate review or to review at public expense independent of a constitutional right. Therefore, I believe the court should resolve the important constitutional questions which the parties present.
Although I disagree with the majority’s holdings in Grove’s case and in Peterson’s case, I agree with the majority that RAP 15.2 is not consistent with relevant law. For example, the rule fails to accurately reflect the inherent power of the court to authorize review at public expense.
Unfortunately, after quoting the rule, the majority says: "Under RAP 15.2, therefore, an indigent appellant is entitled to public funding of an appeal, including appointed counsel, if the case is a criminal or juvenile offender proceeding or if it involves the termination of parental rights”. Majority, at 231-32. Thus, the majority appears to treat RAP 15.2 as establishing entitlement to public funding of an appeal. Majority at 231-32, 238 (describing RAP 15.2 as a legal basis for public funding of an appeal).
However, RAP 15.2 is not a substantive provision defining the rights to review at public expense and appointed counsel, but is instead strictly procedural. See 3 Lewis H. Orland & Karl B. Tegland, Wash. Prac., Rules Practice, Author’s Comments, at 399 (1991). Because the procedure differs depending upon the basis for seeking public fund*249ing, the RAP differentiates between cases involving crimes, termination of parental rights, and juvenile offenses, in light of decisions recognizing constitutional rights in those areas, and all other cases.
I cannot fault the majority on this point. The rule does purport to reflect substantive law in order to inform as to what must be shown in complying with its procedures and obtaining public funding, and thus has been treated as a source of substantive law. Because the rule does not in fact accurately reflect the law, I agree with the majority that RAP 15.2 needs revision.
Finally, I agree with the majority that where a dispute involves private parties and property rights, there is no constitutional right to appellate review at public expense or to appointed counsel. I therefore do not dissent from the majority’s holding that Mr. Smith is not entitled to review at public expense, or to appointed counsel, on his appeal from the jury verdict which resulted in denial of workers’ compensation benefits. He also has no statutory right at issue.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion.
Durham, C.J., and Dolliver, J., concur with Madsen, J.

RCW 10.101.005 provides: "The legislature finds that effective legal representation should be provided for indigent persons and persons who are indigent and able to contribute, consistent with the constitutional requirements of fairness, equal protection, and due process in all cases where the right to counsel attaches”.

It may be questioned whether the statute applies in the absence of a constitutional right to counsel. The statute’s language "consistent with the constitutional requirements of fairness, equal protection, and due process” can be read as recognizing the right to effective counsel as it is constitutionally based. Reference to effectiveness of counsel in a constitutional sense would necessarily encompass the constitutional right to counsel. RCW 10.101.005. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 n.7, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985) (right to effective assistance of counsel dependent upon constitutional right to counsel). Because I believe the statute simply does not apply in the cases before the' court, I do not believe the court need address the parameters of the statute at all.

RCW 13.34.090(1) provides that any party has a right to be represented by counsel in all proceedings under RCW 13.34; RCW 13.34.090(2) addresses appointment of counsel for indigents.

RCW 13.34.030 was amended by Laws of 1994, ch. 288, § 1, changing subsection (2) to subsection (4).