Court Opinion

ID: 9617032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:51:26.984005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:04.675422
License: Public Domain

*274On Motion for Rehearing.
1. The appellee contends on motion for rehearing that since the appellant’s check was deposited into his professional corporate account, the garnishment should have been filed against the professional corporation (of which the appellee is the sole stockholder) instead of against him individually. The appellee did not raise this issue in his answer to the summons of garnishment, in trial of the traverse, nor did he enumerate it as error by way of cross appeal. This court has no authority to consider judgments and issues which are not appealed or cross appealed. See Escambia Chem. Corp. v. Rocker, 124 Ga. App. 434 (1) (184 SE2d 31) (1971); Carroll v. Johnson, 144 Ga. App. 750 (5) (242 SE2d 296) (1978). See generally Patterson v. Duron Paints of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 123 (1a) (240 SE2d 603) (1977).
2. The appellee appears confused as to our ruling regarding his uncontested receipt of a $3,958.30 fee under Code § 9-613 (2). The appellee was entitled to this charging fee regardless of the time of payment; however, the record shows this fee was paid before service of the garnishment summons on him and as a result, it is included in the $5,458.30 which we held was not subject to garnishment.
3. The appellee also contends that his claim to the $4,903.57 in legal fees paid him subsequent to service is, under Code § 9-613 (1), superior to that of the appellant. This section of the statute recognizes the attorney’s common law general or retaining lien on all papers and money belonging to the client which come into his hands until his claims for professional services rendered are satisfied. See McDonald, Bailey & Powers v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89 (5) (1853); Davidson v. Collier, 104 Ga. App. 546, 549 (122 SE2d 465) (1961); 7 CJS 1141, Attorney & Client §§ 210, 213 (1937). However, money delivered to the attorney by the client for a special purpose cannot be made the subject-matter of a retaining lien in favor of the attorney. 7 CJS 1169, Attorney & Client, § 226 (1937). Therefore, the appellee in this case did not have a retaining lien in the funds remaining in his possession at the time the garnishment summons was served, and the *275law stated in Hargett v. McCadden & McElwee, 107 Ga. 773 (33 SE 666) (1899), controls this case.
In Hargett, the garnishment defendant had turned over to an attorney certain open accounts for collection. Under their agreement the attorney was to retain one-half of the proceeds as his collection fee and was to apply the remaining one-half of the proceeds to a debt owed him by the defendant. The persons against whom the judgment on account was rendered were then served as garnishees by another creditor of the defendant. The Supreme Court held that while the attorney was entitled to receive his (charging) fee, the attorney had no claim to the remainder of the fund as it was subject to the garnishment proceedings instituted by the defendant’s other creditor. Accordingly, there is no merit in this contention of the defendant made on motion for rehearing.

Motion for rehearing denied.