Court Opinion

ID: 9729565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:42:33.268169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.593083
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Parts II, III and IV. Except to the extent that my dissent upon Issue I impacts upon it, I also concur as to Part V. I concur in part as to Part I and dissent in part as to Part I.
I concur in the majority’s holding that the guilty plea court properly vacated five of the convictions for operating with a BAC of .10% or more. I dissent, however from the affirmance of each of the five reckless homicide convictions. In my view only one of those convictions may stand.
Although the majority’s focus upon the thrust of the statute which defines the crime is well taken, binding precedent, though aged, compels a contrary conclusion. In Clem v. State (1873) 42 Ind. 420, our Supreme Court held that the act of shooting a gun which resulted in the death of two persons permitted only one murder conviction. This case has not been overruled. To the contrary, its rationale finds *1345continuing validity in recent cases. See Henderson v. State (1989) Ind., 534 N.E.2d 1105 citing Johnson v. State (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 932; Randall v. State (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 916; and Riley v. State (1982) Ind., 432 N.E.2d 15 for the proposition that multiple convictions will lie if separate crimes are committed against separate victims. In the case before us, like Johnson v. State, supra, homicide is involved. Unlike Johnson, however, here there was only one culpable act. See Hall v. State (1986) Ind., 493 N.E.2d 433. Although that single act resulted in multiple deaths, it will permit only one conviction.1 The conduct was not, as seemingly required in Kelly v. State (1988) 2nd Dist.Ind. App., 527 N.E.2d 1148 at 1155, aff'd on trans. 539 N.E.2d 25, “directed at each particular victim”. Marshall’s conduct was directed at no person. That singular act affected multiple victims but it was not directed toward those individual victims or toward any one of them.

. Clearly, it is permissible to increase the punishment for the act in relationship to its consequences or in proportion to the number of victims or the severity of injury. But it remains a single act and a single criminal offense. See Kelly v. State, supra, 527 N.E.2d at 1155.