Court Opinion

ID: 9482166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:42:19.699222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:48.620091
License: Public Domain

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the six-year federal statute of limitations applies to suits challenging agency action. I further agree that the Penfold-Shiny Rock rule should not apply to claims for which an agency was wholly without statutory authority to promulgate a regulation. Because I do not think Wind River’s claim can be so characterized, I dissent.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) created the wilderness areas in question pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a). That statute authorized BLM to designate as wilderness areas “roadless areas of five thousand acres or more.” Wind River challenges the designation of the area in question as a wilderness area because it claims that the area was not “road-less.” While it is true that something called the Kelso Road bisects the wilderness area, the BLM classified Kelso as a deteriorated “way” and not a “road.”
Wind River contests this determination, claiming that it is inconsistent with the BLM Manual. Even if this claim is accepted at face value, it does not demonstrate an absence of statutory authority vested in BLM. Instead, it merely shows that BLM’s exercise of its authority was ill-considered or, at worst, arbitrary and capricious.1 The authority to determine which areas are roadless clearly belongs to BLM, and Wind River merely challenges how that authority has been exercised. See Students of the California School for the Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538, 546 (9th Cir.1984) (agency charged with defining statutory language does not exceed statutory authority unless definition is not even reasonably related to statute), vacated as *717moot 471 U.S. 148, 105 S.Ct. 1820, 85 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Here, Wind River does not even challenge the way BLM has defined “roadless,” but merely the way it has applied its definition. This is very different from an ultra vires challenge.2
The fact that Wind River chose to describe BLM’s actions as “ultra vires” in its complaint does not change this analysis. While it is true that courts must take plaintiffs allegations as true in resolving motions to dismiss, that rule applies only to factual allegations. See Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987) (“the court must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true”) (emphasis added). By contrast, the question at issue here — what act triggers commencement of the statute of limitations — is a question of law. Englerius v. Veteran’s Administration, 837 F.2d 895, 896-97 (9th Cir.1988). So too is the definition of an ultra vires act.
I do not think we can allow a plaintiffs unsupported legal characterization to preclude disposal of cases on a motion to dismiss. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981) (“We do not, however, necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations”). Just as an allegation in a plaintiffs complaint that she was denied “due process of law” is not conclusive, so Wind River’s allegation that BLM’s actions were “ultra vires” is not conclusive.
In Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 895 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 75, 112 L.Ed.2d 48 (1990), this Court noted that a case should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds only if the determination could be made as a matter of law without resolving genuine factual issues. That is the case here. Whatever they choose to call it, Wind River simply does not state an ultra vires claim. Dismissal is therefore appropriate. I would affirm.

. The interpretation of the agency charged with administering a statute is given great deference. See Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.1986).

. A good example of this difference can be found within § 1782(a) itself. WSAs must be "roadless areas of 5,000 acres or more.” Had BLM chosen to ignore its statutory mandate and declare areas of less than 5,000 acres to be WSAs, that action would have been ultra vires because directly contrary to the rule of the statute. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305, 341 (E.D.Cal.1985) (so holding). Similarly, had BLM attempted to apply the statute to areas which it knew contained roads, its actions would be ultra vires.
Here, however, BLM merely exercised its authority to define and interpret the word "road-less." It concluded that the “Kelso Road” was in fact a deteriorated way, rather than a road. Wind River may claim that that determination was wrong, but not that BLM had no authority to make that determination.