Court Opinion

ID: 9859911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:57:59.057714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:50.306923
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority with respect to the interpretation and applicability of sections 1(f) and 6(c) of the Act. I likewise agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Commission’s finding that Hicks became disabled within two years following the date of last exposure was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the circuit court erred concluding otherwise. My disagreement with the majority’s opinion is with respect to the reinstatement of the Commission’s decision reducing Hicks’ award of permanent disability to 15% man as a whole. As the majority notes, the Commission’s decision was based upon its finding that Hicks failed to prove total disablement because he failed to establish the unavailability of work. The majority correctly notes that it is the claimant’s burden to prove the permanency of his injury, and that where a claimant’s physical disability is so limited in nature that he is not obviously unemployable the burden is on him to establish the unavailability of work to a person in his circumstances. The majority also correctly notes that this burden may be met by a showing that, in light of claimant’s age, experience, training, and education, he is unable to perform any but the most menial tasks for which no stable market exists. I agree with the majority that the Commission correctly found that Hicks’ disablement was so limited in nature that he is not obviously unemployable, and the record supports the Commission’s conclusion that Hicks made no effort to seek employment. From reading the Commission’s decision, however, it is apparent that the Commission focused solely on Hicks’ failure to seek employment and did not consider whether his age, experience, training, and education rendered him unable to perform any tasks for which a stable job market existed when it determined that Hicks failed to prove the unavailability of work. The effect of this was to erroneously increase Hicks’ burden of proof. (See Valley Mould & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 538, 419 N.E.2d 1159, citing Sterling Steel Casting Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 273, 384 N.E.2d 1326; E.R. Moore Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 353, 376 N.E.2d 206.) For this reason, I would remand the cause to the Commission.