Court Opinion

ID: 9848148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:13:38.286979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:03.918805
License: Public Domain

Quillian, J.,
dissenting. At about 7:30 on January 15th, 1956, the sheriff and other officers approached the home of J. W. Yancey in Gwinnett County. A revenue officer, I. W. Davis, went to the Yancey home, summoned Yancey, bought a bottle of non-tax-paid whisky from him, paid him for the same and departed. Sheriff Pittard, the defendant, did not accompany *483Davis to the Yancey home, did not witness the sale, and was stationed about 400 yards distant where he could not see, hear, or otherwise ascertain what was then transpiring between Davis and Yancey. It is well settled that an offense is committed in an officer’s presence only when he becomes aware of its commission through the medium of one of his senses. Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53 (4) (17 S. E. 613); Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14 (6c) (134 S. E. 59). The words of Code § 27-207 “in the presence” mean within the immediate knowledge of the officer. Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672 (4) (72 S. E. 51). In Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297 (1) (52 S. E. 283, 2 L. R. A. (NS) 730), and Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12 (1) (25 S. E. 608, 59 Am. St. R. 226) it is held that an offense reported to an officer by another, as in this case, was not committed in the officer’s presence. In this case Davis reported the offense to Sheriff Pittard; this did not bring the fact of its commission within Sheriff Pittard’s immediate knowledge.
The conclusion seems to me inescapable that on the first visit to Yancey’s home no offense was committed in the sheriff’s presence, and that he did not delay in making an arrest for a crime which had been committed in his presence. Hence, according to my view of the matter, Reed v. State, 195 Ga. 842 (25 S. E. 2d 692), is not applicable to the factual situation developed by the uncontradicted evidence of the present case. In this connection it is well to remember that the officer Davis was not a deputy sheriff, nor under the sheriff’s control, but was a member of another legally constituted law enforcement agency.
About 10:30 the sheriff and Officer Davis returned to the Yancey residence. The sheriff summoned Yancey and when he appeared ask him “Mr. Yancey do you remember this man?” and indicated Mr. Davis. Mr. Yancey replied “Lordy, Lordy, Lordy.” The sheriff testified without dispute that Yancey recognized the officer Davis. The evidence is undisputed that Yancey knew the sheriff; and was, of course, aware that he had previously on the same evening sold whisky to Davis.
Code § 38-409 reads: “Acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer or denial or other conduct, may amount to an admission.”
Numerous are the holdings of our appellate courts that where *484a person is charged with an offense and makes no denial of guilt, his silence is equivalent to an admission of the offense imputed to him, among which is Ball v. State, 47 Ga. App. 804 (171 S. E. 726).
In a number of cases where a culprit was confronted by a person upon whom or in whose presence he had committed a crime, the failure on his part to protest innocence was held to be an admission of guilt. Smiley v. State, 156 Ga. 60 (118 S. E. 713).
It is, of course, necessary for the accused to hear and understand the charge made against him. Jones v. State, 2 Ga. App. 433 (5) (58 S. E. 559).
However, where the circumstances are such as imply that he did hear the accusation, it is for the jury to determine whether he heard it or not. Watson v. State, 136 Ga. 236 (1) (71 S. E. 122); Thrasher v. State, 68 Ga. App. 820 (2) (24 S. E. 2d 222); Dodys v. State, 73 Ga. App. 483 (3) (37 S. E. 2d 173).
It was likewise held in Bray v. Lathan, 81 Ga. 640 (1) (8 S. E. 64), the Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Bleckley, that a statement made in the defendant’s presence which did not in express terms charge him with any offense, in the light of other proven facts, imputed to him the offense of arson. In the same opinion it was held to be a question for the jury as to whether the defendant heard the statement, and whether his failure to deny it amounted to an admission of guilt.
Declarations and conversations must be construed in the light of other related • facts developed by the evidence, and the circumstances in which the evidence shows they were made. The rule is well stated in Mosely v. Gordon, 16 Ga. 384 (2): “Testimony, by itself vague, and apparently relating to matter not in issue, may be made certain in its character, and plainly relevant, by other facts in proof.” •
An admission of guilt made to an officer by a culprit is equivalent to the offense being committed in the officer’s presence, so as to authorize an arrest without a warrant. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206 (5) (135 S. E. 748).
The words spoken by Yancey were ambiguous, but his failure to deny the accusation made by Sheriff Pittard was undisputed and unequivocal.
*485In Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672, 681, supra, this court defined what presence of the officer meant in these words: “To justify the arrest without warrant, the officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime take place, if by any of his senses he has personal knowledge of its commission.”
Certainly the admission by a culprit that he committed an offense is tantamount to the commission of the offense in the officer’s presence, because it brings to the officer’s “personal knowledge” the commission of the crime.
To my mind there is no doubt that Yancey knew to what the sheriff alluded when he made the inquiiy as to whether he recognized Davis. He was according to the undisputed evidence cognizant that during the same evening he had sold the non-tax-paid whisky to that very man, he knew that when the sheriff, with whom he was acquainted, returned with Davis, that the sheriff was aware of the sale' having been made, and that the sheriff was charging him with having sold the whisky to Davis.
But still more strongly I am convinced that viewing the matter most favorably to the plaintiff the evidence made an issue for the jury as to whether he did understand the charge and as to whether his failure to deny it was an admission of guilt.
I think the rule in this State, clearly stated in Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206, supra, is that where pending an investigation of a crime committed shortly before, and of which the officer had information, an admission of guilt on the part of the culprit brings the commission of the offense within the officer’s knowledge in the sense contemplated by our statute embodied in Code § 27-207.
“Under the statutes relating to intoxicating liquor, the offense is regarded as committed in his presence when it is committed with his knowledge, whether through sight, hearing, or other senses, or by the offender’s admission of the fact before arrest.” 4 Am. Jur. 22, § 29.
In Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206, 219, supra, the arresting officer was not present and did not witness the perpetration of the crime when it was in progress. He was summoned by a third person and the victim, who upon his arrival charged the defendant with having beat her. The defendant made no denial of *486the charge. While the defendant then had hold of the woman he was then doing nothing to her.
The arrest was necessarily made for an offense, not literally committed in the officer’s presence, and his personal knowledge of it having been committed, which brought it within his constructive presence and as the Supreme Court held authorized him to make the arrest without a warrant was necessarily derived, at least in a practical part, from the defendant’s tacit admission of guilt in his failure to deny the crime imputed to him in the officer’s presence.
I am further of the opinion that in the factual situation shown by the evidence there was a question for the jury as to whether the arrest was necessary to prevent a failure of justice, and for this reason was warranted under Code § 27-207. See Daniel v. State, 185 Ga. 58 (194 S. E. 360). It strikes me that for the sheriff to awaken a bootlegger engaged in the secretive and surreptitious business of selling moonshine whisky in the middle of the night, apprise him that his crime had been detected and then leave him unarrested would result in the bootlegger avoiding arrest. In my opinion the question as to whether Yancey was after his arrest detained for any unreasonable time before, being carried before a magistrate was also a question for the jury.
Since I am firmly convinced that the legality of Yancey’s arrest and detention were properly submitted to the jury, I cannot concur in divisions 1 and 6 of the majority opinion.
Nor am I able to agree with the conclusion of division 7 of the majority opinion that the charge referred to in that division was error. The pleadings made an issue, though not a material issue as to the existence of a warrant.
The court properly though unnecessarily charged the law as to the issue pleaded. Moreover, even if the charge had been error, it could not have been hurtful for the jury was plainly and fully informed by the judge’s instructions that the arrest was not made under a warrant.
From the judgment of reversal, I am compelled to dissent.