Court Opinion

ID: 9690630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:27:19.734257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:00.356942
License: Public Domain

ALMA L. LOPEZ, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion regarding the doctrine of mootness, but I respectfully dissent with the majority opinion regarding the appellee’s standing to obtain a protective order. On October 31, 1997, a hearing was conducted to finalize the divorce of the appellant and the appel-lee’s daughter. During the hearing, the trial judge ordered the division of community property and community debts, and a protective order. The trial judge then stated, “I’m going to grant the divorce in this case. I want a final divorce decree sitting on my desk no later than Wednesday signed off on by both parties or I want it set to enter a judgment three days later.... I just don’t want this to drag out anymore. I want these people to go on with their lives.” Having divided the community estate, these statements clearly indicate that the trial judge rendered a divorce on October 31, 1997. See S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex.1995) (stating judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk). Although the final divorce decree was not signed until May 28, 1998, the decree states that the divorce was “judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED in open court at BEXAR County, Texas, on OCTOBER 31, 1997.” As a result, no family relationship existed between the appellant and the appellee on March 25, 1998. Thus, the appellee was not entitled to a protective order under section 81.001 of the Family Code. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment for the appellant.