Court Opinion

ID: 9375961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 16:00:31.430921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.228829
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1148     Document: 010110819609       Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                                                                              March 1, 2023
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                          _________________________________                   Clerk of Court
  EMINA GEROVIC,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1148
                                                  (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-03710-RM-NRN)
  CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER;                                   (D. Colo.)
  LEROY LEMOS; JAMES E.
  WILLIAMSON; JOEL WOMICK; KYLE
  KNOEDLER; HSS, INC.,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BRISCOE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Plaintiff-Appellant Emina Gerovic appeals the district court’s entry of summary

 judgment in favor of the defendants: (1) her former employer, the City and County of

 Denver (the “City”); (2) two of the City’s employees, Leroy Lemos and James

 Williamson1 (collectively with the City, the “City Defendants”); (3) HSS, Inc. (“HSS”), a

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
       Gerovic included two additional City employees in her operative complaint:
 Murphy Robinson and Kevin O’Neil. In her response to the City Defendants’
 summary judgment motion, however, Gerovic stated that she did not object to the
                                                                            (Cont’d)
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 private contractor that the City hired to provide security personnel services at its

 buildings; and (4) two HSS employees, Joel Womick and Kyle Knoedler (collectively

 with HSS, the “HSS Defendants”).2

        At issue in this appeal are (1) Gerovic’s claims against the City Defendants for

 race and color discrimination, national origin discrimination, and retaliatory discharge, in

 violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and

 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) Gerovic’s § 1983 claims against the HSS Defendants for

 violation of her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Exercising

 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                    I.   BACKGROUND

    A. Factual Background3

             1. Gerovic’s Employment with the City

        Gerovic is a Caucasian female of Bosnian ethnicity. In August 2014, she

 began her employment with the City as a custodian in the Facilities Management

 Department. She initially worked at Denver Police District (“DPD”) Five, although

 she was later reassigned to work at Denver Human Services (“DHS”).

 dismissal of her claims against these two defendants. Accordingly, Gerovic is not
 appealing the portion of the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
 Robinson and O’Neil.
        2
         The HSS Defendants have submitted a separate appellee brief from the City
 Defendants. In the interest of clarity, we refer to the City Defendants’ brief as “Aple.
 Br.” and the HSS Defendants’ brief as “HSS Br.”
        3
            The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.
                                               2
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       Defendant Leroy Lemos is a Hispanic male, and he served as the Operations

 Supervisor in the City’s General Services Agency during Gerovic’s employment with

 the City. Lemos’s supervisor, Defendant Kevin O’Neil, is a Caucasian male who

 served as the Deputy Director of Facilities Management. O’Neil’s supervisor,

 Defendant James Williamson, is an African-American male who served as the

 Director of Facilities Management. Williamson’s supervisor, Defendant Murphy

 Robinson, is an African-American male who served as the Executive Director of

 General Services.

       Defendant HSS, a private contractor, was hired by the City to provide security

 personnel services at government buildings. Defendants Joel Womick and Kyle

 Knoedler were employees at HSS. When Gerovic was employed by the City,

 Womick was the Assistant Director of Operations for HSS, and Knoedler was a

 Facility Security Supervisor for HSS.

           2. Gerovic’s Early Discipline History

       Shortly after Gerovic began her employment with the City of Denver, she

 developed a discipline history due to a handful of incidents at work.

       In 2015, Gerovic received a verbal warning for wearing a gray DPD sweatshirt

 while on duty at the City’s Police Administration Building (“PAB”). Gerovic

 received a verbal warning for this incident because the DPD sweatshirt was not part

 of her facilities management uniform, and it could cause problems if she were

 misidentified as a police officer.

                                            3
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           On September 21, 2015, Gerovic received a verbal reprimand from Custodial

 Supervisor James Stigall, a Caucasian male, for not wearing her safety shoes.

           On October 1, 2015, Gerovic received a verbal warning from Custodial

 Supervisor Tony Rios, a Hispanic male, for receiving a poor to fair inspection report

 rating.

           On June 13, 2016, Lemos gave Gerovic a documented counseling conversation

 regarding her personal use of her City-issued cell phone.

           On March 17, 2017, Gerovic received a documented counseling conversation

 from Rios regarding her failure to answer her phone when Lemos called, as well as

 her failure to set up her voice mail.

           These incidents did not result in a pay change, change in job duties, or any

 other change in Gerovic’s employment status. Although Gerovic’s termination letter

 lists her prior discipline, it does not state that any prior discipline was the basis for

 her termination.

              3. Gerovic’s Incident at the Denver Motor Vehicles Office

           On May 4, 2017, Lemos issued Gerovic a revised Written Reprimand

 Disciplinary Action, regarding an incident that occurred at the Denver Motor

 Vehicles (“DMV”) office, in the Arie P. Taylor Building. Gerovic disputes the City

 Defendants’ recitation of the facts as to this incident.

           The written reprimand stated that, on March 16, 2017, Lemos received a phone

 call from an “irate” DMV office customer, Brian J., an African-American male.

                                               4
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 Aple. App., Vol. I at 149. Brian allegedly called with Daniel G.,4 a witness to

 incident, standing next to him, so that Daniel could hear the complaint to verify and

 correct anything that Brian said.

       According to the written reprimand, Brian told Lemos that he entered the Arie

 P. Taylor Building “via the unlocked East entrance,” and “proceeded down the stairs

 to the 1st floor lobby to await the DMV office to open, where he encountered Daniel

 G. also waiting.” Id. at 149. The written reprimand notes that “Daniel said that he

 got lucky and the nice city worker [Gerovic] let him in” the building. Id.

       The written reprimand states that Gerovic then came into the lobby and told

 Brian, the African-American male, that the building was not yet open and he needed

 to wait outside—even though she did not say the same thing to Daniel. As a result,

 Gerovic and Brian allegedly got into a heated, verbal exchange that was overheard by

 several witnesses.

       Sequoya Palin, a HSS security agent, submitted a written statement referred to

 in the written reprimand where she asserts that Gerovic told her she let Daniel into

 the building. Additionally, the written reprimand states that the City’s Human

 Resources representative, Anne Carter, interviewed a ResCare employee, Jerrick

       4
         Daniel’s race is not explicitly stated in the record. In the written reprimand,
 however, the City states that Brian accused Gerovic of treating the two men
 differently because of race. While speaking about the incident, Brian reportedly told
 HSS Agent Stanford that it “is racism to kick [him] out and let the white man stay.”
 Aplt. App., Vol. III at 19.
                                            5
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 Perkins, about the incident. According to Perkins, Gerovic told him she was worried

 she was going to get into trouble for letting Daniel into the building.

       Carter and Lemos met with Gerovic about the incident on March 17, 2017.

 Gerovic represented that she did not let Daniel into the building. However, the

 security camera footage indicated that Daniel did not enter the building through the

 unlocked door that Brian used, which is consistent with Daniel’s representations that

 Gerovic let him in through the locked door.

       Gerovic contends that “she was not dishonest with her employer and explicitly

 disputed that she had let anyone, of any race, into the building,” and she testified

 accordingly in her deposition. Reply Br. at 2.

       Although Lemos’s investigation into this incident at the DMV was the basis

 for Gerovic’s written reprimand, it was not the basis for her termination, and it is not

 identified as such in her termination letter.

           4. Gerovic’s Facebook Profile

       In September 2017, the City received information that Gerovic was

 representing herself as a Denver Police Officer on her public Facebook profile.

 During Gerovic’s administrative appeal of her termination, Anna Forsberg, a City

 employee, testified under oath that her daycare provider notified her about Gerovic’s

 Facebook profile. Forsberg then took a screenshot of the page and sent it to Carter,

 the City’s Human Resources representative. Thereafter, Lemos viewed Gerovic’s

 Facebook profile and confirmed that Gerovic was representing herself as a Denver

 Police Officer.
                                             6
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       Gerovic’s public Facebook profile listed her occupation as “Police Officer”

 and her employer as the “Denver Police Department.” Aple. App., Vol. I at 180–182.

 Her profile also included the following photographs: (1) Gerovic wearing a t-shirt

 with a DPD emblem, posted in 2014; (2) two photographs of Gerovic wearing a DPD

 patrol person’s hat, posted in 2015; (3) Gerovic’s DPD-issued access card that

 features a DPD badge, posted in 2014; and (4) Gerovic wearing a hooded sweatshirt

 with a DPD emblem, posted in 2015.5

       Gerovic testified that the photographs of her wearing the police hat were taken

 at the clerk’s office in the PAB, and they were posted to her Facebook page from the

 clerk’s office in the PAB by the police officer who took the picture, per her request.

 Gerovic also testified that none of the posts state that the photographs were taken

 outside of working hours.

       Sergeant Randy Steinke of the Denver Police Department interviewed Gerovic

 about her Facebook posts, and he had Gerovic show him where the pictures were

 taken. Steinke testified under oath at Gerovic’s administrative hearing that the

 pictures of Gerovic in the police hat were taken at the information desk in the police

 lobby. Additionally, Steinke testified that the picture of Gerovic in the t-shirt with

       5
         The City Defendants contend that, in the comments section of the
 photographs where Gerovic was wearing the police hat, one commenter referred to
 Gerovic as a “policewoman” in Bosnian, with the word “MILICIONERKA.” Aple.
 App., Vol. II at 34; see Aple. App., Vol. I at 184. Although Gerovic initially
 disputed this fact, at oral argument she agreed that one commenter indicated that they
 thought Gerovic was, in fact, a police officer.
                                             7
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 the DPD emblem was taken in a room in the PAB. Finally, Gerovic testified that she

 took the picture of her access badge for the PAB in the custodian closet at the PAB.6

           5. The City’s Response to Discovering Gerovic’s Facebook Profile

       On September 19, 2017, Gerovic was issued a Contemplation of Discipline

 letter, scheduling a Contemplation of Discipline meeting to occur on

 September 28, 2017. The next day, on September 20, 2017, Gerovic was issued a

 Notice of Change in Work Location letter, stating that she was being assigned to

 work at the Castro Building (which houses the DHS, rather than the DPD), and that

 her new shift would be from 1:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., rather than her previous shift

 from 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. O’Neil testified under oath during Gerovic’s

 administrative appeal hearing that he was the one who decided to change Gerovic’s

 work location. On September 21, 2017, Gerovic met with O’Neil to discuss her

 location and shift change.

       Gerovic then went to Robinson’s office to meet with him. During their

 meeting, Gerovic admitted that she had made a mistake with her Facebook posts.

 Gerovic testified that while she was in Robinson’s office, she was crying, and she

 said something to the effect of: “even if I kill myself to” prove how good she was

 working. Aple. App., Vol. I at 94. However, Robinson heard Gerovic say that she

 was going to kill herself, which caused him to fear for her safety. As a result, on

       6
        Gerovic also testified that the photograph of her wearing the hooded
 sweatshirt with the “DPD” emblem was taken in her car, on her way home from
 work.
                                            8
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 September 22, 2017, Gerovic was placed on paid administrative leave, and she was

 scheduled for a fitness for duty exam. Gerovic’s Administrative Leave Action Notice

 stated that she should not report to the workplace, and Carter, the Human Resources

 representative, instructed her the same.7

           6. Gerovic’s Administrative Leave & HSS’s “Be-on-the-Lookout”
              Posters

       Around the time that Gerovic was placed on administrative leave, the City

 instructed HSS, the private security contractor, to create a “Be On the Look Out”

 (“BOLO”) poster so that Gerovic’s department could be aware of when she was

 entering City facilities. The BOLO poster was directed to “HSS Employees in ALL

 Buildings,” and it stated: “If [Gerovic] is seen entering ANY Building[,] contact your

 supervisor immediately.” Aple. App., Vol. I at 237 (emphasis omitted). HSS

 employee Knoedler created the requested BOLO poster on September 22, 2017, and

 he updated the BOLO poster on October 3, 2017.

       Gerovic was placed on administrative leave with pay for nine days from

 September 22, 2017, through October 3, 2017. On or about October 3, 2017, Gerovic

 received a Notice of Change in Work Location, which changed her schedule back to

 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., although she was still assigned to work at the DHS, rather

 than the DPD. When Gerovic returned from administrative leave, she returned to her

 work as a custodian on the same shift, with the same pay, and no change in benefits.

       7
         The City Defendants contend that Gerovic entered her workplace, a secure
 area, on the morning of September 22, 2017, and she was discovered by her
 supervisor. However, Gerovic disputes this point.
                                             9
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        When Gerovic returned to work, on or about October 5, 2017, she overheard

  co-workers talking about the BOLO posters. Gerovic became upset and raised her

  concerns with City staff. The City then ordered HSS to remove the BOLO posters

  from all locations. According to the HSS Defendants, the BOLO posters were kept at

  a security desk that was not accessible to the public or non-HSS employees.

           7. Contemplation of Discipline Meeting & Gerovic’s Termination

        The Contemplation of Discipline letter from September 19, 2017, was

  subsequently revised and re-issued on October 18, 2017, to include additional

  information regarding (1) the Facebook posts; (2) Gerovic’s September 20, 2017,

  meeting with Lemos; (3) Gerovic’s September 21, 2017, meeting with O’Neil; (4) her

  September 21, 2017, meeting with Robinson; and (5) her September 22, 2017,

  appearance at work when she was on administrative leave.

        A contemplation of discipline meeting was held on October 31, 2017, where

  Gerovic was represented by an attorney and had the opportunity to discuss everything

  in the Contemplation of Discipline Letter. After the contemplation of discipline

  meeting, Williamson notified Gerovic of his decision to terminate her employment on

  November 27, 2017.

        The dismissal letter set forth Gerovic’s disciplinary history, which included a

  written and a verbal reprimand, two instances of documented counseling, and a

  verbal warning. However, the primary focus of the dismissal letter was Gerovic’s

  public Facebook profile and the misrepresentations contained therein—as well as

                                           10
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  Gerovic’s evasive and inconsistent answers regarding the investigation into her

  Facebook posts.8 In the dismissal letter, Williamson stated the following:

        Falsely identifying yourself to the public as a police officer is both
        troubling and unacceptable. . . . By wearing clothing items that have
        police badges, posting pictures of yourself in police issued clothing and
        posting a copy of your police building access card, you can create
        public confusion regarding your role, responsibilities[,] and duties. It
        can also be dangerous to you and the public, should someone need
        police assistance or intervention and come to you for help.
        Representing yourself [as] a police officer, as a joke or to impress
        others, is not only deceitful, but could be perceived as impersonating a
        police officer, which is a serious offense.

  Aple. App., Vol. I at 197–98.

     B. Procedural Background

        On September 21, 2018, Gerovic filed a charge of discrimination with the

  EEOC, checking the boxes for “retaliation,” “race,” and “color.” Aple. App., Vol. I

  at 268. The gist of Gerovic’s discrimination charges is that she believed she was

  singled out by Lemos for disciplinary action and punishment because she “is not

  Latino.” Id. at 272.

        8
           The district court observed that Gerovic “made multiple evasive and
  nonresponsive statements that the City found difficult to reconcile.” Aple. App.,
  Vol. III at 138. For example, the dismissal letter notes that, when Lemos asked about
  Gerovic’s self-identification as a police officer on her Facebook page, she replied, “I
  do not know how that got there,” and, when asked about the photographs in DPD
  uniforms, she replied, “Those were just for fun a long time ago.” Aple. App., Vol. I
  at 197. Additionally, when the dismissal letter references the photograph of Gerovic
  wearing a t-shirt with the DPD emblem, it notes that Gerovic “state[d] the badge on
  the gray shirt was a sticker, when, in fact, it is clearly an embroidered patch.” Id.
  The dismissal letter also notes that Gerovic initially stated that the pictures of her
  wearing a patrol person’s hat were the result of her being “told” by Officer Ray to put
  on the hat; in a subsequent interview, however, Gerovic “implied [she was] following
  a police order to put on the hat and then a picture was taken.” Id.
                                            11
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         After obtaining a “right to sue” letter, Gerovic filed this lawsuit in the United

  States District Court for the District of Colorado on December 30, 2019. In her Second

  Amended Complaint, Gerovic alleged that the defendants “created and condoned a work

  environment that was hostile to employees who are not Hispanic.” Aplt. App., Vol. I

  at 24. As pertinent to this appeal, Gerovic asserted the following claims for relief:

  (1) Title VII race and color discrimination against the City (Count I); (2) Title VII

  retaliation against the City (Count II); (3) § 1981 claims for violation of her equal

  protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment against all of the defendants except

  the City (Count III); and (4) § 1983 claims for violation of her equal protection rights

  under the Fourteenth Amendment against all of the defendants except the City

  (Count IV).9

         The City Defendants and the HSS Defendants moved for summary judgment. In

  response, Gerovic raised a new theory of national origin discrimination by the City

  Defendants in her summary judgment briefing.10

         9
          In her operative complaint, Gerovic asserted additional claims, and claims
  against additional parties. In her response to the City Defendants’ motion for
  summary judgment, however, Gerovic indicated that she did not object to the
  dismissal of those claims. Therefore, the district court’s dismissal of the following
  claims is not on appeal: (1) Gerovic’s claims against defendants Robinson and
  O’Neil; (2) Gerovic’s §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against the City (Counts III and IV);
  and (3) Gerovic’s claim for violation of the Family Medical Leave Act against the
  City (Count V). Additionally, Gerovic does not challenge the district court’s grant of
  summary judgment as to her § 1981 claim against the HSS Defendants on appeal.
  Accordingly, we do not address any of these claims here.
         10
          In Gerovic’s operative complaint, she captioned Claim I as “Title VII Race
  and Color Discrimination,” and she did not assert a cause of action for “Title VII
                                                                                 (Cont’d)
                                               12
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           The district court granted the City Defendants’ and the HSS Defendants’ motions

  for summary judgment as to all of Gerovic’s claims, including Gerovic’s national origin

  claim.

           Gerovic subsequently moved to alter or amend the district court’s grant of

  summary judgment as to her Title VII retaliation claims. However, the district court

  denied that motion.

           Gerovic filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                 II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

           This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

  legal standard used by the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).

  Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2011). We affirm if

  “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

  judgment as a matter of law.” Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d

  1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A fact is ‘material’ if

  under the substantive law it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. An

  issue is ‘genuine’ if a ‘rational jur[or] could find in favor of the nonmoving party on

  the evidence presented.’” Adams v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242,

  1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting EEOC v.

  Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000)). “The

  National Origin Discrimination.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 33. Although Gerovic’s
  operative complaint stated that Gerovic “was of Bosnian ethnicity and ancestry,” it
  did not include any references to her country of origin. Id. at 22.
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  evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be

  drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

                                   III.   ANALYSIS

        On appeal, Gerovic argues that the district court erred by (1) granting the City

  Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to her Title VII, §§ 1981 and 1983

  race- and national origin-based discriminatory discharge claims, and retaliatory

  discharge claims; and (2) granting the HSS Defendants’ motion for summary

  judgment as to Gerovic’s § 1983 claims. For the reasons that follow, we reject

  Gerovic’s arguments and conclude that the district court properly granted summary

  judgment in favor of the City Defendants and the HSS Defendants.

     A. Reverse Race Discrimination Claims Against the City Defendants

        The district court granted summary judgment to the City Defendants on

  Gerovic’s reverse race discrimination claims on two grounds. First, the district court

  concluded that Gerovic failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not

  submit sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable probability that she would not

  have been fired were she not a non-Hispanic Caucasian. Second, the district further

  concluded that Gerovic failed to show that the City Defendants’ stated reasons for

  firing her were pretextual.

        We need not decide whether the district court erred in determining that

  Gerovic failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Rather, we conclude

  that, even if Gerovic did establish a prima facie case, her racial discrimination claims

  could not survive summary judgment because she cannot show that the City’s

                                             14
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  proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm the

  district court’s grant of summary judgment based on Gerovic’s failure to establish

  pretext.

              1. Legal Background

                   i. McDonnell Douglas framework

         Gerovic alleges that the City Defendants discriminated against her in violation

  of Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.11 Regardless of whether Gerovic’s claims are

  brought pursuant to Title VII, § 1981, or § 1983, however, “the elements of a

  discrimination lawsuit are the same.” Fulcher v. City of Wichita, 387 F. App’x 861,

  864 (10th Cir. 2010); see Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,

  1225–26 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to § 1981

  and § 1983).

         “When alleging disparate treatment on the basis of [race or national origin],

  the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had a

  discriminatory motive or intent.” Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 351

  (10th Cir. 1993). Since Gerovic “lacks direct evidence of intentional discrimination,”

  she “may use the burden-shifting framework” articulated in McDonnell Douglas

  Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), “to demonstrate intentional discrimination”

  using circumstantial evidence. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1191.

         11
         Gerovic also raises claims of discrimination based on her national origin.
  We address Gerovic’s national origin claims separately in Section III.C.
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         Under McDonnell Douglas, Gerovic must first establish a prima facie case of

  discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. If she succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts

  to the City Defendants “to rebut the presumption of discrimination” by “producing

  some evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision.”

  Sorensen, 984 F.2d at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted). The City’s articulation

  of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision “must be

  clear and reasonably specific.” Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1160

  (10th Cir. 1991). If the City Defendants “succeed[] in rebutting the presumption of

  discrimination raised by plaintiff’s prima facie case, then . . . . the plaintiff must

  prove by a preponderance of all the evidence in the case that the legitimate reasons

  offered by the defendant[s] were a pretext for discrimination.” Sorensen, 984 F.2d

  at 352. “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant[s]

  intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the

  plaintiff.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).

                   ii. Reverse Discrimination Claim

         Gerovic alleged in her complaint that the City Defendants discriminated

  against her based on her race and color. Because Gerovic is Caucasian and not a

  member of a minority of a historically disfavored group, her claim is one for reverse

  race and color discrimination. Lyons v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 130 F. App’x 957, 963

  (10th Cir. 2005); Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1251 (10th

  Cir. 1986).

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         In a reverse discrimination case, a plaintiff “must, in lieu of showing that [s]he

  belongs to a protected group, establish background circumstances that support an

  inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates

  against the majority.” Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d

  1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Alternatively, a

  plaintiff may produce facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that but for

  plaintiff’s status the challenged decision would not have occurred.” Id. (internal

  quotation marks omitted). Here, Gerovic acknowledges that the “but for” standard

  applies to her burden to establish a prima facie case, and she argues that there is a

  reasonable probability that she would not have been fired were she not “of Caucasian

  origin and non-Hispanic.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 134–35.

              2. Analysis

         Although the district court concluded that Gerovic failed to establish a prima

  facie case under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework, we

  need not reach this issue here. Rather, we assume without deciding that Gerovic has

  established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, in light of the fact that the

  “burden of establishing a prima facie case . . . by a preponderance of the evidence” is

  “not onerous.”12 McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir.

  2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         12
           We have previously affirmed a grant of summary judgment based on an
  employee’s failure to show pretext after assuming without deciding that the employee
  has stated a prima facie case. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1316
                                                                                (Cont’d)
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        Turning to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, we conclude

  that the City articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating

  Gerovic’s employment. As the City noted in Gerovic’s Notification of Dismissal,

  Gerovic violated multiple Career Service Rules, including Rule 16-29(D) prohibiting

  “[a]ny act of dishonesty,”13 and she falsely identified herself as a Denver Police

  Officer on her public Facebook profile. Aple. App., Vol. I at 194. Additionally, the

  dismissal letter noted that Gerovic told other falsehoods surrounding these posts and

  other incidents, failed to follow protocols, and was disruptive in the workplace.

  These explanations constitute legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Gerovic’s

  termination. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir.

  1995) (noting that employees’ violations of rules and regulations constituted

  nondiscriminatory reasons for their terminations).

        Under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifts

  back to Gerovic to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the reasons offered

  by the City were pretextual. Although Gerovic offers several arguments in support of

  her assertion that she established pretext, none of these arguments are persuasive.

  (10th Cir. 2017) (resolving the employee’s claims based on her failure to show
  pretext, and “assum[ing] without deciding that [the employee] could make a prima
  facie McDonnell Douglas showing of sex discrimination and retaliation”).
        13
           Gerovic’s Notification of Dismissal also noted that she had received a
  written reprimand for dishonesty four months earlier (in connection with the DMV
  incident).
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                    i. The City Defendants’ Treatment of Gerovic’s Facebook
                       Activity as a Serious Offense

         First, Gerovic asserts that the City Defendants “exaggerated the seriousness of

  the Facebook posts, and fabricated or exaggerated misconduct by Gerovic, as pretext

  to discharge her for retaliatory or discriminatory reasons.” Aplt. Br. at 44–45.

  Despite Gerovic’s assertions, she has not presented any evidence aside from her own

  subjective belief that the City exaggerated the serious nature of her misconduct. To

  the contrary, the City’s investigation into Gerovic’s Facebook profile revealed that

  Gerovic received serious and supportive comments in response to her photographs,

  and at least one individual appeared to believe Gerovic was a police officer. Aple.

  App., Vol. I at 123, 183–84. Gerovic’s subjective belief that the City exaggerated its

  response to her misconduct is insufficient to demonstrate pretext.

         Here, the dismissal letter clearly outlined the reasons why the City viewed

  Gerovic’s misconduct as serious in nature. Among other things, the City stressed to

  Gerovic that “[f]alsely identifying yourself to the public as a police officer . . . . can

  create public confusion regarding your role, responsibilities[,] and duties,” and “[i]t

  can also be dangerous to you and the public, should someone need police assistance

  or intervention and come to you for help.” Aple. App., Vol. I at 197–98.

  Additionally, the City noted that regardless of whether Gerovic was misrepresenting

  herself as a police officer “as a joke or to impress others,” her conduct was “not only

  deceitful, but could be perceived as impersonating a police officer, which is a serious

  offense.” Id.

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        Moreover, this was not the first time Gerovic was warned about

  misrepresenting herself as a police officer. In 2015, she had received a “verbal

  warning” for wearing a DPD sweatshirt while on duty, and she was advised that it

  could cause problems if she were misidentified as a police officer.14 Id. at 197.

  Gerovic’s prior warning demonstrates that the City has consistently taken the

  position that misrepresenting oneself as a police officer—whether intentionally or

  unintentionally—raises serious concerns and warrants discipline. Accordingly, the

  evidence in the record would allow a jury to find that the City honestly believed that

  an employee misrepresenting herself as a police officer constitutes serious

  misconduct, and that the City acted in good faith upon those beliefs. Luster v.

  Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089, 1094 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The relevant inquiry is not whether

  the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly

  believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.” (internal quotation

  marks omitted)).

                  ii. Credibility Determinations Regarding Gerovic’s Prior
                      Incidents of Misconduct

        Next, Gerovic contends that the district court “improperly assumed disputed

  facts about [Gerovic’s] ‘less serious misconduct’ in favor of the City Defendants,

        14
            The dismissal letter also notes that, when Gerovic received a verbal warning
  in 2015 for wearing a gray DPD sweatshirt during the workday, she “stated [she]
  wore it because [she was] so proud to work for the DPD.” Aple. App., Vol. I at 197.
  According to the letter, Lemos then “clarified to [Gerovic] that [she] do[es] not work
  for [the] DPD,” but rather, she was “assigned to clean a police building.” Id.
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  rather than in the non-movant, Gerovic’s favor.” Aplt. Br. at 42. In rejecting

  Gerovic’s pretext arguments, the district court held that

        As set forth in the City Defendants’ eight-page dismissal letter, the City
        found [Gerovic]’s most egregious misconduct was representing herself as a
        police officer on Facebook, but her disciplinary history included various
        instances of less serious misconduct as well. [Gerovic] has not shown these
        reasons are unworthy of belief, and, taken together, they provide a
        legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for her firing.
  Aplt. App., Vol. III at 137. Gerovic “disputes that she engaged in dishonesty

  surrounding her Facebook posts or other incidents,” and she “disputes that many of

  the events investigated by Lemos occurred as described, including the [DMV]

  Incident, her failure to wear safety shoes, the ‘white glove’ inspection of areas

  assigned to Gerovic, and her use of her cell phone.” Aplt. Br. at 42–43.

  Additionally, Gerovic disputes “that any comments she made about other employees

  were negative and disruptive,” and she contends that she “submitted numerous

  instances where she was praised by her coworkers, . . . raising questions as to the

  seriousness of her alleged ‘disruptive’ behavior.” Id. According to Gerovic, “such

  questions of credibility should have been reserved for the trier of fact.” Id.

        This argument also fails. As the district court correctly noted, “[c]onsidering

  the facts as they appeared to the City at the time she was fired, [Gerovic] has not

  shown that [the City’s] stated reasons for firing her were not honestly held.” Aplt.

  App., Vol. III at 138. “The pertinent question in determining pretext is not whether

  the employer was right to think the employee engaged in misconduct, but whether

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  that belief was genuine.” Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th

  Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

         Here, Gerovic’s subjective beliefs about her own job performance do not raise

  a genuine issue of material fact regarding the City’s stated reasons for her

  termination. See Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1179

  (10th Cir. 2006). To show pretext, Gerovic must produce evidence that the City

  shifted rationales; that the proffered justification was false, incoherent, or

  contradictory; or that similarly-situated employees were treated differently. See

  Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 649 F.3d 1189, 1197 (10th Cir. 2011). However,

  Gerovic has not produced any evidence that Williamson or Lemos (assuming he was

  involved in the termination decision) shifted rationales at any point between when the

  City began investigating Gerovic’s conduct and when Gerovic was terminated.

  Additionally, Gerovic has not produced evidence that Williamson or Lemos did not

  actually believe Gerovic was dishonest, or that either of them ever contradicted their

  statements that Gerovic was dishonest.

                  iii. Human Resources Email Regarding the City’s Response to
                       Employee Misconduct Outside the Workplace

         Gerovic also attempts to establish pretext by citing to an email from the City’s

  former Human Resources representative, Christina Howard. According to Gerovic,

  Howard’s email states that the City’s “ordinary response to an employee apparently

  misrepresenting the nature of their employment with the City in a Facebook profile

  would be to ‘clarify expectations’ and not to terminate the employee.” Aplt. Br. at

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  23–24. However, Gerovic broadly overgeneralizes Howard’s message and takes her

  words out of context. The full text of Howard’s email, in pertinent part, is below:

        As for city protocol I wouldn’t think [this] is much different . . . than
        city employees[’] activities outside of work—which can sometimes
        reflect in their work environment. Often it is enough to let the
        employee know it has come to our attention and clarify expectations. In
        this instance, [there is] some concern as the employee list[s] DPD as an
        employer and is misrepresenting their role.

  Aplt. App., Vol. III at 99. Howard’s email says nothing about “the City’s ordinary

  response.” Aplt. Br. at 23. Additionally, Howard’s email does not address whether

  an employee could be terminated in this situation, or whether an employee could be

  terminated for violating the Career Service Rule prohibiting dishonesty, especially

  for the second time.

        Moreover, Howard’s email discusses employees who committed misconduct

  “outside of work,” whereas it is undisputed that Gerovic’s Facebook photographs

  were taken at work, in various locations throughout the PAB. Aplt. App., Vol. III

  at 99. Howard also noted that “activities outside of work . . . can sometimes reflect

  in [the employee’s] work environment,” but here Gerovic’s activities directly

  implicate her role at the DPD. Id. Not only does Gerovic’s Facebook profile state

  that she works as a “Police Officer” at the “Denver Police Department,” but each of

  the photographs at issue also feature the DPD emblem or badge in some fashion.

  Aple. App., Vol. I at 180–182.

        Gerovic also fails to mention the key sentence in Howard’s email where she

  states that, “[i]n this instance, [there was] some concern as the employee list[ed]

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  DPD as an employer and [was] misrepresenting [her] role.” Aplt. App., Vol. III

  at 99. This statement suggests that Howard viewed Gerovic’s situation as more

  serious than other situations involving employees’ activities that occurred outside of

  work, and that perhaps it would not be enough to simply notify Gerovic and “clarify

  expectations.”15 Id.

                  iv. Lemos’s Alleged Racial Bias Against Non-Hispanic
                      Employees

        In support of her argument that she has established pretext, Gerovic contends

  that she “submitted evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that

  Lemos was biased against white people.” Aplt. Br. at 43. Additionally, Gerovic

  asserts that a reasonable juror could conclude that “Lemos effectively controlled the

  investigation and discipline of Gerovic for the ‘misconduct’ that [the City] identified

  as bases for her dismissal.” Id.

        This argument fails for several reasons. To begin, Gerovic has not included

  any citations to the record to support the proposition that Lemos “controlled or

  substantially contributed to the investigation and ultimate decision to terminate her.”

        15
           As we noted earlier, Gerovic had previously been warned about
  misrepresenting herself as a police officer, even before the City Defendants
  discovered her Facebook profile. Gerovic’s dismissal letter notes that, when she
  received a verbal warning in 2015 for wearing a gray DPD sweatshirt during the
  workday, she “stated [she] wore it because [she was] so proud to work for the DPD.”
  Aple. App., Vol. I at 197. According to the letter, Lemos then “clarified to [Gerovic]
  that [she] do[es] not work for [the] DPD,” but rather, she was “assigned to clean a
  police building.” Id. This incident further undermines Gerovic’s argument that the
  City’s response to her Facebook profile should have been to “clarify expectations,”
  as the City had already done so.
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  Id. at 31. Rather, the record reflects that termination decisions were outside the

  scope of Lemos’s authority.

        Although Gerovic acknowledges that Williamson made the “formal” decision

  to terminate her, she contends that Williamson told her in May 2017 that he “could

  do nothing and that it was Lemos who made the decision.” Id. at 31 (citing Aplt.

  App., Vol. II at 117, 134). During this May 2017 discussion, however, Williamson’s

  reference to Lemos’s “decision” refers to Gerovic’s written reprimand (in connection

  with the DMV incident), not her termination. Aplt. App., Vol. II at 134, 159–60,

  162. In fact, Williamson could not possibly have been referencing Gerovic’s

  termination, because she was not terminated until several months later, in November

  2017.16

        Gerovic also alleges that “Lemos personally conducted the investigations of

  many of the incidents that served as the stated bases for Gerovic’s dismissal,

  including the [DMV] building incident, the Facebook posts, and Gerovic’s alleged

  personal use of her work cell phone.” Aplt. Br. at 31–32. However, Lemos’s

  investigations regarding Gerovic’s cell phone usage and her misconduct at the DMV

        16
            Similarly, Gerovic overgeneralizes the record when she asserts that “O’Neil
  testified that the ultimate decision by Williamson relied on information provided by
  Lemos.” Aplt. Br. at 31. In the pages of O’Neil’s testimony that Gerovic cites to,
  however, O’Neil was not specifically referencing Williamson’s decision to terminate
  Gerovic’s employment. Aplt. App., Vol. III at 35–37. Rather, O’Neil was
  referencing the administration of discipline in general. Additionally, O’Neil
  specifically stated that, when administering discipline, Williamson would also rely on
  “other information” in addition to any information provided by Lemos. Id. at 36–37.
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  building did not result in her termination. These incidents resulted in a documented

  counseling and a written reprimand, respectively.

        Although Gerovic suggests that Lemos’s review of her Facebook posts was

  tainted by his discriminatory animus, she does not raise any specific allegations about

  how Lemos’s discriminatory animus affected his review. For example, Gerovic does

  not allege that Lemos instigated the review of Gerovic’s Facebook profile; rather,

  Forsberg, a City employee, was notified about Gerovic’s Facebook profile from her

  daycare provider. Additionally, the parties do not dispute that Gerovic’s Facebook

  profile misstated Gerovic’s job title and place of employment, and that Gerovic did,

  in fact, post (or request assistance in posting) the photographs at issue.

        Gerovic also contends that “Lemos repeatedly disregarded her complaints of

  harassment by Hispanic employees.” Aplt. Br. at 31 (citing Aplt. App., Vol. II at

  127, 152). However, the cited pages of the record do not support this proposition.

  See Aplt. App., Vol. II at 152 (Gerovic’s testimony that Lemos “don’t want to listen

  to me” and said “it’s my fault”). Additionally, Gerovic contends that she testified

  that she “told Williamson that Lemos was harassing her because she was not

  Hispanic.” Aplt. Br. at 31 (citing Aplt. App., Vol. II at 117, 134). Here, too, the

  cited pages of the record do not contain this testimony. See Aplt. App., Vol. II at 134

  (Gerovic’s testimony that she “had a meeting with” Williamson, and he told her that

  “he can do nothing” and “Leroy Lemos make decision”).

        Finally, Gerovic claims that Lemos is “demeaning to non-Hispanic Caucasians

  in general.” Aplt. Br. at 31. In support of this allegation, she relies on Facebook

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  graphics that Lemos reposted on his Facebook page, which Gerovic contends

  demonstrate an animus towards Caucasian people. See Aplt. App., Vol. III at 47–49

  (screenshots of Lemos’s Facebook posts). Gerovic’s argument is unconvincing.

  Lemos’s Facebook posts do not denote animus; they simply reflect his own personal

  views on police unions and the Black Lives Matter protests that occurred during the

  summer of 2020. See Aple. App., Vol. II at 76 (Lemos’s testimony about his intent

  behind his Facebook posts). Moreover, Lemos’s Facebook posts were made years

  after Gerovic’s termination, and they clearly do not relate in any way to her

  termination.

                  v. Gerovic’s Treatment Compared to Hispanic Employees

        Finally, Gerovic attempts to establish pretext by offering comparisons to

  Hispanic individuals who she claims were similarly situated to her yet were treated

  differently. According to Gerovic, these Hispanic individuals “were not disciplined

  for acts similar to those for which [she] was purportedly fired.” Aplt. Br. at 24.

        A plaintiff can establish pretext by showing that similarly situated employees

  were treated differently. Hysten v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 296 F.3d 1177,

  1181 (10th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate disparate treatment, Gerovic must establish

  that “she was similarly situated to [her comparators] in all relevant respects.”

  McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006). In determining

  whether two employees are similarly situated, a “court should also compare the

  relevant employment circumstances, such as work history and company policies,

  applicable to the plaintiff and the intended comparable employees.” Id. (internal
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  quotation marks omitted). Moreover, even employees who are similarly situated

  must have been disciplined for conduct of “comparable seriousness” for their

  disparate treatment to be relevant. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230. Gerovic has the

  burden to show she is similarly situated to the employees with whom she is

  comparing herself. Watts v. City of Norman, 270 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 2001).

  Here, none of these employees that Gerovic has proffered are similarly situated

  comparators.

                          a. Proposed Comparators

                                (i) Ms. Viola Chacon

        First, Gerovic compares herself to Viola Chacon, a Hispanic custodian.

  Gerovic contends that Ms. Chacon “merely received a 10-day suspension, instead of

  a termination, despite stealing a plant from the workplace and then lying about it.”

  Aplt. Br. at 24. As an initial matter, Gerovic overlooks the fact that Ms. Chacon’s

  incident regarding the plant was her first act of dishonesty.

        Moreover, the district court reasonably concluded that Ms. Chacon’s

  misconduct—“stealing a plant from the workplace”—is “factually distinct from the

  misconduct that primarily prompted [Gerovic’s] firing—representing herself as a

  police officer on Facebook.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 135. Whereas the City’s

  concerns regarding Gerovic’s misconduct were motivated by important concerns such

  as public safety, Ms. Chacon’s misconduct in stealing a plant from the workplace did

  not implicate concerns of this same magnitude. Finally, the City ultimately

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  terminated Ms. Chacon for a subsequent dishonesty violation. In doing so, the City

  acted in a manner that was consistent with its response to Gerovic’s Facebook posts.

                                (ii) Ms. Danielle Garcia

        Next, Gerovic compares herself to Danielle Garcia, a Hispanic employee who

  worked for the Utility Department. Gerovic contends that Ms. Garcia was demoted,

  rather than terminated, in response to “being rude to a customer and pointing her

  middle finger at her.”17 Aplt. Br. at 24. However, Ms. Garcia cannot serve as a

  proper comparator because Ms. Garcia was not a custodian, she worked for a

  different department, and she worked under a different supervisor. Additionally,

  Ms. Garcia had been employed for a substantially longer period of time, as she was

  originally hired in 2005. Ms. Garcia also received less prior discipline than Gerovic

  did; at the time of her demotion, Ms. Garcia had only received one verbal reprimand.

  Finally, unlike Gerovic, Ms. Garcia was demoted for misconduct that did not include

  a dishonesty violation.

                                (iii) Ms. Teresa Luyando

        Gerovic also compares herself to Teresa Luyando, a Hispanic custodian.

  Gerovic contends that Ms. Luyando “received four or five writeups, including one for

  having her shirt completely unbuttoned, and was the object of many complaints about

        17
           In her opening brief, Gerovic falsely states that Ms. Garcia was only given a
  “short suspension pay cut,” Aplt. Br. at 24, despite previously admitting elsewhere
  that Ms. Garcia was, in fact, demoted. Aple. App., Vol. II at 122; see id. at 74–75,
  86, 92. The record reflects that Ms. Garcia was demoted from the position of Utility
  Worker to custodian. Id. at 122 (noting that Ms. Garcia received a Notification of
  Involuntary Demotion Disciplinary Action on June 2, 2017).
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  fighting with people and yelling at people, but was not fired.” Aplt. Br. at 24. This

  comparison is also unpersuasive. As an initial matter, Gerovic has failed to provide

  any evidence to support her allegations regarding Ms. Luyando’s conduct, aside from

  her own speculation and hearsay, and her testimony that she viewed one disciplinary

  write up that Ms. Luyando received. Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869,

  875 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[u]nsubstantiated allegations carry no probative

  weight in summary judgment proceedings,” and “evidence, including testimony, must

  be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.”). Additionally, Ms.

  Luyando was employed for a substantially longer period of time than Gerovic, as Ms.

  Luyando worked for the City for 15 or 20 years. Moreover, there is no evidence that

  Ms. Luyando was dishonest on more than one occasion.

                                (iv) Mr. David Chavez

        According to Gerovic, Hispanic custodian David Chavez “received starting

  pay of $0.50 an hour more than Gerovic was paid at that time.” Aplt. Br. at 25.

  However, Gerovic overlooks Mr. Chavez’s employment history; at the time that

  Mr. Chavez was hired by the City, he had been a Facilities Manager at Denver Public

  Schools for twenty-two years. Mr. Chavez and Gerovic are therefore not similarly

  situated, as Mr. Chavez had significantly more relevant experience than Gerovic

  which would justify any alleged difference in pay.

                                (v) Mr. John Gandara

        Gerovic also argues that she “was disciplined . . . for not wearing safety shoes,

  while at the same time another Hispanic worker, John Gandara, was not disciplined
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  for the same offense.” Id. However, Gerovic has failed to provide any evidence,

  aside from her own conjecture, to support this allegation and establish Mr. Gandara

  as a similarly situated comparator.

                                (vi) Ms. Yvonne Chavez and Ms. Sharon Romero

        Lastly, Gerovic contends that “Yvonne Chavez, a Hispanic custodial

  supervisor, and Sharon Romero, also Hispanic, were permitted to harass Gerovic

  without consequence, despite Gerovic’s unheeded complaints to Lemos.” Id. at 24–

  25. Specifically, Gerovic contends that Ms. Chavez performed a “white glove”

  inspection of Gerovic’s floor and stairs in the PAB, but that Ms. Chavez did not do

  the same for Hispanic custodians. Id. at 25. Additionally, Gerovic asserts that

  Ms. Romero was “harassing [her] about the trash in [the] parking lot.” Aple. App.,

  Vol. I at 81. Gerovic’s allegations regarding Ms. Chavez and Ms. Romero are

  unsupported by any evidence aside from Gerovic’s own conjecture.

                          b. Discipline Histories and Supervisors of Proposed
                             Comparators

        Gerovic has failed to establish that any of these employees constitute similarly

  situated comparators for an additional reason: she has not provided the discipline

  histories of the employees in question or the identities of their supervisors. The

  district court correctly observed that “this obviously pertinent information” was

  “needed to make a proper comparison.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 135.

        First, Gerovic contends that she was not required to provide the discipline

  histories of her comparators. However, we have held that similarly situated

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  comparators must be subject to the “same standards governing performance

  evaluation and discipline.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232 (internal quotation marks

  omitted).

        Second, Gerovic asserts that she was not required to identify the supervisors of

  her comparators. Contrary to Gerovic’s assertions, however, we have held that to be

  “similarly situated” to the plaintiff, a comparator must “share[] the same supervisor”

  or decision maker.18 E.E.O.C. v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476,

  489 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). This requirement is a logical one, as

  “[d]ifferences in disciplinary decisions ‘may be explained by the fact that the

  discipline was administered by different supervisors, or that the events occurred at

  different times when the company’s attitudes toward certain infractions were

  different.’” Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 540 (10th Cir. 2014)

  (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 1992)).19

        18
           Gerovic cites to Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d
  765 (E.D. Wis. 2010), to support her position that similarly situated comparators
  need not work for the same supervisors. We are unpersuaded by Gerovic’s attempt to
  rely on an out-of-circuit case, especially when this case directly conflicts with the
  established authority in our circuit.
        19
           Even if Gerovic was able to demonstrate differential treatment of similarly
  situated employees, Gerovic would still face an uphill battle in her attempt to
  establish pretext. We have held that, when a plaintiff “attempts to show pretext
  through evidence of differential treatment[,] if the employer’s differential treatment
  of similarly-situated employees is ‘trivial or accidental or explained by a
  nondiscriminatory motive,’ such treatment is insufficient to create an inference of
  discrimination.” Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1168
  (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232). Here, Gerovic provides no
  evidence, beyond her own subjective belief, to demonstrate that an unlawful,
                                                                                  (Cont’d)
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                                           ***

        In sum, we conclude that Gerovic has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute

  of material fact regarding whether the City Defendants’ asserted reasons for

  Gerovic’s termination were a pretext for discrimination. See Debord v. Mercy Health

  Sys. of Kan., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (D. Kan. 2012), aff’d, 737 F.3d 642 (10th

  Cir. 2013) (no pretext where employer terminated employee based on her Facebook

  posts, which contained inflammatory remarks about her supervisor, and the employee

  initially denied making those posts). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court

  properly granted summary judgment as to Gerovic’s discrimination claims against the

  City Defendants based on her failure to demonstrate pretext, and we affirm the

  district court’s grant of summary judgment on this basis.

     B. Retaliation Claims Against the City Defendants

        The district court granted summary judgment to the City Defendants on

  Gerovic’s retaliation claims on two grounds. The district court first concluded that

  Gerovic failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not submit sufficient

  evidence of a causal connection between her alleged protected activity and her

  termination. Additionally, the district court further concluded that Gerovic failed to

  show that the City Defendants’ stated reasons for firing her were pretextual.

        We assume without deciding that Gerovic established a prima facie case of

  retaliation. Instead, we move directly to pretext and conclude her retaliatory

  anti-Caucasian motive was responsible for any alleged difference in treatment
  between herself and any of the Hispanic employees she cites as comparators.
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  discharge claims could not survive summary judgment because she cannot show that

  the City’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual.

             1. Legal Background

        Gerovic’s retaliation claims are also assessed under the burden-shifting

  framework set forth in McDonnell Douglass. Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d

  1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008).

             2. Analysis

        To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) she

  engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) a reasonable employee would

  have found the challenged action materially adverse; and (3) there is a causal

  connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Argo v.

  Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). Here,

  Gerovic alleges that she engaged in protected activity because “she complained about

  racial discrimination a number of times without any action being taken.” Aplt. App.,

  Vol. III at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). As for the first element of a prima

  facie retaliation claim, the district court “assume[d] that [Gerovic] engaged in some

  protected activity by complaining about . . . Lemos ‘treating her differently because

  she was not Hispanic and constantly harassing her.’”20 Id. As for the second

        20
           The City Defendants note that they “did not dispute this element solely for
  purposes of summary judgment.” Aple. Br. at 39 n.14. According to the City
  Defendants, “all the testimonial and documentary evidence in this action (with the
  exception of Gerovic’s testimony) demonstrates that she did not report that Lemos
  was treating her unfairly because of her race/color.” Id.
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  element, the parties do not dispute that Gerovic’s termination was materially adverse.

  As for the third element, however, the district court concluded that Gerovic failed to

  present evidence linking her firing with any protected activity.

         We will assume without deciding that Gerovic has established a prima facie

  case of retaliation and turn to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

  In that regard, we have already determined that the City established legitimate,

  non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Gerovic’s employment. See supra

  Section III.A.2. Therefore, we proceed to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas

  framework, where the burden shifts back to Gerovic to establish a genuine issue of

  material fact that the reasons offered by the City for her termination were pretextual.

         Gerovic relies on largely the same evidence and arguments to show pretext for

  both her discrimination claims and her retaliation claims. Our previous discussion of

  Gerovic’s failure to establish pretext for discrimination, therefore, applies in full

  force here. See supra Section III.A.2. For the same reasons we concluded that

  Gerovic failed to establish pretext for discrimination, we conclude that Gerovic also

  failed to establish pretext for retaliation.

         None of Gerovic’s arguments convince us to the contrary. As we explained

  previously, we are unpersuaded by Gerovic’s arguments that she has established

  pretext with evidence that (1) the City Defendants exaggerated the serious nature of

  her misconduct; (2) the City Defendants deviated from their ordinary response to

  employee misconduct occurring outside of the workplace; (3) Lemos was racially

  biased against non-Hispanic employees; and (4) Gerovic received differential

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  treatment compared to non-Hispanic employees. Additionally, for the reasons

  discussed earlier, we rejected Gerovic’s argument that the district court made

  improper credibility determinations relating to Gerovic’s prior incidents of

  misconduct.

        The only other evidence of pretext which Gerovic offers is the temporal

  proximity of her protected activity and her termination. According to Gerovic, the

  short window of time between her protected activity and her termination “support[s]

  an inference of retaliatory motive.” Aplt. Br. at 40. Granted, Gerovic raises the issue

  of temporal proximity in the context of her prima facie case of retaliation—

  specifically, she contends that temporal proximity establishes the requisite causal

  connection. However, because we have stated that “close temporal proximity is a

  factor in showing pretext,” we briefly address Gerovic’s temporal proximity

  argument in the context of our pretext analysis. Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d

  1233, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004).

        Gerovic alleges that she complained to Williamson about Lemos in May 2017,

  which is approximately six months before her November 27, 2017, termination.

  Gerovic also alleges two other instances of protected activity in support of her

  argument that temporal proximity supports an inference of retaliatory motive.21 First,

  Gerovic claims that she engaged in protected activity by “complaining to Anne Carter

  about Lemos treating her differently because she was not Hispanic and constantly

        21
          The City Defendants note that they “dispute[] the facts relied on by Gerovic”
  regarding these two alleged instances of protected activity. Aple. Br. at 41.
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  harassing her” in “September and October of 2017.” Aplt. Br. at 38. Second, she

  asserts that, on September 20, 2017, Commander Ron Thomas of the DPD sent an

  email to Robinson on Gerovic’s behalf “raising the issue of unfair treatment.” Id.

        Although temporal proximity can potentially support a finding of pretext, we

  have consistently held that “temporal proximity alone is not sufficient to defeat

  summary judgment by showing that the employer’s proffered reason is actually

  pretext for retaliation.” Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1066

  (10th Cir. 2009); see also Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1138

  (10th Cir. 2005) (“No reasonable jury could conclude that a five-week span of time[,]

  . . . without more, meets this standard.”). In other words, “close temporal proximity

  can support a finding of pretext only in combination with other evidence of pretext.”

  Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 733 F.3d 1283, 1293 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).

  Because we have determined that Gerovic is otherwise unable to establish pretext,

  temporal proximity alone cannot establish pretext, either.

        In sum, we conclude that Gerovic has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute

  of material fact regarding whether the City Defendants’ asserted reasons for

  Gerovic’s termination were a pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, we conclude that

  the district court properly granted summary judgment as to Gerovic’s retaliation

  claims against the City Defendants based on her failure to demonstrate pretext, and

  we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this basis.

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     C. National Origin Claims Against the City Defendants

        We now turn to Gerovic’s national origin-based discrimination claims against

  the City Defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to the City

  Defendants on these claims because, among other reasons, Gerovic failed to exhaust

  her administrative remedies by raising a national origin discrimination claim in her

  EEOC complaint. Despite Gerovic’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that the

  district court properly determined that Gerovic failed to administratively exhaust her

  national origin claims.

            1. Legal Background

        Under Title VII, a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her federal claims enables an

  employer to raise lack of exhaustion as an affirmative defense. Lincoln v. BNSF Ry.

  Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1185 (10th Cir. 2018). “[A] plaintiff’s claim in federal court is

  generally limited by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably

  be expected to follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC.” Jones v.

  United Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

  marks omitted).

            2. Analysis

        Here, Gerovic concedes that she did not check the “national origin” box on her

  EEOC charge of discrimination. She relies instead on the supplemental description

  that she attached to her EEOC charge, which states that she “is a naturalized US

  citizen who arrived in America after enduring many years of war in her birthplace,

  Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 113. Additionally, Gerovic points out
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  that “[t]here is no mention of [her] non-Hispanic status in either of the first two

  paragraphs.” Aplt. Br. at 33. In Gerovic’s view, therefore, “a reasonable

  interpretation of the paragraphs is that the discriminatory behavior resulted from her

  country of origin.” Id.

        This argument is unavailing. Contrary to Gerovic’s assertions, the EEOC

  could reasonably view these statements about Gerovic’s citizenship and birthplace as

  background information in the introduction of her supplemental description. The

  single reference to Gerovic’s national origin in the attachment to her EEOC charge

  does not provide the EEOC with any information about when Gerovic became a U.S.

  citizen, or whether the City had any knowledge of her birthplace.

        Gerovic also contends that her charge describes a national origin claim

  because it states her belief that Lemos has a “pattern of disciplining employees under

  him more harshly when the employee is not Latino.” Aplt. Br. at 33 (internal

  quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aplt. App., Vol. III at 115). We are unpersuaded.

  As the City Defendants correctly note, “[i]t is unclear how ‘not Latino’ is related to

  Bosnians in particular and not Serbians, Romanians, Croatians, Bulgarians,

  Hungarians, Russians,” or a host of other national origins. Aple. Br. at 34. In other

  words, Gerovic’s assertion that she was discriminated against because she was not

  Latino did not provide the City with notice of a national origin claim based on

  Gerovic being Bosnian.

        In sum, the statements that Gerovic relies on in her charge are insufficient to

  cause the EEOC to investigate a national origin claim. As the district court correctly

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  noted, “[t]he EEOC complaint, like the Complaint in this case, is devoid of any

  allegations that [Gerovic] was treated differently because she came from Bosnia or

  even that her national origin was ever mentioned or alluded to by any Defendant.”

  Aplt. App., Vol. III at 136. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect

  the EEOC to widen the scope of its administrative investigation beyond race and

  color discrimination to also include Gerovic’s national origin.22 Accordingly, we

  conclude that Gerovic failed to administratively exhaust her national origin claims,

  and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Gerovic’s national

  origin claims against the City Defendants.

     D. § 1983 Claims Against the HSS Defendants

        Lastly, we address Gerovic’s § 1983 claims against the HSS Defendants. The

  district court granted summary judgment to the HSS Defendants on these claims

  based on its determination that the HSS Defendants were not the proximate cause of

  any violation of Gerovic’s rights. The district court reasoned that the HSS

  Defendants could not have been the proximate cause because they acted as

  intermediaries and did not participate in the decision to issue the BOLO posters that

  allegedly violated Gerovic’s rights. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude

        22
           In fact, the record reflects that the EEOC did not have notice of Gerovic’s
  national origin claims. In one of the EEOC’s internal documents, a Supervisory
  Investigator described Gerovic’s charge as “alleging that she was harassed,
  disciplined, retaliated against[,] and discharged from her position as a custodial
  worker because of her color, not-specified, and race, white.” Aple. App., Vol. II
  at 95 (emphasis added).
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  that the district court properly granted summary judgment as to Gerovic’s § 1983

  claims against the HSS Defendants.

            1. Legal Background

         Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who causes a constitutional

  deprivation while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a

  claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) a violation of rights protected by the

  federal Constitution or created by federal statute or regulation, (2) proximately

  caused (3) by the conduct of a person (4) who acted under color of [state law].”

  Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (internal

  quotation marks and brackets omitted).

         Courts employ general tort principles of causation in § 1983 cases to

  determine whether the alleged constitutional violation caused a plaintiff’s

  injury. Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012). General tort

  principles of causation provide that even where the defendant’s conduct does not

  directly cause the plaintiff’s injuries, the defendant can still be liable if his conduct

  was the “proximate cause” of the injury. Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th

  Cir. 2006). Proximate cause exists where the defendant “set in motion a series of

  events that the defendant[ ] knew or reasonably should have known would cause

  others to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation

  marks and brackets omitted). “In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a

  defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a

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  constitutional right must be established.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227

  (10th Cir. 2006).

            2. Analysis

        Here, Gerovic contends that she submitted sufficient evidence that the HSS

  Defendants were the proximate cause of the violation of her constitutional rights.

  According to Gerovic, the HSS Defendants may be held liable for their “participation

  in the creation and posting of the BOLO posters,” even though it is undisputed that

  the HSS Defendants acted at the direction of the City and lacked any discriminatory

  motive towards Gerovic. Aplt. Br. at 47.

         We conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment as to

  Gerovic’s § 1983 claims against the HSS Defendants. As an initial matter, it is

  undisputed that the HSS Defendants had no independent authority to issue the BOLO

  posters of Gerovic. In fact, Gerovic acknowledges that “before anyone at HSS made

  any decision to put out a BOLO for any employees of the City and County of Denver,

  the source of the BOLO, which would typically be a representative of a City

  department, would have to be involved.” Aplt. Br. at 9. Gerovic concedes that the

  BOLO posters at issue were created and distributed as a result of the City’s “order to

  HSS,” rather than the HSS Defendants’ own initiative. Id. (emphasis added).

  Moreover, the HSS Defendants did not have any input or influence regarding the

  City’s decision to issue Gerovic’s BOLO posters. Similarly, the HSS Defendants did

  not have any discretion to rescind the BOLO posters after Gerovic complained about

  them upon her return from administrative leave; rather, the HSS Defendants had to
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  wait for the City’s instructions before removing the BOLO posters. Accordingly,

  both parties agree that the HSS Defendants were not the decision makers with respect

  to the posting of the BOLO posters at Gerovic’s place of employment.

        Not only is there no evidence that the HSS Defendants exercised any

  decision-making authority over Gerovic’s BOLO posters, there is also no evidence

  that the HSS Defendants possessed any discriminatory motive toward Gerovic. In

  fact, as the HSS Defendants correctly note, “there is evidence suggesting that HSS

  took a conciliatory and understanding approach toward Ms. Gerovic,” and that

  “Ms. Gerovic viewed HSS as confidants with respect to her dispute against the

  [C]ity.” HSS Br. at 15. For example, the record reflects that after Gerovic learned

  about the BOLO posters and became “visibly upset,” she went to the office of

  Defendant Knoedler, the Facility Security Supervisor at HSS, to share her concerns.

  Aplt. App., Vol. II at 13, 38. Later that same day, Knoedler sent an email to Lemos

  memorializing his conversations with Gerovic. Knoedler represents that he told

  Gerovic he “was willing [to] attest to her being in distress” about the BOLO posters,

  but Gerovic said that she “wanted to try and keep [Knoedler] out of the situation,”

  and that she would raise this issue with human resources on her own. Id. at 39.

        Not only does Gerovic fail to allege that the HSS Defendants possessed any

  discriminatory motive towards her, but Gerovic also appears to concede that the HSS

  Defendants, in fact, did not possess any such malintent. Specifically, Gerovic

  maintains that a subordinate defendant may be liable under § 1983 where they have

  “direct personal responsibility” for the alleged constitutional violation,

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  “notwithstanding the fact that he was acting at the direction of a third party, and there

  is no evidence that the subordinate defendant himself had discriminatory intent.”

  Aplt. Br. at 48 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree

  with Gerovic’s assertion.

        Gerovic has not presented any evidence that the HSS Defendants possessed a

  discriminatory motive toward her, or that they set in motion the events leading to the

  BOLO posters being issued. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the HSS

  Defendants could not have been the proximate cause of any violation of Gerovic’s

  constitutional rights. The district court, therefore, properly determined that the HSS

  Defendants are not liable for Gerovic’s § 1983 claims against them.

        Gerovic’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. Gerovic disagrees with

  the district court’s view that a defendant without any decision-making role or

  discriminatory motive leading to challenged action cannot be liable under § 1983.

  According to Gerovic, “a defendant may have ‘direct personal responsibility’ for a

  constitutional violation that he effected, notwithstanding the fact that he was acting at

  the direction of a third party, and there is no evidence that the ‘subordinate’

  defendant himself had discriminatory intent.” Aplt. Br. at 48. Here, Gerovic

  contends that the HSS Defendants “had substantial decision-making authority in the

  content, presentation[,] and placement of the posters,” and that these “decisions had

  an effect on Gerovic’s rights equal to or greater than that of the simple decision by

  the City Defendants to create the posters in the first place.” Reply Br. at 19. In

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  Gerovic’s view, therefore, the HSS Defendants “bore direct personal responsibility

  for, and were the proximate cause of, the violation.” Id. at 20.

         The fact that the HSS Defendants carried out the City’s orders to make and

  distribute the BOLO posters does not inevitably mean that the HSS Defendants were

  the proximate cause of the alleged constitutional violation. Here, the HSS

  Defendants neither set in motion the series of events leading to the issuance of the

  BOLO posters, nor did they know or reasonably should have known that their actions

  would violate Gerovic’s constitutional rights.

         Unlike the cases we cited in Maestas where subordinate employees were held

  liable for significantly contributing to adverse employment decisions made by others,

  here the HSS Defendants did not personally participate in the decision to issue

  Gerovic’s BOLO posters. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005).

  Instead, the HSS Defendants only participated in implementing the City’s decision to

  do so. Although the HSS Defendants followed the City’s instructions to issue the

  BOLO posters, this minimal level of involvement does not rise to the level required

  to establish proximate causation here. See Fuqua v. City of Altus, No. CIV-17-115-

  HE, 2018 WL 1702339, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2018) (noting that causation

  under Maestas requires “some level of formal involvement in the eventual decision”

  that violated the plaintiff’s rights, such as “initiating an investigation, recommending

  the [plaintiff’s] discharge, investigating [the plaintiff’s] conduct, or instigating

  charges” (citing Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1191)).

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        Further, Gerovic has not pointed to any evidence that the HSS Defendants

  knew or should have known that creating and posting the BOLO posters might

  violate her constitutional rights. As the district court correctly noted, “[a]lthough the

  HSS Defendants had a ministerial role in implementing the City’s decision, there is

  no evidence that they could have reasonably foreseen that the notices would violate

  [Gerovic’s] rights.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 132; see Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204,

  1220 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that an assistant city attorney’s conduct was a

  substantial factor in the violation of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by

  denying permits for an anti-abortion parade, where “[d]espite discovering that

  denying the parade permits for the reasons offered by the City was most likely

  unconstitutional,” the city attorney advised the deputy police chief to sign the denial

  letter). Under these circumstances, where the HSS Defendants merely acted as

  intermediaries and did not participate in the decision to issue the BOLO posters, the

  district court did not err in concluding that the HSS Defendants cannot be held liable

  under § 1983 because the requisite causal connection had not been met.

        In sum, the HSS Defendants could not have been the proximate cause of any

  violation of Gerovic’s rights, as required for her § 1983 claims against the HSS

  Defendants. The parties do not dispute that the HSS Defendants did not have any

  input in the decision to issue Gerovic’s BOLO posters, and the HSS Defendants did

  not possess any discriminatory motive toward her. Moreover, the record does not

  contain any evidence that the HSS Defendants knew or should have known that the

  issuance of the BOLO posters would violate Gerovic’s constitutional rights.

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  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment

  as to Gerovic’s § 1983 claims against the HSS Defendants based on her failure to

  demonstrate proximate cause, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

  judgment on this basis.

                                 IV.   CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Mary Beck Briscoe
                                            Circuit Judge

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