Court Opinion

ID: 9704554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:39:45.266726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.291077
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Associate Judge,
with whom Associate Judge NEBEKER concurs:
The majority opinion for the court deals with this case in a manner which I feel obliged to characterize — with reluctance— as disingenuous. The majority opinion makes disbarment appear both routine and inevitable. In reaching such a result, however, the court effects major changes in our disciplinary procedures, without acknowledging that it is doing so. I am unable to acquiesce in the majority’s treatment of such important issues, and accordingly express these dissenting views.
I
In setting forth the reasons for my inability to agree with my colleagues, initial ref*1170erence should be made to the Constitution of the United States. Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution provides in part: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferi- or Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, . . .” Thus, the Supreme Court, and, inter alia, the United States District Courts and the United States Courts of Appeals as thereafter created by Congress, often are referred to as Article III courts. On the other hand, this court was created by Congress under Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, which empowers the Congress in part “To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”1
The majority opinion discusses (and bases its disbarment upon) what is now § 11-2503(a) of the District of Columbia Code. Prior to 1971, disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys in the District of Columbia was vested in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The relevant statute had existed in roughly the same form since 1901. As phrased in § 11-2103 of the 1967 edition of the District of Columbia Code (77 Stat. 505), it provided in pertinent part:
When a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, . . . the name of the member so convicted may thereupon, by order of the court, be struck from the role of the members of the bar, and he shall thereafter cease to be a member thereof. * * *
This court acquired the responsibility for the professional discipline of attorneys admitted to practice in this jurisdiction as one consequence of the passage of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub.L.No.91-358, 84 Stat. 473 et seq. (codified at D.C.Code 1973, § 11-101 et seq.). The relevant provisions of that Act are few in number, and warrant quotation for easy reference.
D.C.Code 1973, § ll-2501(a), states:
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure,, suspension, and expulsion.
Section 11-2502 of the Code provides in part:
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals may censure, suspend from practice, or expel a member of its bar for crime, misdemeanor, fraud, deceit, malpractice, professional misconduct, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
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It is apparent that those two statutes confer plenary jurisdiction upon this court in the vitally important area of professional discipline. Somewhat inconsistent therewith are the two subsections of § 11-2503 of the D.C.Code. I quote and comment briefly upon each.
First, § ll-2503(a) provides:
When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the conviction is presented to the court, the court shall, pending final determination of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice. Upon reversal of the conviction the court may vacate or modify the suspension. If a final judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.
*1171That subsection presents various problems, a principal one of which concerns due process. An attorney’s right to practice his profession obviously is a valued one, which may not be taken away without proper notice and a fair hearing. See, e. g., In re Buffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968); In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1974); cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977); Beil v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971).
Second, § ll-2503(b) states:
Except as provided in subsection (a), a member of the bar may not be censured, suspended, or expelled under this chapter until written charges, under oath, against him have been presented to the court, stating distinctly the grounds of complaint. The court may order the charges to be filed in the office of the clerk of the court and shall fix a time for hearing thereon. Thereupon a certified copy of the charges and order shall be served upon the member personally, or if it is established to the satisfaction of the court that personal service cannot be had, a certified copy of the charges and order shall be served upon him by mail, publication, or otherwise as the court directs. After the filing of the written charges, the court may suspend the person charged from practice at its bar pending the hearing thereof.
Here again, in the interest of brevity I comment only generally. That subsection provides for an abundance of due process rights for any attorney charged with other than conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. However, read literally, it indicates (1) that disciplinary proceedings may be initiated only by the filing in this court of written charges under oath [which is inconsistent with §§ 7(1) and (2) of our Rule XI], and (2) that this court shall itself conduct disciplinary hearings. Unquestionably the caseload of this court would preclude such a role for us; it is necessary for us to turn to the bar for structured disciplinary proceeding assistance.
II
As this court prepared to undertake its new disciplinary responsibilities, it received assistance both from a committee of the long-established Bar Association of the District of Columbia and from a committee of the new District of Columbia Bar (unified) for recommendations as to disciplinary rules. In the meantime, the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Discipline had drafted a set of model disciplinary rules.2 It is important to recognize that the ABA’s Standing Committee was preparing model rules adaptable for use in any state; those rules were not drafted in contemplation of the provisions of a statute such as § 11-2503 of our Code, by which the very legislature — the Congress of the United States — which created this court and set forth its disciplinary powers also enacted specific provisions which in part are inconsistent with the ABA’s model rules.
In considering what rules to adopt in 1971, this court (of which, like Chief Judge NEWMAN and Judges MACK and FER-REN, I was not then a member) was faced with the inconsistencies between the broad grants of power contained in §§ 11 — 2501(a) and 11-2502 on the one hand, and the restrictive provisions set forth in § 11-2503 on the other. In characterizing the provisions of the new § 11-2503 as restrictive, I do so advisedly, for court reorganization brought with it two significant statutory changes from the former § 11-2103 of the 1967 edition of the District of Columbia Code which was operative on the United States District Court. First, the prior statute had no mandatory suspension provision, while the new § ll-2503(a) provides that when a member of our bar has been convicted “of an offense involving moral turpitude,” then “the court shall, pending final determina*1172tion of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice.” Second, the prior statute made disbarment discretionary (“the name of the member so convicted may ... be struck from the roll of the members of the bar”), while the new § ll-2503(a) makes disbarment mandatory for conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Also, it should be noted that while § 21(2) of our Rule XI permits an application for reinstatement five years after a disbarment, disbarment under the statute (either the former § 11-2103 or the new § 11-2503) connotes permanence: “. . .he shall thereafter cease to be a member.”3
When the point of decision was reached as to the adoption of disciplinary rules, the court chose the ABA’s model rules (with certain modifications thereof), which have provided both thorough guidance and a desired flexibility. The court did not specifically discuss § 11-2503; that statute’s objectives readily could be considered to be subsumed by (1) the broad authority specifically granted by Congress in §§ ll-2501(a) and 11-2502 (including § 11-2502’s provision for us to “censure, suspend from, or expel a member of [our] bar for crime . .”), and (2) the inherent power possessed by the highest court of any jurisdiction to exercise disciplinary authority over attorneys admitted to practice within that jurisdiction. See D.C.Code 1973, § 11-102. On October 7, 1971, this court adopted a comprehensive set of rules (to become effective April 1, 1972) governing the bar of the District of Columbia — including, of course, the disciplinary rules set forth in Rule XI.
From this point on, I shall limit my discussion of the subject matter basically to the situation arising when an attorney has been found guilty of a criminal offense. Overriding the discussion which follows is one simple fact: From the time of the adoption of our disciplinary rules in 1971 until the majority disbarred Colson on the basis of the language of the latter portion of § ll-2503(a), that statute has not been relied upon by this court, by Bar Counsel, or by The Disciplinary Board (which was renamed the Board on Professional Responsibility in January 1978) in any disciplinary case — including this one.4 In that connection, one point should be stressed. While I recognize that at least one of the court’s newest judges may not have been aware of the existence of § 11-2503 prior to this case, I can state flatly that this court as an institution, Bar Counsel, and the Board as an institution long have been well aware of the problems presented by the inconsistencies between § 15 of our Rule XI and § 11-2503 of the Code — and, as would be expected, there has been careful dialogue on the subject between the court, Bar Counsel, and the Board.
In adopting in 1971 a set of rules for the handling of a disciplinary proceeding involving an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, this court established as § 15 of *1173Rule XI of our Rules Governing the Bar essentially- the ABA’s relevant model provisions. I quote in full the first six subsections of § 15 so that their lack of conformity with § 11-2503 readily may be recognized.
Section 15. Attorneys Convicted of Serious Crimes
(1) Upon the filing with the court of a certificate demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime as hereinafter defined, the court shall enter an order immediately suspending the attorney, whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty or nolo con-tendere or from a verdict after trial or otherwise, and regardless of the pendency of an appeal, pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding to be commenced upon such conviction.
(2) The term “serious crime” shall include any felony and any lesser crime a necessary element ■ of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of such crime, involves improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, wilful failure to file income tax returns, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a “serious crime.”
(3) A certificate of a conviction of an attorney for any crime shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that crime in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against him based upon the conviction.
(4) Upon the receipt of a certificate of conviction of an attorney for a serious crime, the court shall, in addition to suspending him in accordance with the provisions of (1) above, also refer the matter to The Board for the institution of a formal proceeding before a hearing committee, without any probable cause hearing before any inquiry committee, in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed, provided that a disciplinary proceeding so instituted will not be brought to hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.
(5) Upon receipt of a certificate of a conviction of an attorney for a crime not constituting a serious crime, the court shall refer the matter to The Board for whatever action it may deem warranted, including the institution of an investigation by Bar Counsel, a probable cause hearing before an inquiry committee, or a formal proceeding before a hearing committee, provided, however, that the court may in its discretion make no reference with respect to convictions for minor offenses.
(6) An attorney suspended under the provisions of (1) above will be reinstated immediately upon the filing of a certificate demonstrating that the underlying conviction for a serious crime has been reversed but the reinstatement will not terminate any formal proceeding then pending against the attorney, the disposition of which shall be determined by the hearing committee and The Board on the basis of the available evidence.
Thus, quite intentionally, and with no reference to § 11-2503, this court’s evaluative criterion became that of a “serious crime,” rather than § ll-2503(a)’s “offense involving moral turpitude.” The court provided that when it found a crime to have been “serious,” it would suspend an attorney and, under § 15(4) of Rule XI, “refer the matter to the Board for the institution of a formal proceeding before a hearing committee ... in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed . . .”
It should be recognized that the responsibility of professional discipline was new to this court and to those who thereafter became members of the disciplinary structure which we created as an arm of the court to administer the provisions of Rule XI.5 As *1174we have progressed, we have sought to develop consistent standards. Thus, in In re Kleindienst, D.C.App., 345 A.2d 146, 147 (1975) (en banc), we noted that “the nature of the discipline imposed is a judgment independently to be made by this court.” In eschewing the concept that punishment is an objective of a disciplinary proceeding, we also observed:
We start with a fundamental premise: The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is to question the continued fitness of a lawyer to practice his profession. [Id.; citations omitted.]
The Kleindienst case produced a majority and a dissenting opinion, the latter written by Judge KELLY, the author of the majority opinion in this case. It also produced a separate opinion by Judge GALLAGHER stating why he voted to grant rehearing. 345 A.2d at 152. In none of those three opinions was § 11-2503 of the Code mentioned (quite properly, I hasten to add); all references were to the provisions of the Disciplinary Rules which the respondent was charged with having violated.
Judge KELLY had occasion to write an opinion for a division of the court in In re Wild, D.C.App., 361 A.2d 182 (1976). In a 2-1 opinion, the court adopted the recommendation of our former Disciplinary Board and suspended the respondent for one year. As had always been true, no mention was made of § 11-2503. At that time, Judge KELLY wrote in part:
The Disciplinary Board found it unnecessary to determine whether respondent’s [unlawful] conduct involved moral turpitude (DR1-102(A)(3)) or was prejudicial to the administration of justice within the meaning of DR1-102(A)(5) since it found a clear violation of DR1-102(A)(4) in respondent’s secretly transferring funds of a Bahamian subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation to President Nixon’s Reelection Committee and directing Maurice Stans to list the contributions as made by “employees of Gulf Corporation” — a patent effort to circumvent the law [Id., at 183.]
Another ease which should be noted is In re Foshee, No. S-48-77. That respondent was found to have engaged in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, but there had been no suspension pending a disciplinary hearing, there was no reliance upon (or even mention of) § ll-2503(a), and there was no automatic disbarment as the majority now says that statute requires. Rather, the evaluation of that respondent’s conduct was keyed to his violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3).6 By an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Order issued March 17,1977, we adopted the recommendation of The Disciplinary Board that the respondent be suspended for three months.7
*1175During the early years of our exercise of responsibility over the bar, it became apparent that various aspects of our rules needed refinement, improvement, and supplementation. In the meantime, the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Discipline continued its outstanding work in the field, and it effected further improvements in its model disciplinary rules. In 1977, we undertook to make changes in our rules. At our invitation, the Disciplinary Board suggested various improvements; the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar also gave us recommendations.
By the end of 1977, this court included among its nine active judges four persons who had not participated in the adoption of the original rules on October 7,1971. If the court as an institution somehow had erred in subordinating § ll-2503(a) in promulgating the original rules, consideration of major amendments to those rules presented an ideal opportunity to revitalize that statute. No such thing happened; when we amended the rules on January 12, 1978, § 15 of Rule XI was unanimously readopted with no relevant change.8
Ill
The foregoing recitation has been necessary to place in context one question with which I deal: Why has the majority turned to one portion of § ll-2503(a), which unquestionably this court had subordinated to the more comprehensive and flexible provisions of §§ ll-2501(a) and 11-2502 of the Code and § 15 of our Rule XI, to lead to the result of disbarment for respondent Colson? It is likely that the answer is found in the following new provision of § 7(3) of Rule XI which was adopted in January of 1978 (over Judge NEBEKER’s and my opposition):
In considering the appropriate [final disciplinary] order, the Court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or otherwise would be unwarranted.
I feel strongly — and I believe my view is shared by the great majority of persons who are knowledgeable in the field of professional discipline — that the basic decisional responsibility for the sanction to be imposed in a disciplinary proceeding should rest upon the judges of a jurisdiction’s highest court, rather than upon the members of a court-created disciplinary body.9 After all, our Board on Professional Responsibility is not akin to an administrative agency which is presumed to have an expertise which we lack; we should be quite as capable in this area as our appointed Board members, and we should be free of even the hint of potential peer pressures which might make a particular respondent feel that he or she can receive impartial consideration only from judicial officers.
Nonetheless, the majority of my colleagues effectively concluded to the contrary. For reasons which remain inexplicable to me, this court, in adopting the above-quoted provision, has conferred what amounts to a quasi-agency status upon the Board which we have created and whose members we appoint.
While I disagree with the adoption of such a provision, I recognize that differences of opinion make, among other things, horse races and dissenting opinions. However, this case came along soon thereafter, and the majority promptly found itself confronted by its new creation.
On October 19, 1977 (while we were actively considering changes in our rules), the Board issued its Findings and Recommendations in this case. The Board then had seven members. Four concluded that a *1176five-year suspension would be the appropriate disciplinary sanction; three voted for disbarment. Neither the majority nor the minority opinion of the Board made any reference to § ll-2503(a) of the Code; both dealt with the appropriate consequences of what had been concluded to be Colson’s violations of Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(3) and 1 — 102(A)(5).
Bar Counsel and respondent Colson then filed a joint motion to dispense with briefs and oral argument in this court, urging us to “enter an Order [of suspension] in conformity with the recommendation of the Board.”10 The court then concluded that the Board’s minority position advocating disbarment needed exposition beyond that which already was apparent from the record. Accordingly, the court appointed a distinguished member of the bar, John W. Douglas, as amicus curiae to represent the position of the Board’s minority (/. e., to advocate disbarment).11 In his brief, Mr. Douglas referred to the statute in a limited fashion as follows:
Imposition of the disbarment sanction under the Court’s Rule XI, Section 15, would also be consistent with Section 11-2503(a) of the District of Columbia Code, dealing with the discipline of attorneys convicted of crimes. That section provides for the removal of members of the Bar for any “offense involving moral turpitude.” In view of the fact that disbarment here would be consistent with Section ll-2503(a), we see no useful purpose in considering the question, not raised below, of whether the Court is compelled by Section ll-2503(a) to automatically disbar an attorney, such as respondent, for any crime involving moral turpitude — even though we recognize that the literal language of the statute could support such a conclusion.
In due course, the case was argued before the court en banc, and the majority has rejected the Board’s suspension recommendation by stating simplistically: “Because of legislative fiat, however, we are precluded from adopting The Board’s recommendation.” At 1163.
A reader with little prior exposure to disciplinary matters might well conclude that the Board must have been rather obtuse to overlook such a seemingly obvious point. However, there was no reason for the Board to have considered § ll-2503(a) of the Code to be controlling. As I have stated, we have never even cited it in any case previously. Moreover, we did not rely upon its provisions in this case until reaching a final decision. That is, we did not initiate this proceeding by suspending Col-son under § ll-2503(a) for having committed an offense involving moral turpitude (which, under the statute, thereafter would call for automatic disbarment); we suspended him under § 15(1) of Rule XI and directed the Board to initiate a proceeding under § 15(4) “in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed . . . If § ll-2503(a) is to be followed, a precondition to its applicability is a determination by this court that a member of the bar has been “convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.” We made no such finding; rather, as noted, our suspension order and the direction to hold a disciplinary hearing were predicated exclusively on § 15 of Rule XI.
*1177IV
Wisely, courts seldom decide cases on grounds not urged or briefed by the parties. When they do, they risk going astray, and that is precisely what has happened here.
It would be one thing if the majority were to have said candidly, in effect, (1) that this court no longer will operate under the premise that the objectives of § 11-2503 properly may be considered to be subsumed within the broader grants of statutory authority (/. e., §§ 11-2501 and 11-2502) and to be satisfied by the provisions of our Rule XI, and (2) that inasmuch as ours is an Article I court, Congress is free to direct (without a separation of powers problem) that an attorney who has been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude must thereupon be suspended by this court and thereafter (following affirmance in any appeal) shall cease — permanently—to be a member of our bar.
The majority does not take such an approach. Rather, it indulges the fiction that § 15 of Rule XI is readily compatible with § ll-2503(a). It effects major surgery upon our disciplinary procedures, but seeks at the same time to assure the patient that there is nothing wrong. In the process, in my view, the majority wreaks considerable hovac upon the orderly functioning of the Board on Professional Responsibility and its hearing committees. The majority opinion does not provide guidance; it creates confusion. Illustratively, the statute calls for disbarment upon conviction of “an offense involving moral turpitude.” Without any basis in either legislative history (there is none) or reason, the majority jumps from that provision to the following interconnected conclusions:
An attorney is subject to disbarment under the statute for his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, not for his commission of an act involving moral turpitude. The threshold focus of the statute, then, is on the type of crime committed rather than on the factual context surrounding the actual commission of the offense. The Board, therefore, must make an initial determination as to whether the attorney’s crime inherently involves moral turpitude. If The Board decides that it does, that is the end of the inquiry; The Board must recommend disbarment. [Ante, at 1164 (emphasis in original).]
I have studied the majority opinion many times in vain seeking to find a coherent thread of consistency which adequately might guide our appointed Board in future cases.12 To back up to the threshold of the applicability of § ll-2503(a), if the statute is to be applied, then it is we who must make a determination of moral turpitude prior to suspension, which would leave nothing (other than confirming the fact of conviction) to be determined by the Board.13 Further, although the statute quite clearly relates disbarment to conviction of an “offense involving moral turpitude,” the majority opinion essentially translates such language into requiring a determination based solely on the language of the relevant criminal statute, without regard to any mitigating circumstances concerning the commission of the violation thereof. Here too there is uncertainty, for the majority also takes the position that some cases will require precisely the type of analysis which is rejected in this case. See 412 A.2d at 1166, 1167.
An overview of the disposition of this case, as I see it, finds the majority seeing no constitutional infirmities in § ll-2503(a), *1178and yet applying only that portion of it which leads to the disbarment of respondent Colson. I cannot acquiesce in either such a selective utilization of the statute or what I consider to be the shoehorning of a single provision of the statute into a complex disciplinary mechanism (our Rule XI) which was neither drafted nor adopted with any directly intended interconnection with § 11 — 2503(a).
V
Like the majority, I express no independently-reached judgment as to whether respondent Colson should be suspended or disbarred. The factors which led him to commit the acts under consideration are exceptionally unique and complex. Recognizing, as I have quoted above from our en banc opinion in In re Kleindienst, supra, that “[t]he purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is to question the continued fitness of a lawyer to practice his profession” [345 A.2d at 147 (citations omitted)], the underlying question of the appropriate discipline is a difficult one — particularly when one recognizes our manifest obligation to disregard any and all political overtones of Colson’s conduct.
I have expressed my disagreement with what I consider to have been my colleagues’ unwise abdication of too much of our deci-sional responsibility to the Board; as noted we have committed ourselves under the new § 7(3) of Rule XI to “adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or otherwise would be unwarranted.” Under that standard of review, I could not say — nor do I believe the members of the majority validly could say — that the suspension recommendation of the Board’s majority should be rejected.
However, the majority does not apply the review standard which its members so recently adopted. Rather, it decides this case on the basis of one portion of § 11— 2503(a), notwithstanding the unquestioned facts that (1) this court has never applied § ll-2503(a) to any disciplinary respondent previously, (2) the court made no prior reference whatsoever to § ll-2503(a) in this proceeding, (3) neither the majority nor the minority of the Board placed any reliance on the statute, and (4) no party to this proceeding has advanced the applicability of § ll-2503(a). I believe that the majority’s singling out of respondent Colson for disbarment under a statutory provision never before utilized by this court presents a serious question as to whether due process requirements have been met. Additionally, because of my deep concern as to the adverse precedential consequences which will follow from what I consider to be the majority's unsound analysis of the issues, I respectfully express these dissenting views.
Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and KELLY, KERN, GALLAGHER, NEBEKER, HARRIS, MACK and FERREN, Associate Judges, and YEAGLEY, Associate Judge, Retired.*
Statement by Associate Judge KERN, with whom Associate Judge KELLY, and Associate Judge YEAGLEY, Retired, join:
The dissent, distilled to its essence, complains that in the instant case the majority of the court, sitting en banc, has recognized, read and applied the particular section of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § 11-2503(a), enacted by Congress to deal with the situation “when a member of the bar . is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.”1 The dissenters decry (Dissent at 1178) “such a selective utilization of the statute . . . [and] the shoehorning of a single provision of the *1179statute into a complex disciplinary mechanism (our Rule XI) which was neither drafted nor adopted with any directly intended interconnection with § ll-2503(a).”
If this court failed to apply the law as written by Congress, then this failure would indeed, constitute “a selective utilization of the statute.” So, too, rules of this court, however drafted and adopted, surely do not take precedence over a congressional mandate. In sum, the member of the bar before us falls within the applicable statute and we are duty-bound to abide by the law as found in this statute.

. Section 8 of Article I also empowers Congress “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square), as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, . . . ”

. At that time, the ABA committee’s model rules had not yet received formal ABA approval. Later they did, and they have proved to be extremely helpful. They first were issued as “Suggested Guidelines for Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement” bearing the date November 14, 1974; the most recently amended edition is dated June 9, 1977.

. The statute provides only one exception to the permanence of disbarment for conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. The last sentence of § ll-2503(a) states: “Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.”
The statutory permanence of disbarment — in contradistinction to suspension — for conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude is consistent with prior case law during those years in which disbarment was discretionary. See, e. g„ In re Quimby, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 273, 359 F.2d 257 (1966); In re Williams, 158 F.Supp. 279, 281 (D.D.C.1957) (three-judge court).

. These words were wholly correct when first written. However, the refinement of multiple conflicting opinions — as has occurred in this case — consumes time. On January 23, 1979, a division of this court (all of whose members— Chief Judge NEWMAN and Judges KELLY and KERN — are members of the majority in this case) issued an unpublished order in another disciplinary proceeding. In it, anticipating the new procedures as they were being incubated in this case, a suspension was ordered under § 15(1) of Rule XI [rather than under § 11-2503(a)]. The division further provided:
[T]he Board on Professional Responsibility is directed to institute formal proceedings and specifically to review the elements of the crime for which Respondent was sentenced for the purpose of determining whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude within the meaning of D.C.Code § ll-2503(a). [In the Matter of Fodiman, No. S-55-78.]

. The court’s inexperience may provide the explanation for what I consider to have been a major error in the adoption of our rules. In appointing the members of our Board, we limit*1174ed ourselves in § 4(1) of Rule XI to selecting such Board members from a list of not less than three candidates per vacancy submitted to us by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar. (This provision was not adopted from the model rules, but rather was accepted as a recommendation from the District of Columbia Bar.) Indicative of the lack of wisdom of such a provision is the fact that no other court in the country has similarly limited itself.
We have been fortunate in that our Board has had two distinguished Chairmen and many able and dedicated members. (Also, the Board selected a highly able Bar Counsel.) Nonetheless, countless hours have been spent fruitlessly in our considering the qualifications of many nominees who are unknown to us. We properly have total discretion in naming the members of our Committee on Admissions, our Committee on Unauthorized Practice, and the trustees of the Clients’ Security Trust Fund. I firmly believe we should have similar discretion with respect to selecting the members of our Board on Professional Responsibility, which probably is the most sensitive arm of the court. A majority of the court, however, thus far has been unwilling to rectify this problem.

. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) provides in relevant part:
“A lawyer shall not: . . Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.”

. The Foshee case received the careful attention of the full court. The division which was assigned to the case prepared and circulated a draft opinion for intended publication. The court voted sua sponte to consider the case en banc. The division then concluded that disposition of the case by an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment would permit its prompt resolution. That approach proved acceptable to the en banc court, which returned the case to the division for decision.

. The only meaningful change in § 15 of Rule XI was the deletion of references to inquiry committees, which previously were part of our disciplinary structure but which we decided were no longer necessary.

. I believe this to be particularly true where, as is now the case in the District of Columbia, the disciplinary body includes members who are not lawyers.

. Bar Counsel and counsel for Colson filed a stipulation which reads as follows:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between Bar Counsel and Counsel for Respondent that each is satisfied with the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board herein, and that neither intends to further contest or seek modification of the recommendation.

. There was somewhat of a temporal overlap in our consideration of this particular case and of our overall rule changes. Mr. Douglas was appointed to urge disbarment on November 30, 1977. The revised § 8 of Rule XI which was adopted on January 12, 1978, included the following new provision:
Whenever at least two members of the Board recommend disbarment, the case shall be referred initially to the court en banc. Additionally, since Bar Counsel appears before the Court on behalf of the Board, in a case in which two or more members of the Board recommend a discipline other than that recommended by the majority of the Board, the Court in its discretion may appoint an attorney to advocate the minority view.

. It risks repeating the obvious, for example, to note that while § 1 l-2503(a) speaks in terms of “an offense involving moral turpitude,” the majority opinion draws its distinction between “conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude” and the “commission of an act involving moral turpitude.” Others who find this less than clear will not stand alone.

. This presents due process problems for the majority, whose discussion on this subject ranges from an attorney’s right to a full hearing as to whether the elements of a particular crime “inherently” involve moral turpitude to the far lesser concept that an attorney’s criminal trial, plus his right to contest the fact that he has been convicted, provide all the due process to which he is entitled. See 412 A.2d at 1164 1169.

 Judge Yeagley was an Associate Judge of this court at the time of oral argument; his status changed to Associate Judge, Retired, on April 20, 1979.

. Section 2503(a) mandates disbarment of a lawyer so convicted and the record reflects that subsequent to this enactment the member of the bar here pleaded guilty to the charge of “obstructing justice in connection with the criminal prosecution” of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503.