Court Opinion

ID: 9839955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 18:04:24.004841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:44.082851
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/14/23 P. v. Frazier CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080220

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD289037)

MARTEL MIGUEL FRAZIER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Affirmed.
         John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                              INTRODUCTION
      A jury found Martel Miguel Frazier guilty of human trafficking,
pimping, and pandering of a minor. The trial court found true that Frazier
had suffered a prior strike under the Three Strikes law. Frazier, who is
Black, submitted sentencing briefs in which he offered statistics showing that
over a 10-year period, more Black people than members of other races were
arrested for human trafficking of minors, and/or pimping and pandering of
victims of any age. He also claimed Black defendants tended to receive more
severe punishment for these offenses than members of other races.

      Based on this asserted data, Frazier claimed a violation of Penal Code1
section 745, a provision within the recently enacted California Racial Justice
Act of 2020 (RJA), which prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a
criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race. As a remedy for the
alleged RJA violation, he asked the trial court to dismiss the strike allegation
under section 1385, former subdivision (c)(3)(A) (now subdivision (c)(2)(A)),
and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), or
alternatively to impose a low-term sentence.
      The trial court declined to do so. It found Frazier had failed to make a
prima facie showing of an RJA violation, in that he failed to satisfy the
statutory requirement of showing the defendants assertedly receiving more
lenient treatment were similarly situated to him. (See § 745, subd. (a)(3),
(4)(A).) On appeal, Frazier fails to establish the court’s ruling was erroneous.
As a consequence, we affirm the judgment.

1     Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                       2
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                           I.
                          Trial Evidence and Verdict
      In February 2018, a San Diego police officer assigned to the
Department of Justice Human Trafficking Task Force learned the services of
a 17-year-old prostitute (Jane Doe or minor) were being offered in a
commercial advertisement posted on a website commonly used to advertise
prostitution. The officer, posing as a sex buyer, texted the phone number in
the advertisement and arranged for the minor to meet at a hotel and engage
in certain sex acts for an agreed price.
      At the appointed time, the minor arrived at the hotel in a car driven by
29-year-old Frazier. Frazier remained in the car as the minor exited and
made her way to the hotel room, where police officers were waiting. The
officers detained the minor and arrested Frazier.
      A box of condoms was discovered in Frazier’s car. Two months’ worth
of text messages between the minor and Frazier were extracted from the
minor’s cellphone. The topics included arranging meetings with sex
customers, what sex acts the minor could perform, finding customers’
locations, the minor’s need for condoms, and collecting money from
customers. An expert in human trafficking testified the messages were
consistent with pimping, pandering, and human trafficking activity.
      A jury convicted Frazier on charges of human trafficking of a victim
under 18 years old (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1); count 1), pimping of Jane Doe
(§ 266h, subd. (a); count 2), and pandering of Jane Doe (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1);
count 3). It further found in connection with counts 2 and 3 that Jane Doe
was a minor 16 years of age or older. (§§ 266h, subd. (b)(1), 266i,
subd. (b)(1).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that

                                           3
Frazier had suffered a prior robbery conviction (§ 211) that qualified as a
strike within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).
                                           II.
                                    Sentencing
A.    Frazier’s Sentencing Briefs
      In advance of the March 2022 sentencing hearing, Frazier filed a
sentencing memorandum and a corresponding addendum in which he
requested sentencing leniency. He asked the trial court to dismiss the strike
allegation, or alternatively to impose the low term of three years (doubled by
the strike) for a sentence of six years.
      In moving to dismiss the strike allegation, Frazier relied on section
1385, subdivision (c), which was added to section 1385 effective January 1,
2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Subdivision (c) of section 1385 requires
sentencing courts to “dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of

justice to do so” and would not endanger public safety.2 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1),
italics added; id., subd. (c)(2).) It provides a list of nine mitigating
circumstances for the court to consider when exercising its discretion to

dismiss enhancements. (Id., subd. (c)(2)(A)–(I).)3 The first of those

2     As we later discuss, the parties agree section 1385, subdivision (c), does
not authorize a sentencing court to dismiss a strike allegation. We will
assume this is correct without deciding so.

3     As of June 30, 2022, the provision in section 1385 that lists the
mitigating circumstances was renumbered from subdivision (c)(3) to (c)(2).
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15 [deleting former subdivision (c)(2) and renumbering
former subdivision (c)(3) as subdivision (c)(2)].) Although Frazier’s
sentencing took place before the renumbering became effective, to avoid
confusion we refer to the relevant provision that sets forth the mitigating
circumstances using its current designation of subdivision (c)(2).

                                           4
mitigating circumstances is whether “[a]pplication of the enhancement would
result in a discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(A).)
      Section 745, in turn, was added to the Penal Code by enactment of the

RJA, which became effective January 1, 2021.4 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5.)

      The other eight mitigating circumstances are whether multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case; application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years; the “current offense is connected
to mental illness”; the “current offense is connected to prior victimization or
childhood trauma”; the “current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5”; the “defendant was a juvenile when they
committed the current offense or any prior offenses . . . that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case”; the
“enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old”; and
“[t]hough a firearm was used in the current offense, it was inoperable or
unloaded.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)–(I) & (c)(4).)
      The statute provides that “[p]roof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)

4      After Frazier filed his opening brief on appeal, the Legislature enacted
certain amendments to the RJA that became effective January 1, 2023.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) The parties agree these amendments do not
substantively affect Frazier’s case and should not be applied retroactively to
Frazier. The amendments did not alter the text of subdivisions (a)(4)(A) or
(h)(2) of section 745, two of the provisions relevant to Frazier’s appeal. (See
Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) Although the amendments did alter the text of
subdivision (a)(3) of section 745 by substituting the phrase “who commit
similar offenses” with the phrase “have engaged in similar conduct” (see
Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2), this modification does not affect our analysis of the
adequacy of Frazier’s prima facie showing of an RJA violation. Because this
appeal does not require us to consider whether the recent amendments of the
RJA should be given retroactive effect or to apply the statute in its current

                                         5
Subdivision (a)(4) of section 745⎯the provision cited in subdivision (c)(2)(A)
of section 1385, prohibits racial discrimination in sentencing. (See § 745,
subd. (a)(4)(A) & (B); Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138,
147–148 & 148, fn. 4 (Young).) Relevant here, subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section
745 establishes that the RJA is violated when a longer or more severe
sentence is imposed based on the race of the defendant. More specifically, it
provides that a violation of the RJA “is established if the defendant proves, by
a preponderance of the evidence” that “[a] longer or more severe sentence was
imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated
individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe
sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share
the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other
races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was

imposed.”5 (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A).)
      In moving to dismiss the strike allegation pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c), Frazier sought in part to establish the mitigating
circumstance that “[a]pplication of the enhancement would result in a

form, and because the parties rely on the text of the RJA as originally
enacted, all of our references to the statutes comprising the RJA are to the
former versions of the statutes unless otherwise stated.

5     Subdivision (a)(4)(B) of section 745 establishes that the RJA is violated
when a longer or more severe sentence is imposed based on the race of the
victim, and is not at issue here. (See § 745, subd. (a)(4)(B) [“A longer or more
severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other
similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or
more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on
defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than
in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, in the
county where the sentence was imposed.”].)

                                       6
discriminatory racial impact as described in” subdivision (a)(4) of section 745,
among other enumerated mitigating factors. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A).) In
support of this part of his motion, he offered statistics he obtained from the
San Diego County District Attorney’s Office in response to a Public Records

Act request.6
      According to Frazier’s interpretation of the District Attorney’s

statistics,7 they revealed that during a 10-year period from January 1, 2012

to January 1, 2022,8 Black people “have been more likely prosecuted” than
“White, Hispanic, and other[ ] (Asian, Guatemalan, Vietnamese)” people for
“prostitution crimes.” Frazier defined “prostitution crimes” to mean human
trafficking in violation of section 236.1, subdivision (c)(1) (the provision that
proscribes human trafficking of a minor); pimping in violation of section

6      Our ability to summarize Frazier’s arguments accurately is made
difficult by a lack of precision in his citations to the relevant provisions of
section 745 (e.g., he cited to section “745(a)(b)(4),” which does not exist) and
mathematical inconsistences in his descriptions of the statistics (e.g., he
initially stated 254 Black people were arrested for “prostitution crimes” but
later stated that 254 Black people were prosecuted for them, and even later
stated 245 Black people had been arrested, of whom 251 were “charged and
sentenced” while “14 were dismissed”). These errors, however, are not
outcome-determinative of this appeal.

7     Although the statistics were produced to the defense on an Excel
spreadsheet, the spreadsheet and the raw data it contained were not
provided to the trial court and are not part of the record on appeal. In his
sentencing memorandum, Frazier explained he omitted “many entries on the
Excel sheet” regarding “prostitution arrests” from “the defense counting of
the statistics” for various reasons, including that “some entries” purportedly
contained “insufficient facts” as to the ultimate disposition of the case.

8     Elsewhere, Frazier framed the 10-year period as “1/11/2012[ ] to
12/13/21.”

                                        7
266h, subdivision (a); or pandering in violation of section 266i, subdivision
(a)(2). Unlike the current offenses for which Frazier was convicted, the
pimping and pandering offenses he included in his statistics did not
necessarily involve crimes against minor victims.
      Frazier contended that in this 10-year period, 254 Black people were
prosecuted for one or more of the identified prostitution crimes, compared to
10 White people, 13 Hispanic people, and 3 others (“Asian/Vietnamese”) who
were prosecuted for prostitution. He further stated that although “Black
[p]eople make up 6.4% of the City of San Diego, and 5.5% of the County of

San Diego,”9 “Black [p]eople make up 91% of people prosecuted for
prostitution crimes in San Diego County.” By comparison, he stated, “White
[p]eople make up 3%,” “Hispanic [p]eople make up 5%,” and “[o]thers[ ] make
up approximately 1%” of those prosecuted for prostitution. As he put it, “[i]n
simple English, if it looks like more [B]lacks are arrested than [W]hites and
Hispanics there is a racial impact in the Black community.” (Italics added.)
      Frazier filed an addendum to his sentencing memorandum in which he
purportedly set forth additional statistics in support of his claim of an RJA
violation as a basis for the trial court to dismiss the strike allegation under
section 1385, subdivision (c). In the addendum, Frazier emphasized arrests of
people for the identified prosecution crimes in the same 10-year period. He
stated that for this period, 254 Black people were arrested for prosecution

9      Frazier cited the “United States Census Bureau, 2020” as the source of
this information.

                                        8
crimes, compared to “10 [W]hite [people], 13 Hispanic [people] and 3 others

(Asian, Vietnamese etc.).”10
      In a footnote within this addendum, Frazier added the following
“comparison of prison sentences, sentences of probation and dismissals or

rejections”:11
      • 251 Black people “were charged and sentenced,” of which 172 or 68
        percent were sentenced to prison and 59 or 23 percent were placed
        on probation. “The total arrested was 245,” with 14 or 6 percent of
        those cases “dismissed or rejected.”

      • 12 White people were charged and sentenced, of which 7 or 58
        percent were sentenced to prison and 5 or 42 percent were placed on
        probation. “The total arrested was 18,” with 6 of those cases
        dismissed or rejected.

      • 15 Hispanic people were charged and sentenced, of which 10 or 67
        percent were sentenced to prison and 5 or 33 percent were placed on
        probation. “The total arrested was 16,” with one of those cases
        dismissed or rejected.

      • 34 “Black people were sentenced with strikes alleged and sentenced
        to 231 years, averaging approximately 6.8 years. Whites had no
        strike cases alleged along with the prostitution charges and there
        was one Hispanic case with an alleged strike.”12

10     These are the same numbers he used to describe people prosecuted for
prostitution crimes in the same 10-year period. It is unclear whether Frazier
is referring to a different set of data or mischaracterizing the same data.

11    As with Frazier’s original sentencing memorandum, the underlying
data was not provided; he set forth the statistics within the text of the
addendum.

12    As the People observe in their response brief on appeal, there are
numerous calculation errors in the defense statistics. However, for the
purposes of our analysis, we assume the statistics as described by the defense
are generally accurate.

                                      9
      Based on his presentation, Frazier urged the court to “conclude [that]
because [B]lack people are being prosecuted more often tha[n] others they
experience a racial impact in their community[.]” He argued the statistics, as
he interpreted them, “make clear the [identified] prostitution laws impact
[B]lack people more frequently than other races, or groups” and moved the
court to dismiss the strike allegation “based on the [r]acial [i]mpact of the
law” as “described by section 1385, as it is defined [by section] 745(a)(4).”
Alternatively, if the court denied his motion to dismiss the strike allegation,
he argued consideration of this circumstance justified the court imposing the
low term of three years on either count 2 (pimping, § 266h, subd. (a)) or count
3 (pandering, § 266i, subd. (a)(1)), doubled by the strike, for a total sentence

of six years.13
B.    The People’s Response to Frazier’s Sentencing Briefs
      The People opposed Frazier’s request to dismiss the strike allegation or
to impose a low-term sentence. Addressing whether there were grounds for
relief under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), the People specifically disputed
Frazier’s claim of an RJA violation. They provided a seven-page table of
information relating to 47 defendants charged with human trafficking,
pimping, and pandering offenses. The table showed each defendant’s race,
charges in the latest criminal complaint, “guilty charges,” disposition, and
sentence.

13    Frazier also argued other mitigating circumstances listed in
subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 supported dismissing the strike allegation,
and alternatively moved the trial court to dismiss the strike allegation under
its general authority to “order an action to be dismissed” under section 1385,
subdivision (a), pursuant to Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504. As we later
discuss, the court was not persuaded by these arguments. Frazier has not
challenged these aspects of the trial court’s sentencing decisions on appeal.

                                       10
      Although the information in the People’s table was culled from the
same set of statistics provided to Frazier, the People’s focus was narrower
than Frazier’s. The People reviewed the criminal cases of 47 defendants
“whose charged offenses” included human trafficking of a minor in violation
of section 231.6, subdivision (c)(1); pimping of a minor in violation of section
266h, subdivision (b); and/or pandering of a minor in violation of section 266i,

subdivision (b).14 Thus, the cases analyzed by the People were limited to
cases like Frazier’s in which the defendant was charged with human
trafficking, pimping, and/or pandering offenses involving a minor victim.
      Summarizing its data, the People stated that of the 47 defendants
charged with committing human trafficking, pimping, and/or pandering of a
minor, 38 were Black, one was Filipino, three were Hispanic, and four were
White. The last defendant’s race was identified as “[o]ther.” Sentencing for
these 47 defendants included the following:
      • The 38 Black defendants received sentences ranging from probation
        to 10 years, eight months in state prison, with a median sentence of
        four years and an average sentence of 4.3 years.

      • The Filipino defendant was sentenced to five years in state prison.

      • Two of the three Hispanic defendants were granted probation; the
        third was sentenced to three years in state prison.

14      Section 236.1, subdivision (c)(1), provides that “[a] person who causes,
induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, a person
who is a minor at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a
commercial sex act, with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section
. . . 266h, [or] 266i, . . . is guilty of human trafficking.” (Italics added.)
Section 266h is the criminal statute that prohibits pimping; subdivision (b)
applies when the person engaged in prostitution was a minor. Similarly,
section 266i criminalizes pandering; subdivision (b) of this section applies
where the person procured for prostitution is a minor.

                                       11
      • The four White defendants were sentenced to state prison for terms
        ranging from five to 12 years.

      • The remaining defendant whose race was unidentified received six
        years, four months in state prison.

      • There were six Black defendants, and one White defendant, charged
        with prior strikes.15

      The People argued its statistics showed that for defendants whose
charged offenses included human trafficking, pimping and/or pandering of a
minor, the sentences they received had “absolutely nothing to do with their
race.” They further argued that Frazier’s “ ‘similarly situated’ analysis” was
deficient in that there was no indication he had compared his background,
offense conduct, or the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence in his case,
with the backgrounds or cases of the defendants summarized in his statistics.
As such, he had not demonstrated the discriminatory racial impact required
to justify relief under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(A).
      The People agreed that certain other mitigating factors in section 1385,

subdivision (c)(2), were present.16 They argued, however, that alleviating
Frazier of the consequences of his strike would endanger public safety, a
result that independently supported denying relief under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2). They pointed to the probation report, which stated

15    At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated there were six
defendants with alleged strikes, but our review of the data in the table shows
the actual total was seven.

16    Specifically, the People agreed the mitigating factors under section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) [application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years), (F) [current offense is not a violent felony], and (H)
[the enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old]
were met.

                                        12
Frazier’s strike conviction arose from an incident in which he entered a motel
room and told a prostitute to take a sex buyer’s wallet while yelling at the
prostitute to “get [Frazier’s] gun” so he could keep the sex buyer from calling
the police.
      The People also submitted a new report from a detective who had
listened to calls Frazier placed from jail while awaiting trial on his current
offenses. According to the report, while in pretrial custody, Frazier had
continued pimping, using the jail phone to give an 18-year-old prostitute
various commands; had committed state unemployment fraud, collecting
$10,000 in fraudulent payments; and had communicated with the minor
victim of his current offenses in violation of a stay-away order.
      The People argued this history, in addition to Frazier’s current offense
conduct of directing a 17-year-old minor to meet with sex buyers on 40
occasions over a two-month period, showed Frazier was dangerous and
undeserving of sentencing leniency under section 1385, subdivisions (a) or (c),
or Romero. They also opposed a low-term sentence on the ground that
aggravating sentencing factors outweighed any circumstances in mitigation.
C.    Sentencing Hearing
      At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that although the
People’s statistics were focused on defendants who were charged with “the
exact crimes of which Mr. Frazier was convicted,” he argued “the statistics
are pretty much the same” and show “a great many more [B]lack people were
arrested than [W]hite people.” However, counsel acknowledged he could not
“say why [B]lack people are arrested more and sentenced longer” but stated
“the statistics show that they are.” He argued “the purpose of the law” is “to
see if there [is] a racial impact,” and “they send you to another code outside of
[section] 1385 to [section] 745(a)(b)(4) [sic], which basically says that a racial

                                        13
impact occurs if more people of a particular racial or ethnic group are
arrested and charged with crimes.”
      Defense counsel’s reference to section “745(a)(b)(4)” prompted
discussion. The trial court left the bench to consult its copy of the Penal
Code. When the court returned, the prosecutor clarified that defense counsel
was relying on the provision in section 1385, subdivision (c), that “says,
‘Application of the enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial
impact, as described in [p]aragraph 4 of [s]ubdivision (a) of [s]ection 745.”
The prosecutor further explained the operative section of the RJA “for our
purposes today” was section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(A), under which a
violation was established if “ ‘a longer or [more] severe sentence was imposed
on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly-situated individuals
convicted of the same offense.’ ”
      The trial court responded, “Correct. Yes. That’s the way I understood
it. And that’s more or less the sense that I get from [defense counsel’s]
argument.” The court told counsel: “I think . . . the focus should be on
convictions versus arrests. And, also, that there’s a disparity in the amount
of time or punishment. [¶] . . . I think that in accordance with [section] 1385
and the change in the law, from a racial disparity standpoint, the [c]ourt’s
focus needs to be on is there a disparity . . . taking into account the
defendant’s race versus other similarly-situated individuals of a different
race in the length of punishment that the defendant receives for individuals
that are in his race.”
      Defense counsel agreed and stated, “[a]nd my statistics went into that.”
Counsel highlighted the additional statistics provided in Frazier’s addendum
to the sentencing memorandum showing a “comparison of prison sentences,
sentences of probation and dismissals or rejections” among the various

                                        14
cohorts, including that 68 percent of the Black defendants were sentenced to
prison, compared to 58 percent of the White defendants. Counsel admitted
“there’s not that much difference between 58 percent and 68 percent,” but
argued “although the disparity of the percentages is not really much, [B]lack
people seem to be sentenced to prison longer than [W]hite or Hispanic
[people]. What jumps out is there’s such a big pool of [B]lack people and so
little of a pool of [W]hites and Hispanics that . . . common sense tells you that
[B]lack people are sentenced longer . . . we can’t say why [B]lack people are
arrested more and sentenced longer, but the statistics show that they are.”
      The trial court expressed doubt whether “the legislature is necessarily
asking [the court] to focus on the disparity in arrests versus . . . a difference
in the punishment that courts are imposing.” Defense counsel responded
that the defense “statistics show that proportionally [B]lack people are
sentenced a little bit more severely than [W]hite and Hispanic [people].” As
for the relevance of the arrest statistics, counsel argued, “More [B]lack people
in the community are arrested pertaining to . . . pandering, pimping, [and]
human trafficking. I’m arguing the [B]lack community is affected by this law
because more [B]lack people are arrested by it.”
      The trial court ultimately concluded it “should look at the disparity [in]
arrests between [the Black] and [W]hite population in determining whether
. . . the [d]efense has made [a] prima facie showing[,] and the [c]ourt should
therefore consider this as a factor in dismissing the strike pursuant to
[section] 1385.” Defense counsel responded that Frazier’s “statistics show
that [B]lack people do go proportionally to prison more often than [W]hite
and Hispanic [people]. Not by a great amount, but they do.” He then turned
to arguing the merits of the remaining mitigating circumstances the defense
was relying on to strike the strike under section 1385. (See footnote 13, ante.)

                                        15
      The prosecutor argued Frazier had not made a prima facie showing of
an RJA violation. The prosecutor emphasized the defense statistics relied on
“straight pimping, straight pandering, . . . [and] straight human

trafficking,”17 whereas the People confined their analysis to cases where
defendants were either charged or convicted of the same crimes as Frazier,
namely human trafficking, pimping, or pandering of a minor, which were “the
statistics that should be considered.” Also, Frazier failed to discuss whether
the individuals reflected in the statistics were similarly situated to him, such
as by providing the facts of other cases or criminal histories of other
defendants, or by otherwise giving individualized consideration “to any of
these defendants as they relate to Mr. Frazier.”
      Turning to the other mitigating circumstances relied on by the defense,
the prosecutor argued that even though Frazier’s strike was more than five
years old such that one of the mitigating circumstances existed (see § 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H)), the evidence Frazier continued pimping while in custody
supported denying relief under subdivision (c)(2) based on a finding that
“striking the enhancement in this case would endanger public safety.”
      In the end, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion under
section 1385 to dismiss the strike allegation. Acknowledging that both sides

17     The prosecutor was correct that Frazier’s statistics included arrests,
charges, and sentences for “straight pimping” and “straight pandering”—in
other words, violations of sections 266h, subdivision (a), and 266i, subdivision
(a)(1), which penalize pimping and pandering of “another person” without
requiring the person to be a minor. However, Frazier’s sentencing
memorandum and addendum stated that the human trafficking crime
addressed in his statistics was section 236.1, subdivision (c)(1), which is
human trafficking of a minor, not “straight human trafficking” as the
prosecutor claimed.

                                       16
had spent “a considerable amount of time on the . . . [mitigating] factor[ ] that
deals with racial disparity,” the court explained why it did not believe the
defense sufficiently demonstrated this factor. The court stated it was
persuaded by the prosecution’s argument that “even if you do have these
numbers . . . you have to do a deeper dive in comparing apples to apples as
far as offense to offense in determining whether there’s a disparity in the
sentence that a defendant receives . . . relative to conduct he or she engaged
in.” It therefore was not persuaded the defense “made a prima facie showing
as to a racial disparity in sentencing, as given Mr. Frazier’s race as [a Black]
person versus other similarly situated [W]hites[.]”
      The trial court went on to find that “one or more” other mitigating
factors enumerated in subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 were present. It
denied relief, however, because it found that striking Frazier’s strike “would
result in . . . the public being in danger.” The court stated the evidence that
Frazier had continued pimping while in custody “show[ed] a dedication” to
the human trafficking activities that resulted in his arrest and conviction,
which it found to be “considerably concerning.” After weighing aggravating
and mitigating sentencing factors, the court declined to impose a low term
sentence. It chose count 1 as the principal count and imposed a 16-year
prison term on that count (the middle term of eight years, doubled due to the
strike prior). Sentencing on counts 2 and 3 was stayed pursuant to section
654. Thus, Frazier’s total custodial term was 16 years.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                       I.
                                    The RJA
      The Legislature enacted the RJA in 2020 with an important goal, “to
eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure

                                       17
that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in
sentencing.” (Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill 2542)
§ 2, subd. (i).) The Legislature found that “ ‘[e]ven though racial bias is
widely acknowledged as intolerable in our criminal justice system, it
nevertheless persists because courts generally only address racial bias in
its most extreme and blatant forms. . . . Even when racism clearly infects
a criminal proceeding, under current legal precedent, proof of purposeful
discrimination is often required, but nearly impossible to establish.’
[Citation.] ‘Implicit bias, although often unintentional and unconscious,
may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar to intentional
bias. The intent of the Legislature is not to punish this type of bias, but
rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of
the judicial system.’ ” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 149, quoting
Assem. Bill 2542, § 2, subds. (c), (i); Young, at pp. 149−150 [discussing the
uncodified legislative findings that accompanied passage of the RJA, which
“provide an illuminating guide to the legislative objectives in passing the
[RJA]”].)
      As the Young court noted, the legislative findings express a concern
that courts have not done enough to redress racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system, and cite “various examples drawn from case law to
illustrate what [the Legislature] perceives as judicial reticence in dealing
with claimed race discrimination[.]” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 149.) The findings specifically call out the oft-criticized decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279⎯in which the United States
Supreme Court declined to find any inference of racial discrimination in
Georgia’s criminal justice system from statistical evidence that “ ‘relentlessly
document[ed]’ ” the risk that a defendant was 4.3 times more likely to receive

                                        18
the death penalty if charged with killing White victims as opposed to Black
victims ⎯“as an emblem of perceived judicial indifference to racial bias.”
(Young, at pp. 150–152; id. at pp. 150−151 [discussing McCleskey].) In
enacting the RJA, our Legislature made clear “its intent to depart from the
discriminatory purpose paradigm in federal equal protection law,” as
expressed by the majority in McCleskey, and to permit the use of statistical
evidence to establish racial bias. (Young, at pp. 150, 152−153.)
      The RJA, which is codified in three interrelated statutes (§§ 745, 1473,
subd. (f), 1473.7, subd. (a)(3)), provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or
obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or national origin” (§ 745, subd. (a)). “The [RJA] sets forth
four categories of conduct, any of which, if proved, is enough to ‘establish’ a
violation of section 745, subdivision (a).” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 147; see § 745, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) Two of these categories—imposing
charges or obtaining convictions on the basis of race (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)) and
imposing longer or mere sentences on the basis of race (§ 745, subd. (a)(4))—
are relevant to this appeal.
      A defendant who alleges a violation of subdivision (a) of section 745
“may file a motion in the trial court[.]” (§ 745, subd. (b).) “Claimed violations
of section 745, subdivision (a) may also be raised postjudgment, by petition
for habeas corpus under section 1473, subdivision (f) or by motion to vacate
an allegedly invalid conviction or sentence under section 1473.7.” (Young,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 148.) If the defendant “makes a prima facie
showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing”
at which “evidence may be presented by either party, including, but not
limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the
sworn testimony of witnesses.” (§ 745, subd. (c).) “ ‘Prima facie

                                        19
showing’ means that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that
there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred.”
(§ 745, subd. (h)(2).) “ ‘[S]ubstantial likelihood,’ ” in turn, means “more than
a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.” (Ibid.)
      The defendant bears the burden of proving a violation of subdivision (a)
of section 745 by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 745, subd. (c).) If a
violation of section 745, subdivision (a), is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, “the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found
from” a list of remedies set forth in subdivision (e) of section 745. Relevant
here, the court may, “[i]f the court determines that it would be in the interest
of justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special
allegations, or reduce one or more charges.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)(C).)
                                       II.
                        Frazier’s Contentions on Appeal
      Frazier’s essential contention on appeal is that the trial court
erroneously failed to find an RJA violation under subdivision (a) of section
745. However, he presents the claimed violation to us differently than the
manner in which he presented it to the trial court. In the trial court, Frazier
sought to demonstrate an RJA violation as a basis for the court to strike his
prior strike under subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385. As he made explicit in
the addendum to his sentencing memorandum, “[t]he purpose of the statistics
[he offered] was to evaluate the racial impact of the enforcement of the
prostitution laws in accord with [section] 1385,” which authorized the
sentencing court to “look at the [r]acial [i]mpact of a law in deciding whether
to dismiss a strike.” To a lesser extent he relied on the asserted RJA
violation as a basis for alternatively requesting that the trial court impose a
low-term sentence.

                                       20
      Now, in his opening brief on appeal, Frazier states his RJA claim “is
based directly on section 745 and not section 1385.” (Italics added.) He
explains that subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 governs dismissal of
enhancements, and prior strikes are not considered enhancements (which
means the statute he relied on in the trial court as a basis for striking the
strike did not actually authorize that relief). He contends the statistical
information presented to the court was sufficient to establish a violation of
subdivision (a)(3) and/or (a)(4)(A) of section 745. He argues he is entitled to a
remand of his case so the trial court can “fashion a remedy for the violation”
under subdivision (e) of section 745.
      The People oppose Frazier’s arguments on procedural and substantive
grounds. Procedurally, they contend that Frazier, by detaching his claim
from its original moorings in section 1385, is improperly seeking to raise a
violation of section 745, subdivision (a), on appeal in the first instance. They
maintain Frazier “cannot file a standalone [RJA] claim on direct appeal”
because he did not file a motion pursuant to section 745, subdivision (b);
rather, he filed sentencing memoranda in which he “referenced” section 745
as a basis for relief. Substantively, the People argue that Frazier’s trial court
filings failed to address whether the disparity reflected in his statistics
involved similarly situated individuals. As a result, the trial court ruled
correctly when it found Frazier failed to make a prima facie showing of the
discriminatory acts proscribed by section 745, subdivision (a).
                                        III.
                             Procedural Objections
      We start by considering the parties’ procedural arguments. Although
in the trial court, the defense, prosecution, and the court all proceeded as
though section 1385, subdivision (c), authorized the court to strike Frazier’s

                                        21
strike, on appeal the parties are now in agreement that in fact this provision
grants no such authority. Since this point is undisputed and Frazier no
longer relies on section 1385, subdivision (c), as the basis for striking his
strike, we assume without deciding that the parties’ interpretation of the
statute is correct.
       Frazier seeks to avoid this difficulty on appeal by recasting his RJA
claim as one brought exclusively under section 745, which, as we have
discussed, has its own remedial provision—subdivision (e). If the sentencing
court finds an RJA violation, subdivision (e)(1)(C) authorizes it to “dismiss
enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations” if it is in the
interest of justice to do so. (§ 745, subd. (e)(1)(C), italics added.) Frazier
maintains that because the statistics before the trial court were sufficient to
prove a violation of subdivision (a)(3) and/or (a)(4)(A) of section 745, we must
remand his case so the trial court can fashion a remedy pursuant to
subdivision (e) of section 745. Even though he did not invoke subdivision (e)
of section 745 in the trial court, he indicates he now wishes to pursue a
variety of remedies under subdivision (e), including dismissal of the charges
against him as well as the strike allegation, and to request imposition of a
low-term sentence.
      The People’s concern with this turnaround is understandable, and
there is merit to some of their procedural arguments. As they point out, the
plain language of section 745 does not appear to authorize a defendant to
bring a section 745 claim on direct appeal in the first instance. Instead,
persons alleging violations of subdivision (a) of section 745 are provided three
options. They may file (1) a motion in the trial court prior to entry of
judgment; (2) a postjudgment petition for writ of habeas corpus; or (3) a

                                        22
postjudgment motion to vacate a conviction or sentence by a person no longer
in custody under section 1473.7. (§ 745, subd. (b).)
      We also agree with the People that consideration of an RJA claim for
the first time on appeal does not appear “compatible with the development
and consideration of an RJA claim” as contemplated by section 745. Under
section 745, a defendant must “make[ ] a prima facie showing of a violation of
subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (c).) If he succeeds in doing so, the trial court
must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 745, subd. (c)(1).) A first-time claim
under section 745 would therefore be “ ‘dependent upon evidence and matters
not reflected in the record on appeal,’ ” violating the rule that an appellate
court’s “ ‘review on direct appeal is limited to the appellate record.’ ” (People
v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 952.) We also observe that by seeking relief
under subdivision (e) of section 745 on appeal when he did not do so in the
trial court, Frazier violates the rule that a defendant’s “ ‘ “ ‘ “failure to make
[a] timely assertion of [a] right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it” ’ ” ’ ” forfeits that right. (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th
850, 856.)
      Notwithstanding the People’s procedural objections, we elect to reach
the merits of Frazier’s appeal. The California Supreme Court recently issued
an order in a case on direct review granting the appellant permission to file a
supplemental opening brief raising claims under the RJA, while reserving the
question of whether such claims are cognizable on direct appeal. (People v.
Colbert (May 17, 2023, S169152) 2023 Cal.LEXIS 2611, *1.) Thus, the
procedural objection raised by the People will soon be decided by our
Supreme Court.
      Also, the People’s concern about an appellate court’s consideration of
evidence in the first instance does not exist here. Both sides presented their

                                        23
statistical analyses to the trial court, which did consider whether the defense
met its burden under section 745, subdivision (c), of making a prima facie

showing of an RJA violation of subdivision (a)(4)(A).18 The parties and the
court extensively considered the merits of Frazier’s RJA claim. Frazier’s
appeal relies entirely on the trial record and does not ask us to consider new
facts or evidence. Thus his appeal presents a question of law with respect to
the proof required to establish an RJA violation, “an important legal issue.”
(In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888, fn. 7 [“an appellate court may
consider a claim raising an important question of law despite” a forfeiture
where the case “ ‘present[s] an important legal issue’ ”]; see People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate court retains discretion
to entertain forfeited legal issues].) Also, addressing the substantive issue
raised by Frazier may forestall a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(See People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282 [considering merits of
appellant’s forfeited claims “to forestall an ineffectiveness of counsel
contention” based on defense counsel’s failure to preserve the claims for
appeal by making a timely objection in the trial court].)
                                       IV.
                   Prima Facie Showing of an RJA Violation
      Frazier’s current contention is that he succeeded in establishing an
RJA violation at the sentencing hearing and is entitled to the remedies

18    Although section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(A), only incorporates
subdivision (a)(4) of section 745 (which relates to racial discrimination in
sentencing), Frazier’s sentencing memorandum also relied on the text of
subdivision (a)(3) of section 745 (relating to racial discrimination in charging
decisions and convictions). Perhaps for this reason, the People do not contend
this appeal is the first time Frazier has invoked subdivision (a)(3) of
section 745.

                                       24
afforded by subdivision (e) of section 745. As we have noted, the remedies
under subdivision (e) are available only “if the court finds, by a
preponderance of evidence” a violation of subdivision (a) of section 745.
(§ 745, subd. (e).) Here, the trial court found Frazier did not succeed in
making even a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), which is a
less burdensome standard than the preponderance of the evidence standard
required by subdivision (e). (See § 745, subd. (h)(2) [“ ‘Prima facie showing’ ”
means “the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a
substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred”;
“ ‘substantial likelihood’ requires more than a mere possibility, but less than
a standard of more likely than not”]; Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 160
[the RJA’s requirement to prove a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence is a “more demanding standard” than the requirement to make a
“ ‘prima facie showing’ ” of a violation].) As we discuss, Frazier fails to show
the court’s prima facie ruling was erroneous. As a consequence, he fails to
demonstrate that the factual record he developed in the trial court entitles
him to a remand to pursue the remedies in subdivision (e).
      We review de novo the trial court’s determination that Frazier failed to
make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation. (See, e.g., People v. Scott
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384 [court reviewed de novo whether defendant had
made a prima facie case of racial discrimination in use of peremptory
challenges]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 104 [whether
defendant made a prima facie showing for relief under former § 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6) reviewed de novo].) Although our review is independent, it is
Frazier, as the appealing party, who bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573
[“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment

                                       25
challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error.”]; accord People v. Sullivan (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 524, 549.)
      Frazier claims the trial court erred in its ruling because it refused to
consider his arrest statistics when it evaluated his RJA claim. Citing Young,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 138, he argues this was improper because statistics
showing racial disparities in arrest rates are relevant to establishing racial
bias in a charging decision or conviction in violation of section 745,
subdivision (a)(3). This is so, he claims, because “a defendant is charged with
or convicted of a more serious crime if he or she is charged with any crime at
all and members of a different race are not charged at all.” He contends
arrest statistics may also be relied on to show racial bias in sentencing, a
violation of subdivision (a)(4)(A), because “longer and more severe sentences
are being imposed on the suspect group if they are sentenced for any crime,
and the other races are simply not charged, convicted, or sentenced at all.”
      We reject Frazier’s threshold assertion that the trial court refused to
consider the defense statistics showing more Black people than non-Black
people were arrested for human trafficking, pimping, or pandering crimes.
The record simply does not support this view. Although the court initially
questioned whether it could consider arrest statistics in determining whether
Frazier had demonstrated racial disparity in sentencing under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), after extensive discussion with counsel, the court stated it
“should look at the disparity [in] arrests between the African[ ]American and
[W]hite population in determining whether . . . the [d]efense has made [a]
prima facie showing[,] and the [c]ourt should therefore consider this as a
factor in dismissing the strike pursuant to [section] 1385.” (Italics added.)

                                       26
The court’s statements bely Frazier’s claim that it refused to consider his
arrest statistics.
      Next, as for Frazier’s argument that arrest statistics like those he
presented may be relevant to establishing a violation of subdivision (a)(3) or
(a)(4)(A) of section 745, we do not disagree that this theory may have validity
in some cases. The precise entry points when racial discrimination is
introduced into a criminal proceeding may be difficult to isolate, and “the
extended impact that any initial discrimination may have on later stages of
the criminal process” even more difficult to identify. (Developments in the
Law: Race and the Criminal Process: IV. Race and the Prosecutor’s Charging
Decision (1988) 101 Harv. L.Rev. 1520, 1524–1525 [discussing the difficulty of
isolating the potential points at which racial discrimination enters the
criminal process given the discretionary nature of prosecutorial charging
decisions].) As the Young court explained, “evidence of racial bias in arrests
may be potentially relevant to an allegation of racial bias in charging.”
(Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) The problem with Frazier’s
argument is not the validity of the theory that a logical link may exist
between arrests and charging or sentencing decisions, but the statistical
analysis he offered. It simply fell short of satisfying the relevant statutory
requirements.
      At the time Frazier originally brought his RJA claim in 2022, to
establish a violation under subdivision (a)(3) of section 745, the defendant
was required to prove he or she “was charged or convicted of a more serious
offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who
commit similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the evidence
establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained
convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the

                                       27
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the
convictions were sought or obtained.” (Italics and underscore added.) To
establish a violation under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 745, the defendant
must prove that “[a] longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the
defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted
of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently
imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity,
or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national
origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.” (Italics and
underscore added.) Each provision thus requires proof the defendant was
subjected to harsher penal consequences than other “similarly situated”
individuals who committed similar offenses or were convicted of the same
offenses, and that members of the defendant’s race were “more frequently”
subjected to harsher penal consequences than members of other races.
      It was Frazier’s showing as to the “similarly situated” requirement that
the trial court found deficient. The court ruled that “given the information
that was provided,” Frazier failed to make “a prima facie showing as to a
racial disparity in sentencing, as given . . . Frazier’s race as an African[ ]

American person versus other similarly situated [W]hites.”19 In his opening
brief on appeal, Frazier acknowledges “[t]he trial court did not find a section

19     During the sentencing hearing it was made clear by the prosecutor and
trial court, without objection from Frazier, that because Frazier was moving
to dismiss his strike allegation under subdivision (c) of section 1385, his RJA
claim was limited to a claim of racial discrimination in sentencing in violation
of subdivision (a)(4) of section 745. Based on Frazier’s failure to object to this
framing of his RJA claim, the court quite reasonably did not consider whether
Frazier established a prima facie claim of racial bias in a charging decision or
conviction in violation of subdivision (a)(3) of section 745.

                                        28
745 violation because [he] had not demonstrated that similarly situated
[W]hites and African[ ]Americans were sentenced differently.” Yet none of
Frazier’s appellate arguments address this critical factual deficiency.
      Frazier tries to demonstrate error on appeal much as he did in the trial
court: by relying on the sheer disparities in the arrest rates among various
racial groups represented in the parties’ statistics. He continues to
emphasize that the defense statistics showed 254 Black people, but only 10
White people, were arrested for human trafficking, pimping, or pandering
between 2012 and 2022, and that Black individuals constituted 91 percent of
arrests for those offenses, “but only about six[ ] percent of the population [of]
the San Diego County metropolitan area.” He argues these arrest statistics
established a violation of subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4)(A) of section 745 because
“the staggering disparity between the arrest of African[ ] Americans for
pimping related laws and other races suggests that imbalance perpetuates
itself in the charging, convicting, and sentencing of these offenses.” But as
defense counsel candidly acknowledged in the trial court, the defense could
not “say why [B]lack people are arrested more,” only that “the statistics show
that they are.”
      The RJA, however, requires a showing that a defendant was subjected
to harsher penal consequences than others “who commit similar offenses and
are similarly situated” (§ 745, subd. (a)(3), italics added) or “other similarly
situated individuals convicted of the same offense” (id., subd. (a)(4)(A), italics
added), not just that members of the defendant’s race were “more frequently”
subjected to harsher penal consequences than members of other races (id.,
subd. (a)(3) and (a)(4)(A).) This more focused comparison was missing from
Frazier’s statistical presentation.

                                        29
      Whereas Frazier was convicted of human trafficking, pimping, and
pandering of a minor (§§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1), 266h, subds. (a), (b)(1), 266i,
subds. (a)(1), (b)(1)), the comparison group he put forward included
individuals arrested, charged, or convicted of straight pimping or straight
pandering (§§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1), 266h, subd. (a), and 266i, subd. (a)(2)). His
selection of this broad comparison group did not consider that minors are a
more vulnerable class of victims and the exploitation of minors for
commercial sex trafficking is a different category of crimes. Thus he failed to
show the other defendants he included in his statistics had “commit[ted]
similar offenses,” as required by section 745, subdivision (a)(3), or had been
“convicted of the same offense,” as required by subdivision (a)(4)(A). It
follows that Frazier cannot show the individuals represented in his statistics
were “similarly situated” to him as required by the RJA. (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)
and (a)(4)(A).)
      Frazier maintains on appeal that “similarly situated” should not be
interpreted to mean perfectly identical. He complains that the trial court set
too high a bar by requiring an “apples to apples” comparison. In his reply
brief on appeal, he asks us to rely on new subdivision (h)(6) of section 745,
which became effective on January 1, 2023, after his opening brief was filed.
(See Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) New subdivision (h)(6) of section 745 states:
“ ‘Similarly situated’ means that factors that are relevant in charging and
sentencing are similar and do not require that all individuals in the
comparison group are identical. A defendant’s conviction history may be a
relevant factor to the severity of the charges, convictions, or sentences. If it is
a relevant factor and the defense produces evidence that the conviction
history may have been impacted by racial profiling or historical patterns of
racially biased policing, the court shall consider the evidence.”

                                        30
      Frazier’s arguments do not persuade us that the trial court erred.
First, “apples to apples” is a colloquial phrase generally used to mean
comparing things that are alike. The trial court’s use of the phrase did not
necessarily signal it was requiring Frazier to compare individuals whose
crimes involved identical, as opposed to merely similar, facts. Second, on our
independent review of Frazier’s factual showing as to the “similarly situated”
requirement, we find no error in the court’s conclusion that it was deficient.
Frazier’s statistical presentation was devoid of information showing any
degree of similarity existed between himself and the individuals included in
his statistics. Even if we were to apply new subdivision (h)(6) of section 745,
it would not assist him. New subdivision (h)(6) requires the RJA claimant to
show “that factors that are relevant in charging and sentencing are similar.”
Frazier did not provide any information at all about factors “relevant in
charging and sentencing” for any of the individuals whose criminal cases
were reflected in his data.
      Frazier also relies on the People’s statistics, which he describes as
showing that “African[ ]Americans made up 38 of the 47 total defendants

sentenced for pimping related convictions.”20 We are not persuaded that this
disparity establishes a prima facie violation of subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4)(A)

20     Frazier also states that the population of White people in the “San
Diego County metropolitan area” is “approximately 20 times greater than the
population of African Americans.” He claims “[t]his means that
approximately 5,000 [W]hites would have to have been arrested for pimping
related conduct during this 10-year period to have a rough equivalency of
arrest between [W]hites and African[ ]Americans.” However, he offers no
record support for these assertions. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th
107, 137 [counsel’s unsupported factual assertion cannot establish a prima
facie showing].)

                                       31
of section 745, either. Neither the cited statistic nor any other aspect of the
People’s data addressed the offense conduct engaged in by the nine non-Black
defendants or whether factors “relevant in charging or sentencing are
similar” (§ 745, new subd. (h)(6)) among Frazier and the nine non-Black
defendants. The People’s statistics therefore did not demonstrate that
Frazier was “charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants
of other races . . . who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(3).) Second, that more Black people are sentenced for
“pimping related convictions” does not establish a violation of subdivision
(a)(4)(A) of section 745. Instead, subdivision (a)(4)(A) is violated when “longer
or more severe sentences [are] more frequently imposed for that offense on
people that share the defendant’s race . . . than on defendants of other
races[.]” (Italics added.)
      Further, as the People observe, their statistics showed the 47
defendants charged received sentences that were similar. Although Black
defendants made up a majority of the convictions, their sentences ranged
from probation to 10 years, and the average sentence was 4.3 years. The four
White defendants, by comparison, received sentences ranging from five to 12

years, with an average sentence of 8.08 years.21 One Filipino defendant
received a five-year sentence, and one “[o]ther” defendant was sentenced to
six years, four months in state prison. The only racial group that received
lighter sentences in the aggregate were the three Hispanic defendants, whose
terms ranged from probation to 3 years in state prison. The People’s

21     The People did not state the average sentence for the White
defendants in this group. However, based on the specific sentences of 5
years, 6 years, 9 years and 4 months, and 12 years set forth in the People’s
table of data, the average would be 8.08 years.

                                       32
statistics thus did not tend to show that longer or more severe sentences
“were more frequently imposed for [the same] offense[s]” on Black people
than on members of other racial groups as is required to establish a violation
of subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 745.
      Finally, Frazier maintains the trial court “made the wrong factual
finding” when it ruled he fell short of making a prima facie showing of a
violation of the RJA. In his view, since the “prima facie language” appears in
subdivision (c) of section 745 and establishes the threshold required to hold
an evidentiary hearing, once the court held a hearing, “[t]he prima facie issue
was moot.” We disagree. The hearing at which the court considered Frazier’s
RJA claim was a sentencing hearing, not an evidentiary hearing. And
although the statute entitles defendants to an evidentiary hearing if they
make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, it does not preclude a court
from affording the parties a hearing on a lesser showing. That the court in
this case entertained argument about the merits of Frazier’s claim at the
sentencing hearing does not compel the conclusion, to use Frazier’s words,
“[t]he prima facie issue was moot.” In other words, no conflict arises from the
court’s decision to entertain argument at a hearing and its later finding that
Frazier had not made a prima facie case showing of a violation of subdivision
(a) of section 745.
      In sum, because the statistics proffered to the trial court failed to
address all the requirements of subdivision (a)(3) and (a)(4)(A) of section 745,
the trial court did not err when it concluded Frazier had not made a prima
facie showing of an RJA violation. For this reason, he is not entitled to a

                                           33
remand to pursue the remedies for an RJA violation under subdivision (e) of

section 745.22
                                       V.
                 Frazier’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated
      Citing Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 345, Frazier contends
the trial court’s “section 745 violation” deprived him of his right to due
process of law. However, for the reasons we have already discussed, the court
did not violate section 745. We agree with the People there was no statutory
error under section 745, let alone error that “was ‘so arbitrary or capricious
as to constitute an independent due process’ violation.” (Moore v. Chrones
(C.D. Cal. 2009) 687 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1041.)

22      Frazier’s appellate claim that he is entitled to a remand of his case to
pursue the remedies in subdivision (e)(1)(C) of section 745 suffers from an
additional problem. These remedies become available only “[i]f the court
determines that it would be in the interest of justice” to impose them. (§ 745,
subd. (e)(1)(C).) The trial court found that Frazier had continued pimping
while in custody, and it relied on this finding when it concluded that
dismissing his strike would “endanger public safety” under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2). Frazier does not challenge the trial court’s factual finding.
He also does not argue that it is likely the same court that determined that
reducing his sentence would endanger the public safety would conclude that
it is “in the interest of justice” to grant him sentencing relief under
subdivision (e)(1)(C) of section 745. Although Frazier’s failure to establish
that there exists a factual basis for concluding he meets the “interest of
justice” requirement in subdivision (e)(1)(C) of section 745 serves as an
additional reason for rejecting his appellate claim that he is entitled to a
remand to pursue its remedies, we do not resolve the appeal on the basis of
this omission since the parties have not addressed it in their appellate
briefing.

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                         DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

                                       DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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