Court Opinion

ID: 9658985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:24:59.418083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:00.546534
License: Public Domain

BLOODWORTH, Justice
(dissenting) :
I must respectfully dissent, as I think there was error in the admission of the confession made while defendant was being *503held in jail under an illegal and unconstitutional arrest, in the absence of a showing that the confession was not a product of the illegal detention. I agree with the rest of the majority opinion.
Perhaps as much or more than any member of this court, I dislike having to place myself in the posture of voting to remand this cause for further proceedings. But, I think the United States Supreme Court decisions compel this result. And, of course, we have a duty to follow those cases, whether we agree with them or not.
In Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held:
“The decisions of this Court concerning Fourth Amendment probable-cause requirements before a warrant for either arrest or search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. * * * ” (Emphasis added)
The affidavit upon which the warrant in Whiteley was based averred in relevant part :
“I, C. W. Ogburn, do solemnly swear that on or about the 23 day of November, A.D. 1964, in the County of Carbon and State of Wyoming, the said Harold Whiteley and Jack Daley, defendants did then and there unlawfully break and enter a locked and sealed building * *
This affidavit was rejected by the United States Supreme Court as being “nothing more than the complainant’s conclusion that the individuals named therein perpetrated the offense.” Id. at 565, 91 S.Ct. at 1035. Having found the affidavit insufficient to support the warrant, the Court in Whiteley declared the arrest invalid and reversed the conviction because evidence seized at the time of the illegal arrest was improperly admitted at trial, being the “fruits” of the illegal arrest.
The case at bar is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Whiteley, in my judgment. The officer who swore to the affidavit in the present cause merely stated:
“ * * * that he has probable cause for believing and does believe that Jimmy Lee Logan, alias, forcibly ravished * * * a woman * *
Such a bald, conclusory statement cannot “support the independent judgment of a disinterested magistrate” as required by Whiteley. The affidavit is clearly insufficient, thus the warrant is invalid as is the resulting arrest.
Not many of us thought, before the United States Supreme Court told us so in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), that a purely conclusionary affidavit wouldn’t do to support a search warrant. (See Knox v. State, 42 Ala.App. 578, 172 So.2d 787, cert. den. 277 Ala. 699, 172 So.2d 795 (1965).)
Neither did many of us think, before the United States Supreme Court decision in Whiteley v. Warden, supra, that a purely conclusionary affidavit wouldn’t do to support an arrest warrant.
Now, it seems absolutely clear to me that, as to both search and arrest warrants, the affidavit must contain sufficient allegations to constitute “probable cause.” Whiteley, supra; Aguilar, supra; Spinelli, supra.
Logically, it may be asked what difference does it make if the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant is conclusionary and the subsequent arrest therefor invalid?
Probably, it makes no difference if the defendant is indicted, as he must be in Alabama to be tried for a felony, provided no fruits of a search and seizure, line-up, confession, fingerprints (see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed. *5042d 676), etc., obtained during the illegal detention, are sought to be introduced against the defendant.
Having concluded that the arrest in this case was invalid, the question then arises whether the defendant’s confession to his cellmate while he was being unlawfully detained was tainted by his illegal arrest.
While the United States Supreme Court in Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 711 n. 7, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967), purported to reserve the question of the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant following an unconstitutional arrest, later cases require that it clearly appear on the record that the confession was not caused or brought about by the illegal detention.
In State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 187 A.2d 230 (1962), the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut upheld a conviction based upon a voluntary confession obtained while the defendant was being unlawfully detained. However, when the case came before the United States Supreme Court in Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493, 83 S. Ct. 1899, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1963), the Court summarily remanded the case for further consideration in the light of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).
After remand, the Connecticut court, in State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755, held that while a “confession made in the course of, or following, an illegal detention * * * [is not] per se inadmissible as matter of law,” it is “prima facie, inadmissible under the Wong Sun rule * * In other words, the state is required to prove voluntariness as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a confession in any case, but the effect of an illegal detention, under the Wong Sun rule, * * * is to add to that burden.” The court concluded that:
“ * * * even though, from the evidence produced, a confession made during an illegal detention is properly found to have been truly voluntary, nevertheless, if the illegal detention was an operative factor in causing or bringing about the confession, then the confession will be considered as the fruit of the illegal detention and will be inadmissible. It is this causation factor which Wong Sun added to the previously settled voluntariness requirement in the sense that proof of its absence is now a prerequisite to the admissibility of an otherwise voluntary confession, if the confession was made during an illegal detention. * * *»
In Traub, the Connecticut court, after examining the record, found sufficient evidence to conclude that the detention was not an operative factor in producing the confessions. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Traub v. Connecticut, 377 U.S. 960, 84 S.Ct. 1637, 12 L. Ed.2d 503 (1964).
Similarly, in Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed.2d 299 (1969), the United States Supreme Court vacated a conviction based upon a confession obtained from the defendant while in police custody. The Court acknowledged that the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary, but remanded the cause for determination as to the lawfulness of the police detention at the time the confession was obtained in order to determine whether the confession was properly admitted at trial.
Thus, it appears to me to be the law that confessions obtained while under unlawful detention, even though shown to be voluntary, are subject to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine of Wong Sun, supra, if caused or brought about by the illegal detention, and that such doctrine is fully applicable to the states through Ker v. California, supra.
Upon reviewing the transcript in the instant case, I find nothing in the record to affirmatively show that the confession ad*505mitted into evidence was not a product of the illegal arrest and detention. The trial judge never considered the issue, because he was of the opinion that the arrest was constitutional.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that this cause should be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether or not the confession was the product of the illegal detention.1

. Even though the affidavit is insufficient on its face to support probable cause, our decisions permit the State to show by adducing testimony that there were sufficient facts presented under oath to the issuing magistrate to constitute probable cause. See Clenney v. State, 281 Ala. 9, 198 So.2d 293 (1966) ; § 3.9, Searches & Seizures, 17A Ala.Dig.