Court Opinion

ID: 9669071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:38:40.999286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.950134
License: Public Domain

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Presiding Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Milligan v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, et al., No. SD28179, 232 S.W.3d 683, 693 (Mo.App. S.D.2007) I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion that Paragraph 27 is unambiguous, but concur in the majority’s opinion that Paragraph 27 does not preclude Plaintiffs claims against McCormack. In light of Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 388 (Mo.App. W.D.1999) and Alack v. Vic Tanny International of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 1996), I would find Paragraph 27 of the apartment lease to be ambiguous because its general language would include intentional torts and other causes of action which one may never use to exonerate oneself from future liability.