Court Opinion

ID: 9849009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:32:41.723791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:57.189088
License: Public Domain

Higgins, J.
The State law, G. S. 20-158(a), provides: “The State Highway Commission, with reference to State Highways, and local *341authorities, with reference to highways under their jurisdiction, are hereby authorized to designate main traveled or through highways by erecting at the entrance thereto from intersecting highways signs notifying drivers of vehicles to come to full stop before entering or crossing such designated highway. . . (emphasis added)
By the terms of the statute the erection of stop signs on an intersecting highway or street is a method of giving the public notice that traffic on one is favored over the other and that a motorist facing a stop sign must yield. Stop signs at intersections are in such general use and their function so well known that a motorist, in the absence of notice to the contrary, may presume they were erected by lawful authority. Jackson v. McCoury, 247 N.C. 502, 101 S.E. 2d 377; Smith v. Buie, 243 N.C. 209, 90 S.E. 2d 514; Johnson v. Bell, 234 N.C. 522, 67 S.E. 2d 658. The presumption is one of fact and, like other presumptions of fact, is rebuttable.
In this case the evidence permits the inference the plaintiff knew Woodland was surfaced by the State through the City of Sanford. Hughes was built by the city as an intersecting street on which stop signs were erected. The plaintiff testified he knew of these signs and relied on them as giving him the right of way. At the time of the accident, and unknown to him, the sign on the eastern approach was not in place. It was, however, restored after the accident.
This evidence is sufficient to present the question whether as to the intersection on the occasion of the accident the plaintiff had the right to assume that traffic from the east on Hughes would yield. Plaintiff’s conduct is to be judged by the rule of the prudent man; that is, by that which a man of ordinary prudence would do under the same or similar circumstances when charged with like duty. These questions arise on the issue of negligence.
If the jury should find the stop signs were erected on Hughes Street by proper authority and the plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive notice the one on the eastern approach was not in place, its absence would not take away his right to treat Woodland as the preferred street. “A motorist proceeding along a favored highway is entitled to assume that traffic on an intersecting secondary highway will yield him the right of way, and the effect of his right to rely on this assumption is not lost because warning signs have been misplaced or removed, . . .” 162 A.L.R. 927; 58 A.L.R. 1197; 81 A.L.R. 185; 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 350, p. 832; Bell v Crook, 168 Neb. 685, 97 N.W. 2d 352; Schmit v. Jansen, 247 Wis. 648, 20 N.W. 2d 542; Lyle v. Fiorito, 187 Wash. 537, 60 P. 2d 709; Jones v. McCullough, 148 Kan. 561, 83 P. 2d 669; Titus v. Braidfoot, 226 Ala. 21, 145 So. 423; Welch v. Canton City Lines, 142 O.St. 166; King v. Gold, 224 Iowa 890; Austinson v. Kil*342patrick, 105 N.W. 2d 258 (N.D. 1960); Seyfer v. Gateway Baking Co., 159 Fed. Sup. 177.
What is said here relates to the plaintiff’s rights, duties, and liabilities in traversing the intersection. The defendant was not familiar with the intersection. He was on the plaintiff’s right and was not confronted by stop sign notice that Woodland was the preferred street. His conduct likewise must be judged by the rule of the prudent man, by that which a man of ordinary prudence would do under the same or similar circumstances, when charged with like duty. Each party’s responsibility is to be judged in the light of conditions confronting him.
The rule with respect to the rights of motorists to rely on stop signs is stated in Blashfield 2, Perm. Ed., Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 998, p. 242:
“That the usual marker or sign erected to inform travelers of the superior character of an intersecting road is temporarily removed or destroyed does not change the character of the road nor affect the usual incidents appropriate to such road, such as its conferring the right of way upon traffic flowing along it as against that on intersecting roads, although in a case where a motorist, approaching an arterial highway from the right, did not see the stop sign because the edge had been turned toward him, it was held that a person proceeding in the exercise of ordinary care cannot be held negligent in failing to stop at an intersection with an arterial highway with which he is not familiar and which is not properly marked with a lawful stop sign.
“Conversely, where signs or markers have been posted by the proper authorities to the effect that a particular road is of superior classification, it will be regarded as being such so far as concerns the question of right of way, even though not legally established as a road within that particular classification. A driver has the right to assume, unless he knew otherwise, that a sign has been erected by the proper authority.”
After all, responsibility for an accident must be determined upon the basis of the particular facts of each case. One party, or both, or neither, may have acted in accordance with the rule of the prudent man. Consequently, a collision at an intersection where a stop sign has been erected and then removed or defaced may result from the negligence of one party, or both, or neither. The court’s charge in this case was a peremptory instruction to find the plaintiff was negligent by reason of his failure to yield to the defendant on his right.
*343The court’s charge was an amplification of what this Court said in Tucker v. Moorefield, 250 N.C. 340, 108 S.E. 2d 637. The rule herein stated is recognized in that case; however, decision was based upon the premise the evidence affirmatively showed the sign to have been erected by the city engineer on account of a special hazard and not by either the State Highway Commission or the local authorities (the governing board of the city) as specified in G.S. 20-158(a), leaving G.S. 20-155 (a) applicable. In Tucker v. Moorefield, the Court said: “The mere fact that the city traffic engineer determined that a special hazard existed at this particular intersection did not convert North Smith Street or the portion thereof within the intersection into a through street. A driver on North Smith Street had no preferential rights because of the city traffic engineer’s said determination.”
In the case before us the evidence was sufficient to present the question whether the plaintiff, under the circumstances that confronted him, was warranted in assuming he had the right of way through the intersection. The peremptory instruction to the contrary was prejudicial error for which we order a
New trial.