Court Opinion

ID: 9747545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:20:15.79845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.443491
License: Public Domain

Lowe, J.,

concurring'.

Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I cannot agree with reasons I and II why they believe that the statute of limitations does not apply. Because I think that waiver by nonassertion at the administrative and nisi prius levels is dispositive of the issue of limitations on this appeal, Md. Rule 1085, my opinion may well be an exercise in semantics. I am concerned, however, that we analogize a businessman’s license procedure to the responsibilities of the Court of Appeals in disciplining an officer of the Court in reason I.. Furthermore, it disturbs me when I see an appellate court perpetuating guidelines without support of reason, as appear in reason II.
I
The majority equates the disciplinary proceeding of a real estate salesman with the disciplinary proceeding of an attorney. But the very cases relied upon for that analogy rest on reasoning totally inapplicable to the lay world. The case quoted at length by the majority rejects any such analogy. Judge Levine, writing for the Court in Anne Arundel Co. Bar Ass’n v. Collins, 272 Md. 578, 582-583, stated:
“Although it does not appear that we have *346considered the question previously, courts elsewhere have uniformly held that disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are not barred by a general statute of limitations, .... In Braverman [v. Bar Assn. of Balto., 209 Md. 328], supra, we said:
‘The action of a court in exercising its power to disbar or suspend an attorney is judicial in character, but the inquiry is in the nature of an investigation by the court into the conduct of one of its own officers, and is not the trial of an action at law, as the order which is entered is only an exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction which a court has over its officers. .. .’ 209 Md. at 336.” (emphasis added).
It is therefore clear that the sole basis for circumventing the limitations statute was the special relationship between an attorney and the court he serves. I see no basis for concluding that a realtor has a comparable relationship with the Real Estate Commission.
II
The second reason assigned by the majority is bifurcated. It first states that there is no “prosecution” or “suit” because prosecutions and suits must take place in a “court” and
“Patently, an administrative agency is not a ‘court’ ....” Majority Opinion p. 341.
The negatively restricted interpretation of the word “court” implicit in that statement does not appear to be supported by any dictionary definition. The twelve alternate definitions in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language do not restrict “court” to a particular room set aside for judicial trials and presided over by a constitutionally designated judge. To the contrary, the *347breadth of definition and variety of interpretation gives an entirely different picture:
“court ... 1. An extent of open ground partially or completely enclosed by walls or buildings; courtyard. 2. A short street; especially, an alley walled by buildings on three sides. 3. A large, open section of a building, often with a glass roof or skylight. 4. Formerly, a mansion or other large building standing in a courtyard. Now used only in proper names. 5. The place of residence of a sovereign or dignitary; a royal mansion or palace. 6. The retinue of a sovereign, including the royal family and his personal servants, advisers, ministers, and the like. 7. A sovereign’s governing body, including the council of ministers and state advisers. 8. A formal meeting called for and presided over by a sovereign. 9.a. A person or body of persons appointed to hear and submit a decision on civil cases, b. The building, hall or room in which cases are heard and determined, c. The regular session of a judicial assembly. 10. Any similar authorized tribunal having military or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 11. An open, level area, marked with appropriate lines, upon which tennis, handball, basketball, or another game is played. 12. The body of directors of a corporation, a company, or other organization.”
The Oxford English Dictionary has 19 major listings and numerous sublistings for the word “court”. Black’s Law Dictionary, in an effort to be thorough, provides pages of alternatives which cannot be resorted to restrictively. Perhaps the most restrictive is the tenth definition of “court” in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed.):
“10. Law. a The hall, chamber, or place where justice is administered, b The persons duly assembled under authority of law for the administration of justice, whether specifically appointed to exercise only judicial powers, as most *348modern courts, or combining judicial with legislative powers, as often formerly, and still in some cases, as that of the British Parliament, the legislature of Massachusetts, etc.; an official assembly legally met together for the transaction of judicial business; a judge or judges sitting for the hearing or trial of causes, c A tribunal established for the administration of justice, d The judge or judges, as distinguished from the counsel or jury, e The session of a judicial assembly.”
Even that does not fulfill the hopes of the majority since the administrative proceeding before the Real Estate Commission is judicial in nature. See Md. Code, Art. 56, §§ 224-225.
The second prong of the majority’s reasoning relies upon a statutory interpretation device resorted to by courts only when they have no other crutch upon which to lean in their search for Legislative intent:
“The Legislature, which is presumed to know of the interpretations made of statutes by the Attorney General, Jackson Marine Sales v. St. Dept., 32 Md. App. 213, 359 A. 2d 228 (1976) [cert. den. 278 Md. 725 (9/24/76)]; Demory Brothers v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 20 Md. App. 467, 316 A. 2d 529 (1974), aff'd, 273 Md. 320, 329 A. 2d 674 (1974); see also Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 648, 227 A. 2d 8, 13 (1967); Read Drug & Chemical Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 257-58, 166 A. 742, 745 (1933), has met at least annually since then Attorney General Hammond handed down his opinion in 1951, but that body has not changed the statute. Thus, the General Assembly has sub silentio tacitly approved the Attorney General’s interpretation.” Majority Opinion p. 342.
As so often happens in the law, the original sound reasoning of one case is used synergistically to reach one decision, then another, over the years. When a more distinctive factual premise arises, one of the synergistic *349elements is isolated and used to support a cause wherein the other elements, including those necessary to the original reasoning, are inapposite. That is what has occurred here.
In seeking Legislative intent, courts since the inception of our judicial system have held that they should refrain from interpreting a statute differently from the prevailing administrative interpretation except for the most potent and urgent reasons. See Hays v. Richardson, 1 G & J 366; Salisbury Beauty School v. St. Bd., 268 Md. 32, 65-66. Administrative construction and enforcement remains an important interpretive guide, see Public Serv. Comm’n v. Howard Res., 271 Md. 141, 150-152, and our reports are replete with the variety of its application.
That rule was at the base of the 1933 opinion in Read Drug & Chem. Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, but there an Attorney General’s opinion was relied upon to show, first, what the administrative interpretation was, and second, as a makeweight by saying that the legal opinion as well as the administrative construction should be given great weight:
“ . .. such legal interpretation and administrative construction should be given great consideration in determining the legislative intent.” Id. at 257. (emphasis added).
What had once been a helpful interpretative guide soon became a substantial source for determining Legislative intent. By 1966, in Crest Investment v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, the Court kept the makeweight and discarded the scale. There the Court relied upon the existence of a 9 year old Attorney General’s opinion to an agency to infer Legislative acquiescence by silence, but failed to mention the 9 years of administrative application of the Attorney General’s construction. It would appear that the Court charged the Legislature with knowledge of the opinion because it had been expressly recognized in a study commission report submitted to the Legislature. 245 Md. at 648, n. 7.
Crest would seem to stand on its peculiar facts had we not fallen into its trap by reciting it as a rule of statutory construction rather than a mere makeweight, Demory *350Brothers v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 20 Md. App. 467, 473, aff'd 273 Md. 320, although we later preserved the distinction of limiting the Attorney General’s opinion to its peculiar role as added support to the administrative-construction-and-enforcement principle. See Jackson Marine Sales v. St. Dep’t, 32 Md. App. 213, 217, cert. den. 278 Md. 725 (9/24/76).
It is time we placed this interpretative guide in proper perspective, instead of perpetuating its unwarranted growth. An Attorney General’s opinion is simply the considered opinion of another lawyer. If that opinion is solicited and received by the General Assembly, or was before it as of record, the Legislature can honestly. be charged with its knowledge and an inference can be drawn from subsequent inaction. But for a court to charge the Legislature with the knowledge of every opinion rendered to every agency, department, board or other State institution demands too much credulity for even an appellate court. Perhaps contrary to our own sense of self-esteem, common sense tells us that those overburdened public servants probably do not even have time to read our opinions, let alone the myriad rendered by the Attorney General upon every official request. I would restrict this presumed knowledge — silent acquiescence — to its limited role, or discard it altogether in reaching for the Legislative intent when interpreting an unclear statute.
On the other hand, the Legislature can be charged with knowledge of the administration of its laws and their consequent administrative interpretation. It annually appropriates funds to effect that administration and has standing committees statutorily created to review administrative procedure and conduct. Md. Code, Art. 40, § 40A. There is also some logic in pointing out an Attorney General’s interpretation submitted to the administrative agency, to indicate with precision what construction had been placed upon the statute by the agency.
It is, of course, only when the words of a statute are not definite and free of ambiguity that we need seek Legislative intent. But when the meaning is ambiguous, the verbal *351significance may be divined by examining the evil the Legislature sought to inhibit, Stoll v. Baltimore, 163 Md. 282, 292, and it is the language of the statute itself that provides the primary source for determining Legislative intent. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421.
It is my opinion that the statute of limitations now found in Md. Code, Cts. Art., § 5-107, was intended from its inception to relate only to monetary “fines”, monetary “penalties” and monetary “forfeitures”. If that be so the license revocation hearing would not be subject to the one year limitation. This view can be justified by Black's Law Dictionary definitions of the words used in the statute. “Fine” is defined as meaning:
“To impose a pecuniary punishment or mulct.
To sentence a person convicted of an offense to pay a penalty in money.”
“Penalty” and “forfeiture” carry a variety of meanings. However, under the rule of ejusdem generis, we do not construe those terms in their broadest sense but apply them only to things of the same general kind or class as that specifically mentioned, i.e., “fine”. Therefore, an alternative definition in Black’s for the term “penalty” is most ■appropriate here:
“The term also denotes money recoverable by virtue of a statute imposing a payment by way of punishment.” (authorities deleted).
The same rule of interpretation applies to “forfeiture”. The ninth definition in Black’s is the most appropriate in context:
“9. A thing or sum of money forfeited. Something imposed as a punishment for an offense or delinquency. The word in this sense is frequently associated with the word ‘penalty.’ ” (authorities deleted).
Applying the rule of ejusdem generis is not only a reasonable application but a most appropriate one in light of *352the Legislative history. While we should construe limitations statutes in furtherance of their objectives, Green v. Johnson, 3 G & J 389, their objectives must often be found in light of the purposes and objects sought to be attained by their enactment. See McMahan v. Dorchester Fert. Co., 184 Md. 155, 159-160. The time and circumstances under which a statute was originally passed should be taken into consideration in ascertaining the true intention of the Legislature. Maurice v. Worden, 52 Md. 283, 294.
The original enactment of § 5-107 was as a last clause after-thought, applied to a lengthy procedural law entitled:
“An Act to direct in which manner all fines, forfeitures and penalties, shall be recovered, and in what manner fines, forfeitures, penalties and amerciaments, shall be applied.” Dorsey's Laws of Maryland. — 1777, Ch. 6.
The entire statute dealt with money payments for wrongful acts, by whatever name called. Even when it was first changed, Laws 1801, Ch. 74, § 32, it still dealt with monetary penalties. Nowhere is there apparent in its history any indication that the Legislature ever intended to deviate from applying a one year limitation upon the institution of a suit or prosecution for any “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” other than in a pecuniary sense.
Therefore, if reasons need to be assigned for our interpretation of that statute, I would have felt more comfortable in seeking Legislative intent through statutory history than by relying on a presumed tacit acquiescence in a lawyer’s opinion rendered to someone else, and an analogy between a licensed business and a learned profession.