Court Opinion

ID: 9561265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:06:04.004377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:42.337686
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully with the majority opinion. I write separately only to address the dissenting opinion’s misperception that Newman has not relied upon Wright’s promise to her detriment.
It is an established principle in Georgia that a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.1 This doctrine, known as “promissory estoppel,” prevents a promisor from reneging on a promise, when the promisor should have expected that the promisee would rely upon the promise, and the promisee does in fact rely upon the promise to her detriment.2 Sufficient consideration to enforce a contractual promise pursuant to promissory estoppel may be found in any benefit accruing to the promisor, or any reliance, loss, trouble, disadvantage, or charge imposed upon the promisee.3
Bearing these principles in mind, and as explained very well in the majority opinion, it is clear that Wright’s commitment to Newman to assume the obligations of fatherhood as regards her son are enforceable. Specifically, it is abundantly clear that Wright should have known that Newman would rely upon his promise, especially after he undertook for ten years to fulfill the obligations of fatherhood. In this regard, it could hardly have escaped Wright’s notice that Newman refrained from seeking to identify and obtain support from the *522child’s biological father while Wright was fulfilling his commitment to her. Moreover, Newman did in fact rely upon Wright’s promise, to her detriment when, ten years after he undertook the obligations of fatherhood, Wright reneged on his promise.
Promissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.4 In this case, it cannot seriously be argued that Newman’s reliance was anything other than reasonable, as she had absolutely no indication that Wright would ever renege, especially after he fulfilled his promise for such a long time. Moreover, contrary to the dissent’s implicit assertion, promissory estoppel does not require that the injured party exhaust all other possible means of obtaining the benefit of the promise from any and all sources before being able to enforce the promise against the promisor. In this regard, it is illogical to argue that Newman, after reasonably relying upon Wright’s promise for ten years, can now simply seek to determine the identity of the biological father and collect support from him. First, there is nothing in the case law that requires Newman to do so before being entitled to have Wright’s promise enforced. Second, this requirement would be an imposing, if not an impossible, burden, and would require Newman not only to identify the father (if possible), but also to locate him, bring a costly legal action against him, and to succeed in that action. Imposing this requirement would effectively penalize Newman for no reasons other than (1) her reasonable reliance upon a promise that was not kept, and (2) for allowing herself to be dissuaded by Wright from seeking the identity of the biological father. As noted, nowhere does the case law support imposing such a requirement, and none of the facts in this case support doing so now.
Finally, there can be no doubt that, unless Wright’s promise to Newman is enforced, injustice will result. Given the approximately ten years that have passed since the child’s birth, during which time Wright, for all purposes, was the child’s father, it likely will be impossible for Newman to establish the identity of the child’s biological father, bring a successful paternity action, and obtain support from that individual. Consequently, if Wright is allowed to renege on his obligation, Newman likely will not receive any support to assist in the cost of raising her son, despite having been promised the receipt of such by Wright. Furthermore, an even greater injustice will be inflicted upon the boy himself. A child who has been told by any adult, regardless of the existence of a biological relationship, that he will always be able to depend upon the adult for parenting and sustenance, will suffer a great deal when that commitment is broken. And *523when a child suffers under those circumstances, society-at-large suffers as well.5
Because Wright’s promise is capable of being enforced under the law, and because I believe that Wright’s promise must be enforced in order to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice, I concur fully in the majority opinion.

 OCGA § 13-3-44; Insilco Corp. v. First Nat. Bank of Dalton, 248 Ga. 322, 322-323 (283 SE2d 262) (1981); see Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus, 248 Ga. 114, 116 (281 SE2d 579) (1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 90 (1981 and Supp. 1992).

 Doll v. Grand Union Co., 925 F2d 1363, 1371 (11th Cir. 1991).

 Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 248 Ga. at 116; see Zachos v. C & S Nat. Bank, 213 Ga. 619, 624 (100 SE2d 418) (1957); Folks, Inc. v. Dobbs, 181 Ga. App. 311 (352 SE2d 212) (1986).

 Fidelity &c. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 178 Ga. App. 578 (344 SE2d 268) (1986); see Doll, supra.

 Wright is also morally obligated to provide support for Newman’s son. Merely because an obligation may not be capable of legal enforcement, one is not necessarily free to act in any way that he might choose. In addition to our legal duties, we are also bound by a consciousness of duty that is based upon fundamental values such as honor, truth, and responsibility. The “non-legal” obligations that we undertake are no less sacrosanct merely because they may not be capable of legal enforcement. The moral (as opposed to the legal) dilemma faced by Wright lies within his conscience, heart, and soul. He need have looked no further than there to determine what he must do in this case.