Court Opinion

ID: 9833164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:30:14.438064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.235298
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In order that a better understanding of the contentions here may be had, we will briefly outline the proceedings in this case in the trial court, in their chronological order:
Plaintiff has filed his original petition February 28, 1921. Defendant’s original answer was filed March 31, 1922. No further action was had in the case until the October term of the court, which ended December 2,. 1923. During the October term the court dismissed the ease for want of prosecution. There is no statement of facts in the case,. but the plaintiff’s bill of exception shows that during the October term of the court the-plaintiff appeared in open court in person and advised the court that he had intended and did intend to prosecute said cause, and asked the court to reinstate the same and set aside the order of dismissal; that the court granted this request at that time and set the case down'for a day certain in the next succeeding term of the court which convened on December 4, 1922. On December 12th of the-December term, 1922, the plaintiff filed a first supplemental petition and -also an affidavit, stating that the rent contract had been lost. Objection was made by defendant to the trial of the case at that time because it had been previously dismissed at the October term, and that any order reinstating it, if made, had not been entered upon the minutes. The court overruled this objection, and the case was tried to a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff Parnell for the amount sued for and against defendant Barron on his pross-action. On the next day, December 13, 1922, the plaintiff filed a written motion, praying the court to set aside the judgment of dismissal previously entered at the October term, and to enter an order nunc pro tune, reinstating the case as of December 1, 1922. The court granted this motion, and it appears that the motion and the order were antedated December 12, 1922. At the December term, on January 1, 1922, the defendant Barron filed his amended motion for a new trial, in which it is asserted that the court had.no jurisdiction to try the case and raising the question as to the sufficiency of the petition to sustain the judgment and challenging the action of the trial court in admitting certain evidence. On February 1, 1923, at the same term of the court, the motion for new trial was granted, the judgment. upon the merits was set aside, as well as the or*532der reinstating the case, and the whole proceeding was dismissed.
The ease is before us upon the following assignment of error: '
“The court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion to dismiss this cause on the ground that this court had no jurisdiction of the same as shown by appellant’s bill of exception No. 1.”
Under this assignment the following proposition is urged:
“An order made by a court at a previous term, although there is no entry of the same upon the judge’s docket, and no memorandum of such order is preserved, the judge may properly enter same nuno pro tunc upon oral testimony and his own recollection.”
As stated in the original opinion, we think this. proposition is sound. A trial judge who has dismissed a case for want of prosecution may, at the same term, reinstate the case on plaintiff’s motion, without notice to defendant. Carlton v. Miller, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 619, 21 S. W. 697; Williams v. Huling, 43 Tex. 113. The bill of exception and one of the court’s many orders shows that plaintiff’s motion was made orally in open court. According to this holding, the case was properly reinstated and stood for trial in its order at the succeeding term.
 The next question .to be considered is: Was the order for reinstatement properly and legally made at the December term? In addition to the cases cited in the original opinion, the following cases clearly and uniformly hold that the entry of an order or judgment may be made at a subsequent term upon the personal recollection of the trial judge who rendered such judgment or made such order; that his personal - recollection must be given the dignity and force of evidence ; and that he may enter such order upon his own motion: Slayden v. Palmo (Tex. Civ. App.) 90 S. W. 908; Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 98 Tex. 42, 81 S. W. 25; Blum v. Neilson, 59 Tex. 379; Bradford v. Malone, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 440, 130 S. W. 1013; Owens v. Vander Stucken (Tex. Civ. App.) 133 S. W. 491; Partridge v. Wooton, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 280, 137 S. W. 412; Trotti v. Kinnear (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. 326; Moore v. Chapman (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 7. As stated, the case was tried on December 12, 1922. On the next day plaintiff filed his written motion to reinstate the case, and said motion and the order granting it appear to have been filed on December 12th. The order reinstates the case as of December 1st, which was during the October term, the term at which the order of dismissal was made and entered. Just why this motion and the order were dated back does not appear, and we think is immaterial, although irregular. The court had the right, according to the cases above cited, to make such order at the succeeding term. Whether made before or after a trial upon the merits is wholly immaterial. Later, as stated, the court grants ed defendant’s, motion for a new trial, set aside the judgment rendered upon the merits, and rested upon his original action dismissing the case. The only reason for so doing, as stated in the bill of exception, is that he was without jurisdiction to try the case. There is nothing in the record tending to show that he did not have jurisdiction to try the case and enter the- judgment upon the merits. Upon its face, the record shows jurisdiction. In the absence of a statement of facts, showing that the court did not have jurisdiction, the proceedings in the transcript must control.
The appellee has filed no cross-assignments of error. In his brief there is only one suggestion of fundamental error which can be considered, and that is the insufficiency of the petition to sustain a judgment for any amount based upon a written contract of loase. The original petition does not declaré upon a written contract, but plaintiff’s subsequent pleadings, when considered with the original petition, are sufficient in the absence of a special exception. The defendant did except because the amount due for rent was stated in a sworn account rather than a declaration in the petition as to the terms and legal effect of a written lease. As far as the record shows, all such exceptions were waived, since we find no order in the transcript overruling them. But if it be admitted that plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient, this defect has been cured by specific allegations of the making of a written lease between the defendant and Albritton, plaintiff’s agent, in more than one count of the defendant’s answer. The admission, and exclusion of evidence does not present a question , of fundamental error. This court is limited in its consideration of an appeal to such errors as are properly excepted to in the lower court, save as to fundamental errors. The assignment and proposition presented here are sufficient to call in review the error of the court in setting aside all proceedings subsequent to his order of dismissal, upon. the ground that he had no jurisdiction to afterward try the case.
The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.