Court Opinion

ID: 9905511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:10:59.805242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.320218
License: Public Domain

J-S39015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                    :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                                    :
                v.                                  :
                                                    :
                                                    :
  RAFAEL HERNANDEZ                                  :
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :     No. 667 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 6, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0003319-1998

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                FILED: NOVEMBER 29, 2023

       Appellant Rafael Hernandez appeals pro se from the Order entered April

6, 2023, in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas denying his seventh

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1          Citing

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), Appellant challenges

the stewardship provided in 1999 by his first PCRA counsel.2 After careful

review, we affirm.

                                               A.

       This Court previous summarized the background that provides context

for this appeal as follows:
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 In Bradley, our Supreme Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a

PCRA court denies relief and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se,
raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do
so, even if on appeal.” 261 A.3d at 401.
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       On May 5, 1999, pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant pled guilty
       to first-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of life
       imprisonment. . . . On May 17, 1999, counsel for Appellant filed a
       motion to withdraw his guilty plea and also requested permission
       to withdraw from the case. On May 20[,] 1999, the trial court
       entered an Order dismissing Appellant’s request to withdraw his
       guilty plea as untimely filed. However, the trial court granted
       counsel’s petition to withdraw from the case and appointed new
       counsel, Gail Chiodo, Esquire, to represent Appellant.

       Although no PCRA petition was currently pending before the trial
       court, on March 27, 2000, Attorney Chiodo filed a no-merit letter
       pursuant to [Turner/Finley3]. On March 29, 2000, the trial court
       permitted Attorney Chiodo to withdraw and entered a Notice of
       Intent to Dismiss Appellant’s “petition” without a hearing.

       On June 1, 2000, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal and later
       filed a pro se concise statement of matters on appeal. On July 11,
       2000, the trial court appointed Michael Dautrich, Esquire, to
       represent Appellant on appeal. On August 17, 2000, Attorney
       Dautrich filed an amended concise statement of matters.
                                      ...

       [O]n January 2, 2001, [the court held] an evidentiary hearing . .
       . concerning whether Appellant had asked Attorney Chiodo to file
       a direct appeal on his behalf. During that hearing the parties
       stipulated that such a request had been made, and [that] Attorney
       Chiodo [had] failed to perfect Appellant’s direct appeal rights.

       On January 9, 2001, Attorney Dautrich filed an “amended” PCRA
       petition on behalf of Appellant seeking reinstatement of
       Appellant’s direct appeal rights. On that same date, the trial court
       filed an opinion requesting [that] this Court either permit
       Appellant [to] file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, consider the
       appeal on its merits or remand the case for further proceedings.
       Tr. Ct. Op., 1/9/[20]00, at 6. Because the trial court has treated
       these proceedings as if a PCRA petition had been filed, we will
       consider this appeal on the merits.
____________________________________________

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

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Commonwealth v. Hernandez, No. 1294 MDA 2000 (Pa. Super. filed Dec.

21, 2001) (paragraph breaks added).

       On appeal, Appellant challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea and asserted a claim that Attorney Chiodo was ineffective for failing

to raise all meritorious issues on appeal, including the defenses of provocation,

self-defense, and involuntary intoxication.         Id. at 13. This Court found

Appellant’s plea knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and observed that the

entry of a guilty plea serves as a waiver of all defects and defenses except

those concerning jurisdiction, legality of sentence and the validity of the plea.

The Court acknowledged Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim and referenced its

prior discussion of waiver before concluding that Appellant’s claims had no

merit. Id.4 Appellant subsequently filed five PCRA petitions.

                                               B.

       On October 24, 2022, Appellant filed his seventh PCRA Petition, the

denial of which is now before us, challenging the assistance provided by

Attorney Chiodo in 1999. In support, he argued that the Bradley decision

created a new constitutional right that permits him to raise a claim of

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel retroactively. The PCRA court appointed

____________________________________________

4 In a footnote, the Court stated that “[s]ince we have addressed the merits

of Appellant’s claim of an involuntary plea, we need not address Appellant’s
remaining issues challenging prior counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file
a direct appeal.” Hernandez, No. 1294 MDA 2000, at 13 n.4

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David Long, Esq., as counsel. Mr. Long filed a “no-merit” Turner/Finley letter

and a request to withdraw as counsel.

      On February 28, 2023, the PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to

withdraw and issued a notice of intent to dismiss without a hearing pursuant

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Appellant’s

petition is patently untimely and Appellant failed to plead and prove the

applicability of any of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions provided in 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Appellant filed a response to the Court’s Rule 907 notice.

On April 6, 2023, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing the petition.

      Appellant timely appealed. He filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

Statement, and in response, the PCRA court issued a Statement directing this

Court’s attention to its Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss dated February

28, 2023.

                                       C.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1.    Whether [Appellant] can have his appeal rights restored
      nunc pro tunc to raise PCRA Counsel’s ineffectiveness on an appeal
      to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, pursuant to
      Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Oct. 20, 2021)?

      2.    Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
      present a claim during the first PCRA proceeding, that trial counsel
      was ineffective in relation to securing a Spanish interpreter for the
      plea colloquy and sentencing?

      3.   Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
      present a claim during the first PCRA proceeding that plea counsel
      was ineffective in relation to advising [Appellant] to enter an

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      involuntary and unknowing plea, because there was a strong
      defense of serious provocation and involuntary intoxication?

Appellant’s Br. at 2.

      Our standard of review is well-settled. “We review the denial of a PCRA

petition to determine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings

and whether its order is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206

A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is

jurisdictional, and if a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over

the claims and cannot grant relief. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d

1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005). To be timely filed, a PCRA petition, including second

and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date a

petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

“[A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking

the review.”    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).       The PCRA’s jurisdictional time

restriction is constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287,

292 (Pa. 2004).

      Here, Appellant’s petition, filed nearly 23 years after his Judgment of

Sentence became final, is patently untimely. Without explicitly acknowledging

the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions, Appellant contends that he now raises his

challenge to Ms. Chioto’s 1999 stewardship because “the Supreme Court

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substantively changed a watershed procedural rule on how and when claims

of PCRA Counsel’s ineffectiveness can be raised for the first time.” Appellant’s

Br. at 9.   Providing a generous reading of his argument, we deduce that

Appellant attempts to implicate the newly recognized constitutional right

exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar provided in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1)(iii).   Our Supreme Court has explained:

      First, [the exception] provides that the right asserted is a
      constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of
      the United States or [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,] after
      the time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the
      right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus,
      a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right
      and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply
      retroactively. The language “has been held” is in the past tense.
      These words mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., “that
      court” has already held the new constitutional right to be
      retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the past
      tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly intended that
      the right was already recognized at the time the petition was filed.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 679 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

      This Court has observed that “[n]othing in Bradley creates a right to

file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method

of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permits recognition of such a

right.” Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Moreover, the Bradley Court itself clarified that that “an approach favoring

the consideration of ineffectiveness claims of PCRA counsel . . . does not

sanction extra-statutory serial petitions.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 403.

Additionally, the Court explained that the discovery of prior counsel’s

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ineffectiveness would not constitute a “new fact” for purposes of the timeliness

exception at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at 403 n.18.

       Although this Court has not addressed the applicability of Bradley as to

the newly recognized constitutional right exception in a published decision,

several unpublished decisions have rejected the argument. We have stated:

       Bradley . . . did not announce a new constitutional right, much
       less one applicable retroactively. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
       Johnson, 2023 WL 2379233 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished
       memorandum) (noting “although Bradley did not specifically
       address the timeliness exception upon which appellant relies, it is
       clear Bradley did not recognize a new constitutional right, id. at
       *4); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 2022 WL 17973240 (Pa. Super.
       2022) (unpublished memorandum) (holding Bradley does not
       trigger the timeliness exception of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii));
       Commonwealth v. Parkinson, 2022 WL 5237927 (Pa. Super.
       2022) (holding “Bradley did not create a new, non-statutory
       exception to the PCRA time bar,” id. at *3).

Commonwealth v. Ruiz-Figueroa, No. 1531 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. filed

June 22, 2023) (unpublished memorandum at *2) 5

       As the above case law illustrates, Appellant’s attempt to challenge the

effective assistance of his 1999 PCRA counsel based on the holding in Bradley

does not meet the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. Accordingly, this Court,

like the PCRA court, lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s

issues. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s seventh PCRA

petition.

____________________________________________

5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

                                           -7-
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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2023

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