Court Opinion

ID: 9381219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 14:12:14.824377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.797568
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 21

                  SUPREME COURT           OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP1078-FT

COMPLETE TITLE:        Secura Supreme Insurance Company,
                                 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       The Estate of Daniel Keith Huck,
                                 Defendant-Respondent.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 542, 966 N.W.2d 124
                             PDC No: 2021 WI App 69 - Published

OPINION FILED:         March 22, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         November 7, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Racine
   JUDGE:              Eugene A. Gasiorkiewicz

JUSTICES:
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with
respect to ¶¶1-2, 4-16, and 29, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN
WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Barbara A. O’Brien, Erik M. Gustafson, and Borgelt,
Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral
argument by Patryk Silver.

       For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Susan R. Tyndall, Tony M. Dunn, Angela Komp, and Habush, Habush
& Rottier, S.C., Racine. There was an oral argument by Tony M.
Dunn.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Edward E. Robinson and
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, for the Wisconsin Association
for Justice. There was an oral argument by Edward E. Robinson.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by              James A. Friedman,
Daniel C.W. Narvey, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, for the
Wisconsin   Insurance   Alliance,   the   American    Property   Casualty
Insurance Association, and the Wisconsin Defense Counsel.

                                    2
                                                                       2023 WI 21
                                                               NOTICE
                                                 This opinion is subject to further
                                                 editing and modification.   The final
                                                 version will appear in the bound
                                                 volume of the official reports.
No.       2020AP1078-FT
(L.C. No.    2019CV1847)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                           :            IN SUPREME COURT

Secura Supreme Insurance Company,

             Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                                                                    FILED
      v.                                                       MAR 22, 2023

The Estate of Daniel Keith Huck,                                  Sheila T. Reiff
                                                               Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Respondent.

ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with
respect to ¶¶1-2, 4-16, and 29, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN
WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.               Affirmed.

      ¶1     PATIENCE      DRAKE   ROGGENSACK,     J.     Petitioner         Secura

Supreme Insurance Company (Secura), which insured Daniel Keith

Huck, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision1 that

      1Secura Supreme Ins. Co. v. Est. of Huck, 2021 WI App 69,
399 Wis. 2d 542, 966 N.W.2d 124.
                                                                     No.     2020AP1078-FT

affirmed an order granting judgment to the Estate of Daniel

Keith Huck (Estate).2         We affirm the court of appeals.

     ¶2     We interpret Secura's policy as precluding Secura from

reducing its liability to the Estate by the total amount of

payments    the    Estate     initially          received.      The        Estate      first

received worker's compensation from Huck's employer's worker's

compensation insurer (WC insurer), and then a settlement from

the tortfeasor's insurer.              Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29(1)(b)(2021-

22)3 obligated the Estate to reimburse the WC insurer with a

portion    of   the    settlement       it       received    from    the     tortfeasor.

Secura's    underinsured          motorist          (UIM)     policy        contemplated

payments made in accordance with worker's compensation law in

its reducing clause, and obligated the Estate to reimburse the

WC insurer.       The policy also required the Estate to exhaust any

other bodily injury liability bonds or policies and to receive

payment    from    them      before     Secura       would     pay     UIM     benefits.

Accordingly, we conclude the policy's plain language required

its payment of UIM benefits based on the Estate's recovery after
reimbursements        to    the   WC     insurer       and     collection         of    the

tortfeasor's liability payment had occurred.

     ¶3     However,        Secura     argues       its     policy     "substantially

incorporates"         the     statutory            language     of         Wis.        Stat.

§ 632.32(5)(i), which permits it to reduce payment by the amount

     2 The Honorable Eugene A. Gasiorkiewicz of Racine County
presided.
     3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

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the Estate initially received.                     We conclude the plain language

of § 632.32(5)(i) establishes that an insurer may reduce its

liability by the recovery of the insured at the time the insurer

enforces      its     reducing          clause.           The      Estate's         obligatory

reimbursement was made pursuant to "worker's compensation law,"

which      § 632.32(5)(i)2.           recognizes.            For     these     reasons,      we

conclude that Secura is not statutorily authorized to reduce its

liability        limits     by    the        total       worker's       compensation         and

tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but

was   obligated      to    reimburse         in     part.        Accordingly,        Secura's

policy      and     § 632.32(5)(i)            require        Secura      to     provide       an

additional $9,718.73 to the Estate.

                                      I.     BACKGROUND

      ¶4     The facts are undisputed.                      Mr. Huck was struck and

killed by a motorist while he performed his job duties for the

Village of Mount Pleasant.                 Since the fatal accident occurred in

the course of Mr. Huck's employment, the Village's WC insurer

initially provided $35,798.04 to the Estate.
      ¶5     The    motorist          that    struck      Mr. Huck       was   insured       for

$25,000     in    liability       coverage,          which      also    was    provided       to

Mr. Huck's Estate.          However, by receiving the $25,000 settlement

from the tortfeasor, the Estate was obligated to reimburse the

WC    insurer       from        the     settlement           based      on     Wis.     Stat.

§ 102.29(1)(b).            As    required,         the    Estate       reimbursed      the   WC

insurer      $9,718.73      so        that    the     Estate       ultimately         retained

$26,079.31 from worker's compensation.                       This dispute centers on
the   importance      of    the       $9,718.73      reimbursement           (the    "Disputed
                                               3
                                                                            No.       2020AP1078-FT

Amount")       that    the    Estate          was    required       to   return       to     the    WC

insurer.

     ¶6        Mr. Huck had purchased an automobile insurance policy

from Secura that included UIM coverage with a liability limit of

$250,000 for "each person."                    The Estate's recovery from worker's

compensation          and    the       tortfeasor        were    insufficient           to    cover

Mr. Huck's       damages,          which       exceeded         $250,000.            The     Estate

submitted a claim under the Secura UIM policy.                                      The policy's

reducing       clause       allowed         Secura      to   reduce      its    UIM     liability

limits by the amounts paid by a tortfeasor, and by "amounts paid

or payable under any worker's compensation law."4                                      Therefore,

Secura reduced its liability limit to the Estate by the $25,000

settlement       with       the        tortfeasor.           Secura      also       reduced        its

liability limit by the total worker's compensation benefit of

$35,798.04,      "even       [though]          some     of   that     money     (the       Disputed

Amount) return[ed] to the [worker's compensation] Payor."                                     Based

on these reductions, Secura tendered $189,201.96 to the Estate.5

     ¶7        Secura       filed       a    declaratory        judgment        complaint          and
moved    for    judgment          on    the    pleadings        pursuant       to     Wis.    Stat.

§ 802.06(3).          Secura sought a declaration that its UIM reducing

     4 A reducing clause "permits a setoff from the insured's UIM
coverage the amount paid to the insured by the underinsured
tortfeasor," or by other enumerated sources.    Dowhower ex rel.
Rosenberg v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶1, 236 Wis. 2d
113, 613 N.W.2d 557.
     5 Secura explained in its declaratory judgment complaint
that: ($250,000)-($25,000 tortfeasor settlement)-($35,798.04 in
worker's compensation) = $189,201.96.

                                                    4
                                                                               No.     2020AP1078-FT

clause      applies       to     the    total         "amount       paid"     pursuant       to    the

worker's compensation payment, notwithstanding any reimbursement

under Wis. Stat. § 102.29.                       The circuit court denied Secura's

motion      and    granted       the    Estate            judgment    on     its     counterclaim,

ordering Secura to tender the Disputed Amount to the Estate.

Secura appealed.

       ¶8        The     court     of       appeals             affirmed,     relying       on     our

statutory analysis of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) in Teschendorf

v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d

258.        In    Teschendorf, we held that § 632.32(5)(i) "does not

allow an insurer to reduce uninsured motorist [UM] policy limits

by worker's compensation payments that are not made to or on the

behalf of the insured, the insured's heirs, or the insured's

estate."         Id., ¶2.        The court of appeals reviewed our statutory

analysis         and    public     policy        rationales          in     Teschendorf      before

concluding         that     Secura          is    "permitted         to     reduce     its       [UIM]

coverage         limits . . . [only]              by       the    total    amount     of    worker's

compensation actually received by the Estate."                                     Secura Supreme
Ins. Co. v. Est. of Huck, 2021 WI App 69, ¶20, 399 Wis. 2d 542,

966 N.W.2d 124.             Accordingly, the court of appeals determined

Secura must provide the Estate the Disputed Amount.

       ¶9        Secura    petitioned            us       for    review,    which     we    granted.

Secura renews its argument that the plain language of "amounts

paid" and "payment" settles this matter.                                  Secura argues it may

reduce      its        liability       by    the       "amounts       paid"    to     the    Estate

regardless of what happened after those amounts were provided
because the Estate was paid those amounts, notwithstanding its
                                                      5
                                                                 No.    2020AP1078-FT

obligation to reimburse the WC insurer.6               The Estate contends the

Disputed Amount cannot be considered an "amount paid" because

the Estate did not retain possession of it.                       It argues that

Secura impermissibly reduced its UIM liability limits by the

Disputed Amount, and that Secura owes it the Disputed Amount for

a total recovery of $198,920.69 under the policy.

                                 II.     DISCUSSION

                           A.       Standard of Review

      ¶10   Our task is to interpret an insurance policy and Wis.

Stat.     § 632.32(5)(i)         based      on   undisputed       facts.         The

interpretation of an insurance policy presents a question of law

that we review independently.             Smith v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 155

Wis. 2d     808,    810,       456     N.W.2d    597        (1990).       Statutory

interpretation also presents a question of law that we review

independently.      Mau v. N.D. Ins. Rsrv. Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶28,

248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45.

                               B.    Secura's Policy

      ¶11   We first review the UIM policy Mr. Huck purchased from
Secura.     The Declarations page provides that Mr. Huck purchased

UIM   coverage     with    a    liability     limit    of    $250,000    for   "each

      6The policy allows Secura to reduce its liability by "all
sums: paid" (by or on behalf of persons who are legally
responsible) and by "all sums: paid or payable" (worker's
compensation law).      Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) allows
insurers to reduce their liability by "[a]mounts paid" (by or on
behalf of persons who are legally responsible) and "[a]mounts
paid or payable" (worker's compensation law). Despite the minor
differences between the policy language and statute, Secura
relies on its interpretation of "paid."

                                          6
                                                                    No.    2020AP1078-FT

person."         The   policy    includes         an        "Underinsured     Motorist

Coverage"   endorsement.         The   UIM   endorsement            establishes      that

Secura "will pay under this coverage only after the limits of

liability under any bodily injury liability bonds or policies

have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements."

The policy also includes a reducing clause, which provides in

pertinent part:

    The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums:

    (1)     Paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf
            of persons or organizations who may be legally
            responsible . . . .

    (2)     Paid or payable because of the bodily                          injury
            under any of the following or similar law:

            a.    Worker['s] compensation law;

    . . . .

    This coverage, when combined with any amounts paid by
    liability policies or bonds applicable to the owner or
    driver of an underinsured motor vehicle, will provide
    coverage up to the amount stated in the Declarations.
This is the contract language we interpret to determine whether
Secura's policy permits the insurer to reduce its UIM liability

limit to the Estate by the total payments it initially received,

rather than by the Estate's recovery after reimbursement to the

WC insurer had occurred.

    ¶12     We    begin   by    revisiting    the           rules   that    guide    our

analysis.        Our   interpretation        of        an    insurance      policy    is

controlled by the same rules of construction that we apply to

interpret a contract.          Kremers-Urb. Co. v. Am. Emps. Ins. Co.,
119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).                         Our goal is to

                                        7
                                                                    No.     2020AP1078-FT

"give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the

language of the policy."              Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶12,

264   Wis. 2d      617,   665      N.W.2d   857.       Language     in    an    insurance

contract "is to be given the common and ordinary meaning it

would have in the mind of a lay person."                           Kremers-Urb., 119

Wis. 2d     at     735.      "If    possible,      a   court     should    interpret      a

contract so that all parts are given meaning."                       Whirlpool Corp.

v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 154, 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995).                               When

the "terms of an insurance policy are plain on their face, the

policy    must     not    be    rewritten    by     construction."          Smith,       155

Wis. 2d at 811.

      ¶13    The policy does not define the term "paid."                              Secura

argues      that     "paid"      simply     means      an    obligation         has    been

discharged, "no matter the ultimate destination."                         Secura argues

that the WC insurer and the tortfeasor's insurer "paid" the

Estate, consequently discharging their obligations.                            Therefore,

Secura argues it may reduce its liability limit by the Disputed

Amount    despite     the      Estate's     statutory       obligation     to    repay    a
portion of its recovery to the WC insurer.

      ¶14    The     plain     language     in   the   policy's     reducing          clause

allows    Secura     to    reduce     its   liability       by    "sums"    "[p]aid      or

payable . . . under            any . . . [w]orker['s]            compensation         law."

Accordingly, the policy contemplates payments made consistent

with worker's compensation laws (because of bodily injury).                             See

State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d 704,

                                             8
                                                                      No.        2020AP1078-FT

710, 456 N.W.2d 359 (1990) (express reference to a law by a

contract reflects the parties' clear intent to address it).7

       ¶15     Located in Wis. Stat. ch. 120 "Worker's Compensation,"

Wis.       Stat.    § 102.29,    the    statute          by   which   the        Estate     was

obligated          to   reimburse      the        WC     insurer,     is     a      worker's

compensation law.              Although the policy does not specifically

identify the worker's compensation law to which it refers, there

is no dispute that § 102.29 comes within that general provision

in the policy.           See id. at 712 ("[W]e give full meaning to the

intent of the parties, as ascertained from the express language

of the contract.").

       ¶16     Accordingly, Secura may not alter its liability limit

based on the outcome of some, and not all, "sums" paid "because

of" a payment under worker's compensation law.                         It follows that

the "sums" by which Secura may reduce its liability because of

"worker's          compensation        law"        account      for        the      Estate's

reimbursement pursuant to the Wis. Stat. § 102.29 requirements.

Lastly,      because     the    policy's      plain      language     does       not   except
reimbursements          made   under    ch.       102,   we   will    not    read      in    an

exception that is not there.               To do so would rewrite the policy,

which we cannot do.              Smith, 155 Wis. 2d at 811.                       Since the

       See also Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI
       7

107, ¶60, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 ("[T]he laws which
subsist   at   the  time   and  place   of   the  making  of   a
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they were
expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.         This
principle embraces alike those which affect its validity,
construction, discharge, and enforcement." (quoting Von Hoffman
v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1866)).

                                              9
                                                                       No.     2020AP1078-FT

policy contemplates payments made in accordance with worker's

compensation law, including § 102.29, Secura may not ignore the

law's effects on the Estate's recovery.                    Accordingly, Secura may

not reduce its liability limit by the Disputed Amount.

       ¶17    Furthermore,         even     if    we    were     to    accept     Secura's

argument that the word "paid" completely resolved the dispute,

we would have to reject its interpretation of the policy's terms

because it impermissibly interprets the reducing clause in a

manner that renders a portion of the contract meaningless.                                Md.

Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶45, 326 Wis. 2d 300,

786 N.W.2d 15 ("[C]ontract language should be construed to give

meaning      to     every    word,      'avoiding      constructions         which     render

portions       of     a     contract      meaningless,      inexplicable          or    mere

surplusage.'" (internal citations omitted)).

       ¶18    The policy directs, "We will pay under this coverage

only   after        the   limits     of   liability      under    any    bodily        injury

liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of

judgments or settlements."                 The policy amount that is "paid or
payable" under worker's compensation law is a timed payment as

the policy directs that Secura "will pay" UIM coverage "only

after" other sources of payment "have been exhausted."                               Because

we must give meaning to a policy's provisions by reviewing the

policy as a whole, we do not review the reducing clause in

isolation.          Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶24.                    Stated otherwise,

the policy's plain language conditions Secura's UIM payment on

the    final      resolution       of     "amounts      paid"    by     other     sources;

                                             10
                                                           No.    2020AP1078-FT

accordingly, we conclude that the policy addresses an insured's

recovery after required reimbursements have been made.8

            C.    Wisconsin Stat. §§ 632.32(5)(i) and 102.29

      ¶19      Secura argues its policy "substantially incorporates"

the   language     of    Wis.   Stat.   § 632.32(5)(i),   which    it   argues

"provides" that Secura need not pay the Disputed Amount to the

Estate.     Accordingly, we turn next to interpret the statute to

determine whether it permits Secura to reduce its payment to the

Estate    as    Secura   contends.9     Secura   argues   that    the   statute

      8We note Wis. Stat. § 893.43(2) supports our interpretation
of the policy.     There, the legislature has provided that "A
cause     of    action     involving    underinsured     motorist
coverage . . . accrues on the date there is final resolution of
the underlying cause of action by the injured party against the
tortfeasor." This is important because final resolution of the
claim against the tortfeasor is what causes the injured party,
under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(2), to reimburse the WC insurer for a
portion of its initial payment to the injured workman.
      9We have interpreted this statute previously, but never in
light of the novel issue now facing us: "[w]hether the
statutorily approved phrase 'all sums . . . [p]aid or payable
because of the bodily injury under [w]orker's compensation law'
in an underinsured motorist ('UIM') insurance policy's reducing
clause necessarily permits the reduction for all amounts paid,
including those amounts that the employer/worker's compensation
insurer initially paid, but then recovered through a third-party
action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29."    Pet. Br. at 7.   See
Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 293 Wis. 2d
123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) to
determine whether an insurance company may reduce its liability
by the amount of worker's compensation paid to the State Fund
rather than to an estate); Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶23,
302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411 (interpreting whether payments
to an insured from non-UIM tortfeasors are ones "that apply"
under   § 632.32(5)(i));   Dowhower,   236   Wis. 2d   113,   ¶2
(interpreting whether § 632.32(5)(i) violates substantive due
process). See also Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc.,
2001 WI 86, ¶15, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893 ("Depending on
                                        11
                                                             No.     2020AP1078-FT

allows an insurer to reduce its liability by "amounts paid" by

worker's compensation and the tortfeasor, and therefore it is

"not relevant" that the Estate had to repay a portion of the

worker's compensation recovery.

       ¶20   Wisconsin    Stat.    § 632.32(5)(i)      states      in    relevant

part:

            (i) A policy may provide that the limits under
       the policy for . . . underinsured motorist coverage
       for bodily injury or death resulting from any one
       accident shall be reduced by any of the following that
       apply:

            1. Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person or
       organization that may be legally responsible for the
       bodily injury or death for which the payment is made.

            2. Amounts paid or payable under any worker's
       compensation law.
       ¶21   We   first      review     the    principles       of      statutory

interpretation, as set forth in Kalal.             State ex rel. Kalal v.

Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d

110.    We "assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in

the statutory language."          Id., ¶44.    Accordingly, we begin with

the    language   of   the   statute,    and   "[i]f   the   meaning      of   the

statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."                      Id., ¶45.

"A dictionary may be utilized to guide the common, ordinary

meaning of words."        Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10,

¶10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.             We also strive to give

"reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."

the facts of a case, the same statute may be ambiguous in one
setting and unambiguous in another.").

                                        12
                                                                        No.    2020AP1078-FT

Kalal,     271    Wis. 2d        633,       ¶46.      We    note     that     "[s]tatutory

interpretation centers on the 'ascertainment of meaning,' not

the recitation of words in isolation."                        Brey v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1

(quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47).

    ¶22      With these principles in mind, we conclude that the

plain language of the statute grants permission to an insurer to

reduce its liability limit when the final amount of an insured's

worker's compensation recovery has been determined.                            The parties

agree    that     Wis.    Stat.        § 632.32(5)(i)         serves     as    legislative

permission to insurers to reduce their limit of liability by

enumerated means.          Subdivisions (i)1. and (i)2. are at issue in

the instant case.

    ¶23      Both subdivisions contain the phrase "amounts paid,"

so we begin there.          In this context, "paid" is a past participle

of pay that the legislature uses to modify "amounts."                                  Secura

argues the word, "paid," simply communicates past action, but it

overlooks        that     past     participles          are      "routinely         used    as
adjectives to describe the present state of a thing."                               Henson v.

Santander        Consumer        USA        Inc.,     582     U.S.      79,    84      (2017)

(interpreting       the    Fair    Debt       Collection       Practices       Act).       For

example,     the        Supreme        Court        explained      in    its        statutory

interpretation of "a debt owed" that an ordinary person would

understand       "collect[ing]          a    debt    owed   to   Steve,"       as    "a    debt

currently owed to Steve," rather than "a debt Steve used to own"

and now does not.         Id. (emphases in original).

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                                                                           No.     2020AP1078-FT

       ¶24     Similarly, "amounts paid" uses the past participle of

"pay" as an adjective to describe a present state.                                An ordinary

person would understand "amount paid" to mean "amount currently

paid" rather than "amount once paid and then given back."                                      See

id.

       ¶25     To    ensure      our    interpretation           gives     meaning       to    all

words in the statute, we next interpret the word, "payable,"

that appears only in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.                                   Kalal, 271

Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.                "Payable" is defined as "requiring to be

paid, specifying payment to a particular payee at a specified

time or occasion, or in a specified manner."                               Webster's Third

New    Int'l        Dictionary       1659     (1986).            The     plain    meaning       of

"payable," therefore, is that payment is due, but the manner and

the    timing        of    payment      may    involve          future     payments.           For

instance,      a     settlement        may    be    "payable       in    installments,"         or

"payable monthly."               Regardless, it would still be an "amount

payable" under our interpretation of the statute.

       ¶26     Lastly,      Wis.     Stat.     § 632.32(5)(i)2.            allows        for   the
reduction      of     "[a]mounts        paid       or    payable       under     any    worker's

compensation law."            As we stated earlier, Wis. Stat. § 102.29 is

a worker's compensation law that establishes reimbursement of

amounts      initially        received        as    worker's       compensation          due    to

subsequent         settlements.          By    including         "worker's       compensation

law"      in        § 632.32(5)(i)2.,              the     legislature           contemplated

proceedings         such    as    those       subject      to    § 102.29.             See   Union

Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 64, 68-69, 108 N.W.2d
180 (1961) ("A general reference refers generally to the law on
                                               14
                                                             No.   2020AP1078-FT

a   subject      and   incorporates     the   entire   subject     matter.").

Because § 102.29 obligated the Estate to reimburse the Disputed

Amount,    the    reimbursement   was      made   pursuant   to    a   worker's

compensation law.       We interpret § 632.32(5)(i)2. to account for

the reimbursement into the "amount paid" to the Estate so that

the statute contemplates the Estate's final recovery.

     ¶27    Accordingly, we conclude, that "amounts paid" under

Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)1. and "amounts paid or payable" in

subd. 2., both reference the present tense.              "Amounts paid" is

interpreted as the current "amounts paid" or outstanding such as

by an installment agreement,10 at the time an insurer seeks to

reduce its liability under § 632.32(5)(i).               Stated otherwise,

"amounts paid" refers to an insured's final recovery at the time

an insurer reduces its liability, which we recognize may occur

when a UIM claim accrues.11       See Wis. Stat. § 893.43(2).

     ¶28    At the time Secura sought to reduce its liability, the

Estate had already reimbursed the Disputed Amount pursuant to a

worker's compensation law.            The final "amounts paid" to the
Estate pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i) was $51,079.31 from

the combined tortfeasor and worker's compensation settlements.

     10We provide just one example of a situation that gives
meaning to the term "payable."      Our decision today does not
limit   "payable"  to   just   installment   payments or   other
circumstances that have not been briefed before us.
     11Our conclusion is consistent with that reached in other
jurisdictions. See Wildman v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 703
N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ind. App. 1998); Cherry v. Coregis Ins. Co.,
204 P.3d 522, 525-26 (Idaho 2009).

                                      15
                                                                   No.     2020AP1078-FT

Secura seeks to reduce its UIM liability to the Estate by both

the "amounts paid" and also by the Disputed Amount; in other

words, Secura seeks to reduce its liability by the amount the

Estate initially received before required reimbursements were

made.   Section 632.32(5)(i) does not support this.                       Secura must

tender the Disputed Amount to the Estate in accordance with the

statute.

                                III.    CONCLUSION

    ¶29     We interpret Secura's policy as precluding Secura from

reducing its liability to the Estate by the total amount of

payments    the    Estate     initially       received.       The        Estate      first

received    worker's        compensation        from     Huck's     employer's          WC

insurer, and then a settlement from the tortfeasor's insurer.

Wisconsin     Stat.      § 102.29(1)(b)2.        obligated        the      Estate      to

reimburse the WC insurer with a portion of the settlement it

received from the tortfeasor.             Secura's UIM policy contemplated

payments made in accordance with worker's compensation law in

its reducing clause, and obligated the Estate to reimburse the
WC insurer.       The policy also required the Estate to exhaust any

other bodily injury liability bonds or policies and to receive

payment from them before Secura would pay UIM benefits.                                 We

therefore conclude that the policy's plain language required its

payment of UIM benefits based on the Estate's recovery after

reimbursements      to    the    WC     insurer        and   collection         of    the

tortfeasor's liability payment had occurred.

    ¶30     However,      Secura       argues    its     policy      "substantially
incorporates"       the      statutory          language      of         Wis.        Stat.
                                         16
                                                                    No.    2020AP1078-FT

§ 632.32(5)(i), which permits it to reduce payment by the amount

the Estate initially received.              We conclude the plain language

of § 632.32(5)(i) establishes that an insurer may reduce its

liability by the recovery of the insured at the time the insurer

enforces     its     reducing     clause.           The      Estate's       obligatory

reimbursement      was   made    pursuant     to     a    "worker's       compensation

law," which § 632.32(5)(i)2. recognizes.                   For these reasons, we

conclude that Secura is not statutorily authorized to reduce its

liability    limits      by     the   gross        worker's       compensation       and

tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but

was   obligated     to   reimburse    in    part.          Accordingly,       Secura's

policy     and     § 632.32(5)(i)     require            Secura     to    provide     an

additional $9,718.73 to the Estate.

      By   the   Court.—The      decision     of    the     court    of    appeals    is

affirmed.

                                       17
                                                                        No.    2020AP1078-FT.rfd

    ¶31     REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.                     (concurring).              If I buy an

$8 sandwich, hand the cashier a $10 bill, and she hands me my

sandwich and $2 in change, how much was she "paid" for the

sandwich?     Eight dollars, of course.                      But according to Secura,

that isn't so clear.                It contends that the Estate of Daniel Huck

was "paid" $250,000 in connection with the accident that caused

Huck's     death,       even        though    the    Estate        ended       up        with       just

$240,281.27       after        it     was     required       by    statute          to       pay     the

$9,718.73 difference back to a workers' compensation insurer.

See generally Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).                          By that same logic, the

cashier in my sandwich example was paid $10, even though she

kept only $8.           I agree with the majority/lead opinion that this

nonsensical result is contrary to the plain meaning of the word

"paid"     and,     therefore,          the      policy's         language.                  I     write

separately,       however,           because     I     reach       that       conclusion             for

different——and in my view, simpler——reasons.

    ¶32     The     language           of     Secura's       policy       is    clear.                It

guaranteed        the     Estate        a     "predetermined,             fixed          level        of
[underinsured motorist coverage]," $250,000, "that is arrived at

by combining payments from all sources."                          Welin v. Am. Fam. Mut.

Ins. Co., 2006 WI 81, ¶49, 292 Wis. 2d 73, 717 N.W.2d 690.                                           The

initial grant of coverage states that Secura will pay damages

the Estate "is legally entitled to recover from the owner or

operator    of    an     underinsured          motor     vehicle        because          of      bodily

injury."     The emphasized terms are defined in the policy, and

one of them——"underinsured motor vehicle"——is relevant here.                                          An
underinsured        motor           vehicle     is     one        "to     which          a       bodily

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                                                             No.      2020AP1078-FT.rfd

injury . . . policy applies at the time of the accident but its

limit for bodily injury liability is . . . [l]ess than the limit

of liability for this [underinsured motor vehicle] coverage."

The limit of liability for Secura's coverage is $250,000, which

Secura "will pay . . . only after the limits of liability under

any bodily injury liability . . . policies have been exhausted

by   payments     of   judgments    or     settlements."         In    other   words,

Secura promised to pay last, after the Estate recovered any

money it was owed for the accident by the tortfeasor or others,

and only if the limits of the tortfeasor's insurance coverage

were less than $250,000.           And all Secura promised to pay was the

difference between the money the Estate recovered from those

other sources and $250,000.           That is spelled out clearly in the

policy's    reducing     clause,     which      decreases   Secura's        limit   of

liability by "all sums" paid by those legally responsible for

the accident or "[p]aid or payable because of the bodily injury

under . . . [w]orkers' compensation law."

      ¶33   The    upshot   of     these       provisions   is     simple.      Every
dollar the Estate is paid either by those legally responsible

for the accident or by workers' compensation reduces Secura's

$250,000 limit of liability by that same amount.                      If the Estate

is paid $250,000 or more by those legally responsible or by

workers' compensation, then Secura owes nothing.                      If not, Secura

makes up the difference up to $250,000.                In any case, the Estate

is guaranteed to end up with at least the predetermined, fixed

amount of coverage it bargained for, $250,000.                      See Welin, 282

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                                                                       No.    2020AP1078-FT.rfd

Wis. 2d 73, ¶49.            Or at least that's what the policy says should

happen.

       ¶34     Secura       argues,      however,       based     on     a     hyper-literal

interpretation         of    the       word    "paid,"    that     the        Estate      should

receive just $240,281.27.                That is because the Estate initially

received       $35,798.04         in    workers'       compensation          payments,      even

though    it    later       had    to   pay     $9,718.73       back     to    the   workers'

compensation insurer according to a statutory formula.                               See Wis.

Stat. § 102.29(1), (giving the workers' compensation insurer a

right to a portion of the proceeds the Estate recovered from the

tortfeasor).       In Secura's view, the Estate was therefore "paid"

the full $35,798.04, even though it netted only $26,079.31 in

the end.

       ¶35     The problem with Secura's interpretation is that when

the policy is read as a whole, the Estate is only "paid" the

money it retains after resolving both its claims against the

tortfeasor       and    any       resulting         obligations        to      the     workers'

compensation insurer.              See Liebovich v. Minn. Ins. Co., 2008 WI
75, ¶27, 310 Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764 (explaining that we

must read insurance policies "as a whole").                            Simply put, it is

not enough if, at one point in time or another, the Estate had

$250,000.       Rather, the policy requires that the Estate end up

with    the    predetermined,            fixed,     final      recovery        of    at    least

$250,000 it bargained for.                    And because Secura's argument would

leave    the    Estate       with       less    than    that     amount,        it   must    be

rejected.

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                                                                   No.    2020AP1078-FT.rfd

      ¶36    This   conclusion       is     confirmed       both    by     the     policy's

language    regarding      workers'       compensation       recoveries           and    by    a

statute     governing      underinsured         motorist     claims.           First,     the

policy's reducing clause lowers Secura's limits of liability by

"all sums . . . [p]aid or payable . . . under . . . [w]orkers'

compensation law."          And as mentioned previously, § 102.29(1)——a

provision     of    workers'        compensation       law——mandates              that    the

workers' compensation insurer receive a portion of the money the

Estate recovered from the tortfeasor.                  Thus, the amount "[p]aid

or payable" under workers' compensation must be determined by

taking into account money the Estate had to pay back to the

workers'    compensation       insurer      under     § 102.29(1).             Only      after

that repayment is made can we know "all sums" the Estate was

"[p]aid."     See also majority/lead op., ¶16 (reaching a similar

conclusion).        Second,     Wis.      Stat.    § 893.43(2)           states    that       an

underinsured motorist claim accrues for statute-of-limitations

purposes    only    after     the   "final       resolution        of    the   underlying

cause of action by the injured party against the tortfeasor."
The final resolution of the underlying cause of action against

the   tortfeasor      is    also     what       triggers     the        injured     party's

obligation under § 102.29(1) to repay a portion of that final

recovery    against     the   tortfeasor         to   the   workers'        compensation

insurer.     For that reason, it makes no sense to calculate the

amounts "paid" to the Estate under Secura's policy before that

point in time, as Secura does.              We only know what the Estate was

"paid," and therefore what Secura owes, once the Estate has
resolved its claim against the tortfeasor and made any necessary

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reimbursement         to    the    workers'       compensation          insurer     under

§ 102.29(1).

     ¶37    In my view, that's all we need to say to resolve this

case.      Despite that, the majority/lead opinion goes further,

unnecessarily         analyzing     a   provision    of     the    policy     that   the

parties    did    not      meaningfully       discuss     in    their     briefs,     see

majority/lead op., ¶¶17-18, and the omnibus statute, Wis. Stat.

§ 632.32(5)(i),        which      regulates      reducing      clauses.       See    id.,

¶¶19-28.     Even though I agree with the majority/lead opinion's

bottom line, I would not reach these issues.                            Accordingly, I

respectfully concur.1

     ¶38    I    am    authorized       to   state   that      Justices      ANN    WALSH

BRADLEY, BRIAN HAGEDORN, and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion.

     1   I join ¶¶1-2, 4-16, and 29 of the majority/lead opinion.

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    ¶39     REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.             (dissenting).

    I remember once I was with [Justice Oliver Wendell
    Holmes, Jr.]; it was Saturday when the Court was to
    confer.   It was before we had a motor car, and we
    jogged along in an old coupé. When we got down to the
    Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as he
    walked off, I said to him:    "Well, sir, goodbye. Do
    justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said: "Come
    here. Come here." I answered: "Oh, I know, I know."
    He replied: "That is not my job. My job is to play
    the game according to the rules."
Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of Liberty

302, 306–07 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960).

    ¶40     This court should resolve this case by considering the

parties' arguments and neutrally applying well-established rules

for interpretating insurance policies.                 Instead, the majority

rejects the parties' contractual agreement in favor of doing

justice in a case involving tragic facts.                     While the results

achieved by the majority's decision may be more palatable, the

resulting injury to the rule of law is anything but just.

    ¶41     Daniel   Keith      Huck     died   from    a     bodily       injury   he

sustained while working for the Village of Mt. Pleasant.                            The
Estate of Huck received about $36,000 in worker's compensation

benefits.       Later,   the    Estate    became    statutorily        required     to

reimburse   a   portion    of   this     payout.       Huck    had    an    insurance

policy with underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage through Secura

Supreme Insurance Company.             The Estate filed a claim.               Secura

and the Estate dispute the amount owed under the policy.                       Secura

relies on the policy's reducing clause, which provides that the

policy's    limits       "shall    be        reduced     by     all        sums . . .
[p]aid . . . because of the bodily injury under . . . [w]orkers'

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compensation      law[.]"        Secura     argues       the    Estate      was   "paid"

$36,000 because Mt. Pleasant's $36,000 financial obligation to

the Estate was discharged when the Estate was provided with the

money.       The Estate does not respond by referencing definitions

of "paid" or relying on grammatical principles.                          Instead, the

Estate primarily argues that siding with Secura would produce an

"absurd result."          That argument is grounded not in law but in

subjective perceptions of justice.

       ¶42    The majority/lead opinion sides with the Estate, but

conspicuously absent from the opinion is any discussion of the

Estate's principal argument.1             Instead, the opinion attempts to

develop a textual analysis that was——at best——underdeveloped by

the    Estate.       This    court   need       not   address    an    underdeveloped

argument, and it should not do so in this case.                       See, e.g., Papa

v.    Wis.   Dep't   of     Health   Servs.,      2020    WI    66,   ¶42    n.15,   393

Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17 (declining to address an underdeveloped

argument).       Although suffering from its own analytical flaws,

Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet's concurrence correctly notes the
majority/lead opinion goes too far by "analyzing a provision of

the policy that the parties did not meaningfully discuss in

their briefs[.]"          Concurrence, ¶37.           While this court has near-

absolute discretion to deviate from the parties' arguments and

often does given its law-development function, the majority/lead

       This court's internal operating procedures explain, "[i]f
       1

. . . the opinion originally circulated as the majority opinion
does not garner the vote of a majority of the court, it shall be
referred to in separate writings as the 'lead opinion[.]'" Wis.
Sup. Ct. IOP III.G.4 (Feb. 28, 2023).

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                                                                         No.   2020AP1078-FT.rgb

opinion does not exercise discretion because it does not explain

its departure from the party presentation principle.                                   See Town

of   Wilson        v.   City       of     Sheboygan,          2020     WI      16,    ¶73,    390

Wis. 2d 266,        938     N.W.2d 493              (Rebecca       Grassl       Bradley,      J.,

concurring).            The       majority/lead              opinion        does      not     even

acknowledge——let           alone        explain——why          it   leaves       the    Estate's

primary argument unaddressed.

     ¶43      In    this     case,        a     persuasive         explanation        would    be

difficult     to    provide.            This        court    granted     the    petition      for

review to address the Estate's primary argument, which the court

of appeals, in a published opinion, held it was compelled by

this court's precedent to adopt.                            See Secura Supreme Ins. v.

Estate   of    Huck,       2021     WI        App    69,     ¶7,   399      Wis. 2d 542,      966

N.W.2d 124.         Specifically, the court of appeals held it was

bound by Teschendorf v. State Farm Insurance Cos., 2006 WI 89,

293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258, in which this court disregarded

the plain meaning of the law in favor of what the court deemed a

more just result.              While a majority of the court could not
coalesce on a rationale, six justices agreed that a "literal"

reading of the law favored the insurer and accordingly deemed it

either absurd or ambiguous in order to decide the case in favor

of a sympathetic plaintiff.                     Id., ¶¶18, 22, 32 (majority/lead

op.).    Notably, in this case court of appeals judge Shelley A.

Grogan wrote a concurrence signaling concern that Teschendorf

required the court of appeals to disregard the plain language of

the insurance policy and Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. (2019–20).2

     2 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019–20 version.
                                3
                                                                      No.    2020AP1078-FT.rgb

See    Secura         Supreme    Ins.,      399       Wis. 2d 542,     ¶21    (Grogan,     J.,

concurring).            As the majority/lead opinion notes, this court

granted      review        of    the   court      of     appeals     decision,      but    the

majority          leaves      that     decision         largely      unreviewed      in    its

opinions.         Majority/lead op., ¶¶1, 9.

       ¶44    Justice Dallet's concurrence, with its references to

allegedly "nonsensical" results, aligns more closely with the

Estate's actual argument, but her concurrence is problematic for

a different reason.              See Concurrence, ¶¶31, 36.                  Justice Dallet

endorses          a    case-deciding         approach        grounded        in    subjective

perceptions of justice at the expense of the rule of law.

       ¶45    Applying the law to the parties' arguments, I conclude

the policy's limits should be reduced by the total amount of

worker's compensation paid, not by the amount ultimately netted

by the Estate.             I further conclude Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.,

which also uses the word "paid," permits such a reduction.                                   I

respectfully dissent.

                                       I.    BACKGROUND
                                  A.    The Tragic Facts

       ¶46    The parties have stipulated to the tragic facts of

this   case.           Huck     was    struck     by     a   negligently      driven      motor

vehicle while employed as a utility worker for Mt. Pleasant.

Huck died as a result.                   The Estate received about $36,000 in

worker's compensation benefits.                       After that, the Estate settled

with the negligent driver's insurance company for the policy

limits       of       $25,000.         Additionally,          Wis.    Stat.       § 102.49(5)
required Mt. Pleasant to pay $20,000 to the state treasury for

                                                  4
                                                                No.    2020AP1078-FT.rgb

the   benefit     of    the    Work    Injury       Supplemental      Benefits    Fund.

Under § 102.29,          the Estate      was obligated to             reimburse about

$10,000 of the worker's compensation benefits to the worker's

compensation           carrier        using        the     settlement         proceeds.

Accordingly,       the        Estate     received          $36,000      in     worker's

compensation benefits, but the Estate netted only about $26,000.

Huck's insurance policy with Secura provided UIM coverage with

limits of $250,000; the damages exceed those limits.                         The Estate

made a claim under the policy.

                              B.   The Reducing Clause

      ¶47   The        parties     calculate         the    amount      Secura     owes

differently, based on different readings of the reducing clause,

which provides:

      B. Reducing Clause:              The limit of liability shall be
      reduced by all sums:

            1. Paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf
               of persons or organizations who may be legally
               responsible. . . .

            2. Paid or payable because of the bodily injury
               under any of the following or similar laws:

                   a. Workers' compensation law[.]
The parties dispute only the amount of reduction for worker's

compensation benefits.             Secura argues for a $36,000 reduction——

the amount the Estate received under worker's compensation law——

while the Estate argues the reduction should be only $26,000

because the Estate had to reimburse the worker's compensation

carrier approximately $10,000.                    The parties agree the $25,000

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                                                                      No.    2020AP1078-FT.rgb

settlement reduces the limits.3                     They also agree the $20,000

payment          by    Mt. Pleasant    to    the    Fund       does    not     trigger      the

reducing clause.              Accordingly, the parties calculate the amount

owed under the policy as follows:

                       Secura                                    The Estate

       $250,000 (the limit of                            $250,000 (the limit of
             liability)                                        liability)

    −$36,000 (the amount of                           −$26,000 (the amount of
worker's compensation received)                    worker's compensation netted)

−$25,000 (from the settlement)                     −$25,000 (from the settlement)

                  = $189,000                                     = $199,000
       ¶48        Notably,      the   language      of    the    reducing          clause    is

materially similar to the language of Wis. Stat. § 632.32, also

known       as    the     "Omnibus    Statute"      because,      as        this   court    has

explained, "it sets the minimum requirements all motor vehicle

insurance policies in Wisconsin must satisfy."                               Brey v. State

Farm       Mut.       Auto.   Ins.,   2022   WI 7,       ¶5,    400    Wis. 2d 417,         970

N.W.2d 1.             Subsection (5)(i)2. provides:

       (i) A policy may provide that the limits under the
           policy   for   uninsured   motorist   coverage   or
           underinsured motorist coverage for bodily injury or
           death resulting from any one accident shall be
           reduced by any of the following that apply:

                  . . . .

       The Estate notes the parties agree that "[t]he UIM
       3

reducing clause permitted reduction of the $250,000 UIM limits
by the $25,000 recovered from the tortfeasor and the $26,079.31
net benefits paid by the worker's compensation carrier."    The
parties "part[] ways" over the $10,000 of worker's compensation
benefits that was "repaid[.]"

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                                                              No.   2020AP1078-FT.rgb

            2.    Amounts paid or payable             under   any    worker's
                  compensation law.
The operative effect of the reducing clause must be permissible

under § 632.32(5)(i)2.

                            C.    The Procedural History

    ¶49     This       case's         procedural   history       demonstrates     the

parties focused on the applicability of Teschendorf.                          Secura

sought from the circuit court a declaration stating it owed only

$189,000,   and       the     Estate    counterclaimed.       The   circuit     court

sided with the Estate.

    ¶50     Secura appealed, and the Estate's argument in response

focused mainly on this court's decision in                       Teschendorf.      It

framed the sole issue on appeal as follows:

    In Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 2006 WI
    89, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258, a statutorily-
    permitted reducing clause was declared impermissible
    when used to reduce underinsured motorists . . .
    limits by sums paid not to the insured, but to a state
    fund . . . . Does a reducing clause permitted by Wis.
    Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), reducing UIM limits by "all sums
    . . . [p]aid or payable because of the bodily injury
    under . . . [w]orker's compensation law," become
    impermissible where the worker's compensation insurer
    has been reimbursed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29,
    precluding double recovery by the insured?[4]

    Answered by the Circuit Court:                 Yes.
(Third and fourth ellipsis and modifications in the original.)

    ¶51     The       court      of   appeals   affirmed   the    circuit   court's

decision    in    a    published       opinion.     Secura    Supreme    Ins.,    399

Wis. 2d 542 (majority op.).                The court of appeals accepted the

    4  Although this issue statement claims Teschendorf was about
UIM coverage, the case was actually about uninsured motorist
coverage. See infra Section III.B.

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                                                                  No.    2020AP1078-FT.rgb

Estate's     framing,      concluding,         "[t]he       court       in    Teschendorf

squarely rejected the literal reading of the reducing clause

Secura    proposes    here."        Id.,       ¶10     (citing      Teschendorf,      293

Wis. 2d 542, ¶¶22, 24, 44).              The majority opinion of the court

of appeals cites Teschendorf more than 30 times, demonstrating

its   centrality     in     the   reasoning       of       the    court      below.    In

concurrence, Judge Grogan wrote, "[o]n a clean slate, Secura's

textual argument may not have been so swiftly dismissed, but our

supreme court foreclosed it in Teschendorf."                        Id., ¶21 (Grogan,

J., concurring).

      ¶52    Secura filed a petition for review.                          It explicitly

argued    "Teschendorf      is    ripe   for     reexamination           to——at   least——

clarify     the   proper    analysis      [to]       the    lower       courts[.]"     In

response, the Estate professed this case does not present a

novel question of law given Teschendorf.                     The Estate framed the

issue in much the same way that it had framed the issue before

the court of appeals:

      Words in statutes and insurance policies are given a
      meaning which avoids absurd or unreasonable results,
      or results clearly at odds with the legislature's
      purpose. . . .   Can an insurer reduce its [UIM]
      coverage limits by sums neither its insured nor his
      workers compensation insurer recovered because its
      policy contains a reducing clause deducting "all
      sums . . . [p]aid or payable because of the bodily
      injury under . . . [w]orker's compensation law"?
(Second and third ellipsis and second and third modifications in

the original.)        The Estate argued              Teschendorf should not be

reexamined because the absurd results canon has been "repeatedly
applied"    in    various    contexts——not           just    in    Teschendorf.        It

claimed this case would be a mere "rehash[ing]" of the "same
                                          8
                                                                     No.   2020AP1078-FT.rgb

principles"      applied    in    Teschendorf           and    several      other       cases.

This court granted Secura's petition.

                           D.    The Parties' Briefing

       ¶53    The focus on Teschendorf continued in the briefing.

Secura argues the case does not need to be overruled but should

be limited to its extreme facts (discussed more in Part III).

The Estate argues the court of appeals was correct to "center"

its analysis on Teschendorf, declaring the analysis "spot on."

Similarly, the Estate claims this case does not raise an issue

of "first impression" because, in its view, "the issue raised is

very similar to that addressed in Teschendorf[.]"                                The Estate

continues,      "Teschendorf       . . .     require[s]             that   the     appellate

court's decision be affirmed."                   The Estate opens its brief by

noting,      "Wisconsin    courts      reject         interpretations         of    statutes

that   produce    results       contrary         to    the    statute's       purpose      and

common    sense."        (Citation     omitted.)              The    Estate      also    makes

passing      reference    to    the    principle         that       statutes     should     be

construed       in       harmony,        grounding             this        argument         in
consequentialism.         The Estate argues, "[a]s the court of appeals

correctly      explained,        Secura's         argument——that            the         workers

compensation was 'paid' to the insured but ignoring that that

sum had been reimbursed to the workers compensation insurer——

'defies      common   sense      and   the       fundamental         purpose       of    [UIM]

insurance      coverage[.]'"           Quoting         Secura       Supreme      Ins.,     399

Wis. 2d 542, ¶17 (majority op.).                  Claiming a purported ambiguity

in the policy, the Estate argues this court must affirm the
decision of the court of appeals because "[t]o hold otherwise

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would create an absurd result[.]"                  Regardless of how the Estate

frames its arguments, every contention advanced by the Estate

rests on the absurd results canon.

      ¶54   In   contrast,      Secura    offers       a    fully-developed          plain

language argument in response to the Estate's emphasis on the

purported    absurdity     of    the     results       Secura's       plain    language

interpretation       may   yield.             Secura       references      dictionary

definitions to support its interpretation of "paid," some of

which have been adopted by Wisconsin courts in other contexts.

See, e.g., Danbeck v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins., 2000 WI App 26, ¶9,

232 Wis. 2d 417, 605 N.W.2d 925 (noting "payment" is defined as

"1:   the act of paying or giving compensation : the discharge of

a debt or an obligation . . . 2:                     something that is paid :

something given to discharge a debt or obligation or to fulfill

a promise" (quoting Payment, Webster's Third New International

Dictionary (1993)) (ellipsis in the original)).

      ¶55   In    contrast,       the      Estate          references         dictionary

definitions      once——for      the      word       "reimburse"——which           appears
nowhere in the relevant language of the policy or the Omnibus

Statute.5     Apparently, the Estate means to suggest that money

reimbursed has not been "paid," but even the language the Estate

uses to describe the facts of this case presupposes the Estate

was, in fact, paid.          For example, the Estate writes, "[t]he

parties     parted    ways . . . as           to     Secura's     denial        of    the

[E]state's claim to the extent of the . . . [disputed amount]

      5The brief also contains a reference to Black's Law
Dictionary, within a block quote of another source, but the
definition is for the word "insurance."

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repaid to the workers compensation carrier."                        (Emphasis added.)

An amount can be "repaid" only if it in fact has been "paid."

       ¶56    In     attempting      to     illustrate       the    meaning           of    this

utterly      plain       word,    Justice    Dallet's      sandwich            shop    analogy

suffers      from    a    basic    mathematical       error.             She    begins          her

concurrence        with    the    following       scenario:        "If     I     buy       an   $8

sandwich, hand the cashier a $10 bill, and she hands me my

sandwich and $2 in change, how much was she 'paid' for the

sandwich?      Eight dollars, of course.                  But according to Secura,

this isn't so clear."              Concurrence, ¶31.           This simple analogy

fails    because      Justice      Dallet     did   not    incur     a     $10    financial

obligation——only an $8 one.                 The moment she handed $10 to the

cashier, she satisfied her obligation to pay for the sandwich,

but the cashier immediately incurred an obligation to give back

$2.     In this case, the worker's compensation carrier incurred a

$36,000      financial      obligation,       which    was    satisfied           when      that

amount was paid to the Estate.                 Had the carrier incurred a mere

$26,000 obligation but inadvertently sent the Estate a check for
$36,000, perhaps Justice Dallet's analogy would be relevant.                                     In

this case, however, the carrier used exact change.                              Even though

the law later compelled a reimbursement, had the carrier paid

only    $26,000       initially,      it     would     not    have        fulfilled             its

obligation.           Perhaps       textual       arguments        may     exist       for       a

definition of "paid" favoring the Estate, but Justice Dallet

offers none.

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                               II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶57   This     case      requires       this     court   to    interpret       an

insurance policy.          The interpretation of a policy is a question

of    law,   subject      to    independent       review.       Talley      v.   Mustafa

Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, ¶13, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55 (citing

Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins., 2016 WI 54,

¶12, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285).

       ¶58   Contrary to the majority, the policy language compels

a reduction by the total amount of worker's compensation paid to

the Estate.         Accordingly, I must determine whether Wis. Stat.

§ 632.32(5)(i)2.           permits      such      a     reduction.           Statutory

interpretation, like policy interpretation, presents a question

of law subject to this court's independent review.                          Water Well

Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc., 369 Wis. 2d 607, ¶12 (citing Estate of

Sustache     v.     Am.    Family     Mut.     Ins.,    2008    WI    87,    ¶18,    311

Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845).

                                     III.    ANALYSIS

 A.    The Consequence of the Majority/Lead Opinion not Reviewing
                    the Court of Appeals Decision
       ¶59   The majority/lead opinion correctly notes this court

granted review of a court of appeals decision; however, it does

not review it.            In a published opinion, the court of appeals

decided it was bound by Teschendorf.                   By affirming the court of

appeals without reviewing its decision, the majority preserves

the court of appeals opinion as binding precedent.                       Although the

majority affirms the decision on a different basis, it does not
expressly——or even impliedly——signal that the opinion below does

not retain its precedential value.                    Consequently, the court of
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appeals will understand itself to be bound by that opinion.                 See

State v. Schmidt, 2016 WI App 45, ¶48 n.11, 370 Wis. 2d 139, 884

N.W.2d 510 (citing Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins., 2010 WI 78,

¶44, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78).            See generally Wis. Mfrs.

& Com. v. Evers, 2023 WI 5, ¶2, 405 Wis. 2d 478, 984 N.W.2d 402

(per curiam) (noting that while this court has not addressed the

issue directly, when this court affirms a published opinion of

the    court   of   appeals,       on   different   grounds     but   without

suggesting its rationale was incorrect, the court of appeals

opinion remains binding precedent).            At a minimum, the majority

should withdraw the precedential status of the opinion below.

               B.   This Court's Decision in Teschendorf

      ¶60   If the majority had reviewed the decision of the court

of appeals, it would need to revisit Teschendorf, on which the

Estate's argument continues to heavily rely.             Although no less

tragic, the facts of Teschendorf are quite different than the

facts of this case.        A man died while acting in the scope of his

employment after an uninsured motor vehicle struck a car in
which the man was riding.            293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶3 (majority op.).

In    accordance    with    Wis.    Stat.    § 102.49(5)(b)    (2001–02),    a

portion of worker's compensation benefits were paid to the Fund,

but none were paid to the man's estate because he was single and

had no dependents.         Id.     Of the approximately $174,000 paid in

worker's compensation benefits, $159,000 went to the Fund, and

the rest went to recipients other than the man's estate.                    Id.

The man had a policy providing uninsured motorist coverage, with
limits of $150,000.        Id., ¶4.      The insurer argued the reducing

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clause operated to change the limits to $0 because more than

$150,000 had been paid in worker's compensation benefits.                     Id.,

¶5.

       ¶61   The   issue   in     Teschendorf       was    whether   Wis.     Stat.

§ 632.32(5)(i)2. (2001–02) prohibited reducing the limits by the

$159,000 paid to the Fund.             Although this court resolved the

issue, it was divided on the rationale.               Public policy pervaded

each member's reasoning.

       ¶62   This court held Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. prohibited

the reduction; however, it was split into two factions.                        The

first faction, which has been subsequently called the "absurdity

faction,"     consisted      of     three    justices      who    concluded    the

statutory language unambiguously did not prohibit the reduction

but determined the result of applying the unambiguous language

would be absurd.       Id., ¶18 & n.8.           They first recognized the

plain meaning of the reducing clause:

       There is no ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.
       The statute says that policy limits may be reduced by
       "amounts   paid   or   payable   under   any  worker's
       compensation law."     The clause "amounts paid or
       payable" is not qualified and unambiguously brings
       within its scope payments made to the insured or to
       any other person or entity, provided that the payment
       was made under any worker's compensation law.
Id.,   ¶30   (lead   op.);    see    also    id.,    ¶18   n.8    (majority   op.)

(explaining the absurdity faction "believe[d] that the meaning

of the statute is plain, but the results produced by the plain

meaning are absurd").             These justices      declined to apply the

plain meaning, however, because in their view "the results that
follow are so unreasonable . . . that they require the plain

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meaning to be rejected."             Id., ¶18 (majority op.).             Accordingly,

these justices "construe[d] the statute to avoid that result."

Id., ¶32 (lead op.) (citing State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶15,

259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416).              Defying a fundamental canon of

construction, they opted to read the words "to the insured" into

the statute after the words "amounts paid or payable[.]"                               Id.,

¶31.     These justices expressly acknowledged the qualifier "to

the insured" "is not present in the text of the statute" and its

plain meaning "allows policy limits to be reduced regardless of

to     whom     worker's    compensation        benefits     are        made."         Id.

Nevertheless,        to    protect    "injured     persons,"           they    opted    to

rewrite       the   statute,    openly   discarding       what    they        (correctly)

understood to be the plain meaning of the words chosen by the

legislature.        Id., ¶38.

       ¶63     The second group, known as the "ambiguity faction,"

consisted of three justices who agreed the statute was ambiguous

and who resolved the ambiguity in favor of the insured.                                Id.,

¶18 (majority op.).            Like the absurdity faction, they conceded
the plain meaning of the statute:

       The literal reading of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.
       favored by [the insurer] permits the conclusion that
       an insurer may reduce uninsured motorist limits by the
       amount of worker's compensation payments made to
       anyone.    Subsection (5)(i)2. contains no qualifying
       language specifying to whom the payments must be made;
       payments could be made to the insured, to the Fund, or
       to anyone.
Id., ¶22 (lead op.).           This faction noted the insurer's "literal

interpretation"        could    reduce    the    limits    to     $0.          Id.,    ¶28.
Finding that result unpalatable, these justices read into the

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statute      "an    implicit      condition        that      the     insurer    may    reduce

uninsured       motorist      benefits      only       by    the     amount    of    worker's

compensation payments made to or on behalf of the insured."

Id., ¶23.          This implicit condition was supported, the three

claimed, by § 632.32(4) (2001–02), which required that every

motor     vehicle         insurance      policy        include       uninsured       motorist

coverage.          Id.,    ¶24.       Under      the    ambiguity        faction's     extra-

textual      reasoning,      "[t]he      consistent          leading       purpose    of   this

statutory scheme is to require that insurers provide uninsured

motorist coverage for the protection of their insureds," while

"the subordinate purpose is to minimize the insurers' exposure

by     allowing     insurers        to     limit       the     protection       offered     by

uninsured      motorist      coverage       to     a   fixed,       predetermined      amount

that    takes      into    account       payments       from       specified    sources[.]"

Id., ¶27.          According to the ambiguity faction, the purported

"leading      purpose"      would     be    defeated         if    not   for   the    read-in

implicit condition.

       ¶64    The    two     factions       achieved         their       desired     result——
defeating the contractual reduction——after joining together in a

lengthy      discussion      of   legislative          history       and    public    policy,

rather than text.              Id.,      ¶¶44–62       (majority op.).             Then-Chief

Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson concurred with the mandate but

joined neither the absurdity faction nor the ambiguity faction.

Id., ¶66 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

  C.    Evaluating the Parties' Arguments:                        Teschendorf's Limited
                                Reach
       ¶65    In this case, the parties' arguments primarily address

the reach of Teschendorf and, more generally, the absurd results
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canon.       Secura does not ask this court to overturn Teschendorf.

In fact, it concedes the reducing clause may not be read to

cause a subtraction from the limits for the $20,000 paid to the

Fund——because        of    Teschendorf.             Instead,        Secura    simply      argues

that    Teschendorf        does    not    apply          to   the   $10,000        in   worker's

compensation benefits, which were paid to the Estate and later

repaid.      Secura asserts the court of appeals erred in extending

Teschendorf too far.            In contrast, the Estate argues Teschendorf

should be the focal point of this court's analysis and prohibits

the reduction at issue.

       ¶66    As a preliminary matter, Secura argues Teschendorf is

largely "non-binding" because no majority agreed on a rationale,

citing      State    v.    Elam,    195       Wis. 2d 683,          685,     538    N.W.2d 249

(1995) (per curiam).              In Elam, this court explained that "[a]

general principle of appellate practice is that a majority of

the participating judges must have agreed on a particular point

for it to be considered the opinion of the court."                                 Id. (citing

State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194–95, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984)
(per curiam)).           Critically, no majority in Teschendorf held the

particular      result      absurd,       and       no    majority     held    the      statute

ambiguous——a majority formed almost exclusively on a discussion

of legislative history and public policy.                             As this court has

explained, a dearth of overlap between rationales on which a

mandate was based is "troublesome."                       Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI

76,    ¶8    n.5,    387   Wis. 2d 552,         929       N.W.2d 600.         Teschendorf's

application         to   this   case     is     a    prime     example:            In   applying
Teschendorf, how much weight should this court place on its

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specific    facts   and    the    purported     absurdity       of   the    insurer's

proffered interpretation?           The lack of a majority rationale in

Teschendorf     provides     sufficient        justification         to    limit    the

decision's application to its extreme facts because determining

how   Teschendorf    applies       to   even    a    slightly    different         fact-

pattern is difficult.            See Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of

Judicial Precedent 198–99 (2016).              See generally Johnson v. Wis.

Elections     Comm'n,     2022     WI   14,    ¶243,    400     Wis. 2d 626,        971

N.W.2d 402 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting), summarily

rev'd sub. nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595

U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (per curiam) (explaining this court

does not follow the so-called "Marks rule," pursuant to which a

legal rule may be precedential even if its rationale was not

adopted by a majority).

      ¶67   Although      noting    this      divide,   Secura       restricts      its

argument to attacking the rationale advanced by the ambiguity

faction in Teschendorf, because the absurdity faction's analysis

would not extend to the significantly less extreme facts of this
case.   In contrast to Teschendorf, the Estate in fact receives

insurance     proceeds     approaching         the   policy     limit,      and     the

variance between the parties' positions approximates $10,000.

Secura asserts "the only way the [a]mbiguity [f]action could

find an alternative to the 'literal' meaning [wa]s by adding a

qualification into the statute . . . that is simply not there."

(Citation omitted.)        Judges may not, however, either add words

to or subtract words from the text of the law.                        See State v.
Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶24, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271 ("It is a

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cardinal 'maxim[] of statutory construction . . . that courts

should    not       add     words      to     a     statute        to       give     it    a   certain

meaning.'"          (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387

Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 129) (modification in the original)).

As Judge Grogan explained in her concurrence, the text of the

law does not state "the 'payment' must be made to the insured"

even though this court in Teschendorf so held.                                      Secura Supreme

Ins.,    399       Wis. 2d 542,        ¶21     (Grogan,          J.,     concurring)           (quoting

Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins., 2005 WI App 10, ¶¶19-20, 278

Wis. 2d 354,         691     N.W.2d 882             (2004)        (Fine,       J.,        dissenting),

aff'd, 293 Wis. 2d 123).                 Nor, as Judge Grogan also noted, does

the text "address what happens after a worker's compensation

payment is made but is subsequently partially paid back, which

is the factual scenario presented in this case."                                    Id.     Secura is

correct to argue the ambiguity faction's rationale should be

rejected; it is antithetical to fundamental rules of textual

interpretation.

     ¶68       In     effect,          the        ambiguity           faction        searched      for
ambiguity,          which       this     court           has      repeatedly          rejected      as

inappropriate.            See, e.g., Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. Div. of

Hearings       &    Appeals,      2019       WI 109,           ¶18,     389    Wis. 2d 486,        936

N.W.2d 573         ("We    do    not,    however,           look      for     ambiguity        because

'[s]tatutory          interpretation               involves           the     ascertainment         of

meaning, not a search for ambiguity.'"                                (quoting State ex rel.

Kalal    v.        Cir.    Ct.    for        Dane        Cnty.,       2004     WI 58,       ¶47,   271

Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110) (modification in the original)).                                        A
good lawyer can render a sentence as straightforward as "the sky

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is blue" ambiguous if he stares at it long enough; perhaps the

sky is just sad.            Merely because the argument can be made that

the sky is sad does not mean a reasonable person would actually

ascribe     that     meaning         to       the        sentence    "the       sky    is     blue."

Ambiguity     must     be     facially              present     in    a     statute,        and     it

certainly    does     not    come         into       existence       merely      because       three

justices are troubled by a result dictated by plain meaning.

See   Antonin      Scalia        &    Bryan         A.     Garner,     Reading        Law:         The

Interpretation       of     Legal         Texts      174     (2012)    ("A       provision        that

seems to the court unjust or unfortunate . . . must nonetheless

be given effect.").

      ¶69    While the court in Teschendorf agreed on very little,

it should disturb this court that six justices acknowledged a

"literal" reading of the statute supported the insurer.                                           293

Wis. 2d 123, ¶¶24, 32 (lead op.).                             A literal reading is not

necessarily     the    same          as   a    plain        reading,      but    the    absurdity

faction noted the insurer's reading was not only "literal" but

"plain[.]"      Id., ¶32.            See generally Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶11
(explaining "the plain-meaning approach is not 'literalistic'"

(quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52)).                             Self-evidently, a plain

meaning cannot be ignored by merely labelling it literal, as the

ambiguity faction did in discarding it.

      ¶70    The ambiguity faction's addition of what it deemed an

"implied condition" is reminiscent of a time when "the monarch

. . . [was considered by some] a one-man legislator."                                   Scalia &

Garner,     Reading       Law,       at    349.           Centuries       ago,    one       treatise

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embraced    judicial    law-making         in   an    early    exposition      of        the

usefulness of divining legislative intent:

       [I]n order to form a right judgment when the letter of
       a statute is restrained, and when enlarged, by equity,
       it is a good way, when you peruse a statute, to
       suppose that the lawmaker is present, and that you
       have asked him the question you want to know touching
       the equity; then you must give yourself such an answer
       as you imagine he would have done, if he had been
       present . . . .    And if the lawmaker would have
       followed the equity, notwithstanding the words of the
       law . . . , you may safely do the like.
Edmund Plowden, Note to Eyston v. Studd, (1574) 2 Plow. 459a,

467,   as   reprinted   in    Scalia       &    Garner,      Reading    Law,    at       349

(ellipses in the original).                Centuries later, the people of

Wisconsin    vested     the    law-making            power     exclusively          in     a

representative body of the people.                   See Wis. Const. art. IV,

§ 1.    To ask what the king would want may yield an answer, but

to divine what hundreds of legislators would want is impossible.

See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 349.                     Collective intent is

nothing more than a "fiction" because each legislator has his

own "subjective views[.]"        Id. at 392; see also Town of Wilson,
390 Wis. 2d 266, ¶68 ("Crafting judicial doctrines based on the

collective intent of a large body relies on the false premise

that a deliberative body acts with a single purpose."                          (citing

John W. MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in

Present Day Law Practice, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1950))).

Additionally, to ask the latter has the potential to invite

"judicial    mischief,"      Scalia    &       Garner,    Reading      Law,    at    350,

because "judicial predictions of how the legislature would have
decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little

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more than wild guesses, and thus lack the legitimacy that might

be accorded to astute guesses."                         Frank Easterbrook, Statutes'

Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 548 (1983).

       ¶71        While members of the judiciary may have valid and good

ideas for improving the law, the people deny us the authority to

make such policy decisions, having vested the law-making power

exclusively          in    the    legislature.               The     desirability             of    such

"improvements" undoubtedly depends on how one may be affected by

the     rewritten         law.          "Although           judges        may     profess          well-

intentioned             justification             for         'improving'               the         law,

'interpretative            approaches        can       be     used        for     all      kinds      of

purposes, not just beneficent ones.'"                              Friends of Frame Park,

U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶96, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976

N.W.2d 263         (Rebecca       Grassl     Bradley,         J.,     concurring)            (quoting

Bryan        A.     Garner,       Old-Fashioned             Textualism           Is     All        About

Interpretation, Not Legislating from the Bench, ABA J., Apr.

2019).        "The people of Wisconsin elect judges to interpret the

law, not make it."               Id.
       ¶72        The   ambiguity       faction's       rationale           was       nothing       more

than     a        dangerous       "venture"        down       the     "path           of      judicial

legislation" to reach a result deemed "desirable[.]"                                       See State

ex rel. Crow v. West Side St. Ry. Co., 47 S.W. 959, 961 (1898).

Such an action aggregates law-making power to the judiciary,

thereby       consolidating            in   one   branch       governmental             powers       the

people deliberately kept separate to avoid tyranny.                                        See League

of    Women       Voters    of     Wis.      v.    Evers,          2019    WI     75,       ¶35,     387
Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209.

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       ¶73     After    attacking        its    rationale,        Secura       suggests   the

absurdity faction may have framed the case correctly, but would

limit the reach of the absurdity doctrine to a "truly anomalous"

situation      identified         after    an       "exacting      analysis."        Secura

points out, "[h]ad the insurer prevailed in Teschendorf, the

insured's          estate   would       have    received         nothing       because    the

employer's payments exceeded the . . . limits."                                In contrast,

the Estate would receive just about five percent less if this

court adopted Secura's argument.                     The Estate counters that Huck

bargained      for     a    "predetermined,           fixed      level    of    coverage"——

$250,000——and Secura's interpretation of the policy would deny

the Estate the benefit of Huck's bargain, a result it declares

"absurd."

       ¶74     A     historical        analysis       of   the     absurdity       doctrine

supports Secura's argument that even if the absurdity faction in

Teschendorf was correct (it wasn't), that faction's rationale

does     not       extend    to     this       case.          Defining     absurdity      is

challenging, but two "archetypal" examples of an absurd result
exist in common law.              Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the

Limits of Literalism:              Defining the Absurd Result Principle in

Statutory Interpretation, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 127, 139 (1994).

One scholar wrote that these two examples are "the nearest thing

we have to a legal definition of absurdity."                        Id.     Both examples

developed in the context of statutory interpretation, but the

absurd    results       canon     is    materially         the    same    as    applied   in

contract interpretation.                The examples were summarized and the

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absurd    results     canon     applied    long    ago   by   the   United   States

Supreme Court in the following oft-quoted passage:

      The common sense of man approves the judgment
      mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which
      enacted, 'that whoever drew blood in the streets
      should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not
      extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person
      that fell down in the street in a fit.        The same
      common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden,
      that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a
      prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony,
      does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the
      prison is on fire——'for he is not to be hanged because
      he would not stay to be burnt.'    And we think that a
      like common sense will sanction the ruling we make,
      that   the  act   of   Congress   which  punishes  the
      obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail,
      or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of
      temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest
      of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868).

      ¶75    To   equate     the      Estate   receiving    $189,000    instead    of

$199,000 with the two archetypal examples of absurdity would be,

well, absurd.       The two examples are qualitatively different than

the   Estate's      received     insurance      proceeds.        History   tells   us

punishing a person for trying to preserve life would work a
grievous moral injustice.              Punishing a doctor who provides life-

saving care or a prisoner who escapes a burning prison would not

violate only common sense——it would violate natural law.                      See 1

William Blackstone, Commentaries *129 ("THE right of personal

security     consists      in      a    person's    legal     and    uninterrupted

enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his

reputation."); see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All people are
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent

rights;     among    these      are    life, liberty       and    the   pursuit    of
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happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted,

deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").

Punishing a mail carrier for temporarily detaining mail while

the carrier was detained by the State would be Kafkaesque and

contrary to the common law tradition of prohibiting punishment

for involuntary acts.           See actus reus, Black's Law Dictionary

(11 ed. 2019).

    ¶76      The two archetypal examples demonstrate "the absurd

. . . results canon applies only rarely and in rather narrow

circumstances[.]"       Container Life Cycle Mgmt., LLC v. Wis. Dep't

of Nat. Res., 2022 WI 45, ¶79, 402 Wis. 2d 337, 975 N.W.2d 621

(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).                "Just because a court

dislikes the outcome does not mean it is absurd."                    Id. (quoting

Schwab v. Schwab, 2021 WI 67, ¶44 n.1, 397 Wis. 2d 820, 961

N.W.2d 56 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)).                       Properly

understood,    absurdity    is    not     about   "practical[ity]"        or   "fit"

because    "people     differ    over     what    is   sensible     and    what   is

desirable," which is why "we elect those who write our laws——and
expect courts to observe what has been written."                          Backus v.

Waukesha     County,    2022     WI     55,   ¶26,     402    Wis. 2d 764,        976

N.W.2d 492      (Rebecca         Grassl       Bradley,       J.,      dissenting)

(modification in the original) (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading

Law, at 22).     An absurd result "consists of a disposition that

no reasonable person could intend."                Scalia & Garner, Reading

Law, at 237.

    ¶77      Justice Joseph Story described the extraordinary facts
necessary to disregard plain language to avoid absurdity:

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      [I]f,   in   any  case,  the  plain  meaning   of  a
      provision . . . is to be disregarded, because we
      believe the framers of that instrument could not
      intend what they say, it must be one, where the
      absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to
      the case would be so monstrous, that all mankind
      would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the
      application.
1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United

States § 427 (1833).        The Estate's primary argument would have

this court lower the threshold for application of the absurdity

doctrine from "monstrous" to merely unfavorable.            In ruling for
the   Estate,    the     majority   implicitly   endorses     a   new   rule

declaring   that   when    happenstance——i.e.,   an   event   outside    the

control of the insured——reduces the "predetermined, fixed level

of coverage," the result is legally absurd, justifying judicial

revision of the insurance contract.

      ¶78   If results are to drive interpretation of insurance

policies, the majority should consider the consequent increase

in insurance premiums, which alone demonstrates that the effect

of Secura's proffered interpretation is not "so monstrous, that

all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the

application."      Id.     In its discussion of the absurd results

canon, a leading treatise on Wisconsin insurance law repeats the

maxim, "an insurance company should not be bound to risks it did

not contemplate and for which it did not receive a premium."               1

Sheila M. Sullivan, Anderson on Wisconsin Insurance Law § 1.34

(8th ed. 2022).        "[W]hen the terms of a policy are plain on

their face, the policy should not be rewritten . . . to bind the
insurer to a risk it was unwilling to cover, and for which it

was not paid."     Olguin v. Allstate Ins., 71 Wis. 2d 160, 164–65,
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237   N.W.2d 694     (1976).        Happenstance   often    plays    a    role   in

determining how a policy applies.              Ambiguity in a policy is

almost always resolved against an insurer, but if unambiguous

policy provisions can also be interpreted against an insurer

whenever judges think the language would produce unfair results,

insurers are left with increased risk uncertainty and will price

their policies accordingly.6

      ¶79    As amicus Wisconsin Insurance Alliance et al. (WIA)

explains:       "Insurers underwrite and issue policies in belief

that policies – and the statutes with which the policies must

comply – will be interpreted and enforced as written.                    Deviating

from this precept injects uncertainty and additional costs into

an    already     heavily-regulated      industry."        Reducing       clauses,

especially, "are valued by insurers because they serve to reduce

the   cost   of    premiums    to    policyholders."       Therefore,      "[t]he

decision below fosters confusion and undue complexity and will

      6Usually, this court has interpreted ambiguity against an
insurer.   See, e.g., Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 2016, WI 53,
¶42, 369 Wis. 2d 547, 881 N.W.2d 309 (citing Estate of Sustache
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2008 WI 87, ¶21, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751
N.W.2d 845). In at least one case, however, this court used the
absurd results canon to side with the insurer's interpretation
of an ambiguous policy provision.    Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins., 6
Wis. 2d 53, 57–58, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959) ("Even though the policy
provision is ambiguous and must be construed against the
insurer, the unreasonable result should be avoided of so
construing the medical payments clause of defendant's policy as
to permit the injured person to recover for medical or hospital
services supplied to him by some third party volunteer without
cost or personal liability to pay therefor on the part of such
injured person.").      That case demonstrates the possible
"absurdity"——if that word will be used so loosely——of holding
insurers liable for risks never contemplated and for which no
premium has been paid.

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harm insurers and consumers by placing upward pressure on the

cost of insurance."

       ¶80    Lowering the threshold for absurdity would effect a

substantial change in the law.                       The purpose of UIM coverage is

to "substitute[] for insurance that the tortfeasor should have

had."         Teschendorf,       293        Wis. 2d 542,             ¶24         (quoted     source

omitted).          Had   Huck   been       hit       by    a   negligently-driven             motor

vehicle that was not underinsured (i.e., by a vehicle covered

under a policy with $250,000 limits), the Estate would have

received about $10,000 less than it would receive in this case

under    Secura's        proffered     reading.                But   for     the     negligently

driven    motor     vehicle     being       underinsured,             the        reducing    clause

would    have      no    relevance.             The       Estate     would        have     received

$250,000      in    settlement,       plus       a    $36,000        payment        of     worker's

compensation        benefits,        for    a    total         of    $286,000.           Wisconsin

Statute § 102.29(1), however, would have required the Estate to

refund       the   $36,000      in    total.              Additionally,            the     worker's

compensation carrier would have been entitled to $20,000 of the
settlement         under     Wis.      Stat.          § 102.29(2).                  After     these

statutorily-required deductions, the Estate would have received

only    $230,000.          Accordingly,          Secura        accurately          notes,     "Huck

purchased UIM insurance to protect against being injured by a

tortfeasor with liability limits less than $250,000. . . .                                     [The

Estate]       received      exactly        that——and           more——since           the     Estate

recovered      more      than   if    the       tortfeasor           had    been     insured     to

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$250,000."7         The Estate has no response to this fact.                       As Secura

accurately observes, under a plain language interpretation of

the policy, "the Estate's recovery is greater than zero——already

distinguishing this case from Teschendorf——and more than if the

tortfeasor had liability limits of $250,000."

       ¶81     Expanding      the    absurd     results      canon      to    override       the

text       whenever      judges    deem   the      results    "nonsensical,"            as   the

Estate would have it, would unsettle the reasonable expectations

of contracting parties, not to mention leave the law vulnerable

to   judicial       revision.        The   language         of    the     reducing      clause

plainly contemplates reducing the limits by all sums paid in

worker's       compensation         benefits.         $36,000       was       a   sum    paid.

Nothing       in   the     policy    language       gives    the     reimbursement           any

relevance.          Reimbursement of money paid does not change the

simple fact that money was, in fact, paid.                           While this result

may seem "unfair," nothing gives this court the authority to

disregard          the     plain     language        of      an    insurance            policy.

Teschendorf was wrongly decided but may be distinguished based
on its materially different facts.                    Either way, Teschendorf has

no bearing on a textual interpretation of the policy in this

case.

              D.    The Analysis of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.

       ¶82     The majority/lead opinion (in a part joined only by

the author and one other justice) concludes Secura's proffered

       WIA similarly observes, "the outcome advanced by SECURA is
       7

not absurd at all because it results in the insured recovering a
greater amount than if the tortfeasor had liability coverage
equivalent to the insured's UIM limits."

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interpretation of the reducing clause is not authorized by Wis.

Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.              Majority/lead op., ¶¶19–28.                    This non-

precedential         analysis       is        unnecessary       given      the     opinion's

conclusion that Secura's interpretation of the reducing clause

is incorrect.          Regardless, that analysis is wrong.

       ¶83     The   majority/lead            opinion's     analysis       works     only    by

improperly adding a word to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2.                              Section

632.32(5)(i)2.         authorizes         a    reduction    by     "[a]mounts        paid    or

payable        under     any       worker's          compensation         law[.]"           The

majority/lead opinion inserts the word "current" before "amounts

paid," so the statute becomes:                   "Current amounts paid or payable

under any worker's compensation law[.]"                            Id., ¶27 ("'Amounts

paid'     is     interpreted         as       the     current      'amounts        paid'     or

outstanding such as by an installment agreement, at the time an

insurer seeks to reduce its liability under § 632.32(5)(i).").

Problematically for the majority/lead opinion, the text does not

use the phrase "current amounts paid."                      It does not include any

temporal limitation on how the amount paid is to be calculated.
Without      rewriting       the     statute,         the   majority/lead          opinion's

analysis fails.

                                    IV.       CONCLUSION

       ¶84     This case demonstrates that "the law is such an Ass."

George Chapman, Revenge for Honour, A Tragedie 37 (1654).                                   If,

however, we are to be a "government of laws, and not of men,"

that    is     the   price     we    must      occasionally        pay.       John    Adams,

Novanglus:      A    History    of       the    Dispute     with    America,       from     Its
Origin, in 1754, to the Present Time, in Revolutionary Writings

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of John Adams (C. Bradley Thompson ed. 2000).     Because I would

leave the revision of our laws with the legislature where that

work belongs, I respectfully dissent.

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1