Court Opinion

ID: 9762041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:09:12.186357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:29.609884
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, Justice,
concurring.
I join the decision to affirm. I withdraw my previous opinion of August 5, 1993, and issue this one in its stead solely to reflect that I also join the decision to overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.
I reluctantly agree that Jones v. State, 796 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), not Miles v. State, 842 S.W.2d 278, 279 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), governs the disposition of this appeal. The harsh result is the denial of an appeal the appellant sought for a valid reason under rule 40(b)(1): review of a matter “raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.” No one disputes that Mr. Moreno and his trial attorney sought to appeal an adverse ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress evidence.
Justice Cohen correctly points out in his dissenting opinion that: (1) Jones was decided more recently than Miles, although Miles was reported more recently; and (2) Jones does not “distinguish, overrule, or mention the Miles opinion.” I disagree with his conclusion that we are therefore free to ignore the more recent Jones and follow the earlier Miles. I believe that when our Court of Criminal Appeals speaks twice on the identical subject, we are bound by that court’s most recent pronouncement, even when it ignores that body’s last previous — and conflicting — treatment of the same topic.
I also disagree with Justice Cohen’s observation that there is “no purpose whatsoever” in Tex.R.App.P. 40(b)(l)’s requirement that the notice of appeal either state that the trial *663judge granted permission to appeal or list the motions raised and ruled on before trial. I believe the rule is intended for a laudable purpose: to provide the appellate court with a concise statement of the basis on which appellate jurisdiction is invoked.
In fact, the defect in Mr. Moreno’s notice of appeal was not brought to our attention until the State filed its motion to dismiss the appeal more than seven months after the notice. This was after the trial court appointed an attorney to represent the indigent defendant, after a statement of facts was prepared by the court reporter and filed, and after the appellant’s brief was researched, prepared, and filed, all at public expense. Such a delay would surely be the basis for a finding of waiver of the defect or laches in its assertion, but for the fact that the defect in the notice is jurisdictionally fatal under Jones.
In keeping with the spirit of Texas Supreme Court decisions (cited by Justice Cohen) allowing defects in pleading to be corrected by amendment before imposing the “death penalty” of dismissal, I join others on this Court in urging the Court of Criminal Appeals to revisit Jones and permit reasonable out-of-time amendment of the notice of appeal under Tex.R.App.P. 83.