Court Opinion

ID: 9582701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:28.239123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:15.251102
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as the record reveals Johnson did successfully manipulate the court system and obtain a complete discharge of his debts without scheduling this personal injury claim, a potentially valuable asset. Not until after Trust Company moved for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel did Johnson file a motion with the bankruptcy court to reopen his bankruptcy case. Armed with affidavits showing he told his attorneys about this personal injury claim but the attorneys failed to schedule it, Johnson persuaded the bankruptcy court to grant his motion and allow him to amend his schedules to list this claim as an asset. But prior to his original discharge, Johnson and his attorneys told the bankruptcy trustee nothing about his planned personal injury claim, even though he stated he had been shot at the ATM and had suffered damage to his car in the process. This significant omission made under oath, combined with the fact that Johnson made no effort to correct the omission until it threatened the viability of his personal injury claim, gave the trial court more than sufficient reason to apply judicial estoppel.
“The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘is directed against those who would attempt to manipulate the court system through the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions in judicial proceedings.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F2d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 1988). Johnson’s misrepresentation to the bankruptcy court allowed him to be discharged from his debts and begin anew with an unencumbered asset: the claim against Trust Company. See Payless Wholesale Distrib. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.), Inc., 989 F2d 570, 571 (1st Cir. 1993). Having been “caught” in his failure to include this asset in his bankruptcy estate, Johnson informed the bankruptcy *653court of it nine months after that court closed his case. His shifting of positions constitutes exactly the kind of “playing fast and loose with the courts” which the judicial estoppel doctrine is designed to prevent. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982). “ ‘Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position.’ Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 689 [(15 SC 555, 39 LE 578)] (1895).” (Emphasis supplied.) In the Matter of Thomas V. Cassidy, 892 F2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990). The judicial estoppel doctrine applies with full force here because Johnson “acted inconsistently in such a degree and manner to offend the judicial process and properly preclude him from now raising” this claim against Trust Company. Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F2d 875, 898 (4th Cir. 1992); accord Rebhan, supra. I would, therefore, uphold the trial court’s judgment as an appropriate disciplinary remedy for Johnson’s actions, notwithstanding his last-minute effort to “come clean” and make amends to the bankruptcy court.
Decided November 22, 1996
Maurice J. Bernard III, Curtis A. Thurston, Jr., for appellant.
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Frederick M. Valz III, Scott D. Huray, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Johnson and Judge Smith join in this dissent.