Court Opinion

ID: 9775856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:11:09.50527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.540269
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CLINTON, Judge.
This is a matter implicating the scope of right to appeal deferred adjudication proceedings. Article 42.12, § 5, V.A.C.C.P.
After hearing evidence upon his plea of guilty to an offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, the trial court found it sufficient to substantiate guilt, and ordered that further proceedings be deferred without entering an adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on probation for a period of ten years, specifying terms and conditions. Id., § 5(a).
Soon thereafter the State alleged that appellant had violated three separate conditions of probation and moved that he be cited to appear and show cause “why the Court should not proceed with an adjudication of guilt.” Appellant responded with his “Motion to Quash State’s Revocation,” challenging certain aspects of the State’s motion. Upon a hearing the trial court found that appellant had violated the alleged terms and conditions, set aside the prior order deferring adjudication, proceeded to adjudge appellant guilty of committing the offense originally charged and assessed punishment at confinement for life. Id., § 5(b).
Appellant timely gave notice of appeal and raised six points of error. In an unpublished opinion the court of appeals dismissed all points of error and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Appellant petitioned for and we granted review on the only ground presented, viz:
“The court of appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s points of error, holding that petitioner could not challenge the trial court’s determination to •proceed with an adjudication of guilt.”
PDR, at 3.1 We will affirm.
The court of appeals correctly noted that “all of appellant’s points of error challenge the trial court’s determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt." Olowosu-ko v. State, (Tex.App. — Dallas, No. 05-90-00105-CR, delivered December 4, 1990), slip op. at 2. Appellant’s claim there as here is based on his reading of Article 44.01(j), V.A.C.C.P., viz:
“... The current amendments to Article 44.01(j) changed prior case law and now authorizes a defendant who is placed on deferred adjudication to prosecute an appeal and challenge a determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt.”
PDR, at 6.
Appellant relies on Kite v. State, 788 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st] 1990), no PDR. The court of appeals believed it “specifically rejected this argument in Dillekey v. State, 788 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1990, no pet.).” Slip opinion, at 2. This Court, however, reversed its judgment. See Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), holding the Legislature clearly intended defendants on deferred adjudication probation “be allowed, under Art. 44.01(j), V.A.C.C.P., to immediately appeal rulings on pre-trial motions in compliance with Article 44.02,” (slip op. at 4).
The problem thus illuminated in a deferred adjudication context lies in a failure to identify the precise matter a defendant seeks to appeal. It is axiomatic that a party may appeal only that which the Legislature has authorized. Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949, at 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Therefore, an appellate court must sort out various rulings a trial court may make in the course of a deferred adjudication proceeding to determine those which the Legislature provided a right to appeal. Accordingly, we proceed to address the rul*942ings pertinent here, i.e., an order deferring adjudication; a determination to proceed to an adjudication of guilt; judgment in post-adjudication proceedings.
Formerly the Court squarely held that the relevant statutory provisions clearly preclude appellate review of an order deferring adjudication. McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). But as our recent decision in Dillehey v. State, supra, discerned, the Legislature lately intended to provide just such an appeal by enacting Article 44.01(j).
However, the Court has held from the beginning of deferred adjudication practice that the Legislature meant what it said in Article 42.12, § 5(b): “No appeal may be taken from this determination [to proceed with an adjudication of guilt].” Williams v. State, 592 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt is one of absolute non-reviewable discretion); accord: Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Neither the Legislature nor this Court has changed that prohibition. See Russell v. State, 702 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Article 42.12, § 5(b), supra.
Therefore, in this cause the Dallas Court of Appeals correctly dismissed all points of error presented by appellant, although its decision in Dillehey, supra, has since been disapproved by this Court.
Article 42.12 § 5(b) expressly allows an appeal of all proceedings after adjudication of guilt on the original charge, but because appellant does not advance any point of error directed to the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals also properly affirmed that judgment.
For those reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Dallas Court of Appeals.

. All emphasis throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise noted.