Court Opinion

ID: 9964257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 16:03:37.570383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:15.661910
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                         Theodore Rokita,                    FILED
                                Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Defendant      Apr 29 2024, 8:44 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                     v.                     Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

                                            Barbara Tully,
                                 Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Plaintiff

                                             April 29, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                            23A-PL-705
                             Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                              The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                        49D06-2107-PL-25333

                              Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024     Page 1 of 23
      Kenworthy, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Barabara Tully requested information from the Office of the Indiana Attorney

      General (“OAG”) regarding an informal advisory opinion issued to Attorney

      General Theodore Rokita by the Indiana Office of Inspector General (“OIG”).

      The OAG declined to give Tully access, claiming the opinion was confidential

      and not subject to disclosure under Indiana’s Access to Public Records Act

      (“APRA”). After the Indiana Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) also

      concluded the opinion was excepted from disclosure, Tully sued Attorney

      General Rokita, alleging a violation of APRA. The trial court granted Tully

      summary judgment and Attorney General Rokita appealed.

[2]   But while this appeal was pending, the Indiana General Assembly added a

      wrinkle: it amended the statute relating to the Inspector General’s duties and

      made that amendment retroactive. The amended statute explicitly provides the

      Inspector General’s informal advisory opinions are confidential and excepted

      from disclosure under APRA. Based on this turn of events, we reverse and

      remand with instructions.

      Facts and Procedural History
      A. Indiana Office of Inspector General

[3]   Created in 2005, the OIG is tasked with “addressing fraud, waste, abuse, and

      wrongdoing” in state agencies. Ind. Code § 4-2-7-2(b). To help achieve this

      goal, the General Assembly directed the OIG to implement a code of ethics for
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024       Page 2 of 23
      state government through rulemaking. See I.C. §§ 4-2-7-3(6), 4-2-7-5(a). The

      OIG did so by establishing the Indiana Code of Ethics. See 42 Ind. Admin.

      Code 1-1-1 et seq. Relevant to this appeal are Rules 5 and 8 of that Code. 42

      I.A.C. 1-5-1 et. seq (“Rule 5”); 42 I.A.C. 1-8-1 (“Rule 8”). Rule 5 sets forth the

      Ethics Rules, one of which specifically concerns outside-employment

      restrictions for state employees. See 42 I.A.C. 1-5-5. Rule 8 grants the

      Inspector General, or its designee, the “authority to render informal advisory

      opinions.” 42 I.A.C. 1-8-1(a). Such opinions are “expressions of opinion that

      are communicated for the purpose of deliberation and decision making” that

      “shall be considered confidential under IC 5-14-3-4(b)(6).” 42 I.A.C. 1-8-1(b).

      Through Rule 8’s process, the OIG issues around 215 to 375 informal advisory

      opinions per year to Indiana state employees seeking prospective ethical advice.

      See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 161.

      B. Indiana Access to Public Records Act

[4]   In 1983, the Indiana General Assembly passed APRA 1 with the express

      purpose that “all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding

      the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as

      public officials and employees.” I.C. § 5-14-3-1. To serve this purpose, APRA

      provides: “Any person may inspect and copy the public records of any agency

      during the regular business hours of the agency.” I.C. § 5-14-3-3(a). And

      1
          See I.C. §§ 5-14-3-1 through 5-14-3-10.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024          Page 3 of 23
      because APRA is intended to ensure Hoosiers have broad access to most

      government records, APRA is to be “liberally construed,” and places the

      burden for nondisclosure of a public record “on the public agency that would

      deny access to the record and not on the person seeking to inspect and copy the

      record.” I.C. § 5-14-3-1.

[5]   However, certain categories of public records are excepted from APRA’s

      disclosure requirement. See I.C. § 5-14-3-4. Some records are excepted unless

      disclosure is specifically required by statute or court order, I.C. § 5-14-3-4(a),

      while others are excepted at the discretion of a public agency, I.C. § 5-14-3-4(b).

      A member of the public or a public agency can make an informal inquiry or

      request a formal advisory opinion from the PAC regarding whether a document

      is subject to disclosure under APRA. See I.C. § 5-14-4-10(5), (6).

[6]   But an opinion from the PAC does not have to be the end of the road. Rather,

      a person denied access to a public record may file an action in court “to compel

      the public agency to permit the person to inspect and copy the public record.”

      I.C. § 5-14-3-9(e). If the plaintiff seeking disclosure prevails in the court action,

      the court “shall” award reasonable attorney fees, court costs, and expenses if

      the plaintiff first sought and received an informal inquiry response or formal

      advisory opinion from the PAC. 2 I.C. § 5-14-3-9(i).

      2
       Due to this incentive, most cases involving APRA begin as complaints with the PAC. See, e.g., ESPN, Inc. v.
      Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192 (Ind. 2016); Citizens Action Coal. of Ind. v. Koch, 51 N.E.3d 236

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                    Page 4 of 23
      C. Tully’s APRA Request and Subsequent History

[7]   Soon after Attorney General Rokita assumed office in January 2021, he sought

      and received an informal advisory opinion from the OIG relating to the ethical

      implications of his continued outside employment with Apex Benefits. A few

      weeks later, the Indianapolis Business Journal ran an article about the OIG

      opinion. In the article, a spokesperson for the OAG confirmed Attorney

      General Rokita had sought and received an opinion from the OIG and assured

      the opinion clarified Attorney General Rokita’s “interests and outside

      employment are all squarely within the boundaries of the law and do not

      conflict with his official duties.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 51.

[8]   Tully then submitted a written public records request to Attorney General

      Rokita seeking access to the OIG opinion. When the OAG refused to provide

      her with a copy, claiming the OIG opinion was confidential under Rule 8, Tully

      turned to the PAC. And after the PAC agreed with the OAG that the opinion

      was confidential under Rule 8 and not subject to disclosure under APRA, Tully

      sued Attorney General Rokita.

[9]   In the trial court, both parties moved for summary judgment. According to

      Attorney General Rokita, the deliberative materials exception to disclosure

      specifically referenced in Rule 8 excepted the OIG opinion he received from

      disclosure. See I.C. § 5-14-3-4(b)(6). The trial court disagreed and granted Tully

      (Ind. 2016); see also Courtney Abshire, Public Business is the Public’s Business: Koch’s Implications for Indiana’s
      Access to Public Records Act, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 455, 458 (2019).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                         Page 5 of 23
       summary judgment, finding Rule 8 “is not harmonious” with Rule 5.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 14. In the trial court’s view, accepting Attorney

       General Rokita’s reasoning “would allow a state employee to determine

       whether to request an informal advisory opinion under Rule 8, or be subject to

       a more public review by the [Ethics] Commission subject to APRA.” Id. at 15.

       The trial court reasoned “[s]uch a work around would allow the [OIG] to

       promulgate rules which clearly exceed the [OIG’s] statutory authority” and

       “circumvent the purpose of the [Code of Ethics] Rules.” Id.

[10]   After ruling in Tully’s favor, the trial court invited Attorney General Rokita to

       present a redacted copy of the OIG opinion, which was to be issued to Tully. 3

       Rather than redact, Attorney General Rokita appealed. 4

[11]   Ordinarily, the facts would end there. Here, though, the Indiana General

       Assembly amended Indiana Code Section 4-2-7-3 effective July 1, 2023—i.e.,

       while this appeal was pending. 5 The amendment inserted a new subsection

       relating to the Inspector General’s duties:

                  The inspector general shall . . . [p]rovide informal advisory
                  opinions to current, former, and prospective state employees,
                  state officers, and special state appointees. An informal advisory
                  opinion issued by the office of the inspector general is

       3
           The trial court stayed the execution of judgment until fifteen days after the resolution of any appeal.
       4
        Tully cross-appealed, claiming the trial court erred by not awarding her attorney’s fees and by allowing
       Attorney General Rokita to redact the OIG opinion “without limitation.” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 37.
       5
        Attorney General Rokita filed his Notice of Appeal on March 29, 2023. Neither party filed an appellate
       brief in this case prior to July 20, 2023.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                      Page 6 of 23
                confidential under IC 5-14-3-4, including any previously issued
                informal advisory opinion by the office of the inspector general
                that recites that it is confidential.

       I.C. § 4-2-7-3(9) (2023) (“Subsection 9”). 6 Thus, Subsection 9 changed the

       playing field by purporting to resolve any dispute over the scope of the OIG’s

       authority to grant confidential informal advisory opinions; Subsection 9 says

       the OIG may do so.

[12]   Because of this change, the parties’ arguments on appeal differ from those

       presented below. On appeal, Attorney General Rokita claims we should apply

       Subsection 9, which “completely resolves” this appeal in his favor. Appellant’s

       Br. at 16. Tully counters, arguing applying Subsection 9 to this case violates

       Article 3, Section 1 and Article 4, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution.

       Additionally, Tully contends even if the OIG opinion is confidential, Attorney

       General Rokita waived confidentiality through the OAG spokesperson’s

       comment to the Indianapolis Business Journal regarding the OIG opinion.

       Ultimately, the parties agree there are no issues of material fact, and this appeal

       turns solely on questions of law.

       Standards of Review
[13]   We review summary-judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standard as

       the trial court. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 644 (Ind. 2023). Summary

       6
        Compare I.C. § 4-2-7-3 (2019), with I.C. § 4-2-7-3 (2023) (adding duty to issue confidential informal advisory
       opinions).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                  Page 7 of 23
       judgment is appropriate only when “the designated evidentiary matter shows

       that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

       is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Parties

       filing cross-motions for summary judgment “neither alters this standard nor

       changes our analysis—‘we consider each motion separately to determine

       whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Erie

       Indem. Co. for Subscribers at Erie Ins. Exch. v. Est. of Harris by Harris, 99 N.E.3d

       625, 629 (Ind. 2018) (quoting SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675, 677

       (Ind. 2015)). Summary judgment “is a desirable tool to allow the trial court to

       dispose of cases where only legal issues exist.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d

       1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clipp v. Weaver, 451 N.E.2d 1092, 1093 (Ind.

       1983)).

[14]   We also review pure questions of law de novo, including statutory and

       constitutional claims. 7 Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1033 (Ind. 2024).

       7
         The “longstanding principle of constitutional avoidance . . . weighs against deciding constitutional
       questions not absolutely necessary to a merits disposition.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)
       (quoting Ind. Land Tr. Co. v. XL Inv. Props. LLC, 155 N.E.3d 1177, 1182 (Ind. 2020)). As a result, our
       Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to adjudicate constitutional questions when presented with other
       dispositive issues.” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 441 (Ind. 2022) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bayh v.
       Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind. 1991) (“[C]onstitutional issues are to be avoided as long as there are
       potentially dispositive statutory or common law issues still alive.”), cert. denied. Put simply, non-
       constitutional claims come first, constitutional claims come last. See Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 402. As
       discussed, Subsection 9 eliminated potential non-constitutional grounds on which this case might have been
       decided—whether the OIG exceeded its authority by issuing confidential informal advisory opinions under
       Rule 8 and whether the OIG opinion is confidential under the deliberative materials exception in APRA
       (Indiana Code Section 5-14-3-4(b)(6)). Thus, we turn to what remains. In adhering to our Supreme Court’s
       directive, we first address whether Attorney General Rokita waived any potential claim to confidentiality
       before turning to whether Subsection 9 survives Tully’s constitutional challenges. In this sense, we resolve

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                    Page 8 of 23
       1. Attorney General Rokita Did Not Waive Confidentiality
[15]   First, we address Tully’s remaining non-constitutional claim. According to

       Tully, even if the OIG informal advisory opinion is confidential, Attorney

       General Rokita waived confidentiality when a spokesperson for the OAG

       disclosed the opinion’s “essential conclusions to the public[.]” Appellee/Cross-

       Appellant’s Br. at 21.

[16]   Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, claim,

       or privilege. Ashby v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins., 949 N.E.2d 307, 312 (Ind. 2011).

       Although APRA contains no waiver provision, a public agency can waive the

       exceptions to public disclosure. See Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind.

       Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 918–19 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003), trans. denied.

[17]   In Indiana Newspapers, the Indianapolis Star sought access to materials held by

       the trustees of Indiana University. The Star requested records—under APRA—

       relating to Indiana University’s investigation into then-head basketball coach

       Bob Knight’s alleged inappropriate behavior, including choking basketball

       player Neil Reed during practice. Id. at 898. The Star claimed it was entitled to

       the records because, among other reasons, the trustees waived all applicable

       Tully’s constitutional claims only after exhausting any potential dispositive statutory or common law
       issues—i.e., as a last resort.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                Page 9 of 23
       APRA exceptions by selectively disclosing materials relating to the

       investigation. Id. at 916.

[18]   A panel of this Court disagreed with the Star, holding disclosure of a three-page

       report containing a “very generalized overview with very little specific

       information concerning the underlying investigatory materials and without the

       quotation of extensive and integral portions” of the investigatory materials was

       not “the sort of release of otherwise non-discloseable [sic] information sufficient

       to warrant waiver of any of the APRA exceptions.” Id. at 919–20. Although

       not essential to its conclusion, the court also envisioned a situation in which a

       state agency might relinquish protections afforded by APRA’s exceptions if “an

       agency allowed one party access to materials and then in turn denied another

       party access to the same materials based upon an exception to APRA[.]” Id. at

       919. After all, if an agency “has already disclosed the allegedly non-

       discloseable [sic] materials, the purpose of the APRA exceptions will have

       already been compromised.” Id.

[19]   In this case, the OAG spokesperson’s statement confirming Attorney General

       Rokita had sought and received an OIG opinion and assuring the opinion

       clarified Attorney General Rokita’s “interests and outside employment are all

       squarely within the boundaries of the law and do no conflict with his official

       duties” is like the “very generalized overview with very little specific

       information” deemed insufficient to constitute waiver in Indiana Newspapers.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 51; Ind. Newspapers, 787 N.E.2d at 919. Rather than

       divulge the specifics of the opinion, the OAG spokesperson’s comment

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024          Page 10 of 23
       conveyed the opinion’s general conclusion, but nothing more. Under these

       circumstances, we cannot say the spokesperson’s statement was disclosure

       sufficient to waive the protections of APRA’s exceptions. Nor does this case

       present the type of selective disclosure waiver hypothesized in Indiana

       Newspapers. Neither the OAG nor Attorney General Rokita allowed one party

       access and then denied access to another party. So, although a party may waive

       APRA’s exceptions to disclosure, Attorney General Rokita has not done so

       here. 8

       2. Indiana Code Section 4-2-7-3(9) Is Expressly Retroactive
       and Applies Here
[20]   “Generally, a statute applies prospectively unless it expressly states otherwise.”

       Guzzo v. Town of St. John, 131 N.E.2d 179, 180 (Ind. 2019). There is no general

       prohibition on applying retroactive laws to cases pending on appeal. See, e.g.,

       Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995) (“When a new law

       makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in

       reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was

       enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly.”). Courts must generally

       8
         In the alternative, Tully claims Attorney General Rokita is equitably estopped from asserting confidentiality
       regarding the OIG opinion following the OAG spokesperson’s comment. In substance, however, Tully’s
       argument boils down to Attorney General Rokita should not be able to wield confidentiality “offensively
       rather than defensively.” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 24 (citing Purdue Univ. v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797, 807
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). Interpreted either way, Tully’s claim does not prevail. “Under Indiana law, equitable
       estoppel can be applied only if three elements are shown: lack of knowledge, reliance, and prejudicial effect.”
       Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 520 (Ind. 2021). Tully has not argued, let alone shown, how
       she has satisfied these elements. Further, we do not view Attorney General Rokita’s assertion of
       confidentiality as the type of offensive privilege invocation warned against in Wartell’s dicta.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                  Page 11 of 23
       honor the legislature’s choice to make a law retroactive unless doing so would

       violate a vested right or constitutional guarantee. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast

       Fuel & Servs., Inc., 783 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2003) (“Ultimately . . . whether or

       not a statute applies retroactively depends on the Legislature’s intent.”)

[21]   Our first task when interpreting words in a statute is to assign them their plain

       meaning. Rust, 228 N.E.3d at 1054. “If we neglected this elemental task, ‘we

       would be rewriting’ unambiguous language, and therefore disrupting our

       ‘separation-of-powers because it is the legislature that writes and revises statutes

       while [courts] merely interpret and apply them.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Right to Life

       Victory Fund v. Morales, 217 N.E.3d 517, 524 (Ind. 2023)).

[22]   The language of Subsection 9 plainly states it applies to “any previously issued

       informal advisory opinion by the office of the inspector general that recites that

       it is confidential.” I.C. § 4-2-7-3(9). An enacted statute’s language is the best

       evidence of legislative intent. See Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1285 (Ind.

       2022). And we must honor the legislature’s intent for Subsection 9 to apply

       retroactively, so long as doing so does not violate a vested right or

       constitutional guarantee owed to Tully. See Bourbon, 783 N.E.2d at 260.

       3. Indiana Code Section 4-2-7-3(9) Is Not Unconstitutional
[23]   Tully asserts applying Section 9 retroactively to this case would violate two

       provisions of the Indiana Constitution: Article 3, Section 1 (distribution of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024         Page 12 of 23
       powers); and Article 4, Section 19 (single-subject requirement). 9 When faced

       with a question under Indiana’s Constitution, we must examine “the language

       of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification,

       the purpose and structure of our Constitution, and case law interpreting the

       specific provisions.” Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1277 (quoting Hoagland v. Franklin

       Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 27 N.E.3d 737, 741 (Ind. 2015)). We treat the language

       in each provision with “deference, as though every word had been hammered

       into place.” Id. (quoting Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind. 2013)).

       Ultimately, the challenger bears a high burden because all laws come to us

       “cloaked with ‘the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a

       contrary showing.’” Rust, 228 N.E.3d at 1033 (quoting Horner v. Curry, 125

       N.E.3d 584, 588 (Ind. 2019)).

       A. No Violation of Article 3, Section 1

[24]   The Indiana Constitution vests the General Assembly with the “[l]egislative

       authority,” of the State, Ind. Const. art. 4, § 1, and our state courts with the

       “judicial power,” id. art. 7, § 1. Although the Constitution of the United States

       “implicitly mandates” the separation of powers at the federal level, Indiana’s

       9
         Based on the timing of the legislature’s amendment—prior to any briefing in this case—each party was
       given, and took advantage of, a full and fair opportunity to develop their claims regarding application of
       Subsection 9 to this case. And given our standard of review—de novo—we owe no deference to the trial
       court’s decision. See Rust, 228 N.E.3d at 1033. Additionally, there are no issues of fact for the trial court to
       resolve if we were to remand. For these reasons we address the merits of the parties’ claims even though the
       trial court has not specifically weighed in on the issue. Cf., Guzzo, 131 N.E.3d at 180 (remanding in light of
       intervening, retroactively applicable amendment to pertinent statute in order for the trial court to, in part,
       make a factual determination).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                  Page 13 of 23
       constitution—and the constitutions of many other states—“clearly and

       explicitly command[s] that each branch of state government respect the

       constitutional boundaries of the coordinate branches.” Berry v. Crawford, 990

       N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ind. 2013); Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1 (prohibiting each branch

       from “exercise[ing] any of the functions of another, except as in this

       Constitution expressly provided”). 10 The doctrine of separation of powers “is

       the keystone of our form of government” and “recognizes that each branch of

       the government has specific duties and powers that may not be usurped or

       infringed upon by the other branches of government.” State v. Doe, 987 N.E.2d

       1066, 1072 (Ind. 2013) (quotations omitted).

[25]   As our Supreme Court has made clear, federal separation of powers decisions

       do not determine the distribution of powers under Article 3 of the Indiana

       Constitution. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 404; see also Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 445

       (explaining interpretation of an Indiana Constitutional provision is “an

       independent judicial act” from a similar analysis under the Federal

       Constitution). That said, decisions from federal courts may “nonetheless [be]

       persuasive,” although we stop short of granting them deference or precedential

       status. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 445 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Wright, 371

       N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (Ind. 1978)). And when interpreting Article 3, Section 1,

       10
            In full, Article 3, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
                The powers of the Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the
                Executive including the Administrative, and the Judicial: and no person, charged with official
                duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as
                in this Constitution expressly provided.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                 Page 14 of 23
       our Supreme Court has sometimes turned to “helpful” cases from other

       jurisdictions. See, e.g., Berry, 990 N.E.2d at 415–16; see also State v. Monfort, 723

       N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind. 2000) (noting the central principles of separation of

       powers underlying the thinking of the framers of the Federal Constitution were

       shared by the framers of the Indiana Constitution).

[26]   Tully contends retroactively applying Subsection 9 to this case violates Article

       3, Section 1 of Indiana’s Constitution. According to Tully, the legislature “does

       not have authority to retrospectively void a final court judgment[.]”

       Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 30. Thus, she believes the legislature “usurped

       judicial powers and prerogatives” by invalidating her “vested interest in [the

       trial court’s] final judgment.” Id.

[27]   In one respect, Tully is correct: the legislature cannot, consistent with the

       doctrine of separation of powers, set aside a final judgment of a court. 11

       Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 814 (Ind. 2011) (describing this principle as

       “well-settled”). That said, the crux of Tully’s claim is based on a

       misinterpretation of “final judgment,” as used in this context. Important here,

       there is “a distinction between judgments from which all appeals have been

       forgone or completed, and judgments that remain on appeal (or subject to being

       appealed)[.]” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227.

       11
         As used here, “final judgment” does not have the same meaning as in Indiana’s Rules of Appellate
       Procedure. See Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H); see also DeCola v. Norfolk S. Corp., 222 N.E.3d 938, 939 (Ind. 2023).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                 Page 15 of 23
[28]   Article 7, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution vests the “judicial power of the

       State” in “one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such

       other courts as the General Assembly may establish.” 12 In much the same way

       Article III of the United States Constitution creates a “judicial department

       composed of ‘inferior Courts’ and ‘one supreme Court’” and “not a batch of

       unconnected courts,” so too does Indiana’s Constitution. Plaut, 514 U.S. at

       227. The Indiana Supreme Court sits atop Indiana’s court structure; it is the

       Hoosier-state’s court of last resort. One step below are intermediate appellate

       courts—including this Court. And going down one step further are the trial

       courts. All these courts are connected through Indiana’s greater judicial

       structure.

[29]   Within Indiana’s hierarchy of courts, the decision of a trial court is not—unless

       the time for appeal has expired—the final word of our judicial department as a

       whole. Rather, the obligation of expounding the department’s final word lies

       with the last court in the hierarchy to rule on the case. And in so doing, the

       court must give effect to the legislature’s latest enactment, even when that has

       the effect of overturning a judgment of a lower court. See, e.g., Columbus, C. & I.

       Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Grant Cnty., 65 Ind. 427, 442 (1878) (noting courts “do

       not question the power of the Legislature to enact general laws, regulating the

       practice in courts of justice, which may materially affect or change the decision

       12
         In 1881, the word “other” in Article 7, Section 1 replaced the word “inferior.” See Ex parte France, 95 N.E.
       515, 518 (Ind. 1911).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                Page 16 of 23
       of causes pending before the courts”); see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227. Once a

       decision reaches finality—meaning no further appeal may be taken—it becomes

       the last word of the judicial department regarding that case. At this point, the

       legislature cannot “declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to

       that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.” Plaut, 514

       U.S. at 227; see also Thorpe v. King, 227 N.E.2d 169, 170–71 (Ind. 1967).

[30]   The cases Tully cites support the principle she recounts, but not her definition

       of “final judgment.” 13 For example, in Thorpe, the Board of County

       Commissioners of Lake County passed an ordinance to incorporate the

       purported Town of Cedar Lake. 227 N.E.2d at 170. The Lake Superior Court

       declared the ordinance void. Id. The time to appeal the court’s decision then

       expired. Id. Just under two months later, the General Assembly sought to

       legalize the purported incorporation of the Town of Cedar Lake by declaring

       the acts taken to incorporate the town “sufficient.” Id. Our Supreme Court

       declared the General Assembly’s act was “unconstitutional and ineffective”

       because it would have “the legal effect of setting aside and nullifying a final

       decree of the Lake Superior Court.” Id. The Court recognized to “hold

       otherwise might be construed that this Court recognizes the right of the

       13
         Tully also relies on Toomey v. Ind. Dep’t of Correction, 49C01-1501-PL-3142 (Marion Cnty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29,
       2018). On appeal in the Indiana Supreme Court, the trial court’s order ruling against the Department of
       Correction for multiple reasons was affirmed pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 59(B). Ind. Dep’t of
       Correction v. Toomey, 162 N.E.3d 1099 (Mem) (Ind. 2021); see also App. R. 59(B) (“When the Supreme Court
       Justices participating are evenly divided in such an appeal, the trial court judgment shall be affirmed.”).
       Therefore, it is challenging to glean helpful guidance from Toomey’s outcome.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                               Page 17 of 23
       legislative branch of government to encroach upon the judicial branch of

       government,” thereby violating Article 3, Section 1. Id; see also Horner, 125

       N.E.3d at 589 n.4 (recognizing Thorpe held the legislature cannot set aside final

       judgment of a court).

[31]   But Thorpe is notably different from this case. The trial court’s judgment in

       Thorpe was “final” because the time for appeal had expired. Here, not so;

       Attorney General Rokita timely appealed. If we were to accept Tully’s position

       that the legislature divested her of a final judgment, we would be creating a rule

       which prohibits the legislature from ever applying laws retroactively to pending

       appeals in which a trial-court order has been entered. This rule would conflict

       with the federal rule, see Plaut, 514 U.S. at 216, and might result in our state’s

       judiciary infringing upon the legislature’s province to write and revise the law,

       see Ind. Const. art. 4, § 1; see also Berry, 990 N.E.2d at 415 (cautioning “[c]ourts

       should be very careful not to invade the authority of the legislature . . . for if

       they overstep the authority which belongs to them, and assume that which

       pertains to the legislature, they violate the very constitution which they thereby

       seek to preserve and maintain”) (quotation omitted). We therefore decline to

       fashion such a rule.

[32]   In sum, it is “well-settled under the doctrine of separation of powers that the

       Legislature cannot interfere with the discharge of judicial duties or set aside a

       final judgment of a court.” Lemmon, 949 N.E.2d at 814. In this context, a final

       judgment is one from which no further appeal can be had. Applying this

       principle here, we detect no violation of the separation of powers mandate of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024           Page 18 of 23
       Article 3, Section 1 because—for these purposes—the trial court’s order

       granting Tully summary judgment was not a “final judgment.” It could be—

       and, in fact, was—timely appealed. 14

       B. No Violation of Article 4, Section 19

[33]   Next, Tully claims applying Subsection 9 to this case violates Article 4, Section

       19 of Indiana’s Constitution:

                An act, except an act for the codification, revision or
                rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject and
                matters properly connected therewith.

       Ind. Const. art. 4, § 19. 15 The purpose of this provision is two-fold: (1) “to

       prevent surprise or fraud in the Legislature by means of a provision or

       provisions in a bill of which the title gave no information to persons who might

       be subject to the legislation under consideration” and (2) “to prevent a

       combination of nonrelated subjects in the same act.” Loparex, 964 N.E.2d at 813

       (quoting State ex rel. Ind. Real Est. Comm’n v. Meier, 190 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind.

       1963)).

       14
          At least in part, Tully’s opposition to applying Subsection 9 to her case stems from alleged
       “gamesmanship” by Attorney General Rokita and the OAG surrounding the passage of the amendment.
       Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 34. These are not claims we can entertain. We look to the language of the
       statute itself and our venture stops there. See e.g., N.G. v. State, 148 N.E.3d 971, 976 (Ind. 2020) (Slaughter,
       J., dissenting) (explaining, as courts, we should not speculate about legislative motives, because “whatever
       those are—and often they are elusive—they are not the law”).
       15
         Since the ratification of Indiana’s 1851 Constitution, the text of Article 4, Section 19 has been amended
       twice: in 1960 and again in 1974. See Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 964 N.E.2d 806, 812–13 (Ind.
       2012) (discussing the amendments).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                   Page 19 of 23
[34]   Thus, “if there is any reasonable basis for grouping together in one act various

       matters of the same nature, and the public cannot be deceived reasonably

       thereby, the act is valid.” Id. (quoting Stith Petroleum Co. v. Dep’t of Audit &

       Control, 5 N.E.2d 517, 521 (Ind. 1937)). In other words, we “indulge in a very

       liberal interpretation rather than a critical and strict construction calculated to

       defeat the act.” Dorch v. Lugar, 266 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind. 1971), abrogated on other

       grounds by Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994); see also Dague v. Piper

       Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 214 (Ind. 1981) (explaining our Supreme Court

       “has traditionally given broad interpretation to the one-subject requirement,

       and thereby allowed legislative combinations of matters which, at first blush,

       might appear quite diverse”); but see A.B. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1204, 1227 (Ind.

       2011) (Sullivan, J., concurring in part) (reminding “the General Assembly has

       been given substantial deference but not carte blanche”).

[35]   The 123rd General Assembly passed P.L. 201-2023, entitled “AN ACT to

       amend the Indiana Code concerning state and local administration and to make

       an appropriation.” Subsection 9 was included in P.L. 201-2023. And, as

       mentioned, Subsection 9 clarified the Inspector General’s duty to issue

       confidential informal advisory opinions. This provision has at least some

       rational connection to P.L. 201-2023’s general purpose of efficient state

       administration and appropriation. See, e.g., Ind. State Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch.

       Comm’rs of the City of Indianapolis, 679 N.E.2d 933, 935–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)

       (upholding legislation which restricted the collective bargaining rights of public-

       school teachers in Indianapolis as part of the state’s budget bill even though the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024          Page 20 of 23
       connection was “tenuous at best”). In fact, the provisions of P.L. 201-2023 are

       no less unrelated than legislation combining the Products Liability Act with

       amendments to the Indiana Code for courts and court officers. See Dague, 418

       N.E.2d at 213–15 (upholding constitutionality of such a combination).

       Therefore, grouping the amendment to Section 4-2-7-3 with the other provisions

       of P.L. 201-2023 seems reasonable, and we cannot say doing so violated Article

       4, Section 19.

       C. Courts Do Not Set Public Policy, the Legislature Does

[36]   The General Assembly made the policy decision that the OIG’s duties should

       include issuing confidential informal advisory opinions and that previously

       issued opinions should also be confidential if the opinion says so. As our

       Supreme Court has reminded:

               The legislature’s policy choices, so long as they are
               constitutional, are beyond our purview. We neither applaud the
               wisdom of such choices nor condemn their folly. We simply
               assess their legality. Once we determine they pass muster, our
               task concludes.

       KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 907 (Ind. 2017). Put simply, the

       legislature makes the law and courts interpret the law as written. Ind. Const.

       art. 4, § 1; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (declaring it is

       “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the

       law is”). Having interpreted the challenged statute, we conclude it falls within

       the legislature’s broad discretion and does not run afoul of the Indiana

       Constitution. Therefore, we heed “our limited constitutional role” and leave
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024          Page 21 of 23
       this policy decision to our coordinate department—the legislature. Rust, 228

       N.E.3d at 1045; see also Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1.

       Conclusion
[37]   Subsection 9 grants the OIG power to issue informal advisory opinions, such as

       the one requested and received by Attorney General Rokita. Subsection 9 also

       makes such opinions confidential under APRA’s exceptions to disclosure,

       including on a retroactive basis. Having determined Subsection 9 survives

       Tully’s constitutional challenges and Attorney General Rokita did not waive

       confidentiality, we reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court

       grant Attorney General Rokita’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 16

[38]   Reversed and remanded.

       Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General for Indiana
       James Bopp, Jr.
       Melena S. Siebert
       The Bopp Law Firm, PC
       Terre Haute, Indiana

       16
          Based on this result, Tully has not “substantially prevail[ed]” such that she is statutorily entitled to attorney
       fees and court costs. See I.C. § 5-14-3-9(i). And because the OIG opinion issued to Attorney General Rokita
       is confidential and excepted from disclosure under APRA, we cannot say the trial court erred in allowing
       Attorney General Rokita to redact the OIG opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024                                    Page 22 of 23
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William R. Groth
Daniel Bowman
Bowman & Vlink, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-705 | April 29, 2024   Page 23 of 23