Court Opinion

ID: 9697308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:12:40.337046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.366267
License: Public Domain

SNYDER, J.
(dissenting). Parole is a conditional release from imprisonment which entitles the parolee to serve the remainder of his or her criminal sentence outside the confines of a penal institution if he or she complies with all of the terms and conditions of the parole order. Thomas v. Arizona State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 564 P.2d 79, 81 (1977). Parole portends at least one prior criminal conviction that has resulted in a prison sentence. It is axiomatic that one on parole has a parole agent monitoring his or her conditional release *192back into the community. The State called Ingram's parole agent to testify as a part of its case-in-chief. My concerns are three-fold.
First, the appearance and testimony of a parole agent, establishing that Ingram was on parole and not following the rules of parole, were not factored into the admissibility analysis which balances the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect. Advising the jury in the State’s case-in-chief that Ingram is a parolee not following parole rules is inherently prejudicial. In the mind's eye of the jury, the trial was likely over when it was presented with that evidence. As recognized by United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 858 (1992), the failure to balance the probative value of that evidence against the full ramifications of the disclosure is not harmless error and is not curable by a limiting instruction as to how the evidence may be used by the jury. See id. at 473.
Second, irrespective of whether the admissibility of the parole agent's testimony is analyzed under § 904.03, Stats., or as "other acts" evidence, see § 904.04(2), Stats., the evidentiary analysis used by the trial court and affirmed by the majority does not include the consideration of a necessary legal standard. Where trial testimony reveals a prior criminal conviction to a jury, it is necessary to analyze the admissibility of such evidence under § 906.09, Stats., amended by 1995 Wis. Act 77, § 622-27.1 Subsection (3) states in relevant part:
Admissibility of Conviction or Adjudication. No question inquiring with respect to a conviction of a *193crime ... nor introduction of evidence with respect thereto, shall be permitted until the judge determines pursuant to s. 901.04 whether the evidence should be excluded. [Emphasis added.]
Since the parole agent's testimony is "evidence with respect" to Ingram's conviction, its admissibility requires consideration of the requirements of § 901.04, Stats.
Turning to the requirements of that section, the introductory language provides that "[preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge, subject to sub. (2)." Section 901.04(1), Stats. Subsection (2) then requires:
Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. [Emphasis added.]
The condition of fact required before admitting the parole agent's testimony — in fact, the foundation for Ingram's parole status violations and motive to flee — is Ingram's previous criminal conviction. While Ingram's intent to avoid a return to prison may well have provided him with a motive to flee and been "crucial" to the State's case, majority op. at 183, the admissibility of evidence is not based solely on that consideration. Rather, in ruling as to the admissibility of the parole agent's testimony, the court must consider the prejudicial impact of allowing the prosecution during its casein-chief to advise the jury that Ingram has a prior criminal conviction and is under parole supervision. Because the admissibility analysis did not consider *194§ 906.09, Stats., and its requirement that the State present evidence of Ingram's prior conviction as foundation for the testimony of his parole agent, the prejudice inherent in the introduction of the parole agent’s testimony was not weighed.
While the majority concedes that the appearance of the parole agent "may have inferentially suggested to the jury that Ingram was a dangerous person," majority op. at 184, it then concludes that no unfair prejudice attached to this revelation. This conclusion encapsulates my third concern with the admissibility of parole agent testimony.
Allowing the State to reveal in its case-in-chief the evidence of Ingram's prior conviction and parole status fails to consider a defendant's control over the disclosure of such evidence. While the law in Wisconsin provides for the use of prior conviction evidence in limited circumstances, it also recognizes the great potential for abuse which exists if the State is allowed to expound on the nature and details of past crimes. Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 683, 688, 183 N.W.2d 11, 14 (1971). Therefore, the introduction of information pertaining to past convictions is carefully circumscribed and lies within the control of the defendant. Id. at 691, 183 N.W.2d at 16. The defendant controls the choice of whether past offenses will be mentioned by name. Id. Here, because the testimony of Ingram's parole agent was allowed during the State's case-in-chief, the State was allowed to circuitously introduce to the jury evidence of a prior criminal conviction, which is otherwise prohibited. Ingram was denied the safeguards provided by the law which place control over such disclosure in the hands of the defendant.
In sum, the appearance and testimony of Ingram’s parole agent during the State's case-in-chief improp*195erly placed before the jury Ingram's prior conviction, that he was on parole for that conviction, and that he was in violation of that parole. Such testimony is inherently prejudicial, with "a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means." See State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 455, 304 N.W.2d 742, 750 (1981) (quoted source omitted). Furthermore, because the admissibility analysis did not include a consideration of § 906.09, Stats., regarding the admissibility of. evidence of a prior conviction and thereby overlooked established precedent which allows a defendant to control such evidence, I respectfully dissent.

 The amendments to § 906.09, Stats., 1993-94, do not affect our analysis. We have, however, quoted the current statute.