Court Opinion

ID: 9788677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:15:20.780565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:15.928209
License: Public Domain

*330CARPENETI, Justice,
with whom EASTAUGH, Justice, joins dissenting in part.
In Part IV.B. of today's Opinion, the court holds that it was error for the superior court to exclude the Meltvedt affidavit from summary judgment consideration. The superior court excluded the affidavit on two grounds: its lateness and its lack of substance. Because the appellant has not timely addressed the second basis for the superior court's decision, I would hold that the appellant has waived any objection to this second basis for the decision, and affirm the superior court on the basis of waiver.
Judge Burbank ruled that the Meltvedt affidavit was late and that it was so concluso-ry as to be useless to oppose summary judgment. In his opening brief Maines argues that the superior court erred in its lateness ruling, but he does not challenge the superior court's alternative basis for its ruling. The appellant has therefore waived argument on this issue. This is a sufficient basis for affir-mance.
We have consistently found that parties have waived challenges to lower court action by (1) failing to raise an issue in the lower court or to include it in points on appeal;1 (2) failing to brief an issue to this court after including it as a point on appeal;2 or (8) failing to brief an issue adequately3
Here, Maines has failed to address the superior court's ruling that the Meltvedt affidavit and report were conclusory and thus insufficient at every critical juncture of the appellate process: It is not in the statement of points on appeal, it is not mentioned at all in the appellant's brief, and it is therefore not briefed adequately. It is mentioned for the first time in Maines's reply brief, too late under our case law. Maines has therefore waived consideration of the issue.
Today's Opinion tries to find in the appellant's opening brief a challenge to the superi- or court's ruling that the Meltvedt affidavit was conclusory. Conceding that the issue is a "close call," the court points to Maines's assertion in his opening brief that the superi- or court abused its discretion by "misinterpret{ing] the facts" and ignoring evidence that Meltvedt had inspected the vehicle in question on two occasions. But this sparse language does not go at all to the issue whether the superior court erred in finding the affidavit to be conclusory; it goes to when Kenworth and PACCAR ought to have realized that Meltvedt was going to be called as an expert witness. The section of the appellant's brief in which this language is found begins: "The trial court excluded the affidavit of Chris Meltvedt because it found that Meltvedt was not identified as an expert prior to its filing." (Emphasis added.) The entire section is then devoted to showing that Kenworth and PACCAR were on notice that Meltvedt was an expert from an early stage of the case. In sum, there is not a word in Maines's opening brief about whether the Meltvedt affidavit was conclusory and without factual support.
As noted above, Maines did not mention the issue at all until his reply brief Our case law is perfectly clear that an argument may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief.4
*331Despite Maines's failure to raise the issue of the conclusory nature of the Meltvedt affidavit in a timely fashion, the Opinion nonetheless considers the superior court's alternative basis for summary judgment-that Meltvedt's affidavit lacked substance and was conclusory-and holds that this alternative basis was erroneous. But Maines's failure to address this issue before his reply brief leaves us with no basis for considering it. Even the plain error doctrine5 -a doctrine not addressed by today's Opinion-would not allow us to reach an issue not raised by the appellant before us. While we may affirm on any basis supported by the record,6 it is quite another thing to go beyond the issues raised by the appellant in order to reverse.7
Because Maines did not mention the superior court's ruling that the Meltvedt affidavit was insufficient in his points on appeal and he did not raise the issue in his opening brief, I would hold that he has waived any argument that the superior court erred in refusing to consider the Meltvedt affidavit I would affirm the judgment of that court on that basis.8 I respectfully dissent.

. Gunderson v. Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks, 902 P.2d 323, 327 n. 5 (Alaska 1995) (holding that argument not raised before trial court or not included in statement of points on appeal will not be considered on appeal).

. Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1171 (Alaska 2002) (finding waiver where party listed issue in points on appeal but failed to brief it); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 677 P.2d 1256, 1259 n. 6 (Alaska 1984) (finding waiver where numerous points on appeal were not briefed).

. Shearer v. Mundt, 36 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Alaska 2001) (holding that pro se litigant waived argument for failure to "develop" it); City of Fair banks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1106 (Alaska 2000) (holding that issue was so "sparsely briefed" as to be waived).

. Lewis v. State, Dep't of Corr., 139 P.3d 1266, 1272 (Alaska 2006) ("We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief."); Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska, 139 P.3d 572, 580 (Alaska 2006) ("We deem arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief to have been waived."); Lakloey, Inc. v. Univ. of Alaska, 141 P.3d 317, 323 n. 18 (Alaska 2006) ("'Because Lakloey raises this contention for the first time in its reply brief, we do not consider it."); Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807, 819 (Alaska 2005); Simpson v. State, Commercial *331Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 101 P.3d 605, 611 (Alaska 2004) (argument waived because first raised in reply brief in superior court).

. See, eg., Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 461 (Alaska 1981) (party may raise issue on appeal, even after failure to raise it at trial, if the issue involves "plain error"). Thus, plain error, a doctrine used to excuse a party's failure to raise an issue in the trial court, requires that the appellant have addressed the issue in the appellate court. Maines did not address the issue of the Meltvedt affidavit's insufficiency before us.

. Hall v. TWS, Inc., 113 P.3d 1207, 1210 (Alaska 2005).

. See Still v. Cunningham, 94 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Alaska 2004) (Issues that are not raised in the superior court are waived and cannot be asserted on appeal as grounds for overturning a judgment."); Pitka v. Interior Reg'l Hous. Auth., 54 P.3d 785, 788 (Alaska 2002) (holding that appellate court will not consider new issues in order to secure reversal of lower court).

. Waiver is a sufficient basis to resolve this issue. But I note in passing that Judge Burbank's decision that the Meltvedt affidavit was insufficient because of its conclusory nature appears to be well within the court's discretion: The Meltvedt affidavit merely sets out Meltvedt's background, recites that he has reviewed documents produced in the case, and concludes that the "analysis, service, maintenance and repair" of the truck "fell below the standards acceptable in the truck and automotive service and repair industry" so that "a failure in the [truck's] air conditioning system ... resulted in the leaking of refrigerant." Other than this flat conclusion, unsupported by any specific {acts, there is nothing. The Meltvedt report adds greater detail as to Meltvedi's background and the documents he reviewed, but recites the same conclusory language with regard to his opinion.