Court Opinion

ID: 9582062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:22:03.090316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:25.391765
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the judgment of the majority reversing the directed verdict for appellee, I believe the majority goes far beyond *134what is necessary to a resolution of this case.
The majority has correctly determined that the record in this case fails to establish "an admission of liability or an indisputable fact situation that clearly establishes liability,” either of which would support the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict for appellee on the issue of liability. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 236 Ga. 448, 451 (224 SE2d 25) (1976). Factual issues such as appellee’s knowledge of the terms of appellant’s lease with the railroad frame important jury questions which bear directly on the question of liability in this case. A directed verdict for appellee was therefore inappropriate.
Unfortunately, the majority has gone far beyond this dispositive determination and has assumed the role of factfinder in the instant appeal. In this capacity the majority determines that "[U]pon due inquiry the appellee could have ascertained the pre-eminent facts that the lease rights of its lessor Gulden expired in 1972, and that Gulden had no right to grant a lease thereafter, nor in fact any right to sublease at all without the written consent of the railroad [Gulden’s lessor].. .” Citing the case of Rosen v. Wolff, 152 Ga. 578 (110 SE 877) (1921) as authority for its position, the majority carries its analysis one step further and declares that "the appellee is held to have had notice by implication that Gulden’s own lease terminated in 1972 and that Gulden had no right to lease the appellee the property after 1972, and that his agreement to do so was worthless.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I reject the notion that the case of Rosen v. Wolff, supra, imposes upon each and every would-be lessee an absolute duty to exhaustively investigate the possible existence of a primary lease. The Rosen decision addresses the question of whether a sublessee is bound by a restrictive covenant contained in a lease of which the sublessee has notice. While it may be argued that the holding in Rosen applies to the instant case by analogy, the concept of "notice by implication” must not be extended so as to attribute constructive knowledge of the terms of a primary lease to a sublessee or assignee as a matter of law where it appears from the record that the lessee under the primary lease knowingly withheld the fact of the existence of that lease from the sublessee or assignee.
Moreover, I do not believe appellee would necessarily be barred from recovering damages even if the finder of fact determined that appellee had actual knowledge of the expiration date of appellant’s lease prior to the signing of appellee’s lease agreement. The reasonableness of appellee’s reliance on appellant’s representations concerning the duration of appellee’s leasehold *135would remain a major issue. "[A] lessee who sublets for a term longer than his own is liable to the sublessee for the damages resulting from his eviction before the expiration of the sublease; and this liability is not affected by the fact that the sublessee knows that the head lease will expire before the sublease, where he relies on the lessee’s representations that he may occupy the premises for the full term of the sublease.” 5 CJS 150, Landlord & Tenant, § 49. See also Frankfurt v. Decker, 180 SW2d 985 (Tex. Civ. App.) (1944).
The majority clearly implied in its decision that the appellee in this case has no cause of action against the appellant regardless of whether appellee reasonably relied upon appellant’s alleged misrepresentations as to the duration of the leasehold interest which he conveyed to appellee. To the extent that the majority relies on the case of Rosen v. Wolff, supra, and the concept of "notice by implication” to find that "there is no remedy for the plaintiff [appellee],” I am compelled to state that I disagree.