Court Opinion

ID: 9828772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:43:49.440864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:52.999778
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
By bill of exception taken by appellants to the paragraph of the court’s charge submitting the issue of the measure of plaintiff’s damages, the contention was made that the court should require a separate finding by the jury on each element of damages mentioned in the charge, and that the charge was erroneous, in that it required a finding by the jury of all such damages in an aggregate sum; attention being called in the bill of exception to the fact that in plaintiff’s petition she had claimed $10,000 damages for irhysieal pain and mental anguish; $4,750 for lost time and inability to work, and $250 for doctor’s bills. In said objection to the charge appellants insisted that the jury should be instructed to make separate findings upon the elements of damages so itemized by the plaintiff.
Appellants now insist that as the attention of the trial judge was thus specially directed to those matters in accordance with the present statutes governing in such cases, the old rule of decisions in force before the adoption of such statutes, requiring requested instructions calling the court’s attention to such an omission in his charge, does not now obtain. And appellants insist, further, that the conclusion reached by us is in conflict with such decisions as H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Buchanan, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 165, 84 S. W. 1073, Q. A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Galloway, 154 S. W. 653, K. C., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Worsham, 149 S. W. 755, to the effect, that a total failure to charge on the measure of damages, although merely an omission of duty on the part of the court, is reversible error, even in the absence of a requested instruction upon that issue. Even though it could be said that appellants are correct in their contention that under such circumstances a requested instruction is not necessary, yet the error, if any, would not require a reversal of the judgment, unless it appears that it was reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, an improper judgment. Rule 62a, 149 S. W. x. The total amount of damages allowed by the jury was $8,500, and as that was far less than the aggregate amount claimed in the plaintiff’s petition, it cannot be said that the jury allowed moi’e than the aggregate amount sued for. Nor have appellants pointed out any testimony to show that the jury probably allowed an excessive amount upon any particular element of damages submitted, except to say that the amount that could have been allowed under the evidence for disability to labor, viewed in its most favorable aspect, would have been negligible only, and that the doctor’s bill incurred in treatment of plaintiff for her injuries was less than $100, leaving the only item for which plaintiff reasonably could have been allowed damages that of physical and mental suffering. Plaintiff claimed $10,000 for the item of physical and mental suffering alone, and the evidence would justify a finding of great physical suffering sustained by her extending over a long period of time. In view of the entire record, we are unable to say that the omission in the charge complained of, if error at all, probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.
Another contention is made that there was fundamental error in the judgment, in view of the absence of any specific finding of negligence which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. We do not think there is any merit in this contention, as the findings of the jury were essentially to that effect, as shown by the issues submitted and the findings thereon contained in our original opinion.
Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is overruled..