Court Opinion

ID: 9489502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:17:18.793908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:33.986316
License: Public Domain

MAGILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The real issue of this case is who is to foot the bill for Ms. Schramm’s transition from high school to college: Ms. Schramm and her parents, or the Yankton School District. Ms. Schramm is a demonstrably bright, academically gifted student who requires no special education programs to excel in her course work. This case therefore presents the legal question of whether a student who is capable of achieving academic success without special education programs is nevertheless entitled to transition services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that Congress intended to mandate this delivery of patently unnecessary services.
The majority declares that “Tracy is a disabled child under IDEA because the orthopedic impairment caused by her cerebral palsy still requires ‘special education and related services.’” Maj.Op. at 1374 (quoting *137820 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A)). I disagree with this pivotal conclusion. While Tracy is undeniably “disabled” under various definitions, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and is therefore entitled to reasonable accommodations such as modified transportation assistance, the IDEA has a specialized definition which Tracy simply does not meet.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A) provides that:
The term “children with disabilities” means children—
(i) with ... orthopedic impairments ...; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.
(emphasis added). Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(7), an “ ‘[o]rthopedic impairment’ means a severe orthopedic impairment that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.” Here, Ms. Schramm’s educational performance clearly has not been adversely affected by her impairment, and she does not require special education programs.1 As the majority acknowledges, Ms. Schramm is an “A” level student bound — unlike, I would venture, many of her nondisabled classmates — for college. The last “special education” required by Ms. Schramm was for physical education; because her physical education requirements were met, the Yankton School District appropriately discontinued Ms. Schramm’s special education program.2
The purpose of the IDEA is not to “require states to provide each handicapped child with the best possible education at pub-he expense,” Petersen v. Hastings Pub. Sch., 31 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted, emphasis in original), but rather to “assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.... ” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). Ms. Schramm has received a free appropriate education which has met her special needs. Ms. Schramm has achieved considerable success in her education, and the Yankton School District determined that Ms. Schramm was no longer in need of special education services. This determination was fully supported by the facts of this case, and by the IDEA and its enabling regulations.
Because Ms. Schramm did not meet the regulatory definition of disabled, the IDEA has not been violated by the Yankton School District’s decision that Ms. Schramm was no longer entitled to special education services, and Ms. Schramm is not entitled to transition services. “In assuring that the requirements of the [IDEA] have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States.” Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Ignoring that “courts lack the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,” id. at 208, 102 S.Ct. at 3052 (quotations and citation omitted), the majority now second-guesses the Yankton School *1379District’s assessment of Ms. Schramm’s educational needs.3 I dissent.

. The regulations define "special education” as
specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including—
(i) Instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and
(ii) Instruction in physical education.
34 C.F.R. § 300.17(a)(1). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.17 n. 1 ("The definition of special education is a particularly important one under these regulations, since a child does not have a disability under this part unless he or she needs special education," (emphasis added)).

. The majority assumes that, were the school district to deny Ms. Schramm every reasonable accommodation to her disability, her academic performance would be adversely affected by her impairment. See Maj.Op. at 1375. While I tend to believe that Ms. Schramm’s academic success is more dependent on "her long hours of study” than on "these special measures,” id., I note that all of the accommodations provided to Ms. Schramm are mandated by § 504. Because Ms. Schramm will continue to receive these reasonable accommodations regardless of her status under the IDEA, I perceive no reason to disregard their existence and to speculate on what *1379impact Ms. Schramm’s impairments could have on her academic performance without them.

. As acknowledged by the school district, the issue in this case is not whether the school district can choose to supply an eligible student with special education services. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 8 n. 1 ("It is not the District's position that the District could refuse to provide special education to an eligible student under the guise of 'educational methodology' as alleged by Appellees; it is, however, the school's position that a student may be eligible for services pursuant to Section 504 but not for services pursuant to IDEA.”). Rather, the issue is whether Ms. Schramm's orthopedic disability necessitates special education at all, a matter which clearly is within the school district's expertise. The school district has determined that Ms. Schramm only required special education services for her physical education needs, which have already been met. Despite acknowledging that "school authorities are better situated than courts to determine what educational practices and materials to include in a child’s IEP,” Maj.Op. at 1376 n. 9, the majority nevertheless mandates that the school district now provide a far broader range of special education services than found necessary by the school district. In light of this, I find the majority's apparent objection that it is not second-guessing the school district's assessment of Ms. Schramm's needs, see id. at 1376 n. 9, less than convincing.