Court Opinion

ID: 9401492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 14:11:25.65794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.155157
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                               No. 04-22-00861-CV

                          In the Interest of N.T.P., C.C.P., and P.C.P., Children

                       From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                    Trial Court No. 2022-PA-00028
                          Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 7, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant S.G. (“Mother”) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her

children, N.T.P., C.C.P., and P.C.P. 1 In one issue, Mother argues the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was

in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

                                                   BACKGROUND

           On January 7, 2022, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed its

original petition for protection of the children, conservatorship, and termination of parental rights.

On January 21, 2022, the trial court held an adversary hearing and rendered temporary orders,

To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the appellant and the children by their initials. See TEX. FAM.
1

CODE. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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appointing the Department temporary managing conservator of the children. Additionally, the trial

court’s temporary orders ordered Mother to undergo drug testing as directed by the Department;

to comply with each requirement set out in the service plan prepared by the Department; and to

submit to a psychological evaluation and attend and cooperate fully in counseling sessions to

address the specific issues that led to the removal of the children.

       On December 6, 2022, the case proceeded to a bench trial. The Department presented the

testimony of a caseworker. Mother testified on her own behalf. After hearing the evidence, the

trial court signed a judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights based on three predicate

grounds: (1) constructive abandonment of the children; (2) failure to complete a court-ordered

family service plan; and (3) using a controlled substance and failing to complete a court-ordered

substance abuse treatment program. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N),(O),(P). The trial

court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Id.

§ 161.001(b)(2).

       Mother now appeals the trial court’s termination judgment. On appeal, Mother does not

challenge the predicate grounds for termination; however, she does challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.

                           BEST INTEREST AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

       To terminate parental rights under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the

Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should

be terminated pursuant to one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1) and that

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1),(2).

       Under Texas law, there is a strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served

by keeping the child with a parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). In determining

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whether the child’s parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment, we

consider the factors listed in section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code. 2 TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b). In addition to these statutory factors, we consider the non-exhaustive list of factors

set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 3

“The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from

reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest,

particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of

the child.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). Evidence that proves one or more statutory

ground for termination may also prove that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. at 28. “A

best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of

the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

         In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best-interest

finding, we look “at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether

2
 These factors are: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-
home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has
been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is
fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental
evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (7)
whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the
child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the
child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the
child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate
agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and
personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting
skills; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of extended family and friends is available to
the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).
3
 These factors are: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) the
present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the
child by the individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or the proposed placement; (8)
the parent’s acts or omissions indicating that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any
excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).

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a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.”

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.

2002)). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider disputed or conflicting

evidence. Id. at 345. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could

not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.”

Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Under these standards, the factfinder is the sole judge

of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).

                                             ANALYSIS

        In her sole issue, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support

the trial court’s best-interest finding.

Department Caseworker’s Testimony

        At trial, a Department caseworker, Marissa Benavides, testified that at the time of trial, the

children, N.T.P., C.C.P., and P.C.P., were ages eight, five, and four, respectively. They were

removed from Mother’s care on January 7, 2022, after the Department received four different

referrals for neglectful supervision and physical neglect over a five-month period. Mother was the

children’s primary caregiver. Benavides explained that at the time of removal the Department had

concerns about Mother’s drug use, the home environment, and the children’s physical well-being

due to their rotting teeth. Apart from their poor dental care, the children were healthy.

        The Department prepared a family service plan for Mother and Benavides reviewed it with

her. Although Mother refused to sign the family service plan, Mother was aware of the services on

the plan and what she needed to do to be reunified with the children. The family service plan

required Mother to: (1) submit to random drug testing; (2) undergo a drug and alcohol assessment

and follow all recommendations including inpatient or outpatient treatment; (3) participate in

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individual counseling, (4) participate in weekly one-hour visits with the children; (5) maintain safe,

stable, and appropriate housing and allow the Department announced or unannounced access to

her home to assess its safety and appropriateness for the children; and (6) maintain legal

employment and provide verification of her income and employment to the Department on a

monthly basis.

       Benavides was concerned that Mother had a long-term pattern of drug use, which she failed

to address while the case was pending. Mother told Benavides that she did not use drugs; however,

Mother admitted to a service provider that she did use drugs. Mother wholly refused to drug test.

Benavides requested that Mother submit to a drug test on twenty-two separate occasions and

Mother submitted to none. Although Mother did complete a drug assessment, she wholly refused

to attend inpatient drug treatment, even though Benavides found her an available bed on three

separate occasions. Mother demonstrated a similar lack of cooperation regarding individual

counseling. Mother performed an initial assessment with a counselor, but then refused to sign the

paperwork necessary to begin the sessions. As a result, Mother was discharged from individual

counseling. Therefore, Mother failed to engage in drug treatment or individual counseling as

required by her family service plan. Benavides pointed out that Mother could not legitimately

complain that she could not engage in services due to a lack of transportation because some

services were offered virtually and Mother had a family member who was willing to drive her to

services.

       At the beginning of the case, Mother sometimes appeared late for visits with the children

or failed to show up at all. However, for at least the last six months, Mother regularly attended her

weekly visits with the children. During the visits, Mother acted appropriately. Benavides

acknowledged that the children had a bond with Mother. However, Benavides also pointed out that

Mother had the opportunity to increase her weekly visits by engaging in her services and

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demonstrating her stability and sobriety. Even though Mother was aware of this opportunity to see

the children more frequently, she did not take advantage of it.

       Mother never provided Benavides access to her home as required by her service plan.

Benavides last attempted to conduct a home visit a week before trial, but Mother refused to let her

enter, stating that her home was not “presentable.” On another occasion, Benavides knocked on

the door and she could hear Mother and someone else in the home, but Mother did not answer the

door or otherwise respond. Despite Benavides’s requests for pay stubs or proof of income and

employment, Mother never provided her with anything.

       Benavides believed that Mother had four other children and that she had lost custody of all

of them.

       The three children in this case had remained in the same household while under the

Department’s care. Initially, the children were placed with their maternal aunt, but she was no

longer able to care for them because she was also caring for some of Mother’s other children. After

living with their aunt, the children were placed in a foster home, where they remained at the time

of trial. The current placement was not a foster-to-adopt home, but the children will remain there

until the Department locates a foster-to-adopt home for all three children. Benavides felt that there

would not be any problem finding a foster-to-adopt home for the children. The Department plans

to keep the children together because they are very bonded to each other and do well together.

       When they first came into the Department’s care, two of the children required dental care,

specifically, caps and fillings, which they received. Two of the children had a speech delay, which

is being addressed by speech therapy. Otherwise, the children do not have any special needs and

do not have any behavioral concerns.

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Mother’s Testimony

       Mother asserted that she did not use drugs while this case was pending. The reason Mother

refused to drug test was because the case was “going on for so long” and she “just [didn’t] feel

that [she] should have to go through this.” Mother further asserted that she had “cooperated with

everything else.”

       Mother acknowledged that she was ordered to perform certain services and she claimed

that she did them. According to Mother, she participated in the drug classes identified by

Benavides, and she went to Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, but these

organizations “cut [her] off” after she missed a group meeting.

       Mother claimed that she never denied Benavides access to her home; rather, Benavides

never attempted to conduct a visit. According to Mother, she emailed Benavides a few times and

requested a home visit, but Benavides did not respond to Mother’s emails.

Application

       “[T]he prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to

be in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). In determining whether the child’s

parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment, we consider the factors

listed in section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code, including the parent’s willingness and

ability to accept and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an

appropriate agency’s close supervision, and the parent’s willingness and ability to effect positive

environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time. Id. § 263.307(b)(10),(11)

       Here, there was evidence that Mother failed to participate in individual counseling and in

inpatient drug treatment as required. There was also evidence that Mother denied a caseworker

access to her home to verify its appropriateness for the children. In so doing, Mother hindered the

Department’s efforts to determine if Mother could provide the children with a safe and stable

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environment. Thus, the evidence demonstrated that Mother was unwilling to complete court-

ordered counseling services, to cooperate with and facilitate the Department’s close supervision,

and to effect positive environmental and personal changes in her life within a reasonable period of

time. See id.

       There was also evidence that Mother had a problem with drug use, which she wholly

refused to address during the pendency of the case. Mother never submitted to a single drug test

despite twenty-two requests from the Department. “[A] fact finder reasonably can infer that a

parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug tests indicates the parent is avoiding testing

because they were using illegal drugs.” See In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

       “A parent’s drug use supports a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”

Id. at 266. “The fact finder can give ‘great weight’ to the ‘significant factor’ of drug-related

conduct.” Id. “Illicit drug use is relevant to multiple Holley factors, including the children’s

emotional and physical needs now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the

children now and in the future, Mother’s parental abilities, the stability of Mother’s home, and the

acts or omissions which may indicate an improper parent-child relationship.” In re A.N., No. 04-

19-00584-CV, 2020 WL 354773, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, no pet.).

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the best-interest finding, the trial court

could have reasonably concluded that Mother was incapable of meeting the children’s emotional

and physical needs now and in the future, that the child’s current foster placement was meeting

their current emotional and physical needs, and that the Department would ensure that the

children’s future emotional and physical needs were met by finding them a permanent placement.

We conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination

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of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.

        With regard to factual sufficiency, Mother testified that she did not have a drug problem,

that she had attended Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and that

Benavides rebuffed her offers to conduct a home visit. However, we conclude the disputed

evidence is not so significant that the trial court could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

Accordingly, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.

We overrule Mother’s sole issue.

                                             CONCLUSION

        The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                    Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

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