Court Opinion

ID: 9696758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:57:23.287991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:26.471071
License: Public Domain

JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 45. (concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that under Truth-in-Sentencing I (TIS I),1 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c)2 and State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24, the circuit court was not required to bifurcate Jackson's six-year penalty enhancer and add it to the underlying term of imprisonment for his unclassified felony. Majority op., ¶¶ 3, 20. However, I disagree with the majority's method of calculating Jackson's sentence, and therefore cannot join Part IV of the opinion. As will be demonstrated below, the majority's method of calculating Jackson's sentence for his unclassified felony ignores the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)&(c). Furthermore, the calculation in Part IV of the opinion is the mathematical equivalent of what the majority linguistically claims is prohibited in Part III.
*135¶ 46. As this case involves the interpretation of several portions of Wis. Stat. § 973.01, the relevant provisions are set forth in full bellow. Section 973.01 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Bifurcated Sentence Required. Except as provided in sub. (3), whenever a court sentences a person to imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons for a felony committed on or after December 31, 1999, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence that consists of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision under s. 302.113.
(2) Structure of Bifurcated Sentences. The court shall ensure that a bifurcated sentence imposed under sub. (1) complies with all of the following:
(a) Total length of bifurcated sentence. Except as provided in par. (c), the total length of the bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the felony.
(b) Imprisonment portion of bifurcated sentences. The portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term of confinement in prison may not be less than one year, subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for the felony, and, except as provided in par. (c), may not exceed whichever of the following is applicable:
6. For any felony other than a felony specified in subds. 1. to 5., the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 75% of the total length of the bifurcated sentence.
(c)Penalty enhancement. The maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable penalty enhancement. If the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the total *136length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed is increased by the same amount.
(d) Minimum term of extended supervision. The term of extended supervision that follows the term of confinement in prison may not be less than 25% of the length of the term of confinement in prison imposed under par. (b).
Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (emphasis added).
¶ 47. The majority opinion, relying on the "rule of lenity," majority op., ¶ 41, comes to a conclusion that directly contravenes the express language of this statute. The majority calculates the maximum amount of confinement for a penalty enhanced, unclassified felony by erroneously reading § 973.01(2)(c) to require that any increase in the term of confinement also increases the term of imprisonment, which is then subject to the 75 percent bifurcation rule contained in § 973.01(2)(b)6. Majority op., ¶¶ 40, 42. However, the majority provides no authority for the proposition that § 973.01(2)(b)6. incorporates § 973.01(2)(c). The majority cites to no statutory provision that subjects the enhanced term of confinement in § 973.01(2)(c) to the confinement limitations contained in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b). Quite the contrary, § 973.01(2)(b) specifically states that any increase in confinement time under the penalty enhancement provision of § 973.01(2)(c) is not subject to the limitations contained in § 973.01(2) (b) 1.-6. Rather than incorporating § 973.01(2)(c) into § 973.01(2)(b)6., § 973.01(2)(b) explicitly excludes penalty enhancers from the limitations on confinement time contained therein. Sections 973.01(2)(b) and 973.01(2)(b)6., when read together, provide: "[t]he portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term of confinement in prison ; . . except as *137provided in par. (c) [the penalty enhancement provision], may not exceed .... 75% of the total length of the bifurcated sentence." By applying the 75 percent rule contained in § 973.01(2)(b)6. after adding the penalty enhancer to the total term of initial imprisonment, the majority effectively eradicates the phrase "except as provided in par. (c)" from § 973.01(2)(b). Because this language appears in paragraph (b), it applies to all of the limits contained in the subdivisions of paragraph (b). The majority fails to explain why this language is inapplicable to the limit in subdivision 6.
¶ 48. The error of the majority's interpretation is obvious if one looks to the other limitations on the time of confinement contained in the subdivisions of § 973.01(2)(b). If, as the majority argues, the allowable increase in confinement time contained in § 973.01(2)(c) is subject to the confinement limitations contained in § 973.01(2)(b)l.-6., then the penalty enhancer provision is rendered a nullity for classified felonies. For example, the sentencing limitation contained in subdivision 4 provides that "[f]or a Class D felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 5 years." Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)4. Similarly, subdivision 5 provides that "[f]or a Class E felony, the term of confinement in prison may not exceed 2 years." Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)5. If any increase in confinement time under § 973.01(2)(c) is subject to the limitations contained in § 973.01(2)(b) 1.-6., then the term of confinement for a Class D felony could never exceed five years, even if a penalty enhancer applied. Likewise, for a Class E felony, the term of confinement could never exceed two years, even if the initial sentence were subject to a penalty enhancer. Therefore, if a person were convicted of a Class E felony and subject to, say, a six-year penalty enhancer, the additional six years could *138never attach to his sentence. Under Volk, 258 Wis. 2d 584, the penalty enhancer cannot be added to the term of extended supervision, and under the majority's logic, the increased term of confinement is still subject to the two-year limit in § 973.01(2)(b)5.
¶ 49. This result is purely absurd, as it reads the penalty enhancement provision out of the statute. The statute attempts to avoid this absurd result by providing that the limits on the term of confinement contained in § 973.01(2)(b)l.-6. apply "except as provided in par. (c)." Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority's suggestion, majority op., ¶ 39, this language is crystal clear and unambiguously indicates that the limits contained in the subdivisions of paragraph (b) do not apply to increases in confinement time under the penalty enhancement provision of paragraph (c). The majority's reading of the statute ignores this language and therefore places the vitality of penalty enhancers under TIS I in serious jeopardy. The majority fails to explain why the penalty enhancement provision of § 973.01(2)(c) is subject to the limit contained in § 973.01(2)(b)6., but not the limits proscribed in § 973.01(2)(b)l.-5. In other words, the majority does not explain why the phrase "except as provided in par. (c)" applies to subdivisions 1.-5. but not to subdivision 6. The only difference between § 973.01(2)(b)l.-5. and § 973.01(2)(b)6. is that the former provisions cap confinement time for classified felonies at a definitive number, whereas, the latter provision caps confinement time for unclassified felonies by providing that the term of confinement cannot exceed a certain percentage of the total sentence. None of the limits contained in the subdivisions of § 973.01(2)(b) contain any reference to § 973.01(2)(c). If any increase in confinement time under § 973.01(2)(c) *139is subject to the limit in § 973.01(2)(b)6., then any increase must also be subject to the limits in § 973.01(2)(b) 1.-5. There is simply no textual basis for distinguishing the limit on confinement time for unclassified felonies from the limits proscribed for classified felonies; both are subject to the phrase "except as provided in par. (c)."
¶ 50. The majority attempts to justify a distinction by misreading the second sentence of § 973.01(2) (c) in conjunction with § 973.01(2)(b)6. to provide that the enhanced sentence is bifurcated only after the enhancer is added to the initial sentence. Majority op., ¶¶ 40, 42. The second sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) provides: "If the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the total length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed is increased by the same amount." (Emphasis added.) Notably, this sentence does not provide that the total length of an increased sentence is thereafter subject to the limitations in § 973.01(2)(b). To read this sentence as such is entirely illogical because, as demonstrated above, § 973.01(2)(b) expressly excludes increases in the term of confinement under § 973.01(2)(c) from the requirements listed in § 973.01(2)(b)l.-6. Also, the first sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) provides: "The maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable penalty enhancement." (Emphasis added.) The plain language of the statute contemplates that the enhancer is added after the maximum term of confinement specified in paragraph (b) is calculated. The second sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) simply provides that the total term of imprisonment calculated under § 973.01(2)(b) is subsequently increased as a mathematical consequence of the penalty *140enhancer being added to the term of confinement pursuant to the first sentence in § 973.01(2)(c).
¶ 51. The majority writes, "[w]e apply the 75% rule of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 after the penalty enhancer is added to the underlying maximum term of confinement." Majority op., ¶ 42. The error of the majority is obvious. The penalty enhancer cannot be added to the underlying term of confinement until the underlying term of confinement is calculated. However, in order to calculate the underlying term of confinement in the first place, the 75 percent rule of § 973.01(2)(b)6. must be applied.
¶ 52. I do not understand how the majority can add the penalty enhancer in § 973.01(2)(c) to the underlying term of confinement without first calculating the underlying term of confinement under the 75 percent rule contained in § 973.01(2)(b)6. The statute itself requires that the penalty enhancer is added after the initial term of confinement is calculated: "The maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable enhancement. If the maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) is increased under this paragraph, the total length of the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed is increased by the same amount." Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) (emphasis added). The majority never calculates the underlying term of confinement and instead seems to add the enhancer directly to the total term of the sentence. See majority op., ¶ 40-42.
¶ 53. Either the majority is applying the 75 percent rule twice — once to calculate the underlying term of confinement and then again after the penalty enhancer is added — or the majority is simply adding the penalty enhancer to the total term of imprisonment without ever calculating the underlying term of con*141finement. This second possibility is the mathematical equivalent of Jackson's argument that the majority supposedly rejects. Jackson argues that his penalty enhancer, six years or 72 months, is subject to the 75 percent bifurcation rule and added to the total length of imprisonment. Pet'r br., at 8-10. Therefore, Jackson reasons that only 75 percent of 72 months, or 54 months should be added to his initial 27-month term of confinement to produce a total 81 months of confinement. Id. at 10. The majority states that it rejects this argument. Majority op., ¶ 3.
¶ 54. Yet, the majority reaches the exact same figure as Jackson regarding his total term of increased confinement, 81 months. Compare majority op., ¶ 42 with pet'r br., at 10, 12. The majority reasons that the 72-month enhancer increases the total term of imprisonment to 108 months, which is then bifurcated according to the 75 percent rule, to reach 81 months of confinement. Majority op., ¶ 42. The only difference between the majority's approach and Jackson's is that instead of bifurcating the 72 months up front and then adding the resulting 54 months to the original 27 months of confinement to reach 81 months, the majority adds the 72 months to the total term of initial imprisonment, 36 months, and then bifurcates under the 75 percent rule to reach 81 months.
¶ 55. The majority's reading of § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) directly contradicts its earlier position that the total amount of confinement subject to a penalty enhancer is not calculated by adding the enhancer to the original underlying term of imprisonment. Majority op., ¶ 3. While the majority states that it rejects Jackson's argument that the 72-month enhancer should be added to the underlying maximum term of imprisonment, id., its mathematical formula does precisely just that:
*142Six year penalty enhancer (72 months)
+ Underlying maximum term of imprisonment (36 months)
(Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c)) _
108 months
108 months x 75% = 81 months maximum amount of confinement
Majority op., ¶ 42.
¶ 56. Following the approach of the State, and in accordance with the plain language of the statute, I conclude that Jackson should be subject to a total of 108 months imprisonment, composed of 99 months confinement and 9 months extended supervision. When read properly, § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) set forth a two-step procedure for calculating sentences affected by a penalty enhancer. First, the original term of imprisonment is calculated pursuant to the limits contained in § 973.01(2)(b). - Second, under § 973.01(2)(c), "[t]he maximum term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by any applicable penalty enhancement." Therefore, any applicable penalty enhancer increases the total amount of confinement that was calculated under paragraph (b).
¶ 57. Prior to the application of the penalty enhancer, the total amount of imprisonment available for Jackson's unclassified felony is three years or 36 months. This underlying sentence is bifurcated into a term of confinement and a term of extended supervision. Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1). Symbolically, this relationship between confinement, extended supervision, and the total term of imprisonment can be represented as follows: "a" = confinement; "b" = extended supervision; *143and "c" = total term of imprisonment. Pursuant to § 973.01(1), "a" + "b" = "c." Therefore, "c," the total term of imprisonment, equals 36 months.
¶ 58. Under § 973.01(2)(b)6., the maximum amount of confinement for an unclassified felony may not exceed 75 percent of the total length of the sentence. As such, Jackson's maximum term of confinement for his unclassified felony, pre-enhancement, is 75 percent of 36 months, or 27 months. The remainder, nine months, is the term of extended supervision. Therefore, Jackson's pre-enhanced sentence is represented as follows: "a"= 27; "b"= 9; and "c"= 36. 27 + 9 = 36.
¶ 59. Next, pursuant to § 973.01(2)(c), the amount of the penalty enhancer is added to the maximum term of confinement specified in paragraph (b), which was just determined to be 27 months. Jackson's penalty enhancer is six years or 72 months. Adding 72 months to 27 months yields a total period of confinement of 99 months. Therefore, post-enhancement, Jackson's term of confinement "a^ has a value of 99. While the amount of confinement is now greater than 75 percent of Jackson's total sentence, as discussed supra, § 973.01(2)(b) provides that the 75 percent rule for unclassified felonies in § 973.01(2)(b)6. is not applicable to an increase in the term of confinement under § 973.01(2)(c).
¶ 60. The second sentence of § 973.01(2)(c) provides that if "a" is increased by 72 months, "c," as a function of "a" + "b" is increased by that same amount: "a" + 72 + "b" = "c" + 72. Jackson's sentence structure now appears as follows: "a+ "b" = "c-l" or 99 + 9 = 108. Thus, pursuant to the second sentence of § 973.01(2)(c), "c/ is now 108 months, which is 72 months greater than "c," the precise amount of the *144increase in confinement between "a" and "a^" Therefore, Jackson's total enhanced sentence should be 108 months, composed of 99 months confinement and nine months extended supervision.
¶ 61. I do agree with the majority, although for different reasons, that the court of appeals erred in applying the 25 percent rule contained in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d). Majority op., ¶ 36. Section 973.01(2)(d) provides: "The term of extended supervision that follows the term of confinement in prison may not be less than 25% of the length of the term of confinement in prison imposed under par. (b)." (Emphasis added.) This section has no reference to paragraph (c); it simply provides that when a bifurcated sentence is calculated under paragraph (b), the term of extended supervision cannot be less than 25 percent of the term of confinement calculated under that paragraph. As noted above, § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) provide a two-step procedure for calculating sentences with penalty enhancers. Under the initial calculation pursuant to § 973.01(2)(b)6., Jackson's term of confinement was 27 months and his term of extended supervision was nine months. Twenty-five percent of 27 months equals 6.75 months. Therefore, Jackson's initial term of extended supervision was greater than 25 percent of the initial term of confinement and the proscription contained in § 973.01(2)(d) was not violated. As § 973.01(2)(c) provides that a penalty enhancer is added to the term of confinement after the original sentence is bifurcated under § 973.01(2)(b), the 25 percent rule in § 973.01(2)(d) does not apply to the enhanced sentence.
¶ 62. The majority states that this approach is reasonable, majority op., ¶ 29, yet, in the interest of "lenity," it elects to adopt an approach that ignores the plain language of § 973.01(2)(b)&(c) and contradicts its *145earlier position that the total amount of confinement subject to a penalty enhancer is not calculated by adding the enhancer to the original underlying term of imprisonment.
¶ 63. For these reasons, while I concur in the mandate of the majority opinion, I do not join Part IV of the opinion.

 See 1997 Wis. Act 283.

 All reference to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted.