Court Opinion

ID: 9882131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 14:27:21.925371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:51.285407
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  21-P-590

                             HEATHER B. MONTALVO

                                       vs.

                              JOSE L. MONTALVO.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant (husband) appeals from an amended judgment of

 contempt entered November 16, 2021, including an award

 allocating the fees of the special master and granting the wife

 attorney's fees.      We affirm the amended contempt judgment to the

 extent the judge found that the husband failed to comply with

 the divorce judgment's requirement that the marital home be sold

 "forthwith."     However, we vacate so much of the amended contempt

 judgment as rests on the judge's determination that the husband

 violated any other provision of the divorce judgment or

 subsequent order, and remand the matter for reconsideration and

 reallocation of the special master's and attorney's fees.
     Background.    We summarize the findings of the judge,

supplemented by certain undisputed facts. 1   The essential facts

are undisputed.    After trial, a judgment of divorce nisi entered

on July 24, 2019, nunc pro tunc to June 21, 2019 (divorce

judgment).   As pertinent to this appeal, the divorce judgment

provided that

     "[t]he marital home located at 25 Moses Wheelock Lane, Unit
     20, Westboro, MA, which is subject to a deed restriction,
     shall be sold forthwith. The parties shall list the home
     for sale with a real estate broker, subject to the deed
     restriction and the Department of Housing and Community
     Development Regulations. If the parties are unable to
     agree upon a real estate broker on or before September 1,
     2019, Attorney Thomas Donahue is appointed as Master to
     effectuate the sale of the marital home. The fees
     associated with a Master, as appointed by the Court, shall
     be paid from the proceeds from the sale of the property
     prior to any distribution to the parties. The Master shall
     have the authority to list the property for sale, subject
     to the deed restriction and the Department of Housing and
     Community Development Regulations, hire a real estate agent
     and agree upon a sale price. Upon the marital home being
     sold, the Master's Fees being paid and all normal and
     customary costs associated with said sale being paid, the
     parties shall share equally in the then remaining proceeds
     from the sale."

1 The husband correctly points out that the statement in the
amended judgment that the defendant "continued to attempt to
refinance the existing mortgage on said home, which indebted
both parties" is inconsistent with the judge's findings and
unsupported by the evidence. As correctly found in the judge's
findings, the defendant was seeking to obtain financing for
another home, not the marital home. The erroneous statement in
the amended judgment should be corrected by the judge on remand.

                                  2
At the time the divorce judgment entered, the husband was living

in the marital home with the couple's two children, of whom he had

primary physical custody.

     The parties obtained the marital home through a lottery

system for affordable homes.    Title was in the husband's name

alone, as was the mortgage.    The property was encumbered by a

deed rider requiring the husband to notify the Department of

Housing and Community Development (DHCD) and the town of

Westborough in writing of his intent to sell the property before

it could be put on the market.    However, even after giving such

notice, the husband retained the right to halt the sale of the

property at any time, and DHCD was required to comply with any

such request from the husband.    The property could be sold only

to a qualified buyer at no more than the maximum price set by

DHCD.

     The husband did not take the initial step towards sale,

which was to notify DHCD of his intent to sell the property,

until September 11, 2019.   Thereafter, the husband completed a

resale property information form, and the DCHD notified the town

of its right of first refusal, which the town elected to waive.

The property was placed on the open market on December 10, 2019.

     The record supported the judge's findings that the husband

took several steps thereafter that effectively caused the

property to be taken off the market.    Specifically, on December

                                  3
31, 2019, the husband informed DHCD that he would not be

available for several weeks, which halted marketing efforts.     On

February 3, 2020, the husband informed DHCD that he was

attempting to obtain financing on another home and would be

seeking from the court additional time to comply with the

divorce judgment. 2   On April 27, 2020 -- shortly after the wife

filed a complaint for contempt -- the husband reinitiated the

sale process, but halted it again on May 13, 2020, by informing

DHCD that he would be unavailable.    On June 5, 2020, the husband

informed DHCD that he wished to reinstate the sale process, but

that his compliance with the divorce judgment was contingent

upon his finding alternative housing.    The divorce judgment did

not permit the husband to impose such a contingency.

     On July 21, 2020, the judge held a hearing on the wife's

contempt complaint.    The judge credited the special master's

report at the hearing that there was a buyer interested in the

property, but that the sales process was on hold due to the

husband's self-made condition that the sale of the property be

contingent upon his finding alternative housing.    The judge

found the defendant in contempt for failing to comply with the

2 On February 3, 2020, the husband filed a complaint for
modification seeking more time to comply with the divorce
judgment due to his difficulties in obtaining alternate housing.
That complaint was dismissed, a ruling the husband did not
appeal.

                                  4
divorce judgment despite having the ability to comply and

ordered the husband to "sign any offer from a qualified buyer

with no contingencies."   Further, the defendant was notified

that "[t]he court may assess further fees and sanctions for

failure to comply with this order."

     Following the July 21, 2020, order, the husband entered

into a purchase and sale agreement (P&S) with his live-in

girlfriend, who had been deemed qualified by DHCD, at the

maximum sale price set by DHCD.   The wife then sought to halt

the sale to the girlfriend as further relief on her contempt

complaint.   On August 31, 2020, the judge declared void the P&S

on the ground that it was not in fact a bona fide offer.    The

judge also ordered the husband to accept an offer only from a

"neutral third party buyer."   The husband filed a timely

petition for interlocutory relief from a single justice of this

court.   The petition was allowed on October 8, 2020, and the

single justice concluded that the judge abused her discretion in

voiding the P&S.   The single justice found that, although the

proposed purchaser was the husband's significant other, she had

been approved by DHCD to buy the home for the maximum resale

value and there was no evidence that the offer was made without

good faith or fraudulently.

     On October 26, 2020, after hearing, the judge entered a

further order on the contempt complaint, requiring that "[a]ny

                                  5
proceeds from the sale of [the property] shall be held in

escrow" by the special master.

     On November 5, 2020, the husband and his girlfriend entered

into a subsequent P&S (second P&S) at the maximum sale price,

with a deposit of $6,070, and a closing date of November 30,

2020.   On December 28, 2020, the special master filed an interim

report in which he stated the closing did not occur as

scheduled.   The special master also reported that the closing

was on hold because of an issue the lender had with appraisal

associated with the loan to the girlfriend.   On December 29,

2020, the judge issued a further temporary order on the contempt

complaint, in which she authorized the special master to obtain

a copy of the second P&S and information concerning any pending

loan applications.

     On February 12, 2021, the special master filed a further

supplement and interim report stating that, after some back-and-

forth concerning loan application and mortgage information, he

had approved the transfer of the property on February 11, 2021.

The closing took place the following day, February 12, 2021.

Also on that day, the wife filed a motion seeking an order

requiring that the husband be responsible for the fees of the

special master.   The wife claimed that the husband had delayed

the sale of the property, and that the husband and his

girlfriend had frustrated the special master's ability to obtain

                                 6
necessary information.    Simultaneously, the wife filed a motion

seeking an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $20,915.

     On February 15, 2021, after having received a copy of the

closing disclosure, the special master learned that the husband

had given the girlfriend a credit of $7,982.81 toward the

purchase price.    The special master was told that the second P&S

provided that the husband would "credit the buyer up to 6% of

the purchase price as a closing cost credit at closing as

allowed under the mortgage terms.     This shall come out of his

proceeds only.    Any share of the proceeds being paid to other

parties shall not be affected by this credit."     The special

master was also told by the closing attorney that the girlfriend

would not have qualified for the mortgage without this credit.

The effect of this undisclosed arrangement was that the special

master would receive only $35,742.13 (plus the $6,070 deposit)

from the sale, rather than $49,796 as he should have.     The

special master suggested to the judge that the husband's credit

be paid directly to the wife, and that the proceeds from the

sale be divided keeping "in mind the cost of the special master,

the application for counsel fees filed by the [p]laintiff's

attorney, and any sanctions that may be assessed."

     On February 17, 2021, the wife filed a second complaint for

contempt (second contempt complaint), claiming that the closing

cost credit violated the judge's October 26, 2020, order because

                                  7
it was not disclosed by the husband to the special master and

because it diverted funds to the girlfriend and away from the

escrow to be held by the special master.

     On April 27, 2021, after further hearing, the judge found

the husband to be in contempt of the divorce judgment by failing

to sell the property "forthwith."    The judge divided the

proceeds of the sale equally between the husband and wife

($24,898 after accounting for the closing cost credit), found

that the husband's failure to comply with the sale of the

property resulted in the need for extensive involvement of the

special master, ordered the husband to pay one hundred percent

of the special master fees ($7,280), and awarded $15,750 in

attorney's fees for the wife.   The judgment was later amended to

reduce the attorney's fees award after the wife's counsel

acknowledged an error as to the amount of the fees.    This appeal

followed.

     Discussion.   The husband makes two major arguments on

appeal.   First, the husband argues that the judge abused her

discretion in finding him in contempt of the divorce judgment.

Second, he argues that the judge abused her discretion in

ordering him to bear the full amount of the special master's

fees and the wife's attorney's fees.    We address each of these

arguments in turn.

                                 8
     1.   Finding of contempt.   "We review the judge's ultimate

finding of contempt for abuse of discretion, but we review

underlying conclusions of law de novo and underlying findings of

fact for clear error."   Jones v. Jones, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 673,

688 (2022), quoting Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n v.

Boston Boat Basin, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 532 (2018).     "[A]

judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of

discretion where we conclude the judge made 'a clear error of

judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, such

that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives" (citation omitted).     L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).   "A finding is 'clearly erroneous'

when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed."     Rosen v. Rosen,

90 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 692 (2016), quoting Martin v. Martin, 70

Mass. App. Ct. 547, 549 (2007).    "[W]e give 'due regard' to the

trial judge's ability to judge the witnesses' credibility."

O'Connell v. Greenwood, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 150 (2003).

     "To constitute civil contempt there must be 'clear and

convincing evidence of disobedience of a clear and unequivocal

command.'"   Jones, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 687, quoting Birchall,

petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 853 (2009).     "Civil contempt 'can be

used as an enforcement mechanism only if the underlying order is

                                  9
sufficiently clear, so that the party to be bound is provided

with adequate notice of the required or prohibited activity.'"

Lynch v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 776

(2001), quoting Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424

Mass. 501, 565-566 (1997).    "The requisite unequivocal clarity

requires more than a general statement that might or might not

include the accused's conduct."    O'Connell, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at

150.

       "[V]ague or ambiguous language in a judicial decree will

not suffice.    Ambiguities are regularly resolved in favor of the

alleged contemnor, and cannot be removed by examining the

evidence underlying the judgment in which the ambiguous language

is found." (Citations omitted.)    Sax v. Sax, 53 Mass. App. Ct.

765, 772 (2002).    Findings of contempt "have been upheld where,

although the operative language was facially unclear, the simple

straightforward, and undisputed facts regarding the parties'

post-agreement conduct, clearly showed not only what the

language meant but also that the parties shared a common

understanding of that meaning.    Far different are cases where

the order's language is filled with discretion . . . or cannot

be understood without an extensive review of the evidence,

findings, or other background materials on which it is based."

(Citations omitted.)    Id. at 772-773.

                                  10
     The divorce judgment ordered that "[t]he marital home

. . ., which is subject to a deed restriction, shall be sold

forthwith," followed by a series of provisions prescribing the

appointment of a special master.      The husband argues that the

divorce judgment's order was not a clear and unequivocal command

"because it defers to the authority of DHCD and makes reference

to deed restrictions and DHCD regulations creating ambiguity as

to the judgment's directives."   We disagree.

     The divorce judgment unambiguously required the husband to

"list the home for sale with a real estate broker, subject to

the deed restriction and the [DHCD] Regulations" so that the

property could be sold "forthwith."      The divorce judgment also

required the parties to agree on a real estate broker by

September 1, 2019.   The failure to meet the September 1 deadline

resulted in the appointment of the special master.      That is not

to say, however, that the husband was insulated from

responsibility under the divorce judgment once a special master

was appointed.   The husband remained responsible for listing the

marital home for sale, which he had the power to do under the

deed rider and DHCD regulations. 3

3 The husband -- not the wife -- participated in the DHCD's local
initiative program, and he was given the opportunity to purchase
the marital home at an affordable price. Accordingly, his was
the only name on the deed to the property, and he was required
to follow the process outlined in section 4 of the deed rider to
sell the property. That process required him to notify DHCD and

                                 11
     The obligation to list the property for sale and sell it

"forthwith" would naturally include the obligation not to

withdraw the home from the market once listed, as well as an

obligation not to impose conditions of the husband's own making

on the listing or sale.   See Demoulas, 424 Mass. at 567 ("We

have upheld findings of contempt where the court order, although

subject to some legal interpretation, has nonetheless placed the

party bound by the order on notice that certain actions could

constitute the basis for contempt").   The record supported a

conclusion that the husband violated the divorce judgment by

withdrawing the house from the market on multiple occasions, and

by imposing conditions on the sale of his own making.

Accordingly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding

that the husband was in contempt of his obligation under the

divorce judgment to list the property with a real estate broker,

subject to the deed restrictions, in a manner to accomplish the

sale of the property "forthwith."

     However, the judge also concluded that by giving a closing

credit to the girlfriend, the husband had violated both (1) the

the town of Westborough that he intended to sell the property;
at that point DHCD calculated the maximum resale price and
commenced the marketing process (once the town waived its option
to purchase the property). However, "once the resale process
outlined in Section 4 of the Deed Rider commences, . . . it is
not DHCD's normal practice to compel the homeowner to continue
with the sale of the property," when a homeowner decides they no
longer wish to sell.

                                12
divorce judgment, which provided that "[u]pon the marital home

being sold, the Master's Fees being paid and all normal and

customary costs associated with said sale being paid, the

parties shall share equally in the then remaining proceeds from

said sale"; and (2) the temporary order dated October 26, 2020,

which required that "any proceeds" of the sale be held in escrow

by the special master.   "[I]n order to find a defendant in civil

contempt there must be a clear and unequivocal command and an

equally clear and undoubted disobedience."    Hoort v. Hoort, 85

Mass. App. Ct. 363, 365 (2014), quoting Larson v. Larson, 28

Mass. App. Ct. 338, 340 (1990).    Neither the divorce judgment,

nor the October 26 temporary order was a clear and unequivocal

order that the husband could not extend a closing credit that

would not affect the amount the wife was to receive from the

sale.   We note in this regard that "normal and customary costs

associated with said sale" as used in the divorce judgment is

silent as to the handling of credits, and that "any proceeds"

was undefined in the temporary order and could easily be

understood to mean net proceeds from the sale.

     Accordingly, we affirm the finding of contempt only to the

extent it is based on the husband's failure to list and maintain

the property for sale in a manner to accomplish its sale

"forthwith."

                                  13
     2.    Award of special master's fees and attorney's fees.

The husband argues that the judge abused her discretion by

awarding the full amount of the wife's attorney's fees without

any examination of the reasonableness of the fees.     Second, the

husband argues that the judge abused her discretion by ordering

the husband to pay one hundred percent of the special master's

fees without considering the wife's own conduct in delaying the

sale.     Third, the husband claims that the judge erred in

awarding fees without finding that he had the ability to pay

them.

     As presented to the judge, there were three potential

procedural mechanisms by which she could make an award of

attorney and special master fees against the husband.     The first

was on the wife's contempt complaint and the temporary orders

entered on that complaint.     The second was on the wife's motion

for an award of attorney's fees based on the husband's purported

"various and sundry actions and behavior to obfuscate the sale

of the home in order to frustrate the" divorce judgment.       The

third was on the wife's motion for an order allocating the fees

of the special master based on similar allegations, as well as

the refusal to provide necessary information to the special

master.     In the end, the judge awarded fees solely on the

contempt complaint, and took no separate action on the wife's

two motions.     That said, the judge based the award of fees not

                                  14
only on the husband's violation of the divorce judgment, but

also on her finding that the husband's closing credit violated

both the divorce judgment and the October 26 temporary order.

       In light of our conclusion that the judge erred in finding

the husband in contempt for giving the closing credit, a remand

is necessary to permit the judge to reconsider the allocation

and amount of the special master and attorney's fees.    There is

no doubt that "the awarding of attorney's fees and costs is an

appropriate element of a successful civil contempt proceeding."

Martinez v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 708 (2019),

quoting Ventresca v. Town Manager of Billerica, 68 Mass. App.

Ct. 62, 65 (2007).    But the award must be grounded in the legal

fees incurred "as a consequence of the [husband's] violation of

the court order."    Ventresca, quoting Demoulas, 424 Mass. at

571.    Where a party has not prevailed in a contempt proceeding,

fees should ordinarily not be awarded.    See id. at 65-66.   In

this case, the pertinent order is the command in the divorce

judgment that the husband list the property so that the property

could be sold forthwith.    It necessarily follows that, on

remand, the judge should consider the extent to which the wife's

own actions may have delayed the sale.    The wife is not entitled

to recover fees resulting from any delay she may have caused.

       In addition, it appears from the record that the judge may

have accepted the wife's application for fees without close

                                 15
examination of its reasonableness or relationship to the

contumacious actions of the husband.    We note in this regard

that the judge accepted the first fee application at face value

even though it contained a significant error resulting in more

than twice the amount of fees that should have been claimed, and

that she does not appear to have engaged in any examination of

the reasonableness of the second fee affidavit.    On remand, we

are confident that the judge will give close examination to the

amount of attorney's fees claimed and their relationship to the

husband's contempt.

     We do not mean to suggest that, on remand, the judge cannot

make an award of attorney's fees against the husband, or that

she cannot allocate more than fifty percent of the special

master fees to him.   However, any award should take into account

the considerations we have set out above.

     Finally, the husband argues that the judge did not consider

his ability to pay the award of fees.    This argument, however,

appears to be targeted to the original contempt judgment, which

resulted in a net judgment against the husband in excess of his

half of the proceeds from the sale.    As we have already noted,

the amount was significantly reduced in the amended contempt

judgment, with the result that the husband would receive some

amount from the sale.   The husband has made no argument

concerning his ability to pay the amended amount.    In any event,

                                16
because the judge, as a result of this decision, will reconsider

the amount and allocation of attorney's and special master's

fees, the father's argument is best directed to the trial court

on remand.

       Conclusion.   We affirm so much of the amended judgment of

contempt as found the husband in contempt of the divorce

judgment provision requiring the marital home to be sold

forthwith.    We vacate the remainder of the amended judgment of

contempt, and remand the matter for reconsideration and

reallocation of the special master's and attorney's fees.       We

allow the wife's request for appellate attorney's fees.       In

accordance with the procedure specified in Fabre v. Walton, 441

Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004), the wife may, within fourteen days of the

issuance of this decision, submit an application for attorney's

fees with the appropriate supporting materials.       The husband

shall have fourteen days thereafter to respond.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                         Shin & Ditkoff, JJ. 4),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    October 5, 2023.

4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  17