Court Opinion

ID: 9668640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:20:28.895083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.744881
License: Public Domain

McDONALD, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the disposition of this case by Judge Morrison.
In reviewing the statement of facts, it is noted that the trial judge stated that he had read all the cases he could find on the law and that he had come to the conclusion that the only discretion he had in a given fact situation was when a defendant had an excuse for not being present in the trial court.
The careful trial judge, I think, earnestly endeavored to correctly interpret and apply the law in this case when he made the foregoing statement, and I infer from such statement and two other separate and almost identical statements made by him that he would possibly have exercised his discretion and granted a remittitur had he felt that he possessed the authority to do so. I feel that in a proper case, wherein —as I view it here— discretionary power is vested in the trial court, his failure to exercise such power would constitute an abuse of discretion.
In abstractly viewing “abuse of discretion,” one might well conclude in a given case that the trial court created harm, and thus an abuse of his discretion, by exceeding the bounds of his authority.
*458On the other hand, the lack of action on the part of the trial court and his failure to remedy a harmful situation might possibly bring about equally as much harm as would his exceeding the bounds of reasonable discretion .
It is evident that Art. 439, V.A.C.C.P., does vest broad discretion in the trial court to remit the whole or part of the sum specified in the bond or recognizance.
There is no statutory authority giving discretionary power to this court. At the same time, it is elemental that this court does have the right, power, and authority to review the acts of the trial court in abusing his discretionary power.
The two early appeals in bond forfeiture cases decided in 1912, namely: Johnson, et al, v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. Rep. 51, 150 S.W. 890, and Williamson, et al, v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. Rep. 53, 150 S.W. 892, are cited in some quarters as authority for saying that discretionary power to grant remittiturs is not vested in this court.
It was held in the Johnson case that only in those instances where the record disclosed that the trial court had abused the discretion confided in him would this court be authorized to disturb the judgment. This court discussed the facts in the case and pointed out that the trial court had found as a fact that Johnson had wilfully and intentionally absented himself to prevent a trial of his case at the certain term of court, and this court found that making final a forfeiture of the full amount of the bond would not be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
I feel that the holding of this court in the Johnson case allows sufficient latitude to authorize us to disturb a judgment of the trial court.
Much has been said with reference to the statutory provisions leaving this matter discretionary with the lower court and not with this court. If this court properly reviews cases involving an abuse of discretion by a trial court, then it certainly should have some latitude in correcting cases of the trial court’s abuse of discretion other than to simply reverse and remand the case for another trial.
By the majority opinion in this case we are giving to the trial court an opportunity to do that which he thought he had no *459authority to do, or, if he disagres with us, then he may try the lawsuit again.
I do not doubt the power of the trial court to decline to remit, but I think the trial court clearly demonstrated by his statements that he did not consider he possessed any authority to . remit in this case.