Court Opinion

ID: 9388457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 17:00:24.35284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.485630
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           ____________

                          Nos. 21-3198 & 22-2079

                               ____________

                           MEGHAN M. KELLY,
                                   Appellant

                                      v.

 DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL PATRICIA B. SWARTZ; DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
KATHLEEN M. VAVALA; DAVID A. WHITE, CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL;
      OFFICE DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL; BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE;
   PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATORY COMMITTEE; ATTORNEY GENERAL
                           DELAWARE

                               ____________

               On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the District of Delaware
                    (District Court No. 1-21-cv-01490)
                  District Judge: Hon. Colm F. Connolly
                               ____________

              Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                               April 11, 2023
                              ____________

    Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

                           (Filed: April 20, 2023)
                                        ____________

                                          OPINION *
                                        ____________

CHAGARES, Chief Judge.

       Meghan Kelly, a Delaware attorney, filed a complaint for injunctive and related

relief to halt a state proceeding to adjust her bar status to “disability inactive” (the

“disability proceeding”). The disability proceeding has since concluded. For the reasons

that follow, we will dismiss the appeal in part as moot and affirm in part the District

Court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. We also will affirm the District Court’s

other orders, including its post-judgment orders denying reconsideration.

                                               I.1

       Delaware’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) 2 informed Kelly in August

2021 that it had concerns about her fitness to practice law and requested that she

voluntarily submit to a mental health examination. Kelly refused an examination. The

ODC then informed her that it would petition the Preliminary Review Committee

(“PRC”) 3 to place her Delaware bar membership on disability inactive status.

       Kelly responded by filing a 103-page pro se complaint in the United States District

*
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
  Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.
2
  The ODC is an independent arm of the Delaware Supreme Court that has authority to
recommend disciplinary action regarding the practice of law in Delaware. See Del.
Supreme Ct. Rule 64(e)(3).
3
  The PRC reviews the recommendations of the ODC following its initial investigation.
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“Del. Disc. Rules”) 3(a).
                                               2
Court for the District of Delaware naming the ODC and several of its officials, the PRC,

the Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR”), 4 and the state Attorney General

(collectively referred to as “the defendants”). In it, she claims the defendants are

pursuing the disciplinary proceeding to malign and retaliate against her based on her

political and religious beliefs. Kelly’s complaint seeks injunctive relief and asserts

claims under § 1983, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, obstruction of

justice, and for injury to her reputation. She seeks relief in the form of an injunction,

attorneys’ fees, and “possibly” damages for emotional distress. Complaint 103. 5

       The District Court dismissed the complaint and denied related relief, including a

request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that it should abstain under Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). It determined: (1) the disciplinary proceeding falls within an

“exceptional category” covered by Younger, see Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S.

69, 78 (2013); and (2), the disciplinary proceeding is: (a) a state judicial proceeding that

(b) implicates important state interests and (c) allows an adequate opportunity to raise

constitutional challenges, see Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

457 U.S. 423, 432 (1983). Kelly timely appealed.

        Kelly then filed in the District Court a “motion for reargument” and other

motions, which the court construed as seeking reconsideration under Federal Rule of

4
  The BPR conducts hearings and makes findings, conclusions, and recommendations in
attorney discipline and disability matters. Del. Disc. Rule 2(a). The BPR submits its
report and recommendation to the Delaware Supreme Court for review. Del. Disc. Rule
9(e).
5
  Page 103 of the Complaint appears to have been omitted from the Supplemental
Appendix.
                                              3
Civil Procedure 59(e) and denied. Kelly filed an amended notice of appeal to incorporate

that order and continued filing motions in that court. She sought, among other things,

reconsideration of the reconsideration denial under Rules 52(b) and 59(e). The District

Court denied relief, and Kelly filed a second notice of appeal. The appeals have been

consolidated for all purposes.

       The Delaware Supreme Court issued an order while the appeals were pending,

transferring Kelly to disability inactive status. 6 It noted that Kelly’s court filings “were

confusing and unfocused, irrelevant to the issues at hand, demonstrated a lack of

understanding of the role of courts, and were non-compliant with court rules.”

Supplemental Appendix (“Supp. App.”) 149. Due to Kelly’s religious objection to a

mental health examination, none was conducted. The Delaware Supreme Court instead

considered the record, noting that Kelly’s “inability to make cogent legal arguments,

present relevant evidence, or identify relevant legal authority is painfully clear from the

record.” Supp. App. 154. It concluded that Kelly’s “lack of competence to practice law

endangers prospective clients, the public, and the orderly administration of justice.”

Supp. App. 155. The court also considered and rejected Kelly’s constitutional claims.

       Kelly’s bar status is now disability inactive and she cannot practice law in

Delaware. If she wishes to seek reinstatement, she must petition the Delaware Supreme

Court for reinstatement to active status. See Del. Disc. Rule 19(e).

6
  The Delaware Supreme Court appointed counsel for Kelly at no cost to her, but she
elected to proceed pro se.
                                               4
                                            II.7

                                             A.

       Kelly’s complaint primarily seeks to vindicate First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights through an injunction to halt the disability proceeding. See Supp. App. 130–35;

see also Supp. App. 39 (“I brought this law suit . . . to enjoin proceedings brought by the

Defendants to place my attorney license on inactive disabled in violation of the First

Amendment . . . [and] Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”). Because Delaware since has

concluded the disability proceeding, the requested injunctive relief is no longer available.

That aspect of the complaint is therefore moot. 8 See Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar

Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718, 724 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[I]ssuance of the [disciplinary] decision by the

Ohio Supreme Court moots plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against

defendants.”); Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that,

when the underlying disciplinary matter came to a close, “a request for injunctive relief

from those proceedings is now a moot issue”).

7
  Kelly invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s judgment and orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
8
  Kelly presents challenges to the Delaware Supreme Court’s order adjusting her status,
claiming she was denied notice, discovery, an impartial judge, an ability to present
evidence and witnesses, and the like. These issues are beyond the scope of the current
appeal. After the District Court dismissed her complaint, Kelly moved to amend the
complaint to add claims concerning the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to adjust her
bar status and to add the Delaware Supreme Court as a party. It does not appear that the
District Court has ruled upon Kelly’s post-judgment motions, although it appears that
these attempts to pursue a federal court challenge to the Delaware Supreme Court’s order
would be barred. See, e.g., Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 865 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal court from reviewing state
court imposition of attorney discipline sanction).

                                             5
                                             B.

       To the extent any of Kelly’s claims are not moot, we agree that the District Court

properly abstained under Younger. We review the District Court’s decision to abstain de

novo. PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 978 F.3d 871, 881 n.11.

       Attorney discipline matters 9 fall within the narrow range of cases in which

Younger abstention may be appropriate. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982). Younger abstention is therefore appropriate

where the disciplinary matter: (1) is a state judicial proceeding that (2) implicates

important state interests and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional

challenges. Id. at 432. The burden rests on the plaintiff to show that the state procedures

do not provide an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims. See Schall v. Joyce,

885 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1989).

       Kelly argues that the disability proceeding did not permit her to present

constitutional claims. She contends, without legal support, that the Delaware Supreme

Court is “without subject matter jurisdiction” over her constitutional claims. Kelly Br.

15. Kelly points to no legal bar to bringing her constitutional challenges in the

disciplinary proceeding and thus fails to meet her burden.

9
 Delaware conducts attorney discipline and attorney disability matters in the same
manner. Del. Disc. Rule 19(c) (“The [disability] procedures and hearings shall be
conducted in the same manner as disciplinary proceedings.”). We therefore treat the
disability proceeding as equivalent to a disciplinary proceeding for purposes of our
analysis.
                                              6
       Kelly also contends that abstention was inappropriate due to “bad faith,

harassment, or extraordinary circumstances.” Kelly Br. 18. She is correct that, if shown,

bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances provide exceptions to Younger

abstention. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. Kelly merely presents conclusory

statements in this regard. She has failed to support adequately her claim of bad faith,

harassment, or extraordinary circumstances to warrant a Younger exception.

       Kelly finally claims that she seeks damages that are not available in the state

forum, and so her case should have been stayed under Younger rather than dismissed and

now should be permitted to proceed. We disagree because damages are unavailable.

Delaware’s Disciplinary Rules provide that the BPR, the PRC, the ODC and its members,

and others involved in the disciplinary process are “immune from civil suit for any

conduct in the discharge of their official duties.” Del. Disc. Rule 10.

                                             C.

       We review the District Court’s denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). Kelly did not show an

intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to

correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice, and thus did not meet the

standard for reconsideration. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.

Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). The District Court therefore did not abuse

its discretion in denying relief.

                                              7
                                             D.

       Kelly seeks review of every interim ruling the District Court made in her

proceeding. We have considered her arguments and the record below and conclude that

no relief is warranted.

                                            III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss as moot any claims concerning the

aspects of Kelly’s complaint that seek injunctive relief. We will affirm the remainder of

the District Court’s judgment, its post-judgment orders, and all other orders on appeal. 10

10
  The defendants’ motion for summary affirmance is denied. The defendants’ motion to
supplement the appendix is granted. Kelly’s motion to correct an error of fact is
considered but no action will be taken, as it is unclear what relief it seeks. Kelly’s
motion for reconsideration is denied.
                                             8