Court Opinion

ID: 9839225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:00:57.163651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:46.672739
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                                         No. 22-1354

                     JAIRO FABRIANO VELASQUEZ-CONTRERAS,
                                                             Petitioner
                                             v.

            ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                           On Petition for Review of a Final Order
                            Of the Board of Immigration Appeals
                                 (BIA No.: A209-418-434)
                         Immigration Judge: Charles M. Honeyman

                               Argued on November 16, 2022
                                   and August 23, 2023

                  Before: AMBRO*, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion Filed September 12, 2023)

Abdoul A. Konare (Argued)
Suite 101
5235 Westview Drive
Frederick, MD 21703

                Counsel for Petitioner

*
    Judge Ambro assumed Senior Status on February 6, 2023.
Jessica E. Burns (Argued)
John F. Stanton
Leslie McKay
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P. O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

              Counsel for Defendant

                                         OPINION**

AMBRO, Circuit Judge*

       Jairo Fabriano Velasquez-Contreras sought asylum, withholding of removal, and

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection after allegedly suffering extreme hardship

in Honduras. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals denied his claims

because his counsel argued a defective legal theory. Velasquez-Contreras, armed with new

counsel in this appeal, presented a new, potentially meritorious theory to us. But he did

not raise that new theory to the Board of Immigration Appeals, so we cannot consider it.

Thus, we deny his petition for review.

                                             I

       Velasquez-Contreras is a native and citizen of Honduras. In 2014, he and his father

lived in San Juan Pueblo, a Honduran village. That year, a corrupt police officer recruited

**
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

                                             2
Velasquez-Contreras’s father to traffic drugs for a narco-trafficking gang. A.R. 264; 120.

His father refused to do so and was murdered by a member of that gang as a result. Id.

       Velasquez-Contreras reported his father’s murder to the police, but that brought him

only trouble. A.R. 145–46, 149–50. After he filed the police report, his father’s murderer

called him and threatened to murder him as well. A.R. 124. And later, the corrupt police

officer who recruited his father to traffic drugs visited the home of Velasquez-Contreras to

demand, menacingly, that he keep silent. A.R. 126.

       To avoid further violence, Velasquez-Contreras fled to his uncle’s house located

three hours away. A.R. 127–28. But he found no peace there, either. After his uncle

refused to pay a (different) gang an extortion “tax,” the members of it beat up Velasquez-

Contreras and told him that he had to work for them. A.R. 154. Fearing for his safety and

not wanting to work for that gang, he left for the nearest big city, Comayagua. Id. Luckily,

he suffered no crime there. A.R. 155–156.

       Sometime later, Velasquez-Contreras returned to San Juan Pueblo to see how the

investigation into his father’s murder was progressing. A.R. 132, 156. But when he visited

the police station, officers refused to help him and told him to return another day. A.R.

132. Two days later, while Velasquez-Contreras was still in San Juan Pueblo, unknown

individuals shot at him while he was driving, causing him to have an accident. A.R. 133–

34.

       Fed up, Velasquez-Contreras fled Honduras and entered the United States to seek

asylum. A.R. 118, 260. An asylum officer determined he possessed a credible fear of

persecution if he returned to Honduras.          A.R. 263–64.   But in October 2016 the

                                             3
Government charged Velasquez-Contreras as inadmissible for lacking valid immigration

documents at the time of his admission to the United States. He then filed an application

for asylum, withholding-of-removal, and CAT protection.

       The Immigration Judge found Velasquez-Contreras credible but denied all his

claims. The Judge rejected his asylum and withholding-of-removal claims after finding

his asserted particular social group (“PSG”)—“victims of crime where the police do not

offer protection”—not to be cognizable.1 A.R. 75. And the Judge denied his CAT claim

after finding insufficient evidence he would face torture upon return to Honduras. The

Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. It agreed that Velasquez-Contreras’s proposed

PSG was inadequate, and so his asylum and withholding-of-removal claims failed. It also

held that he waived any objection to the Immigration Judge’s CAT decision by not

addressing it in his brief.

                                              II2

       “ A court may review a final order of removal only if the alien has exhausted all

administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). We must

1
       A PSG is a group “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in
question.” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 542 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Matter
of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)). The Immigration Judge held that
Velasquez-Contreras’s PSG failed “because it is neither particular nor socially distinct
within Honduran society.” A.R. 51.
2
       The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
                                              4
deny Velasquez-Contreras’s petition for review because his appeal depends on arguments

he never raised before the Immigration Judge or Board.

       Velasquez-Contreras’s asylum and withholding-of-removal petitions require him to

show that he either suffered past persecution, or had a well-founded fear of future

persecution, because of his membership in a PSG.           See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B);

§ 1101(a)(42)(A); § 1231(b)(3). As noted, the Board held that Velasquez-Contreras’ then-

suggested PSG failed, and he does not challenge that holding.

       Before us, he presents a new PSG—“family members of Jose Velasquez,” his father.

Opening Br. at 11. But we will not consider this argument because he never made it to the

Board. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if the

alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”); see

Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “an alien

is required to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for relief if

he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that claim”). Velasquez-Contreras

insists he never asserted this PSG because the Immigration Judge failed to develop the

record. But we reject that premise because the Judge specifically urged his counsel to

argue a family-based PSG, but he failed to do so. In short, because Velasquez-Contreras’

petition for review of his asylum and withholding claims rests on a PSG we cannot

consider, we must deny his petition for review of those claims.3

3
       We note, however, a troubling aspect of this case. Velasquez-Contreras’s counsel
on appeal pointed out in oral argument rebuttal that, unlike his application, the asylum
applications of his two sisters were granted with the consent of the Government based on
the same particular social group now urged by Velasquez-Contreras. See 11/16/22 Oral
                                             5
       We also cannot grant the petition for review of his CAT claim. The Board held

Velasquez-Contreras let that claim go by not addressing it in his briefs. A.R. 5. He does

not challenge that holding, so we will not disturb it.

       For the foregoing reasons, we must deny Velasquez-Contreras’s petition for review.

Arg. 22:09-25:45. Though “not legally dispositive,” it is also the case that “the granting of
asylum to a family member may be relevant to the determination of the alien’s status” if
brought to the agency’s attention while the alien’s case is adjudicated. Pop v. I.N.S., 279
F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 2002).

        But as the Government points out, Velasquez-Contreras’s earlier counsel did not
raise the family-based PSG before the Immigration Judge or the Board, did not bring the
sisters’ cases to the agency’s attention in his case, and did not apprise the agency when his
sisters’ applications were granted. Nor has he since requested re-opening by the agency
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, cf. Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 378
(3d Cir. 2020), or newly discovered evidence, see Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556 (3d Cir.
2004).

      Ultimately, our review is limited to the issues presented and grounded in “the
administrative record on which the order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).
So although we find the Government’s inconsistent treatment of individuals in like
circumstances to be disturbing, it is beyond our purview.
                                              6