Court Opinion

ID: 9496091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:17:53.488632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:22.056530
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In this slip and fall case, the panel majority has determined that Sandra Morris has proved negligence pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to reverse the district court’s award of judgment as a matter of law to store-owner Wal-Mart. Unfortunately, the majority’s conclusion disregards the controlling weight of existing Tennessee law applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to circumstances where the instrumentality that caused injury was purportedly under the exclusive control and management of the defendant and where the injury would not have occurred in the ordinary course of events if the defendant had used reasonable care and where the defendant failed to offer an explanation or proof that the injury was not caused by the defendant’s exercise of due care over an instrumentality it purportedly exclusively controlled. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Mrs. Morris averred that while shopping with her husband in the frozen-food section of a Sam’s Club store she slipped and fell in water puddled near the open drain plug of a display cooler. The district court rejected as highly speculative the plain*863tiffs assertion that the cooler, here in issue, which was located in a high-traffic public area within a self-service commercial space, was exclusively controlled by defendant, concluding that such causal uncertainty could not bring the claim within the orbit of res ipsa loquitur. Specifically, plaintiffs inability to prove that Wal-Mart exercised exclusive control of the cooler was fatal to her prima facie case, disallowing the application of the reduced eviden-tiary burden afforded by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Relying on Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Professional Cleaning Service, Inc., 217 Tenn. 199, 896 S.W.2d 351 (1965), the majority has argued that it is enough for the application of res ipsa loquitur that Wal-Mart, more probably than not, controlled the instrumentality that caused Mrs. Morris’ injury. The majority reaches that conclusion without considering several decisions of the Tennessee courts mandating a stringent proof requirement of exclusive control as a shield against unreasonable jury speculation in cases, such as the one before this appellate panel, predicated on scant circumstantial evidence of causal injury in a busy public arena. Provident Life is inapposite to the instant case, involving as it did the question of whether a cleaning service, the sole occupants of a closed office building at 11:15 p.m., had negligently started a fire in an elevator trash-can while performing its cleaning duties. Contrary to the present dispute, the conclusion that the cleaning service in Provident Life had exclusive control of the trash-cans involved no speculation. Consequently, the majority’s application of Provident Life to the instant case has imprudently released Morris from the necessary burden of proving a causal nexus between the offending cooler and defendant’s alleged negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is a form of circumstantial evidence allowing a plaintiff, upon proof of a prima facie case, to infer the defendant’s negligence from the occurrence of an injury. Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946) (considering the res ipsa ‘doctrine’ as one of evidence and not of substantive law); Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, 9 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tenn.1999). However, a jury cannot presume a defendant’s negligence from the fact of an injury alone. Id. Application of the doctrine requires the injury, (1) to have been caused by some “thing,” (2) under the exclusive control of the defendant, and, (3) which by its nature does not ordinarily result in injury when managed carefully.1 Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment for defendant and finding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable where the defective pipe was not under the management or control of defendant plumber). If the plaintiffs injury could reasonably have occurred even without the defendant’s negligence then the doctrine is inapplicable. Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992); Brown v. University Nursing Home, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992).
As a means of avoiding jury speculation Tennessee courts have adhered to the rule *864that sole control by the defendant of the allegedly offending instrumentality is an “essential element of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.” Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806, 808 (1943) (sustaining defendant’s motion for a directed verdict in an airplane accident in which the plane provided dual controls thus barring the application of res ipsa loquitur). Within the context of res ipsa loquitur,
it is not necessary that the defendant have control of the [object] at the time of the injury, but it is sufficient if he had exclusive control when the acts apparently causing the injury occurred, provided the plaintiff show that the condition of the [object] or its contents had not been changed after it left the defendant’s possession.
Boykin v. Chase Bottling Works, 32 Tenn.App. 508, 222 S.W.2d 889, 897 (1949) (declining to find exclusive control over a bottle that exploded when removed from an ice box in defendant’s restaurant as customers regularly served themselves from the icebox and third parties had access to the icebox and its contents). In the instant case, Morris provided no evidence that Wal-Mart had exclusive control over the cooler.
As in Boykin, Wal-Mart’s customers in the case sub judice, had full access to the cooler and its contents. Morris averred no proof that excluded the possibility of third party interference in dislodging the cooler’s drain plug. Morris had the burden of proving that either her actions or those of a third party did not contribute to or cause the alleged incident. Appellant did not meet this burden and, consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. O’Brien v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 36 Tenn.App. 518, 259 S.W.2d 554-57 (1952) (noting that res ipsa is not applicable to a slip and fall case and directing a verdict for the defendant).
From the plaintiffs proffered evidence a jury could not reasonably infer that Wal-Mart acted negligently. Yet, bootstrapping such an inference as the majority has done by lowering the standard of proof necessary for res ipsa loquitur “undermines [the State’s] system of tort liability based on fault.”2 Lamb v. State, No. M1998-00910-COA-R12-CV, 2002 WL 31319755 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct.16, 2002). As the district court noted in oral hearing, Mr. Morris’ testimony that he observed the plug to the cooler not completely closed, falls short of the necessary proof of exclusive control:
[h]ere the jury would have to speculate as to whether Sam’s Club or its employees removed the plug or failed to insert it properly. It is just as reasonable a conclusion that a customer could have removed it. This spot freezer was accessible to customers, the plug was near the base of the freezer. It was low to the ground. It was in the reach of children, children could have removed it. For all I know, it could have easily been bumped by a shopping cart when a customer turned the aisle and became dislodged in this manner.
*865Tennessee courts have long maintained a consistent rule against jury speculation in their res ipsa loquitur decisions.3 While juries may draw inferences, Tennessee has recognized “an inference can be drawn only from the facts in evidence, and cannot be based on surmise, speculation, conjecture, or guess.” Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn.1992). “[N]or is a jury permitted to speculate or guess as to the proximate cause of injury.” Moon v. Johnston, 47 Tenn.App. 208, 337 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1959). Valid and reasonable inferences must make “the existence of the fact to be inferred more probable than the nonexistence of the fact.” Underwood v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 892 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994). When two equally possible inferences exist, a jury cannot employ, as the majority opinion allows, guesswork, speculation, or conjecture to decide a case. Stringer v. Cooper, 486 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving her case and when two probabilities are at most “evenly balanced,” the court must direct a verdict for the defendant. As the Tennessee Supreme Court observed in Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tenn.1985):
The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant,
(quoting Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 41, at 269 (5th ed., 1984)). Furthermore, “[cjourts need not submit to the jury negligence cases containing only a spark or glimmer of evidence that requires the fmder-of-fact to make a leap of faith to find the defendant hable for the plaintiffs injury.” Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 66 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their son would not have been injured had it not been for Home Depot’s negligence, noting the public character of the premises and confirming the availability of res ipsa inference only when the instrumentality that caused the harm was within the defendant’s exclusive control).
The record before this court indicated nothing more than the possibility that the defendant might have had control of the cooler. The plaintiff introduced no evidence to allay the district court’s reasonable concern for the equivalent possibility of alternative causes for the puddle of water that precipitated plaintiffs injury. Without addressing the possible contribution of customer conduct in the store the appellant could not develop the necessary proof of defendant’s control over the cooler and the district court’s determination merely acknowledged this legal inadequacy. Contrary to the majority opinion, Tennessee courts recognize that in instances such as the case sub judice, proof of causation equating to a possibility is not sufficient as a matter of law to establish the *866required nexus between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant’s presumed tortious conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Lindsey, 689 S.W.2d at 862. See also, White v. Methodist Hosp. South, 844 S.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992). Causation in fact is a matter of probability and as the court in Lindsey affirmed, a mere possibility is not an affirmative basis for a finding of fact: “In the language of the law of evidence, that which is merely possible, standing alone and not offered as auxiliary or rebuttal testimony is immaterial to the ascertainment of the fact and so is inadmissible as evidence of that fact.” Id.
In the instant case, the appellant did not call any Wal-Mart associates to testify that the plug was not properly inserted, nor did she introduce any expert testimony in an effort to prove that Wal-Mart failed to insure that the drain was properly plugged. Moreover, the appellant did not provide evidence of the length of time the hazard was present on the store floor, or of prior or constructive knowledge among Wal-Mart personnel. Finally, Morris produced no evidence that a customer could not have dislodged the plug prior to the incident. As a result, the district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could not be permitted to speculate that Wal-Mart’s negligence created the hazard.
The salient facts of the case sub judice are analogous to Underwood v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, 892 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994). Underwood brought a negligence action against the defendant cafeteria alleging injury when an ice dispenser cover struck her. Id. at 425. The court affirmed Underwood’s directed verdict, because the plaintiff failed to introduce any proof that the defendant’s employees, rather than the customers accessing the ice dispenser, caused the panel to become dislodged. In a statement, echoed by the district court in the case sub judice, the Underwood court noted that:
In order to determine that the hospital was negligent, the fact-finder would be required to speculate whether the hospital employees created the condition or whether it was caused by cafeteria customers. If the condition was caused by customers, the fact finder would be required to speculate whether the condition had existed long enough to have been discovered and corrected had the hospital been maintaining the dispenser properly.
Id. at 427. The district court, in the instant case, properly noted that res ipsa loquitur should not apply in the absence of evidence which would prevent a jury from having to speculate over whether the cooler’s drain plug had become dislodged by appellee, a customer, a child or a shopping cart.
The majority opinion is certainly correct in its observation that “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is well steeped in Tennessee law.” Yet, contrary to the majority’s position, Tennessee law supports the general rule that a plaintiff must prove defendant had exclusive control over the instrumentality causing harm. Indeed, stretching back more than a half-century the Tennessee courts have recognized as particularly inappropriate the application of res ipsa to claims involving areas of ‘high-traffic’ public access with its attendant causal uncertainty.4 See Susman v. Mid-South Fair, *867180 Tenn. 471, 176 S.W.2d 804 (1944) (granting motion for directed verdict in claim of injury at public amusement park and observing that the application of res ipsa required there be no reasonable inference but that the injury complained of was due to defendant’s negligence and proof that the instrumentality causing injury was under the exclusive control of the defendant); Oliver-Gill v. Krohn, No. I-26029, 2003 WL 724433, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. March 4, 2003) (affirming jury verdict for the defendant builder in negligence suit brought by homeowner whose driveway was subsiding and finding no basis for a res ipsa inference that cause of subsidence was within defendant’s exclusive control given the number of other contractors handling the soil work); Jones v. Metro Elevator Co., No. W2000-02002-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1683782 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec.31, 2001) (affirming inapplicability of charge of res ipsa loquitur for injury allegedly sustained by plaintiff while riding elevator in the public area of a building where landlord did not have exclusive control over the elevators in the building and had no actual or constructive knowledge of any danger associated with the elevator); Smith v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 1997 WL 203605, *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. April 25, 1997) (affirming summary judgment for defendant department store finding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable for injury sustained when a mirrored tile fell and struck plaintiff while shopping concluding that evidence failed to indicate defendant’s control over the object where the tile could have been defectively manufactured or improperly installed); Mears v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 02A01-CV-00058, 1995 WL 37344 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.31, 1995) (affirming defendant’s award of summary judgment where the defendant allegedly sustained an injury from eating defendant’s soup in a public cafeteria because the defendant did not have exclusive control over the instrumentality, prepared and kept on the steam table hours before lunch and served in a cafeteria catering to at least 800 employees); Hawkins v. Opryland, U.S.A. Inc., No. 01A01-9309-CV-00408, 1994 WL 323092 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 8, 1994) (affirming defendant public theme park’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs fall from a broken concrete step, noting the doctrine of res ipsa did not apply to a public place when the agency causing the injury was not under the defendant’s exclusive control); Ferguson v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 1993 WL 115661 (Tenn.Ct.App. April 16, 1993) (finding res ipsa inference inapplicable where child slipped and fell on the stairs at a public school because the instrumentality was not under the defendant’s “exclusive control”); Wilson v. Target Stores, Inc., 1993 WL 30617 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb.10, 1993) (refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff was injured in a self-service store because the *868defendant did not have exclusive control over the display items causing the injury); Graves v. Coca-Cola Company, 1987 WL 12378, (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (affirming a directed verdict for defendant where plaintiffs injury from falling display in a “high traffic area” of a drug store was accessible to customers and employees and, therefore, not under the exclusive management and control of the defendant); Boyatt v. Yancey, 736 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that it was error for the trial court not to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant because res ipsa loquitur was unavailable to customer injured at a gas pump used regularly by other customers as the pump was not under the exclusive management and control of the defendant); Stinnett v. Wright, 59 Tenn.App. 118, 438 S.W.2d 357 (1968) (affirming a directed verdict for the defendant in holding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable to a malfunctioning washing machine in a public laundry, noting that public access to the instrumentality made res ipsa inference unsuitable).
As this litany of cases suggest, Tennessee law has long demanded that plaintiffs must prove exclusive control to warrant the invocation of res ipsa loquitur. Contrary to the majority’s contention regarding the disposition of a directed verdict, Susman, Graves, Boyatt, and Stinnett each indicate that a directed verdict was legally appropriate where, as in the instant case, the facts supported the contention that the vendor of a publicly accessible and frequently trafficked commercial arena did not possess the exclusive control required to prove res ipsa loquitur.
Additionally, res ipsa loquitur pertains to only two of the five elements of a common-law negligence claim.5 Lamb v. State, 2002 WL 31319755, at*7. The plaintiff must still prove that (1) defendant owed a duty and the cause of her injury lay within the ambit of that duty; (2) she suffered an injury; and (3) that defendant’s conduct was the legal cause of her injury. Burton v. Warren Farmers Coop., No. M1999-00486-COA-R3CV, 2002 WL 31039345, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept.12, 2002). Tennessee courts have defined the term “duty” as the legal obligation a defendant owes to a plaintiff to conform to the reasonable person standard of care in order to protect against unreasonable risks of harm. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn.1995).
In the context of premises liability, the person in control of the premises has the duty to exercise reasonable, ordinary care by maintaining the site in a reasonably safe condition, removing or warning of any latent, dangerous conditions that the owner is aware of or should have been aware of through reasonable diligence. Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tenn.1984); see also, Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Tenn.1996). A defendant breaches that duty where it has created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition prior to the accident. Jones v. Zayre, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980). Proving constructive knowledge requires evidence that the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of its existence, prior to the injury producing incident. Hardesty v. Service Merchandise Company, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997), referring to Self v. *875Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 885 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir.1989).
Pursuant to controlling Tennessee precedent, Wal-Mart did not breach its duty to Morris where the plaintiffs evidence failed to demonstrate an inference of defendant’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The appellant failed to introduce any evidence proving a causal connection between Wal-Mart’s actions and the puddle on the floor. Mrs. Morris admitted that she did not know how the liquid got on the floor, how long it was there on the date of her injury and, did not provide any evidence that Wal-Mart had tampered with the plug or that appellee had failed to insert or close the plug. Moreover, plaintiffs insistence that the cooler had been on the floor but a short while further mitigated against finding any actual or constructive notice of the defect. See Paradiso v. Kroger Co., 499 S.W.2d 78,79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1973) (noting in slip and fall case that the length of time a dangerous condition existed is only one factor in determining constructive notice along with the nature of the business, its size, the number of patrons, the nature of the danger, its location along with the foreseeable consequences).
Consequently, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the district court.

. Contrary to the majority's suggestion of a trend away from the requirement of exclusive control in res ipsa claims, the state of Tennessee has codified res ipsa loquitur for malpractice actions in T.C.A. § 29-26-115(c):
In a malpractice action as described in subsection (a) of this section there shall be no presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant. Provided, however, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was negligent where it is shown by the proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in the defendant's (or defendants') exclusive control and that the accident or injury was one which ordinarily doesn't occur in the absence of negligence.
(emphasis added)

. Tennessee courts have recognized the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "cannot serve as a substitute for proof ... because the plaintiff must place the instrumentality causing the harm under the exclusive control and management of defendants before res ipsa loqui-tur applies at all.” Greer v. Lawhon, 600 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980) (quoting Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn.App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759 (1947)). As the plaintiff in the instant case has failed to meet this standard she cannot use the res ipsa doctrine to establish proof that is absent. Allowing otherwise, as the majority enables, removes the necessity of demonstrating fault from tort liability and does not comport with the rule laid down by the Tennessee courts.

. In Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn.App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417, 420 (1937), the plaintiffs eye was injured in the course of surgery. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary prerequisite of exclusive control by the operating physician to allow for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, noting that bringing the case before a jury "would have permitted the jury to speculate as to whether the injury occurred in the operating room where, as we have seen, plaintiff was under the control of defendant, whether it occurred in transit from the operating room to plaintiff's private room, or occurred after he was left in the custody of the nurse.”

. As the majority has interpreted Prosser and Keeton as endorsing the effort to generally dispose of the plaintiff's need to prove ‘exclusive control,’ it is instructive to remember their ‘hornbook’ conveys a more sober view of the disposition of cases such as the one at hand. As Prosser and Keeton explain,
there are many accidents which, as a matter of common knowledge, occur frequently enough without anyone’s fault.... [A]n ordinary slip and fall ... will not in [itself] justify the conclusion that negligence is the most likely explanation; and to such events *867res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed.1984) § 39, p. 246.
A more recent treatise echoes the unsuitability of applying res ipsa to slip and fall cases, such as the instant dispute, unable to muster evidence to arrive at the conclusion that negligence explains the cause:
"[S]ome fact patterns seem to be generally inappropriate for res ipsa. Courts usually think that the defendant's negligence is not a sufficiently likely explanation of events when the plaintiff, as an invitee in the defendant's place of business, falls on a slippery substance. Without more evidence, the possibilities are too strong that the defendant was not responsible for placing the substance there and that he did not have time to discover it and make it safe, so specific evidence on theses points is usually required.”
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001) § 155. Where the evidence indicated, as it did here, that defendant's had only recently placed the cooler in the frozen food section of the store the possibilities are even stronger that the defendant did not have time to discover the leak.

. Under Tennessee law, to support a negligence claim the plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) conduct falling below the standard of care that amounts to a breach of that duty, (3) an injury or loss, (4) cause in fact, and (5) proximate cause. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, et al., 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn.1996).