Court Opinion

ID: 9662688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:15:37.082886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.385423
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
The majority of this panel has reversed four of appellant’s six convictions for sexual abuse of a child because no deadly weapon or verbal expression of aggression were used or exhibited so as to communicate a “threat.” See Rucker v. State, 599 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Rogers v. State, 575 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
*722The majority ignores the common sense fact that a person who is being beaten is just as much threatened with the infliction of serious bodily injury as someone who has a gun pointed at him or has a knife at his throat. You do not have to tell someone you are threatening him when he is being beaten, because to the person being beaten it is painfully obvious. For these reasons, Backer and Rogers were wrongfully decided and the proper rule to be applied to these cases is as expressed in Seaton v. State, 564 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). In Seaton, a panel of this Court determined that “threats” are not restricted to those coming from the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or mere verbal expressions of aggression, but also include non-verbal conduct which conveys an offer or willingness to use force in the future if certain acts on the part of the threatened person are done or not done as the case may be.
In Seaton, the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape of a nine-year-old child. The complainant testified that after defendant achieved penetration of her he hit her several times in the face, mouth and eyes. There were also verbal expressions of aggression which were not made until after the aggravated rape offense had been completed and thus could not suffice to establish the aggravating circumstances required under Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 21.-03(a)(2). Therefore, excluding the evidence of verbal threat from consideration together with the absence of any serious bodily injury or the use or exhibition of any deadly weapon the only evidence of threat to satisfy the requirements of Section 21.03(a)(2) were bruises on the body, face and head of the complainant and two black eyes.
In all four cases in which the majority would reverse appellant’s convictions, the victims were younger than the complainant in Seaton, all suffered bruises, cuts, bloody noses, etc., not dissimilar from those in Sea-ton.
As recognized in the majority opinion, the elements and proof under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 21.05(a)(2), involved here are identical to those in Section 21.03(a)(2) on which Seaton is based. In Rucker v. State, 599 S.W.2d at 586, the majority of the Court held that “[tjhere can be no question that a threat can be communicated or conveyed other than by words. Actions and deeds may also constitute threats ... [citations omitted]. This has been the rule both before and after the enactment of the Penal Code.”
Section 21.05(a)(2), supra, currently provides that:
“(2) By acts, words or deeds places the victim in fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone; ...”
However, at the time of the offense, it provided that:
“... compels submission to the sexual abuse by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone.”
Clearly, being beaten carries with it the implied assertion that such beating will continue and could lead to serious bodily injury or death, unless the person being beaten submits to do or not to do the act desired.
By the present form of Section 21.-05(a)(2), supra, the Legislature has expressed its displeasure (and corruption of its intent as formerly expressed) with Rucker and Rogers and re-emphasized that it intended a Seaton-like construction of the statute.
Rucker and Rogers appear to have been overruled sub silento by their marked lack of use as authority and by the fact that the Legislature has amended both Sections 21.-03(a)(2) and 21.05(a)(2) so as to include as an aggravating circumstance the type of threat used here. This Court should fully and finally lay Rucker and Rogers to rest and return to a construction compatible with Sections 21.03(a)(2) and 21.05(a)(2), and as expressed in Seaton v. State, supra.
I dissent to the reversals in Causes No. 61,824, 61,825, 61,827 and 61,828. I concur in the result in Causes No. 61,823 and 61,-826.