Court Opinion

ID: 9578478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:45:37.88965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:48.018455
License: Public Domain

*72HEARN, Chief Justice:
Respectfully, I dissent. In evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment, this court should “look at the issue with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 130, 437 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1993); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 501 n. 1, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 n. 1 (Ct.App.1991) (giving “a common sense reading [to] the indictment as a whole”). If the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer, the indictment passes legal muster. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998); State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 364, 543 S.E.2d 586, 597 (Ct.App.2001). When these indictments are viewed in their entirety with a practical eye, I believe they were sufficient to enable both the trial court and Wilkes to know what crimes they alleged.
The indictments state that Givens and Schmid were “officers” and that the assault occurred while they attempted to process Wilkes “after arrest.” The majority holds the indictments are fatally defective because the language employed could be construed to identify Givens and Schmid as arresting officers rather than officers employed by a state or local correctional facility as provided by S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-360 (Supp.2000). I disagree. In my view, the indictments are not fatally defective simply because they fail to allege that Givens and Schmid were correctional facility employees. The caption of each indictment clearly states the charge as “assault on correctional facility employee.” Moreover, the title, located just above the charging language on the same page, reads “assault on correctional facility employee” and refers to “§ 16-3-630.”
I do not read State v. Tabory, 262 S.C. 136, 202 S.E.2d 852 (1974), as broadly as the majority opinion to hold that a reviewing court cannot consider a caption or a title in reviewing the sufficiency of an indictment. Tabory holds that “the State may not support a conviction for an offense intended to be charged by relying upon a caption to the exclusion of the language contained in the body of the indictment.” 262 S.C. at 141, 202 S.E.2d at 854 (emphasis supplied). It does not *73hold that the caption of an indictment may not be considered when, as here, it is consistent with the charging language, nor does it prohibit the court from looking at the title of an indictment when scrutinizing it for legal sufficiency. In the past, this court has looked to the title of an indictment as a factor in determining sufficiency. See Hamilton, 344 S.C. at 364, 543 S.E.2d at 597 (considering title in finding indictment sufficient). If there was any doubt in the mind of the trial judge or Wilkes as to what type of “officers” Givens and Schmid were, it was clarified by the language in the title located immediately above the charging language. Viewing the indictments “with a practical eye,” I would-hold that where they specifically identify the victims as officers assaulted by Wilkes after his arrest, and the title cites the relevant statute and refers to correctional facility employees, the indictments are sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial judge.