Court Opinion

ID: 9477229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:17:35.231445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:46.178293
License: Public Domain

MAYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
There is no question the United States Postal Service (Service) violated 5 C.F.R. §§ 353.308 and 1201.21 when, in a May 29, 1985, letter denying Shiflett’s request to be reinstated, it failed to inform her of her appeal rights to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). But the Board did not *675hold that against her; it treated the appeal period, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b), as not beginning until August 19, 1985. That was the day the national union, her authorized representative, received notice in a grievance decision that the proper appeal avenue was through the Board.
This court has set out the rule that “waiver of the time limit for appealing is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion and this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.... Our review of Board cases in which timeliness is at issue is limited to whether the Board’s decision not to waive the regulatory time limit was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Rowe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 802 F.2d 434, 437 (Fed.Cir.1986).
In this type of case, the “critical element ... is that the employee acted promptly and within the allowable time limits once he was aware of the basis of his claim.” Gordy v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 736 F.2d 1505, 1508 (Fed.Cir.1984); Casey v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 748 F.2d 685, 686 and note (Fed.Cir.1984). Notwithstanding the failure to tell Shiflett of her appeal rights, she has not met this requirement because her union representative did have notice on August 19,1985, but she did not file an appeal with the Board until eight months later. In Gordy, the petitioner was apprised of his right to appeal a reclassification decision to the Office of Personnel Management or to his department. He was not told that if he considered the reclassification to be a reduction in force, the appeal should go to the Board. Thereafter, he became aware that his appeal should properly go to the Board, but did not file it for more than three months. This court confirmed that his appeal was untimely. 736 F.2d at 1508.
Because the August 19, 1985, decision sent to the national union was not sent to her local union representative, Shiflett says it did not constitute notice to her. But the record shows the national union, not just her local shop steward, was her authorized representative. Notice to the national union is sufficient to put her on notice and commence the appeal period. Gragg v. United States, 717 F.2d 1343, 1346 (Fed.Cir.1983) (notice received by union official, although not petitioner’s designated union representative, is equivalent to receipt by petitioner); Johnson v. Department of Treasury, 721 F.2d 361, 365 n. 10 (Fed.Cir.1983); see Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390-91, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). In any event, the local union representative was aware of petitioner’s appeal rights to the Board all along. On June 18, 1985, he filed a step two grievance which stated, “Appeal rights are also provided for under 5 C.F.R. 353.” Not only that, but a copy of the August 19 notice was forwarded to him on September 5, 1985. So Shiflett’s argument that she and her local representative were unaware of her appeal rights to the Board from “the inception of the grievance and through its progression through Step Three” is inaccurate.
“It is well settled that a person is bound by the consequences of his representative’s conduct, which includes both his acts and omissions.” Rowe, 802 F.2d at 437; see Link, 370 U.S. at 633, 82 S.Ct. at 1390. In Whitaker v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 784 F.2d 1109, 1110 (Fed.Cir.1986), the petitioner’s designated union representative elected to pursue arbitration instead of appealing to the Board and this court held the petitioner bound by the decision in spite of his contention that he had not personally chosen arbitration. “Having selected the union as his representative, the petitioner is bound by its actions.” Massingale v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 736 F.2d 1521, 1523 (Fed.Cir.1984). In Duncan v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 795 F.2d 1000 (Fed.Cir.1986), a non-lawyer union representative gave the petitioner poor advice which prevented him from having a hearing on the merits of his case. But there was no relief from this result because “federal personnel are bound by the actions of their freely selected representatives or agents.” Id. at 1003. So, too, should Shiflett be bound by her union’s failure to inform her of her right to appeal. The initial failure of the Service to advise her of her rights was cured by the *676August 19 notice to her representatives who need only have referred to the specific regulation cited in it for all the information needed to file the appeal.
In Rowe, the petitioner was told of his right to either appeal his removal to the Board within 20 days or file a grievance within 30 days. His attorney filed an appeal to the Board four days late but within the 30-day limit which applied to the grievance. The court said the petitioner was bound by the actions of his attorney in filing too late even though he had relied on him in good faith. 802 F.2d at 437. The court observed that “ ‘it was his head that was on the chopping block,’ and not his attorney’s. He had a personal duty to monitor the progress of his appeal at all times and not leave it entirely to his attorney.” Id. at 438. The same is true here. It is unfair and encourages litigation to make exceptions to the rules that bind everyone else when for one reason or another a case strikes the court as particularly sympathetic.