Court Opinion

ID: 9431173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:31:31.311232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:27.293693
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Respondent claims that his 30-day suspension was imposed in violation of the procedural regulations of his employing agency and that he is therefore entitled to backpay for that *456period. It is undisputed that if his claim had arisen prior to the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), and if he had proved his allegations, he could have recovered his backpay in the Court of Claims. It is also undisputed that there is not a single word in either the text or the legislative history of the CSRA that purports to withdraw or curtail any judicial remedy that was previously available to employees like respondent, who do not enjoy the protections accorded to members of the competitive service or those accorded to veterans and their close relatives. It is therefore quite wrong for this Court to supplement that carefully crafted piece of legislation with an unnecessary and unenacted repealer.
To explain my profound disagreement with the Court’s nontextual reading of the Act, I shall first comment on the state of the law prior to the enactment of the CSRA and then explain how that statute — whose primary focus is upon employees who are either in the competitive service or are veterans — gave certain new protections to nonpreference eligible members of the excepted service without withdrawing any of their pre-existing rights. Finally, I shall comment on certain flaws in the reasoning of the majority.
I
In important respects respondent’s case is similar to Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959). In that case, as in this, the Department of the Interior discharged a nontenured employee without following the procedures dictated by the Department’s own regulations. In both cases it must be assumed that the employing agency had sufficient grounds for its action because an employee in the excepted service is subject to discharge without cause. As the Court noted in Vitarelli, petitioner was a person “who concededly was at no time within the protection of the Civil Service Act, Veterans’ Preference Act, or any other statute relating to employment rights of government employees, and who, as a ‘Sched*457ule A’ employee, could have been summarily discharged by the Secretary at any time without the giving of a reason.” Id., at 539. Nevertheless, having “chosen to proceed against petitioner on security grounds, the Secretary . . . was bound by the regulations which he himself had promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though without such regulations he could have discharged petitioner summarily.” Id., at 539-540.
In cases following Vitarelli, prior to the passage of the CSRA, it was held that a nonpreference eligible excepted service employee could seek a remedy under the Tucker Act and the Back Pay Act in the former Court of Claims1 if he or she was discharged in violation of applicable agency regulations.2 See Batchelor v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 180, 184, *458cert. denied, 382 U. S. 870 (1965); Greenway v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 72, 76 (1963); cf. Watson v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 749, 162 F. Supp. 755 (1958). In those cases, as in this, there was no judicial review of the merits of the executive decision to remove or suspend the excepted service employee. Such employees did not have, and do not now have, any generalized right to review of the merits of their removal. Tucker Act jurisdiction was limited to those instances in which the agency had violated its own regulations.
In contrast to the limited remedy available to employees like Vitarelli and respondent, employees protected by the Civil Service Act and the Veterans’ Preference Act had a variety of administrative and judicial remedies that included a right to review of the merits of adverse personnel actions.3 Indeed, a concern that those employees had too much protection, as well as dissatisfaction with the fact that the Civil Service Commission had both management and adjudicatory responsibilities, were among the factors that led to the enactment of CSRA. As the Court recognizes, the “general perception was that ‘appeals processes [were] so lengthy and complicated that managers [in the civil service] often avoid[ed] taking disciplinary action’ against employees even when it was clearly warranted. S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 9.” Ante, at 445.4 It is of critical importance to note that the *459appeals processes in the Civil Service Commission were not available to nonpreference eligible employees in the excepted service. Their limited right to judicial review of the question whether their employing agency had followed its own procedural regulations was not part of the problem that Congress solved by allocating the management functions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and its adjudicatory functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
II
When read against its background, the text of the CSRA is readily understood as meaning exactly what it says and no more. Generally, the CSRA merely enacted provisions necessary to achieve the reallocation of CSC functions and codified the protections previously enjoyed by competitive service employees only by virtue of an Executive Order. See n. 3, supra. It addresses nonpreference eligible excepted service employees only limitedly, and then only to expand, not to contract, the remedies available to them. Chapter 23 of the Act extends limited protection against prohibited practices (such as retaliatory discharges and discrimination) to nonpreference eligibles in the excepted service, and Chapter 43 extends them certain procedural rights in connection with adverse personnel actions based on poor job performance. In both of these areas, the CSRA grants nonpreference eligible members of the excepted sendee benefits that they had not previously enjoyed.
Chapters 75 and 77 describe the administrative and judicial procedures that are available to veterans and competitive service employees who are removed for “cause.” Since nonpreference eligible members of the excepted service have no job tenure and may be removed without cause, it is perfectly obvious why Congress did not include them within the *460coverage of these chapters. It did, however, give the OPM the authority to extend the coverage of Chapter 75 to certain employees in the excepted service. See 5 U. S. C. § 7511(c). Again, however, this is a provision which, if exercised, would provide new protections for nonpreference eligible excepted service personnel.
Not a word in the CSRA suggests that Congress intended to repeal the limited pre-existing judicial remedy for nonpreference eligible excepted service employees.5 The fact that Congress expressly added to the protections for this class of employees, in light of Congress’ presumed familiarity with the established remedy that was already available to them,6 strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to repeal that remedy. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 381-382 (1982). This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress was careful to amend a number of earlier statutes to conform *461them with the CSRA,7 but did not amend the Back Pay Act or the Tucker Act to limit the nature or scope of relief available under their provisions.8
Given the comprehensive nature of the CSRA, it is highly improbable that Congress intended to make any significant changes in the law that are not plainly discernible from the language of the statute. This realistic appraisal of the actual intent of the lawmakers who drafted and enacted the CSRA is given added support by the strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670-673 (1986).
Ill
In my opinion the majority is not faithful to the rule against lightly implying an intent to repeal a previously existing statutory remedy,9 or to the presumption that agency actions are *462subject to judicial review. The majority finds within the CSRA, a statute that generally broadens the rights of federal employees, an intention to eliminate judicial review of the *463procedural regularity of agency actions that may affect thousands of federal workers.10 To support this remarkable conclusion, the majority places primary reliance on our decisions in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 345-348 (1984), and United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201 (1982). But this reliance extends these cases beyond their intended scope and gives them weight they cannot bear. As the Federal Circuit noted in its decision: *464ferent statute. It is essential to a proper understanding of this case to recognize that the issue is not whether the CSRA authorizes judicial review for persons in the excepted service. The issue is not whether persons in the excepted service are entitled to the protection afforded other federal workers by the CSRA. The issue is not whether the CSRA grants persons in the excepted service some kind of private right of action. Fausto makes no claim of entitlement under the CSRA and we do not resolve that issue in this case. The issue in this case is whether one act of Congress, the CSRA, has silently repealed other acts of Congress, the Tucker Act and the Back Pay Act. The government asserts that it has. But its arguments, though appearing persuasive, are superficial and fail to directly address the issue. The thrust of its arguments, of its authority in the Supreme Court and in this circuit and in the other circuits, is that persons in the excepted service have no cause of action under the provisions of the CSRA and in that sense the CSRA does not authorize suit; that is to say, the government explains, the CSRA ‘precludes’ judicial review and therefore, the government concludes, the CSRA bars judicial review under any basis in any forum.
*463“In both Community Nutrition and Erika there was no jurisdiction because the very statute asserted to provide the substantive right relied on was instead interpreted to prohibit judicial review of its own provisions. The Court did not hold in either case that the relevant statute had repealed a substantive right granted in a dif-
*464“Again, that is not the situation here. Whether the CSRA provides a basis for a cause of action for, or whether the CSRA instead precludes judicial review of, issues which the CSRA does cover is not at all the issue here. Neither Community Nutrition nor Erika supports the proposition that omission of any mention of an issue in one statute operates to repeal the grant of judicial review of that issue contained in a different statute.” 791 F. 2d 1554, 1557-1558 (1986).11
*465The majority also draws assurance as to Congress’ intent from the “structure of the statutory scheme,” but this likewise lends no support to the majority’s conclusions. Not surprisingly, the CSRA generally provides for review of an adverse personnel action by the Merit Systems Protection Board only when such review is necessary to protect the system of hiring and promoting federal employees on the basis of merit.12 By definition, see ante, at 441, n. 1, employees in the excepted service are not part of the system of merit-based hirings and promotions.13 Thus, their general exclusion from the protection of the MSPB is quite understand*466able. Since the availability of judicial review under the Act is tied to initial review by the MSPB, 5 U. S. C. § 7703(a)(1), the CSRA does not provide any means by which a nonpreference eligible excepted service employee may seek judicial review. Thus, the failure to provide an avenue of judicial review for nonpreference eligible excepted service employees within the CSRA is not a preclusion of such review in all contexts, rather it is merely the consequence of the fact that actions against persons who are not in the competitive service do not pose a threat to the merit protection system. The converse is also true; permitting nonpreference eligible excepted service employees to seek review of adverse agency decisions under the Tucker Act poses no harm to the merit protection system.
The majority argues that allowing nonpreference eligible excepted service employees to obtain judicial review under the Tucker Act would turn “upside down” and “seriously undermine” structural elements of the CSRA. Ante, at 449. The majority creates from thin air the notion that the CSRA was designed to create a primacy of competitive service employees and preference eligible excepted service employees over nonpreference eligible excepted service employees. As explained above, nonpreference eligible excepted service employees receive limited treatment in the CSRA not because Congress saw them as less worthy than other federal employees, but because actions affecting them could have little effect on the merit protection system the CSRA was designed to protect. The majority simply overlooks the narrow scope of the remedy available under the Tucker Act. It bears repeating that nonpreference eligible excepted service employees do not have, and have never had, a generalized right to challenge their removals under the Tucker Act. Batchelor v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl., at 183; Greenway v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl., at 75. Tucker Act jurisdiction was and remains limited to those instances when the agency violates its own regulations in discharging an employee. Making a *467remedy this narrowly drawn available to employees not covered by the MSPB poses no threat to the structural integrity of the MSPB.
The majority claims that permitting nonpreference eligibles to pursue this remedy would give such employees an advantage over preference eligibles and competitive service employees. Quite the contrary. To proceed under the Tucker Act, a nonpreference eligible excepted service employee must be prepared to develop the facts relevant to his or her claim at a formal trial. An employee who is entitled to seek relief before the MSPB will have the opportunity to proceed in a far less formal atmosphere, without paying filing fees and other costs. Because the proceedings are less formal, the employee may be able to present his or her case competently without the assistance of an attorney. Also, the CSRA requires that review by the MSPB be provided expeditiously, 5 U. S. C. §7701(i)(l); an employee entitled to proceed before the Board may therefore anticipate obtaining relief in a much shorter period of time than an employee who must file a complaint with the Claims Court. The difference in the burdens of proof in the two schemes also favors the employee with a right to seek MSPB review. An employee who brings a Tucker Act claim must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that the agency violated its own regulations. In proceedings before the MSPB, however, the agency has the burden of proving that its actions are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 5 U. S. C. § 7701(c)(1)(B), and in some instances by substantial evidence, § 7701(c)(1)(A). Most importantly, an employee entitled to seek relief before the MSPB may obtain judicial review of the merits of an adverse personnel action, while a nonpreference eligible excepted service employee proceeding under the Tucker Act is entitled to judicial review only of whether the agency violated its own regulations. Given the advantages that attend review by the MSPB, it is clear that pursuit of a Tucker Act claim is not the more favored route.
*468Contrary to the majority’s view, holding that a Tucker Act remedy survived the enactment of the CSRA would not impair the congressional goal of “[e]ncourag[ing] more consistent judicial decisions on review.” The majority reads into the desire to “encourage” uniformity a command to guarantee it. However, the precatory words Congress chose describe only a desire to encourage or promote uniformity, nothing more. As originally enacted, §205 of the CSRA achieved this congressional goal by eliminating review by United States district courts, not by limiting the number of courts of appeals that had jurisdiction to review appeals from the MSPB.14 In 1982 Congress amended § 205 to limit review of MSPB decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1). Any goal Congress sought to achieve in making this change is not frustrated by continuing to recognize jurisdiction under the Tucker Act since Tucker Act suits are also appealable only to the Federal Circuit. See n. 11, swpra.
In essence, the majority relies on the bare fact that Congress provided for review of some adverse personnel actions through the MSPB to infer a congressional desire to preclude judicial review of other actions. But congressional silence surely does not provide the clear and convincing evidence of intent we have previously demanded before finding that an existing statutory remedy has been repealed. I respectfully dissent.

 The United States Court of Claims was abolished by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. The FCIA created in its stead the United States Claims Court, which inherited the Court of Claims’ authority to exercise general jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims. Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U. S. 768, 796 (1985).

 The Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1), provides in pertinent part:
“The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
The Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5596(b), provides in pertinent part:
“An employee of an agency who, on the basis of a timely appeal or an administrative determination (including a decision relating to an unfair labor practice or a grievance) is found by appropriate authority under applicable law, rule, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement, to have been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action which has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee—
“(A) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period for which the personnel action was in effect — [an amount equal to back pay (less any amount earned through other employment) and reasonable attorney fees].”
As we explained in United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398 (1976), the Tucker Act created jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to consider eer*458tain claims against the United States whenever a substantive right existed. The Back Pay Act supplies the substantive right to recover
backpay whenever an employee is affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action which leads to the withdrawal or reduction of pay and allowances. Id, at 406.

 The right of preference eligible employees to appeal to the Civil Service Commission was granted by statute, 5 U. S. C, §7701 (1976 ed.), whereas the rights of competitive service employees were conferred by Executive Order, see Exec. Order No. 11491, §22, 3 CFR 874 (1966-1970 Comp.). Neither the statute nor the Executive Order applied to nonpreference eligible excepted service employees.

 “One of the central tasks of the civil service reform bill is simple to express but difficult to achieve: Allow civil servants to be able to be hired *459and fired more easily, but for the right reasons.” S. Rep. No. 95-969, p. 4 (1978).

 The language used by Congress to grant those employees covered by Chapter 75 and other chapters of the Act judicial review of adverse MSPB decisions is instructive. Employees who are governed by Chapter 75 have an express right to seek administrative review of adverse personnel decisions before the MSPB. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7703(a)(1) provides that “[a]ny employee or applicant for employment adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial review of the order or decision.” If, as the majority concludes, Congress intended to bar nonveteran excepted service employees from all judicial review of any adverse personnel action falling within the scope of Chapter 75, one would reasonably have expected Congress to draft § 7703 to read “only employees or applicants for employment adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial review of an adverse personnel action.” Such language would have made it clear that Congress intended to limit judicial review to those personnel actions falling within the jurisdiction of the MSPB. However, as actually written, § 7703 merely creates jurisdiction. Nothing in its language or construction even hints at the withdrawal of jurisdiction created elsewhere.

 See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525 (1987) (per curiam) (Congress is presumed to act with full awareness of existing judicial interpretations).

 See Technical and Conforming Amendments, Pub. L. 94-454, §§703 and 906, 92 Stat. 1216 and 1224.

 Congress’ failure to so amend the Back Pay Act is especially notable since the Back Pay Act was amended by the CSRA in other respects. The CSRA amendment to the Back Pay Act ensures that unfair labor practice and grievance proceedings are considered administrative proceedings, specifies the particular items recoverable as backpay by a prevailing employee (pay, allowances, and differentials plus interest, and attorney’s fees and costs), and provides procedures for restoring annual leave, but does not purport to limit the class of employees entitled to obtain this relief. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, pp. 60-61 (1978); n. 2, supra. The amendment contains no language supporting the majority’s conclusion that the words “appropriate authority” in the Act were implicitly amended by the CSRA to exclude courts relying on Tucker Act jurisdiction.

 See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S., at 524 (1987) (repeals by implication are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S. 647, 661 (1986) (“ ‘ “[I]t is ... a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored,” ’ ” quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 154 (1976), in turn quoting United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S. 164, 168 (1976)); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1017-1018 (1984) (“[Rjepeals by implication are disfavored” and “where two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty *462of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective”).
Monsanto concerned the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U. S. C. § 136 et seq. One of the challenged provisions provided that a party who submitted data to the Environmental Protection Agency as part of the process of registering a product could lose its right to compensation for the public use of those data if it failed to participate in proceedings to reach agreement as to the amount of compensation due or to comply with the terms of such an agreement. See § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii). Rejecting an allegation that this provision evidenced an intent to repeal the Tucker Act remedy that ordinarily was available for a taking without just compensation, we reiterated that repeals by implication are not favored and reasserted that whenever two statutes were capable of coexistence, it was our duty, “absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Monsanto, 467 U. S., at 1018. We reached the conclusion that no repeal of Tucker Act jurisdiction was intended even though we had to imply a requirement that remedies under FIFRA be exhausted before Tucker Act relief was sought to reconcile the two statutes. Ibid.
The reasoning we applied in Monsanto applies with even more force here. The CSRA and the Tucker Act coexist easily. Allowing nonpreference eligible excepted service employees to pursue a remedy under the Tucker Act in no way interferes with the operation of the CSRA. No judicially created exhaustion requirement or other gap-filling measure is necessary to the harmonious operation of the two statutes. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U. S. 772, 788 (1981) (the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable).
There is an unacknowledged danger in the majority’s failure to accord the presumption against implied repeals the weight it has enjoyed in previous decisions of this Court. The presumption disfavoring implied repeals has been a part of this Court’s jurisprudence at least since 1842. See Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 362-363 (1842) (repeal to be implied only if there is a “positive repugnancy” between the old law and the new); Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636, 648 (1845) (“Virtual repeals are not favoured by courts”); United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92 (1871) (“[I]t is a familiar doctrine that repeals by implication are not favored”). It is a *463firmly entrenched part of the legal landscape against which Congress works. We can presume with certainty that Congress is aware of this longstanding presumption and that Congress relies on it in drafting legislation. Necessarily, we must presume that Congress drafted the CSRA in the context of our assurances that the Act’s language would not lightly be found to repeal existing statutes. Changing the weight to be accorded this presumption alters the legal landscape. If we construe a statute in a different legal environment than that in which Congress operated when it drafted and enacted the statute, we significantly increase the risk that we will reach an erroneous interpretation. This danger further enhances the need for us to be faithful to our duty to read statutes consistently whenever possible and to find repeals by implication only when differences between earlier and later enactments are irreconcilable.

 It is remarkable that the majority finds this intention sufficiently well expressed in congressional silence to overcome a presumption that can be rebutted only by “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to deny judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). To meet this standard, congressional intent must be fairly discernible in the statutory scheme. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984). Even when “substantial doubt about the congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling.” Ibid. There simply does not exist in the legislative history or text of the CSRA clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended despite its silence to effect a repeal of Tucker Act jurisdiction.

 The Federal Circuit concluded on initial review and after rehearing that prior to the passage of the CSRA a nonpreference eligible employee had a cause of action under the Tucker Act and the Back Pay Act if he or she was discharged in violation of applicable agency regulations and that *465Congress did not destroy this cause of action when it enacted the CSRA. 791 F. 2d 1554 (1986); 783 F. 2d 1020 (1986). Because of the unique character of the Federal Circuit, its conclusions are entitled to special deference by this Court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25. It is the only Federal Court of Appeals whose jurisdiction is “defined in terms of subject matter rather than geography.” S. Rep. No. 97-275, p. 3 (1981). Because its jurisdiction is confined to a defined range of subjects, the Federal Circuit brings to the cases before it an unusual expertise that should not lightly be disregarded.
The Federal Circuit is the only Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to review cases on appeal from the Merit Systems Protection Board and the United States Claims Court. In consequence, all claims by federal employees brought under the CSRA or the Tucker Act/Back Pay Act will ultimately be subject to review by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction in this area renders it uniquely qualified to determine whether the CSRA implicitly works a partial repeal of Tucker Act/Back Pay Act jurisdiction.

 “Thg Merit Systems Protection Board, along with its Special Counsel, is made responsible for safeguarding the effective operation of the merit principles in practice.” S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 6.

 Throughout the CSRA, preference eligible excepted service employees, that is, veterans and some close relatives of veterans, are given for policy reasons the same protections as members of the competitive service. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, at 8 (“[Veterans’ preference laws [are] a benefit which the Government bestowed and should continue to bestow on its citizens who have served in the armed services during a period of war or armed conflict”).

 Section 205 of the CSRA, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1143, originally provided:
“Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the Court of Claims or a United States court of appeals as provided in chapters 91 and 158, respectively, of title 28.”
Thus appeals from the MSPB could be heard by the Court of Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, or by any court of appeals pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2342 and 2344. The original form of §205 demonstrates that Congress did not intend to achieve uniformity at the expense of limiting the scope of Tucker Act jurisdiction.