Court Opinion

ID: 9752290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:55:30.221373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:13.254572
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. In a period of otherwise increasing judicial sensitivity to the victims of crime, I believe today’s decision is a setback.
In most cases, a victim’s only realistic chance to recover damages is the restitution process. Hence, as the statutory scheme makes clear, restitution is a favored remedy under the law. The statute mandates that “[rjestitution shall be considered in every case in which a victim of a crime has suffered a material loss or has incurred medical expenses.” 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a) (emphasis added). It further provides that “[w]hen restitution is not ordered, the court shall set forth on the record its reasons for not ordering restitution.” Id. § 7043(f). The statute thus creates a strong presumption in favor of restitution where the victim has suffered a material loss, and demands an explanation on the record from the trial court when it is not ordered.
Nowhere does the restitution statute define the burden of proof, nor does it specifically delineate the kinds of “material loss” for which *48compensation may be ordered. It refers simply to “damages to the victim’s property or person.” Id. § 7043(b)(2). In State v. Jarvis, 146 Vt. 636, 638, 509 A.2d 1005, 1006 (1986), however, we construed the statute to exclude restitution for a victim’s pain and suffering, emotional trauma, or loss of potential earning capacity, holding that only amounts “which are easily ascertained and measured are recoverable under the legislative scheme.” Id. Our holding, we explained, “avoid[ed] the possible constitutional problem of lack of trial by jury in assessing unliquidated damages.” Id. at 639, 509 A.2d at 1006. Yet nothing in Jarvis suggests an intent to further limit the effectiveness of restitution as the Court has today.
Here we are confronted with the relatively simple question whether lost profits are compensable under § 7043. The Court correctly concludes that lost profits may be awarded as restitution damages. Implicit in this conclusion is the recognition that, as a category of damages, lost profits satisfy the criteria set forth in Jarvis, that is, they are generally the type of damages that may be easily ascertained and measured. Id. at 638-39, 509 A.2d at 1006. As the Court notes, this conclusion is consistent with recent case law across the country. See, e.g., State v. Ihde, 532 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); State v. Jurado, 905 P.2d 274, 275 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Kisor, 916 P.2d 978, 981 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
The only question logically remaining, therefore, is whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the restitution award. Traditionally, to support a damage award, “all that is required is that the plaintiff furnish sufficient data that the jury may estimate the proper amount with reasonable certainty.” Green v. Stockwell, 87 Vt. 459, 462, 89 A. 870, 871 (1914); accord Retrovest Assocs. v. Bryant, 153 Vt. 493, 496-97, 573 A.2d 281, 283 (1990); Lemnah v. American Breeders Serv., Inc., 144 Vt. 568, 580, 482 A.2d 700, 707 (1984). In reviewing damage awards, we do not “substitute our judgment for that of the jury, nor will we substitute our discretion for the discretion of the trial court.” In re Estate of Boisvert, 135 Vt. 69, 74, 370 A.2d 209, 212 (1977).
Assessed in light of these standards, the evidence below — while not overwhelming — was nevertheless adequate to support the judgment. The general manager of the printing company victimized by defendant testified that its graphic artist was unavailable to work on other projects for the 343.5 hours he had to spend reentering information into the computers purchased to replace the stolen one, thereby resulting in lost profits of $3,435 (based upon the manager’s *49estimate of a $10 profit per hour); that the business lost $10 per hour in profits for each of the 120 hours that the printing presses stood idle because project information had not yet been entered into the new computers; and that, based on a profit margin of 37.5%, the business lost $2,027 in profits associated with three projects that were lost to other printers.
If this had been a civil trial, I have no doubt that under the traditional standards of review this Court would routinely uphold the award of damages. The record contains sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable estimation of the business’s lost profits. Nevertheless, the Court concludes the evidence was inadequate, apparently because the State adduced no corroborating evidence of the business’s profit margin. Yet, the manager’s testimony was subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, and was largely undisputed. The Court also faults the State for failing to prove precisely “how many potential customers the business had lost as the result of the theft.” 166 Vt. at 44, 689 A.2d at 1078. Where much of the business comes from a walk-in trade, however, it is neither fair nor reasonable to demand such precise accounting. As the general manager explained, it was simply impossible to “stand out front with the graphic artist and the other employees . . . turning those customers away.” An award based on the amount of employee time unavailable for other projects as a result of the theft represented a reasonable basis to estimate lost profits. See Bryant, 153 Vt. at 496-97, 573 A.2d at 283 (“‘[Difficulty in computing damages does not preclude the jury from making an assessment if there is evidence from which an estimation may be made with reasonable certainty.’”) (quoting Lemnah v. American Breeders Serv., 144 Vt. at 580, 482 A.2d at 707). I perceive no reason, and the Court supplies none, to hold the State to a more stringent evidentiary standard in establishing a restitution award for lost profits than the law has traditionally demanded in the civil context. Nor do I perceive any reason to depart from the fundamental rule that this Court does not “substitute [its] discretion for the discretion of the trial court.” Boisvert, 135 Vt. at 69, 370 A.2d at 212.
The inequity is compounded when we recall that the purpose of the restitution statute is to provide some measure of relief to innocent crime victims, not to punish them doubly by imposing artificially high standards of proof necessitating time-consuming and costly efforts to obtain basic compensation. Denying restitution in this case does not square with the legislative mandate to consider restitution in every case where the victim has suffered a material loss. 13 V.S.A. *50§ 7043(a). Indeed, the Legislature may now represent the last best hope for relief from this and other unduly narrow readings of the restitution statute. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 151 Vt. 200, 559 A.2d 658 (1989) (restitution under the statute may not include payments to insurers of direct victims).