Court Opinion

ID: 9404690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 21:00:26.450702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:16.262742
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48         Filed: 06/22/2023    Pg: 1 of 13

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-6888

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff – Appellee,

                     v.

        LELIS EZEQUIEL TREMINIO-TOBAR, a/k/a Scooby, a/k/a Decente,

                            Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cr-00209-LO-5; 1:22-cv-00186-
        LO)

        Submitted: February 24, 2023                                      Decided: June 22, 2023

        Before DIAZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker
        and Judge Harris joined.

        ON BRIEF: Elizabeth L. Van Pelt, LIBBEY VAN PELT LAW, PLLC, Arlington,
        Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Aidan Taft Grano-
        Mickelsen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888       Doc: 48         Filed: 06/22/2023      Pg: 2 of 13

        DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

               Lelis Ezequiel Treminio-Tobar appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for

        postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.           He argues his trial counsel were

        constitutionally ineffective in not objecting to a duress jury instruction that didn’t contain

        verdict-directing language. But his argument is foreclosed by our decision on his direct

        appeal, so we affirm.

                                                      I.

                                                      A.

               A jury convicted Treminio-Tobar of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, conspiracy

        to commit kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering, and kidnapping resulting in death,

        all based on his involvement in the brutal killing of Carlos Otero-Henriquez. Otero-

        Henriquez was murdered by members of MS-13 who lured him to a remote location and

        stabbed him to death.

               Treminio-Tobar admitted to participating in the murder but said he acted under

        duress. He testified that he didn’t want to join MS-13, actively resisted its recruitment

        efforts, was unaware of the plot until it was too late to escape, and participated only because

        he believed he would be killed if he refused. He admitted that he held Otero-Henriquez

        down during the murder but claimed that he merely pretended to stab him—and only after

        Otero-Henriquez had been fatally wounded by another gang member.

               Government witnesses, including MS-13 leaders who directed the killing, provided

        a sharply different account. They described Treminio-Tobar as an enthusiastic member of

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888       Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 3 of 13

        MS-13 who was eager to increase his standing in the gang and willingly participated in the

        murder. They said he was aware of the plot and could have left, but instead provided the

        knife used to kill Otero-Henriquez, stabbed him multiple times, and slashed him across the

        neck. They also testified that Treminio-Tobar helped cover up the killing.

               Treminio-Tobar sought a jury instruction on duress, and the district court agreed

        one was warranted. The court’s instruction, however, omitted Treminio-Tobar’s proposed

        language, which would have informed jurors that they had a “duty to find him not guilty”

        if they found he acted under duress. Compare J.A. 994, with J.A. 1353–54. Treminio-

        Tobar’s attorneys made a general objection to the final instruction but didn’t specifically

        object to its lack of verdict-directing language. 1

               The jury found Treminio-Tobar guilty. The district court sentenced him to 120

        months’ imprisonment on the racketeering count and imposed life sentences on the

        kidnapping conspiracy and kidnapping-resulting-in-death counts, all to run concurrently.

                                                      B.

               Treminio-Tobar and several codefendants filed a direct appeal. They argued the

        district court’s duress instruction deprived them of a fair trial because it “lacked necessary

        verdict-directing language informing the jury that it had to find defendants not guilty if

        they determined defendants acted under duress.” United States v. Lazo, 816 F. App’x 752,

               1
                   The government objected to the court giving any duress instruction, but argued
        that if it did, it should use a four-element instruction based on our decision in United States
        v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995), rather than the two-element version the defense
        proposed. The court’s final instruction largely tracked the government’s proposal.

                                                       3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 4 of 13

        763 (4th Cir. 2020). They also challenged the court’s omission of definitions for “reckless”

        and “reasonable legal alternative,” terms which appeared in the duress instruction. Id.

               We applied plain-error review because Treminio-Tobar’s attorneys had only

        “generally objected” to the duress instruction at trial; they didn’t “make the district court

        aware that they believed the instruction was faulty because it lacked verdict-directing

        language and contained undefined terms.” Id.

               We reviewed the jury instructions “as a whole and in [] context” and determined

        that “the jury was well aware it should acquit if it found Appellants acted under duress.”

        Id. at 763–64. We observed that we had never held that verdict-directing language “is an

        essential component of an affirmative defense instruction.” Id. at 764. And we emphasized

        that the district court accurately informed the jury (1) “that Appellants were entitled to the

        presumption of innocence,” (2) that “it must acquit” if it “has a reasonable doubt that a

        defendant is guilty,” (3) that “coercion or duress may provide a legal justification or excuse

        for the charged offense,” and (4) “that the defendants only needed to establish the

        justification defense by a preponderance of evidence.” Id. In a footnote, we stated that

        “[e]ven if we were to conclude that the omission of verdict-directing language was error,

        any error would not be ‘plain.’” Id. at 764 n.3.

               We also found that “the terms ‘recklessly’ and ‘reasonable legal alternative’ made

        sense in context.” Id. at 765. Separately, we concluded that the Appellants couldn’t show

        the prejudice necessary for plain error because the failure to define the terms didn’t affect

        their substantial rights. Id. We found that “the Government presented the jury with

        overwhelming evidence that Appellants knowingly, not just recklessly, placed themselves

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888       Doc: 48         Filed: 06/22/2023      Pg: 5 of 13

        in the vehicle” used to drive Otero-Henriquez to his death. Id. And we determined there

        was “overwhelming evidence that Appellants were well aware of the gang’s intentions and

        yet continued participating in [its] activities.” Id. This evidence, we held, foreclosed the

        possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendants had the court defined the terms

        in question. Id.

               Treminio-Tobar sought, and we denied, rehearing and rehearing en banc on issues

        related to the lack of verdict-directing language. He also petitioned for a writ of certiorari

        on the sole issue of “[w]hether the Fifth Amendment Due Process right to present a defense

        requires the trial court to instruct the jury that it has a duty to acquit any defendant who

        proves an affirmative defense.” J.A. 1815. The Supreme Court denied his petition.

                                                      C.

               Treminio-Tobar then petitioned to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28

        U.S.C. § 2255. He argued his trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective in several

        ways, including by “fail[ing] to object to the absence of verdict directing language” in the

        instruction on duress, which was his “entire defense.” J.A. 1809–10. Treminio-Tobar’s

        trial counsel filed the § 2255 petition on his behalf and said their failure to object “was not

        a strategic decision.” J.A. 1810. They asked the district court to appoint new counsel so

        they wouldn’t have to “habeas themselves,” requesting that new counsel have the chance

        to amend or supplement the petition after reviewing the record. J.A. 1811.

               The district court denied the petition and motion for counsel without a hearing. It

        refused to rely on counsel’s “conclusory” evaluations of their own performance. J.A. 1853.

        It also found Treminio-Tobar couldn’t show that his counsel performed deficiently, noting

                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48         Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 6 of 13

        that we had “upheld substantially similar language in a jury instruction for duress” in a

        prior case. J.A. 1855 (citing United States v. King, No. 95-5917, 1997 WL 407803 (4th

        Cir. July 22, 1997)). Finally, it held that because counsel had no “basis in Fourth Circuit

        precedent to find that the jury instruction was fallible,” they acted reasonably in not

        objecting. Id.

               We granted a certificate of appealability on a single issue: “Whether [the] district

        court erroneously determined counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to [a] duress

        jury instruction because [the] instruction lacked verdict-directing language.” Dkt. No. 11.

                                                    II.

                                                    A.

               We first address the scope of our review. Along with his argument about the lack

        of verdict-directing language, Treminio-Tobar asserts that the duress instruction “failed to

        explain how an affirmative defense operates relative to the government’s burden” and

        “failed to define ‘by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Appellant’s Br. at 24–25. He

        argues competent counsel would have objected on these grounds as well. The government

        responds that Treminio-Tobar’s new arguments “are not cognizable” because they go

        beyond the certificate of appealability and weren’t raised in the district court. Appellee’s

        Br. at 16.

               We don’t address issues outside the certificate of appealability, particularly when

        they weren’t raised below. See Appleby v. Warden, N. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility, 595

        F.3d 532, 535 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that we are “empowered to consider only the

                                                     6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48         Filed: 06/22/2023      Pg: 7 of 13

        specific issue or issues set forth in the certificate of appealability” (cleaned up)); United

        States v. Herrera-Pagoada, 14 F.4th 311, 318 (4th Cir. 2021) (claim procedurally barred

        where not raised before district court in § 2255 petition). And separate objections must be

        specifically preserved, even if they relate to the same instruction. See United States v.

        Nicolaou, 180 F.3d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A party wishing to preserve an exception to

        a jury instruction must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of

        his objection.” (cleaned up)).

               Treminio-Tobar’s § 2255 petition didn’t raise any potential objections to the duress

        instruction beyond the lack of verdict-directing language, and his new objections aren’t

        covered by the certificate of appealability. So we won’t consider whether counsel was

        ineffective in failing to make them.

                                                     B.

               Now to the sole issue properly before us. We typically review de novo the legal

        conclusions in a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Carthorne,

        878 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2017). And where the district court denies relief without an

        evidentiary hearing, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the movant. United

        States v. Pressley, 990 F.3d 383, 387 (4th Cir. 2021).

               But collateral proceedings aren’t “designed to be a rehash” of our decision on direct

        appeal. United States v. Fulks (Fulks II), 683 F.3d 512, 521 (4th Cir. 2012). Once we

        establish the law of the case, it generally “must be followed in all subsequent proceedings

        in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal.” United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d

        501, 528 (4th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). We have applied the law-of-the-case doctrine in

                                                     7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 8 of 13

        proceedings under § 2255. See Fulks II, 683 F.3d at 521; United States v. Bennerman, 785

        F. App’x 958, 962 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the law-of-the-case doctrine “has been

        applied to serve finality interests in the habeas context, where the normal preclusion

        principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel don’t apply”).

               The law-of-the-case doctrine “applies both to questions actually decided as well as

        to those decided by necessary implication.” Lentz, 524 F.3d at 528. There are three

        exceptions: “(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence, (2)

        controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the issue, or

        (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” Id.

        (cleaned up).

               To succeed on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Treminio-Tobar must

        prove that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and he was prejudiced as a result.

        Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Our decision on direct appeal

        precludes him from establishing either.

                                                     1.

               The government argues Treminio-Tobar can’t show deficient performance because

        we held on direct appeal “that the jury instructions were not erroneous.” Appellee’s Br. at

        22. We agree.

               On direct appeal, Treminio-Tobar argued that the lack of verdict-directing language

        in the duress instruction deprived him of his due-process right to present a defense. He

        now argues counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the instruction on the same

                                                      8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 9 of 13

        ground. But that argument is foreclosed by our holding from his direct appeal under the

        law-of-the-case doctrine.

               Our decision in Fulks II is instructive. On collateral review, Fulks argued that his

        capital-sentencing counsel was ineffective by not exercising peremptory challenges on

        three jurors who were “unfavorably disposed to [his] cause.” 683 F.3d at 520. He said

        counsel also overlooked a fourth juror’s failure to answer a questionnaire item about family

        members who were crime victims—as it turned out, her first husband had been murdered.

        Id. at 520–21.

               Fulks’s § 2255 petition followed a direct appeal in which he argued that the district

        court should have excluded the three unfavorable jurors for cause and granted a new trial

        when the fourth juror’s omission was discovered. See United States v. Fulks (Fulks I), 454

        F.3d 410, 427–32 (4th Cir. 2006). But we had rejected those arguments, finding the court

        acted within its discretion. Id. at 428–33.

               When Fulks made the same points on collateral review, we determined that “[t]he

        inevitable upshot of our holding on direct appeal . . . was that the process had resulted in a

        fair and impartial jury.” Fulks II, 683 F.3d at 521. When the Supreme Court denied review

        on Fulks’s direct appeal, that holding became the “law of the case.” Id. And from that

        “immutable premise,” we held that Fulks could “under no circumstances demonstrate the

        necessary precondition for his claim, i.e., that [counsel’s] actions . . . strayed beyond the

        bounds of reasonableness.” Id. at 522.

               Just as our finding of no error in the jury composition in Fulks I precluded a finding

        of deficient performance in Fulks II, our decision finding no error in the duress instruction

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888       Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023      Pg: 10 of 13

        on Treminio-Tobar’s direct appeal forecloses a finding of deficient performance here. On

        direct appeal, we reviewed the instructions holistically to confirm they were “not

        misleading and contained an adequate statement of the law.” Lazo, 816 F. App’x at 764.

        And we found “the jury was well aware it should acquit if it found [Treminio-Tobar] acted

        under duress.” Id. (cleaned up). That decides the performance inquiry, because counsel

        can’t be ineffective for “failing to offer alternatives to proper jury instructions.” Bennett

        v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1350 (4th Cir. 1996).

               Treminio-Tobar argues we aren’t bound by our direct-appeal decision because “any

        suggestion that the instruction was not error at all is merely dicta.” Appellant’s Br. at 54.

        He relies on a footnote where we stated that “[e]ven if we were to conclude that the

        omission of verdict-directing language was error, any error would not be ‘plain.’” Lazo,

        816 F. App’x at 764 n.3.

               But Treminio-Tobar gets it backwards: The focus of our earlier decision was

        whether the duress instruction fairly informed the jury that it “should acquit” if it found he

        acted under duress. Id. at 764. If there’s dicta here, it’s in the footnote.

               Treminio-Tobar’s remaining arguments are no more availing. He asserts that his

        former attorneys didn’t make the same arguments on his direct appeal, so “the questions at

        hand have not been squarely addressed.” Appellant’s Br. at 54. Not so.

               His opening brief on direct appeal claimed, “an accused is deprived of his due

        process right to a fair trial and right to present a defense if the jury is not instructed as to

        its duty to find an accused Not Guilty if it determines the accused acted under duress.”

        Appellants’ Br. at 40, Lazo, 816 F. App’x 752 (No. 18-4449), ECF No. 50 (emphasis

                                                      10
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 11 of 13

        removed). That brief also pointed to nearly all the same cases and pattern jury instructions

        as he does in this appeal. See id. at 37–42.

               It’s true that Treminio-Tobar now argues (for the first time) that counsel should have

        objected because the instruction didn’t define “preponderance of the evidence” or explain

        the relationship between the government’s burden and an affirmative defense. But those

        arguments aren’t covered by the certificate of appealability. And we won’t depart from

        our prior holding based on arguments that aren’t properly before us.

               Nor do we agree with Treminio-Tobar’s assertion that our prior decision was “dead

        wrong.” Appellant’s Br. at 55. Admittedly, many of our sister circuits include verdict-

        directing language in their duress pattern jury instructions. But while it may be a best

        practice, that doesn’t make it a constitutional requirement.

               In fact, none of the cases cited by Treminio-Tobar imposed a per-se requirement for

        verdict-directing language—each examined the effect of the alleged error in the context of

        all the instructions. E.g., State v. Thomas, 868 N.E.2d 1061, 1065–66 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)

        (considering the “instructions taken as a whole”). That’s exactly what we did on direct

        appeal, finding that the totality of instructions adequately informed the jury of its duty. We

        won’t retread the same ground now.

               Treminio-Tobar doesn’t offer any other reason why the law of the case shouldn’t

        govern, and we see no reason to depart from our earlier holding. Because there was no

        error in the duress instruction, Treminio-Tobar can’t establish deficient performance.

                                                       11
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48          Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 12 of 13

                                                      2.

               Our direct-appeal decision also forecloses a finding of prejudice. The “substantial

        rights” prong of plain-error analysis mirrors the prejudice prong of Strickland’s ineffective-

        assistance-of-counsel inquiry. See United States v. Rangel, 781 F.3d 736, 745–46 (4th Cir.

        2015) (“Affecting substantial rights, in most cases, means that the error must have been

        prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceeding. This

        outcome-based standard is similar to Strickland’s prejudice inquiry.” (cleaned up)). Both

        analyses require the defendant to establish “a reasonable probability” of a different result.

        Id. at 745.

               We held on direct appeal that the omission of verdict-directing language from the

        duress instruction wasn’t an error, so we didn’t consider whether it affected Treminio-

        Tobar’s substantial rights. But we did conclude that his substantial rights weren’t impacted

        by the lack of definitions for “recklessly” and “reasonable legal alternative” in the same

        instruction. See Lazo, 816 F. App’x at 765.

               That conclusion binds us here by “necessary implication.” See Lentz, 524 F.3d at

        528. The district court instructed the jury that to find Treminio-Tobar acted under duress,

        it had to find that he didn’t “recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be

        forced to engage in criminal conduct.” J.A. 1354. But we held on direct appeal that

        Treminio-Tobar couldn’t “establish that the jury would have acquitted [him] had the

        district court defined ‘recklessly’ and ‘reasonable legal alternative,’” because the jury saw

        “overwhelming evidence that [he] knowingly, not just recklessly, placed [himself] in the

        vehicle on the night” of the murder. Lazo, 816 F. App’x at 765.

                                                      12
USCA4 Appeal: 22-6888      Doc: 48         Filed: 06/22/2023     Pg: 13 of 13

               We agree with the government that our prior decision establishes that “there was no

        reasonable probability that the jury would have found for [Treminio-Tobar] on one of the

        required factual elements of his [duress] defense.” See Appellee’s Br. at 27. By “necessary

        implication,” there isn’t a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted him

        based on duress (even if the instructions included verdict-directing language). See Lentz,

        524 F.3d at 528. So even if counsel erred in not objecting to the lack of verdict-directing

        language—and we don’t think they did—Treminio-Tobar can’t show prejudice under

        Strickland.

                                                   III.

               The issues here are governed by the law of the case we established on Treminio-

        Tobar’s direct appeal, and he hasn’t offered a persuasive reason to depart from our earlier

        decision. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. And we dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid in our decision.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

                                                    13