Court Opinion

ID: 9638896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:57:39.457006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.501482
License: Public Domain

*772CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The opinion of the Court states:
“As Hudson noted, however, such an indictment as the instant one is not subject to a motion to quash. See Smith v. State, 571 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).”
The problem solved in Smith is nothing like the one in the instant case, and the Hudson court mistook the indictment in Smith to be one that failed to allege “the constituent elements of the offense attempted.” To the contrary, the Smith indictment alleged that the accused did unlawfully commit an offense in that he:
“with intent to commit theft, did attempt to enter a habitation ... by prying on door of said habitation with a tire tool, without the effective consent of Complainant.”
That pretty well sets out constituent elements of burglary prescribed by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 30.02(a)(1). The contention of the motion to quash in Smith was that the indictment failed to allege that accused “had the ‘specific intent’ to commit burglary,” and thereby did not charge “in plain and concise language the essential elements of the offense attempted to be therein charged ...” The Court found that “the word ‘specific’ is not essential to an indictment which alleges an offense requiring a ‘specific intent’ for its mens rea,” and concluded that the indictment “clearly sets forth that the offense of attempted burglary was set forth in ‘plain and intelligible words.’ ” 571 S.W.2d at 169.
While it is true that the instant indictment withstands any fundamental error test, to prepare for trial an accused needs to be informed whether the prosecution will assert that his intent was to commit theft or a felony and, if the latter, which felony. That is the lesson of Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), and we should follow its teachings in this cause.
I respectfully dissent.
ODOM, J., joins.