Court Opinion

ID: 9827039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:05:22.091584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:21.681691
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellant have earnestly presented a motion for rehearing that has perhaps apparent force, and we think it not amiss, in deference, to the earnestness of counsel, to again refer to the distinctions that we think exist between the case before us and that of Sabine Motor Co. v. English Auto Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 291 S. W. 1088, so strongly relied upon by appellant’s able counsel. . The English Auto Company, by means of its writ of sequestration, not only took from the possession of the Sabine Motor Company the cars in controversy, but also further proceeded to sell the cars and appropriate the proceeds. Here possession of the car in controversy was taken from appellant by an officer of the court, and not by appellee. True, it was delivered to appellee by the officer; but, for aught that the record show% appellee held it for and in the right of the officer. There is no evidence or finding that he used or converted it in any way to his own benefit; the car in fact has never been sold, but is in esse and subject to the order of the court, which directed its sale and the applica*365tion of the proceeds to the payment of appel-lee’s debt, with the excess paid to appellant. It is to be further noted that in the case appellaht relies upon it does not appear, so far as we have been able to ascertain, that the mortgages held by the English Auto Company contained, as in the case before us, an express power conferred upon the mortgagee, Covington, to, “without demand of performance, remove, take possession of, and sell said chattels at public or private sale, without notice, at any place where found.”
The validity and effect ¡of such a provision is expressly recognized by the able judge who wrote the opinion in the ease of Sabine Motor Co. v. English Auto Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 291 S. W. 1088, 1091. He there said:
“It goes without saying that a proper action in court cuts off the title 'of the mortgagor or his assigns. And our Supreme Court has recognized the validity of stipulations in mortgages authorizing the seizure and sale of mortgaged- property without legal proceedings at all. See Harling v. Creech, 88 Tex. 300, 31 S. W. 357; Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Rios, 96 Tex. 174, 71 S. W. 275, 60 L. R. A. 143, 97 Am. St. Rep. 901. In the former case, Associate Justice Brown said: ‘The instruments being chattel mortgages, the vendor had the rights of a mortgagee under a chattel mortgage containing the stipulations of right to take possession, * * * of the property if he deemed himself insecure, or the debt riot being paid, and to 'hold or dispose of the property in the character of mortgagee, and not as owner. We. answer the question, that under the law the instruments were chattel mortgages, and by their terms the defendant, Creech, had the right to take possession upon failure to pay or if he deemed himself insecure, but he had no right to convert the property to his own use. It was the property of the plaintiff, subject to the defendant’s rights as mortgagee.’
“In the latter case Chief Justice Gaines, referring to the former case, said: ‘So far we have not adverted to the case Harling v. Creech, 88 Tex. 300, 31 S. W. 357. In that case, in answering a certified question, this court, after construing the instrument in controversy to be a chattel mortgage, said: “The instruments being chattel mortgages, the vendor had the rights of a mortgagee under a chattel mortgage containing the stipulations of right to take possession, which would be to take possession of the property if he deemed himself insecure, or the debt not being paid, and to hold or dispose of the property in the character of mortgagee, and not as owner.” It is claimed by counsel for 'ap-pellee that this was a dictum. Without pausing to inquire whether the remark was called for in a decision of the question there certified, we deem it sufficient to say, that if a dictum, it is in our opinion a correct announcement of the law.’ ”
In the case from which we (have just quoted, the Sabine Motor Company, the assignee of the mortgagor, was not a party to the suit of the English Auto Company, nor a party to the proceedings which resulted in the final conversion of the automobiles in that case involved. And if the appellee, Covington, had the lawful right under the terms of his mortgage to take possession without process, we fail to see how the taking by the officer under the authority of the writ of sequestration makes any substantial difference in the right of appellee to possession, it being conceded that an unpaid balance of indebtedness existed.
On' the whole, we think the motion for rehearing must be overruled; and it is so ordered.