Court Opinion

ID: 9543291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:44:01.169835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:05.831956
License: Public Domain

*301FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the majority, in interpreting the statutes dealing with sovereign immunity, has ignored the intent of the legislature and misinterpreted the rule of civil procedure dealing with delay damages, consequently reaching an absurd result. Hence, I dissent.
Sovereign immunity is the law of this Commonwealth under the state constitution as well as under statutory law.
Pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.
1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. In general, then, a citizen such as the plaintiff herein who is injured through the negligence of a Commonwealth agency, is entitled to recover nothing from the defendant.
The General Assembly, however, has mitigated this rule and permits suits to be brought against the Commonwealth and its agencies for certain specific types of negligent acts, limited to a maximum recovery of $250,000 in favor of any plaintiff. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8522, 8528. The historical notes accompanying this legislation document the obvious — that the General Assembly, waiving sovereign immunity even in severely limited circumstances, was concerned with financial risk management and the health of the public fisc. Pursuant to these statutes, the plaintiff herein proved the negligence of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and recovered $250,000.
The majority holds that the $250,000 maximum recovery should be supplemented by $622,387 in delay damages pursuant to rule of court. The result is justified by reference to the rules of construction contained in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and an assertion that Rule 238 is “clear and unambiguous.” What is clear and unambiguous in my view is the absurdity of superimposing more than $622,000 delay *302damages on an award of $250,000; this obviously violates Pa.R.C.P. 128(a), which states that in construing any rule of civil procedure it may be presumed that “the Supreme Court does not intend a result that is absurd ... or unreasonable.”
I think the only reasonable course is to calculate delay damages under Rule 238 on the award — the statutory maximum — of $250,000, rather than the legally impermissible jury verdict of $1.5 million. I dissent.