Court Opinion

ID: 9903789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:04:18.113154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:47.003326
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

NICHOLAS FORD,

             Appellant,

v.                                          Case No. 5D22-389
                                            LT Case No. 2017-DR-235

JILL FORD,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed December 2, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Flagler County,
Christopher A. France , Judge.

Tonya D. Cromartie, of The Law
Office of Tonya D. Cromartie, P.A.,
Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.

      Nicholas Ford (“Former Husband”) appeals an order resolving several

post–dissolution motions. We affirm on all issues, except one. The trial court

ordered the equal distribution of $4,761.76 in proceeds held by Former
Husband from the sale of the former marital home. We reverse on that issue

because the lack of adequate factual findings precludes meaningful appellate

review.

      The parties’ marital settlement agreement provided that Former

Husband would continue to have sole and exclusive use and occupancy of

the marital residence until the parties’ minor child turned 18. During his

occupancy, Former Husband would be responsible for the mortgage, taxes,

insurance, maintenance, utilities, and minor repairs. However, upon Former

Husband vacating the property, the parties would equally divide the expenses

of the mortgage, taxes, insurance, maintenance, utilities, and minor repairs

until the property was sold. At that time, the parties would equally divide the

net proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence.

      The evidence established that Former Husband vacated the former

marital home approximately five months prior to its sale. He claimed that he

had expended $9,523.52 for the mortgage, utilities, and repairs during this

five-month period. Thus, Former Husband asserted that he was entitled to be

reimbursed $4,761.76 by Jill Ford (“Former Wife”)—said sum representing

one-half of his expenditures during the relevant five-month period.

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      Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, $4,761.76 of the proceeds derived

from the sale of the former marital home were held in trust by Former

Husband until the trial court determined the amount of reimbursement, if any,

to be paid by Former Wife.

      At an ensuing evidentiary hearing, Former Husband testified consistent

with his claim and argued he should receive the entirety of the monies held

in trust. Former Wife acknowledged that she was obligated to pay half of the

mortgage payments but contested some of the monies claimed for utilities

and repairs. The trial court’s order required the money held in trust to be

equally divided by the parties without providing any explanation as to how it

reached such result.

      After Former Husband’s motion for rehearing was summarily denied,

this appeal followed. On appeal, Former Husband argues that “[s]ince there

are not any factual findings contained in the Order, it’s impossible to

determine how the trial court arrived at that number.” We agree. Indeed, a

cursory review of the uncontested expenses reflect that Former Husband

should have received more than one-half of the monies held in trust. Because

the trial court’s lack of findings precludes meaningful appellate review, we

reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider this issue and to make

sufficient factual findings to permit meaningful appellate review. See Walsh

                                      3
v. Walsh, 600 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (reversing distribution

scheme utilized by trial court because “[t]he lack of findings makes

determining the distribution plan intended by the trial court impossible to

review.”).

      AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED.

EDWARDS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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