Court Opinion

ID: 9473956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:44:38.641301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:50.345667
License: Public Domain

NELSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, and in the reasons offered in part II.A of its opinion. However, I write specially to comment on its discussion in part II.B of the standard for reopening deportation proceedings.
Since the majority properly refuses to assume that the BIA based its denial of Maroufi’s motion on its underlying discretion, the majority’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in INS v. Rios-Pineda, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985), and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vasquez v. INS, 767 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.1985), is purely dicta. We are remanding this case precisely because we cannot determine from the record whether the BIA’s decision was based on the use of an incorrect legal standard or on the BIA’s underlying discretion. Consequently, it is unnecessary to decide or discuss whether an exercise of discretion to deny the motion to reopen would be proper under Rios-Pineda in the present case.
Furthermore, even if this question were currently before this panel, any citation to Vasquez would be tenuous at best. In part II of Vasquez, the court’s discussion of Rios-Pineda as it pertains to motions to reopen for suspension of deportation is dictum. Indeed, even its discussion in part I of the relevance after Rios-Pineda of the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary statutory eligibility determinations is dictum. In part I, the Vasquez court was dealing with a motion to reopen for adjustment of status, in which the determination of basic statutory eligibility is non-discretionary. Obitz v. INS, 623 F.2d 1331, 1332 (9th Cir.1980). Even before Rios-Pineda, however, the Ninth Circuit held that when dealing with non-discretionary basic statutory eligibility, motions to reopen could be denied regardless of a prima facie showing. Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1122 & n. 2. Thus, there was no need in part I of Vasquez to discuss discretionary basic statutory eligibility. As a result, the authoritativeness of that opinion on the interpretation of Rios-Pineda and the state of the law in motion to reopen situations is very much in doubt.
With these reservations and comments as to part II.B of the majority opinion, I concur in the judgment.