Court Opinion

ID: 9738423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:52:42.653349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.037105
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: Adhering to an unnecessary and outmoded state rule, the majority concludes that the remedy for legally inconsistent verdicts of acquittal and conviction is to reverse the conviction. I believe that the better approach is to allow the conviction to stand, as it would under federal practice, and accordingly I dissent. The defendant in this case was charged with one count of theft and two counts of official misconduct; the misconduct counts were based on the actions alleged in the theft count. The jury returned verdicts finding the defendant not guilty of theft, count I, and not guilty of one charge of official misconduct, count II, but guilty of another charge of official misconduct, count III. The defendant argues that the verdicts are legally inconsistent and that the only remedy for the problem, under People v. Frias, 99 Ill. 2d 193 (1983), is to reverse the conviction for official misconduct. The majority holds for the defendant, relying on Frias. The majority rejects the State’s argument that this court should no longer adhere to Frias and should instead follow the contrary rule of the United States Supreme Court, which would allow the defendant’s conviction to stand. I disagree with the majority and would adopt the approach proposed by the State. What colors much of the majority’s analysis in this case is its faulty assumption that the defendant’s acquittal on count I is the jury’s "correct” verdict and that the conviction on count III is the "incorrect” one. In these circumstances, there is no way of knowing which is the "correct” verdict and which is the "incorrect” one. " 'The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.’ ” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 76 L. Ed. 356, 359, 52 S. Ct. 189, 190 (1932), quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925). In United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S. Ct. 471 (1984), a unanimous Supreme Court determined that nothing in the United States Constitution requires the reversal of a conviction merely because it is legally inconsistent with an acquittal rendered on another charge in the same proceeding. Announcing a rule for federal cases, the Supreme Court held under its supervisory authority that a legally inconsistent conviction may stand in those circumstances. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Frias court had earlier relied on principles of collateral estoppel. As Powell makes clear, however, collateral estoppel is not applicable to this situation. Although collateral estoppel would preclude the State from bringing a second prosecution for conduct for which the defendant was found not guilty in an earlier prosecution, collateral estoppel is not implicated when the charges are brought in a single proceeding and .the inconsistency arises from those verdicts. Collateral estoppel applies to sequential prosecutions, not simultaneous ones. While we are not required to follow Powell, I would do so, for it represents the better rule. The majority correctly recognizes that the constitutional underpinnings of the Frias decision are no longer sound. 172 Ill. 2d at 280-81. Nonetheless, the majority refuses to follow Powell and offers several grounds in support of its continued adherence to the rule in Frias. None of the reasons cited by the majority are persuasive. First, the majority takes issue with the Powell Court’s observation that legally inconsistent verdicts may be explained as the product of jury lenity. The majority insists that lenity provides a rational explanation only when the defendant is convicted of the predicate offense and acquitted of the compound offense. The majority believes that lenity cannot be used to explain cases such as this one, in which the jury acquits the defendant of the predicate offense and convicts him of the compound offense. 172 Ill. 2d at 278 ("Any attempt to reconcile verdicts such as those here, where the jury acquits the defendant of the predicate offense and convicts him of the compound offense, on the basis of jury lenity defies logic and common sense”). The majority is mistaken, however, in searching for a rational explanation for a jury’s exercise of lenity. What the majority forgets is that lenity, by its very nature, does not necessarily operate in a rational manner, and a rational explanation cannot always be expected for its exercise. The majority also disputes the Powell Court’s recognition that the burden of the jury’s exercise of lenity falls on the prosecution, because double jeopardy principles preclude the prosecution from challenging an acquittal. I am not sure how much of the Powell Court’s analysis stems from a desire to achieve "symmetry,” as the majority charges (172 Ill. 2d at 279), and how much is based on the commonsense observation, ignored by the majority, that there is no reason to assume that the acquittal represents the correct verdict. As Powell explains: "Inconsistent verdicts *** present a situation where 'error,’ in the sense that the jury has not followed the court’s instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter of course.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 468-69, 105 S. Ct. at 477. In addition, the majority forgets that the defendant always remains free to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction. The conviction is not insulated from review; Powell merely says that the conviction should not be reversed automatically. Finally, the majority mentions that when legally inconsistent verdicts are returned by a jury, the trial judge should point out the problem to the jury and ask the jurors to resume their deliberations. The majority believes that the failure on appeal to reverse a legally inconsistent conviction would cause the defendant to bear the burden of the trial court’s inaction. 172 Ill. 2d at 279. Once again the majority begs the question by assuming that the acquittal is the jury’s "true” verdict and that the conviction is the improper verdict. Perhaps in these circumstances the judgment of acquittal is an unwarranted boon delivered to the defendant by a jury convinced of the defendant’s guilt. As Powell noted, "It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 105 S. Ct. at 476. For the reasons I have stated, I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to that court so that it may consider the other issues raised on appeal by the defendant. JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.