Court Opinion

ID: 990460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:21:50.455086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:35.614260
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 96-4197

VERNON KENDALL HAYDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem.
William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge.
(CR-95-212)

Submitted: August 20, 1996

Decided: September 23, 1996

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

William E. Martin, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Assis-
tant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appel-
lant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Clifton Thomas
Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Vernon Hayden appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy
to distribute cocaine base,1 and carrying and using a firearm during
a drug trafficking crime.2 Hayden contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction, and that the district court
improperly refused a requested jury instruction. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm Hayden's conviction and sentence.

We review a denial of a motion for acquittal under a sufficiency
of the evidence standard.3 To sustain a conviction the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, must be suffi-
cient for a rational jury to have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.4 All reasonable inferences from the
facts proven to those sought to be established may be made.5

The government presented substantial evidence that Hayden con-
spired to distribute cocaine base. Several witnesses testified that they
received crack cocaine from Hayden, either for their personal use or
to sell. One witness admitted to making several trips to New York and
transporting crack cocaine back to North Carolina for Hayden.
Another witness testified that she had observed Hayden distributing
crack cocaine to other persons. A government agent testified that
Hayden attempted to buy three firearms for an ounce and a half of
crack cocaine. Additionally, a search of Hayden's residence and an
adjacent apartment revealed crack cocaine and a firearm that was
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1 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988).
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 1996).
3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1228 (1992).
4 United States v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1993).
5 United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).

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identified by a witness as traded to Hayden for $275 of cocaine. Hay-
den's action of bartering drugs for guns constitutes"using a firearm"
for purposes of § 924(c).6 Based upon the evidence presented at trial,
we find the evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to convict
Hayden of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 7 and carrying and
using a firearm during drug trafficking.8

Finally, Hayden asserts that the district court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury after it had already begun its deliberations that he
could not be convicted of conspiring with a paid government infor-
mant. Because Hayden failed to preserve the issue by requesting the
instruction prior to the jury's deliberations, we review this claim for
plain error that affects substantial rights.9

We do not find the court's failure to issue the jury instruction after
the jury began its deliberation to be plain error. The necessity, extent,
and character of any supplemental jury instruction is a matter solely
within the trial court's discretion.10 When Hayden finally requested an
instruction concerning a paid government informant, the trial court
had already instructed the jury regarding the credibility of witnesses,
immunity of witnesses, witnesses who had used addictive drugs, and
the inability to conspire with a government agent. Together, these
instructions informed the jury that an informant's testimony must be
weighed with greater care to determine if the testimony was affected
by interest or prejudice. Additionally, evidence at trial supported the
jury's verdict independent of any activities conducted by a paid gov-
ernment informant. Consequently, we find no reasonable probability
that the instruction would have changed the outcome of the trial.
_________________________________________________________________

6 Bailey v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 4039, 4042 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 1995) (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492).

7 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988).

8 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 1996).
9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-
32 (1993).
10 United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1234 (1991).

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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