Court Opinion

ID: 9815417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 00:57:28.079645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:15.282727
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Decided Nov 3, 1931
BY THE COURT
Submitted on application of plaintiffs in error for a rehearing.
We have carefully considered the propositions presented by counsel and the testimony in connection therewith. We find no argument advanced nor supporting testimony presented which was not covered in the very exhaustive briefs on behalf of plaintiffs in error heretofore considered by the court. We gave consideration to all claims urged and in a general way discussed most of them in our former opinion. There may be two exceptions, first, the testimony of George Turner to the effect that he brought the Studebaker to a stop with the culvert right ahead of him; and second, respecting some impairment of his vision. Granting that he was mistaken it does not follow that he was wilfully testifying to an untruth. In fact, it is probable that had he purposed to falsify he would not have placed the Studebaker east of the culvert in a position where all the physical facts would obviously have refuted his statements. The Studebaker was not east of the culvert upon the theory that defendant in error advanced. If it was struck by the truck it was driven backward and not forward. Many records have been presented to this court and no doubt many more will be wherein there are statements inconsistent with the facts as they actually existed, and witnesses are prone to err, but because they do so it does not follow that nothing they say is worthy of belief.
Touching the impairment of one of Mr. Turner’s eyes, we can but say that the jury had full opportunity to consider this along with other testimony, and by its verdict found that the collision was not caused in any manner because of any negligence of Mr. Turner.
We recognize that there is sharp conflict in the testimony and that if the theory of the plaintiffs in error is correct the theory of the defendant in error must fail, but the jury in our judgment had a right to accept the evidence as more probably supporting the claim of the defendant in error than that of the plaintiffs in error. We see no reason warranting the granting of the application for rehearing, and it will therefore be refused.
ALLREAD, PJ, HORNBECK and KUNKLE, JJ, concur.