Court Opinion

ID: 9852285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:35.806848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.991658
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
In Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.1986), I urged a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker in a custody contest between equally fit parents with children too young to voice a preference.
In this case I argue that, at the very least, the primary caretaker is entitled, under NDCC § 14-09-06.2(4) and (5) (hereafter factors 4 and 5), to receive recognition and that if factors 4 and 5 had been properly construed, the trial court not only should have, but in all probability would have, awarded custody to the primary caretaker, who in this case was the mother.
Whether or not primary caretaking deserves presumptive force, it is a relevant and significant factor in a custody decision.1 We have acknowledged as much when we recognized that the primary caretaker concept “inheres in the statutory *218factors” of § 14-09-06.2. Gravning, supra at 622. If trial courts are to have any guidance and this court is to conduct any meaningful, principled review, we should identify and analyze those statutory factors in which the primary caretaker concept “inheres.”
This case gives us the opportunity to do so as to factors 4 and 5 because Ms. Dinius has squarely raised the issue. That, is what distinguishes this case from Gravn-ing, where it was not argued that factors 4 and 5, or for that matter, subsections 1, 2 and 3, reflect legislative recognition of the importance of primary caretaking. See O’Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker As Custodian, 63 N.D.L.Rev. 481, 505-508 (1987). Unfortunately, we did not avail ourselves of the similar opportunity in Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.1985), but we should not perpetuate our oversight.
The trial court interpreted factor 4 to refer to job stability, and factor 5 to refer to continuity of residence in the immediate area where the family lived together [Center] before the marital breakdown. Concluding that Mrs. Dinius had to complete her education and was uncertain about where this would'occur, while Mr. Dinius was living in Center and working at the same job, the trial court found that factors 4 and 5 favor Mr. Dinius.
That every child needs continuity of care from its psychological parent has been recognized by our Legislature in, at least, factors 4 and 5 of NDCC § 14-09-06.2. I do not see where the trial court has given any consideration of or weight to the fact that “Carmen apparently had the main responsibility for the care of the children.” (Majority opinion p. 6.) I believe the trial judge clearly stated what he attached importance to in factor 4 — that John has a certain job and because of that continuity, John prevailed under factor 4. In my view, the trial court misconstrued the meaning of factor 4 and overlooked entirely its intent that the continuity and stability that are relevant are the continuity and stability of the child’s emotional relationship with the psychological parent. The “stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity” of that environment are connected with more than a job location. They must refer at least to a significant degree, to continuity of the environment provided by the primary caregiver.
With regard to factor 5, “the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home,” the Legislature surely had in mind something more than a physical structure or a geographical location. After all, the statute does not say family house or the town or city where the family lived together. It refers to a “custodial home,” “as a family unit.” If home is where the heart is, the “custodial home” surely is where the bonded psychological parent is — the center of family life, the anchor of continuity of the family unit.
If factors 4 and 5 had been properly construed to give any weight to a primary caretaker’s significance to the children’s best interests, custody in this case would have been awarded to the primary caretaker notwithstanding the children’s resentment of the primary caretaker’s paramour.2 The problem with the trial court’s construction of factors 4 and 5 is its predictable adverse impact on the children, in every case where one parent has remained in the home to care for the children and household. Upon dissolution of the marriage, that parent’s “job” is no longer available because of financial circumstances. He or she must, therefore, seek a new job. Thus, if it is only job stability and geographical location that define factors 4 and 5, they will always be weighed against the primary caretaker (unless a new job is available in the same location without need for education or training, or unless education or training are locally available and future plans are known and future plans include *219continuous residence in the same location, all highly improbable.) See, e.g., Lands-berger v. Landsberger, supra. Instead of inhering in the statutory factors as we have concluded in Gravning, the continuity and stability of the relationship with the primary caretaker are given no weight under factors 4 and 5 by the trial court. The crucial bond between the children and the parent who, for twelve years in this case, was the primary caregiver is overlooked entirely. Where, then, I must ask, does the concept of primary caretaker inhere?
By affirming the trial court, the majority pays mere lip service to the importance of the bond between children and primary caretaker to the best interests of those children. It also renders ineffective and meaningless our recognition that the primary caretaker concept inheres in the statutory factors. If either proposition is to have any meaning, we ought to hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in construing factors 4 and 5 as it did.
The trial judge stated that, “I could make a decision in this ease, in all probability, awarding the children to either one of the parents and have it stand up to appellate review.” While I appreciate its candor, I believe the trial court’s “flip-a-eoin” mentality arises from its improper construction of the statutory factors in which it ignored entirely, or undervalued significantly, the legislative recognition of the importance of the primary caretaker in the lives of children.3 Because the trial court did not give the weight due to the primary caretaker under factors 4 and 5, I would hold that it misapplied the law, thereby making its custody decision clearly erroneous. I would reverse.
I respectfully dissent.
MESCHKE, J., joins the dissent.

. The majority recognizes that “being a primary caretaker is a relevant factor for determining custody,” but undermines the theoretical underpinning of the primary caretaker by dismissing the “psychological parent" concept as inapplicable to interparent custody disputes. Yet, the reason to attach significance to primary caretaker status is because "the intimate interaction between young children and their primary caretakers creates a unique psychological bond between them” which is crucial to maintain. See O’Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker As Custodian, 63 N.D. L.Rev. 481, 484 (1987).
A psychological parent is "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child’s physical needs.” Id., quoting J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).

. It is interesting that the children’s resentment extended only to the primary caretaker’s liaison, not to those of the noncustodial parent with whom they spent time on visitation. This suggests the strength of the bond between children and caretaker and the children's heightened expectations of undivided care and attention from their primary caregiver.

. In Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1985), the same trial court construed the same factors in similar fashion. We upheld its construction while lamenting over the difficulty in resolving a close question. Further reflection and this case illustrate to me the error of our prior ways. Doubtless, the trial court will continue to construe factors 4 and 5 in similar fashion in favor of the parent who throughout the marriage held an out-of-the-home job which remains secure.