Court Opinion

ID: 9926318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 16:04:48.486017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:32.318740
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                           MATTHEW ADAMS,
                              Appellant,

                                     v.

                        LYNDSAY CUNNINGHAM,
                              Appellee.

                            No. 4D2023-0572

                            [January 24, 2024]

   Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth
Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Cynthia L. Cox, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 312022DR001114.

  Thomas W. Sculco and Shannon McLin of Florida Appeals, Orlando, for
appellant.

    Amy D. Shield and Roger Levine of Shield & Levine, P.A., Boca Raton,
for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

    Appellant husband appeals a nonfinal order of temporary relief to
appellee wife in the underlying dissolution of marriage action. Appellant
challenges: (1) the amount of monthly support which he is required to pay;
(2) the award of exclusive use of the marital home to appellee; and (3) the
timesharing schedule imposed. Because of the broad discretion given to
trial courts in fashioning temporary relief in marriage dissolution actions,
we affirm without further comment as to issues two and three.

    As to issue one, we reverse the amount of temporary support awarded
to the wife. Appellant’s net income was $3,939 per month, and the court
awarded monthly support of $5,387 for several months, reduced to
$4,084.70 thereafter, both figures exceeding appellant’s income. “[A] trial
court cannot enter a temporary support award that exceeds or nearly
exhausts a party’s income.” Bolton v. Bolton, 898 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla.
4th DCA 2005); see also Miller v. Miller, 707 So. 2d 419, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998). This amount cannot be justified by requiring appellant to invade
his relatively modest assets, because there was no evidence that the
parties had relied on those assets to support their lifestyle during the
intact marriage. See Goodman v. Goodman, 797 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.
4th DCA 2001) (noting the general rule that “a party does not have to
invade the principal of non-marital assets in order to support a spouse at
a standard of living never achieved during the marriage”). Moreover, and
particularly because the court granted exclusive possession of the home
to the wife, the trial court’s award left appellant with no funds for his own
support. The trial court’s award constitutes an abuse of discretion. See
Bolton, 898 So. 2d at 1084.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                     2