Court Opinion

ID: 9740668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:59.928993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.604229
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The question presented, I agree with the majority, is whether the public building exception to governmental immunity1 ap*172plies to a slip and fall injury occasioned by an accumulation of grease or oil2 on a hallway floor.3
The circuit judge granted summary disposition, finding that Wade did not allege a "defect in the building itself.”4 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that a governmental agency "has a statutory duty to maintain its public buildings so that the members of the public who are on public premises are protected from dangerous and defective conditions of the building.”5 (Emphasis in original.)
The majority reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that "the transitory condition was not caused by a dangerous or defective condition of the building itself, thus the public building exception does not apply.”6 The majority elaborates that "[t]he statutory scheme does not contemplate transitory conditions because they are not related to the permanent structure or physical integrity of the building.”7 The majority would further limit the building exception, stating "[m]ere negligence by a governmental agency does not trigger liability.”8
*173I
I would affirm the Court of Appeals, and would remand for trial.
A
The majority’s construction ignores that there are two prongs of the building exception. The building exception provides that a governmental agency is obliged to "repair and maintain" a public building under its supervision. (Emphasis added.) That obligation, the first stated prong of the building exception, is specifically and separately stated in the sentence immediately preceding the sentence stating the second prong, that a governmental agency is subject to liability for damage resulting from a "dangerous or defective condition” of a public building.9
A governmental agency is thus subject to liability under the building exception where it has failed to repair and maintain a public building, without regard to whether the failure to repair and maintain also constitutes a "dangerous or defective condition.” This Court, in Reardon v Dep’t of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398; 424 NW2d 248 (1988), otherwise regarded by the majority as "controlling,”10 recognized that the building exception states two separate obligations: "The ñrst sentence [of the building exception] imposes upon governmental agencies the duty to 'repair and maintain public buildings under their control . . . .’11 "In addition, the second sentence of the exception imposes liability on governmental agencies for injuries 'resulting from a dangerous or *174defective condition of a public building . . . .’ ” (Emphasis supplied in Reardon.)12
B
Nor is there justification for the majority’s conclusion that the "dangerous or defective condition” prong of the building exception should be limited by judicial construction
—to exclude a dangerous or defective condition that is "transitory,”13 —to include only a dangerous or defective condition that relates to the "permanent structure or physical integrity of the building,”14 or
—to a dangerous or defective condition caused by a fault of a governmental agency more egregious than "[m]ere negligence.”15
The words "transitory” and "permanent structure or physical integrity of the building” and words establishing a standard of fault more egregious than "mere negligence” do not appear in the building exception. Nor are such words, or the concepts they convey, so today added by the majority by judicial construction,16 consistent with either a literal reading of, or a purpose of, the building exception, both identified by the majority and supported in the history of the governmental tort liability act or in the development, in Michigan and elsewhere, of statutory delineation of the *175scope of governmental immunity and of exceptions providing for governmental liability.
In Reardon, this Court said:
In light of the historical context in which the statute was enacted, as well as the language chosen by the Legislature, and the generally broad scope of immunity, we hold that the Legislature intended the public building exception to apply in cases where the injury is occasioned by the physical condition of the building itself.[17]
"Physical condition” was not limited in Reardon, to a condition that relates to the "permanent structure or physical integrity of the building.”18
C
The majority argues that "use of the ninety-day *176period for conclusively presuming knowledge, as well as the reference to time to 'repair’ the defect,” supports a belief that the building exception "does not encompass transitory conditions or ordinary daily maintenance.”19 The argument ignores that the statutory requirement that a governmental agency have knowledge of, and reasonable time to remedy, the condition applies in terms only under the second stated prong, "dangerous or defective condition of a public building,” and not under the first stated prong, "repair and maintain public buildings,” of the building exception. See n 1 for text of the building exception.
The majority’s argument also ignores that an injured person might show that the requisite knowledge was in fact acquired, and that there was also a reasonable opportunity to remedy, within minutes or hours, long before the lapse of ninety days when the governmental agency is conclusively deemed to have knowledge and time to repair. An accumulation of grease or oil might be remedied within minutes or hours of the governmental agency acquiring knowledge, and, remedied or unremedied, concerns the "physical condition” of the floor and hence of the building itself.20
The majority’s statement of this argument additionally ignores that the statute imposes, under the first prong, an obligation to "repair and maintain” not merely an obligation, as stated in the majority opinion, to " 'repair’ the defect.” The obligation is actually stated in the statute as an obligation to "repair and maintain public buildings under their control.” The majority in Reardon, quite correctly, read this as meaning an obligation to " 'repair or maintain.’ ”21
*177D
In the instant case, Wade does not assert that the grease or oil accumulated because of a structural defect.22 In another case, however, the "transitory” grease or oil might have accumulated in a crevice in the floor or because the floor, as a result of poor design or poor construction, is slanted.
ii
The majority relies heavily on Reardon, supra. There the plaintiffs sought to recover, under the building exception, for injuries suffered as a result of a sexual, assault by an employee of the Department of Mental Health on a nursing student, and for a sexual assault on a mentally retarded resident of a facility operated by the department. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of a method of securely locking the door of a dormitory room, in one case, and the floor plan of a ward, in the other, constituted "dangerous or defective conditions” of facilities operated by the department.23
The Court, in Reardon, observed that "the assaults were the result of the act of an intervening party rather than a dangerous or defective condition of the building itself,” and stated, and I continue to agree, that "the Legislature intended to impose a duty to maintain safe public buildings, but not necessarily safety in public buildings” and *178concluded "that the public building exception does not apply under the facts of these cases”24

A

The majority in the instant case states that although Reardon is "factually distinguishable from the instant case, the holding in Reardon delineating the public building exception is controlling”25
It is unclear on what basis the majority concludes that Reardon is controlling. I agreed with the dispositions in Reardon, read the opinion of the Court as deciding a lawsuit, not as a tour de force, and signed the opinion of the Court. The "holding” in Reardon is not even pertinent to, let alone controlling of, the correct resolution of the issue presented for the first time in the instant case.
Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded, as did this Court in Reardon, that a governmental agency is not subject to liability for physical assaults under a statutory building exception worded much like this state’s building exception, and yet have concluded that a governmental agency is subject to liability for a "transitory” dangerous condition26 *179and for a maintenance failure.27
B
The constant reiteration in the instant case of the phrase "of the building itself” taken from Reardon, suggests that, although that phraseology was indeed used in Reardon — in the context of distinguishing between an assault by an "intervening party” and "a condition of the building itself ” —the word "of” and the word "itself” mean to the majority that, in construing the exception, the word "building” is so far paramount that it trumps "dangerous or defective” and mandates judicial desuetude for "repair and maintain.”
The majority then expands "of the building itself” by adding a gloss limiting "building” to "permanent structure or physical integrity of the building.” Having made that leap, the majority continues its activism, expanding the judicially created limitations by adding, as well, the "transitory” and the "more-than-negligence” limitations.
The majority argues that grease or oil on a hallway floor is a condition in a building and not a *180condition of the building,28 and therefore is not a "condition of the building itself.”29 To be sure, a condition in or on a floor of a building is a condition in a building because a floor is in the building. A condition, in or on a floor, is nonetheless also a condition of the building.
If a floor of a building was structurally uneven, it would be both a condition in the building and a condition of the building. That such a condition is in the building does not mean that it is not also a condition of the building.
The emphatic appositive "itself” means "that identical one,”30 and adds nothing, when employed in a judicial opinion, to, nor can it modify, "building,” the word used in the statute. "Itself,” when employed in a judicial opinion, means in this context "that very building.” The use of "itself” in Reardon did not and could not change the meaning of "building,” the word used in the statute without "itself.”
c
This Court is called upon in this case to expound concerning the building exception, not Reardon. As appears from the majority opinion, opinions of this Court are increasingly ephemeral. The statute is more enduring.
The majority appears to read out of the statute, for the time being or until possibly the next case, both the first prong, "repair and maintain,” and the second prong, "dangerous or defective condition,” of the building exception._
*181In the next case, the Court could continue in the direction in which it appears to be headed and declare, on the basis of the analysis and language employed in the instant case, that "of the building itself ” includes only the roof and four outer walls,31 but then only if the governmental agency has, possibly, been reckless or grossly negligent, not "merely” negligent, in selecting the contractor who installed the roof and four outer walls, but not if there was a design32 or foundation defect because a design or foundation defect is not "of the building itself ” — a foundation defect is not in or of the building, but underneath the building.
III
The majority has developed its construction of the meaning of the building exception without considering either decisions in other jurisdictions construing similar statutory language or whether the limitations it has imposed by judicial construction are consistent with the construction this Court has, in earlier decisions, placed on the highway33 *182and motor vehicle34 exceptions.
A
Courts in other jurisdictions, construing "dangerous condition of a public building,” have concluded that failures of maintenance are included.35
Statutes in a number of other jurisdictions use the term "property” or "real estate” rather than "building” in stating the exception.36 I would read the legislative intent in using the word "building,” rather than "property” or "real estate,” as excluding parks and recreational facilities, but not as excluding areas that are part of the curtilage of the building. Such a construction would be consistent with the constrüction of the building exception by this Court in Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268; 269 NW2d 143 (1978),37 and
*183with a correct construction of the highway exception.38 Such a construction would also be consistent with the statement in Reardon that the Legislature imposed "a duty to maintain safe public buildings.”39
On extensive research of the statutes of other states, no case has been found in any jurisdiction limiting recovery under a building exception to a "condition” that relates to the "permanent structure or physical integrity of the building”40 or that *184would exclude "transitory” conditions. Recovery for "mere negligence” is the most usual basis of recovery in other jurisdictions under a building exception, and also under highway and motor vehicle exceptions. No case was found imposing a higher standard.
A number of cases were found where the courts held that a governmental agency was subject to liability for maintenance failures under statutes worded similarly to the Michigan statute, i.e., liability was imposed for a dangerous condition of a building, or for failure to maintain.41
B
This Court has not imposed with respect to the highway and motor vehicle exceptions the "transitory,” "permanent structure or physical integrity,” *185or "mere negligence” limitations imposed today with respect to the building exception.42 Imposing such limitations with respect to the building exception is not consistent with this Court’s decisions construing the other exceptions.
C
The majority’s reliance on Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), in justification of its construction of the building exception, is misplaced. Ross concerned the meaning of the term "governmental function” as used in the section of the governmental tort liability act stating that a governmental agency shall be immune from tort liability when "engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”43
While Ross does indicate that a majority of the Court took a broad view of the scope of the term "governmental function,” and was of the opinion that the scope of the term embraced most governmental activities, it does not follow that the Court, as then constituted, would have read the building exception or any of the other exceptions providing for governmental liability as narrowly as the Court today reads the building exception.
In all events, the correct construction of the highway, automobile and building exceptions, subjecting governmental agencies .to liability, were not in issue in any of the nine cases consolidated in Ross._

 Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition. Knowledge of the dangerous and defective condition of the public building and time to repair the same shall be conclusively presumed when such defect existed so as to be readily apparent to an ordinary observant person for a period of 90 days or longer before the injury took place. [MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106).]

 Or other possible substance that plaintiff’s proofs, were this case to be remanded for trial, might tend to show.

 Ante, pp 160-161. The order granting leave to appeal did not, contrary to an intimation of the majority, state an issue. 437 Mich 972 (1991).

 See Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 182 Mich App 519, 521; 453 NW2d 683 (1990), where the bench opinion of the circuit judge is set forth.

 Id., p 525.

 Ante, p 161 (emphasis added).
The majority similarly states "no defect of the building itself was pleaded.” Id., p 171.

 Id., p 168.

 Id., p 170.

 See n 1 for text.

 Ante, p 164.

 Reardon, supra, p 409 (emphasis added). See n 18 for full text.

 Id., p 410 (first emphasis added). See n 18 for full text.

 Ante, p 161.

 Id., p 168.

 M, p 170.

 It is unclear which of these alternative judicial formulations is the basis of decision in this case, and thus they all may be regarded as obiter dictum.

 Reardon, supra, pp 412-413 (emphasis added).

 In Reardon, supra, pp 409-410, this Court said:
The first sentence [of the building exception] imposes upon governmental agencies the duty to "repair and maintain public buildings under their control . . . .” In Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), we held that this duty is not strictly limited to the repair or maintenance of public buildings. Instead, we held that "a building may be dangerous or defective because of improper design, faulty construction or the absence of safety devices.” Id. at 730. We reiterate this proposition, as the holding in Bush is entirely consistent- with today’s conclusion that the injury must be occasioned by the dangerous or defective physical condition of the building itself. As long as the danger of injury is presented by a physical condition of the building, it little matters that the condition arose because of improper design, faulty construction, or absence of safety devices. However, while the public building exception is not strictly limited to failures of repair or maintenance, the Legislature’s choice of those terms to define the governmental duty is indicative of its intention regarding the scope of the exception. The duty to repair and maintain a premises clearly relates to the physical condition of the premises.
In addition, the second sentence of the exception imposes liability on governmental agencies for injuries "resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

 Ante, pp 170-171.

 See text accompanying ns 17-18.

 Reardon, p 409 (emphasis added).

 Because this case has not been tried, the cause of the accumulation of oil or grease, whether a structural defect or not, has not been established. Contrary to the assertion of the majority, an injured person is not required to plead with particularity the source of the accumulation.

 It does not appear that those lapses were claimed to have constituted a failure to "repair and maintain.”

 Reardon, supra, p 417 (emphasis added).

 Ante, p 164 (emphasis added).

 A Pennsylvania court held that the state was subject to liability, under a statute providing for liability where there is a " 'dangerous condition of Commonwealth real estate,’ ” where rocks were thrown at motorists from an overpass, because the state had failed to erect protective fencing or barricades that would have prevented the throwing of rocks onto the highway. Mistecka v Commonwealth, 46 Pa Commw Ct 267, 272; 408 A2d 159 (1979). (Although, in Snyder v Harmon, 522 Pa 424, 435, n 7; 562 A2d 307 [1989], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disavowed the statutory distinction made by the Mistecka court, this does not undercut the ruling for which Mistecka is cited.)
Users of Michigan expressways observe such protective fencing on overpasses in urban areas.
*179The Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, under a statute providing for liability for " '[ijnjuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s property,’ ” held that the state was subject to liability for the alleged placement of a temporary partition against a ladder on which a worker was working while servicing the elevator of a state building that resulted in the worker falling and sustaining injuries. Alexander v State, 756 SW2d 539, 541 (Mo, 1988).

 Failure of custodial crew to remove a stick from a lawn before another crew mowed the lawn causing injury to the plaintiif who was struck by the flying stick, subjected the governmental agency to liability under an exception for injuries caused by a " 'condition of the public entity’s property.’ ” Jones v St Louis Housing Authy, 726 SW2d 766, 774 (Mo App, 1987). See Mo Rev Stat, § 537.600.1(2).
Failure to trim foliage found to be causally related to surprise attack by a mugger, subjected a governmental entity to liability under an exception for " 'dangerous condition of its property ....’” Peterson v San Francisco Community College Dist, 36 Cal 3d 799, 809; 205 Cal Rptr 842; 685 P2d 1193 (1984).

 Ante, p 163. See also id., p 164.

 Id., pp 161 and 168.

 See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p 1204: "The letter itself was missing.” (Emphasis added.) The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed, unabridged), p 1017: "Even without flowers, the bowl itself is beautiful.” (Emphasis added.)

 Under the lexicon which the majority is developing, a dangerous or defective .condition of a tile, dirt or mud floor might not be encompassed by the building exception because the "permanent structure or physical integrity of the building” is unaffected by the floor, or whether there even is a floor. A roof and four outer walls would constitute a "permanent structure” and there would be "physical integrity of the building” even if there is an abyss where one would ordinarily expect to find a floor.

 In Reardon, supra, p 410, this Court said that it reiterates the proposition that a building may be dangerous or defective because of "improper design.” See n 18 for full text.

 Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it' is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. [MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).]

 Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner .... [MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105).]

 See n 41 and accompanying text.

 See, e.g., Tenn Code Ann, § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C); Tex Civil Practice & Remedies Code Ann, § 101.021(2); Mo Rev Stat, § 537.600.1(2); Ill Rev Stat, ch 85, ¶ 3-102.
The Ohio statute speaks of "public grounds” rather than "public building.” See Ohio Rev Code Ann, § 2744.02(3).

 In Reardon, supra, p 413, this Court said:
In Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268; 269 NW2d 143 (1978), the plaintiff was injured on a permanently attached playground slide immediately adjacent to the defendant’s school building. In an opinion joined by four other justices on the public building exception issue, Justice Fitzgerald held that the Legislature intended that the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity impose upon governmental entities the duty to maintain safe public places. Id. at 285. Thus, the Court found the building exception applicable to the admittedly dangerous and defective slide, despite the fact that the slide itself was not a building. See also Tilford v Wayne Co General Hosp, 403 Mich 293; 269 NW2d 153 (1978) (building exception applicable where plaintiff injured on sidewalk immediately adjacent to hospital). This legislative purpose to maintain safe public places was later echoed in Bush, supra at 731-732 (public building exception applicable where claimed defect *183is absence of safety features), and Lockaby v Wayne Co, 406 Mich 65, 76-77; 276 NW2d 1 (1979) (building exception applicable where plaintiff alleged lack of padding in cell where he was being held).
In Tilford, supra, this Court concluded that the entrance walk of a public building was within the building exception. No one opinion was signed by four justices, but in opinions written by Justices Fitzgerald, Moody and Ryan, six justices so agreed. Justice Ryan’s commentary on the argument that an entrance sidewalk is not within the building exception applies with equal force to the suggestion that the condition of a floor of a public building is not within the building exception:
The defendant argues that the Legislature, in employing the term "building,” intended to impose liability on governmental agencies that was extremely narrow in scope and applicable only to acts or omissions in connection with the care and maintenance of the walled, roofed edifice itself and no more.
In my view, that is an inappropriately narrow reading of the legislation and of the legislative purpose. [Id., p 303.]

 See Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), opinion by Boyle, J., p 637, opinion by Brickley, J., p 637.

 Reardon, supra, p 415 (emphasis added).

 While New Mexico courts at one time required a finding of "physical defect” in a building, this "narrower view” has been abandoned in more recent cases. See Bober v New Mexico State Fair, 111 NM 644, 653; 808 P2d 614 (1991) (overruling the rationale adopted in the following cases: Wittkowski v State, 103 NM App 526; 710 P2d 93 [1985], overruled on other grounds Silva v State, 106 NM 472; 745 P2d 380 [1987]; Gallegos v State, 107 NM App 349, 351; 758 P2d 299 [1987]; Martinez v Kaune Corp, 106 NM App 489, 491; 745 P2d 714 [1987]; Pemberton v Cordova, 105 NM App 476, 478; 734 P2d 254 [1987] ). See also Castillo v Santa Fe Co, 107 NM 204, 205; 755 P2d 48 (1988) .

 See ns 26 and 27.
Additionally, a number of cases were found where the courts held that a governmental agency could be subject to liability for negligent maintenance such as failure to pick up loose shells on the shoulder of a state highway, L & R Leasing v Allstate Ins Co, 561 So 2d 1011 (La App, 1990), failure to provide traffic control on state fairgrounds, Bober v New Mexico State Fair, n 40 supra, and failure to trim back a tree that blocked the sidewalk, Verity v Danti, 585 A2d 65 (RI, 1991).
Cases were found where courts held, under fact patterns quite similar to the instant case, that a governmental agency could be subject to liability for negligent maintenance. In Aubrey v Schenectady Co, 46 AD2d 714; 360 NYS2d 307 (1974), the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss where a prisoner brought an action for injuries sustained when he slipped in water on the floor of his cell. The court held that the county could be held liable for negligent "maintenance of the penitentiary, and, more specifically, . . . maintenance of the plumbing and the cell wherein the plaintiff was confined [and] negligent maintenance of the physical plant of the county penitentiary.” In Harris v Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Correction, 61 Ohio Misc 2d 21; 573 NE2d 213 (1989), the Court of Claims of Ohio concluded that the plaintiff, an inmate at the Ohio Reformatory for Women, had presented sufficient evidence to prevail against the state for negligent maintenance where she slipped and fell on an unsecured manhole cover while traversing the reformatory grounds.

 A governmental agency may be subject to liability for a highway design defect. See, e.g., Killeen v Dep’t of Transportation, 432 Mich 1; 438 NW2d 233 (1989).

 MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1).