Court Opinion

ID: 9394121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 14:06:08.523584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.327097
License: Public Domain

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22-P-210                                               Appeals Court

                COMMONWEALTH    vs.   RACHELLE SCORDINO.

                               No. 22-P-210.

           Middlesex.     December 9, 2022. – May 12, 2023.

              Present:   Rubin, Massing, & D'Angelo, JJ.

Uttering Forged Instrument. Negotiable Instruments, Forgery.
     Forgery. Evidence, Intent. Intent. Practice, Criminal,
     Required finding.

     Complaint received and sworn to in the Natick Division of
the District Court Department on July 3, 2017.

    The case was heard by David W. Cunis, J.

     Laurie Yeshulas for the defendant.
     Daniel M. DeBlander, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    RUBIN, J.     In this case we address the proof necessary to

support a conviction for uttering a false check ("uttering") in

violation of G. L. c. 267, § 5, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Concluding that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden, we

reverse.
                                                                    2

     Background.    The defendant was convicted of uttering after

a jury-waived trial.   The facts adduced at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v.

Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), were as follows.      At

about 4:30 P.M. on May 11, 2017, the defendant entered a branch

of her own bank, Citizen's Bank, at the Stop & Shop supermarket

on Worcester Street in Natick, and, presenting her own valid

driver's license, cashed a check made payable to her in the

amount of $950.    The check was drawn on the Citizen's Bank

account of one Phyllis Adams.

     The following month, Adams noticed several checks that she

had not written were cashed against her account.   She kept two

checkbooks for that account at her home in Natick.    She

testified that no one had permission to sign checks from the

account on her behalf.1   Apparently checks from both checkbooks

were used without her authorization.

     Adams did not sign the check the defendant cashed.     Adams

did not know the defendant, nor had Adams ever seen her before.

And Adams had no reason to pay the defendant.

     1 Evidence at trial, however, did indicate that the account
was a trust account and that checks from one of the checkbooks
show the names of both Phyllis Adams and John Douglas Adams in
the top lefthand corner of the checks where account owner names
and addresses typically appear. Nothing in our decision turns
on this.
                                                                       3

      There was no evidence linking the defendant to Adams's home

or to any other unauthorized use of Adams's checks.    There was

no evidence that the defendant was in possession of Adams's

checkbook at any point in time, or that she had any access to

it.   In fact, the Commonwealth presented no evidence as to how

the defendant obtained the check.    And, despite the fact that

several checks were missing, there was no evidence that the

defendant attempted to cash or did cash any other checks.      There

was also no evidence that the check the defendant did cash was

altered in any way.   On the contrary, from all appearances, the

check was written out to the defendant from Adams's account and

bore a signature that at least arguably looked like that of

Adams.   There was no evidence that the defendant signed the

check.

      Nor was there any evidence of consciousness of guilt.     The

defendant's conduct at the bank was normal, offering little more

than a typical bank transaction.    There was no evidence that the

defendant attempted to conceal her identity, alter her

appearance, or assume the identity of another while cashing the

check.   She did not try to cash the check at a bank where she

was not a customer.   And, the defendant did not make any

admissions that she knew the check was fraudulent.
                                                                     4

       The defendant appeals her conviction, arguing that the

evidence was insufficient to support it, a claim properly

preserved in the trial court.

       Discussion.   To support a conviction for uttering a false

check in violation of G. L. c. 267, § 5, the Commonwealth is

required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the

following four elements:    (1) that the defendant offered as

genuine; (2) an instrument; (3) she knew to be forged; (4) with

the intent to defraud.     Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 438 Mass.

658, 664 n.9 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Levin, 11 Mass.

App. Ct. 482, 496 (1981).    On these facts, we are presented with

the following question:    Is evidence that a defendant in an

otherwise unremarkable bank transaction who cashed a check from

a person who did not know the defendant and did not owe the

defendant money, alone, sufficient to support a finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the instrument was

forged and acted with an intent to defraud?    We conclude it is

not.

       It is not a crime to accept payment or funds from one

person with a check drawn on the account of another.    Recipients

of such checks may not know, and may never have met, the

individual on whose accounts such checks are drawn.    As an

example of such a transaction, the defendant put forward the

hypothetical of an attorney who is paid for services provided to
                                                                    5

a client by a check drawn on the account of another person, such

as a friend or family member of the client.   We have no doubt

that such an arrangement, permitted when consistent with the

requirements, including client consent, of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8

(f), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1349 (2015), is not out of the

ordinary.   And if, in fact, such a check was presented but it

was stolen, as the check was here, the account holder would be

able to testify truthfully, as Adams testified here, not only

that he or she did not know the payee, but that he or she did

not owe the payee anything.

    Nonetheless, consistent with the holdings of some courts in

other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, we do not

think the recipients of such checks could be convicted for

uttering merely upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, without

something more, that in the ordinary course they cashed a check

drawn on a stranger's account made out to them in an otherwise

unremarkable transaction at their own bank.   We do not think the

recipient's conduct of cashing such a check would suffice to

demonstrate either an intent to defraud, or knowledge of

forgery, beyond a reasonable doubt.   The Commonwealth must show

more.   See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 579 F.2d 46, 47 (7th

Cir. 1978) ("the mere passing of a counterfeit instrument,

without more, is insufficient in itself to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the instrument to be
                                                                     6

counterfeit and thus passed it with intent to defraud"); Parks

v. State, 746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ("This

Court has wisely held that intent or guilty knowledge cannot be

inferred from the mere passing of a forged instrument.    Albrecht

v. State [486 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)].    Indeed,

to hold otherwise would create the danger that the unknowing and

accidental passing of a forged instrument could effectively

become a strict liability offense.").   See also Commonwealth v.

Horton, 465 Pa. 213, 218 (1975) ("we also find unacceptable the

Commonwealth's intimation that the possession by a person in

appellant's circumstances of a check purportedly issued by a

defunct corporation supports the requisite guilty knowledge.

Experience teaches that all too frequently it is the poorer and

less trained citizen within our society who is victimized by

bogus schemes in which non-existent or defunct corporations are

used as ploys").

    Of course, such recipients could put on a defense that

described their legitimate receipt of any such check.    But a

defendant has no burden in a criminal prosecution, and the

defendant is not required to disprove any element of a charged

offense.   The burden is always on the Commonwealth to prove each

element beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Horton, supra at 218.

("we reject the Commonwealth's suggestion that an inference of

guilt can be drawn from Mrs. Horton's failure to explain her
                                                                    7

possession of this check.     To rule otherwise would permit the

prosecution to be relieved of its obligation to prove its case,

unaided by the defendant").

    For evidence to be sufficient to meet the burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt it must be sufficiently probative to

demonstrate the truth of the proposition with the requisite

degree of certainty.   Given the not uncommon circumstances in

which a person may be given a check drawn on a third party's

account, we do not think the inference of intent to defraud or

of knowledge of forgery from cashing such a check is

sufficiently strong, that, standing alone, cashing such a check

can support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to

those elements of uttering.

    Consequently, the defendant's conviction must be reversed.

                                      Judgment reversed.

                                      Finding set aside.

                                      Judgment for the defendant.