Court Opinion

ID: 9949339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:11:28.791825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:42.183430
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 7, 2024

                                In The

                           Court of Appeals
                                For The

                       First District of Texas
                         ————————————
                          NO. 01-22-00718-CV
                        ———————————
                RENE CAMPOS, JIMMY ARNOLD, AND
                   CHRIS ROBERTSON, Appellants
                                  V.
               THE CWEREN LAW FIRM PLLC, Appellee
                                  and
              THE CWEREN LAW FIRM PLLC, Appellant
                                  V.
   EUREKA MULTIFAMILY GROUP, L.P., EUREKA MULTIFAMILY
  GROUP GP, INC., 2016 BAYTOWN WARD RD., LLC, 2015 HOUSTON
     REDFORD, LLC, 2014 GALVESTON JONES DRIVE, LLC, 2013
    HOUSTON FLEMING, LLC, 2013 HOUSTON MAXEY, LLC, 2015
    HOUSTON GULFTON, LLC, 2013 TRAVIS OAK CREEK, LP, 2013
  TRAVIS OAK CREEK GP, LLC, RENE CAMPOS, JIMMY ARNOLD,
   CHRIS ROBERTSON, KENNETH B. CHAIKEN, AND CHAIKEN &
                     CHAIKEN, P.C., Appellees

           On Appeal from the County Civil Court of Law No. 2
                               Harris County, Texas
                           Trial Court Case No. 1156293

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This case involves two related appeals. In the first appeal, appellants, Rene

Campos, Jimmy Arnold, and Chris Robertson, challenge the trial court’s order

denying their motion for sanctions against appellee, the Cweren Law Firm PLLC

(the “Cweren Law Firm”), and its attorney, Brian Cweren, filed in the Cweren Law

Firm’s suit for breach of contract, suit on sworn account, fraud, quantum meruit, and

promissory estoppel. In their sole issue, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson contend

that the trial court erred in denying their motion for sanctions.

      In the second appeal, appellant, the Cweren Law Firm, challenges the trial

court’s orders vacating a previous order which had granted the Cweren Law Firm’s

motion for sanctions against appellees, Kenneth B. Chaiken and Chaiken & Chaiken,

P.C. (collectively, “Chaiken”), denying the Cweren Law Firm’s request for

attorney’s fees under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”)1 against

appellees, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson, and denying the Cweren Law Firm’s

motion for sanctions against appellees, Eureka Multifamily Group, GP, Inc., Eureka

Multifamily Group, L.P. (collectively, “Eureka”), 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC,

1
      See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011.

                                           2
2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston

Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013

Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson, in the Cweren Law Firm’s suit for breach of contract, suit on sworn

account, fraud, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel. In three issues, the

Cweren Law Firm contends that the trial court erred in vacating the previous

sanctions order, denying its request for attorney’s fees, and denying its motion for

sanctions.

      We affirm.

                                   Background

      In its second amended petition, the Cweren Law Firm alleged that Eureka

constituted “an investment and apartment management company that own[ed]

and/or operate[d] apartment communities across the United States.” Campos was

the general partner of Eureka, as well as the “managing member and director” of

certain Eureka properties. According to the Cweren Law Firm, it had “a long history

of performing legal work for Eureka properties,” but it had not been paid the legal

fees owed on numerous matters.

      Specifically, the Cweren Law Firm alleged that 2015 Houston Redford, LLC

had engaged the firm to represent it in two matters. 2015 Houston Redford, LLC

“agreed to pay [the Cweren Law Firm] for legal services rendered, together with

                                         3
reasonable expenses incurred by [the firm] in the performance of [its] work,” but

2015 Houston Redford, LLC owed the Cweren Law Firm $1,949.06 in unpaid legal

fees and expenses.

      Next, the Cweren Law Firm alleged that 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC

engaged the firm to represent it in two matters. 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC

“agreed to pay [the Cweren Law Firm] for legal services rendered, together with

reasonable expenses incurred by [the firm] in the performance of [its] work,” but

2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC owed the Cweren Law Firm $1,604.11 in unpaid

legal fees and expenses.

      Further, the Cweren Law Firm alleged that 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC

engaged the firm to represent it in two matters, and 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC

“agreed to pay [the Cweren Law Firm] for legal services rendered, together with

reasonable expenses incurred by [the firm] in the performance of [its] work.”

According to the Cweren Law Firm, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC owed the Cweren

Law Firm $6,142.12 in unpaid legal fees and expenses.

      The Cweren Law Firm also alleged that 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC engaged

the firm to represent it in twelve matters, and 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC “agreed

to pay [the Cweren Law Firm] for legal services rendered, together with reasonable

expenses incurred by [the firm] in the performance of [its] work.” 2013 Houston

                                        4
Fleming, LLC owed the Cweren Law Firm $22,517.62 in unpaid legal fees and

expenses.

      As to 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP and 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, the

Cweren Law Firm alleged that they engaged the firm to represent them in two

matters, and 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP and 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC

“agreed to pay [the Cweren Law Firm] for legal services rendered, together with

reasonable expenses incurred by [the firm] in the performance of [its] work.” They

owed the Cweren Law Firm $7,025.08 in unpaid legal fees and expenses.

      The Cweren Law Firm further alleged that 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC

engaged the firm to represent it in one matter and 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC

engaged the firm to represent it in one matter. Each “agreed to pay [the Cweren Law

Firm] for legal services rendered, together with reasonable expenses incurred by [the

firm] in the performance of [its] work.” According to the Cweren Law Firm, 2015

Houston Gulfton, LLC owed it $3,103.99 in unpaid legal fees and expenses, and

2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC owed it $647.66 in unpaid legal fees and

expenses.

      Additionally, the Cweren Law Firm alleged that it had regularly sent invoices

to the property managers at the various Eureka properties and made direct payment

requests to Campos at Eureka’s corporate office.        Despite multiple invoices,

demands, and attempts to compromise, Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015

                                         5
Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming,

LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak

Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson had

failed to pay the Cweren Law Firm the fees and expenses it was owed, which totaled

$42,989.64.

      The Cweren Law Firm further alleged that Campos had a “history of

committing fraud by disputing or refusing to pay legitimate invoices” and “taking

advantage of others to enrich himself and his business associates.” Campos “likely

financially benefit[ted] by not paying” the Cweren Law Firm the legal fees and

expenses the firm was owed. According to the Cweren Law Firm, in April and May

2020, Campos “specifically promised” the Cweren Law Firm that it “would be paid

the duly owed legal fees,” but the firm was never paid. Further, Arnold promised

the Cweren Law Firm that it “would be paid,” but then refused to pay, and Robertson

“also participated in the fraud.”

      The Cweren Law Firm brought claims against Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward

Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013

Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC,

2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson for breach of contract, suit on sworn account, fraud, quantum meruit, and

                                         6
promissory estoppel. The Cweren Law Firm requested damages in the amount of

$42,989.64 as well as attorney’s fees.

      Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014

Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey,

LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak

Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson all answered, generally denying

the allegations in the Cweren Law Firm’s petition, and asserting certain specific

denials.

      On April 1, 2021, the Cweren Law Firm filed an emergency motion for

sanctions against Chaiken, who, at the time, represented Eureka, 2016 Baytown

Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC,

2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton,

LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos,

Arnold, and Robertson in the trial court. The Cweren Law Firm asserted that

Chaiken had “engaged in highly abusive, scorched-earth litigation tactics designed

to harass” the Cweren Law Firm. According to the Cweren Law Firm, the goal of

Chaiken’s harassment was “to force [the] Cweren [Law Firm] to walk away from

the legal fees [it] was owed.” The Cweren Law Firm requested that the trial court

sanction Chaiken pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and its inherent

authority.

                                         7
      Chaiken filed a response to the Cweren Law Firm’s motion for sanctions.

After a hearing, on April 13, 2021, the trial court granted the Cweren Law Firm’s

motion for sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority and Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure 215.2(b) and 215.3 (the “April 13, 2021 sanctions order”). The trial court

assessed monetary sanctions against Chaiken, ordering that Chaiken, within ten days

of the date of the order, pay the Cweren Law Firm $50,000 for “the reasonable and

necessary attorney’s fees and expenses [it] ha[d] incurred in responding to the

sanctionable conduct . . . and pursuing the motion for sanctions.”2 The trial court

also ordered that Chaiken, Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston

Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC,

2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek,

LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson:

(1) “communicate      only     with    [t]he     Cweren      Law      Firm[’s] . . . lead

counsel, . . . Cweren, about th[e] case and refrain from contacting the firm’s

associates”; (2) “issue no third party subpoenas or deposition notices without first

seeking and obtaining leave of court”; (3) “not contact current or former associates

or clients of [t]he Cweren Law Firm . . . concerning th[e] case without first seeking

2
      On April 21, 2021, the trial court granted Chaiken’s motion to withdraw as counsel
      for Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014
      Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey,
      LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak
      Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson.

                                           8
and obtaining leave of court”; and (4) “refrain from making ad hominem, personal

attacks o[n] . . . Cweren and [t]he Cweren Law Firm . . . in . . . pleadings and in their

communications with counsel.”

      Following the trial court’s April 13, 2021 sanctions order, Chaiken filed an

emergency motion to defer its payment obligations under the order, requesting that

the trial court allow it to pay the sanctions award “after judgment and appeal” in the

case. On April 26, 2021, the trial court denied Chaiken’s motion (the “April 26,

2021 order”).

      Thereafter, Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford,

LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013

Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP,

2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson filed a motion to

transfer and for sanctions, asserting that the Cweren Law Firm had engaged in

“judge[]shopping.”3 More specifically, they asserted that the Cweren Law Firm had

“filed seven separate [c]ounty [c]ivil [c]ourt lawsuits against seven of” them, “one

or two at a time, until the last suit landed” with the particular judge that the Cweren

Law Firm wanted to hear its case. The Cweren Law Firm then “amended its

pleadings in th[e] [instant] []suit to join all other [parties] and . . . quietly nonsuited

3
      Chaiken joined the motion to transfer and for sanctions.

                                            9
the other suits that were pending in courts [with judges] that [the firm] did not like.”4

Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014

Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey,

LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak

Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson thus requested that the trial court

transfer the Cweren Law Firm’s suit to Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 2—

the county civil court in which the firm’s first suit was filed and over which the

Honorable Jim Kovach presided. Further, Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC,

2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston

Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013

Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson asked the trial court to impose monetary sanctions against the Cweren

Law Firm and Cweren because they had engaged in improper “judge shopping.”

The trial court denied the motion to transfer and for sanctions.

      However, after denying the transfer and sanctions motion, the Honorable

Judge Barnstone resigned, and his successor, the Honorable Audrie Lawton-Evans

reconsidered Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC,

4
      The underlying suit was filed in Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 1, over which
      the Honorable George Barnstone was the presiding judge. During the pendency of
      the Cweren Law Firm’s suit, Judge Barnstone resigned, and the Honorable Audrie
      Lawton-Evans was appointed to serve as the presiding judge of the Harris County
      Civil Court at Law No. 1.

                                           10
2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston

Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis

Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s motion to transfer and for

sanctions. The trial court granted the motion to transfer and transferred the Cweren

Law Firm’s suit to Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 2.5 The trial court denied

the request for sanctions.

      After the Cweren Law Firm’s suit was transferred, Eureka, 2016 Baytown

Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC,

2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton,

LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos,

Arnold, and Robertson as well as Chaiken filed motions to reconsider the April 13,

2021 sanctions order and the April 26, 2021 order, and they requested that the trial

court vacate the previous orders.

      The Cweren Law Firm responded, requesting that the trial court affirm the

April 13, 2021 sanctions order and the April 26, 2021 order. After a hearing, the

trial court, on July 21, 2022, vacated the April 13, 2021 sanctions order and the April

26, 2021 order “in all respects.”

5
      See In re 2016 Baytown Ward Rd LLC, No. 01-21-00250-CV, 2022 WL 904626, at
      *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)
      (noting successor trial court judge granted motion to transfer and transferred Cweren
      Law Firm’s suit, as requested). The Honorable Jim Kovach is the presiding judge
      of Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 2.

                                           11
      The Cweren Law Firm then non-suited its claims against Eureka, 2016

Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones

Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015

Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP,

LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson.6 And on July 29, 2022, the trial court signed

an order of nonsuit, dismissing the Cweren Law Firm’s claims without prejudice.7

      Campos, Arnold, and Robertson then moved for sanctions against the Cweren

Law Firm and Cweren, asserting that they had engaged in “improper judge

shopping” and had brought claims against Campos, Arnold, and Robertson that

“ha[d] no basis in law or fact,” but that were “brought solely for the purpose of

harassment.” Campos, Arnold, and Robertson requested sanctions be imposed

against the Cweren Law Firm and Cweren under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13

and Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code chapter 10 in an amount “equal to the

6
      Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014
      Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey,
      LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak
      Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson also nonsuited any counterclaims
      they had pending against the Cweren Law Firm.
7
      The trial court’s July 29, 2022 order of nonsuit did not constitute a final judgment
      because the Cweren Law Firm still had claims pending against another defendant
      who is not a party to this appeal. But the trial court’s July 29, 2022 order of nonsuit,
      dismissed Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC,
      2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston
      Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis
      Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s counterclaims against the
      Cweren Law Firm without prejudice as well.

                                             12
cost that they [had] incurred defending against the groundless claims.” Further,

Campos, Arnold, and Robertson requested that the Cweren Law Firm and Cweren

be sanctions “$10,000 each” and that Campos, Arnold, and Robertson “be awarded

their attorney’s fees incurred relating to the motion to transfer” because the Cweren

Law Firm and Cweren had engaged in “judge shopping.” After the Cweren Law

Firm filed a response, the trial court, on August 29, 2022, denied Campos, Arnold,

and Robertson’s motion for sanctions.8

      Additionally, the Cweren Law Firm moved for sanctions against Eureka, 2016

Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones

Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015

Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP,

LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson, arguing the trial court should impose

sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and its inherent authority because

Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014

Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey,

LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak

Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson had “attended [a] mediation in bad

8
      In its response, the Cweren Law Firm requested sanctions against Campos, Arnold,
      and Robertson for filing “a groundless, frivolous motion for sanctions . . . in bad
      faith and solely for the purpose of harassment in violation of” Texas Rule of Civil
      Procedure 13. The trial court denied the Cweren Law Firm’s request for sanctions
      as well.

                                          13
faith.”     According to the Cweren Law Firm, Campos, “inexplicably left [the

mediation] early and refused to be present during the entire mediation process.”

Thus, the firm requested that the trial court “impose sanctions” and award it “costs

and attorney’s fees.” After a response was filed, the trial court, on August 29, 2022,

denied the Cweren Law Firm’s motion for sanctions.

          On August 31, 2022, the trial court signed a final judgment, which disposed

of all issues and all parties.

                       Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s Appeal

          In their sole issue, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson argue that the trial court

erred in denying their motion for sanctions against Cweren and the Cweren Law

Firm because Cweren and the Cweren Law Firm “engaged in impermissible forum

shopping” and “asserted groundless claims against [Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson] that had no basis in law or fact” and that were for “an improper purpose,

namely, to harass, annoy, and alarm” Campos, Arnold, and Robertson.

          A trial court may be authorized to impose sanctions against a party or a party’s

attorney by rule, statute, or its inherent authority. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 10.001–.006; Phillips v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of

Fla., No. 01-18-00375-CV, 2019 WL 3121856, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] July 16, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A trial court possesses the inherent

authority to impose sanctions for a bad faith abuse of the judicial process even when

                                             14
the specific conduct is not covered by a rule or statute.”). We review a trial court’s

order denying sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See Am. Flood Research, Inc. v.

Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); Am. Fisheries, Inc. v. Nat’l Honey, Inc.,

585 S.W.3d 491, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). We may

reverse the trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions only if the trial court acted

without reference to any guiding rules and principles, such that its ruling was

arbitrary or unreasonable. See Am. Flood Research, 192 S.W.3d at 583; Am.

Fisheries, 585 S.W.3d at 506. The trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases

its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its decision.

Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009); Am. Fisheries, 585

S.W.3d at 506. When the trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions

of law, we imply all necessary fact findings to support the trial court’s decision.

McCain v. NME Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no

writ).

         A trial court may impose sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 if

a party or a party’s attorney files a pleading that is groundless and that is brought in

bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Am. Fisheries,

585 S.W.3d at 506. “Groundless” means “no basis in law or fact and not warranted

by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”

TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (internal quotations omitted). “To determine if a claim is

                                          15
groundless, the trial court must objectively ask whether the party and [its] counsel

made a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim at the time the

[pleading] in question was filed.” WWW.URBAN.INC. v. Drummond, 508 S.W.3d

657, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The court determines

whether the party and its counsel made a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual

basis of the claim by considering the circumstances that existed when the pleading

was filed. Id.

      “Bad faith” means “the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest,

discriminatory, or malicious purposes.” Thielemann v. Kethan, 371 S.W.3d 286,

294 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). “Improper motive is an

essential element of bad faith.” Gomer v. Davis, 419 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). “Bad faith does not exist when a party merely

exercises bad judgment or is negligent.” Thielemann, 371 S.W.3d at 294. “To

‘harass’ means to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse another person.” Id. Whether a

party or its counsel acted in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment is also

determined in reference to the circumstances that existed when the pleading was

filed. Drummond, 508 S.W.3d at 676.

      Notably, a court is to presume that “pleadings, motions and other papers are

filed in good faith.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. And the party moving for sanctions bears

the burden of overcoming that presumption. Am. Fisheries, 585 S.W.3d at 506. The

                                          16
trial court’s decision to impose a sanction under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13

is discretionary. Manning v. Enbridge Pipelines (E. Tex.) L.P., 345 S.W.3d 718,

728–29 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied).

      Like Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code chapter 10 allows the trial court to sanction a party or a party’s attorney for

filing a motion or pleading with an improper purpose or that lacks legal or factual

support.   Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2014);

Beddingfield v. Beddingfield, No. 10-15-00344-CV, 2018 WL 6378553, at *15 (Tex.

App.—Waco Dec. 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Specifically, Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001 provides, in pertinent part:

      The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the Texas Rules of
      Civil Procedure constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the
      signatory’s best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
      reasonable inquiry:

            (1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any
            improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary
            delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

            (2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleading
            or motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
            argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
            law or the establishment of new law;

            (3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or
            motion has evidentiary support, or for a specifically identified
            allegation or factual contention, is likely to have evidentiary
            support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
            disc.overy; and

                                         17
             (4) each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual contention
             is warranted on the evidence or, for a specifically identified
             denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.001. Thus, a trial court may impose

sanctions on a party or the party’s signatory for a violation of one of the statutory

provisions in section 10.001.9 See id. § 10.004 (“A court that determines that a

person has signed a pleading or motion in violation of [s]ection 10.001 may impose

a sanction on the person, a party represented by the person, or both.”); see also id.

§ 10.002 (“A party may make a motion for sanctions, describing the specific conduct

violating [s]ection 10.001.”). The party moving for sanctions under Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10 has the burden to prove the pleading party’s

subjective state of mind, and the same presumption that “pleadings, motions and

other papers are filed in good faith” applies. See Drummond, 508 S.W.3d at 675;

see also GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 731 (Tex. 1993)

(trial court presumes parties and their counsel file all papers in good faith, and party

seeking sanctions must overcome that presumption). The trial court’s decision to

impose a sanction under chapter 10 is entirely discretionary. Manning, 345 S.W.3d

at 728.

9
      The trial court “may not award monetary sanctions against a represented party” for
      making an unwarranted or frivolous legal contention in contravention of Texas Civil
      Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001(2). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
      ANN. § 10.004(d).

                                          18
      Finally, we note that the trial court also has the inherent authority to impose

sanctions for a bad faith abuse of the judicial process even when the specific conduct

is not covered by rule or statute. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997);

Phillips, 2019 WL 3121856, at *7. A trial court may exercise its inherent authority

as necessary to deter, alleviate, or counteract a bad faith abuse of the judicial process.

Phillips, 2019 WL 3121856, at *7.

      In the trial court, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson moved for sanctions against

the Cweren Law Firm and Cweren under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10, asserting that the Cweren Law

Firm had alleged “groundless claims” against them “in bad faith and for an improper

purpose.” According to Campos, Arnold, and Robertson, “[s]anctions under either

[r]ule 13 [or] [c]hapter 10 [were] appropriate . . . because the [Cweren Law Firm’s]

claims against [them were] groundless, with no basis in law or fact, without

evidentiary and legal support, and [were] brought in bad faith or to harass.”

      Campos, Arnold, and Robertson also argued that the trial court should

sanction the Cweren Law Firm and Cweren, presumably under its inherent

authority,10 because they had engaged in “impermissible judge shopping,” by filing

“numerous successive suits,” only changing the named defendant in the suit each

10
      Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s motion for sanctions did not specifically include
      the words “inherent authority.”

                                           19
time, until its “last-filed suit was assigned to Judge Barnstone.” “Only then did [the

Cweren Law Firm] file an amended petition in the last-filed suit that substantially

expanded the case’s scope—including by naming defendants sued in the previous

six suits and request[ing] citations.” The Cweren Law Firm then non-suited the first

six cases “without ever having served them.”

      In its response to the motion for sanctions, the Cweren Law Firm requested

that the trial court deny the motion because Campos, Arnold, and Robertson had

defied a “clear directive” from the trial court and Judge Lawton-Evans, before

transferring the Cweren Law Firm’s suit, orally denied Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson’s motion for sanctions at the hearing on the motion to transfer. Further,

the Cweren Law Firm asserted that neither it nor Cweren had “engage[d] in improper

forum shopping” and the Cweren Law Firm’s claims against Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson were valid and “based in law and fact.”

      Notably, in this case, the trial court denied Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s

motion for sanctions, without explanation. And although a hearing was conducted

on the motion, no record was taken of the hearing.

      A court of appeals affords a trial court wide discretion in determining whether

to impose sanctions against a party or a party’s attorney. Khan v. Valliani, 439

S.W.3d 528, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Great

W. Drilling, Ltd. v. Alexander, 305 S.W.3d 688, 698 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no

                                         20
pet.); Dewalt v. Dewalt, No. 03-03-00056-CV, 2004 WL 1574252, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Austin July 15, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). And a trial court’s ruling to not

impose sanctions will only be set aside upon a showing that the trial court “clearly”

abused its discretion. See Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 516 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1991, no writ) (internal quotations omitted); see also Evans v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 685 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,

writ ref’d n.r.e.). It is a “heavy burden” for an appellant to “show[] that the trial

court’s refusal . . . to impose sanctions was an abuse of discretion.” Allstate Ins. Co.

v. Garcia, No. 13-02-092-CV, 2003 WL 21674766, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburgh July 18, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);

see also Scott Pelley P.C. v. Wynne, No. 05-15-01560-CV, 2017 WL 3699823, at

*31 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      Here, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson had the burden of making an appellate

record demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. See Evans, 685

S.W.2d at 768; see also Crown Asset Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Castro, No. 05-07-01305-CV,

2008 WL 3272169, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“[T]he appellant bears the burden to supply [the appellate court] with a complete

record demonstrating the trial court abused its discretion.”); Neal v. Kuniansky, No.

01-05-00368-CV, 2006 WL 1493735, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1,

2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant “had the burden of furnishing [appellate court]

                                          21
with a record that support[ed] her issues on appeal”). Generally, when there is no

reporter’s record, and findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither requested

nor filed, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary findings of fact to

sustain the judgment. Vadackaneth v. Asariyathu, No. 05-21-00893-CV, 2023 WL

3881128, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Stated

differently, we must presume that, had a transcript of the motion-for-sanctions

hearing been taken, it would support the trial court’s order. Id.; see also K.J. v. USA

Water Polo, Inc., 383 S.W.3d 593, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet.

denied); Thomas v. Itochu Project Mgmt, Inc., No. 01-00-00578-CV, 2002 WL

2023509, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2002, pet. denied) (not

designated for publication) (“[W]e cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion” in denying motion for sanctions where “[w]e have no record of the oral

hearing held on the motion for sanctions.”); Page v. Sartin, No. 05-01-01710-CV,

2002 WL 1634478, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2002, no pet.) (not designated

for publication) (“Without a record from the sanctions hearing, we must presume the

evidence before the trial [court] was adequate to support the decision.”); Univ. of

Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 357–58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999,

pet. denied).

      Additionally, we note that Campos, Arnold, and Robertson, in their briefing,

have not cited a single case in which an appellate court held that a trial court abused

                                          22
its discretion by declining to impose a punishment for conduct that would be

considered sanctionable. See Manning, 345 S.W.3d at 728; see also Garcia, 2003

WL 21674766, at *2 (appellant failed to cite “any authority in which an appellate

court reversed a trial court’s decision not to impose sanctions under [Texas] [R]ule

[of Civil Procedure] 13 or [Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code] chapter 10”).

Instead, in cases where a party has appealed a trial court’s order denying a motion

for sanctions, appellate courts have upheld the trial court’s decision because of the

trial court’s discretion. See, e.g., Manning, 345 S.W.3d at 728–29 (noting trial court

was “in a better position than [appellate court] to decide whether to impose

sanctions”); see also Heritage Gulf Coast Props., Ltd. v. Sandalwood Apartments,

Inc., 416 S.W.3d 642, 662–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.)

(declining to hold that trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award sanctions

under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10); Alexander, 305 S.W.3d

at 697–98 (noting trial court familiar with case and appellate court could not “find

[that] the trial court abused its discretion in its refusal to award . . . sanctions” under

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

chapter 10); Griffin Indus. v. Grimes, No. 04-02-00430-CV, 2003 WL 1911993, at

*1–7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 23, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for

publication) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for

sanctions).

                                            23
      Accordingly, we hold that Campos, Arnold, and Robertson did not meet their

burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their

motion for sanctions against the Cweren Law Firm and Cweren.

      We overrule the sole issue of Campos, Arnold, and Robertson.

                         The Cweren Law Firm’s Appeal

      In its first issue, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in

vacating the April 13, 2021 sanctions order against Chaiken because “Judge

Barnstone properly imposed sanctions against [Chaiken]” due to Chaiken’s “pattern

of misconduct,” Judge Barnstone “entered a detailed, ten-page sanctions order with

highly specific findings of misconduct by Chaiken,” and the trial court only vacated

the April 13, 2021 sanctions order “to end the case.” (Emphasis omitted.) In its

second issue, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in denying its

request for attorney’s fees under the TCPA because Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson’s TCPA motion to dismiss was “frivolous and solely intended to delay.”

In its third issue, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in denying

its motion for sanctions because Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015

Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming,

LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak

Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson

“fail[ed] to act in good faith at a court-ordered mediation.”

                                          24
A.    April 13, 2021 Sanctions Order

      In its first issue, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in

vacating the April 13, 2021 sanctions order against Chaiken because Judge

Barnstone properly granted the Cweren Law Firm’s motion for sanctions and the

trial court only vacated that April 13, 2021 sanctions order “to end the case.”

      On April 1, 2021, the Cweren Law Firm filed an emergency motion for

sanctions against Chaiken, who, at the time, represented Eureka, 2016 Baytown

Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC,

2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton,

LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos,

Arnold, and Robertson in the trial court. In its motion, the Cweren Law Firm

requested that the trial court—Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 1—sanction

Chaiken pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and its inherent authority.

After Chaiken filed a response and a hearing was held, the trial court granted the

Cweren Law Firm’s motion for sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority and Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure 215.2(b) and 215.3.

      However, the Cweren Law Firm’s suit was then transferred to a new trial

court—Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 2—and Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward

Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013

Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC,

                                         25
2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson as well as Chaiken filed motions to reconsider the April 13, 2021

sanctions order,11 requesting that the trial court vacate the April 13, 2021 sanctions

order. The Cweren Law Firm responded, stating that the trial court should affirm

the April 13, 2021 sanctions order. On July 21, 2022, the trial court, after a hearing,

vacated the April 13, 2021 sanctions order “in all respects.”

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions for an abuse of

discretion. See Altesse Healthcare Sols., Inc. v. Wilson, 540 S.W.3d 570, 573–74

(Tex. 2018). We also review a trial court ruling on a motion for reconsideration for

an abuse of discretion. See Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. 1984);

Callaway v. Martin, No. 02-16-00181-CV, 2017 WL 2290160, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Here, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in vacating the

April 13, 2021 sanctions order against Chaiken because the original trial court

properly granted the firm’s motion for sanctions and the new trial court only vacated

the April 13, 2021 sanctions order “to end the case.” But the trial court’s July 21,

2022 order vacating the April 13, 2021 sanctions order does not contain an

explanation for the trial court’s ruling. And according to the Cweren Law Firm,

11
      They also requested that the trial court reconsider the April 26, 2021 order, but the
      Cweren Law Firm does not appear to challenge on appeal the trial court’s vacatur
      of the April 26, 2021 order.

                                           26
there was no record taken during the trial court’s hearing on the motions to

reconsider the April 13, 2021 sanctions order filed by Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward

Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013

Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC,

2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson as well as Chaiken.

      The Cweren Law Firm, as the appellant, has the burden of making an appellate

record demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. See Evans, 685

S.W.2d at 768; see also Castro, 2008 WL 3272169, at *1 (“[T]he appellant bears the

burden to supply [the appellate court] with a complete record demonstrating the trial

court abused its discretion.”); Neal, 2006 WL 1493735, at *2 (appellant “had the

burden of furnishing [appellate court] with a record that support[ed] her issues on

appeal”).   And when there is no reporter’s record, and findings of fact and

conclusions of law are neither requested nor filed, the judgment of the trial court

implies all necessary findings of fact to sustain the judgment. Vadackaneth, 2023

WL 3881128, at *2. In other words, we must presume that, had a transcript of the

motion-to-reconsider hearing been taken, it would support the trial court’s order. Id.

Without a record from the hearing on the motions to reconsider, we cannot determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the motions to reconsider

and vacated the April 13, 2021 sanctions order. See Willie v. Donovan & Watkins,

                                          27
Inc., No. 01-03-00890-CV, 2005 WL 375328, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Feb. 17, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co.,

739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987) (appellant had burden of presenting a sufficient

record to establish that trial court acted outside the zone of reasonable disagreement);

Thomas, 2002 WL 2023509, at *4 (“[W]e cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion” in denying motion for sanctions where “[w]e have no record of the oral

hearing held on the motion for sanctions.”); Page, 2002 WL 1634478, at *1

(“Without a record from the sanctions hearing, we must presume the evidence before

the trial [court] was adequate to support the decision.”); Youngs v. Choice, 868

S.W.2d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (holding

appellant waived any error regarding sanctions order by failing to provide the court

with a record that showed error).

      Accordingly, we hold that the Cweren Law Firm did not meet its burden of

establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the April 13, 2021

sanctions order.

      We overrule the Cweren Law Firm’s first issue.

B.    Attorney’s Fees Under TCPA

      In its second issue, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in

denying its request for attorney’s fees under the TCPA because Campos, Arnold,

                                          28
and Robertson’s TCPA motion to dismiss was “frivolous and solely intended to

delay.”

      Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.009(b), a trial court

“may award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees” to the party responding to a

TCPA motion to dismiss “[i]f the court finds that [the] motion to dismiss . . . [was]

frivolous or solely intended to delay.”        TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 27.009(b). We generally review a trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees

for an abuse of discretion. Keane Frac, LP v. SP Silica Sales, LLC, 608 S.W.3d 416,

432 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). A trial court abuses its

discretion if its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to guiding

rules or principles. ADB Int., LLC v. Wallace, 606 S.W.3d 413, 440 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).

      The TCPA treats an award of attorney’s fees differently for movants and

respondents.     See Weller v. MonoCoque Diversified Ints., LLC, No.

03-19-00127-CV, 2020 WL 3582885, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin July 1, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.). An award of reasonable attorney’s fees is mandatory for a party

who prevails on its TCPA motion to dismiss, but an award to a responding party that

is successful in defending against a TCPA motion to dismiss is discretionary even if

the trial court makes the required findings that the TCPA motion to dismiss was

frivolous or solely intended to delay. Id.; Cruz v. Van Sickle, 452 S.W.3d 503, 525

                                          29
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied); see also Megatel Homes III, LLC v.

Woodhull Ventures 2015, L.P., No. 03-21-00390-CV, 2023 WL 4373424, at *9

(Tex. App.—Austin July 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (award of attorney’s fees to

party who successfully defends against TCPA motion to dismiss is entirely

discretionary).

      In the trial court, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson moved to dismiss certain

claims that the Cweren Law Firm had alleged against them under the TCPA, arguing

that the trial court should dismiss the claims because they were filed against Campos,

Arnold, and Robertson in response to their “exercise of free speech and right of

association.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003. In its response to

the TCPA motion to dismiss, the Cweren Law Firm asserted that the motion was

“frivolous and solely intended for delay,” and it requested that the trial court award

its attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

section 27.009(b).

      Following a hearing, the trial court, on July 22, 2022, signed an order denying

Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s motion to dismiss.12 But the order did not find

12
      The Cweren Law Firm has attached to its appellant’s brief an unofficial copy of an
      order dated July 21, 2022, which appears to deny Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s
      TCPA motion to dismiss and deny the firm’s request for attorney’s fees. The
      Cweren Law Firm has not directed this Court to the location, if any, of the order in
      the appellate record. The attachment of documents as exhibits or appendices to an
      appellate brief does not constitute formal inclusion of such documents in the record
      for appeal, and we cannot consider matters outside of the record in our review. See
                                           30
that the TCPA motion to dismiss was frivolous or solely intended for delay, and it

did not contain a ruling on the Cweren Law Firm’s request for attorney’s fees and

costs.13 Subsequently, on July 29, 2022, the trial court entered an order of nonsuit,

dismissing the Cweren Law Firm’s claims against Campos, Arnold, and Robertson,

which appears to have included the Cweren Law Firm’s request for attorney’s fees

against Campos, Arnold, and Robertson.

      In the portion of its briefing in which the Cweren Law Firm argues that it was

entitled to attorney’s fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section

27.009(b) because Campos, Arnold, and Robertson’s TCPA motion to dismiss was

“frivolous and solely intended to delay,” the firm fails to direct the Court to any

portion of the record or appropriate authority to support its assertion. Further, in the

portion of its briefing in which the Cweren Law Firm asserts that the trial court

“improperly denied” its request for attorney’s fees “solely to end the case,” the firm

fails to direct the Court to any portion of the record or any appropriate authority

supporting its assertion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“[Appellant’s] brief must

contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.”); Richardson v. Marsack, No.

      McCann v. Spencer Plantation Invs., Ltd., No. 01-16-00098-CV, 2017 WL 769895,
      at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
13
      The order that was signed by the trial court denying Campos, Arnold, and
      Robertson’s TCPA motion to dismiss was approved by the Cweren Law Firm as to
      substance and form and was submitted to the trial court by the Cweren Law Firm.

                                          31
05-18-00087-CV, 2018 WL 4474762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 19, 2018, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing,”

including requiring “appellants to state concisely their complaints, to provide

succinct, clear, and accurate arguments for why their complaints have merit in law

and fact, to cite legal authority that is applicable to their complaints, and to cite

appropriate references in the record.”). A failure to cite appropriate authority or

provide proper citation to the record waives a complaint on appeal. See Huey v.

Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); see also Roberts for

Roberts v. City of Texas City, No. 01-21-00064-CV, 2021 WL 5702464, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]dequate briefing

[requires] proper citation to the record, and [i]f record references are not made or are

inaccurate, misstated, or misleading, the brief fails.” (second and third alteration in

original) (internal quotations omitted)); Walker v. Davison, No. 01-18-00431-CV,

2019 WL 922184, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2019, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding appellant waived his appellate issues because appellant’s brief

did not contain citations to record in support of appellant’s contentions).

      Accordingly, we hold that the Cweren Law Firm waived its complaint that the

trial court erred in denying its request for attorney’s fees under Texas Civil Practice

                                          32
and Remedies Code section 27.009(b) due to inadequate briefing.14 See, e.g., LMP

Austin English Aire, LLC v. Lafayette English Apartments, LP, 654 S.W.3d 265,

290–91 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.) (holding complaint regarding attorney’s

fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.009(b) waived

because of inadequate briefing).

C.    Motion for Sanctions Related to Mediation

      In its third issue, the Cweren Law Firm argues that the trial court erred in

denying its motion for sanctions because Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC,

2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014 Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston

Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey, LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013

14
      We further note that the trial court’s decision on whether the award attorney’s fees
      and costs under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.009(b) is
      completely discretionary, and the Cweren Law Firm has not come forward with a
      record demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the request
      for attorney’s fees and costs. See, e.g., Zidan v. Zidan, No. 05-20-00786-CV, 2022
      WL 17335693, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
      (explaining trial court did not make required finding that TCPA motion to dismiss
      was frivolous or solely intended to delay, and even if it had, whether to award fees
      under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.009(b) was still in the
      trial court’s discretion); see also Bookout v. Shelley, No. 02-22-00055-CV, 2022
      WL 17173526, at *29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)
      (recognizing trial court was in best position to evaluate circumstances in
      determining whether to award attorney’s fees under Texas Civil Practice &
      Remedies Code section 27.009(b)); Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Loc.
      975, No. 03-21-00227-CV, 2022 WL 17096786, at *19 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov.
      22, 2022, pet. granted) (mem. op.) (noting trial court had broad discretion in
      deciding whether to award attorney’s fees under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
      Code section 27.009(b)).
                                            33
Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and

Robertson “fail[ed] to act in good faith at a court-ordered mediation.”

      As previously addressed, we review a trial court’s order denying sanctions for

an abuse of discretion. See Am. Flood Research, 192 S.W.3d at 583; Am. Fisheries,

585 S.W.3d at 506. We may reverse the trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions

only if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles,

such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Am. Flood Research, 192

S.W.3d at 583; Am. Fisheries, 585 S.W.3d at 506.

      The Cweren Law Firm argues that “[s]anctions were warranted” against

Eureka, 2016 Baytown Ward Rd., LLC, 2015 Houston Redford, LLC, 2014

Galveston Jones Drive, LLC, 2013 Houston Fleming, LLC, 2013 Houston Maxey,

LLC, 2015 Houston Gulfton, LLC, 2013 Travis Oak Creek, LP, 2013 Travis Oak

Creek GP, LLC, Campos, Arnold, and Robertson because they failed to participate

in a court-ordered mediation in good faith. (Emphasis omitted.) The Cweren Law

Firm bases its argument on its allegation that Campos was “the decision maker” and

he “left the mediation early.” (Emphasis omitted.) Further, the Cweren Law Firm

asserts that the trial court denied its motion for sanctions “solely to end the case.”

      Again, we note that a court of appeals affords a trial court wide discretion in

determining whether to impose sanctions against a party or a party’s attorney. Khan,

439 S.W.3d at 537; see also Alexander, 305 S.W.3d at 698; Dewalt, 2004 WL

                                           34
1574252, at *2. And a trial court’s ruling to not impose sanctions will only be set

aside upon a showing that the trial court “clearly” abused its discretion. See Hanley,

813 S.W.2d at 516 (internal quotations omitted); see also Evans, 685 S.W.2d at 768.

It is a “heavy burden” for an appellant to “show[] that the trial court’s refusal . . . to

impose sanctions was an abuse of discretion.” Garcia, 2003 WL 21674766, at *2;

see also Scott Pelley P.C., 2017 WL 3699823, at *31.

      The Cweren Law Firm has provided no record of the trial court’s hearing on

its motion for sanctions. See Evans, 685 S.W.2d at 768 (appellant has burden of

making appellate record that demonstrates trial court abused its discretion); see also

Castro, 2008 WL 3272169, at *1 (“[T]he appellant bears the burden to supply [the

appellate court] with a complete record demonstrating the trial court abused its

discretion.”); Neal, 2006 WL 1493735, at *2 (appellant “had the burden of

furnishing [appellate court] with a record that support[ed] her issues on appeal”).

Thus, we must presume that, had a transcript of the motions-for-sanctions hearing

been taken, it would support the trial court’s order. See Vadackaneth, 2023 WL

3881128, at *2; see also K.J., 383 S.W.3d at 608; Thomas, 2002 WL 2023509, at *4

(“[W]e cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion” in denying motion for

sanctions where “[w]e have no record of the oral hearing held on the motion for

sanctions.”); Page, 2002 WL 1634478, at *1 (“Without a record from the sanctions

                                           35
hearing, we must presume the evidence before the trial [court] was adequate to

support the decision.”); Bishop, 997 S.W.2d at 357–58.

      Accordingly, we hold that the Cweren Law Firm did not meet its burden of

establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for

sanctions.

      We overrule the Cweren Law Firm’s third issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                              Julie Countiss
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

                                        36