Court Opinion

ID: 9528657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:42:50.103069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:11.124548
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: Petitioner, Lela Ann Bratcher, and respondent, David L. Bratcher, were married in 1972, the year they graduated from high school. Neither has a college education. They have two children, born in 1973 and 1976. On May 7, 2004, Lela filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. At that time, the parties were each 50 years of age. On November 29, 2006, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage, awarding each party the personal property in his or her possession and dividing equally the remaining marital property, with each receiving about $1,634,000. Additionally, the trial court ordered David to pay maintenance of $12,500 per month for a period of 111 months. David appeals the award of maintenance. We reverse and remand. I. BACKGROUND The trial court made the following findings. The parties founded Bratcher Heating and Air Conditioning in 1983. When the parties opened the business, Lela assisted for approximately seven years in various capacities, including answering the phones, billing, payroll, hiring, decorating, and training with their supplier, Lennox. Lela also worked as a checker at a local grocery store to obtain health-insurance benefits for the family. Lela’s involvement in the workforce ceased in 1992, when she became the primary caregiver of the parties’ granddaughter who had a number of health problems. The trial court found that Bratcher Heating and Air Conditioning has a value of $1,297,922. That figure included a discount of 20% for lack of marketability, finding that the business is essentially a “one man show” in terms of its management. “Dave Bratcher is Bratcher Heating and Air Conditioning. By his own admission, the business cannot run without him.” The trial court awarded Lela the former marital residence and some accounts. The primary asset awarded Lela was a commercial property on Fort Jesse Road valued at $725,000. The trial court also ordered David to make an equalizing lump-sum payment to Lela of $876,759. With the lump-sum payment, the total award of marital property to Lela, even after deducting $34,682 in credit-card debt that she was required to pay, was $1,634,449. David was awarded Bratcher Heating and Air Conditioning, a residence, a commercial property on East Pine Street, and a number of accounts, and he was charged with dissipation for payments he made to the parties’ daughters in the amount of $6,467. After deducting the lump-sum payment, the total award of marital property to David was $1,634,719. Under the trial court’s order, Lela will receive monthly income of approximately $14,000, consisting of $8,193 rental income on the Fort Jesse Road property and $5,845 interest at 8% on the lump-sum payment, plus perhaps some income from her anticipated work as a realtor. In ruling on David’s motion to reconsider, the trial court noted that the rental income on the Fort Jesse Road property “is less certain” than the higher amount argued by David, $10,829. David will receive monthly income of approximately $27,000, consisting of $9,013 wages, $417 dividends, $1,710 rental income on the East Pine Street property, and $21,900 other income from Bratcher Heating and Air Conditioning, reduced by $5,845 interest on the lump-sum payment. If maintenance is factored in, Lela will have monthly income of $26,500 and David will have monthly income of $14,500. In awarding maintenance, the trial court noted that in terms of personal incomes, Lela would never generate the type of income that David produces. “While the Court declines to ‘equalize’ the parties’ income by virtue of the maintenance award, it does find that it can look beyond the basic needs of the parties and allow for additional, discretionary income, particularly in a marriage of this duration with the amount of income available for the Court’s consideration. As referenced above, the parties’ venture into the business world was truly a joint effort.” The trial court also quoted from Justice Steigmann’s special concurrence in In re Marriage of Hart, 194 Ill. App. 3d 839, 853, 551 N.E.2d 737, 745 (1990) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring): “Marriage is a partnership, not only morally, but financially. *** It is inequitable upon dissolution to saddle petitioner with the burden of her reduced earning potential and to allow respondent to continue in the advantageous position he reached through their joint efforts.” II. ANALYSIS “Maintenance issues are presented in a great number of factual situations and resist a simple analysis.” In re Marriage of Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d 765, 769, 725 N.E.2d 22, 25 (2000). “The trial court has discretion to determine the propriety, amount, and duration of a maintenance award. A reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s maintenance determination absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Reynard, 344 Ill. App. 3d 785, 790, 801 N.E.2d 591, 595 (2003) (Reynard I). Of course, that does not mean that trial courts can do whatever they please in awarding maintenance. It is important that reviewing courts have some ability to maintain control of and clarify the legal principles underlying maintenance awards. With the enactment of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2006)) in 1977, the legislature sought to provide for the financial needs of the spouses through the disposition of property rather than through maintenance. Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 768, 725 N.E.2d at 24. The 1993 amendments to the Dissolution Act made it easier for maintenance to be awarded, but maintenance is not the absolute right of every party to a marriage and should mainly be reserved for circumstances of necessity. Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 768, 725 N.E.2d at 24. It is interesting to compare the facts in this case to those in In re Marriage of Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d 31, 495 N.E.2d 659 (1986), where the parties were married after graduating from college and the wife then taught school for 10 years while the husband pursued his medical education and training. Shortly after the husband commenced his medical practice, he filed for dissolution of marriage. The Second District reversed and remanded, stating, “[T]he contributing spouse must receive some form of compensation for the financial effort and support provided to the student spouse in the expectation that the marital unit will prosper in the future particularly where, as here, Harry filed the suit for divorce so soon after Helen completed her part of the bargain.” (Emphasis added.) Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 39, 495 N.E.2d at 664. In Rubinstein, that compensation could not be achieved by division of marital assets, because the dissolution occurred before significant assets were acquired. That is not true in the present case where the parties had acquired several millions of dollars in assets and Lela was awarded half of those assets. Lela was not “saddle[d] *** with the burden of her reduced earning potential” (Hart, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 853, 551 N.E.2d at 745)— she was awarded assets totaling more than the value of the business. It is true that Lela will never generate the income that David does, but there is no need for Lela to work. In some cases, the family business may constitute almost all of the assets and it may be necessary to award that business to the operator of the business and compensate the other spouse through maintenance. That is not true in the present case where Lela was awarded substantial assets, including an $876,759 lump-sum payment, similar to maintenance in gross. Lela made important contributions to the business in its early years, but she has been compensated for those contributions. In awarding maintenance, the court may consider impairment of earning capacity due to “devoting time to domestic duties or having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage.” 750 ILCS 5/504(a)(4) (West 2006). The court may also consider “contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse.” 750 ILCS 5/504(a)(10) (West 2006). In Mayhall, the parties were married after high school and their marriage was dissolved 14 years later. The wife maintained the household and was the primary caretaker of the parties’ two children. We affirmed an award of maintenance to the wife on the basis she had been disadvantaged by the marriage in comparison to her husband because of her delayed entry into the workforce. Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 769, 725 N.E.2d at 25. Mayhall, however, involved average-income earners with no substantial assets, not the situation here. Lela’s earning capacity would probably be greater if she had worked continuously outside the home after the parties’ marriage, but it would never have approached David’s. Lela was not “disadvantaged by the marriage in comparison to” David. Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 769, 725 N.E.2d at 25. Equalization of incomes might be appropriate even though neither spouse has been disadvantaged by the marriage, where the parties have been married for many years, they have few assets, and both have been employed with one spouse earning more than the other. Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 769, 725 N.E.2d at 25. Again, that is not the situation here. It is not necessary to equalize the income of these parties so that they may continue at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. This case involved sufficient assets to make a substantial award to Lela, and the lump-sum distribution eliminated any inequality between the parties. The trial court abused its discretion in its award of maintenance. The trial court properly provided for Lela by its division of marital property. Where it is possible to do so, a division of property that adequately provides for the parties is preferable to an award of maintenance. Lela has the advantage of certainty with the lump-sum payment; it cannot be modified or terminated in the future. The fact that David could afford to pay some maintenance is not a reason for ordering him to do so. III. CONCLUSION We reverse the award of maintenance in this case and remand so that the trial court may reconsider its award in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. Reversed and remanded.