Court Opinion

ID: 9796332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:55:43.452276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:02.338976
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, J.,
with whom WATT, J., and COLBERT, J., join, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
¶ 1 I dissent to the majority’s holding that “the evidence provides undisputed proof of the open and obvious condition of the premises, supporting but a single inference that favors nonliability of the defendants based on absence of duty to the plaintiffs.” The summary judgment materials present disputed questions of fact which have been raised regarding the “open and obvious” nature of an allegedly “unsafe and inherently dangerous” 1843 pound steel beam which clearly preclude summary judgment.
FACTS
a. Undisputed Facts
¶2 On February 18, 2002, the appellant, Robert Scott (Scott), rented a large U-Haul truck (U-Haul), and loaded it with furniture which he intended to take to an auction house during his lunch hour the next day. On the morning of February 19, 2002, Scott drove the U-Haul truck from his home in Edmond, Oklahoma, to his work site at an Oklahoma City office building known as “The Tower.” Scott was employed as an audiovisual coordinator for Tower tenant, Aeker-man-McQueen Advertising.
¶ 3 The Tower parking garage consisted of two levels-a lower level deck and an upper level, open air deck. Scott had been driving up the south, upper deck access ramp, and parking his vehicle, a Ford Expedition, on the upper deck for nearly two years. Scott approached the parking garage in the U-Haul and attempted to enter the ramp leading to the upper deck. The U-Haul required a clearance of 11 feet, but the garage had installed a steel barrier beam (clearance bar/ beam) across the ramp to stop vehicles taller than 8 feet 6 inches from entering the upper deck.
¶ 4 The purpose of the beam was a “safety” measure and it was intended to “stop” heavy trucks in their tracks from entering the upper level and risk falling through to the level below. No warnings about weight limits were posted. The clearance bar had been in place since the structure was built in 1981. The City of Oklahoma City required that the upper level be off limits to heavy trucks. Another clearance bar is located on the north side of the budding as well. Through the years the north and south ramps have alternatively functioned as either entrance or exit ramps, but since 1997, the south ramp has served as the entrance to the upper level and the north ramp has served as the exit.
¶5 The 1843 pound beam was approximately 26 feet long and 9 feet tall. It was constructed of welded 8 inch steel square tubing, and it sat on two steel posts that were approximately 8 inches by 12 inches. The barrier was anchored to the concrete with four 3/4 inch x 6 inch long expansion bolts. The beam was marked with a warning across the top, facing oncoming traffic, in 10 inch white letters reading:
“No Trucks. Visitor Parking. Clearance 8'6"”
¶ 6 Scott did not see the beam, nor did he have an explanation for not seeing it, other than he was watching for oncoming traffic. Consequently, he struck it with the U-Haul while attempting to drive up the ramp. The truck knocked the beam loose from its anchors and it fell onto the cab of the truck, crushing it and rendering Scott a quadriplegic. On February 18, 2004, Scott and his family brought a lawsuit against various defendants who were involved in ownership or management of the parking garage (collectively, parking garage), alleging that Scott’s injuries resulted from breaches of the defendants’ respective duties to exercise reasonable care. He alleged that they: 1) negligently erected and maintained the beam across the ramp; 2) failed to warn and protect from the dangers which they knew about or should have foreseen; 3) installed the *1216beam in such a manner as to constitute a violation of their duty to keep the premises reasonably safe; and 4) created a hidden snare, trap or pitfall through their installation of a beam which toppled easily and posed serious danger of injury by its weight.
¶ 7 All of the defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted that the undisputed facts showed that they had no duty to protect or warn Scott because the beam was an “open and obvious” danger. They also insisted that: 1) even if Scott could establish that he was an invitee, rather than a trespasser, they had no legal duty to warn him because the beam posed an open and obvious danger which should have been observed by any person exercising ordinary care for his own safety; and 2) the beam was in plain view and clearly marked with clearance warnings and the height-clearance warnings were posted plainly on the U-Haul dashboard and on the outside of the truck.
b. Disputed Facts
¶ 8 The materials attached to the motions for summary judgment and responses reveal several relevant, disputed facts. For instance, between 1984 and 1992, there were approximately half a dozen incidents where the north clearance beam had been hit by trucks and knocked down. After each incident, the beams were moved, the old concrete holes filled, and the posts were reattached to the concrete. A physical inspection of the property reveals the areas where the posts have been moved from place to place and bolt holes have been filled with concrete. While no injuries were reported, the bar may have landed on trucks at least twice in one year. Most of the incidents were likely caused by commercially licensed, professional truck drivers. The parking garage insists that not all of the concrete filled holes were evidence of prior attachments of safety beams, but, instead, could have been from other signs which existed in the past.
¶ 9 In 1997, the clearance bar on the south ramp was hit by an Airborne Express commercial delivery truck and it fell on the truck. The truck was damaged, but no injuries were sustained. The beam was reinstalled. Scott’s accident would have been the eighth known accident in approximately 20 years. Engineers reported that the beams were inadequately secured with bolts which appeared to have become loose and secured with wire in an attempt to make them fit better. The engineers also reported that because of the beam’s size and weight, it was defectively installed and constituted a hazard which would easily topple over when hit and which would not be readily observed by a driver.
¶ 10 The beam is so heavy that a crane is required to lift it for reinstallation. While the photographs submitted show that the beam had a visible warning posted on it, it is not clear merely by looking at the beam exactly what material it was made of or how heavy it was. The engineers insist that there were many alternative choices that would have posed a significantly lower risk of injury which were available for warning and stopping trucks from entering the upper level. The clearance bar, as it was installed, served as a booby trap to create a life threatening hazard.
c. Procedural Facts.
¶ 11 Without specifying the reasons, the trial court granted each defendant summary judgment on October 28, 2005. Scott appealed on November 16, 2005, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because whether the clearance bar was open and obvious or a hidden hazard was a question of fact for the jury. The Court of Civil Appeals, in an unpublished decision, affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of some of the defendants, but reversed as to others. It also recognized that under the rules pertaining to summary judgment, fact questions had been raised regarding whether the 1843 pound beam was “open and obvious” and whether the beam was an inherent danger because of its inappropriate, unsafe installation.
¶ 12 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, MATERIAL FACT QUESTIONS EX-*12171ST AS TO WHETHER THE BEAM WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER OR WHETHER IT WAS A DEFECTIVE, DECEPTIVELY DANGEROUS, HIDDEN HAZARD. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
¶ 13 Scott asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the parking garage because disputed fact questions exist as to whether the clearance bar was an open and obvious danger or a hidden hazard. The parking garage contends that because the beam was clearly visible and clearly marked for everyone entering the garage to see, it was an open and obvious danger for which it owed no additional duties towards Scott.
¶ 14 A party seeking to establish negligence must prove by a preponderance of evidence: 1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to use ordinary care; 2) a breach of that duty; and 3) an injury proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of duty.1 A business owner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition for use of its invitees2 and a duty to warn invitees of dangerous conditions upon the premises that are either known or should reasonably be known by the owner.3 This duty extends to hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls and the like which are not known to the invitee. However, the invitar has no duty to protect or warn about dangers which are open and obvious, and which would be discovered by the invitee in the exercise of ordinary care.4 The facts of a each particular case are controlling upon questions of negligence in respect to dangerous conditions of premises, and whether such facts constitute negligence is ordinarily a question for the jury in an action by an invitee.5
¶ 15 The parking garage based its motion for summary judgment on its assertion that it owed no duty to Scott because the beam was an open and obvious danger. It contends that anyone, by looking at the beam, would either know or should know that it poses a danger of giving way and falling on a vehicle when it is struck. Scott challenges the parking garage’s position. He argues that the parking garage created a condition which appeared as a safety measure, but because of its defective design, its deceptively heavy weight, and the ease with which it toppled over, in reality created a hidden, dangerous hazard. Consequently, the questions of safety and the obviousness of the beam were questions for the jury.
¶ 16 A motion for summary judgment may be filed if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits and other exhibits reflect that there is no substantial controversy *1218as to any material fact.6 Even when basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment should be denied, if from the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts.7 Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other evidentiary materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.8
¶ 17 All conclusions drawn from the evi-dentiary material submitted to the trial court are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.9 Before a motion for summary judgment under Rule 13, 12 O.S. Supp.2002, Ch. 2, App. Rules for the District Courts may properly be granted, the movant must show that there is no disputed issue of material fact.10 Accordingly, if, after considering the evidentiary materials attached the motion for summary judgment and the response in a light most favorable to Scott, a disputed question of fact remains, then the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment motion.
¶ 18 A hidden danger need not be totally or partially obscured from vision or withdrawn from sight; the phrase is used to describe a condition presenting a deceptively innocent appearance of safety which cloaks a reality of danger.11 In Jack Healey Linen Service Co. v. Travis, 1967 OK 213, ¶ 9, 434 P.2d 924, the Court in addressing whether the question of an accumulation of water constituted a hidden hazard explained:
... ¶ 9 Plaintiffs familiarity with the general physical condition which may be responsible for her injury does not of itself operate to transform the offending defect into an apparent and obvious hazard. Mere knowledge of the danger without full appreciation of the risk involved is not sufficient to bar plaintiffs right of recovery-While the general physical condition might be familiar to the actor, a particular risk from the known defect could nevertheless, under the circumstances of a given occasion, be incapable of apprecia*1219tion. If, as here, conflicting inferences may be drawn from the facts and circumstances in evidence as to whether the offending hazard did have a ‘deceptively innocent appearance’, or its extent could not be anticipated, neither the trial court nor this court may declare that the peril was obvious and apparent and that recovery is precluded as a matter of law. The question is one for the jury....
¶ 19 The majority relies on Pickens v. Tulsa Metropolitan Ministry, 1997 OK 152, ¶ 10, 951 P.2d 1079. Pickens involved a homeless shelter in Tulsa which had on its premises a retaining wall without guardrails or barriers. When Pickens rolled off of the top of the wall in his sleep and was injured, he sued the owners and architect alleging negligence. The Court determined that the concrete retaining wall was an open and obvious danger as a matter of law and that, as such, recovery was precluded. While the legal premise of Pickens is correct, its application to the facts of this cause is not. Nothing about the retaining wall in Pickens was hidden or obscured, undiscoverable or in fact undiscovered. The wall was not defective. It did not collapse causing a fall or collapse and fall upon anyone.
¶ 20 Here, the evidentiary materials show that Scott did not see the beam, but that it was clearly marked, and nothing was obstructing his vision of it. This only shows that the beam, itself, could have been seen. The evidentiary materials are not dispositive of material fact questions concerning whether the beam was open and obvious or whether it posed a hidden danger and was defective in design. The fact that the clearance bar may have been hit at least 8 times raises a jury question as to whether the beam, itself, was open and obvious—whether under similar or like circumstances an ordinary prudent person would have been able to see the beam in time to avoid being injured— much less an open and obvious “danger.”
¶ 21 The stated purpose of the beam was that it was installed as a “safety” measure to “stop” trucks from entering the upper level, but according to the disputed facts, it was defectively designed and, in fact, created a life threatening, hazardous condition. Nothing in the record mentions the speed at which Scott may have been traveling, but a large U-Haul traveling up a ramp would not likely have been traveling very fast. Yet, it is not readily apparent from the photographs that the beam weighed nearly a ton and that it would so easily topple over and crush a cab of a truck when hit at a low rate of speed. At the very least, reasonable persons could differ as to these material questions and summary judgment was improper.
CONCLUSION
¶22 The purpose of summary adjudications is not to substitute a trial by affidavit for one by jury, but rather to afford a method of summarily terminating a case where only questions of law remain.12 When uncon-troverted proof lends support to conflicting inferences, the choice to be made between the opposite alternatives does not present an issue of law, but rather one for the trier of fact.13 Based on the evidentiary materials presented in connection with the summary judgment motion, reasonable minds could differ, after concerning all the evidence and its reasonable inferences, as to whether the clearance bar was an open and obvious danger or a hidden hazard. The summary judgment motion offered by the parking garage falls short of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the parking garage.

. Grover v. Superior Welding, Inc., 1995 OK 14, ¶ 5, 893 P.2d 500; Wofford v. Eastern State Hasp., 1990 OK 77, ¶ 8, 795 P.2d 516; Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., 1982 OK 87, ¶ 7, 652 P.2d 260.

. Because the majority opinion determines that the clearance bar was an open and obvious danger, it does not reach the question of whether Scott was an invitee, or as the parking garage argues, a trespasser. Under the undisputed, facts, I would treat Scott, as a matter of law, as an invitee because he was employed by one of the businesses who was entitled to use the parking lot and because he never ventured into any prohibited area because he was stopped in his tracks by the beam before he ever reached such an area. However, even if one were to view Scott as a trespasser which required a lower level of duty owed to Scott, the alleged facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to Scott, could also allow a jury to conclude that the parking garage acted in a wilful and wanton manner by repeatedly installing an unsafe beam in an unsafe manner after vehicles struck it eight times in the last 20 years.

. Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., 1996 OK 114, ¶ 6, 925 P.2d 891; Taylor v. Hynson, 1993 OK 93, ¶ 16, 856 P.2d 278; Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1973 OK 119, ¶ 3, 515 P.2d 223.

. Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 1988 OK 105, ¶ 19, 765 P.2d 770; Nicholson v. Tacker, 1973 OK 75, ¶ 9, 512 P.2d 156; Beatty v. Dixon, 1965 OK 169, ¶¶ 8-10, 408 P.2d 339.

. Jack Healey Linen Service Co. v. Travis, 1967 OK 213, ¶ 0, 434 P.2d 924; Henryetta Construction Co. v. Harris, 1965 OK 88, ¶ 11, 408 P.2d 522, 28 A.L.R.3d 876; Pruitt v. Timme, 1959 OK 276, ¶ 8, 349 P.2d 4.

.Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., see note 3, supra at ¶ 17; Roach v. Atlas Life Ins., 1989 OK 27, ¶ 15, 769 P.2d 158; Rule 13, 12 O.S. Supp. 2002, Ch. 2 App. Rules for the District Courts provides in pertinent part:
a. A party may move for either summary judgment or summary disposition of any issue on the merits on the ground that the evidentia-ry material filed with the motion or subsequently filed with leave of court show that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact....
b. Any party opposing summary judgment or summary disposition of issues shall file ... a concise written statement of the material facts as to which a genuine issue exists and the reasons for denying the motion; ... the adverse party shall attach to the statement evi-dentiary material justifying the opposition to the motion, but may incorporate by reference material attached to the papers of another party. In the statement, the adverse party or parties shall set forth and number each specific material fact which is claimed to be in controversy and reference shall be made to the pages and paragraphs or lines of the evidentia-ry materials. All material facts set forth in the statement of the movant which are supported by acceptable evidentiary material shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment or summary disposition unless specifically controverted by the statement of the adverse party which is supported by acceptable evidentiary material. If the motion for summary judgment or summary disposition is granted, the party or parties opposing the motion cannot on appeal rely on any fact or material that is not referred to or included in the statement in order to show that a substantial controversy exists....

. Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., see note 3, supra; Markwell v. Whinery’s Real Estate Inc., 1994 OK 24, ¶ 24, 869 P.2d 840.

. Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., see note 3, supra; Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assoc., 1995 OK 33, ¶ 16, 896 P.2d 522; Roach v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., see note 6, supra.

. Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., see note 3, supra; Ross v. City of Shawnee, 1984 OK 43, ¶ 16, 683 P.2d 535.

. Rule 13, 12 O.S. Supp.2002, Ch. 2 App. Rules for the District Courts, see note 6, supra; Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., see note 3, supra; Roper v. Mercy Health Center, 1995 OK 82, ¶ 4, 903 P.2d 314.

. Pickens v. Tulsa Metropolitan Ministry, 1997 OK 152, ¶ 10, 951 P.2d 1079.

. Martin v. Aramark Services, Inc., 2004 OK 38, ¶ 12, 92 P.3d 96; Bowers v. Wimberly, 1997 OK 24, ¶ 18, 933 P.2d 312; Stuckey v. Young Exploration Co., 1978 OK 128, ¶ 15, 586 P.2d 726.

. Martin v. Aramark Services, Inc., see note 12, supra; Walters v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 2003 OK 100, ¶ 13, 82 P.3d 578.