Court Opinion

ID: 9845664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:59.288211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:17.641228
License: Public Domain

WEIS, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the District Court erred in treating the discontinuance of a juvenile adjudication as a sentence for the purpose of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a). The resulting addition of a point to the defendant’s criminal history modified his category from III to TV, changing the applicable Guidelines range for Counts One and Two from 37-46 months to 46-57 months. The miscalculation, however, did not make the sentence unreasonable. The record shows that the Guidelines computation did not contaminate the final 46-month sentence and served as a sufficient benchmark for the Court’s analysis. The sentence imposed satisfies this Court’s reasonableness review based on consideration of all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. It is also consistent with our suggestion in United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834 (3d Cir.2006), that some errors in Guidelines calculations “can be harmless, as the sentence imposed after a district court exercises its discretion in step three ... is *221subject to our reasonableness review.” Id. at 839 n. 6.
I.
A brief history is helpful to understand the issue here. For most of the twentieth century federal courts operated under a long-standing indeterminate system which gave judges discretion to sentence defendants within a broad range set by Congress. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-65, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (“[Ujnder the indeterminate-sentence system, Congress defined the maximum, [and] the judge imposed a sentence within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation)....”).
“[Widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties and the disparities” in sentencing led to drastic alterations in this system through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.8 Id. at 366, 109 S.Ct. 647. The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission and directed it to promulgate Guidelines establishing narrow ranges of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994. Congress provided a list of factors that the sentencing court should consider when determining the point within the new Guidelines range at which the sentence should be imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Congress also declared the Guidelines ranges would be binding on courts, except in limited circumstances where departure from the range would be permitted. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Judges were required to state in open court the reasons for the final sentence imposed and to “give specific reasons” for any departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
November 1, 1987, the effective date of the first set of Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553, ushered in an era of limited judicial discretion in sentencing. The rigid mandatory Guidelines system survived until set aside by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by requiring judges in certain situations to impose an enhanced sentence based on facts not found by a jury. Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738.
To remedy the constitutional infirmity, the Court excised two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act. First, the Court removed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), making the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” Id. at 245, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Court left the remainder of § 3553 intact, reasoning that such an arrangement best preserved Congress’ intent to promote increased uniformity while preserving flexibility for individualized sentencing. Id. at 263-65, 125 S.Ct. 738. As a result, sentencing courts were no longer bound to impose the penalty at a set point within a fixed range, but were required to “take account of the Guidelines” along with the other sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a). Id. at 259-60, 125 S.Ct. 738. Second, the Court severed an appellate review provision that depended on the mandatory nature of the Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), and in its stead directed appellate courts to review sentences for reasonableness based on the trial court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 261-62, 125 S.Ct. 738.
II.
The Guidelines are intended to bring uniformity in sentencing, an important goal for criminal justice. The Commission *222had attempted to ensure that offenders with similar circumstances receive similar sentences.9 Although there is merit to the concept of national uniformity, the Sentencing Commission’s “one-size-fits-all” approach led to a mechanical sentencing regime that created its own disparities and injustices.10
The Booker line of cases is in tension with the concept of national uniformity. See Kimbrough v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 558, 574, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (“[0]ur opinion in Booker recognized that some departures from uniformity were a necessary cost of the remedy we adopted.”). In declaring the Guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory, the Supreme Court restored much of the discretion district courts previously possessed.
The authority the Court has approved, however, is limited by the role the Guidelines still play in sentencing. The Guidelines remain an important part of the sentencing process post -Booker.
The Supreme Court has stated that “the Guidelines range should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” for sentencing determinations, Gall v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), because “in the ordinary case, the Commission’s recommendation of a sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’ ” Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 574 (quoting Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). The Court also explained that “[t]he fact that § 3553(a) explicitly directs sentencing courts to consider the Guidelines supports the premise that district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597 n. 6.
Although the Supreme Court has preserved the continuing role of the Guidelines, it has limited their influence in the sentencing process. In Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, the Court sought to remedy the errors of many courts that “continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually mandatory,” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring), by reemphasizing their advisory nature as well as the broad discretion granted sentencing courts under § 3553(a). See, e.g., Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 564 (“A district judge must include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration .... [but] may determine, however, that, in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3553(a))).
The Court explained that, after determining the Guidelines range, a sentencing judge must “consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97 (internal citation omitted); see also Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 564 (the Guidelines only “serve as one factor among sev*223eral courts must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”)-11
The Supreme Court’s emphasis shows that the Guidelines should not be granted presumptive weight over the “array of factors,” Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 564, considered in the § 3553(a) analysis. After Booker, the primary purpose of the Guidelines calculation is to provide the sentencing court with a “benchmark” or center of reasonableness on which to base the § 3553(a) analysis. The sentencing judge is not bound to remain within the “rough approximation” provided by the Guidelines range, but may sentence a defendant based on the other § 3553(a) factors at a point anywhere within a zone of reasonableness surrounding the benchmark provided by the Guidelines range. As we said in United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62 (3d Cir.2008), “[rjeasonableness is a range, and our job is to ensure that the district court properly exercised its discretion by imposing a sentence within the range of reasonableness that is logically based upon, and consistent with, the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 90-91.
This procedure promotes flexibility by allowing the formulation of a sentence that represents a resolution of the often conflicting views of the public, Congress, law enforcement, and courts. The Guidelines provide national ranges and thus set guideposts that district courts can consult before pondering the other factors that are to be taken into account in setting the final sentence.
Recognizing that the Guidelines are no longer given primacy in the complex § 3553(a) calculus also resolves the conflict between the district court’s ability to impose a sentence tailored to the offender’s individual circumstances and Congress’ goal of uniform and predictable sentences. This conclusion is bolstered when one considers that to some extent there is an overlap between the factors a sentencing court considers during the Guidelines computation and the § 3553(a) calculus.
III.
These considerations also guide our review. Appellate courts “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, [or] failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (emphasis added). Then they must give due deference to the sentencing judge’s determination under § 3553(a) of the final point at which to impose the sentence. Id. at 597; see also Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469 (“The sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court.”).
*224Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough show that appellate review hinges on the reasonableness of the ultimate sentence as based on the total § 3553(a) analysis, rather than on the calculation of the Guidelines range. The reasonableness of a sentence will not be vitiated by an “insignificant” error in the Guidelines calculation. The Guidelines computation should be performed carefully, but it is designed to produce a range— not a designated point. Consequently, the Guidelines calculation need not be as precise as an engineering drawing.
There is enough play in the system to allow for harmless error. Although a sentence may be unreasonable if a district court makes clearly erroneous factual findings when determining the Guidelines range, the doctrines of plain error or harmless error can apply to preserve the sentence imposed. See Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 84-85 (citing United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir.2007)); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 268, 125 S.Ct. 738 (stating that appellate courts reviewing sentences should “apply ordinary prudential doctrines” such as waiver, plain error, and harmless error).
If the computations, even if erroneous, lead the district judge to consider a reasonable range of sentences that is not a marked deviation from the national estimate provided by the correct Guidelines range, they have fulfilled their proper role of promoting national uniformity. They have also played a role that satisfies § 3553(a)(4)’s requirement that the sentencing court review “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range” for the offense. The Supreme Court confirmed that appellate courts can continue to require a strong showing to sustain a final sentence that is imposed outside the Guidelines range, Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597, but that justification can be supplied by the strength of the reasoning in the court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. In its final ruling, the District Court’s proper use of all the § 3553 factors to reach the ultimate sentence can make insignificant its errors in the Guidelines calculation.
IV.
This case presents a situation where an insignificant miscalculation in the Guidelines computation did not result in an unreasonable sentence. The sentence was not simply within the zone of reasonableness around the proper Guidelines range, but was in fact within that range itself, albeit at its extreme. See Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463 (noting that a judge’s choice of a sentence within the Guidelines range means that his judgment accords with that of the Sentencing Commission and “increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”); see also United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir.2006) (“A sentence that falls within the guidelines range is more likely to be reasonable than one outside the guidelines range.”).
The District Court, in recognizing that the Guidelines were “still ... a factor that Court [sic] is required to consider in imposing sentence,” gave them the “respectful consideration” they were due. Kim-brough, 128 S.Ct. at 570. Because the District Court conducted a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors and evaluated the characteristics applicable to the defendant and his offense, the erroneous Guidelines calculation did not significantly infect the final sentencing determination. The final 46-month sentence, therefore, easily satisfies a reasonableness review.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

. Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).

. In the statute establishing the Commission, Congress stated that it should, inter alia, "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that ... avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” 28U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).

. For thoughtful criticism of the pre-Booker Guidelines system, see Albert W. Alschuler: The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L.Rev. 901 (1991); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 Colum. L.Rev. 1315 (2005).

. In this Circuit, sentencing courts should observe the following steps:
"(1) Courts must continue to calculate a defendant's Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before Booker.
(2) In doing so, they must formally rule on the motions of both parties and state on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit's pre-Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force.
(3) Finally, they are required to exercise their discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors in setting the sentence they impose regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.”
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).