Court Opinion

ID: 9676551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:26:51.830845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.533908
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, concurring. I agree that appellants’ fundamental rights of due process were denied; however, I write separately to address additional issues as they may occur on remand. First, although it is not likely that preservation of the argument will be an issue on remand because appellants will have counsel, it should be noted that the youngest child, B.B., was never adjudicated dependent-neglected. Second, the evidence presented does not support the termination of parental rights as to C.B., Jr., and B.B. The allegations upon which termination of rights were predicated merely involved a delay in motor skills and painful dental-hygiene conditions. Furthermore, although evidence supports the finding that A.B. is a special needs child requiring more than ordinary care, the fact that the parents may not be able to provide for the needs of a child requiring extraordinary care does not necessarily mean that they cannot raise their other two children. To address that issue, a determination of the limitations and interpretation of Section 9-27-341 (ix)(a)(4) of Arkansas Code Annotated (Repl. 2002) may be required. The section sets forth as one ground for the termination of parental rights that a “parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction ... to have had his parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a sibling of the child.” The subsection is included among offenses significant enough to warrant termination of parental rights for parents having committed murder, voluntary manslaughter, felony battery, and other aggravated acts. Similarly, section 9-27-303 (33) (6) relieves DHS from its obligation to provide reasonable efforts towards reunification where parental rights have been involuntarily terminated as to a child’s sibling. Both of these references to siblings were added pursuant, to Act 401 and approved by the general assembly on March 4, 1999. During this same session, the definition of dependent-neglected was amended twice following the approval of Act 401. First, Act 1503, approved on April 4, 1999, added the reference to “a sibling” in the definition of a dependent-neglected juvenile. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303 (Repl. 2002). This same definition was then further amended and approved on April 16, 1999, where the reference to a sibling was deleted. Despite this deletion, the term sibling was included in the codification of the amendments. Section 1-2-207 provides that when identical acts are enacted by the General Assembly during the same session, that the act signed last shall be deemed to have repealed the earlier enactment. However, when more than one act concerning the same subject matter is enacted during the same session, whether or not specially amending the same sections of the Arkansas Code or an uncodi-fied act, all of the enactments shall be given effect except to the extent of irreconcilable conflicts in which case the conflicting provision of the last enactment shall prevail. The statutory construction of these sections will be necessary to address the issue dependency neglect regarding the two brothers in this case. This statutory construction issue is even more critical because this case involves the termination of parental rights. When the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship. Ullom v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 12 S.W.3d 204 (2000). Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Id. Therefore, our adherence to strict compliance with our statutes is not merely a standard of review. See Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cox, 349 Ark. 205, 82 S.W. 3d 806 (2002) (DHS’s conduct deeply disturbing when agency took custody of child utterly without authority and outside the limited circumstances set out in our state statutes).