Court Opinion

ID: 9670424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:20:19.669783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.367461
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result and in all of the court’s opinion except the sentence in division IV that the purpose of § 279.13 is to give the teacher an opportunity “to successfully argue” that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, “if he can prove” that the assigned reasons were trivial, etc. I fear that this sentence may be construed to mean that boards of directors do not have the final say on whether to renew or not to renew teachers’ contracts. If boards do not have the final say, despite their desire not to renew, then we have in fact transformed § 279.13 into a teacher-tenure law. Had the legislature intended to grant teachers tenure, I think it would have done so in clearer terms.
Two matters are involved here: a teacher’s right to a hearing before the board votes not to renew his contract, and a board’s right not to renew a contract. Quite a few of the decisions in this area deal with the first matter — whether procedural due process required a hearing under the facts of the particular case. We do not have that problem in Iowa, as § 279.13 gives the teacher a right to both a conference and a hearing in every case of nonrenewal (§ 279.24 gives a similar right in every case of discharge for cause). As to the second matter, the board’s right not to renew, § 279.13 clearly gives the board the final decision and does not grant teacher tenure.
The first paragraph of § 279.13 provides that a teacher’s contract of the kind which is before us may provide for a term of employment not exceeding the ensuing school year. The reason for this limitation on duration is explained in Miner v. Lovilla Independent School Dist., 212 Iowa 973, 978, 234 N.W. 817, 819 (“it was enacted primarily for protecting the school district”).
Section 279.13 goes on to require a board considering nonrenewal of a teacher’s contract to inform the teacher in writing of the right to a private conference with the board. The teacher may in writing request the conference and also a written statement of the board’s specific reasons for nonre-newal. After that statement is given and the conference is held, the directors may “by a majority vote of the elected membership of the board, cause said contract to be terminated by written notification of termination. . . . ” § 279.13. Within a specified time the teacher may protest, whereupon the board must hold a public hearing. The section then provides, “Upon the conclusion of the hearing the board shall determine the question of continuance or discontinuance of the contract by a roll call vote entered in the minutes of the board, and the action of the board shall be final.” (Italics added.)
*636The evident purpose of the procedural steps in § 279.13 is to enable the teacher to learn what is in the board’s mind and to afford the teacher two opportunities to try to persuade the board to renew — the private conference and the public hearing. But the concluding provision of the statute remains that the ultimate action of the board “shall be final.”
A special situation exists when a board does not renew the contract because of the teacher’s having exercised a constitutional or statutory right — such as his right of free speech. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570. The rationale of this principle is that “if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.” Id. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d at 577. Thus nonrenewal predicated on a teacher’s having exercised a constitutional or statutory right cannot stand. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231. But teachers do not have a constitutional right to tenure, or a nonconstitutional right to it either in the absence of a statute giving it to them. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. We have no such statute. Compare opinion of district court in Scheelhaase v. Central Community School Dist., 349 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.Iowa) (granting damages to an Iowa teacher on ground nonrenewal was “arbitrary and capricious”), with opinion of court of appeals in same case, 488 F.2d 237 (8 Cir.) (reversing the judgment).
I therefore do not concur in the sentence in question in the court’s opinion in the present case.
LeGRAND, J., joins in this special concurrence.