Court Opinion

ID: 9671113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:31:23.019088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.256268
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 56. (dissenting). Ask any judge or justice what duties they assign to law clerks/interns and the response will be largely the same: draft memoranda on issues of law; draft memoranda on cases; assist in the drafting of opinions; research; discuss issues and cases. This, of course, was precisely the role of Professor McCormack.
¶ 57. The majority says that Judge Tesmer "should have known" that her use of Professor McCormack violated the Code of Judicial Ethics. But just what is it about her use of Professor McCormack as a law clerk/intern that she "should have known" was a violation? The majority opinion fails to answer that question with any degree of clarity. And that, I submit, is because there is no clarity, no direction, to be found. The basic problem is the lack of any rules, regulations, or guidelines with respect to law clerks/interns. Without them, judges have been left largely adrift as to where the lines are drawn. Accordingly, I conclude that there is no standard that gave any degree of fair notice to Judge Tesmer that what she was doing was a violation. It is not Judge Tesmer who has failed the system; it is the system that has failed Judge Tesmer.
¶ 58. Judge Tesmer is accused of violating SCR 60.01, which read literally forbids contact with anyone with respect to the judge's decision making responsibility. No one suggests it be read literally: to do so would be to forbid the use of law clerks/interns who are an accepted part of the judiciary.
*735¶ 59. Thus the question is:, where are the lines drawn? Who can be a law clerk/intern? What are the parameters of utilization?1
¶ 60. May a law clerk/intern be a law professor? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline forbidding it, and I can find none.
¶ 61. May the law clerk/intern do some or all of their work outside the actual physical surroundings of the court to which they are assigned? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline forbidding it, and I can find none.
¶ 62. Must the law clerk/intern be part of a formally recognized program of law clerks/interns? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to *736no rule, regulation, or guideline requiring it, and I can find none.
¶ 63. Must the law clerk/intern be registered with the court where the law clerk/intern works? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline requiring it, and I can find none.
¶ 64. Must the law clerk/intern be a graduate lawyer? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline of the circuit court requiring it, and I can find none.
¶ 65. Must a law clerk/intern be at the very least a law student? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation, or guideline requiring it, and I can find none.
¶ 66. If the law clerk/intern must be a lawyer, must that person be only a "recent graduate" or is there no limit to the number of years that have passed since law school to be eligible? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline providing the answer, and I can find none.
¶ 67. Can a law clerk/intern, performing his or her duties as a law clerk/intern, be simultaneously employed outside the judicial system? The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline providing the answer, and I can find none.
¶ 68. The questions posed, and not answered by any rule, regulation, or guideline, leave all judges and not just Judge Tesmer in a legal and ethical quandary. If the majority's decision is a rule of reason, as suggested by the majority's ambiguity in setting out precisely what it is about Judge Tesmer's actions that violate the Code, it is a rule of reason left solely to an after the fact determination subject to the eyes of the *737beholder. That is not fair, it is not just, it is not practical. It contravenes fundamental notions of fair notice and due process.
¶ 69. The majority opinion, by drawing the line here, provides a start in the right direction. At least we all know that we cannot use a law professor as a law clerk/intern if the professor works out of our home on weekends. But we must draw the lines more brightly. We must provide rules, regulations and guidelines to assist all of us in knowing what are the parameters. What if the next case involves a law professor working in chambers during court hours?
¶ 70. Everyone agrees that Judge Tesmer's use of Professor McCormack was in good faith: she did not believe her actions were in any way wrong. Everyone agrees that she maintained decisional responsibility. Everyone agrees that Professor McCormack was a totally disinterested participant. Everyone agrees that he functioned, in essence, as a law clerk/intern.
¶ 71. Nevertheless the majority says she is guilty of judicial misconduct. But what exactly, in retrospect, was wrong here? Was it that he was a professor? Or Was it that Professor McCormack was her friend? Or was it that he worked at her home instead of in chambers? Or was it that he worked only on weekends?
¶ 72. To hold as does the majority that Judge Tesmer's use of Professor McCormack was willful because she "should have known" it was beyond the bounds, is to ignore our own failings in providing guidance on these questions. As part of the order in this case, this court should establish a panel to explore and answer these questions in order to provide guidance for the future.
¶ 73. Given the need for some basic understanding with respect to the role of law clerk/interns, I agree *738with the majority to the extent that in the future these actions constitute a violation of the Judicial Code. This at least gives notice to all judges that there are some limits. But I further conclude that Judge Tesmer's actions were not willful. Given the lack of rules, regulations or guidelines clearly delineating that these actions were wrong, she did not have fair notice and thus should not be held to a "should have known" standard. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion finding that Judge Tesmer is guilty of judicial misconduct.
¶ 74. I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske joins in the dissent.

 I note that Rules for the First Judicial District, State of Wisconsin (1990) regarding legal interns and law clerks provide as follows:
VII. LEGAL INTERNS AND LAW CLERKS
148. ASSIGNMENT
Legal interns and law clerks shall be assigned by the Chief Judge or Deputy Chief Judge.
151. PRIVILEGE
All transactions and communications between a judge and his assigned legal intern or law clerk, during the period of each assignment, are privileged to the judge.
154. WORK PRODUCT
The work product of a judge who has been assisted by a legal intern or law clerk is the sole responsibility of the judge.
The Rules are the same today. The Judicial Commission neither briefed nor argued that these rules apply. I can only conclude that the Rules for the First Judicial District are irrelevant to this case or are largely ignored.