Court Opinion

ID: 9942430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 01:00:50.322055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:04.931185
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50697    RESTRICTED Document: 106-1          Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/20/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________                           FILED
                                                                  February 20, 2024
                                   No. 22-50697
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                           Clerk

      United States of America,

                                                                Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

      Marco Antonio Abundiz,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 3:20-CR-2409-1
                     ______________________________

      Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
      Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
            Convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and sentenced to life
      imprisonment for sexually abusing his six-year-old niece, K.Z., Marco
      Antonio Abundiz argues the district court erred by: (1) denying his right to
      confrontation by allowing K.Z. to testify via CCTV; (2) failing to make the
      findings required under 18 U.S.C § 3509 before allowing K.Z. to testify via
      CCTV; (3) admitting evidence of a previous sexual assault; (4) admitting
      evidence that he possessed child pornography; and (5) instructing the jury
      regarding evidence admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.
      We AFFIRM.
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                                              No. 22-50697

                                                    I.
              In 2020, six-year-old K.Z. told her mother, Adriana Zapata, that
      Abundiz (K.Z.’s uncle and Adriana’s brother) had been sexually abusing her
      while babysitting her in their home on the Fort Bliss Army Base in El Paso,
      Texas. According to testimony at trial, K.Z. reported to her parents and
      multiple medical professionals that on multiple occasions, Abundiz would
      sexually molest her.
              Further investigation revealed that Abundiz previously sexually
      abused his minor cousin, who testified that Abundiz had sex with her
      numerous times over an eight-year time span before she was sixteen.1
      Abundiz was charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor
      under the age of 12 years in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
                                        A. K.Z. Testimony
              1. CCTV
              Before trial, the Government moved to allow K.Z. to testify via CCTV
      outside the personal presence of Abundiz and the jury, in accordance with
      18 U.S.C. § 3509, the federal statute defining child victims’ rights when they
      are required to testify at trial.2 At a March 28, 2022 hearing on the motion,
      the Government called Dr. Lubit, an expert in forensic, child, and adolescent

              _____________________
              1
                  Abundiz was never prosecuted for this conduct.
              2
                Prior to the hearing, the district court also issued a written order explaining the
      law under 18 U.S.C. § 3509 and establishing the relevant standards for the hearing.
      Abundiz notes that the Government’s initial request for CCTV testimony had a “fatal
      failure” in that it did not request a hearing despite the fact that “every single circuit court
      that considered this issue [child victims testifying under 18 U.S.C. § 3509] required that a
      hearing be held.” The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether hearings are necessary and
      need not reach this issue because the district court cured any error by holding a hearing.

                                                    2
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                                              No. 22-50697

      psychiatry.3 Lubit began by providing general testimony about child victims
      who testify in the presence of their abusers. He testified that, in his opinion
      and based on scientific literature, child victims who must “be confronted by
      or see” their abusers are “re-traumatize[d]” by the experience as it can be
      an “immense traumatic trigger causing a great deal of fear, anxiety, and
      distress.” Lubit further explained that forcing a child victim to be in the same
      space as her abuser causes “betrayal trauma,” which may make the child
      distrust society, the police, and the legal system, “damag[ing] [their] ability
      to trust adults in general.”
             Turning to K.Z., Lubit testified that he spoke with her three times but
      that K.Z. was hesitant to discuss the assault on all three occasions because
      “it was too painful.” Lubit opined it was “too anxiety provoking” for her.
      Lubit further testified that K.Z. was scared of Abundiz and had substantial
      anxiety about seeing him and speaking about the assault. He explained that
      “[s]he reports very clearly she is frightened of [Abundiz].” If K.Z. were
      forced to speak about the assault in Abundiz’s presence, Lubit opined that
      K.Z. would be “so flooded with anxiety, that she wouldn’t be able to” testify.
      He also stated that having to testify in front of Abundiz would “re-
      traumatize” K.Z., “deepen the trauma she has,” and cause more than de
      minimis “betrayal trauma.” Moreover, Lubit suggested that being in the
      same room as Abundiz would, “to a reasonable degree of medical
      certainty . . . prevent [K.Z.] from being able to testify” and that having an
      adult attendant in the courtroom would not resolve this issue. Finally, Lubit
      testified K.Z. faced a higher risk of trauma if she were required to testify in
      the presence of Abundiz rather than permitted to testify via CCTV.

             _____________________
             3
                 At no time did Abundiz object to Lubit’s qualifications as an expert.

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      According to Lubit, this risk of trauma was more than mere nervousness or
      reluctance.
             Following this testimony, the district court granted the Government’s
      request to allow K.Z. to testify via CCTV:
             I find that the tender age of the child dictates that she be
             allowed to testify via closed-circuit TV. The combination of the
             time elapsed since the incident and the facts and circumstances
             leading to the incident and what has transpired since the
             incident, again, dictates that this testimony happen -- her
             testimony take place in the less stressful set of circumstances
             that can be fashioned to do so. I find that to avoid the
             appearance for any -- to avoid any misapprehensions,
             misperceptions, or any presumption of guilt or of risk to the
             child, only the child should be on camera when she is testifying.

             The court specified procedures for K.Z.’s CCTV testimony and
      requested to meet with K.Z., her guardians, and counsel in chambers to
      explain the process and instill upon K.Z. the need to testify truthfully. Then,
      the following exchange occurred:
             AUSA: Is your Honor finding under Section 3509(b)(1)(B)(ii)
             that there is a substantial likelihood established by expert
             testimony that the child would suffer emotional trauma from
             testifying?
             Court: Yes.
             2. K.Z. Testimony
             Pursuant to the district court’s order, K.Z. testified via CCTV. K.Z.,
      who was seven-years-old and in second grade at the time of trial, testified that
      she remembered living in Texas and that Abundiz babysat her. When asked
      what Abundiz did to her, K.Z. said “he always does something bad to me,”
      he “always see[s] my private part [sic],” and he “licks” her private parts.

                                             4
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                                             No. 22-50697

      She said this occurred “more than one time” while Abundiz was “sitting on
      his bed” and she was “laying down.”4
                  B. Maria Feliz Ramirez & Rosalva Hernandez Testimony
              The Government also offered the testimony of Maria Feliz Ramirez,
      Abundiz’s sister, and Rosalva Hernandez, Abundiz’s stepsister.
              Maria explained that she lived with Abundiz until she was fourteen
      and recalled a moment when Abundiz told her he was dating their stepsister,
      Rosalva, who would have been no more than 11 years old at the time. Maria
      recalled Abundiz asking her to remember when she walked in on him and
      Rosalva having sex:
              So he told me that they were dating. And I was 16, so I didn’t
              even know how to react. I was just like, Oh, that’s cool. And
              then he was like, Oh, you walked in on us one time. And I was
              like, Oh, no, I didn’t. He was all, like, Yeah, you came into my
              room to, like, clean. And I put the blanket over me really quick.
              Rosalva also testified and confirmed these allegations. She said that
      she lived with Abundiz as a child and that she had sex with him from when
      she was eight until she was sixteen, numerous times “on a weekly basis.”

              _____________________
              4
                 K.Z. made similar reports to medical professionals who testified at trial. Alena
      Cummings, an EMT who responded to the scene, testified to K.Z.’s statements on the day
      of the arrest. On that day, Cummings spoke privately with K.Z. and later testified that K.Z.
      shared “that her uncle told her to go up to the room. . . . and then he kissed her on her lips
      and touched her in her genital area,” which K.Z. called her “pee-pee” while “point[ing]
      to her vagina.” Although K.Z. could not identify the day this happened, Cummings
      understood that the assault occurred in the house. Leticia Sprinkle, the registered nurse
      who examined K.Z. the day she was brought to the hospital, also testified that K.Z. made
      similar statements during the examination. Furthermore, K.Z. indicated to Sprinkle that
      Abundiz kissed her genitalia and mouth with his lips and tongue, but not her breasts. K.Z.
      denied penetration and other sexual acts, but she said “it was wet” when she was asked
      how she knew Abundiz used his tongue. Based on her examination, Sprinkle believed that
      the assault happened a few days prior.

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               In response to the Government’s motion in limine and over Abundiz’s
      objections, the district court admitted this evidence under Federal Rule of
      Evidence 413 (“FRE 413”). First, the district court determined that FRE
      413 authorized this testimony as evidence of “any other” prior sexual assault
      admissible under the rule. Under FRE 413, “[i]n a criminal case in which a
      defendant is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that
      the defendant committed any other sexual assault.”5 “Sexual assault”
      includes a crime under federal or state law involving “any conduct prohibited
      by 18 U.S.C. chapter 109A.”6 Because Abundiz was charged under 18
      U.S.C. § 2241(c), which falls within 18 U.S.C. chapter 109A, the court
      concluded that Rosalva and Maria’s testimony fell squarely within the Rule’s
      ambit.
               The district court further explained that “[c]onduct admissible under
      Rule 413 need not have been conduct for which Defendant was convicted or
      even charged” and that “[a]ll that is required by the rule is the evidence be
      relevant.” The court then found the testimony was relevant because “[i]t is
      certainly relevant if, in a trial for aggravated sexual abuse, the defendant has
      a history of allegations of sexual assault.” Lastly, the court found that “the
      probative value of this testimony . . . is not substantially outweighed by the
      concerns in Rule 403,” noting that FRE 413 “is a rule of inclusion and
      presumes the admissibility of evidence that falls under the rule.”7

               _____________________
               5
                   Fed. R. Evid. 413(a).
               6
                   Fed. R. Evid. 413(d)(1).
               7
                As discussed, infra Section III.A.1, the district court excluded a third alleged
      assault between Maria and Abundiz under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as “needlessly
      cumulative.”

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                                      No. 22-50697

                          C. Kathleen Fronczak Testimony
             Kathleen Fronczak, an FBI task force officer, appeared on behalf of
      the Government and testified that the FBI flagged Abundiz one year earlier
      after his name matched the physical mailing address associated with an IP
      address that had shared child pornography files. After K.Z.’s mother
      reported the assault, Fronczak interviewed Abundiz at a hospital, where he
      was staying due to a COVID-19 exposure. Abundiz waived his Miranda rights
      and told Fronczak that K.Z. told her mother he “kissed her upstairs in his
      bedroom.” Abundiz “explained that he didn’t know why she had said
      something like that, that he thought maybe she was mad at him . . . because
      she had been punished earlier in the day for misbehaving, and he had laughed
      at her.” Abundiz also “couldn’t advise how she would get an idea to say
      something like this or would even know to say something like this.”
             Abundiz also admitted to Fronczak that he had previously
      downloaded child pornography using the UTorrent network, which was the
      same software used by the IP address that shared child pornography in 2019.
      Specifically, Abundiz recalled downloading a large file with a bunch of
      smaller files in it and explained that he would search for material using the
      terms “CP” (child pornography) and “PTHC” (pre-teen hard core). He also
      said he downloaded content such as “The Anarchist Cookbook,” “anime,”
      and “videos of animals and children being killed” and that he believed he
      would one day be caught and go to jail because of the child pornography.
             Under Federal Rule of Evidence 414, the district court admitted
      Fronczak’s testimony regarding the FBI’s child pornography investigation as
      well as her statements that Abundiz admitted to accessing child

                                            7
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                                                 No. 22-50697

      pornography.8 Rule 414 permits courts “[i]n a criminal case in which a
      defendant is accused of child molestation” to “admit evidence that the
      defendant committed any other child molestation” for “any matter to which
      it is relevant.”9 The court explained that FRE 414 “presumes the
      admissibility of evidence that falls under the rule” and “makes clear that a
      defendant’s alleged possession of child pornography is relevant to a case
      involving an accusation of child molestation.” The court admitted
      Fronczak’s testimony after finding that the probative value of testimony
      regarding Defendant’s possession of child pornography was not
      “substantially outweighed by undue prejudice or any of the other concerns
      in Rule 403.”
                                         D. Jury Instructions
              This Circuit has yet to adopt a FRE 413 and FRE 414 pattern jury
      instruction. As a result, the district court crafted its own, declining to adopt
      the exact instructions used by the Ninth or Eighth Circuits that the
      Government suggested, modeling its instructions on those of the Eighth
      Circuit.10
              _____________________
              8
                See infra Section III.B. The district court rejected Abundiz’s argument that the
      statements were involuntary because of his hospitalization, finding that Abundiz
      “provide[d] no documentation regarding the extent of his illness,” nor “provide[d] an
      argument that, considering the totality of circumstances, his will was overborne” by the
      interviewers, and that Abundiz received his Miranda warnings. Abundiz does not advance
      his involuntariness argument on appeal.
              9
                  Fed. R. Evid. 414(a).
              10
                   The final instruction read:

              PREVIOUS ACTS                OF     SEXUAL        ABUSE   AND     CHILD
              PORNOGRAPHY
              You have heard evidence that the defendant may have committed other
              offenses of sexual abuse and downloading of child pornography and child
              sexual abuse material. The defendant was not convicted of any of these

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                                              No. 22-50697

              On April 1, 2022, the jury found Abundiz guilty, and the district court
      sentenced him to life in prison, five years of supervised release if he were to
      be released, and a $100 special assessment.
              Abundiz timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under
      28 U.S.C. § 1291.
                                                   II.
              Abundiz contends the district court erred by allowing K.Z. to testify
      via CCTV. We find no error.
                                                   A.
              First, Abundiz argues that allowing K.Z. to testify via CCTV violated
      his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as outlined in Crawford v.
      Washington. This issue is reviewed de novo and rejected by this Court.11

              _____________________
              offenses. The defendant is not charged with any of these offenses. You may
              consider the evidence of any of these offenses only if you unanimously find
              that the offense or offenses you are considering is more likely true than not
              true of having occurred.

              You decide that by considering all of the evidence of the given offense and
              deciding whether it is more likely than not to have occurred. This is a lower
              standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.
              You must disregard the offense or offenses you find to have not been
              proved as stated in the previous paragraph. The offense or offenses that
              you find to have been proved as previously stated, can be considered by
              you in deciding any matter for which you find them relevant.
              11
                 United States v. Cotto-Flores, 970 F.3d 17, 39 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing United States
      v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d
      555, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 2004)
      (“Alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause [of the Sixth Amendment] are reviewed
      de novo, but are subject to a harmless error analysis.”) (alteration and emphasis in original).

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              The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
      confront witnesses who testify against them.12 However, the Supreme Court
      has recognized several exceptions to the right to physically confront
      witnesses.13 Relevant here, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig held:
              [I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state
              interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of
              testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to
              justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child
              witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the
              absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.14
              Following Craig, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b) to “specify[]
      the procedures to be used in federal courts to allow a child victim to testify
      via [CCTV].”15 Of note, § 3509(b) permits 2-way CCTV under certain

              _____________________
              12
                   U.S. Const. amend. VI.
              13
                See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (former testimony of
      unavailable witness); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (hearsay exceptions); Bourjaily
      v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1987) (hearsay statements of nontestifying
      coconspirators); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1970) (trial judge may remove
      defendant from courtroom for disruptive behavior). As the Bourjaily Court explained:
              While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use
              of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this
              Court has rejected that view as “unintended and too extreme.” Rather, we
              have attempted to harmonize the goal of the Clause—placing limits on the
              kind of evidence that may be received against a defendant—with a societal
              interest in accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-
              court statements.
              Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted).
              14
                   Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
              15
                   United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 1993).

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      circumstances, providing a greater ability for defendants to confront
      witnesses than the Craig Court, which upheld the use of 1-way CCTV.16
              In 2004, the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington held that
      testimonial out-of-court statements by witnesses are barred by the
      Confrontation Clause unless the witness is otherwise unavailable and the
      defendant had a previous opportunity for cross-examination.17 Abundiz
      argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford “conflict[s]” with
      Craig—and presumably by extension, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)—and that
      “various courts and scholars have struggled to reconcile Craig with the
      Court’s subsequent holding in Crawford.” Abundiz’s argument reduces to
      his contention that “given Crawford’s protections, it’s just a matter of time
      before a clash between the two makes its way to the Supreme Court.”
              Abundiz provides no supporting citations for these assertions but
      properly concedes that “Crawford did not overturn Craig” and that “Craig
      governs this case.”18 He has also failed to elaborate on how having a child
      testify in real time, subject to cross-examination, via CCTV in response to
      expert findings that she is likely to be traumatized, conflicts with Craig. Nor
      has Abundiz explained how this situation differs from other exceptions to the

              _____________________
              16
                  Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (“So long as a trial court makes such a case-
      specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a State from using
      a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child witness
      in a child abuse case.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(A) (“In a proceeding involving an
      alleged offense against a child, the attorney for the Government . . . may apply for an order
      that the child’s testimony . . . be televised by 2-way closed circuit television.”).
              17
                 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“[T]he common law in 1791
      conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior
      opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those
      limitations.”).
              18
               See United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 492 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring)
      (“Crawford did not overturn Craig.”).

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      Confrontation Clause that the Supreme Court and all Circuit Courts have
      repeatedly upheld.19
                                                       B.
                Second, Abundiz argues that the district court failed to make the
      requisite factual findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b). Section 3509(b) “sets
      forth the conditions under which a child may testify by closed-circuit
      television.”20 Specifically, it provides that “[i]n a proceeding involving an
      alleged offense against a child, the attorney for the Government . . . may
      apply for an order that the child’s testimony be taken in a room outside the
      courtroom and be televised by 2-way closed circuit television.”21 If the court
      finds, inter alia, that “[t]he child is unable to testify because of fear” or
      “[t]here is a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the
      child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying” in open court, then
      “[t]he court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by closed-
      circuit television.”22 Accordingly, Abundiz argues the district court failed to
      find on the record that K.Z. would be unable to testify in open court because
      of either fear or a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that
      she would suffer emotional trauma.23
                Whether the district court’s relevant factual findings under
      18 U.S.C. § 3509 were supported by evidence in the record is reviewed for

                _____________________
                19
                     See supra note 13.
                20
                     Cox, 871 F.3d at 484 (citing United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 898 (6th Cir.
      1998)).
                21
                     18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(A).
                22
                     18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
                23
                 At oral argument, Abundiz appeared to concede this issue; but to the extent he
      does not, this Court rejects the argument.

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      clear error, although whether such factual findings are “sufficient to permit
      the use of closed-circuit television testimony” is a legal question reviewed de
      novo.24 Upon review, this Court finds no error.
              As described supra Section I.A.1, the district court held a pre-trial
      hearing, heard expert testimony on this issue, and concluded K.Z. would be
      unable to testify in open court because there was a substantial likelihood she
      would suffer emotional trauma if forced to do so. Dr. Lubit testified that it
      was “too anxiety provoking” for K.Z. to discuss the assault one-on-one with
      him and that K.Z. repeatedly expressed she would be “quite afraid if she had
      to see [Abundiz].” Lubit testified that K.Z. was afraid to see Abundiz in the
      courtroom and that “if she had to talk about it, she would even be worse.”
      Lubit opined that K.Z. would be “so flooded with anxiety, that she would not
      be able to” testify in court, and that her fear would, “to a reasonable degree
      of medical certainty . . . prevent her from being able to testify.” Lubit further
      explained that in-court testimony would “re-traumatize her,” “deepen the
      trauma she has,” and cause “betrayal trauma”; moreover, Lubit said the risk
      of trauma was substantially more likely if K.Z. testified in front of Abundiz
      than apart from him. Finally, Lubit explained that courtroom
      accommodations would not reduce the risk of trauma and that K.Z. would
      still be “traumatized and very, very anxious.”
              After hearing from Lubit, the district permitted K.Z. to testify via
      CCTV given her “tender age,” “[t]he combination of the time elapsed since
      the incident and the facts and circumstances leading to the incident,” and

              _____________________
              24
                 Cotto-Flores, 970 F.3d at 39 (citing Turning Bear, 357 F.3d at 735–36); Turning
      Bear, 357 at 735–36 (“The district court was required to make certain findings in order to
      permit [the child victim] to testify by closed-circuit television. Whether the district court’s
      relevant factual findings were supported by evidence in the record is reviewable under the
      ‘clearly erroneous’ standard . . . .”).

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      “what has transpired since the incident.” Then, the court confirmed on the
      record        that    these       findings        supported       its     ruling      under
      18 U.S.C. § 3509(1)(B)(ii). Finally, the judge limited his ruling so that K.Z.
      would be the only witness allowed to appear on camera to avoid any
      “misapprehensions, misperceptions, or any presumption of guilt.”
               The district court’s findings are plausible, supported by Lubit’s
      testimony, and stated on the record. Abundiz’s argument fails.25
                                                   III.
               Abundiz contends the district court erroneously admitted evidence
      regarding prior sexual assaults and his possession of child pornography.26 We
      find no error.
                                                   A.
               Abundiz argues the district court erred in admitting Maria and
      Rosalva’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 413 for two
      reasons. First, Abundiz contends the testimony was unfairly prejudicial
      under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Second, Abundiz claims the district
      court improperly admitted the testimony as evidence of his character without

               _____________________
               25
                  There is little precedent in this Court addressing the requirements under
      18 U.S.C. § 3509, but the district court’s findings comport with those of other circuits. See,
      e.g., United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 2019) (in dicta, describing
      that an expert witness with extensive experience in assessing trauma in sexually abused
      children forming an individualized opinion that a child victim would suffer trauma from
      testifying in front of the defendant would be a sufficient factual finding to support use of
      CCTV under §3509(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
               26
                 Although Abundiz’s briefs refer to “two” prior sexual assaults—of both Maria
      and Rosalva—a review of the record shows that Rosalva and Maria testified about
      Abundiz’s abuse of Rosalva during his youth. As a result, this Court will consider only
      allegations of Rosalva’s sexual assault.

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                                             No. 22-50697

      making on-the-record findings regarding the alleged assaults. We reject both
      arguments.
              1. Relevancy and Prejudice
              The district court admitted Maria and Rosalva’s testimony pursuant
      to Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Abundiz argues that this testimony should
      not have been admitted because it lacked probative value and was unfairly
      prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. As Abundiz preserved this
      argument, we review for an abuse of discretion subject to a harmless error
      analysis.27 “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an
      error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 28 However,
      an evidentiary error may “be excused if it was harmless, particularly if there
      is ‘other overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.’”29
              Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, relevant evidence is generally
      admissible unless otherwise provided by the federal Constitution, statute, or
      the Federal Rules of Evidence.30 Although Rule 404(b) prohibits otherwise-

              _____________________
              27
                 United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
      Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Girod, 646
      F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2003)
      (“[F]or any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible error, the admission of the evidence
      in question must have substantially prejudiced Sanders’s rights.”).
              28
                  United States v. Caillier, 80 F.4th 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United States
      v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 239–40 (5th Cir. 2005)).
              29
                United States v. Nguyen, 504 F.3d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
      Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1992)) (cleaned up).
              30
               Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact
      more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of
      consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

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      relevant “propensity” evidence,31 FRE 413 provides a “broad exception” to
      FRE 404(b) and expressly allows the admission of character and propensity
      evidence in sexual assault cases to prove a defendant acted in conformity with
      that character.32 Nevertheless, evidence admitted under FRE 413 remains
      subject to FRE 403’s balancing test under which a “court may exclude
      relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
      danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”33 Unfair prejudice may be “mitigated by the
      district court’s careful instruction to the jury” that the defendant is on trial
      only for the charged crimes, not for the other conduct, act, or offense.34
      Ultimately, it is a “rare case” that would “warrant[] reversal of a district
      court’s Rule 403 analysis.”35

              _____________________
              31
                “Propensity” evidence refers to “evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
      [admitted] to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
      person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
              32
                 Fed. R. Evid. 413(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a
      sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual
      assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”); United
      States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Congress intended to expand the
      admissibility of character or propensity evidence relating to sexual assault by creating a
      broad exception to the prohibition in Rule 404(b).”).
              33
                   Fed. R. Evid. 413; Fed. R. Evid. 403.
              34
                   United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d 543, 548 (5th Cir. 2015).
              35
                   Id. (citing Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387). In Dillon, this Court stated:
              A district court’s determination under Rule 403 with respect to whether
              the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
              of unfair prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard but,
              at least generally, with “an especially high level of deference to” the
              district court, with reversal called for only “rarely and only when there has
              been a clear abuse of discretion.”
      Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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              After reviewing the record, we find that the district court did not
      abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. First, Abundiz argues that
      Maria and Rosalva’s testimony lacked probative value and was not relevant
      to the case at hand because Rosalva’s alleged assaults were remote in time
      and “unadjudicated.”36 The district court disagreed and in doing so,
      explained its application of the Rules of Evidence to the facts. The court
      began this analysis by noting that FRE 413 is a rule “of inclusion and
      presumes the admissibility of evidence that falls under the rule.” The district
      court appropriately found that Rosalva’s alleged assaults need only be
      relevant to be admissible under FRE 413; Abundiz did not need to be
      formally charged or convicted for the conduct to be admissible. The court
      found the evidence regarding a defendant’s “history of allegations of sexual
      assault” probative “in a trial for aggravated sexual abuse” and not
      “substantially outweighed by the concerns in Rule 403.”
              We agree and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
      finding the testimony probative and relevant. An “alleged sexual assault does
      not need to have been identical” to the charged sexual assault for it “to be
      admissible, but aspects of the assault must have sufficient probative value as
      to some element of the charged offense to not be substantially outweighed by
      its danger of unfair prejudice.”37 Rosalva’s testimony that Abundiz raped her
      as a child speaks to Abundiz’s tendency to commit sexual assault generally,
      and with children and family members specifically. Maria’s testimony
      corroborates Rosalva’s account. And statements by Abundiz’s counsel at
      trial—notably, that “there is great similarity” between the “prior acts” and
      “the act charged”—refute Abundiz’s current argument that the assaults are
              _____________________
              36
                 Abundiz also objects on the grounds that the assault occurred within the context
      of “child abuse and unlawful status.” However, he failed to elaborate on this argument.
              37
                   Dillon, 532 F.3d at 389.

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      too dissimilar to offer value. Finally, because part of Abundiz’s defense was
      that K.Z. misidentified the perpetrator, this evidence that he committed
      previous sexual assaults is particularly probative. 38
              Abundiz’s second argument—that the testimony was unfairly
      prejudicial—fares no better. While Maria and Rosalva’s testimony may be
      prejudicial, “prejudice” is not enough: Rule 403 only prohibits evidence
      when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
      prejudice.39 Abundiz’s only contention regarding unfair prejudice is that
      “the admission of this kind of evidence caused undue prejudice with the jury
      who was likely moved with undue passion and emotion to punish the
      appellant.”
              That the district court “took great care in weighing the evidence of”
      additional alleged assaults and “admitted [only] those that it determined to
      be relevant” supports the conclusion that it appropriately exercised its
      discretion.40 Specifically, the district court declined to admit “additional
      evidence relating to Abundiz[’s] abuse of [Maria]” in part because it did not

              _____________________
              38
                Although the district court did not expressly address Abundiz’s arguments that
      the assaults were “unadjudicated” or “undermined by the underlying parental child
      abuse,” the court sufficiently justified its ultimate ruling and implicitly addressed
      Abundiz’s objections.
              39
                   Fed. R. Evid. 403.
              40
                 Dillon, 532 F.3d at 391 (“[The district court] held that their testimony would
      have been unfairly prejudicial because those two alleged sexual assaults were remote in time
      and dissimilar in their commission to the charged offenses. The district court took great
      care in weighing the evidence of all these prior sexual assaults. It admitted those that it
      determined to be relevant, and it excluded those that it determined to be unfairly
      prejudicial. In making these decisions, we are unable to conclude, under the applicable
      standard of review, that the district court abused its discretion.”).

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      comply with Rule 403.41 In short, the district court did not blindly admit all
      evidence of prior sexual incidents but carefully considered the admissibility
      of each instance under the appropriate legal standards. We conclude that the
      district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Maria and Rosalva’s
      testimony.42
              2. FRE 104(b)
              Second, Abundiz argues that the district court erred in admitting
      Maria and Rosalva’s testimony because it did not “make a preliminary
      finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence
      that the defendant committed the other act and that it constituted an ‘offense
      of sexual assault’ for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 413.”43 He also appears to
      suggest that the district court was required to make this finding on the record.
              While Abundiz objected to the want of a “probable cause finding”
      before the district court, he did not reference Federal Rule of Evidence 104
      or the correct “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable to
      whether uncharged acts under FRE 413 may be submitted to the jury.44

              _____________________
              41
                The district court found the evidence inadmissible in part because it was
      “needlessly cumulative” under FRE 403.
              42
                 Further, without the evidence relating to Maria and Rosalva, the trial would have
      been little more than “a swearing match between K.Z. and Abundiz, which is a primary
      reason Rules 413 and 414 were enacted.” See Guidry, 456 F.3d at 502–03 (“Because sexual
      assault allegations are often reduced to a swearing match, Congress aimed to assist the fact
      finder’s assessment of credibility through allowing evidence of the defendant’s extrinsic
      sexual misconduct as character or propensity evidence.”).
              43
               On appeal, Abundiz uses both “probable cause” and “preponderance of the
      evidence” language to describe his objections.
              44
                 Fed. R. Evid. 104; Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387 (describing that the preponderance
      of the evidence standard applies to evidence proffered under Rule 413).

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      Because Abundiz’s objections below did not put the district court on
      sufficient notice of his claim, we review for plain error.45
              Federal Rule of Evidence 104 requires courts to decide preliminary
      questions about whether evidence is relevant and admissible.46 Under Rule
      104(b), “[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists,
      proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does
      exist,” but courts are permitted to preliminarily admit the evidence, so long
      as the required proof is introduced later.47 In certain instances, courts are
      required to conduct a hearing on a preliminary question, but there is
      otherwise no requirement that a district court make “on the record” findings
      regarding preliminary issues.48 Moreover, this Court has held:
              To be admissible under Rule 413, the uncharged “offense of
              sexual assault” need not be established by a conviction . . . but
              the district court must make a preliminary finding that a jury
              could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that
              the defendant committed the other act and that it constituted
              an “offense of sexual assault” for purposes of Rule 413. 49

              _____________________
              45
                Because Abundiz cited the wrong standard in his objection below, he likely did
      not provide the district court with sufficient notice of his claim and, as such, did not
      preserve the error. See Lewis, 796 F.3d at 545 (“To preserve error, an evidentiary objection
      must ‘state[ ] the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context.’”) (citation
      omitted) (alteration in original). Furthermore, the record indicates that the district court
      did not address his concern, increasing the likelihood that Abundiz failed to sufficiently
      apprise the court of his objection. See id. at 546 (ruling that plain error review applied when
      defendant argued before the district court that FRE 413 evidence should not be admitted
      because it was intrastate and not interstate but on appeal, defendant argued the same
      evidence should not have been admitted for a different reason).
              46
                   Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
              47
                   Fed. R. Evid. 104(b).
              48
                   Fed. R. Evid. 104(c).
              49
                   Dillon, 532 F.3d at 387 (internal citations omitted).

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              Thus, although the district court made no on-the-record findings
      pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) that the alleged assaults
      occurred, the failure was not plain error. To start, Rule 104(b) does not on its
      face require an explicit finding, nor does Abundiz offer case law suggesting
      otherwise. Instead, the text of Rule 104(b) merely requires the existence of
      “proof” that is “sufficient to support a finding” that the incident occurred.
      Here, the district court made implicit findings that the assaults took place
      when it found the allegations probative.
              More telling is the district court’s instruction to the jury that it “may
      consider the evidence of any of these offenses [FRE 413 and FRE 414
      evidence] only if you unanimously find that the [prior] offense or offenses
      you are considering is [sic] more likely true than not true of having
      occurred.” As a result, the absence of an express finding under FRE 104(b)
      by the district court was not plain error: the court implicitly made the Rule
      104(b) finding and cured any potential error by jury instruction.50
                                                   B.
              We turn next to Abundiz’s argument that it was unfairly prejudicial
      for the district court to admit evidence that Abundiz possessed child
      pornography under FRE 414, which “in a criminal case in which a defendant
      is accused of child molestation, [allows] the court [to] admit evidence that
      the defendant committed any other child molestation.” 51 In particular, the
      district court admitted Abundiz’s statements to FBI Agent Fronczak as well
      as the results of an independent FBI investigation showing that a device with

              _____________________
              50
                 Moreover, Abundiz does not claim the Court should exercise its discretion due
      to a serious effect on “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
      See Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d at 419 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
              51
                   Fed. R. Evid. 414(a).

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                                                No. 22-50697

      an IP address linked to his mailing address shared such materials. Before the
      district court, Abundiz objected to this evidence on the basis that his
      statements to Fronczak were involuntary. He has abandoned this argument
      on appeal and instead argues that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.
      Because his prejudice argument was not made below, this Court reviews the
      objection for plain error and finds none.
               As a threshold matter, Abundiz gives this issue little attention,
      devoting only two lines of his brief to arguing the evidence was prejudicial
      because “he was convicted and received a life sentence.” 52 He does not
      explain how this evidence was unfairly prejudicial as required under FRE
      403. Finally, even assuming some error, Abundiz presents no argument that
      the error was clear or that it affected his substantial rights. We find no plain
      error.
                                                     IV.
               Finally, Abundiz contends the jury instructions regarding evidence
      admitted under FRE 413 and 414 were erroneous because they “did not
      clearly state how the jury would use all of the 413/414 evidence,”
      “confuse[d] the standard of proof required to convict,” and “g[a]ve the jury
      the ability to convict using a ‘lower standard’ of proof.” 53

               _____________________
               52
                    Abundiz argues:
               Even if Fed. R. Evid. 414(a) allows [the evidence] in as a similar act of child
               molestation, the prejudicial effect when combined with the R.H. and M.R.
               testimony cannot be overstated. In fact, there is no way to quantify the
               prejudice this admission caused the appellant’s right to a fair trial other
               than he was convicted and received a life sentence.
               53
                    Abundiz sufficiently preserved this objection.

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             We review this challenge for an abuse of discretion.54 When
      considering whether a jury instruction was supported by the evidence, this
      Court “view[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
      from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.”55
      Erroneous jury instructions are considered harmless if a court, “after a
      ‘thorough examination of the record,’ is able to ‘conclude beyond a
      reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the
      error.’”56
             Upon review, Abundiz’s arguments are unpersuasive. The district
      court appropriately exercised its discretion to draft jury instructions57 as this
      Circuit does not have pattern jury instructions for FRE 413 and FRE 414
      evidence. And more to the point, the district court’s instructions were
             _____________________
             54
                  United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 504 (5th Cir. 2008).
             55
                  United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
             56
                United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Neder v.
      United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)).
             57
             PREVIOUS              ACTS      OF    SEXUAL      ABUSE      AND      CHILD
      PORNOGRAPHY
             You have heard evidence that the defendant may have committed other
             offenses of sexual abuse and downloading of child pornography and child
             sexual abuse material. The defendant was not convicted of any of these
             offenses. The defendant is not charged with any of these offenses. You may
             consider the evidence of any of these offenses only if you unanimously find
             that the offense or offenses you are considering is more likely true than not
             true of having occurred.
             You decide that by considering all of the evidence of the given offense and
             deciding whether it is more likely than not to have occurred. This is a lower
             standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.
             You must disregard the offense or offenses you find to have not been
             proved as stated in the previous paragraph. The offense or offenses that
             you find to have been proved as previously stated, can be considered by
             you in deciding any matter for which you find them relevant.

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                                               No. 22-50697

      sufficient and do not indicate clear, reversible error. The court modeled the
      language from the Eighth Circuit’s pattern instructions but modified them in
      three major ways: (1) removing the word “believable” from the fourth line;
      (2) repeating the preponderance standard to avoid reducing the standard of
      proof for prior act evidence; and (3) removing language suggesting specific
      ways that the jury could use the evidence to avoid “nudg[ing]” the jury.58 As

             _____________________
             58
                  The Eighth Circuit’s pattern instructions stated:
             2.08A DEFENDANT’S PRIOR SIMILAR ACTS IN SEXUAL
             ASSAULT AND CHILD MOLESTATION CASES (FED. R. EVID. 413
             AND 414)
             You [are about to hear] [have heard] evidence that the defendant may have
             previously committed [another] [other] offense[s] of [sexual assault] [child
             molestation]. The defendant is not charged with [this] [these] other
             offense[s]. You may consider this evidence only if you unanimously find it
             is more likely true than not true. You decide that by considering all of the
             evidence and deciding what evidence is more believable. This is a lower
             standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find that [this
             offense has] [these offenses have] not been proved, you must disregard [it]
             [them]. If you find that [this offense has] [these offenses have] been
             proved, you may consider [it] [them] to help you decide any matter to
             which [it is] [they are] relevant. You should give [it] [them] the weight and
             value you believe [it is] [they are] entitled to receive. You may consider the
             evidence of such other act[s] of [sexual assault] [child molestation] for its
             tendency, if any, to show the defendant’s propensity to engage in [sexual assault]
             [child molestation] [.] [, as well as its tendency, if any, to [determine whether the
             defendant committed the acts charged in the Indictment] [determine the
             defendant’s intent] [determine the identity of the person who committed the
             act[s] charged in the Indictment] [determine the defendant’s (motive) (plan)
             (design) (opportunity) to commit the act[s] charged in the Indictment]
             [determine the defendant’s knowledge] [rebut the contention of the defendant
             that [his] [her] participation in the offense[s] charged in the Indictment was the
             result of (accident) (mistake) (entrapment)] [rebut the issue of __________
             raised by the defense].] Remember, the defendant is on trial only for the crime[s]
             charged. You may not convict a person simply because you believe [he] [she] may
             have committed similar acts in the past.

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                                           No. 22-50697

      modified, the district court appropriately informed the jury that evidence
      admitted under FRE 413 and 414 may be used for any relevant purpose only
      if it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. As drafted, the
      instructions track the language of the Rules of Evidence and do not
      improperly suggest how the jury should use the evidence.59
              Contrary to Abundiz’s assertions, the instructions do not allow the
      jury to convict using a lower standard of proof, nor do they confuse the
      preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt standards. And although the
      instructions do not specifically instruct the jury on how to use the evidence,
      they need not do so because the Federal Rules of Evidence permit juries to
      use the evidence for any relevant purpose. In short, as the Government
      argues, “[t]he district court’s thoughtful consideration of how to craft this
      jury instruction in the absence of a pattern instruction was well-balanced and
      aimed to ensure that the jury followed the law regarding consideration of the
      Rule 413 and 414 evidence;” there was no abuse of discretion.
                                                V.
              The district court properly allowed K.Z. to testify via CCTV and did
      not err in admitting testimony of Abundiz’s previous sexual assault or in
      crafting jury instructions about using evidence admitted under FRE 413 and
      414. We AFFIRM.

              _____________________
      Manuel of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit
      §2.08A (2021) (emphasis added only on parts removed or changed when comparing this
      instruction to the district court’s instruction in this case.)
              59
                   Fed. R. Evid. 413; Fed. R. Evid. 414.

                                                25