Court Opinion

ID: 9733502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:09:25.091155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.074530
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the Opinion of the majority. As is the case with any appeal that comes before our court, the initial concern upon which we must focus our attention is whether our court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Because I find that the present appeal is interlocutory in nature, I am of the opinion that this court lacks *490jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and that the appeal should therefore be quashed.1
It is well settled that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute. Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa.Super. 332, 459 A.2d 1255 (1983). A final order is usually one which ends the litigation or, alternatively, disposes of the entire case. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978). In the case presently before us, the order appealed from neither ends the litigation nor disposes of the entire case. The order appealed from in this instance merely vacates a prior order which had directed Pittsburgh National Bank, as Garnishee, to pay over certain funds held in an account for the Estate of Nicholas Rade Stone, Deceased. The order did not resolve the controversy between the parties as to whether proceeds of the Estate could be used to satisfy Orie’s judgment against Stone, Jr. Rather, the October 19, 1990 order merely vacated a prior order which had directed the Garnishee, PNB, to pay over funds in an estate account to satisfy Orie’s judgment against the Executor, Stone, Jr. Furthermore, the October 19, 1990 order was followed by another order directing the estate funds to be deposited in a court supervised account pending final resolution of the matter. Clearly, by its own terms, the October 19, 1990 order was not a final, appeal-able order.
Since the order in question is not one which terminates the case and therefore is not a final, immediately appealable order, the order must therefore be interlocutory in nature. As a general rule, interlocutory orders are subject to appellate review only under certain limited circumstances. Pursuant to Rule 1311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal may be taken by permission from an interlocutory order of a trial court. Such a process requires the written permission of the appellate court in which *491review of the order is sought. No such permission was ever granted in this instance.
The second alternative by which an interlocutory order is subject to appellate review is provided under Rule 311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 311, certain interlocutory orders may be appealed as of right. A review of Rule 311 reveals that the present order does not fall within any of the categories of interlocutory appeals as of right set forth in the rule.2 The fact that the present appeal does not fall within the purview of Rule 311 is the feature distinguishing this case from a case relied upon by the majority, Luckenbaugh v. Shearer, 362 Pa.Super. 9, 523 A.2d 399 (1987).
Luckenbaugh and the present case are procedurally similar in that in both instances the trial courts entered orders which were followed by either motions or petitions of the party against whom the order was entered. In the present case it was a motion to vacate the order, and in Luckenbaugh it was a petition to strike the dismissal. In each instance the motion or petition was filed within 30 days of the preceding order. However, in each instance the trial court failed to rule on the respective motion or petition within the applicable 30-day period, and by operation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the orders became final. Again, in each case following the expiration of the 30-day period, but prior to any appellate action being com*492menced, the trial courts ruled upon the pending motions or petitions which had been filed within the 30-day period. It was from those rulings which the appeals were filed. The ruling in Luckenbaugh struck the dismissal and opened the judgment. The ruling in our case vacates a prior order directing garnishee to pay over funds in an estate account to satisfy a judgment against the executor of the estate. In both instances, the orders appealed from were interlocutory in nature. However, the fact that this court allowed the appeal in Luckenbaugh cannot be used as support for allowing the present appeal. The Luckenbaugh court expressly noted that the appeal was an interlocutory appeal as of right permissible under Rule 311(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Initially, it should be noted that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(a) establishes the right of the defendant to appeal from the order entered. Rule 311(a) provides that ‘an appeal may be taken as of right from: (1) [a]n order opening, vacating or striking off a judgThe trial court’s order, which purported to ‘open’ and ‘strike’ its judgment was appealable.
Luckenbaugh, 362 Pa.Superior Ct. at 12, 523 A.2d at 401 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
However, since Luckenbaugh was decided in 1987, Rule 311 has been amended. Presently, Rule 311(a)(1) only permits interlocutory appeals as of right from “order[s] refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment. Therefore, the order appealed from in Luckenbaugh could not be appealed from as an interlocutory appeal as of right under the present Rule 311. Any reliance on Luckenbaugh by the majority is therefore misplaced, as under the current state of Rule 311(a) the October 19, 1990 order in question was not appealable.3
*493Clearly, the present interlocutory order is not the type from which an appeal as of right is mandated. Therefore, because the order in question is not a final order, and because it is not the type of interlocutory order which may be appealed as of right, nor was permission granted to appeal this order, I find that this court is without jurisdiction to consider this matter.
The majority’s analysis of the September 11, 1990 order being a final and appealable order may well be correct. {See majority opinion, at p. 486-487.) But it is not the September 11, 1990 order which is being appealed to this court. No appeal was ever taken from that order. Rather, *494it is the October 19, 1990 order which is being appealed. Therefore, it is that order which must be examined to determine its finality for review purposes. As noted previously in this dissent, the October 19, 1990 order is not a final order, nor is it the type of interlocutory order which warrants an appeal as of right. Thus, I reiterate my conclusion that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the October 19, 1990 order of the trial court, and I would therefore quash the appeal.

. The issue of jurisdiction is properly raised by this court, sua sponte. See Suburban East Tires v. Duquesne Light Co., 302 Pa.Super. 284, 448 A.2d 638 (1982).

. In his Statement of Jurisdiction, appellant cites Rule 311(a)(2) as providing the basis upon which this court may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. That section allows for an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order “confirming, modifying or dissolving ... an attachment ..." The October 19, 1990 order is not such an order. The October 19, 1990 order arguably did dissolve appellant's attachment of the funds. However, as noted in the body of this text, that order was followed by a second order which provided that the garnishee was not to release the funds from the account of the Estate of Nicholas Rade Stone but rather was to pay the funds into a court-supervised account pending final resolution of the matter. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the order on appeal is not one which dissolved an attachment. The attachment still exists. It was the order compelling payment which was vacated pending final resolution of controversy. Thus, the October 19, 1990 order is not the type contemplated by Rule 311(a)(2).

. Furthermore, it is my belief that the majority’s reliance upon Luck-enbaugh may be inappropriate for another reason. The Luckenbaugh court relied, in part, upon Rule 1701 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure to support its conclusion that the trial court acted without authority when it entered an order on the petition to strike more than 30 days after order dismissing the case was entered.
*493A judgment entered in a contested proceeding which ends the litigation must either be appealed within thirty days or the trial court must expressly grant reconsideration within thirty days from the entry of the judgment. Pa.R.A.P. 1701, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
Here, the trial court’s action was well beyond the thirty-day time period in which it had to grant reconsideration.
Luckenbaugh, 362 Pa.Superior Ct. at 13, 523 A.2d at 401.
The thirty-day period in 1701 merely defines the appeal period from the entry of a final order. If no appeal is filed within the thirty-day period, 1701 has no application in limiting the power of the trial court to act on a party’s motion. In the present case, no appeal was taken from the September 11, 1990 order of the trial court. Thus, Rule 1701 has no application to the subsequent action by the trial court of entering an order on October 19, 1990, vacating the September 11, 1990 order.
The only applicable statutory section is 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505, which defines the period of time (also thirty days) in which the trial court may act to modify or rescind an order upon notice to the parties.
However, to the extent that the majority relies upon section 5505,1 offer the following comments. First, I believe an argument can be made that this section only precludes action by the trial court sua sponte and does not prohibit the trial court from acting on a party1 s motion. In the present case, appellant was aware of the challenge to the September 11, 1990 order, as evidenced by the Notice of Presentation and Certification of Service. Although it may have been a more prudent course for the trial court to have vacated the decree within thirty days, I cannot find conclusively that § 5505 wrests jurisdiction from the trial court to act on a party’s timely motion where no appeal has been filed and all parties are on notice as to the challenge. Section 5505 was enacted to provide finality to orders thirty days after entry. However, in this case or any case where a timely motion challenging the order is pending before the court, an order can hardly be characterized as final for § 5505 purposes until the petition is acted upon by the court.