Court Opinion

ID: 9493949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:24:19.538293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:07.622143
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although it probably did not affect the outcome, the admission of Reames’ testimony about Strawhorn’s threats raises serious questions. Tyrone Reames was permitted to testify that in August 1988, he witnessed a murder committed by two *1063Gangster Disciples from his neighborhood. Two years later, as the Gangster Disciples’ state court murder trial date approached, Reames said he was approached by Straw-horn and another Disciple, who grabbed him and took him to see “Coal Black,” who was identified as Robert Dordies, another Disciple. Strawhorn and Dordies, according to Reames, threatened that if Reames did not change his account of the murder to exculpate the Disciples charged with it, Strawhorn would “take care of’ him. Reames himself was not a member of the Gangster Disciples or any other street gang, and the alleged murder had nothing to do with the drug conspiracy charged in this case.
The government offered the Reames testimony to show, among other things, an example of enforcement of the law of silence and secrecy in the gang. The district court instead found that “in order to make the conspiracy go, they offered protection to certain people and one of the ways they did that was to intimidate people from testifying. So, it seems to me one of the main procedures that gangs have always — not gangs so much as organized crime activities — have always been conducted.”
There may be some marginal relevance to Reames’ testimony as showing gang practices in enforcing silence about gang crimes. As the district judge said, this was the way of organized crime. But the facts surrounding Reames’ testimony had nothing to do with the drug conspiracy with which the Disciples were charged.
It was uncontested at trial that Straw-horn was a longstanding member of the Disciples with the rank of governor.and that he knowingly assented to gang rules. The probative value of showing his threats to silence witnesses in matters having nothing to do with the distribution of drugs is slight while the prejudice attaching to hushing up a witness could hardly be greater. Indeed, we have noted that evidence of witness intimidation constitutes “a striking example of evidence that appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 664 (7th Cir.1996). The introduction of this testimony, therefore, exposed heinous conduct typical of organized crime but which had no plausible connection with the drug conspiracy. Although the outcome may not be affected, Reames’ testimony should not have been admitted.
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the court’s opinion. I write separately only to express my concern about the findings of a previous panel of this court regarding the government’s failure to have the Vienna surveillance tapes sealed immediately upon expiration of the surveillance warrant, as 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) required. See United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 915-18 (7th Cir.), remanded on other grounds, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 376, 148 L.Ed.2d 290 (2000). Jackson concluded that none of the documented reasons that the government gave to the district court for waiting 32 days to have the tapes sealed constituted the “satisfactory explanation” for the delay that section 2518(8)(a) demands. 207 F.3d at 915-18. Rather than ordering the tapes suppressed, however, the court embraced an explanation founded on facts that were not asserted in the affidavit submitted by the prosecutor in charge of the surveillance. Id. at 918. If indeed the “real reason” for the delay was the government’s expectation, based on the assurance of technicians, that a new and smaller microphone would become available within a day or two, an assurance that purportedly *1064was repeated until finally “it became clear that ‘a few days’ were going to stretch on indefinitely,” id., then I cannot fathom why that reason was not spelled out in the affidavit, which was the only evidence before the district court, and remains the only evidence before this court, as to the explanation for the delay in sealing the tapes. See id. at 916. Even more perplexing to me is this court’s decision to accept as a satisfactory explanation for the delay an asserted reason which, although it may be true and accurate, has no support in the record.
We routinely disregard arguments premised upon factual assertions that are not borne out by the record. E.g., United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir.1990) (“An appellant may not attempt to build a new record on appeal to support his position with evidence that was never admitted in the court below.”); Box v. A&P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1379 n. 5 (7th Cir.1985) (“arguments in briefs are not evidence”), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58 n. 16, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608 n. 16, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 159, 13 L.Ed. 927 (1851). We do not allow parties to stray beyond the bounds of the record for reasons so obvious and familiar that they scarcely require mention: if the evidence upon which a party bases its argument is not in the record, then the opposing party has not had the opportunity to respond appropriately, the district court has never had the opportunity to assess that evidence, and last, but by no means least, when push comes to shove, the “evidence” may never materialize — litigants often make representations that turn out to be inaccurate. I have no reason to think that the government has misrepresented the facts, but if indeed the “real reason” for the delay in sealing the tapes was the prosecutor’s expectation that a more discreet microphone would shortly become available, then some evidence of that expectation should have been produced long before the record closed and the Jackson case was on appeal. Instead, the unverified and untested factual assertions of a brief have become the foundation for the law of this circuit, binding panel after panel hearing the Gangster Disciple appeals and defendant after defendant — none of whom has ever seen any evidence bearing out the government’s asserted rationale for the delay in sealing the tapes.1
Our credibility as a judiciary depends in great measure upon the consistency and fairness with which we honor our own rules. At oral argument, Mr. Edwards’ counsel observed that if he were to make assertions outside of the record, we would not tolerate it for a moment. He is right. The government should be treated no differently. Obviously, suppression of the tapes — described in Jackson as “[s]ome of the government’s strongest evidence,” 207 F.3d at 913, and here as its “best evidence ..., evidence so crushing that the rest of the prosecution’s case scarcely mattered,” ante at 1055, might have dire ramifications for the government’s case. Yet, the stakes were no doubt apparent to the government when the affidavit was prepared. I do not *1065understand why the government should be relieved of the obligation to make a record in support of its arguments- — particularly its “real reason” for a crucial delay in complying with a statutory requirement — • when we would not relieve any other litigant of that obligation. Simply because the ramifications are odious does not justify a departure from the basic tenets of fairness, common sense, and the rule of law.
It is with the greatest reluctance that I criticize the holding of another panel of my colleagues. But the same issue that confronted the panel in Jackson is squarely presented here, and the briefing in this case makes it abundantly clear that the key facts on which Jackson relied have no support in the record — Jackson itself leaves little doubt in that regard. After much reflection, and with a heavy heart, I have concluded that I cannot remain silent with respect to this court’s unusual decision to accept the government’s unverified allegations as “a (barely) satisfactory explanation” for the government’s delay in complying with its statutory obligations. See 207 F.3d at 918.
I accept, as I must, the panel’s holding in Jackson-, it is the law of this circuit vis á vis the admissibility of the Vienna tapes. See United States v. Wilson, 237 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir.2001); ante at 1055-1056. I do so, however, with great reservation as to the prudence of this court’s decision to accept as fact crucial assertions made only in a brief, and with the hope that in the future, the government will make an appropriate record as to its “real reason” for any failure to comply with the requirements of Title III.

. Jackson notes that the district judge himself relied on the government's explanation as a reason for admitting the belatedly sealed tapes into evidence. 207 F.3d at 918; see United States v. Paries, No. 95 CR 510, 1997 WL 136761, at *20 (N.D.Ill. March 24, 1997). To the extent that is true, it hardly justifies this court's resort to asserted facts that are without support in the record; our review of the sufficiency of the government’s explanation must focus on the evidence submitted to the district court. See United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 267, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 1851, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) (majority); id. at 267-68, 110 S.Ct. at 1852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).