Court Opinion

ID: 9742929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:22:50.527631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:37.916424
License: Public Domain

*787Irwin, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s decision in this case, and I write separately to further address the majority’s application of both the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301 (Cum. Supp. 2004) and the holdings in City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006), and Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004), to the facts of the instant case. I would conclude that application of the plain language of § 25-1301 demonstrates that there is no jurisdictional defect in the instant case. Similarly, I would conclude that application of the holdings in Ashland Salvage and Hosack dictate a conclusion that there is no jurisdictional defect.
1. § 25-1301
It is fundamental that in construing a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. State v. Wester, 269 Neb. 295, 691 N.W.2d 536 (2005). The majority quotes the relevant language of § 25-1301 but does not apply the statute’s plain language. Section 25-1301(1) plainly indicates that only “the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action” can be considered a “judgment.” Sections 25-1301(2) and (3) then provide how a “judgment” must be rendered and entered to be appealable. The majority focuses its attention on rendition and entry, but disregards the essential notion of § 25-1301(1) that there first be a final determination of the rights of the parties before there is a judgment to be either rendered or entered.
As the majority also quotes above, the May 3, 2004, document filed by the court specifically indicated that counsel was “to prepare a Decree in conformance with the Court’s findings and submit the same to opposing Counsel for approval, then to the Court for signature.” (Emphasis supplied.) This language demonstrates that the May 3 document was not a final determination of the rights of the parties just as much as if the court had specifically stated the following: These findings are not the final determination of the rights of the parties and the final determination will be made only after counsel prepares a decree in *788conformance with the findings, submits the same to opposing counsel for approval, and then to the court for rendition and entry. See Hosack v. Hosack, supra (journal entry directing party to prepare later decree and advise court if matters left unresolved was not final determination of rights). This is clear from the actions of everyone involved in this case. More than 3 weeks after the May 3 document was filed, counsel actually did present the trial court with a decree in conformance with the May 3 document’s findings. Mary filed a motion for new trial from this later decree. On appeal to this court, neither party has asserted that the May 3 document was a “final determination” of anything.
Without a final determination of the rights of the parties, the May 3, 2004, document cannot be considered a “judgment” under the plain language of § 25-1301. The majority does not explain how the May 3 order — which the record demonstrates nobody intended, understood, or contemplated to be a final determination of rights — can be taken to be a final determination of the rights of the parties. The only way to reach such a result is to disregard the explicit language in the May 3 document which clearly indicates to the contrary. As a result, I would not sua sponte find a jurisdictional defect in this case, but I would find that the May 3 document was not a judgment within the meaning of § 25-1301(1) and that the appeal was timely.
2. City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage and Hosack v. Hosack
Similarly, application of the holdings in City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006), and Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004), demonstrates that there is no jurisdictional defect in the present case. As the majority correctly notes, Ashland Salvage and Hosack involved similar factual situations to the facts presented in the instant case. Application of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Ashland Salvage and Hosack should result in a similar resolution in the instant case.
In Hosack, the district court signed and filed a document which indicated that the court had “ ‘considered all matters properly before it’ ” and set forth the court’s findings on all matters presented. 267 Neb. at 935, 678 N.W.2d at 750. One provision in the document was that counsel should “ ‘advise the court. . . *789if the court failed to rule on any material issue presented.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 936, 678 N.W.2d at 750. Finally, the document specified that counsel was to “ ‘prepare the decree and provide it to [opposing counsel] for review [and then present it] to the Court for signature.’ ” Id. Counsel prepared a decree in conformance with the document, the court signed and filed the decree, and an appeal was taken.
This court ruled that the first document filed by the district court was intended to be a final determination and that the appeal was untimely. This court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On further review, the Supreme Court reversed that decision. The Supreme Court first focused on the plain language of § 25-1301(1) and focused on “which action by the district court finally determined the rights of the parties: the [first document] filed [by the district court] or the decree [prepared by counsel and then signed and] filed [by the court].” Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. at 938-39, 678 N.W.2d at 752. The Supreme Court determined that the first document did not finally determine the rights of the parties because it directed the parties to advise the court if any material issues were not resolved and because it “contemplated that the decree was to be prepared” by counsel for opposing counsel’s review and for later court signature and filing. Id. at 939, 678 N.W.2d at 752. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the first document “was not the final determination of the rights of the parties in [the] action.” Id. at 939-40, 678 N.W.2d at 752. As such, the appeal from the actual decree, prepared in accordance with the directions of the first document filed by the court, was timely.
The similarities of the facts in Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004), to the facts of the instant case are striking. In both cases, the district court filed a first document setting forth the court’s findings on the material issues. In both cases, those findings did resolve all material issues; in Hosack, the court directed the parties to file a written motion if any material issues were not resolved, but there is no indication that any such unresolved issues existed. In both cases, the first document directed counsel to prepare a decree for review by opposing counsel and for rendition and entry by the court. In both cases, this direction was followed.
*790Finally, although the Supreme Court did specifically caution against a trial court’s filing both the journal entry and the subsequent decree in these cases, the Supreme Court in no way suggested that if the trial court does file both documents, then the first one is somehow transformed into something it is not — a final determination of the rights of the parties. The decision in Hosack was released 4 days after the first document in the instant case was filed by the district court. The fact that the district court in the instant case failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s caution does not change the fact that the first document filed by the court was not a final determination and was not a judgment that could be rendered and entered.
In City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006), the district court file stamped a journal entry which ruled in favor of the City of Ashland, declared the boundaries of Ashland Salvage’s property, and found the existence of public rights-of-way. The journal entry also directed the city to prepare an “ ‘injunction.’ ” Id. at 365, 711 N.W.2d at 866. A later “ ‘Order of Permanent Injunction’ ” was filed by the court. Id. at 366, 711 N.W.2d at 866. Nonetheless, the city filed a timely appeal from the journal entry, prior to the entry of the later order.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the appeal was timely, because “the district court’s file-stamped journal entry . . . disposed of all claims and constituted a judgment for purposes of § 25-1301.” City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. at 368, 711 N.W.2d at 868. In so holding, the Supreme Court distinguished the journal entry in Ashland Salvage from the journal entry in Hosack, specifically indicating that the journal entry in Hosack “left certain matters unresolved.” City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. at 368, 711 N.W.2d at 868.
A review of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hosack, as discussed above, does not indicate that any substantive matter was actually unresolved by the district court’s journal entry, except that the journal entry directed preparation of a decree for ap - proval by the opposing party and allowed for the preparing party to alert the court to any unresolved issues. By comparison, the journal entry in Ashland Salvage which the Supreme Court held “disposed of all claims and constituted a judgment” directed *791preparation of a decree, but the journal entry did not provide for approval by the opposing party and did not allow for the preparing party to alert the court to any unresolved issues. As such, the journal entry in Ashland Salvage constituted a judgment under § 25-1301, because the journal entry did not provide for any disagreement by the parties about the court’s resolution and did not provide for the parties to alert the court to any unresolved issues. In this regard, the journal entry in the present case is distinguishable from the journal entry in Ashland Salvage. Here, the journal entry, which is substantially identical to the journal entry in Hosack, did require approval by the opposing party and did allow for the preparing party to alert the court to any unresolved issues.
3. Resolution
Because the district court’s journal entry in the present case is not significantly distinguishable from the district court’s journal entry in Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004), I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would conclude that the journal entry in this case was not a judgment, and I would not sua sponte find a lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006), further suggests that a journal entry like the one in the present case, which document calls for preparation of a decree to be approved by the opposing party, allows for the parties to alert the court to any unresolved issues and is not a judgment. Because I believe the only consistent application of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Hosack and Ashland Salvage would be to find that the journal entry in the present case was not a judgment, I would find no jurisdictional default and would resolve this case on its merits.