Court Opinion

ID: 9561638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:13:24.757528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.246031
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of defendant’s cross-assignment of error, because I agree that the frisk was lawful. I dissent, however, from the decision to reverse the order suppressing evidence of the contents of the container, because the majority applies the wrong test to determine the legality of the seizure of the container. The correct test requires suppression of that evidence, as the trial court held.
ORS 131.625 is the source of authority for a police officer to frisk for weapons a person whom the officer has stopped.1 See State v. Lumpkin, 133 Or App 265, 269-70, 891 *247P2d 660, rev den 321 Or 138 (1995). Subsection (2) provides that
“[i]f, in the course of [a] frisk, the peace officer feels an object which the peace officer reasonably suspects is a dangerous or deadly weapon, the peace officer may take such action as is reasonably necessary to take possession of the weapon.”
In Lumpkin, we construed that provision to allow an officer to seize an object that is not itself a weapon,
“if the officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts,’ that the object [felt during a frisk] contains a dangerous or deadly weapon.”
Id. at 269-70. Thus, the test contains both an objective and subjective component. The officer must subjectively believe that the object seized contains a weapon, and that belief must be objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances, thus the term reasonable suspicion.2
The majority, at one point, correctly states the test as set out in Lumpkin. The majority states that, in order for the seizure of a container detected during a pat down to be lawful, the court must find “(1) that the container had to have the physical capacity to conceal a weapon, and (2) that under the totality of the circumstances, there was a reasonable suspicion that it did contain a weapon.”
Unfortunately, however, the majority then restates the subjective component of the test to be whether the officer reasonably suspects that the object “he or she feels during a pat down ‘might’ contain a weapon.” 142 Or App at 243. In so *248concluding, the majority seizes on the following language from Lumpkin:
“[T]he officer here gave very clear reasons as to why he was concerned that the object that he felt might have contained aweapon[.]”
133 Or App at 270. That particular language, however, refers to the reasonableness of the officer’s previously stated belief that the object he seized from the defendant contained a weapon. That is confirmed by the fact that the quoted language in Lumpkin is followed by the statement that “[Officer] Ludwig’s belief was reasonable under the circumstances[.]” In concluding that the test for what the officer must believe is whether the object might contain a weapon, the majority demonstrates a basic confusion between the objective and subjective components of the test. Because the majority distorts the test, it reaches the wrong result in this case.
The state argued that an officer conducting a pat down for officer safety can seize any container that could contain a small weapon, such as a razor blade or a needle. The law requires, however, that the officer actually suspect that the particular container does contain such a weapon, not just that it could contain one. By collapsing the test to consider only whether the object was capable of containing a weapon, we would totally discount the subjective component of the test, which is that the officer must believe that it does.3 We have consistently refused to make that change in the test.
In State v. Kurtz, 46 Or App 617, 621, 612 P2d 749, rev den 289 Or 588 (1980), we rejected the proposition that “an officer may remove anything that might conceal any sort of a weapon,” noting that such an argument is contrary to the plain language of the statute. (Emphasis added.) In Kurtz, the officer felt a large, lumpy object in the defendant’s pocket. *249The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he could not determine whether the object concealed a weapon, so he seized it to check. Id. at 620. We held that, because the officer did not believe that the object he felt was a weapon, he could not seize the object. Id. at 620-21.
The majority claims that my reliance on Kurtz is misplaced because the officer in Kurtz held only a belief that the object that he seized was capable of containing a weapon, not that it did contain one. But that is precisely the same set of facts that we have in this case. The officer testified that, based on his general training and experience, an object such as the one seized from defendant could contain a weapon, so he seized it to check. He never once stated a subjective belief that it did contain a weapon. For that reason, this case is indistinguishable from Kurtz 4
The danger of adopting the alternative test stated by the majority, a test that we have consistently rejected, is aptly demonstrated by the officer’s testimony in this case. During the suppression hearing, the court engaged the officer in the following colloquy:
“THE COURT: Can you think of any object you can find in anybody’s pocket that can’t at least contain either a needle or a razor blade?
“THE WITNESS: That can not?
“THE COURT: Yeah.
“THE WITNESS: [N]ot off the top of my head, no.
“THE COURT: So officer safety will justify removing any object found in the pat down?
“THE WITNESS: I wouldn’t necessarily say any object, no.
*250“THE COURT: Give me an example of one that doesn’t contain a — I just — I mean I take seriously the officer [safety issue] ....
“THE WITNESS: I would venture to say that an object that was smaller than the length of a needle or smaller than the size of a razor blade.
“THE COURT: Okay. So a matchbook could contain a razor blade.
“THE WITNESS: Yes, it could.
“THE COURT: And I mean not the folding — hard wooden matchbook, folding matchbook — if you found a matchbook in somebody’s pocket in the same place under those conditions, would you take out the matchbook too?
“THE WITNESS: Certainly.
“THE COURT: So once there’s a pat down, anything the size of a razor blade or larger, unless it’s flexible like paper and you can tell there’s nothing in it, will come out of the pocket because it might contain a razor blade or a needle?
“THE WITNESS: It could very well, yes.”
As the officer admitted during the suppression hearing, he could not think of any object that could not contain a weapon such as a needle or a razor blade. Clearly, the law does not permit an officer to search every object found on a person during a pat-down search.
In this case, the officer did not testify that he believed that the object contained a weapon; he stated only that the object could contain a weapon. This court has consistently held that a generalized belief, based on experience, that an object could be a weapon or could contain a weapon is insufficient to warrant seizure of the object. Rather, the officer must believe, based on particularized, articulated facts, that the object was a weapon or did contain a weapon. See, e.g., State v. Hoskinson, 320 Or 83, 88, 879 P2d 180 (1994) (although wallet could contain a weapon, search of the defendant’s wallet not justified where officer could state no specific reason to believe that the wallet did contain a weapon or means of escape); State v. Boyd, 101 Or App 649, 652-53, 792 *251P2d 462 (1990) (seizure of small metal box not justified where officer did not believe box contained a weapon).
In summary, the officer seized the container in order to exclude the possibility that it contained a weapon, not because the officer believed that it did. Neither ORS 131.625(2) nor the officer safety doctrine permits the officer to seize the container on that basis, as the trial court correctly held.5 Consequently, under existing law, I believe that we are obliged to affirm the trial court’s suppression order.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the suppression order.

 The majority points out that the state disavowed any reliance on ORS 131.625 and argued, instead, that the frisk was justified by the officer safety doctrine. The majority concludes, however, that the same analysis used to determine whether a frisk conducted pursuant to ORS 131.625 is lawful should apply when an *247officer frisks a person under the officer safety doctrine. 142 Or App at 244. I agree with that conclusion. In enacting ORS 131.625, the legislature established a policy about the permissible scope of a search of a person whom a police officer reasonably suspects is armed with a weapon. That policy controls our analysis in this case, because we are not free to establish a different policy about the permissible scope of those searches from that chosen by the legislature. Thus, the analysis in Lump-kin is applicable to this case even if the authority for the frisk did not come from ORS 131.625.

 This understanding of the term “reasonable suspicion” is reinforced by the statutory definition found in ORS 131.605(4):
“ ‘Reasonably suspects’ means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts * *

 This test is not unlike other tests concerning the lawfulness of an officer’s actions. For example, to prolong a traffic stop to inquire about conduct that was not the basis for the stop, an officer must reasonably suspect that other criminal activity has occurred. The officer must actually suspect such activity to have occurred, and that suspicion must be objectively reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 139 Or App 175, 180-82, 912 P2d 379 (1996). It is not enough for the officer to believe that other criminal activity might have occurred, because that would always be possible and, as a consequence, the officer’s authority to conduct such an inquiry would be unlimited.

 The majority also contends that if the test requires an officer to believe that an object seized during a pat down contains a weapon, such a test would “require clairvoyance and could not accommodate a reasonable belief that turned out to be wrong.” 142 Or App at 245. That is not the case. The test requires only that an officer reasonably believe that the seized object contains a weapon, not that the officer be certain that it does. The seizure is valid even if it turns out that the object does not contain a weapon, as long as the officer reasonably believed that it did.

 Because the court granted the motion to suppress, we must assume that the trial court decided factual issues in a manner consistent with the ultimate conclusion that it reached. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968). Consequently, we are bound by the court’s implicit finding that the officer did not subjectively believe that the container contained a weapon if there is evidence to support that finding. There is such evidence in this case.