Court Opinion

ID: 9950577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:15.64353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:30.344714
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
                                                          TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2023-SC-0251-MR

JUSTIN ALDAVA                                                         APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                        NO. 2023-CA-0088
               JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 21-CI-500526

HONORABLE ANGELA JOHNSON, JUDGE,                                        APPELLEE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

AND

ALYSSA BAUM                                            REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

         OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER

                                   AFFIRMING

      The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(“UCCJEA”) was drafted to increase the efficiency of courts faced with thorny

issues of jurisdiction in interstate child custody matters. Central to the

UCCJEA’s scheme is differing bases for jurisdiction and the prioritizing of the

child’s “home state” jurisdiction, defined as “the state in which a child lived

with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive

months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding”,
with an exception for temporary absences. KRS 1 403.800(7). The statutory

language of the UCCJEA does not provide a definition for “temporary absence”

and the courts of this state, as well as our sister states, have been left to

develop their own standards for judging when an absence is temporary. Today

we resolve the question within Kentucky jurisprudence of what standard to

apply by adopting an objective standard for assessing when an absence is

temporary, with the central inquiry focused on simply where the child was

living in the six months preceding the child custody proceeding and abjuring a

subjective assessment of the intent of the parties.

                                  BACKGROUND

      This matter centers around custody of soon-to-be five-year-old H.A. H.A.

was born in Texas on June 18, 2019, to Justin Aldava and Alyssa Baum. On

December 10, 2019, Baum and H.A. left Texas to stay with Baum’s family in

Kentucky. Baum testified that she intended to stay in Kentucky, while Aldava

contends it was meant as a temporary visit. In any case, Baum returned to

Texas with H.A. on or around March 28, 2020.

      The family remained in Texas until May 29, 2020, when they relocated to

Yelm, Washington for Aldava’s work. Aldava is a wind turbine blade technician

and his job frequently requires him to relocate for indefinite periods of time.

Such was the case for the move to Yelm. While there, the family signed a lease

      1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                         2
on a residence, 2 received mail, 3 and lacked a firm idea of when the family

would be leaving Washington following completion of the job.

      Baum, Aldava, and H.A. returned to Texas from Washington on October

3, 2020. Around November 22, 2020, Aldava again left Texas for work, this

time without Baum and H.A. Shortly after Aldava left, Baum and H.A.

decamped Texas for Kentucky and have remained here since that time.

      On November 30, 2020, Baum filed a petition for an order of protection

on behalf of herself and H.A. 4 In the petition, Baum indicated that she sought

temporary custody of H.A. The court granted the order that same day. The

order was amended on December 10, 2020 to grant temporary custody to

Baum and to fix several minor errors. Aldava was not served with the order

until April 7, 2021, however he testified that he was aware of the EPO through

his attorney in Texas.

      On December 14, 2020, Aldava filed a custody petition in Texas.

Aldava’s petition indicated that “[n]o court has continuing jurisdiction of this

suit or of the child the subject of this suit” and at no point does the petition

refer to the EPO in Kentucky or request the Texas court analyze jurisdiction

under the UCCJEA. Baum did not appear before the Texas court. The Texas

      2 Parties dispute whether this was a month-to-month lease on an apartment or

a week-to-week rental of an Airbnb.
      3 Parties dispute the amount of mail received at the residence, though at

minimum Amazon packages were delivered there.
      4 Although the limited record before us indicates the petition filed was an

interpersonal protective order, the parties have consistently referred to the order as an
emergency protective order (“EPO”). Like the Court of Appeals, we will refer to the
order as an EPO as the distinction between the two is immaterial to this writ.

                                            3
court entered a temporary custody order on January 26, 2021, finding “that

the pleadings of the Petitioner are in due form and contain all the allegations,

information, and prerequisites required by law The Court, after receiving

evidence, finds that it has Jurisdiction of this case and of all parties.” The

order also briefly indicated Texas was H.A.’s home state. The order contained

no discussion of the UCCJEA.

      Baum initiated her own custody action in Kentucky on March 2, 2021.

On May 3 of that year, Baum requested the Jefferson Circuit Court conduct a

UCCJEA conference with the Texas court. For reasons unknown, that

conference did not occur until more than a year later and little record was

made of its contents. The circuit court’s November 23, 2022 order finding

Kentucky jurisdiction, discussed below, states, “The [Circuit] Court also

engaged in a telephone conference with the Court in Texas. Neither Court felt

comfortable asserting superior jurisdiction and agreed that further proceedings

were necessary.” Records from the Texas court confirm the conversation and

indicate, “Judge Johnson will email decision on KY keeping jurisdiction.”

      On September 23, 2022 parties appeared before the circuit court to

discuss jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. On November 23, the circuit court

issued the abovementioned order finding primarily that (1) Texas was not the

home state of H.A. by virtue of the family’s time in Washington and (2) because

of the EPO, Kentucky has emergency jurisdiction of H.A. against which Texas

has no basis to interfere. Thus, the circuit court determined that Kentucky

                                         4
was the only state with any jurisdiction over H.A. and the custody action

should be heard here.

        Aldava then filed a direct appeal, Case No. 2023-CA-0001, 5 as well as

this original action seeking a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeals denied

the writ, finding the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the initial custody

determination pursuant to KRS 403.828. As to Kentucky’s retention of

jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals found that Texas “presumably assumed

jurisdiction under th[e] mistaken belief” that no other court had exercised

jurisdiction over H.A. and issued a standard statement that it had jurisdiction.

Further, the Court of Appeals found the circuit court’s finding that the family’s

stay in Washington disrupted H.A.’s residency in Texas was supported by

sufficient evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

        After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, and after Aldava

appealed as a matter of right 6 to this Court, Aldava returned to the Texas court

and requested a hearing on UCCJEA jurisdiction in the Texas custody case.

Baum was not present for the hearing. Following the hearing, the Texas court

entered an order on July 24, 2023, finding that the move to Washington was

temporary and did not disrupt H.A.’s Texas residency and accordingly “Texas

had proper, initial home state, ongoing jurisdiction to hear the entirety of the

custody matter beginning immediately upon the commencement of the case on

        5 The direct appeal was dismissed as interlocutory by order entered March 1,

2023.
        6 Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 60(I).

                                            5
December 14, 2020.” The transcript of the hearing and the Texas court’s order

were entered into the record of this appeal by our grant of Aldava’s Motion to

Supplement the Record.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

      As we have often said, “[t]he issuance of a writ is an extraordinary

remedy that is disfavored by our jurisprudence. We are, therefore, ‘cautious

and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in granting such relief.’”

State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 670 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Ky.

2023) (quoting Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 144–45 (Ky. 2015)).

Writs fall into two classes:

      The first class requires a showing that “the lower court is
      proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and
      there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate
      court.” The second class requires a showing that “the lower court
      is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its
      jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
      otherwise.”

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004)).

Because Aldava alleges the circuit court is proceeding outside of its

jurisdiction, he “need not establish the lack of an adequate alternative remedy

or the suffering of great injustice and irreparable injury.” Goldstein v. Feeley,

299 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Ky. 2009). “When the lower court is alleged to be acting

outside its jurisdiction, as alleged in the present case, the proper standard is

de novo review because jurisdiction is generally only a question of law.” Karem

v. Bryant, 370 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Ky. 2012). To the extent factual findings are

implicated, “the standard on appellate review requires a great deal of deference

                                         6
both to its findings of fact and discretionary decisions.” Frances v. Frances,

266 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Ky. 2008). This principle is especially true where, as

here, we have only a very limited record before us.

                                      ANALYSIS

 I.   The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

      The UCCJEA was enacted with the intent to “discourage jurisdictional

controversies between the states,” and “promote uniformity in state

jurisdictional laws.” MARIE FAHNERT & MÉLYSE MPIRANYA, CHILD CUSTODY

JURISDICTION: THE UCCJEA & PKPA xv (ABA Book Publishing 2015). Kentucky

has embraced the UCCJEA through its enactment of KRS 403.800 to 403.880.

Texas too has codified the UCCJEA as Texas Family Code Chapter 152. The

two enactments are largely identical.

      Under the UCCJEA, there are three general ways a court may exercise

jurisdiction of a case involving a minor child: initial jurisdiction, jurisdiction to

modify, or emergency jurisdiction. 7 Initial jurisdiction is found if the state

      is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of
      the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six (6)
      months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child
      is absent from this state but a parent . . . continues to live in this
      state[.]

      7 Other courts have rightly identified four bases for jurisdiction, see Rosen v.

Celebrezze, 883 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ohio 2008), however, the three paths to jurisdiction
identified by the Jefferson Circuit Court are more prescient to the current matter and
as a result we follow that roadmap here.

                                           7
KRS 403.822(1)(a); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(1). 8 “‘Home state’ means

the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for

at least six (6) consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a

child custody proceeding.” KRS 403.800(7); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.102(7)

(emphasis added). A temporary absence is part of that period, or, put another

way, the temporary removal of the family from the state would not reset the

clock in determining home state status. Id.

      A state with home state jurisdiction has exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction until,

      (a) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the
      child and one (1) parent, nor the child and a person acting as a
      parent have a significant connection with this state and that
      substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning
      the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or

      (b) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that
      the child, the child's parents, and any other person acting as a
      parent do not presently reside in this state.

KRS 403.824; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202.

      Jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination is granted if,

      a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial
      determination under KRS 403.822(1)(a) or (b) and:

             (1) The court of the other state determines that it no longer
             has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under KRS 403.824 or
             that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum
             under KRS 403.834; or

      8 We cite the Texas Family Code provision where the two are substantively

identical. References to the Kentucky statutes in the KRS version, are, of course,
replaced by references to Texas statutes in the Texas version.

                                           8
            (2) A court of this state or a court of the other state
            determines that the child, the child's parents, and any
            person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other
            state.

KRS 403.826; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.203. A court may also decline

jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum after consideration of a number of

factors. KRS 403.834; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207.

      Finally, a state may exercise emergency jurisdiction “if the child is

present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the

child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or

threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” KRS 403.828(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 152.204(a). This emergency jurisdiction can potentially be lost if the following

occurs:

      If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled
      to be enforced under KRS 403.800 to 403.880 and a child custody
      proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having
      jurisdiction under KRS 403.822, 403.824, and 403.826, a child
      custody determination made under this section remains in effect
      until an order is obtained from a court of a state having
      jurisdiction under KRS 403.822, 403.824, and 403.826.

KRS 403.828(2); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.204(b). However,

      If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in
      a court of a state having jurisdiction under KRS 403.822, 403.824,
      and 403.826, a child custody determination made under this
      section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this
      state becomes the home state of the child.

Id.

      Having set forth the statutory bases for jurisdiction under the UCCJEA,

we now turn to which state has jurisdiction over this particular custody matter.

                                         9
II.   Neither Kentucky nor Texas had initial jurisdiction over H.A.

      The first question we must answer is which state, if any, possesses initial

jurisdiction over the custody of H.A. The UCCJEA grants initial jurisdiction to

the home state of the child. As we have noted, a child’s home state is where he

has lived with a parent for six months prior to the commencement of a custody

proceeding, notwithstanding any temporary absences. In the case of H.A.,

because no dispute exists that Kentucky was not the child’s home state when

the EPO was first granted, we need only address whether Texas properly had

initial jurisdiction. Resolution of whether Texas is H.A.’s home state turns on

whether the family’s move to Washington should be considered temporary or

permanent and who gets to make that determination.

      As to the first part of this inquiry, we are confronted with two competing

assessments of H.A.’s home state. The Jefferson Circuit Court found that the

time in Washington was permanent, pointing to the fact that “Aldava testified

that he signed a lease in Washington, received mail in Washington, and had an

indefinite end time for his stay.” Thus, the time spent in Washington ended

any six-month period of residency in Texas.

      The Texas court found the opposite. That court observed that (contrary

to the findings of the circuit court) mail was still sent to the family’s Texas

address, the family lived in hotels and an Airbnb, Aldava’s next job site was

Texas, and the family returned to Texas after the job ended. Accordingly, the

Texas court determined the move to Washington was temporary and H.A. had

                                         10
spent the requisite six months in Texas needed to establish that state as his

home state.

      Insofar as we are tasked with evaluating the circuit court’s factual

findings, those finding were supported by substantial evidence and not clearly

erroneous. What constitutes a “temporary absence” under UCCJEA has been a

question that has bedeviled courts since the creation of the model code. The

lack of a definition of “temporary absence” in the UCCJEA has led to the

development of different methods of assessment in the various states, although

broadly courts either apply an objective or subjective standard. Peter W.

Buchbauer & Lawrence P. Vance, “Temporary Absence”: A Continuing Obstacle

to Clarity in Child Custody Jurisdiction, 60 VA. LAWYER 44, 45 (Feb. 2012).

“Courts applying the objective standard tend to focus on a bright line of where

the child lived for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the suit.”

Id. Alternately, “courts applying a subjective standard look to such factors as

the parties’ intent, the length of absence, and the child’s prior contact with the

forum.” Id.

      Kentucky has never explicitly adopted a method of determining when an

absence is temporary, but our consideration of the issue convinces us the

objective test is more in keeping with the UCCJEA’s meaning and purpose.

The UCCJEA was intended to simplify and expedite the resolution of interstate

custody battles by creating uniform rules for determining jurisdiction. In part,

the UCCJEA achieves this goal by granting priority to the home-state

jurisdiction (a change from the act’s predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody

                                        11
Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”)) which can be determined by applying a simple test:

finding where has the child lived in the six months prior to the custody action.

If in the previous six months the child has lived in a single state then that state

is clearly the child’s home state. If the child did not reside in a single state in

the preceding six months then the child lacks a home state and some other

basis for jurisdiction must be found. This bright-line test eliminates the

unpredictability of a subjective approach—amply demonstrated in the case of

H.A.—and facilitates the objectives of the UCCJEA.

      The language of the UCCJEA, as adopted by our General Assembly, lends

further support for the objective approach. KRS 403.800(7) uses the word

“lived” in defining how to determine a child’s home state rather than “resided”

or “domiciled.” Where an individual is “living” is distinct from his residence

and domicile. Whereas where one resides or is domiciled is based upon

consideration of a variety of factors, making it “difficult, at times, to determine

just where one's legal residence is”, Boyd’s Ex’r v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky.

764, 767, 149 S.W. 1022, 1023 (1912), to “live” somewhere is simply “to

maintain oneself” or “to occupy.” Live, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate

Dictionary (1983). The use of the word “lived” suggests our Legislature wanted

to make the process of determining a child’s home state as straight-forward as

possible by eliminating the consideration of subjective factors in favor of a more

mechanical approach. We are not alone in coming to this conclusion. See,

e.g., Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005); Escobar v. Reisinger, 64

                                         12
P.3d 514, 517 (N.M. 2003); In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d 827, 843 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1994).

        As our sister states have observed, this does not make jurisdiction

determinations unresponsive to the specific circumstances of the case. A brief

stay in a hotel while on vacation in another state would still be considered a

temporary absence, since no reasonable argument could be advanced that a

family on vacation lives in their hotel. Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court

noted

        Two other sections of the UCCJEA provide the flexibility needed to
        avert potential injustice once the trial court has determined the
        child's home state. The first, section 152.208, states that if a court
        acquires jurisdiction “because a person seeking to invoke its
        jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct,” then with
        certain exceptions “the court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction.”
        TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.208. Thus, for example, were a state to
        acquire home-state jurisdiction through a parent's illegal or
        improper actions, the court could decline to exercise jurisdiction.
        The second, section 152.207, is the inconvenient-forum provision;
        it allows the home-state court to defer jurisdiction if the court is an
        inconvenient forum under the circumstances and a court in
        another state would provide a more appropriate forum. Id. §
        152.207.

Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 327. The reasoning is equally true in light of Kentucky’s

adoption of substantively identical provisions in KRS 403.834 and 403.836.

        In sum, we hold that for determining where a child lived for purposes of

establishing home-state jurisdiction, the physical location of the child must be

the central consideration. See Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 328. To the extent our

jurisprudence has adopted an incompatible standard, we now expressly

overrule the conflicting portions of those opinions. See Anderson v. Anderson,

                                          13
No. 2016-CA-001502-ME, 2017 WL 1379778, at *4-5 (Ky. App. Apr. 14, 2017)

(observing that Kentucky courts have not fully defined “temporary absence”

and proceeding to adopt a subjective test); Dellapenta v. Goldy, 575 S.W.3d

697, 699-700 (Ky. App. 2018) (following the factors set forth in Anderson).

      Having now determined the standard to be applied in determining H.A.’s

home state, we have no doubt that the circuit court’s conclusion was correct.

At H.A.’s birth, his home state was Texas. Five months later, H.A. and his

mother were living in Kentucky, thereby divesting Texas of home-state status.

When the family travelled to Washington, they undeniably lived there for

several months, regardless of any intent to eventually return to Texas. Thus,

from the first time H.A. left Texas for Kentucky, H.A. never lived in any state

long enough to establish home-state status. 9 Thus, when Baum petitioned for

an EPO and sought custody of H.A., no state could assert initial, home-state

jurisdiction over the child. Although we now disclaim the circuit court’s

weighing of factors in determining H.A.’s home state, it nonetheless came to the

right answer.

      Having determined that neither Kentucky nor Texas possessed initial,

home-state jurisdiction over H.A. when custody was first raised, we turn to the

relatively uncomplicated issue of which state does have jurisdiction.

      9 After H.A. left Texas the first time he spent, in order of his moves, 3 months,

18 days in Kentucky; 2 months, 1 day in Texas; 4 months, 4 days in Washington;
approximately 1 month, 19 days in Texas; and to present, 3 years, 3 months in
Kentucky.

                                          14
III.   Kentucky has Jurisdiction over H.A. pursuant to KRS 403.828.

       In the absence of a state able to assert home-state jurisdiction over H.A.,

there remains only one possibility: Kentucky properly has temporary

emergency jurisdiction under KRS 403.828 by virtue of the EPO. KRS 403.828

provides for emergency jurisdiction in the event of an emergency to protect the

child or parent of the child. KRS 403.828(1). Although described as

temporary, jurisdiction under this section is not subject to a fixed period of

expiration, or even to a more subjective reasonable period of time standard.

Rather, jurisdiction obtained through KRS 403.828 continues until an order is

received from a court of a state having a basis for jurisdiction under another

provision of the UCCJEA. KRS 403.828(2). If no other state can assert another

basis for jurisdiction, “a child custody determination made under this section

becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the

home state of the child.” Id.

       In the case of H.A., no other state could assert jurisdiction under KRS

403.822, 403.824, or 403.826. Because jurisdiction does not exist elsewhere,

no child custody determination made outside of Kentucky is entitled to

deference by the circuit court. And because no other state has jurisdiction, the

determination of the Jefferson Circuit Court can be made final and Kentucky

can properly be considered the home state of H.A.

                                        15
      That the Texas court has now, belatedly, decided that Texas is H.A.’s

home state does nothing to divest Kentucky of jurisdiction. 10 We agree with

the Court of Appeals that the Texas court’s first finding of jurisdiction in the

January 26, 2021 order should not be read as finding initial jurisdiction under

the UCCJEA. When the Texas court made that initial determination it did so

without the benefit of awareness of the Kentucky EPO and, because of this,

fundamentally lacked sufficient information to determine under the UCCJEA

which state had jurisdiction. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the

notation in the Texas court’s record that it would await a jurisdiction

determination by Kentucky suggests the Texas court was, at that time,

prepared to concede the issue. In any event, by the time the Texas court made

a determination in reference to the UCCJEA, the Jefferson Circuit Court had

already found jurisdiction in Kentucky. KRS 403.832 directs the Kentucky

court to make the determination whether a child custody proceeding has been

commenced in another state. KRS 403.832(2). Necessary in making that

determination is adjudicating which states have jurisdiction under the

UCCJEA and which do not. Cf. Danaher v. Hopkins, 449 S.W.3d 765 (Ky. App.

2014) (finding that where Kentucky entered an order finding North Carolina

was not the home state of the child, Kentucky was not obligated to enforce a

custody order issued by North Carolina where there was no basis for the latter

      10 We question whether the Texas court’s conclusion follows the objective

standard set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Powell, but are, of course, without
power to address that question.

                                         16
to exercise jurisdiction). If a state does not have a basis for jurisdiction, and

the circuit court found Texas did not, there is no need for Kentucky to stay the

proceeding and communicate with the foreign court. Once Baum filed her first-

in-time EPO petition, the ball was in Kentucky’s court to make further findings

as to where jurisdiction lay.

      Additionally, pursuant to KRS 403.846(1) and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

152.303(a), once a custody determination was made pursuant to the UCCJEA,

the Texas court was obligated to “recognize and enforce [the] child custody

determination[.]” See also, KRS 403.866; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.313 (both

providing, “A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order

issued by another state and consistent with [this chapter] which enforces a

child custody determination by a court of another state . . . []”). Kentucky’s

determination was made approximately 8 months prior to the hearing and

order in Texas and the Texas court should have deferred to that ruling rather

than issue its own, conflicting order. This situation is precisely what the

UCCJEA was designed to prevent.

      This ruling does not mean H.A.’s case can never be transferred to Texas.

KRS 403.834 provides,

      A court of this state which has jurisdiction under KRS 403.800 to
      403.880 to make a child custody determination may decline to
      exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an
      inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of
      another state is a more appropriate forum.

KRS 403.834(1). If Aldava so moves, or if the Texas court requests it, the

circuit court shall consider a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine

                                        17
whether it would be nevertheless more appropriate for the Texas court to hear

the matter. Further, if Baum elects to leave Kentucky and reside elsewhere,

Kentucky may lose jurisdiction and the court of another state could assert its

authority. KRS 403.824(1)(b). However, until such an event occurs to divest

Kentucky of jurisdiction, Kentucky will retain its power to preside over the

custody case.

                                 CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

      All sitting. Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell, JJ., concur.

Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Miles Devon Skeens, IV
Skeens Law, PLLC

APPELLEE:

Hon. Angela Johnson, Judge
Jefferson Circuit Court

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,
ALYSSA BAUM:

Samantha Jo Hall
Fleur de Law LLC

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