Court Opinion

ID: 9470919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:20:24.710805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:10.921838
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I am compelled to depart from the majority’s analysis with respect to cause and actual prejudice. I think that there was adequate “cause” for the appellant’s alleged procedural default. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). A number of Illinois cases have held that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly raised on direct appeal only where the claim involves allegations of facts which are within the trial court record. Goins v. People, 103 Ill.App.3d 596, 59 Ill.Dec. 312, 431 N.E.2d 1069 (1981); People v. Edmonds, 79 Ill.App.3d 33,34 Ill.Dec. 555, 398 N.E.2d 230 (1979); People v. Turner, 74 Ill.App.3d 840, 30 Ill.Dec. 400, 393 N.E.2d 55 (1979).1 Where such a claim is based on facts which are outside the scope of the trial court record, the generally recognized procedure is to raise the claim in a post-conviction proceeding. Perry v. Fairman, 702 F.2d 119, at 122 (7th Cir.1983)2 The ineffective assistance-of counsel claim raised by appellant is based on actions — or inaction— which are not part of the trial court record. Thus, the appellant, relying on what appeared to be controlling Illinois precedent, could reasonably have believed that the proper course for him to follow with respect to his claim was a post-conviction proceeding and he thus had cause for not raising this claim on direct appeal.3
I also note that the state did not raise this waiver issue until after this petition had been heard in the district court, was appealed to this court, and was then remanded back to the district court. The state’s only excuse for this failure seems to be that the waiver theory did not occur to it until after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Engle v. Isaac. This can hardly be considered an adequate reason for this delay, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), would seem to have given the state an adequate basis to, at minimum, raise the theory. If the petitioner is to be held to strict standards of waiver, fairness demands that the state meet the same standards.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. I believe that the Illinois appellate court here departed from much settled precedent in determining that a waiver occurred. As the discussion of Perry v. Fairman indicates, Illinois law seems to direct appellant to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a post-conviction proceeding, not on direct review.

. The majority distinguishes Perry on the grounds that it involved exhaustion rather than waiver. I do not understand why this fact should in any way undermine the authority of the Perry court’s description of the state of Illinois law. In that respect Perry is entirely apposite to the instant case.

. Appellant also clearly satisfies the “prejudice” prong of the cause and prejudice test, since his alleged default has now prevented him from bringing his claim to federal court.