Court Opinion

ID: 9749713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:59:43.364227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:44.399972
License: Public Domain

Peters, J.
(dissenting). I disagree. The majority opinion accepts the principle of law established by our cases and by the treatise writers that parties to a written contract retain the power to alter or vary or discharge any of its provisions by a subsequent agreement. See, e.g., Brian Construction & Development Co. v. Brighenti, 176 Conn. 162, 169-70, 405 A.2d 72 (1978); Blakeslee v. Water Commissioners of Hartford, 121 Conn. 163, 182-83, 183 A. 887 (1936); O’Loughlin v. Poli, 82 Conn. 427, 432, 74 A. 763 (1909); 3A Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 763; 6 Corbin, Contracts (1962) § 1295; 15 Williston, Contracts (3d Ed. 1972) § 1828. The majority opinion accepts the factual premise that twenty-four months’ uncomplaining receipt of belated rental payments creates an ambiguity about the continued enforceability of the forefeiture clause in the lease. This combination of law and fact leads me to the conclusion that the plaintiff cannot now peremptorily rely on the nonwaiver clause in the lease to establish its right to retake the premises.
I would remand to the trial court for an eviden-tiary hearing on whether there has been a waiver in fact, in which hearing the contract’s nonwaiver clause would be relevant but not dispositive. If the trier determines that there has been a waiver, then I would follow the provisions of 1 Restatement *513(Second), Contracts (1981) § 841 which, like Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209, General Statutes § 42a-2-209 (5), would permit reinstatement of the forfeiture provision only upon notification to the defendant.
Neither the hearing that has been held nor the statute of frauds is an obstacle to this resolution. The trial court’s memorandum of decision demonstrates that the court determined the question of waiver by erroneously assigning conclusive weight to the nonwaiver clause. The statute of frauds does not require written modification of nonessential clauses, such as nonwaiver clauses. See Lynch v. Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 441n, 435 A.2d 977 (1980); 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts (1981) § 150.
*514I do not believe that the present record permits us to speculate about the reasons why the parties conducted their past business relationships as they did. The record does not show whether the defendant is a wrongdoer or a struggling businessman trying, in good faith, to make ends meet. The record equally does not show whether the plaintiff forbore from protest about late rental payments because of kindness or because of calculation about the scarcity of alternate business opportunities. Just as the record fails to demonstrate whether the defendant’s conduct was wilful or the plaintiff’s beneficent, so it fails to provide enlightenment about how the nonwaiver clause came into the contract, whether it was a bargained-for contract provision or a printed clause in a form contract.
It is precisely because the record is in every way so barren that I believe that a case for forfeiture and for rejecting waiver has not yet been made out. Cf. Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 497, 429 A.2d 946 (1980). We simply do not know enough about the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the lease or about the subsequent conduct of the parties to warrant affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. It seems to me that twenty-four months’ acquiescence in delayed rental payments presents a sufficient basis for ambiguity to require a full evidentiary hearing.
In this opinion Speziale, C. J., concurred.

 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts (1981) §84 provides as follows:
“promise to perform a duty in spite of nonoccurrence OF A condition
“(l)Except as stated in Subsection (2), a premise to perform all or part of a conditional duty under an antecedent contract in spite of the non-occurrence of the condition is binding, whether the promise is made before or after the time for the condition to occur, unless
“(a) occurrence of the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange for the performance of the duty and the promisee was under no duty that it occur; or
“(b) uncertainty of the occurrence of the condition was an element of the risk assumed by the promisor.
“(2) If such a promise is made before the time for the occurrence of the condition has expired and the condition is within the control of the promisee or a beneficiary, the promisor can make his duty again subject to the condition by notifying the promisee or beneficiary of his intention to do so if
“(a) the notification is received while there is still a reasonable time to cause the condition to occur under the antecedent terms or an extension given by the promisor; and
“(b) reinstatement of the requirement of the condition is not unjust because of a material change of position by the promisee or beneficiary; and
“(e) the promise is not binding apart from the rule stated in Subsection (1).”