Court Opinion

ID: 9448328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:31:41.575616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:22.937191
License: Public Domain

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As the general factual background of the instant appeal is delineated in the majority opinion, I shall merely emphasize those topographical features of the case which lead me to dissent.
The pertinent sides of appellant’s building face due south and west, respectively, the southward-looking portion being bounded by E Street, N. W., on the south, the westward-looking portion being bounded by Thirteenth Street, N. W., on the west. Directly across E Street, and standing squarely between appellant’s building and Pennsylvania Avenue, is a large, new, modern office building; directly across Thirteenth Street is another commercial structure housing various business enterprises.
On the southwest corner of E and Thirteenth Streets begins Pulaski Park, a triangular shaped public park, extending along both E and Thirteenth Streets and having Pennsylvania Avenue as its southwestemmost boundary. Pulaski Park is not included as a part of the Shipstead-Luce Act.
*322It thus appears that a rather substantial corridor1 2of property belonging to others intervenes between appellant’s building and Pennsylvania Avenue. Nevertheless, a majority of the court holds appellant’s building to fall within the ambit of the statutory language “to front or abut upon * * * Pennsylvania Avenue * * 2 The majority seems to hold, as indeed it must, that the property does not “abut” upon Pennsylvania Avenue; their decision is based upon the use of the word “front” 3 as assisted by the word “adjacent” in the preamble of the Act. I cannot agree.
Appellees advise us to pay due respect to the interpretation given to the statute by the administrative authorities charged with the task of implementing it.4 I agree. But it is also true that an incorrect interpretation cannot become lawful on the basis of its longevity. I am told by the majority that “[t]his interpretation of ‘to front’ on the Avenue so as to include the comer in question should not be disturbed by the courts unless the Act, reasonably construed, so requires.” I think the Act, reasonably construed, requires granting appellant the requested relief. The words of the Act are simple enough: “any portion of which is to front or abut upon * * * Pennsylvania Avenue * *
Nor, in my opinion, does the word “adjacent” lend solidity to the majority opinion; it is found in the preamble and is almost immediately followed by the more constricting words quoted from the Act. If Congress intended the Act to embrace buildings visible from Pennsylvania Avenue, I do not think it startling to assume that it would have said as much; however, I do think it startling that the words “to front or abut upon,” words having a rather limited meaning in law,5 were deliberately chosen by Congress in codification of such an intention.
But even assuming, arguendo, that the word “adjacent” may be relied upon to expand the Act’s coverage, nevertheless I think the extent to which it can be so employed must be severely circumscribed in view of the restrictive words “to front or abut upon” contained in the enacting clause.6 Interpreting “adjacent” in this fashion, I think it unreasonable to apply it so as to bring appellant’s building within the purview of the Act. The building is situated in such a way that each pertinent side directly faces another building on the opposite side of the street. In relation to Pennsylvania Avenue, appellant’s building is observable, from a distance and across a public park, as an oblique corner structure
*323fronting on two disparate, metropolitan thoroughfares, E Street and Thirteenth Street.
The holding that appellant’s building fronts upon Pennsylvania Avenue forms a basis for further limiting the individual’s right to the use and enjoyment of his own property,7 and that use and enjoyment should not be limited or taken from him except by clear and specific legal authority.

. At its closest point appellant’s building is roughly two hundred and fifty feet from Pennsylvania Avenue.

. It is, of course, possible to see appellant’s building from Pennsylvania Avenue; it is also possible to see other buildings up Thirteenth Street as far as F Street.

. The word “front” has been defined, among other things, as “the place or position before a person or thing; as it’s right in front of you; the land bordering a lake, ocean, street, etc.”
The word “frontage” has been defined as “the front part of a building; the direction toward .which this faces; exposure; the land between the front edge of a building and the street; the front boundary line of a lot facing a street, the length of this line; land bordering a street, river, lake, etc.”
The quoted definitions are from Webster’s “New World Dictionary.”
As “front” is also synonymous with “face” I think the following words from Hamlet, Act III, are apt: “God has given you one face, and you make yourselves another.”

. Section 5-411 D.C.Code (1961).

. Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545; Barniak v. Grossman, 141 W.Va. 760, 93 S.E.2d 49; City of Wilburton v. McConnell, 119 Okl. 242, 249 P. 708; Crane v. French, 50 Mo.App. 367.

. If the word “adjacent” is given operative effect, its expansion should be measured, at least in my opinion, by a yardstick to preserve and not proscribe private property rights.

. Staley v. Mears, 13 Ill.App.2d 451, 142 N.E.2d 835.