Court Opinion

ID: 9790102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:08.797537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.091612
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
The appellant was charged with “unprofessional conduct” by an osteopathic representative committee and the Department of Registration. At the time the charges were made, osteopaths were subject to U.C.A., 1953, § 58-12-18 (repealed in 1981, see infra ). Section 18 sets out seventeen subpar-agraphs stating with particularity acts deemed to be “unprofessional.”1 The osteopathic representative committee charged appellant with, and found him guilty of, unprofessional conduct under another section not applicable to osteopaths, § 58-12-36. That section applies only to medical doctors.2 See §§ 58-12-30, 58-12-31, 58-12-38. (The Legislature subsequently enacted new standards defining unprofessional conduct, not applicable here, to govern osteopaths and medical doctors. Section 7, ch. 27 Laws of Utah 1981, now U.C.A., 1953, § 58-12-7 (Supp.1981) (osteopaths); and Section 8, ch. 30 Laws of Utah 1981, now U.C.A., 1953, § 58-12-36 (Supp.1981) (medical doctors)). Because the committee and *133the Department had no statutory authority to revoke the appellant’s license under § 58-12-18, and because the committee and the Department had failed to promulgate rules defining unprofessional conduct which could have provided a valid basis for revoking appellant’s license, they relied upon § 58-12-36, which applies to medical doctors. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, I do not believe that the parties can stipulate to adjudicate the case under statutory standards not applicable to osteopaths.
Section 58-1-25 states the grounds upon which a license of any licensee subject to the Department of Registration, including such diverse groups as barbers, cosmetologists, and physicians, may be refused, suspended, or revoked. One ground for revocation is “unprofessional conduct.” However, a charge of unprofessional conduct, like other grounds for revocation under that provision must, as required by the next subsequent section, § 58-1-26, be “specific,” in writing, verified and filed with the Department.
The governing statutes required that the term “unprofessional conduct” be defined by the promulgation of rules which give a licensee notice of the type of conduct for which his license could be revoked. The “representative committees” and the Department of Registration may not, as I read our statutes, revoke a license solely on a finding made in an ad hoc adjudicatory proceeding that a licensee has been guilty of some violation deemed for the first time to constitute unprofessional conduct.3 The statutory procedure for license revocation contemplates notice of specific allegations of acts proscribed either by statute or rule.4
Section 58-1-13 is not, as the majority opinion seems to imply, a general authorization to revoke a license for anything a representative committee and the Department might deem to be “unprofessional conduct.” Rather, that provision simply states that a representative committee may propose rules defining unprofessional conduct to the Department which may then officially promulgate those rules. Specifically, § 58-1-13 provides that the Department, upon the written recommendation of the appropriate representative committee, shall exercise the function of “(6), defining unprofessional conduct, except as herein otherwise provided” (Emphasis added). That the defining of unprofessional conduct by rule is contemplated by § 13, rather than by an ad hoc adjudicatory process, follows from the language of that section itself and other statutory provisions. Section 13 is not phrased in adjudicatory terms at all. The duty of “defining unprofessional conduct” clearly contemplates the formulation of standards of unprofessional conduct by rule.
That conclusion is buttressed by § 58-1-25, which provides that the “department of registration may upon the written recommendation of the appropriate representative committee ... suspend or revoke any license” when the holder “has been guilty of unprofessional conduct.” That provision, on its face, contemplates an adjudicatory proceeding based on already defined standards of unprofessional conduct. The statutory scheme contemplated that the adjudication of the “specific charges” of unprofessional conduct had to be made under standards either promulgated pursuant to § 58-1-13 or pursuant to the statutory definitions of unprofessional conduct stated in § 58-12-18.5
*134There is a sound reason for defining unprofessional conduct by rules, even when the rules, because of the nature of the subject matter, may have to be broad. A rule making procedure permits consideration of the viewpoints of all members of the profession, as well as the public at large. Furthermore, the formulation of standards in a rule making proceeding is likely to be done in a more disinterested atmosphere than when it is the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding.
The general statutory obligation of representative committees and the Department of Business Regulation to promulgate rules was established in Athay v. State, Department of Business Regulations, Utah, 626 P.2d 965 (1981):
The legislative grant of authority to the administrative agency is necessarily in general language. It is the responsibility of the administrative body to formulate, publish and make available to concerned persons rules which are sufficiently definite and clear that persons of ordinary intelligence will be able to understand and abide by them.
Id. at 968. That principle applies with at least as much force in the instant case as it did in Athay.
In attempting to distinguish Athay, the majority states that: “The Court required ‘uniform, published, identifiable and objective standards’ ... in apparent recognition that prospective professionals who are making large investments of time and money are entitled to specific guidance as to what is necessary for professional certification.” If one who is not yet a member of a profession is entitled to that degree of protection, I am at a loss to understand why one who has been in a profession and spent many years building his livelihood not only on his professional education but also on the experience and good will built up in the practice of that profession for a number of years is not entitled to the same, if not more, protection.
The majority’s implicit contention that the public is entitled to greater protection after a professional is certified rather than at the time of the certification process itself seems to create a distinction without any difference. The public’s reliance upon the validity of the certification process, whether it is at the beginning of a professional career, or at some time thereafter, is exactly the same.
In dealing with such sensitive matters as state regulation of professions and vocations, the law must provide both for the protection of the public welfare as well as a person’s right to due process of law before he may be deprived of practicing his chosen calling. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1951); Lewis v. District of Columbia, D.C., App., 385 A.2d 1148 (1978). A principle central to the notion of due process of law is that a person should be given prior notice of proscribed conduct. Lewis v. District of Columbia, supra, at 1152. Due process, however, is not a concept so rigid that accommodation cannot be made for necessary variations which arise because of the different kinds of regulatory problems that must be addressed. A highly rigid approach that is insensitive to the complex nature of the regulatory problems involved is not constitutionally required. The regulation of professional and vocational conduct by a code as encompassing and as detailed as the Internal Revenue Code would be both stultifying to the profession or vocation and detrimental to the public. Sufficient latitude must be available to protect the public against incompetence and overreaching.
However, rules can and should be drafted which provide some guidelines more specific than the vague term “unprofessional conduct.” Unless some specific meaning is infused into that term, every practitioner of a licensed profession or vocation could be placed in jeopardy for every out of the ordinary act, even though it may represent a significant and valid advancement in the calling. Such rules need not diminish the *135public’s right to be protected against new schemes and artifices.
Concededly, the courts have not been unanimous as to the degree of specificity required by statutes and rules regulating the practice of professions and vocations. However, I submit that those courts which have held that the term “unprofessional conduct” is unconstitutional as applied when there have been no limitations on the scope of that term, more fully recognize the nature of all the interests that should be recognized. E.g., Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Ariz. 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979); Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980); State Board of Dentistry v. Blumer, 78 Mich.App. 679, 261 N.W.2d 186 (1977); Lester v. Department of Professional & Occupational Regulations, Fla.App., 348 So.2d 923 (1977). I do not believe that administrative agencies should be given such far-reaching power over a right protected by the due process clause.
In sum, I do not agree that the actions of the representative committee and the district court in this case can be justified on the statutory basis relied upon in the majority opinion, especially when the representative committee was not properly constituted and the appellant did not receive the kind of judicial review in the district court required by statute. Had the representative committee and the Department of Business Regulation promulgated rules governing unprofessional conduct for osteopaths, as contemplated by statute, the case could be remanded for further consideration under those rules. But, because appellant was found guilty of unprofessional conduct on other standards, I submit that the revocation of his license is unconstitutional.

. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-12-18 (repealed 1981) provided:
The words “unprofessional conduct” as relating to the practice of medicine, or any other system of treating human ailments, or the practice of obstetrics, are hereby defined to include:
(1) Procuring, or aiding in or abetting, or offering or attempting to procure or aid in or abet the procuring of, a criminal abortion.
(2) Procuring any fee or recompense on the assurance that a manifestly incurable diseased condition of the mind or body can be permanently cured.
(3) Communicating without the consent of the patient information acquired in treating a patient necessary to enable one to act for such patient.
(4) Advertising, announcing or stating directly, indirectly or in substance, that the holder of any license issued under the rules and regulations of the department of registration, or that any other person, company or association by whom he is employed, will cure or attempt to cure or will treat any person or persons for lost manhood, sexual weakness or venereal diseases, or will cure or attempt to cure or treat any disorder or any disease of the sexual organs; or acting in the service of any person, firm, association or corporation so advertising, announcing or stating any of such things.
(5) Advertising in a way that is intended or has a tendency to deceive the public or to impose upon credulous or ignorant persons, or that may be harmful or injurious to public morals or safety.
(6) Advertising medicine or means whereby the monthly periods of women can be regulated or the menses re-established if suppressed.
(7) Habitual intemperance or excessive use of narcotics.
(8) Lending one’s name to be used as a physician or surgeon by another person who is not licensed to practice in this state.
(9) Street advertising or the public peddling or selling of medical or surgical remedies or appliances in person or by proxy.
(10) Prescribing morphine or cocaine or other narcotics, with intent that the same shall be used otherwise than medicinally, or with intent to evade any law in relation to the sale, use or disposition of such drugs.
(11) Prescribing intoxicating liquor to be used as a beverage.
(12) Willfully violating the law in regard to the registration of births and deaths and the report of infectious diseases.
(13) Diagnosing or treating a case of venereal disease and failing to make report thereof to the health authorities in such form and manner as the state board of health shall direct.
(14) Treating venereally infected individuals and failing to fully inform such persons of the danger of transmitting the disease to others, and failing to advise against marriage by the person who has such disease in a communicable form.
(15) Advertising or professing publicly to treat human ailments under a system or school of treatment or practice other than that for which he holds a license.
(16) Willfully violating the rules and regulations of the department of registration governing examinations.
(17) Using fraud or deceit to secure a license to practice.

. The majority relies on the broad standards stated in subsection (15) of § 58-12-36 which reads:
Any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized standards of ethics of the medical profession, or any conduct or practice which does or might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or safety of the patient or the public ....

.Existing, well recognized standards in the profession may provide sufficient normative standards. But once the osteopathic committee decided to condemn conduct beyond that condemned by the standards of unprofessional conduct stated in § 58-12-18, it was incumbent on the committee to promulgate rules adopting such standards of unprofessional conduct so that those subject to sanctions could conform their conduct to such standards.

. The complexity of the subject matter to be regulated does not permit the same specificity as is required by the criminal law, of course, but it certainly permits greater specificity than the vague term “unprofessional conduct.” The legal profession’s code of professional conduct clearly demonstrates that reasonable specificity is possible in rules that regulate professions.

. In 1981, after the hearing took place in the instant case, the Legislature revised the osteopathic licensing scheme and defined unprofes*134sional conduct in even greater detail in § 58-12-7.