Court Opinion

ID: 9380457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-18 17:08:22.203271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:24.973623
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00366-CV

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

            IN RE SIGNATURE CARE EMERGENCY CENTER AND
                 ROUND TABLE PHYSICIANS GROUP, PLLC

                           On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

                                              OPINION

                    Before Justices Benavides, Silva, and Peña
                             Opinion by Justice Silva1

        In this original proceeding, relators Signature Care Emergency Center (Signature

Care) and Round Table Physicians Group, PLLC (Round Table) contend that the

multidistrict litigation (MDL) pretrial court 2 abused its discretion by vacating November

         1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
         2 This original proceeding arises from MDL No. 15-0360 in the 444th District Court of Cameron

County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable David Sanchez. See id. R. 52.2.
10, 2021 orders granting relators’ motion to transfer venue from Hidalgo County, Texas,

to Fort Bend County, Texas, and by failing to grant relators’ motion to remand the relevant

cases to their trial courts contemporaneously with the November 10, 2021 orders

transferring venue. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

                                         I.      BACKGROUND

        This original proceeding arises from multidistrict litigation regarding the validity of

medical liens. The real parties in interest, Baldemar Quintero, Maria Quintero, Karina

Quintero, and Edgar Perez, 3 filed suit against relators in various Hidalgo County district

courts alleging that the real parties were injured in accidents and received medical care

at relators’ medical care facilities. The real parties thereafter retained attorneys to

represent them against third parties regarding their injuries. According to the real parties,

rather than billing their medical insurance providers for the charges that they incurred,

relators filed medical liens to collect payment for their services. The real parties alleged

that the liens were fraudulent and illegal because, inter alia, they were not “admitted” to

medical facilities and relators have no right to file hospital liens under Chapter 55 of the

Texas Property Code because they are not hospitals. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§§ 55.001–.008 (regarding hospital and emergency medical services liens); TEX. CIV.

        3 The petition for writ of mandamus and response thereto identifies the relevant trial court cases,

and plaintiffs and real parties in interest, as follows: Baldemar Quintero, cause number C-2540-19-L in the
464th District Court of Hidalgo County; Maria Quintero, cause number C-2541-19-L in the 464th District
Court of Hidalgo County; Karina Quintero, cause number C-2542-19-L in the 464th District Court of Hidalgo
County; and Edgar Perez, cause number C-2543-19-H in the 389th District Court of Hidalgo County.

         As discussed in the record, the real parties were involved in a car accident in the Houston area,
they received medical treatment at a Signature Care facility, and they filed claims against the opposing
driver. The mandamus record does not contain all of the separate pleadings and orders regarding each of
these underlying cases. Relators and real parties treat these cases globally, and real parties do not allege
that the cases present different facts or circumstances. Thus, we address the cases collectively based on
the pleadings provided in the mandamus record and supplemental records.
                                                     2
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 12.001–.007 (governing civil liability related to a fraudulent

court record or a fraudulent lien or claim filed against real or personal property). The real

parties also alleged that the liens were not valid because the amounts charged were

excessive and that the relators tortiously interfered with their settlement negotiations with

the adverse drivers’ insurance carriers. The real parties sought declaratory relief and

requested class action certification regarding their claims. The real parties alleged that

venue was proper in Hidalgo County, Texas based on the general rules regarding venue.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a). They alleged that a substantial part

of the acts and omissions giving rise to their claims occurred in Hidalgo County, and they

and their attorneys were residents of Hidalgo County. 4

        The real parties subsequently filed notices that their cases were transferred as tag-

along cases to Cause No. 15-0360, In re Fraudulent Hospital Lien Litigation, in the 444th

District Court of Cameron County, Texas. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.5(e) (governing the

transfer of tag-along cases to pretrial courts in multidistrict litigation), reprinted in TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F. app.

        Relators subsequently filed motions to transfer venue and subject thereto, their

original answers and affirmative defenses. For example, with regard to Baldemar, relators

        4  In his original petition, Baldemar Quintero provided citations to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code § 15.002(a), subsections (1) and (2), to support his venue allegations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 15.002(a)(1), (2). Subsection (a)(2) concerns the defendant’s residence at the time the cause
of action accrued if the defendant is a natural person. See id. § 15.002(a)(2). Based on the petition’s
allegations regarding Baldemar’s residence, and that of his attorney’s, we assume that Baldemar intended
instead to cite to subsection (a)(4), which provides that if subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) do not apply, then
the lawsuit shall be brought “in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the
cause of action.” Id. § 15.002(a)(4). This anomaly in Baldemar’s pleadings does not affect our analysis in
this original proceeding.

                                                      3
explained that Baldemar’s accident occurred in Fort Bend County, Texas, he was

admitted to and received emergency hospital services at a Signature Care location in that

county, and relators had filed medical liens in that county. Relators thus contended that

venue was proper in Fort Bend County under Chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code, which provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n action under this chapter may

be brought in any district court in the county in which the recorded document is recorded.”

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 12.004. Relators also asserted that venue should be

transferred to Fort Bend County based on the convenience of the parties and witnesses.

See id. § 15.002(b). Relators specifically denied Baldemar’s venue allegations,

specifically denied that venue was proper in Hidalgo County, and specifically denied that

a substantial part of the acts and omissions occurred there. Relators further alleged:

      •      [Relators] did not file the Chapter 55 liens in Hidalgo County[.]

      •      [Relators] never provided emergency medical care to [Baldemar] in
             Hidalgo County[.]

      •      [Relators] do not have a principal place of business in Hidalgo
             County—the principal office of [Signature Care’s] facility where
             [Baldemar] was treated, is located at 8910 Highway 6 S, Houston,
             Texas 77083, in Fort Bend County. [Signature Care] has never had
             a facility in Hidalgo County and does not conduct business in Hidalgo
             County, Texas.

      •      The principal office of Round Table is located at 11490 Westheimer
             Rd., Suite 1000, Houston, Texas 77077, which is in Harris County.
             Round Table has never had an office in Hidalgo County.

      •      The principal office of Round Table Medical Consultants, LLC is
             located at 11490 Westheimer Rd., Suite 1000, Houston, Texas
             77077, which is in Harris County.

      •      [Relators] do not own, lease, operate, manage, or oversee any
             freestanding emergency medical care facilities, or any other type of
                                            4
              facility, in Hidalgo County, nor do they provide, or have ever
              provided, any medical services in Hidalgo County[.]

       •      [Relators] do not treat any patients in Hidalgo County, do not
              generate any revenue in Hidalgo County, and do not receive any
              payment for medical services in Hidalgo County.

       •      [Relators] do not have any employees, agents, or representatives in
              Hidalgo County, and they do not hire, fire, pay, or control any
              employees, agents, or representatives in Hidalgo County.

       •      Any communications between Providers and [Baldemar] or counsel
              for [Baldemar] occurred from the Providers’ principal offices in Harris
              or Fort Bend County.

       •      Payment for the medical services provided to [Baldemar] was made
              to Providers in Fort Bend and Harris County.

Relators supported their motion to transfer venue with the affidavit of Lisa Snyder, the

Revenue Specialist Manager for Round Table, who provided testimony in support of the

foregoing allegations. Snyder also explained in some detail that it was not geographically

convenient for the parties or witnesses to litigate the underlying claims in Hidalgo County,

Texas.

       Relators subsequently filed, subject to their motions to transfer venue, motions to

remand the cases from the pretrial court “to the respective district courts in Fort Bend

County, Texas.”

       On September 25, 2019, the pretrial court held a hearing on the relators’ motions

to transfer venue but did not issue a ruling regarding venue.

       On September 26, 2019, the MDL Panel issued a per curiam order in this MDL

proceeding. According to the order, the pretrial court had remanded one of the cases

therein, concerning plaintiff Terrance Williams, to a trial court in Harris County on the

                                             5
basis that it did not constitute a tag-along case. The MDL Panel reviewed that decision

for an abuse of discretion and ruled that:

       The original transfer in this case was limited by the MDL Panel to hospital
       lien cases and tag-along cases filed in Hidalgo County against McAllen
       Hospitals, L.P. [d/b/a] McAllen Medical Center and affiliated hospitals
       (MMC). The scope of the transfer has not been expanded or modified by
       the MDL Panel. The claims of Williams are not against MMC and do not
       involve liens filed in Hidalgo County.

               Having considered all of the pleadings on file, and the original orders
       of the panel creating the pretrial court for cases pending in Hidalgo County
       against MMC and its affiliates, the panel concludes that the Williams case
       is not related to the other cases in the pretrial court and that the Motion for
       Rehearing should be denied.

The MDL Panel thus denied rehearing and affirmed the pretrial court’s order remanding

the Williams case back to the Harris County trial court.

       On October 2, 2019, the real parties notified the pretrial court by letter that the MDL

Panel had issued an opinion clarifying that the multidistrict litigation was limited “to cases

filed in Hidalgo County, Texas against McAllen Hospitals, L.P. d/b/a McAllen Medical

Center and affiliated hospitals.” The real parties thus requested the pretrial court to

“remand these cases to their originating courts in Hidalgo County, Texas” on grounds that

those courts possessed jurisdiction to hear the relators’ motions to transfer venue. The

real parties stated that, based on the MDL Panel’s opinion, “other unrelated hospitals”

had been tagged into the multidistrict litigation, and would require remand, and the parties

would attempt to submit orders of remand for those by agreement unless any defendant

sought to expand the multidistrict litigation by filing a motion with the MDL Panel.

       On October 11, 2019, the MDL Panel issued a per curiam order in a separate MDL

proceeding, MDL No. 19-0499, In re Freestanding Emergency Medical Care Facilities

                                              6
Lien Litigation. The order recited that:

         Twenty-two plaintiffs originally sued [Signature Care] facilities and [Round
         Table] in Harris and Fort Bend Counties. They alleged that the defendants
         had filed fraudulent hospital liens and[,] in their suits[,] sought statutory
         penalties, costs, attorney fees, and exemplary damages. The defendants
         have filed a Motion to Transfer asking us to transfer certain remaining cases
         to a single pretrial court for consolidated or coordinated pretrial
         proceedings. In response to the Motion to Transfer, plaintiffs Natalie Medina
         and Terrance Williams have filed pleadings in opposition. No other plaintiffs
         have filed any opposition to the motion.

                We agree that the cases are related[,] and that transfer would result
         in more efficient pretrial of the related cases. We limit the scope of the MDL
         Pretrial Court to those cases listed in the Appendix to the motion to transfer
         together with tag-along cases filed against [Signature Care] and/or Round
         Table and their affiliates alleging that they have filed fraudulent liens in
         Harris County or Fort Bend County.

                We grant the motion to transfer[,] and we will appoint the MDL
         Pretrial Judge by a separate order.

(Internal footnote omitted). According to the pleadings filed in this case, the Honorable

Judge Mark Davidson was ultimately assigned to preside over that separate MDL

proceeding.

         On November 10, 2021, the pretrial court in this case granted relators’ motions to

transfer venue and transferred venue of the cases to a district court in Fort Bend County.

However, the pretrial court did not concomitantly grant relators’ motion to remand the

cases.

         On January 6, 2022, the real parties filed a “Joint Motion for Clarification

Concerning Order Granting [Relators’] Motion to Transfer Venue.” In this motion, they

asserted that they did not receive notice of the order transferring venue until counsel for

relators gave them a copy of the order on or about December 30, 2021. The real parties

                                               7
contended that relators had not specifically denied their venue facts, argued that they had

offered several reasons for the trial court to deny the transfer of venue, and requested

clarification regarding whether the venue transfer was based on mandatory or permissive

venue. The real parties further argued that venue was improper in Fort Bend County

under either mandatory or permissive venue. In terms of relief, these real parties

requested the trial court to clarify its ruling or, alternatively, to vacate its venue order.

       On March 10, 2022, the pretrial court held a hearing on the status of the case and

the real parties’ motion for clarification. The real parties argued that the pretrial court held

a hearing on relators’ motion to transfer venue but did not rule, and the following day the

MDL Panel issued an order clarifying the scope of the multidistrict litigation to encompass

claims against McAllen Medical and related entities, and to exclude claims against

relators. In turn, relators argued that the pretrial court had lost jurisdiction over the cases

after the transfer of venue. The relators requested the pretrial court to remand the cases

from the multidistrict litigation proceeding so that the cases could be included in MDL No.

19-0499, the separate MDL proceeding for the Fort Bend and Harris County cases.

       On March 14, 2022, the real parties provided the pretrial court with proposed

orders remanding the cases from the pretrial court and informed the pretrial court of their

position that “since the MDL Panel has ruled that the above referenced cases are not

before the correct MDL Pretrial Court, then any ruling beyond remanding the cases back

to the originating trial courts in which they were filed is beyond the jurisdiction of this MDL

Court.” The real parties asserted that the pretrial court’s jurisdiction ended when the MDL

Panel issued its decision on September 26, 2019, the day after the pretrial court heard

                                               8
relators’ motion to transfer venue. The real parties further argued that the “time limitations

for the expiration of the court’s plenary power does not apply to an MDL Court” as

opposed to a regular trial court. The real parties also suggested that case law regarding

the finality of venue rulings applied only in the context where cases were nonsuited, then

refiled, to circumvent unfavorable venue rulings.

       On June 22, 2022, the pretrial court held a hearing on the status of the case. The

relators and real parties again addressed issues pertaining to venue and remand. After

the hearing, but later the same day, the real parties provided the pretrial court with a

proposed order vacating the venue transfer orders while reiterating their position that the

MDL Panel opinion divested the pretrial court of jurisdiction to take any action other than

remand the cases to their originating courts.

       On June 27, 2022, the pretrial court signed an “Order Vacating Prior Orders

Granting Transfer to Fort Bend County, Texas and Order of Remand to Originating Trial

Courts Without Prejudice to Right to Transfer by the Proper MDL Court.” This order states

that the cases “were improperly tagged and transferred from their originating courts” into

the MDL “as per the Opinion and Order issued by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel on

September 26, 2019.” The order vacates the venue transfer order signed on November

10, 2021 “without prejudice to the re-urging of same in the proper MDL Pretrial Court

before the Honorable Pretrial Court Judge Mark Davidson, MDL [19]-0499/Master Docket

No. 2019-77967, styled In re: Freestanding Emergency Medical [Care] Facilities Lien

Litigation, [i]n the 334[th] District Court of Harris County, Texas.” The order further

remands the cases from the pretrial court back to their originating trial courts.

                                              9
       On July 19, 2022, the District Clerk of Cameron County, Texas, issued transfer

certificates transferring the cases to the trial courts in Hidalgo County, Texas. This original

proceeding ensued. By one issue, relators assert that the pretrial court abused its

discretion in vacating its venue transfer order because it lacked plenary jurisdiction and/or

by failing to grant relators’ motion to remand when it transferred venue. Relators request

that we issue mandamus relief “directing the 444[th] District Court to vacate its order dated

June 27, 2022 and directing the court to transfer the suits to Fort Bend County and to

remand them to the respective Fort Bend County District Courts for inclusion in the

Houston area MDL.” This Court requested and received a response to the petition from

the real parties in interest, and further received a reply thereto from relators.

                                II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem.

Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836,

840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148

S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that “(1) the trial

court abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal.” In

re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,

839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts with

disregard for guiding rules or principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable

manner. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 840. We determine the adequacy of an appellate

remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re

                                              10
Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Essex Ins. Co., 450

S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of

Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.

                                      III.   ANALYSIS

       By one issue, relators assert that the pretrial court abused its discretion by vacating

its order transferring venue of the cases to Fort Bend County, or alternatively, by refusing

to grant relator’s motion to remand contemporaneously with the November 10, 2021 order

transferring venue of the cases. Relators contend that: (1) the pretrial court lacked

jurisdiction to vacate its November 10, 2021 order transferring venue because its plenary

jurisdiction expired thirty days after the transfer order was signed on June 27, 2022; (2) a

mandatory venue provision, § 12.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,

requires that this suit be transferred to Fort Bend County where the relevant liens were

filed; (3) relators specifically denied the plaintiffs’ pleaded venue facts and the plaintiffs

failed to proffer prima facie proof supporting their choice of venue; (4) these suits should

be remanded to Fort Bend County and included in the Harris County MDL; and (5) the

pretrial court had jurisdiction to transfer venue. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 12.004. The real parties assert otherwise. In summary, the real parties assert that:

       [Relators are] not entitled to the relief requested for the reason that the MDL
       Pretrial Court was without jurisdiction, at the time of the entry of the order
       transferring venue to Fort Bend County[,] to do anything other than vacate
       the void order of transfer and remand the unrelated Quintero cases back to
       the originating trial courts in Hidalgo County where they were initially filed
       pursuant to Rule 13.5(e) of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration. [The
       pretrial court] did not abuse [its] discretion in vacating a void order over
       which [it] had no subject matter jurisdiction. This Court lacks jurisdiction to
       order [the pretrial court] to reinstate a void order over which the [pretrial
       court] lacked jurisdiction at the time of the entry of the challenged order.

                                             11
               The only MDL [p]retrial [c]ourt with jurisdiction over pretrial matters
       with authority to transfer venue of the Quintero cases to Fort Bend County
       is the Honorable Judge Mark Davidson, the duly appointed presiding Judge
       of the [p]retrial [c]ourt in In re: Freestanding Emergency Centers Lien
       Litigation. [The pretrial court’s] Order of Remand specifically preserves the
       right of [relators] to have [their] Motion to Transfer to Fort Bend County re-
       urged in a proper court with subject matter jurisdiction over the Quintero
       cases.

               The Clerk of the [p]retrial [c]ourt physically transferred all filings and
       orders of the [p]retrial [c]ourt for the Quintero cases back to their originating
       trial courts in Hidalgo County pursuant to Rule 13.7(c). Thus[, relators are]
       not entitled to relief by mandamus since [they have] an adequate remedy at
       law by simply tagging the Quintero cases into the [MDL pretrial court] and
       re-urging their motion to transfer venue before Judge Mark Davidson.

The parties’ contentions thus raise multiple matters for our review.

A.     Multidistrict Litigation Pretrial Court

       The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation “may transfer cases to a pretrial court

if they are related and transfer will further the goals of convenience, efficiency, and

justice.” In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig. 2, 506 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex.

J.P.M.L. 2016); see Mass. Bay Ins. v. Adkins, 615 S.W.3d 580, 585–86 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration

governs multidistrict litigation proceedings and “aims to further these goals by (1)

eliminating duplicative and repetitive discovery, (2) minimizing conflicting demands on

witnesses, (3) preventing inconsistent decisions on common issues, (4) reducing

unnecessary travel, and (5) allocating finite judicial resources intelligently.” In re Farmers

Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig. 2, 506 S.W.3d at 805; see TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13, reprinted

in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F. app.

       The MDL Panel may order transfer of cases to a multidistrict pretrial court if three

                                              12
members concur “that related cases involve one or more common questions of fact, and

that transfer to a specified district court will be for the convenience of the parties and

witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of the related cases.” TEX. R.

JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(l). Further, after the initial transfer order is issued, a party may transfer

a “related” case as a tag-along case, which is “a case related to cases in an MDL transfer

order but not itself the subject of an initial MDL motion or order.” Id. R. 13.2(g). A tag-

along case is “deemed” transferred to the pretrial court when a proper notice of transfer

is filed in both the trial court and the pretrial court. See id. R. 13.5(e).

       Under Rule 13, “[t]he judge assigned as judge of the pretrial court has exclusive

jurisdiction over each related case transferred pursuant to this rule unless a case is

retransferred by the MDL Panel or is finally resolved or remanded to the trial court for

trial.” Id. R. 13.6(a). And “a judge who is qualified and authorized by law to preside in the

court to which an action is transferred” under the provisions of the government code

pertaining to multidistrict litigation “may preside over the transferred action as if the

transferred action were originally filed in the transferor court.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 74.164. Further:

       The pretrial court has the authority to decide, in place of the trial court, all
       pretrial matters in all related cases transferred to the court. Those matters
       include, for example, jurisdiction, joinder, venue, discovery, trial preparation
       (such as motions to strike expert witnesses, preadmission of exhibits, and
       motions in limine), mediation, and disposition by means other than
       conventional trial on the merits (such as default judgment, summary
       judgment, and settlement). The pretrial court may set aside or modify any
       pretrial ruling made by the trial court before transfer over which the trial
       court’s plenary power would not have expired had the case not been
       transferred.

TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(b); see In re Alcon S’holder Litig., 387 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex.

                                               13
J.P.M.L. 2010) (holding that Rule 13 gives the pretrial court authority to rule on special

appearances). The pretrial court can render a final and appealable judgment, and it may

also “order remand of one or more cases, or separable triable portions of cases, when

pretrial proceedings have been completed to such a degree that the purposes of the

transfer have been fulfilled or no longer apply.” TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.7(a), (b). Orders

and judgments by the trial court or pretrial court may be appealed. See id. R. 13.9(b);

Mass. Bay Ins., 615 S.W.3d at 587.

       In this case, the real parties argue that there is no procedure for one pretrial court

to transfer venue to another pretrial court. Nonetheless, the MDL Panel can order cases

transferred from one pretrial court to another pretrial court under specified circumstances,

including “other circumstances when retransfer will promote the just and efficient conduct

of the cases.” TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o). However, the MDL Panel did not do so here.

B.     Jurisdiction of Pretrial Court to Rule on Venue

       The real parties assert that the pretrial court “lost jurisdiction” over the cases before

it granted the motion to transfer venue when the MDL Panel clarified the scope of the

MDL proceedings so as to exclude the cases. The real parties thus argue that the pretrial

court lost jurisdiction over the cases more than two years prior to the transfer of venue.

They assert that the September 26, 2019 order issued by the MDL Panel limited the scope

of the MDL to exclude cases filed against relators for hospital liens filed in Fort Bend and

Harris County. Relators contend that the pretrial court had jurisdiction to transfer venue,

and even if the September 26, 2019 order had some effect on the pretrial court’s

                                              14
jurisdiction, that court retained the power to address venue before subject matter

jurisdiction.

       As stated previously, the assigned judge of the pretrial court “has exclusive

jurisdiction over each related case transferred pursuant to this rule unless a case is

retransferred by the MDL Panel or is finally resolved or remanded to the trial court for

trial.” Id. R. 13.6(a); see Mass. Bay Ins., 615 S.W.3d at 587. According to the record, the

MDL Panel did not retransfer these cases, and they were not finally resolved or remanded

before the trial court issued its ruling transferring venue on November 10, 2021. Thus, the

pretrial court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases when it transferred venue. See

TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a); Mass. Bay Ins., 615 S.W.3d at 587.

       The real parties urge, in substance, that the pretrial court was required to consider

jurisdiction before it considered the propriety of venue. Generally, courts are required to

determine questions of jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case. See In re

Contract Freighters, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per

curiam); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).

Nevertheless, “certain non-merits” and “non-jurisdictional issues” may be addressed

before jurisdiction “under the proper circumstances.” Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd. v. Util.

Trailers de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 336 S.W.3d 664, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2010, no pet.) (discussing and citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549

U.S. 422, 432 (2007)). A court may consider non-jurisdictional and non-merits matters

before jurisdiction based on “considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial

economy.” Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd., 336 S.W.3d at 671 (quoting Sinochem, 549 U.S. at

                                            15
432). Addressing jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, in contrast, is necessary if the court

plans to issue a judgment on the merits. Id.; see Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431.

       Based on the foregoing, the pretrial court had the authority to issue a ruling on

venue before addressing the impact of the MDL court’s ruling on its jurisdiction over the

four cases at issue here. See Mass. Bay Ins., 615 S.W.3d at 587; Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd.,

336 S.W.3d at 671; Schippers v. Mazak Props., Inc., 350 S.W.3d 294, 296–97 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); see also Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.

173, 180 (1979) (“Accordingly, when there is a sound prudential justification for doing so,

we conclude that a court may reverse the normal order of considering personal jurisdiction

and venue.”). Here, addressing venue before jurisdiction comports with the general tenets

of multidistrict litigation insofar as it furthered the goals of convenience, efficiency, and

justice. See Mass. Bay Ins., 615 S.W.3d at 585–86; In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail

Storm Litig. 2, 506 S.W.3d at 805. Further, there is no indication in this record that

addressing jurisdiction before venue was required because the pretrial court planned to

address the merits of these cases. See Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd., 336 S.W.3d at 671; see

also Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431.

C.     Venue

       “Venue refers to a ‘geographic location within the forum where [a] case may be

tried.’” In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2020) (orig.

proceeding) (quoting Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A., 251 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)). Under the legislative framework, venue

may be proper in several different locations. In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc.,

                                             16
596 S.W.3d at 762. “Plaintiffs have the first choice in determining where to file a lawsuit,

but when that choice is properly challenged, the trial court must transfer venue if the

plaintiff fails to establish venue is maintainable in the county of suit.” Id. If venue is

improper, it “shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error” in an appeal

from the trial on the merits. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); see Perryman

v. Spartan Tex. Six Cap. Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 130 (Tex. 2018).

       Here, relators specifically denied the real parties’ alleged venue facts. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 87(3)(a); State v. Life Partners, Inc., 243 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. App.—Waco

2007, pet. denied) (per curiam). Once the relators specifically denied the alleged venue

facts, the real parties had the burden to present prima facie proof that venue was proper

in the county of suit. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a). Based upon the record presented, the

real parties did not do so in this case. Because the real parties failed to discharge their

burden, the right to choose a proper venue passed to the relators. See In re Mo. Pac. R.

Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). The relators pleaded and

presented evidence that venue was proper in Fort Bend County under § 12.004 of the

civil practice and remedies code because that was where the relevant liens were

recorded. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 12.004. Relators also asserted and

presented evidence that venue should be transferred to Fort Bend County based on the

convenience of the parties and witnesses. See id. § 15.002(b). We thus conclude that the

relators sustained their burden regarding venue.

                                             17
D.     Jurisdiction of Pretrial Court to Vacate its Venue Order

       The general rule is that only one venue determination may be made in a single

proceeding, and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87 prohibits changes in venue following

the initial ruling on venue. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. 2008)

(orig. proceeding); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Norris, 635 S.W.3d 242, 249–50 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2021, no pet.); In re Lowe’s Home Ctrs., L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d 861, 871

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, orig. proceeding); In re Hardwick, 426

S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding); see also TEX.

R. CIV. P. 87(5) (discussing the exceptions to the rule that only one venue determination

can be made in a proceeding).

       When a trial court grants a motion to transfer venue, it retains plenary jurisdiction

over the case for thirty days. See In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 260; In re Sw.

Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); HCA Health

Servs. of Tex., Inc. v. Salinas, 838 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (per

curiam); In re Lowe’s Home Ctrs., L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d at 871; see also Sewell v. Brock,

No. 06-20-00009-CV, 2020 WL 5223325, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 2, 2020, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). “Even if the venue transfer is interlocutory for the parties, the order

is final as far as the transferring court is concerned.” In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at

605; see Salinas, 838 S.W.2d at 248.

       Here, the pretrial court granted the relators’ motion to transfer venue on November

10, 2021. The real parties did not file a motion for reconsideration or rehearing of the

                                             18
pretrial court’s ruling regarding venue. 5 On January 6, 2022, the parties filed a joint

motion for clarification. At that point, however, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the order

transferring venue had already ended, and the order transferring venue was final. See In

re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 260; In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605; HCA

Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 838 S.W.2d at 248. We thus conclude that the pretrial court

erred in vacating that order.

E.      Remedy by Appeal

        Real parties assert that relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because they

have an adequate remedy at law by “simply tagging” these cases into MDL Cause No.

19-0499, In re Freestanding Emergency Medical Care Facilities Lien Litigation, pending

in the 334th District Court of Harris County, Texas, before Judge Davidson, and rearguing

their motion to transfer venue in that proceeding. However, there has already been one

venue ruling in these cases, and we disagree, given the instant circumstances, that there

can be another. See In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 259; United Parcel Serv.,

Inc., 635 S.W.3d at 249–50; In re Lowe’s Home Centers, L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d at 871.

        We thus consider whether mandamus relief is otherwise appropriate to remedy the

pretrial court’s error. We note that the pretrial court did not clarify whether it based its

venue ruling on mandatory or permissive venue concepts. Typically, venue rulings are

reviewed after appeal from a final judgment in the case. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

        5   In this regard, the real parties assert they did not receive appropriate notice of the pretrial court’s
ruling on venue. They did not, however, seek to set aside the venue ruling on this basis in the pretrial court
or in this Court. We note that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4) generally allows for extensions of post-
judgment deadlines when a party first receives notice of a judgment more than twenty, but less than ninety-
one, days after it is signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4); see also In re Ashley, No. 13-09-00022-CV, 2009
WL 332312, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 10, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).

                                                       19
ANN. § 15.064(a) (prohibiting interlocutory appeals from venue determinations); TEX. R.

CIV. P. 87(6) (same). By statute, venue rulings involving multiple plaintiffs may be

reviewed by interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b);

UPS Ground Freight, Inc. v. Trotter, 606 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2020, pet.

denied). However, mandamus relief is appropriate to enforce a mandatory venue

provision when the trial court has denied a motion to transfer venue. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642; In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. 2012) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam). Further, mandamus review of a venue ruling is appropriate in

“extraordinary circumstances.” In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 262 (collecting

cases).

      In evaluating the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments in this case,

we examine the specific circumstances presented in accordance with the factors

delineated by the Texas Supreme Court in Prudential and utilized in Team Rocket. See

In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 262; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d

at 136. Based on our review, these factors favor mandamus review. First, the present

case involves an impairment of relators’ procedural rights. The supreme court in Team

Rocket recognized that Texas venue statutes “create a balance” by giving the plaintiff “the

first choice of venue when he files suit” and restricting the defendant to one motion to

transfer that venue. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 262. The court reasoned that

the plaintiff’s action in taking a nonsuit and refiling in another county in response to an

unfavorable ruling on venue violated the defendant’s procedural rights by permitting the

plaintiff to circumvent the balance established by the venue rules. Id. at 261. Similarly,

                                            20
the pretrial court in this case has improperly applied the venue statute by allowing multiple

venue proceedings in violation of the relators’ procedural rights. See id.

       Second, mandamus review presents this Court with the opportunity to give needed

and helpful direction to the law. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.

This factor weighs in favor of mandamus relief if a legal issue “is likely to recur, as

demonstrated by the . . . decisions that have already addressed it.” In re Team Rocket,

L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 262. The concept that only one venue determination may generally

be made in a single proceeding and that changes in venue are prohibited after the initial

ruling has been repeatedly litigated in Texas courts. See, e.g., In re Team Rocket, L.P.,

256 S.W.3d at 259; United Parcel Serv., Inc., 635 S.W.3d at 249–50; In re Lowe’s Home

Ctrs., L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d at 871. Further, granting mandamus relief in this case allows

this Court to provide clarity regarding the application of this concept in MDL litigation. See

In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 259.

       Third, the trial court’s actions will result in an irreversible waste of resources. See

id. In Team Rocket, the supreme court noted that a subsequent reversal of a trial court

ruling on venue would “subject[] taxpayers, defendants, and all of the state’s district courts

to meaningless proceedings and trials.” Id. Stated otherwise, “mandamus relief is

appropriate to ‘spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted

enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’” In re John G. & Marie

Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)

(quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136). This concern weighs in favor of granting

mandamus. See, e.g., In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 262.

                                             21
       Considering the extraordinary circumstances present here, we conclude that the

detriments to issuing mandamus relief are outweighed by the benefits. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36. Accordingly, we agree with relators

that they lack an adequate remedy by appeal.

F.     Remand

       Relators request that we issue mandamus relief “directing the 444[th] District Court

to vacate its order dated June 27, 2022[,] and directing the court to transfer the suits to

Fort Bend County and to remand them to the respective Fort Bend County District Courts

for inclusion in the Houston area MDL.” The real parties contend that directing the pretrial

court to remand the cases to Fort Bend violates Rule 13.5(e) of the Rules of Judicial

Administration. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.5(e). The real parties thus assert that the

cases must be returned to Hidalgo County. In support of this contention, they cite In re

Biomet M2A Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1389, 1389 (U.S.

Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2018). In that case, the pretrial court had conditionally remanded

cases to their originating courts, but the defendants requested the panel to remand the

cases to “districts in which venue is purportedly proper.” Id. The plaintiffs did not oppose

the defendants’ motion. Id. The panel concluded that it lacked authority to make such a

transfer, and the terms of the applicable statute required remanding the cases to the

originating courts. Id. (citing former 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)). The panel suggested that

motions to transfer venue must be made to the originating trial courts after remand. Id.

       We disagree with the real parties that Biomet controls our disposition here. In

Biomet, the defendants did not file a motion to transfer venue in the pretrial court and the

                                            22
pretrial court did not issue a ruling on venue. See id. Here, the defendants filed a motion

to transfer venue and the pretrial court ruled on that motion. Thus, Biomet is not

procedurally on point. We nevertheless agree with the real parties that Rule 13 does not

empower the pretrial court to send the cases to courts other than the originating courts.

Under Rule 13, the pretrial court can enter “a final and appealable judgment,” in which

instance the case is not remanded to the trial court, or it can “order remand . . . when

pretrial proceedings have been completed to such a degree that the purposes of the

transfer have been fulfilled or no longer apply.” TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.7(a), (b). The Rule

does not envision other actions. The pretrial MDL judge does not have the authority to

transfer a case directly to an MDL or to remand the case to a different trial court. See id.

Thus, in accordance with the scheme of multidistrict litigation, the pretrial court should

remand the cases to the originating trial courts, where we note that the pretrial court’s

venue order is, generally speaking, “binding in the trial court after remand.” See id. R.

13.8.

                                    IV.     CONCLUSION

        The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

the real parties’ response, the reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relators

have met their burden to obtain mandamus relief as stated herein. Accordingly, we

sustain the sole issue presented in this original proceeding. We conditionally grant the

petition for writ of mandamus and direct the pretrial court to (1) vacate its order of June

27, 2022; (2) enter a new order of remand to the trial courts with instructions for those

courts to direct the Hidalgo County District Clerk to transmit the records in those cases to

                                             23
appropriate courts in Fort Bend County, Texas. Our writ will issue only if the pretrial court

fails to comply.

                                                                CLARISSA SILVA
                                                                Justice

Delivered and filed on the
14th day of March, 2023.

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