Court Opinion

ID: 9613708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:19:25.461974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:31.293679
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
dissenting:
As I view the facts in this case, petitioner is entitled to a writ in prohibition, staying the collection of an award made by the Commissioner, until the determination of the validity of the' order making the award. I think the petition clearly shows that the order is presently under attack, as being void, because having been obtained through misrepresentation and fraud of claimant. If void for such reason, I assume no one would contend it was not void from the beginning, or that any right could accrue to claimant thereunder. Yet the Court, acknowledging no other available remedy, refuses to issue the writ.
I have no difficulty in believing that the action of the commissioner, in the entry of the order making the award, or in the enforcement of the payment thereof, is at least, quasi judicial. In Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 123 W. Va. 621, 17 S. E. 2d 330, this Court stated: “The final order of the State Compensation Commissioner is not a judgment in the full sense of the term, but it is a judgment in that it is a final determination of a controversy relating to property rights by a public official expressly authorized to make such-a decision. Aniel v. Compensation Commissioner, 112 W. Va. 645, 166 S. E. *515366; Watkins v. Compensation Commissioner, 109 W. Va. 409, 157 S. E. 89; Heaton v. Compensation Commissioner, 106 W. Va. 563, 146 S. E. 368. ‘The workmen’s compensation award, although not a judgment, is in the nature of a judgment and the same rules are applicable to it as are applied to judgments and decrees of courts.’ 71 C. J., p. 1182. A judgment is ‘property’ and as such is the proper subject of constitutional protection * *
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the writ of prohibition is available to litigants as a matter of right in certain instances, by virtue of the provisions of Code, 53-1-1. But the statutory provisions making the writ one of right, in certain instances, do not limit the right or duty of the Court to issue the writ in other instances. “The statute does not enlarge nor narrow the common law scope or range of the writ, Sperry v. Sanders, 50 W. Va. 70; but requires its issuance as of right in a proper case, whether there is other remedy or not.” Steamship Co. v. Hudson, 93 W. Va. 209, 212, 116 S. E. 511. See Railroad Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S. E. 196, 41 L. R. A. 414.
In Lyons v. Steele, 113 W. Va. 652, 169 S. E. 481, this Court, after considering leading cases dealing with the equitable nature of the writ of prohibition, reached this conclusion: “It would seem clear from the foregoing citations that while prohibition is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely influenced by equitable principles. Equity would not lend an ear to a technical right founded on deceit. Neither should prohibition serve deception. We hold, accordingly, that courts in West Virginia are not bound to allow the writ (under Code 1931, 53-1-1) merely because the applicant shows a clear technical right to prohibition; but they should deny the writ (under section 8) whenever he comes not with clean hands, as in the instant case * *
It appears to me that the enforcement of the payment of the award made by the order, under attack as being *516void, in accordance with statutory provisions relating thereto, is analgous to the enforcement of a judgment by execution, and that questions relating thereto, to be determined by the commissioner, are quasi judicial. The writ lies to prevent the collection of a judgment attacked as being void. State v. Blankenship, 93 W. Va. 273, 116 S. E. 524; McGrew v. Maxwell, 80 W. Va. 718, 94 S. E. 395; 15 M. J., Prohibition, Section 9. Why should prohibition not lie in like cases, where the act of the compensation commissioner is quasi judicial, and is void? In Coal Co. v. State Compensation Commissioner, 111 W. Va. 409, 163 S. E. 16, the jurisdiction of the State Compensation Commissioner to enter an order was under attack. The Court held: “2. Prohibition lies as a writ of right in all cases where the lower court or tribunal has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or having jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers.” Yet in the instant case a writ is denied, notwithstanding the order involved is under attack as being void. In Steamship Co. v. Hudson, supra, the Court pointed out at page 212, West Virginia Reports,- that “ * * * The writ has also been employed, and properly so, in cases of attempted fraudulent jurisdiction, Penna. B. R. v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450; Peoples United Telephone System v. Feltner, 87 W. Va. 71; and in those cases involving disqualification of the inferior tribunal by interest or otherwise, Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, 54 W. Va. 210. In such case the fraud or disqualification may be shown aliunde the record.” With the majority, I too hope, and would declare by dicta, that the commissioner may find some statutory basis for preventing what is believed to be fraud and injustice. I would not, however, leave the question to hope or dicta, but would issue the writ.
I agree that the claimant should have been made a party to this proceeding, for the reasons pointed out in the majority opinion. There is no reason, however, that the proceeding should be dismissed without affording the petitioner an opportunity to amend. The procedure sug*517gested in Kump v. McDonald, 64 W. Va. 323, at page 324, 61 S. E. 909, should be followed. In that case, the Court was faced with the question posed here, and, after discussion thereof, concluded: “In this case we ruled that we would not for the defect above stated, dismiss the case, but we required a copy of the rule to be served on Coberly to show cause, on a day, against the prohibition.”
Being of the views indicated, I respectfully dissent.