Court Opinion

ID: 9449003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:52:31.551465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:38.965780
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I have difficulty with the majority’s easy classification of the Thomas Amendment as a “general measure” and Section 606, 5 U.S.C.A. § 946, as the controlling “specific or particular statute.” To me that differentiation seems to depend on the subjective point of view as to which matter appears more important to each judge. True, Section 606 deals particularly with the compensation of “vessel employees of the Panama Canal Company.” That, however, includes both those engaged in “the several trades and occupations” and also others, such as ship’s doctors, professionals, administrative and clerical employees. On the other hand, the Thomas Amendment relates to the compensation of only those employees who are engaged in “the several trades and occupations.”1 Of more importance, the Thomas Amendment deals specifically with the subject of overtime for more than forty hours per week of regular *102hours of labor, which can possibly be covered by Section 606 only by reference to one of “the wage practices of the maritime industry.”
The classification of one statute as a “general measure” and the other as a “specific or particular statute” becomes unnecessary if we agree with the following reasoning of the able and careful district judge:
“ * * * I find nothing repugnant in the application of both the Thomas Amendment and Section 102 (d) and 606 of the 1945 Pay Act to plaintiffs. In the first they are given an overtime guarantee that is general to all employees fitting the terms of the act and in the other they ‘may’ be compensated in accordance with wage practices of the maritime industry. It does not necessarily follow that an act setting up the right of defendant to follow a program of payment in accordance with that utilized at sea should deprive plaintiffs of the benefits of an over-all premium pay statute under which they qualify.”
That reasoning seems sound and in accord with the cardinal rule against repeals by implication and in favor of giving effect to each of two statutes when that can reasonably be done. In dealing with problems much like that confronting us, the Sixth Circuit found no difficulty in reconciling the Eight-hour Law Amendment with the Fair Labor Standards Act,2 and the Supreme Court held that the Walsh-Healey Act did not preclude the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees under the same contract.3 That the same principle is applicable to the present case is demonstrated by the district court’s finding of fact No. 27:
“27. Defendant has acknowledged as hours of work and paid for travel performed by tugboat employees in its Navigation Division. During the past six or seven years more than 100 employees in defendant’s Navigation Division have been paid for their travel time. The water-borne conveyances which transport Navigation Division employees during their travel are of the same type as those used by defendant to transport plaintiffs. The travel performed by the Navigation Division employees is similar, if not,identical to that performed by other employees on defendant’s floating equipment, including plaintiffs in its Dredging Division.”
In other respects I agree with the able and thorough opinion of the district court, and must therefore respectfully dissent.

. In Townsley v. United States, 101 Ct.Cl. 237, the U. S. Court of Claims held that employees of the Panama Canal employed on dredges were engaged in one of the “trades and occupations” within the meaning of the Thomas Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed in United States v. Townsley, 323 U.S. 557, 559, 65 S.Ct. 413, 414, 89 L.Ed. 454. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, with reference to the dredge employee in that case, stated :
“The Court of Claims held that he was engaged in one of the ‘trades and occupations’ whose compensation ‘is set by wage hoards or other wage-fixing authorities’ covered by the Act. We think this conclusion is right and do not understand the petitioner now to contest it.”

. Walling v. Patton-Tulley Transportation Co., 6 Cir., 1943, 134 F.2d 945, 948.

. Powell v. U. S. Cartridge Co., 1950, 339 U.S. 497, 519, 520, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017.