Court Opinion

ID: 9530034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:28.412301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.956375
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that ORS 416.430(4)(a) gave respondent the right to have a jury decide whether he is the father of a child. The majority errs in reaching that conclusion because, correctly interpreted, ORS 416.430(4)(a) did not give him that right. Hence, the proper disposition of the appeal is to reverse the judgment that the trial court entered on the jury verdict and to remand for entry of a judgment that embodies the trial court’s finding that respondent is the father of the child.* 1
The Oregon Legislature enacted House Bill 2324 in 1997 to effect a sweeping overhaul of Oregon’s child support programs. See Or Laws 1997, ch 746. The principal purpose of the overhaul was to bring Oregon law into compliance with the requirements of a 1996 federal welfare reform act. *664Among its provisions, the federal act required states to eliminate jury trials in paternity proceedings as a condition of their receipt of federal welfare funds.2 House Bill 2324 did that by amending a number of statutes that gave parties the right to a jury trial in paternity proceedings or that implemented that right. ORS 416.430(4)(a) is one of the statutes that House Bill 2324 amended. The relevant amendment to that statute deleted the phrase that “either party shall have the right to trial by jury on the issue of paternity.”
Significantly, the 1996 federal welfare reform act imposed a time limit on states to implement the requirement that they eliminate jury trials in paternity proceedings. That limit required states to make the necessary changes in their laws effective
“in no event later than the 1st day of the 1st calendar quarter beginning after the close of the 1st regular session of the State legislature that begins after the date of enactment of [the federal welfare reform act].”3
Given the timing of the relevant events, that meant that the changes to Oregon’s laws had to take effect by September 1, 1997.
The legislature sought to comply with that requirement by including an emergency clause in House Bill 2324 that made provisions addressed to jury trials in paternity cases take effect when the bill became law on August 4,1997. Unfortunately, through what can only be viewed as an oversight, the section that amended ORS 416.430(4)(a) to delete the reference to the right to a jury trial was not made effective on that date. All of the other provisions that addressed that issue were.4
*665According to the majority, the effect of that oversight was to preserve for respondent his statutory right to a jury trial when the parties tried this case on August 27, 1997. However, if the majority is correct, the effect of the oversight reaches farther than that. As noted above, the federal act required changes in Oregon statutes to remove a jury trial right in paternity cases to take effect by September 1,1997. The majority’s decision holds that the legislature failed to comply with that requirement. That failure could expose the state to a financial penalty as a consequence.5
Fortunately, the majority is mistaken in its conclusion that the legislature’s drafting error preserved the right to a jury trial in paternity cases tried under ORS 416.430-(4)(a) after August 4,1997. Between August 4,1997, and January 1,1998, ORS 416.430(4)(a) provided:
“The proceedings in court shall for all purposes be deemed suits in equity, but either party shall have the right to trial by jury on the issue of paternity. The provisions of ORS 109.145 to 109.230 apply to [the] proceedings * *
ORS 109.155 is one of the provisions that applies to such a proceeding. Before August 4,1997, it provided:
“(1) The court or the jury, in a private hearing, shall first determine the issue of paternity. * * *
“(2) If the court or jury finds, from a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner or the respondent is the father of the child who has been, or who may be bom out of wedlock, the court shall then proceed to a determination of the appropriate relief to be granted. * * *” (Emphasis added.)
However, House Bill 2324 amended ORS 109.155 to delete the italicized language that refers to the jury’s role in the factfinding process, and it made that amendment take effect on August 4,1997. Even without the principle that prior versions of statutes are part of the context that bears on their interpretation,6 it should be apparent that ORS 109.155 specifies that courts, not juries, are to be the factfinders in paternity proceedings that are subject to it, which includes proceedings brought under ORS 416.430. However, between *666August 4,1997, and January 1, 1998, ORS 416.430(4)(a) provided that the parties could require juries to be the factfinders in such cases.
The two provisions necessarily conflict, and there is no way to resolve the conflict textually. The majority disagrees. In its view, the 1997 amendments to ORS 109.155 merely removed the references to a jury trial in that statute but did not prohibit such a trial in a paternity proceeding. The majority is mistaken. By specifying in ORS 109.155 that the factfinder in a paternity proceeding under ORS 416.430 is the court and not a jury, the 1997 amendments to ORS 109.155 necessarily conflict with the provision in ORS 416.430(4)(a) that gives the parties a right to have a jury act as the factfinder. Consequently, our interpretive task is to determine which provision the legislature intended to control the factfinding process.71 have no doubt that the proper resolution of that issue is to conclude that the legislature intended ORS 109.155 to control. That is the only interpretation that avoids jeopardizing Oregon’s right to receive its full share of federal welfare funds, and there is no doubt that the legislature intended to do that.
The majority challenges that conclusion on several grounds, none of which is well taken. It contends that I rely on legislative history to reach the conclusion that I do without first establishing an ambiguity in the statutes. In fact, I do not rely on legislative history to interpret the relevant statutes. I conclude that the legislature intended ORS 109.155 to take precedence over ORS 416.430(4)(a) based solely on the provisions in federal law that required Oregon to eliminate the right to a jury trial by September 1,1997, in order to avoid jeopardizing Oregon’s right to receive its full *667share of federal welfare funds. Federal law is part of the context of the Oregon statutes, see Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 433, 877 P2d 1196 (1994), so my reliance on federal law to reconcile the conflict between ORS 109.155 and ORS 416.430(4)(a) does not implicate any of the legislative history of House Bill 2324.
The majority also contends that my interpretation fails to give appropriate effect to ORS 174.010 and ORS 174.020. ORS 174.010 requires a court construing a statute to give effect to all of its provisions, if possible. It is not possible to do that in this case. Whether the majority wishes to recognize it or not, both its and my interpretation of ORS 416.430(4)(a) fail to give effect to one of its provisions.
ORS 174.020, in turn, directs a court to prefer a particular provision over a general one. The majority concludes that the grant of a right to a jury trial is a particular provision and the reference to the other provisions of Oregon law that govern the conduct of the proceedings is a general provision, so the former controls over the latter. I do not believe that it is possible to characterize one portion of the same subsection of ORS 416.430(4)(a) as more particular than the other. For this purpose, they stand on equal footing. Moreover, the stated preference in ORS 174.020 for a particular over a general provision functions as a tie breaker if the text of the statute, in context, provides no other way to resolve the conflict between two provisions. Consistent with the admonition in ORS 174.020 that, “[i]n the construction of a statute[,] the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible[,]” I believe that ORS 416.430(4)(a), when considered in context, can be construed to give effect to the legislature’s intention without attempting to resort to the tie-breaking principle favoring a particular over a general provision, and that that construction denies defendant a right to a jury trial. The majority errs in concluding otherwise.8

 Respondent has not asked us to undertake a de novo review of the decision that the trial court said that it would make on paternity if the issue were its to decide. Hence, I believe that the proper disposition of the appeal is to direct the trial court to enter a judgment that implements its paternity decision. We need not now decide whether respondent can get de novo review of that decision after it has been entered.

 See 42 USCA §§ 609(8), 654(20), 666(a)(5)(I) (Supp 1998). Congress amended 42 USCA § 609(8) in 1997 to change the method of assessing penalties imposed on a state for failing to meet federal child support enforcement requirements. That change does not affect my analysis.

 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-193, § 395, 110 Stat 2105, 2259.

 The oversight is understandable in light of the size and complexity of the bill. The bill has 152 sections that cover 74 pages in the bound volumes of the 1997 session laws. Various provisions were made effective at various times, and many provisions were adopted for limited time periods. See Or Laws 1997, ch 746, § 1. It is not surprising that a mistake could occur in specifying the timing of a particular provision.

 See 42 USCA §§ 609(8), 654(20), 666(a)(5)(I) (Supp 1998).

 See, e.g., Krieger v. Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994); Odneal v. Arlint, 142 Or App 106, 110-11, 919 P2d 508, rev den 324 Or 176 (1996).

 Given that understanding, we are required to make a choice. Either we must ignore the language in ORS 416.430(4)(a) that gives the parties the right to a jury trial on paternity, or we must insert back into ORS 109.155 the language that says that juries can be factfinders in paternity proceedings. That puts us in the rare position in which we must do something that ORS 174.010 otherwise directs us not to do: “to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.” See, e.g., State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 392-93, 927 P2d 79 (1996). The majority implicitly chooses not to omit what has been inserted in ORS 416.430(4)(a). However, in doing that, it inserts back into ORS 199.155 that which House Bill 2324 had omitted from it. It errs in making the choice that it does between those competing interpretive alternatives.

 Respondent argued below and on appeal that the 1997 amendments to the paternity statutes that removed the right to a jury trial, even if effective on August 4, 1997, could not apply to the August 27, 1997, trial in this case, because that would give them a retroactive effect, and nothing in the legislation indicates that the legislature intended them to apply retroactively. Respondent is wrong. Applying the amendments to a trial that occurred after their adoption involves a prospective rather than a retroactive application of them.