Court Opinion

ID: 9895825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:00:52.674087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:01.792474
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11672    Document: 16-1     Date Filed: 11/08/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11672
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ELIJAH JAMES CHISOLM,
       a.k.a. Jamie,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:08-cr-00022-RH-CJK-2
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11672

                             ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Elijah Chisolm, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
       the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduc-
       tion pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The govern-
       ment has moved for summary affirmance. We grant the govern-
       ment’s motion.
                                          I.
               In 2009, a jury found Chisolm guilty of one count of con-
       spiring to distribute or possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or
       more of crack cocaine (Count One), one count of distributing 50
       grams or more of crack cocaine (Count Two), two counts of dis-
       tributing ﬁve grams or more of crack cocaine (Counts Five and
       Six), and one count of distributing cocaine (Count Seven). Chisolm
       faced mandatory life sentences on Counts One and Two because
       he had two prior convictions for felony drug oﬀenses. See 21 U.S.C.
       § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2008). In addition, the district court found at sen-
       tencing that Chisolm was subject to a career-oﬀender enhance-
       ment. The court ultimately sentenced Chisolm to a term of life im-
       prisonment on Counts One, Two, Five, and Six and 360 months’
       imprisonment on Count Seven, all to run concurrently. On appeal,
       we aﬃrmed Chisolm’s convictions and sentence. See United States
       v. Chisolm, 367 F. App’x 43 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).
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       23-11672                Opinion of the Court                           3

              In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act to address
       disparities in sentences between offenses involving crack cocaine
       and those involving powder cocaine. See Pub. L. No. 111-220,
       124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,
       97–100 (2007) (providing background on disparity). The Fair Sen-
       tencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to
       trigger the highest statutory penalties from 50 grams to 280 grams
       and the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger intermediate
       statutory penalties from 5 grams to 28 grams. See Fair Sentencing
       Act § 2; 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2011). But the Fair Sen-
       tencing Act’s reduced penalties applied only to defendants who
       were sentenced on or after the Fair Sentencing Act’s effective date.
       Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012).
              In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
       391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Among other things, the First Step Act
       gave district courts the discretion to apply retroactively the re-
       duced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses in the Fair Sen-
       tencing Act of 2010 to movants sentenced before those penalties
       became effective. See First Step Act § 404.
              After the First Step Act went into eﬀect, Chisolm ﬁled a mo-
       tion seeking a sentence reduction under the Act. The district court
       reduced his sentence to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment.
             About a year after the district court reduced his sentence,
       Chisolm ﬁled a second motion under § 404, requesting a further
       sentence reduction. The government opposed the motion arguing,
       among other things, that the district court lacked the authority to
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                      23-11672

       reduce Chisolm’s sentence because the court had already reduced
       his sentence in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. The dis-
       trict court denied Chisolm’s motion, explaining that the First Step
       Act “allow[ed] only a single reduction” under § 404. Doc. 321 at 1. 1
              A few months later, Chisolm ﬁled a third motion seeking a
       sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. This time Chi-
       solm argued that the district court should further reduce his sen-
       tence because it had erred at sentencing in applying the career-of-
       fender enhancement. The government opposed Chisolm’s motion,
       again arguing that the district court lacked the authority to further
       reduce Chisolm’s sentence because he had already received a sen-
       tence reduction. The district court denied Chisolm’s third motion
       based on § 404(c)’s bar on successive motions. 2
               This is Chisolm’s appeal.
                                             II.
               Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
       the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
       sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
       or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-
       ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
       come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

       2 The district court also concluded that even if it had the authority to further

       reduce Chisolm’s sentence, it would deny his motion because he had been
       properly sentenced under the career-offender enhancement.
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       23-11672                   Opinion of the Court                                  5

       appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
       1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 3
             We review de novo whether a district court had the authority
       to modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment under the First Step
       Act. United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023).
                                              III.
               District courts generally lack the authority to modify a term
       of imprisonment once it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
       But the First Step Act permits district courts to reduce some previ-
       ously-imposed terms of imprisonment for offenses involving crack
       cocaine. See First Step Act § 404. Section 404(c) imposes a limit on
       successive motions for sentence reductions. It states that “[n]o
       court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a
       sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously re-
       duced in accordance with the . . . Fair Sentencing Act . . . or if a
       previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence
       was . . . denied.” First Step Act § 404(c). Under this provision, “[a]
       district court may not consider a First Step Act motion if the mo-
       vant’s sentence was already reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act
       or if the court considered and rejected a motion under the First
       Step Act.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 496 (2022); see
       also United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.4th 881, 886 (11th Cir. 2022)

       3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we

       adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
       down prior to October 1, 1981.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                23-11672

       (explaining that § 404(c) bars courts from “consider[ing] successive
       First Step Act motions” (emphasis in original)).
               Here, the district court granted Chisolm’s ﬁrst motion under
       § 404 and reduced his sentence in accordance with Sections 2 and 3
       of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Because the First Step Act
       plainly states that a movant may receive only one such sentence
       reduction, the district court properly denied Chisolm’s most recent
       motion under § 404, which sought a further sentence reduction.
       See First Step Act § 404(c); Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 496. Because the
       government’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law and there
       is not a substantial question as to the outcome of the case, we con-
       clude that summary aﬃrmance is appropriate. See Groendyke
       Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. Accordingly, the government’s motion for
       summary aﬃrmance is GRANTED.
             AFFIRMED.