Court Opinion

ID: 9492928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:53:39.553784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:33.522568
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I agree that this case is controlled by Coleman, I write separately to emphasize the Hobson’s choice that a Missouri inmate in Miller’s position is forced to make.
In appealing the denial of his petition for postconvietion relief under Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.15, Miller sought to raise several issues that his attorney considered to be without merit. The Missouri Court of Appeals would not accept a pro se brief raising those issues. See Mo. Ct.App.E.D.R. 380. However, any issues Miller failed to raise before the Missouri Court of Appeals would be deemed procedurally defaulted. See Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.1994). Coleman dictates that such a procedural default cannot be excused based on ineffective assistance of counsel because Miller had no constitutional right to effective representation in his Rule 29.15 appeal. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
To preserve the issues in question for federal habeas review, Miller was thus forced to choose between (1) continuing to be represented by the attorney appointed for him and irrevocably defaulting the issues in question; (2) dismissing his appointed attorney and proceeding to argue without the assistance of counsel both the issues his attorney considered viable for appeal and those considered meritless; or (3) attempting to obtain private counsel who would argue the issues Miller wanted to raise. Miller’s choice was complicated by the fact that under Missouri’s consolidated appeal procedures, the attorney handling his Rule 29.15 appeal was the same attorney providing constitutionally-mandated counsel in his direct appeal. Thus, the prospect of discharging his Rule 29.15 appeal counsel was problematic at best.
While I recognize that Miller had no right to counsel in his Rule 29.15 appeal, it seems to me that Missouri’s consolidated appeal process and the appellate court’s refusal to entertain pro se filings from represented parties forced Miller into the untenable position of having to choose between firing his Rule 29.15 appellate counsel, thereby possibly hobbling his direct appeal, and circumscribing any future ha-beas claims to maximize his chances on direct appeal.