Court Opinion

ID: 9480454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:48:26.757686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:41.970861
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While this case presents a close issue, I believe that Congress intended for the sentence of a defendant convicted under the Major Crimes Act to be determined by reference to state sentencing procedures and not by application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s order because defendant’s sentence was not “imposed in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(1).
The court today recognizes, as it must, that unless Congress has clearly expressed an intent to the contrary, courts have a duty to resolve apparent conflicts between federal statutes by regarding each statute as effective wherever possible. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2880-81, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). The court claims that it has construed both statutes in issue here, the Sentencing Reform Act and the Major Crimes Act, in a manner which furthers the goals of each. I respectfully disagree because I believe that the court’s holding is inconsistent with congressional intent.
Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act “to insure equal treatment for Indian and non-Indian offenders who commit certain offenses in Indian country.” H.Rep. No. 1038, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1125. This purpose can also be gleaned from the face of the statute itself. “Any Indian who commits ... burglary [in addition to twelve other enumerated offenses] ... shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (emphasis added). Those offenses which are listed in the statute but not defined and punished by federal law, such as burglary, “shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.” Id. § 1153(b). The court’s holding today frustrates this purpose. The facts of the case before us serve to illustrate the basic flaw in the court’s approach. Defendant’s non-Indian accomplice in the burglary, if prosecuted and convicted, would be sentenced under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines because he is beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624, 26 L.Ed. *1164869 (1881). Defendant, however, will now be sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. While such disparate treatment is not unconstitutional, see United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647-50, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1399-01, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), it nevertheless runs contrary to the purpose of the Major Crimes Act to treat Indians and non-Indians committing certain offenses in Indian country equally.
The court today claims that its holding promotes uniform treatment because Indians convicted under the Major Crimes Act and non-Indians convicted under the Assi-milative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, will both be sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The court presumes that sentences for violators of the Assimila-tive Crimes Act will be based upon the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and not upon state sentencing procedures. That issue, however, has not been decided by this circuit, and is not before us at this time. I am unwilling to make such a presumption, and I am troubled by the potential for disparate treatment demonstrated by the facts before us.1
The crux of this case is interpretation of the Major Crimes Act’s mandate that defendant be “punished in accordance with the laws of the State.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b). The court today contends that this language means that federal law determines the length of the sentence, the computation of good time credits, and the consecutive/concurrent sentence decision. Despite obvious congressional intent to retain state involvement in issues as important as the substantive definition of the enumerated crimes, the court has managed to reduce the states’ role in determining punishment to merely establishing minimum and maximum sentences.
The Major Crimes Act itself neither defines “punishment,” nor explains the extent to which state law determines punishment. In the absence of express statutory guidance, general principles of statutory construction direct that we look first to the ordinary meaning of the word itself. United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1020 (10th Cir.1985); see also id. at 1020-21 (the word “punishment” has been given a “broad and inclusive meaning” in cases interpreting the Assimilative Crimes Act). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “punishment,” in part, as “[a]ny fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1110 (5th ed. 1979). The ordinary meaning of “punishment” must encompass the length of incarceration. Since the Act directs that defendant must be punished in accordance with state law, it follows that the length of incarceration should be determined by referring to state law and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines utilized to sentence defendant in this case.
Moreover, I am persuaded that this is the result Congress intended. In 1986, following the passage of the Sentencing Reform *1165Act, Congress amended the Major Crimes Act and chose to leave intact the critical language before us. The House Report expressly states that burglary is “left to be defined and punished by State law.” H.Rep. No. 1038, supra, at 5 n. 10, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 1129 n. 10. The federal sentencing provisions state that defendants who have been found guilty of an offense described in any federal statute shall be sentenced under the federal sentencing scheme, “[ejxcept as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (emphasis added). I believe that the Major Crimes Act is an instance where Congress has “otherwise specifically provided,” and therefore, it is possible to construe these two federal statutes more harmoniously than the court has done. This construction does not conflict with the Sentencing Reform Act’s purpose to promote uniform sentencing within the federal system. Congressional recognition that uniformity is not to be achieved at all costs is demonstrated by the inclusion of the “except” clause quoted above.
Though few courts have considered this issue, I find support for my position in the decisions of two district courts which have considered similar language in the Assimilative Crimes Act. These courts have held that the Federaljpentencing Guidelines cannot be applied to sentence a defendant convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act.2 See United States v. Policastro, No. 89-244M-3 (E.D.N.C. July 11, 1989) (magistrate’s memorandum and order); United States v. Richards, No. 88-9005M-01 (D.Kan. Oct. 21, 1988) (magistrate’s memorandum and order); see also United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 992 (9th Cir.) (holding that federal law determines parole eligibility but that state law determines the length of the prison term), cert. denied sub nom. 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 156 (1978). This construction of the Assi-milative Crimes Act reflects the Act’s “enlightened purpose, so far as the punishment of crime [is] concerned, to interfere as little as might be with the authority of the States on that subject.” United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 9, 31 S.Ct. 212, 214, 55 L.Ed. 65 (1911).
The court places great reliance on United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250 (10th Cir.1989), in which the Tenth Circuit questioned whether the action before it was brought under the Major Crimes Act or the Assimilative Crimes Act, but decided to entertain it under the Assimilative Crimes Act. Id. at 252 n. 3. While Garcia held that the state law would determine the maximum and minimum sentences, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would determine the sentence within that range. The court emphasized that state law generally only specifies the outer limits of the sentencing range. “Within the permitted range, it is impossible to determine with certainty the sentence that a state judge would impose.” Id. at 254. In our case, however, Minnesota law goes beyond specifying the outer limits because the statutory scheme also contains sentencing guidelines to determine the sentence within the range. Thus, the Garcia court’s reasoning that it would be impossible to determine with cer*1166tainty the sentence imposed under state law has no application here. We know with certainty what punishment would follow from applying Minnesota law. The parties have stipulated to this. Therefore, Garcia provides scant support for this court’s holding today.
Finally, I believe that Minnesota law should govern the other incidents of incarceration which are implicated by the court’s holding. Defendant should be sentenced under Minnesota’s law relating to application of good time credits and the issue of concurrent versus consecutive sentences. I believe that these issues are so inextricably intertwined with the length of incarceration that they could not possibly be severed if defendant were to be sentenced under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, as I believe he should be. I realize that this result would place an administrative burden on the federal prison system; however, I believe that it is for Congress, not this court, to alleviate that burden.
In conclusion, it is my view that the Major Crimes Act directs a sentencing court to look to state sentencing guidelines, as opposed to federal, to determine length of incarceration and the other issues raised by the case before us. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court.

. The court contends that its holding will have the desired effect of eliminating the type of disparity illustrated in United States v. Yazzie, 693 F.2d 102 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1222, 103 S.Ct. 1231, 75 L.Ed.2d 464 (1983), because all Indians convicted of crimes on reservations which cross state boundaries will be sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The disparity in Yazzie resulted from the fact that the conduct was a crime under Arizona law but not under New Mexico law, and the Navajo reservation extended into both states. Yazzie discussed the purpose and legislative history of the Major Crimes Act. It noted that both incest and burglary were intentionally omitted from the 1976 amendments "and continued to be defined and punished according to state law, because there was no possibility that prescribed punishments for those two crimes could differ for Indians and non-Indians." Id. at 103-04. The court declared that it was rational for Congress to elect a statutory scheme in which Indians and non-Indians were subject to the same punishment for the same acts. "It is also rational for Congress to choose to regulate conduct in a manner conforming to standards established by the states.” Id. at 104. Yazzie provides strong authority for applying the Minnesota sentencing procedures in this case. Since Congress reserved to states the authority, under the Major Crimes Act, to determine what type of conduct will be made criminal and how such conduct will be defined, and since the court today concedes that the states can also set maximum and minimum prison terms, it follows naturally that Congress intended that states possess the lesser authority to determine ancillary matters such as the computation of good time credits.

. Cases concerning the applicability of the federal assessment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013, to defendants sentenced under the Assimilative Crimes Act are also instructive. In United States v. King, 824 F.2d 313 (4th Cir.1987), the court declined to require a defendant convicted of violating the Assimilative Crimes Act to pay a federal assessment because "[t]he ACA assimilates the entire substantive criminal law of the state, including laws relating to the definition and scope of an offense and laws governing the manner in which an offense is to be punished." Id. at 315. The King court felt compelled to reach this result because Congress, in the Assi-milative Crimes Act, “chose to assure ‘complete current conformity with the criminal laws of the respective States in which the enclaves are situated.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293, 78 S.Ct. 291, 295-96, 2 L.Ed.2d 282 (1958)); see also United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d at 1021-22 (holding that imposing a federal assessment on those convicted of assimilative crimes would violate the fundamental policy of the Assimilative Crimes Act). But see United States v. Dobbins, 807 F.2d 130, 131 (8th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (holding that a federal assessment did not constitute “punishment” under the Assimilated Crimes Act). Congress amended the federal assessment statute in 1987 to extend its applicability to violations of the Assimilated Crimes Act. No similar legislative enactment has been made to the Major Crimes Act adopting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.