Court Opinion

ID: 9748123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:52:54.060497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.849453
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Senior Judge,
concurring:
This is a compelling case of considerable urgency. While I agree with most of the court’s opinion, I write separately to focus on the practical consequences of any unnecessary delay in disposing of Ms. Andrews’ claim. In this case, as much as or more than in any other case that I have confronted in over thirty years on the bench, justice delayed is likely to prove to be justice denied. If the parties cannot reach a reasonable settlement — by far the most constructive option available — then the Board should, in my view, move with the utmost expedition towards an immediate and just resolution of Ms. Andrews’ claim.
I.
On August 28, 1983, when her father, retired Lieutenant Elmer J. Andrews of the Metropolitan Police Department, died, Pamela Susan Andrews was thirty years old. Upon his death, Ms. Andrews became entitled to receive a survivor annuity, although she was over the age of eighteen, if she was incapable of supporting herself. See D.C.Code § 5-716(e)(2) (2001). If Ms. Andrews qualified (or qualifies) under this statutory standard, then, as the District appropriately acknowledges in its brief, her substantive entitlement to a survivor annuity is automatic. See Jackson v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 717 A.2d 904, 907 (D.C.1998).
*775Because the claim by Ms. Andrews which is presently before us was not filed until 2008,1 one might reasonably anticipate difficulties in assessing Ms. Andrews’ condition in 1983 and in the years that followed. “[S]tale claims present major evidentiary problems which can seriously undermine the courts’ ability to determine the facts.” Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 58 (D.C.1994) (quoting Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72, 727 P.2d 226, 228 (1986) (en banc)). In this instance, however, there is evidence which, at least in my view, makes an eventual finding that Ms. Andrews was disabled in 1983 (and continues to be so disabled today), and thus unable to support herself, highly probable, if not virtually certain.
The record contains an evaluation of Ms. Andrews by Herbert G. Brandes, M.D., dated November 4,1974, almost nine years before Ms. Andrews became potentially eligible for an annuity. Dr. Brandes wrote then that Ms. Andrews, who was twenty-one years old at the time,
is of low mentality and has never attended regular school. She has the mentality of a child about 8 years of age.
Dr. Brandes further reported that Ms. Andrews
cannot read or write nor count money, nor does she attach any value to same. She is totally dependent on her parents for support and care, and if they were to become deceased she would, by necessity, become institutionalized unless a relative were to take her into [his or her] home.
In 2001 and 2008, Dean Traiger, M.D., Ms. Andrews’ primary physician, provided evaluations on her behalf which were largely consistent with Dr. Brandes’ assessment some three decades earlier. Dr. Traiger wrote in 2001 that Ms. Andrews “is of low mentality and ha[s] never attended regular school.” According to Dr. Traiger, Ms. Andrews is “somewhat independent and functional in society,” but her “mentality is not consistent with her age and in fact is childlike or adolescent.” In 2008, Dr. Traiger executed a District of Columbia government form in which he explained that Ms. Andrews has a “moderate” learning disability. In response to the question whether Ms. Andrews was “capable of earning a livelihood,” Dr. Traiger responded “No,” and he added that “she wants to be part of society but lacks skills to manage money.” The record thus reveals that Ms. Andrews is essentially unschooled and that, over the entire period of her adult life, she has functioned mentally like a child.
These evaluations do not stand alone. Ms. Andrews’ 2008 claim was presented on her behalf by her stepmother, who is now over ninety years of age. The very fact that it was necessary to rely on an aged relative to act on Ms. Andrews’ behalf provides common sense support for her claim that she is unable, especially in a complex urban society like ours, to care for or support herself.
My colleagues in the majority hold that the Board, in the first instance, must determine whether Ms. Andrews is, or has been, incapable of supporting herself. Somewhat reluctantly, I agree with a remand for that purpose. The record is not entirely one-sided, and because the prior litigation focused on timeliness, the facts have not been fully developed with respect to the existence or extent of Ms. Andrews’ disability. Ms. Andrews has signed a durable power of attorney in favor of her stepmother, and although her ability to write her name does not demonstrate the *776capacity to support herself, the question arises whether she understood what she signed.2 Ms. Andrews has also earned money — over $11,000 in 20063 — and she has thus apparently contributed in some limited measure to her own support. While living on that level of earnings in the District of Columbia would be challenging even for a genius (and even more so for a person with the intellectual function of a child), I am constrained to agree that the Board, as the finder of fact, and as the agency charged with construing the statute which it is required by law to administer, should be given the opportunity to make a record on the issue, and to decide in the first instance whether Ms. Andrews was or is capable of self-support. I so conclude notwithstanding a measure of mystification as to how, in the context of a humanitarian and remedial statute in which close calls are to be made in favor of the claimant, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Tarlosky, 675 A.2d 77, 80 (D.C.1996), an impartial trier of fact could reasonably find that someone of Ms. Andrews’ apparent mental age is capable of supporting herself. I would be inclined to eschew a remand as unnecessary only if (1) the record before us were conclusive or, by imperfect but instructive analogy, would warrant a directed verdict in a jury trial on the question whether Ms. Andrews is unable to support herself; and (2) we could state with complete assurance that further development of the record could not conceivably alter this result. See, e.g., In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 908 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (the law does not require a remand when remanding the case would be a futile act).4
Obviously, we cannot dispense with findings by the trier of fact in the absence of truly extraordinary circumstances. Although this case is unusual in relation to the need for speed, I agree that it does not warrant preemption by this court of the Board’s responsibility, in the first instance, to make a record, find the facts, and construe the statute.
II.
The practical (and human) problem in this case, however, is that if the proceedings on remand take a conventional leisurely course, then even if the Board ultimately finds that Ms. Andrews is disabled and unable to support herself — and, as I have explained, such a finding is probable, if not inevitable — any legal victory that Ms. Andrews may ultimately win is likely to be a Pyrrhic one. Although the Board has acted with reasonable dispatch in addressing Ms. Andrews’ claim, the fact is *777that litigation takes time. In the present case, the Board denied the claim on patently erroneous statute of limitations grounds5 in June 2008, and the litigation of the question whether Ms. Andrews is unable to support herself has not yet even begun. During the period that has elapsed since the Board’s ruling more than a year and a half ago, Ms. Andrews has received no survivor annuity. If, upon remand, the case continues to proceed at the same pace as before, it is likely to be years before the evidence has been collected and presented, the findings have been made, and any further applications for review by this court have been exhausted. It would be unfair, to say the least, to require Ms. Andrews to wait a protracted period for the vindication of an apparently meritorious claim. Moreover, we cannot even be sure whether Ms. Andrews’ able counsel will be compensated and, if not, whether he will be in a position to represent her through another round of litigation. Ms. Andrews’ prospects would be bleak indeed if she had to proceed without committed legal representation.
Meanwhile, Ms. Andrews’s stepmother — the person who has been looking after Ms. Andrews for several years — is now over ninety years of age. One necessarily wonders how much longer the stepmother will be able to continue to care for Ms. Andrews. If she cannot, institutionalization of Ms. Andrews may be inevitable, unless funds become available to care for her at home. So far as I am aware, survivor annuity payments represent the only possible source of such funds. But if it takes two or three or even five more years to determine that Ms. Andrews is entitled to receive these benefits, then the probability is high that even a favorable determination will have come too late to protect Ms. Andrews.
A trial court or an agency may be justified in some cases in taking reasonable shortcuts. In LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 201 U.S.App. D.C. 22, 26, 627 F.2d 481, 485 (1980), the court stated, in discussing a slightly different but related issue:
Notwithstanding the importance of having the district court express its conclusions with care and in adequate detail, however, we will not remand a case for more specific findings if doing so will consume precious time and judicial resources without serving any purpose. When the record as a whole reveals no substantive issue concerning a material fact, we will not elevate form over function by requiring further district court proceedings to supplement the findings. (Citations omitted). As we stated in Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 78 U.S.App. D.C. 66, 136 F.2d 796 (D.C.Cir.1943), the district court’s obligation to prepare adequate findings of fact is imposed primarily to assist appellate review and is “not a jurisdictional requirement of appeal.” Id. at 799. Consequently, “[i]n cases where the record is so clear that the court [of appeals] does not need the aid of findings it may waive such a defect on the ground that the error is not substantial in the particular case.”
Although this is a petition for review of agency action, rather than an appeal from a trial court ruling, the court’s approach in LaSalle strikes me as well-suited to any future proceedings in the case at bar. Given all of the considerations that I have discussed in this opinion, and assuming that no early settlement can be achieved,6 *778I believe that on remand, the case should be placed on as fast a track as is reasonably available and that procedures should be simplified wherever possible to secure a just result as promptly as this can be achieved.7
III.
Finally, I think it appropriate to add that, in the posture in which this case now finds itself, and with the clock rapidly ticking towards institutionalization, indefinite continuation of the adversarial process strikes me as less than an ideal solution.
Even if counsel for the District, or my colleagues, believe that I am prematurely overestimating the strength of Ms. Andrews’ case when the Board has yet to rule on the question whether she is incapable of supporting herself, it must surely be acknowledged by any reasonable person that Ms. Andrews’ claim is not frivolous. Although my colleagues may regard it as impolitic for me to say so, I am confident that they do not believe that Ms. Andrews’ claim has no realistic prospects of ultimate success. Her case is also appealing from a human perspective. Surely, it has some appreciable settlement value.
With able counsel on both sides, I cannot believe that some reasonable compromise is unattainable if each party is ready to demonstrate goodwill. If a fair compromise is achieved, this might well result in the availability of some kind of care which will enable Ms. Andrews, to quote Dr. Traiger, to continue to “participate in society,” which she wishes to do, without having to be institutionalized. Surely a modest (but not too modest) sum expended to resolve this case will be more profitable for all concerned than potentially protracted and costly continued litigation.
Over almost twenty-two years on the appellate bench, I have suggested settlement, sua sponte, only a handful of times and never, so far as I recall, in a written opinion. I do so in this ease, however, because although “fight the good fight with all thy might” is often the best exhortation or advice, “come let us reason together” strikes me as far more appropriate here.8 I hope for an outcome that is consistent with the law and fair to all concerned.

. An earlier claim was filed and dismissed in 2001.

. The durable power of attorney is replete with technical terminology, e.g., "indemnification of acts of attorney-in-fact.”

. Ms. Andrews is entitled to an annuity if she is not, or was not, able to engage in “substantial gainful activity.” Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1)(B) (emphasis added); Zwerling v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., No. 97-3132, 1997 WL 716151, at *3 (Fed.Cir. Nov. 17, 1997). As the Merit Systems Protection Board held in Rajbhandary v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 91 M.S.P.R. 192, 196, "the fact of current employment alone [does not] disqualify an applicant. Under SSA regulations, the mere fact that an applicant is employed is not necessarily disqualifying.” Id.

.It might be appropriate for an appellate court to decline to remand if, e.g., the physicians' reports disclosed that the claimant has been a quadriplegic for the entire period which she was claiming a survivor annuity. In In re Melton, 597 A.2d at 908, the en banc court "decline[d] to remand the case, in spite of the trial judge’s failure to make an explicit finding on the question on which the admission of the contested evidence depended,” because a remand would have been futile, and because we "discern[ed] no appreciable possibility" that the judge would make a finding contrary to the one to which the record plainly pointed.

. The Attorney General of the District of Columbia has acknowledged that the Board erred in this regard, and has made no attempt to defend the Board’s decision.

. But see Part III of the opinion, infra.

. I recognize that this is not the only case before the Board, and that allocation of the Board's resources does not fall within the judicial function. I think it appropriate, however, to invite the Board's attention to the importance of the special circumstance which dominates this case, namely, that the claimant is being cared for by a stepmother in her nineties.

. Even if the parties are unable to negotiate an immediate resolution of the entire claim they might explore the possibility of interim payments that would keep Ms. Andrews at home, without prejudice to their overall positions.