Court Opinion

ID: 9947735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 16:04:49.18002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:20.950266
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       IN RE DELINQUENCY OF D.F.

                             No. 1 CA-JV 23-0165
                               FILED 3-5-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             No. JV603415
           The Honorable Keelan J. Bodow, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Olivia Porter
Counsel for Appellant

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
                        IN RE DELINQUENCY OF D.F.
                            Decision of the Court

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1            Devin (a pseudonym) appeals the superior court’s order
committing him to the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections
(“ADJC”). After reviewing the entire record, Devin’s counsel found no non-
frivolous issues and requested we review the record for fundamental error
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Maricopa Cnty. Juv.
Action No. JV-117258, 163 Ariz. 484 (App. 1989) (applying Anders procedure
to juvenile delinquency proceedings). We find no error and affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2              In March 2019, when Devin was 11 years old, he was
adjudicated delinquent after admitting to: (1) conspiracy to commit
abandonment or concealment of a dead body; (2) third degree burglary; and
(3) facilitation to commit burglary. The superior court placed Devin on a 12-
month term of probation. Between March 2019 and February 2023, Devin
was adjudicated delinquent four times for various crimes and probation
violations. And in February 2023, the superior court placed Devin on
intensive probation.

¶3            In May 2023, the state again alleged delinquency against
Devin based on technical probation violations. The superior court
adjudicated Devin delinquent under a plea agreement in which he admitted
to violating his probation by failing to participate in 32 hours of required
weekly activities. The state and the juvenile probation officer recommended
commitment to ADJC rather than supervised probation. Devin and his
mother requested he be released with electronic surveillance. The superior
court committed Devin to ADJC for a minimum of 30 days.

                               DISCUSSION

¶4           The record supports the superior court’s findings that Devin’s
admissions were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and that the factual
basis was adequate to support it. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 220(b), (c). And we
found no fundamental error in our search of the record.

¶5            According to his defense counsel, Devin believes the superior
court abused its discretion by committing him to ADJC. But the superior
court found Devin “needs a severely structured environment to be
successful” and has “been on [electronic surveillance] seven times,” which
has “not led him to success.” See Ariz. Code of Jud. Admin. § 6-
304(C)(1)(a)–(d). And the record shows the superior court considered the
appropriate factors in committing Devin to ADJC, so it did not abuse its

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                       IN RE DELINQUENCY OF D.F.
                           Decision of the Court

discretion. See Ariz. Code of Jud. Admin. § 6-304(C)(1)(a)–(d); A.R.S. § 8-
341(A)(1)(e) (the superior court “may award a delinquent juvenile [to
ADJC]”); In re John G., 191 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 8 (App. 1998) (abuse of discretion
standard for review of disposition orders).

                               CONCLUSION

¶6            We affirm. The filing of this decision ends Devin’s defense
counsel’s obligation to represent Devin in this appeal. Counsel need only
inform Devin of the outcome and his future options, unless counsel finds
an issue appropriate for which to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for
review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct.
609.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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