Court Opinion

ID: 9855248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:21:34.722866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:21.895918
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, J.
{concurring in result). I concur in the result because the trial court is merely following the policy adopted by this Court implicit in the repeal of GrCR 1963, 785.4.
However, the same judicial attitude which moved me to concur in People v. Mallory (1967), 378 Mich 538, and which I expressed, in In re Hoffman (1969), 382 Mich 66, compels me to express my continuing dissatisfaction to the repealing of GrCB, 1963, 785.4.
We are not here concerned with a legalistic paradox — i.e., whether a discretionary leave to appeal can ever constitute a permanent substantive right— but rather whether we shall liberally or strictly construe the term “equal protection.” In my opinion, the term “equal” means just what it says in the area of judicial review; and what one man can afford to buy by his wealth cannot be denied to another simply by virtue of his poverty. Judicial concern with and vigilance against spurious appeals by the popular or powerful defendant, which clog the wheels o'f justice, are no justification for completely *543stopping the judicial machine where the appellant is indigent.
I have always considered GrCR 1963, 785.4(2) to be not only desirable, but also legally necessary to the administration of even-handed justice to both rich and poor alike.
Although I must recognize the fact that GCR 1963, 785.4, has been repealed by order of this Court, I cannot subscribe to the policy underlying the re-pealer and, as manifested by this case, its attendant consequences. Therefore, I concur in the result only.
T. G. Kavanagh, J., did not sit.