Court Opinion

ID: 9489128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:06:24.503765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:20.309774
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
This case is unusual because Dean Witter, one of the principal members of NASD, which requires mandatory arbitration of employment disputes under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange Commission, contends that he is entitled to have this court review the $750,000 punitive damage award únder a due process standard. Dean Witter also asserts that the compensatory award of $728,500 to Glennon for defamation constituted a manifest disregard of the law by the arbitration panel which was not required to set out a factual or legal basis for its various determinations. It is our normal experience that the non-NASD party is the one challenging the actions of a NASD arbitration panel.1
The district court made a thoughtful analysis of the number of issues in the dispute. The district judge confirmed the award and Glennon’s right to enforce it, concluding that Tennessee law should be applied under the circumstances. I agree with the majority that this was not an erroneous determination. I also agree that the making out and filing of the U-5 form, which was the basis of the defamation claim, was not subject to the *140claim of absolute privilege asserted by Dean Witter. Dean Witter is entitled to claim only a qualified privilege in its statements in the Form U-5.2
I write separately because I think it is a close question as to whether Glennon adequately proved, as is necessary under Tennessee law, his damages for defamation. No longer are defamation damages presumed under Tennessee law. Emerson v. Garner, 732 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987). Plaintiff is required to plead and prove actual injury and causation in Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.1978). Since we cannot effectively review the amount of the award of compensatory damages awarded by arbitration, if any actual injury has been proven, I am precluded from anything but an expression of dictum that the panel awards of damages and fees were exceedingly generous for Glennon under the circumstances of this case.
Although I find the damages issue not to be free of doubt, I cannot say that there was no evidence to support the awards in this case. We are constrained to a narrow review under the “manifest disregard” standard, and the arbitrators’ decision was not “so patently contrary to established legal precedent” to set it aside. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 422 (6th Cir.1995).
Accordingly, I concur in the panel decision.

. As pointed out by the district court: “[h]aving enthusiastically welcomed the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the securities industry might be expected not to encourage retrial of a case in federal court" Rostad & Rostad Corp. v. Investment Management & Research, 923 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1991).

. This is not a case where the employer is being held liable because it was wrong or mistaken in giving reasons for a discharge; it was held liable for deliberately and intentionally maligning Glen-non in the U-5.