Court Opinion

ID: 9704410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:34:39.86473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.221853
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Givan, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion for the reason that it is based upon the law recently stated by a split decision of this Court in the case of Kinnaird v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 506, 16 Ind. Dec. 250, 242 N. E. 2d 500. The Kinnaird case held that an affidavit charging crime is not sufficient probable cause upon which to issue an arrest warrant. With this I do not agree. I think the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Indiana are fully met when a sworn statement alleging a commission of a crime by a named person is submitted to a Court, and that Court may consider the affidavit as probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the accused. A
The charging affidavit in the Kinnaird case is set out in the opinion and clearly shows that it is an affidavit on personal knowledge, whereas the authority cited in the opinion in support of the proposition that the affidavit is not sufficient is to the effect that “an affidavit upon information and belief and containing only affiant’s conclusion upon probable cause is not of itself sufficient basis for a search warrant” (emphasis added). The above quote is taken from Rohlf*236ing v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 619, 88 N. E. 2d 148.
The majority opinion in Kinnaird also cited the case of McCurry v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 191, 12 Ind. Dec. 138, 231 N. E. 2d 227, and quoted the following language therefrom:
“The doctrines with reference to hearsay as set out in Rholfing v. State, supra, still remain the law in Indiana.”
It is thus quite apparent from the examination of Kinnaird that the decisions cited therein are not authority for the holding that the affidavit is insufficient to show probable'Cause.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the affidavit recites on its face that it is made upon information and belief, it also shows on its face that the affiant is the person from whom the car was taken. The record before us shows he personally - observed the relator take the automobile. It is thus apparent-that the affidavit in this case was made by a person with personal knowledge of the facts stated therein and, therefore, as in the Kinnaird case, the Trial Court was thoroughly justified in finding probable cause upon which to issue a warrant for arrest.
For the above reasons I would overrule the Kinnaird decision and would deny the writ in this case.
However, inasmuch as the majority of this Court has seen fit to establish the principles set forth in the Kinnaird case as a part of the criminal law of this state, I feel that it is necessary that the comments of the majority opinion in this case be made in order to explain the rulings in the Kinnaird case and to serve as a guide to the judges and prosecuting attorneys of this state who are charged with compliance with the Kinnaird ruling.
Note.—Reported in 247 N. E. 2d 519.