Court Opinion

ID: 9901594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 06:05:51.752894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.586064
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    November 21, 2023
                Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 363261
                                                                    Barry Circuit Court
KEITH ALLEN HUGGINS,                                                LC No. 2022-000053-FH

                Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Following a nolo contendere plea, defendant was convicted of felon in possession of a
firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and operating while intoxicated (OWI), third
offense, MCL 257.625(9)(c).1 He was sentenced as a habitual offender, fourth offense,
MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 10 to 30 years’ imprisonment for each offense. Defendant
appeals by leave granted,2 and we vacate and remand for resentencing.

                         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        On January 14, 2022, at 11:43 p.m., defendant’s wife called the police to report that
defendant was intoxicated, armed with a loaded weapon, and intended to shoot out the windows
of a local market. The police arrived at the market. A short time later, defendant drove into the
market’s parking lot. A police officer positioned his vehicle behind defendant’s vehicle.
Defendant stepped out of his car and was instructed to approach the officer. As defendant walked
toward the officer, he appeared to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant advised the police officer
that he was drunk and had a loaded firearm in the car. A loaded rifle was recovered by the police.

1
    Three additional weapon offense charges were dismissed.
2
  People v Huggins, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 15, 2022
(Docket No. 363261).

                                                -1-
       Defendant consented to a field sobriety test, displaying “clues” of intoxication.3 He agreed
to provide a preliminary breath test sample, and it disclosed a .102 result. The laboratory results
from a later blood draw revealed a .091 blood alcohol content. When questioned about the
incident,4 defendant indicated that he was highly intoxicated and believed that he had a flashback
from his military service during a war or suffered from other trauma. Additionally, defendant
could not recall the impetus for his actions, claiming that he had been “off [his] meds” for several
days.

       At the plea hearing, the trial court noted that defendant was pleading no-contest to felon-
in-possession and OWI, third offense, both five-year felonies, but also possibly constituting life
offenses in light of defendant’s status as a habitual fourth offender. Defense counsel advised that
the foundation for the no-contest plea was a lack of memory arising from defendant’s intoxication.
The trial court recited the following factual scenario as the bases for the offenses, without
delineating the source of the information:

               This happened on or about January 14th of this year, so about a month ago.
       It happened right here in Barry County. Pursuant to Count I, the Defendant did
       possess or transport a firearm when ineligible to do so because he . . . had been
       convicted of an Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse, a specified felony, and the
       requirements for regaining eligibility to possess a firearm had not been met.
       Pursuant to Count 5, the Defendant was operating a motor vehicle on the roadways
       after having drunk some amount of alcohol. The amount of alcohol was over
       Michigan’s 0.08 legal limit.

The trial court, with the assistance of counsel, delineated the underlying offenses to support the
OWI, third offense, as well as the fourth habitual offender.

       In the presentence investigation report (PSIR), it was noted that these offenses for felon-
in-possession and OWI, third offense, were defendant’s only criminal history in Michigan. It was
reported that defendant had a significant criminal history in Illinois, including seven prior felony
convictions and five prior misdemeanor convictions.5 As a result, defendant had been imprisoned

3
 Defendant advised that he could not perform the “walk and turn” and “one leg” tests, citing
paralysis on the left side of his body.
4
  Because of the plea agreement, the facts are principally derived from the presentence
investigation report (PSIR) and the transcripts.
5
  According to the PSIR, defendant was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for aggravated
criminal sexual abuse in Illinois in 1987. He was released from prison in November 1988. He
was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence and theft offenses between 1989 and
1994. Between 1994 and 2002, defendant was not convicted of any offenses. Between 2002 and
2010, defendant was convicted of drunk driving or assaultive related offenses. He generally
received probation or jail terms. However, for an aggravated domestic battery conviction and an
unlawful weapon possession conviction committed in Illinois in 2006, defendant received a two-
year prison term. Yet, he was released within three months on community supervision. Between

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twice, sentenced to jail on five occasions, and placed on probation four times. He had a pending
misdemeanor for drunk driving in Louisiana, but it did not appear that there was a warrant for his
arrest arising from that charge.

        To the probation department, defendant indicated that he was in the United States Army
until he received a medical discharge for injuries sustained while serving in Iraq.6 Defendant stated
that he was unemployed and received disability benefits since 2005. For his strengths, the
probation department noted that defendant had completed a basic education, received vocational
training as a mechanic, served in the United States Army, and cooperated during the interview.
Defendant’s weaknesses included his substance abuse history, his criminal history, his physical
and mental health problems, and his lack of a significant support system. Defendant had no living
family members, and his wife sought to evict him from their home while he was in jail.

        The probation department calculated the sentencing guidelines range for felon-in-
possession at 9 to 46 months. The sentencing guidelines range for OWI, third offense, was
calculated at 10 to 46 months. It was also noted that defendant was not eligible for drug or sobriety
court because of his no-contest plea, and he was ineligible for alternative incarceration in light of
his two prior prison terms as well as his physical and mental health issues. Nonetheless, it was
concluded that defendant needed both substance abuse and mental health treatment. Accordingly,
the probation department recommended that defendant be given a 24-month period of probation,
commencing with a 10-month jail sentence until a placement became available in the Alternative
Directions program. This program would purportedly provide defendant with substance abuse and
mental health treatment and temporary housing. Defendant would also be required to perform
community service.

        At sentencing, defendant, who was 54 years old, arrived in a wheelchair. At the
commencement of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor opined that he did not seek to have the
PSIR amended, but would include additional facts during his allocution.7 The prosecutor later
noted that defendant actually had five OWI convictions and an additional charge pending in
Louisiana. Defendant also pleaded to his second felon-in-possession conviction and had four
offenses involving assaultive behaviors. The prosecutor asserted that defendant’s actions needed
to be placed in context. Specifically, it was alleged that in Eaton County, defendant and his wife
were drinking alcohol. Defendant believed that his wife was cheating on him with a fellow
employee at the local market. Defendant’s wife asserted that defendant punched her in the chest

2010 and 2019, defendant was not convicted of any offenses, but was purportedly charged with
driving while intoxicated in Louisiana in 2019. The specific details underlying these crimes were
not delineated in the PSIR. In January 2022, defendant committed and pleaded guilty to his first
underlying Michigan offenses.
6
  In the PSIR, it was noted that defendant’s report of years of military service conflicted with his
criminal record.
7
  When sentencing began, the trial court inquired of the prosecutor whether there were any
additions, deletions, or corrections to the presentence investigation (PSI). The prosecutor
responded, “Your Honor, there are more facts that I want to add, but I can do that during my
allocution. I don’t need to have the PSI[R] amended.”

                                                -3-
and retrieved a 16-gauge shotgun to shoot at his wife’s vehicle. This gun fell apart. Defendant
then purportedly went back into the home to retrieve a rifle and ripped the landline from the wall
to prevent his wife from calling the police. Defendant allegedly advised his wife that he would
kill himself, her, and burn the house down. Defendant also purportedly sent a message to a friend
that admitted to the vehicle shooting and his intent to harm his wife and himself.

        The prosecutor advised that when defendant was apprehended he admitted to damaging his
wife’s vehicle but denied striking her. Additionally, defendant acknowledged damaging his wife’s
vehicle to prevent her from going to the market and having an affair with a coworker. The
prosecutor further apprised the court that defendant planned to “do suicide by cop” at the market,
but it did not get to that point. The prosecutor requested a sentence of 120 to 360 months, citing
the dangerous nature of defendant’s crimes that included shooting a weapon, an assault upon his
wife, drunk driving, threats of murder/suicide, and a threat to engage law enforcement in a
shooting. The prosecutor explained that the sentencing guidelines did not account for the pattern
of criminal activity and “the danger that everyone was placed in that night.”8

       Defense counsel stated that defendant suffered from significant mental health and
substance abuse issues for which he needed treatment. The program recommended by the

8
  Although defendant was charged in Barry County, the prosecutor argued these facts that were
delineated in an Eaton County Police Report. There is no indication that this report was part of
the Barry County court file. Although the prosecutor attached the report as an appendix
purportedly as foundation, this attachment nonetheless constitutes an impermissible expansion of
the record on appeal. People v Morrison, 328 Mich App 647, 655; 939 NW2d 728 (2019).
Moreover, the prosecutor did not apprise the trial court of the contents of this police report that
favored defendant. Specifically, defendant’s wife acknowledged that defendant had “problems”
when he drank, but she reported that he had not been violent with her previously and his actions
on this occasion were essentially out of character. To the Eaton County police, defendant denied
the physicality of his actions, including striking his wife and disabling the phone by ripping the
cord from the wall. Without the submission of the full police report to the trial court and the failure
to amend the PSIR to include the contents of the police report, the accuracy of the prosecutor’s
representations regarding the underlying uncharged criminal acts in Eaton County could not be
verified. And, again, the mitigating contents of that police report were not highlighted by the
prosecutor. A defendant is entitled to be sentenced premised on accurate information. People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). When the accuracy of sentencing information
is challenged, the trial court has a duty to allow the parties to be heard and must make a finding
regarding the challenged information or determine that the challenged information will be not
relied on in sentencing. People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 689; 780 NW2d 321 (2009).
The prosecutor stated that he declined to seek amendment of the PSIR, but nonetheless argued the
contents of the Eaton County Police Report. In light of defendant’s right to be sentenced premised
on accurate information and the prosecutor’s attachment of the document on appeal, the
amendment would have been the appropriate course of action. See Francisco, 474 Mich App at
88; see also MCR 7.210(A)(1).

                                                 -4-
probation department, Alternative Directions, offered defendant the necessary tools to address his
problems.

        In his allocution, defendant denied that he intended to engage in “suicide by cop.” He
explained that, if that was his intent, he would have removed the gun from the car. Instead,
defendant indicated that he stepped out of the car with his hands up and advised the officer that
there was a gun in the car. When asked by the trial court why he had a gun, defendant stated that
he did not know what happened and was unsure if he suffered a flashback from the war. Defendant
advised the court that he needed help with his alcoholism and drug use. When the trial court noted
that treatment programs had been offered before, defendant stated that he “wasn’t ready for it
then.”

       The trial court concluded that the guidelines were “inaccurate” because they did not
account for the number of drunk driving offenses and the serious nature of the offenses, particularly
when someone could have been injured. Specifically, the trial court stated:

        . . . I think sometimes the guidelines are clearly, in anybody’s opinion, lower than
       what . . . they should be. Even if you’re not gonna give a guideline sentence that
       would be . . . at the maximum -- When you look at the criminal history and you
       look what happened here, there’s no way possible that this should be a 10 to 46
       month guideline range. That just shows in this case they’re clearly not accurate.
       They clearly don’t fully score . . . this, nor to some extent can they, [be]cause every
       drunk driving is slightly different. I mean, we kinda stop scorin[g th]em almost at
       three in our state, between 5 and 12 it doesn’t really score any different. Of course
       the fifth time is different than a twelfth. The felon in possession of a firearm could
       be . . . a piece of ammunition. It can be a gun that they do nothing with whatsoever,
       has no ammunition in it, as long as it’s fireable or could . . . readily be made to be
       fireable. It doesn’t even . . . have to currently be fireable.

              This is serious. This is really serious. And . . . it’s only really . . . [by] the
       grace of God, or accident on your part, or who knows what, somebody didn’t end
       up dead here. . . . Including you. . . .

              I’m gonna go through the factors here that I have. Seriousness of the crime.
       This is really serious and the simple charges themselves, Operating While
       Intoxicated as a third offense, this is in fact a fifth offense, so it’s worse than the
       charge would appear.

               Felon in possession of a Firearm, again, I’m incorporating by reference all
       of the arguments made by the Prosecutor already. This not just I happened to have
       a firearm under the seat of the . . . car and . . . I’m a felon. This is someone who
       took a firearm. We all know that once you actually fire -- you pull the trigger once,
       the whole world changes as far as law enforcement, everybody else, about the threat
       level. [Bec]ause now you’re willing to pull the trigger. And you pull the trigger,
       and then you threaten someone you’re gonna kill them, and then you bring that.
       Again, it’s like with a school situation. When I threaten a school, that’s wholly
       different than if I actually travel to the school. When you travel to her place of

                                                 -5-
       work, wow, that just completely changes things, and now you traveled there with
       weapons. Again, the charges themselves cannot reflect that. . . . The Guidelines
       cannot reflect all of that here.

               Protection of society. Listen, he’s had crimes, he was . . . put in prison but
       way back [in] 1987 for the first time, and he’s been in prison since that again. So
       he’s been in prison twice, he’s had services available, he’s had counseling and
       rehabilitative . . . services. Probably has had them if not certainly been available to
       him. He acknowledges that. He acknowledges that he simply wasn’t ready, and
       now he’s ready. I . . . wish I could absolutely know your mind and heart and knew
       that was true, but I don’t. And at this point I have to protect society. I have to think
       of them before I think of you.

               I think a sentence above the guidelines is absolutely appropriate here. I
       think it’s clearly proportionate to the nature of the charges, both charges here. I
       had already written down notes here, and again, I don’t talk to the Prosecutor,
       Prosecutor[] never told me what his thoughts are at all, but I had written down the
       exact same thing here, a hundred and twenty to thirty-six months [sic] on both
       charges with credit for, I believe it’s accurate, 96 days served.

We granted leave of defendant’s challenge to the sentences that departed above the guidelines
range.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        Defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court imposed an
unreasonable and disproportionate upward departure from the recommended guidelines range. We
agree.9

        Although a court must score and consider the sentencing guidelines, the guidelines are
advisory only. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 365, 399; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). The
sentencing guidelines ranges are subject to enhancement when the defendant is a habitual offender.
MCL 777.21(3); see People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 474-475; 683 NW2d 192 (2004), aff’d
473 Mich 399; 702 NW2d 530 (2005). The variables underlying the sentencing guideline range
are calculated premised on the preponderance of the evidence, and the prosecutor’s statements are

9
  To the extent defendant submitted that he was erroneously sentenced premised on hearsay, the
Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing. See MRE 1101(b)(3); People v
McFarlane, 325 Mich App 507, 535; 926 NW2d 339 (2018). Moreover, a trial court’s
consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing violates the defendant’s due process protections.
See People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 629-630; 939 NW2d 213 (2019). Although acquitted conduct
may not be used at sentencing, there is no constitutional impediment to preclude a sentencing court
for punishing a defendant as if he engaged in uncharged conduct when the sentencing court finds
the conduct was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 626-627.

                                                 -6-
not evidence. People v Swift, 505 Mich 980; 937 NW2d 687 (2020), 10 citing People v Ison, 132
Mich App 61, 68; 346 NW2d 894 (1984).11

        “A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an
appellate court for reasonableness.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 520; 909 NW2d 458
(2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).12 The appellate court, when reviewing the
sentence for reasonableness, applies the abuse of discretion standard. Id. “[T]he relevant question
for appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by violating the principle of proportionality[.]” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome that falls outside
the range of principled outcomes.” People v March, 499 Mich 389, 397; 886 NW2d 396 (2016)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

        “A court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing
guidelines set forth in chapter XVII if the departure is reasonable and the court states on the record
the reasons for departure.” MCL 769.34(3) (footnote and citation omitted); see also
MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e) (“At sentencing, the court must, on the record: (e) if the sentence imposed is
not within the guidelines range, articulate the reasons justifying that specific departure[.]”).
Additionally, the court may not premise “a departure on an offense characteristic or offender
characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the
court finds from the facts contained in the court record, including the presentence investigation
report, that the characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.”
MCL 769.34(3)(b). “If the trial judge justifies a departure from the guidelines by stating that he
does so because of the nature of the offense and the record of the offender, the trial court has
considered these factors twice.” People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 658-659; 461 NW2d 1 (1990)
(citation omitted).

        When the trial court departs from the sentencing guidelines, the sentence is also reviewed
for reasonableness and must conform with the principle of proportionality. Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich
App at 520. The principle of proportionality provides:

10
  Although only an order from our Supreme Court, such orders constitute binding precedent when
their rationale can be understood. People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 414; 722 NW2d 237
(2006).
11
  The Swift Court vacated the defendant’s score of 10 points for Offense Variable (OV) 4 that was
premised “solely on the prosecutor’s assertion.” Because the attorney’s statement was not
evidence and the offense variables must be scored in light of the preponderance of the evidence,
the 10-point reduction for OV 4 resulted in a lower sentencing range and entitled defendant to
resentencing. Swift, 505 Mich at 980.
12
  See also People v Posey, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 162373); slip
op at 29 (Opinion by BOLDEN, J.). (“[A]ppellate courts must review all sentences for
reasonableness, which requires the reviewing court to consider whether the sentence is
proportionate to the seriousness of the matter.”).

                                                 -7-
       [A] judge helps to fulfill the overall legislative scheme of criminal punishment by
       taking care to assure that the sentences imposed across the discretionary range are
       proportionate to the seriousness of the matters that come before the court for
       sentencing. In making this assessment, the judge, of course, must take into account
       the nature of the offense and the background of the offender. [Id. at 520-521
       (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

The key test under this principle is whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the
matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the guidelines’ recommended range. Id. at 521
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The factors to consider when applying the proportionality
standard include:

       (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by
       the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the
       relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct
       while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s
       potential for rehabilitation. [People v Lawhorn, 320 Mich App 194, 207; 907
       NW2d 832 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

        A departure from the guidelines recommendation must result in a more proportionate
criminal sentence than the sentence obtainable within the guidelines range. People v Smith, 482
Mich 292, 305; 754 NW2d 284 (2008). If the trial court imposes a sentence outside of the
guidelines range, it must justify the extent of the departure. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453,
476; 902 NW2d 327 (2017); Smith, 482 Mich at 305-306. When the trial court fails to provide
any explanation for the extent of the departure independent from the grounds expressed for a
departure sentence, a justification for the departure is lacking and impairs appellate review. See
Smith, 482 Mich at 305-310. When the trial court fails to provide adequate reasons for the extent
of the departure sentence imposed, the remedy is to remand to the trial court for resentencing.
Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476.

        In imposing defendant’s sentence, the trial court cited to defendant’s lengthy criminal
history and incarcerations, the potential seriousness of the present offenses, and defendant’s failed
benefits from prior treatment programs. We recognize that the trial court was entitled to determine
that defendant’s repetitive commission of the same offenses, including driving while intoxicated
and being a felon-in-possession, as well as the danger posed by the nature of the offenses were
inadequately reflected in the calculation of the sentencing guidelines range. Indeed, the trial court
may determine that these factors were given inadequate weight. See e.g., People v Horn, 279 Mich
App 31, 46; 755 NW2d 212 (2008); People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 636; 683 NW2d 687
(2004). But, after the court examined the four goals of sentencing, it failed to expressly explain
the extent of the departure and the reasons why it resulted in a more proportionate sentence under

                                                -8-
the circumstances.13 See MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e); Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476; Smith, 482 Mich at
305-306. In light of this failure, we vacate defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing.14

       Vacated and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Anica Letica
                                                               /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                               /s/ Michelle M. Rick

13
   Again, it is important to note that a departure from the guidelines premised on the nature of the
offense and the record of the offender results in consideration of factors twice. See Milbourn, 435
Mich at 658-659. Furthermore, the reliance of the facts stated by the prosecutor without the benefit
of the actual Eaton County Police Report did not reflect exculpatory information given by
defendant to the police or the mitigating information contained therein, and did not examine
defendant’s history in detail. For example, the trial court stated that defendant had participated in
treatment previously without success. However, there was no inquiry or evidence presented
regarding the type of treatment received, its duration, and when it transpired. Thus, it was
unknown whether defendant received treatment in Illinois prison facilities and whether those
programs were consistent with Michigan programs. Additionally, defendant’s criminal record
reflected that there were long periods where defendant was not charged with criminal behavior.
There was no inquiry whether those periods were attributable to sobriety or other factors. In light
of the extent of the departure, nearly three times the maximum of the calculated guidelines, the
lengthy minimum and maximum periods of incarceration were not explained despite the trial
court’s concern regarding defendant’s criminal record and the potential risk of danger.
14
   In light of our conclusion that defendant is entitled to resentencing, we do not address
defendant’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
recitation of additional underlying facts at sentencing. At resentencing, the prosecutor must prove
adverse factual assertions by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Walker, 428 Mich 261,
268; 407 NW2d 367 (1987). See also People v Ewing, 435 Mich 443, 462; 458 NW2d 880 (1990)
(Opinion by BOYLE, J.). (“[A] sentence must be based on inferences drawn from accurate
information and that, when disputed, an unverified offense or activity cannot be relied on at
sentencing.”). Although the prosecutor asserted that defendant struck his wife in the chest in Eaton
County and sought to engage in “suicide by cop” in Barry County, defendant disputed both of
those assertions. We presume that the trial court will make a record of the consideration of
appropriate facts that meet the evidentiary standards for the imposition of a departure sentence, if
any, to aid in appellate review. To the extent the prosecutor argued on appeal that defendant failed
to object to his determination to state facts during allocution instead of amending the PSIR, the
prosecutor’s statements are not evidence and would not be deemed accurate information
warranting consideration by a preponderance of the evidence. Swift, 505 Mich at 980. Moreover,
the content of the PSIR and the right of allocution or “opportunity to advise the court of any
circumstances they believe the court should consider in imposing sentence” are two distinct
considerations. See MCR 6.425(D)(1)(b) and (c).

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