Court Opinion

ID: 9961716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:12:41.536584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:27.394070
License: Public Domain

J-S08019-24

                                   2024 PA Super 76

  MICHAEL KOPINETZ                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WASTE MANAGEMENT AND                         :   No. 1344 MDA 2023
  PROCESSORS, INC.                             :

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 24, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at
                            No(s): S-409-2023

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED: APRIL 19, 2024

       Michael Kopinetz (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s order

sustaining preliminary objections filed by his employer, Waste Management

and Processors, Inc. (WMP), and dismissing with prejudice his complaint

alleging WMP terminated him in violation of the Medical Marijuana Act (MMA),

35 P.S. § 10231.101 et seq. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

       Appellant’s complaint alleged the following. WMP hired Appellant as a

loader in November 2015. Second Amended Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶ 6. During

his employment, Appellant suffered from “lower degenerative back/disc

disease and carpel tunnel syndrome.” Id. ¶ 5. In January 2021, with his

medical caregiver’s authorization, Appellant was issued a valid Medical

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S08019-24

Marijuana Card (MMC) for treatment of his back and carpel tunnel conditions.

Id. ¶¶ 9-10.    Six months later, in June 2021, WMP randomly selected

Appellant for a drug test. Id. ¶ 12. Appellant did not disclose to the third-

party test administrator that he was legally permitted to use medical

marijuana. Id. ¶ 13.

     One week later, WMP requested that Appellant come into the office,

where WMP informed Appellant that his drug test revealed a positive result for

marijuana. Id. ¶ 14. Appellant “immediately explained that he lawfully used

medical marijuana for his medical conditions and held a valid MMC.” Id. ¶ 15.

After Appellant disclosed this information, WMP “immediately suspended”

Appellant and informed him that “he would hear from the company in the near

future regarding his employment status with [WMP].” Id. ¶ 16.

     Appellant’s complaint further alleged:

           17. [WMP] did not at this time terminate [Appellant] due
     to the results of his drug screening.

           18. Prior to [Appellant’s] disclosure that he is a medical
     marijuana cardholder, [WMP] did not take any adverse action
     against him.

          19. Instead, [Appellant] was informed by [WMP] that he
     was suspended while [WMP] looked into its “policy.”

           20. Under      information     and    belief, [WMP]     was
     investigating whether or not it would continue to employ a medical
     marijuana cardholder.

          21. Following the above described meeting, nearly one (1)
     month … passed without [WMP] contacting [Appellant].

          22. In or around late June 2021, [Appellant] was
     contacted by a human resources employee of [WMP,] who

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       informed [Appellant] that his employment with [WMP] was
       terminated.

            23. Specifically, [WMP] informed [Appellant] that his
       employment was being terminated as [WMP was] now unable to
       employ him because he lawfully used marijuana to treat his
       medical conditions.

             24. Under information and belief, [WMP’s] one-month
       long investigation into whether or not it would employ[] a medical
       marijuana cardholder[] resulted in the conclusion that [WMP]
       would not employ a medical marijuana cardholder.

             25. [Appellant] was terminated because he is a medical
       marijuana cardholder.

Id. ¶¶ 17-25.

       Appellant’s complaint set forth one count for violation of the MMA, which

provides, in relevant part:

       No employer may discharge, threaten, refuse to hire or
       otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee
       regarding an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
       location or privileges solely on the basis of such employee’s
       status as an individual who is certified to use medical
       marijuana.

35 P.S. § 10231.2103(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also Second Amended

Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶¶ 26-32.1 Appellant alleged WMP violated the MMA “by

suspending and then terminating [Appellant] after learning that [Appellant]

was a certified medical marijuana cardholder under the [MMA] to treat his

medical conditions.” Id. ¶ 31. Appellant alleged he suffered “lost earnings,

____________________________________________

1 In Palmiter v. Commonwealth Health Sys., Inc., 260 A.3d 967, 977 (Pa.

Super. 2021), this Court recognized the existence of an implied private right
of action under Section 10231.2103(b)(1) of the MMA.

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lost employment benefits, and non-economic damages in the form of

embarrassment, humiliation, and anxiety.” Id. ¶ 32.

      WMP filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing

Appellant’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. Preliminary Objections, 7/7/23, ¶ 18 (citing Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4)

(preliminary objections may be filed for legal insufficiency of a pleading)).

WMP argued Appellant’s complaint made “clear that [WMP’s] termination of

[Appellant] was for legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons, specifically the

positive drug test, and not solely on the basis of [Appellant’s] status as an

individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.”       Id. ¶ 25 (some

capitalization modified).   WMP maintained Appellant’s complaint “clearly

state[d] … that he was informed by [WMP] that his employment was being

terminated because of his use of marijuana.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis in original)

(citing Second Amended Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶ 23).

      WMP noted the MMA provides:

      Nothing in this act shall require an employer to make any
      accommodation of the use of medical marijuana on the property
      or premises of any place of employment. This act shall in no way
      limit an employer’s ability to discipline an employee for being
      under the influence of medical marijuana in the workplace or for
      working while under the influence of medical marijuana when the
      employee’s conduct falls below the standard of care normally
      accepted for that position.

35 P.S. § 10231.2103(b)(2); see also Preliminary Objections, 7/7/23, ¶¶ 30-

31. WMP asserted Appellant’s positive drug test “established that [Appellant]

was under the influence of marijuana in the workplace, for which he was

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appropriately disciplined and terminated from employment by [WMP].” Id. ¶

32.

      On August 24, 2023, the trial court entered an order sustaining WMP’s

preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice.

Order, 8/24/23. In an accompanying opinion, the trial court stated:

             It is undisputed that [Appellant] was suspended and then
      terminated from work due to using marijuana and having it show
      up on a positive drug screening. [Appellant] was not selected for
      a drug test based upon his certification as a medical marijuana
      user[,] because it is undisputed that [WMP] was unaware of his
      status until after the test. [Appellant] was not scheduled for a
      disciplinary hearing because of his status[,] but because he tested
      positive for marijuana. As [WMP] was unaware of [Appellant’s]
      medical marijuana status, [WMP] was unable to discriminate
      against [Appellant] based upon his status. Instead, [Appellant]
      had a positive drug test due to random testing, he never disclosed
      prior to the disciplinary meeting that he had a certified medical
      marijuana card[,] and he was terminated based upon his positive
      drug test.

             The [MMA] specifically does not limit [WMP’s] ability to
      discipline [Appellant] or any other employees for being under the
      influence of marijuana. There is no dispute that [WMP] was
      unaware of [Appellant’s] status until after the positive drug screen
      at the disciplinary meeting for his positive drug test. Taking the
      facts in the light most favorable to [Appellant], there is no cause
      of action under the MMA.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/24/23, at 3-4.

      Appellant filed a timely appeal.      Appellant and the trial court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents a single question for our review:

      Did the trial court err in applying the applicable standard of review
      when sustaining [WMP]’s preliminary objections and dismissing
      Appellant’s complaint with prejudice?

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Appellant’s Brief at 2.

      Appellant argues the trial court did not accept his complaint’s allegation

that WMP terminated him because he is a medical marijuana cardholder. Id.

at 11-12. He maintains the trial court improperly decided “a factual issue that

may be in dispute,” namely, “when [WMP] manifested its intent to terminate

[Appellant] and on what theories it relied….” Id. at 12.

      WMP reiterates the arguments made in its preliminary objections, i.e.,

that Appellant’s complaint stated Appellant was terminated because of the

positive drug test, and “not solely on the basis of [Appellant’s] status as an

individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.” WMP’s Brief at 11.

      In conducting our review, we apply the following principles:

      As a trial court’s decision to sustain or overrule a demurrer
      involves a matter of law, our standard for reviewing that decision
      is plenary. Preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers are
      proper when the law is clear that a plaintiff is not entitled to
      recovery based on the facts alleged in the complaint. Moreover,
      when considering a motion for a demurrer, the trial court must
      accept as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the
      complaint and all inferences fairly deducible from those facts.

             Furthermore, our standard of review of an order of the trial
      court overruling or sustaining preliminary objections is to
      determine whether the trial court committed an error of law.
      When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary
      objections, the appellate court must apply the same standard as
      the trial court.

             Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the
      legal sufficiency of the complaint. Preliminary objections which
      seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only
      in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader
      will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right
      to relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be

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J-S08019-24

      sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the
      preliminary objections.

R.A. Greig Equip. Co. v. Mark Erie Hosp., LLC, 305 A.3d 56, 59 (Pa. Super.

2023) (citations and brackets omitted).

      When addressing preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, a

trial court

      may determine only whether, on the basis of the allegations the
      plaintiff pled, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at
      law. The court may not consider factual matters … and the court
      may not address the merits of matters represented in the
      complaint.

In re Adoption of S.P.T., 783 A.2d 779, 782 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations

omitted; italics in original); see also Bailey v. Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206,

1213 (Pa. Super. 1999) (reversing an order sustaining a demurrer in an

employment discrimination action where the complaint pled facts sufficient to

establish prima facie case of discriminatory discharge); Podgurski v.

Pennsylvania State Univ., 722 A.2d 730, 732-33 (Pa. Super. 1998)

(reversing an order sustaining a demurrer in a whistleblower action where the

complaint alleged the plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for complaints

about co-workers’ wrongdoing).

      In Hykes v. Hughes, 835 A.2d 382 (Pa. Super. 2003), an employee’s

complaint alleged she quit her job just prior to the incident underlying her tort

claim against the defendant employer. Id. at 383-84. The employer filed

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. Id. at 384. The trial court

granted the employer’s preliminary objections, finding that the incident

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J-S08019-24

occurred in the course of the plaintiff’s employment and, therefore, her

exclusive remedy was a workers’ compensation claim.                Id.   This Court

reversed, holding that in light of the complaint’s allegation that the plaintiff

quit her job, “it [was] reasonable to infer, at least at this stage of the litigation,

that she was no longer employed” at the time of the incident. Id. at 386.

“The trial court’s determination to the contrary,” we observed, was “at odds

with a view of the pleadings under a preliminary objections standard.” Id.

(citations omitted).    We concluded the trial court “stepp[ed] beyond its

authority (at the preliminary objections stage) and substitute[ed] its own

deduction” on the issue of the plaintiff’s “employee status (a finding of fact),

… which is a matter for a trier-of-fact to decide when in dispute.” Id.

      Here, Appellant argues the trial court’s decision rested heavily on the

fact that WMP was unaware of Appellant’s medical marijuana cardholder status

prior to the June 2021 meeting. Appellant’s Brief at 11; see also Trial Court

Opinion, 8/24/23, at 2-4; Rule 1925 Opinion, 11/16/23, at 1-2; Second

Amended Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶¶ 10-15.              Our review discloses this fact

formed the basis of the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant “was terminated

based upon his positive drug test.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/24/23, at 4.

      However, the complaint alleged that WMP did not take any adverse

action against Appellant until after he disclosed his cardholder status. Second

Amended Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶ 18.              Appellant argues WMP “had the

opportunity to terminate [Appellant] because of [the positive drug] test

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results” at the June 2021 meeting, but did not do so. Appellant’s Brief at 11-

12. Instead, the complaint alleged, WMP suspended Appellant while it looked

into its “policy.” Second Amended Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶ 19. The complaint

alleged that, after investigating whether the company would continue to

employ a medical marijuana cardholder, WMP concluded it would not. Id. ¶¶

20, 24. The complaint specifically alleged that WMP terminated Appellant not

because of the positive drug test, but because he was a medical marijuana

cardholder. Id. ¶¶ 17, 25.

      Based on our review of the complaint, we agree with Appellant’s

argument that “when [WMP] manifested its intent to terminate [Appellant,]

and on what theories it relied[,]” are issues of fact for the fact-finder’s

determination.   Appellant’s Brief at 12.    Notwithstanding, the trial court

rejected Appellant’s argument:

      Appellant argues that [the trial c]ourt failed to take into
      consideration that [WMP] suspended Appellant for a month
      following the failed drug test in order to consider [WMP’s] medical
      marijuana policy. Contrary to Appellant’s argument that this
      shows he was fired due to his status as a medical marijuana
      cardholder, the [c]ourt decided that the Appellant was
      terminated due to the positive drug test.

Rule 1925 Opinion, 11/16/23, at 2 (emphasis added). Our review discloses

that the trial court did not accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true,

but rather substituted its own judgment and decided a disputed factual issue

against Appellant. See id. This was error.

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       Accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, see R.A. Greig

Equip. Co., 305 A.3d at 59, Appellant was terminated solely on the basis of

his status as an individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.2 As such,

Appellant’s complaint is legally sufficient to establish a right to relief under

____________________________________________

2 WMP argues the complaint “clearly states” Appellant “was informed by
[WMP] that his employment was being terminated because of his use of
marijuana.” WMP’s Brief at 8 (emphasis in original). WMP relies on paragraph
23 of the complaint, which alleged: “[WMP] informed [Appellant] that his
employment was being terminated as [WMP was] now unable to employ him
because he lawfully used marijuana to treat his medical conditions.”
Second Amended Complaint, 6/22/23, ¶ 23 (emphasis added). Reading this
paragraph in context with the rest of the complaint’s allegations, it is
reasonable to infer that it refers not to marijuana use generally but specifically
to Appellant’s status as a lawful medical marijuana user.

       WMP further argues Appellant’s positive drug test “established that
[Appellant] was under the influence of marijuana in the workplace, for which
he was appropriately disciplined and terminated from employment by [WMP].”
WMP’s Brief at 13; see also Preliminary Objections, 7/7/23, ¶ 32. The trial
court appeared to credit this argument, emphasizing that the MMA “in no way
limit[s] an employer’s ability to discipline an employee for being under the
influence of medical marijuana in the work[place].” Rule 1925 Opinion,
11/16/23, at 2 (quoting 35 P.S. § 10231.2103(b)(2)); see also Trial Court
Opinion, 8/24/23, at 4. Viewed under the proper standard of review, the
complaint does not support an inference that Appellant was under the
influence of marijuana in the workplace or that WMP terminated him for being
under the influence of marijuana in the workplace. Moreover, a plain reading
of the MMA reveals that an employer may discipline an employee for being
under the influence of medical marijuana “when the employee’s conduct
falls below the standard of care normally accepted for that
position”. 35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(2) (emphasis added). Nothing in the
complaint supports an inference that Appellant’s conduct fell below the
requisite standard of care.

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Section 10231.2103(b)(1) of the MMA.          Accordingly, we reverse the trial

court’s order sustaining the demurrer to Appellant’s complaint.

      Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge Olson joins the opinion.

      P.J.E. Stevens files a dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/19/2024

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