Court Opinion

ID: 9791574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:13:51.382364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.936891
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting).
It is indisputably clear from the evidence that Donald Price, the owner of this Porsche sedan, was knowingly transporting in it considerable quantities of illicit drugs: marijuana and amphetamine pills; and that they were discovered and seized in connection with his lawful arrest. The Highway Patrol officers had followed this *921car, clocking its speed at 95 to 100 miles per hour. The arresting officer, William Pectol, testified that at the time of the arrest he observed in the car in an open sack plastic bags containing what appeared to be marijuana; and also observed different kinds of pills.
The amounts of these substances is not expressly stated. But it is clear that the one ounce of marijuana which was tested had no relationship whatsoever to the total quantities of illicit drugs found in the car. Informative on this point are certain excerpts from the record. Officer Pectol said that after he had informed Mr. Price that he was under arrest and “read him his rights from the card” :
Q. What did you do then ?
A. I laid all the stuff containing contents of the sack on the hood of the patrol car and asked him if he could identify it and asked him if the other two passengers knew what was in the vehicle. And he stated no, that the marijuana was his, and I asked him if he could identify the pills and he said they are amphetamines.
Q. Now from that tell me what you did in getting the samples ?
A. We dumped all of the contents on the desk in the patrol office. Took a sample of marijuana and placed it in a plastic bag and taped it up, placed it inside of the yellow envelope. Wrote on the sample 1, my case number and what the sample was containing. Sealed that envelope, taped it and initialed it, and we did this to each of the different colored pills.
Q. That was sent in to the state toxicologist ?
A. Yes.
Also pertinent to this point is a statement of the trial court with reference to the proffered evidence. In speaking of the officer’s testimony he stated in part:
he testified that there were a number of plastic bags and I just can’t assume that what is in that bag is marijuana ....
* * * * * *
I mean I can infer from what you said I can make a reasonable inference, but I don’t think it is established to the point that I can receive it in evidence as marijuana. Without having been tested. When all he says is he suspects that it is. He took out some and they say that was marijuana, but I don’t feel warranted in making an assumption to the point where I will admit it in evidence as marijuana upon merely his suspicion. I think I have got all of the mileage you can get out of it when he (Officer Pectol) says he took some out and proved to be marijuana and here is the report that is in evidence.
Q. As I recall, there were two plastic bags ?
A. Yes, I believe there were two.
Concerning the matter of forfeiture in his memorandum decision the trial court referred to the car as being of great value, $10,000 which he regarded as greatly disproportionate to the penalty for the crime. (The main opinion speaks of a fine of $299. But there is also the more important penalty of up to six months in jail.) Moreover, it is to be noted that Section 58-37-8, U.C.A.1953, which provides for the penalties for the possession of marijuana, further provides in subsection 58-37-8(8):
Any penalty imposed for violation of this section shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any-civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
The important proposition to be noted on this appeal is that the only reason given by the trial court for his refusal to declare the forfeiture of the automobile was that he thought that its value (the only evidence concerning value was Price’s statement that he had paid $10,000 for it) was so disproportionate to the penalty for the offense of possession of marijuana that the forfeiture should not be enforced. In that *922connection he stated: “This court does not believe that the legislature intended such a harsh and drastic result,” i. e., the forfeiture.
The proposition stated by the trial judge gives rise to two thoughts:
First, that the judge just couldn’t believe the legislature meant what is so clearly said in the statutes.
Second, that if a person is caught transporting drugs in an old beat-up inexpensive car, it is subject to forfeiture. But if he is more prosperous in his traffic, and has a fine new expensive car, the law should not deign to forfeit it.
The trial judge was patently right when he said “I can make a reasonable inference.” That is, that the rest of the substance was also marijuana. It is totally inconceivable to me that the officer could pick up one ounce of substance, all of which had the same appearance, which would turn out to be marijuana, and the rest of it be something else. I therefore say with complete assurance that the only reasonable inference was that the entire quantity was marijuana. I add, however, that the issue of forfeiture under the statute, depends only upon the identification of some substantial and identifiable amount of marijuana, and not upon any particular quantity thereof.
It is to be remembered that the forfeiture of property declared by law is not the same as imposing a sentence for a crime, with respect to which the trial court does have some discretion in modifying or suspending the sentence.1 The declaration of forfeiture of property under circumstances so justifying is the mandate of the people, speaking through their legislature. When such a mandate is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, it is the duty of the court to abide thereby and carry out its mandate, thus avoiding judicial intrusions into the legislative prerogative.2
The principle of forfeiture of the means of transportation as a method of law enforcement and control of illicit traffic in contraband was discussed and reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.3 That principle was reaffirmed in a situation greatly more exaggerated than the instant one. After officers had discovered marijuana aboard, the yacht was seized and forfeited pursuant to Puerto Rican statutes.4 The Supreme Court rejected the attack upon'the procedure and the statutes; and particularly rejected the contention of deprivation of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is noteworthy that our Utah statute is more fair than the one under attack in the Calero-Toledo case, in that under our statute the owner is given the opportunity to show his innocence and his interest will be protected.
With respect to the California experience referred to in the main opinion, this should be noted: their statute was not de-*923dared unconstitutional. It was repealed by their legislature,5 . after a study by the Commission on State Government, and apparently largely because of economic considerations. I appreciate that the reason is quite immaterial here. But the experience itself is in conformity with the idea herein advocated: that whatever the problem may be, it should be dealt with legislatively rather than judicially.
In accordance with what I have said above, it is my judgment that the order of forfeiture should be entered as prescribed by law. (All emphasis added.)
ELLETT, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.

. As to the grant of general power to the courts to suspend sentences or grant probation in criminal cases see Sec. 77-35-17, U. C.A.1953.

. Cases sustaining the principle of forfeiture as a means of law enforcement are numerous. E. g., for similar cases of forfeiture see Associated Investment Company v. United States, 220 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1955), two smoked marijuana cigarettes in the vehicle resulted in forfeiture; General Finance Corporation of Florida South v. United States, 333 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1964) ; State v. Meyers, 328 S.W.2d 321 (Tex.Civ.App.1959) ; Carmichael Finance Company v. State, 475 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Civ.App.1971) ; Prince George’s County v. One (1) 1969 Opel, et al., 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168; State v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 292 A.2d 64. See discussion in the latter case wherein the Maryland Court of Appeals said, inter alia, that the refusal to declare the forfeiture would be comparable to refusal to enter a large judgment against a debtor because it would place a great burden upon the defendant.

. 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974).

. Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 24, Section 2512(a)(4), which has the same wording of the present Utah Statute, Section 58-37-13 (l)(e), U.S.O.A.1953, but has less exemptions.

.California Statutes 1967, Ch. 280, Sec. 3, p. 1438.