Court Opinion

ID: 6907052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-23 22:02:09.815639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:06:23.526679
License: Public Domain

JOHNS, J.
1. The vital question in this case is: To whom did Barnett sell his stock on August 4, 1917, which was then in Lane County, Oregon, from whom did Seward purchase it, and when and where was the deal consummated? Assuming that the defendants are not liable for the goods which Seward received from Barnett, it is apparent that Seward has paid the plaintiff in full for all the merchandise which he purchased from the plaintiff, and that it would not have any legal claim against the defendants.
*479"When the contract between them is analyzed, it simply means that the plaintiff agrees to sell and Seward agrees to buy such reasonable quantities of goods, wares and merchandise as he “may from time to time desire to purchase” at current wholesale prices at the date of shipment, to be evidenced by an itemized invoice, which purchase and shipment is to be made on orders from Seward, and in consideration thereof he agrees to pay the plaintiff such prices for the goods which may from time to time be sold to him. In other words, on the stipulated terms, Seward agreed to pay for all the goods which he actually purchased from the plaintiff. The defendants guaranteed the full and complete payment to plaintiff of any indebtedness of Seward which might become due or owing for the goods which he purchased under the contract.
On August 4, 1917, Barnett signed the following statement addressed to the plaintiff:
“Subject to your approval, I have this date transferred to Mr. E. M. Seward, address Divide, Ore.”
Then follows the list of products, supplies., etc., transferred, amounting to $320.94. At the same time Seward signed the following written statement, also addressed to plaintiff:
“Subject to your approval,- I have this date accepted from Mr. J. S. Barnett, Address, Creswell, Ore., all of the products listed above, and certify that this"" is a true and absolutely correct list of all products transferred. I hereby instruct and authorize you to charge these products to my account at regular current wholesale prices to buyers. I have retained a list of the products received as shown above, and ask you to mail me a fully itemized invoice "promptly. ’ ’
*480These writings were executed at Creswell, in Lane County, Oregon, in the presence of F. GL Larson, of Oakland, California, who was apparently acting for and representing the plaintiff. At Freeport, Illinois, on August 16, 1917, the plaintiff mailed to E. M. Seward, Divide, Oregon, the following communication :
“Following is a list of products you report receiving from Mr. J. S. Barnett, Creswell, Ore. Complying with your instructions, we have charged these products to your account at current wholesale prices as follows: [Then follows a list of the prices].”
Under the same conditions another like notice was mailed on August 29, 1917, and notice in return was mailed to Seward on September 27, 1917. This price list amounted to $35.75.
Exclusive of such writings there is no competent testimony as to when, where, how, and by whom Seward acquired title to the goods which he received from Barnett; but it appears from them that subject to the-approval of the plaintiff, on August 4, 1917, Barnett transferred the listed merchandise to Seward, and that, concurrent therewith and subject to the' approval of the plaintiff, Seward accepted the transfer and authorized the plaintiff to charge bim with the amount of the invoice price. /
“A transfer is an act or transaction by which property of one person is by him vested in another. This, without the use of some qualifying word, is the legal meaning of the term. Transfer is an act of the parties or of the law, by which the title to property is conveyed from one living person to another”: 8 Words & Phrases, 7064.
“The Supreme Court, in the case of Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438 (45 L. Ed. 1171, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes), *481said 'transfer’ is defined to be not only tbe sale of property, bnt every other and different mode of disposing of and parting with property. All technicality and narrowness of meaning is precluded. The word is used in its most comprehensive sense, and is intended to include every means or manner by which property can pass from the ownership and possession of another”: 8 "Words & Phrases, 7066.
The plaintiff contends that it purchased those listed goods from Barnett on August 4, 1917, and sold them to Seward on August 16, 1917, after it had accepted defendants’ guarantee on August 9, 1917. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff, and the only competent evidence of the sale was the writings. As we analyze them, Seward obtained title to those goods through the transfer from Barnett, of which the company was duly notified; in consideration thereof Barnett was credited on his account with the plaintiff for the amount of the invoice price; and concurrent therewith Seward assumed, and the plaintiff charged him with the amount for which it had given Barnett credit. In other words, Seward assumed the payment of Barnett’s debt for the amount of the listed piice. Under a like contract Barnett had previously purchased from the plaintiff and agreed to pay for the merchandise which he transferred to Seward on August 4, 1917, and it was charged to him on plaintiff’s books. It was his property, and he had a right to transfer it to Seward or anyone else, with or without the approval of the plaintiff. While it is true that the actual amount which Seward was to pay for it was evidenced by the value placed upon the listed goods by the plaintiff, the purpose of that was to determine the amount of Barnett’s debt to the plaintiff, which Seward had assumed and agreed to pay, *482and for how ranch the plaintiff should give credit, and the amount which it should charge to Seward.
2. The defendants became guarantors to Seward without hire, or any compensation moving to them, and for such reason their liability must be strictly construed.
“A guarantor, like a surety, is bound only by the strict letter or precise terms of the contract of his principal, whose performance he has guaranteed”: Staver & Walker v. Locke, 22 Or. 519 (30 Pac. 497, 29 Am. St. Rep. 621, 17 L. R. A. 652).
"Under their guaranty the liability of the defendants was limited to the payment for goods which Seward purchased from the plaintiff on or after August 9, 1917, and they are not liable for the merchandise which was transferred by Barnett to Seward on August 4, 1917, or any debt of Barnett to the plaintiff which Seward assumed and agreed to pay.
Judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.
McBride, C. J., and Bennett, J., concur.