Court Opinion

ID: 9880901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:03:25.201154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:00.610011
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 P. v. Moody CA2/4

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    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR
 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B308495

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA445427)
          v.

 TYRONE EUGENE MOODY,
 et al.,

          Defendants and
          Appellants.

      APPEAL from a Judgment of the Superior Court of
California. Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed in part as
modified and reversed and remanded in part.
      David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Tyrone Eugene Moody.
      Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Christopher Vargas.
      Richard A. Levy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Frank Perez.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E.
Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, David F.
Glassman, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
           ___________________________________________

      Appellants Tyrone Eugene Moody, Christopher Vargas, and
Frank Perez (collectively, “defendants”) planned and carried out
the robbery of a taxi driver, during which Vargas shot and killed
the driver. All three appellants were jointly tried before two
separate juries,1 and all three were found guilty of first-degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 with a robbery-murder
special circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and
second-degree robbery (§ 211). The juries also found true gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and gang-principal firearm-use and
discharge allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), (e)(1)). Vargas’s
jury separately found him guilty of carrying an unregistered,
loaded firearm (§ 25850) and found true a taxi driver special
circumstance allegation (§ 190.25, subd. (a)).
      On appeal, defendants assert insufficient evidence supports
that they were major participants in the underlying robbery who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendants also
argue that the trial court committed instructional error; erred in
admitting hearsay statements; and committed sentencing errors.

1     Moody and Perez shared one jury, while Vargas was tried
before another jury.
2    All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.

                                 2
We affirm defendants’ convictions, but remand for a retrial of the
gang and firearm allegations.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      A.    Defendants Plan a Taxi Robbery.

       Perez and Abel Mesta were members of the Choppers 12
gang. Moody was part of a tagging crew known as “RG,” and
although the crew was associated with the Big Hazard gang,
Moody did not belong to either Choppers 12 or Big Hazard.
Vargas was not a member of the Choppers 12 gang but wished to
join. At the time of the offenses, defendants and Mesta were all
18 to 20 years old.
       In March 2016, Perez (aka “Droopy”) lived with his mother,
Lorraine “Shorty” Hernandez. Although Hernandez was also a
Choppers 12 member, she did not live near the gang’s territory.
Instead, Hernandez’s apartment was near Big Hazard territory.
Choppers 12 was on good terms with Big Hazard. The gangs
shared territory and on occasion committed crimes together. 3
       At the time of the offenses, Moody was also living at
Hernandez’s apartment. Hernandez permitted gang members to
leave guns at the apartment.
       On March 13, 2016, Mesta was at the apartment, along
with Perez and Vargas. They were drinking and using drugs.

3      Hernandez was charged with accessory after the fact to
murder (§ 32; count 2) with special allegations including a gang
allegation. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Initially, Mesta was
charged with robbery and the same gang and principal firearm
discharge allegations as the other defendants. Hernandez and
Mesta pleaded guilty and admitted the gang allegations; Mesta
also admitted a principal-armed firearm allegation. They both
testified at trial.

                                3
During the afternoon, Vargas and Perez wanted to obtain some
money; Perez proposed a taxi robbery.
      Mesta gave Vargas a .45 caliber handgun. The gun was a
“gang gun” that was passed around among gang members. Perez
had a .22 caliber rifle.4
      Between 9:05 p.m. and 9:16 p.m., Vargas called a taxi
service on his cell phone. Vargas, Moody and Perez left the
apartment and went to meet the taxi.

      B.    The Robbery and Killing of Taxi Driver Antonio
            Paz.

            1.    The Shooting

      On March 13, 2016, Jose Gonzalez, the taxi dispatcher,
received a call from Vargas’s cellphone to pick up passengers at
4360 Worth Street in an industrial area of Los Angeles. The
victim, cabdriver Antonio Paz, responded that he was nearby and
would pick up the passengers. At 9:26 p.m., Paz told Gonzalez he
had picked them up.
      At about 9:34 p.m., police received a 911 call of a shooting
at the corner of Worth and Indiana Streets. Police found Paz face
down in the street about 20 feet from his taxicab. The taxi’s
engine was running, the headlights were on, and the keys were in
the ignition. Paz had been shot in the head and in his left leg and

4     There was inconsistent testimony concerning the caliber
and number of weapons the three defendants carried. Mesta and
Moody described Perez’s weapon as an “M-16,” although the
prosecution theorized it was likely a .22 caliber rifle. Moody had a
.22 caliber handgun. Both .22 and .45 spent shell casings were
found at the scene of the shooting.

                                 4
was dead. Paz’s shirt had been ripped open, and his wallet, cash,
and phone were missing.
       According to Hernandez’s downstairs neighbor, the
weapons used were a rifle larger than a .22, and a .38 or .45
caliber handgun.5
       At 10:00 p.m., dispatcher Gonzalez received a call and was
told that Paz had been the victim of a crime. Later that evening,
Gonzalez searched social media using the phone number used to
summon the taxi and connected it to Vargas.

            2.     Police Investigation and Forensics.

       Police found a .45 caliber shell casing on the driver’s seat of
the taxicab. Two .22 caliber casings were located by the driver’s
side door. An expended .45 bullet and shell casing were
discovered near Paz’s head in the street. Police also found two
live firecrackers, on the taxi’s center console and one on the
passenger seat, and spent firecracker paper under the taxi.
       Vargas’s palm print was found on the outside rear
passenger window of the taxi.
       Paz died from a gunshot to the head. A bullet entered the
back of his head on the left side and exited the top of his forehead
on the right side. The gun had been fired within one foot of Paz’s
head. The wound to Paz’s leg indicated that the bullet entered
from the front.

5     Moody fairly consistently identified the gun as a .38,
although there was other testimony that the weapon was .45
caliber.

                                  5
           3.    Moody, Vargas, and Perez return to
                 Hernandez’s Apartment.

        Shortly after the robbery, Moody, Perez, and Vargas
returned to Hernandez’s apartment. They told Mesta they had
pistol-whipped the driver with the .45 and the gun went off.
Mesta understood this to mean the gun had accidentally gone off.
Although Moody and Perez had about $250, they did not give any
of it to Mesta.
        Around 9:45 p.m. that night, Hernandez took a rifle,
handgun, and a bulletproof vest to her downstairs neighbor,
Robert Vega. She told Vega it was an emergency and they needed
to hide the guns. Hernandez and two other people put the guns
under Vega’s mattress and Hernandez told him they had hit a
taxi driver. Hernandez retrieved the guns two days later.
        Mesta did not believe that Moody, Perez, or Vargas were
“putting in work” for a gang when they committed the robbery,
nor did he believe any other gang members received the money
from the robbery.

           4.    Surveillance Videos.

      Surveillance cameras near Hernandez’s apartment showed
three individuals leaving the apartment at 9:24 p.m. A nearby
casket factory security camera showed three people running from
the crime scene toward Hernandez’s apartment. They returned to
the apartment at 9:35 p.m. At about 9:41 p.m., police arrived at
the crime scene. At around 9:45 p.m., Hernandez went to Vega’s
apartment.

                               6
            5.    Defendants’ Arrest.

      Perez was arrested in Mexico on April 10, 2016 and
extradited. Moody was arrested on April 20, 2016. Vargas was
arrested on May 17, 2016.
      Hernandez was interviewed on March 30, 2016 and
admitted to police that she was a Choppers 12 member and was
known as “Shorty.”

C.    The Perkins Operation.

       A day after Moody’s arrest, police conducted a Perkins
operation.6 Moody was put in a cell with an undercover officer
posing as an inmate and the following conversation was covertly
recorded.
       The undercover agent asked Moody “[w]here you from?”
and Moody responded that he did “not bang.” Moody later
admitted he was trying to join the Big Hazard gang and had put
in some work to do so.
       Moody described the events of the night of the murder.
Perez had let Moody move into his mother’s apartment when
Moody was kicked out of his own home. Moody had spent the day
of the robbery at a park drinking alcohol. That evening, when he
got back to the apartment, Perez and Vargas told him they were
going to “‘do some . . .’” Moody did not know Vargas. Moody
claimed he just went along to look out for his friend Perez.

6     In a Perkins operation, an undercover operative, who the
suspect does not know is a police agent, is placed in a cell with
the suspect. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 294
(Perkins).)

                                 7
       Moody told the undercover agent about the robbery. Moody
had given Vargas a .38 snub nose handgun7 and Perez had an
M16. Moody claimed he was not armed. Perez hid in the bushes
and when the taxi arrived, Moody got in the passenger seat,
while Vargas got in the rear behind the driver.
       Vargas put the gun to the driver and told him to “give me
everything.” Moody went through the driver’s pockets, took his
wallet and cell phone, and threatened the driver, telling him “if
you want to see your kids don’t do nothing.” The driver had $160
and $3000 pesos. The driver tried to call 911 and Perez emerged
from the bushes with the M16.
       Moody told Vargas to “knock out” the driver, and Vargas
began to pistol whip the driver. Moody lit some firecrackers as a
cover for the gunshot noise.
       The driver got out the taxi and tried to run. Moody grabbed
him, and put him in the trunk. Because that would be
kidnapping, Moody suggested that Vargas knock him out. Vargas
began to pistol whip Paz again, but then shot Paz in the head
According to Moody, Vargas fired four shots at the taxi driver.
       The three defendants fled back to the apartment. A week
later, Moody heard that Vargas had been caught because the
police traced his phone. Moody and Perez planned to kill Vargas
because he snitched.
       Moody told the Perkins operative that Vargas was a
“dumbass” and a “weird ass dude.” Moody was angry with Vargas
because Vargas had identified Moody to the police.

7    This testimony is inconsistent with previous testimony that
Vargas had a .45.

                                8
D.   Vargas’s Two Interviews with Police.

       Police first interviewed Vargas on March 15, 2016. After
being given Miranda warnings, Vargas denied killing anyone and
denied being with anyone when a cab driver was robbed and
killed. He denied calling for a taxicab. No one told Vargas they
were going to use his phone to call a taxi. Vargas claimed Mesta
borrowed his cellphone the night of the shooting and returned it
the next morning.
       Following his release from custody, Vargas was rearrested
on May 17, 2016. After conducting a separate Perkins operation,
police interviewed Vargas a second time,8 and Vargas told them
he had known Perez for about two weeks, but only met Moody
once before the crime. Mesta introduced Vargas to Perez and
Moody. Vargas stated he was present during the discussion at
Hernandez’s apartment planning the robbery. Vargas claimed
Mesta called the taxi using Vargas’s phone.
       Vargas went with Moody and Perez to meet the cab. Moody
pulled out a gun and asked the driver to give him money. Vargas
hit the driver on the head with the gun he had been given at the
apartment, and it accidentally went off. As Vargas ran off, he
heard another gunshot. Later, Moody gave Vargas $50. Vargas
bought a gun because he was scared his eventual co-defendants
would kill him. He was carrying this gun when he was
rearrested.
       Police showed Vargas a six-pack photo array, from which
Vargas identified Mesta, Moody, and Perez.

8     An audiotape of the first and second interviews was played
for the jury.

                               9
E.   Mesta’s Testimony.

       Mesta, who was initially charged as a co-defendant,
pleaded to robbery and admitted the gang and firearm
allegations. He did not have a plea agreement and did not want
to testify.
       Mesta was a member of the Choppers 12 gang and was
known as “Sinner.” Mesta knew Perez as “Droopy.” Mesta did not
believe defendants were committing the robbery for the benefit of
a gang. Mesta gave a .45 gang gun to Perez, who passed it to
Vargas.
       When the group returned from the robbery, Vargas told
them he had “killed someone.” Vargas told Mesta the gun went
off accidentally. Mesta believed he saw a gun in Vargas’s
waistband but did not know the caliber.
       After Mesta was arrested on March 30, 2016, he told an
undercover Perkins agent that he believed the co-defendants were
“flipping” (turning) on him.

F.   Gang Testimony.

       Michael Deschamps, a sheriff’s deputy detective, testified
as a gang expert that Choppers 12 was a criminal street gang
with about 50 members. Choppers 12’s principal activities
included vandalism, graffiti, possession of narcotics for sale,
illegal firearm possession, assault with a deadly weapon,
extortion, witness intimidation attempted murder, and murder. A
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer testified that Big
Hazard was also a criminal street gang. These experts opined
that the taxi robbery was committed for the benefit of the
Choppers 12 and Big Hazard gangs.

                               10
       According to Deschamps, the robbery was committed in
association with the Choppers 12 gang because Perez “the more
established Choppers 12 gang member was acting in association
with the gang partly so ‘he can validate that new guy put[ting] in
the work.’” “An individual who was trying to join Choppers, along
with a validated member who would act as a witness to tell the
rest of the gang that the person trying to join had ‘put in the
work.’” Deschamps opined the crime would benefit Choppers 12
because it would bring notoriety to the gang, and the proceeds
would boost the gang’s operations and help the relationship
between Big Hazard and Choppers 12. However, Deschamps had
not heard of an instance where Big Hazard and Choppers 12
gang members had committed a crime together.
       LAPD Officer Juan De La Riva testified as an expert on Big
Hazard. The gang had about 300 members. He believed the
robbery had been committed in association with Big Hazard
because it was easier for gang members to commit crimes in
groups, as there was “strength in numbers.” Big Hazard would
benefit from the valuables taken. However, de la Riva did not
know of an instance where the two gangs committed a crime
together.
       Martin Flores testified as a gang expert on behalf of
defendants. He was familiar with both Choppers 12 and Big
Hazard. For someone to join a gang, a gang member must be
present to evaluate the crime. Crimes are specifically designed
for initiation purposes. However, Flores believed it was unlikely
vetting crime for one gang would be committed in another gang’s
territory.
       Further, Flores believed members of one gang would not
put in work for another gang. The mere fact members of different

                               11
gangs committed a crime together did not indicate an alliance
between gangs. Such an alliance would need to be decreed from
the top level of the gang. Flores opined that the robbery and
shooting of Paz was not for the benefit of Choppers 12. Rather,
the crime was committed by “four people who happen to know
each other, but not specifically a gang or a tagging crew or a non-
gang.”

G.    Information, Verdict and Sentencing.

       The amended information jointly charged Vargas, Moody,
and Perez with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and second
degree robbery (§ 211) (count 5). Vargas was also charged with
carrying an unregistered firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a)) (count 4).
       A robbery-murder special circumstance allegation and a
taxi driver special circumstance allegation was alleged against all
three defendants. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 190.25, subd. (a).)
       As to the murder and robbery counts, it was further alleged
the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of,
and in association with a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(C).) As to Moody and Perez, it was further alleged that a
principal personally discharged a firearm proximately causing
death, and as to Vargas, it was further alleged that he personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing
death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1).)
       Defendants were tried together before two juries, the
“yellow” jury for Vargas and the “blue” jury for Moody and Perez.
The juries found defendants guilty of first-degree murder with a
robbery-murder special circumstance finding. The juries also
found them guilty of second-degree robbery. Vargas was found
guilty of carrying an unregistered, loaded firearm. As to Moody
and Perez, all special allegations were found true. As to Vargas,

                                12
the jury found the gang and personal firearm discharge
allegations to be not true but found the remaining allegations
(taxi driver special circumstance and personal firearm use) to be
true.
       The trial court imposed life without the possibility of parole
for Perez and Moody on count 1, plus 25 years to life for the
principal firearm discharge enhancement. The court imposed but
stayed punishment for the robbery on count 5. The court imposed
life without the possibility of parole for Vargas on count 1, plus
10 years for the personal firearm use enhancement. The court
imposed a concurrent sentence on count 4 (carrying unregistered
firearm) and imposed but stayed punishment for the robbery.

                          DISCUSSION

I.    SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS MOODY’S AND
      PEREZ’S FELONY MURDER CONVICTIONS ON A
      THEORY THEY WERE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS
      WHO ACTED WITH RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE TO
      HUMAN LIFE

       Both Moody and Perez were convicted on a theory of felony
murder as major participants who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. They contend insufficient evidence
supports these findings.9 (See § 190.2, subd. (d); People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks); People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th
522 (Clark).) We disagree.

9     Moody solely challenges the reckless indifference element,
while Perez challenges both elements.

                                 13
      A.    Standard of Review.

       In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we ask “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715, original
italics (Edwards).) Because the sufficiency of the evidence is
ultimately a legal question, we examine the record in the light
most favorable to the judgment and independently for
“‘substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’” that would support a finding beyond
a reasonable doubt. (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691.)

      B.    Legal Principles

            1.    Felony Murder Special Circumstance, Section
                  190.2, Subdivision (a)(17).

      In California, the felony-murder rule provides an exception
to the malice requirement for murder. (People v. Solis (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 762, 774.) The rule imputes the requisite malice to
those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a felony
inherently dangerous to human life. (People v. Cruz (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 740, 752.) The necessary mental state is simply the
specific intent to commit the underlying felony. (People v. Cavitt
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197.)
      Proposition 115, enacted in 1990, extended the death
penalty to felony murders. (§ 190.2, subd. (d); Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 794.) The felony-murder special circumstance
applies to murders committed in the course of the most serious
felonies, including robbery, rape, arson, carjacking, and first or
second degree burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Like the other

                                 14
special circumstances, the felony-murder special circumstance
applies to defendants who actually killed or who abetted a
murder with the intent to kill. (§ 190.2, subds. (b) & (c).) The
defendant must be a major participant who possesses a reckless
indifference to life. (§ 190.2, subd. (d).) “[U]nlike the other special
circumstances, the felony-murder special circumstance also
applies to some convicted murderers who neither killed nor
intended to kill, namely, ‘major participant[s]’ in the underlying
felony who acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life.’”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 704; § 190.2, subd. (d).)
In Banks, our Supreme Court concluded this language in the
statute imposed both an actus reus requirement (major
participant) and a mens rea requirement (reckless indifference).
(Banks, supra, at p. 798.)

      2.     Meaning of “Major Participant” and “Reckless
             Indifference.”

       Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
522, delineated the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless
indifference.” Banks focused primarily on the factors necessary to
be a “major participant,” while Clark addressed the “reckless
indifference” requirement. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 706.)10 Ultimately, as discussed below, the two cases endorse

10      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the
felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, “to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437
achieved these goals by amending section 188 to require that a

                                  15
the same factors to evaluate the defendant’s conduct and mental
state.
       Banks found that although revised section 190.2,
subdivision (d), did not define “major participant,” the statute
mirrored two United States Supreme Court cases, Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127]
(Tison) and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [102 S.Ct.
3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140] (Enmund). (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
794.) Banks concluded that these cases were placed on a
spectrum and permitted imposition of the death penalty only
when defendants’ “involvement is substantial and they
demonstrate a reckless indifference to the grave risk of death
created by their actions.” (Ibid.)

principal act with express or implied malice (§ 188, as amended
by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2), and by amending section 189 to
state that a person can be liable for felony murder only if: (1) the
“person was the actual killer”; (2) the person, with an intent to
kill, was an aider or abettor in the commission of murder in the
first degree; or (3) the “person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
In Strong, the Supreme Court held “[f]indings issued by a jury
before Banks and Clark do not preclude a [petitioner] from
making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill [No.]
1437. This is true even if the trial evidence would have been
sufficient to support the findings under Banks and Clark.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) The Supreme Court
concluded, “Banks and Clark both substantially clarified the law
governing findings under . . . section 190.2, subdivision (d): Banks
elucidated what it means to be a major participant and, to a
lesser extent, what it means to act with reckless indifference to
human life, while Clark further refined the reckless indifference
inquiry.” (Strong at pp. 706–707.)

                                16
       As Banks observed, in Enmund, at one end of the spectrum,
the defendant took part in a robbery that resulted in the killing of
two victims. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 799–800.) The
defendant’s participation was limited to driving the getaway
vehicle, and there was no evidence he committed the killing, was
present at the killing, or participated in the underlying planning
of the robbery. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 799.) As a result,
Enmund held he could not constitutionally be subject to the
death penalty. (Ibid.) In contrast, in Tison, at the other end of the
spectrum, the defendant participated in an armed jail break,
during which the defendants’ car broke down, and defendants
took a family of four hostage in order to steal their car, drove to
the desert, and killed the family. (Ibid.)
       Banks noted that Tison recognized these two extremes of
culpability—ranging from the defendant who was a “‘minor
actor, . . . not at the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was
found to have had any culpable mental state,’” to “actual killers
and those who attempted or intended to kill.” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 800.) As Banks concluded, “[s]omewhere between
them, at conduct less egregious than the Tisons’ but more
culpable than . . . Enmund’s, lies the constitutional minimum”
showing required for the imposition of death or life without the
possibility of parole. (Id. at p. 802.)
       Applying these principles, Banks found “[a] sentencing
body must examine the defendant’s personal role in the crimes
leading to the victim’s death and weigh the defendant’s
individual responsibility for the loss of life, not just his or her
vicarious responsibility for the underlying crime.” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 801, original italics.) Banks then set forth the
factors to consider in evaluating whether the defendant was a

                                 17
major participant and exhibited reckless indifference to human
life: (1) the defendant’s role in planning the criminal enterprise
that led to one or more deaths; (2) the defendant’s role in
supplying or using lethal weapons; (3) the defendant’s awareness
of the particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, the
weapons used, or the past experience or conduct of the other
participants; and (4) whether the defendant was present at the
scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, or played a particular role in the death. (Id. at p.
803.) “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one
of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in determining
the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation ‘in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation]
was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major.’” (Ibid.)
        Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, observed that “‘reckless
indifference,’” the mens rea requirement, has “subjective and
objective elements.” (Id. at pp. 616-617.) “The subjective element
is the defendant’s conscious disregard of risks known to him or
her,” while the objective element considers “what ‘a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.’” (Ibid.) Clark
identified the following factors, many of which overlap with the
Banks factors, as pertinent to whether a defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life: (1) the defendant’s knowledge
that weapons would be used and/or his personal use of weapons;
(2) the defendant’s physical presence at the scene and his
opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim; (3) the
duration of the felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of his
accomplice’s propensity to kill; and (5) the defendant’s efforts to
minimize the risk of violence in the commission of the felony.
(Clark at pp. 618–623.)

                                18
       As Clark noted, there is “‘significant[ ] overlap’” between
the “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life”
requirements because “‘the greater the defendant’s participation
in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614–
615.) However, Clark pointed out that a defendant who is merely
involved in a first-degree felony murder does not automatically
act with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at p. 616.)

      C.    Analysis.

      Perez and Moody principally point to contradictions in the
evidence to support their argument. However, there is sufficient
evidence under the Banks/Clark factors to support the jury’s
verdict.
      Moody argues that the evidence did not establish he acted
with reckless indifference to human life. In support of his
position, he emphasizes: (1) he did not personally possess or use a
weapon during the robbery; (2) he had no forewarning Vargas
would pistol whip Paz or shoot him; (3) as Paz attempted to flee,
Moody tried to stop Vargas from shooting again; (4) once Paz was
shot in the back of the head, there was not much Moody could do
to render aid; (5) Moody’s decision to flee the scene was
“ambiguous” because it could either show he recognized that
trying to render aid was useless, that he was indifferent, or that
he panicked (which is what one would expect of someone who did
not expect a shooting); and (6) his youth at the time of the
offenses establishes he did not appreciate the risk or dangers.
      Perez argues the evidence did not establish he acted with
reckless indifference because he was not friends with Vargas and
had no knowledge that Vargas would become violent. Perez also
argues he had no realistic opportunity to restrain the crime

                                19
because he was hiding in the bushes; the robbery happened very
quickly, lasting only “a few minutes[;]” he did not brandish or fire
a gun (he allegedly carried an M16, and only .22 and .45 shell
casings were found at the scene); he did not supply the murder
weapon or know that a gun would be fired; once the driver was
shot in the head at close range, “there was nothing anyone could
do to save him[;]” and Perez’s youth (age 19 at the time of the
crime) establishes he lacked the executive functioning to assess
risks and control impulses. Further, Perez contends he was not a
major participant because he was not the mastermind of the
crime who planned and organized the robbery or provided
weapons; rather, Vargas had the lead role. Perez asserts he did
not have a significant role as he was in the bushes, and his
actions and inactions did not play a role in Paz’s death.
       However, contradictions in the evidence do not necessarily
undermine the sufficiency of the evidence. Reversal on
insufficiency of the evidence is unwarranted unless it appears
“that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].” (People v. Redmond (1969)
71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify [the]
findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v.
Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 639.) Indeed, “[a]ppellate inquiry
into the sufficiency of the evidence ‘does not require a court to
“ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Instead,
the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

                                20
a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘it is the jury, not
the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s
guilt . . . .’” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055–1056.)
        The evidence is substantial that Moody and Perez were
major participants who also acted with reckless indifference to
human life:
        (1) Planning. Perez was a central participant in planning
the robbery with Vargas at Hernandez’s apartment. Although
Moody apparently arrived later (he told the Perkins agent he met
Perez and Vargas as they were leaving Hernandez’s apartment
and asked to join them), an inference may be drawn that Moody
participated in some planning because Moody acted in concert
with the other two defendants when they met the taxi: Moody
and Vargas got into the taxi and robbed Paz while Perez waited
in the bushes. Finally, defendants brought fireworks with them
to mask any potential gunfire.
        (2) Provision or use of lethal weapons. The evidence was in
conflict whether Moody was armed. Moody claimed he was not,
while Mesta testified that Moody was armed with a .22 handgun.
The jury was entitled to credit Mesta’s testimony and ignore
Moody’s statements. Further, Moody told the Perkins agent that
he gave a .38 gun to Vargas. Although Perez claims that he did
not supply the murder weapon or know that a gun would be used,
Mesta testified that he gave a .45 gun to Perez, who gave it to
Vargas. Moody told the Perkins agent that Perez had an M16
riffle.
        (3) Awareness of the particular dangers posed by the nature
of the crime, the weapons used, or the past experience or conduct of
the other participants. Both Perez and Moody claim they had no
knowledge of Vargas’s propensity for violence, asserting they did

                                 21
not know him well. Given the ambush of the cab driver in a
secluded location, however, with at least two of the three
defendants armed, the nature of the crime shows defendants
were aware of the dangers. Further, Moody knew the .38/.45 gang
gun had a propensity to shoot, and Moody and Perez knew the
gang gun was kept at Hernandez’s apartment.
       (4) Defendant’s presence at the scene of the killing, whether
defendant was in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual
murder or played a particular role in the death. Moody and Perez
were present during the entire duration of the offense. Both
Moody and Vargas were inside the taxi cab, and a .45 bullet
casing was found inside the cab; Perez was armed with a .22 rifle,
and .22 bullet casings were found near the driver’s side door. On
the other hand, both Moody and Perez had an opportunity to de-
escalate the crime after Vargas’s first shot hit the cab driver in
the leg. They did not use this opportunity.
       (5) Defendant’s action or inaction played a role in the death.
Defendants affirmatively participated in the ambush, beating,
and robbery of the cab driver. They did nothing to prevent Vargas
from firing a second shot.
       (6) Defendant’s rendering of aid or calling for help. Neither
Moody nor Perez did anything to help the cab driver. Instead,
they left him for dead in the street.
       (7) Duration of the offense. Although defendants assert the
crime took between two to four minutes, this short duration was
likely the result of the killing of the cab driver. Once Paz was
dead and defendants took his money, there was nothing further
to accomplish to further their plan except their escape from the
scene.

                                 22
      (8) Defendant’s age. Both Moody and Perez were under the
age of 21 at the time of the offense, and although youth is a factor
to consider in determining reckless indifference, there is nothing
to show that these defendants acted out of rashness or impulse.
Rather, the offense was planned in advance: a cab driver was
chosen as the victim; he was lured to a remote location; the
defendants each played a role in the robbery; and they attempted
to cover up the gunshots with firecrackers.

II.   ADMISSION OF MOODY’S STATEMENTS AGAINST
      VARGAS AND PEREZ.

      Vargas and Perez argue the trial court erred in admitting
Moody’s jailhouse hearsay statements to the Perkins informant
because Moody’s self-serving statements did not qualify as
declarations against interest. Perez asserts that even if
admissible, the statements should have been redacted to exclude
those portions inculpating them. We disagree.

      A.    Factual Background.

       Moody declined to testify at trial by exercising his Fifth
Amendment right, rendering him unavailable as a witness.
       At a pretrial hearing, Vargas objected to Moody’s Perkins
statements as inadmissible hearsay, arguing Moody’s statements
were not declarations against interest because Moody was
shifting blame to Vargas and Perez.11 The prosecution countered
that Moody admitted a significant role in the offenses that would

11      At trial, Perez’s counsel relied on section 4001.9, which
provides that a Perkins operative can listen and can report on
what he hears, but he cannot engage in any conduct designed to
elicit information. Perez does not assert this argument on appeal,
instead relying on Evidence Code section 1230.

                                23
make him guilty of murder; further, Moody was not blame-
shifting because he was bragging about committing numerous
robberies, including the robbery at issue in this case.
       The trial court ruled that Moody’s statements were
admissible against Vargas because they were “sufficiently
against . . . [Moody’s] interests to make them otherwise
trustworthy as required by law[.]” The complete recording of
Moody’s statements to the Perkins agent was played for Vargas’s
jury. A shorter version was played for Moody and Perez’s jury.12

      B.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
            Admitting Moody’s Statements to the Perkins
            Agent.

      A declaration against interest is an exception to the
hearsay rule and permits the admission of any statement that
“when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or
criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by
him against another, or created such a risk of making him an
object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true.” (Evid. Code, § 1230.)
The rationale underlying this exception is that “a person’s
interest against being criminally implicated gives reasonable
assurance of the veracity of his statement made against that
interest,” thereby mitigating the dangers usually associated with
the admission of out-of-court statements. (People v. Spriggs
(1964) 60 Cal.2d 868, 874.)

12    The transcript and recording were redacted to remove
references to unrelated crimes committed by Moody.

                                 24
       To benefit from the exception of Evidence Code section
1230, the proponent must show that the declarant is unavailable,
that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest
when made, and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to
warrant admission despite its hearsay character. (People v.
Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711.) In evaluating whether a
statement is against the declarant’s interest within the meaning
of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently
trustworthy to be admissible, the court may consider not just the
words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the
possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant’s
relationship to the defendant. (Ibid.) We review a court’s
admission of hearsay evidence under Evidence Code section 1230
for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
       With respect to the requirement that the statement be
against the declarant’s interest, only those statements that are
directly and specifically disserving to the declarant’s penal
interests are admissible. (People v. Vasquez (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 609, 621.) As explained in People v. Duarte (2000) 24
Cal.4th 603, a hearsay statement may be facially inculpatory or
neutral, but this feature cannot always be relied upon “to indicate
whether it is ‘truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely [an]
attempt[ ] to shift blame or curry favor.’” (Id. at pp. 611–612.) In
People v. Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 792 (Smith), the court
observed that “the fact a hearsay statement portrays the
declarant as a more minimal participant in a crime by itself does
not require exclusion or end our analysis.” As a result, only when
there is both blame shifting by the declarant and other
circumstances suggesting some improper motive for the blame

                                25
shifting do courts find admission of a hearsay statement against
penal interest in error. (Ibid.)
       Finally, as trustworthiness is key, People v. Greenberger
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, explained “[c]learly the least reliable
circumstance is one in which the declarant has been arrested
and attempts to improve his situation with the police by
deflecting criminal responsibility onto others. . . . However, the
most reliable circumstance is one in which the conversation
occurs between friends in a noncoercive setting that fosters
uninhibited disclosures.” (Id. at p. 335.) Further, “[w]hen
examining what was actually said by the declarant special
attention must be paid to any statements that tend to inculpate
the nondeclarant. . . . [A] statement’s content is most reliable in
that portion which inculpates the declarant [and i]t is least
reliable in that portion which shifts responsibility.” (Ibid.)
However, a statement that incriminates the declarant but also
inculpates a nondeclarant can be specifically disserving of the
declarant's penal interest. (Ibid.) This determination relies upon
a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the
circumstances. (Ibid.; see also People v. Wilson (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 271, 276 [fact that the statement is also disserving to
nondeclarant does not render the statement unreliable and
inadmissible].)
       A remedy for the mixed nature of some statements—those
that are part inculpatory and part self-serving, is redaction. In
People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51 (Gallardo), upon
which Perez and Vargas rely, the declarant incriminated two co-
defendants as participants in a shooting. (Id. at p. 72) The
defendant claimed his confederates were the shooters, and that
he waited around the corner in a getaway car. (Id. at p. 73.) The

                                26
trial court admitted the entire 40-page transcript of the
defendant’s jailhouse confession and did not “independently
assess whether each statement” implicating the defendants was
against the declarant’s penal interest at the time he made it. (Id.
at p. 72.) The court found “certain details [the declarant] had
provided to the informants regarding the crime (including his
identification of [one of the defendants] as the shooter, his
description of the vehicles used and the route they drove) showed
his entire statement was sufficiently trustworthy to warrant its
inclusion as a declaration against interest.” (Ibid.)
       Gallardo concluded some of the statements were too self-
serving and unreliable to qualify as declarations against interest
because although the declarant admitted his participation, he
placed the major responsibility for the offense on his co-
defendants. (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 74.) Gallardo
held admission of the entire transcript constituted prejudicial
error and, in anticipation of a retrial, directed the trial court to
“conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether each
statement the prosecution seeks to admit was sufficiently
against” the declarant’s interest to warrant admission under
Evidence Code section 1230. (Id. at p. 77.)
       Here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Moody’s statements without redaction.
Analyzed in context, Moody’s statements were admissible as
declarations against interest because they were of such a nature
that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the
statements unless he believed them to be true. Moody asserted to
the Perkins operative that he had an active role in the robbery:
he joined with the other defendants in preparing for the crime;
gave his .38 caliber gun to Vargas; directed Vargas to knock out

                                 27
the taxi driver; went through the driver’s pockets and took his
wallet, phone, and money; threatened the driver with harm; lit
fireworks to distract from the gunfire; and divided the spoils after
the crime with Perez and Vargas. All of these statements are
disserving of Moody.
       Nonetheless, Perez asserts that Moody’s statements were
unreliable because he improperly shifted blame to one or more
accomplices and minimized Moody’s own role. Specifically, Perez
emphasizes Moody stated he had no role in the planning of the
robbery and was unarmed; Vargas initiated the robbery; Moody
attempted to save the driver by telling Vargas not to shoot him;
and Moody’s statements contradicted Mesta’s claim that Moody
had a .22 caliber handgun, a fact which was corroborated by the
shell casings at the scene. Vargas similarly argues that Moody
described himself as “calm” about the situation, with the plan
only to rob the taxi driver, but “fool” Vargas shot the driver and
snitched on him. Vargas contends these statements place too
much blame on Vargas to be reliable.
       However, as both Perez and Vargas recognize, mixed
inculpatory and exculpatory statements must be analyzed in
context. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).)
Moody believed he was speaking to a gang member, and he thus
had no motivation to exaggerate Vargas’s or Perez’s participation
because he did not believe the Perkins operative had the ability to
obtain more lenient treatment for him. Furthermore, Moody’s
statements comported with the evidence and Vargas’s own
statements.
       These facts distinguish defendants’ case from People v.
Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th 603, where the declarant’s statements
were made to police, and he thus had motivation to make

                                28
exculpatory statements—“they unmistakably . . . were ‘attempts
to shift blame or curry favor.’”(Id. at p. 615.) Similarly, People v.
Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th 102, is distinguishable. There, the
defendant proffered hearsay in which the declarant (a gang
member) took responsibility for the murder at issue and also
asserted he had been ordered to do so by the Aryan Brotherhood.
(Id. at p. 152.) Lawley concluded the trial court properly admitted
the declarant’s confession to the murder, but excluded the latter
portion of the statement as not being against the declarant’s
interest because the declarant’s naming of the Aryan
Brotherhood was not specifically disserving of his interest. (Ibid.)
       Having concluded the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Moody’s statements, we do not consider
the argument that redaction was required. In any event, neither
Vargas nor Perez was prejudiced by the admission of Moody’s
statement. (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.) Vargas told
the police he shot and pistol-whipped the victim. Mesta testified
Perez had a rifle consistent with the .22 shell cases found near
the driver’s side door of the taxi, and the video surveillance was
consistent with Perez concealing a rifle.

III.   VARGAS’S CONFESSION WAS NOT OBTAINED
       THROUGH COERCION OR DECEPTION.

      Vargas contends his confession, obtained after he was
placed in a cell with a Perkins agent, was involuntary and
violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it
was coerced and obtained by the deceptive means of a Perkins
agent. Respondent contends this argument was forfeited because
Vargas’s motion to exclude was based on the alleged lack of
Miranda warnings during the Perkins operation, not the
involuntariness of his later confession; in any event, Vargas has

                                 29
not demonstrated that the use of the Perkins operation resulted
in an involuntary confession.

      A.    Factual Background.

            1.    Interviews and Perkins Operation.

      During his first interview with police on March 15, 2016,
Vargas claimed Mesta used his cell phone to call the taxi.
      The evening after his arrest on May 17, 2016, Vargas was
placed in a cell with a Perkins agent. Vargas’s conversation with
the Perkins agent was recorded.
      The Perkins agent asked Vargas why he had been arrested.
Vargas responded, “some [expletive] some other fools did . . . they
used my phone, fool, to call some taxi” and they “smoked [the taxi
driver].” The agent told Vargas the agent was in jail for
attempted murder.
      Although Vargas stated the police “pretty much . . . got
me,” because they knew his cell phone had been used in
connection with the murder of a taxi driver, Vargas told the
agent he was not going to say anything to the police. The agent
told Vargas the police would not charge him unless they had
evidence putting him at the crime scene, such as DNA,
fingerprints, or security cam footage. After Vargas told the agent
Moody had been arrested, the agent told Vargas that someone
had been talking to the police. Further, the agent contended the
police had put Vargas in jail because they had something on him
and they would not have rearrested Vargas otherwise.
      A detective came to the cell and told Vargas that he would
be interviewed and that he had already talked to Moody and
Perez. Afterwards, the agent told Vargas that it was likely the

                                30
police had discovered Vargas’s alibi did not hold up, particularly
if someone had talked.
       Vargas told the agent he was not at the crime scene, but
the agent responded that although often “homies” would claim
they were not at the crime scene, the police would have evidence
they had been there. The agent asked Vargas what he did.
Vargas said he pistol-whipped the driver. The agent opined
someone had “rolled” and thus Vargas should not be stuck on his
claim that he was not at the crime scene.
       Vargas sat in the back, while Moody sat in the front of the
taxi. After the Perkins agent informed Vargas that taxis had a
security camera on the rearview mirror, Vargas remarked that he
was “fucked.” The agent suggested that although the shooting
might have been accidental, it was still murder, but if
manslaughter the sentence would be nine or ten years.
       The agent suggested that a better strategy was for Vargas
to tell the police the shooting was accidental because the co-
defendants were talking to the police. Unless Vargas came up
with a story for the police, he would be spending life in prison on
a murder charge. The agent said he believed Vargas had a chance
to save himself. However, the agent opined if Vargas did not
speak to police, it was likely they would charge him with
“straight murder.”
       After Vargas’s conversation with the Perkins agent, police
interviewed Vargas. Vargas was advised of his Miranda rights
but did not invoke his right to remain silent. Police told Vargas
they had been speaking to people, and “we pretty much know
exactly what happened. This is your opportunity to explain what
happened out there.”

                                31
       In the second interview, Vargas told police that he had
known Perez for “a couple of weeks.” He did not know Moody.
Mesta introduced him to Perez and Moody. Vargas had only been
to Perez’s apartment twice. The night of the offense, there were
four of them at the apartment—Mesta, Moody, Perez, and
Vargas. They had a discussion about robbing a taxi driver. Mesta
called a taxi company using Vargas’s phone. When they left the
apartment, Perez concealed the weapon with his sweater.
       Vargas went with Moody and Perez to meet the cab. Moody
pulled out a gun and took the driver’s money. Perez, who had a
rifle that looked like an M16 with .22 caliber bullets, was
standing over the driver on the driver’s side.
       After Vargas hit the driver in the back of the head with the
gun, it accidentally went off. Someone told the cab driver to get
out of the vehicle and he was walking in front of it. Moody hit the
taxi driver. While the driver was on the ground, Vargas hit him
again and the gun went off again. Perez threw some firecrackers
around.

            2.    In Limine Trial Court Motion to Exclude.

       Before trial, Vargas moved to exclude the statements made
during the Perkins operation and his subsequent statements to
police. Vargas argued that his confession to the Perkins operative
tainted his subsequent police interview because the operative
advised Vargas not to exercise his right to remain silent but to
tell police the shooting was accidental. Otherwise, Vargas would
be charged with murder. As a result, his confession was the
result of coercion and was involuntary.
       The prosecution advised the court it did not intend to
introduce Vargas’s Perkins statements at trial. Further, there
was nothing coercive in Vargas’s conversation with the operative

                                32
because he was talking to someone he believed was helpful, and
in any event, Vargas was Mirandized by police before making any
statements.
      The trial court denied the motion to exclude, holding that
People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802 (Orozco) and other
cases had consistently held that a Perkins operation is not a
coercive environment and hence no Miranda warnings are
required.

      B.    Discussion.

            1.     Standard of Review.

       “In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a claimed Miranda
violation, ‘“we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts
and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by
substantial evidence. We independently determine from [those
facts] whether the challenged statements were illegally
obtained.”’” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 530.) If an
interview is recorded and the facts surrounding the admission
are undisputed, we apply independent review. (People v. Leon
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 843.) We do not express any view on
whether we endorse or condemn the particular interrogation
techniques employed in this case; instead, our role is to
determine whether those techniques comport with constitutional
standards as articulated in guiding precedent.

            2.     The Issue Was Not Forfeited.

      As a threshold issue, the People assert Vargas forfeited the
issue in the trial court by failing to raise the precise grounds
raised on appeal, namely, that his confession was involuntary.
Vargas argued at trial that no Miranda warnings were given

                                 33
during the Perkins operation, and that his Perkins statement and
police interview were coerced. (See, e.g., People v. Polk (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194–1195.) In response, Vargas asserts that if
trial counsel failed to preserve the issue, counsel was ineffective
for doing so.
       Here, we find no forfeiture and thus need not consider
whether Vargas’s counsel was ineffective. Forfeiture results when
a party fails to preserve a claim by raising a timely objection.
(Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
798, 805, fn. 4.) Respondent’s argument that Vargas did not raise
the issue below reads the Miranda voluntariness requirement too
narrowly and draws a distinction that does not exist. A coerced
confession is not voluntary. (See, e.g., People v. McCurdy (2014)
59 Cal.4th 1063, 1086.) Vargas’s argument in the trial court
asserted that his confession was effectively coerced by the Perkins
operative’s urging to speak up and claim the shooting was
accidental. Coercion is an element of the voluntariness inquiry.
Vargas’s assertion sufficiently encompassed his Miranda
argument being raised on appeal that his confession was
involuntary.

            3.    Vargas’s Confession Was Voluntary.

       “‘To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination,’” a custodial interrogation must be
preceded by Miranda warnings and by the suspect’s knowing and
intelligent waiver of them. (People v. Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp.
842–843.) A statement obtained in violation of a suspect’s
Miranda rights may not be admitted to establish guilt in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief. (People v. Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at pp. 531–532; People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 299.)

                                34
       A waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary. “To
establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v.
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171.) “As well, ‘[b]oth the state
and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a
defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.’
[Citations.] As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the
voluntariness of a confession.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th
527, 551.)
       The waiver must be voluntary as the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,
and knowing in the sense that it was made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it. (People v. McCurdy,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1086.) The test of voluntariness considers
several factors, including any element of police coercion, the
length of the interrogation and its location and continuity, and
the defendant’s maturity, education, and physical and mental
health. (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 157.) “The
determinative question ‘“is whether defendant’s choice to confess
was not ‘essentially free’ because his will was overborne.”’”
(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 740.)
       Here, Vargas argues that the police interview benefitted
from the deception of the Perkins operation, and although Perkins
permits undercover police operations, it does not condone trickery
or deception to obtain a waiver of Miranda rights. In making this
argument, Vargas relies on People v. Reyes (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th

                                35
7 (Reyes), where police told a suspect they had backed into his car
to induce him to leave his house. (Id. at p. 9) A search of the
suspect yielded controlled substances. (Ibid.) Reyes found the
search unconstitutional because the trickery undermined the
voluntariness of the suspect’s consent. (Id. at p. 13.)
       We reject Vargas’s attempt to analogize the deception of a
Perkins operation to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure
violation based on trickery. In Reyes, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 7,
consent was obtained under false pretenses, thereby undermining
its validity. (Id. at p. 13.) Vargas’s analogy fails on a basic level:
consent is an element of the defense to a Fourth Amendment
violation, while Miranda warnings are not an element
underpinning the validity of a Perkins operation. Indeed, as
Orozco made clear, Miranda does not apply to a Perkins
operation, because implicit in the definition of “interrogation” is
the suspect’s awareness of police participation in the questioning.
(Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 811, 813-814.)
     Further, any trickery does not automatically equate with the
coercion present in a custodial interrogation such that Miranda is
implicated when the defendant, after he speaks to a Perkins
informant, later confesses to police. “Miranda does not protect
suspects when they describe criminal activities to people they
think are cellmates. [Citation.] Rather, Miranda addressed
concerns that a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ generates
‘inherently compelling pressures’ that ‘undermine the
individual’s will to resist’ questioning. [Citations.] Those concerns
evaporate when, as here, an inmate speaks freely to someone he
believes is a fellow inmate.” (People v. Rodriguez (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 194, 198.) People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494
observed that coercion is determined from the perspective of the

                                 36
suspect, and in a Perkins operation, the suspect believed he was
speaking to a friend. (Id. at p. 526.)
     In the present case, the Perkins operative told Vargas he
should speak to police because to remain silent would mean a
harsher charge or sentence. These words, however, do not
amount to coercion by police sufficient to implicate the
voluntariness requirement of Miranda. Vargas believed he was
speaking to someone with valuable knowledge and experience in
dealing with police, rather than the police or their agent. Any
compulsion Vargas felt to speak to police arose from Vargas’s own
decision to follow the operative’s suggestions.
     In any event, any error in admission of Vargas’s confession is
harmless. The erroneous admission of statements obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed for prejudice under
the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705]. (People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th
1013, 1029.) That test requires the prosecution “‘to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (Ibid.)
     In this case, compelling evidence that Vargas shot the taxi
driver was before the jury even without considering the
challenged statements in his interview with police. Mesta
testified that Vargas had the .45 caliber gun; Moody stated
during his Perkins operation that Vargas had hit the driver twice
with the weapon and the gun had gone off accidentally, killing
the driver.

                                37
IV.   INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR.

      A.    No prejudice arising from outdated CALCRIM
            No. 301 instruction.

      Moody contends the trial court erred in giving an outdated
version of CALCRIM No. 301 on corroboration of accomplice
testimony. Moody contends the accomplice corroboration rule
only applies to testimony that tends to incriminate the defendant;
as a result, CALCRIM No. 301 operated to preclude the jury from
considering the exculpatory testimony of Mesta. We disagree.

            1.    Factual Background: Revision of No. 301 and
                  Smith, supra 12 Cal.App.5th 766.

       Smith, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 777–778, stated “a jury
may not convict a defendant of an offense based on accomplice
testimony without corroborating evidence. [However, t]here is no
corroboration requirement with respect to exculpatory accomplice
testimony.” (Original italics.) Smith reasoned that exculpatory
testimony, by definition, cannot be said to support a conviction
and, thus, need not be corroborated. (Id. at p. 780.)
       CALCRIM No. 301, revised in March 2019, reads: “[Unless
I instruct you otherwise,] (The/the) testimony of only one witness
can prove any fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one
witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the
evidence.” The Bench Notes to the instruction state that
corroboration is not required for exculpatory accomplice
testimony, citing Smith, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 766.
       However, the trial court instructed the jury in December
2019 with an outdated version of CALCRIM No. 301: “Except for
the testimony of an accomplice which requires supporting
evidence if you decide that witness is an accomplice, the

                               38
testimony of only one witness can prove any fact. Before you
conclude that the testimony of one witness proves a fact, you
should carefully review all the evidence.”
      Jurors were also given CALCRIM No. 334, which
instructed them in relevant part that if they found Mesta to be an
accomplice, “then you may not convict the defendant of the crimes
charged based on his or her statement or testimony alone.”

            2.    Analysis.

       We apply a de novo standard of review in assessing
whether instructions correctly state the law. (People v. Posey
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Whether an instruction is clear and
unambiguous is not the standard for determining error, however.
A single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial
isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.
(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192.) In making this
determination, we review the allegedly erroneous instruction in
the context of the evidence presented at trial, and we give the
instructions a reasonable, rather than a technical, meaning.
(People v. Martinez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 721, 728.) We also
consider the arguments of counsel in assessing the probable
impact of the instruction on the jury (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1202), and “‘we must assume that jurors are
intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating
all jury instructions which are given.’” (People v. Richardson
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028.)
       Section 1111 provides in relevant part that “[a] conviction
can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it [is]
corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense[.]” This
requirement of corroboration is an exception to the substantial

                                39
evidence rule and is based on the Legislature’s determination
that such testimony is, by itself, insufficient as a matter of law to
support a conviction, due to the reliability questions posed by
accomplice testimony. (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62
Cal.4th 1, 32.) When an accomplice testifies as a witness for the
People, the evidence is seen as coming from a source tainted by
the accomplice’s participation in the crime and because he or she
often is testifying in the hope of favor or expectation of immunity.
(People v. Fowler (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 79, 86.) Where a witness
testifies for a defendant, however, “the rationale underlying the
cautionary instruction no longer applies” because an accomplice
does not usually stand to benefit from providing testimony for the
defense and so his or her statements are not necessarily suspect.
(Id. at p. 87; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 567.)
       Under Smith, “[e]xculpatory testimony, by definition,
cannot be said to support a conviction and, thus, need not be
corroborated.” (Smith, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 780, original
italics.) In Smith, the court concluded the instructional error was
prejudicial because “it [was] clear” the accomplice testimony did
exculpate the defendant. (Id. at p. 781.) Further, the erroneous
instruction “became a point of disagreement between a lone hold-
out juror and the other 11 jurors,” and the hold-out juror was
eventually dismissed “in part because the other jurors believed
that this juror was unwilling to follow the court’s erroneous
instruction regarding the need for corroboration of any
accomplice testimony, regardless of whether that testimony was
inculpatory or exculpatory.” (Ibid, original italics.)
       We agree that the version of CALCRIM No. 301 the trial
court gave the jury was incorrect because it was unclear whether
exculpatory evidence required corroboration. CALCRIM No. 334

                                 40
did not cure the problem because while the inference may be
drawn from the instruction that exculpatory evidence does not
require corroboration, the more obvious and direct inference is
that all accomplice testimony requires corroboration.
      We conclude, however, that no prejudice resulted from the
instruction. Moody asserts there was prejudice flowing from the
erroneous instruction because Mesta’s testimony that Mesta
provided the .45 gun to Vargas contradicted Moody’s statement to
the undercover Perkins agent that Moody gave Vargas a .38
caliber gun. Accordingly, Moody argues, Mesta’s testimony was
exculpatory because it shows Moody did not have a role in
supplying lethal weapons in the robbery. While Mesta’s
testimony may have been exculpatory, as discussed above, other
evidence at trial regarding Moody’s participation in the robbery
and murder was substantial. This evidence included Moody’s
statements at the apartment after the robbery that they had shot
the cab driver and obtained some money; surveillance video
showing Moody and the others leaving the apartment before the
offense and returning afterwards; and Moody’s statements to the
Perkins agent describing the robbery in detail. Thus, any error
arising from the jury’s inability to consider Mesta’s testimony
would likely not have changed the result at trial. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
      Moody also asserts that Mesta’s testimony was exculpatory
with respect to the gang enhancements because Mesta believed
defendants were discussing committing a robbery for their own
benefit, not for the Choppers 12 gang; Mesta did not receive any
money from the robbery, and Mesta did not know if any of the
Choppers 12 gang members received any money. We need not

                              41
consider this issue as we conclude the gang enhancements must
be retried as discussed in section V, post.

      C.    No Error in Failing to Give Pinpoint
            Instruction on Reckless Indifference to Human
            Life

       Perez, joined by Moody, argues that the trial court’s failure
to give Perez’s two proffered pinpoint instructions on “reckless
indifference” constituted prejudicial error. Further, he argues the
court’s instruction on reckless indifference misstated the law. We
disagree.

            1.    Refusal to Give Pinpoint Instruction.

                  (a)   Factual Background.

        The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder with
CALCRIM No. 703 in relevant part: “A person acts with reckless
indifference to human life when he knowingly engages in
criminal activity that he knows involves a grave risk of death.
[¶] . . . Among the factors you may consider are: [¶] (1) Knowledge
of weapons and use and number of weapons; [¶] (2) Physical
presence at the crime and opportunity to restrain the crime
and/or aid the victim; [¶] (3) duration of the felony; [¶]
(4) defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s likelihood of killing; and
[¶] (5) defendant’s effort to minimize the risk of violence during
the felony.”
        On the reckless indifference element, the jury was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 540B,13 which stated “When you

13     The court gave two versions of CALCRIM No. 540. The
first, 540A, applied to Vargas as the actual shooter and the
second, 540B, applied to Perez and Moody as aider and abettors.

                                 42
decide whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference of
human life, consider all of the evidence. Among the factors that
you may consider are: [¶] 1. Knowledge of weapons and use and
number of weapons; [¶] 2. Physical presence at the crime and
opportunity to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; [¶] 3.
Duration of the felony; [¶] 4. Defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s
likelihood of killing; and [¶] 5. Defendant’s efforts to minimize the
risks of violence during the felony. [¶] No one of these factors is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to
determine whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
to life.”
        Perez proffered two special pinpoint instructions dealing
with reckless indifference. Special Instruction No. 2 stated,
“Knowledge of the possible risk of death inherent in certain
felonies—like armed robbery—and knowledge that confederates
are armed is insufficient alone to show a reckless indifference to
human life.” Special Instruction No. 5 stated, “Awareness that a
gun will be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish
reckless indifference to human life.”
        The trial court stated, “I do believe that CALCRIMS cover
everything, and the CALCRIM 540 series has been modified
recently to take into account the changes in the law in this
particular area.” Perez’s counsel responded, “the reason I want
these in—I don’t think that these two statements, which are the
law, are found anywhere in the instructions—in the CALCRIM
instructions. . . . [B]ased upon my conversations with the
prosecution, . . . I think the prosecution intends to argue that
[Perez] had a gun; he knew that other people had a gun, and,

The court noted it had included the most recent case law in
CALCRIM No. 540B.

                                 43
therefore, it was reckless indifference. [¶] . . . When I talk—I talk
to people about my cases when I go to parties and stuff, [everyone
always asks] ‘hey what case do you have now?’ And I tell them
about the case. And I find a surprisingly large number of people
believe inherently that, well, if he had a gun, that is all I need to
know; that he is guilty of whatever happened. And that is just not
the law.”
        The prosecution responded, “I understand that’s what
counsel anticipates me arguing. [However,] [t]hat is [not what] I
will be arguing, that that sole factor alone constitutes a reckless
indifference or being a major participant. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I believe
that the instructions clearly explain what the current state of the
law is under Banks and more recently under Clark, and I will
abide by that.”
        The trial court refused both special pinpoint instructions,
explaining: “I think that the law is pretty clear that someone
whose liability lies as an aider and abettor has to have very
specific intent with regard to aiding and abetting and also being a
major participant when it comes to a felony murder, and,
obviously, there’s elements and factors to consider to be a major
participant, which would certainly require more than does he
possess a gun and be at the scene. So I don’t think that the
instructions here give way to an inference that simply because he
supplied a gun or was present at the scene by itself is sufficient
[¶] . . . . [¶] It’s a factor to consider when you look at it. So I think
it becomes somewhat confusing. I think the [pattern]
instruction[s] give both sides the ability to argue what they need
to for the jurors. So the court is, over defense objection, not going
to give the instructions.”

                                   44
                  (b)   Analysis

        Pinpoint instructions “‘relate particular facts to a legal
issue in the case or “pinpoint” the crux of a defendant’s case, such
as mistaken identification or alibi. [Citation.] They are required
to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the
theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte.’” (People
v. Hill (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1118–1119.) “[O]n request, a
criminal defendant is entitled to pinpoint instructions that relate
particular facts to an element of the charged offense and
highlight or explain a theory of the defense if the instructions are
supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1
Cal.5th 513, 542.)
        However, the trial court “‘need not give a pinpoint
instruction if it is argumentative [citation], merely duplicates
other instructions [citation], or is not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].’” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472,
500.) An instruction is argumentative “when it recites facts
drawn from the evidence in such a manner as to constitute
argument to the jury in the guise of a statement of law” or when
it “‘“‘invite[s] the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the
parties from specified items of evidence.’”’” (People v. Campos
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1244.) We review the trial court’s
decision on a pinpoint instruction de novo. (People v. Brugman
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 622, fn.3.)
        Here, the CALCRIM instructions adequately instructed the
jury that numerous factors, including whether a confederate was
armed, were to be considered in evaluating whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference. Perez’s proposed
instructions were duplicative and might have confused the jury
about the weight to be accorded the highlighted factor (use of a

                                45
gun) in relation to other factors. Further, the pinpoint
instructions were argumentative in that they highlighted that
gun use alone did not prove reckless indifference to life. Finally,
the court permitted defense counsel to argue that, pursuant to
the instructions, gun use alone is insufficient proof of reckless
indifference to life.
       Thus, Perez’s claim of federal constitutional error is
meritless because the standard instructions given by the trial
court “adequately covered the same ground” as the requested
instructions. (See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1022.)

            2.    CALCRIM 540B, the Instruction on Reckless
                  Indifference, Did Not Misstate the Law by
                  Permitting the Jury to Find Guilt Based on One
                  Factor.

                  (a)   Factual Background.

       Counsel for both Perez and Moody argued to the jury that
no single factor could establish reckless disregard. Moody’s
counsel argued: “Any weapons used? Well, it’s kind of common
sense that if you use a gun, there’s a likelihood—a possibility that
someone will get killed. But using a gun in a robbery is not, you
know, the end of the story. An armed robbery necessarily
requires a gun to be used, at least, in terms of brandishing it. If,
however you are there to commit a robbery and nothing more,
that’s all you are going to do. So, I mean, this really says nothing
because everybody knows that guns pose a potential danger.”
       Perez’s counsel argued: “‘No one of these factors is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough to
determine whether the defendant was a major participant.’
[¶] Now, let me tell you what that means, what that includes.

                                46
What that includes is this: Knowledge of the possible risk of
death in certain felonies, like armed robbery, and knowledge that
confederates are armed is insufficient alone to show a reckless
indifference to human life.”
       Counsel further stated, “But, again, they left out the most
important one. ‘No one of these factors is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether a
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [¶] And
that means—and that means that knowledge of the possible risk
of death inherent in certain felonies like armed robbery and
knowledge that confederates are armed is insufficient alone to
show a reckless indifference to life. It also means that awareness
that a gun will be used in a felony is not sufficient to establish
reckless indifference to human life. [¶] And the mere fact that the
defendant knew that his co-defendants were armed is insufficient
to prove an awareness that his actions carry a grave risk of
death.”

                  (b)   Analysis.

       Perez asserts the instruction on reckless indifference
constitutes an incorrect statement of the law because it permitted
the jury to find reckless indifference based on any single factor,
such as gun use. In support of this contention, Perez asserts the
other instructions in this case stated the same general principle
that any particular factor is not necessarily sufficient but may be
sufficient. (See, e.g., CALCRIM 316 (witness’s prior conviction’s
effect on credibility); CALCRIM 332 (weight of expert testimony).
Further, elsewhere, jurors were informed in instructions where a
single factor was not sufficient, e.g., CALCRIM 372 (flight does
not prove guilt by itself).

                                47
       In reviewing a claim of instructional error, we must
consider the jury instructions as a whole, and not judge a single
jury instruction in artificial isolation out of the context of the
charge and the entire trial record. We also consider the
arguments of counsel in assessing the probable impact of the
instructions on the jury. “‘What is crucial . . . is the meaning that
the instructions communicated to the jury. If that meaning was
not objectionable, the instructions cannot be deemed erroneous.’”
(People v. Kumar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 557, 564.) “‘Jurors are
presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are
further presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.’”
(Ibid.) We evaluate whether an instruction correctly states the
law under a de novo standard. (Id. at p. 563.)
       Here, CALCRIM No. 540B was proper and tracked the
language of Banks and Clark setting forth the factors underlying
reckless indifference. The instruction exhorts the jury to consider
all factors and did not direct the jury’s attention to any one factor
nor permit the jury to rely on a single factor in evaluating
reckless indifference to life. As the instruction stated, “[n]o one of
these factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
enough, to determine whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to life.” In sum, the instruction correctly identified
all factors to be considered and did not emphasize one factor to
the detriment of others. Defense counsel’s arguments repeated
and reiterated these points. Therefore, the unrelated instructions
Perez cites could not have confused the jury such that it
understood No. 540B to signify it should only consider a single
factor, to the exclusion of others, to establish felony murder based
on reckless indifference to life.

                                 48
V.    ENHANCEMENTS.

      A.    Gang Enhancements.

       Perez, joined by Moody, argues that the trial court erred in
admitting case-specific hearsay evidence on the predicate gang
acts, in failing to give a unanimity instruction on the specific
gang at issue and an instruction that the benefit to the gang
must be more than reputational, and finally that under revised
section 186.22, which applies retroactively, insufficient evidence
supports those enhancements. Respondent posits that revised
section 186.22 applies retroactively, and double jeopardy
principles do not prohibit remand for retrial of the enhancements.

            1.    AB 333 Modified Section 186.22 to Require
                  Additional Proof, Requiring Remand.

       In 2021, the Legislature enacted AB 333, which amended
section 186.22 to impose new substantive and procedural
requirements for gang allegations. (Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) § 3.) AB 333 found “[g]ang enhancement
evidence can be unreliable and prejudicial to a jury” because such
evidence “is lumped into evidence of the underlying charges[,]
further perpetuat[ing] . . . convictions of innocent people.” (Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 2(d)(6)); see People v. Ramos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129.) Therefore, AB 333 modified the
evidentiary standard for admission of gang evidence and provided
for bifurcation of trials to separate the gang evidence from the
underlying charges. The statute is silent about retroactivity.
(People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 822.)
       The amendments to section 186.22 “require proof of
additional elements to establish a gang enhancement.” (People v.
Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 343.) Among other things, AB

                                 49
333 amended the definitions of “criminal street gang” (§ 186.22,
subd. (f)) and “pattern of criminal gang activity” (§ 186.22, subd.
(e)(1)), and clarified the evidence needed to establish that an
offense benefits, promotes, furthers, or assists a criminal street
gang. (See People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477–478.)
       Most notably, the new law defines “to benefit, promote,
further, or assist” as “to provide a common benefit to members of
a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational.
Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational
may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation,
retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or
intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous
witness or informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).) In addition, the new
law imposes a stricter requirement for proof of a predicate
offense, namely “a pattern of criminal gang activity,” which is
necessary to prove that the group with which the defendant is
associated is indeed a criminal street gang. (See § 186.22, subd.
(f).) The current offense cannot be used as one of the two
predicate offenses. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(2).) Further, both predicate
offenses must have been committed “within three years of the
date the current offense is alleged to have been committed,” by
gang “members,” and must have been for the “common[ ]
benefit[ ] [of] a criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)
       Thus, in summary, pursuant to the new legislation,
imposition of a gang enhancement requires proof of the following
additional requirements with respect to predicate offenses: (1) the
offenses must have “commonly benefited a criminal street gang”
where the “common benefit[ ] . . . is more than reputational”;
(2) the last predicate offense must have occurred within three
years of the date of the currently charged offense; (3) the

                                 50
predicate offenses must be committed on separate occasions or by
two or more gang members; and (4) the charged offense cannot be
used as a predicate offense. (Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) § 3, § 186.22, subd. (e)(1)–(2).)
       Procedurally, new section 1109 provides that, upon the
defendant’s request, the trial court must bifurcate an
enhancement charged under section 186.22, subdivision (b) or (d),
from the underlying charges. (§ 1109, subd. (a).) In addition, such
separate proceedings must be held after the determination of the
defendant’s guilt in the underlying offenses. (Ibid.)
       Respondent concedes, and the parties do not dispute, the
new section 186.22 applies retroactively to cases not yet final on
appeal. (People v. Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 344.) The
same standards apply to challenges to the evidence underlying a
true finding on a special circumstance as to any other evidence.
(Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 715.)
       Perez and Moody argue the enhancements must be
reversed because there was no evidence of any gang motivation in
committing the offenses. Specifically, they argue, no gang
directed them to commit the robbery; neither Vargas nor Moody
was a member of a gang; the “gang” gun was not at the
apartment for the purpose of the robbery; the offense was not
committed in concert with members of the same gang; and there
was no evidence of intent to benefit a gang because the only
evidence suggested that the defendants intended to obtain money
from the robbery.
       We agree that there is insufficient evidence to support the
gang allegations. The prosecution relied on four predicate
offenses, two for each of Choppers 12 and Big Hazard. One
Choppers 12 member was convicted of robbery and one Choppers

                                51
12 member was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm; and two Big Hazard members were convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm. The gang allegations do not
indicate whether the offenses benefitted the gang in a way that
was more than reputational. Accordingly, the gang enhancements
against Perez and Moody are vacated.

            2.    Double Jeopardy.

       Moody and Perez argue that the double jeopardy clause
prohibits retrial of these gang allegations. The double jeopardy
clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California
Constitution provide that a person may not be twice placed “‘in
jeopardy’” for the “‘same offense.’” (People v. Monge (1997) 16
Cal.4th 826, 831–832, 844.) The double jeopardy bar protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense following an
acquittal or conviction, and applies where a conviction is reversed
or set aside because of insufficient evidence. (Id. at pp. 832 (conc.
opn. of Brown, J.), 849, (dis. opn. of Werdegar).)
       When a statutory amendment adds an additional element
to an offense, however, the prosecution must be afforded the
opportunity to establish the additional element upon remand.
(People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) The proper
remedy for this type of failure of proof—where newly required
elements were “never tried” to the jury—is to remand and give
the People an opportunity to retry the affected charges. (Id. at pp.
71–72, fn. 2) Such a retrial is not barred by the double jeopardy
clause because the issue was not relevant to the charges at the
time of trial and accordingly, the question was never tried. (Id. at
p. 72, fn.2) Hence, we reverse the gang enhancements and

                                 52
remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. (Id.
at p. 72.)
       To the extent Perez and Moody argue remand is
inappropriate because there is insufficient evidence in the trial
record to prove the enhancements under the new law, they are
mistaken. Where, as here, evidence is not introduced at trial
because the law at that time would have rendered it irrelevant,
remand to prove that element is proper. (See People v. Balderas
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 197–199 [retrial of special circumstances
issue in death penalty trial after court decision that intent to kill
was required for felony-murder special circumstance].)
       Finally, Perez and Moody argue the failure to bifurcate the
gang allegations under newly-enacted section 1109, which they
contend applies retroactively, constitutes prejudicial error. We
disagree.
       Courts of Appeal are currently split regarding whether
section 1109 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments, and the
Supreme Court declined to resolve the matter in People v. Tran
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1208.14
       We need not decide the issue in this case. As one court has
held, the Watson standard applies to the failure to bifurcate
under section 1109. (People v. E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
480.) Thus, even if section 1109 applied retroactively to this case,

14    Compare People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 105-
108 [§ 1109 applies retroactively]; People v. Ramos, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1128-1131 [same]; People v. Burgos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 550, 564-568, review granted July 13, 2022, S274743
[same], with People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65,
review granted August 17, 2022, S275341 [§ 1109 does not apply
retroactively]; People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 207,
review granted August 17, 2022, S275090 [same].

                                 53
neither Moody nor Perez can show it is “‘reasonably probable’”
they would have obtained a more favorable result if their trial
had been bifurcated. (Ibid. [applying Watson standard to
evaluation of prejudice resulting from decision not to apply
section 1109 retroactively].) Where, as here, the evidence of guilt
on the relevant charges is “‘overwhelming,’” it is unlikely Moody
or Perez were harmed by the format of the trial. (Ibid.; People v.
Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 931, overruled on another ground
in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459 [concluding the
failure to bifurcate was harmless under the Watson standard
because “[t]here was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt
on the other charges”].) As discussed above, there was abundant
evidence of guilt—Moody’s inculpatory statements to police
during the Perkins operation, and Perez’s statements during
police interviews.
       As we conclude the matter must be remanded for a retrial
of the gang allegations against Perez and Moody, we need not
consider their arguments that the trial court erred in failing to
give a unanimity instruction, committed instructional error with
respect to whether the benefit to the gang must be more than
reputational, or erred in admitting hearsay evidence on the
specific gang at issue. (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 924, 947.)

      B.    Firearm Enhancements.

      Perez, joined by Moody, argues that insufficient evidence
supported the gang-principal firearm discharge enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (e) because the
only evidence at trial was that the gun fired accidentally. They
also assert that the enhancements are not saved by Perez’s use
and discharge of a weapon because the pleadings failed to allege

                                54
this as a basis for the enhancements. As a result, they contend
the firearm enhancements may not be retried under the double
jeopardy clause. They also argue instructional error based on the
court’s failure to give an instruction that the benefit to the gang
must be more than reputational. We find sufficient evidence
supported the weapons enhancements based on intentional firing
of the weapon, and as a result the enhancements can be retried
under principles of double jeopardy.

            1.    Factual Background.

       The amended information contained special allegations on
count 1 as to Perez and Moody that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (c), (d) and (e)(1). The information further alleged
that Vargas personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
       Perez and Moody assert the undisputed evidence at trial
showed that Vargas shot and killed Paz. However, with respect to
Vargas’s intent in doing so, Moody told the Perkins agent the gun
Vargas used was prone to go off accidentally; Vargas told Mesta
after the group returned to the apartment that the gun went off
accidentally while he was pistol whipping the driver; Vargas told
the police in his second interview that the gun went off
accidentally when he was striking the cab driver; Moody told the
Perkins agent that the gun went off accidentally when Vargas
was hitting the cab driver. On the other hand, Mesta told a
Perkins agent that he believed Vargas lied about the accidental
discharge of the gun and that he believed Vargas intended to
shoot Paz. The forensic evidence showed that Paz’s head injuries
consisted of abrasions and lacerations from blunt force trauma
and the gun was fired from a distance of 12 inches.

                                55
            2.    Analysis.

       Section 12022.53 requires that the principal intend to
discharge the firearm. (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
588, 598.) Ordinarily, section 12022.53’s sentence enhancements
apply only to personal use or discharge of a firearm in the
commission of a statutorily specified offense, but when the
offense is committed to benefit a criminal street gang, the
statute’s additional punishments apply even if, as in this case, a
defendant did not personally use or discharge a firearm but
another principal did. (People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583,
589–590.) To impose the enhancement vicariously in this
manner, the prosecution must show the defendant was a
principal in the underlying crime and violated section 186.22,
subdivision (b), and any principal in the offense committed any
act listed in subdivisions (b) through (d) in section 12022.53.
(People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, 239 (Lee).) Lee held that
where gang allegations are vacated under section 186.22 as
amended by AB 333, related firearm enhancements based upon
gang affiliation under section 12022.53, subds. (b)/(e)(1) through
(d)/(e)(1) must also be vacated. (Id. at pp. 237, 240.)
       Defendants’ argument is based upon the accidental firing of
the weapon, rather than the fact of gang affiliation under the
now-vacated gang enhancements. Consequently, we find the
enhancements are supported by substantial evidence at trial. We
need not rely on Perez’s use of a weapon to reach this conclusion.
The jury was entitled to believe Mesta’s assertion that Vargas
intended to shoot the cab driver. (People v. Duncan (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018 [testimony of one witness is sufficient to
sustain a conviction].) As a result, we disregard Perez’s
arguments regarding testimony that the gun went off

                                56
accidentally because those arguments go to the weight, rather
than the sufficiency, of the evidence. However, because the
weapons enhancements were based on the now-vacated gang
allegations, under People v. Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 232, we
remand the matter along with the gang enhancements for retrial.
As substantial evidence supports the imposition of the
enhancement, retrial is not barred by double jeopardy.

VI.   PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

       Perez, joined by Moody, argues the prosecutor committed
misconduct by urging the jury to convict them based on their
“moral guilt” as accomplices, thereby violating their due process
rights to be convicted based upon the evidence. (See, e.g., Victor
v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 15 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2
583] [jury might understand “moral certainty” to mean something
less than the very high level of probability the Constitution
requires in criminal cases].) Perez contends the error was
prejudicial because the case was “close” and therefore it was
likely the prosecution’s argument caused one or more jurors to
convict on a lesser standard of proof, and as Moody asserts, given
the “reckless indifference” standard includes an element of moral
culpability, it was likely the jury was confused. Finally, Perez
contends the error was preserved although his trial counsel did
not object because admonition would not have cured the improper
argument; furthermore, even if objection was required, counsel
was ineffective for failing to object. We conclude any references to
moral culpability did not prejudice Perez or Moody.

      A.    Factual Background.

      During closing argument, the prosecutor made several
references to defendants’ guilt on a vicarious liability theory by

                                 57
using the word “moral” to describe their guilt. The prosecution
stated, “even though [Moody and Perez] weren’t the ones that
pulled that final trigger, . . . they are just as liable, both morally
and legally[;]” “[t]here’s no way that these two men are not
morally and legally liable for that man’s death, not in this
scenario[;]” and “[t]hey are both morally and, as you’ve seen,
legally responsible for everything that happened.”
       Moody’s counsel argued in closing that “there’s a difference
between morality and the law[,]” and “from a moral standpoint
you could come to the conclusion, without too much thought, that
these gentlemen are morally responsible. [¶] However, this is a
court of law where there’s a distinction between morality and the
law. The law is the same for everyone. Morality is not necessarily
the same. Under the law individuals are held responsible for the
acts that they actually did and the consequences of those acts.”
Further, Moody’s counsel argued, “[Y]ou are not here to make
moral judgments, to make moral decisions. . . . Morality can vary
from person to person, but the law is the law.” Finally, Moody’s
counsel told the jury that “[s]o unless you can find beyond a
reasonable doubt from the legal standpoint, not [morally], but
legally that Moody did act with reckless indifference . . . .”
       The prosecution also referred to moral guilt when
addressing the standard of proof, stating “[t]he standard of proof
here is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And from the first day
we met, the first day we spoke, I told you that is a high standard
and it . . . 100 percent absolutely should be. And I ask each one of
you to promise if we do not meet that standard, to acquit these
men of these crimes because that is what a fair trial is to all
parties and that is what your role is in this case. [¶] . . . . And the
fair trial has shown well beyond a proof beyond a reasonable

                                  58
doubt that these men are guilty, that they are responsible both
morally and legally for the loss of that man's life.”

      B.    Any Reference to Moral Culpability Did Not
            Prejudice Perez or Moody.

       The prosecution commits misconduct when his or her
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process or involves
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the
trier of fact. (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195,
306.) In general, a prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously
argue his or her case and to make fair comment upon the
evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions that may
be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th
147, 204.) Whether such inferences are reasonable is for the jury
to decide. (Ibid.) However, counsel may not assume or state facts
not in evidence or mischaracterize the evidence. (Ibid.)
       Timely objection is required to preserve a claim: A
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial
misconduct unless in the trial court the defendant raised the
issue and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the
impropriety. (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 306.) Failure to object will be excused only where objection is
futile, or when an admonition would not have cured the
misconduct. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.)
       In assessing prejudice, “‘“‘the question is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of
the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’”’” (People
v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 349.) When attacking the
prosecutor's remarks to the jury, the defendant must show that
in the context of the whole argument and the instructions there

                                 59
was “‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.’”
(People v. Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)
       Here, Perez and Moody acknowledge they failed to object to
the prosecution’s “moral guilt” comments, and they did not
request any jury admonishment. This results in a forfeiture of
their claim. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 334.) Further,
they do not make any argument that admonishment would have
been futile. (See People v. Thomas, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p.
955.)
       Even assuming the error was preserved, defendants cannot
show prejudice, namely, that there was a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the comments in an improper manner. (People v.
Caldwell (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1269.) The prosecution,
numerous times throughout closing argument, admonished the
jury that the evidence and testimony, not defendants’ moral
culpability, established defendants’ guilt. The prosecution stated,
“you heard the evidence. You saw the evidence. You heard from
the witnesses that got up here and talked to you about what
happened. You saw the videos.” “They are guilty of everything.
They are guilty because that is what the evidence shows.” “[W]e
know from the evidence in this case, we know from the witnesses,
we know from what we were told by the people who were involved
in what happened . . . .”
       Further, with respect to defendants’ participation, the
prosecution argued, “[w]ere they major participants in the
robbery? You heard what they did. You saw the evidence. You
heard from the witnesses . . . . “These two men are nothing if not
major participants who acted in reckless indifference to human
life. [Moody and Perez] are guilty of murder.” Given this

                                60
emphasis on guilt based upon the evidence and testimony of
witnesses, with only a brief reference to moral guilt, it is not
reasonably likely the jury convicted defendants based upon an
improper connection between “moral” culpability and legal
culpability, or upon a belief they were people who committed
reckless acts.
       The jury instructions here further dispel any potential
prejudice. (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 260.) The jury
was instructed with CALCRIM No. 200, which admonished jurors
to base their decision as factfinders “only on the evidence that
has been presented to you in this trial,” and admonished them to
“follow the law.” An instruction on reasonable doubt, CALCRIM
No. 220, required the jury to consider “all the evidence” presented
at trial. Given these instructions’ focus on evidence, it is not
likely that the jury found the defendants guilty solely on a
“moral” basis.
       Finally, given the lack of prejudice, defendants’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails. Our holding that the
prosecutor’s error was harmless defeats defendants’ substantive
ineffective assistance claim because defendants have not shown
that the result would have been different if trial counsel had
requested and received a “curative” admonition. (See People v.
Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333 [ineffective assistance claim
requires both deficient performance and resultant prejudice; “the
record must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different’”].)

                                61
VII. SENTENCING ISSUES.

      A.    Recent Amendments to Section 1170

       Vargas argues that the case must be remanded for
resentencing on counts 4 and 5 because the trial court imposed
the upper term, contrary to recent amendments to section 1170,
effective January 1, 2022, which provide that the middle term is
the presumptive term unless certain circumstances, not present
here, exist. Respondent asserts that any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

            1.    Factual Background.

      Vargas was 18 years old at the time of the offenses. At the
sentencing hearing, without specifying its reasons, the trial court
sentenced him to the upper term on count 4 (carrying a loaded
unregistered firearm). With respect to count 5 (robbery), the court
imposed the upper term because the victim was particularly
vulnerable (lured to an isolated area), the crime was extremely
violent, and the crime showed planning and sophistication. The
court stayed the sentence on count 5 pursuant to section 654.

            2.    Analysis.

       At the time Vargas was sentenced, the law in effect
provided that where a statute specified three possible terms
(lower, middle, and upper) of imprisonment, the trial court had
broad discretion to select the term that best served the interests
of justice. (Former § 1170, subd. (b); Former Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.420(e); People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825,847.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567 (SB 567) altered the
determinate sentencing law by amending section 1170,
subdivision (b), to make the midterm the presumptive sentence in

                                62
the absence of specified circumstances. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3, adding § 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2); People v. Flores (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038 (Flores).) The trial court may impose the
upper term only where there are circumstances in aggravation
and such circumstances have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt or are stipulated by the defendant. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2); People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 915.) The
amendments to section 1170 apply retroactively. (Flores, supra,
at p. 1039.)
       Here, Vargas points to his youth at the time of the offenses
(age 19) and contends, unless the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the court should have
ordered the lower term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).) Respondent
argues any error was harmless because there was undisputed
evidence of each of the aggravating circumstances (vulnerable
victim, violence of crime, and sophistication) such that we could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
found an aggravating circumstance.
       Courts are divided on the appropriate standard for
demonstrating prejudice.15 The primary disagreement is between
People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, and People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez). People v. Flores required the
reviewing court to find at least a single aggravating circumstance
to conclude the error was harmless. (People v. Flores, supra, at p.
500–501.) By contrast, in Lopez, supra, the court adopted a more
stringent test involving whether “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . a
jury would have found true . . . all of the aggravating factors on

15   The issue is pending before the Supreme Court in People v.
Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
August 10, 2022, S274942.)

                                63
which the trial court relied in exercising its discretion to select
the upper term” and a second-step evaluation of prejudice.
(Lopez, supra, at p. 467, fn. 11, original italics.) However, in
People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394 (Dunn), review granted
October 12, 2022, S275655, overruled on another ground in
People v. Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 950, the court
evaluated People v. Flores and Lopez and concluded that “[People
v.] Flores sets too low a standard for harmlessness and Lopez too
high.” (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.) Thus, Dunn
adopted a test it described as a modification of Lopez.
       Here, however, we conclude that the trial court’s
sentencing choices were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
even under the more stringent Lopez standard. A jury
undisputedly would find true all of the aggravating factors the
court cited. The trial court based its upper term sentence on its
finding that the victim was particularly vulnerable. The evidence
showed that Paz was called out to an isolated, industrial area.
Vargas’s phone was used to call the taxi service. Further, the
crime was extremely violent, with the evidence showing Paz was
shot twice, once in the head and once in his leg, and had
lacerations on and near his right ear consistent with blunt force
injury. Vargas told the police that he hit Paz’s neck with a gun.
Finally, the planning and sophistication of the offenses is
supported by the luring of the victim to an isolated area and the
three defendants’ assigned roles.
       We conclude that had the jury been called upon to decide
beyond a reasonable doubt whether these aggravating factors
were true, it would have concluded they were.

                                64
      B.    Recent Amendments to Section 654.

       Vargas argues that remand is necessary for the trial court
to exercise its new discretion under amended section 654.
Respondent counters that although these amendments apply
retroactively to Vargas, he cannot benefit from them because the
record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial
court would nonetheless have stayed the shorter, rather than the
longer, sentence.
       Previously, section 654, subdivision (a), required that “[a]n
act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that
provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment[.]”
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 518 (AB 518) amended
section 654 by removing the requirement that a defendant be
punished under the provision providing for the longest term of
imprisonment, and granting the trial court discretion to impose
punishment under any applicable provision. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441,
§ 1.) Section 654, subdivision (a), now provides, “[a]n act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions[.]”
       The parties do not dispute AB 518 applies retroactively.
(People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45; People v. Mani
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379–380.)
       Here, the trial court sentenced Vargas to life without parole
plus 10 years on count 1 and stayed the shorter term on count 5
(five years plus 10 years). Vargas argues there is no basis to
conclude the trial court would have refused to exercise its
discretion by imposing only the shorter term. He points out that
although the court found aggravating factors favored imposing

                                65
the high term on the robbery count, this does not imply that the
court believed the interests of justice favored a life without parole
sentence rather than a sentence of 15 years for an 18-year-old
defendant who the jury determined did not intentionally
discharge a firearm.
      We disagree. Here, Vargas committed both a robbery and
murder. Further, in sentencing Vargas, the court imposed the
high term for both the robbery conviction and the conviction for
carrying a loaded unregistered firearm. Given these sentencing
choices, the matter need not be remanded for the court to exercise
its new discretion under section 654. (See People v. McVey (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 405, 418–419.)

      C.    Moody’s Custody Credits.

      Moody contends he is entitled to two additional days of
custody credit. Respondent concedes this point. The trial court
gave Moody 1,642 actual days of presentence custody credit.
However, 1,643 days elapsed from Moody’s arrest on April 20,
2016, to his sentencing on October 19, 2020. Therefore, Moody’s
abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect 1,644 days of
presentence custody credit.

VIII. CUMULATIVE ERROR.

       Moody and Vargas argue that the cumulative effect of the
state law errors requires reversal. We have found no errors. The
rejection of each of a defendant’s individual claims “cannot
logically be used to support a cumulative error claim [where] we
have already found there was no error to cumulate.” (In re Reno
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483.)

                                 66
                        DISPOSITION

       The judgment of conviction is affirmed as modified to
correct Moody’s custody credits. The gang and weapons
enhancements are vacated and the matter is remanded for retrial
of the gang and firearm enhancements. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                 CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

                              67