Court Opinion

ID: 9622917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:25:00.976531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:21.424169
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately because the United States Supreme Court has refined the holding in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), by ruling that the invocation of right to counsel is limited to its purpose. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, -, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987). Appellant requested assistance of counsel for the limited purpose of determining whether Oklahoma City police had the authority to transport him back to Oklahoma City from Weatherford on February 21, 1983. This request was clear, unambiguous, and less than all-inclusive. Id. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 832. Oklahoma City police informed appellant he could call an attorney when they returned to Oklahoma City. The officers made no attempt to interrogate appellant during the drive back to Oklahoma City, and the promise that appellant would be given an opportunity to call an attorney was honored upon arrival at the Oklahoma City Jail. The following morning appellant responded to police questioning after expressly waiving his right to remain silent and his right to have an attorney present. Midway through his confession to the murder of Smith, appellant said, “I think I need an attorney.” All questioning ceased, and appellant was again informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Appellant began to cry and said, “No, I’ll go ahead and tell you all about it.” Appellant initiated the further conversations with the police, and voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-24, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141-42, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986); Barrett, at -, 107 S.Ct. at 832-33.
With regard to appellant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly suppressed exculpatory evidence by failing to deliver a police report to defense counsel, I would note that, for the reasons given by the majority, appellant’s case is distinguishable from Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir.1986). For the foregoing reasons, I concur.