Court Opinion

ID: 9381883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 05:04:46.238638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.225399
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

LUCIOUS CONWAY,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 23, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 360875
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOL COMMUNITY                                      LC No. 21-008985-NO
DISTRICT, DR. NIKOLAI VITTI, JOHN R. KING
ACADEMIC AND PERFORMING ARTS
ACADEMY, JENNIFER SPENCER, SHARON
SKLAR, BREIA KILGO, BENJAMIN JACKSON,
STEPHANIE CARRECKER, JENICE C.
MITCHELL FORD, ANGELIQUE PETERSON-
MAYBERRY, MISHA STALLWORTH, DEBORAH
HUNTER-HARVILL, GEORGIA LEMMONS,
CORLETTA VAUGHN, SONYA MAYS, and
SHERRY GAY-DAGNOGO,

               Defendants-Appellees,
and

DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD OF
EDUCATION,

               Defendant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and BORRELLO and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

                                                -1-
                                             I. FACTS

       Plaintiff, Lucious Conway, brought this tort action asserting claims arising out of the
employment relationship between his sister, Cheryl Conway (Conway), and defendants.
Defendants are Detroit Public School Community District (DPSCD), Detroit Public School Board
of Education (DPSBE), John R. King Academic and Performing Arts Academy (JRK Academy),
and several named individuals who are administrators or employees of either DPSCD, DPSBE, or
JRK Academy.
        In 2018, plaintiff moved to Detroit to live with Conway and to assist her with caring for
their mother, who died on November 9, 2020. In 2020, Conway was employed by DPSCD as a
clerical worker at JRK Academy. Conway tested positive for COVID-19 in December 2020 and
thereafter worked from home, as did other staff, until January 6, 2021. About that time, plaintiff,
who was living with Conway, was hospitalized for three days for elevated blood sugar and
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-related infections.

        In late January 2021, Conway again tested positive for COVID-19 and received approval
from her supervisor to work from home until February 4, 2021. On February 5, 2021, Conway
filed for unemployment compensation benefits on the basis that she was “not permitted to work
from home or in-person because of” her COVID-19 diagnosis. Conway’s request for benefits was
denied because DPSCD identified Conway as a full-time employee.1 Conway requested additional
time to work from home and additional paid sick leave, which defendants denied. After a series
of exchanges with her employer, Conway was terminated from her position for job abandonment.

         Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against defendants alleging disability discrimination under
the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring,
negligent retention, and negligent supervision relating to the termination of Conway’s
employment. In lieu of filing an answer, defendants moved for summary disposition under
MCR.116(C)(5), (7), and (8) contending that plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert the discrimination claim, had
failed to establish genuine issues of material fact to sustain his claims of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and that plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention could not be established in light of the lack of merit regarding the other claims. Plaintiff
now appeals.

                                         II. DISCUSSION

      Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting defendants summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because sufficient facts were presented to establish genuine issues of

1
 According to plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff represented Conway in her appeal of the denial of
unemployment compensation benefits to the administrative tribunal.

                                                 -2-
material fact regarding his claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 We
disagree.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We review de novo the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287, 296; 954 NW2d 115 (2020). A motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim, and is
properly granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160;
934 NW2d 665 (2019). When reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the documentary evidence submitted by the
parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might disagree. Johnson
v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich 751, 761; 918 NW2d 785 (2018).

                B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

        To establish a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff was
required to demonstrate that (1) defendants’ extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentionally or
recklessly (3) caused (4) plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. See Swain v Morse, 332 Mich App
510, 534; 957 NW2d 396 (2020). Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress “does
not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities.”
Id., quoting Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 91; 536 NW2d 824 (1995). Rather, “[l]iability attaches
only when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Swain, 322 Mich App at 534
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court initially is required to determine whether
the defendant's alleged conduct “may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The test is whether the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor,
and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        In this case, the conduct alleged by plaintiff as extreme and outrageous involves a dispute
between Conway and her employers. Plaintiff alleges that defendants denied Conway paid sick
leave, terminated Conway for job abandonment, engaged in an e-mail exchange discussing the
date of a Board of Education meeting in which Conway’s termination was to be voted upon, failed
to provide plaintiff and Conway an opportunity to speak at the meeting, sent two e-mails informing
Conway she was not approved to work from home and was required to return to work in-person
after proof of a negative COVID-19 test, and daily phone calls and e-mails from coworkers to
Conway regarding her whereabouts.

2
  Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s dismissal of his claims of disability
discrimination under the PDCRA, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention.

                                                 -3-
        Notably, this dispute involved Conway’s relationship with her employer and did not
directly involve plaintiff. Moreover, even when aggregated, these events do not rise to the level
of extreme and outrageous conduct. A job dispute related to work attendance, in conjunction with
a series of communications regarding the status of the employment, does not rise to the level of
outrageousness that is “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See Swain, 322 Mich App
at 534. In addition, the alleged actions of Conway’s coworkers are not attributable to defendants.
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant’s actions were extreme or outrageous, and thus failed
to meet the threshold requirement to establish a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

        Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate that defendants had the requisite intent to cause plaintiff
emotional distress. A plaintiff must show either that “a defendant specifically intended to cause a
plaintiff emotional distress or that a defendant’s conduct was so reckless that any reasonable
person would know emotional distress would result.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 197;
670 NW2d 675 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, defendants’ conduct was
directed to Conway, not to plaintiff. The only conduct defendants directed to plaintiff were two
e-mails plaintiff received in response to his initial inquiry regarding the unfairness of changing the
date of the Board of Education meeting. The first was a confirmation of the meeting date, and the
second was a statement that there were no pending matters regarding Conway after defendants
terminated her employment. The content of the e-mails was informational, and neither extreme
nor outrageous. Plaintiff argues that he experienced emotional distress as a by-product of his
supporting Conway as she dealt with defendants; plaintiff e-mailed DPSCD regarding the Board
meeting, represented Conway in her appeal for unemployment benefits, and assisted Conway with
her communications with defendants. Defendants’ actions, however, as alleged by plaintiff, were
not so reckless that “any reasonable person would know emotional distress would result.” Lewis,
258 Mich App at 197.

        Finally, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he endured severe emotional distress as a result
of defendants’ termination of Conway’s employment. Plaintiff asserted he suffered mental
anguish, anxiety, sleeplessness, vomiting, diarrhea, humiliation, nervousness, and embarrassment
from witnessing Conway suffer and from “fearing for his own life” because Conway’s loss of
employment threatened the stability of his housing and the assistance he receives from Conway.
Although emotional distress “includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions” such as the ones
identified by plaintiff, “[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 235;
551 NW2d 206 (1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). There is nothing in the record
indicating plaintiff’s concern for his sister’s employment situation rose to the level the law
requires.3 Id. In sum, the trial court did into err by finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the
elements necessary to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress.

3
  Plaintiff alleged that he was hospitalized for three days in January 2020. However, this
hospitalization happened before the events at issue occurred, and was not related to defendants’
conduct.

                                                  -4-
                 C. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

        Negligent infliction of emotional distress ordinarily is recognized when a plaintiff
witnesses negligent injury to a third party that results in the plaintiff suffering mental disturbance.
Teadt v Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 237 Mich App 567, 581 n 6; 603 NW2d 816 (1999). A
plaintiff asserting negligent infliction of emotional distress must establish that “(1) the injury
threatened or inflicted on the third person is a serious one, of a nature to cause severe mental
disturbance to the plaintiff, (2) the shock results in actual physical harm, (3) the plaintiff is a
member of the third person’s immediate family, and (4) the plaintiff is present at the time of the
accident or suffers shock ‘fairly contemporaneous’ with the accident.” Taylor v Kurapati, 236
Mich App 315, 360; 600 NW2d 670 (1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

        Here, plaintiff asserted that he suffered mental anguish in response to Conway’s purported
suffering over the loss of her employment, and also suffered fear that the housing and care Conway
was providing him was jeopardized by her loss of employment. Plaintiff, however, failed to
establish the first element, that the injury threatened or inflicted upon Conway was a serious one
that would cause severe mental disturbance to the plaintiff. Conway was terminated from her
employment because she failed to report for work. While losing one’s employment may be
upsetting, it cannot reasonably be described as so serious that observing Conway lose her
employment would cause plaintiff severe mental disturbance.4

        Plaintiff also failed to establish that his alleged physical manifestations were a result of
Conway losing her employment. A valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is set
forth only when the plaintiff can establish that the emotional distress resulted in the plaintiff’s
physical manifestations of that distress. Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 79; 701 NW2d 684
(2005).     “Where the defendant’s negligence causes only mental disturbance, without
accompanying physical injury, illness or other physical consequences, and in the absence of some
other independent basis for tort liability, the great majority of courts still hold that in the ordinary
case there can be no recovery.” Id. at 79 n 9, citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th Ed), § 54, p 361.
Here, plaintiff alleged that as a result of Conway’s dispute with defendants, he experienced
sleeplessness, depression, diarrhea, vomiting, listlessness, and “other physically detrimental
outcomes.” However, plaintiff also acknowledged that before Conway’s dispute with defendants,
he was suffering poor health as a result of diabetes, stress related to the death of his mother, and
AIDS-related infections. Plaintiff has not established that the physical conditions he allegedly

4
  In Pate v Children’s Hosp of Michigan, 158 Mich App 120, 123; 404 NW2d 632 (1986), for
example, this Court held that “while presence at the side of a loved one at the time of her death is
certainly a grievous event, without more it is simply not the sort of inherently shocking and sudden
event to which the doctrine of bystander recover[y] for emotional distress and resulting physical
injury was intended to apply.” Given that this Court found witnessing the death of a loved one
insufficient to establish negligent infliction of emotional distress, we conclude that witnessing a
loved one lose her job is not sufficient to give rise to such a claim.

                                                  -5-
experienced after Conway was fired from her job resulted from that occurrence and were not
further manifestations of his pre-existing illness.

         In addition, plaintiff relies on several events to support his claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, rather than a single shocking event. To establish a claim of negligent infliction
of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish that he or she was present at the time of an
“accident” that inflicted injury upon the third person, and that the plaintiff suffered shock “fairly
contemporaneous” with the accident. Taylor, 236 Mich App at 360. This Court has interpreted
“accident” to refer to a “sudden, brief, and inherently shocking accidental event which causes the
injury or death, which contemporaneously, and by its very nature, results in emotional and physical
injury to the plaintiff.” Pate, 158 Mich App at 123. Plaintiff witnessed the unhappiness
experienced by Conway upon losing her job, not a traumatic or shocking singular event necessary
to support plaintiff’s claim. Absent evidence that he witnessed a single shocking event that gave
rise to a serious injury to Conway, plaintiff failed to allege the required elements of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court did not err by granting defendants summary
disposition.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                               /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                               /s/ Noah P. Hood

                                                  -6-