Court Opinion

ID: 9525390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:03:10.497242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:28.757337
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, dissenting: Our Rule 451 states that whenever an IPI instruction is applicable in a criminal case and the trial court decides that the jury should be instructed on that subject, “the IPI-Criminal instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.” I think that IPI Criminal No. 3.17 does not accurately state the law. But even if it does accurately state the law in a technical sense, it is quite unfair as a statement to a lay jury. It uses the term “accomplice witness” and by doing so it tends to tell the jurors that the defendant participated in the crime, if it does not actually tell them that he did so. “Accomplice” is a word that is familiar to laymen. The primary meaning given in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961) is: “Accomplice — one associated with another in wrongdoing: one that participates with another in a crime either as principal or accessory.” The American College Dictionary, Random House (1952), defines it this way: “Accomplice — an associate in a crime; partner in wrongdoing.” Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms (1951) says this: “Accomplice — confederate; accessory; conspirator.” Any instruction that describes a witness as an “accomplice witness” is inherently prejudicial, it seems to me. The instruction tendered by the attorney for the defendant did not use the word “accomplice,” and this is what he meant when he protested twice that he had not tendered an “accomplice” instruction. The instruction that he did tender accurately stated the law in that respect without using the word “accomplice,” and in my opinion it should have been given as tendered, or as corrected by striking the last sentence. Under the opinion of the court, a defendant who does not want the judge to suggest to the jury that he was a participant in the crime is required to forgo any instruction on the subject. I think this is wrong. The error was not cured by instructing the jury as to “its duty to judge the credibility of witnesses generally.” Such an instruction only compounds the difficulty, for it suggests that the testimóny of the “accomplice” is to be treated like that of any other witness. See People v. O’Connell (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 442.