Court Opinion

ID: 9608490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:13:51.949013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:31.839246
License: Public Domain

Johnson, Presiding Judge.
Robert Jepson, Jr. and Alice Jepson filed this lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus and, in the alternative, declaratory relief. They complained that when their property was reassessed, the Chatham County Board of Assessors failed to comply with OCGA § 48-5-306 (e) by failing to provide “a simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment.” The trial court denied the Jepsons’ request for a mandamus, but granted the Jepsons’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of declaratory relief. The Chatham County Board of Assessors appeals, arguing (1) the Jepsons’ complaint should have been dismissed because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and (2). the trial court erred in finding that the Board of Assessors did not provide á simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment. Because the trial court should not have exercised its equitable jurisdiction when the Jepsons failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
1. The Chatham County Board of Assessors contends that the Jepsons’ complaint should have been dismissed due to their failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.1 We agree.
The issues of reassessment, including the validity of a reassessment, shall be raised within the statutory scheme for tax appeals by an appeal to the county board of equalization or arbitrators.2 The superior court’s jurisdiction to decide issues raised by tax appeals is limited to those cases which come through OCGA § 48-5-311 (g).3 While the statute addressing appeals to the county board of equalization does not specifically address notice deformities, both this Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia have consistently held that the board of equalization is the appropriate forum for deciding not only questions of uniformity, valuation, and taxability, but also a tax*772payer’s questions addressing constitutional and procedural issues.4 These cases establish that as a matter of public policy and judicial economy, tax questions should be resolved first at the local level through the appeal procedures created specifically for that purpose. Moreover, it is well established that an appeal before the board of equalization provides an adequate remedy at law for the determination of county taxpayers’ questions, making unnecessary the exercise of the equitable powers of the superior court.5
While the principles argued by the dissent hold a certain allure and it is true that the system of appeals set up under the statutory framework can be somewhat burdensome, the legislature and Supreme Court precedents mandate that taxpayers must timely appeal questions such as the one presented here before the board of equalization. Even if the notice sent to the Jepsons failed to provide a nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment, this failure did not render an effective appeal to the Board of Assessors impossible. The Jepsons could have appealed to the Board of Assessors and argued that the language failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 48-5-306, just as they argued in the present case. At that point, the Board of Assessors could have either accepted or rejected their argument, and the Jepsons would have exhausted their administrative remedies.
Moreover, it is clear from the record that the Jepsons’ time for appeal to the Board of Assessors had expired before they filed the declaratory judgment action at issue.6 Allowing them to avoid the statutory appeal requirements by filing a declaratory judgment action after their administrative appeal time had expired opens the door for many such actions in the future, a burden on judicial resources which the legislature had relieved in enacting the administrative appeal process for cases such as this one. In addition, adopting the procedure the dissent urges would allow the Jepsons to pursue an appeal, their rights to which they had clearly waived by allowing the time for an appeal to the Board of Assessors to expire.
The Jepsons must raise their tax issues, including the issue of whether they received valid notice, before the board of equalization and exhaust their administrative remedies by the statutorily provided appeal. The trial court should have dismissed this suit for failing to state a claim.7
*7732. Based on our holding in Division 1, we need not address the Chatham County Board of Assessors’ contention that the trial court erred in holding that the change of value notice was not accompanied by a simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment. We note that nothing in this opinion is intended to indicate this Court’s views as to the merits of the Jepsons’ claim.

Judgment reversed.

Smith, C. J., Blackburn, P. J, Ruffin, P. J., Eldridge and Phipps, JJ, concur. Mikell, J., dissents.

 See OCGA § 48-5-311 (e).

 OCGA § 48-5-311 (e), (f); Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 240 Ga. App. 405, 408 (2) (a) (523 SE2d 600) (1999).

 Rolleston, supra.

 See Wilkes v. Redding, 242 Ga. 78, 79 (247 SE2d 872) (1978); Dillard v. Denson, 243 Ga. App. 458, 460 (533 SE2d 101) (2000); Arnold v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 207 Ga. App. 759 (429 SE2d 146) (1993).

 See City of Atlanta v. North by Northwest Civic Assn., 262 Ga. 531, 535-536 (3) (422 SE2d 651) (1992); Wilkes, supra at 79; Dillard, supra.

 See OCGA § 48-5-311 (e).

 See Wilkes, supra at 80.