Court Opinion

ID: 9634278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:05.324275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.214832
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas

                                                 OPINION
                                            No. 04-23-00539-CR

                                IN RE Martha Fosado SANCHEZ, et al.

                                     Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

                                 OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Opinion by:       Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 16, 2023

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

           This original proceeding arises out of three underlying Operation Lone Star (“OLS”) cases.

Defendant-relators—noncitizens who have been removed from the country—moved for a

continuance of their pre-trial hearings until they are legally able to enter the country. The trial court

denied their requested continuances. Relators filed a consolidated petition for writ of mandamus

challenging the trial court’s rulings. On July 5, 2023, we issued an opinion and order denying

relators’ mandamus petition without prejudice without providing a substantive explanation.

Relators subsequently filed a motion for rehearing. The court, on its own motion, withdraws its

July 5, 2023 opinion and order and substitutes this opinion and order in their stead to address the

1
  This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 31836, styled State of Texas v. Martha Fosado Sanchez, Cause No. 31940,
styled State of Texas v. Adriana Estrada Sanchez, and Cause No. 31878, styled State of Texas v. Levi Rubicelda
Vasquez-Lopez, pending in the County Court, Maverick County, Texas, the Honorable Susan D. Reed presiding.
                                                                                     04-23-00539-CR

reasoning for our decision. Consistent with our July 5, 2023 opinion and order, we deny mandamus

relief.

                                         BACKGROUND

          Relators were arrested under OLS, processed, and released on bond. Following relators’

release, they were removed from the country. Although removed from the country, relators were

ordered to appear for an in-person pre-trial hearing on May 25, 2023. Relying on the “Tool Kit for

Prosecutors” published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, they requested the State’s assistance in returning to the country for their

proceedings:

          Defendant petitions Maverick County to submit an application for Law
          Enforcement Agency Significant Public Benefit Parole (LEA Parole) on
          Defendant’s behalf with the Parole and Law Enforcement Programs Unit (Parole
          Unit) within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in order to attend
          [her] in-person jury proceeding. “Once granted by ICE, this type of parole
          authorizes an alien witness, defendant, or cooperating source temporary entry into
          or to remain in the United States.” (emphasis added). U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND
          SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ICE PAROLE AND LAW
          ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS UNIT CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,
          DHS/ICE/PIA-049 (2018) (attached.) “State or local law enforcement agencies
          email parole applications to their local ICE HSI Parole Coordinator, who works in
          one of the HSI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) offices located in the field.” Id.
          Further information on LEA Parole and its procedures can be found in ICE’s Tool
          Kit for Prosecutors, which has been attached as Exhibit A.

(all emphasis in orig.). They also requested a continuance of the in-person hearing until they can

legally enter the country. The trial court denied their motions.

          On May 23, 2023, relators filed a mandamus petition seeking to compel the trial court to

grant relators’ “motion to continue and excuse their presence from the in-person pretrial hearing

set on May 25, 2023, until Relators are given legal authorization to enter the country.” We stayed

all settings requiring the in-person attendance of relators and requested responses from the trial

court and the real party in interest, the State of Texas. No responses were filed.

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                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The principles governing mandamus in criminal cases are set by the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. App. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d

207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). First, a relator “must show that he has no

adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm.” Id. Second, a relator “must show that what

he seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision.” Id. “If

the relator fails to satisfy either aspect of this two-part test, then relief should be denied.” Id. “As

to the latter requirement,” the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has “said that it is satisfied if the

relator can show he has a clear right to the relief sought—that is to say, when the facts and

circumstances dictate but one rational decision under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant

statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles.” Id.; see

also In re City of Lubbock, 666 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (orig. proceeding)

(“Mandamus relief is available for a novel issue or one of first impression with uncontested facts

when the law points to but one clear result.”).

                                             DISCUSSION

        The dispositive issue for our review is whether relators have a clear right to a continuance

of an in-person pre-trial hearing until they are legally able to enter the country.

            A. Prong One: Adequate Remedy at Law

        A trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance is reviewable by appeal. See Renteria v.

State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (reviewing on appeal trial court’s denial of

motion for continuance); accord Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995);

Alvarado v. State, 818 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no pet.). Although

relators can appeal the denial of their motions, the existence of a remedy is not satisfactory if it is

inadequate. Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210. An appeal is inadequate if “it is tedious, burdensome, slow,

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inconvenient, inappropriate, and to some degree ineffective in affording the relief sought.” In re

Smith, 665 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (orig. proceeding).

       Here, delaying relators’ ability to challenge the denial of their motions for continuance

until they can legally enter the country may prevent us from ever reviewing that ruling. See, e.g.,

In re Santiago Villalobos, No. 04-23-00538-CV, 2023 WL 4750833, at *1 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio July 26, 2023, no pet. h.) (Martinez, C.J., concurring) (“What remains after removal is a

pending criminal charge in state court but a defendant who is outside of the country and without

current federal authorization to return.”). There is a real risk that the cases of noncitizens who have

been removed from the country will never be tried, diminishing their ability to seek appellate

review of rulings like this one. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“Appellate

review has now become an integral part of the [] trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or

innocence of a defendant.”); Ex parte Spring, 586 S.W.2d 482, 485–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)

(recognizing right to appeal is statutory, not common law, in Texas); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 44.02 (describing circumstances under which defendant may appeal). Defendants in criminal

cases generally must wait until after the trial of their case to seek appellate review of the decision

to deny their motions for continuance. See Harrison v. State, 187 S.W.3d 429, 430 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005) (reviewing defendant’s complaint about denied motion for continuance on appeal after

trial, conviction, and sentencing). As Chief Justice Martinez recently pointed out in an opinion

concurring in the denial of mandamus relief in a similar case, even “if the trial court were to allow

pretrial appearances by videoconference, trials nevertheless appear unlikely in the foreseeable

future. The record does not show relators have waived their physical presences at trial, and records

from other Operation Lone Star appeals suggest they will not.” In re Santiago Villalobos, 2023

WL 4750833, at *1 (Martinez, C.J., concurring). If relators are never able to legally enter the

country, their cases may never be tried or appealed. See id. We therefore conclude that requiring

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relators to wait until after trial to challenge the denial of their motions for continuance in these

circumstances would be a “tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate, and . . .

ineffective” method of addressing their complaints. In re Smith, 665 S.W.3d at 454. Accordingly,

under these facts, we hold relators lack an adequate remedy at law.

            B. Prong Two: Clear Right to Relief Sought

        Trial courts have the inherent authority to manage their own dockets. Marquez v. State,

921 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citation omitted). Generally, determining “whether

to grant a continuance lies [within] the sound discretion of the court.” Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d

332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (en banc). Although a trial court enjoys broad

discretion in managing its docket, it has a ministerial duty to grant a continuance rendered

mandatory by statute. See id. at 336; c.f., e.g., Ojeda v. State, 916 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d) (“If properly requested, a legislative continuance is mandatory.”). A

request for a continuance that is not statutorily mandated is “entirely within the sound discretion

of the court and will only call for reversal if it is shown that the court clearly abused its discretion.”

Alvarado, 818 S.W.2d at 103.

        In the present case, relators raise a constitutional challenge to the denial of their motion for

continuance. We review the trial court’s decision under a clear abuse of discretion standard. See

id.; Young v. State, 591 S.W.3d 579, 592 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. ref’d) (first citing Lopez

v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), then citing State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d

435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)) (“[A] trial court’s ruling will only be deemed an abuse of

discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside ‘the zone of reasonable disagreement’ or is

‘arbitrary or unreasonable.’”); Daniels v. State, 921 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance

is so arbitrary as to violate due process.”) (citation omitted); Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456,

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                                                                                                      04-23-00539-CR

467–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (per curiam) (noting a trial court abuses its discretion if it denies

continuance where specific prejudice is shown); accord Hernandez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 397, 399–

400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

         Relators argue they have a constitutional right to be physically present at their pre-trial

hearings. Because the State has failed to facilitate their legal entry into the country, relators

conclude they are entitled to a continuance of their required in-person attendance at the May 25,

2023 pre-trial hearing until the State “fulfills their duty to bring Relators to trial or in the

alternative, to allow them to appear via zoom until they are given legal authorization to enter the

country.” 2 If relators are correct, the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant relators’ motions for

continuance. Based on arguments and authority relators presented, however, the trial court and the

State are under no such burdens.

         A defendant has a due process right “to be present at different stages of prosecution.” King

v. State, 666 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Although a defendant has the due process

right to be present, the right is not absolute—“there is no due process violation when the

defendant’s presence does not bear a reasonably substantial relationship to his or her defense.” Id.;

Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding no violation of due

process where defendant’s counsel was present, argued on defendant’s behalf, and obtained

favorable rulings).

         Here, relators do not articulate how or why their presence at the May 25, 2023 pre-trial

hearing is substantially tied to their defense so as to render their absence a violation of due process.

2
  The record contains motions filed by relators requesting the State file federal parole petitions on their behalf. See
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The record does not, however, contain a ruling from the trial court on relators’
motions. Absent a showing that the motions remained pending for an unreasonable time or that the trial court refused
to rule—neither of which is apparent from the record—this issue is not ripe for our review. See Young, 236 S.W.3d at
210 (“While a trial court has a ministerial duty to rule upon a motion that is properly and timely presented to it for a
ruling, in general it has no ministerial duty to rule a certain way on that motion.”).

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                                                                                      04-23-00539-CR

Instead, they argue, “[i]f Relators do not comply with this order [to attend their in-person court

settings], their matter will be called, and their bond will be forfeited, a judgment nisi will be

ordered, and a capias will be issued.” They contend compliance is impossible and their removal

from the country is an uncontrollable circumstance requiring a continuance of their in-person

attendance at pre-trial settings. An “uncontrollable circumstance” is an affirmative defense in bond

forfeiture proceedings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 22.13(a)(3). But the record does not

show that the State has initiated bond forfeiture proceedings in relators’ cases. Accordingly, we

conclude the uncontrollable circumstance affirmative defense is not applicable here.

       Finally, Relators cite several cases challenging a lower court prosecution based on

violations of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. But that issue is not before us

here. The dispositive issue for our review is whether relators have a clear right to a continuance of

an in-person pre-trial hearing until they are legally able to enter the country and appear. Under

these facts and the authority by which we are bound, we must conclude relators have not shown

that they have a clear right to a continuance.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We therefore deny relators’ petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice.

                                                  Beth Watkins, Justice

PUBLISH

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