Court Opinion

ID: 9789020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:24:40.146875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:18.728748
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I join in the judgment affirming the Court of Appeal and concur generally in the majority’s analysis under the particular circumstances of this case. Had the trial court supported its order granting a new trial with an adequate statement of reasons, we would have been bound to defer to the trial court’s resolution of the factual conflicts in the affidavits concerning the existence of juror misconduct. (Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 108-109 [95 Cal.Rptr. 516, 485 P.2d 1132].) In that event, it appears that the Oakland Raiders would have been entitled to the benefit of the new trial order, inasmuch as the National Football League has not contended here that the new trial order was invalid under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Raiders snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in this proceeding only because the trial court failed to comply with its “mandatory” duty to specify the reasons for its order granting a new trial (Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 896 [215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826]) and because the Raiders, on this record, failed to discharge their burden of persuading the reviewing court that a new trial should have been granted.
As the majority emphasizes, however, our decision to review this new trial order under a nondeferential standard is “a narrow one” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 640) in that the trial court’s failure to file a statement of reasons made it *643impossible for us to determine “whether the trial court’s ruling was based on the bias of Joseph A., the misconduct of Linda H., or both.” (Id. at p. 641.) Different situations may invoke a different standard of review, in accordance with our prior observation that “any determination underlying any [new trial] order is scrutinized under the test appropriate to such determination.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493], italics added.) Our decision today thus does not preclude the possibility of deference to the trial court, despite its failure to supply a statement of reasons, when the record leaves no room for doubt as to the trial court’s reasons for granting a new trial and its resolution of conflicting evidence supporting those reasons—as may be the case where the motion for new trial alleged only a single, specific instance of juror misconduct. When the reviewing court is confident both that the trial court carefully deliberated before ordering a new trial and in what findings the trial court must have made in entering its order—i.e., when the statute’s purposes have been satisfied—it seems to me that the interests in accuracy, efficiency, and functional competence may indicate that the new trial order should be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
George, C. J., and Moreno, J., concurred.