Court Opinion

ID: 9604673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:25:20.57772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:25.039490
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring in the result) — I agree with the majority that RCW 46.20.308 and RCW 46.61.506 do not *39require an arresting officer to administer a second Breathalyzer test to a DWI arrestee. United States Supreme Court precedent and case law from our own jurisdiction are consistent on that point. However, our statutory scheme should not be interpreted to grant law enforcement officers some constitution-like right not to perform official duties. The conclusion that the arresting/testing officer is not required to administer a second test under the statutory scheme is correct, but we should not arrive at that conclusion by cloaking it with a nonspecific constitutional right. The statute's plain meaning confers the right to additional tests administered by other qualified people. The accused lacks the right to have that officer administer the test, but has the statutory right to a different test.
RCW 46.61.506 enumerates the "qualified persons" who may administer additional tests to DWI suspects. These are people issued permits to perform the task by the state toxicologist: physicians, qualified technicians, chemists, registered nurses, or other such licensed persons. The right to a test by an alternative method administered by a different qualified person makes practical sense. If the accused's objection to the officer's test is that the machine is malfunctioning or the officer is conducting the test in bad faith, the same result would obtain in a second test with the same officer and machine.
In Blaine v. Suess, 93 Wn.2d 722, 612 P.2d 789 (1980) this court unanimously held that a person accused of driving while under the influence of alcohol is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to gather evidence in his or her defense, and prohibited police officers from impeding the efforts of an accused to secure a second test. Blaine further provided that whether a defendant was afforded that opportunity depends on the particular circumstances of the case. In Blaine, the defendant was a Swiss national with poor English skills. It was undisputed that he communicated to the officers that he wished additional testing, and that they informed him they would take him to a hospital. He reiterated his request en route, but was told he was *40being taken to the jail where there was no testing facility. "Since petitioner was in custody, he had no realistic opportunity to be tested except by stating his wish to the authorities." Blaine, at 727. The conviction was reversed and the case dismissed.
The majority cites Blaine and notes that " [t]he rule permits a reasonable opportunity to gather evidence and the statutory scheme provides that reasonable opportunity by permitting the accused to secure outside tests." Majority, at 36. It is important to note that the statute affirmatively confers the right upon DWI suspects to obtain additional testing from a qualified person, and requires arresting officers to inform suspects of that right.
To assume that persons under custodial arrest being transported to a jail by police officers would comprehend that they can require the officer to detour to the hospital in the brief and crucial time in which another test would yield results indicative of their blood alcohol content is to stretch credulity to the breaking point. As the majority correctly notes, statutes should be construed to effect their purpose, and unlikely, absurd or strained consequences should be avoided. State v. Richardson, 81 Wn.2d 111, 499 P.2d 1264 (1972). In obliging the police in RCW 46.20.308 to inform suspects of their right to an additional test, I do not believe the Legislature intended to bestow a miserly and begrudging right to be informed of a prerogative that could only be implemented by incanting a specific and particular phrase.
Under somewhat analogous circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has required the police to inform suspects under custodial arrest of their Fifth Amendment privileges and that, regardless of their financial status, they can avail themselves of these rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). A complete and meaningful warning is "an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. While the rights involved in Miranda are basic constitutional ones, and the warnings of the police are accordingly *41more thoroughgoing, the statements by the Court concerning their import in a custodial arrest situation apply with equal force to the statutory rights at issue here.
The arrestees must be informed in a meaningful manner of those rights at the point where they are in custody and have expressed their desire to implement them. When a suspect has been given the warnings required by RCW 46.20.308, has submitted to a Breathalyzer test, and has requested a second test, the arresting officer must inform him of his option to have that test performed at his own expense by a qualified person at a hospital.
Pearson, C.J., concurs with Utter, J.