Court Opinion

ID: 9372399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 15:11:13.840138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.852491
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 9

                  SUPREME COURT              OF     WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                2020AP32-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:          State of Wisconsin,
                                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                              v.
                         Oscar C. Thomas,
                                   Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

                           REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                           Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 277, 963 N.W.2d 887
                               PDC No: 2021 WI App 55 - Published

OPINION FILED:           February 21, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:           September 28, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:                Circuit
   COUNTY:               Kenosha
   JUDGE:                Bruce E. Schroeder

JUSTICES:
ROGGENSACK, J., announced the mandate of the Court, and
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined, and the
majority opinion of the Court with respect to ¶2 and ¶¶12-24, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., joined with
respect to ¶¶12-24.    DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion,
which constitutes the majority opinion of the Court, in which
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ.,
joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed        by   John   T.   Wasielewski     and   Wasielewski   &   Erickson,
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by John T. Wasielewski.

       For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Sonya K. Bice,           assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Sonya K. Bice, assistant attorney general.

                                2
                                                                          2023 WI 9
                                                                 NOTICE
                                                   This opinion is subject to further
                                                   editing and modification.   The final
                                                   version will appear in the bound
                                                   volume of the official reports.
No.   2020AP32-CR
(L.C. No.   2007CF1)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

            Plaintiff-Respondent,                                     FILED
      v.                                                         FEB 21, 2023
Oscar C. Thomas,                                                    Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court
            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

ROGGENSACK, J., announced the mandate of the Court, and
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined, and the
majority opinion of the Court with respect to ¶2 and ¶¶12-24, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., joined with
respect to ¶¶12-24.    DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion,
which constitutes the majority opinion of the Court, in which
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ.,
joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                 Affirmed.

      ¶1    PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.              We review a published

decision    of   the   court   of   appeals1   that     affirmed      the    circuit

      1State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55, 399 Wis. 2d 277, 963
N.W.2d 887.
                                                                              No.    2020AP32-CR

court's2    judgment    of    conviction            and     its      denial    of     Oscar       C.

Thomas's postconviction motion.

     ¶2     We accepted two issues for review.                              First, whether

Thomas's    confession       of    sexual      assault          was    corroborated          by   a

significant fact, and we conclude it was.                             This opinion is the

majority opinion for the discussion of corroboration.                                  Second,

whether the cross-examination of Thomas's expert witness by use

of a Wisconsin Crime Lab Report ("the Report") that was not in

evidence    and    whose     author      did       not     testify      violated       Thomas's

confrontation       right.         Four     justices            conclude       the     Report's

contents    were    used    for     their      truth       during       cross-examination,

thereby    violating       Thomas's       right       of    confrontation.              Justice

Dallet's    concurrence       is    the     decision            of    the   court      for    the

confrontation issue.3             Six justices conclude Hemphill precludes

admission     of    evidence        to     correct         an        allegedly       misleading

impression created by the defendant, and seven justices conclude

that any error related to the Report was harmless.                               Accordingly,

we affirm the court of appeals.
     ¶3     The court of appeals concluded that the State met its

evidentiary        burden     to         sufficiently             corroborate          Thomas's

confession of sexual assault.                      We agree with this conclusion.

We also conclude that the State's use of the Report4 that a

     2 The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of Kenosha County Circuit
Court presided.
     3 Justice Dallet's concurrence is joined by Justices Ann
Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Jill J. Karofsky.
     4 The Report, a three-page document, was marked as Exhibit
36 during the prosecutor's cross-examination of Thomas's expert,
                                               2
                                                                              No.   2020AP32-CR

defense     expert       reviewed,      but       which     was    not        admitted     into

evidence, did not violate Thomas's confrontation right under the

United States' Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution when

used for impeachment purposes.5                   However, we reject the State's

argument    that       it   properly    used       the    Report's       contents        during

closing argument.             Furthermore, following Hemphill,6 a criminal

defendant       does    not    "open    the       door"   to      the    introduction        of

testimonial        out-of–court         statements          for         the     purpose      of

"correct[ing]" a "misleading impression."                         Although we conclude

that the State did not use the content of the Report for its

truth on cross-examination, the State did improperly use the

Report's content for its truth during closing argument, which

the circuit court erroneously permitted.                          However, we conclude

the error was harmless because it is "clear beyond a reasonable

doubt that a rational jury would have found                               [Thomas]       guilty

absent    the    error."        State    v.       Harvey,    2002       WI    93,   ¶46,    254

Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citing Neder v. United States, 527

U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).

Dr. Williams.          The prosecutor did not attempt to have Exhibit 36
admitted.
    5    U.S. Const. amend VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.
    6  Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 681, 686
(2022).   We acknowledge that Hemphill was published while this
case was pending on appeal.

                                              3
                                                                               No.    2020AP32-CR

                                        I.     BACKGROUND

       ¶4     In     the    early       hours      of     December     27,    2006,    officers

responded      to     a    911     call      and       found    Ms.   Joyce     Oliver-Thomas

unresponsive         on     the        floor       of     her     apartment.          Emergency

responders employed CPR and attempted to resuscitate Ms. Oliver-

Thomas as they transported her to the hospital, where she was

pronounced dead.              An autopsy concluded that Joyce died from

"Strangulation due to Physical Assault."                               Ms. Oliver-Thomas's

husband, the defendant Oscar C. Thomas,7 was subsequently charged

with       first-degree       intentional               homicide,     first-degree       sexual

assault,       and        false    imprisonment.                  Thomas     provided     three

statements to police over the course of the investigation, which

we address below.

       ¶5     At his 2007 trial, the jury convicted Thomas of all

three charges against him.                     Thomas appealed, and the court of

appeals      affirmed.            We    denied         review.8       Thomas    then    pursued

federal habeas corpus relief, and the Seventh Circuit granted

him a new trial.              Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.

       The record indicates that Thomas and Ms. Oliver-Thomas had
       7

been married, divorced, and then reconciled without remarrying.
Accordingly, Thomas refers to Ms. Oliver-Thomas as his wife.
Striving for consistency with the record, we too, refer to
Ms. Oliver-Thomas and Thomas as spouses, though we recognize
this was not technically the case at the time of Ms. Oliver-
Thomas's death.

       State v. Thomas, No. 2010AP1606-CR, unpublished slip op.,
       8

¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011), review denied, 2012 WI 45, 340
Wis. 2d 542, 811 N.W.2d 818.

                                                   4
                                                                         No.    2020AP32-CR

2015).9     Thomas was retried to a jury in 2018, convicted of all

charges again, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

     ¶6        Thomas    appealed,     and       the   court    of    appeals       affirmed

Thomas's    convictions       and     the     circuit      court's       denial      of    his

postconviction         motions.       Specifically,         the      court     of   appeals

concluded      there    was   sufficient         corroborating        evidence       of    the

sexual    assault       confession,     and       denial   of     the    postconviction

motion was appropriate.             State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55, ¶14,

399 Wis. 2d 277, 963 N.W.2d 887.                       The court of appeals also

concluded the Report's DNA evidence was "inadmissible hearsay,"

causing    a    Confrontation         Clause      violation       when    it    was       used

erroneously       during      trial     and       during       the    State's       closing

argument.       Id., ¶35.         However, the court of appeals concluded

that the error was harmless.             Id., ¶¶35, 37.10

     ¶7        In its briefing to us, the State did not argue that

the Report could be used for the truth of its contents.                             Rather,

     9 Thomas argued his 2007 trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to call a forensic pathologist or other
similar expert to refute the State's forensic pathologist's
testimony.   Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir.
2015).    The court of appeals agreed that failure to call a
forensic expert demonstrated the deficiency of Thomas's counsel
and prejudiced his defense.    Id. at 763.  The Seventh Circuit
concluded "that a reasonable counsel would have consider[ed]
and/or consulted with a forensic expert," and "[g]iven the
weakness of the state's case . . . there is a reasonable
probability the outcome of the trial would have turned out
differently." Id.
     10Thomas presented a third issue to the court of appeals
regarding an allegedly-biased juror, which he has not petitioned
for us to review.

                                             5
                                                                     No.    2020AP32-CR

it set the issue up as:           "[W]hen Thomas's expert gave testimony

directly contradicting the lab report on which he relied, it was

an implied waiver of Thomas's right to confront the author of

the lab report."        However, Dr. Williams did not say he "relied"

on the Report, but rather, that he "reviewed" the Report along

with hundreds of other pages of material relative to this case.11

Nevertheless,     the    State     veered    from     the    argument      it   raised

consistently     below    that     the   prosecutor         used    the    Report     to

impeach Thomas's defense expert.               Instead, at oral argument the

State argued that we should analyze the Report based on the

contention that its contents were properly used during cross-

examination and during closing argument for the truth of the

matters asserted therein.

      ¶8     Thomas petitioned us for review, which we granted on

two matters:      first, to review whether the State sufficiently

satisfied its burden to corroborate Thomas's confession with any

significant fact; second, to review whether the State's cross-

examination of Thomas's expert witness through the use of the
Report     violated    Thomas's    right     under    the    Sixth       Amendment    to

confront the author of the Report.               We also review the State's

use   of   the   DNA    findings    of   the    Report      in     the   prosecutor's

closing     argument.      We     conclude     that   error        occurred     in   the

       Prosecutor:
      11                  "Now, you also reviewed Wisconsin crime lab
reports, correct?"

      Answer:    "Correct."

                                         6
                                                                        No.    2020AP32-CR

prosecutor's      use    of     the       contents    of    the   Report      in   closing

argument; however, the error was harmless as we explain below.

                                    II.     DISCUSSION

                               A.    Standard of Review

       ¶9    Whether evidence corroborates a criminal defendant's

confession(s) or statement(s) presents a question of evidentiary

sufficiency, which is ultimately a question of law subject to

our independent review.                  State v. Bannister, 2007 WI 86, ¶¶22,

33, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892.

       ¶10   We     review          constitutional          issues      independently,

although we benefit from the discussions of the court of appeals

and circuit court.            State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶25, 342 Wis. 2d

710, 817 N.W.2d 410.

       ¶11   Lastly, we review whether an error was harmless by

placing the burden on the party that benefitted from the error

to   establish      it   is    "clear       beyond    a    reasonable   doubt      that   a

rational     jury    would      have       found     [Thomas]     guilty      absent   the

error."      Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at
18).

                                    B.    Corroboration

       ¶12   Thomas first argues that the State did not present

evidence to corroborate the statements he made to police in

which he confessed to the crime of sexual assault.                         Accordingly,

Thomas argues the jury convicted him based solely on the two

                                              7
                                                                No.     2020AP32-CR

relevant    statements      he   made   to   police    following       Ms. Oliver-

Thomas's death.12

     ¶13    In Thomas's first statement to officers, he reported

that Ms. Oliver-Thomas had complained of chest and ear pain in

the early evening.       Throughout the evening, Thomas and a friend

were smoking crack in the basement of the four-plex apartment,

and Thomas checked on his wife frequently.                  Each time he left

the basement to check on Ms. Oliver-Thomas, she was "in bed

dozing off."     Thomas began watching a pornographic video in the

apartment    sometime    after     midnight,     during      which     he    became

aroused and approached his wife, who agreed to consensual sex.

During sex, the couple fell off of the bed and onto the floor.

Following their encounter, Thomas noted that Ms. Oliver-Thomas

complained her "chest was still hurting."              Thomas checked on his

wife a few more times, left the building and, upon returning to

the apartment, he found Ms. Oliver-Thomas on the floor in the

bedroom.     Thomas then called 911 and administered CPR until

officers arrived.
     ¶14    In   Thomas's    second     statement     to   police,13    he   and   a

friend were smoking crack in the apartment building's basement.

     12Thomas's third statement was made while he was in
custody.   The third statement implicated a drug dealer, who
Thomas believes entered the apartment while Thomas was with his
friend and killed Ms. Oliver-Thomas over an outstanding debt
Thomas owed.   As this statement is not relevant to the sexual
assault conviction at issue, we do not address it further. See
Thomas, 399 Wis. 2d 277, ¶6 n.3.
     13Though not initially under arrest, Thomas was placed
under arrest while providing his second statement to police.
Officers read Thomas his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384
                                        8
                                                                 No.      2020AP32-CR

Thomas repeatedly returned to the apartment.                On one trip to the

apartment,        Thomas   noticed      Ms. Oliver-Thomas     was      lying      down

because "her chest was hurting."              On a subsequent trip upstairs,

Ms. Oliver-Thomas said "she was feeling better."                    Thomas began

watching      a    pornographic      video    and   approached      his    wife    to

initiate      sex.    Even     though   she   initially   told   him      to   stop,

Thomas persisted, and, according to Thomas, the pair engaged in

consensual sex, during which they fell to the floor.                           While

engaged in sex, Thomas stated he had his left arm up around his

wife's neck.

       ¶15    After Ms. Oliver-Thomas returned to the bed, Thomas

said he began "humping" Ms. Oliver-Thomas's hip area.                          Thomas

and Ms. Oliver-Thomas again fell to the floor, where Thomas had

his left arm around Ms. Oliver-Thomas's neck a second time.

Thomas stated:

       I didn't think I was squeezing hard, but Joyce was
       struggling and was yelling for me to stop and to quit
       it. Joyce's feet were kicking the floor while she was
       telling me to stop. Joyce was telling me she loved me
       and for me to quit playing.     I kept squeezing for a
       little while . . . Joyce's breathing started to slow
       down, so I turned her loose.       After I turned her
       loose, Joyce was breathing funny and looking at me. I
       got up and left [the apartment].
When   Thomas      returned,    he   found    Ms. Oliver-Thomas      laying       face

down on the floor.         Thomas tried to lift her, but lost his grip

twice.       Each time, Ms. Oliver-Thomas's face hit the bed or the

U.S. 436 (1966)), which Thomas then waived to continue speaking
with police.

                                          9
                                                                    No.    2020AP32-CR

floor.      Thomas called 911, and the dispatcher instructed Thomas

to begin CPR, which he performed until officers arrived.

      ¶16    The State charged Thomas with sexual assault pursuant

to   Wis.    Stat.    § 940.225(1)(a)      (2021-22),14       the   conviction      of

which requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a

defendant      had:     (1) sexual        contact      with     another         person

(2) without consent and (3) caused great bodily harm to that

person.       "Sexual    contact"    is    statutorily      defined       to   include

intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, for

the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.15

The Jury Instructions at Thomas's trial adhered to the statutory

language, and the jury convicted Thomas of first-degree sexual

assault of Ms. Oliver-Thomas.16

      ¶17    Thomas     asserts   there        was   insufficient     evidence      to

support his conviction for sexual assault independent of the

statements he made to police.                  Namely, Thomas points to the

results     from   Joyce's   autopsy      and    forensic     examination,       which

included the use of a sexual assault kit.                     The exam's results

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are
      14

to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.
      15   See Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(b)1.

       The Jury Instructions at Thomas's trial adhered to the
      16

statutory language, stating, "Sexual contact includes the
intentional touching of any part of the body of Joyce Oliver-
Thomas by the defendant's penis. The touching may have been by
the penis directly, or it may have been through the clothing.
Sexual contact also requires that the defendant acted with
intent to become sexually aroused or gratified."

                                          10
                                                                               No.     2020AP32-CR

did not reveal any evidence of sexual intercourse.17                                 The State,

however,         alleged    first-degree            sexual       assault   consistent         with

Thomas's second statement to police.                            In that statement, Thomas

confessed to "humping" Joyce's hip area, during which he had his

left    arm       around    Joyce's        neck     and     he    was    squeezing.          Joyce

struggled         and    yelled      at     Thomas         to    stop,   but    Thomas       "kept

squeezing for a little while," until "Joyce's breathing started

to slow down."           Thomas let her go and noted "Joyce was breathing

funny."          Accordingly, evidentiary results of sexual intercourse

from a forensic exam were not necessary to support the State's

theory of sexual assault in this case.

       ¶18       One of the many tenets upon which our criminal justice

system rests is that "conviction of a crime may not be grounded

on the admission or confessions of the accused alone."                                  State v.

Verhasselt,         83     Wis. 2d         647,     661,        266   N.W.2d     342     (1978).

Instead,          Wisconsin          law      requires           corroboration          of     any

"'significant fact' in order to sustain a conviction."                                  State v.

Hauk, 2002 WI App 226, ¶20, 257 Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393.
While       at   times     we   have       upheld      a   jury's     verdict    of     criminal

conviction         based        on   "considerable              corroborative        evidence,"

Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d at 662, Wisconsin's corroboration rule

requires less than that.                  We have said:

            All the elements of the crime do not have to be
       proved independently of an accused's confession;
       however, there must be some corroboration of the
       confession in order to support a conviction . . . .

       17   R. 319 at 122-23.

                                                  11
                                                                     No.     2020AP32-CR

      If there is corroboration of any significant                          fact,
      that is sufficient under the Wisconsin test.
Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 117 N.W.2d 626 (1962).                               A

significant fact is corroborated when "there is confidence in []

the fact that the crime the defendant has confessed to indeed

occurred."        Bannister,      302   Wis. 2d    158,      ¶26.      The        primary

purpose of the corroboration rule is to ensure the reliability

of an accused's confession, requiring "evidence that the crime

actually occurred."         Id., ¶24; Hauk, 257 Wis. 2d 579, ¶24.

      ¶19   The State points to two pieces of evidence that, in

its   view,       corroborate      a    "significant      fact"       of        Thomas's

confession     of     sexual      assault:     (1) a   downstairs           neighbor's

testimony that she was woken by a loud argument upstairs, during

which she heard a woman scream, "Stop, stop, I love you, I love

you;" and (2) a pornographic video recovered at the apartment.

      ¶20   While     the    State      does    not,   and     need        not,    offer

corroborating evidence of every element of the crime of sexual

assault,    the     State   has   offered      corroborating        evidence       for   a

"significant      fact"     of    Thomas's     statements     given        to     police.
Holt, 17 Wis. 2d at 480.           Thomas's downstairs neighbor testified

she heard an argument between a man and woman, and the woman

screamed, "Stop, stop, I love you, I love you."                        The neighbor

also testified she heard something big hit the floor, the sound

of furniture moving, and silence.               She then heard the apartment

door open, and a person she identified as Thomas walked out.

      ¶21   We conclude the neighbor's testimony corroborates a
"significant fact" of Thomas's statements to the police in which

                                         12
                                                                          No.     2020AP32-CR

he confessed to sexually assaulting his wife.                                 The neighbor

heard a female voice scream "Stop, stop, I love you, I love

you."        This       phrase    corroborates       what       Thomas    told       officers;

namely, that while Thomas "humped" the victim's hip area, "Joyce

was struggling and was yelling for me to stop . . . Joyce was

telling me she loved me and for me to quit playing."18

       ¶22       The neighbor's testimony "permits confidence" that the

crime       of    sexual       assault    that     Thomas       confessed       to    "indeed

occurred."             Bannister,       302   Wis. 2d    158,      ¶30.         Wisconsin's

corroboration            rule     does    not      demand       more     to      support     a

factfinder's determination of guilt when the only other evidence

of a particular crime is the defendant's statements to officers.

Holt, 17 Wis. 2d at 480.

       ¶23       We     also     conclude     that    the        neighbor's          testimony

regarding             Ms. Oliver-Thomas's            statement           establishes         a

"significant fact" consistent with our case law.                          See Bannister,

302 Wis. 2d 158, ¶2 (presence of morphine in an alleged buyer's

body    at       time    of     death    constituted        a    significant         fact   to
corroborate confession); see also Holt, 17 Wis. 2d at 480-82

(charred infant torso found in furnace constituted sufficient

independent corroboration of defendant's confession that baby

was alive when placed in the furnace); Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d at

       While the State need not corroborate a confession with
       18

elements of a crime, we recognize, without deciding, Ms. Oliver-
Thomas's statement may do just that because we conclude that it
is difficult to determine that the phrase "stop, stop" could not
show a lack of consent. Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 117
N.W.2d 626 (1962).

                                              13
                                                                               No.     2020AP32-CR

693 (defendant's confession to fellow prison inmate, gun found

in defendant's car identified as the one from which the bullets

came, and defendant's confession to friend while showing two

bullets corroborated significant facts of confession); State v.

DeHart, 242 Wis. 562, 566, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943) (location and

condition        of    victim's         body     and     expert       testimony        regarding

consistency           of     bone      condition         with     damage       from     buckshot

consistent with defendant's confession).                           Having concluded that

the      neighbor's             testimony        sufficiently            corroborates          the

statements Thomas made to police, we need not further analyze

the   importance           of    the    pornographic          video      found    in    Thomas's

apartment.

      ¶24    We conclude the State satisfied its burden to present

"some evidence" that the sexual assault charged, and to which

Thomas    confessed,            actually      occurred.           Bannister,      302       Wis. 2d

158, ¶¶24, 25.

                                 C.    The Report at Trial

      ¶25    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prevents the admission of testimonial

hearsay     when       the      declarant      is     absent      from    trial      unless    the

witness     is     unavailable          and    the       defendant       has     had    a    prior

opportunity           to     cross-examine            the     witness.            Crawford      v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).                          The Sixth Amendment right

of confrontation is a "fundamental right, as made applicable to

and   obligatory           on    the    states      by      the   Fourteenth         Amendment."

State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶18, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567
(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).
                                                 14
                                                                          No.   2020AP32-CR

       ¶26    Thomas      asks    us    to        consider    whether     his   right    to

confront his accuser, guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause,

was violated at his trial.                        Specifically, Thomas argues his

confrontation        right     was     violated        during     the   State's    cross-

examination of his expert witness, Dr. Karl Williams.                               Thomas

also   asks    us    to   consider          the    impact    of   the   State's    use   of

testimony, elicited from Dr. Williams himself, for the truth of

the matter asserted at closing argument.

                             1.   The Cross-Examination

       ¶27    Thomas called just one witness at trial——Dr. Williams,

a   medical        examiner.           On    direct     examination,        Dr. Williams

testified that "in allegations of violence resulting in death,"

he looks for "an exchange of trauma, an exchange of evidence"

between      the    victim     and     accused.          When     asked    specifically,

Dr. Williams replied that he did not see signs of a struggle or

of defensive wounds.              In his opinion, abrasions on Ms. Oliver-

Thomas's face could have resulted from emergency CPR or from

engaging in face-down sex on the floor, consistent with Thomas's
statements.

       ¶28    On       cross-examination,               the       State         challenged

Dr. Williams's characterization that there were no signs of an

exchange of trauma through the following cross-examination:

       [Prosecutor]: Now, you also reviewed Wisconsin crime
       lab reports, correct?

       [Dr. Williams]:           Correct.

       . . . .

                                              15
                                                        No.      2020AP32-CR

    [Prosecutor]: Okay.    But in those crime lab reports,
    you are aware that there was some analysis done?

         [Defense counsel]:      Objection.

         [Prosecutor]:    It's   what   he    relied   on   in    his
    opinion.[19]

         [Defense counsel]: I'm objecting to going into
    the details of reports that haven't been introduced
    into evidence, though. It's a back door.

         THE   COURT: If   he   examined        it,  then  it's
    presumably something he discounted          or relied upon.
    The objection is overruled.

    [Prosecutor]: And you are aware in those crime lab
    reports that Oscar Thomas's DNA was found under Joyce
    Oliver-Thomas's  fingernail   clippings,  which  were
    clipped from her body at the time of the autopsy,
    correct?

     . . . [The State hands the [R]eport to Dr. Williams
    at his request] . . . .

    [Dr. Williams]: Yes, this appears to be an analysis
    that shows that the DNA found under the [fingernails]
    was obviously a mixture.    You are going to have her
    DNA, but also evidence of DNA from Oscar Thomas.

    [Prosecutor]: And similarly the fingernails from the
    defendant were also swabbed, and her DNA was found
    under that as well; is that correct?

    [Dr. Williams]:    Yes.

    [Prosecutor]:     Okay.

    [Dr. Williams]: They are living in a consensual
    marriage.    A finding of the DNA, they could be
    scratching each other's back. I mean, there is no

    19 Dr. Williams "reviewed" the Report.      That he did not
"rely" on it also is clear from his testimony that diminishes
the importance of the DNA evidence found under the fingernails
of Thomas and Joyce, saying there "is no evidence of trauma on
him to support the fact that she was struggling sufficiently."

                                  16
                                                                             No.   2020AP32-CR

    evidence of trauma on him to support the fact that she
    was struggling sufficiently.
Documents       submitted        prior    to         trial        indicate     Dr. Williams

reviewed    the     Report,      among        other    things,        in     preparing      his

testimony.         Thomas     urges      us     to    conclude        that     the    details

elicited     on    cross-examination            of     Dr. Williams           violated      his

confrontation right.

                       a.    Confrontation or Impeachment

    ¶29     "The       Confrontation           Clause        of     the     United     States

Constitution       and      Wisconsin         Constitution           guarantee       criminal

defendants      the      right    to     confront       witnesses          against     them."

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42; State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶36, 281

Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.                  The right to confrontation applies

to statements that are testimonial.                     Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68;

State v. Deadwiller, 2012 WI App 89, ¶7, 343 Wis. 2d 703, 820

N.W.2d    149     (citing     Davis      v.    Washington,          547     U.S.     813,   821

(2006)).          Testimonial          statements        are        those     made     "under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably

to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial."         Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.                   Forensic or scientific

reports "prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or

prosecution" are testimonial and, therefore, within the ambit of

the Confrontation Clause.                Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.

647, 658 (2011).

    ¶30     When forensic or scientific reports are offered for

their truth, an accused must be able to confront the witness
against     him     by      subjecting         the     report's        author,        as    the

                                              17
                                                                                  No.        2020AP32-CR

statement's declarant, to the "crucible of cross-examination."

Id. at 661 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62).                                    In the event of

witness       unavailability,            a        testimonial              statement             may     be

introduced       at    trial     only        if    an     accused          has    had        a    "prior

opportunity for cross-examination."                        Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.

It is not enough for a report's author to testify by other

means.       See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11

(2009)    (ex     parte      affidavits           cannot       circumvent          the       right      to

confront the declarant by cross-examination); Bullcoming, 564

U.S.     at      652     (surrogate           testimony              does        not     meet           the

constitutional requirement and, an "accused's right is to be

confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless

that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused [has] had

an     opportunity,       pretrial,          to        cross-examine          that       particular

scientist.").           In   sum,    a    forensic         report          cannot       be       used    as

substantive evidence against an accused unless an accused may

confront the report's author through cross-examination in court

or has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the author.
Melendez-Diaz, 577 U.S. at 309.

       ¶31    Although a criminal defendant must be able to confront

a     forensic     report's         author,            expert        witnesses          may       review

inadmissible reports in preparing their testimony.                                     In Williams,

the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of "allowing

an expert witness to discuss others' testimonial statements if

the    testimonial        statements          were       not    themselves             admitted          as

evidence."            Williams    v.      Illinois,            567    U.S.       50,     67       (2012)
(quoting       Bullcoming,          564       U.S.        at         673     (Sotomayor,                J.,
                                                  18
                                                            No.    2020AP32-CR

concurring)).        There, the Court concluded an expert may qualify

the assumptions upon which she bases her conclusions so long as

the bases themselves are not offered for their truth.               Williams,

567 U.S. at 57-58.        The Court reasoned that allowing an expert

to     make   such    disclosures   aids    the     factfinder    in   making

credibility and weight determinations about the validity of the

expert's opinions.       Id. at 77-78.20     Stated otherwise, eliciting

information from an expert for the purpose of undermining the

bases of the expert's opinion, serves to impeach an expert; and

impeachment evidence is not hearsay because it is not offered to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.             Id. at 79 (explaining

that    the   Confrontation    Clause     applies   only   to    out-of-court

statements that are "use[d]" to "establis[h] the truth of the

matter asserted.").

       ¶32    Although we acknowledge that Williams does not provide

a majority rationale,21 Wis. Stat. § 907.03 reflects this concept

       "The purpose for allowing this disclosure is that it may
       20

'assis[t] the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion.' [Citation
omitted.] . . . [The approach is] based on the idea that the
disclosure of basis evidence can help the factfinder understand
the expert's thought process and determine what weight to give
to the expert's opinion . . . .   The purpose of disclosing the
facts on which the expert relied is to allay these fears——to
show that the expert's reasoning was not illogical, and that the
weight of the expert's opinion does not depend on factual
premises unsupported by other evidence in the record——not to
prove the truth of the underlying facts." Williams v. Illinois,
567 U.S. 50, 78 (2012).

       Williams resulted in a 4-1-4 split. Four justices joined
       21

the lead opinion, and Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment.

                                     19
                                                                         No.        2020AP32-CR

and permits an expert to review inadmissible reports in forming

her   conclusions.22         Despite       a    report's        inadmissibility,           or   a

proponent's    failure       to     obtain          admission    of   the   report         into

evidence, a cross-examiner may use the contents of a report for

the "distinctive and limited purpose" of attacking an expert's

credibility    so    a   jury     may      determine       the     weight      to    give       an

expert's testimony.           Id.; see Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2,

¶¶124-127, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 N.W.2d 816.

      ¶33   This method of attack may serve to impeach a witness

even though cross-examination of an expert witness's bases for

her opinion is not a hearsay exception.                           This is so because

substance of reports and data that an expert reviewed are not

automatically admitted as evidence for the truth of the matter

asserted    when    they     come    up    in       cross-examination       for       another

purpose.     See State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, ¶78, 595 N.W.2d

403   (1999)   ("[Wisconsin         Stat.       §]     907.03     does   not        transform

inadmissible       hearsay    into      admissible        hearsay.          It      does    not

permit hearsay evidence to come in through the front door of
direct examination."); Staskal v. Symons Corp., 2005 WI App 216,

¶22, 287 Wis. 2d 511, 706 N.W.2d 311 ("[Section] 907.03 is not a

hearsay     exception      and      does       not     make      inadmissible         hearsay

       "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
      22

expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
or made known to the expert . . . before the hearing . . . .
[T]he facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order
for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that
are otherwise inadmissible may not be disclosed to the
jury . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 907.03.

                                               20
                                                                                  No.     2020AP32-CR

admissible.").           Instead,     parties            may    strategically             determine

whether to request cautioning or limiting instructions for the

use of a report that is not eligible to be admitted for the

truth of the matters asserted therein.                               Limiting instructions

aid a factfinder's understanding of how to evaluate, constrain,

or disregard an expert's opinion "if it is not based on evidence

of record."       Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, ¶82.

      ¶34      Turning to the case at hand, the State's use of the

Report    to    impeach       Dr. Williams          on    cross-examination                  did   not

violate     Thomas's        confrontation           right.           The    State        challenged

Dr. Williams's          conclusion       that        there       was        "no     exchange       of

evidence"       by    referencing        the        Report       that       Dr. Williams           had

reviewed, which showed DNA exchanges under the fingernails of

Thomas    and     Ms.    Oliver-Thomas.              Stated          otherwise,         by   drawing

attention       to      the    "exchange"           of     DNA        between           Thomas     and

Ms. Oliver-Thomas,              the      State            attempted           to          undermine

Dr. Williams's opinion that Ms. Oliver-Thomas's cause of death

could    have     been      accidental.         The      degree        to    which       the     State
succeeded in limiting the usefulness of Dr. Williams's testimony

was   then      considered       by   the      jury       together          with    all      of    the

evidence     in      deciding    Thomas's       guilt.               Although      we     recognize

Thomas could have asked for limiting instructions that the jury

not   consider        the     Report's    contents             for    their       truth      because

testimony about the contents of the Report was not admitted for

substantive purposes, he made no such request.                                We conclude the

State's questioning on cross-examination relevant to the Report

                                               21
                                                                            No.     2020AP32-CR

did not violate Thomas's right to confront the Report's author

when used to impeach Dr. Williams's opinion.

                               b.    Truth of the Report

       ¶35     The State summarily asserted at oral argument that it

wanted    the       Report's      discussion         of    DNA    evidence    found     under

fingernails employed "for the truth of the matter asserted."

The portions of the State's brief relevant to the Report, its

contents,       and    the     confrontation              right   rely     extensively      on

Justice Alito's concurrence in Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S.

___, 142 S. Ct. 681 (2022).                However, at oral argument the State

relied on cases not mentioned in its brief, such as, State v.

Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256, Griep, 361

Wis. 2d      657,     and   Vinicky       v.    Midland      Mut.    Cas.    Ins.    Co.,   35

Wis. 2d 246, 151 N.W.2d 77 (1967).

       ¶36     As we begin, we review Hemphill and Justice Alito's

concurrence and conclude that the State could not use the Report

for its truth at Thomas's trial under Crawford or Hemphill.

       ¶37     In Hemphill, the Supreme Court heard arguments that
the    State     violated         defendant      Hemphill's         confrontation       right

during the course of its prosecution of him for murdering a

young     girl      who     was     hit    by    a        stray   9-millimeter        bullet.

Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 686.                    Hemphill maintained his innocence

throughout trial and premised his defense on the theory another

man, Morris, was the shooter.                        Id. at 688.            The State had

initially charged Morris with the murder but offered Morris a

plea     deal       mid-trial,       which       required         Morris    to      admit   to
possession of a .357-magnum revolver, rather than a 9-millimeter
                                                22
                                                                    No.     2020AP32-CR

handgun.     Id. at 686.       At Hemphill's trial for the same murder,

Hemphill     presented     "undisputed         testimony"     that        police     had

recovered a 9-millimeter handgun from Morris's nightstand.                           Id.

Over objection, the trial court permitted the State to enter

parts of the transcript from Morris's plea allocution to rebut

Hemphill's defense theory, despite Morris's unavailability to

testify.     Id.   The trial court based its decision to allow use

of the transcript on a binding New York case,23 which held that

"a criminal defendant could 'open the door' to evidence that

would otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause

if   the     evidence    was      'reasonably        necessary    to      correct      a

misleading impression.'"           Id. at 688.        New York's highest court

affirmed the trial and appellate courts, reasoning that at trial

"[the]     defendant    created    a   misleading      impression      that    Morris

possessed a 9-millimeter handgun [and so the] introduction of

the plea allocution was reasonably necessary to correct that

misleading impression."        Id. at 688-89.

     ¶38     The United States Supreme Court rejected New York's
corrective ideations, asserting there is "no exception [to the

Confrontation      Clause]     for     cases    in    which   the      trial       judge

believes unconfronted testimonial hearsay might be reasonably

necessary to correct a misleading impression."                   Id. at 693.         The

Supreme Court concluded that New York's rule resulted in a judge

impermissibly making a reliability assessment.                    Id. at 691-92.

Under the Confrontation Clause, reliability must be assessed in

     23   People v. Reid, 971 N.E.2d 353 (N.Y. 2012).

                                         23
                                                                                 No.     2020AP32-CR

a   particular       manner:       "by        testing    in    the        crucible       of    cross-

examination."           Id. at 691 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).                               In

summing up the opinion, the majority stated, "[T]he Court does

not     decide      today    the        validity        of    the        common-law       rule      of

completeness        as    applied        to    testimonial          hearsay.            Under    that

rule, a party 'against whom a part of an utterance has been put

in, may in his turn complement it by putting in the remainder.'"

Id. at 693 (citations omitted).

       ¶39     Justice      Alito       concurred       in    Hemphill.            He     addressed

"conditions under which [he said that] a defendant can be deemed

to have validly waived the right to confront adverse witnesses,"

while       using   the     rule    of    completeness             to     get    there     in    some

circumstances.            Id. at 694 (Alito, J., concurring).                                 Justice

Alito said that a defendant may "waive the Sixth Amendment right

to confront adverse witnesses through conduct."                                   Id.     This was

not     a    case    under     New       York's       opening-the-door-to-correct-a-

misleading-statement             rule         because        its     application          was       not

predicated on "conduct evincing intent to relinquish the right
of confrontation," nor was it predicated on "action inconsistent

with    the    assertion      of     that       right."            Id.    at    694-95.         While

acknowledging the reasons under which the New York rule fails

constitutional          muster     as    related        to    the        confrontation         right,

Justice Alito stated "[t]here are other circumstances, however,

under       which   a     defendant's          introduction             of     evidence       may   be

regarded as an implicit waiver of the right to object to the

prosecution's use of evidence that might otherwise be barred by
the Confrontation Clause."                     Id. at 695.               The concurrence then
                                                 24
                                                                         No.       2020AP32-CR

suggested     the    rule   of    completeness       may    invoke       one       of     those

circumstances.        There, "if a party introduces all or part of a

declarant's       statement,      the     opposing     party        is     entitled         to

introduce the remainder of that statement . . . regardless of

whether     the     statement     is   testimonial     or    there        was       a     prior

opportunity to confront the declarant."                Id.

      ¶40    Justice Alito asserted "the rule of completeness fits

comfortably       within    the    concept     of     implied       waiver          [of     the

confrontation right]."             Id.     By introducing statements of an

unavailable       declarant,      "a    defendant    has     made    a     knowing          and

voluntary decision to permit that declarant to appear as an

unconfronted        witness."      Id.      Under     this    theory,          a    criminal

defendant may waive his confrontation right by introducing an

incomplete statement of an unavailable declarant; completing an

incomplete or misleading statement, the argument goes, demands

that the entire statement is "fair game."                  Id.

      ¶41    In its brief, the State urges us to accept that the

"rationales for the holdings in [Crawford and Hemphill] simply
do   not    apply    here."24      The    State     characterizes         Crawford          and

Hemphill as rejecting "open-ended, reliability-based exceptions

that applied to any kind of evidence."25                      Instead, the State

views the Report at issue in Thomas's conviction as belonging to

a "narrow category of evidence that a defense expert relied on

      24   Resp't. Br. at 28.
      25   Id. (emphasis in original).

                                          25
                                                                           No.    2020AP32-CR

and     gave    factually      inaccurate           testimony         about."26          While

acknowledging the Hemphill concurrence is not binding, the State

asserts      the   concurrence       is       the     guidance         courts      have    in

evaluating situations like Thomas's where, in the State's view,

Thomas elicited testimony that "flatly contradicted" the Report.

Because "he made 'a tactical choice' to put the [R]eport in

play," he "waived his confrontation right as to that [R]eport."27

      ¶42      The State is incorrect on several bases.                           First, it

was the State who introduced the Report in its cross-examination

of Thomas's expert, not the defendant.                      Second, to the extent

the State views Justice Alito's concurrence as "contemplate[ing]

fact patterns like [the one in the instant case]," we fail to

see how.        Justice Alito plainly states, "The introduction of

evidence that is misleading as to the real facts does not, in

itself, indicate a [defendant's] decision regarding whether any

given      declarant     should    be     subjected         to    cross-examination."

Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 695 (Alito, J., concurring).                               In other

words, a defendant's introduction of misleading evidence cannot
be    interpreted        to    infer      a     defendant's            waiver       of    his

confrontation         right.      Accordingly,         we    conclude        the    State's

complaint      that    Thomas's    expert      testified         in    a   way     it    found

"misleading as to the real facts," does not amount to an implied

waiver of the right of confrontation even under Justice Alito's

concurrence.

      26   Id. (emphasis in original).
      27   Id. at 30.

                                          26
                                                                   No.   2020AP32-CR

       ¶43    The fault in the State's rationale is apparent when

applied to Thomas:           Dr. Williams reviewed 219 pages of reports

and statements in preparing his testimony.                       Dr. Williams may

very well have concluded the Report's contents regarding DNA

evidence did not show signs of "an exchange of evidence."                         As

Dr. Williams testified, the existence of another's DNA under a

cohabitating couple's fingernails may have innocent origins and

is   not     necessarily     indicative     of   a   struggle.      If   the   State

disagreed with his conclusion and sought to challenge it, the

appropriate      method    is    through    impeachment,    as    occurred     here.

Otherwise, we fail to differentiate the State's argument from

the reliability determinations that the Supreme Court rejected

in Crawford and Hemphill.               See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-68,

rejecting the reliability-based approach of Ohio v. Roberts, 448

U.S. 56 (1980); Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 690-92, reaffirming that

rejection while overruling People v. Reid, 971 N.E.2d 353 (N.Y.

2012).

       ¶44    There is little doubt the Report was testimonial when
used for its truth.           After all, Ms. Oliver-Thomas's fingernails

were clipped during her autopsy and sent to a crime lab to

determine whose, if anyone's, DNA could be found there.                          The

same   could     be   said      for   Thomas's   fingernails.        Under     these

circumstances an objective witness would certainly believe the

resulting statement in a report would be "available for use at a

later trial" for its truth.             Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.         However,

if the State wanted to use the Report for its truth, the State
was required to introduce and authenticate the Report and then
                                           27
                                                                     No.     2020AP32-CR

subject its author to cross-examination by Thomas in accordance

with the Sixth Amendment and Melendez-Diaz.                    Melendez-Diaz, 557

U.S.     at   305.      The       information      the      State    elicited       from

Dr. Williams on cross-examination for impeachment purposes did

not transform the Report into admissible hearsay.                          We conclude

that the State's questioning of Dr. Williams served to impeach

his    testimony,     and    that    the    State's   use     of    the    Report    for

impeachment     did    not    employ       the   Report's    contents       for     their

truth.

                             2.     Closing Arguments

       ¶45    The second instance in which the Report surfaces is

during closing arguments, where the State used evidence elicited

on     Dr. Williams's       cross-examination         for    the     truth     of    the

contents of the Report.             The prosecution asserted its theory of

the case in closing:

       [Prosecutor]: You would have to be high on crack to
       think that there is any other explanation for Joyce
       Oliver-Thomas's death than that Oscar Thomas killed
       her, but it was more than just killing.        It was
       brutal, vicious, violent, choking the life out of her
       for minutes . . . while he is scratching up her face
       with his free hand, with his right hand, trying to
       cover her mouth.

            [Defense counsel]: I'm going to object to that.
       I'm objecting to this demonstrative.    There is no
       evidence of that, Judge.

              [Prosecutor]:       Closing argument, Your Honor.

            THE COURT:        Well, no, no, no.             Confined to the
       evidence.

            [Prosecutor]: And              the   evidence supports this
       theory, Your Honor.                  We   have testimony of the

                                            28
                                                                 No.     2020AP32-CR

       scratches on her face. . . . Her DNA is found under
       his fingernails. We have testimony from the neighbor
       downstairs.

            THE COURT: All right, as long as you are clear
       this is your theory, and that --

            [Prosecutor]: Absolutely.     It is my closing
       argument, Your Honor.   I'm presenting to the jury my
       theory of how Joyce Oliver-Thomas died, and I think
       the evidence supports that.    This is exactly what I
       think happened.    Oscar Thomas placed his left arm
       around her throat and squeezed, compressing her neck
       while using his other hand to muzzle her nose and her
       mouth to keep her quiet and speed up her death, and
       that's how she got the scratches on her face.
Over defense counsel's objection, the State assured the judge

that    "the   evidence      supports        this    theory."      The     State's

representation was not correct.                There had been no evidence

admitted     for    the   truth   of   the    DNA   found   in   the   fingernail

clippings.     The State presented no independent DNA evidence, did

not enter the Report into evidence, and it did not otherwise

present evidence as to the scratches' origin.

       ¶46   We conclude the State's reliance on hearsay evidence

that was used to impeach Thomas's expert's opinion was improper

during closing arguments because the Report then was used for

the truth of the statements therein.                See State v. Marinez, 2011

WI 12, ¶44, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 (limiting the use of

evidence that had been admitted because of its high potential

for unfair prejudice); State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 676,

298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that reference to

confiscated weapons was improper given its potential for unfair

prejudice).        As stated earlier, the facts or data upon which an
expert bases her opinion may be introduced under Wis. Stat.

                                        29
                                                                        No.     2020AP32-CR

§ 907.03, but only for the limited purpose of assisting the

factfinder in determining an expert's credibility.                            Watson, 227

Wis. 2d 167, ¶82.        Evidence brought in for that purpose does not

transform into admissible hearsay for subsequent use at trial.

Id., ¶78.

    ¶47     Furthermore,       after         defense       counsel      objected,      the

prosecutor incorrectly assured the judge that, "[T]he evidence

supports this theory, Your Honor.                       We have testimony of the

scratches    on    her     face. . . .            Her    DNA   is    found     under   his

fingernails."         It     was     therefore          erroneous     to      permit   the

prosecutor's       statement       in    closing        argument     because     the   DNA

evidence in the Report was not properly admitted as evidence for

its substantive content.

                               D.       Harmless Error

    ¶48     Our test for harmless error has varied over the years.

Despite variations, we have consistently noted that there has

been "little practical difference between the formulations of

harmless error which the court has used from time to time."
State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).

Harmless error analyses have been applied to errors claimed to

have occurred during closing argument.                         State v. Johnson, 60

Wis. 2d 334, 344-45, 210 N.W.2d 735 (1973).                         Over time, we have

moved   toward     implementing          a   uniform      harmless     error     standard

regardless of whether the complained-of error is constitutional,

statutory,    or    other.          Harvey,       254    Wis. 2d     442,     ¶40.     The

beneficiary of the error, here the State, has the burden of
proving the error was harmless.               Id., ¶41.
                                             30
                                                                        No.    2020AP32-CR

       ¶49   In addition, "[Wis. Stat.] § 805.18, made applicable

to criminal cases by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1), prohibits reversal

for error not affecting a party's substantial rights."                                 Id.,

¶39.    The harmless-error inquiry considers whether it is "clear

beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found

the defendant guilty absent the error."                    Id., ¶46 (citing Neder,

527 U.S. at 18).

       ¶50   In reviewing a contention that the error was harmless,

we consider evidence that was not affected by the error that

occurred during the State's closing argument.                        In so doing, we

examine whether the State has met its evidentiary burden.

       ¶51   In regard to the sexual assault, the State offered the

following         evidence    at      trial:        the      downstairs       neighbor's

testimony asking that Thomas "stop, stop" and the large bump due

to    something     falling      on   the     floor       above;    and    the      medical

examiner's testimony, discussed below.

       ¶52   Thomas's     friend      told    the     jury    the   pair      had   smoked

crack together in the apartment basement in the early morning
hours on the day Ms. Oliver-Thomas died.                       The friend stated at

one point he waited about "an hour" for Thomas to return from

checking     on    his   wife.        The    jury     heard     that,     after     Thomas

returned to the basement, Thomas "seemed nervous and kind of

edgy . . . it was a whole different person from what I [had]

seen him like."

       ¶53   The medical examiner testified regarding the results

she found during the forensic examination of Ms. Oliver-Thomas.
The    medical     examiner      provided         testimony    as    to    her      autopsy
                                             31
                                                                       No.   2020AP32-CR

report, which was received into evidence.                         The jury heard the

medical examiner's testimony that "the decedent had injuries to

her face and her neck consistent with strangulation," such as

hemorrhage and bruising along the front of the victim's neck and

throughout the neck muscles.                The examiner further testified to

bruises and bites on the victim's tongue, which she stated may

have been caused "by a force against the neck pushing the back

of the neck into the spine."                She also testified that she found

injuries on the victim's lips in addition to scratches on her

face.      She     continued         by   describing       petechiae,     small    burst

vessels that she observed in the victim's eyes and which are

commonly    seen    in    strangulation          cases.      The    examiner      further

testified   that       the    victim      had    approximately      70ccs    of   bloody

fluid in her stomach, which the victim swallowed.                            The State

also entered nine photographs from Ms. Oliver-Thomas's autopsy

into evidence.

    ¶54     None    of       this    evidence     was   affected     by   the     State's

substantive      use     of    the    hearsay     Report     in    closing   argument.
While Thomas presented a medical expert in his defense, we make

no determination as to the jurors' assessment of credibility and

weight.

    ¶55     The harmless error query does not reduce to a mere

quantum     of     evidence,          but       instead,     whether      absent     the

hearsay/Report it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a

rational jury would have found Thomas guilty.                      Here, we conclude

that the State offered sufficient evidence for a rational jury
to determine Thomas sexually assaulted and intentionally took
                                            32
                                                                                 No.    2020AP32-CR

the life of his wife.                       All of the observations of physical

injury       to    Ms. Oliver-Thomas            are       consistent          with     the    jury's

conclusion          that       Thomas's       interactions          with        her     were       not

consensual and were intentional.                          Accordingly, we conclude that

the    State       has     met    its       burden    to     show    that       the     error       was

harmless.

                                       III.    CONCLUSION

       ¶56        We affirm the court of appeals and conclude that the

State       met    its   evidentiary          burden       to    sufficiently          corroborate

Oscar       C.    Thomas's       confession          of    sexual       assault.             We   also

conclude         that    the     State's      use    of    the    Report       that     a     defense

expert reviewed, but which was not admitted into evidence, did

not     violate         Thomas's      confrontation             right        under     the    United

States' Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution when used for

impeachment purposes.28                 However, we reject the State's argument

that    it       properly      used     the    Report's         contents,       during        closing

argument.          Furthermore, following Hemphill, a criminal defendant

does not "open the door" to the introduction of testimonial out-
of–court          statements          for     the      purpose          of     "correcting"           a

"misleading impression."                    Although we conclude that the State

did not use the content of the Report for its truth on cross-

examination, the State improperly used the Report's content for

its    truth       during      closing       arguments,         which    the     circuit          court

       We note that Justice Dallet's concurrence concludes the
       28

opposite, and is the decision of the court in regard to use of
the Report during cross-examination of Thomas's expert witness.
See ¶2, supra.

                                                33
                                                                  No.    2020AP32-CR

erroneously       permitted.      However,     we    conclude     the    error    was

harmless because it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a

rational     jury    would     have   found   [Thomas]      guilty      absent    the

error."     Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at

18).

       By   the   Court.—The     decision     of    the   court   of    appeals    is

affirmed.

                                        34
                                                                   No.    2020AP32-CR.rfd

     ¶57     REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.            (concurring).              I join the

portion     of   the   majority/lead     opinion       holding           that    Thomas's

confession was sufficiently corroborated to be admissible.                              See

majority/lead      op.,   ¶¶12-24.       As    noted    in    the         majority/lead

opinion,1 because this concurrence              is joined by Justices Ann

Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Grassl Bradley, and Jill J. Karofsky, it

represents the decision of the court with respect to the second

issue raised in this case:           Whether the State violated Thomas's

rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause when it

elicited testimony about DNA evidence contained in a Crime Lab

report not in evidence without affording Thomas the opportunity

to cross-examine the report's author.

     ¶58     I   conclude   that   the       State    violated       Thomas's         Sixth

Amendment rights.         The State sought the DNA evidence described

in the Crime Lab report for its truth at trial.                           That much is

clear from the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury.                               And

the State confirmed that the DNA evidence was offered for its

truth     throughout   briefing    and       during    oral   argument           in    this
court.2     For that reason, the DNA evidence in the Crime Lab

report     was   testimonial    hearsay;        it    was     an     out        of    court

     1   See majority/lead op., ¶2.
     2 The majority/lead opinion is right that the State's
position has changed over time. See majority/lead op., ¶7. In
the post-conviction proceedings, at the court of appeals, and in
its response to Thomas's petition for review, the State argued
that the DNA evidence was used for impeachment at trial.     But
that does not change what happened at trial or in briefing and
oral argument before us, where the State took the consistent
position that the DNA evidence was elicited and used for its
truth.

                                         1
                                                               No.    2020AP32-CR.rfd

statement,   prepared      "under    circumstances       which      would     lead     an

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would

be available for use at a later trial," and offered by someone

other than the declarant for the truth of the matters asserted.

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009)

(quotation omitted).        Because the author of that report was not

available for cross-examination, admitting testimony about it

therefore    violated      the    Confrontation      Clause.          Nevertheless,

because    that   Confrontation      Clause    violation       was     harmless,       I

conclude that Thomas's convictions should stand.

                                         I

    ¶59     Thomas's forensic expert, the sole defense witness at

trial, testified on direct examination that he did not see any

defensive wounds or "signs of a struggle" on the victim.                            This

was important because Thomas argued that he killed the victim

accidentally.           During    cross-examination,          the     State         asked

Thomas's expert if he reviewed reports from the Wisconsin Crime

Lab in reaching his conclusions.              This was the first time the
Crime Lab report and the DNA evidence contained in it came up at

trial, and defense counsel objected to any questioning about the

contents    of    the   report.      The     circuit     court       overruled        the

objection, however, and allowed the State to ask Thomas's expert

about the report because he reviewed it before reaching his

opinion.      The     prosecutor     then    asked     the    expert        about     the

report's    finding      that    Thomas's    DNA   was      under     the    victim's
fingernails at the time of the autopsy.                  After looking at the

report,    Thomas's     expert    said   "[y]es,     this    appears        to   be    an
                                         2
                                                             No.    2020AP32-CR.rfd

analysis that shows that the DNA found under the fingerprints

[sic] was obviously a mixture.                 You are going to have [the

victim's] DNA, but also evidence of DNA from Oscar Thomas."                       He

also confirmed that the victim's DNA was found under Thomas's

fingernails.         Thomas's       expert   dismissed     those    conclusions,

however, explaining that Thomas and the victim were married, and

"[a] finding of the DNA, they could be scratching each other's

back.     I mean, there is no evidence of trauma on him to support

the   fact    that   she    was     struggling."     The    report     was   never

admitted into evidence.

      ¶60    The State's actions would have been permissible if, as

the   majority/lead     opinion      hypothesizes,   it    was     done   only   to

impeach      Thomas's      expert     during    cross-examination.3              See

majority/lead op., ¶¶29-34.             But the record, and the State's

briefing and presentation at oral argument, all establish that

the evidence was offered for the truth of matters contained in

the report——that the victim's DNA was under Thomas's fingernails

and Thomas's DNA was under her fingernails.                That was why, when
the circuit court told the prosecutor to confine his closing

arguments to the evidence, he responded——in front of the jury——

that "[w]e have testimony of the scratches on [the victim's]

face.     We have testimony that it could have been caused by DNA.

      3After all, experts may rely on inadmissible evidence,
including hearsay, in forming their opinions.     See Wis. Stat.
§ 907.03. And if an expert does so, that inadmissible evidence
can be used to impeach the expert's credibility on cross-
examination, but not for the truth of the matters asserted. See
Wis. Stat. § 907.05; see also State v. Heine, 2014 WI App 32,
¶10, 354 Wis. 2d 1, 844 N.W.2d 409. Nevertheless, as explained
below, that is not what happened at Thomas's trial.

                                         3
                                                                    No.   2020AP32-CR.rfd

Her DNA is found under his fingernails."                      The only "testimony"

about DNA was Thomas's expert's answers about the Crime Lab

report's findings during cross-examination.                      And if there was

any   remaining      question      about   the   purpose       of     eliciting       that

testimony, it was answered in briefing and at oral argument in

this court,4 where the State consistently asserted that Thomas

impliedly waived his right to confront the author of the Crime

Lab report when his expert's testimony contradicted the report's

contents.

      ¶61    Nevertheless, the majority/lead opinion insists that

the State used the evidence during cross-examination not for its

truth, but only to impeach Thomas's expert's credibility.                              See

majority/lead op., ¶34.            That is correct, in the majority/lead

opinion's view, since the State's briefing "did not argue that

the Report could be used for the truth of its contents."                              Id.,

¶7.       But the majority/lead opinion misunderstands the State's

position.       Its      argument    that      Thomas    impliedly         waived     his

confrontation right only matters if the report was used for its
truth.      After all, the Confrontation Clause only prohibits the

introduction      of     testimonial       hearsay,      and     hearsay        is,    by

definition,     an     out    of   court   statement      that       is   "offered      in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."                           See Wis.

Stat.      § 908.01(3)       (emphasis     added);      see    also       Crawford     v.

      4For example, when speaking about why the evidence was
admitted, the State's counsel stated that "we want it for the
truth of the matter asserted," "[t]he State is not asking [for]
it as impeachment," and "I don't want to go down the path of
just calling it impeachment . . . ."

                                           4
                                                                            No.    2020AP32-CR.rfd

Washington,          541    U.S.     36,     53       (2004).         Thus,        the     State's

consistent position before us is that it did not violate the

Confrontation Clause when it sought to establish the truth of

the     Crime    Lab       report's       findings          through    Thomas's           expert's

testimony on cross-examination.

       ¶62     The        problem     with        that       position         is      that      the

Confrontation Clause "prohibits the introduction of testimonial

statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is

'unavailable         to    testify,       and     the      defendant       had     had    a    prior

opportunity      for       cross-examination.'"              Ohio     v.    Clark,       576    U.S.

237, 243 (2015) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).                                      Crime lab

reports are testimonial statements because they are "made under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably

to believe that the statement would be available for use at a

later    trial."            Melendez-Diaz,            557    U.S.     at     310     (quotation

omitted); see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 658-

59 (2011).       And for that reason, the conclusions reached by such

reports may be admitted for their truth at trial only if the
person who prepared the report is subject to cross-examination.

See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 663.

       ¶63     That    wasn't       the    case       at    Thomas's       trial.         Instead,

through its questioning of Thomas's expert, the State was able

to    elicit    DNA        evidence       from    the       Crime     Lab    report        without

affording Thomas the opportunity to confront the analyst who

prepared       that       report——a       straightforward           Confrontation             Clause

violation.       See id. at 662 ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause does
not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the

                                                  5
                                                                          No.   2020AP32-CR.rfd

court       believes       that   questioning        one    witness       about     another's

testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for

cross-examination.").

       ¶64        The State tries to sidestep that violation by arguing

that Thomas impliedly waived his right to confront the analyst

who    prepared       the    Crime    Lab    report         when    his     expert    witness

"relied      on"     the    DNA   evidence     in    that     report       and    then   "gave

factually         inaccurate      testimony        about"    it.       This      argument    is

based on the direct testimony of Thomas's expert that he did not

see any defensive wounds or "signs of a struggle" on the victim.

The State claims that was inaccurate because the DNA evidence

showed that Thomas's DNA was under the victim's fingernails (and

her DNA under his).5               And for that reason, the State did not

violate the Sixth Amendment by establishing the facts contained

in the report through cross-examining Thomas's expert.

       ¶65        This argument, however, mirrors an evidentiary rule

the        United      States        Supreme        Court          recently       held      was

unconstitutional in Hemphill v. New York, 142 S. Ct. 681 (2022).
That       rule    allowed    evidence      that     would     otherwise         violate    the

Confrontation Clause to be admitted when the defendant "opened

the door;" that is, when the defendant created "a misleading

impression that requires correction with additional materials

from the other side."                Id. at 691 (quotation omitted).                        The

       This argument is questionable even on its own terms since,
       5

as Thomas's expert explained, the DNA evidence does not
necessarily indicate that a struggle occurred.       Indeed, the
expert stated that because Thomas and the victim lived together,
he would expect to find their DNA under each others'
fingernails.

                                               6
                                                                       No.    2020AP32-CR.rfd

Court    rejected       that    rule      because    the      Sixth   Amendment's          text

"'does     not     suggest          any    open-ended          exceptions          from     the

confrontation requirement to be developed by courts.'"                                Id. at

690 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).                       As the Court explained,

"[f]or Confrontation Clause purposes, it was not for the judge

to   determine       whether         the     [defendant's]            theory . . .          was

unreliable, incredible, or otherwise misleading in light of the

State's proffered . . . evidence," or whether that proffered

evidence was "reasonably necessary to correct that misleading

impression."       Id. at 692.

     ¶66       The State attempts to distinguish Hemphill by arguing

that Thomas impliedly waived his confrontation right.                                 As the

State notes, Hemphill left open the possibility that one type of

implied waiver, the common-law rule of completeness, might allow

testimonial hearsay to be admitted under certain circumstances.

See id. at 693.            And Justice Alito's concurrence in Hemphill

suggested        that      defendants          can       impliedly           waive        their

confrontation       right      in    other    ways,      by      engaging     in     "conduct
evincing intent to relinquish the right of confrontation" or by

taking    an     "action       inconsistent       with     the     assertion         of    that

right."    Id. at 694-95 (Alito, J., concurring).

     ¶67       Drawing    on    that      framework,       the    State      argues       for   a

"narrow    solution"        that     applies        to   the     "narrow      category          of

evidence that a defense expert relied on                           and gave factually

inaccurate testimony about."                 The problem with this argument is

that it rests on the same flawed approach the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected in Hemphill.               See Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 691.                            As

                                              7
                                                                           No.       2020AP32-CR.rfd

Justice      Alito       acknowledged         in    his    concurrence,          a    defendant's

introduction of evidence that is allegedly misleading as to the

real facts is not, by itself, the kind of act that signals an

intent to relinquish the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

See id. at 695 (Alito, J., concurring).                             Yet that is what the

State asks us to conclude: that the DNA evidence contained in

the Crime Lab report "was reasonably necessary to correct [the]

misleading impression" created by Thomas's expert's testimony

that    he    did       not       see   any   defensive         wounds     or    "signs       of   a

struggle" on the victim.                   See Hemphill, 142 S. Ct. at 692.                     But

adopting the State's position would defy Hemphill——something we

cannot do.              Accordingly, Thomas did not impliedly waive his

Confrontation Clause right, and admitting testimony about the

contents      of    the       Crime     Lab   report       without       affording        him   the

opportunity to confront its author violated the Sixth Amendment.

                                                   II

       ¶68    Nevertheless, I conclude that the Confrontation Clause

violation that occurred here was harmless.                              An error is harmless
if the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

complained         of    did      not   contribute         to     the    verdict       obtained."

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).                                   Thus, we look

"not [to] what effect the constitutional error might generally

be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what

effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand."

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (citing Chapman,
386 U.S. at 24); see also id. ("The inquiry, in other words, is

not    whether,         in    a    trial   that        occurred    without       the     error,    a
                                                   8
                                                            No.    2020AP32-CR.rfd

guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the

guilty   verdict    actually    rendered   in     this    trial     was    surely

unattributable to the error." (emphasis in original)).

    ¶69    Here, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the

admission of the DNA evidence did not contribute to the guilty

verdict.     To be sure, the DNA evidence was used as support for

the State's theory that Thomas intended to kill the victim and,

conversely,    to   rebut   Thomas's     theory     that     the     death      was

accidental.      And   admittedly,   the   DNA     evidence       was   somewhat

useful in that regard as it bolstered the State's narrative that

Thomas scratched the victim's face with his free hand while

choking her to death.          But the evidence wasn't necessary to

support that theory since the State's case was already strong

without it.    The jury heard testimony from the medical examiner

about injuries to the victim's face, neck, tongue, and lips, all

of which were consistent with Thomas violently and intentionally

strangling the victim.         Additionally, the jury also heard from

Thomas's neighbor, who awoke to a loud argument in the middle of
the night and a woman screaming "[s]top, stop, I love you, I

love you."     She then heard a loud noise, furniture moving, and

silence.

    ¶70    Finally, even though the jury heard evidence that the

victim's DNA was found under Thomas's fingernails, the rest of

Thomas's   expert's    testimony    undercut     the     importance       of   that

fact.    When the prosecutor asked Thomas's expert about the DNA

evidence, he said the presence of the DNA was unsurprising given
that Thomas and the victim were a couple that lived together.

                                     9
                                                          No.   2020AP32-CR.rfd

Thus, even though it was erroneous to admit the DNA evidence in

violation of Thomas's Confrontation Clause rights, it is clear

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to

the jury's guilty verdict.        See id.

      ¶71   I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA

GRASSL BRADLEY, and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion.

                                       10
                                                                      No.    2020AP32-CR.bh

       ¶72     BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.          (concurring).           A majority of this

court    holds       that     the    testimony      of    Oscar    Thomas's        neighbor

corroborates a significant fact underlying his conviction for

first-degree         sexual    assault.         I   agree    and    join     ¶¶12-24     of

Justice Roggensack's majority/lead opinion.                        A majority of the

court also rejects Thomas's plea for a new trial on the grounds

that     his    Sixth       Amendment     Confrontation          Clause     rights     were

violated.            This    alleged     error      arose    when,        during     cross-

examination, the State elicited testimony from a defense expert

about certain DNA evidence in a crime lab report that was not

admitted into evidence.              During its closing argument, the State

urged conviction in partial reliance on that DNA evidence.                                I

agree with my colleagues that any alleged Confrontation Clause

violation was harmless.              But I do not join their analysis of the

Confrontation Clause issues for two reasons.

       ¶73     First, it is unclear how to analyze and categorize the

State's        use    of     the     report.         In     response        to     Thomas's

postconviction motion and his appeal, the State argued the DNA
evidence       was    used     for     impeachment        purposes.         However,    in

briefing       and    at    argument    before      us,    the    State     asserts,    and

Thomas agrees, that the DNA evidence was admitted for its truth

during       cross-examination.                Justice       Roggensack's           opinion

concludes that the DNA evidence was properly used to impeach the

defense expert——relying on the parties' prior arguments.                                 By

contrast, Justice Dallet's opinion relies on the State's current

representation, despite the fact that is not how this issue was
litigated or represented below.                     This is unusual, to say the

                                            1
                                                                   No.   2020AP32-CR.bh

least, and forms a questionable foundation upon which to opine

on these matters.

       ¶74   Second,    the     confrontation        issues   in    this    case    are

novel and factually complicated.               They center on how to treat a

report not admitted into evidence that is nonetheless reviewed

by a testifying defense expert.                 May the contents of such a

report be explored on cross-examination by the State?                         To what

end?     The United States Supreme Court, whose decisions we are

principally applying in this area of law, has not addressed this

question.       With little guidance from the Supreme Court in this

still     emerging     area     of   law,      and      because     this    case     is

sufficiently resolved on harmless error, I would not wade into

these uncharted waters at this time.

       ¶75   Rather than forge our own path on the State's use of

the evidence, or analyze a novel area of federal constitutional

law     where   the    United    States       Supreme    Court     has     left    much

unaddressed, I would simply conclude the Confrontation Clause

errors Thomas alleges, if they are errors at all, were harmless.
Thomas is not entitled to a new trial and his convictions should

be affirmed.      I respectfully concur.

                                          2
    No.   2020AP32-CR.bh

1