Court Opinion

ID: 9848816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:27:59.401519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:48.111928
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Division 2 of the majority’s opinion reversing Slakman’s conviction because of the introduction of testimony by the court reporter. Under well-established law, the testimony of the court reporter was admissible both as to what she herself heard Slakman state in her presence and as to the accuracy of the tape recording she had made of Slakman’s statement. I also dissent to Division 3 regarding the evidence of prior difficulties and join Justice Hines’ dissent to Division 4 (a). Because no other reversible error was committed in this case, I would affirm Slakman’s conviction for the death of his wife. I concur fully in the majority’s affirmance of Slakman’s conviction for aggravated assault.
1. Contrary to the majority’s position in Division 2, it is not error to allow statements caught on tape to be related to the jury by an ear witness to the statements. Smith v. State, 228 Ga. App. 144 (2) (491 SE2d 194) (1997); In the Interest of L. R., 219 Ga. App. 755 (4) (466 *672SE2d 653) (1996). An audio recording does not constitute the “best evidence” of the statement since the law is well-established that the best evidence rule applies only to writings, not to electronic recording of sound waves upon magnetic tape. Perkins v. State, 260 Ga. 292 (7) (392 SE2d 872) (1990). It is equally well-established that in order to admit an audiotaped recording, the State must establish the accuracy and correctness of the conversations so recorded. Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375 (4) (519 SE2d 221) (1999); Gambrel v. State, 260 Ga. 197 (2) (391 SE2d 406) (1990). See also Daniel, Handbook on Criminal Evidence, § 9-16 (2000 ed.). To do so, our appellate courts have recognized that the foundation witness may testify that the tape is “ ‘the same as it was when it happened,’ . . . [and] that the tape accurately depicts the event and any conversation that took place on the evening when he was with appellant.” Fields v. State, 223 Ga. App. 569, 572 (3) (479 SE2d 393) (1996) (video).
In this case, Slakman made a statement within the hearing of the court reporter. The statement was also captured on the court reporter’s audiotape equipment. The court reporter was called to the stand and testified before the jury to what she heard Slakman say. After the State established the foundational requirements for the admission of the audiotape, including the court reporter’s testimony that the tape authentically reflected what was heard, the tape was played for the jury. On cross-examination, the defense questioned whether the court reporter had misheard Slakman’s statement. On redirect, the prosecutor rephrased the foundational question he had asked earlier, to inquire whether the audiotape “verified” what the court reporter had heard. I cannot agree with the majority that this constituted impermissible “bolstering” since the witness’ answer merely reiterated her earlier admissible testimony that the audiotape was accurate.46
There was no error in the admission of the court reporter’s testimony regarding what she heard Slakman state in her presence even though there was an audiotaped recording of Slakman’s statement. Smith-, In the Interest of L. R., supra. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, these cases cannot be distinguished on the basis that the ear witness in this case was the court reporter since her testimony would carry no more “impact” than that of the police detective who testified to the statement captured on tape in In the Interest of L. R., supra. I would reject as utterly without merit the contention that the *673witness’ role during the trial as court reporter rendered her testimony inadmissible; it was Slakman’s own behavior in uttering a statement in her presence which caused her to be a witness. There was no error in the witness testifying that the recording accurately reflected what she heard, as that testimony was not only admissible but essential in order to support the admissibility of the audiotape recording. Gambrel, supra. Finally, given that it is uncontroverted that no transcript of Slakman’s audiotaped statement was used at any point during the trial, I find meritless Slakman’s argument that the trial court was required to give instructions to the jury limiting their consideration to the audiotaped recording. The cases the majority relies upon are totally distinguishable from this factual situation, where the jury had before it for consideration only the testimony by witnesses who overheard Slakman’s statement and the playing of the audiotaped recording itself. Indeed, the giving of such an instruction in light of the admissibility of ear witness testimony would have been highly inappropriate in this case.
2. Regarding Division 3, while I concur fully with the majority that there was no error in the admission of evidence of prior difficulties relayed by the victim to her mother, I disagree with the majority that the testimony by the victim’s two attorneys was inherently untrustworthy and thus inadmissible for the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in Dix v. State, 267 Ga. 429 (479 SE2d 739) (1997). As I stated in that concurrence,
I would assume that a client’s statements made in the course of the attorney-client relationship are trustworthy given the presence of ample reasons for her to be accurate and truthful, in the absence of any evidence to establish a reason for a declarant to falsify her statements.
Id. at 433. Applying this standard to my review of the facts surrounding the victim’s statements to the attorneys in this case, I would find that this evidence was admissible. Regarding the victim’s statements to her co-workers, it is clear that even if the admission of this evidence was error, it was harmless given the cumulative nature of the evidence. Felder v. State, 270 Ga. 641 (8) (514 SE2d 416) (1999) (“[t]he erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where, as here, legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced. [Cit.] In such a case, the hearsay is cumulative and without material effect on the verdict. [Cit.]” Id. at 646).
For the reasons stated above, I find that a reversal of Slakman’s murder conviction is not necessary and thus I would affirm his convictions and sentences entered thereon.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley concurs in this dis*674sent and Justice Hines concurs in Division 1 of this dissent.
Decided July 14, 2000
Reconsideration denied July 28, 2000.
Steven E. Phillips, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Christopher M. Quinn, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, *675Wesley S. Wood, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 The record reveals that the deputy sheriff called by the defense in rebuttal did not contradict the accuracy of the audiotape or the court reporter’s testimony. Rather, he testified that he did not hear any initial comments Slakman may have made about what Slakman did, but only heard Slakman Subsequently state twice “why did they do that to her.”