Court Opinion

ID: 9526136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:12:57.792254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:34.888776
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: The majority opinion states that the issue of whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to indictment and counsel as required by Supreme Court Rule 401(a) and Rule 401(b) is without merit, and in any event defendant’s failure to argue the point constitutes waiver of any error. I disagree with both statements. With reference to whether defendant argues the issue, the following language appears on page 3 of appellant’s brief: "THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND UNDERSTANDINGLY WAIVE HIS RIGHTS TO COUNSEL, INDICTMENT AND TRIAL WHERE THE RECORD REVEALS THAT HE NEITHER WAS PROPERLY ADMONISHED NOR DID HE UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.” On page 7 of the appellant’s brief the following language appears: “Prior to sentencing, the defendant made two appearances before the circuit court. At the first appearance, on February 12, 1974, Mr. Sifers waived his rights to counsel and to indictment. At the second appearance, held three days later, the defendant went on the [sic] enter pleas of guilty to all of the charges against him. IHinois Supreme Court Rules 401 and 402 state that an accused shaU not be permitted to waive counsel or indictment, or to plead guilty unless the court, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informs the defendant of and determines that the defendant understands the nature of the charge. Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, Ch. 110A, Secs. 401(a)(1) and (b)(1), 402(a)(1). See also Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 113—1 Procedure on Arraignment.) which states that: ‘Before any person is tried for the commission of an offense he shall be called into open court, informed of the charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto ***.’” Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) provides: “The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following: (1) the nature of the charge.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1974 Supp., ch. 110, par. 401(a).) In People v. Alexander, 23 Ill.App.3d 486, 319 N.E.2d 591, the same issue presented to this court was decided. In Alexander the defendant was charged with robbery. The defendant received a copy of the information and arraignment foHowed on the same day. At the arraignment the trial court said the charge is “robbery”; nothing further was said as to the nature of the charge. The minimum and maximum sentences applicable and the right to counsel were explained to the defendant. The defendant then waived his right to counsel and indictment. The defendant argued on these facts that the coHoquy was insufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge. The court agreed. It said: “[W]here defendant is not advised of the nature of the charge, before waiver of indictment, defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea * * * ” 23 Ill.App.3d 486, 488. The explanation of the nature of the charge must precede the waiver of counsel and indictment and whether the entire record later illustrates that the defendant may have understood the charge is immaterial. (People v. Schyska, 14 Ill.App.3d 557, 302 N.E.2d 666.) In Schyska the court framed the issue whether the admonition and advice given following the waiver of indictment and preUminary to the acceptance of the plea complies with Rule 401. The court held that it did not. (People v. Casley, 20 Ill.App.3d 1001, 313 N.E.2d 477.) The Alexander court reiterated this principle when it said: “While we feel that as to admonitions generally under Supreme Court Rules 401 and 402, the admonitions at any time during the course of proceedings should constitute a substantial compliance, the provisions of Rule 401 which require that the nature of the charge be explained by the trial court, before acceptance of a waiver of indictment, appears to be peculiarly appropriate in this case where defendant had no attorney at any time during the proceedings.” 23 Ill.App.3d 486, 488. The Alexander court’s holding that the explanation of the nature of the charge must precede the waiver of indictment or right to counsel precludes an argument based on People v. Krantz, 58 Ill.2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559, that the entire record is available to show substantial comphance with Rule 401 or 402. Furthermore, it should be noted that Krantz applied only to Rule 402. The question remains as to the sufficiency of the explanation of the nature of the charge. For admonishments to be sufficient, they must be such that an ordinary person in the circumstances of the accused would understand them as conveying the information required by the rule. People v. Gray, 102 Ill.App.2d 129, 243 N.E.2d 545. In tire instant case the defendant was given a copy of the information at the arraignment and the charge was referred to by name. The trial court neither read the whole indictment, specifically it did not read that portion which set forth the intent requirement, nor did the court read the relevant section of the Criminal Code. This court has decided that reference to the charge by name and handing the defendant a copy of the information is not sufficient. People v. Ingeneri, 7 Ill.App.3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550. I would also reverse because the record does not show that defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary. (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) In People v. Reeves, 50 Ill.2d 28, our supreme court said at pages 29-30: “The constitutional requirement, both pre and post Boykin, is that a plea of guilty be 'intelligent and voluntary.’ Boykin adds the requirement that if the guilty plea is to withstand appellate or post-conviction review 'the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant who pleads guilty enters his plea understandingly and voluntarily.’ [Citation.] This requirement has been in effect in Illinois since 1948. See former Rule No. 27A, 400 Ill. 22.”