Court Opinion

ID: 9757438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:40:39.668534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:39.386362
License: Public Domain

Bogdauski, J.
(dissenting). The probative effect of the defendant’s out-of-court admissions was a major issue in the trial of this ease. It is undisputed that the defendant pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court to “follow [ing] another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions.” G-eneral Statutes §14-240 (a). That plea of guilty was an admission of negligence. Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 89-90, 139 A.2d 58; Bradley v. Niemann, 137 Conn. 81, 83, 74 A.2d 876. In addition, the plaintiffs offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that the defendant said to one of the plaintiffs, “I shouldn’t have been drinking. It’s my fault.” I believe that the court’s instructions on the subject of those admissions were insufficient, and that as a consequence the charge in its entirety was inadequate, considered from the standpoint of its effect on the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict. Gulia v. Ortowski, 156 Conn. 40, 47, 238 A.2d 396.
*170The court instructed the jury on the subject of admissions in the following words: “In the liability section of my charge, ... I omitted the section on admissions, .... An admission of a party to a suit, that is a plaintiff or defendant made out of court, is admissible in evidence, not as the equivalent of direct testimony of the party in respect to any fact or issue but because conduct of a party in respect to matters in dispute, whether by act, speech or writing which is inconsistent with the truth of any of his contentions on the stand is a fact relevant to the issue involved in such contention.” The trial court did not relate this portion of its charge to the evidence or the pleadings concerning the defendant’s admissions. The plaintiffs duly excepted and claim on appeal that the court erred (1) in not properly stating the law as to admissions; (2) in not fairly stating the claims of the plaintiffs; and (3) in failing to relate the law to the facts with sufficient clarity to permit the jury to comprehend it.
This court has previously had occasion to disapprove virtually the same standardized instruction1 in Worden v. Francis, 153 Conn. 578, 581-82, 219 A.2d 442, saying: “While the court’s instruction was a correct general definition of an admission, it was not related, in this or any other portion of the charge, to the plaintiff’s crucial extrajudicial state*171ment. The eonrt did not inform the jury that an admission is admissible against the plaintiff in proof of the matter stated in it. Sears v. Curtis, 147 Conn. 311, 315, 160 A.2d 742. Nor did the court distinguish between the evidential quality of an admission; Perrelli v. Savas, 115 Conn. 42, 44, 160 A. 311; and a mere contradictory statement, of a witness who was not a party, which could only be offered to affect credibility. Hill v. Small, 129 Conn. 604, 605, 30 A.2d 387.” The error in the charge in Worden v. Francis, supra, was held to be harmful. In the present case the charge on admissions was equally insufficient. The trial court failed to relate its charge to the defendant’s plea of guilty or to his other alleged admission, and failed to instruct the jury on the evidentiary weight to be given the admissions.
The error was not cured by the court’s instruction on the effect of the defendant’s guilty plea. The court charged as follows: “In this ease, the defendant has admitted he pleaded guilty to a violation of Section 14-240 of the General Statutes, following too closely.’ He also explained why he pleaded guilty. Ladies and gentlemen, a plea of guilty does not in and of itself conclude civilly or [sic] establish that he was negligent, nor does it establish that he is responsible for the collision. You must decide from all the evidence the question of negligence and also the proximate cause, as I have explained those terms to you.” The plaintiffs also took timely exception to this portion of the charge. While the court correctly informed the jury that the guilty plea did not conclusively establish negligence, the court neglected to instruct the jury that the plea constituted an admission, with all that that implied. See Dumond v. Denehy, supra, 89.
*172The test of a charge is whether it is correct in law, adapted to the issues .and sufficient for the guidance of the jury. Berniere v. Kripps, 157 Conn. 356, 358, 254 A.2d 496; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. §76. “The primary purpose of the charge is to assist the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which they might find to be established.” Vita v. McLaughlin, 158 Conn. 75, 77, 255 A.2d 848. “[T]he charge must go beyond a bare statement of accurate legal principles to the extent of indicating to the jury the application of those principles of the facts claimed to have been proven. Crane v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 111 Conn. 313, 315, 149 A. 782. While the degree to which reference to the evidence may be called for lies largely in the discretion of the court; Corriveau v. Associated Realty Corporation, 122 Conn. 253, 256, 188 A. 436; an allusion to it is required sufficient to furnish a practical guide to the jury as to how the stated law is to be applied to the evidence before them.” Worden v. Francis, supra, 580; Vita v. McLaughlin, supra.
The trial court’s charge failed to measure up to the standards of relevance and precision enunciated in Worden v. Francis, supra, and innumerable other cases. The plaintiffs’ failure to request appropriate instructions in .advance does not excuse the error. State v. Monte, 131 Conn. 134, 137, 38 A.2d 434; Bjorkman v. Newington, 113 Conn. 181, 185, 154 A. 346; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 106. This is not a case in which the plaintiffs’ failure to file a written request to charge on the legal principle involved in a specific statute prevents their challenge to the adequacy of an instruction. See Practice Book §§ 249, 250; Maltbie, loe. cit. I would find error and order a new trial.

The instruction, was: “I should also say something to you about our rule as to admissions. An admission of a party to a suit, that is, a plaintiff or defendant, made out of court, is admissible in evidence, not as the equivalent of direct testimony of the declarant in respect to any fact in issue, but because conduct of a party in respect to matters in dispute, whether by act, speech or writing, which is inconsistent with the truth of any of his contentions in this trial, is a fact relevant to the issue involved in any such contention.” Worden v. Francis, 153 Conn. 578, 581, 219 A.2d 442.