Court Opinion

ID: 9892745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 19:01:32.436349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:47:35.475614
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11613      Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 10/24/2023   Page: 1 of 19

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 21-11613
                            ____________________

        THOMAS T. TUNSTALL,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        KIMBERLY M. GLIDEWELL, et al.,

                                                               Defendants,

        KELLEY O. EDWARDS,
        In her individual and oﬃcial capacities,
        CYNTHIA T. MOSLEY,
        In her individual and oﬃcial capacities,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                         21-11613

                                 ____________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Alabama
                        D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00356-KD-B
                              ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, ABUDU, Circuit Judge, and
        BARBER,* District Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               Thomas Tunstall appeals the district court’s grant of sum-
        mary judgment in favor of Kelley Edwards, a Financial Support
        Worker with the Baldwin County Department of Human Re-
        sources (“BCDHR”), on his pro se amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
        rights complaint, in which he alleged violations of the Fourth and
        Fourteenth Amendments and state defamation law.1 After a thor-
        ough review of the record and briefs, and with the benefit of oral
        argument, we affirm.

        * Honorable Thomas P. Barber, United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
        1 Tunstall also asserted various claims against other defendants, but he does

        not challenge the district court’s disposition of those claims on appeal. See
        Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
        that a party abandons claims by failing to “plainly and prominently” raise them
        in his brief) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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        21-11613                 Opinion of the Court                             3

               I.      FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL
                       HISTORY
                       A. Factual Background
               This case has a complex history spanning many jurisdictions.
        Although Tunstall’s claims generally focus on one main issue—Ed-
        wards sending a Child Support Enforcement Transmittal Request
        (“2008 Transmittal Request”) to Louisiana—we will summarize the
        record evidence for context. 2
               In 1992, Tunstall separated from his ex-wife, Kimberly
        Glidewell. They entered into a separation agreement in Georgia,
        in which Tunstall agreed to pay Glidewell child support for their
        two minor sons (“1992 Separation Agreement”). In 1994, a Geor-
        gia court adopted and aﬃrmed the 1992 Separation Agreement.
        Tunstall and Glidewell divorced in 1994 (“1994 Divorce Decree”),
        but the decree did not incorporate the 1992 Separation Agreement,
        nor did it include a child support provision.
                In 1995, while both Glidewell and Tunstall were living in Al-
        abama, Glidewell applied for assistance with the BCDHR to estab-
        lish child support in that state. In June 1995, the Baldwin County
        Alabama Juvenile Court (“Alabama Juvenile Court”) ordered Tun-
        stall to pay $370 in child support each month, which was later mod-
        iﬁed to $574 per month. Around three years later, Tunstall moved

        2 These facts, in the light most favorable to Tunstall, come from Tunstall’s

        verified third amended complaint and the documentary evidence Glidewell
        submitted in support of her motion for summary judgment, and Tunstall sub-
        mitted in opposition to summary judgment.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11613

        to Louisiana while Glidewell remained in Alabama. In March 2008,
        the Baldwin County Circuit Court terminated Tunstall’s child sup-
        port obligations, but it ordered him to pay $574 per month until his
        arrears in excess of $8,000 had been satisﬁed.
               In September 2008, while Tunstall was still living in Louisi-
        ana, Glidewell ﬁled an Aﬃdavit of Past Due Support with the
        BCDHR claiming that Tunstall actually owed over $60,000 in un-
        paid child support. Glidewell based that amount on the 1994 Geor-
        gia court order which had incorporated the original child support
        obligation from the 1992 Separation Agreement.
               In October 2008, based on Glidewell’s Aﬃdavit of Past Due
        Support, Defendant-Appellee Edwards sent a Transmittal Request
        (the “2008 Transmittal Request”) to the Louisiana Department of
        Children and Family Services (“LDCFS”) in order to register the
        child support case from Alabama in Louisiana. Importantly, Ed-
        wards sent the 2008 Transmittal Request in her capacity as a Finan-
        cial Support Worker with the BCDHR. Edwards worked on the
        Glidewell/Tunstall child support case from November 8, 2000,
        through October 31, 2008, and again from November 3, 2017,
        through October 4, 2019. As a Financial Support Worker, she was
        responsible for locating parents, establishing and enforcing child
        support orders, providing information for system updates to the
        Alabama Location, Enforcement, and Collections System
        (“ALECS”), and maintaining ﬁnancial information.
              The 2008 Transmittal Request stated that Tunstall owed
        over $150,000 in unpaid child support and interest. The $150,000
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        21-11613              Opinion of the Court                        5

        was based on the Georgia 1992 Separation Agreement, which the
        state of Alabama presumed to be controlling for purposes of cal-
        culating Tunstall’s arrearages. The 2008 Transmittal Request also
        included copies of the 1994 Georgia court order which, again, in-
        corporated the 1992 Separation Agreement, which contained the
        original child support obligation, the 1994 Divorce Decree, and
        Tunstall’s payment history.
              Based on the 2008 Transmittal Request, the state of Louisi-
        ana petitioned its state court to register the Alabama support order
        and to enforce the arrears judgment on Glidewell’s behalf. Ulti-
        mately, in January 2010, a Louisiana court dismissed the case and
        notiﬁed Tunstall of the case’s closure in April 2010.
               In June 2010, after the dismissal of the Louisiana action,
        Glidewell ﬁled a petition for rule nisi and entry of judgment in the
        Alabama Juvenile Court, claiming that Tunstall owed her an addi-
        tional $24,000 in overdue child support payments for the period be-
        tween October 1992 and May 1995. She attached four exhibits to
        the petition, none of which were the 2008 Transmittal Request.
        There is no evidence in the record establishing or suggesting that
        the Alabama court relied upon that document in considering Glide-
        well’s petition.
               In April 2011, the Alabama Juvenile Court issued a ﬁnal judg-
        ment on Glidewell’s petition, noting that Tunstall had been person-
        ally served and had failed to appear or otherwise oppose the peti-
        tion. As a result, the Alabama Juvenile Court entered a default
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    21-11613

        judgment against Tunstall (“2011 Alabama Default Judgment”),
        granted Glidewell’s petition, and awarded her over $170,000.
                Then, in March 2013, the LDCFS moved to hold Tunstall in
        contempt for failing to pay his child support arrearages pursuant to
        an alleged judgment by a Louisiana court that incorporated the
        1992 Separation Agreement. The Louisiana court summoned Tun-
        stall to attend a hearing on the motion for contempt. Beyond the
        allegations in Tunstall’s veriﬁed amended complaint, there is no ev-
        idence in the record documenting whether the Louisiana court ac-
        tually held him in contempt and subjected him to any criminal or
        other penalties. Although it does appear that Tunstall’s driver’s li-
        cense, hunting license, and ﬁshing license were suspended by the
        state of Louisiana until February 2018. 3
                In 2017, Tunstall moved the Baldwin County Circuit Court
        to alter, amend, or vacate the orders the Alabama Juvenile Court
        had entered in his child support proceedings, which were all essen-
        tially based on the 1994 Georgia court order which, again, adopted
        the child support obligation from the 1992 Separation Agreement.
        On March 10, 2017, the Baldwin County Circuit Court granted
        Tunstall’s motion to vacate, determining that the Georgia child
        support order had never been domesticated and registered in Ala-
        bama. Thus, the Alabama court concluded it lacked subject matter

        3 Although Tunstall alleged that the Louisiana court ordered him to serve 30

        days’ imprisonment, at oral argument, Tunstall’s counsel confirmed that Tun-
        stall never served any jail or prison time.
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        21-11613               Opinion of the Court                          7

        jurisdiction to enforce the Georgia child support orders against
        Tunstall.
                Glidewell then moved the Baldwin County Circuit Court to
        alter, amend, or vacate its judgment vacating the state courts’ prior
        orders, and she sought to register the 1992 Separation Agreement
        with the Alabama Juvenile Court. This move prompted the
        BCDHR to ﬁle another Child Support Enforcement Transmittal
        Request that same month (the “2017 Transmittal Request”), seek-
        ing to register the Georgia 1992 Separation Agreement. Unlike the
        2008 Transmittal Request, Edwards did not sign the request; an-
        other Financial Support Worker did.
               On June 29, 2017, the Baldwin County Circuit Court vacated
        its March 10, 2017, order granting Tunstall relief. The court instead
        entered an order in favor of Glidewell and directed Tunstall to pay
        the child support arrearages. Tunstall appealed that order. The Al-
        abama Court of Civil Appeals vacated the lower court’s decision in
        favor of Glidewell, ruling that the Baldwin County Circuit Court
        lacked jurisdiction over the case. See Ex parte T.T.T., 249 So. 3d 514,
        520-21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). As a result, on March 30, 2018, the
        Baldwin County Circuit Court oﬃcially dismissed the underlying
        Alabama court orders, reinstating the holding from March 10,
        2017.
              During the years of multiple court ﬁlings related to the child
        support issue, Tunstall’s credit score was impacted. Speciﬁcally,
        Tunstall’s credit report showed that, as of April 2015, he had
        $167,106 due to Louisiana for unpaid child support. In February
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11613

        2018, the BDCHR sent Tunstall a statement showing that he owed
        over $17,000 in unpaid child support and interest. These child sup-
        port statements were not signed by Edwards or any speciﬁc
        BCDHR employee. Another credit report showed that, as of Au-
        gust 31, 2018, Tunstall owed $7,958 in collections to the Alabama
        Department of Human Resources. No other evidence showed
        how often the credit reports were updated. Tunstall also received
        Child Support Statements from the BCDHR which outlined his
        child support payments and obligations.
                     B. Tunstall’s § 1983 and State Defamation Claims
                In 2018, Tunstall ﬁled a civil action against Edwards in her
        individual capacity. In his third veriﬁed amended complaint, he al-
        leged that Edwards: violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by
        falsifying information regarding his child support obligations and
        improperly sending the 2008 Transmittal Request to Louisiana
        which contained those alleged falsehoods; violated his Fourth
        Amendment rights by seizing his income between September 30,
        2008, and July 27, 2017, and transferring that income to Glidewell;
        and defamed him by falsely reporting to various credit reporting
        agencies that he owed large sums of outstanding child support pay-
        ments.
                     C. Edwards’s Motion for Summary Judgment
               Following discovery, the district court granted Edwards’s
        motion for summary judgment. As to his Fourteenth Amendment
        claim related to the 2008 Transmittal Request, the court ruled that
        the statute of limitations had expired, and that Tunstall could not
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        21-11613                Opinion of the Court                          9

        rely on the 2011 Alabama Default Judgment or the 2015 Louisiana
        contempt order to extend the statute of limitations. As to the claim
        pertaining to the credit reports and his Fourth Amendment claim,
        the district court ruled that Edwards was entitled to qualified im-
        munity. With respect to the defamation claim, the district court
        found that Edwards’s entry of Tunstall’s child support arrearages
        on ALECS was not a “publication” under state law. Tunstall ap-
        peals the district court’s order granting Edwards summary judg-
        ment as to all of those claims.
               II.    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                “We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.
        2000) (en banc). We also review de novo “the district court’s inter-
        pretation and application of the statute of limitations,” Ctr. for Bio-
        logical Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006), and
        the district court’s qualiﬁed immunity analysis, Hardigree v. Lofton,
        992 F.3d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir. 2021). We may aﬃrm a district
        court’s grant of summary judgment for any reason supported by
        the record. Mata Chorwadi, Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach, 66 F.4th
        1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2023). Where a party proceeded pro se before
        the district court, “we liberally construe his pleadings.” Caldwell v.
        Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014).
                Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue
        of material fact exists. Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 64 F.4th
        1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 2023). For a factual issue to qualify as “genu-
        ine,” it “must have a real basis in the record.” Ellis v. England, 432
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   21-11613

        F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
        Mize v. Jeﬀerson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996)).
        “To defeat summary judgment, ‘a mere scintilla of evidence sup-
        porting the opposing party’s position will not suﬃce; there must be
        enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably ﬁnd for that
        party.’” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1253 (11th Cir. 2022) (quot-
        ing Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir.
        2020) (en banc)). A party’s statement in a veriﬁed complaint should
        be treated as testamentary evidence that may be suﬃcient to over-
        come summary judgment. Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206
        (11th Cir. 2019).
                We “view the evidence, draw all reasonable factual infer-
        ences, and resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-mo-
        vant.” Baxter, 54 F.4th at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted)
        (quoting Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir.
        2020)). However, we must only view the evidence in a light most
        favorable to the non-moving party to the extent that the nonmov-
        ing party’s position is supported by the record. Id. Thus, simply
        because some alleged factual dispute exists between the parties
        does not mean summary judgment cannot be otherwise granted.
        Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
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        21-11613               Opinion of the Court                           11

              III.   DISCUSSION
                     A. The District Court Correctly Ruled that the Statute
                        of Limitations Had Expired on Tunstall’s Four-
                        teenth Amendment Claim Related to the 2008
                        Transmittal Request.
                All constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are con-
        sidered torts actions that are subject to the personal injury claims
        statute of limitations within the state where the § 1983 action was
        brought. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In
        Alabama, the statute of limitations is two years. Id.; Ala. Code § 6-
        2-38(l).
               Generally, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
        until the plaintiﬀ knew or should have known that he suﬀered the
        injury forming the basis of his complaint and who inﬂicted the in-
        jury. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). However,
        under the continuing violation doctrine, “a plaintiﬀ [may] sue on
        an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the
        law occur within the statutory period.” McGroarty v. Swearingen,
        977 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted)
        (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 453 F.3d at 1334). Under this
        doctrine, the present consequence of a one-time constitutional vi-
        olation does not extend the limitations period, but the continuation
        of a constitutional violation into the present does. Id.
               Here, the district court properly concluded that Tunstall’s
        claim alleging that Edwards violated his Fourteenth Amendment
        rights by sending the 2008 Transmittal Request to Louisiana was
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11613

        time-barred. The Louisiana court dismissed the state’s child sup-
        port case against Tunstall on January 20, 2010—eight years before
        he ﬁled suit against Edwards. At that point, Tunstall, who attended
        the hearing related to that case, knew or should have known of the
        injury he alleges he suﬀered as a result of the 2008 Transmittal Re-
        quest and that Edwards was the person who provided the infor-
        mation that formed the basis for the Louisiana proceedings. Chap-
        pell, 340 F.3d at 1283. Although Tunstall alleges in his third veriﬁed
        amended complaint that the 2008 Transmittal Request served as
        the basis for the 2011 Alabama Default Judgment and the 2015 Lou-
        isiana contempt order, no direct proof or other evidence supports
        that assertion. Therefore, Tunstall cannot extend the two-year stat-
        utory period by relying on the continuing violation doctrine. Ac-
        cordingly, we aﬃrm the district court’s grant of summary judg-
        ment on that claim.
                     B. The District Court Correctly Ruled that Edwards
                        was Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Tunstall’s
                        remaining § 1983 Claims.
                Tunstall also argued that Edwards violated his Fourteenth
        Amendment rights by allegedly falsifying documents which nega-
        tively impacted his credit score and that his income was illegally
        seized to pay child support amounts that he did not owe.
               When a government employee is sued in her individual ca-
        pacity, she “may seek summary judgment on qualiﬁed immunity
        grounds.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263
        (11th Cir. 2004). To be eligible for qualiﬁed immunity, the
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        21-11613               Opinion of the Court                        13

        employee must ﬁrst demonstrate that she was “engaged in a ‘dis-
        cretionary function’ when [s]he performed the acts of which the
        plaintiﬀ complains.” Id. at 1264 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
        U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A government employee performs a discre-
        tionary function when she performs an activity that falls within her
        job responsibilities. Id. at 1265. To make that determination, we
        ask whether the employee was (1) performing a legitimate, job-re-
        lated function in pursuit of a job-related goal (2) by means that
        were within her power to utilize. Id. To satisfy the ﬁrst prong of
        this test, the government employee must prove that her actions
        would have fallen within her legitimate job description but for the
        alleged constitution violation. Id. at 1266. On the second prong,
        we ask whether the government employee exercised her job-re-
        lated functions in an authorized way. Id.
                 Once we conclude that the government employee per-
        formed a discretionary function, the burden shifts to the plaintiﬀ to
        demonstrate that the employee is not entitled to qualiﬁed immun-
        ity. Id. at 1264. To meet this burden, the plaintiﬀ must demonstrate
        “that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this
        right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
        Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). To determine
        whether a right is clearly established, we ask whether the law on
        the date of the alleged misconduct gave the defendant fair notice
        that their alleged misconduct was unconstitutional. Hardigree, 992
        F.3d at 1224 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11613

               Alabama law grants the BCDHR the statutory authority to
        operate child support programs that include, but are not limited to,
        “locating absent parents,” “establishing or modifying child support
        orders,” and “enforcing support obligations and related matters.”
        Ala. Code § 38-10-3(a). The BCDHR administers income withhold-
        ing procedures to accomplish its goals and establishes a record
        keeping procedure to ensure child support records are properly
        tracked. Id. § 38-10-3(b). When an individual who owes child sup-
        port fails to provide such support, the BCDHR is entitled to “take
        appropriate action” to ensure that the individual provides support,
        such as initiating civil or criminal actions to establish or modify
        child support obligations. Id. § 38-10-7(a). The BCDHR is also au-
        thorized to conduct investigations to determine the location of
        non-custodial parents and to determine the non-custodial parent’s
        income and assets. Id. § 38-10-9(a), (b).
               The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause pro-
        hibits a State from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction
        the equal protection of the laws,” requiring that all similarly situ-
        ated persons be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
        473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
        (1982)). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the
        states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals
        from unreasonable seizures of their property. Gennusa v. Canova,
        748 F.3d 1103, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 2014). “A seizure of property oc-
        curs when there [has been] a ‘meaningful interference’ with a per-
        son’s possessory interest in it.” Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1136
        (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321
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        21-11613               Opinion of the Court                        15

        (11th Cir. 2007)). The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
        reasonableness.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal
        quotation marks omitted) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
        250 (1991)). Reasonableness is measured “by examining the totality
        of the circumstances.” Id. Importantly, “§ 1983 ‘requires proof of
        an aﬃrmative causal connection between the oﬃcial’s acts or omis-
        sions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Alcocer v. Mills,
        906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802
        F.3d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)).
               The district court did not err in concluding that Edwards
        was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Tunstall’s remaining § 1983
        claims. Edwards acted within her discretionary authority at the
        time of the alleged misconduct, pursuant to Alabama Code §§ 38-
        10-3(a)-(b), 38-10-7(a), and 38-10-9(a), (b).
                Tunstall also failed to establish that Edwards violated a con-
        stitutional right. Regarding the 2017 Transmittal Request, the rec-
        ord clearly shows that Edwards was not Tunstall’s case worker at
        the time this statement was mailed to him, and nothing in the rec-
        ord even suggests that Edwards assisted in creating the statement.
        Regarding the child support statements the BCDHR sent to Tun-
        stall in 2018 informing him of any past due payments, there is also
        nothing in the record showing that Edwards played any role in
        sending the statements to Tunstall. Thus, there is no proof of an
        aﬃrmative causal connection between the alleged constitutional
        violation and any action on Edwards’s part. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951.
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                21-11613

               Tunstall appears to argue that any misstatements in ALECS
        regarding his child support obligations are due to malfeasance on
        Edwards’s part. However, at the time the BCDHR sent Tunstall
        child support statements in 2018, the information in ALECS was
        correct. The statement was sent in February 2018, when the Bald-
        win County Circuit Court’s June 29, 2017, order establishing that
        Tunstall owed an arrearage was valid. Until the Baldwin County
        Circuit Court entered an order vacating the June 29, 2017, order
        establishing the arrearages, ALECS accurately reﬂected that, as of
        February 2018, Tunstall still showed an arrearage. Accordingly,
        Tunstall cannot demonstrate that Edwards violated his constitu-
        tional rights. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1264.
               Tunstall also contends that Edwards unlawfully seized his in-
        come in violation of the Fourth Amendment for child support pay-
        ments he was under no legal obligation to pay between July 6, 2017,
        and October 31, 2018. As to the claims related to Louisiana court
        orders collecting payments, there is no evidence in the record es-
        tablishing or suggesting that Edwards played any role in the collec-
        tion of these payments, meaning there is no evidence of an aﬃrm-
        ative causal connection between Edwards’s actions and the alleged
        Fourth Amendment violation. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951.
               As to the payments made to Alabama, the documents show
        that Tunstall made payments that tracked the Alabama orders’
        child support payment obligations. As explained, the Alabama
        child support orders were valid until the Baldwin County Circuit
        Court vacated the orders on March 30, 2018. As such, it was not
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        21-11613               Opinion of the Court                          17

        unreasonable for Edwards to rely on then-valid court orders that
        created Tunstall’s child support obligations. Thus, under the total-
        ity of the circumstances, no unreasonable seizure of Tunstall’s
        funds occurred. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39.
                      C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Tunstall’s
                         Defamation Claim.
                Under Alabama law, a plaintiﬀ establishes a prima facie case
        of defamation by demonstrating: (1) the defendant, at least negli-
        gently, (2) published (3) “a false and defamatory statement to an-
        other” (4) about the plaintiﬀ, (5) which is actionable either per se or
        per quod. Delta Health Grp., Inc. v. Staﬀord, 887 So. 2d 887, 895 (Ala.
        2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Im-
        portantly, a state agent is immune from civil liability in her personal
        capacity when the challenged conduct is based upon the agent’s
        discharging of her duties imposed by statute, insofar as the statute
        prescribes the manner for performing such duties and the state
        agent performs those duties in that manner. Ex parte Estate of Reyn-
        olds, 946 So. 2d 450, 453 (Ala. 2006) (citing Ex parte Cranman, 792
        So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000)). The state agent bears the burden of
        proving she was acting in her discretionary function in order to
        have protection under state agent immunity. Hill v. Cundiﬀ, 797 F.3d
        948, 980 (11th Cir. 2015) (interpreting Alabama law in analyzing an
        Alabama state agent immunity issue). Once the state agent makes
        a suﬃcient showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiﬀ to show that
        the state agent acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
        faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpreta-
        tion of the law,” such that she would not be entitled to state agent
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        18                       Opinion of the Court                    21-11613

        immunity. Id. at 980-81 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex
        parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405).
                To establish bad faith, the plaintiﬀ must do more than show
        the state actor was incompetent, had bad judgment, or acted neg-
        ligently. Id. at 981. Bad faith “imports a dishonest purpose and
        means a breach of known duty through some motive of self-inter-
        est or ill will.” Id. (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v.
        Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981)). To show a state agent acted
        under a mistaken interpretation of the law, a plaintiﬀ must make
        this allegation coupled with a showing of “willfulness, malicious-
        ness, or bad faith” on behalf of the state agent. Id. at 982.
                Here, the district court granted Edwards summary judg-
        ment on Tunstall’s defamation claim after determining that Tun-
        stall failed to establish the publication element. We decline to ad-
        dress the issue of whether Edwards’s actions qualiﬁed as a publica-
        tion because the record supports the conclusion that she is entitled
        to state agent immunity, and we aﬃrm for that reason. Mata Chor-
        wadi, Inc., 66 F.4th at 1263.
               We have established that Edwards worked in her discretion-
        ary authority as a Financial Support Worker and was discharging
        her duties of assisting the BCDHR in operating a child support pro-
        gram to enforce support obligations by entering ﬁnancial infor-
        mation into ALECS. Tunstall contends that Edwards entered false
        information in “bad faith” or under a “mistaken interpretation of
        the law,” such that Edwards would not be entitled to state agent
        immunity. However, that contention is unsupported by the record
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        21-11613              Opinion of the Court                      19

        evidence. There is no evidence, even in considering Tunstall’s ver-
        iﬁed amended complaint, that Edwards input allegedly false infor-
        mation into the ALECS willfully, maliciously, or due to her own
        self-interest or in ill will, nor is there any evidence showing why
        Edwards would have had any personal motivation to engage in that
        behavior. See Hill, 797 F.3d at 981.
              IV.    CONCLUSION
               For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment in Edwards’s favor.