Court Opinion

ID: 8890114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 23:01:31.81354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:09.602976
License: Public Domain

WYZANSKI, Senior District Judge
(dissenting):
The majority opinion and the opinion of District Judge Tyler have a strong basis for their conclusions. Literally, the statute is plainly, unambiguously opposed to the trust fund at issue.
But it is equally clear that the Congressional purpose was solely to prevent an employer from paying funds into a union welfare fund, or the like. The Congressional reports and the Congressional Record are replete with references to abuses, or at least plans, involving payments to funds which union leaders could manage for a variety of different purposes and not necessarily for the immediate and exclusive use of those with whom employees chose to be in a common fund of mutual support. See, for example, S.Rep. No. 105, on S. 1126, 80 Cong. 1st Sess. (1947); H.R.Rep. No. 245, on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); House Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020 (1947); 93 Cong.Rec. 4157, 4679-4680, 4746-4747, 4875-4884, 5494-5496, 7501 (1947).
However, a careful reading of the primary and other sources by counsel and the court has not uncovered any expressions of opinion, hostile or otherwise, by Senators, Congressmen, witnesses, or others with respect to the type of plan here involved. We have no ground to suppose that, in general, Congress has been unsympathetic with pooling of employees’ unemployment, pension, and like funds which treat all employees in an industry, or section thereof, as having such a common interest that they become, by their own free choice, mutual self-insurers.
Moreover, such a mutual support system has particular relevance to an industry, 'or section thereof, where the pattern of collective bargaining is as wide as the industry or a geographical or other broadly drawn section and where there is, if not identity of interest, a least a strong common bond against a common danger which may manifest itself almost haphazardly against some but not against others, and without any predictability.
Nor is it easy to discern what could be a public objection to allowing employers and employees who on a wholly voluntary basis, as in the case at bar, wished to enter into such a bargain, to execute their purpose. No one is the loser if all want to pool risks under such a self-insurance scheme.
Thus the question is whether to disregard the letter of the statute, and to hold it inapplicable because the challenged conduct is not within the reason of the statute. This raises a familiar issue. Theoretically little can be added to the classic authorities on the subject. United States v. Carbone, 327 U.S. 633, 66 S.Ct. 734, 90 L.Ed. 904; see Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211.
In my view those authorities point to the desirability in this case of disregarding the letter of the prohibition and al*377lowing the parties to carry out their agreement to which, so far as we are informed, there is no objection founded on declared or undeclared, discoverable or undiscoverable, alleged or implied, public policy.