Court Opinion

ID: 9585903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:04:58.986188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:16.635025
License: Public Domain

Sweeney, J.
(dissenting) — The standard of review from a trial court’s determination of probable cause is deferential. State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 713, 757 P.2d 487 (1988) (holding any doubts should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant); State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 366, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) (indicating the trial court’s probable cause determination entitled to great deference); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 446, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). Probable cause is not viewed in a hyper-technical manner. State v. Vonhof, 51 Wn. App. 33, 41, 751 P.2d 1221, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1010 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989) . Since the State did not appeal the court’s suppression of James P. Rakosky’s criminal history, this court must review the sufficiency of the affidavit with that information deleted. State v. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d 870, 873, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992).
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that none of the circumstances in Deputy Michael Ostlie’s affidavit, taken alone, are adequate to support a finding of probable cause. When combined and considered together, however, they provide rational grounds for believing that criminal activity was taking place at the Schwan property. Murray, 110 Wn.2d at 712; State v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 61, 515 P.2d 496 (1973). Examining the affidavit, deferring to the *241issuing judge, and resolving doubts in favor of validity, I believe the affidavit provides sufficient facts to support the trial court’s finding of probable cause.
First, the other two individuals associated with the property had prior encounters with the law involving marijuana. While a prior criminal record does not give the police probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, a prior conviction can be a factor considered by a neutral judicial officer when determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant. State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357 (upholding the use of an affidavit’s reference to a prior "police record” as a factor in determining existence of probable cause), review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1017 (1986).
Second, Mr. Rakosky lied to the police by using an alias. For a probable cause determination, the court may consider furtive behavior and falsehoods made to police officers. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1007 (1992); State v. Goodman, 42 Wn. App. 331, 337-38, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1012 (1986); State v. Sinclair, 11 Wn. App. 523, 531, 523 P.2d 1209 (1974). For instance, during a traffic stop Mr. Rakosky provided his real name only when asked for his driver’s license. Mr. Rakosky had used an alias previously when the officer stopped and talked to him after Mr. Rakosky’s van became stuck in the snow. An investigation by the officer, also summarized in the affidavit, found that Mr. Rakosky used a similar alias for his mail and electrical power accounts.
Third, the property had a three-fold increase in electrical consumption. While increased electrical usage by itself never establishes probable cause, when coupled with other factors, evidence of electrical consumption may suffice. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851. The electrical consumption on the Schwan property is no longer innocuous when combined with the prior criminal histories, the furtive behavior on the part of Mr. Rakosky, and the officers’ observations that there was intermittent human oc*242cupancy with durations "of several days and up to a week between times of occupation and vacancy” despite the large electrical consumption.
Besides these three circumstances, a number of other considerations give rise to probable cause when combined. The shed’s roof did not allow fresh snow fall to accumulate while other residences would accumulate between twenty and thirty inches on both composite and metal roofs within the same area of Schwan’s property. The property contained both an outer gate to block entrance from the highway and an inner perimeter electric fence. The inner electric fence allowed two trained guard dogs to have free access to all structures within the inner perimeter. Finally, a separately metered building was being heated for no obvious reason.
Each circumstance taken alone may be innocuous, but taken together and read in a reasonable, commonsense fashion they lead to a rational conclusion that the property was being used to grow marijuana indoors. It was reasonable for the issuing judge to conclude there was probably a marijuana grow operation at the site.
I would affirm the trial court’s finding of probable cause.