Court Opinion

ID: 9529590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:52:15.038534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:51.051674
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the court did not err when it granted defendant Peterson’s motion to dismiss the new plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. I dissent, however, from the holding that the court did not err when it dismissed the new plaintiffs’ claims against the hospital.
In deciding whether the claims that the new plaintiffs asserted relate back, the majority states that Welch, Parker, and Sizemore each
“explains its holding as turning on whether there is a similarity or relationship between the original and new claims sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the specific claim which is later asserted could arise out of the conduct, occurrence or transaction originally pleaded.” 83 Or App at 31. (Emphasis in original.)
Welch, Parker and Sizemore do not hold that the test is so narrow. Indeed, the majority adopts a broader test:
“We conclude that a new claim cannot relate to an earlier pleading unless there is at least enough of a nexus between the claims for the defendant to have been able to have discerned *34from the first that the existence of the second was a possibility.” 83 Or App at 31-32.
It applies that test and concludes:
“In the present case, the connection between the original and added claims was tenuous to the point of non-existence, and there was no possibility that notice of the later claims could have been supplied by the facts alleged in the earlier complaints.” 83 Or App at 32. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority reasons that the connection between the new and original claims was “tenuous to the point of nonexistence” and that there was “no possibility of notice,” because the new claims 1) are for intentional rather than negligent conduct; 2) seek different damages; and 3) contain additional allegations of fact, including that new plaintiffs were present when the decedent died and learned then of the hospital’s decision to withhold life support.
The majority’s reasoning is not persuasive. The conduct of the hospital that gave rise to the new claims has significant and substantial similarities to the conduct that gave rise to the original claim. The original claim alleged that the hospital had knowledge of decedent’s throat condition and ingestion difficulties, that its staff administered fluids which caused decedent to aspirate and suffer respiratory failure and that the hospital staff negligently did not administer life support, which failure resulted in decedent’s death. The new claims allege that substantially the same conduct was intentional or reckless, rather than negligent. The majority’s test does not require that the original and new claims state identical factual allegations or be based on identical legal theories. Neither does the absence of a request for punitive damages in the original claim compel a contrary conclusion. Under the majority’s test, the question is simply whether there is a sufficient nexus between the original claim and the later claim so that defendant hospital could discern from the first claim that the existence of the second is a possibility. The majority’s test does not require that the original and new claim seek to recover identical damages.
Furthermore, although the majority emphasizes that the original claim did not allege that new plaintiffs were present when decedent died or that they learned then of the hospital’s conduct, the issue is whether the original claim gave *35notice to defendant hospital of the possible existence of the new claims, not whether there was notice of every material fact which is an element of the new claims. The original claim identified the decedent’s heirs and alleged that, as a result of the hospital’s conduct, they had suffered the loss of the decedent’s society and companionship. Those allegations gave the hospital notice of the possibility that those heirs had suffered emotional distress as a result of their loss. To argue, as the majority does, that the connection was “tenuous to the point of non-existence” is unconvincing. Even under the majority’s test, I would hold that there was at least enough of a nexus between the claims for defendant to be able to discern from the first that the existence of the second is a possibility.
Moreover, I do not share the majority’s reluctance to turn to federal authority for guidance. The majority asserts, 83 Or App at 31 n 3, that federal cases that construe FRCP 15(c) (identical to ORCP 23C) are unpersuasive, because 1) they manifest a case by case approach from which no particularly useful principle can be derived; and 2) there is now a sufficient body of Oregon case law that construes ORCP 23C so that reference to federal cases is unnecessary. I disagree. We can derive useful principles from the federal cases. Moreover, because there is no reported Oregon case construing ORCP 23C in which the new claim was based on Substantially the same conduct but a different theory of liability, it is appropriate to look to cases decided under FRCP 15(c). Although, as the majority states, the court noted in Welch v. Bancorp Management Services, 296 Or at 221, that “federal caselaw is not particularly helpful because the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure specifically reject the federal approach of notice pleading in favor of the retention of fact pleading,” it nevertheless went on to state that notice is the focus of ORCP 23C:
“The apparent rationale for allowing a post-limitation amendment to relate back to the pre-limitation pleading, and thereby defeat the statute of limitations, is that a party who is notified of litigation concerning certain conduct (Campbell, supra 274 Or at 254) or a given transaction or occurrence through the original complaint, has been given the notice that the statute of limitations was intended to assure. Wright and Miller, [Federal Practice and Procedure] § 1496, 482-83, § 5103, 535.” 296 Or at 221.
*36The court’s citation to Wright and Miller shows that it believed that federal authority is helpful in interpreting the Oregon rule. See also State ex rel Gattman v. Abraham, 302 Or 301, 306, 729 P2d 560 (1986). We have also found federal court analyses of FRCP 15(c) to be helpful. See Waybrant v. Clackamas County, 54 Or App 740, 744, 635 P2d 1365 (1981). I think it is appropriate to make use of federal authority here.
In Williams v. United States, 405 F2d 234 (5th Cir 1968), the mother of a boy injured by an Army firecracker brought an action as next friend of her injured son against the United States. After the two-year Statute of Limitations had elapsed and the plaintiff had obtained a verdict on the merits, she moved to amend her complaint to add a claim on her own behalf for the loss of her son’s services. The court held that the original complaint, which revealed the existence of a minor and the mother and the assertion by her of a claim for her son, put the defendant on notice that an individual claim of the mother was also involved, because it “reasonably indicate[d] a likelihood that [she had incurred] losses of a recoverable kind.” 405 F2d at 239. Accordingly, it allowed the amendment.
A number of courts have followed Williams. In Avila v. I.N.S., 731 F2d 616 (9th Cir 1984), the court held that a father’s claim for his expenses and damages related back to his earlier claim on behalf of his mentally impaired son for wrongful deportation.
“In deciding whether an amendment relates back to the original claim, notice to the opposing party of the existence and involvement of the new plaintiff is the critical element.” 731 F2d at 620. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Williams, the court held that the original claim gave defendant adequate notice of the father’s “existence and involvement,” because
“[t]hat claim * * * identified Jesus as Daniel’s father and explained Daniel’s disability. The nature of Jesus’ damages was such that the government would reasonably expect to occur from its wrongful deportation of a mentally impaired citizen.” 731 F2d at 620.
See also Cunningham by Cunningham v. Quaker Oats Co., 107 FRD 66 (WD NY 1985); Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F Supp 516 (Del 1974).
*37Williams was distinguished in Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F2d 1301 (DC Cir 1982), an action arising out of a plane crash. The court held that the later claim of the original plaintiffs wholly owned corporation for property damage did not relate back to her earlier claim for personal injury. The court reasoned that the nature of the plaintiffs original complaint gave the defendant no notice of the existence of the corporation and, even with such notice, it would not have given the defendant reason to know of the corporation’s potential property claim.
“[The corporation’s] claim was simply a new cause of action, arising out of the same occurrence to be sure, but brought by an essentially unrelated victim.” 694 F2d at 1310.
I derive from the federal cases three criteria to determine whether new plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress relate back to the first amended complaint: that complaint must (1) describe the conduct, transaction or occurrence from which the later claims arise; (2) give the defendant notice of the new plaintiffs’ existence and (3) give the defendant notice that the new plaintiffs may have suffered losses of a recoverable kind arising out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence.
Here, the first amended complaint, filed within the limitation period of ORS 12.110(1), described the events leading to the death of the decedent. Substantially the same events gave rise to plaintiffs’ subsequent claims against the hospital for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, the complaint also notified the hospital of plaintiffs’ existence as the son and the wife of the decedent and as beneficiaries of his estate. Accordingly, the first two criteria for relation back are met.
The third criterion is also met. Plaintiffs were the real parties in interest in the original wrongful death action by the personal representative. Christensen v. Epley, 287 Or 539, 548, 601 P2d 1216 (1979). Although the first amended complaint did not allege that new plaintiffs were present at the decedent’s death, it described them as the wife and the son and the beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate and gave notice to the hospital that plaintiffs had suffered losses of a recoverable kind.
*38Accordingly, whether we apply the test that the majority opinion sets forth or use the principles derived from the federal cases, I would hold that plaintiffs’ claims against the hospital for intentional infliction of emotional distress relate back to the first amended complaint and were timely filed.