Court Opinion

ID: 9639156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:06:06.37167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:13.168673
License: Public Domain

WILBUR, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I adhere to the view tentatively advanced in the opinion heretofore rendered in this matter with reference to the requirements of the waiver provided for by section 274 (d), supra, namely, that the waiver must conform to the requirements of section 274 (d) and not only waive the right of an appeal but also waive the notice of the deficiency. See former opinion 44 F.(2d) 922, 924 (2, 3). Perhaps this may be done after the notice of deficiency has been given by waiving the right of appeal and also expressly consenting to an immediate assessment as held by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit in the case of E. E. Atkinson & Co. v. Willcuts, 52 F.(2d) 1, where the taxpayer had consented to- an immediate assessment and afterward claimed that the assessment made was premature because made within the 60-day period after the deficiency notice allowed by the Revenue Act of 19-26, which Revenue Act of 1926 became effective after the notice of delinquency had been given. The appellant claims that by waiving his right of appeal and consenting to the assessment he so far altered the legal situation that the Commissioner could no longer follow the statute which required him to wait 60 days after his notice of deficiency before making the assessment, but that it was his duty to do so at once, failing in which the assessment made at the time and in the manner required by the statute, in the absence of a waiver, was void because made too late. In order to thus alter the course of procedure outlined in the statute, it was necessary for the taxpayer to invoke a different statutory procedure than that outlined by the statute in the absence of a waiver by conforming on his part to the legislative requirement that he execute a waiver in the manner and form required of him, whereupon, having thus conformed on his part to the statute, the duties of the Commissioner were correspondingly altered by the statute. His consent to something different from -that permitted by the statute would not *909be effective to alter the duties of the Commissioner. Indeed the appellant’s whole case is built upon the theory that, although he expressly consented to an assessment in the amount assessed (less interest) and paid the amount so assessed, that tax is void because the Commissioner did not assess the tax within the time fixed by statute, in view of his consent and waiver. In the absence of an express waiver of the notice of deficiency or of consent to an immediate assessment I am of opinion that it was the duty of the Commissioner to proceed according to the statute and that he did so.
It is to be noted that the assessment made included interest amounting to $2,190.21 in addition to the amount of the assessment consented to by the taxpayer, and that he filed a claim in abatement after paying the latter amount. He might well claim that his waiver was based upon the smaller amount and probably did so. I do not place my concurrence on this ground because the amount agreed to was the principal amount assessed and the assessment according to the statute bore interest.
Por the reasons stated, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment.