Court Opinion

ID: 9895584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 19:09:21.24837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:35.289138
License: Public Domain

J-S29040-23

                                   2023 PA Super 228

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TERRY ALLEN PATTERSON                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 376 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-36-CR-0004889-2021

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:                         FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2023

       Appellant, Terry Allen Patterson, appeals from the judgments of

sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County after it

found him guilty of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver,

knowingly possessing a controlled substance, driving under the influence

(DUI), and of violating the Motor Vehicle Code prohibition against driving with

a suspended license for a prior DUI.1 The sole issue on appeal is the trial

court’s ruling that the initial seizure was lawful under the public servant

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(d)(2); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1)(i), respectively.
J-S29040-23

exception to the warrant requirement where appellant’s car partially blocked

the left lane of a limited access highway. After careful review, we affirm.

      The suppression hearing was held on June 13, 2022, with a single

witness, Sergeant Adam Shope, a nine-year veteran of the Northwest Regional

Police Department with specialized training and ample experience in

recognizing when motorists are DUI. Trial Court Opinion, 2. In its written

opinion, the trial court summarized its factual findings with respect to the

initial stop as follows:

      At approximately 8:18 p.m. on November 15, 2021, Sergeant
      Shope was on patrol traveling eastbound on Route 283 when he
      observed vehicles in the left lane merging into the right lane to
      avoid a vehicle stopped on the left shoulder of the highway.
      Sergeant Shope observed a white Nissan Rogue parked on the left
      shoulder of Route 283 East, at mile marker 16.8 (referred to as
      the “Snyder’s Road overpass” at the evidentiary hearing and in
      memoranda), in a sixty-five miles-per-hour speed limited zone.
      The Nissan was parked with its left tires near the edge of the
      highway's asphalt abutting the grass median and with its right
      tires well into the left lane of Route 283 East, blocking a significant
      portion of the lane. In response, Sergeant Shope activated his
      emergency lights, pulled up behind the vehicle, exited his vehicle,
      and approached the driver. Sergeant Shope both attested and
      testified that the basis for his initiating contact with the Defendant
      was to ascertain the Defendant’s well-being and render any
      necessary aid.

Trial Court Opinion, 2 (footnote omitted).

      The Sergeant was not sure whether the car was disabled or why it was

otherwise stopped in traffic. N.T. Suppression 6/13/23, 6, 35. Notably, he

activated his emergency lights for both the safety of the stopped car and

himself. Id. at 6-7. The trial court’s finding that the car blocked “a significant

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portion” of the left travel lane was fully supported by the video evidence

introduced at the suppression hearing:

Exhibit CW#1, In-Car-Video (Front): time 1:10.

      Immediately upon speaking with Appellant, who was in the driver’s seat

alone in the car, Sergeant Shope recognized the blank stare, confusion,

disorientation, and sluggish movements of a person under the influence.

Appellant was unable to answer simple questions, including why he had

parked the car as he had. Sergeant Shope directed him to exit and stand by

the front of the patrol car. The officer ran Appellant’s information, and learned

he was driving with a suspended license from a prior DUI. While continuing to

speak with him, Sergeant Shope made additional observations that supported

his belief Appellant was operating the car while impaired. A second officer

arrived at the scene, and saw a wet cigarette inside the car, which he

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recognized to be consistent with the use of phencyclidine (PCP). Upon a search

of Appellant incident to arrest, Sergeant Shope discovered a large amount of

cash and a baggie containing 11 separate packets of crack cocaine and

another baggie of cocaine powder. A subsequent blood test revealed there

was PCP in Appellant’s system. Trial Court Opinion, 3-4.

       Appellant moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered. He

specifically alleged that the initial detention, when the officer pulled in behind

his stopped car with emergency lights activated, was without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause. In addition to Sergeant Shope’s testimony, video

evidence from the patrol car and body cameras was introduced at the

suppression hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted

Appellant’s request to file a brief. On November 2, 2022, the court denied

suppression, and listed the matter for trial.

       The trial court filed its opinion addressing the suppression claim

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I) on November 7, 2022. It held that Sergeant

Shope initiated a detention when he pulled his patrol car behind Appellant’s

parked car on the highway with the emergency lights activated. It agreed with

appellant that Sergeant Shope neither had probable cause of a Motor Vehicle

Code violation nor reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at that point in

time. Trial Court Opinion, 7.2 Nonetheless, the court ruled that under the
____________________________________________

2 The trial court declined to consider whether Sergeant Shope had probable

cause of a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code prohibition on standing or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine the seizure was

lawful. Relying on Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017),

the trial court held that “Sergeant Shope was able to articulate specific

objective facts that reasonably suggested his assistance was needed to

mitigate peril.” Trial Court Opinion, 11.

       On February 6, 2023, after a colloquy, Appellant waived a jury trial. The

bench trial was conducted by the same judge who ruled on the suppression

____________________________________________

parking a car on “a limited access highway unless authorized by official traffic-
control devices.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3353(a)(2)(vii). It ruled that the
Commonwealth’s reliance on a violation of that section was an “after-the-fact
justification […] for the stop rather than its genesis.” Trial Court Opinion, 7.
Because we have determined that the stop was lawful under the public servant
exception of the community caretaking doctrine, we will not address the
Commonwealth’s argument that probable cause for a Motor Vehicle Code
violation also existed at the moment of seizure (see Brief for Appellee, 15-
18). We note that, in general, probable cause exists where the totality of the
circumstances shows that “the facts and circumstances within the police
officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be
arrested.” Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa. Super. 2012).
The officer’s subjective intent “play[s] no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996). All that matters is that the officer’s conduct was objectively
reasonable, i.e., a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have
believed that he had probable cause. Id. “[T]he fact that the officer does not
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).

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motion. Trial was based on stipulated facts supported by documentary

evidence and incorporated suppression hearing testimony. The trial court

found defendant guilty of the four counts charged. Appellant waived a

presentence investigation and proceeded immediately to sentencing. The

court imposed an aggregate term of two to six years’ imprisonment.3

       Appellant filed a timely appeal.4 In his Rule 1925(b) Statement, he

asserted it was error to deny suppression, “where the stop and seizure of

[Appellant’s] vehicle was not justified under the public servant exception to

the warrant requirement in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal

Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and

therefore, any contraband or items found on his person, property or in the

vehicle searched should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal

seizure.” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement. The trial court issued an order

on April 3, 2023, specifically relying on its previously filed opinion in response

to Appellant’s claim.

       On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we apply the

following standard of review:

____________________________________________

3 The trial court also terminated probation under a separate docket number.

See CP-36-CR-0006650-2019.

4 The notice of appeal contained a typographical error noting two dates (one

of which was correct) for the judgement of sentence. The caption of the appeal
reflects that it is taken from the February 6, 2023 judgment of sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(en banc) (correcting caption when appellant misstates where appeal lies).

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      [We are] limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
      factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
      conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
      Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may
      consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
      the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
      in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression
      court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound
      by those findings and may reverse only if the [suppression] court’s
      legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the
      determination of the suppression court turns on the allegations of
      legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
      binding on the appellate court, ‘whose duty it is to determine if
      the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.’ Thus,
      the conclusions of law of the [suppression court] are subject to
      our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 195 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).

      At the suppression hearing, Appellant challenged only the “stop and

detention” that initiated the confrontation between him and Sergeant Shope,

and declined to otherwise contest the officer’s conduct during the traffic stop

or the probable cause for arrest. N.T. Suppression 6/13/22, 3-4, 12-13. The

trial court recognized in its opinion that Appellant’s suppression claims “focus

solely on his initial stop and detention.” Trial Court Opinion, 4. And, in his

brief, Appellant challenged only the trial court’s application of the public

servant exception to the warrant requirement for the initial stop and

detention. Brief for Appellant, 4. We will, therefore, limit our analysis to the

lawfulness of the initial seizure.

      There was no dispute at the suppression hearing that Sergeant Shope

seized Appellant when he initiated an investigative detention by pulling in

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behind the stopped car with the emergency lights activated. Indeed, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that “a reasonable person, innocent of

any crime, would … interpret the activation of emergency lights on a police

vehicle as a signal that he or she is not free to leave.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d

at 621. It held that even when the citizen’s car was already parked on the

shoulder of a highway, the “Appellant was seized and subjected to an

investigative detention.” Id. At 625; see also Commonwealth v. Gindraw,

297 A.3d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      The question, therefore, is whether the public servant exception of the

community caretaking doctrine justified that seizure. The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court explained that the community caretaking doctrine:

      … has been characterized as encompassing three specific
      exceptions [to the warrant requirement]: the emergency aid
      exception, the automobile/inventory exception, and the public
      servant exception, also sometimes referred to as the public safety
      exception.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 626-627; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 851.

“Each of the exceptions contemplates that the police officer’s actions be

motivated by a desire to render aid or assistance, rather than the investigation

of criminal activity.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 627.

      With respect to the public servant exception under Pennsylvania law,

the Livingstone Court recognized that “the role of police is not limited to the

detection, investigation, and prevention of criminal activity,” in that “officers

engage in a myriad of activities that ensure the safety and welfare of our

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Commonwealth’s citizens.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629; see also

Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 569 (Pa. 2018) (noting the “wide

variety” of community caretaking “laudable endeavors” expected of police

officers relating to the health and safety of the citizenry in applying the

emergency aid exception).

      In recognition of the many different tasks assigned to police officers, the

Livingstone Court adopted a test of “reasonableness” to evaluate the officer’s

motivation under the exception, because “it is not realistic or wise to expect

an officer to ignore the nature of his or her role in law enforcement—or its

inherent dangers—in order for the public servant exception … to apply.”

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637.

      Thus, so long as a police officer is able to point to specific,
      objective, and articulable facts which, standing alone reasonably
      would suggest that his assistance is necessary, a coinciding
      subjective law enforcement concern by the officer will not negate
      the validity of that search under the public servant exception.

Id.; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 853 (“Livingstone specifically rejected

that … an investigation must be ‘totally divorced’ from the detection of criminal

activity”).

      The Court set forth a three-element test for determining when the public

servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community

caretaking doctrine may properly be invoked:

      the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts
      which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that
      assistance was needed; the police action must be independent
      from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal

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      evidence; and, based on a consideration of the surrounding
      circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to
      rendering assistance or mitigating the peril. Once assistance
      has been provided or the peril mitigated, further police action will
      be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (emphasis supplied).

      The trial court applied Livingstone to the facts of this case and found

that all three elements were satisfied. First, it held that the officer “was able

to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggested his

assistance was needed to mitigate peril” because “essentially half” of

Appellant’s car was parked “in the left lane of a limited access highway,”

thereby putting Appellant “at risk of injury or death from a rear end collision.”

Trial Court Opinion, 11. The court noted further that the officer’s observation

of several cars being “forced to change lanes in order to avoid such a collision”

with Appellant’s car supported the officer’s intervention to minimize the peril

presented. Id. Second, it found that the officer’s “actions were independent

from detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence,” based on

the officer’s written reports and credited testimony that his “sole objective in

initiating the traffic stop was to check on the well-being of the occupant, who

was not visible to him until making contact.” Id. Third, the court found that

the “only reasonable and narrowly tailored means available to Sergeant Shope

to render assistance and mitigate peril was to initiate a traffic stop with his

emergency lights activated to ward off other drivers.” Id. (distinguishing this

case from the facts presented in Livingstone).

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      Appellant argues on appeal only that the trial court’s finding with respect

to the first element of the Livingstone test was erroneous. He contends that

the fact that his car “was partially in the left lane of travel of the two[-]lane

road was not sufficient by itself to justify the seizure.” Brief for Appellant, 18

(emphasis in original). According to Appellant, in light of the officer’s stated

aim to check “on the welfare of the motorist when he pulled in behind

[Appellant’s car,]” the officer “was unable to articulate thereafter any specific

and objective facts what would reasonably suggest that [Appellant] was in

need of assistance at the time of the seizure.” Brief for Appellant, 17.

      We have no difficulty concluding, as did the trial court, that any

reasonable officer would believe her assistance is needed upon finding a car

stopped and blocking the left travel lane of a high-speed portion of a limited

access highway. These are “specific and articulable facts which, viewed

objectively and independent of any law enforcement concerns” fully

support the public servant exception. Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 636

(emphasis supplied). Indeed, absent extraordinary reasons, it would have

been a dereliction of duty for a police officer to ignore such an apparent and

immediate safety hazard on a highway. It also was reasonable to assume that

either the car or motorist was in distress from the fact that the car was stopped

in such a precarious position.

      Appellant’s argument focuses exclusively on his own supposed need for

caretaking. It skips over what is obvious. The stopped car, fully half of which

was in the left lane of a highway in a 65 mile-per-hour speed zone and blocking

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a “significant portion” (at least a third) of that lane, thereby forcing other cars

to move from the left to the right lane to avoid a collision, was the peril the

officer needed to address. That peril, and the risk of serious accident and

injury presented, was to the other motorists on the highway as much as it was

to the motorist of the stopped car. By pulling in behind the car stopped in the

driving lane of the highway and activating his emergency lights for the “safety”

of the stopped car and himself “because [they] were pretty much blocking the

left lane of travel,” N.T. Suppression, 6/13/22, 6-7, the officer manifested his

duty to “ensure the safety and welfare of our Commonwealth’s citizens.”

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 849 (noting

that, even where the stopped car is “legally parked on the shoulder of the

roadway,” the activation of emergency lights serves the purpose of “providing

greater visibility to both the Troopers and the vehicle they were pulling behind

… [and] also signal to other vehicles in the surrounding area to either slow

down or move over”).

      This concern for the safety of other motorists on a highway, in addition

to the motorist of the stopped car, is encompassed within the community

caretaking doctrine. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-448

(1973) (adopting community caretaking doctrine and ruling that police

“concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an

intruder removed a revolver from the trunk” of a car that had been in single

car accident warranted entry into the trunk); State v. McCormick, 494

S.W.3d 673, 687 (Tenn. 2016) (quoted in Livingstone: community

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caretaking encompasses “the possibility of a person in need of assistance or

the existence of a potential threat to public safety”); Ullom v. Miller, 705

S.E.2d 111, 121 (W.Va. 2010) (cited in Livingstone: community caretaking

“encompasses a non-investigatory, non-criminal role of police officers to help

to ensure the safety and welfare of our citizens”);Williams v. State, 962 A.2d

210, 217 (Del. 2008) (cited in Livingstone: community caretaking doctrine

“permits police officers to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in

peril”).

      Appellant relies on the particular circumstances of Livingstone and an

unpublished memorandum of this Court to provide a laundry list of factors not

present here, which he argues undermines the trial court’s conclusion there

was a need for action by the officer: no inclement weather; no signs of

accident; no indication that the car was not parked as close as practicable to

the grass of the median; no hazard lights activated; and no calls or complaints

about a car in need of assistance or “disrupting the flow of traffic.” Brief for

Appellant, 17-18. Appellant’s argument challenges only the weight given by

the trial court to salient factors. Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 852; see also

Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 2021 WL 3702577, *5 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-

precedential decision) (“The crux of Appellant’s argument . . . that there were

no objective facts indicating she was in need of assistance . . . goes to the

weight of the evidence presented”). As such, it is contrary to the standard of

review obligating this Court to consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence

and so much of the defense evidence that remains uncontradicted.

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Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 619. “[I]t is within the suppression court’s sole

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given to their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d

1117, 1123 & 1126 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (deferring to suppression

court’s weighing of testimony given on direct- and cross-examination).

      In Livingstone, the Supreme Court found the circumstances presented

were insufficient to warrant an intrusion under the public servant exception:

a car “pulled over onto the right shoulder of the road; the engine running, but

hazard lights not activated” on an interstate highway. Livingstone, 174 A.3d

at 614. Although not stated by the Court, it is a fair inference that the car

“pulled over onto the right shoulder” was not blocking traffic. These

observations by the state trooper did not rise to “specific and objective facts

that would reasonably suggest that Appellant needed assistance.” Id. at 638.

Similarly, we have ruled that a trooper’s observation of a car “legally parked

on the shoulder” where “the driver appeared to be looking at her phone or

digging through her purse and was slumped over towards the passenger seat”

was insufficient to warrant an intrusion. Commonwealth v. Savino, 2021

WL 4171450, *1 & *6 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision). In both

cases, the cars were safely stopped on the side of a highway, engine running

– indicating the stop could be temporary – and with no other sign of distress.

In direct contrast, Appellant’s car was not safely stopped, and, instead, was

blocking a significant portion of the left lane of a highway in a 65 mile-per-

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hour zone. The salient factor here, not present in either Livingstone or

Savino, was that the stopped car presented a real hazard to other drivers.

      As the Supreme Court observed:

      there are many reasons why a driver might pull to the side of a
      highway: the driver may need to look at a map, answer or make
      a telephone call, send a text message, pick something up off the
      floor, clean up a spill, locate something in her purse or in his
      wallet, retrieve something from the glove compartment, attend to
      someone in the back seat, or, . . . enter an address into the
      vehicle’s navigation system.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634-35 (footnote omitted). We agree that “pulling

to the side of the road to perform any of these activities is encouraged, as a

momentary     distraction   while   driving   may    result   in   catastrophic

consequences,” when the car is safely pulled over and out of the way of traffic.

Id. However, we can think of no reason, and Appellant has offered none, that

should give a reasonable officer a moment’s hesitation to stop and investigate

why this car was blocking the left travel lane.

      By weighing the testimony elicited on cross-examination in isolation of

the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s argument both violates the

standard of review and fails to give any weight to the peril presented by his

stopped car. Certainly, there is nothing in Livingstone that requires the

existence of activated hazard lights, inclement weather or the like to warrant

an intrusion under the public servant exception. The question to be answered

is not whether specific circumstances were present but whether the officer can

“point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably

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suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance.”

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634. Rote reliance on a check list would undermine

the Supreme Court’s stated belief that “[r]equiring an officer to articulate

specific and objective facts … will cabin reliance on the exception and enable

courts to properly assess its employment.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 635. As

the Supreme Court recognized the public servant exception could arise in a

“myriad of [police] activities” and not just those limited to a few factors. Id.

at 629.

      Examining    the   specific    factors    cited   by   Appellant,   moreover,

demonstrates that each must be reviewed within the totality of the

circumstances to be properly weighed. For example, Appellant cites the lack

of calls or complaints about a car disrupting traffic. But no calls were needed

for the officer to reasonably assess the situation here, because he personally

saw that the stopped car was “disrupting the flow of traffic” from the fact that

several cars had to move from the left lane to the right to safely pass by it.

The presence of inclement weather may be significant in certain situations,

particularly where an officer’s concern includes the possibility of a prior

accident or of a motorist seeking help by wandering away from the car, but,

here, the officer’s reasonable concern was directed at a future accident.

Inclement weather might make that concern even greater, but the lack of it

did not render the situation safe.

      We agree that activated hazard lights in many circumstances would

support an officer’s belief that a citizen required assistance (and likely

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welcomed it). See Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 853 (“the presence of Gindraw’s

vehicle on the side of the road after midnight in a dark area with its hazard

lights flashing provided the experienced trooper with specific, objective, and

articulable facts to suggest he might require assistance”). The absence of

activated hazard lights should not automatically preclude application of the

public servant exception where other signs of distress are present. Similarly,

the fact that Appellant’s car was stopped on a narrow shoulder, seemingly

parallel to, and “as close as possible to the median,” Brief for Appellant, 18,

might indicate that the motorist possessed all of his faculties when he stopped

his car on a highway, but certainly was outweighed (and undermined) by the

fact that the car “was blocking a significant portion of” the driving lane. Trial

Court Opinion, 2.

      We therefore agree with the trial court that Sergeant Shope “was able

to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggested his

assistance was needed to mitigate peril.” Trial Court Opinion, 11. The record

amply supports the trial court’s finding that the first element of the

Livingstone test for the public servant exception was satisfied.

      Appellant has not challenged the trial court’s rulings with respect to the

remaining two elements. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and find

the trial court’s rulings are supported by the record evidence at the

suppression hearing. As Sergeant Shope testified, and the trial court found,

his actions were motivated by concern for the motorist and the peril presented

by the stopped car blocking the travel lane, which “were independent from

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detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence” and “would have

been a dereliction of duty” for him to ignore. Trial Court Opinion, 11. Finally,

Sergeant Shope’s interaction with Appellant constituted a minimal intrusion,

as it was limited to an approach to the driver’s side window to inquire on

Appellant’s reasons for having parked the car as he had.5 There was no show

of force by the officer, and the initial confrontation was brief, approximately a

minute, and a proper way to confirm whether assistance was needed to move

the car out of the way of traffic. Trial Court Opinion, 11. This level of

interaction was “commensurate with the perceived need for assistance.”

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637; Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 854 (where car was

stopped on shoulder of road and not blocking travel, the “intrusion was

minimal” because it was short and not conducted for the purpose of detecting

crime).

       Appellant did not contest that the officer acquired reasonable suspicion

and then probable cause of DUI after the initial confrontation. See

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (“Once assistance has been provided or the

peril mitigated, further police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence”). Accordingly, we affirm the order denying
____________________________________________

5 Sergeant Shope testified that when he first made contact with Appellant, he

tried “to ask some information about his trip, what was going on, things like
that. [Appellant] was very dazed and confused, seemed very disoriented. I
had a very tough time getting simple answers from him.” N.T. Suppression
6/13/22, 8-9. Appellant did not provide an answer to the officer’s inquiries
with respect to his welfare or why he had stopped his car “where he did” and
his movements were “very sluggish.” Officer Shope believed at that time that
Appellant “was showing clues of impairment.” Id., 9.

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suppression of physical evidence following Sergeant Shope’s investigative

detention of Appellant.

      Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2023

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