Court Opinion

ID: 9421789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:59:52.007714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:32.426489
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Whittaker, and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
dissenting.
The Government’s primary contention in this case is that an offer to a Congressman to make contributions of *264money to his political party is an offer of a “thing of value” to that Congressman within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 214. The Court, in ignoring this contention, appears to believe that it is not supportable. The Court holds, however, that the information here involved nevertheless states an offense under § 214 on either of two theories, (1) that the offer alleged is an offer of money to Congressman Stauffer (a theory not even advanced by the Government), or (2) that the Republican Party is a “person” within the meaning of § 214, and that the offer alleged is an offer of money to that “person.” In light of the history of § 214, and with proper regard for the principle that an .Essentially ambiguous criminal statute is to be strictly construed, I óannot agree that this information states an offense under § 214.
Dealing with the Government’s principal contention, which the Court by-passes,'the information does not charge that Congressman Stauffer would have received any direct, tangible benefit from the payment of money to the Republican Party. The initial problem, therefore, is to decide whether the term “thing of value” is sufficiently broad- to embrace any act which might constitute an inducement to the person to whom the offer to do the act is made. The history of the statute of which § 214 was passed as a part sheds clarifying light on this problem.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 214 was originally enacted as § 1 of a statute (44 Stat. 918) designed to “punish the purchase and sale of public offices.” See H. R. Rep. No. .1366, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 2 of that statute read on .the “seller” -of influence as opposed to the “purchaser,” and in the 1948 codification became what is now the first paragraph of 18 U. S. C. § 215.1 As originally enacted § 2 provided:
“It shall be unlawful to solicit or receive from anyone whatsoever, either as a political contribution, *265or for personal emolument, any sum of money or thing of value, whatsoever, in consideration of the promise of support, or use of influence, or for the support or influence of the payee, in behalf of the person paying the money, or any other person, in obtaining any appointive office under the Government of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
1 think it plain that this language would not have reached one who solicited, in consideration of the promise of his influence, a general political contribution of money to be paid directly to his party. Under such circumstances the political party would be the “payee” of the money, but it would be the influence of the solicitor, as opposed to that of the party, which was promised. And although the payment of money to the solicitor’s party might well be “valuable” to him in' the sense that it would induce him to exert influence, the use of the word “payee,” an extremely unconventional term to describe the recipient of indefinite and intangible benefits which might flow from the paymént of money to another, shows that it was not contemplated that such an indirect inducement should be considered a “thing of value” in the statutory sense.
Confirmation for this view is found in a letter of Attorney General Clark written to the Senate on. February-19, 1946, in connection with an amendment to 44- Stat. 918 proposed to deal with the solicitation of fees by private employment agencies for referring persons to federal employment openings. In contrasting the language of the proposed amendment with that of § 2 of 44 Stat. 918 the Attorney General was of the opinion that the solicitation provisions of the existing statute reached only the solicitation of political contributions or emoluments “on behalf of. the solicitor’himself.”2
*266This proposed amendment was enacted into law in 1951. 65 Stat. 320. Its effect was merely to add to present § 215 what is now the second paragraph of that section.3 The amendment did not disturb the first paragraph of § 215, whieh alone is relevant in the “use of influence” context, and which, as it had formerly stood in 44 Stat. 918, had been construed by the Attorney General as already indicated.
In the 1948 codification the Revisers, in carrying over into § 215 of thé present Code § 2 of 44 Stat. 918, omitted the language which had expréssly restricted its scope to a situation where the influence of the “payee” is promised.4 But it is apparent that this omission was not *267intended to work a substantive change in the statute.5 Under these circumstances the solicitation provisions .of present § 215 must be read in the light of their history, and so read- they require the conclusion that their impact is restricted to “the solicitation or receipt of compensation ... on behalf of the solicitor himself.” 6
Given this conclusion, I turn once more to § 214, the provision directly involved in this, case. The Government has strongly urged, in an effort to avoid the District Court’s holding that the specific mention of “political contribution” in § 215 implied its exclusion from the term “thing of value” in § 214, that the two sections are plainly reciprocal and must be construed in pari materia. I agree. There is not the slightest indication in the sparse legislative history that Congress intended- that the “purchase” and “sale” provisions of the statute should have different scope, nor has any reason which would reasonably' support a difference in scope been suggested to us.7 I *268cannot believe that Congress intended that although a Congressman soliciting the. kind of party contribution charged in this information in return for his influence would not be covered under § 215 (as the Court appears to concede is so), nevertheless the individual from whom the contribution ;was solicited would, by promising to make it, become guilty of a crime against the United States under § 214 (as the Court now holds). For surely Congress could not have been less eager to reach corruption on the part of government officials than attempts by individuals to take advantage of that corruption. It follows that just as the solicitation of political contributions to be paid directly to a party treasury in return for the promise,of the solicitor’s influence is not interdicted by § 215, the converse of that situation, the offering to a Congressman of a contribution payable directly to his party’s treasury, in return for the promise of his influence, is not reached by § 214.8
Given these considerations, even if the Court were right in holding that the conduct here alleged is an offer of money to Congressman Stauffer I would think it wrong in going on to decide that the information states an offense under § 214. Entirely apart from the statutory history, however, I think it a remarkable construction of the language of § 214 to find that an offer to X to pay money to Y, with whom X is ndt claimed to have any *269financial relationship, is an offer of money to X. Under these circumstances there is an offer to X, but it is plainly an offer to perform an act (pay money to Y) rather than an offer of money to X. The statute does not say that any offer to a person involving money is rendered criminal if the other statutory criteria are met, but only that an offer of money to a person may be.
My reading of the statute makes it unnecessary to decide whether, as the Government further contends and the Court holds, the Republican Party is a “person” within the meaning of § 214, although I would have considerable difficulty in holding that what is characterized by the Court as an “amorphous group of individuals” fits within, this term, particularly when Congress saw fit explicitly to add references to “firm” and “corporation” to secure the inclusion of these entities.9 I think that the use of the words “of the payee” in what is now § 215 merely made explicit what was intended to be implicit in § 214 — that the “influence” sought must be that of the “person, firm, or corporation” to whom any money or thing of value is promised or paid.10 And although the information does not charge in terms that it was the influence of Congressman Stauffer, as opposed to that of the Republican Party, which was sought by appellee, it is clear from the brief and argument of the Government in this Court that it stands on the former construction of the information.
It is of course true, as. the Government argues, that relatively indirect and subtle inducements may contain the seeds of the same mischief as the crudest bribery. But “it would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the prin*270ciple, that a case which is within the reason or mischief. of a statute; is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 96. In light of the considerations discussed above it cannot be said that Congress in 18 U. S. C. § 214 has unequivocally seen fit to outlaw conduct of the kind charged in this information.11 The most that can be said' in favor of the'Government’s position is that the statute is highly ambiguous in the respect involved here, and this in any event should require rejection of the Government’s position under principles discussed in Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81. I would affirm.

 See Note 4, infra.

 The Attorney^ General • wrote: “Further, under the proposed' language, the solicitation or receipt of compensation, either on behalf of- the solicitor ór another, would be prohibited, whereas the existing *266law merely prohibits the solicitation or receipt, of compensation, either as a political contribution or personal emolument on behalf of the solicitor himself(Emphasis added.)
The Attorney General’s letter first appears in S. Rep. No. 1036, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., and was carried over into a series of Senate Reports on bills embodying the proposed amendment. S.'Rep. No. 2, 80th 'Cong'., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 7, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 3, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.

 That paragraph provides:
“Whoever solicits or receives any thing of value in consideration of aiding a person to obtain employment under the United States either by referring his name to an executive department or agency of the United States or by requiring the payment of a fee because such person has secured such employment shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. This section shall not apply to such services rendered by an employment agency pursuant'to the written request of an executive department or agency of the United States.” /

 The relevant portion of *18 U. S. C. §215‘reads:
“Whoever" solicits or receives, either as a political contribution, or for personal emolument, any money or thing of value, in consideration of the promise of support or use of inflüence in obtaining for any person any appointive office or place under the United States, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than'one year, or both.”

 The Reviser’s Note refers expressly to other substantive changes made in .the section at the timé of codification, and appears to class the omission of the “payee” language under “changes in style.”
It is also noteworthy that the Senate Report on the bill which became the “employment agency” amendment to §215 in the 82d Congress, three years after the codification of Title 18, contained the letter of the Attorney Geheral construing the precodification language with no suggestion that the meaning of that language had been altered by the changes made at the time of codification. See S. Rep. No. 3, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.

 See Note 2, supra.

 That the two provisions are reciprocal is further shown by the fact that the same substantive and stylistic changes were made ip both of thepi in 1948, the Reviser’s Note under § 215 merely incorporating that under § 214 by reference.
It is argued that this conclusion is controverted by the circumstance, that on the same day as 44 Stat. 918 was introduced, another bill, also 44 Stat. 918 (now 5 U. S. C. §21a), was also introduced requiring those appointed to public office under the United States to file affidavits that they had not paid any consideration to anyone in the *268expectation of receiving appointment, and that the two bills were described as “correlative.” There is no reason to take the word “correlative” to imply an identity of scope between the two bills, since the word equally well bears the interpretation that 5 U. S. C. § 21a was inteñded to be merely supplementary to the criminal provisions of §§ 214 and 215. Indeed, it is on its face broader than § 214 in its reference to mere “assistance” as opposed to “influence.”

 This is not, of course, to suggest that an offer of a “political contribution” to a Congressman’s personal campaign fund in return for his promise of influence would be without the scope of § 214, or that'the solicitation of such a contribution would not fall within § 215.

 Ail of the cases cited by the. Court in this connection involve clearly defined entities — not “amorphous” groups.

 It is apparent that the Revisers believed that the omission of the words “of the payee” in the recodification of 44 Stat. 918 added nothing to the meaning of § 215. See p. 266, supra.

 The Court derives support for its holding from various statements concerning official corruption in office selling made on the floor of the House of Representatives some two years before the passage of the bill which is now §§ 214 and 215. Since these statements were directed exclusively to revelations of corruption on the part of sellers of influence and the Court appears to concede that the seller of influence is not covered by § 215 unless he is a “payee,” it is difficult to see how these statements can be utilized to support a broader reading of §214.