Court Opinion

ID: 9522073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:31.130851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:15.786405
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the Commission’s decision to discharge plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that her discharge constituted an improper double sanction and cites Burton v. Civil Service Comm’n (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 522, and Messina v. City of Chicago (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 549, as authority. I find these cases to be directly on point. In Burton, a civil service employee received a 10-day suspension for accepting a $20 “gratuity” from a taxpayer. Before returning to work, plaintiff was notified of his further suspension pending discharge for the same conduct; subsequently, he was discharged. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and stated the following: “State personnel rules provide separately for suspensions totaling less than 30 days in a 12-month period, for suspensions totaling more than 30 days in a 12-month period, and for suspensions pending decision on discharge. *** The three are distinct disciplinary actions which are not interchangeable.” Burton, 76 Ill. 2d at 526. In Messina, plaintiff, an employee of the City of Chicago, was suspended for knowingly permitting a lewd aiid racial insult about his supervisor to remain scrawled in fresh cement. For this same conduct, he was subsequently terminated. The Messina court, relying on the teachings of Burton, found that Rule IX, section 3 of the personnel rules of the City of Chicago authorized suspension and discharge as separate sanctions, but did not authorize both sanctions in combination as a disciplinary measure. (Messina v. City of Chicago (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 549, 555.) The court reasoned that “[ejmployees are entitled to know when their liability for misconduct has ended, so that they may go about their normal business and plan their affairs secure in the knowledge that they will retain their employment after paying the penalty exacted by their superiors. This permits them to direct their energies towards reconciliation with the employer.” Messina, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 556. I believe the principles articulated in Burton and Messina are applicable to the instant case. The majority opinion mistakenly asserts that these cases are factually dissimilar from the present case. They claim that the basis for the suspension and the suspension pending discharge involved a course of conduct which has some common acts as well as different acts. Such is not an accurate recitation of the facts. The facts show that plaintiff was placed on a five-day suspension on May 9, 1983. On May 14, 1983, she was notified that her suspension was extended pending discharge for “continued insubordination.” Thereafter she was discharged on June 6, 1983. According to the majority opinion, her initial suspension was based on misconduct from April 18 through April 26, 1983, and her subsequent discharge was allegedly for misconduct from April 27 through May 6. Defendants have arbitrarily divided the time period of misconduct in order to justify plaintiff’s discharge. In essence, defendants’ reasons for suspension pending discharge and her dismissal are merely a more detailed reiteration of the reasons for the initial suspension. Plaintiff was never allowed to return to work after her initial suspension; therefore, she was never afforded the opportunity to correct her prior misconduct. Indeed, she could not have engaged in any new act or acts of misconduct between the time of her suspension and her suspension pending discharge to justify her dismissal. (Messina v. City of Chicago (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 549, 556.) I would reverse the Commission’s decision.