Court Opinion

ID: 9644739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:03:34.069032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:17.587546
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant Norma Lopez files her motion for rehearing complaining of error in our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence, as well as our failure to address her claim in her second poinij, of error that the State did not rebut statutory defenses.
In our discussion of appellant’s first point of error attacking the evidentiary sufficiency, we stated that the sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the language of the court’s charge to the jury. However, in our opinion, we erroneously quoted language from the State’s indictment. The charge reads as follows:
Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant, Norma Lopez, on or about September 21, 1989, in Hidalgo County, Texas, did then and there with the intent to obtain an enconomie [sic] benefit for herself, said benefit being money or employment, did solicit employment for Mauro Reyna, III, by communicating in person with Maria De La Paz Martinez to allow Mauro Reyna, III, to prosecute a suit or collect a claim for Maria De La Paz Martinez against Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Company as a result of the Mission Consolidated Independent School District bus collision with the Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Company motor vehicle that occurred on September 21, 1989, you will find the Defendant “guilty” of barratry, but if you do not believe beyond a reasonable doubt, or if *97you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the Defendant and say by your verdict “not guilty.”
As we discussed in response to appellant’s point five, the difference in language between the charge and the indictment merely made the State’s burden more onerous. Appellant plead to the indictment without objection. The difference in the language does not affect our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence.
Appellant also complains of a misrepresentation of fact. In our original opinion we stated that “appellant told Martinez that the court would possibly appoint an attorney for her daughter and that they would take away her rights.” Upon reexamining the record, we agree that the testimony was taken out of context and the statement is not necessarily attributable to appellant. This adjustment in the facts in no way alters our determination that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
Appellant further contends that we did not address her claim that the State failed to negate defenses to the barratry offense found in § 38.01 of the Penal Code. See point two, supra. Appellant took the position on original submission that the language of § 38.01 constituted exceptions which the State was required to negate in the indictment. In her brief, appellant only generally mentioned that the exceptions could also have been defenses. She supplied no argument or authority on this contention. As such, it was waived. Tex. R.App.P. 74(d).
With these clarifications added to our original opinion, we overruled appellant’s motion for rehearing.