Court Opinion

ID: 9591334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:03:41.102467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:09.820009
License: Public Domain

*499Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part) — I concur in the majority opinion except with regards to the definition of the "abuse of the writ" concept adopted by the majority. I disagree with the rule adopted by the majority, at page 492, which creates a per se rule that the advancing of new issues in successive petitions constitutes an abuse of the personal restraint process.
The majority holds:
that, if the petitioner was represented by counsel throughout postconviction proceedings, it is an abuse of the writ for him or her to raise, in a successive petition, a new issue that was "available but not relied upon in a prior petition". Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
Majority, at 492. The majority's definition of the abusive writ category supports its dismissal of five "new" issues raised by petitioner. Majority at 492-95.
The majority incorrectly and unnecessarily expands the concept of "abuse of the writ," and does so by relying on unclear and nonbinding16 federal case law. The federal cases relied upon by the majority do not define "abuse of process" as expansively as does the majority. Nor have the federal courts clearly or consistently explained the abusive writ concept, making reliance on the federal approach premature.
To support its adoption of a "per se" rule, the majority cites Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986), but fails to note that the section of the opinion upon which it relies was concurred in by only four Supreme Court Justices. The Eleventh Circuit recently noted that the Kuhlmann plurality was not binding and did not control preexisting law. Martin v. Dugger, 891 F.2d 807, 809 (11th Cir. 1989). Explaining generally the effect of plurality opinions, the Supreme Court has said "[w]hen a *500fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977).
Closer examination of federal cases further exposes the majority's error. The federal courts distinguish between "successive" applications for postconviction relief, which are dismissed because they are based on grounds previously heard and determined,17 and petitions raising new issues or issues not previously decided on their merits, which may be dismissed only upon a showing that the applicant for relief is abusing the writ. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148, 83 S. Ct. 1068 (1963).
In Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit, relying on Sanders to explain dismissal of a petition on the ground that it abused the writ, said:
A federal court need not consider habeas claims previously unlitigated in federal court if it determines that the petitioner (1) made a conscious decision deliberately to withhold them from a prior petition, (2) is pursuing needless piecemeal litigation, or (3) has raised the claims only to vex, harass, or delay. . . . Where there is no affirmative indication in the record that the petitioner made a conscious decision deliberately to withhold his claim, proceed by piecemeal litigation, to vex or harass or annoy the court or the state, a second petition raising a new claim is not an abuse of the writ.
(Citations omitted.) Hamilton, at 1473.
Sanders made clear an applicant's conduct may disentitle him to the relief he seeks because dismissal of a writ as abusive is based upon equitable principles. Sanders, at 17. Thus, an applicant's deliberate withholding of grounds when he files his first application for relief and his deliberate abandonment of a ground at an earlier hearing are examples of conduct disentitling an applicant to relief. *501Sanders, at 18. This is because "[n]othing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay." Sanders, at 18.
Unfortunately, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices have not agreed as to any further clarification of the abusive writ concept recognized in Sanders. On several occasions some of the Justices have inferred that dismissal on the basis of abuse of the writ does not require any showing of deliberate misconduct. See, e.g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 379 n.3, 78 L. Ed. 2d 541, 104 S. Ct. 752 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (despite the fact that there was no affirmative evidence in the record showing deliberate withholding, when a petitioner did not offer any explanation for having failed to raise new claims in a prior petition and he had counsel throughout his case, the petition constituted an abuse of the writ). But see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (Powell, J., plurality) (Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b)'s "abuse of the writ" standard supported dismissal of a second writ raising new issues when "a prisoner . . . decides to proceed [in his first habeas corpus writ] only with his exhausted claims and deliberately sets aside his unexhausted claims").
Most recently, "abuse of the writ” was referenced, again by a plurality, in a footnote of Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986). There, Justice Powell, citing Sanders, said, "where a prisoner files a petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, . . . the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that the prisoner has abused the writ." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra at 444 n.6.
Other Justices maintain that continued adherence to Sanders requires a showing of deliberate misconduct for a petition to be dismissed as abusive. For example, in Rose v. Lundy, supra, after reviewing the legislative history of the *502rule and focusing on Sanders, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, said:
. . . Sanders made it crystal clear that dismissal for "abuse of the writ" is only appropriate when a prisoner was free to include all of his claims in his first petition, but knowingly and deliberately chose not to do so in order to get more than "one bite at the apple." The plurality's interpretation obviously would allow dismissal in a much broader class of cases than Sanders permits.
Rose, at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Likewise, in Woodard v. Hutchins, supra at 383, Justices White and Stevens rejected any rule that would make a second habeas corpus petition a "per se" abuse of the writ.
Here, the majority concludes that the petitioner abuses the personal restraint process merely because he relies on issues that were available, but not raised, earlier. As noted this characterization of the concept of abuse of process is, at most, supported only by a plurality of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. A reading of the Kuhlmann plurality as standing for the proposition that raising a new issue in a subsequent petition automatically abuses the writ is certainly not the narrowest reading of the Court's holding, and, as the Court has not overruled Sanders, it is more appropriate to follow the Sanders explanation of the abusive writ and require a showing of deliberate misconduct before determining that a petitioner is abusing the writ.
The ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies also support this approach. The Standards demand, at the very least, some evidence of deliberate misconduct before a petition is dismissed as an abuse of process.
The Advisory Committee recommends generally that no such claim should be denied for failure to present it at a prior time unless the withholding of the claim is so serious as to amount to abuse of process by the applicant. . . . Deliberate and wilful trifling with the courts by inexcusable fragmentation of litigation need not be tolerated. In finding any claim unmeritorious on the ground of abuse of process, a court should be confident that the previous omission was intentional and inexcusable.
*503ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies, Std. 2.1, Commentary at 35-36 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Denial of relief to applicants on the basis of abuse of the remedy ought to be cautiously adjudicated. The recommended limitation is an affirmative defense, to be pleaded and proved by the state. Since the doctrine is equitable in nature, the courts ought to have discretion to determine, once the facts have been fully developed, whether the gravity of any abuse established is sufficient to justify deprivation of a remedy.
ABA Standards Relating to Post — Conviction Remedies, Std. 2.4, Commentary at 48 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Recently enacted RCW 10.73.140 provides a standard for consideration of subsequent personal restraint petitions. The statute requires a petitioner who files a subsequent petition raising a new issue to demonstrate good cause why the grounds were not raised previously. While not applicable here,18 the Legislature has directed inquiry into the reason why a petitioner failed to raise an issue previously. Thus, the Legislature did not intend to bar subsequent petitions by way of an automatic per se rule such as the one adopted by the majority.
Missing from the majority's definition of an abuse of the postconviction process is any reference to deliberate or willful misconduct on the part of petitioner. The majority has eliminated any .inquiry into the reason why petitioner did not earlier advance his five "new" issues. This completely disregards the underlying justification, recognized in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148, 83 S. Ct. 1068 (1963), Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989), the ABA Standards, and recent Washington legislation, for dismissing the application for relief on the grounds of abuse of process, i.e., the principle that misconduct on the part of a petitioner disentitles him to equitable relief.
I would hold that when determining whether a personal restraint petition is an abusive petition, inquiry must be made as to the reasons why an issue was not raised earlier, *504and dismissal requires a showing that the petitioner deliberately or intentionally proceeded by piecemeal litigation for the purpose of vexing, harassing, or annoying the court or the state.
Utter and Dolliver, JJ., concur in that portion of Justice Brachtenbach's opinion which discusses the "abuse of writ" concept.

Although reliance on interpretations of similar federal postconviction relief rules is appropriate in certain instances, e.g., In re Haverty, 101 Wn.2d 498, 503, 681 P.2d 835 (1984), those federal principles are certainly not binding on this court. See In re Mercer, 108 Wn.2d 714, 719, 741 P.2d 559 (1987).

RAP 16.4(d) regulates petitions raising grounds previously heard and determined. See In re Haverty, 101 Wn.2d at 501-03.

This legislation was not effective when petitioner filed this petition.