Court Opinion

ID: 9684852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:16:39.41679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:00.556360
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the expiration of a retired judge’s assignment does not render a conviction void. However, the majority also holds that a defendant may preserve error by objecting pretrial to a procedural irregularity in the assignment of a trial judge who is otherwise qualified.1 I disagree.
In Miller v. State, 866 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), we explained that a party may preserve error concerning the challenge to the authority of a special judge by objecting at trial. We distinguished special judges from duly-elected or retired judges, however, saying that:
Quo warranto is ... the only means to challenge the authority of a duly-elected district judge or an appointed retired district judge, (citations omitted.) However, special judges, unlike duly-elected judges or retired judges, are not office holders subject to quo warranto. A duly-elected judge or a retired judge is a judge in his or her own right.
Thus, although the authority of a special judge was at issue in Miller, the clear implication is that an objection is not sufficient when a party wishes to challenge the authority of a duly-elected or retired judge.
We have also stated that, “in matters which concern the public, the officer’s title to his office (he being in the exercise of its duties) cannot be questioned unless in a direct proceeding having for its object the contestation of his right to hold office.” Snow v. State, 134 Tex.Crim. 263, 114 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.Crim.App.1938) (opinion on rehearing). An attack on the judge’s authority at the trial of a case over which he is presiding is considered a collateral attack, which is not permitted. See, Archer v. State, 607 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), cert. denied 452 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 3037, 69 L.Ed.2d 410 (1981). As this case involves the assignment of a retired judge rather than a special judge, an objection would not have preserved error.
The only recognized method for attacking the validity of a retired judge’s assignment is a quo warranto proceeding. It is true that the defendant cannot file a quo warranto proceeding, and therefore, cannot effectively challenge the trial judge’s authority. However, the courts have recognized that some types of error or misconduct cannot be remedied in a defendant’s criminal trial but must be remedied through other means. House v. State, 947 S.W.2d 251, 252-253 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(disciplinary proceeding before the State Bar is the only method for remedying disciplinary rule violations); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 346, 104 S.Ct. 3093, 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984)(no remedy for criminal defendant for discrimination in selection of grand jury foreman where discrimination did not affect the composition of the grand jury and foreman’s duties were only ministerial); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct, 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995)(ex-clusionary rule does not require suppression of fruits of arrest on warrant that had been quashed where court employees failed to notify law enforcement that warrant had been quashed).
Just such a situation is presented here. As long as the judge presiding over a case is a judge in his own right, a defendant suffers no actual harm merely because the judge is not entitled to act as a judge in that particular ease. The State of Texas is the party harmed when a person acts as one of its officers without authority. A criminal defen*382dant simply has no standing to challenge a judge’s qualifications. See Snow, 114 S.W.2d at 901.
An official who holds office under color of title (such as an elected or retired judge) is considered to be a de facto official, even if all of the legal requirements for holding the office have not been met. See Id. The reason for conferring defacto status is to protect the public and individuals who have dealings with the official by ensuring that the official’s acts will subsequently be recognized. Id. 900. Hence, “[a] judge de facto is a judge de jure as to all parties except the state, and his official acts, before he is ousted from office, are binding on third persons and the public.” Id. at 901 (quoting 33 C.J. pp. 932 and 933).
An elected or retired judge does not preside merely for a particular defendant’s case. That judge acts in a large number of eases. Parties should be entitled to rely upon the actions of the judge until such time as he vacates or is removed from office.
The holding of the majority opinion raises questions regarding related issues. A judge is sometimes involved in proceedings in which a defendant would have no opportunity to lodge an objection. For example, a judge may issue a search or arrest warrant. If traditional objection requirements were followed, a defendant could raise that objection at trial even though the trial judge then has no effective opportunity to cure the error. Law enforcement officials relying upon that judge’s warrant would be blindsided as a result, and the statutory good faith exception might not prevent suppression of the fruits of the search because the judge might not be considered a “magistrate” under the exception if he is not a qualified judge. See Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 38.23(b)(exception applies to warrants issued by magistrates) and 2.09 (definition of magistrate).
Holding that an objection preserves a complaint in these circumstances is contrary to the entire body of civil caselaw on the subject. And, there is something odd about the idea of allowing a challenge to a judge’s authority by means of an objection made to that same judge. If the court has no authority to act, then it has no authority to rule— up or down — on the objection. So, another reason to maintain the status quo regarding quo warranto is that it brings the issue before a tribunal that is authorized to rule.
The quo warranto requirement serves a legitimate purpose: it ensures that a judge’s acts will be recognized regardless of any later challenges to the judge’s authority so that parties and the public will be able to rely with confidence upon judicial actions. Otherwise, “intolerable confusion would inevitably result.” Snow, 114 S.W.2d at 901 (quoting State v. Bednar, 18 N.D. 484, 121 N.W. 614, 615). And the quo warranto requirement recognizes that only the State of Texas (or someone asserting title to the same office held by the judge) has standing to challenge a judge’s authority and that such authority must be challenged in a suit filed for that purpose. With these remarks, I concur in the Court’s judgment.

. Since appellant did not object pretrial, we could have resolved this case without addressing the question of whether an objection preserves error.