Court Opinion

ID: 9375825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 22:03:19.324085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.063872
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/23 Tang v. Blatt CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

                                                                        A163147

 INDIA BLATT TANG et al.,                                               (Marin County
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                   Super. Ct. No. PRO1792513)
 v.
                                                                        ORDER MODIFYING
 MICHAEL BLATT et al., as                                               OPINION AND DENYING
 Trustees, etc.,                                                        REHEARING; NO CHANGE
           Defendants and Respondents.                                  IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 6, 2023, be
modified as follows.

1.       On page 17, in footnote 5, after the sentence which ends, “. . . and no
         citations to legal authority addressing that issue.” insert, continuing in
         the same paragraph, the following sentences:

               In her petition for rehearing, India also contended that the
               uncertainty presumption was raised at the hearing for plaintiffs’ new
               trial motion. We again disagree. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued only that
               the court must draw “reasonable inferences” in favor of plaintiffs and
               determine “what likely would have occurred” based on the facts of the
               case.
2.    On page 17, in footnote 5, in the sentence which begins, “But even if the
      issue had been raised . . . .” insert “or at the hearing for the motion”
      after the phrase “raised in the new trial motion” so that the sentence
      reads:
          But even if the issue had been raised in the new trial motion or at
          the hearing for the motion, it would have been too late.
3.    On page 18, in footnote 5, insert the following at the end of the footnote:

         India also argued in her petition for rehearing that the court is
         required to grant rehearing under Government Code section 68081
         because respondents did argue forfeiture in their respondents’ brief.
         Although respondents did not raise the forfeiture issue and
         addressed the argument on the merits, we may still find the issue
         forfeited. (S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010)
         184 Cal.App.4th 712, 722 [deeming issue waived even though
         respondent had addressed issue on the merits].) Since the assertion
         of an issue in the trial court is generally required to preserve the
         claim for appeal, it is encompassed in the uncertainty presumption
         that India raised and she therefore had the opportunity to brief it.
         Accordingly, we may affirm on the ground of forfeiture even though
         the parties have not briefed it. (Cf. People v. Neilson (2007) 154
         Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534 [provision of adequate record on appeal is “a
         procedural and substantive requirement on the part of any party . . .
         asserting a position on appeal” and thus Gov.Code, § 68081 does not
         require briefing of issue of inadequate record].)

There is no change in the judgment.

The petition for rehearing, filed February 17, 2023, is denied.

02/28/2023                                 STREETER, Acting P. J.

                                       2
Filed 2/6/23 Tang v. Blatt CA1/4 (unmodified opinion)
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 INDIA BLATT TANG et al.,
             Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                                                        A163147
 v.
 MICHAEL BLATT et al.,                                                  (Marin County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. PRO1702513)
 as Trustees, etc.,
             Defendants and Respondents.

         Plaintiffs India Blatt Tang and Ashley Blatt are trust beneficiaries who
alleged, as relevant here, that the trustees, defendants Michael Blatt and
Valerie Wall, breached their fiduciary duties by failing to properly notify
them of the existence of the trust following the death of the settlors, as
required by former Probate Code section 16061.7,1 because the notice was
mailed to them “c/o” their father at an address at which they did not live.
After a bench trial, the court found for plaintiffs in part on their claim that
defendants improperly administered the trust, but found that plaintiffs’
failure-to-notify claim was “inconsequential” and that they had not
established that defendants’ defective notification under former
section 16061.7 caused them damage.

         1   All further undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
      Plaintiffs argue that the evidence at trial established that the
ineffective notice did cause them damage in the form of attorney’s fees they
otherwise would not have incurred, and that to the extent the evidence was
insufficient, any uncertainty about whether the lack of notice caused harm
should be charged to defendants. We find no basis to reverse the trial court’s
decision that an award of attorney’s fees was not warranted, and accordingly
we affirm the judgment.
                               BACKGROUND
   A. Creation and Division of the Trusts
      Plaintiffs are sisters, and India is Ashley’s conservator. Defendants are
plaintiffs’ paternal uncle and aunt.
      Plaintiffs’ grandparents, Raymond and Barbara Blatt, created the
Raymond C. Blatt and Barbara R. Blatt 1988 Trusts in 1988. The trust
agreement provided that when the last surviving grandparent died, and after
debts were paid and specified items of personal property distributed, the
trustee was to divide the trust estate into equal shares, one for each of the
grandparents’ living children, defendants, and Steven Blatt, plaintiffs’ father.
The share allocated to Steven was to be retained and administered by the
trustee in a separate trust. Under the terms of the trust, Steven would be
entitled to annual distributions of $12,000 from the net income of his trust
during his lifetime.
      The trust agreement further provided that upon Steven’s death, the
trustee was to divide his trust into equal shares, one for each plaintiff, and
those shares were to be retained and administered in separate trusts. A 1995
amendment to the trust provided that when India reached the age of 30, the
trustee was to distribute outright to India the balance of her trust.

                                        2
   B. The Section 16061.7 Notice
      Raymond died in 1991, and Barbara died in 1998, at which point
defendants became trustees. Michael retained an attorney, who sent a
notification to the trust beneficiaries under former code section 16061.7 that
all the trusts and sub-trusts of the Raymond C. Blatt and Barbara R. Blatt
1988 Trusts became irrevocable in November 1998, the month Barbara died.
As required by former section 16061.7, the notification advised the recipients
that they were entitled to receive a copy of the trust. (Former § 16061.7,
subd. (a), added by Stats. 1997, ch. 724, § 23.2) Defendants mailed the
notification to plaintiffs “c/o” Steven at an address in Healdsburg, California.
      The evidence adduced at trial in this action indicates that India never
received the notification and did not learn about her and her sister’s interests
in the trust until after their father died in December 2014, more than sixteen
years after Barbara’s death.
   C. The Sonoma County Action and Defendants’ Petition for First
      Account
      In 2017, a couple of years after Steven died, plaintiffs filed a petition in
Sonoma County Superior Court for, among other things, relief under
sections 16420 and 17200 and for an accounting of the trust. According to the
petition, defendants did not inform plaintiffs of their vested rights under the
trust until 2014, and they thereafter failed to respond to plaintiffs’ requests
for information about the trust. The petition further alleged that since 1998,
defendants had not provided any accounting or report of trust assets,
expenses, and distributions, and after Steven’s death, they provided India
with only one financial document, which showed the amount of funds in a

      2 All further references to former section 16061.7 are to this version of
section 16061.7.

                                        3
trust investment account in March 2015. The court dismissed the petition for
improper venue a few months later.
       A month before the court dismissed plaintiffs’ Sonoma County action,
defendants provided plaintiffs a copy of an accounting for the period of
December 2014 to March 2017, and asked plaintiffs to consent to the
accounting. After receiving no response from plaintiffs, defendants initiated
this action by filing a petition to settle first account under section 17200.
      Plaintiffs filed objections to the petition to settle first account, asserting
that defendants, in their capacity as trustees, failed to provide timely
accountings to plaintiffs until they filed their Sonoma County petition. The
objections also contained allegations like those in the Sonoma County
petition regarding defendants’ failure to notify plaintiffs of their interests in
the trust. Plaintiffs later filed a petition to compel defendants to allow
inspection of trust records showing how defendants had administered the
trust since 1998. Over defendants’ objections, the court granted plaintiffs’
petition to compel.
   D. Plaintiffs’ Petitions for Surcharge and for Accounting
      In February 2019, plaintiffs filed a petition for surcharge, for relief for
breach of trust, to recover trust property, and to redress financial elder
abuse. They amended the petition in September 2019. The amended petition
alleged in part that defendants breached their duties as trustees by failing to
maintain records, making it difficult to determine how defendants managed
Steven’s trust from 1998 to 2014, and by imprudently investing trust assets
and using the trust’s money to pay for their expenses.
      In October 2020, plaintiffs filed a petition to compel defendants to
account for the period of November 1998 to December 2014. Plaintiffs alleged
in the petition that defendants’ production in response to the court’s order

                                         4
granting plaintiffs’ petition to compel did not include any check registers,
fiduciary income tax returns, financial statements, or bank statements dated
before January 2012. According to the petition, India was unable to obtain
records from other sources, and many records no longer existed, and therefore
it was impossible to tell whether defendants fulfilled their fiduciary duties
by, for example, distributing only the net income from Steven’s trust during
his lifetime.
   E. The Trial
      In January 2021, plaintiffs filed an issue conference statement
detailing the facts and law pertinent to defendants’ alleged failure to fulfill
“any” of the fiduciary duties they owed to plaintiffs. Those duties included
the duty to administer the trust according to its terms (§ 16000), the duty to
keep beneficiaries reasonably informed of the trust and its administration
(§ 16060), and the duty to serve notification on each beneficiary when a
revocable trust or any portion of it becomes irrevocable because of the death
of one of the settlors (§ 16061.7).
      Trial took place later that month. India testified in support of
plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims. As to defendants’ alleged failure to
notify plaintiffs under former section 16061.7, India testified that she did not
learn about her and her sister’s beneficiary status until Michael told her
about the trust after her father died in December 2014, more than sixteen
years after Barbara’s death. She further testified that she never authorized
anyone to send her mail in the care of her father, and that neither she nor
her sister lived at the address to which defendants sent the section 16061.7
notification.
      Regarding defendants’ alleged failure to keep plaintiffs reasonably
informed of the trust administration, India testified that after Michael

                                        5
mentioned the trust in December 2014, she requested a copy of the trust
instrument around April 2015, and she also inquired about the terms of the
trust and the trust assets. Shortly thereafter, Michael sent India copies of
the trust instrument, an amendment to the trust, and one page of a
statement for a Schwab account. India testified that she called Michael
several times in the following months and sent him an email in
September 2015 in an effort to obtain additional information about the trust.
She further testified that after the September email, all communication
stopped until December 2015, when she received a $100,000 check, which she
believed was a distribution from the Schwab account. India’s attorney also
sent letters to Michael in 2016 asking for trust records and for an accounting.
      Michael testified that when Barbara died in 1998, he engaged an
attorney who helped him with the initial steps of administering the trust
until 2000, and he did not have any understanding in the first year of what
his duties were as co-trustee independent of what his attorney told him. He
further testified that he distributed $12,000 a year to Steven from Steven’s
trust for four or five years and paid expenses for a house defendants owned
using trust assets without considering the trust’s net income.
   F. The Statement of Decision
      The trial court issued a tentative decision in April 2021 addressing
plaintiffs’ causes of action in their amended petition to surcharge. The court
found that defendants had made unauthorized distributions to Steven from
the trust principal between 1998 and 2010, and ordered defendants to pay
$196,000. Because defendants did not keep account records, the trial court
based the amount of the award on Michael’s testimony that he gave Steven
$12,000 per year for five or six years. The court also found that defendants
had made improper distributions totaling approximately $11,000

                                       6
between 2010 and 2015. The court found for defendants on plaintiffs’ other
claims in their amended petition to surcharge. The trial court did not
address plaintiffs’ claims that defendants breached their duty to notify under
former section 16061.7 and their duty to keep beneficiaries reasonably
informed under section 16060.
      Plaintiffs filed objections to the tentative decision, requesting findings
that respondents breached their duty to notify plaintiffs under former
section 16061.7, that respondents were liable for all damages caused by that
breach, and that respondents breached their duties to keep plaintiffs
reasonably informed under section 16060 and to report to plaintiffs under
section 16061.
      The court issued a final statement of decision (SOD) in April 2021. The
court’s findings in its tentative decision remained largely unchanged in the
SOD, with the exception of the claim that defendants made improper
distributions during the time period of 1998 to 2014. Instead of awarding
plaintiffs for those improper distributions, the court found that plaintiffs had
not been harmed by those distributions. The court found for plaintiffs solely
on the claim that defendants made improper disbursements after Steven’s
death, and awarded plaintiffs a judgment in the amount of $2,369.99.
      The court also briefly addressed plaintiffs’ failure-to-notify and failure-
to-inform claims, finding that those claims were “inconsequential.”
Regarding defendants’ alleged failure to provide plaintiffs with adequate
notice under former section 16061.7, the court found that although the notice
was defective, plaintiffs had failed to establish that the defective notification
caused damage. The court also found that Michael had failed to keep
plaintiffs informed about the trust and its administration, but it said nothing
further about plaintiffs’ failure-to-inform claim.

                                        7
   G. Plaintiffs’ New Trial Motion
      After the trial court issued the SOD, plaintiffs moved for a modification
of the SOD, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion was based on
several grounds, but as pertinent here, plaintiffs requested that the court
modify its SOD to find that the defective notification and defendants’ failure
to keep plaintiffs informed about the trust and its administration caused
harm to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contended that as a result of those breaches,
they were forced to spend money litigating their rights as beneficiaries and
were deprived of information that they could have used to prevent
defendants’ other breaches from occurring, and they were therefore entitled
to attorney’s fees and costs under section 16061.9, which provides that a
trustee who fails to serve the notification required by section 16061.7 is liable
for attorney’s fees and costs caused by the failure. (§ 16061.9, subd. (a).) In
the alternative, plaintiffs argued that a new trial was warranted on the issue
of whether the defective notification and other breaches caused damage to
plaintiffs. They further contended that the court did not make a finding as to
plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs under section 16061.9, and
that the trial court was required to award fees and costs under
section 16061.9, regardless of whether there was proof of money damages.
      The court denied the motion. Regarding plaintiffs’ claim that the court
made no finding as to their entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs under
section 16061.9, the court reiterated its finding in the SOD that the defective
notice was “inconsequential because Petitioners failed to establish damages
caused by the defective notice.” The court added that “the evidence at trial
supports a finding that Michael made a reasonably diligent effort to comply
with the notification requirements and as such he is not required to pay
Petitioner’s legal fees/costs.”

                                        8
      Plaintiffs timely appealed from the judgment.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Plaintiffs ask us to remand with instructions to award them all
attorney fees and costs that “would have been avoided” if defendants had
complied with their fiduciary duties as trustees to notify and inform
beneficiaries under sections 16061.7 and 16060, respectively. In general,
parties pay their own attorney fees unless a contract or statute provides
otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; Leader v. Cords (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
1588, 1595 [“Trust beneficiaries must ordinarily pay their own attorney fees
in challenging the trustee’s conduct, even when they are successful”].) And
only a prevailing party is entitled to costs unless otherwise specified by
statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)
      Here, plaintiffs contend they are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs
under subdivision (f) of former section 16061.7 (currently section 16061.9),
pursuant to which defendants are liable for attorney’s fees and costs “caused
by” their failure to comply with their duty to notify beneficiaries under that
section. (Former § 16061.7, subd. (f).) In arguing that remand is required,
plaintiffs appear to challenge both the trial court’s finding that they did not
establish causation and its application of former section 16061.7.
   I. Governing Law
      A trustee owes all beneficiaries a fiduciary duty. (Hearst v. Ganzi
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1208.) To establish a breach of fiduciary duty,
plaintiffs must show the existence of a fiduciary duty, its breach, and damage
proximately caused by that breach. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820; Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1294,
1300 [finding that the beneficiary did not establish her claim for breach of

                                        9
fiduciary duty under section 16060 because she suffered no compensable loss
caused by the breach].)
      The Probate Code codifies many of the duties a trustee owes
beneficiaries. (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 201,
207.) At issue here is the duty under former section 16061.7 to serve a
notification on the beneficiaries when a revocable trust becomes irrevocable
because of the death of one of the settlors. (Former § 16061.7, subds. (a)(1)
& (b)(1).) That obligation was triggered here when Barbara died in 1998.
Under former section 16061.7, subdivision (e), the notification must identify
the settlors of the trust and the trustees, and advise the recipients that they
are entitled to receive a copy of the terms of the trust. (Former § 16061.7,
subd. (e).)3
       At the time of defendants’ alleged failure to adequately notify plaintiffs
in 1998, subdivision (f) of former section 16061.7 provided, in pertinent part:
“A trustee who fails to serve the notification by trustee as required by this
section shall be responsible for all damages, including attorney’s fees and
costs, caused by the failure; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not
apply in any case where a trustee makes a good faith effort to comply with
this section.”4 (Former § 16061.7, subd. (f).)

      3 In their opening brief, plaintiffs also discuss section 16060, which
states that a trustee “has a duty to keep the beneficiaries of the trust
reasonably informed of the trust and its administration.” (§ 16060.)
However, as defendants point out, there is no provision for recovery of
attorney’s fees based on a violation of this section, and in their reply brief,
plaintiffs disavow an intent to seek a fee award based on statutes other than
former section 16061.7.
      4The Legislature has since amended the law, moving the remedy for
breaches of section 16061.7 to section 16061.9. Subdivision (a) of section
16061.9 states: “A trustee who fails to serve the notification by trustee as

                                       10
   II. Waiver
      Before turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ appeal, we address
defendants’ argument that plaintiffs waived their attorney’s fee claim
because they asserted it only prior to trial and failed to petition the court for
attorney’s fees at or after trial. We agree with plaintiffs that they did not
waive their attorney’s fee claim on that basis because the judgment did not
establish grounds supporting an award of attorney’s fees.
      Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees is based on their claim that
defendants failed to provide the required notification under former
section 16061.7. In response to plaintiffs’ request for findings that
respondents breached their duty to notify and were liable for all damages
caused by this breach, the trial court issued a final statement of decision
finding that plaintiffs had not established the element of causation for their
failure-to-notify claim. Because the judgment did not establish a basis for an
award of attorney’s fees under former section 16061.7, plaintiffs had no
reason to file a post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees. Under those
circumstances, their failure to do so does not waive their right to obtain
appellate review of a determination by the trial court establishing that they
had no entitlement to a fee award.

required by Section 16061.7 on a beneficiary shall be responsible for all
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs caused by the failure unless the trustee
makes a reasonably diligent effort to comply with that section.” Although
plaintiffs refer to both sections in their opening brief, the parties agree, as do
we, that former section 16061.7 applies here, not section 16061.9. There is no
indication in section 16061.9 or in its legislative history that the Legislature
intended it to apply retroactively. (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988)
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209 [statutes “will not be applied retroactively unless it is
very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have
intended a retroactive application”].)

                                        11
   III.    Application of Former Section 16061.7
      The record in this case demonstrates that Barbara, a settlor of the
trust, died in 1998, that defendants sent a section 16061.7 notification to
plaintiffs “c/o” their father at an address that was not their residence, and
that India did not learn of her status as a beneficiary of the trust until after
her father’s death in 2014. Although the trial court found that the notice was
defective, it also found the claim “inconsequential” and that plaintiffs failed
to establish that the lack of adequate notification caused them damage.
      While plaintiffs contend that an award of attorney’s fees and costs
under former section 16061.7 is “mandatory,” they do not dispute the express
language in the statute that recovery is available only for damages, including
attorney’s fees, “caused by the failure . . . .” (Former § 16061.7, subd. (f), as
amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 682, § 10.) Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, first,
that the record establishes that the lack of adequate notice did cause them to
incur attorney’s fees (and potentially other damages) that otherwise would
have been avoided, and second, that to the extent it is uncertain what would
have happened differently had they received adequate notice in 1998, that
uncertainty should be charged to defendants rather than to them. We
consider these arguments in turn.
      A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
      To establish causation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about his or her harm. (Viner
v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1240.) Stated differently, evidence of
causation “must rise to the level of a reasonable probability based upon
competent testimony. [Citations.] ‘A possible cause only becomes “probable”
when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes

                                        12
more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.’ ” (Williams v.
Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 133.)
      Plaintiffs argue that their appeal is subject to de novo review because
the relevant facts are undisputed. But this is not a case where only one
deduction or inference may reasonably be drawn from the facts concerning
causation. (Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
709, 719.) Rather, “ ‘ “where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at
trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]
Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was
(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight
as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Lincoln v. Lopez (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 922, 929;
accord, Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067
[“ ‘ “Where, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the burden of
proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by arguing the
evidence compels a judgment in his favor” ’ ”].)
      Because plaintiffs have the burden of establishing causation at trial
(Evid. Code, § 500), we will determine whether the evidence compels a
finding in their favor as a matter of law (Lincoln v. Lopez, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 929). Any conflict in the evidence or reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the trial
court’s decision. (Id. at p. 928.)
      B. Application
      The trial court undertook its duties to weigh the evidence and
concluded that plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden to show that defendants’

                                       13
failure to provide adequate notice under former section 16061.7 caused them
damage. It is not our role to reweigh the evidence.
      On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the evidence shows that if
defendants had complied with their duty to notify, plaintiffs would have
prevented defendants’ other breaches from occurring, as demonstrated by
India’s attempts to obtain trust information beginning in 2015, thereby
avoiding much of the legal expenses incurred by the parties in this action.
      However, plaintiffs’ evidence is not uncontradicted or “ ‘ “ ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient’ ” ’ ” to establish causation. (Fabian v. Renovate America,
Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.) It does not support a finding as a
matter of law that plaintiffs would have sought information about the trust
and its administration in 1998 and that they would have continued to seek
such information in the following years and acted on any indication of trust
mismanagement. The only evidence plaintiffs cite in support of their
contention is the trial court’s finding that defendants breached some of their
duties as trustees at various points between 1998 and 2015. Although the
record demonstrates that India sought information about the trust a few
months after being informed of her beneficiary status in 2014, her stated
reasons for doing so were for her own estate planning and for “setting up
arrangements” for Ashley after the death of their father. The trial court
reasonably could have inferred that India, in seeking trust-related
information, was primarily motivated to do so by those circumstances. We
can only speculate as to whether plaintiffs, had they been properly notified
in 1998, would have been similarly vigilant about obtaining trust-related
information sixteen years earlier, when plaintiffs’ circumstances were
presumably different. (See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th

                                       14
763, 775–776 [“ ‘A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when
the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities
are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict
for the defendants’ ”].) Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to compel a finding
of causation as a matter of law.
      In their reply, plaintiffs assert two additional arguments in support of
their contention that they established causation as a matter of law. Even
assuming they have not forfeited those arguments by failing to raise them in
their opening brief (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th
659, 685), they lack merit. First, plaintiffs contend that the defective notice
resulted in substantial fees for discovery and litigation regarding the
propriety of the notice and the consequences and available remedies for
defective notice. But because defendants are liable only for damages
proximately caused by the defective notification, we must distinguish
between attorney’s fees as damages proximately caused by a tort and
attorney’s fees attributable to bringing the action itself. (Brandt v. Superior
Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817.) We decline to read former section 16061.7
as authorizing attorney’s fees simply insofar as the beneficiary chooses to sue
over the lack of adequate notice itself, because it would render essentially
meaningless the statute’s requirement that the damages were “caused by the
failure” to provide notice.
      Next, plaintiffs argue that the defective notice increased their fee
expenditures in obtaining information about the trust. They cite evidence
demonstrating India’s efforts to obtain information about the trust beginning
in 2015 and culminating in litigation in 2017. But again, we would have to
speculate that plaintiffs would have promptly sought that information if

                                        15
defendants had provided them proper notice under former section 16061.7
in 1998.
      Accordingly, plaintiffs have not shown that the evidence compels a
finding of causation as a matter of law.
      C. The Uncertainty Presumption
      Anticipating that we would find their causation argument lacking,
plaintiffs contend that any uncertainty about the causal effect of defendants’
failure to notify should be construed against defendants—what plaintiffs
term the “uncertainty presumption.” They assert that defendants’ failure to
provide the initial notice “makes it impossible to know for sure” that
defendants’ other breaches would not have occurred, and so defendants
should bear the risk of the uncertainty. Because plaintiffs ordinarily bear the
burden of proof on their claims (Evid. Code, § 500), plaintiffs are effectively
asking us to alter the allocation of the burden of proof on the causation
element of their failure-to-notify claim. “On occasion, . . . courts may alter
the normal allocation of the burden of proof.” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1188.)
      If existing law does not allocate the burden of proof on an issue, courts
must consider certain factors to determine whether the usual allocation of the
burden of proof should be altered. (In re Marriage of Hein (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 519, 539.) Those factors are: “ ‘the knowledge of the parties
concerning the particular fact, the availability of the evidence to the parties,
the most desirable result in terms of public policy in the absence of proof of
the particular fact, and the probability of the existence or nonexistence of the
fact.’ ” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 660–661
(Lakin), quoting Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code,

                                       16
(1966 ed.) § 500 p. 431.) “[T]he exceptions are few, and narrow.” (Sargent
Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1670–1673.)
      However, nothing in the record demonstrates that plaintiffs objected or
otherwise raised this issue in the trial court. The final statement of decision
expressly stated that plaintiffs failed to establish causation. Plaintiffs filed a
motion for a new trial arguing that the defective notification did, in fact,
cause damage in the form of attorney fees and costs, but they never
questioned that they had the burden of proof on causation. Consequently, the
argument is forfeited.5 (California Interstate Tel. Co. v. Prescott (1964)

      5 At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel maintained that the uncertainty
presumption was raised in the motion for a new trial. We disagree.
Plaintiffs wrote: “The Court’s other findings and evidence in the record
outlined above . . . clearly establish Mike and Valerie breached the duty to
provide 16061.7 notification and numerous other fiduciary duties, which
resulted in India and Ashley being deprived of their most basic rights as
beneficiaries. India had no means to remedy those actions other than by
engaging counsel and seeking relief from the Court. This caused substantial
damage to India, including attorneys’ fees and costs.” In their reply
memorandum, they wrote: “In arguing that India failed to offer evidence of
the damage that she suffered caused by Respondents’ breach of their duties
under Probate Code Section 16061.7, Respondents ignore their 16 years of
wrongful conduct as trustees during Steven’s lifetime. Had India properly
been made aware in 1998 that she and Ashley were remainder beneficiaries,
then she could have exercised her right to obtain information about the trust
administration pursuant to Section 16060 throughout the period from then
until Steven’s death. India would then have learned, inter alia, that
Respondents were violating the Trust by making principal distributions. She
would have been able to demand and obtain the Schwab records before they
were unlawfully destroyed by the Respondents.” There is no reference to
uncertainty or to shifting the burden of proof, and no citations to legal
authority addressing that issue. But even if the issue had been raised in the
new trial motion, it would have been too late. (Insurance Co. of State of
Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898,
922 [declining to review defendant’s new theory, raised for the first time in a

                                        17
228 Cal.App.2d 408, 411 [party forfeited argument regarding shift of burden
of proof by failing to object in trial court]; Smith v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 313, 315, fn. 1 [same]; see People v. Accredited Surety
& Casualty Co., Inc. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 122, 132 [declining to decide
allocation of burden of proof issue where party did not address the Lakin
factors in the trial court or on appeal].)6 Had the issue been raised,
defendants may have been more incentivized to further develop the record
regarding, for example, plaintiffs’ knowledge of the trust and their
beneficiary status prior to defendants’ other alleged breaches.7 (See Cassady
v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 234–235
[extent to which the plaintiff’s difficulty in proving his claim was attributed
to the defendant’s wrongdoing was a factor the court considered in declining

new trial motion, because “[n]ew theories that could have been raised, but
were not, is not one of the causes that permits a new trial”].)
      6  We note that in negligence and products liability cases, “the doctrine
has evolved that the burden of proof on the issue of causation may be shifted
to the defendant where demanded by public policy considerations.” (Thomas
v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709, 1717.) “ ‘[T]he shift of the burden of
proof . . . may be said to rest on a policy judgment that when there is a
substantial probability that a defendant’s negligence was a cause of an
accident, and when the defendant’s negligence makes it impossible, as a
practical matter, for plaintiff to prove “proximate causation” conclusively, it
is more appropriate to hold the defendant liable than to deny an innocent
plaintiff recovery, unless the defendant can prove that his negligence was not
a cause of the injury.’ ” (Ibid.) But even where a plaintiff claims that the
defendant’s wrongdoing has made it impossible for him or her to prove
causation, courts must still consider the factors set forth in Lakin, supra, 6
Cal.4th in determining whether the allocation of the burden of proof should
be altered. (Ibid.)
       7 We also note that Plaintiffs do not address the Lakin factors in their

appellate brief, and thus they have not established that the burden of proof
should be allocated to defendants. (People v. Miralrio (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
448, 452, fn. 4 [an appellate court is not required to address undeveloped
claims or ones inadequately briefed].)

                                        18
to shift the allocation of the burden of proof].) “Appellate courts are loath to
reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an
opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to
consider.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)
       Although plaintiffs contend that “settled law” dictates the application
of the uncertainty presumption in this case, plaintiffs have not shown that
the trial court’s allocation of the burden of proof constitutes legal error here.
(Perez v. VAS S.p.A. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 658, 677, fn. 5 [where
“assignment of the burden of proof constitutes legal error appearing on the
face of the statement of decision,” the contention that the trial court
misallocated the burden of proof is not forfeited by failing to raise it in the
trial court].) In our research, we have not found any cases or statutes, and
plaintiffs have not provided any, that have created a presumption allocating
the burden of proof on causation for a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to a
defendant trustee that breached its duty under section 16061.7. Plaintiffs’
cases are inapposite. They cite Estate of McCabe (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 503,
in which a mother was charged with the mismanagement of a trust set up for
the care of her daughter. (Id. at pp. 504–505.) Filing an account covering
15 years of the daughter’s living expenses, the mother listed various costs
without any itemization, and she had no records to justify the expenses
claimed. (Id. at p. 506.) The appellate court noted that “the burden of proof
is on” trustees “to prove every item of their account by ‘satisfactory
evidence’ ” and that “any doubt arising from their failure to keep proper
records, or from the nature of the proof they produce, must be resolved
against them.” (Id. at p. 505.) But the rule pronounced in Estate of McCabe
does not extend to anything other than the correctness of the trustee’s

                                        19
accounts. (Neel v. Barnard (1944) 24 Cal.2d 406, 420–421.) It does not
support plaintiffs’ contention that defendants have the burden of proof on the
causation element of plaintiffs’ failure-to-notify claim.
      Also inapposite is Highland Ranch v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 848. There, the Supreme Court held that the Agricultural
Labor Relations Board (ALRB) had properly imposed a remedy of limited
back pay for an employer’s failure to negotiate with a labor union before
terminating its business, even though it was impossible to “ ‘reestablish a
situation equivalent to that which would have prevailed had the (employer)
more timely fulfilled its statutory bargaining obligation.’ ” (Id. at pp. 862–
866.) Citing the ALRB’s broad remedial powers under Labor Code
section 1160.3, which includes the power to “mak[e] employees whole” for the
loss of pay resulting from the employer’s refusal to bargain, the court
reasoned that limited backpay was an appropriate remedy to effectuate the
ALRB’s order directing the employer to bargain with the union and to ensure
the employer would not profit from its unfair labor practice. (Ibid.) But the
presumption affecting the burden of proof approved by the Highland Ranch
court only applies to cases involving a technical refusal to bargain because in
those types of cases, “the evidence that the parties would not have entered
into an agreement even if they had negotiated in good faith is necessarily
speculative.” (George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1285, 1293.) We do not see that the question
whether a failure to notify under former section 16061.7 caused damage will
necessarily be plagued by the same uncertainty that attends an effort to
predict the result of a good faith negotiation that did not occur.
      County of El Dorado v. Schneider (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1263, another
case cited by plaintiffs, involved evidentiary sanctions against a party that

                                       20
did not comply with discovery requirements, and not a presumption affecting
the burden of proof. There, the trial court resolved the question of paternity
against the father under former Evidence Code section 892 after the father
refused to submit to an order for blood tests. (Id. at pp. 1265–1266.) “By his
wrongful refusal to take the test, defendant has deprived the county and this
court of any opportunity to evaluate the probative value of the blood test
evidence. The probative value is therefore uncertain.” (Id. at p. 1276.) Here,
plaintiffs have not argued that defendants failed to comply with their
discovery obligations, or that defendants have deprived plaintiffs of an
opportunity to evaluate the probative value of specific evidence.
      Finally, plaintiffs cite a Delaware case, McNeil v. McNeil (Del. 2002)
798 A.2d 503, that is not binding on us (Acco Contractors, Inc. v. McNamara
& Peepe Lumber Co. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 292, 296), and that is
distinguishable in any event. In McNeil, the trust at issue was one of five
created by McNeil, with four of the trusts designated for the benefit of
McNeil’s four children (the resulting trusts). (McNeil, at p. 506.) McNeil
established the fifth trust for his wife. (Ibid.) One of McNeil’s children,
Hank, became estranged from the family, and the trustees of the wife’s trust
kept him in the dark about his beneficiary status under the wife’s trust and
his right as a beneficiary to seek distributions from it. (Id. at p. 507.) Upon
learning of his beneficiary status, Hank filed a complaint seeking a make-up
distribution from the trust, and after a trial, the Court of Chancery ordered a
make-up distribution of 7.5 percent of the value of Hank’s resulting trust.
(Id. at pp. 507–508.) On appeal, the reviewing court noted that the
imposition of a make-up trust distribution was, “to a certain degree,
speculative because it assumes that (a) Hank would have requested
distribution had he known his status as a current beneficiary and (b) the

                                       21
trustees would have granted his request . . . .” (Id. at p. 511.) It nonetheless
concluded that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in part
because there was “ample reason to believe that Hank would have satisfied
the demand requirement since he was continually seeking additional
distribution from his own trust. Whether the trustees would have honored
Hank’s request is open to question but any doubt in that regard must be
resolved against the trustees whose conduct led to the litigation and ultimate
resolution of Hank’s entitlement.” (Ibid.)
      In McNeil, the beneficiary sought an equitable remedy. (McNeil v.
McNeil, supra, 798 A.2d at pp. 507, 509, 511.) The Court of Chancery had
“broad” discretion to fashion an equitable remedy for the trustees’ fiduciary
breaches, and the reviewing court found that the Court of Chancery did not
abuse its discretion in imposing a make-up distribution. (Id. at pp. 509, 511.)
Here, plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees and costs under former
section 16061.7, so we must resolve every conflict in favor of the trial court’s
finding that plaintiffs failed to establish causation on that claim. (Lincoln v.
Lopez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 928.) We have already concluded the
evidence and reasonable inferences support that finding. Moreover, as
discussed above, the evidence in the record does not establish what India
likely would have done differently had she received the notice in 1998, and
plaintiffs did not seek to offer testimony on that issue.
      We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err as a matter of law
in finding that plaintiffs failed to establish causation on their failure-to-notify
claim. And because we affirm on this basis, we have no reason to consider
the trial court’s additional finding in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a new
trial—albeit under the “reasonable diligence” standard of section 16061.9
rather than the “good faith effort” standard of former section 16061.7—that

                                        22
the deficiency in mailing the notice to plaintiffs in care of their father would
not have warranted an award of attorney’s fees in any event.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on
appeal.
                                            GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
BROWN, J.

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