Court Opinion

ID: 9901947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 18:08:42.343896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.753531
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Schultz, 2023-Ohio-4228.]

STATE OF OHIO                      )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                   )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                   )

STATE OF OHIO                                          C.A. No.        30407

        Appellee

        v.                                             APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                       ENTERED IN THE
RICHARD SCHULTZ                                        COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                       COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                      CASE No.   CR 19 01 0357

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: November 22, 2023

        CARR, Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant, Richard Schultz, appeals from the judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

                                                  I.

        {¶2}     A grand jury indicted Schultz for sexually abusing the two daughters he shares with

A.F. (“Mother”). With respect to the older daughter, J.S., he was indicted on eight counts of rape,

one count of sexual battery, and seven counts of gross sexual imposition. With respect to the

younger daughter, B.S., he was indicted on three counts of rape and three counts of gross sexual

imposition. The State later dismissed a total of eight counts. Accordingly, only the following

counts were submitted to the jury at trial: (1) five counts of rape as to J.S.; (2) one count of sexual

battery as to J.S.; (3) four counts of gross sexual imposition as to J.S.; (4) two counts of rape as to

B.S.; and (5) two counts of gross sexual imposition as to B.S. The different counts alleged that

Schultz sexually abused J.S. and B.S. during distinct time periods when they were specific ages.
                                                   1

          {¶3}   The jury found Schultz not guilty of one count of rape and one count of gross sexual

imposition, both of which pertained to J.S. The jury found Schultz guilty of his remaining charges.

The trial court sentenced him to a total of thirty years to life in prison and classified him as a Tier

III sexual offender.

          {¶4}   Schultz now appeals from his convictions and raises one assignment of error for

review.

                                                  II.

                                    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

          THE CONVICTIONS IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED AS THEY ARE
          AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND AS THE
          EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THEM WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
          LAW TO PROVE A CONVICTION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

          {¶5}   In his assignment of error, Schultz challenges both the sufficiency and the weight

of the evidence supporting his convictions. We reject his arguments.

          {¶6}   Initially, we note that “[a] review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of

the manifest weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct determinations.” State v.

Vicente-Colon, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009705, 2010-Ohio-6242, ¶ 18. For this reason, “it is

not appropriate to combine a sufficiency argument and a manifest weight argument within a single

assignment of error.” State v. Mukha, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0019, 2018-Ohio-4918, ¶ 11.

The Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure allow an appellate court to disregard an assignment of

error if a party “fails to argue the assignment separately in [his] brief * * *.” App.R. 12(A)(2).

“Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of [Schultz’] combined assignment

of error.” State v. Walter, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0020, 2022-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17. Accord State

v. Seibert, 9th Dist. Wayne Nos. 20AP0013, 20AP0014, 2021-Ohio-3069, ¶ 13.
                                                 2

       Sufficiency of the Evidence

       {¶7}    Crim.R. 29(A) provides:

       The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on
       either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more
       offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is
       insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not
       reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state’s
       case.

       {¶8}    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the

trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).

       An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
       support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
       determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
       the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether,
       after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
       trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
       reasonable doubt.

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶9}    A person commits rape if he engages in sexual conduct with another who is not his

spouse and who “is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of

the other person.” R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). A person commits sexual battery if he engages in

sexual conduct with another who is not his spouse and who is his child. R.C. 2907.03(A)(5).

Finally, a person commits gross sexual imposition if he has sexual contact with another who is not

his spouse and who is “is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the

age of that person.” R.C. 2907.05(A)(4).

       {¶10} Schultz argues his convictions are based on insufficient evidence because the State

relied solely on the testimony of J.S. and B.S. According to Schultz, their testimony was riddled

with inconsistencies. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, however, “this Court is not
                                                 3

charged with resolving evidentiary conflicts nor assessing the credibility of witnesses.” State v.

Hawkins, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 21AP0016, 2023-Ohio-2634, ¶ 7. This Court must view the

evidence in a light most favorable to the State. See Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. Schultz

has not argued that the State failed to prove any specific element of his convictions. Nor has he

argued that the State failed to prove certain conduct occurred during each of the time periods

alleged in his indictment. In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we tailor our review to

address the limited argument Schultz has presented on appeal.

       {¶11} J.S. testified that Schultz began sexually abusing her when she was five years old.

She described how he began touching himself in front of her before he progressed to rubbing her

private parts. Schultz later penetrated her vagina with his finger and, when she was thirteen, had

intercourse with her. J.S. remembered the abuse occurring primarily in her parents’ bedroom at

night while her mother slept elsewhere. She also recalled several instances of abuse in her own

bedroom and one in the bathroom. J.S. testified that most of the abuse occurred while she was

five, six, seven, and eight years old. It stopped after Schultz had intercourse with her at thirteen.

J.S. recalled that, on one occasion, Schultz brought her and B.S. into a room together and made

them both touch his penis.

       {¶12} B.S. testified that Schultz began sexually abusing her when she was three years old

and continued to abuse her after she turned four. She testified that Schultz would touch her vagina

and she would experience pain when he did so. She also recalled an incident when he tried to put

his penis in her mouth and another when he set her on his stomach and moved her body back and

forth against him while wearing only his underwear. Much like J.S., B.S. described most of the

abuse occurring in her parents’ bedroom at night. She also remembered one incident when Schultz

brought both her and J.S. into a room to abuse them.
                                                  4

       {¶13} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact

could have concluded that the State proved Schultz’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jenks,

61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph two of the syllabus. Both J.S. and B.S. described Schultz

subjecting them to ongoing sexual abuse from an early age. “In sex offense cases, this Court has

held that the testimony of the victim, if believed, is sufficient to support a conviction, even without

further corroboration.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Rivera, 9th Dist.

Lorain No. 22CA011875, 2023-Ohio-1788, ¶ 22. The State produced adequate evidence to

establish Schutlz’ guilt through the testimony of J.S. and B.S. Because he has not shown that his

convictions are based on insufficient evidence, we reject his argument to the contrary.

       Weight of the Evidence

       {¶14} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be

against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).

       In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
       evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
       all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
       whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
       and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
       reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). An appellate court should exercise the

power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional

cases. Id.

       {¶15} Schultz argues his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence

because J.S. and B.S. were not credible witnesses, inconsistencies plagued their testimony, and the

evidence tended to show they fabricated the allegations against him. He notes that the girls were

not entirely consistent in their accounts when they spoke with an interviewer at the child advocacy

center, an employee at children’s services, and the jury. According to Schultz, he could not have
                                                 5

abused the girls in the manner they described because other children were often present in his

home, the stairs and floorboards in the home were old and loud, and someone would have heard

him bringing one or more of the girls into his bedroom at night. He notes that both girls

participated in therapeutic treatment as children, but neither ever told one of their counselors they

were abused. Instead, J.S. accused Schultz of abuse around the same time she was experiencing

behavioral problems and losing privileges due to punitive restrictions he and her stepmother put

in place. Schultz claims the jury lost its way when it chose to believe J.S. and B.S.

       {¶16} Mother testified that she met Schultz online when she lived in Arizona. She later

moved to Ohio to begin a relationship with him and, after she became pregnant with J.S., began

living with him. They moved to a three-story home in Cuyahoga Falls a few years later, by which

point B.S. had already been born. Mother testified that the girls shared an upstairs bedroom next

to the master bedroom. Although Schultz stayed in the master bedroom, Mother routinely slept

on the couch downstairs because Schultz snored too loudly.

       {¶17} Mother and Schultz ended their relationship when J.S. was about six years old and

B.S. was about four years old. Mother then took the girls back to Arizona for five months. When

they returned to Ohio, Mother lived with a friend, sought child support from Schultz, and agreed

to a visitation schedule. According to Mother, B.S. never wanted to go visit him and J.S. had

mixed feelings about visitation. She testified that J.S. always seemed to have a “very close”

relationship with Schultz compared to the relationship he had with B.S. Mother continued to take

J.S. and sometimes B.S. to visit Schultz until J.S. turned seven. When J.S. was seven, she told

Mother that Schultz was touching her. According to Mother, B.S. made a similar statement around

that same time. Although Mother was shocked by their disclosures, she did not contact the
                                                  6

authorities. Instead, she stopped sending the girls to visit Schultz. She testified that she regretted

not having reported Schultz when J.S. and B.S. first disclosed his abuse.

       {¶18} Mother testified that she ultimately allowed the girls to resume visitation with

Schultz because he got married and she thought his new wife would protect the girls while they

visited. J.S. eventually began staying with Schultz most of the time while B.S. continued to stay

with Mother. At some point, Mother moved further away, and J.S. chose to live with Schultz.

According to Mother, J.S. was a happy child in her youth but became withdrawn, depressed, and

prone to behavioral issues as she lived with Schultz and became a teenager.

       {¶19} Mother admitted the primary reason she used to refuse to sleep in bed with Schultz

when they were a couple was that she was a light sleeper and he snored too loudly. She also

admitted that the home they shared was an older one that would have made it easier to hear if

someone had been walking around in the middle of the night. Nevertheless, Mother did not recall

waking up at night, even when many children were present in the home. On some occasions,

Mother testified, there would be up to seven children sleeping in the house because both she and

Schultz had children from other relationships. She did not remember ever being awoken by a child

for any reason or hearing a child use the bathroom at night.

       {¶20} The friend who allowed Mother to live with her when Mother returned to Ohio

from Arizona also testified for the State. She testified that she was in the kitchen one day when

J.S. was seven, speaking to her about “stranger danger issues and things like that.” According to

the friend, J.S. shocked her by telling her, “daddy touches my pee pee.” The friend testified that

J.S. divulged additional details, including that Schultz had put her in his bed, had put his hand

inside her pull-ups, and had sat her on his lap in the bathroom while they were both naked. The

friend indicated J.S. was upset as she disclosed the abuse and worried about causing trouble for
                                                 7

Schultz. The friend told Mother about the disclosure but deferred to her rather than report the

incident to the authorities herself. Much like Mother, the friend testified that she regretted not

immediately reporting Schultz to the police when J.S. first disclosed the abuse.

       {¶21} The State also introduced testimony from a woman whose daughter was friends

with J.S. The woman testified that her daughter and J.S. were very close for many years and stayed

in contact even after they stopped attending school together. When J.S. was fourteen, she and B.S.

went to the woman’s house to have a day trip with her and her children. The woman testified that

J.S. and B.S. became upset and started telling her they did not want to go back to their father’s

house later that day. J.S. said she was afraid of her father because he touched her. J.S. also was

afraid for B.S. because J.S. planned to leave the house with her stepmother later that day and

worried Schultz would sexually abuse B.S. in her absence. According to the woman, the girls

were crying, shaking, and took a significant amount of time to calm down once she reassured them

they were safe. The woman testified that she took the girls to the police station later that same day

to report the sexual assaults.

       {¶22} As previously noted, both J.S. and B.S. testified that Schultz sexually abused them

from an early age. B.S. could not recall many surrounding details from that period but was

adamant that the abuse occurred. She testified that it was easy for her to remember the abuse

because it was a traumatizing event that left a lasting impression. She was unable to estimate

exactly how many times Schultz abused her but said that it occurred often. Although Mother was

home when the abuse occurred, B.S. believed Mother never heard anything because she was

sleeping downstairs at the time.

       {¶23} J.S. described Schultz’ abuse as “an on-and-off thing” that would “sometimes * *

* slow down, and then * * * pick back up again.” When she was younger, J.S. testified, the abuse
                                                   8

would occur at night while Mother was sleeping. When she was older, the abuse would occur

when her stepmother was at work. J.S. admitted that she did not like the rules Schultz and her

stepmother imposed when she lived with them. She admitted that she had posted several messages

on social media wherein she called her stepmother a variety of names and complained about her

home life but never claimed she was abused. Further, J.S. admitted that she had seen multiple

counselors over the years but had never disclosed the sexual abuse to them. J.S. testified that

Schultz instructed her never to tell anyone about the abuse because he would get into trouble.

        {¶24} Dr. Robin Tener testified as a clinical psychologist and expert in child sexual abuse.

She testified that, when a parent is an abuser, a child may find it exceedingly difficult to report the

abuse because the child values the parental relationship and may simply be accustomed to the

abuse. She indicated that delayed disclosures are very common and may occur due to an increase

in the severity of the abuse or the child feeling he or she has no other choice but to disclose.

According to Dr. Tener, if a child does disclose abuse to an adult and sees that nothing is done to

address it, the child may be even more hesitant to come forward again in the future. She confirmed

that anxiety, depression, and behavioral problems can all be signs of sexual abuse in children.

        {¶25} Dr. Tener reviewed J.S. and B.S.’ forensic interviews. She noted that the disclosure

J.S. made when she was fourteen came shortly after Schultz had vaginal intercourse with her for

the first time. She reiterated that an increase in severity of abuse can be a motivating factor for a

child in his or her decision to disclose the abuse. Dr. Tener did not find it unusual that neither J.S.,

nor B.S. disclosed the abuse they experienced when meeting with counselors over the years. She

testified that they each met with those counselors for distinct, unrelated issues, and it would be

highly unusual and inappropriate for a counselor to prompt a child about sexual abuse due to

inherent risks in suggestive questioning. Regarding inconsistencies in the interviews J.S. and B.S.
                                                  9

gave, Dr. Tener testified that it is not ideal for children to be interviewed multiple times regarding

sexual abuse disclosures because they have difficulty giving precise accounts or explaining things

the exact same way on each recounting.

       {¶26} Schultz presented two witnesses on behalf of the defense: his wife and an expert in

child abuse. The wife testified that she began a relationship with Schultz after he ended things

with Mother. The wife worked as a pediatric nurse for many years and was well versed in matters

of child abuse. She was adamant that she never detected anything that might lead her to believe

Schultz was abusing his girls. She insisted that she would have known if J.S. was being abused

and called her accusations a “very disgusting” and “outrageous lie[.]” Even so, the wife admitted

she worked long shifts outside the home such that she would have been away from home for

extended periods of time. She also admitted that J.S. engaged in self-destructive behavior,

including cutting herself.

       {¶27} Dr. William O’Donohue testified that he was the director of a clinic that treated

sexually abused children. He also had a wealth of experience revising manuals and publishing

articles about child abuse, pedophilia, and forensic interviewing techniques in children. He

testified that children readily recall abuse and core details associated with abuse because abuse

constitutes a traumatizing event. Consequently, Dr. O’Donohue testified, a child should be able

to recount the core details of an event consistently, even when recounting those events on multiple

occasions. Even so, Dr. O’Donohue admitted it would not be unusual for a child to struggle to

recall peripheral or less central details surrounding a traumatic event. He also admitted that

behavioral issues can be a predominant sign of sexual abuse in some children.

       {¶28} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that Schultz has shown his

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury heard J.S. and B.S. describe
                                                 10

the long-term abuse they suffered at the hands of Schultz. Although the abuse was not reported to

law enforcement for many years, the jury heard testimony that the girls tried disclosing the abuse

when J.S. was seven. Both Mother and her friend admitted that they simply failed to report it.

While Schultz took the position that the girls fabricated the allegations against him, the jury was

in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the testifying witnesses. See State v. Singer, 9th

Dist. Medina No. 22CA0039-M, 2023-Ohio-2636, ¶ 22. “[T]his Court will not overturn the trial

court’s verdict on a manifest weight of the evidence challenge simply because the trial court chose

to believe certain witnesses’ testimony over the testimony of others.” State v. Thomas, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 26893, 2014-Ohio-2920, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Ross, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0007,

2013-Ohio-522, ¶ 16. Schultz has not shown that this is the exceptional case where the trier of

fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by convicting him. See Otten,

33 Ohio App.3d at 340. As such, we reject his argument that his convictions are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Schultz’ sole assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶29} Schultz’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                 Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
                                                11

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     DONNA J. CARR
                                                     FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

NATHAN A. RAY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.