Court Opinion

ID: 9528203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:38:17.142379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:21.889167
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view the video tape in its entirety. I concur with all the other portions of that opinion.
Prior to the trial the defendant moved to suppress the video tape of his activities in delivering the stolen cars to the undercover agents.1 At the pre-trial hearing on that motion, defense counsel suggested that, in the alternative, part of the tape be exciséd. At the conclusion of the hearing the court ruled that neither suppression nor excision was appropriate and denied any relief.2 During the defendant’s jury trial the video tape was received in evidence over his objection.3
Although the video tape depicted events occurring and statements made during the course of commission of the crimes charged, the undercover agents actively sought to elicit from the defendant prejudicial information not directly related to such crimes, knowing full well that the statements were being preserved on a video tape. A few examples will suffice to illustrate:
Agent 2: If I need you sometime to run a trip [to transport stolen vehicles] down to Houston, would you be available?
Mr. Jackson: I sure would.

Agent 2: Do you have any (inaudible)
Mr. Jackson: Oh, no.
Agent: —that might help us with some pieces [i. e. guns] or something? I’m always looking for them.
Mr. Jackson: Well, there’s a possibility. There’s a place we’ve been casing out. I might be able to do something there.

Agent 2: Is this a business you’re casing?
Mr. Jackson: Yes, it is. Yes, it is.

Agent 2: Well, they got pieces in there, don’t they?
Mr. Jackson: Well, the guy would have to be wasted.
Agent 2: Oh (pause) Well ...
Mr. Jackson: ... might not want to do it.4
Mr. Jackson: I’ve kind of been thinking about if.
Agent 2: Well, you going to do it at night? Obviously, huh?
Mr. Jackson: No. The way I was planning it was just kinda go in and—
Agent 2: And hold the place up?
Mr. Jackson: No.
Agent 2: No?
Mr. Jackson: Just knock his ass off, man.
The principle that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove that the accused has a propensity to commit the crime which is charged is well established. E. g., People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64, 596 P.2d 751 (1979). The present case presents the question of the applicability of that principle to prejudicial statements made by a defendant during the course of criminal conduct and relating to matters not directly involved in the charges for which the defendant is being tried. The test for admissibility of such statements *748was set forth as follows in United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d 169, (D.C.Cir.1979) at 173:
“We are unable to subscribe to the broad proposition that evidence of other offenses may be introduced simply because it recounts events temporally related to the commission of a crime for which the accused is on trial. The long-established rule requires a pre-admission showing that the evidence is relevant and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice to the accused.” (Emphasis added.)
This is the test which the majority appropriately has adopted.
As the above examples illustrate, the video tape contains much that is at once minimally relevant and highly prejudicial. The evidence does not support thé trial court’s finding that there was no particular prejudice to the defendant in showing the jury the entire tape.
Some of the defendant’s statements not quoted relate to vaguely described past criminal activity. Most of the prejudicial material such as that quoted relates to the defendant’s willingness to engage in future criminal activity. Almost all of the defendant’s prejudicial statements about past and intended future criminal conduct were elicited by direct, and often suggestive, questions asked by the undercover agents. The video tape is strongly indicative that the police played to the camera and made the defendant a victim of what the majority calls honey potting. See footnote 1 of the majority opinion, where these police activities are suggested as relevant considerations in determining whether the prejudicial effect of video tape evidence substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
Relevant purposes for which the prosecution might have sought to have the video tape placed before the jury were to establish the identity of the defendant and his culpable mental state, including his ac-knowledgement of the criminal nature of his activities with respect to the vehicles which he delivered. These purposes could have been served by excision of parts of the tape or by eliminating the sound accompanying the video presentation of parts of the tape. See Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973). Failure to adopt such measures to shield the jury from the police-elicited statements of the defendant relating to criminal activities and propensities which were at most minimally relevant to the charges for which he was on trial created unnecessary and unfair prejudice to the defendant. Under the circumstances of this case, I conclude that the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice to the accused. See United States v. Childs, supra.
I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the case to the district trial court for a new trial.
ROVIRA, J., joins me in this dissent.

. Sound accompanied the video portion of the tape.

. The court ruled as follows:
“Well, the Court feels that the jury is entitled to view the entire circumstances of an offense which has been video taped. I don’t see any particular prejudice to the defendant in showing them the entire tape. If he made bravado remarks, they were voluntary, as far as the Court can tell from what went on. And I also think that all of the conversations and the totality of circumstances bears on the defendant’s intent concerning the charges which he is now defending against.”

. The defendant did not request a jury instruction limiting the purposes for which any of the video tape evidence could be considered. See Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959).

. This line appears on the video tape but does not appear in the typed transcript.