Court Opinion

ID: 9450313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:41:39.67298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:14.643531
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) : This appellant contends, principal*126ly, that he was unlawfully denied a speedy trial, was brought to trial without a determination of his restored competency, and was twice put in jeopardy.
The record shows an indictment of this appellant on November 16, 1959 on a charge of rape. At his first trial in January 1960, the jury failed to agree. During his second trial the appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape. Appellant thereafter filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate that plea of guilty on the ground that he had been mentally incompetent at the time of trial. After a hearing on March 12, 1962, the District Court granted his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and an order was entered committing the appellant to St. Elizabeths hospital for a mental examination.1 The acting superintendent on June 11, 1962 certified to the court the conclusion of St. Elizabeths staff that the appellant was mentally competent to stand trial and, to the extent he had been suffering as of October 5, 1959 from ■“Anxiety Reaction (Conversion Features),” the alleged criminal offense “was not a product of this mental disease.”
Since the appellant’s discharge from ■St. Elizabeths he had had six court-appointed attorneys.2 Appellant’s own motions, his disagreements or dissatisfaction with counsel and problems involving the succession of attorneys had occasioned the largest share of whatever delay occurred. I think the speedy trial issue should be resolved against him in light of Smith v. United States.3
As to his contention that he improperly was brought to trial without an adjudication of his restored competency following examination at St. Elizabeths, it may be noted first that no objection was raised on that ground. Moreover, this court has held that “an unchallenged certificate of the hospital superintendent * * * obviates the necessity for further proceedings on the question of sanity.” 4
As to his claim of double jeopardy, the proceedings which had resulted in the first conviction on his plea of guilty to the charge of assault with intent to commit rape were reopened and that conviction was set aside on the appellant’s own motion.5 He thus is in no position to complain.6
The record before us discloses no error affecting substantial rights. I would affirm.

. D.C.Code, § 24^301 (1961).

. Actually at one time or other no less than twelve attorneys had been appointed to represent him. His own attacks upon, his attorneys or his motions that a different attorney be named precipitated much delay.

. 118 U.S.App.D.C. -, 331 F.2d 784 (1964).

. Hunter v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 325, 323 F.2d 625, 627 (1963); and see D.C.Code, § 24-301 (1961).

. Cf. Flynn v. United States, 217 F.2d 29 (9 Cir. 1954) cert. denied, 348 U.S. 930, 75 S.Ct. 344, 99 L.Ed. 729 (1955).

. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901 (1961). “Mistrial because the jury was unable to agree is the classic example” of an occasion “where a second trial may be had.” (dissenting opinion) 367 U.S. at 370, 81 S.Ct. at 1527; “The classic example is a mistrial because the jury is unable to agree.” Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963).