Court Opinion

ID: 9499765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:57:07.310238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:42.778232
License: Public Domain

*440RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion cites the proper authorities and engages in the correct analysis, but I believe that it gives short shrift to one key fact that, if adequately factored in, would undermine much of its persuasiveness and lead to the opposite result. Specifically, the state trial judge possessed no knowledge concerning the potential effect of the September 11 attacks on the ability of the jurors to fulfill their civic duties in Walls’s case. Nor, of course, could he have possessed such knowledge; attacks like these had never before occurred on American soil. But the judge’s lack of familiarity with events that were totally extraneous to Walls’s trial distinguishes the present case from each of the cases cited by the majority, as well as from the two 19th-century cases cited in Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 512, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), as examples of the deference usually accorded to a trial court’s evaluation of “possible juror bias.”
In each of those cases, the event or conduct that precipitated the declaration of a mistrial bore a clearly discernible relationship to the ongoing trial. Washington itself involved “improper and prejudicial” remarks made by the defendant’s attorney during his opening statement that “may have affected the impartiality of the jury.” Id. at 510, 511, 98 S.Ct. 824. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 473, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), involved the possibility that several government witnesses might incriminate themselves without full knowledge of their constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 12 S.Ct. 171, 35 L.Ed. 968 (1891), the first 19th-century case cited in Washington, “involved the possibility of bias caused by a newspaper story describing a letter written by defense counsel denying a charge by a third party that one of the jurors was acquainted with the defendant.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 824 (summarizing Simmons). Finally, Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 15 S.Ct. 73, 39 L.Ed. 146 (1894), the second 19th-centu-ry case cited in Washington, involved the possibility of bias where “one of the trial jurors had served on the grand jury that indicted the defendant.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 824 (summarizing Thompson).
Each of the above cases reflects the rationale underlying the basic jurisprudential principle of deference: The reason that reviewing courts typically defer to the judgment of the initial arbiter on largely fact-based matters is that the latter’s “vantage point and day-to-day experience” with such matters endows it with “an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (discussing federal appellate courts’ deference to district courts in their application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to criminal defendants); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430 U.S. 243, 253, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977) (“[I]t is because of his special experience, expertise, and selection by the parties that courts generally defer to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.”).
The same principle applies in the present context of manifest-necessity determinations based on possible juror bias, as the Supreme Court reiterated in Washington:
There are compelling institutional considerations militating in favor of appellate deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the significance of possible juror bias. He has seen and heard the jurors *441during their voir dire examination. He is the judge most familiar with the evidence and the background of the case on trial. He has listened to the tone of the argument as it was delivered and has observed the apparent reaction of the jurors. In short, he is far more “conversant with the factors relevant to the determination” than any reviewing court can possibly be.
434 U.S. at 513-14, 98 S.Ct. 824 (footnotes omitted).
As noted above, however, the state trial judge in the present case was in no way “conversant” with how large-scale terrorist attacks would affect totally unrelated trial proceedings when the events of September 11, 2001 occurred. This was through no fault of his own, to be sure. How was the judge, more than anyone else, supposed to know what the effects of the attacks on the jurors might be? The answer is simply that without asking them — which the judge undisputedly failed to do — he could not have known. He therefore was not any “better positioned” than either the Ohio Court of Appeals or ourselves to make a manifest-necessity determination on the basis of possible juror bias. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (explaining the rationale underlying the abuse-of-discretion standard in a case involving a district court’s authority to award attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act).
In short, the majority correctly states as a general 'principle that “[tjhere are compelling institutional considerations militating in favor of appellate deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the significance of possible juror bias.” Maj. Op. at 438 (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 824). And concern about juror bias is indeed “a legitimate consideration in the ‘manifest necessity’ calculation.” Maj. Op. at 439. But the problem in the present case is the impossibility of abstractly divining what the bias would have been. Because the trial judge could not have known the answer, deference to his uninformed judgment to declare a mistrial is less reasonable than under normal circumstances where the bias-precipitating event bears a direct relationship to the trial at issue.
Caselaw from this circuit provides support for my conclusion. Johnson v. Karnes, 198 F.3d 589, 597 (6th Cir.1999), is our leading case in this area, where the court issued a writ of habeas corpus because “the state trial court failed to exercise ‘sound discretion’ in declaring a mistrial.” In Johnson, the defense attorney asked the victim on cross-examination whether he was aware of the defendant’s prior acquittal for robbery. Id. at 591. The trial judge immediately convened a sidebar, where he expressed anger at the defense attorney for having asked the question and indicated to the prosecutor that he would grant a mistrial “if you want [it].” Id. at 592. After a brief, 10-to-15-minute recess, and after conducting another, more thorough sidebar conference with both attorneys present, the judge declared a mistrial over the defendant’s objection. Id.
Johnson sought habeas relief based upon the trial court’s subsequent denial of his motion to dismiss the remaining counts against him on double-jeopardy grounds. The district court denied Johnson’s habeas petition, but this court reversed, holding that “manifest necessity” did not justify the mistrial. Id. at 597. As the majority here points out, the Johnson court determined that “the trial judge failed to act rationally, responsibly or deliberately, and thus failed to exercise sound discretion as required by [United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) ] and its progeny.” Maj. Op. at 439 *442n. 3 (quoting Johnson, 198 F.3d at 596). The trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial was accordingly determined to be an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law. Id. at 597. Judge Boggs vigorously dissented, emphasizing that because the judge “heard argument by both sides” before declaring a mistrial, he cannot be said to have acted “irrationally or irresponsibly.” Id. at 598 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 514, <CARET>98 S.Ct. 824).
Interestingly, the reasoning of Judge Boggs’s pro-government dissent in Johnson actually supports the district court’s decision to grant Walls a habeas writ in the present case. Judge Boggs reached his conclusion by distinguishing “[t]he primary cases from this circuit cited to support” the majority’s decision to grant ha-beas relief to Johnson. Id. at 598 (Boggs, J., dissenting). These were Glover v. McMackin, 950 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir.1991), and Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322 (6th Cir.1997).
Regarding Glover, Judge Boggs stressed that the “judge declared a mistrial without any motion or argument, in the midst of a heated cross-examination.” Johnson, 198 F.3d at 598 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (discussing Glover). Therefore, “the judge’s actions in Glover were a far cry from what happened in [Johnson], where argument was permitted, and the judge did not make a final ruling until after a motion had been made.” Id. The facts of the present case fit more closely with Glover than with Johnson. To be sure, the trial judge met with both the prosecutor (in person) and the defense attorney (by phone) and gave each a chance to raise objections or other concerns prior to the judge’s official declaration of a mistrial. But the judge admitted in his later testimony that he had made up his mind to declare a mistrial before contacting counsel for their views. The prosecutor, moreover, never made a motion for a mistrial, unlike in Johnson; the mistrial was instead declared by the judge sua sponte, as in Glover.
Most critically, the judge here by his own admission never gave any consideration whatsoever — either at the time that he declared the mistrial or in his post-judgment testimony — to Walls’s constitutional right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. This, if nothing else, the judge was required to do. As the Supreme Court clearly stated in Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486-88, 91 S.Ct. at 558, “in the final analysis, the judge must always temper the decision whether or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” See also Washington, 434 U.S. at 515, 98 S.Ct. 824 (emphasizing that the trial judge, in compliance with Jom, had “evinc[ed] a concern for the possible double jeopardy consequences of an erroneous ruling” and “accorded careful consideration to respondent’s interest in having the trial concluded in a single proceeding”). “The ‘particular tribunal’ principle [underlying the prohibition on double jeopardy] is implicated whenever a mistrial is declared over the defendant’s objection and without regard to the presence or absence of governmental overreaching.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 508 n. 25, 98 S.Ct. 824 (quotation marks omitted). These were the precise circumstances surrounding the mistrial declaration in the present case.
Regarding Harpster, Judge Boggs emphasized that case’s conclusion that the “amount of prejudice that could have existed [on account of the borderline improper testimony for which the mistrial was declared], if any existed at all, was *443minuscule.” Harpster, 128 F.3d at 330 (noting that not even the very basis for the mistrial — namely, the defense counsel’s violation of a pretrial order — was clear from the record). The trial judge’s failure to consider alternatives to a mistrial was accordingly fatal to a finding of “manifest necessity” because a “simple corrective instruction would have been adequate” to cure whatever prejudice did exist. Johnson, 198 F.3d at 598 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (discussing Harpster) (quotation marks omitted). Judge Boggs thus clarified that any discussion of the eonsid-eration-of-alternatives factor of the manifest-necessity analysis must occur “in the context” of the degree of possible prejudice involved. Id.
Stated differently, Judge Boggs’s basic point was that a standard of proportionality is at play in these cases: the lesser the amount of possible prejudice involved, the greater the trial judge’s responsibility to consider alternative curative measures to a mistrial. Judge Boggs impliedly agreed with the result in Harpster, where the degree of possible prejudice was “minuscule or nonexistent.” Johnson, 198 F.3d at 598 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Johnson, conversely, where the degree of possible prejudice was by comparison much greater, was wrongly decided in his opinion. Judge Boggs instead would have ruled as the Supreme Court did in Washington— that is, “[s]ince the record provides sufficient justification for the state-court ruling, the failure to explain that ruling more completely does not render it constitutionally defective.” Id. at 598-99 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. 824).
Again, the facts of the present case align more closely with Harpster (“miniscule or nonexistent” prejudice) than with Johnson and/or Washington. Certainly, the trial judge’s instincts to safeguard Walls’s presumptive innocence are laudable. But attempting to understand how the attacks of September 11 would have prejudiced the jury against Walls strains the imagination. The two have nothing in common. Hijacking jetliners for use as guided missiles versus robbing a residence at gunpoint, although both violent criminal acts, are otherwise incomparable. The September 11 terrorists sought the death of American lives and the destruction of recognizable symbols of American power. Walls’s alleged actions sought only money. The terrorists’ attacks killed approximately 3,000 people. Walls’s alleged actions resulted in no deaths at all. Finally, regarding more tangible indices such as physical appearance that typically account for “spillover effect,” those responsible for the September 11 attacks were of Middle Eastern origin and Islamic beliefs. Nothing in the record indicates that Lawrence Walls was of either.
The likelihood that the attacks would have prejudiced the jury against Walls was therefore, as in Harpster, “minuscule or nonexistent.” Johnson, 198 F.3d at 598 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (discussing Harp-ster ). Regarding the trial judge’s principal concern (expressed for the first time during his post-judgment testimony) that the focus on the attacks would divert the jury’s attention from the case before them, he simply had no basis to make such an assumption. He had not been confronted with similar circumstances at any point in his judicial career, much less on a regular, “day-to-day” basis. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035. If anything, the fact that Walls’s counsel objected to the mistrial should have indicated to the judge that his assumption of divided-attention-based prejudice was faulty, requiring that an actual inquiry be made into the matter. Such an inquiry was especially critical because this was not a case where, as in Washington, “the record provides suffi*444cient justification for the state-court ruling.” 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. 824. The record, in fact, provides no justification at all for any of the trial judge’s alleged grounds for declaring the mistrial. Compare id. at 517, 98 S.Ct. 824 (noting that the record included “the extensive argument of counsel prior to the judge’s ruling”).
To be sure, the majority properly concedes that “[t]he case before us is unusual to the extent that the perceived improper taint came from outside the courthouse.” Maj. Op. at 438. What makes this case unusual, however, is not simply that the “perceived improper taint came from outside from courthouse,” but more specifically that it derived from events that were completely unprecedented and beyond the realm of ordinary human experience. This additional characteristic of the September 11 attacks distinguishes the present case from those involving other “outside the courthouse” taints — for example, the death of a prospective witness or of a juror’s family member — where the judge would be far more capable of gauging the potential effect of the taint on the jury.
Undisputedly, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state-court decisions. See Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir.1998) (“[AEDPA] tells federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an error grave enough to be called unreasonable.”) (quotation marks omitted). As applied to the present case, therefore, AEDPA adds another layer of deference onto a largely fact-based ruling that is already entitled to substantial deference. But AEDPA deference is not absolute, as each of the numerous posN1996 cases granting a writ of habeas corpus attests. A critical footnote in Washington that is not mentioned by the majority is directly relevant to the degree of deference that we should afford in the present case:
It should be noted, however, that the rationale for this deference in the “hung” jury situation is that the trial court is in the best position to assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily discretionary determination whether the jury will be able to reach a just verdict if it continues to deliberate. If the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise the “sound discretion” entrusted to him, the reason for deference by an appellate court disappears. Thus, if the trial judge acts for reasons completely unrelated to the trial problem which purports to be the basis for the mistrial ruling, close appellate scrutiny is appropriate.
434 U.S. at 510 n. 28, 98 S.Ct. 824 (emphasis added).
The failure of the Ohio Court of Appeals to recognize the inapplicability of deferential review to the facts of this case — as mandated by the same Supreme Court precedent on which it otherwise relied— renders its ruling unreasonable within the meaning of AEDPA. I would therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.