Court Opinion

ID: 9955878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:02:22.651372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.844785
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Boston CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A164448
 v.
 DONALD KIRKLAND BOSTON,                                                (Contra Costa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 05-910595-8)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         In 1992, Donald Boston was convicted of multiple offenses, including
three first degree murders with special circumstances. The present appeal is
from an order denying Boston’s 2020 petition to vacate his murder
convictions and resentence him for his other offenses. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)1
Boston argues the superior court erred in concluding that he is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. We affirm.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Boston’s 1992 Convictions
         The events that gave rise to Boston’s convictions are summarized in
People v. Amos et al. (July 22, 1994, A058843) [nonpub. opn.] (Amos).

        Statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless another statute is
         1

cited. Boston filed his resentencing petition under former section 1170.95,
which was amended and renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive
change. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 947, fn. 2; see Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

                                                               1
Although we do not rely on the factual summary in Amos to conduct our
review, we recount some background facts to provide context.
      On December 6, 1989, Boston went to a mini mart in Vallejo with two
associates, Fred Amos and Maurice Jackson, ostensibly to buy drugs. David
Stump and David Conner were working at the mini mart that night. The
drug seller was Johnny Castaneda, who arrived at the mini mart with
Timothy Treas.
      On December 10, 1989, Treas was found dead in the trunk of
Castaneda’s car. Later that day, police went to Castaneda’s apartment where
they found the bodies of Castaneda and his girlfriend, Claudia Blackmon.
The following month, police responded to a report of a shooting incident at
the mini mart, after which Stump and Conner were placed in a witness
protection program.
      Criminal Charges
      Pursuant to a January 1992 amended information, Boston and Amos
were charged with multiple offenses relating to events at the mini mart.2
Both defendants were charged with committing the following offenses on
December 6 and 7, 1989: first degree murder of Castaneda, Treas and
Blackmon (§ 187, counts 1–3); kidnapping for robbery of Castaneda and Treas
(§ 290, subd. (b), counts 4–5); robbery of Castaneda and Blackmon (§§ 211 &
212.5, counts 6–7); burglary of the mini mart and of the apartment
Castenada shared with Blackmon (§§ 459 & 460.2, count 8; §§ 459 & 460.1,
count 9); vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 10); conspiracy to
commit robbery, burglary, and kidnapping (former § 182.1, count 11); and
unlawful possession of a concealable firearm by a felon (§ 12021, count 12 for
Amos, count 13 for Boston).

      2   Jackson was charged and tried separately.

                                        2
      Boston was additionally charged with committing the following offenses
on January 7, 1990: attempted murder of Stump and Conner (§§ 187 & 664,
counts 14–15); and dissuading or preventing witnesses by force (§ 136.1,
counts 16–17).
      As to each murder charge and both defendants, the district attorney
alleged four special circumstances: that the defendant committed more than
one murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3) [the multiple murder special circumstance]);
and that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted
commission of a robbery, a burglary, and a kidnapping, (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)
[the felony-murder special circumstances]). As to the offenses charged in
counts 1 through 11 and 16 and 17, it was further alleged that the defendant
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
      Jury Instructions Regarding Murder Convictions
      At trial, the jury was instructed regarding two theories of first degree
murder: deliberate, premeditated killing with malice aforethought; and
felony murder, with robbery and burglary designated as the predicate
offenses.
      The jury also received instruction regarding the liability of an aider and
abettor, which provided that an aider and abettor is guilty not just of the
“particular crime aided and abetted” (the target offense), but is also “liable for
the natural and probable consequences of the commission of such crime.”
This instruction made clear that a defendant could not be found guilty as an
aider and abettor of any crime unless the jury was “satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that such crime was committed . . .”
      The trial court used a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80 to instruct
the jury that if they found a defendant guilty of first degree murder in this
case, they were required to go on to consider if the prosecution carried its

                                        3
burden of proving any one of the four special circumstance allegations. As
pertinent here, the jury was instructed as follows:
      “The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special
circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special
circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.
      “If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
actually killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant intended
to kill in order to find the special circumstance to be true.
      “If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human
being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual
killer, you cannot find any special circumstance to be true as to that
defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such
defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the
murder in the first degree.
      “In other words, to find any of the four alleged special circumstances to
be true, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
actually killed a human being or had the specific intent to aid and abet
another in killing even though some other person actually did the killing.”3
      Jury Verdicts
      In March 1992, the jury convicted Boston and Amos of all charges, with
the exception of the count 5 charge of kidnapping for robbery, for which the
defendants were convicted of the lesser offense of kidnapping. All alleged
special circumstances pertaining to the three first degree murders were found

      3 The last sentence of this excerpt from the special-circumstance
instruction was a modification to the standard CALJIC instruction.

                                        4
true, and all firearm use allegations were found true, except for the allegation
pertaining to one of the burglary convictions.
      Following separate penalty trials, the jury returned verdicts of life
without parole as to both Boston and Amos. The trial court sentenced Boston
to three consecutive life terms for the murders, each with consecutive four-
year terms for the firearm use enhancement. Boston was sentenced to two
additional consecutive life terms for the attempted murders, again with
consecutive four-year terms for using a firearm. Sentences for Boston’s other
convictions were stayed. (§ 654.) In its 1994 decision in Amos, another panel
of this court affirmed Boston’s convictions and made modifications to his
sentence for some of the firearm use enhancements.
II. Senate Bill No. 1437
      In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended provisions of the Penal Code
pertaining to the felony-murder rule (§ 189) and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine (§ 188) in order “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
959 (Lewis).)
      Regarding the felony-murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189,
subdivision (e) (section 189(e)), which states: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a
death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶]
(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission

                                        5
of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”4
      Senate Bill 1437 also “created a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as
amended,” by filing a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, which
was later renumbered as section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 (Strong); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.)
      Pursuant to section 1172.6, a person previously convicted of murder or
attempted murder may file a resentencing petition “when all of the following
conditions apply”: (1) the charging document filed against the petitioner
permitted the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, or
another theory of imputed malice; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder,
attempted murder or manslaughter following a trial or plea proceeding at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder; and (3) the “petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
III. Boston’s Resentencing Petition
      In August 2020, Boston filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95. In May 2021, after counsel was appointed to represent him,
Boston filed his operative amended petition. Boston alleges that murder
charges relating to the mini mart incidents permitted the prosecution to

      4 As to the natural and probable consequences doctrine, section 188,
subdivision(a)(3) now provides: “Except [for felony-murder liability] as stated
in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”

                                        6
proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of
murder because of changes to section 188 and 189 that went into effect on
January 1, 2019. Boston alleges further that he was not the actual killer; he
did not, with intent to kill, aid, abet or assist the actual killer; and he either
was not a major participant in the felony or he did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or felony.
      On December 2, 2021, the trial court denied Boston’s petition in a
detailed written order. The court found that although Boston filed a facially
valid petition, the record of conviction in this case conclusively shows that, as
a matter of law, Boston is ineligible for relief. In reaching this conclusion, the
court focused specifically on the third element of a prima facie case for relief,
which requires the defendant to state facts to show that he could not
currently be convicted of murder. (Citing former § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)
Here, the court found, the jury verdicts establish that Boston was convicted of
the murders of Castaneda, Treas and Blackmon under a theory of liability
that remains valid under the current definitions of murder described in
section 188 and 189. The court reasoned that the true findings as to the
special-circumstance murder allegations conclusively establish that the jury
found that Boston “either was the actual killer or that he engaged in the
special circumstance felony or multiple murders with intent to kill.”
Accordingly, the petition for resentencing was summarily denied.
                                 DISCUSSION
      The procedure for seeking resentencing relief “begins with the filing of
a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are
met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to [Penal Code] Section

                                         7
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill
1437.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Upon receipt of a facially valid petition, “the court must evaluate the petition
‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ”
(Ibid.) At that stage, the “court may look at the record of conviction, which
will necessarily inform its ‘prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.’ ” (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244,
1251 (Williams); see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
      “If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the
defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) If, on the
other hand, “the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” (Strong, at p. 708,
quoting § 1172.6, subd. (c).) “We review de novo whether the trial court
conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6.” (Williams, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1251.)
      The dispositive issue presented by this appeal is whether the record of
conviction in this case establishes that—as a matter of law—Boston is guilty
of the murders of Castaneda, Treas and Blackmon under a still valid theory.
      Under current law, “[a]ll murder that is . . . committed in the
perpetration of . . . robbery [or] burglary . . . is murder of the first degree.”
(§ 189, subd. (a).) Senate Bill 1437 did not change this law. (See People v.
Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 577 (Lopez); see id. at p. 581 (dis. opn. of
Raphael, J.).) However, Senate Bill 1437 “ ‘narrowed the scope’ ” of the
felony-murder rule by adding section 189(e). (Lopez, at p. 574.) Under the
old felony murder law, before Senate Bill 1437 was enacted, “[t]he necessary

                                          8
mental state was simply the intent to commit a qualifying felony” as “malice
was imputed to the participant based on their willingness to commit a felony
our Legislature deemed ‘ “inherently dangerous to human life.” ’ ” (Lopez, at
p. 574.) Under the pertinent provision of the new law, section 189(e)(2),
participation in a qualifying felony in which a death occurs is sufficient to
justify liability for first degree murder if the defendant was “not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted . . . or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.”
      The jury at Boston’s murder trial was instructed that, in order to find
the special-circumstance murder allegations true, it had to find that Boston
was either the actual killer or that “with the intent to kill” he “aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in
the commission of the murder in the first degree.” This quoted language
mirrors language in section 190.2, subdivision (c) (section 190.2(c)), which
provides: “Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill,
aids, abets, . . . or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first
degree shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances
enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.”
      The jury found that, as to each murder victim, the four special
circumstances alleged against Boston were true. Thus, if Boston was not the
actual killer, the jury found, he harbored the requisite intent to kill when he
aided, abetted, or assisted “in the commission of the murder in the first
degree.” These findings, considered together with the instructions regarding
the murder charges and jury verdicts, establish that Boston was convicted
under a still valid theory of felony murder, as he was either the actual killer
or, at the very least, acted with the intent to kill when he assisted in the

                                          9
commission of the first degree murders by aiding and abetting the robbery
and burglary offenses during which the killings occurred.
      Contending otherwise, Boston briefly argues that because the
determination whether he acted with intent to kill was necessary only to
decide the special-circumstance murder allegations, it cannot be used to
establish the mens rea element of murder. This argument fails in light of
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, which holds that a finding of intent to
kill made pursuant to a special-circumstance murder allegation is relevant
and binding on the petitioner in a resentencing proceeding. (Id. at p. 453
[addressing gang-murder special circumstance].) Also, in contrast to Curiel,
where the defendant was not prosecuted under a felony-murder theory (id. at
p. 464), the record of conviction in this case shows that the jury made
findings adequate to convict Boston of first degree felony murder under
current law. Boston disagrees, which brings us to his primary claim of error.
      Boston argues that the jury did not necessarily make findings to
establish that his conduct would constitute murder under current law.
According to this argument, language in section 189(e)(2) requiring that a
defendant who was not the actual killer must have aided, abetted, or assisted
the “actual killer in the commission of murder” means that the defendant
must have aided, abetted, or assisted the killing itself, not just the target
felony during which the murder occurred. Boston posits that no such finding
was necessarily made against him, reasoning that because the special-
circumstance findings establish only that he assisted “any actor,” they do not
necessarily show that he aided and abetted the killings themselves.
      Boston’s interpretation of section 189(e)(2) was rejected in Lopez, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th 566. The Lopez majority held that Senate Bill 1437 did not
change the actus rea requirement for convicting an aider and abettor of first

                                       10
degree felony murder; under the current and former law, it must be shown
that the defendant aided and abetted the qualifying felony. (Lopez, at
pp. 577–578.) Relying on the dissenting opinion in Lopez, which in turn
relied on People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, Boston insists that
section 189(e)(2) did change the law by expressly requiring that a defendant
must have aided and abetted the “actual killer,” and that this allegedly new
requirement limits aider and abettor liability for felony murder to cases in
which the defendant aided and abetted the homicidal act itself. We disagree
with Boston, as we find the analysis of the Lopez majority more persuasive.
      As explained in Lopez, the purpose of Senate Bill 1437 “was to stop the
practice of imputing malice to defendants to justify convicting them of
murder. A defendant who participates in a qualifying felony while harboring
express malice does not fall into the class of offenders the new law was
enacted to protect. [Citation.] In other words, because express malice is an
element of [section 189(e)(2)] felony-murder liability, there is no reason to
interpret the actus reus requirement as anything different than what the
felony-murder actus reus requirement was before Senate Bill 1437—‘aiding
and abetting the underlying felony or attempted felony that results in the
murder.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578, italics omitted, quoting
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615.) Thus, under felony-murder law,
both currently and historically, “assisting a qualifying felony in which a
death occurs is the same as assisting the actual killer in committing first
degree murder, and vice versa.” (Lopez, at p. 578.) There is no new

                                       11
requirement that the defendant must have also assisted in the killing act
itself.5
       The Lopez majority’s construction of section 189(e)(2) is consistent with
and reinforced by authority construing substantially similar language in
section 190.2(c), the special-circumstance murder statute addressing aiders
and abettors. As noted, section 190.2(c) provides for enhanced penalties
when a special circumstance has been found true as to a defendant convicted
of first degree murder who, though not the actual killer, “with the intent to
kill aids, abets, . . . or assists any actor in the commission of murder.” Our
Supreme Court has construed this language to mean that the defendant must
have aided or abetted the predicate felony but need not have assisted in the
killing itself. (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 900 [construing section
190.2, former subd. (b), now subd. (c)].) The fact that the Legislature elected
to use language that is substantively similar to section 190.2(c) when it
enacted section 189(e)(2) reinforces that the Legislature intended both
provisions to have the same meaning, i.e., that a defendant who aids, abets,
or assists in the commission of the predicate felony thereby also aids, abets,
or assists in “ ‘the commission of murder.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 577–578, italics omitted.)6

       5 In light of our conclusions, we do not address Boston’s argument that
the modification made to the CALJIC jury instruction in this case was
insufficient to require the jury to determine whether Boston aided and
abetted the act of murder.

       6Boston mistakenly relies on People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, an
appeal by a defendant convicted of murdering his wife, with the special
circumstance that the murder was committed for financial gain. (§ 190.2,
subds. (a)(1).) Affirming the judgment, the Court in Fayed observed that
when the financial gain special circumstance and the aiding and abetting

                                       12
      Moreover, construing section 189(e)(2) as changing the actus rea for
felony murder would defy common sense because it would make it “easier for
the prosecution to obtain a conviction for defendants who harbored the less
culpable mindset of reckless indifference to human life than for those who
acted with express malice.” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 579, italics
omitted.) Under the reckless disregard to human life provision of section
189(e), the defendant need only have been a major participant in the felony to
be guilty of murder, and yet under Boston’s reading of the statute, a
defendant who acts with actual malice would not be guilty of murder unless
the prosecution proved that the defendant not only aided and abetted the
qualifying felony but also aided the “murderous act as well.” (Lopez, at
p. 579, italics omitted.) Such a construction is inconsistent with the
legislative purpose underlying Senate Bill 1437, which was to “stop the
practice of imputing malice,” not to “make felony-murder liability more
difficult to prove than direct aiding and abetting in cases where the
defendant acted with express malice.” (Lopez, at p. 579, italics omitted.)
      Boston contends that even if aiding and abetting a predicate felony
during which a killing occurs constitutes aiding and abetting commission of

provision of the special circumstances statute are construed together, “ ‘it is
clear that one who intentionally aids and encourages a person in the
deliberate killing of another for the killer’s own financial gain is subject to
the special circumstance punishment.’ ” (Fayed, at p. 202.) But contrary to
Boston’s argument to this court, Fayed does not assist Boston. Indeed, the
case rejects an argument parallel to the one Boston makes here. Fayed
explains that the financial gain special circumstance is true even when the
participant who acts for financial gain is not the actual killer but a third
person, such as an intermediary between the hirer and the killer. (Ibid.)
Fayed does not hold or intimate that a person convicted as an aider and
abettor of felony murder must have aided in the killing itself, or have aided
the person who does the actual killing as opposed to any other participant in
the crime.

                                       13
murder, the record of conviction in his case does not conclusively show that
the jury made findings sufficient to convict Boston of murder under current
law due to the fact that three people were accused of committing the
robberies and felonies during which the victims were killed. According to this
argument, the distinction between “any actor” and “actual killer” may be
immaterial when the evidence shows that only two people perpetrated the
felonies, in which case it can be assumed that the defendant who aided the
commission of the felony thereby assisted the actual killer. Here, however,
the jury was told that three people participated in the predicate felonies,
which, Boston argues, leaves open the possibility that he was found to have
aided and abetted somebody who was not the actual killer, i.e., “a non-killing
accomplice or conspirator.” Despite its surface logic, this argument is
ultimately unavailing because it rests on the same premise as Boston’s first
argument, i.e., that section 189(e)(2) changed the law to require the
defendant to have aided in the act of killing itself.
      As explained above, “assisting a qualifying felony in which a death
occurs is the same as assisting the actual killer in committing first degree
murder, and vice versa.” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) This
principle does not depend on the number of people who commit the qualifying
felony, as all participants in the crime necessarily aid the others, the actual
killer included. Thus, if the defendant’s conduct constitutes aiding and
abetting of a target felony, and a death occurs during commission of the
felony, that defendant has necessarily assisted the actual killer in
committing first degree murder, whether or not the defendant assisted in the
specific act of killing itself.
      Section 189(e)(2) changed the law of felony murder by imposing liability
on a defendant who is not the actual killer but who, with the intent to kill,

                                        14
aids, abets, or assists in the commission of a predicate felony during which
the death occurs. Such conduct necessarily aids the actual killer in
commission of the murder. Because Boston’s record of conviction shows that
the jury made findings sufficient to convict him of first degree felony murder
under this law, we reject his contention that the trial court erred by denying
his petition.
                                  DISPOSITION
         The order denying Boston’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                              TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Boston (A164448)

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