Court Opinion

ID: 9954577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:30.759124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:54.159814
License: Public Domain

J-S04013-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 DAVIN CORDELL BAKER                      :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :
                                          :    No. 1496 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 13, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0001639-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED MARCH 26, 2024

      Davin Cordell Baker appeals from the judgment of sentence of one and

one-half to four years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation

following his negotiated guilty plea to five counts of sexual abuse of children.

For the reasons explained infra, consistent with our High Court’s guidance in

Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 584 (Pa. 2020), we remand to

the trial court for the development of a full factual record concerning

Appellant’s constitutional challenges implicating the legality of his sentence.

      In 2021, Chester County police received a tip from the National Center

for Missing and Exploited Children that an individual in its jurisdiction was

uploading child sexual abuse material to the internet. Appellant admitted to

transmitting the images, and a subsequent search of his electronic devices

revealed hundreds of pornographic photographs and videos that Appellant had

distributed to other people. He pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of
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children–dissemination of child pornography pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(c)

and four counts of sexual abuse of children–possession of child pornography

pursuant to § 6312(d). In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court

imposed the sentence noted above. As a result of the § 6312(c) conviction,

Appellant has been classified as a Tier II offender, subject to twenty-five years

of registration pursuant to Subchapter H (“Revised Subchapter H”) of

Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).

See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.14(a) and 9799.15(a)(2) (mandating that a

conviction    for   “[d]issemination     of    photographs,   videotapes,   computer

depictions and films” requires registration “for a period of [twenty-five]

years”).

       Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, wherein he averred that

Revised Subchapter H is unconstitutional because it violates his due process

rights by creating “an irrebuttable presumption that those convicted of

enumerated offenses pose a high risk of committing additional sexual

offenses[,] depriving those individuals of their fundamental right to

reputation.” Post-Sentence Motion, 3/22/23, at 3 (cleaned up). Appellant

then requested a stay pending the outcome of Torsilieri, which is currently

pending before our Supreme Court at Docket Number 97 MAP 2022.1 The trial

____________________________________________

1  This is the second time that George Torsilieri’s challenge to the
constitutionality of SORNA is pending before the High Court. See
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020) (remanding to the
trial court for further development of the record regarding the constitutionality
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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court denied the motion without a hearing. This timely appeal followed. The

court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he complied. Thereafter, the

court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

       Appellant presents the following question for our review: “Did the trial

court err in denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion to bar the application

of SORNA and stay the application of SORNA’s requirements pending the

outcome of Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 97 MAP 2022?” Appellant’s brief

at 2 (cleaned up).        Appellant avers that his reporting requirements are

unconstitutional because of SORNA’s “irrebuttable presumption” and requests

remand for an evidentiary hearing concerning the constitutionality of the

requirements of Revised Subchapter H. Id. at 14-16.

       Our Supreme Court has held that challenges to the registration

requirements of Subchapter H implicate the legality of sentencing and cannot

be waived.2 See Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1194, 1198

(Pa. 2022) (concluding that “this Court’s legality of sentencing jurisprudence—

i.e., that challenges implicating the legality of a sentence cannot be waived—

____________________________________________

of Subchapter H of SORNA). On May 23, 2023, the High Court heard oral
argument regarding the constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H, but to date
has not rendered its decision.

2 Insofar as the trial court claims that Appellant is not entitled to relief because

he pled guilty and accepted the SORNA requirements, it is well-settled that
the right to challenge the legality of a sentence survives the entry of a guilty
plea. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stanley, 259 A.3d 989, 992 (Pa.Super.
2021).

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applies equally to constitutional challenges to Revised Subchapter H of

SORNA”).    This Court has observed that “constitutional challenges to the

application of Revised Subchapter H raise questions of law, as they assert that

the registration requirements of Revised Subchapter H are punitive and unduly

rely on an irrebuttable presumption that all sex offenders pose a high risk of

future dangerousness and reoffending.” Commonwealth v. Boyd, 287 A.3d

957, 959 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). “As with all questions of law, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”             Id.

(cleaned up).

      In Torsilieri, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court outlined the significant

burden borne by an individual seeking to invalidate a statutory scheme on

constitutional grounds:

      In addressing constitutional challenges to legislative enactments,
      we are ever cognizant that the General Assembly may enact laws
      which impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health,
      safety, and welfare of society, but also that any restriction is
      subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all
      citizens. We emphasize that a party challenging a statute must
      meet the high burden of demonstrating that the statute clearly,
      palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.

Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 575 (cleaned up).

      Our High Court has also directed that when appellants have preserved

a challenge to the constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H, but have not had

an opportunity to present evidence to support their arguments, they are

entitled to remand:

      If . . . we were to conclude that Appellant is not entitled to a
      remand . . . or preclude Appellant from offering scientific evidence

                                      -4-
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      to establish the punitive nature of Revised Subchapter H on
      remand, Appellant would derive absolutely no benefit from our
      holding today. In other words, our ruling today—i.e., that
      constitutional challenges to the lifetime registration requirement
      set forth in Revised Subchapter H implicate the legality of a
      sentence and, therefore, cannot be waived—would have no
      meaning if individuals seeking to challenge Revised Subchapter H
      on constitutional grounds were required to present evidence in
      support thereof during his/her underlying criminal proceedings.

Thorne, 276 A.3d at 1198 n.13.

      We note that while the appellants in Thorne and Boyd raised the

constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H for the first time on appeal, here,

Appellant raised it for the first time in a post-sentence motion. However, like

the appellants in Thorne and Boyd, Appellant did not have the opportunity

to offer any scientific evidence or learned testimony to establish the punitive

nature of Revised Subchapter H, as the trial court denied his post-sentence

motion without an evidentiary hearing. As noted above, Appellant requests

remand for a hearing to “present evidence regarding whether the legislative

purpose of the sexual registration and notification requirements of Subchapter

H [is] supported by a scientific basis.” Appellant’s brief at 16.

      Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing and

an opportunity for Appellant to supplement his arguments with scientific

evidence or learned testimony. See, e.g., Boyd, 287 A.3d at 957 (“[W]e

remand to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional

                                      -5-
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challenges to SORNA II, Revised Subchapter H that Appellant has raised

before this Court.”).3

       Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/26/2024

____________________________________________

3  While Thorne and Boyd concern the appropriate procedures for Tier III
lifetime registration requirements under SORNA, this Court has also remanded
to the trial court for a hearing when an appellant challenged the
constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H in cases involving a Tier I
requirement, which entails a fifteen-year registration period.               See
Commonwealth v. Best, 2023 WL 8598270, at *5 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-
precedential decision) (remanding to the trial court for a hearing because
“Appellant has not had the opportunity to offer any scientific evidence or
learned testimony to support his claims”); see also Commonwealth v. Chai,
304 A.3d 716, 2023 WL 4881480, at *2 n.5 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-
precedential decision) (concluding that “Chai . . . should have an opportunity
to substantiate his legality of sentence claims”). Hence, in the matter sub
judice, we will not treat Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his
Tier II registration requirements differently than those of the other tiers.

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