Court Opinion

ID: 9740082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:27:36.398012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.104626
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KARMEIER, specially concurring: I agree that mandamus will not lie in this case. I write separately because I would reach that conclusion for a reason different from the one expressed by the majority. Unlike my colleagues, I believe that subsection (1) of section 5 — 601 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5 — 601(1) (West 2004)) does confer upon the State the right to make a speedy-trial demand. Here, as in all cases of statutory construction, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 480 (1997). Subsection (1) of section 5 — 601 expressly provides: “When a petition has been filed alleging that the minor is a delinquent, a trial must be held within 120 days of a written demand for such hearing made by any party, except that when the State, without success, has exercised due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence may be obtained at a later date, the court may, upon motion by the State, continue the trial for not more than 30 additional days.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 — 601(1) (West 2004). Although the word “any” has a diversity of meanings depending on the context in which it is used, its primary definition is “one indifferently out of more than two” or “one or more indiscriminately from all those of a kind.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976). Consistent with this definition, it is synonymous with “either,” “every” or “all.” Black’s Law Dictionary 94 (6th ed. 1990). In proceedings such as this to adjudicate whether a minor is delinquent, the State is the petitioner. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 520 (West 2004). As such, it is unquestionably a “party.” Because the clear and unambiguous language of section 5 — 601(1) of the Juvenile Court Act expressly permits “any party” to file a speedy-trial demand, and because “any” means “one indifferently out of more than two” or “one or more indiscriminately from all those of a kind” and is synonymous with “either,” “every,” or “all,” it necessarily follows that the State is among those parties entitled to file a written trial demand under the law. The majority rejects this conclusion, holding that “any party” actually means “any party except the State.” Such a construction is untenable. Where, as here, a legislative enactment is clear and unambiguous, a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Where the General Assembly intended to distinguish different categories of parties or differentiate the State from other parties to a proceeding governed by the Juvenile Court Act, it did so. For example, in contrast to section 5 — 601(1), section 1 — 15 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1 — 15 (West 2004)), dealing with waiver of objections to venue, is addressed not to “any party,” but to “a party respondent.” Section 1 — 5 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1 — 5 (West 2004)), governing rights of parties to proceedings, refers to “the minor who is the subject of the proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent.” Section 5 — 601(2) (705 ILCS 405/5 — 601(2) (West 2004)) speaks of the “minor respondent”; while section 5 — 705(3) (705 ILCS 405/5 — 705(3) (West 2004)), pertaining to motions for continuances in connection with sentencing, lists “the State’s Attorney, a parent, guardian, legal custodian, or counsel.” Other instances of differentiation between types of parties are common. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/2— 22(2), 3 — 26(7) (West 2004). That the legislature distinguished between parties when it intended to is nowhere more evident than in section 5 — 601(1) itself. As the text quoted above shows, after conferring on “any party” the right to make a speedy-trial demand, it immediately establishes an exception to the hearing deadline which may be invoked only by the State. Given the structure of that passage, a generic reference to parties followed by a specific exclusion for the State, it is clear that term “any party” was intended to embrace the State, as well as the minor, and the minor’s parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent. The formulation employed by the General Assembly Act in section 5 — 601(1) is identical to that used in section 3 — 16(b)(1)(A) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/3— 16(b)(1)(A) (West 2004)), governing adjudicatory hearings for minors requiring authoritative intervention, and section 4 — 13(b)(1)(A) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/4— 13(b)(1)(A) (West 2004)), pertaining to adjudicatory hearings for minors alleged to be addicts. Under those provisions, which took effect January 1, 1988, “any party” has the right to make a speedy-trial demand, just as “any party” has a right to make a speedy-trial demand under section 5 — 601(1) of the Act governing trials for minors alleged to be delinquent. In construing the language of these provisions, it is important to note that prior to January 1, 1988, sections 3— 16 and 4 — 13 of the Act were phrased differently. Under the earlier version of those laws, the speedy-trial period began automatically upon the filing of petitions alleging that a minor required authoritative intervention or was an addict. See 705 ILCS 405/3 — 16(a)(1), 4— 13(b)(1)(A) (West 2004). Because the act of filing was the triggering event, whoever was the petitioner could determine, through the timing of its filing, when the hearings would be held. Under that law, the petitioner could be any of a variety of persons and entities, including the State. See 705 ILCS 405/3 — 15, 4 — 12 (West 2004). Accordingly, any of those persons and entities, including the State, could, by filing the petition, start the clock running on the speedy-trial period. When the legislature amended sections 13 — 16 and 14 — 13 of the Juvenile Court Act effective January 1, 1988, it did not restrict the category of persons or entities who could cause the speedy-trial period to begin. The new system simply alters how the speedy-trial period is triggered. Instead of relying on the mere act of filing, the law now requires that a separate written demand be made. The same is true of section 5 — 601(1) of the Act. Until the statute was amended in the mid-1980s, the statutory hearing deadline automatically commenced when the delinquency petition was filed, regardless of who filed it. No written speedy-trial demand was necessary. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704 — 2. The new version of the law simply requires that a speedy-trial demand be made before the hearing clock begins to run. As with the new versions of sections 13 — 16 and 14 — 13, it in no way restricts the class of persons or entities who may cause the speedy-trial period to begin. The State could start the clock before by filing the petition. It can still start the clock. The only difference is that, now, a written demand is necessary. In justifying its refusal to follow the plain and unambiguous language of section 5 — 601(1), the majority asserts that permitting the State to demand a speedy trial would conflict with section 5 — 601(9) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5 — 601(9) (West 2004)), which states that “[njothing in this Section prevents the minor or the minor’s parents, guardian or legal custodian from exercising their respective rights to waive the time limits set forth in this Section.” The majority’s argument is premised on the assumption that the option of not demanding trial within 120 days is the same as having absolute authority to prevent the commencement of trial until more than 120 days have elapsed. In other words, they read section 5 — 601(9) of the Act to mean “if I don’t ask for it, you can’t have it.” The linguistic and logical steps necessary to reach this construction are not explained, and, frankly, I do not understand them. An abstention is not a veto. In my view, there is no conflict between sections 5 — 601(1) and 5 — 601(9). That one party has authority to waive a statutory right does not mean that the right may not be asserted by any of the other parties in the case. Waiver is merely the intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005). It does not entail, and has never been understood to entail, the power to insist that the right not be exercised by others who have an equal entitlement to invoke it. It is clear from their opinion that what really concerns my colleagues is the prospect that a minor will be forced to trial before he or she is prepared to proceed. What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that even if “any party” is construed to mean “any party except the State,” this potential remains. Delinquency cases, after all, are not simply bilateral proceedings involving a minor and the State. Parents, guardians and legal custodians are also involved, and they possess the same status as parties under the statute as the affected minors. That means they also have the same speedy-trial rights as minors do under section 5 — 601(1) of the Juvenile Court Act. Needless to say, a parent’s interests with respect to the conduct and outcome of delinquency proceedings are separate and distinct from those of the minor. It is entirely possible that a parent may wish prompt resolution of a delinquency proceeding where the child does not. Under section 5 — 601(1), such a parent, as a party, would have every right to demand a speedy trial even if the child were perfectly content to waive his or her own speedy-trial rights and defer the proceedings until later. The only way to prevent that from happening would be to say that the definition of “any party” in section 5 — 601(1) is limited to the minor and the minor alone. In other words, it would require this court to hold that when the legislature said that all of the parties could demand a speedy trial, it actually meant just the opposite, namely, that only one of the parties — the minor — could make a speedy-trial demand. Such a result would be indefensible under any recognized principles of statutory construction. The majority suggests that treating the State as a “party” would yield some absurd and unreasonable results. The examples it gives pertain to the right to appointment of counsel and the obligation to advise parties of their right to appeal from an adjudication of wardship. Without addressing the particulars of those arguments, I would note simply that to the extent that the references to “parties” may be broader than necessary in these examples, the overbreadth is completely inconsequential. As a practical matter, it does no harm. It has no effect. Accordingly, it provides no justification for ignoring the plain and unambiguous language of section 5 — 601(1). Under the prior version of the law, when the speedy-trial period commenced automatically upon filing of the petition, the rigidity of the speedy-trial deadlines was ameliorated by a judicial construction of the statute which read the time period as directory rather than mandatory. See In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d 102 (1974) (construing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 704 — 2). Under more recent precedent (In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 481-82) and in light of subsequent revisions to the statute, such a construction of the law is no longer valid. That does not mean, however, that once the State or any other party files a written speedy-trial demand, the minor is at the mercy of a fixed and unyielding trial date. As the majority correctly points out, minors in delinquency proceedings are, at a minimum, entitled to all the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings (see 705 ILCS 405/5 — 101(3) (West 2004)), including the right to continuances when the interests of justice so require (see 725 ILCS 5/114 — 4(d) (West 2004)). Where the minor involved in such a proceeding seeks and obtains a continuance, thereby delaying the trial, and the delay is deemed to be attributable to the minor, the speedy-trial period, if commenced by a written demand, will be tolled. Section 5 — 601(8) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5 — 601(8) (West 2004)) expressly so states. That is so regardless of which party filed the speedy-trial demand. Under the clear language of section 5 — 601(8), the statutory trial period is tolled whenever there is delay occasioned by the minor. Who initially triggered the speedy-trial period is irrelevant. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court in this case erred when it opined that the State was not among the parties entitled to make a speedy-trial demand under section 5 — 601(1) of the Juvenile Court Act. The State did have the right to demand a speedy trial. That right, however, was not unconditional. Where the request for a speedy trial is opposed by the minor, as it was in this case, the court has the discretion to delay the proceedings and continue the case when the interests of justice require. The record before us shows that the circuit court believed that it would be unduly burdensome on the minor to force him to trial on the delinquency petition while his prosecution on adult charges was underway. Whether one agrees with the circuit court’s assessment or not is of no consequence. For purposes of the matter before us today, the salient point is that this was a determination which the court had the discretion to make. Under Illinois law, the exercise of discretion is not subject to review by a writ of mandamus. International Harvester Co. v. Goldenhersh, 86 Ill. 2d 366, 369 (1981). It is for this reason that the State’s request for a writ of mandamus should be denied. CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GARMAN join in this special concurrence.