Court Opinion

ID: 9930280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 16:19:11.062023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:09.136255
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Causey
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

            PUI HO
                                                                                    OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 1585-22-4                                         JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                  FEBRUARY 6, 2024
            EBNE RAHMAN, ET AL.

                             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
                                          Lon E. Farris, Judge Designate1

                             Stephen Domenic Scavuzzo for appellant.

                             J. Chapman Petersen (Ibnul Ali Khan; Chap Petersen & Associates,
                             PLC, on brief), for appellee Ebne Rahman.

                             (Lisa M. Ernest; Fidelity National Law Group, on brief), for appellee
                             Truist Bank.

                   Pui Ho (“appellant”) appeals the Prince William County Circuit Court’s (the “circuit court”)

            order sustaining Ebne Rahman’s (“appellee”) plea in bar that the 15-year statute of limitations

            period for adverse possession (“possessory period”) could not run against him because he had not

            owned the property for 15 years. Appellant contends that the possessory period runs against the

            property, not the owner, and therefore the intervening sale to appellee is of no consequence to her

            adverse possession claim. For the following reasons, this Court finds, as a matter of law, that the

            intervening sale to appellee did not affect the possessory period. Accordingly, the circuit court’s

            order sustaining the plea in bar is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

                   1
                       Judge Farris is a retired judge of the Prince William Circuit Court.
                                          BACKGROUND2

       In June 2005, appellant purchased her home on Linton Hall Road in Bristow, Virginia.

At the time of her purchase the survey plat map showed “[a] solid black line depict[ing] the

property boundary as noted in the land records” on the west side of appellant’s property and “a

thinner line with perpendicular ‘dashes’ at regular intervals [depicting a] ‘wire fence’” to the

west and outside of appellant’s boundary line. This wire fence separated appellant’s property

from the undeveloped lots to the west and had been installed by a prior owner at some point in

the 1970s. Additionally, numerous trees grew to the east of the wire fence.3 Appellant contends

these trees and the wire fence “form a clearly visible and open boundary between [her] property

and the lots on the west side.”4 After appellant purchased her property, multiple single-family

homes were constructed to the west, including appellee’s home.

       Appellee purchased his home in 2010. He purportedly knew the wire fence was on his

property but made no entry onto the part of his property east of the wire fence until March 2021

when he tore it down and removed the nearby trees. Appellee’s actions constitute the first time

an owner of appellee’s lot disturbed the fence since its construction.

       2
         “[W]here no evidence is taken in support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the
appellate court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in resolving the issue presented. In
doing so, the facts stated in the plaintiff’s [complaint] are deemed true.” Massenburg v. City of
Petersburg, 298 Va. 212, 216 (2019) (quoting Lostrangio v. Laingford, 261 Va. 495, 497
(2001)).
       3
         It is unclear if these trees were on appellant’s property or between the wire fence and
her property line.
       4
         A wood privacy fence was installed during construction on the lots to appellant’s west.
It stood west of the wire fence, and appellant concedes it did not disturb the property line
purportedly established by the wire fence. The record does not reflect if, or when, this wood
fence was removed; seemingly it was included in the second amended complaint to establish
appellant’s claim that her property line extends to the wire fence.
                                                -2-
       In September 2021, appellant brought this action to quiet title for the land between the

surveyed property line and the wire fence. She asserted that she had acquired the land by

adverse possession, or, in the alternative, that her use of it had established a prescriptive

easement by which she should be allowed to continue using the disputed land in the same

manner she had been since acquiring her property in 2005. Appellee demurred, arguing a bill to

quiet title was not the appropriate legal mechanism to litigate this matter because the property

line, not the property title, was in dispute. Appellee also argued a prescriptive easement was an

inappropriate legal mechanism because easements provide land use rights, not ownership, and

appellant had not identified a specific or required use by her on which a prescriptive easement

could be granted. The circuit court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

       Appellant’s amended complaint sought determination of her boundary line, award of the

disputed land acquired by adverse possession, and monetary damages. Appellee again demurred,

arguing that appellant’s suit was not the proper legal mechanism for the relief she sought and that

the amended complaint was insufficient.5 The circuit court denied appellee’s requests and

ordered him to answer the first amended complaint. Appellee filed an answer and moved to join

necessary parties.6

       Appellant subsequently filed a second amended complaint joining the necessary parties.

Finally, appellee filed a plea in bar, arguing that the possessory period could not have started

until he took ownership of the disputed property, less than 15 years prior. In opposition,

       5
         Appellee’s demurrer was amended with leave of the circuit court to include the
sufficiency challenge.
       6
         The necessary parties are Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”),
the holder of legal title to appellee’s property and beneficiary of the deed of trust, Truist Bank,
the assignee of appellee’s mortgage loan secured by the deed of trust, and Deanna Follin, the
named trustee of the deed of trust.
                                                  -3-
appellant argued she had been in exclusive possession of the disputed land for the possessory

period and that the length of time appellee personally owned the land is irrelevant to her claim on

the property itself. Following full briefing from both parties, the circuit court sustained the plea

in bar. Appellant objected to the circuit court’s ruling and endorsed the order dismissing her

case as “Seen and Objection.”

       This appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

                           I. This appeal is not procedurally defaulted.

       Appellee urges this Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the circuit court’s ruling on the

basis that appellant failed to properly preserve her assignment of error.7 He contends that

appellant’s “Seen and Objection” endorsement on the final court order is insufficient under Rule

5A:18 to preserve her argument on appeal because it was neither timely nor specific. Under the

circumstances here, this Court declines to adopt appellee’s position.

       “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an

objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause

shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. To preserve an issue for

appeal, the objecting party must state the objection and its grounds with specificity. Lee v. Lee,

12 Va. App. 512, 515 (1991) (en banc). This specificity requirement allows “the trial judge [to]

know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Bethea v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019) (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App.

351, 356 (2011)).

       7
         Both appellee Rahman and appellee Truist Bank filed appellee’s briefs in this appeal,
generally making the same argument. As Rahman is the lead appellee, references throughout to
“appellee” should be understood to refer to all appellees.
                                                -4-
       “Ordinarily, endorsement of an order ‘Seen and objected to’ is not specific enough to

meet the requirements of Rule 5A:18 because it does not sufficiently alert the trial court to the

claimed error.” Herring v. Herring, 33 Va. App. 281, 286 (2000) (citing Lee, 12 Va. App. at

515). “Seen and objected to” can be sufficient, however, if “the ruling made by the trial court

was narrow enough to make obvious the basis of appellant’s objection.” Mackie v. Hill, 16

Va. App. 229, 231 (1993). Conversely, if a trial court’s final order “encompasse[s] a broad

range of subjects, and each . . . objection[ ] contains distinct issues” the Mackie exception does

not apply. Courembis v. Courembis, 43 Va. App. 18, 28 (2004); see also Herring, 33 Va. App.

at 287 (“The trial court’s final order is not limited to a single finding or conclusion and,

therefore, Mackie does not apply.”).

       Here, the circuit court’s final order sustained the plea in bar on appellee’s statute of

limitations defense, thereby dismissing appellant’s second amended complaint with prejudice.

The single issue raised in the plea in bar was whether, despite possession of the disputed land

against the prior owner, appellant’s claim of adverse possession against appellee was barred, as a

matter of law, because appellee had not owned the disputed property for 15 years. Both parties

briefed this possessory period question for the circuit court’s consideration.

       Based on that narrow issue, the circuit court sustained the plea in bar by final order and

did not write separately to explain its rationale.8 Appellant endorsed the final order as “Seen and

Objection.” Ordinarily such notation on its own would not preserve an objection for this Court

to review on appeal. Nevertheless, appellant’s objection here is sufficient under Mackie because

       8
          This Court recognizes that “trial courts need not state factual findings or legal
conclusions unless required by statute.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 371, 390 n.6
(2023). The acknowledgment that the circuit court did not explain itself here, and simply entered
an order following complete briefing, supports the conclusion that it was fully aware of both
parties’ positions on the statute of limitations claim.
                                                  -5-
the circuit court’s ruling was limited to a single, narrow legal question—whether appellee’s

purchase of property containing the disputed land disrupted the possessory period—and the

circuit court was fully aware of appellant’s position on that narrow issue. Therefore, appellant’s

“Seen and Objection” notation to the final order properly preserved this issue for appellate

review.

             II. Sale of invaded land does not restart adverse possessor’s 15-year clock.

          Turning to the merits of this appeal, appellant contends that the period of time necessary

to acquire an interest in property by adverse possession begins to run when the property interest is

sufficiently invaded and continues to run regardless of any intervening sale by the rightful owner to

someone else. Appellee responds that such a sale restarts the possessory period to allow the new

owner the full period of time to defend his invaded interest. As this appeal presents a pure

question of law, this Court reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo. See Quatannens v.

Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 365 (2004). “All presumptions, however, favor the holder of the legal title

owner.” Calhoun v. Woods, 246 Va. 41, 44 (1993) (citing Matthews v. W.T. Freeman Co., Inc.,

191 Va. 385, 395 (1950)). Because this appeal presents a novel question under Virginia law, this

Court begins its analysis by addressing relevant principles of property law.

          A. Background principles of Virginia property law

          Property “[a]s a legal concept, [encompasses] a body of rights.” Commonwealth, Marine

Res. Comm’n v. Forbes, 214 Va. 109, 113 (1973). This body of rights is sometimes referred to

as a “bundle of sticks” with each right constituting an individual stick in the bundle. United

States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002); Cygnus Newport-Phase 1B, LLC v. City of

Portsmouth, 292 Va. 573, 586 (2016). Common sticks in this bundle, for example, include the

right to use, the right to develop, and the right to exclude others. See Forbes, 214 Va. at 113

(recognizing the right to use land); Bentley Funding Grp., L.L.C. v. SK & R Grp., L.L.C., 269 Va.
                                                  -6-
315, 331 (2005) (“Development rights are property rights.”); Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC,

293 Va. 573, 581 (2017) (“[Appellant] correctly notes that ‘[t]he right to exclude others is

generally “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights . . . .”’” (second alteration in

original) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984))).

       Under this framework, ownership interests may be split among various owners and

conveyed independently of each other. See Bostic v. Bostic, 199 Va. 348, 351 (1957)

(recognizing that property interests in mineral or timber rights can be conveyed separately from

the rest of the property rights); see also Wilson Bros. v. Branham, 131 Va. 364, 373-74 (1921)

(“The right of an owner to carve out of his property as many estates, or interests (perpendicular

or horizontal, perpetual or limited), as it may be able to sustain, cannot be open to doubt.”).

Such independent conveyances can be limited to a particular use or to divide interests over time.

Johnson v. City of Suffolk, 299 Va. 364, 373 (2020) (noting that a lease conveys the present right

to use property but does not convey ownership to the property); Richmond v. Hall, 251 Va. 151,

158-59 (1996) (discussing the different possessory interests between a life tenant and a

remainderman).

       B. General overview of adverse possession

       Adverse possession requires “a claimant [to] prove actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and

continuous possession [of real property], under a claim of right, for the statutory period.”

Quatannens, 268 Va. at 368 (quoting Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61 (1991)). The statutory

period to claim property by adverse possession is 15 years. See Code § 8.01-236. The doctrine

of adverse possession is

               predicated upon the statutes of limitations . . . which, in effect,
               provide that an uninterrupted occupancy of lands by a person who
               has in fact no title thereto, for a certain number of years, shall
               operate to extinguish the title of the true owner thereto, and vest a
               right to the premises absolutely in the occupier.
                                                 -7-
Ferguson v. Stokes, 287 Va. 446, 451 (2014) (quoting McClanahan’s Adm’r v. Norfolk & W. Ry.

Co., 122 Va. 705, 714-15 (1918)). The effect of adverse occupancy is the “vesting in an adverse

occupant . . . a new, independent and indefeasible title—one paramount to and good against that

of all other persons . . . .” Id. (quoting McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 715); see also

McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 738 (“a title acquired by adverse possession is a perfect title,

and good against all the world”). This language suggests that adverse possession primarily

focuses on the possessor’s occupation of the invaded interest and the nature of such occupation,

rather than on the rights of the owner whose interest have been invaded.

       C. The 15-year clock for adverse possession

       “The object of [statutes of limitations] is to quiet titles to land.” Ferguson, 287 Va. at

451 (alteration in original) (quoting McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 715). Because adverse

possession requires the occupancy of an interest for a defined period before a prior owner’s title

may be extinguished and vested as new title in the adverse possessor, the possessory period is

paramount to determining when title transfers by adverse possession. Ordinarily

               [s]tatutes of limitations governing actions for land adversely
               possessed will not begin to run until claimant takes possession in
               fact under color of title or claim of right where such requirements
               prevail, and a cause of action therefor accrues. In other words,
               limitations will not commence to run against the owner until he is
               in such a position that he can protect his title by appropriate
               proceedings, that is, he must have a right which can be invaded
               with the necessity cast upon him to protect it, and when this
               necessity arises the statute will commence to run.

Marion Inv. Co. v. Va. Lincoln Furniture Corp., 171 Va. 170, 178 (1938) (emphasis added)

(quoting 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 162 (now § 205)); see also McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122

Va. at 739 (“Adverse possession to constitute title must be such an invasion of the rights of

another as will give that other a cause of action”); Matthews, 191 Va. at 398. In effect the

                                                -8-
possessory period will not begin to run against an interest owner until the interest owner has the

right to eject the adverse possessor.

       Several cases from the Supreme Court illustrate how this “right to eject” standard, by the

person with a present possessory interest in the invaded land, delays commencement of the

possessory period. For instance, “[adverse] possession of a life tenant[’s interest], or one

acquiring his interest, is not adverse to the remainderman during the term of the life estate.”

Rutledge v. Rutledge, 204 Va. 522, 528 (1963) (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 194 Va. 925, 929

(1953)). Similarly, a co-tenant cannot adversely possess against another co-tenant “unless

notice, actual or constructive, is given to the other co-tenant of the intent to oust, thus making the

occupying co-tenant’s possession hostile.” Harkleroad v. Linkous, 281 Va. 12, 18 (2011).

       Further, “where there has been a severance of the title between the surface and the

underlying minerals, no length of adverse possession of the surface will bar the right of the

owner of the minerals.” McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 739; see also Smith v. Pittston Co.,

203 Va. 408 (1962). Finally, “where land is conveyed subject to building restrictions, no length

of adverse possession by the occupant who does not violate the restrictions can abrogate the

restrictions.” McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 739. In each of these examples, the possessory

period was interrupted “not because of the absence of any one who can sue, but because the

rights of the other party have not been invaded.” Id.

       Moreover, the possessory period will not begin to run until the interest has been

sufficiently invaded and possessed to satisfy all the elements of adverse possession. “A mere

naked possession without claim of right, that is the intention to use the land as his own to the

exclusion of all others, can never ripen into a good title.” Radford Veneer Corp. v. Jones, 143

Va. 124, 128 (1925). Similarly, a mere claim to improvements on the property is equally

insufficient to invade the owner’s rights in the real property. See Sims v. Capper, 133 Va. 278,
                                                -9-
287 (1922). Commercial use of an interest without claim of ownership is also insufficient to

invade the ownership rights. See Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Wickline, 126 Va. 223, 236 (1919) (“a

mere claim to possession, accompanied by the occasional cutting of timber, the prevention of

trespasses, the payment of taxes, and the assertion of title, is not sufficient”). Finally, “[t]o

establish title to real property by adverse possession, a claimant must prove actual, hostile,

exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, under a claim of right, for the statutory period of

15 years.” Grappo, 241 Va. at 61 (emphasis added).

       With these principles taken together it is clear that the adverse possession statute of

limitations begins to run when the present possessory interest is sufficiently and continuously

invaded, thus allowing its owner to defend the interest.

       D. Effect of a sale on the statute of limitations’ commencement

       With these background principles in place, this Court now considers the novel question of

what effect, if any, the sale of sufficiently invaded property has on the possessory period. As

discussed above, adverse possession focuses on the invasion of the interest itself, as hostile to

someone else’s present possessory interests, not on a trespasser’s possession against any specific

owner of the land. Ferguson, 287 Va. at 451 (citing McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 714-15).

And the possessory period begins to run only once the land has been sufficiently invaded—i.e.,

meets all the elements of adverse possession—and the person with a present possessory interest

in the land, most commonly the interest’s owner, is able to defend his rights in the interest.

Jones, 143 Va. at 128; Matthews, 191 Va. at 398. Based on those principles, this Court finds that

the mere sale of property during the 15-year period of adverse possession does not disrupt the

running of the statute of limitations because the land remains sufficiently invaded by the

possessor and the invaded ownership interest continuously has a person (or succession of

persons) properly situated to defend it for the entire possessory period—first the seller as the
                                                 - 10 -
previous owner and then the buyer as the new owner who steps into the shoes of the transferor,

his successor in interest.

        Compare this situation to adverse possession against a life tenant and remainderman.

When the adverse possessor sufficiently invades the life tenant’s property interest, the possessory

period begins to run because there exists both an invasion of the right and someone properly

situated to defend that right. But because the adverse possessor cannot acquire more rights than

the life tenant can defend, the possessory period does not run against the not-yet-vested interests

of any future interest holders. Consequently, the death of the life tenant extinguishes the interest

that the adverse possessor had invaded. The 15-year possessory period is thus reset and will not

restart unless, and until, the adverse possessor invades the interests now presently possessed by

the former future interest holders. See, e.g., Rutledge, 204 Va. 522.

        Likewise, when an adverse possessor sufficiently invades an interest only on the surface

of the property, whoever holds the surface right is exclusively empowered to bring an action to

eject the possessor. The owner of any mineral or other subsurface rights cannot bring suit

against this surface invader because no subsurface rights have been invaded. Accordingly, the

possessory period will not begin to run against any subsurface interests unless, and until, the

adverse possessor sufficiently invades these below-the-surface rights, thus triggering the

subsurface right’s owner’s ability to oust the invader.

        It follows, therefore, that when ownership of an invaded property interest is transferred

via sale, the currently running possessory period does not restart because someone has

continuously been in the position to defend the property right and eject the possessor. Simply

put, the buyer, as successor in interest, steps into the seller’s shoes and takes the invaded interest

as is with all its defects. So long as there is someone properly situated to defend the invaded

                                                - 11 -
interest—the sole subject of the adverse possession—the statute of limitations will not restart

merely because the person entitled and empowered to defend the same interest has changed.9

       E. The circuit court erred in finding that appellee’s intervening purchase of the disputed
property barred appellant’s adverse possession claim.

       In this matter, the circuit court sustained appellee’s plea in bar that the 15-year statute of

limitations for appellant’s adverse possession claim could not have run against him because he

owned the disputed property for fewer than 15 years. As a matter of law, that broad assertion is

incorrect. The statute of limitations began to run if and when appellant sufficiently invaded the

property rights of whomever owned the land between appellant’s property line and the wire

fence to the west. When appellee purchased his property in 2010, he acquired the same property

interests as the previous owner, including an already purportedly invaded interest. While

ownership of that property interest may have shifted to appellee, the interest itself remained both

unchanged and invaded insofar as already done.

       Further, and most importantly, the invaded interest always had an owner situated to

defend it. Therefore, as a matter of law, appellee’s 2010 purchase of the disputed property did

not restart appellant’s possessory period. Nevertheless, appellant bears the burden on remand of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, when her invasion of the disputed land began and

       9
         This conclusion is consistent with the doctrine of “tacking.” Tacking allows successive
adverse possessors in privity with each other to combine their possessory periods to total the
necessary time to extinguish a true owner’s title. Hollingsworth v. Sherman, 81 Va. 668, 674
(1885) (“It is, indeed, a principle well established that where several persons enter on land in
succession, the several possessions cannot be tacked, so as to make a continuity of possession,
unless there is a privity of estate, or the several estates are connected.”). Here, too, a sale does
not break the continuity of the period necessary for adverse possession to ripen into title. The
doctrine recognized herein is, in effect, the mirror-image of the doctrine of tacking.
                                                  - 12 -
whether it originated under a claim of right and was actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and

continuous for 15 years so as to ripen into good title.10

       F. Appellee is not entitled to bona fide purchaser for value protections.

       Notwithstanding the foregoing principles of property law, appellee argues that because he

acquired the disputed property as a bona fide purchaser for value (“BFP”) without notice of

appellant’s potential adverse possession claim his ownership interest is protected and the

possessory period should have restarted because of his purchase.

       “[A] purchaser for value without notice, actual or constructive, having obtained a

conveyance, will not be affected by a latent equity, whether by lien or incumbrance or trust or

fraud or any other claim.” Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 397, 414 (1887); see also Snyder v.

Grandstaff, 96 Va. 473, 477 (1898) (“A purchaser for value and without notice is not affected by

any latent equity.”). “

               [A] purchaser of land “is bound, not only by actual, but also by
               constructive notice, which is the same in effect as actual notice”
               and that “he has no right to shut his eyes or his ears to the inlet of
               information, and then say he is a bona fide purchaser without
               notice.”

Richmond v. Hall, 251 Va. 151, 157 (1996) (quoting Burwell v. Fauber, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 446,

463 (1871)). Defects in a property’s chain of title place the purchaser on constructive notice of

such defect. Shaheen v. Cnty. of Mathews, 265 Va. 462, 477 (2003) (“[A] bona fide purchaser is

charged with constructive notice of only those matters of record in the purchaser’s chain of title

referred to or about which the purchaser is placed on inquiry.”). Indeed, Virginia employs a

       10
          See, e.g., Quatannens, 268 Va. at 371 (holding that in Virginia “adverse possession
requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence”).
                                              - 13 -
recording statute to supply this constructive notice to would be purchasers.11 Id. (“The main

purpose of recordation statutes is to give constructive notice to purchasers and encumbrancers

who acquire or seek to acquire some interest or right in property.” (quoting Chavis v. Gibbs, 198

Va. 379, 381 (1956))). In sum, a BFP is on notice for all defects in a property’s chain of title of

which it has actual or constructive knowledge, and any defects in the recorded chain of title are

imputed to the purchaser as constructive knowledge.

       Because BFP protections insulate a BFP from unknown defects in the chain of title they

necessarily do not protect against adverse possession claims. Until the possessory period is

complete, there is no competing title or other conveyance for a BFP to notice regardless of their

diligence because title by adverse possession ripens outside the chain of title. Further, a fully

ripened adverse possession claim does not transfer the interest owner’s title to the possessor;

rather it “extinguish[es] the title of the true owner” and vests the possessor with “a new,

independent and indefeasible title—one paramount to and good against that of all other persons.”

Ferguson, 287 Va. at 451 (emphases added) (quoting McClanahan’s Adm’r, 122 Va. at 715).

Because no record exists for a BFP to notice, nor is there a competing claim to title before

completion of 15-years of adverse possession, and because the BFP’s title entirely ceases to exist

upon a perfected claim of adverse possession, the BFP protections do not protect from an adverse

possession claim and do not impact the running of the possessory period.

                                           CONCLUSION

       Not every instance of land possession has the potential to ripen into a claim of ownership,

even if that possession has persisted for 15 or more years. More than mere possession is

       11
          To be placed on constructive notice “[a]n intending purchaser was not required to do
more than to examine the public records in order to ascertain the state of the recorded title, and
when he found this complete he could purchase with safety.” Ransom v. Watson’s Adm’r, 145
Va. 669, 676 (1926).
                                              - 14 -
required. In the case at bar, appellant’s possession of the disputed property may have continued

notwithstanding the sale to appellee, but that, by itself, does not effectuate a change in

ownership. Rather, ownership through adverse possession requires clear and convincing

evidence that such possession is adverse, hostile, actual, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and

originating under a claim of right. Absent such proof, a claim of adverse possession fails,

regardless of how long the current owner of the disputed property has owned such land.

       Because the circuit court erroneously dismissed this case on appellee’s statute of

limitations plea, it did not reach the merits of appellant’s adverse possession claim. Much

remains to be proven in a trial court, and this Court refrains from comment on any such proof or

the likelihood that appellant will prevail on the merits of her claim. That being said, this Court

reverses the circuit court’s ruling and orders the case remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                                                            Reversed and remanded.

                                                - 15 -