Court Opinion

ID: 9899886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:11.972579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.914277
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Edmonds CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B319840

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. TA141211)
           v.

 FRANK EDMONDS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H.
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               _________________________________
       Frank Edmonds appeals the order denying his petition for
a finding of factual innocence under Penal Code1 section 851.8.
       Appellant was convicted by a jury of one count of resisting
an executive officer in violation of section 69 (count 1).2 He
appealed, and in an unpublished opinion, we concluded that the
trial court had prejudicially erred in excluding proffered evidence
that the officers were outside of their jurisdiction and had acted
unlawfully in detaining appellant. Because the evidence might
have negated an element of the charged crime, the error could not
be deemed harmless, and we reversed the conviction for resisting
an executive officer in violation of section 69. (Edmonds, supra,
B291146.)
       In a second amended information, the People charged
appellant with one felony count of resisting an executive officer
(§ 69; count 1) and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying,
or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3). On
September 1, 2020, the trial court dismissed all counts on its own
motion in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385.
       On June 10, 2021, appellant filed a petition for a finding of
factual innocence on the charge of resisting an executive officer
under section 69. The People opposed the petition. At the
hearing on the petition, the trial court received evidence and took
judicial notice of exhibits and portions of the reporter’s transcript

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      2 Before trial, appellant had pleaded no contest to count 2,
battery committed on school, park, or hospital property (§ 243.2,
subd. (a)), and counts 1 and 2 were sentenced together. (People v.
Edmonds (July 16, 2019, B291146) [nonpub. opn.] (Edmonds).)
Appellant did not challenge his conviction or sentence on count 2
in his direct appeal.

                                 2
filed in the appeal from the conviction. On January 31, 2022,
following argument by the parties, the court denied the petition.
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition for a finding of factual innocence. He argues that
because the incident took place in the City of Lynwood, which is
outside the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD), and the officers had no probable cause or even a
reasonable suspicion that appellant had committed any crime,
the victim, LAPD Officer Jeffrey Joyce, was not lawfully
performing his duties as an “executive officer” when appellant
resisted the use of force to remove him from his vehicle.
Appellant maintains that since he did not unlawfully resist an
executive officer, the trial court erred in failing to find him
factually innocent of violating section 69, resisting an executive
officer. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s order denying the
petition for a finding of factual innocence.
          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. The incident3
       Around 2:50 p.m. on September 5, 2016, Aaron Thompson,
a police officer employed by the LAPD, was on duty in the area of
103rd Street just west of Alameda. A bystander approached the
officer and reported a vehicle parked on Alameda with a man
behind the wheel who seemed to be passed out. Officer
Thompson located the vehicle, parked behind it, and activated his
dashboard video camera and hazard lights. As he approached, he
could see appellant reclining in the driver’s seat, apparently
unconscious. Appellant was wearing jeans but no shirt, and was

      3 The basic facts of the incident are drawn from our opinion
in Edmonds, supra, B291146.

                                3
bleeding from small lacerations all over his face, head, and ears.
Officer Thompson was unable to wake him. After getting a whiff
of alcohol from the car, the officer conducted a “plain sight” look
inside the vehicle for alcohol or weapons, but saw neither. He
also opened the car doors looking for some identification, but
found none. He then called for emergency medical assistance.
(Edmonds, supra, B291146.)
       Paramedics were able to awaken appellant, but when they
tried to determine appellant’s condition, he became agitated,
aggressive, and repeatedly got in and out of his car. Officer
Thompson called for backup. LAPD Officer Ingram was the first
backup to arrive on the scene. He suggested that if appellant did
not want medical treatment, “then that’s on him,” and asked
appellant if he could drive. Appellant responded that his car was
inoperable. Officer Thompson told him the car would have to be
towed because it was parked illegally. (Edmonds, supra,
B291146.)
       As other officers arrived on the scene, they discussed what
should be done about appellant and the car. Officer Joyce
believed they should pull appellant out of the vehicle to allow the
police to investigate whether he was suffering from a mental
illness, was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or was a
suspect or victim in a crime. Sergeant Sparkman, Officer
Thompson’s supervisor, questioned why appellant was not
already in custody. Officer Thompson responded, “because he
was covered in blood. He didn’t do anything wrong.” At one point
during the officers’ discussion, appellant got out of the car and
kneeled down on the ground where he remained for almost two
minutes before reentering the vehicle. (Edmonds, supra,
B291146.)

                                4
      Sergeant Sparkman instructed the officers to put gloves on,
which the officers understood to mean they would be “taking the
suspect into custody.” After putting on his gloves, Officer Joyce
said to appellant, “We can’t have you sitting in the middle of the
road right here. You either go with the ambulance or you go with
the police, I’m going to let you decide.” Officer Joyce then leaned
into the car, removed the keys from the ignition, and tossed them
on top of the car. Appellant immediately jumped out of the
vehicle and demanded to know what had happened to his keys.
Officer Joyce attempted to grab appellant around the waist, but
appellant dove back into the car. As Officer Joyce began to give
the standard warning that he was about to use his taser,
appellant kicked the officer in the right upper thigh with his left
leg.4 Officer Joyce immediately tased appellant in the chest, but
the taser appeared to have no effect. (Edmonds, supra,
B291146.)
      After being tased, appellant grabbed the steering wheel
and braced himself inside the car so the police could not pull him
out. Other officers tased appellant several more times, and
eventually were able to extract him through the passenger side
door and take him into custody. Appellant was transported to
the hospital. No investigation was conducted to determine if
appellant was under the influence of alcohol or narcotics, and no
alcohol, drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons were found in the
vehicle. (Edmonds, supra, B291146.)

      4 The kick was not captured by any police dashboard video
camera at the scene, nor can any reference to the kick be heard
on the dashboard audio recording of the incident.

                                 5
    B. The hearing on the petition for a finding of factual
       innocence
       The hearing on the petition took place on January 27
and 31, 2022. Appellant called four witnesses to testify: Thomas
Thornton, the Public Works Director and City Engineer for the
City of Lynwood, LAPD Captain Ryan Whiteman, LAPD
Sergeant Zadi Borquez-Rivera, and LAPD Officer Matthew
Martinez. The trial court admitted into evidence the following
exhibits: (1) two parcel maps numbered 24903, one certified on
February 23, 2018 (Defendant’s exhibit A), the other certified on
April 11, 2018 (People’s exhibit 1); (2) a Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department map dated January 2004 (Defendant’s
exhibit C); (3) a Southeast Area Reporting District form
(Defendant’s exhibit D); and (4) a thumb drive containing a video
of appellant in the police vehicle after his arrest (Defendant’s
exhibit E). The trial court also took judicial notice of the
following exhibits attached to appellant’s request for judicial
notice: exhibits 3 through 10, 14 through 16, 22 through 34, 36
through 42, and 45.5 Finally, the trial court granted the People’s
request for judicial notice of volume 3 of the reporter’s transcript
on appeal in Edmonds, supra, B291146.
       According to Thornton, the address of 10401 South
Alameda Street, located on the west side of Alameda Street south
of 103rd Street, is in the City of Lynwood. Reading the parcel

      5 Other than the transcript of the October 18, 2017
preliminary hearing (exhibit 3) and this court’s opinion from the
direct appeal (exhibit 42), all of the documents of which the trial
court took judicial notice consisted of excerpts from the reporter’s
transcript on appeal or the reporter’s supplemental transcript on
appeal.

                                 6
maps for that area, Thornton confirmed that the measurements
for the length of Alameda Street south of 103rd Street in the City
of Lynwood to the border with the City of Los Angeles totaled
1,316.96 feet (438.98 yards), and the total distance from the point
of contact between appellant and police on the west side of South
Alameda Street was 453.98 feet (151.33 yards) from the City of
Lynwood’s border with the City of Los Angeles. Thornton also
testified that he was unaware of any “no parking” signs posted on
the west side of Alameda Street within 100 yards of 103rd Street,
but he conceded that some parking regulations may have been in
effect in that area on September 5, 2016.
       Captain Whiteman testified that if a community member
required assistance within a reasonable distance of the border
with the City of Los Angeles, his expectation as a commanding
officer is that an LAPD officer would respond to evaluate the
situation and provide aid. If the person were injured, he would
expect the responding officer to summon medical assistance.
Captain Whiteman further testified that if the individual is in a
car and there is an indication he or she might be under the
influence, his expectation is that the officer would continue to
investigate in the interest of public safety. Responding to a
hypothetical based on the facts of this case, Captain Whiteman
opined that an officer stationed within Los Angeles city limits on
103rd Street west of Alameda should heed a request to check on a
person who appears to be injured and unconscious in a car
nearby. Such a situation would present a matter of direct
concern to the City of Los Angeles, even if the person in need of
aid was in another jurisdiction in close proximity to the City of
Los Angeles.

                                 7
       Sergeant Borquez-Rivera testified that he was one of the
officers who responded to the scene at 10401 South Alameda on
September 5, 2016. During the encounter with the officers,
appellant was incoherent, uncooperative, and belligerent, and his
behavior was erratic. Sergeant Borquez-Rivera observed that
appellant was sweating profusely and appeared to be under the
influence of a narcotic or alcohol. When appellant attempted to
reenter his car, he seemed to be reaching for something inside the
vehicle, possibly arming himself. At that point the vehicle had
not yet been searched for weapons, and Sergeant Borquez-Rivera
testified he grabbed appellant out of a concern for officer safety.
Sergeant Borquez-Rivera testified that while he and Officer Joyce
were holding onto appellant, appellant kicked Officer Joyce
several times.
       Officer Martinez testified he was also present during the
police encounter with appellant on September 5, 2016. During
the incident, Officer Martinez observed appellant inside the
vehicle, outside the vehicle, and reentering the vehicle. The
officer testified that police were investigating whether appellant
was under the influence of narcotics or alcohol when appellant
reentered the vehicle, which had not been searched. Because of
the danger presented when the subject of an investigation
reenters a car to possibly arm himself or herself, as soon as
appellant moved to reenter his vehicle, the officers sought to
detain him. After watching the video of the incident, Officer
Martinez testified that appellant was already inside the vehicle
when Officer Joyce tased him.
    C. The trial court’s ruling
       The trial court found that appellant’s encounter with police
took place in the City of Lynwood. But because the incident

                                8
occurred within 500 yards of the border with the City of Los
Angeles, the court concluded that under section 782 and People v.
Rogers (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 384 (Rogers), Officer Joyce was
acting in his capacity as an executive officer in investigating why
appellant was passed out behind the wheel of a car, and whether
he was under the influence of a narcotic or alcohol in light of his
physical condition and erratic behavior. The trial court explained
that based on the evidence of appellant’s wrongdoing, the officers
had a duty to investigate and rightfully detained appellant to
continue that investigation.6

      6 Specifically, the court found “[appellant] was passed out
behind the wheel in a public roadway, unable at that time to take
care of himself. He continued, once he came to, to act erratically,
sweating profusely is the evidence I heard. [¶] He continues to
act erratically. He does not listen to [the officers’] commands.
They’re asking him if he needs help. . . . And he gets out of the
car and lays on the ground. [¶] I would assume that he’s on
something. That he’s under the influence of something. He may
not have been, but that’s his appearance. [¶] That’s what [the
officer] is acting on. So they have a right to remove the keys
based on how [appellant] acted. They have a right to do an
investigation as to whether or not he is under the influence. [¶]
To do that investigation requires that he be removed from the
vehicle. He got out of the vehicle. They were trying to talk to
him. He jumped back into the vehicle. . . . [T]he officers indicated
when he jumped back in, he appear[ed] to do furtive movements
and [was] reaching for something. [¶] They did not want him
back into the vehicle because they [had] not checked and made
sure that the car had no weapons in it and so he is tased in an
[effort] to get him back out of the vehicle because he was not
following their commands, their request to cooperate in their
detention of him.”

                                 9
       Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled that
appellant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was factually innocent of the crime of resisting an
executive officer in violation of section 69. Accordingly, the court
denied the petition for a finding of factual innocence.
                            DISCUSSION
    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Petition for
    a Finding of Factual Innocence
    A. Relevant legal principles
       1. Section 69, resisting an executive officer7
       As we explained in Edmonds, supra, B291146, the offense
of resisting an executive officer in violation of section 69 is
committed when a person uses force or violence to knowingly
resist an executive officer in the performance of his or her duty.
(In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 814 (Manuel G.).) It is an
element of the offense that the officer is engaged in the lawful
performance of his or her duties at the time the resistance occurs.
(Id. at p. 815; People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 778;
People v. Sibrian (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 127, 133 [“officer must be
acting lawfully when the resistance occurs”]; People v. Rasmussen

      7 Neither appellant’s opening brief nor the memorandum of
points and authorities in support of the petition contains any
argument for a finding of factual innocence on the charge of
resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in violation of
section 148 subdivision (a)(1), as alleged in count 3 of the second
amended information. Accordingly, any claim for a finding of
factual innocence as to that charge is forfeited. (People v.
Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 69, fn. 11 [failure to support a
claim with relevant legal authority or reasoned argument forfeits
the claim on appeal].)

                                10
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418 [section 69 liability requires
that officer was lawfully engaged in performance of duty at time
of resistance].) The term “executive officer,” while not defined in
section 69, has been interpreted to include peace officers at all
governmental levels as a matter of law. (See Manuel G., at
pp. 818–819; People v. Mathews (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 67, 68–70;
People v. Kerns (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 72, 73–75.)
       Section 830.1, subdivision (a) defines “peace officers” to
include any police officer employed by a city or a district. The
authority of these peace officers extends to any place in the state
with certain limitations. (§ 830.1, subd. (a); People v. Pennington
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 786, 793.) Under section 830.1,
subdivision (a)(1), a peace officer has authority “[a]s to a public
offense[8] committed or for which there is probable cause to
believe has been committed within the political subdivision that
employs the peace officer or in which the peace officer serves.”
Subdivision (a)(3) of section 830.1 provides that a peace officer
has authority “[a]s to a public offense committed or for which
there is probable cause to believe has been committed in the
peace officer’s presence, and with respect to which there is
immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the
perpetrator of the offense.”

      8 A “public offense” refers to misdemeanors and infractions
as well as felonies. (§ 16; People v. Zacarias (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 652, 658; People v. Tennessee (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d
788, 791.)

                                11
       2. The petition for a finding of factual innocence under
section 851.8
       Pursuant to section 851.8, subdivision (c), “[i]n any case
where a person has been arrested, and an accusatory pleading
has been filed, but where no conviction has occurred, the
defendant may, at any time after dismissal of the action, petition
the court that dismissed the action for a finding that the
defendant is factually innocent of the charges for which the arrest
was made. . . . The hearing shall be conducted as provided in
subdivision (b).” Subdivision (b) provides that in any hearing to
determine factual innocence, “the initial burden of proof shall
rest with the petitioner to show that no reasonable cause exists to
believe that the [defendant] committed the offense [charged]. If
the court finds that this showing of no reasonable cause has been
made by the petitioner, then the burden of proof shall shift to the
respondent to show that a reasonable cause exists to believe that
the petitioner committed the [charged] offense.” (§ 851.8,
subd. (b).)
       “A petitioner’s burden to establish factual innocence has
been described as ‘ “incredibly high” ’ and as requiring ‘ “no doubt
whatsoever.” ’ ” (People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 732,
738.) Section 851.8 specifically provides “that ‘[a] finding of
factual innocence . . . pursuant to this section shall not be made
unless the court finds that no reasonable cause exists to believe’
the defendant committed the offense charged.” (People v. Adair
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 (Adair), quoting § 851.8, subd. (b).)
“In other words, the trial court cannot grant relief if any
reasonable cause warrants such a belief.” (Id. at p. 904.)
       The well-established meaning of “reasonable cause” is
“ ‘ “that state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary care

                                12
and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest
and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” ’
[Citations.] To be entitled to relief under section 851.8, ‘[t]he
[petitioner] thus must establish that facts exist which would lead
no person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or
conscientiously entertain any honest and strong suspicion that
the [petitioner] is guilty of the crimes charged. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] [¶] Accordingly, the statutory scheme establishes an
objective standard for assaying factual innocence.” (Adair, supra,
29 Cal.4th at pp. 904–905.)
       To carry their respective burdens of proof, both parties
“may present evidence such as ‘declarations, affidavits, police
reports, or any other evidence . . . which is material, relevant and
reliable,’ including evidence previously suppressed pursuant to
sections 1538.5 and 1539.” (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 903–
904, quoting § 851.8, subd. (b).) But factual innocence under
section 851.8, subdivision (b) does not mean simply a failure to
convict, a dismissal of charges, the absence of proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
or even that the defendant had a viable substantive defense to
the crime charged. (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 905, 909;
People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1056 [acquittal
does not necessarily establish factual innocence, nor does
dismissal in the interests of justice under § 1385].) Rather, to
establish factual innocence, the defendant must show that no
reasonable cause and no objective factors justified an arrest in
the first instance. (Adair, at pp. 905, 909; Matthews, at p. 1056.)
“In sum, the record must exonerate, not merely raise a
substantial question as to guilt.” (Adair, at p. 909.)

                                13
       3. Standard of review of the denial of a petition for a
finding of factual innocence
       On appeal from the denial of a petition under section 851.8,
the reviewing court defers to the trial court’s factual findings that
are supported by substantial evidence, but “must independently
examine the record to determine whether the defendant has
established ‘that no reasonable cause exists to believe’ he or she
committed the offense charged. (§ 851.8, subd. (b).)” (Adair,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 897; id. at p. 905; see People v. Medlin
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101 [such a strict standard of
review is dictated by the Legislature’s “ ‘intent to limit
substantially the scope of relief under section 851.8’ ”].)
       As our Supreme Court has explained, this means that
“[s]ince the statute precludes a finding of factual innocence if any
reasonable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the
charged offense, in the case of a denial both the trial court and
the reviewing court make the same inquiry. This appears to
conflate independent review with the substantial evidence test
because the appellate court may approach its task in either of two
ways: It may examine the record de novo to determine whether
the defendant failed to meet the burden of ‘show[ing] that no
reasonable cause exists to believe’ the defendant committed the
charged offense (§ 851.8[, subd.] (b); see, e.g., People v. Matthews,
supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1057–1063); or it may assess whether
the trial court’s conclusion to that effect is supported by
substantial evidence. Whichever the choice, the analytical
perspective is ultimately the same, and the statutory standard is
satisfied.” (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 907–908.)

                                 14
    B. The trial court properly denied appellant’s section
       851.8 petition for a finding of factual innocence
       Appellant contends that because Officer Joyce was acting
outside of the LAPD’s jurisdiction when he detained and arrested
appellant in the City of Lynwood, he was acting as a private
citizen, not as an executive officer. And since by definition a
violation of section 69 cannot be committed against a private
person, appellant was factually innocent of the offense as a
matter of law. Appellant’s argument presumes that once
appellant declined medical care or assistance, no cause existed
for any further investigation, and the officers’ continued contact
with appellant⎯outside of LAPD jurisdiction⎯was beyond the
scope of these officers’ duties and was therefore unlawful. We
reject appellant’s premise, however, and so disagree with his
conclusion.
       1. Appellant’s conduct during the welfare check supplied a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that supported an
investigative detention
       The undisputed evidence presented at the hearing
established that the incident took place in the City of Lynwood
within 500 yards of its border with the City of Los Angeles, and
appellant concedes the point. Pursuant to section 782, LAPD
officers had authority to respond to and investigate the report of
an unconscious person behind the wheel of a vehicle parked on
the street within 500 yards of the Los Angeles city border.
       Section 782 provides: “When a public offense is committed
on the boundary of two or more jurisdictional territories, or
within 500 yards thereof, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any
competent court within either jurisdictional territory.”

                                 15
       The court in Rogers interpreted this provision to authorize
a peace officer to investigate any crime within 500 yards of the
jurisdictional boundary in which that officer serves. (Rogers,
supra, 241 Cal.App.2d at p. 388 [“Since authority to prosecute
crime extends to offenses which take place just outside the
boundaries of a particular jurisdiction, we believe that, a fortiori,
authority to investigate crime extends beyond the territorial
boundaries of a particular jurisdiction in the same manner and to
the same extent”].) The court thus held that a Covina police
officer’s detention and arrest of a suspect outside the city limits of
Covina⎯but within 500 yards of the jurisdictional border⎯were
within the officer’s lawful duties. (Ibid.)
       Appellant does not dispute that the police were justified in
initiating contact with appellant to conduct a welfare check when
he appeared to be unconscious behind the wheel of a car parked
on a busy thoroughfare. But he contends that “[a]ny right
conferred upon the police ended when appellant declined medical
treatment.” Because he had committed no crime, appellant
asserts that Officer Joyce had no probable cause to detain
appellant and was not engaged in the lawful performance of his
duties when appellant resisted.
       As first established by the United States Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30, “the police can stop and
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has
a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable
cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 (Sokolow).)
The reasonable suspicion standard is not particularly high:
While it requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” ’ ” the “level of suspicion is

                                 16
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence.” (Ibid.; United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266,
274 (Arvizu) [“Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘ “hunch” ’
is insufficient to justify a stop, [citation], the likelihood of
criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance of the evidence standard”].)
       Thus, “ ‘[a] detention is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific
articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the
person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ ” (In re
Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307, quoting People v. Souza
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) “[T]he determination of reasonable
suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
528 U.S. 119, 125.)
       Here, appellant describes the incident as “a welfare check
gone south.” Indeed it was. But not because the police lacked a
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing by appellant that warranted
investigation. Rather, it was appellant’s bizarre and erratic
behavior during the welfare check, along with his excessive
sweating and an odor of alcohol detected from the vehicle, which
justifiably raised a suspicion that appellant was under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and presented a
danger to the officers, himself, and/or the public.9

      9 Public intoxication and being under the influence of a
controlled substance in a public place constitute disorderly

                                17
       Appellant posits a litany of innocent circumstances that he
argues defeat any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in this
case. But “as the high court repeatedly has explained, the
possibility of innocent explanations for the factors relied upon by
a police officer does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (People v. Letner and
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 146 (Letner and Tobin), citing Arvizu,
supra, 534 U.S. at p. 274 [“Although each of the series of acts [in
Terry] was ‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ we held that, taken
together, they ‘warranted further investigation’ ”]; Sokolow,
supra, 490 U.S. at p. 9 [factors that alone were “quite consistent
with innocent travel” collectively amounted to reasonable
suspicion]; see also People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 373
[“that a person’s conduct is consistent with innocent behavior
does not necessarily defeat the existence of reasonable cause to
detain. [Citation.] What is required is not the absence of
innocent explanation, but the existence of ‘specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion’ ”].)
       In determining whether a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity supported an investigative detention, “ ‘ “the relevant
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’
but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of
noncriminal acts.” ’ ” (Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 147, quoting Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 10.) Here,

conduct, a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 647,
subdivision (f). Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section
11550, subdivision (a), it is also a misdemeanor to use or be
under the influence of certain controlled substances specified in
Health and Safety Code sections 11054 through 11058.

                                18
Sergeant Borquez-Rivera and Officer Martinez testified to
appellant’s erratic behavior and attempt to reenter his vehicle,
which had not yet been searched or cleared for weapons. The
totality of these and other circumstances surrounding the
incident formed the basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. The officers’ suspicion in turn justified an
investigative detention to determine if appellant was publicly
intoxicated within the meaning of Penal Code section 647,
subdivision (f), or under the influence of a controlled substance
under Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a).
       The fact that appellant was ultimately never given a
sobriety test and his blood was not drawn to test for alcohol or a
controlled substance is irrelevant to the question of whether
police had a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing that
warranted scrutiny. The reasonableness of a suspicion to justify
investigation does not require a factually correct assessment of
the circumstances. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129,
1136; see also Arvizu, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 277 [“A determination
that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct”].) Similarly, the officers’ opinion
that appellant was an “idiot” (which of course is not a crime) has
no bearing on whether they could harbor a reasonable suspicion
that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. “[T]he
United States Supreme Court has made clear that an officer’s
subjective intent plays no role in the Fourth Amendment inquiry.
‘An action is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, “as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.”
[Citation.] The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.’ ”
(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1052.)

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       2. When appellant kicked Officer Joyce, the officer was
lawfully performing his duties
       While appellant was sitting in his car and police were
trying to determine whether he was under the influence of
alcohol or narcotics, Officer Joyce sensibly removed the keys from
the vehicle to prevent appellant from driving away. After
appellant had gotten out of the car, the officers were then
justified in preventing appellant from reentering the vehicle for
officer safety. To this end, Sergeant Borquez-Rivera and Officer
Joyce grabbed appellant as he was reentering the car because the
car had not been searched or cleared for weapons.
       The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
officer safety is “both [a] legitimate and weighty” reason for
ordering a person out of a vehicle during a traffic stop.
(Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110; Maryland v.
Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412; see also People v. Hart (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 479, 490 [“Officer safety is a legitimate and
important governmental interest to consider in Fourth
Amendment analysis”].) As the high court has observed,
“[r]egrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters,” and
once outside the vehicle, a person “will be denied access to any
possible weapon that might be concealed” in the car’s interior.
(Wilson, at pp. 413, 414.) Our Supreme Court has also held that
“an officer is authorized to search a vehicle and its occupants
based on legitimate and articulated officer safety concerns.”
(People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 927, fn. 18.)
       Here, the officers had the same “legitimate and weighty”
concerns for officer safety when appellant dove back inside his
car as would have justified ordering him out of the vehicle during
their investigation. Officer Joyce was thus engaged in the lawful

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performance of his duties as an executive officer when he grabbed
appellant to try to keep him outside the car and appellant kicked
him.
       Even if it raises a serious question as to appellant’s guilt,
the record in this case does not exonerate. (Adair, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 909.) Rather, we find, as the trial court did,
evidence that “ ‘ “would lead a [person] of ordinary care and
prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that appellant [was] guilty” ’ ” of the crime of
resisting an executive officer in violation of section 69. (Id. at
p. 904.) Accordingly, we affirm the denial of appellant’s petition
for a finding of factual innocence.10

      10 Appellant contends the instant case was prosecuted in
violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(1) (the California Racial
Justice Act). However, appellant never raised the issue in the
trial court, and any such claim on appeal is therefore forfeited.
(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 416 [“defendant’s failure
to make a timely and specific objection on the ground he how
raises forfeits the claim on appeal”].)

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                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying the petition for a finding of factual
innocence is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

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