Court Opinion

ID: 9470714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:14:06.461352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:04.368394
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In this case, James Ray Thompson chose to represent himself. That was his right. The trial court and the prosecution were required to give him no less of a fair trial because he exercised that right. Because the trial court allowed the prosecution improper leeway in making out its case against Thompson, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
The majority finds no error in the admission of lay opinion testimony by numerous prosecution witnesses regarding Thompson’s complicity in this scheme for marketing stolen farm and construction equipment. I find prejudicial error. The Federal Rules of Evidence limit the admissibility of such lay opinions to those “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 701. The opinions admitted in the instant case fail to meet the Rule 701 test both because of the insufficient foundations underlying the opinions and because of the absence of any nonprejudicial assistance given the jury by these opinions.
The majority adopts the “solid facts within [the witness’s] personal knowledge” foundation requirement for a Rule 701 lay opinion. United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir.1975). Here, the facts underlying the lay opinions admitted by the trial court are not as “solid” as the majority perceives. The witnesses, two of whom had previously been convicted for participation in this illegal scheme, were allowed to base their opinions concerning Thompson’s involvement in essence on his presence during transactions among other parties. Moreover, the prosecution elicited the details of Thompson’s presence by a series of leading questions which were totally improper on direct examination. Mere presence is not a sufficient foundation for lay opinion regarding an essential element of a crime, especially when the testimony concerning that presence is the result of improper direct examination of witnesses most likely to sway the jury. The cases relied upon by the majority, United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685, 689-690 (8th Cir.1978) (witness allowed to give opinion on defendant’s knowledge that goods had been fraudulently obtained based on witness’s discussion of the fraudulent scheme with the defendant), and United States v. Freeman, supra, 514 F.2d at 1191 (loan officer allowed to give opinion on probable bank action if a borrower misrepresented the value of collateral based on review of financial documents and involvement in actual award of loan), do not suggest otherwise. The Federal Rules of Evidence were not premised on a doctrine of guilt by association.
In addition to insufficient foundations for these lay opinions, I have serious doubts that the opinions were “helpful” in making a correct and unprejudiced determination of a fact in issue in the instant case. This aspect of Rule 701 was not discussed in United States v. McClintic, supra, 570 F.2d at 690, save its conclusion that the opinion in that case was helpful and its quote of the “shorthand rendition” language in United States v. Freeman, supra, 514 F.2d at 1191. I fail to see how the opinions given in the present case were shorthand renditions of Thompson’s criminal involvement in the marketing scheme based on personal knowledge of the testifying witnesses; rather, the opinions were speculations about a fact *1306easily proven by objective evidence — if the prosecution had such evidence. The opinion testimony here was a far cry from opinions concerning intoxication, speed, knowledge, probable action, or other facts regarding which objective evidence is often nonexistent by virtue of the nature of the fact itself rather than the prosecution’s failure to uncover what it wanted to find. Lay opinion can be helpful to the jury in these unusual cases. In the instant case, the opinions given by the witnesses, after a long line of leading questions, served only to prejudice Thompson’s cause. See Fed.R. Evid. 403.
Even if the majority were to agree that the admission of lay opinion testimony in this case was erroneous, it would likely dismiss that error as an admission of cumulative evidence not objected to by Thompson and not harmful to him. Indeed, the majority, on this cumulative evidence ground, has chosen to overlook error in the admission of hearsay testimony by Danny Schatz, who stated that Dale Johnson “talked about” Thompson as Johnson’s accomplice. In my opinion, rather than being cumulative evidence of Thompson’s involvement, the lay opinion testimony, which I believe was erroneously admitted, and Schatz’s hearsay testimony, which the majority agrees was admitted in error, was the evidence most likely to influence the jury in this case. The opinions of those admittedly involved in the scheme undoubtedly would carry great weight with the jury. Moreover, the hearsay statement regarding Thompson’s alleged complicity with Johnson is devastating evidence in view of Johnson’s prior conviction for his participation in the scheme. Under these circumstances, I would invoke the “plain error” doctrine and disregard Thompson’s failure to object to these errors during trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In order to reverse a decision based on the erroneous admission of evidence not objected to below, we need only find plain error, i.e., “that which has a substantial effect upon the rights of a criminal defendant.” United States v. Grady, 665 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir.1981). In view of the fact that Thompson was not represented by counsel, we should be more liberal in applying this plain error rule. The clear prejudicial impact of the erroneous admission of lay opinions and hearsay testimony in the present case indicates the need to apply that rule here. I would recognize that need and remand for a new trial.