Court Opinion

ID: 9451878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:26:00.195568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:56.749160
License: Public Domain

POPE, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I agree with the disposition made by the foregoing Per Curiam opinion and I agree with what is said therein.
I write this opinion for the purpose of noting certain additional matters which the court below should take into consideration upon the remand and after a full development of the facts.
It may well appear, and I think will probably appear, that the officers of the United States had full and complete notice of the financial situation of the former tenant and that it had in effect thrown up its hands so far as further operations were concerned. If this develops then the situation should be the same as that discussed in Carroll v. United States, D.C.Ark., 229 F.Supp. 891, where it was held that under similar circumstances the United States was liable to pay a reasonable compensation for the use of the premises occupied by it notwithstanding that the owners did not give notice of default as required by the lease. Not only that, but I think the court is obliged to take into consideration the probable fact that the United States by seizing the property actually took from the appellant a right which must be treated as a property right, one actually vested in him. That right was a right to retake possession by terminating the lease in the manner provided in the lease instrument.
This power which belonged to the appellant was effectively terminated and destroyed by the Government’s seizure of the property and the padlocking of the premises. From that time on the appellant was effectively deprived of this power and this continued until the Government surrendered the property. That such power and right was in the nature of a vested property right cannot be questioned. As stated in In Re Technical Marine Maintenance Co., 3d cir., 169 F.2d 548, 551, “The power to have the lease and term ‘terminate, expire and come to an end’ as of November 15, 1945, gave rise to a vested estate in real property upon the declaration by Township. Such a right cannot be divested without due process of law.” If the court finds, as I think it must, that the United States effectively did away with this vested right of the appellant then you have a plain case of taking of property without due process of law.
There is another question which may to some extent depend upon Arizona law. In processing the case here the Government represented that the rights of the United States claimed by it were “derived from the tenant taxpayer.” In short, it appears to be the Government’s claim that it took over the tenant’s rights to the premises, at least for this period of time. It would appear to me that under these circumstances the United States may well have become the successor in interest to the tenant. If that is so, then the proper person upon whom to serve a demand and notice of termination of lease would be this successor, the United States. This would mean that the notice served by the appellant on the United States would satisfy all possible requirements of the lease and of the Arizona statutes.