Court Opinion

ID: 9718005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:14:49.143935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.752751
License: Public Domain

OPINION
COHEN, Justice.
A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault and assessed punishment at life in prison. We reverse and remand.

EXCLUSION OF THE COMPLAINANT’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW

In point of error one, appellant contends the trial court erred by refusing to show the jury two videotapes of the complainant’s interview by a child abuse specialist.
The State contends appellant waived the error because he never offered the tapes during or after the complainant’s testimony. We disagree. Appellant offered the tapes both before and after the complainant’s testimony. Both times the State objected, and both times the judge ruled them inadmissible.
In one interview, the complainant never accused appellant of abuse. She accused someone else. In the other, she accused appellant. At trial, appellant sought to admit both tapes. The complainant, whom the interviewer said was “developmentally challenged,” had difficulty answering questions coherently and stating the difference between the truth and a he.
Two Texas courts have held it was reversible error to exclude such evidence. See Patmore v. State, 881 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1992, no pet.); Hall v. State, 764 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1988, no pet.). Our highest criminal law court has declared, “The rule of admissibility of evidence of this nature should be liberal.... ” Smith v. State, 520 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). The purpose is to admit . any evidence which gives promise of exposing falsehood.” Id. The Hall opinion is emphatic: “Certainly, had [the complainant] personally testified and directly indicated that appellant was her assailant, the videotape would have been admissible as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Tex. R.CRIm.Evid. 612(a)1....” 764 S.W.2d at *67421. That happened here. These opinions are unanimous and well reasoned.
The trial judge sustained the State’s objection, which was based on Tex. Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp.2000). The judge concluded the videotapes were inadmissible because they were made after the complaint was filed. See id. at §§ 2(a), 5(a). Those sections make such recordings admissible when, among other things, they were made before the complaint was filed. This ruling was error, however, because article 38.071 does not apply to this case. “This article applies only ... if the trial court finds that the child is unavailable to testify at the trial of the offense_” Tex.Code CRiM. P.Ann. art. 38.071, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Matz v. State, 989 S.W.2d 419, 423 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 14 S.W.3d 746 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). The trial court never found that, and the complainant testified at trial.
On appeal, the State does not contend its trial objection based on article 38.071 had merit. It does not mention article 38.071 at all. Instead, the State now contends for the first time that the videotapes were inadmissible because appellant never met the rule 613(a) predicate for admission of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement. See Tex.R.Evid. 613(a).2 At trial, the State never mentioned rule 613(a). It would be unfair to allow the State now to penalize appellant for not complying with rule 613 when the State never objected on that basis in the trial court. If it had, appellant would have been on notice of the claimed defect and could have cured it. That is why we require objections. Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
Requiring a timely and specific objection is not a mere “technicality.” Rather, it is one of the most important things that makes a fair trial fair. It is required by statute. Tex.R.Evid. 103(a). The rule has exceptions, but they are few and far between. See Tex.R.Evid. 103(d) (entitled “Fundamental Error in Criminal Cases”). In almost every appellate case, the State invokes the requirement against the defendant, the opposite of the parties’ posture here, and we enforce it vigorously. The policy applies to the State, as well as to defendants. Sedani v. State, 848 S.W.2d 314, 320-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh’g); see Robinson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (“A good rule of evidence works both ways.”). We hold that to allow the State to exclude a defendant’s evidence for secret reasons, unheard of in the trial court and revealed only belatedly on appeal when it is too late for the defendant to respond, would be a denial of due process of law. Id.; see State v. Gonzales, 850 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1993, pet. ref'd) (in a state’s appeal, applying the rule against a criminal defendant, stating, “It would be inappropriate for a reviewing court to determine that the suppression of the evidence is supported on other grounds when the trial court did not address any other possible grounds for the suppression.”).
But even if we were to allow the State to raise its new objection under rule 613(a) now, after the trial has ended and after appellant has lost his right to respond, the State would not prevail. Rule 613(a) does not apply to this case because its last sentence provides, “This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(e)(2).”3 Rule 801(e)(2) provides:
*675(e) A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) •••
(2) Admission by Party — Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is:
(A) The party’s own statement in either an individual or representative capacity;
(B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth;
(C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject;
(D) a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship; or
(E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Tex.R.Evid. 801(e)(2). Thus, appellant did not have to meet the requirements of rule 613(a) because he was offering the admission of the complaining witness herself, ie., an admission attributable to the party-opponent. The Austin Court of Appeals so held in Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). We agree with Cuyler.
We realize that the Austin Court has overruled its holding in Cuyler. See Halstead v. State, 891 S.W.2d 11, 12 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no pet.). The Halstead court held that, in a criminal case, the State, not the complainant, is the “party-opponent,” and, therefore, the language in rule 613(a) favoring admission of testimony by “a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(e)(2)” did not apply to a complainant’s statement. We respectfully disagree with Halstead.
Rule 613(a)’s last sentence attempts to guarantee that the inconsistent testimony of those seeking and resisting judgments is heard. Other rules strive for the same result — that crucial evidence be admitted. As a general rule, “All relevant evidence is admissible_” Tex.R.Evid. 402. What could be more relevant than the complainant’s contemporaneous videotaped statement to a sex-abuse counselor implicating someone other than appellant? “These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration ... of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” Tex.R.Evid. 102. What could be more important “to secure fairness” than to admit the complainant’s videotaped statement implicating someone other than appellant? What evidence could be more likely to achieve “the end that the truth may be ascertained” and to see “proceedings justly determined”?
We consider it significant that, even before our highest courts merged the rules of evidence, rule 613(a)’s predecessor governing only criminal cases contained the same language. Tex.R.Crim.Evtd. 612(a), 701-02 S.W.2d (Tex.Cases) XLIX (1985, superseded 1998). That fact and the rule’s language show that the “party-opponent” admissions mentioned in the rule cannot be only those of “the State” and never those of the complainant. It must include statements of individuals aligned with the State in the ways outlined in rule 801(e)(2). See Tex.R.Evid. 801(e)(2)(B)-(D) (party-opponent admission includes statements (1) in which party has manifested adoption or belief in truth, (2) by one authorized by party to make statements on that subject, and (3) by party’s agent or servant concerning matter within scope of agency or employment); see also Rodela v. State, 829 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (holding police investigator was State’s “agent” under former Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 801(e)(2)(D)); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 850-51 (6th Cir. *6761996) (holding statements of government’s paid informant admissible against government under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) because made within scope of agency). We believe statements by the complaining witness, like those by a police officer or state employee, can fall within rule 801(e)(2)’s definition in a criminal trial. Cf. David W. Louisell <& Christopher B. Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence § 426, 322-25 & n. 9 (suggesting terms agent and servant under FRE 801(d)(2)(D) in at least civil cases “should reach every person whose physical conduct can legally be, and is contended in the particular case to be, the basis of a claim or defense against the party against whom the statement is offered ...,” in addition to actual agents and servants). “The rule should be broadly construed to reach such statements.” Id. “In a practical sense a prosecuting witness certainly occupies party opponent status.” Goodson v. State, 566 So.2d 1142, 1148 n. 11 (Miss.1990). “While the State is technically the ‘party’ in a criminal case, the complainant in a criminal case is analogous to a party. Since the hearsay evidence proffered by [the defendant] was the out-of-court statement of the complainant, such testimony is quite similar to hearsay evidence which is currently admissible under [the Tennessee version of Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2) ].” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 434(Tenn. Jan. 24, 2000) (designated for publication), cert. denied, —— U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 275, 148 L.Ed.2d 200 (2000).
If rule 613(a) means only the inanimate State, its language is almost meaningless. For example, the rule begins, “In examining a witness concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness .... ” It will be difficult to cross-examine the inanimate State of Texas about its prior inconsistent statement. The rule continues: “... the witness must be told the contents of such statement and the time and place and the person to whom it was made....” It will be difficult to tell that to the State of Texas. If nobody but the “State of Texas” can make party-opponent admissions, then rule 613(a)’s protection is largely imaginary in criminal cases.
Excluding these videotapes would be a puzzling result also because that same evidence would unquestionably be admitted if this case were civil, ie., if the complainant sued appellant for damages. “Except as otherwise provided by statute, these rules govern civil and criminal proceedings ... in all courts of Texas.... ” Tex.R.Evid. 101(b) (emphasis added). Now that our highest courts have merged our formerly separate rules and applied the identical rule 613 to both civil and criminal proceedings, how can we interpret that single rule to exclude in a criminal case the same evidence that would obviously be admissible in a civil suit on the same facts between the same people?
Rule 613(a) is about “witnesses.” It mentions them six times. It is found in article VI, which is entitled ‘Witnesses.” Rule 613’s title is “Prior Statements of Witnesses_” Rule 613(a)’s title is “Examining Witness Concerning Prior Inconsistent Statement.” Thus, rule 613(a) is not about the State of Texas, which is, in this context, merely a nominal party.4
We therefore hold that when the rule uses the term “admission by party-opponent,” it includes those of the defendant and the complaining witness. To say that it means only those of the State of Texas is contrary to (1) the purpose of the rule; (2) the language of the rule; and (3) the other rules, particularly rule 102 (requiring that the rules be construed “to secure fairness” and “to the end that the truth may be ascertained”).
We have already stated our disagreement with Halstead. Two other cases have reached the same conclusion as Hal-*677stead. See Ramirez v. State, 987 S.W.2d 938, 943 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.); Owens v. State, 916 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996, no pet.). Both cases, like Halstead, simply say that under rule 613(a), the State is the “party-opponent” and conclude without any further discussion or analysis.5 Owens and Halstead also cite a treatise for the proposition, but it offers no more analysis. These authorities state the one-sentence conclusion, as if it were self-evident. We believe the opposite is evident and that the contrary holdings nullify the rule.
In addition, Ramirez and Owens are distinguishable. In both cases, the State was not using the evidence to impeach a defense witness, as rule 613 contemplates,6 but to make its own prima facie case. In both cases, complaining witnesses changed their stories, and the State then offered their prior statements into evidence. Ramirez, 987 S.W.2d at 940-43; Owens, 916 S.W.2d at 715-17. These statements were obviously not admissions of the State’s “party-opponent.” The complainants in Ramirez and Owens were not, and never could be, the State’s “party-opponent.” The State’s party-opponent in Ramirez, in Owens, and in every case is the defendant. Because the complaining witnesses in those cases were not the State’s party-opponent, the State was not entitled to any benefit from rule 613(a)’s last sentence.7
We decline to follow Halstead, Ramirez, and Owens. We rely on Cuyler, as well as Patmore, 831 S.W.2d at 99, Hall, 764 5.W.2d at 21, Smith, 520 S.W.2d at 386, and most importantly, rule 613(a) itself.

HARM

The State contends the ruling was harmless because Lisa Holcombe, the interviewer, testified the complainant had said in one tape that only her brother had touched her improperly and never implicated appellant. The State refers to the following testimony:
Prosecutor: Did you ask [the complainant] if someone had touched her in a way that bothered her?
Holcombe: Yes.
Prosecutor: What was [the complainant’s] response?
Holcombe: The only indication of anybody touching her was her brother at that time.
[[Image here]]
Prosecutor: Did you ask her if someone had ever put her mouth on their body?
Holcombe: Yes.
*678Prosecutor: And what was her response?
Holcombe: No.
Prosecutor: Did you ever ask if she had been asked to put her mouth on someone’s body?
Holcombe: Yes.
Prosecutor: And her response?
Holcombe: No.
[[Image here]]
Prosecutor: Did she say that [her brother] and her dad had the same private part?
Holcombe: Yes.
Prosecutor: Did you ask her — generally did you inquire as to whether or not someone had touched her vagina?
Holcombe: Yes.
Prosecutor: And what was her response?
Holcombe: No.
Prosecutor: And did you ask her if somebody touched her behind?
Holcombe: I asked her if someone had touched her and she said that [the brother] was the only person that had touched her.
[[Image here]]
Prosecutor: April 4th. By use of the dolls did she indicate that her father had abused her vaginal area?
Holcombe: No.
Prosecutor: Did she indicate that her father had abused her rectal area?
Holcombe: No.
[[Image here]]
Prosecutor: What was the difference in the response?
Holcombe: [The complainant] had made reference to getting touched with a stick on her private part.
Prosecutor: But where did she say that the stick was found?
Holcombe: She said it was found from the yard.
Prosecutor: And she said that she had her clothes on at that time when she was touched by the stick?
Holcombe: She said she had her clothes on.
Prosecutor: And other than the reference to that account, there was no reference of sexual abuse in that interview based on your recollection?
Holcombe: As far as the only other reference that she had made was when I asked — was referring to the dolls and if a private part had ever touched her and she said [the brother] and Craig.
Prosecutor: Okay, but what was in conjunction with the stick?
Holcombe: And when I asked her what with after that she said it was a stick.
[[Image here]]
We decline to hold that this testimony by Holcombe rendered the error harmless. We have viewed the tapes, and in our opinion, Holcombe’s testimony about the complainant is no substitute for the tapes themselves. Holcombe’s testimony is not comparable to the tapes in quality or quantity. By requesting admission of all the tapes, including those that incriminated him, appellant was apparently trying to show the jury a picture of the complainant as a malleable witness, subject to pressure and influence, and thus not credible. The tapes are first-hand, verbatim, pictured statements of the complainant made long before the trial, much closer to the date of the relevant events. Despite lengthy questioning by Holcombe, an interviewer specially trained to elicit sex-abuse allegations from children, the tapes show that the complainant was at first unwilling to accuse appellant, but willing to accuse someone else. Comparing the tapes to Holcomb’s testimony, we conclude that their exclusion may have deprived appellant of the most valuable evidence he had. The State’s case consisted largely of admissible hearsay and circumstantial evi*679dence.8 The State presented its case without calling the complainant to testify, and then it resisted appellant’s attempts to show the complainant as she was when interviewed by the State’s agents, preferring to rely instead on the eyes and ears of others. It is difficult for us to imagine a fair trial of this case without this evidence.
The opinion dissenting from denial of en-banc review lists the evidence against appellant and concludes it was so overwhelming that it makes the error harmless. Again, we disagree. The complainant’s testimony was conflicting, first exculpatory, then inculpatory. To the extent the medical evidence proved she suffered injury, none of it proved appellant was the offender. The other fact witnesses were people who repeated in court selected words of the complainant. That is why it was so important for the jury to see the complainant’s actual demeanor and words nearer the time of the event. The dissent contends that second-hand, selected renditions of the complainant’s accounts were so overwhelming that real evidence was unnecessary to the defendant’s case. A jury that found hearsay so persuasive surely might have been influenced by the contemporaneous statements of the complainant herself.
Based on this record, we conclude that appellant’s substantial rights were affected. Tex.R.App.P. 44.2(b); see Hall, 764 S.W.2d at 21 (“Consequently, the jury should have been afforded the opportunity to view the videotape and assign to it their own value in judging the credibility of the witnesses.”).
We hold that (1) article 88.071 does not apply to this case, (2) rule 613(a) does not apply to this case, (3) pursuant to rule 801(e)(2), the videotapes are not hearsay, and (4) their exclusion was harmful. Point of error one is sustained.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
En-banc consideration was requested.
A majority of the Justices of the Court voted to deny en-banc consideration.
Justice TAFT’s dissenting opinion from the denial of en-banc review to follow.

. Rule 612(a) of the repealed rules of criminal evidence has been reenacted without change as rale 613(a) of the merged Texas Rules of Evidence. Thus, Hall is authority for admission under the present rule 613(a).

. The predicate requires that the witness (1) be told the contents, time, and place of the prior inconsistent statement and the person to whom it was made and (2) be given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. Tex. R.Evid. 613(a).

. We disagree strongly with the dissenting opinion’s statement that, by relying on rule 801(e)(2), we have raised a new theory. It is the State, not this Court, that has raised rule 613(a) as a ground for affirmance on appeal for the first time, after the trial and after appellant filed his appellate brief. Part of *675rule 613(a) is its reference to rule 801(e)(2), which nullifies rule 613(a) in part. The State cannot both raise a new theory on appeal and also expect a court of law to apply only part of the rule — that which favors the State— while ignoring the rest.

. "Nominal" means "titular; existing in name only; not real or substantial....” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.1979). This aptly describes the State’s status as a “party-opponent.”

.The dissent's out-of-state cases are as light on reasoning as Halstead, Ramirez, and Owens. Some devote one sentence to the issue. See Ohio v. Dinwiddle, Summit Appeal 12876 at *3 (Ohio Ct.App. Sept. 16, 1987) (not designated for publication) (“The victim is not a party opponent.”); In re Davis, 166 Mich.App. 735, 420 N.W.2d 872, 873 (1988) (dicta). Others use two, but say no more. See State v. Browning, Clermont Appeal 04-022 at *2 (Ohio Ct.App. Dec. 19, 1994) (not designated for publication); People v. Deskin, 60 Ill.App.3d 476, 17 Ill.Dec. 757, 376 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (1978). The most disappointing is Goodson v. State, which recognizes that, "In a practical sense a prosecuting witness certainly occupies party opponent status,” yet overrules the point in three sentences. 566 So.2d 1142, 1148 n. 11 (Miss.1990). All these cases mistakenly assume that only statements by the two parties, the defendant and “the State” (which is inanimate and can never make statements on its own), can be admissions by a party-opponent. To the contrary, the rule in those states and in ours also allows statements by those closely associated with the parties to "count” as statements by the parties themselves. See, e.g., TEX.R.EVID. 801(e)(2)(B)-(D) (in addition to a party’s own statements, party-opponent admissions include those by the party’s co-conspirator, by its agent or servant, by someone the party authorizes to make the statement, and another’s statement the party adopts). That is the law in Texas. See Rodela v. State, 829 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (State’s investigator’s statements held to be those of party-opponent).

. Rule 613 is entitled: "Prior Statements of Witnesses: Impeachment and Support.”

. "[Rule 613(a) ] does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent_” TexR.Evid. 613(a).

. Dr. Chacko, the State’s medical expert, found no physical evidence of abuse of the complainant’s vaginal area. She found physical evidence "consistent” with abuse of the anal area. She testified that abuse was not the only possible explanation for the anal injury and that four other physical conditions that would have been consistent with abuse of that area were not present. At trial, the complainant first testified that nobody had touched her "anywhere that’s bothered” her; then, on cross-examination by the State, that appellant had anally abused her; finally, on redirect examination, that she had told Hol-combe that appellant had vaginally and anally abused her. In the excluded videotapes, she first implicated only her brother, and then in the second one, she accused appellant. Remaining evidence showed the complainant’s outcry and various conduct that experts said was consistent with abuse. This evidence made it more necessary, not less, that the tapes be admitted. We do not find this evidence so overwhelming as to suggest that any jury hearing it would not have given significant weight to the videotapes.