Court Opinion

ID: 9745683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:17:28.904602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.060105
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN concurring in part and dissenting in part: While previously, pleas of guilty were governed by Section 113 — 4 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, sec. 113 — 4 (c) and Supreme Court Rule 401 (b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110-A, sec. 401 (b), the plea of guilty entered herein was accepted 28 days after the effective date of Supreme Court Rule 402. (See Ill. Rev Stat. 1971, ch. 110-A, sec. 402.) It is this Rule that must be substantially complied with in the instant case. I concur that the nature of the charge was adequately explained to the defendant by the trial judge. It is my feeling, however, that Rule 402 was not substantially complied with due to the trial judge’s failure to explain the minimum sentence, together with the possible penalty to which the defendant may have been subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences, and the court’s failure in determining a factual basis for the plea. Prior to acceptance of the plea of guilty to burglary, the trial court knew there was pending before it, a petition to revoke probation (arising out of convictions for mob action and aggravated battery). As a matter of fact, after acceptance of the plea herein, the court combined the hearings on both matters for disposition. In light of these, circumstances, it was essential that the court not only explain the minimum sentence that could be imposed, but, more importantly, that it explain the possible penalty because of prior convictions and the probability of consecutive sentences. People v. Rue (1966), 35 Ill.2d 234, 240. Except for Trenter (a negotiated plea situation), the authorities relied upon by the majority are all pre-Supreme Court Rule 402. I therefore view them as unpersuasive. The fact that after the plea, and during the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, it was found that the defendant had previously served a term of 1-1½ years in the penitentiary adds no validity to their position. See, People v. Terry (1969), 44 Ill.2d 38, 40; People v. Short (1972), 281 N.E.2d 785, 787. Finally, the majority again relies upon matters “after the fact” (the hearing in the aggravation and mitigation) to bolster its decision with regard to establishing a factual basis for the plea of guilty. The Rule itself explicitly states that the court should not accept a plea of guilty without first determining a factual basis. See, Supreme Court Rule 402 (c). This was not done. I, therefore, dissent.