Court Opinion

ID: 9409275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:08:30.095866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.980410
License: Public Domain

J-A15011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    SALVATORE CASTELLUCCIO                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GIANT EAGLE, INC. AND/OR GIANT             :
    EAGLE MARKETS, INC.                        :
                                               :
                       Appellants              :      No. 1086 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 5, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                             No(s): GD-16-005861

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED: JULY 17, 2023

        Giant Eagle, Inc., and/or Giant Eagle Markets, Inc. (Giant Eagle),

appeals from the judgment entered in this negligence action brought by

Salvatore Castelluccio (Mr. Castelluccio). We affirm.

        This appeal arises from a jury verdict in favor of Mr. Castelluccio. Mr.

Castelluccio’s slip-and-fall accident occurred on April 4, 2014, inside Giant

Eagle’s grocery store located in Moon Township, Pennsylvania (the Moon

Store). Mr. Castelluccio alleged in his complaint that on April 4, 2014, “and

for some time prior thereto,” Giant Eagle:

        [A]llowed a dangerous condition to exist on the premises [of the
        Moon Store,] consisting of a mat which did not stay in place and
        which folded over or bunched up[,] which had a tendency to create
        a trip hazard or which was placed in a manner as to pose a trip
        hazard.
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15011-23

Complaint, 4/4/16, ¶ 10. Mr. Castelluccio claimed, “the foregoing condition

caused [him] to fall and sustain [] injuries and damages,” including “injuries

to his neck including the disc located at C6-7 and/or C5-6”. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14

The complaint further alleged Giant Eagle

       had notice and/or knowledge of the aforementioned dangerous
       condition, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have had
       notice and knowledge of the aforementioned dangerous condition
       and/or caused the condition to exist.

Id. ¶ 11.

       Giant Eagle filed an answer and new matter on May 9, 2016. The case

proceeded to a jury trial in September 2021. The jury returned a verdict in

favor of Mr. Castelluccio, awarding him $95,000 in damages.1 Giant Eagle

timely filed a post-trial motion (PTM), claiming, inter alia, the trial court erred

in certain evidentiary rulings, and in instructing the jury. See PTM, 10/7/21,

¶¶ 1-5, 16-17. On August 29, 2022, the trial court denied the PTM.

       Giant Eagle timely appealed on September 20, 2022. The trial court

entered judgment against Giant Eagle on October 5, 2022. Giant Eagle and

the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Giant Eagle presents four issues for review:

       1. In this slip-and-fall case, Giant Eagle presented evidence about
          the lack of prior incidents at the store in question. The trial
          court concluded that, by presenting this evidence, Giant Eagle

____________________________________________

1 The trial court subsequently molded the verdict to include delay damages,
resulting in an award of $118,000.

                                           -2-
J-A15011-23

          opened the door to evidence relating to subsequent incidents
          at other stores. Did the trial court err?

       2. Mr. Castelluccio did not present any video evidence or any
          eyewitness testimony in his case. Rather, his case rested
          almost exclusively on his testimony. During his testimony, he
          demonstrated for the jury his purportedly limited range of
          motion in his neck. Later, the trial court precluded Giant Eagle
          from impeaching Mr. Castelluccio’s testimony with security
          footage from a few weeks before trial that showed him moving
          his neck without apparent limitation. Did the trial court err?

       3. Giant Eagle sought to introduce deposition testimony from a
          Giant Eagle employee. The employee asserted that he saw Mr.
          Castelluccio earlier in the day in question and that he told him
          to be careful when he saw Mr. Castelluccio kicking and moving
          a mat. The trial court precluded Giant Eagle from introducing
          this testimony. Did the trial court err?

       4. Mr. Castelluccio presented no evidence showing that Giant
          Eagle created a dangerous condition that caused his injuries.
          Yet the trial court instructed the jury that the jury need not find
          that Giant Eagle was on notice of any dangerous condition if it
          concluded that Giant Eagle itself created a dangerous
          condition. Did the trial court err?

Giant Eagle Brief at 4-5.2

       Giant Eagle first claims the trial court improperly “allow[ed] Mr.

Castelluccio to introduce irrelevant evidence of subsequent incidents” that

____________________________________________

2 We observe Giant Eagle’s issues are phrased differently in its court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors. Although we overlook this
defect and conclude Giant Eagle’s issues are nevertheless preserved for our
review, we caution that failure to properly preserve claims in a Rule 1925(b)
statement can result in waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not
included in the Statement … are waived.”); Commonwealth v. Lord, 719
A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (same).

                                           -3-
J-A15011-23

occurred at other Giant Eagle grocery store locations,3 and incorrectly

“concluded that Giant Eagle ‘opened the door’ to evidence relating to

subsequent incidents….”        Id. at 16 (bold omitted).   Giant Eagle claims it

“specifically limited its argument and evidence” to the lack of “prior incidents

that occurred [] at the Moon [S]tore.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 17-18 (citing

the trial transcript).       Giant Eagle further complains, “evidence about

subsequent incidents at other stores is not ‘reasonably related’ to evidence

about the lack of prior incidents at the Moon [S]tore.” Id. at 18-19 (emphasis

in original). Accordingly, Giant Eagle asks that we “vacate the verdict and

remand for a new trial.” Id. at 19.

       Mr. Castelluccio counters the trial court properly admitted the study into

evidence, where:

       Throughout the trial, [Giant Eagle] continually claimed how safe
       its mats were. The study proved that the mats were not as safe
       as [Giant Eagle] claimed. Hence, the study was admissible to
       disprove [Giant Eagle’s] claim of how safe the mats were.

Appellee’s Brief at 10.

       When reviewing evidentiary challenges, our standard of review is well-

established:

             Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within
       the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the
       court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of
____________________________________________

3 Specifically, Giant Eagle challenges the trial court’s admission of an internal
Giant Eagle safety study (the study), performed between 2014 and 2016, “on
incidents involving the type of mat Mr. Castelluccio tripped on.” Trial Court
Opinion, 12/8/22, at 11.

                                           -4-
J-A15011-23

         discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court
         might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a manifest
         unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such
         lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

Turnpaugh Chiropractic Health & Wellness Ctr., P.C. v. Erie Ins. Exch.,

2023 PA Super 99, *6 (Pa. Super. June 8, 2023) (citation omitted).4

         Further,

         [t]he threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether
         evidence is relevant.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564,
         577 (Pa. [] 2005). Evidence is relevant if “it has the tendency to
         make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
         evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the
         action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). “Evidence is relevant if it logically
         tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact
         at issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable
         inference or presumption regarding a material fact.”
         Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. []
         2002). “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
         provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”
         Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
         probative value is outweighed by a danger of one of more of the
         following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
         jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
         cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2022) (some

citations modified).

         The trial court opined it properly admitted the study into evidence at

trial:

         If the study were being offered to prove Giant Eagle had notice of
         the danger encountered by Mr. Castelluccio, [the court] would
         agree there would need to be proof the other incidents were
____________________________________________

4 We also apply this standard of review to Giant Eagle’s second and third
issues, which challenge evidentiary rulings.

                                           -5-
J-A15011-23

       similar. However, the study was offered to challenge or rebut
       Giant Eagle’s argument that it was an isolated incident and that
       the mats did not pose any danger to customers. See id. at 311-
       12 and 321. This “opened the door” to the study that Giant Eagle
       conducted on the mats. See Tillery v. Children’s Hospital of
       Philadelphia, 156 A.3d 1233[,] 1243[, (Pa. Super. 2017)]].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/22, at 11 (citations modified).

       Our review discloses the trial court’s foregoing reasoning is supported

by the record and the law, and we discern no abuse of its discretion in

admitting the relevant study. See Tillery, 156 A.3d at 1243 (holding, “if a

party presents evidence about a certain issue, then they open the door to

rebuttal evidence that may not otherwise have been admissible.”); see also

Duchess v. Langston Corp., 709 A.2d 410, 412 (Pa. Super. 1998). Giant

Eagle’s first issue does not merit relief.

       In its second issue, Giant Eagle argues the trial court erred in precluding

it from introducing into evidence security video footage of Mr. Castelluccio

shopping at two other Giant Eagle stores, recorded in the months prior to Mr.

Castelluccio’s fall at the Moon Store.5 See Giant Eagle Brief at 20-26. Giant

Eagle acknowledges it did not disclose the video footage in question until the

time of trial, see id. at 21, but claims it nevertheless “fully complied with its

discovery obligations,” because:

____________________________________________

5 We further explain the security video below, but note that Giant Eagle claims
it belied Mr. Castelluccio’s trial testimony that his fall and injury at the Moon
Store caused him limited mobility in his neck. See Giant Eagle Brief at 21-
22.

                                           -6-
J-A15011-23

      When Giant Eagle filed its pre-trial statement in this case, it did
      not include the security footage because it did not know that the
      footage existed; it found and reviewed the fresh security footage
      only after Mr. Castelluccio testified.

Id. at 23. Giant Eagle claims, as “the security footage directly impeaches Mr.

Castelluccio’s credibility as a witness,” the trial court erred in precluding Giant

Eagle from presenting this evidence at trial. Id. at 26.

      Mr. Castelluccio disagrees, arguing the trial court “was acting within its

discretion when it excluded this last minute evidence,” which Giant Eagle failed

to disclose to opposing counsel until “the last day of trial.” Appellee’s Brief at

16. We agree.

      The trial court competently rejected Giant Eagle’s claim in its opinion:

      The surveillance video undoubtedly surprised Mr. Castelluccio’s
      counsel as Giant Eagle’s counsel did not disclose the video until
      the morning of the last day of the trial. See [N.T., 9/24-29/21,
      at] 467-68. Giant Eagle argued that [the trial court] should admit
      the evidence as rebuttal to Mr. Castelluccio’s testimony of having
      limited range of motion in his neck. Giant Eagle, however, was
      aware since at least 2017 that Mr. Castelluccio was
      claiming this limited range of motion because Mr.
      Castelluccio said so during his deposition. See id. at 472-
      73. In answers to interrogatories[,] Giant Eagle stated it “does
      not have any photographs, films, videotapes or digital images
      related to the claim in this case.”             [Mr. Castelluccio’s]
      interrogatories directed to [Giant Eagle] attached to [Mr.
      Castelluccio’s] brief in opposition to motion for post-trial relief filed
      12/10/2021, as Document 59. But, when Giant Eagle’s trial
      counsel asked his client to look for video of Mr. Castelluccio after
      he testified at the trial, Giant Eagle was able to use its loyalty
      program records to pinpoint recent dates he was in one of its
      facilities and find him on the facilities’ surveillance videotapes.
      See id. at 469, 472. Giant Eagle, therefore[,] could have used
      this same method to obtain surveillance video of Mr. Castelluccio
      at any time during the six years that his lawsuit was pending[,]
      but instead did not do so until it surprised Mr. Castelluccio’s
      counsel on the morning of the last day of trial.

                                       -7-
J-A15011-23

            Even though Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 212.2
     mandates “a list of all exhibits a party intends to use at trial” be
     in pre-trial statements, [Pa.R.C.P. 212.2(a)(4),] the video
     surveillance was not included in Giant Eagle’s pre-trial statement.
     A note in the Rule states that a list of exhibits for use in rebuttal
     or for impeachment is not contemplated, as “[t]hese matters are
     governed by case law.”            [Pa.R.C.P. 212.2(a)(4), note.]
     Bindschusz v. Phillips, 771 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. 2001), is such
     case law, with the circumstances that led the trial judge to exclude
     a surveillance video being nearly identical to the surveillance video
     that surprised Mr. Castelluccio’s counsel in this proceeding. The
     Superior Court upheld exclusion of the surveillance video because
     the negative interrogatory answer and nondisclosure in the pre-
     trial statement “resulted in unfair and prejudicial surprise to
     appellee midway through the trial….” Id. at 811. In a footnote,
     the Superior Court invalidated the argument that such
     surveillance video is for rebuttal or impeachment, holding that it
     is substantive evidence of the extent of a disputed injury. Id.,
     footnote 6.     Thus, [the trial court] correctly excluded the
     surveillance video of Mr. Castelluccio.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/22, at 14-15 (emphasis added; citations modified).

Again, the trial court’s cogent reasoning is supported by the record and the

law. Giant Eagle’s second issue lacks merit.

     Giant Eagle next claims the trial court improperly “excluded relevant and

critical deposition testimony” from Thomas Stuby (Mr. Stuby), “a Giant Eagle

employee who passed away between his deposition and trial.” Giant Eagle

Brief at 26. According to Giant Eagle, “Mr. Stuby described an encounter that

he had with Mr. Castelluccio[,] prior to his fall[,] in which Mr. Stuby warned

him to ‘be careful[.]’” Id. Giant Eagle complains: “If the jury had heard Mr.

Stuby’s testimony and concluded that Mr. Stuby had indeed warned Mr.

Castelluccio earlier that day ‘to be careful’ …, the jury could have concluded

                                     -8-
J-A15011-23

that Giant Eagle had sufficiently discharged any duty that it owed to Mr.

Castelluccio.” Id. at 28-29.

      Contrary to Giant Eagle, Mr. Castelluccio claims “the trial court properly

excluded speculative testimony attempting to link [Mr. Castelluccio] with an

unidentified customer acting suspiciously earlier in the [Moon] Store[.]”

Appellee’s Brief at 20 (capitalization omitted). According to Mr. Castelluccio:

“When the testimony of [Mr.] Stuby is read in context it is clear that he is

speculating that the individual that he saw kicking a rug was Mr. Castelluccio.”

Id. at 21.

      In its opinion, the trial court competently detailed Mr. Stuby’s deposition

testimony, and determined the court did not err in excluding this evidence:

             During his November 6, 2017 deposition[,] Mr. Stuby
      testified that he was working as a part-time produce clerk on the
      day Mr. Castelluccio was injured. Below are relevant portions of
      the questions asked of Mr. Stuby and his answers:

             Q: [D]o you have a recollection of meeting Mr.
             Castelluccio that day [of his fall in the Moon Store]?

             A: Inadvertently, yes. I was … taking care of the non-
             organic section, and to me, I don’t know, he’s — I sort
             of can judge a little bit how people are, but I didn’t
             see the guy with a buggy or a basket or anything, and
             he was coming through the produce area. And he
             was, like, sort of, like, kicking or shifting the rug a
             little bit, and I said, you’ve got to be careful; these
             rugs do move. He said, okay. So he left and I went
             in, and [I informed] my manager, … I said, you know,
             we got a guy out there, I don’t know what he’s up to,
             but he … doesn’t have a buggy. He wasn’t asking me
             any questions about food or produce, and he’s out
             there, like, kicking the carpet or shifting the carpet a
             little bit, like, kicking on it. So from that point on, [the

                                        -9-
J-A15011-23

              manager] said he’ll check it out, and other than that,
              I didn’t see him.

                                          * * *[6]

        Transcript of Thomas Stuby Deposition, p. 24-[26].

                                     ***
        [The questioning of Mr. Stuby continued:]

              Q: Okay. Mr. Castelluccio, who is seated to my left —

              A: Yes.

              Q: -- [D]o you remember ever seeing him in the
              store?

              A: I don’t — it’s hard to tell. You know, he may have.
              He could have had a hat on. He could have had a
              winter coat over the years. It’s hard to tell.

              Q: But there’s some customers you know on sight;
              correct?

              A: Absolutely. They’re there every day or every other
              day. You know them by name.

              Q: Is Mr. Ca[s]telluccio anyone you recognize in that
              manner?

              A: No.

                                          ***

              Q: And you don’t know Mr. Castelluccio personally, do
              you?

              A: No.

              Q: And you’ve not had any encounters with him
              between April 4th, 2014, and today; correct?
____________________________________________

6   We omit several pages of irrelevant testimony.

                                          - 10 -
J-A15011-23

           A: No.

           Q: You are still employed at Giant Eagle —

           A: Yes, I am.

           Q: --correct? And you had some responsibility for the
           care and maintenance of the mats in the store; is that
           correct?

           A: Yes.

           Q: If a supervisor learned someone — and when I say
           supervisor, I mean anyone above you in the chain of
           command … learned that one of these mats were out
           of place, would you potentially be in trouble?

           A: I could be. I could be if it happened on different
           occasions. That first time, it may be a warning, you
           know. Why didn’t you take care of it? You know —
           but … we get videos every year about safety: mopping
           the floors, wet floors, blocking the door ways, picking
           stuff up, wiping stuff up. I mean, it’s an indoctrination
           they pump in your head, so you’re always on guard
           for that stuff.

     Transcript of Thomas Stuby [D]eposition, pp. 39-41.

            [The trial court’s] analysis of this testimony discloses Mr.
     Stuby first saying he inadvertently met Mr. Castelluccio on the
     date of injury and then repeating seven or more times that he was
     not sure Mr. Castelluccio was the same guy he saw kicking or
     shifting a mat. Hence, [the court] surmise[s] that what [Mr.
     Stuby] meant when he testified he inadvertently met Mr.
     Castelluccio is that the meeting did not occur until after Mr.
     Castelluc[c]io returned to the store in a sling and took
     photographs. [The court] determined the probative value of the
     evidence of an unidentified customer kicking or shifting a mat
     earlier that day is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
     Mr. Castelluccio.     See Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403[,
     supra]. There is little, if any, probative value because the
     testimony has no bearing on whether Giant Eagle or Mr.
     Castelluccio was negligent. However, the danger of unfair

                                    - 11 -
J-A15011-23

      prejudice is readily apparent. The testimony is confusing and
      could have led the jury to think Mr. Castelluccio staged his
      fall, which would have been improper.

            Mr. Stuby’s testimony also could be interpreted as
      speculation by him that Mr. Castelluccio was the same person he
      saw kicking or shifting a mat. Speculation is not admissible
      evidence. See Winschel v. Jain, 925 A.2d 782[, 797 (Pa. Super.
      2007),] and Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305[, 320 n.8 (Pa.
      Super. 2003)].

            Additionally, the probative value of the testimony is
      outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues. See
      Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403. The jury would have to
      determine the credibility of Mr. Stuby’s testimony that a customer
      was kicking or shifting a mat. But, after Mr. Castelluccio was
      injured, Mr. Stuby’s supervisor warned team members to watch
      the mats closely, Mr. Stuby’s sole employment at the time of his
      deposition was Giant Eagle[,] and Mr. Stuby knew he could be in
      trouble with Giant Eagle for not properly maintaining the mat.
      Thus, the jury would have to assess Mr. Stuby’s credibility to
      determine if he contrived the story to avoid the impact on his
      employment for improper maintenance of the mat. … However,
      the jury would be confused because its ability to assess Mr.
      Stuby’s credibility is impaired by the lack of video recording
      of [Mr. Stuby’s] deposition and his death prior to trial.
      Therefore, [the trial court] correctly decided to exclude the
      portions of Mr. Stuby’s deposition where he testified to seeing a
      customer kicking or shifting a mat.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/22, at 2, 6-9 (emphasis and footnote added).

      Our review again discloses record and legal support for the trial court’s

sound reasoning. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court excluding

Mr. Stuby’s deposition testimony under Pa.R.E. 403. Giant Eagle’s third issue

does not merit relief.

      In its final issue, Giant Eagle claims the “trial court erred when

instructing the jury because it added a misleading instruction” to “the standard

                                     - 12 -
J-A15011-23

jury instruction regarding the duty of care that a business owner owes to its

invitees.” Giant Eagle Brief at 30. Specifically, prior to trial, Giant Eagle asked

that the trial court not charge the jury pursuant to Pennsylvania Suggested

Standard Civil Jury Instruction 18.40, see Pa.S.S.J.I. (Civ.) 18.40 (duty of

care owners/occupiers of land owe to invitees), but instead charge the jury as

follows:

       To establish that Giant Eagle was negligent, [Mr. Castelluccio]
       must first prove that Giant Eagle knew, or in the exercise of
       reasonable care, should have known of the existence of the carpet
       in a dangerous condition immediately prior to [Mr. Castelluccio]
       falling.

Giant Eagle’s Proposed Jury Instructions, 10/5/21, at 5; see also id. at 6

(Giant Eagle’s proposed instruction on duty of care); Giant Eagle Brief at 30.

Giant Eagle challenges the trial court’s refusal to give its proposed instruction,

instead arguing that the instruction the court gave at trial7 improperly “allowed

the jury to hold Giant Eagle liable without hearing any evidence that Giant

Eagle had notice of the dangerous condition.” Giant Eagle Brief at 30.

       Mr. Castelluccio counters “the trial court properly instructed the jury

that if the dangerous condition was created by [Giant Eagle], [Mr.

Castelluccio] need not show any further notice.”          Appellee’s Brief at 24

(capitalization omitted). According to Mr. Castelluccio:

____________________________________________

7 We detail below the language of the trial court’s instruction. Prior to the
instruction, counsel for the parties detailed their respective arguments on the
matter. See N.T., 9/24-29/21, at 435-37; see also id. at 572-73 (trial court’s
jury instruction on negligence and duty of care).

                                          - 13 -
J-A15011-23

     [Giant Eagle’s] position that [the trial court’s jury] charge was not
     appropriate is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the
     evidence which was presented. In this case, the negligence was
     established by recognizing that the loose[-]laid mats were
     dangerous and it was [Giant Eagle] which directed their use and
     placement.

Id. at 25-26.

     In reviewing a challenge to a jury charge:

     [O]ur scope of review is to determine whether the trial court
     committed [a] clear abuse of discretion or error of law controlling
     the outcome of the case. Error in a charge is sufficient ground for
     a new trial, if the charge as a whole is inadequate or not clear or
     has a tendency to mislead or confuse rather than clarify a material
     issue. A charge will be found adequate unless the issues are not
     made clear to the jury or the jury was palpably misled by what
     the trial judge said or unless there is an omission in the charge
     which amounts to fundamental error. A reviewing court will not
     grant a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the charge unless
     there is a prejudicial omission of something basic or
     fundamental. In reviewing a trial court’s charge to the jury, we
     must not take the challenged words or passage out of context of
     the whole of the charge, but must look to the charge in its entirety.

Frisch v. James River Ins. Co., 265 A.3d 765, 773 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation, emphasis, and brackets omitted).     Further, “a supplemental jury

charge ‘must be viewed in conjunction with [the original jury charge], not

divorced therefrom and in isolation.’”       Id. (quoting Polett v. Public

Communications, Inc., 126 A.3d 889, 933 (Pa. 2015)).

     The trial court competently rejected Giant Eagle’s claim:

     [T]he instructions that I provided the jury simply set forth
     longstanding Pennsylvania law on the obligations of an owner or
     occupier of land. See [N.T., 9/24-29/21, at] 572-[]73. The first
     part of my instruction on this topic comes from Pennsylvania
     Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instruction 18.40, which describes
     the actual or constructive notice necessary for liability. This jury

                                    - 14 -
J-A15011-23

       instruction is derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§
       343 and 343A, which have been adopted by the Pennsylvania
       Supreme Court. The second part of my instruction is explained in
       Hyatt v. County of Allegheny, 547 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Cmwlth.
       1988),[8] which involved circumstances similar to those
       encountered by Mr. Castelluccio in the Moon [Store]…. In Hyatt,
       the Commonwealth Court relied on Pennsylvania Supreme Court
       precedent for there being an exception to the actual or
       constructive notice necessary for liability when the owner or
       occupier is the one who created the dangerous condition. Id. at
       … 1308. Therefore, [the trial court] provided the jury with an
       accurate instruction on the law concerning Giant Eagle’s duty to
       Mr. Castelluccio.

                                           ***

             Giant Eagle [also] claims [the trial court] committed an
       error by rejecting its proposed jury instruction on the duty it owed
       to Mr. Castelluccio. During the charging conference[,] Giant Eagle
       requested that [the court] not charge the jury with Pennsylvania
       Suggest[ed] Standard Civil Jury Instruction 18.40, but instead
       charge the jury:

                  To establish that Giant Eagle was negligent, [Mr.
            Castelluccio] must first prove that Giant Eagle knew, or
            in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of
            the existence of the carpet in a dangerous condition
            immediately prior to [Mr. Castelluccio] falling.

       See [N.T., 9/24-29/21], p. 436; Proposed jury instructions filed
       10/5/2021 as Document 41, p. 5. This is not a complete
       statement of Giant Eagle’s duty to Mr. Castelluccio since it
       omits the requirement that Giant Eagle inspect the
       premises to discover dangerous conditions and other
       concepts set forth in Standard Instruction 18.40. Also, Giant
       Eagle’s requested instruction cites Moultrey v. Great A&P Tea
       Co., 422 A.2d 593 (Pa. Super. 1980), but omits this statement of
       the law applicable to the circumstances encountered by Mr.
       Castelluccio: “where the condition is one which the owner knows
____________________________________________

8Although decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court,
they may be persuasive. Taylor v. Pa. State Corr. Officers Ass’n, 291 A.3d
1204, 1207 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2023).

                                          - 15 -
J-A15011-23

      has frequently recurred, the jury may properly find that the owner
      had actual notice of the condition, thereby obviating additional
      proof by the invitee that the owner had constructive notice of it.”
      Id. … [at] 596. Therefore, [the trial court] correctly rejected Giant
      Eagle’s proposed jury instruction on the duty it owed to Mr.
      Castelluccio.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/22, at 18-20 (emphasis and footnote added; some

citations modified).

      As the trial court’s foregoing reasoning is supported by the record and

the law, see id., we discern no abuse of its discretion in charging the jury.

Giant Eagle’s final issue fails.

      Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023

                                     - 16 -