Court Opinion

ID: 9768656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 11:08:42.893585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:49.733411
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-22-00414-CR

                                  Woodrow Maybin, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                  The State of Texas, Appellee

               FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
      NO. D-1-DC-22-904015, THE HONORABLE JON N. WISSER, JUDGE PRESIDING

                             M E M O RAN D U M O PI N I O N

               Appellant, Woodrow Maybin, challenges his conviction for continuous sexual

abuse of young child. Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b). Maybin was accused of multiple acts of sexual

abuse against his four granddaughters. 1 After the jury found Maybin guilty, the trial court assessed

punishment at twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Id. at § 21.02(h). Maybin contends in his first

two issues that the trial court erred when it designated two forensic interviewers as the outcry

witnesses for two of the child victims instead of those children’s mother. Maybin contends in his

third issue that the trial court erred when it allowed Maybin’s son to testify that CPS had informed

him of a “no contact order” that required that Maybin not have any contact with his grandson. In

       1
          The continuous sexual abuse of young child statute creates one offense that may include
allegations of sexual abuse against one or more child victims. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b) (“A
person commits an offense if . . . during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person
commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are
committed against one or more victims).
his final issue, Maybin contends that the cumulative error of the three alleged trial court errors

requires reversal of his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s order of conviction.

                                         BACKGROUND 2

                At trial, Maybin’s four granddaughters, K.M., M.M., O.M., and A.M 3.—two sets

of sisters who are cousins—testified regarding multiple incidents of sexual abuse spanning years

and committed by Maybin against each of them personally. The granddaughters also testified to

acts of sexual abuse that they had witnessed Maybin perpetrate against one or more of the other

granddaughters. The oldest of the granddaughters, K.M., was fourteen at the time the outcries

were made and eighteen when she testified at Maybin’s trial.

The Outcry Witness Hearing

                The proper outcry witnesses for two of the granddaughters, K.M. and M.M., were

contested by the parties. The State asserted that the proper witnesses were the forensic interviewers

who interviewed each child individually. Maybin asserted that the proper witness was the

children’s mother. The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the

proper outcry witnesses to designate for the sisters K.M. and M.M. It is undisputed that before the

forensic interviews took place, their mother spoke to them and asked them if Maybin had

inappropriately touched them.

       2
           We recite only the relevant facts necessary to resolve the presented issues.
       3
          To protect the privacy of the minor victims, we will refer to them by their initials and we
will refer to their parents by their relationship to the children rather than by name. See Tex. R.
App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
                                                  2
               At the hearing, their mother testified that on Mother’s Day of 2018 she asked her

daughters if anyone, and specifically if Maybin, had ever touched them inappropriately. She

testified that her daughter K.M. told her that Maybin had inappropriately touched her. The mother

testified that K.M. did not go into details during that initial discussion but that K.M. spoke about

it in more detail after the forensic interview. The mother expressed difficulty remembering exactly

what K.M. had told her and explained that it had been four years, that the mother was trying to

“move past” the experience, and that the mother had blocked out some of the details so that she

“could be the best mother [she] can for [her daughters].” The mother testified that her knowledge

of what K.M. initially told her was limited to “it happened multiple times at multiple houses” and

“it” meant “touching her in her vagina” but that the mother could not remember if those were the

words K.M. used.

               Octavia Littles, the forensic interviewer who interviewed K.M. on May 18, 2018—

when K.M. was fourteen years old—testified that K.M. told her that there were about six incidents

in which Maybin touched her “no-no place” and that they spoke about three of those incidents.

K.M. described the most recent incident, which occurred at K.M.’s grandparents’ house about three

years prior to the interview. K.M. told Littles that while K.M. was sitting with Maybin in a chair

looking at photos of cars, Maybin reached under a blanket that was covering her and touched her

“no-no place.” Littles testified that K.M. also told her about the first incident that occurred. K.M.

told Littles that when she was four or five years old, K.M. was sitting in a chair with Maybin while

her parents were out to dinner and her grandmother was asleep on the couch. K.M. told Littles

that Maybin touched her over her underwear. Littles testified to a third incident that K.M.

described to her, which occurred in between the other two incidents. K.M. told Littles that K.M.

                                                 3
was sitting next to Maybin watching “NCIS” while her mother and sister were in the kitchen and

Maybin touched her “no-no square” over her clothes.

               The mother was recalled as a witness and testified that during her initial

conversation with M.M. about the abuse, M.M. told her that Maybin had touched her breast that

morning. M.M. also told her mother that Maybin had touched M.M.’s vagina over her clothes but

her mother did not testify to any additional details, including when the touching happened. The

mother testified that the only information M.M. gave her prior to the forensic interview was that

Maybin “rubbed her breast and would touch her vagina.”

               Krista Wold, the forensic interviewer who interviewed M.M. on May 18, 2018—

when M.M. was ten years old—testified that M.M. told her about three times that Maybin abused

her. M.M. told Wold that the previous weekend while at her father’s house, Maybin came into her

room, told her to wake up, and licked her breast and her vagina. It is undisputed that the weekend

prior to the forensic interviews was Mother’s Day weekend. The earliest incident that M.M. could

remember was when she was in kindergarten. M.M. told Wold that Maybin was sitting in a

recliner, asked her to come sit with him, positioned her so that she was at the foot of the recliner

facing him, opened her mouth with his hands, and put her mouth on his penis. M.M. also told

Wold about a third incident, which Wold referred to as “the second worst time.” M.M. told Wold

that she was sitting with Maybin in the living room, that Maybin’s penis was out, and that he

attempted to put her on top of him. Wold explained that M.M. described that Maybin was

attempting to put his penis inside of M.M.’s anus but that M.M. was able to get away.

               The trial court designated each forensic interviewer as the respective outcry witness

for the child that they interviewed.

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Testimony of “No-Contact Order”

               Maybin’s son and the father of O.M. and A.M., testified that in 2018 while he was

in the process of adopting his son I.M., he was notified by Child Protective Services (CPS) that

there was a “no-contact order” prohibiting Maybin from having contact with I.M. Maybin objected

and argued at trial that the testimony was impermissible hearsay, irrelevant, and barred by Rule of

Evidence 403 as highly prejudicial. The trial court sustained the objection “to anything further

than the fact that CPS contacted them and maybe the basic just short reason why” and reasoned

that “anything further is not sufficiently relevant to be admitted.”

               After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Maybin guilty of continuous sexual

abuse of young child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.

                                          DISCUSSION

               Maybin contends through three issues that the trial court committed reversible error.

Maybin’s final issue raises a cumulative error claim.

Outcry Witnesses

               Maybin contends that the proper outcry witness for K.M. and M.M. was their

mother because she was the first person the children outcried to about Maybin’s abuse. The State

contends that the information that K.M. and M.M shared with their mother was not specific enough

to constitute an outcry and that the mother’s memory issues regarding her initial discussion with

her daughters made the two forensic interviewers the proper outcry witnesses.

               We review a trial court’s admission of testimony from an outcry witness under an

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gibson v. State, 595 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no

pet.). A trial court has “broad discretion” in determining who qualifies as a proper outcry witness,

                                                  5
and we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and within the

zone of reasonable disagreement. See Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

               Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806,

810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure creates a

hearsay exception in the prosecution of certain sexual offenses committed against children for the

admission of a child’s first outcry of sexual abuse to an adult. See id. “This witness may recite

the child’s out-of-court statements concerning the offense, and that testimony is substantive

evidence of the crime.” Id. at 811. To be admissible under Article 38.072, “[t]he statement must

be ‘more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse is

going on’; it must be made in some discernible manner and is event-specific rather than

person-specific.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Garcia,

792 S.W.2d at 91).

               “There may be only one outcry witness per event.” Id. However, when a child tells

a second adult about a different type of abuse than the child told the first adult, the second adult

may testify about what the child told them about that different abuse. Hernandez v. State,

973 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (citing Turner v. State, 924 S.W.2d 180,

183 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d) (concluding officer could testify to victim’s outcry

about penile penetration because victim’s previous outcry to counselor was about digital

penetration)). Additionally, the subsequently told adult may be the proper outcry witness, if the

first adult whom the child told cannot remember the child’s outcry. Foreman v. State, 995 S.W.2d

854, 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (“We interpret the statute to mean that the ‘first

person’ refers to the first adult who can remember and relate at trial the child’s statement that in

some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.”)

                                                  6
               Here, Maybin contends that the offenses that K.M. and M.M. described to the

forensic interviewers were the same offenses they had already told their mother about, just in

additional detail. See Robinett v. State, 383 S.W.3d 758, 761–62 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no

pet.) (“The proper outcry witness is not to be determined by comparing the statements the child

gave to different individuals and then deciding which person received the most detailed statement

about the offense.”). We disagree. With the exception of the Mother’s Day incident, the mother

did not testify that she knew any details regarding the timing of the events her children told her

about. See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 140 (explaining “[t]he statement must be ‘more than words which

give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse is going on’; it must be made in

some discernible manner and is event-specific rather than person-specific”). As the State correctly

points out, continuous sexual abuse of young child makes it “an offense if . . . during a period that

is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of

whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims” and the child is

younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code § 21.02. The mother testified that her children

did not give her details. The trial court could have reasonably determined that the mother was not

told enough details to describe individual events underlying the charged offense of continuous

abuse of young child in a “discernible manner.” See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 140.

               The only incident that the mother had any time reference for was the Mother’s Day

incident. M.M. told her mother on Mother’s Day 2018 that Maybin had touched her breast “that

morning.” M.M. told her forensic interviewer that Maybin licked her breast and vagina when he

woke her up during Mother’s Day weekend. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that

the forensic interviewer was the correct outcry witness for the alleged abuse event regarding

licking M.M.’s breast and vagina and that the mother had described a different event—touching

                                                 7
M.M.’s breast. See Turner, 924 S.W.2d at 183 (distinguishing child’s outcry regarding penile

penetration from previous outcry about digital penetration).

               Further, the mother testified at the hearing that she could not remember exactly

what the children had told her, alluded that they had shared more details with her after the forensic

interview than they had initially, and testified that she had forgotten and blocked out the details of

the events surrounding the offenses committed against her children. The trial court could have

reasonably determined that the forensic interviewers were the first adults who could “remember

and relate at trial” the children’s statements. See Foreman, 995 S.W.2d at 859 (“We interpret the

statute to mean that the ‘first person’ refers to the first adult who can remember and relate at trial

the child’s statement that in some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.”)

               We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it designated

the forensic interviewers as the outcry witnesses for K.M. and M.M.             See Torres v. State,

No. 03-99-00485-CR, 2000 WL 1028098, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 27, 2000, no pet.) (not

designated for publication) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it designated

subsequent adult told about the abuse when subsequent adult was told the “how, when, and where”

through statements that were “quite detailed,” while first adults told were only told “yes” in

response to asking the victim if defendant had ever hurt her or touched her privates, which

constituted only allusion to sexual abuse rather than describing event in discernible manner).

               We overrule Maybin’s first two issues.

Testimony Regarding “No-Contact Order”

               Maybin contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to

elicit testimony from O.M.’s and A.M.’s father that CPS had contacted him and told him that there

                                                  8
was a “no-contact order” in place prohibiting Maybin from being around I.M. because it was

extraneous offense evidence prohibited by Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The State correctly

points out that Maybin’s objections to this evidence at trial did not include a Rule 404 extraneous

offense objection. Rather, Maybin argued at trial that the testimony was impermissible hearsay,

irrelevant, and barred by Texas Rule of Evidence Rule 403 as highly prejudicial. The trial court

generally sustained the objection, with limited exception for the complained of testimony, and

stated that any further detail would not be relevant. On appeal, Maybin has filed a reply brief but

has not addressed the State’s contention that he failed to preserve his Rule 404 issue for

appellate review.

                To preserve a complaint for appellate review, (1) a party must have made a timely,

specific objection, request, or motion to the trial court that stated the specific grounds for the ruling

sought by the complaining party, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context, and

(2) the trial court must have either ruled or refused to rule on the request—in which case the

complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

“[T]he point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.” Wilson v. State,

71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Preservation of error is a systemic requirement.

Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

                After reviewing the record, we agree with the State that Maybin’s Rule 404(b)

complaint was not preserved because he did not object on that basis in the trial court. Maybin’s

general relevancy, Rule 403, and hearsay objections did not preserve any Rule 404 complaint. See

Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that general relevancy

objection does not preserve Rule 404(b) issue); Parmer v. State, 38 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that Rule 404(b) issue was not preserved because there was no

                                                   9
Rule 404(b) objection, but there was Rule 403 objection made). Thus, we do not address the merits

of this issue. See Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“If an issue has not

been preserved for appeal, neither the court of appeals nor this Court should address the merits of

that issue.”).

Cumulative Error

                 Because we have concluded that Maybin’s first two asserted errors were not an

abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and because we may not review his third asserted error, we

conclude that there is no cumulative error in this case. See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230,

238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[W]e are aware of no authority holding that non-errors may in their

cumulative effect cause error.”).

                                         CONCLUSION

                 Because we overruled the first two of Maybin’s issues and cannot reach his third,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

                                              __________________________________________
                                              Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: August 24, 2023

Do Not Publish

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