Court Opinion

ID: 9588908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:35.296025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:41:34.545747
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
Hollowell, a dealer, owned a wrecker truck located in *89Chattanooga. He sold it twice to separate citizens of Georgia.
The first sale was to Moon, to whom he gave a certificate of origin from the manufacturer, and which certificate Moon used to obtain a certificate of title in Georgia. See Code Ann. §§ 68-408a, 68-409a (b). But Moon did not ever have actual possession of the vehicle, his explanation being that he left it with Hollowell so certain extras might be placed thereon.
Then Hollowell sold the same wrecker truck to Simson, who took possession and obtained a tag registration in Georgia. Just how he obtained a tag registration is hard to understand as he did not have a certificate of title, and without which he was not entitled to obtain a tag registration, although the Revenue Commissioner may accept a sworn affidavit from the applicant for tag registration as evidence of issuance or application for the certificate. See Code Ann. § 68-406a (c).
So the question for this court is as to how stand the two parties, Moon and Simson, with reference to ownership of the wrecker?
While it is true that Simson was diligent in one respect in that he quickly moved into possession (and the old saying is that possession is nine points in the law, whatever that means), and he also obtained a tag registration, in Georgia, where he lived and to which state he moved the car.
But he had no legal right to obtain a tag registration because he had no certificate of title which had been issued to Hollowell. Hence, we may disregard his tag registration, except to comment upon the circumstances.
A circumstance that should be considered is that when Simson went to claim possession of the vehicle, extra equipment was being added thereto. At whose instance is extra equipment usually added — the dealer or the purchaser? The record does not show that Simson — who must have known all about such things — made inquiry about why and at whose instance the extra equipment was being added. He may have learned the truth of the situation then and there, but the record is silent. He should have made inquiry, whether he did or *90not. "Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a fact, due to negligence, shall be equivalent to knowledge, in fixing the rights of parties. (74 Ga. 120; 76 Ga. 823.)” Code § 37-116.
Simson knew he had no legal right to obtain a tag and registration of title in Georgia because he did not have a certificate of origin as is required by Code § 68-409a, which appears to be necessary first for certificate before such tax and legal title registration may be accomplished in Georgia. These circumstances strongly suggest that Simson knew he was not buying the car from one who had the lawful right to sell it.
In view of the foregoing, despite Simson’s actual possession (which he took while Moon was having the seller or someone place extra equipment on the car in Chattanooga), the evidence indicates that Moon had the superior title and right of possession; that Moon’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted and Simson’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
I therefore vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment to Moon and denying summary judgment to Simson. I dissent from the majority opinion and judgment of reversal.