Court Opinion

ID: 9463678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:13:00.353557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:13.552539
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent. Had this case been submitted to a jury on the record before us and a guilty verdict been returned, there is little doubt in my mind that an affirmance would have been in order.
The only appellate issue now before us is whether the Government improperly refused to disclose the identity of a confidential informant for the trial. The majority find that the trial judge’s conclusion “that Gene [the informant] was available only to the Government was plainly correct”. Supra, at 210. Then, on the basis of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 *212L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), they conclude that “Tucker did not receive a fair trial”. Id. It is with both the majority’s premise, unsupported by the record, and its conclusion, a non sequitur, that I disagree.
The record discloses that Tucker knew the informant Gene fairly well. Tucker testified that on the day of the heroin sale he had entered an apartment, the door to which Gene had opened; that they had joked about a birthday party that had not “come off” one and a half years earlier; that in Tucker’s presence Gene and Yearby tested narcotics; and that Tucker and Gene together with Yearby and Special Agent Adams spent a considerable portion of the afternoon together in the apartment of the mother of Tucker’s child. The inference to be drawn from such personal contact is that Tucker was familiar with Gene. Moreover, in answer to a pretrial question from the court, Tucker conceded that he knew the informant’s true first name and the address he had given. And according to this counsel, Tucker knew quite well what Gene looked like. Nonetheless, Tucker claimed that he could not find him. Apparently Tucker’s counsel was as “unable” to locate Yearby as well. But the record makes abundantly clear that Gene’s identity was as available to Tucker as to the Government. This, to borrow the majority’s phrase, makes “nonsense” of the claim that the nondisclosure denied Tucker a fair trial. See United States v. Casiano, 440 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836, 92 S.Ct. 123, 30 L.Ed.2d 68 (1971); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959) (en banc), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 1619, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729 (1960). In light of the above conceded facts, I cannot subscribe to the underlying factual assumption that the informant Gene, “the witness whose identity and whereabouts were never disclosed to the defense,” supra, at 206 (but who, the record reveals, was obviously well known to Tucker), was a witness whose nonappearance could ever raise an issue under Roviaro.
Furthermore, Roviaro does not require reversal here. In Roviaro, the undisclosed informant was the only direct participant in the events leading up to and consummating the drug transaction, and was the only person who could have testified with full knowledge of his conversations with the defendant; he was the sole instigator of the transaction and the only person who could shed light on Roviaro’s motives. By contrast, at each stage of events in this case, there were at least three other people who witnessed Tucker’s activities.
Roviaro leaves in the discretion of the trial judge the weighing of interests relevant to a decision to disclose, directing the judge to consider the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informant’s testimony, and other relevant factors in the circumstances of the case. 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623. Here, the defendant repeatedly failed to offer any explicit reason for his request for disclosure other than the unsupported assertion that it would help the defense. Nor were there any facts solely within the knowledge of the informant. The name of Seville Year-by, who was present at the apartment when Adams was introduced to Tucker, was given to the defense, yet the defendant made no real effort to find him. In all, the decision of the district court not to require disclosure of the informer’s identity cannot be described as clearly erroneous.
Moreover, Tucker has failed to show that the district court did not draw an inference favorable to the defense from the Government’s failure to call Yearby and the informant to testify. Indeed, the court could reasonably have convicted Tucker despite the inference, for two other DEA agents testified as to the movements of the parties; the only direct support for Tucker’s story came from his paramour; and demeanor could have played a crucial part in the trial. Besides, it would be difficult for Tucker under any circumstances to overcome the skepticism which naturally arises in light of his testimony as to being invited into a room by virtual strangers to witness a drug transaction, and then inviting those men over to his paramour’s apartment only to ignore them.
*213On the facts and testimony shown in this case, and on the applicable law, Tucker’s conviction was justified and should be affirmed.