Court Opinion

ID: 9839899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 16:08:52.591738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:55.554153
License: Public Domain

J-S20033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 DANA EVERETT YOUNG                   :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 2658 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 5, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-39-CR-0000560-1983

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 DANA EVERETT YOUNG                   :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 2659 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 5, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-39-CR-0000561-1983

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 DANA EVERETT YOUNG                   :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 2660 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 5, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-39-CR-0000614-1983
J-S20033-23

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 2023

       Appellant, Dana Everett Young, appeals pro se from the order dismissing

his petition for writ of habeas corpus as an untimely tenth petition pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. He

asserts that he was entitled to relief because prior counsel had abandoned

him and caused him to proceed without counsel for appeals from two prior

denials of post-conviction relief. Because his claims concerning prior counsel

abandonment are cognizable under the PCRA, the lower court properly treated

his instant petition as a PCRA petition. We must affirm the dismissal of the

untimely petition where Appellant failed to plead and offer to prove an

applicable exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.

       In separate incidents in January of 1983, Appellant forced a woman to

engage in oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse at knifepoint in a wooded area,

and forced another woman into a car at knifepoint and made that victim touch

his penis after he touched her intimate parts. N.T. 9/21/83, 50, 53-55, 58-

70, 82; 9/23/83, 225-36, 247-48.           He robbed the first victim of $70.00 and,

after taking a purse containing a nominal amount of money from the second

victim, that victim fled as he was taking her to a bank for more money. N.T.

9/21/83, 63-64, 79; 9/23/83, 233-34. He pulled on the hair of both victims,

successfully ripping hair from the second victim’s scalp. N.T. 9/21/83, 59, 69-

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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70, 80; 9/23/83, 233, 236. He broke the wrist of the first victim when he

initially knocked her to the ground. N.T. 9/23/83, 230, 237-38, 248.

      After a consolidated trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of: (1) rape,

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, theft by unlawful taking, theft

by receiving stolen property, terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, aggravated

assault, and possessing an instrument of crime at CP-39-CR-0000614-1983;

(2) four counts of robbery, two counts each of kidnapping and aggravated

assault, and single counts of theft by unlawful taking, theft by receiving stolen

property, and terroristic threats at CP-39-CR-0000560-1983; and (3) indecent

assault and indecent exposure at CP-39-CR-0000561-1983.           N.T. 9/26/84,

461-62. On September 9, 1985, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of twenty-one to forty-two years’ imprisonment. N.T. 9/9/85,

16-19.

      This Court treated a timely appeal from the judgments of sentence as a

petition filed under the precursor act to the PCRA, the Post Conviction Hearing

Act (“PCHA”), in which Appellant alleged that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance for failing to object to the joinder of the underlying

criminal matters.      This Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Young, No. 2595 Philadelphia 1985 (Pa. Super., filed

Aug. 21, 1986). Following that hearing, the trial court entered an order finding

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim meritless. Appellant filed an appeal that we

dismissed as untimely without prejudice to Appellant’s right to petition the

trial court for permission to appeal nunc pro tunc. Appellant thereafter filed a

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petition for permission to appeal nunc pro tunc that the trial court heard and

denied on December 27, 1994. N.T. 12/27/94, 57. Appellant filed an appeal

from that order but later filed a pro se motion to withdraw that appeal, which

this Court granted on November 27, 1995.

      On November 28, 1995, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition that was

considered timely filed because it was not governed by amendments to the

PCRA that were enacted on November 17, 1995, and became effective sixty

days thereafter. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition on

June 30, 1997. Appellant filed a pro se appeal. On November 5, 1998, we

affirmed. Commonwealth v. Young, 734 A.2d 442 (Pa. Super. 1998) (table)

(3175 PHL 97).    On May 18, 1999, our Supreme Court denied allocatur.

Commonwealth v. Young, 739 A.2d 166 (Pa. 1999) (table) (1000

M.D.ALLOC. 1998).

      On July 28, 1999, Appellant filed a pro se second PCRA petition. Counsel

was appointed and filed an amended petition. Appellant pro se appealed the

dismissal of the petition on October 12, 2000. On August 7, 2001, we affirmed

the dismissal; while the PCRA court denied relief after finding that all of

Appellant’s issues were previously litigated, we affirmed on the basis that the

petition was untimely.    Commonwealth v. Young, 785 A.2d 1038 (Pa.

Super. 2001) (table) (3155 EDA 2000).

      Over the next nine years, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated five more

pro se PCRA petitions and this Court affirmed the dismissals in each instance.

See Commonwealth v. Young, 996 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (table) (1041

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EDA 2009) (seventh PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Young, 954 A.2d 45

(Pa. Super. 2008) (table) (1305 EDA 2007) (sixth PCRA petition), allocatur

denied, 960 A.2d 840 (Pa. 2008) (table) (464 MAL 2008); Commonwealth

v. Young, 889 A.2d 120 (Pa. Super. 2005) (table) (363 EDA 2005) (fifth PCRA

petition); Commonwealth v. Young, 863 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(table) (1017 EDA 2004) (fourth PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Young,

833 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. 2003) (table) (213 EDA 2003) (third PCRA

petition), allocatur denied, 847 A.2d 1285 (Pa. 2004) (table) (808 MAL

2003).

       In the ensuing eight years, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated three pro

se petitions styled as petitions for writ of habeas corpus and appeals from the

dismissals of those petitions. See Commonwealth v. Young, 203 A.3d 299

(Pa. Super. 2018) (table) (1119 EDA 2018) (ninth PCRA petition), allocatur

denied, 214 A.3d 232 (Pa. 2019) (table) (841 MAL 2018); Commonwealth

v. Young, 169 A.3d 1163 (Pa. Super. 2017) (table) (1668 EDA 2016) (eighth

PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Young, 125 A.3d 438 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(table) (2426 EDA 2014) (habeas petition). While we agreed that the first of

those petitions was properly presented as a habeas petition, given the nature

of the claim presented in that petition, we affirmed the dismissal of the latter

two   petitions   as   untimely   eighth   and   ninth   PCRA   petitions.   See

Commonwealth v. Young, 2018 WL 6427150, *1-2 (Pa. Super., filed Dec.

7, 2018); Commonwealth v. Young, 2017 WL 1372852, *2-3 (Pa. Super.,

filed Apr. 13, 2017); Commonwealth v. Young, 2015 WL 6949333, *1-2

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(Pa. Super., filed July 7, 2015). Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion

for discovery that the PCRA court denied on July 11, 2022. Appellant appealed

the denial of that motion and later filed a petition to discontinue that appeal

on November 7, 2022. Appellate Docket for Commonwealth v. Young, No.

1916 EDA 2022.

       While the appeal from the denial of the discovery motion was still

pending, Appellant filed the pro se petition, styled as a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, that is the focus of this appeal. In it, he alleged that he was

illegally confined because his due process rights and his right to counsel were

violated when he was deprived of counsel for his 1997 appeal from the denial

of his first petition filed pursuant to the PCRA.    Pro Se Habeas Petition,

7/26/22, ¶¶ 8-20.1 He asserted that the counsel appointed for the litigation

of the first PCRA petition was never permitted to withdraw from representation

prior to his uncounseled appeal from the dismissal of that petition. Id. at ¶¶

20-21. He additionally asserted that counsel at the time of the denial of the

first PCRA petition abandoned him by failing to file a timely notice of appeal

and was “constitutionally ineffective.” Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 33.

____________________________________________

1 Although the petition was time-stamped and docketed on August 2, 2022,

we shall deem it to have been filed on July 26, 2022, when Appellant provided
it to prison authorities for mailing. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d
423, 425-26 (Pa. 1997) (discussing the prisoner mailbox rule and applying it
to all appeals by pro se prisoners); Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287,
1289 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that the prisoner mailbox rule applies to
petitions under the PCRA).

                                           -6-
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      On August 23, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for leave to amend his

habeas petition with an attached supplemental amended petition, in which he

asserted an additional claim that post-trial counsel abandoned him by not

filing a requested direct appeal. Pro Se Amended Habeas Petition, 8/23/22,

¶¶ 5-6, 14-16. The lower court treated Appellant’s petition as an untimely

PCRA petition, based on the nature of the claims included in it, and issued

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Rule

907 Notice, 8/30/22, 1-2 & nn.1-2. After Appellant filed a pro se response,

the lower court denied his motion for leave to amend his petition and

dismissed the petition. Pro Se Response to Rule 907 Notice, 9/2/22; Dismissal

Order, 9/30/22; Amended Dismissal Order, 10/5/22. Appellant timely filed

separate notices of appeal in each of his underlying criminal matters. Notices

of Appeal, 10/12/22.

      Appellant presents the following question for our review:

      Whether the [PCRA c]ourt abused its discretion in dismissing
      Appellant’s [p]etition for [h]abeas [c]orpus [r]elief[,] alleging he
      is illegally confined on the basis of a Post Conviction proceeding
      that violated [d]ue [p]rocess because it was uncounseled in
      violation of the [r]epresentation requirement?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (suggested answer omitted).

      Appellant asserts that prior appointed counsel abandoned him by not

filing counseled appeals from the dismissals of his first two petitions filed

pursuant to the PCRA.     Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.    He argues that those

attorneys were per se ineffective. Id. at 11-13. For cognizability purposes,

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he alleges that his claims of counsel abandonment “fall[ ] outside the PCRA

statutory scheme.”       Id. at 14 (“the right to counsel afforded by the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States falls outside the statutory

framework of the PCRA jurisdiction when an individual is incarcerated in a

state facility.”).   He equates the alleged failures to pursue prior counseled

PCRA appeals with a forfeiture of the right to direct review. Id. at 15 (“it is

undisputed that [prior counsels’] failure to properly understand the law, or

failed to abide by it, lead to the forfeiture of Appellant’s right to direct appeal

of his convictions.”).    He reasons that because Article I, Section 11 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open,” the

interests of justice require that the courts should provide him a remedy for his

counsel abandonment/due process issues and that habeas corpus “is the only

remedy available to fulfill th[at] role.” Id. at 16. Accordingly, he argues that

the lower court erred by dismissing his petition as an untimely PCRA petition.

Id. at 18-19.

      Our scope and standard of review when reviewing the denial of a PCRA

petition are well-settled:

      [O]ur scope of review is limited by the parameters of the [PCRA].
      Our standard of review permits us to consider only whether the
      PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record
      and whether it is free from legal error. Moreover, in general we
      may affirm the decision of the [PCRA] if there is any basis on the
      record to support the [PCRA] court’s action; this is so even if we
      rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm.

                                       -8-
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Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(quotations and citations omitted).

         Appellant’s assertion that the lower court erred by treating his petition

as a PCRA petition fails as a matter of law. Controlling precedent from our

Supreme Court holds that a PCRA court cannot review a claim under

Pennsylvania’s writ of habeas corpus where a claim is time-barred under the

PCRA.     See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 283 A.3d 178, 188 (Pa. 2022)

(“squarely reject[ing]” Taylor’s assertion that a judicial bias claim must be

cognizable under state habeas corpus because the claim did not qualify for

review under a PCRA timeliness exception); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal,

833 A.2d 719, 737-38 (Pa. 2003) (finding no merit to assertion that, “even if

[petitioner’s] claims are time-barred under the PCRA, the PCRA court should

have used its inherent power under common law to review his claims under

Pennsylvania’s writ of habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d

214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (rejecting argument that “even if [petitioner’s] claims are

barred     as   untimely,   his   claims    are   entitled   to   review   under   our

Commonwealth’s habeas corpus”).

      Significantly, Section 9542 of the PCRA provides:

      This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted
      of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal
      sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in
      this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining
      collateral relief and encompasses all other common law
      and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist
      when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus
      and coram nobis. This subchapter is not intended to limit the

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      availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from
      the judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising issues
      waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from collateral
      consequences of a criminal conviction. Except as specifically
      provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to
      capital and noncapital cases.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added). “The plain language of [Section 9542]

demonstrates quite clearly that the General Assembly intended that claims

that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under that Act.”

Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis in

original); see Commonwealth v. Gillins, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 5314740,

*4 (Pa. Super., filed Aug. 18, 2023) (quoting that portion of Hall); see also

Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“a

defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion

as a writ of habeas corpus.”) (citation omitted).

      Concerning the lower court’s treatment of Appellant’s petition, the

question for us is whether Appellant’s substantive claims at issue were

cognizable under the PCRA. Here, Appellant’s claims address allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel abandonment, the denial of

Appellant’s constitutional right to counsel, and notions that, because of prior

counsel’s failures to file counseled appeals with respect to prior actions under

the PCRA, Appellant sustained violations of his right to due process. As these

claims are all cognizable under the PCRA, the lower court properly treated

Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i)-(ii);

see also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274-75 (Pa. 2007)

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(holding that Bennett was entitled to the application of an exception to the

PCRA’s time-bar for his claim that prior counsel abandoned him by failing to

file an appellate brief); Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa.

2005) (Sixth Amendment claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

raises issue cognizable under the PCRA even if the underlying claim of error

has been previously litigated); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 240 A.3d

980, 983 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Due process violations are cognizable under the

PCRA as ‘violation[s] of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the

Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.’”), citing 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9543(a)(2)(i).

      The next question for us is whether the PCRA court properly denied the

petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was untimely.       See

Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. 2008) (“Jurisdictional

time limits go to a court’s right or competency to adjudicate a controversy.”).

The PCRA requires that all petitions be filed within one year of the date on

which the judgments of sentence became final unless the petitioner proves

that one or more enumerated exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1);

see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000);

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1260 (Pa. 1999); see also

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Pa. 2005) (a PCRA

petitioner must explain “in the petition itself” why a claim that is untimely on

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its face is nevertheless cognizable because a statutory exception applies). The

statutory exceptions are that:

      (i)      the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
               interference     by   government     officials  with   the
               presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
               or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
               of the United States;

      (ii)     the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
               unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
               ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

      (iii)    the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
               recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
               the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
               provided in this section and has been held by that court
               to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner seeking to prove the applicability

of a time-bar exception must also allege and prove that he filed his petition

within one year of the date his time-bar exception claim first could have been

presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (the

PCRA’s timeliness provision applies to any PCRA petition “including a second

or subsequent petition").

      The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are mandatory and apply to all

PCRA petitions. Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222 (the PCRA’s time limits “are mandatory

and interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend filing periods

except as the statute permits”).     Where a petition is untimely filed and a

petitioner has failed to plead and prove the applicability of an exception to the

PCRA’s time-bar, a PCRA court must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction

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and forgo analysis of the merits of the underlying claims of relief presented in

the petition. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783 (where a PCRA petition is not

timely filed and is not eligible for an exception, the PCRA court lacks authority

to address the substantive merits of the petitioner’s claims); Commonwealth

v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (courts do not have

jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA petition).

      While maintaining below that his petition was reviewable as a habeas

petition, Appellant made no efforts to demonstrate that the instant petition

was timely filed for purposes of the PCRA. It was clearly untimely where this

Court already affirmed the dismissals of at least eight prior PCRA petitions

from Appellant on timeliness grounds. See supra pgs. 4-5. He also failed to

plead and offer to prove the applicability of any exceptions to the PCRA’s time-

bar in his petition.   Pro Se Habeas Petition, 7/26/22, ¶¶ 37-38 (“Petitioner’s

claim that his PCRA proceeding was uncounseled and unfair is a unique claim

which falls outside the PCRA statutory scheme … The right to counsel afforded

by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States falls outside

the statutory framework of the PCRA…”); Pro Se Amended Habeas Petition,

8/23/22, ¶¶ 18-19 (same allegation that Appellant’s claim concerning the

abandonment by his prior counsel or the deprivation of his constitutional right

to counsel were “outside the PCRA statutory scheme” or “outside the statutory

framework of the PCRA”).

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       Because Appellant failed to plead and prove the applicability of any of

the three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar, the PCRA court lacked

jurisdiction to review his petition.

      On appeal, Appellant provides us with no basis to conclude that the

PCRA court erred by dismissing his petition as an untimely PCRA petition. He

cites our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d

381 (Pa. 2021) – an opinion which recognized that a PCRA petitioner may

raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so,

after the denial of PCRA relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro

se – and asserts that the issuance of the Bradley opinion prompted the filing

of his petition.   Appellant’s Brief at 14.      We have held, however, that

“[n]othing in Bradley creates a right to file a [serial] PCRA petition outside

the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA

counsel or permits recognition of such a right.” Commonwealth v. Stahl,

292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023), citing Bradley, 261 A.3d at 403-04

& n.18 (unambiguously rejecting the filing of a successive untimely PCRA

petition as a permissible method of vindicating the right to effective

representation by PCRA counsel).

      In arguing that his instant claim should be reviewable in a habeas

petition,   Appellant   cites   our    Supreme    Court’s   prior   decisions   in

Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007), and Commonwealth

v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007).          Appellant’s Brief at 14.   While the

Supreme Court recognized that claims in those cases were outside the ambit

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of the PCRA and thus reviewable for habeas purposes, those cases are

inapposite and provide Appellant no support. See West, 938 A.2d at 1044

(concluding that a challenge to the validity of West’s judgment of sentence

after the Commonwealth delayed incarceration for nine years was not

cognizable under the PCRA); Judge, 916 A.2d at 520 (concluding that the

“[a]ppellant’s claim concerning his deportation from Canada to face a death

sentence falls outside the intended scope of the PCRA,” noting that the

question was one of international law). The claims raised in those cases may

be distinguished from Appellant’s proposed ineffective assistance of counsel

claims which involved alleged failures to file requested appeals which are

clearly within the scope of the PCRA eligibility requirements.        See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 (Pa. 1999) (holding that

a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a requested

appeal is cognizable under the PCRA).

       Appellant also argues that the application of the PCRA’s time-bar is

unconstitutional as applied to him because it deprives him of a remedy in

violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania.2 Appellant’s Brief at 15-

16.   To the contrary, however, Appellant could have had review of prior

claims of counsel abandonment presuming that he raised the claims in a timely
____________________________________________

2 “All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,

goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought
against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases
as the Legislature may by law direct.” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11.

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manner after the abandonments had allegedly occurred. His prior failures to

promptly raise any counsel abandonment claims did not convert his claims

into habeas corpus claims or constitute a violation of the Remedies Clause.

See Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770-71 (Pa. 2013) (holding

Remedies Clause did not require a court to afford a remedy to a petitioner

who failed to utilize PCRA procedures to seek relief during time petitioner was

statutorily eligible).

      Here, where Appellant’s underlying claims alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel, prior counsel abandonment, and constitutional violations resulting

from a deprivation of the right to counsel on prior PCRA appeals were

undoubtedly within the ambit of the PCRA, Appellant needed to plead and

prove the applicability of a time-bar exception in his petition to obtain

substantive review.      Having failed to make any assertion of a time-bar

exception below due to his continued and incorrect insistence on the

availability of state habeas review, Appellant failed to establish any basis for

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as an

untimely tenth PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/14/2023

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