Court Opinion

ID: 9901792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 16:03:25.729491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.313248
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                      Opinion filed November 22, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1903
                      Lower Tribunal No. F21-12322
                          ________________

                           Barrett Blackwell,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle
Delancy, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Nicholas Lynch, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.

     LINDSEY, J.
         Appellant Barret Blackwell (Defendant below) appeals from a final

judgment of conviction and sentence for one count of petit theft, following a

jury trial. Blackwell argues the trial court violated his right to a unanimous

verdict by failing to require the jury to unanimously agree on at least one of

the two factual acts—that he stole the victim’s purse or wallet—underlying

the theft. Because theft of the purse or wallet constituted alternative means

of committing a single offense, we affirm.

    I.      BACKGROUND

         In July 2021, Dessiray Sondgerath, the victim, called police to report

that Blackwell had broken into the apartment where she was sleeping.

Blackwell and Sondgerath knew each other as they were former romantic

partners.      Following a police investigation, Blackwell was arrested and

charged by Information with six counts. Relevant here is Count 3 for petit

theft.

         As set forth in the Information: 1

               BLACKWELL . . . did unlawfully obtain or use, or did
               endeavor to obtain or use A PURSE AND/OR A
               WALLET,     the     property     of     DESSIRAY
               SONDGERATH, with the intent to either temporarily

1
   Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(k)(5) permits alternative or
disjunctive allegations for a single offense: “For an offense that may be
committed by doing 1 or more of several acts, or by 1 or more of several
means, or with 1 or more of several intents or results, it is permissible to
allege in the disjunctive or alternative such acts, means, intents, or results.”

                                              2
            or permanently deprive that person of a right to the
            property or of a benefit therefrom, or to appropriate
            the property to said defendant’s own use or to the
            use of any person not entitled thereto, in violation of
            s. 812.014(3)(A), Fla. Stat., . . . .

     At trial, Sondgerath testified that she awoke to the sound of Blackwell

entering through the kitchen window, “hollering, as he was coming through

the window, that he wanted his phone, and his wallet.” Sondgerath told

Blackwell she did not have his phone or wallet and did not know where they

were. After Blackwell entered the apartment, Sondgerath ran to the bedroom

and locked the door. Blackwell broke into the bedroom, still demanding his

phone and wallet. Sondgerath showed Blackwell her purse so he could see

she did not have his phone or wallet. He snatched her purse away from her

and emptied its contents on the floor. Blackwell eventually left the apartment

with Sondgerath’s phone, wallet, and medication.

      On the petit theft count, the trial court instructed the jurors to determine

whether “Blackwell knowingly and unlawfully obtained, or used, the purse or

wallet of Dessiray Sondgerath.” (Emphasis added). The verdict form simply

required the jury to determine whether Blackwell was guilty of petit theft and

whether the stolen property was valued at more than $750. Blackwell did

not object to the court’s instruction or the verdict form. The jury found

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Blackwell guilty of petit theft and determined that the stolen property was

worth less than $750. Blackwell timely appealed.

    II.     ANALYSIS

          Blackwell argues on appeal that the trial court should have required

the jury to unanimously determine whether he stole the purse, the wallet, or

both. “Because this argument is being made for the first time on appeal, the

issue is reviewed for fundamental error.” Cherfrere v. State, 277 So. 3d 611,

614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing State v. Kettell, 980 So. 2d 1061, 1068 (Fla.

2008)).2

          In Florida, a jury verdict must be unanimous. See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.440 (“No verdict may be rendered unless all of the trial jurors concur in

it.”); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.12 (“The verdict must be unanimous, that

is, all of you must agree to the same verdict.”). Here, although the jury

unanimously found Blackwell guilty of petit theft, Blackwell contends

fundamental error occurred because the trial court did not require the jury to

unanimously agree on at least one of the two factual acts underlying the theft.

The State argues that when a single offense, such as petit theft, may be

2
  “Fundamental error is error that ‘reaches down into the validity of the trial
itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained
without the assistance of the alleged error.’” Cherfrere, 277 So. 3d at 614
(quoting Krause v. State, 98 So. 3d 71, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

                                         4
committed by alternative acts, such as stealing a purse or wallet, juror

unanimity is not required as to which of the acts served as the basis for the

verdict.3 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the State.

        The US Supreme Court has explained the requirements of juror

unanimity in the context of alternative acts underlying a verdict as follows:

                     We have never suggested that in . . . [cases in
              which the defendant committed a single offense by
              one or more specified means] jurors should be
              required to agree upon a single means of
              commission . . . . In these cases, as in litigation
              generally, “different jurors may be persuaded by
              different pieces of evidence, even when they agree
              upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general
              requirement that the jury reach agreement on the
              preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.”

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (quoting McKoy v. North

Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).4

3
    Blackwell did not file a reply brief to address the State’s arguments.
4
  Although this explanation is found in a portion of the Court’s plurality
opinion, a majority agreed with this longstanding general rule. See Schad,
501 U.S. at 649-50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“As the plurality observes, it has
long been the general rule that when a single crime can be committed in
various ways, jurors need not agree upon the mode of commission. That rule
is not only constitutional, it is probably indispensable in a system that
requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict.” (citations omitted)). Moreover,
although the Court has partially receded from Schad, the portion relevant
here remains good law. See Dillard v. State, 329 So. 3d 788, 790 n.2 (Fla.
2d DCA 2021), review denied, SC21-1770, 2022 WL 1052407 (Fla. Apr. 8,
2022).

                                         5
      Florida courts follow this well-established principle. See, e.g., Evans

v. State, 995 So. 2d 933, 948 (Fla. 2008); Perley v. State, 947 So. 2d 672,

674 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“While the presentation of dual theories of a crime

is allowable, this occurs when a defendant is charged with the commission

of one crime, and the State presents two scenarios or bases supporting the

commission of the crime.”); Miller v. State, 123 So. 3d 595, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA

2013) (explaining that jurors must agree on the essential legal elements of

an offense, but they “can undoubtedly have different assessments of the

evidence and still reach a unanimous verdict”).

      Although a jury need not unanimously agree on a single alternative

means of committing the same offense, where separate offenses are

involved, a jury verdict must be unanimous as to at least one specific act.

See Perley, 947 So. 2d at 674-75. For example, in Perley, a case Blackwell

relies on, the Fourth District found that the trial court fundamentally erred in

allowing the jury to deliberate on two entirely separate incidents of escape,

separated by time and place, as a single count. Id. at 674. The first escape

occurred when the defendant had been detained following a traffic stop. Id.

The second escape occurred after the defendant had been taken to a

hospital due to complaints of chest pains. Id. Because these were two

separate offenses, and not merely alternative means of committing the same

                                       6
offense, the Fourth District held that a unanimous verdict was required as to

at least one of the offenses. Id. at 675.

      Similarly, in Saldana v. State, 980 So. 2d 1220, 1221-22 (Fla. 2d DCA

2008), the Second District held that the trial court erroneously allowed the

jury to convict the defendant of a single count of alleged possession of a

firearm based on three separate, alleged instances of possession, occurring

at separate times and places over a two-day period. Consistent with Perley,

the court explained that “[a]llowing the jury to convict [the defendant] without

ensuring unanimity that the same incident constituted the charged crime

compromised the validity of the verdict.” Id. at 1222. 5

      Here, by contrast, the alleged theft of the purse and/or wallet were not

distinct offenses of theft separated by time and space. This was instead a

single offense based on alternative acts of theft that occurred against the

same victim, at the same place, and at the same time, with no intervening

break. In short, although multiple items may have been taken, this occurred

during one continuous act or transaction, and was therefore a single offense.

Cf. Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1951) (“[W]here several articles

5
 Blackwell exclusively relies on cases in which a single count was based on
separate offenses—that is, offenses separated by time and place or of a
separate character and type.

                                       7
are taken at the same time and place as one continuous act, though owned

by different people, the offense is a single larceny.”).

   III.     CONCLUSION

          Accordingly, because the jury was not required to unanimously agree

on the two alternative means of committing a single offense of petit theft, no

fundamental error has occurred. We therefore affirm the judgment and

sentence.

          Affirmed.

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