Court Opinion

ID: 9819631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:29:04.873705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.332465
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent. Specifically, I believe that the trial court’s finding of unfitness based on depravity was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In order to establish unfitness, clear and convincing evidence of depravity must be shown to exist at the time of the petition. In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561 (2000). According to case law, depravity is defined as “ ‘an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude.’ ” In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 561, quoting Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 498 (1952). “ ‘[A]cts constituting depravity *** must be of sufficient duration and of sufficient repetition to establish a “deficiency” in moral sense and either an inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted morality.’ ” In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 561, quoting In re Adoption of Kleba, 37 Ill. App. 3d 163, 166 (1976). In my opinion, the State in this case failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was depraved. Because the State failed to meet its burden, the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re J.J., 201 Ill. 2d 236, 250-51 (2002). Essentially, respondent, who is now 18 years old, is being punished for acts committed when she was 10. The majority places great emphasis on the fact that, at age 10, respondent was adjudicated delinquent for involuntary manslaughter, aggravated battery, and aggravated criminal sexual assault (1995 delinquency adjudications). However, a finding of depravity based on the 1995 delinquency adjudications circumvents the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 — 1 et seq. (West 2002)). Despite the 1999 amendments to the Juvenile Court Act, one of the primary purposes of the Juvenile Court Act remains the rehabilitation of the minor. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 69 (2003). Moreover, the 1999 amendments were not in effect in 1995 when respondent was adjudicated delinquent. If rehabilitation remains one of the goals of the Juvenile Court Act, how can an 18-year-old mother be depraved based on acts she committed 8 years ago? In my opinion, the majority’s decision effectively penalizes respondent for acts that could not be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961 and blurs the distinction between the statutes. Section 6 — 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 states that “[n]o person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had attained his 13th birthday at the time the offense was committed.” 720 ILCS 5/6 — 1 (West 2002). In addition, the Juvenile Court Act distinguishes between juveniles over and under the age of 13. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 805(3)(a) (West 2002); In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 90 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, no suggestion or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a juvenile court. In re Dow, 75 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1006 (1979). While respondent’s acts at age 10 could be considered by the trial court in determining the issue of depravity, sexually inappropriate behavior by a 10-year-old does not necessarily pose a long-term risk of recurring. See In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 89 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Given the legislature’s decision to distinguish between juveniles over and under the age of 13, we must be careful not to place undue significance on behavior exhibited by a child at the tender age of 10. I also note that the trial court refused to find respondent depraved according to the case law definition of depravity as set forth in count II of the original petition. When the State filed its original petition to terminate parental rights, count II alleged that respondent was depraved because “she stuck a popsicle stick in the anus of a child who was seven months old and that child ended up dying.” Despite taking judicial notice of the 1995 delinquency adjudications, the court dismissed count II, stating that the State had not “adequately proved that a 10-year-old under [respondent’s] circumstances would have the necessary state of mind or the ability to form the requisite intent to establish depravity.” If the 1995 delinquency adjudications did not establish depravity according to case law when the State filed its original petition to terminate parental rights, they should not form the bases for depravity now. In addition, I do not believe that the additional evidence proffered by the State was sufficient to establish that respondent was depraved. Count IV of the State’s fourth amended petition to terminate parental rights, the only count on which respondent was found unfit, alleged that respondent was depraved due to her (1) continuing propensity to steal; (2) disregard for human life, which in one case resulted in the death of a child and in another resulted in a delay of needed medical care for a young child she had agreed to care for; and (3) repeated violations of her probation terms. However, a careful review of the record reveals that the acts listed above do not amount to clear and convincing evidence of depravity. First, with respect to her alleged failure to seek medical attention for the three-month-old child in her care, DCFS investigator McKinney testified that her report was unfounded as to respondent and that respondent’s husband was responsible for the child’s injuries. Further, respondent testified that she did what she could for the baby and that the baby’s mother did not want to get medical help. Despite the mother’s response, respondent took the baby to the hospital the following day. Second, probation officer Johnson testified that, although respondent was guilty of probation violations, her behavior was generally good while she was in residential care. According to Johnson, her behavior was good both at The Mill and at Indian Oaks. In terms of probation violations, Johnson testified that in January 1998 respondent was placed in detention for not coming home at night, not attending school, stealing her mother’s car, and having unsupervised contact with her brother. However, respondent’s grandmother, Maggie Ann Taylor, testified that the car incident actually occurred in July 1994, before the delinquency adjudications. In addition, the charge regarding unsupervised contact with her brother was dismissed. Finally, Johnson recommended successful discharge from probation, based on respondent’s overall behavior. Third, with respect to respondent’s “continuing propensity to steal,” Johnson testified that respondent was arrested on December 20, 1996, for felony retail theft. However, no evidence of a conviction or detail as to what she stole was provided. Respondent was also arrested on February 1, 2003, for shoplifting $275 worth of merchandise from a store. At the time of the hearing, however, respondent had not yet been convicted of this offense. In my opinion, one unsubstantiated incident in 1996 coupled with another felony retail theft charge does not establish a “propensity to steal.” Last, the only opinion testimony offered at trial was favorable to respondent and weighed against the court’s finding. Clinical social worker White worked with respondent from 1998 to 2002. In White’s opinion, respondent had sufficient counseling to prepare her to be a fit mother. Based upon his extensive hours of counseling, and his observations of respondent’s interaction with J’America B., White made a positive assessment of her maturity and parenting skills. Contrary to the testimony of probation officer Johnson, White testified that respondent successfully completed the sex-abuse victim and sex offender services at The Mill before being sent to Indian Oaks for further residential treatment. According to White, respondent did not pose a risk to children and had developed “an understanding of the world that really were [sic] beyond her years in a positive way.” In addition, respondent received overall satisfactory ratings on three service plans for actively participating in treatment and for making satisfactory progress towards her goals. In sum, there was not clear and convincing evidence that respondent was depraved. Respondent’s behavior from age 10 to 18 did not demonstrate an inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted moral standards, and the trial court’s finding of unfitness based on depravity was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse both the trial court’s judgment of unfitness based on depravity and the judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights to J’America B.