Court Opinion

ID: 9567437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:53:50.346298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:36.624871
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While concurring with Divisions 1 and 4 of the majority opinion, I must dissent from Divisions 2 and 3.
In this case, although the issue is in dispute, the appellees have compiled an impressive factual record containing thousands of pages of documents to support their contention that the upper-ranking leaders of the state Republican party, who supported a particular candidate, embarked upon a scheme or enterprise to systematically challenge the credentials of state convention delegations only from the counties in which a certain opposing candidate had prevailed in the primary election. That scheme, it was argued, was audacious in that the same alleged violations of elections rules occurred in many *150counties that voted for the candidate favored by the appellants, yet systematically no challenges were made to the returns from those counties.
The appellees obtained two injunctions against the appellants, the gist of which was that the appellants could not exclude the appellees from participating in the state convention. These injunctions were in effect approved by the Georgia Supreme Court by virtue of its denial of the appellants’ petitions for discretionary review of the grant of the injunctions. It is no more than conventional wisdom that the appellants, the appellees, the lower courts, and this court are all bound by the Supreme Court’s action. The action of the appellants in adjourning and walking out of the state convention, which resulted in the “rump” convention of the appellees, served the purpose of ignoring or disobeying the injunctive relief won by the appellees. Cancel-ling the party altogether excluded the appellees from participating in the convention no less than did not inviting them in the first place. The spirit, if not the letter, of the injunctive relief was broken by the appellants.
Much of what the appellants have argued, about the impropriety of the courts resolving disputes over the internal operation or rules of a political party, is cogent. However, the Georgia Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on judicial intervention in this political squabble, and this court cannot ignore that.
The majority opinion’s argument that the courts cannot get involved in the resolution of political disputes is really an argument over a matter of degree, since whichever way this court rules, it, along with two separate trial courts and the Georgia Supreme Court, will have been involved in some manner in this drawn-out political dispute. It is acknowledged that courts are loath to inquire and trespass into the merits and beliefs of sensitive and perilous political and theological issues. However, “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes . . . Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a ‘matter of degree . . .’” Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 730 (94 SC 1274, 39 LE2d 714) (1974). (Emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, judicial intervention into political issues should occur only where a compelling state interest is at stake. Republican Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 770 F2d 265, 281 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd 479 U. S. 208 (107 SC 544) (1986). The instant case, however, involves such an interest, viz., the alleged nullification of a primary election and the effective disenfranchisement of a significant block of voters, occurring at a time when political parties urge adherence to a strict code of ethics. The appellants’ assurance that no disenfranchisement occurred, because the alleged scheme to exclude the appellees was never *151completed, is not persuasive, as it appears that only by the limited judicial intervention below did the plan go awry. Admittedly, the appellants may accomplish their goal before the national party committee, but that does not relieve the judiciary of its power and duty to require fair play and honesty in the state political party process, a requirement that is necessary to preserve in general the integrity of the political process itself and specifically the right of a meaningful vote and political association for all.
Decided July 29, 1988
Rehearing denied August 3, 1988
Kent E. Mast, H. Quigg Fletcher, L. Catharine Cox, Oscar N. Persons, Frank B. Strickland, for appellants.
As it was ardently argued by the appellees, the various decisions of the United States Supreme Court, generally holding that the judiciary has no business with the selection of delegates of a national political party, relied on by the appellants, are under the facts here inapplicable. The appellees initially turned to the courts not for approval of any delegate selection, but rather only for the right as party members to be allowed to participate and be heard at the state convention and to be permitted to appeal any decisions not to the courts but to the whole convention. The appellees played by the rules at every turn, and the subsequent amendment of the complaint and ruling by the trial court upholding the appellees’ delegate selection was a necessary response to the appellants’ apparent intention to disregard or thwart the injunctive relief earlier won by the appellees and tacitly approved by the Georgia Supreme Court in its denial of a discretionary appeal. The appellants have strongly protested that judicial intervention infringes upon their constitutional right of free political association. It must be acknowledged that the appellees also have equal civil rights of political association in the selection process.
It is emphasized by appellees that the alleged fraudulent enterprise in this case as argued was perpetrated not merely upon the appellees, but upon the voters of this state. The righteous indignation communicated by the appellees is understandable, and “[i]t would be monstrous to suppose that the arm of the Judiciary of Georgia was too short, or too weak, to reach and relieve . . .” the compelling state interest in this case. Rogers v. Atkinson, 1 Ga. 12, 25 (1846).
On appeal, the evidence must be construed in a light most favorable to the appellees, and since there is evidence to support the findings and action of the trial court, the trial court should be affirmed. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Benham joins in this opinion.
*152Celia Larsen, Wm. Washington Larsen, Jr., Garland T. Byrd, Charles W. Byrd, for appellees.