Court Opinion

ID: 9927785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 22:44:26.405535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:18.408456
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                 January 25, 2024
Christopher Spears,                                                                 C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
Petitioner Below, Petitioner                                                      SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                       OF WEST VIRGINIA

vs.) No. 22-808 (Boone County CC-03-2009-C-86)

Shelby Searls, Superintendent,
Huttonsville Correctional Center,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner appeals the Circuit Court of Boone County’s September 22, 2022, order denying
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 Petitioner contends the circuit court erred by finding his
trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel despite counsel’s failure to investigate
and advise petitioner on the diminished capacity defense. Upon our review, finding no substantial
question of law and no prejudicial error, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that
a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P.
21(c).

       Petitioner was indicted in September 1998 for first-degree murder, aggravated robbery,
burglary, grand larceny, and petit larceny. Petitioner pled guilty to first-degree murder and
aggravated robbery, and the parties agreed to a binding sentence of life with mercy for first-degree
murder. Sentencing for the aggravated robbery was discretionary with the court. Petitioner was
subsequently sentenced to life with a recommendation of mercy for the first-degree murder
conviction and a determinate term of eighty years for the aggravated robbery conviction, to be
served consecutively.2

       Petitioner filed his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the circuit court in
August 2020, and the circuit court later held an omnibus habeas corpus evidentiary hearing. After
reviewing audio recordings of the petitionerʼs 1999 plea hearing in open court, petitioner withdrew
many of his habeas claims.

       1
         Petitioner appears by counsel Roger L. Lambert. Respondent appears by Attorney
General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General William E. Longwell.
       2
          Said sentence is also consecutive to an unrelated burglary conviction for which the
petitioner was sentenced to one to fifteen years.

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        Petitioner’s single assignment of error on appeal is that the circuit court erred by finding
that his trial counsel was not ineffective for not investigating a claim of diminished capacity and
advising him of the same. In Syllabus Point 1 of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d
771 (2006), we held:

               In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court
       in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review
       the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
       the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions
       of law are subject to a de novo review.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the two-pronged test established
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): “(1) Counsel’s performance was deficient under
an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Syl. Pt.
5, in part, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

               In reviewing counselʼs performance, courts must apply an objective
       standard and determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts
       or omissions were outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance
       while at the same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of
       trial counselʼs strategic decisions. Thus, a reviewing court asks whether a
       reasonable lawyer would have acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel
       acted in the case at issue.

Id. at 6-7, 459 S.E.2d at 117-18, Syl. Pt. 6.

        At the omnibus hearing, trial counsel testified that he remembered discussing with
petitioner his drug use, mental health, and lack of memory about the killing. We have held that a
criminal defense attorney is obliged “to undertake reasonable pre-trial investigation of possible
mental defenses where there are indications that a defendant suffers from a significant mental
defect.” Syl. Pt. 7, in part, State ex rel. Vernatter v. Warden, 207 W. Va. 11, 528 S.E.2d 207 (1999).
To substantiate a diminished capacity defense, petitioner must “introduce expert testimony
regarding a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant incapable, at the time the crime
was committed, of forming a mental state that is an element of the crime charged.” Syl. Pt. 3, in
part, State v. Joseph, 214 W. Va. 525, 590 S.E.2d 718 (2003), accord State v. Simmons, 172 W.
Va. 590, 600, 309 S.E.2d 89, 99 (1983) (holding that “[t]he existence of a mental illness is not
alone sufficient to trigger a diminished capacity defense. It must be shown by psychiatric testimony
that some type of mental illness rendered the defendant incapable of forming the specific intent
elements.”).

        Notably, petitioner did not present any expert testimony at the omnibus hearing, which was
necessary to prove his claim of diminished capacity. Furthermore, assuming petitioner’s counsel
had pursued a diminished capacity defense at trial, a jury could still find the petitionerʼs criminal
intent was not negated. In that vein, trial counsel thought accepting the plea was the better course
because the potential sentence of life without mercy was of great concern due to the brutal nature
of the killing. We agree with the circuit court that trial counsel acted reasonably considering the

                                                  2
circumstances of the underlying case at the time of trial preparation and the plea. Trial counsel’s
advice to petitioner was objectively reasonable considering potential trial evidence that the victim
was brutally stabbed 131 times, and that petitioner was almost certainly the culprit.3 Accordingly,
we find no merit to petitioner’s assignment of error.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                    Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 25, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       3
          Law enforcement would have testified that the victim’s personal property was found at
the petitioner’s nearby residence. An officer noticed one of petitioner’s shoes was covered in
blood. Blood stains were found on petitioner’s utility room floor, and petitioner had washed his
jeans at 5 a.m. on the morning of the murder. One of victim’s neighbors heard noises emanating
from the back of the victim’s residence between 2 a.m. to 3 a.m. the same morning. Officers would
also testify that the petitioner fled from his residence and hid during a search of the petitioner’s
home. A witness heard petitioner threaten to kill the victim numerous times. Another witness stated
the victim did not like petitioner and that the victim would not have given petitioner any of the
items found in petitioner’s possession. The petitioner’s then-girlfriend said petitioner had
something to tell her but could not because officers had approached him. Petitioner’s then-
girlfriend also noticed blood stains on petitioner’s shoes, which he tried to hide from her view.
Petitioner’s prints were also found in the victim’s residence.

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