Court Opinion

ID: 9725095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:29:03.015904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:10.012382
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion, reversing the trial court's decision. Instead of the lengthy analysis the majority engages in to reverse the trial court's judgment, I only find one issue to be dispositive in the case before us: whether Kocher has standing to bring this appeal. The standing analysis focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the court's power. Scott v. Randle, 736 N.E.2d 308, 315 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trams. denied. The requirement assures that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested, as plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the litigation's outcome and must show they have sustained, or are in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the defendant's conduct. Id.
In the instant case, Kocher no longer has a personal stake in the litigation's outcome. The record shows that Getz was awarded a judgment for an amount of $237,872.67, which, increased with interest, totaled $266,517.28. Upon Kocher appealing this judgment, Getz requested and was awarded an appeal bond in the total amount of the judgment. This appeal bond was posted by United Farm; Kocher is not listed as a principal on the bond. The bond also stipulates that as long as the principal does not satisfy the judgment in full, the obligation of the bond remains in full force and effect. (See Appellant's App. p. 19).
Furthermore, after Kocher filed his notice of appeal, Getz attempted to execute the judgment by filing a Petition for Writ of Execution. The record shows that in order to stall the execution, Kocher agreed to enter into the Agreement. This Agreement explicitly stipulated that in return for Kocher's assignment of any bad faith claim Kocher had against his insurer, Getz would not enforce the judgment against Kocher in excess of the limits of Kocher's insurance coverage of $100,000.00. At the same time, in the Agreement, Kocher assigns his claim against United Farm to Getz in exchange for her consideration not to enforce the judgment against him but "attempt exclusively to recover the amount of the balance due upon the judgment against [United Farm|]."
The record reflects that after remand of the instant case by the supreme court, United Farm deposited $108,519.21 in partial satisfaction of the judgment with the Clerk of the court in Huntington County. On May 19, 2005, the trial court ordered execution of the appeal bond to satisfy the unpaid balance of the judgment, with the remainder of the bond to be released.
Here, we fail to discern any injury to Kocher or danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of Getz' execution on the appeal bond. See Scott, 736 N.E.2d at 315. Not only does Kocher fail to establish himself as a principal of the bond, he also assigned any rights he might have against United Farm to Getz. As we noted in F & L Rental Equipment, Inc. v. Gifford, 744 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), "after a cause of action is fully assigned, the assignor is no longer a proper party to sue and has no right of action."
The majority now attempts to cireum-vent the lack of standing by determining that "it is apparent that the fact that Kocher's name is listed on the caption is of no moment, inasmuch as United Farm is the actual party bringing, managing, and funding this appeal." Op. p. 1081. While acknowledging that it would have been better practice for United Farm to have intervened in this case, the majority's opinion appears to make light of Indiana's Trial Rules. By "not elevating form over *1035substance," the majority in effect makes Ind. Trial Rule 24, providing for the intervention of parties in an action, worthless and grants insurance companies the tool to ignore rules to which we hold others nonetheless accountable. See op. p. 1081. Referencing a partial sentence lifted from Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind.2005), the majority reaches the sweeping conclusion that our supreme court somehow blessed this newly created exception to Trial Rule 24 for insurance companies.
Furthermore, in order to satisfy the "substance" of Trial Rule 24, and therefore also the "form," the majority finds it sufficient that an insurance company maintains "a consistent presence throughout [the] proceedings, [even] in the background." Op. p. 1031. Without requiring anything more, the majority has dramatically reduced a party's success in bringing a bad faith claim against an insurance company. The lack of a formal commitment through Indiana Trial Rule 24 while maintaining a mere lingering presence in the background, will encourage insurance companies to refuse participation at trial in lieu of a minimal watchful presence from afar to thwart bad faith claims.
Accordingly, because I conclude that Kocher has no standing to bring the instant appeal, I would affirm the trial court's judgment.