Court Opinion

ID: 9716537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:43:18.106535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.679062
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CHAPMAN, dissenting: I cannot join in the majority’s decision because it further erodes the distinction between theft and burglary. After today, virtually any theft which occurs in a building or a vehicle can be successfully prosecuted as a burglary. Indeed, the only instance where a theft is not a burglary, under the majority’s reasoning, is where it occurs in an open field or on a public street. My dissent is not based solely on my concern about extending the limited authority doctrine to motor vehicles. It is certainly not based upon concern for this defendant. (It is difficult to feel any concern for a person who steals from a brother who is kind enough to grant him the use of his vehicle, even though the brother himself is a confessed thief.) My concern is that anyone convicted of a crime should be convicted of the conduct that the legislature intended to prohibit and should be punished according to the penalties prescribed for that conduct. The defendant here is guilty of theft and should be so sentenced. He is not guilty of burglary. My disagreement with the majority is based both upon the historical elements of the crime of burglary and a critical examination of the doctrine itself. Burglary at common law was a breaking and entering the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 19 — 1, Committee Comments, at 569 (Smith-Hurd 1977), citing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 224)). The underlined portions of the preceding sentence furnish the justification for treating burglary as a more serious crime than simple theft. First, burglary involved a breaking into a building, an element that suggests a degree of force or violence. Second, it involved a dwelling and the consequent presence or possible presence of people as opposed to harm to property only. Finally, it was a crime of the dark, which is probably less important for any connotation of evil associated with the night than it is for the increased likelihood of human presence in the building in the nighttime, and therefore the increased likelihood of injury. The stress on . the possible injury to an inhabitant is not meant to imply that human presence was a necessary element of the crime of burglary. It was sufficient that the site was a dwelling place to which someone was likely to return (Schwabacher v. People (1897), 165 Ill. 618), but it is meant to point out that under both the older statutes and under the common law burglary was treated separately and as a more serious offense because of the nature of the entered property. This common law distinction was followed in the early statutes on burglary. The 1827 statute listed burglary under the heading “Crimes and Offences Against Habitations and Other Buildings” (Rev. Code of the Laws of Ill. 1827, at 133, §58 et seq.), while larceny was classified under the more general “Crimes and Offences Relative to Property” (Rev. Code of the Laws of Ill. 1827, at 134, §61 et seq.), and the penalty for burglary was more severe (Rev. Code of the Laws of Ill. 1827, at 133, §60, at 134, §62). I The 1827 statute is set out below as it remained essentially the same (except for penalties) through repeated changes: “Sec. 60. Every person who shall, in the night time, willfully, maliciously, and forcibly break and enter, or willfully and maliciously, without force (the doors or windows being open) enter into any dwelling house, kitchen, office, shop, store-house, ware-house, malt-house, still-house, mill, pottery, factory, water craft, church, or meeting-house, with intent to commit murder, robbery, rape, mayhem, larceny, or other felony, shall be deemed guilty of burglary; and upon conviction thereof, shall be whipped, not less than fifty, nor more than one hundred lashes, on his bare back; be fined a sum not more than one thousand dollars, and be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years.” Rev. Code of the Laws of Ill. 1827, at 133, §60. As a matter of historical note, the class of buildings covered was expanded in 1869 (1869 Ill. Laws 112 (§2)), and the nighttime ele-. ment was eliminated in 1877 (1877 Ill. Laws 85 (§1)). The nighttime element has remained absent since 1877, although in 1885 the legislature did provide for a more serious minimum sentence for nighttime entry (1885 Ill. Laws 73 (§1)). It is apparent that this early statute, while retaining the common law requirement of entry at nighttime, had broadened the proscribed buildings considerably beyond that of the common law dwelling house. The statute also relaxed the requirement of forcible entry as the legislature recognized that illegal entry could be made into an open as well as a closed building. The legislature did require, however, that the entry be made willfully and maliciously. This requirement was in addition to the element of intent to commit one of the enumerated crimes once the defendant was in the building. The element of willful, malicious entry was repeated in every legislative reenactment until the passage of our present burglary statute in the Criminal Code of 1961. That statute reads: “§19 — 1. Burglary (a) A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle as defined in The Illinois Vehicle Code, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft. This offense shall not include the offenses set out in Section 4 — 102 of The Illinois Vehicle Code.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 — 1.) The element of intent is still present in the statute. The earlier “willful, malicious” language has been replaced by the phrase “without authority,” which has been construed to possess the same meaning. See People v. Schneller (1966), 69 Ill. App. 2d 50, 216 N.E.2d 510. In this case the defendant concedes at oral argument that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that he entered the van with the intent to commit a theft, but he argues that he cannot be guilty of burglary because of the absolute authority to enter and drive his brother’s van which he possessed. The statute does set out two separate elements: intent and entry without authority. The State concedes the extent of the defendant’s original authority. How then has the defendant been convicted of burglary rather than theft? The answer to the question lies not in the criminal statute that the legislature has passed, but in the way the statute has been construed by the courts. The first cases to apply the doctrine of limited authority dealt with public buildings. Supermarkets and museums are obviously open to the public. Anyone is free to enter. All have lawful authority to enter. Nevertheless the courts have affirmed convictions on burglary charges of defendants convicted of stealing from such buildings. The case of People v. Weaver (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245, cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 959, 23 L. Ed. 2d 746, 89 S. Ct. 2100, involved the burglary of a laundromat. The defendant contended that the State had failed to prove that he entered without authority because the laundromat was open to the public at the time the crime was committed. Justice Schaefer first stated that entering without lawful authority was one of the elements of the crime, but then went on to affirm the conviction of the defendant. The only case cited in Weaver in support of its holding was People v. Brown (1947), 397 Ill. 529, 74 N.E.2d 706, which involved a pro se defendant convicted of burglarizing a 24-hour gas station who claimed he should only have been convicted of larceny. The court in Brown characterized his argument in the following language: “The gist of these contentions is that an indictment for burglary cannot be based upon an entry without force.” (Brown, 397 Ill. at 530, 74 N.E.2d at 707.) The court in Brown went on to hold that since the statute provided for a conviction on a burglary charge even though the entry was “without force” that the defendant was properly found guilty. The court in Brown did-not discuss the limited authority doctrine for which it was cited in Weaver. The only rationale that has been suggested for the holding is that the authority extended to the public was only the authority to enter, but not the authority to enter with evil intent and that the evil intent therefore destroys the initial authority. The difficulty with this rationale is that intent is a separate element of the crime. Proof of the one element does not establish proof of the other. The majority quotes from People v. Schneller (1966), 69 Ill. App. 2d 50, 216 N.E.2d 510, 512 (Bailey, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 287). The analysis in the quotation has a certain surface appeal. No one is going to invite a thief who is bent upon thieving into his museum or supermarket or home or van. The private owners have the right to exclude the thief and it is proper to do so. The courts would give lit-tie consideration to suits brought by frustrated thieves who complained that a supermarket owner would not let him enter the market to rob it of its rhubarb. But we are not speaking of private rights. We are speaking of the Criminal Code. The legislature says that the exertion of unauthorized control over property of the owner is theft and is punishable by certain penalties. It also says that entering without authority when coupled with theft or another felony is more serious and is punishable by more severe penalties. If a thief said, “I am coming into your store to rob you of your rhubarb,” and the store owner answered, “You can’t come in under those circumstances,” and the thief persisted in his criminal activities, then the thief would be guilty of burglary because he knowingly entered without authority. To say that the thief knew he had no authority to commit theft is not to say he knew he had no authority to enter. What do these words “without authority” mean in the statute? They mean nothing under the doctrine of limited authority. What then do they mean in other criminal statutes? A review of the Criminal Code reveals a plethora of phrases identical to or substantially similar to the “without authority” language of the burglary statute. The following statutes contain the phrase “without authority” or similar language. They are all in chapter 38: §10 — 3 Unlawful restraint — “knowingly without legal authority” §10 — 4 Forcible detention— ‘ ‘without lawful authority’ ’ §12 — 1 Assault — “without lawful authority” §12 — 6 Intimidation — “without lawful authority” §12 — 11 Home Invasion — ‘ ‘without authority’ ’ §16 — 1 Theft — “exerts unauthorized control” §16 — 5 Theft from coin-operated machines — “without authority” §16D — 3 Computer tampering — “without authorization” §16D — 7 Rebuttable presumption — “without authority” §17 — 2 Impersonating a police office — “when not authorized” §19 — 4 Criminal trespass to residence — “without authority” §21 — 2 Criminal trespass to vehicle — “without authority” §21.2 — 2 Interference with a public institution of higher education — “without authority” §25 — 1 Mob action — “without authority of law” §31A — 1 Bringing contraband into a prison — “without authority” §32 — 6 Performance of unauthorized acts — “not authorized by law” §32 — 8 Tampering with public records — “without lawful authority” §32 — 9 Tampering with public notice — “-without lawful authority” §42 — 1 Looting — “without authority of law or the owner” The effect of the majority’s decision on these statutes is unclear, but the possibility exists that the judicial excision of legislative language in the burglary statute could be extended to any of the other similar statutes. Indeed, this court has held that “without authority” should mean the same thing under the burglary and the home invasion statutes. People v. Hudson (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1045, 448 N.E.2d 178, 180-81. The specter of possible involvement of other statutes in the limited authority area is not my prime concern. I am more concerned because this further expansion of the limited authority doctrine has placed a surprising group of people within the reach of the burglary statute: lessees and owners of the burglarized premises. A few exam-pies serve to illustrate my concerns. Two brothers share an apartment, and one of them takes $5 from the desk of the other. Burglary is charged, and the defendant claims that: (1) he had no intent to steal upon entering the apartment; and (2) his entry into the apartment was not unauthorized. The trial judge, however, is not fooled by such trickery, because he has carefully read the opinions of the appellate court. “The fact that property is taken after entry is evidence that the intent to steal existed at the time of the entry” states the judge, citing People v. Snow (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 955, 464 N.E.2d 1262. “But your honor,” pleads the defendant, “even if that is true, my entry into the apartment was not unauthorized. It is, after all, my apartment.” “Foolish defendant,” says the judge, rolling his eyes at such a pitiful argument. “It is well settled that the authority to enter and use the apartment does not include the authority to enter it for the purpose of stealing part of its contents. Your brother testified that he did not give you permission to take the $5.00 from his desk. As the court explained in People v. Bailey, ‘[pjlainly, the defendant’s entry here was not in accord with the will of his brother and was, therefore, unauthorized.’ ” (People v. Bailey (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 278, 287.) “Guilty as charged.” Other examples are equally disturbing: (1) the lessee of a furnished apartment sells a lamp belonging to the lessor-burglary; (2) a homeowner illegally connects his television to a cable outlet — burglary; (3) a jewelry store owner sells a watch that a customer had brought in to be repaired — burglary; (4) a homeowner uses someone else’s credit card to make a long distance phone call from his home— burglary; (5) a man rents a car and steals the spare tire from the trunk — burglary. The results of the above scenarios might be acceptable, of course, if it were clear that the legislature intended such activities to be punishable as burglary. The plain language of the burglary statute, however, precludes such an interpretation. The statute states that a burglary is committed when a person without authority knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building or vehicle with the intent to commit a felony or a theft. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 — 1.) The majority opinion effectively reads the phrase “without authority” out of the statute. “It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that each provision must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning.” (People v. Warren (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 620, 627, 373 N.E.2d 10, 13.) Moreover, “[statutes *** should be construed, if possible, so that no word is rendered meaningless or superfluous.” People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 389, 394, 484 N.E.2d 1081, 1082. There can be no doubt that the majority’s decision treats the phrase “without authority” as mere surplusage. The majority acknowledges that its decision is based on the limited authority doctrine, which originally evolved from cases involving public buildings. The majority further states that under that doctrine the element of entry without authority need not be established apart from the element of entry with intent to commit a felony or theft, because entry with such an intent is entry “without authority.” (Bailey, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 285, citing People v. Perruquet (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 527 N.E.2d 1334; People v. Boose (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 471, 487 N.E.2d 1088.) The subsequent extension of the limited authority doctrine to private residences and now to vehicles has, therefore, resulted in judicial amendment of the burglary statute. I believe that in so doing, the majority is invading the province of the legislature. This invasion is particularly disturbing in view of the fact that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of an accused. People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204, 212, 383 N.E.2d 171, 174. I recognize that other appellate courts, and indeed this one, have in the recent past adopted and applied the doctrine of limited authority. It has been extended not only to public buildings, but also to private residences (People v. Racanelli (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 124, 476 N.E.2d 1179; People v. Hudson (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 448 N.E.2d 178; People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 619, 404 N.E.2d 859), and always the same rationale is given. That rationale is unsound and should be rejected or at least not extended. There is no real reason to refuse to extend the doctrine of limited authority to a van except the recognition that a mistake has been made when it was originally adopted. As Justice Jackson said: “[The Supreme Court is] not final because [it is] infallible, [it is] infallible only because [it is] final.” (Brown v. Allen (1953), 344 U.S. 443, 540, 97 L. Ed. 469, 533, 73 S. Ct. 397, 427 (Jackson, J., concurring).) We as an appellate court are neither final nor infallible. We sit as an intermediate appellate court, but even at this level we are somewhat removed from the everyday concerns of humanity. Regardless of that isolation from everyday human concerns, all courts are nevertheless comprised of humans. To make a mistake is human, to fail to recognize a mistake has been made is also human. Both failings are permissible. But to recognize that a mistake has been made and to fail to rectify that mistake may be human, but it is not a permissible action for an appellate court to take. Therefore, we should not extend the doctrine of limited authority to entry into a motor vehicle. The majority’s alternative argument on behalf of affirming is that the defendant is guilty of burglary as an accomplice. The difficulty with this position is that it relies on the identical rationale as the earlier argument on the doctrine of limited authority, i.e., that the defendant had the authority to enter only for lawful purposes and that his (or Roman’s) intent to commit burglary vitiated that authority. The evidence in this case establishes that the defendant had full unbridled authority with regard to the van. Possessed of such power over the van he could invite a friend in for a ride to the store, or to a service station, or for any other purpose because his authority was unlimited. When that friend enters the van, he enters with authority. The fact that the friend intends to steal from the van does not destroy the authority under which he entered. To illustrate, I again refer to the example of the two brothers sharing an apartment. If one of the brothers allows a friend to enter the apartment, knowing that the friend intends to steal $5 from his brother’s desk, the majority would find that the brother is guilty of burglarizing his own apartment on a theory of accomplice liability. According to the majority’s reasoning, the friend’s authority to enter cannot include the authority to enter for the purposes of committing a theft, notwithstanding the fact that he was given authority to enter for precisely this reason. Such a conclusion is unsupportable unless one accepts the truth of the premise: that any entry made for the purpose of committing a theft is “without authority” regardless of a person’s actual authority to enter. As I have attempted to demonstrate above, this premise is false. In closing, I would note, as the majority does, that the second district has not extended the limited authority doctrine to private buildings. I would also note that the supreme court in the recent case of People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 259, 520 N.E.2d 308, reviewed the evidence of entry without authority in a murder — home invasion — residential burglary case. This review of the evidence suggests that the supreme court may not be willing to extend the limited authority doctrine to private homes, because if it were willing to do so, there would been no necessity to review the sufficiency of the evidence in Simms. The court could merely have ruled that the entry with the intent to commit the crime vitiated any consent to enter that may have been given. In view of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that affirms the burglary conviction.