Court Opinion

ID: 9689921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:37.304149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.766346
License: Public Domain

MADDOX, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I think the majority is correct in holding that the City of Mobile was immune from suit. I disagree with the majority on the question of “proximate cause” and on this issue I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Blood-worth in his dissenting opinion. I agree that Palmer and Baker owed no duty to Havard, the breach of which proximately resulted in his death. I would like to state the reasons why I think there was no duty owed Havard in this case.
Palmer and Baker were engaged by the City as consultants to perform inspection services for the city. As such, the firm was a public works contractor. Under some circumstances, a public works contractor is entitled to enjoy the immunity which the public body enjoys. In the case of Williams v. Stillwell, 88 Ala. 332, 6 So. 914 (1889), this court held that a person injixred by a defective public bridge has no right of action against one who has contracted with the county to keep the bridges in repair for a stipulated period, and has failed to do so.
This Court said:
“The gravamen of the present action, as we understand it, is that Stillwell, the defendant, violated his contract with the court of county commissioners, in this: that he failed to keep in proper repair the county bridge, from which defect the plaintiff alleges she suffered the injury she complains of, — an alleged violation of the contract on the part of Stillwell to keep the county bridges in repair. It is nowhere shown that Still-well built the bridge, and, as builder, guaranteed its safety by bond or otherwise. The suit is not brought on any alleged contract of guaranty. It is not a suit ex contractu, but an action on the case, and claims damages as the result of the defendant’s failure to comply with his contract with the court of county commissioners. No authority has been cited, and we know of none, which authorizes A. to maintain an action against B. for alleged injury suffered from the latter’s failure to comply with a contract made with C.
“This case is entirely without the influence of the statute, and, inasmuch as there is no principle of the common law authorizing such a suit, the demurrer was rightly sustained to the complaint as originally framed and as amended.”
Of course, this Stillwell case is not of recent origin, and implicit in its holding is the principle that there must be privity of contract between the tortfeasor and the injured pax'ty. At one time a showing of privity was considered necessary to occasion liability for negligence, but many courts have been getting away from that doctrine and maxiy have entirely repudiated and discarded it. Under the modern doctrine liability is based on foreseeability rather than privity. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 4(11), p. 502. Alabama recognizes that there are exceptions to the broad general rule that where the charge of negligence is based upon a breach of duty arising out of contractual relations, no cause of action arises in favor of one not in privity to such contract. See Weston v. National Manufacturers & Stores Corp., 253 Ala. 503, 45 So.2d 459 (1950). Alabama applies the so-called “manufacturer’s liability doctrine” in appropriate cases [Defore v. *540Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228, 105 So.2d 846 (1958) ]. We also apply, in appropriate cases, the products liability doctrine. See Birmingham Chero-cola Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921). And in a proper case, a public works contractor cannot avail himself of the immunity of the public body from liability for injuries resulting from willful tort or negligence in the performance of public work. See Morgan Hill Paving Co. v. Fonville, 222 Ala. 120, 130 So. 807 (1930); Evans v. Patterson, 269 Ala. 250, 112 So.2d 194 (1959). See also: Annotation: Right of Contractor with Federal, State, or Local Public Body to Latter’s Immunity from Tort Liability. 9 A.L.R.3d 382.
I am familiar with the rule stated by the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts 2d, § 324(a), which this Court discussed and followed in Beasley v. MacDonald Engineering Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So.2d 844 (1971). I dissented in the Beasley case,' primarily because I thought'the workmen’s compensation carrier which undertook to inspect the premises there could not be sued as a third party tortfeasor, because of the provisions of our workmen’s compensation laws.
Here, every member who participated in this decision holds that the City of Mobile could not be held liable. The City might be able to hold Palmer and Baker liable for breach of its contract, but I do not believe that Palmer and Baker, under the facts here alleged, owed any duty to the plaintiff, as a member of the public, which was breached.