Court Opinion

ID: 9615319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:34:16.795665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:45.438671
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the charge, when construed as a whole, comports with Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992) and its progeny. Therefore, I submit that the majority incorrectly reverses Doretha Delores Harrison’s conviction and sentence for felony murder.
The record shows that the trial court was well aware of Edge and the need to avoid giving a sequential charge. To that end, the trial court specifically prefaced its charge on malice murder, felony murder and voluntary manslaughter with the admonition that the jury was not necessarily to consider Ms. Harrison’s guilt of those crimes in that order, but “should consider all of these three offenses . . . equally and consider them all in connection with the matter that you will deliberate concerning this case.” After instructing on both forms of murder, the trial court again instructed the jury that it was to “consider equally . . . the offense of voluntary manslaughter.” In connection with the charge on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court clearly instructed that that crime is committed by causing the death of another human being under circumstances which “would otherwise be murder,” if the act results solely from a sudden, violent and irresistible passion arising from serious provocation. Finally, in connection with the three crimes listed separately on the verdict form, the trial court again instructed the jury that it should not give “priority” to any one of them. When, after a short period of deliberations, the jury requested recharge on the definitions of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter, the trial court’s recharge again instructed the jury that voluntary manslaughter was a crime “which would otherwise be murder” but for serious provocation which caused the defendant to act in passion.
Ms. Harrison made no request for a charge on the principle addressed in fn. 3 of Edge, supra at 867 (2). In fact, she objected to the giving of any charges on voluntary manslaughter. Moreover, as previously noted, the trial court did instruct the jury in the original *579charge and in the recharge that, if Ms. Harrison acted solely from passion arising from sufficient provocation, she would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder. In the absence of a more explicit request, this charge and recharge is sufficient to convey to the jury the principle discussed in fn. 3 of Edge, supra at 867 (2) and in Russell v. State, 265 Ga. 203, 204 (3) (455 SE2d 34) (1995).
Decided November 3, 1997.
Timothy P. Nealy, Nina M. Svoren, for appellant.
Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Deborah L. Gale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The majority opinion incorrectly implies that the trial court instructed the jury that its deliberations would end once it found Ms. Harrison guilty of murder. Instead, the trial court merely instructed the jury that if, after its deliberations had ended, it found Ms. Harrison guilty of murder, there was no need to consider the remaining part of the verdict form, “because having found her guilty of murder you would then not need to return a verdict on the offense of voluntary manslaughter.” Correctly instructing the jury on possible surplusage in the jury form is not the equivalent of giving the jury an erroneous sequential charge regarding its deliberations.
Because I believe that the charge, as a whole, is consistent with the requirements of Edge, supra, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the conviction and sentence.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.