Court Opinion

ID: 9719131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:43:06.579022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.737485
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly refused to set aside the parties’ property settlement agreement. In my view, the court should have considered not only whether defendant was coerced into signing the agreement, but also whether the agreement was unconscionable. Accordingly, I would reverse the order denying defendant’s motion to set aside the agreement, vacate that portion of the subsequently entered divorce judgment which incorporated the agreement, and remand for further proceedings.
The parties’ settlement of a pending controversy is favored by the courts and such a settlement should only be voided on satisfactory evidence of mistake, fraud, or unconscionable advantage. See Groulx v Carlson, 176 Mich App 484, 489; 440 NW2d 644 (1989), and Pedder v Kalish, 26 Mich App 655, 657; 182 NW2d 739 (1970). A divorce case is equitable in nature, and a court of equity molds *273its relief according to the character of the case; once a court of equity acquires jurisdiction, it will do what is necessary to accord complete equity and to conclude the controversy. Wiand v Wiand, 178 Mich App 137, 144; 443 NW2d 464 (1989), quoting Schaeffer v Schaeffer, 106 Mich App 452, 457-458; 308 NW2d 226 (1981). Thus, the equities of a property settlement agreement reached by the parties to a divorce action may be considered where the record indicates that the settlement may be unconscionable. See Howard v Howard, 134 Mich App 391, 400; 352 NW2d 280 (1984).
In this case, in its opinion denying defendant’s motion to set aside the property settlement agreement, the trial court clearly recognized the uneven distribution of assets for which the parties’ property settlement agreement provided. That recognition is amply borne out by the record. At the hearing on defendant’s motion, plaintiff-husband’s testimony indicated that the total net worth of the parties’ marital assets, exclusive of personal property, was in excess of $94,000. He also testified that the property awarded to defendant-wife under the property settlement agreement, i.e., the pickup truck, had a value of $2,500. Assuming that the husband’s testimony was correct, this means that the property settlement agreement awarded the wife less than three percent of the marital estate while awarding the husband more than ninety-seven percent. Such a distribution can only be characterized as unconscionable.
Furthermore, while the circumstances surrounding the wife’s signing of the property settlement agreement may not have risen to the level of coercion, I believe that they were indicative of unconscionable advantage. The parties were clearly in an unequal bargaining position. The husband had spoken to an attorney regarding the *274divorce and the property settlement. The wife, on the other hand, signed without benefit of advice of counsel. Moreover, the husband’s testimony indicates that when the wife signed the agreement, he assured her that if she decided she was unhappy with its provisions she could get a lawyer to appeal its terms and argue for changes. Under the majority’s view, this assurance was completely false. Obtaining the wife’s signature with misinformation and without an opportunity to confer with an attorney, in my opinion, amounts to unconscionable advantage in bargaining.
The inequity of this property settlement agreement and the manner by which it was obtained mandate that the agreement be set aside. I would therefore reverse and remand for an equitable distribution of the parties’ assets by the trial court.