Court Opinion

ID: 9844212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:59:02.799634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:29.861251
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the foregoing opinion insofar as the majority holds that the respondent, Pierson, was entitled to a lien on the appellants’, Sewell’s, property which respondent was entitled to foreclose. However, I dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that the respondent is not entitled to a personal judgment against appellants and to a deficiency judgment for any balance due after sale of the premises.
The majority opinion recognizes, in its discussion concerning the validity of the lien waiver executed by Pierson, that on several occasions prior to the execution of the waiver, Sewell agreed if Pierson completed his subcontract he would be compensated. The record also discloses that Sew-ell, Butler, and a Mr. Martin who was representing the loaning institution, met to discuss Butler’s financial problems. At this time, early in January, it became apparent that the amount of money the financing institution held to disburse for the job was insufficient to pay all outstanding bills against the Sewell contract. It was also recognized that the shortage in available funds was about the balance due to Pierson for the material and work he had furnished and performed on the Sewell home. There was also testimony that there was an undetermined amount of money due on the Butler contract over and above the contract price because of “extras” furnished at Sewell’s request, and that Sewell rejected an offer from the lending institution to loan him additional funds with which to pay. The record also discloses that one of the reasons that Sew-ell rejected the opportunity to borrow additional funds was that he was expecting to *46receive funds from commissions for real estate sales.
When it was determined that there were insufficient funds remaining with the lending institution to pay all claims Butler and Sewell discussed the relationship between Butler and Pierson to the effect that Butler and Pierson had worked together on many construction contracts, and that when necessary Pierson had on previous occasions been agreeable to giving Butler additional time to meet the obligation. Following this discussion it was determined that Sewell would get lien waivers from all claimants and that all except Pierson would be paid their claims, without prorating the money available from the lending institution.
When Sewell approached Pierson to obtain his lien waiver, Pierson’s expectation was that he would execute the lien waiver so that he could be paid for his claim from funds disbursed by the lending institution. The sole purpose of execution of this waiver, in Pierson’s thinking, was so that Sewell could have the funds made available by the lending institution for disbursement to the claimant. Pierson was not advised that all other claimants . who executed waivers were to be paid, except himself. Under these circumstances, it is my conclusion that there was an implied offer by Sewell to the effect that if Pierson would execute the waiver, that Sewell would see the claim was paid, and the execution of the waiver which was for Sewell’s benefit was Pierson’s acceptance of this offer. See, Calamari & Perillo, Contracts, § 73 (1970).
' At the time that Sewell obtained the lien waiver from Pierson, he obligated himself to see that Pierson obtained his money — i. e., he thus assumed this as a personal obligation. Sewell then used this lien waiver as the basis for having the lending institution release the funds for payment to all other claimants, and thus Sewell obtained the benefits of this agreement to that extent. See, Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 286(b). It is my conclusion that Sewell having received these benefits, the fact that Pierson subsequently filed his lien notwithstanding the waiver did not in any way affect the prior personal obligation Sewell assumed in order to obtain the lien waiver.
It is to be noted that it was Sewell, and not Butler, who conducted the negotiations to obtain the lien waiver from Pierson, and Sewell was a real estate salesman assumedly experienced in real estate transactions. Under these facts it is my opinion that Sewell became personally obligated to pay Pierson, and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.