Court Opinion

ID: 9627547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:47:32.678476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:46.834126
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part V of Justice Johnson’s opinion, in which he questions the admissibility at the preliminary hearing of the results of a DNA-PRINT test conducted by Lifecodes, a private laboratory. I also concur with Part II of the majority opinion, in which Justice Johnson writes for the majority that the minute entry was insufficient to dismiss the first prosecution. The minute entry included no statement of the reason for the dismissal, as required by I.C.R. 48. However, I disagree with Parts III and IY of the majority opinion, and the determination that Horsley’s statutory speedy trial right has not been violated. The majority quickly sidesteps this issue by holding that the nunc pro tunc order entered to dismiss the first prosecution against Horsley was effective. As I explain below, the majority’s analysis of the speedy trial issue impermissibly shifts the burden of proof onto Horsley to show prejudice, when Horsley had already established a prima facie violation of his statutory speedy trial right. Case law clearly indicates that the establishment of a prima facie violation of a defendant’s statutory speedy trial right shifts the burden onto the State to show good cause for the delay. No showing of prejudice to the defendant because of the State’s delay is required.
Part I of my opinion discusses the use of DNA tests in criminal proceedings. Part II discusses the application in this case of the phrase “nunc pro tunc,” as well as the new requirement announced by the majority opinion that a defendant must now show prejudice to have the right to a speedy trial under I.C. § 19-3501 enforced.
I. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA TEST RESULTS
I endorse the statement made by Justice McDevitt in his special concurrence that a *933“test is only as good as the procedures used.” There is a real possibility that test procedures and protocols used by private laboratories to evaluate criminal evidence may be sloppy. While Chief Justice Bakes asserts in his separate opinion that “[g]enetic identification is a modern and highly precise identification method increasingly accepted by courts,” I would caution, that any movement by state courts toward unquestioned acceptance of DNA test results appears to have stalled. DNA tests, when performed incorrectly or without care, are coming under attack by both experts and state courts as more prejudicial than probative of a perpetrator’s identity. Criticism of DNA testing procedures is sufficiently strong that judges at the trial stage and preliminary hearing stage should be wary of test results.
When private labs such as Lifecodes perform DNA identification tests, criticism of the testing procedures of these labs often leads to the inadmissibility of the test results. See for example, Anderson, DNA Evidence Questioned, A.B.A.J. 18 (October 1989); People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (“[t]he testing laboratory [Lifecodes] failed in several major respects to use the generally accepted scientific techniques and experiments for obtaining reliable results, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty”); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn.1989) (“we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory’s compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability [to the court and the parties] of their testing data and results ____the laboratory [Cellmark] in this case did not comport with these guidelines, the test results lack foundational adequacy and, without more, are thus inadmissible”) (footnotes omitted); Thompson and Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 Va.L.Rev. 45,104 (1989) (“certainly under several scenarios, the Lifecodes test might produce a false positive. Whether Lifecodes’ laboratory procedures are adequate to detect these problems is difficult to assess at this point, because the company has chosen not to make its laboratory protocol and manual available for public scrutiny”) (footnote omitted); Note, DNA Printing: The Unexamined “Witness” in Criminal Trials, 77 Cal.L.Rev. 665 (1989) (questioning the relevancy and Frye standards of admissibility for new scientific evidence, and recommending legislation as the answer to ensure test reliability, fairness to defendants, quality controls, and to minimize encroachments on privacy).
The most comprehensive response to the problem of determining the reliability of DNA testing procedures by the courts is found in People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989). In Castro, the court first discussed in comprehensive but understandable detail the tests usually performed to examine DNA, then outlined what pre-trial discovery should reveal about the test procedures before the test results are admissible at trial:
The proponent [of the test results], whether defense or prosecution, must give discovery to the adversary, which must include: 1) Copies of autorads, with the opportunity to examine the originals. 2) Copies of laboratory books. 3) Copies of quality control tests run on material utilized. 4) Copies of reports by the testing laboratory issued to proponent. 5) A written report by the testing laboratory setting forth the method used to declare a match or a non-match, with actual size measurements, and mean or average size measurement, if applicable, together with standard deviation used. 6) A statement by the testing lab, setting forth the method used to calculate the allele frequency in the relevant population. 7) A copy of the data pool for each loci examined. 8) A certification by the testing lab that the same rule used to declare a match was used to determine the allele frequency in the population. 9) A statement setting forth observed contaminants, the reasons therefore, and tests performed to determine the origin and results thereof. 10) If the sample is degraded, a statement setting forth the tests performed and the results thereof. 11) A statement setting forth any other *934observed defects or laboratory errors, the reasons therefore and the results thereof. 12) Chain of custody documents.
Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999. These twelve discoverable and highly useful pieces of information must be available to the court and the parties in order for test procedures to be verified as accurate.
The burden of proof on these matters of accuracy and reliability, as the Castro opinion points out, is clear. Id. There is no presumption enjoyed by the proponent of the test results that the test procedures were performed with care. The proponent must come forward and establish that the tests were properly conducted by the testing laboratory. If the proponent successfully comes forward with information that establishes the reliability of the data offered, then the opponent may by a preponderance of the evidence show that the tests or the calculations performed to determine the test results should be suppressed, or perhaps modified. However, if the proponent cannot or does not establish the foundation for the tests and the test results, the court should consider the test results inadmissible for all purposes. No court should be fooled into lending credibility to what only facially appears to be a scientifically determined test result.
II. THE STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT
To frame this issue, included herein is a brief review of the procedural history of this case. The first information was filed August 26, 1987, and trial was set for December 15. On December 14, one day before trial, the prosecutor moved via telephonic conference for a continuance. This motion was denied, but the judge then suggested to the prosecution that the prosecution request dismissal without prejudice. Dismissal was granted. The judge stated he was granting the prosecution’s dismissal request pursuant to I.C.R. 48. That rule affirmatively requires that the court “shall state in the order of dismissal its reasons for such dismissal.” The judge requested the prosecution to draw up an order of dismissal. A written dismissal order was finally prepared April 21, 1988, approximately four months later. The judge signed it and wrote in hand upon the order that it was “nunc pro tunc December 14, 1987.” Before this nunc pro tunc order was signed, another criminal complaint for the identical charge was filed against Horsley on January 4, 1988.
The majority today endorses the use of nunc pro tunc orders of dismissal in criminal cases, and thereby avoids confronting the requirements of Idaho’s statutory speedy trial provisions. There are (at least) three problems with the majority’s analysis that prevent me from concurring in this portion of the opinion of the Court. First, the State’s showing of good cause for not bringing the defendant to trial within six months was not sufficient. Second, the majority’s reliance upon a dismissal order nunc pro tunc, filed months after the first prosecution was to be dismissed, makes a mockery of the clear intent of I.C. § 19-3501. Third, the majority improperly, unfairly, and without justification shifts the burden to the defendant, forcing Horsley to show that he was somehow prejudiced by the delay. This burden is neither required by the statute, nor mandated by a reasonable interpretation of the case law that discusses I.C. § 19-3501. Each of these three problems will be addressed in turn.
A. The State’s Showing of Good Cause
The statutory right to a speedy trial provided by this State is contained in two provisions of the Idaho Code. I.C. § 19-106 states the speedy trial right, and I.C. § 19-3501 is the enforcement mechanism for that right. Both of these statutes should be considered whenever I.C.R. 48 is invoked. Although the majority opinion is silent on this point, it is obvious that the trial judge suggested dismissal without prejudice, and initially denied the prosecution’s motion for a continuance, precisely because of I.C. § 19-106.
In my opinion, this maneuver is never justified for misdemeanors (see I.C. § 19-3506), nor is it justified in the case of *935a felony simply by satisfying the requirements of I.C.R. 48. The appropriate standard that must be satisfied (before a delay of commencing trial beyond the statutory six month period is justified) is provided by the enforcement mechanism for the affected entitlement, i.e., I.C. § 19-3501. Good cause for the delay must be shown. See State v. Gabrielson, 109 Idaho 507, 509, 708 P.2d 912, 914 (Ct.App.1985). It is not sufficient, as I.C.R. 48 states, to simply show that “dismissal will serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court’s business.”
As the Court of Appeals has recently stated:
Under I.C. § 19-3501, a court must dismiss an action when a defendant is not brought to trial within six months from the date that the indictment or information is filed, “unless good cause to the contrary is shown.” The burden is on the state to show good cause for the delay. State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 579 P.2d 697 (1978). If there is no good cause for the delay, or if the trial was not postponed at the defendant’s request, then the charge against the accused must be dismissed and the inquiry is at an end. State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 887, 107 S.Ct. 283, 93 L.Ed.2d 258 (1986).
Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse. [Citations omitted.] There is no fixed rule for determining good cause for delay of trial; the matter — initially at least — is left to the discretion of the trial court. [Citations omitted.] Because there is no hard and fast rule for determining “good cause,” the ultimate question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, this does not mean that trial judges have unbridled discretion to find “good cause.” We will independently review the lower court’s decision. Such independent review is justified where highly important rights, like speedy trial, are at issue.
State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 495-96, 745 P.2d 1115, 1116-17 (Ct.App.1987). Was good cause shown by the prosecution when it requested a delay in the commencement of Horsley’s trial?
The prosecutor stated that it would have been a waste of taxpayers’ money to have the Lifecodes experts flown in from New York if the trial was going to be delayed and, as a result, he had not finally arranged for their attendance. He stated that he wanted to have any defense motion to continue the trial decided before he went to the expense of bringing the experts in. It was then after 9:00 p.m., on December 10, 1987. Judge Michaud asked, “Are there any further motions to come before the court at this time?” Defense counsel responded, “No motion for a continuance, Your Honor.” With no other business at hand, Judge Michaud recessed court, indicating that the trial would commence as scheduled on December 15, 1987.
Four days later the prosecution requested a continuance. The good cause the prosecution provided was that the two experts from Lifecodes, the private DNA testing lab, were no longer available for trial. No indication from the record is given regarding what occurred in the four days from the time both counsel for the defense and counsel for the prosecution were put on notice that the trial would in fact go forward, and the day the prosecution requested a continuance. To show good cause, it simply is not enough that a prosecutor orally declare that his witnesses are unavailable. Rather it is required that a full and reasonable explanation be provided.
A full and reasonable explanation has assiduously been required by this Court in the past. For example, in State v. Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 236, 386 P.2d 365, 366 (1963), the prosecution’s motion for dismissal explained why the unavailable witness was a material witness for the prosecution (he was an accomplice to the defendant) and why he was unavailable to testify at trial (he was in prison in another state). In State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55, 357 P.2d 656 (1960), a supporting affidavit submitted by *936the prosecution with its request for a continuance specifically discussed why the unavailable witness was material and unavailable:
The affidavit of the senior deputy prosecuting attorney states that the sheriff James Benham ... had suddenly been stricken ill with a serious kidney ailment and is confined in a local hospital; that affiant has been advised by two physicians that said witness will be incapacitated for an indeterminate number of days; that said witness would have testified as to specific exhibits, identifying them and connecting them with the defendant; to conversations had with the defendant; the identification of the sheep which are the subject of the grand larceny charge and to conversations with five other material witnesses.
Hopple, 83 Idaho at 58, 357 P.2d at 658. In contrast to Hopple and Goodmiller, the prosecutor in this case offered practically no explanation for his inability to proceed to trial on the pre-determined date. The prosecutor provided no explanation of his efforts to provide for different experts, instead of the Lifecodes experts that are stationed in New York. If protecting the taxpayers’ money was the real reason for not having the experts in town for trial, why weren’t experts from nearby universities and other research centers requested to attend the trial?
Hopple and Goodmiller demonstrate that a showing of good cause is a relatively easy hurdle for the prosecution to clear. This easy hurdle has been knocked asunder by today’s majority holding. Instead of placing stare decisis reliance on Hopple and Goodmiller, the majority replaces the statutory requirement of showing good cause with a simple assertion by the prosecution of good cause. This Court has provided no reason for changing and thereby gutting the requirement of a showing of good cause, nor is it easy to divine a reason for the majority’s dilution of the statutory speedy trial right.
B. The Nunc Pro Tunc Order of Dismissal
A review of the use of the phrase “nunc pro tunc” in Idaho case law readily discloses that the majority’s endorsement of a nunc pro tunc order of dismissal in this criminal case is a pronounced departure from previous genuine applications of nunc pro tunc orders. Allowing nunc pro tunc orders of dismissal to be effective in a criminal proceeding, when there is a statutory right to have the trial process commenced within a certain amount of time, destroys that statutory right. This can only result in wreaking havoc with legislative protections of the rights of the criminally accused in this State.
The majority’s analysis is simple, and short enough to be repeated here:
Although neither party has addressed the issue, because we have concluded that the court minutes did not constitute an order dismissing the first information, we must consider whether the order issued by the trial court on April 21, 1988, dismissing the first case nunc pro tunc December 14, 1987, was effective.
While this is a criminal case and Ward [v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 720 P.2d 223 (Ct.App.1986) ] and Westmont [Tractor Co. v. Estate of Westfall, 112 Idaho 712, 735 P.2d 1023 (1987)] were civil cases, we see no reason not to apply the same principles concerning nunc pro tunc judgments developed there to this set of circumstances. Applying these principles here, we hold that the order of April 21, 1988, dismissing the first case nunc pro tunc December 14, 1987, was effective as of the earlier date.
Majority opinion, at 925, 792 P.2d at 950. Responsive to that, my first wonder is as to the extent, if any, that the majority searched for a reason for applying the same principles concerning nunc pro tunc judgments developed in civil cases to this criminal case. In fact, as is explained below, this is the first case by a majority of this Court to discuss, let alone endorse, the use of nunc pro tunc orders in a criminal case. Without assistance or briefing from the parties, and without any consideration of the prejudicial effect on the statutory *937right to a speedy trial, the majority endorses the use of nunc pro tunc orders to substantiate the dismissal of a prosecution without prejudice, so as to pave the way for the refiling of a new action, all for the better oppression of the defendant, and certainly not in consideration of the evenhanded administration of justice. I cannot be so cavalier with the introduction of a predominantly civil concept into the criminal arena.
Of the thirty-two cases in Idaho that have used the phrase “nunc pro tunc,” twenty-nine involve civil matters. None of the remaining three criminal cases support the proposition that nunc pro tunc orders are as acceptable in the criminal context as they are in the civil context. Of the three criminal cases in Idaho that use the phrase, not one discusses the ramifications of using nunc pro tunc orders in criminal proceedings. In Housley v. State, Idaho, 1989 WL 100586 (Ct.App. No. 17339, Sept. 1, 1989), a petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed, but the order of dismissal allowed the defendant to file another petition with an earlier effective date for the petition, i.e., nunc pro tunc. This dismissal order was not challenged by the defendant, and the Court of Appeals opinion does not discuss the nunc pro tunc provision. In State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 727 P.2d 1263 (Ct.App.1986); petition for review denied 112 Idaho 950, 738 P.2d 420 (1987), the use of a nunc pro tunc order entered four months after imposition of sentence upon the defendant was not considered by a majority of this Court. Bistline, J. writing on the denial of petition for review, joined by Huntley, J., took considerable umbrage with the aberrational use of the nunc pro tunc order in Hancock, but elicited no activity whatever from Justices Shepard, Donaldson, and Bakes. See 112 Idaho at 950-53, 738 P.2d at 420-23. In State v. Mee, 102 Idaho 474, 632 P.2d 663 (1981), overruled by State v. Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412, 757 P.2d 675 (1988), this Court held that a much less grievous use of a nunc pro tunc order — certification by a magistrate of depositions — was an appropriate and enforceable action.
The majority opinion, without a pause to consider the use in prior opinions by this Court of the phrase, without the assistance of briefing by the parties, and without a request for additional briefing, gives grace and validity to the district judge’s nunc pro tunc order of dismissal. This it does in obvious ignorance of the accepted translation, interpretation, and usage in Idaho of the phrase. The majority simply declares that without the order of dismissal, the first prosecution would have been viable. Yet, in a twist of reasoning only those members of the trial bar not overly concerned with the growth of prosecutorial power will easily accept, the majority pronounces that the defendant’s speedy trial right was not violated because the nunc pro tunc order effectively ended the first prosecution before the running of the six months limitation provided for in the speedy trial statute!
In effect, the majority pays lip service only to the defendant’s right to be brought to trial within six months, but the majority will not deign to recognize that right where the State attempts to undo what has already been done. What has already been done, and cannot be undone by an order nunc pro tunc, is obvious: In contravention of I.C. § 19-3501 the State has dangled a continuing prosecution over the defendant’s head without bringing him to trial within the requisite six months. From this time forward, the six month time limit contained in I.C. § 19-3501 is meaningless. An order nunc pro tunc can turn back the clock for the prosecution at any time, on the whim of the prosecutor, as aided and abetted by this Court’s holding.
C. I.C. § 19-3501 and Burdens of Proof
My final point highlights the most significant deviation from precedent in today’s majority opinion. The majority has shifted the burden of proof away from the State (to disprove a speedy trial violation) and onto the shoulders of the defendant to prove something in addition to a prima facie violation of I.C. § 19-3501. Henceforth I.C. § 19-3501, the enforcement mechanism of the right to a speedy trial, will never be enforced unless the defendant *938proves that some prejudice resulted from the delay. No longer is it enough, as previous cases have held (see for example State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 745 P.2d 1115 (Ct.App.1987)), for the defendant to show that the State has taken more than six months after the information was filed to bring on the trial. The prima facie violation, ie., not commencing trial within six months, is no longer recognized as a statutory speedy trial violation.
The majority explains the new burdens of proof, apparently without realizing that they have announced a new rule, in this way:
In Westmont we noted that in Ward the Court of Appeals focused on the lack of unfair prejudice to the other parties in allowing the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc.
The only evidence of prejudice that Horsley offered because of the delay in the dismissal of the first case was that his bond had not been exonerated. However, since his testimony was that he had furnished the bond through a bondsman for a premium of ten percent, we are unable to see what prejudice there was to Horsley.
Majority Opinion, at 925-926, 792 P.2d at 950-951. Idaho’s statutory speedy trial right requires no showing of prejudice by the defendant. Moreover, the fact that the defendant has had the specter of the State over his head, with no resolution through a trial commenced within six months after an information was filed, is a sufficient showing of prejudice, if such a showing were required.
Why an order nunc pro tunc should be allowed to trump a statutory right in a criminal proceeding is beyond comprehension. In effect, the majority rewards the prosecution for its multiple transgressions, the first of which was in not bringing the defendant to trial within six months. At that point, all the defendant would have to establish in order for the Court to enforce the statutory speedy trial right was that six months had passed and a trial date, through no fault of the defendant, had not been set. But the prosecution made another mistake — they forgot to ensure that the first prosecution had been properly dismissed. For their omission, the Court rewards them by placing a heavier burden on the defendant. Now, it is not enough for the defendant to show that six months had passed and no trial had begun. Horsley must also establish that he has been prejudiced (to the Supreme Court’s satisfaction) by the fact that his speedy trial right was not honored.
In conclusion, I am reminded of the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., when he wrote that:
You cannot argue with your neighbor, except on the admission for the moment that he is as wise as you, although you may by no means believe it.
For the moment, although earnestly I have endeavored to understand the reasoning behind the majority’s analysis and the majority’s disposition of Horsley’s statutory speedy trial claim, I am left without a wisp of insight, and see unfolding the demise of I.C. § 19-3501.