Court Opinion

ID: 9628169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:10:06.379688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:58.736122
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent:
A plain reading of section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.) admits of only one conclusion — that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Section 42-5-102(2) provides that “Any person . . . who knowingly possesses an automobile or automobile part containing [a] removed, changed, altered, or obliterated vehicle identification number . . . commits a class 4 felony . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The statute does not state that any person who possesses an automobile or automobile parts and has knowledge that it contains removed, altered, etc., vehicle numbers has committed a class 4 felony. Thus, as it is presently drafted, the statute prohibits possession of an automobile or automobile parts even if the owner is unaware that the identification numbers have been altered. Such a statute clearly violates constitutional due process.
To avoid the constitutional problems in this case, the majority interprets the statute to require knowledge that identification numbers on the automobile or automobile parts have been altered. In my view, it is for the legislature and not the courts to create statutes. People in the Interest of Maddox v. District Court, 198 Colo. 208, 597 P.2d 573 (1979); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 534, 178 P. 13 (1919); House v. Rose, 6 Colo. 24 (1881). When a statute cannot pass constitutional muster on its own, we must take the difficult path and declare it to be unconstitutional. See People v. Von Tersch, 180 Colo. 295, 505 P.2d 5 (1973); Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972).
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s decision.