Court Opinion

ID: 9896602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 20:04:27.694129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.612101
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23 P. v. Paniagua CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B324440

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. LA081995)
           v.

 ARIEL BAKER PANIAGUA
 et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

       APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Thomas Rubinson, Judge. Paniagua’s
judgment is affirmed as modified. The order denying Martinez’s
petition under section 1172.6 is reversed with directions.
       David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ariel Baker Paniagua.
       Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Hubaldo Martinez.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       __________________

                        INTRODUCTION

       This is Ariel Baker Paniagua’s third appeal and Hubaldo
Martinez’s second. Paniagua appeals from the judgment entered
after the trial court resentenced him (a second time) following his
second appeal (People v. Paniagua (Feb. 28, 2022, B313479)
[nonpub. opn.] (Paniagua II)). Paniagua and Martinez were
convicted of various crimes, some of which they committed
together and some of which Paniagua committed on his own.
       Paniagua argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in declining to dismiss any enhancements under the
2022 amendments to Penal Code section 1385 (Sen. Bill No. 81,
Stats. 2021 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), ch. 721, § 1),1 which added
subdivision (c) to require the court to dismiss an enhancement
under certain circumstances if it is in the interest of justice to do
so. Paniagua also argues that the evidence at his trial does not
support a true finding on the gang allegation under the 2022
amendments to section 186.22 (Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.)) and that, if he forfeited this argument, his appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise it in
Paniagua II. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in (re)sentencing Paniagua under section 1385,

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  2
subdivision (c), that Paniagua forfeited his argument the gang
enhancements should be vacated under amended section 186.22,
and that Paniagua has not demonstrated his appellate counsel
provided ineffective assistance. Therefore, we modify Paniagua’s
sentence to strike an enhancement we reversed in a
nonpublished opinion (People v. Paniagua (Nov. 4, 2019,
B289253) [nonpub. opn.] (Paniagua I)), and affirm.
      Martinez, who pleaded no contest to voluntary
manslaughter, appeals from the superior court’s order denying
his petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6). Martinez argues the court applied the wrong
standard of proof at the evidentiary hearing. We reverse the
order denying Martinez’s petition for resentencing and direct the
court to hold a new evidentiary hearing and apply the proper
standard of proof under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    Paniagua and Martinez Participate in a Shooting;
            One Week Later, Paniagua Commits Another
            Shooting
       On October 6, 2015 Paniagua and Martinez, both members
of the same criminal street gang, drove into the neighborhood of a
rival gang. Martinez stopped the car next to Victor Castillo;
Paniagua got out of the car, asked Castillo if he was associated
with the rival gang, and showed Castillo a handgun in his
waistband and a gang tattoo across his chest. Castillo said he did
not belong to any gang, and Paniagua got back into the car.
Martinez drove to a marijuana dispensary and pulled his car
behind another car with occupants Paniagua believed belonged to
the rival gang. Paniagua got out of the car, shouted “Fuck

                                3
Canoga” (the name of the rival gang), and fired several shots into
the car. One bullet hit one of the occupants of the car; another
hit and killed the driver of a car parked down the street. After
the shooting, Martinez drove off with Paniagua.
      One week later, Paniagua fired shots into another car. The
bullets did not hit anyone, and the car sped off after the shooting.
Martinez did not participate in this shooting. (Paniagua I, supra,
B289253.)

      B.     The People Charge Martinez and Paniagua with
             Various Crimes; Martinez Pleads No Contest, and a
             Jury Convicts Paniagua; Both Are Sentenced
       The People charged Paniagua and Martinez with, among
other crimes, one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and
three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)). The People
also charged Paniagua with offenses related to the second
shooting in which Martinez did not participate.
       Martinez pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted he had a prior felony conviction
that was a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the
three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))
and a serious felony within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced Martinez to 27 years
in prison.
       A jury found Paniagua guilty on all counts (though
convicted him of second, not first, degree murder) and found true
most of the gang and all of the firearm allegations. The trial
court sentenced Paniagua to an aggregate prison sentence of
effectively 268 years four months to life as follows: On count 1,

                                 4
second degree murder, the court imposed a sentence of 30 years
to life (15 years to life, doubled under the three strikes law), plus
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under section
12022.53, subdivision (d). The court also imposed and stayed
execution of 10- and 20-year terms, respectively, for the firearm
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).
For the true finding on the gang allegation, the court imposed a
term of life with a minimum parole eligibility of 30 years under
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) (a minimum parole eligibility of
15 years, doubled under the three strikes law).
        On each of counts 2 through 4, attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder, the court imposed a prison
term of life with a minimum parole eligibility of 30 years under
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) (a minimum parole eligibility of
15 years, doubled under the three strikes law), plus 25 years to
life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d). The court also imposed and stayed execution of
10- and 20-year terms, respectively, for the firearm
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).
        On count 5, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle on
October 6, 2015 (§ 246), the court imposed and stayed execution
of a prison term of three years four months,2 plus 25 years to life
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), plus 15 years to life
under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4). On count 7, shooting at
an occupied vehicle on October 13, 2015 (§ 246), the court
imposed a term of three years four months, plus 20 years under
section 12022.53, subdivision (c), plus 15 years to life under

2    We ultimately corrected this sentencing error in
Paniagua II. (See People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188,
1197-1198.)

                                  5
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4),3 and imposed and stayed a
term of 10 years each under sections 12022.53, subdivision (b),
and 12022.5, subdivision (a). On count 9, possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), the court imposed and stayed
execution of a prison term of one year four months, plus a term of
three years under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1),4 plus one
year under section 667.5, subdivision (b). On each of counts 1
through 4 and 7, the court imposed an additional term of five
years under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

      C.     Paniagua Successfully Appeals Twice, and the Trial
             Court Resentences Him Twice
       In Paniagua’s first appeal, we affirmed the judgment in
most respects and directed the trial court to correct several
sentencing and other errors, to exercise its discretion whether to
strike the five-year enhancements under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), and to consider the effect, if any, of Senate Bill
No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1), which
limits the applicability of the one-year sentence enhancement for
prior prison terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b), to
defendants who have served a prison term for certain sexually
violent offenses. (Paniagua I, supra, B289253.) On remand the
trial court corrected the errors we identified in Paniagua I,
declined to exercise its discretion to strike the five-year

3     In Paniagua I we held the trial court erred in imposing the
gang penalty on count 7 because the jury found the gang
allegation not true. (Paniagua I, supra, B289253.)

4     We reversed the jury’s true finding on the gang allegation
related to count 9 because the trial court erred in failing to give a
unanimity instruction. (Paniagua I, supra, B289253.)

                                  6
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and struck
the one-year prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
       In his second appeal, Paniagua contended, and the People
conceded, the trial court committed two additional sentencing
errors on his conviction for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle
(count 7). We modified the judgment to strike the firearm
enhancements on count 7 and affirmed the judgment as modified.
(People v. Paniagua (Jan. 12, 2022, B313479) [nonpub. opn.].)
       Paniagua filed a petition for rehearing in Paniagua II,
arguing that several new sentencing laws that went into effect on
January 1, 2022 applied to him: (1) Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3), which (among other
things) amended section 1170 to limit the trial court’s discretion
to impose the upper term of imprisonment and to require the
court in certain circumstances to impose the lower term;
(2) Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 441, § 1), which amended section 654 to no longer require the
trial court to impose a sentence based on the longest possible
term where an act or omission is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of the law; and (3) Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), which as stated
amended section 1385 to add subdivision (c), to require the court
to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances. We
granted the petition and concluded the new laws applied to
Paniagua. We directed the trial court on count 7 to strike the
enhancements under sections 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c),

                                7
and 12022.5, subdivision (a),5 and to resentence Paniagua in
accordance with the three new laws. In holding the ameliorative
legislation applied retroactively, we stated that the new laws
constituted “‘“changed circumstances”’” and that the trial court
should conduct a “‘“full resentencing as to all counts.”’”
(Paniagua II, supra, B313479.) On remand the trial court
resentenced Paniagua to an aggregate prison sentence of
effectively 248 years four months to life. Paniagua timely
appealed.

      D.    Martinez Files a Petition for Resentencing Under
            Section 1172.6
       In 2022 Martinez filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6.6 Martinez asserted that, because of the
Legislature’s changes to the definitions of murder under sections
188 and 189, he could not currently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder. The superior court found Martinez
established a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show

5      Once the trial court vacated the gang finding and
life sentence on count 7 (on remand after Paniagua I), the
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c),
no longer applied to Paniagua. (See § 12022.53, subd. (a).) The
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), did not
apply to Paniagua because, as we held in Paniagua II, the
enhancement does not apply where, as here, use of a firearm is
an element of the underlying offense (§ 246). (Paniagua II,
supra, B313479.)

6     Martinez had previously filed a request for resentencing
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The trial court denied the
request, and we dismissed Martinez’s appeal from that order.
(People v. Martinez (Mar. 9, 2021, B306553) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                8
cause, and held an evidentiary hearing. After the evidentiary
hearing, the court ruled Martinez was not entitled to relief and
denied the petition. Martinez timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      A.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
            Declining To Strike Any Enhancements Under
            Section 1385, Subdivision (c)

             1.    Relevant Proceedings
       On August 17, 2022 the trial court conducted a(nother)
resentencing hearing. The court cited the remittitur in
Paniagua II and stated: “This will be a full resentencing of
Defendant Paniagua.” Referring to amended sections 654 and
1385, counsel for Paniagua argued that, because Paniagua was
under the age of 26 when he committed the crimes and “suffered
trauma in his background,” the court should stay execution of the
sentence on the count that carried the longest prison term and
impose the sentence on a count that carried less prison time,
strike the gang allegations, strike the prior conviction allegation,
and impose concurrent sentences. The prosecutor submitted on
the People’s original sentencing memorandum from 2018, which
listed Paniagua’s prior convictions and identified six
circumstances in aggravation under California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a) and (b). The People also reported that, while
Paniagua and Castillo were both in custody before the trial,
Paniagua threatened and attacked Castillo.
       The court found: Paniagua, a member of a criminal street
gang, committed two shootings one week apart. In the first

                                 9
shooting, the trial court stated, Paniagua “brazenly opened fire”
on three people he thought were members of a rival gang, and
one of the stray bullets hit a “completely innocent man inside his
truck, killing him.” In the second shooting, Paniagua fired shots
into a car in rival gang territory, but “thankfully, on this
occasion, no lives were lost.” The court also discussed Paniagua’s
criminal history and found, under California Rules of Court, rule
4.421, four circumstances in aggravation that related to the
crimes and three circumstances in aggravation that related to
Paniagua.
       The court acknowledged that, under amended section 654,
it had discretion to stay execution of the sentence on the more
serious counts, but declined to exercise that discretion because, in
the court’s view, it would not be in the interest of justice.
Turning to amended section 1170, the court recognized that it
had discretion to impose the lower term on the determinate
sentences (counts 5, 7, and 9) and found that under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), Paniagua’s youth was a mitigating factor. The
court concluded, however, that the aggravating factors
outweighed that mitigating factor and that “selecting the lower
term would not be in the interest of justice.”
       Finally, the court stated that the new provision in
section 1385, subdivision (c), gave it discretion to dismiss
enhancements, which the court said were the firearm and (on
some counts) the gang enhancements. The court reviewed the
mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), and found circumstances (B) and (C) applied to
all counts, circumstance (F) applied to counts 7 and 9, and

                                10
circumstance (E) might apply.7 The trial court gave the
mitigating circumstances “great weight,” but concluded that
dismissing the enhancements would “endanger public safety”
because of “the resultant shorter sentence” for Paniagua and that
therefore “it would not be in the interest of justice to dismiss the
enhancements.” However, on count 7, one of the convictions for
shooting at an occupied vehicle, the trial court struck (following
our direction in Paniagua II) the firearm enhancements under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), and section 12022.5,
subdivision (a).
      The court resentenced Paniagua as follows: On count 1, the
court imposed a prison term of 15 years to life, doubled under the
three strikes law, plus 25 years to life under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d). The court also imposed and stayed execution of
10- and 20-year terms, respectively, for the enhancements under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), and imposed a
minimum parole eligibility of 30 years under section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(5). On each of counts 2 through 4, the court
sentenced Paniagua to life in prison, with a minimum parole

7     Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), lists the mitigating
circumstances: “(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a
single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed. [¶] (C) The application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this
instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed. [¶] . . . [¶]
(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization or
childhood trauma. [¶] (F) The current offense is not a violent
felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.” With
respect to mitigating circumstance (E), the court found there was
no evidence of a connection between any trauma and the current
offenses.

                                11
eligibility of 30 years, plus 25 years to life under section
12022.53, subdivision (d). The court again imposed and stayed
execution of 10- and 20-year terms, respectively, for the findings
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c). In addition, on
each of counts 1 through 4, the court imposed a term of five years
under section 667, subdivision (a).
       On count 5, the court imposed and stayed execution of a
term of five years, doubled to 10 years under the three strikes
law, plus 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
and 15 years to life under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4). The
court also imposed and stayed execution of 10- and 20-year terms,
respectively, under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).
       On count 7, the court imposed a term of three years
four months, plus five years under section 667, subdivision (a).
On count 9, the court imposed and stayed execution of a term of
four years, plus three years for the gang enhancement.8

8     The trial court erred in imposing the gang enhancement
under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), on count 9 because in
Paniagua I we reversed the true finding on the gang allegation.
We will modify the judgment to correct this error. (See People v.
Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 986 [“‘When sentencing
error does not require additional evidence, further fact finding, or
further exercise of discretion, the appellate court may modify the
judgment appropriately and affirm it as modified.’”].)

                                12
             2.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Section 1385, subdivision (c), provides: “Notwithstanding
any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so.” Section 1385, subdivision (c),
“further provides that ‘[i]n exercising its discretion under this
subdivision,’ the trial court ‘shall consider and afford great
weight’ to certain ‘mitigating circumstances,’ if proven by the
defendant. [Citation.] ‘Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’” (People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 290 (Mendoza); see People v. Lipscomb
(2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 16-17; People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674 (Sek).)9 “‘“Endanger public safety”
means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.’” (Mendoza, at p. 295; see § 1385, subd. (c)(2);
People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1094, review granted
Apr. 12, 2023, S278894.)
       “[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review for
the trial court’s determination that dismissal of [a defendant’s]
firearm enhancement would endanger public safety” under
section 1385, subdivision (c). (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298; see People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 395,

9     “The mitigating circumstances originally were listed under
subdivision (c)(3) of section 1385. [Citation.] Effective June 30,
2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended the
statute to list them under section 1385(c)(2).” (People v.
Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 291, fn. 1; see Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 15; Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)

                                13
review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309; see also People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony) [“a trial court’s
refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation
under section 1385[, subdivision (a),] is subject to review for
abuse of discretion”].) “The abuse of discretion standard is highly
deferential. When, ‘“as here, a discretionary power is statutorily
vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not
be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’”’” (Mendoza, at p. 298; see Carmony, at p. 377 [“a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it”]; Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490
[same].)

            3.     The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
                   Declining To Dismiss the Enhancements Under
                   Section 1385, Subdivision (c)
       Paniagua argues the trial court abused its discretion
because it “refused to dismiss even a single enhancement on the
ground that doing so would endanger public safety.” Paniagua,
however, did not make this argument in the trial court. He did
not dispute that striking the enhancements would result in
physical danger or injury to others, nor did he challenge the trial
court’s finding at the August 17, 2022 resentencing hearing that
it would. Therefore, he forfeited the argument. (See People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [a party in a criminal case may
not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices”

                                 14
if the party did not object to the sentence at trial]; People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 242 [defendant forfeited his
challenge to the trial court’s decision to impose the upper term
because he failed to object when the court imposed it], review
granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786].)
       In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The court reviewed the evidence and found two mitigating
circumstances applied (the People alleged multiple
enhancements; applying the enhancements would result in a
sentence of over 20 years) to all the counts and a third mitigating
circumstance (the current offense was not a violent felony, as
defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c)) applied to counts 7
and 9. However, the court also considered the circumstances of
the crime, which included that Paniagua “brazenly” fired a gun
on a public street resulting in the death of an innocent man; that
Paniagua committed two shootings one week apart; and
Paniagua’s increasing criminality. The court concluded it was a
“virtual certainty” a shorter sentence would endanger the public.
This was not an irrational or arbitrary conclusion, particularly
given Paniagua expressed no remorse at the original sentencing
hearing and intimidated a witness before trial. (See Mendoza,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to dismiss an enhancement, where the
court considered the circumstances of the crime and concluded “a
long sentence was necessary for [the defendant] to become
rehabilitated after committing such a crime”].)
       Paniagua argues that, given the length of his sentence
(effectively 248 years four months), the court’s finding “that
dismissing any enhancements would endanger public safety . . .
could not possibly be correct.” Paniagua does not dispute the

                                15
court’s finding he poses a public safety risk if released; instead,
he essentially argues it doesn’t matter how dangerous he is
because, given his two-and-a-half century prison sentence, he
may never be released. According to Paniagua, even if the court
dismissed “150 years’ worth of enhancements,” he “would still be
serving” life without the possibility of parole.
      That is not the law. Paniagua cites no authority for the
proposition the length of a defendant’s prison sentence is a factor
in determining under section 1385, subdivision (c), whether
dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety.
Under his theory, a defendant is entitled to dismissal of all
enhancements, regardless of the defendant’s dangerousness, as
long as the resulting sentence exceeds the defendant’s life
expectancy. Moreover, as Paniagua’s three (so far) appeals
demonstrate, his sentence has not remained static—the trial
court made some sentencing errors that, when corrected, resulted
in a shorter aggregate sentence, and the Legislature enacted (and
continues to enact) ameliorative legislation. The trial court
reasonably concluded decreasing Paniagua’s sentence by any
amount would contribute to the risk of serious danger to others.
(Cf. People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1129 [“staying
rather than striking the prohibited firearm enhancements serves
the legislative goals of section 12022.53 by making the prohibited
enhancements readily available should the section 12022.53
enhancement with the longest term be found invalid on appeal”].)
Paniagua has not shown the trial court was unaware of its
discretion to dismiss an enhancement, considered an
impermissible factor, or failed to consider a required factor. (See
Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [section 1385,
subdivision (c), “does not require the trial court to consider any

                                16
particular factors in determining whether ‘there is a likelihood
that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical
injury or other serious danger to others’”]; see also Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“an abuse of discretion occurs where
the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss
[citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss”]; People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134,
1141 [“an abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court
considers impermissible factors, and, conversely, does not
consider relevant ones”].)
       Paniagua also contends that the court’s refusal to dismiss
any enhancements “was inconsistent with the spirit and letter” of
section 1385, subdivision (c). By failing to support this
contention with any argument or citation to authority, however,
Paniagua forfeited it too. (See People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1124, fn. 39; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th
764, 793.) In any event, the text of section 1385, subdivision (c),
preserves the court’s discretion to dismiss an enhancement if
doing so would endanger public safety, which the court found
applied to Paniagua. (See People v. Anderson, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239 [section 1385, subdivision (c), “explicitly
and unambiguously establishes: the trial court has discretion to
dismiss sentencing enhancements; certain circumstances weigh
greatly in favor of dismissal; and a finding of danger to public
safety can overcome the circumstances in favor of dismissal”],
review granted; People v. Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 395
[“Section 1385 makes clear that whether dismissal of an
enhancement is ‘in the furtherance of justice’ is a ‘discretion[ary]’
call for the trial court to make.”], review granted.)

                                 17
            4.      Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(3), Does Not
                    Apply to Alternate Sentencing Provisions
       At the August 17, 2022 resentencing hearing, the trial
court considered whether it should exercise its discretion to strike
the firearm and gang enhancements; the court did not mention or
apparently consider the effect on Paniagua’s sentence of his prior
serious or violent felony conviction under the three strikes law.
Paniagua asks us now to direct the trial court to apply section
1385, subdivision (c), to alternative penalty schemes, like the
three strikes law, and to exercise its discretion whether to
“dismiss those penalty provisions.” Section 1385, subdivision (c),
however, does not apply to alternate penalty provisions like the
three strikes law.
       “‘“[I]n construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the
intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the
law.” [Citation.] In determining that intent, we first examine
the words of the respective statutes: “If there is no ambiguity in
the language of the statute, ‘then the Legislature is presumed to
have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language
governs.’ [Citation.] ‘Where the statute is clear, courts will not
“interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does
not exist.”’”’” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242
(Burke); see People v. Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 17.)
       “The plain language of subdivision (c) of section 1385
applies only to an ‘enhancement,’ and the Three Strikes law is
not an enhancement. We therefore conclude that section 1385,
subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding enhancements do not apply
to the Three Strikes law.” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 244; see People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2
(Tilley) [because a “prior strike conviction is not an enhancement

                                18
but part of an alternative sentencing scheme,” section 1385,
subdivision (c), “does not apply to prior strike convictions”].) We
agree with Burke and Tilley: The statutory language of
section 1385, subdivision (c), is clear and unambiguous. Section
1385, subdivision (c), refers to an enhancement, which “has a
well-established technical meaning in California law” and does
not include an alternate sentencing scheme like the three strikes
law. (Burke, at p. 243 & fn. 3; see People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 527 [“The Three Strikes law
. . . articulates an alternative sentencing scheme for the current
offense rather than an enhancement.”]; People v. Frutoz (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 171, 174, fn. 3 [same]; see also Association of
Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County v. Gascon (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 503, 542 [“the Legislature (and the voters)
enacted the three strikes law to create an alternative sentencing
scheme when the defendant has qualifying prior felony
convictions”], review granted Aug. 31, 2022, S275478.)
        Citing Arden Carmichael, Inc. v. County of Sacramento
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1070, Paniagua argues section 1385,
subdivision (c), contains a “‘latent ambiguity’” that “courts must
resolve to read the law consistent with the Legislature’s true
intention.” Although the court in Arden Carmichael concluded
there was no latent ambiguity in a constitutional provision
adopted by voter initiative, the court described a “latent
ambiguity” as one that may exist “‘“where the language employed
is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but
some extrinsic evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a
choice among two or more possible meanings.”’” (Arden
Carmichael, at p. 1075.) The court in that case cautioned,
however, that “the will of the people as expressed in the plain

                                19
meaning of the constitutional provision is paramount,” that the
court’s duty was “not to twist words to substitute [its] own
judgment for that of the voters” but “to determine and apply the
intent of the people,” and that with “extremely rare exceptions
. . . that intent will be found in the plain meaning of the
constitutional provision.” (Id. at p. 1076.) As more recent case
authority makes clear, “although extrinsic evidence may reveal a
latent ambiguity in a statute, such ambiguity must reside in the
statutory language itself. It cannot exist in the abstract, or by
ignoring the statutory language.” (Siskiyou County Farm Bureau
v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411,
420.) As discussed, the statutory language of section 1385,
subdivision (c), does not reflect any ambiguity.

      B.    Paniagua Forfeited His Request To Apply Assembly
            Bill No. 333 to His Sentence and Has Not
            Demonstrated Ineffective Assistance of Appellate
            Counsel

             1.    Applicable Law
      “Assembly Bill 333 made the following changes to the law
on gang enhancements: First, it narrowed the definition of a
‘criminal street gang’ to require that any gang be an ‘ongoing,
organized association or group of three or more persons.’
[Citation.] Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f)
required only that a gang’s members ‘individually or collectively
engage in’ a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a
‘criminal street gang,’ Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such
pattern have been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by members of the
gang. [Citation.] Third, Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the

                                20
definition of a ‘pattern of criminal activity’ by requiring that
(1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang
activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently
charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the
offenses were committed by two or more gang ‘members,’ as
opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a
criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern
of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged
offense. [Citation.] Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it
means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang,
requiring that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’”
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran); see Sek,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 665.) Paniagua contends, the People
concede, and we agree these ameliorative changes in the law are
retroactive. (See Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206-1207;
People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 380; Sek, at
p. 667.)10

            2.   Paniagua Forfeited His Argument Based on
                 Assembly Bill No. 333
     Paniagua argues the “true findings on the gang allegations
must be vacated based on changes to the law made by [Assembly

10    Assembly Bill No. 333 also added section 1109, “which
requires, if requested by the defendant, a gang enhancement
charge to be tried separately from all other counts that do not
otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the crime.”
(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.) Whether section 1109
applies retroactively “is the subject of a split of authority among
the Courts of Appeal,” which the Supreme Court has declined to

                                 21
Bill No.] 333.” Paniagua, however, did not argue at the
August 17, 2022 resentencing hearing the changes in the law
governing gang enhancements in Assembly Bill No. 333, which
became effective January 1, 2022, applied to him, nor did he ask
the court to dismiss the gang enhancements under Assembly Bill
No. 333. Therefore, he has forfeited the argument. (See People v.
Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351 [“In order to encourage prompt
detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of
unnecessary appellate claims, reviewing courts have required
parties to raise certain issues at the time of sentencing. In such
cases, lack of a timely and meaningful objection forfeits or waives
the claim.”]; People v. Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 242
[defendant forfeited his argument the trial court relied on
improper factors in imposing the upper term], review granted;
People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100 [“Appellant
forfeited his sentencing claims because he did not object at the
time of sentencing.”].)
       Paniagua argues he did not forfeit his argument because,
“when Paniagua II was decided, the law was unsettled as to
whether someone like him, whose convictions had been upheld on
initial review and who was only appealing from his resentencing,
could take advantage of changes to the definition of an
enhancement the jury found true at his trial.” Even assuming
Paniagua’s characterization of the law in February 2022 (when
we filed our modified opinion in Paniagua II after granting
Paniagua’s petition for rehearing) is correct, by the time the
resentencing hearing occurred on August 17, 2022, the Supreme

resolve. (Tran, at p. 1208.) Paniagua states he “is not asserting
he was prejudiced by the lack of a bifurcated trial.”

                                22
Court had decided People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152
(Padilla) (almost three months before the sentencing hearing),
which, as Paniagua points out, held an ameliorative voter
initiative (Proposition 57) applied to the defendant at his third
resentencing hearing.11 (Padilla, at pp. 158-159; see Sek, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 665-667 [Assembly Bill No. 333, enacted
while the defendant’s appeal from his resentencing was pending,
applied retroactively.].) Paniagua’s failure to argue at his
resentencing hearing that Assembly Bill No. 333 applied to him
precludes him from raising the argument in this appeal. (People
v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351; People v. Sperling, supra,
12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1100.)
       In his reply brief, Paniagua asserts it was “not clear” his
trial counsel could have challenged the gang findings because
this court’s disposition in Paniagua II “was limited to
resentencing based on certain new laws specified in the order and
did not encompass a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
for the gang enhancements.” Our disposition, however, did not
preclude Paniagua from asking for relief under Assembly Bill
No. 333. In Paniagua II we agreed with Paniagua the 2022
amendments to sections 654, 1170, and 1385 applied to him and,
citing People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893, concluded the
“changed circumstances” made a “full resentencing as to all
counts . . . appropriate.” (Paniagua II, supra, B313479, internal
quotation marks omitted.) In the disposition, among other things
we vacated Paniagua’s sentence, which authorized the trial court

11    Proposition 57 provides that a minor may be tried and
sentenced in criminal courts only after a juvenile court judge
conducts a transfer hearing. (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 159.)

                                23
to conduct a full resentencing (see Buycks, at p. 893 [“when part
of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a
full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate’”]; People v. Butler
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 962 [because the court vacated the
defendant’s sentences on one of the counts, he was “entitled to a
full resentencing”], review granted May 31, 2023, S279633),
which is what the trial court stated it was doing. The full
resentencing rule allowed the trial court to revisit the gang
findings and hear Paniagua’s argument about Assembly Bill
No. 333. (See People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425
[“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior
sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”].)
       Nor is there merit to the argument in Paniagua’s reply
brief that People v. Lopez (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1110 cast doubt
on “whether the trial court had the authority to grant relief” in
this case. In Lopez the court held that, while the defendant on
resentencing “was fully entitled to the ameliorative benefits of
Assembly Bill 333,” the trial court on remand “had no jurisdiction
to readjudicate the gang enhancements.” (Id. at pp. 1119, 1120.)
Lopez, however, was not decided until July 2023, almost a year
after the resentencing hearing in this case.
       Paniagua also contends that “the use of pre-[Assembly Bill
No.] 333 instructions provides a separate basis for reversal.”
This contention is essentially a different way of saying the trial
court should have required the People to retry the gang
allegation under the amended version of section 186.22. As
discussed, however, Paniagua did not argue at his resentencing
hearing Assembly Bill No. 333 applied to him, thus forfeiting the
issue. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th 1169 and People v. Delgado (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 1067, cases Paniagua cites to support his

                                 24
contention, were in a different procedural posture than this case.
The Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 while the appeals
in those cases were pending, and the defendants argued the new
legislation applied to them. That is not what happened here.
The Legislature enacted the ameliorative legislation while
Paniagua II was pending, and Paniagua had an opportunity to
challenge the gang findings at that time or at any time up to and
including his resentencing hearing in August 2022.

            3.      Paniagua Has Not Demonstrated His Appellate
                    Counsel (in Paniagua II) Was Ineffective
       Paniagua argues that, if he forfeited his argument under
Assembly Bill No. 333, his appellate counsel in Paniagua II was
ineffective for not raising the issue (along with Senate Bill
No. 567, Assembly Bill No. 518, and Senate Bill No. 810) in the
petition for rehearing. Paniagua, however, has not demonstrated
his appellate counsel’s performance prejudiced him.
       “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,
[the defendant] ‘must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’”
(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165; see Tilley, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 778; People v. Fredrickson (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994-995.) “When examining an ineffective
assistance claim, a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable
tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. It is
particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; accord,
People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 872.) To show
prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a “‘reasonable

                                 25
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676; see Tilley, at p. 778.) “‘If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.’”
(Tilley, at p. 778; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 697.)
       Paniagua did not address the issue of prejudice in his
opening brief. Therefore, he forfeited the argument his appellate
counsel was ineffective. (See People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th
522, 552; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 408.)
       In his reply brief Paniagua seems to make the (forfeited)
suggestion that the failure by his appellate counsel in
Paniagua II to request relief under Assembly Bill No. 333
precluded his trial counsel from raising the issue at the (second)
resentencing hearing in August 2022. It did not. As discussed,
our opinion in Paniagua II authorized the trial court to conduct a
full resentencing, which included revisiting the enhancements
and penalties based on the gang findings. Appellate counsel’s
failure to discuss Assembly Bill No. 333 did not preclude trial
counsel on remand from challenging the gang findings under the
new law at the resentencing hearing. Thus, Paniagua has not

                                  26
demonstrated “a reasonable probability of a different result but
for counsel’s errors.” (Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.)12

      C.     The Order Denying Martinez’s Petition for
             Resentencing Must Be Reversed Because the Superior
             Court Did Not Apply the Correct Standard of Proof
       Martinez contends that, at the evidentiary hearing on his
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, the superior court
“applied an incorrect standard of proof” and failed to act as an
independent fact finder. The record supports both contentions.
Therefore, we reverse the superior court’s order denying his
petition and direct the court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing
under the proper standard.

              1.    Relevant Proceedings
       After Martinez filed his petition under section 1172.6, the
superior court issued an order to show cause and set the matter
for an evidentiary hearing. The prosecutor filed a response that
summarized the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing
and that argued, in light of Martinez’s role as a driver and
facilitator of the shooting, he still could be convicted as a direct
aider and abettor under current law. At the hearing, counsel for

12    Paniagua does not argue his trial counsel was ineffective.
In fact, he seems to argue the opposite; namely, his trial counsel
“may have reasonably believed” she could not have raised the
issue under Assembly Bill No. 333 because of the disposition in
Paniagua II and the purportedly unsettled state of the law at the
time of the resentencing hearing.

                                 27
Martinez argued there was insufficient evidence to find Martinez
was not eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
        The superior court stated it was limiting the evidence it
would consider to the evidence presented at Martinez’s
preliminary hearing, explaining it would be improper to consider
any evidence from Paniagua’s trial or the appellate opinions in
this case. The court also stated the applicable standard of proof:
“It is the People’s burden here to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Martinez could be convicted of the crime of which
. . . he pled in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court
found the following facts were “particularly salient as to
[Martinez’s] intent”: Martinez and Paniagua, both members of
the same gang, were in the territory of a rival gang; Martinez
was driving the car when Paniagua “hit up” Castillo; and after
that encounter, “while Martinez was doing the driving,” Martinez
pulled his car up “right behind” another car, “which appeared to
be an intentional means by which to facilitate Mr. Paniagua
having this second confrontation.” The court found that
Paniagua wore a hat representing his gang into a rival gang’s
territory, where “confrontation is either likely to happen or you
are going to initiate it happening” and that Martinez did “the
driving for Mr. Paniagua to commit multiple intentional acts of
violence against the rival gang.” The court found that, even if
Martinez had been surprised by Paniagua confronting Castillo,
“there was no way he could have been surprised” by the second
encounter that resulted in the shooting.
        The court stated: “Mr. Martinez facilitated it, and he aided
and abetted it by providing the access. The driving. Getting
Mr. Paniagua to the location where these crimes happened.” The
court found the evidence showed “beyond a reasonable doubt”

                                28
that “it was more than possible” Martinez’s actions “would result
in the conviction of at least voluntary manslaughter, but more
likely a murder under the current law.” The court stated: “I’m
not saying that he would be, but he certainly could be.” The court
concluded by ruling: “Direct aiding and abetting is still a legally
viable and appropriate theory of liability. And I do believe that
Mr. Martinez would still be convicted under that theory were this
case to go to trial against him.”

             2.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 984; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and
significantly narrowing the felony-murder exception to the malice
requirement for murder (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e);
see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong);
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
an individual’s participation in a crime and requires proof of
malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised
felony-murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e). The latter
provision requires the People to prove that the defendant was the
actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); that the defendant, though not
the actual killer, with the intent to kill assisted in the
commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or that the
defendant was a major participant in a felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference
to human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,”

                                29
the felony-murder special-circumstance provision. (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3); see People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869;
Strong, at p. 708; Gentile, at pp. 842-843; People v. Cody (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 87, 105.)
       Section 1172.6 creates “a procedural mechanism for those
convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief.”
(People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 869.) The statute
authorizes an individual convicted of felony murder or murder,
attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter based on a natural
and probable consequences doctrine “or any other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” to petition the superior court to vacate
the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he
or she could not now be convicted of murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter because of the changes the Legislature made to
the definitions of the crime of murder. (See Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 798; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v.
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
       Where the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1)); see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
pp. 708-709.) At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner
is entitled to relief, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see

                                30
People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 715; People v. Burgess
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 592, 601-602.)
       The 2022 amendments to section 1172.6 “clarified that the
[superior] court’s role in a section 1172.6 proceeding is to act as
an independent fact finder and determine, in the first instance,
whether the petitioner committed murder” under amended
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
112, 123; accord, People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
294; People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.) The
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see People v. Burgess,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 600.) The petitioner and the
prosecutor may also offer new or additional evidence. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3); see People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-
854.)
       “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the
prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached
to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3);
see People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 869; People v.
Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1112-1113.) We review
de novo whether the superior court applied the proper standard
of proof at the evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.)

                                 31
            3.      The Superior Court Did Not Comply with
                    Section 1172.6, Subdivision (d)(3)
       The superior court did not apply the correct standard of
proof at the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). Although the court initially stated the correct
standard13—beyond a reasonable doubt—the remainder of the
court’s comments reflect that the court did not apply that
standard. For example, after stating Martinez facilitated the
shooting, the court concluded it was “more than possible” that
Martinez’s actions would result in a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter or murder. More than possible is not beyond a
reasonable doubt; it’s not even by a preponderance of the
evidence. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), requires the court to
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, a petitioner is guilty of murder,
not possibly guilty of murder, or, as the court also stated, “likely”
guilty of murder. (See People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
at p. 296 [Once “‘a prima facie case of eligibility has been made
and an order to show cause issued, the prosecution’s burden is
neither conditional nor hypothetical. Under subdivision (d)(3)
the prosecutor must prove “the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing,” not that he or she might be or could be
ineligible.’”].) The court’s comment it was not concluding
Martinez would be convicted of murder, only that he could be, is
consistent with applying the wrong standard of proof.
       The record also shows the superior court did not make a
ruling as an independent fact finder. Although the court stated

13    More or less. The court’s description of the standard, that
the People had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
Martinez could be convicted of the crime to which he pleaded no

                                 32
Martinez would be convicted (in addition to stating he could be
convicted) as a direct aider and abettor, the court made this
statement in the context of what would happen at a trial before a
jury, not what the court was actually finding as a trier of fact.
Indeed, the court never suggested it understood its role was to act
as an independent fact finder. (Cf. People v. Burgess, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 602 [“the trial court applied the correct
standard of proof, made extensive factual findings relevant to
whether defendant committed murder under current law, and
made a legal conclusion defendant did commit murder under
current law”].)
        The People argue the court’s comments “as a whole”
demonstrated the court “acted as an independent fact finder as
required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).” The portions of
the record the People cite, however, show the opposite. For
example, the People point to the court’s statements that direct
aiding and abetting remained a viable legal theory of liability and
that, in the court’s view, Martinez “‘would still be convicted under
that theory were this case to go to trial against him.’” This
statement, however, was not a finding that Martinez is guilty of
murder; as discussed, it was a finding that a different fact finder
(i.e., a jury) could or would find Martinez guilty. (Cf. People v.
Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 110 [“Although at one point the
trial court alluded to what a ‘reasonable and rational jury’ would

contest, was inaccurate. Martinez pleaded to and was convicted
of manslaughter; the issue was whether he was guilty of murder
under current law. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) And, contrary to
the court’s use of the phrase “could be convicted,” section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), requires the superior court to find the
petitioner “is guilty” of murder. (See People v. Guiffreda, supra
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 123.)

                                33
do, the court immediately corrected itself by saying, ‘of course I’m
not saying what they would do. I’m the independent fact finder
here, so let’s be clear.’”].)

                         DISPOSITION

      Paniagua’s judgment is modified to strike the gang
enhancement on count 9. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of
judgment and send it to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The order denying Martinez’s petition under
section 1172.6 is reversed, and the superior court is directed to
conduct a new evidentiary hearing and apply the correct
standard of proof under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

                                              SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

                                 34