Court Opinion

ID: 9643504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:31:38.682518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:16.349427
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of the Sentencing Code. For this reason, I must respectfully dissent.
In 1982, Eddings was convicted of robbery and received a sentence of 10-28 months of incarceration. Two years later, Eddings was convicted of aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of Vh to 5 years.
According to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a):
(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the current offense the person had previously been convicted of a crime of violence and has not rebutted the presumption of high risk dangerous offender as provided in subsection (c), be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon a second conviction for a crime of violence, the court shall give the person oral and written notice of the penalties under this section for a third conviction for a crime of violence. Failure to provide such notice shall not render the offender ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).
(2) Where the person had at the time of the commission of the current offense previously been convicted of two or more such crimes of violence arising from separate criminal transactions, the person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25 years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Proof that the offender received notice of or otherwise knew or should have known of the penalties under this paragraph shall not be required. Upon conviction for a third or subsequent crime of violence the court may, if it determines that 25 years of total confinement is insufficient to protect the public safety, sentence the offender to life imprisonment without parole.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a) (emphasis added). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(g), “the term ‘crime of violence’ means ... aggravated assault as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2) or (2) (relating to aggravated assault) ... or robbery as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § S701(a)(l)(i), (ii), (in).” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9714(g).
Section 9714(c) describes the formal procedure employed by courts to determine whether an offender is considered a “high risk dangerous offender.” This subsection also details the factors to be considered when determining the classification of an offender as “high risk dangerous.”
Most relevant to this appeal, however, are the following two sections of subsection (c):
(4) If the court determines that the offender is a high risk dangerous offender, the court shall state on the sentencing order that the offender has been determined to be a high risk dangerous offender and that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under this section shall apply.
(5) If the court determines that the offender has rebutted by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that he is a high risk dangerous offender, the court shall state on the sentencing order that the defendant has not been determined to be a high risk dangerous offender and that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under this section shall not apply.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(c)(4), (5) (emphasis added).
The controversy in this appeal concerns the trial court’s treatment of Eddings’ prior convictions for crimes of violence when fashioning his sentence under section 9714. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(b):
(b) Presumption of high risk dangerous offender. — For the purposes of subsection (a), an offender shall be presumed to be a high risk dangerous offender and shall be *1102deemed to have prior convictions for ciimes of violence if both of the following conditions hold:
(1) The offender was previously convicted of a crime of violence. This previous conviction need not be for the same crime as the instant offense of this section to be applicable.
(2) The previous conviction occurred within seven years of the date of the commission of the instant offense, except that any time during which the offender was incarcerated in any penitentiary, prison or other place of detention or on probation or parole shall not be considered in computing the relevant seven-year period. Convictions for other offenses arising from the same criminal transaction as the instant offense shall not be considered previous convictions for the purpose of this section. For purposes of this section previous conviction shall include any conviction, whether or not judgment of sentence has been imposed or litigation is pending concerning the conviction.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(b) (emphasis added). The “7-year time restriction” for previous convictions set forth in subsection (b)(2) is relevant only when determining the presumption of an offender as a “high risk dangerous offender” under the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. The restriction is not found in any other provision of section 9714.
Presently, the Commonwealth argues that the time restriction of subsection (b)(2) should only apply to sentencing persons under subsection (a)(1), not to sentencing procedures under § 9714(a)(2). I agree.
Contrary to the majority’s interpretation of subsection (b)(2), I do not find that the legislature intended the “7-year restriction” to apply to all persons sentenced under subsection (a). Subsection (b) defines under what circumstances a person will be presumed to be a high risk dangerous offender. There is no such “presumption” or “high risk dangerous offender” language anywhere in subsection (a)(2). In fact, the only other portion of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that refers to this presumption, other than subsections (a)(1) and (b), is found in subsections (c)(4) and (5). These two subsections state that once a court determines whether a person is a high risk dangerous offender, and whether the defendant has rebutted the presumption, the court shall state on the sentencing order whether the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence shall apply. Interestingly, this “ten-year mandatory minimum sentence” is delineated in subsection (a)(1).
I find the language of subsections (c)(4) and (5) leads to the conclusion that only persons sentenced under subsection (a)(1) are entitled to have previous convictions that occurred seven or more years prior to the present offense excluded for sentencing purposes under the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. In keeping with this line of reasoning, it seems logical that the legislature would have created the term “high risk offender” and given this type of offender the opportunity to rebut such a presumption in order to receive a more lenient sentence (five years’ imprisonment) for persons previously convicted of fewer crimes of violence under (a)(1). In this same vein, these “lesser” offenders under (a)(1) would also be given the benefit of having previous crimes committed more than seven years prior to the present offense discounted for sentencing purposes.
Such a conclusion is also reasonable in light of the fact that persons falling within the sentencing realm of subsection (a)(2) are considered more egregious criminal offenders. These persons have previously committed two or more crimes of violence, whereas those persons sentenced under subsection (a)(1) have committed only one previous crime of violence. Accordingly, an individual who has proven to be a more severe repeat offender under (a)(2) should not be entitled to such a potential “break” in sentencing if his or her previous convictions occurred seven or more years from the date of the current offense.
Again, I believe that the fact that the “7-year restriction” only appears in the context of high risk dangerous offenders outlined in (a)(1) was a conscious choice to punish more severely those sentenced under (a)(2) who are, at a minimum, subject to 25 years of total imprisonment. To construe the Code in *1103this fashion does not disrupt the purpose of section 9714 as annunciated by the majority. In fact, it enforces the settled legislative intent to “deter violent criminal acts by imposing harsher penalties on those who commit repeated crimes of violence.” Majority opinion at 1100.
Additionally, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning that adopting the Commonwealth’s interpretation of the statue would give a different meaning to the phrase “previous convictions” found in subsections (a)(2) and (b). Omitted in the majority opinion is the complete language of subsection (b). Under this subsection an offender “shall be presumed to be a high risk dangerous offender and shall be deemed to have prior convictions for crimes of violence if both of the following conditions hold.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(b) (emphasis added). As this language indicates, a person who is presumed to be a high risk dangerous offender is not the same as a person deemed to have prior convictions for crimes of violence. Therefore, a person who is sentenced under either subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) may be considered to have “previous convictions of crimes of violence” under the same meaning of the term, despite the fact that they may not be presumed to be a high risk dangerous offender. I do not find that such an interpretation “run[s] afoul” of maxims of statutory construction.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court. Eddings’ prior convictions for crimes of violence are not subject to the “7-year time restriction” outlined in subsection (b)(2).
Furthermore, I urge the legislature to review section 9714, which, at best, serves as a confusion to both the bench and bar for sentencing purposes. In conducting its review, I would find it imperative that the legislature clarify the application of subsection (b)(2) in light of the remainder of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions— especially section 9714(a).