Court Opinion

ID: 9733990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:22:20.726839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.981986
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
President Judge Crumlish, Jr.:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that it would be inappropriate to resolve this matter on a demurrer. On the contrary I believe it can and should be resolved in this procedural posture.
Lewin contends that Section 40(a) unconstitutionally denies him due process by failing to provide presuspension notice and a hearing or a prompt post-*116suspension hearing. To this complaint, the Board demurs, accepting as it must Dr. Lewin’s factual averments and contending that due process is not offended by the procedure set forth in Section 40(a) of the Act.
Of course, practicing physicians and all persons licensed by the Commonwealth to engage in their livelihood have a significant private interest in retaining the means of that livelihood. This interest, however, must be balanced against the states interest in protecting its citizens’ health, safety and welfare.
The Supreme Court, while recognizing that the Due Process Clause mandates a pre-termination hearing in most cases when an entitlement to employment exists, Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), has never held that such a hearing is in all cases constitutionally required. Indeed, it has acknowledged that there are some situations in which a post-deprivation hearing will satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 542 n. 7. See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (state’s interest in protecting public and preserving integrity of racing outweighs a trainer’s right to hearing before suspension).
The physician enjoys a position of trust in our society. This is partly so because, although we may all “have occasion to consult him . . . comparatively few can judge [his] qualifications. . . . Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license. . . .” Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889). To protect the public safety, and to preserve this relationship of trust, the state, on whom its citizens rely, has broad power to enforce standards of conduct. It is this unique situation which makes the state’s interest most acute. Granting the Board the strong presumption that it, as a government body, is acting with regularity and has upon proper investigation perceived an immediate *117and clear danger which warrants temporary suspension (to be followed by prompt dispositional hearings), then I believe the plaintiff' has received “all the process that is due.”
Accordingly, I would sustain the Board’s demurrer.