Court Opinion

ID: 9514561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:29.052869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.850486
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice.
[¶ 1.] The trial court granted Vento’s motion to suppress evidence. The State filed a petition for intermediate appeal, which we granted. We reverse and remand for trial.
FACTS
[¶ 2.] On August 13, 1998, Officer Harrison stopped Vento for failing to display a front license plate, a violation of SDCL 32-5-98.1 After stopping Vento, he saw that a license plate was lying flat in the front windshield on the passenger side. He later testified (incorrectly) that a license plate in this location is “absolutely” in an appropriate place.
[¶ 3.] After seeing that a license plate was indeed displayed, Harrison asked for Vento’s driver’s license. It was then that Harrison learned that Vento’s license had been revoked from January 27, 1998 until January 27, 2000. Vento was arrested for driving under revocation (SDCL 32-12-65(1)) as well as for failing to maintain financial responsibility (SDCL 32-35-113). However, the complaint included only the driving under revocation charge.
[¶ 4.] On November 25, 1998, Vento filed a “Motion to Suppress Stop,” which the trial court granted. In its Order, the trial court found that “once the officer saw [the] license plate, he no longer had any specific and articulable suspicion of any violation of law by the defendant.” Thus, the trial court concluded: “all evidence and observations obtained by law enforcement following the discovery of the front windshield license plate by the arresting officer be and hereby are suppressed.” The State appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 5.] We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Anderson, 1996 SD 59, ¶ 8, 548 N.W.2d 40, 42 (citations omitted). The trial court’s findings to support a motion to suppress are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Stetter, 513 N.W.2d 87, 91 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted). Questions regarding the application of a legal standard are reviewed de novo. State v. Richards, 1998 SD 128, ¶ 9, 588 N.W.2d 594, 595. “Of course, by definition, a decision based on an error of law is an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
[¶ 6.] WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING VENTO’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
[¶ 7.] The State argues, despite what Officer Harrison subjectively believed, the location of Vento’s license plate was not in accordance with SDCL 32-5-98. The State explains that the statute was not complied with because the license plate was not “conspicuously displayed,” was not “securely fastened,” nor was it displayed “horizontally and in an upright position.” “[B]ecause the license plate was not ‘con*470spicuously displayed’ as required by SDCL 32-5-98, Officer Harrison had an ‘objective reasonable articulable suspicion’ that a traffic violation ‘has occurred or is occurring;’ ” his subjective beliefs were irrelevant. The State, therefore, asserts that Harrison was justified in detaining Vento until the purpose of the stop was fulfilled.
[¶8.] “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and is implicated when a vehicle is stopped.” Richards, 1998 SD 128, ¶ 11, 588 N.W.2d at 596 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979)). A police officer must have a reasonable suspicion to stop an automobile. This has been further interpreted to require the officer to have a “specific and articulable suspicion of a violation before a[n] [automobile] stop will be justified.” State v. Cuny, 534 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1995). The factual basis required to support the stop is as follows:
[T]he stop [must not be] the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. It is enough if the stop is based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion[.]’
Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 331 N.W.2d 568, 570 (S.D.1983)) (other citation omitted). Whether reasonable suspicion existed when the stop was made is a determination based on an objective standard: “[w]ould the facts observable to the law enforcement officer at the time of the [stop] entitle an officer of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate?” State v. Ashbrook, 1998 SD 115, ¶ 9, 586 N.W.2d 503, 507 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968) (citation omitted)). “Simple good faith is not enough; the officer must possess an objectively reasonable belief.” Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906 (citation omitted)).
[¶ 9.] Vento agrees that Officer Harrison had reasonable suspicion to stop him for failing to have his front license plate conspicuously displayed. However, Vento argues that the detention should have ended once Harrison discovered that there was indeed a front license plate displayed in his front windshield, a location Harrison subjectively believed to be legal.
[¶ 10.] Objectively, Vento violated SDCL 32-5-98 by laying the plate flat in his front windshield. He did not conspicuously display the plate; otherwise, he would not have been stopped in the first place. Furthermore, a license plate can not be securely fastened to the front windshield without obstructing the driver’s “clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway” as prohibited by SDCL 32-15-5. If the plate were to be securely fastened to the dash, then it would not be in an upright position.
[¶ 11.] Despite Harrison’s subjective beliefs that the license plate was displayed in a proper location, Harrison was objectively justified in proceeding with the detention of Vento after observing the plate in the windshield, which is a violation of SDCL 32-5-98. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 98 (1996), the United States Supreme Court stated: “[subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177 (1978) (stating that “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action”); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.1990) (noting a standard of objective reasonableness is required for a stop), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448 (1991).
*471[¶ 12.] The State relies on an analogous case. In United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir.1993), police officers stopped Tipton for failing to display a license plate at the rear and front areas of the vehicle. Tipton, 3 F.3d at 1121. Once they stopped the vehicle, they discovered that “a temporary license sticker had partially fallen off the inside of the rear window and was lying on the back shelf but was not readily visible.” Id. The officers then asked the driver and the passenger, Willie Tipton, for identification. Id. After the officers determined that the occupants falsified their identities, they were arrested for obstruction of justice and taken to the local police station. Id. Crack cocaine was found in the police car after Tipton got out and Tipton was also charged with a drug offense. Id.
[¶ 13.] Tipton contended that “once the officers saw the sticker, they no longer had reasonable suspicion to question the occupants.” Id. at 1122. The court stated: “[p]olice officers are justified in conducting a brief investigative Terry stop if an officer is ‘able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906) (other citations omitted).
[¶ 14.] “In addition, the Fourth Amendment is no bar to the police ‘stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if the offense is a minor one.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C.Cir.1991)). The court held that the police officers were justified in detaining Tipton even after seeing the temporary license sticker:
Nor were the officers obliged to abort the stop even if they had noticed the improperly affixed sticker prior to questioning. A driver with a temporary sticker is obliged to display the sticker prominently at all times, and in this case the sticker was not readily visible.
Id. at 1123. See also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir.1999) (reiterating that the stop and detention in Tip-ton were valid); United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286, 290 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Tipton: “[t]he driver’s failure to display prominently a registration sticker, alone, would provide an officer with reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify at the very least an investigatory stop”) (emphasis in original).
[¶ 15.] Harrison had an articulable suspicion that Vento violated the law and he was justified, from the inception, in stopping Vento. Displaying the license plate in the front windshield in that manner is objectively a violation of SDCL 32-5-98. Thus, Harrison was also justified in “conducting a brief investigative Terry stop.” See Tipton, 3 F.3d at 1122. This includes the officer’s request for the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. See United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (7th Cir.1996);2 United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir.1996).3 Officer Harrison conducted a valid stop of Vento and complied with the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the detention was temporary and did not last longer than necessary “to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Flori*472da v. Royer; 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 238 (1983).
[¶ 16.] Because we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Vento’s motion to suppress, we do not reach the State’s second argument that the trial court improperly went beyond the scope of Vento’s motion.
[¶ 17.] We reverse and remand for trial.
' [¶ 18.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.
[¶ 19.] AMUNDSON, Justice, dissents.

. This statute provides, in part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided, no person may operate or drive a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state unless such vehicle shall have a distinctive number assigned to it by the department, and two number plates, bearing such number conspicuously displayed, horizontally and in an upright position, one on the front and one on the rear of such vehicle, each securely fastened.
SDCL 32-5-98.

. The Finke court stated not only are license and warrant requests reasonable in a traffic stop, but a criminal history check is also reasonable as long as the check does not extend the reasonableness of the detention. Finke, 85 F.3d at 1279-80.

. The court in McRae stated:
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.
McRae, 81 F.3d at 1534 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.1994) (other citations omitted)).