Court Opinion

ID: 9943720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-25 04:00:41.420762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:54.221071
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     FEB 24 2024
                                                                  MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS E. CREECH,                             No. 24-978

            Petitioner-Appellant,             D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00114-AKB

v.

JOSH TEWALT, Director, Idaho                  OPINION
Department of Correction; TIM
RICHARDSON, Warden, Idaho Maximum
Security Institution; CHAD PAGE, Chief,
Division of Prisons, Idaho Department of
Correction, in his official capacity; and
UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES, AGENTS,
OR CONTRACTORS OF THE IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,

            Respondents-Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Idaho
                     Brailsford, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 23, 2024
                           San Francisco, California

Before: William A. Fletcher, Jay S. Bybee, and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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      Petitioner-Appellant Thomas Eugene Creech, a death row inmate in the

custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), appeals the denial of his

motion for a preliminary injunction in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action raising

constitutional claims concerning his method of execution. His execution is

currently scheduled for February 28, 2024.

      In 1981, while serving life sentences in Idaho for multiple first-degree

murders, Creech killed a fellow prisoner and was sentenced to death. The

circumstances of the killing and Creech’s previous post-conviction proceedings are

discussed in our opinion in Creech v. Richardson, 59 F.4th 372 (9th Cir. 2023).

      On February 23, 2024, the district court denied Creech’s motion for

preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds that Creech had not made a clear

showing of a likelihood of success on the merits of any of his three constitutional

claims concerning the protocol and method of his execution, and that the balance

of equities and the public interest weigh against granting a preliminary injunction.

See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).1

      We have appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of a preliminary

injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the denial of a preliminary

injunction for abuse of discretion. See Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754,

1
 The district court also denied Creech’s request for an administrative stay. Creech
does not separately appeal that ruling but, in any case, we find no error in the order
denying an administrative stay.
                                          2
760 (9th Cir. 2004). “The district court’s interpretation of the underlying legal

principles, however, is subject to de novo review and a district court abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law.” Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v.

Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “A district court abuses its

discretion if it (1) relies on an improper factor, (2) omits a substantial factor, or (3)

commits a clear error of judgment in weighing the correct mix of factors.”

Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2013). “We review

the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, meaning

we will reverse them only if they are (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without

support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). We affirm.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Creech is

unlikely to succeed on the merits of his two due process claims. On appeal, Creech

repeats his argument that the State failed to provide sufficient information about

the source of its lethal injection drug, pentobarbital. More specifically, Creech

raises the possibility that the State might have obtained the drug from Akorn, a

pharmaceutical company that went out of business in February 2023 and

subsequently recalled its product. Creech also suggests the possibility that the

pentobarbital might have originated from other unreliable sources.

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      Though several of Creech’s arguments originally were premised on his

contention that the State had not informed him of its intended method of execution,

he now concedes that IDOC intends to execute him by using manufactured, rather

than compounded, pentobarbital. The district court found that IDOC provided

Creech’s counsel with a Certificate of Analysis verifying that the pentobarbital in

its possession complies with regulatory and quality standards and that it has a

February 2025 expiration date. We agree with the district court that the State has

adequately disclosed the planned method of execution and that Creech is unlikely

to succeed on his claim that due process additionally requires the State to disclose

the source of the drug. Creech’s other arguments about the provenance, quality,

and reliability of the drug are purely speculative and are based on unauthenticated

exhibits submitted with his motion and the conjecture of his expert.

      Creech’s other due process claim concerns the execution protocol. The

district court correctly found that Standard Operating Procedure 135.02.01.001 is

the applicable protocol for his execution by lethal injection and that the State has

been and is presently following this protocol. That the protocol does not address

execution by firing squad is immaterial, because that method will not be used for

Creech’s execution.

      Creech also challenges his execution on Eighth Amendment grounds. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Creech was unlikely to

                                           4
succeed on this claim. To challenge an execution method under the Eighth

Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that his method of execution presents a risk

that is “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering” and to

give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers.” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 877

(2015) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court

requires that the plaintiff then show “a feasible and readily implemented alternative

method of execution that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe

pain and that the State has refused to adopt [the alternative method] without a

legitimate penological reason.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1125

(2019).

      First, the district court correctly concluded that Creech’s Eighth Amendment

claim fails as a matter of law because he has refused to identify an alternative

method of execution. See id. Second, as with his due process arguments, Creech’s

Eighth Amendment claims rely largely on suppositions that he could be at risk of

suffering unnecessary pain if he were to have certain medical conditions. Creech

requested a medical examination to determine whether he suffers from any of these

pre-existing conditions, which the district court denied. We find no error in the

district court ruling, as Creech acknowledges he does not have any known

conditions that create a substantial risk of severe pain or needless suffering. See

Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877. Creech’s argument that the protocol is deficient because

                                           5
it does not require an anesthesiologist to administer the drug is squarely foreclosed

by Supreme Court precedent, see Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 59 (2008), which also

recognizes that a brain monitor is not required. Finally, Creech has failed to show

why the medical team’s ability to observe the execution through a real-time video

feed, rather than a window, is inadequate.

      The district court found that Creech made a clear showing that he will suffer

irreparable harm if his request for a preliminary injunction is not granted. The

district court also recognized that the State has a strong interest in the finality of its

judgments. The district court correctly concluded that the balance of equities and

the public interest do not weigh in Creech’s favor.

      Because Creech has not made a clear showing of a likelihood of success on

the merits of his claims and because the balance of equities and the public interest

weigh against granting a preliminary injunction, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Creech’s request for preliminary injunctive relief.

      AFFIRMED.

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