Court Opinion

ID: 9398455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 15:02:01.521623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.804762
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13400    Document: 36-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13400
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       JAVIER NOA,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20135-DLG-1
                          ____________________
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       2                        Opinion of the Court                    22-13400

       Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Javier Noa pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
       agreement containing a sentence-appeal waiver, to conspiracy to
       possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation
       of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 1 The district court sentenced Noa to 45 months’
       imprisonment with credit for time served, followed by 3 years’
       supervised release. Noa appeals, arguing that the district court
       erred in (1) imposing a guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G.
       § 2D1.1(b)(2) for making a credible threat of violence, and
       (2) finding that the alleged credible threat of violence qualified as
       relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). The government
       moves to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the sentence-appeal
       waiver in Noa’s plea agreement. In response, Noa argues that the
       appeal waiver is unenforceable because it is ambiguous for three
       reasons: (1) the terms of the waiver were not explained adequately
       to him; (2) he was unaware that the applicable guidelines range was
       41 to 51 months’ imprisonment and not the lower range he had
       requested in his objection to the presentence investigation report;
       and (3) in pronouncing his sentence, the district court stated that
       Noa had the right to appeal his sentence and the government did
       not object. After review, we conclude that the sentence-appeal

       1 In exchange for Noa’s plea to this count, the government agreed to dismiss
       the four remaining counts against him.
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       22-13400               Opinion of the Court                         3

       waiver is valid and enforceable.         Therefore, we grant the
       government’s motion to dismiss.
               “We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de
       novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
       2008). We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and
       voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294
       (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51
       (11th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was made
       knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show that either
       (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the
       waiver during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that
       the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the
       waiver. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
             Noa’s plea agreement contained the following appeal
       waiver:
             the defendant hereby waives all rights conferred by
             Sections 3742 and 1291 to appeal any sentence
             imposed, including any restitution order, or to appeal
             the manner in which the sentence was imposed,
             unless the sentence exceeds the maximum permitted
             by statute or is the result of an upward departure
             and/or an upward variance from the advisory
             guideline range that the Court establishes at
             sentencing. The defendant further understands that
             nothing in this agreement shall affect the
             government’s rights and/or duty to appeal as set
             forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742(b)
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                22-13400

             and Title 28, United States Code, Section 1291.
             However, if the United States appeals the defendant’s
             sentence pursuant to Sections 3742(b) and 1291, the
             defendant shall be released from the above waiver of
             appellate rights.

       Noa initialed each page of the agreement and signed the plea
       agreement.
               At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court confirmed
       that the entire plea agreement was read to Noa in his native
       language of Spanish and that he understood it and signed it. The
       district court explained that Noa faced a maximum sentence of 20
       years’ imprisonment. The district court explained that, after the
       plea hearing, the United States Probation Office would prepare a
       presentence investigation report (PSI) on Noa, that Noa could
       object to the information in the report if he disagreed with any of
       it, and that the report would be used to determine Noa’s advisory
       guidelines range. The district court explained that it could impose
       a sentence more or less severe than the guidelines range and could
       be up to the statutory maximum. Noa confirmed that he
       understood. The district court then explained that any sentencing
       projections Noa may have received from his counsel were just
       estimates, and the district court would make the “final
       determination . . . at the time of sentencing.” Noa stated that he
       understood. The district court then explained to Noa that, by
       pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to appeal his sentence
       unless the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or the
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       22-13400               Opinion of the Court                         5

       sentence was an upward departure or upward variance. Noa
       confirmed that he understood. Thereafter, the district court found
       that both the appeal waiver and Noa’s guilty plea were knowingly
       and voluntarily entered.
              Noa raised several objections to the PSI, which the district
       court addressed at sentencing. In particular, the district court
       sustained one of Noa’s objections and then asked the probation
       office for a revised guidelines range. The probation office stated
       that Noa’s revised guidelines range was 41 to 51 months’
       imprisonment. Noa’s counsel then requested that the court
       impose “the lowest amount,” “which would be the 41 months,
       rather than the top end of the 51 months.” The district court
       imposed a sentence of 45 months’ imprisonment to be followed by
       three years of supervised release. Finally, the district court stated,
       albeit erroneously, that Noa had a right to appeal the sentence
       imposed.
              Noa’s argument that the sentence-appeal waiver is
       unenforceable because it was ambiguous and was not explained to
       him adequately in open court is refuted by the record. The appeal
       waiver stated unequivocally that Noa was waiving “all rights” to
       appeal his sentence unless one of the following occurred—(1) if the
       sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, (2) if the sentence was
       the result of “an upward departure . . . from the advisory guideline
       range that the [c]ourt establishes at sentencing, or (3) if the
       sentence was the result of “an upward variance from the advisory
       guideline range that the [c]ourt establishes at sentencing.” Noa
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13400

       initialed each page of the plea agreement, including the appeal
       waiver, signed the agreement, and confirmed during the plea
       colloquy that the agreement was read to him and that he
       understood it. The district court also orally reviewed the appeal
       waiver with Noa during the plea colloquy and he stated he
       understood.
              Likewise, Noa’s argument that he did not understand that
       the guidelines range would be calculated by the district court and
       that he could not appeal it is belied by the record. The plea
       agreement stated throughout that the guidelines range would be
       determined by the district court, and the district court explained
       during the plea colloquy that it would make the final guidelines
       determination at sentencing and that Noa could be sentenced
       above or below that range up to the statutory maximum, and Noa
       stated that he understood.
               Similarly, Noa’s contention that he did not understand that
       the applicable guidelines range was 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment
       as opposed to the lower range of 33 to 41 months’ he had argued
       was appropriate is refuted by the record. The district court
       addressed each of Noa’s objections to the PSI individually,
       explaining its reasoning in great detail. The district court sustained
       Noa’s last objection and the probation officer stated the revised
       guidelines range on the record. Noa did not object or ask for any
       clarification. Noa’s counsel then requested that the court impose
       “the lowest amount” under the guidelines, “which would be the 41
       months, rather than the top end of the 51 months.” Noa did not
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       22-13400               Opinion of the Court                        7

       express any confusion or ask for clarification. Thus, the record
       establishes that Noa was aware that, with the exception of one,
       each of his objections to the PSI had been overruled and that his
       guidelines range was 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment.
              Finally, although the district court stated erroneously at
       sentencing that Noa had the right to appeal his sentence, it is well-
       established that this statement does not affect the validity of the
       sentence-appeal waiver. See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1297 (explaining
       that an enforceable appeal waiver “cannot be vitiated or altered by
       comments the court makes during sentencing”).
             Consequently, the record establishes that Noa’s sentence-
       appeal waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made and is
       enforceable. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351; see also United States v.
       Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal
       waiver where “the waiver provision was referenced during [the
       defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that
       she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely and
       voluntarily”).
              Because Noa’s claims concerning the guidelines
       enhancements do not fall within any of the limited exceptions to
       the valid sentence-appeal waiver, the waiver forecloses his appeal.
       Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.
             APPEAL DISMISSED.