Court Opinion

ID: 9797624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:26:10.971875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:40.522096
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 22] I agree with the majority’s recitation of relevant law but disagree with the reasoning used in reaching its ultimate determination given the facts and circumstances that exist. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
[¶23] I am in accord that the ultimate issue is whether the trial court reasonably could have concluded as it did or whether it exceeded the bounds of reason under the circumstances when it granted respondents’ motion in limine to exclude expert testimony. I also agree that when faced with such a determination, a trial court must act as a “gatekeeper” to determine the reliability of the proffered expert testimony by applying the flexible criteria set forth in Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471-73 (Wyo.1999) (formally adopting in Wyoming the four nonexclusive tests to the facts at hand enunciated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-97,125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)).
[¶ 24] Perhaps most importantly, I embrace the proposition that a trial court must be given broad latitude in determining whether expert testimony is based upon reliable scientific methodology so as to make those conclusions offered by an expert admissible. Thus, as noted by the majority, quoting the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hollander v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1206-07 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1088, 123 S.Ct. 697, 154 L.Ed.2d 632 (2002), our scope in reviewing such issues is very narrow— limiting our reversal of the trial court’s decision solely if we conclude that it abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony.
[¶ 25] Here, as admitted by the majority, the trial court was presented with voluminous materials to assist in its ruling on the motion and ultimately made a detailed and painstaking application of the Daubert principles before rendering its decision. Upon my review of the analysis expressed in its four-page decision letter, I simply cannot conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in rendering its decision. To the contrary, the trial court, based on the specific materials provided, reasonably determined that the literature was insufficient to scienti*365fically establish that a cause-effect connection exists between trauma and fibromyalgia (FM) and that, despite intensive research, major gaps in our understanding of the pathogenesis and etiology of FM remain.
[¶ 26] Furthermore, while I am not diametrically opposed to the utilization of “differential diagnosis” methodology by medical experts in rendering opinions on legal causation, I believe that such use must be carefully monitored. As disclosed by the majority, a fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the final, suspected “cause” remaining after this process of elimination is applied must actually be capable of causing the injury derived from scientifically valid methodology. In other words, the expert must be able to “rule in” the suspected cause, as well as “rule out” other possible causes based on an established scientific foundation. Upon my independent review, I conclude that the trial court did not unreasonably determine that such evidence was not presented in this case.
[¶ 27] Therefore, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court granting the motion in limine excluding the proffered expert testimony on the basis of its unproven scientific reliability.