Court Opinion

ID: 9703191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:44:17.329708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:46.384016
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority, seeks to justify its manipulation of the clear language of the rule and the undermining of its scheme by suggesting they are serving a societal purpose by doing so. This view ignores society’s great interest in prompt trial in criminal cases. Even the novice is aware that the most effective weapon in the arsenal of defense lawyers in criminal cases is delay. In most of the blatant instances where the guilty were acquitted, delay was either the sole or a major contributing factor. The prompt trial in criminal cases is in the best interest of the public and decisions undermining that objective are not.
As the majority acknowledges and then ignores, Rule 1100 was drafted to serve this societal interest as well as to protect the accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, it flowed from a judgment that a presumptive period should be established to avoid the uncertainty created by the test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). That period was arrived at after input was received from members of the bar throughout the Commonwealth. Consideration was given to the unique problems of the various judicial districts. The attempt to accommodate all legitimate concerns was evidenced by the fact that initially a much longer period was prescribed to permit adjustment to the rule. The period finally arrived at was deemed to be a reasonable time in which to bring a criminal case to trial. Where the trial cannot be commenced, with reasonable diligence, within the prescribed period, the Commonwealth has the option of seeking an extension. There is no limitation on the number of extensions or the length of the extensions. The only requirement is that the Commonwealth must show that it has proceeded *75with due diligence. A proper determination of due diligence must take into account factors such as case load and the resources available to the prosecutor. A denial of a petition for extension is subject to appellate review. Here the Commonwealth sought an extension within the prescribed period and was denied the relief sought on the basis that they had failed to establish “due diligence.” This decision was not appealed. The Commonwealth had the option of seeking interlocutory review under the authority of Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). The Commonwealth elected not to seek review which suggests an implicit concession that they did not exercise “due diligence.” Finally, periods of delay attributable to the defense are automatically excluded from the computation. Thus there can be no legitimate excuse for a prosecutor allowing a prosecution to be barred under the provisions of the rule. Nor can such a result occur except where the prosecutor has failed to act with due diligence.1
The majority states and I agree, “Strained and illogical judicial construction adds nothing to our search for justice, ...” (at 371). It is my view that the result reached today is in fact a “strained and illogical judicial construction.” The rule states in the clearest possible language that trial must be commenced within the prescribed period starting from the date “in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant.” Since there were two complaints filed in the case, the only question presented was which complaint determines the commencement of the presumptive period.
In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 487 Pa. 197, 409 A.2d 308 (1979), we attempted to resolve the problems raised in cases where there was a hiatus between the original initiation of the prosecution and the commencement of trial. In Johnson *76we were successful in gaining the agreement of six of the seven members of the Court at that time.2 There we held that only the period during the hiatus should be excluded from the computation. In Johnson we further stated:
. . . Rule 1100 requires a viable complaint to start its time periods running and that speedy trial considerations do not enter into the case until an effective complaint has been filed.
Id., 487 Pa. at 204, 409 A.2d at 311.
The majority seeks to distinguish Johnson in this factual situation on the grounds that in Johnson there was only one complaint filed. This analysis is in my judgment superficial and ignores the clear meaning of the Johnson decision. In this case, we are faced with a rearrest after a determination by the original district justice that there was not a prima facie case. There was no allegation that the complaint was defective, in fact the second complaint was identical to the first. Thus the interruption did not occur because of a deficiency in the complaint but rather as the result of an apparently erroneous judgment of the first district justice.3 The rearrest procedure does not necessarily require the filing of a new complaint. Thus if we accept the majority’s attempt to distinguish Johnson, we would have to conclude the applicability of the Johnson rationale would be dependent upon whether the Commonwealth elected to file a second paper reciting verbatim the contents of the first. Such a trivial basis for determining substantial rights is abhorrent in an enlightened society.4
*77Since there was a viable and effective complaint originally filed in this case, the period of time that complaint was in effect cannot be ignored for purposes of Rule 1100.5 I would agree that the period between August 22, 1978 and September 11, 1978 was properly excludable under the teaching of Johnson. Since the exclusion of this period of time does not satisfy the presumptive period, I must dissent.

. If there are legitimate objections as to the prescribed time frame, or if it is improper to demand that the prosecution proceed with “due diligence” (recognizing that this term is relative and not absolute), these objections may be aired through the rule-making processes and appropriate modifications can be drafted. We should not attempt to alter the rule on a case-by-case basis or use the decisional process to provide undue allowances for prosecutorial errors.

. In a scholarly dissent in Commonwealth v. Brocklehurst, 491 Pa. 151, 420 A.2d 385 (1980), then Chief Justice Eagen set forth the conflicts in this area and, after a thorough analysis, embraced the Johnson analysis as the most reasonable approach.

. There is no indication that there was any substantial difference in the evidence presented to the two district justices.

. Although I joined the dissent in Commonwealth v. Brocklehurst, 491 Pa. 151, 420 A.2d 385 (1980), I would be the first to concede that there was at least an arguable basis for distinguishing it from our opinion in Johnson. In Brocklehurst, it was the inadequacy of the defect of the first complaint that occasioned the interruption of the *77prosecution; such was not the case here. My disagreement in Brocklehurst was based upon the judgment that the distinction did not deserve the significance given to it.

. The period extended between March 24, 1978 and August 22, 1978. The second complaint was filed September 11, 1978.