Court Opinion

ID: 9694377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:39:32.55285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:00.611683
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
While I believe this Court has the authority to overrule one of its own prior decisions, namely, Rothermel v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 672 A.2d 837 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996),1 I do not believe we have the authority to overrule ease precedent written by the Supreme Court, notably Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989), which, in my view, controls the outcome in this case.
Nowhere in either this Court’s opinion in Snyder v. Harmon2 or in the opinion of the Supreme Court reversing that decision was there any argument advanced that the plaintiffs were not using the road for the purposes for which it was intended to be used. The plaintiffs in Snyder v. Harmon had specifically pled and argued that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT) was negligent by its failure to erect a guardrail along L.R. 33060 where it bordered a strip mine which was adjacent to that state highway. This Court held that “the absence of the guardrail alongside the roadway [which was] on land owned or under the jurisdiction of DOT [was] a dangerous condition on Commonwealth property, as the lack of the guardrail increases the danger of falling off an 80-foot precipice into the strip mine.” 519 A.2d at 531 (emphasis deleted). The Supreme Court reversed that decision, articulating the law as follows:
The appellees next assert that the close proximity between L.R. 33060 and the deep chasm, and the unlit and deceptive appearance of the shoulder of the road presented an inherently dangerous condition. Thus, liability is not predicated on a defective condition on Commonwealth land, *381but rather the knowledge of an inherently dangerous condition contiguous with Commonwealth property which the Commonwealth knows or should reasonably know and takes no action to prevent any harm from occurring. While this theory appears attractive, it is not supported by any exception to our immunity statute.
It is uncontroverted that the strip mine highwall, at the points where the appellees fell, was some distance from the edge of PennDOT’s right-of-way. Furthermore, the absence of lighting so as to create a deceptive appearance of the shoulder of the road cannot be said to be either an artificial condition or a defect of the land itself. Accordingly, we conclude the Section 8522(b)(4) is inapplicable to this cause of action. The issue of duty thus becomes moot.
Id. at 435, 562 A.2d at 312-13 (emphasis added).
The majority today contradicts that holding. The majority states:
Dean contends that she met these conditions [causation] because PennDOT created a dangerous condition of the highway by failing to erect a guardrail, a duty it had at common law, and that this failure caused the car in which she was a passenger to go over the embankment. She further argues that because she suffered damages as a result of PennDOT’s failure to erect a guardrail, PennDOT is liable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4)....
(Op. at 376.) (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion then further states that:
Dean asks us to reconsider our holding in Rothermel and hold that the absence of the guardrail was one of the causes of her injuries utilizing the language set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522[ (b)(4)].
(Op. at 378.) (Emphasis added.)
However strongly the majority might wish to backtrack and reverse the outcome in Rothermel, when the Supreme Court has clearly stated in an identical situation that the issue of duty, and hence causation, is moot because the exception of Section 8522(b)(4) is inapplicable, we are nevertheless bound by that determination.

. Although I recognize that this Court may overrule a prior decision of this Court, I am of the view that this Court should not do so in this instance under these circumstances. Rothermel was an important en banc decision of this Court in a developing area of the law, decided on March 6, 1996, less than two years ago. By today adopting the view of the dissent in Rothermel and making that view paramount, a great uncertainty is created in the law for litigants and the practicing bar, and it also disrupts the orderly development of the law by the Supreme Court where such development ultimately rests.

. 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 519, 519 A.2d 528 (1986).