Court Opinion

ID: 9754280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:53:37.059834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:51.583540
License: Public Domain

DANA, J.,
with whom GLASSMAN, J. joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Here a mother offers in writing to fully support her children during their minority if their father will relinquish his rights to visitation. Soon after the mother’s offer, the father is determined to be fully disabled as a result of his service in the Vietnam War. Although the offer was not formally accepted or incorporated into a court decree, the trial court found that the parents substantially abided by their bargain. Now, after a dozen years and after the children have reached their majority, the mother, having received the benefit of her bargain, changes her mind. The father cries foul. He complains that he can never recapture the visitations he has forgone. Additionally, had he known years ago that his former wife would ultimately bring this action, he could have obtained judicial relief from the prior judgment because of his total disability. In a case such as this where the state has not been required to support the children from the public fisc, I would affirm the decision of the Superior Court and leave the parties to their bargain.
In its analysis, the Court first asserts that the father’s reliance on the agreement was unreasonable and unjustifiable. The Court cites our opinion in Ashley v. State, 642 A.2d 176 (Me.1994), in which we stated that the equitable defense of estoppel must be based on a reasonable reliance. In contrast, laches is “an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time and under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” A.H. Benoit & Co. v. Johnson, 160 Me. 201, 207, 202 A.2d 1, 5 (1964). There is no requirement of “reasonable reliance” by the adverse party.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that Westhoff s twelve year delay in seeking arrearages greatly prejudiced Fisco. As the Superior Court noted, the change in Fis-co’s working and financial circumstances during the period of delay would have provided “both a strong incentive and a compelling argument for a judicial modification of his support obligation.”
The Court’s reliance on a 1958 New Jersey Superior Court decision is unpersuasive support for its conclusion that the trial court erred in determining that the equitable defense of laches is applicable to this case. The trial court’s decision finds substantial support from the many jurisdictions that in recent years have held that equitable defenses are available in support enforcement actions. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Parkinson, 106 Nev. 481, 796 P.2d 229, 231 (1990) (finding a waiver, the court said, “[W]e now align ourselves with the majority of jurisdictions and hold that additional equitable defenses such as estoppel or waiver may be asserted by the obligor in a proceeding to enforce or modify an order for child support or, as here, to reduce child support arrearages to judgment.”) (footnote omitted). See generally *277Annotation, Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support, 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 (1981 and Supp.1994).
Equally inapposite is the Court’s claim that laches is unavailable in this case because the agreement “benefitted [Fisco] at least in part.” The Court supports its conclusion by asserting that the “law "will prevail where the equities are equal.” Although the agreement may have benefitted Fisco in part, implicit in the Superior Court’s decision is the finding that the equities were far from equal.
Finally, the Court’s confusion concerning the requirements of laches is demonstrated in its conclusory statement that Fisco’s “reliance on Westhoffs abiding by an agreement we cannot credit does not constitute the prejudice necessary to establish laches.” (Emphasis added.) As the Superior Court correctly concluded, Fisco’s defense of laches was properly based on the prejudice flowing from Westhoffs failure to assert her claim within a reasonable time. Whether Fisco’s reliance on the agreement was reasonable is irrelevant to the analysis in this case.