Court Opinion

ID: 9810903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:03:20.526629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:19.240522
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.
(dissenting): It is the duty of railroad companies to run their trains according to schedule. “ Passengers, if delayed, are entitled to compensation for loss of their time (Pa. R. R. v. Books, 57 Pa., 339), with their expenses during delay, or, when necessary, expenses of procuring another conveyance. As to compensation for loss of time, * * * it is admissible to prove the rate of wages at the place of destination.” 2 Harris on Damages by Corporation, 545. “A passenger, in order to avoid delay, can only incur a reasonable expense. He cannot take a special train in order to avoid a slight delay. * * * The value of time lost may also be recovered. Evidence of the rate of wages earned by persons of plaintiff’s trade at the place of destination is admissible to guide the jury in fixing the damages.” 2 Sedg. *618Dam., pp. 862, 868. Such are the general principles applicable in cases where, by reason of the train being behind the schedule time, the passenger misses connection with the first train on a connecting road, or is delayed even in reaching his destination on the carrier’s own line according to the advertised schedule when the action is for breach of contract. As in every such case of delay each passenger is entitled, at least, to nominal damages, it is of. importance to the public and the common carrier to revert to the settled principle in actions for breach of contract that the parties are only liable for those damages which were reasonably in their contemplation at the time of making the contract. This is the usual limit of damages, but there may be cases where the neglect, of the carrier is so wilful as to make it liable in an action of tort for exemplary damages.
The plaintiff, however, contends that as the present is an action of tort, upon the evidence he is entitled to recover exemplary damages. The question was decided by this Court, no one dissenting, in Purcell v. Railroad, 108 N. C. 414, where it is said (pp. 417, 418), “ The Code, sec. 1963, provides, ‘ Every railroad corporation shall * * * at regular times, to be fixed by public notice, * * * take, transport and discharge such passengers and property * * * on due payment of the freight or fare legally authorized therefor, and shall be liable to the party aggrieved in an action for damages for any neglect or refusal in the premises.’ For a violation of such statutory dirty the plaintiff might have sued in contract (Hodges v. Railroad, 105 N. C., 170), but he could elect to sue in tort for the injury and the breach of public duty (existing independent of the statute) by the wilfulness or negligence of defendant. Bishop Non-Contract Law, pp. 73, 74; Redfield on Carriers, p. 422; Tallon v. Great Western R. R., 2 El. & El., 844. If the tort was committed by mere negligence of the defendant, as simple carelessness or inadvertence, the plaintiff would be restricted *619to compensatory damages, and as no special damages were alleged and shown other than obtaining another conveyance, the measure of damages, as laid down by the Court, to wit, the price of procuring such other conveyance would have been correct. But if the conduct of the defendant was wilful, or showed such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover punitive damages in addition.”
In the present case, there was evidence of great dilapidation of cars, rolling stock, engines, roadbed and trestles, and of continued neglect to repair the same. So gross was it, that for defendant to continue to offer to transport and to receive for transportation passengers, with such defective machinery and roadway, was such a disregard of its duties and the rights of the public, that in case of death resulting to a passenger while en route, there are authorities which would have sustained an indictment for manslaughter against the president, directors and other chief officers. It is very certain that, with such machinery and roadbed, to contract to take the plaintiff and others on a round trip, and having gotten them to the other end of the line, to leave them there to get back as they could, was such “ gross and wilful disregard of plaintiff’s rights as would entitle him to recover punitive damages.” As was said in Purcell v. Railroad, supra, “ should an excessive verdict have been found by the jury, the discretion rested with the trial Judge to correct it; but it would be a denial of justice to permit a common carrier to exhibit such arbitrary and wilful neglect of the duties it has assumed, and such disregard of the rights of others. Yet such is the effect if, without adequate excuse, it should be allowed thus to act with no other penalty than refunding the price of the ticket, and the price paid for another conveyance, since the latter would be demanded in very few cases, and only when the destination is at a short distance. * * * The refunding of the price of the ticket would, in most cases, amount *620to nothing, as the passenger would usually buy a ticket by the next train. Yet the inconvenience, annoyance and injustice to the traveling public by such detention would be great and difficult to estimate.” In that case, the plaintiff sued for damages because the train ran by its regular station without stopping to take him on. Here, the condition of the machinery and roadbed was such that it was dangerous to travel over the road. The defendant company showed a criminal indifference to the rights of the public in offering to transport passengers when it knew the uncertainty alike of safe transportation, and on schedule time, both of which are implied in its offer.
The company owed it to the public to keep its appliances and roadway in proper condition to transport safely and according to schedule. If it had not money in the treasury, it should have borrowed it, and if unable to do that, it should have suspended operations, as we learn it has since done.
It is not every case where a railroad is in a bad condition, and there is delay or failure to convey, that the jury can give punitive damages. The Court here told the jury that, “ if the defendant had reason to believe, and did believe, from the business of the road for several years past, and the condition of its engines, that it would be able to keep its contract to transport plaintiff, and an accident occurred which they could not, in the ordinary course of their business, have foreseen and provided for, it would not be wilful negligence.” To this the defendant did not except. The Court further charged, if the jury “ found that the roadbed, track and engines of the defendant were, at the time alleged, in such condition as to render it reasonably certain, in the ordinary running of its trains, that the engines would not be able to carry the trains through, or the roadbed and track in such condition as to render it unsafe to carry its trains over it, and they permitted this condition of things to continue up to the alleged time, it would be wilful negligence, *621for which you may allow punitive damages. If you find that they had allowed their road, track and engines to get in such condition as not to be able to do the ordinary business of the road by their negligence, and the character of that negligence was such as to satisfy you that defendant did not care, or was indifferent as to whether they had the train there or not, it would be wilful negligence.” To this the defendant excepted.
The action was brought for a tort. The second paragraph of the complaint was as follows:
“ That the defendant so carelessly and negligently conducted and managed the said railroad, and so carelessly and negligently allowed its track, cars, locomotives and other appurtenances belonging to the said railroad as a common carrier to become so out of repair, and the equipment of the said railroad to become so run down and incomplete, and so negligently failed to provide adequate facilities for the transportation of passengers, that the plaintiff,- by reason of the premises, having, on the 7th day of September, 1892, purchased at the town of Washington a ticket to the town of Jamesville and return — to return on the 9th day of September, 1892 — for which the defendant charged and received from the plaintiff the sum of one dollar, was carried over the railroad of the defendant company to the town of James-ville. That upon the said 9th day of September, 1892, at the advertised time, plaintiff presented himself at the defendant’s depot in Jamesville, N. C., for transportation over said railroad to Washington, N. C., and because of the negligence, carelessness and lack of proper equipment of a railroad receiving the profit of a common carrier, and owing duties to the public, and without fault on the part of the plaintiff, defendant failed to provide locomotive, cars or other means for the transportation of and failed to transport this plaintiff to the town of Washington according to its public duty and advertisement, to plaintiff’s damage five hundred dollars.”
*622And one of the issues submitted was, “ Did the defendant negligently suffer and permit its road, rolling stock and equipment to become in the condition described in section 2 of the complaint, so that it was unable to discharge its duties to the public as a common carrier of freight and passengers ?” The above charge was, therefore, appropriate to the controversy in the pleadings, and it was most amply supported by the testimony.
It will be seen by reference thereto that the roadbed, the engines and the rolling stock were all unfit and dangerous to be used, that the manager of the company reported the condition of the same to the owners in Philadelphia, but that in wilful disregard of their public duties they neither put the road, engines and rolling stock into fit condition, nor discontinued holding themselves out to the public for the safe and regular carriage of passengers. If such conduct as the evidence described was not such wilful disregard of the defendant’s duties to the public as will entitle the plaintiff to recover punitive damages, it will be absolutely impossible for a railroad company in this State to show that “ wilful disregard of its duties and indifference to the rights of the public,” as will, under all the authorities, make it liable for punitive damages. The damages recovered was $50. Upon the evidence the defendant has cause to congratulate itself that it is not defendant in an action for damages for death of personal injuries caused by its gross and wilful negligence, or that its officers are not under indictment for manslaughter.
This is not a breach of contract for carriage by a private party. But it is the direct result of a long continued disregard of duties assumed in regard to the public by a corporation which sought and obtained the exercise of the right of eminent domain to furnish it a right-of-way, and other special privileges. These were granted solely in consideration of the services which the defendant undertook to render to the *623public, but which it has wilfully and grossly neglected to properly render. The defendant’s own evidence was that its manager had repeatedly, time and again, notified the president and directors of the dilapidated and dangerous condition of the machinery and roadbed, but that adequate relief had always been denied.
In Railroad v. Hurst, 36 Miss., 660, it is said: “ It is the right of the jury in such cases to protect the public by punitive damages against the negligence, folly or wickedness which might otherwise convert these great public blessings into the most dangerous nuisances.”
The Railroad Commission Act (1891, ch. 320) sec. 11, provides that for a wilful violation of the rules and regulations made by the commissioners, railroad companies are liable for exemplary damages. It would be an anomaly, certainly, if they are not liable for exemplary damages for a wilful violation of statutory regulations, as in this case.
This disposes of'the exception to the charge. The exception to the evidence that an engineer in defendant’s employ a year previous was allowed to testify to the bad condition of roadway and machinery at that time cannot be sustained. This was competent, taken with the other evidence, to show the gross neglect of defendant in permitting the dilapidation to continue, all the while holding itself out to the public for the safe and regular carriage of passengers. The exception to issues is also without merit. Every phase of the controversy raised by the pleadings could be fairly presented upon the issues submitted. Humphrey v. Church, 109 N. C., 132.