Court Opinion

ID: 9562542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:31:10.761127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:23.698903
License: Public Domain

Taylor, Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to agree entirely with the holdings in the majority Opinion.
Action in this case was brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Anderson County for property damage and loss of consortium suffered by Appellant when a car driven by his wife was in collision with Respondent car driven by Respondent, Dewey A. Ford. The Respondent, Liberty Life Insurance Company, was made a party upon the theory that Respondent Ford was its agent or servant and at the time of the collision was acting as such.
The answers set up a general denial and contributory negligence with the answer of the Defendants Ford and the car which he was driving pleading negligence, willfulness, wantoness and recklessness on the part of Mrs. Gillespie as the sole cause of the injury.
The case came on for trial at the October, 1952, term of Court. A motion for a nonsuit was duly made on behalf of all Defendants (Respondents) which was granted and Appellant comes to this Court contending that there was sufficient evidence to require the case being submitted to the jury for its consideration.
This is a companion case to that of Gillespie v. Ford, reported in 222 S. C. 46, 71 S. E. (2d) 596, which was brought by Mrs. Gillespie, wife of Appellant here, for damages sustained in the same collision. This Court in that *125case went into the testimony in ‘great detail and since the witnesses are the same and the testimony very similar, I will discuss here only that evidence which I conceive as differing in an important aspect from that of the previous trial.
Mrs. Gillespie testified in the first case that she was traveling on the left-hand side of the highway, where she had no right to be, Sections 67 and 72 of Article VII, Act 281 of the 1949 Acts, at the time of the collision while in this case she testified that she was traveling on the right-hand side which relieves her of the burden of overcoming the presumption that such proximately caused the injury, Tinsley v. Parris, 174 S. C. 412, 178 S. E. 496.
The right front fender, headlight and wheel of the Ford car suffered the brunt of the blow with the right rear fender being damaged to a lesser degree. The point of impact on the Gillespie car was on the left side near the door hinges. The impact of the blow turned the Gillespie car around to the extent that it was practically heading back in the direction from which it had come. There is some testimony that the Ford car was traveling faster than that of Mrs. Gillespie and that she had entered the intersection from Ford’s right and had proceeded to the point that the front part of her car was virtually through the intersection at the time of the collision. The testimony does not as a whole differ greatly from that of the case heretofore referred to, the most important one being as to the position of the Gillespie car, whether on the right or left of the road at the time of collision. This could be an important factor when considered in the light of the presumption which attaches if'she was on the left and whether or not the additional distance that Ford would have traveled across the intersection before colliding with Mrs. Gillespie’s car would have been sufficient for him to have avoided the car altogether if she was on the right as there is evidence that he was attempting to do so by turning sharply to his left at the time and succeeded to the extent that only his right front fender, wheel and light were *126damaged to any extent. Although the testimony produced is so similar to that produced in the trial of Mrs. Gillespie’s case, supra, that the trial Judge was induced to grant a non-suit, I am of the opinion that when the foregoing is taken into consideration along with the other circumstances, there is sufficient evidence to require the submission of the case to the jury as the question of contributory negligence is usually one of mixed law and fact and unless it admits of but one reasonable inference, in which event it becomes a mattér of law for determination by the Court, it should be submitted to the jury. Bolen v. Strange, 192 S. C. 284, 6 S. E. (2d) 466.
The Respondent life insurance company duly moved for a nonsuit upon the grounds: First, that the agency of Ford did not include the operation of his car; Second, that Ford’s status with the Company was that of an independent contractor; Third, that there was no evidence that Ford was acting within the scope of his employment at the time. This motion was not passed upon by the trial Judge as he based the granting of the nonsuit upon the ground heretofore discussed. We are therefore confronted with the vital question of whether or not Respondent Ford was the agent or servant of the Liberty Life Insurance Company and acting within the scope of such at the time of the collision or an independent contractor.
The Respondent Dewey A. Ford, a licensed insurance agent, entered into a written contract with Liberty Life Insurance Company, dated April 24, 1950, under which he was assigned a certain territory in Anderson County where this Company had certain industrial policyholders from whom weekly premiums were collected, thus constituting what is called in the field of industrial insurance a debit. And pursuant to this contract Mr. Ford’s duties were to “service” the policyholders, collect the premiums maturing from time to time, and to write new business. His compensation was based strictly on a commission basis; and the testimony *127shows that he averaged in the neighborhood of $50.00 a week.
There is nothing said in the written contract whatsoever with regard to Mr. Ford’s means of transportation, although in order to perform his duties some such means would be required. Manifestly, however, the reason nothing is said about this is that the Company was not concerned with it, that being a matter for which the agent was solely responsible. In other words, he was to provide his own means of transportation, without any allowance by way of expense or otherwise on the part of the Company. So far as transportation was concerned his relation to the Company was that of an independent contractor; that is to say, he was not subject to the control of his employer, in this particular respect, as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work. It is of course well settled that an employee may be an independent contractor as to certain work, and yet be a mere servant as to other work for the same employer. Googe v. Speaks, 194 S. C. 206, 9 S. E. (2d) 439.
There is no substantial conflict in the testimony on this phase of the case. We are reproducing herewith excerpts from the testimony of J. L. Metz, Manager of the Williams-ton local branch office of the Liberty Life Insurance Company :
“Q. What was his average weekly earnings and how were they arrived at? A. Well, his earnings consisted of a commission and I would say it was approximately $50.00 a week.
* * *
Q. At the time you employed him did he have an automobile ? A. I believe he did, yes, sir.
Q. AVas he using his automobile in the course of his employment at the time of this accident? A. I understood that part of the time he did and part of the time he didn’t.
Q. Do you mean by that he walked occasionally to collect premiums? A. Yes, sir.
*128Q. Would you have employed him if he had not had an automobile, or was it practical for him to handle this job without an automobile? A. Well, it could have been done.
Q. It could have been? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any agent working out of your office that doesn’t have an automobile? A. No, I don’t believe I do.
* * *
Q. Now, who makes the general rules of conduct for the agent, as to duties and so on and so forth? A. For his daily activities ?
Q. Yes, sir. A. Well, so far as his daily activities are concerned it is entirely up to him to handle his debit, whatever way is most profitable to him. We have no prescribed rule for that.
Q. Now, how about terminating his employment, do you have any rules along that line? A. No, that is left entirely up to him and the company. That can be terminated in one day’s notice.
* * *
Q. Now, what about the vacation, special trips and so on, was it the duty of the agent or not if he planned to take a trip or vacation and leave his debit? A. Ordinarily it is to his advantage, because if he was to take off of duty there would be no one to serve his business and he would lose his collection commission, and by notifying us we have a man to make his collections for him and he receives his commission just as if he had collected himself.
Q. A moment ago I believe you stated that you could, under the agreement you have, or Mr. Ford has, with your company, your company could terminate his employment upon a day’s notice? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What if anything did the Company prescribe as to when he would collect from a particular policy-holder? A. Nothing.
*129Q. What if anything did the Company prescribe about what route he would follow, whether he would go from this house to that one or some other way around? A. We leave that entirely, Mr. AVatkins, to the Agent to set up his own collection schedule, his own working hours, that is most convenient to him and the policy-holders.
* =1= =i=
Q. What does the Company prescribe about working hours for the Agents? A. We don’t have any certain hours for the men to work.
Q. You don’t have a time-clock? A. No, sir, we don’t punch a time-clock.
Q. Is it of any importance to the Liberty Life Insurance Company whether the Agent makes all of his collections in one day or over the six days a week? A. It doesn’t make a particle of difference with them.
Q. Mr. Metz, did you have any knowledge at the time of this accident, about where Dewey Ford was on that date? A. No, sii-.
Q. Did you know who he was planning to see that day? A. No, sir.
Q. You were not with him, of course, on this day? A. No, sir.
Q. Had you or anyone connected with the Liberty Life Insurance Company directed him to be where he was on that day? A. No, sir.
Q. Mr. Metz, what control, if any, did you or anyone with Liberty Life Insurance Company exercise over the physical movement of the agent, where he should go and when? A. None.
Q. Do you know how and why Dewey Ford happened to be at this place at the time of the accident — do you have any knowledge of why he was there? A. No, I don’t.
Q. Do you know his purpose for being there? A. No, sir.
Q. You don’t know whether he was there going to see a policy-holder or for some entirely different reason, do you? A. No, sir.
*130Q. Mr. Metz, does an agent have to account to you or anybody connected with Liberty Life Insurance Company the time they spend on a debit? A. No, sir.
Q. Do they make any report of hours worked? A. No, sir.
* * *
Q. I believe you stated that Dewey Ford had a license issued by the South Carolina Insurance Commissioner to sell life insurance? A. That’s right.
Q. Now, who pays the cost of that? A. The agent pays that cost himself.”
The means of transportation of an industrial insurance agent, we may assume, would depend upon the location and extent of the territory covered by his debit. Indeed, it would appear that in a large town or city the area might be so compact that the agent could walk in the collection of premiums and the like; or sometimes in the case of a city he might be able to use the public bus system, at least to some extent. However, where the territory is out in the country and covers a considerable area, under modern conditions, an automobile or perhaps a motorcycle would be the only practicable way. But this does not mean that he must own his car, for of course he might hire one; and then too, he might employ someone to drive the car in which he was riding.
It will be observed from the foregoing excerpts from the testimony of the local Manager, Mr. Metz, that he was without authority from the Company to require Mr. Ford to have an automobile of his own and that the Company had no control, or right of control, of the operation of Mr. Ford’s automobile.
There is no evidence whatever that Dewey A. Ford at the time of the accident was operating his car under the direction or control of Liberty Life Insurance Company. Indeed, the evidence is conclusive to the contrary. In other words, the Company did not direct or control the operation of Mr. Ford’s car in any manner whatsoever at the time of the accident or at other times. In fact, liability is determined by *131the relation that exists “at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose.” Holder v. Haynes, 193 S. C. 176, 7 S. E. (2d) 833, 838.
There are numerous authorities to be found in the reports from other States which are relevant to the primary issue under discussion, namely, as to whether ,the agent of an insurance company, or some other like employer, may be deemed a servant or an independent contractor under circumstances akin to those involved in the case at bar. These decisions are not uniform in their holding, and much of their variation is due to the varying facts of the particular case. But with due allowance for this, it is true that there are apparently two schools of judicial thought, one holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior should be extended to hold the company or other employer liable, while it seems to me that the other cases holding that the relation is that of an independent contractor, are much more logical and sound in their reasoning. I am unable to say where the numerical weight of authority lies, but certainly there are many cases from courts of distinction denying liability on the part of an insurance company or other like employer, such conclusion having a firm basis in reason and common sense, and hence not contrary to public policy.
There are two South Carolina cases which in general are akin to the subject under discussion, although clearly not in point, and not cited in any of the briefs, wherein it was held that the employer was liable because of the existence of certain important factors completely absent in the case at bar. The first one of these cases is Wilson v. South Carolina Power Co., 166 S. C. 469, 165 S. E. 186, 187. The employee in this case was employed by the defendant company as its agent to keep its lights in repair, and in doing so to travel from one place to another, and “to use a Studebaker car for the use of which they were to pay him $50.00 per month.” This action arose out of an automobile collision, and at that time the employee was using another car which he owned, to wit, a Chevrolet; and the Court held that this *132fact was quite immaterial, and that the company was liable. But the company specifically hired the employee to use his own car at the rate of $50.00 per month, a circumstance which completely differentiates that case from the case at bar.
Likewise in the case of Stevens v. Moore, 211 S. C. 498, 46 S. E. (2d) 73, 76, the employee was the track supervisor with supervision and maintenance of a portion of the track of the defendant Southern Railway-Carolina Division, and Moore, the employee, was instructed to use “the handcar, which he described as a small motor car, for transportation in his work and that he was never instructed to use his automobile”. Notwithstanding this, however, it appeared that Moore did use his automobile, with the express or implied knowledge of the Company, and that it was therefore liable in the collision which occurred between Moore’s automobile and the motorcycle of the Plaintiff. But it will be observed that the Company was directly concerned with Moore’s transportation in connection with his work, and although he had used another method, there was evidence from which the jury was justified in finding that the Company had acquiesced in and sanctioned Moore’s use of his own automobile, instead of using the hand-car which had been furnished him.
There is another South Carolina case, mentioned in one of the briefs, involving an automobile accident, to which reference will be made because it is an illustration of a case which is definitely inapposite to the case at bar. The case referred to is Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S. C. 211, 62 S. E. (2d) 297; wherein it was held by this Court that the evidence presented a question for the jury as to whether a truck driver delivering milk for a dairy company on a commission basis was an independent contractor or an employee in connection with an automobile accident; especially since the evidence showed that the dairy company furnished the motor truck, and the gas and oil used therein, and contracted to maintain the motor truck and keep it in good condition; the *133same bearing the name of the Defendant dairy company. Clearly this case furnishes no support to the contention of the Respondent.
As we have already indicated, there are numerous cases from other jurisdictions where the facts involved are similar to those in the case at bar, and it was held that the relationship was that of independent contractor and not that of master and servant. We shall not attempt to cite all of these cases, but will refer to some of them.
The first case to which attention will be directed is the annotated Alabama case of Aldrich v. Taylor Grocery Co., 206 Ala. 138, 89 So. 289, 17 A. L. R. 617, and the holding of the Court is correctly stated in the annotated syllabus as follows:
“A salesman employed on a commission basis, who owns and operates an automobile to assist him in seeking his trade, and whose movements are in no way controlled by his employer, is, with respect to the operation of the car, an independent contractor, so that his employer is not answerable for injuries caused by his negligent operation of the car.”
The annotated Massachusetts case of Khoury v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 265 Mass. 236, 164 N. E. 77, 60 A. L. R. 1159, is an important case decided by an eminent Court, and the Court’s holding is accurately stated in the annotated syllabus as follows:
“An employer whose sole interest is that an employee shall be at places where work is to be performed, who leaves the means of transportation to the employee’s decision and convenience, limiting his own liability for expense, if the employee uses his own car, to an amount equivalent to the fares of a common carrier, and who assumes no obligation to keep such car in repair, such duty resting upon the employee himself, is not liable as master under the principle of respondeat superior for injuries to a third person which result from the negligence of the servant in operating the car for a purpose in connection with his employment.”
*134By analogy it will be observed, however, that the case at bar is considerably stronger in favor of the independent contractor relationship than the Massachusetts case, for in that case the employer was liable for the expense incurred, up to a certain amount, by the employee in his transportation, but there is no such liability here.
Some of the cases relate to insurance companies where the particular employment is quite similar to that in the case at bar, and for this reason they may be considered even more in point than some of the others. One of these is the annotated Pennsylvania case of Wesolowski v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa. 117, 162 A. 166, 87 A. L. R. 783, and the holding of the Court therein, in favor of the Defendant, may be seen by reference tO' two of the syllabi, which are as follows:
“An insurance company is not responsible for an employee’s negligent operation of his automobile, by reason of the fact that he was on his way to make collections for the company, where the choice of means of transporting himself was optional with him.”
* * *
“To hold an employer legally responsible for the act of a servant who, while engaged in furthering the employer’s business, negligently uses some instrumentality that carries him from place to place, it must either be proved that the master exercises actual or potential control over that instrumentality, or the use of the instrumentality at the time and place of the act complained of must be of such vital importance in furthering the business of the master that the latter’s actual or potential control of it at that time and place may reasonably be inferred.
The following is from the opinion itself:
“The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company employed Charles J. Adams to 'solicit life insurance business and to make weekly collections of premiums. His salary was $15.00 per week plus commissions on new business. His *135territory was less than a square mile in the city of Philadelphia. The company had the right to Adams’ exclusive services and to fix his working hours. In covering this territory, Adams sometimes walked and some times drove his own Ford car, which he maintained and operated at his own expense. The company did not require him to use a car, though the company’s superintendent, when informed that Adams had a car, said, ‘If you have one, you might as well use it.’ ”
The facts of that case are by no means as strong as those in the case at bar, for it will be observed that the Hancock Company (unlike the Company in our case) had a right to fix the working hours of the insurance agent, which is sometimes considered adverse to the independent contractor relationship. But the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Court in our opinion is quite sound, a portion of which appears as follows:
“In the case before us the defendant had no control over Adams’ car. It was in no position to require him to use it, for the use of his car was no part of his contract of service. It could not direct him when, where, or how to drive his car. It had no more control of Adams’ car in which he transported himself than it had of the shoes he used in walking from patron to patron.” (Emphasis added.)
The annotated New Jersey case of Kohl v. Albert Lifson & Sons, 128 N. J. L. 373, 25 A. (2d) 925, 140 A. L. R. 1146, is out of line with the cases above cited, but there is an important factual difference in this case from the case at bar, because in the New Jersey case the employee received a weekly allowance from the employer toward the expense of the operation and maintenance of the employee’s automobile — a significant difference.
There is an elaborate annotation to this case commencing on page 1150 of 140 A. L. R. Many authorities on both sides of the controversial point before us are cited, stating the holding of the Courts.
*136Included in the cases cited in this annotation are a New York case and a Tennessee case to which brief reference will now be made. The New York case of Dunne v. Contenti, 256 App. Div. 833, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 248, appears to be based on sound reasoning.
“The proof shows that Contenti owned the automobile and he alone paid for its maintenance and upkeep; and even though the defendant company knew he used it in and for his work, he was not required to use it and was free to choose his own hours of work. The company neither gave nor reserved the right to give Contenti any directions with reference to the manner in which he was to do his work, nor did it control or direct the operation of the automobile. At the time of the accident Contenti was an independent contractor and not the servant of the company.”
The Tennessee case is that of American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Poole, 24 Tenn. App. 596, 148 S. W. (2d) 14, wherein it was held that the Company was not liable; and the facts therein are stated in the following quotation from the annotation aforesaid at pages 1155-1156 of 140 A. L. R.:
“The driver was employed by the defendant insurance company in a certain territory and he used his automobile in his work but was not remunerated therefor by the insurer, and his compensation consisted of a stipulated commission but the contract provided that the company should withhold his commission in the event his collection fell below a certain percentage and that his appointment might be revoked at the pleasure of the company, but the evidence was undisputed that he was free to employ his own method and determine his route of travel, as well as the hours during which contracts were made.”
And we add the following important statement from the Court’s opinion: “We think it may also be said that the trend of modern authority is against the hypothesis of agency and in favor of that of independent contractor.”
Appellant’s brief refers to the power of the Insurance Company to terminate the Defendant Ford’s employment with *137one day’s notice as being a circumstance adverse to the independent contractor relationship, but this was the right of either party; even so, however, this standing alone is by no means sufficient as will be seen by reference to the following quotation from 27 Am. Jur., Independent Contractors, Section 21: “The relation between the parties is, however, to be determined from all the surrounding indicia of control, and the sole circumstance that the employer has reserved the right to terminate the work and discharge the contractor does not necessarily make the contractor a mere servant.”
Among the cases cited in the foregoing annotation favorable to the relationship of master and servant instead of independent contractor is the Utah case of Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P. (2d) 191, which is strongly relied upon by counsel for the appellant. The facts of this case were somewhat similar to those in the case at bar. But it seems to us that this case is definitely out of line with those hereinbefore cited and many others. Besides, “the very crux of the case” was the fact that the employee could not substitute another in his place without the consent of the employer. It is quite true that the Defendant Ford could not employ anyone to do his insurance work for the Liberty Life Insurance Company, as to which Mr. Ford was not an independent contractor; but since he was an independent contractor with reference to his personal transportation there is nothing whatever in the record which indicates that he had no right to use some other means of accomplishing his work such as employ someone to drive him in his own car, or in someone else’s car, in his travels from place to place.
A case factually similar to the one at bar is the North Carolina case of Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 12 S. E. (2d) 667, in which, by a divided Court, the opposite view was taken to the holding herein, but it appears to me that the dissenting opinion in that case is much more logical than that of the prevailing opinion.
*138I have not overlooked the evidence that the Insurance Company deducted Social Security tax and withheld income tax from the commissions earned by the agent Ford. This testimony was not relevant, and I doubt very much if its admission was prejudicial. Neither have I overlooked the holding of this Court in Carter's Dependents v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 209 S. C. 67, 38 S. E. (2d) 905, and Norris v. Bryant, 217 S. C. 389, 60 S. E. (2d) 844. The Palmetto Life case was a Workmen’s Compensation Case where there was evidence of control at all times, in that the agent was required to travel a definite route at a definite time and there was a letter in evidence referring to the agent as an employee. In Norris v. Bryant, it was held that upon the making out of a prima facie case the burden shifted to Defendant to show that the relationship was that of independent contractor and failure to produce the alleged servant as a witness gave rise to an inference against the claimed relationship. Here there was no failure to produce witnesses to this effect and hence no such presumption. Mr. Metz, who was manager of the Company’s local branch, was placed upon the stand by Appellant who, of course, is bound by his testimony which, I am of the opinion, when considered in the light of the decisions of this Court, established the relationship of independent contractor. I am also of the opinion that the fact that the Company’s local manager visted the scene of the collision in nowise altered the position of the parties. If Ford was their agent they were bound whether the manager visited the scene or not and, if he was not, this act on the part of the manager could not have created such an agency.
I have been unable to find any case wherein this Court has held an agency to have existed under facts comparable to those now before the Court. I, therefore, am of the opinion that the Order appealed from should be affirmed as to the Insurance- Company and reversed and remanded for a new trial as to the Defendant Ford.