Court Opinion

ID: 9767979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:37:27.677544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.290903
License: Public Domain

NYE, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I agree that this case should be reversed and remanded for trial because there was *761some evidence1 that Mary Josephine was a lawfully begotten child of the testatrix’s son, Claude N. Paulus. Such evidence required the trial court to submit the disputed fact issues to the jury.
I disagree with the majority opinion in two (2) major areas. First, because the marriage license was improperly admitted into evidence and second the interpretation that the majority gives to the testatrix’s will.
It is fundamental that the primary concern of the courts in will construction is the determination of the testator’s (testatrix’s) intent and the effectuation of that intent as far as is legally possible. Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38 (Tex.Sup.1859); Sellers v. Powers, 426 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.Sup.1968). To this end, resort may be made to the provisions of the will as a whole and the surrounding circumstances, rather than a particular word or isolated provision, if the intention is not clearly expressed. Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.Sup.1967).
The primary question before the Court is what meaning should be given to the word “begotten” in the will of Annie C. Paulus. In order to give effect to her testamentary intent, it is our duty to attempt to determine such intent by the particular language used as nearly as possible. The majority would construe the word “begotten” to mean “born”. This would place a strange and improper interpretation on the testatrix’s will. This interpretation would make one ask two questions: What is meant by lawfully born children? and second, Did the mother (testatrix) want to give her estate to any child; regardless of whether it was her son’s child or not, so long as it was “born in lawful wedlock”?
In order to properly determine the testatrix’s intent the particular paragraph in question can be broken down into two clauses: a granting clause and a subsequent clause — divided they read as follows:
GRANTING CLAUSE
“I give to Henry S. Paulus one-fourth (Vi) of my estate to be held in trust by him for any lawfully begotten children of my son, Claude N. Paulus, born after my death,
SUBSEQUENT CLAUSE
But in case he should die without leaving any living children begotten in lawful wedlock after my death, then in that event . . . ” — etc.
Construction of a will must be based on the language of the instrument. Where its language is free from doubt, a will is construed according to its legal import. But if the terms of the instrument create an ambiguity, the will is to be construed in the most reasonable manner possible. 61 Tex.Jur.2d Wills § 151 (1964). Each provision in a will must be interpreted as meaning something, and where possible, each provision will be harmonized with all other provisions. Stephens v. Dennis, 72 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1934, writ ref’d). The words in each paragraph of a will should be given such force and effect so as to harmonize with the whole instrument, thereby permitting all its parts to stand together.
The appellants would have us construe the term “begotten” so that such word would be synonymous with “born”. The appellees on the other hand contend that the term “begotten” when considering the testatrix’s intent could only mean “conceived”.
First, we look to the ordinary meaning of the word begotten. Almost all of the dic*762tionary definitions of begotten construe the word to mean conceive. In Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, the term begotten is defined as: 1) to procreate as to father; sire; 2) cause. In Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed. 1968), begotten is defined as “ ‘to be begotten’ means the same as ‘begotten’, embracing all those whom the parent shall have begotten during his life, quos pro creaverit.” There is no mention of the word born. However, when the word born is defined, its meaning is: 1) brought into existence by or as by birth; 2) having from birth specified qualities; or being in specified circumstances from birth. Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “born” is described thus: “if an infant is born dead or at such an early stage of pregnancy as to be unable to live, it is to be considered as never born”. In each instance the word “born” does not refer to the word begotten thereby leaving us with the inescapable conclusion that born and begotten are not synonymous. They do in fact have different meanings. The testatrix knew of both words and used both words in the same sentence. Had she intended “born” to mean “begotten”, undoubtedly she would have used such word. Again, why would the testatrix say lawfully “born” child of my son? The words “child of my son” nearly tells it all. Lawfully born has no particular meaning, but lawfully conceived does. It is the duty of this Court then to determine the intention of the testatrix, as far as possible from the particular language used.
To be born in lawful wedlock is not important under this will. Annie C. Paulus wanted a direct lineal descendant of Claude Paulus to take the Vith share of her estate. If you use the word “born” in the place of “begotten” in the subsequent part of the subject paragraph, a legally conceived child of Claude could be born after the testatrix’s death and not born in lawful wedlock, i. e. (if Claude’s purported marriage had been terminated by death or divorce). This could deprive Claude’s legally conceived (begotten) child the right to take under the will. Where as here, there has been an absolute grant (“for any lawfully begotten children of my son”) such estate, absolutely given, should not be reduced by a subsequent provision of the will, in absence of a clear intent of the testatrix. If we followed the majority’s construction of the will, this is what would happen. Nor would the subsequent clause as interpreted by the majority manifest the testatrix’s intent to give her estate to the “children of my son” when the clause as interpreted could permit a child to take her estate that was not the son’s child so long as he was married at the time the child was born.
The testatrix used born and begotten in her will, to-wit: “. . . For any lawfully begotten children of my son Claude N. Paulus, born after my death. . . .”. By using the two different words, it is clear that the testatrix used begotten in the sense of “conception” and the word “born” in the sense of an actual birth. Otherwise she would have used born in both instances.
There appears to be an additional sound reason for the two different terms being used in the will. The testatrix devised other interest in her estate to her other children. She did not require that her children’s children be conceived in lawful wedlock nor were they required to be born after her death as she required of her son, Claude. The evidence showed, however, that Claude Paulus, her youngest son, was a special case and was treated as such in the will. The evidence shows that Claude was a gambler and was in trouble many times. He had forged his mother’s name to many checks. Henry Paulus testified he had to go to Houston 75 to 100 times to help Claude out. You could reason then, that Annie Paulus was motivated to set out specific conditions that only those children of Claude that were both lawfully begotten *763and born after her death would take under the will.
To recapitulate, the particular provision of the will provides without dispute that one-fourth of the estate was to be held in trust by Henry Paulus with the income to go to Claude. Those amounts held in trust were for the benefit of “any lawfully begotten children of my son Claude N. Paulus”. Said lawfully begotten children of Claude had to be born after the testatrix’s death. Thus, the testatrix set up two requirements for the children of Claude to take, to-wit: 1) only those children born after her death; and 2) only those children that were lawfully begotten children.
It is undisputed that “lawfully” means legitimate. The term “begotten” means to procreate as the father; sire; or cause. There appear to be numerous other instances in which the word begotten is construed to mean conceive or sire.2 For instance in the Bible in the first chapter of Matthew, the term “begot” is extensively used in the context of meaning conceived or sired. Begotten is a biblical word and is used many times in the Bible to mean conceived or sired. The testatrix’s intent inescapably was, that any lawfully sired, procreated or caused children conceived during the lawful marriage of her son Claude, born after her death should take, such constituting the granting clause of this paragraph of the will.
The second part of the particular provision of the will in question reads: “but in case he should die without leaving any living children begotten in lawful wedlock after my death” is inconsistent with the granting clause in that it would seem to require that the child be conceived after her death. To be consistent with the granting clause, that phrase should include the word “BORN” prior to the words “after my death” the same as it is used in the granting clause of the will. Said clause then would read: “but in case he should die without leaving any living children begotten in lawful wedlock (BORN) after my death then in that event,” etc. This would make both provisions of the will consistent throughout. It is a well recognized rule in will construction cases that words, or clauses or sentences, or even whole paragraphs, may be transposed, supplied or rejected in arriving at the real intention of the testator. Mercantile National Bank at Dallas v. National Cancer Research Foundation, 488 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.); McClure v. Bailey, 209 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1948, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Jackson v. Evans, 305 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Thus, in order to arrive at the real intention of the testatrix, in order to give the words “born” and “begotten” their proper and usual meaning, in order to make both the granting and subsequent phrases of the will consistent throughout, and in order to not arrive at a strained construction of the testatrix’s will, the word “born ” should be supplied. The testatrix’s intent follows: that only children of her son conceived in lawful wedlock and only children of her son born after her death would take under the will.
Included in the record is a purported marriage certificate stating that Claude and Lilia were married November 10, 1946. However, there is a serious question as to its admissibility. Appellant introduced the document under the authority of article 3731a § 4.
The question before us is whether the appellants in offering the documents evidencing a marriage between Claude and Lilia Paulus properly complied with the statutory method of authentication of foreign official documents under article 3731a, *764Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Article 3731a reads in pertinent part as follows:
“Federal, Out of State, and Foreign Records
“Sec. 2. Any written instrument which is permitted or required by law to be made, filed, kept or recorded (including but not limited to certificate, written statement, contract, deed, conveyance, lease, concession, covenant, grant, record, return, report or recorded event) by an officer or clerk of the United States or of another state or nation or of any governmental subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by his deputy or employee; or by any Notary Public of a foreign country in a protocol or similar book in the performance of the functions of his office, shall, so far as relevant, be admitted in the courts of this State as evidence of the matter stated therein, subject to the provisions in Section 3. .
“Notice to Adverse Party
“Sec. 3. Such writing shall be admissible only if the party offering it has delivered a copy thereof, or so much of it as may relate to the controversy, to the adverse party a reasonable time before trial, unless in the opinion of the trial court the adverse party has not been unfairly surprised by the failure to deliver such copy.
“Authentication of Copy
“Sec. 4. Such writings may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy. Except in the case of a copy of an official writing from a public office of this State or a subdivision thereof, the attestation shall be accompanied with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody of such writing. If the office in which the record is kept is within the United States or within a territory or insular possession subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United States, or by any officer of a United States military government, stationed in the foreign state or country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The above quoted sections of Article 3731a § 4 requires in each instance that the copy of the document is to be attested to by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The first instance requires that a copy be attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. In the second instance, except in the case of a copy of an official writing from a public office of this State or a subdivision thereof, the attestation is to be accompanied with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody of such writing. The third instance, in which the office in which the record is kept is in the United States or within a territory or consular possession subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. Here again, the requirement is that the certification is to be made by a particular named person, where such record is kept. (Emphasis supplied.)
The fourth instance concerns an instrument that is kept in a foreign country. In this case, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, vice counsul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the *765United States, or by any officer of a United States Military government, stationed in the foreign state or country in which the record is kept. This last part of the sentence “stationed in the foreign state or country in which the record is kept” modifies or attaches to all those officials named therein. This construction would be consistent with the other provisions in Section 4 requiring that the certification be made by a particular named person who is stationed where the record is kept. (Emphasis supplied.)
Also by the terms secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United States, the legislature intended to name a person which would be a United States citizen stationed in that foreign country or State. The instrument would have more credence, in my opinion, if its certification came from the named officials if they were United States citizens stationed in the foreign country where the record was kept. This is consistent with the Texas cases. In State v. Balli, 173 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1943, aff’d 144 Tex. 195, 190 S.W.2d 71, 328 U.S. 852, 66 S.Ct. 1341, 1363, 90 L.Ed. 1624), the appellees undertook to establish the validity of the alleged grant from the State of Tamaulipas by introducing four purported copies of the expedient. The original expedient was properly archived at Matamoros. The court in admitting the copies stated:
“. . . Both are photostatic copies of the protocol, certified to as correct by El Presidente Municipal (Mayor) of the City of Matamoros and attested by the secretary. Both copies also bear the certificate of the Consul of the United States of America at Matamoros, Mexico, to the effect that the signatures of the Mayor and Secretary are genuine and that such persons are in truth the Mayor and Secretary of the Municipality of Matamoros to whose official acts faith and credit are due. The Consul further certified that the copies had ‘been issued by the lawful custodian of the original document extant in the archives of the Municipality of Matamoros for the years 1827-1830’.” (Emphasis added).
Again, in Williams v. Conger, 49 Tex. 582 (Tex.Sup.1878, 125 U.S. 397, 8 S.Ct. 933, 31 L.Ed. 778), the United States Supreme Court in admitting certain instruments, held said copy of a deed taken from the public archives of Mexico, with the certificate of the proper custodian to the effect that it is a true copy, to be delivered to the United States Consul, by virtue of a judicial mandate, and the authority of the custodian being authenticated by the certificates of three other officers of the foreign government, and the proper United States officers in Mexico, together with the testimony of the custodian and others to the same effect, was sufficient authentication and thus properly admitted into evidence.
In both of the above cases, a United States official located in Mexico, where the record was kept, certified them. I have been unable to find a single case which required less. I believe Article 3731a adopted this requirement that a U. S. official in the foreign country must certify the record. A Mexican citizen with the title of Consul located in the United States (Houston, Texas) attempting to certify records which were not kept in Houston, but were kept in Atizapan, Mexico, could not satisfy the requirements of Article 3731a § 4. The Mexican Consul was not located where the writing was kept and was not a U. S. citizen. If you followed the reasoning of the majority, then any consul of any country residing in any country other than where the records are kept could make such certification. This is not what the statute says nor how the courts of Texas have approved such certification in the past. The marriage certificate not being properly certified should not have been introduced into evidence.
*766The appellants contend that Claude and Lilia had a valid common law marriage. The evidence shows that Lilia met Claude for the first time in 1947. She testified that she was pregnant at the time she met Claude. She stated that Claude was not the father of Mary Josephine. Such testimony was admissible. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.1975). It was against her interest to so testify. As such, it is considered cogent and binding upon her. Mary Josephine was born September 12, 1947. Dr. Harvey Renger, M. D., testified that assuming a normal period of gestation and delivery, a child born on this date was conceived in the month of December, 1946, around the 15th or 17th day of that month. Since Mary Josephine could not have been “begotten in lawful wedlock” (if the jury believed this testimony), this would of itself preclude appellant from taking under the will.
There was compelling evidence discounting any legal marriage. The record reflects that Claude and Lilia went to Mexico City in 1948. This was Lilia’s first trip to Mexico. The purpose of said trip, according to Lilia, was to obtain and backdate a marriage license, showing that she and Claude were married in November 1946. This latter evidence was admitted without objection. The year 1948 was corroborated by Gillermo Garcia, a disinterested witness. He testified among other things that he was in the tourist guide business when he first met Claude and Lilia in Mexico which was in 1948. He testified to putting Claude and Lilia in contact with a lawyer and taking all of the parties with him to Atiza-pan de Zaragoza where the documents were issued in connection with the alleged marriage. Lilia testified that she saw Claude put $500 in an envelope and give the same envelope to Garcia. According to the testimony of Gillermo Garcia, his job for Claude was to arrange a marriage for Claude and Lilia. He testified that he was personally present at the purported marriage ceremony. Lilia testified that her parents kept Mary Josephine while she and Claude went to Mexico. It is clear from such undisputed evidence that Claude and Lilia were not married in December 1946 when the child was conceived. Lilia testified that the date on the marriage certificate was November 10, 1946, which was on a Sunday. Gillermo Garcia, the disinterested witness testified that all official government offices in the Republic of Mexico and at Atizapan de Zar-agoza which could have performed this transaction were closed on Sundays.
It thus appears that the appellant Mary Josephine Wood may have difficulty in proving up a valid ceremonial marriage. If the jury chose to believe that Mary Josephine’s mother was pregnant at the time she first met Claude and that Claude Paulus was not in fact the father of Mary Josephine, then I do not believe that she should take under the will of Annie Paulus. The majority would rely upon a legal common law marriage and the interpretation that so long as Mary Josephine was born during a lawful marriage (common law), she could take even if she was not in fact the child of Claude Paulus. This was not the testatrix’s intent!
Except for the introduction without objection of the affidavit of heirship (see footnote 1) which was some evidence of a valid marriage prior to the time Mary Josephine was conceived, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court..

. A certified copy of a joint affidavit of Henry S. Paulus and J. F. Bozka which was recorded in the office of the county clerk in the county where the suit was pending and the land was located setting out the heirship of the decedent and the marriage between Claude and Lilia on November 10, 1946.

. Dorland’s Medical Dictionary (21st ed. 1948); Funk & Wagnalls Desk Standard Dictionary (1928); Webster’s Third Intema-tional Dictionary (1968); Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1961).