Court Opinion

ID: 9499105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:38:01.097587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:17.468670
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Alvin Bobb entered the United States as a legal permanent resident in 1991 on the petition of his mother, who is a United States citizen. His wife is a United States citizen. His two children — a 15-year-old son and an eight-year-old daughter — are also both United States citizens. He has been convicted of one crime: forging a United States treasury check. He was sentenced to, and has served, four months in prison for that crime. He concedes that he is removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) for having committed a crime of moral turpitude, but contests the Secretary’s determination that his crime qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” The *228consequences of such a designation are harsh: immediate deportation, ineligibility for discretionary relief from removal, a 20-year-prohibition on reentry, and no judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(b), 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) & 1252(a)(29)(C).
I agree with the majority that not all offenses “relating to ... forgery” are “offenses involving fraud or deceit” and therefore subsection (R) is not a subclass of subsection (M)(i). Maj. Op. at 220. I also agree with the majority that, in most circumstances, “the government is required to proceed under a specific statute only if proceeding under a general statute would render the specific statute superfluous.” Maj. Op. at 224. This rule is rooted in the reality that there are often partial redundancies in federal criminal statutes “both as to the conduct they proscribe and the individuals they reach,” and prosecutors are entrusted with the discretion to choose which statute to apply. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also id. (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
In Batchelder, to reuse the majority’s example, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a defendant convicted under one overlapping statute could be imprisoned for more than the maximum term specified in another overlapping statute. Id. at 118, 99 S.Ct. 2198. The Court determined that each statute, “in conjunction with its own sentencing provision, operated independently of one another,” id., and that both could be applied to the same factual situation unless “the legislative intent to repeal” one of the statutes is “manifest in the ‘positive repugnancy between the provisions.’ ” Id. at 122, 99 S.Ct. 2198.
My difficulty with the majority’s approach is that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) is not a criminal statute and subsections (R) and (M)(i) do not “operate! ] independently” of one another, nor do they have their “own sentencing provisionfs].” See id. Indeed, subsections (R) and (M)(i) do not independently proscribe any type of conduct — they simply define what constitutes an “aggravated felony.” Many cases support the notion that prosecutors can choose between applicable criminal and civil statutes, but my research has not uncovered any case permitting administrative agencies to choose between two definitions within the same subsection of the same statute. Moreover, neither the statutory text nor the legislative history evince any intent by Congress to vest the Secretary with the discretion to pick and choose between two definitions of the term “aggravated felony,” applying whichever test is easiest to satisfy under the facts of the ease. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The starting point for my analysis is the recognition that prior tó the 1996 amendment most forgery offenses over $10,000 would have qualified under subsection (M)(i). In 1996, however, Congress amended the aggravated felony classifications and added subsection (R). See Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-32, § 440(e)(8), 110 Stat. 1214. Subsection (R) specifically enumerates several offenses, including those relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and forgery. It cannot reasonably be disputed that Bobb’s crime is an “offense relating to [] forgery,” and therefore falls under subsection (R).
Yet the Government argues, and the majority agrees, that because subsection (R) is not a subclass of subsection (M)(i), Congress intended the Secretary to be able to choose between the two depending upon the facts of each case. I cannot accept this proposition. Regardless of whether subsection (R) is a subset of subsection (M)(i), there can be little doubt *229that subsection (R) is more specifically applicable to the crime of forgery than subsection (M)(i). These are not separate criminal statutes. They are statutory definitions of the term “aggravated felony.” With few exceptions, Congress appears to have consciously avoided redundancies in the aggravated felony classification. In the one case where we found a redundancy, we held that Congress intended the more specific classification to apply. See Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir.2004) (“[I]n enacting subsection (M)(ii), [Congress] intended to specify tax evasion as the only deportable tax offense; it follows that it did not intend subsection (M)(i) to cover tax offenses.”).11 In this context, it makes little sense to look 'to broad classifications (such as crime of violence or crime involving fraud or deceit) when Congress has specifically considered the crime at issue and set forth a particular test.
The Government’s response, which the majority adopts, is twofold. First, it argues that Congress’ sole intention in adding subsection (R) was to bring forgery-related crimes not otherwise covered by subsection (M)(i) (or other aggravated felony classifications) into the aggravated felony rubric. Second, it contends that any other interpretation would defeat Congress’ intent to increase the list of aggravated felonies for which an alien can be deported. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-22, at 7 (1996).
There is no support for the first proposition. See Ki Se Lee, 368 F.3d at 224 n. 8 (observing that, “[f]or the most part, [the 1996 additions to the aggravated felony definitions] were adopted without any discussion of their particular purpose”). It is unmistakably apparent that the crime of forgery is an “offense related to forgery,” and I do not agree that the “relating to” language, which is found throughout § 1101(a)(43), signifies an exclusive intent to focus on offenses “relating to” forgery that are not in fact forgeries. Moreover, I do not agree with the majority that there was no need to revisit the test applicable to “forgery offenses.” See Maj. Op. at 221 - 222 (“Congress is presumed to have understood that ‘forgery offenses’ historically have had as an essential element an intent to defraud or deceive, and thus that they fell under subsection (M)(i).”). Although “forgery offenses” historically have had an intent to defraud or deceive as an essential element, some modern state statutes do not, see 36 Am.Jur.2d Forgery § 26 (noting that fraudulent intent is an element of most state statutes, although some allow intent to injure as well), and Congress has indicated that the federal crime of forgery need not necessarily in-*230elude as an element the intent to defraud. See Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir.2001) (“[I]n Congress’ view, it may well be possible to commit ‘forgery’ without ‘fraud,’ or at least fraud in the ordinary sense of misrepresentation for material gain.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 510(b) (“Whoever, with knowledge that such Treasury check or bond or security of the United States is stolen ....”) (emphasis added). I therefore cannot accept that it “makes no sense” for Congress to have established a new test for all forgery-related crimes.
The Government’s second contention' — ■ that Congress intended to expand the number of aggravated felonies — is irrelevant. My interpretation does not narrow the number of aggravated felonies; I simply propose that we apply the test found in the subsection specifically discussing crimes relating to forgery. Indeed, by many measures this is an easier test for the Secretary, as it removes the high minimum loss requirement and permits removal for relatively short sentences. Moreover, the legislative history is equally plain that Congress intended the 1996 amendment “to ensure that only the most serious crimes, or the more serious convictions of lesser crimes, render the alien deportable.” See H.R.Rep. No. 104-22, at 7 (1996). Accordingly, that Congress may have intended to increase the number of aggravated felonies does nothing to help us resolve whether Bobb’s crime is sufficiently serious to warrant removal.
In sum, I simply cannot escape the eommonsense conclusion that Congress intended subsection (R) — the only classification that specifically mentions the crime of forgery — rather than subsection (M)(i), which does not mention it, to apply to the crime of forgery. Moreover, although I conclude that there is no ambiguity in subsection (R), to the extent that one might so view it, I would apply the “ ‘longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.’ ” Ki Se Lee, 368 F.3d at 225 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)).
Whether this result would constitute an “implied repeal” of subsection (M)(i), as the Government suggests, is purely a question of semantics. I am not suggesting that subsection (M)(i) would not apply if Bobb’s crime were not covered by subsection (R). What I am suggesting is that, in determining whether a crime is an aggravated felony, we should — to carry out Congress’s intent — apply the most analogous aggravated felony classification, to the extent that there is one.
I would therefore hold that, whatever the practice prior to 1996, forgery is now a removable offense only if it qualifies under the test set forth in subsection (R). I find the majority’s contrary conclusion — that subsection (R) alone should apply to forgery-related crimes that are not exactly forgery while the Secretary can pick between the subsections (M)(i) and (R) when it is a forgery-related crime that is forgery — both counterintuitive and problematic. Perhaps Gertrude Stein said it best: “A rose is a rose is a rose.” A forgery is a forgery is a forgery.
Accordingly, with utmost deference and respect, I dissent. I would grant the petition to review and remand to the BIA with a direction to utilize § 1101(a)(43)(R) in determining whether Alvin Bobb committed an aggravated offense.12

. Although I agree with the majority that Ki Se Lee does not carry the day for Bobb, it is nonetheless supportive. Notably, the majority in Ki Se Lee acknowledges that, at least theoretically, not all instances of tax evasion involve fraud or deceit, stating, rather cryptically: "We have considered the government’s contention that there could be a case where a conviction for tax evasion would not involve fraud or deceit, in which case subsection (M)(ii) would exist simply to catch any cases not covered by subsection (M)(i), but the government has not identified, and we are unable to envision, what that case might be.” Id. at 223. Judge, now Justice, Alito, dissented on this issue, stating:
Neither “fraud” nor "deceit” is mentioned in the statute as a necessary element of tax evasion. The statute applies to the willful attempt "in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof.” 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Likewise, leading cases interpreting this language do not hold that fraud or deceit is an element of the offense....
Id. at 227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). It therefore appears that the majority in Ki Se Lee accepted that one classification need not render another wholly superfluous for the more specific to take precedence.

. Because I believe that with the adoption of (R), forgery may no longer be an offense *231under (M)(i), the teachings of Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir.2004), are not applicable to this case.