Court Opinion

ID: 9726243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:38:53.221199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:24.522289
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately for two reasons. First, I consider the issue of whether the court erred as to the state’s *396peremptory strike of potential juror 57 to be a much closer question than does the majority. The burden on the objecting party under step one of Batson is to show that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded. This step presents a relatively low hurdle for getting to steps two and three of the Bat-son analysis. See generally Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). While I defer — with some reluctance — -to the district court’s decision to decide this case under step one and thus do not urge a reversal, I write separately to again emphasize that the burden of proof under step one is quite low. Given the consequences that follow when a court errs in its Batson analysis, courts must at all times approach step one of the Batson analysis with much diligence and never in a doubtful case stop at this step.
The second reason I write separately is to indicate that on the anonymous .jury question, I agree more with Justice Page’s analysis than with that of the majority. That said, I nevertheless agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that Wren has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice that would lead to our granting a new trial based on this issue.