Court Opinion

ID: 9957458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:01:12.903898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.797414
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3165     Document: 010111026811         Date Filed: 04/04/2024        Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                               April 4, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  JOHN ROSS STENBERG,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 23-3165
                                                       (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-03308-JWL)
  DONALD LANGFORD,                                                (D. Kan.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Petitioner John Ross Stenberg, a Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a

 certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the District of Kansas’s denial of his

 petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Stenberg was convicted by jury of rape,

 aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties with two children. State v.

 Stenberg, 2017 WL 4455307, *1–*2 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2017) (unpublished)

 (Stenberg I), rev. denied, (Kan. April 27, 2018). On direct appeal, the Kansas Court of

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
        1
          Because Mr. Stenberg is pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not
 act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
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 Appeals affirmed his convictions. Id. at *1. The Kansas Supreme Court denied

 Mr. Stenberg’s petition for review.

        Mr. Stenberg then sought postconviction relief, which the state district court

 denied after an evidentiary hearing. Stenberg v. State, 2022 WL 570830, at *1 (Kan. Ct.

 App. Feb. 25, 2022) (unpublished) (Stenberg II), rev. denied, (Kan. Sept. 30, 2022). The

 Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, id., and the Kansas Supreme Court denied

 Mr. Stenberg’s petition for review.

        On December 21, 2022, Mr. Stenberg filed a habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 in

 the United States District Court for the District of Kansas asserting two grounds for

 relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) involuntary confession. The

 federal district court denied Mr. Stenberg’s claims on the merits and declined to issue a

 COA. Mr. Stenberg now seeks a COA from this court. The state declined to file a

 response.

        We deny Mr. Stenberg’s application for a COA and dismiss this matter.

                                  I.     BACKGROUND

        Mr. Stenberg was charged with one count of rape, two counts of aggravated

 criminal sodomy, and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, stemming

 from repeated acts of sexual abuse with his two stepdaughters, who were both under the

 age of six. Stenberg I, 2017 WL 4455307, at *1–*2. The stepdaughters were removed

 from the home of their mother and Mr. Stenberg in January 2014 by the Kansas

 Department for Children and Families and placed with a licensed foster parent. Id. at *1.

 About four or five months later, the two stepdaughters disclosed Mr. Stenberg’s abuse to

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 the foster parent, who then took the girls to a police station for forensic interviews. Id.

 Senior Special Agent Bethanie Popejoy of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation

 interviewed the girls separately on May 16, 2014, and the interviews were recorded. Id.

 Three days later, Undersheriff Jeff Sharp interviewed Mr. Stenberg about his

 stepdaughters’ statements. Id. at *2. Mr. Stenberg was already in custody serving a

 sentence on an unrelated matter, and he waived his Miranda2 rights. Stenberg II,

 2022 WL 570830, at *1. Upon conclusion of the approximately two-hour interview,

 Mr. Stenberg verbally admitted to the criminal offenses and then signed a written

 confession “in which he admitted that he twice ‘placed [his] soft penis against [A.P.’s]

 lips,’ that he ‘rubbed [his] soft penis against [K.P.] when [he] awoke from sleeping with

 no clothes on,’ and that he ‘rubbed it against her vagina.’” Stenberg I, 2017 WL 4455307,

 at *2 (alterations in original). A jury found Mr. Stenberg guilty of all counts. Id. The trial

 court sentenced Mr. Stenberg to life in prison with no possibility of parole during the first

 twenty-five years on each of the four counts. Id.

        In his direct appeal before the Kansas Court of Appeals, Mr. Stenberg argued that

 the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress the oral and written

 confessions on account of Undersheriff Sharp’s allegedly coercive tactics, (2) not

 providing the jury with an instruction for the lesser-included offense of attempted rape,

 and (3) sentencing him to lifetime post-release supervision. Id. The Kansas Court of

 Appeals vacated the lifetime post-release supervision imposed by the trial court, but

        2
            Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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 otherwise affirmed the judgment and sentence, concluding the state district court did not

 err in admitting Mr. Stenberg’s confession or clearly err in declining to instruct the jury

 on the lesser-included offense of attempted rape. Id. at *3–*13. The Kansas Supreme

 Court denied Mr. Stenberg’s petition for review.

        In his motion for state postconviction relief before the trial court, Mr. Stenberg

 argued counsel was ineffective for the alleged failure to (1) investigate witnesses,

 (2) secure and call an expert witness, (3) perform certain functions pre- and post-trial, and

 (4) prepare Mr. Stenberg to testify in his own defense. Mr. Stenberg and his trial counsel,

 Peter Antosh, testified in an evidentiary hearing before the trial court on this

 postconviction motion. The trial court found Mr. Antosh to be a credible witness but did

 not find Mr. Stenberg credible. The trial court denied Mr. Stenberg’s postconviction

 motion, concluding that Mr. Stenberg did not establish that Mr. Antosh performed

 deficiently or that Mr. Stenberg suffered any prejudice even assuming Mr. Antosh had

 performed deficiently.

        The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Stenberg’s

 motion for postconviction relief. Stenberg II, 2022 WL 570830, at *1. The Kansas Court

 of Appeals held that Mr. Stenberg showed no deficiency in Mr. Antosh’s preparing

 Mr. Stenberg to testify at trial. Id. at *5. The Kansas Court of Appeals identified some

 potential deficiencies in Mr. Antosh’s failure to contact witnesses who may have served

 as character witnesses or who may have testified that Mr. Stenberg was never left alone

 with his stepdaughters, but it held there was no prejudice because of the overwhelming

 testimony that Mr. Stenberg was alone with his stepdaughters when he abused them. Id.

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 at *5–*7. The court also noted some potential deficiencies in Mr. Antosh’s failure to

 consult an expert concerning the stepdaughters’ victim statements but explained there

 was no prejudice due to Mr. Stenberg’s confession. Id. at *7–*8. Finally, the court

 expressed some concerns about Mr. Antosh’s failure to move for a downward departure

 at sentencing but held there was no prejudice because Mr. Stenberg identified no

 mitigating evidence that might have persuaded the trial court to reduce his sentence. Id.

 at *8–*9. The Kansas Supreme Court denied Mr. Stenberg’s petition for review.

        Mr. Stenberg next filed a habeas petition in federal court, alleging (1) his trial

 counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare him to testify at trial, contact his

 proposed witnesses, secure an expert witness concerning the stepdaughters’ testimony,

 and file a motion for a downward departure at sentencing; and (2) his due process rights

 were violated when Undersheriff Sharp used improper threats and promises concerning

 potential plea negotiations and made incorrect statements of law and fact during an

 interrogation to coerce him into confessing to the charged conduct. The District of

 Kansas denied Mr. Stenberg’s habeas petition. It concluded that the Kansas Court of

 Appeals properly applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to his

 ineffective assistance of counsel claims and made no unreasonable determination of facts.

 The court further held that the Kansas Court of Appeals made no unreasonable factual

 determinations concerning Mr. Stenberg’s involuntary confession claim, properly

 considered Undersheriff Sharp’s challenged statements, made a reasonable determination

 that Undersheriff Sharp’s statements to Mr. Stenberg regarding plea negotiations were

 improper threats rather than improper promises of leniency, and made no holding

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 contrary to or unreasonably applying clearly established federal law. The federal district

 court denied Mr. Stenberg’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and denied a COA.

        Mr. Stenberg now seeks a COA from this court, alleging primarily the same

 grounds for error brought in the federal district court.

                                     II.    DISCUSSION

                                    A.     Legal Standards

        An appeal from “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the

 detention complained of arises out of process issued by a [s]tate court” shall be taken to

 the court of appeals only if “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”

 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). For a circuit judge to issue a COA, the applicant must have

 “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2).

 District courts may deny habeas petitions based on the merits of the petitioner’s claims or

 based solely on a procedural bar. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Where a

 “district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required

 [to obtain a COA] is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable

 jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

 wrong.” Id.

        Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

 when a state court has adjudicated a federal claim on the merits, a federal court can grant

 habeas relief only if the petitioner establishes the state-court decision was “contrary to, or

 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

 by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable

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 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

 proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), a state-court decision

 is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s clearly established precedent if it “applies a rule that

 contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or if it “confronts a set

 of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and

 nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor,

 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). A state-court decision is an “unreasonable application” of

 Supreme Court law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it

 unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407–08. A federal court

 may not grant relief simply because it concludes in its “independent judgment that the

 relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

 incorrectly.” Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Williams,

 529 U.S. at 411). The federal court may grant relief only where “the ruling [is]

 ‘objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.’” Virginia

 v. LeBlanc, 582 U.S. 91, 94 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S.

 312, 316 (2015)).

        Under § 2254(d)(2), “[a] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable

 merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the

 first instance.” Sharp v. Rohling, 793 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wood v.

 Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). “If ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might

 disagree about the finding in question,’ [a federal habeas court] defer[s] to the state

 court’s determination.” Id. (quoting Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015)). “But if

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 a habeas petitioner satisfies § 2254(d)(2), [a federal habeas court] proceed[s] to review

 the state court’s determination de novo.” Id.

                  B.      Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        In his first claim for relief, Mr. Stenberg alleges on appeal that his trial counsel

 was ineffective in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to

 (1) adequately prepare him to take the stand and testify, (2) contact witnesses

 Mr. Stenberg proposed, (3) hire an expert witness to evaluate the stepdaughters’ victim

 statements, and (4) file a motion for a downward departure at sentencing.3 The federal

 district court held that the Kansas Court of Appeals did not reach any conclusions

 contrary to or through unreasonable application of the Strickland framework, and

 accordingly denied habeas relief on these grounds. We hold that the federal district

 court’s resolution of this claim is not reasonably subject to debate and accordingly deny a

 COA as to this claim.

        “An ineffectiveness claim . . . is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the

 proceeding whose result is challenged.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “[E]rrors that

 undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication certainly

 justify the issuance of the federal writ.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 375; see also Strickland,

        3
          Mr. Stenberg also asserts on appeal that his trial counsel “failed to have a
 reasonable and viable defense strategy” and “failed to put the prosecution to adversarial
 testing.” Pet. at 2. Because these arguments vary from the arguments Mr. Stenberg raised
 before the District of Kansas, they are waived. See Milton v. Miller, 812 F.3d 1252, 1264
 (10th Cir. 2016) (petitioners “cannot allege an ineffective-assistance claim and then usher
 in anything fitting under that broad category as the same claim” on appeal, as “[c]ounsel
 can perform ineffectively in myriad ways”).

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 466 U.S. at 697 (describing “fundamental fairness” as the “central concern of the writ of

 habeas corpus”).

        The familiar two-prong standard from Strickland typically governs ineffective

 assistance of counsel claims. Under that standard, a defendant “must show that counsel’s

 performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was

 prejudiced thereby.” United States v. Holder, 410 F.3d 651, 654 (10th Cir. 2005).

 Regarding the second prong of Strickland, “to show that the outcome of his trial was

 prejudiced by counsel’s error, the defendant must show that those ‘errors were so serious

 as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Hanson v.

 Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810, 826 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Put

 another way, the prejudice prong of Strickland requires a defendant to demonstrate there

 was a “reasonable probability” of a more favorable outcome absent counsel’s deficient

 performance. Holder, 410 F.3d at 654. This is a highly deferential standard designed to

 allow federal courts to interfere with state-court decisions only in cases of “extreme

 malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” on issues of federal law. Harrington v.

 Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5

 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

        After reviewing the record of the state-court proceedings, the federal district court

 concluded that the Kansas Court of Appeals’ application of Strickland to Mr. Stenberg’s

 claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. This conclusion

 is not reasonably subject to debate.

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         First, as to counsel’s alleged failure to properly prepare Mr. Stenberg to testify in

  his own defense, the Kansas Court of Appeals explained that the state district court found

  (1) Mr. Antosh credibly explained to Mr. Stenberg during the course of their 11.3 hours

  of meetings prior to trial why he believed Mr. Stenberg should not testify in his own

  defense, (2) Mr. Stenberg expressed no issue with this advice, (3) Mr. Stenberg did not

  insist on testifying at trial, and (4) the trial court gave Mr. Antosh and Mr. Stenberg time

  to confer before Mr. Antosh presented Mr. Stenberg’s case-in-chief, after which

  Mr. Stenberg confirmed on the record that he would not testify. Stenberg II, 2022 WL

  570830, at *5. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that Mr. Stenberg showed no

  deficiency. Id. No reasonable jurist would find it debatable or wrong that the federal

  district court correctly recognized the state-court decision as not contrary to clearly

  established federal law. Cf. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 110 (“[A]n attorney may not be

  faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for

  what appear to be remote possibilities.”).

         Next, Mr. Stenberg claims his trial counsel acted ineffectively in not contacting

  potential defense witnesses. The Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledged that Mr. Antosh

  believed Mr. Stenberg’s proposed witnesses would be character witnesses, and their

  testimony would accordingly open the door to the state presenting rebuttal evidence

  concerning Mr. Stenberg’s criminal history, which may have harmed his case.

  Stenberg II, 2022 WL 570830, at *5–*6. But the Kansas Court of Appeals noted that at

  least three of Mr. Stenberg’s proposed witnesses could have offered testimony that

  Mr. Stenberg was never alone with the stepdaughters, which would have undermined the

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  state’s case. Id. at *6. The court then explained that “[w]hile it is unrealistic to expect

  attorneys to investigate every potential witness throughout the case, the failure to contact

  these witnesses at all to discuss their potential testimony deprived [Mr.] Antosh of the

  ability to make a meaningful decision as to whether to call them at trial.” Id. The Kansas

  Court of Appeals held, however, that Mr. Antosh’s inaction did not necessarily affect the

  fairness of the trial, the ultimate question posed by Strickland, because “[a]s [Mr.] Antosh

  explained at the evidentiary hearing, none of these witnesses could meaningfully refute

  the abuse in light of [Mr.] Stenberg’s confession.” Id. The court also noted that the

  stepdaughters told of Mr. Stenberg being alone with them, which was corroborated by

  Mr. Stenberg’s confession. Id. at *7. The court accordingly rejected Mr. Stenberg’s claim

  based on lack of prejudice. Id.

         The federal district court concluded the Kansas Court of Appeals’ decision was

  not contrary to clearly established federal law. Based on the evidence at trial of the

  stepdaughters’ statements to their foster mother and Special Agent Popejoy indicating

  that Mr. Stenberg was alone with them when committing the abuse, no reasonable jurist

  would find the federal district court’s decision debatable or wrong. See Harrington,

  562 U.S. at 111–12 (under Strickland’s prejudice prong, “[t]he likelihood of a different

  result must be substantial, not just conceivable”).

         As to Mr. Stenberg’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an

  expert to review the stepdaughters’ victim statements, the Kansas Court of Appeals

  discussed state precedent concerning when it would be unreasonable not to hire an expert

  to review a young sexual abuse victim statement to determine its reliability. Stenberg II,

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  2022 WL 570830, at *7. Ultimately, the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded that

  Mr. Antosh’s decision may have been unreasonable and that the better choice would have

  been to hire an expert. Id. Given Mr. Stenberg’s confession, however, the court held he

  was not prejudiced. Id. at *8. The court further explained, “after hearing of several

  consistent disclosures of sexual abuse, the jury learned that Stenberg himself admitted to

  the charged conduct.” Id. Mr. Stenberg has not met his burden to show prejudice under

  Strickland, which requires that “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial,

  not just conceivable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112.

         Finally, the Kansas Court of Appeals found some merit in Mr. Stenberg’s claim

  that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for downward departure at

  sentencing, but it held there was no prejudice because “[Mr. Stenberg] offers no

  mitigating circumstance or evidence that would have supported a departure.” Stenberg II,

  2022 WL 570830, at *9. Accordingly, the Kansas Court of Appeals held “[Mr.] Stenberg

  cannot show any probability that the [state] district court would have departed or run his

  sentences concurrently—even if [Mr.] Antosh should have filed a departure motion.” Id.

  Mr. Stenberg has not attempted to show that the state court made any unreasonable

  factual determinations in reaching this conclusion. Thus, Mr. Stenberg cannot meet the

  strict prejudice requirement under Strickland. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112.

         None of the federal district court’s conclusions concerning Mr. Stenberg’s

  ineffective assistance of counsel claims are debatable or wrong. We therefore decline to

  issue a COA as to Mr. Stenberg’s ineffective assistance claims.

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                         C.     Ground Two: Involuntary Confession

         In his second claim for relief, Mr. Stenberg asserts he was coerced into giving an

  involuntary confession during his pre-arrest interrogation in violation of his Fifth and

  Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Kansas Court of Appeals denied relief as to this

  claim. Stenberg I, 2017 WL 4455307, at *2–*10. The District of Kansas held that the

  Kansas Court of Appeals made no unreasonable factual determinations in reviewing this

  claim, and did not reach any holdings contrary to or involving an unreasonable

  application of clearly established federal law. The federal district court’s resolution of

  this claim is not reasonably subject to debate, and we deny a COA as to this claim.

         To succeed in challenging a state court’s factual determinations, a petitioner must

  show “that the [state court] based its decision on the factual error.” Frederick v. Quick,

  79 F.4th 1090, 1104 (10th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted),

  petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 4, 2024) (No. 23-6888). If (1) the state court “made the

  [challenged] finding in addressing only subsidiary issues” or (2) “other reasons supported

  the court’s decision,” “[t]he state court’s decision is not based on a [challenged] finding.”

  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

         “‘[T]he ultimate issue of “voluntariness” is a legal question,’ but its determination

  is based on ‘subsidiary factual questions.’” Sharp, 793 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Miller v.

  Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 112 (1985)). As a general matter, “[t]o determine whether a

  confession was voluntary, courts assess whether the suspect’s ‘will has been overborne

  and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’” Id. at 1233 (quoting

  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). “Courts must consider the

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  ‘totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and

  the details of the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226). “The totality

  of the circumstances test does not favor any [factor over another]—it is a case-specific

  inquiry where the importance of any given factor can vary in each situation.” Id.

         The District of Kansas’s denial of Mr. Stenberg’s habeas petition on his

  involuntary confession claim is not subject to debate among reasonable jurists.

  Mr. Stenberg challenges the Kansas Court of Appeals’ determinations concerning some

  subsidiary issues, but he does not challenge other rationales that independently support

  the Kansas Court of Appeals’ conclusion that his confession was voluntary under the

  totality of the circumstances. See Frederick, 79 F.4th at 1104. In particular, Mr. Stenberg

  does not challenge before the federal courts how the Kansas Court of Appeals weighed

  the “timing of the ‘inappropriate threats or misrepresentations of the law’ in relation to

  the confession” and “the fact that [Mr. Stenberg’s] inculpatory oral and written

  statements went beyond details provided by [Undersheriff] Sharp during the

  interrogation” in concluding that the confession was voluntary. ROA Vol. 1 at 211

  (quoting Stenberg I, 2017 WL 4455307, at *9–*10). Furthermore, Mr. Stenberg did not

  challenge before the federal district court the Kansas Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

  other circumstances favored a finding that the confession was voluntary, including his

  “ability to communicate with the outside world, his age, his intellect, his prior experience

  with the criminal justice system, [and] his ability to understand the English language.” Id.

  at 211. Thus, Mr. Stenberg cannot show that the Kansas Court of Appeals’ determination

  was “based on” the errors he challenges. See Frederick, 79 F.4th at 1104; Sharp, 793

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  F.3d at 1233. Accordingly, no reasonable jurist could find that the federal district court

  erred in deferring to the Kansas Court of Appeals’ factual determinations as to the

  voluntariness of the confession. This is particularly so given that a federal habeas court

  must defer to the state court when “reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree

  about the finding in question.” Sharp, 793 F.3d at 1228 (quoting Brumfield, 576 U.S.

  at 314).

         Mr. Stenberg claims that Undersheriff Sharp made an improper statement of law

  by convincing him that he would face a reduced sentence for confessing to “mild[er]” sex

  offenses, see Pet. at 23. The federal district court explained that the Kansas Court of

  Appeals found this to be a “close call” in terms of whether it was an improper coercive

  tactic because it was a legal misrepresentation, ROA Vol. I at 210. Nevertheless, the

  Kansas Court of Appeals found that this tactic did not detract from its ultimate conclusion

  that based on the totality of circumstances, Mr. Stenberg’s statements were voluntary.

         Mr. Stenberg also claims that his confession was coerced because he was

  threatened with harsher consequences if he did not confess. The federal district court

  acknowledged that the Kansas Court of Appeals also expressed concern about some

  threats made during Undersheriff Sharp’s interrogation, but determined its concern was

  outweighed by other factors favoring a conclusion that the confession was voluntary. In

  particular, the federal district court noted that the Kansas Court of Appeals considered

  Undersheriff Sharp’s allegedly coercive tactics together with the totality of the

  circumstances, id. at 211. The federal district court then explained that the Kansas Court

  of Appeals found “that although ‘two of the interrogation tactics employed by

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  Undersheriff Sharp were coercive, . . . [Mr. Stenberg’s] statements were voluntary and

  the product of free and independent will when considered in conjunction with all of the

  other circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Stenberg I, 2017 WL

  4455307, at *9).

         Mr. Stenberg further claims that the Kansas Court of Appeals overlooked

  Undersheriff Sharp’s false promise of leniency in determining that his confession was

  voluntary. In rejecting this contention, the federal district court examined the context in

  which Undersheriff Sharp allegedly promised leniency, quoting from the interrogation as

  follows:

         It’s not a matter of if you did or if you didn’t. It’s a matter of you need to tell
         me what happened on your behalf. [Be]cause I really can’t go to the
         prosecutor and tell him. If you have remorse about what happened, there’s a
         chance that things are gonna [sic] be less than what they are now, because if
         we have to go and put those girls on the stand and—and put them through
         that . . . [sigh] . . . he’s gonna [sic] request anything and everything he
         possibl[y] can plus the kitchen sink to throw at you. If you accept this—that
         you made a mistake—and you man up to things, [the county attorney
         will] take a plea agreement on it. At my recommendation. But if he sees
         I’m in here for two and three and four hours and you’re not wanting to play
         ball . . . [shrugs].

  ROA Vol. I at 214–15 (emphasis added) (first, second, third, fourth, and seventh

  alterations in original). The federal district court held that the Kansas Court of Appeals’

  view that this statement constituted an improper threat rather than an improper promise of

  leniency was a plausible reading of the exchange. The federal district court explained that

  “[t]he [Kansas Court of Appeals] simply characterized the statement as an improper

  threat rather than an improper promise of leniency” when it considered this statement

  alongside several “impermissible” statements made by Undersheriff Sharp during the

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  interrogation. Id. at 215. The federal district court also explained that “[w]hile [this]

  might not be the way this [c]ourt would have characterized the statement, the question is

  whether the [Kansas Court of Appeals’] characterization is plausible, and it is.” Id. And

  when a state court gives a “plausible reading” of a recorded exchange, the federal courts

  cannot disturb the state court’s corollary factual determination on § 2254(d)(2) review.

  Frederick, 79 F.4th at 1128. Accordingly, the federal district court concluded “to the

  extent that [Mr. Stenberg] assert[s] that the [Kansas Court of Appeals’] factual finding

  that there were no promises for leniency was erroneous and requires federal habeas relief,

  his argument is unsuccessful.” ROA Vol. I at 215.

         We agree with the District of Kansas and the Kansas Court of Appeals that

  Undersheriff Sharp made several concerning statements when interrogating Mr. Stenberg.

  But in a § 2254(d)(2) challenge, that is simply not enough to justify relief. A federal

  habeas court must “defer to the state court’s factual determinations so long as reasonable

  minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.” Johnson v.

  Martin, 3 F.4th 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). Because “other

  [unchallenged] reasons supported the [state] court’s decision,” namely, other factors in

  the totality of the circumstances analysis, the federal district court’s resolution of this

  claim is not subject to debate, and we deny the COA. Frederick, 79 F.4th at 1104

  (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Appellate Case: 23-3165    Document: 010111026811         Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 18

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

        Because Mr. Stenberg fails to demonstrate that the district court’s holdings are

  debatable or wrong, we DENY his request for a COA and DISMISS this matter.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Carolyn B. McHugh
                                              Circuit Judge

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