Court Opinion

ID: 9633793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:00:18.611572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:19.463363
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.
In my opinion, the decision of the majority authorizes a procedure which ignores constitutional rights, and is directly at variance with the fundamental principles of our government. The question for decision, it seems to me, is not answered by reference to the well established rule that the sovereign may provide a summary method for the collection of taxes.
I fully recognize that the maintenance of government : dependent upon the prompt collection of revenue for pub.*purposes. But the provision of the Retail Sales Tax Act (Stats. 1933, p. 2599, as amended; DBering’s Gen. Laws, 1937 *364Ed., Act 8493), which is upheld in this case permits an administrative body to usurp the functions of the superior court in violation of the constitutional provision: “The powers of the government of the State of California shall be divided into three separate departments—the legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except as in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted.” (Art. III, sec. 1, Const.) It is, of course, true that although there are different departments of our government and each must act within its own prescribed limitations, executive agencies and judicial tribunals may cooperate for the accomplishment of governmental purposes. However, the constitutional provision contemplates independent action. To require the superior court to enter a judgment against an individual upon the mere demand of an administrative agency, in effect, subjects the judicial department of government to the other branches which are coordinate with but not superior to it.
According to section 26 of the Retail Sales Tax Act, supra, the clerk of the superior court, immediately upon the filing of a certificate made by the State Board of Equalization “shall enter a judgment for the people of the State of California against the retailer.” “Execution shall issue upon such a judgment upon request of the board in the same manner as execution may issue upon other judgments and sales shall be held under such execution as prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.” Under these provisions a judgment in personam is entered against the retailer without any compliance with judicial procedure.
This is not a determination which, under section 3716 of the Political Code has the “effect” of a judgment. “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.” (Sec. 577, Code Civ. Proc.) But a determination of liability which is given the “effect” of a judgment is an obligation collectible by administrative proceedings. And although by section 3716 of the Political Code, tax liens are given the “force and effect” of an execution, the execution to be issued upon the judgment provided for in section 26 is the same kind of execution as is issued “upon other judgments. ”
*365In my opinion, therefore, the contention that the proceedings authorized by section 26 of the Retail Sales Tax Act are purely administrative may not be sustained. “The state through its legislature can avail itself of the judicial power as the means by which it will collect the tax,” and for that purpose may prescribe procedure summary and different than is provided for the determination of controversies between individuals. (People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 105 Cal. 576 [38 Pac. 905].) But where at the instigation of the j state the courts are called upon to aid another department . of the government and to add judicial action to administrative ¡ order, the indispensable prerequisites of judicial action must ; exist. Notice by an administrative board of a hearing to ! be held by it is not a substitute for the due process which f must underlie judicial action.
Not one of the eases relied upon by my associates concerned procedure similar to that which is here challenged. In accordance with long established principles they hold that summary methods of an administrative body in the levy, assessment and collection of taxes do not violate due process of law if, somewhere in the administrative proceeding, the taxpayer had notice and an opportunity to be heard. However, these cases are not authority for the enforcement of an administrative determination as the judgment of a court of law.
For example, in Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 [26 L. Ed. 253], the tax collector caused a warrant to issue and levied upon real estate. It was urged that the summary levy and sale deprived the taxpayer of property without due process of law. The court held that this administrative process did not violate the constitutional guarantees. In the case of Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 [55 Sup. Ct. 695, 79 L. Ed. 1421], the court held that administrative procedure of a summary nature is valid, yet its opinion indicates that there is a clear line of demarcation between the administrative and judicial process in the collection of taxes. In this connection it is said that if the amount assessed by the taxing authorities is not paid when due, “administrative officials may seize the debtor’s property to satisfy the debt.”
So also in People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., supra, an administrative procedure to assess and collect taxes upon railroads was upheld, but the decision is not authority for the conclusion reached in the present case. The court said: ‘ ‘ The *366collection of taxes is not, however, the mere collection of a debt, but is a sovereign act of the state to be exercised as may be prescribed by the legislature. Whether the tax is collected by an action in court, or by summary sale by the tax-collector, is immaterial. ’ ’ In other words, the court in that case clearly recognized the distinction between an administrative remedy and judicial process. For, as my associates have pointed out, a statute may require the government to proceed by an action at law or it may authorize the summary seizure of property by the administrative officers. The government may choose its remedy but if it proceeds by way of judicial authority, it must follow the due process required in actions at law.
Curtis, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied August 25, 1941. Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., voted for a rehearing.