Court Opinion

ID: 9915044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 15:06:35.957016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:59.715431
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1469-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TAHJ J. PINES,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted September 19, 2023 – Decided January 4, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No.
                   09-07-1467.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, of
                   counsel and on the brief).

                   Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Tahj J. Pines' challenge to his conviction and fifty-year

sentence for murder, armed robbery, and weapon offenses returns to us

following a second PCR court order––with the State's consent––allowing

defendant to file a new direct appeal with this court. The PCR court determined

defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because

defendant's attorney had simultaneously represented defendant and co-

defendant LaShawn Fitch on appeal. This court previously affirmed the denial

of defendant's first appeal and first PCR petition. State v. Pines, No. A-4721-

12 (App. Div. April 14, 2016); State v. Pines, No. A-1715-18 (App. Div. Feb.

20, 2020).

      Defendant now contends:

             POINT I

             DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
             STATEMENT TO THE POLICE WAS IMPROPERLY
             DENIED, AS THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE
             THAT DEFENDANT MADE A VOLUNTARY,
             KNOWING, AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF HIS
             FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BEYOND A
             REASONABLE DOUBT.

             POINT II

             THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING INTO
             EVIDENCE A STATEMENT OF THE VICTIM AS

                                                                         A-1469-21
                                      2
           AN EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY PURSUANT TO
           N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3).

           POINT III

           THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUA
           SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE
           AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO FELONY MURDER
           SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). (Not Raised
           Below).

           POINT IV

           DEFENDANT'S FIFTY YEAR NO EARLY
           RELEASE SENTENCE IS AN EXCESSIVE
           SENTENCE WHICH IS UNCONSCIONABLY
           DISPARATE IN RELATION TO THE SENTENCES
           IMPOSED ON SIMILARLY SITUATED CO[-
           ]DEFENDANTS.

     In a supplemental self-represented brief, defendant raises these additional

arguments which are renumbered for ease of reference:

           POINT V

           [THE] PROSECUTOR VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
           DUE PROCESS ON THE RIGHT OF A FAIR TRIAL
           BY MAKING IMPROPER STATEMENTS DURING
           SUMMATION, VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S 5TH[,]
           6TH[,] AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS[,]
           COMMITTING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
           (Not Raised Below).

           POINT VI

           [THE] PROSECUTOR VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
           DUE PROCESS [RIGHTS] AND RIGHT TO FAIR

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                      3
            TRIAL BY [MAKING] IMPROPER REMARKS OF
            KNOWLEDGE BEYOND THAT WHICH IS
            CONTAINED IN EVIDENCE THUS COMMITTING
            P[R]OSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. (Not Raised
            Below).

            POINT VII

            [THE] TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
            DUE PROCESS BY INSTRUCTING [THE] JURY
            [ON] FIRST[-]DEGREE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
            ARMED ROBBERY AND OMITTING [IT] ON [THE]
            VERDICT SHEET. (Not Raised Below).

            POINT VIII

            [THE] IMPROPER LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE
            CHARGE ON CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ARMED
            ROBBERY OR ROBBERY VIOLATES DUE
            PROCESS 5TH, 6TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENT
            RIGHTS. (Not Raised Below).

      Based upon our review of the parties' arguments, the record, and

applicable legal principles, we affirm.

                                          I

      The testimony regarding defendant's arrest and conviction are well known

to the parties and summarized in our prior opinions. See Pines, No. A-4721-12,

slip op. at 4-9; Pines, No. A-1715-18, slip op. at 2-4. We need not detail it here.

We do, however, discuss the relevant facts and trial court proceedings when

addressing the issues raised on appeal.

                                                                             A-1469-21
                                          4
                                      II.

       We begin with defendant's challenge in Point I that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to suppress his statement to the police because the

State failed to adequately prove his Miranda1 waiver was made voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently.

                                      A.

       Over two weeks after the murder of Nathaniel Wiggins during a botched

robbery attempt, Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO) Detective

Daniel Baldwin contacted defendant for an interview to determine defendant's

location when the crime occurred and to collect a DNA sample. At the time,

only Kenneth Michael Bacon-Vaughters (Kenny Mike) and Aron Pines,

defendant's brother, were charged with the murder, and although defendant was

a suspect, there was no arrest warrant for him. Defendant consented to being

taken to a police station, where his interview was video-recorded, and a

transcript of the proceeding was prepared.

       Baldwin informed defendant that he "want[ed] to talk about the situation

your brother got himself into . . . the whole Kenny [Mike] and the event that

happened for him being arrested for homicide." Defendant was read his Miranda

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                                          A-1469-21
                                       5
rights and verbally responded that he understood each right. Defendant seemed

confused, however, about the concept of waiving his rights, stating "I don't want

to give up my [rights] . . . I don’t want to do that . . . but I'll answer [all] you[r]

. . . questions." MCPO Detective Edward Nelson told defendant his waiver

"ha[d] to be all or nothing." Baldwin and Nelson noticed defendant did not

understand what "waiver" meant, and the following exchange occurred:

             Baldwin: [Y]ou know what it is, you don't understand
             what we're asking you . . . and that's fine but . . . when
             we say waive your rights . . . meaning, do you agree
             with each one of these statements?

             Defendant: [Y]es . . .

             Baldwin: [E]ach of the rights we are referring to . . . do
             you agree with that? . . . [T]hat's what waiving your
             rights means . . .

             Defendant: [T]his is why I'm here . . .

             Baldwin: [O]kay . . . [S]o the terminology of waiving
             your rights meaning, you're waiving these rights and
             you're agreeing to speak with us . . .

             Defendant: [O]h, yes yes. . .

             Baldwin: [Y]ou understand now . . . you clearly
             understand what . . .

             Defendant: [Y]es . . . I understand what you're saying
             ...

                                                                                A-1469-21
                                          6
            Baldwin: [I]t's just the language you didn't understand
            ...

Defendant: [Y]es . . .Defendant did not provide any incriminating information

directly tying him to the murder.      However, his statement that he was in

Farmingdale at the time of the murder was later found to be untruthful.

      Defendant argues he did not understand the concept of a Miranda rights

waiver as evinced by his reluctance to sign the waiver form despite his

willingness to answer questions. He maintains Nelson's statement that "it has to

be all or nothing" is legally incorrect because a suspect may invoke their right

to remain silent even after making a valid Miranda waiver. See State v. Tillery,

238 N.J. 293, 315 (2019). Furthermore, defendant asserts Baldwin did not

"sufficiently address [his] confusion by merely telling him a waiver meant he

agreed 'to each of these statements' and 'are waiving these rights.'"

      Defendant stresses there were no criminal charges against him when he

was interviewed, even though Ian Everett––who was with defendants and his

co-defendants the day after the murder––had implicated him in the crime the

previous day. The interview was focused on making defendant believe his co -

defendants had confessed to gauge his reaction, which Baldwin admitted failed

because defendant did not confess. Moreover, the interview did not provide the

police with any new facts to establish probable cause, but defendant's alibi was

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                        7
later contradicted by cell phone records. Defendant claims the prosecutor did

not authorize his arrest until after the interview based on defendant's reactions

to the questions and refusal to consent to a buccal swab. Although Baldwin

conceded they would have sought an arrest warrant regardless of whether

defendant refused the buccal swab, defendant contends his refusal is no grounds

for issuing an arrest warrant.

      In summary, defendant asserts the detective's delay in filing a criminal

complaint against him until after the interview was meant to evade the

requirement that an accused be notified of any criminal charges before

questioning. See State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 66 (2003). He maintains "by

giving [him] the impression that he was not about to be charged with murder,"

"the police were fishing for incriminating information by means of trick and

artifice."

                                       B.

      We review the trial judge's factual findings in support of granting or

denying a motion to suppress to determine whether "those findings are supported

by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412,

424 (2014). Where the trial judge determines that a defendant waived the right

to remain silent based solely on a video-recorded statement or documentary

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                       8
evidence, our Supreme Court has held that we defer to the judge's factual

findings. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379-380 (2017).

      The S.S. Court also addressed and reaffirmed this State's historical

commitment to an individual's right against self-incrimination.          "The right

against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and this state's common law, now embodied in statute,

N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503." Id. at 381-82 (quoting

State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)). Most importantly, the Court

reaffirmed the standard a reviewing court must employ to determine if a

defendant asserted his right against self-incrimination, stating:

            [T]hat . . ."[a]ny words or conduct that reasonably
            appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness
            to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an
            invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination."
            In those circumstances in which the suspect's statement
            is susceptible to two different meanings, the
            interrogating officer must cease questioning and
            "inquire of the suspect as to the correct interpretation."
            Unless the suspect makes clear that he is not invoking
            his right to remain silent, questioning may not resume.
            In other words, if the police are uncertain whether a
            suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, two
            alternatives are presented:         (1) terminate the
            interrogation or (2) ask only those questions necessary
            to clarify whether the defendant intended to invoke his
            right to silence.

                   ....

                                                                             A-1469-21
                                        9
            To invoke the right to remain silent, a suspect does not
            have to follow a prescribed script or utter talismanic
            words. Suspects are mostly lay people unschooled in
            the law. They will often speak in plain language using
            simple words, not in the parlance of a constitutional
            scholar. So long as an interrogating officer can
            reasonably understand the meaning of a suspect's
            words, the suspect's request must be honored.

            [Id. at 382-83 (citations omitted).]

      Based upon our de novo review of the denial of defendant's suppression

motion, see State v. Tiwana, __ N.J. __, __ (2023) (slip op. at 9), we conclude

the detectives gave defendant adequate Miranda warnings before defendant

waived his right to remain silent before voluntarily giving a statement. The

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statement was

voluntary. State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 42 (2019). Thus, the court here did not

abuse its discretion in allowing defendant's alibi statement to be introduced. See

State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 81 (2018) (acknowledging appellate courts affirm

the trial court's evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion).

      The video and interview transcript demonstrate defendant's initial failure

to understand the term "waiver" was resolved by the detectives' explanations.

The first indication of defendant's misunderstanding was his request for further

explanation after Baldwin stated: "[A] decision to waive these rights is not final

                                                                            A-1469-21
                                       10
and you may withdraw your waiver whenever you wish, either before or during

questioning . . . do you understand that right?" Nelson further explained "we

can ask you one question or we can ask you a hundred, but whenever you want,

you can cut us off." Defendant then indicated he understood this right.

      Although defendant expressed uncertainty about waiving his rights and

refused to sign the Miranda form, asking if he was under arrest, defendant's

rights were not violated. After informing defendant he was not under arrest, the

detectives sought to clarify whether he was agreeing to speak with them.

Defendant told them, "[T]hat's why I'm here."               Nelson wanting further

clarification, however, asked if defendant waived his rights, which resulted in

defendant expressing confusion and stating: "[W]hat you mean like . . . do I

give my rights up?" As Nelson attempted to explain again, defendant made a

series of ambiguous statements, demonstrating both an unwillingness to waive

his rights and a desire to answer their questions: "[Y]eah[,] I don’t want to

waive my rights . . . cause I don't fully understand that . . . I'll answer [all] you[r]

. . . questions . . . . I'm not waiving my rights because I don't know what's going

on." Baldwin recognized the dilemma, acknowledging "he doesn't understand

what it means" when the detectives used the word "waiver." Baldwin then

explained waiver as defendant "agree[ing] with each of these statements,"

                                                                                 A-1469-21
                                         11
detailing his rights, and "the terminology of waiving your rights meaning, you're

waiving these rights and . . . agreeing to speak with us." Defendant again stated

speaking to the police was "why I'm here," and, after Baldwin's explanation,

defendant stated, "oh, yes . . . I understand what you're saying," confirming he

initially misunderstood the language.

      As such, defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his

Miranda rights. He explicitly stated, three separate times, that he wanted to

speak to the police and no coercive practices were present, indicating the waiver

was voluntary.    Defendant was a seemingly intelligent adult who simply

misunderstood the term "waiver." Based on Baldwin's explanation that a waiver

was needed to continue with the interview, defendant's confirmed understanding

of Nelson's statements that he could stop the interview at any time by invoking

his rights, and defendant's explicit affirmative response when he figured out

what the detectives meant by "waived," constituted defendant's knowing and

intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. See State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397

(2019) (noting "[a]ny clear manifestation of a desire to waive is sufficient"

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 313 (1986))).

Defendant's unequivocal affirmative statements that he waived his rights after

Baldwin's explanation of "waiver" demonstrates his recognition that he initially

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                        12
did not understand the term "waiver" but eventually had his "eureka" moment

of clarity, dispelling any misunderstanding. As such, there is no indication the

trial court abused its discretion in admitting defendant's statement. See id. at

396.

       We further conclude defendant's argument that the detectives purposefully

declined to file the criminal charges before interviewing him to get

incriminatory information is meritless. Preliminarily, defendant did not argue

this before the trial court and, consequently, it is not properly before us because

it neither "go[es] to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great

public interest." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (quoting Nieder v.

Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). Nevertheless, there is no

evidence the detectives intentionally sought to avoid the requirements of A.G.D.

by waiting until after the interview to obtain an arrest warrant and file criminal

charges against defendant. Cf. 178 N.J. at 68 (reversing when the defendant was

not told the arrest warrant had already been issued). While the detectives spoke

with Everett the day before they interviewed defendant, Everett's statements did

not implicate defendant. Instead, Everett merely indicated defendant came over

his house the day after the murder telling him something bad happened the night

before concerning Aron and Kenny Mike. Instead, they merely indicated

                                                                               A-1469-21
                                        13
defendant went to Everett's house the day after the murder and told Everett

something bad happened the night before concerning Aron 2 and Kenny Mike.

In fact, Everett suspected only Aron and Kenny Mike robbed Wiggins. As a

result, the detectives interviewed defendant seeking information regarding

defendant's whereabouts at the time of the murder and a buccal swab.

      Defendant gave the detectives his alibi location, Farmingdale, but refused

consent to a buccal swab. Defendant's interview answers and his refusal to

provide a buccal swab resulted in a warrant for his arrest.        Police telling

defendant Aron had confessed, when he had not, to get a reaction or confession

out of defendant is irrelevant to whether the police purposefully delayed filing

the criminal complaint against defendant; it was also not prejudicial as the

"bluff" was unsuccessful because defendant did not confess.       Moreover, the

police's tactic is not improper as defendant contends. See State v. Galloway,

133 N.J. 631, 655 (1993) ("The fact that the police lie to a suspect does not, by

itself, render a confession involuntary.").     Under the circumstances, the

interview was necessary to gather enough evidence to get support for an arrest

warrant and was not a circumvention of A.G.D.

2
  Because Aron and defendant have the same last name, we refer to Aron by his
first name for convenience. We mean no disrespect.
                                                                           A-1469-21
                                      14
                                       III.

                                       A.

      In Point II, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in not

suppressing the hearsay statements by Wiggins to Micheal Smith.           Smith

informed the police that Wiggins told him he received a phone call from a group

of individuals––including Everett, Kenny Mike, Fitch, and Aron––after just

seeing them on the street, wanting to buy marijuana.    Wiggins previously sold

marijuana to Aron and Kenny Mike. Cell phone records indicated the call was

from Aron's phone.

      At trial, Smith was permitted to testify:

            [Wiggins] was not per se asking my advice but maybe
            just talking out loud but he was kind of skeptical of the
            call. He was kind of unsure what to do concerning the
            call.
                   ....

            He had said the kids he ran into earlier he hadn’t seen
            them in a while, and he wasn’t sure whether just
            running into them and seeing them that day sparked
            their memory who he was or maybe they lost his phone
            number and found it again and contacted him, and they
            were looking to make a purchase [of marijuana].

Smith also stated that Wiggins expressed concern about the "different than

usual" amount of marijuana ordered and about how "[t]he kid mentioned he

didn't have a car" when Wiggins knew he drove a Honda Civic.

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                       15
      The trial court had ruled Smith's statements were admissible under

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) to show a conspiracy to buy marijuana from Wiggins. The

court reasoned:

            [I]n the statement . . . you have basically the plan of the
            decedent, who is actually involved – basically involved
            in a drug transaction, a crime, but this was his plan to
            sell, and he's showing that there are certain concerns he
            has and that he voices these concerns to . . . Smith, his
            friend who was riding in the car.

            So clearly it does involve an issue in the case. It's not
            just that it's an issue that is charged in the case in the
            indictment as was argued but it is clearly an issue as to
            the issue of conspiracy, those being involved, and the
            fact that, yes, there [were] conversations, and then . . .
            Wiggins indicates, yes, he is going to involve himself
            with a drug transaction even though he had certain
            concerns about it.

            But I would say in any drug transaction that goes down
            there are generally concerns about whether there is
            going to be a drug ripoff, things of that nature. I think
            that comes with the business of selling drugs.

                                        B.

      Hearsay testimony based on the state-of-mind exception codified in

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3), provides in pertinent part: "A statement made in good faith

of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical

condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily

health)."

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                       16
      Our Supreme Court has interpreted the rule to allow the admission of

reliable hearsay evidence regarding proof of motive. In State v. Calleia, the

Court held "when a victim's state-of-mind hearsay statements are relevant to

show the declarant's own conduct, and when such conduct is known or probably

known to the defendant, it also can give rise to motive, and the statements

become admissible for that purpose, subject to the usual balancing under

N.J.R.E. 403." 206 N.J. 274, 296 (2011). The statements become relevant

"[w]hen a victim's projected conduct permits an inference that defendant may

have been motivated by that conduct to act in the manner alleged by the

prosecution, [at which time] the statement satisfies the threshold for relevance."

Ibid. The Court recognized '"a wider range of evidence' is permitted to prove

motive, so long as it remains a material issue in a case." Id. at 293-94 (quoting

State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999)).

      Significantly, the Court added:

                  In light of its unique probative function, a strong
            showing of prejudice is necessary to exclude motive
            evidence under the balancing test of N.J.R.E. 403. See
            State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 486 (2001); Covell,
            157 N.J. at 570. Where the prosecution has a theory of
            motive that rests on circumstantial evidence, that
            evidence should not be excluded merely because it has
            some capacity to inflame a juror's sensibilities; to hold
            otherwise would preclude a jury from inferring a
            defendant's "secret design or purpose." See Rogers, 19

                                                                            A-1469-21
                                        17
            N.J. at 228. A reasonably broad allowance for motive
            evidence permits jurors, in their role as fact-finders and
            judges of credibility, to reject a given explanation for
            conduct as inconsistent with their understanding of
            human nature, or to accept a motive as a rational
            premise that could lead a defendant to criminality.

                  Time and again, courts have admitted motive
            evidence even when it did no more than raise an
            inference of why a defendant may have engaged in
            criminal conduct, and even in the face of a certain
            degree of potential prejudice stemming from the
            evidence.

            [Id. at 294 (citations reformatted).]

                                        C.

      Applying these legal principles, we conclude the trial court abused its

discretion to allow Smith's testimony about Wiggins' statements concerning the

phone call under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). See State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018)

(recognizing an appellate court reviews "the trial court's evidentiary rulings . . .

'under the abuse of discretion standard'" (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop.

& Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010))). We agree with defendant that

the court's admission of the statements –– because they evinced a conspiracy to

distribute drugs –– was misplaced as neither defendant nor his co-defendants

were charged with such conspiracy. In addition, Wiggins' statements are not

probative of defendant's motive to rob Wiggins.          The statements did not

                                                                              A-1469-21
                                        18
reference defendant because Wiggins did not see defendant in the street with the

other co-defendants prior to the phone call; Everett had not seen defendant that

day; Smith did not know who called Wiggins; and there was no communication

between defendant and Wiggins. The statements, which relayed Wiggins' own

intent, emotions, and condition––his fearful, quizzical sense of the inquiry

regarding the phone call––do not establish his apprehension that defendant or

his co-defendants might rob him because they wanted to buy a large amount of

marijuana. For the court to use the statements to show defendant's motive to rob

Wiggins along with his co-defendants is a stretch, a conclusion with a flimsy

foundation: There is no evidence in the record that Wiggins believed he would

be robbed. If that was the case, we doubt he would have arranged the sale.

      Although the court should not have admitted the statements, the court's

error was harmless. See State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 483-84 (2017) ("Rule 2:10-

2 directs reviewing courts to disregard '[a]ny error or omission . . . unless it is

of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'"

(alteration in original)). Putting aside the statements, the evidence against

defendant was overwhelming: (1) his DNA was found in both the saliva and

one of the masks in the parking lot of Mr. B's Golf Center adjacent to Wiggins'

apartment; (2) his statements the next morning to Everett that "something bad

                                                                             A-1469-21
                                       19
had happened"; (3) his cell phone pings never indicated his cell phone was in

Farmingdale, thereby refuting his alibi; and (4) his cell phone pings indicated

he communicated with co-defendants before the murder and they moved toward

Wiggins' home prior to Wiggins' girlfriend calling the police.          Hence, the

admission of Wiggins' statements did not warrant a new trial because they were

not, by themselves, clearly capable of resulting in defendant's guilty

verdict. See R. 2:10-2.

                                        IV.

      In Point III, defendant asserts it is plain error that the trial court did not

sua sponte instruct the jury on the N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) felony murder

affirmative defense because defendant satisfied the necessary statutory criteria.

The statute provides a four-prong affirmative defense to felony murder if the

defendant: "(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,

command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; . . . (b) Was not

armed with a deadly weapon . . . (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that

any other participant was armed with such a weapon . . . ; and (d) Had no

reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in

conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(3). These prongs "focus on whether the accomplice undertook a homicidal

                                                                              A-1469-21
                                       20
risk or could have foreseen that the commission of the felony might result in

death." State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 84 (2010) (quoting State v. Martin, 119

N.J. 2, 22-23 (1990)).

      To establish the trial court's failure to charge a defense constituted plain

error, a defendant must demonstrate the evidence clearly indicate the charge was

appropriate. Id. at 87. The defendant has "the burden to produce some evidence

in support of each prong of the defense, irrespective of whether there was strong

evidence to the contrary." Id. at 87. "The trial court does not have the obligation

on its own meticulously to sift through the entire record in every trial to see if

some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain a[n

unrequested] charge." State v. Rivera, 205 N.J. 472, 490 (2011) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 134 (2011)). Instead, the need

for the charge must jump off the proverbial page. State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24,

42 (2006).

      Defendant argues the trial evidence completely satisfied N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(3). First, there is no evidence defendant committed the homicidal act as

Wiggins told his girlfriend Kenny Mike shot him, and the following day

defendant told Everett "a shot . . . went off" when Kenny Mike and Wiggins

were scuffling. Second, there is no evidence defendant had a gun. The gun was

                                                                             A-1469-21
                                       21
found in Everett's yard when defendant was not there and taken by Fitch. Third,

"no evidence was presented to establish at what point [d]efendant was included

among those who would go to Wiggins' apartment" to rob him. As such, there

was no proof defendant "had reason to believe" another participant in the

robbery had a weapon. Fourth, defendant had no reason to know someone was

going to use deadly force against Wiggins, as evinced by his statements to

Everett the day after Wiggins was killed that something bad happened the night

before. We are unpersuaded.

      Although defendant's trial theory was that he was not at the crime scene,

there was evidence to the contrary. Defendant's saliva was found near the crime

scene, and Everett's testimony established that defendant was present at the

crime scene when Wiggins was shot with the gun found in Everett's backyard.

While there was evidence that Kenny Mike might have been the shooter, this

only supported factors N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)(a) and (b).       There was no

evidence at all supporting factors N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)(c) and (d)––that

defendant had no reasonable ground to believe Kenny Mike was armed with a

weapon, and no reasonable ground to believe Kenny Mike intended to engage in

conduct likely to result in Wiggins's death or serious physical injury.

                                                                         A-1469-21
                                     22
Accordingly, the facts did not clearly indicate the appropriateness of charging

the affirmative defense. Walker, 203 N.J. at 78.

                                       V.

                                       A.

      In Point IV, defendant challenges his sentence, arguing it was excessive

because it was disparate from the sentences imposed on Aron and Kenny Mike.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3);

first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree conspiracy to

commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and second-

degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -4(a).

The trial court found aggravating factor three, the risk of defendant committing

another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), noting he was "picking up offenses"

based on his 2007 disorderly conduct charge and 2008 possession of marijuana

charge for which he was on probation at the time of the robbery. The court also

found aggravating factor nine, the need to deter the defendant and others from

violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), due to the use of guns and defendant's

marijuana use, which clouded his judgment.         The court did not find any

mitigating factors and, as such, the aggravating factors predominated.

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                      23
Defendant was sentenced to fifty-years' imprisonment, subject to the No Early

Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      Aron, who found the gun used to murder Wiggins, proposed robbing

Wiggins, and was the get-away driver, was only convicted of second-degree

conspiracy to commit armed robbery and second-degree robbery.            He was

sentenced to eight years. Kenny Mike, who defendant alleges shot Wiggins

based on Wiggins' dying declaration, was sentenced to forty years subject to

NERA. State v. Bacon-Vaughters, No. A-0583-11 (App. Div. Feb. 25, 2013)

(slip op. at 1-2). He was eighteen years old at the time of the murder. Id. at 7.

                                       B.

      We review a judge's sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion

standard. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). We must determine whether:

            (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
            aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
            sentencing court were not based upon competent and
            credible evidence in the record; or (3) the application
            of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
            sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
            judicial conscience.

            [Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95
            N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                       24
An appellate court should defer to the sentencing court's factual findings and

should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (citing

State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 489 (2005)).

      Because the sentencing code's goal is uniformity, an "otherwise sound and

lawful sentence" will be invalid if it is different from a similarly situated co -

defendant's sentence. State v. Roach, (Roach I) 146 N.J. 208, 232-33 (1996).

As the Court explained,

            the sentencing court must exercise a broader discretion
            to obviate excessive disparity. The trial court must
            determine whether the co-defendant is identical or
            substantially similar to the defendant regarding all
            relevant sentencing criteria. The court should then
            inquire into the basis of the sentences imposed on the
            other defendant. It should further consider the length,
            terms, and conditions of the sentence imposed on the
            co-defendant. If the co-defendant is sufficiently
            similar, the court must give the sentence imposed on the
            co-defendant substantive weight when sentencing the
            defendant in order to avoid excessive disparity.
            Sentencing based on such added considerations will
            accommodate the basic discretion of a sentencing court
            to impose a just sentence on the individual defendant in
            accordance with the sentencing guidelines while
            fulfilling the court's responsibility to achieve uniform
            sentencing when that is possible.

            [Id. at 233-34.]

                                                                            A-1469-21
                                       25
      "[A] sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous

merely because a co-defendant's sentence is lighter." Id. at 232 (quoting State

v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)).           Differences in sentences among co-

defendants requires resentencing where "there is an obvious sense of unfairness

in having disparate punishments for equally culpable perpetrators."        Ibid.

(quoting State v. Hubbard, 176 N.J. Super. 174, 177 (Resentencing Panel 1980)).

Because "some disparity in sentencing is inevitable," the issue "is whether the

disparity is justifiable or unjustifiable." Id. at 233-34.

      Our scope of review of alleged sentencing disparity is no different than

when ordinary excessiveness of sentence is asserted, State v. Tango, 287 N.J.

Super. 416, 422 (App. Div. 1996) (citing State v. Lee, 235 N.J. Super. 410, 414

(App. Div. 1989)), namely "whether, on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable

sentencing court could have imposed the sentence under review," State v.

Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 388 (1989) (citing Roth, 95 N.J. at 365).

                                         C.

      While defendant received a harsher sentence than Kenny Mike for the

same offense, we perceive no sound basis to disturb the sentence based on

disparity.

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                        26
      Defendant, Aron and Kenny Mike were tried separately before, and

sentenced by, the same trial court. Aron, who was the driver of the getaway car,

was only found guilty of second-degree offense. The court correctly determined

that Aron's situation was not identical or substantially similar to defendant's

situation. While Kenny Mike was found guilty of the same charges as defendant,

he received a ten-year lighter sentence. The court found Kenny Mike's situation

was not identical or substantially similar to defendant's situation for the

following reasons:

            [I]n looking at who is who in this case, you have, []
            Aron [], [Kenny Mike] sort of hatching this plan. . . .
            the gun was obtained [] at some point by [] Fitch. You
            have [Kenny Mike] is the one that goes to [Wiggins's
            apartment] . . . Goes up the stairs because [] [h]e's the
            one that knows [] Wiggins the best. [Kenny Mike]
            knocks on the door and he [] basically was going to be
            let into the apartment. [Kenny Mike] didn't have a mask
            on because they had to have the entrance. There was
            contact. There was cell phone messages, we're coming
            to buy the weed. That's how it happened.

            So we have a pretty good idea that it was [] not [Kenny
            Mike] that was the shooter. We have a good idea it
            wasn't [Aron] because he was the driver. The State's
            contention is that it was [defendant] that was the
            shooter. It could have been [defendant]. It could have
            been [] Fitch. Those are the two things that the [c]ourt,
            it's the [c]ourt's opinion as to [] who was involved.

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                      27
      Consequently, the court sentenced defendant to fifty years subject to

NERA based on his greater level of participation in this case as the shooter. We

are satisfied that the record presents an acceptable justification of defendant's

sentence considering the sentence imposed on Kenny Mike. The court's factual

finding that either defendant or Fitch was the shooter is entitled to deference.

See Case, 220 N.J. at 65. Moreover, the court's factual finding is supported by

Kenny Mike's statement indicating defendant was the shooter, which the

sentencing court knew because it presided over Kenny Mike's trial as well. See

Bacon-Vaughters, slip op. at 8-9. In all other respects, we conclude the court

did not violate the sentencing guidelines and the record amply supports his

findings on aggravating and mitigating factors. The sentence is clearly

reasonable and does not shock our judicial conscience.

                                      VI.

      In Points V and VI, defendant contends the prosecutor made improper

summation statements which were unobjected to and not cured by the trial court,

which caused unjust prejudice and an unfair trial. Defendant points to the

prosecutor's statements:

                • So[,] if there was any doubt about somebody
                  golfing in this facemask, that night, . . . Do you
                  cut [the] eyes and mouth out of a hat because
                  you're cold? Why do you do this? To conceal

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                      28
                   your identity? . . . Because you're going to
                   commit a robbery and you want to get away with
                   it. You don't want to be identified.

                 • It's the same reason why you park in a darkened
                   back lot where your car cannot be seen from the
                   windows . . . Your car can't be seen, hopefully
                   your faces can't be seen. So that's why we have
                   the mask.

                 • So[,] I don't know what the probabilities are
                   because we heard a lot about it with DNA, right?
                   We know the probabilities are incredible when
                   it comes to the DNA on the mask. We know
                   that.     But what is the probability that
                   [defendant] went golfing earlier that day, spat
                   on the ground within [three] feet of the place
                   where his brother went to park to go rob . . .
                   Wiggins, and threw his mask on the ground?
                   Impossible—that's ridiculous. Recognize it for
                   what it is.

      Defendant maintains the comments asked the jury to speculate beyond

facts in the evidence, and the prosecutor effectively manipulated material

evidence causing the "the jurors [to see it] . . . as proof of [his] guilt or

participation in the crime."

      The prosecutor's remarks were not "'clearly and unmistakably improper,'

and [did not] substantially prejudice[] defendant's fundamental right to have a

jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense." State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181-

82 (2001) (quoting State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999)). And

                                                                             A-1469-21
                                       29
given the absence of an objection, defendant had to establish the remarks

constituted plain error, State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 312 (2008), meaning they

were not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result," R. 2:10-2.

      The prosecutor's references to Fitch's mask and the location of the parked

car were intended to undermine defendant's argument that there were potentially

legitimate reasons for him to wear his ski mask in Mr. B's Golf Center parking

lot. Considering defendant's mask and saliva were discovered after the murder

near Fitch's mask and the parked car––all in the vicinity of Wiggins' apartment—

a reasonable inference is that defendant was not wearing his mask for legitimate

reasons. The prosecutor was not insinuating Fitch's mask belonged to defendant

or that defendant helped park the car in the darken lot.       In summary, the

prosecutor's statements were reasonably related to the evidence provided and

defendant's argument is meritless. See State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999)

(citing State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 559 (1995)).

                                      VII.

      In Point VII, defendant argues the trial court improperly erred in charging

the jury with first-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery when he was not

indicted with the offense. Defendant maintains a higher-degree charge was

prejudicial because it allowed the jury to compromise and convict him of the

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                       30
lower degree of second-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Defendant

also claims if the jury was instructed properly, he would have been convicted of

the lesser-included third-degree conspiracy to commit theft. Thus, he would

have then been acquitted of the predicate armed robbery and, consequently, of

felony murder.

      Defendant's' arguments are meritless because they are based on a

misreading of his indictment and trial record. The jury was never charged with

first-degree conspiracy. The offense degrees on the verdict sheet correctly

described the underlying armed robbery and robbery crimes, not the crime of

conspiracy itself.

                                     VIII.

      Lastly, in Point VIII, defendant argues the trial court erred in not sua

sponte instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree

conspiracy to commit theft when there was a rational basis to do so. Defendant

maintains there was no evidence establishing he possessed a gun or was aware

that any of his co-defendants had a gun when the robbery of Wiggins was

planned, which is necessary to convict him of second-degree conspiracy to

commit armed robbery under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-5.

                                                                          A-1469-21
                                      31
      Defendant's argument is without merit. His trial counsel specifically

requested the lesser-included offense of third-degree conspiracy to commit theft

not be charged because the defense was that defendant was not present when co-

defendants hatched the robbery plan. To charge the jury with the lesser-included

offense of conspiracy to commit theft would have undermined the defense

strategy.   Moreover, the facts did not warrant a third-degree theft charge,

considering a gun was used to kill Wiggins. See State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J.

531, 549 (2021) ("[B]ecause counsel did not request the lesser included charge

of theft, the applicable standard here is whether the lesser included offense of

theft was clearly indicated from the facts presented at trial.").

      To the extent any of defendant's arguments are not addressed, it is because

we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

                                                                           A-1469-21
                                        32