Court Opinion

ID: 9534931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:54.482431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.542859
License: Public Domain

*77Mr. Justice McWilliams
specially concurring.
I agree that the judgment of conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded for a second trial, though I cannot subscribe to the majority opinion in its totality.
Oaks was separately charged, tried and convicted of murder in the first degree, the jury fixing his punishment at life imprisonment. At his trial the People introduced into evidence exhibit P, which was a thirty-three page, typewritten, question-and-answer type statement of Beaty. In this statement Beaty stated, among many, many other things, that he shot and killed one Straub in an attempted robbery and went on to describe how Oaks was not only present and assisting him in the robbery but had actually planned and in fact “ordered” its commission. In this same statement Beaty under questioning also related in great detail the nature of his association with Oaks, and in so doing disclosed that he had committed numerous other crimes, mostly of a petty nature and totally unrelated to the charge of murder, but all committed at the urging of Oaks. Exhibit P was given by Beaty out of the presence of Oaks, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Oaks even knew of its contents, let alone that he assented thereto. Over a timely objection People’s exhibit P was received in evidence in its entirety, the trial court instructing the jury that before Oaks could be convicted as an accessory to the crime of murder in the first degree, the People must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Beaty as the principal was himself guilty of first degree murder, and that this statement was to be considered by the jury only in determining whether Beaty was guilty as a principal of murder in the first degree.
Oaks contends that under the circumstances it was error to receive in evidence in its entirety People’s exhibit P, which not only was a “confession” by Beaty that he killed Straub but also in great detail implicated and incriminated Oaks in the homicide. This ruling of the *78trial court was clearly erroneous. See Miller v. People, 98 Colo. 249, 55 P. (2d) 320.
Was this error of reversible proportions? I conclude that it was. At trial Oaks testified in his own behalf and denied any participation on his part in the killing. The People had therefore introduced a five page “confession” of Oaks, which in my view was sketchy, vague and singularly lacking in detail. This “detail” was amply supplied by People’s Exhibit P.
In my opinion we are not justified in speculating that even if certain portions of exhibit P had been excluded, the jury would still have convicted Oaks of first degree murder. Oaks has the right to have his guilt or innocence determined by a jury that has not been exposed to this clearly inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence, i.e. those portions of People’s exhibit P which tend to incriminate and implicate him. Indeed in my opinion under the circumstances there is real doubt that any portion of People’s exhibit P was admissible. C.R.S. ’53, 40-1-12 provides that one who stands by and aids, abets or assists in the perpetration of a crime shall be deemed, considered and punished as a principal. Therefore, under the People’s theory of the case Oaks was a principal, not an accessory of any type, and he was in fact charged and ultimately punished as a principal.