Court Opinion

ID: 9451500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:18:43.018376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:46.437062
License: Public Domain

McCREE, District Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court, which on rehearing is limited to the issue of damages.
This action was brought on a limited risk insurance policy which subjected the *603insurer to liability only for property damage directly caused by an explosion occurring in any of the specifically enumerated insured objects. There is no question here that a series of explosions took place which, with consequent fire, eventually so demolished the insured’s premises as to justify the use of the descriptive term, “overkill”. However, there is also no question that the insurer, on this particular policy, was only liable for the damage occasioned by the first explosion, and clearly was not liable for damage caused by subsequent fire and explosion. The jury returned a verdict of $40,953.70, and our only inquiry on rehearing is to determine whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a verdict in that amount.
As this case is founded upon diversity jurisdiction, we must apply the law of the forum state, Ohio, to the issues presented. Consistent with general principles, Ohio law imposes upon a plaintiff the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence each fact which must be proved in order to maintain the cause of action. The jury is not permitted to speculate upon the existence of a material fact. Venable v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 366, 189 N.E.2d 138 (1963). In addition, consistent with general principles, Ohio law also requires that the extent of the damages be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The failure to sustain such burden results in an award of merely nominal damages at "best. Anderson v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 99 Ohio App. 183, 132 N.E.2d 256 (1954) (by implication). This is true even where there is some evidence of recoverable damage, but where there is insufficient testimony from which the jury could make a proper determination of the extent of the damage actually suffered. Ibid.
I agree with the opinion of the court in its assertion that plaintiff is entitled to have this court consider the conflicting evidence from the point of view most favorable to it, and is further entitled to such fair inferences therefrom as the jury could reasonably have drawn. I also agree that the total amount of the verdict cannot be supported without attributing some damage to the inventory machinery, which was stored outside, immediately adjacent to the north wall of the building, although it is extremely difficult if not impossible to ascertain the exact amount from the record before us.
As the majority opinion correctly points out, there is no testimony in the record as to exactly at what point during the series of explosions, described as a holocaust, the inventory machinery was extensively damaged. However, the majority were “unable to say that with an explosion of this violence the jury did not have a right to weigh the inventory machinery’s proximity to the blast and the probability of some damage to it in its total assessment of damages.” This is the point of my dissent because I believe that any finding of damage to the inventory machinery, on the evidence before the jury, could be only the consequence of speculation and conjecture.
There is no direct evidence that the inventory machinery was even minimally damaged by the initial explosion. In this respect, it is significant to note that the only evidence of first-blast damage to the north wall, which stood between the building interior and the machinery, was the blowing out of some glass panes from the large windows in that wall. Although there is evidence from which the jury could have found damage to the other three walls resulting from the first explosion, the north wall remained standing, although dislodged, even after the series of explosions had ended and the fires had been extinguished. In addition, there is uncontroverted evidence that the equipment in the generating room, situated immediately inside the north wall, appeared normal and functioning after the first explosion.
A jury finding that “some damage” had resulted to this inventory machinery from the first explosion would be a permissible inference if there had been only one explosion, following which damage had been found. However, since there were several explosions and destructive *604fires, it is just as reasonable to infer that damage to this machinery occurred as a consequence of one or more of the subsequent explosions, of the fire, or of the fire-fighting activities, as it is to infer that it occurred from the initial blast. Since there is no evidence that the north wall was dislodged by the first explosion or that the generating room machinery was substantially damaged until later, the more probable inference is that some factor other than the initial blast was responsible for the damage to the inventory machinery.
In short, there is no evidentiary basis for giving preference to the liability producing inference, since the other inferences are at least as compelling if not more so. There is also no evidence from which the jury could have found the amount of damage to the inventory machinery, if any, attributable to the first explosion as is required by the Ohio cases cited supra. On this record, the jury could only speculate on these critical questions.
On this point, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld an award restricted to merely nominal damages where the plaintiff, could not sustain his burden to separate the insured loss from the loss resulting from causes not covered by the policy. Dennis v. Norwich Fire Ins. Soc’y, 50 Ohio App. 193, 197 N.E. 792 (1935). The policy involved in that case presented the same difficulties of proof as are contained in the policy under consideration here; namely, discriminating between damages caused by an insured event and a noninsured event, and showing the extent of loss resulting from the former. I cannot agree with the majority that the mere existence of such problems absolves a plaintiff from the duty of sustaining the otherwise applicable burden of proof.
For the foregoing reasons, a remitti-tur should be ordered in the amount of damages attributable to the inventory machinery, or if such amount cannot be computed with reasonable certainty, a new trial should be granted limited to the issue of damages.