Court Opinion

ID: 9770799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:21:53.973085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.889500
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice,
dissenting.

Them that’s got shall get

Them that’s not shall lose

—God Bless The Child1
With a double standard, the majority strikes a devastating blow at the most direct method of curbing abuses of judicial power. Many judicial excesses far beyond the scope of anything alleged in this particular case will henceforth receive only an official nod and wink from the Texas Supreme Court.
Mandamus is the legal tool by which appellate courts can promptly correct arbitrary and capricious rulings by trial judges. Today’s opinion announces that this remedy will be available to support concealment of the truth but not its disclosure. Mandamus is officially declared a one-way street, in the Texas courts — our judiciary can help to hide but not to detect.
Despite a determination that a “clear abuse of discretion” has occurred in this particular case, at 840, all relief is denied. Finding a wrong and denying a remedy echoes the logic of the majority’s recent conclusion that a tax is unconstitutional but must be paid anyway. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (1992) (Edgewood III) (Doggett, J., dissenting). Rather than correcting the abuse, the court simply gives the Walkers the same message it gave Texas taxpayers — wait. Only after a full jury trial based upon incomplete discovery will the judiciary even consider any possibility of relief.
For those who have previously sought more specific guidelines for the use of mandamus concerning discovery orders, the majority responds with not one but two standards for reviewing trial court action: orders compelling discovery may be immediately corrected; review of denied discovery is postponed indefinitely in a manner to ensure that no meaningful relief will ever be forthcoming.
I.
What a different path this court now pursues than that so recently proclaimed in its unanimous decision that
Discovery is ... the linchpin of the search for truth, as it makes “a trial less *847a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”
State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1991) (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Go., 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958)). Similarly ignored are our recent, unanimous writings in Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553, 555 (Tex.1990, orig. proceeding) (“[Discovery should provide] the fullest knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial_ [T]he ultimate purpose of discovery ... is to seek the truth_”); and Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.1990, orig. proceeding) (“The primary policy behind discovery is to seek truth so that disputes may be decided by facts that are revealed rather than concealed.”). Without mandamus review to add meaning to these laudatory expressions, they are just hollow words. The new signal is clear — circumvent discovery and conceal information.
Today’s opinion reflects the radical change in philosophy which has taken firm hold in this court — discovery is no longer a search for truth, it is merely a game of hide and seek. No longer may appellate courts intercede through mandamus even for the trial court’s complete abuse of discretion in denying access to vital data; under the newly-announced double standard, intervention can, however, be accorded for those who persevere in evasion.
When a local business is defrauded, when a community is exposed to dangerous toxic wastes, when a manufacturer ignores reports that a safety design change would reduce user injuries, when a monopoly extorts unfair gain from the public, when discrimination results in job loss, and in numerous other circumstances, the burden of proving wrongdoing is exceedingly difficult to satisfy without obtaining evidence of that wrong from the files of the perpetrator. In such situations denial of discovery effectively means denial of all relief. That reality does not go unrecognized by today’s majority.
Entities that begin litigation in control of most of the relevant evidence can often defeat their adversaries simply by denying them the power of information:
[Tjhose with established positions of power are more likely to ... win by preventing their adversaries from producing evidence; they are less likely to be in the position of having to extract evidence from their opponents to make out their case.
23 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 5422, at 674 (1980). With its separate and unequal treatment of litigants, the majority gives yet another edge to the already advantaged. Providing immediate review for orders that start the flow of information but refusing to consider those that stop it, the majority once again expresses its preference for helping the powerful over the seemingly powerless. Those opposing meaningful discovery
tend to be institutions rather than individuals, and tend to be among the more wealthy and powerful segments of society. A review system that gives priority (that is, immediate review) to the complaints of privilege holders, but which consigns the complaints of parties seeking discovery until after final judgment, gives an advantage to those wealthy institutional litigants. They have the power to achieve more favorable results during the pretrial process; their opponents must wait.
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw.L.J. 1045, 1082 (1990) (hereinafter Review of Discovery Orders ) (footnote omitted).2 In this way the *848majority ensures that the scales of justice — which at the onset of litigation are often in reality uneven — never achieve balance.
Until this court included discovery orders within the scope of mandamus review, very few reported opinions addressed this important subject. Trial judges were effectively accorded unlimited discretion with a “resulting atmosphere [that] was very hostile to discovery.” Id. at 1071. As a practical matter, discovery battles, often both complex and time-consuming, were shunned. When the party controlling vital data exercises the power of withholding it, fighting every important request, the judicial command “go work it out” often amounts to a denial of meaningful discovery. The mud-wrestling that frequently ensues in such contests may discourage a trial judge from determining who is acting fairly and who started the fight. If mandamus is not available to correct ill-considered or hasty denials, the hope for ultimate justice in complex litigation is prematurely crushed. The majority’s decision today marks a return to those dark ages when discovery was regularly denied as the path of least resistance and greatest convenience for the judiciary.
II.
By its very nature, discovery involves a search for what is largely unknown from someone who may have an incentive to make that search as long and tortuous as possible. Efforts to prevent discovery have been limited only by the boundless imagination of the top legal talent in America. Requests are either too broad or too narrow; records produced are either minimal or in such voluminous, disorganized form as to make locating relevant information most difficult; vital documents vanish in “routine document destruction” programs or are misplaced. Accordingly, our discovery rules have required continual revision to cope with the newest ways invented by those intent on subverting the process. Each revision of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure during the last decade has included attempted clarification and improvement of discovery procedures. This has produced a body of law that is “complex and rapidly evolving.” David W. Holman & Byron C. Keeling, Entering the Thicket? Mandamus Review of Texas District Court Witness Disclosure Orders, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. 365, 375 (1991) (hereinafter Mandamus of Disclosure Orders).
Given the creativity of those who would thwart discovery, rules of procedure cannot be drawn to provide clear guidance in every situation; judicial interpretation is essential. The more complicated the rule, the more necessary the construction and the greater the likelihood for misinterpretation. See id. at 386 (“Erroneous interpretations of these changes ... are likely with the absence of prior significant precedent.... [and] could have a substantial effect on the subsequent course of a lawsuit.”). This court’s responsibility does not and cannot end when the text of promulgated amendments appears in the Texas Bar Journal. Rather, the court has a duty both to make the rules and to interpret them.
Our American system of jurisprudence is founded on the precept that it is of great benefit to have a written body of case law construing controlling legal principles and applying them to particular facts. This approach is undeniably desirable in the discovery context:
In a system where trial court decisions are unreported and have no precedential value, the creation of a body of reported appellate case law regarding discovery has substantial value. Case law on discovery promotes uniform interpretation of the discovery rules and, in time, decreases the opportunity for individual *849judge’s biases to shape discovery outcomes. Reported decisions develop clear rules, where rules are possible, and narrow the range of judicial discretion in other areas simply by providing numerous cases finding that the trial court did or did not abuse its discretion. Such case law can be particularly helpful in a jurisdiction that has recently amended its discovery rules. Over time, the existence of discovery case law may even clarify the rules sufficiently so as to decrease the number of disputes in the trial court.
Review of Discovery Orders at 1080 (footnotes omitted). Appellate opinions properly applying mandamus produce, then, both more consistency and more accuracy in trial court decisions. See id. at 1077.3
The role of this court is particularly important in answering novel or significant questions of discovery law. See Mandamus of Disclosure Orders at 376 (“[P]retrial appellate review of [important discovery] questions could lend critical guidance to the development of Texas discovery practice.”). Rather than avoiding its responsibility, this court should utilize mandamus review to reduce the abuse of judicial power when “a unique question of discovery” law is presented. David West, Note, The Use of Mandamus to Review Discovery Orders in Texas: An Extraordinary Remedy, 1 Rev.Litigation 325, 327 (1981) (hereinafter The Use of Mandamus).
Most trial court mistakes denying discovery result from the need to make repeated, quick decisions based upon limited information. Recognizing this circumstance, trial judges sometimes actually encourage litigants to raise disputed rulings affecting truly vital matters for appellate examination through mandamus by automatically staying their orders. Refusal of prompt appellate review not only denies a party its rights but may also deprive a trial court of desired guidance.
Today’s opinion appropriately recognizes that “this Court will not grant mandamus relief unless we determine that the error is of such importance to the jurisprudence of the state as to require correction.” At 839 n. 7. But under the standard announced, questions of importance concerning judicially-approved concealment of facts will never be considered. The significance to the state’s jurisprudence of a ruling should certainly not be controlled by whether the order granted or denied discovery.
III.
With mandamus now severely limited, many important issues will not be reviewed. See generally Review of Discovery Orders at 1056; The Use of Mandamus at 337 & n. 94. Abuses of judicial power will go forever uncorrected when the party disallowed discovery, realizing the difficulty of proving a case with less than full information and the uphill task of maintaining a successful appeal, is either forced to settle or forgoes a costly and extended appeal following defeat on the entire case. Nor will improper rulings ever be reviewed where one denied discovery, although severely handicapped, nonetheless prevails at trial.
Where appeals do occur, remedies will be rare even for egregious pretrial rulings. To succeed in this endeavor, one must show that
the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of appellant as *850was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment in the case, or was such as probably prevented the appellant from making a proper presentation of the case to the appellate court.
Tex.R.App.P. 81(b). This standard is universally regarded as a “more difficult hurdle” than abuse of discretion. Helen A. Cassidy, The Instant Freeze-Dried, Guide to Mandamus Procedure in Texas Courts, 31 S.Tex.L.Rev. 509, 512 (1990). As another commentator has aptly concluded,
only an unusual discovery order would be dispositive enough to show the harmful error that most jurisdictions require for appellate reversal. Many appellants, therefore, would not even raise the discovery points on appeal.
Review of Discovery Orders at 1056; see also Mandamus of Disclosure Orders at 376 n. 40 (observing that, because of the harmless error rule, many discovery rulings are not pursued on appeal). In denying mandamus today, the majority closes and locks the appellate courthouse door to any meaningful consideration of numerous significant matters.
IV.
Only with the tragic recent change in course by this court’s majority has such denial of access become acceptable. Previously both this court and the courts of appeals had employed their writ power as necessary to correct the abusive refusal of discovery. Among those cases providing the foundation for appropriate mandamus review is Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1977, orig. proceeding), in which the trial court had overruled a motion to complete an expert witness’s deposition and to compel production of his work papers. We interceded, stating that: “It is settled that the writ of mandamus may issue in a discovery proceeding to correct a clear abuse of discretion by a trial judge.” Id. at 42. Similarly, in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977, orig. proceeding), the trial court refused to order discovery of tests, surveys and complaints by similarly affected persons. This court found an abuse of discretion and granted the writ, despite the argument that the plaintiff had “an adequate remedy via the normal appellate process.” Id. at 801. It is difficult to perceive, in light of this argument and the court’s subsequent grant of mandamus relief, how the majority can now claim that “we [had] not focused” on the requirement of an inadequate remedy by appeal in Allen and on, admittedly, a “few [other] occasions.” At 840-841.
Following these two opinions, this court has not hesitated to consider and correct the wrongful denial of discovery. By issuing mandamus to rectify an erroneous trial court ruling refusing discovery in Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.1984, orig. proceeding), this court recognized that appeal is not an adequate remedy:
[Requiring a party to try his lawsuit, debilitated by the denial of proper discovery, only to have that lawsuit rendered a certain nullity on appeal, falls well short of a remedy by appeal that is “equally convenient, beneficial, and effective as mandamus.”
Id. at 576 (quoting Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 190, 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959) (citation omitted)); see also Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (Tex.1926).
A trial court’s unwillingness to order the production of accident scene photographs was overturned by mandamus in Terry v. Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding). In Lindsey v. O’Neill, 689 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding) (per curiam), the court overturned by mandamus an order limiting the scope of a deposition and quashing the accompanying document request. A blanket order protecting hospital records was similarly vacated by mandamus in Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.1988, orig. proceeding). In Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.1988, orig. proceeding), this court again granted mandamus to remedy a trial court’s erroneous disallowance *851of relevant discovery. See also Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.1989, orig. proceeding) (correcting by mandamus wrongful denial of discovery); Turbodyne Corp. v. Heard, 720 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.1986, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mandamus directing trial court to rescind order denying discovery of documents from insurer in subrogation action); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding) (erroneous bar of deposition by court of appeals cured by mandamus).4
It is only after fifteen years of repeated judicial reliance upon Barker and Allen in the issuance of numerous opinions that we learn these precedents of our court are not good law. This is all the more strange in that we had explicitly refused to overrule them. When that very request was urged in Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 576, our answer was unmistakable: “We decline to do so.” But the majority’s new answer is simple: “Line them up against the wall.” What does it matter that a dozen or more Texas Supreme Court cases and countless decisions of the courts of appeals are to the contrary? They can be disposed of in a mass execution of precedent.5 Today’s firing squad announces that it is only answering the command of Jim Sales and two law students who separately criticized the court during the period 1977-79. At 840-841. It thereby rationalizes constructing so distorted a standard on the corpses of so many prior authorities.
One of the most significant casualties is Jampole v. Touchy, which has formed the centerpiece for discovery in litigation over defective products and toxic substances for almost a decade. The majority, in a massive understatement, “disapproves” Jam-pole “to the extent [it implies] that a remedy by appeal is inadequate merely because it might involve more delay or cost than mandamus.” At 842. Although leaving untouched for now this court’s prior writing on the proper scope of discovery, the majority has in fact overruled that landmark precedent in its entirety. Despite a gross abuse of discretion in denying critical discovery in Jampole, the majority’s only correction by mandamus would be to require inclusion of the disputed materials in *852the record, to await a deferred and meaningless appellate review.
V.
Instead of affording the relief that prior rulings demand, the majority announces, after considerable mental gymnastics, that “at least three [discovery situations] come to mind” where mandamus is justified, at 843; then it strangely proceeds to describe six. The first three instances where remedy by appeal is inadequate stem from a trial court’s wrongful allowance of discovery. First, mandamus will issue if “disclosure of privileged information ... will materially affect the rights of the aggrieved party.” At 843. This requisite is easily fulfilled with discovery objections that include an assertion of privilege, the violation of which necessarily impinges on the objecting party’s rights.
Second, mandamus will issue when a trial court orders the disclosure of “trade secrets without adequate protections to maintain the confidentiality of the information.” At 843 (citing, without discussion, Automatic Drilling Machs., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.1974, orig. proceeding)). Posing numerous problems, this hastily-drawn exception has no relevance to the instant case and was concocted by the majority without any briefing or argument by counsel. One privilege is thereby unjustifiably elevated above all others. Moreover, the writing implies an absolute protection of trade secrets from discovery when in fact this privilege is most definitely qualified, as recognized by Automatic Drilling, 515 S.W.2d at 259,6 the rule itself, Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 507 (trade secrets not protected when nondisclosure conceals fraud or works injustice), and even Mr. Sales, whose writing purportedly warranted today’s brash action.7 Nor does this exception consider the availability in some cases of the interlocutory appeal mechanism provided in Tex.R.Civ.P. 76a(8) to address the adequacy of a protective order. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, Order Granting Leave to File Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Doggett, J., dissenting), 829 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.1991).
The third situation requiring mandamus is an “order [that] compels the production of patently irrelevant or duplicative documents, such that it clearly constitutes harassment or imposes a burden on the producing party far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting party.” At 843. This “catch-all” exception indeed makes the extraordinary writ of mandamus an ordinary one. In almost any complex litigation, the claim of burden is essentially a form objection to discovery. It is difficult to perceive a dispute in which the party seeking to obstruct the process could not and, after today’s decision, will not claim harassment or imposition of an undue burden. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez, 824 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.1992) (per curiam) (granting mandamus to preclude disclosure of corporate tax returns on the basis of undue burden and unnecessary expense, not privilege).8
A fourth exception, based on Trans-american Natural Gas Cory. v. Powell, *853811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), is described when the trial court imposes “discovery sanctions ... precluding a decision on the merits of a party’s claims ... unless the sanctions are imposed simultaneously with the rendition of a final, ap-pealable judgment.” At 843 (emphasis deleted). The majority falsely suggests that today’s standard creates a symmetry with Transamerican. Unlike Transamerican, which treated the striking of a petition in the same manner as the entry of a default judgment, this ruling creates a double standard. Unlike Transamerican, which involved a readily-perceptible wrong such as an order of dismissal, a determination of whether hidden documents “go to the heart of a party’s case,” at 843, involves significant uncertainties.
More importantly, Transamerican was issued at a time when the announced policy of this court was to deter abuses of discretion without regard to whether discovery was granted or denied. A wide spectrum of sanction orders arising from discovery rulings are immediately appealable. See Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding). Superimposing Transamerican and Braden on today’s double standard sends a clear message to the rare trial court that would impose significant penalties on those who obstruct discovery with deceit and delay — be careful. There is no real danger of immediate and genuine appellate examination of an order denying discovery, but there is a constant threat of appellate review of an order granting discovery or imposing meaningful sanctions on obstructionists. Once again the majority provides an incentive for concealment.
The remaining two situations address the wrongful denial of discovery, and constitute a narrow path in the woods compared to the expressway for resisting discovery constructed in the previous four exceptions. Mandamus is possible when
the missing discovery cannot be made part of the appellate record, or the trial court after proper request refuses to make it part of the record, and the reviewing court is unable to evaluate the effect of the trial court’s error on the record before it.
At 843-844. The quick fix of including materials in the appellate record is both ingenious and ingenuous. It has the immediate “benefit” of excluding a great number of errors in the discovery area from mandamus review. As the majority in fact recognizes, “this situation should only rarely arise.” At 844.9 And if it ever does, the majority guarantees that no relief will be forthcoming, by directing that the reviewing court
carefully consider all relevant circumstances, such as the claims and defenses asserted, the type of discovery sought, what it is intended to prove, and the presence or lack of other discovery, to determine whether mandamus is appropriate.
At 844. Within these constraints, there will always be a readily available excuse to deny both discovery and mandamus.
In most cases the materials can be boxed up, file-stamped, and sent to the appellate court. How this will accomplish anything more than cluttering the judicial chambers is quite another matter. No clue is given as to how to resolve the obvious difficulties inherent in appellate determination, without any effective argument and analysis by counsel, of whether each item would have affected the result. Moreover, this approach improperly requires courts of appeals to act as juries while denying to the true fact-finder evidence that may be high*854ly relevant to the proceeding. This distrust of juries — of ordinary people resolving factual disputes — is increasingly reflected in the majority’s decisions.10
The only hope for review of a trial court’s order denying discovery is upon proof that a claim has been “vitiated or severely compromised by the trial court’s discovery error.” At 843. It must be shown “that the trial would be a waste of judicial resources,” at 843, and that “a denial of discovery [goes] to the heart of a party’s case.” At 843. It is far from clear whether these encompass one or three different standards. What is clear is that few cases, if any, will satisfy whatever standard is applied.
The majority offers no example of a case in which a party has ever met such a heavy burden. Apparently an applicant for mandamus in this court must confess that, without the discovery sought, the trial court should and must direct a contrary verdict. Any semblance of a chance at prevailing prevents a determination that the trial would be a “waste of judicial resources” or that the discovery denied goes “to the heart of a party’s case.” While this situation may theoretically arise in the future, it will be most unlikely. Nor is there any explanation of how a party can be expected to show such a probability without having any of the materials in question. We have previously recognized the hardship inherent in showing need for documents when their contents are unknown. State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex.1991) (“It is difficult for the [rela-tors] to make a more particularized showing of need for these documents, the contents of which are unknown to them.”).
Application of today’s font of mandamus law to the Walkers’ situation is most revealing. The majority summarily concludes that the trial court’s misapplication of the law to deprive them of relevant evidence “does [not] vitiate or severely compromise the Walkers’ ability to present a viable claim.” At 844. Most ironically, today’s announcement imposes one type of double standard on top of another alleged double standard. The Walkers claim they have uncovered a double standard at a taxpayer-financed institution that encourages faculty to defend those accused of medical malpractice while discouraging professional advice on behalf of the alleged victim. It is the merits of this revelation that the majority so eagerly seals away from both the Walkers and the public.
Fully aware of the impact of expert credibility on the outcome of much medical malpractice litigation, the majority denies the Walkers the very information that could perhaps demonstrate the bias of a key witness. An official blessing is thus provided for trial court action that may have a material, adverse effect on their ability to present a viable case. Having now learned that the denial of impeachment evidence is never susceptible to mandamus, it remains to be seen what other critical information will next be similarly viewed as unimportant to this majority.
While the nature of the double standard approved by today’s writing requires that this dissent focus on wrongful denials, I recognize that the wrong can be every bit as real from improper grants of discovery. As a practical matter there is probably less danger that a trial judge will capriciously ignore properly established objections and privileges to accord too much information instead of too little. Nevertheless, I favor the use of mandamus to control abuse without regard to how it occurs or whom is helped. What I deplore is the discrimination which the majority officially substitutes for even-handedness. Scholars view*855ing the so-called “Walker mandamus standard” should recognize that it is not a standard but an excuse for ignoring wrongdoing.
After today’s decision, discovery disputes will no longer be resolved on a level playing field. I believe that mandamus should be available to correct any trial court abuse concerning a subject that is important to the jurisprudence of the state and which substantially affects rights of an aggrieved party. If this requisite is satisfied, relief should be accorded without regard to whether the trial court has granted or denied discovery.
VI.
In supporting today’s opinion, Justice Gonzalez insists that we must stem what he claims is an alarming increase in the number of mandamus filings. At 844-846 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). The view that “the sky is falling” is best reflected in the gruesome statistics and conclusions of his dissenting opinion in Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234, 241 (Tex.1991). See also Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 578 (Barrow, J., dissenting); cf. C.L. Ray & M.R. Yogi McKelvey, The Mandamus Explosion, 28 S.Tex.L.Rev. 413, 413-14 (1987).
Blaming an ever-increasing caseload for the Texas courts on the advent of the discovery mandamus is wholly insupportable. These petitions most often present emergency situations requiring expedited review and, consequently, are frequently viewed as a thorn in the side of appellate courts. See Review of Discovery Orders at 1059 n. 99. But I cannot agree that justice should be denied or delayed solely to accommodate appellate judges.
Recent studies have debunked the myth of the mandamus explosion. The Joachim dissent, to which Justice Gonzalez once again points with pride today, is based upon an analysis that fails to segregate filings arising from discovery disputes. A more detailed study of Supreme Court experience during a period of more than ten years correctly concluded that:
[I]nterlocutory review of discovery orders ... has [had] a positive effect-The increase [in appellate caseloads] has been an extremely small and manageable one....
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The numbers, then, suggest that while the availability of interlocutory review of discovery orders added cases to the appellate docket, interlocutory review has not added a large or burdensome number of cases.
Review of Discovery Orders at 1047, 1059.
The fact is that most petitions are denied, with fewer than 3% granted by us during fiscal year 1991. Most of these were handled expeditiously, with over half resolved within one month of filing. Moreover, Justice Gonzalez completely ignored the fact that mandamus requests in this court actually decreased over the last three years. There were 202 of these in fiscal 1991, down from 257 and 258, respectively, in fiscal 1989 and 1990. Although the court’s overall workload is expanding, the contribution of mandamus filings is certainly not uncontrollable.11 “In deciding whether courts should permit interlocutory *856review in specific cases, judges and commentators tend to emphasize the needs of court administration over the needs of the litigants.” Id. at 1049. While cutting off the right to mandamus review when discovery is denied may reduce the appellate workload, the result will be a significant decline in the quality of justice. The inconvenience caused by the unexpected arrival of a petition that often demands immediate action is the price paid “to assure that ... trial proceedings are fair and equitable to all concerned parties_ ‘[W]e must not sacrifice justice upon the altar of expediency.’ ” Mandamus Review of Disclosure Orders at 422 (quoting David W. Holman & Byron C. Keeling, Disclosure of Witnesses in Texas: The Evolution and Application of Rules 166b(6) and 215(5) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 Baylor L.Rev. 405, 458 (1990)) (emphasis added).
VII.
The majority announces here not a standard, but a pseudo-standard. In reality, the rule is little more than “how can we help those whom we want to help?” The only true precedent for this is Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.1991), where Republican relators in redistricting were accorded relief in the Supreme Court never sought in any other forum. This “triple R exception to mandamus,” id. at 760-61 (Mauzy, J., dissenting), only presages the continued pursuit of this goal.
If doubts remain as to the one-sidedness of the standard announced today, its application to currently pending cases should resolve them. See, e.g., Remington Arms Co. v. Canales, No. D-1867, 35 Tex.S.Ct.J. 245 (Dec. 13, 1991) (trial court order which found documents relating to firearm safety relevant and required their production stayed despite no timely response or objection being made); Eli Lilly, & Co. v. Marshall, No. D-1827, 35 Tex.S.Ct.J. 168, 354 (Dec. 3, 1991 and Jan. 23, 1992) (stays of trial court order directing production of information relating to the drug Prozac); see id. at 189 (Order Granting Leave to File Petition for Writ of Mandamus) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Valley Baptist Medical Center v. Bennett, No. D-1193, 34 Tex. S.Ct.J. 668 (June 18, 1991) (stay issued to protect hospital from disclosure of materials relating to policy of informing patients of risk of treatment), and 35 Tex.S.Ct.J. 452 (Feb. 12, 1992) (motion for leave to file granted). One interested in verifying the true meaning of the majority’s carefully chosen words will do well to observe how the court actually disposes of each of these matters.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In an apparent attempt to cope with a false “mandamus explosion,” today’s opinion has offered us an explosion of another type — a reverberating detonation of this court’s prior rulings. True the majority has considerable experience in disregarding precedent as merely a lifeless thing of the past. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 516, 517 (Doggett, J., dissenting); Terrazas, 829 S.W.2d at 739 (Mauzy, J., dissenting); Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex.1991) (Doggett, J., dissenting). But a dozen or more Texas Supreme Court authorities and even more rulings from the courts of appeals cut down at one time is not a modest accomplishment. Precedent, no matter how voluminous or how well-established, will clearly not restrain this majority from accomplishing its preconceived social policy objectives.
Through both deed and now word, the majority invites a true explosion in mandamus filings. What does an attorney whose client faces the possibility of a judgment for significant damages have to lose from accepting the beneficence of a majority of this court ever willing to serve as protector of the privileged? Will a deposition site other than that ordered by the trial court *857be more costly and inconvenient to the claimant? Get a stay from the Texas Supreme Court, even if your petition is still pending in the court of appeals. See Continental Can Co. v. Wittig, No. D-2015, 35 Tex.S.Ct.J. 355, 1992 WL 17415 (Jan. 29, 1992) (stay of trial court order directing engineering employee of products liability defendant to be deposed in Houston rather than Chicago even though mandamus petition was pending in court of appeals). Did the trial court resolve a conflict in deposition schedules in a manner unacceptable to an insurance company? Don’t worry, the Texas Supreme Court will stay proceedings even without bothering to get a response from the affected judge. See Cigna Corp. v. Spears, No. D-2069, 35 Tex.S.Ct.J. 463 (Feb. 19, 1992). Any attorney whose client desires to make more difficult access to information that will jeopardize its credibility, suggest its liability or defeat its defenses would be foolish to accept a trial court discovery order. A majority of the Texas Supreme Court is ready and willing to interfere for the asking.
The ripple effect created by today’s refusal to accord mandamus review to pretrial discovery orders will swell to tidal-wave proportion, and sweep before it any hope of fair and consistent application of our Texas discovery rules. In many cases it will leave buried in the sand any possibility of trials directed by the full and truthful revelation of the underlying facts. Juries will be forced to resolve critical disputes based not on truths but rather upon whatever half-truths can be discovered. Left in the wreckage on the beach will be the tattered remains of the many prior decisions of this court and others that viewed litigation as a search for truth in which fair and prompt appellate review of an order denying discovery was vital.
MAUZY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Billie Holiday, God Bless the Child (Okeh Records 1941) (words and music by Arthur Her-zog, Jr. & Billie Holiday).

. These entities rarely need information to prevail:
Even when an institutional litigant appears as a plaintiff suing an individual defendant as, for example, when a corporation sues an indi*848vidual on a debt, the institutional litigant tends to already have the information needed to prove its case.
Review of Discovery Orders at 1070 n. 162. They are also less likely to require information from an opponent to establish affirmative defenses. Id. at 1070.

. With no appellate opinions setting forth appropriate limitations upon trial court discretion, “litigants may receive widely divergent rulings from different judges, even in the same geographical location.” Id. at 1077. Proper use of mandamus discourages forum shopping to obtain a trial judge more likely to provide a more favorable ruling and allows for greater consistency and accountability:
[Such] review ... even[s] out inconsistencies in trial court rulings, and ... allows trial judges to operate with a more accurate understanding of the meaning of the discovery rules.... If the appellate court is consistent, it can fix disparities and inequities produced by the trial courts and promote consistency among the trial level decisionmakers.
Id. at 1047, 1077 (footnotes omitted).

. Intermediate appellate courts have also recognized the importance of mandamus to avoid trial court abuse in improperly limiting or denying discovery. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) (writ granted when discovery of plaintiffs psychiatric records denied); Foster v. Heard, 757 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding) (mandamus issued against trial court’s denial of discovery of post-accident investigation report); Super Syndicate, Ltd. v. Salazar, 762 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus against trial court’s denial of discovery of claims investigator’s files); Goodspeed v. Street, 747 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, orig. proceeding) (trial court's denial of discovery of hospital records based on privilege without presentation of evidence overturned); Estate of Gilbert v. Black, 722 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987, orig. proceeding) (denial of discovery of insurer’s internal communications overturned on mandamus, despite argument that "mandamus is proper only [for] improperly ordered discovery of privileged material, not when the trial court has denied discovery.”); Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Kitzman, 723 S.W.2d 241 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding) (writ granted to correct trial court's order quashing deposition); Velasco v. Haberman, 700 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, orig. proceeding) (mandamus appropriate “not only where the trial court order improperly grants discovery, but the writ may also issue where the trial court improperly limits or denies discovery.”); Aztec Life Ins. Co. v. Dellana, 667 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.App.—Austin 1984, orig. proceeding) (mandamus issued against trial court for denying discovery of claims files).

. The majority identifies by name five cases in conflict with today’s writing, declaring that: “We disapprove of Barker and Allen, and any other authorities,” at 842, and “[we] disapprove of Cleveland, Crane, Jampole, and any other authorities,” at 842, to the extent they conflict with the new Walker standard. Subsumed within the “other" designation are a great number of additional cases from this court and the courts of appeals that would grant to the Walkers relief when the trial court has clearly abused its discretion in denying discovery. The court’s willingness to sweepingly erase whole unidentified categories of recent precedent is exemplified by their signing of a blank check: "any other authorities,” meaning all other authorities, are now endangered.

. The few cases citing Automatic Drilling do not expand its holding to that suggested by the court today. See Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 574-75 ("We hold that discovery cannot be denied because of an asserted proprietary interest in the requested documents when a protective order would sufficiently preserve that interest.”); Firestone Photographs, Inc. v. Lamaster, 567 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, no writ) (“[T]he claim of trade secrets ... does not necessarily defeat the right of discovery.”).

. James B. Sales, Pretrial Discovery in Texas Under the Amended Rules: Analysis and Commentary, 27 S.Tex.L.Rev. 305, 345-46 (1986), stating that:
Trade secrets ... are not, per se, exempt from discovery. The trial court is obligated to weigh the need for discovery against the interests on secrecy.... The need to protect the confidentiality of documents does not constitute an absolute bar to discovery....

.Although also citing General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983, orig. proceeding), as allowing mandamus relief from an allegedly burdensome trial court discovery order, the majority fails to note the very expansive discovery permitted in that case. The efforts of General Motors to limit discovery to results from tests performed on the particular type of *853truck and the particular type of impact involved in the subject incident were rejected, and it was directed to supply all impact test results for all types of trucks manufactured over a 23-year period.

. If the trial court "refuses to make [the discovery] part of the record,” At 843, presumably the only relief accorded under today’s standard would be issuance of a writ directing inclusion of these materials.

. See Caller Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, 826 S.W.2d 576, 597-608 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (addressing court's refusal to allow evidence of predatory intent); see also Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 823 S.W.2d 591, 596 & n. 1 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 488 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting).

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Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders at 1058-59; the 1989 and 1991 figures are derived from my review of court filings.