Court Opinion

ID: 9698723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:58:24.691117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.971642
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join Judge Cavanaugh’s plurality opinion insofar as the plurality recognizes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings. I also agree with the plurality that effectiveness of counsel’s performance in this context should be measured according to the Pierce standard. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).
*55Juvenile delinquency proceedings do not implicate the special concerns that require adjustment of the Pierce standard when evaluating the effectiveness of parental counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights and in dependency proceedings. See Adoption of T.M.F., No. 2602 Phila.1988, 392 Pa.Super. 598, - - -, 573 A.2d 1035, 1054-1055 slip op. at 14-16 (Pa.Super. filed Mar. 30, 1990) (en banc) (Beck, J., concurring); In re J.P., No. 355 Pgh. 1988, 393 Pa.Super. 1, 32- -, 573 A.2d 1057, 1072 (1990) (en banc) (Beck, J., concurring). In parental termination cases and dependency cases, the right of the parent to the effective assistance of counsel must be balanced against the state’s interest in ensuring that a third party — the child— enjoys the benefits of a stable home environment. In juvenile delinquency proceedings, the party who is asserting the right to the effective assistance of counsel is the child. Moreover, a child who is adjudicated delinquent may be removed from the custody of caring and responsible parents and placed in a state institution for juvenile offenders. Every child should be provided with the services of an able attorney before being subjected to the stigma and potential deprivation of liberty associated with being labeled a juvenile delinquent. In my view, relaxing the test for assessing the performance of counsel for the child in the hope of furthering the best interest of the child would be a mistake. Such an approach would represent a retreat from In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), which emphasized the central importance of counsel’s role in ensuring that the juvenile receives a fair hearing.
Furthermore, I do not believe that application of the Pierce standard will lead to a recriminalization of juvenile proceedings. Although Pierce was a criminal case, the standard it embodies is a flexible one. An appellant must establish: 1) that the issue forming the basis of the assertion that counsel was ineffective is of arguable merit; 2) that the particular course chosen by counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interest; and *563) that the client was prejudiced by counsel’s error. Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 3, 559 A.2d 504, 505 (1989). This three-part test should be applied with full regard for the features that distinguish juvenile proceedings from adult criminal trials.
Not every omission by counsel that would require the grant of a new criminal trial would necessarily require the grant of a new adjudicatory hearing. In some cases, a claim may have arguable merit in the criminal context but not in the juvenile context. Rights of a juvenile defendant are not coextensive with rights of an adult criminal defendant. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). Moreover, a review of the reasonableness of the course chosen by counsel and of the prejudicial impact of counsel’s actions must take into account such factors as the informality of delinquency proceedings and the active role of the family court judge in ensuring an accurate determination. By conducting a sensitive inquiry, we may afford juveniles the benefits of the Pierce standard without compromising the uniquely important features of the juvenile justice system.
I part company with the plurality on the question of post-trial motions. As we observed in Commonwealth v. Clay, 376 Pa.Super. 425, 429, 546 A.2d 101, 103 (1988), neither the Juvenile Act nor the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the filing of post-trial motions following an adjudication of delinquency. The plurality would reach out to disapprove Clay and impose a new post-trial motions requirement without basis in rule or statute. I agree with my colleagues President Judge Cirillo, and Judges Rowley, Tamilia and Johnson that it is inappropriate for the Superior Court to take such action. See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Johnson, J., op. at 76-77; Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Tamilia, J., op. at 61-63 (joined by President Judge Cirillo).
In the first instance, the plurality is attempting to engage in rule making, a function within the exclusive jurisdiction *57of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 400-03, 490 A.2d 421, 423-24 (1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 255 Pa.Super. 1, 5, 386 A.2d 105, 106-07 (1978)).
Next, if we require post-trial practice in the context of ineffectiveness of counsel, there is no rationale for not imposing it as a requisite for challenging all trial errors. Weighing the value of mandatory post-trial practice giving the trial court the opportunity to correct its trial errors against the burden of post-trial practice on the juvenile court, I find the imposition of post-trial practice unwise. It is the rare case in which the trial court reconsiders a matter and reverses itself as a result of post-trial practice. The trial court can be advised of purported trial error under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. This Rule affords the trial court an opportunity to address purported errors in its opinion to the appellate court.
Moreover, the plurality fails to consider the practical consequences of imposing mandatory post-trial practice on delinquency cases. The plurality’s proposed post-trial motions requirement would create a waiver trap for unwary counsel. Inevitably, many attorneys would fail to file timely post-trial motions setting forth all of the claims for relief of their juvenile clients. Some attorneys would neglect to file such motions due to sheer inadvertence. The person who will pay the price for these omissions by counsel is the juvenile. An adult defendant whose claims are waived in post-trial motions may at least seek redress under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 9543-46 (Purdon Supp.1989). The Post Conviction Relief Act affords no remedy to juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent and the availability of a common law habeas corpus remedy is uncertain. See In re DelSignore, 249 Pa.Super. 149, 155 n. 3, 375 A.2d 803, 806 n. 3 (1977). Contrary to the suggestion of the plurality, the applicability of the waiver doctrine and the absence of a statutory collateral appeal from juvenile matters militate against requiring post-trial motions in delinquency cases.
*58Mandatory post-trial practice would also have the negative effect of increasing the work load of the family court and delaying the dispositional stage of the delinquency proceedings without adding to the integrity or correctness of the proceeding in the juvenile court. In cases involving children, time is of the essence; the period between adjudication of delinquency and disposition should be kept short in order to maximize the juvenile’s chances for successful rehabilitation. A post-trial motions requirement would tend to delay final disposition and thereby undermine the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals.
Finally, the timing of the plurality’s decision is curious. Significant segments of the legal community have come to believe that even within the criminal and civil spheres the disadvantages of mandatory post-trial practice far outweigh the advantages. Supreme Court advisory committees have published proposals that would substantially restrict the scope of post-trial practice in this Commonwealth. See Criminal Procedural Rules Committee Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure (August 9, 1988); Civil Procedural Rules Committee Recommendation No. 91; Domestic Relations Committee Recommendation No. 6.
In summary, I join the plurality in recognizing an alleged juvenile delinquent’s right to .the effective assistance of counsel. I join President Judge Cirillo, and Judges Rowley, Tamilia, and Johnson in reaffirming that post-trial motions practice does not apply in delinquency cases.
ROWLEY, J., joins.