Court Opinion

ID: 9526127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:12:48.634455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:30.947461
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 75. (dissenting). The flaws in the majority opin-
ion allowing the expedited process under § 96 of 1997 Act 204 for the RockGen power plant are many, but this dissent will touch upon only three points.
¶ 76. First, § 96 of 1997 Act 204 expressly applies to new electric generation facilities of limited capacity. Accordingly, the Public Service Commission's (PSC) and majority opinion's interpretation that § 96 applies to the facility in question is not reasonable, much less the most reasonable interpretation. By an overreaching statutory construction, the majority opinion allows construction of a facility more than three times that authorized by the legislature.
¶ 77. Second, the majority opinion errs in its standard of review. The majority opinion concludes that the PSC's interpretation of the law is entitled to due weight deference but sometimes applies the great *708weight deference standard of review instead of the due weight deference standard.
¶78. Third, the majority opinion's approval of the PSC's actions in this case undermines a legislative process designed to enable the PSC to consider legitimate community and environmental concerns.
I
¶ 79. Section 96 of 1997 Act 204 expressly limits its application to specified facilities. Section 96(l)(b) applies to:
1) "each eastern Wisconsin utility";
2) "that before the effective date of this paragraph";
3) "has issued a request for proposals soliciting bids for contracts for the construction of new electric generation capacity" (emphasis added).1
¶ 80. The first phrase is defined in 1997 Act 204 and is not the subject of dispute. The effective date mentioned in the second phrase is May 12,1998, and is not the subject of dispute.
*709¶ 81. We therefore look at the third requirement. Instead of stating the capacities set forth in the requests for proposals that had been issued before the effective date of the law, the legislature has incorporated these requests for proposals by reference into the law. Reading the language of the requests for proposals into the law is not, as the majority opinion would have us believe, reading extra words into the law.2 Rather, reading the language of the requests for proposals into the law is exactly what the law directs.
¶ 82. The legislature has told the reader that the expedited process applies only to utilities that have issued specified requests for proposals for facilities. If we want to know the facilities covered by the law, we must turn to the requests for proposals to which the legislature refers. It is these requests for proposals that limit the capacity of the new electric generation facilities.
¶ 83. In sum, because the statute expressly incorporates the utilities' already issued requests for proposals, these documents must be considered as part of § 96. Indeed, § 96 makes no sense without examining the requests for proposals in existence when the law was enacted.
¶ 84. The question then is do the already issued requests for proposals to which the legislature refers envision new facilities with specified capacities? We can easily locate these requests in the documents available to the drafters and the legislature. The documents point to Alliant-WPL's request for proposals being for a 150-170 megawatt (MW) facility.
¶ 85. We begin with Governor Thompson's drafting instructions to the Legislative Reference Bureau, to *710which the majority opinion also refers. The governor's drafting instructions state that § 96 should cover "EWU [Eastern Wisconsin Utilities] utilities with pending RFPs (WEPCO, WPL, MGE) complete same by date certain." The drafter's note from the Legislative Reference Bureau to Governor Thompson dated March 16, 1998, explained that the expedited procedure drafted in § 96 would apply to those utilities that had outstanding requests for proposals, citing "Wisconsin Electric, Madison Gas and Electric and Wisconsin Power and Light." The drafter assured the governor that these utilities would therefore be able to enter contracts by July 31, 1998. The drafter explained that he had followed the schedules for awarding contracts appearing on the utilities' Internet Web sites. The drafting file makes clear that the reference in § 96(l)(b) to "requests for proposals" refers specifically to existing documents for three utilities. These documents were available to the governor and the drafter in drafting §96.
¶ 86. Next we review Alliant-WPL's request for proposals issued before May 12, 1998, to determine whether the request can reasonably be interpreted to refer to a 525 MW project, as the majority opinion concludes.
¶ 87. The only reasonable interpretation of the request is that Alliant-WPL was requesting proposals for a facility in the 150-170 MW range. First, the opening sentence of Alliant-WPL's request for proposals calls "for contracts totaling 150 MW (net)." This call for contracts totaling 150 MW appears in the first section of the request for proposals entitled "Purpose." Based on the stated purpose of Alliant-WPL's request for proposals, the most reasonable interpretation of the legislature's reference to requests for proposals in § 96 *711is that it intended to authorize expedited review for AIliant-WPL's plan for 150 MW.
¶ 88. Additional language in AIliant-WPL's request for proposals supports this interpretation. The request for proposals stated that the resulting contracts "will satisfy the need for new electric generating capacity identified by the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSCW) in its September 24, 1997 Letter Order to WP&L." Turning to the PSC's letter of September 24, 1997, we read that the PSC informed Alliant-WPL "that a reasonable assessment of WPL's resource requirements indicates a need for approximately 170 MW of firm capacity." Indeed, the PSC ordered Alliant-WPL to file an updated supply plan that would address the identified 170 MW need. Alliant-WPL responded by issuing the very request for proposals that is referred to above. In its response letter to the PSC dated December 5, 1997, Alliant-WPL described its issued request for proposals to the PSC as calling for sources with a "total generating capacity of 150 MW." Finally, in March 1998, the PSC approved each of the three utilities' plans to procure its share of the 500 MW total. Specifically, the PSC approved AIliant-WPL's plan to procure 170 MW of new capacity.3 The PSC records clearly show that the *712understanding was that three Wisconsin utilities would construct facilities totaling 500 MW, with Alliant-WPL at 150-170 MW.4
¶ 89. The majority opinion ignores the language of the request for proposals and also ignores the PSC actions leading up to the request for proposals and the adoption of § 96. Instead the majority opinion finds language in the request for proposals that it reads to support its conclusion that the 525 MW facility is included in the request for proposals issued before § 96 was enacted. Majority op. at ¶ 38. The majority opinion correctly quotes language from the request referring to the possibility of a larger capacity facility. But this language comes from portions of the request for proposals designed to allow the utility to refuse to accept proposals that comply with the request and to allow the *713utility to change its request. The language is, in my opinion, taken out of context and transparently stretched to support the PSC's interpretation of the law.
¶ 90. In light of the language in Alliant-WPL's request for proposals and the PSC history behind this request, with which everyone was familiar, the only reasonable interpretation is that § 96 authorizes the PSC to apply the expedited process to the 150-170 MW project it had previously approved for Alliant-WPL, rather than to a 525 MW project considered after the enactment of § 96 of 1997 Act 204.
¶ 91. Finally, the fiscal estimate accompanying A.B. 940, enacted as 1997 Act 204, further confirms the legislature's intentions. The fiscal estimate, prepared by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), one of the agencies to apply § 96, states expressly that § 96 establishes a "shortened process. . .for 500 MW of capacity currently under bid by the Wisconsin utilities" (emphasis added). This reference to 500 MW is obviously to the proposals under bid by the three utilities mentioned in the governor's drafting instructions. The reference is not to a 500 MW facility to be built by a single utility.
¶ 92. The governor (who sponsored this legislation), the Legislative Reference Bureau (which reviewed the utilities' requests for proposals) and the legislature (which enacted legislation that specifically referred to the .existing requests for proposals), intended to refer to the requests for proposals explained herein. If they did not, the terms of the requests would have to be set forth in the law. Instead the legislature took a permissible shortcut and incorpo*714rated the requests by reference, three requests that apparently everyone knew totaled 500 MW.5
¶ 93. Despite the request for proposals and the underlying PSC documents contemplating a total of 500 MW of new energy resources to be built by three Wisconsin utilities, the majority opinion asserts that the PSC's interpretation of § 96 as applying to a single utility's 525 MW facility that would sell a substantial portion of its electricity outside the state is reasonable.
¶ 94. The 525 MW power plant proposal is Wisconsin's largest power plant proposal in over 20 years. It is hard to believe that the legislature created a narrowly tailored exception for a giant power plant. Applying the due weight deference standard proposed by the majority, the only reasonable reading of the language of § 96 is that the legislature limited eligibility for the § 96 expedited process to power plant projects that had been mandated by the PSC to meet the identified capacity needs of three eastern Wisconsin utilities, including Alliant-WPL's needs for 150-170 MW, and that were described in the requests for proposals.6
*715¶ 95. I agree with Commissioner Farrow of the PSC who dissented from the PSC's order granting the certificate of public convenience and necessity. Commissioner Farrow properly read § 96 as narrowly authorizing an expedited process for specific projects contemplated by the legislature when it enacted 1997 Act 204.
II
¶ 96. The majority opinion sometimes confuses two standards of review: (A) the majority opinion adopts the due weight deference standard but its rea*716soning points to the application of a de novo standard; and (B) although the majority opinion concludes that due weight deference is the appropriate standard of review in this case, its analysis sometimes reflects the great weight deference standard.
A.
¶ 97. The majority opinion acknowledges that the PSC has been inconsistent in its application of the expedited review provisions of § 96 of 1997 Act 204. Majority op. at ¶ 23 n.ll. The majority then concludes that this inconsistent approach "argues against both de novo review and great weight deference." Majority op. at ¶ 23 n.ll.
¶ 98. I disagree with the majority opinion that the PSC's inconsistent approach to statutory interpretation argues against de novo review. However, I do agree with the majority opinion that the PSC's inconsistent approach argues, against giving the PSC's interpretation of the statute great weight deference.
¶ 99. I suggest that when an agency has taken inconsistent approaches the court might very well undertake a de novo review. In UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996), the court concluded that when an agency is consistent in its treatment of an issue, it is not appropriate to apply a de novo interpretation. The implication from UFE, Inc. is therefore that the opposite must also be true: when an agency is inconsistent in its treatment of an issue, it is appropriate for a reviewing court to apply a de novo approach. Indeed, in Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶ 18, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635, this court stated that "[d]e novo review also applies. . .'when the agency's position on an issue has been so inconsistent so as to provide no real guidance'" (quoting UFE, 201 *717Wis. 2d at 285). In the present case, the PSC has apparently had only two opportunities to interpret the relevant laws and those two interpretations are inconsistent. Under these circumstances neither of the agency's interpretations provides real guidance to the courts.
¶ 100. Upon reexamining our cases, I observe that the difference between the due weight standard and a de novo review seems slight indeed. Under the due weight deference standard," 'a court need not defer to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is not the interpretation which the court considers best and most reasonable.'" UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660 n.4, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)).7 Thus under both the due weight deference standard and the de novo standard, a court will overturn an agency's interpretation in favor of an interpretation that the court concludes to be more reasonable than the agency's.
B.
¶ 101. In any event, although the majority opinion correctly states the due weight deference standard, it sometimes applies the great weight deference standard. The majority opinion concludes in several places that the PSC's interpretation is reasonable and will therefore be upheld. Majority op. at ¶¶ 25, 44, 45, 49 and 73. The majority then shifts to the due weight deference standard, stating that no more reasonable *718interpretation exists. Majority op. at ¶ 46. Though this conclusory statement is based on the proper standard of review, it is not supported by the record or by the majority's analysis.
1 — 1 5 — l
¶ 102. By approving the PSC s action in this case, the majority opinion has undermined a legislatively mandated process that would ensure adequate consideration of legitimate community and environmental concerns. I offer two examples.
¶ 103. First, the majority opinion allows the PSC to issue a conditional certificate of public necessity and convenience before the DNR issues all necessary permits, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(e). See majority op. at ¶¶ 58-61.
¶ 104. When all is said and done, the majority opinion falls back on "harmless error" to justify its conclusion, which is contrary to the express language of the statute. Majority op. at ¶ 63. The majority's conclusion that the PSC's failure to follow the proper procedures is harmless error misses the point of the legislatively mandated procedures.
¶ 105. A major aspect of § 96 is that the legislature has set forth detailed procedures for an expedited process to help ensure that the PSC reaches its conclusions based on adequate information and analysis.8 This is not a case in which an agency failed to follow a minor procedural requirement. In this statute, the pro*719cedure is a major issue. The PSC's failure to follow the legislatively mandated procedures casts doubt on its ultimate result, and this doubt cannot be glossed over with the phrase "harmless error."
¶ 106. Second, the PSC's expedited time frame for the environmental impact statement reduced the time frame for public comment to a mere twenty days. RURAL argues that a twenty-day comment period is simply not enough time for adequate environmental review.
¶ 107. The majority opinion faults RURAL for not making "any substantive challenges" to the environmental impact statement and for "failing to establish any resulting prejudice." Majority op. at ¶ 56. I disagree with the majority opinion. RURAL's brief identifies numerous deficiencies in the environmental impact statement, including specific areas where additional data and analysis were necessary.
¶ 108. Moreover, I find it relevant that the PSC denied RURAL the intervenor compensation that would enable RURAL to hire experts to evaluate the environmental impact statement and conduct fieldwork to supplement the record where necessary. The majority opinion correctly states that the decision to deny intervenor funding is not before this court. Majority op. at ¶ 48 n.25. However, this decision substantially reduced the possibility of meaningful public comment within the expedited time frame.
¶ 109. Viewed in their entirety, the PSC's actions in approving the RockGen project undermined the legislative process to enable the PSC to consider legitimate community and environmental concerns. The PSC's failure to follow legislatively mandated procedures casts doubt on its ultimate result.
*720¶ 110. If the legislature wanted the expedited process set forth in § 96 of Act 204 to apply to a single 525 MW facility, it would have said so. The legislature, not this court, should determine how our electric generation needs should be met.
¶ 111. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 112. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 Section 96(1)(b), 1997 Act 204, states in its entirety:
By July 31, 1998, or a later date approved by the commission, each eastern Wisconsin utility that, before the effective date of this paragraph, has issued a request for proposals soliciting bids for contracts for the construction of new electric generation capacity shall do each of the following:
1. Complete its evaluation of the bids that were submitted in response to its request for proposals.
2. Select the bids for which it intends to award the contracts.
3. Enter into contracts with the persons who submitted the bids specified in subdivision 2. for the construction of the new electric generation capacity.

 See majority op. at ¶ 37.

 See Public Service Commission and Department of Natural Resources, RockGen Energy Center Environmental Impact Statement v, 1 (October 1998), R.102, Item 90. At the same time it approved AIliant-WPL's plan for 150-170 MW, the PSC also approved MG&E's plan to procure 100 MW and WEPCO's plan to procure 250 MW. See id. at 1. Ultimately, the PSC issued certificates of public convenience and necessity to MG&E and WEPCO for facilities that bore a close resemblance to their approved requests for proposals. On December 22,1998, the PS C approved MG&E's plan to build an 83 MW facility. On Febru*712ary 2, 1999, the PSC approved WEPCO's plan to build a 300-360 MW facility in Neenah.
The majority suggests that the approximately one-third increase in size from WEPCO's initial authorization compares meaningfully to the more than threefold increase in size from Alliant-WPL's initial authorization for 150-170 MW. Majority op. at ¶ 44 n.24. The difference between an increase of one-third and an increase of more than threefold is obvious; the latter exceeds anyone's bounds of reasonableness.

 The PSC's own procedures reinforce the conclusion that the only reasonable interpretation of Alliant-WPL's request for proposals is that it called for a 150 MW facility. The PSC's public notice announcing Alliant-WPL's proposal to construct the RockGen facility only referred to 150 MW of new electric generation capacity. The absence of any other mention of the size of the planned facility in the PSC's public notice undermines the majority opinion's interpretation of the law. See PSC Notice of Proceeding, Investigation, Assessment of Costs, and Hearing, Dockets 9335-CE-101, 6680-CE-155, 6630-CE-263 (October 16, 1998).

 The media reported in July and August 1998 the understanding that appears in the documents referred to above. For example, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported in July 1998 after passage of the law: "The state Public Service Commission ordered three Wisconsin utilities to use private developers to build a total of 500 megawatts of power plants by 2000. With the Alliant-Polski plan alone bigger than that, it's expected that far more generation will be built in Wisconsin than expected." Lee Bergquist, $140 Million Power Plant Proposal to be Announced, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 24, 1998. See also Lee Berg-quist, More Power to You, for $2 billion, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Aug. 9,1998.

 The majority opinion contrasts the absence of a specific limit on plant size in § 96 with § 27 of 1997 Act 204, in which the *715legislature instructed eastern Wisconsin utilities to procure "an aggregate total of 50 megawatts of new electric capacity" generated from renewable energy sources. It concludes that § 27 imposes a "limit" on the specific megawatts contemplated, while § 96 does not. See majority op. at ¶ 39. This argument is not persuasive.
Section 27 pertains to renewable energy that the utilities would not build absent special incentives to do so, despite the long-term benefits of reduced environmental degradation and decreased reliance on foreign energy sources. See Robert D. Hazel, Note: Electric Utility Regulatory Reform: The Demise of Alternative Energy, 8 S.C Envtl. L.J. 137, 139 (1999) (noting that renewable energy sources are more expensive and thus less likely to be offered in this era of deregulation). Here, the Wisconsin legislature has given the utilities the necessary incentive to procure renewable energy sources, by statutorily requiring them to procure 50 MW of new capacity. Thus, the reference to "50 megawatts of new electric capacity" is not a limit, but rather a necessary statement of the legislature's intent that the utilities derive a specific amount of their new capacity from renewable sources. I disagree with the majority's suggestion that the legislature included this reference to 50 MW in order to prevent the utilities from procuring more renewable energy sources.