Court Opinion

ID: 9425346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:26.991483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:54.954787
License: Public Domain

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, DISSENTING IN PART
The holding in Monroe v. Pape that municipalities are not subject to suits for damages under § 1983 was based largely on Congress’ rejection of the Sherman Amendment, which would have provided compensation for individuals from the county, city, or parish for any damage caused by riots, etc. Two theories were expressed in the debates for rejecting the amendment.
The first was the notion that civil liability for damages might destroy or paralyze local governments. Also, it was thought unjust that local governments (and indirectly the citizenry at large) should be subject to damages when they bore no responsibility. Although the Senate passed the amendment, Senator Stevenson stated in opposition:
“This amendment wholly ignores the municipal liability created by the omission of direct, absolute corporate duty. We are now, for the first time, presented with an enactment which undertakes to create a corporate liability for personal injury which no prudence or foresight could have prevented. . . .
“But, Mr. President, this amendment is clearly unconstitutional. If it is attempted to be carried out it will destroy the municipal government of every city and the local government of every county where this liability is created .... Let a judgment be recovered against any of our cities in the East or West and a lien is by this amendment created *518not only upon the municipal property of such city, but upon every dollar in the city treasury. The credit of the city, the means to discharge its contracts and its most solemn obligations are by the operation of this act to be applied to such judgment.
“I have heard no reason for such a lien. If carried out to its full extent, it must prove utterly destructive of the State municipalities! And whence does the Federal Government derive its power in any manner or form to touch the revenues of the State governments or any of its agencies? . . .” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 762.
Senators Casserly and Bayard expressed similar concerns. Id., at 763-764, 776.
In the House, Congressman Kerr stated:
“There is, therefore, a total and absolute absence of notice, constructive or implied, within any decent limits of law or reason. And the bill itself is significantly silent on the subject of notice to these counties and parishes or cities. Under this section it is not required, before liability shall attach, that it shall be known that there was any intention to commit these crimes, so as to fasten liability justly upon the municipality. ... It takes the property of one and gives it to another by mere force, without right, in the absence of guilt or knowledge . . . .” Id., at 788.
See also id., at 791 (statement of Cong. Willard). And Congressman Farnsworth was concerned that the amendment would “put the hand of the national Government into [local government’s] treasury.” Id., at 799.
There was another strain, however. Congressman Brooks viewed the amendment as raising the old struggle between the Federalists and the Democrats. Id., at 790. *519In the words of Congressman Poland, one of the House managers of the Conference Committee, “[w]ith these local subdivisions we have nothing to do. We can impose no duty upon them; we can impose no liability upon them in any manner whatever.” Id., at 793. He stated further:
“But the enforcing a liability, existing by their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or liability upon them by the national Government, which has no power either to create or destroy them, and no power or control over them whatever. . . .
“. . . Counties and towns are subdivisions of the State government, and exercise in a limited sphere and extent the powers of the State delegated to them; they are created by the State for the purpose of carrying out the laws and policy of the State, and are subject only to such duties and liabilities as State laws impose upon them.” Id., at 794.
After the House finally had defeated the Sherman Amendment and the Conference substitute for the amendment, Poland stated:
“I did understand from the action and vote of the House that the House had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the administration of State law.” Id., at 804.
See also id., at 795 (statement of Cong. Burchard), 799 (statement of Cong. Farnsworth).
To the extent that the Sherman Amendment was directed only at liability for damages and the devastating effect those damages might have on municipalities, it *520seems that the defeat of the amendment does not affect the existence vel non of an equitable action. One may, of course, argue that the sweeping statements of Poland and others that Congress had no constitutional power (however defective that argument is in light of developed constitutional doctrine) to authorize any action against a subdivision of state government indicated a purpose to go the whole way and not allow even injunctive relief against a municipality. But this is a matter which the Court has never faced.