Court Opinion

ID: 9351751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 16:06:41.491595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:35.188444
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Carrie Hahn,                              :
                          Appellant       :
                                          :
                   v.                     :   No. 593 C.D. 2021
                                          :   Submitted: February 4, 2022
Wilmington Township                       :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                FILED: January 3, 2023

      Carrie Hahn (Requester) appeals, pro se, from the Court of Common Pleas of
Lawrence County’s (trial court) April 21, 2021 Order granting in part and denying
in part Requester’s appeal from the Office of Open Record’s (OOR) Final
Determination. On appeal, Requester argues that the trial court erred or abused its
discretion in: denying disclosure of requested legal invoices based on its conclusion
that those invoices did not exist; denying disclosure of certain records because they
were protected by attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product doctrine;
rendering evidentiary decisions regarding testimony Requester sought to elicit and
its in camera review of certain records; failing to find that Wilmington Township
(Township) acted in bad faith; and not ordering the Township to provide the
documents during the pendency of this appeal. After review, we affirm.
 I.   BACKGROUND
   A. The Request and Denial
      On December 5, 2019, Requester filed a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1 request
(Request) with the Township seeking:

      Item 1: All invoices from attorneys Burke, Cromer and Cremonese
      [(BCC)].

      Item 2: All correspondence between [T]ownship officials/solicitor and
      attorneys to and from [BCC] (as identified in the Solicitor’s invoices
      beginning December 11, 2018).

      Item 3: All correspondence between Solicitor and [T]ownship officials
      regarding communications with attorneys from [BCC].

(Original Record (O.R.) at 160; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a.) Tracey Deal, the
Township’s Right-to-Know Officer (RTKO) at the time, denied the Request by letter
dated December 10, 2019. The request for records in Item 1 (Invoices) was denied
because “[t]here [were] no invoices from [BCC] in the Township’s possession,
custody or control.” (R.R. at 15a.)2 The requests for records in Items 2 and 3
(Correspondence) were denied because they were “subject to the attorney-client
privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine” thereby exempt under Section
102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.102. (Id.) Requester filed a timely appeal of the
decision to the OOR. (O.R. at 158-59.)

   B. Appeal to the OOR
      Requester filed an appeal to the OOR wherein she explained that the records
at issue are “[i]nvoices from 3rd party attorneys and all correspondence between 3rd

      1
          Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104
      2
          The Township did provide redacted invoices from its solicitor. (See R.R. at 48a-52a.)

                                                2
party attorneys, [the S]olicitor and [T]ownship officials.” (Id. at 158.) Requester
asserted that the Township “acknowledges correspondence exists but makes
unsupported, bald assertions[] that all correspondence [are] subject to attorney-client
privilege and/or attorney work[-]product, failing to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that the records are privileged.” (Id. at 158-59.) Requester argued that her
appeal shows a repeated pattern of “bad faith and [an] abuse of discretion by the”
Township. (Id. at 159.) Both the Township and Requester submitted responses in
support of their positions.

             1. The Township’s Submissions
      The Township submitted a letter in response to Requester’s appeal along with
an attestation of the Township’s RTKO in support of the denial of the Request. In
the letter, the Township explained that, as to the Invoices, the Township’s RTKO
“performed a good faith search of Township records, to include the Township’s
physical files and correspondence, as well as the Township’s email account . . . .”
(R.R. at 18a.) Additionally, the Township solicitor (Solicitor) was notified and “[a]
search was performed of [his] files and office email account . . . ,” and “[n]o such
records were located within the possession, custody or control of the Township.”
(Id.) With respect to the Correspondence sought, the Township explained that it
denied these records as being protected under the attorney-client privilege and/or
work-product doctrine. (Id.) The Township stated that during the January 7, 2019
meeting of the Township Board of Supervisors, the Township agreed to retain BCC.
(Id. at 19a.) As a result, the Township explained that the Correspondence sought by
Requester were those “made by the client ([the] Township and/or its Solicitor acting
on behalf of the Township) to its attorney(s) (the firm [BCC]) seeking an opinion of
law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter,” and the communications “were

                                          3
made privately, by and between the Township and its legal counsel.” (Id.) Thus,
the Township contended the communications are protected by the attorney-client
privilege and/or the work[-]product doctrine, “as [the Correspondence] would reveal
the mental impressions, legal strategy, and research undertaken at the request of the
client, [the] Township,” and these privileges had not been waived. (Id.) With
respect to Requester’s allegations of bad faith and abuse of discretion, the Township
argued that Requester “has provided no information to support such outrageous
allegations.” (Id.) The Township further explained that it “received [Requester’s]
[R]equest, conducted a review of its records, notified the Solicitor and outside
counsel of the [R]equest, and provided a response to [Requester] within the required
time-frame.” (Id. at 19a-20a.) As a result, the Township “strongly object[ed] to
[Requester’s] characterization of its activities as in bad faith or an abuse of
discretion.” (Id. at 20a.)

             2. Requester’s Response
      Requester responded, arguing that, contrary to the RTKO’s assertion that the
Invoices did not exist, the Solicitor “had numerous correspondence with [Attorney]
Cromer of [BCC]” as evidenced by the Invoices submitted in the appeal. (Id. at 30a.)
Requester argued that, as the agent of the Township, “any [I]nvoices that [the
Solicitor] or his office staff may have received from [the] attorneys [of BCC] are
within the possession, custody and control of the Township.” (Id.) Additionally,
Requester contended that the Solicitor failed to provide “evidence that he ha[d]
notified the third-party law firm or Attorney Cromer as required under [Section
1101(c) of the RTKL,] 65 P.S. [§] 67.1101(c).” (Id. at 30a-31a.) Thus, Requester
maintained that neither the Township’s Solicitor nor the RTKO conducted a good
faith search for the Invoices.

                                         4
      Requester also argued that the Solicitor and RTKO acted in bad faith.
Specifically, Requester contended that the sworn affidavit by the RTKO “does not
identify which [a]gency personnel she contacted, nor did she provide any
documentation that she contacted anyone other than [the] Solicitor [].” (Id. at 31a.)
Requester also argued that the Solicitor did not submit a sworn affidavit to the OOR
affirming he had conducted a good faith search for the response, nor did Attorney
Cromer or his associates provide an affidavit “to affirm that his office has not
submitted any Invoices to either the [T]ownship, [the] Solicitor [] or his office.” (Id.)
      As it relates to the Correspondence and the privileges the Township invoked,
Requester contended that “[s]imply asserting that [a] privilege applies generally to
the records as a whole is insufficient to meet an agency’s burden,” and asked that
the OOR conduct an in camera review of the records. (Id. 32a.) Requester argued
that the Township’s RTKO did not “provide[] any evidence regarding the number
of records, the dates on which they occurred, or contents of these records and how
the attorney[]work product is applied,” and that the RTKO used “‘and/or’ regarding
two distinctly different privileges in a blanketed, shot gun attempt to assert some
kind of privilege over the requested documents.” (Id. at 33a.)
      Finally, Requester argued that the Township’s decision to hire BCC “was
done in an effort to silence dissent,” namely by Requester and James and Judi
Hartzler, who had filed procedural validity challenges to the Township’s adoption
of an oil and gas amendment to its zoning ordinance. (Id.) Requester asserted that
“[a]fter more than a year, and numerous threats by [T]ownship officials, the
Township ha[d] yet to take formal action against [Requester] or the Hartzlers,” and
that the [I]nvoices from the Solicitor “confirm[ed] that the [T]ownship ha[d]
corresponded with [BCC] to pursue an illegal action at the expense of [the]

                                           5
taxpayers.” (Id.) Requester contended that the records she is seeking “are within
the possession of the Township, [the Solicitor] and/or Attorney Cromer,” and the
“[e]vidence submitted by [] Requester show[ed] that [the] Township ha[d] acted in
bad faith by denying the requested records and that conclusory statements and bald
assertions of privilege are insufficient as a matter of law.” (Id.)

              3. The OOR’s Final Determination3
       On July 20, 2020, after several extensions, the OOR issued its Final
Determination. In its decision, the OOR determined that the Township proved that
the [I]nvoices do not exist within its possession, custody or control based on the
RTKO’s sworn statement. With regard to Requester’s assertion that no good faith
search occurred, citing this Court’s decision in Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 185 A.3d 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), for
the meaning of “good faith effort,” the OOR concluded that the Township
“demonstrated that a good faith search was conducted, in that [the Solicitor] directed
the Township’s [RTKO] to search the Township’s physical files and business email
account.” (OOR’s Final Determination at 7.) Additionally, the OOR explained that
the Solicitor “searched his firm’s physical files, both of his email accounts and
inquired of [BCC].” (Id.) Based on this evidence, the OOR concluded that the
Township has “demonstrated that no legal invoices responsive to Item 1 of the
Request exist within its possession, custody or control.” (Id.)
       With respect to the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege, the
OOR determined that certain of the responsive records were exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Section 102 of the RTKL. The OOR relied on the attestations of both

       3
        The OOR’s Final Determination is located at pages 1a-13a of the Reproduced Record and
pages 322-44 of the Original Record.

                                             6
the Township’s RTKO and the Solicitor, along with the meeting minutes from the
January 7, 2019 meeting, as showing the Township sought to become a client of
BCC. (Id. at 9-10.) It then conducted an in camera review of the responsive records,
which “consist[ed] of emails, attachments and faxed documents dating from January
4, 2019[,] through August 1, 2019.” (Id. at 10-11.) The OOR concluded, based on
the evidence presented, that “the Township has demonstrated [] it became the client
of the firm [BCC] and that . . . [the] Solicitor[] communicated with Attorney Cromer
on behalf of the Township.” (Id. at 11.) The OOR found that the evidence also
established that “the privilege held by the Township ha[d] not been waived.” (Id.)
      Upon its review of the records, the OOR concluded that the following were
protected by the privilege or consisted of work product: “Item 1 Bates number 0001-
0005[;] Item 6, Bates number 0010-0013[;] Item 10, Bates number 0113-0124[;]
Items 11-12, Bates number 0125-0126[; and] Item 15, Bates number 0129-0143[,]”
because disclosing these records “would reveal communications relating to the
Township’s seeking to become a client, as well as legal advice or strategy and
attorney memoranda, legal summaries, research and theories.” (Id.) The OOR held
that the balance of the records were not protected by the work-product doctrine or
attorney-client privilege explaining that the records, “on their face, . . . consist of
routine scheduling and transmittal correspondence or are comprised of factual
information that is not protected by privilege.” (Id. at 11-12 (citing Pa. Dep’t of
Educ.v. Bagwell, 114 A.3d 1113, 1124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).) The OOR further
explained that “[t]he communications neither seek [n]or render legal advice, nor do
they disclose any attorney legal research, strategy, advice or attorney theories,
mental impressions, conclusions, or opinions.” (Id. at 12.) Thus, the OOR granted
in part and denied in part Requester’s appeal and ordered the Township to “provide

                                          7
unredacted copies of all records responsive to Items 2 and 3 of the Request
determined [] to be non-privileged within thirty days.” (Id. at 13.) Requester then
appealed to the trial court.

   C. Appeal to the Trial Court
       Requester appealed the OOR’s Final Determination to the trial court, which,
after a hearing, affirmed in part and reversed in part the OOR’s Final Determination.
At the hearing, Requester called Judith Hartzler, the Solicitor, and Attorney Cromer
to testify on her behalf. With respect to the Invoices, the Solicitor testified that “he
had not received any invoices from Attorney Cromer requesting payment for
services rendered, nor had he made any payment to Attorney Cromer for services
rendered on behalf of [the] Township.” (Trial Ct. Opinion (Op.) at 8.4) Additionally,
the Solicitor testified, under oath, “that he had no invoices from Attorney [] Cromer,
that he had reviewed his office files, and had reviewed all of his email accounts, and
never [] received anything from Attorney [] Cromer[.]” (Trial Court 1925(a) Op. at
5.5) Attorney Cromer testified that his firm did not submit any invoices to the
Township “for payment for any services rendered to the [T]ownship, nor had his law
firm received any payment from [the] Township.”                (Trial Court Op. at 7.)
Additionally, Attorney Cromer testified “that his law firm had not submitted any
[I]nvoice to [the Solicitor] [n]or had his law firm received any payment from [the
Solicitor].” (Id.)
       Based on the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the OOR’s
determination on the Invoices was correct. (Id. at 8.) In so concluding, the trial

       4
        The trial court’s April 21, 2021 opinion is attached to Requester’s Brief.
       5
        The trial court issued an opinion in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), on August 19, 2021, which is Item 32 in the Original
Record.

                                            8
court relied on the attestations of the RTKO indicating that the Invoices did not exist,
and the testimony of both the Solicitor and Attorney Cromer, “neither of which
supported [Requester’s] position.” (Id. at 6-7.) Thus, the trial court held that the
OOR’s determination as to the existence of the Invoices “was appropriate, supported
by factual evidence, and was supported by additional evidence elicited by
[Requester] in the presentation of her case.” (Id. at 8.)
       With respect to the OOR’s decision regarding the work-product doctrine and
attorney-client privilege protecting certain responsive records, the trial court agreed
in part that certain responsive records were protected by the attorney-client privilege
and/or work-product doctrine. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court conducted
its own in camera review of the records6 and specifically found the following to be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product doctrine: “Item
No. 1, Bates No. 0001-0005; Item No. 6, Bates No. 0010-0013; Item No. 10, Bates
No. 0113-0124; [and] Item No. 15, Bates No. 0129-0143.” (Id. at 9.) The trial court
overruled the OOR’s determination “as to Items 11-12, Bates Nos. 0125-0126.” (Id.
at 10.) The trial court agreed with the rest of the OOR’s determination that the other
responsive records had not been properly withheld. (Id.)
       Finally, the trial court considered Requester’s argument that the attorney-
client privilege had been waived under the crime-fraud exception because the
Township acted in bad faith and that the Board of Supervisors, the Solicitor, and
Attorney Cromer “conspired to violate her first amendment right of freedom of
speech by threatening to file a [Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
[(]SLAPP[)] lawsuit against her relative to the litigation in the [trial court], relative

       6
        At the hearing, the Solicitor resubmitted the in camera documents reviewed by the OOR
to which Requester objected because there was no way to determine that the records being
submitted were the records reviewed by the OOR. (See Notes of Testimony at 78-79.)

                                             9
to the [Township’s] oil and gas lease [ordinance].” (Id. at 11.) In concluding that
the crime-fraud exception was inapplicable, the trial court explained:

       Nothing in the [trial c]ourt’s in camera review of the documents . . .
       leads the [c]ourt to believe that in any manner the crime[-]fraud
       exception to the attorney[-]client privilege is present in this case in any
       manner, as the advice of counsel solicited by [the] Township was not
       for the furtherance of [the] commission of a criminal or fraudulent
       activity.

(Id.) Requester timely appealed to this Court.

II.    DISCUSSION
       This Court’s review7 of a RTKL appeal from a trial court’s order is to
determine “whether the trial court committed an error of law and whether its findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Paint Twp. v. Clark, 109 A.3d 796,
803 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dep’t of Env’t
Res. v. Borough of Carlisle, 330 A.2d 293, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974). On appeal,
Requester raises multiple challenges to the trial court’s: (1) determinations on the
Invoices; (2) determinations on the Correspondence; (3) evidentiary decisions
regarding testimony Requester sought to elicit and its in camera review of certain
records; (4) failure to find that the Township acted in bad faith; and (5) failure to
order the Township to provide the requested documents during the pendency of this
appeal. The Court will address these challenges in turn.

       7
         Requester erroneously asserts that this Court’s review of this appeal is de novo. (See
Requester’s Brief at 3 (citing Bowling v. Off. of Open Recs., 75 A.3d 453, 477 (Pa. 2013)).) Where
a RTKL appeal is taken from the trial court, this Court looks to whether the trial court committed
an error of law and whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. See
California Borough v. Rothey, 185 A.3d 456, 462 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting Paint Twp. v.
Clark, 109 A.3d 796, 803 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).

                                               10
   A. Invoices
              1. Parties’ Arguments
       Requester, citing Section 506(d)(1) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.506(d)(1)
(indicating that records in possession of a party with whom an agency has contracted
to perform a governmental function are in the possession of the agency), argues that
the Invoices are producible under the RTKL and that the Township has failed to
provide sworn affidavits or evidence to the trial court that is sufficient to uphold the
denial of the Invoices. (Requester’s Brief (Br.) at 19.)8 The evidence presented,
Requester asserts, was insufficient to find that the Township did not have possession,
custody, or control of the Invoices in Item 1. With respect to the Solicitor’s
attestation, Requester argues the Solicitor focused only on Items 2 and 3 of the
Request and does not mention Invoices, and he submitted an unsworn statement that
was insufficient to show that the Township did not have possession, control, or
custody of the Invoices. (Id. at 22, 29-30.) Requester also asserts that the privilege
log submitted by the Solicitor failed to reference the Invoices, and that the Township,
through the Solicitor, provided statements that were inconsistent with respect to the
Invoices. (Id. at 22, 31.)
       The Township argues that the trial court’s determination is supported by the
testimony from both the Solicitor and Attorney Cromer, which “clearly indicated no
invoice had been prepared by Attorney Cromer, nor had any invoice been submitted
to the Township or [the Solicitor].” (Township’s Br. at 20-21.) The Township
asserts that Requester did not introduce contrary evidence, and the trial court did not

       8
          Many of Requester’s arguments relate to the proceedings before the OOR and its Final
Determination; however, this Court is not reviewing the OOR’s Final Determination. Rather, we
are reviewing the trial court’s de novo review of the OOR’s Final Determination. Thus, we set
forth the arguments asserting error by the trial court, rather than the OOR.

                                             11
abuse its discretion when it concluded that the Invoices were not in the Township’s
possession, custody, or control. (Id. at 21.) The Township contends that an agency
is not required to produce a record that does not exist and that the evidence presented
at the hearing before the trial court “show[ed] conclusively that no such [I]nvoices
exist within the possession, custody or control of the Township[,]” or elsewhere.
(Id.) The Township argues that Requester “misconstrues the legal requirement of
the Township to search for all responsive records in its possession, custody or
control, with the simple factual statement offered at the hearing that no such
[I]nvoices exist.” (Id. at 22.) The Township, therefore, argues that the trial court’s
decision that the Invoices did not exist is supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at
22-23.)

             2. Analysis
      The RTKL was enacted to “promote access to official government
information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the actions of public officials, and
make public officials accountable for their actions . . . .” Bowling v. Off. of Open
Recs., 990 A.2d 813, 824 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), aff’d, 75 A.3d 453 (Pa. 2013).
Pursuant to Section 302(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.302(a), local agencies are
required to “provide public records” to requesters “in accordance with [the RTKL].”
The term “public record” is defined as “[a] record, including a financial record, of a
. . . local agency that: (1) is not exempt under [S]ection 708; (2) is not exempt from
being disclosed under any other Federal or State law or regulation or judicial order
or decree; or (3) is not protected by a privilege.” 65 P.S. § 67.102. “A record in the
possession of a . . . local agency shall be presumed to be a public record.” Section
305 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.305.

                                           12
      The RTKL requires that the agency “shall make a good faith effort to
determine if the record requested is a public record, . . . and whether the agency has
possession, custody or control of the identified record[.]” Section 901 of the RTKL,
65 P.S. § 67.901. Section 705 of the RTKL provides that an agency responding to a
RTKL request “shall not be required to create a record which does not currently
exist or to compile, maintain, format or organize a record in a manner in which the
agency does not currently compile, maintain, format or organize the record.” 65 P.S.
§ 67.705 (emphasis added). Thus, the proper standard under Section 705 is “whether
such a record is in existence and in possession of . . . [a local] agency at the time of
the [RTKL] request.” Moore v. Off. of Open Recs., 992 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2010) (emphasis added). In Moore, the Department of Corrections denied a request
for a requester’s judgment of sentence on the grounds that the record did not exist
and, therefore, the agency was not required to create it. The Department of
Corrections submitted both sworn and unsworn affidavits explaining that it did not
have this record in its possession. This Court concluded that these “statements
[were] enough to satisfy the Department[ of Corrections’] burden of demonstrating
the non-existence of the record in question.” Id.
      In the present case, Requester sought Invoices from BCC for work it allegedly
performed in connection with potential litigation against Requester and others. The
trial court found that the Township met its burden of proof in showing that the
Invoices did not exist. The trial court, citing the testimony from both the Solicitor
and Attorney Cromer, explained that neither witness supported Requester’s position,
and both indicated that there were no invoices sent to the Township for legal work.
(Trial Court Op. at 7-8.) The trial court further credited the attestation submitted by
the Township’s RTKO wherein she indicated she searched the Township’s physical

                                          13
files and email addresses, as well as reaching out to the Solicitor, and determined
that the Invoices do not exist. (Id. at 6-7.) With respect to affidavits, “[t]his Court
has stated that an agency may satisfy its burden of proof that it does not possess a
requested record with either an unsworn attestation by the person who searched for
the record or a sworn affidavit of nonexistence of the record.” Hodges v. Pa. Dep’t
of Health, 29 A.3d 1190, 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citing Moore, 992 A.2d at 908-
09). Because a reasonable mind might accept the credited attestation of the RTKO
and testimony of Attorney Cromer and the Solicitor as adequate to support the
conclusion that the Invoices do not exist either in the Township’s possession,
custody, or control, or at all, the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial
evidence. Borough of Carlisle, 330 A.2d at 298. Accordingly, we discern no error
in the trial court’s decision that the Invoices did not exist.

   B. Correspondence
             1. Parties’ Arguments
      Requester argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Township
could withhold the Correspondence based on privilege. Specifically, Requester
contends that the Township’s claim of privilege under Section 102 of the RTKL, 65
P.S. § 67.102, is a “ruse” and an abuse of the privilege exemption to deny Requester
the Correspondence. (Requester’s Br. at 31.) Requester asserts that the Township’s
privilege log “lack[ed] sufficient detail to substantiate [the] privilege exemptions
and failed to explain how each exemption applied to the withheld records,” and that
the Correspondence were improperly withheld under Section 102, because “courts
have consistently held that privilege does not protect facts.”         (Id. at 32-33.)
Requester argues that the trial court failed to review all the information relating to
her Request and, as a result, “the [Township’s] information was given greater weight

                                           14
thereby tipping the scale and the burden of proof back to [] Requester which is
contrary to the RTKL.” (Id. at 39.) Thus, Requester argues that the Township failed
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Correspondence were exempt
under either the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. Requester
further argues that the trial court erred in finding that the crime-fraud exception was
not applicable so as to waive the attorney-client privilege. Specifically, Requester
asserts that the crime-fraud exception applies because the Township violated the
Sunshine Act9 and improperly withheld the Correspondence, which “support[s]
arguments of bad faith and the [c]rime-[f]raud [e]xception.” (Id. at 47.)
      The Township argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
withholding certain records as being privileged because the trial court’s
determinations were supported by substantial competent evidence and its own in
camera review. The Township explains that Attorney Cromer credibly testified that
he was retained by the Township and that he met with the Board of Supervisors
during an executive session to discuss potential litigation. The Township asserts that
these communications were made by the Township to its legal counsel in an effort
to seek the legal guidance of its counsel and was done so privately. Thus, the
Township contends that these communications are protected by the attorney-client
privilege and/or the work-product doctrine because disclosing the Correspondence
“would reveal the mental impressions, legal strategy, and research undertaken” by
its counsel at the behest of the Township as client. (Township’s Br. at 13-14.) The
Township further argues that Requester’s claims about evidence submitted to the
OOR are irrelevant because the trial court conducted a de novo hearing, heard
testimony from both Attorney Cromer and the Solicitor, and conducted its own

      9
          65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716.

                                          15
analysis of whether the documents were exempt under privilege. According to the
Township, the trial court correctly held that Requester’s argument that the crime-
fraud exception applies was without merit after its in camera review. The Township
asserts that Requester’s arguments that the Township acted in bad faith by failing to
disclose responsive records, violated the Sunshine Act, and waived privilege are
without merit and are not supported by any evidence of record. The Township
contends that because Requester did not introduce any evidence before the trial court
showing fraudulent or criminal behavior on behalf of the Township, the trial court
properly dismissed these arguments.

             2. Analysis
      Records in the possession of a local agency are presumed to be public unless
the records are protected by a privilege. 65 P.S. § 67.305(a)(2). Section 102 of the
RTKL defines privilege as including, among others, “[t]he attorney work-product
doctrine [and] the attorney-client privilege, . . . .” 65 P.S. § 67.102. Additionally,
Section 506(c)(2) of the RTKL provides that “[a]n agency may exercise its discretion
to make any otherwise exempt record accessible for inspection and copying under
[the RTKL], if . . . [t]he record is not protected by a privilege.”           65 P.S.
§ 67.506(c)(2). “The burden of proving a privilege rests on the party asserting it.”
Off. of the Governor v. Davis, 122 A.3d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing
Heavens v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 65 A.3d 1069 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
      In the context of the RTKL, the work-product privilege “only applies to the
mental impressions, theories, notes, strategies, research and the like created by an
attorney in the course of his or her professional duties . . . .” Pa. Dep’t of Educ. v.
Bagwell, 131 A.3d 638, 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (internal quotations and emphasis
omitted). The purpose of the work-product privilege is to “guard the mental

                                          16
processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze
and prepare his client's case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the
attorney-client privilege, to establish this privilege, an agency must show:

      (1) that the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
      client; (2) that the person to whom the communication was made is a
      member of the bar of a court, or his or her subordinate; (3) that the
      communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by
      his client, without the presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing
      an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter; and (4)
      that the claimed privilege has not been waived by the client.

Id. at 656. “[A]fter an agency establishes the privilege was properly invoked under
the first three prongs, the party challenging invocation of the privilege must prove
waiver under the fourth prong.” Davis, 122 A.3d at 1192.
      The attorney-client “privilege only applies where the client’s ultimate goal is
legal advice.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Fowler, 788 A.2d 1053, 1064 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001). “The central requirement is that ‘communications be for the
purpose of securing or providing professional legal services.’” Davis, 122 A.3d at
1192 (quoting Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 52 n.8 (Pa. 2011)). Additionally,
our Supreme Court has explained:

      [T]he determination of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
      does not turn on the category of the information, such as a client’s
      identity or address, or the category of a document, such as whether it is
      an invoice or fee agreement. Instead, the relevant question is whether
      the content of the writing will result in disclosure of information
      otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege. . . . For example,
      descriptions of legal services that address the client’s motive for
      seeking counsel, legal advice, strategy, or other confidential
      communications are undeniably protected under the attorney[-]client
      privilege. In contrast, an entry that generically states that counsel made
      a telephone call for a specific amount of time to the client is not
      information protected by the attorney-client privilege but, instead, is
      subject to disclosure under the specific provisions of the RTKL.

                                         17
Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 373 (Pa. 2013).
       Here, the OOR determined that Items 1, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 15 were protected
by privilege and were, therefore, exempt from disclosure.                     (OOR Final
Determination at 11.) Upon its review, the trial court agreed except for Items 11 and
12, which it ordered disclosed. (Trial Court Op. at 9-10.) Per the privilege log, the
items that were protected under the privileges are as follows:                   Item 1 is
correspondence and a draft engagement letter from Attorney Cromer to the Solicitor;
Item 6 is correspondence and an engagement letter sent to the Township by Attorney
Cromer; Item 10 is correspondence and a legal memorandum from Attorney Cromer
to the Solicitor; and Item 15 is a draft document from Attorney Cromer to be
reviewed by the Township’s Board of Supervisors. (O.R. at 263-64.) The trial court
reviewed these records and concluded Items 1, 6, 10, and 15 were properly withheld
from Requester as being protected by privilege. (Trial Court Op. at 9.)
       In accordance with American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 232 A.3d 654, 670 (Pa. 2020),10 we conducted an in
camera review of the requested documents. Upon that review, we discern no error
in the trial court’s conclusion. Attorney Cromer credibly testified before the trial
court that he was retained by the Township and that he met with the Board of
Supervisors to discuss potential litigation. Additionally, the records at issue involve
communications between the Township, the client, and Attorney Cromer, the
attorney, and discuss potential litigation and legal advice.                  Thus, these
communications involved private communication where a client was seeking legal
advice from an attorney. Moreover, the documents reflect the “mental impressions,

       10
         Our Supreme Court held that this Court cannot conduct a review of a fact finder’s in
camera review without conducting an equally careful inquiry.

                                             18
theories, notes, strategies, research and the like created by [the Solicitor] in the
course of his . . . professional duties.” Bagwell, 131 A.3d at 657 (internal quotations
and emphasis omitted). As a result, these communications and documents are
protected under the attorney-client and work-product privileges. Unless Requester
established waiver under the fourth prong of the attorney-client privilege, these
documents are protected from disclosure.
      Requester argues that the records are not protected by a privilege because the
Township has waived the privilege through the crime-fraud exception. The crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege “does not protect communications
made for the purpose or in the course of the commission of proposed crime or fraud.”
In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. Cnty. No. 88-00-3503, 593 A.2d 402, 407
(Pa. 1991).

      The reason for the nonapplication [of the privilege] has been variously
      stated: “no court can permit it to be said that the contriving of a fraud
      can form part of the professional occupation of an attorney or solicitor.”
      . . . “In order that the rule may apply there must be both professional
      confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal
      object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of these
      elements must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire
      with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the
      client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be
      the solicitor’s business to further any criminal object. If the client does
      not avow his object he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts,
      which is the foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist. The
      solicitor’s advice is obtained by a fraud.” . . . “Such communications
      were not made to the attorney in his professional capacity, as they were
      such as he could not receive in such capacity, and therefore were not
      privileged.” . . . When the advice of counsel is sought in aid of the
      commission of [a] crime or fraud, the communications are not
      “confidential” within the meaning of the statute[,] and may be elicited
      from the client or the attorney on the witness stand. “There is a
      privilege protecting communications between attorney and client. The
      privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an

                                          19
      attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will
      have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.” . . . .

      The protection of the statute is lost when both attorney and client are
      guilty or if the client alone is guilty. But, before the fact may be shown,
      the court must be satisfied that the evidence proposed to establish the
      fact is sufficient to go to the jury for the purpose. “To drive the
      privilege away, there must be ‘something to give colour to the charge’;
      there must be ‘prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact.’
      When that evidence is supplied, the seal of secrecy is broken.”

Nadler v. Warner Co., 184 A. 3, 5 (Pa. 1936) (internal citations omitted). “Simply
stated,” it is “insufficient” for a party to say they “believe[] it is so, then it must be
so [because] two conclusions conceivably may be drawn from that same evidence—
that suggested by the [party claiming the exception], and that argued by the [party
asserting the privilege].” In re Investigating Grand Jury, 593 A.2d at 407. It is
Requester that bears the burden of presenting “prima facie evidence that the
communications were made in the course of [a] commission of a proposed crime or
fraud.” Id.
      Requester asserts that the Township engaged in unlawful activity as it relates
to alleged violations of the Sunshine Act in hiring Attorney Cromer. Requester also
argues that she presented substantial evidence of the Township’s “bad faith by
detailing threats of litigation against [Requester] over the course of a year” and
presented testimony related to the crime-fraud exception. (Requester’s Br. at 46;
Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 66-77.) Requester further contends that the trial court
did not review the video link of a Board of Supervisors meeting and failed to
consider violations of the Sunshine Act that Requester presented. Requester argues
that the news article titled “Solicitor: Township isn’t suing residents who sued it”
(Article) contains “factually incorrect statements and misquotes suggesting
[Requester’s] concern was that [the] Township would take action against her RTKL

                                           20
requests,” and that this article is “central to [Requester’s] arguments of bad faith and
[the c]rime-[f]raud [e]xception.” (Requester’s Br. at 40-42.) During the hearing
before the trial court, Requester testified that the Township acted in bad faith by
threatening litigation against her and withholding the responsive records and that
BCC was retained specifically to threaten litigation. (N.T. at 66, 69, 71.)
      Reviewing Requester’s arguments on the crime-fraud exception, the trial
court concluded that no evidence was presented to show that the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege was present so as to waive the privilege.
(Trial Court Op. at 11.) Further, our in camera review of the correspondence and
draft engagement letter and the correspondence and engagement letter reveals that
they contain “the client’s motive for seeking counsel, legal advice, strategy, or other
confidential communications[,]” and are, therefore, protected under the attorney-
client privilege. Levy, 65 A.3d at 373. That review also leads us to agree with the
trial court that “[n]othing in the [c]ourt’s in camera review of the documents . . .
leads the [c]ourt to believe that in any manner the crime[-]fraud exception to the
attorney[-]client privilege is present in this case in any manner[.]” (Trial Court Op.
at 11.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Items 1, 6, 10, and
15 were protected by a privilege and that Requester has not proven the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege under the crime-fraud exception.

   C. Testimony Before the Trial Court & Trial Court’s In Camera Review
             1. Parties’ Arguments
      Requester argues that the trial court erred when it did not permit her to
question Ms. Hartzler on the Article, which Requester contends contains
misrepresentations and misquotes suggesting that her concern was that the Township
would take action in response to her RTKL Requests. (Requester’s Br. at 41.)

                                          21
Requester asserts that the Article is central to her claim of bad faith on the part of
the Township, and, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to question
her witness about the Article. Requester also argues that the trial court should not
have accepted records for its in camera review from the Solicitor, but should have
reviewed the records presented to the OOR.              Requester explains that she
“vehemently objected to th[is] submission” and wants this Court to “request the
original in[ ]camera records directly from the OOR” as it is not possible to guarantee
that the trial court and the OOR reviewed the same records. (Id. at 48-49.)
      The Township responds that, even as a pro se party, Requester still must
comply with the basic procedural and evidentiary rules. (Township’s Br. at 23
(citing City of Phila., Water Revenue Bureau v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 822, 824 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2000); Jones v. Rudenstein, 585 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. 1991)).) The
Township also argues that the Article is not relevant to whether the requested
documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine
and that the trial court was within its discretion to preclude Requester from eliciting
testimony about the irrelevant Article. (Id. at 25-27.) With respect to the trial court’s
in camera review, the Township contends that the trial court exercised de novo
review in determining whether the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine
applied and was required to conduct its own in camera review to ascertain the scope
of the asserted privileges. (Id.) The Township argues that Requester’s objection
that the documents submitted to the trial court were somehow different than those
reviewed by the OOR was not supported by any evidence, and the Solicitor attested
that the documents presented to the trial court were the same as those reviewed by
the OOR. (Id. at 28.) Thus, the Township maintains the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in conducting its own in camera review.

                                           22
             2. Analysis
      Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401, all evidence must be relevant.
Evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. Additionally, being a pro se party “is not a
license . . . not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). A pro se litigant “is subject to
the same rules of procedure as is a counseled defendant.” Commonwealth v. Abu-
Jamal, 555 A.2d 846, 852 (Pa. 1989).
      Here, Requester sought to elicit testimony from Ms. Hartzler regarding the
Article to show that the Township is attempting to silence residents who challenge
it. (See R.R. at 65a, 66a-68a.) The issue before the trial court was the Request and
whether the Correspondence were exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client
privilege and/or the work-product doctrine. The Article about which Requester
sought to elicit testimony did not “make a fact [about the application of the asserted
privileges] more or less probable than it would be without the [Article],” and the
Article was not “of consequence in determining the action,” and, therefore, it was
not relevant.   Pa.R.E. 401.    Requester was required to provide evidence and
testimony related to whether the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product
doctrine applies to the Correspondence. The testimony about the Article Requester
sought to elicit does not accomplish this task and such questions were not relevant
to the central issue of whether the documents were protected by a privilege.
Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion to limit the testimony of Ms.
Hartzler to matters relevant to Requester’s appeal.

                                         23
      With respect to Requester’s argument that the trial court erred when it
conducted its own in camera review of the documents, we cannot agree.           In this
local agency RTKL matter, the trial court is the ultimate fact finder and is required
“to conduct [a] full de novo review of appeals from decisions made by RTKL
appeals officers, allowing for the adoption of the appeals officer’s factual findings
and legal conclusions when appropriate.” Bowling, 75 A.3d at 474. Further, when
reviewing an appeal from the OOR, the trial court “is entitled to the broadest scope
of review, a review of the entire record on appeal along with other material, such as
a stipulation of the parties, or an in camera review of the documents at issue . . . .”
Pa. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Darlington, 234 A.3d 865, 870 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2020).
      Here, Requester appealed the OOR’s Final Determination to the trial court,
which conducts its review of the matter de novo.           De novo review is “full
consideration of a case at another time.” City of Clairton v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of
City of Clairton, 246 A.3d 890, 906 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (citation omitted). Stated
more plainly, on de novo review, a trial court is able to “determine the case anew,
including matters pertaining to testimony and other evidence.” Bowling, 75 A.3d at
466 n.14. Thus, the trial court “has the discretion to rely upon the record created
below or to create its own.” Chambersburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dorsey, 97 A.3d 1281,
1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to
conduct its own in camera review as part of its de novo review to determine whether
the documents were protected under a privilege.
      Requester’s only objection to the Township supplying the trial court with the
responsive records was her contention that the records could be different from those
that the OOR reviewed, which the OOR had not certified to the trial court by the

                                          24
time of the hearing. (See N.T. at 77-78.) However, the Solicitor attested, at the
hearing, that the records were the same records submitted to the OOR. (See id. at
79-80.) The trial court noted that the Bates numbers in the index provided by the
OOR and the documents produced by the Solicitor should match up, but indicated it
would make an inquiry with the OOR as to the status of the records produced there,
would hold the Solicitor to his representation, and would undertake a line-by-line
review of the sealed documents to ascertain if they were covered by a privilege or if
the crime-fraud exception applied. (Id.) Most importantly, the trial court noted in
its Rule 1925(a) opinion that it “reviewed, in camera, the electronic unredacted
documents submitted by the Certification of Supplemental Records by the [OOR]
through the Prothonotary of Lawrence County.” (Trial Court 1925(a) Op. at 10.)
Indeed, the trial court expressly stated, in response to this argument, that it “received
from the [OOR] by way of Supplemental Certification to the Prothonotary dated
October 5, 2020, the unredacted documents set forth in Items . . . 2 and 3 of the final
determination of [the OOR] via disk, for the Court’s review in camera.” (Id. at 12.)
Thus, Requester’s argument that the trial court erred in conducting its in camera
review of the documents the Solicitor submitted necessarily fails because the trial
court explained that it reviewed the documents certified to it by the OOR.

   D. Bad Faith
             1. Parties’ Arguments
      Requester contends that the trial court erred by failing to find the Township
acted in bad faith. Requester asserts that the Township did not establish a good faith
effort to search because it “failed to identify a legal statute to deny third-party
invoices or adequately describe the process it employed to search for a financial
record of the Township, and failed to identify what records were withheld under

                                           25
[the] attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product.” (Requester’s Br. at 42-
43.) Requester further argues that the Township failed to notify BCC of the Request
in its search of the responsive records. Requester also asserts that the Township
acted in bad faith by not providing the requested records in contravention of the
OOR’s Final Determination and by threatening litigation against her. (Id. at 43-46
(citing Section 1101(b)(1)(3) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1101(b)(1)(3)).) Requester
argues that the Township continues to act in bad faith by withholding records, and,
therefore, the trial court erred in failing to find that the Township acted in bad faith.
(Id. at 48.)
       The Township responds explaining that courts of this Commonwealth have
only found bad faith in a handful of cases, none of which are analogous to the instant
matter. (Township’s Br. at 29.) Citing Dorsey, 97 A.3d at 1291-92, and Uniontown
Newspapers, 185 A.3d at 1171, the Township argues that bad faith has been found
based on “an agency’s failure to review responsive records,” or where there is
evidence supporting a finding that an agency failed to perform its mandatory duties,
“including a failure to search its records prior to a denial of access.” (Id. (internal
quotations omitted).) Contrasting the cases where bad faith was found with this
matter, the Township contends that the record here shows that it conducted a good
faith search of its records, which includes both electronic and paper records. (Id. at
30.) The Township maintains that Requester presented no evidence showing that
Township acted in bad faith and “the record reflects the Township performed a good
faith search for the records promptly after receiving [Requester’s] request.” (Id.)
Additionally, the Township argues that neither the OOR nor the trial court made a
specific finding of bad faith on the part of the Township, leaving Requester’s bad
faith argument unsupported by the findings. (Id. at 31.)

                                           26
             2. Analysis
      To comply with Section 901 of the RTKL, the Township was required to make
a good faith search to determine whether it had possession, custody, or control of the
responsive records. 65 P.S. § 67.901. Bad faith under the RTKL “does not require
a showing of fraud or corruption. The lack of good faith compliance with the RTKL
and an abnegation of mandatory duties under its provisions” is enough to rise to the
level of bad faith. Uniontown Newspapers, 185 A.3d at 1170. Additionally, an
agency’s failure to perform a good faith search in response to a RTKL request may
be grounds for bad faith. Dorsey, 97 A.3d at 1292. It is a requester’s burden to show
that an agency committed bad faith and must produce evidence of bad faith.
Uniontown Newspapers, 185 A.3d at 1170-71 (citing Barkeyville Borough v.
Stearns, 35 A.3d 91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)).
      In Dorsey, a school district did not provide the requester with all the
responsive records until two years later, when it provided the requester over 3,000
pages of responsive records which were discovered by the district’s interim open
record officer while conducting discovery in an unrelated case. 97 A.3d at 1286.
Although the school district argued it did not intentionally withhold the records, this
Court concluded that the agency acted in bad faith by not disclosing the records until
years later. Id. at 1292. We explained “[t]here is no indication why, with diligence,
the [d]istrict would not have been able to produce those documents in response to
the RTKL requests the way [it was] able to in compliance with the discovery
requests.” Id. Thus, the lack of diligence on the part of the agency in reviewing
responsive records could be grounds for a finder of fact to discern bad faith.
      This Court similarly concluded that an agency acted in bad faith for not
disclosing records in Uniontown Newspapers. There, the Department of Corrections

                                          27
“did not conduct a thorough search for responsive records until after the appeals
process concluded.” Uniontown Newspapers, 185 A.3d at 1175 (emphasis omitted).
The Court further found that the Department of Corrections made “piecemeal,
incomplete disclosures” over a three-year period, and had not complied with the
OOR’s order to disclose the records at issue Id. at 1173, 1175. As a result, the Court
concluded that the agency acted in bad faith.
      The facts in the case sub judice are distinguishable from those in Dorsey and
Uniontown Newspapers. Here, the Township complied with Requester’s Request
and conducted a search for all records requested.            The Township provided
attestations of both its RTKO and Solicitor regarding numerous responsive records
and why those records were not being provided. (R.R. at 21a-24a, 45a-47a.) These
attestations explain, in detail, the search that was conducted for the records, the files
searched in order to locate any responsive records, and why, if records were found,
they were privileged. In contrast, Requester has provided no evidence to support her
allegations that the Township acted in bad faith to support her bare, conclusory
allegations that the Township somehow acted in bad faith. Requester had the
opportunity to introduce evidence at the hearing before the trial court showing that
the Township acted in bad faith, which she did not do. Absent evidence that the
Township acted in bad faith, the Court can discern no bad faith on the part of the
Township. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it failed to find that the
Township acted in bad faith when responding to the Request.

   E. The Township’s Failure to Provide Responsive Records
             1. Parties’ Arguments
      Finally, Requester asserts that the trial court erred by not providing a timeline
for the Township to produce the responsive records. Requester argues that the

                                           28
Township failed to release the records in contravention of the OOR’s Final
Determination and, because the Township did not appeal that determination, it
waived its right to withhold the records. (Requester’s Br. at 50.) Requester also
argues that the automatic stay of the release of responsive records under Section
1301(b) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1301(b), does not apply because the Township
did not appeal the OOR’s Final Determination or the trial court’s decision. (Id. at
51.) As a result, Requester asserts she should not be required to file a separate
enforcement action, which would only delay her receipt of the records and contradict
the purpose of the RTKL. (Id. at 52.)
        The Township rejoins that the appeal to the trial court of the OOR’s Final
Determination stays the release of the responsive records pending disposition of the
appeal. (Township’s Br. at 31 (citing Section 1302(b) of the RTKL, 65 P.S.
§ 67.1302(b)).) The Township argues that, regardless of which party files the
appeal, Section 1302(b) operates a stay of the release of records. (Id. at 32.) The
Township additionally argues that the appeal to this Court also operates as a
supersedeas pursuant to Section 5105(e) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5105(e).
(Id.)   Replying to Requester’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Baron v.
Department of Human Services, 169 A.3d 1268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), the Township
argues that this reliance is misplaced because, in Baron, this Court reached the
opposite conclusion than what Requester argues, holding that a stay applies to all
records regardless of what the basis for the exemption is. (Id.) The Township asserts
that the Court in Baron was clear when it explained “‘any attempt to enforce an
appealed final determination before disposition of the merits is premature.’” (Id. at
33 (citing Baron, 169 A.3d at 1275 (emphasis in original)).) The Township further
argues that Requester has not filed an enforcement or mandamus petition and,

                                         29
therefore, she is requesting that this Court enforce the OOR’s Final Determination
without even having filed a petition to enforce, which would be premature anyway.
(Id.) The Township also contends that to permit disclosure of the records while an
appeal is ongoing would waive the Township’s claim of privilege. (Id. at 34 (citing
Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)).) Thus, the
Township argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order
the Township to provide the responsive records.

             2. Analysis
       Pursuant to Section 1302(b) of the RTKL, an appeal to this Court of a
decision of a final determination of the OOR stays the release of the documents until
the trial court issues its decision. 65 P.S. § 67.1302(b). Additionally, this Court has
explained that “the threat of disclosing a non-public record warrants an automatic
stay.” Baron, 169 A.3d at 1276. The Court further explained that “the stay applies
to all records at issue regardless of the basis for the exemption, who asserted it, or
who preserved it. The alternative encourages piecemeal litigation, whereby parts of
a final determination are enforced and others are disputed, creating confusion for the
parties and the courts.” Id. Furthermore, “any attempt to enforce an appealed final
determination before disposition of the merits is premature.” Id. at 1275 (emphasis
in original). Accordingly, Requester’s argument that an automatic stay was not
triggered due to the Township not appealing the OOR’s Final Determination is
unavailing. It would be contrary to RTKL jurisprudence to allow disclosure of
records prior to the disposition of the merits, particularly where the disclosure of
documents that are allegedly protected by a privilege to a third party would result in
the waiver of the privilege. See Joe, 782 A.2d at 31 (explaining that “once the

                                          30
attorney-client communications have been disclosed to a third party, the privilege is
deemed waived”).
       Because Requester filed a timely appeal of the OOR’s Final Determination to
the trial court and then filed an appeal of the trial court’s decision to this Court, the
release of the responsive records are stayed pending resolution of the appeal. To
require disclosure would make the Township waive its claim of privilege and cause
“confusion for the parties and the courts” where parts of a Final Determination are
enforced and others disputed. Baron, 169 A.3d at 1276. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err when it failed to order the Township to disclose the responsive records.

III.   CONCLUSION
       Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err or
abuse its discretion, and we, therefore, affirm. The Township is required to release
the responsive records that are not exempt from disclosure within 30 days.

                                         __________________________________________
                                         RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                           31
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Carrie Hahn,                             :
                         Appellant       :
                                         :
                   v.                    :   No. 593 C.D. 2021
                                         :
Wilmington Township                      :

                                     ORDER

      NOW, January 3, 2023, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence
County is AFFIRMED. Wilmington Township shall provide Carrie Hahn the
responsive records that are not exempt from disclosure within thirty (30) days.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge