Court Opinion

ID: 9761987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:05:09.368986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:28.820423
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
One of the reasons given by the majority to reverse this conviction is that the court allowed the deletion from the indictment the words “and with his malice aforethought” and apparently holds that these words are descriptive of the offense because they are explanatory. In doing so, the majority holds contrary to Ellard v. State, 507 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Ellard was convicted for an assault with intent to murder a peace officer. The indictment charged that the assault was made “with malice aforethought”. Although charged in the indictment, malice aforethought was not submitted to the jury in the court’s charge. The Court wrote:
. . That the assault was committed with malice aforethought is not an element of the offense. Flores v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 122. Neither does the presence of malice affect the punishment which may be assessed for the offense. Therefore, the words ‘with malice aforethought’ in the indictment are not descriptive of the offense and may be regarded as surplusage. Flores v. State, supra. That being true, it was not necessary that the court charge upon, or the jury find, malice.”
That was a good rule a year ago by a unanimous Court, but it is not a good rule today.
It has always been the understanding of the writer that when something is descriptive of the offense it must be proved as alleged. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction under the indictment.
The distinction of Ellard by the majority in Footnote 5 is a distinction without a difference because in that case the court did not charge that the jury must believe the offense was committed “with malice aforethought” surplusage. If it were a descriptive averment it had to be proved as alleged. Johnson v. State, 384 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), cited by the majority, held that “shoot at” in the indictment did not vitiate the indictment but the State had the burden of proving that allegation.
The majority apparently holds that malice aforethought is a means of committing the offense. It is not explained how this is a means of committing the offense. It appears that malice aforethought is a state of mind and if proof shows a less culpable state of mind, a trial court submits a lesser included offense charge to the jury. Bee Thompson v. State, 521 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). The majority cites no case where “malice aforethought” has been held to be a descriptive averment.
' In Johnson v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 612, 336 S.W.2d 175 (1960), the defendant was charged with killing the deceased by (1) strangling him with his hands, (2) and by suffocating him by squeezing his chest with his arms and hands, (3) and by suffocating him by placing Mm inside a refrigerator and closing the door, sealing him inside of said refrigerator, and (4) and by some means or manner of instruments and weapons to the grand jury unknown through mistake or accident while intending to commit the offense of sodomy, (5) and while in the act of preparing for or executing the offense of sodomy. Of the five means of committing the offense alleged in the indictment, three and a part of a fourth were submitted to the jury. The jury found Johnson guilty without specifying upon which ground he was found guilty. All of these were means of committing the offense. The court permitted the jury to find *806him guilty if he killed by either means. They evidently were not descriptive aver-ments.
If an indictment alleges receiving and concealing stolen property, one may be deleted by amendment or the matter may be submitted to the jury to convict if the accused received or concealed stolen property. Either may be proved. It is not necessary to prove both.
Does the majority opinion now mean that if malice aforethought has been alleged there cannot be a conviction for murder without malice or a conviction for aggravated assault under an indictment? Cf. Thompson v. State, supra.
If malice aforethought is alleged in an indictment alleging a crime prior to the adoption of the new Penal Code, does it have to be proved before punishment can be assessed under the new Code?
The majority opinion states that the prosecution may dismiss a portion of the indictment in a robbery case which states that the robbery was committed with firearms because the firearm allegation only goes to penalty. It has been held in many cases that there is only one offense of murder and the question of malice relates only to the penalty and not a part of the offense. Lopez v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 454, 286 S.W.2d 424 (1956). See also Brazile v. State, 497 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
In Bradley v. State, 456 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), the indictment alleged robbery by assault with a firearm, a capital felony, and in the second and third paragraphs of the indictment two prior non-capital felony convictions were alleged for enhancement. The capital felony alleged could not be used for enhancement with non-capital felony convictions. The State was permitted to waive the capital feature of the first portion of the indictment alleging the use of a firearm. When this was done the State was permitted to use the non-capital feature of robbery by assault with the two prior convictions for non-capital cases for enhancement under Article 63, V.A.P.C. Life would not have been the only punishment under the indictment had not the indictment been amended. The Court held that reversible error was not reflected even though the procedure utilized was not commended.
In view of this Court’s holding in Ellard v. State, supra, that “with malice aforethought” is surplusage, I would follow that holding.
The majority opinion holds that the allegation “by shooting him with a gun” was a descriptive averment but notes that there is no question about the proof. The evidence shows that appellant shot the injured party with a gun. Assuming it was error to permit the deletion of that part of the indictment and that such was a descriptive averment, the allegation was proved.
If the judge had left the indictment as originally presented, he could have submitted the charge to the jury omitting the allegations in question and no harm would be shown. See Johnson v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 612, 336 S.W.2d 175 (1960).
No complaint was made to deletions in the indictment. No contention is made that all of the allegations in the indictment as originally presented were not proved. See Blaylock v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 346, 276 S.W.2d 835 (1955).
The judgment should be affirmed.