Court Opinion

ID: 9896943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:25.212849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:55.565807
License: Public Domain

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              STATE v. BUTLER—CONCURRENCE

   D’AURIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. In this certified appeal, the majority once
again holds that the legislature has stripped the courts
of this state of their inherent common-law authority to
open, correct, or modify a judgment, today, a judgment
of dismissal following a defendant’s completion of a
diversionary program. I disagree that our courts have
been legislatively dispossessed of this inherent author-
ity, but, because I agree that the trial court should have
denied the state’s motion to open in this particular case,
I concur in the judgment.
   We have long recognized that, at common law, courts
of general jurisdiction in this state had inherent power
to open, correct, or modify judgments. See, e.g., Wolfork
v. Yale Medical Group, 335 Conn. 448, 469, 239 A.3d
272 (2020); Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn.
69, 106, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). This principle is deeply rooted
in our common law and reflects the beneficent policy
that courts should be able to admit and correct mis-
takes, whether their own mistakes or those of the par-
ties, to do justice. See State v. Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427,
440, 646 A.2d 85 (1994) (Katz, J., dissenting) (‘‘we
should recognize the trial court’s inherent power to
correct errors of substance within a reasonable time
in order to do justice’’). Historically, this included the
authority to grant a motion for a new trial, which is a
‘‘[common-law] power [that] the courts . . . have the
right to exercise in such a manner as shall best promote
justice.’’ Zaleski v. Clark, 45 Conn. 397, 404 (1877).
   It has never been questioned—and neither the parties
nor the majority in the present case questions—whether
the general common-law rule that courts have inherent
authority to open, correct, or modify judgments applied
equally to all courts of general jurisdiction, which, in Con-
necticut, include criminal courts. See State v. Ramos,
306 Conn. 125, 133–34, 49 A.3d 197 (2012) (‘‘The Supe-
rior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdic-
tion. In the absence of statutory or constitutional provi-
sions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by
the common law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
For purposes of my discussion here, I will assume the
same. The majority assumes, too—or does not chal-
lenge—that this common-law authority, as late as 1978,
extended to the authority of courts to open, correct,
or modify judgments dismissing criminal charges.
  Because the policy favoring the finality of judgments
competes with the beneficent policy permitting courts
to rectify their mistakes, litigation has usually centered
on how long and under what circumstances courts
should be able to exercise their inherent power to open,
correct, or modify their judgments. See, e.g., People v.
Karaman, 4 Cal. 4th 335, 348, 842 P.2d 100, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 801 (1992) (recognizing that common-law rule
‘‘that the trial court may change its judgment only during
the term in which the judgment was rendered, but not
thereafter . . . was established in order to provide liti-
gants with some finality to legal proceedings’’ (citations
omitted; footnote omitted)). The present case is only
the most recent example of this court’s often tortured
attempts to accommodate these competing public poli-
cies, which sometimes results in manufactured rules;
see State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 437, 513 A.2d 620
(1986) (borrowing civil rule of practice providing for
four months to open judgments); exceptions to excep-
tions to those rules; see State v. Myers, 242 Conn. 125,
131, 136, 698 A.2d 823 (1997) (court had jurisdiction to
rule on motion for new trial based on juror bias five
months after defendant had been sentenced); and, most
recently, in the present case and in State v. McCoy, 331
Conn. 561, 586–87, 206 A.3d 725 (2019), in the overruling
of the exceptions to the exceptions (i.e., Wilson and
Myers) in an attempt to clean up our case law and make
the lines brighter.
   McCoy involved the question of whether there was, or
ought to be, an exception to the common-law, temporal
limitation on the court’s inherent authority to correct
its mistakes—that is, that the trial court loses jurisdic-
tion over the case when the convicted defendant is
committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Cor-
rection and begins serving his sentence—that would
permit the trial court to rule on a timely filed motion
before the court had sentenced the defendant. Id., 574–
75. The majority in McCoy answered this question in the
negative: i.e., our law could not abide such an exception
and, to the extent that we had permitted such an excep-
tion in the past, threw shade on our precedent. See id.,
588–89; see also id., 583 (expressing ‘‘serious concerns’’
about Myers’ ‘‘rationale and the implications . . . were
we to follow it without question’’). As I explained in
my concurrence and dissent in State v. McCoy, supra,
331 Conn. 600 (D’Auria, J., Palmer and McDonald, Js.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), I believe the
majority’s holding in that case created an illogical result
and was avoidable if we had acted like the common-
law court we are and found exceptions to a rule—or
relied on existing exceptions—when good sense calls
for it. As in McCoy, the rule at issue in the present case
is ‘‘a common-law rule borne out of experience and
sensibility’’; O. Holmes, The Common Law (P. Pereira &
D. Beltran eds., 2011) p. 5; and ‘‘this court has the
inherent power to define its contours to ensure that
its application does not lead to unsensible and unjust
results . . . .’’ State v. McCoy, supra, 614 (D’Auria, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). I will not
repeat the entirety of that analysis here.
  In the present case, I believe that the majority repeats
the error of McCoy and earlier cases by assuming—
indeed, holding—that the legislature in 1977 abrogated
the authority of our courts to open, correct, or modify
judgments and that it did so by eliminating the word
‘‘sessions’’ from General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 51-
181. See Public Acts 1977, No. 77-576, § 27 (P.A. 77-576).
I agree with the majority that the common-law rule, as
measured by sessions of the court, is now obsolete.
But, in my view, the notion that this legislative change
abrogated our trial courts’ inherent authority to open,
correct, or modify judgments is not an inescapable con-
clusion. Rather, I would conclude that courts of this
state still have this authority, even though fashioning
a rule in the context of this case—the unappealed judg-
ment dismissing a criminal case—might present chal-
lenges that cannot be overcome.
   It is necessary first to review some of the history of
General Statutes § 51-181 and, in doing so, to bear in
mind our general rule of construction that, when a stat-
ute seeks to limit a court’s common-law jurisdiction,
we strictly construe that statute so as to limit any incur-
sion on our authority only to the extent expressly and
explicitly stated by the legislature. See, e.g., Sastrom
v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 291 Conn. 307,
324–25, 968 A.2d 396 (2009) (explaining that legislature
knows how to expressly limit scope of court’s jurisdic-
tion, and, if no intent to limit is expressed, then statute
does not divest court of jurisdiction). This rule of con-
struction is consistent with the even more general rule
that the court’s common-law general jurisdiction is
broad and that ‘‘there is a strong presumption in favor
of jurisdiction’’; State v. Ramos, supra, 306 Conn. 134;
and is a concrete application of the well established
maxim that we must strictly construe statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law. See, e.g., Fennelly v. Norton,
294 Conn. 484, 505, 985 A.2d 1026 (2010). We must also
keep in mind that the Superior Court is a court of
general jurisdiction, and, therefore, ‘‘[i]n the absence of
statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its
jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, supra,
133–34.1
   As the majority correctly notes, at common law,
courts had the inherent power to open, correct, or mod-
ify their own judgments. This authority was limited in
duration, however. Nearly 150 years ago, we described
that limitation as follows: ‘‘During the continuance of
a term of court the judge holding it has, in a sense,
absolute control over judgments rendered; that is, he
can declare and subsequently modify or annul them.’’
Sturdevant v. Stanton, 47 Conn. 579, 580 (1880). Over
100 years later, and since then, we have indicated that,
at common law, ‘‘a trial court possesses the inherent
power to modify its own judgments during the term at
which they were rendered.’’ State v. Wilson, supra, 199
Conn. 436; see also Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn. 567,
571–72, 392 A.2d 440 (1978).2 At common law, even
when the term had not yet ended, a trial court did not
have jurisdiction to modify its judgment after a person
had begun to serve his or her sentence. See State v.
Henkel, 23 Conn. Supp. 135, 138, 177 A.2d 684 (Conn.
Cir. 1961) (‘‘[w]hile the established rule is that [a] sen-
tence in a criminal case may be modified at any time
during the term of court at which it was imposed, such
modification cannot be made after an act has been done
in execution of it’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
There are, however, common-law exceptions to this
general rule, one being that trial courts retain jurisdic-
tion after sentencing to correct an illegal sentence. See,
e.g., State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 835–36, 992 A.2d
1103 (2010). There is also a common-law exception
recognizing that trial courts have ‘‘inherent’’ power,
‘‘independent of [any] statutory provisions,’’ to open a civil
judgment ‘‘obtained by fraud’’ ‘‘in the actual absence
of consent, or because of mutual mistake’’ at any time.
Kenworthy v. Kenworthy, 180 Conn. 129, 131, 429 A.2d
837 (1980).3
   Prior to 1965, § 51-181 provided that there ‘‘shall be
such sessions of the superior court . . . held annually
. . . at such times and such places and for such dura-
tion of time as is fixed and determined by the chief
judge of the superior court . . . .’’ General Statutes
(Cum. Supp. 1963) § 51-181. Therefore, the duration of
time in which courts had the jurisdiction to open, cor-
rect, or modify their judgments was limited by the chief
judge’s decision regarding how long the sessions were
to be held. In 1965, the legislature amended § 51-181 to
specify that the court ‘‘shall be deemed continuously
in session with four quarterly sessions . . . held on the
second Tuesday of September, December, March and
June annually . . . at such times and places and for
such duration of time as is fixed . . . by the chief judge
of the superior court . . . .’’ Public Acts, Spec. Sess.,
February, 1965, No. 331, § 21, codified at General Stat-
utes (Cum. Supp. 1965) § 51-181. This further limited
the duration in which courts could open their judgments
because, although the chief judge still retained authority
to set the duration of the sessions, each session had to
begin on a particular day and end by the next specified
start date.
   In 1977, the statute was modified to remove any refer-
ence to sessions, providing that ‘‘[t]he superior court
shall sit continuously throughout the year, at such times
and places and for such duration of time as is fixed
and determined by the chief court administrator . . . .’’
P.A. 77-576, § 27 (effective July 1, 1978). This statutory
change was accomplished alongside numerous other
statutory changes—including the reorganization of judi-
cial districts and the increase of salaries of judges. See
generally P.A. 77-576. This modification to § 51-181 was
one section of a sixty-five section bill the purpose of
which was to ensure an efficient transition to the reorga-
nized, one tier court system that the legislature estab-
lished the previous year; see Public Acts 1976, No. 76-
436; which merged the Court of Common Pleas and the
Juvenile Court with the Superior Court. When testifying
in favor of the bill before the Judiciary Committee, a
representative from the Office of the Executive Secre-
tary of the State Judicial Department4 noted that, since
the merger of the courts in 1976, there was confusion
regarding the use of the words ‘‘term’’ and ‘‘session.’’
See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judi-
ciary, Pt. 4, 1977 Sess., p. 1360, remarks of Harriett
Rosen. This bill clarified that confusion in part by keep-
ing language that was already present in the statute—
that the court was ‘‘continuously’’ in session—but
removing the reference to ‘‘sessions.’’ P.A. 77-576, § 27.
Thus, the legislature removed the time frame for when
a trial court could exercise its inherent authority to
open, correct, or modify judgments. There is nothing
in the alterations to the statutes governing the court
system, however, that explicitly divests the courts of
their inherent authority to open, correct, or modify judg-
ments.
   Concurrently with this change, in § 28 of P.A. 77-576,
which was codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1979)
§ 52-212a, the legislature established what is now referred
to as the ‘‘four month’’ rule. General Statutes (Rev. to
2019) § 52-212a provided that, ‘‘in such cases in which
the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment
or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be
opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside
is filed within four months following the date on which
it was rendered or passed.’’ In other words, having
explicitly removed the time frame for when the court
may exercise its inherent authority to open, correct, or
modify judgments, the legislature filled in the gap by
creating the four month rule, explicitly divesting the
court of its common-law authority to open, correct, or
modify judgments in civil cases. See General Statutes
(Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (a). No similar statute was enacted
for criminal judgments. However, just because the legis-
lature provided a specific rule for civil judgments does
not necessarily mean it intended to eviscerate a court’s
jurisdiction in criminal cases to open, correct, or mod-
ify. This begs the question: assuming that jurisdiction
previously existed, what happened to the court’s inher-
ent common-law authority to open, correct, or modify
a judgment in the criminal context?
   The majority infers from the legislature’s removal of
the reference to court ‘‘sessions’’ in § 51-181, a small
part of a bill intended to implement an omnibus court
reorganization bill, that, at the same time the legislature
explicitly removed the timing of the court’s sittings,
it implicitly also took away the courts’ common-law
authority to open, correct, or modify criminal judg-
ments. That is to say, the legislature not only removed
the time frame during which the courts could exercise
their inherent authority but also divested the courts of
that authority entirely.
   The majority reasons that ‘‘it is not appropriately
within our purview to infer jurisdiction when no statu-
tory provision exists to grant it.’’ This is unquestionably
true when we had no common-law jurisdiction in the
area. But we have also said that ‘‘[t]he Superior Court
is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction. In the
absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the
limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common
law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos,
supra, 306 Conn. 133–34.
   It is well established that, at common law, a trial court
had the discretionary power to open, correct, or modify
its judgment. Id., 134. This court has identified two
common-law, temporal limitations on this power. The
first is not at issue: that a court loses jurisdiction after
a defendant’s sentence has been executed. See, e.g.,
State v. Pallotti, 119 Conn. 70, 74, 174 A. 74 (1934). The
second was that the court’s jurisdiction to open, correct,
or modify a judgment is limited to the term or session
in which the judgment was rendered. See Sturdevant
v. Stanton, supra, 47 Conn. 580. Now that the Superior
Court—by legislative action—no longer sits in terms or
sessions, a court term or session cannot constitute the
measure of the temporal limit of the courts’ jurisdiction.
But I do not agree that it is ineluctable that this means
the courts now lack this authority entirely. Indeed, noth-
ing in the amendments passed in 1977 explicitly
divested or limited the courts’ authority to open, cor-
rect, or modify criminal judgments.
    As this court must strictly construe statutes that seek
to limit the courts’ common-law authority, looking to
the explicit language removed from § 51-181 by the 1977
amendment, why is it not as reasonable a conclusion
that the legislature intended to extend the courts’ authority
to open, correct, or modify judgments by removing any
temporal limitation? I disagree with the majority that
the statutory changes altering the Superior Court’s
structure fully divested our courts of their common-
law authority to open, correct, or modify criminal judg-
ments. In my view, this reasoning too easily cedes inher-
ent judicial authority to the legislature in a context in
which I find no evidence that the legislature has sought
to annex this authority for its own. In my view, upon
the modest change in the statute, the judiciary retains
its common-law authority to develop and adapt the
common law in light of the fact that courts no longer
sit in sessions. See State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason
Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. 412, 436, 54 A.3d 1005
(2012) (acknowledging that this court has ‘‘authority to
adapt the common law to the changing needs of soci-
ety,’’ although not in sovereign immunity cases); see
also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing
Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102, 21 S. Ct. 561, 45 L. Ed. 765 (1901)
(‘‘the common law comprises the body of those princi-
ples and rules of action . . . which derive their author-
ity . . . from the judgments and decrees of the courts’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. McCoy,
supra, 331 Conn. 608 (D’Auria, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (‘‘[a]ccordingly, because the rule
at issue is a common-law rule, this court has the author-
ity to clarify, develop, and adapt the rule’’).
                             II
    That begs the question of what is the proper rule
to apply to the opening or modification of criminal
judgments under our common law. I note initially that
it is unclear if the court’s pre-1977 common-law author-
ity to open, correct, or modify a judgment before the
end of the session applied to the dismissal of criminal
cases at all. As I will discuss, there are sound reasons
why the authority to open, correct, or modify a judg-
ment should not extend to judgments of dismissal. If
this authority did not exist before 1977, then the courts
do not have this authority now, and this court may not
extend its jurisdiction beyond the bounds that existed
at common law. See State v. Ramos, supra, 306 Conn.
133–34 (‘‘[i]n the absence of statutory or constitutional
provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by
the common law’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
I am unaware of, and the parties have not cited, any
case law regarding whether the common-law rule gov-
erning the opening and modification of judgments extended
to criminal judgments. This might be the answer.
   Absent conclusive evidence that this common-law
rule did not apply to criminal judgments of dismissal,
I will assume that it did. In making this assumption, I
am mindful of the fact that our state courts are common-
law courts; see State v. Luzietti, supra, 230 Conn. 431
(‘‘The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general
jurisdiction. . . . In the absence of statutory or consti-
tutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are
delineated by the common law.’’ (Citation omitted; foot-
note omitted.)); and this court is the ultimate arbiter
of the scope of our courts’ common-law jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26, 45, 996 A.2d
259 (2010) (‘‘it is manifest to our hierarchical judicial
system that this court has the final say on matters of
Connecticut law’’). Thus, once the legislature amended
§ 51-181 to eliminate the word ‘‘sessions,’’ it was for
this court to then decide the impact of this change on
the common-law authority to open, correct, or modify
criminal judgments.
  Common-law judging often involves the search for a
sensible rule that accommodates the interests impli-
cated, and, in this case, any new common-law rule would
have to be limited in a way that does not enhance our
common-law jurisdiction. The rule the majority announces
today as a matter of first impression—that, by legislative
action in 1977, courts lost their inherent authority to
open, correct, or modify criminal judgments of dis-
missal immediately—is actually an exception to the
general rule that I have already referred to twice: that
courts have inherent authority to do so. But as I explained,
because the legislature has not explicitly abrogated the
courts’ common-law authority to open, correct, or mod-
ify criminal judgments, I disagree with the exception
the majority adopts. Rather, assuming that the common-
law rule historically applied to criminal judgments, a
review of our relevant case law regarding jurisdiction
in criminal cases provides guidance for the rule that I
suggest this court could consider adopting in light of
the legislature’s elimination of the word ‘‘sessions’’ in
§ 51-181: that courts retain jurisdiction to open, correct,
or modify a criminal judgment during the twenty day
appeal period if the state places the defendant on notice
at the time of judgment that it may seek to appeal.
   As the majority correctly notes, the dismissal of crimi-
nal charges is a complete and final resolution of all
pending charges, and, under the reasoning in McCoy, a
trial court would lose jurisdiction following that action,
similar to an acquittal. The state does have the statutory
right to seek permission to appeal from any dismissal
of charges pursuant to General Statutes § 54-96. This
court has held that, ‘‘[u]nder § 54-96 . . . permission
to appeal [is] jurisdictional because, at common law,
the state had no right to appeal in criminal cases.’’
Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 614, 646 A.2d 126
(1994). One important limit to the state’s ability to
appeal is that, ‘‘to protect the rights of both the [s]tate
and the accused and to have an orderly procedure, it
was essential that the practice under the statute of 1886
[the original statute giving the state the right to appeal
in a criminal case] should require the [s]tate’s [a]ttorney
or prosecutor to secure from the presiding judge per-
mission to appeal at the time the judgment of acquittal
[or dismissal] was rendered.’’ (Emphasis added.) State
v. Carabetta, 106 Conn. 114, 117, 137 A. 394 (1927).
In recognizing this restriction, this court in Carabetta
acknowledged that ‘‘[t]he instances [in which a prosecu-
tor] will not know at the time of the judgment whether
or not he should appeal will be few. The consequences
to [the] [s]tate and [to the] accused compel this practice,
and the incidental occasional inconvenience to the pros-
ecutor must be accepted for the larger public interests
involved—the just interests of the accused and of the
[s]tate and of the orderly procedure which alone can
make this statute effective and serviceable. . . . It is
not necessary that the prosecutor shall at the moment
of judgment reach a final determination that he will
prosecute the appeal. It is necessary that he determine
at the time of the judgment that he ought to ask the
court for permission to take such appeal, so that the
accused shall not be forthwith discharged . . . .’’ (Cita-
tions omitted.) Id., 118–19.
   This rule has been affirmed multiple times, including
in State v. Ross, 189 Conn. 42, 46–47, 454 A.2d 266 (1983).
The defendant in Ross claimed that the state’s appeal
should be dismissed because of the five day delay by
the state in filing its written request for permission to
appeal. Id., 46. On appeal, this court noted that ‘‘[t]he
evil perceived in granting a tardy request of the state
to appeal was the injustice of dragging back into court
a defendant who had reasonably assumed that his dis-
charge meant that he was a free man no longer charged
with a crime. State v. Carabetta, supra, [106 Conn.]
117. No such expectation could reasonably have been
entertained by [the] defendants, however, because the
state did express its intention to appeal at the time
of judgment and the court refused to discharge the
defendants when such a request was made during the
proceeding. . . . The defendants were fully aware that
the state intended to appeal.’’ (Citation omitted.) State
v. Ross, supra, 46. This has also become the expected
course of action when the state intends to appeal from
a dismissal of charges. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 219
Conn. 752, 755–56, 595 A.2d 832 (1991); State v. Rios,
110 Conn. App. 442, 448 n.6, 954 A.2d 901 (2008); State
v. Tyler, 6 Conn. App. 505, 507, 506 A.2d 562 (1986).
   Because of the requirement, this court has explained
that the trial court loses jurisdiction absent notice at
the time of judgment that the state intends to appeal.
See State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 109, 384 A.2d 315
(1977) (holding that court retained in personam juris-
diction over defendant because state expressed intent
to seek permission to appeal). When the state does
provide this notice, however, the court maintains con-
tinuing jurisdiction over the case. Id. In my view, it
would be a reasonable rule for this court to adopt—in
the absence of court ‘‘sessions’’ to measure the courts’
continuing jurisdiction to open, correct, or modify—
that, once the state provides notice of its intent to appeal
from a dismissal, the trial court retains jurisdiction to
decide any motion, including a motion to open, filed
within the twenty day appeal period. There is logic to
this rule in that it ‘‘imposes reasonable demands on the
trial attorneys to discover and disclose problems they
perceive with the judgment.’’ State v. Luzietti, supra,
230 Conn. 440 (Katz, J., dissenting). It also provides
the defendant with adequate notice that he may not
ultimately remain a free man. See State v. Middleton,
20 Conn. App. 321, 326–27, 566 A.2d 1363 (1989) (court
held that, although state did not explicitly express inten-
tion to appeal, because state took formal exception to
court’s ruling, defendant was on notice of possibility
of appeal).
   Nevertheless, even if the majority were to adopt this
rule, I would have to conclude that the majority reaches
the right conclusion in this particular case. Although
the state could not have announced its intent to appeal
at the time the charges against the defendant were
dismissed, as it could not have known the information
it would receive the next day, the prevailing notion that
a defendant is entitled to notice that his charges may
be reinstated governs here as well. See State v. Tucker,
supra, 219 Conn. 755. The state did not announce its
intent to appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case
or otherwise do anything to put the defendant on notice
that the charges against him could be reinstated after
the dismissal. Thus, at the time of judgment—the dis-
missal of the charges—because the state stated no
intention to challenge the judgment, the trial court lost
its jurisdiction. As a result, the trial court should have
denied the state’s motion to open because the defendant
in this case would not have been on notice that the
charges against him could have been reinstated. This
result, however, does not necessitate the holding that
the trial court does not have the inherent authority to
open, correct, or modify its judgments in criminal cases
because of an action taken by the legislature.
  Finally, this court could decide that, without trial
courts sitting in ‘‘sessions’’ any longer, there is no longer
any sensible rule we can fashion that would appropri-
ately cabin the trial courts’ authority to open, correct,
or modify criminal judgments of dismissal. We could
conclude that the rule should be that courts no longer
have any such authority. This would be a decision by
this court, however, and would be a very different thing
than concluding that the legislature removed from § 51-
181 in the 1977 amendment a portion of the inherent
common-law authority of our trial courts by eliminating
any reference to ‘‘sessions.’’
      Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part.
  1
     The majority confuses this maxim and insists that ‘‘it is not appropriately
within our purview to infer jurisdiction when no statutory provision exists
to grant it.’’
   2
     The majority correctly observes that this court has interpreted the word
‘‘term’’ to refer to ‘‘sessions’’ of the court, ‘‘as it was defined in early enact-
ments of § 51-181.’’ The word ‘‘term,’’ as used in the common-law rule that
a judgment may not be opened after the term during which it was rendered,
has been interpreted to mean ‘‘sessions’’ of court, as defined in § 51-181,
and not the statutory annual term provided for in General Statutes § 51-179.
Cichy v. Kostyk, 143 Conn. 688, 695–96, 125 A.2d 483 (1956).
   3
     As the majority notes, it is not clear whether this particular rule applies
in the criminal context, and we need not reach that issue in this case.
   4
     Although this position no longer exists, at the time, the Office of the
Executive Secretary of the State Judicial Department was a position
appointed by the Chief Court Administrator, and the individual appointed
to that position handled the administration of the nonjudicial business of
the Judicial Department. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 51-8.