Court Opinion

ID: 9573244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:50:47.835052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:57.449586
License: Public Domain

GOOLSBY, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent and adhere to this court’s original majority opinion, an opinion I authored and one in which Judge Shaw, then the senior associate judge of this court, fully concurred. I have altered that opinion somewhat, making it a dissenting opinion. It immediately follows.
Guenter and Karen S. Burbach brought this action against their residential landlords, Investors Management Corpora*500tion International (IMC) and Hoflang Industries. The landlords appeal the jury’s verdict against them.
In January, 1991, the Burbachs executed a one-year lease for a house owned by Hoflang. The Burbachs gave a security deposit of $350 to IMC, Hofiang’s leasing agent.
Karen Burbach testified the Burbachs had constant problems with the house’s oil furnace that neither IMC nor Hoflang resolved. In November, 1991, the Burbachs gave IMC written notice of their intention to vacate due to the heating system’s failure. They vacated the house on Thanksgiving Day, 1991.
At trial the Burbachs contended IMC never returned their security deposit after proper demand. In their amended complaint, they alleged causes of action against IMC and Hoflang for (1) failure to return the security deposit under S.C.Code Ann. § 27-40-410 (1991 & Supp.1996) of the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (RLTA); (2) failure to provide essential services under sections 27-40-440 and 27 — 40-630 of the RLTA; (3) common law conversion of their security deposit; and (4) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), S.C.Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 through -560 (1985 & Supp.1996). The landlords counterclaimed for damages for lost rents and repairs.
During the' trial, the Burbachs presented testimony from three prior tenants of the landlords. These witnesses testified about IMC’s failure to return their security deposits and its attempt to charge them for repairs. They also testified about court actions brought by and against IMC arising from these disputes and the outcomes of these actions. The trial court admitted the testimony over the landlords’ objection, finding it relevant to the Burbachs’ UTPA claim, as well as to the issue of punitive damages under their conversion cause of action.
The jury found for the Burbachs on all of their causes of action and awarded the Burbachs $32,000 in punitive damages for the conversion of their $350. After the Burbachs elected to recover on the conversion cause of action, the trial court conducted a post-trial review of the punitive damages award and affirmed it.
*501The landlords contend the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the prior tenants’ claims against IMC. They argue that evidence was not relevant on the UTPA or the conversion causes of action because the complaints of the prior tenants were dissimilar to the Burbachs’ complaints. I agree.
Evidence meets the test of relevance if it “tends to establish or to make more or less probable some matter in issue upon which it directly or indirectly bears.” Crowley v. Spivey, 285 S.C. 397, 410, 329 S.E.2d 774, 782 (Ct.App.1985). Determinations of relevance are largely within the trial court’s discretion and its decision to either admit or reject evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of such discretion amounting to an error of law to the prejudice of the appellant’s rights. Merrill v. Barton, 250 S.C. 193, 156 S.E.2d 862 (1967). Evidence of similar acts is admissible where there is some special relation between them that would tend to prove or disprove some fact in dispute. Reed v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 286 S.E.2d 384 (1982); Oconee Roller Mills, Inc. v. Spitzer, 300 S.C. 358, 387 S.E.2d 718 (Ct.App.1990). Evidence of similar facts, conditions, or occurrences is inadmissible if not pertinent to the issues in the case. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 770, at 161 (1996). See also Martin v. Amusements of America, 38 N.C.App. 130, 247 S.E.2d 639, 642-43 (1978) (“[E]vidence of similar occurrences or conditions may be admitted upon a showing of ‘substantial identity of circumstances and reasonable proximity in time.’ ... When the circumstances or conditions depicted by such evidence are so dissimilar that the evidence offered lacks substantial probative value, there arises the danger that the jury’s confusion of the issues will outweigh any benefit to be derived from admitting the evidence, and in such a case the evidence should be excluded.”).
The Burbachs argue the testimony in question was relevant to prove three matters: (1) the complained-of conduct affected a public interest, as defined by the UTPA; (2) the landlords’ retention of the Burbachs’ security deposit was willful as defined by the UTPA in that it followed repeated judicial notice that the conduct was wrongful; and (3) the Burbachs were entitled to punitive damages. The relevance of the past incidents of IMC’s withholding security deposits to all three of *502these showings depends upon the conclusion that the past conduct is similar to the conduct complained of in the present case. See Crary v. Djebelli 321 S.C. 38, 467 S.E.2d 128 (Ct.App.1995) (unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce have an impact upon the public interest if the acts or practices have the potential for repetition; one way to prove potential for repetition is to show the complained-of acts have occurred in the past), cert, granted (September 18,1996); S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-140(d) (1985) (“a willful violation occurs when the party committing the violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a violation of § 39-5-20”); Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350 (1991) (one factor to consider in whether to award punitive damages is the existence of past similar conduct on the part of the defendant); see also State ex rel. Tinsman v. Hott, 188 W.Va. 349, 424 S.E.2d 584 (1992) (even where pattern and practice evidence is otherwise properly admissible, such evidence is nonetheless subject to the similarity test).
Here, the circumstances surrounding IMC’s past withholdings of security deposits of the former tenants were so different from the circumstances of the present case that the testimony concerning the prior withholdings was not probative on the issues in question. Specifically, the claims IMC made against its former tenants were substantially different from those it made against the Burbaehs. The damages sought by IMC against witness Harold Doe included back rent, damage to a baseboard, damage to an air conditioner, and costs for taking photographs of the rental property and replacing light bulbs. Lynn Channell’s lawsuit involved charges for replacing light bulbs, a heating element for the water heater, and a towel rack. At issue in IMC’s dispute with Deborah Gower were a professional cleaning fee and charges for replacing range pans and light bulbs.1 The conflicts IMC had with these prior tenants are significantly dissimilar to the conflict in the present case, which involves primarily the Burbaehs’ claim that IMC constructively evicted them and IMC’s claim that the Burbaehs failed to fulfill their lease term.
*503The trial court’s admission of the evidence of INC’s prior withholdings was prejudicial to the landlords in that the jury, as evidenced by its enormous, if not shocking, punitive damages award, clearly considered IMC’s past actions. Particularly prejudicial was the admission of testimony about the outcomes of the prior court actions. Other jurisdictions have recognized the inherent problems of such information. Cf Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Reference by Counsel in Civil Case to Amount of Verdict in Similar Cases, 15 A.L.R.3d 1144,1146 (1967) (“Most courts hold, or recognize, that it is improper for counsel in civil cases to call to the attention of the jury the amount of verdicts in similar cases.”).
I would therefore hold the trial court’s admission of testimony of the IMC’s past withholdings amounted to an abuse of discretion that unfairly prejudiced the landlords. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 770, at 161-62 (1996) (evidence of prior similar occurrences “is generally inadmissible on the grounds of relevance” and even where admission of such evidence is appropriate it may be excluded where “it would ... be unfairly prejudicial”).
I would reverse and remand.

. Gower was even allowed to testify that she was without heat for several weeks even though the judge in her case ruled IMC's conduct in that regard was reasonable.