Court Opinion

ID: 9400018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 06:09:34.023007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.660637
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed May 31, 2023

                                        In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00235-CR

                           HUI ZHU LU, Appellant
                                    V.
                        THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6
                             Collin County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 006-85110-2021

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Smith, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Breedlove
      Appellant Hui Zhu Lu was charged and convicted of prostitution after a jury

trial. The trial court sentenced her to six months’ confinement, probated for 12

months. Appellant appeals, complaining in four issues that: (1) the trial court

erroneously refused to suppress evidence obtained due to an officer’s illegal

conduct; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury pursuant to TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23; (3) the jury’s determination that appellant committed

prostitution is not sufficiently supported by the evidence; and (4) appellant’s right to

a speedy trial was violated. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                 I.    BACKGROUND

      On January 17, 2020, appellant was arrested during a sting operation

performed by Plano police officers at the Hands-On Wellness Center in Plano.

During the sting, Detective George Johnson entered the massage parlor and

requested a 30-minute massage from appellant. She led him to a closed room where

he undressed completely, laid face-down on the massage table, and covered his

buttocks with a towel. Appellant returned to the room and began massaging

Johnson. She then removed the towel, exposing his buttocks. While massaging him,

she grazed his genitals several times. After about twenty minutes, appellant dimmed

the lights and instructed Johnson to turn over onto his back, which exposed his

genitals. She then asked Johnson what he wanted, to which he replied, “Can I get a

hand job?” She asked if he wanted her to take her clothes off. He said no and then

repeated, “A hand job, and is $60 okay?” She replied, “Yep, hand job, $60, okay.”

Johnson then excused himself to the restroom where he called the signal for his

fellow officers to arrest appellant.

      Appellant was charged with prostitution and pled not guilty. On February 8,

2022, a jury found her guilty of prostitution. She then entered into an agreement

with the State regarding punishment by which the court abided. She was sentenced

to six months’ confinement, probated for 12 months with conditions.

                                        –2–
      Appellant appealed the trial court’s sentence on March 21, 2022. In four

issues, appellant complains that:

      1. A Plano officer exposed his penis without permission in a public place
         oblivious to other persons present in the establishment and without concern
         as to who it may offend. His conduct constituted disorderly conduct with
         no legal exception for law enforcement and was directly calculated
         towards appellant in the furtherance of his investigation. The trial court
         erroneously refused to suppress the evidence attained due to the officer’s
         illegal conduct pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23.

      2. A Plano officer exposed his penis without permission in a public place
         oblivious to other persons present in the establishment and without concern
         as to who it may offend. His conduct constituted disorderly conduct with
         no legal exception for law enforcement and was directly calculated
         towards appellant in the furtherance of his investigation. The trial court
         refused to charge the jury pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
         38.23.

      3. The jury’s determination that appellant committed prostitution is not
         sufficiently supported by the evidence.

      4. The delay of 25 months which was almost solely attributable to the State,
         their initial defective information, their bumbling discovery mishaps, and
         finally their miscommunication with arresting officer which caused them
         to beg for a continuance was excessive and violated appellant’s right to a
         speedy trial.

                                       –3–
In response, the State argues that:

      1. The State did not violate any laws. Appellant alleges wrongful conduct to
         have occurred prior to her criminal act, and article 38.23 does not apply to
         conduct occurring prior to the criminal act.

      2. There were no disputed issues of material fact, and article 38.23 would not
         apply because appellant alleged wrongful conduct to have occurred before
         the criminal offense took place.

      3. The State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine
         without speculation that she knowingly agreed to engage in sexual conduct
         for a fee.

      4. The COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court’s schedule, and agreed resets
         were the primary reasons for the delay. Appellant caused further delay by
         filing a motion to quash immediately before her first trial date. After
         subsequently asserting her speedy trial rights, the State did seek a
         continuance for one week, but then appellant sought a continuance, which
         delayed her trial for another three months. Appellant failed to assert her
         speedy trial rights for 20 months, and then only requested a speedy trial
         after filing a motion to quash. Appellant’s conduct indicated that she was
         not interested in a speedy trial, but rather avoiding trial by way of a speedy
         trial dismissal or other procedural tactic. She suffered no prejudice from
         any delay.

               II.   APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

          We address each of appellant’s four issues below. Because issues three

   and four, if sustained, require us to render a judgment of acquittal, we will address

   those first before turning to issues one and two, which, if sustained, require us to

   remand for a new trial.

                                         –4–
A. Legal Sufficiency (Appellant’s Third Issue)

      1. Applicable Law

      Appellant argues in her third issue that there was legally insufficient evidence

for a jury to find her guilty of prostitution. A person commits the offense of

prostitution if she knowingly offers or agrees to receive a fee to engage in sexual

conduct. TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.02(a). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence

to support a criminal conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and

reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational factfinder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019). This standard requires that we defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact

fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Zuniga v. State, 551

S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a

defendant’s guilt. Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(internal citations omitted). Proof of mental state will almost always depend upon

circumstantial evidence. Duntsch v. State, 568 S.W.3d 193, 216 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Lincoln v. State, 307 SW.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2010, no pet.)).

                                         –5–
      2. Discussion

      Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence of any

particular element of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(a). Rather,

appellant challenges whether there was enough evidence for the jury to find that

appellant possessed the requisite command of English to engage in the alleged

transaction. She also argues that Johnson did not know her or “how much English

language” she understood, and that it was “unclear” whether she agreed to the

transaction or was only repeating what Johnson said. However, the jury was free to

believe or disbelieve any evidence of a language barrier. See Braughton v. State,

569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“As the sole judge of the weight and

credibility of the evidence, the jury is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of

all witnesses and to accept or reject any or all of the defensive evidence.”).

      Under the circumstances, the jury could have reasonably concluded appellant

possessed the requisite understanding of English to be able to engage in a transaction

of the type that would violate penal code § 43.02(a) based on the testimony of

Johnson and the audio recording in evidence. The evidence is legally sufficient to

support a prostitution conviction. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.02(a) (“A person

commits an offense if the person knowingly offers or agrees to receive a fee from

another to engage in sexual conduct.”). We overrule appellant’s third issue.

                                         –6–
B. Speedy Trial (Appellant’s Fourth Issue)

      1. Applicable Law

      Appellant argues in her fourth issue that her case should have been dismissed

because her rights to a speedy trial were violated. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to a speedy

trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a speedy trial attaches once a person

is either arrested or charged. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). Courts determine a speedy trial claim on an ad hoc basis by analyzing and

weighing four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the State’s reason for the

delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of her right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice

to the defendant because of the length of delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530

(1972); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. The State has the burden to justify the length of

the delay, while the defendant has the burden to prove she asserted her right and has

been prejudiced. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280.

      We apply a bifurcated standard of review in a speedy trial analysis: we employ

an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components and a de novo standard

for the legal components. State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 113–14 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). Thus, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s historical findings of

fact that are supported by the record. Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014). The balancing test of the Barker factors is a purely legal question

                                         –7–
that we review de novo. Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 768 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016).

      2. Discussion

         i.     Length of delay

      To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make an initial showing

that “the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing

ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808

(quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)); see also Barker,

407 U.S. at 530–32 (holding that length of delay is the “triggering mechanism” for

an analysis of the other factors). Here, the State does not contend the 25 month

interval between accusation and trial was an insufficient delay for appellant to make

the initial showing required by the first Barker factor. We agree.

         ii.    Reason for delay

      We do not attribute equal weight to all reasons for delay: an intentional delay

for tactical reasons is weighed heavily against the State; a neutral reason, such as

overcrowded courts or negligence, is weighed less heavily against the State; and a

valid reason is not weighed against the State at all. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818,

822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The timeline of this case can be divided into several

distinct segments, and we will review the weight attributed to each segment

individually.

                                        –8–
        January 17, 2020–March 30, 2020

        The State charged appellant approximately two months after her arrest. This

is an expected and acceptable delay. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889–90 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2003) (determining that the initial three months it took to charge an

appellant could not be counted against the State “since the State was entitled to a

reasonable period in which to prepare its case”). Accordingly, we hold this time

does not weigh against the State.

        March 31, 2020–December 3, 2020

        After appellant was charged, another eight months passed before the case was

set for trial. Both appellant and the State agree that this delay was due to the COVID-

19 pandemic and its accompanying limitations on the entire judicial system. “Delay

caused by the onset of a pandemic cannot be attributed as fault to the State.” State

v. Conatser, 645 S.W.3d 925, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.). Therefore,

we hold this period does not weigh against the State.1 Further, it appears from the

record that appellant agreed to several resets during this time. Because appellant

agreed to the resets, the remaining time leading up to the December 4, 2020 hearing

likewise does not weigh against the State. See Hogenson v. State, No. 05-14-00981-

    1
      We agree with the State that this case is readily distinguishable from Huynh v. State in which we held
that “delay following the onset of a pandemic, after a reasonable time to put safeguards in place, should be
attributable to the State . . . .” No. 05-21-00991-CR, 2022 WL 17261166, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov.
29, 2022, no pet. h.) (mot. for reh’g pending). In that case, “the case likely could have been tried before a
jury prior to the onset of the pandemic” when the appellant asserted his speedy trial rights well before the
onset of the pandemic and only three months after his arrest. In this case, the pandemic began mere weeks
before appellant was formally charged, and she waited 18 months to assert her speedy trial rights.
                                                    –9–
CR, 2015 WL 3900352, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (citing Celestine v. State, 356 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding that the months of delay that the

defendant agreed to cannot be counted against the State)).

      December 4, 2020–August 1, 2021

      On December 4, 2020, the trial court set the case for trial on August 2, 2021.

No reason was given for the eight-month delay between these two dates.

Accordingly, this delay is treated as having a neutral reason and weighs only slightly

against the State. See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (“In the absence of an assigned

reason for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the part of

the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.” [internal quotation

omitted]).

      August 2, 2021–November 1, 2021

      Appellant filed a motion to quash on July 27, 2021, which the trial court

granted on July 29, 2021. This caused the cancellation of her August 2, 2021 jury

trial. The State refiled charges against appellant on August 6, 2021, and appellant

subsequently invoked her speedy trial rights on August 23, 2021. The trial court

then set trial for November 1, 2021.

      Appellant argues that because the initial charging instrument was faulty, the

time between the trial settings should be weighed against the State. However,

appellant provides no citation to any legal authority to support this proposition. The

                                         –10–
State argues that appellant could have filed her motion to quash anytime during the

prior sixteen months but chose not to do so until less than a week before trial,

practically guaranteeing that her trial date would be delayed. The State further

asserts that appellant could have asked the trial court for a less drastic remedy, such

as agreeing to have the State amend the information pursuant to article 28.10. The

State cites Munoz for the proposition that because appellant was responsible for the

delays during this period, it should not weigh against the State. See Munoz v. State,

991 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“delay which is attributable in whole

or in part to the defendant may even constitute a waiver of a speedy trial claim”).

We agree and conclude that this three-month delay does not weigh against the State.

[or similar conclusion].

      November 1, 2021–November 8, 2021

      On October 21, 2021, the State requested a continuance of the November 1,

2021 trial setting due to the unavailability of Johnson, the State’s key witness.

Appellant argues that this period should weigh against the State because the State

had input in the trial setting date and should have ensured its key witnesses were

available before scheduling trial on that date. Appellant offers no legal authority to

support this argument. According to the State, the scheduling conflict was an

unintentional result of a miscommunication with Johnson about his availability.

Accordingly, this brief delay should not weigh against the State because material

witness unavailability is a valid reason for delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

                                        –11–
      November 8, 2021–February 7, 2022

      Appellant filed a motion for continuance as a result of late disclosure of

evidence that was granted on November 5, 2021. According to the trial court, the

court was initially under the false impression that the State had intentionally

withheld evidence, but the trial court later determined that the disclosure was

actually in response to a late defense request. According to appellant, appellant

requested additional discovery in October 2021, and when the State produced the

requested evidence, appellant requested a continuance “with the belief that it was

necessary to preserve error on the late disclosure of evidence.” We defer to the trial

court’s oral finding that the delay was caused by a late discovery request from

appellant rather than an intentional late disclosure of evidence by the State. See

Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 808 (deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact that are

supported by the record). Therefore, this delay weighs against appellant rather than

against the State. See Munoz 991 S.W.2d at 822.

      Finally, there is no evidence that the State deliberately delayed appellant’s

trial for strategic gain. Because all of the periods discussed above either do not

weigh against the State or do so only slightly, we conclude the second Barker factor

weighs only slightly against the State. See Conatser, 645 S.W.3d at 930.

         iii.   Defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial

      The third Barker factor examines the defendant’s assertion of her right to a

speedy trial. Appellant’s assertion of her right should receive “strong evidentiary

                                        –12–
weight” in our determination of whether she has been deprived of that right. See

Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771. If a defendant does not timely demand a speedy trial,

we must assume that she did not really want one. Id. And the longer the delay before

trial, the more likely it would be that a defendant wanting a speedy trial would

request it. Id.

      In this case, appellant first raised the issue of a speedy trial approximately 18

months after she had been arrested and 16 months after she had been initially

charged. Less than two months after invoking her rights, she requested dismissal.

Although the appellant did not file for a dismissal first instead of a speedy trial, the

very short time between when appellant invoked her rights and when she requested

dismissal has the same effect—it weakens her speedy trial claim because it shows a

desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283. We

conclude that the third Barker factor weighs against her.

          iv.     Prejudice to the defendant

      The fourth and final Barker factor we consider is the prejudice caused to the

defendant as a result of the State’s delay. The defendant has the burden of showing

prejudice. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. We assess this factor in light of the three

interests the right to a speedy trial is intended to protect: (1) preventing oppressive

pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and

(3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Hopper v. State, 520

S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).

                                         –13–
      Appellant’s husband, Lee Harrington, testified at the hearing; his testimony is

the only evidence in the record purporting to show prejudice. He offered no

testimony suggesting either that his wife was subject to oppressive pretrial

incarceration or that her defense was in any way impaired by the delay. See id. He

did testify that she experienced some amount of stress or anxiety. However,

“evidence of generalized anxiety, though relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice

under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the

level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation.” Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 286.

      Our review of the record indicates that, whether in response to questions from

his wife’s attorney or the prosecution, Harrington was unable to identify any

significant prejudice:

           The case has caused emotional distress for himself and appellant
            because appellant would have to return to China if she was convicted,
            and she would not be able to return or visit her son.

           Appellant has been under treatment for depression for several years
            prior to the arrest, as well as hormone therapy, both of which require
            medication that, if discontinued, would cause her harm.

           The case has exponentially increased the amount of stress appellant
            experiences.

           The motion to quash, being filed immediately preceding trial, caused a
            lot of stress for appellant.

           A witness named Joy who worked at the massage parlor at the time of
            appellant’s arrest has since moved to California, and it would be hard

                                        –14–
                to get her to Texas for trial. However, Harrington also testified that “if
                you have enough notice, it could be done.”

             Harrington has experienced a breakdown because his son died and his
              business is floundering.

        None of these facts appear to be unique to the delay and instead are either

caused by unrelated outside factors or are typical of all criminal defendants. We

conclude that appellant failed to identify any significant prejudice caused by the

State’s delay in bringing her to trial. This factor weighs heavily against her. See

Conatser, 645 S.W.3d at 931.

        After applying the four factor Barker balancing test, we conclude that

appellant failed to carry her burden to establish both that she adequately asserted her

right to a speedy trial and that the State’s delay caused her prejudice. We overrule

appellant’s fourth issue.

C. Motion to Suppress Evidence (Appellant’s First Issue)

        In her first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her

motion to suppress evidence2 collected by Johnson during the sting because the

evidence was obtained in violation of article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

    2
       Appellant does not elaborate, either before the trial court or before this court, on what specific
evidence she sought to have suppressed. However, we will interpret this argument broadly to mean a
request for suppression of both Johnson’s testimony regarding his interactions with appellant during the
sting and the audio recording made during the sting.
                                                 –15–
      1. Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

standard of review. State v. Staton, 599 S.W.3d 614, 616 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020,

pet. ref’d) (citing State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). We

give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and

review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Id. We view the record in the

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. When, as in this case, the trial

court does not make explicit findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings

of fact supported by the record. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018). We will sustain the ruling of the trial court if it is correct under any

applicable theory of law. Id.

      2. Applicable Law

      Texas law prohibits the use of evidence “obtained” in violation of Texas or

Federal law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23. But article 38.23 does not

protect a defendant whose unlawful acts occur after (or as a result of) the illegal acts

of a police officer. Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 128–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

“Article 38.23 contemplates that a crime has already been committed; that evidence

of that crime exists; and that officers violate the law in attempting to obtain evidence

of the previously committed crime.” Id.; see also State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544,

551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The exclusionary rule was designed to protect

                                         –16–
individuals from the use at trial of evidence that was obtained in an unlawful manner.

It does not, however, provide limitless protection to one who chooses to react

illegally to an unlawful act by a state agent.”). Moreover, evidence cannot be

“obtained” prior to the crime taking place. See Day, 614 S.W.3d at 128–29.

        3. Discussion

        Appellant argues that the evidence supporting her conviction for prostitution

that was obtained during the sting should be excluded because it was obtained

through Johnson’s illegal act. Appellant’s argument fails in multiple respects.

        First, appellant’s argument requires us to accept the premise that Johnson’s

conduct constituted disorderly conduct.3 We decline to do so. Johnson testified that

he was led into a private room in the massage parlor, waited until appellant left the

room, and then disrobed completely before laying down on the massage table and

covering his buttocks with a towel. The State argues that these set of facts are not

unique to Johnson—in fact, it is common practice for patrons obtaining a full-body

massage to disrobe completely, or nearly so, while in the comfort of a private

massage room. On this record, we conclude that the private room where the offense

occurred is not a public place under the meaning of Texas Penal Code § 42.01.

    3
      Appellant also accuses Johnson of committing prostitution and solicitation of prostitution, but she
specifically frames her argument for suppression based on allegations of disorderly conduct. Therefore, we
limit our analysis to the argument specifically proffered by appellant.
                                                 –17–
      Further, the record is clear that the eventual exposure of Johnson’s buttocks

and genitals to appellant was not the result of any affirmative act on Johnson’s part

but of the actions of appellant. Appellant removed the towel covering Johnson’s

buttocks, and appellant instructed Johnson to turn over onto his back without

replacing the towel over his genitals. The evidence in the record demonstrates,

therefore, that Johnson did not intentionally or knowingly expose his anus or genitals

in violation of Texas Penal Code § 42.01.

      Second, appellant’s argument fails because, even if we were to hold that

Johnson’s conduct did constitute disorderly conduct, his illegal action took place

prior to appellant’s commission of the offense. The exposure of Johnson’s buttocks

and genitals occurred prior to the conversation between Johnson and appellant where

she allegedly agreed to perform a sexual act for a fee. Therefore, any evidence of

the crime could not have been obtained at that time and is admissible under TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23. See Day, 614 S.W.3d at 128–29.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s objection

regarding the admission of evidence obtained during the sting. See Lerma, 543

S.W.3d at 189–90. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

D. Article 38.23 Jury Instruction (Appellant’s Second Issue)

      In her second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in not charging the

jury pursuant to article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the issue of

whether evidence offered by the State was obtained illegally.

                                        –18–
       1. Standard of Review

       In reviewing jury-charge error, we first determine whether error exists. Price

v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Almanza v. State, 686

S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d

738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal citations omitted). If we find error, we

must then determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to require reversal.

Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743. The standard of review differs depending on whether the

defendant made a timely objection at trial. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171). If the error was the

subject of a timely objection, reversal is required if there is some harm to the

defendant as a result of the error. Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171); TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19. If no proper objection was made at trial, reversal

is required only if the error is so egregious that the defendant was denied a fair and

impartial trial. Id.

       2. Applicable Law

       Under article 38.23(a), when the evidence raises a question on whether

evidence was illegally obtained, “the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or

has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of [Chapter 38’s

provisions], then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so

obtained.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a); Madden v. State, 242

S.W.3d 504, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “To be

                                        –19–
entitled to a jury instruction under article 38.23(a), the defendant must show that

(1) an issue of historical fact was raised in front of the jury; (2) the fact was contested

by affirmative evidence at trial; and (3) the contested fact is material to the

constitutional or statutory violation that the defendant has identified as rendering the

particular evidence inadmissible.” Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 510. If there are no

disputed factual issues, the trial judge alone determines the legality of the conduct

as a question of law. Id. And if other facts, not in dispute, are sufficient to support

the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, then the disputed fact issue is not

submitted to the jury because it is not material to the evidence’s admissibility. Id.

The disputed fact must be an essential one in deciding the lawfulness of the

challenged conduct. Id. at 511.

      3. Discussion

      Here, although appellant requested an article 38.23 instruction, she did not

raise any specific fact dispute before the trial court. Further, appellant does not

identify any disputed fact issue related to Johnson’s conduct. She challenges only

the legality of the actions, not whether or how they occurred. Therefore, there was

no fact issue to be decided by the jury, and the judge correctly ruled that the legality

of Johnson’s actions was a determination to be made by the court as a matter of law.

      We therefore conclude appellant was not entitled to a jury instruction under

article 38.23. The trial court did not err by refusing to give appellant’s requested

instruction. See id. at 510. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                          –20–
                              III.   CONCLUSION

      Having overruled all four of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                         /Maricela Breedlove//
                                         MARICELA BREEDLOVE
                                         JUSTICE
220235f.u05
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

                                      –21–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

HUI ZHU LU, Appellant                         On Appeal from the County Court at
                                              Law No. 6, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-22-00235-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. 006-85110-
                                              2021.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Breedlove. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                              and Smith participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of May, 2023.

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