Court Opinion

ID: 9685860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:07:40.354818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:27.675989
License: Public Domain

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                                                RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2021-SC-0534-MR

KEITH KUZYK                                                           APPELLANT

                   ON APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                    HONORABLE JOHN L. ADKINS, JUDGE
                               NO. 19-CR-00258

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                   AFFIRMING

      Keith Allen Kuzyk was convicted by a circuit court jury of attempted

murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, theft by unlawful taking over

$10,000.00, first-degree fleeing and evading, and of being a second-degree

persistent felony offender, but was acquitted of receiving stolen property. He

was sentenced to life in prison. Kuzyk now appeals his conviction as a matter

of right, asserting prosecutorial misconduct, improper denial of a directed

verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment, denial of his right

to confrontation of the author of a ballistics report, and a deficient instruction

on the second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO-2) instruction. We affirm

his conviction and sentence.
                  I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On February 18, 2019, Autumn Neblett arrived at her sister September

Neblett’s residence in Clarksville, Tennessee, in a black Dodge truck with

Kuzyk. While September and Autumn denied knowledge at the time, this

vehicle had already been reported stolen. September got in the truck with

Autumn and Kuzyk and the three then drove and picked up a mutual friend,

Anthony Johnson. The four then traveled to the Hopkinsville Walmart where

Kuzyk and Johnson stole a white Chevrolet Tahoe.

      Johnson drove the Chevrolet (with Kuzyk as his passenger) and Autumn

drove the Dodge (with September as her passenger) to the nearby Square Deal

gas station. While there, Kuzyk and Johnson disabled accessory lights that

were beneath and on the wheels of the Chevrolet which had caused it to be

both distinctive and quite visible. This activity was reflected on surveillance

footage.

      Leaving Square Deal, Johnson drove the Chevrolet (with September as

his passenger) and Kuzyk drove away in the Dodge (with Autumn as his

passenger).

      Johnson and September were subsequently spotted by law enforcement

in the Chevrolet which had been reported stolen. They escaped but the

Chevrolet was later found abandoned in Clarksville, Tennessee. September was

arrested shortly thereafter.

      That night, Officer Jeremy Davidson spotted the Dodge, with a male in

the driver’s seat, in a parking lot in Hopkinsville. After Officer Davidson turned
on his lights and siren, the Dodge departed at a high rate of speed and ran stop

signs and traffic lights in an attempt to evade Officer Davidson’s pursuit.

      Deputy Sheriff Jack Rowland responded to Officer Davidson’s radio calls

and witnessed the pursuit approaching his location. As he moved to deploy

spike strips, Deputy Rowland witnessed the Dodge cross the center line of the

road and approach him. This was also captured on Officer Davidson’s dash

cam. The Dodge ran over a spike strip but continued fleeing.

      Officer Davidson drew close to the Dodge and began to hear bullets

impacting his patrol car. Officer Davidson was struck in the shoulder. Realizing

he was hit, Officer Davidson turned his car toward the side of the road and,

while shooting from the Dodge continued, was struck in the back of the head

by another bullet. Evidence presented at trial showed that at least eleven

rounds had been fired towards Officer Davidson.

      Deputy Rowland transported Officer Davidson to the local hospital where

a CAT scan found bleeding in Officer Davidson’s brain.

      Autumn testified she had ingested Benadryl after previously taking

methamphetamine and had fallen asleep in the Dodge, only awakening when

she heard gunshots and then witnessed Kuzyk driving the Dodge with one

hand while firing an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle out the back window with the

other. After the pursuit ended, Kuzyk abandoned the Dodge, taking the AR-15

with him. He and Autumn travelled by foot to a nearby baseball field. Autumn

remained in a dugout at the baseball field and claimed to fall back asleep there

until police arrived to find only her along with the AR-15.
        Kuzyk then stole a Ford Explorer from a Waffle House parking lot.

Eventually, law enforcement was able to use the owner’s cell phone to locate

the Ford in Clarksville, Tennessee. This resulted in yet another pursuit where

police used spike strips. This time they apprehended Kuzyk.

      At his trial, Kuzyk neither testified nor called any witnesses, relying

instead upon the cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s own witnesses as

his defense to the charges against him.

      The Christian County jury found Kuzyk guilty of the attempted murder of

Officer Davidson, theft by unlawful taking over $10,000.00, first-degree fleeing

or evading, first-degree wanton endangerment for swerving at Deputy Rowland,

and being a PFO-2. The jury recommended a life sentence which was imposed

by the trial court.

                                  II. ANALYSIS

      A. The Trial Was Not Tainted by Prosecutorial Misconduct. –
         Unpreserved

      Kuzyk argues he was denied a fair trial due to “flagrant” prosecutorial

misconduct found in the prosecutor’s opening statement, during both the guilt

phase and penalty phase closing arguments, and multiple instances of leading

questions being used in witness questioning. Recognizing that all but two of his

thirteen alleged errors are unpreserved, Kuzyk specifically seeks redress under

the manifest injustice standard set forth in Kentucky Rules of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 10.26 which provides as follows:

      A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may
      be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
      appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
      preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
      determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.

This is a stringent standard.

      An unpreserved error that is both palpable and prejudicial still
      does not justify relief unless the reviewing court determines that it
      has resulted in a manifest injustice, unless, in other words, the
      error so seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
      reputation of the proceeding as to be “shocking,” or
      jurisprudentially intolerable.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009).

      For an error to be palpable, it must be “easily perceptible, plain,
      obvious and readily noticeable.” A palpable error “must involve
      prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible error[.]”
      A palpable error must be so grave in nature that if it were
      uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the
      proceedings. Thus, what a palpable error analysis “boils down to”
      is whether the reviewing court believes there is a “substantial
      possibility” that the result in the case would have been different
      without the error.

Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (internal citations

omitted).

      Finally, in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, appellate

courts are to focus “on the overall fairness of the trial,” reversing only if the

misconduct was “so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.”

Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004).

             1. Comments Made by the Commonwealth During its Opening
                Statement and Both His Guilt Phase and Penalty Phase
                Closing Arguments Were Harmless. - Unpreserved

      With the above standards in mind, we will first assess the statements

made by the Commonwealth during its opening statement, its guilt phase

closing argument, and its penalty phase closing argument. Kuzyk alleges that
statements made by the Commonwealth in each of the three contained

impermissible opinions and legal arguments.

      As both the rules and standards of review are distinct for each category

of statements, we will address them separately.

                  a. The Commonwealth’s Opening Statement

      Kuzyk argues that the following instances of improper argumentation

during the Commonwealth’s opening statement require a new trial:

      The pursuit of Kuzyk by the officers was “one of the most
      conscientious pursuits I’ve ever seen.”
      ....

      Again, we got wanton endangerment for Jack Rowland at that
      point, we’ve got, now attempted murder for the multiple shots that
      had been fired directly at Officer Davidson, trying to disable, trying
      to take him out, when I say take him out, I’m talking about trying
      to kill him so that he can no longer pursue.
      ....

      Thank God, he actually was leaning forward because if his head
      would have been back where it normally would when he was
      driving it would have went in the side, not in the back, it would
      have went dead in the side of his head and like the doctors told
      him, just a couple of millimeters difference they wouldn’t be having
      the conversation.
      ....

      When it comes time to bring your verdict, you will be given an
      instruction of what a serious injury is, what is a serious physical
      injury, and it includes disfigurement, it includes prolonged loss of
      use and I believe that once you hear from Jeremy himself as well
      as the doctors that are going to testify, one of these wounds at
      least will qualify as a serious physical injury for the assault first
      degree charge. When you look at physical injury versus serious
      physical injury, physical injury is typically a domestic violence,
      smack somebody in the face, hit somebody, punch them, that’s
      your typical physical injury. Serious injury is next step up.
      RCr 9.42(a) requires the prosecutor in his opening statement to “state to

the jury the nature of the charge and the evidence upon which the

Commonwealth relies to support it.” Likewise, under RCr 9.42(b), the

defendant in his opening statement “may state the defense and the evidence

upon which the defendant relies to support it . . . .”

      Thus, “it is never proper in an opening statement for counsel to argue the

case or to give his personal opinions or inferences from the facts he expects to

prove.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Ky. 1951).

      In layman’s terms, the parties are confined in their opening statements

to providing a “roadmap” to the jury of the issues it will be deciding and the

evidence the parties expect to provide the jury during the trial to resolve those

issues. There is no leeway granted to either party under our rules to use their

opening statements to argue, offer opinions, or offer their own inferences to be

drawn from evidence they have yet to present.

      The Commonwealth’s Attorney ventured into offering his opinion and

making improper arguments during his opening statement—arguments which

should have been left for his closing argument. The Commonwealth Attorney’s

opinions as to the pursuit of Kuzyk, Kuzyk’s attempt to kill the officer, and how

the officer’s positioning affected his wound, were not previews of the evidence

the Commonwealth would later present, but opinions as to the conclusions

that the jury should reach based on as-of-yet unsubmitted evidence.

      However, because Kuzyk failed to object, he is required to now show how

the statements were more than simple error, but actually affected the outcome
of his trial. While noting the objectionable statements made by the

Commonwealth, Kuzyk has failed to establish that, in the overall context of his

trial, that the Commonwealth’s statements had any impact on the jury’s

verdict. Therefore, we determine that while the Commonwealth’s statements

were objectionable, they were harmless error and otherwise do not rise to the

level of palpable error.

                   b. The Commonwealth’s Guilt Phase Closing Argument

      Kuzyk argues that the Commonwealth’s Attorney made impermissible

statements designed only to “engender sympathy for the victim and his or her

family” during his guilt phase closing argument. He relies on Bennett v.

Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1998), for support of this proposition. He

also argues the Commonwealth’s Attorney made improper comments relative to

Kuzyk not taking the stand in his own defense.

      In criminal trials, the Commonwealth’s closing argument is its final

opportunity to address the jury prior to it determining a defendant’s guilt. The

Commonwealth may both restate the evidence it presented during the trial and

now argue for the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from such

evidence. Attorneys are allowed great latitude in their closing arguments.

Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987). However, no new

evidence or information may be submitted to the jury which was not previously

provided either by the court or the parties.

      We only reverse for prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument if the

misconduct was “flagrant” or if each of the following are satisfied: (1) proof of
defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; (2) defense counsel objected; and (3) the

trial court failed to cure the error with sufficient admonishment.” Barnes v.

Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002). Kuzyk does not dispute that

element (2) is not satisfied and we do not consider the Commonwealth’s

remarks here to rise to the level of “flagrant” as defined in Brafman v.

Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2020).

      The first statement cited as misconduct by Kuzyk was as follows:

      This case about [Officer Davidson], and him doing his job and a
      badge that has blood on it. His blood. For doing his job. I want the
      person who did this to be held accountable. Justice deserves it. To
      him and his family This isn’t a game you play, I was there, I wasn’t
      there. Who’s this? Who’s that? This is a life we’re talking about. A
      life of a person with a wife and children.

      We do not find the statement in this argument to be improper. In

Bennett, the victim’s mother was called to the stand for the purpose of

“humanizing” the victim and we noted that “[t]he introduction by the

prosecution of ‘a certain amount of background evidence regarding the victim

is relevant to understanding the nature of the crime.’” Id. at 325 (citations

omitted). In Bennett we ultimately determined that the mother’s statements did

not deny the defendant a fair trial and found the admission of that evidence to

have been harmless error. Here, we come to the same conclusion.

      The Commonwealth’s Attorney also made the following allegedly

improper comments during his guilt phase closing relative to Kuzyk not taking

the stand in his own defense:

      When you look at your instructions, the defendant has a right to
      remain silent. Absolutely. But when the Commonwealth rested,
      what did the Judge ask? Does the defendant want to put on any
      defense? Does the defendant want to call Anthony Johnson? Does
      the defendant want to a call anybody? No. So they want to say “you
      didn’t get to hear from Anthony Johnson, you didn’t hear from all
      these other people” but they had the opportunity. There’s no
      burden on them to do it, but if they’re going to exonerate his client,
      then why wouldn’t they be here? Why wouldn’t they? If they know
      they’re going say something that’s going to prove his innocence,
      then why wouldn’t they be here? Easy answer is because he’s
      guilty.

      The Commonwealth’s Attorney should not have made any comment on

Kuzyk remaining silent or not taking the stand in his own defense. We caution

all counsel to avoid such commentary for obvious reasons. There is no doubt

that commenting on a defendant’s right to remain silent is forbidden and that it

is of constitutional magnitude.

      The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “no person .

. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held that

“the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the

accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of

guilt.” Id. at 614; see KRE 511(a).

      Without condoning discussion of Kuzyk’s decision to remain silent, we do

not believe that the statements made here were so improper as to be

considered flagrant or palpable and instead were “harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt” in this instance. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26

(1967).

      In making our determination, we must also note that the prosecutor’s

statement acknowledged that Kuzyk’s was “absolutely” entitled to remain silent
and that the trial court also verbalized that right to the jury prior to its

deliberation together with the prohibition against any negative inference being

drawn from such. That admonition was within Jury Instruction Number Four

which was also tendered in written form to the jury. Further instruction

included reference to the burden of proof being with the Commonwealth.

Therefore, the Commonwealth’s comment did not add to what the jury already

knew: Kuzyk had a right to refuse to testify, he exercised that right, and such a

choice could not be used as evidence of his guilt.

      Just prior to the Commonwealth’s closing argument, counsel for Kuzyk

made repeated references to the Commonwealth not calling Johnson as a

witness. Defense counsel made those statements because a significant part of

its defense was that Johnson could have been the one driving the Dodge and

could have shot Officer Davidson. In this present matter, the prosecutor was

similarly noting Kuzyk’s own failure to call Johnson as a witness. Thus, it was

Kuzyk’s counsel who determined to bring up the issue of Johnson’s absence

and the Commonwealth permissibly called attention to the fact that Kuzyk too

could have called Johnson to testify but did not. This Court has previously

determined “[a]rgument that a defendant had failed to contradict the

prosecutor’s evidence has been upheld as a proper form of argument.” Murphy

v Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 53 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Haynes v

Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Ky. 1983)).

      While we must again strongly caution prosecutors to avoid any

statements regarding a defendant’s right to remain silent and to not testify,
there is no manifest injustice or any substantial possibility that the

Commonwealth’s argument seriously affected the overall fairness of the

proceedings. Thus, we decline to find that the Commonwealth’s comments rise

to the level of being flagrant or palpable error.

                    c. The Commonwealth’s Penalty Phase Closing
                       Argument

      Finally, Kuzyk alleges that statements made by the Commonwealth

during the penalty-phase of the trial contained elements of the prosecutor

testifying as a witness himself and contained impermissible misstatements of

law regarding the sentence that Kuzyk would serve in prison.

      Our Commonwealth’s truth-in-sentencing statute, i.e., KRS

532.055(2)(a)(1)-(6), lists several categories of evidence that “may be offered by

the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing” including minimum parole

eligibility and the maximum expiration of sentence as determined by the

division of probation and parole for all such current and prior offenses. Even

then, the list provided by that statute is illustrative, not exhaustive. Cornelison

v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Ky. 1999). It “does not exclude other

possibly relevant evidence.” Garrison v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 257, 260

(Ky. 2011).

      Regarding the “testifying” alleged by Kuzyk, the Commonwealth’s

Attorney, after going through all the presented evidence and arguing for a life

sentence, stated:

      I talked to Jeremy and his wife about testifying and Jeremy
      said he felt confident that what I told you and argued to you
      would express their interest, their thoughts, and I think I
      have. Jeremy swore an oath to protect this community, he
      almost died that night doing it. Don’t let the person who
      almost took his life walk away.

      Despite being hearsay, the only fact to which the Commonwealth’s

attorney “testified” was that he’d spoken to Officer Davidson and his wife.

Recognizing that this alleged error was unpreserved, we must again be

persuaded that the statements were “flagrant” or “palpable.” Under either test,

a defendant will be entitled to relief only if the prosecutor’s misconduct

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Because that standard has not been

met based on these comments, we must reject Kuzyk’s claim.

      The Commonwealth’s Attorney also stated in his penalty phase

argument:

           The only way we can give the parole board what they
           need is to give a life sentence. Because with a life
           sentence, he meets the parole board at twenty years. If
           he goes to prison and is the model inmate, does
           everything like he is supposed to, he’ll make parole. It
           sounds harsh, it sounds rough, but it puts the keys in
           his hand, it literally puts the keys to the prison in his
           own hands. If he does what he needs to do, shows that
           he changed, become remorseful, then he will be
           rewarded with parole.
      The Commonwealth Attorney should not have made the representation

that Kuzyk would “make parole.” Despite stating that Kuzyk would need to be a

model inmate to be paroled, a definitive statement that Kuzyk would be paroled

if he behaved in prison was improper and inaccurate. The Commonwealth went

beyond restating testimony it had put into evidence and we cannot

unqualifiedly determine that he was permissibly arguing for an inference that

could be drawn from that testimony. We note that the Commonwealth’s
statements were made after it had already called an officer with the

Department of Corrections Division of Probation and Parole to testify. This

officer testified that if Kuzyk were sentenced to life in prison, he would come

before the parole board at twenty years at which time it would factor Kuzyk’s

disciplinary record while in custody in making their determination. The parole

officer further testified that Kuzyk had no guarantee that he would be released

in twenty years.

      On cross examination though, Kuzyk’s counsel was able to highlight that

there would be “no guarantee of release” at twenty years. Kuzyk’s counsel also

properly emphasized this in her closing argument. Therefore, upon full

consideration of the statement within the overall context of the sentencing

portion of the trial, we cannot find that such statement rose to the level of

flagrant or palpable error.

             2. Improper Questioning of Witnesses

      Kuzyk asserts that the Commonwealth’s use of leading questions during

the direct examination of several witnesses was misconduct which denied him

a fair trial. While offering a lengthy list of alleged instances of such conduct,

Kuyzyk’s counsel only objected twice during the trial with one objection being

sustained with the court instructing the Commonwealth to cease and the

Commonwealth correcting the questioning.

      KRE 611(c) states, “[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct

examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness’

testimony . . . .” Kentucky has historically prohibited the use of leading
questions during direct examination. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence § 3.20[6], at

245–46. However, even if Kuzyk had properly objected to the leading questions,

“judgments will not be reversed because of leading questions unless the trial

judge abused his discretion and a shocking miscarriage of justice resulted.”

Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 27 (Ky. 1998).

      A review of the present trial record regarding the leading questions Kuzyk

alleges does not raise concern. The questioning, even when arguably leading in

a purely academic sense, does not appear to have been either intentional or

persistent. There were no instances where the Commonwealth’s Attorney was

feeding a witness facts beyond the witness’ personal knowledge through leading

questions and the Commonwealth’s Attorney never improperly placed his

credibility in issue as an unsworn witness against Kuzyk. What the

Commonwealth’s Attorney added to the witnesses’ testimony did not lend the

sort of central and necessary support to the Commonwealth’s case that would

be improper. See Holt v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 731 (Ky. 2007).

      The Commonwealth’s questioning in this case in singular instances, or

en toto, did not result in any manifest injustice or overarching prejudice to

Kuzyk’s right to a fair trial. The Commonwealth had otherwise overwhelming

evidence against Kuzyk so we are satisfied that these alleged errors, if any,

were harmless.

      B. The Court Correctly Determined to Deny Kuzyk’s Motion for a
         Directed Verdict on the Charge of First-Degree Wanton
         Endangerment. - Preserved
      The basis for the wanton endangerment charge was that Kuzyk swerved

the Dodge toward Deputy Rowland as Rowland was deploying the spike strips.

Kuzyk maintained that his conduct did not create “a substantial risk of death

or serious injury” to Deputy Rowland because the Dodge only veered “slightly”

over the center line, Deputy Rowland was behind his vehicle parked on the side

of the road opposite the oncoming Dodge and, therefore, was well away from

the Dodge. We disagree with Kuzyk that the evidence supports his

interpretation given the reckless manner in which Kuzyk was driving and the

proximity of Deputy Rowland to Kuzyk’s vehicle as recorded on dashcam video.

      In considering whether a motion for directed verdict should be granted,

“[t]he trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence

in favor of the party opposing the motion, and a directed verdict should not be

given unless the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”

Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983).

      If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe
      beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
      verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the
      motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the
      Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to
      the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

      On appeal, the denial of a directed verdict motion is reviewed to

determine whether “under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly

unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the defendant is entitled to a

directed verdict of acquittal.” Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 325

(Ky. 2017) (quoting Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187).
      Kuzyk was convicted of wanton endangerment in the first degree

pursuant to KRS 508.060(1) which states:

       A person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the first degree
       when, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
       the value of human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which
       creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to
       another person.

The term “wantonly” is defined by statute in relevant part as follows:

      A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a
      circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
      aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
      unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
      circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree
      that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the
      standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
      situation.

KRS 501.020(3).

      In other words, “wantonness is the awareness of and conscious disregard

of a risk that a reasonable person in the same situation would not have

disregarded[.]” Robertson v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Ky. 2002).

      In this instance, the trial court correctly concluded that there was

sufficient evidence presented in the trial to proceed to the jury and, therefore,

the trial court did not err by denying Kuzyk’s motion for a directed verdict of

acquittal on the first-degree wanton endangerment charge.

      C. The Admission of the Ballistics Report was Harmless Error. -
         Unpreserved

      Next, Kuzyk alleges that the trial court erred in allowing Special Agent

Jay Espinola to read a ballistics report that was prepared by others at a

Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) lab in Maryland. Kuzyk asserts
that he was deprived of his right of confrontation pursuant to the Sixth

Amendment and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, when the trial court

allowed Agent Espinola to testify as to the contents of a ballistics report instead

of mandating the appearance of the report’s authors. He also argues that the

report was admitted via “hearsay” since Agent Espinola had no firsthand

knowledge of the testing represented by the report.

      The report in question found that fired shell casings found in the Dodge

(from where the AR15 was fired) matched the rifle later recovered at the

baseball field. The Commonwealth seemingly concedes that the introduction of

the report, via Agent Espinola, violated Kuzyk’s right to cross-examine the

witnesses against him. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004);

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

      We agree that the admission of the ballistics report was in error. The

report, being read and submitted by a party other than the author or person

who conducted the underlying testing, was hearsay.

      Kuzyk however recognizes that he did not preserve this argument by

objecting at trial and therefore seeks palpable error review under RCr 10.26. He

further acknowledges that Confrontation Clause errors are generally subject to

a harmless error standard of review if the court is satisfied that the error was

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Heard v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d

240, 244 (Ky. 2007).

      Linking the spent shell casings found in the Dodge to the rifle found at

the baseball field was wholly unnecessary to finding that Kuzyk discharged a
firearm multiple times at Officer Davidson and bullets from that firearm struck

Officer Davidson. The recovery of either the rifle or the shell casings was not

necessary to proving either of those two facts. The overwhelming testimony and

additional evidence offered by the Commonwealth clearly established the

defendant discharged a semi-automatic 5.56mm rifle at Officer Davidson at

least eleven times wounding him twice.

      Given its insignificant role in the Commonwealth’s case as a whole, we

had no trouble concluding that the report’s introduction was not palpable error

and was otherwise harmless.

      D. The Error in the Persistent Felony Offender Instruction was not
         Palpable. - Unpreserved

      Lastly, Kuzyk claims that a typographical error in the jury instruction

regarding the persistent felony offender (PFO) charge, while not preserved, was

erroneous, presumptively prejudicial, and would warrant reversal of this

conviction on an unpreserved palpable error when a manifest injustice is

found. The jury instruction in question stated:

      Second Degree Persistent Felony Offender

       You will find the Defendant guilty of being a Second-Degree
       Persistent Felony Offender under this Instruction if, and only if,
       you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of
       the following.

       A.   That prior to February 18, 2019, the Defendant was
       convicted of the following felony:

       1. Possession of a Controlled Substance,
       Methamphetamine by final judgment of the Todd Circuit Court
       (7th Judicial Circuit) on May 30, 2012;
       OR
       B. That he was eighteen years of age or older when
       he committed the offense of which you believe he was so
       convicted;

       C. That pursuant to said prior conviction he was
       sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or more;

       D. That his parole for the Todd Circuit Court conviction expired
       within 5 years of the offense of which you have found him guilty in
       this case; AND

       E. That he is now twenty-one years of age or older.

(Emphasis added).

      This PFO instruction utilized the wrong alternative connector of “or”

instead of the conjunction “and” found in KRS 532.080(2)1 and therefore could

have, in theory, allowed the jury to find Kuzyk guilty of being a persistent

felony offender on the basis of him only being previously convicted of a felony

in Todd County.

      Kuzyk however cannot claim that any of the required factual elements of

the statute were either not introduced or were incorrect. The Commonwealth’s

Attorney elicited each of the necessary elements for this offense from the

Christian County Circuit Court Clerk and the Probation and Parole officer, both

of whom testified during the penalty phase of the trial. None of their testimony

on these elements, or the documentation underlying their testimony, were

questioned or impeached by Kuzyk’s counsel. In sum, given the objective

       1 The statute requires that to qualify as a PFO 2, the offender has to be “more

than twenty-one (21) years of age and” have been “convicted of one (1) previous felony”
with a “term of imprisonment of one (1) year or more . . . ; and” be “over the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time the offense was committed; and . . . ” otherwise qualify
based on the recency of the conviction or supervision. (Emphasis added).
nature each of the elements of this offense, and their presence in the record,

there is really no question as to whether this conviction was in error or would

change on remand.

      The instruction did contain an error but given the undisputed facts

supporting this conviction, the error was simply not palpable and does not

require a new trial.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      We are confident that Kuzyk received an appropriate and fair trial and was

properly convicted under the totality of the overwhelming evidence presented

supporting each verdict. For the foregoing reasons, Kuzyk’s convictions and the

sentence imposed by the Christian Circuit Court are affirmed in all respects.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Shannon Dupree
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders
Assistant Attorney General