Court Opinion

ID: 9480425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:47:32.652258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:40.752782
License: Public Domain

*255WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion and in the reasoning of parts I, III, and IV of the opinion. I am troubled, however, by the analysis in part II. I write separately because I believe the majority’s approach to determining whether Martinez’s conviction for public indecency is “similar to” the offenses excluded by subsection 4A1.2(c)(2) misinterprets the Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).
Subsection 4A1.2(c)(2) provides: “Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are never counted: Hitehhiking[,] Juvenile status offenses and truancy[,] Loitering[,] Minor traffic infractions[,] Public intoxication[,] Vagrancy.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 4A1.2(c)(2) (Nov. 1989) (U.S.S.G.). The majority concludes that this section articulates a general principle that offenses that are not “universally regarded as culpable” and “relevant to the likelihood the offender will engage in criminal conduct in the future” are not “significant for sentencing purposes.” Maj. op. at 254. While this interpretation of subsection 4A1.2(c)(2)’s rather ambiguous language is not implausible, I believe it is mistaken. I suggest our inquiry should instead focus on whether the activity underlying an offender’s prior offense is similar to the activity underlying the offenses enumerated in subsection 4A1.2(c)(2).
Read in context, the Guidelines support my interpretation. Subsection 4A1.2(c)(2) does not, as the majority seems to suggest, provide the general rule regarding the inclusion of minor offenses. To the contrary, the general rule is contained in section 4A1.2(e) which provides that “[sjentences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted, except as [provided in subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)].” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (emphasis added). Thus, as a starting point, all misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted in computing a defendant’s criminal history category. Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) constitute limited exceptions to this sweeping rule.
The structure of subsection (c)(2) is straightforward: it lists specific offenses that the Commission concluded did not warrant a sentence adjustment and provides that sentences for the listed offenses “and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are never counted.” Id. at § 4A1.2(c)(2). Where the majority and I differ is in our view of what the Commission’s purpose was in listing the specific offenses. As the majority sees it, the Commission enumerated the specific offenses merely to state a general principle that offenses which are not uniformly culpable or predictive of future criminal behavior are not counted. As I see it, however, the listed offenses serve a different purpose: they dictate that the sentencing court, in each case, will decide whether the defendant’s prior offense is an offense identical or similar to each listed offense. Consequently, our inquiry should be whether the acts proscribed by the Oregon public indecency statute are “similar to” the acts generally proscribed by the listed offenses. This interpretation gives continuing purpose to the listed offenses and is mindful of section 4A1.2(c)’s background injunction to count all misdemeanors and petty offenses.
The irony of the majority’s reasoning is that while its decision here relies on an analysis of the listed offenses for its holding, in the future such reliance will no longer be necessary because the general principle that only prior offenses which are uniformly culpable or predictive of future criminal behavior are counted has been inserted in place of the list. In addition to being ironic, the majority’s approach is flawed. By effectively writing the list out of the Guidelines, the majority departs from the basic canon of statutory interpretation that a court should not interpret a statute to render meaningless certain parts of that statute. See, e.g., Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988, 108 S.Ct. 1290, 99 L.Ed.2d 501 (1988). Indeed, if the Commission had intended subsection (c)(2) to state a general principle, it could have done so explicitly. It would not have needed to include any reference to specific offenses.
*256I am also concerned about the effect the majority’s decision may have on the interpretation of subsection (c)(1).1 The majority’s abstraction from the specific offenses listed in subsection (c)(2) suggests that they would conclude that a similar general principle also animates the list contained at subsection (c)(1). But what general principle would the majority draw? Since the listed offenses at (c)(1), unlike the offenses at (c)(2) which are never counted, can be counted if certain conditions are satisfied, see id. at § 4A1.2(c)(1), the Sentencing Commission clearly thought the offenses listed at subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) were different. Thus, I suppose that under the majority’s reasoning, section (c)(l)’s listed offenses must represent a different, somewhat higher, level of culpability. But what level? My point, of course, is not to divine the answer to this inquiry; rather it is simply to show that the difficulties inherent in substituting a general principle for the specific enumerated offenses listed in subsection (e)(2) will only be more imposing when an attempt is made to articulate a general principle to replace subsection (c)(l)’s listed offenses.
As I explained above, I believe that subsection (c)(2)’s listed offenses serve a purpose beyond merely articulating a general principle. They are present because the Commission intended courts to compare whether the defendant’s prior offense is identical or similar to those listed offenses. Admittedly, the task of articulating a federal law description of the offenses listed in subsection (c)(2) is not particularly appealing. But I believe that is what the statute requires.
On the surface, this approach may appear more cumbersome than that proposed by the majority, but to so conclude would be wrong. Under the majority’s approach, a district court will need to engage in the onerous task of researching whether a defendant’s prior misdemeanors or petty offenses are uniformly regarded as culpable throughout the United States and the uncertain task of analyzing whether those prior offenses are predictive of future criminal activity. By contrast, under my approach, once a federal description of the listed offenses is developed, a district court will only need to engage in the less onerous task of comparing this description with the acts proscribed under the statute of conviction for the prior offense.
In this case, the question whether Martinez’s prior offense of public indecency is similar to the offenses listed under subsection (c)(2) is fraught with little, if any, ambiguity. The Oregon public indecency statute provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of public, indecency if while in, or in view of, a public place the person performs: (a) An act of sexual intercourse; or (b) An act of deviate sexual intercourse; or (c) An act of exposing the genitals of the person with the intent of arousing the sexual desire of the person or another person.
Or.Rev.Stat. 163.425 (1989). As the statute's language makes clear, in order to be convicted of public indecency in Oregon, the offender must engage in some type of sexual conduct. By contrast, sexual conduct is not a necessary element of any of the six offenses listed at subsection (c)(2)— hitchhiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy, loitering, minor traffic infractions, public intoxication and vagrancy. Indeed, of the six, the only offense that has any overlap with the offense of public indeeen-*257ey is the offense of public intoxication, which generally proscribes appearing in a public place under the influence of alcohol to the point where the inebriant may endanger himself or other persons or property, or interfere with or obstruct other persons in his vicinity. See Model Penal Code § 250.5 at 374-76 (1985) (discussing behavior generally proscribed by public intoxication statutes); see also Cal. Penal Code § 647(f) (West 1988) (proscribing public intoxication). However, although both offenses address behavior that is inappropriate in a public place, that is where their similarity ends. The public performance of a sexual act is simply not akin to the annoying or tragi-comic behavior of an intoxicated individual who has lost control of his faculties. Therefore, like the majority, I would conclude that none of the offenses listed in subsection (c)(2) are similar to Martinez's prior public indecency offense. I, however, respectfully disagree with the course of reasoning the majority follows to reach this result.

. Subsection 4A1.2(c)(l) provides:
Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense:
Contempt of court
Disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace
Driving without a license or with a revoked or suspended license
False information to a police officer
Fish and game violations
Gambling
Hindering or failure to obey a police officer
Leaving the scene of an accident
Local ordinance violations
Non-support
Prostitution
Resisting arrest
Trespassing.