Court Opinion

ID: 9478024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:37:20.7171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:10.709521
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Prior to Rossillo’s oral plea of guilty before Judge Bramwell, he entered into a Rule 11(e) Plea Agreement, which provides in part as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11(e)(1)(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Philip Rossillo will plead guilty to Count One (Racketeering Conspiracy — 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) of Indictment 85 CR 00244(s) entitled United States v. Anthony Colombo, et al., and will specifically admit to Racketeering *1068Acts 13(b) and 14. After entering this plea, Philip Rossillo will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 14 years.
Thereafter, Rossillo and his attorney, together with thirteen other represented defendants who had signed Rule 11(e) agreements, appeared before Judge Bramwell and pled guilty, as each defendant had agreed to do. At the very outset of the hearing, Rossillo’s attorney, an officer of the court, informed Judge Bramwell in his client’s presence, “Mr. Rossillo does intend to plead guilty.” However, before accepting pleas from any of the defendants, Judge Bramwell addressed them as a group as follows:
Now, before accepting the pleas of guilty, I must advise each of you as to your constitutional rights, the nature of the charge against you and the consequences of your plea.
You have a constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by jury with the assistance of counsel; the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against you; the right to compulsory process to bring in witnesses on your behalf; the right not to incriminate yourself by being compelled to testify at the trial; the right to plead not guilty, in which event the government will be required to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and, in the event the government fails, the jury would have the obligation of finding you not guilty.
Now I will ask each of the defendants separately, do you understand that the Court may ask you questions about the offense to which you offer to plead guilty?
In response to the question which concluded the quoted statement, Rossillo and each of the other thirteen defendants told the court that they understood. The court then continued:
I further state to each of the defendants, if the plea of guilty is accepted as to each of you, there will be no trial so that you will be surrendering and waiving your right to a trial and all the constitutional rights embodied in such a right.
Again, all of the defendants said that they understood. With the approval of the defendants, the court then read the indictment’s general allegation of a racketeering enterprise, which included seventy-two separate racketeering acts, at which point the prosecutor said:
The racketeering activity is described in the next paragraph, but as far as each defendant is concerned, we have negotiated which particular racketeering acts the defendants will in fact allocute so there is no need to read through the entire list of 72 racketeering acts.
The court then proceeded down the line of defendants, asking the attorney for each to allocute his client’s illegal acts. Rossillo was the fifth to be heard, and his allocution proceeded as follows:
MR. Freeman [Rossillo’s attorney]: Mr. Rossillo respectfully requests that the Court allow him to withdraw his entered not guilty plea and plead guilty to Count One of the indictment. Specifically, acts, predicate acts 13(b) and 17(a), and if the Court permits me I’ll go ahead with the allocution.
The Court: You may go ahead with the allocution.
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, Mr. Rossil-lo admits that he was part of an enterprise and the group of people that were part — that were in that enterprise engaged in certain predicate acts. The two predicate acts that Mr. Rossillo was involved in are predicate act 13(b), which involves the arson of a 1974 Ford van.
And the specific facts of that predicate act are that on or about December 31, 1981, in New York, Mr. Rossillo and another intentionally damaged a motor vehicle, to wit, a 1974 Ford van.
Mr. Rossillo, is that true?
Defendant Rossillo: Yes.
Mr. Freeman: The second predicate act is 17(a) and it involves a conspiracy to rob a Mr. Victor Soboleski. The details are that between January and August, 1983, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of New *1069York, Mr. Rossillo and others willfully and unlawfully combined, conspired and confederated to forcibly steal property from a Victor Soboleski, in violation of state law.
Is that true, Mr. Rossillo?
Dependant Rossillo: Yes.
Mr. Guadagno [AUSA]: Your Honor, that’s sufficient.
Following the allocutions, Judge Bram-well inquired of counsel concerning the plea agreements. Donald S. Sullivan, Chief of the Sullivan County District Attorney’s Rackets Bureau, and a party to the agreements, answered on behalf of the prosecution. The exchange concerning Rossillo was as follows:
Mr. Sullivan: Your Honor, this is a similar plea agreement. Forgive me if I have to consult from time to time. There are quite a few of these. I don’t want to get them wrong.
This is a similar plea agreement containing a sentence not to exceed or a cap of 14 years with regard to the defendant Philip Rossillo.
It furthermore contains similar provisions regarding other matters being pursued by other prosecutors’ offices which will be satisfied by this plea.
The Court: All right. Mr. Freeman, anything additional?
Mr. Freeman: Yes, Your Honor.
As the Court knows, Mr. Rossillo has had open heart surgery. I understand Mr. Guadagno has agreed not to oppose a medical hearing, if the proper facts are put before you, before the time of sentence.
Mr. Guadagno: Your Honor, I believe that the agreement is that Mr. Rossillo will bring any relevant facts to Your Honor’s attention before the time of sentence. If Your Honor feels that a hearing is called for, we certainly will not oppose such a hearing.
The Court: Thank you.
Anything else, Mr. Freeman?
Mr. Freeman: Nothing, Your Honor.
The Court: Thank you.
Mr. Freeman: The agreement speaks for itself other than that.
When the discussion concerning all fourteen plea agreements had concluded, Judge Bramwell said:
All right. My next question to each of the defendants, have you been threatened or coerced in any way into pleading guilty.
Rossillo’s response to this question was, “No, Your Honor.”
At Judge Bramwell’s request, the Assistant United States Attorney stated that the maximum penalty that could be imposed on the racketeering count was twenty years and a fine of not more than $25,000. Following this, Judge Bramwell asked each defendant whether he had discussed his plea of guilty with his lawyer, and Rossillo answered, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court then informed all defendants that they would have the assistance of their attorneys at the time sentence was imposed. Judge Bramwell also asked each defendant whether he was under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or other intoxicants, and the following colloquy between Judge Bram-well and Rossillo’s attorney took place:
The Court: Mr. Philip Rossillo?
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, this is an exceptional circumstance.
The Court: He has — his heart condition.
Mr. Freeman: Yes.
The Court: Thank you.
The court thereafter accepted guilty pleas from all of the defendants. At the conclusion of the hearing, Barry Slotnick, attorney for Anthony Colombo and spokesman for the entire group of attorneys, addressed the court as follows:
Mr. Slotnick: Your Honor, before we close, may I — I know it is getting late.
The Court: It’s all right.
Mr. Slotnick: The Court works very late.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Slotnick: It’s so rare that nice things are said on the record. I would like to, now that it is all said and done, just indicate to the Court that all defense lawyers worked very hard together and *1070it’s rare that we have the cooperation of so many lawyers and I think we thanked each other for seeing that the due administration of justice works out.
With regard to Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Guadagno, they are very worthy opponents. They are very tough. They are hard prosecutors. We all walked away from this a little unhappy and maybe that’s what makes a fair agreement.
But on behalf of all the defense lawyers, and I guess I speak for all, in behalf of the Strike Force, we thank Your Honor for the kindness and consideration you gave us knowing how hard we were working.
Thank you, Judge.
When Rossillo appeared before Judge Bramwell for sentencing, his attorney informed the judge, “There has really been a plea bargain struck here and Mr. Rossillo’s plea bargain was that his sentence was not to exceed 14 years.... ” Judge Bramwell lived up to his end of the bargain; Rossillo wants to welsh on his own commitment. On May 13, 1987, eleven months after Ros-sillo pleaded guilty, he moved for permission to withdraw his plea. The only affidavit in support of the motion was that of Rossillo’s attorney, the same attorney who informed Judge Bramwell that his client “does intend to plead guilty”, who participated in the allocution of his client, who stood idly by while his client repeatedly told Judge Bramwell that he understood, who made no objection when Attorney Slot-nick, speaking on behalf of all the defense lawyers, noted that the “due administration of justice” had worked out and thanked Judge Bramwell for his kindness and consideration.
Seeking a peg on which to hang his hat, the attorney made a number of baseless contentions concerning alleged violations of Rule 11, which were rejected below and which my colleagues kindly ignore. Although the attorney knew or should have known that 18 U.S.C. § 1963 does not provide for a mandatory minimum penalty, the attorney contended that Judge Bramwell violated Rule 11(c)(1) by not informing Ros-sillo of the “mandatory minimum penalty provided by law.” Although the attorney knew or should have known that the Plea Agreement provided that the forfeiture count in the indictment was to be dismissed, the attorney asserted that Judge Bramwell erred by not mentioning the possibility of forfeiture under section 1963. Although the attorney knew or should have known that Rossillo was not questioned under oath, see Rule 11(c)(5), he asserted that Judge Bramwell erred in not advising Rossillo that his answers to the judge’s questions might later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury. Despite the pertinent plea colloquy quoted above, counsel asserted that Rossillo was not asked if his plea was voluntary and not the result of force or threats. Despite the existence of the Plea Agreement between Rossillo and government officials, his attorney also alleged error based on Judge Bramwell’s failure to inquire whether Rossillo’s willingness to plead guilty resulted from prior discussions between his attorney and the government. The foregoing groundless contentions are mentioned simply to establish a framework within which to place the hearsay statements in the affidavit of Ros-sillo’s attorney that Rossillo “believes” he is innocent and “maintains” that, when he pled guilty, he was suffering from nausea, dizziness and confusion as a result of medication he was taking for his heart condition. According to the attorney, Rossillo also “maintains” that “he was not feeling well and failed to understand the nature of the proceeding.”
The affidavit did not contain one non-hearsay word concerning the attorney’s own observations and beliefs. Moreover, it made no claim that Rossillo was confused when he signed the Plea Agreement. “Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice ... and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation” when entering into such an agreement. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Although a plea agreement does not obviate the need for *1071meeting Rule 11 requirements, the existence of such an agreement nevertheless is “strong evidence of the voluntary nature of the plea.” Gregory v. Solem, 774 F.2d 309, 316 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S.Ct. 1475, 89 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986).
Judge Bramwell was unwilling to accept the attorney’s hearsay statements concerning Rossillo’s alleged lack of understanding. After carefully reviewing the record, my reaction is exactly the same. During the plea proceedings, the only information that Rossillo and his attorney gave Judge Bramwell was that Rossillo had a heart ailment, a condition he had in common with millions of other Americans. This ailment, which had existed since at least 1979, did not prevent Rossillo from becoming an active member of a major racketeering enterprise, from being convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun, from being married while awaiting trial in the instant case, and from participating in the “complex and lengthy negotiations” which led to the fourteen plea agreements. It did not prevent him from knowingly pleading guilty to only two of the many offenses with which he was charged.
Even if I were not convinced of the lack of merit in this appeal, I would write to express my strong condemnation of the allegations of appellant’s attorney that Judge Bramwell acted out of prejudice and bias. These contentions concerning this principled and conscientious judge are completely unfounded and should not have been made.