Court Opinion

ID: 9956592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 16:10:15.321111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:38.368127
License: Public Domain

J-S01019-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                v.                                :
                                                  :
  WAYNE ALLEN GRAY, JR.                           :
                                                  :
                       Appellant                  :   No. 1274 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered September 6, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-28-CR-0001620-2018

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                                 FILED: APRIL 2, 2024

       Wayne Allen Gray, Jr. appeals following a hearing on remand from this

Court to determine whether one of the witnesses in his criminal trial had an

undisclosed deal with the prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 787

MDA 2022, 2023 WL              2581859         (Pa. Super. 2023) (nonprecedential)

(remanding for evidentiary hearing). The trial court found that no evidence

of a deal existed, denied Gray’s request for a new trial, and reinstated his

sentence of 21 to 60 years’ incarceration. Because the issue Gray appeals

was resolved at the remand hearing, we dismiss his claim of error as moot.

       During the first week of April in 2021, Gray stood trial for rape, sexual

assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.1 The Victim testified

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 2718(a)(1), 3121(a)(1), and 3123(a)(1).

Because our decision rests on procedural grounds, the facts of those crimes
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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to the abuse that Gray inflicted upon her. The Commonwealth told the jury

that the Victim had pending, unrelated criminal charges. It then asked her,

“Have you been . . . promised anything or paid at all for your testimony here?’”

Id. at *4.

       She replied, “No.” Id.

       The jury convicted Gray, and the trial court sentenced him.

       Then, on May 27, 2021, the Victim entered a guilty plea to her crimes.

The attorney who prosecuted Gray also prosecuted the Victim. Gray obtained

a   transcript   of   the   Victim’s    plea   colloquy,   which   showed   that   the

Commonwealth “amended Victim’s felony criminal trespass charge to a

misdemeanor theft, and amended a felony escape charge to a misdemeanor

disorderly conduct.”        Id.    Based on that transcript, Gray believed the

Commonwealth agreed to reduce the Victim’s charges in exchange for her

testimony against him.

       He filed a post-sentence motion seeking a new trial based on after-

discovered evidence of the Victim’s supposed, improper motive to testify

against him. Gray “cited the prosecutor’s statement at the plea that [the]

Victim was cooperative and provided testimony against Appellant.                   The

Commonwealth filed a response to the motion, arguing that her testimony was

only a factor in the plea bargain.” Id. The trial court denied Gray’s motion

____________________________________________

are irrelevant to this appeal. We detailed them in Commonwealth v. Gray,
787 MDA 2022, 2023 WL 2581859 at *1-2 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(nonprecedential) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/22, at 2-6).

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without   holding   an   evidentiary    hearing   to   determine   whether    the

Commonwealth and the Victim had actually entered a plea agreement prior to

Gray’s jury trial. He filed his first, direct appeal to this Court and raised ten

issues.

      A panel of this Court dismissed nine issues as meritless. Concerning

one issue – i.e., “Whether the trial court erred in denying Gray’s request for a

new trial based upon the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose that Victim would

receive a plea bargain in consideration of her testimony against [him]” – the

panel granted Gray partial relief. Id. at *3. (some punctuation omitted). This

Court resolved that issue as follows:

                   Exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused
            is not confined to evidence that reflects upon the
            culpability of the defendant. Exculpatory evidence
            also includes evidence of an impeachment nature that
            is material to the case against the accused. [T]he
            jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a
            given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
            innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the
            possible interest of the witness in testifying that a
            defendant’s life or liberty may depend . . . When the
            failure of the prosecution to produce material
            evidence raises a reasonable probability that the
            result of the trial would have been different if the
            evidence had been produced, due process has been
            violated and a new trial is warranted.

      Commonwealth v. Strong, 761 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. 2000).

            The trial court did not hold a hearing . . . Instead, the court
      concluded that [Gray] failed to establish that a plea agreement
      existed, as the Commonwealth’s response cited several
      explanations for the plea which the trial court credited. The trial
      court declined to determine whether [Gray] would be entitled to a
      new trial if a plea deal existed, but expressed skepticism based on
      the overwhelming evidence of guilt . . . the Commonwealth

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      concedes that a remand for the limited purposes of holding an
      evidentiary hearing to establish a record may be necessary.

             We accept the Commonwealth’s willingness to place these
      matters on the record. While we agree that the evidence of guilt
      appears to be overwhelming, we recognize that prosecutors “have
      a unique role in our criminal justice system.”                  See
      Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617, 631 (Pa. 2017)
      (Donohue, J., concurring). The Commonwealth is required to seek
      justice, not win cases. We are not inclined to simply conclude that
      any such deal, if it existed, was ultimately irrelevant. Indeed, the
      Commonwealth concedes that a limited remand is warranted. We
      therefore find that the trial court abused its discretion in
      concluding that no plea agreement existed without sufficient
      record support.

             Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment of sentence and
      remand for the limited purpose of an evidentiary hearing on this
      issue. If the court concludes after this hearing that [Gray] has
      failed to establish that an agreement was in place at the time of
      trial for a plea bargain in exchange for Victim’s testimony, or it
      concludes that [Gray] cannot establish a reasonable probability
      that the outcome of trial would have been different if any such
      agreement existed, then the court shall reimpose the judgment of
      sentence.

Id. at *5 (some punctuation and some citations omitted).

      On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Gray’s

claim of after-discovered evidence.      The Victim’s defense attorney, his

paralegal, and the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Gray and the

Victim testified that there was no plea negotiation or deal based on the

Victim’s testimony at Gray’s trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/23, at 2-5.

Thus, the trial court found there was no “evidence at all that a plea agreement

existed between the Commonwealth and [the Victim] in exchange for her

testimony” and a retrial was not warranted. Id. at 5.

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      The trial court reinstated its prior judgment of sentence, as this Court

had directed. See Gray, supra, at *5. This timely appeal followed.

      Gray raises one claim of error. He asks, “Whether the trial court erred

in denying [Gray’s] request for a new trial based upon the Commonwealth’s

failure to disclose that [the Victim] would receive a plea bargain in

consideration of her testimony against [him]?” Gray’s Brief at 4. Critically,

this is a verbatim reproduction of the issue that Gray raised and that this Court

granted a remand to resolve in his prior appeal. See Gray, supra, at *3.

      We conditionally resolved this issue in the prior appeal and determined

that only a factual question remained.      As such, this issue is now moot,

because the trial court resolved the outstanding factual question on remand.

      Courts in this Commonwealth “generally will not decide a moot case

because the law requires the existence of an actual controversy . . . .” Ass'n

of Pennsylvania State Coll. & Univ. Facs. v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rels.

Bd., 8 A.3d 300, 305 (Pa. 2010). A “legal question can become moot on

appeal as a result of an intervening change in the facts of the case.” In re

Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. 1978).

      Here, the trial court made a factual finding that the Commonwealth did

not fail to disclose that the Victim would receive a plea bargain in

consideration of her testimony against Gray, because it found that no such

agreement existed. Thus, Gray’s single appellate issue is premised upon a

factual presumption that the trial court rejected on remand. As such, the legal

issue that Gray raises on appeal is moot.

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      In this appeal, Gray attempts to relitigate de novo the factual question

of whether the Commonwealth and Victim reached a plea agreement prior to

Gray’s trial. In fact, his appellate brief is a verbatim reproduction of his post-

hearing brief to the trial court.      Compare Gray’s Brief in Support of

Defendant’s Motion for Post-Sentence Relief at 1-4 and Gray’s Brief at 8-12.

In both briefs, Gray argues that the witnesses who testified at the hearing for

the Commonwealth were “incredible.” Gray’s Brief at 11.

      “A determination of credibility lies solely within the province of the

factfinder.”   Commonwealth v. Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1130 (Pa. Super.

2013). The fact finder “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence,

and to assess the credibility of the witnesses . . . .”     Commonwealth v.

Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      The trial court followed our directions upon remand and made the factual

finding that we requested. This Court previously held that Gray would only

be entitled to a new trial if “an agreement was in place at the time of trial for

a plea bargain in exchange for [the] Victim’s testimony . . . .” Gray, supra,

at *5. Because Gray failed to establish that factual precondition for a new

trial, we dismiss his sole claim of error as moot.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/02/2024

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