Court Opinion

ID: 9516262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:39:21.486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:07.916043
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that the “other insurance” clause is unambiguous in this situation, and is applicable to limit defendant’s uninsured motorist liability to $10,000. The majority relies on two Supreme Court cases (Morelock v. Millers Mutual Insurance (1971), 49 Ill.2d 234; Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 Ill.2d 71) which express disapproval with the concept of stacking policies. However, neither dealt with a fact situation similar to that before us. In Morelock, the plaintiff sought recovery under her own policy and under that of her father, whose car she was driving at the time of the accident. While both policies were issued by the same company, they were not issued to the same person, and presumably the different insureds paid the premiums on their respective policies. The father’s policy was held to be “other insurance”. In Putnam, the plaintiffs sought recovery under their own policy and the policy of a friend, in whose car they were riding when the accident took place. Again, the friend’s policy was held “other insurance”. The court disapproved of stacking policies because this would place motorists in the unusual position of preferring that any injuries sustained be at the hands of uninsured motorists rather than motorists who comply with the Financial Responsibility Law. However, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the Illinois uninsured motorist statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 73, par. 755a) does not prevent motorists from obtaining, or companies from issuing, uninsured motorist protection in excess of the minimum statutory requirements. See also Deterding v. State Farm Farm Mut. Auto. Insurance Co. (1966), 78 Ill.App.2d 29. In the case before us, not only are all three of the pohcies issued by a single company, but they are issued to a single insured, who has paid the company three premiums for this coverage. The insurance company does not deny that the accident is covered by the uninsured motorist provisions of aH three policies, and that it accepted separate premiums to provide this coverage under each policy. In such case, it is not the stacking of policies which puts plaintiff in a better position than if the accident had been caused by an insured motorist. Rather, the increased coverage is caused by plaintiff’s payment of multiple premiums, and the defendant’s election to issue multiple policies providing similar items of coverage. See Woolston v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. (W. D. Ark. 1969), 306 F.Supp. 738; Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. (Kan. 1969), 457 P.2d 34, 42. I would further conclude that the term “other insurance” is ambiguous in this situation. It has been stated that there is no purpose in proration unless the “other insurance” was written by another company, since such clauses are designed to preclude payment of a disproportionate amount of a loss shared with another company. United Services Automobile Association v. Dolder (Nev. 1970), 478 P.2d 583, 584. See also Deterding v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insurance Co. (1966), 78 Ill.App.2d 29, 36. In Morelock, “other insurance” was held to include a policy written by the same company but to different insureds. To extend this interpretation of the policy language to permit the insurer to issue, separate policies to the same insured and to pro-rate the loss among these pohcies, seems an unfair, and unwarranted result. The insured would not reasonably anticipate that his own policies 'tvould be regarded as “other insurance”. When the fact that the same company issued the policies is coupled with the fact that the pohcies are issued to the same insured, who has paid the separate premiums, an ambiguity arises which should be resolved in favor of the insured.