Court Opinion

ID: 9845986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:32:27.288056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:30.741578
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
1.1 concur fully in Division 1. Removal of children to residence in *131another State does not itself constitute or amount to a change of condition warranting alteration of custody. It is a long-standing principle. Mercer v. Foster, 210 Ga. 546, 548 (3) (81 SE2d 458) (1954) and cases cited therein. Here the parties themselves contemplated a move.
Decided November 5, 1998.
Amelia G. Pray, for appellant.
Jacket, Rainey, Marsh & Busch, Michael L. Marsh, Jessica L. Handley, for appellee.
2.1 also concur in Division 2. Not only did the trial court modify the separation agreement by requiring a psychological or psychiatric evaluation of the children before any relocation of the primary custodial parent “to Florida or elsewhere” with the children, but it went further. It ruled that the evaluating professional “may” notify the court of the evaluation and recommendations (the court assumed the latter would accompany the evaluation) and the court would hold a hearing “before making a ruling.” But nothing will be pending before the court which calls for a ruling, as the majority shows.
3. This case illustrates once again the presumably harmful effect on children in limbo while the court processes take their usual course. The little girl was age six and her brother was not yet five when the custody arrangement was finalized by court order in the divorce proceeding. The court heard the matter of change upon all issues in mid-May 1997 but did not enter an order changing custody (if the father moved in the interim) until August.
The notice of appeal, filed in mid-October after this Court granted the father’s application for discretionary appeal, acted as supersedeas, so no change in custody has been effected. OCGA § 5-6-46 (a). The record was sent to this Court on December 22, despite the time requirements of OCGA §§ 5-6-42; 5-6-43.
It is now November 1998. The girl is eight years old and the boy is almost seven years old. The judicial process for resolving custody disputes should be expedited all along the way so that the dynamic character of the children’s growth and development is not prejudiced or harmed by delayed change of custody when that is needed or by the insecurity of inconclusiveness if custody is to remain the same.