Court Opinion

ID: 9474597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:02:34.488997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:12.191064
License: Public Domain

EDWARD S. SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
With all respect, I dissent. Clearly, the circumstances of this case demonstrate the existence of some confusion in the use of the label “Hopkins-type case.” Opinions are not written with the anticipation that certain fact situations will be labeled in hyphenated fashion with the name of any particular litigant. Several issues were involved in Hopkins, but that hyphenated label is important only where neither the procedural complaint (timeliness issue) nor the “adverse” action complained of (denial of attorney’s fees before the board) is attributable to the employer agency. Hopkins articulates the requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(2) that the board shall be designated respondent in all cases appealed from the board except those involving a complaint under section 7701. Whether the confusion results from the anomaly that the exception covers the vast majority of cases is of no moment. Nor is it of particular moment what entity actually appears as respondent in the caption.
What is of moment is that, in this scheme of things, if the action of any employer agency is at issue, that agency will be represented in court by the Attorney-General’s designate; if only the action of the board is involved, the board will defend. The instant case is not a “Hopkins-type” case. In this case, a combination of circumstances resulted in a misdesignation of the respondent, which misdesignation contributed to the elimination of the proper respondent’s counsel from any meaningful participation in the case. Without assigning fault, if any there be, there are sufficient causae proximae to go around, none of which changes the fact that, due to these causes, and not solely due to any act or omission by proper counsel, only one party has briefed the merits of the case, yet the merits have been resolved as well as the procedural complaint.
Obviously, the critical occurrences (1-day lapse in timeliness; 30-day suspension) are not world-shaking events to any of the litigants, but the principle involved is important; it needs clarification, and issues flowing from it are being decided by this court without some of those issues having been fully briefed.
I would grant the motion of the Department of Justice to intervene as well as the motions for rehearing.