Court Opinion

ID: 2965143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:59.918864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:04.254901
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

          No. 97-1127

                   ACKERLEY COMMUNICATIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC.,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                     CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND ROBERT BERSANI, ETC.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                       Godbold* and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                         _____________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

               Charles  Rothfeld,  with  whom Andrew  L.  Frey,  Kenneth S.
               _________________              ________________   __________
          Geller, Mayer, Brown & Platt, George A. Berman, Joseph S. Berman,
          ______  ____________________  ________________  ________________
          Posternak, Blankstein  & Lund, Eric  M. Rubin, Walter  E. Diercks
          _____________________________  ______________  __________________
          and Rubin,  Winston, Diercks,  Harris & Cooke  were on  brief for
              _________________________________________
          appellant.
               Peter L. Koff,  with whom McGowan, Engel,  Tucker, Garrett &
               _____________             __________________________________
          Schultz, P.A.,  Arthur  J. Goldberg  and  City of  Cambridge  Law
          _____________   ___________________       _______________________
          Department were on brief for appellees.
          __________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   February 5, 1998
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

               *Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

                    CYR, Senior  Circuit Judge.   In an earlier  opinion we
                    CYR, Senior  Circuit Judge.   
                         _____________________

          held that the City of  Cambridge had violated the First Amendment

          rights  of Ackerley  Communications  of  Massachusetts, Inc.,  by

          requiring it to remove various signs which failed to conform with

          a  recently enacted  zoning provision  aimed  at controlling  the

          proliferation  of  aesthetically  offensive  signage.    Ackerley
                                                                   ________

          Communications of  Mass., Inc. v.  City of Cambridge, 88  F.3d 33
          ______________________________     _________________

          (1st Cir.  1996) ("Ackerley I").   Ackerley now appeals  from the
                             __________

          judgment entered following our remand, claiming that the district

          court erred by refusing to void the offending zoning provision in

          its entirety.   We vacate the district court  judgment and remand

          with directions to enter judgment for Ackerley.

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Ackerley  owns  forty-six  large  advertising signs  or

          billboards, located throughout  Cambridge, which carry "off-site"

          messages,  by which  we mean  signs whose  content relates  to no

          commercial or noncommercial  activity occurring  at the  premises

          where  the sign is  located.1  The City  amended its ordinance in
                              
          ____________________

               1We cannot improve  upon an earlier explication of  the off-
          site/on-site distinction: 

                         An  onsite sign  carries a  message that
                    bears  some  relationship to  the  activities
                    conducted on  the premises where the  sign is
                    located.   For  example,  an onsite  sign may
                    simply identify a business  or agency ("Joe's
                    Hardware" or "YMCA"),  or it may  advertise a
                    product or service available at that location
                    ("Budweiser Beer" at  Parise's Cafe or  child
                    care at the Lutheran Church).  Depending upon
                    the business  or agency,  the message  on the

                                          2

          1991 to  require removal of  all signs meeting  certain objective
                           _______

          criteria  relating to  dimension and  location.   See  Cambridge,
                                                            ___

          Mass., Ordinance 1123,   7.18.1 (June 10, 1991).

                    Under  the  amended  criteria, all  forty-six  Ackerley

          signs carrying  off-site messages were  to be removed,  since the
                          ________

          ordinance  contained no  "grandfather"  provision.   The relevant

          legal environment  is further  complicated  by the  Massachusetts

          Zoning  Enabling  Act  ("MZEA"),  however,  which  prohibits  any

          municipal  zoning  ordinance  provision  purporting  to  regulate

          existing on-site  signage; that is,  any sign carrying  a message
                   _______

          relating to a  commercial or noncommercial activity  occurring at

          the premises where the sign is located.  See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
                                                   ___

          ch. 40A,   6 (1995).

                              
          ____________________

                    sign may  be deemed either commercial or non-
                    commercial.   An  offsite sign--the  category
                    into  which  most billboards  fit--carries  a
                    message unrelated to its particular location.
                    These signs  also may display  either commer-
                    cial or noncommercial messages.  For example,
                    an offsite sign may advertise "Great Gifts at
                    Kappy's Liquors," with  Kappy's Liquors being
                    located at some distance from the sign, or it
                    may say "No  one should  be left  out in  the
                    cold.   Write:  Citizens  Energy Corp." Thus,
                    the onsite/offsite distinction  is not a dis-
                    tinction between signs  attached to buildings
                    and free standing signs.  An offsite sign may
                    be located on a building rooftop, but because
                    the product, good,  or service it  advertises
                    is not  available at the sign's  location, it
                    is  classified as offsite.  For example, if a
                    sign  advertising the  products available  at
                    Joe's  Hardware is  located  atop the  Parise
                    Cafe building, Joe's sign is offsite.

          Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878
          ______________________________________    __________________
          F.2d 513, 513 n.1 (1st Cir. 1989) (Coffin, J.).

                                          3

                                          4

                    The City  Council which  enacted section 7.18.1  under-

          stood from the start that its  effort to curb visual blight would

          be thwarted, at least in part, by the MZEA.  Be that as it might,

          the City Council  considered off-site signs, such  as Ackerley's,

          the  greater aesthetic intrusion,  see Ordinance    7.11.1(F), in
                                             ___

          the sense that on-site signs at least serve a significant practi-

          cal purpose by  assisting consumers to locate a  particular busi-

          ness  establishment  or  product ("Joe's  Hardware"),  see  id.  
                                                                 ___  ___

          7.11.1(G).  Accordingly, and since  as a general matter the First

          Amendment does  not prefer  commercial speech  over noncommercial

          (e.g., political) speech, the Ordinance included a "substitution"
           ____

          provision  permitting the owner of a "grandfathered" on-site sign

          to  substitute a noncommercial message for the commercial message

          previously displayed by its on-site sign (e.g., "Smith for Mayor"
                                                    ____

          replaces "Joe's Hardware").  See id.   7.17.  Finally, it includ-
                                       ___ ___

          ed  a "severability" clause  saving all "parts"  of the Ordinance

          not specifically held invalid.  See id.   7.30.
                                          ___ ___

                    Until the Ordinance  was amended,  most off-site  signs

          owned by Ackerley carried commercial messages, such as advertise-

          ments and  promotions concerning "for-profit"  business ventures.

          Following its amendment,  however, Ackerley's signs  have carried

          only noncommercial  messages, such as election advertisements and

          public service announcements.  Ultimately, since the MZEA "grand-

          father" provision  does not  cover existing  off-site signs,  the

          City directed  Ackerley to  remove all its  signs based  on their

          nonconforming physical characteristics, see Ordinance   7.18.1.
                                                  ___

                                          5

                    Ackerley  responded  by  filing the  present  action in

          federal district court,  seeking a judicial declaration  that the

          Ordinance    on  its face and  as applied    infringed  its First

          Amendment  right to  free speech.    At the  same time,  Ackerley

          demanded injunctive  relief from the  City order directing  it to

          dismantle its signs.

                    On appeal  we vacated  the  provisional district  court

          ruling  declaring Ordinance   7.18.1 constitutional.  Ackerley I,
                                                                __________

          88 F.3d at 40.   First, we held that the  Ordinance and the MZEA,

          operating in tandem,  distinguished between two types  of noncom-

          mercial  speech     on-site  and off-site      (i) by  permitting

          nonprofit institutions to display on-site, noncommercial messages

          on nonconforming signs located on their own premises, and (ii) by

          allowing  on-site sign  owners  to  convert  from  commercial  to

          noncommercial messages, while denying off-site sign owners either

          option.   We  noted that  noncommercial  speech     for  example,

          political discourse     is  accorded the  highest level  of First

          Amendment  protection, yet the  distinction adopted by  the Ordi-

          nance     though predicated  on no  aesthetic difference  in sign

          appearance  (e.g.,  size)      plainly  imposed  unconstitutional
                       ____

          restrictions upon the  off-site noncommercial speech of  the sign

          owner, by countenancing only those political messages espoused by

          the owner  or occupant  of the  site where the  sign is  located,

          while excluding other political views, such as those held by non-

          landowners.  Thus,  we concluded, even though the  City might ban

          all noncommercial messages from aesthetically intrusive signs, it

                                          6

          cannot prefer one  particular category of political  speaker over

          another.  Id. at 37-38.2
                    ___

                    Furthermore,  because the  Ordinance and  the MZEA,  in

          tandem,  either  allowed  or denied  "grandfathering"  protection

          based  on whether  the sign  carried  an on-site  or an  off-site

          message on the date the  Ordinance was enacted, we concluded that

          the City had  chilled present speech impermissibly by  relying on

          message content to reward on-site speakers for their past speech,

          while penalizing off-site  speakers for their past speech.    Id.
                                                                        ___

          at 38-39 (citing  Ackerley Communications of Mass.,  Inc. v. City
                            _______________________________________    ____

          of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 519 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
          _____________

                    In a separate  discussion captioned "Remedial  Option,"

          we went  on to note that the City  could not correct these uncon-

          stitutional  effects  unilaterally  simply  by  eliminating   the

          "grandfathering" distinction between on-site  and off-site signs.

          See  id. at  39-40.    Instead, since  it  was the  Commonwealth,
          ___  ___

          through  the  MZEA, rather  than  the  City through  Ordinance   

          7.18.1,  which  established the  distinction between  on-site and

          off-site  signs, we stated  that "[r]elief   . . .  is beyond the

          scope of  this court's power  in this case[,]"  id. at 39,  since
                                                          ___

          amendments  to the  MZEA "must  be left  to the  workings of  the

          political process."  Id.  Accordingly, we concluded:
                               ___

                    The Cambridge ordinance contains a severabil-
                    ity provision stating that, in the event some
                              
          ____________________

               2Our  reliance on these grounds avoided any need to consider
          whether the MZEA "grandfathering" distinction between on-site and
          off-site  signs amounted to  a "content-based" speech restriction
          subject to strict-scrutiny review.  See id. at 37 & n.7.
                                              ___ ___

                                          7

                    portion  of it is declared invalid, it is the
                    City's intent that the remainder of the ordi-
                    nance  continue in full force and effect.  We
                    do  not in  this  decision rule  unlawful any
                    particular section of the ordinance.  Rather,
                    because the constitutional problem stems from
                    the interplay of the ordinance  and the state
                    provision, we  hold only  that Cambridge  may
                    not require removal of signs displaying  non-
                    commercial messages based  on their exclusion
                    from  exemption  under the  state  provision.
                    Reversed and Remanded.
                    _____________________

          Id. at 40.
          ___

                    On  remand, Ackerley  requested a  judicial declaration

          determining section 7.18.1  invalid in its entirety,  which would
                                                     ________

          mean that the  City could not order  the removal of any  off-site

          sign,   whether  it  carried  a  noncommercial  message,  as  did

          Ackerley's, or  a commercial  message.   The City  responded that

          Ackerley I conclusively  ruled out any such  wholesale rescission
          __________

          of Ordinance   7.18.1.  See id. ("We do not in this decision rule
                                  ___ ___

          unlawful any  particular section of  the ordinance.").   The dis-

          trict  court  ultimately  granted   Ackerley  declaratory  relief

          "consistent with the decision [in  Ackerley I]" and enjoined  the
                                             __________

          City from requiring  Ackerley to remove signs  displaying noncom-

          mercial messages.

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   Law of the Case
          A.   Law of the Case
               _______________

                    First,  the City contends  that the district  court was

          powerless to  declare section 7.18.1  invalid in its  entirety on

          remand since Ackerley I expressly  stated that we were not ruling
                       __________

          "unlawful any particular section of the ordinance."   Ackerley I,
                                                                __________

                                          8

          88 F.3d at 40.  In other words, the City proposes to construe the

          quoted statement  from Ackerley I  as a binding  pronouncement   
                                 __________

          the "law of the case"    that the unconstitutional effects of the

          MZEA "grandfathering" provision  cannot be redressed through  the

          judicial  process, and, therefore, that the only relief available

          to Ackerley in the present litigation would be an order enjoining

          any application of section 7.18.1 to its noncommercial signs.

                    We  begin our  analysis with  a review  of the  unusual

          procedural posture in Ackerley I.  The Ackerley complaint  sought
                                __________

          a judicial  declaration that section  7.18.1, on its face  and as

          applied, contravened  the First Amendment,  as well as  the Fifth

          Amendment  "takings"  clause.    Ackerley  requested  preliminary

          injunctive relief only in relation to its  First Amendment claim.

          The  district  court  thereafter  denied  preliminary  injunctive

          relief, however,  based on  its determination  that Ackerley  had

          shown no "likelihood of success" on its First Amendment claim.

                    As both parties acknowledged  that no factfinding would

          be required to resolve the purely legal issues controlling  their

          First Amendment dispute,  at their express request  we decided to

          bypass  the  provisional likelihood-of-success  inquiry  normally

          undertaken  in interlocutory appeals from orders denying prelimi-

          nary  injunctive  relief,  and instead  to  resolve  those issues

          finally.  See  Ackerley I, 88 F.3d at 35.  Accordingly, and since
                    ___  __________

          neither party  had sought a  final determination as to  all other

          issues which would  have had to be decided  before final judgment

          could be  entered, nor even  briefed the question  regarding what

                                          9

          remedies might be  available to Ackerley once it  had been deter-

          mined that the  City had violated the First  Amendment, we framed

          our  inquiry narrowly:   "The  issue  we must  decide is  whether
                                    ___  _____

          Cambridge may enforce its sign  ordinance to require Ackerley  to

          remove its billboards."   Id.  at 36  n.6 (emphasis  added).   We
                                    ___

          responded in the negative.

                    Although we found neither the MZEA nor the Ordinance to

          be unconstitutional in isolation, we held that their operation in

          tandem  (i)  violated  the First  Amendment  by  favoring on-site

          noncommercial speech over off-site  noncommercial speech and (ii)

          penalized off-site  speakers based on  the content of  their past

          speech.  Id. at 37-39.
                   ___

                    Importantly, our Section II.D discussion in Ackerley  I
                                                                ___________

          is captioned "Remedial Option,"  not "Remedial Options."  Id.  at
                                 ______                  _______    ___

          39.  Moreover,  its context makes clear that  the Remedial Option
                                                            _______________

          discussion  did not purport to treat with all judicial "remedies"

          available upon entry  of final judgment, but with  the more prag-

          matic and immediate concern as  to how the First Amendment infir-

          mity  might be  avoided, either  unilaterally by  the City  or by
                          _______          ____________

          "construct[ing]  a  justifiable,  content-neutral  grandfathering

          provision"  in cooperation with the  Commonwealth.  Id. at 39-40.
                                                              ___

          Finally, we  went on to  point out the awkward  legal position in

          which the City Council had been placed, in that though it unques-

          tionably  possessed a  legitimate interest  in curbing  unsightly

          signage, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts alone had the power to

          provide a unilateral  legislative remedy for the  First Amendment
                                ___________

                                          10

          infirmity by  eliminating the discrepant  "grandfathering" treat-

          ment accorded on-site and off-site  signs.  Thus, nothing we said

          in Section II.D  remotely suggested that recourse to the legisla-

          tive process was the only avenue open to Ackerley.3
                               ____

                    We repair once again to Ackerley I, where we prominent-
                                            __________

          ly noted that the Ordinance contained a severability clause.  The

          very next  sentence stated:   "We  do not  in this decision  rule

          unlawful  any particular  section of  the ordinance."   Were  the

          quoted sentence to mean, as  the City implicitly insists, that no

          Ordinance  provision could be  determined invalid on  remand, our
                                                            __  ______

          express reference to the severability clause    in the immediate-

          ly preceding sentence    would be rendered meaningless.

                    Instead, the  contextual focus in  the quoted  sentence

          from Ackerley I was  upon the word "particular," whose  inclusion
               __________

          was  a  clear  acknowledgement that  the  forthcoming factfinding

          inquiry on remand could lead the district  court to strike one or
                              
          ____________________

               3The contrary interpretation  proposed by the  City presumes
          that  the thrust  of our  discussion  in Section  II.D is  fairly
          reflected in  the following line  of reasoning:  The  MZEA causes
          the  unconstitutional effects; the  court is powerless  to strike
          down  the  MZEA; therefore,  the  Ordinance must  be  immune from
          judicial invalidation in any part.
               The City Council must take  Commonwealth law as it finds it;
          the MZEA supersedes   7.18.1;  therefore, either the MZEA must be
          modified through  "the workings of  the political process,"  or  
          7.18.1  must be declared  unconstitutional and void,  at least in
          part.
               Unless at least part of   7.18.1 was rendered invalid by the
          MZEA, there can have  been no legal basis  whatever for the  dis-
          trict court order enjoining  the City from directing  Ackerley to
          remove  its noncommercial signs.  Finally,  if the district court
          injunction,  implicitly  and  necessarily,  was predicated  on  a
          partial invalidation of    7.18.1, then  the district court  must
          necessarily  have  resolved  the  closely  related   severability
          question as well.

                                          11

          more portions  of the  Ordinance, but not  all.   As severability

          disputes  usually turn on  fact-intensive inquiries best  left to

          the trial court  in the first instance, see  infra Section II.B,4
                                                  ___  _____

          and no  factfinding had  occurred at  the preliminary  injunction

          stage  in Ackerley  I, we  accordingly  reemphasized the  limited
                    ___________

          nature of  our holding:   "we hold  only that  Cambridge may  not
                                              ____                      ___

          require  removal of signs displaying noncommercial messages based

          on their  exclusion from  exemption under  the state  provision."

          (Emphasis added.)  Thus, Ackerley  I made no pronouncement on the
                                   ___________

          law of the case with respect to the severability issue.5
                                              ____________

          B.   Severability
          B.   Severability
               ____________

                    As the MZEA grandfathering provision was not amended in

                              
          ____________________

               4See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v.  City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
                ___  ____  ________________     _________________
          490, 521  (1981) (holding  that zoning  ordinance violated  First
          Amendment, but remanding to lower  court to determine if it might
          "sustain  the ordinance  by  limiting  its  reach  to  commercial
          speech,  assuming the  ordinance is  susceptible  to this  treat-
          ment"), on remand, 649 P.2d  908 (Cal. 1982) (holding that uncon-
                  __ ______
          stitutional  provision could  not be  severed);  see also,  e.g.,
                                                           ___ ____   ____
          United States Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 509-10
          ___________________________________    ____
          (1993)  (remanding   for  severability   determination);  Planned
                                                                    _______
          Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (same);
          ______________________    _____
          FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.  215, 230 (1990) (same);
          ____________    ______________
          City  of Lakewood  v. Plain Dealer  Pub. Co.,  486 U.S.  750, 772
          _________________     ______________________
          (1988) (same).

               5Lastly, the City  contends that Ackerley  itself understood
          Ackerley I as a final  pronouncement on remedy since it requested
          __________
          attorney fees  on remand.   Its contention  is beside  the point.
          Whether or not  Ackerley prevailed on the  severability question,
          it  had  already  achieved "prevailing  party"  status  following
          Ackerley I by vindicating its constitutional claim and gaining at
          __________
          least  the  right  to extraordinary  equitable  relief  (i.e., an
                                                                   ____
          injunction  against the  removal  of its  signs). See  Hensley v.
                                                            ___  _______
          Eckerhart,  461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (defining "prevailing party"
          _________
          as one  who "succeed[s]  on any  significant issue in  litigation
          which achieves some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing
          suit"). 

                                          12

          response to  Ackerley I,  the constitutional infirmity  persists.
                       __________

          Therefore,  permanent  injunctive  relief   may  not  be  granted

          Ackerley without first  determining whether any, and if so which,

          portion(s) of the Ordinance may be unlawful.  See, e.g., National
                                                        ___  ____  ________

          Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon,  900 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir.  1990)
          __________    _______________

          (de facto effect  of such a targeted injunction  is "to sever the
           __ _____

          unconstitutional  portions of  the ordinances  and  to leave  the

          remainder intact").  Since the district court did not address the

          severability  issue  on remand,  the  case must  be  returned for

          further proceedings, including  any essential factfinding, unless

          we  can make the severability determination now, with confidence,

          as a matter of law.

                    The severability vel non of a state  statute or munici-
                                     ___ ___

          pal ordinance is  controlled by state  law.  See Leavitt  v. Jane
                                                       ___ _______     ____

          L., 116 S. Ct.  2068, 2069 (1997); Exxon Corp. v.  Hunt, 475 U.S.
          __                                 ___________     ____

          355,  376 (1986).   "'Where a statutory  provision is unconstitu-

          tional, if it  is in its nature separable from the other parts of

          the statute, so that they may well stand independently of it, and

          if there is no such connection between the  valid and the invalid

          parts that the [legislative body]  would not be expected to enact

          the valid part without the other,  the statute will be held good,

          except in that part which is in conflict with the Constitution.'"

          Mayor of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 429 N.E.2d 691, 695
          _______________    _________________________

          (Mass. 1981)  (citation omitted).   On the other hand,  "[i]f the

          court  is  unable to  know  whether  the  Legislature would  have

          enacted a particular bill without the unconstitutional provision,

                                          13

          it will not sever the unconstitutional provision, but will strike

          the entire statute."  Id.6  
                                ___

                    At  the very least, Ackerley  is entitled to a judicial

          declaration  invalidating section 7.18.1  to the extent  it would

          require removal of nonconforming off-site signs  carrying noncom-
                                                                    _______

          mercial messages.  The  severability issue thus devolves  into an
          _______

          impressionistic  inquiry into  whether section 7.18.1  would have

          been enacted  had the  City Council known  that it  would require

          only the removal of nonconforming off-site signs carrying commer-
                                                                    _______

          cial messages.  As we cannot divine with confidence what the City
          ____

          Council would have done, Mayor of Boston, 429 N.E.2d  at 695, the
                                   _______________

          case must  be remanded to  the district court with  directions to

          enter a final judgment invalidating section 7.18.1 in its entire-

          ty.  We explain.

                    Severability clauses,  though probative  of legislative

          intent, are not conclusive.  See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117  S. Ct.
                                       ___  ____  ____    ____

          2329,  2351 n.49  (1997)  ("[A] severability  clause  is 'an  aid

          merely;  not  an   inexorable  command.'")  (citation   omitted).

          Although  Ordinance    7.30,  see  supra p.  4,  only applies  to
                                        ___  _____

          invalidated "parts" of the Ordinance, that term begs the question

          in the present  context.  Section 7.18.1 was  neither drafted nor

          enacted in  separate "parts"  which discretely banned  commercial

          and  noncommercial off-site  signs,  either  of  which  might  be
                              
          ____________________

               6Neither party contests the threshold severability  determi-
          nation  that Ordinance    7.18.1,  which  applies exclusively  to
          existing signs, is  readily severable from the  remaining "parts"
          ________
          of the Ordinance prospectively regulating the  aesthetic features
          of future signs.

                                          14

          stricken independently of the other.  Neither section 7.18.1, nor

          any  other "part"  of  the Ordinance,  alludes in  any  way to  a

          substantive  distinction  between  commercial  and  noncommercial

          messages.7  Nor  can such a substantive distinction  be read into

          section 7.18.1, without in effect gratuitously  supplementing its

          language  with  the  phrase "except  for  off-site  signs bearing

          noncommercial  messages."   Therefore,  as  we  cannot  say  with

          confidence that  the City  Council envisioned  section 7.18.1  as

          anything but a unitary "part" of the Ordinance, the  severability

          clause avails the City nothing.

                    Furthermore, although at first blush it may appear that

          settled principles of  federalism and separation of  powers would

          counsel that  the explicit severability  presumption contained in

          Ordinance    7.30 be given literal sway,  there is more here than

          meets  the  eye.   The  severability  principles  controlling the

          present decision  were intended  principally to  ensure that  the

          courts,  state and federal,  not dissuade or  preempt legislative

          bodies  from  debating  and  determining the  appropriate  public

          policy in the first instance, within constitutional limits.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  Reno, 117  S. Ct.  at 2351 n.49  ("'It would  certainly be
          ____   ____

          dangerous  if the  Legislature could  set a  net large  enough to

          catch  all possible offenders and leave  it to the courts to step

          inside and say who could rightfully be detained and who should be
                              
          ____________________

               7Although Ordinance    7.17  allows on-site  sign owners  to
          replace  their commercial  messages with  noncommercial messages,
          this  provision is  merely permissive,  and  imposes no  policing
                                                                   ________
          burden on the  City whatsoever, since on-site  signs were allowed
          without regard to their message content.

                                          15

          set at large.  This  would, to some extent, substitute  the judi-

          cial  for the legislative department of the government.'") (cita-

          tion omitted).    Thus,  proper respect  for  the  principles  of

          federalism and separation  of powers counsels against  construing

          section 7.30 as  a "cure all"  for the  severability ills in  the

          present Ordinance. 

                    The  City further contends that the Council enacted the

          Ordinance  to eliminate nonconforming signs to the maximum extent

          allowed  by law,  and that severance  would prevent  Ackerley and

          other sign owners from converting their off-site sign messages to

          more lucrative commercial  messages, thereby  providing a  strong

          financial  disincentive to maintaining such signs in the future.8

          Be that  as  it might,  however, the  suggested distinction  also

          would entail significant  administrative burdens and  expense for

          the City, which  would be required  to police nonconforming  off-

          site signs to  determine whether they carried only  the permitted

          "noncommercial"  messages,  articulate   objective  criteria  for

          making  the  often blurry  distinction  between  "commercial" and

          "noncommercial" speech, and  provide sign owners with  a forum in

          which  to address  their  challenges to,  and  appeals from,  any

          adverse City determination that a particular message was "commer-

          cial."  See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 649  P.2d 903,
                  ___ ________________    _________________

          908 (Cal. 1982) (rejecting "severability" claim on same ground).

                              
          ____________________

               8Since no factfinding occurred on remand, however, the intu-
          itive  premise advanced by the City finds no record support.  For
          example,  the record  is devoid  of  evidence that  noncommercial
          messages necessarily command less revenue.

                                          16

                    Moreover, nothing in the  Ordinance indicates that  the

          Council ever considered that the City would need to police, hear,

          or determine the commercial-noncommercial distinction in order to

          implement its  chosen  aesthetic objectives.   Nor  has the  City

          pointed to any  probative evidence of such  legislative consider-

          ation  which might  be material  on remand.   Thus,  although the

          blurriness of the commercial-noncommercial distinction itself may

          not render  the amended  ordinance unconstitutional, courts  con-

          fronted with severability questions clouded by serious uncertain-

          ties  regarding whether  the  appropriate  legislative body  ever

          considered the effect of a severability provision in the relevant

          context, ought not be anxious to arrogate the legislative prerog-

          ative inherent  in determining  the preferred  or more  efficient

          means of  pursuing the particular goals chosen by the responsible

          legislative body.9  

                    The  City  Council  may decide  to  adopt  less onerous

          initiatives than the presumably burdensome and expensive adminis-
                              
          ____________________

               9In a similar vein,  the City contends that Ackerley  waived
          any entitlement to wholesale invalidation  of   7.18.1 by conced-
          ing, during  the Ackerley I appeal, that  the City would have had
                           __________
          the authority to ban off-site commercial signs while allowing on-
          site commercial signs.  See Ackerley I, 88 F.3d at 37 n.8 (citing
                                  ___ __________
          Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512).   Far from noting any such "conces-
          __________
          sion" by Ackerley, however, we simply observed that Ackerley "did
          not contest" the  point.  Id.    Because the City  had enacted no
                                    ___
          such  ordinance    i.e.,  one simply banning  off-site commercial
                             ____
          signs while allowing on-site  commercial signs    but had  chosen
          to  ban  off-site  noncommercial signs  as  well,  Metromedia was
                                                             __________
          wholly  inapposite in  Ackerley's first  appeal.   Moreover,  for
          purposes of the present appeal,  the threshold issue no longer is
          whether the City has the  authority to enact an ordinance banning
          off-site  commercial  signs  while  allowing  on-site  commercial
          signs,  but whether  it  envisioned reverting  to  such a  regime
          should its ban on off-site noncommercial signs be struck down.

                                          17

          trative procedures which would be required were we not to invali-

          date section  7.18.1 in  toto.  For  example, it  might determine
                               __  ____

          that  the  municipality's  interests would  be  better  served by

          attempting  to persuade the  state legislature to  approve a con-

          tent-neutral grandfathering  provision based  exclusively on  the

          physical  characteristics of  existing  signs, rather  than their

          content.  See Ackerley I, 88 F.3d at 39-40.  Thus, we  think such
                    ___ __________

          important  policy decisions  are  for the  Council  in the  first

          instance.

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    As the City points to no factual circumstance which, if

          demonstrated on remand, would affect our severability  determina-

          tion,  we  can  discern no  substantial  benefit  from  a further

          remand.  Accordingly, the case  is remanded to the district court

          for entry of  final judgment declaring section 7.18.1  invalid in
                                                                         __

          toto, and  enjoining the City  from requiring Ackerley  to remove
          ____

          signs pursuant  to section  7.18.1  as presently  written.10   So
                                                                         So
                                                                         __

          ordered.
          ordered.
          _______

                              
          ____________________

               10The  City further requests that we reconsider our holding,
          in  Ackerley I,  that  application of  the Ordinance  to Ackerley
              __________
          would  be unconstitutional.   Such relief is  beyond our preroga-
          tives.  See Williams v. Ashland Eng'g  Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st
                  ___ ________    __________________
          Cir. 1995) (noting generally that  First Circuit panels are bound
          by prior panel decisions directly on point).

                                          18