Court Opinion

ID: 9611868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:00:56.736475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:17.097604
License: Public Domain

Batjer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with that part of the majority opinion holding that *333the petition for certiorari be dismissed and that the order of the district court to remand the case to the justice’s court for trial be allowed to stand. I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that: “We regard it as settled that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that there be an adversary judicial hearing and determination of obscenity before a warrant may be issued to search and seize the single copies of allegedly obscene films.”
I agree with the district court judge when he reasoned that prior to a seizure of this nature there must be a judicial determination of obscenity based on facts and not the conclusive determination of a law enforcement officer and then found that the investigator’s affidavit was sufficiently factual to enable the magistrate to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity before issuing the search warrant. Compliance with the Fourth Amendment1 prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures together with the added precautions that the viewing officer’s affidavit must contain factual information and not his conclusions, and that it be carefully considered by a magistrate before the search warrant issues, affords everyone adequate protection.
There is a wide spread contention that property rights can be adequately safeguarded only if there is a prior adversary hearing, for without such a hearing the owner’s property could be detained for an extended period of time and he would suffer a financial loss. That thinking loses sight of the altruistic purpose of the First Amendment that the public has the right to receive non-obscene material, and places the question squarely within the Fourth Amendment protection against deprivation of property without due process of law.
I further agree with the conclusion of the district court judge when he determined that the United States Supreme Court had not laid down a rule of procedure for all state courts requiring an adversary hearing to determine obscenity prior to seizure.
The majority relies on A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9 Cir. 1970); reversed on other grounds; Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 420 F.2d 687 (3 Cir. 1969); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 *334F.2d 410 (2 Cir. 1969); Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4 Cir. 1969); Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7 Cir. 1968), for support of its position that an adversary hearing must be conducted prior to seizure.
The decision of A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra, can be read to stand for the proposition that an adversary hearing must be held as a prerequisite to a seizure of allegedly obscene material, however, Justice Brennan was not speaking for a majority of the High Court. Moreover, it is not apparent whether the decision may have been strictly limited as to its facts. I do not feel constrained to follow it. See Gornto v. State, 178 S.E.2d 894 (Ga. 1970); Mitchum v. State, 244 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1971).
In United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2nd Cir. 1969), that court said: “These cases [Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964), and Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961)], are inapposite since they involved massive seizures of books under state statutes which authorized warrants for the seizure of obscene materials as a first step in civil proceedings seeking their destruction. The seizures in this case were of instrumentalities and evidence of the crime for which appellants were indicted and lawfully arrested. We do not believe Marcus and Quantity of Books can be read to proscribe the application of the ordinary methods of initiating criminal prosecution to obscenity cases.” Cf. Milky Way Productions, Inc. v. Leary, 305 F.Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affirmed 397 U.S. 98, 90 S.Ct. 817, 25 L.Ed.2d 78 (1970), where it was held that an adversary hearing is not a prerequisite to the validity of an arrest for obscenity. Here, on theory, Erwin Glass could have been arrested without a prior adversary hearing, locked up, and prevented from exhibiting to the public his non-obscene materials, but following the majority opinion his two films “ ‘Wanda’, the hypnotist, lashed into submission, for mature adults only,” and “ ‘Title Withheld’, only for the mature adult who understands,” must be granted an adversary hearing before they can be held.
The majority also relies upon Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra, and Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, to support its position that a prior adversary hearing is required. Marcus involved the seizure of 11,000 copies of 280 different publications. The High Court reversed the lower court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to suppress and ordered the seized material returned to the owner on the ground that the search warrants were too general and that the conclusive determination by the *335officers that the material was obscene and the failure of the magistrate to examine the alleged obscene material before issuing the warrant constituted a denial of due process and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although the High Court discussed the question of whether a prior adversary hearing was necessary it did not decide that issue. In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, two films were seized from the petitioner’s theatre, upon the basis of an ex parte warrant based upon an officer’s affidavit, stating only the titles of the films and that he had determined them to be obscene. The High Court held this procedure to be erroneous, as the issuance of the warrant without the justice of the peace’s inquiry into the factual basis for the officer’s conclusions fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. That court’s opinion is silent on the issue of whether a prior adversary hearing is necessary.
Justice Mowbray pointed out in his dissent that NRS 179.-085, affords the petitioner an ample safeguard if his property has been improperly seized. Pursuant to that statute he may move for return of the property on the ground that the search warrant was improvidently issued. Monica Theater v. Municipal Court for Beverly Hills J. D., 88 Cal.Rptr. 71 (Cal.App. 1970).
I believe that we should simply hold that an adversary hearing is not required, dismiss the petition for certiorari, and affirm the order of the district court.

 United States Constitution, Amend. IV: “Unreasonable searches and seizures. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”