Court Opinion

ID: 9637419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:06:48.223893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:42.532360
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
                                  Docket No. 49605

 JAY F. WRIGHT,                                         )
                                                        )
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                              )   Boise, April 2023 Term
                                                        )
 v.                                                     )   Opinion Filed: June 15, 2023
                                                        )
 KRISTIE A. PARISH,                                     )   Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
                                                        )
      Defendant-Respondent.                             )

         Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
         Bonneville County. Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge.

         The order of the district court is reversed.

         Banks Gaffney, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for Appellant, Jay Wright. Jeffrey W. Banks
         argued.

         Olsen Taggart PLLC, Idaho Falls, for Respondent, Kristie Parish. Steven L. Taggart
         argued.
                                ____________________

STEGNER, Justice.
         This case involves the applicability of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral
estoppel (issue preclusion). Jay Wright appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
his ex-wife, Kristie Parish. Wright and Parish were married in 2002 and divorced in 2019. Before
they were married, Wright and Parish, as single persons, purchased two adjacent parcels of real
property in Island Park (“the Island Park Properties”), and their ownership of the property did not
change following their marriage.
         A magistrate court presided over their divorce proceedings and the distribution of their
community property. The magistrate court classified as community property certain loan payments
and improvements that had been made for the benefit of the Island Park Properties but specifically
declined to divide the Island Park Properties because the court concluded the Island Park Properties
were separate property and that it “lack[ed] authority to divide the property.” The magistrate court
concluded that Wright and Parish “apparently” owned the Island Park Properties as

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tenants-in-common, each with a fifty percent interest, though it never made a definitive ruling on
each party’s interest, concluding only that they were “joint owners[.]”
       Roughly one year after the magistrate court entered its final judgment for the divorce,
Wright filed a complaint in district court seeking a partition of the Island Park Properties and for
Parish to deed the Island Park Properties to him, arguing in part that his ownership interest in the
Island Park Properties exceeded the fifty percent determination that the magistrate court had
ostensibly made. In response, Parish moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wright’s claim
that he was entitled to a greater ownership interest in the Island Park Properties was precluded by
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court granted Parish’s motion for
summary judgment after determining that the issues in Wright’s complaint had already been
litigated in the prior divorce proceedings. The district court found that Wright’s argument that he
had a greater ownership interest in the Island Park Properties was barred by res judicata (claim
preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). As a result, the district court concluded that
the proceeds from the sale of the Island Park Properties should be equally divided between Wright
and Parish. Wright timely appealed.
                           I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Before they married, Wright and Parish purchased a home and land in Fremont County,
Idaho, known as the Island Park Properties, for $50,000. The division of the Island Park Properties
was one of the disputes in the divorce proceedings before the magistrate court. It is the only issue
in dispute in this appeal from the district court. During the divorce proceedings, the magistrate
court was required to categorize the couple’s property as either separate or community. In an effort
to discharge its obligation, the magistrate court attempted to trace the individual contributions
made by each party to the Island Park Properties. The magistrate court found that a settlement
statement for the purchase of the properties “show[ed] a purchase price of $50,000 with $44,933.42
going to retire a mortgage loan that existed against the property.” The parties disagreed as to the
source of the $50,000 used to purchase the Island Park Properties.
       Wright argued that the funds were primarily from a home equity loan (“the Home Equity
Loan”), which was secured by real property in Idaho Falls referred to as the Bergeson Property,
and “show[ing] a principal amount credit limit of $38,362.” The Bergeson Property had previously
been Wright’s separate property, but in order to obtain the Home Equity Loan, for which both
Wright and Parish would be liable, the lender required that both Wright and Parish be listed as

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owners of the Bergeson Property. As a result, Wright deeded the Bergeson Property from himself
“to Jay F[.] Wright, a single man and Kristie Ann Parrish [sic], a single woman.” By contrast,
Parish argued before the magistrate court that the entire $50,000 came “from funds she was entitled
to receive from her mother’s estate.” Curiously, the magistrate court determined that neither party
could conclusively prove the source of the $50,000, yet it determined that at least a portion of the
purchase price came from the joint Home Equity Loan.
         Two years after they had taken out the Home Equity Loan, Wright and Parish refinanced
the Home Equity Loan (this new loan was characterized by the magistrate court as the “2001
Loan”). The 2001 Loan was also secured by the Bergeson Property. The couple subsequently made
joint payments on the 2001 Loan. In 2003 and again in 2010, they refinanced the Home Equity
Loan and again secured the loans with the Bergeson Property. (These loans are referred to by the
magistrate court as the “2003 Loan” and the “2010 Loan,” respectively.) Since they never deeded
the Island Park Properties to themselves as a marital community, the magistrate court determined
that Wright and Parish “appear[ed]” to own the Island Park Properties as tenants-in-common.
         In winding up the divorce, the magistrate court listed the assets and liabilities held by each
party. The magistrate court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law tracing the contributions
made to the community, including the purchase of the Island Park Properties and the payment of
the loans, either from separate or community property. Next, in an apparent effort “to equalize the
property and debt distribution[,]”the magistrate court determined that Parish needed to pay Wright
$20,826.25. The magistrate court ordered Parish to pay the $20,826.25 to Wright “within 60 days
of this order.” 1
         After finalizing the necessary division to complete the divorce, the magistrate court
explained that it “lack[ed] authority to divide the property.” It continued: “However, in the event
the parties wish to divide the asset rather than continue as tenants-in-common the court would find
that Petitioner [Wright] should be awarded the property subject to a payment to Respondent
[Parish] of $60,000.” Later, the magistrate court ordered Parish
         to pay Petitioner [Wright] $20,826.25 to equalize the property and debt distribution.
         The court notes this division could be equalized by a different division of the joint
         savings account, but will not order that, rather leaving it to the discretion of the
         Respondent [Parish] on the method of payment. The court directs the payment be
         made within 60 days of this order. This leaves the parties as joint owners of the

1
 Both parties in their respective affidavits filed with the district court agree that Parish paid Wright this amount, and
neither party has disputed this fact on appeal.

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        Island Park property. If the parties wish to consider the Island Park property, based
        on this court’s findings Petitioner [Wright] would owe Respondent [Parish]
        $39,173.75 to equalize the distribution. If the parties wish for the court to review
        this matter, either may request an opportunity to submit legal authority and
        supplemental evidence including oral testimony.
(Italics added.) It is difficult (if not impossible) to divine what the magistrate court intended in the
preceding quotation. Suffice to say, it is challenging to reconcile the magistrate court’s comments.
        Despite the seemingly conflicting language, the magistrate court found that the Island Park
Properties were valued at $120,000 (as suggested by Wright), the property was owned as
tenants-in-common, and each party’s interest was apparently equivalent to half that amount—
$60,000.
        After the magistrate court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, Wright moved
to amend the findings, arguing that his required contribution to the community should be reduced
because a portion of his inheritance, his own separate property, had been used to pay the 2003
Loan. The magistrate court denied Wright’s motion to amend, finding that the Bergeson Property,
an asset of the community and not Wright’s separate inheritance, was the security for the 2003
Loan.
        Neither Wright nor Parish appealed the final judgment of the magistrate court. However,
Wright later filed this partition action in district court, arguing that he had a greater than fifty
percent ownership interest in the Island Park Properties. Parish moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the parties had litigated the question of each other’s ownership interests in the original
divorce proceedings, and, as a result, Wright’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata or
collateral estoppel. The district court agreed with Parish’s argument and granted Parish’s motion
for summary judgment, concluding that Wright’s claim that he was entitled to greater than fifty
percent of the Island Park Properties was barred by both res judicata and collateral estoppel
because the magistrate court had already fully heard and decided the issue of the parties’ ownership
of the Island Park Properties. Wright’s appeal followed.
                                     II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                 In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of
        review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for
        summary judgment. All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the
        non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
        are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Summary judgment is appropriate
        if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
        any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

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       party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If the evidence reveals no disputed
       issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court
       exercises free review.
Ware v. City of Kendrick, 168 Idaho 795, 798, 487 P.3d 730, 733 (2021) (internal citations
omitted). “Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and ‘[w]hether an action is barred by res
judicata is a question of law.’” Monitor Fin., L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, 164 Idaho 555,
559, 433 P.3d 183, 187 (2019) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
                                           III. ANALYSIS
   A. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Parish because neither
      issue preclusion nor claim preclusion apply to Wright’s partition action.
       A grant of summary judgment requires there to be no genuine dispute of material fact and
a showing that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(a). The
primary question before the district court was whether the magistrate court had properly
determined that each party had an equal interest in the Island Park Properties, in which case
Wright’s claim that he was entitled to a greater interest would be precluded by an application of
res judicata.
       Res judicata serves three purposes:
       First, it [preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
       corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to
       inconsistent results. Second, it serves the public interest in protecting the courts
       against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private
       interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata)
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157
P.3d 613, 617 (2007) (citing Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805). Claim preclusion exists
to “bar[] a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims
‘relating to the same cause of action . . . which might have been made.’” Id. (quoting Hindmarsh,
138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805) (alteration in original). Separately, issue preclusion bars additional
litigation of “an identical issue with the same party or its privy.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.” Id.
Because the district court concluded that both issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and claim
preclusion (true res judicata) applied to Wright’s claim, both will be analyzed in turn.

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    1. The district court erred in concluding that Wright’s claim was barred by the doctrine of
       issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).
        The district court concluded that Wright’s claim to greater than fifty percent ownership of
the Island Park Properties was barred by issue preclusion, finding that all five elements were
present. Specifically, the district court found that Wright already had an opportunity to litigate
whether he was entitled to a greater than fifty percent ownership interest in the Island Park
Properties.
        As an initial point, Parish argues we should not reach this question because it was not
preserved by Wright before the district court. Notwithstanding Parish’s argument, we conclude
that Wright’s argument regarding ownership of the Island Park Properties was properly preserved
for appeal. In Wright’s response to Parish’s motion for summary judgment filed in the district
court, he argued that the magistrate court had not “decided the parties’ ownership interest in their
jointly owned, separate property.” It appears from the record that Wright has argued all along that
the magistrate court’s decision was limited to ascertaining and dividing community property, not
separate property. Accordingly, we will address the merits of Wright’s argument on this issue on
appeal. State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 924–25, 517 P.3d 849, 853–54 (2022) (concluding
that “a party preserves an issue for appeal by properly presenting the issue with argument and
authority to the trial court below and noticing it for hearing”).
        In reaching the question of whether issue preclusion applies, we hold that the district court
erred in determining that Wright’s claim for a greater than fifty percent interest in the Island Park
Properties is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. Issue preclusion exists to prevent “litigants
from having to relitigate an identical issue in a subsequent action.” Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at
124, 157 P.3d at 618 (internal citation omitted). For issue preclusion to bar additional litigation,
the following elements must be present:
        (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
        opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case;
        (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in
        the present action;
        (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation;
        (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and
        (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party
        to the litigation.
Id. (internal citation omitted).

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       The district court concluded that each element of issue preclusion had been met, precluding
further litigation of the question of Wright’s and Parish’s respective ownership interests in the
Island Park Properties. We disagree with the district court’s decision. In order for issue preclusion
to apply, a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered. Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Corr., 136
Idaho 90, 93, 29 P.3d 401, 404 (2001). In the couple’s divorce proceedings, the magistrate court
specifically disclaimed any ability to issue a judgment resolving the parties’ respective ownership
of the Island Park Properties. While the magistrate court offered the parties the option of requesting
that the court resolve the ownership of the property, neither Wright nor Parish ever accepted the
magistrate court’s offer. As a result, the magistrate court never rendered a judgment determining
the respective ownership of Wright and Parish in the Island Park Properties. Due to the lack of a
judgment, issue preclusion does not bar Wright from bringing his suit to determine the respective
ownership of the Island Park Properties. As a result, the district court erred when it concluded that
Wright’s attempt to prove that he has a greater than fifty percent ownership interest in the Island
Park Properties was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.
   2. The district court erred in concluding that Wright’s claim was barred by the doctrine of
      claim preclusion (true res judicata).
       The district court also concluded that Wright was not permitted to bring a claim that his
ownership interest in the Island Park Properties exceeded fifty percent because it was barred by
the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court disagreed with Wright’s argument that the
magistrate court’s previous decision was limited only to discussing the community property of the
parties (and not the separate property of the parties, which included the Island Park Properties).
Instead, the district court found that the magistrate court “had the authority to determine each
party’s interest in jointly owned separate property.” The district court determined that, since the
magistrate court properly handled the tracing of separate and community contributions to the
Island Park Properties, “Wright’s claim to a greater ownership interest [was] barred by the doctrine
of claim preclusion[.]”
       To succeed on a theory of claim preclusion, a party must show three elements—“(1) same
parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.” Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at
618. As was fatal to Parish’s assertion of issue preclusion, the lack of a final judgment also
precludes the application of claim preclusion. The district court treated the magistrate court’s
decision as a final judgment resolving the ownership interests in the Island Park Properties.
However, the magistrate court’s offer to resolve the ownership interest of the parties to the property

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in question was nothing more than an unaccepted offer to resolve the dispute. The magistrate court
explained that, absent a stipulation by the parties, the court could not issue a judgment to resolve
the parties’ respective ownership of the Island Park Properties. The parties never stipulated to the
magistrate court’s jurisdiction over that question and accordingly the magistrate court never issued
a final judgment regarding the Island Park Properties. Therefore, the district court erred when it
concluded that the magistrate court’s discussion of the Island Park Properties in the divorce
proceedings amounted to a final judgment, barring Wright’s claim that he had a greater than fifty
percent ownership interest in the Island Park Properties. 2
    3. On remand, the district court must consider whether Wright can produce evidence to
       overcome the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership of the Island Park Properties.
        Because neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion apply here, we now turn to the proper
analysis regarding partition of the Island Park Properties and the parties’ respective ownership
interests because those issues will need to be resolved on remand. See Urrutia v. Blaine County,
134 Idaho 353, 359, 2 P.3d 738, 744 (2000) (“Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a
judgment upon an issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance
for other issues on remand.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The district court
issued its memorandum decision in this case on September 24, 2020, and the parties finished their
briefing for this appeal on August 17, 2022. Neither the district court nor the parties had the benefit
of our two recent decisions in Nordgaarden v. Kiebert, ___ Idaho ___, 527 P.3d 486 (2023), and
Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen, ___ Idaho ___, 527 P.3d 520 (2023). Both cases are illuminating
on the issue of partition.
        In Nordgaarden, the question before this Court was what standard to employ when
determining the physical partition of real property. ___ Idaho at ___, 527 P.3d at 489. Three
siblings owned an undivided, one-third interest in a lakefront piece of real property that contained
only one home. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 490. After the house had fallen into disrepair, one sibling
sought judicial partition of the property, “assert[ing] that the property could be physically
partitioned without great prejudice[,]” so partition by sale was unnecessary. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at
491. The district court rejected that argument and concluded that partition by sale was necessary
because physical partition would be too costly and there was no reasonable division of the property

2
  Because we conclude that Wright’s current claim is not barred by claim preclusion due to the absence of a final
judgment, we need not address the remaining elements of claim preclusion. See Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 273,
127 P.3d 167, 176 (2005); Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618.

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that would result in equal property values for the three siblings. Id. As a result, the parties would
suffer great prejudice from physical partition of the property. Id. (Even though the property
consisted of over three hundred feet of frontage on Lake Pend Oreille, physical partition was not
feasible given the unique characteristics of the parcel. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 490.) This Court
affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that a determination of great prejudice “must take
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 492 (bold lettering and
underlining removed). Next, this Court concluded that the district court’s factual findings
regarding “the totality of circumstances” were supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 495–99. For that reason, the district court did not err when it ordered the
property to be partitioned by sale. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 498–99.
        Shortly after we released our opinion in Nordgaarden, we considered the narrower question
of the methodology of determining respective interests in property. In Demoney-Hendrickson, we
concluded that a rebuttable presumption arises that ownership of tenants-in-common is equal
“when an instrument is silent as to the parties’ respective interests in property[.]” ___ Idaho at ___,
527 P.3d at 527. Accordingly, trial courts are obligated to “examine the totality of the
circumstances to determine the respective ownership interests of the parties.” Id. at ___, 527 P.3d
at 528. In Demoney-Hendrickson, an unmarried couple acquired an interest in real property when
one party conveyed his own separate property to both parties as individual grantees. Id. at ___,
527 P.3d at 522. In the subsequent partition action, the district court relied exclusively upon the
language of the deed when it concluded that each party “owned an undivided, one-half interest in
the . . . Property[.]” Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 523.
        On appeal, this Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding
that the district court erred when it relied exclusively on the language of the deed in determining
that each party owned an equal interest in the property. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 525. Instead, “[t]he
presumption of equal shares may be rebutted with a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the parties intended to share unequally in the property[,]” and the district court erred when it
relied solely on the language of the deed. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 528. This Court concluded that
“trial courts [should] consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
presumption of equal shares has been overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “The
party opposing equal ownership bears this burden.” Id.

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       The present case is analogous to Demoney-Hendrickson. Here, the district court erred when
it failed to consider “the totality of the circumstances” before ruling in Parish’s favor. The district
court determined that the magistrate court’s finding of fifty percent ownership had already been
made. Further, the district court only considered the fact that there was a single house on the
property when it concluded that the parties would be greatly prejudiced by partitioning the property
in kind. It found the existence of a single house to be “sufficient[] [to] demonstrate[] the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact on the question of prejudice if the Property is partitioned in
kind.” However, as we described in Nordgaarden, the question of prejudice must also be answered
by reviewing “the totality of the circumstances.” ___ Idaho at ___, 527 P.3d at 494.
       Both Wright and Parish argued before the magistrate court how much of their separate
funds had been used for the purchase of the Island Park Properties and the payment of the
subsequent loans encumbering the Island Park Properties. However, neither party appears to have
offered any evidence regarding their intended ownership interests of the Island Park Properties.
The magistrate court did not find that either party had provided any evidence that the Island Park
Properties had been conveyed “to the parties as married persons after the marriage[,]” yet it still
concluded that “the parties apparently had the intent to jointly [equally] own the Island Park
property.” Wright argues that his separate property that secured the Home Equity Loan is evidence
that the parties did not intend to equally own the property, yet the magistrate court’s decision
“contained zero discussion as to how these funds impacted the ownership interest of the parties[.]”
       We agree with Wright. The magistrate court erred because it did not have the benefit of
our decision in Demoney-Hendrickson in which we explained that the ownership classification of
joint tenancy is merely a rebuttable presumption that may be overcome. ___ Idaho at ___, 527
P.3d at 527. In Demoney-Hendrickson, the district court “treated the dispute [regarding the parties’
contributions] as one applicable to a contribution claim, rather than a determination of the parties’
respective ownership interests.” Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 528. We clarified that questions of
contribution and questions of ownership interest are distinct, and the district court erred when it
conflated the two. Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 528–29. We further concluded that summary judgment
was improper when one party “produced evidence suggesting he contributed all sums for
improving the . . . Property, [while he] admit[ted] he was unable to procure financing for the
improvements . . . without a co-obligor on the construction loan.” Id. at ___, 527 P.3d at 529.

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        Neither the magistrate court’s nor the district court’s decisions considered whether Wright
or Parish intended for the Island Park Properties to be equally owned as tenants-in-common or
whether they intended a different form of ownership—the decisions only considered the potential
ownership interests considering the respective contributions of the parties. The magistrate court
merely found that the parties owned the Island Park Properties “joint[ly.]” It did not make an
explicit finding of fifty percent ownership. Instead, the magistrate court’s decision used unclear
language (appearing to be advisory in nature), explaining that “[e]ach party would appear to have
a $60,000 interest” and “it appears that the real intent was too [sic] jointly own the Island Park
[Properties.]” (Italics added.)
        The magistrate court’s decision added further confusion when it appeared to suggest an
option for Wright to “buy out” Parish’s interest in the Island Park Properties. First, the magistrate
court ordered Parish to pay $20,826.25. Then, it said that if the parties preferred to include the
Island Park Properties in the divorce action, then Wright could pay Parish $39,173.75 instead. It
is hard to fathom what the magistrate court intended by suggesting that if Wright paid Parish
$39,173.75, the Island Park Properties would then be considered part of the community’s property.
One way to interpret the magistrate court’s suggestion is to conclude that Wright had contributed
$20,826.25 more than Parish to the Island Park Properties. If that supposition is correct, in order
to equalize the ownership of the parties, Parish’s payment to Wright of $20,826.25 presumably
would have given the parties an equal ownership in the Island Park Properties. Conversely, if
Wright had paid Parish $39,173.75, he presumably would have owned the Island Park Properties
free and clear; however, it is unclear what the magistrate court intended. The magistrate court
never fully explained its reasoning, nor is it clear what was intended by suggesting the different
alternatives. The district court erred when it concluded that this confusion was insufficient to
present a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the district court to
resolve in light of this Court’s recent decisions in Nordgaarden, ___ Idaho ___, 527 P.3d 486, and
Demoney-Hendrickson, ___ Idaho ___, 527 P.3d 520.
   B.      Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
        Both Wright and Parish seek attorney fees on appeal. Each will be dealt with in turn.
        Wright requests attorney fees on appeal based on Idaho Code section 6-545. Idaho Code
section 6-545 authorizes an award of attorney fees in actions seeking a partition of real estate.

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        In Nordgaarden, we explained that section 6-545 permits recovery of the costs of partition,
including reasonable attorney fees, incurred “for the common benefit[.]” ___ Idaho at ___, 527
P.3d at 500. However, if the attorney fees are incurred as part of an adversarial process, then
attorney fees are not recoverable under the statute. Id.; see also I.C. § 6-545 (“When, however,
litigation arises between some of the parties only, the court may require the expense of such
litigation to be paid by the parties thereto, or any of them.”). Accordingly, Wright is not entitled
to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 6-545.
        At the same time, we conclude that because Wright has prevailed in this action he is entitled
to his costs. I.A.R. 40.
        Parish also seeks attorney fees on appeal. Parish argues that she is entitled to attorney fees
and costs under Idaho Code sections 6-545 and 12-121 because this is a partition action and
because Wright’s appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. For the
same reasons why Wright is not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section
6-545, neither is Parish. In order to recover attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-121, the party seeking them must prevail. See Easterling v. HAL Pac. Props., L.P., 171 Idaho
500, 520, 522 P.3d 1258, 1278 (2023). Parish has not prevailed. Consequently, we decline her
request for attorney fees and costs.
                                         IV. CONCLUSION
        The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Parish regarding Wright’s attempt
to assert a greater than fifty percent ownership interest in the Island Park Properties. We remand
the case to the district court to consider whether Wright can produce evidence to overcome the
rebuttable presumption of equal ownership of the Island Park Properties pursuant to our decisions
in Demoney-Hendrickson, ___ Idaho at ___, 527 P.3d at 527, and Nordgaarden, ___ Idaho at ___,
527 P.3d at 494. We decline to award attorney fees to either party. Costs on appeal are awarded to
Wright.
        Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.

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