Court Opinion

ID: 9492079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:31:29.205863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:05.713205
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority overlooks a central claim raised in Bear’s federal habeas petition, which he never presented to the Oklahoma courts for resolution in the first instance.
The majority describes the appeals Bear made after the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision modifying his sentence as follows: “On March 19, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, .arguing that the evidence did not support the conviction as modified. Petitioner then lodged the same complaint in the instant § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas . corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.” *786Maj. Op., ante, at 784. While I agree with the characterization of Bear’s petition for rehearing before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, I believe the majority oversimplifies Bear’s claims on federal ha-beas. In his federal habeas petition before the district court, Bear claimed that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ modification of his sentence “denied [him] the right to have a jury determine in the first instance whether or not he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime in the first instance.” This due process issue was highlighted in his stated “Grounds For Relief’ before the district court when Bear included in his description of the issue the following: “The conviction modification denied Mr. Bear of his right to have a jury determine his guilt and sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.” I do not believe this due process claim has been presented to the Oklahoma courts in any fashion, or that those courts have had an opportunity to pass on it in the first instance.
Unlike the sole claim considered by the majority — “that the evidence did not support the conviction as modified” — it would not be futile for Bear to raise his due process claim in the Oklahoma courts. I agree with the majority that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ modification of Bear’s crime of conviction necessarily implies that that court “determined on direct appeal that the record in fact supported ... a conviction for [assault with intent to commit rape].” Maj. Op., ante, at 783. Accordingly, requiring Bear to present again this issue to lower Oklahoma courts would be futile. However, because Bear never presented his due process claim to the Court of Criminal Appeals, or any other Oklahoma state court, I cannot say with confidence that it was considered. Accordingly, I believe Bear must raise his due process claim in the Oklahoma courts in order to meet federal exhaustion requirements.
Further, I do not believe that Bear would be procedurally barred from raising his due process claim in a petition for postconviction relief in the Oklahoma courts. As the majority makes clear, the first opportunity Bear had to raise his due process challenge to the modification of his crime of conviction arose after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion. Because I believe it would have been inappropriate for Bear to raise his due process claim under the limited rehearing procedures set out in Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 3.14,1 I believe Bear can now present his due process claim by way of an application for postconviction relief in the Oklahoma courts.
Since I do not believe Bear’s due process claim has been presented to the Oklahoma courts — “fairly” or otherwise — and I do not believe it would be futile for Bear to raise it now, I conclude Bear has failed to exhaust his state remedies. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust.

. The rule reads, in pertinent part:
RULE 3.14 REHEARING; REQUISITES OF PETITION
B. A petition for rehearing shall not be filed, as a matter of course, but only for the following reasons:
(1) Some question decisive of the case and duly submitted by the attorney of record has been overlooked by the Court, or
(2) The decision is in conflict with an express statute or controlling decision to which the attention of this Court was not called either in the brief or in oral argument.
Bear could not have raised his due process claim under either of these bases.