Court Opinion

ID: 9754651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:08:48.985419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:56.200180
License: Public Domain

OPINION
PER CURIAM.
1. Alaska's probate nonclaim statute, AS 13.16.460, provides that claims against an estate arising before the decedent's death are barred unless presented: (1) within four months of the first publication of notice to creditors; (2) within three years of death if no notice to creditors is published; or (8) within limits specified by other applicable statutes of limitations1 The statute also bars most claims arising after the decedent's death unless presented within four months of the time they arise.2
2. Andrew G. Horwath, Sr. died in 1991 in Ketchikan. His widow, Marjorie Hor-wath, later moved to Minnesota to live with their daughter, Mary Jaworski. A Minnesota court entered a conservatorship order for Marjorie, appointing Mary "Conservator of the Person" and Michael Horwath-An-drew and Marjorie's son, and Mary's brother-"Conservator of the Estate." Marjorie died in 2001, and Michael died in 2007. Michael served for a time as personal representative of Andrew's estate and applied to do so for Marjorie's estate, as well, but was not formally appointed. Another Horwath daughter, Sue Streets, became the personal representative for the estates of Andrew, Marjorie, and Michael.
3. In November 2008 Mary presented claims against all three estates, alleging that her then-deceased brother Michael had not always made a court-ordered monthly payment to her for their mother's care and that Michael had not reimbursed her for improvements she made to her house while caring for Marjorie. Mary also claimed Michael had *754improperly dissipated property and mismanaged both parents' estates.
*753All claims against a decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent ... if not barred earlier by other statute[s] of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) within four months after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with AS 13.16.450; ...
(2) within three years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not been published.
*7544. Personal representative Sue issued a disallowance of these claims in December 2008, asserting that the claims were unfounded and time-barred under both the nonelaim statute and the applicable statutes of limitations. Mary petitioned for an extension of time to initiate proceedings on her disallowed claims. Sue opposed the motion, arguing that no extension could be allowed because all of Mary's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.3 Mary did not respond to the merits of Sue's arguments. The superior court denied Mary's extension petition on grounds that her elaims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations.
5. Mary moved for reconsideration, contending that the superior court's order was "not clear" but seemed to be based on her failure to comply with the nonelaim statute, rather than the underlying statutes of limitations. She asked for clarification. The court did not respond to the motion for reconsideration, and under Alaska Civil Rule 77(k)(4) it was deemed denied 30 days later.4
6. Mary appeals. Although Mary's statement of issues on appeal asserts the superior court erred by denying her requested extension because she "exceeded the period under the statute of limitations," thereby causing a "forfeiture" of her claims, the legal arguments in Mary's opening brief do not address this issue. Instead of addressing the court's ruling that her claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations and that she therefore was not entitled to an extension of time to initiate proceedings on her disallowed claims, Mary argues her claims should not be barred by the nonclaim statute because she had not been given notice the nonelaim period had begun to run.
7. The issue before the superior court was neither the merits of Mary's claims nor the merits of personal representative Sue's disallowance of Mary's claims for failure to comply with the nonelaim statute. The issue before the court was Mary's requested extension of time to contest Sue's disallowance of Mary's claims. The court denied the extension because the applicable statutes of limitations already had run on all of Mary's claims. Mary did not address the statute of limitations issues in the superior court or in her opening brief to this court. Only in Mary's reply brief did she address the statutes of limitations, and then only in the context of Michael's actions as her mother's Minnesota conservator.5
8. Having failed to argue the statute of limitations issues in the superior court or in her opening brief to this court, Mary has waived these issues.6 The superior court's decision is therefore AFFIRMED.7
CHRISTEN, Justice, not participating.

. AS 13.16.460 provides in relevant part:

. See AS 13.16.460(b).

. AS 13.16.465(3) provides no extensions of time to initiate a proceeding on a disallowed claim may "run beyond the applicable statute of limitations."

. Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(k)(4) provides that if the court does not rule on a motion for reconsideration within 30 days, the motion is considered denied.

. Very little of the partial dissent's extensive statutes of limitations discussion can be traced to Mary's arguments or briefing.

. Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874, 889 (Alaska 2010) ("We have repeatedly held that 'a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.'" (quoting Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of America, 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001))); id. at 887 ("[Issues not argued in opening appellate briefs are waived." (citing Shearer v. Mundt, 36 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Alaska 2001))).

. We take no position on whether Mary may, in connection with final accountings in Andrew's and Marjorie's probate estates, assert mismanagement claims as to when Michael served as personal representative. See AS 13.16.485(d) ("Issues of liability as between the estate and the personal representative individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or indemnification or other appropriate proceeding.").