Court Opinion

ID: 9824849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:33:12.880149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:10.063275
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
As shown in the original opinion, if the defendant’s pilot from the south door of its car could have seen the track beyond the end of the car to within as short a distance of such end as he estimates (to within 35 or 40 feet on the opposite side of the track), and if the automobile was in a perilous position — that is, on or going on the track, and not likely to clear the same in time to avoid a collision — when the car was as far away as indicated by the estimate of Nadelhoffer that it was 50 or 80 feet away when he discovered it by looking back after the right *526front wheel of the automobile was in the cavity between the rails of the track and the left front wheel about on the first rail of same or by the estimate of Nadelhoffer’s companion, Greenwood, who thought that the car was about 45 feet away when, upon hearing Nadelhoffer’s exclamation of discovery, he looked back and saw it, although he said the collision came so soon after his discovery that both seemed to occur at the same time, and if the pilot was looking at the crossing during the precise short time while the car covered any portion of the distance ■of from about ten to about 45 feet, which said obviously uncertain estimates, if accepted as correct, would have required it to ■cover after the automobile was in its perilous position and before its view was obstructed by the end of the car, the pilot must have seen it at some' time while from about 50 to about ■80 feet away; but, if it be conceded that the jury might reasonably have inferred from such evidence that the pilot had an opportunity to have discovered the automobile in peril, can it be further inferred that he did so in time to have given a signal to the engineer which should have resulted in avoiding the collision or the resultant damages?
The inference or presumption (based upon the stated testimonial evidence) that the pilot had an opportunity to discover the automobile in peril, although improbable as against his denial, notwithstanding his testimony that he was looking out, is, no ■doubt, permissible to the jury; but does the stated evidence justify the further inference or presumption that he actually discovered such peril and, too, in time to have avoided the collision or the consequent damage?
In 1 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 33, it is said:
“Thus, throughout the whole realm of evidence, circumstantial and testimonial, the theory of the inductive argument as practically applied from the standpoint of admissibility is that the evidentiary fact will be considered when, and only when, the desired conclusion based upon it is more probable or natural, or at least a probable or natural hypothesis, and when the other hypotheses or explanations of the fact are either less probable ■or natural, or at least not exceedingly more probable or natural.”
*527And in 2 Modern Law of Evidence (Chamberlayne) sec. 1029, it is said:
“The requirement that the logical inference styled a presumption of fact should be a strong, natural, and immediate one brings as a corollary the rule that no inference can legitimately be based upon a fact the existence of which rests upon a prior inference. In other words, there can be, in the great majority of cases, no presumption upon a presumption. On the contrary, the fact used as the basis of the inference, the terminus a quo, so to speak, must be established in a clear manner, devoid of all uncertainty.”
Also see cases cited in notes to the text quoted.
Ordinarily, at least, the rule is as stated in said texts.
We think the inference that the pilot discovered the perilous situation of the automobile, and that, too, in time to have avoided the collision or damages, is not based immediately upon testimonial facts of sufficient certainty, and is too attenuated, remote, improbable, and wanting in reason therefor to be allowed.
The case of St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Clark, post, 142 Pac. 396, appears to be distinguishable from the present case in that there was no evidence nor possible inference that Clark’s wagon was in peril before the trainmen actually and admittedly discovered it and did all within their power to avoid the collision, nor that it was possible to have avoided the collision at any time after Clark actually reached a perilous situation; but that case would seem to be a practical recognition and application of the rule that the basic facts must be certain to support an inference, and such inference must be within the foregoing rule stated by Mr. Wigmore and Mr. Chamber layne; it emphasizes the fact that the discovery of peril must have been actual to warrant an instruction upon liability in such event.
Eor the reasons stated, this case should be reversed and remanded for another trial.
By the Court: It is so ordered.