Court Opinion

ID: 9957678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 20:01:58.580702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:33.399603
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/24 P. v. Macias CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E081599

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FVI025322)

 RUBEN MACIAS,                                                           OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory Tavill,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Leslie Conrad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn Kirschbaum and

Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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                                   I. INTRODUCTION

       In 2007, defendant and appellant Ruben Macias was convicted by a jury of special

circumstance first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187) and sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole. In 2022, defendant filed a motion pursuant to People v. Franklin

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, seeking a hearing (Franklin hearing) to preserve evidence of

youth-related mitigating factors that may be relevant to a future youthful offender parole

hearing under section 3051.2 The trial court denied the motion on the ground that, under

section 3051, persons serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole are not

eligible for youthful offender parole hearings.

       Defendant appeals, asserting only a facial challenge to the constitutional validity

of section 3051 on the ground that treating youthful offenders sentenced to life without

the possibility of parole differently than other youthful offenders violates the United

States and California constitutions’ guarantees of equal protection. We respectfully find

defendant’s argument unpersuasive for the same reasons we articulated in People v. Ngo

(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, review granted May 17, 2023, S279458 (Ngo), and the

reasons expressed by the California Supreme Court’s recent opinion in People v. Hardin

(Mar. 4, 2024, S277487)___Cal.5th___[2024 Cal.Lexis 1076] (Hardin). As such, we

affirm the trial court’s order.

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

       2 Generally, for purposes of section 3051, a youthful offender is an individual

who was under 25 years of age or younger at the time the person committed the offense
for which the person was incarcerated. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1), (a)(2)(B).)

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                                    II. BACKGROUND

       In 2007, defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (§ 187; count 1);

two counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664, counts 2, 3); one count of prohibited

possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a), count 4); and one count of street terrorism

(§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5). The jury also found true special allegations that the

murder in count 1 was committed while defendant was an active participant in a criminal

street gang and for the purpose of furthering the activities of the gang (§ 190.2, subd.

(a)(22)); the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,

subd. (b)); and defendant personally used a firearm causing death in the commission of

the offenses (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In addition, defendant admitted he had suffered a

prior prison term within the meaning of former section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant

was sentenced to life in state prison without the possibility of parole, as well as a term of

25 years to life for the personal use of a firearm causing death on count 1.3 At the time

defendant committed the offenses, he was 24 years of age.

       3 Defendant was also sentenced to (1) a term of 40 years to life for each of the

attempted murder convictions, representing 15 years to life for each attempted murder
(§§ 187, 664, counts 2, 3), enhanced by a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the
personal use of a firearm in the commission of the offenses (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); (2) a
consecutive term of four years for active participation in a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5), representing the upper term of 3 years, enhanced by an
additional year for the prison prior (former § 667.5, subdivision (b)); and (3) a
consecutive term of 3 years for prohibited possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a),
count 4), representing the middle term of two years, enhanced by one year for the prison
prior (former § 667.5, subdivision (b)). Pursuant to section 654, the trial court stayed
execution of sentence on count 4, as well defendant’s one-year prison prior enhancements
as to counts 1, 2, and 3.

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       In 2022, defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing seeking to preserve

evidence for a potential youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. The trial

court denied the motion, concluding that a Franklin hearing was unnecessary because

defendant was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section

3051. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion.

                                     III. DISCUSSION

       The only argument asserted by defendant on appeal is that the trial court’s denial

of his motion for a Franklin hearing violated his right to equal protection under the

United States and California constitutions. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.

       Section 3051 generally requires the board of parole hearings to periodically

conduct “youth offender parole hearing[s]” during an offender’s incarceration for persons

who were 25 years of age or younger at the time they committed the underlying offense

for which they were incarcerated. (§ 3051; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)

However, youthful offenders who were older than 18 years of age at the time they

committed the underlying offense and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole

are not eligible for a hearing under the statute. (Ibid.) In this case, defendant contends

that section 3051 denies him equal protection because youthful offenders who are

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are treated differently than all other

youthful offenders. Because defendant’s claim constitutes a facial challenge to the

constitutional validity of the statute, we review the claim de novo. (People v. Sands

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 202 [claim that section 3051 violates equal protection rights

reviewed independently] (Sands); People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 [“We

                                              4
review an equal protection claim de novo.”]; People v. Yang (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 120,

125 [same].)

       Generally, “[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions extend to persons the equal

protection of law.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287.) “At core, the

requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of

people unequally without some justification. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [W]here the law challenged

neither draws a suspect classification nor burdens fundamental rights, . . . [w]e find a

denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in

treatment and some legitimate government purpose.” (Id. at pp. 288-289.) This rational

basis review applies to the Legislature’s decision “to define degrees of culpability and

punishment, and to distinguish between crimes . . . .” (Hardin, supra,___Cal.5th___

[2024 Cal.Lexis 1076 at *4]; People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, 492 [The

rational basis test applies in determining whether carve-outs for certain offenders in

section 3051 are unconstitutional under equal protection principles.].)

       However, we need not discuss defendant’s argument in detail. As defendant

concedes, in Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 116, this court rejected the exact argument he

advances in this appeal. In that case, we concluded there were “several rational bases”

that would justify section 3051’s differential treatment of youthful offenders sentenced to

life without the possibility of parole, including (1) the Legislature’s potentially rational

intent that section 3051 be a limited response to the precise issues identified by the

California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262; (2) the

potentially rational conclusion that providing a youth offender parole hearing to an

                                              5
offender who is not entitled to parole at all appears absurd; and (3) the fact that the

Legislature could rationally recognize a difference in culpability for youthful offenders

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole given the nature of the crimes subject to

such punishment. (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123-124.) In his reply brief,

defendant concedes that his case is not factually distinguishable from Ngo, and defendant

has declined to present any argument addressing the rationale adopted in Ngo.

       More importantly, while this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court

issued its decision in Hardin, supra,___Cal.5th___[2024 Cal.Lexis 1076] concluding that

section 3051’s disparate treatment of youthful offenders sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole does not violate equal protection, resolving the split of authority on

this issue.4 Given our high court’s decision in Hardin, we conclude that the trial court

did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing.

       4 Our conclusion in Ngo was consistent with almost every published decision that

has considered this issue (see People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1080-1081,
review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205;
People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347-349; People v. Jackson (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199-200; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780-781; In
re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 433-436), with the exception of one case.
However, that case has now been reversed by the California Supreme Court. (Hardin,
supra,___Cal.5th___[2024 Cal.Lexis 1076].)

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                              IV. DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                FIELDS
                                                         J.

We concur:

MILLER
              Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
                        J.

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