Court Opinion

ID: 9362940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:17.795844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.515484
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals

                                NO. 2021-CA-0489-MR

ANDRE SHEPHARD                                                              APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 04-CR-000354

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                      APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON,1 JUDGES.

THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: Andre Shephard, pro se, appeals from the Jefferson

Circuit Court’s denial of his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 motion

to vacate his conviction and sentence because his plea was involuntary. We affirm

because his claim is untimely and successive.

1
 Judge Kelly Thompson authored this Opinion before his tenure with the Kentucky Court of
Appeals expired on December 31, 2022. Release of this Opinion was delayed by administrative
handling.
             On or around January 19, 2004, Teandrea Brown died as a result of

multiple stab wounds. When this occurred, there was a pre-existing no contact

order in place restricting Shephard from having any unlawful contact with Brown.

             On January 20, 2004, Shephard was questioned by police during

which he admitted to being with Brown the night before her body was found and

getting into an argument with her. Shephard claimed that during a physical

struggle between him and Brown, she fell onto a knife, and he left her home in a

panic without calling for medical assistance. Shephard told the police that the

knife could be found in a box placed under some Christmas lights, and police

found it there.

             On January 29, 2004, Shephard was indicted by a Jefferson County

grand jury for the murder of Brown. Based on Shephard’s violation of the no-

contact order, the Commonwealth filed a notice of aggravating circumstances

indicating it sought to pursue a punishment up to and including the death penalty.

             Shephard ultimately pled guilty to murder in exchange for a sentence

of life without parole for twenty-five years. Shephard’s guilty plea was accepted

by the trial court at a hearing on June 22, 2005, during which a plea colloquy was

conducted. Thereafter, the trial court found that Shephard knowingly and

voluntarily entered his plea. Shephard was sentenced in accordance with the plea

agreement by judgment entered on June 23, 2005.

                                        -2-
             On September 29, 2006, Shephard filed a pro se motion pursuant to

Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 seeking to vacate his

conviction and sentence on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The

motion asserted multiple claims, including an unknowing entry of his plea and

inadequate advice as to an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense and self-

defense. The trial court denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary

hearing, and this Court affirmed in Shephard v. Commonwealth, No. 2011-CA-

000936-MR, 2012 WL 6632707 (Ky.App. Dec. 21, 2012) (unpublished).

             On December 29, 2020, Shephard filed the instant CR 60.02 motion

asserting that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because his

attorney did not sufficiently advise him of an “accidental killing defense.” He

argues his attorney’s incorrect advice concerning the availability of this defense

was demonstrated during his plea colloquy before the trial court, and the trial court

was obligated to correct this and reject the plea as a result. On April 5, 2021, the

motion was denied as untimely, successive, and without merit.

             Shephard makes three arguments before this Court asserting error in

the denial of his CR 60.02 motion: (1) due to the unknowing and involuntary entry

of his plea, his judgment is void and not subject to timeliness restrictions; (2) this

issue, which he argues was the fault of the trial court, was precluded from being

raised in his previous post-conviction motion because RCr 11.42 is reserved only

                                          -3-
for challenges pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court

misinterpreted the purpose of his citation to overruled case law used to support the

availability of an “accidental killing defense.”

             We review the trial court’s denial of relief under CR 60.02 for abuse

of discretion. Berry v. Commonwealth, 624 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Ky.App. 2021).

“For a trial court to have abused its discretion, its decision must have been

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Grundy

v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Ky.App. 2013) (citation omitted).

             The crux of Shephard’s appeal is that the judgment imposing his

sentence of imprisonment is void; therefore, he believes that his argument about

his plea being involuntary can be raised at any time. Depending on the specific

grounds asserted, CR 60.02 mandates that a motion be filed no later than one year

after entry of a judgment or order, or alternatively, within a reasonable time.

“What constitutes a reasonable time in which to move to vacate a judgment under

CR 60.02 is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court.” Gross

v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).

             However, void judgments are a legal nullity from their outset and a

court does not have discretion in determining whether they should be set aside.

Cabinet for Health & Family Services ex rel. Child Support Enforcement v. B.N.T.,

651 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Ky. 2022) (citation omitted). While courts are afforded

                                          -4-
discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable time under CR 60.02, they are

not afforded the same discretion with respect to void judgments because void

judgments do not gain validity with the passage of time. Id. (citation omitted).

             “[T]he generally accepted rule is that where the court has jurisdiction

of parties and subject matter, the judgment, if erroneous, is voidable, not void.”

Puckett v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Services, 621 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Ky. 2021)

(quoting Dix v. Dix, 310 Ky. 818, 222 S.W.2d 839, 842 (1949)). Judgments

entering a criminal sentence beyond statutorily imposed limitations are to be

deemed void as well. Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 304 (Ky. 2018).

             The issue raised by Shephard on appeal against his judgment does not

implicate any defects with the trial court’s jurisdiction either over him or his

criminal charges, nor does it allege his sentence to be contrary to that allowed

under the applicable statutes. Shephard confuses void judgments with those that

are voidable, and as a result, his request for relief is subject to the timeliness

restrictions of CR 60.02 requiring this action to have, at most, been filed within a

reasonable time.

             The trial court noted that Shephard did not raise this claim until fifteen

years after the entry of his judgment and ruled this was not timely. In support of

its ruling, the trial court cited Djoric v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.3d 908, 910

(Ky.App. 2016), and Reyna v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 274, 274 (Ky.App.

                                           -5-
2007). Both cases addressed claims for CR 60.02 relief from guilty pleas argued to

have been entered unknowingly and involuntarily. In Djoric a thirteen-year delay,

and in Reyna a four-year delay, were both deemed unreasonable. We agree with

the trial court’s reasoning.

             Additionally, Shephard could have, but failed to file a direct appeal

alleging that his plea was involuntary, or to raise this issue in his previously filed

RCr 11.42 motion. “Our rules of civil procedure do not permit successive motions

or the relitigation of issues which could have been raised in prior proceedings.”

Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Ky.App. 2009). There is an

organized procedural framework for challenging a final judgment which is

established in rules governing direct appeals, claims brought under RCr 11.42, and

claims brought thereafter under CR 60.02. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. CR 60.02 is

not intended to allow additional opportunities to raise defenses such as those under

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), but

rather, to afford relief not available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42 after

demonstrating why special, extraordinary relief is warranted. Gross, 648 S.W.2d

at 856.

             Shephard provides no explanation for why he did not raise the issue

regarding the involuntariness of his plea earlier. He only offers his

misinterpretation that RCr 11.42 precluded him from raising this issue. See

                                          -6-
Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 210-11 (Ky. 1994) (“RCr 11.42

encompasses every issue that suffices as reason to vacate a judgment which could

not have been addressed by direct appeal. Such reasons need not be jurisdictional

in nature, nor necessarily such as to render the judgment void or even voidable.”).

Certainly, Shephard could have argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing

to inform him of this potential defense before letting him enter into the plea. As a

result, we also agree with the trial court’s ruling that the motion is successive.

             In conclusion, Shephard’s argument that the trial court misconstrued

the purpose of his legal citations offers nothing that would otherwise cure the

untimely and successive nature of this action. Additionally, as it relates to the

merits of any “accidental killing defense,” it was not the burden of the trial court to

offer him legal advice in place of his trial counsel as his brief appears to argue.

Regardless, the record demonstrates during Shephard’s plea colloquy he was

explicitly told that by pleading guilty he would waive the right to present an

accidental killing defense at trial. Moments later he was further informed of the

incriminating evidence that he would face at trial which included his incriminating

statements, and when asked by the trial court if he believed a jury would convict

him, Shephard answered in the affirmative. See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 258

S.W.3d 435, 439 (Ky.App. 2008) (“In order to be valid, a guilty plea in a criminal

case must represent a meaningful choice between the probable outcome at trial and

                                          -7-
the more certain outcome offered by the plea agreement.”). Therefore, even had

this issue been raised in a timely RCr 11.42 motion, it is doubtful Shephard would

have been able to establish either that his plea was involuntary or that he was

prejudiced as a result.

             Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court

denying Shephard’s motion for CR 60.02 relief.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Andre Shephard, pro se                    Daniel Cameron
 West Liberty, Kentucky                    Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Bryan D. Morrow
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -8-