Court Opinion

ID: 9953467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:43.067563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:55:13.039124
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 354605
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
CRAIG DEAN,                                                         LC No. 86-006381-02-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In 1987, defendant and his codefendant, Darren Cross, were tried jointly by separate juries.
Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316, and sentenced to
mandatory life in prison without parole. After remand from our Supreme Court, People v Dean,
___ Mich ___; 982 NW2d 183 (2022), defendant appeals as on leave granted1 from the trial court’s
order denying his third motion for relief from judgment. We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

      The facts underlying defendant’s appeal are contained in his direct appeal in Docket No.
1004902:
              Defendants Craig Dean (“Dean”) and Darren Cross (“Cross”) were accused
       of an execution style killing committed during the robbery of a house at which
       drugs were sold. The main witness was Ricardo Smith (“Smith”), who had been at

1
  See Dean, ___ Mich at ___; 982 NW2d at 183 (“Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. . . .”).
2
 Defendant’s appeal in Docket No. 100490 was consolidated with Cross’s appeal in Docket No.
101650. See People v Dean, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May
17, 1989 (Docket Nos. 100490; 101650), p 1.

                                                -1-
       the house helping the victim sell drugs and who was an acquaintance of both
       defendants. Smith testified that when defendants came to the house, the victim let
       Dean inside. After talking for a short time, Dean asked the victim if he would let
       Cross in as well. Once inside, Cross displayed a handgun and directed Smith and
       the victim to give him all their money and drugs.

               Following the robbery, Smith testified that Dean left the house with the
       stolen money and drugs. Cross then instructed Smith and the victim to sit on the
       floor with their backs to the wall. Although the victim complied, Smith opted to
       run from the room and jump through a nearby window. Smith related that he heard
       several gunshots go by him as he ran and then additional gunshots once he was
       outside. Subsequent investigation by the police disclosed that the victim died from
       a single gunshot wound to the chest area. [People v Dean, unpublished per curiam
       opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 17, 1989 (Docket Nos. 100490;
       101650), pp 1-2.]

        At the time of the offense, defendant was 19-years-old. During trial, the evidence
suggested defendant and Cross robbed Smith and the victim because the victim owed defendant
$650. Although defendant denied having a gun or being present for the shooting, he admitted to
police that he instigated the robbery and instructed Smith to kill the victim. After sentencing,
defendant appealed his conviction, which this Court affirmed. See Dean, unpub op at 2-4.

        In March 1993, defendant filed his first motion for relief from judgment, claiming his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction,
prosecutorial error, improper jury instructions, and he was denied due process, a fair trial, and the
effective assistance of counsel. In April 2004, defendant filed a second motion for relief from
judgment, alleging improper jury instructions, insufficient evidence, and ineffective assistance of
counsel. Both motions were denied by the trial court.

       In December 2019, defendant, in propria persona, filed a third motion for relief from
judgment under MCR 6.500 et seq., claiming he was entitled to resentencing because his sentence
of life without parole, imposed when he was 19-years-old, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, US Const, Ams VIII and XIV.3 Defendant asserted that he satisfied MCR
6.508(D)(3), claiming there was good cause for his failure to previously raise his argument because
Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012) and Montgomery v
Louisiana, 577 US 190; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016) were not decided until after he

3
  “The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’ US Const, Am VIII.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 124; 987 NW2d 132 (2022).
By contrast, “the Michigan Constitution prohibits ‘cruel or unusual punishment.’ Const 1963, art
1, § 16 (emphasis added). Article 1, § 16 is thus interpreted more broadly than the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. at 124 n 9 (citations omitted). In his third motion for relief from judgment,
defendant cited only to US Const, Am VIII. However, on appeal, defendant cites to both US
Const, Am VIII and Const 1963 art 1, § 16.

                                                -2-
filed his prior motions for relief from judgment. Additionally, relying on Cruz v United States,
opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, issued March 29, 2018
(Case No. 11-CV-787), vacated by 826 Fed Appx 49 (CA 2, 2020), defendant argued there was
new evidence not discovered before his prior motions. In Cruz, the defendant introduced evidence
showing the developmental differences between juvenile and adult brains. Because the Cruz court
extended Miller to apply to 18-year-old offenders, defendant claimed there was good cause for
failing to previously raise his argument. Defendant also argued that he was actually prejudiced
because his “sentence is invalid where his non-parolable [sic] life sentence is maintained outside
the protective provisions of Miller, [] and MCL 769.25a, and where he was unable to present this
claim during his sentencing decades earlier.”

        Defendant further argued that his mandatory sentence of life without parole was
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court’s holdings in Miller and Montgomery should apply to
19-year-old offenders. Defendant, relying on Miller and its predecessors, claimed juvenile
offenders were fundamentally different than their adult counterparts because, as a result of their
underdeveloped brain, they demonstrate a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, are more susceptible to the influence of peer pressure, and their personality traits
are more transient. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional
to sentence a juvenile to a mandatory sentence of life without parole without consideration of the
characteristics of youth or the juvenile’s rehabilitative potential. Defendant, citing several federal
and state court decisions applying Miller, claimed research on the brain development of
adolescents showed there is no developmental distinction between 17-year-old and 21-year-old
offenders. As such, defendant asserted Miller protections should apply to 19-year-old offenders.

         Defendant also claimed, under an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of his
sentence, that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it fails to account for
his youthful attributes, lack of culpability, and rehabilitative potential. Defendant contended his
“reckless” and “impulsive” actions during the commissions of the robbery and resulting murder
demonstrated his lack of maturity, underdeveloped brain, lack of foresight, irrational thinking, and
inability to understand the consequences of his actions. Defendant also claimed “he lacked the
ability to extricate himself from the horrific, crime producing setting[] that made him vulnerable
to the negative influences of his environment,” because he was exposed to domestic violence,
drugs, and poverty. Additionally, defendant asserted that he demonstrated extensive rehabilitative
potential during his time in prison by remaining largely violence-free, maintaining excellent work
reports, and completing his GED and various certificates. For these reasons, defendant argued that
his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and he should be resentenced in accordance
with Miller.

           In July 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s third motion for relief from judgment,
stating:
                  In this motion defendant alleges a retroactive change in law pursuant to
           Cruz v United States. The defendant avers that recent scientific and developmental
           research evidence introduced in Cruz extends the Miller v Alabama ruling to also
           apply to 19 year old offenders, which makes his mandatory life sentence
           unconstitutional. Defendant proffers that this evidence serves as a basis of an
           evidentiary hearing and constitutes grounds for resentencing.

                                                  -3-
                Upon review of the evidence and claims defendant’s argument must fail.
       The new research developments and scientific evidence upon which defendant
       relies is entirely contained in a single second circuit united states [sic] district court
       case that, while persuasive, is not legally binding on this Court and does not amend,
       extend or overrule the Miller ruling. Supreme Court precedent that is binding on
       this Court does not permit an inferior court, appellate or trial, to overrule Supreme
       Court precedent, rather, such precedent places the prerogative of overruling
       Supreme Court decisions with the Supreme Court. Accordingly, because [ ] Miller
       v Alabama is “good law” until our Supreme Court rules that it is not, we are bound
       by Supreme Court precedent that clearly and unequivocally mandates that we
       follow its precedents and leave the business of overruling Supreme Court decisions
       to the Supreme Court.

               As such, Cruz has no retroactive application and defendant’s reliance on
       Cruz in support of his argument is without merit. Defendant has not shown “good
       cause” under MCR 6.508(D)(3), nor has he proven actual prejudice. Therefore, for
       all the aforementioned reasons stated, defendant’s third motion for relief from
       judgment is hereby DENIED.

        This appeal followed. This Court denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal “because defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying the motion
for relief from judgment.” People v Dean, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
December 10, 2020 (Docket No. 354605). Defendant applied for leave to appeal with our Supreme
Court. On December 9, 2022, in lieu of granting defendant’s application, our Supreme Court
remanded defendant’s case to this Court, stating:
               By order of August 3, 2021, the application for leave to appeal the
       December 10, 2020 order of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending
       the decision in People v Poole (Docket No. 161529). On order of the Court, the
       case having been decided on July 28, 2022, 510 Mich ___ (2022), the application
       is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
       appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on
       leave granted in light of People v Parks, 510 Mich [225; 987 NW2d 161] (2022)
       (Docket No. 162086), and People v Stovall, 510 Mich [301; 987 NW2d 85] (2022)
       (Docket No. 162425).

               We do not retain jurisdiction. [Dean, ___ Mich at ___; 982 NW2d at 183.]

                         II. PROCEDURAL BAR OF MCR 6.502(G)(2)

       Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief from judgment
because his argument is based on a retroactive change in law and newly discovered evidence. We
disagree.

                                                  -4-
                                 A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        A trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion and its findings of facts supporting the decision are reviewed for clear error. People v
Swain, 288 Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
court does not select a reasonable and principled outcome.” People v Maye, 343 Mich App 57,
65; 996 NW2d 571 (2022). “Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Chaney, 327 Mich App 586, 587 n
1; 935 NW2d 66 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The interpretation of Court rules
is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 251;
732 NW2d 605 (2007).

                                         B. ANALYSIS

         Motions for relief from judgment are governed by MCR 6.500 et seq. Swain, 288 Mich
App at 629. Generally, a defendant is entitled to file only one motion for relief from judgment.
MCR 6.502(G)(1). However, under MCR 6.502(G)(2), a defendant may file a second or
subsequent motion based on either (a) a retroactive change in law that later occurred or (b) the
later discovery of new evidence. Under MCR 6.502(G)(3), “new evidence” includes new scientific
evidence. In the remand order, our Supreme Court expressly ordered this Court to consider
defendant’s arguments in light of its decision in Stovall. Dean, ___ Mich at ___; 982 NW2d at
183. In Poole, our Supreme Court applied Stovall’s holding, finding:
               We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing defendant’s
       application for leave to appeal, because defendant has met the requirements
       necessary to file a successive motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR
       6.502(G)(2). Specifically, we conclude that, as defendant argues for Miller
       protections to be extended to 18-year-old offenders, Miller and Montgomery serve
       as the “foundation” or “base” for defendant’s challenges to the constitutionality of
       his mandatory life-without-parole sentence; thus, his motion is “based on a
       retroactive change in law” and overcomes the procedural bar in MCR 6.502(G).
       People v Stovall, [510 Mich 301, 310-311; 987 NW2d 85 (2022)] (concluding that
       Miller and Montgomery served as the “foundation” or “base” for the juvenile
       defendant’s challenge to his life-with-parole sentence for second-degree murder).
       [People v Poole, ___ Mich ___; 977 NW2d 530 (2022).]

       In his third motion for relief from judgment, defendant argued that his sentence was
unconstitutional and the holdings of Miller and Montgomery should be extended to 19-year-old
offenders. Defendant specifically claimed he established good cause for failing to raise his
arguments in his prior motions because Miller and Montgomery were not decided until after his
motions were filed and, under Cruz, there was new scientific evidence regarding juvenile brain
development discovered after he filed his prior motions. Although Cruz, as a federal district court
opinion, has no binding effect on this Court or the trial court, see People v Brcic, 342 Mich App
271, 280 n 3; 994 NW2d 812 (2022), because Miller and Montgomery also served as the “base” of
defendant’s challenge he satisfied the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G)(2). See Poole, 977 NW2d
530. However, defendant fails to acknowledge that the trial court did not deny his motion for relief
from judgment for failure to satisfy the procedural bar of MCR 6.052(G)(2). Rather, it denied his

                                                -5-
motion under MCR 6.508(D)(3) because defendant failed to demonstrate good cause or actual
prejudice, thus, the holdings in Poole and Stovall do not apply.

       MCR 6.508(D)(3), states, in relevant part:
               (D) Entitlement to Relief. The defendant has the burden of establishing
       entitlement to the relief requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant
       if the motion

                                                * * *

              (3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could
       have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion
       under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates

              (a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior
       motion, and

               (b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for
       relief. As used in this subrule, “actual prejudice” means that,

               (i) in a conviction following a trial,

               (A) but for the alleged error, the defendant would have had a reasonably
       likely chance of acquittal;

                                                * * *

                (iii) in any case, the irregularity was so offensive to the maintenance of a
       sound judicial process that the conviction should not be allowed to stand regardless
       of its effect on the outcome of the case[.] [MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a), (b)(i) and (b)(iii).]

        In Miller, the Supreme Court held “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 567 US
at 479 (emphasis added). However, because defendant committed his crime at age 19, he is not a
juvenile offender and Miller does not apply to him. Additionally, defendant’s reliance on Cruz’s
extension of Miller does not establish good cause or actual prejudice because Cruz is not binding
law, as acknowledged by the trial court. Since defendant filed his third motion for relief from
judgment, our Supreme Court in Parks extended Miller protections to 18-year-old offenders.
Parks, 510 Mich at 268. However, because defendant was 19-years-old at the time of his crime,
Parks is inapplicable. Because defendant did not establish good cause or actual prejudice to justify
relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), the trial court did not err by denying his motion for relief from
judgment.

                III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE

       Defendant also argues, under both facial and as-applied challenges, the trial court erred by
denying his motion for relief from judgment and he is entitled to resentencing because imposing a

                                                 -6-
mandatory life sentence without parole on a 19-year-old offender, without individualized
consideration of the attributes of youth, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment.4 In the event we
find the protections granted to juvenile offenders under Miller and Parks extend to 19-year-old
offenders, defendant asserts this extension should apply retroactively to him. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        “[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation or constitutional law are reviewed de novo.”
People v Fredell, 340 Mich App 221, 230; 985 NW2d 837 (2022). “Statutes are presumed to be
constitutional, and the courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its
unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 203; 817 NW2d 599
(2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is the burden of the party challenging the
constitutionality of the statute to prove its invalidity.” People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand),
___ Mich App ___, n 1; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 330612); slip op at 3. “The retroactive
effect of a court’s decision is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Quinn,
305 Mich App 484, 489; 853 NW2d 383 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

                                           B. ANALYSIS

               A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one
       of two ways: by either a facial challenge an as-applied challenge. A facial challenge
       attacks the statute itself and requires the challenger to establish that no set of
       circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid. The fact that the . . . [a]ct
       might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
       insufficient[.] An as-applied challenge alleges a present infringement or denial of a
       specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution of government
       action. [People v Johnson, 336 Mich App 688, 692; 971 NW2d 692 (2021) (internal
       quotation marks and citations omitted; alterations in original).]

A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving its invalidity. People
v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67; 768 NW2d 93 (2009). Defendant presents both a facial and as-
applied challenge to his mandatory life without parole sentence. We analyze each challenge in
turn.

       In Miller, 567 US at 477-480, the Supreme Court held it was unconstitutional to sentence
a juvenile defendant convicted of murder to a mandatory sentence of life without parole without
considering the defendant’s age, the “hallmark features” of youth, and rehabilitative potential.

4
 Although defendant briefly cites to Const 1963, art 1 § 16 in his motion for relief from judgment,
he largely argues his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII.
On appeal, defendant argues his sentence is cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1
§ 16. Because “a punishment [that] passes muster under the state constitution . . . necessarily
passes muster under the federal constitution,” People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 204; 817
NW2d 599 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted), we analyze defendant’s arguments
under the standards applicable to the Michigan Constitution.

                                                 -7-
Recently, in Parks, 510 Mich at 265-266, our Supreme Court extended Miller to include
individuals who were 18-years-old at the time they committed their crime. In light of the Parks
ruling, this Court in People v Czarnecki (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023),
(Docket No. 348732); slip op at 1-2, expressly considered whether a defendant, who was convicted
of first-degree murder at age 19, was entitled to resentencing on the grounds that a mandatory life
without parole sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1 § 16. In
Czarnecki, this Court found the holding in Parks did not extend to 19-year-old offenders, stating:

       In Parks, 510 Mich at 268, our Supreme Court held that “mandatorily subjecting
       18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to a sentence of life
       without parole violates the principle of proportionality derived from the Michigan
       Constitution, and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const
       1963, art 1, § 16.” Previously, however, in People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658;
       242 NW2d 377 (1976), our Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
       sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of felony murder,
       expressly rejecting the defendant’s argument that such a sentence constitutes cruel
       or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. . . . Our Supreme Court in
       Parks explicitly limited the effect its opinion had on Hall, stating that its “opinion
       today does not affect Hall’s holding as to those older than 18.” Parks, 510 Mich at
       255 n 9. . . . From this, it follows that Hall’s holding continues to apply to those
       older than 18. This understanding of Parks and Hall is consistent with this Court’s
       recent decision in Adamowicz (On Second Remand), where this Court held that Hall
       compelled the conclusion that subjecting a 21-year-old defendant to a mandatory
       sentence of life without the possibility of parole did not constitute cruel or unusual
       punishment under the Michigan Constitution. Adamowicz (On Second Remand),
       ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4.

                Adamowicz (On Second Remand) is not controlling in this case, however,
       because, again, defendant here was 19 when he committed the first-degree murder.
       Nevertheless, on the basis of Hall, we reach the same result as this Court did in
       Adamowicz (On Second Remand). Before Parks was decided, defendant’s sentence
       of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole did not constitute cruel or
       unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 according to Hall, 396 Mich at
       657-658. Parks explicitly stated that its “opinion today does not affect Hall’s
       holding as to those older than 18.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255 n 9. Accordingly,
       following Parks, defendant’s mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a first-
       degree murder committed at the age of 19 continues to not be cruel or unusual
       punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 according to Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658.
       See Associated Builders & Contractors v City of Lansing, 499 Mich 177, 191-192;
       880 NW2d 765 (2016) (“The Court of Appeals is bound to follow decisions by this
       Court except where those decisions have clearly been overruled or superseded and
       is not authorized to anticipatorily ignore our decisions where it determines that the
       foundations of a Supreme Court decision have been undermined.”) (Footnote
       omitted; emphasis in original.) [Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).]

                                                -8-
       Similar to the defendant in Czarnecki, here, defendant was 19-years-old at the time he
committed his offense. This Court’s holding in Czarnecki is binding precedent under MCR
7.215(J)(1). As such, defendant’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of his mandatory life
sentence fails. And because this Court has explicitly declined to extend Miller and Parks to 19-
year-old offenders, defendant’s alternative argument regarding the retroactive application of an
extension of Miller and Parks also fails.

        Regarding defendant’s as-applied challenge, we note defendant interchangeably argues
that his youthfulness and involvement as an aider and abettor made him less culpable for his
actions, and thus, his sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. However, defendant
cannot argue his youthfulness lessened his culpability because, as stated, Miller and Parks do not
apply to him and the trial court was not required to consider his youthful attributes at sentencing.
Because this argument is only applicable to defendant’s facial challenge, we will not consider it
when evaluating the merits of his as-applied challenge. See Johnson, 336 Mich App at 692 (“An
as-applied challenge alleges a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular
injury in process of actual execution of government action.”) (Quotation marks and citations
omitted). Further, whether defendant is less culpable because of his status as an aider and abettor
is a separate and distinct legal question from his culpability as a youthful offender. Therefore, we
will only address defendant’s argument regarding his culpability as an aider and abettor in his as-
applied challenge.

         Because defendant raised his as-applied argument in his third motion for relief from
judgment, under MCR 6.502(G)(2), in order to successfully advance his argument, defendant must
identify either: a retroactive change in law that occurred after his first motion for relief from
judgment or a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before his first motion. However,
defendant’s as-applied challenge is not based on any new evidence or a change in law holding that
it is cruel or unusual punishment to sentence a defendant convicted under an aider and abettor
theory to a life sentence without parole. In fact, Michigan law expressly permits defendant’s
sentence. See MCL 750.316(1) and MCL 767.39; see also People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552,
558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013) (“[A] proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual.”); People v
Brown, 294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d 531 (2011) (“Legislatively mandated sentences are
presumptively proportional and presumptively valid.”).

         Further, even if defendant could meet the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G)(2), the evidence
suggests defendant was actively involved in the events that led to the victim’s murder. At trial,
Smith testified defendant participated in the robbery, although Cross was the individual who
ultimately committed the murder. Dean, unpub op at 1. Defendant admitted to police he instigated
the robbery and instructed Smith to kill the victim. In his motion for relief from judgment,
defendant also admitted he asked Cross for “his help with robbing the drug house as retribution
for being robbed of his week’s wages,” because he knew Cross had a gun. Further, defendant
admitted he and Cross agreed to split the money and drugs they planned to steal. Thus, defendant’s
argument that his sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment because he was less culpable
as an aider and abettor is unsupported by the record. Because defendant failed to properly raise
his as-applied challenge under MCR 6.502(G)(2), the trial court did not err by denying his motion
for relief from judgment and he is not entitled to resentencing.

                                                -9-
                                       IV. CONCLUSION

        Although defendant met the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G)(2), because he did not
establish good cause or actual prejudice to justify relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), the trial court
did not err by denying his motion for relief from judgment. Additionally, defendant is not entitled
to resentencing because this Court has declined to extend Miller and Parks to 19-year-old
offenders and defendant fails to establish any other change in law to justify resentencing. Further,
because defendant’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences imposed
on 19-year-old offenders fails, there is no basis for retroactively applying any extension of Miller
or Parks.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                             /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                             /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

                                               -10-