Court Opinion

ID: 9943518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 18:02:26.756565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:11.257767
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Buggs CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061456

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 19HF0550)

 JAMON RAYON BUGGS,                                                    OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregg L.
Prickett, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Marvin
E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                Jamon Rayon Buggs appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of,
among other things, two counts of first degree murder. Relying on the California Racial
                                         1
Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) (Pen. Code, § 745), Buggs argues the trial court erred by
finding that Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) Todd Spitzer violated the RJA but
then not imposing its own remedy after Spitzer decided not to pursue the death penalty.
We disagree and affirm the judgment.
                                             FACTS
I. Substantive Facts
                Buggs does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
            2
convictions. Under established appellate principles, we recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the judgment. (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 795.)
                S.B., a traveling nurse, moved from Minnesota to Murrieta, California. She
exercised at a gym and hired Buggs as her personal trainer. They began dating.
                Several months later, Buggs got a job at a gym in Huntington Beach. S.B.
and Buggs moved into an apartment nearby. S.B. got a full-time nursing job. Their
relationship was healthy until they began having financial difficulties. About eight
months later, Buggs hit S.B., and she moved out. They had an on-again, off-again
relationship for about seven months until S.B. decided to end it. S.B. eventually obtained
a restraining order against Buggs.
                In January 2019, S.B. started dating J.Y. S.B. told Buggs that she was
dating someone and their relationship was over.
                About a month later, S.B. met Darren Partch at a gym. During their
conversation, S.B. told him about a business idea, and Partch said he could help. They

1
                All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
              At trial, Buggs’s counsel admitted Buggs killed the victims but argued it
was in the heat of passion.

                                               2
exchanged social media account information to continue that conversation. S.B. never
saw Partch again, and they did not have a dating relationship.
              Although S.B.’s restraining order against Buggs was active, she saw him on
two occasions in March 2019. On the first occasion, she went to his apartment and spent
the night. A couple weeks later, she went to the automobile dealership where he worked
because he said he could get her a deal; he didn’t. In March and April 2019, Buggs
performed extensive internet searches for S.B.’s contact information.
              On March 17, 2019, Partch and his roommate were home. Partch answered
a call on his cell phone using the speaker function. The caller, Buggs, asked if the man
was Partch. Partch asked, “Who is this?” Buggs angrily told Partch to stay away from
his girlfriend, S.B. Partch asked Buggs what he was talking about. Buggs said it would
be bad for Partch if he did not stay away from his girlfriend and hung up. Partch looked
through his phone and found his communications with S.B. Partch texted S.B. and told
her he was afraid and would have no further contact with her.
              On March 25, 2019, S.B. sent Buggs an e-mail asking him to leave her
alone. That same day, Buggs drove to J.Y.’s office. Buggs asked J.Y. where S.B. lived,
what her cell phone number was, and if he was having sex with her. Buggs said he would
not be happy if J.Y. was having sex with S.B. and it was in his best interests to answer
the questions. J.Y. told Buggs it was none of his concern and he was going to call the
police. When J.Y. used his cell phone to record Buggs, he left.
              A couple weeks later, Buggs searched the internet for J.Y.’s address. A
person with the same name, but who was not S.B.’s boyfriend, lived at an address in
Irvine (Irvine residence). From around April 12 through April 20, 2019, Buggs
repeatedly searched the internet to locate S.B. and Partch.
              Surveillance cameras showed a man walking in the condominium complex
where Partch previously lived. Location evidence placed Buggs’s cell phone in that area
during the relevant time. Buggs’s cell phone records placed him at or near Partch’s

                                             3
current residence in the days leading to the murders. Around the same time, S.B. saw
Buggs driving behind her vehicle, but she was able to evade him.
              On April 19, 2019, Partch met Wendi Miller at a nightclub. Miller left with
Partch. When they got to Partch’s residence, Miller texted a friend to say she had arrived
safely. Buggs’s cell phone records placed him near Partch’s residence 50 minutes later.
Sometime early that morning, Buggs entered Partch’s residence and fatally shot Partch
and Miller in the head. When the roommate returned home late the next evening, he
discovered Partch and Wilson and called 911.
              Late on the night after Buggs murdered Partch and Miller, N.C. was sitting
on the couch in her second-floor living room in the Irvine residence; there was a balcony.
Remember, a person named J.Y. but who was not S.B.’s boyfriend lived here. N.C.
heard a thump on the balcony and saw a Black male. N.C. ran to the sliding glass door,
held it closed, and yelled for her husband and son to call the police. As the man started to
climb down from the balcony, he fired a gunshot and fled. Police arrived.
              Days later, police officers arrested Buggs after a car chase and seized his
cell phone. In his car, officers found Partch’s phone number and address. During an
audiotaped interview, Buggs admitted he was at N.C.’s residence and accidently fired the
gun.
              Ballistics and DNA evidence established Buggs had used a revolver to fire
all of the bullets. Evidence established the bullet fired at N.C.’s residence was fired from
the same revolver as the bullets related to Partch’s and Miller’s murders.
II. Procedural Facts
              An information charged Buggs with the following: two counts of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a), counts 1 & 2); attempted first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a),
664, subd. (a), count 3); and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1),
count 4). As to counts 1 and 2, the information alleged Buggs committed multiple
murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and personally discharged a firearm causing death

                                             4
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). It also alleged he had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
                                                    3
subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)).
              On October 1, 2021, the OCDA had a Special Circumstances Committee
(SCC) meeting to discuss whether to pursue the death penalty against Buggs. On
                                                                                           4
December 3, 2021, Ebrahim Baytieh, then an OCDA senior assistant district attorney,
wrote a memorandum about the meeting. Baytieh explained that while they were
discussing Buggs’s prior acts of domestic violence as an aggravating factor, Spitzer asked
about the race of Buggs’s victims and prior girlfriends. Baytieh stated he told Spitzer that
race was an inappropriate consideration. Spitzer said he disagreed and that he “kn[ew]
many [B]lack people who get themselves out of their bad circumstances and bad
situations by only dating ‘[W]hite women.’” Baytieh recounted that he repeated the
committee should not consider race and doing so could implicate the RJA. Spitzer said
that when he was in college he knew a Black student who only dated White women and
he “knew for sure that this [B]lack student did so on purpose to get himself out of his bad
circumstances and situations.”
              On January 21, 2022, Baytieh wrote Spitzer an e-mail stating that at
Spitzer’s request, Baytieh agreed to revise his memorandum. He would replace the
language concerning “get . . . out of . . . bad circumstances” with “enhance [their/his]
status.” A week later, the OCDA notified Buggs that Spitzer would not seek the death
penalty.
              Two days later, Spitzer wrote Baytieh a memorandum. Spitzer admitted he
said that he had “seen Black men date White women in certain circles in order to have
others around them be more accepting.” Spitzer added that he said Larry Elder served as
a potential example of such societal behavior because had been embraced by “the

3
              At trial, the parties stipulated Buggs had suffered a prior felony conviction.
4
              Baytieh is now a judge on the Orange County Superior Court.

                                               5
mainstream conservative White political community.” Spitzer stated he was concerned
about cross-racial identification—whether Buggs could identify the blond-haired White
woman he killed, Miller, as opposed to his White and blond-haired former girlfriend,
S.B., in a dark room. He reasoned it was relevant to the issue of whether Buggs killed
with premeditation or in the heat of passion. Spitzer recounted the measures he took to
cure any harm. He assigned the case to an experienced homicide prosecutor who had no
knowledge of what transpired at the SCC meeting. He “walled off” everyone involved
with the SCC meeting from the prosecution. He decided to not seek the death penalty.
He noted this was a remedy in the RJA. (§ 745, subd. (e)(3).) Spitzer “adamantly
den[ied]” he violated the RJA.
              The prosecution filed a motion for in camera review of privileged work
product. After a hearing and Buggs filed briefing, the prosecution withdrew its claim of
privilege and released the relevant documents to Buggs. At a hearing on Buggs’s request
for additional discovery, Buggs’s counsel discussed potential remedies for violation of
the RJA. The trial court stated these issues could be litigated posttrial. Later, the trial
court considered Buggs’s motion pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
              During trial, Buggs filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss pursuant to the
RJA. Buggs argued Spitzer’s comments violated the RJA and requested the court dismiss
the case or enhancements or reduce the charges. The prosecution filed an opposition
contending Spitzer had not violated the RJA because his question appropriately reflected
a valid concern about Buggs’s state of mind. Alternatively, the prosecution asserted
Buggs already received the appropriate remedy because Spitzer would not seek the death
penalty.
              The jury convicted Buggs of all counts and found true all the
enhancements. Later, Buggs filed a motion to find a violation of the RJA and to grant
appropriate relief.

                                              6
              At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found true that Buggs had suffered
the prior felony conviction. As to the RJA motion, the court noted it was considering all
of the prior pleadings related to the RJA and the discovery and trial exhibits. Buggs’s
counsel argued Spitzer’s statements established a prima facie violation of the RJA. The
prosecutor contended the OCDA did not take any action against Buggs based on his race
and thus it did not violate the RJA. He added Spitzer’s comment went to Buggs’s intent,
i.e., his mistaken belief Miller was S.B., which “as it turned out” was Buggs’s defense.
He added that the decision to not seek the death penalty, “which was influenced in large
part by the CTE information that defense counsel provided, has kind of made this
                       5
particular issue moot.” On the court’s invitation, the parties offered additional argument
on whether it was in the interest of justice to reduce charges, or dismiss special
circumstances or allegations (§ 745, subd. (e)(1)(C)).
              The trial court concluded it was not in the interests of justice to reduce
charges or dismiss the enhancements or the special circumstances because the
prosecution did not “overreach[].” The court opined that “[t]he evidence . . . in this case
was compelling,” the “[e]vidence of motive was overwhelming,” and “[t]he evidence of
identity was almost beyond dispute.” The court stated, “The impact of the violation goes
directly towards the death penalty.”
              Buggs’s counsel requested the trial court clarify whether it was finding that
the OCDA violated the RJA. The court said, “Yes.” Counsel asked for clarification
regarding the remedy. The court stated the appropriate remedy had already been
provided.

5
              Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) is a brain condition thought to be
linked to repeated head injuries and blows to the head. Buggs played football from the
age of seven through junior college.

                                              7
              The trial court sentenced Buggs to prison for four years on count 3; it
imposed and stayed the term on count 4 (§ 654). On counts 1 and 2, the court sentenced
him to two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years to life.
                                       DISCUSSION
              The RJA provides, “The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction
or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a).) The statute provides four categories of conduct that establish a
violation if proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 745, subds. (a), (c)(2).) The
first category of conduct provides, “The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement
officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards
the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745,
subds. (a)(1), (h)(4) [defines racially discriminatory language].) One of the categories
concerns discriminatory language or conduct during trial (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)), one
discriminatory treatment in the offense (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)), and one discriminatory
treatment in the sentence (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)).
              The RJA requires a trial judge to impose a remedy if a violation occurred.
Section 745, subdivision (e), states, “[T]he court shall impose a remedy specific to the
violation found.” (Italics added.) The statute specifies remedies based on whether
judgment has been imposed. (§ 745, subds. (e)(1) [before judgment, declare mistrial or
discharge jury and empanel new jury], (e)(2) [after judgment, reduce offense or impose
new sentence].)
              The statute also authorizes a trial court to “dismiss enhancements, special
circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges” in the interests of
justice. (§ 745, subd. (e)(1)(C).) Additionally, if there was a violation, the defendant is
not eligible for the death penalty. (§ 745, subd. (e)(3).) Finally, the court may impose
“other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California
Constitution, or any other law.” (§ 745, subd. (e)(4).)

                                              8
              Buggs first complains the trial court did not make the required findings
concerning the type of RJA violation. (§ 745, subds. (c)(3), (e).) A violation of section
745, subdivision (a)(1), is the only category implicated by the facts and procedural
posture of the case. That is the only violation Buggs argued below—Spitzer exhibited
bias toward him based on Spitzer’s comments at the SCC meeting. This is what counsel
and the trial court were singularly focused on during the section 745 discussion. Indeed,
Buggs acknowledges the OCDA “most likely” violated subdivision (a)(1). We agree
with Buggs that subdivision (a)(1) is the only provision the OCDA could have violated.
We need not weigh in on the issue of whether the OCDA violated the RJA because the
Attorney General concedes the point.
              The sole issue before us is whether after the OCDA decided to not pursue
the death penalty, was the trial court itself required to impose an additional remedy.
(§ 745, subd. (e) [“the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found”
(italics added)].) We are not concerned here with Buggs’s right to a speedy trial, any
discovery disputes, his Marsden motion, or the unavailability of any plea offers because
the OCDA “walled off” the prosecutors at the SCC meeting.
              “‘Discrimination in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, or
national origin . . . has a deleterious effect not only on individual criminal defendants but
on our system of justice as a whole. . . . Discrimination undermines public confidence in
the fairness of the state’s system of justice and deprives Californians of equal justice
under law.’ [Citations.] The Legislature found that, while racial bias is ‘widely
acknowledged as intolerable in the criminal justice system,’ it persists because ‘courts
generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms.’ [Citation.] In
its view, current law ‘is insufficient to address discrimination in our justice system.
[Citations.] Even when racism clearly infects a criminal proceeding, under current legal
precedent, proof of purposeful discrimination is often required, but nearly impossible to
establish.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, 332-333.)

                                              9
                 The Legislature declared its intent “to eliminate racial bias from
California’s criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at any stage
of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a
miscarriage of justice under [a]rticle VI of the California Constitution, and violates the
laws and Constitution of the State of California.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)
The legislative findings note it is not the Legislature’s intent to punish explicit or implicit
racial bias, “but rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of
the judicial system.” (Ibid.)
                 We address Spitzer’s actions despite him adamantly denying he violated the
RJA. His actions suggest he actually understood his transgression. Spitzer admitted he
took measures to cure any harm. He assigned the case to an experienced homicide
prosecutor who had no knowledge of what transpired at the SCC meeting. He “walled
off” everyone involved with the SCC meeting from the prosecution. Most significantly,
he decided to not seek the death penalty and noted this was a remedy in the RJA. (§ 745,
subd. (e)(3).)
                 Despite Spitzer’s reluctance to acknowledge his expressed racial bias, he
took steps to remedy the harm to Buggs’s case and to the integrity of the prosecution.
The trial court clearly understood Spitzer took the steps necessary to prevent racism from
infecting the criminal proceeding and nothing further was required under the statute.
Based on the unique facts of this case, the trial court did not err by concluding the
appropriate remedy was that Buggs was no longer subject to the death penalty. The plain
language of section 745, subdivision (e), requires “a remedy specific to the violation
found.” The record before us demonstrates the court found Spitzer violated the RJA
when he made racially discriminatory statements during the SCC meeting when
considering whether to pursue the death penalty. The appropriate remedy, no death
penalty, was specific to the violation the trial court found. On this record, Buggs has not
established there was a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const. art. VI, § 13).

                                               10
              Buggs faults the trial court for imposing an “‘overreaching’” requirement
into the RJA and asserts it “eviscerate[d]” the RJA’s purpose by creating a “‘no harm no
foul’ escape clause.” Buggs makes too much of the court’s comment. The statute
authorizes a trial court to “dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special
allegations, or reduce one or more charges” in the interests of justice. (§ 745, subd.
(e)(1)(C).) In his moving papers, Buggs requested the court consider “section (c) [sic]”
remedies. The court opined the prosecution did not overreach while explaining why it
was not in the interests of justice to dismiss the enhancements or special circumstances or
reduce the charges. The court was merely noting “overreach” was one of the ways to
demonstrate Spitzer’s statements infected the proceedings.
              Buggs’s complaint that the trial court’s decision to consider his section 745
motion after trial misses the mark. Buggs does not make the case the prosecution sought
or obtained a conviction or sentence in violation of the RJA. Additionally, Spitzer’s
comments were not before the jury and thus a mistrial or empaneling a new jury were not
appropriate remedies.
              Finally, Buggs claims the trial court could have imposed another remedy,
such as granting a new trial, dismissal, or imposing concurrent sentences. (§ 745, subd.
(e)(4) [other remedies under other laws available].) Buggs did not seek these remedies at
trial and thus forfeited his contentions. (People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 814
[failure to press for hearing on a new trial motion forfeits appellate claim]; People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [failure to object to trial court’s discretionary sentencing
choices forfeits appellate claims].) But as discussed, no additional remedy was
necessary.
              Given the intent of the RJA to eliminate racial bias from California’s justice
system, it would seem counterproductive to fail to acknowledge remedial actions taken
by a district attorney, prior to any intervention by the court, to eliminate any aspect of
racial bias arising from the prosecution. The unintended consequence of ignoring the

                                             11
actions of the prosecution may be to encourage the prosecution not to self-correct but
rather wait to see what the court may do. Instead, we want to encourage the prosecution
to avoid instances of racial bias and when discovered to immediately and appropriately
address the issue. But for the somewhat unusual revelation of internal OCDA
correspondence and Spitzer’s actions, this conversation may never have come to the trial
court’s attention.
                                     DISPOSITION
              The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

                                            12