Court Opinion

ID: 9761435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:42:52.589488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:23.750027
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the defendant’s right under Pa.R. Crim.P. 130, 19 P.S. Appendix, to a prompt preliminary arraignment was not violated by the fifteen hour delay that followed his arrest. I cannot agree.
At the suppression hearing it was established that the defendant was arrested at 7:30 p. m. at the scene of the robbery — a restaurant. Officer Lynch, the police interrogator who obtained the defendant’s confession, then gave the following testimony. He was called to the police station at 7:45 p. m. on the night of the incident to interview the defendant, and spoke with the defendant for approximately one hour. N.T. at 45-46. During this interview the defendant gave the. officer “one story, and we got a little loud in the conversation. N.T. at 63.1 Although it appears that Officer Lynch did not strike the defendant, he admitted that he pushed the defendant back in his chair when he started to get up. Id. The interview terminated when the defendant informed the officer that he did not wish to speak about the incident. N.T. at 46. Officer Lynch then interviewed the other two suspects and succeeded in obtaining statements from them. At 2:00 a. m. Officer Lynch “went home and *297went to bed and got back up and came back in for the 8:00 to 4:00 shift on Monday morning.” N.T. at 48. To his knowledge, no one made any attempt to arraign the defendant during the night of the incident, even though at least one district justice was supposed to be on call twenty-four hours a day to handle preliminary arrangements. Id. On the morning following the incident, Officer Lynch approached the defendant a second time to speak with him. N.T. at 47. At 9:40 a. m. the defendant began his confession, which he completed at approximately 11:00 a. m. N.T. at 48-49. Sometime after 11:00 a. m. the defendant was arraigned. Officer Lynch was the only Commonwealth witness who testified as to the circumstances under which the defendant’s confession was obtained.
The majority attempts to justify the delay of the defendant’s preliminary arraignment on the following grounds:
Instantly we note that three men were arrested simultaneously for the same crime. The same officer conducted separate interrogations of each arrestee during the hours in question. Before midnight this officer was with one of the other suspects. Between midnight and 2:00 A.M. he was obtaining a statement from a second of the trio. Prior to each of these meetings, he had met with Pinkney, and following the other interrogations, he again met with defendant and subsequently obtained his statement. All the while, other necessary processing of the men transpired. Faced with three accused of this crime, all of whom had a slightly different story to tell, and the necessity to reach a clear understanding of the circumstances by interrogating each and comparing what was said, we will not hold that the 13 hours prior to Pinkney’s giving a statement constituted “unnecessary delay.” As a part of required administrative procedures, the investigating officer had to listen to the other men and compare and consider what they said in relation to Pinkney’s story, at 1049.
*298As noted above, the Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence at the suppression hearing showing that the delay of the defendant’s preliminary arraignment was related to the administrative processing of the defendant.2 What evidence there was showed the contrary to be true. Officer Lynch was not listening to the other suspects and comparing and considering what they said in relation to the defendant’s story when he was at home and asleep in bed. Furthermore, there was no evidence that another officer was interviewing the suspects in Officer Lynch’s absence.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 414, 372 A.2d 761 (1977), in support of its holding that the delay here was necessary. Instead of supporting the majority’s holding, Smith undercuts it. In Smith the defendant gave three statements to the police following his arrest but before his arraignment. The first was given one hour, the second eight and one-half hours, and the third twelve hours, after the defendant’s arrest. The lower court suppressed only the third statement. On appeal the defendant argued that the second should have been suppressed as well. The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the delay in the defendant’s arraignment was necessary because other witnesses and suspects had to be questioned by an understaffed police force. Had the police been seeking a quick verification of an exculpatory statement by the defendant, the delay might have been necessary; but instead the police were conducting a general investigation involving the questioning of other suspects at the time the defendant gave his second statement. As a result, the defendant’s right to a prompt preliminary arraignment following his arrest had been violated, the second statement was inadmissible, and a new trial was required.
Here, as in Smith, the delay was not caused because the police were seeking a quick verification of an exculpatory *299statement by the defendant. The defendant had given a statement to Officer Lynch soon after his arrest, but evidently that statement was not the statement that Officer Lynch wanted to hear. Therefore, Officer Lynch interrogated the other suspects, and then went home to bed. When he returned the next morning, Officer Lynch resumed his interrogation of the defendant, and the defendant’s preliminary arraignment was delayed until his confession was obtained.
Before evidence will be suppressed on the ground of pre-arraignment delay, three conditions must be met: (1) the delay must be unnecessary; (2) the evidence must be reasonably related to the delay; and (3) the evidence must be prejudicial to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Williams, 484 Pa. 590, 400 A.2d 1258 (1979); Commonwealth v. Starks, 484 Pa. 399, 399 A.2d 353 (1979). Here the delay of the arraignment was unnecessary, the confession was prejudicial, and because it was given more than twelve hours after the defendant gave his first, apparently exculpatory, statement, the required nexus between the delay and the confession existed. See Commonwealth v. Smith, supra; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1974).
A plurality of the Supreme Court has held that although admission of a coerced incriminating statement may never be deemed harmless error, the admission of a freely given statement that should have been suppressed because obtained in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 may sometimes be deemed harmless error. Commonwealth v. Townsell, 457 Pa. 249, 320 A.2d 111 (1974). Nevertheless, a court should have “great reluctance” in applying the harmless error rule in cases involving incriminating statements. Id.3 I cannot say that here the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d *300155 (1978). No question existed at trial concerning the defendant’s presence inside the restaurant at the time of the robbery. Officer Westerman testified that he arrested the defendant as he was leaving the restaurant with two other males. In addition, articles of the defendant’s clothing were found in the restaurant. However, only one witness who was present in the restaurant at the time of the robbery identified the defendant as one of the robbers. Furthermore, much of her testimony was consistent with the defendant’s assertion that he was only a customer who happened to be in the restaurant at the time. The defendant’s most incriminating act to which the eyewitness testified was his going behind the luncheon counter and opening the kitchen door for the restaurant’s employees and customers to exit through. Yet, this statement was impeached through the eyewitness’s prior statements in which she failed to relate any fact showing unequivocally that the defendant assisted the other robbers in committing the crime. Other than the defendant’s confession, which left no doubt about the defendant’s participation in the planning and execution of the robbery, and the above testimony, the Commonwealth’s most incriminating evidence was the discovery of money under the back seat of the police car that transported the defendant to the station house. However, this money was not discovered until two days after the defendant’s presence in the car, and no one saw the defendant attempting to dispose of the proceeds from the robbery at any time.
The issue is not whether the evidence just related was sufficient to convict the defendant of robbery. It clearly was sufficient. The issue is whether the admission of the defendant’s confession contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Story, supra.
Since I believe the defendant is entitled to a new trial for the reasons above, I do not reach the question of whether the lower court’s resentencing order was valid.

. Officer Lynch did not say what that story was, but the defendant testified with out contradiction, that when he was first questioned he admitted to being inside the restaurant, but denied complicity in the crime. N.T. at 54, 58.

. Nor, it is interesting to note, does the Commonwealth assert on this appeal that the delay was necessary. The Commonwealth’s only argument is that the defendant waived his claim. The majority has correctly rejected this argument.

. Indeed, the precedential validity of the plurality’s holding in Town-sell has been questioned by a majority of the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 259, 346 A.2d 547 (1975).