Court Opinion

ID: 9669191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:42:41.049134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:53.477774
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the holding of the majority that the description of a “ring” and a “watch” is sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirements of a search warrant.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 1
See also Art. 1, Sec. 9, Tex. Const.; and Art. 18.01(b) & (c), V.A.C.C.P.
In Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927), the United States Supreme Court explained:
“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”
Although the language in Marrón may suggest that the police may never seize an object unless it is named in the warrant, it is, of course, entirely proper for those objects which are found in the course of a *455legitimate search to be seized under some circumstances even though they are not specifically described in the search warrant, such as when the objects are found “in plain view”. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). For a search to be legitimate, however, the Constitution demands that the search warrant “particularly describ[e] the ... things to be seized.”
This requirement, according to the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge, supra at 467, 91 S.Ct. at 2038, was intended to prevent a search which is deemed necessary and based on probable cause from becoming a “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”
In Gonzales v. State, 577 S.W.2d 226 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S.Ct. 109, 69 L.Ed.2d 71, this Court recognized that “[t]he requirements for a sufficiently particular description can vary according to the thing being described.” Accordingly, when searching for an object which by reason of its very character is illegal, a specific description is often “unnecessary and ordinarily impossible.” Gonzales, supra at 229; see also Cagle v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928 (1944). Thus, the courts are least demanding when the objects are contraband and a generic description often may be sufficient. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Sec. 4.6, at 101 (1978 & Supp.1984).2
In contrast, however, where the purpose of the search is to find property, the identity of which is of concern, such as stolen property, the rule is that the property must be more particularly described so as to preclude the possibility of seizing any other. Cagle, supra; Gonzales, supra. This follows from the fact that when one is searching for specific property there is a need to distinguish between those things which are legitimately in the place to be searched and those things which are to be seized, unlike most situations involving contraband. Generic descriptions of such property, therefore, have generally been held sufficient only “when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable.” United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.1981), reh. denied, 664 F.2d 289; United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83; United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.1976); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir.1967), rev’d. on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183 (1st Cir.1977).3
In light of the foregoing, it is impractical and dangerous to attempt to determine the sufficiency of the description of the things to be seized by simply referring to prior *456cases in which the same or similar descriptions have been used.
This is exactly where the majority errs in the instant cause. The only authority for the majority’s holding that the description is sufficient is Trevino v. State, 380 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.Cr.App.1963). Trevino, however, was written over 20 years ago, prior to most of the cases which are cited throughout this opinion and which elucidate this issue. Moreover, Trevino refers only to Parrack v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 532, 228 S.W.2d 859 (1950); and Dupree et al. v. State, 102 Tex. 455,119 S.W. 301 (1909), as support for its holding that the description of a “watch, stock certificates, television set, 4 suits, 2 electric blankets, 5 blankets and several throw rugs, electric clippers of the value of $300.00” was sufficient. Both Parrack and Dupree, however, deal with the seizure of contraband, to wit: intoxicating liquors. As discussed earlier, the requirement of particularity in describing the things to be seized is particularly liberal when dealing with contraband. Trevino fails to adequately discuss the theories surrounding this issue and is suspect as authority.4 The majority, in its reliance on Trevino, also errs in failing to adequately address the issues. No “formula” can satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Each search warrant must be individually examined according to the totality of its circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
In the instant case, the search warrant originally contained particularized descriptions. The particularized descriptions, however, must be deleted from the warrant. The remaining description is generic and leaves much to be desired in the way of particularity. Moreover, according to the testimony of the affiant, he was in the process of investigating one of the burglaries of which the appellant was suspected at the time Robison, the informant, made the statement. It would appear that the routine burglary investigation upon which the affiant was engaged would have yielded a more particularized description of the stolen items thought to be at appellant’s apartment than a “watch” and a “ring.” The facts to support the particularized descriptions should have been included in the warrant. It could easily be assumed that appellant, or any other citizen, might innocently have possessed a “ring” or a “watch” at his home. Therefore, I conclude that the warrant in question, after the false statements are excised, impermis-sibly authorized only a general search of appellant’s home and was completely insufficient to establish probable cause. See Marron, supra; Gonzales, supra; 2 W. LaFave, supra at Sec. 4.6.
I would affirm the result of the Court of Appeals since under my analysis the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized during the illegal search. I dissent to the majority’s holding to the contrary.
ODOM, CLINTON and TEAGUE, JJ., join this dissent.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the author of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. See James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907, 90 S.Ct. 902, 25 L.Ed.2d 87 (1970) ("gambling paraphernalia" sufficient); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925) (“cases of whiskey” sufficient during prohibition period); Gonzales, supra, ("drugs or dangerous drugs ... being unlawfully kept and possessed” sufficient); Cagle v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928 (1944) (“implements used in ... The establishment and operation of a lottery, and the keeping and exhibiting of a policy game” sufficient).

. In Cook, supra at 733, it was held that in light of the fact that the agents had a catalogue of "pirated motion pictures” which were on the premises to be searched, the warrant issued by the magistrate improperly used a generic term when it authorized the seizure of “cassettes on to which ... copyrighted films ... have been electronically transferred and recorded" and "illegally obtained films ... Not limited to the motion pictures described in the affidavit.” See also, e.g., United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1980) (serial numbers for United States currency not necessary when all of the serial numbers were not available); United States v. Cortellesso, 601 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S.Ct. 1016, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 ("stolen goods ... in particular men’s suits, sports jackets, women’s boots, leather coats ...” sufficient since the affidavits “clearly established not only that a large collection of similar contraband was on the premises, thereby making it likely that the goods to be seized would be stolen goods, ... but also that for all practical purposes the collection could not be precisely described for the purpose of limiting the scope of the seizure,” in that labels had been removed from some items and as to others only a generic description was known).

. We also note that Trevino was written a year before the Supreme Court’s 1964 landmark holding in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), which might have afforded the defendant some relief. Ex parte Trevino, 411 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).