Court Opinion

ID: 9616606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:48:05.095221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:59.070831
License: Public Domain

Poff, J.,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment should be affirmed.
As my brother Carrico says, discovery of the face mask was not the product of an unlawful search. The mask was discovered in open view in a constitutionally protected zone of privacy by a police officer outside the protected zone. Since the officer had probable cause to believe that it was evidence of a crime, his entry into the protected zone and the warrantless seizure of the mask did not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1973).
Defendant complained that the trial court “erred in refusing to suppress the evidence of possession of Hashish ... as this evidence was seized by the police during an illegal search of the defendant’s automobile.” It seems to me that this assignment of error is sufficiently broad to require us to consider not only the legality of the “search” which led to the discovery of the mask but also the legality of the search which led to the discovery of the hashish, the seizure of which led to defendant’s indictment and conviction. The hashish, packaged in foil inside a bag within the brown bag on the floorboard, was not in open view, was not identifiable as contraband, and was not discovered except by an “exploratory investigation”, an “invasion and quest”, and a “prying into hidden places”, i.e., by a search. The warrantless seizure of the hashish was constitutionally permissible only if the warrantless search by which it was discovered “falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (Part II-D of Mr. Justice Stewart’s four-Justice plurality expressly joined by Mr. Justice Harlan).
One of these exceptions has come to be known as the “automobile exception”. Although an automobile, like a residence or office, is a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, the Supreme Court historically has recognized “. . . a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a *75proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
Since it is the inherent mobility of the car which constitutes an “exigent circumstance” justifying an exception to the warrant requirement, it has been argued that the exigency can be met by immobilizing the car until a search warrant has been obtained.
“[AJrguably, only the ‘lesser’ intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the ‘greater’. But which is the ‘greater’ and which the ‘lesser’ intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970).
See also Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967).
Here, the police officer had a warrant to search defendant’s apartment; he seized a small quantity of contraband from the apartment but had reason to believe that all of the contraband had not been discovered; he had seen defendant park his car adjacent to the stairway leading to the apartment; and inside the car he observed a face mask similar to one he had seen people in defendant’s company using to smoke marijuana. Such circumstances were sufficient to constitute probable cause to believe that defendant’s car contained contraband.
Under the rule in Chambers, such probable cause, standing alone, would seem to be sufficient to validate either a warrantless seizure of Cook’s car or a warrantless search of his car. It may be argued that since Chambers involved a search of a car stopped by police officers *76on a public highway, its rule does not apply to a search of Cook’s car which was parked in a space adjacent to his apartment. Assuming that this factual distinction has a meaningful Fourth Amendment significance, the search which led to the discovery of the hashish was nonetheless validated by “exigent circumstances” justifying an exception to the warrant requirement. Carroll v. United States, supra, and its progeny leave no doubt that when police officers have probable cause to believe that a parked car contains seizable objects (contraband, fruits or tools of a crime, or other evidence of a crime) and when there is a reasonable risk that the car or seizable objects therein might be removed, a warrantless search of the car and its contents is not constitutionally unreasonable.1
Here, the police had probable cause to believe not only that the parked car contained seizable objects, but also that the car or its contents might be removed; they knew that the recently parked car was fully operable and that defendant’s girl friend, who shared his apartment, might have keys to the car, and even if not, she had ready access to its contents. Such probable cause activated the “automobile exception” and justified the warrantless search of the entire car, including the interior of the bag,2 and the warrantless seizure of the contraband discovered there. Under those circumstances, the judgment is properly affirmed.
Cochran, J.,. joins in the concurring opinion.

 Such circumstances constitute an exigency justifying an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., U. S. v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1974); U. S. v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. dism’d, 414 U.S. 897 (1973); People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 884-85 512 P.2d 1208, 1217-18 (1973); England v. State, 17 Crim. L. Rptr. 2061, 2062 (Md., March 24, 1975); People v. Bukoski, 41 Mich. App. 498, 504-505, 200 N.W.2d 373, 377-78 (1972).

 When the automobile exception is activated, the right to search “extends to the entire car, including the passenger compartment, the glove compartment, the motor compartment, the trunk compartment, and closed containers within the car. See Schaum v. Commonwealth, supra 215 Va. 498, 501, 211 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1975) (search of locked trunk); U. S. v. Tramunti, 16 Crim. L. Rptr. 2543, 2544 (2d Cir., March 7, 1975) (search of suitcase in car); U. S. v. Bush, 500 F.2d 19, 21 (6th Cir. 1974) (Per Curiam) (search of glove compartment); U. S. v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1974) (search of suitcases in trunk). See generally, U. S. v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315, reh. denied, 504 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Ehn, 320 N.E.2d 536, 545 (Ill. App. 1974).” Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 126, 216 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1975).