Court Opinion

ID: 9639890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:50:55.54149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:22.816978
License: Public Domain

HANEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I think the majority opinion is based on a misconception of, and a refusal to apply, the California law. In addition, the majority does not consider some of the facts and questions presented.
Appellant contends that it was error to admit into evidence General Order No. 75-A of the California Railroad Commission. Rule I thereof provides: “The purpose o'f these rules is to formulate, for the State of California, uniform standards for grade crossing protection, the application of which will insure greater safety to the public using grade crossings”. Rule V provides in part:
“(a) Each public crossing at grade of a road, highway or street with a track of a railroad * * * shall * * * be protected by at least one crossing sign, constructed and installed in substantial conformity with the specifications herein illustrated and designated as Standard No. 1 * * *
“(b) Each crossing sign (Standard No. 1) herein illustrated shall be located in a conspicuous position facing highway travel, preferably at either corner of the crossing intersection on the right-hand side of the highway traffic flow and in advance of the railroad track * * *”
Rule VI (c) relates to automatic signals and requires them to “be located in a conspicuous position at both corners of the crossing intersection”.
Appellee contends that the above rule requires two crossing signs. The basis of-this argument is reached by disregarding the separation between provisions (a) and (b) of Rule V. In the absences of a California decision so interpreting such rule, I think such a construction is unreasonable and erroneous. The two provisions require only two things: (1) One sign; and (2) that it be placed in a “conspicuous” position facing highway travel. The provisions do not require, but permit two signs. This clearly appears from the use of the word “either”. Under the rule, the signs are to be located “preferably at either corner of the crossing intersection”. Rule VI(c) relates to automatic signals and requires them to “be located in a conspicuous position at both corners of the crossing intersection”. It seems clear that if Rule V had meant “both” by the word “either”, it would have used such word rather than “either”.
Under the order each sign is required to “be located in a conspicuous position facing highway travel, preferably at either corner of the crossing intersection on the right-hand side of the highway traffic flow and in advance of the railroad track”. The signs in question were on the right-hand side of the highway but not “in advance of the railroad track”. They were beyond the railroad track, and because of that fact, appellee contends that appellant violated the order. I think such contention is unsound.
*911The only requirement as to location of the signs is that they must be conspicuous, and facing highway travel. The word “facing highway travel” simply means that the cross-arms should face rather than parallel highway traffic. The signs in question “faced” such traffic. The order does not require that the sign shall be in advance of the track. Such a location is, by the terms of the order, a “preferable” location only. In addition, if only one sign had been placed at the crossing, it would have been beyond the track for the highway traffic going in one direction.
The only remaining question regarding the order, is whether such order was violated by the placing of the signs in an inconspicuous position. Photographs of the crossing show it to be on substantially the same level as the highway. Insofar as the height of the crossing is concerned, the signs may be seen equally well from either side. The base of one sign was about seven and one-half feet from the edge of the pavement, and appears to be on the outer edge of the highway shoulder. The ends of the cross-arms were only about two and one-half feet from the beginning of the highway shoulder.
The word “conspicuous” is defined in the dictionary as follows:
“1. Obvious to the eye or mind; plainly visible, manifest.
“2. Attracting or tending to attract attention, as by reason of size, brillance, contrast, or station * * *” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., Unabridged, 1935, p. 570.
In ordinary clear weather, both signs in question are plainly visible from the highway. Of course they may be plainly visible under certain conditions, and not visible at all under other conditions. I suppose, for example, that appellant is not required to build the signs so high and large that they will be plainly visible for fifty miles. In other words, regard must be had to the purpose of the requirement in reaching any conclusion as to its meaning.
General Order No. 75-A contains a declaration of such purpose as follows: ■“The purpose of these rules is to formulate, for the State of California, uniform standards for grade-crossing protection, the application of which will insure greater safety to the public using grade crossings”. It is quite clear from such statement that the signs required are to protect the public by warning of the presence of a railroad crossing. It is obvious that the sign could not act as a warning under certain conditions because it could not be seen at all, and it would not, therefore, protect the public. If the sign were placed too near the highway it would constitute a hazard or danger rather than protection, and yet it must be near enough to serve the purpose for which it was erected. Since such a location may be one where the sign cannot ^ be seen under certain conditions, I think that under the circumstances here the fact that appellee may not have seen the sign does not show negligence on the part of appellant. On the contrary, I think that, as a matter of law, the sign was clearly in a conspicuous position, and that the court erred in admitting the order in evidence because no violation thereof was shown. In addition I think it was error to leave the question as to whether or not the sign was in a “conspicuous” position to the determination of the jury by instruction 22.
I am unable to agree with the reasoning of the majority regarding this matter. It says that if appellant “in the exercise of due care should have known that the cross-arm sign maintained by it would not be visible in a snowstorm not unusual to the vicinity, then it cannot rely on the maintenance of the cross-arm as a full discharge of its duty to warn the highway user of the presence of its railroad crossing and the danger incident thereto”. The question is whether any evidence showed that the cross-arm sign was not in a conspicuous position. If not, it cannot be said that appellant was negligent in failing to place the cross-arm sign in a conspicuous position. The majority overlooks the real question entirely. Whether there may have been some other duty on appellant has nothing to do with the question mentioned.
The main question in the case is whether or not there was any proof of negligence on the part of appellant. Since a failure to whistle is not negligence (Gett v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 192 Cal. 621, 625, 221 P. 376), and no violation of General Order No. 75-A is shown, we must determine whether appellant was negligent under general principles of law. The California courts hold that if the automobile driver’s negligence is the proximate cause of the injury to the guest, the latter may not recover from the railroad; but on the other hand, if the proximate cause of the guest’s injury is the railroad’s negligence, then the *912guest may recover from the railroad even though the automobile driver is contribu-torily negligent (Baldwin v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 364, 281 P. 380) apparently on the theory of concurrent negligence. Young v. Southern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369, 190 P. 36; 22 Cal.Jur. 314, § 67.
It is appellant’s contention that since it was occupying the crossing, as it had a right to do, the train itself was a sufficient warning of danger, and it was under no duty to give any other or further warning. Appellee contends that the question of negligence is one for the jury where by peculiar and unusual facts and circumstances a crossing is hazardous.
The state of facts here involved is not one where a train runs into an automobile already occupying a crossing. It is not one where the train is occupying a crossing in violation of a statute or ordinance, or for an unreasonable length of time. It is not one where the view of warning signs or the crossing were obstructed by buildings, other cars, brush or trees. It is not one where the crossing is substantially higher or lower than the grade of the road, or one on a curve. It is not one wherein the driver of the automobile is seeking recovery, and it is not one where the guest in the automobile was contributorily negligent. Cases disclosing these facts are not/ therefore, precisely in point.
Briefly stated, the facts here are that a train was slowly moving over a crossing, which was practically level with the highway and at a point where both the tracks and the highway are straight for several hundred feet or more, and the train was struck by an automobile in which appellant was riding as a guest at a time when visibility was impaired by a snow storm, there being no signal of any kind that the train was then -occupying the crossing. Under such circumstances, it is held that the guest may not recover from the railroad for his injuries in the Fifth,1 Seventh2 and Eighth3 Circuits, and in Alabama,4 Illinois,5 Indiana,6 Iowa,7 Kentucky,8 Mississippi,9 Nebraska,10 New Hampshire,11 New York,12 North Carolina,13 Ohio,14 Texas15 and Washington.16 In these cases, the view was impaired by rain, fog, mist, smoke or dust. The reasoning of such cases appears to be: the train has a right to occupy the crossing, no.warning that it is so occupying the crossing, being necessary because it is in and of itself sufficient warning; the proximate cause of the injury is the weather condition; or the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the automobile driver. • ..
On the other hand, it is 'held in Louisiana,17 Minnesota,18 Missouri,19 South Carolina,20 and possibly Maine,21 that under such circumstances, it is a question for the jury to determine whether or-not the railroad used ordinary care under, the cir*913cumstances. These cases disclose impairment of view by snow, fog, mist, steam, or smoke, and proceed on the theory that it is the railroad’s duty to use its property in such a way that it will not injure others.
Our particular problem is to determine which of the two above-mentioned rules is followed in California, since California law is binding here. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487. I think California follows the majority rule above mentioned.
In Dunlap v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 473, 55 P.2d 894, an automobile ran into a train moving on a crossing and recovery on behalf of the guest was denied. The night was very foggy, and there was no warning of any kind that the train was occupying the track. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether a light or an automatic signal at the crossing was operating.22 The court stated (12 Cal.App.2d 476, 55 P.2d 895):
“Appellant earnestly insists that it was a debatable question of fact, upon which reasonable minds might disagree, as to whether or not the defendant railway company was negligent in running its cars across the highway on a dark and foggy night without providing a flagman, red flares, or some other means of warning to travelers at the intersection; but the authorities seem to hold that railway companies, through their agents, in the reasonable management of their trains which are rightfully upon a crossing, are not chargeable with knowledge that an automobile, bearing headlights of sufficient power to enable the driver to avoid an obstruction in the road, was nevertheless likely to crash into a moving train unless a danger signal or flagman with a lighted lantern was stationed in the highway. Gage v. Boston & M. R. R., 77 N.H. 289, 90 A. 855, L.R.A. 1915A, 363. * * *
“No question of the giving of a warning of the approaching train is here involved, because at the time of the accident the engine had passed the crossing and was several hundred • feet north thereof. ‘All crossing signals are intended to protect the traveler against approaching trains and have been so regarded by our courts.’ * * »
Appellee strongly relies on Harper v. Northwestern Pac. R. Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 451, 93 P.2d 821. In that case, it was held that a nonsuit was improperly granted where the evidence disclosed a violation of § 486, Calif.Ciyil Code, and the crossing sign was not in a “conspicuous” position as required by General Order No. 75-A of the California Railroad Commission. Were those facts present here, I would find no difficulty in finding evidence of negligence. In fact the latter case distinguishes the Dunlap case on those grounds. 34 Cal.App. 2d 456, 93 P.2d 821. The contention that the weather conditions made the crossing unusually hazardous is contrary to the Dunlap case and the majority rule stated above. In none of such cases was the weather condition held to create an unusually hazardous crossing.
The majority holds that the Harper case “modified the doctrine pronounced in the Dunlap case”, and thus refuses to apply the California law as stated in the Dunlap case. The Harper case not only did not state that it “modified” the Dunlap case, but specifically distinguished it. How the Harper case could reasonably be said to “modify” the Dunlap case is wholly unapparent to me. In the Harper case, negligence, consisting of a violation of § 486, Calif.Civ.Code because of a failure to whistle, and of a violation of General Order No. 75-A because the cross-arm sign was obscured by brush and trees, was shown. In the Dunlap case there was no showing of such negligence or any other negligence. The cases being patently different on their facts, it is obvious that the prior case was not “modified”.
I believe appellee failed to introduce any evidence from which negligence of appellant could have been inferred under California law, and that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.
The judgment should be reversed.

 Driskell v. Powell, 5 Cir., 67 F.2d 484.

 Probert v. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co., 7 Cir., 93 F.2d 259.

 Megan v. Stevens, 8 Cir., 91 F.2d 419, 113 A.L.R. 992.

 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 216 Ala. 613, 114 So. 215, 56 A. L.R. 1110.

 Coleman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 287 Ill.App. 483, 5 N.E.2d 103; Fox v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 308 Ill.App. 367, 31 N.E.2d 805.

 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Huss, 96 Ind. App. 71, 180 N.E. 919; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Gillespie, 96 Ind.App. 535, 173 N.E. 708.

 Dolan v. Bremner, 220 Iowa 1143, 263 N.W. 798; Thomson v. Stevens, 8 Cir., 106 F.2d 739.

 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Switzer, 275 Ky. 834, 122 S.W.2d 967; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mischel’s Adm’x, 272 Ky. 295, 114 S.W.2d 115.

 Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Holifield, 152 Miss. 674, 120 So. 750.

 Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287.

 Gage v. Boston & M. R. R., 77 N. H. 289, 90 A. 855, L.R.A.1915A, 363.

 Pascal v. Pascal, 254 App.Div. 807, 4 N.Y.S.2d 781.

 Rose v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 210 N.C. 834, 187 S.E. 857.

 Capelle v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 203, 24 N.E.2d 822.

 Texas Mexican Ry. Co. v. Hoy, Tex. Com.App., 24 S.W.2d 18; Texas & N. O. R.Co. v. Stratton, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S.W. 2d 741.

 Reines v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 195 Wash. 146, 80 P.2d 406.

 Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14.

 Munkel v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 202 Minn. 264, 278 N.W. 41.

 Carson v. Baldwin, 346 Mo. 984, 144 S. W.2d 134.

 Funderburk v. Powell, 181 S.C. 412, 187 S.E. 742; Prescott v. Hines, 114 S. C. 262, 103 S.E. 543.

 Richard v. Maine Cent R. Co., 132 Me. 197, 168 A. 811.

 The automobile driver testified that he saw no lights and heard no signal. In California such evidence is sufficient to show an absence of lights and signal. Thuet v. Southern Pacific Co., 135 Cal. App. 527, 27 P.2d 910; Lahey v. Southern Pacific Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 652, 61 P. 2d 461.