Court Opinion

ID: 9552321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:08:42.772986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:07.522684
License: Public Domain

McEWAN, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion fails to mention the uncontroverted evidence showed that Mr. Ferguson has a net worth of $204,000. It is inconceivable to me that a man with a net worth of $204,000 does not have the financial ability to provide $2,000 per year for a daughter to attend college.
We are not called upon to determine if a parent has the obligation to send a child to college because here the appellee agreed to provide financial assistance contingent upon his financial ability. Agreements between a husband and wife concerning the custody and welfare of children in the event of divorce are favored by the courts. Beard v. Beard, Wyo., 368 P.2d 953.
The appellant argued, and the appellee did not disagree, that in determining the appellee’s “financial ability” the trial court should have considered not only the appel-lee’s income but also his net worth.
According to defendant’s financial statement submitted to a bank he had a net worth of $204,800. His principal asset was 41% of the stock in a family ranching corporation, which stock was valued at $195,-000. The corporation owns 23,000 acres of land in Albany and Laramie counties and *660has 1,500 acres of leased lands, and owns 1,421 head of cattle. The financial statement of the corporation lists the following assets and liabilities:
Assets
1,421 head of cattle .$242,950
Farm implements. 20,000
23,080 acres of land at $25 per acre. 577,000
Total Assets .$839,950
Liabilities
Encumbrance on livestock .$118,000
Encumbrance on real estate . 130,000
92,000
11,000
Total Liability .$351,000
Net Worth . 488,950'
Total .$839,950
The defendant was paid a nominal salary by the corporation, $4,450 in 1968, and lived on the ranch in a house provided by the corporation. He testified his banker would not lend him money to send Christine through college. The banker, called as a witness for the defendant, testified the defendant did not have enough collateral to justify a loan of $1,500 to $3,000. However, the banker testified the corporation could borrow 60% to 70% of the market value of cattle and 60% to 70% on the real estate. Even using the low figure of 60%, the cattle would support a loan of $145,770, and the land $346,200, which means that the corporation had additional borrowing power of $140,970. The banker also testified that he would lend the corporation more money.
In reference to the corporation’s notes, the banker was asked, “Do Ferguson boys sign personally?”, to which he replied, “Yes, first they borrow as a corporation and sign on the face of the note identifying themselves as officers and they have to endorse the notes on the back as individuals, which means in the event this corporation does not pay this note, these two individuals individually and collectively are responsible for the indebtedness of the corporation.”
The accountant testified that, in recent years, the ranching operations had been separated and they were operating on three separate bank accounts, plus a corporation banking account; that each member of the family is operating a portion of the ranch; that they sign their own checks and make their own decisions as to what expenditures they are going to make; and that the defendant controls his own portion of the ranching operation.
The defendant did not argue or contend he could not borrow from or through the corporation sufficient monies to satisfy his agreed obligation to provide financial assistance for his daughter’s college education. He perhaps impliedly argued that even though the corporation could borrow money this could not help him in the present situation. However, there is no doubt that he and his brother have control of the corporation, and that he alone has substantial control as evidenced by the fact he had to sign the notes of the corporation not only as an officer thereof but as an individual. It is also significant to note he had complete control of at least a portion of the operation of the ranch.
It is difficult for me to understand the banker’s reasoning. He said the defendant, as an individual, could not borrow $1,500 to $3,000, yet the bank required the defendant to endorse the corporation’s notes, as an individual, in the amount of $118,000. It appears inconsistent to have an individual endorse a note in this large amount if it is thought he did not have *661sufficient collateral to secure a personal note of $1,500 to $3,000.
In any event, I merely say that in this case it appears that if the corporation could borrow money the defendant could borrow money. Mr. Justice Blume extensively discussed the alter ego question in State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944 at 948-950, which subject is also covered by a note “Piercing the Corporate Veil” in 17 Wyo. L.J. 63.
Although neither of the parties argued this point I think it is significant to point out that in the agreement entered into between the parties hereto, which was made part of the divorce decree, it was stated:
“It is further mutually agreed that the financial security of the three children rather than of themselves is the primary concern of the parties hereto, and that the Husband shall make the following disposition of property for and on behalf of the children of the parties: * * * ”
The agreement then provided that at the death of the defendant each of the children of the parties should receive a certain share of his “stock holdings” in the family corporation. The share which the children are to receive depends upon the defendant’s marital status at the time of his death. It thus appears that the husband is, or at least at the time of the divorce was, concerned with the welfare of his daughter. As was stated in Wonneman v. Wonneman, Mo.App., 305 S.W.2d 71 at 79:
“It will, indeed, be unfortunate if defendant finds it necessary to encumber or dispose of a part of his property in order to maintain his children. But it is better that they be properly maintained and educated during their tender years than be left an inheritance preserved at the expense of their present needs and comfort.”
A reviewing court is reluctant to disturb a ruling of a lower court or in any way interfere with the sound exercise of discretion by trial courts. However, as Mr. Justice Parker said in Masek v. Ostlund, Wyo., 358 P.2d 100 at 104, an appellate court has the “ * * * duty of analyzing the evidence in the light of reason and human experience, giving consideration to the motives and propensities which tend to influence or prompt human action, in an effort to solve the question of whether the judgment is reasonably and substantially sustained by the evidence.”
I would reverse with instructions to the trial court to vacate its order dated September 18, 1969, dismissing the “Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause,” and, pursuant to its order to show cause dated July 7, 1969, enter its order directing the plaintiff to provide sufficient financial assistance, in a sum not to exceed $2,000 per year, to Christine Ferguson to allow her to attend college, and to pay the sum of $711.88, which sum represents expenses incurred by said Christine Ferguson for the latter portion of the 1968-69 school year.