Court Opinion

ID: 9475860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:40:49.614105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:59.481254
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Dissenting).
The majority opinion is another example of the growing tendency of this circuit, in Puerto Rico political discharge cases, to assume facts or possibilities that are not supported by the record. Cf Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. City of Bessemer, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Although the majority cites the en banc opinion in Jiménez Fuentes v. Gaztambide, supra, as authority for its ruling, a closer analysis of the present situation indicates that the applicable circuit precedent is De Choudens v. Government Development Bank, 801 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc) (senior vice-president of the Puerto Rico Government Development Bank is not a position for which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement).
The first step in Jiménez Fuentes’ two-pronged test for determining whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position in question4 is, does the particular position “relate [] to partisan political interests ... [or] concerns. That is, does the position involve decision making on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation? Otherwise stated, do party goals or programs affect the direction, pace or quality of governance?” Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242.
As a basis for concluding that the RHA Regional director position is substantially related to partisan political concerns, the majority indicates, ante at 260, that:
The RHA ... administers important agrarian reform programs that impact on the fabric of Puerto Rico’s rural life. The governing political party’s ideological orientation on social and economic issues could affect the approach taken in carrying out these programs____ An official with regional authority to implement rural social and economic reforms could, because of political disagreement with the Administration over fundamental issues, hinder the accomplishment of the elected Administration’s goals.
(Emphasis supplied). The above possibilities certainly do not come from the record. I have searched the record in vain for any factual support for these hypothetical conclusions. If a determination of the appropriateness of political affiliation is going to depend on a whole gamut of possibilities and speculations rather than on facts in the record, government employees are in a defenseless and indefensible position.
If the evidence were in the record, a comparison of the NPP’s and PDP’s official party platforms would demonstrate that after the expected rhetoric is set aside, there is surprisingly little difference in both party’s “ideological orientation on social and economic issues,” particularly as regards “important agrarian reform programs.” There are substantial factions within both the NPP and the PDP who are affiliated to the National Democratic Party. The principal difference between the NPP and the PDP lies in their respective solutions to the question of how Puerto Rico’s status should be resolved as relates to the United States. The NPP believes in statehood as the ultimate goal for Puerto Rico, while the PDP promotes an associated commonwealth.5 Nevertheless, even assuming general ideological differences between these parties, there is no evidence in this record that there are any such differences regarding the administration of the programs handled by the RHA or plaintiff. The closest thing to this type of evidence in the record is the marginally-related testimony of appellant’s “expert,” Dr. Jack Hirshbrunner, evidence which was specifically rejected by the district court as not credible. See District Court opinion at 9-*26410. See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573-576, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-1513.
The majority’s reference, ante at 261, to the RHA’s statutory duties in the distribution of land,6 as a basis for concluding that “the position involve[s] decision making on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation,” is inapposite. The record establishes that these distributions are carried out by chance, that is, by raffle {tómbola), precisely to eliminate the possibility of discrimination, political or otherwise. See also 28 L.P.R.A. § 716. There is thus no political discretion to be exercised by the Regional Director in the execution of the principal raison d’etre of the RHA. Even without such a procedure, however, it would be most infelicitous if this court were to promote a patronage system that would encourage or facilitate the administration of social programs depending on the political affiliation of its recipients. Yet that is the predictable outcome of permitting the position of Regional Director to be filled by resorting to political hacks.
The majority’s conclusion to the effect that “because of political disagreement with the Administration over fundamental issues,” the regional director might be in a position to “hinder the accomplishment of the elected Administration’s goal,” wherefore, the position “is substantially related to partisan political concerns,” ante at 261, reveals equally flawed reasoning. Such a situation basically describes a possible Mt. Healthy7 scenario. If those facts were to develop, i.e., disloyalty or disruptive behavior by the employee against the Administration, irrespective of the employee’s motivations appropriate disciplinary action, including dismissal, would be justified. A Mt. Healthy issue was in fact litigated and the district court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to support such a conclusion. See District Court opinion at pp. 7-8, 9-10. Merely because there is a possibility of disloyal actions by a subordinate, the position in question cannot be automatically converted into one for which political membership is appropriate. If such were the test, political affiliation would be an appropriate requirement for the entire governmental hierarchy, as the possibility of disloyalty is always there. Yet that is not the law. See Branti v. Finkel, supra. As the district court indicated, “[t]he single answer to a non-proactive attitude is dismissal, but not for the employee’s political beliefs.” Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
In sum, the record does not support a finding to the effect that the RHA Regional Director position is substantially related to partisan political concerns, as is required by the first prong in Jiménez Fuentes.
Similarly, the record fails to support the majority’s conclusion to the effect that the second Jiménez Fuentes test has been met. This test requires “examin[ing] the particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement.” Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242.
The record shows, and the district court so found, “that there is no evidence the post entailed a degree of policy-making sufficient for political affiliation to qualify as an appropriate requirement.” District Court opinion at 9. It found “no responsibilities that may be even remotely considered of a policy making nature.” Id. On the record before us, the majority cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction in this case, Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 238. Neither is it free to ignore the district court’s findings. Cf Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511 (“a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact”).
None of the duties listed in the majority opinion, ante at 261, either individually or collectively can lead one to conclude that party loyalty should play any role in carrying out these duties. A reading of these duties reveals, at best, minimal policy input. Furthermore, there is nothing that can im*265ply that the position is privy to confidential information.8 There is no evidence in the record as to this.
. The fallacy in the majority’s conclusion regarding appellee’s position is readily seen when we compare his duties with those of the incumbent in the De Choudens’ case. There we ruled en banc that the position of Senior Vice-President for the Finance Area of the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico was not a position for which party affiliation was an appropriate requirement, despite holding that agency to be a politically sensitive one. Our ruling that de Choudens’ position was non-political was made notwithstanding that she was “a staff official who, ... [held] a policymaking, confidential, and communicative position”, “head[ed] one of the Bank’s three main operations areas, the Finance Area”, “was a member of the Bank’s Loan Committee and sometimes acted as interim President”, “gave advice to the President and the Board of Directors on financial matters within her area”, and “was indeed an agency spokes-person.” De Choudens, 801 F.2d at 9. If we ruled that de Choudens did not hold a political position in the face of those findings, I fail to see how we can rule otherwise in this case.
Because the majority usurps the fact-finding functions of the district court, and because this opinion will cause further confusion in an already disrupted jurisprudential area, I dissent.

. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980).

. The exact meaning of this concept is yet to be fully defined. At least at present, commonwealth includes as its basis, permanent union with the United States under the principles of "common citizenship, common defense, common currency, free market, [and] common loyalty to the values of democracy.” 1 L.P.R.A. p. 151.

. 28 L.P.R.A. § 521, 555, 711 (1985).

. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

. The classification by the Puerto Rico Legislature of this position as being "confidential" 3 L.P.R.A. § 1350, implies only that its incumbent is a high ranking employee, not necessarily one who receives confidential information.