Court Opinion

ID: 9916782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:08:36.200274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:58.816916
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alphonse John Pritchard,                         :
                              Appellant          :
                                                 :
                      v.                         :   No. 49 C.D. 2022
                                                 :   Submitted: December 4, 2023
James Meintel, et al.                            :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                       FILED: January 10, 2024

       Alphonse John Pritchard (Appellant) appeals pro se from the Order of the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (common pleas) sustaining James
Meintel, et al.’s (Appellees) demurrer on the basis of sovereign immunity and
dismissing Appellant’s Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in
part and affirm in part.

I.     BACKGROUND
       Appellant’s Complaint1 alleges as follows.2 Appellant is an inmate, who, at
the time of his alleged injury, was confined at the State Correctional Institution at
Graterford (SCI-Graterford). (Complaint (Compl.) at 1.) Appellee Meintel is the

       1
          Record (R.) Item 0000.
       2
          In determining whether a court of common pleas erred in sustaining a demurrer, “this
Court assumes as true all material facts set forth in the complaint and all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom. The scope of review is limited to whether the law states, with certainty, that
no recovery is possible.” McNichols v. Dep’t of Transp., 804 A.2d 1264, 1266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)
(citation omitted).
Deputy Superintendent of Facility Management at SCI-Graterford and oversees the
safety, care, and custody of all SCI-Graterford inmates. (Id. ¶ 3.)3 On January 26,
2017, when returning to his housing unit, Appellant slipped and fell as he walked
down a metal ramp covered with water due to a spill by kitchen staff, causing injury
to his right shoulder. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) There were no wet floor signs or other
precautions to show the ramp was wet. (Id.) In 2009, a “make-shift wooden ramp”
was replaced with a metal ramp, and slip-resistant materials were applied. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Over time, Appellees did not maintain the slip-resistant surface of the metal ramp.
(Id. ¶ 13.) Following Appellant’s injury, Appellees did nothing to repair the slip-
resistant feature of the ramp, which had been deteriorating for six years. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Appellant alleges that Appellees’ negligence in maintaining the metal ramp caused
his injuries, and he seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 13-16; 22-
26.) He also alleges that Appellees were negligent in allowing the ramp to be in use
while it was wet and in failing to post wet floor signs. (Id. ¶ 18(b)-(c).) Appellees
filed preliminary objections consisting of five counts, which, relevant here, included
a demurrer based on sovereign immunity.4
      Common pleas determined that the Complaint was barred by sovereign
immunity, as it did not fall within the real estate exception to sovereign immunity
set forth in Section 8522(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b), commonly
known as the Sovereign Immunity Act. Accordingly, it sustained Appellees’
demurrer and dismissed the Complaint.            It relied on Raker v. Pennsylvania

      3
         The Complaint also named Dennis Brumfield, Meintel’s predecessor, Ivan Markley,
maintenance manager, Juanita Wilcox and Charles Hensley, B-Block housing unit managers, and
the Department of Corrections (DOC) as defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-9.)
       4
         R. Item 81.

                                            2
Department of Corrections, 844 A.2d 659 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), explaining that like
the wet, waxed floor in Raker,

          there is nothing to indicate that the floor or ramp was constructed
          defectively or that the water had its source in the floor or ramp of the
          Commonwealth real estate. In the [C]omplaint, there are no
          averments which if true would establish that the water derived,
          originated or had as its source the floor or ramp itself.

(Common Pleas’ Opinion (Op.) at 4.) Appellant thereafter filed a timely notice of
appeal.

II.   PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
      Appellant argues that common pleas erred in its application of Raker,
maintaining that the real estate exception applies due to Appellees’ failure to
maintain the slip-resistant material on the ramp. Appellant urges the Court to look
to Bradley v. Franklin County Prison, 674 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), arguing
that “Appellant affirms that the injury was caused because of the ramp’s defective
condition due to its lack of non-slip properties; NOT simply because of water on
[the] exposed metal part of [the] ramp.” (Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 3 (emphasis in
original).) Appellant distinguishes Raker because in it, there was no allegation that
the real property itself was defective.
      Appellees counter that common pleas did not err in finding the real estate
exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable. It argues that the water on the ramp
here is not a dangerous condition inherent in the Commonwealth real estate. It
agrees with common pleas that Raker is controlling because Raker involved a
waxed, wet floor, so the dangerous condition did not have its origin in the real estate
itself. Finally, Appellees argue that Appellant’s claim does not fall within the real

                                             3
estate exception because, in their view, he is arguing that the absence of a precaution
caused his injury, and the absence of a precaution does not give rise to liability under
the real estate exception.

III.   DISCUSSION
       Since 1790, the Pennsylvania Constitution has preserved the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity.5             Specifically, article I, section 11 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[s]uits may be brought against the
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature
may by law direct.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. In 1978, the General Assembly waived
sovereign immunity only in specific, narrow circumstances set forth in the Sovereign
Immunity Act. Relevant here is Section 8522(b)(4), commonly known as the real
estate exception, which waives sovereign immunity as to “[a] dangerous condition
of Commonwealth agency real estate . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4).
       Recently, summarizing decades of precedent, our Supreme Court has
explained that to determine “whether the dangerous condition is ‘of’ the
Commonwealth realty[,] . . . the dangerous condition must derive, originate from or
have as its source the Commonwealth realty.” Wise v. Huntingdon Cnty. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 249 A.3d 506, 517 (Pa. 2021) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
It made clear that “a dangerous condition resulting from ‘a defect in the property or
in its construction, maintenance, repair or design’” falls within the real estate
exception. Id. Finally, “the dangerous condition must be an artificial condition or

       5
        “With roots in the English common law, the concept of a limitation on the availability of
remedies against the alleged wrongdoing by state officials, i.e., the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, was suggested in our Commonwealth as early as 1788.” Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d
332, 340 (Pa. 2014) (footnote omitted).

                                               4
defect of the land itself, as opposed to the absence of such a condition, and that
artificial condition or defect must be the cause, or a concurrent cause, of the injury.”
Id. Wise reaffirmed the notion that absence of a precaution will not give rise to
liability under the real estate exception, but a negligently constructed, maintained,
repaired, or designed precaution will. See Dean v. Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d 1130,
1130 (Pa. 2000) (“[F]ailure to erect a guardrail does not constitute a dangerous
condition of Commonwealth realty.”) (emphasis added).                       But see Cagey v.
Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458, 467 (Pa. 2018) (“When [the Department of
Transportation] installs a guardrail, sovereign immunity is waived if the agency’s
negligent installation and design creates a dangerous condition.”).6
       The plaintiff in Wise instituted a negligence action against a county-owned
public housing complex, alleging that she tripped and fell on an uneven sidewalk.
Specifically, she alleged that the fall was caused by “insufficient outdoor lighting of
the sidewalk area . . . due to the location of pole light and a tree obstructing the light
provided.” 249 A.3d at 509. In finding that scenario to fit within the real estate
exception, the Supreme Court emphasized that the fact that natural darkness might
be a concurrent cause of the injury was of no moment. Id. at 519. Further, it
specifically held that “when [a government] agency installs lighting as part of its real
estate, ‘sovereign immunity is waived if the agency’s negligent installation and
design creates a dangerous condition.’” Id. at 518 (quoting Cagey, 179 A.3d at 467.)
       Our reading of Wise’s careful summary of real estate exception jurisprudence
makes clear that Appellant has pled sufficient facts to proceed under the real estate

       6
          Writing separately in both Wise and Cagey, Justice Wecht has called for overruling that
distinction, citing specific concerns about the incentives the distinction creates. In his view, the
distinction “creates a perverse incentive for the Commonwealth to forego the installation of
guardrails entirely, lest it waive immunity when those guardrails cause injury.” Cagey, 179 A.3d
at 473 (Wecht, J., concurring). See also Wise, 249 A.3d at 526 (Wecht, J., concurring) (same).

                                                 5
exception. Appellant alleges a defect in the real estate itself—here, the metal ramp—
which from its “maintenance[ and] repair” has created a dangerous condition. Wise,
249 A.3d at 517. Likewise, the dangerous condition is an artificial condition which
Appellant alleges caused, or at least was a concurrent cause of, his injury. Just like
the plaintiff in Wise alleged her injury to have been caused by insufficient lighting,
Appellant here alleges his injury to have been caused by insufficient slip-resistance
on the ramp, which he maintains has been allowed to deteriorate for years. (Compl.
¶¶ 14-15; 18(a), (d), (e).)
      Further, common pleas erred in relying on Raker. There, an inmate slipped
and fell on a wet prison floor. In holding that the real estate exception did not apply,
we explained that the inmate’s “injuries were caused by slipping on a wet, waxed
floor, and nothing indicates that the floor of [the prison] was constructed
defectively or that the substances that caused his fall . . . had as its source the floor
of [the prison] itself.” Raker, 844 A.2d at 662 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast,
Appellant has indicated that the ramp was maintained defectively, not simply that it
was an otherwise undefective, but wet, ramp. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15; 18(a), (d), (e).)
      We agree with Appellant that Bradley also supports this conclusion. There,
the inmate slipped and fell on a wet tile floor in the drying-off area of the prison’s
shower room. The inmate alleged that the prison had “fail[ed] to install and/or
allow[ed] to exist a tile floor without non-slip properties.” 674 A.2d at 366. We
found the real estate exception did apply on those facts because the “injury was
caused by the defective design, construction or condition of the floor, devoid of a
non-slip surface . . . .” Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
      Appellees contend that “the water [Appellant] slipped on is not a condition
that derives, originates from or has as its source the prison ramp itself.” (Appellees’

                                           6
Br. at 13.) However, this statement does not fully capture Appellant’s argument,
which focuses on the lack of adequate maintenance of the slip-resistant feature of
the ramp, not simply the presence of water. It is, of course, true that the water on
the ramp could be a concurrent cause of the injury. But, as discussed above, a
concurrent cause in addition to the dangerous condition created by the
Commonwealth real estate does not foreclose Appellant’s ability to invoke the real
estate exception. See Wise, 243 A.3d at 519 (existing concurrent cause “not fatal”
to a claim under the real estate exception).
       Finally, we disagree with Appellees that “[Appellant]’s allegation that the
ramp was lacking in slip[-]resistant material . . . is merely an ‘absence of a condition,
like the absence of lighting or absence of a guardrail . . . .’” (Appellees’ Br. at 13
(quoting Wise, 249 A.3d at 518).) First, Appellant does not allege that Appellees
failed to install any slip-resistant material, but rather, that they did install it and failed
to adequately maintain it. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-14.) Moreover, Shedrick v. William Penn
School District, relied upon by Appellees, is meaningfully distinguishable, as there,
“the trial court found nothing was offered to either prove or infer that a terrazzo
floor is inherently dangerous or slippery.” 654 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)
(emphasis added). Shedrick is more like Raker—finding an otherwise inherently
undefective, wet floor is not a dangerous condition of the Commonwealth real
estate—than Bradley, where we reasoned that a negligently designed slippery floor
in a drying-off room is inherently defective.
       Nor does Nardella v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
34 A.3d 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), also relied upon by Appellees, compel a different
result. There, the plaintiff did not point to an inherent defect in the train platform on
which she slipped, but rather to the transportation authority’s failure to apply ice

                                              7
melt. We were careful to explain that while, in one sense, failure to apply ice melt
could be thought of as “maintenance” of Commonwealth real estate, improper
maintenance sufficient to trigger the real estate exception “result[s] in a defect in the
real property itself.” Id. at 304 (emphasis added). Failure to apply ice melt to an
otherwise safe sidewalk, which creates no defect in the real property itself, is
distinguishable from Appellant’s allegations, which allege failure to maintain the
ramp resulting in a defect in the real property itself.
      In sum, Appellant alleges that Appellees failed to maintain a non-slip surface
on a metal ramp, causing his injury. Because Appellant has adequately alleged an
injury caused by “[a] dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate[,]”
common pleas erred in sustaining Appellees’ demurrer on the basis of sovereign
immunity. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4) (emphasis added). However, to the extent
Appellant’s Complaint can be read to assert a cause of action solely based on
Appellees’ negligence unconnected to negligent maintenance of the ramp, we affirm.

IV.   CONCLUSION
      For all the foregoing reasons, common pleas erred in finding the real estate
exception inapplicable here. We affirm to the extent Appellant’s Complaint alleges
solely that the presence of the water or failure of Appellees to warn caused his injury
and reverse in all other respects. On remand, common pleas shall consider any
outstanding preliminary objections.

                                         __________________________________________
                                         RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                           8
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alphonse John Pritchard,                  :
                           Appellant      :
                                          :
                   v.                     :   No. 49 C.D. 2022
                                          :
James Meintel, et al.                     :

                                       ORDER

      NOW, January 10, 2024, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby AFFIRMED
IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and this matter is REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
      Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                        __________________________________________
                                        RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge