Court Opinion

ID: 9428570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:24:09.012419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:14.281365
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, dissenting.
The Court today affirms the National Labor Relations Board’s finding that withdrawal of an employer from a multi-employer bargaining unit, after a long drawn-out and unproductive bargaining impasse, constitutes an unfair labor practice by the employer in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the *421National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5). In addition, the Court indicates that withdrawal is not permissible even after the union has negotiated separate agreements with other members of the bargaining unit.1 The Court bases its holding in large part on deference to the views of the Board. Although judicial review of the Board’s balancing of conflicting interests is limited, “the balance struck by the Board is [not] immune from judicial examination and reversal in proper cases.” NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 290-291 (1965). When the Board’s decisions create an artifical and unwarranted imbalance of economic weapons, the courts are not bound to show abject deference to the Board’s views. Today the Court perpetuates an unsupportable imbalance and in so doing damages the very multi-employer bargaining mechanism it seeks to protect — a mechanism of great value to both unions and employers.2
I — I
The Court holds that the occurrence of an impasse, without more, does not automatically trigger a right of an employer *422to withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit. If the Court went no further, my objections would be minimal. In this case, however, there was much more than a mere impasse. At the time of the petitioner’s withdrawal from the bargaining unit, the negotiations had been stalemated for more than six months, a selective strike and unitwide lockout had kept employees away from their jobs for five months, and there were no signs that the parties would return to the bargaining table. This was no “temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations” as the Board claims; this was instead a .complete breakdown in negotiations coupled with a prolonged strike and lockout.3 Nevertheless, the Court holds that employers in the multiemployer group could not withdraw.
The Court then goes on, stating that even when the union negotiates separate “interim” agreements with individual employers the remaining employers cannot withdraw from the bargaining group. Thus, with all of the members of a multiemployer group closed down or crippled by a strike or a lockout, the union is permitted to “divide and conquer” by coming to terms with some of the employers, allowing them to resume operations with a full staff. With one or more competitors fully back in business, the ability of the remaining employers to resist the union demands becomes greatly— and unfairly — diminished. Unable to withdraw, the remaining employers have no defense; they are forced either to submit to the union’s demands or to allow fellow members of the group to profit from the strike or lockout. The effect of today’s decision is “to deny self-help by employers when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide.” NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957) (Buffalo Linen).
The Board has purported to follow an evenhanded approach to multiemployer bargaining. The Evening News *423Assn., 154 N. L. R. B. 1494 (1965), enf’d sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 372 F. 2d 569 (CA6 1967). By allowing the union to negotiate interim agreements in order to whipsaw the employer group and yet denying the employers the necessary defense of withdrawal, the Board is hardly living up to its asserted — and mandated— commitment to evenhandedness.
H-( HH
Maintenance of industrial peace requires balancing the interests of labor with those of management; the Court holds that the “difficult responsibility” of striking this balance lies with the Board subject only to “limited judicial review.” But judicial review, although limited, is not absent:
“[T]he phrase ‘limited judicial review’ [does] not mean that the balance struck by the Board is immune from judicial examination and reversal in proper cases. . . . [W]here, as here, the review is not of a question of fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance to be struck between conflicting interests, ‘[t]he deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.’” NLRB v. Brown, supra, at 290-292, quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 318 (1965).
The Court’s deferral to the Board’s conclusion that its rules advance the national labor policy by enhancing stability and promoting collective bargaining represents just the kind of uncritical judicial rubberstamping we have often condemned. NLRB v. Brown, supra, at 291.
Contrary to the Board’s conclusory statements, accepted by the Court, employers who execute interim agreements do not have an equivalent stake in promptly securing a reason*424able final agreement. Such employers are able to operate fully while their competitors are hampered by a strike or defensive lockout; employers covered by interim agreements have a natural economic interest in prolonging the deadlock, thereby increasing their competitive advantage over the employers who remain in the multiemployer group.
The Court also accepts the Board’s naked assertion that “interim agreements . . . deter rather than promote unit fragmentation.” It is difficult to imagine an event more likely to fragment a multiemployer group than a union’s successful whipsawing. Certainly employers will be reluctant to continue their association with other employers who are now encouraged by the Board — and by this Court — selfishly to permit themselves to be used to force the group to yield to the union demands.4
Even without the negotiation of interim agreements, when the parties have remained at impasse for a lengthy period, withdrawal of one or a few employers may facilitate rather than frustrate bargaining. The present case is illustrative. Bargaining between the Teamsters and the association was at a stalemate when Bonanno Linen decided to withdraw. That withdrawal did not cause the immediate “disintegra*425tion” of the bargaining unit, but instead provided the impetus for the union and the remaining employers ultimately to return to the bargaining table and reach agreement. Thus, Bonnano Linen’s withdrawal can be seen as fostering the group collective-bargaining process rather than hindering it. In any event, an employer’s withdrawal from the multiem-ployer group is no more disruptive of the bargaining process than a union’s decision to use “divide and conquer” tactics.
Industrial peace, it must be remembered, is the primary objective of the federal labor laws; multiemployer bargaining is simply one of many tools used to try to achieve that goal for the benefit of both sides. When a union and a group of employers have reached an impasse and further negotiations would appear to be an exercise in futility, it is more consistent with that goal to permit withdrawal and allow negotiation of separate agreements than to force the parties into escalated economic warfare. Because of differing concerns, it is likely that employers will be able to negotiate agreements individually even though efforts to reach a group agreement failed. By instead forcing the parties to use their economic weapons, the Board’s rule runs counter to the congressional goal of industrial peace.
Ill
In addition to arguing that its rule barring withdrawal upon impasse enhances the stability of multiemployer groups and promotes collective bargaining, the Board contends that an impasse is neither sufficiently unusual nor adequately determinable to support withdrawal. “Impasse” is a term of art in labor law; the presence of an impasse triggers other important consequences. At impasse, for example, either party may decline to negotiate further. See, e. g., NLRB v. Webb Furniture Corp., 366 F. 2d 314, 315 (CA4 1966). In addition, at impasse an employer may unilaterally make changes in terms and conditions of employment provided that the changes are consistent with the proposals it made at the *426bargaining table. See, e. g., NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F. 2d 472 (CA5 1963); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N. L. R. B. 475 (1967), enf’d sub nom. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 399, 395 F. 2d 622 (1968).
Because unions and employers have important rights which arise upon impasse, the Board and the courts have acquired considerable experience in determining whether an impasse exists. See, e. g., NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., supra; Taft Broadcasting Co., supra. It makes little sense to say, as the Board does here, that on the one hand an impasse is too common and indeterminable to permit withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit while on the other hand maintaining that an impasse is sufficiently momentous and ascertainable to allow employers to stop bargaining and make unilateral changes. Moreover, if the Board, after nearly 40 years of dealing with the concept, finds impasse too ill-defined to permit withdrawal, it is high time that the Board exercise its presumed expertise and establish more definite guidelines to identify impasse. Unions and employers are entitled to that guidance.
The Court also accepts the Board’s contention that “impasse may be ‘brought about intentionally by one of the parties,”’ and asserts that “permitting withdrawal at impasse would as a practical matter undermine the utility of multi-employer bargaining.” The Court explains that permitting withdrawal upon impasse would allow employers to “precipitate an impasse in order to escape any agreement less favorable than the one expected.” This argument ignores a basic element of impasse: impasse is reached only when a stalemate — a breakdown in bargaining — occurs after good-faith negotiations. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U. S. 217 (1949); Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F. 2d 445, 450 (CA4 1969). Intentionally refusing to agree in order to create an impasse and thus facilitate withdrawal — or trigger any of the other rights available upon impasse — is *427hardly good-faith bargaining. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F. 2d 615 (CA3 1963), cert. denied sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 375 U. S. 984 (1964); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F. 2d 229 (CA5 1960). The Board has ample means to deal with feigned bargaining.
IV
I would have little difficulty with a rule that a brief cessation of bargaining, without more, does not trigger a right to withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit. But the Board has gone much further. No impasse, we are told, no matter how long it lasts or how far apart the parties remain, permits withdrawal. Employers may not withdraw even after the union has negotiated separate agreements with some of the employers in order to force the others in the group into compliance. Absent a more reasonable alternative than that offered by the Board, I would adopt the rule of the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits and permit withdrawal upon impasse.6

 “Whipsawing” describes any one of several tactics by which a union creates a situation in which some but not all employers in a multiemployer group are closed or hampered by a strike or lockout. A union may call a strike against one or a few of the employers or, in the face of a lockout, it may negotiate a separate agreement with one or a few employers. Some of the employers are thus unable to conduct business as usual while others are fully operational. The theory behind whipsawing is that the impaired employers, seeing their competitors enjoying a market advantage and fearing that those competitors will increase their market share at the expense of the impaired employer, will be under irresistible pressure to yield to the union’s demands.

 The multiemployer mode of bargaining, traditionally seen as a defensive reaction by small employers, has become perhaps as important for unions as for employers. As counsel for the union in this case stated during oral argument, the limited funds and personnel of unions often make it very difficult for a union to negotiate separate agreements with each employer in industries where employer units are small.

 As the Board conceded during oral argument, its rule, now endorsed by this Court, prohibits withdrawal even if an impasse and a strike or lockout lasts as long as two years.

 The Court places great reliance on the notion that the union is only allowed to negotiate interim agreements with individual employers and that negotiation of permanent separate agreements not tied to the final association agreement would permit the remaining employers to withdraw from the unit. This reliance may be misplaced. In Tobey Fine Papers of Kansas City, 245 N. L. R. B. 1393 (1979), enf’d, 659 F. 2d 841, 107 LRRM 2221 (CA8 1981), the Board did not permit an employer to withdraw from a multiemployer group even though 2 of the 14 members (representing 42% of the group’s employees) had withdrawn with union consent and negotiated separate, permanent agreements. The Board held that “it does not follow ipso facto that execution of individual separate final contracts with [withdrawn] Association members either proves an intention to destroy, or necessarily causes the fragmentation of, a multiemployer unit.” 245 N. L. R. B., at 1395.

 NLRB v. Independent Assn. of Steel Fabricators, 582 F. 2d 135 (CA2 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Shopmen v. NLRB, 439 U. S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F. 2d 475 (CA3 1975); NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F. 2d 230 (CA9), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 893 (1975).