Court Opinion

ID: 9731021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:30:49.398895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:12.378313
License: Public Domain

Cleary, J.
(dissenting.) The majority has arrived at a result to which, in good conscience, I cannot subscribe. The prox*181imate cause of the assault by Boose was claimant’s use of the flit gun, and, even under the tort theory of causation, liability must follow unless the injury' resulted from some efficient intervening cause. Such an efficient intervening cause, in order to stand as the responsible cause of the ultimate result, must be a new and independent force or agency breaking the chain of causal connection between the original wrong and that result. Beatty v. Dunn, 103 Vt 340, 343, 154 A 770; Meyette v. Can. Pacific Ry. Co., 110 Vt 345, 353, 6 A2d 33. In claimant’s case no new and independent cause intervened. The physical contact temporarily ceased but the assault continued and resulted in the injury.
I would go farther. The phrase “out of his employment” expresses a factor of source or contribution rather than cause in the sense of being proximate or direct. The rule that the employment must be the proximate cause of the accident should be abandoned. A causal connection between the injury and the employment is sufficient, a connection substantially contributory though it need not be the sole or proximate cause. The strict tort reasoning of the doctrine of proximate cause is out of place under Workmen's Compensation Acts. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 US 418, 44 S Ct 153, 68 L Ed 366; Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn 596, 297 NW 19.
It is significant that our Workmen’s Compensation Act makes no mention of proximate cause. Care should be exercised lest long judicial habit in tort cases allow judicial thought in compensation cases to be too much influenced by a discarded or modified factor of decision. If the legislature had intended proximate cause to be the determining factor it wouid have said so. We have no right to judicially insert it.
I cannot follow the argument that the continued use of the flit gun was unreasonable and no longer for the benefit of the employer. The opinion reads something into the facts found by the commissioner which is not there. The majority also finds that “The claimant voluntarily started the second bout for reasons purely personal ’to himself." To my mind a fairer interpretation of the facts found by the Commissioner would be that there was but one match, halted temporarily by the appearance óf a third person. In its treatment of the findings the majority draws inferences adverse to the award rather.than in support of it. It disregards our rule, last stated in Williams v. Blanchard-McDonald Lumber *182Co., 115 Vt 89, 90, 52 A2d 781, 782: “Since the award of the Commissioner is the equivalent of a judgment of a trial court we must construe doubtful findings to support it, if this may reasonably be done.”
In addition to the quotation by the majority from Wilkins v. Blachard-McDonald Lumber Co., supra, that “The Act is to be construed liberally to accomplish the humane purpose for which it was passed” this Court spoke as follows in Brown v. Bristol Last Block Co., 94 Vt 123, 128, 108 A 922, 924 and Giguere v. Whiting Co., 107 Vt 161, 164, 177 A 313, 98 ALR 196; “The act should have a liberal and reasonable construction. It is framed on broad principles for the protection of the workman. Relief under it is not based on the neglect of the employer or affected by acts of negligence on the part of the employee. It rests on the economic and humanitarian principle of compensation to the employee, for earning capacity destroyed by an accident in the course of, or connected with, his work.”
The defendants’ brief insists that the claimant became the aggressor'and so is not entitled to recover. The opinion does not mention it. Both sides briefed and argued the question. Therefore, it should be decided. We have no decision in point but I would adopt the law laid down by recent decisions in two of our neighboring states which hold that aggression by the claimant does not prevent recovery. Dillons Case, 324 Mass 102, 85 NE2d 69; Newell v. Moreau, 94 NH 439, 55 A2d 476.
The majority says that no case cited goes as far as this one would if the claimant recovered. Assuming but not admitting that to be so I know of no requirement that this 'Court be second, or later, in the orderly development of the law. I would affirm the award of the Commissioner of Industrial Relations.
Blackmer, J., concurs in this dissent.