Court Opinion

ID: 9547473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:47:50.429662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:47.135545
License: Public Domain

NEAL, Judge (dissenting). I disagree with the majority for two reasons. I believe the majority ignores the distinction between a mutual mistake as to a present or past fact, which is subject to relief, and a mistake as to a future fact, which is not and also fails to apply the correct standard of review. The starting point for the analysis should be the standard of review for a motion under NMSA 1978, Civ.P.R. 60(b)(1) (Repl. Pamp.1980). The majority fails to address the issue, so a brief review is in order. The rule provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for, among other reasons, mistake. It is a remedial rule to be liberally construed. 7 Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.22 [2] (1983). A court-approved workman’s compensation settlement has the same elements of finality as to other judgments, and the rule is applicable to such settlements. Durham v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Co., 74 N.M. 277, 393 P.2d 15 (1964). Rulings on a Rule 60 motion involve a balance between the conflicting interests of finality and the policy encouraging settlement in workmen’s compensation cases on one hand, and the desire to achieve justice on the other. Courts have broad discretion in ruling on the motion. Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2872 (1973). Our courts have held that the standard of review for Rule 60 motions is abuse of discretion. Desjardin v. Albuquerque National Bank, 93 N.M. 89, 596 P.2d 858 (1979). In order to reverse the trial court, then, it must be shown that the court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of all reason, Independent Steel and Wire Co. v. New Mexico Central Railroad Co., 25 N.M. 160, 178 P. 842 (1919), or that it is contrary to logic and reason, Three Rivers Land Co., Inc. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982), or that the judicial action taken is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; if reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken, the court has not abused its discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Therefore the appellate court cannot merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. We therefore must examine the decision to reopen the judgment for abuse of discretion. The trial judge granted plaintiff’s motion to reopen the court-approved settlement because the injury which is the subject of the settlement was not diagnosed correctly at the time the parties entered the agreement. In general a mutual mistake as to a past or present fact, such as a condition undiscovered at the time of the release or settlement is subject to relief. 54 Am.Jr.2d, Mistake, Accident, or Surprise, § 6 (1971). The majority states that the distinction, recognized in Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277, 299 P.2d 457 (1956), between a mistake of a past or present fact and a “mistake” of a future fact, does not help the appellees. The law, however, is otherwise. Mendenhall draws a distinction between types of mistakes; only a mistake as to a past or present fact will justify relief. “A mistake as to the future unknowable effect of existing facts, a mistake as to the future uncertain duration of a known condition, or a mistake as to the future effect of a personal injury, cannot have this effect, because these future happenings are not facts * * Mendenhall, 61 N.M. at 283, 299 P.2d at 461 quoting, Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 116 F. 913, 914 (8th Cir.1902). See also Durham v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Co., 74 N.M. 277, 393 P.2d 15 (1964). Therefore, while a mistake in prognosis is not subject to relief, a mistake in diagnosis may be. This distinction is widely recognized. Even the case relied on by the majority, DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1957) recognizes the distinction: “While a release executed pursuant to a mistake as to a past or present fact may on proper showing be set aside, unknown or unexpected consequences of known injuries will not result in invalidating the release.” 91 So.2d at 901. In this case the mistake was a present fact ascertainable at the time, not a mistake as to the future unknowable effect of an existing fact. The plaintiff did not seek to reopen the judgment because the injury became aggravated or worse than expected, but because the present status of the injury was not as the parties believed when they entered the settlement. Therefore the factual situation is different from Durham and Mendenhall. Nonetheless, both of those cases recognize that mutual mistake could justify relief from a judgment. See Durham, 74 N.M. at 282, 393 P.2d 15, Mendenhall, 61 N.M. at 277, 299 P.2d at 461. In Durham, the injury became more serious after the settlement and the plaintiff moved to reopen his claim. The court held that they did not err in refusing to reopen the case. In Mendenhall, not a workmen’s compensation case, the plaintiff was told she would recover in four to six weeks. On that basis she executed a release. She did not recover as predicted and a second operation was required. On appeal the court affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of defendant. Both cases involved mistakes as to the future effect of a known condition. Here the doctor made a mistake as to the current, ascertainable facts. Unlike one who makes a choice to settle a claim based on a correct diagnosis, and then experiences unforeseen aggravation of the condition, the plaintiff here did not have the facts upon which to make an informed decision to settle. The trial judge was apprised of the facts and believed the mistake to be one of diagnosis of the current state of the injury. The injury did not become more severe than predicated; it was at the time more serious than the earlier diagnosis disclosed. The judge ruled to reopen that portion of the settlement dealing with medical expenses based on clear language in New Mexico case law. None of the cases relied on by the majority found an abuse of discretion in the granting of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion under such a situation. The judge’s ruling is in keeping with the policy of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to adequately compensate injured workers. Even if an appellate court disagrees, can it say, as a matter of law, that ruling to reopen the judgment, relying on a definition of mistake in New Mexico law, is an abuse of discretion? Hardly. I would affirm.