Court Opinion

ID: 9731007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:30:23.90818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:12.205354
License: Public Domain

*568Dissenting Opinion
Buchanan, P.J.
I dissent from affirmance of the award because there was no “accident.”1
The evidence and the findings conclusively indicate to me that plaintiff (Almodovar) was performing the normal task of his every day employment routine at Inland. He had worked there for nine (9) years and had never previously experienced a back problem.
His job as a “wrapper” of bands and coils of sheet metal required him to continuously use a tool called a stretcher, which had to be lifted and maneuvered as it became necessary to fasten steel bands around coils of steel as they moved at floor level along a conveyor system. Attached to this tool (stretcher) was an air hose, about seventy-five (75) feet in length, which became entangled in and around the conveyor seven or eight or more times a day, requiring the wrapper to pull on the hose to free it. Thus, the plaintiff in the performance of his duties as a wrapper was performing his normal duties when he was required to jerk the air hose free from the conveyor.
All the findings say is that this is an “identifiable event,” which indeed it is, but it is not an accident as the evidence and findings clearly indicate.
This is just another “lifting” case, in which there is no “untoward or unexpected event,” and should fall in the rule of numerous cases so holding. Rivera v. Simmons Co. (1975), 164 Ind. App. 381, 329 N.E.2d 39; Shaffer v. Indiana Gas & Chem. Corp. (1965), 137 Ind. App. 471, 209 N.E.2d 919; Campbell v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (1962), 134 Ind. App. 45, 184 N.E.2d 160; City of Anderson v. Borton (1961), 132 Ind. App. 684, 178 N.E.2d 904; Douglas v. Warner Gear (1961), *569131 Ind. App. 664, 174 N.E.2d 584; Bundy v. Concrete Ready Mix Co. (1960), 130 Ind. App. 542, 167 N.E.2d 477; Arford v. State (1959), 129 Ind. App. 312, 156 N.E.2d 401; Blevins v. Consumers Ice & Fuel Co. (1959), 129 Ind. App. 257, 156 N.E.2d 103.
Reliance by the majority on Heflin v. Red Front Cash & Carry Stores, Inc. (1948), 225 Ind. 517, 75 N.E.2d 662, is indicative of the controversy that centers around the word “accident.” It is one of a line of cases2 which virtually eliminates the necessity of an “untoward or unexpected event.”
My views on this subject are set forth in my reluctant concurring opinion in Estey Piano Corporation v. Steffen, supra, and need not be repeated here except to say, as I concluded there, that the cases interpreting an “accident arising out of or in the course of employment” lead to the conclusion that the word “accident” has been elasticized to the breaking point. In the search for extension of employers’ liability for employment-connected injuries, the law on this subject has become hopelessly conflicting and confused . . . and would appear to have gone far beyond the original intent of the framers of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
“Accident” as a word of art in Workmen’s Compensation law has become as mysterious as the Loch Ness monster . . . and awaits the attention of the Supreme Court or the Legislature.
The holding of the majority that there is an accident under these circumstances appears to me to be contrary to United States Steel Corporation v. Dykes (1958), 238 Ind. 599, 154 *570N.E.2d 111, which is the last Indiana Supreme Court word as to' what constitutes an accident. The closing paragraph reads:
The mere showing that he was performing his usual routine everyday task when he suffered a heart attack does not establish a right to workmen’s compensation because there was no event or happening beyond the mere employment itself. 238 Ind. at 613, 154 N.E.2d at 119. The award should be reversed.
Note. — Reported at 361 N.E.2d 181.

. My analysis of the cases as to what constitutes an “accident” for purposes of awarding Workmen’s Compensation is set forth in my Concurring Opinion in Estey Piano Corporation v. Steffen (1975), 164 Ind. App. 239, 328 N.E.2d 240.

. Anaconda, Aluminum Co. v. Aue (1964), 136 Ind. App. 463, 202 N.E.2d 403; Lock-Joint Tube Co. v. Brown (1963), 135 Ind. App. 386, 191 N.E.2d 110 (criticizing United States Steel Corp. v. Dykes, infra); United States Steel Corp. v. Douglas (1955), 125 Ind. App. 212, 123 N.E.2d 899; Slaubaugh v. Vore (1953), 123 Ind. App. 497, 110 N.E.2d 299; American Maize Products Co. v. Nichiporchick (1940), 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801; The Studebaker Corp. v. Jones (1937), 104 Ind. App. 270, 10 N.E.2d 747; Morgan Packing Co. v. Monroe (1934), 99 Ind. App. 321, 192 N.E. 320; General American Tank Car Corp. v. Weirick (1921), 77 Ind. App. 242, 133 N.E. 391; Indian Creek Coal & Mining Co. v. Calvert (1918), 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N.E. 519.