Court Opinion

ID: 9664337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:14:49.341911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:04.953262
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice STUMBO.
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s opinion regarding the failure to give an instruction on Appellant’s extreme emotional disturbance (EED), and also because the jury impermissibly heard evidence that Appellant had taken a polygraph examination. Either of these errors constitutes reversible error.
Although Appellant did not request an instruction on first-degree manslaughter, the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the whole law of the case. Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57, 60 (1959). “This general rule requires instructions applicable to every state of case covered by the indictment and deducible from or supported to any extent by the testimony.” Id. This rule holds true regardless of whether Appellant requested a lesser-included instruction. Id. See also Trimble v. Commonwealth, Ky., 447 S.W.2d 348, 350 (1969) (stating that *554“[w]hen the prosecution adduces evidence warranting an inference of a finding of a lesser degree of the charged offense, the court should instruct on the lesser degree even though the defendant presents the defense of alibi.”)
There was ample evidence in this case to suggest that Appellant was suffering from EED prior to the incident. There was testimony that one of the victims had broken up with Appellant and that she was carrying another man’s child. There had been repeated incidents where Appellant fired a gun outside the victim’s trailer after she had broken up with him. Also, the evidence suggested that upon entering the victim’s trailer, the two began to fight, but that Appellant did not start shooting until a partially clad man emerged from the bedroom. It was possible that Appellant did not know whom the man was with in the bedroom.
The majority dismisses these possible scenarios as not meeting the standard for an EED instruction because Appellant’s behavior was not continuous, and because a partially clad man emerging from the bedroom was not a viable triggering event because the man was with the other victim and not Appellant’s ex girlfriend.
We have held that the onset of EED “ ‘may be more gradual than the “flash point” normally associated with sudden “heat of passion”, so long as the condition is “a temporary disturbance of the emotions” as opposed to mental derangement per se.’ ” Springer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439, 452 (1999) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464, 468 (1986)). In Springer, we specifically stated, “[t]he fact that the triggering event may have festered for a time in [the appellant’s] mind before the explosive event occurred does not preclude a finding that she killed her husband while under the influence of [EED].” 998 S.W.2d at 452.
Likewise, the facts of this case did not preclude a finding of EED. Appellant was entitled to have the jury weigh the evidence and make that decision.
Secondly, I must disagree with the majority’s holding that the references made to Appellant having taken a polygraph exam were not grounds for reversal. It has long been held that the “mere mention of the taking of a polygraph examination without disclosure of the result” is error. Morgan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (1991); Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671 (1984); Perry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 655 (1983). This Court reversed a conviction for murder in Morgan, supra, simply because it was disclosed to the jury that an interrogation of the defendant took place in a room that contained a polygraph instrument. The majority cites to no áuthority that says the result is different if the defense’s own witnesses made the reference to the polygraph. The outcome is the same. The jury could have inferred that since the results of the polygraph were not admitted, Appellant must have failed it. This was prejudicial error requiring reversal for a new trial.