Court Opinion

ID: 9712486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:55:02.561258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.526453
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge:
Appellants, Adams, Feidler and Bojarski, appeal from the order of the trial court denying their motion to take off a compulsory nonsuit. We reverse and remand for trial.
In PeAir v. Home Ass’n of Enola Legion No. 751, 287 Pa.Super. 400, 403-404, 430 A.2d 665, 666-667 (1981), we said:
A nonsuit should be entered only in a clear case. McMillan v. Mountain Laurel Racing Inc., 240 Pa.Super. 248, 367 A.2d 1106 (1976); DiGiannantonio v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 402 Pa. 27, 166 A.2d 28 (1960); Dunmore v. McMillan, 396 Pa. 472, 152 A.2d 708 (1959). In describing how clear the case must be, it has been said that a nonsuit can be entered *350only when it is inconceivable, on any reasonable hypothesis, that a mind desiring solely to reach a just and proper conclusion in accordánce with the relevant governing principles of law, after viewing the evidence in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff, could determine in his favor the controlling issues involved. Borisoff v. Penn Fruit Company, Inc., 165 Pa.Super. 572, 574, 69 A.2d 167 (1949).
Also, it has been said that a nonsuit should be entered only where the facts and circumstances lead unerringly to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove his case. Korpa v. Stuyvestant Life Ins. Co., 236 Pa.Super. 581, 351 A.2d 682 (1975).
When so viewed, the evidence is as follows:
On January 27, 1979, appellant, Dolores Adams, visited appellee, Adeline Euliano's house with a possible aim of purchasing it.1 A tour of the building disclosed, upon inspection, several holes in floors. Euliano explained to Adams that the holes were in one situation caused by a leaking garbage disposal or water leaks, and in another circumstance was caused by faulty wiring. A real estate appraiser who detected some of the holes was told that they were caused by a dishwasher which overflowed. Appellants purchased the house and one month after moving in they discovered, when they engaged a repairman to fix the holes in the floor, that the house was infested with termites. An exterminator was then employed to inspect the house for termites. He determined the house was infested. He stated also that in his opinion an untrained person would not have been able to determine that there was a termite problem.
Adams claimed, below, that Euliano fraudulently misrepresented to her the condition of her house. Our courts have consistently held that a false representation is fraudulent only when by clear and convincing evidence it is demonstrated that the representation was made knowingly with the intent to deceive or in reckless disregard for the truth or *351falsity of the matter. Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 425 A.2d 412 (1981); Brentwater Homes, Inc. v. Weibly, 471 Pa. 17, 369 A.2d 1172 (1977); Thomas v. Seaman, 451 Pa. 347, 304 A.2d 134 (1973); Bachman v. Artinger, 285 Pa.Super. 57, 426 A.2d 702 (1981); Glanski v. Ervine, 269 Pa.Super. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979); Baker v. Rangos, 229 Pa.Super. 333, 324 A.2d 498 (1974); Shane v. Hoffmann, 227 Pa.Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532 (1974). The lower court granted the compulsory nonsuit because it held that the appellants had failed to establish the requisite scienter to prove that a fraudulent misrepresentation had occurred.
The appellants submitted the following evidence, which the record supports, to the trial court concerning Euliano’s intent to deceive. First, after the appellants purchased the house and discovered the termites, they confronted Euliano about the condition of the house. Euliano stated that she had seen tunnels in the walls at one time and had sprayed and put out mothballs to correct the condition. Second, Euliano supplied varying descriptions about the origins of the holes at different times and to different people. Third, that the real estate appraiser who looked at the house noted the basement was, to the extent he saw it, very clean. Adams testified that she noted the tidiness of the cellar, however, after closing, she discovered a broom handle in the basement which was infested with termites. Appellants argue this evidence, when viewed most favorably to them, demonstrates knowledge of the termite condition and an intent to deceive. We are unable, under these circumstances, to hold that the appellants had so failed in proving their case that the facts and circumstances unerringly lead to a conclusion in favor of Euliano. Thus, the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to take off the compulsory nonsuit as to fraudulent misrepresentation.
Appellants argue alternatively that sellers of real estate in Pennsylvania are not free to make innocent misrepresentations to buyers of real estate where the seller is under a duty to know the condition of his house. Thus, it would follow that the trial court should have determined whether *352such a duty existed herein. The lower court held that no such duty can potentially exist under Pennsylvania law.
In Glanski v. Ervine, supra, we held that a seller was liable for failing to disclose a termite infestation of which he had knowledge. That case involved a real estate broker who materially misrepresented facts and was held liable. The seller of the house claimed that any misrepresentation he made was entirely innocent. In holding that the seller was responsible for damages arising out of his failure to disclose, we said:
There was also sufficient evidence to support the verdict against appellant Graff. The credibility of his statements that he did not know about the termites was for the jury to decide, especially given Ervine’s statement that he had told Graff about them. See Highmont Music Corp. v. J. M. Hoffman Co. [397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d 363], supra (proper jury inference); Shane v. Hoffman [227 Pa.Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532], supra (tenant’s testimony that he had told owner of problems held sufficient to support finding that owner knew of problems. Furthermore, even if Graff’s misrepresentation was innocent,
[a] material misrepresentation may be found whether [seller] actually knew the truth or not, especially where, as here, it was bound to ascertain the truth before making the representation.
Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffman Co., supra, at 397 Pa. at 350, 155 A.2d at 366.
Accord, Berger v. Pittsburgh Auto Equipment [387 Pa. 61, 127 A.2d 334] supra, [footnote omitted]
Id., 269 Pa.Super. at 192, 409 A.2d at 430. Therefore, the lower court incorrectly held that no cause of action would lie if the seller was proven to be under a duty to know about a dangerous condition in the building and innocently failed to disclose information to which that duty applied,2 especially when inquiry was made and a response was given by the owner.
*353Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
CIRILLO, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. Adams, Feidler and Bojarski are in the business of owning and managing real estate. They own six residential properties.

. The appellants also asked: “Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ [appellants herein] motion to reopen plaintiffs’ case after closing to introduction additional evidence?” Appellants’ *353brief, page 2. We find it unnecessary to address this issue having ordered a new trial.