Court Opinion

ID: 9735220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:05:51.793848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:56.128484
License: Public Domain

MACK, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
“Precedent” is one thing — “outcome” another. In our courtrooms, the first describes the legal rule that judges are required to follow, and lawyers to know; the second describes the future life that a citizen accused of crime must face as dictated by his peers, or fortuitous events (including Divine intervention). It must be somewhat disconcerting, therefore, for the layman to realize that errors committed by judges and lawyers'1 can be ignored because of fortuitous events. On the facts of the instant case, therefore, I cannot agree with my colleagues in simply assuming error (on the part of the trial judge) on their way to finding that error to be “harmless” because of a jury’s verdict.
To begin with, we need not “assume” error; the trial judge did not follow the precedent of the landmark decision of Drew v. United States2 and its progeny. In Drew, a three-judge, panel of our circuit court of appeals, disturbed about the natural human reaction of a jury to convict when faced with evidence of multiple crimes, noted, “It is a principle of long standing in our law that evidence of one crime is inadmissible to prove disposition to commit crime, from which the jury may infer that the defendant committed the crime charged.” 118 U.S.App. D.C. at 15, 331 F.2d at 89. The court in Drew went on to identify some purposes for which evidence of other crimes may be admitted. Our .cases have spelled out four specific requirements for the admission of such evidence:
(1) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other offense, see Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 421 n. 11 (D.C.1988); Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 310 & n. 4 (D.C.1987); United States v. Bussey, 139 U.S.App. D.C. 268, 273, 432 F.2d 1330, 1335 (1970); (2) the other crimes evidence must be directed to a genuine, material and contested issue in the case, Landrum v. United States, 559 A.2d 1323, 1326 (D.C.1989); Thompson, supra, 546 A.2d at 420; Graves v. United States, 515 A.2d 1136, 1140 (D.C.1986); (3) the evidence must be logically relevant to prove this issue for a reason other than its power to demonstrate criminal propensity, Landrum, supra, 559 A.2d at 1326; Ali, supra, 520 A.2d at 310 n. 4; Campbell v. United States, 450 A.2d 428, 430 (D.C. 1982); and (4) the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial, e.g., Thompson, supra, 546 A.2d at 420; Campbell, supra, 450 A.2d at 430. See generally Bartley v. United States, 530 A.2d 692, 700-01 (D.C.1987) (Mack, J., dissenting).
Roper v. United States, 564 A.2d 726, 731 (D.C.1989).3
Since Drew was decided, this court has allowed evidence of other crimes to be *951admitted for the precise purpose proscribed by Drew — to prove disposition or propensity — in cases such as this one where the crimes involve “unusual sexual preference.” See Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729 (D.C.1992). Where evidence of other crimes is offered to prove propensity, and for no other purpose, the prophylactic steps outlined above are even more important, since there is no non-prejudicial use to which the jury can put the evidence of the other crime. For this reason, it was most important for the trial court, in considering appellant’s motion for severance, to first determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant had committed both crimes, and second, determine whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its probative value.
In the instant case, if the court had required a proffer from the government on the charge of attempted second degree child sexual abuse, the proffer would have indicated a lack of evidence that appellant actually attempted sexual contact with T.K. Given the lack of evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, of attempted sexual contact, the crime could not be admissible as evidence in a trial of appellant on the other count. “The reason for requiring that there be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant in fact committed the other offense should be obvious: if someone else committed the crime, or if no crime was committed, evidence of the other offense would have no relevance — and at the same time, might seriously prejudice the defendant.” Id.
Even if we assumed that the trial court committed error in not having found clear and convincing evidence of each offense before sending both counts to the jury, we cannot assume that the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the first count, and an acquittal as to the second count, rendered the trial court’s error harmless. More accurately, we cannot assume that the jury’s acquittal on the weaker count rendered the evidence thereof not prejudicial. The majority cites the “strength of the evidence” against appellant on the first count as rendering the trial court’s error harmless. I cannot be so sure. There were inconsistencies in the record which might have caused the jurors to hesitate before convicting appellant, if not for the corroborative nature of the second count.4 Furthermore, the government linked the two offenses in both its opening and closing arguments. For example, the prosecutor argued in closing: “Ladies and gentlemen, twice this year the defendant Willie Preston Parker, Jr., attempted to sexually touch a young boy. In February of 1996, he attempted to sexually touch 13-year-old [T.K.], And [T.K.] ran away. On April 14, 1996, he attempted to sexually touch 12-year-old [M.S.]. [M.S.] was sleeping. He was not able to run away.” See Woodard, supra note 1, 719 A.2d at 973 (stating, in rejecting the government’s argument that trial counsel’s failure to move for severance was harmless, that “during her closing, the prosecutor sought to interweave the facts of the two incidents to create a ‘single inculpato-ry mass’ ”). We would be usurping the role of the jury if we were to determine that, absent the evidence on the second count, it would have convicted appellant on the first count. Thus, convinced that the trial court committed error, I cannot agree *952with the majority that the error was harmless. Accordingly, I dissent.

. See Woodard v. United States, 719 A.2d 966 (D.C.1998).

. 118 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (1964). Drew is binding on this court under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971).

.The division opinion in Bartley also noted the need to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. See 530 A.2d at 695.

. For example, M.S. testified that after the incident, he immediately left the bedroom and went into the living room and then, without saying anything, went into Nicole's room, where he stayed until the police came. He testified that he did not yell at appellant or have a conversation with him other than saying a few words. Tyrone Fowler testified that he heard M.S. and appellant, through the closed bedroom door, talking loudly for several minutes; he then went into the bedroom and talked to M.S. and appellant. Without the evidence of the other offense, tending as it did to show appellant’s propensity to commit this offense, these discrepancies might have caused the jury to question the credibility of some of the witnesses.