Court Opinion

ID: 9943730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 07:14:42.611845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:54.856382
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                        CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                        E-filed: Feb 26 2024 02:43PM
                                                        Clerk Review: Feb 26 2024 02:44PM
                                                        Filing ID: 72138547
                                                        Case No.: 2023-SCC-0012-CRM
                                                        Judy Aldan

                          IN THE
                   Supreme Court
                          OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

    COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,

                             v.

              KENNETH THOMAS BLAS KAIPAT,
                   Defendant-Appellant.

          Supreme Court No. 2023-SCC-0012-CRM

         ORDER DENYING RELEASE PENDING APPEAL

                     Cite as: 2024 MP 1

                  Decided February 26, 2024

           CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
           ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
             ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS

        Superior Court Criminal Action No. 21-0072-CR
         Associate Judge Wesley M. Bogdan, Presiding
INOS, J.:
¶1      Following his conviction, Appellant Kaipat submitted a motion titled
 Emergency Motion Under Rule 27-1. Motions made under NMI Supreme Court
 Rule 27-1 must certify that to avoid irreparable harm, relief is needed in less than
 21 days. On its face, the motion contains no such certification and alleges no
 imminent irreparable harm. There is no emergency. However, because Kaipat
 stated with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief sought, and the
 legal argument necessary to support it, we will consider the motion as a general
 motion under Rule 27.
¶2      Kaipat makes two requests for relief. First, he asks for court appointed
 counsel on appeal. We granted this request and appointed the Public Defender.
 See Commonwealth v. Kaipat, 2023-SCC-0012-CRM (NMI Sup. Ct. Oct. 19,
 2023) (Order Appointing Counsel). Second, Kaipat is essentially requesting to
 be released pending appeal under Rule 9. 1 To be granted this relief, Kaipat must
 establish by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) he will not flee or pose a
 danger to any other person or to the community; 2) the appeal is not for the
 purpose of delay; and 3) the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact
 likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. NMI SUP. CT. R. 9(c). We
 assess these criteria in accordance with the NMI Rule of Criminal Procedure
 46(c) which deals with release of convicted individuals awaiting sentencing or
 appeal. Id.
¶3      Individuals awaiting sentencing or appeal “shall be treated in accordance
 with the provisions of Rule 46(a)(l) through (6),” for the purpose of reasonably
 assuring “that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to
 the community.” NMI R. CRIM. P. 46(c). Failure to meet any one of these
 elements will result in a denial of the motion. See Commonwealth v. Blas, 2004
 MP 26 ¶ 11 (denying motion for stay because it fails to meet one of the three
 elements set out in NMI R. CRIM. P. 46(c)).
¶4      Unlike Rule 46(c), Rule 46(a) deals with release prior to trial and does not
 explicitly instruct the court to ensure that the person seeking release will not pose
 a danger to any other person or to the community. Instead, the thrust of Rule
 46(a) is aimed at ensuring the appearance of the person at trial and other
 proceedings as required. NMI R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(1). The rule contemplates release
 pending trial when the defendant is presumed innocent and is not presumptively
 a danger to the community.
¶5     Nevertheless, the rules for release pending sentencing or appeal require an
 assessment of the risk of danger to any person or to the community, and instruct
 us to look to Rule 46(a) to determine as much. NMI R. CRIM. P. 46(c).

1
    NMI Supreme Court Rule 9(b) requires a moving party to include a copy of the
    judgment of conviction with such a motion. Kaipat failed to do so, but we suspend that
    requirement under NMI Supreme Court Rule 2 and take this occasion to discuss Rule
    46 of the NMI Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    Specifically, Rule 46(a)(2), which accompanies 6 CMC § 6404, 2 lays out the
    factors to consider:
          In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure
          appearance, the judge shall, on the basis of available information,
          take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense
          charged, the weight of the evidence against the accused, the
          accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character
          and mental condition, the length of his/her residence in the
          community, his/her record of convictions, and his/her record of
          appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or
          failure to appear at court proceedings.
          NMI R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(2).
¶6      This rule, though protective of a pre-trial defendant’s presumption of
 innocence, nevertheless permits the court to consider the risk of danger to another
 person or the community. The rule accomplishes this by considering the nature
 and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the
 accused, their character and mental condition, and their record of prior
 convictions and appearances at court proceedings. As written, the rule avoids
 presuming that a pre-trial defendant poses a risk to another person or to the
 community by including these factors under the umbrella of “[ensuring]
 appearance.” Id. However, the sum of the factors in Rule 46(a)(2) plainly allows

2
     Both 6 CMC § 6404 and Criminal Procedure Rule 46(a)(2) deal with the same question
     of release pending trial, but the factors they instruct the court to consider are not
     identical. The NMI Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated pursuant to the NMI
     Constitution, which states that the Chief Justice “may propose rules governing civil and
     criminal procedure, judicial ethics, admission to and governance of the bar of the
     Commonwealth, and other matters of judicial administration.” NMI CONST. art. IV,
     § 9(a). Rules proposed by this Court become effective sixty days after submission to
     the legislature unless disapproved by a majority of either house. NMI CONST. art. IV,
     § 9(a). Constitutional courts are generally acknowledged to “have the inherent or
     implied power to regulate practice and procedure as a necessary function of their duty
     to efficiently administer cases.” Commonwealth v. Camacho, 2002 MP 14 ¶ 15. Further,
     we have held that “[i]f there is expressed or implied constitutional authority for the
     judiciary to promulgate rules of practice and procedure then this power is regarded as
     legislative power. The rules issued have the status of statutes enacted by the
     legislature.” Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction
     § 36.06 at 69 (5th ed. 1992)). When a statute “directly and irreconcilably conflicts with
     a rule of this court on a matter within the court's authority, . . . the rule will prevail over
     the statute.” Id. at ¶ 19. However, we read rules of this Court and statutes in pari
     materia, in order to give effect to both the rule and the statute, if possible. Id. at ¶ 20.
     Here, though 6 CMC § 6404 and Rule 46(a)(2) are not identical, they differ only in that
     Rule 46(a)(2) includes additional criteria for the court to consider when assessing the
     same goal of ensuring the defendant’s presence in the future. Because these two
     provisions do not directly or irreconcilably conflict, we may give full effect to both
     without issue.
 a holistic assessment of the pre-trial defendant, including any risk of danger they
 pose.
¶7      Rule 46(a)(2) permits a court to assess the risk of danger a pre-trial
 defendant poses. This is evidenced in Rule 46(c)’s instruction that a court
 considering release pending sentencing or appeal shall apply the factors in Rule
 46(a)(2). A person who has been convicted no longer enjoys a presumption of
 innocence, and, for this reason, under Rule 46(c) a court must assess the risk the
 person poses to any other person or to the community. Still, the method of
 determining such a risk does not change between when a court is considering
 release pending sentencing or appeal and prior to trial.
¶8      Because Rule 46(a)(2) is the source for assessing the first element of
 release under Supreme Court Rule 9(c) and Criminal Procedure Rule 46(c), we
 consider whether Kaipat has established through clear and convincing evidence
 that he will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community.
 Kaipat asserts that since his arrest he has managed to graduate high school and
 abide by pretrial bail conditions. This alone does not meet the clear and
 convincing evidence standard.
¶9     The nature and circumstances of Kaipat’s criminal conviction were
 extremely violent and weigh against release due to the risk of danger to another
 person or the community. See Appellant’s Mot. at 5 (stating that Appellant was
 convicted on nine counts, including Sexual Assault in the First and Second
 Degrees, Burglary, Aggravated Assault and Battery, Assault with a Dangerous
 Weapon, and Strangulation.)
¶ 10    Also weighing against release due to the risk of danger to others or to the
  community is Kaipat’s character and mental condition. In the pretrial bail order,
  the court found that Kaipat is “angry, destructive, violent, and intimidating in the
  community with family and girlfriends.” In re the Matter of K.T.B.K., No. 20-
  0014-JA (NMI Super. Ct. April 8, 2021) (Order Modifying Bail). Kaipat’s
  motion does not contest this finding or provide clear and convincing evidence to
  suggest that this is not still the case.
¶ 11    We find that neither the weight of the evidence nor the lack of prior
  convictions weigh particularly in favor of release.
¶ 12    The factors we must consider weigh heavily against granting release
  pending appeal. Kaipat has not established by clear and convincing evidence that
  he does not pose a danger to any other person or to the community. Because he
  cannot meet the first part of the first element of Supreme Court Rule 9, Kaipat
  does not meet his burden for release pending appeal and we do need to assess the
  remaining factors. The request for release pending appeal is DENIED.

        SO ORDERED this 26th day of February, 2024.
/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice

                                         COUNSEL
J. Robert Glass, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Emily Thomsen, Office of the Public Defender, Saipan, MP, for Defendant-Appellee.
                                          NOTICE
This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, or e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.