Court Opinion

ID: 9581274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:13:14.371088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:49.191216
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment only. Without explaining all of the reasons I do so, since such would avail nothing but provide tedium, I feel obliged to elaborate with respect to Division 4 of the majority opinion. It deals with Enumerations of Error numbers 6, 7, and 18.
Number 6 claims that the court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the accusation based upon an inconsistency between the offense charged on the ticket and that charged in the accusation.
The traffic citation apparently charged defendant with violating subsection (a) (1) of OCGA § 40-6-391 only. Although the citation is not in the record, the two counsel agreed to this fact during argument on the oral motion to dismiss made at the outset of the trial. The accusation charged, in a single count, that defendant drove a motor vehicle “while under the influence of alcohol” (subsection (a) (1)) “or while there was 0.12 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood . . .” (subsection (a) (4)). What warranted the dismissal, defendant argued, was this difference between the citation and the accusation. No authority was cited. Now appellant merely states without more that this is duplicitous, as these two subsections require proof of separate and distinct elements.
*154It is true that they do. Subsection (a) (1) requires proof that when defendant committed the act, his condition was such that he was “under the influence of alcohol ... to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving,” i.e., “when it appears that it is less safe for such person to operate a motor vehicle than it would be if he were not so affected.” See Cargile v. State, 244 Ga. 871, 873-874 (262 SE2d 87) (1979). Subsection (a) (4), on the other hand, requires no such proof. “Impaired driving ability is not a ‘fact necessary to constitute the crime’ established in subsection (a) (4).. . . the ability of any individual to drive without impairment” due to the influence of alcohol consumption is “irrelevant.” Lester v. State, 253 Ga. 235, 237-238 (320 SE2d 142) (1984). Instead, it must be proved “that the defendant had at least a .12% blood-alcohol count while he was driving.” Id. at 237. “Subsection (a) (4) . . . punishes the individual for choosing to drive when his blood-alcohol count is at least .12% or for choosing to drink alcohol while driving so that his blood-alcohol count reaches the prohibited level.” Id. at 236. But this distinction does not end the matter raised here.
There is no requirement that the accusation charge the same thing, and no more, than what appears in the traffic citation. OCGA § 17-7-71 (a); see Evans v. State, 168 Ga. App. 716 (310 SE2d 3) (1983); Daniel v. State, 169 Ga. App. 722 (1) (314 SE2d 737) (1984); Manning v. State, 175 Ga. App. 738, 739 (2) (334 SE2d 338) (1985).
The question of duplicity was discussed in Peters v. State, 175 Ga. App. 463, 465 (1) (333 SE2d 436) (1985). It would not be subject to review here because, as the majority cites in Division 1 of the instant opinion, the specific ground for appeal must be reserved by raising it below. Ridley v. State, 141 Ga. App. 854 (1) (234 SE2d 688) (1977).
Number 7 claims the court erred in not requiring the state, on the oral demand of defendant at the beginning of trial, to elect between a prosecution of subsection (a) (1) or (a) (4). The ground was that these two charges were constituted of different elements and he had to know which to refute. The court ruled that the state was not required to make an election. The same ground is urged on appeal, but appellant cites no authority, arguing only that the state “should be required to choose which one it will prosecute in the interests of fairness as well as expediency.” Since the law does not now require an election when both subsections are charged and relate to the same conduct, appellant must address this argument regarding criminal procedure to the legislature, as it is one of policy. The jury verdict only convicted of one subsection, that being (a) (1): “We the jury find the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.” Subsection (a) (4), of course, does not embrace proof that defendant was in such condition. Lester v. State, 253 Ga. 235 (2) (320 SE2d 142) *155(1984).
Decided May 21, 1986.
William C. Head, for appellant.
Ken Stula, Solicitor, for appellee.
Number 18 claims that the court erred in giving the jury three alternative forms for their verdict. The first two were agreed to in advance by the two counsel. During an interruption of the jury’s deliberations, the court gave a blank piece of paper and reiterated one of the options, that of finding defendant guilty or not guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (subsection (a) (1)). This, then, was not a third alternative, but rather a different form in that it was a blank piece of paper rather than one on which was written the alternative “guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol; not guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.” Since the verdict returned was precisely one of these two options in the first alternative agreed to by defendant, I fail to see the prejudice he urges. A conclusion that the court directed a verdict of guilty cannot be wrested from the court’s giving the jury the blank piece of paper and instructing the jury as it did regarding its use. If anything, it favored him as it focused attention away from the subsection (a) (4) charge.