Court Opinion

ID: 9951118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:00:32.875522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.671559
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JAIME OWENS,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  CH-1221-19-0309-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: March 14, 2024
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Peter Reinhardt , Esquire, Menomonie, Wisconsin, for the appellant.

           Jason F. Rudie , Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her request for corrective action in this
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal.      For the reasons discussed below, we
     GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     REMAND the case to the Central Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective July 23, 2017, the appellant was hired as a Nurse Practitioner
     under the hiring authority of 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 7 at 243. Her appointment was subject to the successful completion of a
     2-year probationary period. Id. On August 27, 2018, the appellant disclosed to
     the agency’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that a specific doctor who
     worked at her clinic had called in sick on August 16, 2018, and then worked at a
     non-VA hospital that day. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-7. On October 2, 2018, the appellant
     received notice that a Nurse Professional Standards Board (NPSB) would be
     convened on October 15, 2018, to conduct a summary review of her employment.
     IAF, Tab 7 at 52-56. The notice stated that the Board was being convened to
     review deficiencies in her conduct or performance regarding “inappropriate
     behavior.” Id. at 55-56. On October 29, 2018, the NPSB completed its review
     and recommended that the appellant be terminated from her position during her
     probationary period. Id. at 33-35. The agency subsequently issued a letter dated
     November 21, 2018, terminating the appellant, effective December 8, 2018.
     Id. at 29-32.
¶3         On October 10, 2018, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of
     Special Counsel (OSC), in which she alleged that the agency had convened the
     NPSB against her in retaliation for her protected disclosure or activity.    IAF,
     Tab 1 at 23-27.   By a letter dated December 10, 2018, the agency stayed its
     decision to terminate the appellant until January 4, 2019, apparently based on the
     appellant’s pending complaint with OSC. Id. at 16, 19. On February 12, 2019,
     OSC closed its investigation into the appellant’s complaint, id. at 22, and on
     February 13, 2019, the agency lifted the stay on the appellant’s termination, and
     terminated her, effective immediately, id. at 16.
                                                                                         3

¶4        The appellant timely filed the instant IRA appeal on April 18, 2019, and
     requested a hearing.   IAF, Tab 1 at 2.        The administrative judge issued an
     acknowledgment order and a jurisdictional order setting forth the elements and
     burdens of establishing jurisdiction over an IRA appeal.             IAF, Tabs 2-3.
     The appellant filed a narrative response to the orders and filed a copy of the
     complaint she submitted to OIG, and the agency filed its response file.
     IAF, Tabs 4, 6, 7.
¶5        Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge concluded that the
     appellant had exhausted her administrative remedies with OSC regarding her
     whistleblower reprisal claim. ID at 5. Turning to the content of the appellant’s
     claim, the administrative judge determined that the appellant failed to meet her
     burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure
     under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), when she disclosed to OIG that a doctor had
     engaged in potential time and attendance fraud by calling in sick while working at
     another hospital. ID at 6-7. Conversely, the administrative judge concluded that
     the appellant had nonfrivolously alleged that she engaged in protected activity
     under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) when she contacted OIG to complain about the
     potential time and attendance fraud. ID at 7-8. Nevertheless, the administrative
     judge concluded that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her
     protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to convene
     the NPSB. ID at 8-9. Specifically, the administrative judge determined that the
     appellant had not produced any evidence that the allegedly retaliating agency
     officials were aware that the appellant had filed a complaint with OIG, and so the
     appellant could not establish that her protected activity contributed to their
     decision to recommend convening the NPSB.            ID at 8-9.    Consequently, the
     administrative judge concluded that the appellant had failed to make the requisite
     nonfrivolous   allegation   to   establish   jurisdiction   over   her   IRA   appeal
                                                                                            4

     and dismissed the appeal accordingly. ID at 9. The appellant has timely filed a
     petition for review, and the agency has not filed a response. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1.

                                           ANALYSIS
¶6         To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, the appellant must
     exhaust her administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous
     allegations that (1) she made a whistleblowing disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)
     (9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a
     contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to
     take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Yunus v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Salerno v. Department of
     the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016).         A nonfrivolous allegation is an
     assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue.               Bradley v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6 (2016); 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.4(s). Whether allegations are nonfrivolous is determined on the basis of
     the written record. Bradley, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6. Any doubt or ambiguity as
     to whether the appellant made nonfrivolous jurisdictional allegations should be
     resolved in favor of finding jurisdiction. Id.
¶7         Once an appellant establishes jurisdiction over her IRA appeal, she is
     entitled to a hearing on the merits of her claim, which she must prove by
     preponderant evidence. 2 Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. If the appellant proves
     that her protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in a personnel
     action taken against her, the agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and
     convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
     absence of the protected disclosure. Id.

     2
       Preponderant evidence is that degree of relevant evidence a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find a contested fact is
     more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                         5

¶8          On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
      she did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. She also argues that she
      nonfrivolously alleged that her protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C)
      of contacting the agency’s OIG was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
      to terminate her, and therefore, the administrative judge erred by dismissing her
      appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 6-8.
¶9          Regarding the latter claim, the administrative judge considered whether the
      appellant’s complaint to OIG constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C), which describes as protected activity, “cooperating with or
      disclosing information to the Inspector General (or any other component
      responsible for internal investigation or review) of an agency, or the Special
      Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions of law,” and concluded that the
      appellant’s disclosures to OIG constituted protected activity under this provision.
      ID at 7-8. We find no error in this determination. See Fisher v. Department of
      the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8 (concluding that disclosures of information to an
      agency’s OIG are protected regardless of their content, as long as such
      disclosures are made “in accordance with applicable provisions of law”).
¶10         The administrative judge next considered whether the appellant’s protected
      activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to terminate her.
      The administrative judge concluded that, because the appellant had not provided
      any evidence that either of the individuals who initiated the investigation that led
      to her termination had any knowledge of her disclosure to OIG, she could not
      meet her burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation that her protected activity
      was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to terminate her.       ID at 8.
      In determining that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege contributing
      factor, the administrative judge considered the “knowledge/timing” test, by which
      the Board considers whether an appellant has demonstrated that the official who
      took the contested personnel action learned of the protected activity within a
                                                                                             6

      period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the protected
      activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id. (citing Mason v.
      Department    of   Homeland    Security,      116   M.S.P.R.     135,   ¶   26   (2011)).
      Concluding that    the   appellant   failed    to   meet   her     burden    under    the
      knowledge/timing test, the administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant
      gave OIG permission to disclose her name to agency management but noted that
      her release form specified that OIG could not release her written complaint or any
      other personally identifying information to agency managers. ID at 9; IAF, Tab 6
      at 7. Based on this fact, and the fact that the appellant did not allege that OIG
      interviewed either of the agency officials who purportedly retaliated against her,
      the administrative judge concluded that there was no evidence in the record
      establishing that the responsible agency officials were aware of the appellant’s
      protected activity. ID at 9.
¶11        However, the Board has determined that an appellant also may satisfy the
      knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test by proving that the official taking
      the action had constructive knowledge of the protected disclosure, even if the
      official lacked actual knowledge. Nasuti v. Department of State, 120 M.S.P.R.
      588, ¶ 7 (2014). An appellant may establish constructive knowledge by showing
      that an individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official
      accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id. The administrative judge did not
      specifically consider whether either of the allegedly retaliating agency officials
      had constructive knowledge of the appellant’s protected activity.
¶12        Although the administrative judge determined that there was no evidence
      that either of the allegedly retaliating agency officials was aware that the
      appellant filed a complaint with OIG, as the appellant correctly notes, the doctor
      who was the subject of the appellant’s disclosure to OIG (and who was also one
      of the individuals the appellant alleged retaliated against her by convening the
      NPSB) appeared to suggest that he was aware of the content of the appellant’s
      allegations to OIG, in his letter requesting the convening of the NPSB. PFR File,
                                                                                        7

      Tab 1 at 7-8; see IAF, Tab 7 at 85-86 (alleging that the appellant had “targeted”
      him and had “claimed unsubstantiated, unethical, and personal allegations of
      which she has no knowledge,” in a memorandum dated September 10, 2018, after
      the appellant’s disclosure to OIG, but before the convening of the NPSB). The
      record also reflects that the NPSB members who recommended the appellant’s
      termination were also aware of her disclosure to OIG, since they specifically
      reference the content of her OIG disclosure in the termination recommendation.
      See IAF, Tab 7 at 33 (“Ms. Owens has been noted to talk about other staff
      members when they are not present. Examples include; certain staff sleep on the
      job; certain staff call in sick and work elsewhere . . . . These accusations were
      unfounded.”) (emphasis added).
¶13         Based on the fact that the agency official who recommended convening the
      NPSB and the NPSB members who recommended that the appellant be removed
      were all aware of the appellant’s OIG disclosure at the time they took the relevant
      actions, we conclude that the appellant has provided sufficient evidence that the
      allegedly retaliating agency officials had constructive knowledge of her protected
      activity.   Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant has met her burden of
      making a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over her IRA appeal, and
      we remand the appeal for a hearing on the merits of her claim. On remand, the
      appellant will have the opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
      that her protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to
      terminate her. See Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 21
      (2016).
¶14         The Board has held that the knowledge/timing test is not the only way for
      an appellant to satisfy the contributing factor element. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1);
      see Stiles v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 263, ¶ 24 (2011).
      If an appellant fails to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board must consider
      other evidence, such as evidence pertaining to the strength or weakness of the
      agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was
                                                                                              8

      personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether these
      individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Dorney v.
      Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15 (2012); Stiles, 116 M.S.P.R.
      263, ¶ 24. Although the administrative judge identified in her jurisdictional order
      the ways to show that a protected activity was a contributing factor in a personnel
      action other than through knowledge/timing evidence, in the initial decision she
      did not evaluate any of the other methods for doing so beyond the
      knowledge/timing test. IAF, Tab 3 at 4-5; ID at 8-9.
¶15        Here, the fact that the allegedly retaliating agency official and the NPSB
      members were apparently all aware of the appellant’s OIG disclosures prior to
      making    their     respective   recommendations       could    be   relevant   to    the
      non-knowledge/timing methods for establishing contributing factor, such as the
      strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for terminating the appellant,
      whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing or deciding
      officials, and whether he had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant.
      See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15; Stiles, 116 M.S.P.R. 263, ¶ 24. On remand,
      if the administrative judge determines that the appellant failed to meet her burden
      of   proving      contributing   factor   based   on    the    knowledge/timing      test,
      the administrative judge should also consider these non-knowledge/timing
      methods for proving contributing factor.
¶16        Finally, because we conclude that the appellant met her burden of making a
      nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction regarding her claim that she engaged
      in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) when she contacted OIG, we
      need not address the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to
      nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8). ID at 7.
                                                                                       9

                                          ORDER
¶17        For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the initial decision and remand
      this case to the Central Regional Office for the hearing the appellant requested
      and for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 3

      FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                            Gina K. Grippando
                                            Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      3
        In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge may reincorporate prior
      findings as appropriate, consistent with this Remand Order.