Court Opinion

ID: 9555253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:09:56.075187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:10.601896
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      TO BE PUBLISHED

            Commonwealth of Kentucky
                    Court of Appeals
                       NO. 2020-CA-1316-MR

MARC HARDIN                                          APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE OLU A. STEVENS, JUDGE
                    ACTION NO. 14-CI-003678

THE JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION D/B/A JEFFERSON
COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;
CAROL ANN HADDAD, DISTRICT 6;
CHRIS BRADY, DISTRICT 7; CHUCK
HADDAWAY, DISTRICT 4; DAVID
A. JONES, JR., DISTRICT 2; DEBBIE
WESSLUND, DISTRICT 3; DIANE L.
PORTER, CHAIR, DISTRICT 1; DR.
DONNA M. HARGENS,
SUPERINTENDENT; DR. MICHAEL
RAISOR, CHIEF OPERATIONS
OFFICER; LINDA DUNCAN,
DISTRICT 5; AND STATE
EVALUATION APPEALS PANEL,
KENTUCKY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
EDUCATION AND WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT CABINET                                  APPELLEES
                            OPINION
      AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Marc Hardin appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit

Court dismissing his claims against the Jefferson County Board of Education d/b/a

the Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) and the State Evaluation Appeals

Panel (SEAP).1 The dismissal is contrary to our opinion reversing a previous

dismissal of Hardin’s claims. Hardin v. Jefferson Cnty. Board of Education, 558

S.W.3d 1 (Ky. App. 2018) (“Hardin I”). Thus, we reverse and remand the matter

to the trial court, with the exception of one claim which was not resolved by

Hardin I.

              After serving as an administrator in another district for three years,

Hardin served as an assistant principal at an elementary school within JCPS for

two years. Near the conclusion of that second year, the principal of Hardin’s

school recommended Hardin be demoted from assistant principal to teacher. That

recommendation was upheld by JCPS. Hardin sued JCPS, arguing his demotion

failed to comply with, among other things, the procedural protections afforded to

1
  Hardin named numerous other defendants and appellees, such as individual members of the
Jefferson County School Board. For simplicity’s sake, we shall use “JCPS” to refer collectively
to all parties associated with the Jefferson County Public Schools and “SEAP” to refer
collectively to all statewide appellees and defendants.

                                              -2-
school administrators by Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 161.765.2 Hardin also

raised an age discrimination claim and a claim that JCPS failed to comply with its

internal evaluation procedures during the demotion process.

2
    At the time of Hardin’s demotion, KRS 161.765 provided in relevant part:

         (1) A superintendent may demote an administrator who has not completed three
         (3) years of administrative service, not including leave granted under KRS
         161.770, by complying with the requirements of KRS 161.760.

         (2) An administrator who has completed three years of administrative service, not
         including leave granted under KRS 161.770, cannot be demoted unless the
         following procedures have been complied with:

                 (a) The superintendent shall give written notice of the demotion to
                 the board of education and to the administrator. If the
                 administrator wishes to contest the demotion, he shall, within ten
                 (10) days of receipt of the notice, file a written statement of his
                 intent to contest with the superintendent . . . .

                 (b) Upon receipt of the notice of intent to contest the demotion, a
                 written statement of grounds for demotion, signed by the
                 superintendent, shall be served on the administrator. The
                 statement shall contain:

                         1. A specific and complete statement of grounds
                         upon which the proposed demotion is based,
                         including, where appropriate, dates, times, names,
                         places, and circumstances;

                         2. The date, time, and place for a hearing, the date
                         to be not less than twenty (20) nor more than thirty
                         (30) days from the date of service of the statement
                         of grounds for demotion upon the administrator.

                 (c) Upon receipt of the statement of grounds for demotion the
                 administrator shall, within ten (10) days, file a written answer . . . .

                 (d) . . . The board of education shall hear the case, with the board
                 chairman presiding. The board, upon hearing the evidence and
                 argument presented, shall retire to private chambers to arrive at a
                 decision . . . .

                                                   -3-
              JCPS moved to dismiss Hardin’s petition under Kentucky Rule of

Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, arguing Hardin was not entitled to the protections of KRS 161.765

because he had not served as a school administrator for three years in JCPS. The

trial court granted the motion in a terse order. Hardin appealed. We reversed.

              First, we held that KRS 161.765 “does not require that the

administrative service occur in the same school district.” Hardin I, 558 S.W.3d at

6-7. Second, we held the court erred by dismissing Hardin’s age discrimination

claim without “provid[ing] any legal analysis” because Hardin had “adequately

stated a claim for age discrimination . . . .” Id. at 9-10. Finally, we resolved

Hardin’s “claim related to the evaluation process utilized by JCPS.” Id. at 10.

Because it is directly relevant to this appeal, we relate our analysis at length:

              Hardin alleged in his complaint that JCPS arbitrarily
              applied and wholly failed to comply with its own
              administrator evaluation procedures when it disciplined
              and eventually demoted him. . . .

              (e) Within five (5) days from the close of the hearing, the board of
              education shall advise the parties of its decision and shall take
              official action in the case.

              (f) Appeal from final board action may be taken in the same
              manner and under the same provisions as an appeal from tribunal
              action under KRS 161.790.

The statute was amended in 2019, but the changes would not impact the outcome of this appeal.

                                              -4-
...

      Here, Hardin’s claims related to JCPS’ evaluation
process were still percolating through administrative
channels. He had not yet exhausted his administrative
remedies when he filed his complaint. But failure to
exhaust one’s administrative remedies is not grounds to
dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, under CR 12.02(f).

       The more prudent and just course would have been
for the circuit court to grant Hardin’s request for a stay to
allow the administrative process to reach finality. In any
event, it is likely at this point that Hardin’s administrative
venture has reached its inevitable end and the matter is
ripe for judicial review.

        Accordingly, on remand we direct the circuit court
to ascertain the status of Hardin’s administrative appeal.
If it has concluded, Hardin’s claims related to JCPS’
evaluation process may proceed in a manner agreeable to
the circuit court and the parties; if it has not concluded,
the circuit court shall hold the claims in abeyance until
exhaustion has occurred.

      Setting aside the exhaustion issue, JCPS argues
Hardin has no right to appeal the SEAP’s decision.
Neither the statute (KRS 156.557) nor the regulation (704
KAR [Kentucky Administrative Regulation] 3:345)
grants the right to appeal, JCPS asserts. We reject this
argument.

       Hardin’s position is that JCPS acted arbitrarily
when it disregarded its own evaluations process. The
purpose of judicial review of administrative action is to
eliminate arbitrariness. American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964). “On this
ground the courts will assume jurisdiction even in the
absence of statutory authorization of an appeal.” Id.;
Reis v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 938 S.W.2d 880,

                             -5-
              887 (Ky. 1996). Hardin properly invoked the circuit
              court’s inherent authority to judicially review JCPS’
              allegedly arbitrary administrative actions even absent an
              express statutory provision granting a right to appeal.

Id. at 10-11 (some citations omitted).

              On remand, the court granted Hardin leave to file an amended

petition. That new petition added SEAP as a defendant and noted that SEAP had

upheld Hardin’s demotion shortly after Hardin I was issued. The new petition also

incorporated by reference all the allegations in Hardin’s previous petition.

              JCPS quickly filed a motion to dismiss the new petition for failure to

state a cognizable claim. Among other arguments, JCPS contended that

unpublished decisions issued shortly after Hardin I made plain that SEAP’s

decisions were not subject to judicial review. Travis v. State Evaluation Appeals

Panel, No. 2017-CA-001018-MR, 2019 WL 2068539, at *6 (Ky. App. May 10,

2019); Geron v. Jefferson Cnty. Board of Education, No. 2017-CA-000540-MR,

2018 WL 8262575 (Ky. App. Aug. 31, 2018).3 SEAP filed a similar motion.

              The trial court granted both motions and dismissed the entirety of

Hardin’s petition. Perplexingly, that order did not mention Hardin I. Instead, the

3
  Travis was originally issued in September 2018, but that opinion was withdrawn on rehearing
and a new opinion was issued. Notably, the original opinion was designated for publication, but
the revised opinion was not. Our Supreme Court denied discretionary review in October 2019.
Geron was originally issued in August 2018. We denied rehearing in May 2019 but modified the
opinion to note that it was no longer designated for publication. Our Supreme Court denied
discretionary review in March 2020.

                                             -6-
court held merely that SEAP’s actions were not subject to judicial review pursuant

to Geron and Travis. Hardin then filed this appeal.

               Meanwhile, Hardin also filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate in

the trial court.4 We held this appeal in abeyance for over a year until the trial court

eventually denied Hardin’s motion without analysis. In sum, the trial court

dismissed Hardin’s petition without addressing our opinion in Hardin I

whatsoever. We returned the appeal to our active docket after the trial court denied

Hardin’s motion.5

               Our Supreme Court has explained as follows the stringent standards

governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a cognizable claim:

               A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
               which relief may be granted admits as true the material
               facts of the complaint. So a court should not grant such a
               motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be
               entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be
               proved. Accordingly, the pleadings should be liberally
               construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all
               allegations being taken as true. This exacting standard of
               review eliminates any need by the trial court to make
               findings of fact; rather, the question is purely a matter of
               law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts

4
 In those circumstances, the trial court retains jurisdiction to rule on the motion to vacate and the
premature appeal may be held in abeyance – which is what occurred here. See Kentucky Rule of
Appellate Procedure (RAP) 3(E) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); former CR 73.02(1)(e).
5
 The record contains no adequate explanation for the protracted delay in resolving Hardin’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate. Indeed, after waiting for over a year, we had to order the trial
court to rule on the motion within ten days. We are keenly aware that the dockets of circuit
courts across the Commonwealth are busy. Nonetheless, judges are obligated to perform their
duties with diligence under Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 4.300, Canon 2, Rule 2.5(A).

                                                -7-
               alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the
               plaintiff be entitled to relief? Since a motion to dismiss
               for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
               granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes
               no deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an
               appellate court reviews the issue de novo.

Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks, footnotes,

references, and ellipsis omitted).

               One of the fundamental underpinnings of our jurisprudence is the law

of the case doctrine,6 which encompasses “a handful of related rules giving

substance to the general principle that a court addressing later phases of a lawsuit

should not reopen questions decided by that court or by a higher court during

earlier phases of the litigation.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 610

(Ky. 2010). One aspect of the doctrine is “the so-called mandate rule, [which]

provides that on remand from a higher court a lower court must obey and give

effect to the higher court’s express or necessarily implied holdings and

instructions.” Id.7

6
  Law of the case may be spelled with or without hyphens between the words. See, e.g., Law of
the Case, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
7
  We emphatically reject JCPS’ argument that the law of the case doctrine applies only to an
appellate court’s review of a trial court’s evidentiary decisions. Kentucky’s highest court did
hold that “[w]hen an appellate court decides a question concerning evidence or instructions, the
question of law settled by the opinion is final upon a retrial in which the evidence is substantially
the same and precludes the reconsideration of the claimed error on a second appeal.” Siler v.
Williford, 375 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Ky. 1964). Nonetheless, the law of the case doctrine
encompasses more than appellate decisions regarding evidentiary or instructional issues. Indeed,
other Kentucky precedent holds that the law of the case doctrine “makes a final decision of an

                                                -8-
               Like most rules, however, the law of the case doctrine is subject to

exceptions, even though it sometimes is inaccurately described as an “iron rule

. . . .” Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell’s Adm’r, 291 S.W.2d 539, 542

(Ky. 1956). For example, in rare situations of “great urgency demanded by a

strong sense that an injustice should be corrected[,]” a court in a subsequent appeal

of the same case may “simply announce[] that it was wrong in a previous opinion

and proceed[] to examine the merits” anew. Newman, 451 S.W.2d at 420. That

extremely rare exception has typically been applied when a previous decision was

both “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Brown, 313 S.W.3d

at 610 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That high standard has not

been met here.

               Second, a “court is not bound by the doctrine . . . where there has been

an intervening change in the law.” Id. JCPS and SEAP argue Geron and Travis

constitute such an intervening change in the law. We disagree.

               First, neither Geron nor Travis is published, but Hardin I is.

Unpublished opinions cannot constitute a change in the law because they are not

binding precedent, i.e., they do not actually change the law. RAP 40(D)(1)

appellate court the law of the case whether right or wrong and conclusive of the questions
therein resolved.” Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1970) (emphasis added).
Appellate courts are often required to review a trial court’s evidentiary or instructional decisions,
which likely explains the context of the holding in Siler and cases citing to it, but the law of the
case doctrine applies to all questions of law resolved in the higher court’s opinion – i.e., “the
questions therein resolved.”

                                                -9-
(“Opinions designated ‘Not To Be Published’ are not binding precedent.”);

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 659 S.W.3d 832, 837 (Ky. App. 2021) (“Moreover,

unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, but only persuasive authority.”).

Geron and Travis are insufficient to meet the “change in the law” exception to the

law of the case doctrine.

              Second, despite the parties’ arguments to the contrary, there is no true

conflict between Hardin I and Geron and Travis.8 In Hardin I, we did not

definitively determine whether there is a right to judicial review of a final decision

by SEAP under KRS Chapter 13B. Indeed, our opinion does not even address

KRS Chapter 13B, the usual rubric governing judicial review of administrative

decisions.

              In Hardin I, JCPS argued Hardin’s judicial review claim was unripe

because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. We rejected that

argument and directed the trial court on remand to “ascertain the status of Hardin’s

administrative appeal. If it has concluded, Hardin’s claims related to JCPS’

evaluation process may proceed in a manner agreeable to the circuit court and the

parties; if it has not concluded, the circuit court shall hold the claims in abeyance

until exhaustion has occurred.” Hardin I, 558 S.W.3d at 10.

8
 Even if there were, the law of the case doctrine could still apply. See, e.g., Brooks v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Housing Authority, 244 S.W.3d 747, 753 (Ky. App. 2007).

                                             -10-
               It is undisputed that Hardin has now fully exhausted his administrative

remedies, so Hardin’s “claims related to JCPS’ evaluation process” were required

to “proceed in a manner agreeable to the circuit court and the parties . . . .” Id.

Although reasonable minds could quibble over what “manners” would be

agreeable to the circuit court and parties, it is beyond reasonable dispute that

dismissing those claims against Hardin’s wishes was not “agreeable” to him.

There is nothing in Hardin I to support a conclusion that Hardin’s evaluation

process claims were insufficiently pled or were otherwise subject to dismissal

under CR 12.02 on remand.

               Second, JCPS argued in the prior appeal that “Hardin has no right to

appeal the SEAP’s decision” because “[n]either the statute (KRS 156.557) nor the

regulation (704 KAR 3:345) grants the right to appeal . . . .” Hardin I, 558 S.W.3d

at 10. But we flatly “reject[ed]” that argument because “Hardin [had] properly

invoked the circuit court’s inherent authority to judicially review JCPS’ allegedly

arbitrary administrative actions even absent an express statutory provision granting

a right to appeal.” 9 Id. at 11. That conclusion remains accurate. And binding.

9
  Under longstanding Kentucky precedent, a court has the inherent ability to review the actions
of an administrative body for arbitrariness even if the General Assembly does not explicitly enact
a statute allowing for judicial review. For example, over seventy years ago, Kentucky’s then-
highest court held that “it is undisputed that courts have the inherent power to prevent an
administrative body from proceeding illegally, arbitrarily and capriciously to the injury of
another.” Hatch v. Fiscal Court of Fayette Cnty., 242 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Ky. 1951). Our
Supreme Court later reached a similar conclusion, holding that “[j]udicial review does not hinge
upon whether the Board has a property or liberty interest at stake, but upon whether the tribunal

                                              -11-
Hardin has sufficiently invoked the court’s inherent ability to review for

arbitrariness these final administrative actions. The trial court’s contrary decision

cannot stand.10

               However, we affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss Hardin’s

request for judicial review under KRS Chapter 13B. It is undisputed that no statute

or administrative regulation permits judicial review under KRS Chapter 13B of a

final decision by SEAP. Moreover, we rejected Hardin’s arguments in the similar

cases of Geron and Travis. Because our analysis in them resolves many of

Hardin’s arguments about KRS Chapter 13B, we quote from each at length.

               In Travis, an assistant principal was demoted to teacher and the

demotion was upheld by JCPS’ LEAP, a Local Evaluation Appeals Panel, now

known as a District Evaluation Appeals Panel, and SEAP. Travis, 2019 WL

2068539, at *1. She sought review of SEAP’s decision in the Jefferson Circuit

Court, but that court dismissed her petition after concluding that the decisions of

or administrative body acted arbitrarily and without substantial evidence. It is well settled in
Kentucky that an aggrieved party, including a corporation, has an inherent right to seek judicial
review of arbitrary administrative actions.” Reis, 938 S.W.2d at 885. Under the plain holding of
Reis, we must reject JCPS’ argument that judicial review is prohibited because the actions of
JCPS nor SEAP do not impact Hardin’s protected property or liberty interests.
10
   The fact that SEAP was added as a defendant on remand does not destroy the applicability of
the law of the case doctrine. SEAP’s addition as a party did not materially change the relevant
underlying facts or core legal issues. Our Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine in similar
circumstances. Armstrong v. Estate of Elmore, 647 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Ky. 2022).

                                              -12-
LEAP and SEAP were not subject to judicial review. Id. She appealed but we

affirmed, holding in relevant part:

                    Unlike an administrative hearing, the focus of a
             SEAP review under Kentucky’s statutory scheme is not a
             formal adjudication of a teacher’s legal rights, duties,
             privileges, or immunities. Rather, the SEAP is charged
             with determining whether “the local school district failed
             to properly implement the evaluation system.” KRS
             156.557(7); 704 KAR 3:370 § 12(2)(a). The SEAP
             cannot adjudicate a teacher’s legal rights, duties,
             privileges, or immunities because, as set forth in KRS
             156.557(7), it does not have jurisdiction to review the
             “judgmental conclusions of [a] personnel evaluation[.]”
             See also 704 KAR 3:370 § 12(2)(a). The SEAP is not
             authorized to make findings of fact regarding an
             evaluator’s conclusions, nor can it legally find that a
             teacher was wronged so as to entitle her to reinstatement,
             back pay, or other monetary remedy. The authority of
             the SEAP is limited to voiding a personnel evaluation,
             which then simply allows that teacher to be reevaluated.
             As such, the SEAP proceeding cannot be characterized as
             an adjudication of a teacher’s legal rights because the
             result of the proceeding has no substantive impact on the
             teacher.

             ...

                    It should be noted that evaluations themselves are
             not disciplinary in nature. An evaluation does not
             terminate, demote, suspend, or reprimand. Other
             documents advise of and execute such discipline, and all
             are subject to a myriad of procedural due process
             requirements and include various avenues of appeal. The
             evaluation appeals process provided Travis the
             opportunity to submit a rebuttal letter to be placed in her
             file with the evaluation, to appeal the evaluation to the
             LEAP, which is required to hold a hearing, and then to
             appeal the LEAP’s decision to the SEAP. In addition to

                                        -13-
             the review process in place for an evaluation, KRS
             Chapter 161 provides procedures by which a teacher can
             contest adverse employment action, which include the
             availability of a Chapter 13B hearing before the local
             board of education, as well as judicial review of any
             decision . . . . That KRS 156.557 contains no similar
             provision authorizing judicial review indicates that the
             General Assembly did not contemplate that SEAP
             decisions would be subjected to judicial review.

                    Next, Travis argues that if SEAP is not an
             administrative agency subject to judicial review then the
             delegation of authority from the General Assembly to the
             Kentucky Board of Education contained in KRS 156.557
             violates the nondelegation doctrine and is
             unconstitutional on its face. We find this argument to be
             wholly without merit . . . . We are of the opinion that the
             evaluation scheme set forth in KRS 156.557 is not the
             type of action that falls within the purview of the
             nondelegation doctrine. As we have previously
             concluded, the SEAP itself is not an administrative
             agency. Further, the evaluation process and the SEAP
             review do not result in an adjudication of a teacher’s
             legal rights. As such, we simply cannot conclude that
             any delegation of authority to the Kentucky Board of
             Education to implement the evaluation system results in a
             violation of the nondelegation doctrine simply because
             the SEAP decisions are not ordinarily subject to judicial
             review.

Id. at *3-6 (footnotes, citations, and some paragraph breaks omitted). We noted in

a footnote, which cited Hardin I, that “courts may assume jurisdiction in the

absence of statutory authority in order to prevent arbitrary action[,]” but Travis had

not raised such an argument. Id. at *5 n.6. Obviously, Hardin has made that

request.

                                         -14-
             Geron is factually distinguishable to the extent that it involved a

decision to not renew the contract of a non-tenured teacher instead of the demotion

of an administrator, but the legal issues are fundamentally the same as those here.

After receiving no relief from LEAP or SEAP, the teacher sought judicial review.

Geron, 2018 WL 8262575, at *1-2. The circuit court dismissed her petition. We

affirmed, holding in relevant part:

             Pursuant to KRS 13B.010(2), “‘[a]dministrative hearing’
             or ‘hearing’ means any type of formal adjudicatory
             proceeding conducted by an agency as required or
             permitted by statute or regulation to adjudicate the legal
             rights, duties, privileges, or immunities of a named
             person.” However, KRS Chapter 13B creates only
             procedural rights and shall not be construed to confer
             upon any person a right to hearing not expressly provided
             by law. Importantly, no express provision for judicial
             review appears in the statutory framework or
             administrative regulations related to the SEAP. “There is
             no appeal to the courts from an action of an
             administrative agency as a matter of right.” Board of
             Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1,
             2 (Ky. 1978). Thus, unless the SEAP conducts
             “administrative hearings” the provisions of KRS Chapter
             13B do not apply.

                   Our review reveals SEAP proceedings simply do
             not constitute “administrative hearings” as envisioned by
             KRS Chapter 13B. The SEAP is organized pursuant to
             KRS 156.557(7) which states:

                   [t]he Kentucky Board of Education shall
                   establish an appeals procedure for certified
                   school personnel who believe that the local
                   school district failed to properly implement
                   the evaluation system. The appeals

                                        -15-
      procedure shall not involve requests from
      individual certified school personnel
      members for review of the judgmental
      conclusions of their personnel evaluations.

       The operating procedures for the SEAP are set
forth at 704 KAR 3:370 § 12(2)(a) as follows:

      [t]he Kentucky Board of Education shall
      appoint a committee of three (3) state board
      members to serve on the state evaluation
      appeals panel (SEAP). The SEAP’s
      jurisdiction shall be limited to procedural
      matters already addressed by the local
      appeals panel related to the district’s alleged
      failure to implement an evaluation plan as
      approved by the department. The SEAP
      shall not have jurisdiction of a complaint
      involving the professional judgment
      conclusion of an evaluation, and the SEAP’s
      review shall be limited to the record of
      proceedings and documents therein, or lack
      thereof, at the local district level.

       A finding by the SEAP of noncompliance with a
district’s evaluation plan renders the subject evaluation
void. 704 KAR 3:370 § 12(2)(e).

       Clearly, the SEAP is a review panel possessing
very limited statutorily defined functions, and no
provision exists for a hearing officer, the presentation or
cross-examination of witnesses or any of the traditional
hallmarks of an administrative hearing. The SEAP
merely reviews the actions of the LEAP to determine
compliance with an approved evaluation plan and thereby
provide accountability and encouragement for local
districts to implement appropriate evaluation plans. The
SEAP is not empowered to reinstate a teacher to a prior
position or provide any other remedy apart from setting
aside a defective evaluation. Therefore, we conclude the

                           -16-
               SEAP does not conduct “administrative hearings” and
               actions of the SEAP do not come within the purview of
               KRS Chapter 13B.

                      Nevertheless, courts may assume jurisdiction in
               the absence of a specific statutory authorization to
               prevent arbitrary action. Arbitrariness occurs in
               administrative actions when the agency acts in excess of
               statutory powers, denies due process, or makes a decision
               unsupported by substantial evidence. In this case the
               SEAP acted within the powers permitted it by statute and
               administrative regulation. Geron was permitted due
               process hearings. Lastly, substantial evidence supported
               the final decision. Under such circumstances this Court
               may not substitute its judgment for that of the
               administrative body. Thus, the decision must stand. We
               find no reversible error in the trial court’s dismissal of
               Geron’s petition.

Id. at *3-4 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).11

               Of course, though we strive for consistency in our rulings, we are not

strictly bound by either Geron or Travis since each is unpublished. Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 659 S.W.3d at 837. But we are unpersuaded by any of Hardin’s

vehement arguments that either decision is incorrect. Therefore, we adopt their

core holding: SEAP’s final decisions are not subject to judicial review under KRS

Chapter 13B. In short, even “if the facts alleged in the [petition] can be proved[,]”

Hardin would not be entitled to receive judicial review under Chapter 13B of

11
  We do not have the administrative record of the SEAP proceedings before us, so – unlike
Geron – we express no opinion as to whether its actions were arbitrary. That issue must first be
resolved on remand.

                                              -17-
SEAP’s decision, so we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Hardin’s claim for

Chapter 13B judicial review. Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7.

             We now turn to Hardin’s KRS 161.765-based claim. In Hardin I, we

held that Hardin “was entitled to the procedural safeguards outlined in KRS

161.765 before being demoted. Taking the contents of Hardin’s complaint as true,

JCPS failed to afford him those protections. The circuit court erred in finding

Hardin failed to state a claim for violation of KRS 161.765.” 558 S.W.3d at 8.

Nonetheless, the trial court again dismissed Hardin’s KRS 161.765 claim on

remand. What had materially changed in the interim between our opinion

becoming final and the second order of dismissal? Nothing.

             Hardin’s amended petition incorporated the claims in his previous

petition, and the addition of SEAP as a defendant did not substantively change

Hardin’s position that JCPS failed to comply with KRS 161.765. And neither

JCPS nor SEAP expressly addressed the dismissal of this claim in their briefs.

             Hardin I explicitly concluded that Hardin had presented an adequate

claim that his rights under KRS 161.765 had been violated and reversed the trial

court’s contrary conclusion. It is exceedingly difficult to understand why the trial

court again dismissed this claim, especially since the dismissal order contained no

explanation. Regardless of its silent rationale, the trial court’s decision cannot

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stand because it facially conflicts with Hardin I. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of

Hardin’s claim regarding KRS 161.765.

               Finally, a similar result applies to Hardin’s age discrimination claim.

We unmistakably held that Hardin had “adequately stated a claim for age

discrimination . . . .” Hardin I, 558 S.W.3d at 9-10. His amended petition

incorporates the contents of his previous petition, and the parties have pointed to

no relevant changes which occurred after the issuance of Hardin I. 12 Tellingly, the

Appellees do not address the dismissal of the age discrimination claim here.

               Accordingly, it again is exceedingly difficult to understand why the

trial court chose to perform the same act which we had already determined was

improper. The dismissal of Hardin’s age discrimination claim does not comply

with Hardin I. Consequently, we must reverse that dismissal.

               For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed as to

its dismissal of Hardin’s request to receive judicial review of SEAP’s decision

under KRS Chapter 13B. The Jefferson Circuit Court is otherwise reversed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

               ALL CONCUR.

12
   We noted in our original opinion that it was unclear who succeeded Hardin as assistant
principal. Of course, the age of the successor may impact Hardin’s age discrimination claim
since one element thereof is that Hardin was replaced by a “significantly younger person.”
Hardin I, 558 S.W.3d at 9. The identity of that successor is still unclear as the parties have not
pointed us to where in the record the successor’s age is discussed. Also, the addition of SEAP as
a defendant had no obvious impact on the age discrimination claim.

                                              -19-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                          JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF
Peter J. Jannace          EDUCATION D/B/A JEFFERSON
Louisville, Kentucky      COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DR.
                          DONNA M. HARGENS, DR.
                          MICHAEL RAISOR, DIANE L.
                          PORTER, DEBBIE WESSLUND,
                          DAVID A. JONES, JR. CHUCK
                          HADDAWAY, LINDA DUNCAN,
                          CAROL ANN HADDAD AND
                          CHRIS BRADY:

                          C. Tyson Gorman
                          Marianna J. Michael
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                          BRIEF FOR STATE EVALUATION
                          APPEALS PANEL, KENTUCKY
                          BOARD OF EDUCATION,
                          KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
                          EDUCATION, EDUCATION AND
                          WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
                          CABINET:

                          Ashley Lant
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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