Court Opinion

ID: 9754986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:20:10.276673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.257512
License: Public Domain

LAMB, Vice Chancellor,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the Court reversing the decision below. I write separately because the factual pattern presented by the complaint is, in my opinion, more appropriately analyzed under the law of contract than as an instance of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel involves “informal promises for which there was no bargained-for exchange but which may be enforceable because of antecedent factors that caused them to be made or because of subsequent action that they caused to be taken in reliance.” 3 Eric Holmes Mills, et al., Corbin on Contracts, § 8.1, at 5 (Rev. ed.1996). Here, there are no “antecedent factors” in issue, nor is there any “subsequent action” apart from Lord’s disclosure to Hagermann of the exact information his promise sought to elicit from her. Thus, the facts sufficiently allege a “bargained-for exchange” to suggest the existence of an enforceable contract.5
A fair reading of the facts alleged is that Lord and Peninsula (through Hager-mann) bargained for and entered into a contract modifying her preexisting eon-tract of at-will employment. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the complaint allege that when Hagermann approached Lord and asked her to explain what she knew about Souder’s improper conduct, Lord first sought and obtained from him an offer that, if she divulged what she knew, she would be protected from reprisal. These allegations are sufficient to support a conclusion that, when Lord accepted Hager-mann’s offer of protection by revealing what she knew, a contract modifying the terms of her employment came into existence. Peninsula breached this contract when, it is alleged, it permitted Souder to fire Lord.
The majority suggests that Lord’s disclosure of information did not “ris[e] to the level of an enforceable consideration” for Hagermann’s promise because Lord “already had a duty to report” such information to him. However, Hagermann did not insist that Lord perform whatever duty of disclosure she owed to him but, instead, bargained for precisely the performance she rendered. In the circumstances, I would enforce the bargain the parties made.
The practical consequences of Lord’s claim being treated as one for breach of contract rather than a promissory estoppel are hard to predict. I do note, however, that Corbin on Contracts, in describing Delaware promissory estoppel cases, begins by saying “Sometimes less is more.” This implies that plaintiffs who succeed in arguing promissory estoppel in Delaware are awarded greater damages than if their cases were analyzed as enforceable contracts.6 To the extent this observation is *405true, it points out the need both to pay-closer attention to the distinction between contract and promissory estoppel in particular cases and to award remedies in cases of promissory estoppel with the same “conservative judgment and extreme care” that characterizes common law courts’ willingness to recognize reasons to enforce informal promises. Id. Here, it would seem to be the case that Lord’s financial detriment resulting from her termination will be the same whether her claim is analyzed as a breach of contract or under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

. The distinction is significant because promissory estoppel is not merely an alternative ground on which to enforce an otherwise enforceable promise but, rather, a doctrine that allows courts to enforce promises made without "consideration.” See id. As the majority's opinion correctly states, the purpose of the promissory estoppel doctrine is to prevent the injustice that occasionally results from a rigid adherence to the black letter law of contracts. See Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, Del.Supr., 144 A.2d, 123, 133 (1958). Thus, it must first appear that the set of facts at issue do not give rise to an enforceable contract before a court considers whether "injustice” will result.

. Keating v. Board of Educ. Of the Appoquinimink Sch. Dist, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12589, 1993 WL 460527, at *4 (Nov. 3, 1993) aff'd Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1305 (1994) (TABLE), illustrates the point made in Corbin. In that case, a non-tenured teacher alleged the *405breach of an oral representation that her contract would be renewed for another 1-year term. Finding that she detrimentally relied on that representation (most notably by purchasing a new automobile), the court awarded her 5 years of back pay and ordered her reinstatement.