Court Opinion

ID: 9907762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 21:03:31.304545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:19.769077
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220463-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                         NOTICE
 Decision filed 12/06/23. The
                                                                              This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0463
                                                                              Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                              not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                              under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

STEPHEN HARRIS,                                 )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     St. Clair County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 18-L-704
                                                )
GERMANTOWN SEAMLESS GUTTERING, INC.,            )     Honorable
                                                )     Heinz M. Rudolf,
      Defendant-Appellee.                       )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The jury verdict finding plaintiff was contributorily negligent is affirmed where
               sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to determine the issue and the
               trial court’s denials of plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict and motion to bar the
               testimony of defendant’s expert and granting of defendant’s motion in limine
               precluding plaintiff from presenting evidence regarding his left eye, were not
               erroneous.

¶2       Plaintiff, Stephen Harris, appeals the jury verdict finding him contributorily negligent. He

also appeals the trial court’s denials of his motion for directed verdict and motion to bar the

testimony of defendant Germantown Seamless Guttering, Inc.’s (GSG) expert, as well as the trial

court’s granting of GSG’s motion in limine precluding Mr. Harris from presenting testimony

related to his left eye. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                                  1
¶3                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶4      On March 15, 2018, Mr. Harris was employed by his company API, Inc., and was working

as the general contractor for a home construction project located at 7000 Funk School Road,

Freeburg, Illinois. Mr. Harris was also the owner of the home being built. On that day, GSG was

installing guttering on the roof of the house. Mr. Harris arrived at the property late in the morning

and saw the GSG vehicles parked at the property and a few GSG employees on the garage roof.

Mr. Harris proceeded into the house to talk to his workers. When Mr. Harris could not find his

workers, he walked out of the kitchen onto the porch and turned right to walk along the deck

traversing the back of the house. As he turned the corner, a GSG employee said, “Oh shit.” Mr.

Harris looked up and was hit in his right eye by a tube of gutter sealant that rolled off the roof’s

edge.

¶5      On November 7, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against GSG. The complaint alleged GSG

was negligent by (1) failing to keep proper control of the tube of caulk, (2) failing to secure the

tube of caulk to prevent it from falling, and (3) failing to properly warn those nearby that an object

was falling from the roof. The complaint further alleged that as a result of defendant’s negligence,

Mr. Harris’s right eye was injured and requested damages related to the accident.

¶6      On December 7, 2018, GSG filed its answer admitting the accident but denying negligence

and proximate cause. The answer further raised affirmative defenses of contributory negligence

claiming Mr. Harris failed to wear appropriate safety glasses and failed to take reasonable

precautions to protect himself from injury. On December 17, 2018, Mr. Harris filed a reply to

GSG’s affirmative defenses denying the allegations therein.

¶7      On August 13, 2020, Mr. Harris filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The

motion was granted, and the first amended complaint was filed on August 14, 2020. The amended

                                                  2
complaint included the name of the employee, Clinton Kohnen, who dropped the tube of sealant

and uttered the profanity. The complaint included the three previously alleged claims of negligence

and added a fourth that stated GSG “[f]ailed to barricade or cordon off the area below the workers

on the roof to protect others from items which may fall off the roof when he knew or should have

known that items could and had fallen from roofs before.” GSG filed an answer on September 10,

2020. The answer admitted all the allegations except those related to negligence and proximate

cause and raised the same affirmative defenses as seen in the previous answer. On September 16,

2020, Mr. Harris filed a reply to GSG’s affirmative defenses denying the allegations therein.

¶8     The case was set for jury trial on February 1, 2021. On January 14, 2021, Mr. Harris moved

to continue the trial due to his need for additional medical treatment. The motion was granted, and

the trial was rescheduled for July 22, 2021. On February 22, 2021, GSG obtained new counsel. On

May 5, 2021, GSG moved for a continuance due to the unavailability of GSG’s owner at trial.

Over plaintiff’s objection, the motion was granted. The jury trial was set for November 15, 2021.

¶9     On November 4, 2021, GSG filed a motion in limine to bar evidence or testimony regarding

Mr. Harris’s left eye. In support, GSG argued that neither Mr. Harris’s initial, nor the first

amended, complaint claimed injury to Mr. Harris’s left eye, no medical professional testified that

Mr. Harris’s left eye condition was related to the original accident, no Illinois Supreme Court Rule

213 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) disclosure regarding the left eye was made, and one of Mr. Harris’s

physicians stated the two eye conditions were not related.

¶ 10   On November 4, 2021, Mr. Harris filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 219 (eff. July 1, 2002) requesting the court bar the testimony of GSG witnesses

Christopher Janson and Dr. David Hillman based on GSG’s failure to provide information

regarding the experts in its responses to Mr. Harris’s interrogatories. The motion alleged that Mr.

                                                 3
Harris’s interrogatories were provided on February 15, 2019, and GSG’s response was provided

on April 1, 2019. Supplemental disclosures filed by GSG on January 8, 2020 (Janson) and August

10, 2021 (Hillman) did not include the requested information. On November 5, 2021, GSG filed

supplemental disclosures related to the interrogatory.

¶ 11   On November 8, 2021, GSG filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer. The

proposed amended answer admitted all the allegations in Mr. Harris’s first amended complaint,

including negligence and proximate cause. The answer also included affirmative defenses of

contributory negligence, stating Mr. Harris (1) failed to take reasonable precautions to protect

himself from injury, (2) failed to barricade or cordon off the area underneath where GSG was

working, and (3) walked under an area where he knew or should have known GSG was working.

¶ 12   On November 8, 2021, Mr. Harris responded to GSG’s motion in limine related to his left

eye stating he was only required to have “some evidence” to be entitled to an instruction on a

damage claim, sufficient discovery was provided on the issue, and GSG should be sanctioned for

the waste of Mr. Harris’s time in reiterating what was included in his discovery responses.

¶ 13   On November 9, 2021, Mr. Harris filed an objection to GSG’s amended answer. The same

day, GSG filed a response to Mr. Harris’s motion for sanctions related to the lack of responses to

the interrogatories that also included objections to the requested information.

¶ 14   On November 29, 2021, the circuit court issued three orders. The first order granted GSG’s

motion in limine and excluded all evidence related to Mr. Harris’s left eye. The second order

denied Mr. Harris’s motion for sanctions and sustained GSG’s objection to interrogatory number

13. The third order granted GSG’s motion to file an amended answer.

¶ 15   On January 3, 2022, Mr. Harris filed a second amended complaint. The allegations of

negligence remained the same as those set forth in the first amended complaint and the only injury

                                                 4
listed as arising from the alleged negligence was Mr. Harris’s right eye. On February 2, 2022,

defendant filed an answer admitting all the allegations in the second amended complaint.

Affirmative defenses of contributory negligence were again raised, alleging Mr. Harris (1) failed

to take reasonable precaution to protect himself from injury, (2) failed to barricade or cordon the

area where he was working, and (3) walked under an area where he knew or should have known

defendant was working.

¶ 16   On February 10, 2022, Mr. Harris moved to strike the affirmative defenses. He also filed a

response denying the allegations in the affirmative defenses.

¶ 17   On March 29, 2022, Mr. Harris filed a motion to dismiss the affirmative defenses or, in the

alternative, judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)). The pleading further moved to bar the testimony of defendant’s

expert, Christopher Janson, claiming the expert’s testimony supported GSG’s affirmative defenses

and that GSG was attempting to engraft the responsibilities of a general contractor onto Mr. Harris.

In support, the motion alleged that the general contractor on the construction project was API, Inc.,

a party not named in the lawsuit. Mr. Harris also relied, inter alia, on Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 414 (1965) and Carney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 47. Mr. Harris

contended that nothing in GSG’s affirmative defenses indicated any degree of control by the

general contractor.

¶ 18   On March 30, 2022, GSG filed a response to Mr. Harris’s motion to dismiss, citing Mr.

Harris’s deposition testimony that he was on the jobsite as the contractor and hired GSG to perform

the guttering work. The response also argued that the affirmative defenses included application to

Mr. Harris as the general contractor and as an individual at a construction site.

                                                 5
¶ 19   On March 31, 2022, the final pretrial hearing was held at which time argument was

presented on Mr. Harris’s motion to dismiss GSG’s affirmative defenses. Following the argument,

the court denied Mr. Harris’s motion.

¶ 20   On April 8, 2022, Mr. Harris filed a second motion to bar the testimony of Christopher

Janson, once again relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 and Carney to allege that GSG

was attempting to engraft general contractor duties onto Mr. Harris. The motion further argued

against Janson’s expected testimony regarding the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration’s (OSHA) multi-employer citation policy.

¶ 21   The case proceeded to trial on April 11, 2022. Following jury selection, Mr. Harris’s

opening statement addressed the accident, the OSHA regulation requirements regarding barricades

for keeping materials on the roof or keeping people from walking under the roof, Mr. Harris’s

injury, and subsequent treatment. GSG’s opening argument addressed their responsibility for the

accident but further argued that the evidence would show Mr. Harris was also negligent addressing

the general contractor’s responsibilities as well as general rules when walking around an active

construction site. Following argument and release of the jury for the day, Mr. Harris’s counsel

made an offer of proof regarding Mr. Harris’s left eye injury, stating Mr. Harris later jumped off

the back of a truck, fell on his face, immediately had similar vision problems as those caused by

being hit with the sealant tube, and the fall was due to Mr. Harris’s depth perception difficulties.

The court stated it had not changed its mind and further noted that no motion for reconsideration

was filed on the issue.

¶ 22   The following day, Mr. Harris began presenting his case in chief and called Clinton Kohnen

as an adverse witness. Mr. Kohnen testified that he was working at Mr. Harris’s home on March

15, 2018, was the crew chef responsible for the GSG employee’s safety, and lost control of the

                                                 6
tube of sealant that hit Mr. Harris. He stated the area was not blocked off because typically that

was not done on residential construction sites. He stated that Dominic Krieger was on the garage

roof, used an eight-foot stepladder to access that roof, and that ladder was in the area where Mr.

Harris walked on that side of the house. He stated there were also other ladders up to the top roof

in the front of the house. Mr. Kohnen stated that people who work on construction sites received

training in walking beneath areas where people were working. He agreed that his job title as crew

chief involved safety for the GSG crew. He stated it was the responsibility of each crew at the

location to take care of their own safety.

¶ 23   Dominic Krieger testified that he was working below Mr. Kohnen. He stated that he used

an eight-foot ladder to get up to the garage roof and indicated where the ladder was on the day of

the accident using pictures. He stated that Mr. Harris hired GSG to perform the work.

¶ 24   Nathan Rakers testified that he was at the construction site on the day of the accident. He

stated that he had traffic cones in his work vehicle, but they were only used on the side of a road

to keep traffic away from the workers. He stated that they usually did not tape off residential

construction sites. They would occasionally tape off commercial sites because there were more

people around. He expected construction workers to have a higher knowledge of safety than the

general public.

¶ 25   Mr. Harris testified that he moved into the house where the accident occurred on June 30,

2018. On the day of the accident, the house was still under construction. He arrived late in the

morning, went into the garage to enter the house, and walked through the house. He did not see

the guys he was looking for, so he walked out the kitchen door onto the deck. He proceeded to

walk around the corner and was hit by the tube of gutter sealant. He stated that he did not see any

ladders as he moved through the house, except for a ladder on the front of the house. Mr. Harris

                                                7
saw some guys on the garage roof before the accident but did not see anyone on the top roof. He

did not see any stepladder and disputed that an eight-foot ladder would fit on the deck since the

area was a “nine-foot cave.” After the accident, Mr. Harris left the site, went to the store to purchase

stain, and later went to the hospital. He had vision difficulties by Sunday, went to the

ophthalmologist on Monday, and had surgery on Tuesday. He testified that it was a difficult

recovery and later required two additional surgeries. He further testified to difficulties with his

business due to the accident, the effect on his income, and medical expenses related to his injury.

¶ 26   On cross-examination, Mr. Harris agreed that he started his own construction business in

1997 and had 25 years of construction experience. He stated that part of his work involved general

contracting. He agreed that as a general contractor, he would oversee the construction site and had

certain authority. He further agreed that he was at the house on March 15, 2018, as both the general

contractor and as the owner of the property. Mr. Harris testified that he hired GSG to put gutters

on the house and agreed that if he saw them doing something incorrectly, he could tell them they

were not doing it correctly. He agreed that he had the authority, if he saw a subcontractor doing

something unsafe, to tell them to fix it. He would perform periodic inspections of the job site as

the general contractor. Mr. Harris knew GSG was hired to install the gutters, the heights of the

roofs, and where the gutters would be installed. He also admitted seeing the GSG trucks at his

property when he arrived. He admitted knowing GSG was at the property and that GSG was

working on the garage roof. Mr. Harris testified that he never checked to see if any workers were

on the other roof. He admitted the accident occurred directly underneath the roof line of his house,

which was directly underneath an area where GSG was installing gutters. Mr. Harris testified that,

prior to the incident, he never asked GSG or any of his own employees to tape off any areas around

                                                   8
the perimeter of the house. He further testified that he did not tell either group to tape off the area

after he was hit by the tube of sealant.

¶ 27   The video deposition of Dr. Blonnie Dudley was played for the jury. Dr. Dudley, who was

an ophthalmologist, testified that he was the physician who performed Mr. Harris’s surgery on

March 20, 2018. Dr. Dudley stated that Mr. Harris did well after surgery but later developed a

cataract. He referred Mr. Harris to a different physician for care of the cataract.

¶ 28   The video deposition of Dr. Daniel Walsh was played for the jury. He testified that he was

an optometrist and provided professional services related to Mr. Harris’s corneal erosion that arose

from Mr. Harris’s dry eye condition.

¶ 29   Miranda Pogue testified that she worked as a nurse practitioner in the St. Elizabeth Hospital

emergency room on the day of the accident. She testified about Mr. Harris’s complaints upon

arrival and the treatment rendered at the facility.

¶ 30   Two video depositions of Dr. Michael Jones were played for the jury. Dr. Jones testified

that he was Mr. Harris’s ophthalmologist and addressed the treatments provided to Mr. Harris.

Following his testimony, the jury was released for the day.

¶ 31   The following day, plaintiff’s expert witness regarding construction and civil engineering

litigation, Gregory Pestine, provided testimony. He addressed OSHA, testified about what the

agency did, and explained that their safety regulations no longer differentiated between

commercial and residential building. Mr. Pestine testified that he was applying the OSHA

construction regulations, specifically section 502(j) which addressed materials that were grouped

or stacked near a roof edge, section 501(c)(3) which addressed barriers to keep materials from

hurting someone if the materials fell, and section 1926.102(a) which required eye protection in

certain situations. He testified that Mr. Harris wore his safety glasses and opined that GSG violated

                                                  9
sections 501(c)(3) and 502(j) of the OSHA regulations. He stated that the general contractor had

overall site supervisory authority, but the subcontractor would likely have a greater knowledge

about the work it was required to perform. In this case, he opined that GSG had superior knowledge

on performing gutter work and performing the work safely. He stated that the general contractor

was supposed to provide a competent person to perform periodic inspections. That person would

be capable of identifying existing or predictable hazards to health and safety in the workplace and

have authority to correct those situations. Mr. Pestine testified that in this instance, there was no

existing identifiable hazard. If Mr. Harris was the competent person there was no way he could

have known there was a man caulking the edge of the guttering. He did not think OSHA would

have held Mr. Harris responsible. He indicated that the fact that there was a ladder and nobody

was on it told him nothing, stating, “If I saw an eight-foot ladder, I wouldn’t think there was

somebody up on a nine-foot roof above it.” Mr. Pestine explained that OSHA directive CPL 2-

0.124 was the multi-employer citation policy that included the controlling employer, the correcting

employer, the creating employer, and the exposing employer. Mr. Pestine stated it did not provide

any duties for an employer and only gave OSHA agents more leeway as to whom they cited. Based

on his experience, GSG violated the standards and requirements of OSHA, and the violations were

the proximate cause of Mr. Harris’s injury. He stated the words “Oh shit” were not an appropriate

warning.

¶ 32   On cross-examination, Mr. Pestine stated that Mr. Harris did not have a responsibility to

put up a barricade if he was aware of work being done on the roof and saw no barricade installed

by GSG, unless Mr. Harris was aware of where the work was taking place. He stated the entire

perimeter of the house would not be barricaded if you did not know where anyone was. He agreed

that if Mr. Harris was aware that Mr. Kohnen was on the corner of the roof doing work on the roof,

                                                 10
and he was also aware there was no barricade underneath the area, then Mr. Harris would have a

responsibility to address that or tell GSG to barricade the area. He further agreed that if Mr. Harris

was aware that there was work being done on the roof then it would have been his responsibility

to stay out of the way. The expert did not know if Mr. Harris knew who was at the site. He stated

that although Mr. Harris may have seen a truck, he was not sure Mr. Harris knew what they were

doing or where. He did not know if Mr. Harris was aware that there were people working on the

roof when he arrived that day. He agreed that if Mr. Harris was aware of an unsafe condition on

his construction site, “he would have the duty to address it.” He further agreed that if Mr. Harris

knew they were on the roof and working in the location where they were working at the time of

the accident, when he walked outside, he would know there was no barricade under that area.

¶ 33      On redirect, Mr. Pestine was advised that Mr. Harris had just arrived at the site, saw the

guttering truck, and saw some people working on the roof of the garage but no one else. Mr. Pestine

stated those facts did change his opinion. He stated that if Mr. Harris knew GSG was working on

the garage he had no reason to think they were working somewhere else as well. He stated Mr.

Harris would be even less inclined to barricade off that one corner knowing that workers were

somewhere else. Mr. Pestine opined that he did not think that Mr. Harris was negligent because

“he had no knowledge of this work going on above, so he couldn’t be held responsible for

protecting himself from the hazard it caused.” Following Mr. Pestine’s testimony, the plaintiff

rested.

¶ 34      GSG presented its case in chief by playing Brent Kohrmann’s video deposition for the jury.

On the day of Mr. Harris’s accident, Mr. Kohrmann, who is the son of GSG’s owner, was hanging

downspouts and doing gutter work. He did not see the accident, speak to Mr. Harris, or hear

anything other than Mr. Kohnen’s exclamation when the tube rolled away. He stated that the next

                                                 11
day everyone was told to be careful of their surroundings but there was no mention of how sealant

tubes should be handled. On cross-examination, Mr. Kohrmann stated that as to safety, he was told

if he ever heard anyone shout for any reason, to just look down so it would hit the back of his head

instead of his face. This information was provided to him by Mr. Kohnen who was the senior

employee on the job. Mr. Kohrmann stated that barricades were the responsibility of the contractor,

and this general contractor did not tell them to erect one. On redirect, Mr. Kohrmann stated that

every new guy was trained by the most senior employee. He believed that Mr. Kohnen’s statement

when the sealant rolled away was an appropriate warning because it gave notice that something

was about to happen. When asked what made him think that statement would tell him something

was coming down, Mr. Kohrmann replied, “When you’re on a job site and you see ladders on a

roof—moving up to a roof and you see a guttering truck with guttering trailer *** you always have

to be conscious someone is working on that roof.” He believed there were two ladders on the deck

side of the house and there were “ladders all around that house.”

¶ 35   GSG’s expert, Christopher Janson, a board-certified safety professional, stated that part of

his job involved accident prevention programs. In those circumstances, he would inspect the sites,

look for hazardous conditions, and write a report to inform the business of what needed to be done

to prevent accidents and injuries. The other part of his job was helping businesses stay in

compliance with OSHA to avoid fines. Mr. Janson testified that general contractors were

responsible for safety on the job site and both the general contractor and the subcontractors were

responsible for complying with OSHA regulations. He stated that the general contractor was

typically responsible for performing onsite inspections. Mr. Janson opined that there should have

been warnings or barricades where GSG was working. Mr. Janson stated,

                                                12
       “On a construction site the general contractor is also ultimately responsible for the

       whole site. He controls the work. So[,] if you look at this as relates to OHSA ***

       the general contractor’s also responsible for making sure that the subs follow safety

       rules and do what they’re supposed to do.”

Mr. Janson opined that Mr. Harris violated principles related to OSHA because he controlled the

job site, had the duty to ensure subcontractors fulfilled their duties under OSHA, and was to ensure

the site was safe. Mr. Janson was also asked about the OSHA multi-employer citation policy.

Following an objection that was overruled because plaintiff’s expert spoke about the policy, Mr.

Janson testified about the four categories of employers and what each one did. He stated that the

general contractor would be the controlling employer because they controlled the job site. He

stated that Mr. Harris would have been in violation of OSHA policy because he should have

ensured that the subcontractor was performing their duties by barricading off an area where work

was being performed overhead.

¶ 36   On cross-examination, Mr. Janson stated that Mr. Harris would still have violated OSHA

policy even if he could not see anyone on the roof and the people on the roof could not see anyone

on the walkway. He explained that safety was anticipatory, not reactionary, and guttering work

was always above roof level. He explained that the OSHA multi-employer policy was not a

regulation; it was an explanation of how OSHA and safety professionals applied the standards

contained in the regulation and how OSHA viewed the duty. He stated that OSHA viewed

everyone as being responsible including the subcontractor and the general contractor. He agreed

that based on where Mr. Harris was standing when he was hit, he would not be able to see Mr.

Kohnen on the roof or the tube of sealant. Following Janson’s testimony, the defense rested.

                                                13
¶ 37   Thereafter, Mr. Harris moved for a directed verdict based on Carney, the Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 414, and jury instruction 55.01. Mr. Harris argued that there was no testimony

of control. GSG argued there was sufficient evidence to present the issue of contributory

negligence to the jury and the facts in this case were inconsistent with those in Carney. GSG further

argued that there were other areas of contributory negligence, including a failure to be aware of

his surroundings and walking underneath an area where Mr. Harris knew or should have known

work was being performed. The court denied Mr. Harris’s motion.

¶ 38   Following closing arguments, the trial court read the jury instructions that included the

following:

       “[I]f the jury found that all four propositions were proven as to the defendant, then

       you must consider Defendant’s claims that the plaintiff was contributorily

       negligent. As to these claims, defendant has the burden of proving, A, Plaintiff

       Stephen Harris failed or failed to act in one or more of the following ways: Failed

       to take reasonable precaution to protect himself from injury; or failed to barricade

       or cordon off the area underneath where the defendant was working; or walked

       under an area where he knew or should have known the defendant was working,

       and in so acting or failing to act was negligent, B, Plaintiff’s negligence was a

       proximate cause of his injuries.”

¶ 39   Following deliberations, the jury made a finding in favor of Mr. Harris and against GSG,

in the amount of $205,677.42. However, the jury further found Mr. Harris was contributorily

negligent in the amount 45% and assessed Mr. Harris recoverable damages in the amount of

$92,554.84. After polling the jury, the court entered judgment on the verdict.

                                                 14
¶ 40   On May 13, 2022, Mr. Harris filed a posttrial motion moving to set aside the verdict and

judgment and grant a new trial. In support, Mr. Harris argued that the court erred by allowing GSG

to argue that Mr. Harris was contributorily negligent when there was no evidence or testimony to

support the argument and the court erred by allowing Janson to testify after denying plaintiff’s

motion to bar defendant’s expert. Mr. Harris requested the court set aside the verdict and enter

verdict in favor of plaintiff for the full amount of the jury verdict, $205,677.42. Alternatively, Mr.

Harris requested the court amend the math error which should have awarded Mr. Harris

$113,122.58. On July 5, 2022, GSG filed its response disputing all of the allegations except the

math error. Following a hearing on July 7, 2022, the trial court issued an order correcting the

damages award and denying the remainder of Mr. Harris’s motions.

¶ 41                                    II. ANALYSIS

¶ 42   On appeal, Mr. Harris argues that the jury’s finding of contributory negligence was in error.

He further argues that the circuit court improperly denied his motion for a directed verdict and his

motion to bar Christopher Janson’s testimony. Mr. Harris also argues that the circuit court

improperly barred him from submitting evidence as to his left eye.

¶ 43                             A. Contributory Negligence

¶ 44   On appeal, Mr. Harris contends that he was only an employee of the general contractor and

therefore was not contributorily negligent. He further argues that even if he was the general

contractor, finding him liable due to his position was contrary to the decision in Carney v. Union

Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984. This was so because Carney reaffirmed the common law rule

that “one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for harm caused by the latter’s acts

or omissions.” Id. ¶ 31. Mr. Harris further argues that under section 414 of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts and Carney, a general right to enforce safety is insufficient to find retained

                                                 15
control over the independent contractor. Id. ¶ 47. Therefore, Mr. Harris cannot be contributorily

negligent.

¶ 45    While there is no dispute that a general right to enforce safety does not amount to retained

control when addressing theories of vicarious liability as seen in both Carney and section 414 of

the Restatement (Second) of Torts, even if applicable to contributory negligence, the legal

principle only addresses one theory posited for Mr. Harris’s negligence. That theory was Mr.

Harris’s failure to barricade or cordon off the area underneath where GSG was working. As noted

above, the jury instruction provided three distinct theories that, regardless of Mr. Harris’s

responsibility or lack of responsibility as the general contractor, left two remaining. 1 Those two

theories included Mr. Harris’s failure to take reasonable precautions to protect himself from injury

and Mr. Harris walking under an area where he knew or should have known GSG was working.

Neither of those theories were dependent on Mr. Harris’s status as the general contractor.

¶ 46    “Whether conduct was negligent or contributorily negligent is rarely decided as a matter

of law.” Johnson v. Colley, 111 Ill. 2d 468, 475 (1986). “The determination of what conduct is

negligent or contributorily negligent is a composite of the experiences of average people, and is

left to the jury for evaluation.” Id. “A plaintiff is contributorily negligent when he or she acts

without the degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used for his or her own

safety under like circumstances and that action is a proximate cause of his or her injuries or death.”

Merca v. Rhodes, 2011 IL App (1st) 102234, ¶ 45. A reviewing court will not set aside a jury’s

verdict unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d

303, 310 (1976). “ ‘A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite

        1
          Mr. Harris did not challenge either of the remaining two theories either before the trial court or on
appeal. Therefore, any argument regarding either of those theories is forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
                                                     16
conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary[,] and

not based on upon any of the evidence.’ ” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992) (quoting

Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. App. 2d 1082, 1089 (1990)).

¶ 47   “It is settled law that where several causes of actions are charged and a general verdict

results, the verdict will be sustained if there is one or more good causes of action or counts to

support it.” Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d 288, 294 (1970). If plaintiff “desired to ascertain

upon which count or counts the jury returned its verdicts, [he] could have done so by submitting a

separate form of verdict as to each count.” Id. “Not having done so, [he] cannot complain or seek

to take advantage of [his] failure.” Id.

¶ 48   “[T]he supreme court’s rulings with regard to general verdicts provide that when multiple

claims, theories, or defenses were presented to the jury, without the submission of special

interrogatories or separate verdict forms, the return of a general verdict creates a presumption that

the evidence supported at least one of the claims, theories, or defenses and will be upheld.” Great

American Insurance Co. of New York v. Heneghan Wrecking & Excavating Co., 2015 IL App (1st)

133376, ¶ 15. Here, three distinct theories regarding Mr. Harris’s contributory negligence were

presented to the jury in the instructions and a general verdict was returned. No special interrogatory

or separate verdict related to the theories of contributory negligence was presented. Further, no

argument is presented regarding the viability of the remaining two theories of contributory

negligence. As such, we cannot hold that the jury’s finding of contributory negligence is against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 49   Contributory negligence requires evidence revealing that the plaintiff was negligent in that

he or she failed to exercise ordinary care for his or her own safety and the plaintiff’s negligence

was a proximate cause of his injury. Savage v. Martin, 256 Ill. App. 3d 272, 281 (1993). “The

                                                 17
obligation of exercising reasonable care is a duty which constantly attends every individual.”

Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 79 (1946). “Where a plaintiff is thoroughly familiar with a possible

hazard involved in the performance of his job and with the means to avoid such, the fact that at a

particular time he may have been momentarily unmindful thereof, forgetful thereof, or have

overlooked it does not absolve him from the duty of observing due care for his own safety.” Day

v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 511 (1956). “It is elementary law that the degree of

care which a plaintiff in a given case is bound to exercise will be found to depend upon the relative

rights or position of the parties at the time that the injury complained of happened ***.” Metz v.

Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill. App. 609, 614 (1928).

¶ 50   Here, Mr. Harris was the owner of the building where the guttering was being installed. He

testified that he (1) was the owner of a construction company, (2) had 25 years of construction

experience, (3) hired GSG to put the gutters on the house, (4) saw GSG’s trucks when he pulled

up to the job site, (5) saw people working on the garage roof when he walked toward the house,

and (6) saw a ladder extending from the ground to the second floor while he was walking through

the house. These facts confirm Mr. Harris’s knowledge of guttering work being performed on the

roof of the house, which was undisputedly above ground level. As such, regardless of OSHA

regulations, and any duties thereunder as a general contractor, when Mr. Harris walked out of the

house and moved from beneath the safety of any support above his head, he had a duty to protect

himself. Under these facts, we cannot find that a jury’s finding of contributory negligence—which

included Mr. Harris’s failure to take reasonable precaution to protect himself from injury or

walking under an area where he knew or should have known GSG was working—was against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

                                                 18
¶ 51                                 B. Directed Verdict

¶ 52   Mr. Harris also argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict was in

error. In support, Mr. Harris contends that while GSG argued that Mr. Harris should have been

aware of his surroundings and knew or should have known that he was walking under an area

where work was being performed, such claim would require Mr. Harris to be clairvoyant.

Alternatively, Mr. Harris argues that because the trial court erred in allowing GSG’s expert,

Christopher Janson, to testify, GSG was allowed to present evidence that was contrary to the

Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Carney and section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

¶ 53   “A motion for directed verdict will not be granted unless all of the evidence so

overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever

stand.” Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215, 225 (2010) (citing Pedrick v. Peoria

& Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967)). We review the order disposing of the motion for

a directed verdict de novo. Id. On review, we construe all the evidence “in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Thacker v. UNR Industries, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 343, 353-54

(1992)).

¶ 54   Here, the nonmoving party is GSG. As noted above, the evidence revealed that Mr. Harris

arrived at the work site after GSG, saw GSG’s trucks on the property, knew GSG was at the

property to perform guttering work because Mr. Harris hired them for such purpose, saw GSG

employees on the garage roof, and also saw a ladder on the front of the house that extended to the

higher roof. This evidence, even without the conflicting evidence related to the ladders on the back

deck, is sufficient to address at least two of the three potential claims of contributory negligence

alleged by GSG. Under these facts, it would be unnecessary for Mr. Harris to be clairvoyant. Given

his construction experience, he knew, or should have known, that he was walking under an area

                                                19
where work was being performed because he admitted seeing people on the garage roof and a

ladder extending from the ground to the top roof of the house. As such, we cannot find the trial

court’s order denying the directed verdict was in error.

¶ 55                                   C. Evidentiary Issues

¶ 56      Mr. Harris also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions to bar GSG’s expert,

Christopher Janson, from testifying. Mr. Harris first argues that Mr. Janson’s testimony should

have been barred because it was contrary to Carney and section 414 of the Restatement (Second)

of Torts.

¶ 57      A trial court “is *** vested with the discretion to determine the relevance and admissibility

of evidence, including expert testimony.” Alm v. Loyola University Medical Center, 373 Ill. App.

3d 1, 4 (2007). The trial court’s determination of whether an expert should be allowed to provide

testimony will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc.

v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 2022 IL App (5th) 210254, ¶ 25; Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 312-

13 (1993) (a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling unless the trial court

abused its discretion). “An abuse of discretion will be found where no reasonable person would

take the view adopted by the trial court.” Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177

(2003).

¶ 58      Both the original motion, and Mr. Harris’s argument on appeal, are based on “Janson’s

report” and contend Mr. Janson equated “the general responsibility: ‘General contractors have

overall responsibility for ensuring the safety of a work site including responsibility for ensuring

that subcontractors abide by all applicable safety rules’ with tort liability,” citing to page 445 in

the record. However, Janson’s report is not contained in the record on appeal, and it is not Janson’s

report that is cited. The citation refers to GSG’s undated Rule 213 disclosure summarizing Mr.

                                                   20
Janson’s opinions in conjunction with OSHA’s multi-employer citation policy. Regardless, we

find the argument has little merit.

¶ 59   First, at the hearing on the motion, after repeatedly arguing that the OSHA regulations were

inapplicable in this case, Mr. Harris’s counsel conceded that his expert was going to testify that

the OSHA regulations applied. The court responded, “Well then good for the goose, good for the

gander.” We cannot disagree given this record. While Mr. Harris’s brief claims the testimony

regarding OSHA’s multi-employer citation policy should have been barred based on the lack of

evidence exhibiting Mr. Harris’s control over GSG, Mr. Harris’s own expert, Mr. Pestine, testified

about OSHA’s multi-employer citation policy. Mr. Pestine also testified that that if Mr. Harris was

aware that Mr. Kohnen was on the corner of the roof doing work on the roof, and he was also

aware there was no barricade underneath the area, then Mr. Harris would have a responsibility to

address that or tell GSG to barricade the area. Mr. Pestine also testified that if Mr. Harris was

aware there was work being done on the roof, then it would have been Mr. Harris’s responsibility

to stay out of the way. Finally, Mr. Pestine testified that if Mr. Harris was aware of an unsafe

condition on his construction site, “he would have the duty to address it.”

¶ 60   “It is well settled that one cannot complain of admission of evidence offered by one party

where practically the same evidence is afterward introduced by the party so complaining.” Forest

Preservice District v. South Holland Trust & Savings Bank, 38 Ill. App. 3d 873, 876 (1976). Here,

Mr. Harris complains about Mr. Janson’s testimony; however, his own expert provided testimony

on the same issues, namely OSHA regulations and the OSHA multi-employer citation policy. The

only difference in the testimonies of Mr. Pestine and Mr. Janson was what each expert believed

Mr. Harris knew upon his arrival at the job site and whether OSHA would have issued a citation

to Mr. Harris based on his controlling employer status. Given the pretrial arguments, Mr. Pestine’s

                                                21
trial testimony, the side bar during Mr. Janson’s testimony at trial, and Mr. Janson’s testimony at

the trial, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Janson to testify based

on the proposed testimony set forth in GSG’s Rule 213 disclosure.

¶ 61    Mr. Harris also contends that Mr. Janson’s testimony should have been barred as a sanction

for GSG’s failure to timely provide responses to Mr. Harris’s discovery request. “Rule 219(c)

authorizes a trial court to impose a sanction, including dismissal of the cause of action, upon any

party who unreasonably refuses to comply with any provisions of this court’s discovery rules or

any order entered pursuant to these rules.” Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112,

120 (1998). “The decision to impose a particular sanction under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion

of the trial court and, thus, only a clear abuse of discretion justifies reversal.” Id.

¶ 62    Here, the discovery at issue is Mr. Harris’s interrogatory number 13. Mr. Harris’s

November 4, 2021, motion argued that GSG failed to provide responses related to (1) the

witnesses’ opinions, and basis therefor, and (2) the names of each and every lawsuit in which the

expert was retained for consultation, including the case name, city and state of the court, name of

the court, court number, name and last known address of the attorney or insurance company who

hired the expert and further state in each case whether the expert testified in discovery or evidence

deposition for the last five years. The motion contended that the interrogatories were provided to

GSG on February 15, 2019, GSG’s response was provided on April 1, 2019, and GSG’s

supplemental disclosure filed on January 8, 2020, also failed to include the requested information.

¶ 63    On appeal, Mr. Harris contends the decisions in Fraser v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (2d)

130283, ¶¶ 30-31, and Myatt v. Cassens Transport Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 171694-U, ¶ 39, support

his argument that sanctions should have been imposed on GSG and that sanction should have been

barring the testimony of Mr. Janson. We disagree.

                                                   22
¶ 64   First, Mr. Harris’s citation to Myatt is contrary to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e) (eff.

Feb. 1, 2023). No unpublished decision, issued prior to January 1, 2021, may be cited before any

Illinois court. Id. Further, Fraser involved a party’s disregard of a trial court’s order issued after a

motion to compel was filed. 2014 IL App (2d) 130283, ¶¶ 30-31. Most notable here is the lack of

Mr. Harris’s initiative to proceed in any manner necessary to trigger the requested sanction prior

to November 2021.

¶ 65   Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) requires the parties to “make reasonable attempts to

resolve differences over discovery.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(k) (eff. Mar. 17, 2023). The rule further

requires that “[e]very motion with respect to discovery shall incorporate a statement that counsel”

were unable to resolve the differences after reasonable attempts to do so. Id. “Cooperation between

counsel and good-faith efforts by them to resolve disputes without judicial intervention are

essential to the efficient and expeditious administration of justice in this State ***.” Spiller v.

Continental Tube Co., 95 Ill. 2d 423, 431 (1983). Here, there is no evidence of any 201(k)

correspondence from Mr. Harris to GSG or a motion to compel requesting the court issue an order

requiring GSG to provide the requested information prior to Mr. Harris’s request for sanctions. In

fact, the record is devoid of any request for the missing information by Mr. Harris prior to

requesting sanctions.

¶ 66   “Sanctions must be proportionate to the gravity of the violation.” In re Marriage of Lai,

253 Ill. App. 3d 111, 117 (1993). Discovery sanctions are not used to punish a recalcitrant party;

they are used to coerce that party to provide the requested discovery. Brandt v. John S. Tilley

Ladders Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 304, 306-07 (1986). Sanctions are limited to a party’s disregard of

a court order. Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 63 (1995). No sanction is warranted

                                                  23
when no reasonable attempt to resolve the issue was made prior to seeking judicial intervention

and no motion to compel was ever filed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(k) (eff. Mar. 17, 2023).

¶ 67    Finally, it must also be noted that GSG objected to the information requested in the

interrogatory as being “irrelevant and overbroad.” The trial court sustained GSG’s objections and

Mr. Harris did not request review of that ruling on appeal. “Points not argued are forfeited ***.”

Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Failure to argue that the court erroneously sustained

GSG’s objection undermines Mr. Harris’s argument that the trial court erred in denying Mr.

Harris’s motion for sanctions that requested Janson’s testimony be barred for GSG’s failure to

properly respond to Mr. Harris’s interrogatory. Accordingly, we hold the trial court’s denial of Mr.

Harris’s motion for sanction was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 68    Finally, Mr. Harris contends that the trial court’s granting of GSG’s motion in limine,

barring Mr. Harris from providing testimony and evidence related to his left eye, was erroneous.

We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine under the abuse of

discretion standard. Alm, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 4. A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts

without the employment of conscientious judgment, exceeds the bounds of reason, ignores

recognized principles of law, or if no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the

court. Id.

¶ 69    Here, Mr. Harris argues that the court erred in disallowing his testimony regarding a

subsequent accident that involved Mr. Harris jumping off a truck, falling on his face, and allegedly

causing a detached retina in his left eye. In support, he cites numerous cases regarding expert

testimony and the standard of “a reasonable degree of medical certainty” related to that testimony.

¶ 70    We note, however, that while GSG’s initial motion in limine addressed the lack of any

medical testimony to support Mr. Harris’s claim, this was not the only basis for the motion. Here,

                                                24
GSG’s motion stated that all of Mr. Harris’s treating physicians had been deposed and none offered

any testimony relating Mr. Harris’s left eye condition to the March 15, 2018, injury. The motion

further alleged that Mr. Harris’s retinal specialist, Dr. Akduman, specifically testified that Mr.

Harris’s left and right eye conditions were unrelated. Additionally, GSG’s motion noted that

neither Mr. Harris’s initial nor his first amended complaint alleged any injury to his left eye and

no Rule 213 disclosure was ever made regarding Mr. Harris’s left eye. GSG’s supplemental motion

in limine was based on both a lack of medical testimony establishing the left eye injury was related

to the March 2018 accident, as well as the lack of disclosure of any medical records related to right

eye injury. In response, Mr. Harris, citing LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 406-07 (1998),

argued that he was only required to point out “ ‘some evidence’ in the record to be entitled to an

instruction on a damage claim.” The remainder of the response was identical to that set forth in his

current brief.

¶ 71    The order issued by the trial court on November 29, 2021, stated that oral arguments on

the motion in limine were presented and “the court being fully advised in the premises hereby

grants the defendant’s motion. The court rules all evidence[,] testimony[,] or reference to

plaintiff’s left eye injury or condition, including subsequent treatment related thereto, is excluded

from the jury trial in this cause.” No basis for the ruling was included in the order. Approximately

one month later, Mr. Harris filed a second amended complaint that again contained no allegation

of injury to his left eye. However, the left eye issue arose again when Mr. Harris’s counsel

submitted an offer of proof on the issue before the court on April 11, 2022. Following the offer of

proof, the court noted there previously was a “long hearing with regard” to the issue which the

court estimated was 45 minutes. At that time, each party “painstakingly went through [their]

pleadings.” The court noted it had not “changed its thoughts” and “no motion for reconsideration”

                                                 25
was filed. While the trial court clearly addressed the motion in limine, the basis for the court’s

ruling is not contained in the court’s order or within the record supplied on appeal.

¶ 72    An appellant must provide a sufficient record for review of their claims. Foutch v.

O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). “Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness

of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Id. at 392. As noted during the offer of proof,

a lengthy hearing was held on the issue. Without a transcript or an acceptable substitute therefor

(see Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)), this court is left to guess at the basis of the trial court’s

decision. We decline to do so. “An issue relating to a circuit court’s factual findings and basis for

its legal conclusions obviously cannot be reviewed absent a report or record of the proceeding.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Gulla, 234 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2009). In the

absence of an adequate record, we “must presume the circuit court’s order had a sufficient factual

basis and that it conforms with the law.” Id. Accordingly, we find the trial court’s order granting

GSG’s motion in limine was not an abuse of discretion and affirm the November 29, 2021, order.

¶ 73                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 74    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 75    Affirmed.

                                                     26