Court Opinion

ID: 9950054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:00:45.577589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:15.071240
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13303    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 03/13/2024   Page: 1 of 18

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-13303
                           ____________________

        LEE ANNE SAVOIA-MCHUGH,
        JOHN SAVOIA-MCHUGH,
                                                      Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        MICHAEL S. GLASS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant,

        PHILIP KRISPIN, et al.,

                                                             Defendants.

                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13303

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-02018-MCR-HTC
                           ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               Lee Anne and John Savoia-McHugh sued Michael Glass in
        July of 2019. Over the next 15 months, Glass did not respond to
        the complaint, the amended complaint, written discovery requests,
        a motion to compel, or a subpoena. The McHughs requested entry
        of a clerk’s default, which was entered. After a magistrate judge
        issued an order cautioning Glass that failure to comply with
        discovery requests could result in a ﬁnding of contempt or
        sanctions, Glass engaged counsel. Glass then moved to set aside
        the default, arguing that his delayed appearance was not willful,
        that he established meritorious defenses, and that setting aside the
        default would not prejudice the McHughs. The district court
        denied Glass’s motion and later entered a default judgment against
        Glass. Glass appealed.
             After careful review and with the beneﬁt of oral argument,
        we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Glass’s
        motion because Glass willfully defaulted. We aﬃrm.
                                I.    Background
               The McHughs sued Glass, among others, on July 10, 2019,
        alleging misconduct arising from certain real estate investment
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        22-13303                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

        transactions.1 A legal assistant to the McHughs’ counsel, Debra
        Fogarty, signed a declaration saying that she forwarded the
        summons and complaint to the process server, Terry Bumgardner,
        on July 11, 2019. Bumgardner signed a declaration saying he
        “received the Summons and Complaint to be served
        upon . . . Glass[]” on July 16, 2019, and “personally served Glass at
        his residence” with the summons and complaint on July 18, 2019. 2

        1 We note that one of the McHughs’ claims was for civil theft under Florida

        law. Pursuant to Florida Statute § 772.11(1), “[b]efore ﬁling an action for
        damages [for civil theft], the person claiming injury must make a written
        demand for $200 or the treble damage amount of the person liable for
        damages[.]” Thus, a year earlier, on July 3, 2018, counsel for the McHughs
        sent Glass a formal demand letter via e-mail, Federal Express, and certiﬁed
        mail. The letter demanded “treble damages in the amount of $3,329,520.00”
        pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 772.11 within 30 days “based upon the funds
        misappropriated by [Glass] from [the McHughs.]” The letter also requested
        that Glass advise the McHughs “promptly” if he intended to contest the claims
        against him. And it also said that if Glass “fail[ed] to comply with [the] demand
        within the time provided, [the McHughs] intend[ed] to vigorously pursue
        their full legal remedies[.]” Glass did not respond to the demand letter.
        2 While Fogarty’s and Bumgardner’s declarations are unsworn, they carry the

        same force as a sworn affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because Fogarty and
        Bumgardner signed and dated their documents, and “declare[d] under penalty
        of perjury that” their statements “[are] true, correct[,] and made in good faith.”
        See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016)
        (clarifying that “[a]n affidavit is made under oath,” while “a declaration is not
        sworn, but is subject to the penalty of perjury” and that under § 1746
        “declarations are afforded the same legal weight as affidavits, and are treated
        accordingly” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted)); Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th
        1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[U]nder § 1746, a declaration executed within the
        United States will substitute for a sworn affidavit if the declarant dates and
        subscribes the document as true under penalty of perjury in substantially the
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                        22-13303

        Bumgardner also signed a sworn aﬃdavit of service saying he
        personally served Glass with the summons and complaint at his
        residence. 3
              The summons informed Glass that the McHughs sued him
        and that he was required to respond to the suit:
                A lawsuit has been filed against you.
                Within 21 days after service of this summons on you
                (not counting the day you received it)—or 60 days if
                you are the United States or a United States agency,
                or an officer or employee of the United States
                described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3)—you must
                serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached
                complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal
                Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 The answer or motion
                must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s
                attorney . . . .
                If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be
                entered against you for the relief demanded in the

        following form: ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury
        that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature).’”
        (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2)).
        3 In his declaration and sworn affidavit of service, Bumgardner also described

        Glass’s age, race, height, weight, and hair.
        4 Rule 12 provides that a defendant must serve a responsive pleading “within

        21 days after being served with the summons and complaint[.]” Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 12(a)(1)(A).
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        22-13303                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

                complaint. You must also file your answer or motion
                with the court.
        Glass did not respond to the complaint or defend the action in any
        way.
               Four months later, in November 2019, the McHughs ﬁled an
        amended complaint, supplementing allegations of diversity of
        citizenship. The amended complaint reiterated the allegations
        against Glass. Fogarty attested in her declaration that she mailed
        the amended complaint to Glass’s residence via U.S. Mail. Glass did
        not respond to the amended complaint.
              The McHughs next served requests for the production of
        documents and interrogatories upon Glass on June 22 and July 7 of
        2020. Glass did not respond to the discovery requests.
               On July 9, the McHughs moved for the entry of a clerk’s
        default and a default judgment against Glass. 5 A clerk’s default was
        entered immediately, but the requested judgment was not. 6

        5 The certificate of service for the motion for default judgment reads: “I

        HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of July, 2020, a true and correct copy
        of the foregoing was filed via the CM/ECF system, which will send a
        notification of electronic filing to all counsel or parties of record on the Service
        List.” Glass, however, had not yet appeared in the case.
        6 Entry of the default must precede entry of a default judgment.  Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 55(a)–(b). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), in order to determine the
        amount of the default judgment when it is not a sum certain (or capable of
        computation to make it such), “[t]he court may conduct hearings or make
        referrals” to “conduct an accounting;” “determine the amount of damages”
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-13303

              The deadline for written discovery passed on August 6, 2020.
        The overall discovery deadline was extended to March 31, 2021.
               On September 2, 2020, the McHughs ﬁled a motion to
        compel Glass “to fully comply with [their] request for documents
        and interrogatories[,]” serving Glass via Federal Express to his last
        known address. Glass did not respond to the motion to compel.
        The next day, according to Bumgardner’s declaration, Bumgardner
        “personally served a discovery subpoena” on Glass “at his
        residence[.]”
               A magistrate judge granted the motion to compel later that
        month, ordering Glass to “provide full and complete discovery
        responses” within two weeks and expressly cautioning Glass that a
        “failure to comply . . . may result in a ﬁnding of contempt or other
        sanctions.” The magistrate judge directed the clerk to mail a copy
        of the order to Glass at his residence.
               Upon receiving the magistrate judge’s order, Glass obtained
        counsel, who ﬁled a notice of appearance and responded to the
        McHughs’ written discovery requests in early October 2020. Then,
        on October 12, 2020, Glass moved to set aside the default. He
        argued that his delayed appearance in the lawsuit was not
        intentional or willful, that he established “several meritorious
        defenses,” 7 and that setting aside the default would not prejudice

        that the defaulting defendant must pay; “establish the truth of any allegation
        by evidence;” or “investigate any other matter.”
        7 In an attached affidavit, Glass presented four statements as his defenses:
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        22-13303                Opinion of the Court                               7

        the McHughs. Glass attached a sworn aﬃdavit to his motion in
        which he claimed that he never received a number of pleadings:
              •       He claimed that he “was never personally served with
                      a copy of the Summons and [original] Complaint.”
              •       He claimed that he “never received a copy of the
                      Amended Complaint[.]”
              •       He claimed that he “never received a copy of the
                      Motion to Compel[.]”
        But Glass admitted he received four other legal documents:
              •       He “received a copy of the [original] Complaint in this
                      lawsuit via FedEx delivery in or around July 2019.”
              •       He “received via FedEx delivery copies of
                      interrogatories and requests for production of
                      documents” in June 2020.

              17. I have reviewed the Amended Complaint ﬁled in this
              lawsuit, and I dispute many of the allegations asserted against
              me.
              18. I absolutely deny that I ever made any false representations
              or omissions to the McHughs.
              19. I further deny that I committed any act of theft or
              conversion of funds provided by the McHughs.
              ...
              21. It is my understanding that there [are] a number of legal
              defenses that can and should be asserted in response to the
              Amended Complaint.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13303

               •      He “received via personal service . . . a subpoena
                      requesting production of documents” in September
                      2020.
               •      He “received via regular mail a copy of the
                      [magistrate judge’s] Court Order granting the
                      McHugh[s’] Motion to Compel” in September 2020.
        Glass attests that he only understood that “action by [him] was
        necessary” after he received the magistrate judge’s order
        compelling discovery responses.
               The McHughs responded to Glass’s motion to set aside the
        default, saying it “must be denied . . . because the record establishes
        that he has displayed an intentional, willful[,] and reckless disregard
        for these judicial proceedings on multiple levels” and Glass could
        not establish “good cause” to set aside the default.
                The district court agreed with the McHughs and denied
        Glass’s motion to set aside the default. Turning ﬁrst to what it
        called the “factual dispute” of whether Glass was personally served
        with the complaint, it noted it need not resolve it because “Glass
        admit[ted] he received a copy of the [original] Complaint by FedEx
        in July 2019, and thus, he was actually aware of the suit.” The
        district court also observed that, despite Glass’s contentions to the
        contrary, he was properly served the amended complaint. It
        explained that “Glass repeatedly ignored legal papers mailed to
        him,” as well as the language of the summons and the subpoena,
        which informed him of the consequences of not responding.
        Thus, the court concluded that “Glass’s response and appearance,
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        22-13303               Opinion of the Court                         9

        well over a year after he admittedly had actual notice of the case
        and three months after [the McHughs] ﬁled a motion for default
        and default judgment, [were] too little too late.” The district court
        found that Glass “willfully defaulted and displayed an intentional
        or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings[.]” (quotations
        omitted).
               The district court added that “[c]onsideration of the
        additional factors”—whether Glass presented meritorious defenses
        and whether allowing Glass to enter the suit would prejudice the
        McHughs—did not change its decision. It found that “Glass has
        not demonstrated a meritorious defense” because “[h]e oﬀered
        only blanket general denials” and “oﬀered no facts to lend
        plausibility to his defenses.” And the court said that “to allow Glass
        to enter the suit at this late date would cause prejudice to [the
        McHughs]” because they would “hav[e] to duplicate their eﬀorts”
        in the litigation: “the deadline to serve written discovery between
        the parties” had passed and the McHughs had already “expended a
        signiﬁcant amount of time and expense” litigating their case. The
        court therefore concluded that Glass could not prevail on the
        additional considerations of meritorious defenses and prejudice to
        the McHughs.
                The McHughs then moved for entry of ﬁnal default
        judgment against Glass, to which Glass did not respond. The
        district court granted the motion. This appeal followed.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court             22-13303

                            II.      Standard of Review
                We review a district court’s denial of a motion to set aside
        the entry of default for an abuse of discretion. Compania
        Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion,
        88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996). “[T]he abuse of discretion
        standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long as
        that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” In re
        Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). “A
        district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
        standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner,
        follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes
        ﬁndings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Surtain v. Hamlin
        Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations
        omitted).
                “We review de novo whether the district court had personal
        jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Louis Vuitton Malletier,
        S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013).
                                   III.   Discussion
               On appeal, Glass argues that the district court erred because
        his delay in engaging with the litigation was not willful—rather, it
        was a misunderstanding. He maintains that, before the magistrate
        judge’s order, he did not “understand or appreciate” any action was
        required of him. But once he received the magistrate judge’s order,
        he explains, he promptly engaged with the litigation. Glass also
        challenges the district court’s determination that he did not have
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        22-13303                 Opinion of the Court                            11

        meritorious defenses and that the McHughs would be prejudiced
        if Glass entered the suit.
               We start with whether the default was willful. Pursuant to
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, “[w]hen a party against whom
        a judgment for aﬃrmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
        otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by aﬃdavit or
        otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
        55(a). A court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause[.]”
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). We have said that “‘good cause’ is not
        susceptible to a precise formula, but some general guidelines are
        commonly applied.” Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951.
        Courts have considered these three factors: (1) “whether the
        default was culpable or willful,” (2) “whether the defaulting party
        presents a meritorious defense,” and (3) “whether setting [the
        default] aside would prejudice the adversary[.]” Id. “[T]hese
        factors are not ‘talismanic[.]’” Id. For example, “courts have
        examined other factors including . . . whether the defaulting party
        acted promptly to correct the default.” 8 Id. “[I]f a party willfully
        defaults by displaying either an intentional or reckless disregard for
        the judicial proceedings, the court need make no other ﬁndings in
        denying relief.” Id. at 951–52.

        8 Courts have also examined “whether the public interest was implicated” and

        “whether there was significant financial loss to the defaulting party.”
        Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951. But we need not examine these two
        factors because the parties did not raise them.
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                       22-13303

               The district court properly concluded that Glass
        intentionally or recklessly disregarded judicial proceedings because
        “[he] repeatedly ignored legal papers mailed to him[.]” Glass
        denies being personally served with a copy of the summons and
        complaint, and he says he never received the amended complaint
        or a copy of the motion to compel.9 But he acknowledges receipt
        of everything else the McHughs sent him between July 2019 and
        September 2020—(1) a copy of the original complaint in July 2019,
        (2) written discovery requests in June 2020, and (3) the subpoena
        requesting the production of documents in September 2020—all at
        the very same address where the process server swears he served
        Glass with the summons and original complaint, and where copies
        of the amended complaint and motion to compel were mailed.10

        9 While Glass says he “never received a copy of the Motion to Compel[,]” the

        motion to compel’s certificate of service suggests otherwise. It reads: “I
        HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of September, 2020, a true and
        correct copy of the foregoing was filed . . . by serving a copy of the foregoing
        via Federal Express to the last known address of Defendant Michael Glass.”
        Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5, a written motion is properly
        served by “mailing it to the person’s last known address—in which event
        service is complete upon mailing[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Because Glass
        was mailed a copy of the motion to compel via Federal Express to his last
        known address, we conclude that Glass was properly sent the filing. And even
        if he was not, Glass’s argument would still fail. Under that same rule, no
        service was required on Glass because he was “in default for failing to appear.”
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2) (“No service is required on a party who is in default for
        failing to appear.”).
        10 Interestingly, in his filings before this Court and the district court, Glass

        neglects to mention the July 3, 2018 demand letter sent to him via e-mail,
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        22-13303               Opinion of the Court                         13

        From the documents he admits receiving, Glass was clearly aware
        that the McHughs had sued him and were expending time and
        money pursuing the lawsuit. Yet Glass only obtained counsel after
        the magistrate judge threatened him with a ﬁnding of contempt.
        From Glass’s intentional disregard of a number of legal documents
        he received by mail, Federal Express, and personal service over the
        course of ﬁfteen months, it is clear that he displayed an intentional
        or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, we
        conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        ﬁnding that Glass willfully defaulted, negating a ﬁnding of good
        cause to set aside the default. In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d at 168; Compania
        Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951.
              Glass resists this conclusion for three reasons, none of which
        have merit.
               First, Glass argues that the district court erred in ﬁnding his
        default was willful because a “factual dispute exists” as to whether
        he was properly served with the summons and original complaint.
        He swears he was not personally served with the summons and
        original complaint and only received a copy of the original
        complaint (without the summons) in the mail. Thus, allegedly
        deprived of a summons, he claims he did not have notice of the
        lawsuit. But Glass does not win the dispute simply by saying he
        was not personally served. We have said that “[w]here, as here, the
        defendant submits affidavits” challenging personal jurisdiction,

        Federal Express, and certified mail that appraised him of the McHughs’
        “[intention] to vigorously pursue their full legal remedies[.]”
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13303

        “the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce
        evidence supporting jurisdiction[.]” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l
        Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002). “Where the
        plaintiff’s . . . supporting evidence conflict[s] with the defendant’s
        affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in
        favor of the plaintiff.” Id. Here, the plaintiffs met their burden. As
        an initial matter, the McHughs filed an affidavit of service from
        Bumgardner swearing he “personally served” Glass at his home
        address with a copy of the summons and complaint. Glass put the
        matter into dispute by submitting an affidavit swearing he “was
        never personally served with a copy of the Summons and
        Complaint.” In response, however, the McHughs submitted
        additional evidence proving service of process. Fogarty signed a
        declaration saying that she forwarded the summons and complaint
        to Bumgardner, and Bumgardner submitted a second statement
        asserting that he “personally served Glass at his residence” and that
        “Mr. Glass is a bald, white man, approximately 56 years old,
        weighing approximately 220 [pounds] and about 6’01” in height.”
        Because the evidence from the McHughs and Glass conﬂict, the
        district court was free to “construe all reasonable inferences” in
        favor of the McHughs as the plaintiﬀs. Meier ex rel. Meier, 288 F.3d
        at 1269. On our de novo review, Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1350, we
        conclude that Glass was personally served with the summons and
        original complaint.
               Our conclusion of personal service is bolstered by what
        Glass did not do. At no point—after admittedly receiving several
        ﬁlings in the case—did Glass move to dismiss the complaint for
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        22-13303                Opinion of the Court                         15

        insuﬃcient service of process under Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 12, thus forfeiting such a challenge. Fed. R. Civ. P.
        12(a)(1)(A)(i) (“A defendant must serve an answer within 21 days
        after being served with the summons and complaint[.]”); Fed. R.
        Civ. P. 12(b)(5) (defense of insuﬃcient service of process must be
        asserted before the responsive pleading); see Hemispherx Biopharma,
        Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (stating “[c]hallenges to service of process will be waived . . . if not
        raised under [Rule 12,]” and once waived, courts may not “dismiss
        on that ground”). Furthermore, Glass failed to raise insuﬃcient
        service of process as one of his defenses in his motion to set aside
        the default (or any other document). Having waived the defense,
        he cannot assert it now.
                Second, Glass says the district court erred in ﬁnding his
        default was willful because he promptly engaged with the litigation
        “[w]ithin two weeks of receiving the magistrate judge’s order.” It
        is true that, as part of an inquiry into whether there is good cause
        to excuse a default, “courts have examined . . . whether the
        defaulting party acted promptly to correct the default.” Compania
        Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951. But in the words of the district court,
        “[Glass’s] actions [were] far from ‘prompt.’” Even looking only to
        the pleadings he admits receiving, ﬁfteen months passed between
        when he received a copy of the original complaint via Federal
        Express and his counsel’s appearance in this suit. And he admits
        receiving a number of other legal documents in between. Thus,
        the district court is correct that Glass’s eﬀorts are “too little too
        late.”
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                       22-13303

               Third, Glass argues that the district court erred in ﬁnding his
        default was willful because any delay was due to a
        misunderstanding as he did not “understand or appreciate” any
        action was required of him before receiving the magistrate judge’s
        order. We, however, have said that a party’s excuse that he is
        “confus[ed]” about his responsibility to respond to litigation does
        not satisfy “good cause.” E.E.O.C. v. Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc.,
        896 F.2d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1990). Glass’s excuse is simply not
        enough, particularly in light of the pile of legal documents he
        admits he received concerning the suit. 11 Further, the language of
        the summons (with which we have already concluded he was
        served) required a response and warned him of the consequence
        of not responding. Glass’s intentional disregard of the suit,
        therefore, does not satisfy good cause, despite his assertion that he
        did not “understand or appreciate” a need to act.
              For all these reasons, we conclude that the district court did
        not abuse its discretion in ﬁnding that Glass willfully defaulted by
        attempting to avoid the suit. Because no additional ﬁndings are
        necessary to deny relief, Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951–

        11 Moreover, a year before the litigation started, counsel for the McHughs sent

        Glass a demand letter via e-mail, Federal Express, and certified mail
        demanding “treble damages in the amount of $3,329,520.00” pursuant to Fla.
        Stat. § 772.11 within 30 days. The letter said that if Glass “fail[ed] to comply
        with [the] demand within the time provided, [the McHughs] intend[ed] to
        vigorously pursue their full legal remedies[.]”
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        22-13303                   Opinion of the Court                                17

        52, we need not address the additional considerations of
        meritorious defenses and prejudice to the McHughs.12

        12 But considering these two factors would not change our conclusion, as Glass

        did not present meritorious defenses and allowing him to participate in the
        suit would prejudice the McHughs.
        Glass failed to oﬀer anything remotely resembling a meritorious defense. He
        only presented four conclusory and superﬁcial statements that (1) he
        “dispute[s] many of the allegations asserted against [him];” (2) he “den[ies]
        that [he] ever made any false representations or omissions;” (3) he “den[ies]
        that [he] committed any act of theft or conversion of funds;” and (4) “there
        [are] a number of legal defenses that can and should be asserted in response to
        the Amended Complaint.” Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in ﬁnding that Glass failed to present meritorious defenses. See, e.g.,
        Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp., 772 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When we say
        the defendant must show a ‘meritorious defense’ to the lawsuit, we mean
        more than bare legal conclusions[.]”); Marziliano v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 151, 156
        (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that no meritorious defense was presented under
        Rule 55(c) because the party “was extremely superﬁcial and unusually
        equivocal” when it “merely stated that the fee motion raised ‘substantial issues
        of law’” and that a meritorious defense “may” exist).
        Turning to whether it would prejudice the McHughs to allow Glass to
        participate in the suit, Glass argues that no prejudice exists because costs
        incurred by the McHughs would be “simply a cost of litigating the case on the
        merits, not an increased cost as a result of the default/delay,” and the district
        court “easily could control” any prejudice through “an order with reasonable
        discovery limitations[.]” But by arguing that the court could ameliorate any
        prejudice to the McHughs, he implicitly concedes that prejudice exists. And
        exist it does. Prejudice may exist where a party faces “additional expense
        caused by the delay.” 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac.
        & Proc. § 2700 (4th ed. 2023) (“The most common type of prejudice is the
        additional expense caused by the delay, the hearing on the Rule 55(c) motion,
        and the introduction of new issues.”). Setting aside the default would
        prejudice the McHughs by forcing them to pay additional costs to restart
USCA11 Case: 22-13303         Document: 37-1         Date Filed: 03/13/2024         Page: 18 of 18

        18                         Opinion of the Court                        22-13303

                                        IV.     Conclusion

               The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
        Glass’s motion to set aside the default because Glass “willfully
        default[ed] by displaying either an intentional or reckless disregard
        for the judicial proceedings.” Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at
        951–52. We therefore affirm.
                AFFIRMED.

        litigation that had already proceeded over the course of 15 months against
        multiple other defendants. Cf. United States v. $22,050.00 U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d
        318, 326 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding prejudice did not exist where plaintiﬀ-
        appellee “never explain[ed] how setting aside default . . . would increase
        litigation costs to a greater degree than would naturally occur in all cases of
        setting aside default”). Furthermore, by the time Glass ﬁled his motion to set
        aside the default, the deadline for written discovery had passed and the
        McHughs had already conducted several depositions. Thus, the district court
        did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that allowing Glass to
        participate in the suit at this point would prejudice the McHughs.