Court Opinion

ID: 9900448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:13:05.378909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.592959
License: Public Domain

140                    May 24, 2023                 No. 272

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
           MATTHEW JUNIOR ZAMORA,
    aka Mathew J. Zamora, Jr., aka Matthew Zamora,
  aka Matthew J. Zamora, Jr., aka Matthew Zamora, Jr.,
                 aka Matthew Zemora,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
           Multnomah County Circuit Court
                 19CR12260; A174153

  Amy M. Baggio, Judge.
  Argued and submitted August 17, 2022.
   Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 326 Or App 140 (2023)   141
142                                          State v. Zamora

        ORTEGA, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
of five counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427,
three counts of using a child in a display of sexually explicit
conduct (Counts 3, 6, and 9), ORS 163.670, three counts of
private indecency, ORS 163.467, and one count of stran-
gulation, ORS 163.187(4). In his first assignment of error,
defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions on Counts 3, 6, and 9 (the display
counts). In his second through fourth assignments of error,
defendant contends that the admission of the victim’s out-
of-court statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses.
         As to defendant’s first assignment of error, we con-
clude that a rational trier of fact could find that defendant
caused the victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct
“for” defendant to observe her as a masturbatory stimulus
and therefore that there was sufficient evidence to support
a conviction on each of the display counts. We reject defen-
dant’s second through fourth assignments of error with-
out extended discussion because the victim was available
at trial and subject to unconstrained cross-examination.
United States v. Owens, 484 US 554, 558, 108 S Ct 838, 98
L Ed 2d 951 (1988); State v. Hudspeth, 292 Or App 477, 486,
424 P3d 768, rev den, 364 Or 207 (2018). Accordingly, we
affirm.
         We state the few, undisputed facts relevant to the
display counts in the light most favorable to the state, draw-
ing all reasonable inferences in the state’s favor. State v.
Leake, 325 Or App 1, 3, 527 P3d 1054 (2023). On three sep-
arate occasions, defendant had his eight-year-old daughter
lie down on his bed; he then partially disrobed her, stood
over her, masturbated, and ejaculated onto her torso. For
this conduct, the trial court found defendant guilty of the
three display counts, as well as three counts of first-degree
sexual abuse and three counts of private indecency.
         On appeal, defendant argues only that the state
failed to adduce sufficient evidence that he caused the vic-
tim to engage in sexually explicit conduct “for any person
Cite as 326 Or App 140 (2023)                                              143

to observe.” ORS 163.670.1 Relying on State v. Clay, 301
Or App 599, 605, 457 P3d 330 (2019), defendant argues that
he cannot be convicted of using a child in a display of sexu-
ally explicit conduct because his acts of observing the victim
were incidental to his acts of sexually abusing the victim as
a matter of law.
         In response, the state argues that the facts of this
case are distinguishable from Clay. In the state’s view, a
rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant’s sexu-
ally abusing conduct was incidental to his observation of the
victim’s sexually explicit conduct, rather than vice versa, as
was the case in Clay.
          Because the parties’ dispute involves the application
of our prior construction of ORS 163.670 in Clay, we begin
by recounting that case in some detail. In Clay, the defen-
dant arranged to have two teenage sisters participate in
purported photoshoots at his apartment. 301 Or App at 601.
On one occasion, the defendant asked the 13-year-old girl
to remove her undergarments and if he could apply lotion
to her legs, and he proceeded to rub the girl’s vagina and
buttocks and place the girl’s hand on his erect penis over
his shorts. Id. at 601-02. On another occasion, the defendant
asked the 16-year-old girl to remove her undergarments and
if he could apply lotion to her legs, and he proceeded to rub
the girl’s vagina. Id. at 602. The state charged the defendant
with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count
of using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct
relating to the 13-year-old girl, as well as one count each
of third-degree sexual abuse and using a child in a display
of sexually explicit conduct relating to the 16-year-old girl.
Id. at 602-03.
        On appeal, the defendant challenged the suffi-
ciency of the evidence for the display counts, arguing that
observing a child in the course of sexually abusing her
    1
      This case was argued and submitted before this court issued State v. Parra-
Sanchez, 324 Or App 712, 527 P3d 1008 (2023), which construed “lewd exhibition
of sexual or other intimate parts,” ORS 163.665, as it applies to ORS 163.670.
Defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence of the other elements
of ORS 163.670, namely, that he employed, authorized, permitted, compelled, or
induced the victim to participate or engage in sexually explicit conduct.
144                                              State v. Zamora

is not a separate crime under ORS 163.670(1). Id. at 605.
Specifically, the defendant argued that the state failed to
adduce sufficient evidence that he caused the girls to partic-
ipate or engage in sexually explicit conduct “for any person
to observe.” Id.
         Employing our familiar statutory interpretation
analysis, we first looked to the statute’s text and observed
that “[t]he word ‘for’ creates a functional relationship
between the person’s behavior—‘employing, authorizing,
permitting, compelling or inducing a child to participate
or engage in sexually explicit conduct’—and the person’s
purpose in engaging in that behavior—‘for any person to
observe or to record in a visual recording.’ ” Id. at 606 (cit-
ing ORS 163.670; brackets omitted). The significance of that
term is that “ORS 163.670 does not provide that a person
commits the crime of display when the person causes a child
to participate or engage in sexually explicit conduct and any
person observes or visually records the conduct.” Id. (empha-
sis in Clay). Rather, “[i]t expressly requires that the person
cause a child to participate or engage in sexually explicit
conduct ‘for’ any person to observe or to visually record.”
Id.
         Turning to the statutory context and legislative his-
tory, we explained that the legislature was concerned with
“severely punishing the exploitation of children in the pro-
duction of pornography” and “took a broad view of pornog-
raphy, as evidenced by the statutory language it adopted.”
Id. at 607. We observed that ORS 163.670 “clearly captures
live sex shows involving children”—even if they are not pho-
tographed, videorecorded, or otherwise visually recorded,
and even if they involve an audience of one. Id. at 607-08.
Thus, “ORS 163.670 applies equally to causing a child to
participate or engage in sexually explicit conduct for another
person to observe, for oneself to observe, for another person to
visually record, or for oneself to visually record.” Id. at 608
(emphases in Clay).
         The issue before us in Clay was thus to determine
“what it means for a person to cause a child to participate
or engage in sexually explicit conduct ‘for’ that person to
‘observe’ ” when “[t]o ‘observe’ is ‘to see or sense,’ ” and “ ‘for’
Cite as 326 Or App 140 (2023)                             145

creates a functional relationship between the person’s
behavior and the person’s purpose.” Id. at 609. We posited
that a trier of fact could easily conclude that a person caused
a child to participate or engage in sexually explicit conduct
for the person to observe such that ORS 163.670 applies if
a person verbally directs a child to participate or engage in
sexually explicit conduct—but does not personally sexually
touch the child—so that the person can observe the sexually
explicit conduct “as an end to itself.” Id. However, the more
difficult question was whether a person violates ORS 163.670
if the person “observes” a child while sexually abusing the
child or “observes” a child’s sexual or intimate parts in con-
nection with sexually abusing the child. Id. Because “many
acts of child sexual abuse will necessarily involve ‘sexually
explicit conduct,’ ” the person “necessarily will ‘observe’ the
sexually explicit conduct” that they caused, “unless the sex-
ual abuser closed his eyes or otherwise avoids seeing what
he is doing.” Id. at 609-10.
         We ultimately concluded that “the legislature did
not intend ORS 163.670 to capture a person’s observation
of his own sexual abuse of a child or observation of a child’s
sexual or intimate parts while sexually abusing or prepar-
ing to sexually abuse the child.” Id. at 610. That is because
“the ‘observation’ that occurs in such a situation is inciden-
tal to the crime of sexual abuse and was not intended by
the legislature to constitute the separate—and much more
serious—crime of using a child in a display of sexually
explicit conduct.” Id. (footnote omitted). Instead, we under-
stood the crime of display to capture the creation of child
pornography, including “live sex displays,” which “includes
an audience of one—i.e., a person making a visual recording
of a child participating or engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct that he himself has caused to occur, or staging a live
sex display involving a child for his own observation—but
it does not include observation of one’s own acts of sexual
abuse against a child or observation of a child’s sexual or
intimate parts incidental to one’s own acts of sexual abuse
against a child.” Id.
        Importantly, we clarified that we did “not mean to
suggest that a person cannot be convicted of both sexual
146                                          State v. Zamora

abuse and display in appropriate circumstances,” such
as those in State v. Tyson, 243 Or App 94, 259 P3d 64,
rev den, 351 Or 401 (2011), which “involved distinct acts of
the defendant sexually abusing a child and observing the
child engaged in sexually explicit conduct with someone
else.” Clay, 301 Or App at 611 (emphasis in original). We
also acknowledged that “it is difficult to articulate a precise
standard as to when evidence of ‘observation’ that occurred
during a sexual-abuse episode will be legally sufficient for a
display count to survive a motion for judgment for acquittal”
but that the ultimate question “is whether, on the record
that exists, a reasonable juror could find that the defendant
caused the child to participate or engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the defendant to observe, as opposed to the obser-
vation being incidental to the defendant’s sexual abuse.”
Id. at 612 n 8 (first emphasis in Clay, second emphasis added).
We also acknowledged that “[i]n most cases, the defendant’s
purpose will be a question for the factfinder.” Id.
         Applying that construction of the statute to the
facts in Clay, we concluded that the trial court had erred
in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquit-
tal on the display counts because “no reasonable juror could
find that the viewing [of each victim’s vagina] was other
than incidental to [the] defendant’s criminal sexual abuse.”
Id. at 612 (emphasis added). In support of that conclusion,
we relied on the fact that “the only evidence was that [the]
defendant observed the victims’ genitalia in direct connec-
tion with his own sexual abuse of the victims” and that the
defendant “had either already made sexual contact with the
victim before looking at her vagina or made sexual contact
with the victim at the same time as or immediately after
looking at her vagina.” Id.
         We understand Clay to hold that a defendant can-
not be convicted of both sexual abuse of a child and using
a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct when the
evidence supports only one reasonable inference: that the
observation of the child was incidental to the sexual abuse
of the child. But when the evidence allows for a reasonable
inference that the observation of the child was an end in
itself—even if not the only end—there is sufficient evidence
that the defendant caused the child to engage in a display of
Cite as 326 Or App 140 (2023)                              147

sexually explicit conduct for the defendant to observe such
that the defendant’s purpose will be a question for the fact-
finder. Contrary to defendant’s argument, while the temporal
connection between the sexual abuse and the observation of
the child’s intimate parts is relevant to that determination,
it is not the only relevant fact, and it may not be dispositive.
Nor, as defendant suggested at oral argument, must there
be some distinct evidence that the defendant intended to
observe the child independent of the sexual abuse. Rather,
a factfinder may consider all the evidence—including the
nature of the defendant’s sexually abusive conduct—to
determine whether the defendant’s observation of the child
was an end in itself of the sexually abusive conduct that
causes the child to participate or engage in sexually explicit
conduct.
         Returning to this case, defendant argues that there
was insufficient evidence that he caused the victim to engage
in sexually explicit conduct for him to observe because, in
his view, he observed the victim’s sexual or intimate parts
“while” sexually abusing her and his observation “was the
same as his sexually abusing conduct.” Therefore, defendant
contends, he “did not stage a live show with [the victim]
engaging in sexually explicit conduct and then observe the
display.”
         We disagree. Although defendant’s observation
arguably could be characterized similarly to the defendant’s
observation in Clay as directly connected to and closely
intertwined with his sexual abuse of the victim, we conclude
that a rational trier of fact could find that defendant caused
the victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct “for” defen-
dant to observe her as a masturbatory stimulus. As the
state points out, unlike the defendant’s conduct in Clay, the
evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to
the state, supports a reasonable inference that defendant
engaged in sexually abusive conduct—and by doing so
caused the victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct—
for the purpose of observing her to visually stimulate his
engagement in further sexually abusive conduct. That is,
defendant’s observation of the victim’s sexual and intimate
parts was an end in itself, even if it was not the only end, of
defendant’s sexually abusive conduct. We therefore conclude
148                                         State v. Zamora

that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on
each of the display counts.
         We appreciate, as the state acknowledged at oral
argument, that defendant’s conduct may be on the “outer
edge” of the conduct the legislature intended to capture
under ORS 163.670, and we are well aware that the crime
of display is classified as a more serious offense than the
other crimes of conviction that arose from defendant’s sex-
ually abusive conduct in this case. However, as we noted in
Clay, 301 Or App at 605 n 8, “if the legislature intended the
‘observation’ prong of ORS 163.670 to apply more narrowly
than the current statutory language provides, that is a mat-
ter for the legislature to address.”
        Affirmed.