Court Opinion

ID: 9960846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 14:11:18.526117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:55.190677
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Soto, 2024-Ohio-1457.]

STATE OF OHIO                      )                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                   )ss:               NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                   )

STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. No.       30663

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
KEITH A. SOTO                                         COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   CR 22 03 1122

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: April 17, 2024

        SUTTON, Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant Keith Soto appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court

of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     A Summit County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Soto on one count of aggravated

murder, three counts of murder, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of felonious assault,

two counts of having weapons while under disability, and one count of tampering with evidence.

The indictment also included numerous firearm and repeat violent offender specifications.

        {¶3}     The indictment stemmed from a shooting that occurred in the City of Akron on

February 10, 2022. Officers responding to a 911 call placed by one of the victims, D.I., discovered

D.I. with a gunshot wound and D.I.’s half-brother, J.B., deceased inside D.I.’s vehicle. As officers

responded to the shooting, a UPS driver also made a second 911 call. The driver called to report
                                                 2

seeing a gun laying on the side of an Interstate 77 off-ramp. The location of the gun was in close

proximity to the shooting. Police officers responded to the location and recovered the gun.

        {¶4}   As the Akron police began conducting their investigation, they realized the sole

eyewitness to the shooting, D.I., continually changed his story and eventually D.I. stopped

cooperating with police. Detectives developed Mr. Soto as a suspect. Text messages showed that

on the day of the shooting, Mr. Soto arranged to meet up with D.I. to conduct a sale of drugs. Cell

phone records showed Mr. Soto, a resident of Cleveland, was in Akron at the time of the shooting,

and showed Mr. Soto immediately leaving the Akron area after the shooting. Ballistic testing

conducted on the gun recovered from the side of the road near the crime scene matched the bullets

pulled from J.B.’s body. DNA testing showed DNA found on the trigger of that same gun matched

a DNA sample taken from Mr. Soto.

        {¶5}   After Mr. Soto was arrested, the case proceeded to trial. Because D.I. failed to

cooperate with the investigation, the State made a motion for the trial court to call D.I. as the

court’s witness. The trial court granted the motion, appointed counsel for D.I., and allowed D.I.’s

counsel to speak with D.I. prior to his testimony. The State then made a motion to grant D.I.

immunity in exchange for his testimony. After meeting with D.I., his counsel informed the trial

court and the parties that D.I. planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination and not testify. The trial court then granted D.I. limited immunity and ordered him

to testify.

        {¶6}   D.I. testified that on the day of the shooting, he arranged to go with J.B. to meet up

with Mr. Soto at a gas station near D.I.’s home to sell Mr. Soto some marijuana. D.I.’s cousin had

previously introduced D.I. and Mr. Soto. After meeting Mr. Soto at the gas station, both vehicles

drove to a nearby side street. Mr. Soto then exited his vehicle and got into the back seat of D.I.’s
                                                 3

truck. While in the truck, D.I., J.B., and Mr. Soto smoked some marijuana and engaged in

conversation. D.I. testified that Mr. Soto became disappointed in the quality of the marijuana D.I.

was selling him. D.I. testified Mr. Soto then pulled out a gun, told D.I. to take the keys out of the

ignition and throw them out the window, and said “[y]ou already know what this is.” Mr. Soto

then pointed the gun at D.I. and J.B. from the back seat. In the front seat, D.I. saw J.B. reach into

a fanny pack and pull out a gun. From the back seat, Mr. Soto told J.B. to stop moving, and then

suddenly began firing shots. D.I. testified as soon as he heard the gunshots, he fled and was shot

as he exited his truck. D.I. ran to a nearby house until Mr. Soto left the scene. When D.I. returned

to his vehicle, he saw J.B. was shot and attempted to drive him to the hospital. As he started to

drive towards the hospital, D.I. realized his brother was already dead, so he turned around and

proceeded back to the location of the shooting. D.I. called 911 to report the shooting on his way

back to the location.

        {¶7}    D.I. testified he was previously uncooperative with the police investigation because

he did not want to be seen as a “rat” by his peers. He testified that in his community, people who

aid the police in their investigations are looked upon “like a child molester” and that testifying in

court is seen as “telling.”

        {¶8}    Mr. Soto took the stand as part of his defense. He admitted to shooting D.I. and

J.B., but argued it was in self-defense. Mr. Soto alleged that D.I. had tried to rob him when Mr.

Soto got in the back of D.I.’s truck. After getting into the truck, Mr. Soto claimed that D.I. pulled

out a gun and pointed it at him. Mr. Soto testified a struggle ensued between Mr. Soto and D.I.,

and during that struggle, Mr. Soto was able to wrestle D.I.’s gun away from D.I. Mr. Soto testified

he shot both D.I. and J.B. in self-defense using D.I.’s gun. Mr. Soto denied the weapon he used in

the shooting belonged to him.
                                                  4

       {¶9}    The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Soto guilty of one count of murder in

violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and (D)/R.C. 2929.02(B), an unclassified felony; two counts of

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)/(D)(1)(a), both felonies of the second degree;

two counts of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) and (3),

both felonies of the third degree; and one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.

2929.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree. Each count contained firearm specifications. The jury

acquitted Mr. Soto of the three other murder charges and the aggravated robbery charge.

       {¶10} Having previously waived his right to be tried by the jury on the repeat violent

offender specification, the trial court found Mr. Soto was a repeat violent offender. At sentencing,

the trial court sentenced Mr. Soto to a term of incarceration of 37 years to life.

       {¶11} Mr. Soto timely appealed, assigning six errors for this Court’s review.

                                                 II.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       [MR.] SOTO WAS CONVICTED IN COUNTS FOUR AND SEVEN
       ABSENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

       {¶12} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Soto argues the State failed to present sufficient

evidence to sustain his convictions for felony murder and felonious assault. We disagree.

       {¶13} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶

18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the

prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this

Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in
                                                  5

favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it

allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

                                   Count Four – Felony Murder

         {¶14} Pursuant to R.C. 2903.02,

         No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s
         committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the
         first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of
         the Revised Code.

The indictment charged Mr. Soto with the murder of J.B. and indicated that the underlying offense

Mr. Soto committed was felonious assault. R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the felonious assault statute, states

“[n]o person shall knowingly * * * cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by

means of a deadly weapon[.]” “‘Deadly weapon’ means any instrument, device, or thing capable

of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried,

or used as a weapon.” See R.C. 2903.11(E)(1) and R.C. 2923.11(A). A gun is a weapon capable

of inflicting death. State v. Davidson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 2565, 1977 WL 198990, *2 (Aug. 24,

1977).

         {¶15} The State presented physical evidence that showed the bullet and bullet fragments

removed from J.B.’s body matched the firearm that had Mr. Soto’s DNA on the trigger.

Additionally, D.I. testified Mr. Soto brandished a gun at D.I. and J.B., and when Mr. Soto began

firing, D.I. left the vehicle. When D.I. returned to the vehicle, J.B. was dead in the passenger seat.

Additionally, Mr. Soto admitted to shooting J.B. during his own testimony. Construing this

evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the State presented sufficient evidence to convict

Mr. Soto of the murder of J.B.
                                                 6

       {¶16} With respect to Mr. Soto’s argument that the State failed to meet its burden of

disproving Mr. Soto’s self-defense claim, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the State’s

“burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt is subject to

a manifest-weight review on appeal” and it is not part of the review of the sufficiency of the

evidence. See State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 27. Therefore, Mr.

Soto’s argument regarding the State’s rebuttal of self-defense for sufficiency of the evidence is not

part of the sufficiency of the evidence analysis and will not be reviewed here.

       {¶17} Mr. Soto also argues in this assignment of error that the language of the statute

requires the State to prove the underlying offense was not voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.

This is not a sufficiency argument and is outside of the scope of this assignment of error. Mr. Soto

repeatedly raises this argument throughout his brief, without citation to any case law for this

interpretation of the statute. A plain reading of the language of the statute shows the predicate

offense (1) must be a felony of the first or second degree and (2) cannot be involuntary or voluntary

manslaughter. Here, the predicate offense was felonious assault, a felony of the second degree,

and felonious assault is not involuntary or voluntary manslaughter. The case law supports this

interpretation of the statute. In a case cited by Mr. Soto, the Tenth District Court of Appeals in

State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 09AP-70, 09-AP-75, 2009-Ohio-6840, ¶ 95 noted:

       R.C. 2903.02(B) prohibits voluntary and involuntary manslaughter from serving as
       the predicate felony, but the statute does not prohibit prosecuting an offender for
       felony murder merely because the offender could have also been charged with
       voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.

The Tenth District noted that the statute prohibits voluntary and involuntary manslaughter from

serving as the predicate felony. The statute does not require the State to affirmatively disprove the

offense was not voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
                                                 7

       {¶18} Mr. Soto’s argument that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish

felony murder is overruled.

                                Count Seven – Felonious Assault

       {¶19} Mr. Soto also argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the

identity of who shot D.I. because D.I. testified he did not know who shot him, J.B.’s Glock was

missing 9 rounds, and there was evidence that both Mr. Soto and J.B. possessed firearms. For

the following reasons, we disagree.

       {¶20} Mr. Soto’s assertion that D.I. testified he did not know who shot him is not an

accurate reflection of the record. The portion of the record that Mr. Soto identifies for that

assertion is when the State asked D.I. about statements he made. The transcript reads as follows:

       PROSECUTOR:            * * * you said you do not know who shot you. Do you
                              remember hearing that [on the 911 call that was played in
                              court]?

       D.I.:                  Correct.

       PROSECUTOR:            Why did you say that?

       D.I.:                  I didn’t want to be a part of this case at all.

The prosecutor played D.I.’s call to 911 during which D.I. told the 911 call taker that he did not

know who shot him. At trial, D.I. testified that Mr. Soto had a gun, and Mr. Soto began firing the

gun, and he was shot by Mr. Soto as he attempted to flee his vehicle.

       {¶21} Additionally, while J.B.’s Glock was missing 9 rounds, the police officer who

recovered J.B.’s gun at the crime scene testified there was not a bullet in the chamber. A firearm

expert also testified the gun would have had to have had a bullet in the chamber in order to be

immediately fired. The expert explained in order to fire J.B.’s gun, the slide must be pulled back
                                                  8

to cause a bullet to enter the chamber and be fired. Also, D.I. testified J.B. had just pulled out his

gun, and did not testify to his brother shooting anyone, when Mr. Soto began shooting.

       {¶22} Lastly, Mr. Soto admitted during his own testimony that he shot D.I. Mr. Soto’s

argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish felonious assault is

overruled.

       {¶23} Mr. Soto’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       [MR.] SOTO’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE VACATED WHERE
       CONVICTED AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

       {¶24} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Soto argues his convictions were against the

manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mr. Soto did not act in self-defense. For the following reasons, we disagree.

       {¶25} As this Court has previously stated:

       [i]n determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
       evidence an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
       all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
       whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
       and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
       reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a

judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the

appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the

conflicting testimony.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,

42 (1982).

       {¶26} Moreover, an appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as

against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. Otten at 340. “[W]e are
                                                   9

mindful that the [trier of fact] is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.”

State v. Gannon, 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0053-M, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 20. (Internal quotations

and citations omitted.) “This Court will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight challenge

only because the [trier of fact] found the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible.” Id. “[T]he

jury is best able to view witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and

use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” State v. Cook, 9th

Dist. Summit No. 21185, 2003-Ohio-727, ¶ 30, quoting Giurbino v. Giurbino, 89 Ohio App.3d

646, 659 (8th Dist.1993).

        {¶27} As this Court recently stated in State v. Fleckenstein, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

22CA011886, 2023-Ohio-4347, ¶ 23-24:

        Self-defense is an affirmative defense in Ohio. A defendant charged with an
        offense involving the use of force has the burden of producing legally sufficient
        evidence that his use of force was in self-defense. Once a defendant satisfies his
        burden of production, the burden of persuasion shifts to the State to prove beyond
        a reasonable doubt that the accused did not use force in self-defense. The State’s
        burden is subject to a manifest-weight review on appeal.

        The elements of self-defense are as follows:

        (1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the
        affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in imminent
        danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of escape
        from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not
        violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.

        To carry its burden of persuasion, the State need only disprove one of the foregoing
        elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

        {¶28} Here, the State and Mr. Soto presented two different versions of the events leading

up to the shooting. Through the testimony of D.I., the State established that Mr. Soto shot both

D.I. and J.B. as part of what D.I. believed to be an attempted robbery. Mr. Soto argued D.I. and
                                                   10

J.B. attempted to rob him, and he only obtained the gun he used to shoot both D.I. and J.B. after a

struggle with D.I. inside of D.I.’s truck. D.I. testified that he was shot as he was fleeing the vehicle,

and his injury was consistent with that testimony. The jury was in the best position to assess the

credibility of the witnesses presenting the competing versions of events and the jury could have

reasonably concluded that Mr. Soto was at fault for creating the situation that led to J.B.’s death.

J.B. was shot three times, once directly in the back of the head. Therefore, Mr. Soto has not

demonstrated this is the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against the conclusion

that the State disproved his claim of self-defense.

        {¶29} Mr. Soto’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

        THE FAILURE TO GIVE NECESSARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS
        RESULTED IN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL OR
        WAS OTHERWISE PLAIN ERROR.

        {¶30} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Soto argues the failure of his trial counsel to

request an accomplice instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and was otherwise

plain error. For the following reasons, we disagree.

                                  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        {¶31} Mr. Soto argues his trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel’s “failure to

request the instruction was a lapse in care owed to [Mr. Soto] by his trial counsel and was

prejudicial[.]” In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Soto must

show that “counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that

prejudice arose from counsel's performance.” State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 674 (1998),

citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “The benchmark for judging any claim

of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
                                                  11

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland

at 686. Thus, a two-prong test is necessary to examine such claims. First, Mr. Soto must show

that counsel's performance was objectively deficient by producing evidence that counsel acted

unreasonably. State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534 (1997), citing Strickland at 687. Second,

Mr. Soto must demonstrate that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the

results of the trial would have been different. Keith at 534. “This Court need not address both

prongs of the Strickland test if the appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” Gannon, 2020-Ohio-

3075, at ¶ 23, citing State v. Ray, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22459, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10.

        {¶32} “[C]ounsel's decision not to request a jury instruction falls within the ambit of trial

strategy.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 111, citing State v. Lawson,

64 Ohio St.3d 336, 341 (1992); State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 61 fn. 9 (1992). “Furthermore,

debatable trial tactics do not constitute ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id., citing State v.

Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49 (1980); State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶

146.

        {¶33} Additionally, there is nothing in the record that suggests D.I. was an accomplice of

Mr. Soto in the crimes that Mr. Soto was indicted for in this case. R.C. 2923.03(D) mandates the

trial court instructs the jury when an accomplice of a defendant testifies against the defendant.

There is nothing in the record that suggests D.I. was an accomplice to the crimes Mr. Soto was

charged with, but, rather, the record reflects that D.I. was the victim of a felonious assault when

Mr. Soto shot him. There is no deficient performance where counsel does not request a jury

instruction that the trial court was not required to give.
                                                 12

                                            Plain Error

       {¶34} Mr. Soto also argues in this assignment of error that it was plain error for the trial

court not to give the jury the accomplice instruction as required by R.C. 2923.03(D). “Plain errors

or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). However, “error * * * [is] the starting point for a plain

error inquiry[.]” See Akron v. Calhoun, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30472, 2023-Ohio-4840, ¶ 26, citing

State v. Terry, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30137, 2023-Ohio-2234, ¶ 33, citing State v. Gibson, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 30078, 2022-Ohio-1653, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 200 (2001)

and citing Crim.R. 52(B).

       {¶35} As stated above, there is nothing in the record that indicates D.I. was an alleged

accomplice of Mr. Soto in the shooting of J.B. In fact, both D.I., and Mr. Soto himself, testified

that D.I. was a victim of Mr. Soto’s. D.I. testified that Mr. Soto shot him. Mr. Soto testified that

he shot D.I. Therefore, it was not plain error for the trial court to not give the accomplice

instruction because D.I. was not an accomplice in his own shooting.

       {¶36} Mr. Soto’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

       THE JURY VERDICT FORM IN COUNT FOUR WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
       TO CONVICT [MR.] SOTO OF FELONY MURDER.

       {¶37} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Soto argues the jury verdict form was

insufficient because the State was required to prove the predicate felony was not voluntary or

involuntary manslaughter, an argument that Mr. Soto made in his first assignment of error. In light

of our resolution of the first assignment of error related to whether the State was required to prove

the predicate felony was not voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, this assignment of error has

been rendered moot and we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
                                                 13

       {¶38} Mr. Soto’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

       THE STATE OF OHIO VIOLATED SEVERAL ETHICAL DUTIES IN
       PROSECUTING THIS CASE AMOUNTING TO PROSECUTORIAL
       MISCONDUCT, DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AND BRADY
       VIOLATIONS.

       {¶39} In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Soto argues that the State violated his due

process rights and committed prosecutorial misconduct by “failing to obtain evidence” in violation

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and by “eliciting improper in-court identification”

of Mr. Soto by D.I. For the following reasons, we disagree.

                                     Alleged Brady Violation

       {¶40} In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Brady at 87; see also State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 475 (2001). “There are

three components of a true Brady violation: [1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, and [3] prejudice must have

ensued.” State v. Brantley, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29924, 2021-Ohio-4621, ¶ 7, quoting Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999).

       {¶41} As this Court previously stated in Brantley at ¶ 9:

       The Brady rule “arguably applies in three quite different situations.” United States
       v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The first situation, as exemplified by [Giglio v.
       U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972)], is where the prosecution relied on false testimony and
       it either knew or should have known that the testimony was false. Agurs at 103. In
       these cases, “a strict standard of materiality [is required], not just because they
       involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because they involve a
       corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” Id. at 104.
                                                   14

        Accordingly, the use of false testimony “must be set aside if there is any reasonable
        likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id. at
        103. The second situation where the Brady rule is applicable is when the
        prosecution defies a pretrial request for specific evidence. Id. at 104. The third
        situation is where the prosecution refuses to disclose evidence favorable to the
        accused when there is only a general request for exculpatory evidence or no request
        is made. Id. at 107. With respect to the second and third situations, the evidence
        is considered material for the purposes of Brady “only if there is a reasonable
        probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
        proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
        (1985). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine
        confidence in the outcome.” Id.

        {¶42} On appeal, Mr. Soto argues:

        The State did not disclose [Mr.] Soto’s self-defense claim or request evidence from
        the lead detective; such information was never sought or collected. The detective,
        despite knowing everything D.I. said was a lie, completely failed to investigate
        D.I.’s involvement even with knowledge D.I. participated in the drug transaction.
        He failed to: collect D.I.’s standard DNA sample or test for gunshot residue; request
        processing of essential items for his DNA * * * ; did not generate a report of what
        was found in D.I.’s phone; and further failed to investigate D.I.’s home for evidence
        in spite of learning that D.I. left the scene with J.B. dead in his vehicle, drove to the
        area of his home, and then called 911 while driving back to the scene.

Here, Mr. Soto does not allege one of the three situations where the Brady rule would apply. Thus,

Mr. Soto’s argument with respect to the Brady violation is overruled.

                                   Alleged Improper Identification

        {¶43} Mr. Soto also argues “[t]he prosecution committed prejudicial misconduct when it

obtained its only identification of [Mr.] Soto in its case-in-chief by leading D.I.” However, the

record shows that Mr. Soto did not object to this alleged misconduct at trial. The failure “to object

to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct at trial * * * forfeit[s] all but plain error” State v. Whitaker,

169 Ohio St.3d 647, 2022-Ohio-2840, ¶ 85.        Mr. Soto has not argued plain error and we will not

create a plain error argument on his behalf. See State v. Cross, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25487, 2011-

Ohio-3250, ¶ 41; See also State v. Hairston, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008768, 2006-Ohio-4925,

¶ 11.
                                                  15

       {¶44} Mr. Soto’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
       CALLING D.I. AS [A] COURT WITNESS AND GRANTING [HIM]
       IMMUNITY.

       {¶45} In his sixth assignment of error, Mr. Soto argues the trial court abused its discretion

in calling D.I. as a court witness and granting him immunity. For the following reasons, we

disagree.

                                  Calling D.I. as a Court Witness

       {¶46} Mr. Soto argues the trial court erred when it called D.I. as a witness of the court,

allowing the State to question D.I. as if he was under cross-examination. As this Court said in

State v. Walter, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0020, 2022-Ohio-1982, ¶ 42-43:

       Evidence Rule 614(A) provides that the court may, on its own motion or at the
       suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine
       witnesses thus called. The decision as to whether to call a witness on its own
       motion pursuant to Evid.R. 614(A) is within the discretion of the trial court, and
       will be reversed only for an abuse of such discretion. An abuse of discretion means
       that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling.

       * * * Additionally, “[i]t is well-established that a trial court does not abuse its
       discretion in calling a witness as a court's witness when the witness’s testimony
       would be beneficial to ascertaining the truth of the matter and there is some
       indication that the witness’s trial testimony will contradict a prior statement made
       to police.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

       {¶47} Here, in accordance with Evid.R. 614(A), the State filed a written motion asking

the trial court to call D.I. as the court’s witness. That motion stated:

       In the case at the bar, the State of Ohio has conversed with [D.I.] and is unsure if
       he will appear at trial. In addition, the State does not know what [D.I.] will testify
       to if he does appear, as [D.I.] has provided inconsistent statements. [D.I.]’s
       statements make the State unable to vouch for his credibility. The State asserts that
       calling [D.I.] as a [c]ourt’s witness is the best manner in which to elicit the truth
                                                  16

       related to the charges. Thus, the State respectfully moves this [h]onorable [c]ourt
       for an order to call [D.I.] as a witness by the [c]ourt.

As D.I. was both a victim of the shooting and present when his brother was shot, his testimony

was beneficial to ascertaining the truth of the events that happened that day. In the written motion,

the State indicated D.I. had provided prior inconsistent statements, and the State was unsure as to

what D.I. would testify to at trial. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calling

D.I. as the court’s witness.

                                      Granting D.I. Immunity

       {¶48} Mr. Soto also argues in this assignment of error that the trial court erred in granting

immunity to D.I., because such grant of immunity did “not further[] the administration of justice.”

       {¶49} R.C. 2945.44 states:

       (A) In any criminal proceeding in this state or in any criminal or civil proceeding
       brought pursuant to Chapter 2981. of the Revised Code, if a witness refuses to
       answer or produce information on the basis of the witness’s privilege against self-
       incrimination, the court of common pleas of the county in which the proceeding is
       being held, unless it finds that to do so would not further the administration of
       justice, shall compel the witness to answer or produce the information, if both of
       the following apply:

               (1) The prosecuting attorney of the county in which the proceedings
               are being held makes a written request to the court of common pleas
               to order the witness to answer or produce the information,
               notwithstanding the witness's claim of privilege;

               (2) The court of common pleas informs the witness that by
               answering, or producing the information the witness will receive
               immunity under division (B) of this section.

       (B) If, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to withhold an
       answer or any information given in any criminal proceeding, and the witness
       complies with an order under division (A) of this section compelling the witness to
       give an answer or produce any information, the witness shall not be prosecuted or
       subjected to any criminal penalty in the courts of this state for or on account of any
       transaction or matter concerning which, in compliance with the order, the witness
       gave an answer or produced any information.
                                                  17

“The mandate of the statute is clear: immunity may not be granted unless (1) the witness refuses

to answer on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, (2) the prosecuting attorney

makes a written request to order the witness to answer, and (3) the court informs the witness he

will receive transactional immunity.” State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 592 (1994).

       {¶50} Here, the record reflects the trial court, after making the decision to call D.I. as a

court’s witness, appointed counsel to consult with D.I. before he testified. After meeting with D.I.,

his counsel informed the trial court and the parties that D.I. planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination. The record reflects that counsel for D.I. informed the trial court

that D.I. was refusing to testify on the basis of his privilege for self-incrimination. The record also

indicates the State filed a written motion seeking immunity for D.I. pursuant to R.C. 2945.44. The

record further indicates the trial court informed D.I. that he would receive the following immunity

for his testimony:

       D.I. is granted immunity pursuant to [R.C.] 2945.44, in that he shall not be
       prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty in the court of this State for or on
       account of any transaction or matter concerning the events during the hours
       between 12:00 pm and 4:00 pm on February 10, 2022 at or near the area of 1084
       Yukon Avenue, Akron, Summit County, Ohio, that resulted in the death of [J.B.]
       and the shooting of [D.I.], as well as for [D.I.]’s actions and involvement in the
       investigation, including his statements to the police, EMS, and 911 call taker.

       {¶51} After reviewing the record, there is no indication that the trial court abused its

discretion in granting D.I. transactional immunity for his testimony in this case.

       {¶52} Mr. Soto’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶53} Mr. Soto’s six assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                  Judgment affirmed.
                                                18

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     BETTY SUTTON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ERIC M. LEVY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.