Court Opinion

ID: 9556189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:00:47.184596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:41.656579
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-2335
                        ___________________________

                             Garfield Jameson Green

                                             Petitioner

                                        v.

      Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States of America

                                         Respondent
                                  ____________

                      Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                                  ____________

                            Submitted: May 10, 2023
                             Filed: August 16, 2023
                                   [Published]
                                 ____________

Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Garfield Green wants to stay in the country. To do so, he had to convince the
Board of Immigration Appeals that either Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of
violence” or it should waive inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); see id.
§ 1182(h) (waiver of inadmissibility); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act robbery). He
did neither, and we deny his petition for review.
                                          I.

       Green initially entered the United States on a traveler’s visa, but he later
became a permanent resident after marrying a United States citizen. Then, roughly
a decade later, he and his accomplices robbed a delivery van belonging to “an ATM
vendor.” Green pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and spent five
years in prison.

      Once immigration officials found out about the conviction, they started
removal proceedings. As relevant here, the government argued he was removable
because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F),
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The immigration judge and the Board agreed and refused to
waive inadmissibility.

                                          II.

      We have jurisdiction to review legal questions, see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D),
including “whether a conviction for a particular . . . offense qualifies as a basis for
removability,” Jima v. Barr, 942 F.3d 468, 471–72 (8th Cir. 2019). Our review is
de novo. See id. at 472.

                                          A.

       Any alien “convicted of an aggravated felony is removable from the United
States.” Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The list of qualifying aggravated
felonies includes “crime[s] of violence”—offenses that have “as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). For Green to be
removable, Hobbs Act robbery needs to satisfy the now-familiar “force” or
“elements” clause. United States v. Lung’aho, 72 F.4th 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2023).

                                         -2-
      To determine whether it does, we “apply[] the categorical approach.” Ortiz v.
Lynch, 796 F.3d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2015). Using only “the legal definition of [the]
crime, not [Green’s] actual acts,” we ask whether Hobbs Act robbery has “as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States
v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

       The answer, at least according to our precedent, is yes. See Diaz v. United
States, 863 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 842
(8th Cir. 1996). Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of an “unlawful taking or
obtaining of personal property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by
means of actual or threatened force.” Diaz, 863 F.3d at 783 (emphasis added)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)). If this line of cases is still good law, Green is
removable for having committed a “crime of violence.” Dat v. United States, 920
F.3d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir. 2019).

                                         B.

       Based on a recent Supreme Court decision, Green argues it is not. See United
States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2020 (2022). In Taylor, the issue was whether an
attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence.” Id. at 2018 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)). Same issue, different crime. See id. at 2020 (contrasting the
elements of “attempted” and “completed Hobbs Act robbery”); Mathis v. United
States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016) (explaining that “alternative” elements “define
multiple crimes”).

       As the Court put it, “[w]hatever one might say about completed Hobbs Act
robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause.” Taylor,
142 S. Ct. at 2020. The reason is that an attempt requires only “a substantial step”
toward the robbery, which may, but does not always, involve an actual, attempted,
or threatened use of force. Id.; see United States v. States, 72 F.4th 778, 784 (7th
Cir. 2023) (explaining that “a person can commit attempted Hobbs Act robbery by
attempting to threaten force”).
                                         -3-
        The difference between a substantial step and completion of the crime is what
separates attempted and actual Hobbs Act robbery. As we explained pre-Taylor, the
latter necessarily “includes the use or threatened use of force or violence.” Farmer,
73 F.3d at 842. Taylor, in other words, “does not change our position” that a
completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. United States v. Stoney, 62
F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023); see United States v. Baker, 49 F.4th 1348, 1360 (10th
Cir. 2022) (stating that “Taylor does not implicate our holding . . . expressly
address[ing] completed Hobbs Act robbery”). Bottom line, Green is removable.1
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Dat, 920 F.3d at 1194.

                                          III.

       One issue remains. Green complains that the Board applied the wrong
standard of review to the waiver-of-inadmissibility determination. We have
jurisdiction to consider this “legal question” too. Waldron v. Holder, 688 F.3d 354,
360 (8th Cir. 2012); Garcia-Mata v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 2018)
(reviewing the issue de novo). A waiver of inadmissibility is discretionary, see 8
U.S.C. § 1182(h), but the Board must still review the immigration judge’s decision
to deny one de novo, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).2

      It did so here. The Board specifically said it was applying de novo review,
and there is nothing to suggest it did otherwise. The fact that it adopted the

      1
       Given that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, we do not address any
of the other possible grounds for removal. See Gourche v. Holder, 663 F.3d 882,
884 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011); Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 466 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009).
      2
       We also do not address whether Green is statutorily eligible for a waiver of
inadmissibility. After all, “an application for discretionary relief, including a waiver
under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)], may be denied in the exercise of discretion without
express rulings on the question of statutory eligibility.” In re Mendez-Moralez, 21
I. & N. Dec. 296, 301 (B.I.A. 1996); cf. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449
(1985); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1976) (per curiam).
                                          -4-
immigration judge’s reasoning does not show that it “failed to exercise [its] own
discretion.” In re Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (B.I.A. 1994) (stating that the
Board’s “independent review authority does not preclude [it] from adopting or
affirming a decision of the immigration judge”).

                                        IV.

      We accordingly deny the petition for review.
                     ______________________________

                                        -5-