Court Opinion

ID: 9912805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:24.949922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:55.103462
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 In re J.C. CA1/2

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 In re J.C., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND
 HUMAN SERVICES,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                                                      A168283
 E.C.,
                                                                         (Marin County Super. Ct.
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      No. JV27161A)

         E.C. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights
over her now four-year-old son (Minor). She argues that the order must be
reversed because the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion in denying her
request for a continuance to allow for a bonding study to be conducted; and
(2) erred in declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception under
Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).1 We
disagree and affirm.

         1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.

                                                               1
                               BACKGROUND
   A. Initial Petition
      In November 2021, the Marin County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) filed a petition alleging Minor was within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he was at substantial risk of serious
harm due to Mother’s substance abuse. On November 16, police had
responded to the home because Minor, who was two years old at the time,
was found running down the street alone. According to the police report,
Mother’s breath test had a reading of 0.22 percent and there were several
open and closed containers of alcohol inside the home. Mother reported she
had “drank too much” and fallen asleep. Mother was arrested for child
endangerment and Minor was placed into protective custody. The police
officer also reported having “several contacts with [Mother] in the past and in
every case . . . [Mother] has been under the influence of alcoholic beverages.”
      The petition further alleged that Minor was at substantial risk of
serious harm due to Mother’s failure or ability to protect him from domestic
violence in the home. On October 13, 2021, police had responded to a call
after a physical altercation between Mother and Minor’s father (Father)
while there was an active restraining order against Father. Minor was
hiding and crying in a closet, and later abandoned in the parking lot of the
apartment.
      The petition also alleged abuse of a sibling. (§ 300, subd. (j).) Minor’s
half sister had been removed from her parents’ care on multiple occasions
between 2013 and 2016 due to substance abuse and domestic violence.
Parental rights were ultimately terminated, and she was adopted by her
paternal grandparents.

                                       2
      In its November 2021 detention report, the Department noted that
Minor “appeared physically healthy but developmentally had no language”
and “appeared to have an odd shaped head as if he was not carried a lot as an
infant (as evidence by his flatten bead of the head).” Minor’s “only way of
communication was pointing and grunting to people or things.” Minor’s
resource parents reported other “potential developmental delays,” including
inability to feed himself or chew and swallow on his own, and lack of potty
training. They reported that Minor showed no signs of looking for his
Mother. At the November 19 detention hearing, Mother submitted to the
Department’s recommendation that Minor be detained. The court ordered
supervised visitation between Minor and Mother.
      According to the Department’s December 2021 report, Mother reported
that she had begun “drinking heavily” sometime before 2012 and had
completed an in-patient program while Minor was a baby, but then relapsed.
Mother reported that “she knows she has a serious problem with alcohol and
cannot drink.” Minor had “adjusted well” to his resource home, was
“start[ing] to speak more, namely repeating words,” and received a medical
referral for his expressive speech delay. Mother had attended almost all of
her twice-weekly supervised visits. The report stated: “Visits have been
observed to be positive and interactive, and [Minor] appears happy during
the visits.” Mother and Minor were “observed to be connected during
supervised visits,” and “[d]uring these visits, [Minor] goes to [Mother] for
comfort and affection.”
      At the January 4, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true and ordered
reunification services to Mother.

                                       3
   B. Initial Reunification
      In June 2022, the Department recommended that Minor be reunified
with Mother and that family maintenance services be ordered. Mother
reported that she had maintained her sobriety and had shown “consistent
effort in testing clean.” Minor continued to reside at a resource home and his
“language and expression” had improved. The social worker observed a
“healthy bond” between Minor and the resource parent, and that Minor
would “usually stay by her side and listen to her instructions.” At Minor’s
first doctor appointment, where both the resource parent and Mother were
present, Minor “stayed with the resource parent and would not listen or go to
[Mother].” Minor was “more comfortable” around both the resource parent
and Mother at the second doctor’s appointment. During the supervised visits,
the social worker had observed Minor “bonded” to Mother. Minor would run
to Mother, sit on her lap, and hold her hand. Mother had “consistently been
loving, attentive, and appropriate” towards Minor. Visits became
unsupervised, with longer and more frequent visits as part of a transitional
plan towards reunification. At the June 28 hearing, the family court adopted
the Department’s recommendation and returned Minor to Mother’s care.
   C. Section 387 Petition
      In November 2022, the Department filed a section 387 petition2 to re-
remove Minor because Mother had failed to maintain her sobriety. Mother
tested positive for alcohol on October 27. According to the Department’s
report, the social worker instructed Mother to test again on November 3.
Mother did not do so, initially stating she had “forgotten,” but then refusing

      2 Section 387 provides, in relevant part, that an order “changing or

modifying a previous order by removing a child from the physical custody of a
parent . . . shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental
petition.”

                                       4
because the social worker “no longer trusted in her” and would be sending
Minor to live with paternal family members. Mother reported that Father
had come to the home two weeks prior with alcohol and methamphetamine,
and Mother agreed to live with Father (despite the restraining order).
Mother reported that she drank the alcohol, and that Father used
methamphetamine while Minor was in the home.
      The social worker visited the home unannounced on November 3,
observing through a window that Mother was asleep on a sofa and Minor was
laying over her body with a phone in his hands. After seeing the social
worker, Minor poked Mother awake. Mother appeared intoxicated; there was
an almost empty open bottle of alcohol on the sofa in reach of Minor and
another empty container under Minor’s toys. Mother initially denied
drinking, but then stated she had consumed alcohol the previous night and
that morning. During this conversation, Minor “appeared to be angry as
evidenced by throwing things at [Mother], biting her stomach, and biting the
sofa.” Minor appeared to have a dirty diaper and “was drinking water out of
a plastic bottle that had pens inside of them.”
      When the social worker indicated that Minor would be detained,
Mother left the home. When Mother returned 25 minutes later, she told the
social worker that “if she had smoked instead of consuming alcohol, ‘I would
be fucking you up right now.’ ” When the social worker walked outside with
Minor, Mother stated she was going to sleep and closed the door. The next
day, Mother called the social worker and stated that she had relapsed, but “it
was not anyone’s fault.”
      The juvenile court held a detention hearing on November 8, 2022.
Mother was not present. The court ordered the Minor detained. It also
ordered supervised visitation with Mother.

                                       5
   D. Section 387 Jurisdiction and Disposition
      The Department filed a December 2022 report recommending the court
find the previous disposition was not effective, continue to declare Minor a
dependent, and terminate reunification services to Mother. When asked
about the lead up to her current relapse, Mother referenced Minor’s
attendance in his early intervention program in late September. Mother
“vaguely described initially drinking on her own when [Minor] was not
around but over time, started to lose control of things and would drink when
he was with her.” Mother had called law enforcement and was hospitalized
in mid-November “because after drinking for the last three weeks, she was
vomiting blood and had blood in her stool.” The report indicated that since
being in the early intervention program, Minor had not met any of his
educational goals. The social worker observed that Minor was “positively
engaged with the resource parent.” Minor’s twice-weekly visits with Mother
were described as “very positive with both of them showing affection
throughout the visit.”
      Mother did not contest the section 387 allegations, but requested a
contested hearing on the disposition recommendation. At the January 24,
2023 hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations true and adopted the
Department’s recommendation to terminate reunification services to Mother.
It also ordered supervised visitation between Minor and Mother.
   E. Section 366.26 Hearing
      In May 2023, the Department filed a report recommending termination
of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and adoption as the permanent plan
for Minor under section 366.26. The Department indicated that Minor’s
paternal grandparents in Mexico had reached out about adopting Minor, and

                                       6
their home had been approved for placement by the corresponding local
agency.
      The Department reported that Minor “appeared comfortable” in his
current resource home, and that his language communication skills had
“blossomed” in the prior weeks. During the supervised visits, Mother and
Minor “laughed, played games together and read books.” Mother “interacted
with [Minor] in a developmentally appropriate way.” The Department stated
that continued contact with Mother post-adoption would be “beneficial” as
Minor had “made statements saying he misses her while in his current
resource home.”
      A report filed by Minor’s court-appointed special advocate stated that
Minor “appears to have quickly bonded with his current resource parent.” It
continued: “Initially, [Minor] constantly sought his resource parent’s
approval, exhibited a desire to reunite with her immediately after school or
daycare, and expressed anger when they were separated. That clinging
behavior has abated, but the bond continues to be strong.” Minor had also
met two of his four education goals, and was making “significant progress” on
the other two.
      At the section 366.26 hearing on June 15, 2023, Mother’s counsel
requested a continuance “for at least three months” to allow for a bonding
study to be conducted, and to confirm the permanent plan for Minor’s
placement.3 The Department opposed the request, and Minor’s counsel
added: “I don’t know, as county counsel indicated, that a bonding study
would give us more.” Mother’s counsel also argued that the beneficial

      3 Mother’s counsel asked that the court defer ruling on the continuance

request until after the evidence in the section 366.26 hearing had been
entered, as she represented that it “might sway the court.”

                                      7
relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) was
applicable and Mother’s parental rights should not be terminated.
      The Department’s May 2023 report was admitted into evidence. The
social worker testified that the plan was for Minor to be placed with his
paternal grandparents in Mexico. She testified that Minor had once told his
resource parent that he missed Mother. She also testified that Minor had
run to Mother at the start of some recent supervised visits and called her
“ ‘Mommy,’ ” but that Minor does not have difficulty separating from Mother
at the end of the visits and goes readily to his resource parent.
      No other evidence was presented at the hearing. When the matter was
submitted, the court indicated that it needed the opportunity to consider and
review issues raised at the hearing.
   F. Juvenile Court’s Ruling
      The juvenile court issued its ruling on June 27, 2023. As for Mother’s
request for a continuance for a bonding study, the court stated: “First, there
is no requirement for a bonding study by statute. It is not a prerequisite to
terminating parental rights.” Citing In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
1191 (Richard C.), it continued:
      “So is it necessary or important in this case? Here, as noted, [Minor]
has been removed twice. Mother received about 18 months of services
between the two family reunification and the family maintenance matters.
By now, a parent’s right to develop further evidence regarding her bond with
a child is approaching the vanishing point. . . .
      “It is doubtful that a bonding study would be useful to this court. This
court has handled this case from the onset. The social worker’s reports are
comprehensive. . . . There is sufficient evidence here to evaluate the bond.

                                        8
         “The request comes late in the proceedings, months after terminating
reunification services. This would require additional delays in permanency
planning. The Legislature did not contemplate last-minute efforts to put off
permanent placement.
         “While it is not beyond the court’s discretion to order a bonding study
under compelling circumstances, the denial of a belated request for such a
study is fully consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes and with
due process . . . .”
         As for the termination of parental rights, the court began by finding
Minor adoptable. Then, regarding application of the beneficial relationship
exception, the court recited the three-element legal framework from In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). It found the first element had
been met based on undisputed facts: Mother had regular visitation with
Minor.
         On the second element, the court stated that a parent “must establish
that the child has a substantial positive emotional attachment to the parent,
the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” It explained: “And how do we determine that?”
         “Well, we look at several factors: One is the age of the child. [Minor]
just turned four. Next, the portion of the child’s life spent with the parent.
[Minor] has been out of Mother’s custody for 14 months, almost a third of his
life. Next, the positive or negative interaction between [the] parent and the
child.
         “Here, the visits with Mother are positive. The social worker’s report
indicates that Mother is sweet with [Minor], that they love each other and
that it would be beneficial for Mother to maintain contact with [Minor] post
adoption.

                                          9
      “There was also a reference that [Minor] has made statements saying
he misses Mother while at his current resource home. There was also
testimony that [Minor] separates from Mother easily with no distress, that
[Minor] has expressed his sadness on only one occasion and that he is
thriving in his resource home. This is evidence that he is not showing
distress being in their care.
      “As noted in the case of [In re] Autumn H. [(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567],
the interaction between a birth parent and a child will always confer some
incidental benefit to the child, but that is not enough. Here, I cannot help but
note that [Minor] has been removed from Mother twice. [Minor] has
experienced negative interactions for his whole life while in Mother’s care. A
parent’s struggles with the issues leading to dependency may be relevant to
the extent they impact the three prongs.
      “It is not the basis of this court’s finding, but Mother’s struggles with
abuse, substance abuse, stretch back over a decade and are relevant to the
extent they impact a positive or negative interaction between [Minor] and
Mother and to the extent that they have inevitably lessened a parental bond
made and broken for the duration of the child’s life.”
      On the third element, the court stated that “we look to [Minor’s] needs.
As noted by [M]inor’s counsel, the benefits of adoption far outweigh [Minor’s]
relationship with Mother.” Minor’s counsel had argued that “this case does
really depend on the third prong under Caden C. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I do think
this is a kid who has moved several times, has experienced a lot of trauma.
We know that from his issues with speech, he’s made a lot of progress, is
doing well. . . . [¶] And the benefits of adoption far outweigh continuing the
relationship he does have with his mom.”

                                       10
      The juvenile court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
and ordered adoption as the permanent plan. Mother appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
    I. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Bonding Study Request
      Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying
her request for a continuance to allow for a bonding study to be conducted.4
      As the juvenile court correctly noted, and Mother concedes, “There is no
requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding
study as a condition precedent to a termination order.” (In re Lorenzo C.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) Instead, a bonding study is one of the
tools in the toolkit available to the court to help assess the relationship
between a minor and parent. (See Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 195, 202 [evaluation under Evid. Code, § 730 is an “ ‘information-
gathering tool’ ”].) Accordingly, the court’s decision regarding whether to
employ that tool is an evidentiary ruling we review for abuse of discretion.
(In re Lorenzo C., at p. 1338.) “A ruling that constitutes an abuse of
discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
      The juvenile court’s ruling here was not an abuse of discretion. The
court aptly concluded, along with Minor’s counsel, that a bonding study was
unlikely to be useful in this case at this stage. There was no question that
Mother’s substance abuse made her “unable to provide regular care” for
Minor, to the point of risking “serious physical harm to the child, or a

      4 We need not and do not address Mother’s argument that the juvenile

court also abused its discretion on her prior motion for a bonding study made
at the January 24, 2023 dispositional hearing. Mother did not appeal that
ruling.

                                       11
substantial risk of such harm.” (In re N.R. (Dec. 14, 2023, S274943) ___
Cal.5th ___ [2023 Cal. LEXIS 6777, pp. *33–*34].) The court explained that
the Department’s reports were “comprehensive” and there was “sufficient
evidence” for the court to evaluate the bond. Among other things, the
Department had filed six reports detailing the interactions between Minor
and Mother across the two years since dependency proceedings had been
initiated. Citing Richard C., the court explained that the timing of the
request—at the section 366.26 hearing, six months after Mother’s
reunification services were terminated—supported denial.
      Mother now argues that Richard C. is “materially distinguishable.” We
disagree. In that case, the parent had requested a bonding study at the
section 366.26 hearing because her visitation was previously sporadic, but
had been regular for the past year. (Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1194.) The appellate court affirmed the denial of the request. (Id. at
p. 1197.) It explained: “ ‘At the time the court makes its determination, the
parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or
longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular
relationship should be apparent.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1196–1197, quoting In re
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 (Autumn H.).) Given Mother
appears to have had more consistency in her visitation than the parent in
Richard C., this principle applies with even greater force as the bond between
Minor and Mother was apparent and well documented in the evidence
already available to the juvenile court.
      Mother contends next that Richard C. has “questionable reliability”
after Caden C. Again, we disagree. In Caden C., the juvenile court held a
section 366.26 hearing at which it received testimony, department reports, a
bonding study performed by the mother’s expert, a clinical consultation

                                       12
report, and a letter from the child. (Id. at p. 627.) Our Supreme Court noted
that the juvenile and appellate courts found the bonding study “informative”
in that case, and advised courts to “seriously consider, where requested and
appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other relevant expert testimony.”
(Id. at p. 633, fn. 4, italics added.)5 Richard C. does not contradict that
guidance. It only suggests that a bonding study request made at the section
366.26 hearing might be less useful, given the time that has elapsed in the
proceedings and other evidence that has already developed, and therefore
less appropriate in such circumstances. (Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1196–1197.)
      Finally, Mother argues that the juvenile court’s concern about the
months-long delay associated with the continuance request was “misplaced”
because Minor had not yet been placed with his paternal grandparents in
Mexico. As a preliminary matter, the court made clear that this was not the
dispositive factor in its analysis, clarifying it still had the discretion to order
a bonding study if there were “compelling circumstances” to do so. In any
event, Mother provides no authority that consideration of such delay for a
bonding study request at the section 366.26 stage constitutes an abuse of
discretion. “Our Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the shift in
emphasis at the section 366.26 hearing . . . .” (Richard C., supra, 68
Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) Family preservation “ ‘is one of the goals of the
dependency laws’ ” and is of “ ‘critical importance’ ” when a child is removed
from parental custody, but “ ‘Family preservation ceases to be of overriding
concern if a dependent child cannot be safely returned to parental custody

      5 Mother also cites In re Jacob S. (2022) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011 for the

proposition that bonding studies may be helpful in certain circumstances, but
the particulars of that case are not material here as it involved the usefulness
of sibling bond studies when siblings are young. (Id. at p. 1018.)

                                         13
and the juvenile court terminates reunification services. Then, the focus
shifts from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s interest in
permanency and stability.’ ” (Ibid.) Accordingly, it seems well within the
court’s discretion to have considered the delay to permanency associated with
Mother’s request.
      In sum, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mother’s request for a continuance to allow for a bonding study to be
conducted.
                 II. No Error in Declining to Apply Beneficial
                           Relationship Exception
      Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the
beneficial relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
“The beneficial relationship test is an exception to the presumptive rule of
terminating parental rights after reunification efforts have failed, in order to
free a child for adoption.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067.)
The parent asserting the beneficial relationship exception must show three
elements by a preponderance of evidence: (1) “regular visitation and contact”
with the child; (2) the child “has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 636.) As described above, the first element is not at issue here
as the court found Mother had regular visitation with Minor based on
undisputed facts.
      Turning to the remainder of the test, we review the juvenile court’s
determination on the second element for substantial evidence. (In re Eli B.,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 1061.) We review the third element “under a hybrid

                                        14
standard, reviewing its factual determinations concerning the detriment
analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the relative
harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion.”
(Id. at pp. 1067–1068.)
      “In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a
reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640.) “The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by
substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also
exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it
believed other evidence.’ ”6 (Ibid.)
      With this framework in mind, we turn to Mother’s four arguments
regarding the court’s ruling on the beneficial relationship exception here.
      A. Specificity of Findings
      Mother argues that the juvenile court “did not make specific findings
regarding the second two prongs of the test and appears to have conflated
them.” We disagree. On the second element, the court indicated that
supervised visits had been “positive,” but “incidental benefit to the child” was
not enough and Minor “has experienced negative interactions for his whole
life while in Mother’s care” resulting in a “lessened” and “broken” bond. On
the third element, the court specifically found that “the benefits of adoption
far outweigh [Minor’s] relationship with Mother.”

      6 Mother cites In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 and appears to

suggest there is more to this substantial evidence standard for the
determination that she failed her burden on the second and third elements.
That case merely states that the standard is not met when uncontradicted
evidence compels a finding that a parent carried his or her burden as a
matter of law. (Id. at p. 1528.) As detailed below, there was no such evidence
here.

                                       15
      Even if the juvenile court did not state its specific findings on the
record, “we are aware of no requirement—and [Mother] cites no authority
supporting the proposition—that the juvenile court, in finding the parental-
benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its
conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception. To
the contrary, we infer from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which
the juvenile court is required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’
when it makes a finding that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child—that the court is not required to make findings
when it concludes that parental rights termination would not be
detrimental.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)
      B. Sufficiency of Evidence on Second Element
      Mother argues next that there was insufficient evidence to conclude she
had failed her burden on the second element: that Minor had a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to her.
      As the juvenile court recognized, it is not enough to show that
interactions with Mother conferred “some incidental benefit” to Minor.
(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “A positive attachment
between parent and child is necessarily one that is not detrimental to the
child but is nurturing and provides the child with a sense of security and
stability,” and “an emotional attachment is one where the child views the
parent as more than a mere friend or playmate and [whose] interactions with
the parent were not ambivalent, detached, or indifferent.” (In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 (B.D.).) The relationship “must be examined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a
parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in
the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between

                                        16
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables
which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (Autumn H., at p. 576.) “[C]ourts
often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about
their parents.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
      We conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the court’s
finding that Mother failed her burden on this second element. Minor was two
years old when he was removed from Mother and spent 14 months—one-third
of his life—in resource homes. Minor experienced multiple negative
interactions while in Mother’s custody. Minor witnessed an incident of
domestic violence between Mother and Father, and was then abandoned in a
parking lot. The next month, Mother got drunk and fell asleep, leaving
Minor to wander out in the street alone. After Minor was returned to her
custody, Mother relapsed again and was unresponsive with Minor in her
presence. Minor “appeared to be angry as evidenced by throwing things at
[Mother], biting her stomach, and biting the sofa.” This evidence contradicts
any argument that Minor’s attachment to Mother provided him “with a sense
of security and stability.” (B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.)
      While Mother highlights the favorable observations of her supervised
visits with Minor, there was substantial evidence showing he was
“ambivalent, detached, or indifferent” to their relationship. (B.D., supra,
66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.) The social worker testified that Minor did not
have difficulty separating from Mother at the end of the visits and went
readily to his resource parent. Minor, however, had “constantly sought his
resource parent’s approval, exhibited a desire to reunite with her
immediately after school or daycare, and expressed anger when they were
separated.” (Cf. In re D.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153, 167, 170 [reversing
order terminating parental rights where juvenile court performed no analysis

                                       17
of beneficial relationship exception and there was evidence that children had
spent entire life with parents, “routinely asked when they would be coming
home,” and “were happier with [mother] than with the caretakers”].) Minor’s
previous resource parents reported that he showed no signs of looking for his
Mother. At Minor’s first doctor appointment, Minor “stayed with the
resource parent and would not listen or go to [Mother].”
      C. Factors on Second Element
      Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred on the second element
by considering “improper factors,” namely Mother’s struggles with substance
abuse and domestic violence. But as the juvenile court explained, and
Mother appears to concede, our Supreme Court has made clear that “[i]ssues
such as those that led to dependency often prove relevant to the application of
the exception. . . . A parent’s struggles may mean that interaction between
parent and child at least sometimes has a ‘ “negative” effect’ on the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
      B.D. offers a helpful point of comparison. In that case, the appellate
court reversed the order terminating parental rights because the juvenile
court had erred on its analysis of the second element. (B.D., supra, 66
Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.) The juvenile court had “relied heavily, if not
exclusively, on the fact that the parents had not completed their reunification
plans and were unable to care for the children based on their long-term and
continued substance abuse” and “did not examine how the parents’ continued
substance abuse impacted the nature of the parent-child relationship.” (Id.
at p. 1228.) Here, unlike B.D., the juvenile court explicitly considered
Mother’s substance abuse and domestic violence issues “to the extent that
they have inevitably lessened a parental bond made and broken for the
duration of the child’s life.” And there was substantial evidence supporting

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this consideration, given Minor had witnessed domestic violence and repeated
incidents of substance abuse while in Mother’s care.
      D. Third Element
      Finally, Mother argues that the juvenile court did not perform either
part of the analysis on the third element of the beneficial relationship
exception: (1) determining whether terminating the attachment would be
detrimental to Minor; and (2) balancing any detriment against the benefit of
adoption. The record does not support this view. While not required to do so
(In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156), the juvenile court explicitly
described the “lessened” and “broken” bond between Minor and Mother and
found, in light of Minor’s “needs,” that “the benefits of adoption far outweigh
[Minor’s] relationship with Mother.”
      There was substantial evidence to conclude Mother had failed her
burden on the factual predicates for this element. There was little evidence
that Minor would experience significant material or emotional harm from
terminating his relationship with Mother. Minor had expressed only once
that he missed Mother, and appeared at least ambivalent about their
relationship. Minor did not have difficulty separating from Mother and had
bonded with his resource parents, whom he did have difficulty separating
from. The record also supports the court’s factual determination that Minor’s
needs would be benefited by adoption. Among other things, there was
evidence that Minor’s current placement had presented some challenges with
attending his early intervention program. The social worker testified that
Minor’s paternal grandparents were aware of Minor’s needs and had special
education services available to them. Given the evidence for these factual
determinations, we cannot conclude that the court’s balancing constituted an
abuse of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)

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      In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in declining to
apply the beneficial relationship exception.
                               DISPOSITION
      The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

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                                         _________________________
                                         Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

In re J.C. (A168283)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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