Court Opinion

ID: 9776996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:50:51.372265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:45.896840
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I join in much of Justice Dudley’s dissent and write to emphasize that the trial court erred in failing to address the constitutional issues of Mr. Williams’ political free speech. It is not for this court to develop the facts and the law surrounding that issue, but that is exactly what the majority opinion does. Here, the State concedes that the arrest was illegal. Like Justice Dudley, I would remand the matter for the trial court’s consideration and resolution of the First Amendment issue. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON GRANTING REHEARING JULY 3, 1995 901 S.W.2d 831 1. Appeal & error — trial court should have allowed appellant OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT TESTIMONY ON WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED AT THE TIME OF HIS INITIAL ARREST — REQUEST FOR A REMAND TO THE LOWER COURT FOR A FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE facts granted. — Where the trial court failed to afford appellant the opportunity to present relevant testimony on whether probable cause existed at the time of his initial arrest, the appellant’s request for a remand to the lower court for a full development of the facts was granted. 2. Appeal & error — explanatory testimony concerning a videotape NOT ALLOWED — TESTIMONY PROPERLY EXCLUDED AT TRIAL. — The trial court’s denial of appellant’s request to present explanatory testimony related to a videotape which had been introduced into evidence was not in error. Petition for Rehearing granted. Jeff R. Conner, for appellant. Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att’y Gen., Senior Appellate Advocate, for appellee. Tom Glaze, Justice. In his original brief in this appeal, Jeffrey Williams argued in his second point for reversal that the trial court erred in refusing to admit his testimony bearing on the illegality of his arrest for disorderly conduct. Specifically, Williams contended he was denied an opportunity to present testimony on whether probable cause existed at the time of his initial arrest. The trial court declared such testimony was irrelevant. Following that ruling, the trial court also denied Williams the opportunity to proffer testimony concerning the probable cause issue. The thrust of Williams’ argument on this point was that the trial court’s rulings frustrated his attempt to show he was doing nothing wrong before the officers ordered him to leave, and no basis existed for the charge of disorderly conduct. In sum, Williams asserted that the “trumped up” disorderly conduct charge was merely used by the officers to remove him and “bootstrap” themselves into obtaining a.conviction for refusal to submit to arrest. In our original review of this cause, we mistakenly failed to address Williams’ second point as described above. Williams suggests our opinion improperly considered the officers’ testimonies concerning the probable cause issue even though the trial court had refused him the opportunity to develop evidence on that issue. While Williams’ arguments, constitutional and otherwise, seem to overlap and appear confusing in some respects, we are convinced of two things. First, the trial court was wrong in not affording Williams the opportunity to present testimony on whether probable cause existed at the time of his initial arrest. Such testimony was relevant. If probable cause did, in fáct, exist, Williams’ constitutional arguments are arguably preempted even if those arguments had been timely preserved. Second, the trial court compounded its error by denying Williams the opportunity to proffer testimony bearing on the probable cause issue. See Ark. R. Evid. 103(a)(2).  In view of the above, we grant Williams’ request for a remand to the lower court for a full development of the facts. If the constitutional issues argued by Williams are viable after further development of relevant testimony in this cause, the trial court may then address them.  One additional point needs mentioning since this matter will require further evidentiary proceedings on remand. Concerning this court’s original opinion as it involved Williams’ request to present explanatory testimony related to a videotape which had been introduced into evidence, we reiterate our holding that the trial court did not err in excluding such testimony. See Williams v. State, 320 Ark. at 211, 222-223, 895 S.W.2d 913 (1995). For the foregoing reasons, we grant Williams’ petition for rehearing.