Court Opinion

ID: 9860165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:13:01.428122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:37.891516
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority on two basic elements of its disposition. First, the majority note that section 19(k) penalties may be awarded in cases of unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment. Their disposition, however, deals glancingly with the question of unreasonableness and concentrates essentially on vexatiousness or the lack of vexatiousness. The crux of the issue met by the parties in this appeal is the question of unreasonableness, not vexatiousness. Relying on McMahan, the majority limit the application of section 19(k) to situations where there has been vexatious conduct on the part of the employer. McMahan does not apply to the case at hand. McMahan addressed issuing penalties for delay in continuing weekly compensation benefits due an employee during the period of temporary total disability (TTD). McMahan, 183 Ill. 2d at 514-15, 702 N.E.2d at 552-53. McMahan limited section 19(k) to cases of vexatious conduct in those situations in order to distinguish section 19(k) from section 19(1), which also allows for penalties for not making continuing payments for TTD. McMahan, 183 Ill. 2d at 514-15, 702 N.E.2d at 552-53. Extending McMahan to cases involving delay after the entry of an award ignores the plain language of section 19(k). As to the real issue at hand, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of employer’s conduct, the circuit judge, Judge Colwell, who reversed the initial Commission decision, rendered these words of wisdom in his order: “The sole excuse in justification of the delay, offered by the [employer], seems to be an unexplained change in personnel. It is unreasonable that the [claimant] should be required to undertake the burden of the consequences of [the employer’s] personnel practices or of its work place policies.” Judge Colwell was right. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court of Kane County. HOLDRIDGE, J., joins this dissent.