Court Opinion

ID: 9448485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:37:01.938787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:26.683320
License: Public Domain

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
The crucial issue is whether the stolen credit card unlawfully transported in interstate commerce was used or fitted to be used in the false making or forging of a security. The information charged that the credit card was used with a machine by which “an impression is mechanically applied to a form of invoice, an evidence of indebtedness and security.”
The statute defines security to include evidence of indebtedness,1 but does not include “invoice” within the definition and does not define evidence of indebtedness. The word “invoice” was used in the information to describe critically the nature of the instrument made by the use of the credit card.2 The sufficiency of the information depends on whether an invoice is a security.
The guilty plea admits all well pleaded facts.3 If it affirmatively appears on the face of an indictment or information that no federal offense was committed, the charge is vulnerable to attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because one cannot plead guilty to an offense which is not affirmatively stated in the charge.4 In at least three prosecutions under the Transportation of Stolen Property Act5 this court has considered, after a guilty plea, the sufficiency of the indictment or information. In Hawley v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 161 F.2d 825, the charge was transportation of a check-writing machine used to falsify a check. The holding was that the making of a false check was within the statute. In Birtch v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 158 F.2d 134, certiorari denied 331 U.S. 825, 67 S.Ct. 1314, 91 L.Ed. 1841, a profit *791sharing agreement was held to be a security within the statute. In Marteney v. United States, supra, the court set aside a judgment entered upon a guilty plea when the charge did not show any false making of a security.
Appellant’s guilty plea admitted that the credit card was used to make an invoice, but did not admit the legal conclusion that an invoice is an evidence of indebtedness and therefore a security. The question is not whether an invoice “could be cast in a form evidencing indebtedness” but whether “invoice” as used in the charge is in law an evidence of indebtedness.
Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. defines “invoice” as:
“A written account, or itemized statement, of merchandise shipped or sent to a purchaser, consignee, factor, etc., with the quantity, value or prices, and charges annexed.”
Dows v. National Exchange Bank, 91 U.S. 618, 630, 23 L.Ed. 214, says that an invoice is not a bill of sale or evidence of sale and is “a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity, and cost or price of the things invoiced.” “Invoice” is an■other term for bill rendered and standing alone it is not a written promise, ■order, or direction for the payment of money.6 In Federal Trade Commission v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 the Supreme Court said that “invoice” as used in the Fur Products Labeling Act7 includes a retail sales slip.
Whether considered as a list of goods ■sold and the charges therefor, as a bill rendered, or as a sales slip, “invoice” does not imply any acknowledgment of a duty to pay. An evidence of indebtedness may not be created by the unilateral .act of a creditor. I agree with United States v. Jones, W.D.Mo., 182 F.Supp. 146, and United States v. Fordyce, S.D.Cal., 192 F.Supp. 93, that a sales slip is neither an evidence of indebtedness nor .a security. “Invoice,” as used in the information under consideration, does not imply any type of instrument other than a sales slip.
We are concerned with the narrow issues of this case. When sustained by the facts, § 2314 may well be used in credit card cases but there must be some allegation to bring the instrument made by the credit card within the definition of security. I would reverse the judgment and set aside the judgment of conviction.

. 18 U.S.C. § 2311.

. Cf. Marteney v. United States, 10 Cir., 216 F.2d 760, 763.

. Adam v. United States, 10 Cir., 274 F.2d 880, 882-883.

. Marteney v. United States, supra, 216 F.2d p. 762.

. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and its predecessor.

. Greis v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, N.D.Okl., 19 F.Supp. 480.

. 15 U.S.C.A. § 69 et seq.