Court Opinion

ID: 9471786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:41:15.566414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:34.971074
License: Public Domain

RONEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Correctly reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, the district court should not be reversed for abstaining in this case.
Two of the six factors set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., -- U.S. --, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), to be considered in exercising discretion as to abstention, would seem to be significant. First, both the federal and state courts must determine rights in property over which the state court has first taken jurisdiction. The basis of Linda Forehand’s section 1983 claim is that she was not given notice before seizure of her property. Necessarily involved in this claim is the issue of whether Linda Forehand had an interest in the property. The same issue is before the state court in which litigation was first commenced. Second, this determination of property interest which would be made in the § 1983 claim involves questions of state law.
Admittedly through oversight, the bank failed to join Linda Forehand in the state action against the property. Before it could cure that defect, Linda’s own husband, Troy Forehand, upon receiving the • notice of the state seizure, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, temporarily halting further action in the state court. After dismissal of the bankruptcy petition, the bank did add Linda Forehand as a defendant in the state action, in which her interest in the property will be determined under state law.
Instead of using the process available for her in state court to protect her rights, however, Linda Forehand hastily filed a § 1983 action for damages only, claiming a violation of her due process rights. Presumably, until the state procedure is conducted, there will be some difficulty in determining the extent of her damage, even assuming she can prove a due process violation at all. See Lewis v. Hillsborough Transit Authority, 726 F.2d 668 (11th Cir.1984). It seems to me not only within the discretion permitted a district judge but probably an efficient way of handling the matter is to simply wait until that state proceeding is completed.
In order to prevent statute of limitations and other problems from needlessly interfering with the eventual adjudication of Linda Forehand’s § 1983 claim, the district court should have retained jurisdiction until termination of the state litigation, at which time Linda’s federal claim, if she still had one, could be fully considered.