Court Opinion

ID: 9492847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:51:51.123844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:31.358844
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:
I dissent.
It seems to me the literal reading of Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 engaged in by the learned majority and the district court is wooden and unsound. I agree with the district judge that the Sentencing Commission, “having recognized in the first sentence the wide variability in the aggravated felonies that trigger the [16-level] bump-up, then proceeded to adopt an exceptionally flawed solution to that problem by enacting a straight jacket that doesn’t make a great deal of sense.” I also agree with appellant that under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), unless a factor is prohibited, it may be taken into account in an atypical case. Id. at 93, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (“the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.”) (quoting U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, intro, comment. 4(b)). Indeed, the Commission focused in on the very problem here when it said, “When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.” Id. (emphasis added).
Tappin’s conduct did significantly differ from the norm in the following respects:
1) The prior felony was 26-plus years old and is not countable as criminal history under the § 4A1.2(e) rule;
2) The prior felony was third-degree possession of a gun which was found in Tappin’s glove compartment during a road checkpoint stop;
3) The triggering felony was the sale of .8 gram (one glassine) of heroin for $20; and
4) Since his return to the United States in 1996, Tappin had not only committed no crimes, but worked with consistent superlative quality through the end of 1998 at the Bowery Residents Committee Inc. for Homeless Senior Services. His dedicated care for the program’s elderly clientele earned him such praise as “loyal, trustworthy and kind,” and “one of the most honest, re*544sponsible and hardest working men I have ever known.”
The language of Application Note 5 is not — I repeat not — prohibitory. It should not be read to be such. To do so is to violate the spirit of the Guidelines as well as the directive of Koon. Tappin’s is an “exceptional” case, one outside the Guideline’s “heartland.” The maxim relied on by my brethren in interpreting the application note, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, is “not always correct,” In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128 (D.C.Cir.1999), because its application depends on context. I agree with Lord Esher that maxims “are almost invariably misleading,” Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q.B.D. 647, 653 (1887), and with Lord Mansfield that “great caution ought to be used by the Court” in dealing with them. Brisbane v. Deckers, 5 Taunt. 143, 162 (1813). Holmes indeed went further: “General maxims are oftener an excuse for the want of accurate analysis than a help.... ” Ryalls v. Mechanics’ Mills, 150 Mass. 190, 194, 22 N.E. 766, 767 (1889).
I therefore respectfully dissent.