Court Opinion

ID: 9757886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:03:02.841928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.252469
License: Public Domain

Opinion bx
Mr. Justice Jones,
This appeal stems from the refusal by the Court of Common Pleas No. 9 of Philadelphia County to issue a preliminary injunction at the instance of a retail beer distributor concern against a labor union and certain of its officers and members.
Edmund Stryjewski and Jean Stryjewski, his wife, trading as Tacony Beer Distributing Company [Stryjewskis], operate a licensed beer distributing concern on Torresdale Avenue, Philadelphia. Local Union No. 803 [Union], a Teamsters Union affiliate, is the collective bargaining agent for brewery and beer distribu*514tor drivers, helpers and platform men in the Philadelphia area. This Union has a collective bargaining agreement with certain importing distributors1 who supply beer to so-called “D Distributors”, such as Stryjewskis and other retail beer distributors. This collective bargaining agreement provides, inter alia, that all beer supplied by the importing distributors must be delivered to their retail beer distributor customers and that no beer may be picked up at the platforms of the importing distributors by the importing distributors’ customers, including Stryjewskis.2 It is obvious that, because of this provision in the collective bargaining agreement, the picketing of the premises of a “D Distributor”, such as Stryjewskis, precludes the receipt of any beer supplies from the importing distributors because the latters’ union employees will not cross the picket line to make beer deliveries.
“To advertise the fact that [Stryjewskis] is nonunion and to attempt to organize the employees employed by [Stryjewskis]”,3 Stryjewskis’ premises were picketed by the Union from January 10th to 20th, 1967 and from February 10th until the time of hearing in the court below.4 Stryjewskis claim that one of their sons is their sole employee.
On January 12, 1967, Stryjewskis instituted this equity action in the Court of Common Pleas No. 9 of Philadelphia County against the Union and certain of *515its officers and members seeking both monetary damages and injunctive relief to terminate the picketing. After hearing, the court below refused to issue a preliminary injunction and from that decree the instant appeal was taken.
An examination of the opinion of the court below clearly indicates that its refusal to grant injunctive relief was predicated upon the view that the matters at issue were arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board [NLRB], and not the state court.
Initially, we recognize two well-settled principles of law as presently applicable: (1) on an appeal from a decree refusing to grant a preliminary injunction, our appellate review is limited to a determination whether there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below and, unless it is clear that no such grounds existed or that the rules of law relied upon are “palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable”, the merits of the case or the reasons for or against the court’s action are not considered: Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 342, 344, 123 A. 2d 626 (1956); Riverside Borough School District v. International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, Local No. 607, 389 Pa. 637, 638, 133 A. 2d 554 (1957); Northampton Area Joint School Authority v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 396 Pa. 565, 571, 152 A. 2d 688 (1959); (2) when the matters in dispute are arguably subject to Sections 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA],5 then the state, as well as the federal, courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB if the danger of state interference with national labor policy is to be averted: San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 *516S. Ct. 773 (1959); Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 186, 187, 161 A. 2d 603 (1960); Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Local Union No. 830, 408 Pa. 380, 383, 184 A. 2d 243 (1962).
The sole question resolved by the court below was that of jurisdiction, a question generally troublesome in labor litigation. It is clear beyond any doubt that it has been the intent of the Congress through its legislative enactments and of the United States Supreme Court through its pronouncements to fashion a labor policy which is national in scope. However,- for some years an intolerable situation existed in labor-management disputes where the NLRB, for budgetary or other considerations, declined or refused to act and where the state courts or agencies, by reason of the ruling in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 598 (1957), were precluded from exercising any jurisdiction. Both management and labor frequently found themselves in a “no man’s land” where rights existed without a remedy for their enforcement. To correct this situation, through the enactment of the LMRA,6 supra, the Congress provided that state courts could assume jurisdiction in labor disputes where the NLRB, by rule of decision or published rules, had declined or refused to assert jurisdiction. See: Pa. Labor Relations Board v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 365-370, 192 A. 2d 707 (1963).
In the court below, Stryjewskis argued that jurisdiction was in the state court because the NLRB could not and would not take jurisdiction for two reasons: first, because their only employee was their son7 and *517second, because Stryjewskis’ gross yearly sales were only $230,000.8 However, at the time of the . hearing in. the court below, the NLRB had not declined or refused to take jurisdiction9 and the matters at issue were subject to construction as arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB under the Garmon ruling, supra.
Iu the court below, Stryjewskis had the burden of showing that the NLRB would not assume jurisdiction. Assuming, arguendo, that Stryjewskis had carried their burden of proof that, iu all probability, the NLRB would not take jurisdiction because Stryjewskis had only one employee, i.e., their son, and because their gross annual retail sales were far below the jurisdictional standard of cases entertained under the rule enunciated by the NLRB, the question still remains whether until such time as the NLRB, in fact, has declined or refused to accept jurisdiction the state court could assume jurisdiction. .
*518Whether a state court can assume jurisdiction in the absence of an actual declination or refusal to act on the part of the NLRB has not been specifically determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Cf. Hattiesburg Building & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126, 84 S. Ct. 1156 (1964); Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians, Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 85 S. Ct. 876 (1965). On this subject courts in other jurisdictions have adopted contrary views. In Colorado State Council of Carpenters v. District Court of Larrimer County, 155 Colo. 54, 392 P. 2d 601 (1964) the Supreme Court of Colorado held that before a state court can take jurisdiction it must be shown that the NLRB has declined to do so. In Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 669, 43 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1965) the District Court of Appeals in California held that an assumption of jurisdiction by state courts must await an actual declination to act by the NLRB but the Supreme Court of California in Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966) reversed this ruling stating, inter alia: “We hold that the jurisdiction exercised by the state courts pursuant to section 14(c) does not depend upon a showing that the [NLRB] has, in fact, declined to act. Rather, we believe that the party seeking relief need only demonstrate, on the basis of published regulations and decisions of the board, that the case is one which the board will decline to hear.”10
We believe that, until the United States Supreme Court has spoken directly on this subject we should adhere to the view that, pending an actual declination *519to act by the NLRB, a state court should not assume jurisdiction. While both the LMRA and NLRB, the latter through the medium of its rules, have established certain standards it is evident that cases necessarily will present many variables and a resolution of such variable by the state courts, in the absence of a declination to act by the NLRB, may well result in a chaotic situation which will harm the national labor policy.
On the basis of the instant record and in the absence, at the time of hearing, of an actual declination or refusal to act by the NLRB, the court below did have reasonable grounds for its refusal of injunctive relief under the circumstances. When the matter comes on for final hearing, the fact that the NLRB has declined to act will furnish a basis upon which the court below can now assume jurisdiction and proceed to the determination of the cause on its merits.
Decree affirmed. Appellants to pay costs.
Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 An “importing distributor” imports beer from outside the. state and sells to “D Distributors” wbo sell, either at wholesale or retail, but not to other distributors.

 Stryjewskis contend that this provision of the agreement was the result of the decisions in Schauffler v. Brewery and Beer Distributor Drivers, Helpers and Platform Men, Local 830, 162 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa.) (1958) and NLRB v. Brewery & Beer Distributor Drivers, Local 830, 281 F. 2d 319 (C.A. 3) (1960).

 Testimony of the president and business agent of the Union.

 There is neither allegation nor proof that such picketing occasioned any acts of violence or breaches of the peace.

 National Labor Relations Act, as amended by Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, §101, 29 U.S.C. §§157, 158,

 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Title I, §101, 29 U.S.C., .§164(c), (1), (2).

 “Tbe term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed by his parent . . .” LMRA, 1947, §101, 29 U.S.C. §152(3). See: North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass’n v. NLRB, 109 F. 2d 76 (1940), cert. den. 310 U.S. 632, reh. den. 311 U.S. 724. *517In this connection, we disagree with the court below in its footnote finding that Stryjewskis had other employees because an examination of the record fails to substantiate such finding and the evidence in this respect falls far short of the qualitative evidence to support a finding of fact to that effect.-

 Under the authority granted by the provisions of the LMRL §164, (c), (1), 29 U.S.C., §164 (c)(1), the NLRB announced (NLRB Release No. R-576, issued October 2, 1958), that it would assert jurisdiction over all retail enterprises which fell within its statutory jurisdiction and which had a gross volume of business of at least |500,00'0 annually. For the considerations which led to the revision of the NLRB standards, see: Siemons Mailing Service. 122 NLRB 81 (1958). See also: Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 NLRB 88 (1958). The court below considered such factor of no moment because it was of the opinion that it was not the amount of business done by Stryjewskis which was of importance but the amount of business done by the. importing distributors. The soundness of that opinion need not now be considered.

 Since the hearing in the .court below, the NLRB has declined to take jurisdiction. However, such post-trial declination plays no part in determining the propriety of the refusal to issue an injunction on the facts existing at the time of hearing.

 Commentators also have taken opposite views: Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLR Act (1959), 44 Minn. Law Rev. 257, 262; Goldberg and Meiklejohn, Title VII; TaftHartley Amendments, with Emphasis on the Legislative History: (1960), 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 659, 747.