Court Opinion

ID: 9401915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 17:03:42.182146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:56.155133
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/14/23 In re Kieran S. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re KIERAN S., a Person Coming                                    B318672
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00321A)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 AMBER C.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Susan Ser, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jonathan Grossman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             ____________________________________

                         INTRODUCTION

       Amber C., mother of two-year-old Kieran S., appeals from
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders
after the court sustained a petition filed by the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).1
Amber argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s
finding her substance abuse put Kieran at a substantial risk of
serious physical harm. She also argues substantial evidence did
not support the court’s findings that absconding with Kieran and
failing to protect her from her father’s drug use and mental
health problems also placed Kieran at a substantial risk of
serious physical harm. Because substantial evidence supported
the first jurisdiction finding, we affirm.

        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        A.  The Department Investigates the Family, and Amber
            Absconds with Kieran
     Amber and Victor S. (not a party to this appeal) are
Kieran’s parents. In April 2019, when Kieran was two months

1       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                  2
old, the Department received a referral stating the parents used
drugs in the child’s presence. A Department social worker met
with the parents at a home in Lancaster. Victor admitted he
used marijuana; Amber denied she used any drugs and said she
intended to return to Shasta County. The parents agreed to take
drug tests. On April 30, 2019 the social worker received the
results: Victor’s sample was diluted; Amber’s positive for
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine. When the
social worker discussed the test results with Amber the next day,
Amber denied using methamphetamine.
       On May 2, 2019 the social worker called Amber and left a
voicemail message asking her to return the call. On May 6, 2019
Amber sent the social worker a text message stating she left
Lancaster and was in Sacramento with her father “for now.” The
social worker asked Amber for her new address so that a child
protective agency could conduct a welfare check on Kieran.
Amber did not reply to the message or answer the phone when
the social worker called.
       Unable to learn where Amber and Kieran were, the social
worker concluded Amber was evading the Department, which on
May 13, 2019 filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b),
alleging Amber’s substance abuse put Kieran at substantial risk
of serious physical harm. The juvenile court issued an order
detaining Kieran from both parents, a protective custody warrant
for Kieran, and an arrest warrant for Amber. On June 19, 2019 a
social worker spoke with Amber on the phone, but Amber refused
to disclose where she and Kieran were. Amber stated: “[I]f I let
you guys know where I am then you will take my child and I
cannot let you guys do that.” Amber also denied she used drugs,
suggested the test result was “mixed up,” and claimed the

                                3
Department could not prove she used drugs “while with
[Kieran].”
       On August 16, 2019 Amber appeared in juvenile court in
Los Angeles County Superior Court. She left, however, before the
court called the matter for a hearing. The Department had no
contact with Amber for almost two years.
       In April 2021 Amber gave the Department an address
where she claimed Kieran lived with his maternal grandmother.
Despite several welfare checks by local law enforcement, Kieran
was not found at the address. On October 13, 2021 Kieran was
finally located in a home in Shasta County and subsequently
placed in a foster home in Los Angeles County. According to a
detective working on the case, Amber admitted she used
methamphetamine “that day or the day before” and
acknowledged she had a “problem with meth.” The detective
reported that law enforcement found a pipe used for smoking
methamphetamine in an unattached room of the home and that
the home was clean and Kieran appeared to be doing well.
       On October 27, 2021 the Department spoke to Amber about
the allegations in the petition. During the conversation Amber
denied any drug use and claimed she “never got in trouble for
meth.” She admitted, however, she had a 10-year addiction to
opiates. Amber also said Victor used methamphetamine and
marijuana, drank too much alcohol, and had mental health
issues. The Department also learned that Victor claimed Amber
used drugs with her father (Kieran’s maternal grandfather), that
Kieran’s godmother reported Amber used methamphetamine
recreationally, and that the family’s “biggest concern was
[Amber’s] methamphetamine . . . abuse.” Based on this
information, the Department on November 23, 2021 filed an

                               4
amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b), to add
allegations that Amber and Victor placed Kieran at risk by
absconding with Kieran and that Amber failed to protect Kieran
from Victor’s mental and emotional problems. The Department
asked Amber to take an on-demand drug test, but Amber did not
appear for the scheduled test.

      B.      The Juvenile Court Sustains a Petition and Makes
              Disposition Orders
       At the January 28, 2022 jurisdiction hearing counsel for
Amber asked the court to dismiss the petition because there was
no “indication [Amber] was under the influence” when Kieran
was detained and “there was no current risk or harm or showing
of neglect to [Kieran] in mother’s care.” Counsel for Kieran asked
the court to sustain the petition because of Amber’s 2019 drug
test and the methamphetamine pipe found recently in her home.
The juvenile court sustained amended counts under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), concerning Amber: substance abuse (count b-
1), failing to protect Kieran from Victor’s mental and emotional
issues (count b-3), and absconding with Kieran (count b-4).
       At the February 17, 2022 disposition hearing the court
declared Kieran a dependent child of the court, removed him from
his parents, ordered Amber to attend a drug treatment program,
and ordered reunification services. Amber timely appealed from
the court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders.2

2     Amber challenges the disposition orders only to the extent
she argues substantial evidence did not support the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings.

                                5
                          DISCUSSION

       A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “The purpose of section 300 ‘is to provide maximum safety
and protection for children who are currently being physically,
sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and
emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’”
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see § 300.2,
subd. (a).) “Although section 300 requires proof the child is
subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps
necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may
consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs
the court’s protection.” (Cole L., at pp. 601-602.)
       Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), “allows a child to be
adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court when ‘[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child from the conduct of a custodian with whom the child has
been left.’ A jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), requires the Department to prove three
elements: (1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or
failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of

                                 6
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)
       “‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’”’
[Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous
with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence
must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable
in nature, credible, and of solid value.’” (In re Cole L., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.)
       Finally, “[a]pplication of the doctrine of justiciability in the
dependency context leads to the conclusion that ‘[w]hen a
dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a
reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of
jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need
not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’
[Citation.] This is true because no effective relief could be
granted in such a situation, as jurisdiction would be established

                                  7
regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any
such additional jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329.) As the Supreme Court explained,
“the principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child,
not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that “‘[a]s long as there
is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that
another might be inappropriate,’”” so that “where there are
multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one finding
may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.”
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284.)

      B.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
            Jurisdiction Findings Based on Amber’s Substance
            Abuse

            1.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
                   Court’s Finding Amber Abused Drugs
      The juvenile court found, among other things, Amber
abused substances, a finding Amber does not directly
challenge. Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding.
Amber’s 2019 drug test result revealed she was using
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine.3 When law
enforcement finally found Amber and Kieran two years later,
Amber admitted that she had used methamphetamine within the
previous two days and that she had a substance abuse problem.
In addition, investigators found a pipe for smoking
methamphetamine in the house (albeit in a separate, unattached

3    Amber said she had a prescription for morphine. She
promised to show it to the Department, but she never did.

                                  8
room). By that time, by her (occasional) admission, she had been
addicted to methamphetamine and other psychostimulants for
over a decade.4 And, as Amber admits, “[h]er absence in the two
year gap” while she was hiding from child protective agencies and
avoiding law enforcement “could give rise [to] an inference she
used during that period.”
       Amber’s persistent lying about her drug use was a further
indicium of drug abuse. Amber denied drug use when the
Department initially asked her to take a drug test and again
after she tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine,
and morphine. In June 2019 Amber again denied using drugs,
insisting to a social worker that her positive test result must
have been falsified and that the Department could not prove she
used drugs in Kieran’s presence. In October 2021 Amber once
again denied drug use, contradicting her previous admission she
had recently used methamphetamine, and claimed she had been
drug-free for five years. (See In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
593, 601 [juvenile court could reasonably infer from the mother’s
“dissembling about . . . drug use” she was “trying to hide [an]
ongoing drug addiction”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293
[“‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether
persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without
court supervision.’”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188,
197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a [drug] problem one fails to
acknowledge”].)

4     Amber also acknowledged she was arrested in 2017 for
possessing a controlled substance for sale.

                                9
            2.      Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
                    Court’s Finding Amber’s Drug Abuse Created a
                    Substantial Risk of Physical Harm
       As discussed, Kieran was an infant when the Department
became involved with the family in April 2019, and was two years
old when the authorities found her with Amber in Shasta County
in April 2021. Because Kieran was a child under the age of six,
the juvenile court’s finding Amber was abusing substances
created a rebuttable presumption of a substantial risk of physical
harm to Kieran. (See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
1210, 1219 [for children “six years old or younger at the time of
the jurisdiction hearing,” a “finding of substance abuse is prima
facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide
regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm”]; In re
Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 767 [same]; see also In re
Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 [mother’s
“continuous illicit drug use” put her infant daughter “at
substantial risk of harm”].)
       Amber argues she rebutted the presumption because there
was evidence Kieran “was well taken care of,” had “no signs of
injuries or neglect,” and was living in a home that was “clean and
even decorated.” Kieran may have been living in a clean home
and, so far, may have escaped injury and neglect in the care of a
parent who was abusing drugs. The juvenile court did not know
for sure because Amber was “on the run” with Kieran and
incommunicado with the Department for almost two years and,
as Amber concedes, her absconding with Kieran “created the
[D]epartment’s concern it did not know if he were being
neglected.” In addition, Amber had a long history of substance
abuse, and nothing suggested she was trying to face, let alone

                               10
overcome, her drug addiction. But Kieran’s continued good
fortune was not guaranteed, and as discussed, the juvenile court
did not have to wait until Kieran suffered actual injury or neglect
before asserting jurisdiction. (In re Cole L., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
126, 133 [“[a] parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future
behavior”]; In re A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 289 [“court may
consider past events to determine whether the child is presently
in need of juvenile court protection”]; In re Kadence P., supra,
241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [parent’s drug abuse created a
substantial risk of harm to the infant child, even though the child
had not yet been harmed].)
      The cases Amber relies on, In re Rebecca C. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 720 and In re Drake M. supra, 211 Cal.App.4th
754, are distinguishable. In Rebecca C. the court held substantial
evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding the mother’s
substance abuse caused, or there was a substantial risk it would
cause, physical harm to the child because the child in that case
was 13 years old and denied any physical or emotional abuse.
(Rebecca C., at pp. 727-728.) Kieran is only two years old; a
13-year-old child, like the one in Rebecca C., is much more
mature, independent, and able to take steps to protect himself or
herself from a substance-abusing mother than a two-year-old
child who is entirely dependent on his mother and who requires
constant care and attention.
      In In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 the court
held that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s
finding the father was abusing substances and that his use of
medical marijuana did not support the finding he failed to
supervise or protect his nine-month-old child. The court stated

                                11
there was no evidence that the child was exposed to marijuana or
secondhand marijuana smoke or that the father had failed to
provide the child with adequate supervision or protection. (Id. at
pp. 765-767.) Moreover, while the father in Drake M. was using
medically prescribed marijuana for arthritis, Amber was abusing
methamphetamine, a substance that is far more dangerous and
that causes severe side effects that can impair a parent’s ability
to provide regular care for a child. (See In re Alexzander C.
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 449 [methamphetamine is “‘an
inherently dangerous drug known to cause visual and auditory
hallucinations, sleep deprivation, intense anger, volatile mood
swings, agitation, paranoia, impulsivity, and depression’”].)
Again, the juvenile court did not need to wait for actual harm to
occur before asserting jurisdiction to protect Kieran from a parent
whose drug abuse created a substantial risk of physical harm.
(See In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 [“‘The court need not
wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’”];
In re K.B., supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 603 [“The court need not
wait for disaster to strike before asserting jurisdiction.”].)5

5     Because substantial evidence supported at least one of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings, that is enough. (In re
Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 328-329; see In re A.F.,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 290 [“if one of the three jurisdictional
bases relative to mother’s conduct is supported by substantial
evidence, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding must be
affirmed regardless of whether either of the other alleged
grounds for jurisdiction is supported by the evidence”].)

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                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition
orders are affirmed.

                                     SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

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