Court Opinion

ID: 9772940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:33:48.309017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:48.911247
License: Public Domain

JOHN D. TEMPLETON,
Special Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I am unable to agree the offense was committed in the “presence” of the arresting officer within the meaning of T.C.A. 40-7-103(1). In my opinion the evidence against appellant was the fruit of an unlawful warrant-less arrest. I would reverse and dismiss.
I will restate briefly the relevant facts. Trooper John Savage detected by radar a motor vehicle approaching Manchester in the westbound lane of Interstate 24 at a speed of 110 miles per hour. He pursued the speeding vehicle along the Interstate into Manchester and off on to Highway 53 toward Woodbury. He was in touch by radio with both his own communication center in Chattanooga and the local center for Manchester and he requested assistance of Manchester police. Officer David Kennedy was directed by his communication center to go to Highway 53, “that Trooper Savage was in pursuit and needed some assistance”. When Kennedy arrived at Highway 53, he turned his radio scanner on and heard Savage say “he was in pursuit of a light colored Porsche”. Anticipating the Porsche might “double back” into town, Kennedy parked in a lot along Highway 53 some 500 feet from the Interstate on the Woodbury side. As he parked he heard Savage say on the radio he was at New Union School and had lost the vehicle. About a minute later Kennedy saw a light colored Porsche proceeding slowly back toward town on Highway 53. He followed and arrested appellant on the westbound Interstate ramp. It is agreed there was nothing unusual about the operation of the Porsche in Kennedy’s presence. He stopped the Porsche only because he.assumed it was the one Savage was looking for.
To prevent unlawful restraint of liberty for trivial causes our ancestors would not abide an arrest without a warrant except for a grave offense or for an offense committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrests, See. 4. The first part of our statute, T.C.A. 40-7-103(1)(2)(3)(4), is said to be an embodiment of the common law. Tenpenny v. State, 151 Tenn. 669, 270 S.W. 989 (1925). Arrest by an officer without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence is unlawful in our state. Hurd v. State, 119 Tenn. 583, 108 S.W. 1064 (1907); State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 653, 188 S.W. 225 (1916). An offense is committed in the officer’s presence where he has direct personal knowledge of the offense by the use of his senses. Nelson v. State, 219 Tenn. 680, 413 S.W.2d 358 (1967). Arrests for violating motor vehicle laws have been held unlawful by this Court where the arresting officers acted entirely on information received by radio from other law enforcement agents. St. John v. State, 491 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972); Williams v. State, 506 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn.Cr.App.1973).
*485So, our statute provides a safeguard against seizure over and above the guaranty contained in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee. That an arrest is lawful under these constitutional provisions does not mean necessarily it is lawful under the statute. If the arrest is without a warrant by an officer for a misdemeanor not committed “in his presence” it is unlawful.
But the Court here notes and adopts a holding in other states, “that in the light of the increased speed with which offenders may flee from a witnessing officer and modern communication techniques available to the police, an offense may be said to have been committed in the presence of the arresting officer if he is in communication with and is assisting the witnessing officer”. If these circumstances obtain, the words in the statute, “in his presence”, do not mean in the actual presence of the arresting officer; the offense is committed in his presence within the meaning of the statute although not actually in his presence at all. I suppose under other circumstances the words mean the same thing they always have, actual presence, whereby the arresting officer acquires direct personal knowledge of the offense by the use of his senses. By making the words “in his presence” mean out of the presence of the arresting officer in some circumstances and in his presence in others, the Court in my view imparts a Humpty Dumpty1 quality to interpretation.
In treating of the reasons for the new rule, the Court observes that without it misdemeanants, including those endangering the public, might get away; and troopers could not enforce the traffic laws by the common practice of one trooper detecting a violation by radar and another who observes no violation making the arrest. In my opinion expediency is not a proper consideration for changing the meaning of a statute that has for its purpose the preservation of a liberty the people always have had.
The other reason for the new rule is the changes wrought by modern communication techniques available to the police. As I see it, this is the only reason that deserves consideration. The Court evidently feels that information about the offense acquired by radio is the equivalent of direct personal knowledge acquired by being present. Or as Judge Dwyer said, the information received by radio may be reliable enough to apprise the arresting officer an offense is being committed in his presence. Williams v. State, 506 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tenn.Cr.App.1973).
The Court has more confidence in police radio communication than I have. The radio is used freely by numerous policemen and deputies sheriff and I am not sure all of them are anxious to prevent unlawful restraint of liberty for trivial offenses. In the very case before us Officer Kennedy had no information any offense at all had been committed. He stopped the light colored Porsche only because he assumed it was the vehicle Trooper Savage had been pursuing. There is no comfort in the fact Porsche automobiles are scarce in Coffee County. No doubt Officer Kennedy would have stopped a light colored Chevrolet if Trooper Savage had been trying to catch one.
Finally, the relatively narrow exception carved out by the Court can and will be expanded until the statute is destroyed altogether. Modern police communication spans wide geographical areas. The new rule soon will apply, if it does not already, to an arrest by an officer in Chattanooga who is in communication with and assisting a witnessing officer in Nashville. At least a court would be sorely tempted to apply the rule in such a case if the arrest turned up evidence of a heinous crime.
*486It may be time to strike a balance between competing forces and modify the statute, say in the case of traffic violations such as driving while intoxicated. If so, the legislature is the proper department to address the problem. As I view the statute, it contains unambiguous words and their meaning has not changed. In changing the meaning the Court, in my opinion, undertakes to drive a square peg in a round hole.

. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
"The question is,” said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
"The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master — that’s all.”
—Through The Looking Glass, by Lewis Carroll