Court Opinion

ID: 9859092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 18:41:08.34027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:09.969337
License: Public Domain

*556Currie, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons hereinafter set forth.
The majority leaves undecided whether personal property in the hands of the garnishee defendant, which he received as a result of a fraudulent transfer from the principal defendant, is subject to garnishment under our present garnishment statute by creditors of such defendant. Nevertheless, the overwhelming weight of authority is that such property is subject to garnishment under similarly worded garnishment statutes. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 1142, sec. 310. This court, as recently as 1955, in Berger v. Berger (1955), 271 Wis. 292, 73 N. W. (2d) 503, under our garnishment statutes as presently worded, held a purchaser of a stock of merchandise, which purchase was void under the Bulk Sales Act (secs. 241.18 to 241.21, Stats.), liable in garnishment to creditors of the seller. A sale in violation of the Bulk Sales Act is a fraudulent conveyance. Id., at page 295. This aspect of the case is material if sec. 241.01 is applicable to the deposit at issue in this garnishment action with which Kendall paid defendant for his own funeral.
I deem sec. 241.01, Stats., applicable to such deposit if, as the majority holds, a trust relationship was created by sec. 156.125. The majority avoids this result by finding a repug-nancy between secs. 241.01 and 156.125, and then resolving the repugnancy by holding that the later specific statute, sec. 156.125, prevails over the earlier general statute, sec. 241.01. I am unable to perceive any repugnancy between these two statutes. It seems abundantly clear that sec. 156.125 was enacted to protect the rights of those who pay money to funeral directors for future funerals against contingencies such as a funeral director’s going out of business, dying, or having his assets attached, garnished, or levied upon by his creditors. There is no indication in the statute itself, or in its legislative history, that the statute was intended to protect *557the payor against his own creditors. Sec. 241.01 does not render trusts created by the trustor for his own use void as between the trustor and the trustee, but only as against the creditors of the trustor. As between the immediate parties to the trust, courts would afford the trustor protection by enforcing the trust against the trustee.
A further point, on which I disagree with the majority, is that Kendall’s failure to demand repayment of the deposit by the defendant presénts a contingency which renders the deposit immune from garnishment. This facet of the opinion is only material on the assumption that sec. 241.01, Stats., is inapplicable. The general rule is that where the principal defendant has it within his power to demand payment, his failure to do so is not such a contingency as to render the money in the hands of the garnishee-defendant immune from garnishment. Godfrey Coal Co. v. Gray (1936), 296 Mass. 323, 5 N. E. (2d) 556; Atwood v. Dumas (1889), 149 Mass. 167, 21 N. E. 236; and Graf v. Wilson (1912), 62 Or. 476, 125 Pac. 1005. If the garnishee-defendant has the election under the contract with the principal defendant to pay money or perform some act, no garnishable debt arises until such election has been made. This rule, however, should not be turned around and applied to a situation where the principal defendant has an absolute right to elect the payment of money.
Lastly, I disagree with the majority’s holding that this court should hold these funeral deposits exempt from creditors’ process. That is a policy matter for the legislature to decide. Sec. 272.18, Stats., is replete with legislative provisions for exemption from creditors’ process. This court should not add to the numerous classes of exempt property where the legislature itself has not seen fit to do so. Where the legislature enacts the exemption, it frequently places a limit in terms of dollars on the amount of the particular type *558of property which is exempt. The court is ill fitted to do this type of legislating. Under the majority decision as it stands, there is nothing to prevent an insolvent, debtor from making a $5,000 funeral deposit which would be exempt, from the reach of his creditors.
I would reverse with directions that this funeral deposit be held subject to garnishment by plaintiff.