Court Opinion

ID: 9380002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 21:01:14.42139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.361348
License: Public Domain

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                                             PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1169

        YURIY B. MIKHAYLOV,

                            Petitioner - Appellant,

                     v.

        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

                            Respondent - Appellee.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board. (PH-1221-19-
        0343-W-2; PH-1221-20-0181-W-1)

        Argued: October 27, 2022                                       Decided: March 15, 2023

        Before KING and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Petition for review denied by published opinion. Senior Judge Traxler wrote the opinion in
        which Judge King and Judge Rushing joined.

        ARGUED: Morris Eli Fischer, MORRIS E. FISCHER, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland,
        for Appellant. Kelly A. Krystyniak, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
        Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
        Attorney General, Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, Allison Kidd-Miller, Assistant
        Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, UNITED STATES
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; J. Douglas Whittaker, Office of the
        Chief Counsel, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
        Omaha, Nebraska, for Appellee.
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        TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge:

               Yuriy Mikhaylov, an employee of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement

        division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE” or “Agency”), petitions for

        review of the final judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”), which

        rejected Mikhaylov’s claim that the Agency suspended him for two days in retaliation for

        his disclosures of misconduct. Finding no reversible error, we deny the petition for review. 1

                                                      I.

               Federal agencies are prohibited, inter alia, from taking or failing to take a

        “personnel action” against an employee because of any disclosure of information made by

        the employee that the employee “reasonably believe[d]” showed a “violation of any law,

        rule, or regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of

        authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. §§

        2302(b)(8)(A)(i) & (ii).

               An employee who believes a personnel action was reprisal for protected

        whistleblowing may file an action with the Board (termed an appeal) seeking “corrective

        action.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a); see Zachariasiewicz v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 48 F.4th 237,

        242-43 (4th Cir. 2022). The employee may seek judicial review of the Board’s decision “in

        the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

        competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

               1
                       In Case No. 21-2429, Mikhaylov v. United States Department of Homeland
        Security, Mikhaylov challenges a separate disciplinary action that took place shortly after
        the events in this case. We dispose of that appeal in an unpublished opinion also filed today.

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               To prove a whistleblower claim, the employee bears the burden of proving by a

        preponderance of the evidence that he made a qualifying disclosure, and that the disclosure

        was a “contributing factor in the personnel action” taken against the employee. 5 U.S.C.A.

        § 1221(e)(1). Even if the disclosure was a contributing factor, however, the employee is

        not entitled to corrective action if “the agency demonstrates by clear and convincing

        evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such

        disclosure.” Id. § 1221(e)(2).

                                                    II.

               Against this statutory background, we turn now to the facts. Mikhaylov has worked

        for ICE since 1998. Mikhaylov’s work history includes a stint at ICE headquarters as

        Section Chief and Acting Chief over firearms instruction. In 2018, Mikhaylov was serving

        as the Assistant Field Office Director for the office in Baltimore, Maryland. He reported to

        Field Office Director Dorothy Herrera-Niles.

               ICE agents often carry their own firearms in addition to the firearms issued to them

        by the Agency. ICE policy provides that the Agency will supply ammunition for

        personally-owned weapons, but the employee must provide the holsters and magazines for

        any personally-owned weapons used on the job. In July 2018, Herrera-Niles directed

        Mikhaylov to acquire certain accessories for firearms, including 30 magazines and ankle

        holsters for a specific model of Glock handgun—the “Glock 43”—as well as a supply of

        holsters and magazines for another Glock handgun, the “Glock 26.” While many of the

        agents at the Baltimore office carried those Glock models, only one Glock 43 and one

        Glock 26 were government-issued weapons; the rest were personally-owned weapons.
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              Mikhaylov directed Savinder Jaspal to obtain the items requested by Herrera-Niles.

        Jaspal was a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer who had also served for more

        than two years as Senior Firearms Instructor. According to Jaspal, “the gist” of his

        conversation with Mikhaylov was that the items to be purchased were “for [personally-

        owned weapons] throughout the office.” J.A. 635; see J.A. 638 (“As far as I was informed

        or as far as I understood they were to supply [Herrera-Niles] and other people with

        [personally-owned weapons] accessories for their firearms.”).

              After Jaspal determined that the requested items were not available through a

        government database of available inventory, he checked back in with Mikhaylov, who

        directed Jaspal to use the Agency purchase card to buy the items. Mikhaylov told Jaspal

        that there could be something inappropriate about the purchase because of a policy he

        learned about while working at ICE headquarters against paying for accessories for

        personally-owned weapons. Jaspal testified that Mikhaylov said that since Jaspal didn’t

        know about that policy, he should go ahead with the purchase.

              After his conversation with Mikhaylov, Jaspal made inquiries to ICE’s Armory

        Operations and an ethics office about the propriety of the purchases and was informed of

        the policy prohibiting the use of Agency funds to purchase holsters or magazines for

        personally-owned weapons. On July 18, Jaspal informed Mikhaylov that he would not be

        purchasing the requested items because it violated Agency policy. Jaspal told Mikhaylov

        that the purchase card was in his name and that he did not want to be held responsible for

        an unauthorized purchase.

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               Less than an hour after learning that Jaspal would not make the purchases,

        Mikhaylov, after a conversation with Herrera-Niles, began the process of removing Jaspal

        from his position as Senior Firearms Instructor. Jaspal found out a few hours later that he

        had been removed through a phone call from Phillip Meadows, the man tapped by

        Mikhaylov to replace Jaspal. Jaspal told Meadows he believed he had been replaced

        because he refused to purchase the items requested by Mikhaylov.

               On July 20, Jaspal filed a complaint with the Joint Intake Center alleging that

        Mikhaylov removed him from his position in retaliation for Jaspal’s refusal to violate ICE

        policy by purchasing the requested accessories. Jaspal was never directly informed about

        the decision by Herrera-Niles or Mikhaylov. Before he was removed from the position,

        Jaspal had not been counseled about any performance issues, and no concerns about his

        performance had been raised in his employee evaluations.

               ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) began an investigation of

        Jaspal’s complaint. OPR interviewed numerous witnesses, including Mikhaylov and

        Jaspal. In his interview, Mikhaylov confirmed that he was aware of “guidance” from ICE

        that the employees themselves must purchase any accessories for personally-owned

        weapons. See J.A. 345 (stating that the guidance was “for the personal weapons the officer

        . . . needs to buy the stuff himself”). He also acknowledged telling Jaspal about the guidance

        and that there might be something “inappropriate” about purchasing the requested items.

        J.A. 353-54.

               Mikhaylov told the investigators that he called Herrera-Niles a few minutes after

        talking to Jaspal and informed her that Jaspal would not make the purchase because it
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        violated Agency policy. When asked what Herrera-Niles’ response was when she learned

        about Jaspal, Mikhaylov began talking about the fact that he and Herrera-Niles had already

        had “a lot of different issues” with Jaspal. J.A. 361. After cataloging his various concerns

        about Jaspal, Mikhaylov said his concerns were not necessarily the reasons that Herrera-

        Niles removed Jaspal from his position, and that he “d[idn’t] know why she made that

        decision.” J.A. 363. Mikhaylov ultimately was able to recall that Herrera-Niles “brought

        up some of the short comings that Jaspal already had and everything else,” and that “she

        ask[ed] who I wanna put in.” J.A. 363.

               While the investigation was proceeding, Mikhaylov made the disclosures that he

        contends entitle him to whistleblower protection. In October 2018, Mikhaylov questioned

        Janean Ohin, his supervisor in the Baltimore office, abouts reports that she had ignored a

        national list of qualified candidates so she could hire her preferred job candidate. Later in

        October, Mikhaylov complained that Diane Witte, who succeeded Herrera-Niles as

        Baltimore Field Office Director, 2 had violated merit principles by wrongfully reassigning

        his duties. Mikhaylov repeated these allegations in a December 2018 complaint filed with

        the Office of Special Counsel. And in April 2019, Mikhaylov reported to his supervisors

        that an Agency employee had been using an Agency vehicle for personal purposes.

               At the conclusion of its investigation of Jaspal’s complaint, OPR recommended that

        the matter be referred to management. OPR submitted an extensive report, including

               2
                     Herrera-Niles retired at the end of August 2018, while the investigation into
        Jaspal’s complaint was proceeding.

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        transcripts of the interviews, to the Disciplinary & Adverse Action Panel, a rotating panel

        of independent managers that reviews disciplinary investigations, identifies possible

        misconduct, and recommends appropriate punishments about corrective actions. The panel

        submits its recommendations to the Deciding Official, who makes the ultimate

        determination of whether misconduct occurred and what punishment should be imposed.

               The disciplinary panel convened in this case concluded that Mikhaylov committed

        conduct unbecoming a supervisor by directing Jaspal to make a purchase that was

        prohibited by ICE policy and recommended that Mikhaylov be suspended for fourteen

        days. The Deciding Official 3 rejected Mikhaylov’s claim that the proposed discipline was

        reprisal for his whistleblowing activity and concluded that evidence supported the panel’s

        determination that Mikhaylov engaged in conduct unbecoming a supervisor. The Deciding

        Official, however, after considering Mikhaylov’s long career and “favorable work

        performance,” concluded that the appropriate punishment was a two-day suspension rather

        than the fourteen-day suspension recommended by the panel. J.A. 27.

               Mikhaylov appealed his suspension to the Board. An administrative judge held a

        hearing over the course of three days and heard testimony from sixteen witnesses. The

        administrative judge concluded that three of the four disclosures relied upon by Mikhaylov

        qualified as disclosures protected under the statute—his October 2018 report about Ohin’s

        improper hiring practice; his December 2018 report to the Office of Special Counsel; and

               3
                      Because one of the disclosures relied upon by Mikhaylov involved his then-
        supervisor Witte, she was removed as the Deciding Official and was replaced by a
        supervisor outside of Mikhaylov’s chain of command.

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        his April 2019 report about the improper use of an official vehicle. The judge nonetheless

        determined that Mikhaylov failed to prove that the protected disclosure contributed to the

        Agency’s decision to take the personnel actions and that, in any event, the Agency had

        established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the actions even in

        the absence of any disclosures.

               The administrative judge rejected Mikhaylov’s assertion that the personnel actions

        were retaliation for his protected disclosures. The judge noted that the investigation into

        Mikhaylov was not initiated by any of his supervisors, but instead by OPR after the

        complaint by Jaspal, Mikhaylov’s subordinate, and the judge credited Jaspal’s testimony

        at the hearing that he had no knowledge of Mikhaylov’s whistleblowing. The

        administrative judge likewise credited the testimony of the disciplinary panel member who

        signed the notice of proposed suspension that she personally liked Mikhaylov and had no

        knowledge of his whistleblowing and that the question of his whistleblowing was never

        raised during the panel’s deliberations. Although the Deciding Official became aware of

        Mikhaylov’s disclosures through Mikhaylov’s response to the panel’s recommendation,

        the Deciding Official testified that the disclosures had no effect on his deliberations. The

        administrative judge credited this testimony and observed that the Deciding Official

        imposed a significantly lower punishment than the panel recommended, an action that

        undermines any suggestion of retaliatory motive.

               The administrative judge therefore sustained the two-day suspension and denied

        Mikhaylov’s request for corrective action. Because the Board lacked a quorum of

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        members, the administrative judge’s decision became the final decision of the Board and

        is the subject of Mikhaylov’s petition for review now before this court.

                                                      III.

               “When a whistleblower claims an agency took an impermissible personnel action,

        the [Board] evaluates the case using a burden-shifting framework.” Flynn v. United States

        Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 877 F.3d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 2017). The employee must first

               establish a prima facie case by demonstrating four facts: (1) the acting official
               has the authority to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action; (2)
               the aggrieved employee made a protected disclosure; (3) the acting official
               used his authority to take, or refuse to take, a personnel action against the
               aggrieved employee; and (4) the protected disclosure was a contributing
               factor in the agency’s personnel action.

        Id. (cleaned up). The employee may use circumstantial evidence to prove that the protected

        disclosure was a contributing factor, including evidence showing that “(A) the official

        taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or protected activity; and (B) the

        personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could

        conclude that the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel

        action.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 1221(e)(1). If the employee establishes that a protected disclosure

        was a contributing factor, the agency must then prove “by clear and convincing evidence

        that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure.” 5

        U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2).

               Our review of the Board’s decisions is very limited. “We may only set aside agency

        actions, findings, or conclusions if they are (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

        or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law,

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        rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”

        Flynn, 877 F.3d at 204 (cleaned up).

                                                     A.

               Mikhaylov first challenges the administrative judge’s determination that the

        protected disclosures were not a contributing factor to the Agency’s actions. As noted

        above, an employee may prove that a disclosure was a contributing factor through

        circumstantial evidence showing that the official taking the personnel action knew of the

        disclosure and that “the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a

        reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or protected activity was a

        contributing factor in the personnel action.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)(B). Mikhaylov contends

        the disclosures here were contributing factors as a matter of law because the Deciding

        Official learned about the disclosures during his review of the case file shortly before

        imposing the suspension. 4 We disagree.

               The statute does not provide that a protected disclosure automatically becomes a

        contributing factor in every case where a personnel action is finalized shortly after

        protected disclosures come to light; a disclosure is a contributing factor only when the

        confluence of the official’s knowledge and the timing of the action reasonably suggests a

               4
                       Although Mikhaylov discusses the knowledge of the members of disciplinary
        panel in his brief, he nonetheless makes it clear that his argument focuses on the actions of
        the Deciding Official. See Brief of Appellant at 9 (“Thomas Feeley . . ., the Agency
        deciding official, was aware of the disclosures prior to issuing the discipline.”); id. at 10
        (“[T]he personnel action challenged was not the proposed suspension, but the actual two
        day suspension, to which Feeley was the decision maker.”).

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        connection between the two. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). When disciplinary action is

        initiated fast on the heels of an employee making a protected disclosure, a reasonable

        person could easily conclude that the discipline was in retaliation for the disclosure. On

        those paradigmatic facts, the protected disclosure must be viewed as a contributing factor.

        See, e.g., Kewley v. Department of Health & Human Services, 153 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed.

        Cir. 1998) (“If a whistleblower demonstrates both that the deciding official knew of the

        disclosure and that the removal action was initiated within a reasonable time of that

        disclosure, no further nexus need be shown, and no countervailing evidence may negate

        the petitioner’s showing.”) (emphasis added).

                 The facts of this case, however, are very different from the paradigmatic

        whistleblower case. Here, the disciplinary process was initiated before Mikhaylov made

        the protected disclosures—the Agency began investigating after Jaspal made his complaint

        in July 2018, and Mikhaylov made his first protected disclosure in October 2018. To be

        sure, the Deciding Official did impose the two-day suspension shortly after he learned

        through the case file that Mikhaylov had made protected disclosures. The Deciding

        Official, however, came from an office outside of Mikhaylov’s chain of command and was

        not connected in any way to the disclosures. Moreover, the Deciding Official testified that

        he did not consider the disclosures when determining the appropriate sanction, and he

        imposed a significantly less severe suspension than was recommended by the disciplinary

        panel.

                 Contrary to Mikhaylov’s argument, these facts simply do not compel the conclusion

        that the disclosures were contributing factors to the personnel action. See Madrid-Montoya
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        v. Garland, 52 F.4th 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2022) (“We review factual findings for substantial

        evidence, which means we treat them as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

        would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”) (cleaned up). Instead, it was for the

        administrative judge to determine whether Mikhaylov’s protected disclosures could

        reasonably be viewed as contributing to the personnel action. The administrative judge,

        finding the Deciding Official’s testimony to be credible and observing that the shorter

        suspension imposed supported the official’s claim that the disclosure had no effect on his

        decision, concluded that the disclosures did not contribute to the personnel action. That is

        a reasonable view of the facts in the record, and our standard of review does not permit us

        to reject it. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (“[W]hatever the meaning

        of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.

        Substantial evidence . . . is more than a mere scintilla. It means—and means only—such

        relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”)

        (cleaned up); Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining that under

        substantial-evidence review, “we do not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make

        credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ”) (cleaned up).

                                                      B.

               Mikhaylov also challenges the administrative judge’s alternate determination that,

        even if the protected disclosures did contribute to the personnel action, the Agency proved

        by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action even without

        the disclosures. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2).

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               When considering whether the Agency carried its burden, the administrative judge

        applied the factors synthesized by the Federal Circuit in Carr v. Social Security

        Administration:

               the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its personnel action; the
               existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
               officials who were involved in the decision; and any evidence that the agency
               takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who
               are otherwise similarly situated.

        Carr, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Carr factors have been adopted by several

        circuits. See Marcato v. United States Agency for Int’l Dev., 11 F.4th 781, 783, 786-90

        (D.C. Cir. 2021); Duggan v. Dep’t of Defense, 883 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2018); Mottas

        v. Dep’t of the Army, 720 F. App’x 912, 915-18 (10th Cir. 2017); King v. Dep’t of the Army,

        570 F. App’x 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2014).

               Although this court has not issued a published opinion addressing the issue,5 we

        have utilized the Carr factors in an unpublished opinion. See Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans

        Affs., 2022 WL 1797321, at *2 (4th Cir. June 2, 2022) (“The parties submit that we should

        follow the [Board’s] lead in using the factors set forth in Carr . . . to determine whether

        Appellee has demonstrated it would have otherwise terminated Appellant, and we agree.”).

        We believe the Carr factors provide useful guidance for evaluating the agency’s claim that

               5
                      Previously, appellate jurisdiction for federal whistleblower claims lay
        exclusively with the Federal Circuit, unless the case was a “‘mixed case’. . . alleging both
        a prohibited personnel action and discrimination.” Flynn v. United States Sec. & Exch.
        Comm’n, 877 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2017). In 2012, Congress gave the employee the
        option of seeking review by the Federal Circuit or the local Court of Appeals. Because we
        have (relatively) recently begun handling these cases, issues that are “well established in
        the Federal Circuit’s case law” are often “matter[s] of first impression” here. Id.

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        it would have taken the personnel action regardless of the disclosures, and we therefore

        apply them in this case.

               The first Carr factor is the strength of the agency’s case supporting the personnel

        action. The administrative judge concluded that the record evidence clearly and

        convincingly established that Mikhaylov engaged in conduct unbecoming a supervisor. See

        J.A. 758 (“[T]he voluminous evidentiary record more than establishes the charge by clear

        and convincing evidence.”). When making this determination, the judge pointed to the

        thorough investigation and report prepared by OPR and to Jaspal’s testimony that he

        understood Mikhaylov to be directing him to purchase holsters and magazines for

        personally-owned weapons despite Mikhaylov’s acknowledgement that the purchase might

        be inappropriate and Jaspal’s belief that he was removed from his position because he

        refused to make the inappropriate purchase.

               Mikhaylov’s argument on appeal amounts to little more than disagreement with the

        administrative judge’s view of the case. Mikhaylov insists that he never ordered Jaspal to

        purchase accessories to be issued to agents using personally-owned weapons on the job.

        Instead, he claims the holsters and magazines were intended for use at the firing range,

        where they would be loaned out to agents who came for training but neglected to bring the

        required accessories for their personally-owned weapons. The record does contain some

        support for that theory, in the form of Mikhaylov’s own testimony before the Board.

        However, the record also contains voluminous evidence to the contrary, including the OPR

        report and exhibits; Jaspal’s testimony and the emails he sent to agency ethics and legal

        departments asking about the propriety of purchasing accessories for personally-owned
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        weapons; and the testimony of Phillip Meadows, who replaced Jaspal as senior firearms

        instructor and was the person who told Jaspal about his demotion. The administrative judge

        was persuaded by that evidence, not Mikhaylov’s testimony, and the standard of review

        does not permit us to second-guess the Board on this point. See Madrid-Montoya, 52 F.4th

        at 179-80 (Under substantial-evidence review, “we cannot substitute our judgment for that

        of the agency’s by reweighing the evidence and determining which of the competing views

        is more compelling.”) (cleaned up).

               The second Carr factor requires consideration of “the existence and strength of any

        motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision.”

        Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. As the administrative judge observed, it was Jaspal’s complaint

        that started the disciplinary ball rolling, not any action by Mikhaylov’s supervisors. The

        disciplinary panel was composed of independent managers who were not part of

        Mikhaylov’s chain of command and had no involvement in the actions outlined in

        Mikhaylov’s protected disclosures. The disciplinary panel member who signed the

        suspension proposal testified that Mikhaylov’s disclosures were not discussed during the

        panel deliberations. In addition, as previously discussed, the Deciding Official was also

        outside Mikhaylov’s chain of command with no involvement in the protected disclosures,

        and the Deciding Official testified that he gave no consideration to the protected disclosures

        when reviewing Mikhaylov’s case and deciding the appropriate punishment. When

        concluding that the officials involved in the personnel action had little reason to retaliate

        against Mikhaylov, the administrative judge explicitly credited the testimony of the

        disciplinary panel and the Deciding Official. The administrative judge also noted that the
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        “greatly mitigated penalty [imposed by the Deciding Official] suggests there was no

        retaliatory motive.” J.A. 758. Again, our standard of review does not permit us to reject the

        administrative judge’s finding, which rested on significant evidence in the record and the

        judge’s own determinations of witness credibility.

               The third Carr factor requires consideration of “any evidence that the agency takes

        similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise

        similarly situated.” Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. Mikhaylov contends this factor shows

        retaliation, because Jaspal also filed a complaint against Herrera-Niles, Mikhaylov’s then-

        supervisor and the person who requested the holsters and magazines, but she was not

        disciplined by the agency. The administrative judge concluded that the failure to discipline

        Herrera-Niles did not show retaliation because Herrera-Niles retired in August 2018,

        shortly after Jaspal’s complaint, and the agency has a policy of not pursuing disciplinary

        actions after an employee retires.

               As Mikhaylov points out, sometime in the fall of 2018, while the investigation was

        still ongoing, Herrera-Niles was rehired by the Agency for the office in San Antonio. She

        was rehired under the terms of a global settlement agreement resolving then-pending

        litigation. The record contains no details on the settlement, including whether the settled

        action was in any way connected to Mikhaylov. While that information might perhaps

        undermine the Agency’s explanation for its failure to take action against Herrera-Niles, it

        is not up to this court to figure out how those pieces of information interact. The

        administrative judge heard all of the evidence, weighed it, and concluded that the Agency’s

        different treatment of Herrera-Niles did not show that the Agency was retaliating against
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        Mikhaylov. Our standard of review requires us to accept the administrative judge’s view

        of the issue. See Madrid-Montoya, 52 F.4th at 179–80 (“[I]f the record plausibly could

        support two results: the one the agency chose and the one the petitioner advances, we

        must defer to the agency.”) (cleaned up).

               Because the administrative judge committed no legal error when applying the Carr

        factors and his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, we reject

        Mikhaylov’s challenge to the administrative judge’s conclusion that the Agency carried its

        burden of proving that it would have taken the same disciplinary action in the absence of

        the disclosures.

                                                    IV.

               After conducting a hearing and considering the evidence, the administrative judge

        denied the corrective action sought by Mikhaylov, concluding that Mikhaylov’s protected

        disclosures were not contributing factors to the discipline imposed and, alternatively, that

        the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action

        even in the absence of the disclosures. Because the administrative judge committed no legal

        error and his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, we deny Mikhaylov’s

        petition for review.

                                                               PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED

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