Court Opinion

ID: 9781776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:31:57.014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:54.043675
License: Public Domain

KITE, Justice,
dissenting, with whom VOIGT, Justice, joins.
[¶ 67] I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 (LexisNexis 2001) does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Wyoming Constitution. Were I writing the majority opinion, I would conclude the statute is unconstitutional because, contrary to the criteria for equal protection analysis to which this Court has long adhered, § 12-8-301 creates a classification which does not reflect a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection that is, it may not be fairly viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the state. State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Wyo.1982). In reaching this conclusion, I find particularly significant the principle that, although courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of statutes if at all possible, White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo.1984), we do so only if it can be reasonably done. Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Office, 838 P.2d 158, 172 (Wyo.1992). It is equally imperative that we declare legislative enactments invalid when they transgress the Wyoming Constitution. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 782 (Wyo.1988).
[¶ 68] I depart from the majority opinion because it attributes to McClellan v. Tottenhoff 666 P.2d 408, 410-12 (Wyo.1983), a narrow holding not supported by a fair reading of the case. It proceeds from that narrow holding to conclude § 12-8-301 expands the common-law rights recognized in McClellan. In my view, a careful reading of McClellan leads to the conclusion that, rather than expanding common-law rights and responsibilities, § 12-8-301 as currently written severe*740ly limits those rights and responsibilities. From its narrow reading of McClellan, the majority goes on to conclude, contrary to established equal protection analysis, that the class harmed by the statute must be identified in the text of the statute itself. This is not correct under our prior case law or that of the United States Supreme Court, yet the majority relies on that incorrect premise in concluding the classification created by § 12-8-301 consists of liquor vendors who lawfully provide liquor versus liquor vendors who unlawfully provide liquor. From that conclusion, the majority further concludes the legislature’s objective was to “create a comprehensive, yet simple-to-administer tort claim to cover all liquor providers and intoxicated persons” and the legislature “could have rationally thought that the establishment of an unquestioned and predictable yet limited basis for legal liability would provide a more effective incentive for the responsible furnishing of alcohol and the realization of the primary purpose.” Maj. op. at ¶ 62. I do not agree with the narrow definition the majority attributes to the legislative classification created by § 12-8-301, nor do I agree that the classification, when identified in accordance with accepted equal protection analysis, is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. In contrast to the majority’s conclusion that the statute covers all liquor providers and intoxicated persons and the legislature rationally could have concluded the current law provides a more effective incentive for responsible liquor sales, the statute in my view clearly covers only liquor providers and intoxicated persons in the drive-in area and, for that reason, is not rationally based and provides no incentive for responsible liquor sales occurring outside the drive-in area, particularly sales to intoxicated persons inside the drinking establishment.
[¶ 69] In addition, proper equal protection analysis must include consideration of the impact of the statute on those not specifically addressed therein — those injured by intoxicated persons. In my view, the statute creates a class of victims — those injured by liquor providers who negligently serve intoxicated persons within the establishment (as opposed to in the drive-in area) — which has no rational basis and no connection to a legitimate public interest. Of equal importance to my departure from the majority, the statute creates another classification by subjecting liquor vendors who negligently sell to intoxicated persons in the drive-in area to liability while shielding liquor vendors who negligently sell to intoxicated persons inside the premises from liability. No matter what gloss is applied, I can see no rational basis for drawing this distinction; in my view, it does not serve a legitimate state interest, and I would hold the statute unconstitutional.
A. Historical Development of Dram-Shop Liability
[¶ 70] A historical review of the development of dram-shop liability1 is relevant to a complete understanding of the current state of the law in Wyoming. Prior to 1983, a Wyoming alcohol vendor who negligently furnished alcohol to.a customer was not liable for resulting injury. In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, 397 (Wyo.1971), overruled by McClellan, 666 P.2d 408, this Court stated: “We think it cannot be denied there was no cause of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in favor of one injured by a vendee who becomes intoxicated this for the reason that the proximate cause of injury was deemed to be the patron’s consumption of liquor and not its sale.” While this was the position adopted historically in most states, various courts began to question its propriety.
Until recently, dram shop law in America remained virtually unchanged from the English common law. Traditionally, dram shops were not held liable for damages sustained by third parties as a result of the conduct of an intoxicated patron to whom the alcohol was served. Although the traditional common law approach is still referred to and has often been followed by courts, an emerging trend ... has emerged, straying from common law principles by finding dram shops liable for *741damages to third parties caused by intoxicated patrons.
Brett T. Votava, Comment, Missouri Dram Shop Liability: Last Call for Third Party Liability?, 69 UMKC L.Rev. 587, 592 (2001).
[¶ 71] Consistent with this trend, this Court in 1983 rejected the common-law principles espoused in Parsons and recognized a cause of action against alcohol vendors based on common-law negligence principles. McClellan, 666 P.2d at 410-12. We challenged the use of stare decisis “ ‘as a justification for the continuance of an unfair and improper rule which operates to the detriment of those who may suffer tortious injury.’ ” Id. at 411 (quoting Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Wyo.1974)). “We do not choose to stand by and wring our hands at the unfairness which we ourselves have created.” Id. at 415. In support of our departure from the common law, we cited the existence of a possible causal connection between a vendor’s conduct and a plaintiffs injuries:
“When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the intoxicated person but also to members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen; this is particularly evident in current times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so common-place and accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent. [Citations.] ...” Rappaport v. Nichols, ..., [31 N.J. 188] 156 A.2d [1,] 8 [(N.J. 1959)].
The fact that the risk to the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen is supported by disturbing statistics. In 1977, the year when the statute forbidding sale of alcohol to minors and the statute forbidding sale of alcohol at a drive-in to minors or to intoxicated persons were recodified, there were 212 fatal vehicular accidents in Wyoming; 119, or over fifty percent, involved alcohol as a contributing circumstance.
Id. at 414-15.
[¶ 72] As further support for our departure from Parsons, we noted the following policy considerations:
Refusing to acknowledge a claim for relief against a liquor vendor harms society in two ways. First, it is an unjust doctrine which often limits recovery when an intoxicated minor driver injures someone. Businesses which sell liquor are usually in a more solid financial position than a minor. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the current state of the law places us all at more peril, because there is no effective deterrent to keep liquor vendors from selling liquor to minors or to intoxicated persons. Liquor licenses are seldom revoked. Perhaps the threat of civil liability or increased insurance premiums will serve to make liquor vendors more careful.
Id. at 415. We cited cases from other courts finding a cause of action against a liquor vendor based upon common-law negligence principles and concluding “a liquor vendor owes the same duty to the whole world as does any other person.” Id. at 411. We said:
Once the general duty to use reasonable care is acknowledged, then courts focus their attention on the foreseeability of the resulting harm to establish proximate cause. We think this is a sensible and just approach. Henceforth, cases involving vendors of liquor and injured third parties will be approached in the same manner as other negligence cases.
Id. (emphasis added). We recognized “a duty [on the part of liquor vendors] based both upon the common law and upon statutes.” Id. at 414.
[¶ 73] We defined the common-law duty on the basis of ordinary negligence principles a liquor vendor owes a duty “to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.” Id. at 411. We defined the statutory duty on the basis of § 12-5-301(a)(v), prohibiting the sale of alcohol in the drive-in area to minors or intoxicated persons, and § 12-6-101(a), making it a misdemeanor for anyone to furnish alcohol to a minor (except a legal ward, medical patient, or immediate family member). We held that the violation of either statute was evidence of negligence to be considered by the trier of fact together with other cir*742cumstances in determining liquor vendor negligence. Id. at 413.
[¶ 74] Addressing the issue of proximate cause, we held “the ultimate test concerning proximate cause will be whether the vendor could foresee injury to a third person. This question will be one of fact based on the circumstances of each particular case. It is, however, not necessary that a specific injury be foreseen.” Id. at 414. Nowhere in the entirety of the opinion did we limit our holding to only those situations where a vendor sells intoxicating liquor to underage or intoxicated persons in the drive-in area. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion that “one can confidently and reasonably conclude that the McClellan holding was narrow,” Maj. op. at ¶ 13, it is clear this Court intended the holding to apply broadly. That is, we intended a complete abrogation of the common-law rule of nonliability in favor of the application of general negligence principles in cases alleging vendor liability.
[¶ 75] With an emerging trend of state court decisions attaching liability to dram shops, state legislatures responded by enacting statutes either authorizing or denying causes of action against dram shops. Votava, supra, 69 UMKC L.Rev. at 595-96. In 1985, just two years after our decision in McClellan, Wyoming followed suit and enacted § 12-8-301 which abrogated this Court’s decision in McClellan. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws eh. 205, § 1. With the enactment of § 12-8-301, liquor vendor liability became strictly a creature of statute. The 1985 version of § 12-8-301 provided:
12-8-301. Limitation of liability.
(a)No licensee is liable for damages caused by an intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or furnished alcoholic liquor or malt beverages unless the licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated, and:
(i) It was reasonably apparent to the licensee that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was intoxicated; or
(ii) The licensee knew or reasonably should have known from the circumstances that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverages was intoxicated.
(b) No person who is not a licensee who has gratuitously and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.
(c) This section does not affect the liability of the intoxicated person for damages.
(d) This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.
(e) For purposes of this section “licensee” is as defined in W.S. 12-l-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee’s employee or employees.
Id. In what appears to be an attempt to codify and clarify the common-law duties established in McClellan, the legislature limited liquor vendor liability to two situations. First, a liquor vendor could be liable if he furnished alcohol to an intoxicated person and either it was reasonably apparent to him the person was intoxicated or he knew or should have known the person was intoxicated. Second, a liquor vendor could be liable if he furnished alcohol in violation of Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes. Title 12 set hours of operation for liquor vendors, prohibited the sale of alcohol in the drive-in area to minors or intoxicated persons, prohibited the sale of alcohol generally to minors, and contained various other restrictions and rules relating to the sale of alcohol. Like McClellan, § 12-8-301 as originally written broadly imposed liability on liquor vendors for sales occurring not only in the drive-in areas but whenever they knew or should have known the purchaser was intoxicated. Like McClellan, therefore, the original version of § 12-8-301 allowed for liquor vendor liability arising out of sales occurring inside a drinking establishment.
[¶ 76] One year later, in 1986, § 12-8-301 was amended to provide (changes are indicated throughout):
12-8-301. Limitation of liability.
(a) No licensee is liable for damages caused-by an intoxicated person-to whom the licensee legally^sold or-furnished -alcoholic-liquor or malt beverages-^nless-the *743licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a pe¥sou-who-was intoxicated, and:
(i) It-was reasonably apparenh-to-the licensee-that ■ the person buying -er — receiving the aleoholie-liquop-or--malt -beverage-was-intoxicated; ■or
(ii) The licensee knew or reasonably should have known.from- the circumstances-that-the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage^was-intoxicated-.
(fe) (a) No person who is not-a-licensee who has gratuitously-and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.
(e) (b) This section does not affect the liability of the intoxicated person for damages.
(d) (c) This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes.
4e> For purposes of this section “licensee” is as defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee’s employee or employees.
1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 6, § 1. Under this version of the law, which remains in effect today, liquor vendors have complete immunity from civil liability unless they furnish alcohol in violation of Title 12. That is, liquor vendors are immune unless they furnish alcohol in a drive-in area to minors or intoxicated persons, otherwise furnish liquor to a minor, or violate some other provision of Title 12. Under the law as it currently reads, therefore, and in contrast to the law as it existed under McClellan and the original statute, liquor vendors who furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons inside a liquor establishment are immune from liability for injuries occurring after the intoxicated person leaves the establishment — no matter what the circumstances. Clearly, § 12-8-301 as it currently reads does not broaden liquor vendor liability as the majority opinion concludes. Rather, the statute as amended severely limits liquor vendor liability.2
B. Equal Protection Analysis
[¶ 77] The majority opinion concludes the classifications created by the statute do not violate the equal protection provisions of the Wyoming Constitution. The foundation for the equal protection guarantee is found in the following provisions of the Wyoming Constitution:
In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal.
Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 2.
Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual incompeteney, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 3.
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.
Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 34.
The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enu*744merated cases, that is to say: For ... limitation of civil actions; ... granting to any corporation, association or individual ... any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.... In all other eases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.
Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 27. See also Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 52-53 (Wyo.1992). Article 3, Section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution specifically limits legislative .authority in several enumerated instances. Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution, A Reference Guide (1993). We have said that Article 3, Section 27, which prohibits special laws, “means only that the statute must operate alike upon all persons in the same circumstances.” Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Wyo.1982); see also Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo.1978). We have also noted that the prohibition against special laws contained in Article 3, Section 27 is a more specific equal protection guarantee that enlarges the protections of Article 1, Section 34 of the Wyoming Constitution. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 826 (Wyo.1980). The extent and interdependency of the various Wyoming constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to equal protection demand that the judiciary carefully examine legislation claimed to violate that right. Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 556 (1986).
The five separate state constitutional provisions that impose due process-like and equal protection-like limitations on state legislative power, read in conjunction with article 3, section 27 which specifically limits legislative power, might be construed as evidence that the Wyoming framers intended the judiciary to exercise more of a checking function over the legislature than might be inferred in the federal Constitution.
Id. In fact, this Court has long recognized, “the Wyoming Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination than the federal constitution.” Allhusen v. State By and Through Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Board, 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo.1995).
[¶ 78] Perhaps in no other circumstance is the balance between the legislative and judicial functions more delicate than in the realm of equal protection. Although in general the equal protection guarantee mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed, Mills, 837 P.2d at 53, the constitutional provisions at issue do not prohibit legislatively created classifications. In fact, the very foundation of the legislative function is to establish differing legal obligations for different circumstances and persons in the process of furthering the public interest.
Here, then, is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a “pledge of the protection of equal laws.” But laws may classify. And “the very idea of classification is that of inequality.” In tackling this paradox the [United States Supreme] Court has neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle course. It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification.
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L.Rev. 341, 344 (1949). The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. Id. at 344, 346.
[¶ 79] The process of testing legislative classifications is founded upon determining the legitimate legislative purpose “at which legislation must aim.” Id. at 350. In performing this function of judicial review of legislative action, we must exercise “judicial statesmanship” by appreciating the political pressures and practical considerations that naturally exist in the legislative process. Id. at 351. But in doing so, we cannot ignore reason and logic in the name of judicial restraint, and, most importantly, we must act to protect the intent of the framers of our constitution and the paramount value they placed upon equal protection of the law. *745While it clearly is not our function to substitute our view about what is desirable for that of the legislature, “self-restraint is no virtue if the Court has a unique function to perform.” Id. at 366.
[¶ 80] We want to make it clear:
Before testing the classifications herein presented we caution that our constitutional inquiry does not seek to determine whether the [statute at issue is] wise, sound, necessary, or in the public interest. There are ample reasons for concluding otherwise. We simply ask whether the legislation adopted, for whatever purposes disclosed or undisclosed, is reasonably supportable. Each day the devastating effects of the drinking driver rage unabated with all of their tragic social and economic consequences. We do not speculate on the influences that might have prompted the Legislature to answer this acute and growing problem by narrowly restricting rather than enlarging civil liability. In the final analysis the Legislature must answer to an informed, and perhaps ultimately aroused, public opinion for its action. We do not substitute our judgment for its own.
Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal.3d 430, 174 Cal.Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8, 12 (1981) (citation omitted).
[¶ 81] I agree with the majority opinion that § 12-8-301 does not infringe upon the fundamental right of access to the courts or any other fundamental interest, nor does it create an inherently suspect class. Consequently, I agree that the statute must be reviewed under the rational basis test. That test, as we have said, requires us to determine whether the classification created by § 12-8-301 bears a rationale relationship to a legitimate state concern. See generally All-husen, 898 P.2d at 885-86; Johnson, 838 P.2d at 166-67.
[¶ 82] The equal protection guarantee of the Wyoming Constitution was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises. Laude, 654 P.2d at 1226. Even at its lowest scrutiny level- — rational basis- — the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection against legal discrimination than the federal constitution does. Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165. The rational basis test, although a deferential standard of review, is not a toothless one. Id. at 172.
[¶ 83] Like the federal constitution, the Wyoming Constitution does not prohibit legislative classification. It does, however, require that the classification be reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Where such a relationship is nonexistent, the statute must be held to contravene the constitution. Phillips, 611 P.2d at 826.
[T]here must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation as to different classes, and the differences must not be arbitrary and without just relation to the subject of the legislation. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest on a reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 578 P.2d at 1354-55 (citations omitted). In a number of instances, we have struck down legislation that did not pass constitutional muster under the rational basis test. Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo.1978) (holding state automobile guest statute violated the state equal protection provision by distinguishing between paying and nonpaying guest passengers respecting their right to sue for injuries sustained as a result of the driver’s negligence); Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 (holding ten-year limitation violated the equal protection guarantee because it immunized certain defendants from liability arising from their involvement in real property improvements); Hoem, 756 P.2d 780 (finding Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act was unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause of the Wyoming Constitution); State ex rel. Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826 (Wyo.1990) (finding Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act violated the equal protection guarantees of the Wyoming Constitution); Johnson, 838 P.2d 158 (finding statute providing for loss of driver’s license based on age was unconstitutional special legislation lacking rational differentiation and violating the equal protection guarantees); Allhusen, 898 P.2d 878 (holding certain licen-sure provisions violated the equal protection guarantees by affording disparate treatment *746of unlicensed counselors employed by private, for profit institutions).
[¶ 84] In Johnson, we outlined the four elements of the test to be applied in determining whether statutory classifications violate equal protection provisions of the Wyoming Constitution: (1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has the group been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws, (2) what is the public service to be served by the law, (3) what is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate treatment, and (4) how are the characteristics used to distinguish people for disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the challenged law purportedly, intends to serve. 838 P.2d at 166-67. Each of the four elements must be applied in determining whether the classifications created by § 12-8-301 violate the equal protection provisions.

1. Class harmed by the legislative classification

[¶ 85] In reaching the result it does, the majority relies heavily on the assertion that the classification must be identified within the text of the challenged statute. This assertion is incorrect. Under proper equal protection analysis, a classification can be established one of three ways:
First, a law may establish a classification on its face requiring no proof of the classification other than the language of the statute itself. Second, a law, which on its face shows no impermissible classification, may be impermissibly applied in varying degrees to different identifiable classes of individuals. When application of a law is at issue, proof beyond the language of the law is required to establish the classification that is challenged. Finally, a law that neither classifies on its face nor is applied unevenly may nonetheless be shown by outside proof to in reality constitute “a device designed to impose different burdens on different classes of persons.” No-wak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law, eh. 16 at 527 (1978).
Laude, 654 P.2d at 1226. Thus, a classification can be shown: (1) from the language of the statute itself, (2) by the manner in which the statute is applied, or (3) by outside proof that the statute in fact is designed to impose different burdens on different classes of people. The statute at issue creates impermissible classifications in all three ways. On its face, as applied and as shown by outside proof, § 12-8-301 specifically treats individuals injured as a result of liquor vendor negligence occurring in the drive-in area differently than those injured as a result of inside-the-premises liquor vendor negligence. On its face, as applied and as shown by outside proof, the statute also treats liquor vendors who negligently sell in the drive-in area differently than other liquor vendors. The end result of the classifications is that liquor vendors may be accountable for furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person in a drive-in area but cannot be held accountable for furnishing liquor to the same intoxicated person inside the premises. To the same effect, an injured victim has no right to recover if the intoxicated person was served inside the premises but can recover if the person was served in the drive-in area. Stated differently, a person injured by an intoxicated person who was negligently provided alcohol in a drive-in area has the right to seek a portion of his damages from the alcohol provider, whereas a person injured by the same intoxicated person who was served negligently inside the establishment does not.
[¶ 86] The majority attempts to avoid this result by looking at only the face of the statute, drawing the classification narrowly by looking exclusively at liquor vendors, and ignoring the classes harmed by the statute. This is not proper equal protection analysis under our precedent, which requires consideration of the class harmed by the legislation. Johnson, 838 P.2d at 166. Narrow formulation of a statutory classification does not avoid the requirements of the equal protection clause. See generally Tussman & ten-Broek, supra, 37 Cal. L.Rev. at 346-351, 360.
[¶ 87] In Hoem, we considered a similar classification of tort victims who had their right to recover for negligence diminished medical malpractice tort victims. We held a statute creating the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act violated those victims’ equal protection rights. The act created a panel to review all medical malpractice claims against *747health care providers before such claims could be pursued in court. 756 P.2d at 782. The plaintiff in Hoem argued the act treated medical malpractice victims differently than those injured by the tortious conduct of someone other than a health care provider in that only medical malpractice victims were prohibited from filing a claim directly in court for personal injury. Id. Ultimately, we held the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act denied medical malpractice victims equal protection of the law. Id. at 784. Our review revealed the legislature’s purpose was to reduce the number of medical malpractice lawsuits and lower insurance rates. Id. at 783. Although we agreed the legislature had a legitimate interest in protecting the health of the citizens of Wyoming as well as the economic and social stability of the state, we held: “It cannot seriously be contended that the extension of special benefits to the medical profession and the imposition of an additional hurdle in the path of medical malpractice victims relate to the protection of the public health.” Id. We have reviewed similar statutes by focusing on the classification of tort victims created. See Mills, 837 P.2d at 53; Hoem, 756 P.2d at 783; Nehring, 582 P.2d at 77.
[¶ 88] In Hoem, this Court made it clear that the equal protection violation was found in the disparity in treatment of injured persons, some of whom were required to submit their cases to the medical review panel while others did not encounter that impediment in pursuing their claims. We said: “We cannot condone the legislature’s use of the law to protect one class of people from financial difficulties while it dilutes the rights under the constitution of another class of people.” Hoem, 756 P.2d at 784. As with the statute we struck down in Hoem, § 12-8-301 results in disparity in treatment in that it protects one class of people (liquor vendors who negligently sell to intoxicated persons inside the liquor establishment) while diluting the rights of another class of people (those injured as a result of the negligent sale inside the premises).

2. Legislative objectives

[¶ 89] Having identified the class harmed by the legislation, we must determine what public purpose the law serves. As is oftentimes the reality in Wyoming, there is a dearth of evidence of legislative intent regarding this statute. The legislature did not expressly articulate the purpose of § 12-8-301, as it did with the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act, or the relation between the classification in the statute and its purpose. However, when the legislative purpose is not explicit, courts are free to infer the purpose. Tussman & tenBroek, supra, 37 Cal. L.Rev. at 366. ■ It can be safely inferred the purpose of § 12-8-301, located in Title 12 which is entitled Alcoholic Beverages, is to protect the public. A statute which purports to “limit liability” in all but illegal circumstances could arguably be intended to encourage compliance with that law, thus promoting public safety. The Greenwalts assert the legislative objective was to protect the financial interests of liquor vendors and their liability insurers. Rejecting that contention, the majority states:
Having read the definite written words of § 301 and the other pertinent provisions of Title 12, having considered the general public knowledge about the evils attending the sale and furnishing of intoxicating liquors to our state’s citizens, and having considered the prior common law decisions and statutory law, we can confidently conclude that the legislative objective of § 301 is unmistakably what the defenders of that law have identified: a comprehensive statutory tort claim affecting liquor providers (both licensee and nonlicensees), intoxicated eustomers/guests of all liquor providers, and third parties who are damaged by intoxicated eustomers/guests.
Maj. op. at ¶ 51.
[¶ 90] Without an expressly stated legislative purpose, all these characterizations of the legislative purpose require some degree of speculation. However, each characterization ultimately relates to protection of the public and public safety.

3. Rational relationship between legislative classification and objective

[¶ 91] Having identified the class harmed by the legislation and the public purpose of *748the statute, we must examine the characteristic of the disadvantaged class justifying the disparate treatment and how that is relevant to the statute’s purpose. In other words, is there a rational relationship between the purpose of the statute and a characteristic of the class harmed by the legislation? The fatal flaw in Wyoming’s dram-shop statute appears in the final step of the Johnson test particularly because a reviewing court is no longer free to imagine any set of facts which could make the statute appear constitutional. Johnson, 838 P.2d at 167. Can it be argued that preventing a tort victim from seeking damages for a negligent alcohol provider’s share of responsibility is rationally related to protection of the public? I struggle to see the connection. It may be true that subjecting violators of Title 12 to liability encourages compliance with § 12-8-301. However, it does not logically follow that granting immunity to negligent alcohol providers who comply with Title 12 will somehow promote public safety. Under the statute, an alcohol provider may be motivated to diligently comply with each Title 12 requirement to avoid liability, such as refusing to serve minors or intoxicated persons in drive-in areas, observing mandatory hours of operation, and following the myriad of other Title 12 requirements. Yet, under § 12-8-301 the same alcohol provider has no legal incentive to refrain from serving more alcohol to an already intoxicated individual inside the establishment. Both McClellan and the 1986 statute had the effect of encouraging compliance with Title 12 by holding all persons liable who illegally provided alcohol while also protecting the public by imposing that same liability on licensees who failed to exercise reasonable care in serving alcohol to intoxicated persons inside the establishment. Viewed from this perspective, it is difficult to imagine how § 12-8-301 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the statute significantly curtails both the rights of tort victims and the responsibilities of liquor vendors as those rights and responsibilities existed after McClellan and prior to the 1986 amendment to § 12-8-301.
[¶ 92] When an intoxicated individual leaves the provider’s premises, the public is in danger. Usually, but not always, the heightened risk of harm to the public results from alcohol-related traffic accidents that are tragic and foreseeable events, evident in alarming statistics. Regrettably, accidents involving intoxicated drivers in Wyoming are commonplace. In 1986, the year the legislature enacted § 12-8-301, there were 146 fatal vehicular accidents in Wyoming. Wyoming’s Comprehensive Report on Traffic Accidents, Wyoming Highway Department, Highway Safety Branch, Accident Data Management Section at 149 (1986). Seventy-one vehicular accidents, or 48.6 percent of all vehicular accidents which resulted in death that year, were alcohol-related. Id. These statistics fail to account for the many people who had injuries that resulted from alcohol-related traffic accidents but did not result in death. It is also important to note that, although the most obvious public safety concern is drinking and driving, intoxicated persons pose many other types of risks to third persons that do not involve the use of a motor vehicle. Public safety cannot be enhanced by excusing alcohol providers from the same duty owed by all other persons acting reasonably under the circumstances. Therefore, the classification of tort victims created by § 12-8-301 is not rationally related to the apparent purpose of the statute protection of the public.
[¶ 93] , In prior cases where this Court has found statutory classifications were not rationally related to the legislative objective, we have not hesitated to declare the statute at issue unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. In Nehring, 582 P.2d 67, we held the automobile guest statute violated the equal protection provisions by distinguishing between paying and nonpaying guest passengers with regard to their right to sue for injuries as a result of a driver’s negligence. While we recognized the legitimate legislative objective of promoting hospitality by generous drivers, we questioned whether the classification prescribed by statute had a rational relation to that objective. 582 P.2d at 78. We quoted the New Mexico Supreme Court to expose the basic flaw in the relationship:
*749“The classification fails not because it draws some distinction between paying and nonpaying guests, but because it penalizes nonpaying guests by depriving them completely of protection from ordinary negligence-No matter how laudable the State’s interest in promoting hospitality, it is irrational to reward generosity by allowing the host to abandon ordinary care and by denying to nonpaying guests the common law remedy for negligently inflicted injury.”
Id. (quoting McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238, 241 (1975)). We held the guest statute exceeded all bounds of rationality and constituted a denial of uniform operation under the Wyoming Constitution. Id. at 79.
[¶ 94] In Phillips, 611 P.2d 821, we struck down a ten-year statute of limitation that immunized a class of defendants from certain enumerated liabilities arising from their involvement in real property improvements. The statute had the effect of granting a special immunity to architects and contractors. 611 P.2d at 825. Conversely, it limited a specific class of plaintiffs from full recovery — those who suffered damages as a result of the negligence of an architect or contractor. “ ‘The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly appears when we consider that architects and contractors are not the only persons whose negligence in the construction of a building or other improvement may cause damage to property or injury to persons.’ ” Id. (quoting Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (1967)). “ ‘That the statute benefits all architects and construction contractors is significant only if the benefits conferred upon them are not denied to others similarly situated.’ ” Id. at 826 (quoting Skinner, 231 N.E.2d at 591). We held in part that the statute granted immunity from suit for only a narrow spectrum of defendants in violation of the equal protection provisions. Id. at 831.
[¶ 95] Here, the majority concludes the legislature could rationally have thought the classification requiring an injured third party to look to only the intoxicated adult for compensation promotes individual responsibility on the part of those who choose to drink and drive or otherwise abuse alcohol and, in that manner, protects the public. The majority insists the legislature properly could have concluded that to do otherwise would impose an unacceptable burden upon the alcohol provider to recognize its customer is intoxicated and to foresee that a customer may drink and drive. This assertion is fallacious for several reasons. First, it can be presumed, in a great majority of the circumstances, a jury will consider proximate cause and place liability squarely on the shoulders of the intoxicated person. Second, the legislature imposed responsibility on the alcohol provider to determine whether its drive-in customer is intoxicated, a much more difficult task given the attenuated nature of the contact with that person not being able to observe the volume of alcohol previously consumed or the typical behaviors accompanying intoxication. See § 12-5-301(a)(v) (forbids the furnishing of alcohol to an intoxicated person in the drive-in area). It is, at best, questionable whether serving alcohol to an intoxicated customer in the drive-in area poses any greater danger to the public than serving an intoxicated person inside the premises. This is particularly true considering the intoxicated person must only be in the drive-in area and thus may not necessarily be driving a vehicle. Finally, to support the conclusion that imposing the alcohol provider’s share of liability on the intoxicated person will act as a deterrent and encourage personal responsibility on the part of the intoxicated person thereby assisting in protecting the public, this Court must agree that an already intoxicated customer is cognizant of the statute’s effect and has the capacity to conclude he should refrain from further alcohol consumption to avoid assuming more than his personal share of responsibility for injuries he may cause upon leaving the establishment. It is difficult to imagine a more illogical conclusion. As between an intoxicated patron and a licensed alcohol provider, no doubt exists as to who has the greater capacity to control whether more alcohol is consumed and is in fact capable of exercising personal responsibility.
[¶ 96] I also question whether “individual responsibility” was the legislative objective behind the dram-shop statute because it is directly contrary to the policy underlying *750Wyoming’s comparative negligence statute in which the legislature chose to allocate the consequences to all those with fault. In 1986, the Wyoming legislature abolished joint and several liability by amending § 1-1-109 to provide that a party at fault be required to pay for his proportionate share of the fault. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24, § 1; Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 708 (Wyo.1993). The adoption of comparative fault mandates that the trier of fact determine issues of proximate cause and allocate liability accordingly. In a comparative fault case, the jury must consider the negligence of not only the parties but also all the participants in the transaction producing the injuries sued upon.3 Board of County Commissioners of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1191 (Wyo.1981).
[¶ 97] Instead of promoting individual responsibility, the current version of § 12-8-301 excuses an alcohol provider from responsibility for its own negligence by precluding recovery for its proportion of fault when it acts legally but fails to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances. Try as I might, I can find no rational basis to distinguish between victims injured by persons illegally served alcohol or intoxicated persons served in a drive-in area and those injured due in part to the negligence of a person serving an obviously intoxicated adult inside an establishment.
[¶ 98] The Greenwalts suggest the true legislative purpose of § 12-8-301 is to protect alcohol vendors from the expense of liability insurance to cover their potential negligence. Lacking any indication in the legislative history of the intent of the body as a whole, we are offered evidence of the intent of the sponsor of the legislation which would suggest that, at least, to be his purpose.4 However, we cannot consider the intent of one legislator as reflecting the intent of the legislature as a whole. Independent Producers Marketing Corp. v. Cobb, 721 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo.1986). Obviously, if the Green-walts’ contention were true, it would not constitute a legitimate legislative purpose and would raise other constitutional issues such as the prohibition in Article 3, Section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution against special laws granting exclusive immunity to corporations or individuals. Having found the medical profession was not entitled to such preferential treatment, we certainly should not find alcohol providers are entitled to it. Hoem, 756 P.2d at 783.
[¶ 99] I am fully cognizant of the deference we are required to give the legislature and our obligation not to encroach into the legislative field of policy making. However, it is likewise this Court’s duty to declare unconstitutional statutes that clearly violate Wyoming’s constitutional mandates. Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939 (Wyo.2000). Even with considerable effort, I can find no rational relationship between this statute and a legitimate state concern. Following the rationale of our longstanding equal protection jurisprudence, I would find the Greenwalts have carried their burden of proof that the dram-shop statute creates classifications of tort victims and tortfeasors without furthering a legitimate state interest.

. Black's Law Dictionary 509 (7th ed.1999) defines dram-shop liability as: “Civil liability of a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated customer.”

. To better understand the positioning of § 12-8-301 in the continuum of dram-shop liability, it is instructive to examine the status of dram-shop law nationwide. Ten states have failed to enact dram-shop statutes: Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. The courts in five of those states Hawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia currently hold dram shops liable for third-party damages. The courts of the remaining five states continue to follow the common-law rule holding dram shops are not liable for third-party injuries. Thirty-three states hold dram shops liable for alcohol sales to already intoxicated patrons or minors. Five states California, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have enacted dram-shop liability for third parties in the event the dram shop improperly sold alcohol to a minor. Two states have made dram shops completely immune from civil liability Nevada and South Dakota. See Votava, supra, 69 UMKC L.Rev. at 596-604. Wyoming’s statute is unique and grants alcohol providers complete immunity from liability for negligence unless they violate Title 12. See § 12-8-301. This background illustrates the wide statutory variations that exist state to state and further makes clear that such variations play a crucial role in determining whether a statute survives constitutional scrutiny.

. Uncertainty exists as to whether an immune party would be placed on the verdict form.

. In 1986, a representative sponsored the amendment to § 12-8-301. The representative sent a letter to the Wyoming Legislative Service Office stating in pertinent part, "I have enclosed extremely rough drafts of proposed legislation dealing with the liability insurance issue." (Emphasis added.)