Court Opinion

ID: 9849796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:46:33.529827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:26.267327
License: Public Domain

Undercofler, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
1. The majority summarily disposes of the due process issue in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1971) on the facts of that case. It then disposes of the equal protection issue on the basis that it is reasonable to treat unwed fathers differently because state public policy favors adoption. The court thus misconstrues Stanley. Stanley holds that an unwed father has due process rights and that he is denied equal protection because all other parents except unwed fathers are entitled to due process. "[A]s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Stanley v. Illinois, supra, p. 649. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority dismisses the due process right as merely a de facto right, which accrued from the fact that Stanley had intermittently lived with the mother and his children over an eighteen-year period.1 On the contrary, *235the Supreme Court held that Stanley’s due process rights stemmed from the biological fact of paternity.* 2 This is made clear in a footnote: "If unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand hearings. If they do care,... Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to afford them a properly focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding.” Stanley v. Illinois, supra, p. 657, n. 9. (Emphasis supplied.) The court even approved notice by publication to "All whom it may Concern,” where the father was unknown or had disappeared. See footnote 9, supra. Thus the Stanley majority intended to recognize the due process rights of all natural fathers, not merely those who live with their families.
The majority, I think, also misconstrues the basis of the equal protection claim in Stanley. I agree with the majority that the state has a rational basis in promoting the legitimation of the children of unwed fathers. Further, I know of no public policy of this state favoring adoption by strangers over being raised by one’s own father. The crux of the claim in Stanley, however, is that because an unwed father has due process rights in his children, it is a denial of equal protection to treat him differently than other parents.3 Thus based on the due process right, which the majority does not accept, the equal protection claim is not so easily dismissed on state *236public policy grounds. On this distinction, I would hold that Code Ann. § 74-403 (3) denies unwed fathers due process and the equal protection of the laws as was held by the Supreme Court in Stanley.
This position is fortified by the remand of two cases to their respective state courts in light of Stanley. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U. S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding, State v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420 (178 NW2d 56) (1970); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U. S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding, 126 Ill. App. 2d 410 (262 NE2d 717) (1970). On remand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, in a case similar to this one, that an adoption which had taken place without terminating the rights, or without the consent, of the unwed father was invalid in light of Stanley. The Wisconsin Court said, "The Supreme Court decided two things: (1) that the denial of a natural father’s parental rights to a child born out of wedlock based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, and (2) that the termination of a natural father’s parental rights to a child born out of wedlock without actual notice to him, if he was known, or constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving him the right to be heard on the termination of his rights denied him due process of law.” State v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1 (207 NW2d 826, 828) (1973). Likewise, the Appellate Court of Illinois on the remand of Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260 (292 NE2d 145) (1972), interpreted Stanley as having recognized that unwed fathers have protectable rights in their children. See also Miller v. Miller, 504 F2d 1067 (9th Cir., 1974); Willmott v. Decker, 541 P2d 13 (Ha., 1975); Forestiere v. Doyle, 30 Conn. Sup. 284 (310 A2d 607) (1973); State v. Lutheran Social Services, supra; People v. Covenant Children’s Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20 (284 NE2d 291) (1972); Doe v. Dept. of Social Services, 337 NYS2d 102 (1972); In re Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701 (495 P2d 1059) (1972); In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455 (134 NW2d 126) (1965). But see, In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N. Y. 2d 568 (370 NYS 2d 511, 331 NE2d 486) (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U. S. 1042 (1976).
2. I concur with the majority that Code Ann. § *23774-203 arbitrarily placing the parental power of the illegitimate child in the mother, rather than in the father as for legitimate children, has a rational basis in state policy. It is clear from Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971) that the state may make such determinations of family relationships. This section may be distinguished from Code Ann. § 74-403 (3) because it does not purport to deprive the other parent of all parental rights.
Because of my position stated in Division 1, however, I must dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justices Gunter and Ingram join in this dissent.

 The children were not then living with the father, *235but had been left by the father with another couple. Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at p. 663, n. 2.

 See also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973) (unacknowledged illegitimates have a cause of action against their natural fathers for support); Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U. S. 73, 75 (1968).

 " 'To say that the test of equal protection should be the "legal” rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a state to draw such "legal” lines as it chooses.’ Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U. S. 73, 75-76 (1968).” Stanley v. Illinois, supra, p. 652.