Court Opinion

ID: 9792071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:37.408596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.438806
License: Public Domain

Mallery, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion states:
“. . . a disciplinary proceeding is a special proceeding . . . incident to the inherent power of the court to control its officers . . . ” (Italics mine.)
There is no inherent power to disbar an attorney either in the súpreme court alone or acting in conjunction with the board of governors.
In territorial days and up until 1895, “courts of record” were given authority by statute over the admission to practice and discipline of attorneys. The state constitution, adopted in 1889, by a general savings clause validated all statutes not specifically in conflict with the provisions of the constitution. Thus, there is constitutional sanction for the legislative exercise of the police power over the licensing of attorneys. In 1895 “courts of record” were divested by statute of their authority to admit and disbar attorneys, and that power was conferred upon the supreme court. The board of bar examiners was later created by statute, and finally the integrated bar, its board of governors and the present disciplinary powers and procedures were created or provided for by statute. This court now discharges the duty imposed upon it by that statute pursuant to the authority therein conferred.
*11The bar association, its board of governors, and trial committees derive their authority directly from the statute and exercise it pursuant to the rules and procedures promulgated pursuant to statutory authorization. They are no more subject to supervision and control under the theory of inherent power than are the superior courts.
Disciplinary proceedings do not originate in this court, and, indeed, this court officially learns of them only upon the filing in this court of the completed record of the proceeding accompanied by the recommendation of the board of governors.
The majority opinion states:
“. . . we would be remiss if we did not insist that the record before us be amplified by the exploration of any facet of the case which might have a bearing on the ultimate determination. . . .
“. . . this matter is remanded to the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association for further investigation and action.”
This court has no statutory authority for- following such a course. The issues in a disciplinary procéeding.are framed by the pleadings of the adverse parties. It is strictly an adversary proceeding with the bar association on one side and the attorney on the other. The attorney has an unqualified right to interpose proper defenses of his own choosing so long as they are not conflicting. It is not the prerogative of the bar association to elect his defense for him, to conduct it, go forward with the proof of it, or control it in any way. Specifically, no attorney can be compelled to defend on the ground of insanity or incompetence. The attorney’s right to elect and conduct his own defense carries with it the concomitant duty of carrying the burden of it.
There is a line of demarcation between the exercise of supervisory powers over the board of governors on the part of this court and the review of the record at the request of an attorney who claims a proper defense was wrongfully excluded. We should not supervise the board of governors by directing it to “investigate” and “explore” facets of the case which we deem might have a bearing on it, notwith*12standing it would be proper to remand with directions to admit a defense if we find it was wrongfully excluded.
I would adopt the recommendation of the board of governors.
I dissent.
Ott, J., concurs with Mallery, J.