Court Opinion

ID: 9721439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:59:19.304178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.842587
License: Public Domain

RATTIGAN, J.
I respectfully dissent. I agree that the judgment of conviction must be reversed as to the contents of the cookie tin found in the passenger compartment of appellant’s station wagon, and as to the contents of the tote bag found in the luggage compartment, but I reach the same conclusion as to the contents of the “plastic wrapped” packages found with the tote bag. Because I would therefore reverse the judgment in its entirety, contrary to part I of the majority opinion, I need not reach the points discussed in parts II and III.
In declaring closed containers to be generally within the protection of the Fourth Amendment against warrantless searches, the United States Supreme Court excepted only those containers which “by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” (Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753, 764, fn. 13. [61 L.Ed.2d 235, 245, 99 S.Ct. 2586] [quoted in the majority opinion].) The most demonstrative evidence of the “outward appearance” of the two packages in question is the photograph mentioned in the majority opinion. It depicts only one of the packages as Officer DePue found them among a cluttered array of articles in the luggage compartment, but his testimonial description supports the inference that the packages were identical in appearance.
*44The package visible in the photograph is apparently wrapped or boxed in an opaque material covered by an outer wrapping of transparent, cellophane-type plastic. (The photograph is not in color, and the “green” plastic cannot be seen at all.) Both wrappings are sealed on the outside with at least one strip of opaque tape. As thus wrapped and sealed, the package roughly resembles an oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded corners and edges. It bears no legend or other written indicia supporting any inference concerning its contents.
The photograph thus presents to me the visual impression of a package that had been tightly wrapped for shipment by mail, or to protect its contents, or for both purposes. For all that I see, it could contain books, stationery, canned goods, or any number of other wholly innocuous items which might be heavy in weight. In fact, it bears a remarkable resemblance to an unlabelled carton of emergency highway flares that I bought from a store shelf and have carried in the trunk of my own automobile.
For these reasons, I perceive nothing about the packages which dispels “any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” (Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753 at p. 764, fn. 13 [61 L.Ed.2d 235 at p. 245].) I cannot plausibly distinguish them from the closed containers to which the California Supreme Court unanimously extended Fourth Amendment protection under virtually identical circumstances, and on the authority of Arkansas v. Sanders, in one of the decisions cited in the majority opinion. (People v. Dalton (1979) 24 Cal.3d 850, 854 [157 Cal.Rptr. 497, 598 P.2d 467] [describing a “large silver colored metal box,” a “silver-gray metal box,” and a “brown leather box,” all of which were found in the trunk of an automobile and opened by police officers]. See also id., at pp. 855-857 [invalidating the officers’ warrantless search of the “boxes”].)*
The only conceivable support for the majority’s contrary conclusion is Officer DePue’s testimony to his “merely hearsay” impression that “[n]orma!ly contraband is wrapped this way,” which he had “never. *45seen” himself. He also testified that he had received limited training at the California Highway Patrol Academy, “three times,” on how to identify the “odor of burned marijuana.” The record does not show that he had any training on how marijuana or other contraband is “normally wrapped,” nor that his “hearsay” impression on that subject was received from any reliable source, nor that he developed it in the course of his experience in law enforcement.
Given this limited authenticating background, the officer’s “hearsay” certification would not have supported the issuance of a valid warrant authorizing a search of packages with the outward appearance shown here. Given the same background, I am unwilling to rely on the “hearsay” as a basis for determining that he could constitutionally open and search the packages without any warrant at all. Lacking “exigent circumstances” as well (see my fn. ante), I conclude that the sealed packages were protected by the Fourth Amendment and that their contents should have been suppressed. (Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753 at pp. 763-764 [61 L.Ed.2d 235 at pp. 244-246]; compare id., at p. 764, fn. 13 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 245]; see also People v. Dalton, supra, 24 Cal.3d 850 at pp. 855-858; People v. Minjares (1979) 24 Cal.3d 410, 423-424 [153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514].) I would accordingly reverse the judgment of conviction in its entirety.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 30, 1980. Bird, C. J., and Tobriner, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

This decision also controls a significant companion point in the present case. The officers who arrested appellant had handcuffed him and positioned him away from the station wagon before its luggage compartment was opened. Dalton therefore establishes that there were no “exigent circumstances” justifying a warrantless search of the packages found in the compartment. (People v. Dalton, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 857.)