Court Opinion

ID: 9669631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:02:03.290955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:58.808761
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). The majority position is not supported by the facts of the case, this court’s prior decisions regarding reducing clauses, or the plain language and intent of secs. 631.43(1) and 632.32, Stats. (1979-80). This case involves a reducing clause that is clearly governed by sec. 631.43. Although the reducing clause1 is located in the unin*611sured motorist section of the policy, it does not affect or reduce any funds paid under that section of the policy.
The facts indicate that the plaintiff received the full policy limits of the uninsured motorist portion of the policy, and those policy limits fully complied with the requirements of sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats, at the time the policy was issued. As sec. 632.32(4)(a) deals specifically with the issuance of uninsured motorist coverages in policies, and the insurer clearly paid all uninsured motorist benefits to the required statutory policy minimums ($15,000) even before the litigation was started, Home Mutual did not violate sec. 632.32(4)(a), and the reducing clause Home Mutual relied on cannot be voided under that section. The only other statutory section that deals with reducing clauses, sec. 631.43(1), invalidates some reducing clauses but not all. As later explained in this dissent, the majority cannot rely on sec. 631.43(1) to void this reducing clause, so the majority simply refuses to discuss its controlling nature.
To consider the issue the majority reaches, the facts of this case would have to be completely reversed. Home Mutual would have to have paid its *612$50,000 in liability coverage before the trial took place rather than its $15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. Then, the plaintiff would have had to sue for the uninsured motorists coverage. Home Mutual would then have raised the other reducing clause as a defense — the clause that reduced uninsured motorist benefits because of a payment in liability coverage. Plainly, this did not take place, and there is no reason to invoke sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats.
As far as the liability coverage is concerned, the plaintiff is not an "insured” under the policy but a third party claimant and has no standing to complain about a reduction in liability policy limits unless those limits were less than the statutory minimum when the policy was issued, or if the plaintiff received less benefit than a named insured would receive under the same circumstances. These liability policy limits were greater than the statutory minimum even after they were reduced by the reducing clause.2 The majority completely ignores the fact that there are no limitations on the insurer as to the amount of liability coverage required. Since the reducing clause in ques*613tion reduces liability coverage, not uninsured motorist coverage, sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., is completely inapplicable from the outset, and there is no other statute or case that would invalidate this clause.3
However, the majority opinion uses the "legislative intent” of sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., to invalidate the reducing clause. The court has repeatedly refused to invalidate reducing clauses on the basis of sec. 632.32(4)(a). As we have previously stated:
"The issue of stacking uninsured motorist coverage was first raised in Leatherman v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 190 N.W.2d 904 (1971) — We found that the reducing clause was neither ambiguous nor contrary to public policy. Id. at 649-50. We concluded that only the legislature could prohibit the use of reducing clauses, not the court. Id. at 650-51.
"Subsequently, uninsured motorist coverage became mandatory, and the same issue raised in Leatherman was again presented in Scherr v. Drobac, 53 Wis. 2d 308, 193 N.W.2d 14 (1972). This court determined that the uninsured motorist statute, sec. 204.30(5)(a), Stats. (1973), (predecessor to sec. 632.32) had no effect on the validity of the reducing clause contained in the uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 310-11 _
"We found ... [in a third case, Nelson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974)] the Leatherman and Scherr decisions ... only guaranteed recovery of the minimum amount *614of coverage afforded for each policy and not the maximum coverage afforded by stacking several policies ....
"These cases clearly demonstrated this court’s refusal to prohibit reducing clauses and extend the stacking doctrine without a clear legislative mandate: 'any prohibition of reducing clauses was to be made by legislative mandate and not judicial fiat.’ Landvatter v. Globe Security Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 21, 23, 300 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1980).” Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 158, 162-63, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985). (Emphasis added.)
In Tahtinen, this court affirmed the older decisions’ reasoning and changed the rule on reducing clauses only because of the passage of sec. 631.43(1), Stats.4 Tahtinen states: "These cases clearly demonstrate that the validity of reducing clauses in uninsured motorist coverage is controlled by legislative mandate, not by public policy considerations.” Id. at 164. In the present case, there is a reducing clause which is found in the uninsured motorists section of the policy. As Tahtinen states repeatedly, either such *615a clause is prohibited by the clear language of the same statute or it is valid.
The majority concedes that clear language of sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., "is silent about reducing clauses; it neither authorizes nor prohibits them.” Opinion at pages 591-592. Therefore, sec. 632.32(4)(a) clearly and unambigously does not prohibit reducing clauses. There is no need to resort to legislative history to determine the intent of the legislature.
Tahtinen correctly stated that: "Our first resort in determining the legislative intent is to the language of the statute itself. If the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, it is improper to employ extrinsic aids to determine the meaning intended.” Id. at 166. (Citations omitted.) The majority fails to even pay lip service to this cardinal rule of statutory construction; the majority ignores it completely.5 Clearly, the majority can find no ambiguity in silence, so time honored rules are bent to reach the desired result.
Nor is silence in sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats, at all surprising, given the existence of sec. 631.43(1) which clearly deals with reducing clauses. However, since sec. 631.43(1) cannot give the result the majority desires, it resorts to sec. 632.32(4)(a). The majority, while addressing every other argument raised by the parties, states it "need not reach this issue.” Opinion at page 603. The majority does not make the hard *616choice of attempting to explain why the plain language of sec. 631.43(1) does not control because it cannot give an explanation. Instead, the majority reforms the plain language of sec. 631.43(1) and states in a footnote the "legislative objective” of that statute and gratuitously concludes that "[o]ur interpretation of sec. 632.32(4)(a) comports with sec. 631.43(1)” as reformed. Opinion at pages 589-590.
Since sec. 631.43(1), Stats., clearly deals with the subject of reducing clauses and sec. 632.32 is silent on the subject of reducing clauses, there must be a reason the majority is willing to delve into the legislative history of sec. 632.32(4)(a) to resolve the problem and refuse to examine sec. 631.43(1) at all. The reason can only be that the majority does not like the result that analysis of sec. 631.43(1) leads to: the reducing clause is not void. Section 631.43(1) is clearly the legislature’s mandate on reducing clauses. However, this mandate bars reducing clauses only where one reducing clause in one policy reduces coverage in another policy. Since sec. 631.43(1) uses the plural "policies,” it cannot void a reducing clause that appears in one coverage of a single policy and reduces another coverage within the same policy. Because sec. 631.43(1) is the legislative mandate on reducing clauses whether they appear in accident, health, automobile or fire policies and it does not bar the instant reducing clause, the inquiry should be at an end. The legislative purpose is clear.
Although the majority relies on the legislative history of sec. 632.32, Stats., Tahtinen found that section did not prohibit reducing clauses in uninsured motorist policies, citing Scherr v. Drobac, 53 Wis. 2d 308, 193 N.W.2d 14 (1972). Tahtinen, 122 Wis. 2d at 163. Since an argument that sec. 632.32(4)(a) allowed stacking was raised in the Tahtinen briefs (amicus *617curiae brief of Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers at 2), this statement was not dicta, and should be dealt with by the majority or overruled.
Even if the majority can find an ambiguity in sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., and distinguish Tahtinen’s holding that sec. 632.32(4)(a) does not affect stacking, the legislative history the majority relies on does not logically lead to an invalidation of the clause as the majority contends it does.
It is true that sec. 204.30(5)(a), Stats., was amended in 1973 to state:
"The uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage limits provided in an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance as required in this subsection shall not be reduced by the terms thereof to provide the insured with less protection than would be afforded him if he were injured by a motorist insured under an automobile liability policy of insurance containing the limits provided in this subsection.” (Emphasis added.)
Although the majority attempts to make the facts appear otherwise, the reducing clause of the instant policy only reduced liability coverage, not uninsured motorist coverage. Therefore, even if the 1973 amendment were a part of sec. 632.32(4)(a), Stats., today, the amendment would not invalidate this reducing clause.
Even assuming the facts were reversed with the liability coverage being paid out first and the uninsured motorist coverage being reduced, the plaintiff would still receive at least $15,000 in coverage. The difference is that the coverage would be coming from the liability portion of the policy rather than the uninsured motorist portion of the policy. The amendment does not indicate that it considers situations *618where there is an additional liability policy from which recovery is available. The whole tenor of the act and the amendment is to prevent any person insured under uninsured motorist coverage from lacking any source of recovery due to a reducing clause.
The Legislative Council Note in the 1973 amendment states that the bill "'would make certain that the reduction in coverage permitted in Leatherman would not occur under the amended statute.’” Opinion at pages 598-599. However, the reduction in coverage that occurred in Leatherman v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 190 N.W.2d 904 (1971) was a reduction in proceeds or insurance that came from outside the four corners of the policy. Since the facts of Leatherman are the only reference point of the intent of the 1973 amendment, and the facts of Leatherman involve an extra-contractual reducing clause, there is no way the majority can rely on the amendment to justify voiding a reducing clause that affects coverages inside the policy.
The present reducing clause does not really reduce coverage, it states overall policy limits on the occurrence of specific circumstances. Home Mutual could rewrite its policy to state that it offers $35,000 in liability coverage, but in the event that no uninsured motorist proceeds are paid, the liability coverage for any single person shall be $50,000. This has the same contractual effect as the so-called reducing clause and accomplishes the same purposes, but could not run afoul of the majority rule because it actually increases the liability coverage on the occurrence of a specified event, non-payment of uninsured motorist funds.
This 1973 amendment was repealed in 1975, as part of a general revision of the statutes in Chapter 375, Laws of 1975. The committee noted the amend*619ment "does not seem to add anything.” The majority seems to read this as preserving some sort of prior intent; it can also be read as rendering any prior effect of the amendment moot for lack of meaning. If it indeed added to the meaning of the intent of the former section, nothing could be gained by repealing the sentence. It seems strange the majority relies heavily on an amendment repealed because it added nothing. Truly, the search for legislative intent has led to grasping at straws.
Section 631.43(1), Stats, was also created by Chapter 375, Laws of 1975. While its meaning was found to be clear in Tahtinen, the Legislative Committee Note to that section states:
"The most important objective of the law is to give the insured full protection with minimum difficulty and joint and several liability does that. The insurers may then settle accounts among themselves. They will usually be able to do so by agreement. If they cannot, a court can do so first by interpreting the terms of the policies and, where they are inconsistent, applying restitutionary principles. In the past 'other insurance’ clauses have often done injustice; that fact was the reason for the enactment of statutes like s. 203.11 [fire insurance chapter, 1973 Stats.]. Courts have dealt with these problems with reasonably good results even in the absence of such a provision, and there is no reason to doubt that they can do justice as between the insurers, once the insured has received full indemnity.” (Emphasis added.)
The presence of sec. 631.43(1), Stats., and the comment after it make two things clear: the legislature positively enacted a mandate that would void reducing clauses that effected coverage outside of a *620single policy, and the legislature could have extended this mandate to include reduction between coverages in a single policy but did not. This directly contradicts the majority conclusion in footnote 6 that its interpretation of sec. 632.32(4)(a) "comports with sec. 631.43(1).” The enactment of 631.43(1) in the same chapter that the 1973 amendment to sec. 632.32(4)(a) was repealed suggests that the 1973 amendment did not add anything because the Leatherman problem was then clearly covered by sec. 631.43(1). Since sec. 631.43 broadly deals with other insurance clauses in all forms of indemnity insurance (accident, health, homeowners, automobile medical payments) there was no longer a need for specific language in sec. 632.32(4)(a).
The majority cites additional cases that state that "'the purpose of uninsured motorists coverage is to compensate an insured who is the victim of an uninsured motorist’s negligence to the same extent as if the uninsured motorist was insured:’” Opinion at pages 591-592. The majority theorizes that if Chartier had carried liability coverage and was negligent, the plaintiff would have recovered $50,000, $35,000 from the Garcia liability policy and $15,000 from whatever liability policy Chartier had.
I note from the record that the plaintiff, Kim Nicholson, claimed against her own uninsured motorist policy which was with American Family Insurance, in addition to the Garcia’s uninsured motorist policy. Since Chartier was found to have no negligence, Nicholson could not collect under the American Family policy, unless that requirement was waived by her insurance company.
However, if Chartier would have been negligent, which is the assumption the majority relies on (op. n. *6213), Nicholson would have collected both the uninsured motorist limits of her American Family policy and the uninsured motorist limits of the Garcia policy.
If Chartier had had liability insurance on one vehicle with $15,000 limits, Nicholson could have only collected $15,000 from Chartier. Under the majority decision and the rule of Tahtinen, Nicholson could collect $15,000 under her own uninsured motorist coverage, $15,000 under the Garcia’s uninsured motorist coverage and $50,000 under the Garcia’s liability coverage. Where the victim under a liability policy would recover $65,000 total, Nicholson would recover $80,000.
If Nicholson owned multiple vehicles, the distinction gets worse. If Nicholson had three vehicles with minimum coverage, those minimum coverages could be "stacked.” Three minimum coverages at $15,000 each would give her $45,000 in minimum coverages under her own policies. Therefore, if Nicholson owned three vehicles, she could recover $45,000 from her own uninsured motorist policy, $15,000 from the Garcia uninsured motorist policy and $50,000 from the Garcia liability policy for a total of $110,000. If Chartier had been insured, Nicholson would only have been able to collect $15,000 from his policy and $50,000 from the Garcia’s policy.
These examples show that this court, in its prior treatment of uninsured motorists coverage, has never been concerned about attempting to reach parity between those covered by liability coverage and those covered by uninsured motorist coverage. Clearly, from these examples, the ability to "stack” uninsured motorist coverages with other uninsured motorist coverages and now liability coverages puts the victim of an uninsured motorist in a much better position *622than the victim of insured tortfeasors if all coverages are at low limits. Therefore, the majority rationale of treating the victim as if the tortfeasor were insured is completely faulty. Just having the opportunity to buy multiple "stackable” third party coverage places the uninsured victim in a better position.
This court has left to the legislature by its decisions in the past the public policy area of reducing clauses, in all their forms. The legislature clearly has not barred reducing clauses that reduce one coverage within a single policy. The majority decision distorts the facts of this case, the prior case law of this court and the plain language and intent of the statutes to void this reducing clause. Accordingly, I dissent.

 The policy in the uninsured motorists section states:
"Any payment under this [uninsured motorists] coverage will reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover for the same damages under Part A.” (Part A is entitled liability coverage.)
Although the majority cites the reciprocal of this clause, which reduces the limits of uninsured motorist coverage for payments made *611under the liability policy, the reciprocal reducing clause cannot be invoked under these facts, is completely severable from the reducing clause stated in this footnote and was not relied on by Home Mutual in requesting a reduction in the judgment. In fact, the very question certified by the court of appeals does not request a ruling on the application of the reciprocal clause in this case. " 'When an insurance policy contains a provision which accords uninsured motorist (UM) coverage to a passenger in an insured's vehicle and also contains a reducing clause which states that any payment under the UM coverage will reduce any recovery for the same damages under the liability coverage....'" (Majority opinion at pages 585, 586.)

 Section 632.32, Stats., required $15,000 minimum uninsured motorist limits for the injuries of one person and $30,000 per accident. Although there is no minimum limit that liability policies must meet under sec. 632.32(4)(a) (and no restriction on the insurer issuing the policy, a policy could not be considered "proof of financial responsibility” under sec. 344.01(2)(d) and 344.15(1), unless the liability policy as issued provided $15,000 per person/$30,000 per accident liability limits.
The Garcia policy provided $50,000 per person, $100,000 per accident liability coverage. After it was reduced by the uninsured motorist payment, the policy paid $35,000 in liability coverage and $15,000 in uninsured motorist benefits. Both these payments met or exceeded the statutory "minimums.”

 Although there was another reducing clause that reduced uninsured motorist coverage located in the policy, that reducing clause was not relied on by Home Mutual and is not involved in the case. The majority here invalidates that reducing clause which was not invoked by the facts or the parties.

 Sec. 631.43(1), Stats., provides as follows:
"631.43 Other insurance provisions. (1) General. When 2 or more policies promise to indemnify an insured against the same loss, no 'other insurance’ provisions of the policy may reduce the aggregate protection of the insured below the lesser of the actual insured loss suffered by the insured or the total indemnification promised by the policies if there were no 'other insurance’ provisions. The policies may be their terms define the extent to which each is primary and each excess, but if the policies contain inconsistent terms on that point, the insurers shall be jointly and severally liable to the insured on any coverage where the terms are inconsistent, each to the full amount of coverage provided. Settlement among the insurers shall not alter any rights of the insured.”

 It is interesting to note that the same majority that in Tahtinen absolutely refused to examine the statutory history of sec. 631.43, Stats., in the absence of ambiguity here endorse such a method, even though examination of the legislative history of sec. 631.43, shows that the Tahtinen outcome was contrary to that history. In this case the legislative history does not lead to any clear result, and the statute is "silent” on the subject.