Court Opinion

ID: 9840931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 18:00:55.559264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:56.561213
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 20 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BENJAMIN FREEMAN,                               No. 22-16667

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01373-JAT-MHB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
DAVID SHINN, Director, Director at
ADOCRR; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted September 12, 2023**

Before:      CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

      Arizona state prisoner Benjamin Freeman appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after denying Freeman’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052

(9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

      The district court properly denied Freeman’s motion to proceed IFP because

Freeman had filed at least three prior actions that were dismissed as frivolous,

malicious, or for failure to state a claim, and Freeman failed to allege a nexus

between his alleged imminent danger and the unlawful conduct alleged in his

complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir.

2022) (“[I]n order to qualify for the § 1915(g) imminent danger exception, a three-

strikes prisoner must allege imminent danger of serious physical injury that is both

fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in his complaint and redressable by the

court.”).

      Freeman’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 5) is

denied.

      AFFIRMED.

                                          2                                    22-16667