Court Opinion

ID: 9493353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:05:53.495533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:47.875747
License: Public Domain

CARD AMONE, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
After learning in May 1993 that she had been denied tenure at Barnard College where she had taught as an assistant professor in the Chemistry Department for eight years, plaintiff Shelley Weinstock filed a Title VII complaint against defendant Columbia University asserting that the denial of tenure discriminated against her on account of her sex. From the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Columbia dismissing her complaint, plaintiff appeals. The majority has voted to affirm the judgment of the district court. Respectfully, I dissent and vote to reverse the grant of summary judgment. I would permit the case to go to trial so that plaintiff might have her day in court on the merits of her discrimination claim.
The district court ruled that plaintiff made out a prima facie case. That is, as a woman she is a member of a protected class; she is qualified to be a tenured professor; she suffered an adverse employment decision in the denial of tenure; and the circumstances surrounding that denial give rise to an inference of discrimination. The majority accepts the district court’s ruling that a prima facie case has been stated.
After plaintiff has made out a prima facie case the defendant is required to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying tenure. Here that reason was that plaintiffs scholarship allegedly was not up to defendant’s standards. Plaintiffs burden at that point is to come forward with proof that such reason is merely a pretext, and that more likely than not gender discrimination was the real reason.
The district court found that plaintiff failed to come forward with any proof of pretext. The majority could find no error in this conclusion. I think there was error. To avoid dismissal of her civil rights complaint plaintiff need not actually establish pretext. Her burden is only to raise a question of fact as to the validity of the reason proffered by defendant for its adverse employment decision. In this dissent, I hope to demonstrate that this record abundantly reveals material questions of fact regarding both pretext and whether defendant’s decision resulted from sex discrimination.
Professor Weinstock, a woman science professor in a field dominated by men, was turned down for tenure at Barnard College by defendant Columbia University, acting through its provost in whom it vested vast discretion in tenure matters. From the start the provost had a negative view of Weinstock’s candidacy. He took actions that violated both the letter and the spirit of Columbia’s affiliation agreement with Barnard — an agreement executed to ensure fairness to Barnard in tenure matters. Despite the unanimous support for *51tenure of those most familiar with Wein-stock’s scholarship, namely her peers in the Chemistry Departments of Columbia and Barnard, the provost, who had no expertise in the field and had not read any of her publications, single-handedly denied her tenure, stating that, in his view, her scholarship was not up to Columbia’s standards. From this it is fair to say that the provost evaluated plaintiffs candidacy for tenure through a gender-tainted lens, failing to recognize that his vast discretion did not permit him to violate the affiliation agreement, or to trample on the law forbidding discrimination on account of sex that Congress in 1964 enacted as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In particular, this record is marked by numerous contradictions and irregularities in the conduct of and rationales offered by Provost Jonathan Cole, the principal actor in this tenure decision. These inconsistencies are inexplicable in the absence of gender discrimination.
I BACKGROUND
A. Relationship Between Columbia and Barnard
To fully explain the grounds on which I dissent, it is important to understand the relationship between Barnard, the college where Professor Weinstock sought tenure, and defendant Columbia University.
Barnard College and Columbia University are parties to a written affiliation agreement that requires Columbia’s approval of tenure for Barnard faculty. The agreement requires that Barnard appoint faculty of comparable quality to Columbia and that there be a regular system for reviewing Barnard candidates for tenure. Yet, the University agrees that the procedures for Barnard candidates are not identical to those for Columbia candidates, and that this distinction is to ensure fairness to Barnard. Although the tenure review process embodies the same standards and provides for regular review, it recognizes the differences in the mission between Barnard College and Columbia University.
Barnard is a small, undergraduate, women’s ■ liberal arts college of several thousand students (this year’s graduating class was about 570), while Columbia is a large, internationally known research university, teaching graduate as well as undergraduate students. Resources for research at the smaller College are more limited than at the University, which is a reason why “the procedures by which Barnard nominations [for tenure] are reviewed differ in some respects” under the agreement between the University and Barnard. Because there are no graduate students to assist in research and the research budget and facilities are more limited than at the larger University, the projects undertaken by Barnard professors in the Chemistry Department are necessarily narrower than those.at the University. Thus, although the affiliation agreement states that faculty at Barnard and Columbia are to be of comparable quality, the more limited resources at Barnard require that the standards for tenure at the two institutions differ. This crucial difference is explored below.
B. Columbia’s Record in “Natural Sciences” — Statistics
Statistical evidence puts this matter in further perspective and makes plain how the University deviated from the standards it had agreed to abide by. Although not in the record before us, Columbia makes statistical information on its hiring patterns freely and widely available. See Office of Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action (visited Aug. 8, 2000) <http://www.columbia.edu/ cu/vpaa/eoaa/index.html>. Even though Columbia established a 38 percent hiring goal for women in the natural sciences in 1996-97, of the five new hires that year, none were women. Such disparity cannot *52be explained by a lack of women graduate students in scientific fields since women earned 45 percent of all doctorates awarded in life sciences (which includes biochemistry, Weinstock’s field) in 1997; nor can it be explained by a restricted pipeline of candidates since even in 1987 women obtained 35 percent of all life science doctorates nationwide.
In fact, in the natural sciences (often known as “hard sciences”), where plaintiff teaches, only 15 percent of professors at Columbia were women. In over forty years, only two women have ever been tenured in Columbia’s Chemistry Department, and the department has never had more than one woman tenured at a time. Columbia’s record cannot be explained by supply and demand — the number of women obtaining doctorates and entering the academic job market in science has risen dramatically over the last decade. One Columbia professor characterized this abysmal record as a “scandal.” The 15 percent women professors in natural sciences has held steady for the past 12 years, the same length of time the provost who made this tenure decision has held office. Statistical disparities like these are probative on the issue of discrimination because they are often the only way to demonstrate covert discrimination. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 438 U.S. 299, 307-08, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977).
C. Plaintiffs Candidacy
Next we look at plaintiffs background. Weinstock was an assistant professor in the Chemistry Department at Barnard for nine years from 1985 to 1994 when, after she was denied tenure, her employment was terminated. She is a biochemist whose research focused primarily on blood substitutes and artificial organs. Wein-stock was educated at MIT and Harvard, published scholarly works in academic publications and received prestigious grants, including one from the National Institutes of Health, which funds less than 10 percent of all applications. Because the award of such a grant is highly selective it shows that she ranked near the top of her national peer group. In her tenure application, Weinstock received the unanimous support of the Barnard Chemistry Department. The Columbia Chemistry Department voted for plaintiffs tenure with not a single negative vote. The Barnard Committee for Tenure voted in her favor, and the president of Barnard favored granting plaintiff tenure. Weinstock’s tenure dossier was extremely strong, containing excellent referee letters from leading scientists in her field. She was widely lauded as an excellent teacher and mentor.
II Provost Cole and the Ad Hoc Committee
A. Cole’s Conduct
Following the approval of the Chemistry Departments of Barnard and Columbia and the other approvals already recited, Professor Weinstock’s application was turned over to Columbia Provost Cole, who, as provided for in the affiliation agreement, selected an ad hoc committee of five: two from Columbia (Professors Tall and Silverstein), two from Barnard (Professors Braine and Hertz), and one outside member having no affiliation with Barnard or Columbia (Professor Cohn of Rockefeller University). The ad hoc committee serves as an independent, objective body to evaluate tenure candidates.
The two Columbia professors Cole appointed to the ad hoc, Alan Tall and Samuel Silverstein, were both from the medical school. Cole had known both professors for several years and with Silverstein shared a common interest in the “sociology of science,” an area in which Cole has published several books.
As Chair of the ad hoc committee, Cole’s other Columbia appointee, Professor Tall, called each of the ad hoc members before the committee convened and expressed criticism of Weinstock’s candidacy. Tall admitted he called to express “his concerns.” The majority dismisses these phone calls as “protocol,” yet testimony from Lila Braine and Paul Hertz, the two Barnard professors on the committee, *53makes it very clear that Tall was not calling to schedule a convenient meeting time, inquiring about information perhaps missing from the dossier distributed to all members in advance, or attending to any other matters falling within the scope of such administrative “protocol.”
Indeed, Braine testified that Tall was trying to “twist her arm” with his negative views of Weinstock; Both Braine and Hertz were so disturbed by the nature of Tail’s phone calls that independently of each other they reported the phone calls to Robert McCaughey, the Dean of Barnard’s Arts and Sciences faculty, who was to be present at the ad hoc. Columbia’s then-President Michael Sovern, its current President George Rupp, Barnard’s then-President Ellen Futter, and even Cole himself all agree that these phone calls would have been clearly “inappropriate” if Tall were.expressing an opinion on Wein-stock’s candidacy, and would have constituted a procedural irregularity, because, according to Columbia’s president, members of an ad hoc committee are to meet after reviewing the candidate’s dossier “completely independently.”
Yet when Dean McCaughey raised the issue at the ad hoc and requested that a new ad hoc be convened, Provost Cole dismissed his request, claiming that because neither Braine nor Hertz felt their opinions had changed as a result of Tail’s phone calls, there was no procedural irregularity. Replicating Cole’s argument, the majority finds that “whatever irregularities existed did not affect the final decision to deny Weinstock tenure.” Whether Tail’s arm-twisting was ultimately successful is irrelevant to the issue of gender discrimination. The very fact that the calls were made, that they were clearly inappropriate, and as such constituted procedural defects in the tenure review process, calls into question Columbia’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for denying Weinstock tenure, (issue # 1) This evidence raises the first of 12 disputed questions of fact that I identify. Many of them relate to Cole’s credibility. All of them are material to the issues of pretext and discrimination. At this stage of the case, all of these issues should have been resolved in plaintiffs favor.
Moreover, at the ad hoc deliberations, evidence of gender discrimination began to surface. Barnard Professors Braine and Hertz observed that Columbia Professors Silverstein and Tall, who had never met Weinstock, referred to her by her first name, “Shelley.” Referring to a woman by her first name in this context may be probative on the issue of gender discrimination. Amici,1 quoting an article from the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, report that in 1,730 student evaluations of law school faculty, male professors were never referred to by their first names. Braine and Hertz also testified that Silver-stein and Tall assumed a patronizing tone toward Weinstock, calling her “nice” and describing her as if she were nurturing. Although they do not specifically remember what words were used to describe Weinstock, they both believe that “nurturing” was consistent with the nature of Silverstein’s and Tail’s commentary.
The majority finds, as a matter of law, that these comments cannot possibly raise an inference of sex discrimination because “nice” and “nurturing” could: (1) conceivably be used to describe men, and (2) are positive qualities. Perhaps these are positive qualities in a motherhood contest, but during the tenure deliberations for a chemistry professor and scientist, they suggest gender discrimination. By describing her as “nice” and referring to her nurturing manner, Silverstein and Tall were not' extolling her positive qualities— rather, they were using these qualities to highlight what they perceived to be her intellectual weakness.
*54At the ad hoc meeting the Barnard dean and Columbia provost are both present, supposedly as observers. But the provost took an active role and expressed a negative view of Weinstock and her chemistry research, a field in which he had no expertise. Cole admitted he had not read a single one of her many publications. Significantly, he denied in his deposition having expressed any opinion at the ad hoc meeting at all, yet three members of the committee who were present, including outside Professor Cohn, say Cole took an active role and was negative (Professor Cohn said the “sticking point” for Cole was Professor Weinstock’s research), (issue #2)
The provost informed the members of the ad hoc committee that plaintiff should be judged as though she would receive tenure at Columbia, a standard that had not been applied to other Barnard candidates. According to the affiliation agreement between the two institutions, the procedures by which Barnard nominations for tenure are reviewed “differ in some respects” from Columbia nominations. The differences between the two institutions render the provost’s purported standard a false and impossible one. (issue # 3)
Provost Cole’s predisposition against Professor Weinstock, evidenced by his active and deliberate role during the ad hoc, could explain why remarkably he sent Barnard College a letter stating that he agreed with the ad hoc’s decision to deny Weinstock tenure and was thus denying her tenure. He generated this very important document despite the fact that the ad hoc committee had voted to grant plaintiff tenure. Alerted to his glaring error, Cole sent a follow-up letter to Barnard College, explaining that he had sought “additional information” after the ad hoc voted in her favor, which had convinced him to reject its recommendation, (issue # 4)
The process by which Provost Cole collected his purported “additional information” is equally mendacious. He asked Associate Provost Stephen Rittenberg to compile a list of experts in Weinstock’s field to consult about her candidacy. Although Rittenberg provided him with a list of expert faculty within Columbia University, Cole did not contact a single person on this list. Rather, he turned to Breslow and Bersohn, two professors in Columbia’s Chemistry Department, neither of whom are experts in Weinstock’s field. Professor Breslow had previously written a thoughtful letter supporting plaintiffs candidacy, but changed his tune in response to the provost, describing Weinstock as not aggressive, not tough, a “perfectly nice person” and a “pushover.” Having obtained from Professor Breslow what he wanted, the provost then cited Breslow’s advice in support of his decision to turn plaintiffs tenure application down, (issue #5)
When questioned during his deposition on why he did not contact any of the experts knowledgeable about Weinstock’s area of research, Cole responded that he sought only to “confirm” his assessment of Weinstock and therefore did not need to consult an expert. His own notes of his conversation with Breslow are telling in that they touch only briefly on the supposedly central issue — the strength of Weinstock’s research — but instead go on to describe personal characteristics, i.e., a “perfectly nice person,” a “pushover.” Cole found the confirmation he needed— confirmation of gender stereotypes that detracted from Weinstock’s scholarly achievements, (issue # 6)
In addition, from his conversation with Bersohn, Cole discredited the positive recommendation of Columbia’s Chemistry Department, by describing it as a “courtesy” extended to Barnard. If the sincerity of the Columbia Chemistry Department’s letter favoring Weinstock’s tenure was ambiguous, the affiliation agreement sets forth formalized procedures for exploring its meaning, either through a written statement to the ad hoc, or by testimony before it. Neither option was followed. In light of the fact that Weinstock received *5511 votes from Columbia’s Chemistry Department in her favor, 4 abstentions from those unfamiliar with her research, and not a single negative vote, Cole’s assertion that the recommendation was extended as a mere “courtesy” is to say the least, somewhat startling. The majority’s assertion that this vote “was a mere ‘courtesy’ ” at best raises a dispute about a material issue of fact, (issue # 7)
Moreover, in assessing the credibility of Cole’s rebanee on two supposedly negative reports from members of the Columbia Chemistry Department, Weinstock is entitled to the inference from the departmental vote that either (a) Breslow and Ber-sohn thought well enough of her work to vote to tenure her; or (b) they were among those abstaining because they were unfamihar with her work.. Either inference casts doubt on the validity of Cole’s reason, (issue # 8)
Even when the ad hoc’s vote is 8-2, it is rare for the provost to reject its recommendation. To justify, at least in part, taking the “rare” action of overruhng a positive ad hoc committee vote, Cole in his report to the president of Columbia said that Rockefeller University’s Professor Cohn — the only member of the ad hoc committee who was in plaintiffs field— thought Weinstock’s research was “weak.” Yet, according to two of the ad hoc members, Professor Cohn was positive about plaintiffs candidacy. In fact, in Professor Cohn’s own letter to the Chair of Barnard’s Chemistry Department following the denial of tenure, he expressed his unhappiness at Cole’s decision to deny Wein-stock tenure, stated that he had voted in her favor and had found her research “rather imaginative,” and commented that she was an excellent teacher and mentor. Hardly the language used to describe a weak candidate, (issue # 9)
Further, the affiliation agreement provided that the provost was to explain the reasons for his decision to the ad hoc whose recommendation he rejected. Cole offered none. After Barnard Professor Braine wrote two letters requesting an explanation, Cole finally answered, but qualified his response by stating that since Weinstock had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, any explanation he offered must be made with the defense of Columbia University in mind. One might fairly ask what defense would be needed if the reason given was not pretextual. (issue #10)
B. Cole’s Rationale
For the reader to place Cole’s conduct in proper context, some insight into his initial negative view of plaintiff as a woman candidate for tenure in the Chemistry Department can be gained by examining a book he wrote on this subject, Fair Science: Women in the Scientific Community (1979). In the book Provost Cole addresses the question of whether women scientists are subject to sex discrimination in matters -of promotion. Id. at 18. His answer, sét forth in chapter 3, Woman’s Place in the Scientific Community, is “no.” Instead, he believes there is a high degree of fairness in the distribution of scientific rewards and that women’s lack of success is based on what he terms “univer-salistic criteria,” which, at page 5, he defines as merit. See id. at 82. To put it bluntly, a rational juror could find that in the provost’s view, women scientists are not subject to discrimination in denial of tenure cases; they simply lack merit.
Faced with such a strong tenure candidate, ' Cole explained his decision by insisting that Weinstock fell short of the standard needed to obtain tenure in Columbia’s Chemistry Department, rather than Barnard’s Chemistry Department. This rationale enabled him to mischarac-terize all the' positive reviews of her work, including Professor Cohn’s, by insisting that these reviewers were only positive about Weinstock because they applied a lower standard. It is nonetheless clear from the affiliation agreement that the standards for tenure at Barnard, a small undergraduate institutioil with bmit-*56ed research facilities, differ from those at Columbia, a large research institution with advanced facilities and a substantial budget and graduate students to assist professors in their research. There is ample evidence to indicate that as a practical matter, two standards, one for tenure at Barnard and one for tenure at Columbia, had emerged. President Fut-ter of Barnard appealed Cole’s decision in writing — the first time she had ever appealed a tenure decision in her 12 years as Barnard’s president. In his defense, Cole cited the affiliation agreement, arguing that it permitted him to apply identical standards to Barnard and Columbia professors, and that his broad discretion rendered his decision unreviewable.
Cole’s nondiscriminatory rationale is from start to finish incredible. Even Professor Breslow, whose testimony he cites in support of his decision, agreed that Sally Chapman, the Chair of Barnard’s Chemistry Department, would not have been granted tenure under the standard Cole claimed to impose on candidate Weinstock. Professor Weinstock was the first woman nominated for tenure in the natural sciences at Columbia or Barnard during Cole’s term as provost, and it is apparent that Cole selectively applied a higher standard in her case. The tenure bar was raised for Weinstock because she is a woman. This point was made crystal clear the following year when a male professor in the Physics Department was granted tenure at Barnard despite the fact that at least one member of his ad hoc committee acknowledged that he would not have received tenure in the Physics Department at Columbia. That is, the tenure bar was lowered for a man. (issue #11) Standing alone this issue is significant enough to overcome a summary judgment motion.
Even Provost Cole’s response to Professor Braine’s letter inquiring as to his reasons for denying Weinstock tenure was suspect. Cole insisted that as provost he had to be concerned about the financial impact of tenure on University finances. That statement is inaccurate and disingenuous. The affiliation agreement with Columbia leaves the qualifications review up to the agreed-upon ad hoc process, but with respect to financial considerations, Barnard’s decision is “final,” as the president of Columbia conceded, (issue # 12)
This record reflects gender discrimination incontrovertibly shown by gender stereotyping and by statistics. Further this discrimination occurred under the aegis of a provost granted vast discretion in tenure matters who, the record demonstrates, was guilty of procedural irregularities in violation of the affiliation agreement between Columbia and Barnard, as well as a very large number of credibility issues that cast doubt on the provost’s veracity as a witness. In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the proffered reason for denial of tenure was pre-textual, and that the real reason was sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
Ill Law
A. Summary Judgment
In their zeal to “clear the calendar” of so-called “doomed lawsuits,” my colleagues have overlooked the procedural posture of Weinstock’s appeal. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether genuine issues of material fact exist, “a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.... [N]ot only must there be no genuine issue as to the evidentiary facts, but there must also be no controversy regarding the inferences to be drawn from them.” Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (emphasis added).
In reviewing the facts of this case, the district court and the majority have done the precise opposite — resolved factual issues in Columbia’s favor rather than Wein-*57stock’s, and disregarded the controversy surrounding 12 of its pivotal facts. These analytical errors are particularly egregious in .a discrimination case, where an employer’s intent is at issue. As we have repeatedly recognized, .evidence of discriminatory intent is usually circumstantial and can only be gleaned from careful scrutiny of the entire record. See, e.g., Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.1999) (“[T]he trial court must be especially cautious in deciding whether to grant this drastic provisional remedy in a discrimination case, because the employer’s intent is often at issue and careful scrutiny may reveal circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.”); Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir.1996) (“Since it is rare indeed to find in an employer’s records proof that a personnel decision was made for a discriminatory reason, whatever other relevant depositions, affidavits and materials are before the district court must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial evidence that could support an inference of discrimination.”); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that court must be cautious about using this “drastic provisional remedy” where “intent is at issue”).
B. ■ Substantive Law on Discrimination — Factors Bearing on Pretext
1. Gender Stereotyping. The discriminatory effect of gender stereotypes is precisely the problem the Supreme Court 'condemned in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). The majority believes Price Waterhouse is inapplicable to this case because unlike Ann Hopkins, who was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry,” id. at 235, 109 S.Ct. 1775, Wein-stock did not face “carping.” This logic misapprehends why stereotyping is discriminatory. The irony of Price Water-house arose from the fact that Hopkins’ so-called masculine qualities — what others perceived as her abrasiveness — would have been valued qualities in a man being considered for partnership. Price Water-house discriminated against Hopkins because although she performed the “masculine” role of competing successfully for business, the firm punished her for not simultaneously performing the “feminine” role of speaking softly and having a feminine appearance. The Supreme Court held that Hopkins’ failure to fulfill this gendered role was an impermissible consideration in the partnership decision.
This case presents the mirror image of Price Waterhouse. Cole’s decision to deny Weinstoek tenure was based — ironically— on her perceived success at projecting a stereotypically “feminine” image at work. Weinstoek was described as gentle and caring, “nice,” a “pushover,” and nurturing. Unfortunately for Weinstoek, a stereotypically “feminine” person is not viewed in a male dominated field as a driven, scientifically-minded, competitive academic researcher. The inappropriate focus on Weinstock’s “feminine” qualities in the tenure process led Cole and perhaps others to discount her “masculine” success as a researcher and professor. While Hopkins was punished for failing to perform a “feminine” role, Weinstoek was punished for performing it too well.
The problem both Weinstoek and Hopkins faced is that their employers demanded that they perform both “masculine” and “feminine” roles, yet perceived those roles as fundamentally incompatible. Unlike “masculine”- men at Price Waterhouse, Hopkins was punished because her “masculinity” appeared inconsistent with gendered stereotypes of how women should look and behave; Weinstoek was punished because her “femininity” appeared inconsistent with “masculine” success as a researcher. Yet if Weinstoek had chosen to project a more “masculine” image, she *58could very well have ■ suffered the same fate as Hopkins.
2. Procedural Irregularities. In the instant case, Weinstock has raised significant questions about Columbia’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its tenure decision — more than enough evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment. In any other employment setting, the procedural irregularities and shifting standards outlined earlier that characterized the entire process of Weinstock’s tenure review, would undeniably suggest pretext. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir.1993) (implausibility of employer’s nondiscriminatory rationale shows pretext); Schmitz.v. St. Regis Paper Co., 811 F.2d 131, 132-33 (2d Cir.1987) (employer shifting explanations provides evidence of pretext). The context of a tenure decision is no different, as Title VII applies with the same force to universities as to all employers. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 190-91, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990).
In fact, we have held that procedural irregularities can create an inference of discrimination in tenure decisions. See Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir.1997) (reversing summary judgment where procedural irregularities raised inference that reasons given for employment decision were not the real reasons); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir.1984) (procedural irregularities can raise an inference of bias). Whether the affiliation agreement gave Cole the power to reject unilaterally the ad hoc’s tenure recommendation has no bearing on whether he exercised that discretion in a discriminatory fashion. The discretion accorded to Cole as university provost does not place his actions above the law.
In addition to the ample evidence of pretext plaintiff has offered, the facts in this case also create an inference of sex discrimination, suggesting that Weinstock might well have ultimately prevailed had she been given her day in court. In any other employment setting, the use of gendered stereotypes suggests sex discrimination. It is not necessary that these stereotypes form the sole basis for an employer’s decision. Weinstock need only show that her gender was a “motivating factor” in Columbia’s decision. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250, 109 S.Ct. 1775; Renz v. Grey Advertising, Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 221-22 (2d Cir.1997); Montana v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir.1989). When this strong evidence of pretext is considered in the context of gender stereotypes evident in Columbia’s handling of Weinstock’s tenure case, it creates an inference of sex discrimination, suggesting that Weinstock might well have ultimately prevailed had she been given her day in court. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, — U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In holding that evidence of pretext, when combined with a prima facie case could, as a matter of law, support a jury’s finding of discrimination, the Supreme Court in Reeves clarified what circumstances might make that showing insufficient: “An employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Id. at-, 120 S.Ct. at 2109 (emphases added). Thus, to overcome as a matter of law a finding of discrimination based on pretext plus a prima facie case, a defendant must point to evidence in the record clearly indicating that for some reason, plaintiffs evidence of pretext in that particular case should not carry the weight normally assigned to it under general principles of evidence law. See Reeves, — U.S. at-, 120 S.Ct. at 2108 (relying on “the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a *59material fact as ‘affirmative evidence of guilt.’ ”) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992)). In the case before us, Weinstock has raised material issues of fact on pretext sufficient for a rational jury to find in her favor. Columbia points to no reason why all rational factfinders would necessarily discount that evidence of pretext. That is, Columbia has not produced the strong, independent evidence of a third motive or alternative rationale that Reeves requires to overcome a plaintiffs proof of pretext and prevail as a matter of law. In this regard, Weinstock has more than met her burden to obtain a trial on the merits.
3. Statistical Proof. In addition, Columbia’s abysmal record of promoting women professors in the hard sciences is probative evidence on the issue of sex discrimination. An employer’s poor record of hiring and promoting members of a protected class can often provide statistical evidence of discrimination under Title VII, see International Bh’d of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), and can at times, even standing alone, constitute a prima facie case of discrimination. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 307-08, 97 S.Ct. 2736; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339, 97 S.Ct. 1843.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate question we have to answer is not whether Provost Cole’s conduct violated the letter and the spirit of the affiliation agreement between Barnard and Columbia — which it so obviously did — it is whether Cole’s actions violated federal and state anti-discrimination laws. The record suggests that Weinstock was denied tenure not because her scholarship was lacking, as Columbia insists, but because she is a woman. The magnitude of the proof Weinstock offered — reflected in the 12 issues identified above — raises significant, material issues of fact with respect to pretext that cast doubt on Columbia’s purported nondiscriminatory reason for denying her tenure. Were a jury to believe that Columbia has falsely manufactured its reasons for denying plaintiff tenure as a chemistry professor at Barnard — particularly where that disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity — that disbelief together' with the elements of plaintiffs prima facie case already conceded may be sufficient to prove unlawful discrimination at trial. See Reeves, — U.S. at- -, 120 S.Ct. at 2101-02; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 & n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Reeves, which held that a prima facie case, combined with proof of pretext can, as a matter of law, sufficiently support a jury’s finding of discrimination, makes clear that a plaintiff, by showing a material question of fact with regard to pretext, logically defeats a motion for summary judgment.
Although broad discretion did rest in the provost,- it is limited by the agreement with Barnard and by the bounds of Title VII law. For that reason, his discretion did not constitute him, as he appeared to think, a law unto himself. The -sad irony here is that this fabled University, the oldest college in New York State and the fifth oldest in the nation, and - a leading voice for fair and equal rights for women, could continue to countenance for such a prolonged time, a disgraceful record of discrimination against women pursuing academic preferment in the natural sciences, a-record that culminates in this case.
Columbia’s success in depriving its sister college of Professor Weinstock’s services in its Chemistry Department and in having this Court vindicate that decision, must, at some level, be viewed as a victory for Columbia and its provost. But at what price?

. A brief Amici Curiae was filed in this appeal jointly by Equal Rights Advocates, American Association of University Women, Association for Women in Science, and New York Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association.