Court Opinion

ID: 9737024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:10.786692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.991088
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice,
dissenting.
As I believe that the written request for submission to a chemical test is a foundational requirement for the admission of compulsory test results under Iowa Code chapter 321J, I must respectfully dissent. Additionally, I fail to see how a test administered under the compulsion of the implied consent procedure may somehow be determined to be a voluntary submission to a test.
Iowa Code section 321J.6(2) specifically provides that if “the peace officer fails to offer a test within two hours after the preliminary screening test is administered or refused or the arrest is made, whichever occurs first, a test is not required.” (emphasis added). The majority takes the position that the time period is not a foundational requirement for the admission of the test. While we have not specifically held meeting the time element is a foundational requirement, we have often indicated this condition must be met.. State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, “imposes a two-hour limitation”); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) (“a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all”); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test must be given within “two hours after arrest”). In State v. Stoneking, 379 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1985), the test was demanded within the two-hour period but, due to defendant’s delay by speaking with his lawyer, the test was not administered within the time period. The State urged that the two-hour period was not a foundational requirement. We avoided the issue by holding the test need only *432be offered within the two-hour period. Id. at 356. I believe that the plain language of the statute requires that the test be offered within two hours. I further believe that the comments in our cases have indicated such a requirement must be met before the evidence of test results is admissa-ble.
If we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion, we have an anomalous result. We would allow the admission of evidence obtained by deceit. The defendant was informed orally and in writing that a failure to submit to the test would result in the loss of her driver’s license. This is not true. We should not reward this deception by admitting the fraudulently obtained evidence. Rather, the exclusionary rule should apply, making the evidence inadmissible. See Vietor, 261 N.W.2d at 832.
Finally, the majority opinion indicates that error was not preserved on the issue of voluntariness of the consent. The State does not claim the consent was given voluntarily. Obviously the consent to the test was not voluntary. It was compelled by the implied consent procedures with its false threat of a license revocation. The real issue before the court has been preserved. Should we allow the admission of evidence secured by deceit? I think not.
CARTER and LAVORATO, JJ., join this dissent.