Court Opinion

ID: 93627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:07:41+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:10.489393
License: Public Domain

149 U.S. 278 (1893)
UNITED STATES
v.
DUMAS.
No. 230.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted April 20, 1893.
Decided May 1, 1893.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
*280 Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for plaintiffs in error.
No appearance for defendants in error.
*282 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
*283 It is insisted for the government that the order of the Postmaster General and the certified transcript of the accounts, which state the amount of the liability of Anna M. Dumas at $709.89, are final and conclusive. If this proposition is correct, and the order and the transcript constitute conclusive rather than prima facie evidence of the balance due the United States, then the instruction given was erroneous, and that requested should have been given.
The order of the Postmaster General was made, as it recites, in the exercise of the discretion conferred by the first section of the act of Congress approved June 17, 1878, 20 Stat. 140, c. 259, § 1, which provides "that in any case where the Postmaster General shall be satisfied that a postmaster has made a false return of business, it shall be within his discretion to withhold commissions on such returns, and to allow any compensation that under the circumstances he may deem reasonable." Now an order made in pursuance of this provision is certainly not conclusive upon a postmaster that his returns of business are actually false in fact, when by the same section of the act it is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, to make a false return to the Auditor for the purpose of fraudulently increasing his compensation. Neither can it be properly held that, when the Postmaster General is satisfied that a postmaster has made a false return of business, and exercises his discretion "to withhold commissions on such returns," his order in the matter is a final and conclusive determination that the postmaster is not entitled to any commissions as such, or that his compensation shall be absolutely fixed and limited by the allowance made. In a suit for his commissions or compensation, such an order withholding the one, and making a discretionary allowance as to the other, would certainly not conclude the postmaster. It was not the intention of Congress by this provision of the statute to confer upon the Postmaster General the discretion to deprive a postmaster of his commissions, or to vest him with authority to deny all commissions, and allow only such compensation as he might deem proper, as a final settlement and adjudication of the postmaster's rights in the premises.
*284 By a preceding clause of the same section, it is provided "that when the compensation of any postmaster of this class [4th] shall reach one thousand dollars per annum, exclusive of commissions on money-order business, and when the returns to the Auditor for four quarters shall show him to be entitled to a compensation in excess of that amount under section seven of the act of July twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, the Auditor shall report such fact to the Postmaster General, who shall assign him to his proper class and fix his salary as provided by said section." A similar provision in the act of March 3, 1883, was before this court in the case of the United States v. Wilson, 144 U.S. 24, and it was held that a postmaster who is assigned by the Postmaster General to a particular class at a designated salary from a designated date was entitled to compensation at the rate thus fixed from such date without regard to his appointment by the President and confirmation by the Senate. The action of the Postmaster General in assigning a postmaster to his proper class and fixing his salary accordingly, under such provisions of the statute, is essentially different from the exercise of the discretion conferred of withholding commissions on such returns as the Postmaster General may be satisfied are false. "To withhold" commissions seems fairly to imply a temporary suspension, rather than a total and final denial or rejection of the same. If such withholding is not conclusive upon the postmaster, how can the allowance made, while the commissions are being withheld, be treated or regarded as a final and conclusive adjudication as to the compensation the postmaster is, or shall be, entitled to receive? The court below regarded the order in question as provisional in its character, and accordingly held, in substance, that it did not so conclusively fix and determine the commissions and compensation of the postmaster as to make the statement of her accounts based thereon conclusive against her and her sureties.
The contrary proposition urged on behalf of the United States involves the assertion that the falsity of the postmaster's returns is actually and finally established by the order of the Postmaster General, and that the accounts adjusted in accordance *285 therewith amount to more than prima facie evidence of the correctness of the balance claimed to be due from the defendants.
We think this contention of the government cannot be sustained, and that the ruling of the Circuit Court on the question was correct.
As to the competency, merely, of this evidence there can be no question, for it is provided by section 889, Revised Statutes, that "in any civil suit in case of delinquency of any postmaster or contractor, a statement of the account, certified as aforesaid, shall be admitted in evidence, and the court shall be authorized thereupon to give judgment and award execution, subject to the provisions of law as to proceedings in such civil suits."
The force and effect of such testimony has been several times considered by this court. Thus in United States v. Eckford's Executors, 1 How. 250, a statement of account by the officers of the Treasury was held not to be conclusive, but only prima facie evidence. So in United States v. Hodge, 13 How. 478, a Treasury transcript offered in evidence was held to be competent, but not conclusive. In Watkins v. United States, 9 Wall. 759, nothing more appeared in the shape of evidence than the certified transcript of accounts, and being held to be prima facie evidence, it warranted judgment for the government for the amount, therein shown to be due, in the absence of any testimony explaining or contradicting it. But that case does not hold that certified transcripts of accounts are conclusive upon the officer. So in Soule v. United States, 100 U.S. 8, 11, it was held that "Treasury settlements of the kind are only prima facie evidence of the correctness of the balance certified; but it is as competent for the accounting officers to correct mistakes and to restate the balance as it is for a judge to change his decree during the term in which it was entered. Errors of computation against the United States are no more vested rights in favor of sureties than in favor of the principal. All such mistakes in cases like the present may be corrected by a restatement of the account."
In the same line, it has been held by this court that the adjustment of accounts made by the auditor is prima facie *286 evidence, not only of the fact and the amount of the indebtedness, but also of the time when and the manner in which it arose; and that an objection to the statement does not lie to its competency, but to its effect. United States v. Stone, 106 U.S. 525.
It would be manifestly unjust to compel the principal and sureties of a bond to pay an alleged indebtedness based upon a statement of account, when there are palpable errors upon the face of the statement; or when the defendants are prepared to show by affirmative evidence that there are in fact errors in the accounts. As already stated, the bill of exceptions contains nothing to show the character of the evidence introduced, by way of explanation or contradiction of the certified transcript of accounts presented by the government. The single question raised and presented by plaintiffs in error was whether the order of the Postmaster General, in connection with the certified statement of account, was final and conclusive on the defendants in error. We hold that it was merely evidence which, unexplained or uncontradicted, would have warranted a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in error for the balance shown thereby to be due. But this evidence did not conclude the defendants, and, for aught that appears from the record, they may have explained or contradicted the statement, or shown it to be incorrect; and as it does not appear what the evidence was on this subject, we are unable to say that the judgment was wrong, there being no error in the charge of the court.
Nor is there anything said or decided in United States v. Barlow, 132 U.S. 271, 280, cited and relied on by plaintiff in error in conflict with this conclusion. In that case Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said: "We admit that where matters appertaining to the postal service are left to the discretion and judgment of the Postmaster General, the exercise of that judgment and discretion cannot in general be interfered with, and the results following defeated. But the very rule supposes that information upon the matters upon which the judgment and discretion are invoked is presented to the officer for consideration, or knowledge respecting them is possessed *287 by him. He is not at liberty, any more than a private agent, to act upon mere guesses and surmises, without information or knowledge on the subject." This ruling of the court falls far short of holding that the transcript of accounts is conclusive upon the officer.
Our conclusion is that the order of the Postmaster General and the certified accounts produced by the government in the present case were only prima facie evidence of the balance claimed against the defendants in error, and that there was no error in the court below in so holding; and the judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.