Court Opinion

ID: 9787040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:09:15.730943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.597275
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
dissenting.
Today the majority finds that an appointed lawyer, when faced with an indigent client who wishes to proceed with an appeal but who has nothing but frivolous arguments in support of his position, cannot seek to withdraw from the representation even though such representation will violate the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. See Colo. RPC 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. ..."); People v. Breaman, 939 P.2d 1348, 1851 n. 2 (Colo.1997) ("If appointed counsel ... determines that [her client's] case is wholly frivolous ... she should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw."). Instead, "[where neither law nor facts can be framed in support of her indigent client," the lawyer must proceed with the frivolous appeal, doing her best to convey her "client's desire to prevail." Maj. op. at 1060, 1061. In my view, the majority's "my client would like to prevail" approach places the appointed attorney in the untenable position of making wholly frivolous arguments, and provides little corresponding benefit for the respondent parent whose wishes to prevail are expressed to the court. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
The lawyers in this case faced a potential ethical dilemma. They were appointed by the court to represent the respondent parents in this case pursuant to sections 19-1-105 and 19-8-202(1), C.R.S. (2009), which provide that indigent parents in dependency and neglect actions are entitled to counsel at state expense. The parents instructed their lawyers that they wished to appeal the district court's order terminating their parental rights. Under Colo. RPC 1.2(a), a lawyer must "abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation...." The lawyers filed the notices of appeal. After delving into the case, however, the lawyers stated that that they could make no argument on the parents' behalf urging reversal of the district court's order. Under Colo. RPC 8.1, a lawyer "shall not ... assert ... an issue [in an appeal], unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous...." An argument is "frivolous" "if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits [of the appeal] or to support [the appeal] by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Colo. RPC 8.1 emt. 2. Here, the lawyers concluded that such a "good faith argument" could not be made. Accordingly, the lawyers sought to withdraw from the case. See Colo. RPC 1.16(a)(l) (lawyer must seek to withdraw when representation would result in violation of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct).
Given the apparent dilemma faced by the lawyers in this case (namely, a direction from the client to pursue an appeal that could be supported only by frivolous arguments), the lawyers pursued the only course available under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (namely, to seek to withdraw). As *1065the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Association concluded:
In such cireumstances, an attorney who determines that a parent's claims on appeal lack merit may so inform the court and request permission to withdraw. However, ... an attorney may not request permission to withdraw ... unless, among other things, the client insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. ...
Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 114 (2006) (hereinafter "CBA, Formal Op. 114"). Indeed, in the criminal context, we have stated: "If appointed counsel in the first appeal from a criminal conviction determines that the defendant's case is wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he or she should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw." Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1851 n. 2 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)). If a client has instruct, ed his lawyer to appeal under Colo. RPC 1.2(a) but the lawyer cannot make a good faith argument to support that appeal as required under Colo. RPC 3.1, she cannot continue with such a "representation [that] will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct" and accordingly must withdraw. Colo. RPC 1.16(@)(1).
The majority resolves this potential dilemma by simply denying that a dilemma could exist in the first place. According to the majority, "a court-appointed attorney who determines her client's desired appeal lacks merit does not face an intractable ethical dilemma: where a client enjoys rights to an attorney and an appeal, the action is not frivolous merely because it appears hopeless." Maj. op. at 1059. But the majority's approach to the problem in this case is the classic straw man. The majority concludes that there could be no dilemma in this case because there is no ethical violation in filing an appeal that "lacks merit" or where a case appears "hopeless." I wholeheartedly agree. As comment 2 to Colo. RPC 8.1 expressly recognizes, an appeal "is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail." See also Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1851 n. 1 (noting that a lawyer may make any argument that, "although unlikely to prevail, may be reasonably advanced"). As the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice concluded, Anders itself "appears to rest narrowly on the distinction between complete frivolity" (in which withdrawal is appropriate) and "absence of merit" (in which withdrawal is not). ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function & the Def. Function § 8.3 cmt. b, p. 297 (1971).
In sum, the problem in this case is not, as the majority frames it, what a lawyer should do when she believes her client's argument lacks merit. The answer to that question is well-settled: she must proceed. See Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1851 n. 1; Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396; CBA, Formal Op. 114 (citing Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1351 n. 1). The lawyer confronts an ethical dilemma only when she determines that an appeal cannot be supported by an argument with "a basis in law and fact" nor "a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Colo. RPC 3.1; CBA, Formal Op. 114 (lawyer cannot proceed when "the client insists upon presenting [an argument] that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"). In other words, a lawyer cannot present an appeal that is "wholly frivolous." Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1351 n. 2; see also McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 436 U.S. 429, 436-37, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988) ("An attorney, whether appointed or paid, is ... under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal"; when faced with filing a frivolous appeal, appointed counsel has a "duty to withdraw") (emphasis added).
In my view, we should remand this case to the court of appeals, with instructions to respondent parents' counsel to determine the status of this case under the standards articulated above. If counsel believe that an argument consistent with Colo. RPC 8.1 standards can be made in support of the appeal, they should proceed. If counsel, however, *1066conclude that the appeal cannot be supported by an argument that meets Colo. RPC 8.1 standards, they should again seek to withdraw.1
Despite the fact that an attorney is "under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal," McCoy, 486 U.S. at 436, 108 S.Ct. 1895, the majority mandates that the lawyers in this case-and in all cases involving court-appointed attorneys, including criminal appeals, maj. op. at 1064-go forward with the appeals, however frivolous they may be. Indeed, "[where neither law nor facts can be framed in support of her indigent client"-that is, where an appeal is wholly frivolous-the court should "not allow the appointed attorney to withdraw from representation. ..." Id. at 1058, 1061; see id. at 1059 (in such a situation, the attorney is "require[ed] to present her client's case"); id. at 1061 (attorney "must present those issues her client wishes to be addressed," even if wholly frivolous). Instead, if the lawyer's "conscientious and sensitive efforts to locate viable issues" fail, she must proceed with the appeal, "honestly represent[ing] her client's impressions of injustice" as well as "her client's desire to prevail." Id. at 1060, 1060-61; see also id. at 1060 (requiring the "sensitive and compassionate representation of her client's best arguments," even if frivolous). In my view, regardless of how "honest," "conscientious," "sensitive," and "compassionate" the lawyer might be, she is still being put in the untenable position of making frivolous arguments to the court.
The majority seems to believe that respondent parents' counsel must continue the representation despite the frivolous nature of the appeal because "the client's rights to an appeal and to appellate counsel are protected by law." Maj. op. at 1061. Yet, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear, the right to counsel "does not include the right to bring a frivolous appeal and, concomitantly, does not include the right to counsel for bringing a frivolous appeal." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). As the Smith Court continued, "(allthough an indigent whose appeal is frivolous has no right to have an advocate make his case to the appellate court, such an indigent does, in all cases, have the right to have an attorney, zealous for the indigent's interests, evaluate his case and attempt to discern nonfrivolous arguments." Id. at 278 n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 746. If that zealous evaluation yields only frivolous arguments, however, counsel should be permitted to seek to withdraw.
In addition, the majority cites McClendon w. People, 174 Colo. 7, 481 P.2d 715 (1971), and the ABA Standards on Criminal Justice that it adopts, in support of its position. Maj. op. at 1058-59 (noting that Colorado has adopted an approach that "renders unnecessary the cumbersome procedure outlined in {Anders 1"). Yet there is nothing in McClen-don or the ABA Standards that suggests that an appointed attorney is relieved of her ethical obligation to refuse to proceed with a frivolous appeal. On the contrary, McClen-don begins by stating that the ABA Standards "glilve full recognition to the points raised in Anders ... and at the same time define{ ] the obligations of defense counsel in representing a defendant on appeal when the case is without merit." 174 Colo. at 12, 481 P.2d at 718.2 The ABA Standards reiterate that there is a distinction between a case that lacks merit and one that is wholly frivolous, remind counsel that she need only make a good faith argument for the extension of law to support her client's position, and encourage counsel to remain on the case if at all possible. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Criminal Appeals § 21-8.2(b) (3d ed.1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function & Def. Function § 4-8.8 (3d ed.1998). As McClendon noted, *1067"it is better for counsel to present the case, so long as his advocacy does not involve deception or misleading of the court." 174 Colo. at 12, 481 P.2d at 718 (quoting standards). But notably McClendon does not except appointed attorneys from the obligations of Colo. RPC 8.1, nor do the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See ABA Model Rules of Profil Conduct R. 8.1 (2009); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function & Def. Function § 4-8.3 emt., p. 241 (Bd ed. 1993) ("In an appeal that is not entirely frivolous in counsel's estimate, the problem may arise of the appellant's insisting upon including in the appeal a point despite counsel's protest that it is frivolous.... In this situation, it is proper for the lawyer to brief and argue only the points he or she believes are supportable ....") (emphasis added). Compare State v. Cigic, 138 N.H. 313, 639 A.2d 251, 254 (1994) (requiring appointed attorney to proceed with frivolous appeal and making an exception to state's analog to Colo. RPC 8.1). And as we noted most recently in Breaman, if an appointed attorney determines that an appeal is "wholly frivolous," she must seek to withdraw. 939 P.2d at 1851 n. 2;3 see also C.A.R. 38(d) (permitting appellate courts to sanction "frivolous" appeals).
Finally, the majority concludes that its approach "best protect[s]" the interests of respondent parents. Maj. op. at 1062. Yet it is difficult to see how this could be so. According to the majority, an appointed attorney-who, after today's opinion, must proceed with a frivolous appeal-should "describ[el the facts of the case," "direct[ ] the appellate court to the controlling law that should direct its review," "present[ ] the issues her client wishes to be considered," and ultimately convey her "client's desire to prevail." Maj. op. at 1060, 1061. The majority's "my client would like to prevail" approach, however, bears little resemblance to the "zealous" advocacy envisioned by the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. See Colo. RPC pmbl. 2, 9. The majority admits as much, stating that the sort of "advocacy" that it proposes may "differ only slightly from a so-called Anders brief" Maj. op. at 1061. But there is an important difference between the withdrawal remedy recognized in Anders (and Breaman) and the "my client would like to prevail" approach adopted by the majority. Under An-ders and Breaman, the attorney is no longer in the position of acting as an advocate on behalf of her client, as she has sought to withdraw. In contrast, under the majority's proposal, the attorney continues to serve as an advocate while-to use the majority's own phrase-simply "directing the appellate court to the controlling law that should direct its review." Id. I fear that the majority's proposal comes perilously close to the sort of "friend of the court" role condemned in both Amders and Breaman. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396 ("The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae."); Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1352 (appointed attorney must represent client, not "serve as the court's fact-finder"); maj. op. at 1064 (respondent parent's counsel must act as "an advocate in fact as well as name").
The majority's "my client would like to prevail" approach places the appointed attorney in the untenable position of making wholly frivolous arguments, and provides little corresponding benefit for the respondent parent whose wishes to prevail are expressed by counsel to the court. Moreover, the approach-by requiring appointed counsel for indigent respondent parents to proceed with wholly frivolous appeals and by redefining what it means to provide zealous advocacy in that context-marks a significant step in the slippery slope toward a two-tiered ethical code that differs according to whether the client is indigent or not. In my view, this is a *1068path down which we do not want to travel. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice RICE joins in this dissent.

. The withdrawal motion would be accompanied by an Anders brief or other filing that meets constitutional requirements. See generally Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273-16, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (holding that Anders is a prophylactic measure and that states may adopt alternative approaches as long as those approaches meet constitutional standards).

. The McClendon opinion was authored by Colorado Supreme Court Justice William Erickson, who at the time chaired the ABA Criminal Law Section and also served on the ABA Committee to implement the ABA standards. See Hon. William H. Erickson, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Appendix A at n." and n. 192 (Mai-thew Bender 1972).

. The majority cites Breaman affirmatively for two propositions, see maj. op. at 1058, 1062-63, but then goes to great lengths to discount the case, noting, among other things, that it dealt with post-conviction proceedings. Maj. op. at 1062. While it is true that Breaman concluded that an Anders-style brief would not be required in a post-conviction setting, the case plainly states that an attorney must seek to withdraw from a representation if she determines that her arguments are wholly frivolous. 939 P.2d at 1351 n. 2.