Court Opinion

ID: 9694435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:41:35.775453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:01.343105
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen :
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I feel compelled to express my reasons for so doing.
It is my opinion that section (b) of the “Gun Law”1 merely establishes an additional penalty and does not create a new crime. See State v. Frazier, 81 Wash. 2d 628, 503 P. 2d 1073 (1972), and State v. Boyer, 4 Wash. App. 73, 480 P. 2d 257 (1971).2 Since this is so, a defendant need not be indicted for a violation of the “Gun Law”. Am indictment, as Mr. Justice Manderino correctly points out, is to charge an individual with the commission of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 208 Pa. Superior Ct. 121, 220 A. 2d 345 (1966), aff'd 424 Pa. 641, 226 A. 2d 863, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946, 87 S. Ct. 2084 (1967); and Commonwealth v. Smihal, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 232, 126 A. 2d 523 (1956). It is only mandatory that the accused is informed, in the indictment, of the crime that he is charged with, and any aggravating circumstances: 4 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure §1788 (1957); 4-1 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and Informations §152 (1968); and United States v. Jakalski, 267 F. 2d 609 (7th Cir. 1959); and that he be informed, as required by due process, before receiving the enhanced sentence *533of the possibility of the additional punishment; and be given the opportunity to be heard concerning the aggravated penalty: Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501 (1962); United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 204 F. 2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953); and Commonwealth ex rel. Dermendzin v. Myers, 397 Pa. 607, 156 A. 2d 804 (1959).
These requirements were satisfied in this case. The District Attorney did notify the defendant of the possibility of the increased sentence, prior to the trial. The Commonwealth presented the defendant with notice, attached to the indictment, informing the accused that he also violated the “Gun Law”. In addition, the indictment did set out the aggravating conditions which subjected the accused to the additional penalty.
However, the defendant’s sentence for said violation must be overturned because it infringes upon the defendant’s right not to receive double punishment.3 It is my belief that since the defendant received an increased sentence, from simple robbery to armed robbery,4 due to his commission of the crime while in the possession of a firearm, he cannot also receive another penalty,5 for the very same reason. See Robinson v. State, 484 P. 2d 686 (Alaska 1971); Whitton v. State, 479 P. 2d 302 (Alaska 1970); State v. Carter, 79 Nev. 146, 379 P. 2d 945 (1963); and Richmond v. State, 492 P. 2d 349 (Okla. Cr. 1971). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Ciampoli v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 A. 287 (1928); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 703, 280 A. 2d 385 (1971); Commonwealth v. Walker, 219 Pa. Su*534perior Ct. 167, 280 A. 2d 590 (1971); Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P. 2d 839 (1960); and People v. Thomas, 127 Ill. App. 2d 444, 262 N.E. 2d 495 (1970).
Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice O’Brien join in this concurring opinion.

 Act of July 30, 1968, P. L. 689, No. 227, §1, as amended, 18 P.S. §4416.

 See also Commonwealth ex rel. Curry v. Myers, 195 Pa. Superior Ct. 480, 171 A. 2d 702 (1961).

 Clearly the Fifth Amendment right, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, against double jeopardy encompasses the area of “multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969).

 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §705, 18 P.S. §4705.

 For a violation of the “Gun Law”.