Court Opinion

ID: 9445900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:40:36.34769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:26.671575
License: Public Domain

Washington, Circuit Judge, with whom Edgerton, Chief Judge, and Bazelon and Fahy, Circuit Judges,
*480join, dissenting: Petitioner seeks leave to appeal in forma pauperis from convictions in the District Court for housebreaking and larceny carrying sentences of imprisonment totaling 10 to 30 years. Leave so to appeal was denied by the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. On the basis of petitioner’s pro se applications to us for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and of respondent’s oppositions thereto, we appointed counsel to represent petitioner and to file memoranda in support of his applications. Counsel later filed reports with us stating in substance that they had investigated the cases, that the appeals were without merit, and that the petitions should be denied. The entire court, sua sponte, considered the matter, and concluded that leave to appeal in forma pauperis should be denied. I must dissent.
Johnson v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 565, 77 S.Ct. 550, 551, 1 L.Ed.2d 593, requires that in all cases of this sort we afford the petitioner “the aid of counsel unless he insists on being his own.” We appointed counsel in each of these cases “to represent petitioner” and “to file a memorandum in support of the petition.” The reports submitted by assigned counsel indicate that they gave much time and thought to their duties. But it is evident that they conceived their role to be that of impartial arbiters rather than advocates in a contested proceeding.1 *I think the decision in Johnson requires more than disinterested advice to the court, grateful as we .are for such assistance. It is my understanding that since Johnson we have not appointed counsel in any criminal cases to report to the court as amici. In each instance, we have appointed counsel to represent the accused, and I think our intent has been that such counsel give the accused as adequate representation as he would receive if he were financially able to retain counsel. The obligation of court-appointed counsel runs, of course, to the court as well as to the accused. If counsel, after diligent efforts on behalf of the accused, concludes that the appeal is frivolous, there is no doubt that he is entitled to request leave to withdraw from the case on that ground. If the court agrees with that appraisal, finding that counsel has done all that honestly can be done, no doubt the petition for leave to appeal in forma pauperis may be denied. But that is not this case. Here, counsel said that the only possible “area of error” was in the rulings of the District Court that there was probable cause for petitioner’s arrest.2 Counsel then concluded that the rulings of the District Court were not “so clearly erroneous as to constitute probable error.” In so concluding, counsel relied on Holland v. Capital Transit Co., 1950, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 48, 51, 184 F.2d 686, 689. This reliance was misplaced. Holland was a civil suit. In criminal eases the rule is as stated in Johnson, supra, which requires that “either the defendant or his assigned counsel must be enabled to show that the grounds for seeking an appeal from the judgment of conviction are not frivolous and do not justify the finding that the appeal is not sought in good faith.” (Emphasis supplied.)3
Though it may not succeed, an appeal is not frivolous if the rulings of the trial court can reasonably be argued to con*481stitute “possible error.” Where, as here, there was a fairly arguable question, counsel should have proceeded to present argument — candid, but still designed to present as favorable a showing for petitioner as could honorably be made — to show that the questioned ruling was actually erroneous, leaving the decision of the question to the court. Failure so to present the matter deprived this petitioner of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. And absent such representation, this court should not decide that petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling is frivolous. Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is not limited to those appeals which he would win without such assistance.
I would not act upon this petition until the prior orders of this court appointing counsel to represent petitioner are complied with either by present or newly-appointed counsel.

. By disagreeing with counsel’s view as to their proper role in such proceedings,
I do not mean to be understood as being critical of counsel’s conduct. The problems confronting counsel in such matters have not been adequately dealt with by the courts. Misunderstanding is perhaps inevitable. This is one of the reasons why I feel it necessary in this ease to state the considerations which I believe should govern counsel’s approach to their task.

. This was important because he was searched at the time of the arrest, and incriminating materials found. This evidence was vital. If the arrest was invalid for lack of probable cause, there would be no question but that the error was prejudicial and would require reversal.

. The “not frivolous” test was reiterated in Farley v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 521, 523, 77 S.Ct. 1371, 1372, 1 L.Ed.2d 1529.