Court Opinion

ID: 9406078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 19:02:25.854734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:26.764405
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                                 T.C. Memo. 2023-82

GLADE CREEK PARTNERS, LLC, SEQUATCHIE HOLDINGS, LLC,
               TAX MATTERS PARTNER,
                      Petitioner

                                            v.

               COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                          Respondent 1

                                       —————

Docket No. 22272-17.                                             Filed June 29, 2023.

                                       —————

Gregory P. Rhodes, David Mace Wooldridge, Michelle A. Levin, Sidney
W. Jackson IV, and Ronald A. Levitt, for petitioner.

William Benjamin McClendon, Norah E. Bringer, Amber B. Martin, and
Blake J. Corry, for respondent.

               SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

       GOEKE, Judge: In 2012 Glade Creek Partners, LLC (Glade
Creek), donated a conservation easement on undeveloped real estate
that was part of a failed residential development and claimed a $17.5
million charitable contribution deduction (easement deduction). We
disallowed the easement deduction in its entirety on the basis that the
easement’s conservation purposes were not protected in perpetuity
under section 170(h)(5) 2 as that requirement is defined in Treasury

       This Opinion supplements our previously filed opinion Glade Creek Partners,
        1

LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-148, aff’d in part, vacated in part and
remanded, No. 21-11251, 2022 WL 3582113 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2022).
        2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are
to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times,

                                   Served 06/29/23
                                          2

[*2] Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (proceeds regulation), which directs
the allocation of any possible future proceeds from a judicial
extinguishment of the easement. Glade Creek, T.C. Memo. 2020-148.

       We upheld the procedural and substantive validity of the
proceeds regulation in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner,
154 T.C. 180, 181 (2020), aff’d, 28 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2022). However,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the proceeds
regulation is invalid. See Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336, 1339
(11th Cir. 2021), rev’g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2020-89. Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit remanded this case for us to address respondent’s
alternative arguments for disallowing the easement deduction without
reliance on the proceeds regulation. Glade Creek Partner, LLC v.
Commissioner, 2022 WL 3582113, at *3. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
our determination of the easement’s fair market value as $8,877,771.

      On remand respondent concedes that Glade Creek is entitled to
an easement deduction. The sole issue before the Court is whether Glade
Creek is entitled to deduct the fair market value of the easement or
whether the amount of the easement deduction is limited to Glade
Creek’s adjusted basis in the property on which the easement was
granted. 3 This issue turns on whether the property was inventory or
investment property in the hands of the partner that contributed the
property to Glade Creek. We hold that the easement property was
inventory and the deduction is limited to Glade Creek’s basis.

                                   Background

      We incorporate our findings in Glade Creek and summarize the
relevant background for purposes of this Opinion. Glade Creek is a
Georgia limited liability company (LLC) that elected partnership status
for federal tax purposes. When its Petition was timely filed by
Sequatchie Holdings, LLC (Sequatchie), Glade Creek’s tax matters
partner, its principal place of business was in Georgia.

      In January 2006 International Land Consultants, Inc. (ILC),
purchased nearly 2,000 acres of undeveloped land in Tennessee (ILC
property) for over $9 million to develop into a residential vacation

and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, in effect at
all relevant times. Some dollar amounts are rounded.
       3 Respondent advanced this argument in his posttrial briefs, and petitioner had

an opportunity to respond in its briefs.
                                        3

[*3] community. 4 ILC planned to develop and market the property in
three phases. The first phase was tract I, a 677-acre parcel with 415 lots,
with subsequent phases for tracts II and III, noncontiguous parcels of
630.4 and 685.5 acres, respectively, connected by tract I, with an
additional 391 lots. ILC planned to use the cashflow from phase I sales
to fund development on phases II and III. All but three acres of tracts II
and III are the subject of the conservation easement (easement
property).

       Shortly after the purchase, ILC engaged a licensed engineer to
design a concept plan as a master-planned community with lots platted
for all three tracts. The concept plan was completed in April 2006. By
agreement dated July 24, 2006, ILC placed restrictive covenants on the
ILC property. Sometime in 2006 it began to make infrastructure
improvements that would support development of all three tracts. It
completed soil and water absorption testing on all three tracts and
obtained permits and approvals for development on all three tracts. The
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC)
approved the concept plan for the master-planned community on the
three tracts. ILC entered into a 25-year contract to supply water for
development on all three tracts and constructed a hydraulic pump
station and larger water mains to service the pump station with the
capacity to transport water to all three tracts. It also installed electrical
infrastructure that can support service of electricity to homes on all
three tracts. However, it installed electrical lines, water lines, and roads
only within tract I, stopping at the borders of the easement property.
ILC spent approximately $6 million on the infrastructure and approval
process and had “successfully completed numerous steps toward the
development of all three tracts.” Glade Creek, T.C. Memo. 2020-148,
at *39. ILC planned to use the cashflow from sales on tract I to pay for
additional infrastructure work on tracts II and III and record and sell
the subdivided lots after the lots on tract I sold out.

       Before purchasing the ILC property, ILC had engaged James
Vincent, a local businessman and real estate investor and developer, to
evaluate the property for its development potential as a vacation
community and to assist with the permits, government approvals, and
infrastructure. Mr. Vincent did not have an ownership interest in ILC
and was to be compensated through a profit-sharing arrangement. Mr.

       4 Approximately 4 acres of the 1,997-acre ILC property were not part of the

planned development. Acreage amounts are rounded.
                                      4

[*4] Vincent also worked to obtain financing for the infrastructure
construction and personally guaranteed infrastructure loans.

       In March 2007 ILC recorded the lots in tract I and began sales
efforts. It did not record the platted lots for tracts II and III. Mr. Vincent
believed that recording the lots could increase property tax on the
easement property. ILC had some initial sales success, selling
approximately 30% of the tract I lots in less than two years. Sales slowed
significantly by 2009 because of the 2008 economic recession and a
depressed real estate market. Also, sometime in 2009 ILC stopped
marketing the vacation community because of a lack of funds, and it sold
nine lots in 2009. Sometime in late 2009 or early 2010 one of ILC’s three
owners walked away from the project, placing an increased financial
burden on the remaining two ILC owners, James Tague and Rocco
Toscano, and Mr. Vincent, to make payments on ILC’s seller-financed
mortgage for the ILC property and the infrastructure loans.

       In April 2010, facing pressure from the bank that had funded the
infrastructure loans, Mr. Tague, Mr. Toscano, and Mr. Vincent
organized Hawks Bluff Investment Group, Inc. (Hawks Bluff), an
S corporation, as equal shareholders. On April 20, 2010, ILC transferred
the unsold lots of tract I and the easement property to Hawks Bluff by
warranty deed in exchange for the assumption of ILC’s debt.
Accordingly, Mr. Vincent acquired an ownership interest in the ILC
property. Mr. Vincent and Mr. Tague had invested vast sums of money
in the infrastructure, and the land transfer to Hawks Bluff gave them a
controlling interest in the land. The land transfer was done to help
reassure the bank that financed the infrastructure loans.

       Initially, the three men equally made monthly payments on the
debt assumed by Hawks Bluff. Unfortunately, financial difficulties
continued, and Mr. Toscano walked away and surrendered his interest
in Hawks Bluff. Mr. Vincent and Mr. Tague released him from liability
and assumed his share of the debt payments. But they struggled to make
debt payments. In April 2011 Hawks Bluff owed approximately $5.2
million on the seller-financed mortgage. Mr. Vincent and Mr. Tague
transferred real estate not connected with ILC’s development as a $2.1
million payment on the mortgage, and the seller agreed to reduce the
remaining unpaid mortgage by $1.3 million. After the mortgage
modification, Hawks Bluff owed approximately $1.8 million on the
mortgage and had total debt of approximately $3.3 million.
                                        5

[*5] Financial pressures continued. Hawks Bluff sold only a couple of
lots during 2010 and 2011, and no lots in 2012. Mr. Tague stopped
making debt payments although he remained a shareholder of Hawks
Bluff. Mr. Vincent knew that he would not be able to make the debt
payments himself for an extended time. He did not have the money or
desire to develop the easement property himself. He searched for a
solution for the debt. He considered having the timber on the land
harvested or selling part of the property to other developers but believed
that both options would negatively affect residential development of
tract I. After considering other options, in August 2012 he decided to
pursue a syndicated conservation easement transaction to pay off part
of Hawks Bluff’s debt. He believed that the other options might be more
lucrative but chose the conservation easement because it would protect
the natural beauty of the land in a manner consistent with the original
vision for a master-planned community and would protect the future
development of the unsold lots on tract I, which Hawks Bluff retained
and continued to market as a residential development after the
easement transaction. Mr. Tague agreed to participate in the easement
transaction.

       Mr. Vincent sought assistance from Matthew Campbell about
donating the easement. The easement transaction was designed to occur
through two newly organized entities, one to hold the easement
property, Glade Creek, and the second, Sequatchie, to promote the
easement transaction to investors. Under the plan devised by Mr.
Campbell, Hawks Bluff would contribute the easement property to
Glade Creek in exchange for a 98% membership interest, and after
raising money through a private placement, Sequatchie would purchase
a 90% to 95% interest in Glade Creek and then, as a controlling member,
would vote to grant the easement.

      Glade Creek was organized and was owned 98% by Hawks Bluff
and 1% each by Mr. Tague and Mr. Vincent. 5 On September 3, 2012, the
members of Glade Creek entered into an operating agreement. On
September 18, 2012, Hawks Bluff transferred the easement property to
Glade Creek by quitclaim deed subject to a $1.8 million mortgage in
exchange for a 98% membership interest. Glade Creek had a $3,861,316
carryover basis in the property. Hawks Bluff decreased the value of its
inventory by $2,959,815 to account for the transfer. Glade Creek’s
operating agreement states that Hawks Bluff contributed property in

       5 The parties stipulated that the Georgia secretary of state records provide

August 3, 2012, as the date of organization.
                                   6

[*6] exchange for its LLC interest and defines the property as
“unimproved real estate.” The operating agreement does not include any
terms that address the character of the real estate as inventory or
investment property or the parties’ reporting of the character for tax
purposes. Hawks Bluff retained the lots on tract I and continued to sell
them with some success. In 2015 it sold 24 lots.

       On August 12, 2012, Sequatchie was organized. Evrgreen Capital
Administration, LLC (Evrgreen), was its managing member. Mr.
Campbell is Evrgreen’s founder and became Glade Creek’s manager as
part of the easement transaction. Mr. Campbell engaged the
professionals necessary to complete the easement transaction including
tax attorney Tim Pollock. Mr. Pollock discussed the significance of
having the easement property classified as inventory or dealer property
for purposes of section 170(e) at a meeting that Mr. Vincent attended.

       Sequatchie entered into a share purchase agreement with Hawks
Bluff, Mr. Vincent, and Mr. Tague to purchase a minimum membership
interest of 90% and a maximum membership interest of 95% in Glade
Creek. Sequatchie had a private placement memorandum (PPM)
prepared to market its membership interests to raise money for it to
purchase interests in Glade Creek. The PPM described the tax
consequences of a conservation easement transaction at length and
included a discussion relating to whether the easement deduction would
be limited to Glade Creek’s adjusted basis in the easement property
pursuant to section 170(e)(1)(A). It stated that Evrgreen believed that
the easement property constituted a capital asset in Glade Creek’s
hands and therefore an easement deduction would equal the easement’s
fair market value. It stated that Sequatchie believed that the property
had not been associated with any development or dealer activities and
that to Evrgreen’s knowledge neither Glade Creek nor Hawks Bluff had
sold any part of the easement property or undertaken marketing or
development activities. It also stated that Evrgreen did not believe that
the property could be characterized as property held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business or ordinary
income property in Glade Creek’s hands and did not anticipate that the
easement deduction would be limited to Glade Creek’s adjusted basis in
the easement property.

       On November 29, 2012, Sequatchie acquired a 91% membership
interest in Glade Creek for $3.2 million and then voted to grant the
conservation easement. By deed dated December 29, 2012 (easement
date), Glade Creek granted the easement. Hawks Bluff’s sale of a 91%
                                    7

[*7] membership interest terminated Glade Creek’s taxable year under
section 708(b)(1). See § 708(b)(1)(B) (providing for technical termination
of a partnership upon a change in ownership of more than a 50% interest
within a 12-month period); Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(2).

       Glade Creek filed partnership returns for the short tax periods
September 3 to November 29, 2012 (first short-year return), and
November 30 to December 31, 2012 (second short-year return). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(d)(2)(i) (providing that partnerships must file a tax
return for the taxable year beginning on the day after the date of a
technical termination). It claimed the easement deduction on the second
short-year return. The returns were prepared by Habif, Arogeti, &
Wynne, LLP. They reported that Glade Creek was organized on
September 3, 2012, the date of its operating agreement and did not
report that Glade Creek held inventory. Mr. Vincent was listed as Glade
Creek’s tax matters partner on the first short-year return.

       Hawks Bluff’s 2012 S corporation return was prepared by
Sanders Associates, Inc. Hawks Bluff reported that it was a real estate
dealer and reported the easement property as inventory. It decreased
the value of its inventory by approximately $3 million to account for the
transfer of the easement property to Glade Creek. It attached Form
4797, Sales of Business Property, to its 2012 return, on which it reported
a transaction described as “Sale to Glade Creek.” It reported that it
acquired the asset on September 3, 2012, and sold it on November 30,
2012. It reported a gross sale price of approximately $1.4 million and an
ordinary loss on the sale of $194,262.

       Petitioner’s expert witness Richard Norton testified that the
highest and best use of the unencumbered easement property was
residential development. Mr. Norton opined that the property had
excellent development potential, citing the existing approvals and
infrastructure from ILC’s development project. He prepared a concept
plan as part of his expert report for a hypothetical vacation community,
which according to petitioner “largely mirrored” and “was not materially
different” from ILC’s concept plan. Petitioner’s expert Claud Clark III
determined that the fair market value of the unencumbered easement
property was $17,314,049 on the basis of Mr. Norton’s development
concept and determined that the easement had a fair market value of
$16,425,000, slightly less than the $17,504,000 easement deduction that
Glade Creek claimed on its return. Respondent’s expert, Ben Broome,
opined that the highest and best use of the unencumbered easement
property was rural residential, agricultural, and recreational use and
                                    8

[*8] valued the unencumbered easement property at $1,580,000 for such
use. Mr. Broome opined that a residential development was not
economically feasible on the easement property. Mr. Broome valued the
easement at $1,103,600.

      Relying on petitioner’s experts, we found that residential
development on the easement property was economically feasible on the
easement date and was the highest and best use of the easement
property. Glade Creek, T.C. Memo. 2020-148, at *34. We found that on
the easement date the unencumbered easement property had a fair
market value of $9,354,171 and that the easement had a fair market
value of $8,877,771. Id. at *53, *55.

                               Discussion

       Section 170(a)(1) allows taxpayers to deduct charitable
contributions made within the taxable year. For contributions of
property other than money, the deduction is generally equal to the
property’s fair market value at the time of the contribution. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(c)(1). However, the amount of any charitable contribution
deduction must be reduced by “the amount of gain which would not have
been long-term capital gain . . . if the property contributed had been sold
by the taxpayer at its fair market value.” § 170(e)(1)(A). If a sale of
donated property would have generated ordinary income or short-term
capital gain, the amount of the deduction is reduced by the amount of
the ordinary income or short-term capital gain. Thus, in such a case, the
deduction is limited to the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property.

       Section 724(b) provides that if a partner contributes property to a
partnership that is an “inventory item” in the partner’s hands
immediately before the contribution, any gain or loss recognized by the
partnership on the disposition of the property during the five years
beginning on the date the property was contributed to the partnership
is treated as ordinary income or loss. This provision was enacted to
prevent conversion of a partner’s ordinary income property into capital
gain property by contributing it to a partnership that has a different
purpose for owning the property. See Jones v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d
1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009), aff’g 129 T.C. 146 (2007); Strasburg v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-94. If the easement property was
inventory in Hawks Bluff’s hands, section 724(b) would require Glade
Creek to carry over Hawks Bluff’s characterization of the easement
property for five years after the contribution, and the easement
deduction would be limited to Glade Creek’s adjusted basis in the
                                          9

[*9] easement property under section 170(e)(1)(A). Accordingly, we
must determine the character of the easement property in Hawks Bluff’s
hands.

       Respondent argues that the easement property was inventory in
Hawks Bluff’s hands immediately before it contributed the property to
Glade Creek. He argues that under section 724(b) the amount of the
easement deduction is limited to the part of Glade Creek’s adjusted basis
in the easement property that is allocable to the easement determined
by the ratio of the fair market value of the easement over the fair market
value of the unencumbered easement property ($8,877,771/$9,354,171)
multiplied by Glade Creek’s adjusted basis in the easement property
($3,861,316), for a deduction of $3,664,622. 6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(h)(3)(iii).

       Petitioner argues that the easement property was investment
property in Hawks Bluff’s hands, and, accordingly, Glade Creek is
entitled to an easement deduction equal to the easement’s fair market
value. It argues that ILC’s activities are relevant to determine the
character of the easement property, ILC acquired and held all three
tracts as investment property, and only tract I converted to inventory.
Alternatively, assuming that we find that ILC initially acquired the
easement property as inventory, it argues that it converted to
investment property in 2009 when ILC abandoned its intent to develop
the ILC property on account of the recession and a lack of funding. It
further argues that Hawks Bluff was organized to hold the easement
property as investment property and held it as such.

I.     Definition of Inventory Item

       The term “inventory item” for purposes of section 724(b) is defined
in section 751(d) by reference to the definition of a capital asset in
section 1221(a)(1). A capital asset is defined as “property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include . . . stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind
which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer . . . or
property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business.” § 1221(a)(1). An inventory item
is property held primarily for sale to customers in a trade or business.
It is the property that is specifically excluded from the definition of a

        6 Respondent has not argued that petitioner is liable for an increased penalty

for the part of the claimed deduction in excess of Glade Creek’s adjusted basis.
                                          10

[*10] capital asset in section 1221(a)(1). We interpret exclusions
broadly. Capital gain treatment “is an exception from the normal tax
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, [and] the definition of a
capital asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted
broadly.” Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d 1093, 1100 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Corn Prods. Refin. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955)),
aff’g in part, rev’g in part T.C. Memo. 2014-85.

       Whether income derived from the sale of property is subject to tax
as ordinary income or capital gain is a legal conclusion. Boree v.
Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1100. Whether the taxpayer held property
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its business or
held it as an investment is a question of fact. Id.; Pritchett v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 149, 162 (1974). The Eleventh Circuit has stated
that the latter question involves three separate inquiries: (1) whether
the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business, and if so, what
business; (2) whether the taxpayer was holding the property primarily
for sale in that business; and (3) whether the sales contemplated by the
taxpayer were “ordinary” in the course of that business. Sanders v.
United States, 740 F.2d 886, 888‒89 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Suburban
Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 178 (5th Cir. 1980)). 7

       The Eleventh Circuit, to which this case is appealable, has
identified the following factors as relevant to answer the three inquiries:
(1) the nature and purpose of the acquisition of the property and the
duration of the ownership; (2) the extent and nature of the taxpayer’s
efforts to sell the property; (3) the number, extent, continuity, and
substantiality of the sales; (4) the extent of subdividing, developing, and
advertising to increase sales; (5) the use of a business office for the sale
of the property; (6) the character and degree of supervision or control
exercised by the taxpayer over any representative selling the property;
and (7) the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted to the sales.
Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1100 (citing United States v.
Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 909–10 (5th Cir. 1969)); see Sanders, 740 F.2d
at 889 (applying the Winthrop factors).

       Most of the seven factors relate to sales and marketing. Arguably,
these factors support a finding that the easement property was a capital

        7 Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981).
                                          11

[*11] asset because there were no lot sales on the easement property. 8
However, the factors are not a balancing test that requires us to place
equal weight on each factor. “[S]pecific factors, or combinations of them
are not necessarily controlling.” Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States,
526 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Thompson v. Commissioner,
322 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir. 1963), aff’g in part, rev’g in part 38 T.C. 153
(1962)). No factor or combination of factors is controlling, and each case
must be decided on its particular facts. Id. The factors are not meant to
be “mechanically applied so as to disallow a court from viewing the
evidence in its totality and drawing appropriate inferences from that
evidence.” Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1105. “Despite their
frequent use . . . these seven [factors] ‘in and of themselves . . . have no
independent significance, but only form part of a situation which in the
individual case must be considered in its entirety . . . .’” Id. (quoting
Winthrop, 417 F.2d at 910). We are not required to address each and
every factor, and it may be appropriate for us to “give great weight” to
facts not contemplated by the seven factors. Id. Under the circumstances
of this case, we place significant weight on Hawks Bluff’s reporting.

II.    Hawks Bluff’s Reporting as Inventory

       On its 2012 return Hawks Bluff reported that it was in business
as a real estate dealer, reported the easement property as inventory, and
decreased the amount of its inventory on the transfer of the easement
property to Glade Creek. Statements on tax returns may generally be
treated as admissions by that taxpayer. Mendes v. Commissioner, 121
T.C. 308, 312 (2003). Petitioner argues that Hawks Bluff’s reporting was
incorrect. It asserts that Hawks Bluff erroneously reported the transfer
of the easement property as a sale to Glade Creek rather than a
nontaxable partnership contribution so that it could claim a loss on the
transfer and further argues that it mischaracterized the easement
property as inventory to claim an ordinary loss. 9 It further argues that
Glade Creek should not be bound by Hawks Bluff’s reporting.

       8 ILC’s sales and marketing activities with respect to tract I would likely have
benefited future sales of lots on the easement property as the three tracts were one
master-planned community.
       9 No gain or loss is recognized when a partner contributes property to a

partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. § 721. Accordingly, it would have
been incorrect for Hawks Bluff to report a loss on the contribution of the easement
property to Glade Creek.
                                           12

[*12] We find no error in Hawks Bluff’s reporting. We do not agree with
petitioner’s contention that Hawks Bluff reported the contribution as a
sale. The transaction at issue was reported on Form 4797, which
described the transaction as “Sale to Glade Creek.” However, it seems
to us that it is the description of the transaction that is inaccurate and
that Hawks Bluff was reporting the sale of its interest in Glade Creek,
not the contribution of the easement property to Glade Creek. Hawks
Bluff reported that it acquired the asset being sold on September 3,
2012, the date of Glade Creek’s operating agreement and the date that
Glade Creek reported that it was organized on its 2012 short-year
returns. Hawks Bluff reported the date that it sold the asset incorrectly
by one day. It reported the sale occurred on November 30, 2012, but it
sold its membership interest on November 29, 2012. It reported the
gross sale price of $1.4 million, which is the difference of $3.2 million
received less the $1.8 million mortgage.

       If Hawks Bluff was reporting the sale of its Glade Creek interest,
as we understand it was doing, it would have been proper for it to report
the transaction as resulting in ordinary income or loss assuming that
the easement property is inventory. In general, the sale of a partnership
interest is treated as a sale of a capital asset and results in capital gain
or loss. § 741. There is an exception that requires taxpayers to report
the sale of a partnership interest as resulting in ordinary income or loss
if the partnership holds inventory. 10 § 751(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-
1(a)(2). In such a case, the partner is treated as selling an interest in the
partnership assets. Rawat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-14,
at *8‒9. Section 751 was enacted to prevent taxpayers from organizing
partnerships to obtain capital gain treatment for the sale of inventory.
S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 99 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4621, 4732. Thus, assuming that the easement property was inventory,
it would have been proper for Hawks Bluff to treat the sale of its Glade
Creek interest as the sale of an interest in inventory, and thus Hawks
Bluff would have been required to report the sale as generating ordinary
income or loss.

        10 In general, the character of partnership property as a capital asset, a section

1231 asset, or inventory is a partnership item. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1. However,
section 751 requires that “we look through the partnership to the underlying assets
and deem such a sale as the sale of separate interests in each asset.” Grecian Magnesite
Mining, Indus. & Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 63, 79 (2017), aff’d, 926 F.3d
819 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The character of gain or loss under section 751 is an affected item.
Regents Park Partners v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-336.
                                         13

[*13] Nor do we believe that Hawks Bluff had a tax motive for
mischaracterizing the easement property as inventory as petitioner
alleges. Hawk Bluff reported an ordinary loss of less than $200,000 on
Form 4797 and would have had a tax loss for 2012 even without claiming
that tax loss. Notably, it also claimed a charitable contribution
deduction of approximately $1.5 million from the easement donation.
We believe that Hawks Bluff was reporting the sale of its Glade Creek
interest consistent with its understanding that the easement property
was inventory.

        Petitioner argues that Glade Creek should not be bound by
Hawks Bluff’s reporting. 11 It argues that Hawks Bluff’s reporting is
irrelevant. But section 724(b) tells us otherwise. It is the very purpose
of section 724(b) to make relevant the character of the property in
Hawks Bluff’s hands. Congress enacted section 724 to prevent taxpayers
from attempting to recharacterize ordinary income property as a capital
asset by contributing the property to a newly organized partnership
before the property is sold for a gain. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1222
(1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 888. While Hawks Bluff’s
reporting may not bind Glade Creek, petitioner has not provided a
satisfactory explanation with reference to the statute as to why Hawks
Bluff’s reporting should not be given significant weight especially in the
light of the legislative purpose of section 724. It is true, as petitioner
argues, that Glade Creek did not control Hawks Bluff when Hawks Bluff
filed its 2012 return, but that is the fact that is irrelevant. Nothing in
section 724(b) requires that the partnership have control of the
contributing partner when the contributing partner files its return.

       The Code gives taxpayers flexibility in how they arrange their
business affairs to achieve desired tax consequences. See Estate of
Durkin v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 561, 571 (1992). While a taxpayer is
free to organize its affairs as it chooses, once it has done so, the
Commissioner may bind the taxpayer to its decision. Bradley v. United

       11 Petitioner cites only one case, King’s Court Mobile Home Park, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 511 (1992), for the proposition that one taxpayer’s
characterization of property does not bind another taxpayer. That case does not
support petitioner’s argument. It involved a corporation’s attempt to characterize
payments to its controlling shareholder as deductible wages. The Court held that the
corporation’s payments were nondeductible dividends but noted that their
characterization as wages or dividends had the same tax consequences to the recipient.
Id. at 515. Thus, there was no issue relating to whether the corporation’s
characterization bound the recipient.
                                         14

[*14] States, 730 F.2d 718, 720 (11th Cir. 1984); 12 see Commissioner v.
Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974). Glade
Creek and Hawks Bluff could have set out in the operating agreement
that Hawks Bluff was contributing investment property or that Hawks
Bluff was to report the easement property as a capital asset. See Wray
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-488 (stating that partnership
agreement stated that real property was held for investment). Glade
Creek knew the significance of the characterization of the easement
property for federal tax purposes and was aware that the easement
deduction would be limited to Hawks Bluff’s adjusted basis if the
property was inventory in Hawks Bluff’s hands immediately before the
contribution. The characterization of the easement property as
inventory was discussed in the PPM, and Glade Creek’s tax attorney,
Mr. Pollock, discussed the issue at a meeting before the easement
transaction took place. Glade Creek could have negotiated with Hawks
Bluff to have it report the easement property as investment property.
While a taxpayer’s labels are not determinative for tax purposes,
because the parties failed to attach labels in the organizational
documents the only evidence in the record that objectively establishes
how Hawks Bluff characterized the easement property is its 2012
return.

       Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that ILC or Hawks
Bluff treated the easement property as investment property in its books
and records. 13 It produced Mr. Vincent as a witness but failed to elicit
testimony that ILC or Hawks Bluff held the easement property for
investment purposes. In the light of section 724(b) and its purpose, we
place great weight on Hawks Bluff’s reporting of the easement property
as inventory. Statements on a return are not conclusive, however, and
we examine whether the facts otherwise support a finding that the

       12 The Eleventh Circuit recognizes an exception to this principle that allows
taxpayers to challenge the tax consequences of the chosen form only if they prove the
existence of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc. Bradley, 730 F.2d at 720
(citing Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376, 382 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981), rev’g
71 T.C. 1017 (1979)).
        13 Petitioner has not requested that we reopen the record. Both parties

addressed the section 170(e) issue in their posttrial briefs, and petitioner had the
opportunity to present evidence at trial. Accordingly, we see no need to reopen the
record. Whether to reopen the record on remand is “left to the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 551 (1983)).
                                          15

[*15] easement property was a capital asset. Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d
at 181.

III.    Factor Test

        A.      Purpose for Holding Property

         The Eleventh Circuit recognizes that a taxpayer’s purpose for
holding property can change over time and has indicated that the
purpose at the time of sale is not determinative. Boree v. Commissioner,
837 F.3d at 1101 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that ‘the
decisive question is the purpose for which (the property) “primarily” was
held when sold.’” (quoting Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d at 182)). 14 It has
instructed that “a proper analysis of a taxpayer’s primary purpose in
holding property should take into account a reasonable period of time
prior to the sale.” Id.; see Sanders, 740 F.2d at 889 (considering years
leading up to the sale and holding that the sale profit was ordinary
income); 15 Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d at 183–84 (stating that the
inquiry may consider “purpose over the entire course of his ownership
. . . [and] should start at the time the property is acquired”).

       Petitioner argues that Hawks Bluff was organized to hold the
easement property as an investment. It further argues that we should
also consider ILC’s purpose for holding the easement property while
respondent focuses primarily on Hawks Bluff’s holding purpose.
Petitioner argues that ILC treated the easement property as investment
property from the time of its acquisition or, alternatively, the easement
property converted to investment property in 2009 when ILC abandoned
the development project.

      The first inquiry according to the Eleventh Circuit in Boree is
whether Hawks Bluff was in a trade or business as a real estate dealer.
Hawks Bluff reported that its business was real estate dealer on its 2012
return even though its sales had been minimal since its organization. It
continued its efforts to sell lots on tract I after the easement transaction.
“The taxpayer’s claim to capital gain treatment is likely to be weaker if

        14  We have stated that generally the purpose at the time of sale is
determinative, but we consider earlier events to decide the purpose at the time of sale.
Cottle v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 467, 487 (1987).
         15 In Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1101, the Eleventh Circuit found that

consistent with Suburban Realty “[t]he Sanders court also analyzed the taxpayer’s
activities over multiple years” leading up to the sale.
                                    16

[*16] he can point to no other business activities . . . .” Suburban Realty,
615 F.2d at 179 n.24; see Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1105
(finding that taxpayer engaged in no other income-producing activity
although it had no sales during years at issue). Petitioner argues that
Hawks Bluff was organized to hold the ILC property for investment
purposes but failed to address Hawks Bluff’s reporting that it was a
dealer. Mr. Vincent did not testify that Hawks Bluff held the easement
property for investment. Nor did he contest Hawks Bluff’s reporting that
it was in the real estate business. He blamed the lack of sales on the
economy and lack of marketing, likely because it served petitioner’s
argument that residential development of the easement property was
economically feasible on the easement date. As explained further below,
Hawks Bluff was not organized to hold the ILC property as an
investment. Accordingly, we find that it was a real estate dealer.

       Petitioner argues that a real estate dealer may hold real estate
for investment purposes. See Pritchett, 63 T.C. at 163. We find that
Hawks Bluff was a real estate dealer. See Sugar Land Ranch Dev., LLC
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-21 (finding that tax return
statements on business activity were not conclusive because they may
have been inadvertently carried over from earlier returns). When a real
estate dealer holds both inventory and investment property, it must
segregate investment property from its inventory. Pritchett, 63 T.C. at
163. The Eleventh Circuit places the burden on the taxpayer to establish
that it segregated the real estate purportedly held as an investment
from its inventory. Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1104. The Court
of Appeals has stated that “[t]he mere lack of development activity with
respect to parts of a large property does not sufficiently separate those
parts from the whole to meet the taxpayer’s burden.” Id. (quoting
Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d at 185). Our caselaw considers whether the
taxpayer treated the property at issue differently from its other
property, made improvements or subdivided the property, held the
property out for sale or advertised it, and solicited the offer that led to
the sale at issue. Pritchett, 63 T.C. at 164‒68; Wray, T.C. Memo. 1978-
488. We have stated that holding title to real property in a different
name or entity does not conclusively establish segregation but is a factor
to consider. Pritchett, 63 T.C. at 164; Paullus v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-419.

             1.     Hawks Bluff’s Purpose

       On remand, petitioner argues that Hawks Bluff was organized as
part of a plan to cease development, marketing, and sale activities and
                                   17

[*17] to develop a plan for long-term investment of all three tracts. It
states that Hawks Bluff was organized in April 2010 after Mr. Vincent,
Mr. Tague, and Mr. Toscano “devise[d] a new plan [for] developing a
long-term investment plan for the property” and “solidified the ILC’s
members’ intent in holding the property as investment property.”

       Petitioner has not offered any evidence that Hawks Bluff was
organized for the purpose of holding real estate for investment purposes.
Its argument is speculative, not supported by the record, and contradicts
Mr. Vincent’s testimony. Its argument on remand contradicts its
proposed findings of fact in its posttrial briefs where it stated:

      The property was transferred to Hawks Bluff because Mr.
      Vincent and Mr. Teague [sic] had invested vast sums of
      money to fund the utilities, roads, water and infrastructure
      for the property. Transferring the property to Hawks Bluff
      provided Mr. Teague [sic] and Mr. Vincent a controlling
      interest over the ILC Property. This was also done to help
      reassure the bank, which had significant money invested
      in the property through loans to Mr. Vincent.

(Citations omitted.)

       Mr. Vincent testified that Hawks Bluff was organized and the ILC
property was transferred to it to “help reassure the bank” that funded
the infrastructure loans. We do not understand this testimony to mean
that Hawks Bluff was formed to hold the property for investment
purposes. By petitioner’s own admission, a fundamental part of the plan
was to give Mr. Vincent an ownership interest in the ILC property.

       Significantly, Mr. Vincent did not testify that Hawks Bluff was
organized with the intent to hold the ILC property for long-term
investment. Notably, petitioner has failed to produce any evidence
relating to the infrastructure loans and how ILC or Hawks Bluff
represented that it held the ILC property to secure financing. We find
that Hawks Bluff was organized to take over a failing real estate
development with Mr. Vincent as a part owner, find a solution for the
ongoing financial problems, and continue to sell the lots to customers in
the ordinary course of business.

      Furthermore, the evidence shows that Mr. Vincent and Mr. Tague
did not want to relinquish ownership of any part of the ILC property or
to do anything that might negatively affect the master-planned
community for the ILC property after Hawks Bluff acquired it from ILC.
                                    18

[*18] They wanted to protect their ownership and the development
potential. After Hawks Bluff was organized, Mr. Vincent and Mr. Tague
transferred unrelated real estate as partial payment of the unpaid
mortgage. Notably, they did not surrender the easement property. The
primary reason Mr. Vincent chose the easement transaction was that it
solved the debt problems while protecting ILC’s original vision of the
vacation home community. After Hawks Bluff found the solution to its
debt in the form of the easement donation, it continued its real estate
business activities. Hawks Bluff did not passively hold the easement
property in the hopes that it could sell it for the highest price to a third
party. Under such circumstances it is difficult for us to conclude that
Hawks Bluff was organized to hold the ILC property or the easement
property for investment.

       Petitioner produced Mr. Vincent as a witness and could have
elicited testimony from him that Hawks Bluff was organized to acquire
and hold the easement property as an investment but failed to do so,
perhaps because it was concerned that such testimony would have
adversely affected its argument that residential development was
economically feasible and the highest and best use of the land. After we
had agreed with petitioner that development was feasible, it
conveniently changed its position on remand and argues for the first
time that residential development was not feasible in 2009 to advance
its argument that the easement property was investment property
without having presented any evidence at trial to support the
infeasibility of development in 2009.

        Instead, petitioner cites Mr. Vincent’s testimony that he did not
want to develop the easement property alone and did not have the
finances to do so after Mr. Toscano and Mr. Tague stopped making debt
payments. However, neither statement means that Hawks Bluff was
organized to hold the property for investment or requires a finding that
its purpose for holding the property changed to investment. As
Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d at 182, instructs, the fact that the taxpayer
is not still actively engaged in the trade or business is not determinative
under the statute. “The statutory language does not demand that
property actually be sold while a taxpayer is still actively engaged in its
trade or business for ordinary income treatment to be required. Rather,
it demands that the property have been held primarily for sale in that
business.” Id. Hawks Bluff was organized as a real estate dealer and
held itself out as such. It used the easement transaction to eliminate
debt so that it could continue its business. It was actively engaged in
that business after the easement transaction.
                                    19

[*19] Petitioner’s argument that Hawks Bluff was organized for
investment purposes is speculative and unsupported by the evidence in
the record. Objective factors carry more weight than the taxpayer’s
subjective statements of intent. See Guardian Indus. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 308, 316 (1991), aff’d, 21 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished table decision). Accordingly, we place significant weight on
Hawks Bluff’s reporting that it was a real estate dealer and held the
easement property as inventory. Hawks Bluff’s organizational
documents are not in the record. There is no evidence in the record that
Hawks Bluff was organized because its members decided to hold the
property as investment property or that it treated the ILC property as
an investment. It was organized to take over a failing real estate
developer to reassure a major lender and continue the residential
development business albeit unsuccessfully.

             2.     ILC’s Purpose

      Petitioner argues that ILC acquired and held the easement
property as an investment. It argues the three tracts were separate
assets and that ILC took specific steps to segregate the easement
property from tract I to preserve the investment character of the
easement property. It cites the decision not to record the platted lots and
the lack of physical improvements on the easement property. To the
extent that ILC’s holding purpose is relevant, we find that ILC held the
easement property as inventory.

       ILC was in the real estate business and acquired the land because
it was suitable for development. We find petitioner’s argument that ILC
purchased all three tracts for investment to be disingenuous considering
the quick turnaround in development. ILC purchased all three tracts in
one purchase in January 2006 after engaging Mr. Vincent to evaluate
the property for a residential development. In its posttrial brief,
petitioner stated:

      The purchase was made after an extensive and thorough
      investigation of its development potential. Specifically, ILC
      spent significant time and money to verify the property
      contained the topography and attributes suitable for a
      high-end, second-home development. The $9 Million was
      not spent on a whim. It was spent after an investigation by
      sophisticated land investors.
                                         20

[*20] Shortly thereafter ILC engaged a licensed engineer to design a
concept plan for the development of the three tracts into one master-
planned community. The concept plan was completed in April 2006.
Then in July 2006 ILC placed restrictive covenants on all three tracts in
accordance with the concept plan. These actions are inconsistent with
petitioner’s claim that ILC purchased any part of the ILC property to
hold as an investment for future appreciation. See Wray, T.C. Memo.
1978-488 (finding that taxpayer had not made development decision at
time of purchase).

       By petitioner’s own admission in its proposed findings of fact, ILC
expanded substantial amounts of time and money to develop all three
tracts. “ILC . . . expended millions of dollars . . . preparing Tracts I, II,
and III for development as a master-planned community.” “By March of
2007, the infrastructure (roads, underground water, electricity, utilities,
soil testing, storm water plans) was in place to service all 806 lots
depicted in the Concept Plan.” “ILC negotiated and entered into a 25-
year contract . . . that provided the ILC property with . . . enough water
to cover all potential development . . . . ILC had to build a pump station
[and] . . . construct a mile of water mains (pipes) to service the pump
station . . . . After this process, the ILC property had the infrastructure
in place to service all of the proposed 806 lots . . . .” ILC “enjoyed huge
success” with tract I sales. To support its valuation, petitioner argued
that “ILC invested over $6 Million into the property obtaining approvals
for the property, accessing water, utilities, roads and obtaining platted
approvals for the Easement Property.” On the basis of petitioner’s own
admissions through its proposed findings of fact, we find that ILC
developed the easement property and did not segregate the easement
property from tract I as investment property.

       Petitioner also proposed a finding of fact that “Tracts II and III
were specifically held out as ‘investment’ property for potential future
development or sale to a third-party.” However, it failed to provide a
reference to the record as required by Rule 151, and we have found no
support for this proposed finding in the record. 16 ILC’s decision to delay
infrastructure improvements directly on the easement property was not
based on a decision to hold it as investment property. Rather, it made a
business decision to develop the ILC property in phases because of
financial constraints. Mr. Vincent testified that ILC planned to develop

        16 Rule 151(e)(3) requires that the parties’ posttrial briefs contain proposed

findings of fact based on the evidence and include references to the pages of the
transcript, exhibits, or other sources relied on to support the findings.
                                   21

[*21] the land in phases because it did not make business sense to
develop all 806 lots and place them on the market at one time. Such a
business plan does not establish that ILC segregated the easement
property and held it for investment purposes especially in the light of
the substantial amounts of time and money ILC expended to develop all
three tracts.

        Petitioner argues that ILC did not record the platted lots on the
easement property because it intended to segregate the easement
property and hold it as investment property. Such a position is not
supported by the record. Mr. Vincent testified that ILC did not record
the lots to avoid a property tax increase. He testified that normally
developers would not record lots until roads and amenities were
completed because recording can increase property tax. He stated that
if lots were recorded the property would be appraised per lot so it is a
“terrible mistake” to record the lots too early before the developer is
ready to sell them. We do not understand Mr. Vincent’s testimony to
mean that ILC decided to hold the easement property for investment
purposes. We relied on Mr. Vincent’s explanation for not recording the
platted lots in our decision that residential development was the highest
and best use for the easement property. Respondent argued that the lack
of recording weighed against that use. We stated that “ILC’s decision
not to record the platted lots in tracts II and III until it was ready to
develop those tracts is irrelevant to their development potential. It did
not record the lots to avoid a potential property tax increase.” Glade
Creek, T.C. Memo. 2020-148, at *34.

        There is no testimony or other evidence that ILC decided not to
record the platted lots because it planned to hold the easement property
for investment. Petitioner has not presented any evidence that ILC
evaluated the investment potential of the easement property including
the expectation of an appreciation in value and the costs of holding the
property for investment purposes. Instead, petitioner stated in its
posttrial brief that “[t]he property was specifically identified and
investigated by ILC in 2006 for its development potential.” No witness
testified that ILC treated any part of the ILC property as an investment
in its books and records when it acquired it or at any time thereafter.
Without more, ILC’s decision not to record the lots on the easement
property does not establish that ILC segregated it from tract I or held it
for investment purposes.

     Nor has petitioner established that ILC treated any part of the
ILC property as an investment in 2009 when petitioner argues ILC
                                    22

[*22] abandoned its intent to develop the property because of economic
conditions and lack of funding. In 2009 ILC stopped marketing the ILC
property and sales decreased sharply. On remand, petitioner argues
that residential development was not economically feasible in 2009.
However, the character of the property does not change simply because
of a change in market conditions. When a company is going out of
business, it is still in that business while it winds down. See Suburban
Realty, 615 F.2d at 182. ILC was a failed real estate developer that held
the entire ILC property out for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of its business as a master-planned community. ILC continued to hold
the ILC property in that business when it transferred its unsold
inventory to Hawks Bluff although it may not have been actively
engaged in that business.

      B.     Sales Activities

      The Eleventh Circuit has stated that frequency and
substantiality of sales is the “most important” factor in determining the
character of property. Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1100 (quoting
Biedenharn Realty, 526 F.2d at 416). This is because sales are “highly
relevant” to each of the three statutory inquiries for the characterization
of property as a capital asset or inventory including whether the
taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business and whether it held the
property for sale in that business. Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d at 178.
“[T]he presence of frequent sales ordinarily belies the contention that
property is being held ‘for investment’ rather than ‘for sale.’” Id.

       As we stated above, most of the seven factors relate to sales
activities. There were no lot sales on the easement property. However,
the lack of sales on the easement property does not require a finding
that the easement property was investment property where other facts
establish otherwise. No one factor or combination thereof is controlling.
Biedenharn Realty, 526 F.2d at 415. ILC’s original plan was to develop
the property in three phases and to use the cashflow from tract I sales
to fund development on the easement property. In view of this plan, we
place little weight on the lack of sales on the easement property. ILC did
not plan to hold the easement property for investment until lots on tract
I were sold out and then make a decision about whether to develop the
easement property. It had a concept plan designed for a single master-
planned community of the three tracts and completed significant
infrastructure to enable development of all three tracts. ILC’s intent was
to hold the easement property as inventory for development. In the light
of Hawks Bluff’s reporting, ILC’s development activities, and the lack of
                                    23

[*23] credible evidence to support petitioner’s argument, we find that
the lack of sales on the easement property does not require a finding
that ILC or Hawks Bluff segregated the easement property and held it
for investment.

      C.     Development Activities

       Development activities are relevant to whether a taxpayer is in a
real estate business and also to its purpose for holding land. Suburban
Realty, 615 F.2d at 178‒79. Lack of improvements can indicate that the
property is not held primarily for sale. Adam v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
996, 1000 (1973); see also Brown v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1944) (finding that taxpayer was a real estate dealer as it subdivided
the land, installed utilities, built streets and storm sewers, and sold 20
to 30 lots a year); Gates v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 898 (1969) (finding
that property was dealer property where taxpayer subdivided lots,
installed improvements, and sold home construction building
materials); Conner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-6 (citing lack of
development, finding that the taxpayer was not in the real estate
business and was not entitled to business deductions), aff’d, 770 F. App’x
1016 (11th Cir. 2019).

        On remand petitioner argues that the easement property was
never improved or developed although it acknowledges that the
easement property “economically benefited from the development” on
tract I and that ILC’s development activities “increased the likelihood of
developing, subdividing, and selling lots” on the easement property.
Petitioner relied on ILC’s infrastructure and development activities to
support its valuation of the easement property. In its posttrial briefs
petitioner repeatedly stated that ILC made improvements that
benefited all three tracts and added value to the easement property. It
asserted that ILC spent $6 million on infrastructure related to the
development of all three tracts. It criticized respondent’s expert’s
valuation for failing to take into account the $6 million in improvements
made for all 806 lots. It stated that “[a]ll three tracts . . . had ready-
access to water, electricity, utilities, and septic tank capacity. All three
tracts had paved road access. Moreover, all three tracts had obtained
the required TDEC approvals, and lots were platted on all three tracts.”
It argued that the paved roads extending to the borders of the easement
property provided the easement property with a “valuable amenity.” It
stated that “ILC successfully completed the steps necessary to transform
the ILC Property into a fully-approved and shovel-ready 806-Lot
development.”
                                   24

[*24] We agreed with petitioner that the highest and best use of the
easement property was residential development. We relied on the fact
that the easement property had platted lots, a concept plan designed by
a licensed engineer, and significant infrastructure work had been
completed including upgraded utility and water capacity, soil testing,
approvals for septic tanks, sewage, and storm water plans. Glade Creek,
T.C. Memo. 2020-148, at *34. We found that the easement property had
been improved for development and, in this respect, agreed with
petitioner. Mr. Vincent testified that ILC’s development activities
increased the value of the easement property, and we relied on his
testimony to support our valuation. We found that Mr. Broome erred by
failing to take into account “extensive development work ILC performed
on the property,” which contributed to the easement property’s
suitability for residential development. Id. at *32. We concluded that
“[i]n the light of the improved real estate market and the significant
infrastructure work and approvals previously granted, a hypothetical
buyer would have reasonably purchased the property for the
development of a vacation or residential community.” Id. at *34.

      We also agreed with petitioner that ILC’s infrastructure and
other development activities increased the fair market value of the
easement property. Id. at *53. In our decision on the valuation, we
stated:

       Mr. Vincent and ILC invested vast amounts of time and
       money on the development of all three tracts, spending
       over $6 million. Most infrastructure work took place on
       tract I. However, ILC had successfully completed
       numerous steps toward the development of all three tracts.
       ILC constructed a pumping station and installed upgraded
       pipelines to service all three tracts, upgraded electrical
       lines that could service residential developments on all
       three tracts, paved access roads leading up to tracts II and
       III, platted lots on the basis of a design by a licensed
       engineer, completed soil testing, and obtained development
       approvals for all three tracts. Tracts II and III clearly
       benefited from ILC’s work even though ILC had not yet
       extended utilities to those tracts. Mr. Broome [respondent’s
       valuation expert] erred by disregarding the value added to
       the easement property from ILC’s infrastructure and
       approvals.

Id. at *39.
                                   25

[*25] We held that the unencumbered easement property had a fair
market value of approximately $9.3 million using a discounted cashflow
method and found that value was supported by ILC’s purchase price for
the easement property and the value added by ILC’s infrastructure
improvements and development activities. Id. at *52; see Boree v.
Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1105 (finding that taxpayer’s activities
“increase[d] the value of lots in future sales”). We stated:

             We also consider ILC’s $6 million investment in
      infrastructure and its work to obtain approvals which
      benefited all three tracts, including ensuring a water
      supply, upgrading water and electrical capacity, soil
      testing, Government approvals, and access roads leading to
      the easement property. Mr. Vincent credibly testified that
      ILC performed soil testing on tracts II and III. ILC's
      infrastructure and approval work clearly increased the fair
      market value of the easement property. . . . We find it
      reasonable that the unencumbered easement property
      would have increased by $2 and $2.5 million on the basis
      of appreciation and ILC’s infrastructure work.

Glade Creek, T.C. Memo. 2020-148, at *53.

       The development activities weigh against a finding that ILC
segregated the easement property from tract I to hold it for investment
purposes. ILC did not treat the easement property as a passive
investment. Notably, Hawks Bluff did not undertake any additional
development. But we place little weight on this fact because Hawks Bluff
was organized to take over ILC’s failing real estate business, to give Mr.
Vincent an ownership interest, and to appease the bank that financed
the infrastructure. Furthermore, ILC had completed the necessary
infrastructure to sell the lots on tract I, making further development by
Hawks Bluff with respect to those lots unnecessary.

       ILC’s infrastructure improvements and development activities
significantly contributed to the increase in the unencumbered easement
property’s value over the course of ILC’s and Hawks Bluff’s ownership.
“[C]apital gain treatment will be proper only if the gain emanates from
appreciation in value.” Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1104 (quoting
Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d at 186); see Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960) (stating that courts should
construe capital asset narrowly “in accordance with the purpose of
Congress to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically
                                        26

[*26] involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a
substantial period of time”); Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States,
539 F.2d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding property to be dealer property
where the gain resulted from substantial improvements made to the
property by the taxpayer as opposed to long-term market appreciation).
But even an increase in land value attributable more to market
appreciation than to improvements does not automatically mean that
the land is a capital asset, and profit from appreciation may be treated
as ordinary income. Boree v. Commissioner, 837 F.3d at 1104.

       Petitioner did not provide any expert testimony or other evidence
as to the appreciation of the land over the six years of ILC’s and Hawks
Bluff’s ownership from 2006 through 2012 in the absence of the
infrastructure improvements. Instead, it argued the opposite. It argued
that the real estate market was distressed beginning in 2008 but began
to recover by December 2012. 17 Glade Creek, T.C. Memo. 2020-148,
at *6, *38. It repeatedly faulted Mr. Broome’s comparable sales analysis
for using sales that occurred on average four years before the easement
date during what petitioner called the “trough” of the recession.
Petitioner has not established that the amount of the increased value of
the easement property was from appreciation in the absence of the
infrastructure improvements.

IV.    Conclusion

       On the basis of the totality of the facts and circumstances, we find
that ILC and Hawks Bluff did not segregate the easement property from
tract I in a manner sufficient to meet petitioner’s burden to show that
the easement property was investment property. Petitioner has not
presented any evidence to substantiate its argument that Hawks Bluff
was organized to hold the easement property or to dispute Hawks Bluff’s
reporting that it held the property as inventory. ILC held the easement
property as inventory and did not segregate it from tract I. Petitioner’s
position on remand that ILC did not develop the easement property is
inconsistent with our findings of fact and petitioner’s own posttrial brief.
Petitioner relies on speculation that is unsupported by the record. We
place significant weight on the only evidence in the record of how Hawks
Bluff or ILC characterized the easement property, Hawks Bluff’s 2012

       17 Mr. Clark testified that a hypothetical residential development would have

a seven-year absorption period for lot sales beginning in 2012 and that unsold lots
would appreciate 3% to 4% annually.
                                  27

[*27] return. Accordingly, Glade Creek’s easement deduction is limited
to the adjusted basis pursuant to sections 724(b) and 170(e).

      Decision will be entered under Rule 155.