Court Opinion

ID: 9845412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:21:16.665171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:06.329416
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J.
I respectfully dissent.
*316As I read the applicable federal decisions, the dispositive issue in this case — namely, whether defendants’ title to property deriving from a federal patent is subject to an overriding state “tidelands trust” — is a matter of federal, not state, law. (See, e.g., State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co (1977) 429 U.S. 363, 375 [50 L.Ed.2d 550, 561, 97 S.Ct. 582]; Knight v. U.S. Land Association (1891) 142 U.S. 161 [35 L.Ed. 974, 12 S.Ct. 258].) In discussing California’s interest in tidelands, every United Spates Supreme Court decision to which our attention has been directed draws a clear distinction between tidelands that passed to the state a$ sovereign, and tidelands — like those involved in the present case — that1 had been ceded by Mexico to private parties and whose title was later confirmed by a federal patent pursuant to the elaborate procedures adopted by the federal government to comply with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. These decisions uniformly hold that whereas California obtained a sovereign interest in the former category of tidelands under the general common law public trust doctrine, “[t]here is the established qualification that this principle is not applicable to lands which had previously been granted by Mexico to other parties . .. (Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1935) 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 [80 L.Ed. 9, 14, 56 S.Ct. 23]; United States v. Coronado Beach Co. (1921) 255 U.S. 472, 48?-488 [65 L.Ed. 736, 741-742, 41 S.Ct. 378]; Shively v. Bowlby (1894) 152 U.S. 1, 30-31 [38 L.Ed. 331, 342-343, 14 S.Ct. 548]; Knight v. U.S. Land Association, supra, 142 U.S. 161, 183-184 [35 L.Ed. 974, 981-982]; San Francisco v. LeRoy (1891) 138 U.S. 656, 670-671 [34 L.Ed. 1096, 1101, 11 S.Ct. 364].)
In my view, the majority gives an artificially narrow reading to these numerous federal decisions in suggesting that the cases are limited to the question of whether California obtained “title” to the tidelands and that they do not bear on the question of whether California acquired an allegedly independent “tidelands trust” interest in this property. As I understand the governing federal tidelands cases, the special “public trust” which adheres in tidelands — and which operates to limit the legislative prerogative in determining to what uses such lands may be put — flows directly from the initial sovereign ownership of these tidelands. (See Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State of Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387, 452-454 [36 L.Ed. 1018, 1042-1043, 13 S.Ct. 110]; Martin v. Waddell (1842) 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-414 [10 L.Ed. 997, 1012-1014]; cf. People v. California Fish Co. (1913) 166 Cal. 576, 584-587 [138 P. 79]; City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 521-525 [162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362]; State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 210, 226-231 [172 *317Cal.Rptr. 696, 625 P.2d 239].) Thus, if — as a matter of federal law— California never owned these tidelands in trust for the public, the keystone on which the application of the public trust doctrine rests is missing.1
It should be understood, of course, that even in the absence of the public trust doctrine, state and local governments retain broad power to regulate the property in question for environmental, navigational, and recreational purposes and the like. Although this broad regulatory power may not afford the City of Los Angeles authority to enter on and alter defendants’ property without compensation, this extensive legislative control does suggest to me that the majority’s concern over the problems ostensibly emanating from a “Mason-Dixon coastline” is probably overstated. In any event, the policy considerations which might legitimately influence our decision if this were a matter of state law, clearly cannot override the governing United States Supreme Court decisions on a matter of federal law. Because I find the majority’s conclusion inconsistent with those decisions, I dissent.2
The petition of appellant Summa Corporation for a rehearing was denied June 16, 1982. Richardson, J., and Kaus, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

I find nothing in the federal cases that would support the conclusion that when the United States issued a federal patent confirming private interests in property acquired pursuant to an earlier grant from Mexico, the federal government — as a matter of federal law — retained a hidden “tidelands trust” interest which later passed to California. (See, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Land Association, supra, 142 U.S. at pp. 185-189 [35 L.Ed. at pp. 982-984]; Beard v. Federy (1866) 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 491 [18 L.Ed. 88, 92].)

Because the majority opinion upholds the trial court’s decision on the public trust theory, it does not reach that court’s alternative findings that past usage of the property at issue gave rise to a public easement for the passage of fresh water and a dedication for use as public streets or waterways. Since my feelings about these alternative holdings would not affect the outcome of the case in any event, I express no view as to the validity of those conclusions.