Court Opinion

ID: 9497390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:50:15.900138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:10.159966
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part. ,
Because I believe that Lordi has demonstrated cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default on his juror-bias claim, I respectfully dissent from the corresponding portion of the majority’s opinion.
I.
After jury selection, defense counsel Lou D’Apolito received a telephone call from an anonymous woman claiming to be on the jury venire. The woman said that she and, another female venire member, whom she identified, overheard a male colleague who was later seated on the jury (“Juror A”) comment before the trial began that Lordi “was guilty.” She also expressed concerns that Juror A had lied during voir dire, and stated that she felt compelled to report the matter.
D’Apolito requested that the trial court conduct an in-camera hearing to examine Juror A for bias. The prosecution opposed the request, arguing that the accusation was not credible and could potentially taint the jury pool. Denying the request without a hearing, the trial court (1) noted that the call was anonymous; (2) suggested that the anonymous venire member would not have been within hearing range of Juror A when the alleged comment' was made; and (3) speculated that Juror A’s comment may have been in jest. D’Apolito entered his objection to the denial.
Appellate counsel failed to raise a juror-bias claim on direct appeal. Lordi first presented the claim in his delayed motion for reconsideration before the Ohio Court of Appeals, seeking to excuse his procedural default due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.1 Noting the.scant evidence in the record of juror bias, the state appellate court denied the claim, holding that Lordi “has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that had appellate counsel raised this assignment of error [on direct appeal], it would have been sustained.” Ohio v. Lordi, Nos. 99CA62; 99CA247, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct.App. Feb. 23, 2001), appeal dismissed, 91 Ohio St.3d 1526, 747 N.E.2d 251 (2001).
*196II.
To excuse the procedural default, Lordi contends that his counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the juror-bias claim. See, e.g., Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir.2000) (“If [petitioner] could show that she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that rose to the level of a violation of her Sixth Amendment rights, it would excuse her procedural default.”). The applicable standard, enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), requires a showing that (1) counsel’s performance was so deficient as to be “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”; and (2) there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The failure of appellate counsel “to raise an issue on appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the appeal.” McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir.2004).
Because of the procedural arguments in this case, we must first decide whether there was a reasonable probability that the claim of juror bias would have prevailed on its merits at the time Lordi’s appellate counsel failed to raise it. Id. If so, “we can then consider whether the claim’s merit was so compelling that appellate counsel’s failure to raise it amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that would excuse [Lordi’s] procedural default.” Id. at 700.
A.
“Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, a defendant who alleges implied juror bias is entitled to a hearing in which he has ‘the opportunity to prove actual bias.’ ” Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 636 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). “A hearing permits counsel to probe the juror’s memory, his reasons for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his actions.” Phillips, 455 U.S. at 222, 102 S.Ct. 940 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has not dictated the type or breadth of opportunity that state trial courts must provide under Phillips to defendants raising allegations of juror bias. However, we have granted habeas relief where a state trial court categorically refused a defendant’s request for any post-conviction hearing on the claim. See, e.g., Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 373-74 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004, 119 S.Ct. 2340, 144 L.Ed.2d 237 (1999). In Nevers, the defendant appended several jurors’ affidavits to his motion for a new trial, stating that jurors were exposed to extraneous and potentially prejudicial information. We concluded that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for a hearing and factual determination on the claim “prevented [him] from demonstrating with specificity that the extraneous information the jury possessed did in fact impair the ability of the jury to decide the case solely on the evidence properly presented to them” — a violation of the defendant’s right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 374.
The Seventh Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion when juror bias allegations first arose at the start of trial in Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475 (7th Cir.2004). Despite considerable publicity of the murder in the small Wisconsin community, evidence that jurors were discussing the case before trial, and suggestions that at least one juror was willing to convict in order to expedite deliberations, the *197state trial court refused defendant’s request to investigate juror bias and simply readmonished the jury. Id. at 479-80. Granting habeas relief, the Seventh Circuit held that a state trial court’s inquiry into juror-bias allegations must be “reasonably calculated to resolve the doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality” (internal quotation omitted), and should be increasingly more searching as the probability of bias increases. Id. at 480-81. The pretrial atmosphere and reported jury conduct “created a sufficiently high probability of jury bias to require on the part of the trial judge a diligent inquiry” to ensure the protection of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 481.
While it is unnecessary for us to define the precise nature of the hearing required to be afforded to defendants raising juror-bias claims, the anonymous venire member’s allegations were clearly sufficient to warrant some “diligent inquiry” by- the trial court. Oswald, 374 F.3d at 481. First, the anonymous venire member levied a troubling allegation that Juror A lied during voir dire and that Juror A expressed his belief in Lordi’s guilt. Second, she provided the name of a second woman on the venire who could substantiate her allegations, triggering a concern among reasonable jurists that Juror A’s comments may have influenced other members of the jury pool. Third, the indictment and trial of a Mahoning County commissioner would naturally generate local publicity, placing the trial judge on notice about the potentiality for such prejudice.
The state trial court’s response was constitutionally inadequate to protect Lordi’s Sixth Amendment rights. No factual support is cited for its conclusions that (1) the allegation was not credible due to the source’s anonymity; (2) the anonymous ve-nire member could not have overheard Juror A’s. comments; and (3) Juror A probably offered his comments in jest. These are just speculations of the state trial court. The state trial court further failed to recognize that the credibility of the allegation could be quickly ascertained by questioning the second venire member identified by the caller, and without necessarily interrogating — and potentially tainting — Juror A.
In light of the unambiguous command of the Supreme Court in Phillips, I believe it reasonably probable that a reviewing court on direct appeal, after recognizing the trial court’s categorical failure to permit Lordi an- opportunity to demonstrate the presence of actual juror bias, would have reversed the case and ordered relief. The Ohio Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion rested on an “unreasonable application” of Stripkland because it incorrectly limited its. prejudice inquiry to the merits of Lor-di’s juror-bias allegation. It found that even if a juror-bias claim had been offered on direct appeal, there was not “a reasonable likelihood that ... it would have been sustained” because the claim was unsupported by evidence in the record. Lordi, slip op. at l.2 Of course, the reason for this *198lack of support can be attributed to the state trial judge’s complete abrogation of his constitutional duty to permit further inquiry or a hearing to develop the evidence. Hence, by omitting any mention of the trial court’s inexplicable failure to conduct a hearing, the state appellate court did not consider the reasonable probability of reversal on direct appeal due to procedural error, and thus conducted an incomplete and unreasonable application of Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000); see also McFarland, 356 F.3d at 699; Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 966, 123 S.Ct. 1759, 155 L.Ed.2d 521 (2003).
B.
Not only did the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably apply Strickland’s prejudice prong, but also that court failed to analyze Strickland’s deficient-performance prong. Consequently, our analysis of whether appellate counsel’s omission of Lordi’s juror-bias claim on direct appeal rises to the level of deficient performance under Strickland is conducted de novo. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); see also Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.2003).
Lordi’s juror-bias claim was so “significant and obvious” that appellate counsel’s failure to raise it constitutes a deficiency under Strickland. Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946, 120 S.Ct. 369, 145 L.Ed.2d 284 (1999). As noted above, the Supreme Court, without qualification, “has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940. It naturally follows that the juror-bias issue was clearly stronger than the issues presented on direct appeal, mainly the forty-four alleged instances of prosecu-torial misconduct — many of which were utterly frivolous or unsupported by the record. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746 (requiring a habeas petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to demonstrate that “a particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger than issues that counsel did present”). Moreover, D’Apolito’s prompt objection to the trial court’s refusal to conduct any inquiry into juror bias should have alerted appellate counsel of this claim, the Supreme Court’s decisive language in Phillips forecloses any discretion of trial courts on whether or not to conduct an investigation into allegations of juror bias, and the record is totally devoid of any explanation of why appellate counsel would strategically fail to include the juror-bias claim. Mapes, 171 F.3d at 427.
Under these circumstances, the deficient-performance prong of Strickland has been satisfied. Given the clear Sixth Amendment violation, the decision of Lor-di’s appellate counsel to omit this issue on direct appeal was “an unreasonable one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt” and is appropriately cited as the cause for Lordi’s failure to raise the issue on appeal. Id. at 428.
III.
Because the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it held in effect that Lordi could not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland and because Lordi has shown deficient performance of appellate counsel, Lordi has overcome the procedural default. Because Phillips mandates that Lordi be provided with *199some meaningful opportunity to demonstrate actual juror bias after his allegations were presented to the state trial court, I would further hold that the state trial judge’s failure to conduct any inquiry clearly violated Lordi’s Sixth Amendment rights. Therefore, I would reverse the district court’s decision to deny habeas relief, and I would remand with instructions to grant the writ unless the State of Ohio opts to retry Lordi within a reasonable period of time. I respectfully dissent.

. Ohio law requires defendants to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on an application for reconsideration in the court of appeals or on direct appeal to the state supreme court. See State v. Mumahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (1992); Ohio App. R. 26(B).

. The full analysis of the Ohio Court of Appeals is as follows:
Appellant first alleges that counsel should have raised the issue of the court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into an allegation of juror misconduct. The only evidence of such misconduct before the court was an anonymous call. As the record does not support a claim of juror misconduct other than this anonymous call, appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that had appellate counsel raised this assignment of error, it would have been sustained.
Lordi, slip op. at 1. While the opinion failed to cite to Strickland or conduct a meaningful constitutional analysis, our inquiry still proceeds.under the deferential lens of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) because the state appellate court *198included some language that vaguely mirrors Strickland’s prejudice prong.