Court Opinion

ID: 9673233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:51.851079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:21.048393
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The court committed two reversible errors in the conduct of this trial, one in each phase. During the guilt phase of the trial, though requested to do so, the court refused to give an instruction that would have permitted the jury to find Baze guilty of second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide pursuant to KRS 503.120(1). The penalty phase error occurred when the court refused to permit introduction of evidence of the penalty imposed on Appellant during related criminal proceedings in federal court.
Appellant’s theory of defense to these crimes was that he acted in self-defense. He sought instructions which would have allowed the jury to convict him of either wanton manslaughter or reckless homicide; that is, he argued that there was sufficient evidence before the jury for it to find that Appellant’s belief in the need for self-defense, or in the degree of the use of force, was wanton or reckless. Appellant’s contention is that the limitation of KRS 503.060(1), which negates self-defense when one is resisting arrest by a qualified peace officer using no more than the force reasonably necessary to effect an arrest, is inapplicable when evidence has been presented which would support a finding that the offender had an unreasonable belief that the officer was using “more force than reasonably necessary to effect the arrest.”
Appellant does not deny that he caused the death of the two officers, or even that they were using no more than reasonably necessary force in their efforts to arrest him. He contends, and his defense was grounded upon this contention, that because of his emotional state, he could not recognize the reasonableness of their acts. I would reverse and remand for a new trial before a properly instructed jury.
Appellant had been charged with and convicted of a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon in federal court. During the sentencing hearing on that charge, the federal judge found that Appellant had used the rifle to commit murder, which increased the sentence he received under the federal sentencing guidelines. Appellant sought to introduce into evidence during the penalty phase of this trial the judgment of the federal court, and the parole consequences of that sentence, for the jury’s consideration in setting his state sentence. The trial judge refused to permit the introduction of the federal sentence because the case was on appeal.
The Commonwealth cites Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871 (1993), as controlling precedent. However, Thompson concerned the admission over the objection of a defendant, of a nonfinal, unrelated conviction as an aggravating circumstance for which the death penalty can be imposed. Here, the situation is far different. The conviction involves punishment imposed by a federal court for conduct at issue in the trial before the jury, the defendant has raised no objection to admission of the conviction, and *827the conviction is being used for mitigation, not aggravation of sentence. The Commonwealth correctly notes that mitigation evidence is subject to the rules of relevancy and admissibility. I have no trouble finding that the evidence sought to be admitted was clearly relevant for the jury’s consideration in determining whether to impose a term of years, life with or without parole, or a sentence of death.
The Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencing authority consider “relevant mitigating evidence” concerning the defendant’s “character or record” and “the circumstances of the offense.” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). That the offense involved gave rise to a criminal conviction which resulted in a twenty-year sentence that would be run consecutive to any sentence imposed by the jury, and that Appellant would have to serve a minimum of seventeen years of that sentence before he would be eligible for release is clearly a relevant consideration. That the conviction is not final is insufficient reason to bar this evidence. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to prohibit the application of state hearsay rules so as to prevent a defendant in a capital murder case from submitting mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a trial. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). The Supreme Court examined the hearsay sought to be introduced and found that it was highly relevant and of sufficient reliability to be admissible. Here, the evidence consists of the record of a conviction in a federal court, clearly a rehable piece of evidence. I would reverse for a new sentencing hearing at which this relevant and rehable evidence could be considered by the jury-