Court Opinion

ID: 9715239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:58:18.687984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.782564
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority's affirmance of the defendant’s murder conviction and I join in the majority’s opinion to that extent. I cannot, however, agree with the majority that death is an appropriate sentence in this case. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion. The brutal beating death of Jasmin James is indeed shocking and tragic. I do not dispute that her death “resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9—1(b)(7)), and that the defendant therefore qualified for the death penalty under our death penalty statute. But assessing the propriety of a death sentence requires more than a determination that the inherent nature of the defendant’s crime qualifies him for the ultimate sanction. This court recently observed that “[i]n enacting the death penalty statute, our legislature did not intend that every defendant who qualifies should receive the sanetion; there is a certain amount of discretion in imposing the sentence, and this court has automatic authority to review any death penalty imposed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9—1(i).)” (People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, 277.) This court does not lightly disturb the reasoned judgment of the sentencing authority. (People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 430; People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 165; People v. Lykins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 35, 40.) In reviewing the propriety of a death sentence, however, our analysis is guided by the principle that “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the eighth amendment ‘requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.’ ” (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590, quoting Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991. See also Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), 428 U.S. 325, 334, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974, 982, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3006.) Our constitution further requires that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. See also People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 428-29; People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 342, 380-82.) This court has acknowledged the necessity of avoiding arbitrary and capricious death sentences by adequately defining capital crimes, by directing sentencing discretion, and by providing adequate judicial review. (People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 429; People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 164-65; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 161-62.) In capital cases, therefore, this court very carefully reviews the record to ensure that due consideration has been given any relevant mitigating factors, and we have vacated death sentences where we have found such an extreme penalty inappropriate. People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145; People v. Crews (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 60; People v. Walcher (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 159. I agree with the majority that this case is not factually on all fours with Johnson, Buggs, or Carlson. Our decision to vacate the death sentences in those cases turned, in large part, on the presence of certain mitigating factors: no significant history of prior criminal activity (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9—1(c)(1)), and action under extreme mental or emotional disturbance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9—1(c)(2)). These factors were also present in Crews. Also, in Carlson, Buggs and Johnson, the murders appeared to have been aberrations brought on by special circumstances not likely to be repeated in the future. I am cognizant of the fact that the mitigating factor of action under extreme mental or emotional distress is conspicuously absent in this case. But I do not read Johnson, Buggs, Carlson or Crews as carving any exception to the application of our death penalty statute. In none of those decisions did we even purport to do so. These cases do not suggest the emergence of a mechanical rule whereby the presence of those mitigating factors will always result in vacation of a death sentence. Nor will the absence of either or both of these factors command affirmance absent other defects in the sentence. The crystallization of such a rule would effectively amend the death penalty statute by judicial gloss. Such matters are better left to the legislature. This court rather must continually be guided by the recognition that “each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty.” (People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280.) Carlson, Buggs, Johnson and Crews represent nothing more, and nothing less, than a recognition of this court’s responsibility in every death penalty case to carefully consider the character of the defendant and the circumstances of his crime before we sanction the termination of his life. The legislature obviously did not intend that every person convicted of murder should be executed. Also, it is apparent that every person convicted of murder with the additional finding of one or more of the aggravating factors is not to be sentenced to death. This most severe sanction has been reserved by the legislature for a limited class of those convicted of murder with aggravating factors. The prior decisions of this court have fairly well defined that class. In the present case, I do not think that the circumstances of the crime and the character of defendant indicate that the defendant must be permanently eliminated from society. (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590.) Nor do I think that the deterrent and .retributive functions of the death penalty will be served by executing the defendant. The defendant was a man in his twenties at the time of the murder. He had no criminal record whatsoever and had, apparently, displayed no tendency toward crime. There is also no evidence that he had previously displayed traits of violence. He had attended elementary school and three years of high school in Indiana. He held part-time jobs while living with his father and grandmother in Aurora, Illinois. He then moved to Chicago, where he continued to work part-time. The defendant had six children, including Jasmin and Alecia. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the defendant had ever abused Pamela or any of his other children. The defendant had lived with his stepmother and his aunt in homes in which there were many children present. Several of his relatives testified that he never abused any of the children or the adults. They testified that but for this one explosive episode, they had never known him to abuse Jasmin. Indeed, the testimony revealed that the defendant loved and cared for Jasmin, and he seemed like an “ideal father” to her. His relatives spoke of him as a caring and thoughtful man who had not displayed any tendency toward crime. The defendant’s stepmother testified that while the defendant lived with her in Chicago, he had stopped some young boys from purse snatching and otherwise stealing property in the area. The defendant’s relatives testified that the defendant did not have a violent character. They believed that after serving a prison sentence, the defendant could emerge as a benefit to society. The defendant’s stepbrother stated that the defendant was welcome to stay with him, and that he would provide work for the defendant. The defendant did express remorse for what he had done to Jasmin. He said he was only trying to make her a better child, and that he was angered by her persistent refusal to obey his orders to go to bed and by her misbehavior when he .and Pamela took Jasmin to other people’s houses. Corporal punishment of children was a common and accepted practice in the defendant’s family. The defendant testified that his mother had beaten him with an electrical cord when he was a teenager. While the beating was painful, it did not cause him permanent injury. He said it made him “straighten up in a lot of ways.” A review of the record does not reveal that the defendant was acting under extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the beating. Nor does it reveal any “special circumstances,” as in Carlson, Buggs and Johnson, which may have triggered this tragic turn of events. There is no evidence here, as in Crews, that the defendant was acting under the influence of any drug at the time he beat Jasmin. (But see People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, 282 (that defendant was under influence of alcohol and drugs at time of murder is a factor which merits little weight in mitigation).) I am unable to find anything to suggest why the defendant may have thought such a brutal beating was necessary to discipline Jasmin. But the record does reveal that this was an isolated act of extreme violence, and that it stands in stark contrast to an otherwise blameless life. Except for a brief period immediately following the murder when both the defendant and Pamela lied about Pamela’s involvement in the beating, the defendant was cooperative with the police. He described to them at length the details of the beating. He did not attempt to run away after the beating and he did not attempt to hide any physical evidence of his crime. The testimony of Pamela and the defendant’s mother suggests that he was genuinely upset by Jasmin’s death. The defendant’s mother testified that he was crying when she visited him at the police station on the night of the murder. In sum, I conclude that consideration of all the circumstances of this case and the character of the defendant strongly militate against imposition of the death penalty. The evidence presented simply does not portray a man who is a menace to society and who poses such a threat to others that he must be executed. Certainly, the prospects for rehabilitating the defendant are quite promising. I do not mean to belittle the severity of the defendant’s crime. This little girl’s death resulted from an extremely brutal, savage beating. Nor do I, in any way, suggest that those who commit atrocities against their children should invariably be. beyond the reach of our death penalty. I am aware of the tragedy of child abuse in our society and I by no means wish to minimize its utter intolerability. As this court stated in People v. Crews (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 60, 66: “Society is outraged by the murder of a child, but in determining punishment for the crime, care must be taken to insure that the punishment is appropriate and just. The doing of justice must include a consideration of background and circumstances which affect punishment.” For the reasons set forth above, I do not believe that death is an appropriate sentence under the circumstances of this case. I accordingly dissent from the affirmance of the defendant’s death sentence. JUSTICES CLARK and CALVO join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.