Court Opinion

ID: 9794265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:02:19.982968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:31.519940
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, C. J.
I dissent.The record in this case clearly shows that petitioners locked out their employees, and it is impossible for me to understand how it can be said that the employees left their work within the meaning of section 56 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. That section, as amended in 1945, provides: “An individual is not eligible for benefits for unemployment, and no such benefit shall be payable to him under any of the following conditions: (a) If he left his work because of a trade dispute and for the period during which he continues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which he was employed.” (Stats. 1945, ch. 1178, p. 2225; 3 Leering’s Gen. Laws, 1945 Pocket Supp., Act 8780d, § 56.)
*253It is conceded that the right to benefits depends upon whether the worker left his job of his own free will or was forced to do so because of the acts of others and that under the Bodinson case section 56 disqualifies only those workers who voluntarily leave their work. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 327 [109 P.2d 935].) Thus, although the section clearly precludes the payment of benefits to employees who go out on strike (American-Hawaiian S. S. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 716 [151 P.2d 213]; W. R. Grace & Co. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 720 [151 P.2d 215]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra), it has been treated as not generally disqualifying workers who are locked out by their employers. (See Bunny’s Waffle Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735, 741 [151 P.2d 224]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra, at p. 327.) It would be a contradiction in terms to hold that a locked-out employee had voluntarily left his work.
Here it clearly appears from the agreed statement of facts that after the strike was called against one member of the employers’ association, the bakery workers employed by petitioners remained at their jobs until petitioners closed down their plants and that petitioners’ employees were willing to continue working throughout the course of the strike. Ordinarily it would be expected that this would end the matter, establishing that the employees had not voluntarily left but, rather, had been forced to leave their work.
The majority opinion, however, concludes that the employees “left their work voluntarily and, therefore, should have been excluded from receiving unemployment benefits.” The theory seems to be that because the union and the employers’ association were negotiating with regard to proposed changes in the master contract, and because the union had been informed of an understanding or agreement solely among the employers that a strike against one of them would be treated as a strike against all, the members of the union, by permitting a strike against one employer, thereby “placed themselves outside the class of persons who are properly protected by the subjective volitional exception to section 56 which was stated and applied in the Bodinson case.” In my opinion this theory is unsound and does not warrant the conclusion that petitioners’ employees voluntarily left their work.
Before considering the questions of law raised herein, it *254should be noted that certain statements in the majority opinion may create a misapprehension of the true nature of the facts presented by the record. It is stated as a fact or inferred that the union was aware that “under such industry-wide, single contract negotiation, economic action by either side, whether strike or lockout, would be considered by each of the parties as action against the entire group struck or locked out.” There is nothing in the agreed statement of facts to the effect that the union might strike all remaining plants if the association first closed down one or more plants. Further, although the union knew that the employers had an understanding among themselves that “they would act as a unit in collective bargaining matters, and that a strike against any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike against all,” the understanding was entirely unilateral upon the part of the employers, and the union never indicated that it would accept or be bound by it.
It is also stated as a fact in the majority opinion that “In this case the union members knew from letters and statements as well as from prior strike action that any strike during negotiations would result in stoppage of all work.” [Italics added.] The italicized portion goes beyond the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, which shows only that the union knew that a strike against one “would be treated by [the employers] as a strike against all.” It does not follow that the union was aware that the understanding necessarily included an agreement to invoke a lockout or shutdown, since there is other conduct, short of a lockout, which might constitute treating the strike against one as a strike against all. For example, it might have been intended that the remaining employers would publish statements in the newspapers declaring that there was in effect a strike against all, or the employers might have contemplated financial aid to the one struck establishment or assistance in obtaining nonunion labor to reopen that plant or to meet any need for additional workers in their own plants. The understanding might also mean that the employers considered that a strike against all of them, although without a lockout or shutdown, would be a talking point or special matter for discussion during the collective bargaining negotiations.
Although it might be possible to infer that the notification to the union of the understanding among the employers included a threat to close the plants, it does not seem proper to draw such an inference under the circumstances of this *255ease. Petitioners in this mandamus proceeding of course have the burden of proving all facts upon which they rely, and in their pleadings they claimed that the union was aware of such an understanding as is assumed by the majority opinion. The petition alleges that the members of the union knew that “any action” against one employer “would be considered and treated by the said Association as strike action against all, and that all of the establishments would be closed if a strike was called against one or more, but not all,” and it is also alleged that the bakery employees acted with “full knowledge that the said action would bring about the closing of the plants of petitioners herein.” These allegations, however, were denied by the return to the writ. The dispute as to the facts was resolved, at the request of this court, by the agreed statement of facts filed herein, and in view of the pleadings it seems apparent that the language used in the agreed statement was a deliberate modification of or departure from the broader allegations of the petition.
Even if it be assumed that the union knew of an understanding among the employers that, upon a strike against one, the remaining employers would close their plants, this fact is not controlling. The understanding, as we have seen, was not in any way acceded to or binding upon the employees, but was entirely unilateral, among the employers 'only, and it seems erroneous to rely upon the fact that the union had been informed of the understanding and of the employers’ intended course of action. It would broaden the disqualification provisions of the statute to permit employers to escape liability for unemployment due to what would otherwise be classed as a lockout merely by adopting the device of entering into such a unilateral agreement in anticipation of a strike against one employer and then notifying their employees of the agreement. If petitioners would have been chargeable with a lockout had the agreement to close down their plants not been made until after the strike was called against Butter Cream Baking Company, they should likewise be held responsible here. We need not determine whether the understanding would be of importance if it had been made part of the collective bargaining contract, because the union never agreed to be bound by it and, therefore, should not be charged with having improperly disregarded it. Clearly the employers should not be able to defeat any right of the union to act as it did merely by giving notice of the agreement made among *256themselves that they would not recognize a strike as being limited to one employer.
Although the employees authorized the negotiating committee of the union to call a strike against “any one or more of the employers in the committee’s discretion,” the agreed statement of facts clearly shows that the “union declared a strike against . . . one of the members of the Association. ’ ’ The fact that the authorization first given was broader than the strike eventually declared is, of course, immaterial, since it did not, of itself, constitute action directed against the employers.
The only real issue in this case, therefore, is whether, regardless of knowledge of the unilateral understanding, petitioners’ employees were chargeable with having voluntarily left their work in petitioners’ establishments by virtue of the fact that, during the course of negotiations for changes in the industry-wide contract, they, as union members, authorized a strike which was called against only one of several employers as a means of publicizing the dispute. The majority of the court, however, do not make it clear whether they would reach the same result if the factor of knowledge of the understanding were not regarded as a ground for their holding. In my opinion the activity in which petitioners’ employees engaged did not constitute conduct which should be treated as such a direct cause of the shutdown that it was tantamount to a voluntary leaving of work. Although the strike at Butter Cream Baking Company may have induced petitioners to close their plants, there is no contention that operation of the plants actually became impossible because of the strike, and there is nothing to show that any property or business would have been injured by continuation of operations. The only reason given by petitioners for the shutdown is that it was put into effect as an economic weapon on the part of the employers to counteract the tendency that the strike against one bakery might have to break up the united stand adopted by the members of the association.
Even if we assume that petitioners are correct in attributing the strike against the Butter Cream Baking Company to a plan or scheme to force the employers to yield one at a time to the demands made in the labor dispute,* the strike did not *257compel petitioners to take such a drastic step as locking the doors, and, for the purposes of section 56, it should not excuse petitioners’ responsibility for their conduct. A lockout to protect the united stand of a group of employers is, in principle, no different from any other lockout deliberately used by an employer as a weapon to serve his purposes during the course of a labor dispute. This is not meant to suggest that the employers were not free to take such a step but merely that if they did so they, and not their employees, should be required to bear full responsibility for the stopping of operations, insofar as the Unemployment Insurance Act is concerned, and there is no sound basis for holding that the employees in effect voluntarily left their work.
The majority opinion apparently concedes that the members of the union could call a strike against only one employer without being subject to a charge of having voluntarily left work in petitioners’ establishments by merely going through the formality of withdrawing from negotiations with the association and, instead, bargaining with each employer separately. It is stated that “either the union or an individual employer, at any time, could have broken off joint negotiations and bargained with its employees on an individual basis. But that course was not taken.” If this is all that is required of a union as a prerequisite to conducting a strike against only one employer without disqualification under section 56 of those of its members who work for the remaining employers, the rule adopted by the majority is simply one of form and not of substance, because a union need merely announce at the conference table that it is henceforth negotiating with each employer as an individual rather than as a member of the association. Further, there is nothing to indicate that the employers in the present ease were in any manner injured or misled by the union’s failure to take such a step, and to hold that compensation was improperly awarded here solely because the union did not follow the suggested procedure seems clearly unjustified.
Moreover, the conclusion reached by the majority is contrary to Bunny's Waffle Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735 [151 P.2d 224]. In that case restaurant employees, during the course of a labor dispute, refused to bargain collectively with an employers’ association and insisted upon dealing individually with each employer. The employers made *258a 25 per cent cut in wages and a change in working shifts solely for the purpose of compelling the employees to bargain with the association, and the employees thereupon left their work. It was held that the cause of the employees’ leaving-work was not the trade dispute but the cut in wages and the change in shifts which were unrelated to, though motivated by, the demands made in the dispute. The court concluded, therefore, that the employees were not disqualified under section 56 since they had not left their work “because of a trade dispute.” The employers in that case had argued that the wage cut and the change in shifts were merely steps in the course of a labor dispute and were similar to the act of a union in striking against an individual member of an employers’ association. The court, however, using language directly in point here, distinguished the two types of acts (24 Cal.2d at page 741) : “A strike against a single member of an employers’ collective bargaining unit involves economic action against that employer only and subjects to disqualification under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other employers thereupon choose to close their establishments and lock out their employees, such employees cannot be charged with leaving their work because of a trade dispute. The threat of possible economic action involved in a strike upon one of a group of employers . . . bears no analogy to the employers’ act in the present case, for the latter culminated in actual economic action against the employees that caused them to leave their work.” It is apparent that the statement is not dictum, as claimed by petitioners, since it was the answer given by the court to the point raised.
The argument that the result reached by the majority is required, or even suggested, by the Bunny’s Waffle Shop case is without foundation, for at least two major reasons. The majority apparently assume that the Bunny’s case held that the employees there involved did not voluntarily leave work and that the wage cut and the change in work shifts were tantamount to a lockout and in effect compelled the employees to leave work. They say, speaking of the Bunny’s case, that “although the employees left work of their own choice, that choice was not freely made but was compelled by the economic weapon which the employers used.” [Italics added.] Although not made entirely clear, the majority opinion then seems to reason that under this rule, applied by analogy to the present case, the strike against Butter Cream Baking *259Company compelled the remaining employers to close down in the same manner that the wage cut in the Bunny’s case compelled the restaurant workers to leave. From this it is concluded that petitioners did not voluntarily lock out their employees but, rather, that the employees, in effect, voluntarily left their work.
First, the assumption that the Bunny’s case treated the employees as not having voluntarily left work is erroneous. The opinion in that case makes it perfectly clear that, although the commission had relied upon the theory that the wage cut amounted to a lockout, compelling the employees to leave, the court adopted an entirely different ground for concluding that the disqualification of section 56 was not applicable. (See 24 Cal.2d at pp. 739-742.) The court held that section 56 did not apply because there was no “direct causal connection” between the leaving of work and the trade dispute, within the meaning of that portion of the statute disqualifying employees only when they leave “because of a trade dispute.” As stated at page 741 of 24 Cal.2d, the employees in the Bunny’s case “left because of this economic weapon and not because of the trade dispute then in existence. The fact that the trade dispute was unquestionably the motivating cause of the employers’ acts does not establish any direct causal relation between the dispute and the employees’ leaving of work.” Thus, although it is possible that the same result could have been reached in the Bunny’s case upon the theory now attributed to it by the majority herein, the decision was specifically placed upon a different ground.
The opinion in the Bunny’s case indicates that the court really treated the employees as having voluntarily left work. At page 742-743 of 24 Cal.2d the court found it necessary to determine whether, “if they left their work voluntarily, they are subject to the temporary disqualification imposed by section 58(a) of the act upon one who ‘left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause . . ” and it was held that there was “good cause” within the meaning of section 58(a). [Italics added.] It is obvious that section 58(a) would not have required any discussion at all if, as the majority opinion now states, the ruling with respect to section 56 had been placed upon the theory that the leaving was not voluntary.
Second, even assuming that the Bunny’s case held that a 25 per cent wage cut is tantamount to a lockout and therefore compels the employees to leave, and, further, that the case, by analogy, would support a rule that employees will be *260chargeable with having voluntarily left work if they engage in conduct which, similarly, compels their employers to lock them out, it still does not follow that a strike against one employer is sufficient to compel lockouts by the remaining employers involved in the trade dispute. Although it is understandable that a 25 per cent wage cut, or, for example, a 50 or 75 per cent cut, could reduce the income of a worker to such an extent that he would actually be forced to seek a different job in order to survive, the situation of a worker whose wages have been so reduced is not at all comparable to that of the petitioners here. These employers were in no way compelled or forced to lock their doors to protect their plants or businesses, and the purpose of the lockout was simply to give them an added advantage in bargaining with the union. The strike was directed only against the Butter Cream Baking Company, and petitioners were not subjected to strike, or threat to strike, or any other activity which would have forced them to close down. The most that can be claimed is that petitioners were subjected to indirect pressure resulting from a strike against a different employer at a different establishment which might place them at some disadvantage in negotiations. Such activity upon the part of the union cannot reasonably be treated as sufficient to justify the drastic step of a lockout any more than could the conduct of the union in the Bunny’s case justify the action of the employers in imposing the 25 per cent wage cut, insofar as fixing responsibility for unemployment insurance is concerned.
Finally, the determination that the accounts of petitioners should not be chargeable with benefits paid to their employees amounts to disregarding the differences between the California statute and those adopted elsewhere. The California law is unique, since the labor dispute qualification found in section 56, based solely on a voluntary leaving of work, does not appear in the unemployment insurance acts of any other jurisdiction today.* Statutes in a large majority of the other *261states were modeled after the English unemployment insurance laws and the federal Social Security Board Draft Bill, and they provide that an employee is disqualified from receiving benefits if his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute and he either participates in or is interested in the dispute or belongs to a class of workers who are participating in the dispute.† Such statutes operate not only to disqualify employees who would be ineligible under the California law but, in addition, bar many individuals who do not voluntarily leave their work.‡
It is clear that at the time the California Unemployment Insurance Act was adopted, the Legislature was familiar with both the type of labor dispute disqualification based upon the voluntary act of the individual worker and the type of provision now enacted in most other states. When the Cali*262fornia unemployment insurance bill was first introduced in January, 1935, only the State of Wisconsin had passed an unemployment insurance act, and under that statute as it then existed an employee was ineligible for benefits “during any period for which he has left and is out of employment because of a trade dispute still in active progress in the establishment in which he was employed.” (Wis.Stat. [1931 Sp. Sess.] ch. 20, §108.04(5) c.; subsequently amended by Wis. Stat. [1935] ch. 192, §4, p. 292.) The legislators who proposed the California bill knew of the provisions of the original Wisconsin statute and also of the English legislation which disqualified an employee “who has lost employment by reason of a stoppage of work which was due to a trade dispute.” (1935 Assembly J., vol. 1, p. 101; Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo.V. ch. 30(8) ; see 14 & 15 Geo.V. ch. 30(4).) The language adopted by the Legislature in section 56 is almost identical with that of the former Wisconsin provision. We must assume, therefore, that the Legislature deliberately selected a disqualification provision based on voluntary action by the individual employee and rejected the broader type of disqualification found in the English legislation. The Conclusion reached by the majority of this court, however, fails to give full recognition to the fact that our statute is not like those in most of the states, and it improperly increases the scope of the disqualification provision beyond its plain and reasonable meaning.
The only case we have been able to find which dealt with a situation similar to that involved here held that the employees, comparable to petitioners’ employees, were in fact locked out and were therefore entitled to unemployment insurance. (Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., Minn.Supr.Ct., June 24, 1949, 18 U.S. Law Week 2011.) The statute there considered is different from ours in that it disqualifies an employee who has left or lost his employment because of a strike or other labor dispute and then provides that nothing in the provision “shall be deemed to deny benefits to any employee who becomes unemployed because of a lockout.” The court stated that under this statute the “fault which governs is the ultimate and final act causing the unemployment rather than any preliminary act which might furnish a motive for a lockout causing the unemployment.” It also said that by so construing the statute it gives “meaning to the present statutory provision excepting from disqualification unemployment due to a lockout, without doing violence to the legislative *263declaration of public policy limiting the right to benefits of unemployment due to no fault of the employee.”
It is not the province of this court to consider either the merits of the trade dispute underlying the stoppage of work or the social desirability of paying benefits to petitioners’ employees. (See W. R. Grace & Co. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 720, 731 [151 P.2d 215]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 325 [109 P.2d 935].) There is nothing in section 56 or any other portion of the Unemployment Insurance Act which would justify a denial of benefits here, and the possibility that the allowance of benefits in a case such as this may furnish some members of a union with funds which could be used to help finance a labor dispute is plainly a matter which only the Legislature may consider.
The alternative writ of mandate should be discharged and the application for a peremptory writ denied.
Traynor, J., concurred.

The agreed statement of facts does not contain the reason why the union called the strike against only one employer, but at the hearing before the referee a representative of the union testified that it was because “we felt that we couldn’t take all the bakeries on together.”

At least two states, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, once had statutes similar to section 56, but they were subsequently revised to adopt provisions similar to those prevailing in a majority of the states. (See O.C.H. Unemployment Insurance Service: Pa., par. 4102; Wis., par. 4034A.) Eight jurisdictions have expressly mentioned lockouts in the disqualification provisions of their unemployment insurance acts. Of these, three provide for automatic disqualification of locked out employees (see O.O.H. Unemployment Insurance Service: Ariz., par. 4034; Dist. of Gol., par. 4029A; N.Y., par. 4108), four provide that there is no disqualification (see O.O.H. Unemployment Insurance Service: Ky., par. 4036; Ohio, par. 4030; Minn., par. 4051; W. Va., par. 4099), and one *261provides that there is no disqualification if the lockout is unjustified. (See C.C.H. Unemployment Insurance Service: Miss., par. 4011.) Two other jurisdictions may provide for no disqualification in the event of a lockout. (See C.C.H. Unemployment Service: Colo., par. 4010; Utah, par. 4015.)

About 26 states have provisions of this type. (See C.C.H. Unemployment Insurance Service: Ark., par. 4042; Ga., par. 4010; Idaho, par. 4066; 111., par. 4031; Ind., par. 4071; Iowa, par. 4014; Kan., par. 4028; Maine, par. 4013; Md., par. 4016; Mass., par. 4056; Mich., par. 4041; Mo., par. 4048; Mont., par. 4009; Neb., par. 4052; N.H., par. 4028; N.J. par. 4012; N.M., par. 4009; N.C., par. 4072; N.D. par. 4102; Okla., par. 4009; Pa., par. 4102; S.D., par. 4061; Tex., par. 4018; Va., par. 4029; Wash., par. 4077; Wyo., par. 4027.)
Twelve states have statutes which contain somewhat different language but are generally the same in that disqualification is not dependent on whether the employee is voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. (See C.C.H. Unemployment Insurance Service: Ala., par. 4034; Conn., par. 4028; Del., par. 4027; Fla., par. 4032; La., par. 4008; Nev., par. 4028; Ore., par. 4025; E.I., par. 4044; S.C., par. 4010; Tenn., par. 4034; Vt., par. 4071; Wis., par. 4034A.)
For an analysis and classification of the various provisions see Fierst and Specter, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes [1940] 49 Yale L.J. 461; Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation [1945] 60 Yale L.J. 167; note [1949] 49 Columb.L.Bev. 550.

For example, participants in a labor dispute who were locked out by their employers have been held not entitled to benefits. (In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wn.2d 204 [130 P.2d 64, 66]; Adkins v. Indiana Employment Security Division, 117 Ind.App. 132 [70 N.E.2d 31, 34-35]; see Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210 [75 N.E.2d 294, 297].) The courts have also ruled that employees who were laid off because of a strike, but who did not join in the strike were disqualified, regardless of their conduct or sympathies, if some of the workers of their class or grade went on strike. (Auker v. Review Board, 117 Ind.App. 486 [70 N.E.2d 29, 71 N.E.2d 629]; Unemployment Compensation Com. v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277 [45 S.E.2d 385]; Members of Iron Workers Union v. Industrial Com., 104 Utah 242 [139 P.2d 208]; In re Deep River Timber Co.’s Employees, 8 Wn.2d 179 [111 P.2d 575].)