Court Opinion

ID: 9647559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:40:03.233573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:49.742626
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority expressly overrules Casey v. State, 633 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Casey, supra, however, should not be overruled; instead, it should be reaffirmed by this Court. To the action of the majority overruling Casey, supra, I respectfully dissent.
The court of appeals, relying upon this Court’s well written and well reasoned panel opinion by Judge Dally of Casey v. State, supra, reversed the appellants’ convictions after it found that the evidence was insufficient because there was no proof under the theory alleged in the indictment that appellants were involved in the initial unlawful appropriation of the property as required by this Court in Casey v. State, supra.
In Casey v. State, supra, this Court correctly held that when the Legislature enacted the theft statute, it provided that there were two separate and distinct ways that the offense of theft could be committed. One of the ways is to establish that the defendant appropriated property of another without the owner’s effective con*358sent. Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 31.-03(b)(1). Another way is to establish that the accused, acting with intent to deprive the owner of property, appropriated property, which is stolen property, knowing it was stolen by another. Section 31.03(b)(2). The panel ordered the defendant Casey’s conviction reversed because “the indictment allege[d] an offense under Sec. 31.-03(b)(1); however, the evidence establishes only a transfer of stolen property and the evidence fails to show that the appellant was involved in the initial appropriation from the owner.” (887).
This cause is almost a xerox copy of what the panel was confronted with in Casey v. State, supra. Casey controls the disposition that should be made of appellants’ contention that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Sec. 31.03(b)(1), as was alleged in their respective indictments. The majority, however, erroneously overrules Casey v. State, supra.
Almost one hundred years ago, Judge Davidson of this Court in Castleberry v. State, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 382, 33 S.W. 875 (Tex.Cr.App.1896), stated the following: “It would be a dangerous doctrine to hold every citizen guilty of receiving stolen property, and send him to the penitentiary, because he was found in possession thereof.” (875).
In Casey v. State, supra, Judge Dally stated the following: “More importantly to allow the prosecution of cases involving the transfer of stolen property under Sec. 31.-03(b)(1) creates the possibility that an innocent person could be convicted of theft. A good faith purchaser of property, not knowing that the property was stolen, would be knowingly and intentionally exercising control over property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property without the owner’s effective consent. To avoid such a possibility Sec. 31.03(b)(2) requires that the accused know that the property was stolen by another.” (887).
The warnings that both Judge Davidson and Judge Dally stated are as applicable today as when announced in 1896 and 1982.
I believe that under the majority opinion it will now be permissible for the State to prosecute and convict persons only because they are found in possession of stolen property. This holding flies in the face of what has always been axiomatic in American jurisprudence, namely, that “the mere naked possession of stolen goods, not aided by other proof, is no evidence of the defendant’s having received them, knowing them to be stolen.” Castleberry, supra, 33 S.W. at 875.
The State argues that “this Honorable Court’s rationale in Casey is fallacious.” (Page 5 of State’s Petition for Discretionary Review.) I find that it is the majority opinion, and not this Court’s rationale in Casey, supra, that is fallacious.
What appears to cause the majority to use the rationale it did in this cause is that it believes that “One of the single biggest problems by prosecutors under old theft statutes was in proving ‘receiving and concealing’ cases because the proof turned on whether the accused had knowledge of a circumstance surrounding his ‘receipt’ of the property — that being that the property was stolen. Since this scienter is one not inferable from the act of ‘receipt’ of the property alone, there was often no way to convict ‘fences’ or other persons dealing in stolen goods, even if the proof clearly established a knowing nonconsensual possession of the property to the exclusion of the true owner with the intent to deprive the owner of the property.” Contrary to what the majority might believe, but because of the number of receiving and concealing cases that this Court has in the past affirmed, see the cases collated under Texas Digest Criminal Law Key 511(4), I do not believe that the State’s burden was all that great.
I also find it rather interesting that the majority does not cite a single decision from any other jurisdiction to support its rationale and analysis for the proposition that when the Legislature of this State enacted the theft statute it did not intend to do just exactly what Judge Dally stated *359in Casey v. State, supra. Casey, supra, should be reaffirmed, not overruled.
There is yet another reason why the appellants’ convictions should be reversed. All should agree that the trial court committed reversible error in accepting the stipulations of evidence without full compliance with Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. This, however, was only trial error.
In Foster v. State, 635 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), this Court held that in making the determination whether the evidence was sufficient, if there was trial error in the improper admission of evidence, the evidence will be reviewed on the assumption that all admitted evidence was properly admitted. As applied in this case, the substance of the appellants’ stipulations must be reviewed despite the procedural error in admitting the stipulations.
Therefore, I must also dissent to the majority’s failure to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence. See Howeth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.