Court Opinion

ID: 9837009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:59.219124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.811233
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge,
with whom COX, Chief Judge, joins (dissenting):
I
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution to remove members of the same cognizable *66minority racial group as the defendant from a jury violated the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. In United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 MJ 380, 389-90 (1988), we applied Batson to the exercise of peremptory challenges in courts-martial even if the accused had been tried prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson.
The majority suggests that Batson does not apply to this ease or that it does not apply with full force, because appellant was tried before we published our decisions in Santiago-Davila and United States v. Moore, 28 MJ 366 (1989), in which we applied Batson to trials by court-martial. The majority’s position is contrary to precedent in our Court and in the Supreme Court.
In Santiago-Davila, where we first adopted the Batson framework for the military, the accused was tried on July 10, 1985 — 9 months before the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson. The military judge in that case did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision when he ruled on Santiago-Davila’s objection to the Government’s peremptory challenge; in fact, the military judge in that case was faced with directly contradictory language in , the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial (RCM 912(g)(1), Discussion), which suggested that the reasons for a peremptory challenge need not be stated. 26 MJ at 386. Furthermore, the defense in Santiago-Davila did not rely on federal law but relied solely on decisions of the California Supreme Court and other state and federal courts in its argument at trial. Id. at 385.
Nonetheless, even in those circumstances, we held that Batson “applied ... retroactively to trials that preceded its rendition,” id. at 390, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 316, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (applying Batson retroactively to cases not final at the issuance of Batson). We ultimately granted Santiago-Davila a hearing on his Batson claim, id. at 392. See also Moore, 28 MJ at 367 n. 2, 368 (remanding for factfinding hearing where accused was tried after Batson but before Santiago-Davila).
The present case does not involve a preBatson trial. Appellant was tried in late-1987 and early-1988 — over one year after Batson was decided. The defense expressly cited Batson at trial as the basis of its objection. The military judge had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson, yet declined to apply the Supreme Court’s precedent. In view of the relief granted in Santiago-Davila — where the military judge did not even have the opportunity to consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson — it is inappropriate to suggest that appellant should be denied the constitutional protections of Batson because of concerns about retroactivity.
II
In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-part procedure for addressing objections to the exercise of peremptory challenges. First, the trial judge must determine whether the- defense has established “a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.” 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Second, if “the requisite showing” is made, “the burden shifts to the” prosecution to “articulate a neutral explanation [for the challenge] related to the particular ease to be tried.” Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial judge “will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712-(emphasis added); see United States v. Greene, 36 MJ 274, 278 n. 2 (CMA 1993). In the case before us, the military judge committed prejudicial error by failing to perform his duty under Batson.
III
The peremptory challenge at issue in this case was exercised by the Government to remove an African-American officer, Major Quander, from appellant’s court-martial panel. Appellant also is an African-American. At the conclusion of challenges for cause, none of which were directed at Major Quander, the prosecution sought to challenge Major Quander peremptorily. Defense counsel, relying on the fact that appellant and Major Quander were of the same racial minority, *67objected to the challenge and asked the military judge to require trial counsel to demonstrate that the challenge was being exercised for a reason other than Major Quander’s race.1
The military judge refused to require the prosecution to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge, asserting that no explanation was necessary. Subsequently, he asked trial counsel to state on the record that the challenge was not based on appellant’s race, and trial counsel did so. When trial counsel offered to “give some sort of articulation as to the reason we feel that we should perempt [sic] him based on — ,” the military judge cut him off in mid-sentence. The military judge refused to allow any further explanation by trial counsel and granted the peremptory challenge against Major Quander. The military judge did not enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law on the merits of the defense objection to the prosecution’s exercise of the peremptory challenge.
After the peremptory challenge was allowed, the military judge recessed the trial for the weekend. When the court-martial reconvened following the weekend recess, trial counsel filed appellate exhibit LVIII, a memorandum for the record, in which the prosecution team stated that “[t]he peremptory challenge against Major Quander was exercised because we believed his responses concerning the death penalty were equivocal.”2

W

In the present case, the military judge erred by granting the peremptory challenge without requiring the Government to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge of Major Quander. This error was compounded by the military judge’s reliance on the mere denial by trial counsel of discriminatory intent, his failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and his failure to rule on the credibility of the post-hoc explanation filed by trial counsel as an appellate exhibit.
When the defense objected at trial to the peremptory challenge of Major Quander, the Government responded by stating on the record that the challenge was not based on racial grounds. The Supreme Court has explained, however, that a mere denial of discriminatory intent or an affirmance of good faith does not comply with Batson’s second step. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). The Government is obligated to provide a race-neutral explanation for its challenge. In the military justice system, “all the reasons proffered by trial counsel [must] be untainted by any inherently discriminatory motives.” Greene, 36 MJ at 280.
*68In this case, the military judge made clear that he was not going to enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law on the issue of discrimination. Trial counsel subsequently filed as an appellate exhibit an unsworn statement asserting a race-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge against Major Quander. The mere filing of an appellate exhibit, after the military judge has refused to require compliance with Batson, does not remedy the error by the military judge.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the mere articulation of a race-neutral explanation does not satisfy Batson: “Once the prosecutor offers a race-neutral basis for his exercise of peremptory challenges, ‘[t]he trial court then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.’ ” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). The Supreme Court in Hernandez emphasized the role of the trial judge in evaluating the sincerity of the Government’s explanation for a peremptory challenge, noting:
In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”
Id. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (emphasis added); see also Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasizing that it is the responsibility of the trial judge, at the third step of the Batson process, to assess “the persuasiveness” of the proffered “justification”). In Batson and its progeny, the Supreme Court has placed on the trial judge the responsibility to evaluate the explanation for a peremptory challenge, and the cases all recognize the critical importance of the judge in uncovering pretextual explanations.
Our Court has made clear that the military judge bears “the ultimate responsibility ... to determine the existence of purposeful discrimination on the part of trial counsel.” Greene, 36 MJ at 281 (citing plurality and O’Connor opinions in Hernandez). In Greene, we described the three steps that the military judge must take to fulfill this responsibility, as follows: The military judge must, first, “review the record”; second, “weigh trial counsel’s credibility”; and third, make “a factual determination regarding the presence or absence of purposeful discrimination in the panel member’s rejection.” 36 MJ at 281. We further emphasized the critical importance of the military judge’s determination in the Batson equation by noting:
[E]ven if a race-neutral explanation has been proffered by trial counsel for the peremptory challenge, it does not end the military judge’s duties under Batson. The military judge must still determine whether “the asserted justification is merely a pretext for intentional race-based discrimination. See Batson [476 U.S.] at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 1721.”
36 MJ at 281 (citation omitted; emphasis added) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment)).
In this case, the military judge failed completely to comply with the critical third step of Batson — evaluation of the credibility of the Government’s proffered explanation. Batson is not satisfied merely by trial counsel’s articulation of a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge; rather, Batson places on the military judge an affirmative duty to assess whether the Government’s explanation is credible or merely a pretext.
In Moore, we noted that we would “not rule out” the possibility that, in a future case, “a clearly articulated affidavit” might provide post-trial proof of a non-discriminatory intent. 28 MJ at 368 n. 7. Although there may be eases in which the record of trial provides such clear and unambiguous support for trial counsel’s post-hoc rationale that it is possible to find the military judge’s error to be harmless, this is not such a case. See generally Bennett v. Collins, 852 F.Supp. *69570, 584-85 (E.D.Tex.1994) (prosecution’s rationale that juror “had not given much thought to the death penalty” treated as “pretextual” by federal habeas judge in ruling prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenge against African-American venirepersons unconstitutional).
The credibility of the prosecution’s rationale was clearly at issue in this case. The record of trial reflects thoughtful responses by Major Quander to questions about the death penalty. He made clear that he could do his duty, follow the law as instructed by the military judge, and vote for the death penalty. He stated: “I can definitely consider it. I would honestly have to say I would have some problems saying yes, but I could do it.” Such a response is not particularly remarkable from a member facing the awesome responsibility of adjudging the ultimate penalty.
In light of this record, it was critical that the military judge make a determination as to whether trial counsel’s explanation was credible or pretextual. If the military judge had done so, we would sustain his “findings on this factual question unless clearly erroneous.” Greene, 36 MJ at 281 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859). In the absence of such a determination, however, we have no indication that the military judge based his allowance of the challenge on a permissible criteria, and there is no trial-level ruling for us to review.
Although it is possible that the military judge allowed the challenge in compliance with Batson, ie., after determining that the Government’s explanation was not pretextual, there are three other equally likely grounds for his decision, all of which would violate Batson: (1) the military judge may have complied with the then-existing provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial, under which no explanation was required for the exercise of a peremptory challenge3; (2) the military judge may have found that the Government’s rationale was pretextual but believed that a pretextual reason was permissible4; or (3) the military judge may not have considered at all the questions of discrimination and pretext and simply allowed the peremptory challenge.
Despite the absence of a definitive ruling by the military judge, the majority claims that the military judge “did more than require trial counsel to simply state whether his ‘challenge was a result of his bias or prejudice’ ” (51 MJ at 35) and that the judge made an “implied ruling” on the question of pretext (51 MJ at 35). These assertions are not supported by the record.
The exchange between defense counsel, trial counsel, and the military judge demonstrates that the judge determined that he was not required to address the Batson issue. When trial counsel offered to “give some sort of articulation as to the reason” for the challenge, the military judge simply stated that his blanket denial of racial bias would suffice. When trial counsel proffered his explanation for the challenge at the next session of court, the military judge did not provide any indication that he considered it, but merely allowed trial counsel to submit the statement as an appellate exhibit. There is absolutely no indication that the military judge attached any evidentiary value to trial counsel’s statement, and the statement did not constitute in any way a ruling on the part of the military judge. In such circumstances, the military judge’s “judicial inaction ... constituted clear legal error.” Greene, 36 MJ at 282.
In this regard, this case is controlled by Santiago-Davila, a case which we remanded because the military judge neither required an explanation from the Government nor ruled on the issue of discrimination, 26 MJ at 386; and by Moore, where we remanded for a DuBay hearing on the Batson issue and instructed the judge to “determine whether trial counsel has articulated a neutral explanation relative to this particular case.” 28 MJ at 369. Accord United States v. Ruiz, 49 *70MJ 340 (1998); see also Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (responsibility of trial judge to uncover justifications that are merely “pretexts for purposeful discrimination”); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanding where district court “failed to rule squarely” on whether a peremptory strike was motivated by “race-neutral” purposes; concluded that “on this record, we cannot determine whether the district court applied the proper legal analysis” in overruling the defense’s objection to the peremptory challenge); cf. United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir.1991) (applying clearly-erroneous standard and upholding district court finding that “race-neutral” reasons were not pretextual).
V
To support the evidentiary value that it attaches to the explanation submitted by trial counsel, the majority cites Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 n. 2 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153, 118 S.Ct. 1178, 140 L.Ed.2d 186 (1998); Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 905, 116 S.Ct. 271, 133 L.Ed.2d 192 (1995); and Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1411 n. 11 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1073, 116 S.Ct. 776, 133 L.Ed.2d 728 (1996). None of these cases addresses the proper evidentiary value to be accorded to a post-hoc explanation for a peremptory challenge or support the proposition that it is appropriate to sustain a trial judge on the basis of an “implied ruling.” On the contrary, these cases emphasize the importance of a factual ruling by the trial judge.
Moreover, in each ease, the court of appeals found the Batson defect sufficiently serious to warrant either a grant of relief or a remand for further proceedings. In Cochran, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief on a Batson claim; in Simmons, the Third Circuit ordered a new trial because the defendant had established a prima facie ease of discrimination under the first prong of Bat-son, and the reconstructed record was inadequate to review the Batson issue; and in Turner, the Ninth Circuit reversed as “clearly erroneous” the district court’s finding that the peremptory challenge was not racially based.
In support of its assertion that the entirety of the military judge’s conduct constitutes an “implied ruling on his part that trial counsel’s explanation was genuine and that appellant’s Batson claim was without merit,” 51 MJ at 35, the majority cites Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); Clemons, 941 F.2d at 323-24; United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105, 109 S.Ct. 3154, 104 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1989); and United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir.1993).
Purkett bears no relation to the majority’s concept that a trial judge can make an “implied ruling” on the question of pretext in a Batson case. On the contrary, the Supreme Court’s decision in Purkett stressed the importance of a ruling by the trial judge in the Batson procedure. 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769; see also Part IV, supra.
In Clemons, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a Batson challenge on the ground that a brief sidebar conference provided a sufficient opportunity for the defense to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation of a peremptory challenge. 941 F.2d at 324. “The district judge ... made a finding that the race-neutral reasons stated by [the] prosecutors for striking [two black jurors] were sufficient and non-pretextual,” id. at 322; the Fifth Circuit reviewed the record and concluded that this finding was “not clearly erroneous,” id. at 325.
In contrast to this case, where the military judge made no factual ruling, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the district court’s express ruling on the question of pretext. Clemons, as the majority notes, reiterates Batson’s express delegation of procedural implementation to the trial courts, but the case does not permit an appellate court to rely on an “implied ruling” by the trial judge. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the need for the district court to “evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation and determine whether the explanations are pretextual,” id. at 323, “[b]ecause the issues pre*71sented in a Batson challenge turn on evaluations of credibility,” id. at 325.
Similarly, Tucker does not address the validity of an “implied ruling” on a Batson challenge. On the contrary, the district court in Tucker made an express ruling when, “[a]fter considering the government’s explanation, the court ‘concluded and was satisfied that racial bias was not responsible for the challenge of the black venirepersons.’ ” 836 F.2d at 337. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Batson challenges on the grounds that the particular procedure employed by the District Court (an ex parte proceeding, id. at 338) was justified under the circumstances. Id. at 340. Although Tucker supports the well-established proposition discussed by the majority — that a district court has discretion to adopt procedures for litigating Batson claims — Tucker does not permit a trial judge to eschew any factfinding and decision-making procedures but still be affirmed on the basis of “implied rulings.”
Finally, in Arce, the Fifth Circuit found waiver where the defense failed to dispute one of the reasons proffered by the Government for a peremptory challenge during a Batson proceeding. 997 F.2d at 1126-27. Arce, however, has no bearing on the present case. In Arce, the prosecutor asserted his reasons for a peremptory challenge during a Batson proceeding, and the defense did not object. Here, however, the military judge did not conduct a Batson proceeding; he made clear that he would not apply Batson. Although the Government filed an appellate exhibit that asserted reasons for its challenge, the matter was never litigated before, or ruled on by, the military judge.
VI
The prosecution’s unsworn after-the-fact memorandum in this case is no substitute for the findings and conclusions that should have been made by the military judge who had presided during the voir dire of Major Quander, observed the demeanor of trial counsel and Major Quander, and heard the tone of trial counsel’s questions and Major Quander’s responses. The end result in this case is that trial counsel was, in effect, both the advocate for striking Major Quander and the judge of the credibility of his own explanation. That is unacceptable under Batson, Greene, and their progeny.
The potential for error was called to the attention of the military judge, and he had ample opportunity to make the determination required by Batson. The military judge, however, expressly declined on the record to apply Supreme Court precedent. That clear error, which prejudiced the constitutional rights of the accused, requires that we follow our precedent in Santiago-Davila and return the case
to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for referral to an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction for the purpose of ordering a limited hearing on the reasons for the peremptory challenge by the prosecution. The findings and conclusions of the military judge at this hearing, or notice of the convening authority’s determination that such a hearing is impracticable, should be provided by appellee directly to this Court.
26 MJ at 393 (citing United States v. DuBay, 17 USCMA 147, 37 CMR 411 (1967)).5 See United States v. Ruiz, supra.
APPENDIX
The memorandum referred to at n. 2, supra, is an undated document, signed by trial counsel and assistant trial counsel, entitled “MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. For Appellate Record, U.S. v. Gray.” The document contains the following text:
*721. On Friday 18 March 1988, the government exercised its one peremptory challenge against Major Francis Quander. Major Quander is a black soldier and the exercise of this challenge left the panel with only one black member. We carefully considered all of the notes we had taken along with our independent recollections of the voir dire process. We both agreed that the peremptory challenge should be exercised against Major Quander.
2. The peremptory challenge against Major Quander was exercised because we believed his responses concerning the death penalty were equivocal. He indicated that he had never really thought about the death penalty and that he was neither for it or against it. When asked if he could vote for the death penalty he indicated that he “thought” he could. He also stated he had “problems” with the death penalty and the evidence would have to be “devastating” before he could vote for it. He said he could vote for the death penalty but could not say if he would vote to impose the death penalty.
3. Our impression of Major Quander was that he was indecisive and equivocal on the death penalty issue and that it was in the government’s interest to challenge him. We did not have a sufficient basis to challenge him for cause so the peremptory challenge was exercised on him. Major Quander’s race was of no consequence in the decision making process except that we considered not making the challenge to avoid any possibility of an appearance of exclusion on a racial basis. Our peremption [sic] of Major Quander was based on our professional judgement [sic] that it was in the prosecution’s best interest to remove him.

. Because appellant and Major Quander were both African-American, once appellant objected to the Government’s peremptory challenge of Major Quander, he met his burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson as applied in the military justice system. See Greene, 36 MJ at 278; Moore, 28 MJ at 368 (per se showing of prima facie case of discrimination when African-American accused objects to prosecution challenge of African-American panel member). The majority notes, 51 MJ at 34, that we mandated application of the per se rule for cases arising after Moore. That approach was designed to ensure that the per se rule would not be applied to reverse a case tried before Moore in which the military judge — conscientiously applying the first prong of Batson — required more of a showing than the fact that the defendant and the challenged member both were African-American. Here, however, the prosecution did not claim that the defense had failed to meet the first prong of Batson, nor was that the basis of the military judge’s ultimate ruling on the challenge. In fact, the military judge simply declined to address the first prong of Batson. Had he done so, and had he required appellant to demonstrate more than a per se showing, we would have before us appellant’s evidence as well as the findings and conclusions of the military judge as the basis for determining whether to sustain the military judge's ruling. In the absence of a record that demonstrates that the military judge followed the literal requirements of Batson, appellant is entitled to rely on his per se showing to meet the first prong of Batson. Cf., e.g., United States v. Cooper, 28 MJ 810, 814 (ACMR 1989), aff'd 30 MJ 201 (CMA 1990); see United States v. Ruiz, 49 MJ 340 (1998).

. The text of the memorandum is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion.

. See Santiago-Davila, 26 MJ at 386.

. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Greene, 36 MJ at 282 (remanding where the military judge ruled only "on the race-neutrality” of the proffered reason and not on trial counsel’s "true motive”).

. This is the type of procedure used by the federal courts as an appropriate remedy for a trial court's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Batson. See, e.g., Bryant v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 1076, 1076-77 (2d Cir.1997) (decision after reconstruction hearing held by state trial court), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 2066, 141 L.Ed.2d 143 (1998); Turner, 121 F.3d at 1250 (decision after magistrate judge held evidentiary hearing on Batson claim); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.1988) (decision after "adversary hearing" before district court on Batson issue), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 996, 109 S.Ct. 566, 102 L.Ed.2d 591 (1988).