Court Opinion

ID: 9891667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 14:17:58.38986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:02.793298
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Reynolds v. Kamm, 2023-Ohio-3797.]

                             COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

TAYLIN D. REYNOLDS,                             :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            :
                                                             No. 112500
                v.                              :

CARL J. KAMM, III, ET AL.,                      :

                Defendants-Appellees.           :

                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 19, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-22-972386

                                          Appearances:

                Taylin D. Reynolds, pro se.

                Charles Bennett, Erie County Assistant Prosecutor, for
                appellees.

LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

                  Taylin D. Reynolds (“Reynolds”), acting pro se, appeals from the trial

court’s journal entry granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. After reviewing the facts of the case and

pertinent law, we affirm the lower court’s judgment.
              This case stems from a speeding ticket Reynolds received in

October 2022 in Erie County. On November 1, 2022, Reynolds sent correspondence

to Erie County Municipal Court Judge Carl J. Kamm, III, and Jennifer L. Ferbeck,

who is the Erie County Municipal Court Clerk (collectively, the “Defendants”). This

correspondence consisted of two documents: (1) an “Appearance and Perfomance

[sic] Agreement” (the “APA”); and (2) a “Notice of No Legality and Offer to Contract”

(the “Notice”).

              On November 14, 2022, Reynold appeared in Erie County Municipal

Court and pled no contest to the speeding ticket. The court found her guilty and

sentenced her to a fine of $70 and court costs of $100. On November 19, 2022,

Reynolds sent additional correspondence to the Defendants alleging that they

breached the APA and demanding payment of $96,500. The Defendants did not

respond to any of Reynolds’s correspondence.

I.   Reynolds’s Complaint and the Procedural History of the Case

              Reynolds filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas

Court against Defendants on December 12, 2022, alleging the following:

      On or about November 5, 2022, the Defendants and I entered contract
      between each * * *.

      The Defendants breached that contract * * *.

      I now have damage worth no less than $112,350 United States dollars
      (on the date of this complaint) because of the Defendants’ breach of
      that contract.
               Reynolds attached the APA and the Notice, among other documents

not relevant to this appeal, to her complaint.           The APA purports to be an

“agreement” between Defendants, referred to as “Promoters,” and Reynolds,

referred to as the “Performer.” According to the APA, “[t]he Promoters wish to

engage the services of the Performer for both an Appearance and a live Performance

on November 14, 2022 at 9:00 a.m. in Erie County Municipal Court * * * for the case

that stems from” Reynolds’s speeding ticket.

               Under the heading “Payment,” the APA provides, the “Promoters

shall pay the Performer $96,550 no later than 48 hours after the Performer’s (i)

Appearance for the Case and (ii) Performance for the Case.”                  The term

“Performance” is defined to mean “to perform one or more of the following on

November 14, 2022: the acceptance of the title defendant; the entry of a plea; the

preparation of a defense; [and] the execution of every order; * * *.” (Emphasis sic.)

The APA is signed by Reynolds only.

               In the Notice, Reynolds explains that she is giving “notice that the

Ticket issued to me on October 28, 2022 was issued in error because of the following

fact: (1) I was in the capacity of the people at the time” the speeding ticket was issued

“and not in the capacity of driver under license from State of Ohio and (2) no law

compels the people to be in the capacity of driver under license from State of Ohio

at all times * * *.” (Emphasis sic.)

               The   Notice    further states     that   Reynolds    would    “construe

[Defendants’] failure to satisfy one of the following acts to be both [their] tacit
agreement to the Fact [that Reynolds was “the people” and was not a “driver”] and

[their] tacit acceptance of the [APA]: (1) deliver to me tangible proof that disproves

the Fact within 72 hours after [their] receipt of this notice or (2) deliver to me notice

of dismissal with prejudice for both the Case and the Ticket within 72 hours after

[their] receipt of this notice * * *.”

                Defendants moved to dismiss Reynolds’s complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The court

granted that motion on February 16, 2023, finding that the “factual allegations of

the complaint * * * do not establish that a contract existed between Reynolds and

the Defendants.”

                It is from this order that Reynolds appeals raising three assignments

of error for our review:

       I.    Without necessity and without propriety, the Lower Court’s
       application of Rule 12(B)(6) of the Civil Rules to dismiss the Case with
       prejudice altogether denies me both rights and powers that the
       Constitutions aim to secure and to protect — both at the Defendants’
       unjust gain and at my loss.

       II.   The Lower Court’s application of Rule 12(B)(6) of the Civil Rules
       to dismiss the Case with prejudice negates one or more substantive
       provisions of the Civil Rules — both at the Defendants’ unjust gain and
       at my loss.

       III. Without necessity and without propriety, the Lower Court’s
       application of Rule 12(B)(6) of the Civil Rules to dismiss the Case with
       prejudice negates substantive law — especially the Contract and the
       United States Constitution — both at the Defendants’ unjust gain and
       at my loss.

(Emphasis sic.)
               All three assignments of error allege that the trial court erred by

granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted — first, that the dismissal violates the “Constitutions”; second,

that the dismissal violates the “Civil Rules”; and third, that the dismissal violates the

APA and the United States Constitution. Because the assignments of error are

interrelated, we review them together.

II. Law

      A. Pro Se Litigants

               The Ohio Supreme Court has “repeatedly declared that ‘pro se

litigants * * * must follow the same procedures as litigants represented by counsel.’

State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 N.E.2d 376,

¶ 5.” State ex rel. Neil v. French, 153 Ohio St.3d 271, 2018-Ohio-2692, 104 N.E.3d

764, ¶ 10. Furthermore, Ohio courts have consistently held that pro se litigants “are

presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedure and * * * they are held

to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.” Sabouri v. Ohio

Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654, 763 N.E.2d 1238 (10th

Dist.2001).

      B. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss — Failure to State a Claim
         Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

               “Our standard of review on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is de

novo. * * * A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. * * * Under a de

novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” NorthPoint

Props. v. Petticord, 179 Ohio App.3d 342, 2008-Ohio-5996, 901 N.E.2d 869, ¶ 11

(8th Dist.). However, this court has held that, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), a trial

court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions in his or her complaint

as true. Michelson v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 2018-Ohio-1303, 99 N.E.3d

475, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

               “For a trial court to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, it must appear ‘beyond doubt from the

complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief.’”

Michelson at ¶ 5, quoting Grey v. Walgreen Co., 197 Ohio App.3d 418, 2011-Ohio-

6167, 967 N.E.2d 1249, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.).

               We note that items properly incorporated into the complaint may be

considered in conducting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) analysis. Under Civ.R. 10(C), a “written

instrument attached to a pleading becomes part of the pleading.” However, “not

every document attached to a pleading constitutes a Civ.R. 10(C) written

instrument.” State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 154 Ohio St.3d 60, 2018-Ohio-3361,

110 N.E.3d 1275, ¶ 17. Rather, a written instrument “has primarily been interpreted

to include documents that evidence the parties’ rights and obligations, such as
negotiable instruments, ‘insurance policies, leases, deeds, promissory notes, and

contracts.’” Id., quoting Inskeep v. Burton, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2007 CA 11,

2008-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17.

      C. Elements of an Enforceable Contract; Breach of Contract

               “‘A contract is generally defined as a promise, or a set of promises,

actionable upon breach.       Essential elements of a contract include an offer,

acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit

and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of

consideration.’” Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d

58, ¶ 16, quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 409, 414

(N.D.Ohio 1976). “A meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of the contract

is a requirement to enforcing the contract.” Kostelnik at ¶ 16.

               “To establish the essential elements of a breach of contract claim, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a contract existed; (2) the plaintiff fulfilled his

[or her] obligations; (3) the defendant breached his [or her] obligations; and (4)

damages resulted from this breach.” Re/Max Crossroads Props. v. Roberts, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99537, 2013-Ohio-5575, ¶ 11.

III. Analysis

               In her complaint, Reynolds alleges the following: she and the

Defendants entered into a contract on November 5, 2022; the Defendants breached

this contract; and damages resulted “worth no less than $112,350.” We note that the

contract Reynolds alleged she entered into with the Defendants would be
unenforceable if it existed. See, e.g., Rainy Day Rentals v. Next Gen. Props., 7th

Dist. Mahoning No. 21 MA 0096, 2022-Ohio-3530, ¶ 26 (“Contracts found void as

in violation of law and contrary to public policy are void because the law disapproves

of the purpose of the contract, consideration contemplated, or the terms of the

agreement * * *.”); Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(B) (“A judge shall not, in connection with

cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges,

promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of

the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”).         (Emphasis sic.)       See also

Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(C) (similarly restricting court officials).

               Upon review, we find that the statements in Reynolds’s complaint are

all conclusory statements of law. In Michelson, this court affirmed the trial court’s

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against a car manufacturer for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where the plaintiff’s

allegations amounted to legal conclusions, not factual assertions. Michelson, 2018-

Ohio-1303, 99 N.E.3d 475, at ¶ 6. “No matter the labels Michelson applies nor the

conclusions she reaches, the essence of her claims is that a car manufacturer

knowingly produced defectives vehicles, one of which she bought secondhand.” Id.

at ¶ 34.   This court found that Michelson’s complaint failed in part because

“Michelson’s bare legal conclusion * * * is not supported by any facts in the

complaint.” Id. at ¶ 24.
               Similar to Michelson, Reynolds failed to plead facts to support her

legal conclusions. Simply asserting that a contract existed is a legal conclusion that

we need not accept as true.

               Our conclusion does not change when we consider the attachments

to the written complaint purporting to establish the existence of a contract.

Considering the APA, the Notice, and Reynolds’s allegations in a light most favorable

to Reynolds, as we must when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

motion to dismiss, we find that Reynolds failed to demonstrate the first prong of her

breach of contract claim, namely that a contract existed. See Baillis v. Ross, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 97259, 2012-Ohio-705, ¶ 14 (“Because there is no * * * agreement,

and thus, no binding contract, plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under a breach of

contract theory of recovery.”); Knoop v. Orthopaedic Consultants of Cincinnati,

Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2007-10-101, 2008-Ohio-3892 (granting

defendant’s motion to dismiss after analyzing attachments to complaint and

concluding that no enforceable contract was alleged).

               The APA is signed only by Reynolds, and there is no indication on the

face of the document that Defendants agreed to its terms. While the APA and Notice

may be considered an offer, there is no allegation that the Defendants expressly

agreed to the essential terms of Reynolds’s alleged offer, and there is no other

“manifestation of mutual assent.” See Obkukhoff v. Case W. Res. Univ., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 93381, 2010-Ohio-1435, ¶ 24 (finding no contract because there was

no meeting of the minds). Reynolds’s statements in the Notice that the Defendants’
failure to either (1) “disprove” that the traffic citation was issued to her in error, or

(2) dismiss the traffic case against her will result in the Defendants’ “tacit

acceptance” of the terms of the APA have no legal effect. Other than in narrow

circumstances not at issue here, “an offeror cannot cause the silence of the offeree

to constitute an acceptance” of a contract. Richard A. Berjian, D.O., Inc. v. Ohio Bell

Tel. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 147, 152, 375 N.E.2d 410 (1978) (noting the following

exception: “where the relation between the parties justifies the offeror’s expectation

of a reply, such silence may constitute an acceptance on the part of the offeree”).

               In the case at hand, Reynolds has alleged no facts regarding a prior

relationship between the parties. Indeed, while Reynolds alleged she sent the Notice

and APA to the Erie County Municipal Court, she has not alleged that the

Defendants actually received the documents, much less that they agreed to the terms

of the APA.

               The Notice and APA are nothing more than correspondence Reynolds

sent to the Defendants. Reynolds and the Defendants came to no agreement, no

contract was formed, and thus, there was nothing to breach.              Based on the

complaint, including the attachments, Reynolds can prove no set of facts entitling

her to relief, and the court did not err by granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

               Accordingly, Reynolds’s three assignments of error, which all

challenge the trial court’s dismissal of her case, are overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR