Court Opinion

ID: 9780829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:58:24.752706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:14.551958
License: Public Domain

BLACKWELL, Judge,
concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully in the opinion of the Court, but I write separately to express my doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence on which the court below based its finding of contempt.4 We have held before that a *803witness can be convicted of criminal contempt for his failure to appear as directed by a subpoena only upon proof that the subpoena was, in fact, served upon the witness and that it was served by means authorized by OCGA § 24-10-23 or other law. In Edenfield v. State, 147 Ga. App. 502 (249 SE2d 316) (1978), a prosecuting attorney attempted to serve a state trooper with a subpoena by delivering it to the State Patrol post to which the trooper was assigned, where a clerk put it in a mailbox for the trooper. The trooper eventually received the subpoena, but he failed to appear as directed by the subpoena, and he was convicted of contempt for his failure to appear. We reversed that conviction because the trooper was not served personally or by certified mail, the means of service authorized by OCGA § 24-10-23. See 147 Ga. App. at 503 (“The lack of personal service invalidated the legal force and effect of the subpoena; therefore, the subpoena could not serve as the basis for a conviction as a defaulting witness.”). We did so notwithstanding that the prosecuting attorney had served the subpoena upon the trooper “in accordance with established practice” and, according to the State, by “the only practicable method” for service upon officers of the State Patrol, a method that, again, actually caused the subpoena to ultimately be delivered into the hands of the trooper. See id. at 502.
Although the evidence in this case shows that Officer Apoian knew that he was expected in court and, in fact, had given assurances that he would appear upon request, there appears to be no evidence that the subpoena requiring his appearance actually was laid in his hands,5 much less that it was laid in his hands by means authorized for the service of a subpoena. The evidence instead shows merely that the prosecuting attorneys delivered the subpoena to a representative of the Atlanta Police Department, who apparently then used some established protocol to notify Officer Apoian that his appearance in court was required. Whether that protocol involved delivery of the subpoena itself to Officer Apoian, and if so, whether it involved delivery by means authorized for the service of a subpoena, is unknown, inasmuch as no witness testified about the protocol generally or what was done specifically with the subpoena directed to Officer Apoian. This evidence is not, I think, sufficient to sustain a *804conviction for contempt.
Decided January 30, 2012.
David A. Beall, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, for appellee.
These comments are no criticism of the prosecuting attorneys for relying upon the Atlanta Police Department to notify individual officers that their appearance in court is required. To the contrary, the protocol used to summon Atlanta police officers may be quite efficient and effective, and considering the costs that might otherwise be incurred by the office of the prosecuting attorneys in making personal service of subpoenas upon hundreds of law enforcement officers each week, the protocol may be the most fiscally responsible course, even if it does not always work perfectly. There is nothing wrong with a prosecuting attorney relying upon means other than those authorized by statute for service of subpoenas upon law enforcement officers, especially when officers routinely appear when required, the lack of proper service notwithstanding. But when a prosecuting attorney uses some means of service other than those authorized by law, the failure of an officer to appear for court generally will not subject the officer to a finding of contempt. In the absence of proper service, even when an officer has promised to appear, he is bound to do so not by law, but only by his conscience, the standards of professionalism, and perhaps the direction of the law enforcement agency that employs him.
What the Atlanta Police protocol involves, and whether it caused Officer Apoian to be served with a subpoena in a manner authorized by law for the service of subpoenas, are questions to be resolved on remand, if the court below elects to proceed further with the charge of contempt. Perhaps evidence adduced on remand will show that Officer Apoian was, in fact, served with a subpoena by means authorized by statute. But in the absence of such evidence, a conviction for contempt cannot, I think, be sustained.

 The Court does not decide whether the evidence adduced at the summary hearing is sufficient to sustain a contempt conviction, and I agree that it is not necessary for us to definitively decide that question. See In re Troutt, 460 F3d 887, 892-893 (II) (7th Cir. 2006) (remanding for another contempt hearing on procedural grounds and declining to address *803sufficiency of evidence); see also United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 697 (II) n.l (113 SC 2849, 125 LE2d 556) (1993) (“We have not held . . . that the double jeopardy guarantee applies to [summary contempt] proceedings.”). But because we are remanding for another hearing, I write to express my concerns about the evidentiary basis of the earlier finding of contempt in the hope that my comments might prove helpful to the court below and the parties on remand.

 Officer Apoian testified that he could not remember whether he had received any subpoena. No witness testified that a subpoena was, in fact, put in his hands or that he ever acknowledged receipt of a subpoena.