Court Opinion

ID: 4056834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 08:11:24.368585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:08.495153
License: Public Domain

PD-1303-15
                  PD-1303-15                                   COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                                                AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                               Transmitted 10/1/2015 1:52:10 PM
                                                                Accepted 10/2/2015 11:16:40 AM
                                                                                 ABEL ACOSTA
                              No.______________	
                                        CLERK
                                           	
  
                                    IN	
  THE	
  
                COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
  APPEALS	
  
                                   OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                              AUSTIN,	
  TEXAS	
  
                                           	
  
             ROXANE	
  YVETTE	
  DAVIS,	
  APPELLANT	
  
                                          V.	
  
               THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS,	
  APPELLEE	
  
                                           	
  
 APPELLANT’S	
  PETITION	
  FOR	
  DISCRETIONARY	
  REVIEW	
  
                                           	
  
                CASE	
  NUMBER	
  12-­‐15-­‐00077-­‐CR	
  
                        COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  
              FOR	
  THE	
  12TH	
  DISTRICT	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                             AT	
  TYLER,	
  TEXAS	
  
                                           	
  
              ON	
  APPEAL	
  FROM	
  NO.	
  241-­‐1149-­‐14	
  
       IN	
  THE	
  241ST	
  JUDICIAL	
  DISTRICT	
  COURT	
  OF	
  
                      SMITH	
  COUNTY,	
  TEXAS	
  
     HONORABLE	
  JACK	
  SKEEN,	
  JR,	
  JUDGE	
  PRESIDING	
  
                                           	
  
                       J.	
  BRANDT	
  THORSON	
  
                     STATE	
  BAR	
  NO.	
  24043958	
  
                        606	
  E.	
  METHVIN	
  ST.	
  
                               P.O.	
  BOX	
  3768	
  
                     LONGVIEW,	
  TEXAS	
  75606	
  
                              (903)	
  758-­‐4878	
  
                    (903)	
  212-­‐3038	
  FACSIMILE	
  
                                           	
  
         APPELLANT	
  REQUESTS	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  
                                           	
  
                                           	
  
                                           	
  
                                           	
  
                                           	
  
                                           	
  
October 2, 2015
                                           	
  
                 IDENTITY	
  OF	
  JUDGE,	
  PARTIES,	
  &	
  COUNSEL	
  
Appellant:	
   Roxane	
  Yvette	
  Davis	
  
Appellee:	
   The	
  State	
  of	
  Texas,	
  by	
  and	
  through	
  her	
  Criminal	
  District	
  	
  
               Attorney	
  of	
  Smith	
  County,	
  D.	
  Matt	
  Bingham	
  
	
  
Trial	
  Judge	
  
Hon.	
  Jack	
  Skeen,	
  Jr.	
  
241st	
  Judicial	
  District	
  Judge	
  
100	
  N.	
  Broadway,	
  Room	
  220	
  
Tyler,	
  Texas	
  75702	
  
	
  
Appellant’s	
  Trial	
  &	
  Appellate	
  Counsel:	
  
J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  24043958	
  
J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson,	
  PLLC	
  
606	
  E.	
  Methvin	
  St.	
  
P.O.	
  Box	
  3768	
  
Longview,	
  Texas	
  75606	
  
jbt@jbtfirm.com	
  
	
  
Appellee’s	
  Trial	
  &	
  Appellate	
  Counsel:	
  
Lucas	
  R.	
  Machicek	
  (Trial	
  Counsel)	
  
State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  24064230	
  
Michael	
  J.	
  West	
  (Appellate	
  Counsel)	
  
State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  21203300	
  
Smith	
  County	
  Assistant	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney	
  
100	
  N.	
  Broadway,	
  Ste.	
  400	
  
Tyler,	
  Texas	
  75702	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                          2	
  
                                       TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  
Cover	
  Page…………………………………………………...……………………………………1	
  
	
  
Identity	
  of	
  Judge,	
  Parties	
  &	
  Counsel…………………………………………………….2	
  
	
  
Table	
  of	
  Contents……………………………………………………………………………….3	
  
	
  
Index	
  of	
  Authorities…………………………………………………………………………...4	
  
	
  
Statement	
  Regarding	
  Oral	
  Argument………………………………………………..…5	
  
	
  
Statement	
  of	
  the	
  Case…………………………………………………………………………5	
  
	
  
Statement	
  of	
  Procedural	
  History………………………………………………………...5	
  
	
  
Grounds	
  for	
  Review……………………………………………………………………………6	
  
        The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  erred	
  when	
  it	
  held	
  that	
  Appellant’s	
  
        punishment	
  assessed	
  was	
  not	
  cruel	
  and	
  unusual	
  punishment,	
  as	
  
        the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  punishment	
  assessed	
  and	
  the	
  
        underlying	
  criminal	
  act	
  is	
  grossly	
  disproportionate.	
  
        	
  
Argument………………………………………………………………………………………..…6	
  
	
  
Prayer	
  for	
  Relief………………………………………………………………………………10	
  
	
  
Certificate	
  of	
  Compliance………………………………………………………………….11	
  
	
  
Certificate	
  of	
  Service………………………………………………………………………...11	
  
	
  
Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………………12	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                           3	
  
                                     INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  
                                                     	
  
	
  
Atkins	
  v.	
  Virginia,	
  536	
  U.S.	
  304,	
  122	
  S.Ct.	
  2242,	
  153	
  L.Ed.2d	
  335	
  (2002).8	
  
	
  
Davis	
  v.	
  Texas,	
  2015	
  WL	
  5157530	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Tyler,	
  delivered	
  Sept.	
  2,	
  
2015)……………………………………………………………………………………...…….5,12	
  
	
  
Ford	
  v.	
  Wainwright,	
  477	
  U.S.	
  399,	
  106	
  S.Ct.	
  2595,	
  91	
  L.Ed.	
  2d	
  335	
  
(1986)……………………………………………………………………………………………….8	
  
	
  
Roper	
  v.	
  Simmons,	
  543	
  U.S.	
  551,	
  125	
  S.Ct.	
  1183,	
  161	
  L.Ed.	
  2d	
  1	
  (2005)….8	
  
	
  
Rummel	
  v.	
  Estell,	
  445	
  U.S.	
  263,	
  100	
  S.Ct.	
  1133,	
  63	
  L.Ed.2d	
  382	
  
(1980)………………………………………………………………………………………….7,8,9	
  
	
  
Solem	
  v.	
  Helm,	
  463	
  U.S.	
  277,	
  103	
  S.Ct.	
  3001,	
  77	
  L.Ed.2d	
  637	
  (1983)……...7	
  
	
  
Weems	
  v.	
  U.S.,	
  217	
  U.S.	
  349,	
  30	
  S.Ct.	
  544,	
  54	
  L.Ed.	
  793	
  (1910)……………8.9	
  
	
  
	
  
Tex.	
  Penal	
  Code	
  §	
  31.03…………………………………………………………………...…5	
  
	
  
Tex.	
  R.App.Pro.	
  9.4(i)(3)…..	
  …………………………………………………………..….11	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                              4	
  
                             STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  

             The	
  Appellant	
  respectfully	
  requests	
  oral	
  argument.	
  

             	
  

                                                 STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  

	
           Appellant	
  was	
  charged	
  by	
  indictment	
  with	
  the	
  offense	
  of	
  Theft,	
  of	
  

the	
  value	
  of	
  less	
  than	
  $1500,	
  with	
  enhancement	
  of	
  two	
  previous	
  

convictions	
  of	
  theft,	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  Tex.	
  Penal	
  Code	
  §	
  31.03.	
  	
  (CR.,	
  p.	
  1).	
  	
  

Appellant	
  entered	
  an	
  open	
  plea	
  to	
  the	
  Court.	
  	
  Appellant	
  entered	
  a	
  plea	
  of	
  

guilty	
  to	
  the	
  offense	
  of	
  theft	
  as	
  alleged	
  in	
  the	
  indictment	
  and	
  entered	
  

pleas	
  of	
  true	
  to	
  the	
  enhancement	
  allegations	
  contained	
  in	
  the	
  indictment	
  

on	
  February	
  2,	
  2015	
  (Vol.	
  1,	
  p.	
  3,	
  13).	
  	
  On	
  February	
  26,	
  2015,	
  the	
  Court	
  

conducted	
  a	
  Sentencing	
  Hearing,	
  assessing	
  punishment	
  at	
  16	
  months	
  in	
  

a	
  State	
  Jail	
  Facility.	
  	
  (Vol.	
  2,	
  p.	
  80).	
  	
  Appellant	
  timely	
  perfected	
  the	
  

appeal.	
  	
  (CR.,	
  p.	
  60).	
  	
  	
  

	
  

                                  STATEMENT	
  OF	
  PROCEDURAL	
  HISTORY	
  

	
           Appellant	
  presented	
  two	
  issues	
  in	
  the	
  appellate	
  brief.	
  	
  The	
  

conviction	
  was	
  affirmed	
  in	
  the	
  Memorandum	
  Opinion	
  issued	
  on	
  

September	
  2,	
  2015.	
  	
  Roxanne	
  Yvette	
  Davis	
  v.	
  Texas,	
  2015	
  WL	
  5157530	
  

(Tex.App.-­‐Tyler,	
  delivered	
  Sept.	
  2,	
  2015)(See	
  Appendix).	
  	
  No	
  Motion	
  for	
  

	
                                                                                                                               5	
  
Rehearing	
  was	
  filed;	
  therefore,	
  no	
  date	
  for	
  said	
  motion	
  was	
  overruled	
  or	
  

otherwise	
  disposed	
  of.	
  	
  This	
  petition	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  be	
  filed	
  on	
  October	
  2,	
  

2015,	
  and	
  therefore,	
  it	
  is	
  timely	
  filed.	
  

	
  

                                         GROUND	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  

	
        The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  erred	
  when	
  it	
  held	
  that	
  Appellant’s	
  

punishment	
  assessed	
  was	
  not	
  cruel	
  and	
  unusual	
  punishment,	
  as	
  the	
  

relationship	
  between	
  the	
  punishment	
  assessed	
  and	
  the	
  underlying	
  

criminal	
  act	
  is	
  grossly	
  disproportionate.	
  	
  

	
  
                                                  ARGUMENT	
  

	
        The	
  Trial	
  Court’s	
  assessment	
  of	
  a	
  16	
  month	
  confinement	
  in	
  a	
  State	
  

Jail	
  facility	
  for	
  an	
  underlying	
  theft	
  with	
  a	
  restitution	
  figure	
  of	
  $275	
  is	
  

unconstitutionally	
  disproportionate	
  (Vol.	
  2,	
  p.	
  26).	
  Limiting	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  

the	
  8th	
  Amendment	
  to	
  death	
  penalty	
  cases	
  has	
  no	
  foundation	
  in	
  the	
  

Constitution.	
  	
  	
  

	
        The	
  logic	
  of	
  the	
  opinion	
  from	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  is	
  circular.	
  	
  The	
  

Court	
  rationalizes	
  that	
  the	
  Legislature	
  is	
  vested	
  with	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  define	
  

crimes	
  and	
  proscribe	
  punishment,	
  and	
  that	
  as	
  long	
  as	
  the	
  punishment	
  is	
  

within	
  the	
  confines	
  of	
  a	
  valid	
  statute,	
  it	
  is	
  necessarily	
  not	
  excessive,	
  

	
                                                                                                                     6	
  
cruel	
  or	
  unusual.	
  	
  This	
  gives	
  the	
  legislative	
  branch	
  unbridled	
  power	
  to	
  

legislate	
  any	
  punishment	
  it	
  desires.	
  	
  It	
  eliminates	
  the	
  oversight	
  function	
  

of	
  the	
  Courts.	
  	
  Just	
  because	
  an	
  assessed	
  punishment	
  falls	
  within	
  the	
  

legislated	
  confines	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  does	
  not	
  mean	
  that	
  said	
  punishment	
  is	
  

necessarily	
  not	
  cruel	
  or	
  unusual.	
  

	
        The	
  Court	
  then	
  goes	
  onto	
  outline	
  the	
  3	
  prong	
  test	
  found	
  in	
  Solem	
  

v.	
  Helm,	
  463	
  U.S.	
  277,	
  103	
  S.Ct.	
  3001,	
  77	
  L.Ed.2d	
  637	
  (1983)	
  and	
  define	
  

the	
  threshold	
  issue	
  of	
  analysis	
  as	
  disproportionality.	
  	
  In	
  analyzing	
  

disproportionality,	
  the	
  Court	
  relies	
  exclusively	
  on	
  Rummel	
  v.	
  Estell,	
  445	
  

U.S.	
  263,	
  100	
  S.Ct.	
  1133,	
  63	
  L.Ed.2d	
  382	
  (1980).	
  	
  

	
        Times	
  have	
  changed	
  and	
  so	
  should	
  the	
  standards	
  for	
  analyzing	
  

proportionality	
  in	
  sentences.	
  	
  In	
  Rummel	
  v.	
  Estell,	
  a	
  5-­‐4	
  majority	
  opinion	
  

from	
  1980	
  upheld	
  a	
  Mandatory	
  Life	
  conviction	
  for	
  a	
  habitual	
  Texas	
  thief.	
  	
  

At	
  first	
  glance,	
  this	
  case	
  is	
  analogous	
  to	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  hand.	
  	
  Both	
  involve	
  

Texans	
  that	
  had	
  two	
  previous	
  convictions.	
  	
  Both	
  cases	
  involve	
  theft,	
  and	
  

both	
  result	
  in	
  enhanced	
  sentences.	
  	
  The	
  problem	
  with	
  this	
  analysis,	
  

however,	
  is	
  that	
  it	
  doesn’t	
  take	
  a	
  closer	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  underlying	
  

assumptions	
  of	
  the	
  1980	
  case	
  and	
  how	
  jurisprudence	
  has	
  changed	
  in	
  the	
  

last	
  35	
  years.	
  	
  The	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  ruling	
  in	
  Rummel	
  is	
  dramatically	
  different	
  

than	
  the	
  times	
  in	
  which	
  we	
  find	
  ourselves	
  today.	
  

	
                                                                                                                         7	
  
          Looking	
  at	
  Death	
  Penalty	
  cases	
  from	
  the	
  last	
  35	
  years,	
  the	
  view	
  of	
  

Cruel	
  and	
  Unusual	
  Punishment	
  has	
  changed.	
  	
  Our	
  society,	
  in	
  a	
  large	
  part	
  

because	
  of	
  the	
  decisions	
  of	
  the	
  Courts,	
  has	
  moved	
  forward.	
  	
  A	
  

microcosm	
  of	
  this	
  change	
  is	
  Death	
  Penalty	
  cases	
  in	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court.	
  	
  

Examining	
  a	
  timeline	
  from	
  1980	
  until	
  today	
  reveals	
  that	
  the	
  mentally	
  

retarded,	
  minors,	
  and	
  insane	
  can	
  no	
  longer	
  be	
  executed.	
  	
  See	
  Atkins	
  v.	
  

Virginia,	
  536	
  U.S.	
  304,	
  122	
  S.Ct.	
  2242,	
  153	
  L.Ed.2d	
  335	
  (2002),	
  Roper	
  v.	
  

Simmons,	
  543	
  U.S.	
  551,	
  125	
  S.Ct.	
  1183,	
  161	
  L.Ed.	
  2d	
  1	
  (2005)	
  and	
  Ford	
  v.	
  

Wainwright,	
  477	
  U.S.	
  399,	
  106	
  S.Ct.	
  2595,	
  91	
  L.Ed.	
  2d	
  335	
  (1986).	
  	
  This	
  

is	
  not	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  Constitution,	
  but	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  

interpretation	
  of	
  such.	
  	
  The	
  same	
  is	
  true	
  of	
  how	
  the	
  8th	
  Amendment	
  

should	
  be	
  viewed	
  in	
  light	
  of	
  individuals	
  charged	
  in	
  cases	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  

instant	
  case	
  and	
  Rummel.	
  

          A	
  closer	
  look	
  at	
  Rummel	
  reveals	
  that	
  the	
  majority	
  opinion	
  heavily	
  

cites	
  Weems	
  v.	
  U.S.	
  in	
  an	
  effort	
  to	
  steer	
  8th	
  Amendment	
  analysis	
  away	
  

from	
  non-­‐death	
  penalty	
  cases.	
  	
  Weems	
  v.	
  U.S.,	
  217	
  U.S.	
  349,	
  30	
  S.Ct.	
  544,	
  

54	
  L.Ed.	
  793	
  (1910).	
  	
  By	
  focusing	
  on	
  an	
  extreme	
  case	
  where	
  time	
  was	
  

not	
  the	
  only	
  condition	
  of	
  confinement,	
  the	
  Court	
  effectively	
  creates	
  a	
  

standard	
  that	
  “as	
  punishable	
  by	
  significant	
  terms	
  of	
  imprisonment	
  in	
  a	
  

	
                                                                                                                   8	
  
state	
  penitentiary,	
  the	
  length	
  of	
  the	
  sentence	
  actually	
  imposed	
  is	
  purely	
  

a	
  matter	
  of	
  legislative	
  prerogative”	
  Rummel,	
  445	
  U.S.	
  at	
  275.	
  

          As	
  Justice	
  Powell	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  dissent,	
  “The	
  Court	
  concedes	
  today	
  

that	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  disproportionality	
  plays	
  a	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  review	
  of	
  

sentences	
  imposing	
  the	
  death	
  penalty,	
  but	
  suggests	
  that	
  the	
  principle	
  

may	
  be	
  less	
  applicable	
  when	
  a	
  noncapital	
  sense	
  is	
  challenged.	
  	
  Such	
  

limitation	
  finds	
  no	
  support	
  in	
  the	
  History	
  of	
  Eighth	
  Amendment	
  

jurisprudence.”	
  	
  Id.	
  at	
  288.	
  	
  It	
  is	
  time	
  that	
  the	
  wrong	
  of	
  Rummel	
  be	
  

corrected.	
  	
  An	
  honest	
  analysis	
  of	
  proportionality	
  reveals	
  that	
  from	
  a	
  

historical	
  perspective,	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  disproportionality	
  applies	
  to	
  both	
  

capital	
  and	
  non-­‐capital	
  cases.	
  	
  Whether	
  dating	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  extraordinary	
  

circumstances	
  of	
  Weems	
  in	
  1910	
  or	
  merely	
  using	
  common	
  sense,	
  

proportionality	
  and	
  reason	
  deserve	
  a	
  chance.	
  

          In	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  hand,	
  the	
  Appellant	
  admits	
  during	
  testimony	
  at	
  

Sentencing	
  to	
  a	
  restitution	
  amount	
  of	
  $270.	
  	
  (Vol.	
  2,	
  p.	
  26).	
  	
  Dividing	
  that	
  

sum	
  over	
  the	
  sixteen-­‐month	
  period	
  of	
  confinement,	
  the	
  Appellant’s	
  

monthly	
  payment	
  of	
  time	
  to	
  society	
  is	
  only	
  worth	
  $16.875	
  per	
  month.	
  	
  

Taken	
  further,	
  her	
  time	
  is	
  worth	
  less	
  than	
  56	
  cents	
  per	
  day.	
  	
  Granted,	
  

she	
  plead	
  true	
  to	
  the	
  two	
  enhancement	
  allegations	
  in	
  the	
  second	
  

	
                                                                                                                     9	
  
paragraph	
  of	
  her	
  indictment,	
  but	
  the	
  severity	
  of	
  her	
  previous	
  crimes	
  

leads	
  one	
  to	
  question	
  the	
  rationality	
  of	
  such	
  a	
  steep	
  sentence.	
  

          Times	
  are	
  changing,	
  and	
  so	
  are	
  the	
  standards	
  used	
  to	
  determine	
  

what	
  is	
  a	
  just	
  sentence.	
  	
  As	
  is	
  evident	
  with	
  President	
  Obama’s	
  recent	
  call	
  

to	
  eliminate	
  Mandatory	
  Minimum	
  Sentencing	
  guidelines	
  in	
  the	
  federal	
  

system	
  and	
  the	
  overrunning	
  costs	
  of	
  keeping	
  non-­‐violent	
  offenders	
  

incarcerated,	
  Appellant	
  prays	
  that	
  this	
  Court	
  will	
  re-­‐examine	
  this	
  issue.	
  

	
  
	
  
                                          PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF	
  

	
        WHEREFORE,	
  PREMISES	
  CONSIDERED,	
  Appellant	
  respectfully	
  

prays	
  that	
  this	
  Court	
  grant	
  discretionary	
  review	
  and,	
  after	
  full	
  briefing	
  

on	
  the	
  merits,	
  issue	
  an	
  opinion	
  reversing	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals’	
  judgment	
  

and	
  remanding	
  the	
  cause	
  to	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  for	
  a	
  new	
  trial.	
  

	
  
Respectfully	
  Submitted,	
  
/s/J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  24043958	
  
J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson,	
  PLLC	
  
606	
  E.	
  Methvin	
  St.	
  
P.O.	
  Box	
  3768	
  
Longview,	
  Texas	
  75606	
  
jbt@jbtfirm.com	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                               10	
  
                                CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  

	
       I,	
  J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson,	
  do	
  hereby	
  certify	
  that	
  the	
  word	
  count	
  

specified	
  in	
  Tex.	
  Rules	
  of	
  App.	
  Proc.	
  9.4(i)(3)	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  computer	
  

program	
  used	
  to	
  prepare	
  this	
  brief	
  is	
  1621	
  words.	
  

	
  
/s/J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
	
  
                                    CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  

	
       We	
  hereby	
  certify,	
  by	
  affixing	
  my	
  signature	
  below,	
  that	
  a	
  true	
  and	
  

correct	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  foregoing	
  Petition	
  for	
  Discretionary	
  Review,	
  was	
  

delivered	
  via	
  the	
  electronic	
  filing	
  manager	
  to	
  (1)	
  D.	
  Matt	
  Bingham,	
  

Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney	
  of	
  Smith	
  County,	
  Texas	
  and	
  (2)	
  to	
  the	
  Office	
  of	
  

the	
  State	
  Prosecuting	
  Attorney	
  on	
  	
  October	
  1,	
  2015.	
  	
  

	
  
/s/J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
J.	
  Brandt	
  Thorson	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                           11	
  
                                           APPENDIX	
  
	
  
Roxanne	
  Yvette	
  Davis	
  v.	
  Texas,	
  2015	
  WL	
  5157530	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Tyler,	
  
delivered	
  Sept.	
  2,	
  2015)	
  

	
                                                                                              12	
  
                                  NO. 12-15-00077-CR

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

               TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                    TYLER, TEXAS

ROXANNE YVETTE DAVIS,                           §      APPEAL FROM THE 241ST
APPELLANT

V.                                              §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE                                        §      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Roxanne Yvette Davis appeals her conviction for theft, for which she was sentenced to
confinement for sixteen months. In two issues, Appellant argues her sentence is excessive and
grossly disproportionate to the crime of which she was convicted. We affirm.

                                         BACKGROUND
       Appellant was charged by indictment with theft. The indictment further alleged that
Appellant had twice been previously convicted of theft. Appellant pleaded “guilty,” and the
matter proceeded to a trial on punishment. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
confinement for sixteen months, and this appeal followed.

                              CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
       In her first and second issues, Appellant argues that the sixteen month sentence imposed
by the trial court amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. However, Appellant made no timely
objection to the trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore,
failed to preserve any such error. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (waiver with regard to rights under the Texas Constitution); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d
490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (waiver with regard to rights under the United States
Constitution); Ajisebutu v. State, 236 S.W.3d 309, 311–12 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007,
no pet.) (waiver with regard to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 1.09); see also TEX R.
APP. P. 33.1; Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). (“Preservation of error
is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate court should ordinarily review on its own
motion[;] . . . it [is] incumbent upon the [c]ourt itself to take up error preservation as a threshold
issue.”). But even despite Appellant’s failure to preserve error, we conclude that the sentence
about which she complains does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
       The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. CONST.   AMEND.   VIII. This provision was made applicable to the states by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67, 82 S. Ct. 1417,
1420–21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)).
       The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See
Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v.
State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that
punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or
unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495
S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. In the case at hand,
Appellant was convicted of theft of property valued at less than $1,500 with two prior theft
convictions, the punishment range for which is one hundred eighty days to two years. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.35(a), 31.03(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 2014). Thus, the sentence imposed
by the trial court falls within the range set forth by the legislature. Therefore, the punishment is
not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se.
       Nonetheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three part test originally set forth in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the
proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem,
463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas
courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in

                                                  2
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) to require a
threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before
addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v.
State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
         We first must determine whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate. In so
doing, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estell, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63
L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an
appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual
offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. See id., 445 U.S. at 266,
100 S. Ct. at 1135. A life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior felony
convictions––one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services
and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct.
at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and,
further, considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined that the
appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S.
at 285, 100 S. Ct. at 1145.
         In the case at hand, the offense committed by Appellant––theft of less than $1,500 with
two prior theft convictions––is more serious than the combination of offenses committed by the
appellant in Rummel, while Appellant’s sixteen month sentence is far less severe than the life
sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the
sentence in Rummel was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence
assessed against Appellant in the case at hand. Therefore, since we do not find the threshold test
to be satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s first and
second issues are overruled.

                                                   DISPOSITION
         Having overruled Appellant’s first and second issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                                                  JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                     Chief Justice
Opinion delivered September 2, 2015.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
                                              (DO NOT PUBLISH)

                                                              3