Court Opinion

ID: 9456401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:51:35.691269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:57.702664
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I cannot accept the reasoning of the majority in this case, which affects a substantial incursion on the fact finding powers of the federal habeas corpus judge, and dilutes, indirectly but significantly, settled principles of burden of proof in federal collateral proceedings.1
As to the validity of appellant's waiver of counsel in the 1952 proceeding, I find myself again in substantial disagreement with the majority. I first note the factual findings of both the state and federal trial courts.
The Oregon Supreme Court recited the findings of the state trial court in the following manner:
“While the record in the trial court discloses that the petitioner was ‘advised of his right’ to counsel and he ‘stated he did not desire counsel,’ the trial court presumably, because the record did not state that petitioner was specifically advised that he was entitled to court appointed counsel, heard evidence upon the issue of waiver. The trial court then made the following material findings:
“ ‘He was advised of his right to counsel, but he was not specifically advised that he could have counsel at public expense.’
“ ‘However, at that time, the petitioner was aware of his right to court appointed counsel. He had had such' counsel in Multnomah County in 1948. The petitioner voluntarily, understanding^ and freely, without any *697coercion or threats, waived his right to counsel and his right to Grand Jury investigation.’ ”
Schram v. Gladden, 444 P.2d at 8. [Emphasis added] [The opinion continues with a detailed recital of the 1948 proceeding in which appellant was advised and furnished with counsel at public expense. It explains the facts surrounding his dismissal of court appointed counsel over a month later and his retention at his expense of a different lawyer.]
The federal habeas judge found, on the basis of the state record in both the original and postconviction proceedings:
“The Oregon Supreme Court relied on circumstances surrounding a 1948 prosecution for the same offense to prove that at the time of the 1952 prosecution Petitioner knew that he was entitled to a court-appointed attorney. [250] Or. [603], 444 P.2d 6 (1968). The order in the 1948 proceeding states that Petitioner represented himself to be without funds, and that he requested a court-appointed attorney. The Court appointed an attorney, but shortly thereafter he asked to be relieved because Petitioner decided to hire his own attorney. I agree with the Oregon Supreme Court’s finding that when arraigned in 1952 Petitioner knew that he had a right to a court-appointed attorney.” [C.T. 22]
In spite of the foregoing findings of fact, the majority holds that Sehram “prima facie sustained” his burden of proving nonintelligent waiver simply by introducing the record of the Oregon postconviction evidentiary hearing in which the court found that he had not been told specifically that an appointed attorney would be compensated by the state. (See quotation from opinion supra.) I am convinced, as were both the state and federal courts that reviewed the case, that appointment of counsel for the appellant to defend exactly the same charge four years earlier was evidence upon which a trial judge could conclude that this appellant knew of and waived his right to court-appointed counsel. (Opinion of Ore.Sup.Ct. supra.) Indeed, as I discuss in greater detail, infra, reversal and entry of judgment for the appellant as a matter of law seems to contravene established law governing burden of proof and judicial fact finding power in federal habeas proceedings. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons:
First, although I recognize that we deal with a mixed' question of fact and law, I am convinced that the standard of habeas review enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) accords wide discretion to the habeas trier of fact to determine intelligent waiver vel non “ * * * in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023), while applying the heavy presumption against nonwaiver of important constitutional rights. Observance of this totality of circumstances requirement seems particularly important in the context of a case in which both a state and federal trial judge have found facts, which are not in dispute, and have determined that this petitioner knew of and waived his right to publicly compensated counsel.
In short, the central determination which governs the legal conclusions is the quantum of knowledge in this appellant’s mind concerning his rights. I doubt that an appellate court is in a better position than a trial court to make this factual determination or to reject it once it is made on the basis of credible evidence. The majority opinion does this when it finds as a matter of law that appellant has “prima facie sustained” his burden of proof of nonwaiver simply by introducing into evidence a state court finding that indicates the state trial judge omitted mention of public compensation for appointed counsel. This is a narrow and inaccurate characterization of the state court findings which also included a detailed review of *698appellant’s previous publicly financed representation by counsel and his dismissal of such counsel in earlier proceedings for the same charge. (See 444 P.2d at 8)
Second, I think that the holding of the majority opinion, although not couched specifically in terms of burden of proof, implicitly dilutes the burden of proof requirement of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, which was on the appellant, to overturn the presumption of regularity of the original proceedings.2 It can be no answer that the case before us falls within the reasoning of Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) where a criminal defendant’s waiver of counsel was not shown in the record. The Supreme Court in Carnley (at 516, 82 S.Ct. at 890) stated that the Johnson burden of proof rule did not apply, but specifically approved the ease of Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed.2d 167 (1957). In Moore, the appellant was advised of his right to counsel but no mention appears in the quoted record (Id. at 157-158, 78 S.Ct. at 192-193) of public compensation. The burden was held to remain on Moore to establish nonintelligent waiver.
Third, the majority holding increases the difficulty of the federal habeas judge in deciding cases such as this involving proceedings of another era that took place before the extension of the various Bill or Rights guarantees to the states. As I have long maintained, I think it particularly important in these cases to accord flexibility to trial judges to determine from all the facts whether substantive constitutional rights have been denied.
Why should a rule of law be established that if a defendant was not contemporaneously advised that he had a right to free counsel, that his conviction must be reversed, and that he should go free? What are the boundaries of “contemporaneous advice?” Is even that not a factual question, rather than one of law? Should the fact that no “contemporaneous” advice was given prevent, as a matter of law, an inquiry as to defendant’s actual existing knowledge of his right to a lawyer at public expense?
The Supreme Court has recognized this trial judge’s “difficulty,” and has approved such a flexible approach in denying retroactivity to the recently tightened Rule 11 requirements in Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969), even in the face of its language in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), referring to the core of important constitutional rights waived when a guilty plea is entered. For example, in requiring strict observance of the requirements of Rule 11, it was said in McCarthy :
“A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.” 3 [Footnote omitted]
The denial of retroactive application to McCarthy is evidence of a recognition on the part of the Supreme Court of the very practical and common sense difficulties inherent in fastening recently recognized formal requirements on proceedings of an earlier era.4 The majority opinion in this case ignores the underlying policy that motivated the Halli-day (supra) and similar holdings when it decides this case on the ábsence of a formal colloquy containing the words “free”, or “at no expense” or “publicly compensated”. I repeat that I cannot *699believe that the mere lack of such a recitation should command reversal, and entry of judgment in favor of this appellant, in light of the evidence supporting the three previous state and federal decisions to the contrary. We should not be concerned with whether we would have reached exactly the same result as the trial judge, but whether there was sufficient factual evidence to support the legal conclusion he reached.
Fourth, in view of the foregoing, and the additional fact that no formal federal evidentiary hearing was held, I think that at the very least an appropriate disposition would be to allow the federal habeas judge the opportunity to assess first hand the credibility of the petitioner’s assertion that he did not knowingly waive court-appointed counsel. This approach was taken by the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21, 24 (3rd Cir. 1968) —a case that I find indistinguishable from the one before use. There it was said:
“It is unnecessary for this court to decide which of the two rules governing the burden of proof is applicable in this case because regardless of on whom the burden [of proof] rests the determination of the validity of appellant’s waiver of counsel depends largely on what was said to him by [now deceased trial judge] Judge Mook and what he understood the advice to mean. In determining the credibility of appellant’s contention that he understood that he would have to pay for counsel even though court appointed, it was essential that he be given a hearing to enable him to demonstrate the truthfulness of his assertion. The court before whom appellant could testify would have the opportunity to evaluate his demeanor and fully explore the merit of his contention.” [Emphasis added]
After a remand for an evidentiary hearing, this may come before us again for a determination of whether the trial judge was clearly erroneous under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 52(a). We would be in a much better posture on which to decide the case on factual grounds, although I recognize that a determination adversé to the appellant based upon his own testimony would be correspondingly more difficult — and rightly so — to overturn.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion, I would find the district court in error only because it did not grant a hearing and would remand with directions that such a hearing be had.

. At the outset, I think it important to Clarify the issue that is before this court. The majority’s statement of the factual background of the case indicates that we have before us an attack on the validity of appellant’s 1946 and 1952 convictions. I do not so read the record. Neither the Oregon courts nor the federal trial court made any determination as to the validity of the 1946 proceeding. In the words of the Oregon Supreme Court:
“In the recidivist trial, the state relied upon four prior felony convictions, although any three prior felony convictions were sufficient to prove the petitioner’s status and justify the sentence imposed.
:¡: * * *
“The trial court did not pass upon the validity of the first conviction in Klamath County in 1946, mid neither do we."
[Emphasis added.] Schram v. Gladden, 250 Or. 603, 444 P.2d 6, 7 (en banc 1968).
Similarly, the federal trial court did not find it necessary to decide the validity of the 1946 proceeding. Thus, I find the frequent references to the 1946 convictions to be superfluous, if not misleading.
The suggestion of the majority at page 2 that the recidivist proceeding rested upon three previous convictions (1946, 1948, and 1952), is incorrect. Under Oregon law (Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 168.015 et seq.), convictions on multiple felony counts may be considered separately in subsequent recidivist proceedings. Thus appellant’s conviction on one felony count in 1946; two felony counts in 1948; and one in 1952 resulted in a total of four felony convictions charged against him, not including the 1964 conviction that gave rise to the recidivist proceeding.

. It also fails to honor, or even consider, the “presumption of correctness” contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), ¿s established by Congress in 1966.

. As to value of other court’s findings on , factual issues, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 at 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747.

. See generally the discussion in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969).