Court Opinion

ID: 9717983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:14:01.727548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.575313
License: Public Domain

LOPEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe Willard Bur-nap’s claims are barred by limitations. Although the majority contends that the appellees failed to meet their burden to establish the date upon which Burnap knew or should have known' about the alleged wrongful acts and resulting injury, the undisputed facts establish more than one instance which should have placed Willard on notice of his potential liability in this case — that he would likely be a target for a collection suit based on his former interest in the partnership which defaulted on the note. Under the “injury” rule, a cause of action sounding in tort generally accrues when the tort is completed, that is, the act committed and damage suffered. McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), citing Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex.1967). This is the date of legal injury and the statute of limitations begins to run at that time. Pack v. Taylor, 584 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). The date of the legal injury is not the time it is discovered or the date when actual damage is fully ascertained. Id.; Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). In a legal malpractice case, the attorney’s conduct must raise only a risk of harm to the client’s legally protected interest for the tort to accrue; the harm need not be *625finally established or an inevitable consequence of the conduct. Zidell v. Bird, 692 S.W.2d 550, 557 (Tex.App.-Austin 1985, no writ). The limitations period begins to run as soon as the plaintiff discovers or should discover any harm, however slight, resulting from the negligence of the defendant. Zidell, 692 S.W.2d at 555. If the plaintiff does not sue within two years of the discovery of minor injury but waits until the injuries become substantial, the suit will be time barred. See id. (citing Robertson v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 122 S.W.2d 1098, 1099 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1938, writ ref'd)); American Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
In the instant case, Willard signed the release and indemnification for Danny Lin-nartz on July 31, 1986, in his capacity as a partner. That is the act by which he incurred potential personal liability for the partnership debts to the withdrawing partner, Danny. The next ascertainable date of legal injury occurred when Willard signed the First South release in January 1988. The January 1988 discussion of Walter with Rork should also have put Willard on notice that he could face personal liability by virtue of his former partnership status. In addition, Willard should have known by July 19891 when Danny sent Willard and Walter, via certified mail, a letter asserting his indemnity rights under the 1986 release. Thus, there were at least three occasions whereby Willard should have known of his potential liability on the note which occurred before November of 1989. A demand for indemnification would have put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the prior legal services he received may not shield him from personal liability. Willard did not sue Linnartz and his firm until November 1991, more than two years later.
Willard argues that his cause of action did not accrue at any of the times he learned that he could be potentially personally liable on the note, or when he received the demand for indemnity on the note. Rather, he contends that his claim did not accrue until he learned that he might have a claim against Linnartz and his firm for legal malpractice. In a legal malpractice, negligent advice case, however, the invasion of the plaintiffs legally protected interest occurs at the time that the plaintiff receives the incomplete or otherwise improper advice. See American Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d at 577. I disagree with Willard’s position that his cause of action did not accrue until the federal judgment imposed personal liability on him. The alleged conflict of interest should have been apparent to Willard at the time Linnartz and his firm answered the First South/FDIC’s lawsuit on behalf of Danny Linnartz and Max Burleson, when Walter Burnap, Lester Kelly and the partnership were also named defendants in August of 1989. Willard’s malpractice claims accrued no later than Linnartz’s appearance in the federal litigation on behalf of his brother after Danny had sent the demand letter. The combination of those two events clearly put Willard on notice that Linnartz was representing an adverse party.

. Although the letter was sent in July, Willard did not sign for the letter until September 9, 1989. Both the July or September date are outside the two-year limitations period.