Court Opinion

ID: 9642364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:55:59.192144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:09.636270
License: Public Domain

Baldwin, J.
(dissenting). The majority concede that Harris was an employee of the Commercial Garage. They point out that the jury might have found, however, that at the time of the accident he was violating the instructions of his employer and by so doing was outside the scope of his employment. The word “employee” as used in the exclusion clause was plainly intended to indicate a general status in relation to the owner of an automobile repair shop, public garage, service station, or public parking place. Perkins v. Eagle Lock Co., 118 Conn. 658, 663, 174 A. 77; Arlandson v. Humphrey, 224 Minn. 49, 52, 27 N.W.2d 819. “[T]he word employee has a flexible meaning depending upon the context and the object to be accomplished by the written instrument in which it appears.” Muise v. Century Indemnity Co., 319 Mass. 172, 174, 65 N.E.2d 98. As used in this instance, it means one who is working for an automobile repair shop, public garage, service station or public parking place. No question concerning the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior is involved. That this is so appears from the provision of the exclusion clause which states that the insurance does not cover an employee of an automobile repair shop or public garage “with respect to any accident arising out of the operation thereof.” This phrase imposes a limitation upon the broad language which precedes it. It means, simply, that one who works for a garage is not denied coverage merely for that reason alone. He must be driving the car in *582connection with, the business of the garage to come within the exclusion.
The real question in the case is whether the accident was one “arising out of the operation” of the garage. As to that, the facts are conclusive. The garage was open twenty-four hours a day. Bodnar had kept his car there for two years, and the employees of the garage had frequently made repairs upon it. The repair department was closed on the day in question; nevertheless, Harris, an employee, was on duty, and Bodnar entrusted the car to him to be fixed. This whole sequence of events arosé “out of the operation” of this public garage. To say that the jury could have found that Harris had disobeyed his employer’s instructions, concerning which it does not appear that Bodnar had any knowledge, and had therefore temporarily ceased to be an employee is to overlook the obvious intent of plain words and to make the exclusion clause practically meaningless. State, use of Tondi v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 156 Md. 684, 688, 145 A. 182; see Greenberg v. Lotz Asbestos Co., 109 Conn. 441, 446, 146 A. 834. The denial of coverage under the exclusion having been raised in the answer, the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that the exclusion did not apply. Manthey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 127 Conn. 516, 519, 18 A.2d 397; Rochon v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 190, 195, 171 A. 429. The trial court was correct in directing a verdict for the defendant.