Court Opinion

ID: 9704533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:38:55.968715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.357203
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I agree the proceeding for discharge is civil in nature and the use of summary judgment is an expeditious method of resolving proceedings under section 9 of the Act. Also, as the majority states, defendant was not entitled to an independent psychiatric evaluation. As stated in People v. Capoldi (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 11, 18, 225 N.E.2d 634, 638, "[tjhere is no provision in the act entitling him to the services of an independent psychiatrist and we do not believe that such services are necessary to protect defendant’s rights.” My disagreement with the majority stems from the supreme court’s decision in Olmstead. The application for. discharge in Olmstead appears to be similar in content to defendant’s application here. The supreme court found the Olmstead application "meets the requirements of section 9 of the [Ajct and requires a hearing thereon.” Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d at 314, 205 N.E.2d at 630. With respect to commitment and discharge proceedings under the Act, the Olmstead court said: "Both proceedings involve the paramount factual issue of the mental condition of the defendant; both involve his liberty. One proceeding may deprive him of his liberty; the other is his statutory method of regaining his liberty. We believe that the legislature, when it referred to 'any proceeding under this Act,’ in section 5, intended the right to counsel and a jury trial to apply to both the original petition proceedings and the application for discharge.” Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d at 313, 205 N.E.2d at 629. In Capoldi, the supreme court citing Olmstead stated: "We have held in proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act that a defendant must be accorded the same procedural safeguards available to an accused in a criminal trial even though the procedings [sic] are civil in nature.” Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d at 15, 225 N.E.2d at 637, citing Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625. Trial courts should have the prerogative to dismiss petitions under the Act when there is no question of fact to be decided or submitted to a jury. In Shiro, the issue on appeal was whether the petition was sufficient to withstand summary dismissal. Although the supreme court reversed and remanded the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition, the court did not criticize the summary dismissal procedure. However, the reasoning in Olmstead and Capoldi requires a reversal of the summary judgment, which was entered on the basis of defendant’s application and an unsworn Department report.