Court Opinion

ID: 9713186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:10:28.195377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.342995
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that this matter should be remanded for a determination whether the presentation of the merits will be sub-served by withdrawal of the admissions. However, I offer a different analysis in reaching that result.
GMAAD did not demonstrate in its motion to withdraw and/or amend the admissions that withdrawal would subserve the presentation of the merits of the action. Such a showing was required of GMAAD by Ind. Trial Rule 86(B). If the trial court had ruled against GMAAD because it failed to make the requisite showing under TR. 36(B), this Court would have reviewed the determination of the lower court only for abuse of discretion. See Stewart v. Stewart (1987), Ind.App., 506 N.E.2d 1132, 1134.
The difficulty in appellate review arises because the trial court couched its ruling in the following terms:
"... Defendants infer that a lack of soil sampling was necessary for the consu-mation [sic] of the parties [sic] agreement.
The court further finds that defendants, although granted the right to enter upon plaintiff's [sic] land to take the soil samples, have not demonstrated that soil samples were in fact taken pursuant to authority granted by the Court.
THEREFORE, the Court cannot conclude that the request for soil sampling was needed to answer admissions especially in light of the fact that the defendants at no time sought a further extension of time to answer.
FURTHER, plaintiffs' and defendants' history of litigation would indicate matters of this cause were familiar to all parties.
For these reasons and for the reason that the expeditions [sic] conclusion of civil claims are [sic] intended by the trial rules, the court now, pursuant to Trial Rule 36, deems all plaintiffs' request for admissions Admitted."
The lower court, fully cognizant of the course of the proceedings before it, noted that GMAAD's failure to respond to the request for admissions was originally connected with the asserted need to take a soil sampling. Yet no sample was taken during the extended period of time allowed by the court for answering the request for admissions. The trial court reasonably concluded that the soil sampling was merely a pretext used by GMAAD to delay responding to the discovery request. Such conduct on the part of GMAAD was properly considered by the court in determining whether the admissions by default should be withdrawn. After all, TR. 86 is intended, at least in part, to operate as a sanction against a party that fails to respond to a request for admissions. Accord Clark County State Bank v. Bennett (1975), 166 Ind.App. 471, 336 N.E.2d 663 (sanctions for failure to respond to request for admissions found in T.R. 86; resort to T.R. 87 unnecessary).
Because T.R. 36 defines both the discovery procedure for obtaining admissions and the sanction for failure to respond to the discovery request, the rule must be given teeth. T.R. 86(B) places the burden squarely upon the moving party to show how the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions would assist in reaching a just resolution of the action on its merits. In ruling on a motion to withdraw and/or amend admissions, the court should consider whether key controverted issues have been admitted by operation of law. Equally important is a consideration whether the moving party has abused the discovery process by its failure to respond to a request for admissions. Abuse may be manifested in the party's inordinate delay in responding without seeking extensions from the trial court, or in the party's apparent bad faith in refusing to respond.
The lower court in the instant case alluded to both indicia of abuse in its ruling on GMAAD's motion to withdraw and/or amend the admissions. Yet the court did not state with clarity whether or not the *837presentation of the merits would be sub-served by withdrawing the admissions. This ambiguity in the court's ruling has led Judge Staton to conclude that the court employed an erroneous standard in denying GMAAD's motion. While I am not convinced that the trial court applied an improper test, I agree that the court should be given an opportunity to clarify its ruling. For that reason, I concur that the cause should be remanded.