Court Opinion

ID: 9769830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:02:59.897821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:08.404240
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
Applicant, James Carl Lee Davis, was convicted in 1985 of the capital murder of Yvette Johnson, said murder having been committed while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the offense of burglary of the habitation of Pauline Johnson, the victim’s mother. The murder occurred in 1984.1 This Court affirmed applicant’s conviction and death sentence in 1989. Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Applicant’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990. 495 U.S. 940,110 S.Ct. 2193,109 L.Ed.2d 520 (1990).
Applicant filed his first application for ha-beas corpus relief with this Court in 1990, under Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. Art. 11.07, as then in effect. We denied the relief requested in 1992. Subsequently, applicant filed an application for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. In 1993, the federal district court granted applicant relief to the extent of relieving him from his sentence of death. In 1995, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated applicant’s death sentence. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 525, 133 L.Ed.2d 432 (1995).
Applicant filed his second application for state habeas corpus relief in this Court in December of 1995. In January 1996, this Court filed and set this cause for submission to address applicant’s challenge to the provisions of Art. 11.071, which became effective September 1, 1995. Applicant specifically challenged Art. 11.071, Sec. 5, contending it unconstitutionally restricted his right to file subsequent applications for writ of habeas corpus unless he was able to meet one of several criteria specified in Sec. 5.2
The majority opinion correctly, in my opinion, holds Art. 11.071 merely “provides for the methodology for rendering the writ of habeas corpus and does not prevent this Court from exercising its constitutional powers over the writ of habeas corpus.” (Majority- op. at 219). It is clear that Art. 11.071 does not suspend the right to writ of habeas corpus found in Tex. Const. Art. I, Sec. 12; Article 11.071 only provides a framework by which bona fide applications are accorded the attention they deserve and “frivolous” applications are summarily disposed of. I note further that applicant’s contention that there is a constitutionally-protected right to file an unlimited number of post-conviction writs of habeas corpus lacks merit.3 The provisions of Art. 11.071, Sec. 5 ensure that valid claims may be raised by subsequent habeas applications. It is within the power of the Legisla*235ture to provide how and when applications for statutory Art. 11.071 writs of habeas corpus must be filed; Art. 11.071 does no more than this.
The people of Texas, speaking through their elected representatives, have expressed their concern that many death row inmates— understandably — have successfully delayed their executions by filing successive and frivolous applications for habeas corpus relief. While it is not possible to tell if requiring inmates to raise all their claims in their initial writ applications will speed up the pace of executions in Texas, it is not a violation of due process or due course of law to require them to do so. Applicant was convicted for this brutal murder over 11 years ago; other inmates have been on death row for even longer periods of time. Justice delayed is justice denied; to allow legally-imposed death sentences to be delayed in their implementation for up to 20 years, due in part to meritless serial applications for habeas relief filed primarily to effectuate such delays, is an insult to our legal system and to the people of Texas.4
I am distressed that it has taken this Court nearly a year to hand down its opinion in this cause. While the issues presented are complex and much was at stake no matter which way we ruled, I believe we have an obligation to act on matters before us expeditiously. Many Texans, including members of the media, have criticized us for not resolving this case months ago; I find myself in sympathy with this criticism.
With these comments I join Presiding Judge McCormick’s concurring opinion, thereby joining the opinion of the Court.

. Yvette Johnson, along with her brothers, Tony and Tyran, were beaten to death with a pipe. A fourth child, though also beaten with the pipe, was able to escape to a neighbor's residence from where she called the police. Appellant has not been charged with the murder of Tony and Tyran. The victim's mother, Pauline Johnson, was not home at the time of the murders.

. Subsequent applications for writs of habeas corpus are barred by Section 5 as untimely unless (i) the applicant can establish the claims and issues presented in the subsequent writ could not have been raised in his original or previously-considered subsequent writ because the factual or legal bases for the claims in the subsequent writ were previously unavailable; or (ii) he establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the U.S. Constitution, no rational jury could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or (iii) he establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the U.S. Constitution, no rational juror would have answered in the State’s favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant's trial under Art. 37.071 or 37.0711.

.This assumes, of course, there is a constitutional right to post-conviction habeas relief, which, under the common law, is questionable. See Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996).

. This is in no way meant to criticize attorneys representing death-row inmates, who, for the most part, file applications on behalf of their clients in good faith and in the sincere belief that their claims are valid. Also, Article 11.07, as it existed prior to the enactment of Article 11.071, implicitly encouraged the raising of issues piecemeal via the filing of successive applications for habeas relief. I particularly commend counsel for applicant in the present case for his outstanding advocacy on behalf of his client.