Court Opinion

ID: 9593230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:46.337968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:20.906153
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I dissent from the majority’s treatment of the award of attorney fees.
Defendant argues that whether she earned $21,000 or $6,000 in 1989, plaintiff earned a considerably larger salary, in the neighborhood of $50,000 and, therefore, because of the disparity in the parties’ incomes the award of attorney fees is justified in the exercise of the trial court’s discretion. That has not been and should not be the rule regarding attorney fees in domestic relations cases. The proper rule is set out in the final paragraph of Spooner v Spooner, 175 Mich App 169, 174; 437 NW2d 346 (1989):
Plaintiff’s attorney requests that he be awarded attorney fees for the instant appeal. MCR 3.206(A) allows for attorney fees if the moving party alleges facts showing that he or she is unable to bear the expense of the action without receiving aid. Attor*341ney fees are not awarded as a matter of right but only when necessary to enable a party to carry on or defend the litigation. Chisnell v Chisnell, 99 Mich App 311, 316; 297 NW2d 909 (1980). Plaintiffs attorney has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that plaintiff would be unable to bear the expense of this action without aid. Attorney fees were not necessary to enable plaintiff to carry on the instant litigation. This Court refuses to award plaintiff attorney fees for the instant appeal.
The majority’s reliance on Vollmer v Vollmer, 187 Mich App 688, 690; 468 NW2d 236 (1990), is, I believe, unfortunate. I don’t know the value of the estate distributed in Vollmer and I think to the extent that the majority has endorsed the rubbery standard of Curylo v Curylo, 104 Mich App 340; 304 NW2d 575 (1981), it has resurrected an overly broad discretion standard that was intended to be restricted by MCR 3.206(A). I have stated my reasons in previous opinions and dissents and I restate them here.
Attorney fees are not awarded as a matter of right but only when necessary to allow a party to carry on or defend an action. Vaclav v Vaclav, 96 Mich App 584, 593; 293 NW2d 613 (1980); Zecchin v Zecchin, 149 Mich App 723; 386 NW2d 652 (1986). The trial court in this case did not make a finding regarding the necessity of an award of attorney fees. Clearly, on this record, it could not. The majority notes that defendant’s monthly take-home pay is considerably less than plaintiff’s and then concludes, ipso facto, that that necessitates an award of attorney fees. I think that is plain wrong. It was clearly erroneous for the trial court to base its determination of defendant’s ability to carry on or defend the action on a comparison of defendant’s income with plaintiff’s. It is defen*342dant’s financial status alone that must be examined to determine her ability to pay. See, e.g., Tomblinson v Tomblinson, 183 Mich App 589, 593; 455 NW2d 346 (1990). Plaintiffs financial position is of absolutely no consequence to such a determination. Wilcher v Wilcher, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided August 27, 1991 (Docket No. 123315).
I would approve the majority’s disposition of the other aspects of this appeal, but I would reverse the award of attorney fees.