Court Opinion

ID: 9726045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:28:52.648597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.108069
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring: While agreeing with the result reached by Justice Chapman, I concur in the special concurrence filed by Justice Kuehn and add some comments of my own. One should not conclude that this court has embarked on a new, uncharted route of statutory interpretation and use of legislative history. The result reached by the majority opinion is the product of substantive and statutory interpretation of precedents set forth by our supreme court. We noted in Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 5, 666 N.E.2d 909 (1996), that an analysis in statutory interpretation must include an entire statute and not selectively concentrate on one sentence or another of a multisentence section. As Justice Kuehn notes in his special concurrence, the legislative intent of the statute in question was clearly set forth by the bill’s sponsor in the House of Representatives, Representative Telcser. When faced with an ambiguity, our supreme court in Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill. 2d 272, 592 N.E.2d 1031 (1992), explained the proper method of analysis and resolution of that ambiguity. Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 278-79, 592 N.E.2d at 1034-35. Applying this method, the Cummins court concluded that the statute in question was ambiguous. The result reached by this court in the instant case also follows the lead of supreme court cases in similar circumstances. The ambiguity of the statute, the legislative history of the statute as articulated by its sponsor in the House, and the practical effect of not filling the gap between purchased insurance and actual recovery have been noted by our supreme court in Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 591 N.E.2d 427 (1992), and in Hoglund. The Hoglund court also indicated that the General Assembly’s public policy behind the uninsured motorist statute applicable to the under-insured motorist statute as well would be frustrated if the insurance company’s position, similar to defendants’ position in this case, were adopted. (For the importance of public policy considerations, see American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299 (1996).) As the uninsured and underinsured motorist provisions embodied the same public policy considerations and were aimed at achieving similar results, the authorities noted above more than justify our conclusion in the instant case. For the above-stated reasons, I specially concur in the majority opinion and concur in the special concurrence by Justice Kuehn.