Court Opinion

ID: 9853857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:19.959359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:11.695699
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur specially because of the statement in Division 2 that “the element of force must be proved when a defendant is charged with forcible rape upon a minor victim.” Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232, 233-235 (1) (236 SE2d 748) (1977), involving a nine-year-old girl, does say that. But a decade later, the Supreme Court said in Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 631 (2) (352 SE2d 382) (1987), that “[a] five-year-old child cannot consent to any sexual act. [Cit.] Sexual acts directed to such a child are, in law, forcible and against the will. [Cit.]” Cooper was convicted of aggravated sodomy, which requires proof that the act was done “with force and against the will” of the victim. OCGA § 16-6-2.
For the first quoted proposition Cooper cited Drake and McFall v. State, 235 Ga. 105, 106 (218 SE2d 839) (1975), but Drake had said McFall was wrong because it affirmed a conviction of forcible rape on a jury charge that “ ‘the law supplies the essential element of force’ ” when the victim is under age 14. Drake, supra, 239 Ga. at 233. Drake separates “force” from “against the will” (or nonconsent) both as to meaning and as to the requirement of proof.
For the second quoted proposition Cooper cited Carter v. State, 122 Ga. App. 21 (176 SE2d 238) (1970). Carter’s conviction of aggra*106vated sodomy on a seven-year-old girl was affirmed despite a challenge to the jury charge. The Court of Appeals stated that the act of sodomy on a child “could not be simple sodomy, but would always be aggravated sodomy . . . because the ‘with force and against the will’ element of the crime is automatically supplied by the commission of the crime on a person, such as a young child of 7 years of age, who has neither the physical nor the mental capacity to give consent as a matter of law.” 122 Ga. App. at 22. But Drake, decided later, separated the two concepts (“force” and “against the will”) instead of considering them as one element in minor cases.
Decided October 23, 1997
Reconsideration denied November 3, 1997
L. Clark Landrum, for appellant.
A few months after Cooper the Supreme Court repeated that “[sjexual acts directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will,” citing Cooper. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746, 747 (2) (353 SE2d 342) (1987). Richardson went on to say: “The pattern of sexual exploitation presented in this case was also, as a matter of law, forcible and against the will, because of the step-daughter’s age at onset, and because of her familial relationship.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 747 (2). Defendant’s conviction of incest and sodomy against his daughter during the time she was 12 to 17 was affirmed. Once again the concepts of “force” and “against the will” were fused in a minor’s case. Richardson was quoted as controlling in Huggins v. State, 192 Ga. App. 820 (1) (386 SE2d 703) (1989), a conviction of aggravated sodomy on an eight-year-old boy, and in Luke v. State, 222 Ga. App. 203, 205 (1) (a) (474 SE2d 49) (1996).
That is still the law. This year, Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154 (486 SE2d 178) (1997), held that child molestation constitutes a forcible felony for the purpose of establishing the defense of justification. Both Richardson and Cooper, as well as the Court of Appeals cases of Huggins and Luke, are cited for the statement that “[c]hild molestation is, by its very nature, a crime involving a forcible and violent act.” Id. at 155. The Court explained: “Because children do not have the capacity to give consent to or resist a sexual act directed at them, such acts ‘are, in law, forcible and against the will’ of a child. Cooper v. State, supra; Luke v. State, supra.” Id. The victim in Brown was five. Luke, supra at 206, ruled that the age of consent was 14 at the time and noted it is 16 currently.
Durr’s victim was not a minor, so the issue of the meaning of the element of force need not be resolved under the rubrics which would apply had she been a child by age.
*107C. Paul Bowden, District Attorney, Holli G. Martin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. •