Court Opinion

ID: 9713118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:08:29.891276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.334265
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE DiVITO, dissenting: In my judgment, neither Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, nor Illinois case law compels the conclusion reached by the majority. I do not believe the lawyer’s conduct in this case fell below the objectively reasonable standard of professional conduct required by the sixth amendment, and I do not believe either People v. Correa (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307, or People v. Padilla (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 297, 502 N.E.2d 1182, applies where, as in this case, the lawyer is unaware of his client’s alien status. There is no doubt that the Strickland test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366.) The first part of the Strickland test applied to such challenges is “whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’ ” (Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 208, 106 S. Ct. at 369, quoting McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 771, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 773, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449.) Concerning the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “unequivocal, erroneous, misleading representations *** made to [the] defendant in response to his specific inquiry” fall outside the range of competence demanded by Strickland and the sixth amendment, but expressly declined to consider whether the same is true of “the passive conduct of counsel in failing to discuss with a defendant the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d at 551-52. Application of the rule in Correa to “passive conduct” was first considered in People v. Padilla (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 297, 502 N.E.2d 1182. In that case, the defendant challenged his guilty plea in a post-conviction hearing, alleging that his lawyer incorrectly assured him that no deportation consequences would result from pleading guilty. His lawyer denied that he had discussed the subject of deportation with his client. The trial court did not resolve this conflict in the evidence, and the court on appeal did not find the lawyer’s denial relevant, holding that “ineffective assistance render[s] a guilty plea involuntary where counsel knows his client is an alien and does nothing to inform him of possible deportation consequences.” (People v. Padilla, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 303.) In People v. Miranda (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 718, 540 N.E.2d 1008, the court agreed that a lawyer who knows his client is an alien, but does Hot inform him of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, provides constitutionally ineffective assistance, even where the client never raised the subject of deportation with his lawyer. Because the lawyer in Correa actually misrepresented to his client the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, both Padilla and Miranda represent an extension of the result reached in that case. The majority here would now extend Correa further by finding ineffective assistance even though the lawyer does not know his client is an alien. I do not believe, however, that a lawyer’s conduct is outside the range of reasonable competence where the lawyer, who does not know his client is an alien, fails to advise him of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Such a result would impose on defense lawyers a duty, not mandated by the constitution, required by statute, or compelled by Correa, Padilla, or Miranda, to inquire into their clients’ alien status. Indeed, if such inquiries are constitutionally required, then the duty should be imposed on the court as well as counsel to advise a defendant of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, regardless of whether the defendant is known to be an alien. Although this might be a simple procedure to follow, I am not aware of any authority compelling such a practice. If there are circumstances under which a lawyer could be charged with the knowledge that his client is an alien, such circumstances were certainly not present in this case. Defendant never discussed his alien status with his lawyer, had been in the United States for 13 years, was married in Chicago, had two children, was self-employed as a general contractor, and spoke “fairly good” English. The only facts cited by the majority remotely indicative of defendant’s alien status and presumably known to defendant’s lawyer are the entry in the presentence investigation report showing defendant was born in Mexico and the use of defendant’s sister and sister-in-law as interpreters. On these facts, I simply do not believe defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance because his lawyer failed to inform him of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.