Court Opinion

ID: 9852288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:36.418337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.997754
License: Public Domain

Justice BUTTERFIELD
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that respondent acknowledged paternity. Because I believe that respondent also met the support prong of N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601,1 respectfully dissent.
Under N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601, consent to adoption is required of the following individual:
b. Any man who may or may not be the biological father of the minor but who:
4. Before the earlier of the filing of the petition or the date of a hearing under G.S. 48-2-206, has acknowledged his paternity of the minor and
II. Has provided, in accordance with his financial means, reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the biological mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or the support of the minor, or *199both, . . . and has regularly visited or communicated, or attempted to visit or communicate with the biological mother during or after the term of the pregnancy, or with the minor, or with both ....
N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (1999) (emphasis added).
“In matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.” Electric Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). Furthermore, when interpreting a statute, this Court presumes that the legislature acted with reason and common sense, and that it did not intend an unjust result. In re Brake, 347 N.C. 339, 341, 493 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1997). In my opinion, the majority’s interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601 as applied to the instant case brings about an unjust result.
The evidence shows, and the trial court found, that “on the date of [the child’s] birth [4 March 1998], the respondent purchased a $100.00 money order and some baby clothing and gave the same to his mother to forward to O’Donnell. This money order and clothing [were] not mailed to O’Donnell until March 9, 1998.” The majority states that the $100.00 money order respondent purchased arrived too late to satisfy the statute. I believe that respondent acted in conformity with the statute in offering support. He went to Nags Head to make money to save for the child. He then learned that he may or may not be the father, returned to his grandparents’ home, and failed to find gainful employment. Respondent then set about obtaining his GED. Given respondent’s age, his recognition that he had to have more education to secure better employment is, in my judgment, worthy of commendation. Only during the period from 22 September 1997, the date respondent was informed of the pregnancy, through 14 November 1997, the date he learned that he may not be the father, did respondent believe himself to be the only possible father of the child. This demonstration of self-improvement and his continued attempts to communicate with the mother when faced with the possibility that he may not be the father convinces me that he acted reasonably and in accordance with his means to support the mother and child. Disregarding the offer by respondent’s mother to allow O’Donnell to live with her, the evidence that respondent saved at least $100.00 for the child is noteworthy. The fact that respondent did not place $50.00 a week into O’Donnell’s hands does not alter my analysis. Of particular significance to my analysis is that O’Donnell rebuffed respond*200ent’s mother’s offer and stated each time respondent asked that she did not need anything. I find the fact that he was anticipating support of the child after the child’s birth very persuasive. The statute allows for support of the mother during pregnancy or of the minor after birth. But for the filing of the petition on the day after the child was born, respondent’s money would clearly have counted as support of the minor, as he intended. I believe a liberal, rather than strict, construction of the statute is necessary. Such a construction of the statute supports my proposition that the statute is satisfied when adequate attempts are made to provide financial support.
While the statute does specifically state that there can be attempted communication with the mother, it does not speak directly to attempted support. I believe that attempted support is implicit in the statute. Under the majority’s holding, attempted support will never satisfy the statute. The putative father, following this reasoning, must actually give monetary support to the mother or to her creditors. The mother can defeat the putative father’s attempts by simply refusing or forestalling the offers. Even if the putative father sets up some sort of fund for the child after the mother has rejected offers of support, this must also be classified as an attempt and would fail the majority’s test. The mother can also defeat the putative father’s attempts by secreting herself from the putative father during the entire pregnancy and refusing any contact with the putative father. Or it may be possible that the putative father may be completely unaware that he is to be a father until he receives notice of an adoption proceeding. This last scenario tends to point to an inconsistency of purpose in the statute itself, rather than in the majority’s reasoning. Nonetheless, I do not believe that the legislature intended to enact a law that could be so easily circumvented by a mother failing to accept or discouraging offers of support, thereby giving the mother unilateral authority in the adoption. The majority correctly stated the purpose of the statute as follows:
We believe the General Assembly crafted these subsections of this statute primarily to protect the interests and rights of men who have demonstrated paternal responsibility and to facilitate the adoption process in situations where a putative father for all intents and purposes has walked away from his responsibilities to mother and child, but later wishes to intervene and hold up the adoption process.
Therefore, I believe that attempted support or actions that manifest support for the child are included under the statute.
*201I am also concerned that this holding is in conflict with the prior holdings of this Court in Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994), and Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997). These cases stand for the well-established rule from the United States Supreme Court that the “interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” is, “absent a powerful countervailing interest, protected].” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972). Although this constitutional argument was not raised at trial or on appeal, I find its mentioning necessary in light of the majority’s holding. There are no facts to indicate that respondent has acted inconsistently with his protected parental interests, a required showing under Price in order for a parent to be divested of his or her “constitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his or her child.” Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534.
For these reasons, I would reverse the Court of Appeals on the issue of support.
Justice WAINWRIGHT joins in this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.