Court Opinion

ID: 9673648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:15:52.193435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.156867
License: Public Domain

SANDERS, Justice
(dissenting in part).
The unique feature of the majority opinion is that it holds Article 913(B) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional without specifically saying so.
Article 913(B) provides:
“An appeal by the defendant suspends the execution of sentence. If the defendant is not or cannot be admitted to bail, the trial court may, in conformity with Article 881, amend the sentence to grant credit for all or a part of the time served pending the appeal.” (Emphasis mine).
This article vests in the trial judge the discretion to grant credit on a sentence for *781all or part of the time served pending an appeal. It represents sound policy, because numerous factors may cause appellate delays. Not the least of the causes of appellate delay is the failure of the defense to promptly prepare and submit the bills of exceptions. In exercising his discretion, the trial judge can take into account all circumstances. I see no constitutional infirmity in the article.
In holding the article unconstitutional, the majority relies upon North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970); and Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971).
North Carolina v. Pearce is easily distinguished. In that case, the United States Supreme Court dealt only with the resentencing of a defendant after his former conviction and sentence had been vacated and a new trial had. It stands for the constitutional principle that, upon resentencing for the same offense, the judge may not impose a more severe sentence than that originally imposed, absent adequate reasons, and must give credit for the time already served on the original sentence. The thrust of the decision is against penalizing a defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right to have his partially served but invalid sentence vacated. See State v. Crockrell, 470 S.W.2d 507 (Mo.1971).
Robinson v. Beto and Hart v. Henderson are decisions of the United States Court of Appeal. These decisions, of course, are not binding on this court. In both cases, the defendants received the maximum sentence for the crimes of which they were convicted. The Court of Appeal required that the jail time pending appeal be credited, relying upon North Carolina v. Pearce. These cases may be distinguished on the ground that maximum sentences were involved. If this distinction lacks validity, however, the cases represent an unwarranted extension of the Pearce holding.
In this case, there is but one conviction and sentence. Under Louisiana law, because of the length of the present sentence, no defendant, rich or poor, is eligible for bail pending appeal. If it is constitutional for the trial judge to have discretion to credit jail time awaiting trial, as the majority correctly holds, I can perceive of no valid constitutional theory on which unconstitutionality attaches to the same discretion pending appeal.
In my opinion, Article 913(B) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure is constitutional. The majority has erred in holding it invalid. See State v. Crockrell, supra; United States v. Cortese, 244 F.2d 872 (2nd Cir. 1957); Duke v. Blackwell, 429 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1970).
For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent.