Court Opinion

ID: 9897677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:23:34.20367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:59.509312
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Athey, Fulton and Causey
UNPUBLISHED

              VERONICA M. JOHNSON
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0144-23-1                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 NOVEMBER 8, 2023
              ROCK SOLID JANITORIAL, INC., ET AL.

                              FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
                                          Patricia L. West, Judge Designate

                              (Veronica M. Johnson, on briefs), pro se. Appellant submitting on
                              briefs.

                              (Harold E. Johnson; John A. Irvin; Donald E. Morris; Williams
                              Mullen; The Law Offices of Donald E. Morris, on brief), for
                              appellees. Appellees submitting on brief.

                     Veronica M. Johnson, pro se, appeals the circuit court’s final order sustaining a plea in bar

              of res judicata filed by Selective Insurance Company of America (Selective America), Selective

              Way Insurance Company (Selective Way), and Selective Insurance Group (Selective Group)

              (collectively “Selective”). On appeal, she contends that res judicata does not bar her personal injury

              claims against Selective and Rock Solid Janitorial, Inc., that Selective’s plea in bar is based upon a

              void order that should be reversed, and that the circuit court erred by not entering default judgment

              against Selective and Rock Solid for their alleged failure to respond to her discovery requests. The

              parties waived argument in this case. See Code § 17.1-403(ii). For the reasons stated below, we

              affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

              opinion.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                           BACKGROUND

        On July 27, 2016, Johnson filed a warrant in debt in the City of Portsmouth General District

Court against Rock Solid and Selective America. The warrant in debt, as amended, alleged that

Johnson sustained personal injuries on June 30, 2015, when she slipped and fell on a floor waxed by

Rock Solid inside the City of Portsmouth circuit courthouse. It further alleged that Selective Way

paid Johnson a portion of a $15,000 medical expense benefit under Rock Solid’s insurance policy

but refused to pay Johnson the full amount of the benefit.1 Johnson requested that the general

district court award her the balance of the medical expense benefit and punitive damages for “[b]ad

[f]aith [i]nsurance [p]ractices.” She further indicated that she would file “a future claim . . . for

[damages] based on liability.”

        The general district court denied Johnson’s claims, and she appealed the ruling to the circuit

court. Thereafter, Rock Solid and Selective America filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Johnson

lacked standing to pursue her claims and had failed to join all necessary parties. After a hearing, the

circuit court found that Johnson did not have standing to pursue her claims “because she [was] not a

beneficiary under Rock Solid’s insurance policy, [did] not have a contract with Rock Solid’s

insurance company, [t]here [was] no privity of contract, and [she] ha[d] suffered no loss or any

out-of-pocket expenses.” The circuit court also found that Selective Way and Selective Group were

not parties to the case. On December 31, 2018, the circuit court entered a final order, dismissing

Johnson’s claims with prejudice (the “2018 order”).2

        1
         Johnson’s amended warrant in debt named Selective Way and Selective Group as
additional defendants. Although the general district court accepted and ruled upon Johnson’s
amended warrant in debt, it did not grant Johnson leave to name Selective Way and Selective
Group as additional defendants.
        2
         Johnson objected to the 2018 order on the basis that it violated her Fourteenth Amendment
rights and petitioned the Supreme Court of Virginia for an appeal, which the Supreme Court denied.
                                               -2-
       On November 16, 2020, Johnson filed a complaint in the circuit court against Rock Solid

and Selective for negligently causing her June 30, 2015 injuries. The complaint alleged that Rock

Solid negligently spilled wax on the floor and failed to warn Johnson of the floor’s condition. The

complaint further alleged that Rock Solid and Selective acted in bad faith by refusing to pay

Johnson’s medical expense benefits, which “contributed to the exacerbation of [her] injuries,” and

requested an award of “bad faith punitive damages.”

       Selective filed a plea in bar arguing that Johnson’s claims were barred by res judicata

because they arose from its refusal to pay her medical expense benefits and had been previously

adjudicated by the 2018 order.3 In her written opposition, Johnson argued that res judicata did not

bar her claims because the 2018 order was procured by fraud, violated her Seventh and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, and was void ab initio. She further argued that her current action was “for

damages . . . caused by [Rock Solid’s] negligence, and exacerbation of [her] injuries ensuing from

[Selective’s] bad faith,” and not for medical expense benefits.4 In addition to her opposition,

Johnson also filed a motion for declaratory judgment requesting that the circuit court declare the

2018 order void, as well as a motion to compel responses to her discovery requests.

       At the hearing on Johnson’s motions and Selective’s plea in bar, Johnson argued that the

2018 order was void because her former case had been set for trial and the judge who entered the

2018 order could not “overrule” the judge who scheduled the case for trial. She further argued that

the 2018 order violated her Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury and her right to a trial de

novo from the general district court. Johnson also asserted that the general district court committed

       3
           Selective’s plea in bar further argued that Johnson lacked standing to pursue her claims.
       4
         Although Johnson characterized her claims as personal injury claims, she also argued
that Selective was required to answer her claim for “breach of contract.”
                                               -3-
fraud by revising one of its orders nunc pro tunc after she had appealed to the circuit court.5 After

considering the arguments of the parties, the circuit court ruled that the 2018 order was valid.

        Following the circuit court’s ruling that the 2018 order was valid, Johnson argued that her

current claims were not barred by res judicata because she sought to recover personal injury

damages that were “exacerbated” by Selective’s failure to pay medical expense benefits, rather than

medical expense benefits under Rock Solid’s insurance policy. She asserted that the validity of the

2018 order had “nothing to do with [her] personal injury claim” and would not affect her claim

against Rock Solid. Selective argued that Johnson’s claims were barred by res judicata even if they

constituted personal injury claims.6

        After the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court issued a letter opinion finding that

Johnson had previously “alleged negligence on the part of [Rock Solid]” and “sought damages from

[Selective] for [its] refusal to pay her claim for medical benefits.” The circuit court further found

that Johnson’s original claims were dismissed by the 2018 order on their merits and with prejudice

and that Johnson’s November 16, 2020 complaint “asserted the same claim of negligence.” The

circuit court ruled that both lawsuits “arose out of” Rock Solid and Selective’s alleged “fail[ure] to

pay her medical benefits claim” and that Johnson’s current claims were barred by both claim

preclusion and issue preclusion. On July 25, 2022, the circuit court entered a final order dismissing

Johnson’s complaint with prejudice.7 Johnson appeals.

        5
         Specifically, the general district court removed Selective Way and Selective Group
from the case caption of one of its orders two days after it entered its final order.

        At the hearing, Rock Solid “incorporate[d]” Selective’s argument that the 2018 order
        6

barred Johnson’s medical expense claims but did not address whether Johnson’s personal injury
claims against it were barred by res judicata.
        7
        In dismissing the case with prejudice, the circuit court found that demurrers filed by
Rock Solid and Selective were moot.
                                              -4-
                                              ANALYSIS

        On appeal, Johnson asserts that the circuit court erred by sustaining Selective’s plea in bar of

res judicata against all defendants and by failing to enter default judgment sua sponte against all

defendants for their failure to respond to her discovery requests. “[A]ll trial court rulings come to

an appellate court with a presumption of correctness.” Sobol v. Sobol, 74 Va. App. 252, 272

(2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Wynnycky v. Kozel, 71 Va. App. 177, 192 (2019)).

                               I. Selective’s Plea in Bar of Res Judicata

        “Whether a claim or issue is precluded by a prior judgment is a question of law this Court

reviews de novo.” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 297 Va. 645, 653 (2019). Johnson

asserts that the circuit court erred by sustaining Selective’s plea in bar of res judicata with respect to

all defendants. In support of her assertion, Johnson argues that the 2018 order was void ab initio or,

alternatively, that this Court should reverse the order. She further argues that res judicata does not

bar her claims because the 2018 order, if valid, was not a judgment on the merits.8

                            A. Johnson Cannot Relitigate the 2018 Order

        Johnson contends that the order should be reversed on its merits. She argues that the 2018

order “was clearly wrong in holding that [she] did not have standing to sue” because she was a

third-party beneficiary of Rock Solid’s insurance policy. Assuming, without deciding, that Johnson

preserved her argument for appeal, her collateral attack on the merits of the 2018 order is

impermissible.

        8
          Johnson also contends that Selective’s plea in bar violated Rule 3:8 and that this Court
should amend Rule 3:8. Although the record demonstrates that Johnson challenged Selective’s
plea in bar on several grounds, she did not challenge the sufficiency of the plea in bar under Rule
3:8 in the circuit court. Accordingly, she failed to preserve her arguments and we will not
consider them on appeal. Rule 5A:18 (“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a
basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.”); see
also Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019) (“Procedural-default principles require
that the argument asserted on appeal be the same as the contemporaneous argument at trial.”).
                                                 -5-
        “A collateral attack, in general, is an indirect challenge that seeks to avoid the effects of a

prior judgment in a subsequent proceeding.” Saunders v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 793, 805

(2014) (quoting Sutherland v. Rasnake, 169 Va. 257, 266-67 (1937)). When the 21-day period to

challenge a final order passes, a party can avoid the effect of a prior judgment by collateral attack on

the judgment. Nelson v. Middlesex Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 496, 509-10 (2018) (“Rule 1:1

also does not prevent a party from collaterally attacking a judgment entered more than twenty-one

days earlier if it is void because it was procured by fraud or the circuit court that entered the

judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”). “A ‘collateral attack is allowed only where the

judgment is void, a void judgment being a judgment rendered without jurisdiction.’” Saunders, 62

Va. App. at 805 (quoting Fraser v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 775, 777 (1993)).

        Here, 21 days have passed since the 2018 order was entered, so to avoid the order’s effect,

Johnson must collaterally attack the order. We address this attack in the next section.

                B. Johnson Waived Her Challenge to the Validity of the 2018 Order

        In her collateral attack of the 2018 order, Johnson contends that the order is void ab initio

because it was entered in violation of her constitutional right to due process. Her amended opening

brief, however, does not offer any legal authority or argument in support of her conclusion.

        “Rule 5A:20(e) requires that the appellant’s opening brief include ‘principles of law and

authorities’ supporting each assignment of error.” Moncrieffe v. Deno, 76 Va. App. 488, 503

(2023). “‘[W]hen a party’s “failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e)” is

significant,’ this Court may treat the question as waived.” Conley v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App.

658, 681 (2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Bartley v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 740, 744

(2017)). Furthermore, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a

litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Bartley, 67 Va. App. at 746 (quoting Sneed v. Bd. of

Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010)). “Nor is it this Court’s

                                                   -6-
‘function to comb through the record . . . to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [appellant’s]

claims.’” Alwan v. Alwan, 70 Va. App. 599, 612 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Burke

v. Catawba Hosp., 59 Va. App. 828, 838 (2012)). “[W]here a party fails to develop an argument

in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”

Bartley, 67 Va. App. at 746 (quoting Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615).

        Johnson’s amended opening brief does not offer any explanation as to how the 2018 order

violated her right to due process, let alone any legal authority or analysis in support of her

contention. These deficiencies are significant, and we therefore hold that Johnson waived her

challenge to the circuit court’s ruling that the 2018 order is a valid order. Conley, 74 Va. App. at

681.

                   C. Res Judicata Only Bars Johnson’s Claims Against Selective

        Given the validity of the 2018 order, we turn to Johnson’s argument that res judicata does

not bar her current claims against Rock Solid and Selective because the 2018 order is not a

judgment on the merits. For the following reasons, we conclude that res judicata bars Johnson’s

claims against Selective but does not bar her personal injury claim against Rock Solid.

        “Res judicata involves both issue and claim preclusion.” Lane, 297 Va. at 653 (quoting

Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC, 293 Va. 135, 142 (2017)). We discuss claim preclusion and issue

preclusion separately, below.

                                       1. Claim Preclusion

        “Rule 1:6 embodies the common law principle of claim preclusion in Virginia.” Id. at 654.

Rule 1:6(a) provides:

                A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a
                transaction, or an occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final
                judgment, is forever barred from prosecuting any second or
                subsequent civil action against the same opposing party or parties
                on any claim or cause of action that arises from that same conduct,
                transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights
                                                  -7-
                asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised in the prior
                lawsuit, and regardless of the legal elements or the evidence upon
                which any claims in the prior proceeding depended, or the
                particular remedies sought. A claim for relief pursuant to this rule
                includes those set forth in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim
                or third-party pleading.

        “Claim preclusion bars successive litigation where . . . there has been a final judgment on

the merits.” Alexander v. Cobb, 298 Va. 380, 388 (2020). “A judgment is on the merits when it

amounts to a decision as to the respective rights and liabilities of the parties.” Id. (quoting Storm

v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 199 Va. 130, 134 (1957)). “[A] dismissal with prejudice generally

‘is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been prosecuted to a final

disposition adverse to the plaintiff.’” Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women, P.L.C., 272

Va. 87, 92-93 (2006) (quoting Reed v. Liverman, 250 Va. 97, 99 (1995)). However, a dismissal

with prejudice “does not always constitute an adjudication on the merits or operate as a bar to a

subsequent action.” Id. at 93. “Rather, we have stated that the effect of the words ‘with

prejudice’ must ‘be considered in light of the circumstances in which they are used.’” Id.

(quoting Reed, 250 Va. at 100).

        Here, the 2018 order dismissed Johnson’s original claims with prejudice for lack of

standing and failure to join necessary parties. “[S]tanding to maintain an action is a preliminary

jurisdictional issue having no relation to the substantive merits of an action.” Morgan v. Bd. Of

Supervisors of Hanover Cnty., ___ Va. ___, ___ (Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting McClary v. Jenkins, 299

Va. 216, 221 (2020)). Furthermore, “a court lacks the power to proceed with a suit unless all

necessary parties are properly before the court.” Boasso America Corp. v. Zoning Adm’r of City

of Chesapeake, 293 Va. 203, 211 (2017) (quoting Asch v. Friends of Mt. Vernon Yacht Club, 251

Va. 89, 91 (1996)). Although the 2018 order dismissed Johnson’s original claims with prejudice,

it did so based on issues related to the circuit court’s ability to hear those claims and did not

adjudicate them on the merits. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred by ruling that
                                                 -8-
Johnson’s current claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because the 2018 order

was not a final judgment on the merits. Alexander, 298 Va. at 388.

                                         2. Issue Preclusion

        We next address whether the circuit court erred by ruling that Johnson’s claims were also

barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. “Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel,

precludes ‘parties to the first action and their privies’ from relitigating ‘any issue of fact actually

litigated and essential to a valid and final judgment in the first action.’” Lane, 297 Va. at 654

(quoting Funny Guy, LLC, 293 Va. at 142). To establish issue preclusion:

                (1) the parties [or their privies] to the two proceedings must be the
                same, (2) the issue of fact sought to be litigated must have been
                actually litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) the issue of fact must
                have been essential to the prior judgment, and (4) the prior
                proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment against the
                party against whom the doctrine is sought to be applied.

Id. at 654-55 (alteration in original) (quoting Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64 (1995)).

        Johnson, Rock Solid, and Selective America were parties to Johnson’s original action and

are parties to her current action as well. The record also demonstrates that Selective Way and

Selective Group stand in privity with Selective America because Johnson’s claims against all

three defendants arise from their alleged obligation to Johnson under the same provision of Rock

Solid’s insurance policy. See Raley v. Haider, 286 Va. 164, 172 (2013) (“The touchstone of

privity . . . is that a party’s interest is so identical with another that representation by one party is

representation of the other’s legal right.” (quoting State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,

261 Va. 209, 214 (2001))). Furthermore, as we hold above, the 2018 order is a valid, final

judgment against her. Accordingly, whether Johnson’s current claims are barred by issue

preclusion turns on whether the parties seek to relitigate an issue of fact actually litigated and

essential to the 2018 order.

                                                    -9-
        The 2018 order dismissed Johnson’s claims for lack of standing “because she [was] not a

beneficiary under Rock Solid’s insurance policy, [did] not have a contract with Rock Solid’s

insurance company, [t]here [was] no privity of contract, and [she] ha[d] suffered no loss or any

out-of-pocket expenses.” As the circuit court found, Johnson’s current claims against Selective,

however characterized, are based on its alleged bad faith refusal to pay her medical expense benefits

under Rock Solid’s insurance policy. Her claims therefore necessarily require her to prove that

Selective was obligated to pay her medical expense benefits even though the 2018 order determined

that she was not a beneficiary of Rock Solid’s insurance policy. Accordingly, Johnson’s current

claims against Selective seek to relitigate an issue of fact essential to the 2018 order and are barred

by issue preclusion.

        Unlike her claims against Selective, Johnson’s personal injury claim against Rock Solid

does not turn on whether she was a beneficiary of its insurance policy, but rather its alleged failure

to warn her of wax upon which she slipped. To prove her case against Rock Solid, Johnson would

not need to relitigate any fact essential to the 2018 order. The only factual finding made by the

2018 order arguably related to Johnson’s personal injury claim against Rock Solid was that she

suffered “no loss or any out-of-pocket expenses.” That finding, however, was not essential to the

2018 order, which dismissed Johnson’s claims for lack of standing because she was not a

beneficiary under Rock Solid’s insurance policy. Therefore, Johnson’s personal injury claim

against Rock Solid is not barred by claim preclusion or issue preclusion, and the circuit court erred

by dismissing her personal injury claim against Rock Solid.

                  II. Johnson Did Not Preserve Her Request for Default Judgment

        In her final argument, Johnson argues that the circuit erred by failing to enter default

judgment against all defendants sua sponte for their failure to respond to discovery. She failed to

preserve this argument for appeal. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis

                                                 - 10 -
for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,

except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18.

“The purpose of th[e] contemporaneous objection requirement [in Rule 5A:18] is to allow the

trial court a fair opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appeals

and retrials.” Hogle v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 743, 755 (2022) (quoting Creamer v.

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195 (2015)). “If a party fails to timely and specifically object,

[she] waives [her] argument on appeal.” Id.

        Although the record shows that Johnson moved to compel responses to her discovery

requests, she did not request that the circuit court sanction Rock Solid or Selective for their alleged

failure to respond, nor did she move for default judgment against them. She therefore failed to

preserve her argument, and we will not consider it on appeal. Rule 5A:18.

                                             CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment with respect to

defendants Selective America, Selective Way, and Selective Group. We reverse the circuit

court’s judgment with respect to Johnson’s personal injury claim against Rock Solid. Johnson’s

claim against Rock Solid is not barred by res judicata, and we remand this claim for the trial

court to consider the claim on its merits.

                                                   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                                                 - 11 -