Court Opinion

ID: 9961980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 12:01:52.405626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:37.877968
License: Public Domain

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                            Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

            PRESCOTT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
         part. In the underlying criminal trial against the peti-
         tioner, Cecil Grant, the state’s case was predicated
         almost entirely on two pieces of evidence. First, it relied
         on the testimony and credibility of Gustin Douglas. He
         implicated the petitioner in the robbery and shooting
         at the housing complex where Douglas lived, while
         simultaneously attempting to minimize or negate his
         own involvement and culpability in the commission of
         the charged offenses. Second, the state’s case relied
         heavily on the victim’s eyewitness identification of the
         petitioner as the shooter.
            The petitioner testified at trial that he was not present
         during the commission of the attempted robbery and
         shooting and that, instead, he had been driven by his
         brother’s fiancée, Vanessa Cooper, along with her chil-
         dren, to his residence in a different part of Hartford
         shortly before the shooting. Through his trial counsel,
         he also attempted to assert that Douglas participated
         in the robbery but had implicated the petitioner in order
         to minimize or eliminate his own culpability. Finally,
         the petitioner attempted to challenge the reliability of
         the victim’s eyewitness identification of him as the
         shooter.
            The majority and I apparently1 agree that the petition-
         er’s trial counsel, Kirstin B. Coffin, rendered constitu-
         tionally deficient performance in two ways. First, Cof-
         fin’s performance was constitutionally inadequate
           1
              The majority is not entirely clear regarding whether Coffin’s failure to
         investigate or interview the other potential alibi witnesses amounted to
         constitutionally deficient performance. Such a conclusion may be inferred
         from the majority’s statement in part II C of its opinion that, ‘‘we agree
         with the petitioner that Coffin should have, at a minimum, met with and
         interviewed Cooper’s children to ascertain the potential benefit, if any, to
         having them testify on the petitioner’s behalf.’’ That statement is then fol-
         lowed by a determination that the petitioner nonetheless was not prejudiced.
         See part II C of the majority opinion.
            It is equally plausible, however, that the majority merely assumes deficient
         performance and rejects the petitioner’s claim on the prejudice prong of
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                          Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       because she failed to review phone records for Douglas’
       cell phone,2 which, according to Douglas, the petitioner
       used to facilitate the commission of the crimes of which
       the petitioner was convicted. Second, Coffin’s perfor-
       mance was constitutionally defective because she failed
       to investigate and present the testimony of one or more
       of Cooper’s children as alibi witnesses.
          Despite these instances of deficient performance, the
       majority concludes that they did not prejudice the peti-
       tioner. In doing so, the majority does not adequately
       account for the extent to which the phone records
       undermine the credibility of Douglas’ testimony. The
       majority also does not adequately consider the exis-
       tence of a number of factors that reduce the reliability
       of the victim’s eyewitness identification testimony.
       Finally, the majority underestimates the importance
       that one or more additional alibi witnesses would have
       had on the strength of the petitioner’s alibi defense by
       simply dismissing them as cumulative.
         Accordingly, although I agree with the results
       reached in parts I, II A and III of the majority opinion,
       for the reasons that follow, I do not agree with the
       majority’s conclusions in parts II B and C of its opinion
       that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was
       prejudiced by Coffin’s deficient performance under the
       standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
       Strickland. See Crocker v. Commissioner of Correction, 220 Conn. App.
       567, 583, 300 A.3d 607 (‘‘[b]ecause both prongs [of the Strickland test] . . .
       must be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may [deny]
       a petitioner’s claim if he fails to meet either prong’’ (internal quotation
       marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 911, 303 A.3d 10 (2023). Because
       I would conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient with respect to
       her investigation of additional alibi witnesses, I include that analysis as part
       of my discussion of the petitioner’s claim.
         2
           The police identified Douglas’ mother as the actual subscriber of the
       cell phone later associated with Douglas. When questioned by the police,
       Douglas’ mother told them that the cell phone was used by Douglas. For
       ease of discussion, I refer to the phone as Douglas’.
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                           Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).3 I
         reach the contrary conclusion and would reverse the
         judgment of the habeas court and remand the matter for
         a new criminal trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent
         from the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of
         the habeas court.
             I begin with a brief discussion of the instances of
         deficient performance, which is necessary for a more
         thorough understanding of how they prejudiced the
         petitioner’s defense. Common to both aspects of
         defense counsel’s deficient performance was her failure
         to properly investigate readily available evidence and
         witnesses, without a reasonable strategic reason for so
         doing. See Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306
         Conn. 664, 680, 51 A.3d 948 (2012) (‘‘counsel has a
         duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
         reasonable decision that makes particular investiga-
         tions unnecessary,’’ and ‘‘a particular decision not to
         investigate must be directly assessed for reasonable-
         ness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure
         of deference to counsel’s judgments’’ (internal quota-
         tion marks omitted)); Baillargeon v. Commissioner of
         Correction, 67 Conn. App. 716, 721, 789 A.2d 1046 (2002)
         (‘‘[b]ecause a defendant often relies heavily on coun-
         sel’s independent evaluation of the charges and
         defenses, the right to effective assistance of counsel
         includes an adequate investigation of the case’’ (internal
         quotation marks omitted)).
           Counsel first rendered deficient performance by fail-
         ing to review Douglas’ cell phone records, which were
            3
              In Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 687, the United States
         Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for evaluating claims of ineffec-
         tive assistance of counsel: ‘‘First, [a petitioner] must show that counsel’s
         performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors
         so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
         [petitioner] by the [s]ixth [a]mendment [to the constitution of the United
         States]. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient performance
         prejudiced the defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
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                         Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       of particular importance because Douglas asserted that
       the petitioner had used his cell phone to facilitate the
       attempted robbery by calling various businesses,
       including Pizza 101, the victim’s employer. The phone
       records had been obtained by the police prior to trial
       and were readily available for review by the defense.
       If defense counsel had reviewed the phone records and
       investigated the phone numbers contained therein, she
       would have learned that Douglas’ phone was not used
       to call Pizza 101 prior to the robbery and shooting or any
       other identifiable businesses. Having that information
       would have allowed defense counsel to directly contra-
       dict not only the testimony of Douglas but the corrobo-
       rating testimony provided by Detective William J. Siemi-
       onko of the Hartford Police Department.4
          It is, of course, axiomatic that, to demonstrate defi-
       cient performance, a petitioner must overcome the
       strong presumption that a ‘‘challenged action might be
       considered sound trial strategy.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466
       U.S. 689; see also Skakel v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, 329 Conn. 1, 31, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied
       sub nom. Connecticut v. Skakel,           U.S.     , 139 S.
       Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019). In the present case, the
       petitioner met this burden because Coffin’s explanation
       for not pursuing Douglas’ phone records was not
       founded on any sound trial strategy but, rather, was
       objectively unreasonable.
          At the habeas trial, Coffin testified that, at the time
       of the petitioner’s criminal trial, the state had an ‘‘open
       file’’ policy, meaning that she had easy access to the
       phone records. Nevertheless, she admitted that she
       never reviewed the phone records herself, never hired
         4
           Siemionko testified at the criminal trial that the phone records showed
       that the phone associated with Douglas was used to ‘‘call Pizza 101 prior
       to the pizza deliver[y] by [the victim].’’
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                       Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         anyone to review them, and thus never considered offer-
         ing them into evidence at trial. When asked to explain
         the rationale for her inaction, she stated a general belief
         that, ‘‘[s]ometimes phone records can prove to be dan-
         gerous’’ and that, in this case, ‘‘we did have the evidence
         that the call was made from . . . Douglas’ phone, and
         I think I was just sticking with that.’’ A proper review
         of the phone records, however, would have proven any
         such evidence false. She also stated: ‘‘I didn’t want any
         other phone records to come in that could wind up
         hurting our defense.’’ When asked, however, if she had
         been aware of any other phone records that could have
         been introduced, she responded, ‘‘[n]o.’’
            ‘‘[S]trategic choices made after less than complete
         investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
         reasonable professional judgments support the limita-
         tions on investigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
         ted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 306
         Conn. 680. Here, I agree with the majority’s assessment
         that ‘‘fear of discovering evidence that might harm the
         client is not a proper basis for neglecting to investigate’’
         because a minimally competent defense attorney would
         want to assess all of the available information about a
         case, both inculpatory and exculpatory, to formulate
         and execute an effective defense. See part II B of the
         majority opinion. I conclude that Coffin, by not even
         seeking to review the phone records, failed to exercise
         objectionably reasonable professional judgment, and
         her inaction amounts to deficient performance.
            I now turn to the alibi defense. The petitioner testified
         at the criminal trial that, although he was at the housing
         complex on the night of the assault, he had been there
         visiting with Cooper, his brother’s fiancée, and her chil-
         dren, and that they all drove him home prior to the
         events at issue. In addition to the petitioner’s testimony,
         the defense called Cooper, who testified that the peti-
         tioner had visited with them at the housing complex
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       on the relevant date and that she and the children had
       driven the petitioner home and dropped him off prior
       to the time the assault occurred. Coffin did not call to
       testify at trial either of Cooper’s children, who were
       fifteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the
       shooting, nor did she or her investigator even interview
       them as potential witnesses. There is no doubt that
       this failure constituted deficient performance under the
       facts of this case.

          As previously stated, ‘‘[i]nadequate pretrial investiga-
       tion can amount to deficient performance, satisfying
       prong one of Strickland, [because] [c]onstitutionally
       adequate assistance of counsel includes competent pre-
       trial investigation. . . . Although . . . counsel need
       not track down each and every lead or personally inves-
       tigate every evidentiary possibility before choosing a
       defense and developing it . . . [e]ffective assistance
       of counsel imposes an obligation [on] the attorney to
       investigate all surrounding circumstances of the case
       and to explore all avenues that may potentially lead to
       facts relevant to the defense of the case. . . . In other
       words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investiga-
       tions or to make a reasonable decision that makes
       particular investigations unnecessary.’’ (Citations
       omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner of Correction, 159
       Conn. App. 537, 546–47, 124 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 320
       Conn. 910, 128 A.3d 954 (2015).

         ‘‘If counsel makes strategic decisions after thorough
       investigation, those decisions are virtually unchallenge-
       able . . . . In particular, our habeas corpus jurispru-
       dence reveals several scenarios in which courts will
       not second-guess defense counsel’s decision not to
       investigate or call certain witnesses or to investigate
       potential defenses, such as when . . . counsel learns
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                       Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         of the substance of the witness’ testimony and deter-
         mines that calling that witness is unnecessary or poten-
         tially harmful to the case . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;
         internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 547.
            Although the decision whether to call a particular
         witness to testify is ordinarily a matter generally left
         to the discretion of trial counsel as a matter of trial
         strategy, it can constitute deficient performance not
         to call a particular witness if that otherwise strategic
         decision was unreasonable under the facts and circum-
         stances known. This is particularly true in deciding
         whether to call one or more alibi witnesses. Once Coffin
         made the decision to pursue an alibi defense, however,
         she had a duty to adequately investigate, at a minimum,
         the substance of any potential alibi witness’ testimony.
         That duty necessarily included interviewing Cooper’s
         children as potential witnesses, either herself or
         through an investigator.
            The present case is strikingly similar to our Supreme
         Court’s decision in Skakel v. Commissioner of Correc-
         tion, supra, 329 Conn. 47–61, in which that court held
         that trial counsel had rendered deficient performance
         because, despite alibi having been the primary defense,
         counsel failed to investigate and present testimony of
         an easily discoverable, disinterested alibi witness. As
         the court in Skakel stated, ‘‘[w]ith specific regard to the
         duty to investigate a defendant’s alibi defense, counsel
         is obligated to make all reasonable efforts to identify
         and interview potential alibi witnesses.’’ (Emphasis
         added.) Id., 35–36. The court made clear that simply
         deciding not to call an alibi witness without having first
         interviewed that witness was ‘‘objectively unreasonable
         because it was a decision made without undertaking a
         full investigation into whether [the witness] could assist
         in [the petitioner’s] defense. . . . By failing even to
         contact [the witness] . . . counsel abandoned his
         investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       fully informed decision with respect to [whether to have
       the witness testify] impossible.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Id., 36, quoting Towns v. Smith, 395
       F.3d 251, 259 (6th Cir. 2005). The court also identified
       a number of nonexclusive factors that a habeas court
       should consider ‘‘in determining whether counsel’s fail-
       ure to investigate and present the testimony of an addi-
       tional alibi witness or witnesses was reasonable under
       the circumstances. They include (1) the importance of
       the alibi to the defense . . . (2) the significance of the
       witness’ testimony to the alibi . . . (3) the ease with
       which the witness could have been discovered . . .
       and (4) the gravity of the criminal charges and the
       magnitude of the sentence that the petitioner faced.’’
       (Citations omitted.) Skakel v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, supra, 37.
          Here, Coffin knew from Cooper’s statement to the
       police, which was part of the police file, that her chil-
       dren purportedly were with Cooper and the petitioner
       when he was driven home. Accordingly, Coffin was
       aware of at least two additional potential alibi wit-
       nesses. Moreover, whereas Cooper arguably had a
       familial tie to the petitioner through his brother, to
       whom she was engaged, there was no indication in the
       record that the children had a familial relationship with
       the petitioner, and they potentially could have been
       viewed by the jury as more disinterested than Cooper
       and thus more believable. It is also entirely possible
       that the children’s testimony regarding the petitioner’s
       alibi may simply have been viewed as more credible
       than that offered by Cooper and the petitioner or that
       Cooper and the children’s collective testimony, if rela-
       tively consistent, would have rendered the proffered
       alibi defense overall more credible in the eyes of at least
       one of the jurors. See id., 51 (multiple alibi witnesses
       not necessarily cumulative and potentially corrobora-
       tive not only of alibi generally but also as to credibility
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                       Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         of each alibi witness). The younger of the two children
         testified at the habeas trial, and her testimony generally
         was consistent with Cooper’s account of events. Coun-
         sel’s failure even to interview the children so as to
         evaluate their demeanor as witnesses and ascertain the
         substance of their potential testimony was, as in Skakel,
         an objectively unreasonable strategic decision, espe-
         cially in light of the importance of the petitioner’s alibi
         defense, which directly countered the victim’s and
         Douglas’ identification of him as the perpetrator of the
         assault. See id., 37.
            The majority suggests that Coffin’s failure to conduct
         an adequate investigation of the children as potential
         additional alibi witnesses either did not amount to defi-
         cient performance or did not prejudice the defense
         because, at best, the witnesses only provided the peti-
         tioner with a partial alibi. A partial or incomplete alibi
         is one in which an alibi witness cannot testify with
         certainty that a criminal defendant was in his or her
         sight at the precise time that the crime was committed.
         I acknowledge that the court in Skakel observed that,
         ‘‘as a general rule, partial alibis are unconvincing.
         Indeed, it has been argued that a partial or incomplete
         alibi is not really an alibi in the truest sense . . .
         because it fails to account for a defendant’s where-
         abouts for at least some period of time during which
         the crime reasonably could have been committed by
         the defendant. Thus, when a true partial alibi is at issue,
         it is invariably the case that the defendant just as likely
         could have committed the crime during a period of time
         not covered by the alibi.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
         added.) Id., 68. Even a partial or incomplete alibi, how-
         ever, can be important evidence for the defense; particu-
         larly if the jury believes the alibi witness or witnesses
         presented and has no factual basis for considering
         whether the petitioner might have been able to commit
         the crime during a period not directly covered by the
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       alibi testimony. See Spearman v. Commissioner of Cor-
       rection, 164 Conn. App. 530, 571 n.27, 138 A.3d 378
       (alibi witnesses’ testimony concerning accused’s
       whereabouts immediately following crime could be
       helpful to defense to explain or bolster alibi), cert.
       denied, 321 Conn. 923, 138 A.3d 284 (2016).
          The petitioner testified that it was approximately a
       fifteen minute drive between the housing complex
       where the assault occurred and his home, that he was
       driven home by Cooper accompanied by the children,
       and that he was probably home by 10:45 p.m. He testi-
       fied that he remained home and was home around
       midnight when the assault occurred. On the basis of
       this testimony alone, the petitioner presented a ‘‘com-
       plete’’ alibi defense. Although Cooper testified that it
       was her son who drove when they dropped the peti-
       tioner off, she testified, consistent with the petitioner,
       that he was home shortly before 11 p.m. The majority
       correctly notes that Cooper’s daughter initially testified
       at the habeas trial that they dropped off the petitioner
       between 9 and 10 p.m., but she subsequently clarified
       that it was before 11 p.m. The state sought to discredit
       the alibi in the eyes of the jurors by highlighting the
       inconsistencies in Cooper’s and the petitioner’s ver-
       sions of events, such as who was driving, and by point-
       ing out that the petitioner claimed to be unaware of
       the date the assault occurred until he was arrested and
       yet claimed to recall the events of that day to formulate
       an alibi. The state never asked the petitioner or Cooper
       whether he had a car or some other means of returning
       to the housing project where the crime occurred after
       he was dropped off. Moreover, the state in its closing
       argument did not argue that the alibi defense offered
       was incomplete or only a partial alibi. In other words,
       it did not argue to the jury that the petitioner reasonably
       had an opportunity to commit the crime by returning
       to the scene after he was dropped off at home. If the
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                         Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          state was capable of making such an argument on the
          available facts, presumably it would have done so.
          Accordingly, because the majority’s ‘‘partial alibi’’ dis-
          cussion does not account for the petitioner’s own testi-
          mony and appears to speculate about a scenario unsup-
          ported by the record, I find it unpersuasive as a basis
          for rejecting the petitioner’s claim of deficient perfor-
          mance.
              As with her decision not to review the phone records,
          Coffin did not offer an objectively reasonable reason for
          her failure to investigate the additional alibi witnesses.
          Coffin testified at the habeas trial that her decision
          not to call Cooper’s children to testify was a strategic
          decision and that, generally, she avoids calling minors
          to testify if possible because of what she believed was
          a potential negative impact on the jury. Coffin stated:
          ‘‘It might look bad in front of the jury if the jury thinks
          you’re hauling in children to testify, and also they’d
          be—proved to be a little nervous [on the witness] stand
          or possibility of changing their story.’’ She also testified,
          however, that she did not know the ages of Cooper’s
          children, both of whom were teenagers at the time of
          the assault.
             ‘‘[S]trategic decisions of counsel, although not
          entirely immune from review, are entitled to substantial
          deference by the court.’’ Skakel v. Commissioner of
          Correction, supra, 329 Conn. 31. To warrant such defer-
          ence, however, a strategic decision must be objectively
          reasonable under the circumstances. See Jordan v.
          Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279, 291–92,
          267 A.3d 120 (2021) (‘‘our plenary review requires us,
          first, affirmatively to contemplate the possible strategic
          reasons that might have supported [trial counsel’s] deci-
          sions . . . and, second, to consider whether those rea-
          sons were objectively reasonable’’). Without knowing
          the ages of the children, or having spoken to the chil-
          dren, the concerns that Coffin voiced regarding calling
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       minor witnesses to testify amounted to pure speculation
       here, not an objectively reasonable strategy. Moreover,
       prior to deciding not to call them as witnesses, Coffin
       had no way of knowing what the substance of the chil-
       dren’s testimony might have been or whether, in fact,
       their stories would have mirrored that of Cooper. It
       would have been equally important to make sure they
       did not have details that could have been used by prose-
       cutors to counter the testimony of the petitioner or
       Cooper. In other words, Coffin did not have any factual
       basis on which to make a reasoned decision not to
       investigate the children as additional alibi witnesses,
       and her inaction, in my view, constituted deficient per-
       formance.

          In short, counsel’s performance was deficient, egre-
       giously so, in my view. She turned a blind eye to the
       phone records that could have been used to contradict
       the testimony given by two important state’s witnesses
       and, despite having elected to pursue an alibi defense,
       she failed to interview and evaluate two additional
       potential alibi witnesses. The majority nevertheless
       concludes that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
       either of these deficiencies prejudiced him such that a
       new trial is warranted. I part ways with the majority’s
       conclusion regarding application of the prejudice prong
       of Strickland and would instead conclude, for the rea-
       sons that follow, that counsel’s deficiencies, considered
       in the aggregate, demonstrate prejudice warranting a
       new trial in this matter.

          ‘‘An evaluation of the prejudice prong involves a con-
       sideration of whether there is a reasonable probability
       that, absent the errors, the [fact finder] would have had
       a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. . . . A reasonable
       probability is a probability sufficient to undermine con-
       fidence in the outcome. . . . We do not conduct this
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          inquiry in a vacuum, rather, we must consider the total-
          ity of the evidence before the judge or jury. . . . Fur-
          ther, we are required to undertake an objective review
          of the nature and strength of the state’s case. . . .
          [S]ome errors will have had pervasive effect on the
          inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the
          entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an
          isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion
          only weakly supported by the record is more likely to
          have been affected by errors than one with overwhelm-
          ing record support. . . . [A] court making the prejudice
          inquiry must ask if the [petitioner] has met the burden
          of showing that the decision reached would reasonably
          likely have been different absent the errors. . . .
             ‘‘In other words, [i]n assessing prejudice under
          Strickland, the question is not whether a court can
          be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the
          outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt
          might have been established if counsel acted differently.
          . . . Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably
          likely the result would have been different. . . . The
          likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not
          just conceivable. . . . Notably, the petitioner must
          meet this burden not by use of speculation but by
          demonstrable realities.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) Mercer v. Commissioner of Correction, 222
          Conn. App. 713, 730–31, 306 A.3d 1073 (2023), cert.
          denied, 348 Conn. 953, 309 A.3d 303 (2024).
             The majority leans far too heavily on the word ‘‘sub-
          stantial’’ in the previously cited standard. The ‘‘substan-
          tial’’ likelihood requirement has been used by our
          Supreme Court and comes from the United States
          Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562
          U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011), in which
          that court stated that ‘‘Strickland asks whether it is
          reasonably likely the result would have been different.
          . . . This does not require a showing that counsel’s
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                          Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       actions more likely than not altered the outcome, but
       the difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard
       and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and
       matters only in the rarest case. . . . The likelihood of
       a different result must be substantial, not just conceiv-
       able.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Id., 111–12. In Jones v. State, 328 Conn. 84,
       102, 177 A.3d 534 (2018), our Supreme Court described
       the Strickland prejudice standard as being ‘‘slightly
       more lenient than the more likely than not standard
       . . . .’’ Accordingly, courts considering whether a peti-
       tioner has met that burden should be cautious not to
       place too great a weight on the word ‘‘substantial.’’
          In the present case, in which I conclude that the
       petitioner has demonstrated that counsel’s perfor-
       mance was deficient in at least two different ways, it
       is appropriate in evaluating prejudice to consider the
       aggregate effect of counsel’s deficient performance on
       a jury’s consideration of the evidence as a whole and
       the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Although
       Connecticut courts have not expressly adopted this type
       of aggregate error approach in postconviction review;
       see Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn.
       640, 703, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017) (noting that it is ‘‘open
       question whether [claims of cumulative prejudicial
       effect of counsel’s deficient performance] are cogniza-
       ble under Connecticut law’’ and leaving issue unre-
       solved because petitioner failed to show any ‘‘prejudice
       to aggregate’’); the vast majority of federal jurisdictions
       and at least some state courts have done so in the
       context of conducting a prejudice analysis in accor-
       dance with Strickland.5 See Saunders v. Commissioner
         5
          See, e.g., Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005) (‘‘Strickland
       clearly allows the court to consider the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors
       in determining whether a defendant was prejudiced’’ (internal quotation
       marks omitted)); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (‘‘We
       need not decide whether one or another or less than all of these four errors
       would suffice, because Strickland directs us to look at the totality of the
       evidence before the judge or jury, keeping in mind that [s]ome errors . . .
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          of Correction, 343 Conn. 1, 9, 272 A.3d 169 (2022)
          (although federal and state court postconviction juris-
          prudence is not binding on this court, it is appropriate
          to look to such sources for guidance). Furthermore,
          Connecticut already considers the aggregate prejudicial
          effect of errors in reviewing claims of prosecutorial
          improprieties and whether those improprieties, consid-
          ered in total, deprived a defendant of a fair trial.6 It is
          consistent with that existing jurisprudence for our
          courts also to consider in habeas corpus proceedings
          the cumulative effect of multiple instances of constitu-
          tionally defective performance by criminal defense
          counsel.
          have . . . a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evi-
          dence, altering the entire evidentiary picture. . . . We therefore consider
          these errors in the aggregate.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
          omitted.)); see also Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 218, 675 S.E.2d 1 (2009)
          (‘‘combined effects of counsel’s errors are considered in determining the
          prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel’’); State v.
          Allen, 378 N.C. 286, 304, 861 S.E.2d 273 (2021) (adopting reasoning of lower
          court that, ‘‘because [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims focus on the
          reasonableness of counsel’s performance, courts can consider the cumula-
          tive effect of alleged errors by counsel’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
          rev’d in part on other grounds by State v. Walker,         N.C.    , 898 S.E.2d
          661 (2024); State v. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 608, 665 N.W.2d 305 (2003)
          (determining that counsel’s performance was deficient in three ways but
          concluding that ‘‘we need not look at the prejudice of each deficient act
          or omission in isolation, because we conclude that the cumulative effect
          undermines our confidence in the outcome of the trial’’).
             Only the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth
          Circuits have expressly disallowed aggregately assessing an attorney’s errors
          in determining whether there is Strickland prejudice. See B. Means, Postcon-
          viction Remedies (2023) § 30:3 (discussing cumulative error doctrine in
          context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and collecting cases).
             6
               ‘‘[W]hether the defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impro-
          prieties], therefore, depends on whether there is a reasonable likelihood
          that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the sum total of
          the improprieties.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
          State v. Weatherspoon, 332 Conn. 531, 556, 212 A.3d 208 (2019); see also
          State v. Medrano, 131 Conn. App. 528, 553, 27 A.3d 52 (2011) (‘‘[h]aving
          determined that several of the prosecutor’s statements were improper . . .
          we now turn to whether those improprieties taken in the aggregate so
          infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due
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          Missing from the majority opinion is any significant
       discussion of the relative strength, or lack thereof, of
       the state’s case. It is axiomatic that our standard of
       review in evaluating prejudice requires us to ‘‘undertake
       an objective review of the nature and strength of the
       state’s case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mer-
       cer v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 222 Conn.
       App. 730. In part II B of its opinion, the majority cites
       to this court’s decision on direct appeal and states that
       ‘‘the cross corroboration of the testimony of Douglas
       and the victim presented a strong case against the peti-
       tioner.’’ See State v. Grant, 154 Conn. App. 293, 328–29,
       112 A.3d 175 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 928, 109
       A.3d 923 (2015). It is, however, precisely this inextrica-
       ble connection between the testimony of Douglas and
       the victim that renders Coffin’s deficient performance
       in the present case particularly harmful.
         If Coffin had properly investigated Douglas’ phone
       records, she would have learned that Douglas’ phone
       was not used on the night in question to call and case
       potential robbery victims, and most certainly not to call
       the pizza restaurant that employed the victim.7 This
       evidence would have contradicted Douglas’ testimony
       that the petitioner had used his phone to call and locate
       a target, which likely would have discredited him in
       the eyes of the jurors. It also contradicts and thus
       impeaches the corroborating testimony provided by Sie-
       mionko. Demonstrating to the jury that Douglas’ testi-
       mony about the petitioner using his phone to call vari-
       ous businesses was demonstrably incorrect would have
       process’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 308
       Conn. 604, 65 A.3d 503 (2013).
         7
           The majority states that Michael Udvardy, the private investigator who
       reviewed the phone records and provided a report based on his analysis of
       those phone records, testified that his analysis of Douglas’ phone records
       revealed that ‘‘Douglas’ phone probably did not call Pizza 101.’’ (Emphasis
       added.) See part II B of the majority opinion. Neither Udvardy’s report nor
       his testimony, however, equivocated about the fact that the phone records
       associated with Douglas revealed that the phone was not used to call
       Pizza 101.
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          raised substantial doubt as to whether he was being
          truthful about other events or simply was trying to shift
          blame away from himself. The phone records also show
          a gap in the use of Douglas’ phone during the time of
          the assault, which, if the jury did not believe that Doug-
          las had given the phone to the petitioner, supports a
          reasonable inference that Douglas was one of the assail-
          ants and had stopped using the phone during that period
          of time.
            A key defense strategy had been to shift suspicion
          for the assault to Douglas, whose phone number was
          the one provided to the victim as a contact and which
          number the victim called for directions just prior to
          the assault. Throughout his testimony, Douglas both
          inculpated and exculpated himself, placing himself in
          the vicinity of the assault at the time in question while
          shifting focus to the petitioner and Derek Newkirk.
          Although the majority appears to rely on the state’s
          argument seeking to limit the import of the phone
          records by suggesting that the petitioner could have
          used his own phone to call, this is pure speculation
          because no evidence was presented at trial that the
          petitioner used his own phone to call take-out busi-
          nesses on the night in question. There is no doubt that
          the petitioner’s attempt to raise reasonable doubt would
          have been substantially improved by using the cell
          phone records to impeach Douglas’ version of events.
             Additionally, although the majority properly rejects
          the petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were
          violated by the admission of the victim’s out-of-court
          identification or that Coffin rendered deficient perfor-
          mance in the manner in which she challenged the vic-
          tim’s identification of the defendant, that conclusion
          does not speak to the overall strength or weakness
          of the identification evidence. In other words, simply
          because the constitution does not prohibit the admis-
          sion of evidence pertaining to the victim’s identification
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       of the petitioner does not mean that its reliability is
       unassailable. As our Supreme Court recognized in State
       v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 49 A.3d 705 (2012), both
       scientific experts in the field of eyewitness identifica-
       tion and courts recognize that many factors can affect
       the accuracy of an eyewitness’ identification and subse-
       quent testimony. Of particular relevance to the present
       case is that ‘‘there is at best a weak correlation between
       a witness’ confidence in his or her identification and
       its accuracy . . . the reliability of an identification can
       be diminished by a witness’ focus on a weapon . . .
       high stress at the time of observation may render a
       witness less able to retain an accurate perception and
       memory of the observed events . . . cross-racial iden-
       tifications are considerably less accurate than same
       race identifications . . . [and] a person’s memory
       diminishes rapidly over a period of hours rather than
       days or weeks . . . .’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 237–38.
       For a number of reasons, I am persuaded that the record
       in the present case shows that the victim’s identification
       of the petitioner was not necessarily worthy of the
       weight placed on it by the majority.
          First, as The Innocence Project points out in its ami-
       cus brief, circumstances at the time of the assault raise
       doubts about the victim’s ability to make an accurate
       identification. The victim testified that she had never
       seen either man before that night. They did not stand
       near her window on the driver’s side of her vehicle, but
       instead she viewed them only through the passenger
       side window of her car. She was only able to observe
       her assailants for a brief time, two or three minutes at
       best, before one of them drew a gun and attempted to
       open the passenger side door. Moreover, she also
       agreed with defense counsel that, during that brief time,
       her attention was split between the two men. The
       assault occurred at night, the lighting around the hous-
       ing complex was less than ideal,8 and the closest of the
        8
            The victim testified that the lighting ‘‘was fair.’’
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                             Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          men was five or six feet away, observable only through
          the passenger window of the vehicle.
             Second, there were problems with the victim’s out-
          of-court identification of the petitioner. The victim’s
          identification of the petitioner did not occur until more
          than fourteen weeks after the assault, which reflects a
          significant passage of time between the victim’s obser-
          vation of the petitioner and her subsequent identifica-
          tion of him in a photographic array. It is well settled
          that, because memories fade over time, an extended
          period of time between a crime and the subsequent
          identification of the perpetrator can render an identifi-
          cation less reliable, particularly if there was not an
          ample opportunity to observe the perpetrator. See id.,
          238 (‘‘a person’s memory diminishes rapidly over a
          period of hours rather than days or weeks’’); cf. State
          v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 555, 747 A.2d 487 (2000) (‘‘[t]he
          three month time period that had elapsed between the
          crime and the identification was deemed to be ‘‘long
          . . . [but] any negative aspect of both the degree of
          attention and the time between the crime and the con-
          frontation is far outweighed by the opportunity to view
          and the level of certainty of the witness’ identification’’
          (internal quotation marks omitted)).
             There were also problems with the administration of
          the photographic arrays shown to the victim. Detective
          Anthony Pia of the Hartford Police Department pre-
          pared the photographic arrays, each of which consisted
          of eight photos on a single page. One array contained
          a photo of the petitioner, and the other a photo of
          Newkirk, each of whom Pia knew was a suspect. Pia
          also administered the arrays to the victim. Thus, the
          police did not follow a double-blind or sequential identi-
          fication procedure.9 As our Supreme Court recognized
            9
              ‘‘In a simultaneous array, all of the photographs are shown to the witness
          at one time. In a sequential array, the photographs are shown to the witness
          one at a time.’’ State v. Williams, 146 Conn. App. 114, 129 n.16, 75 A.3d 668
          (2013), aff’d, 317 Conn. 691, 119 A.3d 1194 (2015). A double-blind identifica-
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                          Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       in State v. Guilbert, supra, 306 Conn. 253, the use of a
       simultaneous and single-blind identification procedure,
       as was done in the present case, renders the resulting
       identification less reliable. This is because double-blind
       administration procedures ‘‘avoid the possibility of
       influencing the witness, whether intentionally or unin-
       tentionally, and thereby tainting the accuracy of any
       resulting identification.’’ State v. Marquez, 291 Conn.
       122, 167, 967 A.2d 56, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 895, 130 S.
       Ct. 237, 175 L. Ed. 2d 163 (2009). In addition, the victim
       was Hispanic whereas the petitioner and Newkirk were
       black. This raises well recognized concerns regarding
       the reliability of cross-racial identifications. See State
       v. Guilbert, supra, 306 Conn. 238 (‘‘cross-racial identifi-
       cations are considerably less accurate than same race
       identifications’’).
          Significantly, although the victim identified the pho-
       tos of the petitioner and Newkirk on the two photo-
       graphic arrays, she circled each of their photos and
       wrote on the instruction sheet that accompanied the
       array that the circled photo ‘‘is the guy that shot me,’’
       which raises doubts about the accuracy of the victim’s
       memory of the events.10 With respect to the petitioner’s
       photo in the array, he was the only person wearing a
       hoodie, a distinct item of clothing that the victim identi-
       fied to police immediately after the assault that both
       assailants were wearing. Furthermore, and signifi-
       cantly, although the police were aware of Douglas’ close
       tion procedure means that the person administering the photographic array
       to the witness also does not know the identity of the suspect. State v.
       Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 42, 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225, 131
       S. Ct. 1479, 179 L. Ed. 2d 316 (2011).
          10
             I recognize that the state charged the petitioner as both a principal and
       accessory with regard to the assault, and, therefore, whether he or Newkirk
       was the shooter would not have mattered with respect to his criminal
       liability. That fact, however, does not minimize whatever confusion the
       victim may have exhibited in reviewing the photographic arrays and whether
       this was a result of a diminishment in her memories of the assault or a lack
       of certainty regarding her identification of the petitioner.
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          connection to the assault and the evidence demonstra-
          ting that he could have been one of the perpetrators,
          his photo was never presented to the victim in a photo-
          graphic array.
             Third, with respect to the victim’s in-court identifi-
          cation, it is reasonable to conclude that it may have
          been ‘‘tainted,’’ and thus rendered less reliable, by many
          of the problems already identified regarding the out-of-
          court identification. See generally State v. Dickson, 322
          Conn. 410, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (discussing potential
          that in-court identifications may be tainted by sugges-
          tive out-of-court identifications), cert. denied, 582 U.S.
          922, 137 S. Ct. 2263, 198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017). Given all
          of these issues with the identification of the petitioner,
          coupled with the lack of any physical or forensic evi-
          dence tying the petitioner to the assault, I would con-
          clude that the state’s case was not particularly strong
          and thus far ‘‘more likely to have been affected by errors
          . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v.
          Commissioner of Correction, supra, 222 Conn. App.
          730.
             With respect to counsel’s deficient performance in
          failing to review Douglas’ phone records, the majority
          minimizes the import of those records. A review of the
          phone records would have demonstrated that Siemi-
          onko incorrectly testified that the records showed that
          the pizza was ordered using Douglas’ phone, a fact that
          the prosecutor highlighted during his closing argument,
          and, more importantly, would have provided support
          for the defense theory that Douglas had testified inaccu-
          rately about the petitioner using his phone to shift blame
          away from himself. Although the state suggests that the
          petitioner could have used his own phone to place the
          pizza order but also gave Douglas’ number on the order
          to mask his involvement, it does not account for the
          reality that the state’s theory of the case was that Doug-
          las’ credible testimony about the details leading up to
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                           Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       the assault helped to bolster the victim’s identification
       of the petitioner and Newkirk. Any impeachment of
       Douglas’ testimony would have been important to the
       defense efforts to sever this connection in the minds
       of the jurors.11
          The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,
       and the majority further conclude that Coffin’s failure
       to investigate additional alibi witnesses did not preju-
       dice the petitioner. The majority implicitly accepts Cof-
       fin’s explanation that her choice to call one alibi witness
       was strategic, and that any additional witnesses would
       have been merely cumulative of that testimony and thus
       unlikely to have changed the outcome of the petitioner’s
       trial. An alibi defense, however, certainly may be ren-
       dered more believable by a jury if more than one alibi
       witness is presented who can account for the petition-
       er’s whereabouts at or about the time of the crime. See
       Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 329 Conn.
       51. This is particularly true where, as in this case, the
       sole alibi witness offered, Cooper, was not a disinter-
       ested observer but the fiancée of the petitioner’s brother
       and, thus, less likely to be believed by the jury. See
       id. Here, as previously stated, counsel failed even to
       interview the other potential alibi witnesses to deter-
       mine their precise relationship with the petitioner or
       whether one would be more persuasive than Cooper.
       Certainly, at some point, a court could exclude, as
         11
            The majority downplays the significance of the phone records evidence
       as not directly contradicting other aspects of Douglas’ testimony and, thus,
       not likely to have had an impact on the jury. It is true that a jury may
       ‘‘believe all or only part of a witness’ testimony . . . [and that the] jury [is]
       free to credit one version of events over the other . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) State v. Douglas C., 195 Conn. App. 728, 741, 227 A.3d 532
       (2020), aff’d, 345 Conn. 421, 285 A.3d 1067 (2022). It is equally true, however,
       that, if a jury believes that a witness has been untruthful as to one aspect
       of his testimony, this can raise reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the
       remainder of his testimony, particularly in a case such as this one in which
       a key defense theory was that Douglas was attempting to shift blame away
       from himself to the petitioner.
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          ‘‘needless,’’ multiple alibi witnesses as cumulative.
          (Emphasis added.) Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3. Multiple
          alibi witnesses, however, are not per se cumulative, as
          the majority suggests. Nor is it ‘‘needless’’ to offer more
          than one alibi witness, particularly if, as here, the state
          was able through cross-examination to highlight some
          factual differences in the testimony of the petitioner
          and Cooper as to both the relevant time period that he
          was with her and the children and who actually drove
          the car when taking him home.
             Coffin’s failure to investigate Douglas’ phone records
          compromised her ability to impeach him as a witness
          and to lessen his credibility in the eyes of the jurors,
          making it less likely that the jury would regard his
          testimony and cooperation with the police as self-serv-
          ing and intended to deflect suspicion from himself. In
          other words, Coffin’s error significantly limited the peti-
          tioner’s ability to cast Douglas as one of the victim’s
          assailants. Moreover, Coffin’s failure to call any addi-
          tional alibi witnesses weakened the petitioner’s closely
          related defense that he was not even present at the
          time of the shooting and therefore could not have been
          one of the perpetrators.
            Thus, Coffin’s deficiencies, considered in the aggre-
          gate, significantly compromised both prongs of the
          defense strategy, and, given the weaknesses in the
          state’s case, I conclude that the petitioner satisfied his
          burden of demonstrating that there was a reasonable
          probability that, in the absence of these errors, at least
          one juror could have had reasonable doubt respecting
          his guilt, changing the outcome of the trial.
             I respectfully dissent from the decision of the major-
          ity to affirm the judgment of the habeas court.