Court Opinion

ID: 9860293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:17:23.459615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:20:31.323252
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring: I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly commenced defendant’s trial in absentia based upon a showing that defendant had failed to appear in court on her scheduled trial date after having been previously advised of the trial date and of the consequences of her failure to appear. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s contention that the evidence offered by the State to prove that defendant was willfully absent satisfied the requirements of section 115 — 4.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 — 4.1(a) (West 1996)). Rather, I would hold that, under the circumstances presented by this case, the trial judge properly proceeded with a trial in absentia as an exercise of his inherent authority to control his own docket. The majority asserts that the State may establish a prima facie case that the defendant is willfully absent from court by demonstrating that the defendant: (1) was advised of the trial date; (2) was advised that failure to appear could result in trial in absentia; and (3) did not appear for trial when the case was called. 188 Ill. 2d at 343. According to the majority, by establishing such a prima facie case, the State has “ ‘affirmatively proven through substantial evidence that the defendant is willfully avoiding trial,’ ” thus permitting the court to proceed with trial in defendant’s absence. (Emphasis added.) 188 Ill. 2d at 341, quoting 725 ILCS 5/115 — 4.1(a) (West 1996). On the contrary, the majority’s conclusion is only possible by ignoring the two most important words of the statute. The fact that a defendant fails to appear at trial is affirmative proof only that defendant did not appear at trial — nothing more. Defendant’s absence at trial is equally consistent with her having been in an automobile accident on her way to the courthouse as with willful avoidance of trial. Likewise, evidence that a defendant received routine admonitions about the consequences of her failure to appear at trial, and then failed to appear in court, can hardly be characterized as substantial. Thus, the prima facie case which this court holds sufficient to justify a trial in absentia actually falls far short of the requirement which the statute purports to impose upon the courts of this state. Despite my finding that the statutory requirements were not satisfied in this case, however, I nonetheless concur in the majority’s judgment that the trial court had the authority to proceed as it did. I reach this result due to my emphatic agreement with the majority’s analysis of the practical consequences of a contrary rule. The majority writes: “[W]ithout the use of a prima facie standard, the State may confront a ‘logical dilemma’ in having to prove a negative to establish that defendant is willfully absent from his or her trial. It would be highly impractical for the State to negate with evidence the many conceivable explanations a defendant might present to excuse his or her absence from court. Under defendant’s rationale, as long as the reasons for defendant’s absence remain unknown, the State would be prevented from proceeding to trial, even if such uncertainty lasted for hours, days, months, or years. Accepting defendant’s argument could potentially impose a crippling burden upon the court system and pose a danger to the orderly administration of judicial process.” 188 Ill. 2d at 345. Accordingly, in light of the very real dangers pointed out by the majority, I would hold that, to the extent that the statute would prevent a court from proceeding with a trial in absentia after the State establishes a prima facie case of defendant’s willful absence, the statute “unconstitutionally infringes upon a trial judge’s authority to control his docket.” People v. Flores, 104 Ill. 2d 40, 49 (1984). Accordingly, I concur.