Court Opinion

ID: 9794106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:59:28.899367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:49.506761
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J., Concurring.
I concur in the conclusion reached in the majority opinion upon the sole ground that the failure to file a claim as required by section 2.801 of the School Code is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement or maintenance of an action in either the justice’s or superior court.
I do not agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that certiorari will not lie to annul a void judgment of a justice’s court where such void judgment has been affirmed on appeal to the superior court without a trial de novo, and I am of the opinion that a writ of certiorari should issue by this court to annul a void judgment of an inferior court in every case in which there is no remedy by appeal to this court.
The essential issue presented on review by certiorari of a judgment of a justice’s court is whether or not that judgment is void; that is, did the court have jurisdiction to render it ? If it did not, the judgment may be set aside when the remedy of certiorari is invoked. That is true whether the case is *362criminal or civil, and whether the appeal is on issues of law alone,'or of both law and fact, arid whether a new trial or a trial de novo is had in the superior court or the justice’s court.
It is stated in the majority opinion that certiorari lies if the court exceeds its jurisdiction. That may be amplified by the broader proposition that a judgment which is void because of a lack or excess of jurisdiction may be directly or collaterally attacked at any time or any place, and there is no sound reason why certiorari should not be available as the proper mode of attack. As stated in 15 Cal. Jur. 49:
“Generally speaking, if a judgment is void it is subject to collateral impeachment. It has been said that ‘A judgment absolutely void may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally whenever it presents itself, either by parties or strangers. It is simply a nullity, and can be neither a basis nor evidence of any right whatever. ’ ’ ’
It is true that certiorari will not lie if there is a remedy by appeal. But that is a mere procedural limitation. The matter ultimately rests in the sound discretion of the court. If the right of appeal has been exhausted without the judgment having been set aside or the time for appeal has expired, the judgment is nevertheless still as void as it ever was if the court lacked jurisdiction to render it. An affirmance on appeal by the appellate court cannot give it any vitality, even though the appellate court may have had jurisdiction to determine the issue. That follows because where a court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, no act of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon it; it is distinguishable from the case in which jurisdiction over the person is conferred by express or implied consent of the parties.
It is the firmly established rule which has been lost sight of in many cases, that a void judgment cannot be given life or validity by a mere affirmance thereof by an appellate court, even though that latter court may have had appellate jurisdiction to determine that issue. This court said in Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 109 Cal. 633, 642 [42 Pac. 295, 50 Am. St. Rep. 67]:
" It has been held that the affirmance by an appellate court of a void judgment imparts to it no validity; and especially if such affirmance is put upon grounds not touching its validity. ’ ’ And ag‘ain :
‘ ‘ Thus, where a void judgment had been affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Texas, the court said: ‘ The judgment *363of affirmance rendered by this court could not impart to it validity, but would itself be void by reason of the nullity of the judgment appealed from.’ ” (See, also, Ball v. Tolman, 135 Cal. 375 [67 Pac. 339, 87 Am. St. Rep. 110]; Bank of Italy v. Cadenasso, 206 Cal. 436 [274 Pac. 534].) It is said in Pennell v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 375, 378 [262 Pac. 48]: “The rule is well recognized that judgments void on their face may always be attacked either directly or collaterally. In Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 Pac. 648], it is said, quoting from Forbes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342, 348: “ ‘A judgment absolutely void may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally whenever it presents itself, either by parties or strangers. It is simply a nullity, and can be neither a basis nor evidence of any right whatever. ’ (See, also, Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 109 Cal. 638 [50 Am. St. Rep. 67, 42 Pac. 295], and Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290 [13 L. R. A. 275, 28 N. E. 260].) Moreover, the affirmance of a void judgment on appeal does not make it valid. (Ball v. Tolman, 135 Cal. 375 [87 Am. St. Rep. 110, 67 Pac. 339]; Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 109 Cal. 633 [50 Am. St. Rep. 67, 42 Pac. 295].) ”
The cases of Culver v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. 144, 145 [195 Pac. 1055]; Sherer v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. 354 [29 Pac. 716]; Roberts v. Police Court, 185 Cal. 65 [195 Pac. 1053]; and Moyer v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 330 [84 P. (2d) 240], should be disapproved. They rest upon the fallacious basis that certiorari is not available even though the justice’s court lacked jurisdiction, because the superior court had appellate jurisdiction. They ignore the principle that an affirmance of a void judgment does not validate it, and that such a judgment is subject to attack at any time. Furthermore, it should be observed that in all of those cases the writ was sought to review the order of the superior court rather than the judgment of' the justice’s court, and it was held merely that the superior court had appellate jurisdiction to determine whether the justice’s court had jurisdiction to render the judgment attacked. But even assuming that to be true, it appears from the authorities cited above that the affirmance by the superior court could not validate a void justice’s court judgment. Thus, we are back where we started from with a void judgment which may be directly or collaterally attacked at any time. Therefore, certiorari would lie to annul the void judgment of the justice’s court. The more reasonable *364approach would he to say that the action of both the superior court and the justice’s court is void and reachable on certiorari.
With those principles applied, no strange or unusual results are reached such as are indicated by the majority opinion. It is' there concluded that if a new trial is had in a superior court after appeal on issues of both law and fact, then certiorari lies if there is an excess of jurisdiction, because the superior court is acting as a substitute for the justice’s court. But if the appeal is on issues of law alone, certiorari does not lie because the superior court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction. There is no basis founded upon sound reasoning or considerations of practicability why the result should be different in one ease than in the other. The basic inquiry in both instances is whether the judgment is void because the court lacked jurisdiction. If it is void in one instance it is equally void in the other. The affirmance on appeal can no more imbue the void judgment with life when the appeal is on issues of both law and fact than when it is on issues of law alone. While it may be that a lack of jurisdiction in personam in the justice’s court could be cured by voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the superior court in a trial de novo, it is difficult to see how lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter could be so waived. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter can never be conferred by the consent of the parties. Thus, if the superior court is substituting for the justice’s court in holding a trial de novo on appeal and its jurisdiction over the subject matter is restricted by the same limits applicable to the justice’s court, the parties cannot possibly confer jurisdiction on the superior court by their failure to reasonably object to the jurisdiction. The cases of City of Santa Barbara v. Eldred, 95 Cal. 378 [30 Pac. 562]; Hart v. Carnall-Hopkins Co., 103 Cal. 132 [37 Pac. 196]; De Jarnatt v. Marquez, 132 Cal. 700 [64 Pac. 1090]; Nolan v. Hentig, 138 Cal. 281 [71 Pac. 440]; and City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306 [184 Pac. 397], overlook the fundamental issue involved; that is, if the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter the conduct of the parties cannot cure the defect.
The most glaring illustration of the unsound and unjust results which will flow from the principles announced in the decision of the Chief Justice, occurs in appeals of justice’s court judgments in criminal cases. There certiorari will not lie *365to review the justice’s court’s judgment of conviction nor the affirmance thereof by the superior court on appeal even where the statute for the violation of which defendant is convicted is unconstitutional. Yet, if imprisonment rather than a fine be the punishment imposed, defendant has relief by way of habeas corpus. (In re Bell, 19 Cal. (2d) 488 [122 P. (2d) 22].) Whether a defendant convicted in a justice’s court under an unconstitutional law has any remedy in this court is made wholly dependent upon whether a fine or imprisonment be the penalty. No reason has been advanced for such a manifestly absurd result, and I know of none. The incongruity of the results is further manifested in appeal in criminal eases. If the appeal is from a Class A justice’s court and a new trial is ordered, the new trial is in the justice’s court; but if a Class B court is involved then the new trial is in the superior court. (Pen. Code, sec. 1469.) Under the theory announced in the majority opinion, the defendant in an appeal from a Class B justice’s court followed by a trial de novo and conviction could have a review by certiorari, but the defendant in an appeal from a Class A justice’s court would have no such right upon affirmance of the judgment of conviction by the superior court. Furthermore, under the rule announced in the majority opinion a situation could arise where two defendants convicted in the same justice’s court of a violation of an unconstitutional statute and who perfected separate appeals to the superior court, one conviction being affirmed without a trial de novo and the other being granted a trial de novo and convicted and sentenced in the superior court would not have the same opportunity to have their respective cases reviewed on certiorari. The defendant who succeeded in obtaining a trial de novo in the superior court would be entitled to the issuance of the writ, but the one whose conviction was affirmed by the superior court without being granted a trial de novo would not be entitled to have his case reviewed. This lack of uniformity in the operation of the law is in direct conflict with sec. 11 of article I of the Constitution of California which provides: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.”
If the statute under which both of the supposititious defendants above-mentioned were convicted was unconstitutional, the judgment of conviction against both of them would be void, and if both pursued the same remedy to have the *366judgment of conviction against them declared void, they should be entitled to the same relief.. The mere matter of whether the superior judge thought one of them should have a trial de novo in the superior court and the other should not, should not in the least affect the right of the one who was denied a trial de novo in the superior court to have the void judgment against him annulled on certiorari. It was such lack of uniformity, in my opinion, that the above-mentioned constitutional provision was designed to prevent.