Court Opinion

ID: 9492321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:38:11.817346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:14.783451
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because the majority has put a spin on the record that the record does not compel — contrary to I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); has substituted its own judgment of the facts for the BIA’s— which may be felicitous in this particular case but is nevertheless contrary to our obligation to be “highly deferential” to the BIA’s determinations, see Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir.1998); and has reinvented the meaning of “group,” see 8 U.S.C. §' 1101(a)(42)(A); '8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i),1' and of government accountability, see Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (9th Cir.1996).
The majority reverses because of its conclusion that the “violent and harassing actions of a segment of Armenian society bent on ethnic cleansing ... targeted Mgoian and her family for their prominent role as intellectuals in a small and vulnerable minority.” See ante at 1037. In turn, this conclusion flows from the premise that Mgoian is “similarly situated” to members of her family; her family is Kurdish, Mos-lem, and intelligent; violence marked some members of the family; therefore, “she may be next.” See id. at 1037. However, as the BIA found, there is no link between Mgoian, anything that happened to her relatives, and any protected characteristic. That being so, it cannot be enough to compel a finding of well-founded fear of persecution that Mgoian is “similarly situated” to her family (who, like many families, share the same last name, ethnicity, religion, and intelligence) or “remains immutably a member of that group.” See id. As the majority recognizes, “this ‘group’ of similarly situated persons is not necessarily the same as the more limited ‘social group’ category mentioned in the asylum statute.” See id. at 1035-36. But if not, what is it? There can be no basis for finding a well-founded fear of persecution unless the group (whatever it is) has been persecuted by the government or by forces beyond its control on account of a trait such as éthnicity, religion, or political beliefs that are common to the entire group. And there is no evidence of that here.
*1039As Mgoian testified, her Uncle Said was murdered with no known motive; her Uncle Sharko was threatened, perhaps because of his political views, with which neither she nor others in the family are (or appear to be) associated; her father, a physician, was likewise threatened but possibly on account of the death of a child under his care; and her Uncle Agit’s paper was shut down, but there is no explanation why.
While mistreatment of relatives may support a well-founded fear of persecution, there must be some tie to the petitioner’s fear for her own safety and far more than unconnected incidents involving the alien’s family in order to compel it. In Arriaga-Barrientos v. U.S. I.N.S., 937 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.1991), for example, it was insufficient that two brothers had been abducted “by unknown gunmen for unknown reasons.” Id. at 414. The harm that befell Mgoian’s uncles was from unknown people for unknown (and for all the record discloses, different) reasons. On the other hand, we have thought it sufficient to impute a family’s political views to a neutral member when six cousins, two brothers, one half-brother and two uncles had actively engaged in guerilla activities for which they and other family members had been persecuted; the petitioner’s family had a reputation for pro-guerilla sympathies; and the petitioner had visited family members held as political prisoners and had registered under her own name on prison records, thereby putting herself at particular personal risk. See Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir.1990). Here, there is no evidence that what happened to Mgoian’s relatives happened because they were “Mgoians,” or because they were Kurdish and Moslem, prominent and intelligent. While the BIA arguably could have inferred a common denominator and inferred that Mgoian’s relatives were targeted on account of it, it did not do so and certainly did not have to do so. There is no evidence that whatever her relatives did or thought would realistically be attributed to Mgoian herself. In these circumstances, the mere fact of belonging to a well-educated Kurdish-Moslem family, some of whom have been victims of violence or threatened violence from unknown sources and for unknown reasons, cannot qualify for membership in a “group[ ] of persons similarly situated” for purposes of showing a well-founded fear of persecution.
Nor is an unsolved murder and a newspaper shut down from unrelated causes sufficient to compel a finding that the Armenian government “is unwilling or unable to control those elements of its society responsible for targeting the Mgoians.” See ante at 1037. “Those elements” are nowhere identified. Beyond that, there is no evidence tending to show, let alone to compel a finding that there was a nonrandom, systematic campaign orchestrated against the Mgoian family on account of their race, ethnicity, religion, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. This leaves only the general violence and upheavals that, according to the State Department Profile, plague Armenian society. However, as the BIA found, nothing in the evidence distinguishes Mgoian herself from other Kurdish-Moslems “still resident in Armenia [who] do not complain of discrimination.” Admin.R. 123 (U.S. Dep’t of State, Armenia — Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, at 8). That finding is supported in the record. Mgoian testified that she would expect to be harassed by neighbors if she returns to Armenia because harassment is a fact of life in her country. Without question, this is an unpleasant prospect. But the record in this case does not compel the conclusion that suffering “inflicted on the Mgoian family because of its Kurdish-Moslem heritage in a land of Armenian Christians” “now puts Mgoian herself in mortal fear.” See ante at 1037. Mgoian testified that she came to this country to visit a friend, strengthen her English and tour California, and that she planned to return home. She only changed her mind when she found out that her parents had left while she was away *1040and she did not want to go back because her family was no longer there.
The BIA was not compelled to ignore Mgoian’s testimony or to draw inferences that cut either way. 'Given the narrow scope of our review, and substantial evidence in the record that supports the BIA’s determination, I would deny the petition. ■

. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) defines "refugee” as a person unwilling to return to her country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 C.F.R. § 208.13, "Establishing asylum eligibility,” states in relevant part:
(b)(2) Well-founded fear of persecution. An applicant shall be found to have a well-founded fear of persecution if he or she can establish first, that he or she has a fear of pérsecution in his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; second, that there is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he or she were to return- to that country; and third, that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to or avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of such fear.... [T]he asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that he or she would be singled out individually for persecution if;
(i) The applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of face, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; ánd
(ii) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in and identification with such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.