Court Opinion

ID: 9943288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 05:00:27.037876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:45.950861
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                 File Name: 24a0075n.06

                                            No. 22-5879

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                  FILED
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                     Feb 22, 2024
                                                                                KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
                                                           )
 JOSEPH ROACH,
                                                           )
         Petitioner-Appellant,                             )       ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                           )       UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                 v.                                        )       COURT FOR THE WESTERN
                                                           )       DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
 AMY ROBEY, Warden,                                        )
         Respondent-Appellee.                              )                               OPINION
                                                           )
                                                           )

Before: SILER, MATHIS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

       BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Joseph Roach was convicted of murder in Louisville,

Kentucky and sentenced to life imprisonment. The jury instructions allowed him to be convicted

on a theory that he was guilty of murder either as the principal or as an accomplice. Roach argues

this combination instruction denied him a unanimous verdict under the Kentucky Constitution, and

his counsel on direct appeal was therefore ineffective for not challenging his conviction on that

ground. The district court denied Roach habeas relief as to this and other claims. We granted him

a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. Because

Roach has not shown the combination jury instruction was erroneous, his ineffectiveness claim

fails, and we affirm the district court’s denial of Roach’s petition for habeas relief.

                                         BACKGROUND

       On Friday, January 18, 2002, officers from the Louisville, Kentucky police department

responded to a call about a murder in an apartment unit. Inside the apartment, Renee Robinson’s

dead body lay on her bed; she was bloody and beaten with her pants pulled around her ankles.
No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

She had been “choked” and “severely beaten about the head with what was believed to be a golf

club.” Ky. S. Ct. Order, R. 10-3, PageID 383. The floor, walls, and furniture in her apartment were

covered with blood, and her belongings had been ransacked. There was a bloody golf club next to

the door and a crack pipe sitting on top of the microwave in the kitchen. The living room TV

showed static; the VCR that was attached to it had been ripped out and carried away, along with a

handful of VHS tapes.

       After a short investigation, police arrested Joseph Roach and his cousin John Drake and

charged them with Robinson’s murder, rape, and robbery. Drake had Robinson’s VCR in his

house, and Roach had some of her tapes. In exchange for his testimony against Roach, Drake pled

guilty to facilitation to murder and facilitation to robbery and agreed to a sentence of fifteen years’

imprisonment.

       Roach proceeded to trial. The jury heard testimony from the detective who interviewed

Roach after his arrest.1 Roach told him that on the evening of January 17, 2002, he and Drake were

drinking together near Robinson’s apartment. They knew Robinson was looking for “dope” and

had money on her to purchase it. Trial Recording, R. 67, Nov. 24, 2004 at 10:02–10:29. Roach

told the detective that both he and Drake wanted to “holler at” Robinson. Id. Eventually, the three

of them went to drink together in Robinson’s apartment. Robinson wanted to exchange sexual

favors with Roach for crack. So, said Roach, he and Robinson went into her bedroom and “hugged

on each other.” Id. After some time had passed, Roach noticed Drake had left Robinson’s

apartment. Ten minutes later, after he and Robinson “messed around,” Roach left the apartment.

       1
         Roach chose not to testify in his own defense, and the trial court permitted the
interviewing officer to testify about portions of Roach’s Mirandized statement.

                                                  2
No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

Id. Roach did not admit that he was in Robinson’s apartment when she was injured or deceased,

or that he tried to clean up the apartment.

       Drake’s testimony at trial contradicted the story Roach told the detective. Drake said that

Roach saw Robinson and had the idea to give her drugs in return for sex. The three of them went

to the apartment and drank together. Then, Roach and Robinson started to smoke crack together.

Robinson agreed to have sex with at least Roach in exchange for more crack. Eventually, Robinson

asked Drake to leave the apartment for about forty-five minutes because she “wanted to do the sex

thing one at a time.” Trial Recording, Nov. 29, 2004 at 10:56–11:16. Drake said he then fell asleep

drunk in his car. Some time later, Roach woke him up, threw something in the back of Drake’s

car, and told him to come back to the apartment. When he walked in, Drake saw the apartment

covered in blood, and Robinson on the ground with two wounds on her face. Drake said Robinson

was still alive, breathing shallowly, when he saw her. Roach asked Drake to help him clean up the

apartment, but Drake left because he was scared. He started his car to leave, but had to wait to

drive away because of a problem with the car’s transmission. As Drake waited for his car to get

into gear, Roach came back to the car. Drake further testified that Roach told him he “fucked up”

and not to tell anyone about what he had seen. Id. Drake said he did not call the police because he

forgot the number. Drake said Roach told him to drive to different locations so he could dispose

of evidence, but that Roach had left Robinson’s VCR in his car, so Drake brought it into the house

where he was staying.

       As for physical evidence, there was no DNA from Roach or Drake at the crime scene. An

expert testified that samples of blood taken from a rug, a wall, a pair of long underwear, and the

base of the toilet in the apartment were “consistent” with genetic markers present in Robinson’s

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No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

and Drake’s blood, but not Roach’s. Trial Recording, Nov. 23, 2004, 14:12–14:15, 14:21 (rug),

14:24–14:27 (base of toilet), 14:30 (long underwear), 14:30–32 (wall).

          At the conclusion of the trial, the court gave the jury these instructions on the murder

charge:

          You will find the defendant, JOSEPH W. ROACH, guilty of Murder, under this
          Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
          doubt, all of the following:

                 A. That in this county on or about January 18, 2002, acting alone or in
                    complicity with another, he killed Renee Robinson by beating her with
                    a blunt object and/or strangling her;
                 AND
                 B. That in so doing;
                         (1) He caused the death of Renee Robinson intentionally.
                 OR
                         (2) He was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk
                             of death to another and thereby caused the death of Renee
                             Robinson under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
                             to human life.

          Jury Instructions, R. 29-2, PageID 854 (emphasis added). The court provided the following

definition of “complicity”:

          A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the
          intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits,
          commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other person to commit the
          offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or committing
          the offense.

Jury Instruction Definitions, R. 29-3, PageID 855.

          Roach’s trial counsel objected to the complicity instruction. The trial court permitted the

instruction, concluding that if a reasonable jury believed Drake’s testimony that he saw Roach

cleaning up the crime scene after Robinson had been killed, it could believe that either Roach “or

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No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

someone else” committed the murder. Trial Recording, R. 67, Dec. 1, 2004 at 09:57–10:05. The

jury found Roach guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

       The Kentucky courts affirmed Roach’s conviction on direct appeal and on postconviction

review. Roach then petitioned for habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western

District of Kentucky under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising a number of constitutional claims. The

district court denied Roach’s petition in full and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. We

granted his application for a certificate of appealability on one issue: whether Roach’s counsel on

direct appeal was ineffective because he failed to argue that the combination principal-complicity

jury instruction led to the denial of Roach’s right to a unanimous jury verdict under the Kentucky

Constitution.

                                           DISCUSSION

       We review the district court’s denial of Roach’s habeas petition de novo, accepting the

district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.2 Daniel v. Burton, 919 F.3d 976,

978 (6th Cir. 2019). To show his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on

direct appeal, Roach must show that it was “objectively unreasonable” for counsel not to raise the

issue, and that if counsel had raised the issue, there is a “reasonable probability” Roach would

       2
          Kentucky agrees that the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply in
this case because the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied Roach’s appellate ineffectiveness claim
as untimely rather than on the merits. See Maslonka v. Hoffner, 900 F.3d 269, 277–78 (6th Cir.
2018). Such a denial would normally be a procedural default, and Roach would need to persuade
us to excuse it. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). But, as the district court
properly concluded, he need not here. Kentucky courts did not recognize appellate ineffectiveness
claims during the three years in which Roach could have timely brought one. Pollini v. Robey, 981
F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Ky. 2010)).
Kentucky’s choice not to recognize these claims means it “voluntarily forwent the opportunity” to
hear them on the merits; we may therefore consider the merits now. Id. at 499. The warden also
forfeited the procedural default argument on appeal by not raising it in her briefing. See Maslonka,
900 F.3d at 276.

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No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

have prevailed on appeal. Mammone v. Jenkins, 49 F.4th 1026, 1060 (6th Cir. 2022); see also

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). These two requirements correspond to the familiar

“deficient performance” and “prejudice” prongs of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel test

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285–86 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–91, 694).3 Roach argues that his counsel on direct appeal should have

argued that he was denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict in violation of the Kentucky

Constitution because the judge gave the jury the combination principal-accomplice murder

instruction. See Ky. Const. § 7; see also Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1978).

       Under Kentucky law, a jury instruction may include two mutually exclusive theories of a

case so long as “either theory . . . is reasonably supported by the evidence.” Beaumont v.

Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 60, 72 (Ky. 2009) (quotation omitted). The jurors don’t have to agree

on one theory—the verdict is still unanimous if sufficient evidence supports a guilty verdict under

either the principal interpretation or the accomplice interpretation. See Wells, 561 S.W.2d at 87.

       Roach does not dispute that sufficient evidence supported the principal interpretation.

Indeed, it was the prosecutor’s theory of the case. Accordingly, we must assess if sufficient

evidence supported the complicity instruction. For Roach to be guilty under the accomplice theory,

the Commonwealth had to prove (1) Roach intended to promote or facilitate the murder;

(2) another person committed the murder; and (3) Roach “participated in that offense.” Harper v.

Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Ky. 2001). Roach’s appeal primarily concerns the evidence

       3
         The warden is incorrect that Brown v. Davenport requires us to apply an extra measure
of deference to the state-court verdict. 596 U.S. 118, 126, 134 (2022). Because § 2254(d) deference
does not apply here, the prejudice prong of Roach’s ineffectiveness claim does the work of the
equitable deference discussed in Davenport. Hall v. Vasbinder, 563 F.3d 222, 236 (6th Cir. 2009).

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No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

introduced at trial to support the second prong.4 Specifically, he maintains that his appellate

counsel should have argued that there was no evidence in the record from which a jury could find

that Drake murdered Robinson and Roach was guilty as his accomplice. We disagree.

       The jury heard enough at trial to support Roach’s murder conviction on the theory that

Drake was the principal and Roach was the accomplice. In our review of the evidence presented,

we draw “all fair and reasonable inferences” in the warden’s favor, Beaumont, 295 S.W.3d at 68,

with the understanding that a jury may “believe and disbelieve particular portions” of witness

testimony, Morton v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Ky. 1991). No evidence directly

identified the person who murdered Robinson, so the jury had to infer the murderer’s identity from

circumstantial evidence. And a jury instruction is proper so long as the inferences required to

support liability under that instruction are reasonable. Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851,

889 (Ky. 2015).

       Four pieces of evidence provide the basis on which the court properly gave the combination

principal-complicity instruction. First, Drake testified that he was present in the apartment before

Robinson was murdered and as she was near death. As the warden points out, from this testimony

a jury could infer Drake had a motive to kill Robinson—if she had lived, she could identify him

       4
           Roach also suggests there is insufficient evidence on the first prong. But by declining to
dispute that sufficient evidence supported the principal instruction, Roach also declines to dispute
that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to show he intended for and caused Robinson to
be killed. The same intent and participation aspects that support Roach’s principal liability also
support his accomplice liability. Roach argues that there is still a gap in the theory of accomplice
liability: that there was insufficient evidence that he intended for Drake to murder Robinson, citing
Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 327 (Ky. 2006). Parks, however, forbids a complicity
instruction when the evidence shows the person alleged to be principal “could not have committed
the underlying crime.” Pate v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 327, 334–35 (Ky. 2007) (citing Parks,
192 S.W.3d at 327). That means the complicity instruction was proper so long as the jury also
heard evidence which “could support a finding” that Drake “actually committed the underlying
offense.” Id. at 335.

                                                 7
No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

as having been involved in a drug-fueled assault. Second, Drake also testified that he helped Roach

dispose of items taken from Robinson’s apartment after she was killed. It is reasonable to infer

Drake did so to dispose of evidence showing he murdered Robinson. Third, blood samples from

some items in the apartment were consistent with samples from Drake and Robinson, but not

Roach. Fourth, Roach wrote a note to Drake indicating that he told the police that Drake had

committed the murder. Given that no direct evidence at trial identified the person who killed

Robinson, a jury could conclude from these facts that Drake murdered her, and Roach was guilty

as an accomplice.

       The supporting circumstantial evidence here is similar to supporting evidence in other

Kentucky complicity cases. In one, the defendants were present at the victim’s home when she

was killed and personal property was stolen from her home. Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120

S.W.3d 635, 648 (Ky. 2003). In another, the defendant drove the victim to the scene of the murder

and participated in an armed robbery there. Harper, 43 S.W.3d at 265–66. Drake also accompanied

Robinson to the scene of her murder and received the proceeds from her robbery. Accordingly,

Kentucky law supported a complicity instruction.

       True, the Commonwealth’s theory was that Roach acted alone as the principal. The theory

rested on Drake’s testimony that he was not in the apartment when Robinson died. But the jury

could disbelieve certain aspects of Drake’s testimony to conclude that he was the one who killed

Robinson, with Roach acting as his accomplice. See Pate v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 327, 335

(Ky. 2007) (explaining that “the jury was not required to believe” testimony indicating the

defendant acted alone when other evidence implied the defendant acted together with his wife).

Only Drake’s testimony removed him from the apartment at the time of Robinson’s death, and

Roach’s trial counsel impeached Drake’s credibility. Trial counsel emphasized that Drake was

                                                8
No. 22-5879, Roach v. Robey

inconsistent about whether Roach asked him to clean up the bloody apartment. Counsel also

suggested Drake lied when he insisted he forgot the phone number for 911 and claimed he couldn’t

immediately leave Robinson’s apartment because he suddenly had car trouble. And trial counsel

emphasized that Drake pled guilty to facilitation to murder and facilitation to robbery so that he

only had to spend 15 years in prison even though he said he knew nothing about the murder and

did not participate in it at all. Based on the totality of the evidence, the jury could have reasonably

concluded that Drake and Roach were both guilty of murder, even if it didn’t share the

Commonwealth’s view on who was the principal and who was the accomplice. See Holbrook v.

Commonwealth, 525 S.W.3d 73, 77, 87 (Ky. 2017) (concluding that a complicity instruction did

not deny a unanimous verdict when evidence suggested a defendant involved in a murder “might

not have been solely responsible”).

       Roach must show no reasonable juror could conclude that he acted as an accomplice to

Robinson’s murder. The evidence at trial does not support that conclusion. Since there is no

“reasonable probability” the argument would have succeeded on direct appeal, Roach has failed

to show that his appellate counsel’s decision not to press the issue prejudiced him. Mammone,

49 F.4th at 1060. He is therefore not entitled to habeas relief.

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                                  9