Court Opinion

ID: 9885808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:07:59.317105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:20.791239
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/06/2023 09:07 AM CDT

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                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        315 Nebraska Reports
                                           IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                                                Cite as 315 Neb. 311

                    In re Application A-19594, Water Divisions 1-A, 1-B.
                    Central Platte Natural Resources District et al.,
                     appellants, and North Platte Natural Resources
                         District, appellee and cross-appellant, v.
                        Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
                             and Platte to Republican Basin
                               High Flow Diversion Project,
                               appellees and cross-appellees.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed October 6, 2023.   No. S-23-028.

                 1. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from
                    the Department of Natural Resources, an appellate court’s review of the
                    director’s factual determinations is limited to deciding whether such
                    determinations are supported by competent and relevant evidence and
                    are not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; however, on questions of
                    law, which include the meaning and interpretation of statutes and regu-
                    lations, a reviewing court is obligated to reach its conclusions indepen-
                    dently of the legal conclusions made by the director.
                 2. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. Appellate review of an order
                    granting a motion to dismiss is de novo.
                 3. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing is a jurisdictional component
                    of a party’s case, because only a party who has standing may invoke the
                    jurisdiction of a court; determination of a jurisdictional issue which does
                    not involve a factual dispute presents a question of law.
                 4. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings. To prevail against a motion to dismiss,
                    the pleader must allege sufficient facts, taken as true, to state a claim to
                    relief that is plausible on its face.
                 5. Actions: Parties: Standing. A party has standing to invoke a court’s
                    jurisdiction if it has a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the
                    subject matter of the controversy.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                        IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 311

 6. Standing: Jurisdiction: Claims: Parties. Standing requires that a liti-
    gant have such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to
    warrant invocation of a court’s jurisdiction and justify exercise of the
    court’s remedial powers on the litigant’s behalf. Thus, generally, a liti-
    gant must assert the litigant’s own rights and interests, and cannot rest a
    claim on the legal rights or interests of third parties.
 7. Standing: Claims. Common-law standing generally focuses on whether
    the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. That injury must
    be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal sense.
 8. Standing: Complaints. In order to have standing, a complainant must
    allege an injury to itself that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to
    merely abstract, and the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not
    conjectural or hypothetical.
 9. Standing: Proof: Justiciable Issues. To have standing, a litigant must
    show that an injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action and is
    likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
10. Administrative Law: Statutes. For purposes of construction, a rule or
    regulation of an administrative agency is generally treated like a statute,
    because properly adopted and filed regulations have the effect of statu-
    tory law.
11. Administrative Law. Absent a statutory or regulatory indication to the
    contrary, language contained in a rule or regulation is to be given its
    plain and ordinary meaning.
12. ____. A court will construe regulations relating to the same subject mat-
    ter together to maintain a consistent and sensible scheme.
13. Administrative Law: Waters: Parties: Standing: Words and Phrases.
    Taken together, regulations of the Department of Natural Resources in
    454 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7 (2020), specify that to be a “party” clas-
    sified as an “objector,” one must meet the definition of “interested per-
    son” and also be one recognized by the department as having standing.
14. Administrative Law: Waters: Standing. The plain language of the
    regulations of the Department of Natural Resources in 454 Neb. Admin.
    Code, ch. 7 (2020), implicates common-law standing principles, and
    those regulations do not confer standing to one lacking common-
    law standing.
15. Waters: Standing. An entity wanting to challenge an application for a
    surface water appropriation that also requests an interbasin transfer must
    meet common-law standing.
16. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Competent evidence is evidence that is
    admissible and tends to establish a fact in issue.
17. ____: ____. Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make
    the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                       IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 311

      of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
      the evidence.

    Appeal from the Department of Natural Resources. Affirmed.
  Vanessa A. Silke, Steven D. Davidson, Kenneth W. Hartman,
and Hannes D. Zetzsche, of Baird Holm, L.L.P., for appellants.
   Adam A. Hoesing, Steven C. Smith, and Megan A. Dockery,
of Simmons Olsen Law Firm, P.C., L.L.O., for cross-appellant
North Platte Natural Resources District.
   Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Joshua E. Dethlefsen,
and Justin D. Lavene for cross-appellee Nebraska Department
of Natural Resources.
   Brenna M. Grasz, Paul J. Peter, and Remington S. Slama,
of Keating, O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, P.C., L.L.O., for cross-
appellee Platte to Republican Basin High Flow Diversion
Project.
    Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
                       I. INTRODUCTION
   Several entities filed objections to an application seeking an
interbasin transfer to divert surface water from an overappro-
priated Platte River reach to the Republican River Basin. The
director of the Department of Natural Resources (Department)
determined that each purported objector lacked standing and
dismissed the objections. On appeal and cross-appeal, we con-
clude that Department regulations 1 and interbasin transfer stat-
utes 2 do not confer standing where an objector does not meet
common-law standing principles. Because the purported objec-
tors fail that test, we agree with the director that they lacked
standing and affirm the order of dismissal.
1
    See 454 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7 (2020).
2
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-288 and 46-289 (Reissue 2021).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                     IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 311

                     II. BACKGROUND
   We begin by recalling basic elements of Nebraska’s water
regulatory regimes. Then we turn to the application at issue
here, the objections interposed to it, and the procedures fol-
lowed by the Department leading to the dismissal of those
objections.
                1. Surface and Ground Waters
   Surface water and ground water are hydrologically related. 3
Surface water includes all water found on the surface of the
earth, while ground water is water found under the earth’s
surface. 4 The two types of water are connected: “Ground water
pumping can cause diminished streamflows. Streamflow can
support the potential for subirrigation. Seepage from surface
water supplies canals, and deep percolation of applied irriga-
tion water from surface projects can recharge ground water
aquifers.” 5
             2. Regulation of Water in Nebraska
   Although surface water and ground water are linked, 6
Nebraska uses separate systems regulated by different agen-
cies to allocate each type of water. 7 The Department regulates
surface water appropriators, while ground water users are
statutorily regulated by a natural resources district (NRD). 8
The Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act
(Act) 9 sets forth various requirements to manage the hydrologi-
cally connected waters. 10
3
   See Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 269 Neb. 177, 691 N.W.2d 116 (2005).
4
   See id.
 5
   Id. at 183, 691 N.W.2d at 125.
 6
   See Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, supra note 3.
 7
   See Hill v. State, 296 Neb. 10, 894 N.W.2d 208 (2017).
 8
   Id.
 9
   Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-701 to 46-756 (Reissue 2021).
10
   See Hill v. State, supra note 7.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                       IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 311

   With certain exceptions, the Act requires the Department
to annually evaluate the expected long-term availability of
hydrologically connected water supplies for both existing and
new surface and ground water uses in each of the state’s river
basins. 11 For purposes of the evaluation, a river basin may
be divided into two or more subbasins or reaches. 12 Where a
river basin, subbasin, or reach encompassed within an NRD
has not been designated as overappropriated or has not been
finally determined to be fully appropriated, the NRD “may,
jointly with the department, develop an integrated management
plan for such river basin, subbasin, or reach located within the
district.” 13 In other words, an NRD under those circumstances
is permitted but not required to develop an integrated manage-
ment plan (IMP).
   The Act imposes certain duties when a river basin, sub-
basin, or reach is overappropriated or fully appropriated. 14
Under the Act, a river basin, subbasin, or reach is overap-
propriated if it is subject to an interstate cooperative agree-
ment among three or more states and if the Department has
declared a moratorium on the issuance of new surface water
appropriations in such river basin, subbasin, or reach. 15 NRDs
encompassing an overappropriated river basin, subbasin, or
reach, or one which has been finally determined to be fully
appropriated, must jointly develop an IMP for the river basin,
subbasin, or reach. 16 In developing an IMP, NRDs must con-
sider the effects of existing and potential new water uses on
existing surface water appropriators and ground water users. 17
Further, when a river basin, subbasin, or reach is designated
11
   See § 46-716(1)(a).
12
   § 46-713(1)(a).
13
   § 46-715(1)(b).
14
   See, generally, §§ 46-713 to 46-715.
15
   § 46-713(4)(a).
16
   See § 46-715.
17
   § 46-715(2).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

as overappropriated and when the designated area lies within
two or more NRDs, the Department and the affected NRDs
must jointly develop a basin-wide plan (BWP) for the area
designated as overappropriated. 18 The IMPs must be consist­
ent with the goals of the BWPs. 19
   At times, excess flows are available, even in an overappro-
priated basin, subbasin, or reach. An applicant wanting to apply
for a new surface water appropriation within a moratorium or
stay area can file a petition seeking a variance to the morato-
rium or stay. 20 The petition must assert that “[t]he applicant
has credible information that indicates there may be unap-
propriated water available at the proposed location at the time
the depletion is likely to occur.” 21 If the Department grants
a variance, the applicant can then file an application for an
appropriation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-233 (Reissue 2021).
   An application can also be submitted to request an inter­
basin transfer. Such a transfer is “the diversion of water in one
river basin and the transportation of such water to another river
basin for storage or utilization for a beneficial use.” 22 When
evaluating an application under § 46-233 that involves an inter-
basin transfer of water, the Department must consider a number
of factors delineated by the Legislature in order to determine
whether denial of such application is demanded by the public
interest. 23 “The application shall be deemed in the public inter-
est if the overall benefits to the state and the applicant’s basin
are greater than or equal to the adverse impacts to the state and
the basin of origin.” 24
18
   § 46-715(5)(a).
19
   § 46-715(5)(b).
20
   457 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 23, § 001 (2020).
21
   Id., § 001.03 (emphasis in original).
22
   § 46-288(3).
23
   See § 46-289.
24
   Id.
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      315 Nebraska Reports
                        IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 311

                    3. Platte River Basin
   In 2004, the Department declared an official moratorium
on the issuance of new surface water appropriations for three
river basins: the Platte River Basin above the mouth of the
Loup River, the North Platte River Basin, and the South Platte
River Basin. Two months later, the Department designated the
Platte River Basin above the Kearney Canal Diversion, the
North Platte River Basin including Pumpkinseed Creek, and
the South Platte River Basin including Lodgepole Creek as
overappropriated. This overappropriated area covered portions
of five NRDs, including the North Platte NRD (NPNRD) and
the Central Platte NRD (CPNRD). And as mentioned above,
the NRDs were required to formulate IMPs and BWPs due to
the overappropriated designation.

                    4. Application at Issue
   Platte to Republican Basin High Flow Diversion Project
(PRD) filed an excess flow permit application with the
Department. The operative application, “Amended . . .
Application A-19594,” sought to divert up to 150 cubic
feet per second of excess flows from the Platte River Basin
into the Republican River Basin. The application requested
the interbasin transfer for purposes of Republican River
Compact 25 compliance.
   Because the application specified and relied upon a condi-
tion that the proposed interbasin transfer and use appropriation
would be perpetually junior in status, it asserted that it would
have no adverse impact on other water users. The application
included a specific request that “the appropriation granted
to the PRD project will never be able to exercise a call over
any future junior appropriations granted for water uses of the
Platte River within the Platte River Basin.” The application
further stated:
25
     See, Pub. L. No. 78-60, 57 Stat. 86 (1943); 2A Neb. Rev. Stat. appx.
     § 1-106 (Reissue 2016).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      315 Nebraska Reports
                        IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 311

     [A]ny final order granting this application should also
     be conditioned in a manner similar to Permit A-18922
     . . . which includes the following condition: “Only those
     flow’s [sic] in excess of the Desired Minimum Discharge
     shall be considered to be available to be diverted.” . . .
     Therefore, the current beneficial uses of the unappropri-
     ated water in the basin of origin will be protected from
     any impacts of the PRD project.
The application requested that the interbasin transfer permit
“be granted with the conditions described above, and any other
deemed necessary to protect the public interest.”
            5. Objections and Order of Dismissal
   Several entities filed objections to the operative application.
PRD moved to dismiss the objections, asserting that the object-
ing entities lacked standing. Following a hearing, the director
dismissed all of those entities for lack of standing.
   From that dismissal, CPNRD, Lower Loup Natural Resources
District (LLNRD), Loup River Public Power District (Loup
Power), and Cozad Ditch Company (Cozad Ditch) (collec-
tively appellants) took an appeal. NPNRD filed a cross-appeal
to likewise challenge the dismissal. We subsequently granted
NPNRD’s petition to bypass review by the Nebraska Court
of Appeals. 26
   Facts and arguments specific to each appellant and NPNRD
will be set out in more detail in the analysis.
               III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   The overarching issue on appeal is whether the director
erred in dismissing appellants and NPNRD for lack of stand-
ing. In connection with that issue, appellants additionally
assign that the director erred in failing to recognize their rights
to object, request a hearing, and initiate a contested case. And
on cross-appeal, NPNRD assigns that the director erred in (1)
failing to apply Department regulations regarding interested
26
     See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

parties; (2) broadly applying In re Application A-18503 27 and
Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD 28 when,
they assert, Hagan v. Upper Republican NRD 29 and Ponderosa
Ridge LLC v. Banner County 30 hold that competitive interests
in the same water resources confer standing; (3) applying In
re Application A-18503 and Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist.
to determine that the integrated management obligations of
NPNRD do not confer standing on NPNRD; (4) determining
that NPNRD’s unprotected interests in excess flow diversions
would be protected in the future when no competent and rel-
evant evidence on the record supported that determination; and
(5) determining that previous conditions of unrelated excess
flow permits amounted to competent and relevant evidence
that any use of the excess flows under the application would
not harm NPNRD’s integrated management obligations.
                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] The general standard of review on appeals from the
Department is well settled. In an appeal from the Department,
an appellate court’s review of the director’s factual determina-
tions is limited to deciding whether such determinations are
supported by competent and relevant evidence and are not
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; however, on questions
of law, which include the meaning and interpretation of stat-
utes and regulations, a reviewing court is obligated to reach
its conclusions independently of the legal conclusions made by
the director. 31
27
   In re Application A-18503, 286 Neb. 611, 838 N.W.2d 242 (2013).
28
   Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 Neb. 533, 788
   N.W.2d 252 (2010).
29
   Hagan v. Upper Republican NRD, 261 Neb. 312, 622 N.W.2d 627 (2001).
30
   Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, 250 Neb. 944, 554 N.W.2d 151
   (1996).
31
   See In re Appropriation A-7603, 291 Neb. 678, 868 N.W.2d 314 (2015).
   See, also, McManus Enters. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 303 Neb.
   56, 926 N.W.2d 660 (2019).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

   [2-4] But this is an appeal from an order sustaining a motion
to dismiss based on lack of standing. Appellate review of an
order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. 32 Standing is
a jurisdictional component of a party’s case, because only a
party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court;
determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a
factual dispute presents a question of law. 33 To prevail against
a motion to dismiss, the pleader must allege sufficient facts,
taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. 34

                           V. ANALYSIS
                      1. Standing Principles
   The chief issue on appeal is whether the director of the
Department erred in determining that the entities filing objec-
tions lacked standing. We start by recalling general principles
concerning standing.
   [5,6] A party must have standing before a court can exer-
cise jurisdiction. 35 A party has standing to invoke a court’s
jurisdiction if it has a legal or equitable right, title, or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy. 36 Standing requires
that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome of
a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s jurisdic-
tion and justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on
the litigant’s behalf. 37 Thus, generally, a litigant must assert
the litigant’s own rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim
on the legal rights or interests of third parties. 38 We have
32
   See Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 28.
33
   See In re Application A-18503, supra note 27.
34
   See Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 28.
35
   In re Application A-18503, supra note 27.
36
   Id.
37
   Id.
38
   Id.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

consistently applied these principles to contested cases before
the Department. 39
   Common-law standards are typically used to determine
whether one has standing. 40 But the Legislature can provide for
standing that is broader than common-law standards or stand-
ing requirements that are more specific or more restrictive. 41
   [7-9] Common-law standing generally focuses on whether
the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. 42 That
injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal
sense. 43 The complainant must allege an injury to itself that is
distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the
alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. 44 Further, the litigant must show that the injury
can be fairly traced to the challenged action and is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision. 45
                    2. Broad Arguments
   Appellants argue that the Department’s regulations confer
standing more broadly than the common-law standard. They
contend that the interbasin transfer statutes and case law do
not support requiring common-law standing. NPNRD likewise
relies on the Department’s regulations as conferring standing.
But PRD and the Department respond that the regulations, stat-
utes, and case law all require an objector to meet common-law
standing requirements. We start with the regulations.
39
   See id. See, also, Hagan v. Upper Republican NRD, supra note 29;
   Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, supra note 30; Metropolitan
   Utilities Dist. v. Twin Platte NRD, 250 Neb. 442, 550 N.W.2d 907 (1996).
40
   See Griffith v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 304 Neb. 287, 934 N.W.2d
   169 (2019).
41
   See id.
42
   See id.
43
   See In re Application A-18503, supra note 27.
44
   Id.
45
   Id.
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                     IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 311

          (a) Standing Under Department Regulations
   [10-12] Before delving into the regulations, we set forth
rules of construction that guide our inquiry. For purposes of
construction, a rule or regulation of an administrative agency
is generally treated like a statute, because properly adopted
and filed regulations have the effect of statutory law. 46 Absent
a statutory or regulatory indication to the contrary, language
contained in a rule or regulation is to be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. 47 A court will construe regulations relating
to the same subject matter together to maintain a consistent
and sensible scheme. 48 To be valid, a rule or regulation must be
consistent with the statute under which the rule or regulation
is promulgated. 49
   Appellants and NPNRD direct our attention to regulations
for a contested case. One way a contested case begins is with
the filing of a formal objection to an application. 50 PRD’s
application—seeking an interbasin transfer under § 46-289—
qualifies as an “[a]pplication.” 51 An “[o]bjection is a state-
ment or statements presenting arguments in opposition to
an action,” 52 including an “[o]bjection filed in response to a
notice of application or petition.” 53 The objection filings by
appellants and NPNRD fit within this definition. But that does
not necessarily make them “objectors.”
   An “[o]bjector” is defined as “[a] person filing an objection
to the granting of an application or petition.” 54 This definition
46
   Colwell v. Managed Care of North America, 308 Neb. 597, 955 N.W.2d
   744 (2021).
47
   Id.
48
   Id.
49
   Whittle v. State, 309 Neb. 695, 962 N.W.2d 339 (2021).
50
   454 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7, § 002.01(A).
51
   Id., § 001.02(M).
52
   Id., § 001.08.
53
   Id., § 001.08(B).
54
   Id., § 001.09(B).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

comes from a regulation specifying ways in which a party may
be classified. 55 A “[p]arty” is defined as “an interested person
who is recognized by the Department as having standing in
a contested case.” 56 And an “[i]nterested [p]erson” is defined
to be
      a person who or an entity which has a specific legally
      protectable interest in the applicability of a statute, rule,
      or order, as distinguished from a general interest such as
      may be the concern of the public at large. An interested
      person is one who is or could be adversely affected in a
      legally cognizable way by the outcome of a proceeding. 57
   [13] Appellants contend that “rather than needing to sepa-
rately qualify as an interested person, an objector is automati-
cally ‘classified’ by Department rules as having standing in
a contested case.” 58 We interpret the regulations differently.
Taken together, the regulations of the Department in chapter
7 specify that to be a “party” classified as an “objector,” one
must meet the definition of “interested person” and also be one
recognized by the Department as having standing.
   Contrary to appellants’ argument, we understand the regula-
tions to contain “textual standing hooks.” 59 That phrase refers
to terms that we have found implicate common-law standing.
For example, we have used the term “‘interest’” in defining the
common-law standard of standing. 60 We have also addressed
whether an entity was “‘aggrieved’” 61 or an “‘interested
55
   See id., § 001.09.
56
   Id.
57
   Id., § 001.07.
58
   Brief for appellants at 28.
59
   Id. at 32.
60
   Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Twin Platte NRD, supra note 39, 250 Neb.
   at 450, 550 N.W.2d at 912.
61
   Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 28, 280
   Neb. at 539, 788 N.W.2d at 258.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

person’” 62 in connection with engaging in a common-law
standing analysis. Further, we have used terms like “legally
protectable interest” 63 or “legally cognizable” 64 when refer-
encing the common-law standing requirement of an injury
in fact.
   [14] Returning to the regulation’s definition of “interested
person,” textual standing hooks readily appear. An “[i]nterested
[p]erson” is “a person who or an entity which has a specific
legally protectable interest” and “one who is or could be
adversely affected in a legally cognizable way by the outcome
of a proceeding.” 65 We conclude that the plain language of the
regulations implicates common-law standing principles and
that those regulations do not confer standing to one lacking
common-law standing.
                       (b) Statutory Basis
   We next consider whether any applicable statutes con-
tain textual hooks for common-law standing. PRD’s applica-
tion sought an excess flow permit and an interbasin transfer.
Because an excess flow permit is a surface water appropriation,
§ 46-233 is implicated. And § 46-289 is involved, based on the
request for an interbasin transfer.
   Appellants acknowledge that we previously found a tex-
tual hook for common-law standing in § 46-233. The statute
provides in part that “any person having an interest may, in
writing, object to the application” 66 and that “[a]ll interested
parties shall be allowed to testify and present evidence relative
to the application.” 67 In Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Twin
62
   Middle Niobrara NRD v. Department of Nat. Resources, 281 Neb. 634,
   646, 799 N.W.2d 305, 315 (2011).
63
   Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Twin Platte NRD, supra note 39, 250 Neb.
   at 447, 550 N.W.2d at 911.
64
   In re Applications of Koch, 274 Neb. 96, 98, 736 N.W.2d 716, 719 (2007).
65
   454 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7, § 001.07 (emphasis supplied).
66
   § 46-233(5).
67
   § 46-233(6).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      IN RE APPLICATION A-19594
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 311

Platte NRD, 68 after recognizing several earlier decisions using
“‘interest’” in defining the common-law standard of standing,
we declared that “[§] 46-233 did not supplant the common-law
standard of standing.”
   [15] The language of § 46-289 does not contain a similar
recognized textual hook; however, it explicitly acknowledges
that a request for an interbasin transfer is based on “an applica-
tion made pursuant to section 46-233.” And because § 46-233
does contain a recognized textual hook, we conclude that an
entity wanting to challenge an application for a surface water
appropriation that also requests an interbasin transfer must
meet common-law standing.

                           (c) Case Law
   Appellants and NPNRD argue that the director’s order can-
not be reconciled with this court’s decisions in Hagan 69 and
Ponderosa Ridge LLC. 70 In those cases, we determined that
competitive interests in the same water resources were suf-
ficient to confer standing. But those cases are distinguishable.
   Hagan and Ponderosa Ridge LLC involved ground water,
not surface water. A depletion in ground water can affect
others using the same water source. In Hagan, we observed
that the defendants took water from the same aquifer as that
underneath the irrigators’ land and stated that “‘therefore the
[irrigators] are injured in that there is less water available for
them for future requests in that the now declining water table
of the aquifer will decline further by virtue of the withdrawal
of the water by the [d]efendants.’” 71 The same is not true with
respect to excess flows of surface water. Such excess flows
68
   Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Twin Platte NRD, supra note 39, 250 Neb.
   at 451, 550 N.W.2d at 913.
69
   Hagan v. Upper Republican NRD, supra note 29.
70
   Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, supra note 30.
71
   Hagan v. Upper Republican NRD, supra note 29, 261 Neb. at 315, 622
   N.W.2d at 629.
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do not remain in the same stream or basin for later use.
Instead, either the excess flows are used or they flow away.
   Appellants and NPNRD claim that our case law does not
support applying common-law standing. They contend that the
director misapplied In re Application A-18503. 72 We disagree.
   In re Application A-18503 closely resembles the instant case.
It too involved an application to appropriate surface water.
NRDs (and a property owner) filed objections to the applica-
tion. And the same Department regulations were involved.
There, like here, the Department dismissed all objecting enti-
ties due to lack of standing.
   In In re Application A-18503, we started by setting forth
common-law standing principles. In rejecting an argument that
the granting of the application might lead to a fully appropri-
ated designation, we stated that standing could not be based
upon speculation. We also cast aside the NRDs’ contention
that the appropriation would preclude the use of the water
for irrigation. We quoted from Central Neb. Pub. Power
Dist. to the effect that standing requires a more particular-
ized harm than just asserting that use of a limited resource
means less availability of that resource for others. We next
considered whether a property owner who held senior existing
and pending surface water appropriations had standing. The
property owner alleged that granting the application would
affect his existing appropriations and would increase the cost
of his pending applications. But we reasoned that such allega-
tions failed to explain how his rights would be affected when
the existing appropriations were both upstream and senior to
the requested appropriation.
   We are unpersuaded that In re Application A-18503 should
not apply or that the director misapplied it. There, we deter-
mined that an entity filing an objection to an application
to appropriate surface water must meet common-law stand-
ing requirements. We maintained this view despite a dissent
72
     In re Application A-18503, supra note 27.
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contending that “[t]he Department’s definition of ‘interested
person’ distinguishes this case from those in which we have
interpreted this term in a statute to mean a person with
common-law standing.” 73 We see no reason to revisit our deci-
sion there.

                   3. Whether Common-Law
                        Standing Is Met
   Appellants and NPNRD argue that they each alleged suf-
ficient injuries in fact to meet common-law standing require-
ments. We will consider their respective allegations separately,
but first we address the condition in PRD’s application, as it
will affect our analysis.
   Appellants and NPNRD discount the application’s proposed
condition: to be perpetually junior to all Platte River Basin
appropriations. Appellants claim that the “‘requested condition’
is mere speculation at this point and cannot circumvent [their]
standing to object to the application.” 74
   But we conclude that the condition is central to the rea-
soning supporting the director’s disposition. The condition is
part of the application. Further, the Department is statutorily
authorized to impose “reasonable conditions as deemed appro-
priate to protect the public interest.” 75 The requested condition
appears to be such a condition.
   The proceedings in this court confirm that the condition
is essential to the application and cannot be severed from it.
During oral arguments, counsel addressed the proposed con-
dition. PRD asserted that the condition was a “critical part”
of the application and conceded that the application would
be insufficient without it. The Department represented that
it could not strike the condition and that the application was
predicated entirely upon the condition’s being part of it. The
73
   Id. at 636, 838 N.W.2d at 259 (Connolly, J., dissenting).
74
   Brief for appellants at 40.
75
   Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-226.02(3) (Reissue 2021).
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Department explained that if it were to determine that the
condition was not warranted, PRD would need to amend and
refile the application, which would then be “re-noticed,” and
objections could then be made. Given these concessions, we
limit our analysis of standing only to the application including
the requested condition.
   With that limitation in place, we now discuss the various
allegations of harm by appellants and NPNRD.
                            (a) CPNRD
   CPNRD alleged that it owned water rights in or connected
to the Platte River, downstream from PRD’s proposed diver-
sion point, and that the proposed diversion would injure those
water rights. It also asserted that its recharge projects rely on
the availability of excess flows. In connection with its manage-
ment agreement with Cozad Ditch, CPNRD received permit
A-18922, which it must use solely for recharge to support
compliance with IMPs, BWPs, and the Platte River Recovery
Implementation Program (Program). CPNRD also holds a
50-percent interest in permit A-18924, which it must also use
for recharge to support IMP and Program compliance. CPNRD
alleged that because the Department conditions access to water
for permits A-18922 and A-18924 on a case-by-case basis,
PRD could access water “instead of, ahead of, or in addition
to [permits] A-18922 and A-18924, thus limiting [CPNRD’s]
access to excess flows and harming its water rights.”
   CPNRD’s allegations essentially assert that granting the
application would mean potentially less water would be avail-
able to it. This is insufficient to confer standing. As we stated
in Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist.: “It is axiomatic that any
use of a limited resource necessarily results in marginally less
availability of that resource for potential use by others. An
injury in fact, for standing purposes, requires a more particular-
ized harm to a more direct, identified interest.” 76
76
     Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 28, 280
     Neb. at 543-44, 788 N.W.2d at 261.
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   Another deficiency observed in Central Neb. Pub. Power
Dist. is also present here. There, we noted that a power and
irrigation district did not allege that the reduction in the
amount of water would “f[a]ll short of what was required or
even desirable.” 77 Likewise, CPNRD did not allege the amount
of diverted water would alter streamflows in such a way that
there would be a decline in the number of instream flow per-
mits being supported by downstream flows.
   Further, CPNRD cannot show that its instream flow rights
would be harmed. It recognizes that its instream flow rights are
state-protected flows under the Program and that as such, the
Department cannot allow new uses of the Platte River unless
adverse effects on state-protected flows are either prevented
or offset. But CPNRD overlooks that an appropriator with an
excess flow permit can divert water only if there is excess
water after all other demands have been met. Accordingly,
CPNRD’s state-protected flows would not be harmed by any
excess flow permit that the Department may grant to PRD.
   CPNRD also argued that the application would cause it
to spend additional public funds because it would need to
implement and enforce an IMP and a BWP. An IMP is a plan-
ning document that contains possible management options
to achieve the goals and objectives of the IMP, but it does
not mandate any particular management option. 78 Importantly,
CPNRD is already required by § 46-715 to implement and
enforce an IMP and a BWP. CPNRD has not linked any harm
related to its implementation and enforcement of its IMP and
BWP to this application. CPNRD cannot establish that it will
suffer an injury in fact.
                     (b) Cozad Ditch
   Cozad Ditch alleged that it owned real property, includ-
ing canals and associated infrastructure, and natural flow
77
     Id. at 543, 788 N.W.2d at 261.
78
     See § 46-715.
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appropriations for irrigation use and underground storage. It
has an agreement with CPNRD that facilitates CPNRD’s use of
Cozad Ditch’s real property to recharge water for purposes of
compliance with an IMP, a BWP, and the Program. Cozad Ditch
stated that it “joins CPNRD’s objection to the Application as to
A-18922 only to the extent the Application harms any interest
Cozad [Ditch] may have in A-18922 by virtue of owning the
underlying real estate.”
    Cozad Ditch does not have a sufficient personal stake in the
matter. As we noted above, standing generally requires that a
litigant assert the litigant’s own rights and interests and not
rest a claim on the legal rights or interests of third parties. 79
Cozad Ditch’s opposition to the application is based on permit
A-18922, but Cozad Ditch admits that CPNRD is the record
owner of that appropriation. Thus, Cozad Ditch’s allegations
are based on the rights and interests of another. Because Cozad
Ditch cannot base its claim on CPNRD’s legal rights or inter-
ests, we conclude that Cozad Ditch lacks standing.
                        (c) Loup Power
   Loup Power owns, maintains, and operates the Loup River
Hydroelectric Project. The project’s intake diversion weir is
located on the Loup River, and its outlet weir is located at the
confluence of the project’s power canal and the Platte River.
To operate the project, Loup Power must maintain its surface
water rights from the Department and an operating license
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Loup Power alleged that the application would harm it because
it would “reduce Platte River flows, and reduce Loup Power’s
ability to generate power and comply with the FERC require-
ments for its license.”
   Loup Power’s allegations of harm fall short of the common-
law requirement. It alleged that a reduction in Platte River
flows would harm it “by altering streamflows upon which it
must rely for the operation of the [p]roject, and expose Loup
79
     See Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 28.
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Power to the risk of re-initiated formal consultation with
[the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] to maintain its FERC
[l]icense.” Like a deficiency in CPNRD’s allegation of harm,
Loup Power did not allege how the proposed diversion would
alter the streamflows to such a degree that Loup Power’s abil-
ity to generate power and operate the hydroelectric project
would be harmed. And Loup Power’s allegation that granting
the application could jeopardize its operating license from
FERC is conclusory and does not allege an injury that is dis-
tinct and palpable. Loup Power’s contention that it would have
to spend public funds to reinitiate formal consultations for its
FERC license is speculative. Loup Power’s allegations do not
show it will suffer an injury in fact.

                           (d) LLNRD
   LLNRD tries to tie harm to IMP obligations that it vol-
untarily assumed. Its objection alleged that the Department,
contrary to a preliminary determination, made a final deter-
mination that the Lower Platte River Basin—which includes
LLNRD—was not fully appropriated. A statute specifies that
an NRD encompassing a river basin that “has not been finally
determined to be fully appropriated may, jointly with the
department, develop an [IMP] for such river basin . . . located
within the district.” 80 LLNRD did so, even though it was not
required. Its argument that the application would require it to
spend public funds to implement and enforce its IMP over-
looks the fact that LLNRD was not statutorily required to
develop an IMP.
   LLNRD also alleged that the application’s interbasin diver-
sion would harm LLNRD “by reducing the occurrence, vol-
ume, and rate of excess flows available to LLNRD to imple-
ment its goals, objectives, and action items under the Basin
Plan, the IMP, its Rules, and to comply with the Act.” But
again, claimed harm due merely to less water being available
80
     § 46-715(1)(b) (emphasis supplied).
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in the stream is not a basis for standing. LLNRD failed to
demonstrate that it will suffer an injury in fact.
                           (e) NPNRD
   NPNRD alleged that it uses unappropriated excess flows for
ground water recharge and thus has a direct interest in a com-
peting water use. NPNRD based its opposition to the applica-
tion in part on “DNR Contract # 985”—a contract it entered
into with the Department for an “Excess Flows/Groundwater
Recharge Project.” Although PRD and the Department sug-
gest that the contract has been terminated, we will assume for
the sake of argument that it is still in effect. NPNRD alleged
that DNR Contract # 985 allowed it “to divert excess flows
in the North Platte River Basin to North Platte Valley irriga-
tion canals for intentional ground water recharge.” NPNRD
alleged that it used the contract to meet obligations in its IMP
and BWP.
   Review of the contract leads us to conclude that it does
not confer standing on NPNRD. According to the contract,
NPNRD operates the recharge project with excess flow permits
issued by the Department to participating irrigation districts
and canal companies. NPNRD operates the project, but the
Department exercises some degree of control. NPNRD’s opera-
tion must be “in accordance with all permits issued by [the
Department].” An attachment to the contract containing the
excess flows agreement shows that the irrigator will divert nat-
ural flow surface water “when directed by the [Department]”
and do so for a designated period of time “and as directed by
[the Department].” It further shows that the Department deter-
mines the end of the excess flow event.
   Mindful that standing cannot be based upon speculation, 81
there are simply too many contingencies that must be met
before NPNRD could show it will suffer an injury in fact.
To start, there must be excess flows. Next, the Department
must determine that an irrigation district can use those excess
81
     See In re Application A-18503, supra note 27.
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flows. Then, NPNRD must have a contractual relationship
with that irrigation district. We conclude that NPNRD’s abil-
ity to use excess flows under DNR Contract # 985 does not
provide it with standing.
   Further, NPNRD alleged that if the application is approved,
its efforts and expenditures with respect to implementing and
achieving goals of its IMPs would be diminished. But like
CPNRD, NPNRD is already required by § 46-715 to imple-
ment and enforce IMPs and does not identify any harm related
to this application. We conclude NPNRD has failed to clearly
demonstrate that it will suffer an injury in fact.
                 4. Public Interest Standing
   Appellants claim that they have public interest standing.
They contend that some party should remain available to shed
light on the public interest and defend appellants’ interests
from harm. This argument lacks merit. As set forth above,
§ 46-233 and 454 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7, § 001.07, require
the satisfaction of common-law standing requirements. Having
failed to meet that standard, appellants cannot bypass it by
claiming public interest standing.
                 5. Remaining Assignments
   NPNRD also argues that the record contains no competent
or relevant evidence of excess flow analysis or of the appli-
cation’s effect on IMP and BWP obligations. NPNRD faults
the director for using information in permits A-18922 and
A-18924. NPNRD relies on the general standard of review
set forth above—review of the director’s factual determina-
tions to decide whether they are supported by competent
and relevant evidence and are not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. 82
   We do not read the director’s order to make ultimate
factual determinations at this point. The director cited per-
mits A-18922 and A-18924 in its discussion of excess
82
     See In re Appropriation A-7603, supra note 31.
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flow appropriations and its explanation regarding why the
Department’s approach toward integrated management fore-
closes the possibility of harm caused by such management
obligations. The actual approval or denial of NPNRD’s con-
templated requests depends upon the hydrologic conditions at
that future time. By their very nature, those determinations are
at this time entirely speculative.
   [16,17] To the extent that the director was relying on pre-
vious examples of its methodology, we must determine their
competence and relevance. Competent evidence is evidence
that is admissible and tends to establish a fact in issue. 83
Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence. 84
   We conclude permits A-18922 and A-18924, which are
exhibits contained in the record, are competent and rele-
vant evidence for the limited purpose employed in the direc-
tor’s order. They represent applications filed by CPNRD and
approved by the Department for excess flows in the Platte
River. Thus, they concern the same source of water as the
instant application—the Platte River. They contain hydrologic
and administrative conditions imposed by the Department to
ensure compliance with IMPs and the BWP. They include
information that reflects on excess flows in the Platte River
and on integrated management obligations. The permits state
that they can be exercised only if desired minimum discharges
are met. Information in the permits tends to make the existence
of a fact that is of consequence for standing purposes more or
less probable. We conclude that they provide competent and
relevant evidence to support the director’s decision.
   We do not understand NPNRD to be challenging the
Department’s taking official notice of facts or documents in
83
     Cain v. Custer Cty. Bd. of Equal., 298 Neb. 834, 906 N.W.2d 285 (2018).
84
     Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 278 Neb. 18, 767 N.W.2d 765 (2009).
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the Department’s possession. Rather, we understand NPNRD
to argue that granting the application could cause “the loss
of excess flow to NPNRD.” 85 This, in turn, would somehow
impair NPNRD’s “integrated managed obligations.” 86
   The Department argues that NPNRD’s assertion rests upon
an “untenable chain of contingencies,” which the Department
characterizes as “far too speculative to provide a basis for
standing.” 87 We agree. As the Department correctly points out,
to the extent NPNRD could use the excess flow permit of a
third party, “that would not confer a legally protectable inter-
est and there would be no harm because of PRD’s requested
condition.” 88 In response, NPNRD returns to its reliance on
Hagan and to its argument that its “future use of the excess
flows is placed in jeopardy if another appropriation of the same
excess flow exists.” 89 This articulation merely repackages the
notion that we have already rejected as a basis for legal stand-
ing—use of a limited resource means less availability of the
resource for others. This assignment lacks merit.
                      VI. CONCLUSION
   To have standing in this surface water appropriation case,
appellants and NPNRD needed to meet the common-law stan-
dard. Because their allegations do not demonstrate that they
have or will suffer an injury in fact, they each failed to estab-
lish standing. We affirm the decision of the director dismissing
their objections.
                                                     Affirmed.
   Heavican, C.J., and Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.
85
   Brief for cross-appellant at 30.
86
   Id.
87
   Brief for appellee Department at 40.
88
   Id.
89
   Reply brief for cross-appellant at 16.