Court Opinion

ID: 9858382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:21:15.126794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:04.691892
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s decision which I interpret to mean that the State cannot successfully challenge a prospective juror who is committed before trial to voting against the maximum punishment even if warranted. In my judgment, the majority opinion fails to evenly deal with the facts. First, the attorney prosecuting for the State quite properly made it clear from the beginning that he would challenge anyone who could not, under any circumstances, vote for the maximum punishment. An attorney representing the State is not denied that right in our advocacy system of law. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the principle was laid down that the State may get 12 people who acknowledge in advance that they will, if warranted, give the death penalty; those who will not are excused because they are, in effect, biased against the State. The Court said in Witherspoon that the State is entitled to have a venireman who is . . willing to consider all the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts. ...” The State’s attorney prefaced all of his questions with phrases such as, “Would you be able to impose it?”; “Can you consider sending him to the penitentiary for 40 years?”; “. . . and if the facts warranted it, could you return a verdict . . .?” “. . . if the facts warrant, could you impose a sentence up to 40 years . . .?” There was no attempt at all on the part of the State to be unfair in qualifying this jury. Two prospective jurors were excused for cause. The trial judge found that these jurors were irrevocably opposed to maximum punishment. Mrs. Collins, whose testimony is quoted in part in the majority opinion, finally concluded: “Well, yes, I do feel that way.” Mr. Banks, the other excused venireman who was challenged but whose testimony is not recited in the majority opinion, testified as follows: Q. . . The Defendant here is charged with battery in the first degree, and first degree is punishable up to twenty years in the Department of Corrections. He is also charged with aggravated assault with the use of a firearm. That is likewise punishable up to twenty years in the Department of Corrections. That’s a total of forty years. That is a long time in a man’s life, but because of the facts in this case, that’s exactly the punishment the State is going to ask for, and the question I want to pose to you is this: Assume that after the evidence is in that you believe the State had proved the man’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as we are required to do on both offenses, battery in the first degree and aggravated assault and at that point, the maximum possible punishment would be forty years upon the Defendant in the Department of Corrections. A. I could not. Q. What I’m asking you is this: If you believe he’s guilty of both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, you are convinced that in your mind, he’s guilty, would you automatically refuse to consider a punishment of up to forty years as possible punishment? Would you just refuse to consider it? A. I couldn’t give forty years. Q. Regardless of the facts and circumstances, you could not consider — even consider that? A. Not forty years. Q. Regardless of what the facts were? A. No. Q. Is that your answer? A. That’s my answer. [Emphasis added.] We have several cases where we have discussed the application of the Witherspoon rule. In McCree v. State, 266 Ark. 466, 585 S.W. 2d 938 (1979), we discussed the testimony of several prospective jurors who vacillated back and forth as they were questioned by the defense attorney and the State’s attorney but, when finally questioned by the judge, said they could not vote for the death penalty. They were properly excused. In Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312, 595 S.W. 2d 934 (1980), we discussed another case where a juror equivocated repeatedly about her willingness to vote for or against the death penalty. Her final position as quoted in the Hulsey opinion, was as follows: Q. Now, what I am trying to find out, even though you think he is guilty, would you automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty would regard to any evidence that might develop in the trial of the case? A. I believe I would, yes, sir, because I don’t want to take a life. We said in Hulsey that the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the prospective juror and was in a position to weigh her somewhat contradictory versions in order to determine whether she was qualified under the Witherspoon rule. In such situations the trial judge has some discretion, a matter which the majority has totally ignored. I cannot reconcile the majority holding with our cases involving the death penalty. It is not for us to judge whether a prosecuting attorney should attempt to qualify a jury for the maximum punishment. While it is a practice that ought to be used with care, because it can be abused, neither I nor the members of this court have the duty and responsibility of a prosecuting attorney to represent the best interests of the State. Our role regarding trial tactics is to review their legality, not advisability. Obviously a prosecuting attorney would be derelict in his duty if he did not in some cases seek the maximum punishment — from the beginning. In performing that duty he should be able to remove people from a jury panel who will not under any circumstances consider the maximum punishment. No doubt some people have strong feelings about certain crimes and would not impose a maximum sentence, although the facts might warrant it. The prosecutor in this case was simply trying to get a jury that could, if it so determined, award the maximum punishment. The majority presumes that the jurors chosen would automatically vote for a maximum sentence if they found the defendant guilty; I find no evidence to support that conclusion. The questions by the State were properly phrased to see if a venireman could impose a maximum sentence. That is permitted by law. The majority’s reference to the myriad of problems that will arise if we approve such trial tactics is, in my judgment, irrelevant. Prosecuting attorneys have for years inquired of prospective jurors concerning any prejudices that the jurors harbored regarding a particular offense or punishment. Just because that practice may cause us problems is no reason to deny the use of it. Our function is to solve problems, not avoid them. In all due respect I feel the majority’s decision reflects a misconception of our system of law, a system based on an adversary presentation of evidence. The State’s attorney is obligated under that system to do all he can, within the law and ethical standards, to present the State’s case in the best possible light. By law the State is entitled to have the case heard by 12 people who have not already decided, before the trial, that a lawful sentence will not be imposed regardless of the circumstances. I feel the majority has denied the State that right - a decided departure from the principle of trial by advocacy. Fogleman, C.J. joins in this dissent.