Court Opinion

ID: 1001431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:55:33.27419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:02.232979
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

IRIS C. PAYNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                   No. 99-2094
NORTH CAROLINA HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CA-98-149-5-BO)

Submitted: March 28, 2000

Decided: April 26, 2000

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Marvin Schiller, David G. Schiller, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Charles L. Steele, IV, MAUPIN, TAYLOR & ELLIS,
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina; Keith D. Burns, FAISON &
GILLESPIE, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Iris C. Payne appeals the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency (the "Agency")
and dismissal of her employment discrimination complaint. Payne
claimed that she was passed over for a promotion because of her gen-
der in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). On appeal,
Payne contends that the district court erred by finding that she did not
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and that
she did not rebut the Agency's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons
for not offering her the promotion. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.

A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. See Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d
1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all
reasonable inferences from the affidavits, depositions, and attached
exhibits submitted below in his or her favor. See Evans v. Technolo-
gies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996).

To meet her burden on summary judgment, Payne proceeded under
the proof scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In order to establish a prima facie case, Payne
had to show that: "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) her
employer had an open position for which she applied; (3) she was
qualified for the position; and (4) she was rejected for the position
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimi-
nation." Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 230 (4th Cir.

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1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Feb. 28,
2000) (No. 99-1092). If Payne succeeded in establishing a prima facie
case, the Agency had to respond by showing a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for not offering the promotion to Payne. Payne
was then required to rebut the Agency's response by showing that the
proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. See Evans, 80 F.3d
at 959.

We will assume for the purpose of this appeal that Payne estab-
lished a prima facie case. However, we agree with the district court
that the Agency offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not
promoting Payne and for promoting a male employee. We further
agree with the district court that Payne did not show that the Agency's
proffered reasons for not promoting her were a pretext for discrimina-
tion.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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