Court Opinion

ID: 9929058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 18:01:58.410694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:40.296893
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10626    Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 02/01/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10626
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ADAM KILLICK,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS USA INC,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00111-MW-MJF
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10626         Document: 21-1          Date Filed: 02/01/2024          Page: 2 of 6

       2                          Opinion of the Court                         23-10626

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Adam Killick appeals pro se following the district court’s
       grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Harbor
       Freight Tools USA, Inc. (“Harbor Freight”) in this product-liability
       action originally brought in Florida state court. We can discern
       two arguments from Killick’s brief on appeal. First, Killick argues
       that the district court judge and magistrate judge should have sua
       sponte recused themselves. Second, he contends that the suit was
       improperly removed to federal court because he never served Har-
       bor Freight.1
                                               I.
              We ordinarily review the district court’s denial of
       a recusal motion for an abuse of discretion. Loranger v. Stierheim,
       10 F.3d 776, 779 (11th Cir. 1994). While arguments in a civil case
       which are raised for the first time on appeal are normally deemed
       waived, see Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994),

       1 To the extent that Killick might be attempting to raise other issues in his

       initial brief, they are not fairly raised such that we cannot entertain them. See
       Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-83 (11th Cir. 2014) (ex-
       plaining that a party abandons a claim “when he does not ‘plainly and promi-
       nently’ raise it” in his appellate brief). Even assuming that he did fairly raise a
       challenge to the district court’s failure to appoint counsel for him, we cannot
       conclude that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Killick
       had failed to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances standard to warrant ap-
       pointment of counsel in a civil case.
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       23-10626                Opinion of the Court                           3

       when a plaintiff fails to argue for a judge’s recusal before the district
       court, we review for plain error the failure to sua sponte recuse,
       Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651
       (11th Cir. 1983). Under plain error review, the party raising the is-
       sue has the burden to show that (1) there is error (2) that is plain
       (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights and (4) “not correct-
       ing the error would seriously affect the fairness of the judicial pro-
       ceeding.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329
       (11th Cir. 1999).
              Recusal is governed, in part, by 28 U.S.C. § 455. Un-
       der § 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
       which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 455(a). The test under § 455(a) is “whether an objective, disinter-
       ested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the
       grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant
       doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Parker v. Connors Steel
       Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). Under § 455(a), “a judge
       has a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper
       legal grounds exist.” Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.
       2001) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, bias sufficient to dis-
       qualify a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources. Hamm, 708
       F.2d at 651. However, an exception exists where a judge’s remarks
       in a judicial context demonstrate pervasive bias and prejudice
       against a party. Id. Absent evidence of pervasive bias and preju-
       dice, “a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case may not serve
       as the basis for a recusal motion.” McWhorter v. City of Birmingham,
       906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10626

              Here, Killick has not shown that either the district court
       judge or the magistrate judge plainly erred by failing to sua sponte
       recuse themselves. The complained-of actions were all made in the
       context of judicial proceedings, and, accordingly, cannot serve as
       the basis for holding that the judges should have recused them-
       selves in the instant case, absent evidence of pervasive bias and
       prejudice, which he has failed to show. McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678.
       Thus, neither the district court judge nor the magistrate judge
       plainly erred in failing to sua sponte recuse themselves.
                                        II.
               Second, Killick argues that Harbor Freight’s removal of this
       case to federal court was improper, and the district court should
       have granted his motion to remand the case to state court. Killick’s
       argument apparently is that the removal was improper because
       Harbor Freight was never served and therefore there was no case
       to be removed. We employ a two-tiered standard of review for the
       district court’s determination of subject-matter jurisdiction. Be-
       cause it involves questions of federal subject matter jurisdiction, we
       review the denial of a motion to remand a removed state court ac-
       tion de novo. Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202,
       1204 (11th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]he district court’s factual find-
       ings with respect to jurisdiction . . . are reviewed for clear error.”
       United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002). Factual
       findings may only be overturned under the clear error standard if
       we, “on the entire evidence [are] left with the definite and firm con-
       viction that a mistake has been committed.” Eggers v. Alabama, 876
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       23-10626               Opinion of the Court                         5

       F.3d 1086, 1094 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Section 1446(b)
       of Title 28 provides that a defendant may remove a civil action
       from a state court by filing a notice of removal in the district court
       within 30 days of receipt of a copy of the initial pleading. See 28
       U.S.C. § 1446(b).
              Here, as an initial matter and notwithstanding Killick’s fail-
       ure to timely object to the magistrate judge’s report and recom-
       mendation, because Killick’s contentions on appeal involve ques-
       tions of federal subject matter jurisdiction, we review the denial of
       the motion to remand de novo but the district court’s factual find-
       ings for clear error. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114; Bailey, 536 F.3d at
       1204.
               The magistrate judge did not clearly err in finding that Har-
       bor Freight had been served with the summons and complaint and
       that Harbor Freight had timely removed the case to federal court.
       The magistrate judge found that Killick, at the time represented by
       counsel, served Harbor Freight with a summons and copy of the
       complaint on April 22, 2021. We do not have a “definite and firm
       conviction that a mistake has been committed,” especially because
       Killick does not offer compelling argument to the contrary. Eggers,
       876 F.3d at 1094. Rather, Killick merely repeats his general asser-
       tion that Roane and defense counsel colluded against him. Because
       Harbor Freight’s removal of the case to federal court was timely,
       and there appears to be no other obstacle to the district court’s ju-
       risdiction, the district court properly adopted the magistrate
       judge’s recommendation and denied Killick’s motion to remand.
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       6                  Opinion of the Court              23-10626

             AFFIRMED.