Court Opinion

ID: 9393301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 20:03:15.128116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.282008
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/9/23 P. v. Donahue CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B317638

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. YA102832)
         v.

RONALD TITUS DONAHUE,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
      John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Mathews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      At trial, defendant Ronald Titus Donahue admitted that,
during a murder-for-hire gone awry, he shot two people, killing
one. On appeal from his murder conviction, he raises three
claims of instructional error related to voluntary intoxication and
also challenges the admission of preliminary hearing testimony.
We affirm.

               II.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Shooting

       In October 1982, Vaughn Stokoe was separated and living
apart from his wife, Alice, and in a relationship with fellow postal
worker Julia Crandell, the murder victim. Early in the
investigation, detectives suspected that the crime was a murder
for hire and that Alice and her brother Rami may have been
involved. They also believed that the murder victim was not a
target, but rather an “innocent bystander who was at the wrong
place at the wrong time . . . .”
       According to defendant, an older acquaintance named
“Beto” hired him to kill Stokoe in exchange for $5,000. When
defendant agreed to kill Stokoe, Beto advised that he would
supply the weapon and “do the driving.”
       Prior to the shootings, Beto drove defendant on a number of
occasions to the area where Stokoe lived and showed him the
specific street and house. On one occasion, they saw Stokoe in
the front yard of the house. Beto explained that the occupants
were postal employees who would leave early in the morning for

                                 2
work. Because it would still be dark, Beto believed that the early
morning would be “‘a perfect time [for the shooting].’”
      Before dawn on the morning of October 30, 1982, Beto
drove defendant to Stokoe’s house, gave him a loaded rifle, and
showed him how to use it. Beto also told defendant to position
himself between the house and an RV parked next to it so that
defendant would be able to see Stokoe walk out. Beto then
dropped defendant off, advising that he would be “‘in the back.’”
As defendant waited for Stokoe to leave the house, he smoked a
cigarette to calm his nerves and then flicked the butt of the
cigarette on the ground.
      From his vantage point, defendant saw Stokoe leave the
house, walk to a car in the driveway, and occupy the driver’s seat.
As Stokoe backed down the driveway, defendant fired two shots,
one of which struck Stokoe in the upper body near his right
shoulder. Uncertain whether either of his shots had struck
Stokoe, defendant decided to fire a third shot. That shot struck
and killed Crandell, whom defendant described as having
appeared “out of the blue.”
      Defendant ran from the scene and got in the car with Beto
who drove off. Beto gave defendant some money and advised him
to leave the area.
      Torrance Police Department officers who first responded to
a shots-fired call on October 30, 1982, found Crandell lying on the
ground next to the vehicle and Stokoe nearby on the sidewalk.
Detectives recovered a cigarette butt from the ground between
the house and RV.
      In 2011, a Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department criminalist
began work on a DNA sample previously extracted from the
cigarette butt. On January 28, 2013, based on some preliminary

                                 3
DNA results, detectives interviewed defendant and obtained a
blood sample. The criminalist then determined that the DNA
profile from the cigarette matched the DNA profile developed
from the blood sample taken from defendant.
       Detectives interviewed defendant a second time in March
2013 and again in 2015. During those interviews, he admitted
being aware of the shootings, but denied any involvement.
During a fourth interview on November 15, 2018, however,
defendant admitted that Beto had offered to pay him $5,000 for
the murder, drove him to the scene, and provided him the gun.
Defendant also admitted that he waited outside for Stokoe to
come out of the house before opening fire. Finally, he admitted
that he shot Crandell, stating, “I pulled the trigger and I hit her.”

             III.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In an information, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney charged defendant with murdering Crandell in violation
of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a).1
      Defendant testified at trial and admitted that he had been
hired to kill Stokoe, but had killed Crandell instead. According to
defendant, he started smoking marijuana and drinking at age 13
and by the time he turned 21, he used heroin and cocaine
everyday. Beto supplied him with the drugs and also employed
him part-time at his upholstery shop.
      On the morning of October 30, 1982, “[a]bout three to four
hours before” the shooting, defendant injected a mixture of heroin

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

                                  4
and cocaine. He “took more than usual”2 to “get calm,” as his
“conscience was screaming at [him] not to do it” and he wanted
“to drown it out.” Defendant claimed the dose “hit [him] pretty
hard,” although he was used to doing heroin and cocaine and
“[b]y then [he] had a little tolerance, but not that much.”
       Defendant’s first thought when he saw Stokoe get into his
car was “[g]et him.” He fired one shot, “kept focused on [Stokoe],”
and then fired a second and third shot. As he prepared to fire the
third shot, “that’s when the lady came in” and defendant “hit
her.” It was not defendant’s intention to shoot Crandell.
Defendant was “only trying to shoot . . . Stokoe.” It was hard for
defendant to focus due to the heroin and cocaine he had injected.
       At trial, the prosecution argued that defendant intended to
kill Stokoe and that his intent to kill could be imputed to the
death of Crandall under the doctrine of transferred intent. The
jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the trial
court sentenced him to a prison term of 25 years to life.

                       IV.   DISCUSSION

A.    Refusal to Instruct on Voluntary Intoxication

      Defendant contends that the trial court violated his due
process rights by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary
intoxication.

2      Defendant did not specify the amount of the drugs he
injected, stating only that it was “$50 [worth] of heroin [and] $50
[worth] of cocaine . . . .”

                                 5
      1.    Background

      During the jury instruction conference, defendant’s counsel
requested that the trial court deliver CALCRIM no. 6253 on
voluntary intoxication. The court declined to deliver the
instruction because there was insufficient evidence to support it.

      2.    Legal Principles

      “‘[T]he trial court normally must, even in the absence of a
request, instruct on general principles of law that are closely and
openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ [Citation.] In addition, ‘a defendant
has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the
defense [citations]; however, a trial judge must only give those
instructions which are supported by substantial evidence.
[Citations.] Further, a trial judge has the authority to refuse
requested instructions on a defense theory for which there is no
supporting evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘A party is not entitled to an

3      CALCRIM no. 625 provides: “You may consider evidence, if
any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited
way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether
the defendant acted with an intent to kill[,] [or] [the defendant
acted with deliberation and premeditation[,]] [[or] the defendant
was unconscious when (he/she) acted[,]] [or the defendant
_________ .] [¶] A person is voluntarily
intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using
any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it
could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the
risk of that effect. [¶] You may not consider evidence of the
defendant’s voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.”

                                 6
instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.’
[Citation.]
       “Evidence of voluntary intoxication, formerly admissible on
the issue of diminished capacity (see generally People v. Mendoza
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1125 [(Mendoza)] . . .), now is ‘admissible
solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually
formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder,
whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
express malice aforethought.’ ([former] § 22, subd. (b); see
[Mendoza], supra, [18 Cal.4th] at p. 1126.) Accordingly, [under
current law,] a defendant is entitled to an instruction on
voluntary intoxication ‘only when there is substantial evidence of
the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication
affected the defendant’s “actual formation of specific intent.”’
(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 . . . .)” (People v.
Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715.)4

4     Defendant’s trial counsel requested an instruction on
voluntary intoxication under current law which limits the
consideration of that issue to whether a defendant was able to
premeditate or form the specific intent to kill. On appeal,
however, defendant contends that the law of voluntary
intoxication, as it existed in 1982, applied to his offense. Under
that prior version of the defense, “evidence of voluntary
intoxication [was] admissible under [former] section 22 with
regard to the question whether the defendant harbored malice
aforethought, whether such malice is express or implied.” (People
v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 441.)

                                 7
      3.    Analysis

       We will assume, without deciding, that the law on
involuntary intoxication in effect in 1982 governed defendant’s
murder charge and that the defense therefore applied to both
express and implied malice murder. We nevertheless conclude
that there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction on
that defense under either current or former law.
       Defendant testified that when he injected heroin and
cocaine three or four hours before the shooting, the drugs “hit
him hard” and made it difficult for him to focus during the
shooting. Accordingly, there was evidence to support an
inference that defendant was experiencing some level of
intoxication at the time of the shooting. There was no evidence,
however, that such intoxication interfered with defendant’s
ability to form the specific intent to kill or to act with implied
malice. Indeed, defendant admitted that he agreed to shoot
Stokoe according to a plan devised by Beto, that he followed that
plan by hiding and waiting for Stokoe, that he fired three shots at
Stokoe with the intent to kill him, and that he was then paid by
Beto as agreed. That defendant killed the wrong person did not
negate his intent to kill.5 Therefore, the trial court did not err in

5      As noted, the prosecution argued that defendant was liable
for the first degree murder of Crandall under the doctrine of
transferred intent. “Under the ‘classic formulation’ of the
transferred intent doctrine, where a defendant intends to kill a
victim but misses and instead kills a bystander, the intent to kill
the intended victim is imputed to the resulting death of the
bystander and the defendant is liable for murder.” (People v.
Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 664.)

                                 8
failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. (People v.
Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 998.)

B.    Failure to Instruct on Nonstatutory Manslaughter

      Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by not
instructing sua sponte on a form of nonstatutory manslaughter
that was recognized in 1982.6 According to defendant, the
evidence of his voluntary intoxication supported an inference of
an “actual failure to form the mental state of malice.”

      1.    Background

       During the instruction conference, defense counsel asked
for instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter,
explaining that defendant acted with disregard for human life,
but did not have the intent to kill. The trial court ruled, “I’m not
giving voluntary or involuntary manslaughter instructions. The
evidence is overwhelming that this murder occurred through the
vehicle of transferred intent, because [defendant] was hired to
commit murder, and he intentionally went out there, hid at the
side of the house, stepped out and fired three rounds, one of them
which struck Ms. Crandell and killed her. [¶] There isn’t even a

6     Defendant contends that under “the 1982 version of
[former] section 22, evidence of voluntary intoxication could be
considered in determining whether a criminal defendant
harbored either express or implied malice,” citing among other
cases, People v. Whitsett (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 213, 215–216.
Thus, a defendant could show that “a mental disease, defect or
disorder prevented him from actually forming any required
mental state, including [malice].”

                                 9
slight bit of evidence to support either one of those [two] lesser-
included offenses.”

      2.    Legal Principles

       “‘[The] obligation [to instruct on the general principles of
law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence] has been held
to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when
the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of
the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is
no evidence that the offense was less than that charged.
[Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses
exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only
fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being
given. [Citations.] Just as the People have no legitimate interest
in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that
established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an
acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser
included offense. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154–155.)

      3.    Analysis

      We will assume without deciding that the former law
regarding nonstatutory manslaughter applied to defendant’s case
and that evidence of his voluntary intoxication could therefore be
considered by the jury when determining whether he acted with
either express or implied malice. We nevertheless conclude that
an instruction on that former theory of manslaughter was not
supported by substantial evidence.

                                 10
      As we explain above, there was no evidence from which the
jury could have concluded that the drugs defendant injected
hours earlier had any effect on his ability to form the mental
state of malice at the time of his planned shooting. The trial
court therefore did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on the
nonstatutory manslaughter theory.

C.    Failure to Instruct on Involuntary Manslaughter

      Based on his view of the evidence of his voluntary
intoxication, defendant maintains there was a factual issue as to
whether he had any ability to form the requisite express or
implied malice to commit murder. He therefore concludes that he
was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of
involuntary manslaughter.

      1.    Background

      As explained above, defense counsel requested instructions
on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter based on the
evidence of defendant’s injection of drugs. The trial court found
there was no evidence to support either instruction.

      2.    Legal Principles

      “Involuntary manslaughter is ‘the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice . . . in the commission of an
unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a
lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or
without due caution and circumspection.’ (§ 192, subd. (b).)

                                 11
       “‘Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication,
is a complete defense to a criminal charge.’ [Citations.]
However, ‘[w]hen a person renders himself or herself unconscious
through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing
is attributed to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that
point, and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 463.)

      3.    Analysis

      We agree with the trial court that there was no evidence to
support an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. As we
discuss above, there was no evidence that defendant’s
intoxication affected his ability to form the mental state of
malice. Nor was there any evidence that defendant was
unconscious at the time he fired three shots at Stokoe. To the
contrary, his detailed recitation of his conduct during the
commission of the crime, both prior to and at trial, demonstrated
that he was fully aware of his actions and acted with deliberation
during the shootings.

D.    Preliminary Hearing Testimony

      Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ruled
that Detective Kranke’s preliminary hearing testimony could be
read to the jury in light of his unavailability. According to
defendant, although the prosecution’s evidence showed that the
detective’s attendance at trial may have been inconvenient to
him, it did not establish unavailability.

                                12
      1.    Background

      During an Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the
admissibility of Detective Kranke’s preliminary hearing
testimony, the trial court tentatively ruled that it would allow the
testimony if the prosecution established his unavailability. The
prosecution then presented testimony from a detective and the
deputy district attorney describing their efforts to ensure
Detective Kranke’s attendance and the reasons for his
unavailability. After hearing the testimony, the court ruled that
the detective was unavailable and allowed the reading of his
preliminary hearing testimony.
      During his brief appearance at the preliminary hearing,
Detective Kranke testified about: (1) his role in the recovery of
the cigarette butt from the scene, including the fact there was a
camera malfunction; (2) the fact that he met with Stokoe at the
hospital after the shooting and that Stokoe was shot in the right
shoulder; (3) the fact that he attended Crandell’s autopsy and
took photographs; (4) his meeting at the tow yard with other
detectives during which they attempted to determine the
trajectory and timing of the three rounds that struck Stokoe’s car,
including his descriptions of demonstrative photographs taken
during that meeting; and (5) the two 30.06 shell casings found at
the scene, the fact that they likely came from a bolt-action rifle,
and the fact that three shots were fired with the first two casings
being ejected and the third one remaining in the rifle.

                                13
      2.    Legal Principles

       California Evidence Code “[s]ection 1291, subdivision (a)(2),
provides that ‘former testimony,’ such as preliminary hearing
testimony, [footnote omitted] is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if ‘the declarant is unavailable as a witness,’ and
‘[t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered was a
party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was
given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he
has at the hearing.’ Thus, when the requirements of section 1291
are met, the admission of former testimony in evidence does not
violate a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation.
[Citation.]” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621.)

      3.    Analysis

       Even if we assume that the trial court erred by allowing the
preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury, defendant
has failed adequately to articulate how he was prejudiced by that
error. As described above, following the prosecution’s case-in-
chief, defendant testified and admitted to going to the scene with
a loaded, high-caliber rifle, lying in wait for Stokoe while smoking
a cigarette, and intentionally firing three shots at Stokoe while
he sat in his car to ensure that he killed him. Moreover, other
officers testified about finding a cigarette butt at the scene,
finding 30.06 shell casings at the scene, and Stokoe’s wound.
Similarly, a deputy medical examiner read the autopsy report
and testified in detail about Crandell’s gunshot wound and the
cause of death. Given defendant’s detailed admissions and the

                                14
other testimony, there was nothing about the detective’s
testimony that was crucial to the prosecution’s case or that was
otherwise relevant to defendant’s assertion of voluntary
intoxication. Thus, even without Detective Kranke’s limited
testimony, there was no reasonable probability that defendant
would have obtained a more favorable outcome. (People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [“state law error in admitting
evidence is subject to the traditional Watson[7] test: The
reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent
the error”].)

E.    Cumulative Error

      Finally, defendant contends the combined effect of the
instructional and evidentiary errors require reversal of his
conviction, even if the errors were not prejudicial when
considered separately. Because we have found no error other
than the assumed error in the trial court’s admission of Detective
Kranke’s prior testimony, there was no prejudice that could
accumulate. (See People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 319.)

7     People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

                                15
                        V.   DISPOSITION

     The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             MOOR, J.

                               16