Court Opinion

ID: 9569658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:16:11.817121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:42.746746
License: Public Domain

WOOD, Chief Judge (specially concurring). I concur in the result only, the extended discussion is unnecessary. Defendant stipulated to the qualifications of the polygraph examiner and did not object to introduction of the test results. His contentions concerning the examination results are raised for the first time on appeal and should not be considered under Appellate Rule 11. See State v. Chavez, 82 N.M. 238, 478 P.2d 566 (Ct.App.1970). The prospective jurors excused for cause stated they could not return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder regardless of the facts. They were properly excused. See State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d 197 (1969). At oral argument counsel conceded that the record does not show that the jurors who sat in the case were not in fact representative of a cross-section of the community. See State v. Gonzales, 82 N.M. 388, 482 P.2d 252 (Ct.App.1971). The argument that voir diring prospective jurors as to their beliefs concerning the death penalty deprived defendant of a representative jury has no factual support in the record. There is no basis for the claim that cross-examination concerning a juvenile record was unduly restricted. Defendant made no tender under Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2). The testimony of a witness that shortly after the crime defendant stated that he had gotten away with armed robbery was admissible under Rule of Evidence 803(3) because the testimony showed defendant’s existing state of mind. In permitting the witness who had remained in the courtroom to testify on rebuttal, the trial court substantially complied with the procedure suggested in State v. Barboa, 84 N.M. 675, 506 P.2d 1222 (Ct.App.1973).