Court Opinion

ID: 9568299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:19.215859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:34.156527
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting in part.
This is a condemnation proceeding by the State Highway Department against lands of Mr. and Mrs. Kinsey in Dade County, Georgia. The new proposed highway split the farm of the owners and there was no way for the owners’ cattle to travel from one farm to the other except by going under the highway through a culvert. But the culvert is alleged to have been so small, with a stream of water at all times flowing over the bottom of the culvert, as to render it undesirable as a passage-way for the owner’s cattle.
In Division 2 the majority opinion seemingly holds that the owner’s right to travel from one part of his farmlands to another part (now obstructed by the new highway) is a matter of grace and not a matter of right, and therefore, not compensable.
On the other hand, the landowners contend that the value of their land has been diminished because of being split, and the unsuitable passageway for their cattle from one farm to the other farm bears directly upon the issue as to how much the value of their remaining land has been reduced.
1. The majority opinion cites the quite recent case of Department of Transportation v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 (201 SE2d 441). That case is directly against the position of the majority, and among other things it points out that formerly all landowners had the right to enter a highway at any point contiguous to their property; but the "limited access highway law” has taken away such right of entry into the highway at any point; and that a landowner through whose land such limited access highway is condemned, cannot recover damages for denial of his right to enter the highway at any point adjoining his lands. The Hardin case, then at page 362, *774holds as follows: "We do not mean to infer by this opinion that a condemnee would not be entitled to compensation for any reduction in the market value of his remaining property in the event the right of way acquired from the condemnee for a limited access highway divides the condemnee’s property and prevents convenient access from one portion to the other, or cuts off a portion of his property so that he has no access to it. ” (Emphasis supplied.) To paraphrase the holding by the Supreme Court in Hardin, supra; the landowner cannot complain because he cannot leave his property and enter the highway at any point adjoining his property; but the landowner can complain because he cannot leave his property and enter and go upon other property of the same landowner, when he is obstructed therefrom by a hew highway running through and splitting his property. This is the case sub judice in a nutshell; it fits like a glove.
2. But the majority opinion seeks to escape the effect of the holding in the Hardin case by stating that it was "decided after the present case was pending on appeal.” It makes not one bit of difference that the Hardin case was not decided when, or before, the case sub judice was on trial. The law to be applied on review is the law in effect on the date the appellate court considers the case, and this is true even though the law is changed following the trial in the lower court and before it is decided in the appellate court. In Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 265 (161 SE2d 281), the Supreme Court holds: "As was said in City of Valdosta v. Singleton, 197 Ga. 194, 208 (28 SE2d 759), a reviewing court should apply the law as it exists at the time of its judgment rather than the law prevailing at the rendition of the judgment under review, and may therefore reverse a judgmerit that was correct at the time it was rendered and affirm a judgment that was erroneous at the time, where the law has been changed in the meantime and where the application of the new law will impair no vested right under the prior law.” (Emphasis supplied.) Let it be understood that I do not agree that the law has been changed as applied to this case, but if it has been changed, the law existing at the time of our decision in this reviewing court must be applied.
*7753. The majority opinion urges that the landowner did not prove the value of his damage through being denied the right to go from one farm under the highway to the other farm. There was no obligation whatever upon the landowners to divide their damages up in such fashion, because this item became an element of damage to all of the landowners’ remaining land, and was proven by the evidence as to the reduced value of the remaining land, as to which there was ample evidence. (Tr. pp. 23-33, 47-49, 54, 55, 62-64, 67, 89, 90). Further, the burden was on the condemnor — Department of Transportation — to prove such damage as an integral part of its right of eminent domain. The majority opinion admits this proposition of law and cites in support thereof Georgia Power Co. v. Brooks, 207 Ga. 406 (4) (62 SE2d 183).
I concur with the majority opinion as to all portions except Division 2, and would vote to affirm the judgment.