Court Opinion

ID: 9861892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:53:33.310605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:37.788484
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DONOVAN, specially concurring: I concur in the decision to confirm the Commission’s decision. I write separately to voice my concern regarding the majority’s expression of its willingness to “consider giving credence” to a statement in Cook, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 552, 531 N.E.2d at 384, which proposes that the Commission’s decisions be subjected to “extra scrutiny” in cases where the Commission has overturned credibility findings of the arbitrator. As is evident from the majority’s decision, a review of fixed precedent regarding the Commission’s prerogative to decide credibility issues is unnecessary to a disposition of the issues in the case before us. Thus, the discussion in the majority’s decision amounts to an advisory statement that will likely spur unhappy litigants to appeal merely because the Commission’s findings are at odds with those of the arbitrator, without regard to whether the Commission’s findings and conclusions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since Cook was decided, numerous appellants have relied on it as authority to support their arguments that the Commission’s decisions should be subject to “extra scrutiny” in cases where the Commission has overturned credibility findings of an arbitrator, and this court has largely declined to do so. See Sleeter v. Industrial Comm’n, 346 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784, 805 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (2004); Komatsu Dresser Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 235 Ill. App. 3d 779, 788-89, 601 N.E.2d 1339, 1345-46 (1992); Dillon, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 607-08, 552 N.E.2d at 1087. Moreover, throughout the years, the Illinois Supreme Court has been asked over the years to consider the functions of the arbitrator vis-avis the functions of the Commission, and it has consistently held that the Commission exercises original jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator’s findings. See Berry, 99 Ill. 2d at 405, 459 N.E.2d at 965; Esposito v. Industrial Comm’n, 12 Ill. 2d 305, 306, 146 N.E.2d 65, 66 (1957); Garbowicz v. Industrial Comm’n, 373 Ill. 268, 269-70, 26 N.E.2d 123, 124 (1940). It is worth noting that the argument that the hearing officer who actually observed the witnesses is in the best position to judge credibility issues is not unique to workers’ compensation cases and that such arguments have been uniformly rejected where the responsibilities of fact-finding and decision-making are statutorily conferred on an administrative agency. See, e.g., Starkey v. Civil Service Comm’n, 97 Ill. 2d 91, 100-01, 454 N.E.2d 265, 269 (1983); Caracci v. Edgar, 160 Ill. App. 3d 892, 896, 513 N.E.2d 932, 935 (1987); Gregory v. Bernardi, 125 Ill. App. 3d 376, 380-81, 465 N.E.2d 1052, 1055-56 (1984). The long-standing rule provides that while an agency is required to consider the findings and conclusions of its hearing officer, it is not bound to accept them, and that the agency must make its own decision based on the evidence in the record. Starkey, 97 Ill. 2d at 100-01, 454 N.E.2d at 269; Gregory, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 380-81, 465 N.E.2d at 1055-56. The rule has been applied even when the findings of fact depend on the credibility of witnesses and the hearing officer, rather than the agency, had the opportunity to observe and to assess the demeanor of the witnesses. Starkey, 97 Ill. 2d at 100-01, 454 N.E.2d at 269; Gregory, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 380-81, 465 N.E.2d at 1055-56. I believe it is imprudent to revisit a clearly established precedent where the issue is not necessary to a disposition of the appeal and where the appellant has not established good cause or a novel theory to justify a departure from that precedent. In all other respects, I concur.