Court Opinion

ID: 9927576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 15:06:54.106918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:22.463836
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3556-21

K.E.E.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S.A.L.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued January 16, 2024 – Decided January 29, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
                   No. FV-15-1431-22.

                   Brian D. Winters argued the cause for appellant (Keith,
                   Winters, Wenning & Harris, LLC, attorneys; Brian D.
                   Winters, on the brief).

                   Rachelle Ann Waitz argued the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM
        Defendant S.A.L.1 appeals from the June 3, 2022 final restraining order

("FRO") and August 18, 2022 amended FRO entered against her and in favor of

plaintiff K.E.E. pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:25-17 to -35 ("PDVA"). Following our review of the record and applicable

legal principles, we affirm.

        The parties were previously in an intimate relationship and share a child

together. Their relationship ended in 2010. In February 2022, plaintiff filed a

domestic violence complaint alleging harassment and was granted a temporary

restraining order. On June 3, 2022, the court conducted a trial on plaintiff's

application for an FRO. Plaintiff appeared in person and defendant appeared

virtually at her request.

        Plaintiff testified that on February 23, 2022, between approximately 10:25

and 10:37 p.m., defendant came to his home uninvited and knocked on the door,

yelled, cursed, threatened him, and told him "[t]o come to the door or she was

going to burn the house down." Plaintiff was not home, having left for work

shortly before defendant arrived. Plaintiff's fiancée and her children were inside

the residence.

1
    We utilize initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(9).
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      Plaintiff communicated with defendant using his cell phone through a

Ring doorbell. He asked defendant to leave. When she refused, plaintiff called

the police. The police arrived several minutes later and transported defendant

to a hospital where she was placed in a psychiatric hold and involuntarily

committed.       According to plaintiff, when the police arrived defendant was

"screaming, carrying on. Saying that . . . [plaintiff] sent Jehovah Witnesses to

try to kill her and [their] son and that [plaintiff is] trying . . . to sleep with her."

Plaintiff introduced photographs of the Ring video feed he took with his cell

phone during the incident that established the incident took place between 10:25

and 10:37 p.m.

      Plaintiff testified he did not give defendant his address. Plaintiff does not

have a relationship with their shared child. The last time plaintiff saw defendant

or their child was in 2018. Other than emails with counsel, plaintiff had no

contact with defendant since their last court appearance in 2018.

      Plaintiff testified that in 2017, defendant left a voicemail message on his

phone that was intended for his mother. Plaintiff introduced a transcript of the

voicemail, which the court read into the record. In that voicemail defendant

said, in part:

             Is this b[****]? You better get [plaintiff] and tell him,
             oh, leave me the f[***] alone or you will pay for it.

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                  ....

            I promise you, b[****], your own mother[*******]
            think this is game, b[****]. I know where you live.
            And you are going to pay for his actions. Tell that
            p[****] n[*****] to leave me the f[***] alone. This
            ain't no game. I found you before. And I'ma find you
            again. Show this s[***] to the cops too. . . . I'ma make
            you pay for the s[***] he's doing to me and my family.
            . . . I'ma going to get to you, b[****]. That's how the
            f[***] that goes. You better tell him leave me and my
            mother[*******] family alone. . . . See how that feels
            when you don't want someone to call you your
            f[******] phone or be in your f[******] life . . . [?]
            I'ma fight you back about – you better hope your
            daughter around to help you, b[****].

      Plaintiff also testified that on November 10, 2017, defendant sent him a

text message in which she wrote, "I'm going to put a bullet in your head" and

"I'm going to shoot you in the f[******] head. I am not kidding. You're getting

out of my li[f]e one way or another."       He testified further that defendant

previously harassed his mother by showing up at her place of employment and

by calling her. Plaintiff also testified that in March 2018, he observed defendant

and two other individuals throw eggs at the front door of his previous residence.

After plaintiff moved to his current residence, he believed defendant would not

be able to find him, and they would have no further contact. Plaintiff testified

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an FRO was necessary to protect him and his family, and without an FRO there

would be continued acts of domestic violence.

      Defendant testified plaintiff did not give her his address and she found it

through court records in an unrelated lawsuit. She contended however, plaintiff

previously invited her to contact him and that is why she had his permission to

be at his home on February 23, 2022. Defendant also testified the parties had a

pattern of going years without any contact and then reinitiating contact.

According to defendant, showing up unexpectedly was something they did all

the time and was nothing out of the ordinary.

      Defendant testified she and plaintiff communicated sporadically and

sometimes late at night about their child. These communications related to

matters such as the child's health insurance and passport.        According to

defendant, her last email with plaintiff about the passport was in 2019 and she

left voicemail messages for him relating to the passport in 2021. In defendant's

view, these communications demonstrated plaintiff invited her to contact him in

any manner at any time. Defendant testified that leading up to the February 23,

2022 incident, she had been trying to contact plaintiff and left him voicemail

messages.

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      Defendant introduced several text messages exchanged between the

parties in 2017. The court reviewed the messages and noted, plaintiff was "not

threatening or using any really offensive language, yet [defendant was] using

offensive[,] co[a]rse, obscene language and . . . referencing to shoot[ing] him in

the head." In one text message, defendant wrote, "stay the f[***] away from my

family . . . If you don't I will kill you." Defendant further emphasized her threat

by sending the following messages, one word at a time, to plaintiff: "I . . . will

. . . kill . . . you . . . literally." In another text message exchange, the parties

wrote:

            [Defendant:] I don't want you around. . . . If you don't
            get away from me, I'm going to kill you, [K.E.E.]. I'ma
            shoot you in your f[******] head. I am not kidding.
            You getting out of my life, one way or another.

                   ....

            [Plaintiff:] Why are you going to kill me? I believe
            you. I am not in your life. . . . Never was. I am not
            around you. Only time I seen you in court.

            [Defendant:] Because I don't want you bothering me
            no more. No. I don't want you text me. I don't want
            you depositing your money. I don't want you binded to
            me, [K.E.E.]. I want you to die. Either you do it
            figuratively, or I'ma do it literally. I don't only see you
            in court.

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             [Plaintiff:] I want it to stay that way. But I['m] scared
             for [my] life. Can you drop court case so you can move
             on? Kill me SMH [(shaking my head)]?

             [Defendant:] You don't get it. I don't want you around
             at all.

      Following the close of evidence, the court rendered an oral opinion. It

found plaintiff to be credible.     The court found defendant less credible,

specifically noting she contradicted herself several times. It found defendant's

own proofs showed plaintiff did not want any contact with her, defendant

repeatedly threatened to shoot and kill plaintiff, and defendant stated she wanted

plaintiff dead.

      Applying the two-step analysis set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super.

112 (App. Div. 2006), the court found that on February 23, 2022, defendant

committed the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). The court also

determined an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff and his family against

future acts of domestic violence.

      Specifically, the court found:

             plaintiff has proven by the preponderance of the
             evidence that [defendant] came to his home uninvited.
             She was not provided with his address by [plaintiff].
             That she came to the home in late evening hours . . .
             between 10:25 [p.m.] and 10:37 [p.m.].

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                   [P]laintiff was able to engage with
            [defendant] . . . through the Ring doorbell. He did not
            invite her in. And he indicated that he is concerned for
            his safety in view of past threats, which there is clear
            evidence [for]. There's no dispute about the text
            messages. [Defendant] does not dispute the text
            messages that were sent in which she is using offensive
            coarse language and that she is threatening to kill him
            or shoot him and that she . . . wants him to die. One
            way or the other she wants him to die.

                  ....

                   The Court clearly finds that there has been a past
            history of domestic violence in view of those threats
            that she did make via text messaging.

                  In addition, the court finds that [plaintiff] has
            proven under Silver . . . that he is concerned for his
            safety in view of the prior threats of killing him . . . and
            her showing up uninvited to a home that he did not
            provide an address to, certainly his fear for his safety
            and that of his family's is a reasonable concern.

      The FRO was entered on June 3, 2022. Defendant requested a stay

pending the appeal, which was denied. On August 18, 2022, an amended FRO

was entered vacating the imposition of a fine.             Defendant moved for

reconsideration, which was denied. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the court abused its discretion in

finding the predicate act of harassment; (2) the court erred as a matter of law

and abused its discretion in finding the entry of an FRO was necessary to protect

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plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence; and (3) the court failed to set

forth appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

      Our scope of review is limited when considering an FRO issued by the

Family Part. See D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013). This

court will "grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the

legal conclusions based upon those findings." Ibid. (citing Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "The general rule is that findings by the trial

court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12. Deference is particularly appropriate

where the evidence is largely testimonial and hinges upon a court's ability to

make assessments of credibility. Id. at 412. We review de novo the court's

conclusions of law. S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 430 (App. Div. 2010).

      The entry of an FRO requires the trial court to make certain findings,

pursuant to a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. "First,

the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance

of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth

in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. The trial court should make

this determination "in light of the previous history of violence between the

parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). Second, the court must

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determine "whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6),[2] to protect the victim

from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse."           Id. at 127 (citing

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) (stating, "[i]n proceedings in which complaints for

restraining orders have been filed, the court shall grant any relief necessary to

prevent further abuse")); see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011).

        A person commits harassment if, with purpose to harass another, they:

              a. Make[], or cause[] to be made, one or more
              communications anonymously or at extremely
              inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language,
              or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

              b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or
              other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

2
    The six factors are:

              (1) [t]he previous history of domestic violence between
              the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
              harassment, and physical abuse; (2) [t]he existence of
              immediate danger to person or property; (3) [t]he
              financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;
              (4) [t]he best interests of the victim and any child; (5)
              [i]n determining custody and parenting time the
              protection of the victim's safety; and (6) [t]he existence
              of a verifiable order of protection from another
              jurisdiction.

              [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(6).]

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            c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or
            of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or
            seriously annoy such other person.

      [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a-c).]

      "'A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence

presented' and from common sense and experience . . . ." H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175

N.J. 309, 327 (2003) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997)). The

finding must be supported by "some evidence that the actor's conscious object

was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed or

annoyed is insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. at 487.

      Pursuant to these principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons set

forth in the court's oral opinion. We add the following comments.

      Defendant's contention that the court erred in finding she committed the

predicate act of harassment is not persuasive. Specifically, defendant argues her

mere use of foul language is insufficient to support a finding of harassment and

the court did not find a purpose to harass.

      Defendant's claim that the court based its decision on nothing more than

foul language is not supported by the record. The court found credible plaintiff's

testimony that defendant came to his residence uninvited at approximately 10:30

p.m. and was yelling, cursing, and threatening to burn the house down. The

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court also found, based on plaintiff's credible testimony and defendant's own

admissions and text messages, there was a clear history of past threats of

violence by defendant. The court's decision was based on substantial, credible

evidence in the record, not solely on defendant's use of foul language.

      Defendant's contention that the court did not find a purpose to harass is

without merit. The court found "the plaintiff has prove[d] . . . harassment under

2C:33-4[(a)], in which a person . . . with the purpose to harass another . . . makes

or causes to be made a communication or communications . . . at extremely

inconvenient hours or in offensively coarse language or in any other manner

likely to cause annoyance or alarm." (emphasis added). In finding defendant

committed the predicate act of harassment as defined, the court determined she

acted with the purpose to harass.

      Defendant's claim that the court erred by finding she acted with a purpose

to harass because that finding was inconsistent with her testimony is

unconvincing.     The court found defendant's testimony less credible than

plaintiff's and determined defendant did not have permission to contact plaintiff

at any time or arrive uninvited at plaintiff's home as she testified. The court's

finding that defendant acted with the purpose to harass was supported by

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substantial, credible evidence in the record, which showed defendant had no

valid reason to come to plaintiff's residence.

      Defendant's claim that the court erred as a matter of law and abused its

discretion in finding the entry of a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from

future acts of domestic violence lacks merit. Applying the second prong of

Silver, the court found a FRO was necessary based on defendant's documented

and undisputed history of repeatedly threatening to shoot and kill plaintiff and

stating she wanted him dead, as well as her conduct on February 23, 2022. "At

its core, the [PDVA] effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic violence

is entitled to be left alone. To be left alone is, in essence, the basic protection

the law seeks to assure these victims."          Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584.     The

substantial, credible evidence in the record reflects that the entry of the FRO

achieved this goal.

      Defendant's argument that the court did not set forth appropriately its

findings of fact and conclusions of law is without merit. The court's oral opinion

was detailed, thorough, and well-reasoned.         The court plainly satisfied its

obligations under Rule 1:7-4.

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      To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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