Court Opinion

ID: 9650514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:41:41.97986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:22.693376
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in the result.
Although I agree with my colleagues that the correct resolution of this appeal is to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the arbitrator’s award, I arrive at that conclusion via a different, but straighter path.
The parties in this case stipulated that the issues to be determined by the arbitrator—and, hence, what the arbitrator would *282have jurisdiction to consider—included not only whether “the Board of Education ha[d] just cause to terminate the employment of John Mizichko” but also “if not, what shall be the remedy?” By that latter inquiry, the parties vested in the arbitrator the authority to determine both whether discipline was to be imposed and, if so, the degree of discipline to be imposed. Stated differently, by explicitly stipulating to the issues to be determined by the arbitrator, the parties waived any objection to the exercise of that jurisdiction.
We have made clear that “parties may waive their right to have a court determine the issue by their conduct or by their agreement to proceed in arbitration.” Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 381, 944 A.2d 642 (2008) (citing N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 160 N.J.Super. 292, 300, 389 A.2d 980 (App.Div.1978)). In determining whether, in the arbitral context, a waiver is presented,
the court should consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether a party has waived the right to object to arbitration after the matter has been ordered to arbitration and arbitration is held. Some of the factors to be considered in determining the waiver issue are whether the party sought to enjoin arbitration or sought interlocutory review, whether the party challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, and whether the party included a claim or cross-claim in the arbitration proceeding that was fully adjudicated.
[Id. at 383-84, 944 A.2d 642.]
A straightforward application of those principles to the facts in this case yields a simple result: because the parties agreed to submit to arbitration not only whether discipline should be imposed, but also the quantum of discipline to be imposed, and because, until the award was issued, the parties continued participating in that arbitration without protest or objection, plaintiff Linden Board of Education cannot now be heard to complain that, in respect of the remedy imposed, the arbitrator exceeded his powers in violation of the Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11. In short, plaintiff affirmatively waived any challenge to the arbitrator’s power when it specifically authorized the arbitrator to determine, if discipline short of termination was appropriate, what the extent of that discipline would be. If plaintiff truly was of the view it now advances on appeal—that, once the arbitrator deter*283mined that there was sufficient cause to discipline John Mizichko, the amount of the discipline (termination) imposed by plaintiff was not subject to review—it simply should not have authorized the arbitrator to determine also (1) that termination of Mizichko’s employment was inappropriate and (2) short of termination of employment, “what shall be the remedy?”
In colloquial terms, plaintiff made its own bed, and it now should lie in it. Because, in my view, plaintiff has waived the objection it now pursues on appeal, this Court need not parse out what the arbitrator did or did not do; outright enforcement of the parties’ own agreement to arbitrate, on its explicit terms, more than suffices to justify reinstatement of the arbitrator’s award.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—6.
Justice RIVERA-SOTO, concurs in result.