Court Opinion

ID: 9689799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:47:11.632799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.232557
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 42. (dissenting). I do not agree that the officers' testimony in this case satisfies the U.S. Supreme Court's test1 for a no knock entry.2 I therefore dissent.
*370¶ 43. The majority opinion concludes that the officers in this case had two grounds for dispensing with th^ constitutional rule of knocking and announcing their presence: (1) knocking and announcing their presence might have allowed the defendant to destroy evidence and (2) knocking and announcing their presence might have endangered the officers' safety. Some particularity to support reasonable suspicion is required under Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
¶ 44. First, there are not sufficiently particular facts to suggest that the officers had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would allow the destruction of evidence.
¶ 45. The majority opinion relies on the fact that the bedroom where the drugs were kept is near a bathroom, making destruction of evidence easy. However, in most apartments and indeed in most houses, each room usually has easy access to a bathroom.3
*371¶ 46. The majority opinion also relies on the fact that Henderson had a prior drug-dealing record. Thus, the majority concludes, Henderson had added incentive to avoid getting caught.4 What criminal lacks incentive to avoid getting caught? If anything, Henderson's own criminal history supports the conclusion that Henderson was unlikely to destroy evidence. Indeed, testimony established that in two prior searches that turned up drugs, Henderson did not attempt to destroy evidence.
¶ 47. Second, there are not sufficiently particular facts to suggest that the officers had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would endanger their safety.
¶ 48. The officers' testimony focused on the dangerousness posed by a so-called associate of the defendant, Larry Moore. But the testimony gives no indication of the extent of Moore's "association" with the defendant or whether the officers believed that Moore or Moore's weapons would be present in the home.
¶ 49. Although the testimony establishes that the officers believed that a second individual, Kevin Rutherford, might be present in the defendant's residence, the officers did not provide any information to evaluate the reasonableness of their suspicion that Rutherford's presence might endanger their safety, were officers to knock and announce their presence. The officers testified only that Rutherford was "a big concern" and that they had previously interacted with Rutherford in a combative atmosphere.
¶ 50. But the officers also testified that the defendant was not known to carry a weapon, and they *372did not testify about any specific acts of violence by the defendant against officers. Without particular allegations of violent conduct, general allegations regarding the defendant's "gang affiliation" do not establish a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing the officers' presence might endanger the officers' safety.
¶ 51. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 52. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 State v. Richards, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).

 The magistrate in the present case failed to authorize a no knock entry. The fact that a warrant does not authorize a no knock entry adds a layer of complexity to the good faith exception adopted in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. In Eason, this court concluded that the exclusion*370ary rule does not apply where officers rely in good faith on a warrant authorizing a no knock entry, provided that the officers conduct sufficient investigation and review before applying for the warrant. Good faith reliance may be undermined where, as here, officers do not include in the affidavit all information known at the time they apply for a warrant or where the officers subsequently learn of facts that undermine reasonable suspicion.

 See State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1055 n.6 (Fla. 1994) (information that drugs were stored "near the bathroom" was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that they may be destroyed, because "there is nothing in the affidavit to show that the proximity of drugs to the bathroom is anything but happenstance. The residence was a conventional four-bedroom, four-bath home, and virtually any room in the home would have been 'near a bathroom.'").

 See majority op. at ¶ 38.