Court Opinion

ID: 9616190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:44:03.176993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:55.901645
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent to the portion of the Court’s opinion suggesting that in Oklahoma the County Court is the tribunal in which to commence a proceeding for the construction of a will. See discussion.
By § 11 of the Organic Act (Act of Congress, May 2, 1890, 26 U.S. St. at Large, pp. 81-100), it was provided, inter alia, that certain “chapters and provisions of the Compiled Laws of the State of Nebraska, in force November first, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, in so far as they are locally applicable, and not in conflict with the laws of the United States or with this act, are hereby extended to and put in force in the Territory of Oklahoma until after the adjournment of the first session of the legislative assembly of said Territory, namely: The provisions * * * of sections fifteen and sixteen of article six [now Article V] 'of the constitution of said state, and of chapter twenty of said laws, entitled ‘Courts — probate;’ of chapter twenty-three, entitled ‘Decedents’; * *
Section 9 of such Article VI (now Article V) of the Nebraska constitution provided that the district courts should have both chancery and common law jurisdiction and such other jurisdiction as the legislature might provide, etc.
Section 15 of such Article VI (now Article V) provided for the election in each county of a county judge, who should be judge of the county court and section 16 thereof provided that the county courts should be courts of record, should “have original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, * * * and such other jurisdiction as may be given by general law * * Section 3 of Chapter 20 provided that “The courts of probate in their respective counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills, the administration of estates of deceased persons, and * *
The chapter on decedents (23) included provisions concerning the making, construction and probate of wills (§§ 123-162).
Section 124 of Chapter 23 provided as follows: “Every devise of land, in any will hereafter made, shall be construed to convey all the estate of the devisor therein, which he could lawfully devise, unless it shall clearly appear, by the will, that the devisor intended to convey a less estate.”
On the page of the “Compiled Statutes of the State of Nebraska, 1881, (Fourth Edition) With Amendments 1882 to 1889, Comprising All Laws of a General Nature in Force November 1, 1889”, containing such section 124, supra, (p. 415) references made to a citation of such section 124 in “25 Neb. 322.”
The reference is to the case of Little et al. v. Giles, et al., 25 Neb. 313, 322, 41 N.W. 186, 188, decided January term 1889. In that case the facts were that Jacob Dawson, who died in June, 1870, had provided in his will dated May 10, 1869, that his estate go to his wife, “the same to remain hers, with full power, right, and authority to dis*265pose of the same as to her shall seem most meet and proper, so long as she shall remain my widow; upon the express condition, however, that if she shall marry again” the estate should go to his children.
Plaintiffs, claiming under the widow, instituted in the district court of Lancaster County, an action to quiet title to certain real estate in the City of Lincoln, against defendants, who claimed under the children. The court said “the determination of the case depends upon the construction of the will of said Jacob Dawson”.
The court, in concluding its opinion, further said:
“The heirs seem to have been fed and clothed during their minority with means derived from the sales of their father’s estate, and while retaining all these benefits, as well as the benefit of the payment of the debts of their father by such sales, they ask for the land also. If they were entitled to such a judgment, it would be upon purely legal grounds, and not for equitable considerations.” (Emphasis supplied).
The court further said the widow had the power to sell and exercised it before she re-married, “the grantees under her deeds acquired all the title of the testator to such lands.” The decree of the district court was affirmed.
The Congress adopted for temporary use in Oklahoma Territory the statute above quoted (section 124) and its prior construction by the district court in a suit brought in the district court to construe it and to quiet title based upon the construction to be given the section and the approval of that construction in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska as above noted.
The Nebraska statute was adopted together with its prior construction by the Nebraska court. Blevins v. W. A. Graham Co., 72 Okl. 308, 182 P. 247; Gripe v. Sinor, Okl., 416 P.2d 902; In re Allen’s Will, 44 Okl. 392, 144 P. 1055, 1056.
In the case of In re Allen’s Will, just mentioned (44 Okl. 392, 144 P. 1055, 1056), there was involved the refusal of the district court on appeal from an order of the county court also refusing to admit the will of a full-blood Choctaw Indian to probate. This Court there said:
“ * * * (U)nder the laws of Arkansas in force in the Indian Territorjr _ by act of Congress, the only issue triable' in a proceeding to probate a will was the factum of the will, or the question of devisavit vel non. The former opinion of the court contains a review of many authorities sustaining the court’s conclusion. Such, then, may be considered the state of the law in all cases arising in the Indian Territory portion of the state prior to statehood.
“Turning to the statutes in force in this jurisdiction when the will in the present case was offered for probate and the hearing had on the contest * * * ” « * * * q^ej-e js no authority conferred by statute by which the court, upon a 'hearing of the contest, has authority to construe the will or adjudicate upon the rights of the parties or the validity of the disposition thereof. The latter section of the statute is the same as section 5672, Comp.Laws of Dakota 1887 (section 47, Prob.Code, Comp.Laws South Dakota 1910). Construing this section of the South Dakota statute, from which state our statute appears to have been adopted, the Supreme Court of that state, in Irwin et al. v. Lattin et al., 29 S.D. 1, 135 N.W. 759, Ann.Cas.1914C, 1044, held that, upon a proceeding to probate a will, the only matters to be adjudicated were that the will was duly executed and attested, was not procured by fraud; that the testator had sufficient mental capacity to make a will, and had authority to dispose of his property by will; that the attesting witnesses, where required, were competent and credible; and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the probate * * * ” “ * * * This is the same conclusion that was reached by this court under the laws formerly in force in the Indian Territory.”
*266In the case of Brock v. Keifer, 59 Okl. 5, 157 P. 88, 90, 91, this Court followed and quoted from the case of In Re Allen’s Will, supra.
In the case of Courtney et al. v. Daniel et al., 124 Okl. 46, 47, 253 P. 990, 992, this Court stated:
"It is well settled that in a proceeding to probate a will the only issue triable is the factum of the will, or devisavit vel non. In re Allen’s Will, 44 Okl. 392, 144 P. 1055, followed in numerous decisions, including Armstrong et al. v. Letty et al., 85 Okl. 205, 209 P. 168. In such proceeding, the court cannot construe or interpret a will, or distinguish between a valid or void disposition of property. Brock v. Keifer, 59 Okl. 5, 157 P. 88. On the probate of the will in the instant case, the court could not determine the rights of the pretermitted children herein.”
In the case of In re Lincoln’s Estate, Lincoln v. Lincoln, et al., 185 Okl. 464, 467, 94 P.2d 227, 231, we said:
■ “Decisions of other courts are cited by plaintiff in error to the effect that if a woman having a living husband conceals the fact and induces another to marry her, who then makes a will in her favor because he believes her to be his wife, such testamentary disposition to her will be held void. In re Dries’ Will, 69 N.J. Eq. 475, 55 A. 814; In re Carson’s Estate, 184 Cal. 437, 194 P. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239. We do not pass on this question. The validity of that portion of the will devising property to the proponent is not properly triable in the present action, the instant proceeding being only for the probate of the will. We have repeatedly held that in a proceeding to probate a will the only question triable is the factum of the will or the question of devisavit vel non. In re Allen’s Will, 44 Okl. 392, 144 P. 1055; Brock v. Keifer, 59 Okl. 5, 157 P. 88; Ward v. Cook, 152 Okl. 234, 3 P.2d 728, 729. In Mantz v. Gill, 147 Okl. 199, 296 P. 441, testatrix sought to dispose of her property to the exclusion of the surviving husband. The surviving husband contested the probate of the will and the district court refused to admit it to probate. This court reversed that decision, pointing out that the admitting of the will to probate cannot determine the validity of distribution, but that such question is for consideration in later proceedings. It is therefore unnecessary and improper for us at this time to rule on this contention.”
In the case of In re Heitholt’s Estate (State v. Duerkson et al.), 202 Okl. 351, 356, 213 P.2d 865, 870, there was involved an appeal from an order of the district court admitting a will to probate in an appeal to that court from an order of the county court admitting the will to probate. After quoting from Brock v. Keifer, supra, and In re Allen’s Will, supra, of above effect, we there said:
“By the above, it is shown that the court in the instant case was without power to construe the will as to any of its provisions or whether or not it created a trust.
“That part of the conclusions of law of the District Court relative to the creation of a trust was beyond the power of the court in the present proceeding, and the same is disapproved and stricken. Whether the will creates a trust is a question for future determination by appropriate proceedings. In all other respects, the findings and order of the District Court are affirmed.”
By Article VII, Section 12, Oklahoma Constitution, it is provided that “The County Court, co-extensive with the county, shall have original jurisdiction in all probate matters, * *
By Section 13 of that Article it is provided further that, “The County Court shall have the general jurisdiction of a Probate Court. It shall probate wills, * * *-t grant letters testamentary and of administration, settle accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians; transact all business appertaining to the estates of deceased persons, * * * including the *267sale, settlement, partition, and distribution - of the estates thereof.”
In the case of Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 924, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said:
“* * * (T)he term ‘Probate Code’ may and should be construed as meaning ‘the body or system of law relating to the estates of deceased persons and of persons under guardianship’ ”. * * * “(A)nd in popular signification the term ‘probate law’ includes all matters of which probate courts generally have jurisdiction, among which is ‘estates of deceased persons.’ ”
In his work, Oklahoma Probate Practice, (Thomas Law Book Company) at page 45, Mr. Curtis M. Oakes states :
“The scope of the jurisdiction of the County Courts in probate is, of course, confined to the consideration of those proceedings which are in their nature probate.”
In Crump et al. v. Pitchford, 24 Okl. 808, 104 P. 911, one question for determination was whether the county court had jurisdiction for a forcible entry and de-tainer action. This Court said:
“The jurisdiction of the county court being limited and not general, jurisdiction therein is never presumed, and attaches only when specifically authorized.”
This Court did recently hold in Oberlander v. Eddington, Old., 391 P.2d 889, that the County Court’s decree entered some 40 years prior to the filing of the present action in the district court for construction of a will would stand under the authority of the county court to distribute the estate of deceased, the plaintiff in the action from which the involved appeal arose having waited more than one year after having reached his majority to bring his suit.
By Article VII, Section 10, Oklahoma Constitution, the District Courts are given original jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given some other court. i
It would appear that the better practice to be followed by one proposing to seek the construction of a will which has been admitted to probate is for such party to-first apply for and secure the permission of the county court for that purpose. f
In 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1076, 744- it is said:“There is no general and inherent power vested in probate courts to construe wills as a distinct and independent branch of jurisdiction, and the construction of a will is not presented and cannot be litigated on an application or petition for the probate of a will. On such application the court has no jurisdiction other than to inquire into the execution of the will; nor can a construction of a will be had in a proceeding for the revocation of probate, or on petition for letters of administration with the will annexed. Such power exists only where conferred by statute, expressly or by necessary implication, and in a number of jurisdictions it has been held that no power is conferred on probate courts by local statutes to construe wills for any purpose, such power being reserved to the law and equity courts. In such jurisdictions a bill may be filed in a court of equity by direction of the probate court for the construction of a will and, advice as to the respective rights of the parties.”
* * * * * *
“Thus, a court of probate may construe a will for the purpose of determining * * * to whom the property of the estate shall be distributed, * * * ”
Cited under note 82 to the statement last above quoted are our decisions in Oberlander v. Eddington, supra, and Matthewson v. Hilton, Okl., 321 P.2d 396, both cited by the majority.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice LAVENDER concurs with the views herein expressed.