Court Opinion

ID: 9724624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:05:02.509572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.702277
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring: I concur in the decision to vacate and remand for a new sentencing hearing. I suggest, however, that the trial court, in the circumstances of this case, may not increase defendant’s total sentence from 15 to 18 years. A reviewing court does not have the power to increase the punishment imposed by the trial court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b). A trial court may reduce a sentence within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, but the court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(c) (West 2002). Where a conviction has been set aside on direct appeal, the court shall not impose a new sentence that is more severe than the prior sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—4 (West 2002). Section 5 — 5—4 sets out requirements of due process. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 669, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1969); People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439, 447, 657 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (1995) (improper chilling effect on appeal). A harsher sentence imposed after a successful appeal or motion to reconsider is only proper if it is based on additional bad conduct performed by the defendant after the original sentencing. People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 433, 686 N.E.2d 587, 594 (1997). However, where concurrent sentences are imposed in violation of section 5 — 8—4(a), requiring consecutive sentences, those sentences are void. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 112-13, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995). The sentences to be imposed on those counts on remand, therefore, will not be greater than, less than, or equal to defendant’s original sentences. People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 73, 688 N.E.2d 57, 65 (1997). The due-process prophylactic rule of Pearce has been limited in its application to circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that an increase in sentence is the product of actual judicial vindictiveness. However, “the correction of a void sentence under Arna fails to present circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that a sentence imposed on remand will be the product of judicial vindictiveness against a defendant.” Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d at 75, 688 N.E.2d at 66. Garcia did not consider the sentences that were actually imposed after remand. Garcia was concerned only with the limited steps that must be taken to correct a void sentence under Arna. An increase in the total sentence is appropriate if necessary to comply with Arna, but it is not clear why a trial court would increase the total sentence if it were not necessary to do so. We have affirmed several decisions, noting that the total sentence was not increased. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1093-94, 835 N.E.2d 980, 983 (2005) (“As defendant’s individual terms were reduced and the aggregate remained unchanged, the trial court’s resentence complied with section 5 — 5— 4(a) [(730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—4(a) (West 2002))] of the Unified Code and did not constitute an improper increase of his sentence”). In the present case, defendant’s total sentence was increased after remand, from 15 years to 18 years. The statute mandating consecutive sentences is concerned with the total sentence a defendant will receive. The purpose of mandatory consecutive sentences is to insure that the defendant receives, in total, at least the minimum sentence on each count. Here, for example, the trial court could not have sentenced defendant to a total imprisonment of less than five years. The mandatory-consecutive-sentences statute is not a device for haphazardly increasing sentences on appeal that the trial court originally deemed appropriate. The majority cites People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 752 N.E.2d 1137 (2001) (holding that court’s finding of “severe bodily injury” and imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences did not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)). However, that case did not involve any issue of increased sentence on remand and did not discuss the judicial-vindictiveness concern addressed in section 5 — 5—4. The majority also cites People v. Sanders, 356 Ill. App. 3d 998, 827 N.E.2d 17 (2005), but in that case, the defendant’s original total sentence was 45 years, which was not exceeded on either of the subsequent remands. Cases holding that an increase in an individual sentence violates section 5 — 5—4 are not authority for the proposition that an increase in the total sentence can never violate section 5 — 5—4.