Court Opinion

ID: 9554348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 18:11:26.217141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:15.658656
License: Public Domain

J-S13008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    FERNANDO RIVERA                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2291 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 28, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0005244-2019

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 8, 2023

       Appellant Fernando Rivera appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after he entered an open guilty plea to aggravated assault and

related offenses. Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw

and an Anders/Santiago brief.1 After review, we grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The underlying facts and procedural history of this matter are well

known to the parties. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/14/22, at 1-4. Briefly, on January

11, 2019, Appellant got into an argument with Shayquan Wright (Wright) over

the sale of a dirt bike. Aff. of Probable Cause, 2/15/19, at 2. Appellant then

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J-S13008-23

shot at Wright multiple times, striking him in the neck, leg, and groin. Id.

Appellant was subsequently arrested in connection with the shooting, and on

July 27, 2021, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count each of

aggravated assault, persons not to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried

without a license, carrying firearms on public streets or public property in

Philadelphia, possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and recklessly

endangering another person (REAP).2

       On March 28, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent

terms of seven to fourteen years of incarceration for both aggravated assault

and persons not to possess firearms. Sentencing Order, 3/28/22, at 1. The

trial court imposed no further sentence on the remaining crimes, resulting in

an aggregate sentence of seven to fourteen years of incarceration. See id.

       On April 1, 2022, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion

requesting reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court docket reflects that

the post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law on August 2, 2022.

       Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 26, 2022. On August 31,

2022, the trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

On September 19, 2022, in lieu of Rule 1925(b) statement, Counsel filed a

notice of intent to file an Anders/Santiago brief pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(4).

The trial court subsequently issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a), and 2705,

respectively.

                                           -2-
J-S13008-23

       Before we reach the issues identified in the Anders/Santiago brief, we

first address whether Appellant’s appeal is timely. See Commonwealth v.

Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that the

timeliness of an appeal impacts our jurisdiction, and this Court lacks

jurisdiction over an untimely appeal). A notice of appeal must be filed within

thirty days of the date of the order from which it is taken. See Pa.R.A.P.

903(a); see also Capaldi, 112 A.3d at 1244. In criminal cases where the

defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be

filed within thirty days of the entry of the order deciding the post-sentence

motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(2)(a).

       Pursuant to Rule 720 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the trial court must rule on a defendant’s post-sentence motion within 120

days. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). If the trial court fails to do so, “the

motion shall be deemed denied by operation of law.” See id. When a post-

sentence motion is denied by operation of law, the clerk of courts shall enter

an order deeming the motion denied by operation of law on behalf of the trial

court and serve copies on the parties. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c).

       Here, although the 120-day period for the trial court to decide

Appellant’s post-sentence motion expired on August 1, 2022,3 the clerk of
____________________________________________

3 The 120th day fell on Saturday, July 30, 2022, and therefore, Monday,
August 1, 2022, was the first day the courts would be open following the
expiration of the 120-day period. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for computations of
time, if the last day of any such period shall fall on a Saturday, Sunday, or on
a legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from the computation).

                                           -3-
J-S13008-23

courts did not enter the order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion by

operation of law until one day later on August 2, 2022. Therefore, we conclude

that a breakdown occurred. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d

493, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2007) (reiterating that a court breakdown occurs

when the trial court clerk fails to enter an order deeming a defendant’s post-

sentence motions denied by operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

720(B)(3)(c)).     Further, the record reflects that Appellant filed his appeal

within thirty days of the trial court’s August 2, 2022 order. See Notice of

Appeal, 8/26/22. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Appellant’s

appeal was timely. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 1621 EDA 2021, 2023

WL 129427, at *5 & n.11 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 9, 2023) (unpublished mem.)

(finding that the appellant’s notice of appeal was timely when it was filed

within thirty days from the date that the trial court belatedly entered an order

denying the post-sentence motion by operation of law).4

         Counsel has identified the following issues in the Anders/Santiago

brief:

         1. Is the guilty plea in this matter valid – that is, should . . .
            [A]ppellant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea?

         2. Was the sentence imposed upon . . . [A]ppellant by the lower
            court manifestly excessive?

Anders/Santiago Brief at 5.

____________________________________________

4  See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be
cited for their persuasive value).

                                           -4-
J-S13008-23

      “When faced with a purported Anders[/Santiago] brief, this Court may

not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining

counsel’s request to withdraw.”    Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d

379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the

technical requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for

leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2)

providing a copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant

that he has the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise

additional arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s

attention. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super.

2007) (en banc).

      Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements

established in Santiago, namely:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

      “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

                                     -5-
J-S13008-23

frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); accord

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for

seeking withdrawal by filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter

notifying Appellant of his intent to withdraw, explaining his appellate rights,

and informing Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with private counsel,

and supplying Appellant with a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief.         See

Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290. Counsel also provided this Court with a copy of

his letter to Appellant informing him of his rights.     Moreover, Counsel’s

Anders/Santiago brief complies with the requirements of Santiago.

Counsel includes a summary of the relevant factual and procedural history,

refers to the portions of the record that could arguably support Appellant’s

claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.        See

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude that Counsel has met

the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, and we will proceed to

address the issues presented in Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief.

      The first issue Counsel identified in the Anders/Santiago brief involves

the validity of Appellant’s guilty plea.     Anders/Santiago Brief at 26.

However, Counsel explained that because Appellant did not raise this issue

                                     -6-
J-S13008-23

before the trial court or move to withdraw his guilty plea, this claim is waived

and cannot support a direct appeal.        See id. at 27-28.       We agree with

Counsel’s assessment.

      It is well settled that in order to challenge the validity of a guilty plea on

direct appeal, the defendant must either object during the plea colloquy or file

a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.                   See

Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa. Super. 2013);

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). When the defendant fails to object or

move to withdraw the plea, the issue is waived on appeal. Lincoln, 72 A.3d

at 610.   “Historically, Pennsylvania courts adhere to this waiver principle

because it is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in

the first instance, any error which may have been committed.” Id. (citation

omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, Appellant did not object to the validity of his guilty plea during the

plea colloquies. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/27/21; N.T. 7/27/21, at

4-27. Further, although Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, he did not

challenge any aspect of the guilty plea or request to withdraw his guilty plea.

See Post-Sentence Mot. 4/1/22.          For these reasons, we conclude that

Appellant failed to preserve the issue for review. See Lincoln, 72 A.3d at

609-10; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, we note that when an issue is waived,

it is deemed a frivolous issue. See Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d

285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that when an issue has been waived,

                                       -7-
J-S13008-23

“pursuing th[e] matter on direct appeal is frivolous”).5 Accordingly, we agree

with Counsel’s assessment and conclude that Appellant’s challenge to the

validity of the plea is frivolous and no relief is due.

       In the second issue, Counsel identifies a claim that the trial court abused

its discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. Anders/Santiago Brief at 18.

Specifically, Counsel indicates that Appellant believes the sentence was

excessive. Id. However, Counsel concludes that he cannot ethically argue

that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed Appellant’s sentence.

See id. at 25-26.

       “A challenge to an alleged excessive sentence is a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d

884, 886 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).            It is well settled that a

defendant “who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then

seek discretionary review of that sentence.” Commonwealth v. O’Malley,

____________________________________________

5 We note that, although Counsel did not raise the issue before the trial court

or in a Rule 1925(b) statement, Counsel references one potential issue related
to the guilty plea proceedings.          Specifically, Counsel notes that the
Commonwealth did not provide a description of the firearm as defined in
Section 6102, and therefore, “one could colorably argue” that the
Commonwealth provided an insufficient factual basis to support Appellant’s
guilty plea. Anders/Santiago Brief at 28-29. However, Appellant did not
raise this issue during his guilty plea colloquy, nor did he seek to withdraw his
plea in a post-sentence motion. Further, he did not argue this issue at any
time before the trial court. Therefore, Appellant failed to preserve an appellate
challenge concerning the description of the firearm. See Lincoln, 72 A.3d at
609-10; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Accordingly, it is
waived, and therefore frivolous. See Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 609-10; Kalichak,
943 A.2d at 291.

                                           -8-
J-S13008-23

957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). However, where

the appellant enters an open guilty plea and there is no agreement as to

sentence, the appellant may challenge the discretionary aspects of their

sentence on appeal. Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1159 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

      It is well settled that

      challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle
      an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging the
      discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s
      jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

      We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
      and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
      sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
      Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
      that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
      Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some

citations omitted and formatting altered). “A substantial question exists only

when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, Appellant preserved his sentencing claim in a post-sentence

motion and filed a timely appeal. However, Counsel did not include a Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f) statement in the Anders/Santiago brief, and Counsel concluded that

                                      -9-
J-S13008-23

there is no “colorable” argument or question that can be raised with respect

to Appellant’s sentence. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 25-26.

       It is well settled that:

       [w]hen challenging the discretionary aspects of sentence, an
       appellant must include in his or her brief a separate concise
       statement demonstrating that there is a substantial question as
       to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing
       Code. If the Commonwealth objects to the appellant’s failure to
       comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), the sentencing claim is waived for
       purposes of review.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 149 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

       Here, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant has failed to properly

preserve his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence due to his

failure to include a Rule 2119(f) statement.       Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.

Because the Commonwealth has objected to Appellant’s failure to include a

Rule 219(f) statement, we are constrained to find Appellant waived his

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Griffin, 149 A.3d at

353. Further, we reiterate that a waived issue is a deemed to be a frivolous

issue. See Kalichak, 943 A.2d at 291.

       After review, we agree with Counsel’s assessment of Appellant’s appeal,

and we conclude that the appeal is, therefore, wholly frivolous.6 Further, our

____________________________________________

6 Although Counsel does not specifically use the word “frivolous,” Counsel
concludes that he is “unable to ethically advance a colorable argument”
regarding Appellant’s sentence and notes that Appellant has failed to preserve
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 10 -
J-S13008-23

independent review of the record does not reveal any additional, non-frivolous

issues for direct appeal, therefore no relief is due. See Goodwin, 928 A.2d

at 291; Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250. For these reasons, we grant Counsel’s

petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

       Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/2023

____________________________________________

any challenge to his guilty plea on direct appeal. Anders/Santiago Brief at
25-26, 33. However, in his application to withdraw, Counsel specifically
concludes that Appellant’s issues are frivolous. See Appl. to Withdraw at ¶ 5
(“[A]ll possible issues to be raised in the instant appeal [are] frivolous.”), ¶7
(“I ultimately determined [Appellant’s issues] to be frivolous under controlling
law in light of the existing record.”). In light of Counsel’s otherwise strictly
compliant Anders/Santiago brief, which demonstrates a comprehensive
understanding of the record and controlling law, we deem Counsel’s conclusion
is sufficient and Counsel’s brief compliant with the requirements to withdraw
pursuant to Anders and Santiago. See Commonwealth v. Boodoo, 950
EDA 2018, 2019 WL 2185511, at *2 n.3 (Pa. Super. filed May 21, 2019)
(unpublished mem.) (concluding that although counsel did not use the word
“frivolous” in the Anders/Santiago brief, counsel’s conclusions that he could
not ethically advance the defendant’s claims on appeal, when viewed in light
of counsel’s assertions and conclusions from the application to withdraw that
concluded that all possible issues are frivolous, satisfied the requirements of
Anders and Santiago).

                                          - 11 -