Court Opinion

ID: 9409391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 00:00:29.774651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.194124
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30179         Document: 00516823604             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                FILED
                                                                              July 17, 2023
                                       No. 21-30179                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                     Summary Calendar                             Clerk
                                     ____________

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Blandon Richard,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 6:19-CR-160-4
                      ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Defendant-Appellant Blandon Richard pleaded guilty pursuant to a
   plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation
   of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence
   of ninety months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised
   release. On appeal, Richard challenges the imposition of several conditions

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-30179      Document: 00516823604           Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                     No. 21-30179

   of supervised release that were included in the written judgment but not
   orally pronounced at sentencing. We VACATE and REMAND.
          Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office attached to the
   Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) a “Notice to Parties Regarding
   Conditions of Supervised Release.” This Notice contained recommended
   conditions of supervised release: four mandatory conditions prescribed by 18
   U.S.C. § 3583(d) and fifteen discretionary conditions, composed of thirteen
   “standard” conditions and two “special” conditions. At sentencing, the
   district court never referenced this Notice. Instead, the district court read the
   substance of the first standard condition and then stated Richard was “also
   subject to certain conditions of supervised release.” The district court stated
   it had “written some of those down” and asked the law clerk to read those
   conditions. The law clerk stated “[t]he defendant is subject to the following
   mandatory and special conditions” before reading the four mandatory and
   two special conditions listed in the Notice. After sentencing, the district
   court entered a written judgment containing the four mandatory conditions,
   thirteen standard conditions, and two special conditions contained in the
   Notice.
          On appeal, Richard argues the written judgment conflicts with the oral
   pronouncement of his sentence because it includes standard conditions two
   through thirteen, which were neither read nor adopted by reference at the
   sentencing. While we usually review only for plain error when a defendant
   objects for the first time on appeal, “we do not review for plain error when
   the defendant did not have an opportunity to object in the trial court.” United
   States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). In that
   circumstance, we instead review for abuse of discretion. United States v.
   Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2022). In the case of
   conditions of supervised release, the opportunity to object exists “when the
   court notifies the defendant at sentencing that conditions are being

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                                    No. 21-30179

   imposed.” Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560. Even when a standing order, PSR
   recommendation, or other document provides advance notice of possible
   conditions, “the in-court adoption of those conditions is when the defendant
   can object.” Id. at 561; see also Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 366-67
   (reviewing for abuse of discretion when the district court “fail[ed] to clarify
   ‘the standard conditions’” it purported to adopt by reference); United States
   v. Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 2021) (reviewing for plain
   error when the district court properly stated it was imposing the “standard
   conditions” contained in the PSR and standing order). Because, as we
   conclude below, the district court did not state it was imposing the standard
   conditions recommended by the Notice, we review for abuse of discretion.
          Conditions of supervised release are part of a defendant’s sentence
   and must be pronounced unless their imposition is required by 18 U.S.C.
   § 3583(d). See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 556-59. The pronouncement requirement
   “is part of the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing, which in turn is
   based on the right to mount a defense” and is “satisfied when a district judge
   enables that defense by giving the defendant notice of the sentence and an
   opportunity to object.” Id. at 560. In the event of a conflict between the oral
   pronouncement and a written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls,
   and the written judgment must be amended to conform with the oral
   pronouncement. United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020).
          The district court can satisfy the pronouncement requirement by
   orally stating the condition or by in-court adoption of a written document that
   lists proposed conditions, such as a PSR, a court-wide or judge-specific
   standing order, or some other document. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-62.
   However, “the mere existence of such a document is not enough for
   pronouncement,” and we have “expressly disapproved of a procedure ‘in
   which the court admitted a list of proposed conditions but never said that it
   was adopting those recommendations.’” Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367

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   (quoting Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5). Instead, “[t]he district court must
   orally adopt that list of conditions within the document when the defendant
   is in court and can object.” Id. (citing Grogan, 977 F.3d at 350). The district
   court must also “ensure, as it does with the PSR, that the defendant had an
   opportunity to review [the document] with counsel” before adopting the
   conditions listed in the document. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5.
          In this case, because standard conditions two through thirteen are not
   mandatory under § 3583(d), they are subject to the pronouncement
   requirement. See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 556-59. Because the district court did
   not read out standard conditions two through thirteen, in order to satisfy the
   pronouncement requirement, the district court would have had to adopt
   them by reference. We have found a district court properly adopted
   conditions recommended by a PSR when it specifically stated it was imposing
   the “conditions and instructions that have been set forth in the defendant’s
   presentence report.” United States v. Harris, 960 F.3d 689, 692, 696 (5th Cir.
   2020). However, simultaneous reference to the PSR or other document when
   imposing conditions is not necessary if the court’s oral sentence otherwise
   provides sufficient “notice” of what list of conditions is adopted. See Joshua
   Martinez, 15 F.4th at 1180. We have found a district court properly adopted
   conditions recommended by a PSR and laid out in a standing order when the
   court imposed “the standard and mandatory conditions of supervision” and
   had previously adopted the PSR after confirming the defendant had reviewed
   it. Id. at 1180-81; see also United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526, 527-28 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (finding no error when the district court followed the same steps
   as in Joshua Martinez, but did not “orally adopt the PSR in its entirety”); but
   see Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367 (vacating the judgment when the
   “standard conditions” in the written judgment did not match the standard
   conditions listed in a standing order purportedly adopted at sentencing
   because “district court erred in failing to clarify ‘the standard conditions’ to

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                                    No. 21-30179

   which it referred at the sentencing hearing or to expressly locate, identify,
   and adopt by reference a specific written list of conditions”).
          Here, the district court never mentioned the “standard conditions,”
   much less purported to adopt them. Instead, it only read out the substance of
   standard condition one and then stated it was imposing mandatory and
   special conditions before reading those out as well. Unlike the cases
   discussed above, the court failed to provide “notice” it was imposing the
   remaining standard conditions. Cf. Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th at 1180.
   Further, the district court did not purport to adopt the conditions in the PSR
   as a whole. While the court orally adopted the “findings of the presentence
   report” when calculating Richard’s offense level and criminal history under
   the Sentencing Guidelines, adopting the factual findings supporting
   calculations of the Guidelines is distinct from adopting “th[e] list of
   conditions within the document.” Cf. Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367.
   Even if the district court did properly adopt the conditions in the Notice, the
   court did not confirm Richard had the opportunity to review it with counsel,
   which is required to adopt by reference the conditions of supervised release
   listed in another document. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5.
          The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and this case is
   REMANDED for amendment of the written judgment by removing
   unpronounced standard conditions two through thirteen.

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