Court Opinion

ID: 9640974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:20:02.288334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:34.313415
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee in his motion for rehearing complains that we considered appellant’s statements in her brief “that neither she nor her counsel were notified of this hearing” even though appellee challenged such claims in his brief. We are aware of the rule to which appellee refers. To clarify our original opinion in this respect we now state that we did not give any consideration whatsoever to the statements complained of in arriving at our original decision. As a matter of fact, both appellant’s and appel-lee’s briefs contained statements of alleged facts which do not have support in the record. We did not consider any of such statements, nor did we consider appellant’s affidavit sworn to on June 14, 1976, and filed with the clerk of the trial court on June 15, 1976.
*769The only matters which Courts of Civil Appeals are authorized to consider on affidavits are those which involve the exercise of its jurisdiction. Rosetta v. Rosetta, 525 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1975, n. w. h.); Article 1822, V.T.C.S.
In our original opinion we pointed out that in the record before us were two volumes of statement of facts of evidence taken in another hearing in May of 1975 between the same parties and that such statement of facts were not offered in evidence on the hearing held January 27, 1976. Therefore, we cannot consider contents of these two volumes of statement of facts. Neither the trial court nor this court may take judicial knowledge of the contents therein. Ray v. Shafer, 519 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Civ.App.— Fort Worth 1975, n. w. h.); Continental Oil Co. v. P. P. G. Industries, 504 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Ex parte Turner, 478 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, n. w. h.); see White v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, 444 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex.1969).
The social study, dated April 1, 1975, made by the Child Welfare Department was introduced into evidence by plaintiff-appellee on the hearing held January 27, 1976. The social study is before us only by way of supplemental transcript filed in this court on July 28, 1976, approximately six months after the hearing and sixty-one days after time for the filing of the statement of facts and transcript had expired. The report itself was filed with the clerk of the trial court on July 20, 1976, three months after this court obtained jurisdiction over this matter. 4 Tex.Jur.2d Part 1 sec. 321 p. 173.
“Instruments which are part of proceedings in trial court only because they have been offered in evidence may not properly be included in transcript on appeal.” Rules 376, 376-a, T.R.C.P.; Rotello v. The State of Texas, 492 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ of error ref’d 497 S.W.2d 290). A social study is not evidence upon which the trial court’s findings may be based unless the report is properly admitted into evidence. Fletcher v. Travis County Child Welfare Department, 539 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1976, n. w. h.) and Magallon v. State of Texas, 523 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, n. w. h.). Therefore, the social study could only be considered by the trial court by reason of it being offered into evidence. Being before us only by improper inclusion in the transcript, the social study cannot be considered by this court. The only evidence taken in the January 1976 hearing found in the statement of facts is the testimony of the parties. Appellee’s testimony to a great extent consists of hearsay.
We have again examined all the evidence before us and all of the surrounding facts and circumstances and in view of the condition of this record we remain convinced that the decision we reached in our original opinion is correct.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is respectfully overruled.