Court Opinion

ID: 9401723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 20:03:24.3401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:54.787633
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/13/23 P. v. Hawkyard CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Placer)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C094270

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 62-172747)

           v.

 WILLIAM ROBERT HAWKYARD,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant William Robert Hawkyard appeals from his convictions of committing
lewd acts on a minor, contacting or communicating with a minor with the intent to
commit a lewd act (luring), and possessing heroin. (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (c)(1);
288.3, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); statutory section citations that
follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.)
         Defendant contends (1) insufficient evidence supports the luring count,
specifically whether defendant knew or should have known that the victim was a minor;

                                                             1
(2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not requesting a pinpoint jury
instruction on the mistake of fact defense to the luring count; (3) the trial court erred in
excluding evidence that supported defendant’s mistake of fact defense; and (4)
cumulative error. Defendant also raises sentencing error, contending we must reverse
and remand his sentence for further proceedings pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 and
Assembly Bill No. 124, and because the trial court violated section 654 by not staying
one of the lewd act counts or the luring count, as both were part of the same course of
conduct.
       Except to remand for resentencing under the recent legislation, we affirm the
judgment.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY        OF THE   PROCEEDINGS
       The victim, Jane Doe, was born in August 2005. In April 2020, 14-year-old Jane
was a high school freshman. She lived in Sacramento County near Elk Grove with her
father Stephan F., Stephan’s wife, and Jane’s siblings. Stephan’s mother, Alice F., lived
nearby. Jane’s mother, Jessica P., lived in the Natomas area. Jane had lived with her
mother before she moved to her father’s home when she was 12.
       Prior to April 2020, Jane had her own cell phone but only at school for
communication purposes. In April, due to the coronavirus pandemic, she began attending
school remotely from home. As a result, Stephan took away her phone. He did not want
her accessing social media. He did not approve of any kind of social media at her age.
       On the night of April 25, 2020, Jane stayed at her grandmother Alice’s house
along with other cousins and relatives. When her grandchildren slept over at her house,
Alice required them to give her their cell phones. She also did not allow them to use the
Wi-Fi, computers, and tablets. Alice had a cell phone and a land line with three cordless
headsets. She allowed her grandchildren to use her house phone only to call their
parents, and then only with her permission.

                                               2
       Around 1:30 a.m. April 26, 2020, Alice’s house phone rang, and Alice answered
it. A male asked to speak with Jane. Alice went to the living room where Jane was
sleeping and asked Jane who was calling her. Jane said she did not know. Alice said,
“Hello,” into the phone but no one responded. Alice went back to bed.
       Jane testified that when everyone went to sleep, she left the house, hopped the
fence, and went across the street. She waited in a neighbor’s driveway until a Lyft
arrived. The Lyft driver took her to defendant’s house. She arrived there at around 2:00
a.m.
       At Alice’s house on the morning of April 26, family members looked for Jane.
Alice’s house phone had caller ID, and it showed an incoming call around 1:30 a.m. from
“Montez, John.” The phone number matched a number listed as the last call made from
the phone. Evidence at trial established that the phone number in John Montez’s name
belonged to defendant’s phone.
       Jane’s father Stephan called defendant’s phone number multiple times on April 26.
The first time he called, someone picked up the call and hung up. Stephan left voicemails
stating he just wanted to talk to Jane and to let him know if she was not there. He also
sent texts to defendant’s phone asking who it was and stating that Jane was only 14 and
to bring her home. At 11:47 a.m., he texted, “Just come home kiddo. It’s only me here.
We can talk.” He texted his final message at 6:38 p.m., stating, “She’s only 14. She’s a
little girl.” He never received a return call or message.
       Stephan’s sister Stacey called defendant’s phone number multiple times on
April 26. Stacey used Alice’s house phone, but that was blocked before noon after a few
calls. She called defendant 237 times from her own cell phone and many times from
other phones. She left about 30 voice mail messages. In the messages, she stated that
Jane was 14 years old and underage. She also stated they did not want any trouble; they
just wanted to get Jane back.

                                              3
       After police were summoned to Alice’s house that day, an officer with the
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department called defendant’s phone, and no one
answered. The officer left a voice mail stating she was calling about the missing person’s
report she had taken on Jane, and she requested a call back. No one returned the call.
       On April 28, 2020, a detective looking at Alice’s phone history found that Alice
received a phone call from defendant’s phone at approximately 1:57 a.m. on April 26.
He also found other calls were made from defendant’s phone number to Alice’s phone
over the previous couple of weekends when Jane had stayed at Alice’s house.
       Later that day, law enforcement officers entered defendant’s house in Loomis.
They saw defendant and Jane naked and walking out of the bathroom after taking a
shower. Officers also found a plastic baggie containing heroin on a nightstand in
defendant’s bedroom. DNA found on vaginal swabs taken from Jane matched
defendant’s DNA profile.

       Jane’s trial testimony

       Jane first met defendant on Bumble, an online dating app for adults. Even though
she was a minor, she was able to create an account for the site. On Bumble, a woman
must message a man first. A man cannot message a woman; he must wait for a woman to
contact him. Jane testified that when she first met defendant, he asked her how old she
was. She said she was 18.
       After meeting on Bumble, Jane and defendant communicated through Snapchat.
Snapchat is a social media app commonly used by younger people to communicate with
others and send pictures and short videos. Videos and pictures sent through Snapchat can
be set to delete.
       For a while, Jane had her own cell phone and used it to speak and communicate
with defendant, including via Snapchat. She broke it because she got mad. After that,
she used her grandmother’s house phone to speak with defendant and exchange instant

                                            4
messages. She also accessed social media with her friends’ cell phones after her family
confiscated her own.
       Jane testified that in her Snapchat messages with defendant, she said things about
herself that were not true. She said she worked at Panera Bread, but she did not. She
stated her family wanted her to sell drugs and that they were involved in gang activity.
But it was only her mother’s side of the family that participated in gang activity and
wanted her to sell drugs, not her father’s side.
       In one of her Snapchat messages, Jane said she wanted to be an oceanographer.
She was trying to prove to defendant that she was older by saying she wanted to go to
San Diego State. In another message, she told defendant she was 18 years old and a
senior in high school. In fact, she was a freshman. Also through Snapchat, Jane sent
photos and videos to defendant of herself topless and of her vagina. We will set forth the
Snapchat messages in detail below.
       Jane testified she called defendant the night of April 25, 2020, because she was
ready to leave her father’s house to be with defendant. She was tired of being with her
father’s side of the family because she was different from everyone else. She and
defendant decided they would meet at defendant’s house, and Jane would get there via
Lyft. Defendant would order the Lyft for her. That night, she put her bags by the side
gate. As already stated, Jane left Alice’s house once everyone was asleep. A Lyft took
her to defendant’s house.
       Once Jane was inside defendant’s house, defendant took her to his bedroom. He
told Jane his mother lived in the house, and Jane was to stay in his bedroom until his
mother left. The first night Jane was there, she and defendant touched each other’s
genitals and had sexual intercourse.
       While Jane was with defendant, she saw him using a cell phone. She saw calls
and text messages coming into the phone from her family. She did not listen to any of
the voicemails. Defendant told her that her “people” were calling. Jane could not

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remember at trial if he asked why they were calling. Jane told defendant not to answer
his phone when they called. She hung up his phone at least one time. She read some of
the text messages from her family, but she decided not to respond to them and told
defendant not to respond to them.
       Jane had sex with defendant more than three times. They also engaged in oral sex.
The two had sex right before law enforcement came to pick her up. She had just got out
of the shower and was naked when they arrived.
       Defendant would say little things to her where she felt he was asking about her
age, but she brushed them off. Defendant never really asked anything that would show
how old she was. He videotaped her while asking how old she was when she was “half
asleep.”
       Jane testified that defendant made her feel pretty and good about herself when
they were together. She cared about him a lot and still did as of the time of trial.

       Police interview of defendant

       Detectives interviewed defendant at his home the day of the arrest. During the
interview, defendant said he met Jane on Bumble and that she was 18 years old. The
morning of his arrest, Jane told him she was 18. He told her it was a little odd she did not
have identification on her. He asked her for her name and date of birth and then
videotaped her response because he had a weird feeling.
       During the interview, detectives asked defendant if he and Jane had sex.
Defendant said they did not. He repeated she told him she was 18. A detective said, “So,
she’s 18. Did you guys have sex?” Defendant said they did not, and then asked, “[I ]s
this a trick question? Is she 18? ‘Cuz we’re not . . . I don’t think you’re tellin’ me the
truth here. I don’t think she’s 18. I don’t think you guys would be here if she wasn’t. [¶]
. . . [¶] [Y]ou said, ‘Yes, she is 18,’ Then you asked me again, ‘Did you have sex.’ I’m
payin’ attention. So, basically, I think you are lying to me. I don’t think she’s 18.”

                                              6
Defendant then asked the detective if Jane was 18. The detective said she was not.
Defendant said Jane told him she was 18, and the detective said that Jane had told him
she said that. Defendant continued to deny he and Jane had sex or oral sex. He said he
did not know Jane was underage.
       While defendant sat in the back seat of the patrol car, the computer-aided dispatch
log on a computer screen in the car showed that the call for service was for a child
molest, but it did not mention the victim’s age. Defendant said to the detectives, “I saw
that there was a rape and – and – and, uh, molestation on a computer inside your vehicle,
so I’m not dumb. I understand that – well, what’s going on here? I didn’t know that she
was not 18. I would not have brought her to my house, bro. I get plenty of bitches. I’m
not worried about no fuckin’ 14-year-old girl, understand that.” Defendant said he had
no reason to think Jane was lying to him. She had a grown-woman’s body and said she
was 18 and finishing high school.
       At trial, one of the interviewing detectives testified that when he listened to the
recorded interview of defendant, he heard defendant say that Jane was 14. The detective
had not told defendant Jane’s true age prior to defendant’s statement.

       Cell phone evidence

       Officers recovered defendant’s cell phone at his house. The contact name “never
answer” had been assigned to Alice’s phone number in defendant’s phone on April 25,
2020. Nineteen phone calls were exchanged between defendant’s phone and Alice’s
phone from April 25 through April 28, 2020. Alice’s phone called defendant’s phone on
April 25 at 3:18 p.m., 4:00 p.m., and 11:39 p.m. Defendant’s phone called Alice’s phone
for a two-second call on April 26 at 12:03 a.m. Alice’s phone called defendant’s phone
on April 26 at 12:03 a.m. for a four minute, 15 second call. Alice’s phone also called
defendant’s phone on April 26 at 1:20 a.m., 1:21 a.m., and 1:22 a.m., but those calls were
not answered.

                                              7
       Alice’s phone made three additional short calls to defendant’s phone that morning
at 1:38 a.m., 1:42 a.m., and 1:46 a.m. Then defendant’s phone called Alice’s phone at
1:59 a.m. April 26 for a 21 second call. The next calls from Alice’s phone to defendant’s
phone began at 8:40 a.m. that morning.
       From April 25 to April 28, 2020, a total of 331 calls were made to and from
defendant’s phone. Hundreds of those calls from Jane’s family went unanswered.
       Three instant messages were exchanged between defendant’s phone and Alice’s
phone on April 26 regarding the Lyft’s arrival. The first at 1:37 a.m. was from
defendant’s phone and stated, “They’re outside.” The next message at 1:40 a.m. was
from defendant’s phone and stated, “I told him three to five mins.” “He just said okay.”
The third message was sent at 1:51 a.m. from defendant’s phone and read, “It’s five
mins.” “Silver Nissan.”
       A video on defendant’s phone depicted the person who was filming the video
touching Jane’s naked buttocks and exposing her perineum and vaginal area. The video’s
metadata indicated the video was created on April 26, 2020, at 11:30 p.m.
       Another video on defendant’s phone depicted defendant asking Jane how old she
was, and her answering she was 18 years old. Defendant then asked Jane repeatedly,
“Can you give me your full name for the record?” Metadata indicated the video was
created on April 28, 2020, at 11:05 a.m.

       Snapchat messages

       The information alleged the unlawful communications happened from February 24
to April 26, 2020. Snapchat records contained 303 messages exchanged between
defendant and Jane from February 24 to April 21, 2020. We recite them in relevant part
with their original punctuation, capitalization, and spelling.
       On February 24, 2020, Jane wrote to defendant, “I mean after high school over the
summer I’m going back to San Diego and going to SDSU for my softball training and

                                              8
I’m going to try and go to SDSU for oceanography” Jane continued, “that’s cool and the
only reason why I have big plans is because my parents never really taught me things it
was like always, ‘beat her ass and sell this and do that and get a hood [n-word]’ because
my family bangs norte so I never really grew up to really know what to do but now I’m
here and I’m building it higher for myself and to show people no matter how hard life
was or is u can always find a way to make it better”
       The next day, February 25, defendant wrote, “I wanna video chat u today” That
night, Jane gave him a phone number. The following evening, February 26, Jane wrote,
“Honestly I wanna be able to make u happy I never really got to” Defendant responded,
“How do you plan on makin me so happy boo?” She wrote, “Just keeping it real baby”
He replied, “You wanna make me happy? Support my dreams and plans and come make
these bands with me” At this point, Jane forwarded to him pictures and videos of her
touching her exposed breasts and of her hands touching her exposed vagina.
       The February 26 messages then continued as follows:
       Defendant: “You givin all that to me to own?”
       Jane: “If u gonna treat me good it’s yours”
       D: “I don’t share”
       J: “I don’t either”
       D: “If you give that [to] me” “Then we rockin in every aspect of life.”
“Spiritually mentally physically financially.” “So make sure this is what you want.”
“It’s a choice.” “Its not just gonna be sex.”
       J: “I like u a lot u make me feel good about myself”
       D: “Im always gonna make sure you feel as gorgeous as you look. If you ready
tell me daddy I’m yours.”
       J: “DADDY IM YOURS”
       D. “We rocking then.” “I gotchu.”

                                                9
       J: “Just promise me when I am at work u won’t’ get hella pissed at me” “Panera
and I work from 5 to 12:30” “And I get home around 1:15”
       D: “You get home at 1:15 in the morning???” “My boy works at Panera.” “Who
do you live with in eg?”
       Jane responded the next afternoon, February 27, 2020, with “Hey” After
defendant replied, “Wassup,” Jane sent several short videos of herself and her face. They
contained no nudity. She wrote, “Yes, but not tmr” “It’s okay baby I still like you” She
sent more videos of her face. Their dialogue continued:
       J: “Hehe we will do it together soo all the little [n-word] know you mine”
       D: “You ain’t said nothin I don’t like yet”
       J: [After sending an emoji] “But u gotta claim me too soooooo” “What did u
think of the nudes?”
       D: “They go brazy.”
       J: “Would u fuck?” “If u get with me I’m a freak” “For the first time I want it
slow and romantic but the other times I want it to be rough” “Ya my pussy is hella tight I
only fucked once and I just never did it again”
       On the evening of February 28, 2020, defendant asked Jane how she slept. Jane
replied she was “so tired” “Cuz of fuckin work I barely get any sleep” Their dialogue
continued:
       D: “What time do you get off?”
       J: “1:15 is when I get home I get off at 12:30” “But from school I get off at 3” “I
don’t have work today so I’m happy”
       D: “What times does Panera close???”
       J: “Like 10 [symbol] but I have to clean up” “Not rn”
       D: “Lemme see wassup with later.”
       J: “ok”
       D: “It just be weird you only snap me in class”

                                            10
       J: “Sorry”
       D: “Lemme call after school” “Get my video chat on” “I want I want”
       J: “really baby?” “Sorry baby at least I come back I mean” “I could just bounce”
       Their messaging resumed on March 2, 2020, as follows:
       J: “Hey sorry I’ll explain” “So my mom got mad cuz I came home late on
Saturday but I was with my brothers and I smelled like tree and shit but I didn’t smoke
and my mom took my phone I got hella pissed and left and then came back but that shit
had me fucked up because I’m damn near grown and she wanted to take my shit”
       D: “Well it’s because she’s hispanic” “Hispanic moms are like that” “Especially
with daughters”
       J: “I wish she wasn’t”
       D: “Well she probably loves you. And just shows it in her own way.” “Your
young.” “Your still her baby so she’s gonna be protective” “Plus your pretty and she
knows what it used to be like being young and pretty. .”
       Later that evening, they continued messaging each other, in relevant part:
       D: “Just be real dont hide it.”
       J: “I don’t no one wants me because I’m ‘mean’ when in reality I’m living a life
that ain’t mine” “Ion belong a gang member and all this” “I have dreams but ppl tie me
down” “And get mad when I go chase them”
       D: “You gotta do good yourself other wise you cant do someone any good.” “I
guess I just gotta pull up one time and just chop it up” “See where your heads at.” “See
if we cant help each others situation out.” “Because it sounds like your trying to
succeed.”
       J: “I am but a lot of shit holds me back”
       D: “And your circumstances seem to slow you down.” “Like what”
       J: “My mom and my family just want me to follow there footsteps ‘ carry the gun
and smoke this and sell this ‘ I don’t wanna do that and ion wanna have my children to

                                            11
have to see shit I seen my brother got shot in front of me when I was 3 yrs old and I never
ever forgave anyone for that even tho it wasn’t there fault”
         D: “Shitttttttt.” “Ha I wish you knew my life.” “I mean at the end of the day their
throwing you a huge opportunity” “You could really be making huge moves in your
life.”
         The next day, March 3, 2020, Jane messaged that defendant could pick her up
from school, but she had to be home by 4:00. Their dialogue continued:
         D: “And shake her hand and say nice to meet you?”
         J: “No just be normal and just take me home” “Baby remember I’m a freak so
when I see u I want u to be comfortable because I might wanna be in there”
         D: “Wait what” “Like be in there in there?”
         J: “I wanna show u how freaky I am”
         D: “In 45 minutes??”
         J: “YaI’ll make it work” “Ya babe wait” “And [you]’ll see baby”
         D: “You gotta communicate better with me.” “Cause once you leave school. I
dont hear from you”
         J: “Honestly baby if u see me I’m sort of a sex Addict” “And ya baby I’m sorry
for real”
         D: “Well how have you only fucked one time” “But you’re a sex addict” “How
do you know you only wanna fuck me and be in a whole ass relationship. Being hella
faithful to only one person. Like doesn’t fucking one dick sound boring?”
         J: “I mean if u don’t wanna be with me it’s ok I’m not gonna waist ur time but I
mean I’m good with just fucking one dick” “But u sound not interested so” “I’ll just go”
         D: “It’s not that I’m uninterested” “This is just a big decision and I just wanna be
sure you wanna make it.” “I dont take relationships lightly.” “I never get in them. So
when I do like its serious.” “Ya know?” “Or is that just me?”
         J: “I wanna be with u if I didn’t I wouldn’t waist my time witchu rn”

                                              12
       D: “Which panera do you work at?”
       J: “The one in Davis”
       Jane also messaged that night: “5’2” “But I’m chubby” “I’m Mexican tho
sooooo” She further typed, “I am in love pa” “Witchu” Defendant asked “Whyyyyy,”
and she replied, “I don’t know u are just amazing”
       The following evening, March 4, 2020, defendant wrote to Jane, “Go to the
bathroom and send me a video sayin yea it’s me I cant wait to see you or whatever you
want.” “And my other question is do you got your ID on you?” Jane responded, “Ok ya
gimmie a second I just went to the bathroom so I’ll show u in a bit” Later that evening,
when defendant asked if he could pick her up the next day, she said to pick her up
because she was “already going” Defendant asked, “Already going where” and Jane
responded, “Pleasant grove high school at 3”
       Defendant and Jane next messaged each other on March 6, 2020. Jane indicated
she was leaving. Their dialogue went as follows:
       J: “Hey” “I’m going tonight ya”
       D: “You didn’t feel like letting me know?” “Great communication babe.” “Are
you done with school?” “And where at in LA?” “Can I swoop?”
       J: “Ya u can”
       D: “Are you done with you[r] school? And are you gonna be able to respond all
the time?”
       J: “Ya I will be and naw” A few hours later, Jane messaged, “Not live just stay
for a while”
       Early the next morning, March 7, the two continued messaging each other as
follows:
       D: “Can you leave the house and come back?” “I wanna see you play with that
pussy” “And spread your legs and take a pics busting it open from the front” “With your
face in it too”

                                            13
       J: “kk”
       D: “Yes and then finger yourself and suck on your fingers lickin your pussy
juice.” “Mmmmm mami”
       J: “damn baby”
       Later that day, Jane messaged defendant that she had been at juvenile hall for six
months. Defendant replied that he went to prison for two years.
       The two had a long exchange in the early morning hours of March 11, 2020. It
went as follows:
       J: “I’m in Natomas”
       D: “Shit ite.” “I’m in rocklin rn”
       J: “What time[?]” “Oh damn nvm u too far”
       D: “You playin.” “You be playin”
       J: “Just let’s link tmr” “Whatever have fun”
       D: “Smh.” “Tf” “You be hittiin any [n-word] up rn”
       J: “No
       D: “Omm”
       J: “What the fuck where is this coming from” “And I put that on everything dude
u need to chill tf out”
       D: “You ain’t hit me in the last few days much at all” “And then you wanna
chill” “I say I’m on my way and then you like ‘whatever have fun.’
       J: “Because we don’t have a nice ass convo baby u don’t be saying nothing but
‘lemme see ur pussy’ and ‘u playin’ like fuck that shit and check urself don’t ever talk to
me like that ever”
       D: “Are you serious??????” “And that you wanted to do shit to me in the whip”
“And I wasn’t even trippin on it” “Kept telling me your a freak”
       J: “Ok but that’s not all I talk [symbol] I’m dun talking about all this just u do u”
“Honestly I’m not about to argue because it’s just a waste”

                                             14
       D: “And then I ask to see some pussy when you sending nudes to me fresh out the
shower” “And now I talk to you some type of way?” “Yeah check it out.” “I’m grown.
Noone dictates my life.” “Other than the D.A” “I treat you with a lot of respect” “And I
try to communicate with you often about all aspects of life.” “You used to wanna talk
hella all the time about your family and your future” “And now you keep it short which
is whatever but don’t flash on me”
       J: “I just sometimes feel like this is all fake I feel like if I shake my head it will all
go away and I am not supposed to feel like that I have feelings for u but the emotions
from ex’s and getting hurt build up and I can’t take it ok” “I’m sorry I’m a fuck up”
“I’ve always been that way” “But its hard ok”
       D: “I understand.” “Just work with me.” You cant change the past we can only
change the future.”
       Late on March 14, 2020, defendant and Jane engaged in the following dialogue:
       D: “Why you put me on silent treatment???”
       J: “I’m sorry I am just going through so much and don’t really wanna talk about
it”
       D: “Can I grab you?”
       J: “Tmr ya”
       D: “What time” “And where”
       J: “Around 2 and from my sisters house”
       D: “Okay addy.” “And what time u need to be back?” Jane did not respond.
       On March 24, 2020, Jane wrote, “Whatever” Defendant responded, “Lmao tf”
“Ur crazy” “All I do is say what’s up and you say whatever”
       The next morning, March 25, Jane wrote, “Hey” Defendant said, “Wassup”
About two and half hours later, Jane wrote, “Cuz then u will probably be a jerk” “Cuz I
just don’t wanna say shit ion mean and end up hurting ur feelings I’f u get drunk”
Defendant replied, “Why tf.”

                                               15
       The remainder of the exchanges were insignificant. On April 19, 2020, defendant
sent Jane an indecipherable photograph or screenshot. On April 20, he sent her two blank
messages. On April 21, he sent her an empty attachment.

       Judgment

       A jury found defendant guilty on three counts of committing lewd acts on a child
of 14 or 15 years by a person who is at least 10 years older than the child (counts 1, 2,
and 3), one count of luring (count 5), and one count of possessing heroin (count 6).
(§§ 288, subd. (c)(1); 288.3, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) The jury
found defendant not guilty of one count of possessing child pornography (count 4).
(§ 311.11, subd. (a).)
       The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of four years, eight months,
calculated as follows: the upper term of three years on count 1, a consecutive eight
months each on counts 2 and 3, a consecutive four months on count 5, and a concurrent
90 days on count 6. The court found that section 654 did not apply to counts 2, 3, 5, and
6.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                               Knowledge of Jane’s Minority

       Section 288.3, subdivision (a) prohibits communicating with a minor with the
intent to commit an enumerated sexual offense, including section 288, subdivision (c)(1)
which prohibits lewd or lascivious acts upon a child 14 or 15 years old. To prove a
violation of this statute, a prosecutor must establish, among other elements, that the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was a minor. (§ 288.3,
subd. (a); San Nicolas v. Harris (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 41, 46.)

                                             16
       Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that
he knew or reasonably should have known that Jane was a minor when he communicated
with her between February 24 and April 26, 2020, as charged in the information. He
argues the photos and videos Jane sent him on Snapchat of her face, breasts, and vagina
are not substantial evidence that he knew or should have known Jane was under 18. He
claims his acquittal of possessing child pornography, a crime which requires the
defendant to know the person depicted is a minor, shows that the jury found he did not
know Jane was under 18 based on her facial appearance and physical development as
depicted in the Snapchat photos and videos.
       Defendant argues the Snapchat messages also do not establish that he knew or
should have known Jane was under 18. In those statements, Jane lied about her age, her
schooling, her employment, and her plans. She portrayed herself as sexually active
beyond someone of her real age. She even posed as an adult to open an account on
Bumble, where she contacted defendant.
       Further, defendant claims the phone calls and messages between his phone and
Alice’s phone on April 25 and 26, 2020, are not substantial evidence. Jane portrayed
herself in those calls and messages as an adult. Defendant argues the additional calls and
texts sent by Jane’s family after Jane left Alice’s house are irrelevant because they
occurred after Jane was with defendant.
       In evaluating defendant’s claim, “ ‘we review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to
support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] “Conflicts and even

                                              17
testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient
evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]’ (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
       We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that defendant
knew or should have known that Jane was under 18 years of age. The jury could have
reasonably reached this conclusion from viewing the photos Jane sent of herself to
defendant. The photos depict the face of a young teenage girl. Although Jane’s body
may have been developed, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that her face is not
that of an 18-year-old adult.
       Defendant argues that the jury’s finding him not guilty of possessing child
pornography demonstrates the jury found he did not know from the photos that Jane was
under 18. We disagree. It has long been the law that an acquittal of one or more counts
charged in an accusatory pleading “shall not be deemed . . . an acquittal of any other
count.” (§ 954; People v. Amick (1942) 20 Cal.2d 247, 251-252.) The jury was required
to consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each, and the trial court
so instructed the jury. (CALCRIM No. 3515.) We presume the jury followed the
instruction. (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 457-458.)
       Even if the jury’s acquittal of the child pornography charge could be considered, it
was not relevant to the luring charge. To prove possession of child pornography, the
prosecutor had to establish defendant knew that the offending matter depicted a person
under the age of 18. (§ 311.11, subd. (a); 311.2, subd. (g); CALCRIM No. 1141.) In
acquitting defendant of possessing child pornography, the jury was not asked to consider

                                              18
whether defendant should have known that Jane was under 18, the element of the luring
charge. The acquittal thus has no bearing on the jury’s findings on the luring charge, and
the photos of Jane were substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably
conclude defendant should have known that Jane was under 18.
       Additional evidence exists in the record from which the jury could reasonably
conclude defendant knew or should have known that Jane was under 18. When
detectives interviewed defendant on the day of his arrest, and after defendant learned Jane
was not 18 and the police were there to investigate a molestation, defendant stated, “I
didn’t know that she was not 18. I would not have brought her to my house, bro. I get
plenty of bitches. I’m not worried about no fuckin’ 14-year-old girl, understand that.”
Defendant made this reference to a 14-year-old before the detectives told him Jane’s true
age. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant made the comment in reference to
Jane whom he knew was 14 years old.
       Defendant was charged with luring Jane up to and including April 26, 2020, and
he received several text and voice mail messages on his phone from Jane’s family on
April 26, 2020, informing him that Jane was a minor. Jane’s father Stephan sent text
messages stating Jane was 14 years old and referring to Jane as “kiddo.” Stephan’s sister
Stacey left numerous voicemails that day on defendant’s cell phone stating Jane was 14
and was underage. The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant knew or
should have known from these messages on April 26 that Jane was under 18, but despite
that knowledge defendant continued to lure Jane with the intent of committing sexual acts
with her on April 27 and 28, as the information charged.
       Several Snapchat messages between defendant and Jane could have reasonably led
the jury to believe that even defendant was not convinced Jane was 18 and that he should
have known she was underage. In one message, Jane said her mother got mad at her and
took her phone. That angered Jane “because I’m damn near grown” and her mother
wanted to take her things. Defendant explained Jane’s mother’s actions in part by saying

                                            19
to Jane, “Your young.” “Your still her baby so she’s gonna be protective.” The jury
could reasonably infer from Jane’s and defendant’s comments that defendant knew or
should have known that Jane was a minor. She was “near grown” and “young.”
       On March 4, 2020, defendant specifically asked Jane if she had her “ID” on her.
Jane said she would show him in a bit, but there is no evidence she sent any kind of
identification to defendant via Snapchat. The jury could reasonably infer from
defendant’s comment that he knew or should have known Jane was a minor. Otherwise,
he would not have asked for her identification.
       Despite Jane’s lies to make defendant think she was 18, she told defendant she
was in high school. While 18-year-olds obviously attend high school, defendant said it
was weird she sent Snapchat messages with him only while in class, and he asked if he
could call after school, get his “video chat on,” and “I want I want.” Jane did not address
his request. Instead, she said, “really baby?” “Sorry baby at least I come back I mean.”
“I could just bounce” Days later, Jane asked defendant to pick her up at school, but she
had to be home by 4:00. Defendant again commented that once she left school, he did
not hear from her, and he wanted her to communicate better with him. The jury could
reasonably infer from these comments that defendant recognized or should have
recognized that Jane was a minor due to her inability to contact him after school.
       In his brief, defendant emphasizes the Snapchat messages from which he
reasonably could conclude that Jane was 18. We do not disagree that Jane sent a
significant number of messages intending to convey she was an adult. But we do not
resolve evidentiary conflicts. We look only for substantial evidence to support the jury’s
finding, and having found it, we must affirm the jury’s determination that defendant
knew or should have known that Jane was under the age of 18 when he lured her to his
home to engage in lewd acts. (People v. Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 87.)

                                            20
                                               II

                               Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

         Defendant contends his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by not requesting
a pinpoint jury instruction on his mistake of fact defense to the luring count. He argues
that substantial evidence supported his affirmative defense that he actually believed Jane
was 18 years old. Counsel thus had a duty to request an instruction on the mistake of fact
defense, but he did not make the request, and there is no satisfactory reason why he did
not make the request. Defendant contends the error was prejudicial because without the
instruction, the jury had no opportunity to decide whether defendant believed Jane was
18.

         A.     Background

         The trial court ruled in limine and during the parties’ discussions about jury
instructions that defendant could raise actual mistake of fact as a defense to the luring
count. The court instructed the jury on the luring count with CALCRIM No. 1124. The
instruction informed the jury that to find defendant guilty, the People had to prove:
         “1. The defendant contacted or communicated with a minor;
         “2. When the defendant did so, he intended to commit a lewd or lascivious act on
a child 14 or 15 years of age in violation of Penal Code section 288(c)(1) involving that
minor;
         “AND
         “3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a
minor.
         “A minor is a person under the age of 18.”
         Defense counsel did not request the trial court to instruct the jury with the mistake
of fact instruction, CALCRIM No. 3046.

                                               21
       B.         Analysis

       A trial court does not have a duty to instruct sua sponte on a defense such as
mistake of fact that merely negates an element of the crime if the jury received complete
and accurate instructions on the element. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838,
873-874.) It is defense counsel who has a duty to request “ ‘all instructions which in his
judgment are necessary to explain all of the legal theories upon which his defense rests.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 270.)
       To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that (1)
counsel’s performance in not requesting an instruction on the mistake of fact defense fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687-688.)
       “On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance is warranted where ‘(1) the
record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged
act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) ‘[W]here counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do
not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal
unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ (People v.
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.)” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.)
       Defendant admits the record does not indicate why counsel did not request the
mistake of fact instruction. He contends we must nonetheless find that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because there was sufficient evidence to justify giving the mistake
of fact instruction and there can be no satisfactory or conceivable reason why counsel did
not request it.

                                            22
          We disagree. It is conceivable that counsel did not request the instruction because
the instruction the court gave, CALCRIM No. 1124, correctly and completely instructed
on the knowledge element and provided the jury an opportunity to determine whether
defendant knew or should have known that Jane was under 18. A mistake of fact
instruction was not necessary to put that issue before the jury. (See People v.
Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 873-874 [defense that operates only to negate mental
element of a crime is not a special defense and court does not have duty to instruct on the
defense sua sponte].)
          It is also conceivable that counsel did not request a mistake of fact instruction
because he believed defendant was not entitled to the instruction, the trial court’s earlier
rulings notwithstanding. It is not clear that defendant was entitled to a mistake of fact
instruction on the luring count. “[A] mistake of fact jury instruction is not appropriate
where the defendant’s mistaken belief does not negate an element of the crime.” (People
v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 345.) Defendant’s actual belief that Jane was 18
years old does not necessarily negate the luring statute’s knowledge element. Defendant
is guilty of luring if he should have known Jane was under 18 despite his mistaken actual
belief.
          Defendant directs us to no authority for the proposition that a mistake of fact
defense lies against the luring statute’s objective knowledge element. (§ 288.3, subd.
(a).) His reliance on People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, and People v. Hanna
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 is misplaced. In Speck, a panel of this court determined the
trial court erred when it denied defense counsel’s request to instruct on mistake of fact as
a defense to charges of felony vehicle theft and receiving stolen property and that the
error was prejudicial. (Speck, at pp. 791-795.) In Hanna, another panel of this court
determined the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel’s request to instruct on
mistake of fact as a defense to a charge of attempted lewd conduct with a child under the
age of 14 years but that the error was not prejudicial. (Hanna, at pp. 460-463.) Neither

                                                23
case concerned ineffective assistance and whether defense counsel had no conceivable
reason for not requesting the mistake of fact instruction, nor did either case concern a
crime with an objective knowledge element.
       Because the record does not indicate why counsel did not request a mistake of fact
instruction and because rational reasons for counsel’s omission are not inconceivable, we
conclude defendant has not established that counsel rendered deficient performance and
ineffective assistance.

                                              III

                                    Exclusion of Evidence

       Defendant contends the trial court erred in not admitting into evidence Snapchat
messages between defendant and other persons on the ground of hearsay where defendant
asked the other persons their ages and in writing ended the conversations or did not
respond upon learning the other persons were minors. Defendant argues the evidence
was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matters stated. It was
offered to establish defendant’s state of mind and his habitual reaction upon learning the
persons were minors. Defendant asserts the error was a prejudicial abuse of discretion
and it denied him his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and to present a
defense.

       A.     Background

       During trial and outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor informed the court
that defense counsel that morning gave her copies of some Snapchat messages between
defendant and other unknown people which defense counsel intended to introduce as part
of his case. The prosecutor objected, arguing the messages were hearsay statements
which did not qualify under any hearsay exception.
       Defense counsel stated the messages were found by a defense data extraction
expert who would be testifying. The messages were between defendant and other

                                              24
persons who claimed to be minors. In the messages, defendant asked the persons their
ages and, upon learning they were minors, discontinued speaking with them or told them
he could not hang out with them. Counsel argued the messages showed defendant did not
exhibit a pattern of criminality.
       Defense counsel also argued the messages were relevant because they would relate
to the testimony from another defense expert witness, a licensed psychologist. The
psychologist would testify that defendant as a young child had been diagnosed with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and that people with ADHD have a
difficult time remembering things or completing tasks and are easily distracted. Defense
counsel wanted to argue that because defendant had ADHD, he may not have followed
through with his request to Jane to show her identification because he may have believed
he had already verified Jane’s age, something the new Snapchat messages showed he did
“on a regular basis[.]”
       The court confirmed with defense counsel that the messages were not being
offered for the truth of whether the other persons were actually minors but were being
offered to show defendant’s state of mind related to minors. Counsel confirmed the court
was correct.
       The prosecutor argued that although it appeared the evidence would come in to
show defendant’s state of mind, it would still be used for the truth to show that defendant
in fact rebuffed advances from minors. The court stated the evidence was not hearsay as
to the other persons, but it asked defense counsel whether the evidence was hearsay as to
defendant. Counsel stated the evidence was hearsay in that it consisted of out-of-court
statements, but it was admissible through a hearsay exception to show defendant’s state
of mind.
       The trial court questioned counsel’s argument, stating, “But that can always be the
case. In a murder case and some defendant says I didn’t do it, that’s state of mind. He

                                            25
doesn’t believe he did it, but it wouldn’t come in.” The court took the matter under
submission.
       Ultimately, the court ruled it would not admit the new Snapchat evidence. It
reasoned the evidence was “inadmissible hearsay as to the defendant. [¶] If he were on
the stand, for example, and you wanted to bring this in and there was an objection from
the People saying, well, Your Honor, we object because the statement from the girl or the
other person is hearsay, then it might come in on a state of mind; right? But if the
defendant’s not on the stand, his statement would be coming in without an exception to
the hearsay rule. It wouldn’t come in under [Evidence Code section] 1220 because it’s
not being used against him. And that’s my ruling.”

       B.     Analysis

       The Attorney General initially contends defendant has forfeited his argument that
the Snapchat messages were admissible to show he had a habit of verifying ages because
at trial defendant did not assert habit as a ground to admit the evidence. We disagree.
Defense counsel argued the messages were relevant because they attested to defendant
regularly verifying the ages of the people he communicated with on Snapchat. Arguing
for the admission of this evidence of regular behavior is sufficient to preserve on appeal
the right to argue whether the evidence should be admitted as evidence of habit under
Evidence Code section 1105. “[A] habit involves a consistent, semiautomatic response to
a repeated situation.” (Bowen v. Ryan (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 916, 926.)
       The primary issue before us, however, is whether the evidence was inadmissible
hearsay. Evidence of habit is not admissible if the evidence is hearsay not subject to a
hearsay exception. (Evid. Code, § 1105.) Defendant argues the evidence was not
hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. Rather, it was
offered to show defendant’s state of mind upon reading the responses to his questions and
his reaction to those responses.

                                            26
       We review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725.) Generally, evidence of a declarant’s out-of-court
statement “ ‘ “ ‘offered to prove that the statement imparted certain information to the
hearer and that the hearer, believing such information to be true, acted in conformity with
that belief . . . is not hearsay, since it is the hearer’s reaction to the statement that is the
relevant fact sought to be proved, not the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 100; Jefferson, Cal. Evidence
Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2022) § 1.34.)
       Under this rule, the other persons’ responses to defendant’s questions about their
ages are not hearsay to the extent they are offered to show that defendant acted in
accordance with believing the statements were true. But in this instance, defendant acted
as an out-of-court declarant himself when, after learning the other persons were minors,
he stated he could not hang out with them.
       Defendant contends his responses to the other individuals were offered to
demonstrate his state of mind, not the truth of the matters he stated, and that he had a
habit of verifying the ages of his Snapchat contacts. We disagree. His responses to the
contacts were hearsay which were relevant only if they were introduced for the truth of
the matter stated. His responses showed defendant did not hang out with minors on
Snapchat only if they were admitted for their truth. Defendant’s state of mind in writing
those responses or the fact that he wrote those words were irrelevant. Defendant offered
no exception to the hearsay rule under which the court could have admitted the evidence,
and habit itself is not a hearsay exception. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
not admitting the evidence.
       Even if the trial court erred in not admitting the evidence, the error was not
prejudicial under the state or federal standards for demonstrating prejudice. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) The
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because had the jury been made aware of

                                                27
defendant’s habit, it still would have concluded defendant should have known Jane was
under 18. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Jane’s photograph alone should
have led defendant to know that she was under 18. Speaking with police, defendant
made a derogative comment about not worrying about a 14-year-old girl before police
informed him of Jane’s age, suggesting he already knew Jane was 14. And on the day
Jane arrived at defendant’s house and before all the lewd acts had been performed,
defendant’s phone received hundreds of voice mails and text messages from Jane’s
relatives, many of which informed him Jane was underage.
            Moreover, even if defendant did not follow up on his request to see Jane’s
identification, Jane testified that when she and defendant first met, he asked her for her
age. She told him she was 18. Defendant made the request, habit or not, and the jury still
concluded defendant should have known she was 18 under the all the evidence presented
at trial.
            Also if there was error, the error did not deprive defendant of his constitutional
right to present a defense. Excluding evidence related to a possible habit of checking
ages did not deny defendant the right and ability to present his mistake of fact defense.
(See People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 58 [no denial of due process where
exculpatory value of excluded evidence was tangential at best].)

                                                  IV

                                          Cumulative Error

            Defendant contends that the trial court’s series of errors cumulatively resulted in a
denial of due process as to the luring count. “Under the cumulative error doctrine, the
reviewing court must ‘review each allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any
errors to see if it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more
favorable to defendant in their absence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646.) Where there are no errors to cumulate, we must reject

                                                  28
defendant’s cumulative error argument. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48,
63; review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275341.)

                                             V

                                    Sentencing Remand

       Defendant contends that recent amendments to the state’s sentencing laws apply
retroactively to him, and he asks us to remand for resentencing. The Attorney General
agrees with defendant, as do we.
       Effective January 1, 2022, a trial court must impose a lower term sentence if the
defendant was under 26 years of age when he committed the offense unless the court
finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances that imposition
of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§§ 1170, subd. (b)(6);
1016.7, subd. (b) [Stats. 2021, ch. 731 (Sen. Bill No. 567), § 1.3; Stats. 2021, ch. 695
(Assem. Bill No. 124), § 4].)
       Also effective January 1, 2022, a trial court may not impose an upper term
sentence except where there are circumstances in aggravation that justify imposing the
upper term, and the facts underlying those circumstances were stipulated by the
defendant or were found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(1), (2) [Stats. 2021, ch. 731 (Sen. Bill No. 567), § 1.3].) The court, however,
may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a
certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(3).)
       Both measures apply retroactively to nonfinal cases on direct appeal. (People v.
Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1108-1109 [Sen. Bill No. 567]; People v. Banner
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 240 [Assem. Bill No. 124].) Both measures apply here.
Defendant was 24 years old when he committed the offenses. He thus is entitled to a

                                             29
resentencing hearing for the trial court to determine under section 1170, subdivision (b)
whether imposing the lower term on count 1 would be contrary to the interests of justice.
       Defendant was also sentenced to the upper term on count 1. The trial court found
as circumstances in aggravation that the crime involved a high degree of callousness, the
victim was particularly vulnerable, the manner in which the crime was carried out
indicated planning, defendant’s past violent conduct indicated he was a serious danger to
society, his prior convictions as an adult were numerous, he was on parole when he
committed the crime, and his prior performance on probation and parole had been
unsatisfactory.
       There is no evidence in the record, however, that the court’s findings in
aggravation were found true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or that defendant
stipulated to them. There is also no evidence that the court’s consideration of defendant’s
prior convictions was based on a certified record of those convictions. Defendant is thus
entitled to a resentencing hearing for the trial court to determine whether to impose the
upper term in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b) as amended effective
January 1, 2022. We will so order on remand.

                                             VI

                                         Section 654

       Defendant contends the trial court erred under section 654 by imposing separate
sentences for count 1, lewd act on a minor on or about April 27, 2020, and count 5, luring
between February 24 and April 26, 2020. He argues that both counts arose from the same
course of conduct and must be stayed under section 654. He also claims that remand is
appropriate for the trial court to determine whether count 1 or count 5 should be stayed in
accordance with Assembly Bill No. 518 (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1), which amended
section 654 effective January 1, 2022.

                                             30
       Whether section 654 applies “is a question of fact for the trial court, which is
vested with broad latitude in making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not
be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]
We review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent
and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)
       At the time of defendant’s sentencing, section 654 provided that “[a]n act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be
punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Former § 654, subd. (a) [Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1].) Effective January 1,
2022, the statute now states that such an act “may be punished under either of such
provisions,” but in no case under more than one provision. (§ 654, subd. (a) [Stats. 2021,
ch. 441 (Assem. Bill No. 518), § 1].)
       Section 654’s reference to an “act or omission” may include both a discreet
physical act and a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with the same
objective. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) Courts thus apply a two-
step inquiry to determine whether section 654 bars multiple punishments. First, if the
defendant completed the crimes by a “ ‘single physical act,’ ” he may not be punished
more than once for that act. (Ibid.) Second, if the case involves more than a single act—
i.e., a course of conduct—courts “consider whether that course of conduct reflects a
single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
       The parties do not dispute the trial court’s finding on step one that counts 1 and 5
involved more than a single physical act. We thus turn to step two to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that counts 1 and 5 involved a
course of conduct that reflected multiple intents and objectives.

                                             31
       “ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective
of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be
punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Latimer
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208, quoting Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11,
19.)
       “Importantly, under section 654 ‘a course of conduct divisible in time, although
directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment.’ (People
v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 11 [].) Therefore, ‘[i]f the offenses were
committed on different occasions, they may be punished separately.’ (People v. Kwok
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1253 [].) ‘This is particularly so where the offenses are
temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and
to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the
violation of public security or policy already undertaken.’ (People v. Gaio (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935 []).)
       “In cases involving sex offenses, ‘[e]ven where the defendant has but one
objective—sexual gratification—section 654 will not apply unless the crimes were either
incidental to or the means by which another crime was accomplished. [Citations.] [¶]
[S]ection 654 does not apply to sexual misconduct that is “preparatory” in the general
sense that it is designed to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the victim.’ (People v.
Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1006 []).)” (People v. Jacobo (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 32, 53.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that section 654 did
not apply to the sentences for counts 1 and 5. The luring occurred from February 23 to
April 26, 2020, and the molestation charged in count 1 occurred on April 27, 2020. Even
though the luring facilitated the lewd acts, the offenses were committed at different times,

                                             32
and defendant had a sufficient opportunity to reflect and form a new intent, or renew his
intent, before he molested Jane.
       Defendant relies on People v. Medelez (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659 (Medelez) to
contend he harbored a single intent for both crimes and that the luring was merely
incidental to, and directly facilitated, the molestation in count 1. Medelez is
distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the defendant drove a minor to a remote place
and offered the minor money in exchange for oral sex. When the minor refused, the
defendant told the minor to take off his pants. The minor complied because he was
afraid. The defendant showed the minor pornographic pictures and “ ‘was about to lean
in’ ” when the minor pulled up his pants and stopped the defendant. (Id. at p. 662.) The
jury found the defendant guilty of luring with the intent to engage in oral sex and
attempted oral copulation with a minor. (§§ 288.3, subd. (a); 664; former § 288a, subd.
(b)(1).) The trial court imposed separate sentences for the crimes. (Medelez at p. 661.)
The court of appeal reversed. It ruled that the defendant could not be punished for both
attempted oral copulation and luring “because the crimes were based on a single intent
and objective, as the People concede.” (Id. at p. 663.)
       In Medelez, the crimes immediately followed one after the other in time. The
luring truly was incidental to the attempt, and the crimes were not temporally separated in
such a way as to afford the defendant the opportunity to reflect and to change or renew
his intent. Here, sufficient evidence existed for the trial court to determine that defendant
had a sufficient opportunity to reflect and renew his intent to commit lewd acts between
the luring and the molestation.

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                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded solely for resentencing under
section 1170, subdivision (b) as that statute was effective January 1, 2022. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                 HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RENNER, J.

McADAM, J.*

*  Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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