Court Opinion

ID: 9849452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:40:20.989347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:24.635848
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I completely agree with the majority’s rulings and reasoning as set forth in Divisions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 and I concur fully in the judgment affirming the conviction. However, I do not believe that any reversible error exists in connection with the sentencing phase of the proceedings and, accordingly, dissent from Division 5 of the majority opinion and from the judgment remanding the case for resentencing.
The majority diagnoses a fatal malady in the sentencing phase because of the trial court’s observation that he needed to consider certain "other incidents” of which defendant had not been convicted but which were revealed to the court and jury during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. The admissibility of evidence *679concerning these "other incidents” during the first portion of the trial is specifically and properly approved in Division 2 of the majority opinion in this case.
The majority holds that "a sentence based in part upon articulated consideration of other offenses, as yet untried, amounts to prescribing punishment for conduct for which there has been no conviction.” This analysis appears to be grounded upon an analogy between the "incidents” and prior illegal convictions or convictions otherwise not admissible under Code Ann. § 27-2503 (a), the provisions of which control presentence hearings. The majority’s equation of previous "incidents” with prior "convictions” ignores, discounts or disregards the undisputed fact that the trial judge specifically stated that he would not consider these "incidents” as "convictions.” If the trial judge had stated — or even implied — that he looked upon the prior incidents as being equivalent to convictions, I would agree with the majority. Such is not the case here.
The crucial and determinative factor with regard to this issue is, in my opinion, that the "incidents,” the consideration of which by the trial judge is held to be error, were not divulged during the presentence hearing as "additional evidence” but were already in evidence before the court as well as the jury during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. In this connection, the majority, emphasizing the limited purpose for which the evidence of the other incidents was admitted during the first phase of the trial, states that such evidence "may not properly be an articulate premise upon which sentence is partially based.” Thus the majority holds that because of the limited purposes for which the other incidents were considered by the jury in determining guilt, they cannot be considered by the court in deciding punishment.
However, the Georgia appellate decisions do not support such a restriction upon the consideration, during the presentence hearing, of evidence admitted during the first phase of the trial. In Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247 (206 SE2d 12) (1974), the Supreme Court discussed the scope of the presentence hearing under the former law governing such hearings. Ga. L. 1973, p. 159; Code Ann. § 27-2534, repealed Ga. L. 1974, p. 352. The repeal occurred *680when the legislature provided for sentencing by the judge and not the jury except in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed. However, the former statutory language is almost identical to present Code Ann. § 27-2503 (a) dealing with evidence during the presentence hearing. As did Justice Undercofler in Eberheart, I quote the relevant language of the 1973 statute, to wit: "In such hearing, subject to the laws of evidence, the jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas; provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible.” Ga. L. 1973, p. 162. After reciting this language, the Supreme Court held: "The bifurcated trial was created to withhold matters inadmissible on the issue of guilt or innocence from the jury until that issue had been determined. The statute is clear that the presentence hearing is for additional evidence and in no way excludes from consideration on sentence the matters heard on the issue of guilt or innocence.” (Emphasis supplied.) Eberheart v. State, supra, 253-254.
Thus, it appears clear to me that the trial judge can and must consider all evidence before the court and jury during the guilt-innocence phase as well as the additional evidence, if any, introduced during the presentence hearing. Since only as a result of properly admitted evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial was the trial judge in this case even aware of the incidents, the consideration of which the majority holds to be error, it is my opinion that the trial judge did not commit error in considering the incidents. In fact, I believe that had he failed to consider all of the evidence received during the first phase of the trial, he would not have properly discharged the duties imposed upon him in connection with sentencing.
The majority cites Clark v. State, 138 Ga App. 266 (226 SE2d 89) (1976), so as to distinguish from this case Clark’s ruling with regard to the presumption that the judge did not consider improper matters. However, *681illustrative of the parameters of appellate review of the sentencing procedure is another portion of our opinion in Clark disapproving — but not reversing because of — a trial judge’s allowance of evidence of the defendant’s acquittal in a prior case. Referring to the unquestioned' rule that illegal convictions should not be considered in presentence hearings, this court in Clark states:
"Where evidence of illegal convictions has been admitted in pre-sentence hearings, even without objection, our appellate courts have granted new trials on the issue of punishment. See, e.g., Clenney v. State, 229 Ga. 561 (4) (192 SE2d 907); Fowler v. State, 132 Ga. App. 812 (209 SE2d 255); Harrison v. State, 136 Ga. App. 71 (2) (220 SE2d 77). Exceptions have been made where it affirmatively appeared that the judge discounted their effect in fixing the sentence (Knight v. State, 133 Ga. App. 808 (2) (212 SE2d 464); Workman v. State, 137 Ga. App. 746 (7)), or that such evidence was brought out without objection during the trial and the defendant’s counsel participated in the exchange of conversation from which the information regarding the defendant’s prior conviction (which properly should not have been considered) was discussed. Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 390 (221 SE2d 465).
"On the other hand, where the improperly considered matter consisted of less than illegal convictions (such as rumors, hearsay, innuendoes, and information not obtained from the judge’s personal observation), our courts have specifically disapproved the practice, yet held it to be harmless error, based on the 'presumption, in the absence of a strong showing to the contrary, that the trial judge, when sitting without a jury, separates the legal evidence from facts not properly in evidence in reaching his decision.’ Ingram v. State, 134 Ga. App. 935, 940 (8) (216 SE2d 608), citing McBryde v. State, 34 Ga. 202, 204 and Jones v. State, 233 Ga. 662 (3) (212 SE2d 832).” Clark v. State, supra, 270.
Here, the allegedly "improperly considered matter consisted of less than illegal convictions.” Although objection to the introduction of testimony concerning the incidents here involved was made during the *682guilt-innocence phase of this trial, the trial court ruled the evidence admissible and we have affirmed that ruling; thus such facts were "properly in evidence.”
In Jones v. State, 233 Ga. 662 (212 SE2d 832) (1975), our Supreme Court considered the defendant’s attack upon his sentence because, during the presentence hearing, the trial judge "wondered aloud that the state had nothing to present on Milton Jones, since 'Your name [Jones] has been prevalent in the criminal circuit for a long time.’ ” Jones v. State, supra, 663. In Jones, the defendant had no criminal record. The Supreme Court, noting that no objection was interposed by the defendant to the remarks at the time they were made, held that there was no error requiring reversal of the sentence. See also Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 390, 392 (221 SE2d 465) (1975). The record here reveals the absence, during the hearing, of any objection to the trial court’s "articulated consideration” of the other incidents. For other examples of waiver because of the failure to object during the sentencing hearing, see McKisic v. State, 238 Ga. 644 (5) (234 SE2d 908) (1977), and Cochran v. State, 144 Ga. App. 820 (4) (242 SE2d 735) (1978).
I do not believe that the position taken by the majority is supported by its recitation of and reliance upon the judge’s charge that the jury could consider the other incidents only for the limited purposes specified by the court. I agree with the majority that the charge excerpt included in the opinion is "an excellent statement of the applicable law with respect to evidence of 'other offenses.’ ” However, this charge was proper and necessary because and only because it was to guide the jury in determining guilt or innocence of the defendant. That the jury was admonished not "to consider such evidence for any other purpose” is totally unrelated to a determination of what is to be considered during the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial. The quoted instructions were given to insure that the jury would not be influenced by the other incidents in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The issue of punishment was not before the jury.
In this connection, the limitation on the scope of the presentence hearing enunciated by the majority in this *683case arguably would apply also to a presentence hearing before a jury determining punishment under subsection (b) of Code Ann. § 27-2503 in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed since that provision states that "[s]uch hearing shall be conducted . . . before the judge as provided in subsection (a) of this section.” Thus it would seem that the reasoning of the majority in this case would preclude the jury’s consideration at the presentence hearing of other incidents shown by the evidence admitted during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial under the same or similar evidentiary rules applied in this case.
I am constrained to opine that trial judges throughout the state may be giving presentence instructions authorizing the jury to ponder matters which this court now conceals from the judge. The pattern jury instructions prepared by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia include the following suggested language, to wit: "In reaching this determination, you are authorized to consider all of the evidence received by you in open court in both phases of the trial. You are authorized to consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Emphasis supplied.) Such an instruction would appear to be not only proper but mandatory under the ruling in Eberheart, supra. Surely the discretion allowed to a trial judge is as broad in scope as that entrusted to a jury performing the same function.
For the above reasons, I would affirm not only the conviction but the sentence imposed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Shulman join in this dissent.