Court Opinion

ID: 9448946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:50:33.37806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:37.373464
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority here reverses an Order of the District Court which denied and dismissed a preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs, and remands the cause to the District Court on the ground that it failed to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law.
I disagree. I would affirm the District Court’s Order for the reasons later stated.
The District Court’s opinion, reported at 204 F.Supp. 357 (E.D.Pa.1962) sets forth its findings of facts and conclusions of law and that is all that is necessary to satisfy the requirements of Rules 41(b) and 52(a), as amended,1 *808and to enable this Court to consider the issue here presented as to whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction .sought by the plaintiffs.
In its Opinion, the District Court stated (p. 36.0):
“Since the injunction which is sought has mandatory aspects, the burden of making a strong showing, •on the part of plaintiffs, is a heavy •one. See W. A. Mack, Inc. v. General Motors Corporation, 260 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1958).
“To recite all the semantic variations of the phrases which courts have used in describing the chancellor’s chore cannot serve any useful purpose. It is enough to say that the issues are doubtful. As was said in Madison Square Garden Corporation v. Braddoek, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3rd Cir. 1937):
«* # * * n has been so well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.*
"‘Accordingly, after hearing all of the plaintiffs’ evidence, and considering the exhibits and arguments, this Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden required of them and, therefore, finds as a fact that plaintiffs have failed to prove bad faith, coercion, discrimination, or threatened irreparable harm warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunction under the law. It is to be understood however, that this Court is in no sense deciding the case on the merits.”
The plaintiffs on this appeal have not asked this Court to reverse and to remand to the District Court for the stating of special fact findings and conclusions ox law. Nor have the plaintiffs presented a contention that the factual findings made by the District Court in its Opinion are “clearly erroneous”.
The sum of plaintiffs’ position is that their evidence (1) “tended to show the defendant’s bad faith”; (2) “showed, at the least a bona fide dispute as to the bad faith of the defendant”; (3) “shows at this stage right in the plaintiffs which merits equitable consideration”, and that for these reasons the District Court was guilty of an abuse of discretion in denying the preliminary injunction since “the balancing of equities” was in favor of the plaintiffs.
I would affirm the Order of the District Court denying the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs for the reason that the record as made does not disclose that the District Court was guilty of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion. It is settled law that “The granting or denying of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed upon appeal ‘unless contrary-to some rule of equity, or the result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion’ ”2
The District Court, in its Opinion, reviewed the evidence which the plaintiffs urge “tended to show bad faith” on defendant’s part and found that it was not of a quality to warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction. The District Court, in its Opinion, also recognized “the necessity of balancing the competing equities” between the parties and found that the plaintiffs’ evidence failed to establish the threat of irreparable injury warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
It is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in the weighing of evidence and the “balancing of equities” in the absence of a showing that the fact-findings were “clearly erroneous” and *809that the judicial “balancing of equities” in considering the issue of a threat of irreparable injury was improvidently performed.
As earlier stated the record here would not in my opinion justify a determination by this Court that the District Court was guilty of an improvident exercise of discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction.

. Rule 41(b), as amended, provides in relevant part:
“If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a).” Rule 52(a), as amended, provides in part:
“If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein.”
“An examination of Rule 52(a) discloses that its objective is to have the trial judge set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law in cases where he is the trier of the fact * * * where his decision turns in part upon a factual determination. That is, in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, and at the final hearing of the action, including a dismissal at the end of plaintiff’s case under Rule 41(b) * * ». The Rule does not place a severe burden upon the *808trial judge, foi- lie ‘need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters’, and after the 1946 amendment it is clear that these may be part of his opinion or memorandum of decision.” 5 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 52.06 [1] (2nd Ed. 1951).

. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 268 F.2d 569, 573 (3 Cir. 1959).