Court Opinion

ID: 9621109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:51:48.950658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:03.427796
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I believe that the trial court correctly entered a judgment in favor of the insureds as to their recovery of no-fault benefits under the policy issued to Ms. Dupree by the insurer. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the judgment in Case No. 76596.
1. Pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-45 (d), the giving of notice to an *860insured is made a condition precedent to the cancellation of his automobile policy. There is no question that the insurer must strictly comply with that condition precedent. In addition, former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1) provided, in relevant part, that “[t]he insurer, within five days after the effective date of a permitted cancellation of [no-fault] coverage, shall notify the Department of Public Safety in writing of the cancellation.” Nothing in former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1) specified that the giving of notice to the Department of Public Safety was an additional condition precedent to the insurer’s effectuation of a successful cancellation of an insured’s automobile policy. Accordingly, if consideration is limited solely to the language of the applicable statutory provisions, it might be possible to accept the majority’s conclusion that an insurer’s lack of strict compliance with the notice provision of former OCGA § 33-34-10 “would not result in the total nullification of the insurer’s attempt to cancel the policy.” It is my opinion, however, that, notwithstanding the ostensible feasibility of the majority’s conclusion, the interpretation heretofore given to former OCGA § 33-34-10 by the Supreme Court requires a contrary holding.
Former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1) “requirefdj insurers to notify the Department of Public Safety before cancellation of no-fault automobile coverage [could] be effective. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 251 Ga. 244 (304 SE2d 725) (1983). See also Sentry Indem. Co. v. Sharif, 248 Ga. 395, 397 (282 SE2d 907) (1981); Pearce v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 33 (268 SE2d 623) (1980). Thus, the Supreme Court has apparently construed an insurer’s compliance with the provisions of former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1) as the satisfaction of a condition precedent to the effective cancellation of an automobile policy. “ ‘[A] provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way, shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the Act or proceeding, or when some antecedent or prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercised, the statute must be regarded as mandatory.’ ” Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 740 (187 SE2d 835) (1972). The majority cites no authority for holding that anything short of an insurer’s strict compliance with former OCGA § 33-34-10, as a condition precedent to the effective cancellation of a policy of automobile insurance, would be sufficient. “ ‘The notice requirements of the statutes regarding cancellation of insurance policies are mandatory and require strict compliance and failure to adhere to the requirements results in non-cancellation of the policy. [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Perry *861& Co. v. New South Ins. Brokers, 182 Ga. App. 84, 86 (2) (354 SE2d 852) (1987).
If the majority were correct, then, notwithstanding the terms of the notice provided to the insured pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-45 (d), the date of effective cancellation of an automobile policy will remain uncertain until the insurer makes its own unilateral determination to provide the notice required by former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1). According to the majority, the cancellation would simply become effective at whatever point in time the insurer might subsequently provide notification to the Department of Public Safety. In my opinion, neither the uncertainty as to the date of cancellation nor the insurer’s unilateral power to determine the effectiveness of the cancellation is warranted. As I construe the statutes, the date of proposed cancellation of an automobile policy must necessarily be established by the terms of the original written notice required to be provided to the insured pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-45 (d) and the effectiveness of that cancellation must necessarily be dependent upon the insurer’s strict compliance with the mandatory notice requirements of former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1). The insurer notified Ms. Dupree that it was electing to cancel her policy effective January 14, 1985. Within five days of that date, the insurer did not provide the additional notice required by former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1). Accordingly, the insurer’s attempt to cancel Ms. Dupree’s policy on the date that it had proposed was ineffective. If the insurer thereafter wished to effectuate a cancellation of Ms. Dupree’s policy to be effective at a later date, it should be required to send her another notice of proposed cancellation pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-45 (d) and the insurer should not be permitted to urge that the effective date of its original cancellation attempt was merely suspended until such time as it might subsequently undertake to provide notice to the Department of Public Safety. The effectiveness of the cancellation of an automobile policy is, in my opinion, controlled by the insurer’s strict compliance with all of the applicable statutory provisions regarding cancellation, and not by the insurer’s unilateral compliance with its own less objective standards. See generally Perry & Co. v. New South Ins. Brokers, supra at 86 (2).
I believe that the trial court correctly construed the five-day time period of former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1) as mandatory, and that the insurer’s failure to comply therewith resulted in the noncancellation of Ms. Dupree’s policy. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of the insured’s motion for a directed verdict as to the existence of coverage under the policy.
2. I concur in the affirmance of the judgment in Case No. 76595, but for different reasons than those given by the majority.
It is my opinion that error, if any, in the grant of the insurer’s *862motion for a directed verdict as to its compliance with the notice requirements of OCGA § 33-34-45 (d) is moot. As previously discussed, regardless of the insurer’s compliance with that statutory provision, the insureds were nevertheless entitled to recover no-fault benefits because the trial court correctly held that there was a noncancellation of Ms. Dupree’s automobile policy as the result of the insurer’s failure to comply strictly with the additional notice provision of former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1).
Decided September 27, 1988
Rehearing denied October 19, 1988
Ken W. Smith, for appellants.
Steven P. Gilliam, Donald T. Hunt, for appellee.
I also agree that the trial court correctly granted the insurer’s motion for a directed verdict as to its liability for statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages pursuant to OCGÁ § 33-34-6 (b) and (c). “[T]his case is one of first impression in Georgia in its interpretation of the specific language in [former OCGA § 33-34-10 (a) (1)], and presented a close question as to the construction to be given this language. Thus . . . the trial court [correctly granted the insurer’s] motion for directed verdict on the issue of bad faith penalties as there was no legal basis for the jury to award such damages. [Cits.]” Johnson v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 177 Ga. App. 204, 207 (2) (338 SE2d 687) (1985).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this opinion.