Court Opinion

ID: 9367970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 17:03:41.27064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.985995
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                          Docket No. 49075

    STATE OF IDAHO,                                )
                                                   )    Filed: February 2, 2023
           Plaintiff-Respondent,                   )
                                                   )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    v.                                             )
                                                   )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    ROBERT WESLEY WARDEN,                          )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                   )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
           Defendant-Appellant.                    )
                                                   )

          Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Idaho
          County. Hon. Gregory FitzMaurice, District Judge.

          Order denying motion for new trial, affirmed.

          Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds,
          Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

          Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
          General, Boise, for respondent.
                    ________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge
          Robert Wesley Warden appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial. We
affirm.
                                                   I.
                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Following a court trial in 2018, the district court judge found Warden guilty of felony
driving under the influence (DUI).1 Just under two years later, Warden filed a pro se motion for a

1
       This Court affirmed Warden’s judgment of conviction and sentence in an unpublished
opinion. State v. Warden, Docket No. 46136 (Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

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new trial.2 Warden argued several pieces of newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial. As
relevant to this appeal, Warden asserted that “statements” from two detention deputies obtained
“through the Freedom of Information Act” after his trial “would have been favorable to him.” The
statements, memorialized in jail logs authored by the detention deputies, relate that the detention
deputies observed that Warden (despite having alcohol on his breath) was coherent, steady on his
feet, initially cooperative, and without bloodshot eyes or slurred speech while being booked into
jail.3 After appointing counsel and holding a hearing, the district court denied Warden’s motion,
concluding the jail logs did not “substantially undermine the [district court’s] confidence in the
guilty verdict.”
       More than one month later, Warden filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, arguing the
prosecution’s failure to disclose the jail logs constituted “‘structural discovery error’ which
violated” his rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Despite noting certain
procedural defects in the motion, the district court denied it without a hearing, concluding the
prosecution’s failure to disclose the logs was not prejudicial. Warden appeals.
                                                 II.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       A decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 687, 889 P.2d 118, 121 (Ct. App. 1995). When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable
to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

2
        This motion is actually Warden’s second motion for a new trial; his first motion for a new
trial was filed and denied prior to his initial appeal.
3
       In email correspondence attached to an affidavit of Warden’s appointed counsel, the
prosecutor claims to have been unware of the detention deputies’ statements until receiving a letter
from Warden that included them.

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                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
          Warden argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial because
testimony of the detention deputies “would likely have produced an acquittal.” Warden also argues
that the district court evaluated his Brady claim using the wrong legal standard. The State responds
that the district court properly concluded the “limited and partially cumulative” new evidence
Warden presented did not warrant a new trial. The State further responds that various procedural
irregularities are fatal to Warden’s Brady claim and that, even if not, the claim fails on the merits.
Because Warden has failed to establish the district court erred by determining the new evidence
he presented was unlikely to produce an acquittal and the failure to disclose the evidence was not
prejudicial, we affirm the order denying his motion for new trial.
A.        Newly Discovered Evidence
          Idaho Criminal Rule 34 authorizes a trial court to order a new trial “on any ground
permitted by statute.” Idaho Code Section 19-2406 enumerates the exclusive grounds for granting
a new trial. One such ground is when “new evidence is discovered material to the defendant,” and
the defendant could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at
trial. I.C. § 19-2406(7). A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must disclose
that: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of the
trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) the evidence will
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) the failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a lack of
diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P. 972, 978
(1976).
          Warden supported his motion for new trial with declarations and copies of jail logs
authored by two detention deputies on duty at the jail to which Warden was transported following
his arrest. According to Warden, he obtained the jail logs “through the Freedom of Information
Act” after his trial. The jail logs describe the detention deputies’ interactions with Warden during
the booking process. According to the jail logs, Warden was agitated, but initially respectful and
“reasonably cooperative” with the detention deputies. Although both detention deputies detected
the odor of alcohol on Warden’s breath, they described him as steady on his feet without slurred
speech. One detention deputy also indicated that he did not observe Warden’s eyes being

                                                  3
bloodshot. When the detention deputies informed Warden he was legally required to sign a
fingerprint card, however, he scrawled a profanity on the fingerprint card, tore it up, and refused
to sign another. The detention deputies then placed Warden in “the Max cell,” informing him that
he would remain there until he was ready to cooperate. The jail logs do not reflect any further
interaction between Warden and the detention deputies.
       Despite determining that the above-described evidence satisfied three prongs of the
Drapeau standard (newly discovered, material, and no lack of diligence), the district court denied
Warden’s motion for new trial because the new evidence did not “substantially undermine the
[district court’s] confidence in the guilty verdict.” When considering the likelihood that the jail
logs would produce an acquittal, the district court stated:
       [The detention deputies] observed and had interactions with Warden, albeit a
       considerable amount of time had elapsed since the initial stop. However, the video
       evidence and testimony of the arresting officers outweigh the observations of the
       detention deputies. The observations of the arresting [officers’] were immediately
       following [an officer’s] observation of suspected impaired driving. Furthermore,
       [one detention deputy] reported that Warden was “very animated with his body
       language when describing his contact with the arresting [officer] . . .” and that
       [Warden] wrote on, and then tore up his fingerprint cards. [The other detention
       deputy] reported that he detected a slight odor of alcohol on Warden and confirmed
       that Warden tore up his fingerprint cards. [The detention deputy] stated Warden
       was extremely agitated when [the detention deputy] encountered Warden.
(citations omitted). The district court further observed that, even though “the detention deputies
did not observe physical manifestations of intoxication to the extent the arresting [officers] did,
they did observe behavior that is indicative of intoxication and contribute to a finding of impaired
driving through the totality of the circumstances.”        Consequently, the district court denied
Warden’s motion for a new trial, concluding the new evidence he presented did not “substantially
undermine the Court’s confidence in the guilty verdict.”
       Warden faults the district court for evaluating “whether [it] believes [he] is guilty” instead
of “whether the evidence would have likely resulted in acquittal.” Warden notes that the district
court characterized the evidence presented at trial as “mixed.” However, Warden does not describe
precisely how the evidence was mixed. Rather, Warden makes the conclusory assertion that “he
could have challenged the credibility of the arresting officers, which likely would have led to a
different result” had he known, at the time of trial, about the detention deputies’ observations.

                                                  4
       To the extent Warden argues that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard to
resolve his motion for a new trial, we are unpersuaded. Because Warden was found guilty of
felony DUI in a bench trial, the district court could have responded to his motion for new trial by
taking “additional testimony and entering a new judgment.” See I.C.R. 35(a). That is, the district
court could have taken testimony from the detention deputies and entered a new judgment
acquitting Warden of felony DUI. However, the district court (with the same presiding judge as
Warden’s bench trial) did not do so. Consequently, the denial of Warden’s new trial motion
implies not only that the district court concluded the new evidence was unlikely to result in an
acquittal, but also that the actual factfinder from Warden’s bench trial, the district court, would not
acquit him because of the new evidence.
       Warden’s argument that the district court erred in assessing the probable effect of the new
evidence he presented is also unavailing. During Warden’s bench trial, the State presented
multiple pieces of evidence proving he was guilty of DUI under an impairment theory. To prove
Warden guilty of DUI under an impairment theory, the State needed to present evidence
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he had consumed enough alcohol to influence or affect
his ability to drive a motor vehicle. See State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 872-73, 436 P.3d 683, 693-
94 (2019). Testimony from officers and videos depicting Warden’s behavior can provide such
evidence. See id. at 873, 436 P.3d at 694. One officer testified to observing Warden’s vehicle
“drifting back and forth within its own lane” and then crossing the centerline once and the fog line
twice. The officer further testified that, during the ensuing traffic stop, Warden’s vehicle and
breath smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred, and he had bloodshot, watery eyes. After briefly
stepping away to call for back-up, the officer returned to find Warden sitting in his vehicle drinking
a can of beer and observed more than one empty beer can in the vehicle. Additionally, the officer
testified that Warden exhibited “mood swings[;] argumentative behavior”; made nonsensical
statements, such as telling the officer to “get your f[******] feet in the law”; and falsely accused
him of brandishing his service weapon during the traffic stop. The preceding testimony was
corroborated by testimony from another officer and bodycam video.
       Furthermore, the potential favorable impact of the detention deputies’ observations of
Warden in support of his defense is limited.          The detention deputies encountered Warden
approximately eighty minutes after the initial traffic stop, diminishing the probative force of their

                                                  5
observations regarding whether Warden drove impaired. The detention deputies’ observations
also overlap, in large part, with other evidence admitted during Warden’s trial. Video from one of
the arresting officer’s bodycam that was published during the court trial depicts Warden steady on
his feet and moving without apparent difficulty while cooperating with one of the detention
deputies. Warden’s counsel highlighted this evidence during Warden’s bench trial. Moreover, the
detention deputies could have provided additional evidence that Warden was impaired.
Specifically, both detention deputies indicated that they detected alcohol on Warden’s breath and
that he became agitated and uncooperative during the booking process, tearing up his fingerprint
card after scrawling a profanity on it. Emotional instability can indicate alcohol impairment. See,
e.g., Smith v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (observing
that “emotional instability” is a symptom of alcohol intoxication); State v. Jones, 322 S.W.3d 141,
144 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (citing expert testimony that emotional instability is a symptom of alcohol
intoxication). Warden has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by concluding
the new evidence he presented probably would not have resulted in an acquittal.
B.     Failure to Disclose Jail Logs
       Warden also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for new trial because
the State’s failure to disclose the jail logs was a Brady violation. Specifically, Warden contends
that the district court applied the wrong standard to determine that he was not prejudiced by the
inadvertent failure to disclose the jail logs. The State responds that a new trial motion was not a
proper procedural vehicle to assert a Brady claim and that, even if it was, other procedural
irregularities are fatal to the claim, which otherwise fails on the merits. We hold that Warden
failed to show a reasonable probability that disclosure of the jail logs would have led to a different
result and do not address the State’s other arguments.
       Due process requires the State to disclose to a defendant all material exculpatory evidence
known to or possessed by the State. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Criminal defendants seeking relief
under Brady must establish that the evidence at issue: (1) is favorable to the accused because it is
either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;
and (3) was material because there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the defense
would have led to a different result. State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 422, 313 P.3d 732, 750 (Ct.
App. 2013).

                                                  6
       Following the denial of Warden’s motion for new trial, he filed a pro se motion for
reconsideration, reiterating his claim that the failure to disclose the jail logs was a “structural
discovery error” that violated Brady and asserting that the denial of his motion for new trial was
an abuse of discretion and “excused” the sheriff’s office “of any duty to disclose the evidence [the
district court] ruled was ‘material.’”      Despite acknowledging “procedural deficiencies” in
Warden’s motion for reconsideration, the district court considered the merits of his claim that the
failure to disclose the jail logs was a Brady violation.4 Initially, the district court noted that, in
denying Warden’s motion for new trial, it had not “excused . . . any duty to disclose,” but instead
had “found that the newly discovered evidence did not put Warden’s case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”
       When discussing the merits of Warden’s Brady claim, the district court observed that, for
a Brady violation to occur, the evidence at issue: (1) must be “favorable to the accused because it
is exculpatory or impeaching”; (2) must “have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently”; and (3) “the defendant must have been prejudiced.” The district court then
determined that the jail logs were “favorable to Warden and were inadvertently suppressed” by the
State, satisfying the first two prongs of the Brady analysis. However, the district court further
concluded that Warden failed to satisfy the third prong.
       In analyzing whether Warden satisfied the third prong of the Brady analysis, the district
court analogized to Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 162 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2007). In Roeder, this
Court affirmed the summary dismissal of a Brady claim asserted in a petition for post-conviction
relief because no prejudice resulted from the suppression of the evidence at issue. Roeder pled
guilty to three counts of aggravated assault for an incident in which he allegedly threatened his
wife, two stepdaughters, and four officers with a butcher knife. Subsequently, Roeder’s wife

4
         The district court noted three “procedural deficiencies” with Warden’s motion for
reconsideration. First, the Idaho Criminal Rules do not expressly provide for a motion for
reconsideration. Second, Warden’s motion for reconsideration could “be considered untimely in
that it was filed more than fourteen days after” entry of the order denying his second motion for
new trial. Finally, the district observed that Warden’s appointed counsel had not signed the
motion. On appeal, the State argues these procedural defects rendered it error for the district court
to reach the merits of Warden’s Brady claim. Because we hold Warden failed to show error in the
district court’s determination that the failure to disclose the jail logs was prejudicial, it is
unnecessary to address these arguments.

                                                  7
obtained an “Incident Report” from the local sheriff’s office authored by a dispatch officer who
was not present at the crime scene. Adopting the trial court’s reasoning that the report did “not
represent all of what happened” on the date of the incident, this Court concluded the report was of
limited use in impeaching one of the officers present at the scene who had initialed the report. Id.
at 419, 162 P.3d at 798. Because the incident report was of minimal evidentiary value overall and
cumulative to other evidence, we held the report could not be viewed as realistically altering
Roeder’s likelihood of success at trial. Id.
        The district court observed that, similar to the incident report in Roeder, the jail logs
Warden presented “were not prepared by the investigative officers” and did not “reflect all that
happened during Warden’s interactions with the investigative officers.” The district court further
noted that it found Warden guilty of felony DUI “mostly on [his] interactions with the arresting
[officers], not on whether [Warden’s] eyes were bloodshot or his speech was slurred.”
Consequently, the district court rejected Warden’s Brady claim, concluding he “was not prejudiced
by the failure of the State to produce” the jail logs.
        Warden faults the district court for applying an incorrect legal standard to evaluate whether
the failure to disclose the jail logs was prejudicial. According to Warden, the district court’s
omission of the word “substantial” from the description of its rationale for denying his newly
discovered evidence claim shows the district court “did not newly analyze [his] claim of
prejudice . . . but simply altered the language of its earlier order to meet the requirements of
Brady.”5 This argument is meritless. As described above, the district court’s evaluation of
Warden’s Brady claim analogizes to Roeder--a case analyzing whether withheld evidence satisfied
the third prong of the Brady analysis (albeit in the context of a guilty plea, rather than a court trial).
Under such circumstances, we will not infer from the district court’s omission of a single word
from its description of the rationale of a prior decision that the district court failed to “newly
analyze” Warden’s Brady claim.

5
         As noted, the district court’s order denying Warden’s motion for new trial indicates that
the jail logs did not “substantially undermine the [district court’s] confidence in the guilty verdict.”
However, the order denying Warden’s motion for reconsideration describes the district court as
having “found that the newly discovered evidence did not put Warden’s case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”

                                                    8
        Warden also faults the district court for citing Roeder when evaluating whether the failure
to disclose the jail logs was prejudicial. Warden contends that Roeder is inapposite because it
analyzed a Brady claim in the guilty plea context, rather than a guilty verdict following a court
trial. When considering a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality (i.e., prejudice)
is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the State’s failure to produce evidence, the
defendant would not have entered the guilty plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial.
State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 436, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Ct. App. 1994). In the context of a
guilty verdict, however, the defendant’s burden is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability of
a different verdict in that the State’s suppression of evidence undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial. Branigh, 155 Idaho at 422, 313 P.3d at 750. However, the district court did
not rely on Roeder for the applicable materiality standard. Rather, the district court analogized to
the analysis of the probative force of the evidence at issue in Roeder to support the conclusion that
the jail logs Warden presented held such minimal evidentiary value that (like the incident report
in Roeder) they could not realistically be viewed as altering Warden’s likelihood of success at trial.
        Warden points out that the standards for relief on a Brady claim for a prosecutor
withholding evidence is less stringent than the Drapeau standard for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. As noted, Drapeau requires a defendant to show that the evidence “will
probably produce an acquittal” while Brady provides that the defendant’s burden is satisfied by
showing a reasonable probability of a different verdict in that the suppression of evidence
“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Branigh, 155 Idaho at 422, 313 P.3d at 750.
The latter is a lesser burden. However, Warden has failed to show that the jail logs satisfy this
lesser burden. As previously discussed, the jail logs were of limited evidentiary value to Warden
and could have resulted in the admission of additional testimony indicating he was impaired.
Moreover, the most significant new information identified in the jail logs (i.e., that the detention
deputies did not observe Warden being unsteady or having bloodshot eyes and slurred speech)
held little probative force relative to testimony of the arresting officers and the video evidence
admitted during trial. Warden has failed to show that the district court erred by concluding that
the failure to disclose the jail logs was prejudicial.

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                                                  IV.
                                          CONCLUSION
       Warden has failed to show that the newly discovered evidence he presented would probably
have resulted in an acquittal or raised a reasonable probably of a different verdict in his bench trial.
Consequently, Warden has failed to show error in the denial of his newly discovered evidence
claim or his Brady claim. Accordingly, the order denying Warden’s motion for new trial are
affirmed.
       Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.

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