Court Opinion

ID: 9565299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:18:46.900431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:31.916684
License: Public Domain

*911KAUS, J.
I respectfully dissent. Just when the bench and bar of this state thought that all the dangers in the procedural minefield created by section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been identified and charted, the court unnecessarily adds a new one.
The court concedes that the order of November 27 was not void. In the face of La Manna v. Stewart (1975) 13 Cal.3d 413 [118 Cal.Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073] it could hardly do otherwise: there the order contained no statement of the ground on which the motion was granted. Nevertheless we held it sufficient, since the motion had been made on only one ground—insufficiency of the evidence. Here, of course, the motion was made on several grounds and as of November 27 it was impossible to know which had appealed to the court. This hardly mattered, however: as to all grounds except insufficiency and excessive damages, the correctness of the order was subject to appellate review in spite of the failure to specify the ground in the November 27 order. (Treber v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 128, 133-134 [65 Cal.Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330]; Malkasian v. Irwin (1964) 61 Cal.2d 738, 745 [40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822].) As to insufficiency and excessive damages, the court had 10 days in which to file its reasons. If the trial court’s failure to provide a statement of grounds is not fatal with respect to all other grounds, it should not be so with respect to insufficiency and damages, as long as the order granting the motion is followed up by a statement of reasons within the 10-day period provided by section 657.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Witkin—after reviewing the evolution of the current statutory language—seems to suggest that the Legislature intended the 10-day extension to apply to the statement of the ground of insufficiency as well as to the statement of reasons to support that ground. He states: “It would seem impossible ... to state reasons for granting the new trial on a particular ground without indicating the ground itself; hence the 10-day limit would seem to be still applicable to the ground as well as the reasons.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §71, p. 3646.) A dictum in Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 121 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315] supports Mr. Witkin. There we said that “purported specification of grounds or reasons after the 10-day statute of limitations has run is an act in excess of jurisdiction, and therefore void to that extent.” (Italics added.) (See also Fry v. Young (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 340, 347 [73 Cal.Rptr. 62].)
In the leading decisions in this area, Treber v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pages 131-134, and Mercer v. Perez, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pages 112-116, this court explained carefully and persuasively why, on the one hand, the new trial order must be affirmed—in spite of a total failure to specify grounds or reasons—if justified on any ground stated in the motion *912except insufficiency of the evidence or excessive or inadequate damages, while, on the other hand, the statute insists that an order based on insufficiency of the evidence or excessive or inadequate damages be supported by an adequate, timely specification of reasons.1 I respectfully challenge the majority to advance an equally principled reason explaining why a new trial order, made within the time limit of section 660 and supported by a timely, adequate statement of reasons should be of no effect.

In In re Marriage of Beilock (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 713, 725-726 [146 Cal.Rptr. 675] the court explained that this apparent seesawing between super-liberality and super-strictness “requires a realization that the Legislature in drafting section 657 had at least two different objectives in mind. Generally, one objective is to facilitate a meaningful appellate review of orders granting new trials primarily where the ground is either that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict or that the damages are excessive or inadequate. The second objective, assuming the given order is defective with reference to the first objective, is to prevent injustice by extending the scope of appellate review to any ground listed in the motion and not relied upon by the trial court.” (Italics omitted.)