Court Opinion

ID: 9390672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 07:10:46.558414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.085971
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-22-00065-CV
                               __________________

                         VANESSA THREET, Appellant

                                         V.

                         PATRICIA ELBERT, Appellee

 ________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the 284th District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 18-12-17090-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Vanessa Threet (“Vanessa,” “Plaintiff,” or “Appellant”) appeals

from the trial court’s Final Judgment granting a directed verdict in favor of Appellee

Patricia Elbert (“Patricia” or “Appellee”). On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial

court erred by excluding certain evidence and by granting Patricia’s motion for

directed verdict on the defense of limitations. For the reasons explained herein, we

affirm.

                                          1
                                   Pretrial Procedure1

      On January 5th, 2017, Vanessa was involved in a motor vehicle collision

between her vehicle and a vehicle driven by Rufus Elbert (“Rufus”). On December

30, 2018, Vanessa filed an Original Petition against Rufus asserting a claim for

negligence and seeking a recovery for injuries Vanessa allegedly sustained in the

accident. The district clerk’s office issued citation for Rufus on January 4, 2019, and

the return of service that was filed into the record shows Rufus was served on

January 24, 2019. Rufus filed an Original Answer that included a defense (among

others) that the Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the two year statute of limitations.

      On July 13, 2020, defense counsel filed a Suggestion of Death stating that

Rufus died on February 29, 2020, that it was not then known whether Rufus had a

will or who would be the estate’s representative, and stipulating that Rufus caused

the accident at issue in the lawsuit. On February 23, 2021, Vanessa filed a First

Amended Original Petition naming Patricia Elbert as Rufus’s heir and requesting a

scire facias. Patricia was served on March 10, 2021, and on April 6, 2021, Patricia

filed Defendant’s Original Answer and Jury Demand that included a defense (among

others) that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by limitations.

      A pretrial order set the date of trial as November 29, 2021, and it also included

dates and express provisions for naming witnesses and experts, as well as

      1
          We limit our discussion of the facts in the trial court to the issues on appeal.
                                            2
requirements pertaining to the exchange and filing of exhibits prior to trial. The jury

trial began on November 30, 2021.

                                  Evidence at Trial

      Just prior to trial, the parties and the trial court discussed the facts related to

the limitations defense. The trial court and parties agreed that the lawsuit was filed

December 30, 2018; the motor vehicle accident happened on January 5, 2017; and

the limitations period ended January 5, 2019. Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the

defendant’s proposed charge included a question about the defense of limitations

and that the proposed charge was filed after the court’s deadline. The trial court

stated that “[t]he Court did its own charge[]” with a question on limitations and that

“[l]imitations has been a viable defense in this case for a long time.” Plaintiff’s

counsel stated it had two witnesses, the process server and the Montgomery County

clerk, who were prepared to testify on that issue. The trial court stated that it would

be an abuse of discretion for the court to allow witnesses to testify who had not been

previously disclosed. Plaintiff’s counsel also told the court,

      . . . the citation was actually mailed to us. . . . and received on January
      the 11th at which point we notified the process server of the citation.
      And we’ve got e-mails to show the process server didn’t see it due to
      an internal error with the process server until I brought it back to their
      attention 11 days later. And they picked it up that day and served Rufus
      Elbert the next day.

The court responded,

                                           3
      You know that you filed your lawsuit timely, but the question then for
      limitations is going to be service. I mean, that -- that’s an issue that’s
      been in this case since they filed the answer.
      ...
      The question comes down to diligence as a matter of law. That’s always
      the question. Diligence itself is a fact question.
      ...
      At this point, there’s nothing for me to rule on so -- because you have
      not called those witnesses yet.

      During the Plaintiff’s case in chief at trial, Vanessa testified that she was “very

involved[]” in serving Rufus. On direct examination, she stated, “I was pretty much

calling [my counsel’s] office on a daily basis once the -- once we filed the claim.

And just -- you know, we just were in constant contact [] about that.” She testified

that Rufus was served by a process server her counsel had hired. Vanessa recalled

talking with Britney Estrada, the process server, “right when she was hired[,]” to

give Britney the information she had about Rufus, including his address, his license

number, and his date of birth, but Vanessa did not recall talking with Britney again.

According to Vanessa it took “13 days from the day we got the papers in the mail[,]

[on] January 11th[]” to serve Rufus. Vanessa testified that the papers came from the

clerk’s office, and Vanessa testified she continued to call her attorney every day “to

see if there was anything that [Vanessa] could do[,]” and she also called the clerk’s

office at one point to see if there was anything else Vanessa could do. Vanessa

testified that when her counsel told her they would “handle it,” Vanessa made no

further phone calls. Vanessa recalled that Rufus was served on January 24, 2019.

                                           4
      On cross-examination, Vanessa agreed that it was 13 days from the day the

process server got the paperwork before service on Rufus was perfected and that she

recalled “calling the office at least four times a week wanting updates because [she]

knew it was critical that he got served.” A certified copy of the Officer’s Return was

admitted into evidence, which states it “came to hand” on January 23, 2019, and that

service was perfected on January 24, 2019. Vanessa testified that “[i]t was a 13-day

delay from the time that [her] attorney’s office received” the citation until Rufus was

served.

      On redirect, Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to show Vanessa Exhibits 25, 26,

and 27, which were characterized as emails between counsel and the process server,

to “refresh Vanessa’s memory.” The court asked whether Vanessa was included on

the emails as a recipient, counsel replied that she was not, and the court instructed

counsel to retrieve the documents from Vanessa, and the court would not allow

Vanessa to testify about the exhibits. Vanessa testified that she was aware of

communications between her counsel and the process server because she was “in

constant contact with [her] attorney’s office.” Vanessa also testified that she

attempted to assist her counsel in having Rufus served:

      I gave you guys any kind of information I had, any addresses or, like,
      even try to Google search for any addresses that -- I mean, I was just
      trying to do my part. Any, you know, addresses that I might could find.
      I mean, there was -- the license and things like that. But, you know, I
      tried to give a little bit of a description of what I remember he looked

                                          5
      like, so when he was served they knew the person who they found was
      the right guy.

      The Plaintiff then rested, and the defense moved for a directed verdict on the

issue of limitations, stating,

      The evidence in front of the jury is that the process server got the
      citation on the 23rd day of January, perfected service the very next day.
      It’s a 23-day unexplained delay in due diligence. And Texas courts
      across the state have held an unexplained delay issue with 18 days is a
      lack of due diligence as a matter of law.

An extended discussion occurred at the bench, outside the presence of the jury.

Citing to Mauricio v. Castro, 287 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no

pet.), Plaintiff argued that “in cases of relatively short delay, it may take little

evidence to prove that, as a matter of fact, the Plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent

person and was diligent in obtaining service.” The trial court then stated,

      The length of time that I think I have no evidence on is the delay
      between January 4th and January 23rd. What evidence do I have related
      to the diligence that was exercised during that period of time to get --
      to get the citation to the process server[?]. . .the burden is on you to
      explain [] every lapse in effort of period of delay. I have a lapse between
      January 4th and January 23rd[.]

Plaintiff’s counsel responded that Vanessa testified that she stayed in contact with

his office, and she was aware of the efforts that were being made to serve Rufus. The

following exchange occurred:

      The Court: [Vanessa’s] awareness of efforts is different from the jury’s
      awareness of efforts. And they don’t have any evidence of what those
      efforts were. I mean, she says that she Googled it and she looked for
      addresses and she did all of those kinds of things, but I literally have no
                                           6
evidence that says that this was an address problem or that [Rufus] was
dodging service or that we had a failed attempt at one address and then
found a better one, nothing like that here.
      The evidence I have before me shows a lapse between January
4th and January 23rd. What evidence do I have to explain what was
happening during that period of time?

[Plaintiff’s counsel]: The Plaintiff’s testimony is what we have. . . .

The Court: That she was diligent in terms of checking to see if service
had been achieved but it had not been. So what evidence do I have of
the diligence to obtain service?
...
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: The evidence is that our office received the
citation on January the 11th of 2019.
...
       That’s the testimony from the Plaintiff.

The Court: She provided that testimony. There is some evidence of that.
So let’s get you to January 11th. The problem is, what was the delay
between the date of filing and you getting it on January 11. I have my
explanation for that. Putting that aside for a moment, tell me what
happened between January 11th and January 23rd to effect service in
terms of the evidence our jurors have heard.
...
. . . I have the evidence from the -- from the Plaintiff’s testimony that
your office received the citation on January 11th. I got 12 days and
nobody has accounted for that.

[Plaintiff’s counsel]: The Plaintiff has accounted for that by saying she
was aware --

The Court: She called. She called frequently. She understood the
urgency and she was very insistent on getting updates and making sure
that this got done. But she’s not serving the papers.

[Plaintiff’s counsel]: But she doesn’t have to be the one serving the
papers.

                                    7
The Court: But there has to be an explanation for what you were doing
to get service achieved. You are her agent. What were you doing? And
there’s no evidence of that. What was the process server doing?

[Plaintiff’s counsel]: The case law doesn’t say that it has to be just my
office or just the process server.

The Court: It does not. That is true. But you have to explain every lapse
and every period of delay.
...
. . . [T]he Plaintiff wasn’t doing anything to achieve service after
providing information that she was able to obtain about dates of birth
and the address. She did that. And then she was very diligent in calling
your office to see if it had been accomplished. But the question is not
whether the Plaintiff was very diligent in checking up on whether
service had been achieved. The question is were you diligent in getting
service?
...
. . . I don’t know what happened between January 11th when the citation
arrived in your office and January 23rd when it was delivered to the
process server. That’s a 12 day delay. And the burden is to show that
there is diligence every step up of the way. I’ve got 12 days with no
explanation of what was happening.
...
. . . [T]he return shows that the process [server] didn’t have the citation
to serve until January 23rd.
...
What is the evidence between January 11th and January 23rd?

[Plaintiff’s counsel]: Okay. The Plaintiff testified that the process
server got his papers on January the 11th. And from that time period up
until the time the Defendant was served, that she was aware of the -- of
the attempts that were being made. That’s what she said. That’s
technically some evidence. . . .
...
[Defense counsel]: . . .[S]he did not testify that the process server
received it on a specific date. What she did testify, and if I’m wrong,
we can go back and check the record, but I believe my recollection was
that she said that the attorney’s office got it on the 11th. I objected. You
sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard[.] . . .[T]he
                                     8
Plaintiff never said that that’s when the process server got it. And the
only evidence before the jury right now completely contradicts it and
says that process server received it on the 23rd and perfected service at
the same address that’s listed in the petition the very next day, the very
next morning. So I respectfully disagree that there were any service
attempts because there is no evidence of that.

...
The Court: . . . You got the citation January the 11th. Maybe the process
server got the citations January 11th. That’s the way you recall it, but
at this moment it [] doesn’t matter with my question because once the -
- once the citation landed in somebody’s hands on January 11th, it
doesn’t go anywhere until January 24th.
...
I need some affirmative evidence to explain to the jury what happened
between January 11th and January 23rd if they believe Defendant’s
Exhibit 3; January 24th, if they do not because your client testified on
the date of service so that evidence is there.
...
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: [W]e can refer back to the e-mails that were
Exhibits Number 25 and 26 and 27 that were offered, obviously, pretrial
that you know they were object[ed][] to by the Defendant.

The Court: They were not admitted. They’re not part of the evidence
the jury has received or will receive.

[Plaintiff’s counsel]: And I would just ask the Court to reconsider the
ruling under that -- under the optional completeness statute.

The Court: You literally never offered them.
...
. . . I have not made a ruling on it because you never offered it and I
never received an objection because you never offered it and I never
ruled because I didn’t have an objection to rule upon or an offer of
evidence to rule upon.
...
. . . Finding no evidence to explain the delay between January 11th and
January 23rd related to the service issue and noting that the evidence is
conclusive that the cause of action accrued on January 5th of 2017 to
your limitations period as a matter of law, that takes [] us to January 5th
                                    9
      of 2019. The lawsuit was timely filed. Service was not achieved until
      January 24th, also conclusive. The only open question is what diligence
      was exercised between January 11th and January 23rd. And I am
      finding that there is no evidence to explain those delays in service. The
      motion for directed verdict is granted.

When the jury returned, the trial court told the jury that the case had been resolved

and then excused the jury. The trial court signed a Final Judgment on December 3,

2021, granting Patricia’s motion for directed verdict and ordering that Vanessa take

nothing.

                            Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Filing

      Vanessa filed a Motion for New Trial [and] Alternatively Motion for

Reconsideration of Directed Verdict. Therein, Vanessa argued that she had offered

proposed Exhibits 25, 26, and 27 into evidence at trial and the trial court excluded

the exhibits.2 The motion characterized the proposed exhibits as “three emails

between the process server who signed the Service Return, and Plaintiff’s counsel,”

which Plaintiff’s counsel argued specifically addressed a several-day gap in service

that the process server attributed to an internal computer server issue, and counsel

argued it provided full context of the January 11 through January 24, 2019

timeframe.

      2
        The proposed email exhibits were not listed in Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit List
filed before trial on November 15, 2021, but they were listed in Plaintiff’s First
Amended Trial Exhibit List filed November 29, 2021, the day of trial.
                                      10
      The emails were attached to the Motion for New Trial. Proposed Exhibit 25

appears to be an email from Plaintiff’s counsel to Britney Estrada, the process server,

dated January 11, 2019 and states: “We have a citation ready for pick up.” Proposed

Exhibit 26 appears to be an email from Plaintiff’s counsel to Britney Estrada dated

January 22, 2019, and it states: “Could y’all please shoot us an update for this case?

SOL was 1/5/19.” Proposed Exhibit 27 appears to be an email from Britney Estrada

to Plaintiff’s counsel dated January 23, 2019, and it states: “I am so sorry, our old

email server has been spamming a lot of our emails, and this one must have been

missed. We have fixed our server, and this will be picked up and attempted today!”

      According to the motion, although the emails were offered under Rules 106

and 107 (“The Rule of Optional Completeness”), the trial court “believed the emails

were a ‘separate document[]’” and “disagreed that the emails had ever been offered

and refused to reconsider its ruling as to Plaintiff’s offer under those Rules.” The

Plaintiff argued in the motion that the excluded documents would have given

“context and explanation for any perceived lack of diligence in serving Rufus

Elbert.” Plaintiff also argued that Patricia had not timely filed her pretrial documents

according to the court’s pretrial order, and that when Patricia did file her pretrial

documents, she did not include nor reference the service return as an exhibit. The

plaintiff argued in the motion, that because Rule 107 allows admission of “any other

act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement that is necessary to

                                          11
explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by the

opponent[,]” the trial court erred by excluding the emails on the basis that they were

from “‘another’ or [a] ‘separate’ document[.]”

       The Plaintiff also argued in the motion that a fact issue precluding a directed

verdict existed because Vanessa testified about her diligence including the date the

process server received the citation whereas the service return stated a different date.

Plaintiff asserted that if the trial court had admitted the process server’s emails, “a

full explanation as to the 19-day gap in service would have been bridged[.]” Plaintiff

also argued that 6 of the 19 days “were taken up by the Clerk’s office mailing the

citation,” and the remaining 13 days were explained by Vanessa.

       Patricia filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion. Patricia argued that Plaintiff

may not create a fact issue on diligence by claiming that the district clerk was late in

mailing the citation and that the process server had a computer server issue because

it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to timely effect service. Patricia also argued that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the email exhibits. According to

Patricia, Rules 106 and 107 do not apply because the email exhibits “were not an

‘other part’ of the return of service[,]” and the return of service speaks for itself.3

       Citing SJ Logistics Grp. v. Colossal Transp. Sols., LLC, No. 01-17-00324-
       3

CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1769, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 8,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Garza v. Watkins, P.C., No. 04-07-00848-CV, 2009 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1588, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 4, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)
                                        12
Patricia argued that the emails Plaintiff references “show that only one inquiry about

the status of service was made to the process server—on January 22, 2019[,]” and

that “[b]y that date, limitations had run 17 days” earlier, and therefore, the delay in

service was not explained. Patricia also argued that Vanessa’s testimony about

staying in contact with her attorneys was no evidence of diligence because it was not

based on personal, firsthand knowledge of efforts to serve Rufus. Patricia further

argued that the trial court did not err by not allowing Vanessa to “refresh her

recollection” by looking at the emails because she had not sent nor received them

and did not have personal knowledge of the emails.

      The trial court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial on January 28, 2022.

This appeal followed.

                                        Issues

      Appellant raises two issues on appeal. In issue one, Appellant argues that the

trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on Appellee’s defense of limitations

because fact issues existed on Appellant’s diligence. In issue two, Appellant argues

that the trial court erred in denying admission of three of her exhibits that would

“explain a 12-day gap the trial court claimed needed additional evidence of

diligence.”

(citing Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per
curiam)).
                                        13
                                 Standard of Review

      “We review a trial court’s grant of directed verdict de novo, using the legal

sufficiency standard appellate courts apply to no-evidence summary judgments.”

City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 178 (Tex. 2022) (citing JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018);

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005)). “A trial court properly

grants a directed verdict when no evidence supports a vital fact or the evidence fails

to state a claim as a matter of law.” Id. (citing City of Keller, 645 S.W.3d at 810-11,

814-16). “We consider the evidence in a light favorable to the party suffering an

adverse judgment, crediting all reasonable inferences and disregarding evidence and

inferences to the contrary.” Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C.,

348 S.W.3d 194, 215, 217 (Tex. 2011)).

      We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard of review. See Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464

S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2015). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an

arbitrary or unreasonable manner, or if it acts without reference to any guiding rules

or principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42

(Tex. 1985). We will uphold the trial court’s decision if it is within the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Diamond Offshore Servs., Ltd. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d

539, 545 (Tex. 2018). We consider a trial court’s ruling in light of what was before

                                          14
the court when the ruling was made. See Stephens Cty. v. J.N. McCammon, Inc., 52

S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. 1932) (“When an appellate court is called upon to revise the

ruling of a trial court it must do so upon the record before that court when such ruling

was made.”); Congleton v. Shoemaker, Nos. 09-11-00453-CV & 09-11-00654-CV,

2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2880, at **15-16 n.3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 12, 2012,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Our review . . . is limited to the record before the trial court

at the time of its ruling.”).

                                 Statute of Limitations

       “A suit for personal injuries must be brought within two years from the time

the cause of action accrues.” See Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007)

(citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 592 (Tex. 2017). “A cause of action for negligence

accrues on the date when the negligent act that produces the injury is committed.”

Sykes v. White, No. 09-20-00227-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 6638, at **13-14 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Dunmore v. Chicago

Title Ins. Co., 400 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)). “To ‘bring

suit’ within the two-year limitations period prescribed by section 16.003, a plaintiff

must not only file suit within the applicable limitations period, but must also use

diligence to have the defendant served with process.” See Gant v. DeLeon, 786

S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990) (citing Rigo Mfg. Co. v. Thomas, 458 S.W.2d 180, 182

                                           15
(Tex. 1970); see also Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215. If the petition is filed within the

applicable limitations period, service outside the limitations period may still be valid

if the plaintiff exercises due diligence in procuring service on the defendant. Ashley

v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. 2009). “If service is diligently effected after

limitations has expired, the date of service will relate back to the date of filing.”

Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215 (citing Gant, 786 S.W.2d at 260).

      Once a defendant has pleaded the affirmative defense of limitations and has

demonstrated that service occurred after the limitations deadline, the burden shifts

to the plaintiff to explain the delay. See Ashley, 293 S.W.3d at 179; Proulx, 235

S.W.3d at 216. “[I]t is the plaintiff’s burden to present evidence regarding the efforts

that were made to serve the defendant, and to explain every lapse in effort or period

of delay.” Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216.

      The inquiry is two-pronged: (1) whether the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily

prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances, and

(2) whether the plaintiff acted diligently up until the time the defendant was served.

See Ashley, 293 S.W.3d at 179; Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216. “A plaintiff’s

explanation of the efforts in obtaining service may demonstrate a lack of diligence

‘as a matter of law’ when ‘one or more lapses between service efforts are

unexplained or patently unreasonable.’” Allen v. Dies, No. 09-10-00157-CV, 2011

                                          16
Tex. App. LEXIS 4507, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 16, 2011, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (quoting Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216). 4

      It is the plaintiff who is responsible for ensuring that service is properly

accomplished and not the process server nor district clerk. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(a);

Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152-53 (Tex. 1994); Allen, 2011

Tex. App. LEXIS 4507, at **5-7. Any delay or deficiency by the process server is

imputed to the plaintiff as a matter of law. See Flanigan v. Nekkalapu, 613 S.W.3d

361, 365 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.) (citing Roberts v. Padre Island

Brewing Co., Inc., 28 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000

pet. denied)); Allen, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4507, at *6. “[I]f the plaintiff’s

explanation for the delay raises a material fact issue concerning the diligence of

      4
         See also Smith v. Ramos, No. 09-21-00153-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS
1571, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 9, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“When the
record reveals a period of time when the plaintiffs made no efforts to serve the
defendant, and that lack of effort is unexplained, there is a lack of due diligence as a
matter of law.”) (citing Cumpian v. Ventura, No. 09-16-00277-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 922, at **6-7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018 no pet.) (mem. op.));
Jenkins v. Taylor, No. 14-21-00175-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3098, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[I]f one or more
lapses between service efforts are unexplained or patently unreasonable, then the
plaintiff has failed to show diligence as a matter of law[.]”) (citing Proulx v. Wells,
235 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tex. 2007)); Michel v. Foodmaker, Inc., No. 09-97-101-CV,
1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5800, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 6, 1997, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (explaining that diligence in effecting service is normally a question of
fact, but if no excuse is offered for a delay or if the lapse of time and the plaintiff’s
acts conclusively negate diligence, a lack of diligence may be found as a matter of
law) (citing Perry v. Kroger Stores, Store No. 119, 741 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)).
                                           17
service efforts, the burden shifts back to the defendant to conclusively show why, as

a matter of law, the explanation is insufficient.” Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216 (citing

Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. 1975)). “[T]he measure of

diligence begins from the time the suit is filed and an explanation is needed for every

period of delay.” Sharp v. Kroger Tex. L.P., 500 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216; Gant, 786

S.W.2d at 260).

      Even if the delay is relatively short, the plaintiff must present some evidence

of diligence in obtaining service. See Budget Rent A Car Sys., LLC v. Valadez, 558

S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Mauricio,

287 S.W.3d at 480).5 “[A] negligible delay in service does not necessarily translate

to a showing of diligence as a matter of law in cases involving service beyond the

statute of limitations.” Rojas v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 13-16-00257-CV, 2017 Tex.

      5
         See also Rojas v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 13-16-00257-CV, 2017 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8729, at **11-13 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 14, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden as a matter of
law where it failed to explain the thirty-six-day delay between filing suit and
obtaining service, even though service was completed eight days after the passing of
limitations); Rodriguez v. Tinsman & Houser, Inc., 13 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise a fact issue
on diligence because the proffered excuse for the twenty-five-day delay between the
expiration of limitations and service was not valid); Perkins v. Groff, 936 S.W.2d
661, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied) (holding that suit was barred by
limitations where the plaintiff provided no explanation for the eighteen-day delay
between the expiration of limitations and service on the defendant).
                                          18
App. LEXIS 8729, at *11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 14, 2017, no

pet.) (mem. op.). Rather, “[i]n cases of relatively short delay. . . it may take little

evidence to prove that, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent

person and was diligent in obtaining service; however, it does take some evidence.”

Mauricio, 287 S.W.3d at 480. In Mauricio, the trial court granted a directed verdict

where there was no evidence to explain a lapse of thirty-one days from the time the

statute of limitations expired to the time the defendant was served with the citation

and petition. See id.

                               Admission of Evidence

      We address Appellant’s second issue first, which challenges the trial court’s

exclusion of Proposed Exhibits 25, 26, and 27 (hereinafter, “the emails” or “the

email exhibits”). Appellee argues that Appellant failed to preserve error because she

failed to make an offer of proof. The trial court stated that the Plaintiff had never

offered the emails for the court to make a ruling. Because Plaintiff failed to make an

offer of proof, she has failed to preserve error on this issue. See Gunn v. McCoy, 554

S.W.3d 645, 666 (Tex. 2018) (“If a court ruling excludes evidence, a party must

preserve error by filing an offer of proof informing the court of the substance of the

excluded evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 103.”). 6

      6
        Appellee also argues that Appellant waived this issue by failing to support
her argument with citations to the record as required by Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38.1.
                                        19
      Even if Appellant had preserved error, we also conclude that the trial court

did not err in excluding the email exhibits. Appellant argued at trial that the exhibits

should be admitted under the “Rule of Optional Completeness.” Texas Rule of

Evidence 106 states that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded

statement, an adverse party may introduce, at that time, any other part—or any other

writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same

time.” Tex. R. Evid. 106. And Rule 107, the “Rule of Optional Completeness,” states

that “[i]f a party introduces part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing, or

recorded statement, an adverse party may inquire into any other part on the same

subject. An adverse party may also introduce any other act, declaration,

conversation, writing, or recorded statement that is necessary to explain or allow the

trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by the opponent.” Tex. R. Evid. 107.

      During cross-examination of Vanessa, the defense offered Exhibit 3, which

was a certified copy of the process server’s return. Plaintiff’s counsel objected that

the document was hearsay and unauthenticated and stated, “under the doctrine of

optional completeness in Rule 106 and 107, we ask that if that document be admitted

that the documents -- in other words, the e-mails with the process server also be

admitted so that the jury can see the whole picture and the full story.” The court

ruled that “[t]he objection as to optional completeness is overruled because we’re

dealing with separate documents.”

                                          20
      Later during the trial, Plaintiff sought to introduce the emails with Vanessa in

an attempt “to see if [they] refreshe[d] [her] memory” of the January 2019 time

period. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 612, when a witness does not immediately

recollect certain facts in a case, the witness may refresh her memory by reviewing a

writing made when her memory was fresh, and after reviewing the writing, the

witness must testify either her memory is refreshed or that it is not. See Tex. R. Evid.

612. The appellate record gives no indication that Vanessa was unable to recollect

the events outlined in the email exchange between her attorney and the process

server, nor did her attorney explain how the emails would help her refresh her

memory of January 2019. The trial court explained on the record that Rule 612 did

not apply, and Vanessa was not an author or recipient of the emails.

      Appellant also argues in her brief that the trial court erred by excluding the

emails and that “whether the process server emails were from ‘another’ or ‘separate’

document” is not a basis for exclusion when “in fairness [they] ought to be

considered” and are “necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully

understand the part offered by the opponent.” See Tex. R. Evid. 106, 107. Appellant

further argues that the emails “would [] have explained the diligence issue of serving

Rufus Elbert.” As noted above, during the trial it was the Plaintiff who objected to

the admission of the return of service, and after the defense moved for a directed

                                          21
verdict on limitations, Plaintiff wanted to introduce the emails through the Plaintiff

to explain to the jury what happened between January 11th and January 23rd or 24th.

      On this record, we conclude the trial court’s exclusion of Plaintiff’s Exhibits

25, 26, and 27 was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and it was not an

abuse of discretion. See Diamond Offshore Servs., Ltd., 542 S.W.3d at 545; Gharda

USA, Inc., 464 S.W.3d at 347; Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42. We overrule

Appellant’s second issue.

                                  Directed Verdict

      The parties do not dispute that the motor vehicle collision occurred on January

5, 2017, that Rufus was served on January 24, 2019, and that the statute of limitations

expired on January 5, 2019. Appellant acknowledges that

      [t]he case at hand has a 19-day gap from the expiration of the limitations
      period to when Rufus Elbert was served, at least 6 days of which were
      explained/taken up by the Clerk’s office mailing the citation, which left
      at most just 13 days, which was acknowledged by the trial court.

Appellant alleges that Vanessa testified that the citation arrived at her attorney’s

office on January 11, 2019 “and was emailed to a process server the same day[,]”

but the brief does not provide record references for this assertion. See Tex. R. App.

P. 38.1(i). According to the Appellant, what happened between January 11, 2019

and January 23, 2019 has two explanations: Vanessa’s testimony, and the process

server’s email indicating an internal computer server issue (Proposed Exhibit 27

which was never offered into evidence). Vanessa testified that she was “pretty much
                                          22
calling [her attorney’s] office on a daily basis” after the petition was filed, and she

stopped calling after her attorney’s office told her they were “handling it[.]”

      Appellant argues that a fact issue exists as to the date when the process server

received the citation because Vanessa testified that the process server received the

citation on January 11, 2019 and the return of service indicates the process server

received the citation on January 23, 2019. The trial court stated that Vanessa testified

that her attorney’s office received the citation on January 11th and that is not

necessarily the date when the process server received it. Plaintiff argued that a fact

issue existed because the jury could choose to believe the citation, which stated that

the process server received the citation on January 23, or “they can choose to listen

to what the Plaintiff’s testimony said.”

      Vanessa testified that it took “13 days from the day we got the papers in the

mail[]” on January 11, 2019 for the process server to serve Rufus, and “we got the

document in the mail from the clerk’s office on January 11th.” Even assuming that

Vanessa may have called her attorney and obtained information about efforts at

service, the trial court concluded there is “no affirmative evidence [] that explains

what happened to that citation and getting it into Mr. Rufus Elbert’s hands between

January 11th and January 23rd.”

      Appellant complains that the trial court did not allow admission of the email

exhibits which would have explained the relevant time period. However, even if the

                                           23
emails had been admitted, the emails are dated January 11 and January 23, and they

do not explain the gap between these two dates. We cannot say the trial court erred

in making her rulings, nor would the emails provide affirmative evidence that

explained what happened to the citation and the delay in service of Rufus between

January 4 to January 11, and then January 11 to January 23 of 2019.

      Appellant had the burden to explain the delay in service and failed to do so by

presenting evidence explaining the delays of service during the trial. So, we cannot

say the trial court erred. The trial court correctly noted the Plaintiff failed to meet

her burden and pointed out the unexplained periods of delay demonstrated a lack of

diligence as a matter of law. Therefore, a directed verdict was proper. See Allen,

2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4507, at *4 (citing Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216); Mauricio,

287 S.W.3d at 480. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

      Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                     _________________________
                                                         LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                               Justice

Submitted on March 16, 2023
Opinion Delivered April 27, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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