Court Opinion

ID: 9770553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:09:23.523931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.362782
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Apparently, the victim in this case was so severely injured that he was unable to appear in court because he was hospitalized in a town which was not the county seat of the *435county where trial occurred.1 After some discussion among the lawyers and the trial court, appellant affirmatively agreed to have the proceedings moved to the hospital for the testimony of the victim and a doctor witness.2
“[THE COURT]: Any problems?
“[APPELLANT]: No, sir. We’ll concur with that. Seems like that’s the most efficient way to do it.”
Based on Article V, Section 7, of the Texas Constitution, appellant claimed on direct appeal the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings at the hospital because it was located approximately ten miles outside the county seat, and the parties could not confer by consent or waive the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because the majority adopts this, I dissent.
I would hold Article V, Section 7, was not violated in this ease. Article V, Section 7, in relevant part, says:
“The [District] Court shall conduct its proceedings at the county seat of the county in which the case is pending, except as otherwise provided by law. (Emphasis Supplied).”
This provision has been interpreted to mean that “a judge of the district court in this state has no power to adjudicate the rights of litigants except at the time and places prescribed by law for holding courts, unless the authority is conferred by statute.”3 See Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 88 Tex. 468, 27 S.W. 100, 109 (1894); Isbill v. Stovall, 92 S.W.2d 1067, 1070 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1986, no writ). The majority fails to give effect to the plain meaning of Article V, Section 7, by ignoring the “except as otherwise provided by law” language in it.
One issue is whether there exists any authority “conferred by statute” that grants Texas courts the discretion to follow the procedure the trial court followed in this ease. I have found at least one statute and one rule that grant Texas courts this authority.
For example, Section 21.001(b), Texas Government Code, provides:
“A court shall require that proceedings be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and control the proceedings so that justice is done.”
In addition, Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 610(a) provides:
“The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”
These authorities grant Texas courts the discretion to do what happened here; therefore, Article V, Section 7, was not violated.4 See also V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 24.017 (Proceedings in Multicounty Districts). And, since the trial court had the power to do what it did, appellant waived any right he *436had to later on complain about it.5 See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279-80 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).
Also, notwithstanding the foregoing, Article 1.14(a), V.A.C.C.P., states:
“The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law except that a defendant in a capital felony case may waive the right of trial by jury only in the manner permitted by Article 1.13(b) of this code.” (Emphasis Supplied).
This provision also comes within the “except as otherwise provided by law” language of Article V, Section 7, and it gives defendants in a criminal prosecution the ability to waive its requirements.6
In addition, this record does not reflect the trial court actually “adjudicated” any of the litigants’ rights except in the courthouse in the county seat; therefore, Article Y, Section 7, is not even implicated. See, e.g., Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co., 27 S.W. at 109; Isbill, 92 S.W.2d at 1070-71. What happened here was approximately one day of testimony was taken in a hospital located approximately ten miles outside the county seat because of the State’s need for its evidence.7 Everything else was done at the courthouse.8 The facts here are not much different than where the court allows a “jury view.” See, e.g., Wendorf, Some Views On Jury Views, XV Baylor Law Review 379-399 (Fall 1963); see also State v. O’Day, 188 La. 169, 175 So. 838, 842 (1937):
“The right to take the jury to the scene and to take testimony there to explain it is a right based on necessity, and it is within the discretion of the court to determine whether a necessity existed to take testimony at the scene. This seems to be the most reasonable rule because under such a rule neither the defendant or (sic) the State would be deprived of their evidence.”
Finally, the majority gratuitously concludes Article V, Section 7, is “mandatory” and “thus no harm analysis may be done.” I agree that any jurisdictional violation of Article Y, Section 7, might not be subject to a harmless error analysis. However, to the extent the majority opinion suggests all violations of mandatory, nonjurisdictional provisions are not subject to a harmless error analysis, I disagree. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 784 S.W.2d 430, 435-38 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).
*437-461Because the majority opinion represents yet another triumph of narrow technicalities over practical common sense, I dissent.
WHITE and KELLER, JJ., join this dissent.

. See V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 24.398, (The 220th Judicial District is composed of Bosque, Comanche, and Hamilton counties).

. There was evidence presented at the hearing on appellant's motion for new trial that this was a strategic decision by appellant’s trial counsel. There was some concern the victim might die. According to appellant's trial counsel, if this case could be tried before the victim died, then the State could not later prosecute appellant for murder.

. This should be distinguished from a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction set out in Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution.

. In addition, there is other statutory authority that invites this Court to exercise common sense in construing the relevant statutory provisions to effectuate the purposes of the Code. See, e.g., Article 1.03, V.A.C.C.P. (Objects of the Code); see also Tex.Gov't.Cd., Section 311.023(1) & (5); but see Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 786 fn. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Also, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.05(a), does away with “strict construction” of a penal statute and requires this Court to "liberally" construe the provisions of the Code "according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code.” These provisions also fall within the "except as otherwise provided by law” language of Article V, Section 7, and they permit this Court to uphold what the trial court did in this case "to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code.” See, e.g., V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.05.

. Even had appellant objected, it was within the trial court’s discretion to have decided the procedure followed here would have made “the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth,” and that justice otherwise would not have been done, because the State would have been deprived of its evidence. See Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 610; Tex.Gov't.Cd., Section 21.001(b). Appellant’s lawyer even said the procedure followed here was “the most efficient way to do it." Under the majority's interpretation of Article V, Section 7, the State would have been deprived of its evidence in this case. This also could happen to a defendant in a later case.

. The State also argues Article V, Section 7, speaks to venue because it is Article V, Section 8, that sets out the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Etchieson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The State further argues that since Article V, Section 7, is not jurisdictional, then “it creates a right which is forfeited if not insisted upon by the party to whom it belongs.” See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279-80. This is a persuasive argument which the majority should at least address.

. Apparently, part of the rationale of the majority opinion is that a "defendant may request to take the deposition of a witness" pursuant to Article 39.02, V.A.C.C.P. However, this case involves a situation where the State would have been deprived of its evidence.
Another part of the majority's rationale appears to be the loss of the right to a public trial. However, there is no evidence of a violation of that right. And, under the facts of this case, it was within the trial court's discretion to decide the State's need to present its evidence outweighed appellant’s right to have the proceedings conducted in the courthouse.

.In addition, any violation of Article V, Section 7, does not make the other proceedings that occurred in the courthouse in the county seat void. The record reflects appellant admitted his guilt during the punishment phase which occurred in the courthouse in the county seat. Under these circumstances, appellant would not be entitled to the remedy of a reversal of his conviction due to any jurisdictional violation of Article V. Section 7, in having part of the proceedings at the hospital. See, e.g., DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657, 660-61 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (when a defendant does not testify at the guilt-innocence stage, but does testify at the punishment stage and admits his guilt, he has entered the equivalent of a guilfy plea).