Court Opinion

ID: 9689176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:22:55.869234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:45.806385
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority’s holding that to bind Mr. Justice over on the two counts of conspiracy there must be probable cause to believe that he and his coconspirators shared the specific intent to accomplish the substantive offenses charged. However, notably absent from the majority’s holding and analysis is the requirement that both conspirators must possess the specific intent to deliver the charged amounts' from the time of the formation of the conspiratorial agreement that is the basis of the conspiracy charge. I disagree with the majority’s conclusions on both counts because I do not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish that Mr. Justice and his respective coconspirator specifically intended to deliver the charged amounts at the time that the conspiratorial agreement was formed.
Regarding count I, I would hold that the district court abused its discretion in binding Mr. Justice over on conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine. I believe the evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer that he and his coconspirators had a specific intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine at the time that *364they formed their drug sale-purchase agreement.1 Also, I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Justice and Ms. Boyer possessed the intent to combine to deliver to third persons over 650 grams of cocaine. Further, I believe that the district court abused its discretion in binding Mr. Justice over on the conspiracy charge of possession with intent to deliver between 225 and 650 grams of cocaine. Similar to count i, I do not believe there was sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Justice’s or Ms. Kausler’s intent to deliver the charged amounts or their intent to combine to deliver the charged amounts.
I. THE BINDOVER
To bind a defendant over for trial, the district court must find that a specific crime has been committed and probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime charged. People v King, 412 Mich 145, 152-153; 312 NW2d 629 (1981). In determining whether bindover is proper, the court should consider the credibility of the witnesses in addition to their competency, and the weight to be accorded their testimony. It is also true that the district court should not dismiss the charge when there is conflicting evidence or reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt because those are issues for the jury.
However, King also instructs:
The inquiry is not limited to whether the prosecution has presented evidence on each element of the offense. The [district court] is required to make [its] determination “after an examination of the whole matter.” Although the prosecution has presented some evidence on each element, if upon *365an examination of the whole matter the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the [district court] that the offense charged has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it, then [it] should not bind the defendant over on the offense charged but may bind him over on a lesser offense as to which [it] is so satisfied. [Id. at 154 (emphasis added).]
The majority should have kept these concepts in mind when it reviewed for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a bindover on each conspiracy count. I would hold that the district court abused its discretion in binding the defendant over on either count because there was insufficient evidence to establish that either offense was committed and probable cause to believe that Mr. Justice committed either offense.
H. CONSPIRACY
The majority acknowledges:
To be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the people must prove that (1) the defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, (2) his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person. See, e.g. [People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 485, 508, n 31; 505 NW2d 843 (1993)]. [Ante at 349.]
Further, the majority also acknowledges that “ ‘[t]he gist of the offense of conspiracy lies in the unlawful agreement’ . . . [meaning] . . .' [t]he crime is com*366píete upon formation of the agreement . . . People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 568; 330 NW2d 314 (1982).
Putting these concepts together, it follows that for the defendant to be guilty of the charged conspiracy counts, Mr. Justice and his coconspirators would have had to have intended to deliver the charged amounts from the time that they formed an agreement to deliver the cocaine to third persons. If Mr. Justice and his coconspirators did not specifically intend to deliver the charged amounts, then they could not have had an agreement to deliver the charged amounts. If there was no agreement to deliver the charged amounts, then there was no conspiracy.
ra. COUNT i
Count I involves an alleged conspiracy between Mr. Justice and Cathy Boyer to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine to third persons. Although the charge alleges a conspiracy between the Fall of 1989 through the Summer of 1990, the record evidence only establishes Boyer’s possible intent to deliver when Suzanne Kausler entered the picture in February 1990. Before February 1990, there is no evidence in the record that Boyer intended to deliver cocaine to third persons. Even if she intended to do so, there is no evidence that Mr. Justice knew she intended to do so or that he intended to combine with her to do so.
What the majority focuses on in Count I are the transactions occurring between February and May 1990 in which Boyer purchased cocaine on behalf of Kausler. For Mr. Justice to be properly bound over on *367this count, he and Boyer would have to have agreed to deliver over 650 grains of cocaine to third persons at the time they formed their unlawful agreement. The record in this case is void of any evidence that there was any kind of agreement that there would be deliveries of the quantities necessary to reach the level charged in this count. Rather than being considered as part of an ongoing conspiracy to deliver cocaine, the testimony indicates that the drug transactions are properly labeled as separate transactions.2
The lack of evidence to establish that Mr. Justice and his coconspirators possessed the requisite intent *369is shown by the majority’s conclusion that defendant could have conspired with Boyer to deliver over 650 grams, Boyer could have conspired with Mr. Justice to deliver that amount, and that Mr. Justice and Boyer could have possessed the intent to combine to deliver over 650 grams to third persons. I agree that anything is possible, but this Court should require sufficient evidence before it allows a bindover, especially when this count involves an offense mandating a sentence of life without parole.
iv. count n
Count n alleges that Mr. Justice conspired with Suzanne Kausler to deliver or possess with intent to deliver between 225 and 650 grams of cocaine between March 1990 and December 1990. This count concerns only the drug transactions occurring between Kausler and Mr. Justice after the Boyers were preparing to move to Florida. It was only after this time that Kausler began to deal directly with Mr. Justice.
To bind Mr. Justice over on this count, the prosecutor must establish that Mr. Justice specifically intended to deliver between 225 and 650 grams of cocaine, Kausler specifically intended to deliver between 225 and 650 grams of cocaine, and Mr. Justice and Kausler specifically intended to combine to deliver that amount to third persons. At this point, we *370know that Kausler is a cocaine addict. Obviously, cocaine addicts use a significant amount of cocaine.3 So, even though Kausler made one purchase over 225 grams, I do not believe that that alone is sufficient probable cause to' believe that she intended to deliver that entire amount. I also question whether there is probable cause to believe that Mr. Justice intended to combine with Kausler to deliver that entire amount. Rather, because of her cocaine addiction, I believe it more probable that Kausler intended to use most of it herself. In fact, she testified that she sold only a few grams here and there.
As this Court instructed in Blume, supra at 485-486:
Clearly, the prosecutor must present more evidence than the seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s proposed illegal purpose. For intent to exist, the defendant must know of the conspiracy, must know of the objective of the conspiracy, and must intend to participate cooperatively to further that objective. “ ‘[T]o establish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal . . . because charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon inference ....’” [People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310; 220 NW2d 465 (1974)], quoting Direct Sales Co [v United States, 319 US 703; 63 S Ct 1265; 87 L Ed 1674 (1943)].14
To bind Mr. Justice over in this case, the prosecutor would need to pile inference upon inference. Because *371there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Mr. Justice knew Kausler intended to redistribute some of the cocaine, the prosecution has to infer that intent from the quantities delivered to Kausler. Then, the prosecution must infer that she intended to redistribute the charged amount of between 225 and 650 grams.
Similar to the majority’s conclusion regarding count i, I believe it was an abuse of discretion for the court to bind Mr. Justice over on this count because there was not sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary examination to support a finding of probable cause on this conspiracy count.
V. CONCLUSION
I believe that the transactions involved in both counts were not part of a defined conspiracy, but rather were separate transactions. Thus, I believe it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have bound Mr. Justice over on either count. “[T]he fact that there was some redistribution of the cocaine does not establish that there was an agreement that the coconspirators would redistribute it and return for more when the supply was exhausted. There simply was no evidence that defendant and Kausler or Boyer were involved in an ongoing conspiracy to deliver the aggregate quantities charged.” People v Justice, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 28, 1995 (Docket No. 173326) (White, J., dissenting), slip op at 4. For these reasons, I would reverse the decision of the Court of *372Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Count I concerns the alleged drug transactions between Mr. Justice and Cathy Boyer.

 Called as a prosecution witness, Cathy Boyer, the alleged coconspirator in count I, provided this testimony:
Q. That was for that one incident, right? That one time?
A. Right.
Q. And then when you needed it again, you would call him up, and you would go down again? Correct?
A. Or he would come part-way.
Q. Okay. But each time, you had to make a phone call, correct?
A. One of us did.
Q. Okay, so there wasn’t an on . . .
A, Either he called us, or we called him.
Q. Okay, there wasn’t an on-going plan, Til meet you every Wednesday.”
A. No.
Q. “I’ll meet you every Friday.”
A. No.
Q. “I’ll met [sic] you twice a week.”
A. No.
Q. Each one was arranged individually?
A. Right. When Suzy needed it, we called him.
Q. Okay. Each delivery that you testified to, you indicated was a different price. Each one was separately bargained for, is that a fair statement?
A. Not always.
Q. Well ...
A. Sometimes it would be the same price . . .
*368Q. Okay.
A. ... for a month, and then it might . . .
Q. Okay.
A. .. . according to supply and demand, it could be . . .
Q. Okay.
A. . . . nine hundred dollars one day, and two days later be fifteen hundred.
Q. Okay, but each time it was separately bargained for?
A. Right.
Q. It could be the same price, it could be a different price?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. Payment was made after each delivery?
A. With each delivery, right.
Q. Each time that you went down to see Mr. Justice, he never knew if he was going to see you again, then, is that a fair statement?
A. Yep.
Q. Until you called him again the next time?
A. Unless I went to see him as a friend.
Q. Right.
A. We were friends.
Q. Right. Okay.
A. Whether I went there for drugs or not, I still saw him. He was my friend.
Suzanne Kausler, the alleged coconspirator in count n, provided similar testimony, regarding the occasions on which she dealt directly with the defendant.
Q. Okay. But each of these meetings was an individual meeting? Is that a fair statement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, you didn’t tell Mr. Justice, “Well, I’ll see you every Wednesday, at . . .
A. No.
Q. . . . West Branch.
A. Correct.
Q. Or, “I’ll be down in Ann Arbor every Monday.”
A. I understand what you’re saying.
Q. Okay. Each one — you made a phone call, saying . . .
A. One time, right.
*369Q. . . . “I need something. Here, this is how much I want.” And then there was a meeting set up following that phone call?
A. Correct.

This Court stated in Atley at 314-316, that a conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence or an inference, provided that the evidence and circumstances are “ ‘within safe bounds of relevancy and be such as to warrant a fair inference of the ultimate facts.’ (Emphasis added.)” Id. at 311 ....

 As an example, there is testimony from the preliminary examination that James Boyer, who considered himself a cocaine addict, used from half an ounce to an ounce a day.