Court Opinion

ID: 9928851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 04:01:03.279621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:40.545227
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to revision before publication.

       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                FOR THE ARMED FORCES
                      _______________

                    UNITED STATES
                        Appellee

                              v.

Fernando M. BROWN, Chief Machinery Technician
       United States Coast Guard, Appellant

                      No. 22-0249
                Crim. App. No. 001-69-21

 Argued January 24, 2023—Decided January 10, 2024

              Military Judge: Ted R. Fowles

  For Appellant: Scott Hockenberry, Esq. (argued);
  Lieutenant Commander Kristen R. Bradley (on
  brief).

  For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander Daniel P.
  Halsig Jr. (argued); Lieutenant Elizabeth Ulan.

  Chief Judge OHLSON announced the judgment of
  the Court, in which Judge SPARKS, Judge MAGGS,
  Judge HARDY, and Judge JOHNSON joined in part.
  Judge SPARKS filed a separate opinion concurring
  in part and dissenting in part, in which Judge
  JOHNSON joined. Judge HARDY filed a separate
  opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
  which Judge MAGGS joined in part.
                    _______________
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                   Judgment of the Court

  Chief Judge OHLSON announced the judgment of the
Court.
    Sometimes a seemingly simple statute can be devilishly
difficult to interpret. As reflected by the various opinions
in this case, that certainly is true with Article 91(3), Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 891(3)
(2018), which prohibits disrespect towards a warrant, non-
commissioned, or petty officer. Nonetheless, this case re-
solves two key points. First, a majority of this Court holds
that an accused servicemember can be convicted under Ar-
ticle 91(3) even if his or her disrespectful conduct occurs
outside the physical presence of the victim. Importantly,
that means that disrespectful language or behavior to-
wards a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer can be
criminally actionable even when it is remotely conveyed us-
ing a digital device such as a smartphone and even when
the disrespectful language or behavior is conveyed via so-
cial media. And second, a majority of this Court holds that
under Article 91(3), servicemembers can only be held crim-
inally liable if at the time they conveyed the disrespectful
language or behavior the victim was then in the execution
of his or her office. The reasons for these conclusions are
explained below.
                      I. Background
    Appellant was stationed aboard the United States
Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) Polar Star. Senior Chief
Petty Officer (SCPO) K.B., the ship’s Command Senior
Chief, created a text group consisting of the cutter’s eleven
chief petty officers. This text group—colloquially referred
to as the “Chief’s Mess”—was designed to pass along work-
related information because the crew was geographically
separated while the cutter was in dry dock. There was no
explicit order to participate in the text group. However,
during his court-martial testimony SCPO K.B. agreed with
the trial counsel that it would be inappropriate for a chief
petty officer to ignore a “crew issue” even if it was raised
outside of work hours. All group members used their per-
sonal cell phones to access the texts. Although the text

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           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                   Judgment of the Court

group sometimes encompassed “some levity” and “friendly
conversations,” it was otherwise “all work-related.”
    The three instances of disrespect for which Appellant
was convicted consisted of messages he sent to the text
group which contained either modified pictures of, or spe-
cific references to, one of his three fellow chief petty offic-
ers: Chief Petty Officer (CPO) J.D., SCPO K.B., and CPO
S.C. The first instance occurred when CPO J.D., while
working on the cutter, sent a picture of himself to the text
group. Appellant modified the photo by adding a crude
drawing of male genitalia to CPO J.D.’s forehead and then
resent the image to the group. CPO J.D. was “down in dry
dock” when he received the message from Appellant. Upon
seeing that he received the text, CPO J.D. checked his
phone to “keep track of what was going on throughout the
text message stream, [and to see] if there was any-
thing . . . pertinent.”
    The second instance occurred after SCPO K.B. missed a
chief’s call. Appellant sent a picture which depicted a scant-
ily clad man along with a text stating: “Found out why
[K.B.] missed chiefs [sic] call.” This text was sent at
7:39 p.m., outside of regular duty hours.
    The third instance occurred when Appellant sent a pic-
ture of CPO S.C.’s high school yearbook photo with the
added caption: “Voted most likely to steal your bitch.” CPO
S.C. identifies as lesbian, a fact which was known among
the Chief’s Mess. At the time she received the disrespectful
message she was on convalescent leave. CPO S.C. testified
that she felt embarrassed when Appellant posted the photo
to the group.
    A special court-martial composed of a military judge sit-
ting alone convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of
three specifications of disrespect towards a noncommis-
sioned officer in violation of Article 91(3), and one specifi-
cation of sexual harassment in violation of Article 92,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2018). The military judge sen-
tenced Appellant to reduction to E-4, a reprimand, and re-
striction for thirty days. The convening authority approved

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           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                   Judgment of the Court

the sentence. Upon application of Appellant, the Judge Ad-
vocate General of the Coast Guard sent the case to the
United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals
(CCA) pursuant to Article 69(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869(d)
(2018). The CCA set aside and dismissed the Article 92
charge and its specification, affirmed the remaining find-
ings, and reassessed the sentence, reducing Appellant to
E-6 but otherwise affirming the sentence. We granted re-
view of the following issue:
      Are Appellant’s convictions under Article 91 le-
      gally insufficient where there is an absence of ev-
      idence that the charged conduct occurred in the
      sight, hearing, or presence of the alleged victims
      while they were in the execution of their office?
United States v. Brown, 83 M.J. 64 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (order
granting review). We affirm in part and reverse in part the
decision of the CCA.
                  II. Standard of Review
   Questions of legal sufficiency are reviewed de novo.
United States v. Wilson, 76 M.J. 4, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citing
United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011)). In
reviewing for legal sufficiency, this Court considers
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
     Questions of statutory construction are also reviewed de
novo. Wilson, 76 M.J. at 6 (citing United States v. Atchak,
75 M.J. 193, 195 (C.A.A.F. 2016)). “[I]t is axiomatic that
‘[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its
language.’ ” United States v. Murphy, 74 M.J. 302, 305
(C.A.A.F. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting United
States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177, 181 (C.A.A.F. 2014)). “The
inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous
and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.”
United States v. McPherson, 73 M.J. 393, 395 (C.A.A.F.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barn-
hart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc. 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). Of

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                    Judgment of the Court

note, “we are not bound by the President’s interpretation of
the elements of substantive offenses.” Wilson, 76 M.J. at 6
(citing United States v. Davis, 47 M.J. 484, 486 (C.A.A.F.
1998)). Nonetheless, “when the President’s narrowing con-
struction of a statute does not contradict the express lan-
guage of a statute, it is entitled to some deference, and we
will not normally disturb that construction.” Id. (citing
Murphy, 74 M.J. at 310).
                        III. Discussion
    The relevant text of Article 91(3) states: “Any warrant
officer or enlisted member who . . . treats with contempt or
is disrespectful in language or deportment toward a war-
rant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer, while
that officer is in the execution of his [or her] office . . . shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.”
    Appellant’s argument before this Court can largely be
distilled into two prongs: (1) Do the provisions of Article
91(3) encompass those instances where an accused re-
motely uses digital communication technology? And if so,
(2) does the victim have to be “in the execution of . . . office”
at the time the accused conveys the disrespectful language
or behavior, or is it sufficient for the victim to be in the ex-
ecution of office at the time the victim views or hears the
disrespectful language or behavior? We address each of
these prongs in turn.
   A. Prong One: Within Sight, Hearing, or Presence 1
   As shown above, the language of Article 91(3) is quite
broad. However, the elements supplied by the President
narrow the scope of the offense. In pertinent part, the ele-
ments make it a crime for “a warrant or enlisted member”
to use disrespectful language or behavior “toward and

   1 Judge Sparks and Judge Johnson concur with this section.
See United States v. Brown, 83 M.J. __, __ (1) (C.A.A.F. 2023)
(Sparks, J., with whom Johnson, J., joins, concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Maggs and Judge Hardy dissent from
this section. See Brown, 83 M.J. at __ (7-8) (Hardy, J., with whom
Maggs, J., joins in part, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

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           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                   Judgment of the Court

within sight or hearing of a [victim] warrant officer, non-
commissioned, or petty officer.” Manual for Courts-Mar-
tial, United States pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(c) (2019 ed.) (MCM)
(emphasis added); see also id. para. 17.c.(5) (explaining
that the word “ ‘[t]oward,’ ” as used in subsection (c), “re-
quires that the behavior and language be within the sight
or hearing of the warrant, noncommissioned, or petty of-
ficer concerned” (emphasis added)). Because the President
had the authority to constrict the scope of the statute in
this manner, it is the President’s language contained
within the elements of the MCM that guides our analysis.
Wilson, 76 M.J. at 6.
    Appellant argues that an offense under Article 91(3)—
particularly in light of the elements supplied by the Presi-
dent—can occur only if the accused and the victim were in
“physical proximity” at the time of the charged conduct.
Thus, it would appear that Appellant’s position is that a
servicemember can convey to a victim recipient a disre-
spectful and public message through any medium—text,
telephone, email, video communication, social media, etc.—
yet avoid punishment if the offending sender was not phys-
ically proximate to the victim when the conduct occurred.
   It is essential to note, however, that language requiring
physical proximity between an accused and a victim is
absent from both the statutory language of Article 91(3)
and from the listed elements. 2 Rather, all that is required

   2 The President has defined the elements of Article 91(3) as:

         (a) That the accused was a warrant officer or
      enlisted member;
         (b) That the accused did or omitted certain
      acts, or used certain language;
         (c) That such behavior or language was used
      toward and within sight or hearing of a certain
      warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer;
          (d) That the accused then knew that the person
      toward whom the behavior or language was di-
      rected was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty
      officer;

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                    Judgment of the Court

under element (c) is that the disrespectful language or
behavior was within the sight or hearing of the victim.
Indeed, we note that the explanation of Article 91 refers
the reader back to the discussion of “disrespect” in Article
89, UCMJ, 3 which states that presence “is not essential.” 4
MCM pt. IV, para. 15.c.(2)(c) (emphasis added). In other
words, regardless of physical proximity, this element is met
so long as an accused causes his or her disrespectful
language or behavior to come within the sight or hearing of
the victim.
    Therefore, we hold that disrespectful language or be-
havior towards a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty of-
ficer can be criminally actionable even when it is remotely
conveyed using a digital device and even when the disre-
spectful language or behavior is conveyed via social media.

           (e) That the victim was then in the execution of
       office; and
          (f) That under the circumstances the accused,
       by such behavior or language, treated with con-
       tempt or was disrespectful to said warrant, non-
       commissioned, or petty officer.
MCM pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(a)-(f). There are two additional ele-
ments if the victim was the superior noncommissioned or petty
officer of the accused. Id. para. 17.b.(3)(g)-(h). These additional
elements apply only to the specification regarding SCPO K.B.
These additional elements are not at issue in this case.
   3 Disrespect toward superior commissioned officer; assault of
superior commissioned officer, Article 89, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 889
(2018).
   4 The President’s explanatory text accompanying Article 91
states: “Article 91 has the same general objects with respect to
warrant, noncommissioned, and petty officers as Articles 89 and
90 have with respect to commissioned officers, namely, to ensure
obedience to their lawful orders, and to protect them from vio-
lence, insult, or disrespect.” MCM pt. IV, para. 17.c.(1).

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                    Judgment of the Court

         B. Prong Two: In the Execution of Office 5
    In order for disrespectful conduct to be a chargeable of-
fense, element (e) of Article 91(3) requires the following:
“That the victim was then in the execution of office.” 6 MCM
pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(e) (emphasis added). We conclude that
this language requires the victim to be in the execution of
his or her office at the time the accused engages in the dis-
respectful behavior. We come to this conclusion based on
our textual analysis of two elements listed in the MCM.
    Elements (d) and (e) list two further conditions that are
necessary to find a servicemember criminally liable under
Article 91(3). These two elements require the government
to show that “the accused then knew that the person to-
ward whom the behavior or language was directed was a
warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer” and that “the
victim was then in the execution of office.” MCM pt. IV,
para. 17.b.(3)(d)-(e) (emphasis added). It is clear that under
element (d), the word “then” imposes a requirement that
the accused knew the military status of the victim at the
time the accused engaged in the disrespectful behavior. See
id. para. 17.c.(2) (“All of the offenses prohibited by Article
91 require that the accused have actual knowledge that the
victim was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer.”);
cf. United States v. Biggs, 22 C.M.A. 16, 18, 46 C.M.R. 16,
18 (1972) (concluding there was sufficient evidence “to sup-
port the court’s determination that, at the time of the

   5 Judge Maggs and Judge Hardy concur with this section. See
Brown, 83 M.J. at __ (7-9) (Hardy, J., with whom Maggs, J., joins
in part, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Sparks
and Judge Johnson dissent from this section. See Brown, 83 M.J.
at __ (1-4) (Sparks, J., with whom Johnson, J., joins, concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
   6 Paragraph 17 of Part IV of the MCM refers the reader to
Paragraph 15 for a discussion of the phrase “ ‘in the execution of
his office.’ ” MCM pt. IV, para. 17.c.(5). “An officer is in the exe-
cution of office when engaged in any act or service required or
authorized by treaty, statute, regulation, the order of a superior,
or military usage.” Id. para. 15.c.(3)(f).

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           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                   Judgment of the Court

offenses . . . the accused knew the military identity” of his
victims (emphasis added)).
   Element (e) also uses the word “then.” It requires that
“the victim was then in the execution of office.” MCM pt.
IV, para. 17.b.(3)(e) (emphasis added). Because of the re-
peated use of the same word “then” in consecutive MCM
elements, we conclude this word must have the same
meaning and effect. See Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139
S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019) (“This Court does not lightly as-
sume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to
the same term in the same or related statutes.”). Therefore,
reading these elements together demonstrates that the vic-
tim must be “in the execution of office” at the time the ac-
cused engaged in the disrespectful behavior.
    This interpretation of element (e) is bolstered by exam-
ining the statutory language upon which it is predicated.
The relevant portion of Article 91(3) prohibits an enlisted
member from engaging in disrespectful language or behav-
ior towards a petty officer “while that officer is in the exe-
cution of his office.” (Emphasis added.) The word “while,”
when used as a conjunction, means “during the time that.”7
See also Leighton Techs. LLC v. Oberthur Card Sys., S.A.,
358 F. Supp. 2d 361, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (defining “while”
to mean “simultaneously or concurrently”). The best inter-
pretation of this language within Article 91(3) is that it im-
poses a “concurrency requirement” regarding the conduct
of the accused on the one hand and the official status of the
victim on the other. Therefore, Appellant’s convictions un-
der Article 91 can stand only if the evidence shows that
SCPO K.B., CPO J.D., and CPO S.C. were in the execution
of their office during the time that Appellant conveyed his
disrespectful language or behavior. 8

   7   While, Merriam-Webster Unabridged Online Dictionary,
https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/while
(last visited Oct. 13, 2023).
  8 We acknowledge that our reading of the elements creates
situations in which a warrant officer or enlisted member cannot
be held criminally liable under Article 91(3) despite using

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                    Judgment of the Court

     C. Application of the Second Prong to this Case 9
   Having resolved the meaning of Article 91(3), we now
must determine its application to the facts of Appellant’s
case.
                  1. SCPO K.B. and CPO S.C.
   It is true that when conducting a legal sufficiency re-
view, “the relevant question an appellate court must an-
swer is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Herrmann, 76
M.J. 304, 307 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal

blatantly disrespectful language or behavior towards a warrant,
noncommissioned, or petty officer if the putative victim was not
in the execution of his or her office at the time of the disrespect-
ful act. Nevertheless, it is not the role of this Court to expand
the reach of either statutory language passed by Congress or el-
ements of the articles promulgated by the President in order to
avoid anomalous or undesirable results. Cf. Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“[W]hen the mean-
ing of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end. The people
are entitled to rely on the law as written, without fearing that
courts might disregard its plain terms based on some extratex-
tual consideration.”). However, Congress or the President may,
of course, revise the current language of Article 91(3) and/or its
elements in order to more comprehensively address disrespect-
ful conduct if they deem it appropriate to do so.
   9 In a November 2, 2023, petition for reconsideration, Appel-

lant argued that the CCA does not have factfinding authority in
this instance because this case arrived at the lower court under
Article 69, UCMJ, rather than under Article 66, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 866 (2018). Appellant is correct. Article 69(e) precluded
the CCA from factfinding, and thus this Court’s lead opinion
could not rely on the CCA’s factfinding. However, we note that
the lead opinion did not rely exclusively upon the CCA’s factual
finding in reaching its conclusion in this case. Indeed, eliminat-
ing the CCA’s findings of fact does not change the lead opinion’s
conclusions because the evidence contained in the record of trial
was sufficient to uphold Appellant’s conviction regarding CPO
J.D. We have, however, revised this opinion and removed lan-
guage referring to the CCA’s factfinding ability.

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                    Judgment of the Court

quotation marks omitted). But despite this generous stand-
ard, it must be noted that in the instant case the Govern-
ment failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that two
of the victims—SCPO K.B. and CPO S.C.—were on duty
when Appellant sent the texts. For example, the Govern-
ment did not elicit testimony from SCPO K.B. and CPO
S.C. that they opened the texts concurrent with Appellant
sending them. Therefore, these two convictions cannot
withstand appellate scrutiny. Accordingly, we set aside the
findings pertaining to SCPO K.B. and CPO S.C.
                           2. CPO J.D.
    Regarding the remaining victim, CPO J.D. testified he
was “down in dry dock” when he “received a message” in
the Chief’s Mess group text. His testimony further reflects
that he checked his phone when he received this message
to “keep track of what was going on throughout the text
message stream, [to see] if there was anything . . . perti-
nent.” And upon opening the group text, CPO J.D. discov-
ered Appellant’s disrespectful text. Thus, when drawing
“every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in
favor of the prosecution,” United States v. Robinson, 77
M.J. 294, 298 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted), we conclude there is sufficient
evidence that CPO J.D. was in the execution of his office at
the time Appellant engaged in the disrespectful conduct.
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s conviction pertaining to
CPO J.D. 10

   10 In his petition for reconsideration, Appellant also argued
that this Court cannot affirm his conviction under Specification
1, Charge I, because “Appellant’s conduct has never been evalu-
ated by a factfinder under the proper construction of the ele-
ments.” Petition for Reconsideration at 1, United States v.
Brown, No. 22-0249 (C.A.A.F. Nov. 2, 2023). The Court is unper-
suaded by this argument. In this judge-alone trial, the military
judge was the factfinder. And in issuing his special findings, the
military judge held that “[a]t the time that [Appellant] commu-
nicated the digital photograph, which included a depiction of
male genitalia, [CPO J.D.] was then in the execution of his office.”
(Special Findings at 3.) (Emphasis added.) Such language

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
                    Judgment of the Court

                        IV. Judgment11
    The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to Charge I and Specifica-
tion 1 thereunder, but reversed as to Specifications 2 and 4
of Charge I and as to the sentence. The findings of guilty
with respect to the latter two specifications are set aside
and dismissed. The record is returned to the Judge Advo-
cate General of the United States Coast Guard for remand
to the Court of Criminal Appeals to either reassess the sen-
tence based on the affirmed findings or order a sentence
rehearing.

indicates that, in convicting Appellant of the offense at issue, the
trier of fact did indeed apply the theory regarding the presiden-
tially defined element (e) of Article 91(3) that was articulated in
the lead opinion. Therefore, contrary to Appellant’s argument,
Appellant’s conduct has been evaluated by a factfinder under the
proper construction of the elements.
   11 Judge Maggs and Judge Hardy join with respect to setting

aside the offenses involving SCPO K.B. and CPO S.C. but would
also set aside the offense involving CPO J.D. See Brown, 83 M.J.
at __ (9 & n.5) (Hardy, J., with whom Maggs, J., joins in part,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Sparks and
Judge Johnson join with respect to affirming the offense involv-
ing CPO J.D. but would also affirm the offense regarding SCPO
K.B. See Brown, 83 M.J. at __ (4-5) (Sparks, J., with whom John-
son, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part). There-
fore, the judgment expressed here is supported by a majority of
the Court. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(articulating that when a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale commands the majority, “ ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest grounds’ ”
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))).

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            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge SPARKS, concurring in part and dissenting in part

   Judge SPARKS, with whom Judge Johnson joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    As noted by the lead opinion, Appellant’s argument
before this Court can be condensed into two prongs: (1) Do
the provisions of Article 91(3), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 891(3) (2018), encompass
those instances where an accused remotely uses digital
communication technology? And if so, (2) does the victim
have to be “in the execution of office” at the time the
accused conveys the disrespectful language or behavior, or
is it sufficient for the victim to be in the execution of office
at the time the victim views or hears the disrespectful
language or behavior?
    First, I agree with the lead opinion that an accused
servicemember can be convicted under Article 91(3),
UCMJ, even if his or her disrespectful conduct occurs
outside the physical presence of the victim. Under
Appellant’s     interpretation    of    the   elements,   a
servicemember could convey a disrespectful message
through any medium to the victim recipient—text,
telephone, mail, video communication, etc., yet avoid
punishment simply because the offending sender was not
physically proximate to the victim when the disrespectful
conduct or language was committed or communicated. This
result would plainly conflict with the article’s intent and
the overall statutory scheme: promoting good order and
discipline     via    punishment       of   disrespect   to
noncommissioned officers. See Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, pt. IV, para 17.c.(1) (2019 ed.) (MCM).
    My disagreement is with the lead’s holding that under
Article 91(3), UCMJ, the victim must be in execution of his
or her office at the time the accused engages in the
disrespectful conduct. For the reasons discussed below, in
my view, the victim must be in the execution of his or her
office at the time the victim views or hears the disrespectful
conduct.
                I. In the Execution of Office
    In order for disrespectful conduct to be a chargeable
offense, element (e) of Article 91(3), UCMJ, requires: “That
the victim was then in the execution of office.” MCM, pt.
            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge SPARKS, concurring in part and dissenting in part

IV, para. 17.b.(3)(e). From Appellant’s perspective there
are two parts to the “execution of office” analysis: (1) does
the language of the specification focus on when Appellant
sent the texts, or when the texts were read or received; and
(2) is there evidence that the victims were in “ ‘execution of
[their] office’ ” at the appropriate time, or at all? (Alteration
in original.)
    As for the first part, I conclude that the language of
Article 91, UCMJ, and the specifications in this case apply
to when the victims read or received the texts. The
language of the statute and the elements compel me to
reject the notion that the operative focus is centered on
when Appellant sends the text messages. The relevant
elements state that “the accused did . . . or used certain
language;” “[t]hat such behavior or language was used
toward and within the sight or hearing of a certain . . . petty
officer;” “[t]hat the accused then knew that the person
toward whom the behavior or language was directed was
a . . . petty officer;” and “[t]hat the victim was then in the
execution of office.” MCM pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(b)-(e). The
important point here is that when Appellant engaged in
the disrespectful conduct, he “then knew” that the victim
was a noncommissioned officer and that the victim “was
then” in the execution of office. 1 Id. It is tempting to read
these provisions in the context of the classic situation
where the target of the conduct or language instantly
becomes aware of it because the offender and the victim are
physically within each other’s presence. However,
Appellant was charged with either sending or distributing
the images, and neither sending nor distributing are
necessarily isolated or discrete acts occurring at one
instantaneous point in time. Here, the act of sending or
distributing was complete when the communications were
in the possession of the recipients, i.e., when they were
delivered. See e.g., Distribute, Black’s Law Dictionary 508
(8th ed. 2004) (“[t]o deliver”). Thus, it is not necessary that
the record reflect whether the victims were in execution of
office when Appellant pressed send because it sufficiently

   1 Appellant does not challenge that he “knew” the victims

were petty officers.

                                 2
            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge SPARKS, concurring in part and dissenting in part

demonstrates that Appellant knew the victims would
receive and read the texts, and that they would “then” be
in execution of office when doing so. See MCM pt. IV, para.
17.b.(3)(b-e).
    As to the second part, this Court has held that a
servicemember may be in “ ‘execution of his office when
engaged in any act or service required or authorized to be
done by him, by statute, regulation, the order of a superior,
or military usage.’ ” United States v. Glaze, 3 C.M.A 168,
172, 11 C.M.R. 168, 172 (1953) (quoting William Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedents 571 (2d ed., Government
Printing Office 1920) (1895)). Given that whether one is in
“execution of office” is a factual inquiry, from a legal
sufficiency standpoint, we are bound by the military
judge’s finding as a rational trier of fact. Although there
was some joking in the group text, the record indicates that
the primary purpose of the group text was for official work
reasons. Accordingly, when the chief petty officers
participated in the group chat, they were in effect working.
See e.g., Glaze, 3 C.M.A. at 172, 11 C.M.R. at 172 (finding
that the victim noncommissioned officer was in “execution
of his office” when in charge of a supply tent despite
simultaneously fraternizing and drinking alcohol with
other noncommissioned officers); see generally United
States v. Diggs, 52 M.J. 251, 256 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(supporting the notion that a servicemember need not be
explicitly on duty in order to be in “execution of his office”);
United States v. Nelson, 17 C.M.A. 620, 622-23, 38 C.M.R.
418, 420-21 (1968) (concluding an officer “in execution of
his office” despite being off-duty and wearing civilian
clothes when stopping two drunk soldiers from causing a
scene in public).
   Appellant is correct, however, that there is a temporal
requirement relating to the disrespectful conduct or
language occurring “within sight or hearing” of the victim
and whether the victim is in “ ‘execution of [their] office,’ ”
as those two conditions must occur contemporaneously.
The question here is whether the military judge, could have

                                 3
            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge SPARKS, concurring in part and dissenting in part

reasonably inferred that the victims read the text messages
within a reasonable time after Appellant pressed “send.” 2
                         II. Application
         a. Senior Chief Petty Officer (SCPO) K.B.
   Prosecution Exhibit 9 indicates that Appellant sent the
image to SCPO K.B. at 7:39 PM. The exhibit displays SCPO
K.B.’s comments regarding his having missed a previous
chiefs’ meeting. Beneath his comment is the offending
image sent by Appellant at 7:39 PM. SCPO K.B. confirmed
that he received the text after working hours but did not
respond to the sent image. However, SCPO K.B. testified
that he found the image funny at the time he received it,
presumably shortly after 7:39 PM. Given the importance
he and the others placed on checking their phones
regarding the group texts, his testimony supports the
conclusion that he checked his phone a relatively short
time after the text was sent. Thus, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a
rational trier of fact could have found SCPO K.B. was in
the execution of his office at the time he saw the text
message. See Wilson, 76 M.J.at 6. Accordingly, I dissent
from the lead’s holding to the contrary and would affirm
Appellant’s conviction for this offense.
              b. Chief Petty Officer (CPO) J.D.
    I agree with the lead opinion that CPO J.D. was in the
execution of his office, albeit based on a different
interpretation, when he opened the group text while being
down at the dry dock. Accordingly, I concur that we should
affirm Appellant’s conviction pertaining to CPO J.D.

   2 Consider the following example. A servicemember leaves a

disrespectful picture on a noncommissioned officer’s desk early
in the morning before the victim is at work, but the offender
knows the victim will be there shortly as it is the victim’s
appointed place of duty. The offender caused the disrespectful
picture to be within sight of the victim despite not being
physically or temporally proximate. However, the victim saw the
picture upon coming to the desk and was thus in the “execution
of office” at that time. This scenario is no different than the case
at hand, despite the technological differences.

                                   4
            United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge SPARKS, concurring in part and dissenting in part

                         c. CPO S.C.
   As for CPO S.C., she testified that her light duty status
prevented her from joining the crew while the ship was in
dry dock. Nonetheless, she still felt obligated to carry out
her duties as a chief petty officer. That included checking
her phone when it notified her that a text from the chiefs’
group had been received. However, even under my view
and considering her response (Defense Exhibit A) to the
image from her high school yearbook (Prosecution
Exhibit 5) posted by Appellant, it is difficult to conclude the
evidence is sufficient with respect to the allegation
pertaining to her. Here, unlike with SCPO K.B., it is
unknown when CPO S.C. opened the text message in
question. Accordingly, I concur with the lead opinion that
we should set aside and dismiss this specification.

                                5
             United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG

   Judge HARDY, with whom Judge MAGGS joins with
respect to Part II, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    As relevant here, Congress has broadly criminalized
any conduct by an enlisted servicemember that “treats
with contempt or is disrespectful in language or deport-
ment toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or
petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his of-
fice.” Article 91, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. § 891 (2018). Absent any narrowing construction
by the President, this broad language likely would pro-
scribe Appellant’s actions in this case. Nevertheless, the el-
ements and explanation of Article 91, UCMJ, promulgated
by the President in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2019 ed.) (Manual or MCM), require that the ac-
cused perform his disrespectful act within the sight or
hearing of the victim for the conduct to be criminal. MCM
pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(c). Because the record contains no ev-
idence that Appellant’s disrespectful behavior occurred
within the sight or hearing of the alleged victims, I would
hold that the United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal
Appeals (CGCCA) should be reversed as to Specifications 1,
2, and 4 of Charge I, and that the findings of guilty with
respect to those three specifications should be set aside and
dismissed. 1
   I. The President’s Elements to Article 91(3), UCMJ,
                  Control the Analysis
   The granted issue in this case asks whether Appellant’s
convictions under Article 91(3), UCMJ, were legally

   1 Putting aside the question whether an accused’s conduct

must be performed in the sight or hearing of the victims, I also
agree with Chief Judge Ohlson that the elements and explana-
tion of Article 91(3), UCMJ, impose a concurrency requirement
on the offense, such that the conduct of an accused must occur
when the target of his contempt or disrespect was in the execu-
tion of his office. United States v. Brown, __ M.J. __ , __ (9)
(C.A.A.F. 2023). Because the Government introduced no evi-
dence establishing whether the targeted petty officers in Speci-
fications 2 and 4 of Charge I were in the execution of office when
Appellant acted, I agree with Chief Judge Ohlson that the
CGCCA should be reversed with respect to those two Specifica-
tions for this additional reason. Id. at __ (11).
              United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
       Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

insufficient because there is no evidence that his disre-
spectful behavior occurred “within the sight or hearing” of
the victims. MCM pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(c). This so-called
“presence” requirement does not appear in the text of Arti-
cle 91(3), UCMJ, but rather is an element of the offense
that the President has specified in the Manual. This raises
the interesting question—briefed extensively by the par-
ties—whether the President has the authority to narrow a
statutory offense by adding elements that must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt beyond those requirements ex-
pressly stated by Congress in the text of the article.
    In its briefs, the Government argues that we need only
consider the text of Article 91(3), UCMJ, to determine the
legal sufficiency of Appellant’s convictions without any con-
sideration of the President’s elements presented in the
Manual. The Government contends that the President’s
guidance—issued pursuant to an express delegation of au-
thority from Congress in Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836
(2018), and through the President’s inherent constitutional
authority as commander-in-chief, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
cl. 1—can be ignored unless it unambiguously narrows the
scope of the offense’s statutory language. The Government
abandoned this line of reasoning at oral argument conced-
ing that it must prove every element enumerated by the
President in the Manual to convict a servicemember of an
offense under the UCMJ. 2 In light of the Government’s con-
cession, it is no longer strictly necessary to answer this
question to decide this case. Nevertheless, given the im-
portance of this threshold question and the extensive brief-
ing already presented in this case, I think it is worth con-
sidering whether the President’s elements are relevant to
the legal sufficiency of Appellant’s challenged offenses.
   Possibly the best support for the Government’s
argument comes from an opinion from our predecessor
Court stating that “the President’s rule-making authority
does not extend to matters of substantive military criminal
law.” Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 92-93 (C.M.A. 1988).
Twenty years earlier, our predecessor had similarly

   2 Oral Argument at 30:06-32:34, United States v. Brown
(C.A.A.F. Jan. 24, 2023) (No. 22-0249).

                                   2
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

suggested that the President’s elements may “be
disregarded if they are ‘no more than an attempted
addition to the statute of something which is not there.’ ”
United States v. Margelony, 14 C.M.A. 55, 57-58, 33 C.M.R.
267, 269-70 (1963) (quoting United States v. Calamaro, 354
U.S. 351, 359 (1957)). Although the language in those
precedents might be interpreted as suggesting that the
President lacks any authority to promulgate elements
narrowing the scope of a statutory criminal offense
(because doing so exceeds the scope of the delegation of
authority made to the President by Congress in Article 36,
UCMJ), I do not believe that that is the best reading of
those cases.
    I read those precedents as only holding that the Presi-
dent lacks the authority to create new criminal offenses or
to expand the scope of the statutory offenses enacted by
Congress. This reading has two benefits. First, it does not
call into question the past seven decades of military justice
practice during which the President’s elements have de-
fined how the government establishes guilt for crimes pros-
ecuted under the UMCJ. And second, this reading is con-
sistent with our precedent, where we have permitted the
President to narrow—but not to expand—the applicable
scope of the statutory UCMJ offenses. See, e.g., United
States v. Jenkins, 7 C.M.A. 261, 262, 22 C.M.R. 51, 52
(1956) (refusing to enforce the President’s expansion of Ar-
ticle 83, UCMJ, to include inductees); United States v.
Rushlow, 2 C.M.A. 641, 644, 10 C.M.R. 139, 142 (1953) (re-
fusing to enforce the President’s guidance that a contingent
purpose to return qualifies as an intent to remain away
permanently for the purpose of Article 85, UCMJ). But
whether or not Article 36, UCMJ—or possibly the com-
mander-in-chief clause of the Constitution—grants the
President authority to promulgate additional elements to
statutory UCMJ offenses, I believe that there is a greater
constitutional concern that would prevent this Court from
disregarding the President’s guidance in the Manual.
   This Court has long held that “[w]here the President’s
narrowing construction is favorable to an accused and is
not inconsistent with the language of a statute, ‘we will not
disturb the President’s narrowing construction, which is an

                                3
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

appropriate [e]xecutive branch limitation on the conduct
subject to prosecution.’ ” United States v. Guess, 48 M.J. 69,
71 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (quoting United States v. Davis, 47 M.J.
484, 486-87 (C.A.A.F. 1998)). In my view, the deference the
Court gives the President in these matters is not simply a
courtesy but is also necessary to uphold fundamental prin-
ciples of notice and due process.
    The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he essence of
due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of
serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
348-49 (1976) (second alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Accordingly, our
predecessor Court recognized that “[a]n accused must be on
notice that his conduct is unlawful and that the article
fairly informs ‘that particular conduct which he engaged in
was punishable.’ ” United States v. Guerrero, 33 M.J. 295,
297 (C.M.A. 1991)) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
755 (1974)). Requiring the government to prove every ele-
ment as enumerated and explained by the President is nec-
essary to protect servicemembers’ due process rights by en-
suring that they bear no criminal liability for conduct that
the President has publicly and officially deemed noncrimi-
nal in the Manual.
   Servicemembers are justified in relying on the Presi-
dent’s guidance for fair notice of what conduct is criminal
under the UCMJ for two reasons. First, the President is-
sued and updates the Manual via executive order pursuant
to express statutory authority under Article 36, UCMJ. 3
When the President issues an executive order “pursuant to
a mandate or a delegation of authority from Congress” that
order has “the force and effect of laws.” Farmer v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 7 (3d Cir. 1964); see also Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349

   3 See 2023 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, Exec. Order No. 14,103, 88 Fed. Reg. 50,535 (July
28, 2023) (updating the current version of the 1984 Manual);
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, Exec. Order No.
12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (Apr. 13, 1984) (prescribing the 1984
Manual and rescinding all previous editions).

                                 4
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

(1920) (noting that it is a settled principle of law that “a
regulation by a department of government, addressed to
and reasonably adapted to the enforcement of an act of
Congress . . . has the force and effect of law if it be not in
conflict with express statutory provision”). Because Con-
gress has delegated to the President the authority to pre-
scribe regulations for courts-martial, and because all the
actors in the military justice system are members of the
executive branch to whom the President’s executive order
lawfully applies, the President’s guidance is legally binding
on the military justice system. 4
    Second, when the President enumerates elements in
the Manual, he is informing the military community what
conduct is criminal under the UCMJ pursuant to his inher-
ent constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. The
President’s enumeration of criminal elements is an exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion that functions as a lawful
order to commanders and trial counsel, that they must
prove every element before an accused can be convicted of
an offense by courts-martial. As the Government conceded
at oral argument, see supra note 2 and accompanying text,
it has no authority to deviate from the President’s elements
when charging servicemembers with crimes under the
UCMJ. Servicemembers are thus fully justified, for notice
and due process purposes, in relying on the President’s

   4 One notable exception to this rule, of course, are the judges

of this Court, who enjoy the constitutionally curious status of
executive branch officers who are empowered to act inde-
pendently of the President because they have statutory tenure
protection. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
632 (1935) (holding that Congress may create executive branch
agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the
President only for good cause); Article 142(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 942(c) (2018). Although the scope of Congress’s authority un-
der Humphrey’s Ex’r to create independent executive branch of-
ficers has recently come under increased scrutiny, this Court’s
constitutional status as a multimember panel of principal offic-
ers that performs a judicial function seems secure. See Seila L.
LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199 (2020)
(describing the limits of Congress’s power to create independent
executive branch entities).

                                 5
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

lawful order to describe the scope of conduct considered
criminal under the UCMJ.
    The President’s guidance in the Manual puts all ser-
vicemembers on notice of what conduct is proscribed and
what must be proven to put their personal liberty in jeop-
ardy. Even if this Court were eventually to decide that Ar-
ticle 36, UCMJ, does not authorize the President to prom-
ulgate elements for the UCMJ offenses, convicting a
servicemember for conduct that fell outside the scope of
conduct described by the President in the Manual would
still violate the servicemember’s fundamental due process
rights because under the current state of the law, service-
members are entitled to rely on the President’s orders—as
published in the Manual—until and unless those orders
are declared to be unlawful.
            II. Legal Sufficiency of Appellant’s
              Convictions Under Article 91(3)
    I turn now to the granted question in this case, whether
Appellant’s challenged convictions under Article 91,
UCMJ, were legally insufficient. Specification 1 alleged
that Appellant engaged in disrespectful conduct “by modi-
fying a digital photograph of Chief Petty Officer [J.D.] to
include a depiction of male genitalia on his head and dis-
tributing it to the POLAR STAR Chief’s Mess.” (Emphasis
added.) Specification 2 alleged that Appellant engaged in
disrespectful conduct “by modifying a digital image of Chief
Petty Officer [S.C.]’s high school yearbook photograph to
include the phrase ‘[v]oted most likely to steal your bitch’
and distributing it to the POLAR STAR Chief’s Mess.” (Sec-
ond alteration in original.) (Emphasis added.) Specification
4 alleged that Appellant engaged in disrespectful conduct
“by sending a digital image of a scantily clad male to the
POLAR STAR Chief’s Mess and alleging that the scantily
clad male was the reason Senior Chief Petty Officer [K.B.]
was unable to attend a Chief’s Call, or words to that effect.”
(Emphasis added.) Applying the President’s elements, the
question presented can be broken down into two compo-
nents. First, whether Appellant’s disrespectful behavior
was “used toward and within sight or hearing” of the
named petty officers.’ MCM pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(c). And
second, whether those petty officers were “then in the

                                6
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

execution of office” when Appellant committed the disre-
spectful acts. MCM pt. IV, para. 17.b.(3)(e).
          A. The Elements of Article 91(3) Must
              Be Satisfied Simultaneously
    I agree with Chief Judge Ohlson that the language of
Article 91(3)’s elements mandates that those elements be
satisfied simultaneously for the accused’s conduct to be
criminal, and therefore agree that Appellant’s convictions
as to Specifications 2 and 4 of Charge I should be reversed.
Brown, __ M.J. at __ (9-11). I believe, however, that there
is a more straightforward means of resolving this case un-
der which Appellant’s convictions as to Specifications 1, 2,
and 4 of Charge I should be reversed.
     B. Appellant’s Disrespectful Behavior Was Not
         Performed Within the Sight or Hearing
              of the Named Petty Officers
    As applicable here, to convict Appellant of the charged
Article 91(3) offenses, the Government was required to
prove, inter alia: “[t]hat the accused did . . . certain acts”
and “[t]hat such behavior . . . was used toward and within
sight or hearing” of the named petty officers. MCM pt. IV,
para. 17.b.(3)(b)-(c). The most straightforward meaning of
the requirement that the disrespectful behavior must occur
“within the sight or hearing” of a certain petty officer is
that the accused must have committed disrespectful acts at
a time when, and in a place where, the petty officer could
see or hear the accused commit the disrespectful acts. In
this case, the Government did not prove that Appellant
committed the charged disrespectful acts—“modifying,”
“distributing,” and “sending” photos and messages—at
times when, and in places where, the named petty officers
could see or hear Appellant commit these disrespectful
acts. Therefore, the evidence did not show that these disre-
spectful acts occurred “within the sight or hearing” of the
named petty officers.
   To be sure, the disrespectful messages that Appellant
sent did reach and were eventually viewed by the chief
petty officers. But those disrespectful messages were the
product of Appellant’s disrespectful acts, not the acts of
“modifying,” “distributing,” or “sending” with which

                                7
           United States v. Brown, No. 22-0249/CG
    Judge HARDY, concurring in part and dissenting in part

Appellant was charged. For these reasons, I find the
evidence to be legally insufficient to prove Appellant guilty
of disrespectful deportment in violation of Article 91(3),
UCMJ, under the elements specified by the President.
    This interpretation of Article 91(3), UCMJ’s elements
may seem overly strict, but I am unaware of any case before
today in which this Court affirmed a finding that an ac-
cused was guilty of an offense under Article 91(3), UCMJ,
where the accused engaged in disrespectful behavior at a
time when, or in a place where, the disrespected warrant,
noncommissioned, or petty officer could not see or hear that
behavior. Moreover, as noted by Chief Judge Ohlson, “it is
not the role of this Court to expand the reach of either stat-
utory language passed by Congress or elements of the arti-
cles promulgated by the President in order to avoid anom-
alous or undesirable results.” Brown, __ M.J. at __ n.8 (9
n.8). Nor do I mean to suggest that I believe—as Appellant
argues—that the elements of Article 91(3), UCMJ, impose
a physical presence requirement. Modern communications
technology might bring an accused’s conduct “within the
sight or hearing” of the accused’s intended victim. Never-
theless, when the government charges an accused with
committing disrespectful acts—as it did in this case—the
government must prove that those acts were committed
“within sight or hearing” of the victim. MCM pt. IV,
para. 17.b.(3)(b). Because the Government failed to do so in
this case, the findings of guilty with respect to Specifica-
tions 1, 2, and 4 of Charge I are not legally sufficient.
                        III. Conclusion
   Because the record indicates that Appellant did not cre-
ate or send the disrespectful text messages within the sight
or hearing of any of the alleged victims, I would hold that
his Article 91(3) convictions are not legally sufficient and
reverse the decision of the CGCCA with respect to Specifi-
cations 1, 2, and 4 of Charge I. 5

   5 In the alternative, I agree with Chief Judge Ohlson that

Appellant’s Article 91(3) convictions with respect to
Specifications 2 and 4 of Charge I were not legally sufficient, and
I would reverse the CGCCA with respect to those two
specifications.

                                  8