Court Opinion

ID: 9548842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:09:35.438354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:28.592306
License: Public Domain

HOWARD, Judge
(dissenting).
A.R.S. § 13-1424 is a legislative attempt to fashion a law which would comply with the case of Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). In Davis the defendant was one of twenty-four Negro youths picked up by the police without a warrant and taken to the police station for fingerprinting. He was released but subsequently charged with *400and convicted of rape. The Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the admission of the fingerprint evidence and affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the warrant-less detention of the defendant during which the fingerprints used at trial were taken constituted an unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There is language in Davis which apparently led our legislature to conclude that a statute such as A.R.S. § 13-1424 would pass constitutional muster. It is as follows:
“Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, however, that, because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth' Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).” 394 U.S. at 727, 89 S.Ct. at 1397.
The court further stated, however, that it did not have to decide whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest. Traditionally probable cause to arrest is defined to exist when facts within the officers’ knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. State v. Williams, 104 Ariz. 319, 452 P.2d 112 (1969).
The probable cause requirement has not been eliminated. In Camara the court states:
“In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, ‘probable cause’ is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.” 387 U.S. at 534, 87 S.Ct. at 1734.
Camara makes it clear that in order to apply the standard of probable cause, one must first focus on the public interest, which allegedly justifies intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen. The need to search is balanced against the invasion which the search entails. In balancing these interests, the following should be considered: (1) Is the primary purpose of the search to discover criminal evidente? (2) Is there a necessity for the particular type of search? (3) Can this type of search be effectively done in a less intrusive manner? (4) What is the extent of the invasion of privacy?
What is suggested by Camara is that under certain circumstances “probable cause” and “reasonableness” are synonymous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) relied upon by the majority represents another application of the Camara theory. The Terry search is justified by the necessity to protect the life of the police officer.
Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961) also cited by the majority is a border search case. As is pointed out by the court in Witt, border searches have always been placed in a category separate and apart from other searches and the majority’s reliance on Witt is misplaced.
In the case sub judice the purpose of the arrest under the statute is to further a criminal investigation. Unlike Terry or Camara, there is no necessity or emergency which would justify departure from the traditional definition of probable cause. In place of the dragnet approach used by the police in Davis v. Mississippi, supra, the Arizona statute permits the police to pick up individuals one-by-one on the grounds that it may contribute to the identification of the individual who committed the offense. This ephemeral standard offers no protection for the individual’s Fourth *401Amendment rights. The arrest of anyone could be justified on the grounds that if the identifying physical evidence proves that the individual is not connected with the crime, then it at least has contributed to the identification of the individual who did commit the offense by eliminating one who did not.
The majority’s attempt to hold the statute constitutional is valiant, but futile. The absence of a nexus of probable cause renders the statute unconstitutional. I would reverse.