Court Opinion

ID: 9747183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:00:41.577065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:20.990363
License: Public Domain

PANELLA, J.,
Dissenting:
¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether Manning has, at this stage of the proceedings, provided clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the Appel-lees broadcasted the allegedly defamatory statements with actual malice. In a well-written Opinion, the Majority finds that Manning failed to adduce adequate evidence to establish a cause of action for defamation, and thus, affirms the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. My review of the record, however, indicates that Manning, as the non-moving party, produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer falsity and actual malice from the objectionable broadcasts. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 We may reverse the entry of summary judgment only where we find that the trial court erred in concluding that either (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed, or (2) the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644, 841 A.2d 1000, 1004 (2003). We must review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts and drawing all inferences against the moving party. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 586, 812 A.2d 1218, 1221 (2002). As the appeal sub judice presents a question of law, our scope of review is plenary. McCarthy v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., Inc., 724 A.2d 938, 941 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 707, 743 A.2d 921 (1999).
*1148¶ 3 In applying the above legal standards in a defamation claim involving a public figure, the non-moving party
must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93,101-102, 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1008, 117 S.Ct. 512, 136 L.Ed.2d 401 (1996). It is critical that at this stage of the litigation we review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we give the benefit of all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. See Lewis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 833 A.2d 185, 190 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 690, 844 A.2d 553 (2004).
¶ 4 Initially, I note that Manning concedes that he is a public official.1 To survive summary judgment, Manning, as a public official, must not only come forward with evidence to show that the statements were false, see, e.g., Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 577 Pa. 598, 621, 848 A.2d 113, 127-128 (2004), but he must also present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows Appellees acted with actual malice.2 See Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212, 216 n. 3, 860 A.2d 48, 50 n. 3 (2004), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1700, 161 L.Ed.2d 539, 73 USLW 3462 (2005).
¶ 5 Actual malice is not established by showing that the publisher had an ill will or desire to do harm. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666-667, n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) (“The phrase ‘actual malice’ is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will.”). Rather, actual malice is a subjective standard of recklessness. We explained in Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 376 Pa.Super. 508, 546 A.2d 639 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 576, 559 A.2d 37 (1989), that:
[rjeckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disre*1149gard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice
546 A.2d at 642 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968)) (emphasis added). There is no single all-encompassing definition of “reckless disregard” in the context of a defamation case; instead, the term is considered in light of the various factors involved in a particular case. Curran, 546 A.2d at 642. For instance, a plaintiff may prove reckless disregard by showing that the story was conceived entirely within the imagination of the television station, the television station had reason to doubt the veracity of its sources, or the story was so implausible that only a reckless person would have published it. See generally, St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323.
¶ 6 As discussed, actual malice must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Lewis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 833 A.2d at 192. The determination of whether a plaintiff has established actual malice by the requisite clear and convincing evidence standard “may not be left in the realm of the factfinder.” Id. As we noted in Lewis,
[t]he question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’
Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 7 Applying the foregoing principles, I find that viewing the evidence and all inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to Manning3 demonstrates a genuine issue of fact from which a jury could reasonably find actual malice with convincing clarity. Manning’s evidence demonstrates that conflicting accounts of the incident had been related to the Appel-lees, and that WPXI, through its agents Newman and Johnson, had a preconceived agenda in reporting the story with a slant against Manning.
¶ 8 The primary source in this case is Riggins. Riggins provided her employer with two written statements. In the first statement, Riggins detailed the incident involving Manning, but attributed the racial slurs to Manning’s son and fiancée, whom she referred to as being Manning’s wife. She noted that “his wife and his son kept giving me the finger (middle) and called me a n-r several times.” Rig-gins, First Statement, 12/20/95. In her second statement, however, Riggins again detailed the incident, but this time attributed a racial slur to Manning as she explained that Manning called her a “f-g n-r.” 4 Riggins, Second Statement, 12/20/95. As noted in the record, shortly after the incident, Patrolman Harrison interviewed Riggins and she attributed the racial slur to Manning’s fiancee. The police report states that Riggins “saw the *1150man’s wife give her the finger and say ‘[n]-r.’ ” Police Report, 12/20/95. Nowhere in the police report is it indicated that Riggins attributed any racial slurs to Manning.
¶ 9 Manning argues that the conflicting accounts regarding the incident from the victim of the alleged verbal assault certainly should have provided Appellees with obvious reasons to doubt the truth of Riggins’ later accusations. Thus, based solely upon the inconsistent statements of Riggins, Manning contends his defamation action is viable; Appellees published the defamatory statements regardless of the reasons to doubt the veracity of their sources.
¶ 10 To buttress his complaint, Manning points to evidence which suggests that Ap-pellees purposefully ignored Riggins’ conflicting statements. Manning’s former attorney, Gary Zimmerman, testified that when he confronted Scott Newman with the police report, Newman told him “I’m going to go with the story the way I want to go with it.” Zimmerman, Deposition, 9/19/00, at 76. Furthermore, attorney Zimmerman requested that the news broadcast reflect the events as recounted in the police report, i.e., that Manning had not used racial slurs; but Newman allegedly refused stating, “I’m not going to do that because that doesn’t fit into my program.” Id. When attorney Zimmerman objected and informed Newman that he did not believe that his story would reflect the incident’s actual events, Newman purportedly stated, “I don’t care what the truth is. I’m running the story my way.” Id.
¶ 11 Manning further emphasizes the manner in which Appellees reported Frank Aiello’s oral comments. Aiello’s written statement, in its entirety, is as follows:
I was working the # 4 mag and Ursula Riggins was working the #3 X-ray. I agree with Ursula on her report, up to where she told the gentleman to pick up his garment bag. I had to have the man scanned. He did not pick up his bag as Ursula asked him as he was going back to the scanner. I then went back to handling the mag and therefore cannot attest to the actions that followed.
Aiello, Statement, 12/21/95 (emphasis added). Despite his written statement, which Appellees had in their possession, during the taped interview, which was subsequently broadcasted, Aiello orally stated the following: “Of all the things I heard him [i.e., Manning] say, I did hear him make the one statement, that’s what happens when you give a f and n a job.” Broadcast, 2/1/96. At this stage of the litigation, in light of our standard of review, Manning plausibly argues that Aiel-lo’s taped statement blatantly contradicts his written statement, but yet Appellees reported his oral account without reservation.
¶ 12 Manning points out that Appellees did not make any effort to reconcile the discrepancies between Aiello’s two statements or make the public aware of his differing accounts. To the contrary, on the February 1, 1996, broadcast, Johnson referred to the signed written statements and stated the following: “These incident reports completed and signed by six Ogden employees — who said they were in the area that day — all indicate Judge Manning made racial remarks — on the day in question.” Id.
¶ 13 Lastly, I consider Appellees’ argument that they are “entitled to summary judgment on the independent basis that [the publication] was privileged under the fair report or neutral report doctrines.” Appellees’ Brief, at 52. In this regard, I find that Appellees’ argument is without merit.
*1151¶ 14 In Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212, 216 n. 3, 860 A.2d 48, 50 n. 3 (2004), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1700, 161 L.Ed.2d 539, 73 USLW 3462 (2005), our Supreme Court refused to adopt the neutral reportage doctrine as it held that “neither the United States nor the Pennsylvania Constitutions mandate adoption of the neutral reportage doctrine.” Thus, the neutral reportage doctrine cannot afford Appellees protection. Furthermore, the fair report doctrine “is a common law privilege protecting media entities which publish fair and accurate reports of governmental proceedings.” Id., 580 Pa. at 220 n. 6, 860 A.2d at 53 n. 6 (emphasis added). There is no governmental proceeding at issue in the present case, and therefore, the fair report doctrine is inapplicable.
¶ 15 Based on the foregoing, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.5 Thus, I respectfully dissent.

. Manning's status as a judge unquestionably makes him a public official. See, e.g., DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa.Super. 510, 544 A.2d 1345, 1348 (1988). I note, however, that the alleged misconduct attributed to Manning took place while he was not acting in his official capacity, i.e., the conduct took place while he was involved in private matters. Nonetheless, I find, and Manning does not dispute, that Manning’s alleged behavior clearly touches on his fitness for office and, as such, Appellees are afforded the protection of the public-official rule, which requires a showing of actual malice. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (holding that public official rule protects "anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office”).

. There is no dispute among the parties that the challenged publications, i.e., the accusations of making racial slurs, are capable of a defamatory meaning. See 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8343(a) ("In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving ... [t]he defamatory character of the communication.”). A communication is defamatory if it "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third parties from associating or dealing with him.” Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 577 Pa. 598, 615, 848 A.2d 113, 124 (2004).

. As aforesaid, defamation actions do not require a different standard of review from other types of civil actions regarding summary judgment motions: “[W]e view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.” Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 98, 674 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1008, 117 S.Ct. 512, 136 L.Ed.2d 401 (1996) (emphasis added).

. In the second statement, Riggins again noted that Manning’s son and fiancée were making obscene gestures and calling her a "n-r.” Riggins, Second Statement, 12/20/95.

. The trial court, without explaining its reasoning, granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment as to Count II of Manning's amended complaint, the civil conspiracy count. I assume the trial court granted the motion as to Count II because without Count I, the defamation count, there was no underlying tort. See Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa.Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973, 980 (1985) (cause of action for civil conspiracy requires that two or more persons combine or enter agreement to commit unlawful act or to do otherwise lawful act by unlawful means). As I would reverse the grant of summary judgment as to Count I, the underlying tort would be reinstated, and thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Count II must necessarily also be reversed.