Court Opinion

ID: 9915577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:05:20.944984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:26.823726
License: Public Domain

SECOND DIVISION
                                 MERCIER, C. J.,
                           MILLER, P.J., and HODGES, J.

                      NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                      physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                      days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                                 https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                       January 5, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1780. PONDERS v. THE STATE.

      HODGES, Judge.

      A jury found Anthony Ponders (“Ponders”) guilty of child molestation.

Ponders appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting that he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in several respects. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

      The evidence shows that A. M. lived with her grandparents, Rhonda and

Anthony Ponders, and a number of other relatives. On February 12, 2021, Ponders

woke up A. M. to clean up her dog’s feces and urine. A. M., who was 14 years old at

the time of the second trial,1 testified that Ponders “expos[ed] his self” while he was

      1
          Ponders’ first trial ended with a mistrial.
in her room. According to A. M., Ponders spent five to ten minutes in her room with

his “penis . . . out” of his shorts about six feet away from her, and she believed

Ponders wanted her to see his penis. He walked from one side of the bed to the other

in a way that made her look at it, even though she did not want to see it. He also left

three dollars on her table, but did not say why. Earlier in the day, Ponders had taken

A. M. to a store and bought her ice cream and a vape.

      Haley Ponders, Ponders’ daughter and A. M.’s aunt, walked by A. M.’s room

and saw Ponders inside with A. M. Haley testified that Ponders’ pants were down and

she saw his buttocks exposed. She was concerned about what was happening in the

room because Ponders was panicky when he saw her. In fact, A. M. testified that

Ponders “ran out [of] the room” when Haley walked by. Haley entered A. M.’s room

and talked to her about what she had witnessed. Haley also testified that she saw

money thrown on A. M.’s night stand. After Haley spoke with A. M., she told A. M.’s

grandmother to call the police, which she did after hearing what happened from both

A. M. and Haley. A. M. testified that she would not have said anything because she

was scared. The three women stayed locked in A. M.’s grandmother’s room until the

                                          2
police came. When the police arrived, A. M. told them what had happened. She was

embarrassed and did not want to talk to them.

      On cross-examination, A. M. testified that she told her grandmother shortly

after the incident that what happened could have been an accident. On redirect,

however, A. M. testified that she told the officer that she wanted the incident to be an

accident because it would be easier for her and her family, but it was not an accident.

A. M. testified unequivocally at trial that the incident was not an accident.

      A. M.’s grandmother also testified at trial. According to her, Haley woke her

up, frantic, and told her what had happened. Haley said “that she [saw] her daddy

coming out of [A. M.’s] bedroom with his pants pulled down” and told her to call the

police. Haley then brought A. M. to the grandmother’s bedroom. A. M. was scared

and told her that Ponders came into her room and “showed himself to her[,] . . . going

from one side of her bed to the other to make sure that she [saw] it.” A. M. said she

tried to look away and not see it. The grandmother told police that Ponders had

exposed himself to A. M. and was possibly on drugs. She later saw three dollars in A.

M.’s room. The grandmother also testified about a phone conversation between

Ponders and his brother where, according to her, Ponders admitted he exposed

                                           3
himself to A. M. but claimed he should have been charged simply with indecent

exposure. The recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

      An officer who responded to the scene wore a bodycam while he spoke with

individuals at the scene, and the bodycam footage was played during the

grandmother’s testimony at trial. The officer also testified that Ponders exhibited

manifestations of drug use, but noted that Ponders did not have any drugs on his

person and was not tested for drugs on the night of the incident.

      A similar transaction witness also testified at trial regarding Ponders’ sexual

abuse of her as a child.

      Ponders testified that his shorts accidentally “slid down” and he covered

himself up and started walking out of the door. According to Ponders, he gave A. M.

three dollars to buy Takis snack chips the next day because she had brought in some

kindling for the fireplace.

      A jury found Ponders guilty of child molestation, and the trial court sentenced

him to 20 years, with the first 19 years to be served in prison and the remainder on

probation. Ponders filed a motion for new trial on the general grounds. Subsequently,

his new appellate counsel filed both a motion for new trial on the general grounds and

                                          4
an amended motion for new trial claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The

trial court denied Ponders’ motion as amended, and this appeal followed.

      Ponders argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his trial counsel: (1) failed to object to alleged hearsay on numerous occasions;

(2) failed to properly utilize Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”)

records; and (3) failed to assist Ponders at the sentencing hearing. The trial court

concluded that Ponders’ trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. We find

no reversible error.

      To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, one must prove both deficient

performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.

668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457

(2) (807 SE2d 369) (2017). “To show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient, [a

defendant] must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his duties in an objectively

unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” (Citation omitted.) Brown, 302 Ga. at 457 (2). Counsel’s

performance is deficient only if it falls below the wide range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-689 (III) (A). “This burden,

                                            5
although not impossible to carry, is a heavy one, because when reviewing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, this Court applies a strong presumption that counsel’s

performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Prescott v. State, 357 Ga. App. 375, 385 (3) (850

SE2d 812) (2020); see also Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 342, 346 (3) (733 SE2d 400)

(2012) (concluding that a defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that

the performance of his lawyer was not within the range of reasonable professional

lawyering). A defendant

      bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. To carry this burden,
      he must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his
      lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In
      particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the
      basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
      unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a
      course.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown, 302 Ga. at 457 (2). A finding of deficient

performance requires a showing of errors so serious that counsel was not functioning

as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687

(III); accord State v. Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 323 (3) (745 SE2d 617) (2013).

                                          6
      Prejudice is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694 (III) (B);

Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 584-585 (783 SE2d 913) (2016).

      Even when a defendant has proved that his counsel’s performance was
      deficient in this constitutional sense, he also must prove prejudice by
      showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
      errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. It is not
      enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
      outcome of the proceeding. Rather, [a defendant] must demonstrate a
      ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result, which, the United States
      Supreme Court has explained, is a probability sufficient to undermine
      confidence in the outcome.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown, 302 Ga. at 457 (2).

      An ineffective-assistance claim is a mixed question of law and fact, and we

accept the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous but independently

apply the law to those facts. Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 60 (5) (766 SE2d 1) (2014);

see also Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698 (IV). Importantly, “[t]he standard regarding

ineffective assistance of counsel is not errorless counsel and not counsel judged

ineffective by hindsight, but counsel rendering reasonably effective assistance.”

                                           7
(Citation omitted.) Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 584, 587 (2) (b) (723 SE2d 431) (2012).

The defendant bears the burden of proof on both prongs of an ineffective-assistance

claim — if he fails to establish either prong, a reviewing court need not examine the

other. See Robinson v. State, 298 Ga. 455, 462-463 (6) (782 SE2d 657) (2016). In short,

the burden of proving a denial of effective assistance of counsel is a heavy one, and

after reviewing Ponders’ claims in accordance with these standards, we conclude that

Ponders has not met his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was ineffective.

      1. Ponders first claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to

alleged hearsay on numerous occasions. He acknowledges, however, that the failure

to object to hearsay is not reversible if it stemmed from a strategic decision. See

Martin v. State, 360 Ga. App. 1, 7 (1) (b) (860 SE2d 582) (2021).

      Generally, counsel’s decision to forgo objecting to hearsay testimony can
      be reasonable trial strategy. We evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s
      strategic decision in conjunction with the attendant circumstances of the
      challenged conduct with every effort made to eliminate the distorting
      effects of hindsight. Thus, deficiency cannot be demonstrated by merely
      arguing that there is another, or even a better, way for counsel to have
      performed.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

                                           8
      At the motion for new trial hearing in this case, Ponders’ trial counsel explained

that he did not object to the statements complained of because: (i) they probably

would have been admitted as a result of the child hearsay exception; and (ii) the

individuals who testified also testified at Ponders’ first trial, and trial counsel was

going to address any alleged hearsay through cross-examination. According to trial

counsel, based on his experience,

      you can, in fact, alienate a jury by too many objections. It almost appears
      that you’re trying to hide something at times, so I let evidence come in
      sometimes because I understand that we’re going to be able to rebut it in
      some other fashion in the future and so forth without alienate -- in my
      mind, alienating a jury or creating some sort of concern.

This was especially true in Ponders’ case where, because this was his second trial,

counsel had a preview of what the evidence was going to be.

      Pretermitting whether the complained-of statements actually constituted

objectionable hearsay,2 we conclude that trial counsel’s decision not to object, but to

      2
        The State asserts that the subject statements did not constitute hearsay, were
non-responsive to questions, were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule —
specifically, excited utterances, past inconsistent statements, child hearsay, and
present sense impression — or were merely cumulative of other admissible evidence.

                                           9
address the alleged hearsay through cross-examination, was a reasonable trial strategy

in this case. See Richards v. State, 306 Ga. 779, 781-782 (2) (a) (833 SE2d 96) (2019)

(finding that trial counsel’s strategic decision to not object to hearsay and rebut such

statements via cross-examination or exposing inconsistencies in other witnesses’

testimony is a reasonable trial strategy). Trial counsel’s strategy was calculated and

deliberate, he cross-examined and occasionally re-cross-examined witnesses, and his

strategic move was neither patently unreasonable nor outside the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. See Hughs v. State, 312 Ga. 606, 612 (2) (864 SE2d

59) (2021) (“[A] tactical decision will not form the basis for an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim unless it was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney

would have chosen it.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      Moreover, Ponders only asked trial counsel two generic questions regarding the

alleged hearsay statements at the motion for new trial hearing; he did not separately

question trial counsel regarding each instance he asserts in his appellate brief. As our

Supreme Court has explained, “when trial counsel does not testify at the motion for

new trial hearing about the subject, it is extremely difficult to overcome the

presumption that his conduct was reasonable.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

                                          10
Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 876 (3) (b) (742 SE2d 707) (2013); see also id. at 874 (3)

(a), n. 5 (holding that to carry his burden, the defendant must show deficiencies by

competent evidence, for a silent or ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the

presumption). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Ponders did not

demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently in this regard.

         2. Ponders next asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

properly utilize DFCS records to: (i) counter the State’s theory that he was high the

day in question; (ii) show that he gave A. M. dollar bills on a regular basis for non-

sexual reasons; and (iii) show that A. M. liked Takis snack chips to support Ponders’

claim that he gave her money for that purpose. We disagree.

         At the outset, we note that Ponders’ counsel at the motion for new trial hearing

mentioned that the DFCS record log contained approximately 200 pages, but Ponders

only introduced a few of those pages into evidence at the hearing, and trial counsel was

not confronted with any of the pages or questioned about any evidence that was

included within the pages. Moreover, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial

hearing that he reviewed the DFCS records and strategically chose not to use them at

trial.

                                            11
      Turning first to Ponders’ alleged drug usage on the day in question, Ponders

argues that trial counsel should have introduced what appears to be a 2009 DFCS

record log indicating that Ponders had been sent for a drug screen (though no result

was indicated), and a February 16, 2009 DFCS record log stating that Ponders brought

in a drug treatment completion certificate. First of all, the crime in this case occurred

12 years after the proffered evidence regarding Ponders’ drug screen and treatment

as noted in the DFCS record log, and Ponders does not indicate how these general

record logs are relevant to the February 12, 2021 incident. Based on the length of time,

alone, we cannot find that the DFCS record logs would counter the State’s theory that

Ponders was under the influence of drugs on the night of the incident. See Harris v.

State, 359 Ga. App. 356, 362 (2) (b) (857 SE2d 815) (2021) (finding no reasonable

probability that a three-year-old prescription for the same controlled substances found

in the defendant’s car would have changed the outcome of her trial for possession of

a controlled substance). Instead, trial counsel challenged the State’s theory through

cross-examination.

      Second, the mere failure to utilize certain evidence is insufficient to constitute

ineffective assistance; the failure must be one indicating that the attorney performed

                                           12
in an objectively unreasonable way. Brown, 302 Ga. at 457 (2). Here, trial counsel

testified that he did not have evidence that Ponders was not high on the night of the

incident, and trial counsel did not want to “get into . . . allegations . . . that might

enhance the allegations of the meth usage[,]” especially since Ponders had a

possession case involving methamphetamine pending against him at the same time as

the molestation trial. This strategic decision not to utilize the DFCS records —

showing Ponders’ drug treatment 12 years before the crime at issue — because they

could have highlighted Ponders’ drug usage was a reasonable tactical decision. “[W]e

cannot conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing

to use the [evidence] at trial.” Sellers v. State, 277 Ga. 172, 174 (4) (587 SE2d 35)

(2003); see also Brown v. State, 226 Ga. App. 238, 239-240 (1) (486 SE2d 385) (1997)

(concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to utilize records that had

neither exculpatory nor impeachment value).

      As for Ponders’ other claims, he argues that trial counsel should have

introduced an undated DFCS record log indicating that A. M. told a representative

that “Pawpaw gives a dollar everyday” and that she and her brother “fight over TV

time and Tahkies [sic] (chips) a lot[.]” According to Ponders, this evidence would

                                           13
have supported the defense theory that Ponders gave A. M. money for Takis snack

chips and not some sexual reason. We again find no merit in this assertion. First,

Ponders has not shown that he was the individual giving A. M. “a dollar everyday.”

The DFCS record log does not contain a specific date, but the heading of the page

introduced into evidence indicates the case name “Mcbee, Dorothy,” and the page

begins with “PGP[]s stated that they have taken care of their grandchildren for 11

years but MGP[]s help out too.” It is undisputed that A. M. and her brother lived with

the McBees, their paternal grandparents, until a few years prior to the trial in March

2022. It is further undisputed that A. M. referred to Ponders as “Pappy,” not

“Pawpaw.” Accordingly, the evidence would not, as argued by Ponders, support the

defense theory that Ponders gave A. M. a dollar every day for non-sexual reasons,

much less the three dollars he left on her table on the night of the incident. Second,

whether A. M. likes Takis was not in dispute during the trial; the issue was whether

Ponders gave A. M. money immediately after the child saw his penis as a form of

grooming.

      Trial counsel’s strategic decision not to use the DFCS record log at trial was

neither patently unreasonable nor outside the wide range of reasonable professional

                                          14
assistance. See Hughs, 312 Ga. at 612 (2). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court

that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to introduce the pages of the

DFCS record log suggested by Ponders.

      3. Finally, Ponders argues that trial counsel was ineffective by abandoning him

at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, Ponders claims that trial counsel “presented

no evidence in mitigation, asked no questions of the state’s witness, made no legal

argument, made no objections, and requested no leniency.” Ponders also asserts that

trial counsel “failed to prevent [him] from making inflammatory statements that

essentially blamed the victim and denied any responsibility on the part of Mr.

Ponders.” Indeed, the record shows that although trial counsel was physically present

at Ponders’ sentencing hearing, he did not, according to the trial court, “make any

attempt to further advance [Ponders’] case.” In fact, trial counsel admitted at the

motion for new trial hearing that he “did not participate at all in the sentencing

portion.” Ponders maintains that trial counsel’s inaction resulted in his receipt of the

maximum sentence permitted under law. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (1) (“[A] person

convicted of a first offense of child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for

not less than five nor more than 20 years and shall be subject to the sentencing and

                                           15
punishment provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.2 and 17-10-7.”). Although we do not

condone trial counsel’s inaction, we find that his inaction did not prejudice Ponders.

      At the sentencing hearing, trial counsel informed the court that Ponders had

alleged numerous claims of ineffectiveness against him. In fact, it is apparent from the

sentencing transcript that Ponders had lost all faith in his trial counsel. When the trial

court asked Ponders if he wished for trial counsel to represent him with sentencing on

two unrelated cases being heard at the same time as the case before us, Ponders

declined, stating, “I don’t want him to be my attorney on [those cases].” The trial

court then continued those unrelated cases, and the State proceeded on sentencing in

the case before us.

      The State first introduced evidence showing that Ponders was a habitual felon

and requested the maximum sentence for child molestation. When the State

concluded, Ponders’ trial counsel stated, “Your Honor, given the fact that I have been

accused of ineffective assistance, I don’t know that I can render any type of decision

with respect to admissibility or an objection at this time.” The State then called A.

M.’s grandmother, who explained how the crime had affected her family. When she

finished testifying, Ponders’ trial counsel stated, “Your Honor, again, I don’t know

                                           16
that I can ask any questions given the circumstances.” Trial counsel did not offer any

mitigation evidence on behalf of Ponders. When asked if he wished to make a

statement in regard to sentencing after the State had concluded its presentation of

evidence, Ponders stated “yes” and then addressed the court. Specifically, Ponders

argued that everything that happened to the family was because a dog urinated on the

floor and his shorts fell down; it was not his fault.3 The trial court then sentenced

Ponders to 20 years, with the first 19 years to be served in prison and the balance to

be served on probation.

      Trial counsel explained at the motion for new trial hearing that although he was

still the attorney of record in the case and had not filed a formal withdrawal, Ponders

      had filed a written complaint alleging about seven or eight different
      issues as to [trial counsel’s] ineffectiveness and so forth. It was very clear
      that he was not happy with [trial counsel’s] representation and [trial
      counsel] felt, based upon the written complaint he had filed, that I really

      3
        Ponders stated, “This has affected our family. I wasn’t the one that caused
everybody to move. That wasn’t me. They couldn’t — they didn’t pay the bills. [A.
M.’s grandmother] asked them to leave, not me. A dog peed in the floor, my shorts
fell down. I didn’t do this. It was not to fill my sexual gratification. It was on account
of a dog peed in the floor and that’s what happened. And, Your Honor, I did not do
this.”
                                            17
      could not go forward and continue to represent him with that — that
      complaint pending.

According to trial counsel, Ponders was “very adamant” that he did not want trial

counsel and wasn’t satisfied with trial counsel’s representation. That said, trial

counsel testified that he spoke with Ponders numerous times prior to the sentencing

hearing, specifically telling him that he could call witnesses and speak to the judge at

sentencing. And the parties stipulated at the motion for new trial hearing that Ponders

“would not have testified at sentencing if his counsel had instructed him not to.”

      Pretermitting whether trial counsel’s lack of participation at Ponders’

sentencing was proper given counsel’s failure to withdraw or seek to demonstrate that

a conflict existed, his inaction does not warrant a new trial. As pointed out by the trial

court, the jury had already deliberated and returned a verdict. The question before us,

then, is whether such inaction warrants a new sentencing hearing. See Black v. State,

264 Ga. 550, 552 (1) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (concluding that “any errors committed

during the sentencing phase do not justify a new guilt-innocence trial”); see also Hall

v. McPherson, 284 Ga. 219, 226 (3), 235 (5) (663 SE2d 659) (2008) (holding that

deficient performance in the sentencing phase only entitled the defendant to vacation

                                           18
of his sentence); Schofield v. Gulley, 279 Ga. 413, 416 (I) (B) (614 SE2d 740) (2005)

(finding that ineffectiveness in the sentencing phase required only a new sentencing

trial). We find that it does not.

      First, although Ponders makes some conclusory assertions that trial counsel’s

inaction resulted in the imposition of the maximum sentence, he presented no

evidence or proffer at the motion for new trial hearing showing what mitigating

evidence could have been presented or what actions or objections should have been

taken by trial counsel, “much less that such additional evidence [or actions] in

reasonable probability would have persuaded a rational trier of fact to reach a different

sentencing verdict.” Hulett, 296 Ga. at 69 (5) (c) (i); accord Harris v. State, 345 Ga.

App. 80, 82 (1) (d) (812 SE2d 342) (2018). “Because [Ponders] has not satisfied his

burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance at

sentencing, this claim of ineffective assistance must fail.” Davis v. State, 286 Ga. 74,

78 (4) (686 SE2d 249) (2009) (concluding that the defendant did not demonstrate that

he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s performance at sentencing when he failed to

“suggest what evidence might have served to mitigate his sentence; he offered no

                                           19
witnesses and proffered no affidavits on this issue at the hearing on the motion for new

trial”).

       Apparently recognizing his failure to demonstrate what evidence trial counsel

could have presented in mitigation,4 what questions he could have asked of the State’s

witness, what legal arguments or objections he could have made, or what statements

could have been offered as a plea for leniency at the sentencing hearing to minimize

his sentence, Ponders’ appellate brief focuses on trial counsel’s failure to counsel him

not to make a statement to the court. Ponders correctly notes that the trial court’s

order failed to recognize the parties’ stipulation that he would have followed his

counsel’s advice not to make a statement. Notwithstanding this fact, we conclude that

the trial court correctly denied Ponders’ ineffective assistance claim in this regard

because Ponders cannot show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to

prevent him from making an inflammatory statement to the court.

       Ponders’ statement at sentencing did not differ from his testimony at trial.

Ponders consistently stated during the trial that he stepped in dog urine and that his

       4
       In fact, trial counsel testified that none of the potential mitigation witnesses
suggested by Ponders returned his phone calls.
                                          20
shorts fell down accidentally. He also denied taking any action for sexual gratification,

but blamed the dog urine on the floor. Ponders’ statements denying responsibility at

the sentencing hearing were simply reiterations and cumulative of his testimony at

trial. Because the same judge who decided Ponders’ sentence also presided over his

trial and had heard the evidence presented, and because this judge, “knowing whether

[Ponders’] statement would have affected the choice of sentence, found that counsel

was not ineffective[, w]e cannot say that this finding was ‘clearly erroneous.’”

(Citation omitted.) Baines v. State, 201 Ga. App. 354, 355 (1) (a) (411 SE2d 95) (1991);

see generally Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 493 (2) (b) (651 SE2d 698) (2007)

(stating that a “trial court’s finding is entitled to particular deference given that the

trial judge who conducted the evidentiary hearing on the amended new trial motion

was the same judge who presided over [the defendant’s] trial”). The trial court did

not err in denying Ponders’ motion for new trial on this ground.

      Judgment affirmed. Mercier, C. J., and Miller, P. J., concur.

                                           21