Court Opinion

ID: 9790940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:01:50.0352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.739162
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
I concur. I write separately to address an important issue which was the original reason why this court granted a hearing in this case. The issue is whether an accused’s honest, good faith, but mistaken belief that there has been a reconciliation is a defense to a violation of Penal Code section 278.5.1 Resolution of this question turns on whether section 278.5, subdivision (a) describes a specific intent crime and if it does, what specific intent is required.
Section 278.5, subdivision (a) provided in pertinent part; “Every person who in violation of a custody decree takes, retains after the expiration of a visitation period, or conceals the child from his legal custodian, and every person who has custody of a child pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of any court which grants another person rights to custody or visitation of such child, and who detains or conceals such child with the intent to deprive the other person of such right to custody or visitation shall be punished by *860imprisonment in the state prison . . . .” (Italics added.) As is evident from the italicized language, the statute clearly contained a specific intent element. (See People v. Lortz (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 363, 371-372 [187 Cal.Rptr. 89].)
The Attorney General recognizes the existence of this specific intent language, but would limit its applicability to persons who have custody.2 In his view, section 278.5 described a general intent crime as to a “noncustodial parent,”3 thereby rendering irrelevant that parent’s otherwise unintentional mistakes.
However, such a constrained construction is illogical at best. Consider the following example. Under the terms of a custody decree, a mother had visitation rights on the first weekend of every month. Acting under the mistaken belief that she had been granted visitation rights on the second weekend of every month, she took her child on the second weekend instead of on the first. Under the Attorney General’s view, the mother could be convicted of violating section 278.5, since she took her child in violation of a custody decree, even though she lacked the specific intent to deprive the father of his custody rights. Surely, the Legislature did not intend such a result.
The Attorney General’s interpretation is also contrary to the legislative history and the statutory scheme of which section 278.5 was a part. Every other statute in this area contained a specific intent element.4 For example, *861an earlier version of section 278, subdivision (a)5 provided in pertinent part: “Every person, not having a right of custody, who maliciously takes, entices away, detains or conceals any minor child with intent to detain or conceal such child from a parent, or guardian, or other person having the lawful charge of such child shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison . . . .” Since this statute did not require a violation of a custody decree, it included situations in which a person without any rights under a custody decree took a child. Under this section, the state was required to prove the accused’s specific intent to detain or conceal a child from his or her parent or guardian in addition to the act of taking the child. (See People v. Johnson (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1021, 1026 [199 Cal.Rptr. 231].)
Section 278.5, on the other hand, required a violation of a custody decree and, therefore, included situations in which a “noncustodial parent” with visitation rights took his or her child. Under the Attorney General’s interpretation, in a section 278.5 prosecution involving a “noncustodial parent,” the state would not have been required to prove any culpable mental element beyond a general “intent to take, retain, or conceal.” It is unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to make it more difficult to convict persons without any rights pursuant to a custody decree than to convict the child’s own parent.
The legislative evolution of section 278.5 also supports the view that a specific intent is required in section 278.5 cases. As initially proposed by Assembly Bill No. 2549, section 278, subdivision (b)—which eventually was enacted as section 278.5, subdivision (a)—contained only the “custodial parent” portion with its specific intent requirement. (Assem. Bill No. 2549 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 5, 1975.) Subsequent amendments added the “noncustodial parent” provision to the same subdivision. (Assem. Amend, to Assem. Bill No. 2549 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 20, 1976; Sen. Amend, to Assem. Bill No. 2549 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 16, 1976; Conference Amend, to Assem. Bill No. 2549 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Assem., Aug. 30, 1976, Sen., Aug. 31, 1976.) Since the latter provision was added to the subdivision which contained a specific intent requirement, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended that requirement to apply to both “custodial” and “noncustodial parents.”6
*862Since every other statute in this area requires a specific intent, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to require a specific intent in all section 278.5 cases.7 Therefore, before an accused could be held criminally liable under section 278.5, the prosecution had to prove that he or she acted with the specific intent required by the statute.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Legislature’s 1983 amendment of section 278.5, subdivision (a). (Stats. 1983, ch. 990, § 4.) The intent language in the amended version of section 278.5 clearly applies to “custodial” and “noncustodial parents” alike. That statute now provides in pertinent part: “Every person who in violation of the physical custody or visitation provisions of a custody order, judgment, or decree takes, retains, detains, or conceals the child with the intent to deprive another person of his or her rights to physical custody or visitation shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison . . . .” With this amendment, the Legislature has laid to rest any doubts as to whether specific intent is required in section 278.5 cases involving “noncustodial parents.”
What then, exactly, was the specific intent required by section 278.5? The statutory language punished those persons who took a child in violation of a custody decree “with the intent to deprive the other person of such right to custody or visitation.” When the “noncustodial parent” was charged with violating section 278.5, the words “other person” referred to the person who had custody, i.e., the legal custodian. The phrase “such right” referred to a right to custody under a custody order, judgment or decree. Thus, for a “noncustodial parent,” the specific intent required by the statute was the intent to deprive the legal custodian of his or her right to custody pursuant to a custody order, judgment or decree.
Since section 278.5 was a specific intent crime, an accused was entitled to have a jury consider any defense which applies to specific intent crimes and is supported by the facts in the case. A good faith mistake of law is *863such a defense, if the mistake negates the specific intent required for the offense. (People v. Butler (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 573 [55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703]; People v. Eastman (1888) 77 Cal. 171, 172 [19 P. 266]; see 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes, § 149; People v. Devine (1892) 95 Cal. 227, 228-231 [30 P. 378]; People v. Photo (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 345, 352-353 [114 P.2d 71]; see also People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 804 [299 P.2d 850].) It is clear that an honest or good faith mistake of law does not negate general intent. (See People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819].) However, there appears to be no California decision which holds that such a mistake does not negate specific intent.
Theft and robbery are examples of such crimes where a good faith mistake of law may negate specific intent. (People v. Butler, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 573.) In Butler, an individual was accused of felony murder based on the underlying crime of robbery. The evidence showed that the defendant had been employed by a man named Anderson, who had not paid him for some work. One evening, the defendant went to Anderson’s home to collect payment. Anderson was killed in the course of the evening, and the defendant left with Anderson’s wallet. At trial, the defendant testified that he intended only to recover the money which he was owed. (Id., at pp. 571-572.) Although the crime of robbery requires the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to negate that intent by establishing the defense of an honest belief that he was entitled to the money. (Id., at p. 572.)
On appeal, this court found the denial of the defense to be error and reversed the judgment. The court noted that “[i]t has long been the rule in this state and generally throughout the country that a bona fide belief, even though mistakenly held, that one has a right or claim to the property negates felonious intent. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 573.)
In an earlier case involving the crime of larceny, this court noted that “[i]t is one thing to take and carry off personal property with the intention to steal, and another to take it away under a mistaken idea of legal rights honestly entertained, and any fact or circumstance which tends to throw light upon the actual intent of the party charged with the felonious taking is pertinent evidence, and should be allowed to go to the jury.” (People v. Eastman, supra, 77 Cal. at p. 172.) The good faith mistake of law defense has also been recognized with respect to other specific intent crimes. (People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 139 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317] [embezzlement]; People v. Crowder (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 578, 586 [272 P.2d 775] [forgery].)
In a more analogous context, this court has recognized that an erroneous but good faith belief in the validity of a judgment of dissolution or annul*864ment may absolve an accused of criminal liability for the offense of bigamy. (See People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 804.) The bigamy statutes (§§ 281, 282) provide that a person who remarries after his or her former marriage has been dissolved “by the judgment of a competent Court” is not guilty of bigamy. In Vogel, this court observed that it would not “be reasonable to hold that a person is guilty of bigamy who remarries in good faith in reliance on a judgment of divorce or annulment that is subsequently found not to be the ‘judgment of a competent court’. ...” (46 Cal. 2d at p. 804.) The court reasoned that “[sjince it is often difficult for laymen to know when a judgment is not that of a competent court, we cannot reasonably expect them always to have such knowledge and make them criminals if their bona fide belief proves to be erroneous.” (Ibid.)
Clearly, an erroneous but good faith belief in the invalidity of a child custody order constitutes a defense to a violation of section 278.5. If the accused in good faith believes that the child custody order has been nullified as a result of a reconciliation with his spouse, then he does not entertain the specific intent required by the statute—i.e., “the intent to deprive the [legal custodian] of such right to custody. ...”

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant was convicted of violating the 1976 version of section 278.5 (Stats. 1976, ch. 1399, § 11, p. 6315.) That statute was amended in 1983. (Stats. 1983, ch. 990, § 4.) All further references to section 278.5 are to the 1976 version unless otherwise noted.

Section 278.5 applied to two classes of persons. The first part of subdivision (a) concerned persons who did not have custody pursuant to a custody decree but who did have some rights under the decree, such as visitation rights. (Hereafter, these persons are referred to as “noncustodial parents.”) The second part concerned persons who were granted custody pursuant to a custody decree. (Hereafter, these individuals are referred to as “custodial parents.”)

Presumably, the Attorney General culls this general intent from the language in section 278.5 which punished “[e]very person who in violation of a custody decree takes, retains ... or conceals the child . . . . ”

Former section 279 was divided into three subdivisions. Subdivision (a) prohibited the act of keeping a child after the expiration of a visitation period “without good cause and with intent to detain or conceal such child.” Subdivision (b) forbade the act of concealing a child “without good cause and with intent to deprive such other person of such right of limited custody or visitation. ” Subdivision (c) proscribed removing and concealing a child “without good cause and with intent to prevent the other parent from exercising rights of custody to the child . . . .” (Stats. 1965, ch. 194, § 1, p. 1158, repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1399, § 12, p. 6316.)
An earlier version of section 278 provided in pertinent part: “Every person who maliciously, forcibly, or fraudulently takes or entices away any minor child with intent to detain and conceal such child from its parent, guardian, or other person having the lawful charge of such child is punishable . . . .” (Stats. 1901, ch. 106, § 1, p. 269, repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1399, § 9, p. 6315.)

Like section 278.5, this section (Stats. 1976, ch. 1399, § 10.5, p. 6315) was amended in 1983. (Stats. 1983, ch. 990, § 3.)

Even if one were to ignore the legislative history of section 278.5, the most that can be said for the statute is that it is ambiguous as to whether a specific intent is required in cases involving “noncustodial parents.” A possible ambiguity arises because the specific intent language can be interpreted as applying to both “noncustodial” and “custodial parents” or only to the latter.
In resolving such an ambiguity—assuming it exists—courts are “guided by well-settled principles of statutory interpretation. ‘[W]hen language which is reasonably susceptible of *862two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted, [f] The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186].) These principles support the conclusion that the statute should be read to have required the state to prove specific intent in all section 278.5 cases.

Apparently, even the prosecutor in this case so concluded. The information charging the appellant included the specific intent language from section 278.5. It alleged in part: "... Gene Martin Howard did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in violation of a custody order, take, retain and conceal minor children, to-wit: Ryan A. Howard, born May 18, 1973, and Chad M. Howard, born August 18, 1976, from Pamela D. Howard, the person having the right to legal custody of such children with the intent to deprive said PAMELA D. HOWARD, with [sic] the right to custody of such children.” (Italics added.)