Court Opinion

ID: 9550423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:35:02.913338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:31.633838
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting.
The opinion of the court condones a new approach to be applied to divisions of property in marriages of short duration where there has been no significant commingling of assets. The court’s holding rejects the equitable balancing established by our case law and substitutes a new, objective rule which treats property division as an action in the nature of rescission. This rule is both unnecessary and unworkable.
AS 25.24.160(a)(4) directs the trial court to divide the parties’ property “in the manner as may be just.” Since our decision in Merrill the “justness of the division of property” has been based upon a set of equitable considerations known now as the Merrill factors. Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547-48 n. 4 (Alaska 1961). See also Vanover v. Vanover, 496 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972) (any other factors bearing on whether the equities dictate that the other spousé is entitled to share in the property may be considered). Thus, the new rule is unnecessary because our case law has already established “an accepted method of legal analysis to be followed under AS 25.-24.160(a)(4).” Opinion at 1124 (referring to Merrill, 367 P.2d 546 and Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1983)).
Duration of the marriage is one of the Merrill factors, but we have never held that duration is a controlling factor. Indeed, we have required the application of the Merrill analysis in cases where the parties’ marriage was of the same or even shorter duration than that of the Roses’. *1126See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 225 (Alaska 1986) (eighteen months); Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802 (Alaska 1986) (eleven months).
Further, whether the assets have been commingled, although not an explicit Merrill factor, falls within the conduct and acquisition of property rubric. We have not held that the parties’ conduct is a controlling factor. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417, 420 n. 4 (Alaska 1985) (a joint loan not required to show parties intended to treat property as a joint asset); Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 572 (Alaska 1983) (fact that title taken solely in husband’s name not controlling as to divisibility of property). Neither party suggests that the Merrill/Wanberg analysis should be overruled or would have provided an inequitable result in this case. To now decide that duration and commingling are the dispositive factors is inconsistent with our precedents.
The new rule is unworkable because it raises more questions than it answers. In future cases decided under this rule the trial court must determine how short is short, how commingled is commingled and how compelling are “compelling reasons” which mandate the Merrill/Wanberg analysis. In other words the court’s opinion provides no guidelines as to when it is within the trial court’s discretion to use the new rule. In all likelihood deciding whether to use the new rule will be determined by resorting back to the Merrill factors. Further confusion will result in trying to trace the parties assets and put them back into the financial position they would have occupied had no marriage taken place.
I believe the trial court applied an improper legal standard. I would remand this case for reconsideration in accordance with Wanberg and Merrill.
RABINO WITZ, J., joins.