Court Opinion

ID: 9528456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:21.251484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:16.293002
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
Per Curiam.
Appellees assert in their petition for rehearing “That the decision of this Court is erroneous in holding that the Acts of 1905, ch. 169, Sec. 78, p. 584 (Burns’ Anno. Stat. Vol. 4, Sec. 9-2402), prevents a municipal corporation from duplicating provisions of said Act when by the very terms of the Act of 1939, ch. 48, Sec. 28, p. 289 (Burns’ Anno. Stat. Vol. 8, Pt. 2, Sec. 47-1828) local authorities have been granted the following express powers over the regulation of motor vehicles:
“Powers of local authorities.— (a) The provisions of this act shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from:
“1. Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles.
“2. Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic control signals.
“3. Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways.
“4. Designating particular highways as one-way highways and requiring that all vehicles thereon be moved in one (1) specific direction.
“5. Regulating the speed of vehicles in public parks.
“6. Designating any highway as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles stop before *294entering or crossing the same or designating any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop at one or more entrances to such intersection.
“7. Restricting the use of highways as authorized in Article XYI of this act.
“8. Regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration and licensing of same, including the requirement of a registration fee.
“9. Regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles at intersections.
“10. Altering the prima facie speed limits as authorized herein.
“11. Adopting such other traffic regulations as are specifically authorized by this act.”
We do not interpret the opinion as so holding. On the contrary, the opinion specifically recognizes and affirms the authority expressly granted to local autorities by §§47-1827 and 47-1828, Burns’ 1952 Replacement, by the use of the following language:
“The rights of municipalities are limited by the statute §47-1827, to the adoption of additional traffic regulations with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction, as more fully provided for by §47-1828, Burns’ 1952 Repl.”
However, we did not intend by the use of this language to invalidate that part of Acts 1905, ch. 169, §78, p. 584, being §9-2402, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, which reads as follows:
“Provided, That every city and town shall have exclusive power to pass and enforce ordinances to keep the streets and other public places of any such city or town free from all obstructions, and to prevent the riding or driving of any vehicle or animal on any sidewalk therein except in the necessary act of crossing.”
A careful examination of the other questions raised by the petition for rehearing leads us to the conclusion *295that they are without merit sufficient to warrant further discussion than is given them in the original opinion.
Petition for rehearing is, therefore, denied.
Note.—Reported in 126 N. E. 2d 247.