Court Opinion

ID: 9411017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:05:16.726151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.278319
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.E., R.E., and
                          M.E.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0018
                               FILED 7-25-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD37976
                 The Honorable Robert Ian Brooks, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

John L. Popilek PC, Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee
         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.E., et al.
                       Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

G A S S, Chief Judge:

¶1            Father appeals the superior court’s order terminating his
parental rights to his three biological children—A.E., R.E., and M.E. Mother
is not a party to this appeal. Because reasonable evidence supports the
order, we affirm.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             This court views the evidence, and reasonable inferences
drawn from it, in the light most favorable to affirming the superior court’s
ruling. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 13 (App.
2002).

¶3             Father has three children with mother—eight-year-old A.E.,
seven-year-old R.E., and five-year-old M.E. In August 2019, the Department
of Child Safety (DCS) received a report mother was unstable and acting
erratically. In September 2019, father and mother engaged in a physical
fight in front of the children, during which father pinned mother down and
choked her. Additionally, the DCS investigator reported father had a long
history of substance abuse, was on probation, and had pending felony drug
charges.

¶4            DCS took custody of the children and petitioned the superior
court to adjudicate them dependent. Soon after, father was incarcerated.
DCS then placed the children with their maternal grandmother. In
November 2019, the superior court found the children dependent as to
father and, in January 2020, adopted a case plan of family reunification.

¶5            In April 2021, father was released from custody. DCS and
adult probation provided father services, including substance-abuse testing
and treatment, a psychological evaluation, anger-management counseling,
marriage counseling, and supervised visitation. The parents participated in
services, and the superior court returned the children to their custody but
did not dismiss the dependency.

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.E., et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶6           A week after their return, father attacked mother—shoving,
punching, and kicking her. Mother called the police and reported father had
been “drinking and taking pills again.” DCS removed the children and once
more placed them with their maternal grandmother. Father then failed to
comply with drug testing or engage in services, and only communicated
with DCS once.

¶7            At a subsequent review hearing, father objected to DCS’s
request to change the case plan to termination and adoption, arguing
guardianship was more appropriate. But father disclosed no one willing to
serve as a guardian. At the May 2022 review hearing, the superior court
changed the case plan over father’s objection but gave father leave to file a
motion for guardianship. Around the same time, father was incarcerated
once again and had an expected release date of February 2024, almost two
years in the future.

¶8            DCS then moved to terminate father’s parental rights in June
2022 under the fifteen-month out-of-home placement ground. See A.R.S.
§ 8-533.B.8(c). At the time of adjudication, father also had a pending
probation revocation hearing. The superior court terminated father’s
parental rights, reasoning father had made “minimal progress in his
recognition of anger management and domestic violence.”

¶9             This court has jurisdiction over father’s timely appeal under
article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-
120.21.A, and -2101.A.1.

                                 ANALYSIS

¶10           Because father does not challenge the statutory grounds for
termination, he has abandoned that argument. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577 ¶ 5 (App. 2017). Instead, father argues the
termination of his parental rights does not serve the children’s best
interests.

¶11            DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
termination is in the children’s best interests. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210
Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005). Because the superior court “is in the best position
to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of
witnesses, and resolve disputed facts[,]” this court will affirm an order
terminating parental rights if supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009). The children’s
“interest in stability and security” must be the superior court’s primary
focus. Alma S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 12 (2018).

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.E., et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶12           Termination of parental rights serves a child’s best interests
if the child will benefit from the termination or will be harmed if the
relationship continues. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. The superior court
may find a child would benefit from termination if an adoption plan were
in place, the child was adoptable, or the child “would benefit
psychologically from the stability an adoption would provide.” Maricopa
Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994).

¶13           The superior court found the children would benefit from
termination because maternal grandmother was meeting their needs and
wished to adopt them. The superior court further found termination would
give the children stability because maternal grandmother provided a home
free of drugs and domestic violence. The record supports these findings.

¶14          Even so, father argues because he has a very close bond with
the children, DCS had to present expert psychological testimony on
“whether the long-term psychological implications of severance were
outweighed by the immediate need for permanency.”

¶15           First, Arizona law does not require expert testimony in a best-
interests determination. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B. Instead, it simply requires the
superior court determine “how the child would benefit from a severance or
be harmed by the continuation of the [parent-child] relationship.” Maricopa
Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990).

¶16           Second, as father acknowledges, the superior court
recognized father’s bond with, and love for, the children. Even so, the
superior court determined the children “have now been in an out-of-home
placement for over [three years] and are in need of the stability and
permanency that [termination] will provide.” Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98–99 ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (“The existence and effect of a
bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a
factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests.”).

¶17           The record, thus, shows the superior court considered the
effect termination would have on the children, yet found termination was
in the children’s best interests. Reasonable evidence supports the superior
court’s finding, and this court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal.
Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶18           Next, father claims DCS “did not present any evidence that
[maternal grandmother] had herself addressed any prior domestic violence
issues.” He cites mother’s testimony of significant domestic violence as a
child, presumably in maternal grandmother’s home. Father’s standing to

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.E., et al.
                       Decision of the Court

make this argument is questionable. See Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 370 ¶ 2 (App. 2009) (“[O]nce [a parent’s] rights [are]
terminated, [the parent] no longer ha[s] standing to challenge [the child’s]
placement and anticipated adoption.”). And no evidence in the record
suggests the children had witnessed domestic violence in maternal
grandmother’s home in the three years they lived there. Indeed, the
superior court found maternal grandmother will provide the children with
a domestic-violence-free home.

¶19          Father also argues guardianship was more appropriate
because grandmother’s motivation to adopt was based solely on available
adoption subsidies. But father never filed a guardianship motion even
though the superior court invited him to do so.

¶20           Even so, the superior court expressly considered
guardianship as part of the best-interests inquiry. The record shows
maternal grandmother wished to adopt the children and neither DCS nor
any other party had identified anyone willing to serve as a guardian. See
A.R.S. § 8-871.A.4 (establishing a guardianship requires finding “[t]he
likelihood that the child would be adopted is remote or termination of
parental rights would not be in the child’s best interest”). Finally, regardless
of maternal grandmother’s motivation, the superior court found “the
[c]hildren are young, and adoption better provides for their future stability
and permanency.” Reasonable evidence supports this finding. See Jordan C.,
223 Ariz. at 93 ¶ 18.

¶21           Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined terminating father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests.

                               CONCLUSION

¶22           We affirm.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED:    JT

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