Court Opinion

ID: 9590800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:28.99312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:44.567525
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
In Cranford v. Cranford, 120 Ga. App. 470 (170 SE2d 844) (1969), this court held that the mere fact of employment was not within any psychologist-patient privilege. However, the facts in Cranford, as well as the need and motivation for disclosure, are so different from the instant case that Cranford need not be followed here.
Cranford involved a suit for divorce, alimony and child support, and the plaintiff sought discovery of the defendant psychologist’s appointment books, apparently because such would reflect on the defendant’s financial ability to pay alimony and child support. The plaintiffs’ motivation in the instant case, however, is to contact other patients of the defendant to inquire about their treatment and results. In short, in Cranford and the cases it relies upon, the fact of employment was really incidental to the subject being pursued, whereas the fact of employment is the matter pursued by the plaintiffs in the instant case. In Cranford, disclosure of the fact of employment resulted in no further intrusion into the lives of the patients.
Cranford relies upon Fowler v. Sheridan, 157 Ga. 271, 275 (121 SE 308) (1923), dealing with the analogous attorney-client privilege, which held that “ ‘[t]he rule making communications between attor*291ney and client privileged from disclosure does not ordinarily apply where the inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney’s employment and the name of the person employing him.’ ” In the instant case, the inquiry certainly was not confined to the mere fact of employment, but sought the addresses of the patients so that they could be contacted.
Decided February 13, 1989.
William W. Gardner, for appellant.
Carr, Tabb & Pope, David H. Pope, for appellees.
I do not believe Cranford provides an adequate basis for breaching the confidentiality between the appellant and its other patients, and sanctioning an intrusion into the lives of those other patients. The appellant’s informational brochure provides that “[i]t’s not your fault that you can’t quit smoking. Millions of Americans have tried to, without success. Your body becomes physically addicted to the nicotine in cigarettes. Your mind has formed habits from years of lighting up. The habitual part of smoking is hard to stop; the physical addiction is often impossible to end.” While disagreeing with the appellant’s allegorical articulation and attitude of what constitutes an addiction — compare alleged alcoholic addictions and disease in Dan River, Inc. v. Shinall, 186 Ga. App. 572 (367 SE2d 846) (1988), on the one hand, and one’s use, or lack of use, of free will in elimination or control of one’s habit, on the other — I do not doubt that many, if not most all, of the appellant’s patients would prefer that their addiction and/or habit and treatment not be a matter of public knowledge. If the plaintiffs hope to ferret out other dissatisfied patients, there are other means to do so. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke and Judge Benham join in this dissent.