Court Opinion

ID: 9656643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:53:37.786375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:33.986339
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. Because the General Assembly has expressly and unambiguously relieved an adjudicated father of the obligation to pay child support, after scientific testing shows he is not the father, I dissent from the majority opinion. The majority holds that once there is a divorce decree adjudicating a man to be the father, that adjudication is irrevocable regardless of future scientific testing showing the man could not be the father. I disagree. Act 1736 of 2001 amended Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115 (Supp. 1999), by adding the following language in an attempt to clarify the Paternity Code: (e)(1)(A) When any man has been adjudicated to be the father of a child or is deemed to be the father of a child pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity without the benefit of scientific testing for paternity and as a result was ordered to pay child support, he shall be entitled to one (1) paternity test, pursuant to § 9-10-108, at any time during the period of time that he is required to pay child support upon the fifing of a motion challenging the adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity in a court of competent jurisdiction. (f)(1) If the test administered under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section excludes the adjudicated father or man deemed to be the father pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity as the biological father of the child and the court so finds, the court shall set aside the previous finding or establishment of paternity and relieve him of any future obligations of support as of the date of the finding. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115(e)(l)(A) and (f)(2) (Repl. 2002) (emphasis added). Act 1736 of 2001 was passed at the next general legislative session after this court’s decision in Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 995 S.W.2d 338 (1999). In Williams, we held: • Res judicata bars relitigation of paternity where paternity was established in the prior divorce decree. • Previous § 9-10-115(d), which addresses modification of child support when an adjudicated father is proven not to be the biological father of the child, after scientific testing, is part of the Paternity Code and is vastly different from an adjudication of paternity in a divorce decree. • The child support obligation of the adjudicated father should continue. The broad language added to § 9-10-115 by Act 1736 states that the section applies to “any man” adjudicated to be the father of a minor child. In McCormac v. McCormac, 304 Ark. 89, 799 S.W.2d 806 (1990), this court specifically said that a divorce decree is an adjudication of paternity. Section 9-10-115(e)(l)(A) is unambiguous, and we construe it by giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. See Weiss v. Maples, 369 Ark. 282, 253 S.W.3d 907 (2007). The words “any man” clearly indicate that the General Assembly intended for the subsection to apply to any man previously adjudicated to be the father of a child, whether in a paternity action or as part of a divorce proceeding. To draw a distinction between the two flies in the face of the clear and exact language of Act 1736. Furthermore, by Act 1736, the General Assembly expanded the time frame for challenging a paternity adjudication. Under the previous version of the statute, an adjudication could only be modified within three years of its entry. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9 — 10-115(f) (Supp. 1999). Act 1736 now provides that an adjudication may be challenged “at any time during the period of time that [the adjudicated father] is required to pay child support.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115(e)(l)(A) (Repl. 2001). The statute thus applies to Mr. Martin, as he was still obligated to pay child support at the time he challenged his paternity. The General Assembly has now mandated that Mr. Martin, though the adjudicated father in a divorce decree, be relieved of his obligation to pay future child support under Act 1736 by expanding the pertinent section to apply to “any man.” The breadth of the language in Act 1736 manifestly encompasses divorce decrees. The circuit court did not interpret the new act that way, but instead dismissed Mr. Martin’s challenge to the child-support obligation. This was error in my judgment. Yet, the majority affirms the error. I respectfully dissent. Corbin, J., joins this dissent.