Court Opinion

ID: 9641961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:44:26.12951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:41.215623
License: Public Domain

HOLSTEIN, Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion. But even assuming some ministerial duty to issue regulations exists, mandamus is not available. Relators’ brief includes what I believe is a significant misunderstanding of Missouri law that was apparently relied on by the trial court. This misapprehension has to do with relators’ standing to seek mandamus.
Standing to bring mandamus has an exceedingly low threshold. But having standing in mandamus requires more than being a citizen interested in good government, as relators claim. It is fundamental to the concept of standing that the relators must have something personal at stake in the dispute, however slight, attenuated or remote it may be. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (holding that congressmen had no standing in mandamus to challenge a statute granting the president a line item veto on appropriations bills.). While several of our cases make note of how low the threshold is when a simple, purely ministerial function is involved, none of the cases relied on by relators holds that no threshold of interest is required. See State ex rel. Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. banc 1992) (holding that the presiding judge of the circuit court had sufficient standing to enforce through mandamus the ministerial responsibilities of public officials regarding the circuit court’s budget); State ex rel. Taylor v. Wade, 360 Mo. 895, 231 S.W.2d 179, 181 (1950) (holding that the attorney general, due to both his statutory and common law duties, had sufficient standing to compel a county court to prepare and publish a mandated annual financial statement by means of mandamus); Missouri Coalition for the Environment v. Joint Committee on Administrative Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Mo. banc 1997) (holding that taxpayers had standing to challenge the actions of a legislative committee where funds were being expended for the unconstitutional operation of the committee).
As each of these cases indicates, standing in mandamus belongs to anyone within the wide orb of those persons that a legal mandate was designed to benefit or persons who hold some special office implicating a duty to enforce the legal mandate. A mere curious bystander has no standing to bring mandamus unless, of course, the legal mandate in question was intended to benefit curious bystanders. For example, a statute mandating public disclosure of a county’s financial condition and imposing a criminal penalty for noneompliance was designed to benefit the entire public, an informed public being essential to democracy. In such case, a member of the public has sufficient standing to bring mandamus. State ex rel. Taylor v. Wade, supra. The statutory mandates on adopting reassessment regulations were not designed to inform the general public or for the benefit of nontaxpayers.
The statutory mandates on reassessment were designed to benefit taxpayers by ensuring a reasonably fair distribution of the property tax burdens among all classes of property owners. Neither before the trial court nor here do relators make a claim to standing as taxpayers. Perhaps this is because doing so would give rise to serious questions of whether mandamus lies for a taxpayer who has legal remedies available. See State ex rel. J.C. Nichols Co. v. Boley, 853 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Mo. banc 1993).
I conclude that the sole basis upon which relators claim standing, that of concerned citizens, is insufficient. Mandamus does not lie even if there were a true ministerial duty to enforce.