Court Opinion

ID: 9643032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:16:16.641106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:14.128319
License: Public Domain

OPINION ANNOUNCING JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
PAPADAKOS, Justice.
This is the appeal of Lawrence F. Hitchon (Appellant) from the per curiam order of the Superior Court, In re: Estate of Schofield, etc., 306 Pa.Superior Ct. 584, 453 A.2d 22 (1982), affirming an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Orphans’ Court Division, entered on December 3, 1980, by the Honorable Nathan Schwartz. That order dismissed objections of Appellant to the First and Final Account of Eutimio R. Vitillo, Executor of the Estate of A. Carolyn Schofield, deceased (decedent).
Decedent died testate on January 2,1979, and by her Last Will and Testament executed on March 22, 1969, devised to her nephew (Appellant) her one-half interest in and to certain real property in New Stanton, Hempfield Township, Westmoreland County. Her residuary estate, after other pre-residuary gifts, passed in equal shares to Appellant and ten other residuary legatees. A codicil dated October, 1970, reaffirmed these gifts. The record reveals that at decedent’s death she did not own the New Stanton property, having conveyed her interest on July 28, 1976 to Antonio and Rose Josephine Pagano. At decedent’s death, it was discovered that her share of the proceeds of the sale (approximately $127,000.00) had been commingled with other funds and was in her husband’s (Harry L. Schofield) possession. The executor instituted an Equity action against the husband, alleging that he misappropriated the sale proceeds for his own use. The Executor ultimately recovered the full amount claimed, less attorney fees, and included this net recovery of $99,500.00 in his Petition for Distribution, *99recommending that it be distributed among the eleven residuary legatees.
At audit, Appellant filed objections to the Petition for Distribution, claiming the balance of the sale proceeds as his own. The Executor argued that since Appellant’s specific devise was sold prior to decedent’s death, the gift was adeemed. The trial court agreed with the Executor and dismissed the objections by its order of December 3, 1980. Exceptions to that order were dismissed by a Court en banc and Superior Court affirmed. This appeal followed.
Before us, Appellant advances the same arguments presented to the trial court and Superior Court in support of his claims over the sale proceeds. Appellant first argues that he can reach the balance of the recovered proceeds pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. Section 2514(16.1). That section provides as follows:
Non-Ademption; Incompetency
If property of an incompetent specifically devised or bequeathed is sold or exchanged or if a condemnation award or insurance proceeds are paid to the Estate of an incompetent as a result of condemnation, fire or casualty, the specific legatee or devisee has the right to the net sale price, the property received in exchange, the condemnation award or the insurance proceeds. This paragraph does not apply if subsequent to the sale, exchange, condemnation or casualty, the Testator has been adjudicated competent and survives the adjudication by one year.
Appellant argues that this Section covers all situations where an incompetent testator’s property is sold, irrespective of whether or not the testator was judicially adjudged to be incompetent prior to his death. Furthermore, Appellant argues that this Section would permit him to introduce evidence in a post-mortem proceeding to establish the decedent’s incompetence at the time of the sale. Appellant bases these arguments on a comparison of the current 20 Pa.C.S. Section 2514(16.1) with former 20 Pa.C.S. Section 2514(16) which provided prior to July 9, 1976 as follows:
*100Ademption. A specific devise or bequest shall not be adeemed where the Testator or the Testator’s Estate receives an asset in exchange for the subject of the devise or bequest and the act which otherwise would have caused the ademption occurs while the Testator is an adjudged incompetent. In such case the devise or bequest shall be deemed to apply to whatever was received in exchange.
Appellant places great emphasis upon new Section 2514(16.-1), wherein the Legislature substituted “adjudged incompetent” for “incompetent,” and suggests that the deletion of the single word “adjudged” is of particular significance. We disagree.
Section 2514(16.1) is derived from the Uniform Probate Code, Section 2-608, Nov. 2-608(b)1 which contains the following language:
If specifically devised property is sold by conservator or if a condemnation award or insurance proceeds are paid to a conservator as a result of condemnation, fire or casualty, the specific devisee has the right to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net sale price, the condemnation award, or the insurance proceeds. This subsection does not apply if after the sale, condemnation or casualty, it is adjudged that the disability of the Testator has ceased and the Testator survives the adjudication by one year...
Our comparison of the Uniform Probate Code and Section 2514(16.1) leads us to conclude that our statute provides for exactly the same elements as does the Uniform Probate Code with only one difference. The Uniform Probate Code language refers to a “conservator,” the use of which clearly implies that a formal adjudication of incompetency has occurred prior to death. Although our. Section 2514(16.1) does not refer to “guardians” or “conservators,” it concludes with the sentence “this paragraph does not apply if subsequent to the sale, exchange, condemnation, or casualty, the Testator has been adjudicated competent and sur*101vives the adjudication by one year.” Since only an adjudged incompetent can be subsequently adjudged competent, it is clear that the legislative intent was not to change the former provision of 2514(16) and thus create a new proceeding in which the Court would be compelled to make an adjudication of competency or incompetency after the death of the Testator. Our reading of this Section as a whole convinces us that its scope encompasses only formal pre-death adjudications of incompetency.
Both Sections as their chief purpose seek to soften the inflexible rule of ademption where specific devises are destroyed during periods of the testator’s officially declared incompetency. In furtherance of that end, both sections establish a rule avoiding ademption where specific devises are destroyed by sale, condemnation, or act of God at a time when the affairs of the testator are formally in the hands of a court appointed guardian. Each section specifically provides for its inapplicability where an adjudication of competency is made and the testator survives for a one year period.
The comments to Section 2514(16.1) do not mention any radical difference in our Section from the Uniform Probate Code Section; to the contrary, they are indicative of legislative intent to adopt in total the construction as framed by the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code.
The trial court, in a well reasoned opinion, was also of this view and further observed that our Probate Code makes no distinction between incompetents and adjudicated incompetents, (See Sections 5505, 5512, 5522, 5524, and 5525), nor does it anticipate post-mortem adjudications of incompetency. (See Sections 5511(a), (c)). All of these sections indicate a consistent use of “incompetent” in our Probate Code which carries over into Section 2514(16.1).
It is our view that the Legislature, by this section, intended to ameliorate the inflexibility of the ademption rule only in situations of pre-death judicial adjudications of incompetence and not in situations where no pre-death determination had been made. The striking similarity of our *102statute with the Uniform Probate Code convinces us of this, as does our examination of this section with other sections of our Code which consistently apply the term “incompetent” to pre-death adjudications. We see no reason why Section 2514(16.1) should be interpreted differently.
Our Legislature recognized that ademption was particularly harsh “where the alienation of the property was at the direction of the guardian of an incompetent testator. In such cases a specific legatee or devisee was subject to the possibility of favoritism which guardians might be inclined to exercise among named beneficiaries of the incompetent.” In re: Estate of Fox, 494 Pa. 584, 431 A.2d 1008 (1981). Since the testatrix was not adjudged an incompetent prior to her death, Section 2514(16.1) is not available to Appellant in his attempt to reach the sale proceeds.
Appellant also argues that the sale of the specific devise was induced by fraud, and that fraud or undue influence practiced upon a decedent causing the sale of such specific devise should not work an ademption where the proceeds are preserved and traceable.
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that a specific legacy or devise is extinguished if the property is not in existence or does not belong to the testator at the time of his death. Nakoneczny Estate, 456 Pa. 320, 319 A.2d 893 (1974); Soles Estate, 451 Pa. 568, 304 A.2d 97 (1973); McFerren Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950); Horn’s Estate, 317 Pa. 49, 175 A. 414 (1934); Harshaw v. Harshaw, 184 Pa. 401, 39 A. 89 (1898); Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301 (1853); Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts 335 (1834). This rule is equally applicable where the specific devise is removed from the testator during his lifetime by fraud, an involuntary act, or by operation of law. Harshaw v. Harshaw, Pleasant’s Appeal, 77 Pa. 356 (1875); Blackstone, Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox 184, 30, English Reporter 85 (1789); Partridge v. Partridge, 1 Talbot 226, 25 English Reporter 749 (1736).
*103In these cases the Courts have consistently avoided inquiring into the testator’s intent when the specific devise is not part of the estate at death because
the idea of discussing what were the particular motives and intention of the testator in each case, in destroying the subject of the bequest, would be productive of endless uncertainty and confusion ... and though the Court might be lucky enough occasionally to hit the testator’s intention it is in point of precedent a very dangerous sort of refinement, and would in nine cases out of ten lead to great confusion and embarrassment.
Humphreys, 185-186.
Whether the rigid rule of ademption in cases of purported fraud ought to continue as the law in this Commonwealth is certainly a most important proposition, but with this record we decline to reach the merits of Appellant’s argument. Even if we were to endorse Appellant’s position it would be non-productive, since he did not plead fraud with specificity as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b) which states that: “averments of fraud or mistake shall be averred with particularity.” Averments of fraud are “meaningless epithets unless sufficient facts are set forth which will permit an inference that the claim is not without foundation or offered simply to harass the opposing party and to delay the pleader’s own obligation.” Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 423 Pa. 373, 224 A.2d 174 (1966). In satisfaction of the particularity requirement we have required that two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense, and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge. Bata, id.; See also Sokoloff v. Strick, 404 Pa. 343, 172 A.2d 302 (1961); Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 72 A.2d 294 (1950); Rice v. Braden, 243 Pa. 141, 89 A. 877 (1914).
In his objections to the proposed decree of distribution, Appellant averred that the property sale was “the *104initial step in a fraudulent plan put into effect by Harry Schofield,” (R.32a) and that the August 5, 1976, sale was procurred by fraud, (R.33a). These are the only references in this entire record to support the proposition that the sale was the product of fraud. There is no allegation that the sale itself was fraudulent, that the sale proceeds are traceable, that the property was sold for less than its fair market value, or that the decedent was induced to sell the subject property to defraud Appellant out of his devise. Appellant merely raises a bald accusation of fraud which is insufficient to satisfy Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b). The allegation is defective in that it fails to advise the estate of the nature of the claim being raised and provides no opportunity for the preparation of a defense. Finally, Appellant’s assertions make it impossible for a court to determine whether the allegations have merit or are mere subterfuge.2
Appellant was given every opportunity to amend his objections, both at the Audit of May 19, 1980, and at an in-camera hearing on ^September 15, 1980, but chose not to offer any amendments. In view of the state of the record and pleadings, we find that fraud was not pled in conformance with Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b). Amendment at this time, therefore, would be improper. The Order of Superior Court is affirmed.
FLAHERTY and HUTCHINSON, JJ., join in this opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.
LARSEN, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which NIX, C.J., joins.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in the dissenting portion of the concurring and dissenting opinion of LARSEN, J.
McDERMOTT, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. See Official Advisory Comment to 20 Pa.C.S. Section 2514(16.1).

. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Larsen points out allegations of fact in the pleadings which tend to establish either undue influence or fraud. We agree. However, it is to be noted that although such assertions were made, nothing specific was pleaded to support these allegations which would warrant an additional evidentiary proceeding.