Court Opinion

ID: 9528464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:25.603657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:53.878987
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge STERNBERG
dissenting.
I disagree with Part II of the majority opinion and therefore respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion.
*297It is important to emphasize the factual background of the case before us. Public Service Company owned utility poles; United Cable’s predecessor was allowed to use these poles to string its lines. These two sophisticated corporations engaged in arms-length negotiations which culminated in a written agreement under which Public Service Company authorized the use of its poles. In an obvious effort to prevent Public Service Company from incurring any liability because of that authorization, an indemnity provision was inserted, the object of which was to protect Public Service Company from “all claims.” The provision in question, quoted in full in the majority opinion, in my view, unambiguously succeeds in holding Public Service Company harmless from all claims — including those arising from its own alleged negligence.
The language is straightforward; only by straining logic can one find an ambiguity. Two sophisticated business entities negotiated and reduced to writing their agreement. To use questionable semantic ingenuity to create an ambiguity in the language at issue here will serve only to encourage, indeed, to require, lawyers drafting such agreements in the future to pile on more and more “legal gobbledygook,” thereby obfuscating further the intentions of the parties.
The majority and the trial court are persuaded that Williams v. White Mountain Construction Co., 749 P.2d 423 (Colo.1988) “requires” their conclusion. In my view, the situation here is far beyond the scope of any precedential mandate arising from Williams.
As the majority notes, the facts of Williams and the language of the indemnity agreement interpreted in that opinion are significantly different from those here at issue.
In Williams, the court was interpreting an alleged oral agreement for indemnification arising when a ditch was being dug on a construction site. The contractor digging the ditch apparently was uneasy about the possibility of a collapse. The representative of another entity on the site supervising the digging stated that “we will take care of it if anything happens.” Both the trial court and supreme court found these words were ambiguous and did not create a contract of indemnity.
The situation here is so far different from that in Williams as to make that case of no relevance. In Williams, there was a terse oral statement; here, there was a lengthy all-encompassing written paragraph. There, the alleged indemnity agreement was brief and uttered hastily on the spot by a layman with little time for reflection; here, the agreement was a product of negotiation in which legal advice was available at each step. In Williams, the parties were laymen; here, they were sophisticated business people. See Glaspell v. Ohio Edison Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 44, 505 N.E.2d 264 (1987).
I would reverse the judgment and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of Public Service Company.