Court Opinion

ID: 9866318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 03:42:13.102999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:08.017974
License: Public Domain

Goode, J.,
concurred in this opinion. J. T. Blaib, J., now Chief Justice, delivered a concurring opinion, holding that there was evidence justifying an instruction on the law of imperfect self-defense, but dissenting from the ruling that there was no substantial evidence tending to prove appellant acted in the exercise of perfect self-defense.
Woodson and Geaves, JJ., concurred in this opinion. Walkee, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, in-which WilliamsoN, J., concurred, holding that the evidence did not warrant an instruction on manslaughter, and that the judgment should be affirmed. •
*299*298III. We are of the ojjinion that the court correctly declared the law in instructions 8 and 9, if the evidence justified the.giving of instructions on the-law of self-defense or imperfect self-defense, [State v. Starr, 38 *299Mo. 270; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608; State v. Hardy, 95 Mo. 455; State v. Gieseke, 209 Mo. 331 (6); State v. Sharp, 233 Mo. 269 (11); 21 Cyc. 807.] BUt on reading the defendant's amination, it is clear that the defendant returned with the purpose of renewing the quarrel and the court should not have given an instruction on self-defense. ~
The defendant testified that he knew Ryland was armed, and then admitted he saw nothing to indi~ate that he was armed. "I thought it was better to settle it while it was new than to wait till we met in the middle of the road and lie would jump on me." In other words, he had no reason to believe Ryland was armed that morning, and he concluded that he had an opportunity to meet him unarmed. W.e think his testimony, that he had no f e-lonious intent when he returned and renewed the previous quarrel, when all the facts are considered, is unworthy of belief, and the instructions should not have been given.
IV. There is another consideration that is fatal to defendant's plea of self-defense. When the defendant went to his house and loaded his shotgun, he was forty rods from the scene of the quarrel and out of danger. Concede that when he returned Byland made a hostile demonstration with his ax. R~Jand was on his own premises and, in effect, ordered the defendant off. There was a space of at least twenty-five feet and the four-foot fence between them. Roberts was not in imminent danger and should have withdrawn. If he could have avoided an assault by retreating, or if there was any other alternative, he was not justified in taking the life of his assailant.
In State v. Fraga, 199 Mo. 127, 134, Burgess, P. J., said:
"In State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426, SHERWOOD, J., in passing upon the right of the defendant to an instruction upon self-defense, held that. he was not, saying, `The right of that nature is not to be invoked unless all other means fail; it is the derqvier ressort, and in *300order to justify a homicide on the ground of self-defense, the doer of the homicidal act must have done everything in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and to avert the necessity; and he must retreat, if retreat be practicable. [Kerr’s Law of Hom., sec. 180, p. 203, and cases cited; State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554.]’ ”
In State v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121, 126, we said:
“The right of self-defense does not imply the right of attack, and it will not avail in any case where the difficulty is sought for.and induced by the party himself —commenced or brought on by any wilful act of his toward his antagonist, or where he voluntarily and of his own free will enters into a difficulty. If the defendant was expecting a difficulty with the deceased, his right to defend himself did not arise until he had done everything in his power to avoid the necessity. If he could have safely avoided using the weapon he was not justifiable in taking the life of the deceased.”
In 21 Cyc. 820, the .general rule is succinctly stated:
“As a general rule in order to justify or excuse a homicide as in self-defense defendant must have embraced all re'asonable or probable means of escape or retreat within his power and consistent with his safety, so as to avoid the danger and avert the necessity of killing, especially where he was at fault in getting himself into the dangerous situation. Thus as a general rule a person is not justified or excused in killing one who attacks him, unless he first retreats so far as he can do so without increasing his real or apparent peril; and the fact that retreat will not place him in less peril or on better vantage ground than before does not excuse him from performing; this duty.”
The defendant’s testimony makes it clear that he was not in immediate danger and had ample opportunity to withdraw to his own premises without increasing his peril. [See Kelleys’s Crim. Law, secs. 520 and 521, (3 Ed.)].
*301Y. The court’s instruction numbered 1 for the defendant should not have been given as there was no self-defense in the case. If the evidence had warranted an instruction on self-defense, it was too favorable for the defendant. The burden is not on the State to prove that the killing was without justification. It is upon the defendant to prove any affirmative matter in excuse, justification or extenuation of the offense, and he must show to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he acted in self-defense. [Kelley’s Crim. Law, sec. 253, (3 Ed.) and cases cited.] So, also, the defendant’s instruction numbered 3 was too favorable. It is only when one has reasonable cause to apprehend immediate danger that he may act upon appearances. [State v. Banks, 258 Mo. 479, 492; Kelley’s Crim. Law, sec. 519, and cases cited.] The court should not have given the defendant’s third and fourth instructions. There was no error in the refusal of defendant’s instructions A, B, C, D, E and F. Instruction P was on reasonable doubt and was covered by other instructions given. The others were on self-defense.
VI. It is contended that the court erred in giving instructions 4, 5 and 6 for the State, because they cover the entire case and ignore the defense set up by the defendant. There would be no merit in this contention even if the evidence made a submissible case of self-defense. The rule adopted by our Court In Bane on this question is "where the plaintiff's instruction omits some feature which is not an ele-. ment of his cause of action, but of the defense which is set up, the omisäion may be cured by instructions for defendant submitting that feature." [State ex rel. Jenkins v. Trimble, 236 S. W. 651, 653, and cases cited.]
*302*301VII. The appellant complains of the refusal qf the court to permit him to testify to specific acts of violence on the part of the deceased towards others that were known to the defendant prior to the homicide, and to *302conversations with deceased in which the latter told him of trouble he had had with others. This character of evidence was inadmissible to prove that deceased was a lawless, turbulent
or dangerous man, as that could oniy be proven by witnesses who knew his general reputation in the neighborhood in which he lived. [State v. Phillips, 233 Mo. 299, 305; State v. Beaty, 25 Mo. App. 214; Seymour v. Farrell, 51 Mo. 95, 97; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 590; State v. Teeter, 239 Mo. 475, 485; Kelley's Crim. Law, sec. 381; 16 C. J. 582.]
The rule is thus sfated in 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (16 Ed.). see. 46Th:
"One sort of evidence of character is conduct ex-~ hibiting that character. How far may the witness's character he exposed by introducing particular instances of conduct throwing light on that character~? The important line of distinction here is between proof by outside testimony-i. e., by other witnesses-and proof by cross-examination of the witness to be impeached.
"It has long been settled that testimony from other witnesses of particular instances of misconduct is an improper mode of discrediting, because of the confusion of issues and waste of time that would thus be involved, and because of the uplair surprise to the witness, who cannot know what variety of false charges may be specified and cannot be prepared to expose their falsity. This rule excluding proof by other witnesses is well settled and everywhere accepted."
VIII. The record fails to show a formal arraignment or plea of guilty. The defendant announced that he was ready and went to trial. This was equivalent to a plea of not guilty and was a waiver of a formal ~rraignment. [Sec. 3958, R. S. 1919; State v. Braunschweig, 36 Mo. 397; State v. O'Kelly, 258 Mo. 345, 372; State v. Allen, 267 Mo. 49, 183 S. W. 329; State v. Hascall, 226 S. W. 18, 21.]
*303In Ills motion for new trial, appellant complains of other minor errors. We have examined them and-find they are without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.