Court Opinion

ID: 9544966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:04:05.535523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:49.598637
License: Public Domain

Opinion
BROUSSARD, J.
Pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq. hereafter the Act),1 petitioner American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc. (ACLU) sought to inspect and copy, among other things, certain index cards and computer printouts held by defendant California Department of Justice. The department refused to allow inspection on the ground that the information in question was “intelligence information” exempt from disclosure under section 6254, subdivision (f) of the Act. The ACLU then brought suit to compel production of these records. The trial court, after inspecting the records in camera, ruled that data on the cards and printouts should be disclosed with the exception of personal identifiers and information which might reveal confidential sources. Defendants appeal from that decision.
The first issue presented by this appeal is the definition and scope of the exemption for “intelligence information” in section 6254, subdivision (f). We agree with the trial court that this exemption should not be read so broadly as to preclude discovery of any information in intelligence files which relates in some manner to criminal activity. We believe, however, that the court erred in limiting the statutory protection to personal identifiers and material which might disclose confidential sources. The term “intelligence information,” even if read narrowly so as to further the Act’s objective of expanded public disclosure, should protect information furnished in confidence, even if that information does not reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus the “intelligence information” exemption severely limits the information subject to disclosure, but does not entirely protect the index cards and printouts.
*444Secondly, defendants invoke the balancing test of section 6255, asserting that the burden of segregating exempt and nonexempt information outweighs the benefits of disclosure. The issue is close, but after in camera inspection of the index cards in question, ,we conclude that in this case the segregation of personal identifiers, confidential information, and information which might reveal confidential sources will be so burdensome, and will so reduce the utility of disclosing the documents to the ACLU, that the public interest will not be served by requiring disclosure of the index cards. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment to the extent it compels disclosure of nonexempt information on the cards in question. The computer printouts, on the other hand, contain neither confidential information nor information supplied by confidential sources, but only data derived from public records. Excision of personal identifiers from the printouts would be a relatively simple task. We therefore affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment requiring disclosure of nonexempt information on the printouts.
I.
This case arose when the ACLU, in May of 1976, filed a request under the Act to inspect and copy a number of documents relating to state law enforcement surveillance practices and records. Among those documents were index cards compiled by a network of law enforcement departments known as the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU), listing persons suspected of being involved in organized crime. Each card lists, among other data, the individual’s name, alias, occupation, family members, vehicles, associates, arrests, modus operandi, and physical traits. The subject of a card may be a person suspected of a specific crime; a person suspected of aiding, directly or indirectly, those involved in organized crime; or a person who is “associated” with a principal suspect. “Associates” might be individuals entirely innocent of crime, including family members, business associates, or attorneys of the principal suspects.2
The ACLU also sought to inspect and copy computer printouts from the Interstate Organized Crime Index (IOCI). The IOCI printouts, in contrast to the LEIU index cards, contain entries based solely on infor*445mation that is a matter of public record.3 Existing IOCI printouts are still being used by law enforcement agencies but no new information is being added to them. The printout entries include, among other information, an individual subject’s name, physical characteristics, criminal record, crime-related and noncrime-related associates, occupation, and residence.
The ACLU’s objective in seeking disclosure was to determine generally the nature of the information contained on the LEIU cards and stored in the IOCI computers, not to ascertain the entries relating to any particular person. The ACLU, therefore, requested the first 100 cards in alphabetical order in the LEIU index and the first 100 entries in the computer printouts, omitting personal identifiers protected from disclosure by section 6254, subdivision (c).4 When the department refused to permit inspection, the ACLU, charging that the department had violated the Act, brought suit to compel disclosure.
At trial, the department claimed the records in question were protected by section 6254, subdivision (f) of the Act, which permits the state to withhold “[rjecords of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, and any state or local police agency, or any such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local police agency ... for correctional, law enforcement or licensing purposes .... ” (Italics added.) The department also claimed an exemption under section 6255, which permits an agency to avoid disclosure of materials by showing that “on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making the rec*446ord public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.”
 The trial court first rejected the department’s claim of exemption under section 6254, holding that the exemptions in that section were confined to (1) personal identifiers,5 i.e., information which might reveal the names of those who were the subjects of the cards and printouts, and (2) information which might reveal the names of confidential sources who gave the department the card and printout data. The trial court further found that “[pjublic revelation of the information other than personal identifiers and confidential sources ... is in the public interest and the public interest weighs in favor of disclosure. Revelation of this information will inform interested members of the public of the type of information which the defendants develop and gather.” Although the trial court initially concluded that separation of exempt from nonexempt information on the LEIU cards and’ the IOCI printouts would be unduly burdensome, on motion to modify the judgment the court reversed its decision and found that the burden of segregating nonexempt information was outweighed by the public interest in access to that information. The trial court therefore rejected the claimed exemption under section 6255,6 and accordingly entered judgment requiring disclosure, among other matters, of the LEIU index cards and the IOCI printouts, excluding personal identifiers and data which would reveal confidential sources.
*447II.
The Act, enacted in 1968, replaced a confusing mass of statutes and court decisions relating to disclosure of governmental records. (See Shaffer et al., A Look at the California Records Act and Its Exemptions (1974) 4 Golden Gate L.Rev. 203, 210-213.) The Act begins with a declaration of rights: “In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” In the spirit of this declaration, judicial decisions interpreting the Act seek to balance the public right to access to information, the government’s need, or lack of need, to preserve confidentiality, and the individual’s right to privacy. (See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 651-652 [117 Cal.Rptr. 106]; American Federation of State, etc. Employees v. Regents of University of California (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 913, 915-916 [146 Cal.Rptr. 42].)
The Act was modeled on the 1967 federal Freedom of Information Act (81 Stat. 54), and the judicial construction and legislative history of the federal act serve to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart. (See Northern Cal. Police Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 116, 120 [153 Cal.Rptr. 173]; Cook v. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 781 [127 Cal.Rptr. 712]; Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 652.) As enacted in 1967, the Freedom of Information Act exempted “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.” (See former 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7).)7 The California Act, enacted in 1968, elaborated on this ex*448emption, barring disclosure of “[r]ecords of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, and any state or local police agency, or any such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local police agency, or any such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes. ...”8
When a series of federal decisions held that under the 1967 law all documents in a law enforcement investigatory file were exempt,9 Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act to narrow and clarify the exemptions from disclosure. (See Pratt v. Webster (D.C.Cir. 1982) 673 F.2d 408, 417; Climax Molybdenum Co. v. N. L. R. B. (10th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 63, 64; Pass v. N. L. R. B. (10th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 654, 657.) The act, as amended in 1974, limited the exemption to “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting *449a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel; ...” (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).) Since the 1974 amendments were adopted to reinstate the scope of the exemption as intended in the original act (see Climax Molybdenum Co. v. N. L. R. B„ supra, 539 F.2d 63, 64), and since the California law was modeled upon that original act, we may use the amendments to guide the construction of the California Act.
We therefore reject defendants’ contention that the “intelligence information” exemption of section 6254, subdivision (f), exempts all information which is “reasonably related to criminal activity.” Such a broad exemption would in essence resurrect the federal judicial doctrine which Congress repudiated in 1974, and which was never part of California law.  It would undercut the California decisions which in some circumstances limit the exemption of subdivision (f) to cases involving concrete and definite enforcement prospects.10 And most important, it would effectively exclude the law enforcement function of state and local governments from any public scrutiny under the California Act, a result inconsistent with its fundamental purpose.
We believe, however, that the definition adopted by the trial court is too narrow. We do not dispute its exemption of “personal identifiers”; such an exemption would be required, if not by the express terms of the Act, by the right of privacy established in article I, section *4501 of the California Constitution. Indeed, in view of the substantial harm that could be inflicted by a public revelation that an individual was listed in an index of persons involved in organized crime, or even listed as an “associate” of someone involved in organized crime, we think the exclusion of personal identifiers must be viewed broadly. Not only names, aliases, addresses, and telephone numbers must be excluded, but also information which might lead the knowledgeable or inquisitive to infer the identity of the individual in question.
We agree also that information which might lead to the disclosure of confidential sources should be exempt from disclosure. The terms of subdivision (f), however, do not protect sources as such, but protect “intelligence information.” We thus see no escape from the conclusion that information supplied in confidence is protected by the Act even if the revelation of that information will not necessarily disclose the identity of the source.
We conclude that the “intelligence information” exemption bars disclosure of information that might identify individuals mentioned in the LEIU or IOCI records, that might identify confidential sources, or that was supplied in confidence by its original source.11
The foregoing construction of section 6254, subdivision (f) will bring that exemption into approximate alignment with the exemption in section 552, subdivision (b)(7) of the amended federal act. We recognize, of course, that California has not enacted any amendments to the Act comparable to the 1974 federal amendments, but then the California Legislature faced no overly restrictive court decisions such as those *451which impelled the federal amendments. As we have explained, the 1974 federal amendments were intended to restate and clarify the original purpose of the federal act, and since that purpose—public access to records except where access must be limited to protect privacy or confidentiality—corresponds to the purpose of the California Act, we believe the two statutes should receive a parallel construction.
Our interpretation of subdivision (f) also derives from the fact that the Act imposes no limits upon who may seek information or what he may do with it. In the present case the ACLU seeks information to test the operation of the LEIU index and the IOCI printouts and to determine if those police intelligence systems are being misused. In other cases, however, information may be sought for less noble purposes. Persons connected with organized crime may seek to discover what the police know, or do not know, about organized criminal activities (cf. Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson (1982) 456 U.S. 615, fn. 12 [72 L.Ed.2d 376, 387, 102 S.Ct. 2054]); persons seeking to damage the reputation of another may try to discover if he is listed as an organized crime figure or as an associate of such a figure; other persons may simply try to put the state to the burden and expense of segregating exempt and nonexempt information and making the latter available to the public. In short, once information is held subject to disclosure under the Act, the courts can exercise no restraint on the use to which it may be put. (See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 656.)
We note, by way of contrast to the unrestricted seeking and use of information acquired under the Act, the discovery procedures employed under Evidence Code section 1040. This section serves essentially the same purpose as the “intelligence information” exemption of section 6254, subdivision (f)—the protection of confidential information. Under section 1040, however, a court will uphold disclosure only if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the necessity for preserving confidentiality (see Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 124, 126 [130 Cal.Rptr. 257, 550 P.2d 161]); in making this decision the court can consider the needs and interests of the particular litigants (id., at p. 126), and can in some cases impose protective orders to limit the use and dissemination of the information.
If, for example, the ACLU had sought to discover LEIU or IOCI records in a pending suit, the trial court, after ascertaining the bona tides of the request, could permit inspection under section 1040 subject *452to protective limitations on use or publication of the information. Since the provisions of the Act do not “affect the rights of litigants ... under the laws of discovery of this state” (§ 6260), the limitations on disclosure in section 6254 would not restrict discovery sought in connection with such a civil action. In bringing a request under the Act, however, the ACLU stands in no better position than any member of the public who seeks to inspect LEIU or IOCI records for whatever reason he may have (cf. Brown v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2d Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 71, 75), and is subject to the restrictions of section 6254.
We therefore conclude that the “intelligence information” exemption bars disclosure to the ACLU of personal identifiers, confidential sources, and confidential information relating to criminal activity. Although much of the information of the LEIU cards and the IOCI printouts is thus exempt from disclosure, the scope of the intelligence information exemption alone thus is insufficient to justify the defendants’ blanket refusal of disclosure.
III.
Defendants next argue that in the present case the burden of segregating exempt from nonexempt information is so great, and the utility of disclosing nonexempt information so minimal, that the court should invoke section 6255 to bar any disclosure.12 That section states that an agency can justify nondisclosure by showing “that on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.”
Section 6255 has no counterpart in the federal Freedom of Information Act, and imposes on the California courts a duty which does not burden the federal courts—the duty to weigh the benefits and costs of disclosure in each particular case. We reject the suggestion that in undertaking this task the courts should ignore any expense and inconveni*453ence involved in segregating nonexempt from exempt information. Section 6255 speaks broadly of the “public interest,” a phrase which encompasses public concern with the cost and efficiency of government. To refuse to place such items on the section 6255 scales would make it possible for any person requesting information, for any reason or for no particular reason, to impose upon a governmental agency a limitless obligation. Such a result would not be in the public interest.13
After careful examination of the LEIU index cards in camera, we conclude that in the present case the public interest predominates against disclosure of the cards. It is clear that the burden of segregating exempt from nonexempt information on the 100 cards would be substantial. The cards do not indicate which material is confidential, might reveal a confidential source, or identify the subject of the report; in many instance's defendants would have to inquire from the law enforcement department supplying the information. The utility of disclosure to the ACLU, on the other hand, is questionable: the deletion of personal identifiers will make it impossible for the ACLU to learn if a particular person is improperly listed as an associate of a criminal suspect (cf. fn. 2, ante)-, the deletion of confidential information will defeat its efforts to learn if any person is listed on the basis of inaccurate or unsubstantiated rumor.
At best, disclosure of nonexempt information from the cards in question might reveal certain generalities about the records, such as the proportion of persons listed with prior criminal records, the type of criminal activity of which they are suspected, etc. Conceivably such information might help to confirm or allay suspicions concerning the operation of criminal indexing systems. When this marginal and speculative benefit is weighed against the cost and burden of segregating the exempt and nonexempt material on the cards, we conclude that on the facts of this particular case the public interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure *454of the record.14 We therefore conclude that defendants, relying on section 6255 of the Act, may refuse to disclose the subject index cards of the LEIU.
The IOCI printouts, however, stand on a different footing. All information on the printouts is derived from public records. Information so acquired is not confidential, and the public records in question are not confidential sources. Consequently, the task of segregating exempt material on the printouts reduces to one of excising the personal identifiers. This is a much less onerous burden than the deletion of personal identifiers, confidential information, and confidential sources from the LEIU cards. Weighing the burden of segregation against the benefit of disclosure of the IOCI printouts, the balance tips in favor of disclosure.
The portion of the judgment of the superior court requiring disclosure of the Interstate Organized Crime Index printouts is affirmed. The portion of that judgment requiring disclosure of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit index cards is reversed. The cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.15
Mosk, J., Newman, J., and Kaus, J., concurred.

 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Government Code.

 The ACLU cites a striking example of the potential for abuse in unmonitored gathering of information by law enforcement agencies. Briefly, former State Senator Nate Holden was listed as one of six “associates” of Black Panther Party member Michael Zinzun on the latter’s index card. That card was disclosed in litigation in Chicago and was, therefore, on file in other places outside California. Holden, who had never been arrested or convicted of a crime, had rented a house to Zinzun for about four months.

 The department’s Organized Crime Criminal Intelligence Branch is the coordinating agency not only for the LEIU which produces the index cards, but also for the nationwide computer system which formerly produced the printouts. That system, the IOCI, was originally funded by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (now defunct); one condition of that grant was that the computer entries be based on information that was a matter of public record.

 The ACLU’s original request included a total of nine items; in addition to the cards and printouts, the ACLU sought disclosure of annual reports submitted to the Legislature by the department’s Organized Crime Criminal Intelligence Branch (OCCIB), notes and texts of briefings given to the Legislature, a catalog of OCCIB publications, the OCCIB policy statement with regard to maintenance or establishment of political files, lists of training conferences, a hardware index, and the current issue of various publications. Some of these items were produced voluntarily; others were produced at the order of the trial court; others did not exist or had been discontinued. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court’s order only insofar as it applied to the index cards and printouts.

 The ACLU, as we have noted, expressly excluded from its disclosure request “personal identifiers such as names of subjects [protected] by Government Code § 6254(c).” This section exempts “personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Since subdivision (c) is confined to “personnel, medical, or similar files,” the personal identifiers in the cards and printouts here at issue would not be exempt under that section. We read a similar exemption for personal identifiers into the “intelligence information” exemption in subdivision (f).
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court (United States v. Washington Post Co. (1982) 456 U.S. 595 [72 L.Ed.2d 358, 102 S.Ct. 1957] ruled that language in the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)), identical to that of section 6254, subdivision (c), bars disclosure whenever release of information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, regardless of the nature of the “file" in which the information is stored. Under this interpretation, section 6254, subdivision (c) would bar disclosure of personal identifiers in the cards and printouts.

 Section 6254, subdivision (k), exempts from disclosure “[rjecords the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to provisions of federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” This section thus incorporates the privilege for “official information” of Evidence Code section 1040. As the trial court observed, however, section 1040 involves a balancing test similar to that required by section 6255; thus, the court’s rejection of the exemption under section 6255 on the ground that the public interest weighs in favor of disclosure led *447the court to reject also claims of exemption under section 6254, subdivision (k) and Evidence Code section 1040.
For discussion of the relationship between section 6254, subdivision (k) and Evidence Code section 1040, and a comparison of the balancing tests required in those sections, see Note, The California Public Records Act: The Public’s Right of Access to Governmental Information (1976) 7 Pacific L.J. 105, 121-125.

 The 1967 federal act contained no express mention of “intelligence information.” It did incorporate other statutory exemptions, including a statute (50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)) which orders the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to protect “intelligence sources.” The federal courts have construed that enactment to bar disclosure of information relating to national security which could not have been obtained without guaranteeing the confidentiality of the source. (Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency (D.C.Cir. 1980) 642 F.2d 562, 571.)
It is unlikely that the California Legislature, when it enacted an exemption for “intelligence information,” had in mind protection of information and sources relating to national security. The language of section 6254, subdivision (f) suggests instead that the Legislature considered “intelligence information” a subclassification of the broader exemption for law enforcement investigatory records under the 1967 federal act.

 defendants, claiming that the “intelligence information” exemption was intended to encompass all information on the LEIU index and the IOCI printouts, rely on the fact that state budget bills antedating the Act refer to the California Department of Justice’s cooperative information exchange with the FBI. These bills, however, relate not to the indexing systems involved here, but to the National Crime Information Center telecommunications system which linked existing department records with a federal computer. In any case, proof that the Legislature was aware of an information exchange system does not shed any light on whether it intended to protect all information in that system from disclosure.

 See Weisberg v. U.S. Department of Justice (D.C.Cir. 1973) 489 F.2d 1195 (en banc), (spectrographic analysis of the bullet that killed President Kennedy is exempt since it is part of an FBI file compiled for law enforcement purposes, and nothing else is relevant); Aspin v. Department of Defense (D.C.Cir. 1973) 491 F.2d 24 (four-volume report on the coverup of the My-Lai massacre exempt in its entirety); Ditlow v. Brinegar (D.C.Cir. 1974) 494 F.2d 1073 (letters between the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and automobile manufacturers concerning possible safety defects protected by exemption 7, even though the only potential defendants have information); Center for National Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger (D.C.Cir. 1974) 502 F.2d 370 (since future fund cutoff proceeding, while unlikely and admittedly speculative, was conceivable, HEW’s title VI Civil Rights Compliance Reports concerning segregation and discrimination practices in northern public schools could be kept secret).

 In Bristol-Meyers Company v. F. T. C. (D.C.Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 935, 939, the court limited the federal exemption in the 1967 act to cases in which the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete and definite. The California Court of Appeal adopted the Bristol-Meyers definition. (Uribe v. Howie (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 194, 213 [96 Cal.Rptr. 493]; see State of California ex rel. Division of Industrial Safety v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 778, 784 [117 Cal.Rptr. 726]; Younger v. Berkeley City Council (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 825, 833 [119 Cal.Rptr. 830].) By 1976, however, the federal courts had generally rejected the Bristol-Meyers holding limiting the exemption to cases with concrete enforcement possibilities. (See Note, op. cit. supra, 7 Pacific L.J. 105, 127-128 and cases there cited.) The most recent Supreme Court decision on section 552, subdivision (b)(7) upholds an exemption for investigatory records without considering the prospects for enforcement (United States v. Washington Post Co., supra, 456 U.S. 595.)
The Bristol-Meyers doctrine, as adopted in Uribe v. Howie, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d 194, nevertheless remains viable as a construction of the Act. As explained in Younger v. Berkeley City Council, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 825, 833, however, that doctrine relates only to information which is not itself exempt from compelled disclosure, but claims exemption only as part of an investigatory file. Information independently exempt, such as “intelligence information” in the present case, is not subject to the requirement that it relate to a concrete and definite prospect of enforcement proceedings.

 We agree with the trial court that information is not “confidential” in this context unless treated as confidential by its original source. Thus, information does not become confidential because the California Department of Justice and the submitting law enforcement agency agree to treat it as such; it is confidential only if the law enforcement agency obtained it in confidence originally.
Amicus calls our attention to a definition of “confidential information” in the Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.). That definition includes as “confidential” all information compiled by law enforcement agencies “for the purpose of a criminal investigation of suspected criminal activities, including reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual.” (Civ. Code, § 1798.3, subd. (a)(1).) It is not clear, however, if this definition would encompass the LEIU cards or the IOCI printouts, since those materials are not necessarily compiled for the purpose of a current investigation. In any event, Civil Code section 1798.24, subdivision (g), makes it clear that information classed as confidential under the Information Practices Act may still be disclosed pursuant to the California Act; thus, the Information Practices Act definition cannot be used to define an exemption under the California Act.

 The briefs of the Attorney General and amicus also suggest that if the court orders disclosure of any information from the LEIU cards, this would breach the LEIU agreements and result in departments of other jurisdictions refusing to provide information to the California Department of Justice. This consequence, they suggest, is one matter to be weighed by the court in evaluating the claimed exemption under section 6255. The record on appeal, however, is entirely insufficient for us to determine the effect, if any, of ordering disclosure limited to nonconfidential information upon the future exchange of data by law enforcement units.

 We agree as a general principle with the language in Northern Cal. Police Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 116, 124 [153 Cal.Rptr. 173], that “where nonexempt materials are not inextricably intertwined with exempt materials and are otherwise reasonably segregable therefrom, segregation is required to serve the objective of the [Act] to make public records available for public inspection and copying unless a particular statute makes them exempt.” The burden of segregating exempt from nonexempt materials, however, remains one of the considerations which the court can take into account in determining whether the public interest favors disclosure under section 6255.

 Section 6255 requires the courts to look to “the facts of the particular case” in balancing the benefits and burdens of disclosure under the Act. Thus our decision against requiring disclosure is necessarily limited to the facts of this particular case; in another case, with different facts, the balance might tip in favor of disclosure of nonexempt information on the LEIU cards. If, for example, a person were to seek disclosure of only his own card, the diminished need to delete personal identifiers (the person in question presumably knows his own identity and that of his associates) and the reduced burden of determining confidentiality of sources or information when only a single card is involved might justify a court in requiring disclosure.

 Plaintiff seeks attorney fees pursuant to Government Code section 6259. The trial court should determine the fees to be awarded, taking into account not only the matters litigated on this appeal, but also the other items included in plaintiffs complaint (see fn. 4, ante).