Court Opinion

ID: 9377157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 00:02:13.885952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.159630
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/23 CBM Investments v. Royal Business Bank CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

CBM INVESTMENTS, INC., et al.,                                    B310205

         Cross-complainants and                                   (Los Angeles County
         Appellants,                                              Super. Ct. No. BC722043)

         v.

ROYAL BUSINESS BANK,

         Cross-defendant and
         Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Holly Fujie, Judge. Dismissed.

     Law Offices of Tony M. Lu and Tony M. Lu for Cross-
complainants and Appellants.

      Neufeld Marks, Paul S. Marks and Yuriko M. Shikai for
Cross-defendant and Respondent.

                                 _______________________
      CBM Investments, Inc. and CBM Systems, Inc (collectively,
CBM) appeal from the court’s order granting Royal Business
Bank’s motion for determination of a good faith settlement (Code
Civ. Proc., § 877.6). We dismiss the appeal.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Peng Chen sued CBM and other defendants, alleging
causes of action for conversion, violation of Penal Code section
496, constructive trust, and civil conspiracy. CBM cross-
complained against Royal Business Bank and other parties.
      Royal Business Bank moved for a determination that its
settlement of prior related litigation had been made in good faith,
barring the claims made against it in CBM’s cross-complaint.
After extensive briefing and argument, the trial court granted
Royal Business Bank’s motion. The clerk of the superior court
served the court’s minute order on the parties on October 21,
2020.
      CBM did not file a petition for writ of mandate seeking
review of the good faith settlement ruling; instead, CBM filed a
notice of appeal on January 22, 2021.
                         DISCUSSION
       In its respondent’s brief, Royal Business Bank contends
CBM’s appeal should be dismissed because CBM was required to
seek review of the good faith settlement determination through a
petition for writ of mandate rather than by direct appeal.

                                 2
       We conclude CBM has appealed from a nonappealable
order and dismiss the appeal. Code of Civil Procedure section
877.6, subdivision (e), provides: “When a determination of the
good faith or lack of good faith of a settlement is made, any party
aggrieved by the determination may petition the proper court to
review the determination by writ of mandate. The petition for
writ of mandate shall be filed within 20 days after service of
written notice of the determination, or within any additional time
not exceeding 20 days as the trial court may allow.” We have
previously held that a “good faith settlement determination is a
nonappealable interlocutory ruling and immediate review of the
merits of that determination is obtainable only by a timely writ
petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 877.6.” (Oak
Springs Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Advanced Truss Systems,
Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1307 (Oak Springs).) The
question of whether writ review is the exclusive method of
obtaining review of a good faith settlement determination is
currently pending before the California Supreme Court; in the
absence of a definitive answer by the Supreme Court we continue
to find persuasive our analysis in Oak Springs, which is
supported by the extensive statutory analysis set forth in Pacific
Fertility Cases (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 568, review granted August
17, 2022, S275134, and by the decisions in O’Hearn v. Hillcrest
Gym & Fitness Center, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 491, 499,
Main Fiber Products, Inc. v. Morgan & Franz Ins. Agency (1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1134–1137, and Chernett v. Jacques (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 69, 70–72.
       We are aware of decisions holding that a good faith
settlement determination may be reviewed on appeal from a final
judgment, specifically, Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.

                                3
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 955–956, Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Tuff
Boy Holding, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 627, 636–637, and
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Andreini & Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
1413, 1420–1426. These decisions, however, are inapposite
because in each case, the appellant had filed a petition for writ of
mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6,
subdivision (e), prior to seeking appellate review. (See Cahill, at
p. 956 [“Maryland Casualty’s detailed analysis of the legislative
history of section 877.6(e) . . . persuades us the Legislature did
not intend that statute to preclude postjudgment appeals of good
faith settlement determinations where earlier writ petitions were
summarily denied”]; Wilshire, at p. 637 [“Wilshire sought timely
writ review in this court. In these circumstances, we conclude
the trial court’s good faith settlement determination is subject to
appellate review on appeal from the judgment”]; Maryland
Casualty, at p. 1425, fn. 13 [describing the question presented as
“whether a nonsettling party, having previously sought but failed
to obtain a writ, can challenge a determination of good faith on a
postjudgment appeal”].) Because CBM appealed without first
filing a petition for writ of mandate, these decisions, permitting
appellate review of a good faith settlement determination where
the appellant had previously filed a petition for writ of mandate,
do not undermine our determination that CBM may not appeal
the court’s ruling here.
       We are also aware of our discretion to treat an improper
direct appeal from a ruling on a good faith settlement motion as a
petition for writ of mandate, but we decline to do so here, as there
is no unusual circumstance or peculiarity that would justify
exercising our discretion. (See Oak Springs, supra,
206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1309.)

                                 4
                        DISPOSITION
     The appeal is dismissed. Respondent shall recover its costs
on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

     GRIMES, J.

     WILEY, J.

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