Court Opinion

ID: 9763553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:49:10.174812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:27.888562
License: Public Domain

CHAPA, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The dissenting opinion delivered and filed on May 22, 1996, is'hereby withdrawn and this dissenting opinion is substituted.
While I agree that the majority has correctly stated the standard for determining right to control in a borrowed servant context, I conclude that appellant’s summary judgment proof raises a factual issue regarding right to control in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The borrowed servant doctrine protects the employer who had the right to control an injured employee at the time of the injury from common-law liability. Regalado v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 863 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 1993, no writ). As the majority points out, when the right to control is not expressed in a contract between the general and specific employers, it is inferred from the facts and circumstances of the employment. Producers Chemical Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220, 226 (Tex.1963). As such, the right of control is generally a question of fact. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex.1977). It follows, then, that in order to successfully defend its summary judgment, appellee must conclusively demonstrate that it had the right to control appellant at the time of the injury in question.
Appellee attached as evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment the affidavit of Judy Barrick, the owner of ATS. Barrick’s affidavit states that “while employed by Mapelli Food Distribution Company, Austin Temporary Services, Inc.’s temporary employees, including [appellant], were under the complete direction, custody and control of Mapelli Food Distribution Company.” (emphasis added)
In support of his response to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, appellant also offered the affidavit of Judy Barrick. The affidavit relied upon by appellant appears to be a copy of the same affidavit attached to appellee’s motion with several substantive changes made by Barrick. The affidavit attached to appellant’s response provides that “while employed by Mapelli Food Distribution Company, Austin Temporary Services, Inc.’s temporary employees, including [appellant], were under the complete direction, custody and control of Austin Temporary Services.” 1 (emphasis added)
The majority concedes that Barrick’s affidavits are contradictory; however, it ignores the well-established rule that where conflicting inferences may be drawn from competing summary judgment evidence, a fact issue is presented. See Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex.1988). In order to accomplish such a departure from precedent, the majority cursorily deduces that Barriek’s affidavits are conclusory and of no legal effect as the statements about control are not based upon Barriek’s personal knowledge.
Not only does Barrick state in her affidavit that she has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the affidavit, but she asserts that she is the Personnel Director of ATS and that she is familiar with ATS’s operating procedures regarding the staffing of temporary employees. To qualify as competent summary judgment proof, an affidavit must *618affirmatively demonstrate the manner in which the affiant became personally familiar with the facts so as to be competent to testify. Radio Station KSCS v. Jennings, 750 S.W.2d 760, 761-62 (Tex.1988); Tex. R.Civ.P. 166a(f). Under this standard, Bar-rick’s assertions regarding her personal knowledge and experience regarding the placement of ATS employees are clearly sufficient to establish her competency to testify regarding the control of ATS’s employees when they are on temporary assignment.
The majority further states that although ATS may have controlled appellant for certain purposes, there is uncontroverted evidence showing that Mapelli personnel controlled the manner of his work at the time he was injured. This could only be the case if Barrick’s second affidavit was completely discounted. I do not believe that this can be properly done given Barrick’s competency to testify as appellant’s supervisor and the content of the affidavit. See Knetsch v. Gaitonde, 898 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1995, no writ) (holding that conflicts in summary judgment evidence do not negate that evidence, but create impeachment material).
As previously noted, right to control is a question of fact. Sparger, 547 S.W.2d at 583. Therefore, Barriek’s statements regarding right to control are statements of fact based upon her personal knowledge as appellant’s employer. Barrick’s statements regarding right to control should be considered as competent summary judgment proof.
In order to avoid considering Barrick’s statements, the majority discounts appellant’s attempts to distinguish on procedural grounds the cases the majority relies upon. The majority states that considering the “mechanics of summary judgment procedure” misses the point of Regalado and De-nison as the eases only apply to the present case in the sense that they delineate the factors to be considered in determining right to control.
The right to control is an issue pivotal to this case and one about which a fact issue has been raised by Barrick’s conflicting affidavits. As such, the determination of right to control belongs to a jury, not to this court. Our task, as defined by the point of error before us, is limited to a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied summary judgment law in granting appel-lee’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the “mechanics of summary judgment procedure” are exactly what we are called upon to interpret in this case.
Specifically, we are to determine whether a factual issue exists as to a material element of appellant’s cause of action. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a. We are not to weigh the credibility of the summary judgment evidence or resolve factual inconsistencies on our own volition. Evans v. Conlee, 741 S.W.2d 504, 508-09 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987). Instead, we are to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant’s position as true. Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1965). If the summary judgment evidence raises conflicting inferences or warrants passing on its credibility, summary judgment is improper. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558-59 (Tex.1989).
A situation similar to the case at bar was present in a case decided recently by a Houston Court of Appeals. See Bottoms v. Smith, 923 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1996). There, portions of an expert’s deposition testimony were used by both the appellant and the appellee as summary judgment evidence. The expert’s testimony contradicted itself, and each side used that portion of the testimony that benefitted its case as evidence in support of its position. The court held that the granting of summary judgment was in error because the conflicting summary judgment evidence created a material issue of fact. Id. at 249-50.
Similarly, summary judgment is improper in the present case because of the conflicts present in Barrick’s affidavits. In fact, an even stronger factual issue is presented here than was present in Bottoms due to the fact that Barrick actually interlineated portions of a previous affidavit and replaced it with new language, as opposed to waffling on certain *619issues during deposition testimony as was the case in Bottoms. See id. at 249.
In my view, Barrick’s contradictory affidavits raise an unmistakable fact issue in regard to whether ATS or Mapelli exercised the right to control appellant’s work at the time of the injury. Such issue should now be presented to a jury to be considered with and weighed against the remaining evidence regarding right to control. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this ease for trial on the merits.

. Barrick also notes on the altered affidavit that her original affidavit was based on misinformation.