Court Opinion

ID: 9632310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:10:12.291004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:20.781751
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
dissenting.
The question in this negligence case is whether the harm that befell plaintiff resulted from a risk created by defendant’s negligence and is a harm for which reasonable people in our society would deem defendant blameworthy and impose liability. The trial court answered that question in the negative and entered summary judgment in favor of *619defendant. On review, the majority notes that plaintiff, while acting within the course and scope of her employment, was not injured directly as a result of defendant’s negligence, and that “[t]he negligently created condition no longer existed when she was injured.” 146 Or App at 614-15. Nonetheless, the majority reverses the trial court because it believes that it was for the jury to decide whether the risk of plaintiffs injury was within the general type of potential incidents that made defendant’s conduct negligent. I dissent because the majority’s construct of “foreseeability” is overbroad and is tantamount to making defendant an insurer to the world at large — defendant’s liability should not be predicated on the mere fact that plaintiffs injury is traceable to the hazard created by defendant’s negligence. The event that causes plaintiffs injury must be identified as one that falls within the scope of the risk associated with the hazard created by defendant’s negligence. The clearest description of what the concept of “foreseeability” is all about is found in Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Div., 316 Or 499, 509, 853 P2d 798 (1993):
“ [F] oreseeability is a method of describing how the law limits the circumstances or conditions under which one member of society may expect another to pay for a harm suffered. Within those limits, the jury or other factfinder may determine whether to award damages and in what amount. Outside those limits, the judge determines as a matter of law whether the facts alleged or the evidence of them is sufficient to support relief.”
It is apparent that the principle of foreseeability involves more than simply being able to imagine the sequence of events that led to plaintiffs injury. It also involves a societal judgment call — was defendant’s conduct such that, in the community’s conception of fault, defendant ought to pay for plaintiffs injury? As a matter of law, the facts established here simply do not create liability under that foreseeability principle.
The majority’s analysis begins with a discussion of two cases: Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 469 P2d 783 (1970) (an illustration of the type of harmful event in which the question of “foreseeability” was given to the jury), and Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, *620766 P2d 1026 (1988) (an illustration of the type of harmful event that was not foreseeable as a matter of law). Having properly noted that negligence law in Oregon recognizes a demarcation between the role of the court and that of the jury in deciding the question of foreseeability, the majority then concludes that this case falls within the ambit of Stewart. I disagree and believe that this case is closer to Hefty.
The majority is correct in quoting Stewart for the proposition that the focus of our inquiry is not on “the predictability of the actual sequence of events.” 146 Or App at 616 (quoting Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 13, 734 P2d 1326 (1987)). The majority, however, fails to heed that guideline. In this case, defendant’s conduct led to the accumulation of water on the hospital floor. Simply because a chain of events may be imagined or conjured in which defendant’s conduct plays a role does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the question of whether plaintiffs injury was foreseeable is one for the factfinder. There must also be something about defendant’s involvement that convinces us, as deciders of questions of law, that reasonable persons in our society would somehow view that involvement as a culpable cause of plaintiffs injury. In formulating the precept of foreseeability in Stewart, the Supreme Court explained:
“The premise upon which this standard is based is the concept that an actor should not be liable unless he is at fault in the legal sense. Although legal fault is not the exact equivalent of moral fault, the predicate is blameworthiness in some sense; the actor being regarded as blameworthy if his conduct is, according to community standards, generally considered as creating a danger to persons in the situation in which the plaintiff finds himself. * * *
"* * * * *
“If in our appraisal of the community’s conception of fault, we find that the conduct in question clearly falls outside the conception, we are charged with the duty of withdrawing the issue from the jury.” 255 Or at 608-09. (Footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Later, in concluding, the court stated:
*621“Equating likelihood of harm to fault, we are of the opinion that the likelihood of harm occurring as it did in this case is such that it might well be considered as blameworthy within the community’s sense of fault. If we could say that defendant’s conduct would not be deemed blameworthy according to the community’s sense of fault, we would not permit the jury to impose liability.” 255 Or at 611.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hefty is instructive as to the proper analytical procedure. There are two steps: first, the court must identify the risk to be expected from defendant’s conduct, and second, it must then identify how far that risk extends:
“The risk to be foreseen * * * encompassed those generalized incidents and injuries created by discharging Kimberly, an impaired minor addicted to alcohol, without notice to parents or police, without the permission of her doctor, without providing alternative care, and with the knowledge that Kimberly could not care for herself.
“As regards the scope of the risk associated with Kimberly’s alcoholism, Kimberly did not resume abusing alcohol or drugs after being discharged from the Unit. Neither the friend nor Kimberly took alcohol or drugs before the collision. Neither alcohol nor drugs factored into the events leading to the collision. * * *
“As regards the scope of the risk associated with Kimberly’s impaired judgment and inability to control her behavior, here, too, the injuries fell outside the scope of the risk. Motorcycle riding is a common, everyday activity. Kimberly herself owned and rode motorcycles with her parents’ permission. Engaging in an everyday mode of transportation would not appear to be an activity associated with the exercise of poor judgment or the inability to control one’s behavior.” 307 Or 252-53 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
In Hefty, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the grounds that no reasonable factfinder could find the risk foreseeable:
“[I]n an extreme case a court can decide that no reasonable factfinder could find the risk foreseeable. This is an ‘extreme case.’ ” Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
*622In this case, the majority broadly identifies the hazard or risk of harm created by defendant’s negligence as the risk that “someone [might be] injured by the water that had collected inside the hospital.” 146 Or App at 617-18. It then proceeds with the second step of the analysis by addressing the scope of that generalized risk of harm: “Had plaintiff slipped and injured herself as a result of the water, the element of ‘foreseeability would be satisfied because of the inherent properties of the water.” Id. After that point, however, the majoritys analysis unravels as it rushes to conclude:
“Similarly, a factfinder could find, depending on the circumstances, that it would be reasonably foreseeable that it would be necessary for hospital personnel to clean up the water that had been allowed to seep into the hospital. Part of the process of cleaning up the water could require the emptying of containers used to collect the water. We conclude that risk of injury to people performing tasks such as that performed by plaintiff is not beyond the range of reasonable foreseeability.” Id.
The majoritys analysis is fundamentally flawed — it fails to recognize that in formulating the precept of “foreseeability’ the Supreme Court in Stewart “sought to formulate ‘the line at which defendant’s liability ends,’ not where it began.” Fazzolari, 303 Or at 13 (citation omitted).
The inherent properties of water are well known. The generalized hazards associated with the accumulation of water on a floor and around electrical equipment are also well known. Given the present facts, the majority failed to focus on, and limit its analysis to, the scope of the risk associated with those generalized hazards that defendant created. Although the water played a role in the incident, that is merely the first step in the analysis, not, as for the majority, the place to stop. The second question is whether, in the communitys conception of fault, defendant should be expected to pay for this injury, occurring as it did. That is where the line that limits defendant’s liability should be drawn.
The majority is correct in stating that the element of foreseeability would be satisfied if plaintiff slipped and *623injured herself because of the water. The element of foreseeability might also be satisfied if the accumulated water was in contact with electrical equipment and she had been electrocuted during her attempt to collect the water. In this case, however, the majority acknowledges that those hazardous conditions associated with defendant’s negligence were no longer present when plaintiff was injured. 146 Or App at 614-15. Plaintiff was not injured by the water. Defendant’s liability should cease, at least, when the harm-producing event arises from the intervention of a force beyond defendant’s control. I conclude, as did the trial court, that plaintiffs injury falls outside the scope of the risk of harm associated with defendant’s negligence, as a matter of law.
I dissent.