Court Opinion

ID: 9955898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:02:24.360548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:38.151811
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Frazier CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097629

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE000092)

           v.

 ISAIAH FRAZIER,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Isaiah Frazier guilty of first degree murder and unlawfully
possessing a firearm. As to the murder, the jury found true the allegation that defendant
discharged a firearm causing the victim’s death. The trial court later found true a prior
strike allegation. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 75 years to
life in prison. On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support
the murder conviction. We disagree and affirm.

                                                             1
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       This case centers upon a homicide by shooting. On appeal, defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the prosecution’s sole theory and the jury’s
finding that defendant was guilty as the actual shooter as opposed to as an aider and
abettor or coconspirator, which the jury was not instructed on. Given that defendant is
challenging only the underlying theory for the murder conviction, we relay the facts with
a focus thereon.
       In the early morning hours of December 27, 2019, the victim was shot four times
while waiting in a McDonald’s drive-through. At the time, the victim was sitting in the
front passenger seat of a burgundy car driven by his girlfriend, L.M. L.M.’s friend was
one of the two other passengers in the burgundy car. Only the victim was shot, and he
died from his wounds.
       The shooting was recorded on a McDonald’s surveillance system. The footage
comprised of clips taken from various cameras stationed at different angles. The footage
was played for the jury during defendant’s trial; however, it was not included in the
record on appeal. We have only the trial testimony of former Sacramento County
Sheriff’s Detective Glen Petree describing the footage.
       Three minutes before the shooting, and approximately one-half mile from the
McDonald’s, two people were seen getting into a silver car registered to defendant’s
girlfriend. The silver car drove into the McDonald’s shopping center just before the
shooting. It is undisputed that defendant was one of the two people in the silver car.
Defendant was known to drive the silver car.
       After entering the shopping center, the silver car drove alongside the cars waiting
in the McDonald’s drive-through, headed toward the drive-through exit. The silver car
stopped before the exit to the drive-through and reversed, stopping near the entrance to
the drive-through. The driver got out of the driver’s side door and walked to the
passenger side of the silver car. Detective Petree believed the former driver got into the

                                             2
passenger-side door, but this was not depicted in the surveillance footage due to the
positioning of the cameras and the silver car. Detective Petree believed the former driver
switched places with the unknown second person inside the car. The surveillance footage
did not depict anyone enter the driver’s side door nor any doors on the silver car open.
The second passenger was not seen in the McDonald’s footage.
       The silver car drove forward again and stopped. The front passenger—wearing
clothing matching those of the person previously seen leaving through the driver’s side
door—got out of the silver car and shot seven rounds toward where the victim sat in the
burgundy car. The shooter wore a beanie, a tan jacket, a grey sweatshirt, sweatpants, and
white and black shoes.
       Within 24 hours of the shooting, the silver car was found at the apartment complex
where defendant’s brother lived. Defendant and defendant’s girlfriend were found in the
silver car after being seen entering and exiting defendant’s brother’s apartment. During a
search of the apartment, officers found a gun with no fingerprints on it, which was later
identified as the murder weapon. Defendant was taken into custody.
       At the time of his arrest, defendant was wearing shoes like those the shooter wore.
Several videos spanning the days leading up to the shooting and through the evening of
defendant’s arrest showed defendant wearing clothing similar to what the shooter wore.
One video uploaded to the Internet four hours before the shooting showed defendant
holding a firearm and wearing clothing similar to the shooter. These videos were played
for the jury during defendant’s trial. The videos were not included in the record on
appeal; we have only testimony discussing their contents.
       L.M. and her friend from the burgundy car were questioned by deputies at the
sheriff’s department a few hours after the shooting. At some point, L.M. and her friend
were left alone in a video surveilled interrogation room. When alone together, L.M.
reenacted the McDonald’s shooting in front of her friend and said, “Klicko did it.”
Defendant was known to go by the moniker Klicko. L.M. also speculated to her friend

                                             3
that defendant’s girlfriend was the second passenger in the silver car. L.M. was unaware
her discussion was being recorded and assumed the conversation was private. The
recording was played for the jury during defendant’s trial. The video was not included in
the record on appeal; we have only testimony describing its contents.
       At trial L.M. recanted her recorded statements to her friend, stating she did not see
the shooter or the silver car and that, in the conversation with her friend, she was simply
trying to figure out what happened during the shooting. During testimony, L.M. could
not explain why she identified Klicko as the shooter nor why she assumed defendant’s
girlfriend was the other passenger in the shooter’s car. L.M. said she was unable to
clearly remember the shooting because she was drowsy and under the influence of Xanax
at the time. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Sean Woodward did not perceive L.M.
as being drowsy or under the influence of Xanax when he questioned her after the
shooting.
       L.M. testified at trial she was aware of defendant’s moniker and was very familiar
with defendant, having lived in the same neighborhood. L.M. dated defendant before
dating the victim. L.M. maintained contact with defendant after their breakup and
exchanged calls and messages in the days leading up to and following the shooting. L.M.
also visited defendant in jail after his arrest for the shooting.
       Defendant associated with a gang from the neighborhood in which he and L.M.
had lived. The victim associated with a gang from a different neighborhood. The two
gangs were notorious rivals, resulting in countless shootings, beatings, and murders over
the years.
       Defendant’s defense at trial was that the unknown second passenger in the silver
car was responsible for the murder. Defendant argued his girlfriend was not the
passenger; he argued the passenger was D.A. D.A.’s fingerprints were found along the
outside of the passenger-side rear door of the silver car, cell tower data placed
defendant’s cell phone near D.A.’s home just before the shooting, and D.A. belonged to

                                               4
the same gang as defendant. Cell tower data placed D.A.’s cell phone at his home during
and after the shooting.
       The jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and unlawfully
possessing a firearm. The jury also found true the allegation defendant discharged a
firearm causing the victim’s death, which was attached to his murder charge. The trial
court found true a prior strike allegation and declined defendant’s request to strike the
prior strike. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the murder
conviction, doubled pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law, and 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement, bringing the total sentence to 75 years to life in prison. The trial
court further sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of two years, doubled pursuant to
the Three Strikes law, for the firearm possession conviction.
       Defendant appeals.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction for murder based
on the theory he was the shooter. Specifically, he argues the evidence supporting that
theory was speculative and not sufficiently solid or credible. We disagree.
       The sufficiency of the evidence review standard is well established. In the light
most favorable to respondent, the appellate court must examine the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the fact finder’s determination by conducting an independent review
of the entire record for substantial evidence. (People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
245, 270; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577 [the review must be based upon
the whole record, not simply isolated evidence taken out of context].) Substantial
evidence is “evidence [that] is reasonable, credible, and of solid value⸺such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Johnson, at p. 578.) “ ‘In applying this test, we . . . presume in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. . . .
“We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Penunuri

                                              5
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.) We ask whether “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies
primarily on circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Montanez, at p. 271.)
       The jury was instructed on defendant’s murder liability as a direct perpetrator, not
as an aider and abettor or coconspirator. To support this theory, the prosecution relied on
the testimony and prior statements of L.M., the surveillance footage of the shooting, and
videos of defendant wearing clothing similar to what the shooter wore in the surveillance
footage. Together, this evidence cannot be understood as mere “isolated evidence,”
contrary to defendant’s assertion. Even so, the video of the shooting and pictures of
defendant provided the jury with an opportunity to visually compare the characteristics of
the shooter with those of defendant to determine for itself whether defendant was the
shooter. We have not been provided with the recording of the shooting nor the
photographs of defendant in clothing similar to that worn by the shooter. As a
consequence, we are in no position to second-guess the jury’s determination based on that
evidence. (See Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644 [“Where the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of
the challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or order is
correct, and on that basis, affirm”].)
       Defendant further argues there was no direct evidence establishing he was the
shooter. This is incorrect. “ ‘[D]irect evidence’ means evidence that directly proves a
fact, without an inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true, conclusively
establishes that fact.” (Evid. Code, § 410; cf. People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011)
52 Cal.4th 254, 329 [purported eyewitness testimony about what they saw is direct
evidence].) The evidence contained a video recording from just hours after the shooting
in which L.M. acted out the shooting and stated defendant “did it.” This is a statement
from an eyewitness who sat within arm’s reach of the victim when he was shot. This

                                             6
constitutes direct evidence and is generally sufficient to uphold a conviction. (See
People v. Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [a conviction may be supported by
testimony from a single witness].)
       Defendant attacks the substantive value of, and therefore the jury’s possible
reliance on, L.M.’s statement that defendant “did it.” He does so by arguing that L.M.’s
in-court repudiation of the statement was more credible, that she could not see the
shooter, and that she did not see the car he came from. These arguments are
unpersuasive. Defendant’s beliefs regarding the witness’s credibility are immaterial
because that determination rests squarely with the trier of fact. (People v. Penunuri,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 142; People v. Ozene (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 905, 910 [“It is
blackletter law that any conflict or contradiction in the evidence, or any inconsistency in
the testimony of witnesses must be resolved by the trier of fact who is the sole judge of
the credibility of the witnesses”].) It is not in the appellate court’s domain to second-
guess the fact finder’s determinations related to credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts
unless the testimony is impossible or inherently improbable. (Cf. Penunuri, at p. 142;
Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 427, 448 [unless
testimony is impossible or inherently improbable, such determinations are
“unreviewable”].) Defendant has failed to make such a showing.
       A reasonable jury could have decided L.M.’s repeated evasiveness and
contradictions while testifying marked her untrustworthy in court. For example, she
regularly did not provide substantive answers, including to foundational background
questions, and instead responded with “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember.” This
included when she was asked about where she was at the time of the shooting, what
neighborhood she grew up in and how long she lived there, how long she had known
defendant, and whether she had ever dated him. Indeed, the trial court stepped in on
multiple occasions to remind L.M. of her obligations to the court, including to advise her,
“We’re not here to play games,” and to keep in mind that lies are perjury. Additionally,

                                              7
Sacramento Police Sergeant Joseph Ellis explained that persons associated with gang
members adhere to a no “snitching” rule that dictates they not “cooperate with the
police”—even to help resolve a shooting by a rival gang member. The record thus
contains solid evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have rationally found
L.M. was lying during testimony when she stated she did not see the shooter.
         Further, just after the shooting, L.M. told her friend defendant “did it” when she
believed she was not being surveilled. Yet, at trial, she said she did not see the shooter
because she was looking away from the victim and then ducked her head down at the
time of the shooting. In the context of the case as a whole, especially given L.M.’s
familiarity with defendant and his girlfriend, L.M.’s acting out the shooting to her friend,
and L.M.’s specific identification of defendant as the shooter, we conclude that it is not
impossible nor inherently improbable for a fact finder to reasonably find L.M. was able to
see the shooter and the car from which the shooter exited.
         Regardless, defendant’s assertion regarding the lack of direct evidence of
defendant’s guilt is irrelevant. As the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 223,
“Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence or by a combination of both.
[¶] . . . [¶] Both direct and circumstantial evidence are acceptable types of evidence to
prove or disprove the elements of a charge, including intent and mental state and acts
necessary to a conviction, and neither is necessarily more reliable than the other. Neither
is entitled to any greater weight than the other.” (Cf. People v. Livingston (2012)
53 Cal.4th 1145, 1165-1166 [agreeing with several decisions concluding CALJIC
No. 2.00, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 223, accurately states the law].) Thus, the
jury was permitted to base its determination of defendant’s guilt on indirect evidence
alone.
         Indeed, a jury could reasonably deduce defendant’s guilt as the shooter based upon
the indirect evidence presented throughout the entire record. (People v. Mumin (2023)
15 Cal.5th 176, 202 [a jury is authorized to make logical and reasonable deductions from

                                               8
evidence].) Deductions made by the jury may not be mere speculation, as defendant
points out. (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 891 [reasonable inferences must be
drawn from the evidence and not mere guesswork, speculation, or suspicion].) As
discussed, the jury heard a plethora of evidence tying defendant to the act of shooting the
victim. Defendant was one of just two persons in the silver car, defendant was seen
wearing clothing matching that of the shooter in the days leading up to the shooting,
hours before the shooting defendant published a video of himself holding a gun and
wearing clothes similar to those the shooter wore, and the gun used in the shooting was
found in defendant’s brother’s apartment the evening following the shooting just after
defendant was seen leaving the apartment. A rational trier of fact could reasonably find,
based upon the above evidence and not mere speculation or guesswork, that defendant
was the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Lastly, defendant’s claims the evidence pointed to D.A. as the shooter are
unavailing. While the evidence may be interpreted to support an inference D.A. was the
shooter, that is but one theory and it is not the place of this court to choose one
interpretation of the facts over another. (See People v. Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th
at p. 271 [we presume “ ‘the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,’ ” and reverse only where no
hypothesis whatsoever provides sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict].) The
role of this court is to “ ‘determine if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
not, [that] will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.’ ” (Adoption of Emilio G.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1145.) We have determined reasonable, credible, and
solid evidence supports the jury’s factual findings.
       Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the murder
conviction.

                                              9
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                           /s/
                                           ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

                                      10