Court Opinion

ID: 9572160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:12.555928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:42.634931
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority’s holding “that the indictments in 98 CRS 0005 and 0006 are fatally defective, requiring that the judgments entered in those cases be vacated.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
“Both our legislature and our courts have endorsed the use of short-form indictments for . . . sex offenses, even though such indictments do not specifically allege each and every element.” State v. Harris, 140 N.C. App. 208, 215, 535 S.E.2d 614, 619 (2000) (citations omitted). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b) (2001), “[i]f the victim is a person under the age of 13 years, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did engage in a sex offense with a child under the age of 13 years, naming the child . . . .” An indictment including these averments and allegations “shall be good and sufficient in law as an indictment for a sex offense against a child under the age of 13 years and all lesser included offenses.” Id. The indictments at issue in this case (1) allege that each victim is under the age of thirteen; (2) name each victim; and (3) aver that defendant “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did engage in a sex act . . . .” Contrary to the majority, I believe these indictments are sufficient since they contain all the information *616required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b). While the indictments contain additional factual allegations, these unnecessary allegations should be treated as surplusage. See State v. Moore, 311 N.C. 442, 460, 319 S.E.2d 150, 156 (1984) (Meyer, J., concurring) (citing State v. Moore, 284 N.C. 485, 202 S.E.2d 169 (1974); State v. Lewis, 58 N.C. App. 348, 293 S.E.2d 638 (1982)).
This case can be compared to State v. Dillard, 90 N.C. App. 318, 320, 368 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1988), in which this Court concluded the indictment at issue was sufficient to charge the defendant with either first or second degree sexual offense. In Dillard, the indictment charged a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5 and was captioned ‘“SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE.’” Id. The indictment stated “ ‘defendant . . . unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did engage in a sex offense with [victim’s name] age 8, by force and against that victim’s will. At the time of this offense the defendant was at least 12 years old and at least 4 years older than the victim.’ ” Id. This Court concluded “[t]he statements regarding the victim’s and defendant’s ages d[id] not render the indictment insufficient to charge a violation of G.S. 14-27.5 [second degree sexual offense,]” which offense did not include any age requirements of the victim or perpetrator. Id. at 320-21, 368 S.E.2d at 444. Although the indictment in Dillard included information in addition to that required in a short-form indictment for a sexual offense, this Court concluded the indictment was sufficient to charge the defendant with either first or second degree sexual offense. Id. at 320, 368 S.E.2d at 444.
The indictments in the instant case, as the indictment in Dillard, include elements from two different statutes. In this case, the indictments include elements from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4 (first degree sexual offense) and elements from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A (statutory rape or sexual offense of person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old). In following Dillard, the indictments are sufficient to charge defendant with first degree sexual offense and all lesser included offenses. Therefore, I would hold that the indictments in 98 CRS 0005 and 0006 are not fatally defective.