Court Opinion

ID: 9486356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:46:03.259513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:40.947570
License: Public Domain

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
*285The Sentencing Reform Act, Tit. II, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (1988), provides that “in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment” and in determining the length of imprisonment to be imposed, a court “shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphasis added). The proposition that the court is not to order imprisonment for purposes of rehabilitation is reinforced by one of the statutory provisions governing the United States Sentencing Commission’s creation of federal sentencing guidelines, in which Congress provided that
[t]he Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 946 (2d Cir.1992) (“§ 994(k)[ ] stands for the ... proposition that rehabilitation is not an appropriate ground for imprisonment” (emphasis in original)).
The majority agrees that the above provisions prohibit the district court from ordering imprisonment for purposes of rehabilitation or medical care in imposing the original sentence. I see nothing in these provisions, or in any other provision, that relaxes these constraints when the court is imposing a sentence for violation of supervised release. I do not agree with the majority’s view, ante, note 4, that the use of the phrase “ ‘require the person to serve in prison’ [in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) ] rather than the phrase ‘sentence the person to a term of imprisonment’ [interpolating 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) ]” suggests that “Congress intended that the limitations applicable upon an initial sentence of imprisonment would not be applicable upon the revocation of a term of supervised release,” Majority opinion, ante, note 4. Surely if Congress meant to override its two explicit statutory constraints and allow a court to impose a term of imprisonment for purposes of rehabilitation or medical care as part of a sentence for violation of supervised release it could have thought of more revealing language.
It is true that if (a) in imposing the original sentence the court has included a term of supervised release that is designed to provide rehabilitation or medical care, and (b) in imposing sentence for violation of a condition of supervised release the court has ordered imprisonment for the length of the supervised-release term, the overall effect is imprisonment for a term that includes a period originally designed to provide rehabilitation or medical care. That effect is, however, incidental, and the court’s election to order imprisonment for the length of the original supervised-release term is properly viewed, assuming no indication from the court to the contrary, as punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised release, not as imprisonment for the purposes that motivated the original conditions of supervised release. That incidental effect is not prohibited. What is, in my view, prohibited by the statutory scheme is the imposition of a term of imprisonment, whether originally or thereafter upon some subsequent violation, for the purpose of rehabilitation or medical care.
The majority points out that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) provides that “in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,” the court shall consider the need “to provide the defendant with ... medical care[ ] or other correctional treatment,” and argues that interpreting the statutory framework as foreclosing imprisonment for these purposes would render superfluous the portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (“Modification of conditions [of supervised release] or revocation”) that refer to § 3553(a)(2)(D). I disagree in light of the fact that § 3583(e) gives the court options other than imprisonment. It states that
[t]he court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6)—
(1) terminate a term of supervised release ...;
*286(2) extend a term of supervised release if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed, and may modify_the conditions of supervised release at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of supervised release ...;
(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release ...; or
(4) order the person to remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours ... as an alternative to incarceration.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Thus, § 3553(a)(2)(D) plainly remains relevant to subsection (2) of § 3583(e), and perhaps to subsections (1) and (4), as well, i.e., to the provisions that do not provide for imprisonment. We do not render it superfluous by recognizing its inapplicability to subsection (3).
In sum, I conclude that the district court’s sentencing of the defendant in the present case to imprisonment for the stated reason that “You need I think, in my judgment, intensive substance abuse and psychological treatment in a structured environment,” violated the express statutory provision of § 3582(a). Accordingly, I would vacate the sentence and remand for the imposition of a sentence that is based on consideration of only permissible factors.