Court Opinion

ID: 9905202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 21:10:41.722545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:34.742423
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Estate of Carte v. Bringardner, 2023-Ohio-4286.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In the Matter of the Estate of                          :
James Carte, Deceased,
                                                        :
Dan Miller,                                                           No. 22AP-787
                                                        :           (Prob. No. 606694WC)
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                        :         (REGULAR CALENDAR)
v.
                                                        :
Daniel Bringardner
Individually and as Co-Executor of the                  :
Estate of James Carte and Co-Trustee
of the Amended and Restated James A.                    :
Cart[e] Declaration of Trust et al.,
                                                        :
                 Defendants-Appellees.
                                                        :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on November 21, 2023

                 On brief: DuPont and Blumenstiel, LLC, and Braden A.
                 Blumenstiel, for appellant. Argued: Braden A. Blumenstiel.

                 On brief: Carlile Patchen & Murphy, LLP, and Bryan M.
                 Pritikin for appellees Daniel Bringardner and Harry B. Gate.
                 Argued: Bryan M. Pritikin.

                 On brief: Benson & Sesser, LLC, and Mark C. Melko, for
                 appellee Mildred Osborne. Argued: Mark C. Melko.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
                                     Probate Division

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Dan Miller, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, which granted summary judgment in
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                 2

favor of defendants-appellees, Daniel Bringardner, Harry B. Gate, and Mildred Osborne.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} James Carte was married to Virginia Miller until her death in late 2009.
Carte and Virginia had two children, Carolyn Harris and Jean Miller. Appellant is Jean’s
husband; they have two adult children. Carolyn also has two adult children.
        {¶ 3} On April 11, 2012, Carte executed an “Amended and Restated James A. Carte
Declaration of Trust,” which amended and restated an original trust agreement dated
June 20, 2006 and subsequent amendments thereto dated January 13, 2010, June 9, 2010,
and January 12, 2011. (Compl. at ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) Carte named as beneficiaries of the 2012 trust
Carolyn, her two children, Jean’s two children, his friend and caretaker Osborne, and three
charitable organizations. The 2012 amended trust included a no contest clause which
specifically stated that Carte had intentionally made no provision for Jean and that if she
or her children contested the validity of the trust or his will, provisions made in the trust
agreement for Jean’s children would lapse. Carte named Bringardner, his attorney, and
Gate, his friend, as co-trustees.
        {¶ 4} Also on April 11, 2012, Carte executed a will which revoked all former wills
and codicils. The will contained a pour-over provision directing the distribution of his
property into the trust.          Carte appointed Carolyn, Bringardner, and Osborne as co-
executors of his estate; Gate was appointed as successor co-executor.
        {¶ 5} Carte died on September 9, 2020. Administration of his probate estate was
opened November 3, 2020 by Bringardner. Upon Bringardner’s application, the trial court
admitted the 2012 will and appointed Bringardner as sole executor. Bringardner filed the
certificate of notice of probate of will on November 12, 2020.
        {¶ 6} On February 16, 2021, appellant filed a complaint seeking to invalidate the
2012 will and the 2012 trust, to set aside certain inter vivos transfers of assets, and for
declaratory judgment. The complaint named as defendants Bringardner, Gate, Carolyn,
and Osborne individually1 and as co-executors of his estate, along with Jean, Jean’s

1 On June 4, 2021, appellant filed a Civ.R. 41(A)(1) voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, of Bringardner and

Gate in their individual capacities only.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                              3

children, Carolyn’s children, the three charitable organizations identified in the trust, and
Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.2
        {¶ 7} In the complaint, appellant alleged that he was a named beneficiary under a
prior will and trust executed by Carte and Virginia in 2006 but was not a named beneficiary
under the 2012 will and 2012 trust; accordingly, he had a direct pecuniary interest in Carte’s
estate which qualified him under R.C. 2107.71 as a “person interested” in the 2012 will and
2012 trust. (Compl. at ¶ 7-9, 27.) Appellant further alleged that Carte executed his 2012
will and 2012 trust at a time he was susceptible to undue influence by Osborne and/or
lacked testamentary capacity to execute the documents. Appellant also alleged that Carte
made certain inter vivos transfers of assets at a time he was susceptible to undue influence
by Osborne and/or lacked testamentary capacity to make the transfers. Appellant
additionally alleged that the inter vivos transfers of assets constituted a conversion of
Carte’s assets, necessitating imposition of a constructive trust. Finally, appellant sought a
declaration that the 2012 will and 2012 trust were invalid.
        {¶ 8} Osborne answered appellant’s complaint on April 21, 2021, asserting as an
affirmative defense appellant’s lack of standing to contest the 2012 will. Following two
unopposed requests for an extension to move or plead in response to appellant’s complaint,
on May 28, 2021, Bringardner and Gate (together “appellees”) filed a joint motion to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Therein, appellees averred that Carte had executed a prior will in
2011 which was filed in the probate court on May 26, 2021,3 and which did not provide for
any distribution to appellant. Appellees asserted that appellant was not a “person
interested” under R.C. 2107.71 because: (1) he was a non-blood relative not otherwise
entitled to inherit through intestate succession, and (2) even if he were a named beneficiary
in the 2006 will, the fact that he was not a named beneficiary in the 2011 will eliminated
any standing he might otherwise have had under the 2006 will. Thus, argued appellees,
appellant lacked standing to contest the 2012 will. Appellant filed a memorandum contra,

2 Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it appears that Yost was named as a defendant pursuant

to R.C. 2107.73.
3 Appellees noted the Administration No. 606694 associated with this filing and urged the probate court to

take judicial notice of its docket.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                             4

to which appellees filed a reply. On September 1, 2021, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion to dismiss.
        {¶ 9} Following an October 8, 2021 status conference, a magistrate of the probate
court issued a scheduling order on October 12, 2021 setting forth a discovery cut-off date of
April 29, 2022, and a dispositive motion filing deadline of June 1, 2022. In a separate order
filed October 12, 2021, the magistrate ordered appellees to answer the complaint no later
than November 5, 2021. Appellees filed separate answers on November 4, 2021; both
asserted as an affirmative defense that appellant lacked standing to contest the 2012 will.4
        {¶ 10} On May 31, 2022, just over one month after the April 29, 2022 discovery cut-
off deadline, appellant filed a combined motion (which, to simplify, we refer to as the
“motion to compel”) requesting that the trial court: (1) compel Bringardner to supplement
his responses to appellant’s first set of interrogatories and request for production of
documents served July 13, 2021; (2) remove Bringardner as executor, appoint a new
executor and order the new executor to sign authorizations allowing appellant to obtain the
estate planning file of Carte’s former attorney, David Humphrey, and Carte’s medical and
financial records from third parties; (3) extend all case deadlines, including the discovery
cut-off date, by at least 180 days; and (4) award appellant the attorney fees incurred in
preparing the motion. Appellant attached several exhibits to his motion to compel.
        {¶ 11} In his memorandum in support of his motion to compel, appellant
summarized the sequence of discovery efforts as we have noted in the following paragraphs.
On February 24, 2021, he issued a subpoena to Humphrey seeking all estate planning
documentation he prepared for Carte from January 2000 to the present. Humphrey failed
to respond to the subpoena, but soon thereafter indicated, citing attorney client privilege,
that he would not provide the subpoenaed documentation absent written authorization
from Bringardner as executor of Carte’s estate. Despite appellant’s advisement that the
statute governing attorney client privilege, R.C. 2317.02, was inapplicable under the
circumstances of the case, Humphrey maintained his refusal to provide the subpoenaed
documentation without authorization from Bringardner.
        {¶ 12} In June 2021, appellant, Bringardner, and Humphrey exchanged
communications pertaining to appellant’s request that Bringardner sign an authorization

4 The remaining named defendants, save for Jean, her children, and one of the charitable organizations, all

filed answers.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                5

permitting appellant to obtain Carte’s estate file from Humphrey. Bringardner averred that
he would not sign the authorization, and Humphrey reiterated that he would not provide
the documentation without written authorization from Bringardner.
        {¶ 13} On July 13, 2021, appellant served his first set of interrogatories and requests
for production of documents on Bringardner. Later that same day, Bringardner notified
appellant that he would not respond to the discovery requests prior to the trial court ruling
on the motion to dismiss. On July 15, 2021, appellant again subpoenaed Humphrey’s estate
planning records. On July 27, 2021, Humphrey emailed appellant indicating he had
received the subpoena but would not respond absent a written authorization from
Bringardner. Later that day, Bringardner emailed appellant advising that Humphrey
would not comply with the subpoena because he was without waiver to comply with the
document request. Appellant responded by email, reiterating his assertion that under R.C.
2317.02, no attorney client privilege exists where claims of undue influence or lack of
testamentary capacity are asserted; appellant further averred that he wanted to avoid
needless motion practice unless absolutely necessary and would be willing to participate in
a conference call with the court in order to obtain guidance on the issue.
        {¶ 14} Following the trial court’s September 1, 2021 denial of the motion to dismiss,
Bringardner, on December 1, 2021, filed his responses to appellant’s discovery requests.5
On April 19, 2022, appellant wrote Bringardner requesting that he supplement his
responses to select interrogatories and requests for production of documents and sign
authorizations permitting appellant to obtain Humphrey’s estate planning files and Carte’s
medical and financial records from third parties. In a letter dated April 29, 2022,
Bringardner averred that appellant’s failure to refine or address his objections to the
discovery requests, coupled with the fact that appellant waited almost five months to send
the letter, demonstrated a lack of good-faith effort to resolve the discovery issues. As to the
authorization forms, Bringardner indicated that because discovery was closed and
Humphrey was never properly served with a subpoena, the authorization issue was moot.
Bringardner further stated that any attempt by appellant to subpoena Carte’s medical and
financial records would be met with objection as improperly and untimely issued.

5 We note that appellant’s motion to compel did not set forth, or include as an exhibit, Bringardner’s initial

responses to appellant’s discovery requests.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                  6

       {¶ 15} Appellant’s motion to compel requested that the trial court order Bringardner
to file supplemental responses to select interrogatories (Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 10) and requests
for production of documents (Nos. 3, 6, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25). Those
interrogatories requested information pertaining to Carte’s financial holdings in the last ten
years of his life, including identification of bank, IRA, brokerage accounts, pensions,
insurance policies, savings bonds, and transfer on death deeds, names and addresses of
financial institutions in which Carte held assets or had accounts, account numbers and
balances for all bank accounts, as well as identification of Carte’s real estate holdings during
the five years preceding his death. The documents requested included all of Bringardner’s
files pertaining to any legal work performed for Carte during Carte’s lifetime; copies of
Carte’s financial holdings from January 1, 2004 to the present held by Bringardner; written
statements and/or documentation regarding any person Bringardner intended to call as a
fact or lay witness; Carte’s personal or private documents and computer files held by
Bringardner; Bringardner’s personal or private files related to Carte that were generated
before the filing of appellant’s complaint; Carte’s personal check ledgers for the ten years
preceding his death; and copies of accounting information, notes, phone logs, and written
communications generated as a result of legal work performed by Bringardner for Carte
from January 2004 to the present.
       {¶ 16} On June 1, 2022, the last day for filing dispositive motions, appellees filed a
joint motion for summary judgment; Osborne followed later that day with her own motion
for summary judgment. Both motions asserted that appellant lacked standing to contest
the 2012 will and 2012 trust. Specifically, both motions argued that appellant was not a
“person interested” under the 2012 will and 2012 trust and had no pecuniary interest in
Carte’s estate because he is not a blood relative of Carte and is not a beneficiary under the
2012 will and 2012 trust. Both motions further argued that even if appellant was a named
beneficiary under Carte’s 2006 will and 2006 trust, Carte eliminated him as a beneficiary
through two subsequent codicils to his will and two subsequent amendments to the trust,
executed on January 10 and June 9, 2010, respectively, and through a will executed on
January 12, 2011 which revoked all prior wills. Both motions further argued that even if
appellant had standing to challenge the 2012 will and 2012 trust, no genuine issue of
material fact existed establishing Carte was unduly influenced or lacked testamentary
capacity in the execution of those documents.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                   7

        {¶ 17} Appellees attached as exhibits to their motion for summary judgment
excerpts from the deposition of appellant taken May 16 2022;6 a copy of Carte’s first will
and trust, executed June 20, 2006; a copy of the first codicil to the will and first amendment
to the trust, executed January 13, 2010; a copy of the second codicil to the will and second
amendment to the trust, executed June 9, 2010; a copy of the will and trust executed
January 12, 2011 and a copy of the 2012 will and 2012 trust. Appellees also attached
Bringardner’s affidavit attesting he served as Carte’s attorney from late 2010 through his
passing in 2020, drafted Carte’s 2011 will and 2011 amended trust, Carte’s 2012 will and
2012 amended trust, and that the documents attached to the motion for summary judgment
as exhibit Nos. 5 and 6 were true and accurate copies of those documents.
        {¶ 18} Thereafter, on June 13, 2022, Bringardner filed a memorandum contra
appellant’s motion to compel, arguing, inter alia, that such was time-barred pursuant to
probate court local rules, as it was filed after the April 29, 2022 discovery deadline. He
further argued that the motion did not include the certification required by Civ.R. 37(A)(1)
that appellant had in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with him in an effort to
obtain the requested discovery without court action. Bringardner also challenged as
improper appellant’s requests to have him removed as executor, to extend the discovery
deadline, and to order him to pay appellant’s attorney fees.
        {¶ 19} Bringardner attached three exhibits to his memorandum contra. The first
was a copy of his December 1, 2021 response to appellant’s first set of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents.7 Bringardner objected to many of the 24
interrogatories and 26 requests for production of documents on grounds they were overly
broad, vague, ambiguous, or unduly burdensome, or, particularly with regard to requests
about Carte’s financial and real estate holdings, that they had no bearing on appellant’s
claims regarding Carte’s legal capacity to execute the testamentary documents. The second
exhibit was a copy of appellant’s April 19, 2022 letter to Bringardner wherein appellant
acknowledged the approaching April 29, 2022 discovery cut-off date, indicated he wished
to schedule depositions and continue with discovery, and averred that if the parties could
agree to move forward with discovery, court intervention would be unnecessary. The third

6 Appellees averred that a complete copy of appellant’s deposition was filed with the clerk of the probate court.
7 There appears to be no dispute that Bringardner produced copies of the 2006, 2010, and 2011 testamentary

documents in his December 1, 2021 response.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                  8

exhibit was a copy of a May 23, 2022 email from Bringardner to appellant asserting
appellant’s ongoing efforts to obtain discovery from Humphrey and others were improper
because the discovery cut-off date had passed and he had never properly served Humphrey
with a subpoena; he also noted that appellant had failed to make discovery requests for
medical records from those who might have possession of such records. Bringardner
averred that because appellant had ample time to conduct discovery, he would oppose
further attempts to compel improperly (or never) sought discovery and any attempts to
extend the discovery deadline. Bringardner offered, however, to execute a waiver for
Carte’s healthcare records as long as the waiver was directed at a specific physician or
medical practice and the request sought information relevant to appellant’s claims, and to
execute a waiver of confidentiality for Humphrey’s 2006-2010 estate planning documents.
Bringardner advised that the offer was made notwithstanding that the parties were weeks
beyond the discovery cut-off date and with reservation of all rights to object to any motion
to extend the discovery deadline.
        {¶ 20} On June 21, 2021, appellant filed a reply brief in support of his motion to
compel. Therein, appellant asserted that on May 16, 2022, the day before appellant’s
May 17, 2022 deposition, he emailed all opposing counsel expressing his concern that the
ongoing discovery dispute would likely result in protracted depositions involving numerous
objections which would require trial court involvement. He further asserted that after he
raised the same issue during appellant’s May 17, 2022 deposition, Bringardner averred
(after the deposition was completed) that he would oppose all attempts to compel
improperly sought discovery and all attempts to extend the discovery deadline.
Accordingly, appellant determined that it would be futile to conduct his previously
scheduled depositions of Bringardner and Osborne.8 He then filed the motion to compel
two weeks later, on May 31, 2022.
        {¶ 21} Appellant attached three exhibits to his reply brief. The first was a copy of his
pre-deposition May 16, 2022 email to opposing counsel. In it, appellant indicated that he
would likely obtain guidance from the trial court regarding the discovery dispute in order

8 On May 16, 2022, appellant filed notices of deposition for Osborne and Bringardner, to be conducted May 18

and June 2, 2022, respectively. The record on appeal does not include any discussion between counsel during
or after appellant’s May 17, 2022 deposition related to appellant’s decision to cancel the scheduled depositions
of Osborne and Bringardner.
No. 22AP-787                                                                              9

to streamline the deposition process. The second was a copy of Bringardner’s responses to
appellant’s first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents. The third
was a copy of Bringardner’s April 29, 2022 letter to appellant.
       {¶ 22} On June 30, 2022, appellant filed a Civ.R. 56(F) motion seeking an extension
of time to complete discovery prior to filing a response to the motions for summary
judgment. Appellant reiterated and incorporated the arguments set forth in his motion to
compel regarding his difficulty in obtaining discovery from Bringardner relevant to his
claims. In addition, appellant argued that the estate documents executed by Carte in 2010
and 2011 did not preclude him from having standing to pursue his case. Appellant
maintained that if the 2012 will was invalidated, the 2011 will would control, and because
it was a pour-over will putting all estate assets into the 2006 trust under which appellant
was a beneficiary, he had standing to contest the 2012 will. Appellant further maintained
that the 2010 and 2011 estate planning documents suggested that Osborne was actively
involved in their creation, serving as evidence supporting his claim of Osborne’s undue
influence over Carte in executing the 2012 will.
       {¶ 23} Appellant requested the court grant his Civ.R. 56(F) motion and stay rulings
on the two pending motions for summary judgment until he received from Bringardner
supplemental responses to his discovery requests and signed authorizations permitting him
to obtain Humphrey’s estate planning files and Carte’s financial and medical records from
third parties, and thereafter deposed pertinent parties and witnesses. Appellant attached
to his motion the affidavit of his counsel, Braden Blumenstiel, his own affidavit, and the
2006, 2010, 2011, and 2012 testamentary documents.
       {¶ 24} In his affidavit, Blumenstiel averred that prior to filing the complaint, he
attempted to obtain estate planning documentation from both Humphrey and Bringardner.
When those efforts were unsuccessful, he was forced to file the complaint. Subsequent to
filing suit, he attempted to obtain estate planning documents from Humphrey, who
informed him that he would not provide the documents without authorization from
Bringardner. Bringardner refused to sign authorizations for Carte’s prior estate planning
documents, medical records, and financial records. Bringardner also initially refused to
respond to appellant’s discovery requests, filed partial responses to those discovery
requests five months after being served, and, upon appellant’s request for supplemental
responses, filed only partial responses. At that point, Blumenstiel filed a motion to compel
No. 22AP-787                                                                              10

Bringardner to supplement the responses to appellant’s discovery requests and to sign
authorizations related to Carte’s estate planning documents, medical records, and financial
records. Blumenstiel incorporated the arguments and factual allegations set forth in the
motion to compel into the Civ.R. 56(F) motion. According to Blumenstiel, Bringardner’s
refusal to provide the requested discovery and sign the requested authorizations prejudiced
appellant because those documents were required to properly investigate appellant’s
claims, take depositions of pertinent witnesses, and fully respond to the pending motions
for summary judgment. Blumenstiel anticipated completion of necessary discovery within
the next six months if Bringardner was accommodating or if he was replaced by a more
cooperative executor.
       {¶ 25} In his affidavit, appellant averred that Bringardner had prevented him from
obtaining estate planning documents executed by Carte between 2010 and 2012, and that
Bringardner’s actions precluded him from accessing evidence relevant to his claims.
Appellant also averred that following Carte’s wife’s death in 2009, Carte became extremely
dependent upon Osborne, prompting concerns by appellant and his family that Osborne
was taking advantage of Carte. Appellant further stated that in his numerous interactions
with Osborne over the years, he had observed and become familiar with her handwriting,
and that her handwriting appeared on the testamentary documents executed by Carte in
2010. He also asserted that Osborne’s sister worked in Bringardner’s office at the time he
drafted the 2011 and 2012 wills and trusts for Carte. Appellant also stated that Carte’s
execution of the first codicil to his will on January 13, 2010, only 27 days after his wife’s
death, was out of character for Carte, and that the multiple alterations to his estate plans
over a short period of time were inconsistent with the way Carte operated throughout his
lifetime. Appellant also averred that Carte would not have intentionally or voluntarily
disinherited Jean or him.
       {¶ 26} On July 5, 2022, Bringardner filed a memorandum in opposition to
appellant’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion, supported by his own affidavit with corresponding
attachments. In his affidavit, Bringardner averred that he served as Carte’s attorney from
late 2010 until his death in 2020. In 2011, Carte updated his HIPAA release information,
healthcare power of attorney, living will, and funeral representative appointment; none of
the updates named appellant or Jean in any capacity, and to the extent they were previously
No. 22AP-787                                                                                11

named in such capacities, Carte sought to remove all of their authority with respect to such
positions.
       {¶ 27} In the body of his memorandum in opposition, Bringardner first challenged
appellant’s contention that he was uncooperative in appellant’s pre-litigation investigation
and that such failure resulted in appellant being forced to file his lawsuit. Specifically,
Bringardner noted that appellant’s deadline to contest the 2012 will was limited by R.C.
2107.76, which provides that an action to contest the validity of a will must be commenced
no later than three months after the initial filing of the notice of admission of the will to
probate. Bringardner noted that the notice of admission was filed November 12, 2020,
making the three-month deadline to contest the will February 12, 2021. Bringardner further
averred that the first time appellant contacted him was via an email dated February 10,
2021, only two days prior to the February 12, 2021 deadline set by R.C. 2107.76. According
to Bringardner, appellant attached to that email a demand letter dated February 10, 2021,
a copy of Carte’s 2012 will and 2012 trust, and affidavits from appellant and individuals
named Karen Pfeiffer and Linda Bevan suggesting that Carte was suffering from dementia
and was thus susceptible to undue influence exerted by Osborne to alter his estate plans
after Virgina’s passing. In the letter, appellant demanded executed affidavits from all co-
executors that were to include complete financial accountings for the prior three years;
executed authorizations by at least one co-executor to obtain financial documents and
information from financial institutions, and to permit Humphrey to share documentation
associated with legal work he performed for the Cartes; compensation of 20 percent of all
probate and non-probate assets of Carte at the time of his death, and a waiver of all statutes
of limitations “associated with contesting a will, the trust, inter vivos transfers, breach of
fiduciary duty, and/or other related claims.” (Memo in Opp. at 2, Ex. 1, Aff. at ¶ 12, Ex. A.)
Bringardner responded to the email on February 11, 2021; during a telephone conversation
later that day, Bringardner advised appellant that Carte eliminated him and Jean from
inheritance multiple times over multiple documents prior to and including the 2012 will
and 2012 trust and that Carte was competent when executing his 2012 will and 2012 trust.
Bringardner further asserted that because appellant was not entitled to any inheritance
from Carte’s estate, Bringardner was without authority to accede to the demands set forth
in the letter.
No. 22AP-787                                                                            12

       {¶ 28} Bringardner also challenged appellant’s assertions that he improperly
refused to provide requested discovery. He maintained that he initially refused to provide
the requested discovery during the pendency of the motion to dismiss, which was premised
on appellant’s lack of standing; however, once the trial court denied the motion, he
provided appropriate and relevant discovery responses. Bringardner noted that appellant
took no issue with Bringardner’s discovery responses in the almost five months following
service and never moved to compel further response. He further argued that despite
appellant’s claims that he needed Carte’s prior estate planning documents from Humphrey
and Bringardner and Carte’s medical and financial records, he did not explain why he did
not pursue them during the open discovery period and waited until well after the discovery
deadline had passed to file the motion to compel.
       {¶ 29} Bringardner further argued that appellant did not provide sufficient reason
why he could not present facts essential to justify his opposition to the motions for
summary judgment. He maintained that appellant had not shown a particularized factual
basis to indicate why further discovery was needed to respond to the legal issues presented
in the motions for summary judgment or how further discovery would aid the trial court in
resolving those legal issues. Bringardner averred that appellant did not provide a detailed
explanation of what he hoped to discover in the estate planning documents, financial
records or medical records or how that information would aid him in opposing the
arguments made in the pending summary judgment motions.
       {¶ 30} On July 6, 2022, Osborne filed a memorandum in opposition to appellant’s
Civ.R 56(F) motion. Osborne maintained that appellant’s failure to obtain discovery was
due to his own dilatory conduct in failing to bring the alleged discovery issues before the
trial court in a timely manner. Specifically, Osborne averred that appellant did not timely
and properly follow up on Bringardner’s allegedly insufficient discovery responses, did not
properly serve Humphrey with subpoenas for Carte’s estate planning files, did not attempt
to depose Humphrey, did not issue subpoenas to Carte’s medical providers, did not contact
the trial court for an informal discovery conference, did not depose Osborne or
Bringardner, and did not move to compel discovery until over one month after the discovery
deadline had passed.
       {¶ 31} Osborne also argued that the discovery dispute between appellant and
Bringardner was a red herring because all of Carte’s testamentary documents were properly
No. 22AP-787                                                                               13

before the court and conclusively established that appellant lacked standing to contest the
2012 will and 2012 trust. Osborne challenged appellant’s contention that if the 2012 will
was found to be invalid, the 2011 will depositing all estate assets into the 2006 trust, of
which appellant was a beneficiary, would control. Osborne noted that the 2011 will
expressly revoked all former wills and the 2011 trust expressly amended and restated all
former trusts; accordingly, even if appellant was a beneficiary under the 2006 will and 2006
trust, both had been revoked.
       {¶ 32} On July 12 and 14, 2022, respectively, appellant filed replies to the opposition
memoranda filed by Bringardner and Osborne. In them, appellant reiterated his position
that the estate planning documents Humphrey prepared for Carte and Carte’s medical
records and financial records were integral to his ability to appropriately respond to the
motions for summary judgment and that Bringardner prevented him from obtaining those
documents. Appellant also responded to the arguments presented in the opposition
memoranda, including the contentions that appellant had failed to explain what evidence
he hoped to obtain through additional discovery. To that end, appellant asserted that he
intended to investigate the circumstances under which the testamentary documents
executed in 2006, 2010, 2011, and 2012 were created. Specifically, he averred that
production of the complete estate planning files of Humphrey and Bringardner, including
phone records, billing statements, notes made during estate planning meetings,
correspondence, and “a wide variety of other evidence” would aid him in determining who
was involved in the creation of the documents and the roles individuals played during the
drafting and execution of the documents. (Reply Brief at 14.) Appellant claimed that
production of these files was particularly important because he believed that Osborne
handwrote notes on at least some of the documents. Appellant further asserted that Carte’s
medical records would provide a more detailed explanation of the state of Carte’s physical
and cognitive health when the 2010, 2011, and 2012 testamentary documents were
executed. Appellant alleged that such records were necessary for him to prove his claims
of lack of testamentary capacity and/or susceptibility to undue influence by Osborne.
Regarding Carte’s financial records, appellant asserted that those documents would include
such things as beneficiary designation forms needed to investigate if and when beneficiary
designations associated with Carte’s financial assets were changed and who was involved
in having them changed. Appellant also claimed that the documents would provide
No. 22AP-787                                                                                14

information regarding whether any of the parties had access to and/or wrongfully took any
of Carte’s financial assets. Appellant asserted such information was relevant to his claim of
improper inter vivos transfers.
       {¶ 33} On November 30, 2022, the trial court filed an entry denying both appellant’s
motion to compel and his Civ.R. 56(F) motion. The court concluded that the motion to
compel was untimely, having been filed nearly one month after the discovery deadline had
passed. The court found that appellant had presented no persuasive justification for failing
to involve the court during the open discovery period. The court also found that even if
appellant believed he would be able to persuade Bringardner to provide authorizations and
satisfactory discovery responses sometime after the April 29, 2022 discovery deadline, it
would have been appropriate for appellant to request an extension of the deadline before it
passed if he wished to maintain the possibility of obtaining recourse under Civ.R. 37 in the
event it became necessary.
       {¶ 34} The trial court denied the Civ.R. 56(F) motion on essentially the same basis,
i.e., that the discovery deadline had passed and that appellant had made no timely effort to
request court involvement in resolving the discovery issues. Accordingly, the court found
that appellant had failed to set forth sufficient reasons warranting an extension of time to
conduct discovery.
       {¶ 35} In an entry filed December 1, 2022, the trial court granted the two pending
motions for summary judgment with respect to the will contest and dismissed the other
claims raised in appellant’s complaint without prejudice.
       {¶ 36} In its analysis, the court first set forth the procedural history of the case,
particularly noting that the parties’ discovery dispute culminated in the trial court denying
appellant’s discovery-related motions as untimely and that appellant had not filed
memoranda contra the motions for summary judgment.
       {¶ 37} The court next addressed the causes of action raised in appellant’s complaint
other than the will contest, i.e., that the 2012 trust and certain inter vivos transfers be
declared invalid. Citing Loc.R. 78.1(L) of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Probate Division and Hess v. Sommers, 4 Ohio App.3d 281 (3d Dist.1982), the court
emphasized that a will contest under R.C. 2107.71 is a special statutory proceeding, distinct
from other kinds of civil actions, which the court’s local rule requires to be filed separately
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                  15

from any other causes of action.9 Accordingly, the court dismissed without prejudice all
causes of action set forth in the complaint other than the will contest.
        {¶ 38} Regarding the will contest, the trial court concluded appellant lacked
standing to challenge the validity of the 2012 will as a matter of law, as he was not a person
“interested in a will or codicil admitted to probate” under R.C. 2107.71. The court found
appellant was not interested in the 2012 will because he did not have a direct pecuniary
interest in Carte’s estate, as he would not inherit from the estate at intestacy and was not a
beneficiary under a former will that was revoked by the 2012 will.
        {¶ 39} The court’s conclusion was based on its review of the intervening
testamentary documents executed by Carte in 2006, 2010, 2011, and 2012. To that end, the
court noted that the 2006 will left a specific bequest to appellant and the residuary estate
to the trustee of the 2006 trust; in the trust, appellant was left a specific gift as well as a
share of the residual trust property. The first codicil and first amended trust executed in
January 2010 deleted the provisions leaving specific and residual bequests to appellant and
contained no new provisions naming appellant as a beneficiary. Likewise, the second codicil
and second amended trust executed in June 2010 included no provisions for appellant as
beneficiary. The 2011 will revoked all former wills and codicils and left all property to the
trustee of the 2006 trust as amended or restated; the 2011 trust amendment indicated that
it amended and restated the 2006 trust and all amendments thereto. Neither the will nor
the trust agreement included any provision for appellant. The 2012 will at issue in the
present case revoked all former wills and codicils and left all property to the trustee of the
2006 trust as amended or restated; the 2012 trust amendment indicated that it amended
and restated the 2006 trust and all amendments thereto. Again, neither the will nor trust
agreement contained any provision for appellant.
        {¶ 40} While acknowledging appellant’s suspicions about the circumstances under
which the 2010, 2011, and 2012 documents were created, the court found that no genuine
issue of material fact existed as to the facial validity of any of those documents, as they were
all subscribed by Carte and notarized or witnessed in accordance with the requisite

9 Loc.R. 78.1(L) provides in part that “[a]ll special statutory proceedings, including but not limited to actions

filed pursuant to 2107.71 (will contests) * * * shall be filed separately and with no other causes of action
accompanying the pleading.” Hess holds that “[a] will contest * * * raises the single and ultimate issue whether
the writing produced is the last will or codicil of the testator.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                16

statutory formalities. The court found that while appellant could have expected a share of
the probate estate if the 2006 will and trust provisions remained in effect, both of those
documents had been validly superseded multiple times since 2010 and would not be
reinstated even if the 2012 will were invalidated. The court further found that setting aside
the 2012 will would reinstate the 2011 will, which made no direct provision for appellant
and funneled all assets into the trust. The court further stated that “[i]nvalidating the 2012
will would not automatically invalidate the 2012 trust amendment and restatement,
however—the restatement is an independent document that would remain in effect unless
successfully contested in a separate action by someone with proper standing. Thus,
following the terms of the 2011 [trust] would have the same effect as following the terms of
the 2012 will, at least with respect to the issue at hand; in either event, the entire proceeds
of [Carte’s] probate estate are to be poured into a trust whose terms make no provision for
[appellant].” (Dec. 1, 2022 Entry at 7.) The court concluded that since appellant would not
inherit regardless of whether the 2011 will was set aside, he lacked a pecuniary interest in
Carte’s estate that would grant him standing to contest the 2012 will as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court granted the pending summary judgment motions and dismissed the
will contest action.
II. Assignments of Error
        {¶ 41} Appellant timely appeals from the trial court’s December 1, 2022 judgment10
and assigns the following two assignments of error for our review:
                 [I]. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling Plaintiff-Appellant Lacked
                 Standing to Contest the Will of Decedent James Carte.

                 [II]. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s
                 Civ.R. 56(F) Motion for Extension.

III. Analysis
        {¶ 42} To facilitate our analysis, we first consider appellant’s second assignment of
error. In it, appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Civ.R.

10 The trial court’s November 30, 2022 entry denying the Civ.R. 56(F) motion is an interlocutory order related

to the December 1, 2022 judgment granting summary judgment to Bringardner, Gate, and Osborne.
Consequently, the entry denying the Civ.R. 56(F) motion merged into the final judgment which disposed of
the claims asserted against them. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ryan, 189 Ohio App.3d 560, 2010-Ohio-4601,
¶ 20 (10th Dist.) Because interlocutory orders merge with a court’s final judgment, appellant was not required
to separately identify the entry denying his Civ.R. 56(F) motion in the notice of appeal. Childs v. Kroger Co.,
10th Dist. No. 22AP-524, 2023-Ohio-2034, ¶ 36.
No. 22AP-787                                                                              17

56(F) motion for an extension of time to obtain additional discovery prior to responding to
the motions for summary judgment. Although appellant does not specifically assign error
to the trial court’s denial of his motion to compel, we note that he expressly reiterated and
incorporated the arguments set forth in his motion to compel in his Civ.R. 56(F) motion for
extension.
        {¶ 43} Civ.R. 56(F) provides that “[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion for summary judgment that the party cannot for sufficient reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.” Civ.R. 56(F) thus
provides the remedy for a party seeking a continuance to conduct discovery relevant to a
motion for summary judgment. Jacobs v. Jones, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-930, 2011-Ohio-3313,
¶ 58, citing Hahn v. Groveport, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-27, 2007-Ohio-5559, ¶ 30, citing Gates
Mills Invest. Co. v. Pepper Pike, 59 Ohio App.2d 155, 168 (8thDist.1978).
        {¶ 44} Civ.R. 56(F) expressly requires the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment to submit affidavits with sufficient reasons stating why the party cannot present
sufficient facts to justify its opposition. Id., citing Hahn, citing Gates Mills at 169. “The
party requesting a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance bears the burden of establishing why such
party cannot present sufficient facts to justify its opposition without a continuance.”
Singleton v. Ohio Concrete Resurfacing, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-991, 2007-Ohio-2012,
¶ 21, citing Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Petro, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1125, 2006-Ohio-1205,
¶ 39.
        {¶ 45} “ ‘The court’s discretion in granting continuances pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F)
should be exercised liberally in favor of the nonmoving party who has requested a
reasonable interval for the production of necessary rebuttal material.’ ” Whiteside v.
Conroy, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-123, 2005-Ohio-5098, ¶ 37, quoting Carrier v. Weisheimer
Cos., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 95APE04-488 (Feb. 22, 1996), citing Whiteleather v. Yosowitz, 10
Ohio App.3d 272 (8th Dist.1983). “Ultimately, however, ‘ “the provisions of Civ.R. 56(F)
are all discretionary. They are not mandatory.” ’ ” Id., quoting Martinez v. Yoho’s Fast
Food Equip., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-79, 2002-Ohio-6756, ¶ 14, quoting Carlton v. Davisson,
104 Ohio App.3d 636, 648 (6th Dist.1995). Thus, “[a]n appellate court will not reverse a
trial court’s denial of a Civ.R. 56(F) motion absent an abuse of discretion.” Singleton at
No. 22AP-787                                                                               18

¶ 21, citing Carolina Tobacco. An abuse of discretion implies an “unreasonable, arbitrary
or unconscionable” decision. Walter v. ADT Security Sys., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-115,
2007-Ohio-3324, ¶ 39, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
       {¶ 46} Appellant’s motion to compel and his Civ.R. 56(F) motion both were filed
after the discovery cut-0ff date of April 29, 2022. We first note that under Loc.R. 78.2(B)
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division “[a]bsent extraordinary
circumstances, the discovery cut-off date included in the case management schedule shall
be the last day for any party to seek the involvement of the court in the discovery process,
by way of motion seeking a ruling, order, sanction, or other court action. Voluntary,
mutually agreed-upon discovery, including depositions, may continue after the discovery
cut-off date in a manner that does not delay any other event on the case schedule.” Thus,
absent extraordinary circumstances (which appellant does not assert exist here) the
discovery cut-off date of April 29, 2022 was the last date appellant could seek court
involvement in the discovery process. As noted above, appellant filed both his motion to
compel and Civ.R. 56(F) motion well after the discovery cut-off date.
       {¶ 47} Moreover, this court and others have held that a trial court does not abuse its
discretion in denying a motion to compel and/or a Civ.R. 56(F) motion where a party lacks
diligence in conducting discovery and/or does not seek court involvement until after the
discovery cut-off date. In Steele v. Mara Ents., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-102, 2009-Ohio-5716,
the appellee responded to the appellant’s first discovery requests, offering answers to
interrogatories, documents, and some objections. Id. at ¶ 32. Nearly seven months later,
the appellant informed the appellee of perceived deficiencies in its discovery response. Id.
The appellee responded with supplemental answers, reiterated certain objections and
requested clarification on certain requests. Id. Approximately one month later, the
appellee served the appellant with a second set of documents in response to the appellant’s
second request for production. Id. One day after the extended discovery cut-off date, the
appellant filed a motion to compel discovery, informing the trial court for the first time of
what he believed to be the appellee’s insufficient cooperation in discovery. Id. at ¶ 33. This
court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to
compel on two grounds: (1) that he was not diligent in following up on his discovery
requests, and (2) that the motion to compel was untimely, having been filed after the
discovery cut-off date. Id.
No. 22AP-787                                                                               19

       {¶ 48} In Singleton, the appellant’s claims had been pending for almost three years
when the appellee moved for summary judgment, during which time the court twice
extended the discovery cut-off date. Id. at ¶ 23. Despite the appellee’s stated intention to
move for summary judgment, the appellant made no attempt to depose witnesses before
the dispositive motions deadline or the discovery cut-off date. Id. The appellant did not
request an extension of the discovery cut-off date but, instead, waited until after the
dispositive motions deadline, discovery cut-off date, and the appellee’s filing of its motion
for summary judgment before moving the trial court for any relief regarding discovery. Id.
We found that the appellant’s unexplained lack of diligence, not an uncooperative opposing
party, hindered his ability to obtain discovery, and that such lack of diligence undercut his
contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Civ.R. 56(F) request. Id.
In so finding, we cited to Grenga v. Bank One, N.A., 7th Dist. No. 04 MA 94, 2005-Ohio-
4474, where the court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of a Civ.R. 56(F) motion
filed after the discovery cut-off date where the moving party did not request a change in the
discovery cut-off date.
       {¶ 49} In State ex rel. Verhovec v. Northwood, 6th Dist. No. WD-13-002, 2013-
Ohio-5074, the appellant deposed the appellee’s representative approximately three weeks
prior to the discovery deadline. Id. at ¶ 12. One month after the discovery deadline, the
appellant filed a Civ.R. 56(F) motion and a motion to compel discovery. Id. The court noted
that in the month following the deposition, the appellant never indicated he had any
problems with the deponent’s responses. Id. The court further noted that the appellant
could have filed a motion to compel or a motion for continuance of discovery prior to the
discovery deadline if he felt the deponent’s responses were inadequate or insufficient; he
opted instead to file his discovery motions after the discovery deadline had passed. Id. The
court considered the tardiness of the appellant’s motions in concluding the trial court had
not abused its discretion in denying them. The court reasoned that if the appellant believed
the deponent was insufficient, he should have sought redress from the trial court prior to
the discovery deadline. Id. at ¶ 14.
       {¶ 50} The foregoing cases support our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellant’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion. As noted in our recitation of the
factual and procedural history of this case, appellant served his first set of discovery
requests on Bringardner on July 13, 2021. Bringardner immediately informed appellant
No. 22AP-787                                                                                20

that he would not respond to the requests while his May 31, 2021 Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss remained pending. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on September 1,
2021, and on October 12, 2021, the magistrate imposed the April 29, 2022 discovery cut-
off deadline and the June 1, 2022 dispositive motion deadline. Bringardner responded to
appellant’s discovery requests on December 1, 2021. Approximately four and one-half
months later, on April 19, 2022, appellant informed Bringardner of perceived deficiencies
in his discovery responses. Appellant noted the upcoming discovery deadline and indicated
that as long as discovery progressed, he did not perceive a need to request from the court
an extension of the discovery deadline. Ten days later, on April 29, 2022, Bringardner sent
appellant supplemental responses to the discovery requests. On May 16, 2022, appellant
emailed Bringardner indicating he would likely obtain guidance from the trial court as to
the discovery dispute prior to appellant’s deposition which was scheduled later that day.
Also on May 16, 2022, appellant scheduled depositions for Bringardner and Osborne;
however, he cancelled them following appellant’s deposition. On May 23, 2022,
Bringardner offered to execute a waiver for Carte’s healthcare records conditioned upon the
waiver being directed at a specific physician or medical practice and sought relevant
evidence, and a waiver of confidentiality for Humphrey’s 2006-2010 estate planning
documents. On May 31, 2022, over one month after the discovery cut-off date, and two
weeks after he sat for deposition and cancelled the depositions of Osborne and Bringardner,
appellant filed his motion to compel. He filed his Civ.R. 56(F) motion on June 30, 2022,
two months after the discovery deadline and one month after the motions for summary
judgment were filed.
       {¶ 51} Appellant was aware of the April 29, 2022 discovery cut-off date since the
scheduling order was imposed on October 12, 2021; indeed, he referenced the discovery
deadline in his communications with Bringardner. Appellant made no attempt to depose
any witnesses before the discovery cut-off date, and he ultimately cancelled the depositions
he had scheduled after the discovery cut-off date. Further, appellant never requested an
extension of the discovery cut-off date prior to filing his motion to compel and his Civ.R.
56(F) motion. Although at various times appellant alluded to seeking court intervention in
the discovery dispute, he waited until after the discovery cut-off date before moving the trial
court for any relief regarding discovery. Further, there is no indication in the record that
appellant took advantage of Bringardner’s May 23, 2022 offer to execute waivers for Carte’s
No. 22AP-787                                                                                 21

healthcare records and Humphrey’s estate planning documents. Given the ample time
appellant had to conduct discovery, the fact that the discovery cut-off date elapsed prior to
appellant filing his motion to compel and his Civ.R. 56(F) motion, and appellant’s lack of
diligence in pursuing discovery, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in
denying appellant’s Civ.R. 56(F) request for additional time to conduct discovery.
       {¶ 52} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
       {¶ 53} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in
granting appellees’ motions for summary judgment on grounds that he lacked standing to
challenge Carte’s 2012 will.
       {¶ 54} We review a decision on a motion for summary judgment under a de novo
standard. LRC Realty, Inc. v. B.E.B. Properties, 160 Ohio St.3d 218, 2020-Ohio-3196, ¶ 11.
De novo appellate review means the court of appeals conducts an independent review,
without deference to the trial court’s decision. Wiltshire Capital Partners v. Reflections II,
Inc., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-415, 2020-Ohio-3468, ¶ 12. Summary judgment is appropriate
only when the moving party demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists,
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds
could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom
the motion for summary judgment is made. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp.
Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 (1997). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
the court must resolve all doubts and construe the evidence in favor of the non-moving
party. Premiere Radio Networks, Inc. v. Sandblast, L.P., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-736, 2019-
Ohio-4015, ¶ 6.
       {¶ 55} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the party moving for summary judgment bears the
initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those
portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The moving party cannot satisfy this initial
burden by simply making conclusory allegations, but instead must demonstrate, including
by use of affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C), that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Wiltshire Capital at ¶ 13. If the moving party fails to satisfy this initial burden, the court
must deny the motion for summary judgment; however, if the moving party satisfies the
initial burden, the non-moving party has the burden to respond, by affidavit or otherwise
No. 22AP-787                                                                                                  22

as provided under Civ.R. 56, with specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue exists for
trial. Dresher at 293; Hall v. Ohio State Univ. College of Humanities, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-
1068, 2012-Ohio-5036, ¶ 12, citing Henkle v. Henkle, 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 735 (12th
Dist.1991).
        {¶ 56} “Standing relates to a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial
enforcement of a legal duty or right.” Albanese v. Batman, 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-
5814, ¶ 24, citing Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-
Ohio-5024, ¶ 27, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 1442 (8th Ed.2004). In an action
contesting the validity of a will, R.C. 2107.71(A)11 requires that the party challenging the will
be a “person interested” in the will. For purposes of a will contest, a “person interested” is
“ ‘[a]ny person who has such a direct, immediate, and legally ascertainable pecuniary
interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be impaired or defeated by the
probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the will.’ ” State ex rel. Abraitis v.
Gallagher, 143 Ohio St.3d 439, 2015-Ohio-2312, ¶ 16, quoting Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St.
46, 49-50 (1908); Wical v. Bernard, 26 Ohio St.2d 55, 57 (1971) (“[a] person interested,
within the meaning of the statute, is one who has a direct pecuniary interest in the estate of
the putative testator that would be impaired or defeated if the instrument admitted to
probate is a valid will”).
        {¶ 57} Here, it is undisputed that the 2012 will did not bequeath anything to
appellant. Accordingly, appellant cannot claim to be a “person interested” in the 2012 will
as a beneficiary thereunder. Nonetheless, appellant contends that because he was a
beneficiary under the 2006 will, he has standing as a “person interested” to contest the
validity of the 2012 will.
        {¶ 58} It is undisputed that appellant was Carte’s son-in-law and not a blood
relative; therefore, he would not be entitled to inherit by intestate succession were the 2012
will to be found invalid. See R.C. 2105.06. When a party contesting a will who would not
otherwise inherit by statute alleges he is a “person interested” under R.C. 2107.71(A), he
must demonstrate that if the probated will is invalidated, he would have a direct pecuniary
interest in the testator’s estate by virtue of a prior will that has not been validly revoked.

11 R.C. 2107.71(A) provides in part that “[a] person interested in a will * * * admitted to probate in the probate

court * * * may contest its validity by filing a complaint in the probate court in the county in which the will
* * * was admitted to probate.”
No. 22AP-787                                                                                23

Cook v. Everhart, 8th Dist. No. 107867, 2019-Ohio-3044, ¶ 12, citing Barnhart v.
Barnhart, 4th Dist. No. 921 (Jan. 27, 1983).
       {¶ 59} Under R.C. 2107.03, “[e]xcept oral wills, every will shall be in writing, but
may be handwritten or typewritten. The will shall be signed at the end by the testator or by
some other person in the testator’s conscious presence and at the testator’s express
direction.” Additionally, “[t]he will shall be attested and subscribed in the conscious
presence of the testator, by two or more competent witnesses, who saw the testator
subscribe, or heard the testator acknowledge the testator’s signature.”
       {¶ 60} As noted by the trial court in its judgment entry granting the motions for
summary judgment, the 2010 codicils and the 2011 will were all signed at the end by Carte
and attested and subscribed by two competent witnesses in accordance with R.C. 2107.03.
Appellant does not challenge this finding. Nor does appellant challenge the trial court’s
finding that he was not a named beneficiary in the 2010 codicils and the 2011 will, and that
the 2011 will revoked all previous wills and codicils, including the 2006 will under which
he was a named beneficiary. Rather, appellant maintains the trial court prematurely
granted summary judgment on lack of standing grounds before he had the opportunity to
conduct discovery related to the 2010 codicils and 2011 will and present evidence contesting
their validity. On this point, appellant essentially reasserts the arguments set forth in his
second assignment of error relating to his Civ.R. 56(F) motion. As we have determined that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his Civ.R. 56(F) request for additional
time to conduct discovery, appellant’s argument lacks merit.
       {¶ 61} Moreover, appellant’s reliance on the Barnhart case is misplaced. There,
Earl Barnhart executed a will in February 1974 leaving certain real property to his niece and
nephews (collectively, “the Barnharts”). Id. In April 1974, Earl executed a codicil to the
will which revoked his bequest to the Barnharts and left the real property to his future wife,
Jean for certain trust purposes. Id. In August 1975, Earl executed another will revoking all
other wills and making no bequest to the Barnharts. Id. In 1977, Earl married Jean. Id. In
May 1978, Earl executed a will providing that after certain legacies, Jean would inherit
Earl’s real and personal property. Id. Following Earl’s death, his May 1978 will was
admitted to probate. Id.
       {¶ 62} The Barnharts filed suit against Jean contesting the 1978 will on grounds it
was the product of undue influence and that Earl did not have the requisite mental capacity
No. 22AP-787                                                                               24

to make a will. Id. In her answer, Jean alleged that the Barnharts were not “persons
interested” in Earl’s will as required by R.C. 2107.71. Id. She later filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing the Barnharts failed to plead a pecuniary interest in Earl’s
estate and relied on a deposition of one of the Barnharts as purporting to show no prior
executed will in which the Barnharts were beneficiaries was known to the Barnharts. Id.
The Barnharts filed a memorandum contra which included an affidavit from one of the
Barnharts to which a copy of the 1974 will was attached. Id. The trial court entered an
order deeming the matter submitted but allowed Jean to file a reply to the Barnharts’
memorandum contra. Id. In her reply, Jean argued for the first time that the February
1974 bequest to the Barnharts was revoked by the April 1974 codicil and August 1975 will;
she attached both those documents to her reply brief via an affidavit from her attorney. Id.
The trial court then granted Jean’s motion for summary judgment. Id.
       {¶ 63} The court of appeals reversed, finding the Barnharts were not afforded a
reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the April 1974 codicil and August 1975 will
which were submitted for the first time in Jean’s reply brief. Id. The court concluded that
the trial court “erred by prematurely granting summary judgment without an opportunity
being afforded to [the Barnharts] to oppose the new and distinct reason belatedly advanced
in support of the [summary judgment] motion.” Id.
       {¶ 64} The instant case is factually and procedurally distinguishable from Barnhart.
There, Jean essentially ambushed the Barnharts by asserting the revocation argument and
attaching the intervening estate documents for the first time in her reply brief and after the
motion for summary judgment was already under advisement. Here, the standing
argument based on the revocation of the 2006 will was asserted in the motions for summary
judgment and the 2010 and 2011 estate documents were submitted with those motions.
Thus, in contrast to Barnhart, the summary judgment movants did not present a “new and
distinct reason belatedly advanced in support of the [summary judgment] motion.”
       {¶ 65} Moreover, as discussed in our resolution of the second assignment of error,
appellant was aware of the standing issue and had at least one of the intervening estate
documents under which he was not a beneficiary (the 2011 will) no later than May 28, 2021
when Bringardner and Gate filed their Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Appellant had 11
months from that point in time until the April 29, 2022 discovery cut-off to conduct
discovery in an attempt to invalidate that will. Further, appellant received the other
No. 22AP-787                                                                                 25

intervening estate documents under which he was not a named beneficiary no later than
December 1, 2021 when Bringardner produced them in discovery. He had 5 months from
that point in time until the discovery cut-off to conduct discovery in an attempt to invalidate
those documents.
       {¶ 66} Further, Barnhart actually supports the rule of law relied upon the trial court
in the instant case. The court stated, “[w]hen a contestant, who would not otherwise inherit
by statute, seeks to bring himself within the status of an interested party by reason of a prior
will, it is necessary that his interest be such that if the probated will is invalidated that he
would then have an interest by reason of the earlier will. This necessarily presupposes that
the prior will under which he claims has not been validly revoked and this is the general
rule.” Id. Applying that rule to the facts of the case, the court averred “[i]t necessarily
follows that if either the codicil of April 11, 1974 to the 1974 will revoking the devisee to
appellants or the 1975 will in which [the Barnharts] were neither legatees or devisees and
which revoked all prior wills were valid, summary judgment was properly entered below.”
Id.

       {¶ 67} In the present case, because the 2011 will made no bequest to appellant, and
because it validly revoked all former wills, including the 2006 will under which appellant
was a beneficiary, appellant cannot demonstrate that if the 2012 will were invalidated, he
would have a pecuniary interest in Carte’s estate by virtue of a prior will that has not been
validly revoked. Accordingly, appellant cannot demonstrate that he is a “person interested”
in the 2012 will pursuant to R.C. 2107.71(A). Because appellant is not a “person interested”
pursuant to R.C. 2107.71(A), he has no standing to challenge the 2012 will. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in granting the motions for summary judgment filed by Osborne,
Bringardner, and Gate and dismissing appellant’s complaint.
       {¶ 68} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
 IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 69} Having overruled appellant’s two assignments of error, we hereby affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division.
                                                                          Judgment affirmed.

                                    BOGGS, J., concurs.
                                   JAMISON, J., dissents.
No. 22AP-787                                                                                26

JAMISON, J., dissenting.
       {¶ 70} I would find that standing is a threshold question that should have been
answered prior to deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
appellant’s Civ. R. 56(F) motion. I would find that appellant had standing to challenge not
only the 2012 will and amended trust, but as appellee conceded in oral argument, appellant
would be able to challenge the unprobated 2010 codicils and amended trusts, and the 2011
will and amended trust, if the 2012 will and amended trust were found invalid. Because only
a jury can decide the validity of a will, I would remand on the issue of standing and find that
discovery should be exchanged, and allow the issue of the validity of the estate documents to
be determined. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
       {¶ 71} The initial question is whether Dan Miller lacked standing to contest the 2012
will of James Carte. Miller was a beneficiary under Carte’s 2006 will and trust, but Carte
did not name him a beneficiary under the January 2010 codicil and amended trust, the June
2010 second codicil and second amended trust, the 2011 will and amended trust, or the 2012
will and amended trust.
       {¶ 72} A “person interested” in a will admitted to probate may contest the validity of
that will. R.C. 2107.71(A). Generally, “[a] ‘person interested’ for purposes of a will contest
is ‘[a]ny person who has such a direct, immediate, and legally ascertained pecuniary
interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be impaired or defeated by the
probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the will.’ ” State ex. rel. Abraitis v.
Gallagher, 143 Ohio St.3d 439, 2015-Ohio-2312, ¶ 16, quoting Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St.
46, 49 (1908). In holding more specifically applicable to our case, the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated that “[a] person who is a beneficiary under a will has such a pecuniary interest
in the estate of the testator as entitles him * * * to contest another alleged will of the same
testator which would destroy, reduce or impair his share in such estate.” Kennedy v.
Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442 (1928), overruled on other grounds, Krischbaum v. Dillon, 58
Ohio St.3d 58, 64 (1991), fn. 9.
       {¶ 73} If he established a prima facie case as to the invalidity of the 2010 codicils
and trust amendments and the 2011 will and trust amendment, Miller could have standing
to challenge the 2012 will. If the 2010 and 2011 estate documents were invalid, then the
2006 will and trust would be the operative estate documents, thus giving Miller a direct
pecuniary interest that would be benefitted by the setting aside of the 2012 will. Challenging
No. 22AP-787                                                                               27

the 2010 and 2011 estate documents, however, requires evidence of undue influence or
incompetence which requires consideration of Miller’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion. When the
lower court denied Miller’s motion, the court made a preliminary determination that
effectively renders the 2012 will and trust valid. “In this respect the court invaded the
province of the jury, which alone has the authority to decide the ultimate issue of validity.”
Bazo v. Siegel, 58 Ohio St.2d 353, 354 (1979).
       {¶ 74} In Krischbaum, the court held that the statutory presumption of validity,
being rebuttable, shifts the burden of persuasion upon the contestants in an action to
contest a will that has been admitted to probate. “A presumption arises from the order of
admission of the will to probate that the testator was free from restraint. The burden of
proving undue influence is upon the contestants. West v. Henry (1962), 173 Ohio St. 498,
502, 20 O.O.2d 119, 121, 184 N.E.2d 200, 203; Kata v. Second Natl. Bank (1971), 26 Ohio
St.2d 210, 55 O.O.2d 458, 271 N.E.2d 292; Kennedy v. Walcutt (1928), 118 Ohio St. 442,
161 N.E. 336; Hall v. Hall (1908), 78 Ohio St. 415, 85 N.E. 1125.” Krischbaum at 64.
       {¶ 75} Further, I would order appellees to exchange discovery as appellant was the
beneficiary under a prior unprobated will. Krischbaum shifts the burden of persuasion
upon contestants and the lack of discovery has hamstrung appellant. Since the inception
of this case, appellee Bringardner has obstructed the exchange of discovery. Pursuant to
Civ.R. 26(B)(3)(a):
              Without awaiting a discovery request, a party must provide to
              the other parties, except as exempted by Civ.R. 26(B)(3)(b) or
              as otherwise stipulated, or ordered by the court:

              (i) The name and, if known, the address, telephone number, and
              e-mail address of each individual likely to have discoverable
              information - along with the subjects of that information - that
              the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses,
              unless the use would be solely for impeachment; [and]

              (ii) A copy - or a description by category and location - of all
              documents, electronically stored information, and tangible
              things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or
              control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the
              use would be solely for impeachment[.]
(Emphasis added.) Not only did appellee Bringardner ignore this rule, he also unilaterally
refused to provide responses to appellant’s discovery requests as required by Civ.R. 33 and
No. 22AP-787                                                                                 28

34. Appellee Bringardner admitted that he decided he was not going to comply with
Civ.R. 33 and 34 because his motion to dismiss was pending when he received appellant’s
discovery requests. Notably, appellee Bringardner did not seek or receive a stay of
discovery during the pendency of the motion to stay. A party does not get to choose when
he will follow the rules.
       {¶ 76} Appellee Bringardner finally provided some discovery responses after the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. This belated response led appellant to believe that
appellee Bringardner would participate in discovery without court intervention and,
therefore, appellant did not file a timely motion to compel. Appellant, however, was not
successful in obtaining the discovery materials he needed to address necessary issues.
       {¶ 77} Given the court’s duty to consider the entirety of the circumstances resulting
in the discovery failures that occurred in this case, the trial court should have held a hearing
on appellant’s motion to compel. Moreover, at the very least, the trial court should have
granted a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance to allow that hearing to occur and determine the
parameters of further discovery. The trial court prematurely granted summary judgment
without giving appellant an opportunity to oppose the 2010 and 2011 estate documents to
prove his standing to contest the 2012 will.
       {¶ 78} Because the majority decision concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
                                     __________________