Court Opinion

ID: 9675997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:11:52.87933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:02.586672
License: Public Domain

Gerrard, J.,
concurring.
Although I disagreed with the majority’s double jeopardy analysis in State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 542 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (Gerrard, J., dissenting, joined by White, C.J., and Fahmbruch, J.), I concur in the instant judgment in light of Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997), in which the U.S. Supreme Court largely “disavow [ed] the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper,” 522 U.S. at 96, and reaffirmed the traditional rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple sanctions for the same offense only if those sanctions are “criminal punishments,” (emphasis in original) id. at 99. I agree that United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 (1980), rehearing denied 448 U.S. 916, 101 S. Ct. 37, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1179, and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963), set forth the proper approach.
This court has never construed Nebraska’s double jeopardy clause to provide any greater protections than those guaranteed by the federal Constitution. See State v. Hansen, supra. Howell contends that because he has already had his driver’s license administratively revoked, to prosecute him for failure to submit to a chemical test would subject him to multiple punishment for the same offense. However, in protecting an already-punished person against further punishments, it is clear that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that “could, ‘ “in common parlance,” ’ be described as punishment,” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. at 99; rather, it “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense” in successive proceedings (emphasis in original), id. Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory interpretation. See, Hudson v. United States, supra; Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938).
Thus, the first question the court must ask is “whether the legislature, ‘in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indi*259cated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.’ ” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. at 99 (quoting United States v. Ward, supra). If the court determines that the Legislature has indicated an intention to establish a sanction that is civil, the court must then ask whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect,’ ” as to “ ‘transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ ” 522 U.S. at 99.
With regard to the first question, I agree with the majority’s analysis that the Legislature intended the administrative license revocation sanction to be civil in nature. A legislative body’s designation of a penalty as civil is entitled to considerable deference. As such, a legislative body’s designation of a penalty as civil will not be overborne unless the statute, considered on its face and without reference to the level of sanction imposed in the particular case, see, Hudson v. United States, supra-, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, is clearly so punitive as to “render [it] criminal despite Congress’ intent to the contrary,” United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2148, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996). “ ‘[O]nly the clearest proof’ ” of its punitive character “will suffice to override legislative intent and transform” a sanction labeled “civil” into one that is criminal. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting United States v. Ward, supra).
The test to be used in determining whether a sanction is so punitive in nature as to transform what was intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, and thus subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause’s bar on multiple punishments, is the same inquiry that is used in determining whether other criminal proceeding protections apply. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997) (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 (1980), rehearing denied 448 U.S. 916, 101 S. Ct. 37, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1179; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963)). Thus, the majority correctly considered the seven factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra:
(1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been *260regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment— retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”
(Emphasis in original.) Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra).
This seven-factor list provides “useful guideposts,” 522 U.S. at 99, and certainly no single factor is meant to be dispositive, see, Hudson v. United States, supra; United States v. Ward, supra. By and large, I agree with the majority’s analysis of the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors; however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 542 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (Gerrard, J., dissenting, joined by White, C.J., and Fahmbruch, J.), I submit that the administrative license revocation sanction does indeed involve “ ‘an affirmative disability or restraint,’ ” and I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the sanction of license revocation has not been historically regarded as a punishment. Nevertheless, I cannot conclude, in balance, that the administrative license revocation sanction appears excessive in relation to its remedial purpose of protecting the public health and safety or that the administrative license revocation statutes are so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature’s stated intent.
I therefore concur in the judgment.
White, C.J., joins in this concurrence.