Court Opinion

ID: 9657168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:16:36.517299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:41.648547
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons:
1. In Nelson #1, 384 N.W.2d 468 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), we remanded for consideration of the parties’ net earnings and to open the record for additional documentation and testimony. While a hearing was scheduled on May 2, 1986, it was cancelled because the court file had not yet been returned. Three months later, without any intervening hearings or input from either of the parties, the trial court issued its new *766decision, apparently thinking no additional evidence was needed. The majority finds that the new findings are still not as required by our remand, but in the interests of judicial economy thinks it better bring the litigation to an end.
I disagree with this approach and would remand again to accomplish what this court intended in Nelson #1. Otherwise our remand becomes meaningless.
2. While a trial court has equitable powers in matters of this nature, in my opinion this result extends DeLa Rosa, relied on by the majority, to a degree not intended by the supreme court. In that case the supreme court was of the view that the award should have been limited to the monies expended by respondent for petitioner’s living expenses and any contributions toward petitioner’s direct educational costs. The majority here extends DeLa Rosa not only to the educational contributions, but also toward the establishment of appellant’s law practice. Without more evidence than is here, I disagree with this extension which speculates regarding contribution to the establishment of a profession or business. The proper forum for establishing such an expanded theory is in the supreme court.