Court Opinion

ID: 2966108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:48:56.812407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:08.690472
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 98-1582

                     EDGARDO MULERO SANTANA,

                           Petitioner,

                                v.

                 ZOE LABOY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
              PUERTO RICO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                           Respondent.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

       [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, Senior U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Selya, Circuit Judge,
                   Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
     Teodoro Mendez Lebron on brief for petitioner.
     Gustavo A. Gelpi, Acting Solicitor General, Edda Serrano
Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, and Leticia Casalduc Rabell,
Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for respondent.

December 8, 1999

                                
            Per Curiam. Edgardo Mulero Santana ("Mulero") appeals
  from a dismissal of his habeas petition for failure to exhaust
  state remedies.  We affirm the dismissal on an alternative
  basis.
            Mulero was convicted of unlawful appropriation before
  a Puerto Rico superior court.  He contends that the
  Commonwealth court lacked jurisdiction to try him because,
  inter alia, the crime occurred in a federal post office. 
  Mulero raised the jurisdictional issue before the trial court,
  which rejected it.  He raised the issue, again, before the
  intermediate appellate court, which also rejected it.  Finally,
  he raised the issue in a petition for certiorari filed with the
  Commonwealth's highest court.  That court denied the petition
  on the procedural ground that Mulero failed to attach certain
  copies of certain portions of the record, as required by local
  rule.  Mulero sought reconsideration indicating that the
  failure to comply with the local rule was due to attorney
  error.  The motion for reconsideration was denied.  
            Mulero argues that he has exhausted his state
  remedies.  Specifically, he contends that although a collateral
  attack is technically available, further proceedings would be
  futile since the state courts have already resolved his claim
  against him.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953)
  (holding that a prisoner does not have "to ask the state for
  collateral relief, based on the same evidence and issues
  already decided by direct review").  Although it argued non-
  exhaustion below, the Commonwealth now switches gears.  It
  argues that Mulero has exhausted state remedies but that his
  claim is procedurally defaulted.
            We are persuaded that Mulero has exhausted his claim. 
  However, this conclusion gains him little since the
  "independent and adequate state ground doctrine" applies "to
  bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a
  prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to
  meet a state procedural requirement."  Coleman v. Thompson, 501
  U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991).  The bar obtains unless there is
  "cause for the default and actual prejudice" or "failure to
  consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage
  of justice."  Id. at 750.  "[A] 'fundamental miscarriage of
  justice' is defined as an 'extraordinary instance[] when a
  constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of
  one innocent of the crime."  United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d
  34, 48 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
  494 (1991)).
            In the instant case, we conclude that the independent
  and adequate state ground doctrine applies, and that Mulero is
  procedurally barred from raising his claim in federal habeas. 
  The Puerto Rico Supreme Court unambiguously rested its denial
  of Mulero's certiorari petition on a procedural ground.  Mulero
  conceded in the Commonwealth court that the Puerto Rico Supreme
  Court has been consistent in requiring strict compliance with
  its rules.  Attorney error cannot be "cause" for excusing the
  procedural default, since there is no federal constitutional
  right to counsel on a discretionary appeal to a state supreme
  court.  See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-57; Ross v. Moffit, 417
  U.S. 600 (1974).  Finally, there is no fundamental miscarriage
  of justice in holding Mulero to the procedural default since
  the claimed error does not relate to guilt or innocence.
            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal. 
  See Loc. R. 27(c).  In light of our reasoning, the judgment
  should be modified to reflect that the dismissal is with
  prejudice.  
            Affirmed as modified.