Court Opinion

ID: 9417446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:15:49.420108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:42.585672
License: Public Domain

TVT-r.. Justice Bradley, with whom concurred The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Gray,
dissenting.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Gray, and myself dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case, and I am authorized to state the reasons upon which our dissent is founded.
*578The Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company, an Illinois corporation, plaintiff in error, .was sued by the State of Illinois to recover a penalty for the breach of its laws, passed “to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination in the rates charged for the transportation of passengers and freight on railroads in the State.” The law sued on was originally passed in 1871, and revised in 1873, and the material portions of its most important section are in the following words, to wit:
“If any such railroad corporation shall charge, collect, or receive for the transportation of any passenger or freight of any description, upon its railroad, for any distance, within this State, the same or a greater amount of toll or compensation than is at the same time charged, collected, or received for the transportation, in the same direction, of any passenger or like quantity of freight, of the same class, over a greater distance of the same railroad; . . . or if it shall charge, collect, or receive from any person or persons, for the use and transportation of any railroad car or cars upon its railroad, for any distance, the same or a greater amount of toll or compensation than is at the same time charged, collected, or received from any other person or persons, for the use and transportation of any railroad car of the same class or number, for a like purpose, being transported in the same direction, over a greater distance of the same railroad ; ... all such discriminating rates, charges, collections, or receipts, whether made directly or by. means of rebate, drawback, or other shift or evasion, shall be deemed and taken, against, any such railroad corporation, as prima facie evidence of unjust discrimination, prohibited by the provisions of this act; . . . Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent railroad corporations from issuing commutation, excursion, or thousand-mile tickets, as the same are now issued by such corporations.”
A penalty of not less than $1000 and not more than $5000 for the first offence is imposed for the violation of the law; and it was for this penalty that the company was sued in the Ford County Circuit Court.
The declaration alleged, in substance, that the - company *579charged certain parties fifteen cents per hundred pounds for carrying a load of freight from Peoria, in the State of Illinois, to New York, one hundred and nine miles of the distance being in Illinois, whilst at the same time it charged certain other parties twenty five cents per hundred pounds for carrying a like load of the same class of freight from Gilman, also in the State of Illinois, to New York, twenty three miles of the distance being in Illinois, both places being on the line of the road. This allegation was substantially admitted, and judgment was finally rendered in favor of the State, and was sustained by the Supreme Court of the State, to which the present writ of error was directed.
The main point insisted on by' the railway company in its defence was, that the law on which the action was founded is unconstitutional in its application to their case, as being a regulation of interstate commerce. They also contended that a gross charge from Peoria or Gilman to New York was no evidence of any particular charge within the State of Illinois.
The construction given to the .law by the Supreme Court of Illinois is to be received by us, on a writ of error brought for the purpose of questioning its constitutionality. That construction is clearly exhibited in the following announcement of the opinion of that court when the case was brought before it a second time. The court says:
“We see no reason to depart from the conclusion reached in this case when it was here before. See People v. W., St. L. & P. Railway Co., 104 Ill. 476. But to avoid misapprehension, we deem it desirable to state explicitly that we disclaim any idea that Illinois has authority to regulate commerce in any other State. We understand and simply hold that, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, a single and entire contract to carry for a gross' sum from Gilman, in this State, to the city of New York, implies necessarily that that sum is charged proportionately for the carriage on every part of that distance; and that a single and entire contract to carry for a gross sum from Peoria, in this State, to the city of New York, implies the same thing ; and that, therefore, when it is shown that there is charged for carriage upon the same line *580less from Peoria to New York (the greater distance) than from Gilman to New York (the less distance), and nothing is shown to the effect that such inequality in charge is all for carriage entirely beyond the limits of this State, a prima facie case is made out of unjust discrimination under our statute occurring within this State. We hold that the excess in the charge for the less distance presumably affects every part of the line of carriage between Gilman and the State line proportionately with the balance of the line. The judgment is affirmed.” Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois, 105 Ill. 236.
We have no doubt that this view of the presumed equal distribution of the charge to every part of the route is correct. If one-tenth, or any other proportion, of the whole route of transportation was in Illinois, the clear presumption is, if nothing be shown to the contrary (as nothing was shown), that the like proportion of the whole charge was made for the transportation in that State.
The principal question in this case, therefore, is whether, in the absence of congressional legislation, a State legislature has the power to regulate the charges made by the railroads of the State for transporting goods and passengers to and from places within the State, when such goods or passengers are brought from, or carried to, points without the State, and are, therefore, in the course of transportation from another State, or to another State. It is contended that as such transportation is commerce between or among different States, the power does not exist. The majority of the court so hold. We feel obliged to dissent from that opinion. We think that the State does not lose its power to regulate the charges of its own railroads in its own territory, simply because the goods or persons transported have been brought from or are destined to a point beyond the State in another State.
The case before us is not embarrassed by any allegation of a contract between the State and the company; it is a question of the power to regulate, pure and simple. The State has never contracted away or attempted to contract away this power.
*581It is also unembarrassed by any Federal legislation on the subject. No one disputes that Congress might, if it saw fit, under its power to regulate commerce among the several States, regulate the matter under consideration ; but it has not done so. The question rests solely and entirely upon the power of the State, when unrestrained by any contract, or by any action of the legislative department of the United States. Does it follow, then, that because Congress has the power to regulate this matter (though it has not exercised that power), therefore the State is divested of all power of regulation ? That is the question before us.
We had supposed that this question was concluded by the previous decisions of this court: that all local arrangements and regulations respecting highways, turnpikes, railroads, bridges, canals, ferries, dams, and wharves, within the State, their construction and repair, and the charges to be made for their use, though materially affecting commerce, both internal and external, and thereby incidentally operating to a certain extent as regulations of interstate commerce, were within the power and jurisdiction of the several States. That is still our opinion.
It is almost a work of supererogation to refer to the cases. They are legion. A few only will be selected and referred to.
The first great case on the subject was that of Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Co., 2 Pet. 245, 252, where the State of Delaware had authorized a dam in a navigable tide-water creek of that State, communicating with Delaware Bay; and Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, said : “ The value of the property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come into collision with the powers of the general government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the States. But the measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, *582is an affair between tbe government of Delaware and its citizens, of which this court can take no cognizance. The counsel for the plaintiff in error insist that it comes in conflict with the power of the "United States ‘ to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.’ If Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case, any act in execution of the power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to control State legislation over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows, and which abound throughout the lower country of the Middle and Southern States, we should feel not much difficulty in saying that a State law coming in conflict with such act would be void. But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect the question. We do not think that the act empowering the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across ,the creek c.an, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”'
This case was, in all things, affirmed by the later case of Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. The Legislature of Pennsylvania authorized the city of Philadelphia to erect a permanent bridge across the Schuylkill River (a navigable water), at the foot of Chestnut Street. It was sought to restrain the erection of this bridge on the same grounds which had been urged in the Blackbird Creek case ; but the Ciro-uit Court of the United States refused to intei-fere, and dismissed a bill for an injunction. The decision was sustained by this court, which held that it was for Congress to determine when its full power to regulate commerce should be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions which should be provided; and that, until the dormant power of the Constitution is awakened and made effective by appropriate legislation, the reserved power of the States is plenary, and its exercise in good faith cannot be made the subject of review by this court.
*583These principles are reaffirmed in the still more recent case of Escanaba Company v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683. In that case the authorities of Chicago, under the powers conferred upon them by the Legislature of Illinois, regulated the times for opening and closing the draws in the bridges crossing the Chicago River, so as to accommodate the local travel across them at certain times, and to allow the passage of vessels at others. This operated as a regulation of the commerce on the river, including interstate and foreign, as well as domestic commerce. But there being no legislation of Congress to the contrary, this court held that the power was constitutionally exercised. Commerce was affected; commerce was even incidentally regulated; but the jurisdiction of the State, and of the city acting under State authority, was unhesitatingly recognized by the court. Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, said : “ The Chicago River and its branches must, therefore, be deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which Congress under its commercial power may exercise control to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation. But the States have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, including in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their people. This power embraces the construction of roads, canals, and bridges, and the establishment of ferries, and it can generally be exercised more wisely by the States than by a distant authority. . . . Nowhere could the power to control the bridges in that city, their construction, form, and strength, and the size of their draws, and the manner and times of using them, be better vested than with the State, or the authorities of the city upon whom it has devolved that duty. When its power is exercised so as to unnecessarily obstruct the navigation of the river or its branches, Congress may interfere and remove the obstruction. . . . But until Congress acts on the subject, the power of the State over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary.”
The doctrines announced in these cases apply not only to dams in, and bridges over, navigable streams, but to all struct*584ures and appliances in a state which may incidentally interfere with commerce, or which may be erected or created for the furtherance of commerce, whether by water or by land. It is matter of common knowledge that from the beginning of the government the States have exercised almost exclusive control over roads, bridges, ferries, wharves, and harbors. No one has doubted their right to do so. It is recognized in the great case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, where Chief Justice Marshall, after enumerating some of the powers reserved to the States,says: “They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the' States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.” And he adds (what is very pertinent to this discussion): “ No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power 'which is expressly given.”
The case of Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 101 U. S. 691, 701, related to wharves. The city of Parkersburg had built certain wharves for the accommodation of vessels, principally steamboats, navigating the Ohio River. The Transportation Company, being the owner of several steamboats plying on that river, complained of the wharfage charges as being extortionate, and an unconstitutional interference-with the commerce of the Ohio River. It was shown that the charges were imposed by authority derived from the State laws; and we held that, until Congress interfered, the charges for wharfage was a matter of State law and of State jurisdiction. “We then said: “Wharves, levees, and landing-places are essential to commerce by water, no less than a navigable channel and a clear river. But they are attached to the land; they are private *585property, real estate; and they are primarily, at least, subject to the local State laws. . . . Until Congress has acted, the courts of the United States cannot assume control over the subject as a matter of Federal cognizance. It is Congress, and not the judicial department, to which the Constitution has given, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. The courts can never take the initiative on this subject.”
There is a class of subjects, it is true, pertaining to interstate and foreign commerce, which -require general and uniform rules for the whole country, so as to obviate unjust discriminations against any part, and in respect of which local regulations made by the States would be repugnant to the power vested in Congress, and, therefore, unconstitutional; but there are other subjects of local character and interest which not only admit of, but are generally best regulated by, State authority. This distinction is pointed out and enforced in the case of Cooley v. The Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299. In that case it was held that the pilotage regulations of the different ports of the country belong to the latter class, and are susceptible of State regulation. This case has been approved in several subsequent decisions. Gilman v. Philadelphia, ubi supra; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 42; Ex parte McNeill, 13 Wall. 236; Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479, 482; Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 569; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 581, 582; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, 88; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 575; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 698; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559, 562.
It is hardly necessary to argue that, in reference to this rule, railroads, canals, turnpikes, bridges, ferries, and wharves belong to the category of local subjects, local means, and local aids of commercial intercourse. Congress may'establish national roads, canals, and bridges, it is true; but we speak of those (hitherto the most part) which' are constructed and established under State authority; and, in reference to these, it seems to us very clear that, in the absence of congressional *586legislation to the contrary, they are not only susceptible of State regulation, but properly amenable to it, irrespective of other considerations to which we shall refer.
The highways in a State are the highways of the State. Convenient ways and means of intercommunication are the first evidence of the civilization of a people. The highways of a country are not of private but of public institution and regulation. In modern times, it is true, government is in the habit, in some countries, of letting out the construction of important highways, requiring a large expenditure of capital,' to agents, generally corporate bodies created for the purpose, and giving to them the right of taxing those who travel or transport goods thereon, as a means of obtaining compensation for their outlay. But a superintending power over the highways, and the charges imposed upon the public for their use, always remains in the government. This is not only its indefeasible right, but is necessary for the protection of the people against extortion and abuse. These positions we deem to be incontrovertible. Indeed, they are adjudged law in the decisions of this court. Railroads and railroad corporations are in this category.
Now, since every railroad may be, and generally is, a medium of transportation for interstate commerce, and affects that commerce; and since the charges of fare and freight for such transportation affect and incidentally regulate that commerce; and since the railroad could not be built, and the charges upon it could not be exacted, without authority from the State, it follows as a necessary consequence that the State, in the exercise of its undoubted functions and sovereignty, does, in the establishment and regulation of railroads, to a certain and a very material extent, not only do that which affects but incidentally regulates commerce. It does so by the very act of authorizing the construction of railroads and the collection of fares and freights thereon. No one doubts its powers to do this. The very being of the plaintiffs in error, the very existence of their railroad, the very power they exercise of charging fares and freights, are all derived from the State. And yet, according to the argument of the plaintiffs in error, pursued to its legitimate consequences, the act of the State in doing all this ought to be *587regarded as null and void because it operates as a regulation of commerce among the States. Not only does the right to charge fares and freights at all come to a railroad company from the grant of the State, but the amount of such charges is also regulated by the State law, either by the charter of the company, or by legislative regulations, or by the general law that the charges shall be reasonable — and that is State law, and not United States law. Where else but from the laws of the State does the railroad company get its right to charge any fares or freight at all ? And since its being, its franchises, its powers, its road, its right to charge, all come from the State, and are the creation of State law, how can it be contended that the State has no power of regulation over those charges, and over the conduct of the company in the transaction of its business whilst acting within the State and using its railroad lying within the bounds of the State \ Omne majus eontinet in se minus. If the State created the company and its franchises, it surely may make regulations as to t]re manner of using them.
It is evident from what has been said, that the dealing of a State with a railroad corporation of its own creation, in authorizing the construction and maintenance of its road and the charge of fares and freights thereon, is, in its purpose, a matter entirely aside from that kind of regulation of commerce which is obnoxious to the provisions of the Constitution. There is not a particle of doubt that it was. the right of the State to prescribe the route of the plaintiff’s road — it might be in a direction north and south, or east and west; it might be by one town, or by a different town; it was its right to prescribe how the road should be built, what means of locomotion should be used on it, how fast the trains might run, at what stations they should stop. It was its right to prescribe its charges, and to declare that they should be uniform, or, if not uniform, how otherwise: this certainly was the right of the State at the inception of the charter, and every one of these things would most materially affect commerce, not only internal but external; and yet not one of them would be repugnant to the power of Congress to regulate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution.
*588Suppose the original charter of the railroad company in this case had contained precisely the provision against discriminating charges which is contained in the general law now complained of, could the company disregard the conditions of its charter, and defy the authority of the State ? We think it clear that it could not. But if the State had the power to impose such a condition in the original charter, it must have the same power at any time afterwards; for the exercise of the power in the original grant would be just as repugnant to the Constitution, and no more, as the exercise of it at a subsequent period. The regulation of charges is just as unconstitutional in a charter as in a general law.
To sum up the matter in a word : we hold it to be a sound proposition of law, that the making of railroads and regulating the charges for their use is not such a regulation of commerce as to be in the remotest degree repugnant to any power given to Congress by the Constitution, so long as that power is dormant, and has not been exercised by Congress. They affect commerce, they incidentally regulate it; but they are acts in relation to the subject which the State has a perfect right to do, subject, always, to the controlling power of Congress over the regulation of commerce when Congress sees fit to act.
It is only for the sake of convenience that the State lets out its railroads to private corporations. It might construct them itself. Suppose it had done so in this case : could not the State have instituted such rates of freight and fare as it pleased ? Certainly it could, It might have made them uniform, as the present law requires them to be, or it might have made them discriminative between different places, and no one could have called it to account. Instructions in the form of laws, or in the form of orders made by a State board, might have been given to the superintendents of the road, acting in behalf of the State, to adopt the one course or the other. Could the agents of the State, acting under such instructions, have been interfered with by the judicial department on the ground of unconstitutionality ? Certainly not; certainly not, unless discriminations were made to the prejudice of the citizens of other States, or of the products of other States.
*589The State of New York built and owns the Erie Canal. Did any court ever attempt to control that State in its regulation of tolls on the canal, even though made for the purpose of affecting the relative movement of goods on the canal and the railroads of the State ? We presume that no such attempt was ever made, or would be successful if made.
It is true, and this we concede, that if the laws of a State discriminate adversely to the citizens or products of other States, whether the railroads belong to the State or to private corporations, the courts might interfere on the ground of the repugnancy of such regulations to that freedom of commerce which Congress by its non-action on the subject' has indicated shall exist. This has been frequently decided. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 282; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 631, and cases there cited. But no such discrimination is made by the law in question.
We also concede that any taxes, duties, or impositions, upon interstate commerce (that is, upon the commerce itself), carried on over the railroads of the State, would interfere with the freedom of- such commerce, and would be repugnant to the presumed intention of Congress. This has frequently been decided. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; and the authorities cited in the latter case. But the present is not a case of that kind, and has no semblance of likeness to it. All such discriminations, taxes, duties, and impositions are direct regulations and burdens upon the commerce itself, and come fairly within the exclusive prerogatives of Congress.
The distinction between such burdens and charges for service rendered is well explained in the case of The Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 217, where Mr. Justice Field, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, in relation to ferries, says: “ It is true that, from the earliest period in the history of the government, the States have authorized and regulated ferries, not only over-waters entirely within their limits, but over waters separating them ; and it may be conceded that in many respects the States can more advantageously manage such interstate ferries than the general govern*590ment; and that the privilege of keeping a ferry, with a right to take toll for passengers and freight, is a franchise grantable by the State, to be exercised within such limits and under such regulations as may be required for the safety, comfort, and convenience of the public. Still the fact remains that such a ferry is a means, and a necessary means, of commercial intercourse between the States bordering on their dividing waters, and it must, therefore, be conducted without the imposition by the States of taxes or other burdens upon the commerce between them. Freedom from such impositions does not, of course, imply exemption from reasonable charges, as compensation ‘for the carriage of persons, in the way of tolls or fares, or from the ordinary taxation to which other property is subjected, any more than like freedom of transportation on land implies such exemption. Reasonable charges for the use of property, either on water or land, are not an interference with the freedom of transportation between the States secured under the commercial power of Congress. . . . That freedom implies exemption from other charges than such as are imposed by way of compensation for the use of the property employed, or for the facilities afforded for its use, or as ordinary taxes upon the value of property.”
This subject in many of its aspects was considered by this court in the case of Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, 471-3. In that case, in a charter for constructing and operating a railroad from Baltimore to Washington, authority was given to the company to charge two dollars and a half for each passenger, and it was stipulated that the company should pay to the State one-fifth of the whole amount received for the transportation of passengers on the road. The company sued for a return of the sums paid on this account, as being exacted by an unconstitutional law. It was insisted that the reservation was equivalent to the imposition of a tax on passengers, and, therefore, a restriction of free intercourse and traffic between different States — much of the travel being that of passengers coming from, or going to, other States. The argument that the reservation of one-fifth of the passage-money necessitated an increased charge upon the passenger *591was met by this court as follows: “ Had the State built the road in question, it might to this day, unchallenged and unchallengeable, have charged two dollars and fifty cents for carrying a passenger between Baltimore and Washington. So might the railroad company under authority from the State, if it saw fit to do so. . . . This unlimited right of the State to charge, or to authorize others to charge, toll, freight, or fare for transportation on its roads, canals, and railroads, arises from the simple fact that they are its own works, or constructed under its authority. It gives them being. It has a right to exact compensation for their use. It has a discretion as to the amount of that compensation. That discretion is a legislative — a sovereign — discretion, and in its very nature is unrestricted and uncontrolled. . . . The exercise of [this] power on the part of a State is very different from the imposition of a tax or duty upon the movements or operations of commerce between the States. Such an imposition, whether relating to persons or goods, we have decided the States cannot make, because it would be a regulation of commerce between the States in a matter in which uniformity is essential to the rights of all, and,’ therefore, requiring the exclusive legislation of Congress. Grandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 42; State Freight Tax Cases, 16 Wall. 232, 279. It is a tax because of the transportation, and is, therefore, virtually a tax on the transportation, and not in any sense a compensation therefor, or for the franchises enjoyed by the corporation that perform it. . . . The question is practically reduced to this : What amounts to a regulation of commerce between the States ? This is often difficult to determine. In view, however, of the very plenary powers which a State has always been conceded to have over its own territory, its highways, its franchises, and its corporations, we cannot regard the stipulation in question as amounting to either of these unconstitutional acts. It is not within the category of such acts. It may incidentally affect transportation, it is true; but so does every burden or tax imposed on corporations or persons engaged in that business. Such burdens, however, are imposed diverso intuitu, and in the exercise of an undoubted power.”
*592But it is needless to multiply citations which establish or recognize the principles which govern the present case. The very point in question has been already expressly decided by this court. We refer to the case of Peik v. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 94 U. S. 164, 175, 177-8. That was a bill filed by the bondholders of the company to restrain the Railroad Commissioners of Wisconsin from enforcing a law' of that State limiting the rate of charges for transporting passengers and freights on the railroads of the State. The bill, amongst other' things, complained that the classes of freight established by § 3 of the act were different from those established by the laws of Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota, for the transportation of freight upon the railro.ads of the same company in those States, and rendered it practically impossible to carry on the business of transporting freight from Wisconsin to either of those States; and that the 18th section (limiting the rates) was a regulation of interstate commerce. The act excepted from its operation the case of freight or passengers carried from one State to another State entirely through or across the State of Wisconsin. It did operate on freight and passengers carried from another State to any point within the State of Wisconsin, or from any such point to another State. The Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, states the precise question to be decided, as follows: “ These suits present the single question of the power of the Legislature of Wisconsin to provide by law for a maximum of charge by the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company for fare and freight upon the transportation of persons and property carried within the State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken up inside and carried without.” He then, after disposing of certain other questions relating to the consolidation of the company with an Illinois company, disposes of the main question as follows: “ As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of interstate commerce. The law is' confined to State commerce, or such interstate commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress a,cts in reference to the relations of this company to interstate commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regu*593late its fares, &c., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Incidentally, these may reach beyond the State. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may indirectly^affect those without.” The law was sustained, and the bill of complaint was dismissed.
We do not see how this case can be distinguished from that now under consideration. The fact that in Peik’s case there was a classification of freights and á limitation of charges, and in the present case a prohibition of discrimination in the charges, is a distinction without a difference. The opinion is brief, it is true, but all the principles involved in it were so fully discussed in the cases immediately preceding, beginning with that of Munn v. Illinois, that no extended discussion of Peik’s case was deemed necessary. All the justices who concurred in the opinion were entirely satisfied with it. The cases were all argued at the same time, or in reference to each other, and were considered together. But there stands the judgment of the court, and, in our apprehension, the judgment in the present case is directly opposed to it."
We have omitted to cite a number of cases corroborating the views we have expressed.’ The case of State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, is weighted with arguments and considerations in this direction. We would also refer to the cases of Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560; Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 334, 335.
It is supposed that the decision in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488-9, supports the contention of the plaintiffs in error. We think not. What was that case % A statute of Louisiana, as construed by its courts, prohibited those engaged in the business of carrying passengers, in that State (including those engaged in interstate commerce), from making any discrimination on account of race or color in the use of the accommodations of their conveyances — a direct regulation of commerce, and within the reason of the tax cases before referred to. A steamer which regularly plied between New Orleans and *594Vicksburg had a cabin specially set apart for white persons, and De Ouir, a colored person, being refused admission to that cabin, sued for damages. We held that the law (as above suggested) was a direct regulation of commerce and a burden upon it. It compelled the steamboat proprietor to place colored persons travelling from one place to another in Louisiana in the cabin set apart for white persons, many of whom were bound to another State; and, therefore, in its operation was a regulation of interstate commerce. It was against the rule that, in the absence of action by Congress, commerce must remain free and untrammelled. By that rule the proprietor of the vessel was at liberty to adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for the disposition and comfort of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing its voyage, as seemed to him most for the interest of all concerned. The statute took away from him this power so long as he was within Louisiana. We especially distinguished the case from Munn v. Illinois, Reik v. Railway Co., and the cognate cases, as belonging to a different categorjr, and governed by different considerations; and the difference between them seems to us very apparent.
The Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ There can be no doubt but that exclusive power has been conferred upon Congress in' respect to the regulation of commerce among the several States. The difficulty has never been as to the existence of this power, but as to what is to be deemed an encroachment upon it; for, as has been often said, ‘legislation may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution.’ Sherlock v. Allwig, 93 U. S. 103; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284. Thus, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, it was decided that a State might regulate the charges of public warehouses, and, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, of railroads situate entirely within the State, even though those engaged m commerce among the States might sometimes use the warehouses or the railroads in the prosecution of their business.” After r-eferring to the cases of dams and bridges over navigable waters, and of turnpikes and ferries, the *595Chief Justioe continued : “ By such statutes the States regulate, as a matter of domestic concern, the instruments of commerce situated wholly within their own jurisdictions, and over which they have exclusive governmental control, except when employed in foreign or interstate commerce. As they can only be used in the State, their regulation for all purposes may properly be assumed by the State, until Congress acts in reference to their foreign or interstate relations. When Congress does act, the State laws are superseded only to the extent that they affect commerce outside the State as it comes within the State.” He then added : “But we think it may safely be said that' State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, doés encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without, or goes out from within.” The distinction here taken seems to us sound, and to distinguish the present case from that of De Cuir. In the Peik case, and others of like character, the State regulated the charges made upon an instrument of commerce (a railroad) situated within the State and under its jurisdiction — such charges being made by virtue of the State’s authority; in the De Cuir case it attempted, as the law operated, to regulate the manner of carrying passengers -on an instrument of commerce having no fixed location, but plying on navigable waters within and without the State; in other words, it attempted to regulate interstate commerce itself, directly, in a matter in which it had no special prerogative to legislate.
Other cases are referred to by the plaintiffs in error in support of their contention; but we think that no case can be found which is not clearly distinguishable from the present on some or one of the grounds already referred to.
The inconveniences which it has been supposed in argument would follow from the execution of the laws of Illinois, we think have been greatly exaggerated. But if it should be found to present any real difficulty in the modes of transacting *596business on through lines, it is always in the power of Congress to make such reasonable regulations as the interests óf interstate commerce may demand, without denuding the States of their just powers over their own roads and their own corporations.