Court Opinion

ID: 9791460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:11:04.953278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.451607
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(dissenting)—I agree with the majority in their determination that the evidence is sufficient to justify submission of the cause to the jury upon the issues presented by the pleadings and defined by the instructions.
The majority, however, grant a new trial upon the basis that the trial court failed to submit an instruction reciting the host-guest statute (RCW 46.08.080). With this determination I disagree.
Appellants excepted, at the time of trial, to the trial court’s failure to submit their proposed instruction embracing the host-guest statute in the following manner:
“The defendant excepts to failure to give defendant’s Instruction Number 6, Your Honor, which is a statement of the law of the State of Washington: [Statute read.] This is 46.08.060, I believe, Your Honor; I will stand corrected on the last two.”
A general exception such as this does not conform with the requirements of Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 51.16W, RCW Yol. 0, and will not support an assignment of error or appellate review. Klise v. Seattle, 52 Wn. *500(2d) 412, 325 P. (2d) 888; Cauble v. Dahl, 48 Wn. (2d) 440, 294 P. (2d) 416; Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wn. (2d) 26, 290 P. (2d) 697; Rank v. Alaska S.S. Co., 45 Wn. (2d) 337, 274 P. (2d) 583; Shields v. Paarmann, 41 Wn. (2d) 423, 249 P. (2d) 377; Ballard v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Wn. (2d) 67, 145 P. (2d) 1019; Glick v. Ropes, 18 Wn. (2d) 260, 138 P. (2d) 858; Hansen v. Columbia Breweries, 12 Wn. (2d) 554, 122 P. (2d) 489; Boyd v. Cole, 189 Wash. 81, 63 P. (2d) 931; Keseleff v. Sunset Highway Motor Freight Co., 187 Wash. 642, 60 P. (2d) 720; Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Snohomish Cy. v. Everett, 171 Wash. 471, 18 P. (2d) 53, 88 A.L.R. 123.
The sole written argument advanced by appellants in their brief upon the assignment of error embracing the foregoing exception reads:
“The refusal of the trial court to give these instructions to the jury prevented them from adequately considering all of the law applicable to the facts of this case.”
Rule on Appeal 42(a)(7), RCW Vol. 0, requires that assignments of error be discussed in the brief. A failure so to do will be deemed an abandonment or waiver of the assignment of error. Seattle v. Love, 61 Wn. (2d) 113, 377 P. (2d) 255; El Cerrito, Inc. v. Ryndak, 60 Wn. (2d) 847, 376 P. (2d) 528; State v. Davis, 60 Wn. (2d) 233, 373 P. (2d) 128; DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn. (2d) 122, 372 P. (2d) 193; Verstraelen v. Kellog, 60 Wn. (2d) 115, 372 P. (2d) 543; State v. Bell, 59 Wn. (2d) 338, 368 P. (2d) 177; Kent v. Whitaker, 58 Wn. (2d) 569, 364 P. (2d) 556; Fulton v. Fulton, 57 Wn. (2d) 331, 357 P. (2d) 169, Reeder v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 41 Wn. (2d) 550, 250 P. (2d) 518.
If the requirements of Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 51.16W, RCW Vol. 0, are to be overlooked, and the foregoing quoted statement is to be considered a compliance with Rule on Appeal 42(a) (7), RCW Vol. 0, then it would not be unreasonable to conclude, from the brevity of appellants’ discussion, that appellants themselves attach but little significance to this claim of error.
Under such circumstances, the assignment should not be considered of sufficient moment to warrant a new trial. *501This court has frequently stated we will not accept invitations to search the record for error. In re Bellevue, 59 Wn. (2d) 793, 370 P. (2d) 861; State v. Bell, supra; Fulton v. Fulton, supra; Malnati v. Ramstead, 50 Wn. (2d) 105, 309 P. (2d) 754.
The issues carried into the instructions and submitted to the jury were (a) whether appellant-driver was guilty of wanton misconduct, gross negligence, or intoxication; and (b) whether the deceased, as a passenger, was guilty of contributory wanton misconduct or negligence.
To have quoted the host-guest statute in its entirety (which the majority states should have been done) could well have been confusing to the jury, because it suggests issues which were not in the case.
Respondent did not plead or contend that appellant-driver intentionally injured the deceased. Appellants do not contend, and under the circumstances the record would not justify a contention that, the evidence being otherwise sufficient, the cause of action was not “corroborated by competent evidence or testimony independent of, or in addition to, the testimony of the parties to the action.” In this latter respect, the liability phase of respondent’s cause of action rests wholly upon the testimony of the remaining passengers in the fatal vehicle, other independent witnesses, and the physical evidence, coupled with the testimony of appellant-driver as an adverse witness. Appellants called no witnesses.
Except for their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellants make no assignment of error to submission of the issue of wanton misconduct. The propriety, therefore, of including such issue should not be reviewed on this appeal. Pettaway v. Commercial Automotive Ser., 49 Wn. (2d) 650, 306 P. (2d) 219.
In fact, in argument upon an assignment of error directed to the trial court’s instruction defining the various terms, including wanton misconduct and contributory wanton misconduct, appellants state in their brief:
“. . . In and of itself, Instruction No. 3 is a good and valid instruction when sufficiently explained by other *502instructions submitted by the court so that it acts as a guidepost for the jury in determining how the additional instructions apply to the factual situation of the particular case involved. However, in the instant case, the court erred in giving the jury the definition of ‘negligence’ in that negligence was not a grounds for consideration by the jury in the determination of liability and the said definition being in the instructions would tend to confuse the jury, rather than assist them in their deliberations.”
The trial court, in its instructions, made it abundantly clear that to recover respondent had to establish wanton misconduct, gross negligence or intoxication. He advised the jury clearly as to the effect of contributory negligence or wanton misconduct upon the part of the deceased passenger. All of the terms were correctly defined. A definition of negligence was explanatory and desirable to an understanding on the part of the jury of the terms “gross negligence” and “contributory negligence.” Pickering v. Stearns, 182 Wash. 234, 46 P. (2d) 394.
Appellants’ theory of the case was that appellant-driver was not guilty of wanton misconduct, gross negligence or intoxication, or, if so, the decedent, as a passenger, was under all the circumstances, guilty of contributory misconduct or negligence in continuing to ride in the vehicle or in failing to take advantage of appellant-driver’s offer to relinquish the driving.
In the instructions, appellants’ theory of the case was presented in the following language:
“With reference to the issue of liability, the defendants deny the plaintiff’s allegations of wanton misconduct, gross negligence, and intoxication. As an affirmative defense to the charge of wanton misconduct, the defendants allege that the conduct of the plaintiff’s son at the time and place in question was the same as that of the defendant William Chapman, and if the one was wanton misconduct, so was the other. With reference to plaintiff’s allegation of gross negligence and intoxication, the defendants allege that the plaintiff’s son was contributorily negligent in:
“1. Failing to make any protest or objection concerning the speed or the manner in which the defendant William Chapman was operating the automobile; and
*503“2. In voluntarily assuming and consenting to any danger and risk incident to the place, speed, and manner in which the automobile was being operated.”
In a following instruction, the jury was adequately advised of the effect of a determination favorable to defendants.
Appellants’ theory of the case was fairly presented to the jury. A recitation of the host-guest statute would have added nothing.
In Lamping v. Ripley, 178 Wash. 206, 209, 34 P. (2d) 459, this court stated:
“. . . Jury trials are serious and expensive things, and the public, as well as the parties, are interested in having cases once fairly tried and finally disposed of. Repeated trials of the same issue are to be encouraged only when, in spite of care and diligence, error has been committed and injustice has been done. ...”
I would affirm the judgment.
Hill, Donworth, and Finley, JJ., concur with Hamilton, J.