Court Opinion

ID: 9756030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:03:58.956004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:14.039729
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
On September 14, 1977, at or about 8:00 o’clock, A.M., Theresa Barone was operating a motor vehicle northwardly on Bethel Grant Road in Upper Gwynedd Township, Montgomery County. When she came to the intersection of Bethel Grant Road and Morris Road, she stopped as she was commanded to do by a stop sign. Because traffic was heavy, she waited several minutes for traffic to pass. When she believed the roadway to be clear of traffic, she started through the intersection. While still in the intersection, her vehicle was struck on the side by a motorcycle which she did not see prior to impact. The driver of the motorcycle died from injuries received in the collision. Ms. Barone was charged with homicide by vehicle for failing to yield the right of way to the motorcycle on the through street as required by 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(b).1 At trial the Common*335wealth presented the foregoing facts and rested. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the Commonwealth’s evidence, and the Commonwealth appealed.2
Homicide by vehicle is defined in Section 3732 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, which provides:
“Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.”
The offense, thus defined, includes three express elements: (1) a violation of a law or ordinance relating to the operation of motor vehicles; (2) the death of another person; and (3) a causal connection between the violation and the death. Proof of further culpability is not mandated by the statute. Specifically, the statutory language does not require conduct which is reckless or grossly negligent. In this respect it is distinct from the crime of involuntary manslaughter which, by definition, requires the doing of an act in a ‘reckless or grossly negligent manner.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504.3
The legislature may define a crime so that proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Commonwealth v. Black, 251 Pa.Super. 539, 542, 380 A.2d 911, 913 (1977); Commonwealth v. Grant, 235 Pa.Super. 357, 364-65, 341 A.2d 511, 515 (1975). Whether criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of a statutory offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute and from its manifest purpose and design. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 *336Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959); Commonwealth v. Black, supra; Commonwealth v. Grant, supra; Commonwealth v. Bready, 220 Pa.Super. 157, 286 A.2d 654 (1971). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all possible ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); Commonwealth v. Mutnik, 486 Pa. 428, 406 A.2d 516 (1979).
The language of the section defining homicide by vehicle is precise and unambiguous. As it pertains to the facts of the instant case, the only culpability required is a violation of a law “applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic.” Highway safety and the means for achieving it are legitimately, even uniquely, within the legislature’s area of concern. Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939), affirmed in Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 S.Ct. 726, 84 L.Ed. 969 (1940); Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936). Because automobiles are potentially hazardous instrumentalities, the legislature, in the public interest, may adopt traffic regulations and rules of the road reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of those who use its highways. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927). Apparently alarmed by the deplorable carnage on our highways, the legislature determined that potential prosecution for involuntary manslaughter was an inadequate response. Motorists are generally reputable citizens. When one of them is involved in an automobile accident resulting in death to another person, the cause frequently is a negligent violation of a rule of the road or speed limit. A reckless disregard for the safety of others is frequently absent, and when it is present, it is often difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the legislature determined to make criminal responsibility dependent upon violation of a traffic law and not necessarily on culpable or criminal negligence.4
*337Comparable statutes adopted in other jurisdictions have been similarly construed to eliminate a requirement for wanton or reckless conduct. See: State v. Freeman, 31 N.C.App. 93, 228 S.E.2d 516, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 449, 230 S.E.2d 766 (1976); Pribyl v. State, 165 Neb. 691, 87 N.W.2d 201 (1957); State v. Kotapish, 171 Ohio St. 349, 171 N.E.2d 505 (1960).5 This court also, by a footnote in Commonwealth v. Trainor, 252 Pa.Super. 332, 337 n. 4, 381 A.2d 944, 947 n. 4 (1977), has acknowledged the legislature’s intent to reduce the degree of culpability necessary to convict for homicide by vehicle.6
The language for Section 3732 of the Vehicle Code and similar statutory provisions in other states was derived from the Uniform Vehicle Code, Section 11-903(a), which provided as follows:
“Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of homicide when such violation is the proximate cause of death. . . ”
*338Under this section the gravamen of the offense was intended to be the violation of a traffic law which resulted in death. , Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia enacted similar provisions. A substantial majority, however, included a requirement that the offending motorist’s conduct must also be reckless. See: National Committee on Uniform Traffic Law Ordinances, Traffic Laws Annotated, § 11-903 (1972 and Supp. 1976). The history of the provision in other states merely confirms that the legislature in Pennsylvania deliberately chose to premise criminal responsibility solely upon a traffic violation.
This interpretation of Section 3732 is consistent with the recent decision of a panel of this Court in Commonwealth v. Danchision, 270 Pa.Super. 112, 410 A.2d 1274 (1979). (Opinion by Van der Voort, J., joined by Hester and Wieand, JJ.). The panel there held that the issue of homicide by vehicle had to be submitted to a jury where the Commonwealth’s evidence reasonably supported a finding that defendant had violated a provision of the Vehicle Code and, as a result, had caused the death of another person.
Although the legislature has wide latitude in the enactment of strict liability statutes, its power to create such crimes is limited by due process requirements. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct, 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). Nevertheless, where the statute involves what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable, and where adherence thereto can properly be expected of a person, a statute may validly eliminate the requirement of criminal intent. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910). See also: Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).
Homicide by vehicle, as I have observed, is the legislature’s response to a high fatality rate on the public highways. The standard adopted to define the offense, i. e., a violation of a traffic law that causes a death, is not unrea*339sonable. Motorists cannot justly complain that they will be held criminally accountable for the consequences if they violate the Vehicle Code. These factors, I believe, are controlling. Contrary to appellee’s argument, the classification of the offense as a misdemeanor of the first degree and the fixing of a maximum sentence equivalent to that prescribed for involuntary manslaughter are not determinative.7 These considerations must yield to the paramount interest of the legislature in establishing laws which regulate the operation of vehicles on the highways of the Commonwealth. In previous due process challenges to motor vehicle regulations, Pennsylvania courts have invariably upheld statutes that evidenced a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose and were not arbitrary or capricious. Maurer v. Boardman, supra; Commonwealth v. Funk, supra; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 215 Pa.Super. 444, 258 A.2d 885 (1969). I conclude that the offense of homicide by vehicle is not an unreasonable method to effectuate a legitimate state safety policy.
I express no opinion, of course, concerning the wisdom of the legislature’s decision to provide criminal responsibility without recklessness or gross negligence. Neither do I express an opinion concerning the legislature’s decision to classify homicide by vehicle as a criminal offense equal in seriousness to involuntary manslaughter.8
*340Appellee makes a facial attack on the validity of the statute by arguing that its language is vague and overbroad and, therefore, unreasonable. I conclude otherwise. In the first place, appellee has no standing to attack the statute facially. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held recently that, absent an assertion of an infringement of First Amendment freedoms, the challenged statute’s specificity must be measured solely within the context of the facts of the case in controversy. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 508, 364 A.2d 306, 309 (1976); Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 4-5, 354 A.2d 244, 245 (1976). See: United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Because appellee does not claim any abridgement of First Amendment rights, I will not consider hypothetical situations in which the application of the statute might appear unreasonable.
Secondly, a statute is deemed unconstitutionally vague if persons of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. . . . ” Heinbaugh, supra, 467 Pa. at 5, 354 A.2d at 245, quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926). The statutory language of Section 3732 is neither vague nor ambiguous. To the contrary, the offense is defined in clear, intelligent and unmistakable terms: If a traffic law is violated and a death results, criminal responsibility follows.
The learned trial judge sustained a demurrer to the Commonwealth’s evidence because there was no showing that appellee’s traffic violation had been reckless or grossly negligent. By adding this requirement of culpability the court rewrote the applicable provision of the statute. The Commonwealth’s evidence revealed that appellee had committed a stop sign violation which caused the death of a motorcyclist on the through street. This evidence should have been submitted to the jury. It was sufficient, if believed, to constitute the statutory offense of homicide by vehicle. See: Commonwealth v. Danchision, supra.
*341For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
PRICE and HESTER, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. This section provides, inter alia: “After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian in a crosswalk or to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute a hazard during the time when the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.”

. Theresa Barone filed a cross appeal from a pre-trial order denying her motion to have Section 3732 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, declared unconstitutional.

. Prior to the enactment of homicide by vehicle, a person who caused a death while operating a motor vehicle could be charged with involuntary manslaughter and convicted only upon a showing of reckless or grossly negligent conduct. See, e. g.: Commonwealth v. Kaulback, 256 Pa.Super. 13, 389 A.2d 152 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 244 Pa.Super. 182, 366 A.2d 1252 (1976); Commonwealth v. Greer, 232 Pa.Super. 448, 335 A.2d 770 (1975).

. Culpable or criminal negligence is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4): “A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure *337to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” It should be noted that the minimum culpability requirements contained in Section 302 of the Crimes Code, supra, afford appellee no support. These requirements have no application to “offenses defined by statutes other than [the Pennsylvania Crimes Code] in so far as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(a)(2).

. After this decision, the Ohio statute was repealed and provisions defining the crimes of “aggravated vehicular homicide” and “vehicular homicide” were adopted which incorporated requirements for recklessness and negligence respectively. National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Traffic Law Annotated, § 11-903 (1972 and Supp. 1976).

. In Trainor, Judge Cercone, after reiterating the principle that not every violation of law in the operation of an automobile will render an operator criminally liable for deaths which may result, commented that the “vitality of this principle is cast in doubt as a result of the recently enacted Vehicle Code.”

. The validity of strict liability statutes imposing comparable maximum penalties has been upheld in the following cases: United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975) (misbranded or adulterated drugs-$l,000 and/or one year for first offense, $10,000 and/or three years for subsequent offense); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971) (possession of unregistered firearms-$10,000 and/or ten years); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945) (bigamy-ten years); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922) (unlawful drug sale-five years); United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976) (fishing limit violation-$100,000 and/or one year).

. I observe, however, that the legislature’s creation of the crime of “homicide by vehicle” has largely rendered the crime of “involuntary manslaughter” superfluous in cases where death results from a vehicular accident.