Court Opinion

ID: 9477793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:31:27.882078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:03.176465
License: Public Domain

MAYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because I see a sharper distinction between the best mode and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
*591Enablement and best mode are two separate and distinct elements of patentability. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 USPQ 311, 315 (CCPA 1962). The test for best mode cannot be equated with that for enablement. “The question of a specification’s adequacy in [the best mode] context is in no way related to the question of the specification’s sufficiency in complying with the enablement requirement.” In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816 n. 4, 204 USPQ 537, 544 n. 4 (CCPA 1980). The enablement aspect requires a disclosure that will permit those skilled in the art, without undue experimentation, to make and practice the invention. The best mode clause insists on more: it requires “an inventor to disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he executes the application, of carrying out his invention.” In re Gay, 309 F.2d at 772, 135 USPQ at 315. It precludes “inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.” Id.; see also United States Dept. of Energy v. Daugherty, 687 F.2d 438, 446, 215 USPQ 4, 11 (CCPA 1982).
Here, prior to the patent application, one of the patentees and the president of Ran-domex, Ludka, had tried several different cleaning solutions in his quest for the one that worked best. Through experimentation, he learned that “there was a difference in effectiveness in detergent formulae percentages,” and ultimately arrived at an optimum cleaning formula. As he admits, however, he intentionally refrained from disclosing the optimum formula so that the users of his cleaner would also purchase his cleaning solution. 2 USPQ2d at 1626. Ludka believed this intentional non-disclosure was “a good advertising gimmick” that would bring him additional profits from his invention.
The specification of the ’660 patent said, “The cleaning solution employed should be of a type adequate to clean grease and oil from the disc surfaces, such as a 91 percent alcohol solution or a non-residue detergent solution such as Randomex Cleaner No. 50281.” As can readily be seen, this sets out an undifferentiated list of apparently equally effective solutions, no one of which is highlighted as preferred over the others. There would be no problem with this if all of the suggested solutions worked equally well. But using the alcohol solution, an example of an unstated number of other cleaning solutions, did not work well and could produce dangerous fumes:
Ludka ... testified that in experimenting to find the best fluid, he abandoned alcohol after one try. While he maintained at the trial that alcohol was usable, neither he, nor plaintiff’s expert, contradicted defendants’ expert’s testimony that, because plaintiff’s device was enclosed, alcohol could produce dangerous fumes.
2 USPQ2d at 1623 n. 1. Further, the use of certain “non-residue detergent solutions” also could have negative consequences. As Randomex related in a letter to a client:
It is our intent to deliver continuous amounts of our [cleaning] solution across [the disc] surfaces, through the device of the brush bristles, so that the chemical solution itself emulsifies the contamination on the surface, lifts it, and either carries or spins it from the surface____ To achieve proper emulsification, it is mandatory that you provide enough of the chemicals, carried in a deionized water base, to do their emulsifying job. Too little will result in incomplete contaminant removal; the wrong solution will generally result in residue and subsequent head crashes [in the cleaning apparatus]. [Emphasis added in last clause.]
Thus, not only did Ludka fail to point out that the Randomex solution was the best mode, he also disclosed solutions that he knew could be harmful and even dangerous. This is the antithesis of the good-faith full disclosure that is mandated by section 112’s best mode requirement. See In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184, 47 CCPA 1031, 1048, 126 USPQ 242, 253 (1960) (“One cannot read the wording of section 112 without appreciating that strong language *592has been used for the purpose of compelling complete disclosure”).
It is irrelevant that there was a variety of non-residue detergent solutions on the market that might work because Ludka knew that among those available his was the most effective. Yet he only named it as one among many possible solutions, and then only by its trade name, not generically. He did not disclose which of the suggested modes was the “best mode contemplated by him” for practicing the invention. In re Gay, 309 F.2d at 772, 135 USPQ at 315; Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed.Cir.1986). His disclosure does not satisfy section 112 because he buried his best mode in a list of less satisfactory ones. Cf. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1536, 3 USPQ2d 1737, 1745 (Fed.Cir.1987) (“Even though there may be a general reference to the best mode, the quality of the disclosure may be so poor as to effectively result in concealment”).
In view of this, question 2(b) was, as the district court concluded in the end, irrelevant. In answer to that question, the jury said that the “disclosure with respect to the cleaning fluid [was not] so inadequate that a person skilled in the art who did not use plaintiff’s named cleaner would have had to engage in an undue amount of experimentation ... to find the best mode to use the invention.” Implicit in this finding is the undeniable premise that Randomex had not disclosed the best mode and therefore one would have to “find” it. But if there is a best mode known to the inventor he must say so; he cannot require the public to hunt for it. See DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324, 226 USPQ 758, 763 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“Not complying with the best mode requirement amounts to concealing the preferred mode contemplated by the applicant at time of filing”). This special verdict did not find that the disclosure was sufficient to teach one skilled in the art how to practice the best mode. It found only that the disclosure was sufficient to teach one skilled in the art how to find the best mode. That is a horse of a different color.
To find the best mode one might have to try any number of solutions akin to 91% alcohol, hopefully without the same damaging results of alcohol, as well as any number of non-residue detergent solutions, among them Randomex Cleaner No. 50281. Having done all that, the searcher presumably would conclude that the Randomex solution was best. But the end of that quest is only the beginning of another. He would then have to “reverse engineer” the Randomex solution, which may or may not be a simple proposition. As the district court observed, Randomex said in a letter to a potential customer that its cleaning solution took “some two years” to develop and its “consulting chemist continues searching for improvements....” See Memorandum to Counsel in Scopus Corp. v. Randomex, Inc., No. 82-1032-MA-A (Oct. 19, 1987).
Question 3 is more pertinent to our inquiry. The best mode aspect of section 112 contemplates that inventors not apply for a patent while “concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions.” In re Gay, 309 F.2d at 772, 135 USPQ at 315. “The public” is everyone, not just those skilled in the art, and embraces “users,” very likely the members of the public who will practice the invention. While a word more comprehensive than “users” might have been used in question 3, the district court was surely correct that it was adequate. In response to Rando-mex’s belated complaint about use of the word to instruct the jury, the trial court said, “While a communication sufficient to inform persons skilled in the art must be sufficient, or there would be no end to the required disclosure, the principle remains that it is the public that is meant to be informed.” 2 USPQ2d at 1626 n. 7.
In any event, Randomex did not timely object to the question and must therefore be deemed to have accepted it, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 (“No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires....”); Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1566, 5 USPQ2d 1769, 1777 (Fed.Cir.1988) (party waives ob*593jection to jury instruction if he fails to timely raise it), and it is not so deficient as to result in an injustice if it is upheld, see, e.g., Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 615, 222 USPQ 654, 662 (Fed.Cir.1984) (“If no objection is raised, the instructions cannot be challenged on appeal unless great injustice would result”); Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148, 1150 (5th Cir.1985) (“Failure to object to the jury charge in the trial court precludes review on appeal unless the error is so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice”). Furthermore, although this court makes much of the fact that the district court vacillated in its approach to the best mode issue, the district court’s statement that questions 3 and 3(a) did not concern best mode was “not said to the jury, and therefore did not affect its deliberations.” 2 USPQ2d at 1627.
“Compliance with the best mode requirement, because it depends on the applicant’s state of mind, is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1536, 3 USPQ2d at 1745. On the evidence here, I see no basis for holding that the district court’s determination that Randomex failed to disclose its best mode was clearly erroneous.