Court Opinion

ID: 9694231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:30:57.489978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:57.626829
License: Public Domain

Loring, Chief Justice.
This was an action in the district court of Ramsey county on a Wisconsin divorce decree for unpaid installments awarded plaintiff for the support of two minor children. The court found for plaintiff, and judgment was ordered giving plaintiff the right to enforce the judgment by extraordinary remedies. On motion, the court struck from the order for judgment the right to enforce it by extraordinary remedies. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to the amended order.
*461In 1926, plaintiff and Joy Straub were divorced in Wisconsin. The decree ordered defendant to pay $12 per week for the support of his minor children, born September 25, 1918, and December 30, 1919. In March 1939, the Wisconsin court fixed the balance of unpaid installments at $1,700. Subsequently, on January 30, 1941, after the children had reached their majority, that court found that only $40 had been paid on the arrearages. Defendant failed to pay any part of the balance of $1,660.
Plaintiff brought suit in Minnesota for $1,660 and accrued interest. Defendant admitted the right of plaintiff to obtain a money judgment, but denied her right to enforce this judgment by extraordinary remedies, particularly by contempt proceedings. After a trial on the merits, the district court ordered judgment on December 29,1948, for plaintiff in the sum of $1,660, with interest, together with the right to enforce the judgment by all the remedies available under the laws of Minnesota for the enforcement of orders, judgments, and decrees requiring payments of alimony or support money in actions for absolute divorce. Defendant moved to strike out that part of the order for judgment which gave plaintiff the right to enforce her judgment by extraordinary remedies, and the court granted the motion.
The sole issue presented to this court is whether plaintiff has a right to an extraordinary remedy such as contempt proceedings to enforce a judgment for support money which accrued during the minority of the children, although the judgment was rendered after they had reached majority. Under our decision in Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W. 449, the judgment based on the Wisconsin decree is enforceable here according to our law. The question presented is one of first impression in this state. The decisions in other jurisdictions are in conflict. In McCartney v. Superior Court, 187 Okl. 63, 101 P. (2d) 245; Lowry v. Lowry, 189 Okl. 650, 118 P. (2d) 1015; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 192 Okl. 564, 137 P. (2d) 914; Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 19 N. W. (2d) 317, the courts held that contempt proceedings were not available after the children had ceased to be minors. See, Sides v. Pittman, 167 *462Miss. 751, 150 So. 211, and Annotation, 172 A. L. R. 892. In the McCartney case, the court had for interpretation a statute very similar to ours.2 The contention was made that the court had a continuing jurisdiction over the father, after the children had reached majority, to coerce by contempt proceedings compliance with the order as to unpaid installments accruing prior to the attainment of majority. The Oklahoma court’s answer was brief. It stated (187 Okl. 64, 101 P. [2d] 245):
“* * * it is obvious from the language of the statute that the jurisdiction of the court to punish for contempt terminates with the child’s attaining majority.”
Reaffirming this position in Lowry v. Lowry the court there stated (189 Okl. 650, 118 P. [2d] 1016):
“The purpose of the order in this case was the support of the minor children. This purpose has been accomplished, and the matter of the care and custody of the minor children is finally disposed of. The force and life of the order expired on the date the youngest child attained majority. It makes no difference whether the one directed to pay has fully complied with such order or not, insofar as enforcing same by contempt proceedings. We hold, therefore, that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to enforce its order to pay child support by contempt proceedings on accrued unpaid installments commenced after the child has reached majority.”
In Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 19 N. W. (2d) 317, the Wisconsin supreme court followed the Oklahoma decisions and reached the same result, quoting with approval much of the court’s language in the Lowry case.
*463In State ex rel. Casey v. Casey, 175 Or. 328, 153 P. (2d) 700, 172 A. L. R. 862, the supreme court of that state arrived at the opposite conclusion, on the sole ground that the failure to pay constituted contempt of the authority of the court. It did not discuss the scope or purpose of the divorce statute. Our statute, M. S. A. 518.17, provides:
“Upon adjudging the nullity of a marriage, or a divorce or separation, the court may make such further order as it deems just and proper concerning the care, custody, and maintenance of the minor children of the parties and may determine with which of the parents they, or any of them, shall remain, having due regard to the age and sex of such children.” (Italics supplied.)
In Sivertsen v. Sivertsen, 198 Minn. 207, 269 N. W. 413, we have construed § 518.17 to mean that the court cannot award support payments after the children have reached majority. A like result was reached by the supreme court of Wisconsin in Boehler v. Boehler, 125 Wis. 627, 104 N. W. 840. The purpose of our statute (§ 518.17) and its enforcement by contempt proceedings is to insure support for the children during their minority. When they reach majority, the purpose and justification for the extraordinary remedy has expired. Hence, we are of the opinion that the legislature did not authorize the court to enforce its orders for support money for the children by extraordinary remedies after the children reached majority. The right to a judgment enforceable by ordinary remedies alone remained.
Affirmed.

Okl. Stat. 1941, Title 12, § 1277, provides:
“When a divorce is granted, the court shall make provision for guardianship, custody, support and education of the minor children of the marriage, and may modify or change any order in this respect, whenever circumstances render such change proper either before or after final judgment in the action.” (Italics supplied.)