Court Opinion

ID: 9391239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 17:00:56.314779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.245080
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 1 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TULE LAKE COMMITTEE,                            No.    20-16955

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-00688-WBS-DMC
 v.

FEDERAL AVIATION                                MEMORANDUM*
ADMINISTRATION; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of California
                   William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 18, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,*** District
Judge.

      Tule Lake Committee (the Committee) appeals the district court’s dismissal

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
              The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, Senior United States District Judge
for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
for lack of jurisdiction of its claims brought against the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), the City of Tulelake and its city council, and the Modoc

Nation (Tribe) and its tribal Council (non-federal defendants collectively referred

to as the City). The Committee seeks to invalidate the City’s transfer of property

underlying the Tulelake Municipal Airport to the Tribe. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

      We review de novo a district court’s decision on subject matter jurisdiction,

Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1986), and review for abuse of

discretion a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a

state-law claim, Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2022). The Committee

does not challenge the dismissal of its claims against the FAA, and therefore has

abandoned these claims on appeal. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727,

738 (9th Cir. 1986). The only claims at issue on appeal are those against the City.

      1.     The Committee argues there is federal subject matter jurisdiction

under 18 U.S.C. § 1331 over its claims against the City based on the 1951 federal

land patent transferring the airport property to the City (1951 Patent), the Federal

Airport Act of 1946 (Pub. L. No. 79-377, 60 Stat. 170 (May 13, 1946)) (Airport

Act), the federal or state declaratory judgment acts, or a significant federal

question arising in its state-law claims. None of these arguments has merit.

      Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and we must ensure we do

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not exceed the scope of our power to hear a case. Negrete v. City of Oakland, 46

F.4th 811, 813 (9th Cir. 2022). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts “have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” A case can “arise under” federal law in two ways:

either (1) the federal law creates a cause of action, or (2) a “substantial federal

question” arises in a state-law claim. Id. at 816–17.

      a.     The 1951 Patent cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction as the

Committee is a stranger to the patent and does not have any interest to support its

ability to challenge the City’s transfer. See Raypath, Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 544

F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1976). Even if the Committee had a legal interest in the

patent, the mere existence of a federal patent does not provide a basis for federal

jurisdiction simply because the title derived under an act of Congress. See Shulthis

v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 570 (1912); see also Virgin v. Cnty. of San Luis

Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000).

      b.     Assuming the complaint properly alleged a violation of the Airport

Act, the Committee cannot show that the Airport Act provides either an express or

implied right of action. The parties agree, and it is evident from the text of the

statute, that the Airport Act does not provide an express right of action. The

Committee attempts to argue an implied right of action under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.

66 (1975), but failed to raise the argument in its opening brief and thus we may

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consider it waived. Barnes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 865 F.3d 1266, 1271 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2017). Even if properly before us, based on the lack of support in the text of

the statute or the record, we are doubtful that the Airport Act was created for the

benefit of any particular class of individuals; rather, it appears to be intended to

benefit the public generally through the development of airports. See California v.

Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294–95 (1981) (noting that neither the text nor

legislative history indicated that the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act was

meant to benefit a special class, instead finding it was intended to benefit the

public at large by empowering the federal government to address obstructions in

navigable rivers). Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to create

an implied right of action to protect the ability of certain groups to sue public

entities in California who received a land patent under the Act, especially

considering the Airport Act outlined a different process for public participation

through public hearings on project approvals. See First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v.

Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the key inquiry under Cort v.

Ash is legislative intent).

       c.     Neither the federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) nor

its state analog (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1060) can provide an independent basis for

federal jurisdiction. See Staacke v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir.

1988) (finding the Declaratory Judgment Act provides an additional remedy in

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cases where jurisdiction is already established but does not itself confer subject

matter jurisdiction); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation

Tr. for S. Cal. 463 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1983) (“[W]e hold that under the jurisdictional

statutes as they now stand federal courts do not have original jurisdiction, nor do

they acquire jurisdiction on removal, when a federal question is presented by a

complaint for a state declaratory judgment, but Skelly Oil [Co. v. Phillips

Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950),] would bar jurisdiction if the plaintiff had

sought a federal declaratory judgment.”).

      d. All that remains is the possibility of federal jurisdiction under Grable &

Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308

(2005), which outlines the analysis to determine if a significant federal issue

imbedded in a state-law claim can provide federal courts with subject matter

jurisdiction.1 The only remaining state-law claims raised by the Committee as a

basis for federal jurisdiction are those under the Ralph M. Brown Act (Cal. Gov’t

Code § 54950 et seq.). The Committee’s Brown Act claims relate solely to the

conduct of the City during its public meetings and do not in any way necessarily

involve an interpretation of the Airport Act, 1951 Patent, or any other federal law.

1
  To the extent the Committee argues that Grable can support jurisdiction over a
substantial federal issue in a federal statute notwithstanding a lack of a right of
action in that statute, it fundamentally misunderstands the holding of Grable,
which only applies to jurisdiction over state law claims with imbedded federal
issues.

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Therefore, Grable does not support federal jurisdiction.

      2. Given the lack of any claim within the original jurisdiction of the federal

courts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the state-law claims. See

Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)).

      The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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