Court Opinion

ID: 9453587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:18:18.383408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:43.380283
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.
In February 1967, defendants Dave Evans, Salvatore Battaglia and Joseph Amabile were indicted for conspiring with each other and with non-defendant Rocco Pranno to violate the Hobbs Act.1 The gist of the conspiracy charge was that defendants obtained $48,500 from the Riley Management Corporation by extortion. As required by the statute, the indictment also charged that the conspiracy affected interstate commerce, particularly with respect to that firm’s construction of the King Arthur Apartments in Lansing, Illinois. The three defendants were found guilty by a jury. Evans’ and Battaglia’s appeals were heard together and are disposed of in this opinion. Amabile’s appeal has not yet been heard.
Because Evans and Battaglia assail the sufficiency of the evidence, it must be summarized in some detail, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. The evidence showed that William Riley was president of the Riley Management Corporation and that his company was building the King Arthur Apartments in Lansing, Illinois. Since 1962, defendant Evans had been one of his superintendents of construction and was assigned to the Lansing job in June 1964. At that time Riley and Evans discussed letting the sewer contracts for the Lansing apartments. Riley told Evans to line up subcontractors but to keep it secret “from the boys in Mel-rose Park,” specifically from defendant Amabile (also known as Joe Shine) and from Nick Palermo. Riley told Evans that if Amabile and Palermo learned of the project, Riley would quite possibly be forced to use them again as subcontractors. Amabile had been connected with earlier Riley projects and had on several occasions threatened Riley and his family. Evans promised to keep the King Arthur Apartment information from Amabile and Palermo. However, a few *308days later, Riley was requested to go to the office of the Melrose Park Plumbing Company to meet Nick Palermo. Riley acceded. Both Palermo and Amabile were at the meeting. Palermo insisted on their receiving the plumbing contract for the Lansing project. Amabile said that otherwise he would stop Riley’s other apartment building projects underway in Northlake and Westmont, Illinois, and that Riley “would be walking the streets with a candy cane.” They told him they knew where Riley’s mother lived and where his children went to school and that they had a baseball bat to handle “wise guys” like him.
A few days later, Riley complained to Evans about the leak to Amabile and Palermo. Riley told Evans that the Mel-rose Park group was not to receive any Lansing work from Riley Management Corporation. In August 1964, Riley instructed Evans to obtain a sewer contractor that was “foreign” to Amabile and Palermo.
Amabile had told Mike DiVito, a sewer contractor, that Amabile could not get the Lansing sewer work if DiVito’s name were to be on the contract. Amabile advised DiVito and co-conspirator Rocco Pranno to come up with “a good clean fellow” if they were to obtian the business. They suggested Henry La-Key, an experienced construction foreman. In September 1964, La-Key was hired by Pranno and DiVito as construction superintendent for a brand-new firm, Carlson Construction Company, with the title of president.
DiVito said he and Pranno met with Evans and Amabile at Amabile’s apartment in mid-September.2 Pranno explained to Amabile that La-Key was “clean,” but Amabile said that before giving Pranno and DiVito the Lansing sewer job he wanted $20,000 in cash. After looking at Evans’ figures, DiVito told Pranno that there would be $20,000 in cash above Pranno’s and DiVito’s costs and profits for the job. Thereupon Pranno told Amabile that he would give him the $20,000 in cash and Amabile accepted the deal. Afterwards, Pranno told DiVito that Evans was Amabile’s “guy” and that DiVito should never say anything in front of Evans because it would get back to Amabile.
La-Key testified that he attended a September meeting at Amabile’s apartment with Evans, DiVito and Amabile. Amabile said that he was giving the Lansing sewer job to DiVito and Pranno and eared about nothing except getting his $20,000 “off . the top.” In La-Key’s presence, DiVito later relayed the message to Pranno about Amabile’s demand for $20,000. Pranno directed La-Key and DiVito to meet with Amabile and Evans at the El Morocco lounge. At that meeting DiVito told Amabile that there would not be enough money in the contract to pay him $20,000 “off the top.” Amabile then instructed Evans to figure a way to obtain more money from the job. Evans tore up the original contract and wrote a new contract, raising the price from $150,000 to $199,600.
Pranno gave DiVito and La-Key approximately $13,000 to open a bank account for Carlson. In September 1964, Evans advised Riley that he had selected the Carlson Construction Company as the sewer contractor, that its reputation was excellent, and that it was operated by Henry La-Key. Thereafter, Carlson Construction Company was awarded the sewer contract for about $150,000, to be paid directly to Carlson by a suburban savings and loan association through pay-out slips issued by Riley’s company. Carlson commenced the Lansing work in September or October 1964.
In mid-October, Evans told La-Key that the only contracts Evans let at Lansing were the ones Amabile told him to. Evans told La-Key that he did not want Riley to know that Evans knew Amabile. In November, Amabile told La-Key that Evans worked for Amabile, that Amabile had placed Evans in Riley’s office, and that Evans would do whatever Amabile told him to do.
*309Before making the first draw from the savings and loan association, La-Key told Amabile that the draw would be for $57,000. The next day, Amabile and Le-Key drove to the hospital where Evans was a patient. Amabile told La-Key that Amabile was going to give $5,000 to Evans as his cut on the job, instead of $7,500. At the hospital Amabile gave Evans a “wad of bills.” Evans reduced the estimate for the first draw by approximately $10,000.
On November 12, 1964, La-Key received the first draw for $47,517.97 from the savings and loan association. He deposited $39,000 in Carlson’s payroll account, retained $517 for his wages, and gave $8,000 to Rocco Pranno. Three days later, on Amabile’s instructions, he drew out $20,000 from Carlson’s account and gave it to Amabile.
In late November or early December, La-Key accompanied Amabile to a farm in Pingree Grove, Illinois, where Ama-bile introduced La-Key to Battaglia as “running the job for them” in Lansing, Illinois. La-Key heard Battaglia ask Amabile why Evans was getting “that kind of money.” Amabile explained that he had made a deal with Evans who had “got us the job.” Amabile also said he had promised Evans $7,500 and that he would take care of it. The next morning La-Key mentioned to Evans that he had been at Battaglia’s farm, and Evans warned him not to talk about it. Later, Pranno explained to Amabile that La-Key should not have been taken to the farm. When Pranno attemped to hit La-Key, Amabile stopped him, saying that he had La-Key down to the farm and that “the man [Battaglia] says he is OK.”
Prior to the first draw, Pranno, Di-Vito and La-Key borrowed $5,000 because Carlson had run short of money. Pranno gave $4,500 of this amount to La-Key to deposit for Carlson. This loan was not repaid by January 1965. Later that month Pranno told Amabile about this in DiVito’s presence and asked Ama-bile to locate La-Key so that the loan could be repaid. Several days later Pranno told Amabile that he was going to “the farm” to see “the man” in order to have Amabile obtain $5,000 from La-Key to pay back the loan. At the resulting Battaglia farm meeting, attended by Amabile, Pranno and DiVito, Pranno mentioned that $20,000 from the Lansing sewer job was intended for Battag-lia, who then nodded. The second time the $20,000 was mentioned for Battaglia, he said “yes.” Battaglia also said:
“ ‘Well, I don’t think Hank La-Key is such a bad guy, I like him, I like to work with him,’ that they had other things coming up, and that they could use him again because he was clean.”
He told Pranno that he would see what he could do for him as to the $5,000. On the drive back from the farm, Pranno told DiVito that he thought Amabile was short-changing Battaglia and keeping $10,000 of the $20,000 for himself.
In January 1965, La-Key advised Evans that Carlson did not have enough money to pay for necessary materials. Evans told La-Key not to worry, saying:
“ T will talk to Joe Shine [Amabile] and Joe Shine will talk to the man [Battaglia or Riley3]. We will see that the money is in the bank for you.’ ”
That same month Amabile told La-Key to prepare the papers for the second draw. La-Key said that the second draw would be for $60,000. Amabile said this was too high and that he would determine how much it should be and would straighten it out with Evans. That same night, Evans went to La-Key’s home and changed prices to bring the draw down to $48,000. Evans told La-Key to present the second draw papers to Sol Meltzer, Riley’s financial officer. However, Melt-zer refused to authorize this draw. Thereupon, La-Key went to see Amabile. Evans was present while La-Key told Amabile what had happened. The next morning La-Key picked up Evans. They *310entered Riley’s office separately. Riley said that he would authorize a pay-out only when Carlson had paid its suppliers. At this meeting La-Key told Riley that the cost of the job had gone up to $200,-000. Evans explained that this was because “complications set in on the job.”
La-Key thereupon reported to Amabile that the second draw was still not authorized. Amabile told La-Key to accompany him to Riley’s office the next morning. On the following day Amabile told Riley that he had to pay La-Key because “the man” [Battaglia] wanted La-Key paid. Amabile said that otherwise there would be “all sorts of trouble.” Because of his fear of physical harm and economic collapse, Riley authorized the second draw of $48,512.48. This was the sum mentioned in the indictment and was deposited by La-Key in a Carlson account. A few days later, Amabile instructed La-Key to draw out $17,000. La-Key thereupon obtained $5,000 in cash and a certified check for $12,000. Amabile insisted upon all cash and ordered Evans to accompany La-Key to cash the cheek. After the $12,000 check was cashed, La-Key and Evans went to Amabile’s apartment, and La-Key gave Amabile the $17,000. Amabile then gave La-Key $5,000, of which La-Key gave Evans $1,000. Amabile told La-Key to take a vacation, and he went to Florida. Shortly thereafter, Evans advised La-Key to return to Chicago, at Amabile’s request. Amabile then complained that La-Key had not been paying Carlson’s bills, thus getting Amabile in trouble with Riley and “ ‘making Dave Evans lose his job. You are taking my man [Evans] right out of Riley’s.’ ” La-Key then told Amabile that there was no money in the Carlson account because Ama-bile had bled it.
A few days later, La-Key complained to Evans that the Carlson bills were unpaid because of Amabile’s actions. La-Key asked Evans why he didn’t get out of the business. Evans replied:
“ T can’t get out. I am in too deep with Joe Shine [Amabile]. I know too much about the other people. * * * I can’t quit. I wish I could get back to my own job where I came from.’ ”
Evans then said that he wished he had never met Amabile and reiterated that he was in too deep to quit.

Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Evans

Evans and Battaglia concede there was enough evidence of a conspiracy to obtain money from Riley Management Corporation by fraud. Evans admits that there was sufficient evidence that he was a party to that conspiracy. He also admits that Amabile used extortion to induce Riley to authorize the second draw. However, Evans contends that there is no evidence to show that the extortion was pursuant to a conspiracy of which he was a member. We reject that contention.
On this record, it is obvious that Evans knew of Riley’s fear of Amabile. Although Evans took the stand, he significantly never explained that violence was not contemplated. La-Key was told by Evans that he would talk to Amabile, and that Amabile would talk to “the man” (Battaglia or Riley in this instance; see note 3 supra) in order to get the second draw paid. Evans knew that Riley was unwilling to pay the second draw because Carlson’s bills were unpaid, and that Riley was afraid of Amabile. The jury could properly infer that Evans knew Amabile would induce Riley — through fear — to authorize the second draw. After the second draw, La-Key withdrew another $17,000 for Amabile, who then gave La-Key $5,000, who in turn gave Evans $1,000.4 Even though he may not have spoken to Amabile about the second draw, Evans’ own statement to La-Key showed his willingness to take part in a course of action which would cause payment by coercion. It would be unreasonable to suppose that Evans would be so closely associated with Amabile in the scheme to defraud without realizing that Amabile would employ coercive means for obtaining the second draw. Cf. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, *31112-13, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435. As in Lefco v. United States, 74 F.2d 66, 68, 69 (3rd Cir. 1934), Evans has resorted to a conspirator’s common contention, made in extremity, that he was a party to a sub-conspiracy not charged in the indictment, but our digest of the evidence discloses evidence quite sufficient to sustain the allegations and finding of his participation in a single conspiracy to obtain money, encompassing extortion as well as fraud.
Evans has relied on Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252; United States v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358 (3rd Cir. 1965), and Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), certiorari denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 1626, 12 L.Ed.2d 498. None is apposite. In Stirone, the Court condemned the variance between indictment and proof. As we have seen, the proof here is consistent with the indictment. In Critchley, the evidence did not show any threat at the critical time, so that there was no extortion. Here there was ample evidence that co-conspirator Amabile threatened Riley with violence to obtain the second draw, and of course Evans is chargeable with his co-conspirator’s acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.5 In Carbo, Gibson had legitimate business reasons for his association with the conspirators, whereas Evans’ associations with Amabile were clearly for illegal purposes.

Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Bat-taglia

As noted above, during Di-Vito’s, Pranno’s and Amabile’s February (or early March) 1965 visit to Battaglia’s farm, Battaglia said he liked La-Key and they could use him in other things because he was clean. From this, the jury could infer that Battaglia had embarked “upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline” (United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944)). He was committed to a long-term relationship contemplating the use of La-Key in numerous ventures. Battaglia admitted knowledge of Evans’ paid role. He also acknowledged that he was to receive a $20,000 cut from Riley through the Carlson contract at Lansing. Since Battaglia had a stake in the outcome of the conspiracy, even the stringent test of conspiracy liability evolved by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940), affirmed, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128, was satisfied. Battaglia was also the arbiter of disputes among the co-conspirators. Being an associate of Amabile in this venture, Battaglia is properly chargeable with knowledge that his confederate, Amabile, would resort to threats if necessary to extract money from Riley. Battaglia had to “take his chances” as to the methods used by the other co-conspirators. United States v. Andolschek, supra. As in United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 468, note 4 (2d Cir. 1963), certiorari denied sub nom. Corallo v. United States, 375 U.S. 835, 836, 84 S.Ct. 62, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, “there was ample evidence to raise a question for the jury whether he had joined in the conspiracy; if the jury so found, he [a co-conspirator who held the bribe money] was criminally responsible for the acts of the other conspirators and his own failure to perform more than a few overt acts would be immaterial.” Evidence of knowledge of the details of the plan or of participation of others is not required. United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1966), certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 928, 87 S.Ct. 284, 17 L.Ed.2d 210.

Intent to Affect or Knowledge of Effect on Interstate Commerce

 Battaglia insists that it was necessary to find that he intended to affect or had knowledge that the conspiracy would affect interstate commerce, and that there was insufficient evidence of such intent or knowledge. A similar argument was rejected in United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 672 (2d Cir. *3121955). As we recently held in United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967):
“All that must be proved, however, is that defendants conspired to commit extortion, and that the natural effect of carrying out their threat, whether they were conscious of it or not, would affect commerce.”
The District Court charged the jury that “all that is necessary is that the natural effect of the acts committed pursuant to the conspiracy was to affect, delay or obstruct [interstate] commerce,” and that the requisite effect on commerce would be found if the jury believed “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants’ activities as shown by the evidence in any way or degree obstructed, delayed or ' affected commerce.” These instructions were proper under the Hobbs Act. Neither Battaglia nor Evans argues that the extortion would have no effect on interstate commerce. Here, one of the means to accomplish the extortion was the threat otherwise to cause Riley Management Corporation “all sorts of trouble.” Many interstate deliveries were being made to its Lansing project. If Amabile’s threats to destroy Riley had been carried out, this interstate commerce would necessarily have been obstructed. The Hobbs Act covers such a situation. United States v. Pranno, supra. Furthermore, the Riley company’s reserves were depleted by the extortion. Since its business depended, in part, on ability to pay for interstate shipments to the Lansing site, the jury could infer that the extortion would have an effect on interstate commerce. Under the language of this statute (see note 1 supra), that is a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce.

Denial of BUI of Particulars

Evans’ briefs do not contest the denial of requests Nos. 2 and 3 in his motion for a bill of particulars.6 However, Battaglia adopted these requests and argues that the District Court erroneously denied them. Specifically, Bat-taglia asserts that he was entitled to information about the 1962 and 1963 Palermo-Amabile threats to Riley with respect to his Northlake and Westmont, Illinois, projects. But requests Nos. 2 and 3 provide:
“2. State the acts or things done by the petitioner [Evans and, by adoption, Battaglia] by which he and the other named and unnamed persons, combined, confederated and agreed together to obstruct, delay and affect commerce as charged.
“3. State the dates, times and places when and where the alleged acts set forth in paragraph 2 above were done or performed.”
Even if the District Court had ordered the Government to answer these requests, the Palermo-Amabile threats would not have been revealed. Since Battaglia did not ask for this information below, he may not assert error in this respect. Furthermore, none of the five requests in the motion for a bill of particulars covered this subject matter. Therefore, the Government was not required to respond as to it. No abuse of discretion has been shown with respect to the partial denial of this motion. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82, 47 S.Ct. 300, 71 L.Ed. 545.

Conspiracy Instruction

During the early portions of the trial, the District Court refused to permit the Government to have the defendants’ declarations considered against all of them. Later in the trial, upon motion of the Government, the Court instructed the jury as follows:
“Before we proceed with the taking of further testimony in this case, I have a direction and instruction to give you, to make to you.
“You will recall during the course of this trial certain testimony was admitted in evidence only as to one or more of the defendants, and you were instructed at that time that such evidence was not then to be considered *313against any defendant to whom the evidence did not pertain.
“It is now my responsibility under the law, to instruct you that such evidence is admissible against all of the defendants as evidence in connection with the alleged conspiracy charged in the indictment, whether or not each of the defendants was present when the acts or conversations or incidents testified about were done or carried on.
“You may consider then such evidence as pertaining to all of the defendants.”
Citing United States v. Pronger, 287 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1961), Battaglia complains that this instruction was a direction to the jury that a conspiracy had been proven and that each defendant was a member of that conspiracy. However, the last paragraph of this instruction referred to “the alleged conspiracy” and did not tell the jury that the Government had proved a conspiracy. A later instruction made it plain that the jury could not consider acts and declarations of one conspirator against the others unless the jury found the existence of a criminal conspiracy and that the acts and declarations were in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The Pronger case is not controlling here. The terms of the instruction in that case were dissimilar to those here, and any defect in that instruction was apparently not cured by a later instruction. Conspiracy instructions similar to those here were approved in United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715, 719-720 (7th Cir. 1961), which reinforces our conclusion that the later instruction made the risk of prejudice too slight to justify reversal. Pronger has been confined to a situation where the erroneous instruction was in effect given as part of the charge and does not apply where, as here, trial time intervened between the assailed comments and the final, proper charge. United States v. Alle-gretti, 340 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1964, en bane), certiorari denied, 381 U.S. 911, 85 S.Ct. 1531, 14 L.Ed.2d 433.
Battaglia claims that the jury was not told that it could not consider acts or declarations of a co-defendant made outside the presence of a defendant against the absent defendant unless it found that a conspiracy existed and that the acts and declarations were in its furtherance, but an examination of the transcript shows that such an instruction was given.

Admission of Pre-indictment Threats Made by Amabile and Palermo and Admission of Statements of Co-conspirator Pranno

Battaglia also asserts that the District Court erroneously admitted Riley’s testimony of 1962-1963 threats by Amabile and Palermo and erroneously admitted Pranno’s statements outside the presence of the defendants. We agree with the Government that the PalermoAmabile threats were relevant to show the reasonableness of Riley’s fear when confronted with Amabile’s demand to authorize the second draw. The District Court carefully instructed the jury that this testimony was limited to that purpose (Tr. 2564).
As to Pranno, the evidence concerning his January 1965 visit to Battaglia’s farm, as well as other evidence previously summarized, shows that he was a co-conspirator of Battaglia and Amabile, so that La-Key’s and DiVito’s testimony concerning Pranno’s statements outside the presence of defendants was properly received.

Accomplice Instruction

Battaglia complains that the District Court’s accomplice instruction advised the jury that DiVito and La-Key were accomplices. The instruction was as follows:
“I must tell you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that an accomplice is one who unites with another person in the commission of a crime voluntarily and with common intent. An accomplice does not become incompe*314tent as a witness because of participation in the criminal act charged. On the contrary, the testimony of an accomplice alone, if believed by you, may be of sufficient weight to sustain a verdict of guilty even though not corroborated or supported by other evidence. However, you should keep in mind that such testimony is to be received with caution and weighed with great care. You should not convict any defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an accomplice unless you believe the unsupported testimony beyond all reasonable doubt.”
This instruction does not say or imply that DiVito and La-Key were accomplices. The instruction obviously means that if a person is found to be an accomplice, his testimony should be scrutinized with special care. A similar instruction has been proposed by Judge Mathes for the use of the District Courts. 20 F.R.D. 244. Such cautionary instructions were advocated in United States v. Bucur, 194 F.2d 297, 305 (7th Cir. 1952); Wainer v. United States, 82 F.2d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 1936), affirmed, 299 U.S. 92, 57 S.Ct. 79, 81 L.Ed. 58, and Ruvel v. United States, 12 F.2d 264, 265 (7th Cir. 1926). Battaglia relies on United States v. Balodimas, 177 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1949), but there the district judge termed two named witnesses as accomplices. Here the jury had already been instructed that it was the exclusive fact finder, and there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that La-Key and DiVito were accomplices of the defendants. In this setting, the giving of this instruction was not erroneous.

Restriction of Cross-examination and Refusal to Admit Defense Exhibits

Battaglia assails the District Court’s rulings restricting the cross-examination of DiVito, La-Key and Riley; he also assails the court’s refusal to receive certain defense exhibits. A study of the cross-examination of these witnesses shows that the District Court allowed defense counsel considerable latitude.
Battaglia’s counsel attempted to show that a tax indictment had been dismissed against DiVito in return for his agreeing to be a government witness in this case. Battaglia’s counsel cross-examined DiVito extensively about a “deal” to drop the income tax charge if DiVito testified for the Government in the instant case. Later the First Assistant United States Attorney in Chicago testified that the reasons for the Government’s dismissal “were that Mr. DiVito’s lawyer served us with that motion showing that he had paid his taxes, attaching the check and the receipt and it was obvious that we had no case * * *_» 7 jje ajso testified that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the DiVito case was satisfied that proof the tax had been paid in 1964 was a defense to that indictment. If Battaglia’s counsel was still not satisfied why the DiVito indictment was dismissed, he could have also called the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of that matter.
The District Court refused to permit the defense to put into evidence the court file and docket entries relating to Di-Vito’s tax case, but they were merely cumulative and did not reveal any “deal.” Hence their exclusion was not prejudicial to Battaglia.
Battaglia endeavored to show that La-Key was responsible for the “milking” of the Carlson Construction and Equipment Company. The defendants were given ample opportunity to examine La-Key regarding the balances in the Carlson bank accounts. The District Court did sustain the Government’s objection to certain cheeks. But Bat-*315taglia was not prejudiced by this ruling, for the checks were already reflected by ledger sheets that had been received, thus enabling Battaglia’s counsel to argue that La-Key had looted the Carlson Company for his own personal gain. In addition, the checks were being offered in an attempt to contradict a witness on a collateral matter not relating to the $48,500 allegedly extorted. This is impermissible. United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 276-277 (3rd Cir. 1959). 3 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) § 979. Prior contradiction may be shown only on a matter material to the substantive issues of the trial. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420, note 13, 73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447. As noted there, a trial judge has “wide latitude in control of cross-examination, especially in dealing with collateral evidence as to character.” 344 U.S. at p. 423, 73 S.Ct. at p. 375.
Next, Battaglia states that he was precluded from showing Riley’s purchase price for the Lansing land. It is true that the real estate contract was not admitted by virtue of the best evidence rule. But earlier Battaglia had shown through Robert Biederman’s testimony that the price was about $140,-000. Since the disparity between the purchase price and the price used in loan negotiations was already in the record, no prejudice stemmed from this ruling.
Battaglia complains too that Riley’s February 5, 1960, bankruptcy petition should have been admitted. Again, the District Court had broad discretion to refuse it as a collateral matter. United States v. Bender, 218 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1955), certiorari denied, 349 U.S. 920, 75 S.Ct. 660, 99 L.Ed. 1253. Riley’s bankruptcy petition supposedly stated that he owned no stocks or bonds as of that date, but this record does not show that the bankruptcy statement was “obviously perjured” as Battaglia claims. No abuse of the District Court’s discretion has been shown in this exclusionary ruling.
Battaglia complains that in Amabile’s cross-examination of Riley, Amabile was not permitted to show that Riley’s October 5, 1965, statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not refer to the 1962-1963 threats of Palermo and Amabile. However, Riley testified that he had advised the FBI of these threats and added: “I have only read two pages [of the October 5 statement] and I see it in there, yes, sir.” If Battaglia’s counsel considered the point worth pursuing, he could have called FBI agents Dahlman and Kotsos to prove the contrary. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir. 1964), certiorari denied, Cin-quegrano v. United States, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555.
In his reply brief, Battaglia’s counsel contends that the Government should have granted his request for production of DiVito’s grand jury testimony.8 No particularized need for this testimony was shown, nor was there any showing that the ends of justice required production. Therefore, production was unnecessary. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868-875, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973.
As to Battaglia’s principal cases cited to show reversible error, in Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624, defense counsel was not permitted to establish that a prosecution witness was in government custody and therefore might expect consideration. In this case, the defense was permitted to show that both DiVito and Riley were in government custody. In Spaeth v. United States, 232 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956) and United States v. Hogan, 232 F.2d 905 (3rd Cir. 1956), the defense sought to cross-examine government witnesses who stood convicted of a federal offense, in an effort to show that they expected leniency in return for their testimony. The District Court refused to allow such *316cross-examination. In this case, Battag-lia’s counsel subjected DiVito to a lengthy cross-examination about the reasons for the dismissal of the tax evasion indictment against him. This also serves to distinguish United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960), where such cross-examination of government witnesses was not permitted.
Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946), and Meeks v. United States, 163 F.2d 598, 11 Alaska 378 (9th Cir. 1947) deal with the exclusion of documentary evidence showing that the prosecution witnesses had been punished for violating federal law and were still subject to the jurisdiction of the court or agency which had imposed the punishment. In each case, the information contained in the documentary evidence tended to prove bias and was not otherwise present in the record. In this case, the District Judge remarked at one point: “I assume that the government is the only one who could voluntarily move for the dismissal [of the tax indictment against DiVito.]” This statement, coupled with the extensive cross-examination of DiVito and the examination of the First Assistant United States Attorney in Chicago, told the jury that the indictment had been dismissed on motion of the government. Defendants do not show that any other significant information was contained in the excluded documentary evidence.
Gordon, Masino and Meeks are further distinguishable because in those cases reversal was based on the cumulative prejudicial effect of two or more errors. This case lacks at least one of the errors found in each of those cases.
We approve of the foregoing cases and of the policy of affording the defense wide latitude in showing bias. We do not view the disposition of the issues herein as inconsistent with them.
We have considered Battaglia’s other points relating to cross-examination, exclusion of documentary exhibits and instructions and find them to be without merit. In closing this discussion, it should be noted that various criticized evidentiary rulings of the District Court were well within those approved in United States v. Lawinski, 195 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1952). Taken together, the eviden-tiary rulings here gave these defendants broader latitude than in Lawinski and do not amount to an abuse of discretion.

Evans’ Character Witnesses

Evans was precluded from showing his good character through four acquaintances. Relying on Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168, the District Court explained that his evidentiary rulings were based on improperly put questions and on improper foundation. As to some of the questions, this may have been an overstrict application of Michelson. However, no foundation was laid to show that these witnesses knew any of the people who lived in the community where Evans resided. Proof of reputation “among a limited group such as fellow employees in a particular building” has been held inadmissible. 335 U.S. at p. 481, note 17, 69 S.Ct. at p. 221; Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 397, 18 S.Ct. 92, 42 L.Ed. 509; Kroot v. United States, 66 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1933). Although a more liberal approach to character witness rulings has precedential basis, we adhere to Mr. Justice Jackson’s precept not to “disturb rulings of trial courts” in this troublesome field except in rare instances (335 U.S. at p. 480, 69 S.Ct. 213).

Restriction of Evans’ Testimony

Evans argues that the District Court’s evidentiary rulings during his testimony denied him an opportunity to present an adequate defense.
It is true that Evans was not permitted to deny certain secrecy admonitions supposedly made about the Lansing project during Riley’s June 1964 conversation with Evans, but this was because of the leading and suggestive nature of his trial counsel’s questions. To rebut secrecy, Evans’ counsel was permitted to elicit that the Riley company had prepared a brochure to promote sales of the Lansing *317apartments, and that the Hammond Times published a story about the project in August 1964.
The rulings not permitting Evans to answer certain questions as to conversations with Amabile, La-Key, DiYito and Pranno were based on the improper form of the questions and lack of proper foundation. These rulings are supportable under rudimentary rules of evidence. Furthermore, Evans was permitted to deny that he met with those persons after his counsel rephrased his questions.
As to the bid sheets, Evans was allowed to testify that there were a signed original and a signed copy of the sewer contract bid sheets, and that the signed original was left in Riley’s office, the very points his trial counsel was attempting to elicit.
Since Evans was charged with a January 1965 conspiracy, we cannot state that it was erroneous for the District Judge to consider irrelevant whether Riley held Evans in high esteem in August 1965.
Our study of Evans’ testimony shows that he was given great scope in presenting his denials of any part in the conspiracy. The District Court’s exclusionary rulings did not jeopardize his defense and were permissible interpretations of the law of evidence.

Evans’ Counsel’s Inability to Comment on Battaglia’s and Amabile’s Failure to Testify

Before the defendants presented their witnesses, the District Court instructed their counsel not to refer to the failure of any of the defendants to take the stand. This instruction was of course to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of the two silent defendants, Battaglia and Amabile. The defenses of the three accused were not mutually exclusive. Also, Evans’ counsel’s closing argument took advantage of Evans’ having taken the stand. There was no “showing that real prejudice will result from the defendant’s inability to comment” (United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 840 (7th Cir. 1967), certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 1015, 88 S.Ct. 591, 19 L.Ed.2d 661, so that severance was not necessitated. Trial Publicity
Even though defendants successfully objected to sequestering the jury, Battaglia now argues that prejudicial publicity violated his due process rights. In closing argument, his counsel recognized that the trial court repeatedly admonished the jury to ignore news coverage. There is no claim that any jurors read any of the “prejudicial” articles, thus differentiating the case from Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250. In Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716, 81 S.Ct. 1662, 6 L.Ed.2d 846, the second conviction was reversed because the trial court had not inquired whether the jurors had read a St. Louis Post-Dispatch article published during the trial and containing “inadmissible prejudicial information.”9 Here the jurors were twice asked whether they had seen articles about the ease. None admitted having done so. United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962), and United States v. Largo, 346 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1965), certiorari denied, 382 U.S. 904, 86 S.Ct. 240, 15 L.Ed.2d 157, do not hold that the District Court must always interrogate each juror singly. See United States v. Jannsen, 339 F.2d 916, 919-920 (7th Cir. 1964).
Battaglia also complains of the presence of a permanent press table inside the bar.10 The Supreme Court has recently emphatically disapproved of such an installation (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600), so that the District Judges should consider reserving the bar of the court for counsel in the future (384 U.S. at p. 355, 86 S.Ct. 1507). However, we do *318not consider the placement of this press table to constitute reversible error, for this record reveals no “frequent confusion and disruption of the trial” or “constant commotion within the bar” (384 U.S. at p. 355, 86 S.Ct.). In our view, the intrusion of the news media into this trial was not so great as to obviate a showing of prejudice (cf. Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600). Battaglia has failed to satisfy us that he was denied a free trial because of adverse publicity.

Eavesdropping

The Government’s brief reprints an August 18, 1967, letter from the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to the United States Attorney in Chicago. The letter confirms the Department’s pre-trial advice to the United States Attorney that there was no electronic monitoring in this case. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231, 87 S.Ct. 1583, 18 L.Ed.2d 738. Accordingly, it is now academic whether the District Court should have granted a hearing to determine whether electronic eavesdropping had taken place.
No prejudicial error having been shown, the two judgments are affirmed.

. In pertinent part, the Hobbs Act provides (18 Ü.S.C. § 1951):
“ (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
“(b) As used in this section—
* * * * *
“(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”

. This may be the same Amabile apartment meeting described infra by La-Key.

. In other instances in the record, the evidence supports a finding that the expression “the man” refers to defendant Bat-taglia.

. Previously, according to La-Key, Evans had received another “wad of bills” from Amabile.

. United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 892 (2d Cir. 1956), certiorari denied, 351 U.S. 987, 76 S.Ct. 1055, 100 L.Ed. 1500.

. The other three requests were granted and the Government answered them.

. By allowing this testimony, the trial judge acted consistently with the rule that bias or interest of a witness is not a collateral issue, and that extrinsic evidence is admissible thereon. United States v. Lester, 248 F.2d 329, 334-335 (2d Cir. 1957); 3 Wigmorc on Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 948-950, 1005(b); McCormick on Evidence (1954) § 40, pp. 85-80.

. Battaglia’s counsel did not request the production of La-Key’s and Riley's grand jury testimony.

. See Solicitor General’s Memorandum filed in the Supreme Court in the Janko case.

. Such tables have been installed in the various trial courtrooms in the Northern District of Illinois.