Court Opinion

ID: 7819996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:50:37.974475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:42.877577
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice, dissenting. I object to the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure by this Court for the following reasons. 1. Many of the Rules affect matters of public policy about which teachers, farmers, business men, preachers and church deacons are as qualified to act as are members of this Court. One example is Rule 3.5, which provides: “Whenever a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that any person found at or near the scene of a felony is a witness to the offense, he may stop that person. After having identified himself, the officer must advise the person of the purpose of the stopping and may then demand of him his name, address, and any information he may have regarding the offense. Such detention shall in all cases be reasonable and shall not exceed fifteen (15) minutes unless the person shall refuse to give such information, in which case the person, if detained further, shall immediately be brought before any judicial officer or prosecuting attorney to be examined with reference to his name, address, or the information he may have regarding the offense. ” The present law on this subject is set out in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-432 (Supp. 1973), as follows: “Whenever a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that any person found at or near the scene of a felony is a material witness to the felony, he may stop that person and after having identified himself he must advise the person of the purpose of the stopping and may then demand of him his name, address, and any information he may have regarding the felony. Said detention shall in all cases be reasonable and in no event shall such detention be in excess of fifteen (15) minutes.” Now, obviously, the present law provides a method for examining witnesses under oath, but that harsh remedy is left to the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, an elected official, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-801 (Repl. 1964). Under Rule 3.5, supra, the determination of whether a witness has any information regarding a felony and whether such information is necessary for prosecution is left solely to the discretion of a policeman. It looks to me that one does not have to be a lawyer, much less a judge, to know whether such discretion should be vested in just any policeman. In fact, it’s-a matter about which ordinary people are just as capable as I in making such a decision involving their own personal liberties. Another example of matters involving public policy is Rule 28. Our present law on the subject came to us from the Revised Statutes, Ch. 45, § 169, as compiled in 1838, now codified as Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1708 (Repl. 1964), which provides: “If any person indicted for any offense, and committed to prison, shall not be brought to trial before the end of the second term of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, which shall be held after the finding of such indictment, he shall be discharged so far as relates to the offense for which he was committed, unless the delay shall happen on the application of the prisoner.” Rule 28.1 this day adopted is not nearly as definite as to the time. That Rule provides: “(a) Any defendant charged with an offense in circuit court and committed to a jail or prison in this state shall be brought to trial before the end of the second full term of the court, but'not to exceed nine (9) months, from the time provided in Rule 28.2, excluding only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in Rule 28.3.” Rule 28.3 excludes periods of delay resulting from congéstion of the trial docket, from continuances granted the prosecuting attorney and from “Other periods of delay for good cause.” As can be seen from the foregoing, the present law on speedy trials contains a definite time limitation that can be calculated by any normal citizen; whereas, Rules 28.1, together with the excluded periods in Rule 28.3, virtually leaves the matter of speedy trials up to the discretion of the trial court — it certainly is not a matter that any ordinary citizen can determine from an inspection of the files in the courthouse. (I don’t know what happens to a person held in jail without any charge being made in the circuit court.) In my opinion, the foregoing Rules (and others too numerous and lengthy to mention) involve matters of public policy, and when this Court uses its “Rule making power” to enact the same in statutory form, it is unlawfully legislating on such matters in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine in Article 4 of the Constitution of Arkansas. 2. In so far as this Court by these Rules attempts to supersede or set aside the laws of this State, its conduct is strictly prohibited by Art. 2, § 12 of the Constitution of Arkansas which provides: “No power of suspending or setting aside the law or laws of the State shall ever be exercised except by the General Assembly.” 3. The people of this State have historically called upon their legislators individually and lobbied with them publicly to make their wishes known in matters involving public policy. On the other hand the citizens of this State, in general, have frowned upon the personal and political pressuring of the individual members of the judiciary in matters before this Court. Yet, if this Court insists on projecting itself into matters involving public policy, in statutory form, I can see no reason why the individual citizen should not apply the same personal contact and political pressure to the members of this Court that in the past have been applied to members of the legislative department. Consequently, I suggest that we should stick to the adjudication of controversies in our appellate capacity and leave legislating to the Legislative Branch of our government. 4. Probably my most basic objection to the majority’s construction of its rights and duties under Act 470 of 1971 and its “general superintending control” under Art. 7, § 4 of the Arkansas Constitution is the fear that it leaves this Court in a constantly ready position to enact laws in statutory form without notice and without the shackles of the Initiative and Referendum Amendment. Consequently, with that ability, there need no longer be any worry about whether this Court is messing up the law when it gives an ex post facto type interpretation to a procedural rule, because it can set the rules right the next day with a better and clearer rule. For the reasons stated, I would deny the petition to adopt these Rules and would suggest that they be referred to the General Assembly for its consideration.