Court Opinion

ID: 9600630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:29:03.047564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:52.327652
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
In my opinion the majority of the court has misconstrued our statutes relating to the procedure for placing an initiated or referred measure on the ballot. The legislative assembly established two safeguards against the use of insufficient or unfair ballot titles in the initiative and referendum process. The first of these safeguards is found in the requirement that the ballot title appearing on the covers of the petition must be prepared by the Attorney General. The second safeguard was provided by the statutory requirement for judicial review of the ballot title so prepared. ORS 254.080. Thus, the legislature set up a procedure which, in each instance, calls for the surveillance of the ballot title by elected public officials; in the first instance by the Attorney General, and finally by the Oregon Supreme Court.
*236It will be noted that if the ballot title is revised by the Supreme Court, ORS 254.080 directs the Secretary of State to “print on the official ballot and in the voters’ pamphlet the ballot title thus certified to him.” The statute does not direct the Secretary of State or anyone else to change the ballot title on the petition. The directive relating to the ballot title which is to appear on the petition is found in ORS 254.060. There it is provided that the ballot title prepared by the Attorney General shall be transmitted to the Secretary of State, who in turn is directed to furnish a copy “to the persons or organizations under whose authority the measure is initiated or referred.” If the legislature had intended that the ballot title on the petition was to be changed after the revision of the ballot title by the Supreme Court, one would expect to find an express statutory provision to this effect.
I would construe the statutes as providing this surveillance for two separate and distinct purposes. The first of these purposes was to provide a reasonably accurate description of the measure on the petitions. The task of providing this description was entrusted to the Attorney General. It is fair to assume that he was designated for this purpose because it was felt that he, as a public official, would act impartially in preparing the title. At this stage in the procedure for initiating or referring a measure the safeguard thus provided would seem adequate. The object of requiring a certain number of signatures on an initiative or referendum petition is simply to provide some assurance that the measure proposed is one which a substantial number of the electorate consider worthy of submission to the people for approval or disapproval. Those who sign the petition may, in fact, not favor the measure but may feel that the issue should *237be resolved by the people. At this preliminary stage in the procedure the harm that can be done by an ambiguous ballot title is far less than that which may result from the same title when it appears on the official ballot. It is reasonable to assume that the legislature had this difference in mind in setting up the procedures for minimizing misleading ballot titles and that, while the legislature intended the Supreme Court to have the authority to pass upon the title before it is submitted to the people at the final and crucial stage when the vote is taken, it also intended that the title prepared by the Attorney General would be adequate without further modification by the Supreme Court at the preliminary, tentative and less important stage when the petition is circulated.
The construction adopted by the majority produces a very significant inhibition on the referendum process. The sponsors of a referendum petition must obtain the necessary signatures within 90 days after the legislative session in which the measure sought to be referred was passed. Under the majority’s interpretation, the adequacy of the ballot title for the purpose of circulating a petition cannot be known with certainty until the Supreme Court passes upon the question. Consequently, the sponsors of the referendum cannot safely proceed with the gathering of signatures until the decision of the Supreme Court is obtained. Deducting the time allotted for appeal, the time necessary to get the matter at issue, the time necessary to have the matter heard and decided by the court, there would be insufficient time in most cases to obtain the necessary signatures. It would not seem that the legislature .intended to put such an inhibitory obstacle in the way of the referendum process.