Court Opinion

ID: 9884223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:48:05.983113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:36.624863
License: Public Domain

LESLIE, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from Part I. Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1, enacted in 1965, provides that “no action by any person in * * * tort * * * to recover damages for any injury to property * * * arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution, or indemnity for damages sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design * * * or construction of the improvement to real property * * * more than two years after discovery thereof * * Thus, the plain language of the statute bars this action for contribution because it was brought more than two years after discovery of the “defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.”
The majority gives a tortured interpretation to the statute by reading the phrase “discovery thereof” to refer to the action for contribution. Although not directly addressing this issue, the Minnesota appellate courts and the Eighth Circuit have indicated that an action for contribution or indemnity must be commenced within two years after discovery of the “defect” or “hazard.” See Jack v. Applebaum’s Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 250, 158 N.W.2d 857, 859 n. 1 (1968); Bethesda Lutheran Church v. Twin City Construction Co., 356 N.W.2d 344, 352 (Minn.Ct.App.1984); Continental Grain Co. v. Fegles *664Construction Co., Inc., 480 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir.1973). There is no support in case law for the majority’s position; rather, the majority is writing legislation, which is clearly not this court’s function. Furthermore, although the need for certainty in this area is obvious, the majority fails to explain when a third-party action is “discovered,” which will only invite further litigation.
I do not advocate, however, the application of the statute to a case in which a plaintiff failed to commence a cause of action until shortly before the statute expired. I agree with the statement made by Justice Yetka in Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Minn.1982), that the statute would not satisfy due process requirements if a third-party defendant were barred from having a “reasonable time” to join third parties for contribution or indemnity. Minn.R.Civ.P. 14.01 encourages the joining of third parties at an early stage of the proceeding by requiring written consent of all parties or leave of the court if not. joined within ninety days of the service of summons on the defendant. In addition, the supreme court has noted that defendants customarily join third parties at the inception of the suit. Calder, 318 N.W.2d at 844.
As in Calder, and contrary to the majority opinion, there is no due process issue here. The plaintiffs commenced their action against Hector Plumbing within eighteen months of the date of the fire. Hector Plumbing thus had six months in which to commence its third-party action against 20th Century. Although Hector Plumbing knew of the injury long before it was sued, it waited until one year after plaintiffs commenced the action before attempting to assert a claim against 20th Century. This delay resulted in a hardship for 20th Century because it was forced to prepare for trial within seven weeks concerning a defect discovered more than three years earlier. Because Hector Plumbing had a reasonable time in which to bring an action for contribution and yet failed to do so within two years of the discovery of the “defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property,” Minn.Stat. § 541.-051, subd. 1 bars its claim.