Court Opinion

ID: 9491837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:25:08.81174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:58.160405
License: Public Domain

ALITO, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join the opinion of the court, but I write separately to elaborate on my reasons for disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.1998), which conflicts with our decision here. Both Gendron and this case concern the new deadline for filing a motion under 28 U.S.C § 2255. The current version of § 2255 imposes a one-year period of limitation and provides that this limitation period shall run from the latest of four specified dates. One of those dates is “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This is the language at issue in both Gendron and the case now before us.
If one looks at only the text of § 2255, the phrase “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes .final” is susceptible to two entirely reasonable interpretations. It may mean the date on which occurs the last step in the process of direct appeal. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 532 (1967) (defining “final” to mean, among other things, “last in place, order, or time”). Alternatively, the phrase “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final” may reasonably be interpreted to mean the date on which the conviction is no longer subject to reversal by means of the process of direct appeal. See id. (defining “final” to mean, among other things, “precluding further controversy on the questions passed upon”).
These two interpretations produce the same results in those cases in which the defendant exhausts the process of direct review, i.e., appeals to the court of appeals and then petitions for a writ of certiorari. In those cases, the last step in the process of direct appeal occurs at the same time when the defendant’s conviction becomes immune from reversal on direct appeal, i.e., when the Supreme Court denies certiorari or, if certio-rari is granted, when the Supreme Court hands down its decision on the merits of the ease. These two interpretations, however, produce different results in those cases, such as this case and Gendron, in which the defendant does not exhaust the direct-review process. In cases like this one and Gendron, *578the last step in the process of direct appeal occurs when the court of appeals’ judgment is entered, but the judgment of conviction does not become immune from reversal through the process of direct appeal until the time for petitioning for certiorari expired— generally 90 days after the entry of the court of appeals’ judgment. See Supreme Court Rule 13.1. Thus, in those cases in which a defendant appeals to the court of appeals but does not seek certiorari, the first interpretation will generally give the defendant one year from the entry of the court of appeals’ judgment to file a motion under § 2255, whereas the second interpretation will generally give the defendant 15 months from the entry of the court of appeals’ judgment to file that motion.
As I have already said, I believe that the text of § 2255 may reasonably be interpreted in either of these ways. Indeed if I were compelled to choose one interpretation based solely on the text of that provision, I would find the choice exceedingly hard. Moreover, I think that a reasonable legislator could easily choose either interpretation. As noted, this choice matters in only those cases in which the defendant does not exhaust all of the steps of the direct review process, i.e., chiefly in those cases in which a defendant does not petition for certiorari. In such cases, a legislator could reasonably think that the one-year limitation period should begin to run upon the entry of the court of appeals’ judgment, because all defendants, whether or not they petition for certiorari, should have one year (and no more) from the end of the direct review process to prepare and file a § 2255 motion. On the other hand, recognizing that some defendants who do not end up petitioning for certiorari nevertheless spend some of the time prior to the certiorari deadline considering that option, a legislator could reasonably think that such defendants should have a full year from that deadline to devote to the preparation of a § 2255 motion. Both of these policy choices are reasonable, and viewed prospectively the difference between them is hardly of much significance.
As both the Gendron court and our panel recognize, however, the relevant language in § 2255 must be considered together with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), which sets a one-year period of limitation for the filing of a federal habeas petition by a state prisoner. This provision, like the portion of § 2255 at issue in this case, was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Moreover, § 2244(d)(1), like the current version of § 2255, provides that the limitation period for a state prisoner filing a federal habeas petition begins to run from the latest of four specified dates, one of which is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Accordingly, we must decide what to make of the fact that § 2255 refers to “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final,” whereas § 2241(d)(1) refers to “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking-such review.”
Tackling this problem, the Gendron court invoked a canon of interpretation set out in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983), viz., that “[wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”1 Noting that Congress included the phrase “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” in § 2244(d)(1) but omitted that phrase from § 2255, the Gen-dron court concluded that the concept of the date on which a judgment becomes final must mean something different under § 2255 than it does under § 2244(d)(1), and the Gendron court then held that under § 2255 a judgment becomes final upon the conclusion of direct review.
I would not quarrel with the canon set out in Russello even if it were my prerogative to *579do so, but I do not agree with the Seventh Circuit’s use of the canon in Gendron. It is important to recognize that this canon does not purport to lay down an absolute rule and that, like every other canon, it is “simply one indication of meaning; and if there are more contrary indications ... it must yield.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 27 (1997). The way in which the canon was employed in Russello illustrates how it may properly be used.
Russello concerned the interpretation of a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations “(RICO)” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1), which, at that time, authorized the forfeiture of “any interest” that a convicted RICO defendant had “acquired ... in violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 1962,” the provision setting out the activities prohibited by the RICO statute. The defendant in Russello argued that the term “interest” referred only to an interest in the RICO enterprise itself and not to profits or proceeds derived from racketeering. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court began with the ordinary meaning of the term “interest” and observed, after quoting several dictionary definitions, that it was “apparent that the term ‘interest’ comprehends all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds.” 464 U.S. at 21, 104 S.Ct. 296. Then, as one of several reasons for rejecting the defendant’s artificially narrow interpretation of the term “interest,” the Court invoked the canon upon which the Gendron court relied. Noting that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) spoke “broadly of ‘any interest ... acquired,’ ” while the very next subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2), “reache[d] only ‘any interest’ in ... any enterprise which [the defendant] had established[,] operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962,’ ” the Court observed that “[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” 464 U.S. at 23, 104 S.Ct. 296 (citation omitted). The Court added:
We refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.

Id.

Russello, then, was a case in which the statutory language at issue had a plain meaning, an argument was made that the statutory language should be interpreted more narrowly than that plain meaning, another provision of the same statute used different language to convey that narrower meaning, and the Court therefore presumed that the provision at issue meant what its language plainly stated and did not have the artificially narrow meaning explicitly set out in the other, more narrowly crafted statutory section.
The situation in the present case is quite different in several important ways. Here, the relevant language in § 2255, unlike the statutory language at issue in Russello, does not have a single, obvious meaning. Instead, as I have said, that language may be interpreted in two entirely reasonable ways. Moreover, both of these interpretations— that a judgment of conviction becomes final by “the conclusion of direct review” and that a judgment of conviction becomes final by “the expiration of the time for seeking such review” — are set out in § 2244(d)(1). Invoking the Russello canon, the Gendron "court says that it is refusing to read into § 2255 the extra explanatory language contained in § 2244(d)(1), but actually the Gendron court in effect reads into § 2255 part of that explanatory language, viz., the part that says that a judgment of conviction becomes final “by the conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The Russello canon is based upon a hypothesis of careful draftsmanship. See 464 U.S. at 23, 104 S.Ct. 296 (“We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.”). But the Gendron court’s interpretation produces a result that is inconsistent with that hypothesis. According to the Gendron court, the hypothetical careful draftsman responsible for crafting § 2255 used the phrase “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final” to mean the date on which direct re*580view concludes, even though a careful draftsman would have realized that this phrase is susceptible to another, entirely reasonable interpretation. Moreover, according to the Gendron court, this hypothetical -careful draftsman took this approach even though he or she included in § 2244(d)(1) language that expressly conveys this very meaning, i.e., “by the conclusion of direct review.” This simply does not make sense. A careful draftsman who laid § 2255 and § 2244(d)(1) side by side would not have taken such an approach. Rather, a careful draftsman would have realized that, just as it was necessary in § 2244(d)(1) to explain what was meant by the date on which a judgment became final, so it was equally necessary to provide such an explanation in § 2255.
For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the disparate language in §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255 resulted from a careful drafting decision — and this is borne out by an examination of the origins of these provisions. At the beginning of the 104th Congress, Senator Dole introduced S.3, “The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995,” which among other things, proposed to reform federal habeas corpus practice. Like many prior habeas reform bills introduced during the preceding decade, Section 508 of S.3 imposed a limitation period for the filing of § 2255 motions and provided for this period to run from the latest of four dates, including “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” See, e.g., S.238, “Reform of Federal Intervention in State Proceedings Act of 1985,” 99th Cong. § 6 (1985). This language, of course, is precisely the same as that now contained in § 2255.
Another portion of section 508 provided for § 2244 to be amended to include a one-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition, but this proposed amendment— again following the pattern of prior unsuccessful habeas reform bills2 — differed from the analogous language now in § 2244(d)(1). This proposed amendment provided for the one-year period to run from the latest of
“(1) the date on which State remedies are exhausted;
“(2) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, where the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
“(3) the date on which the Federal constitution al right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court where the right has been newly recognized by the Court and is made retroactively applicable; or
“(4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
S.3, 104th Cong. § 508 (1995) (emphasis added).
Several months after S.3 was introduced, Senators Specter and Hatch sponsored S.623, the “Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995,” which took a different approach with respect to the date on which the limitation period should begin to run for federal habeas claims asserted by state prisoners. Instead of providing, as S.3 had, for this period to begin to run from “the date on which State remedies are exhausted,” S.623 provided (as § 2244(d)(1) now does) for this period begin to run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” S.623, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). At the same time, S.623, like current § 2244(d)(2), provided for the one-year period to be tolled during the pendency of a properly filed state application for post-conviction or other collateral review. Id.
Senator Specter’s remarks when he introduced S.623 suggest the reason for this new approach. Senator Specter said that it was “necessary to end the abuse in which petitioners and their attorneys” then engaged in capital cases, viz., waiting until a death warrant was signed before filing a federal habeas petition. 141 Cong. Rec. S4592 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995). Senator Specter also complained about “the endless delays” caused by the exhaustion requirement. Id. Based on *581these remarks, it is reasonable to infer that the reason for the new approach taken in S.623 was to force state prisoners, upon the completion of direct review, promptly to commence either a state post-conviction relief proceeding (which would toll the limitation period) or a federal habeas proceeding. Thus, the phrase “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” seems to have been employed to make it clear that the approach taken in S.3 and prior bills was being changed. Unfortunately, S.623 did not modify the language used in S.3 and previous bills concerning the one-year period for filing § 2255 motions.
On April 19, 1995, the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed, and on April 27, Senator Dole introduced S.735, the “Comprehensive Terrorism Protection Act of 1995.” This bill incorporated the habeas reform provisions of S.623. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7597 (daily ed. May 26, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); id. at S7585 (remarks of Sen. Specter); 141 Cong. Rec. S7803 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Specter); 142 Cong. Rec. S3472 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter). S.735 passed the Senate and the House with the relevant amendments to §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255 essentially untouched.3
Based on the text of §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255 and the history set out above, I conclude that § 2255’s reference to “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final” and § 2244(d)(l)’s reference to “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” mean the same thing. I reach this conclusion for three chief reasons: first, the statutory text strongly suggests that the difference in language did not result from a careful drafting choice; second, the legislative history suggests that this difference in language is instead a product of the vagaries of the legislative process; and third, while I think that a legislator could reasonably choose to have the one-year limitation period begin either when direct review ends or when the opportunity for direct review expires, I think it would be odd for a legislator to take one approach in cases involving federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners and the other in cases involving § 2255 motions filed by federal prisoners. Consequently, I believe that a “judgment of conviction becomes final,” within the meaning of § 2255 on the date when direct review ends and there is no opportunity for further direct review.

. The Gendron court cited Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 1977, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998), and McNutt v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir.1998), which both quoted Russello.

. See, e.g., id. § 2,

. No house or Senate Report was submitted, and the Conference Report contained only one brief reference to this provision. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-518, at 111, (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944 ("This title ... sets a one year limitation on an application for a habeas writ....”).