Court Opinion

ID: 9858734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:35:32.656767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:38.890291
License: Public Domain

•Snell, J.
I respectfully dissent. I do so with reluctance because the defendant was insolent and capricious.
Prior to the morning of October 28, 1963, when Mr. Vietor *865was appointed as counsel the defendant was uncooperative and recalcitrant in the face of solicitous efforts by the court and the county attorney to protect his right to counsel. He created a dilemma. Unless defendant’s actions are construed as a waiver of his constitutional rights the subsequent procedure cannot be defended.
The hospital treatments referred to by the majority in Division I were psychiatric treatments. Irritating as defendant’s actions undoubtedly were I do not think they constituted a voluntary waiver or a justification of the precipitous procedure that followed. Defendant may have been psychotic, stupid, or just plain ornery, but he did not waive his right to a fair trial.
On the day set for trial the defendant appeared without counsel. Mr. Vietor was called and told of his appointment to represent defendant. He was introduced to the defendant and within a few minutes (at 9:43) moved for continuance. Evidence thereon was taken. The case was continued until November 25, except for the selection of a jury and the introduction of the evidence by the State.
The county attorney refused to give Mr. Vietor any information relative to the personnel of the jury. Admitting, arguendo, that defendant’s counsel was not entitled to the work product contained in the county attorney’s files the fact remains that defendant’s counsel was completely lacking in factual information when forced to select the jury and cross-examine the two principal witnesses for the State.
Following the direct examination of the first witness for the State, defendant’s counsel was given a five-minute recess for the purpose of conferring with the defendant and in preparation for cross-examination.
This witness was immediately followed by the man who cashed the draft for the defendant.
Court was adjourned at 4:55 p.m. until 9 a.m. the next morning. Cross-examination of this witness indicated threats of criminal prosecution to the wife of defendant by the State’s witness.
At 11:04 a.m. on October 29 the case was adjourned with *866trial to be reconvened on November 26. In the interim several of the jurors served as jurors in other cases.
In speaking of the request for continuance, the majority-opinion says, “The request was in fact granted.” I would not so interpret the record. It is true that the trial was recessed for almost a month, but before that defendant’s counsel was forced into the selection of a jury and the cross-examination of the principal witnesses for the State.
The State resisted defendant’s motion for continuance on October 28 on the ground that one of the principal witnesses was under subpoena and was present and that his induction into the armed services was imminent and he would not be available to testify at a later date. In appellee’s brief and argument the State attempts to refute the idea that there was need for more effective cross-examination by commenting “It is interesting to note that no attempt to recall those witnesses for further cross-examination was made by the appellant after the continuance.” These two positions are somewhat inconsistent.
If these witnesses were still available on November 26 why was it so imperative that their testimony be taken on October 28 and 29 ? The case could have been continued for a few days, the witnesses held over and a proper trial held. All of this trouble could have been avoided. The jury verdict might have been the same but with the defendant facing ten years in the penitentiary we should not make that assumption.
A defendant is not supposed to be faced with surprise witnesses. He has the right to be fully advised in advance of trial of what the State’s witnesses will say. Here defendant’s counsel was completely in the dark. The State’s ease was made and the defendant’s ease lost before defendant’s counsel had time to find out what it was all about.
It is well settled, as the majority opinion admits, that the right to counsel means “effective counsel.” Mr. Yietor, a competent attorney, did not in my opinion have a chance to be “effective counsel” or a fair opportunity to make a defense. I would reverse.
ThorntoN and Moore, JJ., join in this dissent.