Court Opinion

ID: 9673896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:13.560079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.647736
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the affirmance of the guilt portion of the trial. While I agree that the extraneous offense between appellant and the victim was admissible, I disagree there remains an exception to the extraneous offense rule to show the un-natural propensities or disposition of the accused. Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
I dissent to the affirmance of the punishment phase. I do not believe the extraneous offense between appellant and his stepson was admissible. In the first place, testimony concerning reputation must not be based solely upon personal knowledge of misconduct, but also how other persons perceive appellant. Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Therefore, I do not believe the door was opened in the attempted impeachment of the stepson. Even if it was, the rules regarding extraneous offenses still apply. This is to say there must be the balancing test between relevancy and prejudice. The prejudice of evidence of a similar sexual offense substantially outweighs the relevance of a twenty-three-year-old incident.
There was an additional error in the punishment phase. Two other reputation witnesses were allowed to testify. The testimony was their opinion of appellant not what his reputation was in the community. Neither witness indicated they had discussed appellant’s reputation with other members of the community. Thus, their testimony was not admissible. See Hernandez v. State, 767 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.App. —Corpus Christi 1989, pet. granted); see also Green v. State, 679 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Because of these errors, I would remand for a new trial on punishment. TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b). In view of the majority’s total affirmance, I respectfully dissent.