Court Opinion

ID: 9849412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:39:54.932903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:23.555093
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(concurring). I write to emphasize three points: 1) sentencing guidelines will be established in this state regardless of what this court does; 2) the power to establish penalties for criminal offenses rests with the legislature, not the judiciary, which is a distinction too frequently (but understandably) blurred in the minds of the public; and 3) notwithstanding the establishment of sentencing guidelines, the principles of McCleary will remain good law.
I.
The issue is not whether sentencing guidelines will be established in this state. The legislature in enacting 1983 Wis. Act 371 decided that question: sentencing guidelines will be established regardless of what this court does. *205The only issue is who will establish these guidelines, the supreme court working with a legislatively created sentencing council, or an independent commission created by the legislature. Regardless of who establishes the guidelines and promulgates the rules implementing them, the end result will be largely the same. The reason that this is so is that the sentencing commission will be made up of precisely the same 17 members as the sentencing council, the members of each body will be appointed by the same people, the geographic, racial, social and gender diversity will be the same, the governor will appoint the chairperson in either case, the basis upon which any rules are promulgated will be the same,1 and, perhaps most importantly, the use of the guidelines by the sentencing judges will be precisely the same.2
In 1988, this court concluded that it was inappropriate to order the use of sentencing guidelines. In a dissent, Justices Beilfuss, Heffernan, and Abrahamson urged the adoption of felony sentencing guidelines, “. . . (because we believe that the adoption of the guidelines on an experimental basis is a valid attempt to improve our sentencing system. ...” In the Matter of Implementation of Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 113 Wis. 2d 689, 711, 335 N.W.2d 868 (1983).
The desires expressed by those dissenting justices for sentencing guidelines have been accomplished by the enactment of 1983 Wisconsin Act 371. It is now for this *206court to decide who should be in charge of establishing the guidelines and promulgating the rules to govern them, not whether sentencing guidelines should be established.
II.
The power to establish penalties for criminal offenses rests with the legislature, not the judiciary. For too long that distinction has been blurred in the mind of the public, due in no small part to the system of indeterminate sentencing and parole established by the' legislature. As far back as 1971, this court in McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971) pointed out the confusion this creates:
“. . . as sentences are now imposed, the public is misled into thinking that a trial judge has safely isolated a dangerous criminal from society when, in fact, all he has done is to turn him over to ‘experts’ for analysis and treatment, and possible early release. This may be good penology and good sociology, but it does not comport with fundamental honesty in dealing with the public — at least if we take seriously the attorney general’s argument that the judicially imposed sentence is irrelevant.” Id. at 288, n. 4.
That confusion existed in 1971, and continues to exist today. The legislature has maintained indeterminate sentencing by maintaining the same system of parole. It has not enacted minimum mandatory sentencing. It has not given over to the judiciary the responsibility for establishing penalties for criminal offenses. Because of the availability of parole, the sentencing court has no power to determine the length of sentence actually served below the maximum imposed despite the public’s belief that this power rests in the sentencing court. Until the legislature chooses to change that system, I do not believe this court should be a party to a procedure which will continue to mislead the public as to which branch of *207government is responsible for establishing criminal penalties and the actual sentence served by a convicted defendant. If this court accepted the legislative invitation and promulgated the sentencing guidelines, I believe we would simply continue to add to this confusion.
III.
It is important to note that the guidelines, once established, will be just that: guidelines, not edicts. Unless and until the legislature does away with indeterminate sentencing or adopts a system of minimum mandatory sentences for certain crimes, the responsibility of the trial court will continue to be to sentence within the range of the penalties established by the legislature. The responsibility of this court, firmly established in Mc-Cleary, will continue to be to review the propriety of those sentences on appeal.
McCleary, decided in 1971, will remain good law even after the sentencing guidelines and the rules promulgating them have been established.
“ ‘The sentence imposed in each case should call for the minimum amount of custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.’ ” McCleary, Id. at 276 (citing with approval American Bar Association Project, Approved Draft, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentencing, page 14, sec. 2.2).
In establishing the principle of appellate review of sentences, this court provided:
“ ‘The sentencing judge should be required in every case to state his reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed. Normally, this should be done for the record in the presence of the defendant at the time of sentence. In cases in which the sentencing judge deems it in the interest of the defendant not to state fully the *208reasons for the sentence in the presence of the defendant, he should prepare such a statement for transmission to the reviewing court as a part of the record.’ ” Id. at 281-82 (citing with approval American Bar Association Project, Approved Draft, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentencing, page 11, sec. 2.3 (c)).
In McCleary, this court stated the objectives of appellate review of sentencing, quoting from the American Bar Association Approved Standards of Review of Sentences :
“ ‘ (i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
“‘(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
“ ‘ (iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
“ ‘(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just.’” Id. at 274-75.
This court has consistently adhered to McCleary since 1971, and nothing in 1983 Wisconsin Act 371 will change that.
In conclusion, these guidelines may well prove to be a valuable sentencing tool. But it is neither wise nor necessary for this court to promulgate them for the reasons set forth in this concurring opinion.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICES ROLAND DAY, WILLIAM CALLOW, DONALD STEINMETZ and LOUIS CECI join in this concurrence. While all of the justices concurring agree with the substance of the per curiam opinion, including this author, all agree that the additional comment in this concurrence is appropriate.

 Section 5, ch. 371, creating sec. 15.105(17), Stats. 1983-84.

 Section 14, ch. 371, creating sec. 973.012, Stats. 1983-84, states:
“Use of guidelines by judges. Beginning on the first day of the 18th month commencing after the effective date of this section (1983), a sentencing court, when imposing a sentence, shall take the guidelines established under s. 973.011 into consideration. If the court does not impose a sentence in accordance with the recommendations in the guidelines, the court shall state on the record its reasons for deviating from the guidelines. There shall be no right to appeal on the basis of the trial court’s decision to render a sentence that does not fall within the sentencing guidelines.”