Court Opinion

ID: 9571600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:33:15.117552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:41.336152
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Division 1 of the majority opinion and in the judgment. I write specially because I have concluded that Curry Corp. *557v. Mooro, 195 Ga. App. 184 (393 SE2d 33) (1990), should be overruled not for the reason stated by the majority but because it conflicts with federal law.
Decided November 19, 1992 —
Reconsideration denied December 2, 1992
Barry G. Irwin, Phillip Walsh, for appellant.
Stokes, Lazarus & Carmichael, Karl M. Terrell, King & Spalding, Ralph A. Pitts, Robert R. Ambler, Jr., for appellee.
Long, Aldridge & Norman, Paul R. Shlanta, Bruce P. Brown, amici curiae.
Congress provided an exclusive remedy for Truth in Lending violations in 15 USC §§ 1610 (d), 1640 (a), 1667d (a). See Burgess v. Charlottesville S & L Assn., 477 F2d 40, 45 (4th Cir. 1973); see also 12 CFR § 213.8 (c). Voiding the contract as a penalty for a Consumer Leasing Act violation is not a remedy included within the federal statutory scheme, 15 USC §§ 1667d (a), 1640 (a); therefore, the inconsistent state law remedy applied in Curry was preempted by federal law. See American Express &c. Co. v. WEB, Inc., 261 Ga. 480, 482 (2), n. 4 (405 SE2d 652) (1991). Consequently, the decision in Curry was erroneous — not because, as the majority contends, it distinguished rather than followed First Citizens Bank &c. v. Owings, 151 Ga. App. 389 (259 SE2d 747) (1979), but rather because state law principles should not have been applied at all.
Accordingly, I would overrule Curry for the reason I have stated, not on the basis stated in the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Carley, Judge Pope, Judge Beasley, Judge Cooper, Judge Andrews, and Judge Johnson join in this special concurrence.