Court Opinion

ID: 9455948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:37:50.760874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:47.847108
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge
(concurring) :
I concur in the result reached by the Court today, but for a different reason from that put forth by the majority. In my opinion, the conduct of these demonstrators could not be considered a violation of the student expression area rule set out at page 70 of the University publication “Hill Hints,” because that rule merely specifies a time and place at which student demonstrations may be held but does not prohibit demonstrations at any other time and place.1 If the rule can be construed so as to apply in a prohibitive manner to these circumstances, then I think its validity doubtfu*881l.23 At the same time, I find it unnecessary to rely upon the rule to hold the suspensions valid. I find from a study of the record that Dean Martine’s directions to the students were reasonable and lawful. Regulations issued ad hoc to particular students concerning their expression of ideas must meet a higher standard than codified rules, but I find that the dean’s action in this case met the standard. The dean’s directions did not prohibit the students from holding their demonstration, but merely regulated the time and place at which that demonstration could be held. My concurrence is therefore based upon my judgment that the demonstrators knowingly and intentionally violated a lawful direction of the Dean of Students that prohibited them from using this particular time and place for their demonstration, after being specifically warned by the dean that they would be suspended if they persisted in this particular course of action.
The students were suspended because of their failure to obey the dean’s suggestion that they occupy the very area they occupied, but at a different time. Had they used the statue area from noon to one o’clock, the time that the dean suggested, rather than insisting upon occupying it from ten o’clock on, a time that the dean specifically prohibited, they would not have been suspended. This suggestion shows a real effort to accommodate the wishes of the demonstrators. And the efforts of the administration to protect the rights of the demonstrators were even more extensive than this. These efforts were reflected in numerous communications between the dean and the demonstrators before the date of the demonstration, in which several alternatives were explored and suggested by the administration but rejected by the demonstrators. The time and place set out in the student expression area rule was always available to the students; the dean alternatively proposed a way in which they could lawfully use the very place they used; and the administration advanced other possibilities, including the use of an auditorium at times when space was available. It appears from the evidence that the University would have been amenable to reasonable suggestions from the students themselves as to when and where they could hold their demonstration, so long as it could be accommodated to the University’s activities. Thus the record shows a good-faith attempt by the administration of the University to set up a time and place that would allow the demonstrators their .first-amendment rights while at the same time preventing the demonstration from interfering with the functions of the University.
The crucial fact in this case is that the University did not prohibit this demon*882stration. It merely regulated the time and place at which it could be held. At this time, it requires no citation to say that the University was authorized to regulate the time, place and manner of conduct on the campus provided its regulations were reasonable. A University is a dynamic, active institution that consists of large numbers of people crowded in a small space, so that it can function only if those people obey rules regulating the time, place and manner of their activities. The administration, in its turn, is required to make every reasonable effort to accommodate the freedom of expression of all students with the functions of the University, but this effort must be made under constantly changing conditions and in response to changing interests. Perfect congruence with the intentions of all students cannot be expected. Even a carefully drafted set of rules, although it can go far toward reducing conflicts, cannot solve all the University’s problems. Therefore, so long as the administration protects freedom of expression without substantial impairment, it must be afforded the flexibility to issue ad hoc directions specifying the time, place and manner in which particular activities are to be held and the right to expect that these directions will be followed. The administration may even be justified in issuing a regulation that impairs some expression if that regulation is absolutely necessary to prevent material and substantial disruption of its lawful functions,3 and consequently when it has actually protected the right to expression by furnishing adequate alternative forums, as the University did in this case, its actions are lawful.
For these reasons, it seems to me that the trial court correctly held that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient probability of prevailing on the merits to qualify them for a preliminary injunction under the circumstances.

. The rule relied upon by the majority states that “Students and University personnel may use the Student Expression Area located on the grass terraces in front of Old Main between the hours of 12:00 noon to 1:00 p. m., and from 5:00 to 7:00 p. m.” Thus the rule is permissive only. The evidence indicates that the administration has always interpreted it as permissive and has regarded all. other parts of the campus and all other times as subject to some degree of discretion for the protection of University functions.
The majority relies upon tlie rule to distinguish tlie case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 1969, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731. Tlie rule is thus an essential step in the reasoning of the majority, because it allows tlie avoidance of the question whether there was a danger of “material and substantial disruption” of University functions. I question the propriety of distinguishing Tinker by stretching a rule that does not seem to me to cover the ease. To my mind, Tinker is inapplicable anyway because it involved a substantial impairment of the plaintiffs’ expression of ideas, and no such impairment is occasioned in this case because the University furnished adequate alternative forums.

. In my judgment, the only way in which the rule can be interpreted so as to avoid the discretionary nature of the University’s action in this case is to say that it prohibited demonstrations at all other times and at all other places than those specified in the rule. This interpretation might make the rule invalid for several reasons. First, it requires a real stretch of the imagination to infer this meaning from the language of the rule. Second, the rule was not so construed when applied to other student assemblies, and it would be discriminatory so to construe it in this case. Third, it would restrict student assemblies to so small an area and so brief a time as to be unreasonable if strictly enforced.
By tacitly allowing loose construction of the regulation on the ground that it is a university rule governing student conduct, the Court proceeds upon assumption and without discussion into a difficult new area of the law. The courts that have held that such rules are not subject to the usual standards of specificity required of laws regulating conduct off the campus have been severely criticized by the commentators. Compare General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 146 (W.D.Mo.1968) with Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VaudX.Rev. 1027 (1969) Even if this view should prevail, rules concerning first amendment rights on campus should probably be subject to a stricter construction. At any rate, the rule in this case need not be examined by the Court, because there was no denial of first-amendment rights by the reasonable directions issued by the dean.

. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 1969, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731; Burnside v. Byars, 5th Cir. 1966, 363 F.2d 744; Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 5th Cir. 1966, 363 F.2d 749.