Court Opinion

ID: 9860231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:15:14.33275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:31.261605
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring: I agree with the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment. I write separately for the reasons that follow. First, the majority’s opinion concludes the question of whether an incompetent individual can revoke a power of attorney need not be decided. I would find that such an individual cannot do so. “ ‘From the time a person is adjudged to be distracted and incapable of caring for his property and effects, until, if ever, he is adjudged to be restored, he has no more legal power to act for himself than as if he were dead. A contract made, or release or receipt given, by him has no legal significance.’ ” In re Estate of Kutchins, 169 Ill. App. 3d 641, 645-46, 523 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1988), quoting Bradshaw v. Lucas, 214 Ill. App. 218, 223 (1919). Once an individual is deemed incompetent, the power to act for onself from a legal standpoint ceases until such time as the incompetency is removed. Until then, the agent acts in the individual’s stead. It would be illogical to allow an incompetent individual to revoke a power of attorney when the existence of such a document aims to protect that person during his or her incompetency. Therefore, I would hold an incompetent individual cannot revoke a power of attorney. Notwithstanding, I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court implicitly revoked respondent’s power of attorney pursuant to section 2 — 10 of the Power of Attorney Act (755 ILCS 45/2 — 10 (West 2004)). Second, I do not agree we need to address the question of whether the term “shall” in section 11a — 3(b) of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/1 la — 3(b) (West 2004)) is mandatory or directive. Here, it is not the disabled adult who attempts to invoke section 11a — 3(b). It is, instead, respondent who does not take issue with the trial court’s appointment of a guardian but rather objects to the appointment of petitioners instead of her. As such, I would find the failure to comply with the 30-day notice provision of section 11a — 3(b) was harmless error as to respondent’s challenge to the appointment of petitioners.