Court Opinion

ID: 9520838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:51:31.548713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:02.951587
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part. As the majority notes, "trial courts, in their discretion, may choose to distribute the marital property unequally in favor of one spouse based on statutorily identified considerations, one of which is inherited property." Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind.2002). However, "Iwlhether to do so is a matter of trial court discretion in light of all other relevant factors" Id. I believe the trial court's distribution of the marital property constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Trial courts must measure each factor and the evidence adduced therefrom against the weight of the statutory presumption of an equal distribution. Cowden v. Cowden, 661 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). "This balancing of the statutory factors and the evidence related to them is the essence of the trial court's work in crafting a just and reasonable property division." Id.
The simple fact of the matter is that Terry inherited the property at issue, valued at more than $339,000, just eight months before he filed his petition for dissolution of his marriage of thirty-three years. For all of those years, and as they raised two children to the age of majority, Terry and Deborah contributed equally to the marriage. After a marriage of such substantial length, and in light of Deborah's limited earning capacity, I believe equity and relevant statutory criteria dictate a division of all property of whatever character in excess of fifty percent to Deborah.
Here, while the trial court considered "the inherited character" of the stock and IRA, it made no findings at all regarding the parties' economic cireumstances or earning abilities. See Ind.Code § 31-15 7-5. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for redistribution of the marital estate in light of all relevant common law and statutory criteria.
However, I fully concur in the majority's decision to remand the case for an award of attorney's fees to Deborah. I fully sub-seribe to the majority's determination that "the trial court's findings regarding attorney fees and costs are inadequate to support the decision it made" on Deborah's petition for attorney fees.