Court Opinion

ID: 9902966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:27:07.875638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.742203
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CRAIG A. MARLOWE,

           Appellant,

v.                                      Case No. 5D21-2407
                                        LT Case No. 2005-CA-0186

CITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE, KEVIN
VAN DYKE, MARCY A. VAN DYKE,
PAUL A. LEONARD AND SUSAN J.
LEONARD, TRUSTEES OF THE LEONARD
FAMILY REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
DATED 23RD JANUARY, 2007, ET AL,

           Appellees.

________________________________/

Opinion filed July 14, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for St. Johns County,
Kenneth J. Janesk, Judge.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer,
PA, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Isabelle C. Lopez, City Attorney, St.
Augustine, and Michael Cavendish,
of   Cavendish     Partners,   P.A.,
Jacksonville, for Appellee, City of
Saint Augustine.
Rebecca Bowen Creed, of Creed &
Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, and Bruce
B. Humphrey and Lauren E. Howell,
of Birchfield & Humphrey, Ponte
Vedra Beach, for Appellees, Kevin
Van Dyke and Marcy A. Van Dyke.

Gary S. Edinger, of Benjamin,
Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A.,
Gainesville, for Appellees, Paul A.
Leonard and Susan J. Leonard,
Trustees of the Leonard Family
Revocable Living Trust Dated 23rd
January, 2007.

LAMBERT, J.

      Craig A. Marlowe appeals the final summary judgment entered against

him and in favor of the City of St. Augustine (the “City”) and Kevin and Marcy

A. Van Dyke (the “Van Dykes”). Marlowe also appeals the order denying his

motion for attorney’s fees as a sanction against the City, filed pursuant to

section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2020).      We affirm, without further

discussion, the order denying Marlowe’s section 57.105(1) motion for

attorney’s fees. However, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the final

summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                       2
                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Marlowe initially filed the underlying lawsuit in 2005 against the owners

of a single parcel of real property that is directly adjacent to real property

owned by Marlowe in St. Augustine, Florida. What began as a dispute

between two neighboring properties regarding riparian rights—based on

Marlowe’s allegation that the neighbors’ dock obstructed and interfered with

his riparian rights (particularly his right to build his own dock that accesses

the navigable waters of Hospital Creek)—evolved into a complicated

multiparty litigation involving several nearby properties, as well as disputes

over the correct property boundaries and the historical ownership of the

subject waterfront land dating back to Spanish colonial Florida in the early

nineteenth century.

      The City and the Van Dykes were later added as defendants

because—though Marlowe did not assert any claim directly against them—

they were found by the trial court, in an earlier order on a motion to dismiss

filed by a different defendant, to be “indispensable parties” based on the

possibility that a determination as to Marlowe’s riparian rights might affect

the riparian rights appurtenant to nearby waterfront properties owned by the

City and the Van Dykes, respectively. Specifically, the City owns a thirty-foot

right-of-way road called San Carlos Avenue, part of which borders the entire

                                      3
northern boundary of Marlowe’s property. San Carlos Avenue allegedly runs

all the way to Hospital Creek, which is east of all of the separate tracts of

land owned by the parties to the lawsuit. The Van Dykes own the waterfront

real property immediately north of San Carlos Avenue, which separates their

property from Marlowe’s property. The other defendants in the initial stages

of the underlying litigation1 own property bordering the south of Marlowe’s

property.

      During the earlier stages of this litigation, Marlowe had apparently

obtained a title opinion that advised him that a dissolved corporation, St.

Augustine North Beach and Toll Bridge Company (“Toll Bridge Company”),

not Marlowe, owned the easternmost portion of what Marlowe had

considered to be his own property. Marlowe would later acknowledge that,

as a result, he discontinued actively pursuing resolution of the instant lawsuit

for over seven years while he took steps that he believed were necessary to

acquire the subject property from Toll Bridge Company via adverse

possession.

      In early 2017, Marlowe filed a fifth amended complaint in which he

      1
       As of the date that the summary judgment was entered, the
neighboring property and dock that were owned by the original defendants
had come under ownership of the appellees Paul A. Leonard and Susan J.
Leonard, Trustees of the Leonard Family Revocable Living Trust Dated 23rd
January, 2007 (“the Leonards”).

                                       4
added Toll Bridge Company as a defendant, together with “any and all

unknown parties claiming by, through, under and against St. Augustine North

Beach & Toll Bridge Company who may be dead or alive, if said unknown

parties may claim an interest through said company as spouses, heirs,

devisees, grantees, or otherwise.” Marlowe alleged for the first time that Toll

Bridge Company owned all of the relevant waterfront land south of San

Carlos Avenue other than the waterfront land owned by Marlowe and, thus,

they were the only parties to the lawsuit who had riparian rights appurtenant

to property south of San Carlos Avenue.

      The following year, Marlowe filed a sixth amended complaint, which is

the operative complaint. Marlowe revealed in this complaint that he had filed

a separate lawsuit solely against Toll Bridge Company to quiet title and that,

in November 2016, he obtained a default judgment against Toll Bridge

Company. In that default judgment, the trial court found that when Marlowe

acquired his property, Toll Bridge Company “may have had some right, title,

and/or interest” in part of the property—specifically, the easternmost part of

the property, nearest to Hospital Creek—but that Marlowe had become the

true record titleholder of that property by virtue of adverse possession. The

                                      5
default judgment further found that, as to “any or all accreted[2] lands that

may be appurtenant to [the subject property acquired by Marlowe through

adverse possession],” Marlowe “has the superior right to the accreted lands

east of and appurtenant to [that subject property], subject to any other

lawfully superior claims of adjacent owners to the accreted lands, if any.”

      Returning to the operative complaint in the underlying case, Marlowe

asserted three causes of action requesting: (1) a declaration as to his riparian

rights; (2) an injunction ordering the Leonards and another defendant 3 to

remove their docks and restraining the defendants from further interfering

with his riparian rights; and (3) quiet title and a declaration that Marlowe owns

“the accreted property adjacent to his upland property,” including a portion

of allegedly accreted land claimed by the Leonards. Marlowe’s claims in the

underlying lawsuit depended upon Marlowe owning waterfront property and

      2
         Black’s Law Dictionary defines “accretion” as “[t]he gradual
accumulation of land by natural forces, esp[ecially] as alluvium is added to
land situated on the bank of a river or on the seashore.” Accretion, Black’s
Law Dictionary (3d Pocket Ed. 2006).
      3
        Between the initiation of the lawsuit and the filing of the sixth
amended complaint, Marlowe had added as defendants the owners of the
property immediately south of the Leonards’ property, Christopher and
Georgia C. Park (the “Parks”). The Parks also had a dock between their
property and Hospital Creek, and Marlowe had alleged that both the
Leonards’ dock and the Parks’ dock interfered with his riparian rights. The
Parks have not participated in this appeal.

                                       6
the riparian rights thereunto appertaining.

      After the various parties filed their responses to this sixth amended

complaint, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. The City argued

that it, and not Marlowe or Toll Bridge Company, owned that easternmost

part of the land claimed by Marlowe as his own, including all lands east of

Marlowe’s property to the waters of Hospital Creek. The City asserted that

Marlowe could not have obtained that easternmost waterfront land because,

when he purchased the property in 2004, the prior owner of Marlowe’s

property who sold it to him did not own that easternmost waterfront portion.

      The City next asserted that Marlowe could not have obtained that

easternmost waterfront property from Toll Bridge Company as a result of the

default judgment because Toll Bridge Company did not own that land. As

evidence in support of its summary judgment motion, the City filed, among

other documents, records from the St. Johns County Property Appraiser

identifying the easternmost waterfront portion of the land claimed by Marlowe

(as well as the waterfront land separating from Hospital Creek all of the

parcels south of Marlowe’s property that are owned by other defendants)—

i.e., the land that Marlowe argued had been owned by Toll Bridge Company

and that he subsequently acquired through adverse possession—as Tax ID

Parcel 1493300000 that is owned by the City.

                                      7
      The City thirdly argued that the default judgment obtained by Marlowe

against Toll Bridge Company in the separate suit was void as a matter of law

because it was obtained against a “non-existent” entity for which there are

no records substantiating its “existence” later than the 1930s. The City

reminded that since it was never joined as a party in Marlowe’s separate suit

against Toll Bridge Company, the default final judgment entered in that case

had no res judicata effect against it.

      The City also argued that while Toll Bridge Company operated a horse-

drawn railway car over a nearby bridge in the 1910s and 1920s and that Toll

Bridge Company had some deeded interest in some of the disputed land at

that time, the land held by Toll Bridge Company was not waterfront property.

Instead, the City argued that there had always been unsurveyed and

unplatted sovereignly owned land between the privately owned property

involved in this case and Hospital Creek. 4

      Lastly, the City asserted in its motion that Marlowe’s claim to ownership

of the disputed waterfront land is fatally flawed due to Marlowe’s failure to

      4
       The City did acknowledge that some new land had been formed along
the subject waterfront stretch between the 1920s and the present—although
the City asserted that it was formed by “dumped street sweepings during
years of public works projects,” as opposed to natural accretion—but the City
maintained that there had always been some sovereign land between
Hospital Creek and the privately owned land in that specific location.

                                         8
plead the necessary element of “state action.”          According to the City,

Marlowe was suing a sovereign entity for a determination of the sovereign’s

property rights but the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

claim because Marlowe failed to allege some “state action” by the City in the

form of a taking or infringement upon Marlowe’s private property rights.

      Marlowe filed a response to the City’s summary judgment motion. He

asserted that in the early 1800s (prior to the United States acquiring Florida

from Spain), Spain transferred the subject waterfront property into private

ownership and that the surveyed and platted property owned by Toll Bridge

Company was originally waterfront property—and was so as late as the

1920s. Therefore, Marlowe asserted that all of the unplatted land between

Toll Bridge Company’s original property and Hospital Creek is new land

(whether formed by accretion or the City’s filling activities), title to which was

vested in Toll Bridge Company, as owner of the immediately upland property,

and was now vested in him, as a result of the default final judgment entered

in the separate suit finding adverse possession.

      Marlowe further responded that the City’s “state action” argument was

unavailing because he had not sought judicial determination as to the City’s

ownership interest in any land; rather, the City was only added as a

defendant because the trial court believed it to be an indispensable party due

                                        9
to the possibility that a determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights might affect

the City’s riparian rights arising from its neighboring waterfront property (i.e.,

San Carlos Avenue).

      The Van Dykes filed their own motion for summary judgment. They

joined in and adopted the arguments raised by the City in its summary

judgment motion, explicitly emphasizing the argument that Marlowe

possesses no riparian rights because he does not own the unplatted

waterfront land between the easternmost platted property and Hospital

Creek. The Van Dykes also argued that even if Marlowe were found to have

riparian rights, any determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights could not affect

their riparian rights because their waterfront property and Marlowe’s property

are separated by San Carlos Avenue and thus not immediately adjacent.

Lastly, the Van Dykes asserted that Marlowe’s claim against them was time-

barred under section 95.12, Florida Statutes (2004).

      Lastly, Marlowe filed his own motion for partial summary judgment. He

asked that the trial court hold that the eastern boundary of the subject platted

property was originally waterfront and is, thus, riparian property and that he

owns that easternmost portion of the platted property east of and

appurtenant to his undisputed property, as well as “all accretions” east of his

property.

                                       10
      Following a hearing on the three summary judgment motions, the trial

court entered an order granting the City’s and the Van Dykes’ motions and

denying Marlowe’s motion and thereafter entered final summary judgment

consistent with its order.    The trial court first concluded that it lacked

jurisdiction to determine ownership of the unplatted land because Marlowe

failed to satisfy the “state action” requirement raised by the City, as he did

not show or even allege any “deprivation, taking or infringement” by the City

against his private property interests.

      The trial court then proceeded to engage in “a complete analysis of the

arguments.” It first found that the summary judgment evidence did not

support Marlowe’s claim that the subject waterfront property was transferred

into private ownership by Spain in the early 1800s. It instead concluded that

the evidence established beyond a genuine dispute of material fact that the

unplatted land east of Marlowe’s property and separating the platted property

from Hospital Creek was owned by the City as sovereign.

      The trial court then addressed the default judgment obtained by

Marlowe against Toll Bridge Company. The court did not find the default

final judgment to be void, stating that it “[did] not wish to question or rewrite

the history of another case,” but concluded that it was “not inclined to give

any further validity to a default decision against a company that stopped

                                       11
existing decades before Marlowe even purchased the property.”

      As to the summary judgment in favor of the Van Dykes, the trial court

found that even if Marlowe possessed riparian rights, under this court’s

decision in Lake Conway Shores Homeowners Ass’n v. Driscoll, 476 So. 2d

1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), any determination as to those rights could not

affect the Van Dykes’ riparian rights because the Van Dykes’ property does

not “adjoin” Marlowe’s property. The court also separately found that any

riparian rights claim asserted by Marlowe against the Van Dykes was time-

barred by section 95.12.

      On appeal, Marlowe asserts numerous arguments in support of his

request that this court reverse the summary judgment. Applying the de novo

standard of review, see Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,

760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000), we find that four of Marlowe’s arguments

merit reversal of the final summary judgment.

                                       I.

      Marlowe argues that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction under the “state action” theory forwarded by the City. As

previously indicated, the trial court explained that “state action” required that

“there must be some deprivation, taking or infringement by the sovereign

against a private citizen’s property interest before that private citizen can

                                       12
request [that the court] determine the sovereign’s property rights.”        We

reverse on this issue for two reasons.

      First, Marlowe did not allege that the City took some affirmative action

depriving or infringing against his property interests. Marlowe sought a

declaration as to his own riparian rights, injunctive relief against the owners

of two pieces of private property with two corresponding private docks, and

to quiet title to the easternmost waterfront portion of what he claimed to be

his own property. Marlowe did not allege, nor did his complaint appear to

contemplate, that the City might have some claim to that land. Marlowe later

added the City as a defendant in response to the trial court’s finding, in an

earlier order that it entered on a motion to dismiss filed by a prior defendant,

that the City was an indispensable party because its riparian rights arising

from the City’s ownership of adjacent property might be affected by a

determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights, if any.

      It was the City, in fact, that first suggested sovereign ownership of the

property that Marlowe claimed to own. The City filed its motion for summary

judgment and presented evidence in the form of records from the St. Johns

County Property Appraiser that conflicted with Marlowe’s evidence as to

ownership. To the extent that the City’s subsequent claim of ownership over

land to which Marlowe sought to quiet title somehow transformed Marlowe’s

                                      13
claim into one seeking a determination of a sovereign’s property rights, the

City’s claim of ownership in derogation of Marlowe’s claim of ownership that

he based on deeds and the default judgment against Toll Bridge Company

would arguably satisfy the requirement of a “deprivation, taking, or

infringement.”

      Second, the authorities cited by the trial court in its order do not support

the City’s “state action” argument. In Blessey v. Walton County, Case No.

3:18cv1415/MCR/CJK, 2018 WL 4291735 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2018), a

beachfront property owner filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration

that Florida’s common law “customary use doctrine”—providing that “the

public maintains a right to use the dry sand beach adjacent to the mean high-

water line without interference by the property owner”—was unconstitutional.

Id. at *1.   To demonstrate the injury to his own property that was a

prerequisite to obtaining the declaration that he sought, the plaintiff alleged

only that the county was “intending” to assert “customary use” over all

shoreline in the county, including shoreline owned by the plaintiff. Id. at *2.

      The federal district court found that until the county actually asserted

customary use over the plaintiff’s property, his requested declaratory relief

was premature. Id. at *4 (“Addressing a challenge to the common law

doctrine with no state action and no concrete or immediate threat of injury

                                       14
would require [the court] to make a constitutional determination based on

hypothetical facts” and “in the abstract, which [the court] may not do.” (citing

Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018); In re

Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 780 F.3d 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 2015))).

      Blessey is inapposite to the resolution of the instant case. Marlowe’s

complaint does not seek a declaration as to some future action that the City

is considering, and Marlowe’s complaint alleges an actual injury supporting

his requested relief—that is, Marlowe alleges that his neighbors’ docks

interfere with his riparian rights. Therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Blessey,

Marlowe is not seeking a declaration “in the abstract” or “based on

hypothetical facts.” Gagliardi is likewise inapposite to the instant case. See

Gagliardi, 889 F.3d at 732–34 (holding that a property owner’s lawsuit in

federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a city related

to the city’s approval of the building of a religious center in a residential area

became moot when other property owners sued the city in state court

seeking to block that same project and successfully obtained for all similarly

situated property owners the relief that the Gagliardi plaintiffs sought in

federal court).

                                       II.

      We next address the default judgment that Marlowe obtained against

                                       15
Toll Bridge Company in the separate suit. Marlowe argued, among other

things, that the default final judgment evidenced his interest in a portion of

the subject real property. In granting summary judgment to the City, the trial

court stopped short of declaring the default final judgment against Toll Bridge

Company to be void. It did, however, express that it was “not inclined to give

any further validity to a default decision against a company that stopped

existing decades before Marlowe even purchased the property.” To the

extent that the trial court, in the context of a summary judgment, disregarded

the default judgment because Toll Bridge Company was a long-dissolved

Florida corporation, the court erred.

      Marlowe served his quiet title complaint upon Toll Bridge Company by

publication. “Service of process by publication may be made in any court on

any party identified in [section 49.021, Florida Statutes], in any action or

proceeding” to, inter alia, “quiet title or remove any encumbrance, lien, or

cloud on the title to any real or personal property within the jurisdiction of the

court.” § 49.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2015).

      “Where personal service of process or, if appropriate, service of

process under [section] 48.194[5] cannot be had, service of process by

      Section 48.194, Florida Statutes (2015), controls personal service of
      5

process outside of the State of Florida.

                                        16
publication may be had upon any party, natural or corporate, known or

unknown, including,” inter alia, “[a]ny corporation or other legal entity,

whether its domicile be foreign, domestic, or unknown, and whether

dissolved or existing, and, when described as such, the unknown assigns,

successors in interest, trustees, or any other party claiming by, through,

under, or against any named corporation or legal entity.” § 49.021(2), Fla.

Stat. (2015). This statute does not provide any time limit on how long a

corporation may be dissolved and still be served by publication. Therefore,

the trial court’s premise in the proceeding below in which it apparently

weighed and then summarily disregarded evidence of the default judgment

because Toll Bridge Company has long been dissolved was incorrect. 6

      6
         To the extent that the City and the Van Dykes argue, and the trial
court implied, that the default judgment could be declared void based on lack
of personal jurisdiction over Toll Bridge Company, actions that are in rem or
quasi in rem, which would include Marlowe’s quiet title action against Toll
Bridge Company, do not require the establishment of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant landowner. See Hinton v. Gold, 813 So. 2d 1057, 1059
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820, 830 (Fla.
1926); T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Wolf v. Indus.
Guar. Bancorp., 281 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)); Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Fla. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. ex rel Bd. of Trs. of the Int. Imp. Trust
Fund, 78 So. 3d 31, 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). However, a trial court obtains
jurisdiction in such actions “only after the plaintiff wishing to bring suit
complies with the requirements of due process,” which requires “that the
defendant be given fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard
before a judgment is rendered.” Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 1059–60 (citing
Ryan’s Furniture Exch. v. McNair, 162 So. 483, 487 (Fla. 1935); Wyatt v.
Haese, 649 So. 2d 905, 907–08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)). Service of process

                                         17
      Neither the Van Dykes nor the City presented any evidence or

argument that Marlowe failed to comply with Florida’s service of process by

publication statutes, nor did the trial court make any such finding.

Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court found that the default judgment

was unenforceable because, as a matter of law, the City, and not Toll Bridge

Company, owned the subject property, we conclude that there are genuine

disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment. See Fla. R. Civ.

P. 1.510(a) (requiring a showing “that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact” and that “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”

before a summary judgment may be granted).

      At the summary judgment hearing, both Marlowe and the City

presented and relied upon the original 1924 plat map of the development

area encompassing all of the parties’ subject properties. The plat map

identified Toll Bridge Company as the owner of the proposed development.

Marlowe presented a chain of deeds arguably supporting Toll Bridge

Company’s ownership of the subject property, including the easternmost

by publication, when effected in compliance with statutory requirements,
satisfies this due process requirement for in rem jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Honegger v. Coastal Fertilizer & Supply, Inc., 712 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla.
2d DCA 1998) (citing Bedford Comput. Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So.
2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 1986); Est. of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp., 563 So. 2d
739, 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)).

                                      18
portion of the surveyed and platted property in dispute.

     That easternmost portion of the surveyed and platted property was

dedicated as a roadway in the 1924 plat map. However, the road was never

built, and the dedicated right-of-way was expressly abandoned by the City

by ordinance in 1966. Because Toll Bridge Company may arguably have

held title to the entire dedicated-then-abandoned roadway, 7 comprising the

easternmost boundary of the surveyed and platted property, this evidence

materially conflicted with the evidence presented by the City through the St.

Johns County Property Appraiser records that attributed ownership of the

subject waterfront property to the City. The City argued that this showed its

ownership of the unplatted land between the platted property and Hospital

Creek, which appears to include the eastern one-half of the dedicated-then-

abandoned roadway comprising the eastern boundary of the platted

property. This genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City or Toll

Bridge Company owned the easternmost portion of the platted property

     7
       See Pelican Creek Homeowners, LLC v. Pulverenti, 243 So. 3d 467,
470–71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018); Lehmann v. Cocoanut Bayou Ass’n, 269 So.
3d 599, 608–10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). We reject, without further discussion,
the City’s and the Van Dykes’ argument that section 177.085(2), Florida
Statutes (1972), undermines Marlowe’s theory as to Toll Bridge Company’s
ownership of the easternmost portion of the subject platted property. See
Pelican Creek Homeowners, 243 So. 3d at 472–73; Lehmann, 269 So. 3d at
613–14.

                                     19
when Marlowe obtained the default judgment against Toll Bridge Company

in adverse possession was not resolvable through summary judgment.

     Second, while the City maintains that there have always been

unsurveyed and unplatted sovereign lands between the subject platted

property and the waters of Hospital Creek, Marlowe asserted that the platted

property (particularly, the dedicated-then-abandoned roadway comprising

the eastern boundary of the platted property) was originally waterfront

property and that all of the unplatted waterfront land to the east was newly

formed since the dedication of the plat in 1924. The summary judgment

evidence on this issue is conflicting, with some maps from the 1920s

depicting a large and undefined space between the creek and the platted

property, with other maps from the 1920s suggestive that the creek’s waters

ran closer to the platted property. One map also depicted the waters of the

creek bordering and slightly overlapping the platted property.

     This disputed fact bears upon ownership of all of the land between the

platted property and Hospital Creek. If the platted property was waterfront

property, then the upland owner of the easternmost portion of platted

property could have arguably held title to the newly formed land adjacent

thereto, whether that land was formed by accretion or by the City’s filing

activities. Compare Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998

                                     20
So. 2d 1102, 1111–12 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing the riparian/littoral 8 right to

ownership of accretions), with § 253.12(9), Fla. Stat. (1993) (granting, under

certain circumstances, the state’s right, title, and interest in tidally influenced

land that has been created by fill before July 1, 1975, to “the landowner

having record or other title to all or a portion thereof or to the lands

immediately upland thereof and its successors in interest”). This Court need

not, and we therefore do not, reach the hypothetical issue of whether Toll

Bridge Company, if it owned originally waterfront property and if the new land

was formed by the City’s filling activities, could have obtained title to the

newly formed land pursuant to section 253.12(9). The genuinely disputed

factual issues of who owned the easternmost portion of the platted property

and whether the platted property was originally waterfront property—not to

mention the unsettled issue of whether the newly formed land was created

by accretion, by fill, or by a combination of both—render erroneous the trial

court’s summary judgment.

                                         III.

      Turning to the summary judgment entered in favor of the Van Dykes

      8
        “Riparian” technically refers to rights appurtenant to ownership of
property abutting a river or stream, while “littoral” refers to rights appurtenant
to ownership of property abutting an ocean, sea, or lake. Nevertheless,
Florida case law and the Florida Statutes often use the terms
interchangeably. See Stop Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1105 n.3.

                                        21
on Marlowe’s claim of riparian rights, the trial court, citing to this court’s

decision in Lake Conway Shores, determined that whatever may be the

riparian rights of Marlowe, they could not affect the Van Dykes’ riparian rights

because the Van Dykes’ property was not directly adjacent to Marlowe’s

property. We reverse.

      Lake Conway Shores does not support this conclusion that the

determination of a waterfront property owner’s riparian rights could only

possibly affect the riparian rights of immediately adjacent waterfront property

owners. See 476 So. 2d 1306. The only relevant holding from Lake Conway

Shores, which is not dispositive of the instant parties’ summary judgment

motions, is that using the “prolongation of property line” method (i.e.,

extending the interested parties’ property lines into the navigable waters to

determine the areas in which the parties may exercise their respective

riparian rights) cannot be used if it eviscerates another waterfront property

owner’s riparian or littoral rights. See id. at 1308–09. Here, a “riparian

survey” filed by Marlowe similarly used the “prolongation of property line”

method to draw “riparian boundaries,” but the “riparian lane” proposed in the

survey veered toward and even cut across the Van Dykes’ property.

      The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d

795 (Fla. 1957), is instructive. The parties in that case disputed the proper

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location of riparian or littoral lanes. Id. at 798. Each party used different

angles to prolong their property line into an available channel. Id. The

Florida Supreme Court recognized the bedrock common law riparian rights

of “an unobstructed view” and “access,” holding that

              the common law riparian rights to an unobstructed
              view and access to the Channel over the foreshore
              across the waters toward the Channel must be
              recognized over an area as near “as practicable” in
              the direction of the Channel so as to distribute
              equitably the submerged lands between the upland
              and the Channel.

Id. at 801.

      The court, however, observed the difficulty at times in protecting and

establishing these rights, holding:

                     It is absolutely impossible to formulate a
              mathematical or geometrical rule that can be applied
              to all situations of this nature. The angles (direction)
              of side lines of lots bordering navigable waters are
              limited only by the number of points on a compass
              rose. Seldom, if ever, is the thread of a channel
              exactly or even approximately parallel to the
              shoreline of the mainland. These two conditions
              make the mathematical or geometrical certainly [sic]
              implicit in the rules recommended by the contesting
              parties literally impossible. We must therefore
              search elsewhere for a solution to this admittedly
              difficult problem.

Id.

      In other words, the court appeared to appreciate that when determining

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riparian rights, there is no exclusive right to any geometrically drawn “riparian

lane.” In some circumstances, such as with a relatively straight shoreline

and consistently straight navigable channel, those rights might look like or

take the shape of straight “lanes” with docks, but that is often not true:

                     Riparian rights do not necessarily extend into
              the waters according to upland boundaries nor do
              such rights under all conditions extend at right angles
              to the shore line. Our own precedents are completely
              inconsistent with the appellees’ view that such rights
              extend over an area measured by lines at right
              angles to the Channel. It should be borne in mind
              that littoral or riparian rights are appurtenances to
              ownership of the uplands. They are not founded on
              ownership of the submerged lands. It is for this
              reason, among others that we cannot define the area
              within which the rights are to be enjoyed with
              mathematical exactitude or by a metes and bounds
              description.

Id. at 802.

      From these principles, we conclude that the fact that the Van Dykes’

property is not directly adjacent to Marlowe’s property does not show,

beyond a genuine dispute of material fact, that a determination of Marlowe’s

riparian rights could not possibly affect the Van Dykes’ own riparian rights.

The trial court, therefore, erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the

Van Dykes on this basis.

      The trial court also held that Marlowe’s claim against the Van Dykes to

set the riparian rights was barred by the seven-year statute of limitations

                                        24
codified in section 95.12. This statute provides, in its entirety:

            No action to recover real property or its possession
            shall be maintained unless the person seeking
            recovery or the person’s ancestor, predecessor, or
            grantor was seized or possessed of the property
            within 7 years before the commencement of the
            action.

§ 95.12, Fla. Stat. (2004).

      As such, the plain language of section 95.12 applies to actions

involving the recovery of real property or its possession. Here, Marlowe did

not assert a claim against the Van Dykes seeking the recovery or possession

of real property; rather, as indicated, the Van Dykes are joined because a

determination as to Marlowe’s riparian rights could affect the Van Dykes

riparian rights arising from their nearby waterfront property. We find that the

trial court erred in ruling that Marlowe’s claim against the Van Dykes was

time-barred by section 95.12.

      In summary, we reverse the final summary judgment entered in favor

of the City and the Van Dykes, and we remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

WALLIS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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