Court Opinion

ID: 9951352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 20:03:09.199587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:58.951791
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                           A167813
 STEVEN LAURENT                               (Solano County
 MONTGOMERY, JR.,                             Super. Ct. No. FCR330516)
         Defendant and Appellant.

       In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery, Jr. pled no contest to several
violent felonies. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court sentenced him to
18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison
sentences within the meaning of former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision
(b) (prison priors). (Undesignated statutory references are to this code.)
Later, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing under Senate Bill
No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill 483), which invalidated most prison
priors imposed before January 1, 2020. 1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) Although
the court struck the prison priors, it failed to hold a resentencing hearing.
Accepting the Attorney General’s concession of error, we reverse and remand
with instruction to hold a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.
Further, we conclude the Legislature intended to constrain the prosecutor’s

       1 This statute was formerly section 1171.1, but the Legislature

renumbered it to section 1172.75. (Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.); Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
                                        1
ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the
resentencing hearing.
                                  BACKGROUND
      The prosecutor charged Montgomery with forcible oral copulation
(former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A) [renumbered § 287, subd. (c)(2)(A), eff. Jan. 1,
2019]; count one), injuring a domestic partner (§ 273.5, subd. (f); count two),
false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; count three), assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count four), and assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury (Id., subd. (a)(4); count five). The prosecutor
alleged Montgomery personally inflicted great bodily injury in the
commission of a felony sex offense on count one, and he inflicted great bodily
injury under circumstances involving domestic violence on all counts.
(§§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d), 12022.7, subd. (e).)
      Under the terms of a plea agreement, Montgomery pled no contest to
injuring a domestic partner, false imprisonment, and assault with a deadly
weapon, in addition to admitting the great bodily injury enhancement as to
those offenses. He also pled no contest to forcible oral copulation, and the
prosecutor dismissed the sex offense enhancement and assault charge.
Montgomery also admitted two prison priors within the meaning of former
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
      The parties agreed to — and the trial court imposed — a sentence of 18
years, which consisted of the upper term of eight years for forcible oral
copulation, one year for injuring a domestic partner plus a five-year great
bodily injury enhancement, eight months for false imprisonment, one year for
assault with a deadly weapon, and one consecutive year for each prison prior.
      After the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
notified the trial court of various errors in the abstract of judgment, the

                                         2
court — with the agreement of the parties — imposed the great bodily injury
enhancement on the forcible oral copulation plea and corrected the abstract of
judgment to reflect a sentence of 17 years and eight months. And after the
Legislature enacted Sen. Bill 483, the court dismissed both one-year prison
priors, but it did not conduct a resentencing hearing in Montgomery’s
presence.
                                  DISCUSSION
      The parties agree Sen. Bill 483 not only invalidated Montgomery’s
prison priors, it mandated a full resentencing hearing — with a right to be
present, represented by counsel, and present evidence at the hearing. We
likewise agree, reverse the trial court’s order striking the prison priors, and
remand for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.
      But the parties disagree on one remaining point. The Attorney General
argues that, if the trial court is inclined to reduce Montgomery’s sentence
beyond dismissing the prison priors, the prosecutor must be permitted to
amend or withdraw from the plea agreement, returning the parties to the
status quo ante. For his part, Montgomery contends the prosecutor cannot
withdraw from the plea agreement due to any sentence reduction at the
hearing, even one due to enactments other than Sen. Bill 483. We conclude
Montgomery has the better argument.
      Section 1172.75 provides “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5
[a prison prior], except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction
for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a);
People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399 (Monroe).) Once the CDCR
identifies those persons serving a term which includes a prison prior, “ ‘the

                                          3
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ ” (Monroe, at
p. 399.)
      “By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not
merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.”
(Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.) “The resentencing ‘shall result in
a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed’ ” unless the court finds
“ ‘that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,’ ” but it may
not impose a longer sentence. (Id. at p. 399; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The
“ ‘court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion
so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.’ ” (Monroe, at p. 399; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The court may
consider postconviction factors, including but not limited to the defendant’s
disciplinary record, evidence indicating the defendant’s risk for future
violence has diminished, or evidence that circumstances have changed since
the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interests of justice. (Monroe, at p. 399; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
      “[L]ong-standing law limits the court’s unilateral authority to strike an
enhancement yet maintain other provisions of the plea bargain.” (People v.
Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701.) Section 1192.5 constrains a trial court’s
actions when the parties have agreed to a plea deal. (People v. Prudholme
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 973 [“ ‘ “judge who has accepted a plea bargain is
bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain” ’ ”].) Once the
court approves a plea agreement, “ ‘the court may not proceed as to the plea
other than as specified in the plea.’ ” (Ibid; § 1192.5, subd. (b).) The court
thus lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of the plea agreement so it becomes
more favorable to the defendant unless the parties agree otherwise.

                                        4
(Prudholme, at p. 973.) “ ‘ “[O]nce a court withdraws its approval of a plea
bargain, the court cannot ‘proceed to apply and enforce certain parts of the
plea bargain, while ignoring’ others.” ’ ” (Stamps, at pp. 706–707.)
“ ‘ “Instead, the court must restore the parties to the status quo ante.” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 707.)
      A plea agreement, however, does incorporate “ ‘ “the reserve power of
the state to amend the law.” ’ ” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66.) A
plea agreement “does not have the effect of insulating [the parties] from
changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.”
(Ibid.) Thus, the critical inquiry in determining the effect of a change in the
law on a plea agreement is one of legislative intent. (Harris v. Superior Court
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 991.) Here, in an uncodified section of Sen. Bill 483, the
Legislature expressed that “any changes to a sentence as a result of the act
that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind
a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
      Two courts have addressed the extent to which the Legislature has
precluded prosecutors from withdrawing from a plea bargain due to sentence
reductions following a section 1172.75 resentencing hearing. In People v.
Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960 (Carter), the Fourth District held that the
Legislature intended to prohibit the prosecutor from withdrawing from a plea
bargain for any reduction to a sentence, even if the reduction resulted from a
code provision other than those enacted by Sen. Bill 483. (Carter, at pp. 964,
972–973.) In People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562 (Coddington),
on the other hand, Division One of this court held that the Legislature
intended to preclude a prosecutor from withdrawing from a plea agreement
when a prison prior is struck, but the prosecutor can withdraw from the

                                        5
agreement if the sentence is otherwise reduced. (Id. at p. 565.) We find this
to be a rather close issue, but we share the views expressed in Carter.
      Carter based its conclusion on the text and legislative history of Sen.
Bill 483. (Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 968, 973–975.) Section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) requires a trial court resentencing a defendant to
“apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” Sen.
Bill 483’s uncodified section expressly requires that “any changes to a
sentence as a result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for
a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1,
italics added; Carter, at p. 973.) That language does not distinguish between
the striking of prison priors and “ ‘any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion,’ ” nor does the bill’s legislative
history make such a distinction. (Carter, at pp. 966, 972–975.) Instead, the
uncodified section “broadly refers to ‘any changes’ to the sentence.” (Id.
at p. 973.) Carter concluded the Legislature thereby intended to preclude a
prosecutor from rescinding a plea agreement due to any sentence reduction at
a section 1172.75 hearing. (Carter, at p. 973.) We reach the same conclusion.
(Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73–74 [“A
court may not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to
make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.”].)
      This interpretation is consistent with other resentencing provisions in
section 1172.75, subdivision (d). (People v. Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 975 [examine the statutory language not in isolation, but in the context
of the statutory framework as a whole].) A trial court must impose a lesser
sentence unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that doing so would
endanger public safety. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) And the court may also

                                         6
consider postconviction factors, including disciplinary and rehabilitation
records, and any evidence reflecting whether age, time served, and
diminished physical condition have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence to determine whether “continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Moreover, the resentencing hearing
“shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) Taken together with the uncodified section, these provisions
indicate the Legislature intended to reduce or preserve sentences whilst
limiting the prosecutor’s ability to rescind plea agreements as a result. 2
      We respectfully disagree with our colleagues in Division One.
Coddington — relying on People v. Stamps — rejected the argument that Sen.
Bill 483’s uncodified section prohibits a prosecutor from rescinding a plea
agreement for sentence reductions beyond the elimination of prison priors.
(Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 570–571.) The court concluded the
codified legislative purpose in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) was more
important than the uncodified language. (Coddington, at pp. 570–571.)
Subdivision (d)(2) directs the trial court to apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion “so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2); Coddington,
at p. 571.) The court concluded that “categorically preventing prosecutors
from withdrawing assent to a plea bargain for other [non-prison prior]
changes reducing sentences that were part of a plea bargain” thwarts this
intent because prosecutors “would retain such a remedy for defendants being

      2 Indeed, in People v. Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 979 to 980,

the Supreme Court cited the uncodified section of Sen. Bill 483 as an “express
statement . . . employed effectively” to communicate the Legislature’s intent.
                                        7
sentenced prospectively.” (Coddington, at p. 571.) Such a result, Coddington
reasoned, “would produce, not eliminate, sentencing disparities.” (Ibid.)
With regard to the legislative history, Coddington concluded the Legislature
eliminated most prison priors with Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.), and Sen. Bill 483 was enacted “to make the change retroactive.”
(Coddington, at p. 571; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
      Like Carter, we think the language here is closer to Harris v. Superior
Court than People v. Stamps. (Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.)
Stamps held that, for the defendant “ ‘to justify a remand for the court to
consider striking his serious felony enhancement while maintaining the
remainder of his bargain, defendant must establish not only that [the
legislative change] applies retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision,
the Legislature intended to overturn long-standing law that a court cannot
unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term.’ ” (Carter, at p. 969.) Stamps
concluded the Legislature did not intend such a result because none of the
legislative materials mentioned plea agreements. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 701–702.) In Harris, by contrast, the Supreme Court concluded that,
by “expressly mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated
relief to all eligible defendants.” (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 991–993.)
As in Harris, Sen. Bill 483’s uncodified section “expressly mentions plea
agreements and prohibits both the court and the prosecution from rescinding
the plea agreement.” (Carter, at p. 974.)
      We also conclude that, by enacting Sen. Bill 483, the Legislature
intended to correct past sentencing disparities resulting from “ ‘racial bias’ ”
and to “ ‘ensure equal justice,’ ” rather than the potential disparity noted in
Coddington. (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 571; Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 1.) Indeed, the Legislature said as much in the uncodified section,

                                        8
explicitly making Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) retroactive “in
order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing.”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) This intent is also evidenced by Sen. Bill 483’s
express mandate that resentencing under its terms shall result in a reduced
sentence unless there is a finding that a lesser sentence would endanger
public safety. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The legislative history is in accord.
“The Assembly Committee on Public Safety’s analysis of Senate Bill 483
emphasized the bill author’s statement ‘ “that long prison and jail sentences
have no positive impact on public safety, but are demonstrably injurious to
families and communities — particularly Black, Latino, and Native
Americans in the United States and in California.” ’ ” (Carter, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.) As in Harris, these goals would be thwarted if the
prosecution could withdraw from a plea agreement if a resentencing hearing
resulted in a sentence reduction beyond the elimination of prison priors.
(Harris v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.5th, at p. 992.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order striking the prison priors is reversed, and the
matter remanded so the court may hold a resentencing hearing that complies
with section 1172.75. 3 At the hearing, Montgomery may seek relief under
any provision of section 1172.75, and the prosecutor may not rescind the plea
agreement due to a resulting sentence reduction. The abstract of judgment

      3 Since we hold section 1172.75 provides Montgomery the right to be

present, represented by counsel, and to present evidence at a full
resentencing hearing, we need not reach his constitutional claims. Also, we
have no occasion to consider the interplay of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)
and other changes in sentencing law that the Legislature or case law have
determined were not “ ‘intended to overturn long-standing law that a
court cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term.’ ” (Carter, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 969; e.g., People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.)
                                        9
filed December 13, 2022, shall be corrected to reflect that Montgomery pled to
the great bodily injury enhancements (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) on counts two and
three, but the punishments were stayed. We also note that all abstracts of
judgment incorrectly note Montgomery pled to count two as a violation of
section 237.5, subdivision (a). The abstract of judgment issued after the
resentencing hearing shall reflect Montgomery pled to a violation of section
237.5, subdivision (f).

                                      10
                                 _________________________
                                 Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

A167813

                            11
Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Daniel J. Healy

Counsel:

Megan Hailey-Dunsheath, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle
and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                    12