Court Opinion

ID: 9559051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:21:19.605879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:45.170017
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J.—I dissent.
There is no disagreement between the majority opinion of Justice Spence and the dissenting opinion of Justice Schauer on the law applicable to the fixing of penalties by the Department. The fixing of the penalty rests in the discretion of the Department. Within the limits of that discretion the determination of the Department is final and conclusive on the Appeals Board and on the courts. The majority opinion concedes and the dissenting opinion holds that there can be an abuse of discretion as a matter of law in the fixing of the penalty, and that if such occurs, the Appeals Board and the courts possess the power and the duty to reverse and to send *298the case back to the Department for a reappraisal of the penalty.
The difficulty comes in determining when a particular penalty falls within and when without the proper discretion of the trier of the fact. If the penalty is so excessive that reasonable minds cannot reach any other conclusion but that the penalty is excessive, then as a matter of law, the discretion of the trier of the fact has been abused. To this principle all agree. The Appeals Board has determined, as a matter of law, that this is such a case.
In determining whether or not a penalty is excessive as a matter of law, it must be remembered that this is a proceeding to revoke a license. In such a case, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove all elements of its ease, including facts to justify the penalty. We are not permitted to engage in conjecture as to why a particular penalty was imposed. We are not permitted to assume that the Department, being specialists in the field, lmew of facts not appearing in the record that might support what otherwise would appear to be an excessive penalty. The Appeals Board is a specialist in the same field, and yet it found the penalty excessive as a matter of law.
We are limited to the record. If from that record we believe that the penalty was excessive as a matter of law, we should reverse. In determining this question, I suppose that the real question is whether the penalty is so excessive that it shocks the conscience. Some consciences are more easily shocked than others. The penalty herein imposed shocks my conscience. For most of the factual reasons set forth in the dissent of Justice Sehauer, I believe the penalty here imposed was excessive as a matter of law. This being so, the case should be sent back to the Department for a reappraisal of the penalty.