Court Opinion

ID: 9771641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:49:52.799566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:34.406480
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin joined by Justices Garwood, Calvert and Smith
dissenting.
*238The majority opinion holds that probable injury is not shown by conduct on the part of the jurors which the opinion admits constitutes misconduct. I cannot agree that the plaintiff has not shown that he suffered probable injury as a result of such admitted misconduct. Since the happening complained of by the petitioner is admitted by all courts, including the trial court, to be misconduct on the part of the jury, I shall confine my remarks to the question of whether or not “* * * * it reasonably appears from the evidence both on the hearing of the motion (for new trial) and the trial of the case and from the record as a whole that injury probably resulted to the complaining party,” as is provided in Rule 327, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
We agree with the majority opinion that the burden is upon the complaining party to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct probably resulted in injury to him. Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Texas 510, 169 S.W. 2d 462, Rule 327, T.R.C.P. Under the evidence introduced upon the hearing on the motion for new trial, and looking to all the proceedings had in the trial court, there is no escape from the conclusion that injury is shown which will require a reversal of the judgments of both courts. Prior to the admitted misconduct of the jury, the foreman, one Gring, stated that, in his opinion, it was immaterial how the jury answered the issues on negligence of defendant because the plaintiff would recover damages regardless of how such negligence issues were answered. At the time the statement was made the jury stood 10 for a negative answer to such issues and two for an affirmative answer. After the statement was made and after a discussion of such statement was had by many of the jurors — including the two who had voted in the affirmative — the two who had been for affirmative answers to the negligence issues changed their votes to negative votes, thus making a unanimous finding of no negligence. It is an admitted fact that at the time Gring made his statement, and the discussion thereof was had, the jury had been unable to agree on answers to the negligence issues, but had agreed upon the answer to the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff. They had agreed this amount of damages was the sum of $24,000.00 After being assured by Gring and having discussed that how they voted on the negligence issues would not have any effect, these two jurors then voted “no” on the negligence issues. The majority opinion argues that these two might have come over ,to a “no” answer even without Gring’s Statement, and this is assigned as one reason for holding no error. This is mere speculation, as the facts show the two jurors *239changed their vote only after the statement and discussion, and without great delay.
Neither do I agree that the fact that this cause had taken three weeks in which to introduce the testimony, nor that the charge contained 27 issues, nor that the attorneys took eight hours of argument in submitting the case shows that plaintiff suffered no probable injury by the jury misconduct. To hold they do have such bearing is to hold that if the pleadings are voluminous, the trial and argument long, and the charge lengthy, all misconduct of the jury during its deliberations is cured, and no error results. The misconduct of the jury occurred only after all trial matters had been completed. The question of negligence of the defendant was a bitterly contested issue, and the evidence thereon was such that reasonable minds could well differ as to the conclusion to be drawn therefrom, and the answers to be returned to the negligence issues.
I cannot comprehend how any action on the part of a jury could be more harmful to a litigant than for such statement and discussion to cause such litigant to suffer a verdict adverse to him. This was injury going to the very heart of plaintiff’s causé of action and her right to recover therefor.
Although the following cases were decided under the old rules of civil procedure, and although the burden of showing error has been placed upon the complaining party by the new rules, I believe the reasoning of these cases requires a holding that probable error resulted from the overt act of misconduct present in this case. Abrams v. Bradshaw, Texas Civ. App., 2 S.W. 2d 917, affirmed by Supreme Court, Texas Com. App., 24 S.W. 2d 372; Harvey v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., Texas Civ. App., 261 S.W. 197, affirmed by Supreme Court, Texas Com. App., 276 S.W. 899; Walker v. Quanah Ry. Co., Texas Com. App., 58 S.W. 2d 4; Warnack v. Conner, Texas Civ. App., 74 S.W. 2d 719, no writ history, approved in City of Amarillo v. Huddleston, 137 Texas 226, 152 S.W. 2d 1088; Figula v. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co., Texas Civ. App., 131 S.W. 2d 998, error ref.; Allcorn v. Fort Worth Ry. Co., Texas Civ. App., 122 S.W. 2d2d 341, error ref.; Dwyer v. Southern Pacific Co., Texas Civ. App., 141 S.W. 2d 961, error dism. cor. judgm.; Harkins v. Mosley, Texas Civ. App., 134 S.W. 2d 706, no writ history; Mann v. Cook, Texas Civ. App., 11 S.W. 2d 572, no writ history; Coons v. Culp, Texas Civ. App., 278 S.W. 914, no writ history; Pryor v. New St. Anthony Hotel Co., Texas Civ. App., 146 S.W. 2d 427, error ref.
*240Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Texas 447, 216 S.W. 2d 558, 561, upon the point involved stated that if the issue is answered by a juror with the distinct purpose that his answer shall have a preconceived legal effect, he violates the clear intention of Rules 277 and 327, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. That case also says no misconduct of a juror is involved “if he considers each special issue without regard to the legal effect of the answer to be made, but solely from the viewpoint of arriving at the correct conclusion under the evidence.” In that case all issues covering the negligence of the defendant proximately causing plaintiff’s injuries had been answered prior to the discussion involved. In our case no one of the issues on negligence had been answered prior to the discussion. A reading of the record conclusively demonstrates that the two jurors who changed their answers on issues as to defendant’s negligence from “yes” to “no” were answering the issues without regard to the evidence, but solely in order that plaintiff might recover. This very fact convinces me that Gring’s statement that, in his opinion, it made no difference upon the plaintiff’s right of recovery how the jury answered the negligence issues constituted harmful misconduct, and that a fair trial was not had in this case.
I believe there can be no escape from the conclusion 'that the “overt act” of misconduct which is established by the evidence, and which act is admitted, caused “probable injury” to plaintiff and I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals and remand for a new trial.
Opinion delivered February 16, 1955.
Rehearing overruled March 30, 1955.