Court Opinion

ID: 9465863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:57:55.168283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:30.193251
License: Public Domain

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the result reached by the majority on remand from the Supreme Court, namely, reversal of the judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Zampano, J.) which had held that retrial of Grasso was barred by the double jeopardy clause, and remand to the District Court with instructions that retrial of Gras-so is not barred by double jeopardy.
The order of the Supreme Court of June 26, 1978, 438 U.S. 901,1 which vacated our prior judgment, 552 F.2d 46, in my view *348virtually mandated the result we have now reached, as stated above.
The Supreme Court last Term made it .very clear that among the double jeopardy issues it determined were (1) that a defendant who, “by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused,” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1978), may not avail himself of a double jeopardy claim against retrial; and (2) that the absence of an “explicit finding of ‘manifest necessity’ ” and the failure of the trial judge to explore alternatives to a mistrial do not bar retrial of the defendant on the ground of double jeopardy. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1978). The Court’s order of June 26, 1978, note 1, supra, vacating our judgment, expressly directed us to reconsider our prior decision in the light of Scott and Arizona2
The bed-rock of the majority’s prior opinion was its holding that “when a trial ends in a mistrial without any findings having been made as to alternatives to mistrial, the double jeopardy clause will usually bar a retrial of the defendant.” 552 F.2d at 53. The majority today correctly acknowledges that the Arizona court held that findings and exploration of alternatives are not required. It follows that the majority’s prior reading of the plurality opinion in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971), also heavily relied upon, 552 F.2d at 52, was erroneous.
Arizona also held that in the area between the extreme cases “in which a prosecutor requests a mistrial in order to buttress weaknesses in his evidence,” where the strictest scrutiny is demanded in the discharge of a hung jury, and where “great deference” must be accorded to the trial judge, a declaration of a mistrial in a case like this “is entitled to special respect.” The Court illuminated what this meant by saying that the test is whether the trial judge acted “irrationally and irresponsibly.” The majority today correctly concedes, as it must, that Judge Clarie did not do this.3
Perhaps the chief factor in the instant case which in my view compels reversal of the District Court’s double jeopardy holding in the light of Arizona is the retraction of the recantation by the government witness Harris. 552 F.2d at 55. Less than two hours after his recantation to defense counsel, Harris told Special Agents of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service that this was a lie which had been induced by threats. If the defense had been allowed to recall Harris for further cross-examination and to introduce evidence of his recantation, the government of course would have been permitted to offer this evidence — with devastating impact on the defense. Judge Clarie must have had this in mind when he said that Grasso could not “get a fair and impartial trial under the present circumstances.” Everyone agreed with this conclusion. No one, including Grasso’s experienced counsel, wanted the trial to proceed. In this respect the instant *349case is stronger for the government than was Arizona. The majority today correctly recognizes the critical impact of the evidence of the retraction of the recantation.4
For the reasons stated above, as well as those expressed in my previous opinions in this case, 552 F.2d at 54 and 568 F.2d 899,1 concur in the result reached by the majority, thus clearing the decks for retrial of Grasso on the federal income tax evasion charges which have never been determined by a jury.

. The Supreme Court’s order, 438 U.S. 901 (1978), which vacated our prior judgment, is as follows:
“No. 76-1543. United States v. Grasso. C.A.2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), and Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). Reported below: 552 F.2d 46.”

. It is well settled that where, as here, the Supreme Court vacates a judgment of our Court and directs us to reconsider our decision in the light of an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court is acting on the merits. As recently as November 13, 1978, we were reminded of this by Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall:
“Whenever this Court grants certiorari and vacates a Court of Appeals judgment in order to allow that court to reconsider its decision in the light of an intervening decision of this Court, the Court is acting on the merits. Such action always imposes an additional burden on Circuit Judges who — more than any other segment of the Federal Judiciary— are struggling desperately to keep afloat in the flood of federal litigation. For that reason, such action should not be taken unless the intervening decision has shed new light on the law which, if it had been available at the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, might have led to a different result. ” Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25-26, (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

. Unfortunately, however, the majority does not stop with that concession. It engages in an interpretation of Arizona which I think is unnecessary and possibly incorrect, referring to the last two sentences of the majority’s footnote 10. I do not agree with that interpretation of Arizona.

. Here again, however, I am unable to agree with the majority’s imposing as a condition upon the government’s right to retry Grasso its willingness not to call Harris as a witness at the retrial, majority footnote 10, despite the government’s representation that it has no present intention of using Harris at the retrial. It seems to me that, in ruling on a double jeopardy legal issue pursuant to a Supreme Court remand, we should limit ourselves to that function, leaving the record to speak for itself.