Court Opinion

ID: 9673298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:09:42.020742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:21.393313
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
I fail to perceive the difference between our statute, R.S. 40:962A, and section 11,-721 of the California Health and Safety Code which was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758. Both statutes make it unlawful to be addicted to narcotic drugs and, therefore, have for their purpose the infliction of a criminal penalty for a status, rather than denouncing as unlawful a particular act or acts.
The California statute provides “No person shall use * * * or be addicted to the use of narcotics, * * *
R.S. 40:962A declares “It is unlawful for any person * * * to be or become an addict as defined in R.S. 40:961.”
Thus, no act or conduct is prohibited— it is the status of being a drug addict that is proscribed. R.S. 40:961 defines an addict to be a person who habitually uses narcotic drugs “ * * * to such an extent as to create a tolerance for such drug, or drugs, and who does not have a medical need for the use of such drug, or drugs”. It does not render unlawful the act of habitually using the narcotic drug “ * * * leading to such a status”, as the majority opinion states. It is the status itself, i. e., “ * * to be or become an addict as defined in R.S. 40:961” that is prohibited.
Nor can I subscribe to the majority statement that the relators “are not now in prison for being narcotic addicts”, for it was the alleged crime of being a narcotic addict to which each relator pleaded guilty and for which each was sentenced. And these are the same sentences that relators are now serving in the penitentiary.
There is nothing in our statute requiring drug addicts to enter an institution for rehabilitation. Hence, it is not accurate to say that relators are confined in the penitentiary for “ * * * having failed to comply with an established system of treatment designed to promote the general health and welfare of all inhabitants of this state.” R.S. 40:981 provides:
“[I]n cases of conviction for the offense of being an addict as defined in R.S. 40:961 the court may in its discretion, if such conviction be the first had by the offender * * * suspend the execution of the sentence and place such offender on probation * * conditioned upon such person voluntarily entering, within thirty days, one of the United States Public Health Service Hospitals and remaining in such hospital until certified by the medical officer in charge as being cured, and conditioned upon such person’s good behavior for the remainder of his sentence.” (Emphasis mine).
*713This provision makes it doubly clear that the penalty is meted out solely for being an addict. However, unlike the other penalties for infractions of this law (such as sale or possession of narcotic drugs) which prohibit any suspension of sentence, the statute permits the judge to suspend the sentence of a person convicted of the “offense of being an addict” under the specified conditions therein provided. And, like all other laws permitting the judge to suspend sentence, it vests the judge with the right to revoke such suspension when the conditions under which such suspension is granted are not fulfilled.
I respectfully dissent.