Court Opinion

ID: 9528863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:51.015398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:24.815971
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, also dissenting: I join in the dissent of the chief justice and also dissent for the additional reason that I am convinced the proposed referendum violates the free and equal elections provisions of the Illinois Constitution, which provides: “All elections shall be free and equal.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. Ill, sec. 3.) The identical provision was contained in the 1870 Constitution of this State in article II, section 18. In the 1848 Constitution the language was slightly different: “That all elections shall be free and equal.” (Ill. Const. 1848, art. XIII, sec. 5.) Similar language was found in the 1818 Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1818, art. VIII, sec. 5.) Thus, the mandate that all elections shall be free and equal has been a fundamental precept of our constitution since statehood was conferred upon Illinois. This court has construed the free and equal election provisions as requiring that the vote of every qualified elector shall be equal in its influence as that of every other one. (People ex rel. Breckon v. Board of Election Commissioners (1906), 221 Ill. 9, 16, overruled as to other grounds in People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson (1929), 333 Ill. 606; O’Connor v. High School Board of Education (1919), 288 Ill. 240, 247-48 Routt v. Barrett (1947), 396 Ill. 322, 332.) This court has also held that the free and equal elections requirement prohibits the combining of separate unrelated questions into a single proposition for submission to a vote. (Village of Deerfield v. Rapka (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 217, 224.) The reason for so holding is that, by combining two unrelated propositions, the voter is thereby deprived of an opportunity to vote separately and independently on each one. A voter is thereby prevented from giving free and equal expression of preference as to each proposition. (People ex rel. Toman v. Chicago Great Western R.R. Co. (1942), 379 Ill. 594, 598;People ex rel. Hall v. Bopp (1947), 396 Ill. 80, 83; Routt v. Barrett (1947), 396 Ill. 322, 332; Roll v. Carrollton Community Unit School District No. 1 (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 148, 150.) When two unrelated propositions are combined, a voter desiring to vote for one and against the other is forced to cast his vote partially contrary to his preference and therefore does not have an equal opportunity or equal influence with the voter who either favors or opposes both propositions. (O’Connor v. High School Board of Education (1919), 288 Ill. 240, 248; Village of Deerfield v. Rapka (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 217.) In Craig v. Peterson (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 191, this court synthesized the meaning of free and equal elections as contained in our constitution from its previous decisions, and stated: “ ‘The constitutional guarantee gives to every qualified voter the free exercise of his right to cast his vote without suffering any restraint; and his vote, when cast, shall have the same influence as the vote of any other voter’ *** ‘Elections are equal when the vote of each voter is equal in its influence upon the result to the vote of every other elector — where each ballot is as effective as every other ballot.’ ” (Craig v. Peterson (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 191, 195, quoting People v. Deatherage (1948), 401 Ill. 25, 37, and Moran v. Bowley (1932), 347 Ill. 148, 162-63. See also People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson (1929), 333 Ill. 606; People v. Fox (1920), 294 Ill. 263;People ex rel. Grinned v. Hoffman (1886), 116 Ill. 587. In this State this court has effected the prohibition against submitting to the electorate multiple propositions on one referendum through the construction of our free and equal constitutional provisions. Several States have provisions in their constitutions specifically requiring that multiple propositions be submitted in such a manner that the voters may vote for or against each proposition separately. In construing this requirement of their constitutions, the courts in those States have recognized another evil found in the submission of multiple propositions in one referendum. This evil is generally referred to as “logrolling,” which practice, by including in one referendum several unrelated propositions, induces the voters who favor one proposition to vote for all. The result is that through the cumulative favorable votes on all of the propositions some otherwise doubtful propositions are adopted. (Kerby v. Luhrs (1934), 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 549; Hood v. State (1975), 24 Ariz. App. 457, 539 P.2d 931; Schmitz v. Younger (1978), 21 Cal. 3d 90, 93, 577 P.2d 652, 653, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 518 (Manuel, J., dissenting); Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239; State ex rel. City of Fargo v. Wetz (1918), 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835.) In Kerby v. Luhrs, the Arizona Supreme Court has exhaustively analyzed the cases from other jurisdictions on this subject. This court, without specifically referring to the free and equal elections provisions of the constitution, in an early case condemned the evils of logrolling inherent in submitting unrelated propositions together in one referendum so as to secure a favorable vote on all. In Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi & Wabash R.R. Co. (1859), 21 Ill. 333, 373, this court stated: “All elections, as well for measures as men, should be perfectly free, uninfluenced by any consideration, other than the merits of the individual man or measure proposed. We boast of the freedom of the elective franchise, should we not strive to swell the boast by its purity also? A single, isolated measure, such as a railroad, may not unite a majority of a county to whom it is proposed. It. may favor, if constructed, one portion of a county more than another, and thereby be prevented from receiving a clear majority vote, such as the law clearly contemplates shall be given. Is it fair, in order to accomplish this object, to attach another measure to it, to be voted on at the same time, which may benefit the opposing portion of the county? The law never intended that two roads should be coupled together, and the people forbidden to vote for one if they did not also vote for the other, the one road being really a bribe offered for votes for the other. The truth is, the voters of Fulton have never had an opportunity to vote, and never have voted this subscription, for the question was at no time distinctly before them. The question before them was, will you vote for a subscription to two roads? Neither road has received the approving vote of the people, and until that is done, until the naked single question shall be fairly presented to those voters, they ought not to be bound, or injuriously affected, by any such jockeying management and log-rolling. *** This tacking one measure upon another, is unjust in another view, as it gives the County Court power to weigh down a popular single measure, by attaching odious measures to it, and thus virtually depriving the people of their right to vote on the one measure, the success of which would greatly promote their interests.” In spite of the condemnation by this court and the courts of other jurisdictions of the practice of submitting multiple propositions in one referendum, it must be admitted that, as a practical matter, absolute purity in this regard is not required and indeed in many instances would be impossible. There are few propositions that do not involve incidental questions which will be approved or rejected by voting on the principal issue. The question then becomes one of how to differentiate between the joinder of questions that are constitutionally permissible from the joinder of those that violate the free and equal election requirement of our constitution. Regardless of the contention of the respondents that there are three separate questions present in our case, as discussed in the majority opinion, I view the proposition as presenting two separate and unrelated questions. The explanation of the proposed amendment, as contained in the form of ballot set out in the official publication of the Secretary of State mailed to the voters, states: “The purpose of the Amendment is to reduce the size of the House of Representatives from 177 to 118 members and to provide for the election of one Representative from each of 118 districts.” (Office of the Secretary of State, Amendments To The Constitution of Illinois That Will Be Submitted To The Voters November 4, 1980, at 8.) Providing for the election of one representative from each of 118 districts would abolish cumulative voting as is now provided in article IV, section 2(b), of the Constitution of 1970. There are then two questions presented by the referendum: (1) shall the House of Representatives be reduced from 177 to 118 members and (2) shall cumulative voting for members of the House of Representatives be abolished. The majority opinion states that separate questions may be combined in a single proposition as long as they are reasonably related to a common objective in a workable manner. I fail to see how the two questions we are considering are reasonably related to a common objective. The majority deviates from this test later in the opinion when it states: “If there is a reasonable, workable relationship to the same subject, the proposal may be submitted for approval or rejection by the voters.” (83 Ill. 2d at 258.) Frankly, I do not know what that statement means. I have never seen that test stated in any case concerning the submission of multiple questions in one proposition. The opinion appears to attribute this test to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona in State ex rel. Jones v. Lockhart (1953), 76 Ariz. 390, 265 P.2d 447. However, Lockhart does not support the conclusion drawn by the majority of this court. It is not enough to state the general language used in Lockhart — 1 relate to and are germane to, one general subject” — to understand the holding of that case. (76 Ariz. 390, 397, 265 P.2d 447, 452.) Lockhart does not support the general proposition that as long as two questions are germane to and relate to one general subject they may be submitted in one proposition. To understand the holding of Lockhart we must consider the reason behind the general language used. The Arizona Supreme Court in that case, in explaining why the proposed amendment did not violate the multiple question prohibition of that State’s constitution, stated that, at all times since statehood, the provisions governing the composition and apportionment of the two houses of their legislature had been consolidated into a single subsection of their constitution. While the size and apportionment of the House had at previous times been changed by amendment, the size of the Senate had remained the same. Although the amendment in question in that case was the first time that there had been a change in the number of senators elected from each county, each previous amendment had amended the entire section just as much as if it had changed the number of senators. The court was explaining that the subject matter of the question in the amendment had always been treated as a unit, as one subject. The language relied upon by the majority of our court: “[c] learly both relate to, and are germane to, one general subject, i.e., the composition of the state legislature” (83 Ill. 2d at 256), must therefore take its meaning from the Arizona court’s discussion in Lockhart. It is not enough that the several questions simply be germane to or related to one general subject. The majority opinion seems to feel that Lockhart overruled, or somehow superseded (the language used is “controls”) (83 Ill. 2d at 257) the previous holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in Kerby v. Luhrs (1934), 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 549. That is not the case. In fact, the court in Lockhart affirmed the holding of Kerby and stated that the court in Kerby had “laid down the yardstick to be used in determining what matters fall within the ban of the constitutional provision.” (State ex rel. Jones v. Lockhart (1953), 76 Ariz. 390, 396, 265 P.2d 447, 451.) The court then quoted extensively the “yardstick” as laid down in Kerby: “If the different changes contained in the proposed amendment all cover matters necessary to be dealt with in some manner, in order that the Constitution, as amended, shall constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced in that part which is amended, and if, logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a whole, then there is but one amendment submitted. But, if any one of the propositions, although not directly contradicting the others, does not refer to such matters, or if it is not such that the voter supporting it would reasonably be expected to support the principle of the others, then there are in reality two or more amendments to be submitted, and the proposed amendment falls within the constitutional prohibition.” (State ex rel. Jones v. Lockhart (1953), 76 Ariz. 390, 396, 265 P.2d 447, 451.) The Lockhart court then noted that in Kerby it had rejected the contention that the three questions could be combined into one proposition because they all fall under the general heading of taxation. Thus, it is not enough that the questions combined related to one general subject in a general way. According to the yardstick of Kerby, approved and applied in Lockhart, the questions relating to the same general subject matter must be such that, “logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a whole.” (Kerby v. Luhrs (1934), 44 Ariz. 208, 221, 36 P.2d 549, 554.) If one question “is not such that the voter supporting it would reasonably be expected to support the principle of the others” (Kerby v. Luhrs (1934), 44 Ariz. 208, 221, 36 P.2d 549, 554), then they are in reality two or more amendments. Therefore, the test of Kerby, which the majority of our court refuses to apply because of Lockhart, is still the law in Arizona. Also, contrary to the belief expressed in our majority opinion, Lockhart, applying these tests, could not approve the proposal before us. The majority opinion’s reliance on Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, is also misplaced. In considering the several separate questions combined in the famous “Proposition 13,” the court applied a dual test. The first part the court took from its earlier holding in Perry v. Jordan (1949), 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47, which the court referred to as the “reasonably germane” test. The language the court quoted from Perry shows that the “reasonably germane” test does not permit a broad general relationship to a general subject, but requires that the numerous questions presented in one proposition must have one general object and must be so related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 208, 230, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248. The second part of the test applied by the California court was taken from Mr. Justice Manuel’s dissent in Schmitz v. Younger (1978), 21 Cal. 3d 90, 100, 577 P.2d 652, 657-58, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 522-23, which requires that the various questions, to avoid the multiple-question proscription of the California constitution, must be “functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 208, 230, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248.) The California court then held that the proposition in question satisfied both tests in that “the several elements of that article satisfy either standard in that they are both reasonably germane to, and functionally related in furtherance of, a common underlying purpose, namely, effective real property tax relief.” (Emphasis added.) Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 208, 230, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248. The two separate questions combined into the one proposition which we are now considering do not meet either facet of the test applied by the California court. Our two questions can only be said to be germane in that both relate or pertain to the House of Representatives of our General Assembly. The two questions do not have one general object, because the object of one is to reduce the size of the House of Representatives, while the object of the other is to abolish cumulative voting. Also, the two questions are not so related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme. Obviously, there is no common scheme underlying the two questions. Also, they are not related or interdependent. The size of the House can easily be reduced without abolishing cumulative voting by reducing the number of House districts to a number which, when multiplied by three, gives the desired number of members of the House of Representatives. House districts and Senate districts need not coincide. Also, cumulative voting can be abolished without reducing the size of the House of Representatives or changing the number of districts from which the members are elected by simply electing three representatives from each district without the benefit of the cumulative vote. The language quoted by the majority opinion in our case from Carter v. Burson (1973), 230 Ga. 511, 198 S.E.2d 151, also does not support the opinion of this court because that case also holds that all parts of the amendment must be germane to the accomplishment of a single objective. Likewise, the language of the Louisiana case State ex rel. Kemp v. City of Baton Rouge (1949), 215 La. 315, 40 So. 2d 477, requires that the proposed amendment be considered as a plan of government and that the several subjects must be germane to the general purpose of the amendment. As noted above, there are two general purposes involved in the proposition we are now considering, each unrelated and not interdependent. We need not go to other jurisdictions to find support for the position for which I contend. In People ex rel. Hall v. Bopp (1947), 396 Ill. 80, 83, this court said: “The constitutional provision circumscribes the power of the General Assembly and prohibits it from prescribing a form of ballot which combines two or more separate unrelated propositions into a single question.” (Emphasis added.) This court went on to say in Bopp that separate questions which are incidental to and form an integral part of the main question to be submitted to the voters need not be submitted separately. (People ex rel. Hall v. Bopp (1947), 396 Ill. 80, 84.) The same “separate and unrelated” and “incidental to” tests were applied in Routt v. Barrett (1947), 396 Ill. 322, 332-33. In Village of Deerfield v. Rapka (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 217, 224, the court also applied the “separate and unrelated” test. In Roll v. Carrollton Community Unit School District No. 1 (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 148, 151, this court found that the single proposition submitted to the voters had but one general purpose, namely, to meet the building needs of the school district as a whole and that the proposals included in the single proposition “are substantially connected to and related to each other in nature to satisfy the constitutional provision.” In Solomon v. North Shore Sanitary District (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 309, 318, the court found that the several separate construction projects submitted for approval on ballot did not violate the constitutional proscription because they were “related and dependent and are components of one proposition.” In Voss v. Chicago Park District (1946), 392 Ill. 429, 434, the court stated “the object designated on the ballot indicates a single general purpose ***.” The word “germane,” as used by this court in applying the constitutional provision now under consideration, appears to be related to the use of that word by this court in cases which considered the provisions of the 1870 Constitution which prohibited an act of the legislature from embracing more than one subject and which required that subject to be expressed in the title (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, sec. 13). In Dolese v. Pierce (1888), 124 Ill. 140, this court gave meaning to the word “germane” in applying the prohibitions of article IV, section 13, of the Constitution of 1870, and stated: “It is said, however, that legislation affecting the boundaries of cities and villages is germane to that affecting the boundaries of townships. But counsel have failed to tell us in what way or sense the one is germane to the other, or what meaning they attach to that term in giving a construction to the provision of the constitution in question. Literally, ‘germane’ means ‘akin,’ ‘closely allied.’ It is only applicable to persons who are united to each other by the common tie of blood or marriage. When applied to inanimate things, it is, of course, used in a metaphorical sense, but still the idea of a common tie is always present. Thus, when properly applied to a legislative provision, the common tie is found in the tendency of the provision to promote the object and purpose of the act to which it belongs. Any provision not having this tendency, which introduces new subject matter into the act, is clearly obnoxious to the constitutional provision in question.” (Dolese v. Pierce (1888), 124 Ill. 140, 147.) This court restated this definition of “germane” in Sutter v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co. (1918), 284 Ill. 634, 643. In Campe v. Cermak (1928), 330 Ill. 463, in considering a statute challenged as being in violation of article IV, section 13, of the Constitution of 1870, the court said: “If the particulars are incidental or germane to the general title or main purpose and show a furtherance of the one scheme or purpose of the act, the title is single and the act embracing the same general subject and particulars is valid.” Campe v. Cermak (1928), 330 Ill. 463, 468. The majority opinion in our case pays lip service to the “separate and unrelated” test and to the “germane” test. However, in doing so it retreats from the separate purpose of each question on the ballot until it is able to find some common denominator. As stated in the opinion, that common denominator is that “they relate directly to the ultimate purpose of structural and procedural change in the House of Representatives.” (Emphasis added.) (83 Ill. 2d at 260.) That is about as broad a statement of a common purpose as one can make because that encompasses the entire area concerning the House of Representatives which is subject to change by a constitutional amendment brought about by initiative. Article XIV, section 3, of the Constitution of 1970 limits constitutional amendments submitted in this manner to “structural and procedural” subjects contained in article IV. What the majority opinion seems to say is that any and all constitutional changes of either House of the General Assembly authorized under article XIV, section 3, can be submitted on one ballot regardless of how many questions may be involved or what “structural and procedural” changes they propose. I do not agree. There is nothing in article XIV, section 3, of our constitution which even intimates that the “free and equal elections” provision of article III, section 3, of our constitution shall not apply. Likewise, article III, section 3, does not so indicate. This construction given to article III, section 3, simply renders it meaningless. The observation of the Arizona court in Kerby v. Luhrs is particularly appropriate: “An entire Code of laws cannot be embodied in an amendment to the constitution merely because said laws pertain to ‘one object or purpose.’ ” (Kerby v. Luhrs (1934), 44 Ariz. 208, 218, 36 P.2d 549, 553.) I must also agree with the statement of Mr. Justice Manuel of California in his dissent in Schmitz v. Younger (1978), 21 Cal. 3d 90, 101, 577 P.2d 652, 658, 145 Cal. Rptr. 512, 523: “[I] f the broad umbrella of ‘educational reform’ can embrace such diverse and unrelated subjects as are presented here, then the one subject limitation becomes meaningless.” It is again appropriate to refer to the language of this court in Dolese v. Pierce: “It is an error to suppose that two things are, in a legal sense, germane to each other merely because there is a resemblance between them, or because they have some characteristics common to them both. One might, with just as much reason, contend that two persons are necessarily akin because they are of the same complexion, or in other particulars alike.” Dolese v. Pierce (1888), 124 Ill. 140, 147. The majority opinion, although referring to and quoting from many of the same cases to which I have referred in this dissent, does not apply the law as stated in those cases, which requires more than just some vague general connection between two questions submitted under one proposition. The majority opinion simply holds that since both questions we are considering relate to the types of amendments authorized under article XIV, section 3, of our constitution, they can be combined into one proposition on the ballot. This is a dangerous construction and will surely lead to a deprivation of the right of voters to express themselves separately on unrelated questions. Voters’ influence and the weight of their votes will no longer be equal, and logrolling to achieve adoption of undesirable issues will be encouraged. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.