Court Opinion

ID: 9784393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:43:46.517582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:54.183796
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
1124 I respectfully dissent. The majority recognizes that, at a preliminary hearing, "the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). The majority fails, however, to properly apply that standard in this case.
[ 25 The evidence presented at this preliminary hearing established that defendant told an undercover officer, who had inquired about buying drugs, that defendant had cocaine; the officer handed defendant twenty dollars; and defendant took the money and told the officer to "wait there." That was sufficient to bind defendant over for arranging to distribute a controlled substance because the evidence and reasonable inferences established that defendant had "discussed the purchase with [the officer], set a price for the [cocaine], and agreed to make the exchange." State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1987).
126 The majority argues, however, that it would be an "exercise in pure speculation" to try to determine whether defendant actually intended to deliver cocaine to the officer. The majority may be correct in suggesting that defendant might have intended to steal the officer's money rather than to deliver the eocaine. For purposes of a bindover, however, we do not need to make that determination. Because it was reasonable to infer that *732defendant intended to deliver cocaine to the officer, the judge should have bound defendant over for trial. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 (stating that " 'unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial") (citation omitted; alteration in original).
127 In citing State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911, the majority implies that the quantum of evidence necessary for a bindover and a conviction is the same. This, of course, is not the law. At a bindover hearing, "¢ "[the prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must [only] present a quantum of evi-denee sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact.""" State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). The applicable standard for a bindover is probable cause. See id. "This probable cause standard 'is lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases'" Id. (citations omitted). Here, we certainly have probable cause to believe that defendant intended to facilitate a drug transaction.
T28 In any event, defendant was not charged only with arranging to distribute a controlled substance. The State charged defendant with "unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance," in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-87-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp.1999). For purposes of a bindover, there can be little dispute that the facts sufficiently showed that defendant offered, agreed, or consented to distribute a controlled substance in violation of the statute.
1 29 Accordingly, I dissent.