Court Opinion

ID: 9420503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:54:54.154458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:25.496245
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
joined by Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting.
Although the parties are the United States and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, this is nothing more than an ordinary insurance case. It is before us because of a conflict with the views of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in General Insurance Co. of America v. Link, 173 F. 2d 955. On December 16, 1942, the Standard tanker Worthington collided with a United States Navy mine sweeper, the YMS-12, engaged in sweeping mines in the channel outside New York harbor. It has been stipulated that the collision “was contributed to both by fault in the navigation of SS John *62Worthington and fault in the navigation of the United States Ship YMS-12, consisting of failures on the part of both vessels to comply with applicable rules for the prevention of collisions and the requirements of good seamanship under the circumstances.” The Worthing-ton was undamaged, but under admiralty law Standard was liable for half the damage sustained by the mine sweeper since both ships were at fault. Standard, as a self-insurer of its tanker Worthington, had assumed all marine risks except those undertaken by the United States, the charterer of the vessel. The Government’s undertaking was to insure against “all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations.”1
The United States filed a libel against Standard to recover for one-half the damage to the Navy mine sweeper. Standard answered that the United States, as insurer of the tanker, would, in view of the nature of the *63collision, have to reimburse Standard for any loss it sustained in the suit.2 The District Court dismissed the libel upon this theory. 81 F. Supp. 183. The Court of Ap*64peals for the Second Circuit reversed, 178 F. 2d 488, and this Court granted certiorari, 339 U. S. 977, because, as already noted, there was a conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits.
In granting without limitation the petition for certiorari, we brought here all that by fair implication is contained in the following question: “Is a collision between a war vessel engaged on a warlike operation and a merchant vessel, with fault on the part of both vessels, a consequence of the warlike operation of the war vessel?” I do not think it is permissible to limit the question that was brought here by an assumption that there was no proof of relation between the peculiar risks due to the warlike operation and the loss. The District Court found a connection between the loss and the risks incident to the warlike operation. The Court of Appeals opinion discussed at length the standard upon which such a finding is based. The petitioner’s submission here seems clearly to adhere to the ground on which he prevailed in the District Court. It is true that where the standard to be applied to the facts is clear, we ought not to be concerned over a difference of view regarding the facts between the District Court and Court of Appeals. But where the clash of views may involve the meaning of the standard to be applied to the facts, it makes for uncertainty if this Court fails to consider the problem fully. The “proximate cause” standard of insurance liability is, at best, an elusive concept. It acquires more vivid meaning when abstract discussion leads to an application of the principle.
Since the issue is the scope to be given the words “all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations,-’ it is important to place the phrase in its historic setting. Phrases like other organisms must be related to their environment. It furthers clarity explicitly to set to one side a group of cases construing an earlier phrase which arose in a different setting. In several cases the Court of *65Claims and this Court had occasion to consider a provision in Civil War charters and later Government charters whereby the Government assumed the “war risk” for the vessels. When first called upon to construe the charter provision “war risk,” the Court of Claims specifically noted that it was not dealing with a standard marine insurance clause and construed the words to mean “acts of the public enemy” or “casualties of war.” Bogert v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 159, 163. This restrictive definition was reiterated in Morgan v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 182, 189-190, which was affirmed in 14 Wall. 531, and became settled doctrine in the subsequent cases involving the “war risk” charter term.
The clause that is our concern, “all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations,” was not derived from the American “war risk” charter term and therefore is not to draw its meaning from the cases construing that term. It is a clause evolved by English maritime insurers. See the opinion of Lord Justice Atkin in Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1919] 2 K. B. 670, 692-693. And the language has often been construed in English courts. See Yorkshire Dale S. S. Co. v. Minister of War Transport, [1942] A. C. 691, 703, 714, for a discussion of the cases by Lord Wright and Lord Porter. It is only natural that American courts have looked to the English cases for illumination just as courts look to the decisions of another State for aid in determining the meaning of a statute adopted from that State. Provisions in a standard contract form become words of art, and their content is most dependably arrived at by considering the origin of the words and the meaning they have in practice acquired. These are considerations making for appropriate construction and do not imply subservience to English decisions.
Two problems arise in construing the clause: (1) What constitutes “hostilities or warlike operations?” (2) What is the sweep of the words “all consequences?” The first *66question, which has presented great difficulties in cases involving convoys and blacked-out vessels, has been removed from the case by a stipulation that the mine sweeper was engaged in sweeping mines — beyond dispute a warlike operation. A warlike operation does not lose its warlike character because it is carried out negligently.
The only question before the Court is whether the collision was a “consequence” of the warlike operation, or, in the jargon of insurance cases, whether the warlike operation was the “proximate cause” of the collision. “Proximate cause,” as a requirement of liability under an insurance policy, is not a technical legal conception but a convenient tag for the law’s response to good sense. It is shorthand for saying that there must be such a nexus between the policy term under which insurance money is claimed and the events giving rise to the loss that it can be fairly declared that the loss was within the risk assumed. The case is one of “common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations.” Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 117.
. Unlike obligations flowing from duties imposed upon people willy-nilly, an insurance policy is a voluntary undertaking by which obligations are voluntarily assumed. Therefore the subtleties and sophistries of tort liability for negligence are not to be applied in construing the covenants of a policy. It is one thing for the law to impose liability by its own notions of responsibility, and quite another to construe the scope of engagements bought and paid for. The law of marine insurance is concerned with and reflects the practicalities of commercial dealings. The law does not play an unreal metaphysical game of trying to find a single isolatable factor as the sole responsibility to which is to be attributed a loss against which insurance has been bought. As a matter of experience’ and reason such losses are invariably the resultant of a combination of factors. The scope of the undertaking *67to cover for such losses is partly the law’s confirmation of the settled understanding of those whose business is shipping — their understanding of what contingencies the undertaking covered. It is partly the law’s endeavor, in view of the inevitable treacheries of language, to shield the insurer from liability for a loss on the basis of a factor too remote, and therefore too tenuous, in the combination of elements that converged toward the loss.
Looking to the facts of this case and the terms of the contract, does the failure of both vessels “to comply with applicable rules for the prevention of collisions and the requirements of good seamanship under the circumstances” relieve of responsibility the insurer against all consequences of hostilities and warlike operations? In other words, does contributory negligence in relation to a warlike operation displace the warlike operation as an effective force in bringing about a loss?
The collision occurred between 5 and 6 a. m. on December 16, 1942, in the swept channel in the approaches to New York harbor. The YMS-12 was proceeding seaward with her mine-sweeping gear streamed. She was the starboard vessel in a formation of three mine sweepers engaged in sweeping the buoyed channel. In the words of the District Judge, who questioned counsel closely on the way in which mine sweeping was carried on:
“Here, concededly, negligence in navigation existed on the part of both masters, but that negligence did not break the chain of causation so as to prevent the loss from being attributable to the warlike operation. The YMS-12 and the two accompanying vessels, in mine sweeping formation, proceeding with mine sweeping gear streamed and trailing paravanes, presented an unusual and unexpected obstacle to navigation. YMS-105 was the guide ship of the formation, the YMS-12 was stationed several hundred yards on the starboard beam of the YMS-105 and *68the third vessel in the formation, the AMC-95, was echelon to the right of the guide ship, in a position approximately a half mile astern and midway between the YMS-105 and the YMS-12. From the time of the encounter until actual collision the vessels continued in their mine sweeping operations with their paravanes trailing; in all her manoeuvres and in her navigation the YMS-12 was necessarily restricted and impeded. This unusual formation, of which the YMS-12 was a part, closed to the S. S. John Worth-ington lanes of navigation affording possible escape which would ordinarily have been open to her.
“The negligence found to exist was negligence ‘under the circumstances’ of the special and extraordinary conditions existing — conditions created by the warlike operation of mine sweeping.” 81 F. Supp. 183, 191.
Whether the Court of Appeals reached its decision by application of an erroneous rule of law, by the erroneous application of the proper rule of law, or by an erroneous construction of the stipulation of fact made by the parties is not clear. In any case, it should be reversed. If the matter is viewed simply — according to the fair judgment of men of commerce and clear of beclouding abstractions— one can hardly escape the conclusion of the District Court. The fact that the English courts have reached the same conclusion in similar cases does not weaken its force. See Board of Trade v. Hain S. S. Co., [1929] A. C. 534; Attorney-General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292.
The Government makes a second contention: that its war-risk undertaking did not extend to collision liability. Since the only loss to Standard was a liability for damage to the other ship, this argument would relieve the Government of its liability as insurer. The contention finds support in Adelaide S. S. Co. v. Attorney-General (The Second Warilda), [1926] A. C. 172. But subsequent *69changes in the wording of the policy make it perfectly plain that the United States insured against collision liability.3

 The Worthington was under requisition time charter to the United States at the time of collision. Clause 20 of Part II of the charter provided:
“Unless otherwise mutually arranged, at all times during the currency of this Charter the Charterer shall provide and pay for or assume: (i) insurance on the Vessel, under the terms and conditions of the full form of standard hull war risk policy of the War Shipping Administration, . . . .”
The clause further provided that Standard should assume or insure against all risks “[e]xcept as to risks or liabilities assumed, insured or indemnified against by the Charterer [i. e. the United States]
The Government provided insurance against risks arising from hostilities or warlike operations by an involute and somewhat enigmatic set of forms. A binder of insurance issued to Standard by the United States provided: “3. This binder shall be subject to all the rules, regulations, conditions and policy forms as prescribed by the War Shipping Administration. . . .” Endorsement No. 1 to the binder also provided: “2. This insurance shall be subject to all the rules, regulations, conditions and policy forms as prescribed by the War Shipping Administration in force at the time of issuance of the binder and shall be subject to the terms of the requisition *63charter party relative to this vessel accepted by the assured and any modifications or amendments thereto.”
The standard War Shipping Administration policy form referred to in the charter and binder included the following clauses:

“F. C. & S. Clause. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Policy, this insurance is warranted free from any claim for loss, damage, or expense caused by or resulting from capture, seizure, arrest, restraint, or detainment, or the consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat, or any taking of the Vessel, by requisition or otherwise, whether in time of peace or war and whether lawful or otherwise; also from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations (whether there be a declaration of war or not), piracy, civil war, revolution, rebellion, or insurrection, or civil strife arising therefrom.

“If war risks are hereafter insured by endorsement on the Policy, such endorsement shall supersede the above warranty only to the extent that their terms are inconsistent and only while such war risk endorsement remains in force.”

An endorsement to the policy form further provided:
“It is agreed that this insurance covers only those risks which would be covered by the attached policy (including the Collision Clause) in the absence of the F. C. & S. warranty contained therein but which are excluded by that warranty.”

 In a letter to Standard counsel dated December 14, 1945, the Acting Chief Adjuster, Division of Maritime Insurance, stated that “any claim or suit by the United States of America, as Owners of the ship Y.M.S.-12, in which we might prove to be concerned, would be waived.”
See Interdepartmental Waiver promulgated by War Shipping Administration in Legal Bulletin W. S. A. No. 23, Part II, dated January 14, 1943:
“II. Inter-Departmental Claims
“Generally stated, it can be said that all types of maritime claims in favor of or against a Government department or agency, such as War Shipping Administration, Army, Navy, Lend-Lease Administration, etc., which claims are in turn for or against another. United States Government department or agency, are to be waived and will not be asserted or pressed to final conclusion. . . .”

 The corresponding insurance provisions in the Second Warilda and the present case are set forth below:

Warilda

[1926] A. C. at 177-178
“19. The risks of war which are taken by the Admiralty are those risks which would be excluded from an ordinary English policy of marine insurance by the following, or similar, but not more extensive clause:
“ ‘Warranted free of capture, seizure, and detention and the consequences thereof, or of any attempt thereat, piracy excepted, and also from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations whether before or after declaration of war.’ ”

Worthington

“War Risk Clauses
“It is agreed that this insurance covers only those risks which would be covered by the attached policy (including the Collision Clause) in the absence of the F. C. & S. warranty contained therein but which are excluded by that warranty. . . .

“F. C. & S. Clause

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Policy, this insurance is warranted free from any claim for loss, damage, or expense caused by or resulting from capture, seizure, arrest, restraint, or detainment, or the consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat, or any taking of the Vessel, by requisition or otherwise, whether in time of peace or war and whether lawful or otherwise; also from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations. . . .

“If war risks are hereafter insured by endorsement on the Policy, such endorsement shall supersede the above warranty only to the extent that their terms are inconsistent and only while such war risk endorsement remains in force.”