Court Opinion

ID: 9603858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:10:25.786964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:14.567019
License: Public Domain

*198BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because the record unequivocally shows that the trial court had a sound legal basis for dismissing one juror who cursed at and demeaned other jurors, our standard of review mandates a finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. As such, I respectfully dissent from Division 2 and must therefore dissent from the judgment reached by the majority.
In cases such as this, our longstanding standard of review requires us to defer to the trial court’s discretion in excusing a juror for cause. Atrial court, in its discretion, may dismiss a juror who for “good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty,” or may dismiss a juror for “legal cause.” OCGA § 15-12-172. “ ‘Under OCGA § 15-12-172, the trial court has discretion to discharge a juror and replace him or her with an alternate at any time, and we will not reverse as long as the court’s exercise of discretion has a sound legal basis’ ” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Norris v. State.9 Where the defendant has agreed to be tried by less than 12 jurors if a juror is dismissed, the trial court may in the exercise of this discretion dismiss a juror for good cause and allow the proceedings to continue with only 11. Baptiste v. State.10
The sound legal basis here was the juror’s unabashed cursing (which he only reluctantly and evasively conceded) of other jurors in an attempt to browbeat those jurors into agreeing with his point of view. Indeed, this juror also humiliated other jurors by calling them “monkeys,” “stupid,” “and a few other things.” Contrary to the court’s instruction to decide the case based on the evidence presented, this juror’s tactic of verbal abuse to intimidate other jurors to change their opinions perverted the deliberative process and was clearly sufficient grounds for the court to exercise its discretion to dismiss the offending juror. See Mayfield v. State11 (“[c]ertainly, a juror’s refusal [during deliberations] to decide the case on the evidence under the law as charged by the court would provide legal cause for that juror’s removal”); Thompson v. State12 (court may consider totality of circumstances in dismissing holdout juror who was connected to attempt to subvert the jury); Wooten v. State13 (juror’s failure to respond truthfully was grounds for dismissing juror during deliberations); *199McGuire v. State14 (juror dismissed where he visited crime scene and tried during deliberations to influence other jurors to decide the case on this evidence).
Decided July 7, 2005
Edith M. Edwards, for appellant.
J. David Miller, District Attorney, James G. Threlkeld, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority opines, without appropriate authority to do so, that, as a matter of law, offensive language during deliberations can never be the basis for a trial court to exercise its discretion to remove a juror. This ruling, however, contradicts our mandatory standard of review, and it unduly restrains the sound legal discretion of a trial court experiencing firsthand a wayward juror who contrary to court instructions is on a verbal rampage to intimidate other jurors into accepting his point of view.
Sears v. State,15 cited by the majority, actually requires a finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. In Sears, our Supreme Court held that it would sustain the trial court’s exercise of discretion to not dismiss a juror who accused another juror of perjury; that is exactly what we should do here — sustain the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Sears did not state that it would have reversed the trial court if it had decided otherwise. Similarly, had the trial court decided not to dismiss the offending juror here, we would have been correct in sustaining that discretionary decision and in not substituting our own judgment as to what we would have done had we been sitting in the trial judge’s chair. As an appellate court reviewing a cold record, we are bound to sustain a discretionary decision regarding the dismissal of jurors so long as there is some sound basis for that decision. Herring v. State.16 Berating and bullying other jurors to coerce them to come to a verdict different from that which they feel is justified by the evidence is a sound basis to dismiss that juror.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s decision here and must therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews and Judge Miller join in this dissent.

 Norris v. State, 230 Ga. App. 492, 495 (5) (496 SE2d 781) (1998).

 Baptiste v. State, 190 Ga. App. 451, 453 (2) (379 SE2d 165) (1989).

 Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. 324, 330 (2) (a) (578 SE2d 438) (2003).

 Thompson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 253, 258-259 (5) (581 SE2d 596) (2003).

 Wooten v. State, 250 Ga. App. 686, 687 (3) (552 SE2d 878) (2001).

 McGuire v. State, 200 Ga. App. 509, 510 (3) (408 SE2d 506) (1991).

 Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 841 (3) (b) (514 SE2d 426) (1999).

 Herring v. State, 224 Ga. App. 809, 811 (1) (481 SE2d 842) (1997).