Court Opinion

ID: 9811798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:28:57.915858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:29.960285
License: Public Domain

Walker, J.,
dissents because the court did not have the requisite jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court statute, and further because if it had such jurisdiction there was not any evidence that justified the findings as to fact and law, or which should deprive the father of, or impair his preferential right to, the custody of Ms child. One of the most important and essential facts was not found by the court below, and the failure of the father to visit his wife and child, if there was such a failure, is fully explained by the testimony, which shows that it was not the father’s fault, but the fault of those who now seek to retain the custody of the child. The right of the father, in my opinion, should be upheld upon the principle so often applied by us in such cases, when the father’s natural right was recognized and enforced. Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15. In that case, at page 18, this Court said, and it is. strikingly applicable to the facts in this appeal: “While the Court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may order the child into the custody of some other person other than the father, when the facts and circumstances justify such a disposition of the child, we do not think that any such case is presented in this record as should induce us to adopt that course and except this case from the general rule. The father has done nothing by which he has incurred a forfeiture of Ms right to the custody of his offspring. There is no room for the exercise even of a sound discretion in favor of the grandparents who have possession of the- ehild. Speaking for himself, and not committing the Court to his view, the writer of this opinion would hesitate to remove the child from its *49present custody, if tbe law were more elastic and we were vested witb a larger discretion tban is given by tbe law; but we must follow tbe precedents and tbe general principles of justice established by them, tbougb tbe result may be contrary to wbat we may consider as tbe real merits of tbe particular case, and tbougb by tbe facts, even as found by tbe court, our sympathies may be enlisted in behalf of tbe grandparents. Tbe insistence upon bis strict right under tbe circumstances may not be very creditable to tbe petitioner, yet tbe law is inexorable in such a case, and cannot be made to yield in deference to a mere sentiment ox to a tender regard for tbe feeling of one of tbe parties; nor are we permitted to exercise an arbitrary discretion.” Tbe Newsome case has been frequently approved and affirmed. In re Jones, 153 N. C., 312; In re Turner, 151 N. C., 474; In re Fain, 172 N. C., 790; Howell v. Soloman, 167 N. C., 588; Brickell v. Hines, 179 N. C., 254, where tbe cases are collected. See, also, Latham v. Ellis, 116 N. C., 30.
Tbe mother of this child is dead. Tbe father is able to take care of tbe child, and if tbe evidence is at all credible, is better able to do so tban those to whom its custody has been awarded. It has been said by this Court in tbe cases above cited, that tbe parent has tbe preferred right of custody and for cogent reasons, and in Brickell v. Hines, supra, by Justice Nolee, that “this right, being a natural and .substantive one, may not be lightly denied or interfered witb by action of tbe courts.” It is true, as we have often held, that tbe welfare of tbe child deserves and should have consideration, but tbe Court should proceed cautiously and not deprive tbe father of bis right, except upon clear and strong evidence, which is not present in this case.