Court Opinion

ID: 9430507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:53.307577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:24.723164
License: Public Domain

Justice O’Connor,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
This case requires us to define and apply the standard required by the Equal Protection Clause when a governmental agency agrees to give preferences on the basis of race or national origin in making layoffs of employees. The specific question posed is, as Justice Marshall puts it, “whether the Constitution prohibits a union and a local school board from developing a collective-bargaining agreement that apportions layoffs between two racially determined groups as a means of preserving the effects of an affirmative hiring policy.” Post, at 300 (dissenting). There is no issue here of the interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; accordingly, we have only the constitutional issue to resolve.
The Equal Protection Clause standard applicable to racial classifications that work to the disadvantage of “non-minorities” has been articulated in various ways. See, e. g., post, at 301-302 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Pow-*285ELL now would require that: (1) the racial classification be justified by a “‘compelling governmental interest/” and (2) the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose be “narrowly tailored.” Ante, at 274. This standard reflects the belief, apparently held by all Members of this Court, that racial classifications of any sort must be subjected to “strict scrutiny,” however defined. See, e. g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. J., joined by White, J.) (“Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees”); id., at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification”); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by White, J.) (“Racial,and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination”); id., at 361-362 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (“[0]ur review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict — not ‘“strict” in theory and fatal in fact/ because it is stigma that causes fatality — but strict and searching nonetheless”). Justices Marshall, Brennan-, and Blackmun, however, seem to adhere to the formulation of the “strict” standard that they authored, with Justice White, in Bakke: “remedial use of race is permissible if it serves ‘important governmental objectives’ and is ‘substantially related to achievement of those objectives.’” Post, at 301-302 (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting Bakke, supra, at 359 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
I subscribe to Justice Powell’s formulation because it mirrors the standard we have consistently applied in examining racial classifications in other contexts. In my view,
“the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply *286because the objective appears acceptable to individual Members of the Court. While the validity and importance of the objective may affect the outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself does not change.” Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724, n. 9 (1982).
Although Justice Powell’s formulation may be viewed as more stringent than that suggested by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, the disparities between the two tests do not preclude a fair measure of consensus. In particular, as regards certain state interests commonly relied upon in formulating affirmative action programs, the distinction between a “compelling” and an “important” governmental purpose may be a negligible one. The Court is in agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program. This remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required. See infra, at 289-293; ante, at 277-278. See also post, at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Additionally, although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently “compelling,” at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest. See, e. g., Bakke, supra, at 311-315 (opinion of Powell, J.). See also post, at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting); post, at 315-317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And certainly nothing the Court has said today necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other governmental interests which have been relied upon in the lower courts but which have not been passed on here to be sufficiently “important” or “compelling” to sustain the use of affirmative action policies.
*287It appears, then, that the true source of disagreement on the Court lies not so much in defining the state interests which may support affirmative action efforts as in defining the degree to which the means employed must “fit” the ends pursued to meet constitutional standards. See, e. g., ante, at 280, nn. 6, 7. Yet even here the Court has forged a degree of unanimity; it is agreed that a plan need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently “narrowly tailored,” or “substantially related,” to the correction of prior discrimination by the state actor. See infra, at 289; ante, at 277-278; post, at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In the final analysis, the diverse formulations and the number of separate writings put forth by various Members of the Court in these difficult cases do not necessarily reflect an intractable fragmentation in opinion with respect to certain core principles. Ultimately, the Court is at least in accord in believing that a public employer, consistent with the Constitution, may undertake an affirmative action program which is designed to further a legitimate remedial purpose and which implements that purpose by means that do not impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by a plan’s racial preference.
Respondent School Board argues that the governmental purpose or goal advanced here was the School Board’s desire to correct apparent prior employment discrimination against minorities while avoiding further litigation. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 15-17. See also Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss in No. Civ. 81-8173249 (ED Mich.), p. 16 (hereinafter cited as Defendant’s Summary Judgment Brief). The Michigan Civil Rights Commission determined that the evidence before it supported the allegations of discrimination on the part of the Jackson School Board, though that determination was never reduced to formal findings because the School Board, *288with the agreement of the Jackson Education Association (Union), voluntarily chose to remedy the perceived violation. Among the measures the School Board and the Union eventually agreed were necessary to remedy the apparent prior discrimination was the layoff provision challenged here; they reasoned that without the layoff provision, the remedial gains made under the ongoing hiring goals contained in the collective bargaining agreement could be eviscerated by layoffs.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not focus on the School Board’s unquestionably compelling interest in remedying its apparent prior discrimination when evaluating the constitutionality of the challenged layoff provision. Instead, both courts reasoned that the goals of remedying “societal discrimination” and providing “role models” were sufficiently important to withstand equal protection scrutiny. I agree with the plurality that a governmental agency’s interest in remedying “societal” discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny. See ante, at 276. See also Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). I also concur in the plurality’s assessment that use by the courts below of a “role model” theory to justify the conclusion that this plan had a legitimate remedial purpose was in error.* See ante, at 275-276. Thus, in my view, the District Court and the Court of Appeals clearly erred in relying on these purposes and in failing to give greater attention to the School *289Board’s asserted purpose of rectifying its own apparent discrimination.
The error of the District Court and the Court of Appeals can be explained by reference to the fact that the primary issue argued by the parties on the cross motions for summary judgment was whether the School Board, a court, or another competent body had to have made a finding of past discrimination before or at the time of the institution of the plan in order for the plan to be upheld as remedial in purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1200 (ED Mich. 1982). See also Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in No. Civ. 81-8173249 (ED Mich.), pp. 5-13; Defendant’s Summary Judgment Brief 11-15. The courts below ruled that a particularized, contemporaneous finding of discrimination was not necessary and upheld the plan as a remedy for “societal” discrimination, apparently on the assumption that in the absence of a specific, contemporaneous finding, any discrimination addressed by an affirmative action plan could only be termed “societal.” See, e. g., 546 F. Supp., at 1199. I believe that this assumption is false and therefore agree with the plurality that a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past discrimination by a court or other competent body is not a constitutional prerequisite to a public employer’s voluntary agreement to an affirmative action plan. See ante, at 277-278.
A violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements does not arise with the making of a finding; it arises when the wrong is committed. Contemporaneous findings serve solely as a means by which it can be made absolutely certain that the governmental actor truly is attempting to remedy its own unlawful conduct when it adopts an affirmative action plan, rather than attempting to alleviate the wrongs suffered through general societal discrimination. See, e. g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S., at 498 (Powell, J., concurring). Such findings, when voluntarily made *290by a public employer, obviously are desirable in that they provide evidentiary safeguards of value both to nonminority employees and to the public employer itself, should its affirmative action program be challenged in court. If contemporaneous findings were required of public employers in every case as a precondition to the constitutional validity of their affirmative action efforts, however, the relative value of these evidentiary advantages would diminish, for they could be secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important values.
The imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would severely undermine public employers’ incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obligations. See, e. g., Bakke, supra, at 364 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Cf. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 210-211 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). This result would clearly be at odds with this Court’s and Congress’ consistent emphasis on “the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law.” Bakke, supra, at 364 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). The value of voluntary compliance is doubly important when it is a public employer that acts, both because of the example its voluntary assumption of responsibility sets and because the remediation of governmental discrimination is of unique importance. See S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 10 (1971) (accompanying the amendments extending coverage of Title VII to the States) (“Discrimination by government. . . serves a doubly destructive purpose. The exclusion of minorities from effective participation in the bureaucracy not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in that particular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too often hostility toward the entire process of government”). *291Imposing a contemporaneous findings requirement would produce the anomalous result that what private employers may voluntarily do to correct apparent violations of Title VII, Steelworkers v. Weber, supra, public employers are constitutionally forbidden to do to correct their statutory and constitutional transgressions.
Such results cannot, in my view, be justified by reference to the incremental value a contemporaneous findings requirement would have as an evidentiary safeguard. As is illustrated by this case, public employers are trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken. Where these employers, who are presumably fully aware both of their duty under federal law to respect the rights of all their employees and of their potential liability for failing to do so, act on the basis of information which gives them a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial action is necessary, a contemporaneous findings requirement should not be necessary.
This conclusion is consistent with our previous decisions recognizing the States’ ability to take voluntary race-conscious action to achieve compliance with the law even in the absence of a specific finding of past discrimination. See, e. g., United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 165-166 (1977) (reapportionment); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971) (school desegregation). Indeed, our recognition of the responsible state actor’s competency to take these steps is assumed in our recognition of the States’ constitutional duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimination. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968).
*292Of course, as Justice Powell notes, the public employer must discharge this sensitive duty with great care; in order to provide some measure of protection to the interests of its nonminority employees and the employer itself in the event that its affirmative action plan is challenged, the public employer must have a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is warranted. Public employers are not without reliable benchmarks in making this determination. For example, demonstrable evidence of a disparity between the percentage of qualified blacks on a school’s teaching staff and the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice claim by minority teachers would lend a compelling basis for a competent authority such as the School Board to conclude that implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan is appropriate to remedy apparent prior employment discrimination.
To be sure, such a conclusion is not unassailable. If a voluntary affirmative action plan is subsequently challenged in court by nonminority employees, those employees must be given the opportunity to prove that the plan does not meet the constitutional standard this Court has articulated. However, as the plurality suggests, the institution of such a challenge does not automatically impose upon the public employer the burden of convincing the court of its liability for prior unlawful discrimination; nor does it mean that the court must make an actual finding of prior discrimination based on the employer’s proof before the employer’s affirmative action plan will be upheld. See ante, at 277-278. In “reverse discrimination” suits, as in any other suit, it is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of demonstrating that their rights have been violated. The findings a court must make before upholding an affirmative action plan reflect this allocation of proof and the nature of the challenge asserted. For instance, in the example posed above, the nonminority teachers could easily demonstrate that the purpose and effect of the *293plan is to impose a race-based classification. But when the Board introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby supplying the court with the means for determining that the Board had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the nonminority teachers to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the Board’s evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently “narrowly tailored.” Only by meeting this burden could the plaintiffs establish a violation of their constitutional rights, and thereby defeat the presumption that the Board’s assertedly remedial action based on the statistical evidence was justified.
In sum, I do not think that the layoff provision was constitutionally infirm simply because the School Board, the Commission, or a court had not made particularized findings of discrimination at the time the provision was agreed upon. But when the plan was challenged, the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not make the proper inquiry into the legitimacy of the Board’s asserted remedial purpose; instead, they relied upon governmental purposes that we have deemed insufficient to withstand strict scrutiny, and therefore failed to isolate a sufficiently important governmental purpose that could support the challenged provision.
There is, however, no need to inquire whether the provision actually had a legitimate remedial purpose based on the record, such as it is, because the judgment is vulnerable on yet another ground: the courts below applied a “reasonableness” test in evaluating the relationship between the ends pursued and the means employed to achieve them that is plainly incorrect under any of. the standards articulated by this Court. Nor is it necessary, in my view, to resolve the troubling questions whether any layoff provision could survive strict scrutiny or whether this particular layoff provision *294could, when considered without reference to the hiring goal it was intended to further, pass the onerous “narrowly tailored” requirement. Petitioners have met their burden of establishing that this layoff provision is not “narrowly tailored” to achieve its asserted remedial purpose by demonstrating that the provision is keyed to a hiring goal that itself has no relation to the remedying of employment discrimination.
Although the constitutionality of the hiring goal as such is not before us, it is impossible to evaluate the necessity of the layoff provision as a remedy for the apparent prior employment discrimination absent reference to that goal. See, e. g., post, at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this case, the hiring goal that the layoff provision was designed to safeguard was tied to the percentage of minority students in the school district, not to the percentage of qualified minority teachers within the relevant labor pool. The disparity between the percentage of minorities on the teaching staff and the percentage of minorities in the student body is not probative of employment discrimination; it is only when it is established that the availability of minorities in the relevant labor pool substantially exceeded those hired that one may draw an inference of deliberate discrimination in employment. See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299, 308 (1977) (Title VII context). Because the layoff provision here acts to maintain levels of minority hiring that have no relation to remedying employment discrimination, it cannot be adjudged “narrowly tailored” to effectuate its asserted remedial purpose.
I therefore join in Parts I, II, III, and V of the plurality’s opinion, and concur in the judgment.

 The goal of providing “role models” discussed by the courts below should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty. Because this latter goal was not urged as such in support of the layoff provision before the District Court and the Court of Appeals, however, I do not believe it necessary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its applicability in this ease. The only governmental interests at issue here are those of remedying “societal” discrimination, providing “role models,” and remedying apparent prior employment discrimination by the School Board.