Court Opinion

ID: 9741058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:48:50.518922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.023642
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do not agree, that there was error in admitting Officer Cox's testimony, hence there is no need, in my mind, to resort to the harmless error determination, which, in my judgment utilized an incorrect standard.
From my review of the record, I have determined that the officers were justified in the limited search that revealed the bloodied clothing and the keys-which I do not regard as having been in plain view. The exigent cireumstances warranted the searches which were very limited in time and area; and the officers were merely making an unobtrusive search for evidence which they had reasonable grounds to believe existed and was subject to being destroyed by Defendant's wife if they delayed in order to procure a warrant.
Very similar circumstances are related in Chimel v. California (1969), 895 U.S. 752, 778-74, 89 S.Ct. 2084, 2046, 28 L.Ed.2d 685, 700 (White, J., dissenting). Although this citation is to a dissenting opinion by Justice White, the majority does not run contrary to the application of the rationale under the circumstances of the case before us. I am of the opinion that, given the judicial trend today to allow more leeway to officers in making good faith and reasonable necessary warrantless searches, this basis for affirming the conviction is to be preferred over the "harmless error" employed by the majority.