Court Opinion

ID: 9514829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:58.735946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:21.466411
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 53.] We have stated: “[t]estamentary capacity cannot be determined based on a single moment in time, but rather is based on consideration of the condition of the testator’s mind a reasonable length of time before and after the making of the will.” In re Lanning, 1997 SD 81, ¶ 11, 565 N.W.2d 794, 796 (citing In re Estate of Nelson, 330 N.W.2d 151, 155 (S.D.1983)). The following cumulative facts show that when Dokken executed his will on July 12, 1985, he did not have the requisite testamentary capacity.
[¶ 54.] The trial court received various VA documents into evidence, without objection from the proponent. In fact, some by stipulation. The trial court reviewed the field examinations and referred to them in the findings of fact, albeit primarily by contradiction.
[¶ 55.] The majority states that the controlling standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. However, “[u]nder our long-standing rule, when reviewing findings based on documentary evidence we do not apply the clearly errone*501ous rule ..., but review the matter de novo.” First National Bank v. Bank of Lemmon, 535 N.W.2d 866, 871 (S.D.1995) (Miller, C.J., writing the majority opinion with respect to the issue of the correct standard of review) (citing Pankratz v. Miller, 401 N.W.2d 543, 548 (S.D.1987); In re Investigation of the Highway Construction Industry, 396 N.W.2d 757, 758 (S.D.1986); Leslie v. City of Bonesteel, 303 N.W.2d 117, 119 (S.D.1981); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 140-41 (S.D.1977); Ayres v. Junek, 247 N.W.2d 488, 490 (S.D.1976); Geo. A. Clark & Son, Inc. v. Nold, 85 S.D. 468, 185 N.W.2d 677, 680 (S.D.1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 833, 92 S.Ct. 82, 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971)).
[¶ 56.] Since 1956, Dokken has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type. The VA immediately determined him to be incompetent under its standards:
A mentally incompetent person is one who because of injury or disease lacks . the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her own affairs, including disbursements of funds without limitation.
[¶57.] The VA then conducted annual field examinations to evaluate Dokken’s competency. There were three categories that were evaluated by the examiner: (1) Description and Health; (2) Social and Economic Adjustments; and (3) Allowances. Beyond Dokken’s financial position, the VA was concerned about the care Dokken was receiving, how he was adjusting to his environment and whether his needs were being met.
[¶ 58.] A field examination, dated March 30, 1983, revealed that Dokken “had no knowledge of his actual income and estate.” The report further stated Dokken did not “seem to have any understanding as to the actual value of the dollar.”
[¶ 59.] On April 11, 1984, the field examiner, Mr. Russell L. Lofswold, noted that Dokken “seemed to be unsure of actually who [his] guardian [wa]s.” It further noted Dokken had “virtually no understanding of his actual income, estate, and expenses.”
[¶ 60.] On April 2, 1985, Lofswold again stated in his field examination report that Dokken had “no understanding of his income, estate and expenses.” Furthermore, he could not provide his own date of birth or the name of his guardian of three years, Kenneth Cross.15
[¶ 61.] On April 9, 1986, the report was unchanged: Dokken “obviously ha[d] virtually no understanding of his income, estate and expenses.”
[f 62.] The record also discloses other situations that give reason for concern. On April 22, 1991, Dokken was seen by a doctor for “inappropriate self-destructive behavior.” In November of 1992, Robert Bender documented that Dokken claimed to have seen snakes coming out of the walls in his residential care home:
Mr. Dokken was visited by this worker on 6/29/92, 7/21, 8/6 and 9/16/92. When I visited the veteran in June[,] Mr. and Mrs. Rost told me that the veterans’ Thorazene had been reduced, he had become psychotic and it was necessary to increase the medication. At that time[,] the veteran was seeing snakes coming out of the walls and was going out into the yard from tree to tree, *502shaking the tree and branches.... In early September, Mr. Rost called to report that Mr. Dokk[e]n was becoming quite psychotic again, that he was doing a lot of swearing and he was going through everybody’s closets. He was also spending a lot of time beating on the trees in the yard and pounding rocks together.
Bender signed this medical record, which appears as proponent’s stipulated exhibit 5.
[¶ 63.] On occasion, Dokken also denied that Myrtle Cross was his sister and that his brother, deceased- since 1969, was still alive and living in North Dakota. At one point, Dokken stated that he felt the U.S. Treasury was handling his money for him and that he had no idea of the extent of his estate or his investments. Dokken also had stated that the residential care home he lived in was actually a ranger station and that the forest service ran it.
[¶ 64.] In determining whether one has a sound mind for purposes of testamentary capacity, we have stated:
One has a sound mind, for the purposes of making a will, if, without prompting, he is able ‘to comprehend the nature and extent of his property, the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty and the disposition that he desires to make of such property.’
Lanning, 1997 SD 81, ¶ 11, 565 N.W.2d at 796 (quoting In re Estate of Burk, 468 N.W.2d 407, 409 (S.D.1991) (quoting In re Estate of Podgursky, 271 N.W.2d 52, 55 (S.D.1978)) (emphasis added)).16
[¶ 65.] I recognize “[t]he fact that a guardian has been appointed to take care of a testator’s estate does not, by itself, invalidate a will because of lack of testamentary capacity.” In re Estate of Long, 1998 SD 15, ¶ 22, 575 N.W.2d 254, 258 (citation omitted). However, as we have previously stated, while the facts that Dokken had a- guardian and suffered from schizophrenia are not dispositive of the issue of whether testamentary capacity existed, they are helpful. Id. ¶ 24.
[¶ 66.] In viewing the record cumulatively, it is clear that Dokken did not understand the nature and extent of his property at the time he executed his will in 1985. The annual reports, beginning in 1983, consistently report that Dokken had no knowledge of the nature and extent of his property. More specifically, the field examination report, issued on April 2, 1985, three months before he executed his will, unequivocally stated that Dokken had “no understanding of his income, estate [or] expenses.”17
[¶ 67.] Cross-presented evidence of Dokken’s residential care provider from 1982 to 1986, Ms. Hyde. Hyde also agreed that Dokken had “no understanding of his income, estate and expenses.” She further admitted that neither she nor her husband “talk[ed] to him about any income or es*503tates or any of his expenses other than his allowance.”
[¶ 68.] Cross also called Dokken’s social worker, Robert Bender, who worked with Dokken from 1978 until February of 1985, to testify. During this time period, Bender saw Dokken either monthly or every two months. He initially testified that Dokken had the ability to understand his estate. However, beyond his monthly allowance of $75 - $100, Bender admitted that he never spoke with Dokken about his estate. He also admitted that he never talked to Dokken about Dokken’s relatives. On cross-examination, Bender further admitted that Dokken was hard to converse with, but that he did respond to “yes or no” questions:
Q: Why would you say it’s difficult to converse with him?
A: Well, probably because he just was not one who liked to do a lot of conversing. But he would answer my questions.
[[Image here]]
Q: And generally speaking, if you prompted, [Dokken] about a fact like, “Is your sister Myrtle Cross,” wouldn’t he agree with you?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. He was the type of person who liked to - he didn’t want confrontation? He didn’t want confrontation, didn’t like confrontation?
A: No.
Q: He would want to tend to get along and be agreeable?
A: Uh-hmm. Very much so.
Clearly, any response to Bender’s inquiries would constitute “prompting.” He further stated that during the time period of 1982-1986, Dokken had a history of being overtly psychotic at times. For example, Dokken would talk to trees or beat on them 4-6 times a year and occasionally throw his clothes away.
[¶ 69.] Dr. Manlove also testified as to the testamentary capacity of Dokken. Manlove, however, never met Dokken. He based his opinion, in part, on telephone conversations with Hyde and Bender as well as the field examination reports from 1983 to 1990. However, some of the facts he based his opinion on were inconsistent with what was testified to at trial. For example, Manlove’s report states that Hyde told him that Dokken “was aware that he had a substantial amount of money and wanted to make a will.” At trial, however, he agreed that Dokken had “no understanding of his income, estate and expenses.”
[¶ 70.] Dr. Manlove’s opinion testimony was properly objected to, was highly questionable, and even if admissible should have little weight.
[¶ 71.] Additionally, the attorney who drafted Dokken’s will, predeceased Dokken. The son of said deceased attorney opined as to the attorney’s usual procedures, which procedures were, in fact, substantially inconsistent with the attorney’s own notes. The attorney’s notes, dated July 11,1985, indicate that Dokken wanted to bequeath an interest in a contract for deed as well as $200,000 in savings to his sister Myrtle Cross. Yet, the parties could not locate a contract for deed in Dokken’s name. It is presumed that the contract for deed never existed. Consequently, Dokken did not even know his property, or the extent of it.
[¶ 72.] “The proponent of a will has the burden of establishing the testamentary capacity of the testator at the time the will was executed.” Long, 1998 SD 15, ¶ 26, 575 N.W.2d 254, 258 (citation omitted). Based upon the cumulative evidence, it is evident that Dokken was not able “to comprehend the nature and extent of his property.” Lanning, 1997 SD 81, ¶ 11, 565 N.W.2d at 796 (quotations omitted). Therefore, Cross did not meet her burden in establishing that Dokken possessed testamentary capacity.
*504[¶ 73.] Finally, I respectfully submit that the majority is being incredibly “result oriented.” If this will had been procured by the nephew and gave everything to him, it would not have a chance to be admitted to probate. Instead, they look the other way because the guardian procured the will for his wife, Dokken’s sister.
[¶ 74.] In doing so, we have reduced our standards for competency to make a will to a new low. In fact, even below those of the VA. Dokken did not have the “mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs ...,” but this court permits him to dispose of his entire estate to one person. This estate should be distributed by intestate succession, not by a will signed totally without testamentary capacity. Because there was no testamentary capacity, the issue of undue influence need not be reached.
[¶ 75.] I vote to reverse and remand on Issue 1.

. The trial court made specific findings regarding Lofswold’s field examination:
35. Russell L. Lofswold was a field examiner who visited with Gilbert Dokken in 1985, a few months before the execution of the Will.
36. Lofswold noted that Gilbert could not give his correct date of birth or his guardian’s name and did not know about his income, estate or expenses. Mr. Lofs-wold was a stranger to Gilbert and someone he did not want to talk to. Gilbert Dokken even refused to answer some questions.
Based on the fact that Lofswold did not testify, the trial court had to deduce these findings from the VA documents. Thus, the findings are subject to de novo review. First National Bank, 535 N.W.2d at 871 (citations omitted).

. In one finding of fact, the trial court correctly stated that to establish testamentary capacity, “Dokken needed to comprehend the nature and extent of his property, know who his heirs were and know how he wanted his property disposed of.” It appears that the field examination reports alone could have answered the question. But in the next finding of fact, the trial court attempts to justify why it provided little value to the government documents:
Veterans Administration’s filed examiners are not qualified medical workers and they are not required to have medical or psychological training. The Veteran Administration’s field examiners work for the administrative office and their job is to determine whether the veteran remains unable to care for their financial affairs.
One does not need to be a medical doctor or a psychologist to make observations regarding testamentary capacity. If that were the case, then “forensic psychiatry” would replace all witnesses in testamentary capacity cases in South Dakota.

. While the majority considers these government records “stale,” they are accurate reflections of observations of the VA employees evaluating Dokken. One could argue that they are more accurate than the live testimony of witnesses trying to recall, in 1998, what transpired in their communications with Dokken in 1983-86.