Court Opinion

ID: 9476694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:02:34.739349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:27.332260
License: Public Domain

OBERDORFER, District Judge,
concurring:
I have misgivings about a “boiler plate” arbitration clause which requires an applicant, as a pre-condition of employment in an extensive specialized industry, to waive his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a common law defamation and privacy suit such as is before us now. As the Supreme Court reminded us in a decision preserving jury trials in certain stockholder derivative suits:
The Seventh Amendment ... entitled the parties to a jury trial in actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and slander, for recovery of land, and for conversion of personal property.
*834Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533, 90 S.Ct. 733, 735, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, in approving arbitration of disputes arising out of alleged violations of the federal anti-trust laws, the Supreme Court has further admonished us that
Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds “for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2....
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985).
The District of Columbia Uniform Commercial Code authorizes a court to find “as a matter of law” that a contract clause was “unconscionable” when made. 28 D.C. Code § 28:2-302(1). Also, a court “may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Id. Thus, if it were established that it is “unconscionable” to deny to plaintiff his constitutional right to a jury trial of his common law tort suit against both defendants in the circumstances here, we could fully honor plaintiffs demand for a jury trial without disturbing arbitration of essentially “exchange-related” disputes. See Fuller v. Guthrie, 565 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.1977) (clause requiring arbitration of claims, disputes or controversies “involving the musical services arising out of or connected with” a contract, did not require arbitration of a promoter’s slander claim against a performer on account of statements that he made to an audience during a concert).
However, the plaintiff here raised no constitutional question. Nor did he invoke the principles relating to enforceability of disadvantageous contracts resulting from “overwhelming economic power.” Moreover, the District Court’s undertaking to entertain the plaintiff’s claims against defendant Bell without awaiting arbitration effectively honors any constitutional right of plaintiff to a jury trial. Since there is no constitutional or contract issue before us and since we should not raise them on our own motion, I concur in Judge Ginsburg’s opinion that the plaintiff’s claim against defendant Hutton must be arbitrated while his claim against defendant Bell is being litigated. I am impressed by the fact that the Exchange has been investigating the conduct which is the subject matter of the report that plaintiff claims to be defamatory. See Affidavit of James A. Tricarico, Jr., Senior Vice President and Senior Associate General Counsel of E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc., dated February 14, 1986; Letter of Rex M. Mixon, Jr., Senior Special Counsel, New York Stock Exchange, Bureau of Enforcement, dated May 17, 1985; see also Affidavit of Edward Morris, Arbitration Director of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., dated February 18, 1986. The active interest of the Exchange in plaintiff's business practices is strong, objective evidence that the underlying dispute about them is “exchange-related.” See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F.2d 577, 580 n. 5 (2d Cir.1984). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment and the opinion.