Court Opinion

ID: 9699956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:00:53.30227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:33.651438
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4001

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JULIET NANETTE LITTLEJOHN,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:10-cr-00273-RJC-1)

        Submitted: August 8, 2023                                         Decided: August 24, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Megan C. Hoffman, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
        CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States
        Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Juliet Nanette Littlejohn appeals the 18-month sentence imposed following the

        revocation of her supervised release. On appeal, Littlejohn contends that the Government

        breached the parties’ agreement to jointly recommend a six-month sentence. In addition,

        she claims that the district court failed to address several of her nonfrivolous sentencing

        arguments. Finally, Littlejohn asserts that the court relied on an impermissible sentencing

        factor. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               As Littlejohn concedes, she did not raise her breach argument in the district court.

        Consequently, plain error review applies. United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281, 286, (4th

        Cir. 2019). “Under that standard, [Littlejohn] must show that the [G]overnment plainly

        breached its . . . agreement with h[er] and that the breach both affected h[er] substantial

        rights and called into question the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

        proceedings.” Id. at 286-87. 1

               Littlejohn faults the Government for not directly stating that it was recommending

        a six-month sentence. But the Government never disputed Littlejohn’s representation that

        the parties were making a joint recommendation, and the district court clearly understood

        that the recommendation was coming from both sides. Thus, we are unpersuaded by this

        argument.

               1
                 For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the contract law
        principles underlying the enforcement of plea agreements, see Edgell, 914 F.3d at 287,
        apply with equal force to joint sentencing recommendations between the Government and
        criminal defendants.

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               Littlejohn also complains that the Government’s remarks at sentencing focused on

        her criminal history and proclivity for shoplifting, thereby undermining the agreed-upon

        recommendation. But by the time the Government began its argument, the district court

        had clearly signaled its skepticism over the parties’ recommendation, emphasizing

        Littlejohn’s “troubling criminal history” and, in the words of the probation officer, her

        “willingness to habitually commit offenses against the community with little to no regard

        for the law or the Court.” (J.A. 2 38). With these comments in mind, the Government could

        not persuasively advocate for a six-month sentence without addressing the negative aspects

        of Littlejohn’s record. So, far from undermining the parties’ agreement, the Government

        wisely engaged with the court’s concerns in an attempt to salvage the joint

        recommendation. We therefore discern no breach of the joint recommendation.

               Next, Littlejohn takes issue with the district court’s treatment of her sentencing

        arguments. “A district court has broad . . . discretion in fashioning a sentence upon

        revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d

        202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

        maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first must

        determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. Even

        if a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we will reverse only if it is “plainly so.” Id. at

        208 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               2
                   “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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               Where a defendant “presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a sentence outside

        the [policy statement range], the sentencing [court] must address or consider those

        arguments and explain why [it] has rejected them.” United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129,

        137 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Critically, though, “[a]ppellate

        review is not a game of ‘Gotcha!’ where we tally up the number of distinguishable

        arguments a defendant mentioned in the district court and then comb the sentencing

        transcript for proof the district court mentioned each one by name.” Id. “Rather, when a

        district court addresses a defendant’s central thesis, it need not address separately every

        specific claim made in support.” Id. (cleaned up).

               Littlejohn highlights three primary nonfrivolous arguments that, in her view, the

        district court failed to address. First, she maintains that the court ignored her rehabilitation

        evidence. True, the court did not mention by name Littlejohn’s sobriety, her stable

        residence, her long-term employment, or any of her other points about rehabilitation. But

        the court undoubtedly rejected Littlejohn’s central thesis, underscoring that Littlejohn’s

        supervision violations arose from the same pattern of conduct for which she was initially

        prosecuted. Thus, even though Littlejohn had taken some positive steps in her life, the

        court clearly did not find her to be rehabilitated.

               Second, Littlejohn asserts that the district court neglected her serious medical issues.

        However, Littlejohn’s health-related argument was not presented as a basis for mitigation;

        rather, it was expressly advanced to support her request for voluntary surrender. And,

        notably, the court granted this request, thereby demonstrating its consideration of this

        argument.

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               Third, Littlejohn claims that the district court failed to address the possibility that,

        if given a short sentence, she might be able to keep her job. But this argument necessarily

        relates back to Littlejohn’s broader claim that her steady employment was evidence of

        rehabilitation. And since the court was unpersuaded by the latter argument, it seems clear

        why the court was likewise unmoved by the suggestion that it impose a substantial

        downward variance just so Littlejohn could potentially retain a job that, so far, had not kept

        her from reoffending. See United States v. Lester, 985 F.3d 377, 386 (4th Cir. 2021) (“We

        will not vacate a sentence simply because the court did not spell out what the context of its

        explanation made patently obvious: namely, that a shorter prison term was inappropriate

        under the circumstances.” (cleaned up)).

               Finally, Littlejohn contends that the district court erred by basing its sentencing

        decision on the need to promote respect for the law. Littlejohn is correct that promoting

        respect for the law—an appropriate factor for consideration when imposing an original

        sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—is not among the § 3553(a) sentencing factors

        listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the statute governing the revocation of supervised release.

        However, we have previously held that § 3583(e) “does not expressly prohibit a court from

        referencing” the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th

        Cir. 2013). Indeed, so long as a revocation sentence is not “based predominately on” the

        § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render a

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        revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and

        considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 642. 3

               Here, while the district court did discuss the need to promote respect for the law, the

        court explicitly stated that its primary concern was the need to protect the public from

        further crimes that Littlejohn might commit. Thus, we reject Littlejohn’s claim that the

        court relied too heavily on the need to promote respect for the law.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

               3
                  Littlejohn questions the viability of Webb, claiming that the Supreme Court’s
        recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), abrogated Webb
        based on the following statement: “[I]n determining whether to include a term of
        supervised release, and the length of any such term, Congress has expressly precluded
        district courts from considering the need for retribution.” Id. at 2400 (citing 18 U.S.C.
        § 3583(c); Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011)). We cannot agree. For one,
        the statement from Concepcion dealt with § 3583(c), which is not at issue here. And
        second, the Concepcion statement did not announce a new rule; rather, it merely cited
        another case, Tapia, that was decided two years before our decision in Webb.

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