Court Opinion

ID: 9763646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:51:10.823099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:47.320593
License: Public Domain

*646PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired,
dissenting:
In my view, there was manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial in this case, engendered primarily by the public interest in a meaningful prosecution of this defendant charged with a serious crime. Consequently, I would hold that the trial court exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial since the crime scene technician’s testimony was essential and relevant to matters at issue.
A mistrial without a bar to retrial may be declared without the consent of the defendant or even over his objection if “manifest necessity” exists or if the “ends of public justice” would otherwise be defeated. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Braxton v. United States, 395 A.2d 759, 769 (D.C.1978); United States v. Bristol, 325 A.2d 183, 186 (D.C.1974). Since it is virtually impossible to define all the circumstances in which it would be proper to discharge a jury, courts have been hesitant to fashion a rigid test to determine what circumstances will constitute “manifest necessity.” As a result, trial courts have, as a general rule, balanced a defendant’s recognized right to be free of successive prosecutions against the interest of society in the meaningful enforcement of the criminal law. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949).
In accommodating the uneasy tension which necessarily exists between these conflicting considerations, a great deal of discretion must be vested in the trial judge, who is usually best situated to determine the degree of necessity for the declaration of a mistrial when an unexpected event occurs during a trial. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1069, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973); Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 872, 59 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979); Coleman v. United States, 449 A.2d 327, 328 (D.C.1982). For this reason, reviewing courts generally “accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation,” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 511, 98 S.Ct. 824, 833, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), and his decision has been disturbed on appeal only “in extreme circumstances threatening a miscarriage of justice,” Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S.Ct. 756, 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983); Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 127 (D.C.1979). Consequently, our review should be limited to determining whether the trial court, in the case at bar, abused its discretion in finding that the absence of a prosecution witness constituted a “manifest necessity” for the declaration of a mistrial.
Transcendent in the factual setting disclosed by this record is the public interest in bringing to trial this defendant who was alleged to have approached an automobile in which the complainant was seated in a defenseless position and who, upon questionable provocation, fired five or more bullets into complainant’s body in an obvious attempt to take his life. My colleagues, in their effort to minimize the importance of the evidence lost through the absence of the crime scene technician, hold that since the government failed to demonstrate “manifest necessity,” the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits appellant’s retrial. I cannot agree and conclude that the record amply supports a finding of “manifest necessity.”
In order to sustain its burden of proof, the government was required to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant fired the bullets with intent to kill the complainant. In this respect, the angle from which the bullets were fired was crucial and any testimony to that effect would have been particularly relevant and critical to the government’s case. Furthermore, the officer’s testimony was necessary in order to authenticate certain crime scene photographs and to provide a proper foundation for their admission into evidence. From the record it appears, and the trial judge ruled, that no other witness could have provided this type of information. *647Neither the complainant nor other police officers present at the scene had actually witnessed the absent officer take the photographs in question, nor were they able to verify the fact that the photographs accurately depicted the scene on the morning and at the time of the shooting. Thus, without the officer’s testimony, it would have been impossible to adequately reconstruct the crime scene.
The absent witness was also to have offered testimony regarding the bullets and shell casings he personally recovered from and near complainant’s car. This particular testimony was necessary to establish a chain of custody for the admission into evidence of the shell casings, bullets and photographs. Without such physical evidence, the government would not have been able to sufficiently link appellant to the crime other than through the testimony of the only eyewitness to the incident, the victim of the shooting.1
My colleagues assert that the admission of the bullets into evidence was only relevant to prove the number of shots which were fired and they insist that this fact had already been sufficiently proven by the complainant when he exhibited his gunshot wounds to the jury during the first day of trial. In addition, they say that there was another witness who would have been available to testify regarding the number of shots he heard fired that morning. I do not perceive this evidence to be a legitimate substitute for the missing officer’s testimony. First, there was no certainty that the wounds shown to the jury were in fact the same ones which the complainant sustained as a result of the shooting in question. Furthermore, testimony regarding the sounds which another witness perceived to be gunshots would have been particularly weak and of doubtful probative value.
But more than this, once the victim’s credibility was attacked on cross-examination with a prior conviction and a prior inconsistent statement, the absent officer’s testimony, which would have corroborated complainant’s account of the shootings, became critical. The evidence collected by the officer would have provided the only significant corroboration of the victim’s testimony, and without the crime scene technician’s testimony, it would have been impossible to introduce this critical evidence.2 Thus, I cannot agree that the trial court could not find from the totality of the circumstances that the crime scene technician was a key prosecution witness.3
*648Finally, the majority opinion suggests that the prosecutor moved for a mistrial in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage because, so it is said, “the case was not proceeding smoothly.” To support this conclusion the majority opinion relies on portions of the record which indicate that the prosecutor may have been surprised by the introduction of certain evidence at trial; to wit, the introduction of complainant’s prior conviction of possession of a deadly weapon and the presentation at trial of the pipe allegedly used by complainant against appellant in their altercation of the previous day. Cf. United States v. Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at 470, 91 S.Ct. at 547. My colleagues suggest also that the government moved for a mistrial in an attempt to gain a fresh start with a new trial. But there is nothing in the record tending to establish that the government’s action was motivated by a desire to harass the accused or “to afford the prosecution with a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant.” United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). In any event, I do not understand it to be the function of the court, nor should it be, to read between the lines of a cold record in an attempt to cull from it potentially improper motives of the prosecution.
More importantly, however, I fail to perceive why we should indulge a presumption of wrongdoing when the only issue of substance which need concern this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial due to the unexpected absence of a key government witness. While courts have held that a second prosecution in cases of prosecutorial bad faith or error is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause because of the absence of “manifest necessity,” see United States v. Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at 470, 91 S.Ct. at 547; Downum v. United States, supra, 372 U.S. at 734, 83 S.Ct. at 1033; Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.1931) (where retrial was barred when prosecutor participated in the jury selection process without first ascertaining whether or not his witnesses were present) there is simply nothing in the case at bar which suggests that the unavailability of the officer as a witness resulted from the bad faith of the government. In fact, it is undisputed in the record that when the trial began, the Assistant United States Attorney believed that the crime scene technician officer would be available to testify as scheduled, and, had he not suffered medical complications, the officer would have testified. Thus, there is no showing whatsoever that the prosecutor had knowledge of the officer’s condition or its severity until after the jury had been impaneled, opening statements had been completed, and the first government witness had testified.
While reviewing the prosecution’s motion for a mistrial, repeated attempts were made by the trial judge to resolve the issue in a manner which would avoid discharging the jury. When the problem of the witness’ illness arose, he conferred with counsel and gave each a fair opportunity to explain his position with regard to how the trial should proceed. However, after determining that no satisfactory solution existed, the trial court ruled that “in order to be as fair as possible to every [sic] side in this case, I’m going to grant the government’s request for a mistrial.... If it appears after several months, the witness isn’t going to be any better able to supply this *649information, then I think we’re going to have to consider throwing the case out.”
It is obvious that the trial court was confronted with a difficult situation in this case but was amenable to suggestions from both counsel.4 In view of the witness’ disability, however, the trial court concluded that appellant’s right to have the trial completed at that time was subordinate to the public’s interest in a fair and meaningful trial designed to end in a just judgment. See Wade v. Hunter, supra, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837. Consequently, where, as here, the trial court has properly explored the appropriate alternatives to the discharge of the jury and there is a sufficient basis in the record for the declaration of a mistrial, this court should not disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Hall v. Potoker, 49 N.Y.2d 501, 427 N.Y. S.2d 211, 403 N.E.2d 1210 (1980).
Applying the standards of manifest necessity and public justice to the facts in this case, I would hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring over appellant’s objection a mistrial.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The testimony of the complaining witness was that on February 19, 1981, he and appellant, a co-worker at the United States Government Printing Office, had an altercation at their workplace. During the course of the dispute, complainant struck appellant with a pipe.
The following morning, at approximately six o’clock, complainant was warming up his car in front of his home when appellant appeared. Appellant approached the car, and taking a gun from his pocket, said to complainant, "I told you it wasn’t over with." Complainant testified also that appellant then proceeded to fire four or five shots into the car. The complainant tried to avoid the gunfire, but was unable to do so. As a result, he sustained several gunshot wounds.

. In my view, the importance of this evidence is highlighted by appellant's refusal to stipulate to it. While appellant maintains that the crime scene technician’s testimony was not critical to any matter in issue, defense counsel told the court that he could "see no tactical advantage to waiving our right to confrontation as far as this witness is concerned. That is why we have not agreed to stipulate to his testimony." Defense counsel’s unwillingness to stipulate the evidence casts doubt on appellant's position that this evidence was "mere window dressing” for the government. Moreover, since appellant's defense was that he was not there and that someone else fired the shots, I fail to perceive how stipulating to this evidence would have been detrimental.

. See United States ex rel., Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008, 94 S.Ct. 370, 38 L.Ed.2d 246 (1973), where the key prosecution witness who had been present on the first day of petitioner’s murder trial suffered coronary insufficiency and was unable to testify, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial over petitioner’s objection and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude petitioner’s retrial. The majority distinguishes this case on the ground that in Gibson, the missing witness was a police captain to whom the defendant had *648made a confession. The Third Circuit concluded that since the confession was the most important element in the government’s case and it could only be introduced through the missing witness, double jeopardy did not attach.
The majority says that the crime scene technician’s testimony was not the most important element in the government's case, therefore, Gibson should not control. I disagree. In the instant case, the missing testimony would have bolstered the testimony of the victim and only eyewitness to the shooting. Clearly, the complainant’s testimony was the most important element of the government’s case. Once he was impeached, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to corroborate the victim’s version of the shooting. Thus, while the absent officer’s testimony may not have been the most important element of the government’s case, it certainly was a significant and critical part of it.

. In reviewing the record, I note that in granting the government’s motion for a mistrial, the trial court reserved the opportunity to "throw the case out" if, after several months, the officer was still unavailable to testify. The fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy "was designed ... [to prevent] repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223-24, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). By retaining supervision over the case, the trial judge’s action was appropriate since it was consistent with the spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause.