Court Opinion

ID: 9557906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:59:52.837882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:40.589552
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result in this case, I write separately because I disagree with the reasoning by which the majority has reached it. The majority holds that the trial court had no authority to correct defendant’s sentence because the court lost jurisdiction once defendant had been delivered to the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) to begin serving his sentence. I disagree.
A trial court’s power to modify a sentence ends when that sentence has been executed by delivering a defendant to *263the custody of ODOC or a local authority pursuant to a valid sentence. State ex rel O’Leary v. Jacobs, 295 Or 632, 634-36, 669 P2d 1128 (1983); see also State v. DeCamp, 158 Or App 238, 973 P2d 922 (1999). A valid sentence, in turn, is a sentence that the court has statutory authority to impose. State v. Leathers, 271 Or 236, 240, 531 P2d 901 (1975); see also State v. Cotton, 240 Or 252, 400 P2d 1022 (1965) (sentencing court had duty to vacate invalid sentence and impose valid sentence even though defendant had begun serving sentence). A court imposing punishment for a criminal offense is strictly limited to the provisions of the applicable statute, and any deviation from the statute in the extent of punishment renders the judgment void. Cotton, 240 Or at 254. If a court concludes that it imposed an unlawful sentence, then, under Leathers and Cotton, it has authority to correct the error by vacating the original sentence and imposing a lawful sentence, even though the defendant has begun serving the original sentence.
The majority states in a footnote that the rule in Leathers and Cotton does not apply to this case, because those cases involved county jail sentences. As I have noted above, the court in O’Leary clearly stated that under former ORS 137.010(4), renumbered by Or Laws 1989, ch 849, § 1, the language of which is substantially the same as ORS 137.010(6), on which the majority relies, the trial court’s power to modify a sentence ends only when the defendant has begun to serve a valid sentence. Nor can I find anything in ORS 137.320, the statute governing a defendant’s commitment to ODOC, or ORS 137.330, governing commitments to county jails, to indicate that the court’s authority to correct an invalid sentence depends on whether the defendant has been committed to the county jail or to ODOC.
The relevant inquiry is whether the sentence is valid. Whether the sentence commits a defendant to a county jail or to ODOC is simply of no import. In other words, if a sentence is invalid, the trial court has the authority under the common law to correct the sentence regardless of where the defendant has begun serving it. Furthermore, the authority of a court to act to modify an executed sentence does not *264turn on whether the court is correct in its belief that the original sentence is unlawful. It has authority to act if it believes that the original sentence is unlawful.1 If it turns out that the court is wrong in that belief, then that error can be corrected on appeal from the judgment imposing the second sentence by vacating that judgment and reinstating the first.
Because the trial court had concluded that the mandatory sentencing provisions of Measure 11 were unconstitutional, it had the authority to correct the original sentence that it had imposed under Measure 11. If the trial court’s conclusion about the validity of Measure 11 were correct, then the second judgment would be a valid judgment notwithstanding the fact that defendant had begun to serve the sentence imposed by the original judgment. Cotton, 240 Or at 254.2 The fact that the provisions of Measure 11 that Judge Morgan concluded were unconstitutional have since been declared constitutional, State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 932 P2d 1145, cert den _ US _, 118 S Ct 557, 139 L Ed 2d 399 (1997), does not mean that the court did not have authority to act at the time it did but, rather, means only that the court erred in its initial conclusion that the original sentence was invalid. The appropriate disposition on appeal, then, is to vacate the second sentence and to remand for reinstatement of the original, Measure 11, sentence.
Although I have concluded that the trial court had common-law authority to vacate a sentence that it believed to be unlawful, I also address the state’s alternative argument against that action, because that argument also raises a jurisdictional challenge to the court’s authority to vacate the *265original sentence. The state contends that, because defendant had appealed the judgment that imposed the original sentence, and that appeal was pending when the court vacated the judgment, the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the judgment. ORS 19.270(1). Defendant responds that the trial court had authority under ORS 138.083 to enter an amended judgment while an appeal from the original judgment was pending.
ORS 138.083 provides:
“The sentencing court shall retain authority irrespective of any notice of appeal after entry of judgment of conviction to modify its judgment and sentence to correct any arithmetic or clerical errors or to delete or modify any erroneous term in the judgment. The court may correct the judgment either on the motion of one of the parties or on the court’s own motion after written notice to all the parties. If a sentencing court enters an amended judgment under this section, the court shall immediately forward a copy of the amended judgment to the appellate court. Any modification of the appeal necessitated by the amended judgment shall be pursuant to an appropriate order by the appellate court.”
(Emphasis added.) The operative statutory language in this case is “to delete or modify any erroneous term in the judgment.” Defendant argues that the 70-month sentences were “erroneous terms” because they were based on a mandatory sentencing scheme that the court had concluded was unconstitutional.
Again, the issue turns on the court’s understanding of the lawfulness of the original sentence. ORS 138.083 applies to those sentences that are erroneous because they exceed the maximum limits or fail to meet the minimum limits allowed or required by law. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 143 Or App 85, 88, 923 P2d 664 (1996) (post-prison supervision term that exceeded maximum allowable under former OAR 253-05-002(2)(a) is within sentencing court’s authority to modify under ORS 138.083). See also State v. Arellano, 149 Or App 86, 93, 941 P2d 1089 (1997). As I have already concluded, the court believed that the original sentence was invalid because it had been imposed under a sentencing scheme that the court had determined to be unconstitutional before it entered its original judgment in this case. To the *266court, that understanding meant that the sentence imposed in the original judgment was erroneous, because it exceeded the presumptive sentence under the guidelines, with no accompanying explanation by the court for such a departure.3 The fact that the court was wrong in concluding that the original sentence was invalid was, as under the common law, merely error, correctable on appeal by vacating the second sentence and reimposing the first. In other words, the court had jurisdiction under ORS 138.083 to vacate the original judgment to correct an erroneous term even though it was wrong in its belief that the judgment contained an erroneous term.
I conclude, therefore, that the court acted within its common-law and statutoiy authority when it vacated the original judgment that it believed to be unlawful and resentenced defendant. I further conclude, however, that the court erred in determining that the original sentence was unlawful. Accordingly, the proper disposition of this case is to vacate the amended judgment and reinstate the original judgment.

 The operative term here is unlawful. The trial court does not have the authority to change an executed sentence that it knows to be valid simply because it later concludes that there is a better and more appropriate sentence.

 The state argues that, even if the court lacked authority under Measure 11 to impose the original sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment on each count, that sentence was nonetheless valid because a 70-month term is well within the maximum 10-year sentence authorized by law for a Class B felony. That argument is not well-taken. Once it has been established that the court’s sentencing authority is controlled by the sentencing guidelines, the court must make certain calculations to reach a sentence under them. If the court chooses to depart from the presumptive sentence under the guidelines, the court must articulate why it has departed. Even if I were to agree that the guidelines might allow for a 70-month sentence for second-degree robbery, the sentence in this case nonetheless would be invalid because the court did not apply the required guidelines analysis.

 The state’s argument that ORS 138.083 does not apply because, by resentencing defendant, the court did more than modify the judgment is not well taken— in cases in which courts must correct an erroneous term it may be necessary to resentence the defendant to make the required correction.