Court Opinion

ID: 9691576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:40:57.071628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:22.893127
License: Public Domain

Taylor, J.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the erroneous exclusion of certain reputation evi*322dence regarding the victim’s character for violence was not harmless.
This matter arises out of the death of defendant’s friend from a knife wound. Defendant raised three defenses: accident, self-defense, and intoxication. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge because there was sufficient evidence to support this charge. I also agree with the majority’s analysis of the evidentiary issues and its conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding reputation evidence regarding the victim’s violent character. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was not “a high probability that the inclusion of evidence pertaining to the deceased’s violent character would not have affected the judgment.” Ante at 320. In the context of the evidence admitted regarding the victim’s violent reputation and the circumstances surrounding his death, as well as defendant’s own theory that the death was accidental, I am convinced that the erroneous exclusion of certain reputation evidence regarding the victim’s violent character was harmless. I do not believe that this error would justify reversal of defendant’s conviction under either MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 (“No judgment or verdict shall be . . . reversed ... in any criminal case, on the ground of . . . the improper . . . rejection of evidence . . . unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”), or MCR 2.613(A) (“An error in . . . the exclusion of evidence ... is not ground ... for setting aside a verdict . . . unless refusal to take this *323action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice”).
Despite the language of MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096, in People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170; 577 NW2d 422 (1998), a majority of this Court adopted the “highly probable” standard for preserved, nonconstitutional error.1 Under this standard, the issue is whether “it was highly probable that the errors did not contribute to the verdict[].” Id. at 205. Here, I am convinced that it is highly probable that the erroneous exclusion of certain reputation evidence regarding the victim’s violent character did not contribute to the verdict.
First, some evidence of the victim’s violent character was admitted. At trial, defendant testified about the victim’s past history of having a violent temper when drunk. He also testified about the victim threatening to beat his wife on the day at issue.2 Further, he testified about the specifics of the day at issue in terms of drinking, arguing between defendant and the victim, and physical altercations. The other two witnesses corroborated defendant’s testimony regarding the drinking and arguing. In the context of this evidence bearing directly on the victim’s conduct on the day at issue, additional evidence regarding the victim’s general reputation for violence would have been largely cumulative. See, e.g., People v Fortson, 202 *324Mich App 13, 19; 507 NW2d 763 (1993), in which the Court held that failure to admit character evidence in support of a defendant’s self-defense theory was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the overwhelming evidence of the victim’s aggressive behavior on the day at issue. Where, as here, evidence of the victim’s actual conduct in connection with the incident at issue is admitted, general character evidence becomes less compelling regarding whether the victim was the likely aggressor.
Moreover, while defendant claimed self-defense, his bottom-line theory was that the victim’s injury and resulting death were accidental. Defendant’s self-defense theory played a limited role similar to that described in People v Bell, 14 Mich App 80, 84; 165 NW2d 283 (1968):3
The role of self-defense in this case was to show that the defendant was not the aggressor and to supply a justification or excuse for engaging in a struggle which resulted in accidental death.
Here, defendant contended that he was not afraid of the victim at the time he took out his knife; only later did he become afraid of the victim. Defendant testified that he was trying to get away when the victim was injured with the knife and that it was “an accident.” Thus, according to defendant, the knife wound that killed the victim was accidental and not inflicted in self-defense. In the context of defendant’s allegation that the fatal knife wound was accidental, evi*325dence regarding the victim’s character for violence was immaterial to whether defendant acted in self-defense. Accordingly, under defendant’s own version of the incident, the exclusion of certain evidence relating to the victim’s character for violence simply would not bear on whether defendant was guilty of the charged offenses.
For these reasons, I believe it is highly probable that this evidentiary error did not contribute to the verdict.4 Accordingly, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.
Boyle and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.

 I remain convinced that the proper standard for preserved, nonconstitutional error is set forth in MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 and that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why the judgment should be reversed. See Gearns, supra, opinion of Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which I concurred. However, I believe that the error at issue here is harmless even under the highly probable standard.

 Defendant also testified that he and the other two witnesses responded by reminding the victim that his wife had a restraining order against him, but the court instructed the jury to disregard that information.

 I refer to this case solely for its description of how a defendant might simultaneously claim accident and self-defense. I do not, as the majority erroneously contends, rely on it as “conclusive support that the error in this case was harmless.” Ante at 321, n 1.

 I conclude that the error was harmless for three reasons: because some character evidence regarding the victim was admitted, because evidence regarding the specifics of the incident made general character evidence less compelling, and because defendant claimed that the fatal knife wound was accidental. The majority mischaracterizes my position by indicating that I find the error harmless solely because testimony regarding drinking and arguing was admitted.