Court Opinion

ID: 9785720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:16:45.230904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:31.948292
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, P. J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the three-year statute of limitations under ORS 30.020(1) applies to plaintiffs products liability claim under the holding in Korbut v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100 Or App 649, 787 P2d 896, rev den 310 Or 70 (1990). The majority misunderstands our holding in Korbut. Even if that is not the case, the legislature has changed ORS *38430.020(1) since Korbut was decided so that, when the statutes are read together, it is apparent that the two-year limitations period of ORS 30.905(2) controls plaintiffs claim.
ORS 30.020(1) provides, in relevant part, that
“[wjhen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or commission of another, the personal representative of the decedent, * * * may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same act or omission. The action shall be commenced within three years after the injury causing the death of the decedent is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered * * *. In no case may an action be commenced later than the earliest of:
“(a) Three years after the death of the decedent; or
“(b) The longest of any other period for commencing an action under a statute of ultimate repose that applies to the act or omission causing the injury, including but not limited to statutes of ultimate repose provided for in ORS 12.110(4), 12.115,12.135,12.137 and 30.905.”
ORS 30.905(1) provides for an eight-year statute of ultimate repose. ORS 30.905(2) provides:
“Except as provided in ORS 30.907 and 30.908(1) to (4), a product liability civil action shall be commenced not later than two years after the date on which the death, injury or damage complained of occurs.” (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs decedent died on December 6,1995. Plaintiff filed his wrongful death claim on December 1,1998, more than two years after decedent died. His complaint alleges claims against the manufacturer and the seller of the vehicle in which she was riding at the time of her death. The claims assert that the airbag in the vehicle was defectively designed and caused her death. A “product liability civil action” includes an action based on a design or other defect in a product. ORS 30.900. Under the plain language of ORS 30.905(2), plaintiffs action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
*385The majority creates a conundrum for itself that does not exist. Ultimately, it holds that ORS 30.020(1) is controlling because it reasons that it “cannot construe the statutes in a way that gives complete effect to both, * * * and thus [is] left with general rules of construction to attempt to resolve the impasse.” 173 Or App at 381.1 disagree that such an impasse exists when the statutes are read together and effect is given to both. ORS 30.905(2) applies to products liability cases in which death occurs. ORS 30.020(1) applies to wrongful death actions in general. As evidenced by its language, ORS 30.020(1) presently incorporates a discovery rule1 and a statute of ultimate repose. The statute starts running at the time that the injury causing the death is discovered.2 Thus, by its terms, ORS 30.020(1) imposes a statute of limitations for all wrongful death claims. In contrast, ORS 30.905(2) applies to all products liability cases, including those in which death occurs, and it expressly imposes a two-year statute of limitations for those specific claims. The majority’s interpretation reads the word “death” out of ORS 30.905(2). Because we are required in interpreting statutes to give meaning to all the terms used by the legislature, if possible, under ORS 174.010, the majority errs. Both statutes can be given meaning when the two-year limitation in ORS 30.095(2) is understood to create an exception to the general three-year statute of limitations in ORS 30.020(1).
The majority also bases its holding on its incorrect belief that the issue in this case is controlled by our holding in Korbut and the Supreme Court’s adoption of that holding in Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 373, 811 P2d 627 (1991). In Korbut, the plaintiff brought a products liability claim in 1988 based on the decedent’s death in 1982, after discovering the alleged cause of the decedent’s death earlier in 1988. Thus, the question was not whether the three-year limit under ORS 30.020 or the two-year limit under ORS 30.905(2) applied. The plaintiffs action was not *386timely under either statute, and it did not matter to the plaintiffs case which statute applied. The action would only have been timely if the time for filing the claim had been extended under a discovery doctrine by starting the limitations period in 1988. At the time, neither statute contained an express discovery provision.
We held in Korbut that the plaintiffs argument that the limitation period for his action should be extended by the discoveiy rule was controlled by the court’s holding in Eldridge v. Eastmoreland General Hospital, 307 Or 500, 769 P2d 775 (1989).3 In that case, which did not involve a products liability claim, the Supreme Court decided that the legislature did not intend that the discovery rule apply to wrongful death actions subject to ORS 30.020. By applying the rule of Eldridge in Korbut, we were doing nothing more than holding that no discovery rule was applicable to a claim brought under either ORS 30.020 or ORS 30.900 as they existed in 1990. Most importantly to this case, we did not decide in Korbut whether ORS 30.020(1) or ORS 30.905(2) applied to a products liability claim because that decision was not required; the plaintiff could not prevail under either statute of limitations without the benefit of a discovery rule.
Western Helicopter Services was decided by the Supreme Court on May 14,1991. The existing discovery provisions were not added to ORS 30.020(1) by the legislature until later that year. Or Laws 1991, ch 608, § 1. The question certified to the court by the United States District Court in Western Helicopter Services was:
“1. Does the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims set forth in ORS 30.020(1) or the statute of limitations for product liability actions set forth in ORS 30.905 *387apply to wrongful death claim based on the theory of product liability?”
Thus, the issue presented to the court in Western Helicopter Services is identical to the issue in this case, but dissimilar to the issue in Korbut.
Whether the above-described difference in issues was recognized by the certifying judge in Western Helicopter Services or the Supreme Court is subject to debate. In denying certification, the court said,
“We turn to the discretionary factors. The first applicable factor is our conclusion, contrary to that of the district court, that there is controlling precedent with respect to the first question — Korbut v. Eastern Kodak Co., supra. It is true that Korbut is an extremely brief decision from the Court of Appeals. It is also true that there is contrary precedent from the Ninth Circuit — precedent that the district court would normally follow. But the question is one of Oregon law, not federal law, the federal court’s decision was the earlier of the two, and it is the Oregon court’s decision— not that of the Ninth Circuit — that is binding for purposes of the certification law.8 It follows from the foregoing that this court should not accept certification of the first question, unless some other discretionary factor dictates a contrary conclusion.”4 311 Or at 373-74.
It is unclear from the opinion in Western Helicopter Services whether the Supreme Court was telling the United States District Court that it should follow Oregon law rather *388than the federal cases interpreting Oregon law or whether the court was in fact affirming that Korbut was controlling precedent on the issue presented by the certified question. The majority feels compelled to follow the latter interpretation of Western Helicopter Services, which in turn leads to its holding that the three-year statute of limitations in ORS 30.020(1) governs plaintiffs products liability claim.5 In my view, the discovery provision added to ORS 30.020 in 1991, after Western Helicopter Services was decided, makes clear the legislature’s contrary intent. In particular, ORS 30.020(l)(b)’s reference to ORS 30.905(2) demonstrates that it had ORS 30.905 in mind when it amended ORS 30.020. That reference implies a specific intent to make the limitation on products liability claims a two-year period. The Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of a statute are part of the context of a statute, but when the legislature subsequently acts, the Supreme Court’s case law is not necessarily controlling precedent. Fechtig v. City of Albany, 150 Or App 10, 20, 946 P2d 280 (1997).6 Even if Korbut was held by the Supreme Court to have decided what was not intended by this court, the law and the parties would be better served if we would forgo the application of the principle of stare decisis in this case and interpret the existing statutes in accordance with their plain language.7 Under that construct, it is evident that ORS 30.905(2), the more specific statute, controls over the more general statute, ORS 30.020(1), when the present texts of the statutes are read together.
For these reasons, I dissent, and I would hold that the two-year statute of limitations bars plaintiffs claim.

 A discovery rule embodies the concept that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or should know that a tort was committed that caused an injury to the plaintiff and that the defendant committed the tort.

 However, the action must be commenced within three years of the date of death, or the longest period provided by any other statute of repose provided by another statute, including the statute of repose in ORS 30.905(1).

 The majority reasons that Korbut decided that the three-year statute of limitations in ORS 30.020(1) applies to a wrongful death claim based on a products defect liability theory because the defendant in Korbut relied, in part, on our holding in Dortch v.A. H. Robbins., Inc., 59 Or App 310, 650 P2d 1046 (1982). Our opinion in Korbut does not mention Dortch, and for good reason; Dortch did not involve a wrongful death claim and therefore did not implicate any potential conflict between ORS 30.020(1) and ORS 30.905(2). Similarly, that issue was not before us in Border v. Indian Head Industries, Inc., 101 Or App 556, 792 P2d 111 (1990), in which we held that the discovery rule cannot apply to a statute of ultimate repose.

“We recognize that the district court appears to be concerned about an inconsistency in decisions on this subject. However, our focus in searching for controlling precedent is narrower than the focus of the district court. The Oregon Court of Appeals decision in [Korbut] is ‘controlling precedent’ for the purposes of ORS 28.200 [the statute authorizing answers to questions of law certified by other courts] and our exercise of discretion under that statute.”

 The court did not say that Korbut was controlling precedent on the issue of whether ORS 30.905(2) controlled over ORS 30.020(1) for purposes of a products liability case.

 One concern underlying the majority’s statutory interpretation appears to be that plaintiff has been misled into believing that his claim was governed by the three-year statute of limitations. If the majority is persuaded by plaintiffs argument in that regard, the appropriate disposition is to overrule Korbut, but to do so only prospectively, so that plaintiffs claim is not time-barred. Such reliance by plaintiff would not justify the perpetuation of an erroneous understanding of how the two statutes work together.

 In Carlson v. Myers, 327 Or 213, 959 P2d 31 (1998), the Supreme Court said:
“In the construction of amendatory acts, such as the one under consideration here, it is presumed that material changes in the language of the statute create material changes in meaning.”

 Both Korbut and Western Helicopter Services were decided before PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1140 (1993).