Court Opinion

ID: 9386468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 16:06:41.286248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.630381
License: Public Domain

J-S04015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ANDREW MCCORMICK                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1033 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0008465-2019

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED APRIL 12, 2023

        Andrew McCormick (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of aggravated assault, possession

of an instrument of crime, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another

person.1 We affirm.

        The trial court recounted the facts presented at trial as follows:

        On September 25, 2019, Felicia Giles (hereinafter “Ms. Giles”)
        testified that she called the police to have her cousin, Appellant,
        removed from their grandmother’s home at 5355 Thomas Ave,
        Philadelphia, PA[; the police informed Ms. Giles that] a restraining
        order was required. Notes of Testimony (hereinafter “N.T.”),
        Waiver Trial, 11/08/21. Ms. Giles then called both her brother,
        James Giles (hereinafter “Mr. Giles”), and her boyfriend, Shalon
        Kirkland (hereinafter “Mr. Kirkland”), requesting their help in
        transporting her grandmother, Vivian Murray (homeowner), to
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 907(a), 2701(a), and 2705.
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      secure a restraining order to evict Appellant. Id. Mr. Giles and
      Mr. Kirkland arrived [at] the address separately, but
      simultaneously. Id. Upon arrival, Mr. Kirkland informed Mr. Giles
      of his intent to fight the Appellant[.] Id.

             When the Appellant learned Mr. Kirkland was going to fight
      him, the Appellant retreated to an upstairs bedroom and closed
      the door behind him. Id. Mr. Kirkland continued after the
      Appellant[,] who then emerged from the bedroom with a knife in
      his hand. Id. The fight between the Appellant and Mr. Kirkland
      began in the stairwell leading from the living room to the upper
      floor. Id. All four individuals were involved in the first altercation
      on the stairwell: Appellant at the top of the stairs with Ms. Giles
      and Mr. Giles on the middle steps attempting to separate Mr.
      Kirkland on the lower landing from the Appellant. Id. Mr. Kirkland
      managed to punch [Appellant] multiple times in the face.
      Appellant responded by swinging his knife towards Mr. Kirkland,
      resulting in the Appellant haphazardly and inadvertently stabbing
      Mr. Giles in the forearm. Id. [] Appellant became enraged by
      this mistake and yelled[,] “you made me hit my cousin.” Id. at
      p. 72, Line 1.

             Ms. Giles encouraged Mr. Kirkland to leave, and he
      subsequently exited the house, but he taunted Appellant to
      continue the fight outside. Id. Once outdoors, the Appellant
      chased Mr. Kirkland around a parked car. Id. Appellant was still
      in possession of the knife and eventually managed to stab Mr.
      Kirkland in the upper lip, slice his tongue in two, and effectively
      knock out multiple teeth, leaving blood splatters on the car. Id.
      Immediately after stabbing Mr. Kirkland in the face, the Appellant
      fled the area. Id. On September 27, 2019, Appellant [] turned
      himself in to the police and was arrested. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 1-2.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant, at two separate dockets, with

crimes related to the assaults on Mr. Giles and Mr. Kirkland.        Following a

November 8, 2021, bench trial, the trial court acquitted Appellant of all

charges relating to Mr. Giles, while convicting Appellant of the above charges

relating to Mr. Kirkland.    On March 15, 2022, the trial court sentenced

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Appellant to an aggregate 4 – 8 years in prison, with credit for time-served.

This timely appeal followed.2

        Appellant presents two issues for review:

        1.    Whether the trial court abuse[d] its discretion in failing to
        grant a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of
        the evidence?

        2.    Whether the trial court abuse[d] its discretion or erred in
        finding [Appellant] guilty when the evidence was insufficient to
        sustain the verdict because the Commonwealth failed to disprove
        beyond a reasonable doubt [Appellant’s] self-defense claim?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

        In his first issue, Appellant claims the verdict was against the weight of

the evidence because “witnesses gave less than credible testimony[.]” Id. at

15.     Appellant specifically contends the trial court erred in crediting the

testimony of Ms. Giles, Mr. Giles, and Mr. Kirkland; the three witnesses

testified that Appellant stabbed Mr. Kirkland after following him outside.

Appellant’s Brief at 22-27; see also N.T., 11/8/21, at 37-41; 73-74; 103-05.

Appellant maintains the trial court should have credited Appellant’s testimony

that he acted in self-defense in stabbing Mr. Kirkland inside the home.

Appellant’s Brief at 26-27; N.T., 11/8/21, at 145-46, 173.

        The Commonwealth argues Appellant waived his weight claim because

although Appellant “asserts that he filed a ‘post-trial motion’ after the trial,

but before the sentencing, [] this alleged motion does not appear in the record

____________________________________________

2   Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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or on the docket.”     Commonwealth Brief at 6.        In the alternative, the

Commonwealth avers Appellant’s “argument the court erred by not crediting

[Appellant’s] testimony over that of three witnesses and photographic

evidence establishing his guilt would not entitle him to relief.” Id.

      “A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is sufficient

to sustain the verdict but seeks a new trial on the grounds that the evidence

was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict

shocks one’s sense of justice.” In re A.G.C., 142 A.3d 102, 109 (Pa. Super.

2016) (citation omitted). “Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of

the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the

verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth. v. Widmer,

744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).

      Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
      consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
      judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Id. (citation omitted). This standard applies even when the trial court is the

finder of fact. See Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014, 1022 (Pa.

Super. 2016) (reviewing trail court’s exercise of discretion in weight claim

arising from a non-jury verdict).

      A challenge to the weight of the evidence

      must be preserved either in a post-sentence motion, by a written
      motion before sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing.
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). “The purpose of this rule is to make
      it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be

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     raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Comment to
     Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. If an appellant never gives the trial court the
     opportunity to provide relief, then there is no discretionary act
     that this Court can review. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93
     A.3d 478, 491 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 834-35 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(footnotes omitted, emphasis added).

     Appellant claims he filed a post-trial motion challenging the weight of

the evidence on February 16, 2022. Appellant’s Brief at 22. This motion is

not listed on the docket or contained in the certified record.         However,

Appellant argued a motion for extraordinary relief immediately prior to

sentencing.   Appellant emphasized the insufficiency of the evidence, but

stated “there was no credible evidence … [Appellant] stabbed Mr. Kirkland

outside.” N.T., 3/15/22, at 4-5; see also id. at 4-21. As this statement is

the crux of Appellant’s weight argument, we decline to find waiver.

     In rejecting Appellant’s argument, the trial court explained:

     The verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
     sense of justice. Though Mr. Kirkland initiated the first fight inside
     [] home, witnesses testified that Mr. Kirkland exited the property
     before the second altercation, but Appellant followed Mr. Kirkland
     outside. N.T., Waiver Trial, 11/08/21. The weight of the evidence
     shows Appellant relinquished the opportunity to retreat. Id. The
     majority of witnesses, including Mr. Giles, testified that Appellant
     and Mr. Kirkland were outside the property during the [] stabbing.
     Id. Mr. Giles testified that Appellant was “running around the
     car,” “behind [Mr. Kirkland].” Id. p. 73 at Lines 6-7, 18-19.
     Additionally, there was photo evidence of blood splatters on the
     interior of the car door, indicating that Mr. Kirkland was stabbed
     outside by the car.         Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4D.            The
     corroboration of testimonial and physical evidence demonstrates
     the Appellant’s claim lacks merit and the [c]ourt’s verdict should
     not be disturbed.

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 5.

      The trial court credited the Commonwealth witnesses’ testimony that

Appellant pursued Mr. Kirkland and stabbed him outside the home; the trial

court rejected Appellant’s testimony that he remained in the home and

stabbed Mr. Kirkland in self-defense. See id. As factfinder, the trial court,

“while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence

produced,    is   free   to   believe    all,   part    or   none   of   the   evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super. 2016). Thus,

the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the verdict was not contrary

to the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we determine “whether the evidence

at trial, and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to

establish   all   elements    of   the   offense       beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.”

Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).

“Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on circumstantial evidence,

and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). “In conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the

evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.” Id.

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      Appellant’s argument regarding sufficiency is identical to his argument

regarding the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 27; see id. at 20-

27. Appellant maintains the trial court improperly credited the Commonwealth

witnesses who testified that Appellant stabbed Mr. Kirkland after pursuing him

outside. Id. at 27. Appellant provides no additional argument to support his

claim that he was defending himself when he stabbed Mr. Kirkland. Thus,

Appellant’s claim goes to the weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence. See

Commonwealth v. W.H.M., Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(finding claim that jury should not have believed the victim’s version of events

goes to the weight of the evidence, not sufficiency).

      Furthermore,

      a claim of self-defense (or justification, to use the term employed
      in the Crimes Code) requires evidence establishing three
      elements: (a) [that the defendant] reasonably believed that he
      was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that
      it was necessary to use deadly force against the victim to prevent
      such harm; (b) that the defendant was free from fault in provoking
      the difficulty which culminated in the slaying; and (c) that the
      [defendant] did not violate any duty to retreat. Although the
      defendant has no burden to prove self-defense ... before the
      defense is properly in issue, there must be some evidence, from
      whatever source, to justify such a finding. Once the question is
      properly raised, the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove
      beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in
      self-defense.     The Commonwealth sustains that burden of
      negation if it proves any of the following: [1] that the [defendant]
      was not free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty
      which resulted in the [injury]; [2] that the [defendant] did not
      reasonably believe that he was in imminent danger of death or
      great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to kill in order to
      save himself therefrom; or [3] that the [defendant] violated a
      duty to retreat or avoid the danger.

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Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740-41 (Pa. 2012) (citations

omitted; some brackets in original); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505 (use of force

in self-protection). “If the Commonwealth establishes any one of these three

[negation] elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction is

insulated from a defense challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence where

self-protection is at issue.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1149

(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).

     As the trial court explained,

     this case involves two separate incidents between Appellant and
     Mr. Kirkland. In the first incident, Mr. Kirkland provoked the
     Appellant’s use of defensive force when Mr. Kirkland aggressed
     the Appellant and punched him in the face multiple times while on
     the stairs. N.T., Waiver Trial, 11/08/21, p. 145. In response to
     being punched multiple times, the Appellant swung his knife and
     accidentally stabbed Mr. Giles in the forearm. Id. The [trial c]ourt
     found that the Appellant reasonably believed that this use of
     deadly force was necessary to avoid serious bodily injury and that
     the Appellant could not retreat from this first incident with
     complete safety. Id. at p. 196. In accordance with these findings,
     the Appellant was found not guilty for Mr. Giles’ injuries. Id. at
     p. 195.

            Witnesses testified that the Appellant yelled out “you made
     me hit my cousin,” indicating that after the Appellant accidentally
     stabbed his cousin, he became enraged. Id. at p. 72, Line 1.
     After the first stabbing, Mr. Kirkland taunted the Appellant to
     continue the fight onto the street and vacated the property. Id.
     at p. 100. When Mr. Kirkland left the home, this provided
     opportunity for the Appellant to retreat from the altercation. Once
     Mr. Kirkland separated himself from the Appellant by exiting the
     house, the Appellant could no longer claim self-defense and any
     continued use of force was unjustified. The evidence proved,
     however, Appellant pursued Mr. Kirkland outside. Mr. Giles
     testified that Appellant seemed to be running after Mr. Kirkland
     around the car. Id. at p. 73. Mr. Kirkland also testified that he
     was stabbed on the street, by the car. Id. at p. 105. Additionally,

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      photo evidence corroborates the stabbing at the car.
      Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4D. With the second incident occurring
      outside, the Appellant had ample opportunity to run away from
      any engagement with Mr. Kirkland and it therefore cannot be said
      that he could not retreat with complete safety.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 7-8.

      The trial court, sitting as factfinder, was free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence. Miller, 172 A.3d at 640. It is not the role of this Court to

reweigh the evidence. Id. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue does not

merit relief.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2023

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