Court Opinion

ID: 9815210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 00:28:07.513716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.591938
License: Public Domain

Hinds-Radix, J.,
concurs in part and dissents in part, and votes to affirm the order appealed from, with the following memorandum: Pursuant to the Martin rule, the Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of the complaint against the union defendants and the individual defendants, acting in their representative capacities as officers of the union defendants (see Martin v Curran, 303 NY 276 [1951]; see also Palladino v CNY Centro, Inc., 23 NY3d 140 [2014]; Lahendro v New York State United Teachers Assn., 88 AD3d 1146 [2011]; Duane Reade, Inc. v Local 338 Retail, Wholesale, Dept. Store Union, UFCW, AFL-CIO, 17 AD3d 277 [2005]). Since the union defendants are unincorporated associations, suits against them and their officers “for breaches of agreements or for tortious wrongs” are limited to “cases where the individual liability of every single member can be alleged and proven,” based upon allegations that each of their members expressly, or impliedly with full knowledge, authorized or ratified the specific acts in question (Martin v Curran, 303 NY at 282). The Martin rule applies to intentional torts such as are alleged in this case (see Piniewski v Panepinto, 267 AD2d 1087 [1999]; Torres v Lacey, 3 AD2d 998 [1957]). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the Martin rule applies to causes of action for injunctive relief as well as to causes of action to recover damages (see Mounteer v Bayly, 86 AD2d 942 [1982]; Olympic Radio & Tel., Inc. v Andrews, 279 App Div 1081 [1952]).
There are exceptions to the Martin rule. For example, in Madden v Atkins (4 NY2d 283 [1958]), the Court of Appeals allowed an action against a union to proceed, based upon a theory that all of its members delegated, to a ruling group in the union, the authority to discipline members. The Court thus concluded that, if the ruling group acted, the entire unincorporated association was liable for its conduct (see also Hoffman v Victory, 281 App Div 849 [1953]). Moreover, injunctive relief may be sought against union officials to prohibit violent picketing (see Labor Law § 807; Wolf St. Supermarkets v McPartland, 108 AD2d 25 [1985]; Nathan’s Famous v Local 1115, Joint Bd., AFL-CIO, 70 Misc. 2d 257 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1972]). None of these exceptions is applicable here.
The Martin rule applies to individuals acting in their capaci-
*1086ties as representatives of the union (see Martin v Curran, 303 NY at 280; Roth v United Fedn. of Teachers, 5 Misc. 3d 888, 896 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2004]), and in their union roles (see Lahendro v New York State United Teachers Assn., 88 AD3d 1146 [2011]; Duane Reade, Inc. v Local 338 Retail, Wholesale, Dept. Store Union, UFCW, AFL-CIO, 17 AD3d 277 [2005]). The plaintiffs contend, however, that the verified complaint asserted causes of action against the individual union officials in their individual capacities and that, therefore, the causes of action against them may proceed (see Stefania v McNiff, 49 Misc. 2d 480 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1966]). However, in Stefania, the court noted that the defendant, who was an officer of a union, “has had a long-standing antipathy toward the plaintiff” (id. at 483), and acted contrary to his usual practice as a representative of the union. Thus, I conclude that a defamation cause of action may be pursued against a union official in his or her individual capacity (see A. Terzi Prods., Inc. v Theatrical Protective Union, 2 F Supp 2d 485, 492 [SD NY 1998]) only if the individual was acting with personal animosity and/or beyond his or her role as a union official (see Stefania v McNiff, 49 Misc. 2d 480 [1966]).
Here, the verified complaint alleges that the union defendants and the individual defendants, acting in concert with each other, engaged in a “defamatory campaign.” Although it is alleged that the individual defendants each made representations at the same “tele-town hall meeting,” repeating the representations of all of the defendants, nowhere is it alleged that the individual defendants acted independently. Therefore, it is my view that the complaint does not state a cause of action against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. An allegation that the individual defendants acted independently is necessary for the court to exercise jurisdiction over them, and is not merely a defense to the defamation cause of action asserted against them. If disclosure is necessary to determine whether the individual defendants acted independently, the plaintiffs should have proceeded pursuant to CPLR 3102 (c) for pre-action disclosure to aid in framing a complaint.
As noted by the majority, the plaintiffs failed to state causes of action sounding in tortious interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, since they failed to name any specific contract or business relation that was actually affected by the allegedly wrongful conduct (see McGill v Parker, 179 AD2d 98 [1992]).
Accordingly, I respectfully conclude the order appealed from, which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), should be affirmed.