Court Opinion

ID: 9701510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:22:29.309336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:24.255576
License: Public Domain

Parskey, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the court’s opinion except for Part II, C.
It is a discriminatory practice for an employer, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ a person because of sex. General Statutes § 46a-60. The hearing on a charge of a claimed discriminatory employment practice involves two issues, namely, (1) the existence of a discriminatory employment practice and (2) the causal relationship between that practice and the complainant’s rejection. In addressing the first question, the trial court concluded that though disparate treatment of women was shown by the use of the employment application form, there was ample support in the record for the hearing examiner’s conclusion that the sep*66arate questions asked of women were motivated by reasons of health and therefore the use of the particular application form did not constitute a discriminatory practice. I agree with the majority that the use of the application form in question constitutes a discriminatory practice as a matter of law and thus requires the issuance of a cease and desist order.
Once a discriminatory practice has been found the only remaining issue involves the appropriate remedy. General Statutes § 46a-86 (a) provides in pertinent part that “[i]f, upon all the evidence . . . the hearing officer finds that a respondent has engaged in any discriminatory practice . . . [he] shall issue . . . and cause to be served on the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the discriminatory practice . . . .” The majority recognizes this in its direction, ante at p. 60, that such order shall issue. The statute also authorizes the hearing officer to require the respondent “to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of the hearing officer will effectuate the purpose of this chapter.” Under subsection (b) of § 46a-86 the affirmative action referred to in subsection (a) includes hiring of the employee, with or without back pay. If there is a causal connection between the discriminatory practice and the refusal to hire then affirmative relief would be presumptively indicated. To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court in Title VII cases, the Discriminatory Employment Practices Act deals with legal injuries of an economic character occasioned by sex discrimination. Where prohibited discrimination is involved, the hearing officer has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will, so far as possible, eliminate the *67discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975). Given a finding of a refusal to hire resulting from a discriminatory practice, the hiring of the person discriminated against should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purpose of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. Id.
The reason that affirmative relief may be warranted in this case is that the evidence is sufficient to establish a causal connection between the discriminatory practice and the rejection of the plaintiff’s application. When the plaintiff refused to answer those portions of the application form which she regarded as intrusive, her application was held up. This was before the plaintiff filed with the commission on human rights and opportunities her complaint alleging retaliatory action. Later, when she was rejected by the employer, no reason was assigned for such rejection. It would not be unreasonable for a trier to infer from this evidence that her rejection was causally related to the defendants’ discriminatory practice. The practice found wanting here is no different in substance from the discriminatory qualification test condemned in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1971), which the United States Supreme Court recognized as requiring analysis different from that required for a neutral act which potentially has a discriminatory impact. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
*68The presumption in favor of affirmative relief is a strong one that seldom can be overcome. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719, 98 S. Ct. 1370, 55 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1978). Although affirmative relief is not an automatic remedy for the correction of a discriminatory practice, the denial of such relief can never be justified merely on the basis of the “good faith” of the employer. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422. “If [affirmative relief] were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the remedy would become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a compensation for workers’ injuries.” Id. In any event, the remand to the trial court should be with direction to remand the case to a hearing officer for the limited purpose of determining the appropriate remedy. At such hearing, the burden should be on the defendants to show that affirmative relief would not be appropriate because the plaintiff does not possess the requisite qualifications for the position. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763, 96 S. Ct. 1251, 47 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1976).
If an employer has a neutral employment policy or practice, a complainant charging either disparate treatment or disparate impact bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier that he has been the victim of discriminatory action in the face of the employer’s articulation of a non-discriminatory ground for the suspected action. If, on the other hand, an employer has engaged in a practice which is facially discriminatory or in a pattern of discrimination in the past, then in order to effectuate the governmental policy of eradicating discriminatory treatment or practices, it is appropriate in the *69individual case of claimed discrimination for the employer to bear the ultimate burden of showing that its rejection of the individual complainant was due to non-diseriminatory causes. Cf. Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S. Ct. 807, 89 L. Ed. 1095 (1945); note, “Developments in the Law— Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1169 n.22 (1971). Sensitivity to the fundamental policy considerations underlying the Discriminatory Employment Practices Act requires that the victim of such practices be treated as more than merely a sacrificial lamb for future benefit of others similarly situated.