Court Opinion

ID: 9882900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:21:39.602519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:08.593642
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re G.C.M.G., 2023-Ohio-3018.]

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                PORTAGE COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:                                CASE NOS. 2023-P-0024
                                                           2023-P-0025
G.C.M.G. AND J.A.G.,
DEPENDENT CHILDREN
                                                 Civil Appeals from the
                                                 Court of Common Pleas,
                                                 Juvenile Division

                                                 Trial Court Nos. 2022 JCF 00607
                                                                  2022 JCF 00608

                                            OPINION

                                     Decided: August 25, 2023
                                       Judgment: Reversed

Katherine E. Rudzik, 26 Market Street, Suite 904, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For
Appellant, Heather Duche).

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Julia B. Adkins, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Appellee, Portage
County Department of Job and Family Services).

Karlek D.D. Jarvis, 206 South Meridian Street, Suite A, Ravenna, OH 44266 (Guardian
Ad Litem).

Thomas Grist, 228 West Main Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For G.C.M.G., Minor).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}    Appellant, Heather Duche, appeals from the judgment of the Portage

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of her

children, G.C.M.G. and J.A.G., to appellee, the Portage County Department of Job and

Family Services (PCDJFS). For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the
lower court.

      {¶2}     Duche is the biological mother of G.C.M.G., born July 27, 2011, and J.A.G.,

born July 13, 2012. The children’s biological father is Garrett Greenstreet, who has not

appealed from the lower court’s termination of his parental rights.

      {¶3}     On November 30, 2020, complaints were filed alleging the children were

abused, neglected, and dependent. They alleged that the children had been left in the

care of an individual by Duche while she had a medical procedure and she did not return

to pick up the children. Following a shelter care hearing, the children were placed in the

interim custody of PCDJFS. The children were adjudicated dependent pursuant to a

stipulation. The dependency finding was based on a “need for services to address

parenting issues and abandonment issues.”         A dispositional hearing was held on

February 9, 2021, and the children were placed in the temporary custody of PCDJFS. A

springing order issued at that time provided that the children would be returned to Duche’s

legal custody, with protective supervision, in 30 days. On February 25, 2021, PCDJFS

filed objections to the springing order as Duche had tested positive for methamphetamine

and had violated a no contact order by having her boyfriend at her residence while the

children were present.

      {¶4}     After multiple extensions of the temporary custody order, PCDJFS filed a

Motion for Permanent Custody on November 10, 2022. It requested termination of

parental rights since the father was incarcerated and Duche “has failed to adequately

address her mental health, housing, and employment issues,” was presently homeless,

had tested positive for illicit substances, and had not completed her case plan objectives.

      {¶5}     A hearing on the motion for permanent custody was held on April 14, 2023.

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
It was conducted jointly with a hearing on a separate legal custody case involving Duche’s

two other children. The following testimony was presented:

      {¶6}   Danielle Stropki, a PCDJFS caseworker, became involved with the family

in November 2020. At that time, the children were removed from Duche’s custody when

a friend watching them for a weekend could no longer care for them and police could not

locate Duche. The case plan required that Duche complete drug and alcohol and mental

health assessments, participate in counseling services, comply with requests for drug

screens, complete a parenting program, obtain an income, and maintain safe and stable

housing. She was also to address any issues arising from prior endangering children

charges in Summit County.

      {¶7}   After the dependency adjudication, the springing order was put in place and

the children returned home on an extended visit. Shortly thereafter, in February 2021,

PCDJFS filed a notice of objection given Duche’s positive drug test and violation of an

order that the children not have contact with her boyfriend. The children remained in the

temporary custody of PCDJFS.         In May 2021, Duche twice tested positive for

methamphetamine. At the time of the case plan review in November 2021, Duche was

in mental health counseling and had another positive drug screen. Stropki testified that

Duche had completed both her drug and alcohol and mental health assessments.

      {¶8}   Kellan Towns, a PCDJFS caseworker, was assigned to the case from

November 2021 until June 2022. According to Towns, she conducted “random” drug

screens of Duche when she saw her for appointments. Towns testified that these were

conducted about once a month “due to the fact that she was [also] doing screening with

Compass Recovery” and Towns was “getting those reports.” Duche did not complete

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
many of the requested screens from Compass in March through May 2022. Towns

confirmed that Duche tested positive for methamphetamine three times in 2021, but

Duche denied usage and asserted that she tested positive because others in her

apartment building were using methamphetamine. Duche did not comply with requests

to confirm the results with a hair follicle test. Duche also refused three oral drug screen

requests in 2021. Towns was asked if “at any point in time” did Duche begin screening

negatively, to which Towns stated: “She did. There were frequent negatives.” Towns

testified that the last positive test by Duche in this case was March 30, 2022. Towns

testified that, there had initially been times Duche did not come in for drug screens, so

Towns began asking for verification for her unavailability (the date of this request is not

clear from her testimony). After that request, apart from the hair follicle test, Duche

provided doctor’s notes or other documented justifications for not being able to timely

complete drug tests. According to Towns, Duche did not refuse any tests requested by

PCDJFS in 2022.

       {¶9}   According to Towns, Duche participated in counseling at both Compass

Recovery and Coleman Health Services.            She eventually began undergoing all

counseling services at Compass for mental health and substance abuse.               Towns

discussed that Duche had been at risk of being discharged from these services for failing

to attend some sessions. Towns testified that beginning in January 2022, meetings with

Duche became difficult and she was non-compliant.

       {¶10} Duche was consistent with her supervised visitation with the children. She

also attended several extracurricular activities for her children, such as baseball games

and a basketball game. During this time, J.A.G. was doing well in school but had tantrums

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
after visitation on Tuesdays. Katie Miley, program manager at Place of Peace, had been

supervising Duche’s visits for about two years. Duche was always on time and came to

all visitations. When staff asked Duche “not to say certain things to the children * * * in

respect to coming home and time lines on that,” Duche complied with these requests.

       {¶11} Rachell Magrell, a PCDJFS on-going caseworker, began working with the

family in July 2022. Although Duche was supposed to meet with Magrell monthly, Magrell

met with Duche in July, September, and October but did not see her in August 2022 or

November through January 2023.         Magrell testified that she had difficulty getting

responses to communications with Duche. Duche indicated she had difficulty scheduling

meetings due to her work commitments.

       {¶12} As to Duche’s progress on the case plan, Magrell testified that Duche had

worked as a manager at Family Dollar since April 2022. Magrell believed she could care

for the children with the income made at this job. Duche had been in multiple apartments

during the pendency of this matter and Magrell had difficulty arranging visits to those

apartments. However, Duche obtained housing in February 2023, which Magrell visited.

Magrell described the residence as appropriate: “It’s a large, three bedroom house with

a fenced in backyard. The floors are good. The rooms are good. She has beds for the

children.”

       {¶13} Magrell explained that Duche tested clean for drugs in July 2022 and her

tests were negative for over a year. Duche submitted to all random and/or requested

drug screens from the time Magrell took over the case in June, and tested negative as

recently as February 2023, although screens were not completed in the months they did

not meet. Magrell explained that Duche had been receiving treatment from both Coleman

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
and Compass and, in August 2022, she decided to receive services from Compass only,

attending appointments weekly. During that time, Duche was being screened for drug

use by Compass and all tests were negative. Duche stopped going to Compass in

November 2022, saying that she worked too much. According to Magrell, Duche did not

complete a parenting program as required by her case plan.

      {¶14} Magrell characterized the relationship between G.C.M.G. and Duche as a

“love-hate” relationship “because of the things she has put him through” but he loves her.

He “bounces back and forth from, I’d rather be adopted than go home to I want to be with

my Mom, which is where he’s at right now.” J.A.G. is nonverbal but has a bond with

Duche. Both children are bonded with each other and their other siblings. J.A.G. has

had multiple placements but was in a foster home at the time of the hearing. G.C.M.G.

had three or four placements and was in a group home at the time of the hearing.

      {¶15} Bradford Price, a counselor at Compass Recovery, worked with Duche from

December 2021 to November 30, 2022, and believed she made positive progress through

her treatment. While she initially had some urine drug screens that tested positive for

THC, her last 21 drug screens were negative for all mood-altering chemicals. She

engaged well in her treatment and reviewed strategies to modify her behavior and make

positive decisions, which led to her choice to live in a home in a better neighborhood.

She stopped engaging in services because she indicated that she made significant

progress.

      {¶16} Duche testified that she is a full-time assistant manager at Dollar General

and receives pay she believes is adequate to support her children. She is up to date with

her rent in her current residence and has a month-to-month lease. She testified that she

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
sometimes had difficulty meeting with Magrell due to Magrell’s limited availability and

Duche’s work schedule. She also made a decision to stop going to Compass because

the appointment times conflicted with her work schedule. She spoke with Magrell about

reengaging with Compass in February 2023 and Magrell indicated: “it wouldn’t really

matter what I did at this point if I reengaged or not.”

       {¶17} Duche testified that she previously used methamphetamine but stopped in

October 2019 and her last positive drug screen was in March 2022. She described that

the child endangering charges were due to a past boyfriend’s abuse of the children and

she is in good standing on non-reporting probation.

       {¶18} Duche testified that she consistently visited the children and indicated that

the children do not want to leave at the end of visitation. She loves her children and

believes she can care for them best because she knows them. She expressed concerns

that she had not been informed about her children’s medical concerns and visits with her

children were sometimes cancelled by PCDJFS. Duche testified that she had completed

a parenting program prior to PCDJFS’ involvement with the family and provided proof to

Stropki, who said it would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a parenting class.

       {¶19} The guardian ad litem, Karlek Jarvis, recommended that permanent

custody be granted to PCDJFS. When Jarvis met with G.C.M.G. in November 2022, he

did not want to return to his mother. However, in February 2023, G.C.M.G. stated that he

wanted to return to his mother’s home. J.A.G. is clearly bonded with his mom and is

unable to fully express his wishes. Jarvis had concerns with Duche’s inconsistency,

failure to complete counseling, and her past relationships.

       {¶20} On April 24, 2023, the trial court issued a Journal Entry granting permanent

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
custody of the children to PCDJFS. The court found that the children had been in the

custody of children’s services for 22 of the prior 22 months. It found it was in the children’s

best interest that Duche’s parental rights be permanently terminated.           It found that

reunification was unlikely since Duche had failed to consistently engage with PCDJFS,

recently obtained housing, had not completed a parenting program, had not consistently

provided random drug screens, and stopped services after November 2022.

       {¶21} Duche timely appeals and raises the following assignment of error:

       {¶22} “The Trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of Appellant as to

the Children in this appeal was against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

       {¶23} “It is well established that a parent’s right to raise a child is an essential and

basic civil right.” (Citation omitted.) In re T.B., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-055, 2008-

Ohio-4415, ¶ 29; In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997). Termination

of parental rights has been described as “the family law equivalent of the death penalty.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d

485, ¶ 14. However, “[t]he rights of a parent to his or her child, while fundamental, ‘are

always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child.’” (Citation omitted.) In re L.M.R., 11th

Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-096, 2017-Ohio-158, ¶ 33, citing In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d

100, 105, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979). “[T]he termination of the rights of a natural parent

should occur as a last resort” but is authorized “when necessary for the welfare of the

child.” Id.

       {¶24} “R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis that the juvenile

court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.” In re Krems, 11th Dist.

Geauga No. 2003-G-2535, 2004-Ohio-2449, ¶ 33. The court must find: (1) that one of

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
the circumstances set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) is present and (2) that

it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency moving for

custody. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

       {¶25} The lower court found that, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the children

had been in the custody of PCDJFS for 22 months of a consecutive 22 month period,

since February 18, 2021, thereby satisfying the first prong. Duche does not dispute this

finding.

       {¶26} As to the second prong, Duche contends that the best interest finding made

by the trial court was not supported by the weight of the evidence. She argues that her

substantial compliance with the case plan indicated it would be in the best interest of the

children to return to her custody.

       {¶27} A determination that it is in the best interest of the children to grant

permanent custody to the children’s services agency must be supported “by clear and

convincing evidence.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); In re J.S.E., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2009-

P-0091 and 2009-P-0094, 2010-Ohio-2412, ¶ 25. In applying a clear and convincing

evidence standard, the evidence must “‘produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Citation omitted.) In re

Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). The reviewing

court examines the record to determine whether the evidence satisfies this burden of

proof. Id.

       {¶28} Regarding Duche’s contention that the court’s judgment is not supported by

the weight of the evidence, “‘[a] reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court’s

permanent custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
evidence.’” (Citation omitted.) In re N.M.P., 2018-Ohio-5072, 126 N.E.3d 200, ¶ 54 (11th

Dist.); In re J.L.S., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2020-P-0053 and 2020-P-0054, 2020-Ohio-

5143, ¶ 26. The appellate court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage

of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” (Citations

omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶

20. “‘Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence

are primarily for the trier of fact.’” (Citations omitted.) In re D.H., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.

2017-A-0081, 2018-Ohio-630, ¶ 18. “A trial court’s judgment terminating parental rights

and awarding permanent custody to an agency will not be reversed as against the

manifest weight of the evidence if it is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In

re Belanger, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0047, 2002-Ohio-4956, ¶ 17.

       {¶29} We recognize that there is a case currently pending before the Ohio

Supreme Court to resolve a conflict on the issue of the applicable standard of review in

termination of parental rights proceedings. In re Z.C., 169 Ohio St.3d 1439, 203 N.E.3d

730, 2023-Ohio-482 (finding that a conflict exists on the following issue: “[w]hen reviewing

a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights, is the appellate standard of review

abuse of discretion, manifest weight of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or

sufficiency of the evidence?”).     Nonetheless, there is no question that the applicable

statute mandates that a court may grant permanent custody only if it determines “by clear

and convincing evidence” that such decision is in the best interest of the children and

satisfies the other factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). If a trial court terminates

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
parental rights in the absence of such evidence, it logically follows that this would not be

a proper exercise of its discretion. See In re L.H., 2021-Ohio-3521, 179 N.E.3d 214, ¶ 9

(2d Dist.) (“[a] permanent-custody determination is unreasonable, and may be reversed

as an abuse of discretion, if the record lacks clear and convincing evidence” to support

the statutory elements for termination of parental rights). Similarly, as noted above, a

decision supported by clear and convincing evidence is likewise supported by the weight

of the evidence. Belanger at ¶ 17. In the present matter, the absence of clear and

convincing evidence means the lower court could not exercise its discretion to terminate

parental rights nor does the evidence weigh in favor of such termination.

       {¶30} Duche argues that the decision to terminate her parental rights was against

the evidence because she did what was asked of her, even if it was not exactly in the

manner requested by PCDJFS. She emphasizes that, at the time of the final hearing,

she was employed, had an appropriate home, and was drug free.

       {¶31} As part of her argument, Duche points to the “substantial” progress she

made on her case plan. It has been held that compliance with a case plan does not

preclude termination of parental rights. In re of A.M., 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2022-A-

0090 and 2022-A-0091, 2023-Ohio-671, ¶ 47. This is not to say, however, that progress

on a case plan is irrelevant, since compliance with the case plan can impact the children’s

best interests. In re C.E., 4th Dist. Athens No. 19CA10, 2019-Ohio-4125, ¶ 46 (“[a]

parent’s case plan compliance may be relevant to the extent that it affects the child’s best

interest”). Duche’s progress is a relevant consideration when it comes to the best interest

factors and will be considered in relation to those factors.

       {¶32} In evaluating the entirety of the evidence presented in conjunction with the

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
best interest factors, we find that there is a lack of evidence to meet the burden of clear

and convincing evidence or that the court’s termination of parental rights was supported

by the weight of the evidence. There was not adequate evidence presented that Duche

is unable to provide adequate care or support to her children or that it would be in their

best interest to have their relationship with their mother terminated. See In re A.J., 11th

Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0041, 2010-Ohio-4553, ¶ 66, citing In re Fry, 3d Dist. Marion

Nos. 9-02-14, et al., 2002-Ohio-3935, ¶ 8 (“the permanent removal of a child may be

condoned only where there is demonstrated an incapacity on the part of the parent to

provide adequate parental care,” not where an adoptive family could provide better care).

       {¶33} In determining the best interests of the children, a court shall consider “all

relevant factors, including, but not limited to”: the interaction and relationship of the child

with his parents, siblings, relatives, and foster caregivers; the wishes of the child with

regard for his maturity; the custodial history of the child; the child’s “need for a legally

secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved

without a grant of permanent custody to the agency”; prior convictions for child

endangering; and whether the parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm due

to alcohol or drug abuse. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e) and (E)(7)-(11).

       {¶34} Here, there are a multitude of factors in favor of a finding that termination

was not in the children’s best interests. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), relating to the child’s

relationship with family members and caregivers, is “highly significant” as it “focuses on

a critical component of the permanent custody test: whether there is a family relationship

that should be preserved.” In re C.M., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21372, 2003-Ohio-5040, ¶

11. Both children were bonded with their mother and had appropriate interactions with

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
her at visitations, which Duche attended without fail. At the time of the permanent custody

hearing, the testimony clearly demonstrated that G.C.M.G. wanted to return home to his

mother. It is further evident he had difficulty settling in with any foster family placement.

Although J.A.G. is non-verbal, testimony indicated that he was bonded to Duche as well

as G.C.M.G. Because both children were in multiple placements, and G.C.M.G. was in

a group home at the time of trial, their bond to foster parents is not a significant factor to

weigh.

         {¶35} Further, both children had lived with their mother and each other for the vast

majority of their lives. “A trial court should consider the ‘foreseeable impact on [a child’s]

emotional and social well-being’ before removing a child from a parent if the child has a

profound connection with that parent.” (Citation omitted.) A.J. at ¶ 71. Removing

G.C.M.G. from his mother’s custody permanently, considering his current expressed

desire to live with her and the fact that he has spent most of his life with her, would likely

have a negative impact upon him, although this was not adequately addressed at the

hearing.     Id.; see In re A.W., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009631, 2010-Ohio-817, ¶

18 (“Significantly lacking in [Children Services’] evidence pertaining to [the child’s]

relationship with Mother was any evidence to explain how terminating this relationship

would impact [him]. * * * Evidence of [the child’s] likely emotional reaction to the

termination was another critical piece of information that should have been considered by

the trial court in its best interest determination.”). The undisputed testimony of two

witnesses demonstrated G.C.M.G.’s conflicting wishes and his most recently expressed

desire to live with his mother. Given the record before this court, it cannot be said that

there was clear and convincing evidence presented to support a finding either that

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
G.C.M.G. presently desired to be removed from his mother’s custody or that permanent

termination of her parental rights would not have a negative impact on him.

       {¶36} As to the need for a legally secure placement, the evidence supports a

determination that Duche can provide this to her children. In response to the removal of

her children, she achieved and has held for over a year a full-time job as an assistant

manager. Although she did struggle with housing, at the time of the hearing she had a

house described as suitable for the children by a PCDJFS caseworker. There was

nothing to indicate she would not remain in that home given her testimony that she had a

lease and was up to date with payments, without any evidence to the contrary. Previous

concerns about drug use were addressed, as the testimony indicated that Duche had not

had a positive drug test for a year. Her past 21 drug screens at Compass were negative,

which establishes a consistent lack of drug use (and reveals that, despite arguments

regarding her lack of cooperation, she submitted to a substantial number of tests). While

the dissenting opinion places great emphasis on Duche’s past positive drug tests in 2021,

there is no dispute that she had not tested positive for one year. If we are to find that past

drug use which has been discontinued is a significant factor in applying the family law

equivalent of the death penalty, it raises serious questions about the entire system for

reunifying children with their parents. What is the incentive or purpose for a parent to

address those concerns in the case plan if their prior bad choices will be held against

them although they have taken steps to rectify these issues?

       {¶37} Further, although there had been a past conviction for child endangering

due to the conduct of a prior boyfriend, Duche remained in compliance with probation and

there is nothing in the record to indicate she is currently in a relationship which would

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
endanger her children.

       {¶38} While much emphasis was placed on Duche’s failure to continue with

counseling, it is unclear how this would impact her ability to provide a legally secure

placement. Her counselor provided testimony that she had made concrete steps and

progress in counseling which led to better choices and that she also had consistently

screened negative for drug use. PCDJFS failed to adequately demonstrate the need to

indefinitely continue counseling in order for Duche to successfully parent her children.

The record lacks clear and convincing evidence that adequately demonstrates the reason

for indefinite mental health counseling. As noted above, permanent custody proceedings

are not a test of compliance with the case plan but a determination of the children’s best

interests. Failure to continue with counseling, when it is not proven necessary to further

the best interests of the children, is of little consequence.

       {¶39} In its brief, PCDJFS emphasizes its belief that Duche failed to substantially

comply with her case plan. In support of its argument, PCDJFS argues that it took her a

significant amount of time to achieve housing, that she did not have verifiable employment

until April 2022, and that she had previously had positive drug screens. We emphasize,

however, the progress that Duche made on these objectives as addressed above.

“Although the court may consider a parent’s history with the child in determining the child’s

best interest, the court should also consider whether the parent has improved and made

changes to benefit the child. If the parent has made great strides and improvements, her

past activity is not conclusive as to whether the parent is currently fit to retain permanent

custody of her child.” A.J., 2010-Ohio-4553, at ¶ 73. Duche has made significant

progress by obtaining full-time employment and stable housing, as well as in addressing

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
drug use. Although she may have made some errors in the past, the purpose of PCDJFS

creating a case plan is to assist parents in taking better care of their children.

       {¶40} We recognize PCDJFS’ argument that Duche failed to continue counseling

and had difficulty maintaining constant contact with PCDJFS.           It is reasonable that

Duche’s efforts to obtain full-time employment and housing, as well as attending all visits

with her children, sometimes led to difficulty in maintaining a consistent schedule of

meetings with caseworkers and counselors. Duche has been under a case plan for over

two years and an indefinite requirement to continue counseling has not been proven

necessary to successfully parent her children, particularly where she has made significant

progress. Where there are alleged deficiencies by a parent, it has been found that these

do not warrant termination of parental rights where they do not “impact [a parent’s] current

ability to care for [his child]” or “have a negative impact upon [the child’s] best interests.”

In re J.F., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0078, 2011-Ohio-6695, ¶ 72.

       {¶41} As to the question of whether Duche completed a parenting class, we

observe that Duche testified she had completed one prior to removal of the children and

that caseworker Stropki told her this satisfied the case plan goal. Stropki did not provide

testimony as to whether this occurred. While the dissent asserts that the parenting class

was incomplete, the testimony in support of this conclusion lacks clarity. The testimony

of the most recent case worker, who took over the case after Duche had already been

working the case plan, does not demonstrate awareness of discussions Duche and

Stropki may have had on this issue. This prevents a conclusion that this issue was

demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence since other caseworkers could not attest

to what Stropki told Duche on this issue.

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
       {¶42} Finally, PCDJFS argues that Duche did not remedy those concerns leading

to the removal of the children from her custody. Removal initially occurred when a friend

watching the children could no longer do so and where there was difficulty getting in

contact with Duche to return the children. There is nothing to indicate this behavior would

be repeated. Further, the springing order was revoked due to Duche’s abusive boyfriend

and positive drug test. As addressed thoroughly above, there is nothing in the record

showing that either of these is presently a concern. The record does not indicate she is

presently in an abusive relationship and she has not tested positive for drugs for over a

year. Duche must be credited for the changes she has made which remedied those

concerns leading to removal of the children, particularly where the facts indicate she can

presently provide a safe environment for the children. See A.J., 2010-Ohio-4553, at ¶ 74

(“remedying conditions which led to the removal of children from their parents’ home

supports a conclusion allowing the parents to retain permanent custody of their children”).

       {¶43} The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the weight of the evidence supports

the trial court’s decision and that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate credibility

and adjudicate conflicts. While the trial court is certainly entitled to deference on matters

such as credibility, the issue here is not which witness is to be believed but instead simply

that the evidence presented does not rise to the standard of clear and convincing. The

deference to be afforded is in resolving conflicts in evidence but we cannot defer to the

court if the evidence does not rise to the statutorily mandated standard.

       {¶44} It cannot be overemphasized that, although the dissent points to Duche’s

failure to comply with certain parts of the case plan during the period the children have

been removed, this does not dictate the termination of parental rights.           Termination is

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
only appropriate if it is in the children’s best interest.   This involves far more than

considering whether the parent technically complied with the entirety of the case plan. It

involves consideration of Duche’s current ability to provide a home to the children, the

wishes and bonds of the children, and their custodial history. Permanently removing the

children from the custody of the mother with whom they have lived the majority of their

lives when she has made significant progress to provide them a safe home and has

terminated drug use for over a year, and instead requiring them to remain in placements

which have fluctuated multiple times throughout PCDJFS’ custody, is not in their best

interests.

       {¶45} Duche also argues that insufficient efforts were made at reunifying her with

her children. We need not reach this issue since we hold that there was a lack of clear

and convincing evidence to support a finding that termination of parental rights was in the

children’s best interest. As such, we must reverse the trial court’s finding that Duche’s

parental rights be terminated as to G.C.M.G. and J.A.G.

       {¶46} The sole assignment of error is with merit.

       {¶47} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of G.C.M.G. and J.A.G.

to PCDJFS, is reversed. Costs to be taxed against appellee.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J., concurs,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.

                       _________________________________________

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.

       {¶48} We are not performing a de novo review of the evidence adduced in the

lower court. The majority is weighing for itself the effect of each piece of evidence and

merely second-guessing the trial court, rather than determining whether the trial court’s

judgment was not supported by some competent, credible evidence of each of the

essential elements of the case, clearly lost its way, and created a manifest miscarriage of

justice.

       {¶49} The children were removed from their mother on November 28, 2020 based

upon a stipulated finding of dependency due to a need for services to address parenting

issues and abandonment issues on the part of their mother, and the children were placed

in the temporary custody of the Portage County Job and Family Services (“PCJFS”).

       {¶50} Thereafter, a case plan was ordered to address appellant’s needs.

Appellant violated a "springing order," on or about February 18, 2021, by testing positive

for illegal drugs and allowing a violation of a no-contact order, and the springing order

was vacated. The temporary custody of the children with PCJFS was extended twice,

each for six months, on November 29, 2021 and again on May 25, 2022. PCJFS was

granted permanent custody after a trial on April 14, 2023.

       {¶51} Appellant's case plan (one originally with Summit County Children Services)

included mental health, parenting classes, and finalizing child endangerment charges in

Summit County; the charges were finalized in mid-2020. Shortly thereafter, the children

were removed by PCJFS, with appellant stipulating that she had abandoned the children.

Her case plan for reunification included random drug screens; a failure to submit was

deemed positive for illegal substances. She was to complete a chemical dependency

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
assessment and follow any recommendations. She was to have a case manager and

follow a plan, maintain safe and stable housing, maintain income sufficient to support her

family, and complete a parenting program.

      {¶52} Appellant tested positive for illegal substances on February 18, 2021, but

failed to follow through with completion of her treatment programs. She was given another

treatment provider and failed to follow through with that program. She had multiple

positive drug screens for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and cocaine throughout the

second half of 2021. She denied a substance abuse problem and refused to submit hair

follicles for testing, and yet maintained her denial. She was discharged for noncompliance

from two programs that were intended to address her substance abuse and mental health.

She missed monthly meetings with her case manager. When appellant said she would

complete treatment in August 2022, she stopped in November 2022, blaming "crazy

hours" at work.

      {¶53} Appellant first obtained appropriate housing only in February 2023, but

stopped completing all other case-plan services other than employment. Based upon

appellant's failure to successfully complete her case plan requirements, PCJFS filed for

permanent custody on November 10, 2022. The children have been in the custody of

PCJFS for 12 or more months out of a consecutive 24-month period.

      {¶54} The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant has

(1) refused to complete her case plan, (2) not completed mental health treatment, (3)

failed to consistently engage with PCJFS, (4) only recently has obtained housing, (4) not

consistently provided random screens, and (5) not completed a parenting program,

despite reasonable efforts by PCJFS to prevent the continued removal of the children

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
from the appellant. With those findings, the trial court placed the children in the permanent

custody of PCJFS.

       {¶55} We use the criminal standard for manifest weight of the evidence in our

review of the trial court’s decision. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-

328, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17, applying State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d

541 (1997). In doing so, we must give great deference to the trier of fact. “Judgments

supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of

the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight

of the evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578

(1978), syllabus.

       {¶56} Permanent custody cases are extremely fact intensive. The appellate briefs

of the parties, not surprisingly, focus and highlight the facts that support each party’s

respective position. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the

evidence and adjudicate any conflicts. Forcier v. Forcier, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2019-G-

0192, 2019-Ohio-5052, ¶ 55. As such, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to

assess the credibility of testimony and other evidence. Any judgment regarding the

persuasiveness of evidence is for the trial court, not the appellate court. We must

therefore look to see if the trial judge lost her way such that she could not have a firm

belief or conviction of the evidence as she evaluated it. To say, as the majority asserts,

that an appellate court reviews the trial court’s judgment under a clear-and-convincing

standard is, in effect, asserting this court reviews the trial court’s judgment de novo and

without deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations. We do not, however, retry

the case on appeal. We are reviewing to determine whether we are satisfied that the trial

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025
court could make, by clear and convincing evidence, the conclusion that was rendered. I

maintain this standard was satisfied.

       {¶57} Significantly, the issue of an appellate court’s standard of review in

permanent custody cases is currently before the Supreme Court of Ohio on a conflict

certified by this court. See In re Z.C., 2022-Ohio-3199, 195 N.E.3d 590 (11th Dist.),

certification granted In re Z.C., 169 Ohio St.3d 1439, 203 N.E.3d 730, 2023-Ohio-482. In

Z.C., the Court certified the following question: “When reviewing a trial court’s decision

to terminate parental rights, is the appellate standard of review abuse of discretion,

manifest weight of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or sufficiency of the

evidence?” We await a conclusive resolution of this question. In light of the foregoing

analysis, however, it is my position that, in order to afford the trial court due deference in

credibility calls in relation to a trial court’s best-interest analysis, it makes the most sense

to follow the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.

       {¶58} We cannot say that the trial court clearly lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. The credibility and weight of each witness’s testimony lies primarily

with the trier of fact. The evidence in his case does not weigh heavily against the judgment

of the trial court. I respectfully dissent and would affirm.

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0024 and 2023-P-0025