Court Opinion

ID: 9626311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:08:02.935278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:25.307766
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
dissenting.
Having closely examined the transcript of the proceedings, I am not persuaded that any irregularities during the jury deliberations warrant a new trial. The essence of defendants’ argument is that the actions of the trial court and the circumstances of the jury deliberation process had the effect of improperly coercing the jury to reach a unanimous verdict. Section 15A-1235 of our General Statutes, which is entitled “[l]ength of deliberations; deadlocked jury,” provides in pertinent part:
*435(c) If it appears to the judge that the jury has been unable to agree, the judge may require the jury to continue its deliberations and may give or repeat the instructions provided in subsections (a) and (b). The judge may not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(d) If it appears that there is no reasonable possibility of agreement, the judge may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235(c), (d) (2001). “The purpose behind the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1235 was to avoid coerced verdicts from jurors having a difficult time reaching a unanimous decision.” State v. Evans, 346 N.C. 221, 227, 485 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1057, 139 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1998).
“It is well settled that Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of North Carolina prohibits a trial court from coercing a jury to return a verdict.” State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409, 415, 420 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1992). “In determining whether a trial court’s actions are coercive under this section of our Constitution, we must analyze the trial court’s actions in light of the totality of the circumstances facing the trial court at the time it acted.” Id. at 415-16, 420 S.E.2d at 101.
“It is well-settled that the decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge,” and that “[t]he trial judge’s ruling on a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless it is so clearly erroneous as to amount to a manifest abuse of discretion.’ ” State v. Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. 596, 607, 540 S.E.2d 815, 823 (2000) (citation omitted). Factors that may properly be considered in analyzing the totality of the circumstances include, but are not necessarily limited to
whether the court conveyed an impression to the jury that it was irritated with them for not reaching a verdict, whether the court intimated to the jury that it would hold them until they reached a verdict, and whether the court told the jury a retrial would burden the court system if the jury did not reach a verdict.
State v. Beaver, 322 N.C. 462, 464, 368 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1988).
Considering the totality of the circumstances here, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a *436mistrial, nor do I believe that the trial court’s actions were coercive. First, as to the time involved in the jury deliberations, “[o]ur courts . . . have not adopted a bright-line rule setting an outside time-limit on jury deliberations, or a rule that deliberations for a certain length of time, in relation to the length of time spent by the State presenting its evidence, is too long.” Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. at 608, 540 S.E.2d at 823. Here, the jury deliberated for a total of more than eleven hours over a period of three days. Given the complexity of the trial, involving three defendants and numerous charges, I do not believe the duration of the jury deliberations itself was so long as to be coercive of a unanimous verdict. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 169, 178-79, 429 S.E.2d 597, 603 (1993) (no error in denying motion for mistrial where jury deliberated for approximately twelve hours over period of three days in case involving single defendant and two counts of second degree murder), cert. denied, 336 N.C. 612, 447 S.E.2d 407 (1994).
Moreover, I believe the trial court adequately instructed the jury during deliberations so as to mitigate the possibility of coercion as a result of the length of deliberations. On the third day, after a total of almost nine hours deliberating, the trial court instructed the jury as to its duties in accordance with subdivision (b) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235:
Members of the jury, I am going to allow you to resume your deliberations in an attempt to reach and return a verdict: I have already instructed you that your verdict must be unanimous; that is, that each of you must agree on the verdict. I am going to give you some additional instructions.
First, it is your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement if it can be done without violence to individual judgment. Second, each of you must decide the case for yourself but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. Third, in the course of your deliberations, you should not hesitate to re-examine your own views and to change your opinion if you become convinced it is erroneous. On the other hand, you should not hesitate to hold to your own views and opinions if you remain convinced they are correct. Fourth, none of you should surrender an honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
*437Now ladies and gentlemen, please be mindful that I am in no way trying to force or coerce you to return or reach a verdict. I recognize the fact that there are sometimes reasons why jurors cannot agree. Through these additional instructions that I have just given to you, I merely want to emphasize that it is your duty to do whatever you can to reason this matter over together as reasonable people and to reconcile your differences if that can be done and it is possible without the surrender of conscientious convictions and to reach a verdict.
Given the complexity of the trial, and because the trial court specifically instructed the jurors not to surrender their honest convictions only two and one-half hours prior to the jury reaching a verdict, I am not persuaded that the length of the deliberations had a coercive effect upon the jurors. Furthermore, the trial judge is not required to instruct the jury in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235 every time a jury returns to the courtroom without a verdict; rather, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235 merely provides guidelines, and a trial judge “must be allowed to exercise his sound judgment to deal with the myriad different circumstances he encounters at trial.” State v. Hunter, 48 N.C. App. 689, 692-93, 269 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1980).
As to the effect of the trial court’s silence regarding Juror Gock’s request on Wednesday to be excused on Thursday morning, there is nothing in the record indicating that the jurors were led to suspect that the trial court intended to deny Juror Gock’s request, or that such a suspicion, even if it existed, had a coercive impact upon the jury. I believe it is more likely that the trial court’s silence as to Juror Gock’s request simply led the jurors to conclude that the trial court intended to wait to address the matter until the end of the afternoon.
As to the communication that transpired between the trial court and only two of the jurors at approximately 4:45 p.m. on Wednesday, I believe this communication was clearly harmless. It is true that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1234(a)(1) (2001) has been broadly interpreted as requiring “that all communications between the court and the jury be conducted in open court with all members of the jury present.” State v. King, 342 N.C. 357, 365, 464 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1995). In such situations there is a concern that a court’s statements may be misinterpreted by jurors who are not present. See State v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 701, 462 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995). However, I do not believe the brief and innocuous communication at issue here (which significantly did not include any actual jury instructions) amounts to prejudicial error pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1234(a)(1). Furthermore, *438defendants did not specifically object to this communication and, therefore, have waived any objection to the procedure. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1); State v. Davis, 353 N.C. 1, 17, 539 S.E.2d 243, 255 (2000), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 151 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2001).
Finally, as to the period of time during which only ten of the jurors remained in the jury room while two of the jurors communicated with the trial court, there is, again, nothing in the record to indicate that the jurors inappropriately continued to deliberate during this very brief period of time. Moreover, the trial court expressly instructed the jurors on at least four separate occasions during the deliberation process that they should only deliberate when all twelve jurors were present, and there is no reason to believe that the jurors disobeyed this instruction.
In summary, under the totality of the circumstances, I do not believe either that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial, or that the actions of the trial court resulted in coercion of the jury verdict pursuant to the test set forth in State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 449, 451, 154 S.E.2d 536, 537-38 (1967). Thus, I disagree with the majority that a new trial is warranted on this basis.