Court Opinion

ID: 9454217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:39:45.339083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:01.337311
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:
Judge Atkins and I concur in Judge Simpson’s view that the conviction of Cazares-Ramirez must be affirmed and, acting as a majority, we also affirm the conviction of .Jose Felix Nandin. ^s ju(jge Simpson has indicated, he -would reverse Nandin’s conviction for insufficiency of evidence,
In Smith v. United States, 5th Cir. 1967, 385 F.2d 34, 38, this Court defined constructive possession as follows:
“Possession” within the meaning of the statute may be either actual or constructive, constructive possession being dominion and control over the illegal drug. Such possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared with others, and is susceptible of proof by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. >: *
This definition was adopted in Garza v. United States, 5th Cir. 1967, 385 F.2d 899. In each of these cases, we held the presumption of 21 U.S.C. § 174 applicable to a defendant who, though not caught with the incriminating evidence in his hands, was known to have driven in a car with the illegally imported drugs and from all the circumstances appeared to share dominion and control over them, The same can be said of Nándin: That is, the jury could reasonably infer that *234when he and Cazares-Ramirez made the trip to the motel to complete the sale, they shared dominion and control over the heroin. From the fact that Nandin attended the negotiations on November 1’ and vouched for the quality of the heroin and from the additional facts that he returned to the motel in a car with Cazares-Ramirez on the afternoon of November 2 and walked into the room where the sale was completed, knowing that the prospective buyer was staying there and knowing that his companion had the drugs on his person, the jury could reasonably infer that he was a full-fledged partner in the venture. It could reasonably be concluded that Nan-din was as much responsible for producing the drugs as Cazares-Ramirez, the only difference between the two being that Cazares-Ramirez did most of the talking and had the evidence in his hands when the arrest was made.
The inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence are entirely consistent with guilt, i. e., with constructive possession which brings the presumption of guilt into play, and are inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. As we have said many times, the question for the appellate court is whether the jury might reasonably conclude that the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt. See O’Connell v. United States, 5th Cir. 1968, 402 F.2d 760 [October 28, 1968] and authorities cited therein. In the case at bar, the only hypothesis of innocence would be that while Nandin was present at all the critical times and obviously had guilty knowledge, he was merely a disinterested observer who did not share control over the drugs and did not have a financial interest in the sale. That he was merely a disinterested observer or casual facilitator seems to us such a remote possibility that we believe the jury could reasonably reject it and could decide the only reasonable inference to be that the two men who brought the heroin from the car to the motel room shared control over it.
The dissent relies on United States v. Jones, 2d Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 26 where the evidence was held insufficient to support the statutory presumption. There, however, the defendant was nothing more than a go-between or casual facilitator. The most the jury could possibly infer was that he knew a man who sold drugs. The seller’s statement to the undercover agent that in the future he should deal with the seller directly indicated that the defendant did not have a working relationship with the seller and did not share dominion and control over the drugs. In the case at bar, on the other hand, there is no evidence of this kind to negative the inference that Nandin shared dominion and control. The jury could reasonably interpret all the evidence to point toward a working relationship between the two appellants.1
We have considered Nandin’s remaining contentions as to the district court’s charge and find them to be without merit. Therefore, the convictions of Cazares-Ramirez and Nandin are in all things affirmed.
Rehearing denied.
SIMPSON, J., dissents.

. A recent case in which the evidence was held insufficient to support the statutory presumption is Montoya v. United States, 5th Cir. 1968, 402 F.2d 847 [October 10, 1968]. There the only evidence was that Montoya was a passenger in the truck being used to transport a quantity of marihuana. Because of the location of the marihuana in the truck, it was as reasonable to infer that the defendant did not know the drugs were being transported as to infer that he did know. Under these circumstances, the Court was unable to say that the jury could reasonably infer that Montoya shared dominion and control and could reasonably exclude every hypothesis of innocence. The circumstantial evidence as to Nandin’s dominion and control is far stronger, so that a proper jury question was clearly presented.