Court Opinion

ID: 9532588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:54.486692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.405493
License: Public Domain

Judge JONES,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from Part I of the dispositive opinion. I agree with defendant that a member of the venire panel should have been dismissed for cause, and therefore, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
To protect a defendant’s right to a panel of impartial jurors, the trial court must exclude prejudiced or biased persons from the jury. *554Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 612 P.2d 79 (1980); People v. Ferrero, 874 P.2d 468 (Colo.App.1993).
Such bias may be either actual or implied. Actual bias exists when a juror has a state of mind that prevents him or her from deciding the case impartially and without prejudice to one of the parties. • Bias may be implied, however, when the prospective juror has a close relationship to a party or attorney in a ease, or has had an important contact with the case, so as to create serious doubt about the prospective juror’s impartiality, if not in fact then at least in appearance. People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo.1992).
The applicable test is whether it appears the potential juror would render a fair and impartial verdict according to the law and based upon the evidence presented at trial. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702 (Colo.1990); People v. Arevalo, 725 P.2d 41 (Colo.App.1986); § 16-10-103, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol.).
Although the trial court has broad discretion to determine challenges' for cause, this discretion does not permit an appellate court to abdicate its responsibility to ensure that the requirements of fairness are fulfilled. See Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331 (Colo.1981).
Because failure to remove a juror for cause impairs the defendant’s ability to change the ultimate composition of the jury, prejudice is shown per se when the defendant exhausts all his peremptory challenges and one of those challenges is > expended on a juror who should have been removed for cause. People v. Macrander, supra; People v. Prator, 833 P.2d 819 (Colo.App.1992).
Here, the trial court refused to dismiss for cause a potential juror who knew and worked with the victim’s father. This juror also had engaged in numerous, lengthy conversations with the victim’s father, during which the father talked extensively about his family. And, although the potential juror had not spoken with the victim’s father since the killing, the juror admitted he and other employees had discussed the killing and speculated as to what had happened. Indeed’, he stated that, once defendant was arrested, he believed defendant to be guilty.
In addition, the juror conceded that he might be influenced by the fact that his own children were approximately the same age as the victim. He also acknowledged that he had formed some opinions about the case, that he would expect defendant to testify, and that it would be difficult to judge defendant fairly if he heard only one side of the story. He further indicated that, although he had been “trying real hard to push [his opinions] away,” he could not do so. Finally, when asked, the juror stated that he would not want himself on the jury if he were defendant.
In my view, the trial court’s failure to dismiss this juror for cause constitutes an abuse of discretion. The juror admitted preconceived notions and biases which made it appear doubtful that he could be fair. Although the juror was questioned extensively by both attorneys and by the trial court, the juror was, at best, ambivalent as to whether he could follow the court’s instructions. In light of these concerns, when combined with the juror’s personal acquaintance with the victim’s father and continued employment with the same employer, I believe it was necessary for the trial court to excuse the juror for cause. See Morgan v. People, supra; People v. Gurule, 628 P.2d 99 (Colo.1981); Nailor v. People, supra.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial. Although, because I would reverse, I need not consider the issues addressed in Part II of the dispositive opinion, I do concur with that opinion on all other issues raised on appeal.
Additionally, except that I disagree with its concurrence with the dispositive opinion as to the judgment here, I share the concerns expressed by the specially concurring opinion regarding the difficulties faced by trial judges in providing bias-ficfee jurors while at the same time obtaining sufficient jury pools to accommodate the increasing numbers of felony trials that must proceed in the face of extensive pre-trial publicity.