Court Opinion

ID: 9490425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:43:15.443362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:05.659095
License: Public Domain

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in my colleagues’ carefully reasoned opinion but write separately only to express my misgiving about a point of previously established circuit law; that is, that the question of the number of employees goes to sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as opposed to jurisdiction, disposable under Rule 12(b)(1). I agree with the majority that Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 1488 (D.C.Cir.1995), impels us to treat this as a Rule 12(b)(6) question rather than a jurisdictional one. Although I served on the panel in Haddon, I have become increasingly convinced that Haddon was incorrectly decided. Again, as the majority notes, three other circuits have treated the employee numbering requirement drawn from the Title VII provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. as jurisdictional. McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 932-33 (11th Cir.1987); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir.1983); Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon Alabama, 612 F.2d 974, 979-80 (5th Cir.1980). While it is true, as the majority notes, that none of the courts discussed why the question is jurisdictional, I nonetheless believe they have it right. While it is also true, as the majority notes, that “nothing in Title VII (or the ADA) expressly limits the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” Maj. Op. at 624, to me it is more important that nothing in Title VII or the ADA extends the district court’s jurisdiction to eases not involving the requisite number of employees. The federal courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, I believe that our sister circuits are correct in holding that eases without a sufficient number of employees fall outside.
Beyond that, given the present state of circuit law, I join the majority opinion. I do so with a reservation that some of the language may be confusing both as to precedent and for the district court on remand. The majority states that “If the defendants comprise only one legal entity there may well be no need to apply Radio Technicians at all.” Maj. Op. at 625 (emphasis added). Because I can conceive of no set of facts on which the defendants would not be a single employer if they are merely parts of one legal entity, I am not sure what the majority means by that phraseology. If I were the district court, I might find myself confused as to the scope of my duties on remand. I hope that if the *627district court finds a single legal entity, its remand duty will be satisfied without application of a test that appears to me to be designed exclusively for employment cases involving multiple entities. Were I sitting as the trial judge, I would consider that my proper task on remand. I also wonder what effect the open-textured language will have on circuit precedent as to the circumstances in which Radio Technicians applies.