Court Opinion

ID: 9559000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:20:31.723203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:42.871961
License: Public Domain

MANNHEIMER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by Judge Stewart, but I differ from him in my approach to the question of statutory interpretation presented in this appeal.
Judge Stewart’s opinion repeatedly refers to and relies on the supreme court’s statement in Guin v. Ha that, when a court is required to decide a question of law, the court’s “duty is to adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, policy, and reason.”1 This statement is only partially true.
The statement applies in full measure when a court must declare the common law.2 *593But when a court construes a statute, the court’s task is to ascertain and implement the intent of the legislature.3 In accomplishing this task, the court’s primary point of reference is the wording of the statute.4 When that wording is unclear or ambiguous, a court may be assisted by “precedent, policy, and reason” — as well as by the statute’s legislative history and the recognized rules of statutory construction. But a court exceeds its authority if it interprets statutes as it believes the legislature should have meant them. To the extent that Judge Stewart’s opinion and the passage from Guin v. Ha suggest otherwise, I respectfully disagree.
Turning to the issue presented in this appeal- — the meaning of the phrase “after having been convicted of a felony” contained in AS 11.61.200(a)(1) — I concur that this phrase encompasses defendants who have been found guilty but who have not yet been sentenced. I reach this conclusion for four reasons.
First, I agree with Judge Stewart that, for purposes of this case, the definition of “convicted of a felony” adopted by this "court in Berg v. State5 is dictum.
Second, AS 11.61.200(a)(1) uses the phrase “convicted of a felony” as part of a longer phrase. The relevant portion of the statute reads: “after having been convicted of a felony or-adjudicated a delinquent minor for conduct that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult”. Both the Alaska Statutes and the Alaska Delinquency Rules repeatedly refer to the “adjudication” of a delinquent minor as the fact-finding stage of the juvenile proceeding — the stage at which a judge or a jury determines whether the minor has violated the criminal law. That is, a minor is first “adjudicated a delinquent”, and then the superior court holds a disposition hearing to determine what should be done with the minor.6 Because the phrase “adjudicated a delinquent minor” refers to the fact-finding process, not the sentencing process, an analogous -interpretation presumably should be applied to the companion phrase, “convicted of a felony”.7
. Third, this construction of AS 11.61.200(a)(1) promotes the legislative policy that underlies all statutes that prohibit felons from possessing firearms — the perception that people who commit serious crimes can not be trusted to use firearms responsibly.8 For purposes of this policy, the crucial event is the finding that a defendant has committed a felony, not the later sentencing.
Fourth, this construction of AS 11.61.200(a)(1) accords with other states’ interpretation of similar statutes. See People v. Allaire (Colorado)9, State v. Holmes (Kansas) 10, and State v. Carr (Louisiana)11.
*594For these reasons, I conclude that AS 11.61.200(a)(1) applies to all persons who have been found guilty of a felony, regardless of whether they have yet been sentenced. Thus, Brant and Archambault were properly convicted of violating this statute.
I wish to stress that the issue in this case is the proper interpretation of AS 11.61.200(a)(1). It is possible that the phrase “convicted of a felony”, used in other statutes and in other contexts, should be interpreted to require a formal entry of judgement following sentencing. For example, compare State v. Rastopsojf, where this court held that a defendant should not be considered a repeat felony offender for presumptive sentencing purposes unless the defendant committed the subsequent felony after being sentenced for prior offenses.12 But with regard to the felon-in-possession statute, I conclude that the legislature intended that the triggering event be the finding of guilt, not the sentencing.

. 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).

. See, e.g., the Alaska Supreme Court’s recent decision in Flynn v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, 988 P.2d 97, 98 (Alaska 1999), defining the legal standard governing modification of pre-trial discovery orders and assigning the bur*593den of proof to the party seeking the modification.

. See Sakeagak v. State, 952 P.2d 278, 284 (Alaska App.1998); Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App.1992).

. "Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of its language construed in light of its purpose." Beck v. State Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 116-17 (Alaska 1992).

. 711 P.2d 553, 554 (Alaska App.1985).

. The following statutes use the term "adjudication" in the sense of fact-finding, not sentencing: AS 12.61.010(a)(1)(B); AS 18.15.300(g); AS 47.12.040(a)(1); AS 47.12.110(d); and AS 47.12.120(b)(4)(A).
Alaska Delinquency Rules 2(a) and 21(a) explicitly define "adjudication hearing” as the fact-finding proceeding in which a judge or jury determines whether the minor has violated the criminal law. In fact, Delinquency Rule 21(c) refers to an "adjudication by juiy" — a phrase that would make no sense if "adjudication” referred to the final entry of judgement and imposition of sanctions. Rather, Delinquency Rules 17(b), 21, and 23 explicitly distinguish between the "adjudication” (the formal finding that a minor has or has not violated the criminal law) and the "disposition” (the judge’s decision as to what should be done with a minor after the minor is found to be delinquent).

. In the law of statutory construction, this principle is sometimes referred to as noscitur a sociis. See Olson v. Olson, 856 P.2d 482, 484 n. 2 (Alaska 1993).

. See State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai'i 507, 928 P.2d 1, 29 (1996); People v. Allaire, 843 P.2d 38, 41 (Colo.App.1992); State v. Holmes, 222 Kan. 212, 563 P.2d 480, 482 (1977).

. 843 P.2d 38, 39 (Colo.App.1992).

. 222 Kan. 212, 563 P.2d 480, 482 (1977).

. 487 So.2d 147, 148 (La.App.1986).

. 659 P.2d 630, 640-41 (Alaska App.1983).