Court Opinion

ID: 9930355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 18:03:49.496911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:58.592333
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 Steinbruner v. Soquel Creek Water District CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 REBECCA STEINBRUNER,                                                 H050093
                                                                     (Santa Cruz County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   Super. Ct. No. 21-CV-02699)

           v.

 SOQUEL CREEK WATER DISTRICT et
 al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         Representing herself, plaintiff Rebecca Steinbruner petitioned for a writ of
mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to challenge an
addendum to a previously certified environmental impact report for the “Pure Water
Soquel: Groundwater Replenishment and Seawater Intrusion Prevention” project. She
filed the mandatory Public Resources Code section 21167.4 request for hearing six days
late. Defendants Soquel Creek Water District and its Board of Directors moved to
dismiss the action based on that untimely filing. Plaintiff sought relief based on
excusable neglect under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), alleging
that multiple hardships caused her to miss the filing deadline. The trial court found that
plaintiff had not demonstrated excusable neglect and it granted the motion to dismiss.
Applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review as we must to this issue,
we will affirm the judgment of dismissal.
                           I.   TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

       The record on appeal does not include detailed information about the Pure Water
Soquel project. It is undisputed that plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged by petition for
writ of mandate the certification of the environmental impact report for the project, which
was affirmed by a different panel of this court in Steinbruner v. Soquel Creek Water
District (July 12, 2021, H047733) [nonpub. opn.].
       Plaintiff filed her petition for writ of mandate on November 4, 2021. The petition
states defendants approved an addendum to the environmental impact report for the Pure
Water Soquel project in October 2021. The petition alleges 12 causes of action,
including violations of the Water Code, a State Water Resources Control Board
resolution, and Public Resources Code section 21166 (pertaining to subsequent
environmental review under CEQA). Plaintiff filed a request for hearing on February 8,
2022, 96 calendar days after the petition was filed. Public Resources Code
section 21167.4, subdivision (a) requires a request for hearing to be filed within 90 days
of the petition’s filing. Defendants moved to dismiss the petition on February 17, 2022
based on plaintiff’s untimely request for hearing.
       Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion to dismiss on March 15, 2022, requesting
relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) due to excusable
neglect. In a supporting declaration, plaintiff described several hardships that caused her
to overlook the deadline to file the request for hearing, including: being the primary
caregiver for her 89-year-old mother-in-law in Napa County; the suicide of a close friend;
responding to Soquel Creek Water District serving plaintiff’s husband with an order of
examination relating to a different case; quarantining after exposure to COVID-19; a
malfunctioning home computer requiring plaintiff to prepare the request for hearing at the
county law library; and technical difficulties that prevented plaintiff from filing the
document electronically.

                                              2
       The trial court issued a tentative ruling that would grant the motion to dismiss. In
a second declaration filed the day of the hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss,
plaintiff added that she had forgotten to note the deadline to file the request for hearing in
her paper calendar due to “extreme duress caused by [defendants’] actions against my
husband, as well as the chronic health emergencies of my Mother-in-Law, as well as busy
holiday schedules and Court closures.” She attached a copy of her calendar as an exhibit.
       At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court acknowledged plaintiff had
“just submitted a declaration with a series of attachments,” presumably referring to the
second declaration. The court noted it “took in account [the] issue of excusable mistake
in [its] tentative ruling” and stated that it did “not consider[] that persuasive.” The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss by written order after the hearing. The order
describes the case as “one of several related actions” plaintiff had filed to challenge the
project. The court found that the “excuses put forward by [plaintiff] for her failure to
timely file a hearing request do not constitute isolated mistakes that ‘anyone could have
made’; and she did not act diligently, despite her apparent knowledge of the requirement
to timely file a hearing request.”
                                     II.   DISCUSSION

       The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
plaintiff’s request under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) for relief
from dismissal after her untimely request for a hearing. Public Resources Code
section 21167.4, subdivision (a), states that in any action alleging CEQA noncompliance
“the petitioner shall request a hearing within 90 days from the date of filing the petition
or shall be subject to dismissal on the court’s own motion or on the motion of any party
interested in the action or proceeding.” (See Fiorentino v. City of Fresno (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 596, 603 [“under the plain meaning of the statutory language, a CEQA
action must be dismissed when a timely request for hearing is not filed, provided that a

                                               3
motion is made by any interested party or the court.”].) Given plaintiff’s tardy request
for hearing, the case was subject to dismissal.
       Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), a trial court may
“relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect” if the party requests relief “within a reasonable time, in no
case exceeding six months,” after the order is entered. Discretionary relief under Code of
Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) from a Public Resources Code
section 21167.4, subdivision (a) “dismissal caused by an excusable mistake is
unquestionably available.” (Nacimiento Regional Water Management Advisory Com. v.
Monterey County Water Resources Agency (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 961, 966, italics
omitted.)1 Although a trial court order denying relief under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473 is “ ‘scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits,’ ”
we are nonetheless limited to reviewing the decision for abuse of discretion. (Rappleyea
v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980–981.)
       Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss and first supporting declaration
identified several personal hardships, but did not aver that she forgot to note the deadline
to request a hearing in her personal calendar. It was on the day of the hearing on the
motion to dismiss that plaintiff filed a second declaration describing the calendar issue.
The trial court acknowledged the hardships identified by plaintiff but determined that

       1
          We are troubled by defendants’ assertion in their briefing that Nacimiento “held
that relief from a [Public Resources Code] Section 21167.4 dismissal is not available
where a petitioner seeks relief on the grounds of mistake or neglect.” (Citing Nacimiento,
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) Indeed, the Nacimiento court observed that
“[d]iscretionary relief under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 473, [subdivision] (b) for
a [Public Resources Code] section 21167.4, [subdivision] (a) dismissal caused by an
excusable mistake is unquestionably available.” (Nacimiento, at p. 966.) Stated
properly, the issue in Nacimiento was “whether mandatory relief under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 473 for a [Public Resources Code] section 21167.4 dismissal caused
by an inexcusable mistake is required.” (Nacimiento, at p. 966.)
                                              4
they were unpersuasive. The trial court also acknowledged receiving and considering
plaintiff’s second declaration, but similarly was unpersuaded to depart from its tentative
ruling finding no excusable mistake. Though a different trial court could reasonably
reach a different conclusion on these facts, “ ‘we are not authorized to substitute our
judgment for that of the trial judge; the trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be
disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse.’ ” (Jensen v. Superior Court (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1012.) To prevail on appeal, plaintiff must therefore demonstrate
that the trial court’s decision was so at odds with the relevant facts or law as to constitute
an abuse of discretion on this record. She has not done so.
       Plaintiff relies on Comunidad en Accion v. Los Angeles City Council (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 1116 (Comunidad), which involved a CEQA challenge to a city’s
approval of waste facilities. (Comunidad, at p. 1121.) The real party in interest moved to
dismiss the action based on the petitioner’s failure to file a Public Resources Code
section 21167.4 request for hearing. (Comunidad, at p. 1130.) The day after the motion
to dismiss was filed, the petitioner filed both a request for hearing and a request for relief
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The petitioner’s attorney stated in a
declaration that he “inadvertently omitted the 90-day hearing request from his personal
calendaring system” and that the “mistake was compounded by a family illness that
required counsel to leave the state” for the two weeks preceding the deadline to file the
request for hearing. (Comunidad, at p. 1131.) The Comunidad court observed that the
issue “implicates two competing public policies—the strong preference for a trial on the
merits and the policy favoring expeditious review of CEQA challenges.” (Ibid.) It
determined that denying relief was an abuse of discretion because the one-week delay in
requesting a hearing was an “isolated mistake in an otherwise vigorous and thorough
presentation of [the petitioner’s] claims.” (Id. at pp. 1134–1135.) The Comunidad court
also noted that the motion for relief was filed “well within a reasonable time” and that the

                                               5
respondents would not suffer prejudice from the short delay because they themselves had
sought extensions to prepare the administrative record. (Id. at p. 1133.)
       Although the justifications for delay bear some similarity to the case here,
Comunidad does not compel reversal. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss did
not mention her failure to note the relevant 90-day deadline on her personal calendar.
She invoked that additional basis for relief only later in a declaration filed the day of the
hearing on the motion to dismiss, and she offered no explanation to the trial court for not
initially raising the calendar error. We have no reason to question the veracity of
plaintiff’s representations. But given that her opposition to the motion to dismiss cited
and discussed Comunidad, the trial court could reasonably conclude that she would have
raised the calendar issue in her initial opposition papers had that been the primary reason
she failed to timely file the request for hearing.2
       We note that plaintiff rightly takes issue with the trial court’s reliance on
reasoning from the prior unpublished opinion affirming the denial of plaintiff’s challenge
to the certification of the environmental impact report for the project. The trial court’s
written order referenced plaintiff’s “characterization of this action as ‘primarily’
challenging the District’s approval of a ‘Modified’ project without providing the public
with a Final Degradation Analysis ... and note[d] that this same claim was rejected by the
6th DCA in affirming the judgment denying her appeal in Case no. 19CV00181.”

       2
          Defendants also point out, in contrast to the “isolated mistake” by counsel in
Comunidad, that plaintiff appears to have made the identical error in previous litigation
regarding the Pure Water Soquel project. Defendants asked the trial court to take judicial
notice of a San Francisco Superior Court order sustaining a demurrer without leave to
amend in a case plaintiff filed against the California Coastal Commission regarding its
approval of the project. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court took judicial
notice of or considered that order, and we decline to consider extra-record material which
is not the subject of a request for judicial notice in this court. Even if we were to take
judicial notice, the order is of questionable relevance as plaintiff does not claim to have
been ignorant of the deadline to timely request a hearing, but rather that she “simply
forgot to write it on [her] calendar.”
                                               6
Language in the order suggests that the trial court viewed the prior case as relevant “in
balancing the competing public policies discussed in Comunidad” (Comunidad, supra,
219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131 [noting the tension between adjudicating the merits versus
minimizing delay]), such that it gave “more weight to the policy favoring expeditious
review of CEQA challenges.” We agree with plaintiff that the relative merit of the
underlying petition is not germane to the question of whether she established excusable
neglect. We conclude, however, that the trial court’s improper but limited consideration
of this court’s prior decision does not compel reversal. The trial court’s discretionary
decision to deny relief was adequately supported by its determination that the reasons
plaintiff identified did not excuse her failure to meet the filing deadline.
                                   III.   DISPOSITION

       The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. In the interest of justice, each party shall
bear its own costs.

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                                            ____________________________________
                                            Grover, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050093
Steinbruner v. Soquel Creek Water District et al.