Court Opinion

ID: 9551615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:56:19.728354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:17.677210
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Chief Justice,
with whom McFADDEN, Justice,
concurs (concurring specially):
I agree that a general statute, which is ambiguous on the point, should not by construction be made to include agencies of government. However, I do not believe the decision in this case should rest upon such narrow ground. Thus limited, the decision tends to infer that the legislature by amending the statute could make it applicable to public employment. Such an enactment would constitute an attempt to authorize governmental officers to delegate to, or share with, a private organization, the sovereign powers and duties with which they are charged.
The legislature cannot delegate its constitutional power to any other authority. Idaho Savings & Loan Association v. Roden, 82 Idaho 128, 350 P.2d 225 (1960); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 228 P. 796 (1924); State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358 (1923).
Except as to police powers granted directly by the Constitution (art. 12, § 2) cities have and may exercise only such powers as are granted by the legislature. Municipal officers, both elective and appointive, have and may exercise only such powers as are granted by the legislature, and they must perform the duties imposed upon them by law, I.C. Title 50. The city council, like the legislature, cannot delegate its legislative power to any other authority. It cannot share that power with any private organization. Municipal officers, acting within the authority given them, are in the exercise of a portion of the sovereign power of the state; it is not theirs to deal with as they see fit. Any attempt on their part, by contract or otherwise, to alienate or dilute their official authority, is void. Their discretionary powers are entrusted to them by those who put them in office — ultimately the electors. These powers they are bound to exercise in the interest of the electorate as a whole. It would be inimical to the public trust reposed in them to permit such officers, in the discharge of that public trust, to be subjected to pressure or coercion by any private organization.
That the employees of the city of Burley may organize for social or fraternal benefits is not questioned. For that purpose they need no union representatives. The representatives or agents sought by this proceeding are bargaining agents within the terms of the statute. The purpose of the certification sought from the Commissioner is to enable plaintiffs to conduct negotiations, and bargain, with the city officers as to qualifications, tenure, wages, working conditions of the city employees, and to enforce such bargaining, and any agreements resulting therefrom, as provided by the statute. The qualifications, tenure, terms, and conditions of public employment are subject to the continuing authority of the governing body. They cannot be permanently fixed, or removed from *449that authority, by contract, nor can they be subjected to the will of a private organization. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
A statement of the proposition is sufficient to indicate, not only that the legislature never intended such a result, but also that it could not under our constitution thus subvert, or authorize the subversion, of the sovereign will.
In Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547, 550 (1962), the Colorado court quoted an earlier Missouri case, City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1230, 206 S.W.2d 539, 545 (1947), and commented as follows:
“ ‘[t]he whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions for any public service, involves the exercise of legislative powers. Except to the extent that all the people have themselves settled any of these matters by writing them into the constitution, they must be determined by their chosen representatives who constitute the legislative body. It is a familiar principal of constitutional law that the legislature cannot delegate its legislative powers and any attempted delegation' thereof is void. [Citing cases] If such powers cannot be delegated, they surely cannot be bargained or contracted away; and certainly not by any administrative or executive officers who cannot have any legislative powers. Although executive and administrative officers may be vested with a certain amount of discretion and may be authorized to act or make regulations in accordance with certain fixed standards, nevertheless the matter of making such standards involves the exercise of legislative powers. Thus qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract. Such bargaining could only be usurpation of legislative powers by executive officers; and, of course, no legislature could bind itself or its successor to make or continue any legislative act. * * * ’
“We are in accord with the views above set forth. A proper exercise of the legislative function might well involve consultation and negotiation with spokesmen for public employees, but the ultimate responsibility rests with the legislative body and, under the record here presented, that responsibility cannot be contracted away. For a complete annotation on the question see 31 A.L.R. 2d 1142.” 377 P.2d 550.
In Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745, 747, 162 A.L.R. 1101, 1104 (1945), the court said:
“ * * * To the extent that * * * [hours, wages, working conditions] are covered by the provisions of the City Charter, creating a budgetary system and a civil service, those provisions of law are controlling. To the extent that they are left to the discretion of any City department or agency, the City authorities cannot delegate or abdicate their continuing discretion. Any exercise of such discretion by the establishment of hours, wages or working conditions is at all times subject to change or revocation in the exercise of the same discretion.” 44 A.2d 747, 162 A.L.R. 1104.