Court Opinion

ID: 9388868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 21:00:18.383791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.532377
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4389

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        MATTHEW ZACHARY COLEMAN,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00104-KDB-DSC-1)

        Submitted: March 21, 2023                                         Decided: April 20, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Eric J. Foster, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United
        States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Matthew Zachary Coleman pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

        possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,

        Coleman claims that the court improperly dismissed his motion to proceed pro se and that

        his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The Government contends that the district court

        properly dismissed Coleman’s motion and seeks to enforce Coleman’s appeal waiver with

        respect to his sentencing claim. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

               We turn first to Coleman’s challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his motion

        to proceed pro se. Although a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent

        himself at trial, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 & n.15 (1975), his assertion of

        that right must be “(1) clear and unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and

        (3) timely.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2021). However, given

        that the right to counsel and the right to self-representation are in tension, “the right to

        counsel is preeminent and hence, the default position.” United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d

        642, 649 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court presumes that a

        “defendant should proceed with counsel absent an unmistakable expression” to the

        contrary by the defendant. Id. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f a defendant

        first asserts his right to self-representation after trial has begun, the right may have been

        waived. The decision at that point whether to allow the defendant to proceed pro se at all

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        . . . rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d

        1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1997).

               Coleman first requested to proceed pro se in a motion filed months after signing his

        plea agreement and two days before sentencing. Thus, we review the district court’s

        dismissal of Coleman’s motion requesting to proceed pro se at that late stage for abuse of

        discretion. See id.; accord Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 222, 226.

               We conclude that Coleman’s attempt to assert his right to self-representation was

        untimely and therefore that the district court did not abuse its discretion is dismissing

        Coleman’s motion. As noted, months after signing his plea agreement and two days before

        sentencing, Coleman gave his motion to prison officials for mailing. The district court had

        not yet received the motion by the time of Coleman’s sentencing hearing, and Coleman did

        not raise the issue during allocution or prompt his attorney to do so. It is unclear when the

        court physically received Coleman’s motion, but it was filed by the clerk the day after

        Coleman was sentenced. Accordingly, Coleman’s motion was untimely, and the district

        court’s dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959,

        965 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

        motion to proceed pro se made during jury selection); Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1098-99

        (deeming untimely a request for self-representation made after trial began).

               Next, we review Coleman’s challenge to his sentence and the Government’s

        invocation of his appeal waiver.         We review the validity of an appeal waiver

        de novo. United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021). “Where the

        Government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and the defendant has not alleged a breach

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        of the plea agreement, we will enforce a valid appeal waiver where the issue being appealed

        is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, a review of the record reveals that

        Coleman’s appeal waiver is valid and that his sentencing claim falls squarely within its

        scope. Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal.

               We therefore affirm in part and dismiss in part. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART

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