Court Opinion

ID: 9530019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:23.807191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.672242
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Chief Justice,
concurring, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
While I agree that W.R.Cr.P. 48 does not apply to retrials, I believe Newport’s speedy trial claim must be analyzed under constitutional speedy trial guarantees to determine if the delay between mistrial and retrial deprived Newport of his right to a speedy trial.
Preliminarily, I consider this issue to be properly before the court. While Newport’s brief relied on Rule 48, the important fact is that Newport argued that he was denied a speedy trial. It is well established that even when Rule 48 has not been violated, an appellant’s speedy trial claim is further subject to constitutional analysis. Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 230 (Wyo.1998); Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Wyo.1996); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo.1995). In reliance on this court’s practice of analyzing both the rule-based and constitutional arguments, the State devoted nine pages of its brief to the constitutional issue. In addition, “recent experience with post-conviction remedies teaches us that the failure of counsel to raise issues which implicate constitutional rights of a defendant in an appeal will result in those issues being presented in a subsequent proceeding under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, judicial efficiency strongly suggests the treatment of obvious matters in the first appeal.” Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo.1989). Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation in addressing the constitutional speedy trial issue.
I also have no hesitation concluding that the constitutional speedy trial protections apply to Newport’s retrial. In Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 669-70 (Wyo.1982), this court used the constitutional analysis in denying Grable’s claim that he had not received a speedy retrial after the appellate reversal of his first conviction. Besides Grable’s ac*1219knowledgment that the speedy trial guarantees apply to retrials, this court has consistently analyzed speedy trial claims under both Rule 48 and the constitution. Sides v. State, 963 P.2d at 230; Hall v. State, 911 P.2d at 1370-71; Yung v. State, 906 P.2d at 1032. Because Rule 48 does not apply in this case, the reason to apply the constitutional analysis is far more compelling than in the usual speedy trial case: the only speedy trial guarantee available upon retrial is the constitutional one. Furthermore, even the courts that have held their speedy trial rule or statute inapplicable to retrials recognize that a defendant retains the constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997); Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 677 (Miss.1990); State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1982). Relying on the foregoing, I would go one step further than the majority and analyze the constitutional issue.
The standard generally applied to determine if a criminal defendant received a speedy retrial is reasonableness under the federal and state constitutions. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d at 669; State v. Fanning, 437 N.E.2d at 585; Handley v. State, 574 So.2d at 677; State v. Kula, 254 Neb. 962, 579 N.W.2d 541, 545-46 (1998); People v. Tedder, 83 Ill.App.3d 874, 39 Ill.Dec. 53, 404 N.E.2d 437, 443 (1980), overruled on other grounds by People v. Tyllas, 96 Ill.App.3d 1, 51 Ill. Dec. 211, 420 N.E.2d 625, 627 n. 1 (1981). In making this determination, we are guided by the four-part test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this court in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo.1972). This test requires us to balance 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant. Doyle v. State, 954 P.2d 969, 975 (Wyo.1998); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d at 1032; Grable v. State, 649 P.2d at 669.
Turning to Newport’s claim, the first issue to resolve is which interval should be used to calculate the length of delay. Should our analysis apply to the interval between mistrial and retrial, or should we also include the time prior to mistrial? In answering this question, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, after reviewing numerous cases, held that absent extraordinary circumstances, the only time to be considered in this sort of case is the time between the mistrial and the subsequent trial. Icgoren v. State, 103 Md. App. 407, 653 A.2d 972, 978 (1995). See also State v. Kula, 579 N.W.2d at 546 — 47; Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.1978); People v. Tedder, 39 Ill.Dec. 53, 404 N.E.2d at 443. The Maryland court’s decision is consistent with our determination in Grable v. State, 649 P.2d at 669-70. There, after Grable’s first conviction was reversed and remanded to the district court, Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001 (Wyo.1979), thirteen and one-half months passed before Grable was retried. 649 P.2d at 670. In rejecting Grable’s speedy trial claim, this court considered only the interval between filing of the mandate in district court and the retrial. Id. Therefore, I believe the appropriate interval to consider is the time from mistrial to retrial.
Here, Newport’s first trial resulted in a mistrial on April 11, 1997. Although the district court initially scheduled the retrial for April 29, 1997, the State was granted two eontinuancés which caused the retrial to be postponed until September 8, 1997. From April 11 to September 8, 150 days passed from Newport’s first trial to his retrial.
A review of Wyoming cases indicates that a 150-day delay is insufficient to create a presumption of prejudice. See Yung v. State, 906 P.2d at 1032 (delay of 171 days not presumptively prejudicial); Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo.1991) (244 days not presumptively prejudicial but requires further analysis); Sides v. State, 963 P.2d at 230 (146 days). While these Wyoming eases concern speedy trial claims pertaining to a first trial, other jurisdictions have addressed the delay between mistrial and retrial. These courts have found delays similar to the one presented here insufficient to constitute presumptive prejudice. See Handley v. State, 574 So.2d at 677 (delay of 6 months between mistrial and retrial not presumptively prejudicial); Bryant v. State, 1998 WL 850105, *11 (Miss.App.1998) (delay of 165 days between mistrial and retrial does not constitute pre*1220sumptive prejudice). In addition, although W.R.Cr.P. 48 is not applicable to this factual scenario, its time constraints are instructive. See McDaniel v. State, 945 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Wyo.1997). The 150-day delay presented here is well within the 180 days allowed, upon proper continuance, under Rule 48(b)(4). For these reasons, I would conclude that a 150-day delay is insufficient to establish presumptive prejudice.
When the length of delay is neither presumptively prejudicial nor significantly long, no further analysis into the Barker v. Wingo factors is warranted. McDaniel v. State, 945 P.2d at 1188; Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo.1979); Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo.1992). Indeed, “[t]he length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. Finally, it should be noted that Newport did not reassert his demand for a speedy trial after his mistrial. We have repeatedly emphasized “[ljess than vigorous assertions of the right to a speedy trial are given little weight.” Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Yung v. State, 906 P.2d at 1033); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168, 171 (Wyo.1981). I would hold that the 150-day delay between mistrial and retrial did not deny Newport his constitutional right to a speedy trial.