Court Opinion

ID: 9732114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:08:37.469866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:23.483131
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BURMAN dissenting: I dissent from the majority opinion. Edward R. Birmingham, the appellant, purchased the subject property in 1911, and he has owned the property continuously since that date. On June 20, 1968, the City of Chicago filed a Petition to Condemn this and other parcels of land for the benefit of the public schools. In exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire privately owned real estate for public purposes, the City must act in accordance with due process of law and must give the property owner just compensation for his property. If the City and the property owner are unable to agree on what constitutes just compensation, the question of the fair market value of the property on the date of condemnation is determined by the courts. In my opinion, the record in the present case clearly shows that the verdict returned by the jury was the result of passion and prejudice. Donald D. Clark, a realtor who was familiar with the area in which the subject property was located, appeared as an expert witness for the City. Clark testified on direct examination that he appraised fourteen or fifteen parcels of land on Jackson Boulevard including the subject property for the Board of Education. He was then asked, “And the others were disposed of, is that correct?” He replied, “As I understand, the others were all settled.” It was thus pointed out to the jury that Birmingham was the only one of the property owners who had not settled with the City. Counsel for the City amplified this testimony in closing argument when he stated, * * * you heard Mr. Clark tell about the other fourteen parcels. We cant tell you what we settled those parcels for. The law restrains us from doing that.” This testimony and argument presented to the jury the following facts: first, Clark was an expert who appraised the fourteen or fifteen pieces of property for the Board of Education; second, all of the owners of the property which Clark appraised had settled with the City except Birmingham; third, the City would like a reveal the amounts for which the other owners settled, but it is restrained by law from doing that; fourth, if the City could reveal this information the jury could have no other recourse but to accept Clark’s appraisal. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $14,500.00 as testified to by Clark. It is clear, in my opinion, that Birmingham was so prejudiced by the testimony and argument that he did not receive a fair trial on the issue of the fair market value of his property. It has long been the law in Illinois, that in a proceeding to determine the fair market value of a piece of property which is being taken under the power of eminent domain, a party may not introduce as evidence of the fah market value of that property, the cost to the condemning authority of obtaining other parcels of land. (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Pellini, 7 Ill.2d 367, 131 N.E.2d 55; Jefferson Park District v. Sowinski, 336 Ill. 390, 168 N.E. 370.) Here the City did not introduce into evidence the cost of obtaining the other parcels; however, it was the City which elicited the only testimony relating to the other-parcels, and it was the City which commented upon them in its closing argument. The City by directing the attention of the jury to the other-parcels invited the jury to speculate on what the City might have paid for those parcels, and it was implicit in the City’s closing argument that the City had paid and the other property owners had accepted amounts in accord with the appraisals of Clark. No objections were raised at trial either to testimony or to the parts of the closing argument noted above. However, when in a condemnation proceeding the arguments presented to the jury are so prejudicial that a party cannot receive a fair trial, a reviewing court will reverse the judgment even though no objections were raised. As stated in City of Chicago v. Pridmore, 12 Ill.2d 477 at 453, 147 N.E.2d 54 at 58, where a judgment in a condemnation proceeding was reversed: “If prejudicial arguments are made without objection of counsel or interference of the trial court to the extent that the parties litigant cannot receive a fair trial and the judicial process cannot stand without deterioration, then upon review this court may consider such assignments of error, even though no objection was made and ruling preserved thereon. [Citation.]” For the reasons set forth above, I believe that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.