Court Opinion

ID: 9667098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:35:21.599945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.952539
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
Appellant in a supplemental brief and in his motion for rehearing directs our attention to a time table as follows:
(a) Dec. 2, 1947, City of Sherman voted Civil Service (St.F. p. 54)
(b) March 29, 1948, Civil Service Rules adopted (St.F. p. 145)
(c) July 1, 1948, Rules promulgated (St. F. p. 22)
(d) August 25, 1948, Appellant suspended (St.F. p. 145)
and calls our attention to H. B. No. 145, Ch. 102, page 164, 52nd Legislature, Regular Session, wherein Art. 1269m, § 23, Vernon’s R.C.S., was amended so as to eliminate therefrom the provision for publication, which provision controlled the decision of our Supreme Court on the appeal of the former case, 148 Tex. 516, 226 S.W.2d 620, and followed by us in our opinion on original submission hereon.
Appellant claims that the amended Art. 1269m changed his status and that the holding of our Supreme Court above stated is no longer controlling. This directly raises the question as to whether the former judgment of our Supreme Court settled the rights of the parties as of the date of its rendition only, or upon its becoming final conferred vested rights in the matters therein adjudicated in favor of appellee.
It is settled law that a validating act cannot affect or change vested rights. Haney v. Gartin, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 577, 113 S.W. 166; 9 Tex.Jur. 527. It is also true that a final judgment settles all rights therein adjudicated and that the substantive rights therein granted parties thereto are vested rights. State ex rel. Weingart v. Kiessenbeck, 167 Or. 25, 114 P.2d 147; City of Paris v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 280 Ky. 492, 133 S.W.2d 559; Kelly v. Hall, 191 Ga. 470, 12 S.E.2d 881; City of Sanford v. McClelland, 121 Fla. 253, 163 So. 513; Gidgsby v. Peak, 57 Tex. 142; Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249, and Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 16.
Because of the above additional holdings, we must add the following to the appellant’s above quoted time table:
(e) The judgment of the Supreme Court, 148 Tex. 516, 226 S.W.2d 620, became final February 22, 1950.
(f) The first amended original petition was filed in the present suit here appealed from June 30, 1950.
(g) The validating act above cited became effective April 30, 1951.
Taking into consideration appellant’s time table with our additions above, the final judgment of our Supreme Court and its opinion holding that appellant’s rights must be determined under the provisions of appellees’ City Charter, together with its denial to appellant of a right of recovery under Art. 1269m, R.C.S., became the law of the case; conferred vested rights; and is res adjudicata as between the parties as of February 22, 1950; and the legislative amendment of Art. 1269m, effective April 30, 1951, could pot, and did not, affect such vested rights, authorized by our Supreme Court’s judgment.
*884Since the parties are bound by the Supreme 'Court’s judgment and the express holdings set out in its opinion reported in 148 Tex. 516, 226 S.W.2d 620, we properly disposed of the case by our original opinion and judgment. The motion for rehearing is therefore
Overruled.