Court Opinion

ID: 9666857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:28:55.333514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:33.054539
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. I would affirm. I do not find the trial court erred in submitting an instruction on intervening cause.
An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor’s negligent act or omission has been committed. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 441, at 465 (1965). The eases in which the effect of the operation of an intervening force may be important in determining whether the negligent actor is liable for another’s harm are usually ... cases in which the actor’s negligence has created a situation harmless unless something further oc*436curs.... In such cases, the actor’s negligence is often called passive negligence, ... Id. at 466. A dependent, intervening force is one which operates in response to or is a reaction to the stimulus of a situation for which the actor has made himself responsible by his negligent conduct. Id.
It was established defendant had an obligation to clear the road ditches and failed to do so. It also was established plaintiff voluntarily decided to cut the weeds and the situation only became dangerous when plaintiff exerted himself doing so.
The weeds in the road ditch were basically harmless (at least they would not have caused plaintiffs heart attack) until something else occurred (plaintiff cut the weeds). Plaintiffs injury was not caused by the weeds, it was caused by plaintiffs action in cutting the weeds.
The fact plaintiffs intervention (plaintiffs act of exerting himself to clean the ditch) brought about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor’s (City’s) negligence; and the fact its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation would support a finding an intervening force (plaintiffs actions) is a superseding cause. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442, at 467 (1965).
While I agree with the majority that caution should prevail in assessing whether a plaintiffs conduct can be an intervening cause, I believe it is clearly applicable in this cause.
Furthermore, I fail to find substantial evidence to support a finding defendant was guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. I believe a motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim on this ground, if made, should have been sustained. We are bound to affirm the trial court for any reason whether argued or not. See State v. Vincik, 436 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 1989).