Court Opinion

ID: 9429222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:02.928594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:17.974358
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Whether gravel is a mineral within the meaning of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 may be a matter of *73considerable importance in the semiarid lands of the West, but it is of much less importance to the rest of the Nation. For that reason, as well as those set forth at some length in my concurring opinion in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 273 (1981), I believe the Court of Appeals should have been permitted to make the final decision upon the unique question of statutory construction presented by this case.* Accordingly, while I join Justice Powell’s opinion explaining why the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, I believe an even better disposition would have been simply to deny certiorari.

 What I said two years ago remains true today:
“The federal judicial system is undergoing profound changes. Among the most significant is the increase in the importance of our courts of appeals. Today they are in truth the courts of last resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of last resort — including this one — they occasionally render decisions that will not withstand the test of time. No judicial system is perfect and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial error. Most certainly, this Court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals. Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its finality, we possess no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect. The quality of the work done by the courts of appeals merits the esteem of the entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly as well or as widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that if we accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to grant certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction that our review of a ease may produce an answer different from theirs. In my opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting certiorari.” 451 U. S., at 275 (footnote omitted).