Court Opinion

ID: 9953284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 18:03:01.030317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:53.804778
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/24 P. v. Verkade CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081035

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCN290070)

JOSEPH ROBERTSON VERKADE,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert J. Kearney, Judge. Affirmed.
         Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
       In 2013, a jury convicted Joseph Robertson Verkade of first degree

murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)). The jury found true the allegation that
Verkade intentionally and personally discharged a firearm in the commission
of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (c)) and intentionally and personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death during the
commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (d)). The jury also found true two
special circumstances allegations: (1) the murder was committed during the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery, in violation of section 211,
within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17); and (2) the murder
was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a
burglary, in violation of section 459, within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17).
       The court sentenced Verkade to prison for life without the possibility of
parole.
       Verkade appealed his conviction, and we affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion. (See People v. Verkade (Aug. 17, 2015, D064499).)
       On December 28, 2021, Verkade filed a petition for resentencing under

section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95).2 The superior court appointed
counsel and received briefing on the matter. Without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the court dismissed the petition for failing to state a prima facie case
for relief.
       Verkade appeals the court’s order denying his section 1172.6 petition,
contending the court improperly relied on our opinion in Verkade’s direct

1      Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

2     Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) renumbered
section 1170.95 to 1172.6, effective June 30, 2022.
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appeal and made findings of fact that were not appropriate at the prima facie
stage of Verkade’s petition. We disagree and affirm the order.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The amended information charged Verkade with murder, attempted
robbery, and burglary. Among other allegations, the amended information
included the allegation that Verkade, in the commission of each of the
charged offenses, “intentionally and personally discharged a firearm, to wit:
a sawed-off shotgun, and proximately caused great bodily injury and death to
a person (other than an accomplice), within the meaning of PENAL CODE
SECTION 12022.53[, subdivision] (d).”
      The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of murder: malice
aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520) and felony murder (CALCRIM No. 540A).
The felony murder instruction was only based on the theory that Verkade
killed the victim in the commission of an attempted robbery or burglary. The
court separately instructed the jury on aiding and abetting (CALCRIM
No. 401), attempt (CALCRIM No. 460), robbery (CALCRIM No. 1600), and
burglary (CALCRIM No. 1700).
      In addition, the court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 3149
regarding personal use of a firearm causing injury or death per
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Pursuant to that instruction, the court
informed the jury it could only find the allegation true if the prosecution
proved: (1) Verkade personally discharged a firearm during the commission
or attempted commission of the charged crime; (2) Verkade intended to
discharge the firearm; and (3) Verkade’s act caused great bodily injury to or
the death of a person who was not an accomplice to the crime.

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      Among other crimes, the jury convicted Verkade of first degree murder
and found true that, in the commission of murder, he personally used a
firearm causing great injury or death.
      Following his conviction and as we discuss post, the Legislature
narrowed the scope of liability for felony murder and abolished liability for
murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See,
generally, § 1172.6.)
      Verkade then filed a form petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. He checked boxes stating that he was convicted of murder on
a theory of felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
and could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of
changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. He also
requested counsel.
      The People filed a response asking the court to deny the petition. The
People’s primary argument was that Verkade was not eligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because he was the actual killer: He shot the victim in the
chest with a shotgun, killing him. The People attached several documents to
their response, including the amended information, minutes from the
rendering of the jury verdict, the completed verdict forms, the minute order of
Verkade’s sentencing hearing, and our unpublished opinion in People v.
Verkade, supra, D064499.
      Verkade, now represented by counsel, filed a reply to the People’s
initial response. The reply included a generalized discussion of the
requirements for stating a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 and
the People’s burden of proof at an evidentiary hearing, but said nothing
specific about Verkade’s case.

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      The superior court held a prima facie review hearing where it explained
that it would not consider the facts as stated in our opinion in People v.
Verkade, supra, D064499. In addition, although the court recalled that the
instant matter was tried before it, the court agreed that it would not rely on
its recollection of the evidence presented at trial to determine whether
Verkade made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. After some
exchanges with counsel and discussion of the jury instructions and the
prosecution’s theory of the case, the court denied the petition, explaining:
         “So just looking at the record, separating myself as the trial
         judge, I think that the record, based on the jury
         instructions given and the findings by the jury, preclude
         [Verkade] from going forward, because he is—he has been
         found to be the actual killer.”

      Verkade timely appealed the order. While this case was pending, we
granted Verkade’s motion to augment the record with the jury instructions
provided at his trial.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) was
enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)”
(People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) Senate Bill 1437 did this
by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.) Amended
section 188 states: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
                                         5
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Amended section 189
states: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] [or] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
      Senate Bill 1437 also established resentencing relief for eligible
defendants. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
707–708.) Under subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony murder or
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a
petition” with the sentencing court to have his or her murder conviction
vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts “when all of the
following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment
was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under
a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or
second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second
degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second
degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019” under Senate Bill 1437.
      A petition for relief must contain: (1) a declaration by the petitioner
that he or she is eligible for relief under section 1172.6; (2) the superior court

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case number and year of petitioner’s conviction; and (3) whether the
petitioner requests counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(C).) If the petitioner
requests counsel, the trial court must appoint one. (See People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970 (Lewis); § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
      Within 60 days after service of a sufficient petition, “the prosecutor
shall file and serve a response. The petitioner may file and serve a reply
within 30 days after the prosecutor’s response is served. . . . After the parties
have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court may deny a petition without an evidentiary
hearing where the record establishes the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of
law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.)
      If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief,
the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.

(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).)3
      We review the challenged order de novo. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden); People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)
      In its verdict on the murder charge, the jury found Verkade guilty of
first degree murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a), and found that
in committing the murder he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury or death within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The verdict thus established a
killing (§ 187, subd. (a) [murder is unlawful killing of human being with
malice aforethought]) that Verkade himself caused by discharging a firearm

3     On October 5, 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate
Bill 775) into law, and its amendments to section 1172.6 became effective on
January 1, 2022. None of the changes under Senate Bill 775 are relevant to
the instant action.
                                        7
(see Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 55 [“natural meaning of ‘personally
inflicted’ is that the defendant herself inflicted the injury”]). In other words,
the verdict established that Verkade was the “actual killer.” (See People v.
Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 56, 58 [by finding defendant guilty of
murder and finding section 12022.53, subdivision (d) allegation true, “the

jury implicitly found [defendant] was the ‘actual killer’ ”];4 Webster’s 3d New
Internat. Dict. (2002) pp. 22 [defining “actual” as “existing in act <our ~
intentions>: existent — contrasted with potential and possible”], 1242
[defining “kill” as “cause the death of” and “killer” as “one that kills”].)
      As discussed ante, the jury was instructed on two theories of murder:
killing with malice aforethought and felony murder. Although the verdict on
the murder charge does not state which theory the jury adopted, Verkade
would not be entitled to relief under section 1172.6 on either theory. If the
jury found him guilty on a malice theory, he would be ineligible for
resentencing because section 1172.6 applies only when the petitioner’s
murder conviction was based on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or another theory under which malice is imputed
based solely on the petitioner’s participation in a crime. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a);
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.) If the jury found Verkade guilty of
felony murder, he would also be ineligible for resentencing because, under the
legislation that narrowed the scope of liability for felony murder, the actual

4       Our high court granted review in Cornelius and held that matter for
resolution of Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952; however, the Supreme Court
subsequently dismissed the petition for review in Cornelius, remanded the
matter, and deemed the case “non-citable and nonprecedential ‘to the extent
it is inconsistent with’ [the] decision in Lewis.” (People v. Cornelius
(Oct. 27, 2021, S260410).) The trial court in Cornelius did not appoint
counsel and denied Cornelius’s petition. (Cornelius, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 56–57.)
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killer remains liable. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1), as amended by Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 3; People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973; Harden, at
p. 53.) The felony murder instruction provided to the jury here only allowed a
juror to find Verkade guilty of murder if he caused the death of another
person in the process of committing or attempting to commit robbery or
burglary. Hence, based on the verdicts and jury instructions, the trial court
correctly denied Verkade’s section 1172.6 petition.
      Nonetheless, Verkade insists the record of conviction does not
establish, as a matter of law, that he was the actual killer and therefore is
not entitled to resentencing. To this end, Verkade asserts the superior court
“placed considerable weight that Mr. Verkade had not checked boxes on the
pre-printed form petition that he was not the actual killer[.]” The record,
however, belies this contention. Indeed, the superior court explicitly stated
that it would not have changed its analysis had Verkade checked the box
indicating that he was not the actual killer. The court explained:
         “In some case you have two people using a gun. One waves
         it around; one shoots. But both of them have personal use
         of a firearm. Okay. But one shot the person; one didn’t. In
         this case nobody else was ever alleged for—charged with
         any firearm offenses except for [Verkade].”

      Verkade also argues that the superior court improperly relied on the
facts as set forth in our opinion in People v. Verkade, supra, D064499. Not so.
The superior court specifically stated it had not reviewed the opinion and was
not relying on it in evaluating Verkade’s petition for resentencing.
      In addition, we disagree with Verkade that the superior court made
any factual findings in this matter. The type of factfinding prohibited at the
prima facie review stage “ ‘involv[es] the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) The superior court did
not weigh any evidence or exercise any discretion in denying Verkade’s
                                       9
resentencing petition. It heard counsel’s arguments based on the jury
instructions and verdicts, reviewed the verdicts, and determined the jury had
found Verkade was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6. “[T]he parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to
aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief under subdivision (c).” (Lewis, at p. 972; see
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47–48, 51–52 [court may consider jury
instructions and verdicts at prima facie review stage].) There was no error in

doing so in this case.5
      Finally, our analysis here does not change if we consider People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 (Offley) as Verkade urges us to do. Verkade
cites that case for the proposition that a true finding under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) “does not categorically bar a defendant from relief under
section 1172.6.” Offley, however, is not on point here. In that case, the issue
was not whether the defendant was the actual killer, but whether he acted
with actual malice. Offley was one of five defendants who took part in a
gang-related shooting that resulted in a death. (Offley, at p. 592) The trial
court instructed the jury that a member of a conspiracy is liable not only for
the particular crime he knows his coconspirators agreed upon and committed,
but also for the natural and probable consequences of any crime a
coconspirator committed to further the objective of the conspiracy. (Id. at p.

5      We acknowledge that the superior court stated: “So my understanding
is at this point, if there is a factual discrepancy, I’m entitled to select that
which I think is correct if in essence there’s something in the record that
overrules his allegations.” We do not read the court’s comments as an
indication that the court was making an improper factual finding at the
prima facie stage. Rather, the court was explaining that it did not have to
accept Verkade’s petition as true if the record of conviction contradicted it
and showed Verkade’s representations were refuted as matter of law. This is
the correct approach. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.)
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593.) The jury found Offley guilty of murder and found true the attached
enhancement allegation that his personal and intentional discharge of a
firearm proximately caused the victim’s death. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
concluded that because the finding on the firearm enhancement allegation
did not establish that Offley acted with malice aforethought, and the jury
could have found him guilty of murder based solely on his participation in a
conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm, he was not ineligible for relief as
a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 598–599.) Unlike in Offley, the jury in Verkade’s
case was not instructed on a conspiracy theory or on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine through which malice could be imputed to him based
on his participation in a crime other than the murder. Instead, as we have
explained, Verkade was tried for murder on theories of malice aforethought
and felony murder, and under either theory the jury’s finding that he
personally caused the victim’s death by shooting him makes Verkade
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (See
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 56, fn. 9 [distinguishing Offley].)
      In summary, we agree with the superior court that Verkade was
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because “the jury instructions
and verdicts conclusively establish—with no factfinding, weighing of
evidence, or credibility determinations—that [he] was convicted as the actual
killer.” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 47.)

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                              DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.

                                            HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

KELETY, J.

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