Court Opinion

ID: 9677871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:02:49.814694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:59.319208
License: Public Domain

ELSA ALCALA, Justice,
dissenting from denial of en banc reconsideration.
I respectfully dissent from the denial of appellee’s, Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”), motion for en *819banc reconsideration of the panel’s decision to reverse the portion of the trial court’s decree that appointed DFPS as the “sole managing conservator” of the children. This decision conflicts with prior decisions by our court that left in place the portion of the trial court’s decree that appointed DFPS as the sole managing conservator of the children, although the portion of the decree that terminated the rights of the parent was reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence. See Ruiz v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 212 S.W.3d 804 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Yonko v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 196 S.W.3d 236 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet).
Under the posture of these cases, when our court reverses a decree terminating the rights of a parent, that reversal will also include a reversal and remand of the trial court’s decree appointing DFPS as the sole managing conservator if Justice Nuchia or Justice Higley1 preside over the case. However, under identical circumstances, a majority of the justices on our court will leave in place the trial court’s decree appointing DFPS as the sole managing conservator when our court reverses a decree terminating the rights of a parent.2 En banc consideration is therefore necessary to secure or maintain uniformity in this Court’s decisions concerning whether we must reverse and remand the portion of the trial court’s decree regarding the placement of DFPS as the sole managing conservator when we reverse the portion of the trial court’s decree that terminates parental rights. See Tex.R.App. P. 41.2(c). I therefore vote for en banc reconsideration.
I would also hold that, absent an issue on appeal challenging the portion of the trial court’s decree that places DFPS as the sole managing conservator, the issue is waived. I would not sua sponte remand the issue to the trial court, as the majority opinion and judgment does here. Appellant has not challenged the portion of the trial court’s decree that appoints DFPS the sole managing conservator. An appellant can raise an issue on appeal that challenges the trial court’s decree that appoints DFPS as the sole managing conservator. See Cervantes-Peterson v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 255-56 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (stating that one issue on appeal asserted by Cervantes was that “[i]n light of the fact that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s decision to terminate [Cervantes]s] parental rights, it follows that it was not in [J.M.’s] best interest that [DFPS] be granted sole managing conservatorship of [J.M.].”). The appellant here simply chose not to contest on appeal the trial court’s decree that appointed DFPS as the sole managing conservator. Perhaps appellant has no dispute with the placement of DFPS as the sole managing conservator, which the Family Code provides can be DFPS whether the parental rights are terminated *820or not. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.005(b), § 263.401(d)(3) (Vernon 2002 & Supp.2006).3 Regardless, I would hold that the failure of appellant to challenge that portion of the trial court’s decree appointing DFPS as the sole managing conservator waives the issue for our review on appeal. See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655-56 (Tex.2001) (quoting San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209-10 (Tex.1990), for “well-established rule that grounds of error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of appeals are waived”). I therefore disagree with the panel’s sua sponte reversal and remand of the trial court’s decree that makes DFPS the sole managing conservator.

. Justices Nuchia and Higley are the panel members of the majority opinion here.

. Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Higley comprised the panel in Ruiz, which did not alter the trial court’s placement of the managing conservator, despite reversing for legal insufficiency the trial court’s decision to terminate the parent’s rights. Ruiz v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 212 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("We reverse the portion of the decree terminating the parent-child relationship-”). Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland comprised the panel in Yonko, which did not alter the trial court’s placement of the managing conservator, despite reversing for factual insufficiency the trial court’s decision to terminate the parent’s rights. See Yonko v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 196 S.W.3d 236, 249 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet).

. Section 153.005 provides:
(b) A managing conservator must be a parent, a competent adult, an authorized agency, or a licensed child-placing agency.
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.005(b) (Vernon 2002).
Section 263.401(d)(3) acknowledges that the DFPS can be appointed a managing conservator even if parental rights have not been terminated, stating,
(d) For purposes of this section a final order is one that:
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(3) without terminating the parent-child relationship, appoints the department as the managing conservator of the child.
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.401(d)(3) (Vernon Supp.2006).