Court Opinion

ID: 9374821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 07:00:14.53519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.328372
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SAMAR AZAWI,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  SF-1221-18-0148-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: February 23, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Samar Azawi, Newport Beach, California, pro se.

           La’Chelle M. Woodert, Esquire, Redlands, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal as untimely filed with no
     basis to equitably toll the deadline. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision, FIND

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     jurisdiction over the IRA appeal, and REMAND the case to the regional office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed as a GM-15 Physician Chief, Radiation
     Therapy, and is the former Chief of the Radiation Oncology Therapy Section at
     the agency’s Long Beach, California facility. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1
     at 8, Tab 12 at 35.    Before filing the instant appeal, she filed a prior appeal
     stating that, based upon false accusations: the agency reduced her pay, grade, or
     band; denied her a within-grade increase; temporarily reassigned her; placed her
     into an absence without leave status; reprimanded her; and downgraded her
     annual appraisal in retaliation for her reports of patient safety practices, delays in
     patient care, clinical and nonclinical staff shortages, inappropriate use of funds,
     prohibited personnel practices, harassment, unfair treatment, and hostility , and
     her complaints to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the Office of Inspector
     General (OIG), and the Secretary of the agency (Secretary). Azawi v. Department
     of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-16-0543-W-1, Initial Appeal
     File, Tab 1 at 2. On August 12, 2016, the administrative judge dismissed that
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he found that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure. Azawi v. Department
     of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-16-0543-W-1, Initial Decision
     (Aug. 12, 2016).      The Board affirmed the administrative judge’s decision as
     modified to find also that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her
     disclosures to OIG, her complaint to OSC, and her report to the Secretary were
     contributing factors in any personnel action. Azawi v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-16-0543-W-1, Final Order (Feb. 3, 2023).
¶3         On March 13, 2017, the Medical Center’s Chief of Staff issued a notice
     proposing to remove the appellant and revoke her clinical privileges on the basis
     of the following charges:       (1) delaying patient care; (2) failing to provide
                                                                                         3

     appropriate medical treatment; (3) entering inaccurate information in a medical
     record; (4) documenting in the medical record that treatment had been completed
     when it had not yet started; (5) delaying documentation; (6) plagiarizing notes in
     patient medical records; (7) being unavailable for patient care; and (8) acting in
     an unprofessional manner by contributing to a hostile work environment. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 8-19. On April 28, 2017, the Medical Center Director issued a decision
     imposing the appellant’s removal, effective May 8, 2017.            Id. at 20-22.       On
     May 4, 2017, the appellant requested to retire on May 7, 2017, before the
     effective date of the removal decision. IAF, Tab 12 at 54. She retired effective
     May 7, 2017. Id. at 58-59.
¶4         The appellant filed an appeal with the agency’s Disciplinary Appeals Board
     (DAB) on May 23, 2017. Id. at 67. The DAB found that the appellant did not
     demonstrate that her retirement was involuntary, and thus it did not have
     jurisdiction over her appeal. Id. at 63-64. The Acting Principal Deputy Under
     Secretary for Health executed the recommendation of the DAB. 2 Id. at 67-68.
¶5         The appellant filed a complaint with OSC in which she alleged that the
     agency threatened to remove her in retaliation for her disclosures and activities,
     including disclosures about improper staffing, the improper selection of a
     physician, and a possible case of inappropriate assigning of fee services to a
     friend. IAF, Tab 1 at 32-34. She also asserted that she filed a Board appeal and
     equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints. 3 Id. at 32. Further, she argued

     2
       Effective July 3, 1988, the appellant’s appointment as a physician was converted to an
     excepted appointment. IAF, Tab 12 at 70; 38 U.S.C. § 4104(1) (1988); see Department
     of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-40, § 401,
     105 Stat. 187, 238 (striking out 38 U.S.C. § 4104(1) and inserting 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1)
     in lieu thereof). When, as here, the agency’s action arises out of a question involving
     professional conduct or competence, an employee, such as the appellant, does not have
     Board appeal rights and instead may file an appeal with the DAB. 38 U.S.C.
     §§ 7401(1), 7425, 7462(a)(1).
     3
       To the extent that the appellant is asserting retaliation for EEO activity, the Board
     lacks IRA jurisdiction over such matters unless the EEO activity sought to remedy
     whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See Bishop v. Department of
                                                                                        4

     that her retirement was coerced. 4          Id. at 33.    OSC issued its proposed
     determination on August 1, 2017, and afforded the appellant 15 days to respond.
     Id. at 32-34.
¶6         On August 17, 2017, the appellant informed OSC that she did not receive its
     proposed determination letter until August 11, 2017, as the letter had been
     addressed to her attorney.     Id. at 37.   On August 22, 2017, she requested an
     opportunity to respond to the preliminary letter, and this request was granted. Id.
     Despite the fact that the appellant had been granted an extension, on August 25,
     2017, OSC made a final determination to close out the matter. Id. at 36. The
     appellant submitted a response on September 5, 2017. Id. at 37. In this response,
     she asserted that the agency retaliated against her when it retracted a report of
     malpractice and that agency employees wrongly accessed her medical records.
     Id. OSC issued its close-out letter on September 29, 2017. Id. at 37-39.
¶7         On October 23, 2017, the appellant emailed OSC, stating that, although she
     was informed that OSC letters were sent to her address, she did not see them.
     IAF, Tab 8 at 12. In response, on October 24, 2017, OSC emailed the appellant
     copies of the aforementioned letters and informed her that she had 65 days from
     the date of its close-out letter to submit a Board appeal. Id. at 8-9.
¶8         The appellant filed the instant appeal on December 17, 2017, and requested
     a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal without
     holding the appellant’s requested hearing because he found that it was untimely

     Agriculture, 2022 MSPB 28, ¶ 16; Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 6-7 (2013). There is no evidence or allegation that the appellant’s
     EEO activity was intended to remedy whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8).
     4
       The appellant also reasserted that the agency removed her from her duties and placed
     her under investigation in reprisal for her activities and disclosures. IAF, Tab 1
     at 32-33. However, the issue of whether the Board has jurisdiction over these
     allegations was litigated in the appellant’s prior appeal, and thus it is barred by
     collateral estoppel. See McNeil v. Department of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 146, ¶¶ 15-20
     (2005) (holding that the appellant was collaterally estopped from relitigating
     jurisdictional issues that were litigated in her earlier appeal).
                                                                                        5

      filed and that the appellant did not establish that the time limit for filing the
      appeal should be tolled. IAF, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-7.
¶9             The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has responded
      in opposition to the petition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

                         DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The appellant timely filed her appeal.
¶10            The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that her appeal
      was untimely because she asserts that she first received notification of OSC’s
      September 29, 2017 close-out letter on October 24, 2017. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9.
      An appellant may file an IRA appeal with the Board once OSC closes its
      investigation into her complaint and no more than 60 days have elapsed since
      notification of the closure was provided to her.       5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A); see
      Heimberger v. Department of Commerce, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 6 (2014). Under the
      Board’s regulations implementing that statutory time limit, an IRA appeal must
      be filed no later than 65 days after the date that OSC issues its close-out letter or,
      if the letter is received more than 5 days after its issuance, within 60 days of the
      date of receipt. See Heimberger, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 6; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1).
      The appellant bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that she
      timely filed her appeal. 5 Pacilli v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R.
      526, ¶ 8, aff’d, 404 F. App’x 466 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
¶11            In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant was
      required to file her appeal by December 4, 2017, the first workday after 65 days
      elapsed from when OSC issued its September 29, 2017 letter. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1
      at 39;     see   5 U.S.C.   § 1214(a)(3)(A);   5 C.F.R.    §§ 1201.23,   1209.5(a)(1).
      Accordingly, he found that, when she filed her appeal on December 17, 2017, it
      was 13 days late.      ID at 6; IAF, Tab 1.    Further, he found that, because OSC

      5
       A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
      person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
      contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                    6

      informed the appellant that her appeal was due 65 days after it issued the
      September 29, 2017 close-out letter, she did not allege circumstances warranting
      invocation of the doctrine of equitable tolling. ID at 6-7. We disagree because
      we find that the appellant proved that she filed her appeal within 60 days of when
      she was notified that OSC issued its close-out letter.
¶12         When, as here, the appellant asserts that she did not receive OSC’s
      close-out letter within 5 days of its issuance, she must file the appeal within
      60 days of receiving notification of OSC’s close-out letter, even if she did not
      receive this notice via OSC’s close-out letter as sent through regular mail.
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1); see Walsh v. Social Security Administration, 93 M.S.P.R.
      617, ¶ 6 (2003) (finding that, assuming the appellant received notification of
      OSC’s close-out letter via telephonic contact, such contact could constitute
      notification under the Board’s regulations).      The appellant responded to the
      administrative judge’s orders regarding jurisdiction and timeliness and asserted
      that her appeal was timely filed because she did not originally receive OSC’s
      close-out letter. IAF, Tabs 2-3, Tab 8 at 7, 12. In doing so, she indicated on the
      online questionnaire that she was asserting facts from her personal knowledge and
      declared under penalty of perjury that the facts stated in her pleading were t rue
      and correct.   IAF, Tab 8 at 3.    In her response, the appellant stated that she
      contacted OSC on October 23, 2017, at which point she was told that OSC
      already had sent its close-out letter to her. Id. at 7. She further stated that she
      first received the close-out letter via email on October 24, 2017, and via regular
      mail at a later point. Id.
¶13         A declaration subscribed as true under penalty of perjury, if uncontested,
      proves the facts it asserts. Woodall v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
      30 M.S.P.R. 271, 273 (1986). The record does not contain evidence supporting a
      finding that the appellant did indeed receive the letter in Septembe r, and the
      appellant’s statement that she did not actually receive it is uncontested.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has proven, through her sworn statement,
                                                                                           7

      that she was not notified of the close-out letter until she contacted OSC on
      October 23, 2017. See Gonzales v. Department of the Navy, 99 M.S.P.R. 97, ¶ 9
      (2005) (finding that, even if the appellant was deemed to have received notice of
      OSC’s close-out letter through his representative, based upon the appellant’s
      representative’s affidavit, he did not receive the letter until less than 60 days
      before filing his appeal); King v. Department of Health & Human Services,
      71 M.S.P.R. 22, 31 (1996) (finding that the appellant’s statement that she did not
      receive OSC’s close-out letter was sufficient to support a finding tha t she did not
      receive notice of it).
¶14         Having found that the appellant’s sworn statement demonstrates that she
      was first notified of OSC’s close-out letter on October 23, 2017, we find that her
      appeal was timely filed. Because the appellant was notified of OSC’s close-out
      letter more than 5 days after its issuance, she was required to submit her appeal
      within 60 days of the date of this notice. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1). She submitted
      her appeal 55 days later, on December 17, 2017. IAF, Tab 1. Thus, we find that
      it was timely filed after she received notice of OSC’s close-out letter.

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made a protected disclosure that
      was a contributing factor in her proposed removal, the decision to remove her,
      and her alleged involuntary retirement, thus entitling her to a hearing.
¶15         Because we find that the appeal was timely filed, we must consider whether
      the appellant has established jurisdiction over her appeal.         The appellant may
      establish jurisdiction over this IRA appeal if she demonstrates by preponderant
      evidence that she exhausted her administrative remedy before OSC 6 and makes
      nonfrivolous    allegations 7 of    the   following:      (1) she   made    a   protected
      whistleblowing disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected

      6
        It is undisputed that the appellant exhausted her administrative remedy. IAF, Tab 1
      at 32-40.
      7
        A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
      issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s); see Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d
      1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
                                                                                          8

      whistleblowing activity under 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and
      (2) the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to
      take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action. 5 U.S.C.
      §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(e)(1); Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,
      2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14 ; Lewis v. Department of Defense, 123 M.S.P.R. 255, ¶ 7
      (2016); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016);
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(1), (b), (c)(1); see Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .8            If an appellant establishes
      jurisdiction over her IRA appeal, she is entitled to a hearing on the merits of her
      claim, which she must prove by preponderant evidence. Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R.
      230, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(4). An appellant is entitled to this hearing if she
      makes a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one protected disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take, or fail to take, or threaten to
      take or fail to take, at least one personnel action. See Fitzgerald v. Department of
      Agriculture, 97 M.S.P.R. 181, ¶ 10 (2004).
¶16         For the reasons that follow, we find that the appellant has nonfrivolously
      alleged that she has made at least one protected disclosure that was a contributing
      factor to at least one covered personnel action. Accordingly, we find that she has
      established jurisdiction over this IRA appeal and is entitled to a hearing on the
      merits. 9 See id.

      8
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
      the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
      petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
      circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
      review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
      9
        Because the appellant need only nonfrivolously allege that she made at least one
      protected disclosure that was a contributing factor to the agency’s decision to take at
      least one personnel action to establish jurisdiction and entitlement to a hearing, we do
      not here address the appellant’s other alleged protected disclosures and activity. On
                                                                                         9

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made a protected disclosure
            that employees improperly accessed her medical records.
¶17         A protected whistleblowing disclosure is a disclosure of information that
      the appellant reasonably believes evidences any violation of any law, rule, or
      regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
      or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.             5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8); Bradley v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547,
      ¶ 7 (2016).    The proper test for determining whether an employee had a
      reasonable belief that her disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested
      observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable
      by the employee could reasonably conclude that the disclosure evidenced one of
      the circumstances described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).        Bradley, 123 M.S.P.R.
      547, ¶ 7.
¶18         On January 11, 2017, the appellant asserted that her medical records were
      inappropriately accessed by other agency employees. IAF, Tab 9 at 8, 34. On
      March 1, 2017, the Medical Center Director issued a letter stating that the Privacy
      Officer conducted an investigation and concluded that the appellant’s medical
      records were accessed inappropriately, notifying her of the steps she could take to
      protect her identity, and apologizing for the inconvenience.         Id. at 8-9.       On
      appeal, she states that the inappropriate access constituted an act of retaliation by
      agency administrators. Id. at 33-34. Particularly considering that the agency’s
      Privacy Officer found that employees improperly accessed the appellant’s
      information, we find that the appellant, who is not an expert in privacy law, has
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency violated her rights under relevant
      privacy laws, rules, and regulations.       See Mudd v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 9 (2013) (finding that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged that she made a protected disclosure that the agency violated various

      remand, the administrative judge shall address the other alleged protected disclosures
      and activity raised by the appellant before OSC and below.
                                                                                    10

      laws, rules, and regulations governing scheduling practices , particularly when the
      agency appeared to have granted the appellant some relief in connection with her
      grievance regarding these practices).

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her disclosure was a contributing
            factor in the agency’s decision to propose her removal and issue a removal
            decision, as well as in her alleged involuntary retirement.
¶19        An appellant may meet her jurisdictional burden regarding the contributing
      factor element if she nonfrivolously alleges that the official who took or
      threatened the personnel action at issue knew of the protected whistleblowing
      disclosures or activity and that the personnel action occurred within a period of
      time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosures or activity
      were a contributing factor in the personnel action.         Carney v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 7 (2014).         The Board has found that
      personnel actions alleged to have begun within 1 to 2 years of the appellant’s
      protected whistleblowing disclosures or activity satisfied th e timing prong of this
      knowledge/timing    test.     See,   e.g.,   Mastrullo v.   Department   of   Labor,
      123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 20-22 (2015) (finding that the appellant proved that his
      August 2010 disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s failure to give
      him a 40-hour time-off award in June 2012).
¶20        We find that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that her disclosure
      was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to propose her removal and
      issue a removal decision, as well as in her alleged involuntary retirement. She
      asserted that the agency issued a removal decision and that her retirement after
      the decision was involuntary. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 5. The agency’s proposal and
      issuance of the removal decision constitute personnel actions because an
      employee may pursue an appeal regarding a personnel action, such as a removal,
      even if the action was only proposed. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a), 2302(a)(2)(A); see
      Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 629, ¶ 9 (2014).
      Further, the Board has held that an employee can pursue a claim of an involuntary
                                                                                      11

      retirement or resignation as a personnel action in an IRA appeal. See Mastrullo,
      123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 10.     We also find that the appellant has met her burden
      regarding knowledge of her disclosure because, in his role as the Medical Center
      Director, the deciding official issued a letter in response to the disclosure. IAF,
      Tab 9 at 8-9.
¶21        Last, we find that the appellant has met her burden regarding the timing
      prong of the knowledge/timing test.         The appellant made her disclosure on
      January 11, 2017. Id. at 8. The agency proposed her removal on March 13, 2017,
      and issued its removal decision on April 28, 2017.        IAF, Tab 1 at 8-22.     The
      appellant retired effective May 7, 2017. IAF, Tab 12 at 54. Because all of these
      actions occurred less than 4 months after the appellant’s disclosure, we find that
      she has nonfrivolously alleged that it was a contributing factor in the personnel
      actions at issue.   See Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 17
      (2014) (finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his disc losure was a
      contributing factor in his reassignment when he asserted that the officials
      reassigning him were notified of his disclosure when a judge’s decision
      mentioning the disclosure was published and that the reassignment was ordered
      within 4 months of the judge’s decision).
¶22         As we conclude that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that
      she made at least one protected whistleblowing disclosure that was a contributing
      factor in the agency’s decision to propose her removal and issue a removal
      decision, as well as in her alleged involuntary retirement, the Board has
      jurisdiction over this appeal, and the appellant is entitled to a hearing on the
      merits. 10 See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14.

      10
        We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                12

                                          ORDER
¶23        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.