Court Opinion

ID: 9784870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:56:28.740541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:00.552439
License: Public Domain

Greene, J.,
dissenting: As recognized by my colleagues, the issue of reasonable suspicion to extend the detention of defendant Moore is “a close question.” With due respect, I would conclude that Trooper Jimerson had insufficient factors to establish reasonable suspicion, thus requiring reversal.
Trooper Jimerson relied on the following factors: (i) Moore was driving a vehicle which was not registered to him; (ii) Moore was traveling from Las Vegas to Maryland; (iii) Moore carried little clothing; (iv) the interior of the vehicle smelled of fabric softener dryer sheets, a known masking agent for illegal drugs; and (v) Moore demonstrated severe nervousness. Moore had reasonable and plausible explanations for both his possession of the vehicle and his route. Nervousness must be discounted, as recognized by the majority. Accordingly, this case turns on the impact of the perception by the officer of the odor of fabric softener diyer sheets.
I respectfully suggest that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ cases relied upon by the majority do not reflect the better approach to this problem, nor can they be squared with controlling authority from our own Kansas Supreme Court. As noted by the majority, most jurisdictions have concluded that the mere odor of diyer sheets, even when coupled with one or more mildly suspicious factors, does not support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See the cases cited by majority from Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. Moreover, when the factors deemed insufficient for reasonable suspicion by our Supreme Court in State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 733, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998), are compared with the factors deemed adequate for reasonable suspicion by the *812Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1997), it is clear that the Eighth Circuit has a far more generous view of such factors than does our Kansas Supreme Court. Arguably, the factors deemed adequate in Carrate are considerably less weighty than those deemed insufficient in DeMarco. Accordingly, the majority’s reliance on the Eighth Circuit authorities seems misplaced.
As acknowledged by the majority, Moore’s extended detention cannot be viewed as consensual. Given my view that the officer had inadequate information to form a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Moore should not have been detained for further questioning or the resulting search. In Kansas, our Supreme Court has been clear in stating that in the absence of consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, extended detention is unwarranted.
“A law enforcement officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver’s licence and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid licence and proof that he or she is entitled to operate the car, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his or her way, without being subject to further delay by the officer for additional questioning. In order to justify a temporary detention for questioning, die officer must also have reasonable suspicion of illegal transactions of drugs or of any other serious crime.” State v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, Syl. ¶ 4, 960 P.2d 200 (1998).
Although the trooper’s unwillingness to allow Moore to proceed on his way may have resulted in a fruitful search, the search violated Moore’s right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and should have been suppressed. I would reverse the district court and suppress the fruits of the search of Moore’s vehicle. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).