Court Opinion

ID: 9462486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:42:23.847016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:37.078031
License: Public Domain

*764LAY, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result. However, I cannot accept the rationale offered by the majority. The opinion in my judgment misconstrues the deference due state law under the policy of competitive equality and thereby justifies use of state law to define a federal branch bank. This allows “the tail to wag the dog.” The definition of a “branch” bank is solely a question of federal law. First National Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 134-36, 90 S.Ct. 337, 24 L.Ed.2d 693 (1969); Driscoll v. Northwestern National Bank, 484 F.2d 173, 175 (8th Cir. 1973).
The McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36, sets out the concept of competitive equality:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (my emphasis).
As the Supreme Court discussed in Dickinson :
[Wjhile Congress has absolute authority over national banks, the federal statute has incorporated by reference the limitations which state law places on branch banking activities by state banks. Congress has deliberately settled upon a policy intended to foster “competitive equality.” Walker Bank, 385 U.S., at 261, 87 S.Ct. [492], at 497, 17 L.Ed.2d 343. State law has been utilized by Congress to provide certain guidelines to implement its legislative policy.
Admittedly, state law comes into play in deciding how, where, and when branch banks may be operated, Walker Bank, supra, for in § 36(c) Congress entrusted to the States the regulation of branching as Congress then conceived it. 396 U.S. at 131, 133, 90 S.Ct. at 342 (my emphasis).
Although state law comes into play in deciding “how, where and when” a branch may operate, Congress intended federal law to determine “what” is a branch. With this in mind I fail to see the relevance of the .testimony of the State Banking Director or of state law in deciding whether or not the drive-in facility is a branch. Section 36(f) simply says:
The term “branch” as used in this section shall be held to include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located in any State or Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f).
The evidence is undisputed that at the facility in question “deposits are received” and “checks paid.” The only remaining issue under the test of Dickinson is whether the bank is “apart from the chartered premises.” Dickinson, supra 396 U.S. at 135, 90 S.Ct. 337. The physical facts clearly support the finding that the drive-in facility is “apart from the chartered premises.” Reference to state law merely serves to corroborate this determination. Under Nebraska Department of Banking Regulations, § 85-157-01, the facility is considered “detached.” However, regardless of this regulation, the facility is clearly a “branch bank” under federal law.