Court Opinion

ID: 9928828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:11:04.948142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:49.295408
License: Public Domain

J-S30037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 EDWARD L. JONES                           :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 2712 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 23, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002716-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 EDWARD JONES                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 2716 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 23, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002357-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                        FILED JANUARY 24, 2024

      Edward L. Jones (“Jones”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of one count each of rape of a child,

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, and simple assault, and

two counts each of unlawful contact with a minor, endangering the welfare of
J-S30037-23

children, corruption of minors, indecent assault, and indecent exposure.1 We

affirm.

       The charges arose from Jones’s 2019 sexual assaults of his then-twelve-

and fourteen-year-old daughters.2 See N.T., 2/11/22, at 20-23, 25-27, 39,

76, 79. The trial court held a non-jury trial and convicted Jones of the above

crimes. Following completion of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), a

mental health assessment, and a sex offender assessment, the trial court

found Jones to be a sexually violent predator.       Despite this, and despite

Jones’s status as a repeat felon, the trial court sentenced Jones to a below-

guidelines aggregate sentence of thirteen and one-half to twenty-seven years

in prison, to be followed by five years of probation. Jones filed a post-sentence

motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, as well as the

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 2701(a), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1),
6301(a)(1)(ii), 3126(a)(7) and (8), and 3127(a).

2 The Commonwealth originally also charged Jones with sexually assaulting a

friend of his older daughter. N.T., 9/23/22, at 18-21. The Commonwealth
nolle prossed the charges after the child’s mother refused to bring her to trial.
See id.

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discretionary aspects of sentence, which the trial court denied.3 Jones timely

appealed.4,5

       Jones presents a single question for our review:

       Did the lower court abuse its discretion by imposing an
       unreasonable and manifestly excessive sentence that failed to
       adhere to the general sentencing principles outlined in 42 Pa.
       C.S.A. § 9721(b), in that the [c]ourt imposed a sentence that
       exceeded what was necessary to protect the public and the
       community, failed to consider Jones’s background and character
       fully[,] and imposed a sentence that was well beyond what was
       necessary to foster the rehabilitative needs of Jones?

____________________________________________

3 The trial court denied Jones’s motion for reconsideration via a single-
sentence order. See Order, 10/20/22, at 1 (unnumbered).

4 When Jones filed the notices of appeal, he listed both dockets on each notice.

Separate notices of appeal are required when a single order resolves issues
arising on more than one trial court docket. See Commonwealth v. Walker,
185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018), overruled in part, Commonwealth v.
Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (reaffirming Walker, but holding
Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits appellate court in its discretion, to allow correction of
the error where appropriate); see also Pa.R.A.P. 902 (amended May 18,
2023). Nevertheless, in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (en banc), this Court held quashal is not necessary when an
appellant files multiple notices of appeal listing more than one docket number
so long as an appropriate number of notices of appeal were filed. Id. at 1148.
Thus, under Johnson, Jones has substantially complied with the requirements
of Walker. See Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148. This Court sua sponte
consolidated Jones’s appeals.

5 The trial court ordered Jones to file a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Jones requested and received an extension
of time to file his Rule 1925(b) statement. Prior to the date the statement
was due, the trial judge was appointed to the federal bench. Jones never filed
the Rule 1925(b) statement, and the trial court never authored an opinion in
this matter. In its brief, the Commonwealth states it will not argue Rule 1925
waiver under these circumstances. Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 n. 1. Based
on these unusual circumstances, we decline to find waiver.

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Jones’s Brief at 4.

      A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute,

but rather, “must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 348 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and

internal citation omitted). To reach the merits of such a claim, this Court must

determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [the defendant]
      preserved [the] issue; (3) whether [the defendant’s] brief includes
      a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
      appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and
      (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question
      that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–330 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).   “[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a

sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim

to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an

objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth

v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

      As noted above, Jones timely appealed. His brief includes a Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f) concise statement. See Jones’s Brief at 8-10. Regarding a substantial

question: Jones asserts his sentence is excessive because the trial court

“unfairly focused on the need to protect [Jones’s] biological daughters.” Id.

at 12. Jones acknowledges the trial court reviewed his “[PSI], mental health

report, and sentencing guidelines[.]” Id. However, he contends “the record

is silent as to how the [c]ourt used this information to help fashion its

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sentence.” Id. He last complains the record does not support “such a weighty

sentence” and does not demonstrate the sentence “was necessary to protect

the public and support the rehabilitative needs of [Jones].” Id. This presents

a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686,

692 (Pa. Super. 2021) (claim that sentence was harsh and excessive and trial

court failed to consider mitigating factors raises substantial question);

Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064-65 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[A]

claim that a sentence is excessive because the trial court relied on an

impermissible factor raises a substantial question.”).

       However,     while    Jones    filed    a    timely   post-sentence   motion   for

reconsideration of sentence, he vaguely asserted the following:

       7. Further, [Jones] believes his sentence was an abuse of
       discretion by [the trial court].

       8.    Further, [Jones] believes his sentence was within the
       discretionary aspect of sentencing, so he files the instant motion
       to preserve his appellate rights.

Jones’s Motion for Reconsideration, 10/4/22, at 2 (unnumbered).6

       An appellant waives a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence

not raised in a post-sentence motion and may not raise it for the first time on

____________________________________________

6 We note Jones labeled his post-sentence motion as “nunc pro tunc,”
presumably because he filed it on the eleventh day after sentencing. The
Commonwealth did not object to the late filing and the trial court appears to
have denied the motion on the merits.         See Order, 10/20/22, at 1
(unnumbered).

                                              -5-
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appeal.     See Commonwealth v. Bradley, 237 A.3d 1131, 1138-39 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (claim waived where not specifically raised in post-sentence

motion); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Here, because Jones did not raise the

specific challenges raised in the instant appeal in his post-sentence motion,

he waived them, and is therefore due no relief.

      However, even if Jones had preserved his issue, it warrants no relief on

the merits. Our standard of review of a discretionary sentencing claim is well-

established:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).     “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad

discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances

before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      Jones concedes the record demonstrates the trial court considered the

PSI, the mental health evaluation, the sex offender evaluation, and the

sentencing guidelines in imposing his sentence. See N.T., 9/23/22, at 23-27;

Jones’s Brief at 12. This is what the law requires. See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2023) (rejecting defendant’s

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challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence where record reflected the trial

court considered the circumstances of the crime, the PSI, the arguments of

counsel, and imposed a sentence within the guidelines); Commonwealth v.

Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 10-12 (Pa. Super. 2022) (finding above-the-guidelines

sentence was not excessive or unreasonable where the trial court considered

the   guideline    ranges,    the    PSI,      the   mental   health     evaluations,   the

circumstances of the crime, and the testimony at the sentencing hearing).

Jones’s    below-guidelines      sentence        was   thus    neither     excessive    nor

unreasonable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.

Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (defendant’s sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive

where “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of

the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.”).               Accordingly, even if

properly preserved, Jones’s claims would not merit relief, because he has not

shown his below-the-guidelines sentence was clearly unreasonable or

excessive. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3).7

____________________________________________

7 Although the trial court acknowledged RFEL was the applicable prior record

score category, Jones ultimately received a term that was well under the RFEL
guidelines range. See N.T., 9/23/22, at 11-12. If we granted a resentencing
as Jones requests, he would run the risk of having his minimum sentence
increased from thirteen and one-half years to twenty years because the record
contains no facts which would have justified a downward departure sentence
under RFEL. However, the Commonwealth has not asked us to correct the
trial court’s improper downward departure, and the sentence was not
rendered illegal by that error such that we must remedy it sua sponte. See
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 1/24/2024

____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Krum, 533 A.2d 134, 134 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“If a
sentencing court considers improper factors in imposing sentence upon a
defendant, the court thereby abuses its discretion, but the sentence imposed
is not rendered illegal. Otherwise, every erroneous consideration by a
sentencing court will render the sentence illegal in a manner which cannot be
waived[.] This is not the law.”); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 721 (setting forth
procedure for Commonwealth sentencing appeals and challenges to
sentence).

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