Court Opinion

ID: 9831203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:54:41.269258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:32.463769
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In our original opinion, in discussing the second ground of negligence submitted by the trial court, which was to the effect that Dr. Urrutia, after having been called, failed to wait upon and treat Edward Patino, we used the expression, now corrected:
“He refused to attend, because he did not go outside of his office to practice his profession, unless it was an emergency, and this was not shown to be an emergency case, as the deceased lived several months thereafter.”
Our use of the words, “He refused to attend,” .is slightly, incorrect for the reason that Dr. Urrutia testified that he did not refuse to attend, because he never received the call.
There is no positive testimony in the record that Dr. Urrutia administered to Patino neo-salvasan or any poisonous drug; but, on the contrary, Dr. Urrutia testified that what he did administer was ferro-arsen, a harmless drug used for the purpose of building up a depleted system, and this idea was supported by the testimony of other physicians. The only testimony to the contrary was from Mrs. Patino, the widow, who testified that what the doctor administered was medicine of a yellowish hue, and it appeared that ferro-arsen was of a reddish hue, and as neo-salvasan was of a yellowish hue it might be presumed that neo-salvasan had been administered, but there was no proof as to this; but be this as it may, the jury found that whatever it was that the defendant administered it did not cause Edward Patino any harm, and that issue of negligence was found by the jury in the defendant’s favor, leaving, as the one and only ground of negligence found in plaintiff’s favor, the one as stated above with reference to the defendant’s failure to call Upon and treat Patino on Sunday, July 26, 1925.
The undisputed facts in this case are that on July 23, 1925, an injection was given to Patino by Dr. Urrutia. On the next day, Friday, Patino did not go to his work, but on the following day, Saturday, July 25, Patino worked all morning and called at Dr. Urrutia’s office that afternoon. The next day, Sunday, July 26, the plaintiffs claim they called Dr. Urrutia to come and visit Edward Patino, but Dr. Urrutia claims, he did not receive this message. Be that as it may, he did not visit Patino on Sunday, July 26. Then what happened? On the next day, Monday, July 27, the plaintiffs called in Dr. Goodson, who came immediately, treated Patino for 4½ months, and did everything that any medical man could do for him, and he testified that Patino died from septic infection of the bladder. A few days later Dr. Dorbandt was called in the consultation and visited Patino 12 or 15 times before his death, 4⅛ months afterwards.
Dr. Dorbandt’s diagnosis was that Patino died from infantile paralysis, a disease of the brain and spinal cord; hence it cannot be said that even if the defendant had visited P-atinoi on that Sunday, July 26, he could have done anything to prevent Patino’s death, 4½ months afterwards; hence no negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to visit Patino on Sunday, July 26, was shown, and even if this fact could be charged against Urrutia as negligence, Patino’s death must have been the natural and probable result of such negligence, one that could have been foreseen, else the negligence is not the probable cause of Patino’s death. G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Hanway (Tex. Civ. App.) 57 S. W. 695; Mella v. Northern S. S. Co. (C. C.) 162 F. 512; Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256; Empire State Cattle Co. v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co. (C. C.) 135 F. 135; U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Des Moines National Bank (C. C. A.) 145 F. 273; Cole v. German Savings & Loan Association (C. C. A.) 124 F. 113, 63 L. R. A. 416; Cochran’s Adm’r v. Krause, 144 Ky. 202, 137 S. W. 1054; Gores v. Graff, 77 Wis. 174, 46 N. W. 48.
And the fact that Dr. Urrutia stated that if he had been left in charge of the case he could have cured Patino is of very little im*584portance, because the question is whether he could have saved his life by calling on him that day, Sunday, July 26. He testified, and it was his opinion, that if he had had the opportunity to treat the man he could have cured him. This has no meaning except that he should have had full charge of the case during the entire illness.' The appellees prevented this by calling in other physicians the following Monday and by not requesting the services of Dr. Urrutia again. Having been relieved of his duties by appellees, they cannot be heard to complain of the fact that if he had continued to treat Patino he could and would have cured him and thus done more than any other physicians did or could have done.
Special Issue No. 7, “Was the death of Edward M. Patino due to other causes than the alleged negligence or treatment of him by defendant, Dr. Urrutia?” was a defensive issue and amounted to nothing more than the converse of the second ground of negligence and to question No. 5 thereunder. It was another finding by the jury that the failure to visit Patino on Sunday, July 26, was the only cause of his death, and that it was not due to a disease or other cause. This had already been found by the jury in answer to question No. 5. Manifestly, • the failure to visit him in itself could not be the sole cause of his death, because necessarily he must have had some disease or ailment producing the condition calling for treatment and which condition culminated in his death.
Even if it be admitted that Dr. Urru-tia was guilty of negligence in failing to visit Patino on Sunday, July 26, there was no causal connection between that negligence and the death of Patino, which occurred 4½ months afterwards, and it is clear that the burden was upon the plaintiffs to establish causal connection between the negligence alleged and proven and the death. Causal connection can no more be presumed than the negligence itself. _ Neither, can rest upon mere presumption, but both must be proved, and there must be some tangible fact or circumstance from which the jury might reasonably conclude that the alleged negligent act brought about the death. Houston E. W. T. R. Co. v. McHowell (Tex. Civ. App.) 278 S. W. 258; Bock v. Fellman Dry Goods Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 582; Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Latham, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 115 S. W. 891; Southern Kansas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Emmett (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 48; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Perkins’ Adm’r, 177 Ky. 88, 197 S. W. 526; Hughes v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., 91 Ky. 526, 16 S. W. 275; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Zachary’s Adm’r (Ky.) 106 S. W. 843; Warner v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 178 Mo. 125, 77 S. W. 69; Wichita Palls & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Cover, 65 Okl. 110, 164 P. 662.
We have given unusual care and consideration to this case. We have again read, with very much interest and benefit, the masterful brief, argument, and then the motion for rehearing, but find no cause to change our opinion. We think the case is without any merit, and therefore deny the motion for a rehearing.