Court Opinion

ID: 9544705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:59:57.947754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:28.942922
License: Public Domain

SEAWELL, J., Dissenting.
I dissent. The majority opinion is predicated upon the premise that the siren of the defendant’s emergency vehicle was properly sounded as required *487by law. The jury impliedly found it was not, and this finding is amply supported. Negative testimony of the kind here involved has frequently been held to create a substantial conflict in the evidence. The opinion as written improperly weighs the evidence.
In addition it is my opinion that the majority decision incorrectly interprets the provisions of law involved, and fails to give effect to the obvious legislative policy therein embodied. I am of the opinion that section 17141/2, Civil Code, by its clear and unequivocal language imposes liability on governmental agencies for injuries to third persons arising out of the use and operation of all motor vehicles, whether being used in the performance of a governmental or proprietary function, and that neither that section nor any other statutory provision expressly or impliedly exempts governmental agencies from liability for torts growing out of the use and operation of authorized emergency vehicles. The exemption from certain provisions of the Vehicle Code conferred on emergency vehicles merely makes the liability in each case a question of fact, the arbitrary speed limit and right of way provisions not being applicable. In this connection I am satisfied to rest my opinion on the reasoning of the appellate court in Rogers v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 294 [44 Pac. (2d) 465], and Lossman v. City of Stockton, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 324 [44 Pac. (2d) 397], I am convinced that those cases correctly interpret the statutory provisions involved.
Rehearing denied.