Court Opinion

ID: 9950322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 19:04:40.891287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:36.979343
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Lewis CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080083

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF1102889)

 PAUL DIXON LEWIS,                                                       OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.

Affirmed.

         James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and

Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Defendant and appellant Paul Dixon Lewis appeals the order of the Riverside

County Superior Court denying his request made pursuant to People v. Superior Court

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to dismiss his prior strike convictions. We

will affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND1

       Defendant is an inmate at the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco, serving a

49-year sentence for raping a 15-year-old girl in 1990. In May 2011, correctional officers

searched defendant and found in his underwear a blue latex glove containing 13.2 grams

of marijuana wrapped in 25 plastic bindles. In June 2012, a jury convicted defendant of

possessing a controlled substance in a penal institution (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, count 1)

and possessing marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, count 2).2 The trial

court found true that he had eight strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12,

subd. (c)(2)(A)) and one prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

       The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life on count 1 plus

one year for the prior prison term enhancement, and stayed the sentence for count 2

pursuant to section 654. It also denied defendant’s Romero motion to strike seven of the

1      We granted the People’s request for judicial notice of our opinions issued in
defendant’s four prior appeals: People v. Lewis (Dec. 19, 2013, E056993) [nonpub. opn.]
(Lewis I); People v. Lewis (Nov. 4, 2015, E063680) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Lewis
(Dec. 15, 2017, E068789) [nonpub. opn.]; and People v. Lewis (Oct. 22, 2020, E072446)
[nonpub. opn.].

2      All statutory references herein are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                             2
eight prior strike convictions. On appeal, we ordered modifications of the minute order

and abstract of judgment to correctly reflect the assessments and fees ordered, and to note

on the abstract that defendant’s conviction was by jury trial. We affirmed the judgment

in all other respects. (Lewis I, supra, E056993.)

       In January 2022, section 1172.75 became effective.3 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3,

(Sen. Bill No. 483), eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) That provision eliminated as legally invalid all

prison prior sentence enhancements set forth in section 667.5, subdivision (b) that were

imposed before January 1, 2020, except those involving a prison prior for specified

sexually violent offenses. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A defendant eligible for resentencing

relief pursuant to section 1172.75 is entitled to a full resentencing hearing. (§ 1172.75,

subd. (c); People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960.)

       In May 2022, defendant petitioned the court to eliminate the prior prison

enhancement imposed with respect to his possession of marijuana. In August, defendant

invited the trial court to exercise its discretion pursuant to section 1385 and Romero to

eliminate the prior strikes in the course of defendant’s resentencing hearing. The court

struck the prison prior. It declined, however, to strike the prior strike convictions and

sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life on court 1 and 180 days on count 2, to

run concurrently with count 1. Defendant timely noticed this appeal.

3      At the time of its enactment in January 2021, section 1170.75 was renumbered to
section 1171.1, effective June 30, 2022, with no substantive changes to the statute (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10).

                                              3
                                       DISCUSSION

       On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

Romero motion. Romero gives the trial court discretion to dismiss a defendant’s strike in

the interests of justice pursuant to subdivision (a) of section 1385 if, upon consideration

of three factors, the court deems a defendant’s conviction outside the spirit of the Three

Strikes laws. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-531; People v. Williams (1998) 17

Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).) The three factors are: (i) the nature and circumstances of

the defendant’s present felony, (ii) the defendant’s prior serious and violent felony

convictions, and (iii) the particulars of the defendant’s background, character, and

prospects. (Romero, at pp. 530-531; Williams, supra, at p. 161.)

       The trial court’s decision not to dismiss or strike a prior conviction is subject to

review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, that is, the reviewing court

must affirm unless the defendant demonstrates that the decision was so irrational or

arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33

Cal.4th 367, 375, 377.)

       Here, the trial court’s decision was not irrational or arbitrary. It properly weighed

the Romero factors and issued a detailed opinion supporting its decision to deny

defendant’s motion. As to defendant’s present felony, the court recognized that

possession of a controlled substance in prison is not a serious or violent felony and that

the law concerning marijuana had drastically changed in the last several years. But, it

also explained that the Legislature has continued to deem marijuana possession a felony

for persons who are imprisoned, who are required to register as a sex offender pursuant to

                                              4
section 290, or who have committed a super strike offense—and noted that defendant

falls within all three categories. The court noted as well that defendant’s possession of

marijuana offense took place while he was serving a very long prison sentence for

committing a horrendous crime against a child, and defendant did not take early

responsibility for the possession offense but instead was convicted after a jury trial.

       As to defendant’s prior serious and violent felony convictions, the court reviewed

the facts that he and another man had kidnapped a 15-year-old girl, then repeatedly raped

and assaulted her, and threated to bomb her house if she reported what had happened. A

jury convicted defendant of eight strikes, including five sexually violent offenses. The

court recognized the convictions took place over 30 years earlier but concluded that,

“consistent with the caselaw, they cannot be considered remote.” It noted defendant had

since been constrained in his opportunities to engage in criminal activity because of his

imprisonment but nevertheless managed to commit criminal offenses as evidenced by his

in-prison possession of marijuana for sale. The court also emphasized that five of

defendant’s strike priors are sexually violent offenses that place “defendant squarely

within a category of criminals who are to be punished even more severely than other

strikers.”

       With respect to defendant’s background, character, and prospects, the court

concluded he is “a career criminal who is unable or unwilling to conform his behavior to

that of a law-abiding citizen, even while he is incarcerated and knows he is subject to a

life sentence for the commission of any felony.” The court pointed to the facts that

defendant had been consistently engaged in criminal activity from the time he was 20

                                              5
years old, and that those crimes increased in seriousness and violence over time until his

current incarceration, which began when he was 24. And, 22 years later while still

imprisoned, he continued to engage in criminal activity as evidenced by his conviction

for possession of marijuana in an amount evidencing intent to sell.

       Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero

resentencing request because he does not come within the spirit of the Three Strikes law.

He bases that contention on the fact that his prior convictions arose from a single incident

over 30 years earlier, as well as on the notions that (i) the circumstances of his current

conviction are not egregious and, (ii) the court could not make informed findings

concerning his prospects and background because his 2012 probation report was outdated

and provided sparse information. We are not persuaded.

       The trial court’s opinion makes clear that it not only reviewed the probation report

and other information submitted by the People, but that it considered as well mitigating

factors submitted by defendant for the court’s consideration. Those factors included not

only defendant’s participation in programs while incarcerated as well as his lack of

serious in-prison rule violations (except for related to his conviction for marijuana

possession), but also numerous details about his background, childhood, parental

illnesses, the murder of his father, his educational background, his marriage, and his

children.

       In support of his claim that his case does not fall within the spirit of the Three

Strikes law, defendant attempts to distinguish his prior convictions from those in

Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, and posits his circumstances are akin to those in People

                                              6
v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490 (Garcia). There is nothing in those opinions that support

a conclusion that the trial court’s decision in this case was irrational or arbitrary.

       In Williams, our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal to

the extent it found Williams came within the spirit of the Three Strikes law and set aside

the trial court’s order vacating one of Williams’s prior convictions. (Williams, supra, 17

Cal.4th at p. 165.) The appellate court had found the trial court not only erred in not

stating the reasons for its decision, but the trial court also abused its discretion in striking

Williams’s conviction because he could not be deemed to be outside the spirit of the

Three Strikes law in view of his variety of felony convictions suffered over a period of

time 13 years earlier. (Id., at pp. 162-163.) In Garcia, our Supreme Court found the trial

court acted within the limits of its discretion to strike one of defendant’s convictions.

(Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 503.)

       The facts in defendant’s case are more similar to Williams than those in Garcia.

Here, as in Williams, defendant’s criminal history involved serious and violent crimes,

including rape, and an insufficient showing of reform or mitigating circumstances to

justify vacating his conviction. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 162-164.) On the

other hand, Garcia is readily distinguishable from defendant’s case. There, our Supreme

Court found the trial court acted within the limits of its discretion to strike a conviction

because, unlike here, Garcia’s criminal history did not include any actual violence,

Garcia had cooperated with police, and his crimes were related to his drug addiction.

(Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 503.)

                                               7
       In view of the presumption against striking prior strike convictions, the

defendant’s present and prior criminal convictions, as well as his background, character,

and prospects, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s

Romero motion.

                                     DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                RAMIREZ
                                                                                        P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
                          J.
RAPHAEL
                          J.

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