Court Opinion

ID: 9754004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:37:57.504141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:14.032677
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the court below properly granted defendant-appellee’s petition to open the default judgment entered against it. I disagree.
Appellee AMT argued that its default in filing an answer was excused because of the fact that settlement negotiations were taking place at the time, and also because of appellant’s failure to notify appellee, immediately prior to entry of the default judgment, of his intention to enter said judgment. The court below found, and the majority agrees, that appellant failed to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 237.1 in that appellant was, in this instance, under an obligation to give appellee AMT ten days written notice of appellant’s intent to enter judgment on February 25, 1980. Accordingly, the court below held that “As plaintiff [appellant] failed to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 237.1, and in light of the protracted settlement negotiations . . . AMT’s failure to file a responsive pleading could be excused.”
The record shows that the initial complaint in this case was filed May 2, 1979. Appellee AMT was served May 9, 1979. On June 12, 1979, an appearance was entered by the law firm of Sidkoff, Pincus, Greenberg and Green on behalf of both Kastner and AMT. Attorney Pincus was specifically retained by AMT’s general counsel in Boston to represent AMT. By letters of May 22 and September 21, 1979, AMT’s *175general counsel authorized Pincus to file an answer on behalf of AMT. No answer was filed, however. It appears that during this time, the parties were attempting to work out a settlement.
The record shows that on May 15, 1979, an agreement was entered into between Attorney Pincus and Attorney Reich, appellant’s attorney, which was contained in a letter from Pincus to Reich, stating in part:
This will confirm our telephone conversation of today, at which time, it was agreed . . . that you will take no action in the suit without giving to me at least ten (10) days notice prior to the taking of any such action.
By September, 1979, however, Pincus received a letter from appellant’s counsel warning that “in the event a responsive pleading is not made to the complaint on or before October 6, 1979, I shall take judgment against your clients on October 7, 1979.” On January 24, 1980, another letter was sent to appellee demanding that an answer be filed on or before February 13, 1980. No answer was filed. On February 8, 1980, Pincus advised AMT’s general counsel, Crosson, that the arrangement between the parties had broken down, and that Pincus was withdrawing as AMT’s counsel to avoid a conflict of interest between Kastner and AMT. On February 8, 1980, Sidkoff, Pincus, Greenberg and Green withdrew its appearance for AMT.1 Crosson then took steps to obtain other Philadelphia counsel for AMT. On February 25, 1980, appellant took judgment by default against AMT for failure to file a responsive pleading.
In Watts v. Jenkins, 226 Pa.Super. 469, 313 A.2d 775 (1973), the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations which proved fruitless by November 4, 1970. In December, 1970, appellee’s attorney sent certified letters to appellants notifying them that he intended to proceed to judgment. No answer was filed, and judgment by default was taken February 3, 1971. Appellants argued that their default *176could be excused on the ground that they were led to believe that no legal action would be taken while settlement negotiations were being conducted. In holding that appellants had not offered an excuse for their default, we stated:
[I]t is indisputable that after negotiations had broken down, the appellants were warned of appellee’s intention to proceed to judgment, and of the necessity of appellant’s securing counsel to protect their interests. This is clearly not a case in which appellee’s counsel lulled the appellants into a false sense of security by promises of inaction. Appellant’s failure to answer can only be attributed to a lack of diligence.
Id., 226 Pa.Superior Ct. at 470-471, 313 A.2d at 776.
Similarly, in Kennedy v. Black, 492 Pa. 397, 424 A.2d 1250 (1981), our Supreme Court held that the default could not be excused on the grounds that the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations. In Kennedy, appellee was given several chances to respond, and several extensions of time were granted. Appellant finally sent a letter stating that if no action was taken within twenty days, he would be forced to enter a default judgment. The Supreme Court held that “[wjhile settlements are clearly favored and default judgments are not, we do not believe the attempts in this case to negotiate a settlement can justify appellees’ protracted delay in the filing of an answer.” Id., 492 Pa. at 402, 424 A.2d at 1252.
Here, the parties were attempting to negotiate a settlement, but negotiations broke down by September, 1979, at which time it became clear to appellee that appellant intended to enter a default judgment if no responsive pleading was filed. In January, 1980, appellee was again warned that appellant intended to enter judgment by default against it if no answer was filed. In effect, appellee had from May, 1979, the time when it first received the complaint, to February, 1980 to file an answer, a period of eight months. Ample notice was given appellee of appellant’s intention to enter judgment. For these reasons, I would hold that appellee’s failure to appear cannot be excused here.
*177The majority also holds that appellant had failed to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 237.1. Pa.R.C.P. 237.1 requires that ten days’ notice be given prior to the filing of a praecipe for entry of default judgment. The rule also states that if a written agreement for an extension of time specifies a time within which the responsive pleading must be filed, and default occurs thereafter, then judgment may be entered without prior notice. The court below found that appellant’s letter of September 28, 1979, was uncertain with respect to fixing a date of compliance, on the ground that subsequent notices were sent after the September 28 letter and judgment was not entered until five months later. I must disagree with the court’s conclusion that appellant remained under an obligation to give appellee ten days’ written notice of his intent to enter judgment February 25, 1980.
To begin with, the September 28, 1979 letter set a specific date of compliance—October 6, 1979. Appellant’s January 24, 1980 letter also set a specific date of compliance—February 13, 1980. Default judgment was not taken until February 25, 1980, twelve days later. As a courtesy, appellant gave appellee an additional twenty days by its letter of January 24,1980, to file an answer. The fact that appellant gave appellee several opportunities to file an answer should not be used to penalize appellant.
Pa.R.C.P. 237.1 evolved from the need to regulate the conduct of attorneys who “[a]ttempt(ed) to utilize every niggling procedural point for maximum advantage.” Silver-man v. Polis, 230 Pa.Super. 366, 371, 326 A.2d 452, 455 (1974). Here, the lower court urges an application of the rule which yields the opposite result—namely, penalizing a plaintiff-creditor for being courteous by granting extensions of time. It certainly cannot be said here that appellant took a “snap” judgment, in the true sense of that term, given the length of time between the filing of the complaint and the entry of judgment by default. Accordingly, I would hold that appellant complied with both the letter and spirit of Pa.R.C.P. 237.1.
For these reasons, I must dissent.

. Although counsel withdrew, it is clear that AMT had ahead received ample notice, before the date of withdrawal, of appellant’s intent to take judgment.