Court Opinion

ID: 9394517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:07:26.486565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.637463
License: Public Domain

J-A11035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DAMON DUANE AMISON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 631 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-25-CR-0000713-2020

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DAMON DUANE AMISON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 632 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-25-CR-0003003-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                            FILED: May 15, 2023

        Damon Duane Amison (Amison) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County (trial court) in these

consolidated cases after his conviction of persons not to possess firearms,

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A11035-23

possession with intent to deliver (PWID), and related charges. He argues that

the evidence was insufficient because it failed to establish that he possessed

a “firearm” as defined by applicable law making the PWID charge

inappropriate. He also contends that the trial court erred in denying his Rule

600 motion.1 We affirm.

       We take the pertinent facts and procedural history from the trial court’s

July 14, 2022 opinion and our independent review of the record.

                                               I.

       The convictions in this matter relate to events that occurred on August

5, 2019, at and near Moe’s One Stop convenience store located at 24th and

Parade Streets in Erie, Pennsylvania. The trial court explains:

              The charges in the Information filed on December 11, 2019
       at No. 3003 of 2019 arose from [Amison]’s activities of August 5,
       2019 in the 2400 block of Parade Street, Erie, Pennsylvania when
       Appellant fled from police who were familiar with him and who had
       approached him because there was an outstanding warrant for his
       arrest. When Appellant fled from the store … he ignored police
       orders to stop; and instead ran from the police into congested
       traffic in the 2400 block of Parade Street, causing several vehicles
       to abruptly stop. After a struggle with the police which involved
       deployment of a Taser, [Amison] was arrested. [He] was charged
       with weapons and flight-related offenses as follows: Count One-
       Persons Not to Possess, Use, Manufacture, Control, Sell or
       Transfer Firearms; Count Two-Firearms Not to be Carried Without
       a License; Count Three-Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or
       Punishment; Count Four-Recklessly Endangering Another Person;
____________________________________________

1Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A)(2) provides: (2) Trial shall
commence within the following time periods. (a) Trial in a court case in which
a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365
days from the date on which the complaint is filed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2).

                                           -2-
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       Count Five-Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement; and Count
       Six-Disorderly Conduct.[a]

           18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1); 6106(a)(1); 5126(a); 2705;
         [a]

         5104; and 5503(a)(4), respectively.

             According to the Criminal Complaint of August 5, 2019
       which led to the charges at No. 3003 of 2019, review of store
       surveillance video at Moe’s One Stop depicted [that Amison]
       possessed a handgun at the time. Further review of the store
       surveillance video of August 5, 2019 also depicted [that he]
       possessed a clear plastic bag containing a white substance which
       [Amison] discarded and/or concealed inside Moe’s before he fled
       from the police. Laboratory analysis revealed the white substance
       was 14.53 grams of heroin and fentanyl.

             On May 14, 2020, the drug charges at Docket No. 713 of
       2020 ensued: Count One, Possession With Intent to Deliver
       (heroin and/or fentanyl) [(PWID)]; Count Two, Possession (heroin
       and/or fentanyl); Count Three, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia;
       and Count Four, Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.
       …[b]

         [b]35 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16) and
         780-113(a)(31)(i), [], and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4910(a)(1)[,
         respectively].

(Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 1-2).

       On January 14, 2020, Amison filed a pro se omnibus pretrial motion that

included, in pertinent part, a motion for writ of habeas corpus and/or motion

to quash/dismiss the firearms charges. (See Pro Se Omnibus Pretrial Motion,

1/14/20, at 3-5).2 On August 31, 2020, Amison filed a motion for continuance

____________________________________________

2 Our review of the docket reflects that Amison was represented by privately
retained counsel, Attorney Eric Vaughn Hackwelder, at the commencement of
the litigation. It is not clear when Attorney Hackwelder withdrew his

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of trial with a waiver of his prompt and speedy trial rights and a motion for

discovery seeking police dispatch records.       The trial court granted both

motions. On November 30, 2020, Amison filed a counseled omnibus pretrial

motion for relief/exhibits seeking the production of discovery previously

ordered and the suppression of cell phone evidence. After the Commonwealth

filed a brief, the court denied the motion. On July 19, 2021, Amison filed trial

motions and exhibits again raising, in pertinent part, the unresolved issue of

the firearms charges. The court held a hearing on the motion in which found

that the evidence was sufficient to make it a jury question and that it should

be raised in a motion for judgment of acquittal after the Commonwealth

presented its evidence.         (See N.T. Hearing, 10/20/21, at 10-13).      On

December 22, 2021, Amison filed a renewed motion to dismiss the firearms

counts, which the trial court again denied.

       On March 18, 2022, three days before trial, Amison filed a motion to

dismiss on Rule 600 grounds. On March 21, 2022, immediately before voir

dire, the parties engaged in a contentious argument on the Rule 600 motion

about who bore the responsibility for the delays. The Commonwealth argued

that they were caused in large part by Amison’s unavailability due to the

numerous pre-trial motions he repeatedly represented had to be decided

____________________________________________

representation, but Attorney Elliot Jay Segal (also privately retained) entered
his appearance on behalf of Amison on January 29, 2020.

                                           -4-
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before he could proceed. Amison relied on Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d

579 (Pa. 1999), for his argument that filing pre-trial motions did not

automatically make him unavailable for Rule 600 purposes since they did not

delay the start of trial. (See N.T., 3/21/22, at 11-26). Ultimately, the trial

court proposed deciding the issue based on the Rule 600 motion and the

Commonwealth’s brief. Amison’s counsel did not object to this suggestion.

(See id. at 26). The same day, the trial court issued an order denying the

motion. (See Order, 3/21/22).

                                       II.

       At trial, Amison testified that he was a drug addict and not a dealer. He

also asserted that the gun shown in the surveillance video was merely a BB

gun.

       Multiple officers, including Officer Strauch (who also testified at the

preliminary hearing), Officer Schroeck and Detective Suchy of the Erie Police

Vice Unit, testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. Officers Schroeck and

Strauch testified about their attempt to serve the warrant, locating the

heroin/fentanyl and their realization, after viewing the surveillance video, that

Amison had possessed and discarded a firearm, which appeared to them to

be a real gun. They explained the physical factors that made it appear to be

a semi-automatic handgun and drew inferences from the way Amison was

moving the firearm around, holding it and using it.

                                      -5-
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      Detective Suchy, a 22-year veteran of the Erie Police Department and a

member of the drug task force testified that in his expert opinion, the amount

of heroin/fentanyl in this case was consistent with PWID. He explained that

in the hundreds of drug investigations in which he had participated, he had

never seen a user possess heroin/fentanyl in the amount Amison possessed

which was more than five times the amount that he had ever seen on a user.

Detective Suchy also testified that people with that much heroin possess it

with the intent to deliver it for profit.   This was bolstered by secondary

evidence, including Amison’s possession of two cell phones, which the officers

stated is common for drug dealers.

      The detective also explained that because drug dealing occurs in a

violent setting, drug dealers typically carry firearms for their protection.

Although Amison testified that the object in his possession was a BB gun, the

detective explained that he has never seen a drug dealer with a “fake” firearm

or BB gun because they would do very little for the drug dealers who were

trying to protect their product.

      The jury convicted Amison of the foregoing charges on March 23, 2022,

and on April 25, 2022, the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of

incarceration of not less than eight nor more than sixteen years, plus

probation. Amison did not file a post-sentence motion, but he timely appealed

at the above docket numbers on May 25, 2022, and filed court-ordered

                                     -6-
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statements of errors. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This Court consolidated the

appeals sua sponte.

        On appeal, Amison claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient where

it failed to prove the item in his possession met the statutory definition of a

firearm; (2) the court erred in denying his Rule 600 motion without holding a

hearing or making findings of fact and accepting the Commonwealth’s

adjusted run date; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the

Commonwealth to argue that he should be convicted of PWID because he

possessed a firearm since it failed to prove that the item in his possession met

the legal definition of a “firearm.”

                                           III.

                                               A.

        Amison first argues that the trial court erred in denying his habeas

corpus motion to dismiss the firearms charges because the Commonwealth

failed to produce sufficient evidence that he possessed a statutorily defined

“firearm” to establish a prima facie case.          3   The Commonwealth responds that

____________________________________________

3   Pursuant to our standard of review:

        The decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus
        will be reversed on appeal only for a manifest abuse of
        discretion.... Our scope of review is limited to deciding whether a
        prima facie case was established.... The Commonwealth must
        show sufficient probable cause that the defendant committed the
        offense, and the evidence should be such that if presented at trial,
        and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing

                                           -7-
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individuals can be convicted of a firearms offense without direct evidence that

the weapon was operable because it can be established by circumstantial

evidence.

       For the purpose of a persons not to possess charge, the Crimes Code

defines “firearm” as “any weapons which are designed to or may be readily

converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 6105(i).     Possessing firearms without a license relies on the general

definition of firearm contained in Section 6102, which defines firearm based

on its size, providing in pertinent part that a firearm is “[a]ny pistol or revolver

with a barrel length less than 15 inches[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102. Under these

statutes, we have held that “[t]he Commonwealth [] need not show the

weapon to have been operable until evidence of its inoperability has been

introduced into evidence.” Commonwealth v. Horshaw, 346 A.2d 340, 342

(Pa. Super. 1975). “[A] reasonable fact finder may ... infer operability ... from

an object which looks like, feels like, sounds like, or is like a firearm ... without

____________________________________________

       the case to go to the jury. When deciding whether a prima facie
       case was established, we must view the evidence in the light most
       favorable to the Commonwealth, and we are to consider all
       reasonable inferences based on that evidence which could support
       a guilty verdict. The standard clearly does not require that the
       Commonwealth prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable
       doubt at this stage.

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 954 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 916 A.2d 633 (Pa. 2006) (citation and brackets omitted).

                                           -8-
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direct proof of operability.” Commonwealth v. Fitzhugh, 520 A.2d 424, 432

(Pa. Super. 1987) (citation omitted).      Thus, “testimony that defendant

possessed a gun allow[s] a reasonable inference of operability, despite lack of

direct testimony on this issue.” Commonwealth v. Holguin, 385 A.2d 1346,

1351 (Pa. Super. 1978).

      At the argument on the petition for writ of habeas corpus or to dismiss

the firearms charges, defense counsel argued that the photograph he attached

to Amison’s motion was inconclusive to prove Amison had a firearm or that it

was operable.     (See N.T., 10/20/21, at 11-12).        The Commonwealth

countered that the photograph was merely one still from the surveillance

videotape that contained three camera angles that clearly showed Amison was

holding a gun.    Furthermore, based on the circumstantial evidence that

Amison ran when the officers approached to serve the warrant, and he

removed the weapon that was hidden in his waistband and passed it off to

another individual who fled, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that

Amison believed the weapon was an operable firearm, which was sufficient for

the issue to at least go to trial. (See id. at 13). The court did not abuse its

discretion when it found that this issue should go to the jury and denied the

motion for writ of habeas corpus or to dismiss the firearms charges.

                                      B.

      Similarly, Amison argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for judgment of acquittal on the firearms counts at the close of the

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Commonwealth’s case because it failed to prove the operability of the

firearms.4

       Officers Strauch and Schroeck testified about their attempt to serve the

warrant, locating the heroin/fentanyl and their realization, after viewing the

surveillance video, that Amison had discarded a firearm, which appeared to

them to be a real gun. They explained the physical factors that made it appear

to be a semi-automatic handgun and drew inferences from the way Amison

was moving the firearm around, holding it and using it.         (See N.T. Trial,

3/21/22, at 77-79, 93-97, 100-04); (N.T. Trial, 3/22/22, at 24-30, 32-40, 44,

47, 52-53).

____________________________________________

4 “A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is granted only in cases in
which the Commonwealth has failed to carry its burden regarding that
charge.” Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 86 A.3d 892, 894 (Pa. Super. 2014).

       A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
       law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
       when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
       and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
       doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
       contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
       experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient
       as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court
       is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
       verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
       inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 189 A.3d 389 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis omitted).

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       The evidence also established that Amison was a drug dealer, which

tended to show that the item in Amison’s possession was an operable firearm

rather than a BB gun as he testified. Commonwealth expert Detective Suchy

of the drug task force testified, as he did at the suppression hearing, that the

amount of heroin/fentanyl was consistent with PWID in the hundreds of cases

with which he had been involved, had never seen a user possess

heroin/fentanyl in the amount Amison possessed, five times more than he had

ever seen on a user. He testified that Amison’s possession of two cell phones

is common for drug dealers, and because drug dealing occurs in a violent

setting, dealers typically carry firearms for their protection. The detective had

never seen a drug dealer with a “fake” firearm or BB gun because they would

do little for the drug dealers who were trying to protect their product.

       Because the jury could infer from the foregoing that Amison discarded

the gun because it was an operable firearm rather than a BB gun, the trial

court properly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the

Commonwealth’s case.5

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5 Amison argues that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to
argue that he was guilty of PWID because he possessed a firearm since it
failed to prove the weapon was operable. Again, this fails because the jury
could infer that Amison possessed an operable gun based on the
circumstantial evidence.

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                                               IV.

       We next consider Amison’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his

Rule 600 motion when it failed to hold a hearing, make findings of fact and

accepted the Commonwealth’s adjusted run date.6 (See Amison’s brief, at

48-66).

                                               A.

       We first address the claim that the trial court erred when it failed to hold

an evidentiary hearing to determine if an Act 600 violation occurred.          The

purpose of a Rule 600 hearing is for the parties to present factual allegations

about whether the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial and, if so,

why. See Commonwealth v. McGeth, 622 A.2d 940, 945 (Pa. Super. 1993).

Generally, failure to hold a hearing on an appellant’s speedy trial issue

requires a case to be remanded for the hearing. See Commonwealth v.

Swartz, 579 A.2d 978, 980-81 (Pa. Super. 1990). This is so because our

scope of review on appeal is “limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule

600 evidentiary hearing and the findings of the trial court.” Commonwealth

v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

6  The trial court’s rulings as to computation of time under Rule 600 are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 204
A.3d 945 (Pa. Super. 2019). “An appellate court must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hen
considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the
dual purpose behind Rule 600 … (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy
trial rights, and (2) the protection of society.” Id.

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However, if the docket entries demonstrate that the defendant was brought

to trial before the adjusted run date, then failing to hold a hearing is harmless

error. See McGeth, 622 A.2d at 945.

      Immediately before trial commenced, the parties to this matter engaged

in a contentious argument on the Rule 600 motion about who bore the

responsibility for any of the delays.    The Commonwealth argued that they

were caused in large part by Amison’s unavailability due to the numerous pre-

trial motions he repeatedly represented had to be decided before he could

proceed to trial. Amison relied on Hill, 736 A.2d 579, for his argument that

filing pre-trial motions did not automatically make him unavailable for Rule

600 purposes since they did not delay the start of trial. Instead, he maintained

that the court’s order scheduling a hearing on the motion was the date when

delay started because only once a hearing was scheduled did he become

unavailable.   (See N.T., 3/21/22, at 11-26).        Ultimately, the trial court

proposed deciding the issue based on Amison’s Rule 600 motion and the

Commonwealth’s response brief. Neither party objected. (See id. at 26).

      First, Amison has waived this argument by failing to object at trial. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).    Moreover, even if not waived, we discern no abuse of

discretion where the trial court was familiar with the protracted procedural

history, heard argument on the Rule 600 issue, and decided the matter on

this basis, thus ensuring that this Court can review the reasons for its decision.

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                                      B.

      Next, we determine if the trial court properly denied Amison’s Rule 600

motion.

      Generally, Rule 600 protects the speedy trial rights of the accused, as

well as society's interest in prosecuting crimes.   See Commonwealth v.

Watson, 140 A.3d 696, 698 (Pa. Super. 2016). The Rule mandates that a

“[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the

defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the

complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). The final day of that period is

called the “mechanical run date.” See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d

1097, 1101-04 (Pa. Super. 2007). “For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of

delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the [Commonwealth’s failure

to exercise due diligence] shall be included in the computation of the time

within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be

excluded from the computation[]” with the mechanical run date adjusted

accordingly. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added).

      The trial court may exclude time from the Rule 600 calculation if “the

delay occurred as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s

control and despite its due diligence[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. To prove it

acted with due diligence, the Commonwealth must demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that it “put forth a reasonable effort.”

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). “Where the

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Commonwealth was prepared to proceed throughout the pendency of a case,

it demonstrated that it was prosecuting the defendant’s case with due

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. 2006),

appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).

        In this case, the criminal complaint was filed in case number 3003-2019

on August 5, 2019,7 making the mechanical run date August 5, 2020.

Amison’s case went to trial on March 21, 2022, which was 593 days past the

mechanical run date.

        Most of the delay in this matter was caused by emergency judicial orders

entered in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which are not to be included

in the Rule 600 calculation. See Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 750

(Pa. Super. 2022) (Delays caused by a Covid-19 judicial emergency closure

order are not to be included in Rule 600 calculations); (see also Emergency

Judicial Order, 3/17/20, at ¶ 1);8 (Amended Emergency Judicial Order,

____________________________________________

7Amison withdrew his claim that Rule 600 precludes the prosecution of case
713-2020 because trial commenced within the mechanical run date. (See
N.T., 3/21/22, at 38).

8   The Emergency Judicial Orders direct:

        The operation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 shall be suspended in the Sixth
        Judicial District of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
        Pennsylvania, during the period of local judicial emergency. The
        time period of the duration of the judicial emergency shall be
        excluded from any time computation pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
        600. The Court finds that such delay is not chargeable to the
        Commonwealth or the Defendants.

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3/31/20); (Second Amended Emergency Judicial Order, 4/16/20); (Judicial

Order, 5/06/22). Erie County trials were cancelled from March 17, 2020, until

August 18, 2020. Although trial was scheduled for the September term, the

oldest cases were to have preference,9 which did not include Amison’s, and on

November 11, 2020, Erie County again issued emergency orders postponing

all criminal trials due to Covid-19, with trials to resume on February 8, 2021.

(See Emergency Judicial Order, 11/12/20); (Supplemental Emergency

Judicial Order, 12/21/20); (Administrative Order, 1/05/21).

       This 328-day delay was excusable since it involved “circumstances

beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence.” Martz,

232 A.3d at 810. Adding this 328-days to the mechanical run date of August

5, 2020, results in an adjusted run date of June 21, 2021. Trial commenced

on March 21, 2022, 274 days beyond this date.

____________________________________________

(Emergency Judicial Order, 3/17/20, at ¶ 1); (see also Amended Emergency
Judicial Order, 3/31/20); (Second Amended Emergency Judicial Order,
4/16/20); (Judicial Order, 5/06/22).

9In its response to the Rule 600 motion, the Commonwealth explained that it
was permitted two trials after the August “soft opening of the Courthouse”
and that it was instructed that they were to be the oldest cases involving
defendants who were being held in jail on their charges. Amison was serving
a sentence on another case at the time. (Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s
Pretrial Motion, 3/21/22, at ¶ II(a)(iv)).

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       Additionally, another 274 days has to be subtracted from the mechanical

run date because on August 31, 2020, Amison filed a continuance of the

scheduled September trial for the court to first dispose of a related motion to

suppress, which ultimately was decided on April 30, 2021. In that motion, he

waived his speedy trial rights and the court’s order reflected same.10 (Motion

for Continuance with Waiver of Prompt or Speedy Trial, 8/31/20); (Order,

9/01/20) (continuing trial “from the September 2020 trial term to the end of

the next available trial term following resolution of the pending [police

dispatch information] discovery matter” with Rule 600 expiration date “to be

recomputed pursuant to the defendant’s Rule 600 waiver”). Subtracting these

241 days from the above 274 days results in a lapse of 33 days.

       As to whether there is a valid excuse for those 33 days, the trial court,

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, explains:

            On March 21, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a Brief in
       Opposition to Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. Oral argument was
____________________________________________

10  The record also reflects that Amison filed other continuance motions in
which he waived his Rule 600 right to a prompt and speedy trial, which the
trial court granted, observing the waivers. (Motion for Continuance with
Waiver of Prompt or Speedy Trial, 3/03/20); (Order, 3/03/20) (continuing trial
until end of April 2020 term with “Rule 600 expiration to be recomputed
pursuant to the Amison’s Rule 600 waiver of time from this date until the last
date of the April 2020 trial term of court”); (Motion for Continuance with
Waiver of Prompt or Speedy Trial, 8/03/21); (Order, 8/11/21) (continuing trial
until outstanding issues resolved with Rule 600 expiration date to be re-
computed pursuant to Amison’s Rule 600 waiver); (Motion for Continuance of
Hearing/[Argument] on Defendant’s Trial Motion, 8/19/21) (stating “time will
not be charged against Commonwealth”); (Order, 8/20/21) (rescheduling
hearing to 10/20/21) (delay will not be charged against the Commonwealth
for Rule 600 purposes).

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      held on March 21, 2022.         The court concurred with the
      Commonwealth’s calculations as set forth in the Commonwealth’s
      brief, and on March 21, 2022 the court denied [Amison]’s motion.

             Contrary to [Amison]’s claims, the court determined the
      Commonwealth acted with due diligence for periods of delay
      identified in [Amison]’s motion. [Amison] filed multiple pre-trial
      motions after the original pro se and follow-up counseled omnibus
      motion was ruled upon. There were numerous e-mail exchanges
      between the Commonwealth and [Amison]’s counsel which, in the
      court’s assessment, demonstrated a conscientious and high level
      of diligence in prosecuting the case. The Commonwealth at one
      or more times requested an earlier trial date, for example, e-mails
      in January of 2022 requested rescheduling the trial from March of
      2022 to February of 2022 to accommodate a potential
      complication in the ADA’s trial schedule and the Commonwealth’s
      concomitant desire to diligently prosecute the case. In that
      instance, as one example, the court determined the time from the
      beginning of the February of 2022 trial term through the start date
      of trial, March 21, 2022, would not be held against the
      Commonwealth. The court concurred with the Commonwealth’s
      position as set forth in its brief and during argument, and denied
      [Amison]’s motion. No abuse of discretion occurred. …

(Trial Ct. Op., at 5).

      Based on the emails submitted by the Commonwealth, the trial court

found that it attempted in good faith to move the trial from March 21, 2022,

until the beginning of the February term, but Amison refused (after initially

agreeing), so the court declined to hold the approximately 48 days against the

Commonwealth for Rule 600 purposes. We discern no abuse of discretion and

based on the foregoing, there was no Rule 600 violation.

                                      C.

      Moreover, for the sake of completeness, we briefly address Amison’s

reliance on Hill, although this is not material to our disposition where we did

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not base our decision on his multiple pretrial motions and, even if we did, Hill

would not support his position.

      In Hill, the defendant filed four pre-trial motions between May 2, 1994,

and July 17, 1995, one of which was an omnibus pretrial motion that remained

pending the entire time. In considering whether Hill was “unavailable,” thus

rendering the time excludable, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed:

      [T]he mere filing of a pretrial motion by a defendant does not
      automatically render him unavailable. Rather, a defendant is only
      unavailable for trial if a delay in the commencement of trial is
      caused by the filing of the pretrial motion. If a delay is created,
      in order to establish that the delay is excludable, the
      Commonwealth must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
      evidence, that it exercised due diligence in opposing or responding
      to the pretrial motion. A delay caused by the Commonwealth’s
      lack of due diligence will not constitute excludable time.

Hill, 736 A.2d at 587 (citations omitted).

      The record in Hill reflected that the court held multiple hearings in

considering the pretrial motions and the Supreme Court observed that,

therefore, “due to Hill's filing of pretrial motions, the commencement of his

trial was delayed. In order to determine whether the delays caused by the

pretrial motions should be excluded from the Rule [600] calculation, we must

consider whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in opposing

them.” Id. at 588.

      Other than two continuance requests by the Commonwealth, it:

      attended and was prepared for each of the hearings and other
      proceedings that were conducted by the trial court throughout this
      period. Thus, other than the two instances noted above, the
      Commonwealth was duly diligent during the period between May

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      2, 1994 and July 17, 1995. Consequently, the entire period, less
      four days, constitutes excludable time.

Id. at 588.

      Similarly, here, Amison filed several pre-trial motions and the

Commonwealth exercised due diligence by responding, producing discovery

and appearing for the hearings. It explained that its failure to produce certain

items was not due to lack of diligence, but because they were not in its

possession.   The few continuances the Commonwealth did request do not

appear to have been requested in bad faith, with it ultimately offering to bring

the case to trial sooner and Amison refusing.

      We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that the

Commonwealth exercised due diligence.         Therefore, even had this Court

decided the Rule 600 issue on the basis of Amison’s multiple pre-trial motions,

under Hill, Rule 600 time would continue to run where the motions caused

delays in trial because hearings had to be scheduled.

      Viewing the foregoing in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

and recognizing the dual purpose to be served by Rule 600 to preserve an

accused’s speedy trial rights and the protection of the public, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Amison’s Rule 600 motion. See Carter,

204 A.3d at 945 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2023

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