Court Opinion

ID: 9965621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 21:03:35.76008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:19.866695
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D2024-0663
                     LT Case No. 2020-CF-374
                  _____________________________

MORRIS LEE REYNOLDS,

    Petitioner,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA and
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES,

    Respondents.
               _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Roseanne Eckert, of The Eckert Law Firm, PLLC, Orlando, for
Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Stephen R.
Putnam, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Respondent, State of Florida.

Logan Bartholomew, Assistant Regional Counsel, Orlando, for
Respondent, Department of Children and Families.

                          May 2, 2024

SOUD, J.
     Petitioner Morris Lee Reynolds, who was involuntarily
committed to the Department of Children and Families after being
found not guilty by reason of insanity of first-degree murder, seeks
a writ of habeas corpus from this Court commanding his release
from the custody of DCF and ordering the trial court to consider
outpatient treatment at an appropriate facility. We have
jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(3). As Petitioner remains mentally ill and, because of his
mental illness, remains manifestly dangerous to himself or others,
we deny the petition.

                                 I.

      In February 2020, the grand jury of Lake County, Florida
returned an indictment charging Petitioner with the first-degree
premeditated murder of Joyce Reynolds, his wife of approximately
fifty-five years. During trial, evidence was presented that
Petitioner shot his wife to death and then attempted to kill himself
by “goring” and shooting himself. Ultimately, a jury found
Petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity.

     Thereafter, the trial court held a commitment hearing as
contemplated by section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (2023), and
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.217 to consider whether to
involuntarily commit Petitioner to the custody of DCF. Among
other witnesses, two experts testified; one called by the State, and
the other called by Petitioner. Both experts agreed Petitioner was
mentally ill. Similarly, both experts testified that Petitioner’s
apparent stability at the time of the hearing was attributed to his
compliance with medications, which resulted from the significant
supervision and structure placed upon Petitioner while confined in
the jail. In a less structured environment, both experts also
believed Petitioner was at risk of non-compliance and that he
would be manifestly dangerous to himself or others in such event.
Specifically, Petitioner’s own expert testified:

       What I did have concerns about is that the lack of
       stability in his medication and not being monitored
       had led to him having difficulty being at risk to
       himself and/or others and ultimately the homicide
       and his self-inflicted wounds. And in my opinion in
       forming my conclusions, if he were not to be in a

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        situation where he is assisted in medication
        compliance and monitored such as he is being now
        that he would be at risk for an episode in which, in
        fact, he may become destabilized, and in that case,
        he would be manifestly at risk for harm to self or
        others. And so while he is not presently, I did feel
        that he would need to have that type of supervision
        so as not to be.

     Following the commitment hearing, the trial judge ultimately
entered his written Amended Order of Commitment of Defendant
Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, wherein he made detailed
factual findings. Based on those findings, the trial court concluded
Petitioner met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment
as Petitioner suffered from mental illness (permanent major
depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder), and,
because of mental illness, was manifestly dangerous to himself or
others (though he was not exhibiting those signs at the time of the
hearing because of his strictly supervised environment 1). As a
result, the trial court ordered Petitioner involuntarily committed
to the custody of DCF.

    This petition followed.

                                II.

     A petition seeking habeas relief is an appropriate vehicle to
challenge the trial court’s commitment of Reynolds following the
verdict finding him not guilty by reason of insanity. See Thurston
v. Navarro, 546 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); see also
MacNeil v. State, 586 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“Habeas
corpus is the traditional remedy used to obtain a person’s release
from an illegal order of involuntary commitment.”). We review de

    1 The trial court’s written order acknowledged that both
experts agreed that at the time of the hearing, Petitioner did not
pose a threat to himself or others. However, the trial court found
that was “because [Petitioner] is in a strictly structured
environment and his medication is closely monitored and
administered. . . . [W]ithout this structured environment and
medication regiment, [Petitioner] would pose a manifest threat to
himself or others.”

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novo a trial court’s legal conclusions concerning interpretation of a
statute. We review a trial court’s decision to commit a defendant
for abuse of discretion. In doing so, we will not disturb a trial
court’s factual findings if the findings are supported by competent
substantial evidence. See Alcazar v. State, 349 So. 3d 930, 932 (Fla.
3d DCA 2022).

    In this case, the record before us provides ample support for
the trial court’s well-reasoned decision to involuntarily commit
Reynolds to DCF.

                                  A.

     All individuals are presumed sane. See § 775.027(1), Fla. Stat.
As a result, insanity is an affirmative defense that must be raised
by a defendant in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.216. At trial, a defendant carries the burden to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he was legally insane at the
time the offense was committed. See § 775.027(2), Fla. Stat.;
Bourriague v. State, 820 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); see
also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(a). To do so, a defendant must
prove that he suffered from “a mental infirmity, disease, or
defect[,]” and that because of such condition he did not know what
he was doing or the consequences of his actions, or while knowing
what he was doing and the resulting consequences, he did not
know his conduct was wrong. See § 775.027(1), Fla. Stat. “If a
defendant introduces evidence sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt about sanity, the presumption of sanity vanishes and the
state must prove the defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Bourriague, 820 So. 2d at 998 (citing Hall v. State, 568 So.
2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1990)). If the state fails to do so, a defendant is to
be acquitted. Id. (citing Fisher v. State, 506 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla.
2d DCA 1987)).

    A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity “may be
involuntarily committed . . . if the defendant has a mental illness 2

    2 Pertinent here, “mental illness” is defined by the statute as

“an impairment of the emotional processes that exercise conscious
control of one’s actions, or of the ability to perceive or understand
reality, which impairment substantially interferes with the

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and, because of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or
herself or others.” § 916.15(2), Fla. Stat. Thus, the plain language
of this statute requires a trial court to determine two things: is a
defendant mentally ill; and, if so, is a defendant, as a result of the
illness, manifestly dangerous to himself or others. See id. Within
this statutory framework, a defendant found not guilty by reason
of insanity must demonstrate that “the conditions that led to his
acquittal have changed,” and that he is either no longer mentally
ill or no longer manifestly dangerous to himself or others. See
Tavares v State, 871 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

     If the trial court determines that a defendant satisfies these
criteria, the trial court has three options: (i) commit the defendant
to the Department of Children and Families; (ii) order outpatient
treatment at any other appropriate facility or service; or (iii)
discharge the defendant. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.217(b). In making
its determination, the trial court properly considers, inter alia,
“the evidence obtained at trial and prior reports of psychologists,
as well as any relevant evidence presented at the commitment
hearing.” Tavares, 871 So. 2d at 976 (citing State v. Vigil, 410 So.
2d 528, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)). If a trial judge determines it
appropriate to commit a defendant, DCF is statutorily compelled
to admit, retain, and treat such a defendant and provide periodic
reports as required by the statute. See § 916.15(3)(c), Fla. Stat.; see
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.218.

                                  B.

      In this case, there is competent substantial evidence
supporting the trial court’s conclusions that Reynolds is mentally
ill, and because of that illness, manifestly dangerous to himself or
others. Therefore, the trial court was well within its discretion to
commit Reynolds. 3

defendant’s ability to meet the ordinary demands of living.” §
916.106(14), Fla. Stat.
    3 As we noted in Tavares, commitment to DCF is not an
alternate means of punishing Petitioner. See Tavares, 871 So. 2d
at 977 (“An involuntary commitment of a defendant acquitted of a
crime by reason of insanity is not imposed as a punishment.”).
Rather, commitment is an available (and important) measure to

                                  5
     The experts who testified at the commitment hearing both
testified Reynolds was in fact mentally ill. As a result, the trial
judge found Reynolds mentally ill, having been diagnosed with
permanent major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress
disorder.

    The focused dispute presented for our resolution is whether
Reynolds is manifestly dangerous to himself or others. He is.

     Whether Reynolds is mentally ill, and because of that,
manifestly dangerous to himself or others, is a legal question for
the courts to resolve, not simply a medical question. See Hill v.
State, 358 So. 2d 190, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In reaching its
decision on commitment of an insane acquittee, a trial court is not
limited to one snapshot of one moment in time (at the commitment
hearing) in making its decision. Indeed, whether one is
“[m]anifestly dangerous . . . is a mixed question of ‘(t)he likelihood
of future misconduct, the type of misconduct to be expected, and
its probable frequency. . . .’” Id. at 196 (quoting Dixon v. Jacobs,
427 F.2d 589, 595 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 4

    Initially, as the trial court must evaluate, inter alia, the
evidence presented at trial, see Tavares, 871 So. 2d at 976, we first
note trial courts rightly consider the facts of the underlying case.
Here, Petitioner was charged with murdering his wife of
approximately fifty-five years and then “goring” and shooting

protect the public. As a result, the safety of the public must be
given full consideration. See § 916.15(2), Fla. Stat. (Petitioner “may
be involuntarily committed . . . if [he] has a mental illness and,
because of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself . . . or
others.”) (emphasis added).
    4 In Hill, the First District applied a likely-to-injure standard,

which is no longer applicable in cases where a defendant is found
not guilty by reason of insanity. As noted in Thomas v. State, 443
So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and discussed supra, section
916.15 makes clear the trial court must find that a defendant is
mentally ill and, because of the illness, manifestly dangerous to
himself or others.

                                  6
himself in a failed suicide attempt. At trial, Petitioner did not
dispute he shot and killed his wife; rather, he asserted the defense
of insanity. There is hardly a case that more clearly demonstrates
a manifest danger to both oneself and others. Thus, Petitioner’s
manifest danger in the past is self-evident.

     That context is relevant to the trial court’s consideration of
whether Petitioner continues to be manifestly dangerous, and
relatedly, the probability of future misconduct and the nature
thereof. There is a plethora of evidence before the trial court to
warrant Petitioner’s commitment. At the commitment hearing
both experts, including Petitioner’s expert, agreed that without the
substantial supervision and structure provided Petitioner in the
county jail that ensures his compliance with medication and
treatment, he would be a manifest danger to himself and others.
Specifically, Petitioner’s own expert testified that without such
structure and supervision Petitioner “may become destabilized,
and in that case, he would be manifestly at risk for harm to self or
others. . . . [H]e would need to have that type of supervision so as
not to be [manifestly dangerous].” This testimony is consistent with
the State’s expert who emphasized the importance and necessity
of continuing such supervision to ensure Petitioner’s stabilization
and compliance with treatment so as to contain the manifest
danger he poses to himself and others. The testimony of these two
experts alone, as well as when considered together with the other
evidence presented to the trial court, is sufficient to commit
Reynolds to DCF. See Husk v. State, 453 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984) (affirming commitment of insane acquittee where
testimony was presented that the defendant “was still a paranoid
schizophrenic, that he would definitely be dangerous if medication
ceased, and that he should remain [involuntarily hospitalized]”).
Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that Petitioner is
manifestly dangerous to himself or others.

     To hold otherwise—to require Petitioner be released from the
very structure and supervision that ensures his continued stability
and mitigates the manifest danger he presents—would be contrary
to the enactments of the Florida legislature designed to protect
innocent members of our communities from such dangerous
persons. Simply put, the law does not require, nor will it permit,
gambling the safety of our citizens by releasing into alternative
settings insane acquittees who, in the absence of proper and

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needed supervision, are manifestly dangerous to themselves or
others.

                                III.

     Accordingly, as Petitioner remains mentally ill and, because
of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or others, the
petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

    It is so ordered.

JAY and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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