Court Opinion

ID: 9673967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:19.245334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.021339
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
Mr. Chief Justice Hickman
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In compliance with respondents’ motion for rehearing we add this statement to our original opinion in the interest of clarity. The word “void” as used in the statutes has various shades of meaning. It is rarely used in the sense of implying an absolute nullity. The true sense in which it is used is to be determined from a consideration of the statute as a whole in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished by its enactment. Wiener v. Zwieb, 105 Texas 262, S. W. 771 and 147 S.W. 867; Southern National Insurance Company of Austin v. Barr, 148 S. W. 845; 67 C. J. 263 et seq. As thus considered, we think the word was not used in the statute under review in its strictest sense.
Section 5a (e) of Article 911b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil *313Statutes, which is a part of the Specialized Motor Carrier amendment, provides:
“Except where otherwise provided, applications for and holders of certificates of public convenience and necessity, as provided for in this Section, shall be subject to all of the provisions of the Act relating to common carriers by motor vehicles.”
The only procedure prescribed by the statute for attacking orders issued to common carriers is that provided in Section 20, Article 911b. That method is by direct attack. The Specialized Motor Carrier amendment provides no other method of attack. It appears that the Legislature intended that orders entered under the terms of that amendment, like the one involved in this case, may be attacked only as provided in Section 20, Article 911b. The use of the word “void” in the statute affects the manner of making proof in a direct attack. Failure to follow the provisions of Section 5a (d) makes the order invalid on its face, and no further proof of invalidity is required: whereas, the party attacking an order issued to a common motor carrier has the burden of showing that the order is unreasonable or unjust as to him. It is our view that the order under review is not absolutely void and subject to collateral attack.
As stated in our original opinion, the question is procedural. If the Commission has- determined the facts upon which - the validity of an order depends, its error in.failing to.set out its findings in the order is not of that fundamental nature which absolutely nullifies , the proceeding.
Except to the extent indicated above, the motion for rehearing is overruled. • •
Réhearing overruled June 20, 1951.