Court Opinion

ID: 9781429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:37:34.020729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.384834
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(concurring):
126 I wholeheartedly agree with the majority opinion, and write only to highlight my principal difficulty with the State's position. Under the State's view, the penalties associated with the dangers posed by drug use are stood on their head. A pedestrian arrested with a controlled substance in their blood-regardless of their activities at the time of the arrest-would be subject to a greater penalty than someone arrested for driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in their blood. See Utah Code Ann. §§ (20083); 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) (1998). The State argues that the legislature intended this result and that the legislature has the right and the authority to make this distinction. I agree that the legislature has both the right and the authority. But, in the absence of an express legislative statement supporting the State's position, we should avoid drawing problematic conclusions. See Rowley v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, 519 (1947) (stating " 'a purpose to disregard sound public policy must not be attributed to the lawmaking power, except upon the most cogent evidence, and it is the duty of the courts to render such an interpretation of the laws as will best promote the protection of the public " (citation omitted));1 Department of Human Servs. v. B.R., 2002 UT App 25, ¶ 9, 42 P.3d 390 (accepting parenthetically that "following the literal statutory wording is not required when to do so would defeat legislative intent and make the statute absurd" (quotations and citation omitted)).
127 Here, adopting the State's position would lead to the absurd result that the unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a felony, would become a lesser-included offense of driving with any measurable amount of a controlled substance in the *758blood, a misdemeanor. Moreover, in those cases not involving a vehicle, the State's position amounts to imposing a greater penalty upon a sleeping, standing, or walking defendant who is in possession through presence in the blood, than upon a driver who is actively endangering others by operating a potentially deadly vehicle with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the blood. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs creates a grave public safety concern, and the mayhem that results from it is one that the legislature clearly intends to punish harshly. -It makes little sense to treat an offender who has prohibited drugs in his bloodstream less seriously if he moves behind the wheel of a vehicle, than if he merely chooses to walk to his destination. Adopting the State's position would create just such a result.
1] 28 Accordingly, I concur.

. In further support of this principle, the Rowley court also stated:
We have not overlooked the legal principle that if the intent of the legislature is by the statute made clear and certain, even though we may believe the legislation absurd and undesirable, we cannot substitute the judgment of the court for the judgment of the legislature. On the other hand, when the legislative intent is not clear and certain, and a literal interpretation of the language of the statute gives an absurd result, then the court is justified in searching the enactment for further indications of legislative intent.
Rowley v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, 519-20 (1947). Here, the majority has ably divined the legislative intent underlying the statute, and in doing so has avoided an otherwise absurd result.