Court Opinion

ID: 9893010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 19:03:59.966867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:45.911094
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/25/23 P. v. Valladares CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080081

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. FSB19002514)

BENJAMIN VALLADARES,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Harold T. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Affirmed with instructions to correct
the judgment.
         William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and
Steve Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      A jury convicted Benjamin Valladares of two counts of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a child age 10 or under (Pen. Code, § 288.7,
subd. (a); counts 1 & 2) and two counts of forcible lewd or lascivious acts upon
a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 3 & 4). The
court sentenced him to a prison term of 16 years plus 50 years to life. Prior
to trial, the court ruled to allow evidence of Valladares’ prior acts of, and his
two convictions for, felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)) pursuant
to Evidence Code section 1109, which allows evidence of past domestic
violence to show propensity for committing charged acts involving domestic
violence.
      On appeal, Valladares contends that evidence was inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1108, which allows evidence of past sexual offenses to
show propensity for committing charged sexual offenses. As a result, he
claims the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury using
CALCRIM No. 1191A, the pattern instruction on section 1108 evidence.
Valladares further contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to
instruct the jury that simple battery is a lesser included offense of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a child age 10 or younger.
      As we explain below, we first conclude the trial court properly admitted
Valladares’ prior uncharged offenses under Evidence Code section 1109 and
did not err in instructing the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM
No. 1191A. Second, we determine the evidence did not warrant an
instruction on battery as a lesser included offense of counts 1 and 2; thus, any
failure to so instruct was not erroneous. We therefore affirm.

                                        2
                                BACKGROUND
                                       I.
      In July 2020, Valladares was charged with two counts of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with his daughter A.L., a child age 10 or under (Pen.
Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), and two counts of forcible lewd or
lascivious acts upon A.L., a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (b)(1); counts 3 & 4).
      Before trial and over Valladares’ objection, the trial court ruled to allow
evidence of Valladares’ prior physical abuse of children in his care and the
resulting conviction under Evidence Code section 1109, finding the evidence’s
probative value outweighed any prejudice.
                                       II.
                                       A.
      Consistent with the court’s pretrial ruling, at trial the People offered
evidence of Valladares’ prior acts of child abuse.
      A.L. testified that in May 2017, she was at home with Valladares, her
cousin M.L., and her four siblings, who at the time were all living with
Valladares’ mother in Desert Hot Springs. A.L. heard the baby, who was in
the bedroom with Valladares, cry, followed by a “spanking” noise. She then
saw Valladares exit the bedroom and slap her younger sister in the face, hard
enough that she fell into a cabinet and onto the floor. Next, A.L. saw
Valladares punch M.L. twice in the stomach, slap her in the face, and grab
her by the hair. Finally, Valladares approached A.L. and said, “I forgot . . .
about hitting you.” Although her recollection was “kind of blurry,” she
recalled he slapped her hard in the face more than once, leaving a mark.
      The next day, A.L. told her teacher, and police officers and social
workers came to her house that evening. A.L. feared Valladares might hit

                                        3
her and the other children if she talked; however, she told one of the police
officers what happened, that the abuse had started a couple years prior, and
that “[t]he way he was hitting [them]” was “getting worse.” On the stand, she
said Valladares would hit her and the other children “every week.” A.L.’s
younger sister generally corroborated A.L.’s account.
      Over the defense’s objection, the trial court permitted the People to
play the audio recording of A.L.’s contemporaneous police interview. The
recorded interview and the interviewing officer’s testimony were largely
consistent with A.L.’s testimony. The court also admitted stipulations about
Valladares’ (1) June 30, 2017 conviction under Penal Code section 273d,
subdivision (a) “of two separate counts of felony child abuse . . . , to wit,
[A.L.], age 9, and to wit, [M.L.], age 10,” and (2) resulting time in custody.
                                         B.
      The People also presented evidence of the charged sexual offenses.
      The alleged sexual abuse happened over a one-week period sometime in
the fall of 2018, when A.L. was ten years old. At that time, A.L. and her
siblings were living in San Bernardino with Valladares, Valladares’ partner,
his partner’s mother and stepfather, his partner’s grandmother and her son,
and the partner’s parents’ nephew, who A.L. called her “cousin,” in a two-
bedroom mobile home. Children and Family Services (CFS) received a
referral related to A.L. and her siblings in August 2018. Leah Zipperstein, a
lead social service practitioner at CFS, visited the home several times, first
on September 7, 2018, as part of the investigation. On November 30, 2018,
CFS removed the children from the home for “general neglect,” and A.L. and
her sisters were placed together in a foster home in Barstow.
      A.L.’s foster mother was the first person she told about the alleged
sexual abuse. On February 22, 2019, over about 45 minutes, an emotional

                                         4
A.L. described two specific incidents before she began crying harder and her
foster mother suggested they talk to CFS.
      A.L. next talked about Valladares’ alleged sexual abuse with
Zipperstein, about one week later at the CFS office. Zipperstein spoke with
A.L. and her siblings because they knew her from the prior CFS
investigation. A.L. described four incidents of sexual abuse. After
interviewing the other children, CFS referred A.L. and her family to the
Children’s Assessment Center (CAC).
      The third time A.L. recounted the abuse was during a March 14, 2019
forensic interview at the CAC that lasted roughly one and one-half hours. A
forensic interviewer spoke directly with A.L., while two social workers,
including Zipperstein, and a detective from the San Bernardino Police
Department observed behind a two-way mirror. A video of the CAC interview
was admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial. The charged
counts correspond, in reverse order, with the incidents discussed during the
CAC interview.
      A.L. did not talk about the sexual abuse again until late August 2021,
when she testified at Valladares’ trial. On the stand, A.L. testified to three
specific incidents.
      Across these recountings, A.L. described five separate times Valladares
sexually abused her.
                                       1.
      The first incident A.L. described during the CAC interview corresponds
with charge 4 of the information. A.L. told the forensic interviewer she and
her siblings had been at the park, but she went home because it was hot. Her
cousin was watching television in the living room when Valladares called her
into the bathroom.

                                       5
      Valladares was showering when A.L. entered the bathroom. He told
her to close the bathroom door, pull her pants down, and bend over. She did.
He was still in the shower with the water running. He stood behind her and
put his “private” “between [her] private and [her] behind.” A.L. thought he
“[t]ried to put it in [her] behind,” which she later clarified was “the butthole,”
but he did not do so.
      Afterward, she left the bathroom. Once Valladares exited, she went
back in and cleaned “[her] behind and [her] private,” because “[she] didn’t
think it felt right[,] what he did[.]” While cleaning herself, A.L. saw “a little
bit of[ ] . . . discharge,” “clearish liquid . . . [i]n [her] private” and nowhere
else. She “d[id]n’t think it[ was] from [her] dad’s private part.”
      A.L.’s testimony in court about this first incident was generally
consistent. She added some additional details—for example, that she asked
Valladares what he was calling her for before she entered the bathroom. She
also provided some details that differed—for example, that she was in the
kitchen rather than the hall when he called her. The pith of the account,
however, remained the same. A.L.’s account was further corroborated by
Zipperstein, who testified that A.L. relayed essentially the same facts to her
in February 2019.
                                          2.
      The second incident A.L. described during the CAC interview
corresponds with charge 3 of the information. The second incident happened
“the next day,” when A.L. was home because she “didn’t wanna go to the
park.” She thought her brother may have been sleeping, but aside from him,
she and Valladares were alone in the house. Once again, Valladares called
her name while he was in the shower and told her to enter the bathroom,
which she did. Then “he did the same thing” as before.

                                          6
      Although A.L. did not testify about this incident during trial, she
relayed essentially the same facts to Zipperstein in February 2019.
                                        3.
      The third incident A.L. described during the CAC interview
corresponds with charge 2 of the information. When asked if anything went
“in the hole,” A.L. replied, “The third time he did it.”
      According to A.L., Valladares was in the shower again, with the sliding
door ajar. She was standing in front of the shower. Valladares told her to
bend over and pull her pants down. Then “he tried to put his private part in
[her] butthole[.]” When the forensic interviewer asked A.L. to tell her more
about that, A.L. said that she felt “something kinda go in,” and it “felt
wrong,” because “nothing really goes inside . . . , it comes out instead.” She
said the “something” “felt . . . soft but hard.” After Valladares exited the
shower, A.L. cleaned both her “private” and her “behind” with toilet paper.
“[T]here was a little bit of blood” when she wiped.
      At trial, Zipperstein agreed generally that A.L. had told her about
“three similar incidents,” but the People did not specifically question her
about penetration.
      A.L. did not testify about this incident at trial. She could not recall this
incident on the stand, even after reviewing the transcript of the CAC
interview, but she explained she remembered everything better at the time of
the interview and had told the forensic interviewer everything at the time.
                                        4.
      The fourth incident A.L. described during the CAC interview
corresponds with charge 1 of the information. A.L. said this incident “was
different” from the others.

                                         7
      A.L. and her siblings were playing games in the house when Valladares
called A.L. into the bathroom. No other adult was at home at the time.
When A.L. entered the bathroom, she found Valladares hiding behind the
bathroom door. He closed the door and told A.L. to lay down and pull down
her pants. She laid on her back and saw he had no pants on. A.L. said
Valladares’ “private part” looked “kinda like . . . a stick,” and “was kinda long
and . . . a dark peach color, like a dark color[,]” with black hair, and it moved
around “[a] little bit” and “was like wiggly or something[,]” with a pink tip.
      When A.L. provided a brief overview of all four incidents at the
beginning of the CAC interview, she first said Valladares “tried” to put “his
private part” in her “private part”. When the CAC interviewer asked her to
describe everything she could recall about the fourth incident, however, A.L.
said Valladares got “on his knees and he put his private part in [hers].” A.L.
“closed [her] eyes” because she “didn’t wanna look,” “didn’t wanna see him.”
She said “when he was trying to put it in my thingy . . . like I don’t know if
there’s a hole in me, um it hurt . . . . It really hurt bad.” The forensic
interviewer confirmed that Valladares’ “private part” was his penis, and that
A.L.’s “private part” was what A.L. said was her “va-jay-jay[,] but it’s called a
vagina.” When the forensic interviewer asked if A.L. “actually fe[lt] anything
go in the hole,” she replied, “Mmm I think my dad’s private part.” She said
“he kept trying to put it in,” and “[i]t would hurt but [she] wouldn’t say
anything,” because she “was scared.”
      Valladares stopped when A.L.’s little sister knocked on the closed
bathroom door and said the baby “was acting up.” Valladares said “he’d be
out in a little bit”; A.L. did not think her younger sister knew she was in the
bathroom, too. Valladares got up and told A.L. to pull her pants up. She
stood up and some “greyish stuff came out of [her] private part.” Valladares

                                        8
cleaned it off the floor with toilet paper. She saw “[a] little bit” of the grey
stuff “at the tip” of Valladares’ penis, which he cleaned off. Valladares gave
A.L. some toilet paper to clean herself with, washed his hands, told her not to
tell anybody, and left.
      A.L. went to the kitchen but later returned to the bathroom to clean
herself. There was “a little bit” of blood, and her “private part hurt [her] a
little bit” when she wiped. She said it was “cuz [her] dad put his in there [sic]
and . . . I don’t know what he was doing that hurt me because I closed my
eyes.” A.L. “was kinda bleeding when [she] walked.”
      In court, A.L. testified about this incident as the “third time” her father
sexually abused her. As with the first incident, her trial testimony was
largely consistent with her CAC interview. As before, she recalled and
testified about additional details. For example, she said she and her siblings
were playing a video game in Valladares’ bedroom when he called her, and
she did not go the first time he called because she “was afraid of the same
thing that he was going to do.” She also testified that the pain was an 8 on a
scale of 1 to 10 and that the “gray liquid” was different from the discharge
she saw after the first incident.
      There were some details A.L. could not remember about this incident
by time of trial. For instance, while she recalled telling the forensic
interviewer that her father had put his penis inside her, she had no memory
of it actually happening. The overarching facts and details were consistent
with what she described in her CAC interview, however, both Zipperstein and
A.L.’s foster mother corroborated A.L.’s account as consistent with what she
told them in February 2019. Zipperstein confirmed that A.L. told her that
Valladares’ penis penetrated her “vajayjay.”

                                         9
                                        5.
      At trial, A.L. described a fifth, uncharged incident when asked about
the “second time” Valladares sexually abused her. A.L. could not recall
whether anyone else was home. Valladares again called her into the
bathroom, and when she entered, he was in the shower. He told her to take
off her clothes, close her eyes, and get in the shower. A.L. was scared
Valladares would hit her, so she obeyed.
      The water was on. Valladares picked A.L. up and “was trying to do the
same thing he did to [her] when he told [her] to bend over.” He held her with
her arms around his neck, her legs around his waist, and her body facing his.
Valladares was trying to “put it in something,” but A.L. “d[id]n’t know how to
explain it.” She “d[id]n’t know exactly what he was doing,” but it hurt, an 8
on a scale of 1 to 10. She compared the pain to a time when she fell off the
monkey bars and a ladder hit her between her legs, making her bleed. At
some point, Valladares’ partner’s mother knocked on the door and said she
had to use the bathroom. Valladares said something, but A.L. kept quiet.
The woman then “said she couldn’t hold it” and left the house. Afterward,
Valladares cleaned himself and told A.L. to do the same.
      A.L.’s foster mother testified that A.L. told her about this incident in
February 2019. And during the CAC interview, A.L. told the forensic
interviewer that “one of the [times] . . . [her] dad was doing that to [her],”
Valladares’ partner’s mother knocked on the door but left because “she
couldn’t hold it.”
                                        C.
      The People presented evidence to explain the differences between the
reports A.L. gave in 2019 and her testimony at trial two and one-half years
later. Namely, the forensic interviewer from A.L.’s CAC interview testified

                                        10
that the purpose of such an interview is “to obtain as much detail as possible
about the alleged abuse in the child’s own words”; accordingly, forensic
interviewers are trained to use open-ended questions. She explained that
trauma affects children in different ways. Some children cope by “block[ing]”
memories, making them harder to recall over time and causing details to
fade. Such children may recount memories in fragments or non-sequentially
and may remember certain things at one time but not another.
       The forensic interviewer also testified that it is “very difficult” for
children who have experienced trauma to remember events chronologically.
It is common for such children not to know the day, date, or time of day
events happened.
                                         D.
       The People did not present any physical evidence of abuse at trial. The
forensic nurse clinician who conducted A.L.’s forensic medical examination at
the CAC on March 11, 2019, testified that most children seen at the CAC
were abused weeks or even years prior. In her experience, children under 12
delay reporting abuse approximately 70% of the time. Because most physical
evidence, like DNA, is gone within a week, the CAC usually does not collect
any.
       In the forensic nurse’s experience, even if a child reports abuse right
away, the exam will be “normal”—showing no physical sign of abuse—
roughly 50% of the time, and about 90% of exams are “normal” in children
who delay reporting. “Abnormal” findings, meanwhile, would include
sexually transmitted infections or tears or abrasions to the hymen or genital
area. To illustrate her point, she discussed a scientific study involving 36
pregnant teenagers. Despite confirmed penetration, only two exams showed
any physical signs of penetration; the rest were “normal.”

                                         11
      A female child who has been vaginally penetrated and experienced
some physical trauma typically experiences pain during penetration and for a
variable time afterward. Unless trauma is significant, however, signs of
injury are unlikely after five or six days, as the genital area “heals very, very
quickly and very, very well.” There may be no injury at all if the child’s
hymen is estrogenized or if the penetration was interlabial, as it is “the
majority of times.” The anal region is also “very stretchy,” so it is not
uncommon for anal penetration to cause no injuries. In the forensic nurse’s
experience, if a child reports pain and bleeding, it is “symptom-specific” to
penetration or trauma to the genital area and would signify injury.
      When she examined A.L., the forensic nurse took a brief history. A.L.
relayed that her father had “touched her private part with his private part,”
that it hurt and there was some bleeding, and that he touched “her butt part
with his private part.” In response, the nurse conducted both vaginal and
anal genital exams. A.L.’s hymen was estrogenized and she had a normal
exam “consistent with her history.” The nurse testified that A.L.’s
description of pain and bleeding was consistent with the alleged abuse.
                                       III.
      The defense case focused on undermining A.L.’s credibility.
      The defense highlighted inconsistencies between A.L.’s accounts. For
example, A.L. told the forensic interviewer that the incidents happened day
after day, but on the stand she testified that the incidents occurred every
other day. Counsel noted that A.L. testified that Valladares’ partner’s
grandmother and her son were always home, a detail she omitted during the
CAC interview when asked who was home during the incidents. Relatedly,
Valladares’ partner’s stepfather testified that he or his mother-in-law and

                                       12
wife’s brother, who were always home, would have heard if Valladares had
called out to A.L. from the bathroom like she claimed.
      The defense also pointed out instances of “leading questions” the
forensic interviewer used when A.L. mentioned “think[ing]” Valladares had
touched her in a certain way.
      In addition, the defense sought to call into question A.L.’s description of
Valladares’ penis. An investigator shared photographs of Valladares’
genitalia, showing his penis was uncircumcised and had a scar on the
underside—two distinctive details not mentioned by A.L. The investigator,
however, took no photographs of Valladares’ erect penis, as A.L. would have
seen it.
      The defense also cross-examined A.L.’s younger sister, who testified
that A.L. would lie to protect her. On redirect, the sister explained, as an
example, that once when Valladares’ partner’s mother got angry at her for
making food, A.L. said it was her idea so she would get in trouble instead.
                                       IV.
                                       A.
      After the defense rested, the court and parties discussed proposed jury
instructions. The full discussion was not on the record.
      As relevant here, all agreed to instruct with CALCRIM No. 1127
(sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child age 10 or younger) for the
elements of counts 1 and 2. There was no reported discussion of any lesser
included offenses for those charges.
      Everyone also agreed to instruct with CALCRIM No. 1111 (forcible
lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14) for the elements of
counts 3 and 4. All further agreed to instruct the jury on two lesser included
offenses for those charges: (1) attempted forcible lewd act upon a child under

                                       13
age 14 in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 288, subdivision (b)(1),
which they added after an off-the-record discussion; and (2) a lewd act upon a
child under age 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a).
      In addition, the court and parties discussed the People’s proposed
instruction under CALCRIM No. 1191A (evidence of uncharged sex offenses).
Defense counsel objected to the instruction because it addressed evidence of
prior uncharged sex offenses for use as propensity evidence in cases charging
sex offenses under Evidence Code section 1108. The court allowed the
instruction over defense counsel’s objection.
                                       B.
      The jury received instructions consistent with this discussion. Among
the instructions given were: CALCRIM No. 220, confirming Valladares was
presumed innocent unless the People proved his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; CALCRIM No. 301, instructing that a single witness’ testimony can
prove a fact; CALCRIM No. 303, reminding the jury evidence admitted for a
limited purpose was to be considered for only that purpose and no other;
CALCRIM No. 359, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict;
CALCRIM Nos. 1127 and 1111, specifying the elements of the charged
offenses and reminding the jury that the People must prove those elements;
Penal Code section 664 and CALCRIM No. 1110, specifying the lesser
included offenses for counts 3 and 4; CALCRIM No. 1190, providing that
“[c]onviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a
complaining witness alone”; the People’s modified version of CALCRIM
No. 1191A, permitting the jury to consider the prior felony child abuse as
propensity evidence for the charged sexual offenses; and CALCRIM No. 822,
providing the elements of felony child abuse the jury had to find proven by a

                                      14
preponderance of the evidence before they could consider it for the limited
purpose of propensity.
                                         V.
      In closing, the People focused on the consistencies between A.L.’s
descriptions of the sexual abuse over time. As to the evidence of prior child
abuse, the People stated: “Evidence Code 1109 says that you can find that a
person who commits physical acts of violence against children is more likely
to commit sexual acts of violence against them.” The People also stated: “If
you find that the defendant committed that act of child abuse, and I submit
to you he was convicted of it, then you can find it was more likely that he
committed this act of sexual violence.” Defense counsel objected but was
overruled. In total, the People’s argument lasted roughly two and one-half
hours.
      Defense counsel, in closing argument, summarized Valladares’ defense
as follows: “The truth never changes, but lies do[.] . . . [A.L.] lied to you.”
Counsel contended, “You have two possible conclusions in this case. One,
[Valladares] molested his daughter [A.L.]; two, . . . he did not and . . . she . . .
lie[d] to you.”
      To support this theory, defense counsel again emphasized the
inconsistencies in A.L.’s various recountings of the alleged sexual abuse. In
so doing, counsel compared what A.L. said happened the “first time” on the
stand against what she said happened the “first time” during all prior
retellings, and did the same with the second, third, and fourth times. For
example, defense counsel noted that the second incident A.L. described to
Zipperstein happened outside the shower while she was bending over, but the
second incident she described on the stand and to her foster mother happened
inside the shower while Valladares was holding her.

                                         15
      Defense counsel also addressed the Evidence Code section 1109
propensity evidence. She asked the jury to “use [their] common sense” to find
that parents who “discipline” their children “are not automatically inclined to
pick one of their children” and sexually abuse them over “a random four
days.” The defense characterized these two categories of events as “two
different extremes.”
                                      VI.
      After deliberating for approximately one and one-half hours and
without submitting any questions, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all
four charged counts.
      On November 30, 2021, the trial court sentenced Valladares to a
determinate sentence of 16 years on counts 3 and 4 and an indeterminate
sentence of 50 years to life on counts 1 and 2. The abstract of judgment
specifies that the sentence for count 4 is 8 years and “006” months, although
the total sentence imposed is correctly noted to be 66 years.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Valladares appeals on two grounds. First, he contends that the
uncharged acts of child abuse were inadmissible under Evidence Code
section 1108; thus, the court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury with a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 1191A. Second, he argues that the court
prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that simple
battery is a lesser included offense of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a
child age 10 or younger. As explained below, we disagree with both
arguments.

                                       16
                                         I.
                                        A.
      We first address Valladares’ claim that the propensity evidence was
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1108, as this argument underlies
his claim that the contested instruction was erroneous.
                                        1.
      Generally, “evidence of specific instances of [a person’s] conduct[ ] . . . is
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”
(Evid. Code, § 1101.) There are, however, two exceptions relevant here.
      First, under Evidence Code section 1108, if the defendant is accused of
a sexual offense, evidence of his or her commission of one or more other
sexual offenses is admissible to establish propensity. (Evid. Code, § 1108,
subd. (a).) A “sexual offense” is a crime under state or federal law involving
conduct identified in specified sections of the Penal Code. (See id., subd. (d)).
CALCRIM No. 1191A is used when evidence is admitted under section 1108.
      Second, under Evidence Code section 1109, if the defendant is accused
of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of his or her commission of
other acts of domestic violence is admissible to establish a propensity for
domestic violence. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)). CALCRIM No. 852A is
used for section 1109 evidence.
      Even if admissible under one of these sections, a court may still exclude
the evidence if it decides the probative value is “substantially outweighed” by
the likelihood it will unduly consume trial time or creates a “substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.)

                                        17
                                        2.
      Valladares argues evidence of his prior acts of felony child abuse is
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1108. This is true. Felony child
abuse under Penal Code section 273d is not a “sexual offense” under Evidence
Code section 1108. (See Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (d).)
      That is inconsequential here, however, as the trial court admitted the
evidence under Evidence Code section 1109. The court could admit
Valladares’ prior acts of felony child abuse here because the charged sexual
offenses “involv[ed] domestic violence” under section 1109. (People v. Poplar
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1138 (Poplar).)
      Evidence Code section 1109 defines “domestic violence” as either (1) the
definition set forth in section 13700 of the Penal Code, or (2) subject to a
hearing under Evidence Code section 352, the definition set forth in
section 6211 of the Family Code if the act occurred no more than five years
prior to the charged offense. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (d)(3)). “Abuse”
encompasses intentionally causing bodily injury to another. (Pen. Code,
§ 13700, subd. (a).) Family Code section 6211 defines domestic violence as
“abuse” against various persons, including “[a] cohabitant” per Family Code
section 6209, “[a] child of a party,” or “[a]ny other person related by
consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.” (Fam. Code, § 6211,
subds. (b), (e) & (f).)
      First, Valladares’ prior felony child abuse is “evidence of [his]
commission of other domestic violence” under Evidence Code section 1109,
subdivision (a)(1). Felony child abuse, which is “cruel or inhuman corporal
punishment or an injury resulting in a traumatic condition” upon a child,
qualifies as abuse. (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a).) That abuse happened in
May 2017, less than two years before Valladares’ charged offenses. (Evid.

                                       18
Code, § 1109, subd. (d)(3)). Finally, the persons abused fall under Family
Code section 6211. A.L. and her siblings, as Valladares’ children, are covered
by subdivisions (e) and (f), and M.L. is covered under subdivision (b) as a
cohabitant because she “regularly reside[d]” in the house at the time of the
abuse. (Fam. Code, § 6209.)
      Second, the crimes with which Valladares was charged are “offense[s]
involving domestic violence.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
Lewd or lascivious acts by a caretaker on a dependent under 14 accomplished
“by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the victim” constitute “abuse” under Penal Code
section 13700, subdivision (a), and thus “domestic violence” under Evidence
Code section 1109. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(2).) Likewise, sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger intentionally
causes bodily injury per Penal Code section 13700, subdivision (a), and thus
is abuse constituting domestic violence. (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a).)
Other courts have admitted evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence
under section 1109 in cases charging sexual offenses. (See Poplar, supra,
70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 [affirming admission of evidence of prior domestic
violence to show propensity for rape, “a higher level of domestic violence”];
People v. Trujillo Garcia (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1332-1336 [finding
admissible evidence of violation of domestic violence restraining order
subsequent to charged rape and rejecting defendant’s claim that such “acts do
not reflect a tendency toward sexually assaultive behavior”].)
      Accordingly, evidence of Valladares’ prior domestic violence was
admissible under Evidence Code section 1109 unless its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the possibility of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code,
§ 352.) Here, the trial court repeatedly found this evidence did not violate

                                       19
Evidence Code section 352, and Valladares does not argue on appeal this
exercise of discretion was erroneous.
      We therefore conclude evidence of Valladares’ prior acts of domestic
violence, while inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1108, was properly
admitted under Evidence Code section 1109.
                                        B.
      We next address whether the given propensity instruction was
erroneous. We review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly states the
law, looking at the instructions and trial record as a whole and considering
the challenged instruction in that context. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th
193, 218; People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 680.) Where reasonably
possible, we interpret the instructions to support the judgment. (People v.
Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 825.)
      Valladares contends that, because the uncharged prior acts of felony
child abuse were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1108, the trial
court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1191A, the
corresponding propensity instruction for uncharged sex offenses. The People
concede that the prior acts were not “sexual offenses” and thus the court
erred in using CALCRIM No. 1191A rather than CALCRIM No. 852A, the
propensity instruction for uncharged domestic violence that corresponds with
Evidence Code section 1109. We, however, reject Valladares’ argument and
decline to accept the People’s concession, as we conclude the given instruction
was a correct and non-erroneous statement of law. (People v. Alvarado (1982)
133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1021 [appellate court not bound by Attorney General’s
concession].)
      As explained ante, the challenged propensity evidence was properly
admitted, as Evidence Code section 1109 allows the permissive inference that

                                        20
a defendant who has committed acts of domestic violence, like felony child
abuse, is more likely to commit further and escalated acts “involving
domestic violence,” a phrase courts have construed broadly. (Evid. Code,
§ 1109, italics added.) In Poplar, for example, evidence of a defendant’s prior
physical altercations with two former partners was properly admitted in a
case charging him with forcible rape of a third partner. (See Poplar, supra,
70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1138-1139.) The Poplar court rejected the claim that
there was “‘no logical disposition toward committing rape based on a prior
physical hassle or verbal contest between domestic partners’” because the
charged offense, rape, involved domestic violence, albeit at “a higher level.”
(Ibid.)
      Here, the permissive inference of propensity is even more logical than
that in Poplar. The charges against Valladares involved one of the same
victims as the prior acts. The prior acts happened fewer than two years
before the charged offenses. Following the 2017 child abuse, A.L. told the
police she thought the abuse would continue to escalate, which she reaffirmed
on the stand. On this record, the inference that Valladares’ prior felony child
abuse predisposed him to committing further and escalated acts of domestic
violence, including sexual offenses against children, was logical. Thus, a
propensity instruction was warranted to guide the jury as to the permissible
use of the evidence properly before it.
      And here, the given instruction correctly stated the applicable law as
interpreted by Poplar. Like CALCRIM No. 852A, the given instruction
allowed the jury to infer propensity to commit the charged offenses based on
other uncharged acts. The given, modified instruction merely made explicit
CALCRIM No. 852A’s implicit and allowable inference that the jury could
consider Valladares’ commission of prior acts of domestic violence—the 2017

                                          21
child abuse—in deciding if he was predisposed to commit a higher form of
domestic violence—the charged sexual offenses. Further, the given
instruction, like CALCRIM No. 852A, informed the jurors that: (1) they
should disregard the child abuse evidence if the People failed to prove it by a
preponderance of the evidence; (2) they could, but did not have to, draw the
permissive inference; (3) should they conclude Valladares committed the 2017
child abuse, that fact is merely one factor to consider with all the evidence;
(4) the People still must prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt to find
Valladares guilty; and (5) the evidence could be used only for the limited
purpose of “determining whether [the d]efendant has a propensity for

violence against children and/or to prove an element of the charged offense.”1
While instructing with an unmodified CALCRIM No. 852A instruction may
have been preferable, the minor deviations in wording here did not amount to
error, even if delivered under the heading “[CALCRIM ]No. 1191A.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 2.1050(f) [while use of the CALCRIM instructions “is
strongly encouraged,” a judge has discretion to provide different instructions]
& 2.1055(a)(1)(B) [recognizing ability to instruct on approved instructions
that have been “substantially modified”].)
      In addition, the jury instructions collectively (1) reaffirmed that
Valladares was presumed innocent unless the People proved his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, (2) cautioned the jury that evidence admitted for a
limited purpose was to be considered for only that purpose, (3) reminded the
jury the People bore the burden of proving each element of the charged
offense, and (4) outlined the elements of the felony child abuse the People
proved by a preponderance of the evidence before the jury could consider

1    The second purpose stated in the given instruction concerns only
charges 3 and 4, and thus is neither applicable nor addressed here.
                                       22
those acts for the limited purpose of propensity. Finally, the People raised
Evidence Code section 1109’s permissible inference in only two sentences in a
closing argument that lasted about two and one-half hours, and Valladares’
counsel directly refuted those statements in closing.
      In this context, we conclude the jury’s charge correctly stated the law,
and thus we perceive no instructional error. Accordingly, we need not reach
the issue of prejudice.
                                       II.
      Valladares also contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to
instruct sua sponte on simple battery as a lesser included offense of counts 1
and 2; thus, those convictions must be reversed. Reviewing de novo, we
conclude the court did not err. (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 113.)
                                       A.
      Valladares argues, and the People “[a]ssum[e] without conceding[,]”
that battery is a lesser included offense of counts 1 and 2. We agree.
Because the information merely incorporates the statutory definition of the
charged offenses, we apply the elements test. (People v. Fontenot (2019)
8 Cal.5th 57, 65.) “A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.” (Pen. Code, § 242.) The charged
offenses, meanwhile, require “penetration, however slight,” of the vagina,
genitalia, or anus by a penis. (Pen. Code, §§ 288.7, subd. (a) & 289,
subd. (k)(1).) One therefore cannot commit the offense of sexual intercourse
or sodomy with a child age 10 or younger without also committing a battery,
making the latter a lesser included offense of the former. (See People v.
Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 366.)

                                       23
                                        B.
      The trial court had a duty to instruct on battery if “substantial evidence
supports a finding that the defendant touched the victim in a way other than
charged.” (People v. Miranda (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 162, 176 (Miranda).)
The court need not instruct on a lesser included offense, however, “whenever
any evidence is presented, no matter how weak.” (People v. Strozier (1993)
20 Cal.App.4th 55, 63 (Strozier).) Rather, the court must give the instruction
only if there is “substantial evidence” that, if accepted, would absolve the
defendant from guilt of the greater offense but not the lesser. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 (Cole).)
      Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable jury could find
persuasive. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1218.) In assessing whether there
is substantial evidence of a lesser included offense, a court determines the
bare legal sufficiency, and not the weight, of the evidence. (See Miranda,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p.177.) When doing so, a court does not evaluate
credibility. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p.162.) Any doubts as to the
evidence’s sufficiency should be resolved in favor of giving the instruction.
(Strozier, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)
                                        C.
      As relevant here, the charged offenses required an act of “sexual
intercourse” or “sodomy” with the victim. (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a);
People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 79 (Mendoza).) “Sexual
intercourse means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or
genitalia by the penis.” (Ibid.) Penetration in this context can be mere
intrusion of the labia majora, the vulva’s exterior boundaries. (People v.
Quintana (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371.) Sodomy, likewise, entails
“penetration, however slight,” of the anus by the penis. (Mendoza, supra,

                                        24
240 Cal.App.4th at p. 79; Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (a).) Sodomy similarly
“requires penetration past the buttocks and into the perianal area but does
not require penetration beyond the perianal folds or anal margin.” (People v.
Paz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1038.)
      Valladares contends substantial evidence exists to support a jury
finding of only the lesser offense of battery for counts 1 and 2 because alleged
inconsistencies in A.L.’s statements and testimony could have led a
reasonable jury to find that Valladares “did not actually penetrate [A.L.]’s
vagina, genitalia, or anus.” The People claim “there was no evidence of a
‘harmful or offensive’ touching other than sexual intercourse or sodomy.” We
are persuaded by the People’s reasoning.
      Valladares essentially argues the evidence of penetration is equivocal.
As to count 2, Valladares contends “[A.L.] repeatedly and consistently told
the forensic examiner that appellant ‘tried to put his private part’ in her
‘butthole’” and notes she did not testify about this incident at trial. As to
count 1, Valladares notes that A.L. first stated in her CAC interview that
Valladares “tried” to penetrate her and only later said he did, and at trial she
testified she had no memory of penetration. We, however, disagree with
Valladares’ assessment of the evidence.
      That A.L. did not describe the count 2 incident at trial may bear on the
weight of the evidence supporting the charge; it is not, however, “substantial
evidence” on its own of the commission of only a battery. Further, Valladares
is incorrect that A.L. “repeatedly and consistently” stated in her CAC
interview that he only “tried” to penetrate her anus. When asked if anything
went “in the hole” while discussing Valladares’ first act of sexual abuse, A.L.
replied, “The third time he did it.” Although A.L. said several times
Valladares “tried” to put his penis in her anus, when the forensic interviewer

                                       25
specifically asked A.L. to “[t]ell [her] about him trying to put his private part
in [her] butthole” and whether she “fe[lt] something happening with [her]
butthole,” A.L. said she felt “something kinda go in.” She expounded that it
“felt wrong” because “nothing really goes inside” there, “it comes out instead.”
The blood that A.L. described finding when she wiped her genital and anal
area afterward further indicates penetration. The forensic nurse testified it
is not unusual for anal penetration to result in no injury, but bleeding would
evidence penetration or injury. This evidence is not, as Valladares posits,
equivocal as to penetration.
      As to count 1, A.L. did not, as Valladares contends, state only at the
end of her interview that he penetrated her. During her initial, brief
rundown of all the incidents at the start of her CAC interview, she shared
that Valladares “tried” to put “his private part” in her “private part,” “it hurt
really bad,” and she “was kinda bleeding when [she] walked” afterward. But
when asked to describe everything she could recall about the fourth incident
(charged as count 1), A.L. stated unequivocally that Valladares “put his
private part in [hers],” and clarified that she was talking about his penis and
her vagina. A.L. then said “[i]t really hurt bad” when Valladares was “trying”
to put his penis inside her. When the forensic interviewer asked if A.L.
“actually fe[lt] anything go in the hole,” A.L. replied, “Mmm I think my dad’s
private part,” and when asked what Valladares did after he put his penis
inside of her, A.L. said “he kept trying to put it in,” and “[i]t would hurt.”
Once again, when A.L. wiped herself afterward, she found blood on the toilet
paper and her genital area hurt. That evidence supports penetration.
      This evidence was corroborated by others at trial. Zipperstein testified
that A.L. told her in 2019 that Valladares put his penis in “her vajajay,” it
hurt badly, and she bled afterward. And on the stand, A.L. said Valladares

                                        26
“tried” to put his penis inside her multiple times over the course of several
minutes and the pain was an 8 on a scale of 1 to 10. She testified about the
blood on the toilet paper when she cleaned herself afterward. Although she
remembered telling the forensic interviewer that Valladares had penetrated
her vagina, she could only remember the pain, not the penetration, roughly
three years later. The forensic nurse testified that there may be no physical
signs of penetration in a child with an estrogenized hymen, like A.L., or if the
penetration were merely interlabial, but that pain and bleeding signify
penetration or injury. Again, this evidence of penetration is not ambivalent.
      Meanwhile, the record is devoid of any actual evidence Valladares
attempted penetration but was unsuccessful such that he could have
committed a battery but not the charged offense. Unlike in People v. Ngo
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 126, 157, where the defendant admitted to touching
the victim but denied penetration, here, Valladares’ defense was that A.L.
fabricated her account. There was no evidence to support a middle ground
between A.L.’s account of two instances of penetration and Valladares’ denial
that anything ever happened.
      We thus determine there was not substantial evidence to persuade a
reasonable jury Valladares was guilty of battery but not the charged offenses.
                                 *     *      *
      We conclude battery is a lesser included offense of sexual intercourse or
sodomy with a child age 10 or younger. Even so, there was not substantial
evidence here to support a conviction on the lesser but not the greater offense
for counts 1 and 2. Thus, the trial court did not err in not instructing on
battery. Because we find the trial court did not err, we need not reach the
issue of prejudice.

                                       27
                                 DISPOSITION
      We affirm. However, we note there appears to be a typographical error
in the abstract of judgment as to the sentence for count 4. We thus sua
sponte direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that
the sentence for count 4 is 8 years and “00,” rather than “006,” months and to
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
(See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-187 [appellate courts can
order on their own motion corrections of abstracts of judgment that do not
accurately reflect the oral judgment at sentencing].)

                                                                  CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

                                       28