Court Opinion

ID: 9648842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:36:31.764123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:59.988757
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge:
In this en banc proceeding reviewing criminal convictions, we have examined challenges to 1) the denial of a motion to suppress evidence and 2) the effective assistance of defense counsel who, prior to a hearing told the motions judge of his client’s intention to commit perjury, and who permitted his client to go to a bench trial before the same judge.1 Although the first issue presents a troublesome question in light of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we need deal *845here only with the second; we have concluded that appellant, as a result of developments following counsel’s revelations to the court, has been prejudiced by errors of constitutional dimensions fatally infecting both the suppression hearing and the subsequent trial. We therefore reverse the convictions for assault on a police officer and carrying a pistol without a license (D.C. Code 1973, §§ 22-505(a), -3204), and remand for new proceedings.
The flavor of the proceedings is best conveyed by a lengthy chronological recitation of the facts.
Appellant was arrested on January 31, 1975, and counsel was appointed for him on February 1. Indictment followed on April 4, and counsel, on April 19 filed a motion to suppress. On September 25, 1975, the day set for the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel asked leave for his client to address the court on preliminary matter. Thereupon appellant asked for the appointment of “another” counsel until such time as he could secure his own. He explained that he had been incarcerated since February and had experienced difficulty in communicating with present counsel — that is, that he had not had sufficient time to discuss his case. He added that he had written the Bar Association, the Public Defender Service and the court about his difficulty, that he understood that counsel was a busy man, but that he would appreciate having a counsel with more time.
Counsel addressed the court in return to say that, while he did not object to being removed from the case, he had talked to his client for an hour on the day of appointment, conferred with him for 30 minutes prior to a preliminary hearing, and filed the motion to suppress. The real reason for his client’s complaints, he said, was the length of incarceration occasioned by the defendant’s parole status. [“The evidence is such, Your Honor, that he’s in violation of the parole even if he wins the case, because the Parole Board can determine that the defendant had a pistol on him . . . .”] Conceding that he had not visited the jail in “two, three, four months” counsel continued:
This is an open and shut case, Your Honor, where I talked for approximately two hours with the defendant, filed an appropriate motion, and there are one or two witnesses that are police officers, for the government, and this defendant’s word against theirs as to an incident on the street that took about ten minutes to occur. It is not a case where you put character in evidence, because the defendant is on parole for a crime of moral turpitude, and he doesn’t have an alibi because he was arrested on the scene and, to be frank, Your Honor, because I expect he wants to testify in this case he is concerned that I do not want to put him on the stand, because he’s told me before that he had the pistol, and today for the first time he tells me that’s not true.
I have explained to the defendant, Your Honor, that I cannot put him on the stand if I think he’s committing perjury, without telling the Court.
To which the court replied:
Of course you can’t. To do so would be a violation of the law and your professional ethics and responsibility. And I don’t have any doubt in the world but that he represented to you that he had this pistol on him.
Now, based upon your change in your story, Mr. [Defense Counsel] can’t put you on the stand after you told him that and testify that you didn’t have it. It doesn’t really make any difference anyway, if, as I understand the government's evidence in this case to be that the pistol was recovered from the small of your back. What difference does it make whether you say you had it or you didn’t have it. Where did it come from? Out of thin air?
Thereafter in answer to the court’s further inquiry as to what the case was about, the government’s evidence was detailed by both counsel.
In the course of the discussion of the evidence defense counsel (noting that he would not be revealing these matters on the record but for the accusation of ineffective *846assistance) spoke of his efforts to convince his client that if the suppression motion was unsuccessful, he would probably be convicted of the pistol charge 2 (a felony by virtue of a previous conviction) and that a plea of guilty to the pistol charge, in exchange for the government’s waiver of allocution, would give him a stronger chance for concurrent time.
When appellant protested that the pistol charge stemmed from an illegal search, a long colloquy followed3 during the course of which the court told the appellant that the law and the Constitution would not help him in the decision he had to make (/. e. whether to enter a plea of guilty), that if the motion went to a hearing and was denied, it was all over for him, that under these circumstances he would have nothing to bargain with, that a jury would see the pistol 'and he would then be in a “pickle.” The court added that it thought the govern*847ment had offered “a pretty decent disposition under the circumstances and it would be well worth your while to take it.”
The court advised appellant that he must decide what he wanted to do. Appellant noted at one point, “I accept the counsel,” and at another, “I want to go on with the trial.” During this discussion the court explained that the officers could justify the warrantless search by showing that they had reasonable suspicion for a patdown, that reasonable suspicion “means almost anything, to tell you the truth” and that the advice of defense counsel was sound.4
Defense counsel, after a private conference with appellant, told the court that the problem was that the defendant did not trust him; he requested that the case be passed over until the following day and that another attorney be appointed that appellant might listen to. Counsel said he would be happy either to remain in or get out of the case, but that he hated to see appellant make the tragic mistake of going to trial. The court told appellant that he saw no reason to remove counsel, an abortive discussion followed as to the chances of appellant securing his own counsel, and the appellant then said he would accept the government’s offer.5 When the court began its Super.Ct.Cr.R. 11 inquiry, appellant again expressed reluctance, the court refused to accept the plea, and instructed the government to call its first witness for the purpose of hearing the motion to suppress. After testimony from one police officer de*848scribing appellant’s apprehension6 the motion for suppression was denied and a trial date set.
Trial was scheduled for October 28, 1975 before the same judge who had heard the motion to suppress. On that morning counsel and the court disposed of preliminary matters while waiting for appellant to be brought to court. Defense counsel told the court that “we intend” to have a nonjury trial which he anticipated, because of stipulations, would take no more than ten minutes. After counsel spoke to evidentiary matters, defense counsel, in answer to the court’s inquiry, indicated that he did not think his client would take the stand:
I explained the problems with the Court the last time regarding whether or not he was telling the truth about having the pistol. So I reserve stating what I’ll do until he gets here and let him make the decision but I don’t think he will take the stand.
Counsel explained he had taken this approach because he had assured appellant that this way he would still have an appeal and that the court would assist him in getting an attorney.
The court spoke of its recollection that appellant had at least one prior conviction. Government counsel recited all prior convictions: attempted robbery in the United States District Court, possession of implements of crime 'in 1970, and carrying a pistol without a license in 1971. Defense counsel indicated, upon inquiry from the court, that he would not have any difficulty with those convictions in the event appellant took the stand.
When the case was called for trial, defense counsel stated for the record:
We are going to have just a trial by the Court. I have spoken to Mr. Butler Friday, he was in agreement with that advice at that time and again this morning at about 9:15, at that time Mr. Butler indicated he would prefer that we go to trial before Your Honor.
‡ ‡ $ $ $ $
I have advised Mr. Butler that the court will assist him ... in getting . a very competent attorney to handle his appeal. .
Thereafter, a written waiver of trial by jury was executed. The testimony of the officer who had appeared at the pretrial motion was admitted by stipulation. Two other officers testified to identify the pistol and give details of the assault charge. Motions for a judgment of acquittal were denied, the defendant elected not to testify, and the defense rested.
In closing argument, defense counsel speaking first “to save the court time,” stated inter alia:
Your Honor, being as honest about it as I think we can be in this case, I think this is a case which will pivot upon whether or not Your Honor was correct or incorrect in not suppressing the pistol at the September 25th motion to suppress.
* * * * * *
In regard to the assault on the police officer, I would submit on the argument I made on the judgment of acquittal [that the defendant was entitled to meet force with force if the police officer was not performing his duties in good faith]. With that, I’d ask the Court to find the defendant not guilty if Your Honor disbelieves the Government’s testimony.
The - court did not hear from the government and found the defendant guilty on both counts.
I.
A central, and rather startling factor, at first blush, raises complex issues in an unusual factual context. In a prehearing setting, defense counsel has told a motions judge who (apparently as a result of counsel’s advice to his client) has ultimately become the trier-of-fact, of the merits of his client’s case and the fact that his client intends to commit perjury. In this court we are asked — does counsel’s conduct *849amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment? The government argues that the fact that counsel was faced in the pretrial setting with the accusation of having rendered ineffective assistance of counsel precludes our finding here that counsel’s performance amounted to reversible error in the absence of prejudice. A skillful analysis is made pointing to the conflict that a lawyer faces in protecting his client’s confidences and at the same time responding to an allegation of ineffectiveness. We would remind, however, that a lawyer likewise may face a conflict in protecting his client’s confidences and in refraining from lending support to what he (or she) believes to be false testimony. The first described conflict is a matter of first impression here; the second is not.
The protection of a client’s confidence is so basic a tenet of professional responsibility that it yields only in the rarest of real ethical dilemmas. Thus in such a dilemma, advice, disassociation, and even passive representation, may be resorted to in lieu of exposure.7 These are the accommodations suggested by the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Defense Function (Approved Draft, 1971), under circumstances where a defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts which establish his guilt, the lawyer’s independent investigation establishes the admissions are true, but the client insists on his right to trial. Standard 7.7 provides that the lawyer must advise his client against taking the stand to testify falsely, but that if the defendant insists that he will do so the lawyer must withdraw if feasible. The Standard continues:
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court, or if the situation arises during the trial and the defendant insists upon testifying falsely in his own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend his aid to the perjury or use the perjured testimony. Before the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer must confine his examination to identifying the witness as the defendant and permitting him to make his statement to the trier or the triers of the facts; the lawyer may not engage in direct examination of the defendant as a witness in the conventional manner and may not later argue the defendant’s known false version of facts to the jury as worthy of belief and he may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his closing argument.
The Standard has been discussed in appeals urging that there was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
In Thornton v. United States, D.C.App., 357 A.2d 429, cert. denied, 429 F.2d 1024, 97 S.Ct. 644, 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976), we gave approval to the trial tactics of a lawyer who, knowing his client was taking the stand to commit perjury, and having been denied the right to withdraw, restricted his representation to the recommendations of the ABA Standard.
In Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 162 (1979), we spoke to the degree of certainty (of proffered false testimony) that is required before a lawyer may claim a dilemma. We quoted the commentary to Standard 7.7:
The existence of this dilemma is predicated upon the defendant’s admitting in-culpatory facts to his lawyer which are corroborated by the lawyer’s own investigation. So long as the defendant maintains his innocence, the lawyer’s realistic appraisal that he is in fact guilty does not preclude a vigorous defense. [Id. at 164 n.2.]
*850We held in Johnson that an inconsistency between two proffered defenses was insufficient to establish that the intended testimony was false. In reversing a conviction on the ground that the trial court improperly imposed the restrictions of Standard 7.7 upon defense counsel, we noted:
Section 7.7 speaks to a situation in which the falsity of the defendant’s testimony is known and not merely suspected. Likewise, our previous cases in which this problem arose involved situations in which the attorney knew, based on independent investigation of the case or on prior discussions with the client, that the defendant’s testimony was false. It was in that context that we held that the attorney could, consistent with the defendant’s right, limit his or her representation in accordance with § 7.7. Thornton v. United States, supra; Herbert v. United States, D.C.App., 340 A.2d 802, 804 (1975); see also United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977). Where as here, the veracity or falsity of the defendant’s testimony is conjectural, the ethical dilemma does not arise. [Id. at 164 (footnote omitted).]
Both Johnson and Thornton involved cases tried before juries. Of interest, therefore, is the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in a case where the spectre of false testimony arose in the context of a bench trial. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). The court held in Lowery that defense counsel’s motion to withdraw (without stating a reason) coupled with his passive representation in accord with Standard 7.7 was such an unequivocal announcement (of counsel’s belief of perjury) to the factfinder as to deprive the defendant of due process. (Judge Hufstedler, specifically concurring would have rested the decision on the denial of Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.) The court said:
We start with the basic proposition that if, under these circumstances, counsel informs the fact finder of his belief he has, by that action, disabled the fact finder from judging the merits of the defendant’s defense. Further, he has by his action openly placed himself in opposition to his client upon her defense. . If in truth the defendant has committed perjury (a fact we do not know in this case) she does not by that falsehood forfeit her right to fair, trial. [Id. at 730.]
The court found that its result was not inconsistent with ethical standards and would not expose counsel to subornation of perjury. It noted, inter alia, that the ABA Standards did not deal with a trial had before a judge without a jury: “The Standards seem quite sensibly to assume that counsel will not be expected to act in such a fashion as to disclose his quandary to the fact finder.” Id. at 731 (footnote omitted).
It is safe to say therefore that the courts which have weighed the dilemma of a defense counsel, faced with the unenviable position of representing a client whom he knows will commit perjury, have approved (for jury trials at least) the recommended accommodation of the ABA Standards which meets both ethical requirements of protecting clients’ confidences and refraining from wrongdoing. The lawyer is permitted to let his client tell his own story and is insulated from a subsequent charge of ineffective assistance of counsel. We are persuaded that this approach is the preferable one and we reaffirm the implicit holdings of Thornton and Johnson that defense counsel, when in possession of substantial facts indicating that his client is going to give perjured testimony before a jury, may, consistent with effective representation, follow the recommended procedures of Standard 7.7.
As to the instant case, it should be noted initially that the record does not support an inference that defense counsel knew that his client was going to commit perjury. Counsel raised the issue with the court at the pre-motions hearing stage “because I expect he wants to testify in this case” and “because he’s told me before that he had the pistol, and today for the first time he tells me that’s not true.” At that point in time counsel knew only that his client had made inconsistent representations to him about the possession of the gun. He ad*851vised appellant that he could not commit perjury but he also advised the court that he had done so and why. We think he unnecessarily betrayed the confidences of his client, a factor having serious consequences in view of what was to follow.8
But it is argued that the fact that counsel was reacting to a challenge to effective assistance of counsel at the pretrial stage makes a difference. The government, relying on our decision in Monroe v. United States, D.C.App., 389 A.2d 811, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S.Ct. 621, 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978), defends counsel’s position as having been merely responsive to the inquiry of the court.
In Monroe we held that “a trial court’s primary duty under the Sixth Amendment when confronted with a pretrial claim of inadequate preparation and consultation by counsel is to decide whether counsel has consulted with the defendant and prepared his case in a proper manner.” Id. at 819. We held that the court must conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations and that it must make “findings of fact of record [emphasis in original] sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review on the issue of the ability and preparedness [emphasis added] of counsel to render effective assistance . . ..” Id. at 821. See also Farrell v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 755 (1978). Nothing that we said in Monroe can be read as suggesting that the trial court in assessing the capability and preparedness of counsel can inquire into the merits of the defense or the substance of the defendant’s testimony or that defense counsel may ethically address such issues. Indeed, subsequently in Johnson, supra, we questioned the propriety of a court’s requesting a proffer of defense (even where trial was had by jury), and with respect to the court’s surmise that the defendant was about to commit perjury, we said, “if the trial court were to fully inquire into the matter, it would necessarily touch upon privileged attorney-client communications.” Id. at 164. Monroe, supra, intended as a shield for an accused, would become a sword if interpreted in such manner as to permit the betrayal of the confidence of one who has sought its protection. The effect of such an interpretation would be to deter defendants from raising legitimate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The government argues, however, that a hearing on alleged incompetence of counsel, whether held before or after trial, has inherent adversary characteristics and that counsel cannot fairly be expected to resolve every doubt as to necessity for disclosure in favor of a client who has challenged counsel’s performance. We are told that the issue as to how much counsel may say under such circumstances is not an easy one and that even if one or more of the remarks were precipitous and unnecessary, we should not reverse appellant’s conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the record demonstrates that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s actions.
We find little difficulty in demonstrating on this record the precise point at which counsel should have stopped. However, even if we were to assume the validity of the government’s argument, the issue of prejudice cannot be assessed without taking into consideration the events which subsequently transpired. Had defense counsel requested that the court disqualify itself and that the case be certified to another court for hearing and trial (and had such request been granted) there would be no need for such inquiry. He did not do so and we find that the cumulative effect of the *852actions taken by counsel9 and the court has deprived appellant of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
II.
The essence of the judicial role is neutrality. Byrd v. United States, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 400, 404 (1977). A trial judge “must remain a ‘disinterested and objective participant in the proceeding’ ” and “[o]nce his neutral position has been jeopardized, the judicial evenhandedness that should pervade the courtroom disappears and ‘the right to a fair trial may be imperiled.' ” Haughton v. Byers, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 18, 20-21 (1979) (citations omitted).
It is difficult to imagine how the neutrality of a judge could remain free from compromise when it had been told by defense counsel that the government’s case can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant intends to commit perjury. When the court has regard for the ability and honesty of the lawyer, as the court apparently did here, the credibility of the defendant would necessarily suffer in direct proportion to such regard. Under such circumstances recusal and certification, to another court is the desired procedure (see Thornton, supra) and we hold that it is mandated. Error in failing to do so is compounded when the judge sits as the trier-of-fact. The due process clause commands fundamental fairness in factfinding. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1990, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).
The trial court in this case expressly indicated at the prehearing stage its belief that the defendant had changed his story: “And I don’t have any doubt in the world but that he represented to you that he had this pistol on him.” “Now based upon your change in your story, Mr. [Defense Counsel] can’t put you on the stand after you told him that and testify that you didn’t have it.” Moreover, the court not only shared the view of defense counsel as to the facts but also as to the best defense strategy, affirming his belief in the good judgment of counsel again and again. And although the assessment may have been both right and well-intentioned (and the course followed thereafter borne out of compassion), it is clear that the active role of the court, in trying to convince the defendant that he should follow counsel’s advice to enter a plea of guilty to the pistol charge, was improper.
In Byrd v. United States, supra, we remanded a case with directions that a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea of guilty be granted under circumstances where the record showed that the trial court went beyond permissible bounds in encouraging that plea. We noted in that case that while the appellant would undoubtedly have a difficult time convincing a jury of his innocence based on the nature of his defense, “[i]t is, however, appellant who runs the risk of conviction and it is appellant who must decide, preferably after consulting with counsel, whether he wishes to have the jury finally determine his guilt or innocence” and that “whatever may be said of the wisdom of appellant’s plea, consideration of fundamental fairness must control . .” Id. at 405. We cautioned that the trial court’s remarks in a Rule 11 situation must not cross the fine line that demarcates advice from coercion. Id. at 404.
The trial court’s remarks in the instant case are similar to those made in Byrd — the folksy advice about the “facts of life,” the references to the strength of the government’s position, the speculation as to the length of incarceration, the chances of defendant’s prevailing on the motion to suppress or at trial before a jury if he did not enter a plea — all interposed with admonitions that the decision was one for the defendant and the judicial assessment that *853the government had made a good offer. Government counsel has candidly admitted that if a plea had been entered in the instant case, the plea would be vulnerable to challenge. But the plea was not entered and the judge, who had told the defendant that reasonable suspicion “means almost anything,” sat to hear and deny the motion for suppression. This was hardly the “fair” hearing by a “neutral and detached magistrate” required for the adjudication of Fourth Amendment claims. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 368-369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) quoted in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Moreover, the same judge, who had told the defendant that a decision against him on the motion “put an end to it . . .,” then sat to hear the evidence and to enter judgments of conviction without bothering to hear closing argument by government counsel.
We are mindful of the fact that the trial court recited its reasons for denying the motion to suppress and that it recited at trial that the government had established each and every element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The government has urged that “absent a clear showing of substantial prejudice, a bench trial judge is presumed to have considered only relevant and admissible evidence in reaching his findings” citing, inter alia, United States ex rel. Placek v. State of Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1302 (7th Cir. 1976). Yet, the destruction of the appearance of impartiality is so prevalent on this record as to strain any such presumption beyond the breaking point. And the substantial prejudice is apparent. In critical stages of these proceedings, appellant has been deprived of procedural safeguards — the right to fundamental fairness of process.10
The degree to which our race for technology has invaded the criminal law is mirrored in the government’s written argument that “[to] the extent . . . that counsel reasonably concluded that trial in this case served only to preserve the legal issue on which his client’s prospects depended, the importance of the judge’s role as factfinder was, as a practical matter, greatly diminished.” This comment highlights, in the context of this case, another balancing act (if not a conflict) faced by defense counsel — the duty to know and apply technical skills and the duty to faithfully represent his client — even when he cannot win. The former is of course of the utmost importance, but when it is used in derogation of the latter, it may herald dire consequences for our system of justice. In this age of plea bargaining, the option of going to trial before an impartial factfinder must be kept open. If it is not, then the man or woman presumptively having the mentality to control the conduct leading to a criminal accusation in the first instance is foreclosed from exercising that mentality to maintain any manner of control over the right of defense guaranteed by the Constitution.11 Then arrest and indictment may mark the end of the road and a computer could take it from there.
We hold here, that once defense counsel had informed the court of the merits of his client’s case and the fact that his client intended to commit perjury, the proceedings should have been certified to. another judge. The failure to do so has deprived the appellant of due process.

Reversed and remanded.

. Our initial decision issued by a division of this court was filed and vacated on January 12, 1979. See Appendix at p. 861.

. The defendant denied that he ever told counsel that he had a pistol and added:
And by you supposed to be representing me, you ain’t supposed to make no statements such as that anyway.

. THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, the CPW stems from an illegal search; the assault stems from an illegal search.
THE COURT: Well, see, you’re talking theory and I’m talking facts. You have been in jail since February; is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What’s the maximum you can get on a CPW?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is a felony I, Your Honor.
THE COURT: This is a felony?
MR. GILMAN: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: It can be forty months to ten years.
THE COURT: What’s the basis for it being a felony?
MR. GILMAN: Previous conviction of the same crime, Your Honor.
THE COURT: CPW?
MR. GILMAN: Yes, Your Honor. And I have an information which I shall file today, Your Honor, indicating that. I have copies for the counsel and defendant.
THE COURT: Phew!
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have just tried to explain, I don’t mind trying any case, but I’d rather take on the hardest murder case in the world and have a chance to win it than a simple pistol charge, because you either have it or you don’t, and I have tried to persuade the defendant, and I wouldn’t be revealing these things on the record but for the fact he’s accused me of ineffective assistance of counsel.
THE COURT: Mr. — I believe your situation here — What you need now is some sane judgment. We all know what the law is and we all know what the Constitution is and all that, see, but that won’t help you right now in the decision you got to make at this time. The question is do you want — see, because it’s all over, really, when the motion is decided. You don’t have anything to bargain with. It’s all over then, the CDW and the APO.
THE DEFENDANT: For an illegal search, Your Honor, I should get some type of consideration, from the search being illegal itself.
THE COURT: Well, see, what I’m telling you now is, if the thing goes to hearing on the motion and the motion is decided against you, you put an end to it then, because you don’t really have anything to work with at that point and the government knows it. What in the world are they going to make a plea bargain with you for? If I deny your motion to suppress the evidence, they’ve got the evidence, they’ve got the physical evidence and there it is in front of the jury.
What do you think they’re going to do on CDW felony? Now, you know the law, I guess. You have come in here telling me about your rights and all about the law and the Constitution. Now, you seem like a smart man to me, but I know what juries will do. I haven’t seen a case yet where you have that physical evidence on that pistol — I’m telling you right, Mr. Butler. I wouldn’t tell you wrong for anything in the world. If this motion goes to hearing and it’s denied, you really are in a pickle.
Now, you got some chance on that APO, see, because we all know the fact of the matter — juries go kind of slow on those things. We all know that. So, I don’t know what they’ll do if you got the APO and CDW at the same time. That doesn’t look too good. The only thing they can see is that pistol and they’re going to wave it all in front of them and take it in the jury room with them. I’m telling you what the facts of life are. I wouldn’t give you a piece of wrong information for anything.
Now, you do what you want to do. We’ll either hear the motion or dispose of it one way or the other, and I don’t know what I’d do with the motion. I don’t know what the facts are and have no way in the world for me to tell you what I’m going to do with the motion. I can’t decide that until I’ve heard it, but I think, Mr. Butler, they offer you a pretty decent disposition under the circumstances and it would be well worth your while to take it.

. THE DEFENDANT: Well, I want to know what would justify reasonable suspicion.
THE COURT: Well, see, therein lies the problem and, really, Mr. Butler, I’ve been asking the same question for years, and to tell you the truth, now you want me to tell you what reasonable suspicion means.
THE DEFENDANT: I understood, Your Hon- or—
THE COURT: It means almost anything.
THE DEFENDANT: It means, sir—
THE COURT: It means almost anything, to tell you the truth.
THE DEFENDANT: Does it mean walking down the street like this. I wasn’t near a car, so can’t say I was near a car. Does that appear to be reasonable suspicion?
THE COURT: It really doesn’t. That much, Mr. Butler, is about the best thing I can tell you.
THE DEFENDANT: This is what I got to say.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I have tried to explain to Mr. Butler that if the police officer testifies that he saw Mr. Butler pop up from behind a car on a dark street, near midnight, and do something evasive, or look suspicious, and the Court believes the police officer as opposed to not believing the defendant’s version, then that’s justifiable reason to search for the pistol.
THE COURT: You gave him sound advice.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And he seems to interpret — he disagrees with the officer’s version and automatically thinks that any judge or jury is going to believe him. I have tried to explain to him the practicalities of the police officer’s testimony.
THE COURT: See, he knows more about this case than I do. But his advice, as I hear it, is sound.
Now, you do what you want to do.

. THE COURT: Really, I don’t know what your problem is. You have been sitting over there since February, sitting in jail; right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You got this thing hanging over your head; right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you got the parole situation hanging over your head.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, you got to get on the road some kind of way, got to get ahead somewhere. You’re just deadtiming over there. You’re headed nowhere right where you are just sitting in jail. How much time can you do on it?
THE DEFENDANT: I was told I can do ten years.
THE COURT: Yes, you can do ten years on it. You can do ten years’in D.C. jail, too. THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Waiting on it. The question is what you want to do. You got to, you know, be practical about these things, Mr. Butler. There’s some you make a stand in and some you don’t, and if I were in your circumstances I wouldn’t have any hesitation to go ahead and dispose of it. But you got to decide that for yourself.
THE DEFENDANT: All right, Your Honor, I’ll accept the government’s—
THE COURT: You’ll accept the government’s offer, will you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that what you want to do, Mr. Butler? Is that your determination now?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, my determination.

. Defense counsel did not call his client to testify but suggested that the court ask him if he wished to be heard. The court did not do so.

. Some commentators have questioned whether an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case may ever disclose his client’s intention to commit perjury. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 n.13 (3rd Cir. 1977), citing Michael Callan and Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 Rutgers L.Rev. 332 (1976). M. Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System (1975). Cf. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility— DR 4-101(C)(3).

. In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, supra at 122, the Third Circuit noted:
It is essential to our adversary system that a client’s ability to communicate freely and in confidence with his counsel be maintained inviolate. When an attorney unnecessarily discloses the confidences of his client, he creates a chilling effect which inhibits the mutual trust and independence necessary to effective representation. It is apparent that an attorney may not volunteer a mere unsubstantiated opinion that his client’s protestations of innocence are perjured. To do so would undermine a cornerstone of our system of criminal justice.

. We note that in United States v. Joslin, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 252, 434 F.2d 526 (1970), the failure of defense counsel (whom the defendant had previously requested to be replaced for allegedly not acting in defendant’s best interest) to support the defendant’s request to withdraw a plea of guilty, was held to constitute inadequate assistance of counsel warranting a remand for a new hearing on the request.

. Counsel for appellant in this court has put the matter well:
While it may well be that the outcome of hearing and the trial would have been precisely the same if the appellant had been represented by trusted and faithful counsel diligently pursuing his client’s interests, and had been tried by a court properly performing its judicial function, the process surely would have been completely different, even if the result — conviction—would have been the same. But process — procedure—is what much of our constitutional law is all about.

. The facts of United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, supra, illustrate “The Case of the Presumptuous Counsel” who chose a defense (without first consulting the client) and who prevailed (with the help of the trial court) in pursuing this defense after threatening to withdraw if the defendant insisted on testifying. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted and the order affirmed.