Court Opinion

ID: 9955516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:14:16.988909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:18.904525
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  WEAVER WAREHOUSE, LLC                        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                        Appellant              :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JEFF GOTTSCHALK AND DIETZ &                  :   No. 847 MDA 2023
  BLUETT, LLC                                  :
            v.                                 :
                                               :
                                               :
  W.N. TUSCANO AGENCY, INC.                    :

                     Appeal from the Order Entered May 30, 2023
                     In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                                     Civil Division at
                               No(s): 2019-SU-001727

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                          FILED MARCH 28, 2024

       Weaver Warehouse, LLC appeals from the order entered May 30, 2023,

granting summary judgment in favor of Jeff Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett,

LLC.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       At all times, Weaver Warehouse, LLC (“Weaver”) had one shareholder

and member, Matthew Steinkamp. On December 19, 2014, Weaver purchased

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1Weaver Warehouse, LLC has only argued in its brief that the trial court erred

in granting summary judgment as to Jeff Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett, LLC.
See Appellant’s Brief, at 1, 2. Summary judgment was granted in favor of
W.N. Tuscano Agency on May 30, 2023, but is not part of this appeal.
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commercial property in York, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). The Property

consisted of three buildings, located at 125 N. Broad Street, 127 N. Broad

Street, and 410 Walnut Street.2

       Weaver, through Steinkamp, initially sought insurance for the Property

on July 15, 2015. Weaver enlisted Dietz and Bluett, LLC (“Dietz and Bluett”)

to assist in obtaining insurance. Dietz and Bluett is a licensed retail insurance

agency that assists insurance applicants in obtaining insurance quotes either

directly from an insurance carrier or through a wholesale insurance broker.

Gottschalk was employed by Dietz and Bluett as a retail insurance agent. At

all times relevant to this appeal, Weaver worked with Gottschalk as Dietz and

Bluett’s representative.

       In 2015, Gottschalk was able to obtain a quote from Essex Insurance

Company which included existing property coverage of over $1 million.

Weaver conducted repair work on the Property, but ultimately stopped work

and stopped paying the insurance premiums, allowing the policy to lapse in

2016. Weaver went without any insurance on the Property from that time until

work began again in August of 2017.

       Weaver decided in 2017 to renovate the Property. The renovations

included demolishing 410 Walnut Street and converting 127 N. Broad Street

____________________________________________

2 Weaver paid $135,680.51 for the property.

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into an apartment complex.3 Weaver obtained financing from Fulton Bank,

however, Fulton Bank required builder’s risk insurance. Weaver, through

Steinkamp, met with Gottschalk to obtain the necessary coverage. Weaver

informed Gottschalk it wanted $3 million in builder’s risk insurance and $2.6

million in existing structure coverage, as per the renovations that Weaver had

either completed or planned at that time.

       On May 31, 2017, Gottschalk forwarded an application incorrectly

stating that the Property had been purchased in June 2015 instead of

December 19, 2014, and requested $3 million in builder’s risk insurance and

$2.6 million in existing structure coverage.

       Gottschalk submitted the application to W.N. Tuscano (“Tuscano”), a

licensed wholesale insurance broker who provided Dietz and Bluett access to

insurance markets that they otherwise would not be able to access. Tuscano

submitted the application to various insurance carriers. At least two carriers

declined to offer any quote for coverage. Only one carrier, Great American

Insurance Company of New York (“Great American”), offered a quote, but with

far less existing structure coverage. Great American offered $3 million in

____________________________________________

3 127 N. Broad Street was an old piano factory building.

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builder’s risk insurance, but only $280,000.00 in existing structure coverage,

divided between the three separate buildings.4

       Gottschalk met with Steinkamp and informed him of the quote.

Steinkamp questioned why the existing structure coverage was so low on 127

N. Broad Street and asked it to be increased to $480,000.00.5 Gottschalk

contacted Tuscano and requested the increase on 127 N. Broad Street to

$480,000.00. Tuscano then requested Great American increase the existing

structure coverage for 127 N. Broad Street to $480,000.00. Great American

responded that it would not increase the coverage due to a concern of

insurance fraud. Great American, based on the emails provided during the

pendency of this case and the underwriter’s deposition, seemed to believe,

incorrectly, that the Property had been purchased in the preceding 12 months,

and they had a standing policy that they did not offer existing structure

coverage above the purchase price if the property were purchased within the

past year. See Deposition of Walter Wilmshurst, 3/11/22, at 103-105. At no

point was Gottschalk or Dietz and Bluett informed of Great American’s

confusion over the purchase date.

____________________________________________

4 The $280,000.00 was split up in the offer with 127 N. Broad Street having

$130,000.00 in existing structure coverage and 125 N. Broad Street having
$150,000.00 in existing structure coverage. 410 Walnut Street had $0 existing
structure coverage because Weaver intended to demolish the building.

5 This request was     apparently based off an appraisal Steinkamp had of the
Property.

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      Gottschalk informed Steinkamp that Great American declined to

increase the existing structure coverage for 127 N. Broad Street. Steinkamp

did not ask any further questions of Gottschalk, nor make any other requests.

Weaver purchased the coverage, even though, on June 2, 2017, Steinkamp

was also seeking insurance coverage for Weaver and the same project through

Bubb Insurance, which provided a quote for $500,000.00 existing structure

coverage and $3.5 million in builder’s risk insurance. The Great American

insurance coverage went into effect on August 18, 2017. While renovations

were ongoing, the building at 127 N. Broad Street caught fire on March 21,

2018, causing significant damage to that building and additional damage to

125 N. Broad Street. Great American covered the losses and paid out over

$2.5 million.

      Weaver believes it was underinsured and not fully compensated by

Great American; as such, it filed a complaint on June 5, 2019, against

Gottschalk      and   Dietz   and   Bluett   alleging   negligence,   negligent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and

respondeat superior. After preliminary objections were filed, negligent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional negligence were

either dismissed or withdrawn. On March 14, 2023, Gottschalk and Dietz and

Bluett filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted their

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motion on March 30, 2023, after oral argument.6 Weaver filed an appeal and

a timely court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement.

       After receiving an extension to file the Rule 1925(b) statement, Weaver

raises the following claims:

       Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
       where the defendant failed to meet their burden to demonstrate
       there were no issues of material issues of fact?

       Whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
       summary judgment by failing to consider all facts of record and
       reasonable inferences, and to resolve any and all doubts in favor
       of plaintiff?

       Whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
       summary judgment where the court failed to give due deference
       to plaintiff’s expert’s opinion?

       Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
       where the court’s decision was based, in large part, on the
       plaintiff's rejection of an insurance quote by Bubb Insurance,
       which rejection was irrelevant to the determination of defendant’s
       duties to plaintiff?

       Whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
       summary judgment on the basis defendant’s had no duty to
       plaintiff?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Our scope and standard of review are well-settled:

       On appellate review, an appellate court may reverse a grant of
       summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse
       of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no genuine
       issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, and
       therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This
____________________________________________

6 The transcript from the oral argument held on May 18, 2023,has not been

provided to this Court.

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      means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower
      tribunals. To the extent that this Court must resolve a question of
      law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
      context of the entire record.

Westminster American v. Bond, 307 A.3d 749, 752 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      The trial court found the first three claims waived: “We believe Weaver

has waived the first three issues it raises, as they are general allegations of

error from which we cannot determine the precise error alleged.” Trial Court

Opinion, 8/14/23, at 8. Rule 1925(b) requires the statement to “concisely

identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to

identify the issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii)

(emphasis added). “Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii). This Court has explained:

      When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing,
      that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails
      adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be
      pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of
      a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues. In other words,
      a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to
      identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of
      no Concise Statement at all.

Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting

Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

      In Lineberger, this Court addressed a very similar claim as raised in

Weaver’s three issues. There, “[a]ppellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement

announced a very general proposition; namely, that the trial court erred when

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it granted Wyeth’s summary judgment motion.” Lineberger, 894 A.2d at

148-149. The trial court found that the issue was too vague to preserve the

issue for appeal and this Court agreed. Id. at 149. We find the same is

required here. Weaver did not point to the specific issues that it intended to

raise on appeal and therefore, the trial court did not address those claims in

its Rule 1925(a) opinion. As Weaver has hampered our review, we find its first

three claims waived. However, even if the claims were not waived, we would

find Weaver is not entitled to relief, as discussed below.

      Weaver argues in his fourth claim that the trial court placed undue

emphasis on the fact that Weaver had another quote for insurance on the

same project but chose not to purchase it. See Appellant’s Brief, at 24. This,

Weaver alleges, was an incorrect focus regarding the question of whether

Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett breached their duty to Weaver. See id. at 27.

      Weaver alleged that Gottschalk was negligent in procuring adequate

insurance coverage for the Property. Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] plaintiff

acquires a cause of action against his broker or agent where the broker

neglects to procure insurance, or does not follow instructions, or if the policy

is void or materially defective through the agent's fault.” Laventhol &

Horwath v. Dependable Ins. Assocs., 579 A.2d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 1990)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Similar to a traditional negligence

claim, insurance brokers face liability if “they fail to exercise the care that a

reasonably prudent businessman in the brokerage field would exercise under

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similar circumstances and if the broker fails to exercise such care and if such

care is the direct cause of loss to his customer.” Al’s Café, Inc. v. Sanders

Insurance Agency et al., 820 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Summary judgment may properly be entered only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Williams

v. Pilgrim Life Insurance Co., 452 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citation

omitted). Moreover, a court must view the record in a light favorable to the

non-moving party and any doubt must be resolved against the moving party.

See Erie Insurance Exchange v. Eachus, 306 A.3d 930, 932 (Pa. Super.

2023). The standards for summary judgment are also set forth in Pennsylvania

Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2, which states:

      After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as
      not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary
      judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law

            (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material
            fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action
            or defense which could be established by additional
            discovery or expert report, or

            (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the
            motion, including the production of expert reports, an
            adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial
            has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the
            cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would
            require the issues to be submitted to a jury.

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Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.

      Weaver claimed Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett acted negligently in

obtaining insurance for the project. There are four elements required to prove

negligence:

      (1) the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by law,
      requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct;
      (2) a failure on the part of the defendant to conform to that duty,
      or a breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between the
      defendant's breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
      damage suffered by the complainant.

Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Pa. 2002)

(citation omitted). Our focus is on the second element, as the trial court found

that Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett did owe a duty to Weaver. The trial court

found the duty required was “to take reasonable steps in obtaining the

coverage his or her insured has specifically requested.” Trial Court Opinion,

9/20/19, at 16. As stated above, our Court has held that a cause of action

against a broker or agent may be maintained “where the broker neglects to

procure insurance, or does not follow instructions, or if the policy is void or

materially defective through the agent's fault.” Laventhol, 579 A.2d at 391.

We find that the trial court’s decision regarding the existence of a duty is in

line with our prior holdings. Now that we have determined that a duty was

required by Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett, we look to see whether the trial

court focused on the wrong factors in determining if that duty was breached.

      Weaver, around the same time Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett were

seeking insurance for the project, was also in communication with Bubb

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Insurance.7 Bubb Insurance provided a quote for the project with an existing

structure coverage of $500,000.00. Weaver chose not to purchase that

coverage. The trial court stated that Weaver did not purchase the coverage

“for financial reasons and perhaps due to the need to produce Engineer

approval.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/23, at 2 n.2.

       In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that “[t]his

observation has no relation to Defendants’ duty to Weaver and we made no

causal connection. As we made no connection between the Bubb Insurance

quote and Defendants’ duty to Weaver, we cannot further address a claim that

making such a connection was error.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 10.

       Other than the footnote quoted above, the trial court made only one

other reference to the Bubb Insurance quote in its opinion and order granting

summary judgment: “Even as a fact intensive inquiry, we see no material

dispute between the coverage sought and what was obtained which would

preclude summary judgment now given Plaintiff’s denial of the Bubb Insurance

quote and their subsequent acceptance of the Great American quote as

presented by Defendants.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/23, at 3. While we agree

that the trial court should not have placed any emphasis on Weaver obtaining

____________________________________________

7 Weaver signed the Acord application with Dietz and Bluett for an insurance

quote on the project on May 31, 2017, and received the initial quote from
Great American on June 13, 2017. Weaver contacted Bubb Insurance in May
2017 and received their quote on June 2, 2017.

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the Bubb Insurance quote as it does not affect the duty owed, we do not

believe that the trial court placed undue emphasis on it.

      The trial court clearly made its decision that Gottschalk and Dietz and

Bluett did not breach their duty to Weaver, and that is why it granted summary

judgment in their favor:

      As this [c]ourt previously held in ruling on Defendants’ Preliminary
      Objections, specifically to the issue of duty, the relationship
      between Plaintiff and Gottschalk was nothing more than an “arm’s
      length business transaction” and the [c]ourt gave slight weight to
      the overall public interest in requiring insurance agents to follow
      the requests of their insured. Defendants owed a duty to procure
      insurance as requested by Plaintiff, did so through its Agreement
      with wholesale broker Tuscano, and Plaintiff made the choice to
      purchase the coverage offered. Defendants’ inability to obtain the
      higher amount requested is irrelevant to the question of duty. If
      their steps did not result in Plaintiffs desired coverage, such a
      result does not mean those steps were inadequate or insufficient
      with respect to the role of a retail insurance agency/agent. And
      here, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Plaintiff, we
      find no breach of duty.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/23, at 3.

      It is obvious from reading the trial court’s entire opinion that it did not

place undue emphasis on the Bubb Insurance quote. It found that Gottschalk

and Dietz and Bluett had a duty to procure insurance as requested by Weaver,

but when they tried to do so, they were unable to obtain the requested quote

amount. Two insurance carriers refused to offer any quote at all. See Motion

for Summary Judgment, 3/15/23, Exhibit L, at 1, 4; Deposition of Robert

Tuscano, 8/4/21, at 72-73. Only Great American offered a quote, but with less

existing structure coverage than Weaver wanted. See Complaint, 6/5/19, at

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5; Answer, 10/10/19, Exhibit C, at 1. When Weaver requested a higher

existing structure coverage on 127 N. Broad Street, Gottschalk reached out to

its broker, Tuscano, who in turn reached out to Great American. See

Deposition of Robert Tuscano, 8/4/21, at 113-16; Deposition of Jeff

Gottschalk, 7/20/21, at 69-70, 74. Great American declined to increase the

coverage. See id.; Deposition of Walter Wilmshurst, 3/11/22, at 100, 138.

Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett met their duty by requesting the insurance

and the increase in existing structure coverage. While the coverage amount

was not the exact amount Weaver requested, it was what could be obtained,

and Weaver accepted it.8 As the trial court aptly noted:

       Here, [Appellees] found only one company which would provide
       insurance to Weaver – Great American. Great American made a
       take it or leave it offer of insurance, which Weaver ultimately
       opted to take. Thus, we do not hold that [Appellees] had no duty
       to Weaver, but held that, under the circumstances, it was
       impossible for [Appellees] to procure insurance in the form
       Weaver requested. Further, we found no dispute of fact that
       Weaver accepted the insurance bid procured by [Appellees].

Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2023, at 9.

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8 While it is true that Great American’s underwriter seemed confused over
whether the Property was purchased in the preceding 12 months, that
information (Great American’s confusion) was never provided to Gottschalk or
Dietz and Bluett. Gottschalk wrote on the application provided to Tuscano and
Great American that the Property was purchased in June 2015, more than 12
months before the application, which was created on May 31, 2017.There is
nothing in the record to this Court that shows Gottschalk or Dietz and Bluett
were aware Great American believed the Property was purchased in the
preceding 12 months.

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      As such, Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett did not breach their duty to

Weaver. They followed Weaver’s instructions, procured insurance, and the

policy was not void or materially defective. See Laventhol, 579 A.2d at 391.

In fact, Weaver does not allege to the contrary; and only complains that the

policy did not have the amount of existing structure coverage on 127 N. Broad

Street that it wanted. Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett took reasonable steps

to try to obtain the insurance requested by Weaver. The trial court did not err

in granting summary judgment as Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett did not

breach their duty to Weaver.

      We note that Weaver argues that the “reasonable expectations” doctrine

should apply. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15, 16. We disagree. We have

consistently held that:

      The standards to be applied in reviewing insurance contracts are
      well settled. The proper focus regarding issues of coverage under
      insurance contracts is the reasonable expectation of the insured.
      In determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, courts
      must examine the totality of the insurance transaction involved.
      However, while reasonable expectations of the insured are the
      focal points interpreting the contract language of insurance
      policies, an insured may not complain that his or her reasonable
      expectations were frustrated by policy limitations which are clear
      and unambiguous.

Hertz Corp. v. Smith, 657 A.2d 1316, 1317 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations

omitted; emphasis added); see also Bishops, Inc. v. Penn National Ins.,

984 A.2d 982, 990 (Pa. Super. 2009). Even if we were to apply this standard,

Weaver “may not complain that [its] … reasonable expectations were

frustrated by policy limitations which are clear and unambiguous.” Id. Weaver

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was explicitly informed that the existing structure coverage for 127 N. Broad

Street was $130,000.00. It cannot now complain it was unaware, as the policy

was clear and unambiguous.

      In its final claim, Weaver alleges the trial court erred in holding that

Gottschalk and Dietz and Bluett did not have a duty to Weaver. However, as

thoroughly discussed above, the trial court did, in fact, find that Gottschalk

and Dietz and Bluett owed a duty to Weaver. This issue lacks merit.

      In sum, after careful review, we find that Weaver waived its first three

issues, but even if not waived, they would not entitle it to relief. In Weaver’s

final two issues, the trial court correctly determined that summary judgment

was appropriate. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment.

      Order Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/28/2024

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