Court Opinion

ID: 9640530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:07:39.829225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:30.570893
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion correctly states that we do not indulge in statutory interpretation when the meaning of the words used in the statute under consideration is clear. The statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 17-22-101 (Supp. 1987), defines “contractor” as, among others, one “who, for a fixed price . . . undertakes to . . . repair . . . any . . . grading. . . .” Contrary to the majority of the members of the court, I do not find these words to be ambiguous. The first definition of the verb “repair” found in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged, 1968) is, “to restore by replacing a part or putting together what is torn or broken.” The same dictionary notes that the word “grading” is the gerund of “grade.” The third definition of the verb “grade” is “to reduce (as the line of a canal or roadbed) to an even grade whether on the level or in a progressive ascent or descent.” The third definition of the noun “grade” includes the following: “c. : level or elevation esp. of a land or water surface; as (1): a datum or reference level (2): the contemplated level of the ground when the work or erecting a building is completed: ground level. . . .’’The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged, 1970) includes among the definitions of “grade” the following: “Building Trades. [T]he ground level around a building.” 771 S.W.2d 741 APRIL 24, 1989 Howell, Price, Trice, Basham & Hope, P.A., by: Carey E. Basham, for appellant. L. David Stubbs, for appellee. The majority opinion declares the statute to be ambiguous, but it does not say how or why. The opinion notes that the statute is subject to varying interpretations but does not say what they are. Given the dictionary definitions of the words used, it seems clear to me that the statute applies to one who contracts to replace damaged sod on ground torn up in a sewer project. Wilcox was repairing a grading. The only explanation given by the majority opinion is that “the actions of Wilcox in sodding, sprigging, and seeding the land ... do not fall within the definition of . . . repair.” I suspect that the reason no authority whatever is cited for that conclusion is that none exists. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Dudley, J., joins this opinion. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice. On rehearing, Safley contends our decision effectively overrules Bird v. Pan Western Corporation, 261 Ark. 56, 546 S.W.2d 417 (1977). In support of this contention he states as follows: In Bird, this court found that the legislative intent of the wording of the statute in question was meant to broaden, rather than narrow, the application of the statute. This court, however, declares that it must now narrowly construe the language of the statute. In Bird, we addressed the issues of whether a person must contract with an owner or assume charge in a supervisory capacity to be considered a “contractor” under § 71-701 (Supp. 1975) (currently § 17-22-101). In reaching our decision, we first recognized that licensing statutes such as § 71-701 are to be strictly construed. We then held that because the legislature substituted the term “contractor” for “general contractor” and inserted the words “in a supervisory capacity or otherwise,” its intent was to broaden the application of the act so its application would not necessarily be limited to one who contracted with an owner or one who assumed charge in a supervisory capacity.  Whereas Bird recognized that the legislature broadened the application of our statute by inserting and substituting certain words in the statute, it did not change our long-standing rule that language contained in licensing statutes must be strictly construed. See Arkansas State Licensing Board for General Contractors v. Lane, 214 Ark. 312, 215 S.W.2d 707 (1948). Petition denied.