Court Opinion

ID: 9883807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:20:34.906878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:31.413757
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur with the result reached by the majority.
However, as to Issue I, collateral estop-pel, I would reverse and grant the plaintiff a new trial on damages, not only on the basis found by the majority, i.e., that once it was determined that the no-fault threshold was not reached, the damage issue was moot and it was unnecessary for the jury to determine damages, but also because the damage issue to be decided by the jury in the upcoming case (Coughlin v. Moose Club) is substantially different than the damage issue decided by the jury in the first case (Coughlin v. LaBounty).
Coughlin asserts that the trial court erred in determining that he was collaterally estopped from litigating the damage issue in his dram shop action (second of two trials resulting from the same accident). I agree.
The trial court based its collateral estop-pel ruling on the ground that all damage issues were considered and decided in La-Bounty. The trial court reasoned that, since the LaBounty jury heard expert testimony as to the probability that Coughlin would need future surgery, along with testimony relative to the projected expenses for that surgery, all damage issues were fully litigated at that first trial. The trial court ruled that the damage figure, even though uncollectable because no tort thresholds were reached, as a matter of law would be filled in at the second trial, with the next jury to decide only liability, if any, of the Moose Club.
Collateral estoppel is appropriate where, among other requirements, the issue presented is identical to one in a prior adjudication. The party estopped must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Ellis v. Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.1982). See also Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn.1984). Neither of these requirements have been met here.
Since the facts underlying appellant’s damages claim have changed substantially, the damage issue in this action is different from the damage issue litigated in La-Bounty. At the LaBounty trial, Cough-lin’s treating physician testified that there was a seventy percent probability that Coughlin would have to undergo surgery. LaBounty’s expert witness testified that Coughlin did not suffer from any disability as a result of the accident. This testimony implied that Coughlin would not have to undergo surgery.
Since LaBounty, Coughlin has undergone back surgery, and this new evidence will be presented for the jury to consider. Since surgery was actually performed, the treating physician may now have a different opinion regarding the permanency of Coughlin’s injury (which could be less or greater), and Coughlin may testify to his pain and discomfort resulting from actual surgery, evidence he could not have presented at the first trial.
There is a difference between evidence indicating a possibility of surgery and evidence of actual surgery. At the first trial, the jury was entitled, based on their per*822ception of the credibility of the two conflicting medical experts’ opinions, to come to a conclusion that there was little or no possibility of future surgery. A jury is not required to accept the opinion of medical experts as to future estimates. See Civ. Jig II, 22 G-S. On the other hand, a jury cannot ignore an undisputed fact.
In the second trial, since Coughlin has had surgery, the jury will not be able to consider the possibility that he might not have the surgery in deciding damages. Assessing the dollar value, if any, attributable to the surgery is within their discretion, but they, cannot compute damages as if surgery did not happen as could the La-Bounty jury, which considered damages and had the latitude either to decide that surgery would be unnecessary or, if it was, that it had no dollar value.
This difference between the facts underlying the two damage claims (the possibility of future versus the actual back surgery) renders collateral estoppel inapplicable to Coughlin’s dram shop action.
Coughlin is not precluded from relitigat-ing his damage claim because his. actual medical expenses for the surgery were less than the treating physician’s estimate at the LaBounty trial. The LaBounty jury may not have considered the cost of Cough-lin’s future surgery, since that jury may have initially determined that Coughlin likely would not undergo future surgery.
I conclude that Coughlin is entitled to the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the nature and extent of his injuries following actual, not projected, surgery.