Court Opinion

ID: 9949478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:04:50.149811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:29.723735
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 220451-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                          NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/11/24. The
                                                                               This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0451
                                                                               Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                  not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                     under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Lawrence County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 19-CF-66
                                                )
APRIL L. PENROD,                                )     Honorable
                                                )     Robert M. Hopkins,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Boie concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where the trial court substantially complied with Rule 402(a) admonishments, and
               the record shows that the defendant’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made,
               the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea
               was not an abuse of discretion.

¶2       The defendant, April L. Penrod, pled guilty to possession of less than five grams of

methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(b)(1) (West 2018)) and was released on a personal

recognizance bond with conditions. The defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea, which was

denied after a hearing. The defendant admitted a petition to revoke her bond and was sentenced to

two years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), plus one year of mandatory supervised

release (MSR). The defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. This court entered a summary remand

due to plea counsel’s failure to file a Rule 604(d) certificate. After plea counsel filed a Rule 604(d)

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certificate, the court held another hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

The trial court again denied her motion, and the defendant filed the instant appeal.

¶3                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶4     The defendant was charged by information on June 16, 2019, with possession of less than

five grams of methamphetamine. The defendant’s bail was set at $25,000 (10% to apply). On June

26, 2019, at the defendant’s first appearance, she entered an open plea to the charge in exchange

for the State’s agreement to release her on a personal recognizance bond, subject to certain

conditions including random drug testing and compliance reviews. The trial court admonished the

defendant that she would be pleading guilty to the offense of unlawful possession of

methamphetamine, a Class 3 felony, “ordinarily punishable in this State upon conviction by a fine

of up to $25,000 or incarceration for up to five years in the Department of Corrections, with, in

addition, one year mandatory supervised release.” The trial court additionally admonished the

defendant that she had a right to trial by jury, the right to a prompt preliminary hearing, the right

to remain silent and not testify against herself, and the right to release on reasonable bond.

¶5     The defendant signed a “PLEA OF GUILTY AND WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY

TRIAL” form and a “WAIVER OF EXTRADICTION” form. The State recited a factual basis that

witnesses would testify that on June 15, 2019, at the tenth block of Johnson Street in St.

Francisville, Lawrence County, Illinois, the defendant knowingly possessed less than give grams

of methamphetamine. The defendant, through her attorney, stipulated to the factual basis. The trial

court found that the defendant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waived her rights of trial by jury

and “other rights of defense” after which it found her guilty and set the case for a status/compliance

review on July 2, 2019.

                                                  2
¶6     On August 1, 2019, the defendant’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea

which alleged that at the time she entered her plea, she did not fully understand the implications

because “she was ill with a high fever, and received treatment shortly after release” and that she

had “a valid defense to this cause in that she was not in possession of any unlawful substance.” On

November 6, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion.

¶7     The following is a portion of the direct examination of the defendant, where her attorney

posed the questions, and the defendant provided the answers:

               “Q. And at the time that you entered that guilty plea, were you having difficulty

       thinking clearly?

               A. Most definitely.

               Q. Why was that?

               A. I believe my body was shutting down.

               Q. What do you mean by that?

               A. Well, I—I pled guilty to be able to go to the hospital to have surgery. I had

       MRSA, and they had let me sit with it for two weeks in jail, and it spread. My kidneys were

       shutting down, and I was running 105 fever by the time I got there.

               Q. And as a result of that—that fever and your medical conditions, do you think

       you had—were unable to clearly understand the implications of the guilty plea?

               A. I would’ve said anything to get out of jail to go have surgery to get better.”

¶8     The following is a portion of the cross-examination of the defendant, where the State posed

the questions, and the defendant provided the answers:

               “Q. Is—isn’t it true that you were fully informed of the consequences of entering

       your guilty plea when you did—in June?

                                                 3
              A. Honestly, with what I have going on right now with my mind, my short-term

       memory is almost completely gone. I—I reach for grasp. I didn’t even know where I was

       this morning when I woke up.

              Q. So you don’t remember entering a guilty plea?

              A. I don’t remember that day. No, sir.”

¶9     The following is a portion of the questioning of the defendant, where the trial court posed

the questions, and the defendant provided the answers:

              “Q. So, Ms. Penrod, you’re saying that you don’t remember what actually happened

       on the day the plea was taken, June 26th, 2019?

              A. Correct.

              Q. And you probably don’t remember what was happened [sic] on June 15th, 2019?

              A. Only way is if I write it down and I look back at notes.

              Q. I see. But don’t know whether the notes are correct or not?

              A. Correct. I guess you could say that.”

¶ 10   No other witnesses testified, and no additional evidence was presented. After hearing

argument from the State and the defendant’s attorney, the trial court stated: “The court is

questionable about the veracity of the defendant’s testimony as the major reason why the court

will deny the motion. Also, based upon her own testimony, she doesn’t know whether or not she

committed the offense.”

¶ 11   On February 13, 2020, the State filed a “PETITION CHARGING VIOLATION OF

CONDITIONS OF BAIL BOND” alleging that the defendant failed to appear for a random drug

test at the Jefferson County Probation Office. On February 21, 2020, the defendant admitted the

petition. On April 7, 2021, the defendant entered a negotiated agreement to be sentenced on her

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open plea entered June 26, 2019, to 24 months in IDOC, plus 1 year of MSR, to be served

concurrently with Jefferson County case No. 20-CF-105. On April 25, 2021, the defendant filed a

pro se notice of appeal form, which included the allegations that she “wasn’t in right state of mind

when I pled guilty, wrongly accused and evidence was planted in my truck.”

¶ 12   On April 6, 2022, this court, in a summary order, granted the defendant’s uncontested

motion for summary remand due to plea counsel’s failure to file a 604(d) certificate. Ill. S. Ct. Rule

604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). The cause was remanded for the filing of a Rule 604(d) certificate, the

filing of a new postplea motion, if deemed necessary, and a hearing on any new motion.

¶ 13   On June 1, 2022, plea counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance. Despite the

fact that no new or amended motion to withdraw guilty plea was filed, the trial court conducted

another hearing on July 13, 2022. The defendant again testified that the reason she pled guilty was

to be released from the Lawrence County jail to receive medical attention. She stated, “I had a

lesion underneath my arm that was bleeding and just pussing out profusely, and nothing was being

done about it.” The defendant admitted into evidence as Exhibit A, a discharge summary from

Lawrence County Memorial Hospital, documenting a surgical procedure to drain puss from a “left

axillary/left chest wall abscess,” which developed after shaving.

¶ 14   Plea counsel asked the defendant the following question: “Was entering a guilty plea the

only the only way that you saw that you were going to be able to get the medical treatment you

needed?” The defendant answered, “I knew that was the only way to get out.” When asked by the

State on cross-examination whether she was fully informed of the consequences of her guilty plea

at the time it was entered, the defendant replied, “Honestly, in the state that I was in at the time,

I—I just knew I needed medical attention. That’s—that’s all.”

                                                  5
¶ 15   After hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court again denied the defendant’s motion to

withdraw her guilty plea, stating in relevant part:

       “Based upon the evidence presented today and also based upon the evidence presented

       back on November 6th, 2019, when we heard the motion to withdraw previously, based

       upon all that evidence, court’s awareness of the case, the court finds that the defendant

       freely, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement, and that the plea was

       not coerced because of circumstances at the jail.

               *** The mere fact that she was operated on right after she got out is not really the

       relevant inquiry; the inquiry is how long she was in jail with that condition and had

       requested treatment.” (Emphasis added.)

This appeal followed.

¶ 16                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17   The defendant argues that the trial court did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule

402 at her plea hearing, and on that basis, the trial court should have granted the motion to

withdraw her guilty plea. Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). The State counters that the trial

court substantially complied with Rule 402 admonitions during the defendant’s guilty plea hearing

and, furthermore, that the record establishes that real justice was not denied where the defendant

voluntarily and knowingly entered into the plea agreement and was not prejudiced by the trial

court’s incomplete admonitions.

¶ 18   Rule 402(a) requires that prior to entering a guilty plea, the trial court shall inform the

defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the following: (1) the nature of the

charge, (2) the minimum and maximum sentences, (3) the right to plead not guilty, (4) the right to

trial by jury, and (5) the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. Here, the trial

                                                   6
court admonished the defendant of her right to jury trial, the nature of the charge, and the maximum

penalty for the charge. The trial court failed to admonish the defendant of the minimum sentence

possible, the right to be confronted with the witnesses against her, and the right to plead not guilty.

¶ 19    In admonishing a defendant, the trial court must substantially comply with the requirements

of Rule 402. People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 195 (2005). Substantial compliance with Rule

402 does not mean literal compliance. People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 495, 501-02 (1975).

Substantial compliance is determined by the admonishments provided to the defendant at the

hearing when the guilty plea is received. People v. Blankley, 319 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1007 (2001). A

defendant’s due process rights are violated if the trial court does not substantially comply with all

the required admonishments. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 195. However, failure to comply with all the

Rule 402 admonishments does not necessarily establish a due process violation or other grounds

that would allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. People v. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d

134, 139 (2009). A defendant must establish that real justice was denied or that he was prejudiced

by the inadequate admonishments. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 139. We review the trial court’s

compliance with Rule 402(a) on a de novo basis. People v. Chavez, 2013 IL App (4th) 120259,

¶ 14.

¶ 20    Illinois courts have held that a trial court can be in substantial compliance with Rule 402

even if it omits one or more of the admonitions. In People v. Dougherty, the court found that there

was substantial compliance with Rule 402 even though the trial judge did not admonish the

defendant on every provision. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 139. The Dougherty court found that

the trial judge substantially complied with Rule 402 because the evidence established that the

defendant entered his plea voluntarily and with full understanding. Id. The court reasoned that the

purpose of Rule 402 admonishments “is to ensure that a defendant understands his plea, the rights

                                                  7
he has waived by pleading guilty and the consequences of his action.” Id. at 138. Literal

compliance is not mandated. Id. at 139. “ ‘Substantial compliance’ means that although the trial

court did not recite to the defendant, and ask defendant if he understood, all the components of

Rule 402(a), the record nevertheless affirmatively and specifically shows that the defendant

understood them.” Id. at 138. Whether the standard of “substantial compliance” has been met

depends upon the facts of each case. Id. To determine whether the defendant’s guilty plea was

intelligently and voluntarily given in the absence of a full compliance with the Rule 402

admonishments, a reviewing court may consider the entire record. Id. at 139.

¶ 21   The issue here is not whether the trial court included every component required by Rule

402 during its admonishments but, rather, whether the trial court substantially complied with Rule

402. The transcript of the defendant’s open plea hearing, during which she was represented by

counsel, includes the following colloquy:

                  “THE COURT: Ms. Penrod, do you understand the proposed plea agreement

       explained just now by Mr. Shinkle?[1]

                  THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes sir.

                  THE COURT: Have you had a chance to discuss that with him?

                  THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

                  THE COURT: At this point, do you have any questions concerning that proposal?

                  THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: No, sir.

                  THE COURT: Do you understand that it is proposed according to this agreement

       that you would plead guilty to the offense of Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine,

       Count I, as charged in this case, a Class 3 felony. Do you understand that?

       1
           Mr. Shinkle was the defendant’s court-appointed attorney.
                                                     8
       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: Do you understand that that offense is ordinarily punishable in this

state upon conviction by a fine of up to $25,000 or incarceration for up to five years in the

Department of Corrections with, in addition to, one year mandatory supervised release,

otherwise known as parole?

       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: Do you understand you have a right to trial by jury on this charge?

       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: You have a right to a prompt preliminary hearing?

       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: (Nodding.)

       THE COURT: You have a right to—to remain silent and not testify against

yourself?

       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: You have a right to release on reasonable bond?

       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: But is it your intention, nevertheless, at this time, on advice of

counsel, to give up your right to trial by jury and other rights of defense and plead guilty

all according to this agreement?

       THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

                                      ***

       THE COURT: I have here what purports to be a written plea of guilt and waiver of

jury trial as to this charge, Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine, Count I, a Class 3

felony. Do you recognize this document?

                                         9
                THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

                THE COURT: Did you read and sign it?

                THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.

                THE COURT: And do you believe you understand what it says?

                THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir

                THE COURT: Do you have any questions:

                THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: No, sir.

                THE COURT: Do you understand if the Court accepts the plea agreement and

        enters orders consistent with it, you’ll be found guilty of this offense, Unlawful Possession

        of Methamphetamine, a Class 3 felony, and you’ll have no trial whatsoever. Do you

        understand that?

                THE DEFENDANT, APRIL L. PENROD: Yes, sir.”

Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court substantially complied

with Rule 402.2

¶ 22    The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that her guilty plea was

entered knowingly and voluntarily. The act of entering a plea of guilty is “grave and solemn.”

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). If a defendant is allowed to change his mind so

that a jury can hear his case, the guilty plea would become “a temporary and meaningless formality

reversible at the defendant’s whim.” United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

Allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea is not automatic and should be based on a need to

        2
          This was a very close case. The trial court would be well-advised to admonish future defendants
of all required components in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402.
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correct a manifest injustice. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520 (2009), overruled on other

grounds by People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965.

¶ 23    A trial court should allow a plea to be withdrawn if (1) the plea was entered on a

misapprehension of fact or law, (2) there is doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, (3) the defendant has

a meritorious defense, or (4) the ends of justice would be better served by submitting the case to a

jury. People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991). In her “MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA”

filed August 1, 2019, the defendant alleged she had a valid defense “in that she was not in

possession of any unlawful substance.” In her pro se notice of appeal, filed April 25, 2021, the

defendant alleged that she was “wrongly accused and evidence was planted in [her] truck.” The

record fails to contain a scintilla of fact, much less evidence, to support these conclusory

allegations, which are also contradictory.

¶ 24    The defendant’s reliance on People v. Urr, 321 Ill. App. 3d 544, 748 (2001), and People v.

Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38, 52 (1999), is misplaced. In Urr, the defendant maintained throughout

the proceedings that he was innocent and that he was being physically threatened on a daily basis

at the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC). Urr, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 548. Further,

the defendant made clear before his plea was accepted that the only reason he was pleading guilty

was because he had been sexually assaulted in the CCDOC. Id. When asked by the trial court if he

wished to plead guilty, the defendant responded, “ ‘Yes, I wish to plead guilty because I have no

other choice. *** I don’t want to die at this point.’ ” Id. In Peterson, the trial court vacated the

defendant’s guilty plea after the defendant’s persistent claim of innocence. Peterson, 311 Ill. App.

3d at 42. The court held “although the trial court may accept a plea from a defendant who maintains

his innocence, it is not required to do so in all instances.” Id. at 45.

                                                   11
¶ 25    Here, at the defendant’s plea hearing, neither she nor her attorney ever mentioned that a

lack of medical treatment at the Lawrence County jail was a factor in her decision to plead guilty.

The only mention of the defendant’s medical condition was her attorney’s statement that she had

a scheduled surgery. Nothing was said about what the surgery was for or how the need for that

surgery had any possible effect on the defendant’s current ability to knowingly and voluntarily

plead guilty. The record clearly shows that the defendant had numerous opportunities to bring any

medical concerns to the trial court’s attention, but she failed to do so. In fact, the defendant engaged

in a discussion with the trial court concerning how a travel restriction as a condition of her

recognizance release would adversely affect her employment in Missouri.

¶ 26    We find it compelling that at the conclusion of the first hearing on the defendant’s motion

to withdraw her guilty plea, the trial court made a specific finding that the defendant’s testimony

was not credible. “[W]e give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the

best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses. [Citation.] A

reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility

of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.” People v.

Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).

¶ 27    A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the

trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed unless the trial court clearly abused its

discretion. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 519. A trial court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion if

it is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted

by the trial court. People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009). Based upon a review of the entire

record, there is nothing to support a finding that that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary,

fanciful, or unreasonable.

                                                  12
¶ 28   The defendant finally argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing

to file a new or amended postplea motion. The defendant contends this was error because the initial

postplea motion was untimely when it was filed before the defendant’s sentencing hearing, and

counsel’s failure to include “the new arguments raised at the second hearing on Ms. Penrod’s

motion to withdraw guilty plea” caused her prejudice.

¶ 29   With a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-prong test of Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.

Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984). Under this test, the defendant must prove that (1) defense

counsel’s performance was deficient or fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and

(2) the defendant suffered prejudice because of defense counsel’s deficient performance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. If the defendant fails to establish either prong of the Strickland test,

the ineffective assistance claim fails. People v. Theis, 2011 IL App (2d) 091080, ¶ 39. If the

defendant does not raise his or her ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the trial court, our

review on appeal is de novo. People v. Berrier, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1166-67 (2006). The

reviewing court is not required to analyze both Strickland prongs and may conclude that the

defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance because he was not prejudiced by counsel’s

alleged deficient performance. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 342 (2007).

¶ 30   The untimeliness of the original motion to withdraw guilty plea was never raised until the

instant appeal. The trial court allowed the defendant to have another hearing on her motion to

withdraw her guilty plea without objection by the State. We disagree with the defendant’s

characterization that new arguments were raised during the second hearing. The only new things

were more detailed testimony from the defendant regarding her medical condition and the

additional evidence of the hospital discharge form, both of which the trial court heard and

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considered. We conclude that the defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance because she

was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Id.

¶ 31                                 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32   We find, based upon a review of the entire record, that the trial court substantially complied

with Rule 402 and that its decision to deny the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea was

not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

¶ 33   Affirmed.

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