Court Opinion

ID: 9464773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:42:02.849402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:48.410512
License: Public Domain

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree with the court that the warrant was too broad. As the affidavit afforded probable cause only to search for and seize Motown material, the warrant should have been limited to searching for and seizing like material.
It is clear from the record that a substantial quantity of material other than Motown material was seized by those executing the warrant at Montilla’s plant.* Moreover, *328there is no way that the warrant can be read as limited solely to Motown tapes and records. The affidavit, indicating that unauthorized Motown material was being produced, was not incorporated in the warrant by suitable words of reference. United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Womack, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 49, 509 F.2d 368, 382 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022, 95 S.Ct. 2644, 45 L.Ed.2d 681 (1975) and United States v. Lightfoot, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 181, 506 F.2d 238, 242 (1974)). Therefore, the warrant has to be construed, at face value, as authorizing the seizure of any supposedly illegal tapes and records. However, the affidavit presented to the magistrate did not provide probable cause to believe that this defendant was illegally manufacturing tapes and records other than Motown.
Our Klein case was different, in that it related to a retail record-shop which sold to the general public tapes ostensibly produced by various different manufacturers. The affidavit presented to the magistrate indicated the presence in the shop, for sale, of numerous illegal tapes, from which it could be inferred that the suspect was dealing broadly in tapes of that nature. There was thus probable cause to issue a warrant permitting a search of the shop and the seizure of unauthorized pirated tapes that were found there. The problem in Klein, leading to disagreement between myself and the court, was not whether there was probable cause to authorize such a search and seizure but whether the warrant contained a description adequate to enable the executing officer to distinguish reliably the articles to be seized. I felt that reference in the warrant to “certain 8-track electronic tapes and tape cartridges which are unauthorized ‘pirate’ reproductions” was adequate in that context to measure up to the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment, especially since there was evidence that pirated tapes of this type could easily be visually distinguished from authorized ones by their shoddy, amateurish covers and lettering.
Here, however, we deal with a manufacturer, not a retailer. The suspect is a former Motown licensee said, in the affidavit, to be continuing to manufacture Motown items after his license had been terminated. These facts provided probable cause for issuance of a warrant to search for and seize, as evidence of the illegal conduct, items bearing the Motown label or otherwise indicating the illegal production of Motown items.
But they did not give rise, without more, to an inference that other tapes and records found on the premises were similarly being manufactured without a proper license— thus they did not support a warrant for seizure, generally, of other “illegal” items, there being no adequate cause shown to anticipate additional illegality. See generally Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313-14 (1st Cir. 1966).
Moreover, even had there been probable cause, I would be more troubled in this context than I was in Klein about a description of the articles to be seized couched solely in terms of their illegality.
In the Klein dissent I said I did “not mean to suggest that an overly general description in a warrant would in every case be adequately narrowed by limiting seizure to items termed ‘illegal’. But if unauthorized ‘pirate’ items can be distinguished, visually as well as aurally, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, and if identifying them demands judgments that are more factual than legal, the concern that agents will inadvertently or purposely violate personal rights in the course of a seizure under the warrant is greatly diminished.”
*329565 F.2d at 191. I went on to concede that “there are some categories of illicit items so general that an agent could not in most circumstances be expected reliably to pick out the items belonging to the class . . . ” Id. I think the materials in question here, other than Motown, fall into this latter category. Deciding whether a manufacturer is licensed to produce tapes or records by whoever is entitled to issue licenses requires a legal inquiry into licensing arrangements — a more complex and judgmental task, in most instances, than picking out “pirated” tapes in a retail store, especially where the latter can be visually identified by the quality of their packaging.
I therefore agree with my brethren that on facts such as these the executing officers should not be given carte blanche authority to make, during the search, their own determination of illegality. This kind of determination should be made in advance by the magistrate, the warrant then describing those items of which proof of illegality was furnished.

 One agent testified that while executing the warrant, he and the other agents came across materials under the ABC Records label. One *328of the agents apparently telephoned a Mr. Selt-ski of ABC Records to find out if Montilla was authorized to produce for ABC. The agent stated that ABC’s response to the inquiry was that Montilla was not authorized to produce for ABC; the ABC material was therefore seized. Counsel for Montilla implied that he could repudiate the agent’s testimony about Montilla’s authorization, and in Montilla’s brief on appeal the implication is made express, but we find no record support for this contention.