Court Opinion

ID: 9966181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 12:01:53.634533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.795602
License: Public Domain

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                            Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

               HAROLD T. BANKS, JR. v. COMMISSIONER
                         OF CORRECTION
                            (AC 43187)
                           Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Suarez, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         The petitioner, who had been convicted of robbery in the first degree, sought
            a writ of habeas corpus more than five years after the date on which
            his judgment of conviction was deemed to be final. Pursuant to statute
            (§ 52-470 (c) and (e)), the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,
            moved for an order to show cause why the petition should not be
            dismissed as untimely. At a hearing on the motion, the petitioner’s
            habeas counsel, S, argued that the petitioner’s history of mental health
            issues and his filing of his petition immediately after he received certain
            medical records supported a finding of good cause for the delay, but S
            did not present any evidence in support of that argument. The habeas
            court dismissed the habeas petition, concluding that it was untimely
            and that the petitioner, in failing to present some evidence supporting
            the reason for the delay, did not rebut the presumption under § 52-470
            (c) that no good cause existed to excuse his late filing. Thereafter, on
            the denial of his petition for certification, the petitioner appealed to
            this court, claiming that the habeas court had abused its discretion in
            denying his petition for certification to appeal because S had rendered
            ineffective assistance and because the habeas court had failed to fulfill
            an alleged duty to intervene to protect the petitioner’s constitutional
            and statutory rights. Because those claims were not raised before the
            habeas court or included in his petition for certification to appeal, the
            petitioner sought review under the plain error doctrine or, alternatively,
            under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). This court dismissed the appeal,
            concluding that the certification requirement in § 52-470 (g) barred
            appellate review of unpreserved claims in uncertified appeals under
            both the plain error doctrine and Golding. This court reasoned that the
            habeas court could not have abused its discretion in denying the petition
            for certification to appeal when the petitioner did not distinctly raise
            his claims during the habeas proceeding or in his petition for certification
            to appeal. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to
            our Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of dismissal, and
            remanded the case to this court with direction to consider whether the
            petitioner had fulfilled his burden of establishing that his unpreserved
            claims challenging the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceeding
            itself were not frivolous under the criteria set forth in Simms v. Warden
            (230 Conn. 608), namely, whether they involve issues that are debatable
            among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve in a different manner
            or that are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Held
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                         Banks v. Commissioner of Correction
          that the inadequacy of the record as to the petitioner’s allegation that
          S rendered ineffective assistance was fatal to the petitioner’s unpre-
          served and uncertified claims challenging the habeas court’s handling
          of the habeas proceeding, and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed:
          although the failure of S to present evidence during the evidentiary
          hearing to support the petitioner’s claim of good cause could have been
          the product of ineffective assistance rather than sound strategy, the
          petitioner’s claim necessarily depended on whether such evidence
          existed and whether that evidence had been made available to counsel,
          and, in the present case, there was no evidence as to why S failed to
          present evidence at the hearing and no indication that such evidence
          existed; moreover, an adequate factual record was necessary for an
          appellate court to review a claim under the plain error doctrine or
          Golding, and the petitioner could not establish a due process violation
          based on the constructive denial of his statutory right to habeas counsel
          without first establishing that S rendered ineffective assistance; further-
          more, in the absence of any persuasive or binding authority, this court
          declined to recognize a new duty for the habeas court to act when
          counsel’s legal strategy was not readily apparent to the habeas court
          or to evaluate counsel’s strategic performance, as the record did not
          disclose whether S had evidence to present or whether the petitioner
          had agreed to testify at the hearing; additionally, this court concluded
          that the habeas court did not commit any error by failing to inquire as to
          the professional judgment of S when he appeared to make a questionable
          decision during the evidentiary hearing, and, accordingly, it would not
          have been an abuse of the habeas court’s discretion to deny the petition
          for certification to appeal if the unpreserved claims had been
          included therein.

                  Argued January 3—officially released May 7, 2024

                                  Procedural History

          Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the
       Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where
       the court, Newson, J., rendered judgment dismissing
       the petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition
       for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed
       to this court, Cradle, Alexander and Suarez, Js., which
       dismissed the appeal, and the petitioner, on the granting
       of certification, appealed to the Supreme Court, which
       reversed this court’s judgment and remanded the case
       to this court for further proceedings. Appeal dismissed.
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                       Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

           Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant
         (petitioner).
            James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,
         with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky
         III, former state’s attorney, Jennifer F. Miller, former
         assistant state’s attorney, and Lea Hawley, senior assis-
         tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                                    Opinion

            BRIGHT, C. J. This appeal returns to us on remand
         from our Supreme Court. See Banks v. Commissioner
         of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 361, 297 A.3d 541 (2023).
         The petitioner, Harold T. Banks, Jr., appealed to this
         court following the denial of his petition for certification
         to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dis-
         missing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as
         untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (c) and
         (e). Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn.
         App. 337, 338, 256 A.3d 726 (2021), rev’d, 347 Conn. 335,
         297 A.3d 541 (2023). On appeal, the petitioner asserted
         unpreserved claims that were not included in his peti-
         tion for certification to appeal, contending that his
         unpreserved claims were reviewable for plain error and
         pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
         567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
         317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Banks v.
         Commissioner of Correction, supra, 205 Conn. App.
         342. This court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, hold-
         ing that the certification requirement in § 52-470 (g)
         bars appellate review of unpreserved and uncertified
         claims whether for plain error or pursuant to Golding.
         Id., 343–45.
            After granting the petitioner’s petition for certifica-
         tion to appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the judg-
         ment of this court, holding that ‘‘§ 52-470 (g) does not
         restrict [a reviewing court’s] authority to review unpre-
         served claims under the plain error doctrine or Golding
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                     Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       following a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certifi-
       cation to appeal, so long as the appellants’ claims chal-
       lenge the habeas court’s handling of the habeas pro-
       ceeding itself and the appellant fulfills his or her burden
       of establishing that the unpreserved claims’’ are nonfriv-
       olous under Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646
       A.2d 126 (1994). Banks v. Commissioner of Correction,
       supra, 347 Conn. 350. Accordingly, our Supreme Court
       remanded the case to this court with direction to con-
       sider ‘‘whether the petitioner fulfilled his burden of
       establishing that his Golding and plain error claims
       challenging the habeas court’s handling of the habeas
       proceeding itself were nonfrivolous under the [Simms]
       criteria.’’ Id., 360–61. Because we conclude that he has
       not fulfilled his burden, we dismiss the appeal.
          Our Supreme Court set forth the following relevant
       facts and procedural history giving rise to this appeal.
       ‘‘On May 30, 2012, the petitioner was convicted of rob-
       bery in the first degree and sentenced to twelve years
       of incarceration. He did not file an appeal. More than
       five years later, on December 13, 2017, the self-repre-
       sented petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
       corpus challenging his conviction. The respondent, the
       Commissioner of Correction, filed a motion for an order
       to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed
       as untimely under § 52-470 (c), which provides in rele-
       vant part that ‘there shall be a rebuttable presumption
       that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of
       conviction has been delayed without good cause if such
       petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Five
       years after the date on which the judgment of conviction
       is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion
       of appellate review or the expiration of the time for
       seeking such review; [or] (2) October 1, 2017 . . . .’
       See also General Statutes § 52-470 (e).
         ‘‘The habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing
       on the respondent’s motion, at which the petitioner was
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                       Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

         represented by Attorney Jonatham M. Shaw. At the
         evidentiary hearing, Attorney Shaw argued that good
         cause existed to excuse the petitioner’s belated filing
         because the petitioner had ‘a long history of mental
         health issues . . . .’
            ‘‘The respondent’s attorney objected, stating that
         ‘[w]e don’t have any evidence of that.’ The habeas court
         responded: ‘Understood. I think he’s presenting argu-
         ment. I mean, I’ll allow him to do that.’ Attorney Shaw
         did not present any evidence but proceeded to argue
         that the petitioner ‘filed immediately after obtaining
         [certain medical] records in December of 2017, just a
         couple months after the deadline, and I believe there
         is good cause to allow his case to go forward.’ The
         respondent’s attorney countered that the petitioner had
         failed to fulfill his burden of demonstrating good cause
         for the delay because ‘[e]very claim that [Attorney Shaw
         made was] unsubstantiated by any evidence, and the
         timeframe [spoke] for itself.’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.)
         Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347
         Conn. 339–40.
            ‘‘Attorney Shaw stated that he ‘would just leave it to
         . . . what was stated in [the petitioner’s] response to
         the motion [for an order to show cause].’ In that
         response, Attorney Shaw argued that good cause
         existed to excuse the petitioner’s belated filing because
         the petitioner previously had filed a timely petition for
         a writ of habeas corpus, which allegedly was withdrawn
         on the advice of counsel. According to Attorney Shaw,
         ‘[t]he petitioner wished to refile the present action as
         soon as possible but needed to obtain medical records
         from various mental health treatment facilities in the
         state of New York. . . . The petitioner received his
         requested records on or about December of 2017. . . .
         Upon receipt of the . . . records, the petitioner imme-
         diately refiled his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’
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                     Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       No evidence was submitted at the hearing in support
       of these assertions.’’ Id., 339 n.1.
         ‘‘The habeas court thereafter issued a written memo-
       randum of decision, dismissing the petitioner’s petition
       for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court explained
       that the ‘petitioner had until October 1, 2017, to file
       the present petition; however, it was not filed until
       December 13, 2017.’ Given the statutory rebuttable pre-
       sumption that no good cause existed to excuse the
       petitioner’s late filing, and the petitioner’s failure ‘to
       provide some evidence of the reason for the delay,’ the
       habeas court concluded that the petition for a writ
       of habeas corpus was not timely filed under § 52-470
       (c). . . .
          ‘‘Following the dismissal of his habeas petition, the
       petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal,
       claiming that ‘the habeas court erred in finding that
       there was not good cause to allow [the] petition for [a
       writ of] habeas corpus to proceed on the grounds that
       he filed outside of the applicable time limits.’ The
       habeas court denied the petition for certification to
       appeal.’’ Id., 340. The petitioner appealed to this court,
       claiming ‘‘that the habeas court had abused its discre-
       tion in denying his petition for certification to appeal
       because (1) Attorney Shaw rendered ineffective assis-
       tance of counsel, thereby depriving the petitioner of
       his statutory right to counsel and his constitutional right
       to due process of law, and (2) the habeas court failed
       to fulfill an alleged duty to intervene to protect the
       petitioner’s constitutional and statutory rights. The peti-
       tioner acknowledged that these claims were not pre-
       served in the habeas court or included in the petition
       for certification to appeal but argued that appellate
       review was available under the plain error doctrine and
       Golding.’’ Id., 341.
         This court dismissed the appeal, concluding that ‘‘the
       certification requirement in § 52-470 (g) bars appellate
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                            Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

         review of unpreserved claims in uncertified appeals
         under the plain error doctrine and Golding.’’ Id. More
         specifically, we concluded ‘‘that, if the petitioner
         desired appellate review of his claims of ineffective
         assistance of habeas counsel and/or whether the habeas
         court had a duty to address counsel’s deficient perfor-
         mance to prevent prejudice to the petitioner, he was
         required to include those issues as grounds for appeal
         in his petition for certification to appeal.’’ Banks v.
         Commissioner of Correction, supra, 205 Conn. App.
         345.
            Our Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s petition
         for certification to appeal, limited to whether this court
         properly concluded that review for plain error, or pursu-
         ant to Golding, ‘‘of challenges to the habeas court’s
         handling of the habeas proceedings is unavailable for’’
         claims not raised in the petition for certification to
         appeal.1 Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 338
         Conn. 907, 908, 258 A.3d 1281 (2021). Although the peti-
         tioner also sought certification regarding ‘‘[w]hether
         Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834 [613 A.2d 818] (1992),
         affords the Appellate Court jurisdiction to review on
         direct appeal a claim of ineffectiveness of habeas coun-
         sel independent of any limitation on its jurisdiction
         imposed by . . . § 52-270 (g),’’ our Supreme Court did
         not certify that issue and specifically noted that ‘‘[t]he
         petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
             1
              The Supreme Court granted the petition for certification to appeal, lim-
         ited to two issues:
            ‘‘1. Did the Appellate Court correctly interpret . . . decisions of this court
         in concluding that plain error review of challenges to the habeas court’s
         handling of the habeas proceedings is unavailable for any issue that is not
         included in the petition for certification to appeal?
            ‘‘2. Did the Appellate Court correctly interpret . . . decisions of this court
         in concluding that review under State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 233],
         of challenges to the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceedings is
         unavailable for any issue that is not included in the petition for certification
         to appeal?’’ (Citations omitted.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 338
         Conn. 907, 907–908, 258 A.3d 1281 (2021).
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                     Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       which do not challenge the habeas court’s handling of
       the habeas proceedings, [were] outside the scope of
       the certified issues.’’ (Emphasis added.) Banks v. Com-
       missioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 342 n.2.
          As to the certified issues, our Supreme Court held
       ‘‘that unpreserved claims challenging the habeas court’s
       handling of the habeas proceeding are reviewable under
       the plain error doctrine and Golding, despite the peti-
       tioner’s failure to include such claims in the petition
       for certification to appeal denied by the habeas court,
       if the petitioner can demonstrate, consistent with
       [Simms], that the unpreserved claims involve issues
       that are debatable among jurists of reason, could be
       resolved in a different manner, or deserve encourage-
       ment to proceed further.’’ Id., 359–60. The court further
       explained that ‘‘the appellant must demonstrate that the
       unpreserved and uncertified claims are nonfrivolous,
       which [it] define[d] as raising a colorable claim of plain
       error or the violation of a constitutional right due to
       the actions or omissions of the habeas court. Only if
       the appellant succeeds in surmounting that hurdle will
       the appellate court review the appellant’s unpreserved
       claims on the merits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
       ted.) Id., 350–51.
          Accordingly, the court remanded the case to this
       court to consider whether the petitioner could sur-
       mount the hurdle of establishing that his unpreserved
       and uncertified claim ‘‘that the habeas court failed to
       fulfill its alleged duty to intervene to preserve the peti-
       tioner’s constitutional and statutory rights’’; id., 360;
       raises ‘‘a colorable claim of plain error or the violation
       of a constitutional right due to the actions or omissions
       of the habeas court.’’ Id., 351.
         As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard
       of review. ‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a
       petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can
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                       Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

         obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition
         for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged
         test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v.
         Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and
         adopted in Simms v. Warden, [supra, 230 Conn. 612].
         First, he must demonstrate that the denial of his petition
         for certification constituted an abuse of discretion. . . .
         To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must
         demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim
         involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of
         reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a differ-
         ent manner]; or that the questions are adequate to
         deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . Sec-
         ond, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion,
         he must then prove that the decision of the habeas
         court should be reversed on the merits. . . .
            ‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
         its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for
         certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
         the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether
         the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
         tioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
         nal quotation marks omitted.) McClain v. Commis-
         sioner of Correction, 188 Conn. App. 70, 74–75, 204
         A.3d 82, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 914, 204 A.3d 702 (2019).
         When, as in the present case, the habeas court never
         considered the unpreserved issues because they were
         not included in the petition for certification, ‘‘[t]he more
         accurate inquiry . . . is whether it would have been an
         abuse of discretion to deny the petition for certification
         to appeal if the unpreserved issue had been included
         in the petition for certification.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
         Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn.
         358 n.13.
           During oral argument before this court on remand,
         the petitioner’s counsel asserted what she claimed were
         two distinct arguments challenging the habeas court’s
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                     Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       handling of the habeas proceeding. Counsel contended
       that the petitioner claimed that ‘‘the state, acting
       through the habeas court . . . had an obligation to
       appoint counsel. [It] failed to appoint competent coun-
       sel, so [it] failed to fulfill a statutory obligation, and I
       allege that that is a deprivation of due process, and
       that’s the Golding claim. Separately, I say the [habeas]
       court had an obligation to step in when it was viewing
       this patently ineffective counsel, and it was plain error
       for the court not to do so. So, they’re separate argu-
       ments.’’ When asked how we are supposed to evaluate
       the habeas court’s appointment of Attorney Shaw for
       purposes of the petitioner’s due process claim, counsel
       responded that it would be based on Attorney Shaw’s
       performance. Counsel also clarified that the petitioner’s
       due process claim is based on the habeas court’s alleged
       duty to intervene when the court realized that Attorney
       Shaw was not going to present any evidence at the
       evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the petitioner’s due
       process and plain error claims are premised on the
       court’s alleged ‘‘duty to intervene when it became appar-
       ent that Attorney Shaw had decided not to offer evi-
       dence at an evidentiary hearing, guaranteeing a dis-
       missal of the habeas petition before the petitioner had
       an opportunity to demonstrate good cause for its
       untimely filing.’’
         Although styled as a challenge to the habeas court’s
       handling of the underlying habeas proceeding, the foun-
       dation of each of the petitioner’s claims is that Attorney
       Shaw’s ‘‘patently ineffective’’ assistance triggered the
       habeas court’s alleged duty to intervene. Consequently,
       a review of how and when ineffective assistance of
       counsel claims typically are addressed by our courts
       informs our analysis of the petitioner’s claims. A claim
       of ineffective assistance of counsel is ‘‘more properly
       pursued on . . . a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
       rather than on direct appeal . . . [because] [t]he trial
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                        Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

          transcript seldom discloses all of the considerations of
          strategy that may have induced counsel to follow a
          particular course of action.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) State v. Taft, 306 Conn. 749, 768, 51 A.3d
          988 (2012). ‘‘[A] habeas proceeding provides a superior
          forum for the review of a claim of ineffective assistance
          because it provides the opportunity for an evidentiary
          hearing in which the attorney whose conduct is chal-
          lenged may testify regarding the reasons [for the chal-
          lenged actions]. . . . A habeas proceeding thus
          enables the court to determine whether counsel’s [defi-
          ciency] was due to mere incompetence or to counsel’s
          trial strategy, which would not be possible in a direct
          appeal in which there is no possibility of an evidentiary
          hearing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
          Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 431, 147 A.3d 655 (2016).
            ‘‘[O]n the rare occasions that [our Supreme Court has]
          addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
          direct appeal, [it has] limited [its] review to allegations
          that the defendant’s sixth amendment rights had been
          jeopardized by the actions of the trial court, rather
          than by those of his counsel. . . . [The court has]
          addressed such claims, moreover, only where the
          record of the trial court’s allegedly improper action
          was adequate for review or the issue presented was
          a question of law, not one of fact requiring further
          evidentiary development.’’ (Emphasis in original; inter-
          nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, supra, 306
          Conn. 768.
             The petitioner recognizes this general rule but insists
          that this is one of those rare occasions when an ineffec-
          tive assistance claim can be addressed in a direct appeal
          because ‘‘[t]here is no conceivable tactical or strategic
          reason for Attorney Shaw’s omission that could be con-
          sidered objectively reasonable. Under these circum-
          stances, a collateral proceeding to explore Attorney
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                          Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       Shaw’s reasons for not offering evidence at an eviden-
       tiary hearing would be an empty exercise.’’ The respon-
       dent, however, argues that it is possible that there sim-
       ply ‘‘was no evidence to present. . . . Certainly, if no
       additional evidence existed for [Attorney Shaw] to pres-
       ent or if any such evidence would undermine his claim
       of good cause, the petitioner would necessarily fail to
       establish deficient performance.’’ In his reply brief, the
       petitioner responds that the record is adequate to
       review his ineffective assistance claim because ‘‘[t]his
       court should presume that Shaw acted ethically in rep-
       resenting that the evidence he specifically identified
       in his written submission and during the good cause
       hearing actually existed. . . . In the absence of evi-
       dence to the contrary, our courts will presume counsel
       fulfills his ethical obligations.’’ (Citation omitted;
       emphasis added.) We are not persuaded by the petition-
       er’s contention and conclude that the record is inade-
       quate to review whether Shaw rendered ineffective
       assistance, which is a necessary predicate of the peti-
       tioner’s due process and plain error claims.2
         ‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
       counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-
       pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
       [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
       (1984)]. Strickland requires that a petitioner satisfy
          2
            To be clear, this court previously declined to consider the petitioner’s
       ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the ground that that issue was
       neither preserved nor included in the petitioner’s petition for certification
       to appeal. During oral argument before this court on remand, counsel for
       the petitioner conceded that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
       claim was foreclosed in light of our Supreme Court’s order granting certifica-
       tion limited to the petitioner’s Golding and plain error claims challenging
       the habeas court’s handling of the underlying habeas proceeding. We agree
       that any consideration of that claim would fall beyond the scope of our
       Supreme Court’s remand order to this court. Accordingly, we address the
       reviewability of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim only
       insofar as it relates to the reviewability of his due process and plain error
       claims challenging the habeas court’s handling of the proceedings.
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                        Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

          both a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To
          satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must demon-
          strate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
          was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . . by
          the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . To satisfy the prejudice
          prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a rea-
          sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
          sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
          been different. . . . Because both prongs . . . must
          be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court
          may [deny] a petitioner’s claim if he fails to meet either
          prong. . . .
             ‘‘Our Supreme Court has stated that to establish defi-
          cient performance by counsel, a [petitioner] must show
          that, considering all of the circumstances, counsel’s
          representation fell below an objective standard of rea-
          sonableness as measured by prevailing professional
          norms.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Crocker v. Commissioner of
          Correction, 220 Conn. App. 567, 583–84, 300 A.3d 607,
          cert. denied, 348 Conn. 911, 303 A.3d 10 (2023). ‘‘[T]here
          is a strong presumption in favor of concluding that
          counsel’s performance was competent. . . . In order
          to overcome that presumption, the petitioner bears the
          burden of proving that counsel’s representation fell
          below an objective standard of reasonableness. . . .
          [T]he performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s
          assistance was reasonable considering all the circum-
          stances. . . . Thus, the question of whether counsel’s
          behavior was objectively unreasonable is not only one
          on which the petitioner bears the burden of proof; its
          resolution turns on a fact intensive inquiry.’’ (Citations
          omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
          omitted.) Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction, 329
          Conn. 584, 603, 188 A.3d 702 (2018).
            In the present case, the petitioner asks us to assume,
          on the basis of a presumption that counsel fulfilled his
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       ethical obligations, that there was evidence of good
       cause that Attorney Shaw failed to present at the hear-
       ing due to his incompetence. At the same time, he asks
       us to presume that counsel’s assistance was unreason-
       able, which would be contrary to the presumption of
       competence. In rejecting a similar argument in State v.
       Jose V., 157 Conn. App. 393, 405–406, 116 A.3d 833, cert.
       denied, 317 Conn. 916, 117 A.3d 854 (2015), this court
       explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough the record may reflect the
       actions of defense counsel during the [underlying] pro-
       ceeding, we do not know all of the reasons for those
       actions. . . . All of the relevant circumstances are not
       known. Our role . . . is not to guess at possibilities,
       but to review claims based on a complete factual record
       developed by a trial court. Without a hearing in which
       the reasons for counsel’s decision may be elicited, any
       decision of ours . . . would be entirely speculative.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
          The same reasoning applies in the present case
       because, although Attorney Shaw’s failure to present
       evidence during an evidentiary hearing to support the
       petitioner’s claim of good cause certainly could be the
       product of ineffective assistance rather than sound
       strategy, whether that is true necessarily depends on
       whether such evidence existed and had been made
       available to counsel. Not only is there no evidence as
       to why Attorney Shaw failed to present evidence at the
       hearing, there is no indication in the record that such
       evidence existed. See Crocker v. Commissioner of Cor-
       rection, supra, 220 Conn. App. 585 (‘‘because [t]he law
       presumes that counsel is competent until evidence has
       been introduced to the contrary . . . a petitioner who
       fails to call the attorney in question to testify at the
       habeas trial may face considerable difficulty in over-
       coming the presumption of competence’’ (citation omit-
       ted; internal quotation marks omitted)). The petitioner
       recognizes the significance of that evidence because,
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          despite arguing that no further development of the
          record is required, he correctly notes that ‘‘the evidence
          that should have been offered to rebut the presumption
          of untimeliness in this case will be offered to prove
          [that] the petitioner suffered prejudice from [Attorney
          Shaw’s] failure to offer that evidence.’’ Simply put,
          because all the relevant circumstances are not readily
          apparent from the record, an evidentiary hearing is nec-
          essary to address the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
          of habeas counsel claim.3 See, e.g., State v. Campbell,
          328 Conn. 444, 468 n.7, 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (‘‘[t]he
          defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is precisely the
          type of collateral attack that is best resolved in a habeas
          action, where the defendant will have the opportunity
          to present evidence in support of his claim that his
          counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was
          prejudiced by that deficient performance’’).
             The inadequacy of the record for review of the peti-
          tioner’s allegation that Attorney Shaw rendered ineffec-
          tive assistance is fatal to the petitioner’s unpreserved
          claims challenging the habeas court’s handling of the
          habeas proceeding. ‘‘In Golding, our Supreme Court
          held that a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitu-
          tional error not preserved at trial only if all of the
          following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate
          to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is
          of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a
          fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional viola-
          tion . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a
          fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
             3
               Although the petitioner claims that a new habeas petition alleging ineffec-
          tive assistance of habeas counsel is unnecessary, he does not claim that
          that remedy is unavailable to him. See Crocker v. Commissioner of Correc-
          tion, supra, 220 Conn. App. 585 (‘‘habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy
          for the ineffective assistance of appointed habeas counsel, authorizing . . .
          a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . challenging the perfor-
          mance of counsel in litigating an initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus’’
          (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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       the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
       alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
       doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions,
       the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribunal
       is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim
       by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in
       the particular circumstances. . . .
          ‘‘With respect to the reviewability prong of Golding,
       our Supreme Court stated that [t]he defendant bears
       the responsibility for providing a record that is adequate
       for review of his claim of constitutional error. If the
       facts revealed by the record are insufficient, unclear or
       ambiguous as to whether a constitutional violation has
       occurred, we will not attempt to supplement or recon-
       struct the record, or to make factual determinations,
       in order to decide the defendant’s claim. . . . Subse-
       quently, this court stated that [i]t is axiomatic that this
       court will not resort to speculation and conjecture in
       avoidance of an inadequate record.’’ (Citations omitted;
       emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Ayuso v. Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App.
       322, 373–74, 282 A.3d 983, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 967,
       285 A.3d 736 (2022).
          Under the plain error doctrine, an appellant must
       demonstrate ‘‘that the claimed error is both so clear
       and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment
       would result in manifest injustice. . . . It is axiomatic
       that . . . [t]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a
       rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That
       is, it is a doctrine that [an appellate] court invokes in
       order to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either
       not properly preserved or never raised at all in the trial
       court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court’s
       judgment . . . for reasons of policy. . . . Put another
       way, plain error review is reserved for only the most
       egregious errors. When an error of such a magnitude
       exists, it necessitates reversal. . . . An appellate court
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                              Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

          addressing a claim of plain error first must determine
          if the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent
          [or] readily [discernible] on the face of a factually ade-
          quate record, [and] also . . . obvious in the sense of
          not debatable. . . . This determination clearly requires
          a review of the plain error claim presented in light of
          the record.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
          internal quotation marks omitted.) Cookish v. Commis-
          sioner of Correction, 337 Conn. 348, 358–59, 253 A.3d
          467 (2020).
             Thus, an adequate factual record is necessary for an
          appellate court to review a claim under Golding or to
          consider it under the plain error doctrine. See Mozell
          v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 69 n.3,
          967 A.2d 41 (2009) (‘‘[b]ecause the record is inadequate
          for review under Golding it is also inadequate for con-
          sideration under the plain error doctrine’’); see also
          State v. Cane, 193 Conn. App. 95, 120 n.23, 218 A.3d 1073
          (same), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 901, 219 A.3d 798 (2019).
             In the present case, the petitioner cannot establish
          a due process violation based on the constructive denial
          of his statutory right to habeas counsel without first
          establishing that Attorney Shaw rendered ineffective
          assistance.4 In other words, because the record is inade-
          quate to review the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
            4
              Because we conclude that the record is inadequate to review the petition-
          er’s unpreserved due process claim, we simply note that the petitioner failed
          to brief the due process issue properly. The petitioner’s cursory analysis in
          his principal appellate brief fails to identify, let alone apply ‘‘the traditional
          three part balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
          335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), to determine what safeguards the
          federal constitution requires to satisfy procedural due process.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Turn of River Fire Dept., Inc. v. Stamford, 159
          Conn. App. 708, 712 n.2, 123 A.3d 909 (2015); see also In re Jonathan M.,
          255 Conn. 208, 234, 764 A.2d 739 (2001) (applying Mathews factors and
          concluding ‘‘that the risk of error and the procedural alternatives that exist
          weigh against extending the writ of habeas corpus to permit a parent, whose
          parental rights have been terminated in a prior proceeding, to assert a claim
          of ineffective assistance of counsel’’).
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                     Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       of habeas counsel claim, the record also is inadequate
       to review his due process claim under Golding’s first
       prong. ‘‘[I]n the absence of a sufficient record, there is
       no way to know whether a violation of constitutional
       magnitude in fact has occurred. Thus . . . we will not
       address an unpreserved constitutional claim [i]f the
       facts revealed by the record are insufficient, unclear or
       ambiguous as to whether a constitutional violation has
       occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
       Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 581, 916 A.2d 767 (2007).
          The petitioner’s plain error claims also are premised
       on the alleged ineffectiveness of Attorney Shaw. Specifi-
       cally, the petitioner contends that he ‘‘identified two
       errors he alleges constitute plain error; first, the depri-
       vation of due process arising from the constructive
       denial of habeas counsel in violation of General Statutes
       § 51-296, and, second, the habeas court’s breach of its
       duty to protect the petitioner’s rights by ensuring that
       the proceedings before it were conducted in conformity
       with statutory and constitutional requirements. . . .
       The errors are readily discernible on the face of the
       record. When Attorney Shaw announced he would rely
       on the written response to the motion to show cause,
       the habeas court pointedly asked, ‘[y]ou’re asking the
       court to just rely on the papers in this matter?’ The
       habeas court obviously understood what Shaw appar-
       ently did not—that in the absence of evidence, Shaw
       might as well have said nothing at all. No further devel-
       opment of the record is necessary.’’
         Again, as we concluded regarding the alleged due
       process violation, the alleged ineffective assistance of
       counsel triggering the habeas court’s duty to act is not,
       as the petitioner maintains, readily apparent on the face
       of the record. As previously noted in this opinion, the
       record does not disclose whether Attorney Shaw had
       evidence to present or whether the petitioner had
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                        Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

          agreed to testify at the hearing. The petitioner neverthe-
          less argues that this court should notice plain error
          attributable to the habeas court because ‘‘the court
          could have asked whether counsel had particular evi-
          dence he wanted to introduce to support his argument,
          or whether he perhaps wished to put the petitioner on
          the stand, or could even have questioned the petitioner
          himself. The court could have taken a recess and ques-
          tioned counsel in chambers, and continued the hearing
          to allow Shaw to produce the evidence he should have
          been prepared to produce all alon[g]. . . . Any of those
          small steps might have been sufficient to avert the gratu-
          itous loss of the petitioner’s rights.’’ Put differently, the
          petitioner requests that we recognize a new duty for
          the habeas court to step in whenever it appears that
          counsel has no strategic reason for failing to pursue a
          certain course of action. In the absence of any persua-
          sive, let alone binding, authority to support the petition-
          er’s contention, we decline to do so.
             First, we are not persuaded by the petitioner’s reli-
          ance on cases that have found that a trial court has a
          duty to intervene in a criminal case in certain circum-
          stances. In particular, the petitioner, in citing cases from
          the United States Supreme Court, argues that a trial
          court has a duty to act, sua sponte, ‘‘to ensure the
          integrity and fairness of the proceedings over which it
          presides.’’ See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384,
          110 S. Ct. 1190, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1990) (‘‘[a]rguments
          of counsel which misstate the law are subject to objec-
          tion and to correction by the court’’); Viereck v. United
          States, 318 U.S. 236, 248, 63 S. Ct. 561, 87 L. Ed. 734
          (1943) (holding that trial court ‘‘should have stopped
          [the prosecutor’s prejudicial and improper] discourse
          without waiting for an objection’’). The petitioner also
          argues that a trial court has a duty to act, sua sponte,
          ‘‘to inquire into possible conflicts of interests of which
          it is, or should be, aware’’; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
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                      Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

       U.S. 335, 346, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980)
       (noting that when ‘‘the trial court knows or reasonably
       should know that a particular conflict exists,’’ it must
       initiate inquiry as to conflict of interest); and ‘‘to prevent
       the trial of an incompetent defendant.’’ See Drope v.
       Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d
       103 (1975) (‘‘trial court must always be alert to circum-
       stances suggesting a change that would render the
       accused unable to meet the standards of competence
       to stand trial’’).

          Making a qualitative judgment as to counsel’s perfor-
       mance during the proceeding in which the alleged inef-
       fective assistance is occurring is fundamentally differ-
       ent than correcting misstatements of the law, curtailing
       prosecutorial impropriety, and inquiring into an appar-
       ent conflict of interest or mental incapacity, because
       evaluating counsel’s performance would require that
       the court inquire as to counsel’s strategy for the matter
       that is still proceeding before the court. The problem
       with that line of inquiry is that ‘‘the trial court risks
       interfering with the defendant’s right to counsel and the
       attorney-client relationship if the court asks counsel,
       during trial, for a full explanation of his strategy.’’
       (Emphasis added.) State v. Castro, 200 Conn. App. 450,
       462 n.10, 238 A.3d 813, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 983, 242
       A.3d 105 (2020). Indeed, that is why, ‘‘in circumstances
       in which defense counsel’s [conduct] . . . constitutes
       a violation of the defendant’s right to the effective assis-
       tance of counsel, the defendant may seek recourse
       through habeas corpus proceedings.’’ (Internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Id., 461. Accordingly, the recog-
       nized duties of courts to intervene in proceedings refer-
       enced by the petitioner are not analogous to the duty
       that he seeks to impose on criminal and habeas court
       judges, and which duty he claims the habeas court
       breached in the present case.
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                        Banks v. Commissioner of Correction

             Second, given that ‘‘[o]ur Supreme Court has repeat-
          edly and expressly rejected the proposition that a trial
          court is required to assess defense counsel’s profes-
          sional judgment before accepting his or her waiver of
          a constitutional claim’’; id., 460; and considering that
          the petitioner has failed to cite a single decision in
          which a reviewing court has held that a trial court
          has a duty to evaluate appointed counsel’s strategic
          performance, we cannot conclude that the habeas court
          committed any error, let alone an error so obvious that
          it is not debatable, by failing to inquire as to Attorney
          Shaw’s professional judgment when he appeared to
          make a questionable decision during the evidentiary
          hearing. See State v. Campbell, supra, 328 Conn. 469
          n.7 (‘‘[T]he defendant’s argument simply recasts an inef-
          fective assistance of counsel claim in an attempt to
          secure review of unpreserved claims. Just as with any
          other collateral attacks that are based on ineffective
          assistance of counsel claims, the defendant’s remedy
          for his claim that his counsel were ineffective for failing
          to preserve claims on appeal is to file a petition for a
          writ of habeas corpus.’’).
             In sum, because the record is inadequate to review
          the petitioner’s unpreserved and uncertified claim,
          either for plain error or pursuant to Golding, we con-
          clude that it does not ‘‘involve issues that are debatable
          among jurists of reason, could be resolved in a different
          manner, or deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’
          Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn.
          360. Accordingly, it would not have been an abuse of
          the habeas court’s discretion to deny the petition for
          certification to appeal if the unpreserved issues had
          been included therein. See id., 358 n.13.
            The appeal is dismissed.
            In this opinion the other judges concurred.