Court Opinion

ID: 9380042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 00:00:29.895686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:29.057143
License: Public Domain

Case: 16-70023     Document: 00516679247          Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/16/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                        FILED
                                                                   March 16, 2023
                                   No. 16-70023
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk
   Joseph Gamboa,

                                                            Petitioner—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                                            Respondent—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 5:15-CV-113

   Before Jones, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Petitioner Joseph Gamboa, a capital inmate in Texas, appeals the
   district court’s denial of his “Motion to Dismiss Counsel” during his 28
   U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus proceedings. Because we cannot grant

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 16-70023        Document: 00516679247         Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/16/2023

                                     No. 16-70023

   any effectual relief, Gamboa’s appeal is moot, and we must dismiss it for lack
   of jurisdiction.
                                           I.
          The background to this case has been amply discussed elsewhere. See
   Gamboa v. Davis, 782 F. App’x 297, 298–99 (5th Cir. 2019). We briefly
   recount the facts as relevant here. In 2007, a Texas jury convicted Joseph
   Gamboa of capital murder and sentenced him to death for killing Ramiro
   Ayala and Douglas Morgan during a 2005 robbery at a bar in San Antonio,
   Texas. Id. at 289. Gamboa’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
   appeal, see Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), and his
   state habeas application was denied in February 2015, see Gamboa, 782 F.
   App’x at 298.
          In 2015, following his unsuccessful state habeas proceedings, Gamboa
   moved in federal district court for appointment of counsel to assist with his
   28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. The district court appointed
   attorney John Ritenour, Jr. to represent Gamboa. Ritenour filed Gamboa’s
   § 2254 petition in February 2016, alleging various challenges to the
   constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty scheme. Ritenour later met with
   Gamboa, who allegedly expressed his displeasure with what Gamboa
   perceived as Ritenour’s failure to investigate other issues related to the guilt
   and penalty phases of his capital trial. In April 2016, the State filed an answer,
   contending that all of Gamboa’s claims were foreclosed by settled precedent
   and that some were also procedurally defaulted. The next month, Ritenour
   filed an untimely two-paragraph reply brief, conceding that each claim in
   Gamboa’s federal habeas petition was foreclosed. Id. at 298–299. On June
   8, 2016, Ritenour wrote to Gamboa, enclosing the reply brief and explaining
   his rationale for conceding that all claims were foreclosed.

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          Three weeks later, on June 29, 2016, Gamboa filed a pro se “Motion
   to Dismiss Counsel” wherein he requested that the district court remove
   Ritenour as his appointed counsel and appoint new counsel to represent him.
   The motion stated that “appointed counsel has failed to file the appropriate
   and REQUESTED ERRORS necessary to the adequate defense to the
   federal habeas writ pending against defendant herein.” The pro se motion
   further stated that Gamboa had “lost faith in counsel and no longer trust [sic]
   counsel’s advice” and that, “as a result of the attitude and performance of”
   appointed counsel, “there now exist [sic] an irreparable, antagonistic
   relationship between Defendant and appointed counsel.” The motion,
   however, lacked a certificate of conference and, although it included a
   certificate of service, that certificate was incorrectly addressed.
          On July 8, 2016, the district court struck Gamboa’s motion for failing
   to comply with the Local Court Rules for the United States District Court for
   the Western District of Texas and, in the alternative, denied the motion on
   its merits. First, the court stated that the applicable standard for evaluating
   Gamboa’s motion to substitute counsel was whether there was “good cause
   . . . for the withdrawal of counsel.” The court then emphasized that the
   motion was filed four months after Ritenour filed the § 2254 petition, more
   than a month after Ritenour filed the “last operative pleading” in the case,
   and well after the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s statute of
   limitations had expired on Gamboa’s petition. The court also observed that
   Gamboa had not alleged any specific facts demonstrating an actual or
   potential conflict of interest between himself and Ritenour nor had Gamboa
   identified with specificity any irreconcilable conflict between himself and
   Ritenour.
          Responding to Gamboa’s allegation that his counsel failed to assert
   claims that Gamboa wanted to include in his petition, the court noted that
   Gamboa had not “identif[ied] any non-frivolous claims for relief” that he

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   would have included in his § 2254 petition but that Ritenour failed to
   incorporate, and, moreover, counsel is under no duty to raise every non-
   frivolous claim that could be pressed. Last, the district court stated that the
   motion was deficient under the Local Rules because it lacked both a
   certificate of service and a certificate of conference.
          On August 4, 2016, the district court denied Gamboa’s § 2254 motion
   and denied a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”), determining that all of
   his claims were procedurally defaulted and/or foreclosed by precedent.
   Ritenour then moved to withdraw as counsel. The district court denied his
   motion without prejudice. Subsequently, Gamboa filed a pro se notice of
   appeal. The notice identified two orders that Gamboa sought to appeal—the
   district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss counsel and the order
   denying his § 2254 petition.
          In proceedings before this court, Ritenour again moved to withdraw,
   and we granted his motion. Gamboa obtained new counsel and successfully
   obtained a stay of proceedings in this court so that he could file a motion for
   relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in the
   district court. He argued that Ritenour abandoned him, “depriving him of
   the quality legal representation guaranteed in his federal habeas proceedings
   under [18 U.S.C.] § 3599, and that the proceedings should therefore be
   reopened to cure that defect.” Id. The district court denied Gamboa’s Rule
   60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive petition and, alternatively,
   denied the motion on the merits for failure to show extraordinary
   circumstances justifying Rule 60(b) relief. The district court also denied
   Gamboa a COA. Gamboa then sought a COA from this court to challenge
   the district court’s ruling on his Rule 60(b) motion. Acknowledging that
   Gamboa’s claims of attorney abandonment were “troubling,” we denied a
   COA in light of binding circuit precedent. Id. at 301 (citing In re Edwards,
   865 F.3d 197, 204–05 (5th Cir. 2017)).

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          Following our denial of a COA, the parties briefed the issue of whether
   the district court committed reversible error in denying Gamboa’s motion to
   dismiss counsel and appoint substitute counsel.
                                         II.
          On appeal, Gamboa argues that the district court applied the incorrect
   standard in considering his motion to appoint substitute counsel. He points
   out that the Supreme Court had mandated that district courts assess “the
   interests of justice” in considering indigent capital defendants’ requests to
   replace appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e), see Martel v. Clair, 565
   U.S. 648, 652 (2012), but that the district court instead stated that the
   applicable standard was whether there was “good cause . . . for the
   withdrawal of counsel.” Gamboa asks us to reverse the district court’s denial
   of his motion and to remand this matter to the district court with instructions
   “that the case proceed with substitute counsel, as of the date of the filing” of
   his motion.
          Before we may entertain the merits of Gamboa’s appellate arguments,
   we must first consider our jurisdiction. Although Gamboa has not sought nor
   received a COA to appeal the denial of his motion to substitute counsel under
   18 U.S.C. § 3599(e), a COA is not required to appeal this issue. Title 28
   U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), the provision governing the issuance of a COA for
   state prisoners, provides that, unless a COA issues, “an appeal may not be
   taken” from “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the de-
   tention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court.” The
   Supreme Court has observed that this provision specifically “governs final
   orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding—a proceed-
   ing challenging the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention.” Harbison v.
   Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). By contrast, “[a]n order that merely denies a
   motion to enlarge the authority of appointed counsel (or that denies a motion

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                                          No. 16-70023

   for appointment of counsel) is not such an order and is therefore not subject to
   the COA requirement.” Id. (emphasis added). This includes motions to sub-
   stitute appointed counsel filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e). See Lambrix v.
   Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining
   that “petitioner d[id] not need a COA to appeal a district court’s denial of”
   of his “Motion for Appointment of Substitute Collateral Counsel” under 18
   U.S.C. § 3599(e) because “[a]n order denying a motion for court-appointed,
   federal habeas counsel under [that provision] is ‘clearly an appealable order
   under 28 U.S.C. § 1291’” (cleaned up) (quoting Harbison, 556 U.S. at 183)).
           Though appeals from the denial of appointment of counsel do not re-
   quire a COA, we must address the additional jurisdictional issue of whether
   the present appeal is moot. 1 “A case becomes moot . . . ‘only when it is im-
   possible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
   party.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 161 (2016) (quoting
   Knox v. Serv. Emps. Intern. Union Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)).
   Gamboa seeks to have the district court’s order denying his motion for ap-
   pointment of substitute counsel reversed. But Gamboa has not been repre-
   sented by Ritenour—the attorney Gamboa sought to replace—since we
   granted Ritenour’s motion to withdraw early in the proceedings in this court.
   Moreover, Gamboa has had the services of substitute counsel for almost the
   entirety of his proceedings in this court. So, any request to merely substitute
   counsel at this juncture in the habeas litigation would be moot.
           What Gamboa actually seeks is not simply to change counsel now; in-
   stead, he asks us to rule that the district court should have granted his motion

           1
              “None of the parties raised” any “jurisdictional issue[s] on appeal. Of course,
   we ‘must examine the basis of [our] jurisdiction, on [our] own motion, if necessary.’” Hill
   v. City of Seven Points, 230 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d
   659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987)).

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                                    No. 16-70023

   to appoint substitute counsel during his § 2254 proceedings before that court,
   which would allow him to rewind his federal habeas proceedings to the time
   he filed that motion. Implicit in this request is that we vacate or otherwise
   effectively invalidate orders that were entered after Gamboa filed his motion
   to substitute counsel, including, most importantly, the district court’s denial
   of his § 2254 petition. Granting the relief he requests would, at a minimum,
   imply the invalidity of the order denying his petition, as it was issued follow-
   ing the denial of the motion to substitute counsel. But, as explained below,
   we are powerless to vacate or invalidate the district court’s judgment denying
   Gamboa’s federal habeas petition without first issuing a COA.
          In order for us to overturn the district court’s order “dispos[ing] of
   the merits of [his] habeas proceeding,” Harbison, 556 U.S. at 183, Gamboa
   would need to appeal that order. But before he could prosecute such an ap-
   peal, he would first need to receive a COA from this court, which would then
   authorize his appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); see also United States v. Davis,
   971 F.3d 524, 535 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that, in the context of a § 2255
   motion, “a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any appeal” and that this
   court therefore has “no judicial power to do anything without it”). And “[a]
   COA may issue ‘only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
   denial of a constitutional right.’ Until the prisoner secures a COA, the Court
   of Appeals may not rule on the merits of his case.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct.
   759, 773 (2017) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).
          The district court denied Gamboa a COA on the denial of his § 2254
   petition. Foreseeing that a COA would be required to grant his request that
   we vacate this denial in order to deliver relief on his motion to substitute
   counsel, Gamboa asks in the alternative that we construe his September 12,
   2016 Notice of Appeal as a request for a COA. Federal Rule of Appellate
   Procedure 22(b)(2) permits this. However, we decline to grant a COA be-
   cause no reasonable jurist would find the district court’s decision here

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   debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003). As Gamboa
   concedes, the claims that attorney Ritenour raised in Gamboa’s petition were
   generic, broadside constitutional challenges entirely foreclosed by precedent.
   He is correct that “none of the claims contained in appointed counsel’s pe-
   tition would qualify for a COA.”
          Instead, Gamboa argues that the district court’s erroneous denial of
   his motion to substitute counsel had the consequence of depriving Gamboa
   of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his petition in violation of due
   process. While it is true that there is a due process right to counsel of one’s
   choice, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006), and
   this is at least partly rooted in the fundamental right to be heard, Gandy v.
   Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287
   U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)), this constitutional right typically does not extend to
   situations in which counsel is court-appointed, Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at
   151; cf. Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[M]otions for
   substitution of retained counsel and for a continuance can implicate both the
   Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and the Fourteenth Amendment
   right to due process of law.”) (emphasis added); see also Christeson v. Roper,
   574 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (“Congress has not, however, conferred capital ha-
   beas petitioners with the right to counsel of their choice.”). Here, Gamboa’s
   motion requested that the district court appoint new counsel, putting the mo-
   tion beyond the apparent bounds of this particular aspect of due process as
   recognized thus far in caselaw. Section 2253(c) requires a “substantial show-
   ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” When there is doubt as to the
   existence of the constitutional right asserted, we cannot say a substantial
   showing of its denial has been made. Thacker v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 607, 617–18
   (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we find Gamboa has not carried his burden to
   warrant issuing a COA for his appeal of the denial of his motion to substitute
   counsel.

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                                      III.
         For these reasons, Gamboa’s appeal of the denial of his motion to sub-
   stitute counsel is DISMISSED as moot.

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