Court Opinion

ID: 9538879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:43:15.511481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:13.175452
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, Presiding Judge,
concurring in result:
I concur in the denial of Braun’s Application, but I believe the opinion engages in needless discussion. The lengthy analysis of the principle of access to the courts in Proposition II is unnecessary. Braun complains because we denied his request to supplement his appellate brief with a proposition relating to sufficiency of the Information, while we granted similar requests in two other eases. Braun’s underlying claim relies on dicta in Pickens v. State1 and his argument does not support the conclusion that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been different. Consequently I would simply deny relief.
I also disagree with the analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel in Proposition IV. The opinion describes the Walker v. State2 three-tiered procedure for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, then wanders into a discussion of federal habeas corpus law which is both inappropriate and unnecessary under Walker. We do not need to explicitly or by analogy rest our interpretation of the revised post-conviction statutes on federal case law. Based on the analogy to federal law, the opinion concludes that Braun fails to show his claims were unavailable to direct appeal counsel, and further fails to provide a “substantial” reason rebutting the majority’s presumption that appellate counsel’s decision not to raise certain issues was “studied”. None of this conforms to Walker. Applying the Walker test, I first note that the conduct Braun claims was deficient actually occurred. However, he merely provides 1) a laundry list of supposedly meritorious claims which appellate counsel faded to raise; 2) counsel’s affidavit claiming none of these failures were strategic decisions; and 3) an affidavit stating a reviewing attorney believes appellate counsel’s decisions to have been ineffective. Taken as a whole this material does not set forth facts and law establishing that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient, and I would deny the claim.
Finally, the discussion of Proposition VI states that “since there is no constitutional right under the United States Constitution to post-conviction counsel, there can be no Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective counsel.” State law entitles Braun to counsel in post-conviction proceedings and, if he is entitled to counsel, he must be entitled to effective counsel. Otherwise this right to counsel makes no sense. I would review the claim and deny relief.
I am authorized to state that Strubhar, V.P.J., and Johnson, J., join in this opinion.

. 885 P.2d 678, 683-84 (Okl.Cr.1994). Our decision reversing Pickens did not rest on the lack of "malice aforethought" in the Information, and remarks regarding that language are dicta. Charm v. State, 924 P.2d 754 (Okl.Cr.1996).

. 933 P.2d 327 (Okl.Cr.1997).