Court Opinion

ID: 9955342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:06:49.597991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.084039
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13382

            MATTHEW SUTTON1   vs.   JORDAN'S FURNITURE, INC.

         Middlesex.      October 4, 2023. – March 28, 2024.

     Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.2

Massachusetts Wage Act. Labor, Wages, Overtime compensation,
     Minimum wage. Minimum Wage. Practice, Civil, Class
     action, Summary judgment, Attorney's fees, Costs,
     Retroactivity of judicial holding. Statute, Construction.
     Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of statute.
     Retroactivity of Judicial Holding. Damages, Attorney's
     fees.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 19, 2019.

     The case was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J., on
motions for summary judgment; a motion to amend the judgment and
for attorney's fees and costs was also heard by her; and a
second amended judgment was entered by her.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated.

     2 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case
prior to his retirement.
                                                                   2

     Brant Casavant (Hillary Schwab also present) for the
plaintiff.
     Julie B. Brennan (Ariel D. Cudkowicz & Dawn Reddy Solowey
also present) for the defendant.
     Joshua D. Nadreau, for Retailers Association of
Massachusetts, was present but did not argue.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     Michael J. Sheehan, P. Kevin Connelly, & Barrick Bollman,
of Illinois, Robert J. Cordy, Andrew Liazos, Frank J. Bailey,
& Selena Fitanides for Pioneer Public Interest Law Center.
     Raven Moeslinger for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers
Association & others.
     Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, & Alexander
Sugerman-Brozan, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney
General.

     GEORGES, J.   The primary issue in this case is whether the

commissions-based compensation scheme for sales employees of a

retail employer, Jordan's Furniture, Inc. (Jordan's), complied

with the overtime statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, and the Sunday

pay statute, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50).3   We held in Sullivan v.

Sleepy's LLC, 482 Mass. 227, 228 (2019) (Sleepy's), that

(1) employers must make "separate and additional payments" to

one hundred percent commission sales employees, to compensate

the employees "for every hour [they] worked over forty hours or

on Sunday"; and (2) "draws and commissions cannot be

retroactively allocated" to meet these requirements "even if

     3 Portions of the record and the parties' briefs were
impounded pursuant to a Superior Court order. The impoundment
is "lifted as to the information in the opinion, to the extent
necessary in resolving the case." Commonwealth v. Stevenson,
474 Mass. 372, 373 n.1 (2016).
                                                                   3

th[o]se draws and commissions equaled or exceeded the minimum

wage for the employees' first forty hours of work and one and

one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty

hours or on Sunday."

     This class action lawsuit was brought in the Superior Court

by a former Jordan's employee on behalf of all persons employed

at one of Jordan's Massachusetts stores as sales employees

between 2016 and 2019 and who worked more than forty hours in

any work week or on any Sunday.   The plaintiff class alleged

that Jordan's failed to comply with the requirements this court

outlined in Sleepy's.   See Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 228-229.   On

cross motions for summary judgment, the motion judge agreed and

granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class because

Jordan's compensation plan "failed to remit separate and

additional payments to its sales [employees] for overtime and

Sundays," thereby violating the overtime and Sunday pay

statutes.   Subsequently, after the plaintiff class sought

statutory attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party, the

same judge utilized the lodestar method to calculate the award

of attorney's fees, discounted hours spent in settlement

negotiations, and enhanced the lodestar figure by using a four

times multiplier.4

     4 The lodestar method is a means of calculating attorney's
fees that involves "multiplying the number of hours reasonably
                                                                    4

     Jordan's now appeals, maintaining that its compensation

scheme complied with the overtime and Sunday pay statutes, that

the judge erred in applying our decision in Sleepy's

retroactively, and that there is no private right of action for

violations of the Sunday pay statute.5   Both parties also appeal

from aspects of the judge's calculation of attorney's fees.

     We conclude, as the motion judge did, that Jordan's

compensation scheme violated G. L. c. 151, § 1A, and G. L.

c. 136, § 6 (50).   Further, the judge did not err in applying

our holding in Sleepy's to this case.    We also conclude that the

Sunday pay statute is enforceable under the Wage Act's private

right of action, G. L. c. 149, § 150.

     Regarding attorney's fees, we hold that the judge abused

his discretion by relying exclusively on common fund cases to

support the application of a four times lodestar multiplier and

by categorically deducting time spent toward settlement

negotiations.

     Accordingly, while we affirm the order on summary judgment,

we vacate so much of the second amended judgment as awards

attorney's fees to the plaintiff class, and remand this matter

spent on the case times a reasonable hourly rate."   Fontaine v.
Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324 (1993).

     5 Jordan's does not argue that there is no private right of
action to enforce the overtime statute.
                                                                         5

to the Superior Court for recalculation of the award of

attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.6

     1.     Background.   a.   Facts.   Jordan's is a Massachusetts

corporation that owns and operates retail furniture stores in

Massachusetts and other States.         Matthew Sutton, the named

plaintiff, is a former Jordan's sales employee.        He represents a

class of employees who worked at Jordan's Massachusetts stores

as "sale consultant[s]" or "sleep technician[s]" between June

19, 2016, and August 1, 2019, and worked more than forty hours

in any work week or on any Sunday.        Jordan's sales employees

work at its retail stores and sell furniture and related

products to customers.     As part of their regular work schedules,

Jordan's sales employees often work on Sundays.        Some of

Jordan's sales employees occasionally work more than forty hours

per week.    All members of the plaintiff class worked either on a

Sunday or over forty hours in at least one week between 2016 and

2019.

     Jordan's compensated its sales employees on a one hundred

percent commission basis.      Sales employees only earned

     6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of
Jordan's by the Pioneer Public Interest Law Center; the
Retailers Association of Massachusetts; and the Massachusetts
Employment Lawyers Association, Fair Employment Project, Inc.,
and Public Justice. We also acknowledge the amicus brief
submitted in support of the plaintiff class by the Attorney
General.
                                                                    6

commissions if they made sales.   Jordan's utilized a system of

draws under its Sales Draw Plan (Draw Plan), which functioned

like a loan or advance on the sales employees' future

commissions because the draws were deducted, or "pa[id] back,"

from the sales employees' commissions once earned.   Employees

received a draw that was at least equal to the minimum hourly

wage for all time that they worked in one week, up to forty

hours, plus one and one-half times the minimum wage for any time

that they worked over forty hours in one week or for any time

that they worked on Sundays.

     The Draw Plan included three primary types of draws:     (1) a

base draw, (2) an overtime draw, and (3) a premium draw.

Jordan's calculated the base draw by multiplying the number of

hours the employee worked during the pay period by a base hourly

rate, which was equivalent to the minimum wage rate at the time.

The overtime draw was calculated by multiplying the hours an

employee worked over forty hours in a given week by the base

hourly rate and then applying a 1.5 overtime multiplier.

Similarly, the premium draw was calculated by multiplying the

hours a sales employee worked on Sunday by the base hourly rate,

and then by a 1.5 "premium" multiplier.   All three categories of

draws were "recoverable from future commissions."

     Jordan's only used future commissions to cover an

employee's draw if the employee had a "negative draw balance" --
                                                                        7

which was created where commissions earned during a pay period

were less than the total draw owed for the same period.     In

those instances, the negative balance of the recoverable draw

was carried forward to future weeks "and deducted from future

Sales Earnings."    Sales earnings included commissions.

     b.    Hypotheticals.   Given the complexity of Jordan's pay

scheme, we provide the following hypotheticals for clarity.        In

these hypotheticals, we will use a base hourly rate of $10 and a

1.5 premium multiplier for time worked on a Sunday.7

     The over-all effect of Jordan's compensation scheme was

that a sales employee's gross pay for a particular week would be

an amount equal to his or her total draw if the sales employee's

commissions did not exceed the total draw for that week,

although this would create a negative draw balance for

subsequent weeks if the commissions were less than the total

draw.     Conversely, in weeks where the sales employee's

commissions exceeded his or her total draw, the sales employee's

gross pay would be in an amount equal to his or her commissions

minus the negative draw balance (if any), but would not be any

lower than the amount of the employee's total draw.

     7 These hypotheticals only address Sunday premium pay; the
overtime draw functioned the same as the Sunday premium draw.
                                                                      8

     i.    Example no. 1.   If a sales employee worked forty hours

in a given week (week no. 1), which included ten hours on a

Sunday, the employee's total draw would be $450, comprised of a

$300 base draw (30 hours x $10 hourly rate) plus a $150 premium

draw (10 hours x $10 hourly rate x 1.5 premium multiplier).      If

this employee also earned $400 in commissions in week no. 1,

then the employee's gross pay would be $450, with a $50 negative

balance ($400 commissions - $450 total draw) carried over to the

following week (week no. 2).     We will also assume that the

hypothetical sales employee has no negative draw balance going

into the first week (week no. 1) of the hypothetical.

     If during week no. 2, the sales employee worked thirty

hours on days other than Sunday and earned $400 in commissions,

the employee's gross pay would be $350 rather than $400 because

the $50 negative balance from week no. 1 would be deducted from

the employee's commissions.

     In total, the sales employee would receive $800 in gross

pay over the two weeks ($450 from week no. 1 + $350 from week

no. 2).

     ii.   Example no. 2.   If the sales employee worked forty

hours in week no. 1 on days other than Sunday and earned $400 in

commissions, the employee would receive $400 of gross pay.      In

this scenario, the employee's commissions would be equal to the

total draw and therefore there would not be any negative balance
                                                                   9

carried over into week no. 2.   We will also assume that the

sales employee has no negative draw balance going into the first

week (week no. 1) of the hypothetical.

     If during week no. 2, the sales employee worked thirty

hours on days other than Sunday and earned $400 in commissions,

the employee's gross pay for week no. 2 would be $400.

     The sales employee would again receive $800 of gross pay

over the two week period ($400 from week no. 1 + $400 from week

no. 2).

     Notably, the sales employee in these two hypotheticals

would earn the same gross pay over a two week period regardless

of whether the employee worked on Sunday in week no. 1.       In

short, under Jordan's Draw Plan, the premium Sunday rate has no

impact on this sales employee's compensatory bottom line, at

least when the employee's gross pay from the two weeks is

combined.8

     c.   Procedural history.   In 2019, Sutton commenced a

putative class action lawsuit against Jordan's on behalf of

     8 Although a sales employee's gross pay would increase if
the employee earned higher commission while working on Sundays,
this fact does not influence our analysis of whether Jordan's
complied with the Sunday pay statute, as an employer's
obligation to provide Sunday premium pay, pursuant to G. L.
c. 136, § 6 (50), is distinct from and in addition to the
employer's obligation to pay employees their earned commission.
See G. L. c. 149, § 148.
                                                                  10

himself and similarly situated sales employees to recover unpaid

wages.   Sutton alleged in count one and count two of his

complaint that Jordan's failed to pay its sales employees

overtime and Sunday pay as required by G. L. c. 151, § 1A, and

G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), respectively.   Sutton brought these

claims under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150.    A

judge later certified the following class of plaintiffs:

     "All individuals whom Jordan's Furniture, Inc. ha[d]
     employed in the positions of "sales consultant[s]" or
     "sleep technician[s]" at one or more of its retail stores
     located in Massachusetts, during the time period between
     June 19, 2016 and August 1, 2019 and who worked more than
     forty hours in any workweek or on any Sunday."

     The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Jordan's sought summary judgment on all counts.   The plaintiff

class sought partial summary judgment as to Jordan's liability

for failure to comply with the overtime and Sunday pay statutes,

reserving the calculation of damages for trial.   The motion

judge allowed the plaintiff class's motion for partial summary

judgment, and accordingly entered summary judgment on the issue

of liability in favor of the plaintiff class.9

     9 In count three of the complaint, Sutton alleged that
Jordan's violated G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), by requiring employees
to work on Sundays at a rate of less than one and one-half times
the employee's hourly rate. The motion judge entered summary
judgment on this count in favor of Jordan's on the ground that
it was redundant, but otherwise denied Jordan's motion for
summary judgment as to the remaining counts. Neither party has
raised the dismissal of count three on appeal.
                                                                    11

     Thereafter, the parties came to an agreement regarding

damages, which included all single and mandatory treble damages

and prejudgment interest, both in gross and on a per member

basis for all 247 members of the class, but which did not

include attorney's fees.    The parties filed a joint motion to

enter the proposed form of judgment that expressly reserved the

parties' right to appeal.    The motion was allowed by the judge

who had granted the plaintiff class summary judgment.

     The plaintiff class then filed a motion before the same

judge to amend the judgment and a petition for fees and costs

seeking statutory attorney's fees under G. L. c. 149, § 150, and

G. L. c. 151, § 1B.10    Specifically, the plaintiff class sought

$1,035,110 in attorney's fees plus $17,181.98 in costs.     The

judge allowed the motion and petition in part.     Adopting the

lodestar method, the judge first determined the reasonable hours

spent on the case by counsel for the plaintiff class, and

discounted the hours spent in settlement negotiations and

mediation attempts.     The judge then calculated a base lodestar

figure of $161,840 and enhanced the award by using a multiplier

of four, rather than a multiplier of five as requested by the

     10Pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, an employee who prevails
in an action against his or her employer for certain Wage Act
violations, including failure to pay "wages earned," G. L.
c. 149, § 148, is entitled to the "costs of the litigation and
reasonable attorneys' fees."
                                                                    12

plaintiff class.11   An amended judgment entered awarding the

plaintiff class $647,360 in attorney's fees plus $7,631.98 in

costs, for a total award of $654,991.98.

     Because of an inadvertent error in calculating damages, the

parties subsequently filed a motion to amend the judgment again,

which was granted by the same judge.     Jordan's timely appealed

from the Superior Court judge's finding of liability on summary

judgment and from the award of attorney's fees.     The plaintiff

class filed a cross appeal, seeking review only of the judge's

ruling on the fee petition.     Specifically, the plaintiff class

challenges the judge's decision to exclude time spent on

settlement negotiations and mediation attempts from the total

reasonable hours spent on the case.     After the cross appeals

were entered in the Appeals Court, we allowed Jordan's petition

for direct appellate review.

     2.   Discussion.   a.   Standard of review.   "We review a

decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo."

Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 330

(2021).   "Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled

     11In his endorsement on the plaintiff class's motion to
amend the judgment and petition for fees and costs, the judge
initially stated that he was applying a multiplier of 4.5 to the
lodestar amount. However, in his final calculation of
attorney's fees, the judge applied a multiplier of four.
                                                                       13

to judgment as a matter of law."     Id.    When both parties move

for summary judgment, as the parties did here, "we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom

summary judgment was entered."     Id.     See Miramar Park Ass'n v.

Dennis, 480 Mass. 366, 377 (2018).

     b.   Relevant statutes.   We start our analysis with an

examination of the statutory language of the overtime and Sunday

pay statutes in effect at the relevant time.       The overtime

statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, mandates that "employee[s]

receive[] compensation for [their] employment in excess of forty

hours at a rate not less than one and one half times [their]

regular rate."   The Sunday pay statute, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50),

as amended through St. 2014, c. 182, required that employers

"compensate all employees engaged in . . . work performed on

Sunday[s] . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half times

the employee's regular rate."12

     As mentioned at the outset of this opinion, we previously

examined the application of the overtime and Sunday pay statutes

     12The Sunday pay statute, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), was
amended, effective January 1, 2019, decreasing the compensation
rate to 1.4 times the employee's regular rate. St. 2018,
c. 121, §§ 5, 37. The parties accounted for this rate change
when determining damages. General Laws c. 136, § 6 (50), was
then legislatively abolished, effective January 1, 2023.
St. 2018, c. 121, §§ 9, 36. Given that the events at issue in
this case occurred between 2016 and 2019, the Sunday pay statute
was in effect for the relevant time period.
                                                                    14

to one hundred percent commission employees in Sleepy's, 482

Mass. at 228, which we summarize here.     In Sleepy's, the

plaintiffs were sales employees who were "paid on a '[one

hundred percent] commission' basis:     their wages took the form

of a recoverable draw of $125 per day, and any sales commissions

in excess of the draw."   Id. at 229.    Their total compensation

"always equaled or exceeded the minimum wage times the number of

hours they worked up to forty hours, plus one and one-half times

the number of hours they worked over forty hours or on Sunday."

Id.   Even so, we concluded that these employees were entitled to

"separate and additional" payments for overtime and Sunday hours

and that "employers may not retroactively reallocate and credit

payments made to fulfill one set of wage obligations against

separate and independent obligations."     Id. at 228-229, 233,

239-240.   We reasoned that this outcome was necessary to fulfill

the three purposes of the overtime and Sunday pay statutes,

which are "[1] to reduce the number of hours of work,

[2] encourage the employment of more persons, and [3] compensate

employees for the burden of a long workweek" (citation omitted).

Id. at 233-234, 239.

      c.   Compliance with overtime and Sunday pay requirements.

Although Jordan's Draw Plan is different in some respects from

the compensation scheme in Sleepy's, it suffers from the same

fundamental flaws as the scheme in Sleepy's -- namely, once the
                                                                  15

layers of complexity have been peeled back, it is clear that

Jordan's plan fails to provide employees with "separate and

additional" payments for overtime and Sunday hours.   Sleepy's,

482 Mass. at 228.13

     Jordan's "tracked all regular, overtime, and Sunday hours,

exactly calculated the regular and premium pay for those hours,

and paid that amount to each sales employee."   Although these

payments then appeared as separate line items on a sales

employee's pay stub, they in fact were not separate from and in

addition to the sales employee's commissions, because, as

explained supra, negative draw balances were deducted from the

employee's future commissions; thus, the draw payments that an

employee received did not have an impact on the employee's gross

pay over a broader time frame.   In our Sunday premium

hypothetical above, while the sales employee would receive a

higher gross pay in week no. 1 if he or she worked on a Sunday,

the employee would nonetheless receive the same total

compensation over a two week period as if the employee had not

     13Jordan's also emphasizes that under its compensation
scheme an employee would never be paid less than minimum wage
plus all statutory premium pay. This argument fails. In
Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 236, we noted that the mere fact that
"the payments that the employees received always equaled or
exceeded one and one-half times the minimum wage for all
overtime hours worked [and all hours worked on Sundays]" did not
alter our analysis. This fact is likewise immaterial here.
                                                                    16

worked on a Sunday during week no. 1, because the employee's

commissions in week no. 2 would be reduced to offset the Sunday

premium pay from week no. 1.14

     In this way, Jordan's Draw Plan is similar to the

compensation scheme used by the defendant employer in Mullally

v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 529-530 (2008).    In

Mullally, the "employer used a payroll formula founded on a

fluctuating 'base pay rate' that reflected the number of

overtime hours an employee actually worked."    Sleepy's, 482

Mass. at 234, citing Mullally, supra at 529.    "Nonetheless, the

employee would receive 'approximately the same hourly wage

regardless [of] whether [he or she] work[ed] overtime.'"

Sleepy's, supra, quoting Mullally, supra at 532.    In Mullally,

supra, we concluded that the employer's payroll formula violated

the overtime statute because it "evade[ed] the economic

disincentive to have an employee work more than forty hours a

week."    Likewise, Jordan's compensation scheme also evades the

purpose of the overtime and Sunday pay statutes because it does

not incentivize Jordan's to have its sales employees work

shorter weeks.

     14In its briefing, Jordan's presents a hypothetical of its
own to show that it provided higher compensation for overtime
work. It suffices to say that Jordan's ignores in its
hypothetical that a negative balance would be carried over to
the next week, thereby negating any higher compensation.
                                                                   17

     Jordan's contends that its compensation scheme was lawful

because it never retroactively allocated commissions to overtime

and Sunday pay, unlike the defendant employer in Sleepy's.       But,

regardless of whether the allocation is retroactive, it is a

violation of the Wage Act to "[]allocate and credit payments

made to fulfill one set of wage obligations against separate and

independent obligations."   Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 233.    The

commissions owed to Jordan's sales employees were intended to

fulfill wage obligations separate from the overtime and Sunday

pay requirements, and thus it was impermissible for Jordan's to

make deductions from its employees' commissions to cover its

overtime and Sunday pay obligations.

     Simply put, a sales employee's commissions are one type of

compensation, and overtime and Sunday pay are separate types of

compensation that require employers to make additional payments

to employees.   By attempting to allocate amounts owed to its

sales employees in commissions toward their overtime and Sunday

premium draws, Jordan's did not provide its sales employees with

separate and additional overtime and Sunday pay, thereby

violating the overtime and Sunday pay statutes.15

     15Jordan's contends that it "merely applied the formula it
had chosen for calculating the amount of an employee's
commission[s]." It is true that the Wage Act does not provide a
specific means for calculating commissions. See G. L. c. 149,
§ 148. However, an employer's formula cannot violate the Wage
Act or be used to circumvent other obligations under the Wage
                                                                  18

     Jordan's alleges that two opinion letters from the former

division of occupational safety (division), bearing the same

language as the letters sent to the defendant employer in

Sleepy's, and one opinion letter from the Attorney General's

office indicate that its pay plan complied with the overtime and

Sunday pay statutes.16   See Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 232 nn.13, 14.

However, "[a]n opinion letter interpreting a statute or

Act. See id. ("No person shall by a special contract with an
employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section
or from [§ 150]").

     16With respect to the first letter from the division,
Jordan's sought guidance from the division in 2003 as to whether
"inside sales employee[s]" could be paid on a one hundred
percent commission basis and, if so, whether such employees were
owed overtime and Sunday pay, what form these payments could
take, and how they should be calculated. The division sent
Jordan's an opinion letter in March 2003, which advised that
inside sales employees can be paid on a one hundred percent
commission basis, but that such employees are still owed
overtime and may be owed Sunday pay. The Attorney General's
office also responded to Jordan's 2003 request for guidance with
a letter, which expressly announced that "the following response
is for informational purposes only and should not be construed
as a legal opinion of the Attorney General." More to the point,
although the letter stated that inside sales employees can be
paid on a one hundred percent commission basis, it did not
address Jordan's questions relating to overtime and Sunday pay.

     Lastly, Jordan's sought guidance from the division again in
2009 as to how an employee's overtime should be calculated if
the employee occasionally "works random shift(s) . . . in a
different role in which the employee earns a base hourly rate
plus a commission." In December 2009, the division sent
Jordan's an opinion letter, which advised that "inside
salespersons are subject to the state overtime law" and that an
"employee's regular hourly rate must not be less than the
minimum wage."
                                                                      19

regulation 'does not have the binding force attributable to a

full-blown regulation.'"     Id. at n.11, quoting Massachusetts

Gen. Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 371 Mass. 705, 707 (1977).

Additionally, no deference is given to an agency's

interpretation of a statute if it is "contrary to plain language

of the statute and its underlying purpose."     Sleepy's, supra,

quoting Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 450 (2004).

Therefore, to the extent that these nonbinding letters could be

interpreted contrary to the rule announced in Sleepy's, they did

not have the force of law.

     d.   Retroactive application of Sleepy's.    Jordan's argues

that the motion judge erred in applying our decision in Sleepy's

retroactively.    We disagree.   "Where a decision does not

announce new common-law rules or rights but rather construes a

statute, no analysis of retroactive or prospective effect is

required because at issue is the meaning of the statute since

its enactment."    McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. 257, 261

(2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011).     In Sleepy's, we

interpreted how the overtime and Sunday pay statutes apply to an

employer's compensation scheme for one hundred percent

commission employees.    Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 228-229.      We

therefore determined the meaning of these statutes "since

[their] enactment."     McIntire, petitioner, supra.   Accordingly,
                                                                    20

the judge properly applied our holding in Sleepy's to this case.

See Sleepy's, supra.

     e.    Private right of action.   There is no express private

right of action in the Sunday pay statute, G. L. c. 136,

§ 6 (50), and the Sunday pay statute is not included in the list

of statutory provisions that can be enforced under the Wage

Act's private right of action, G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Nonetheless, we conclude that the Sunday pay statute can be

enforced under the Wage Act's private right of action through

G. L. c. 149, § 148.

     Under the Wage Act:

     "An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of
     [§] 33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 152, 152A, 159C
     or 190 or [G. L. c. 151, § 19,] may . . . institute and
     prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for
     himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action
     for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for
     any lost wages and other benefits."

G. L. c. 149, § 150.   Included in the enumerated list of

privately enforceable sections is § 148, which requires

employers to timely pay their employees "wages earned."     Section

148 states that "[e]very person having employees in his service

shall pay weekly or biweekly each such employee the wages earned

by him."   G. L. c. 149, § 148.   "When an employee has completed

the labor, service, or performance required of him . . . he has

'earned' his wage" (quotation and citations omitted).     Fernandes

v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 124 n.6 (2014).
                                                                  21

     Section 148 applies to all wages earned, including those

prescribed by statute.   See Drive–O–Rama, Inc. v. Attorney Gen.,

63 Mass. App. Ct. 769, 769–770 (2005) (failure to pay time and

one-half for work on legal holidays, as required by G. L.

c. 136, § 13, violated Wage Act).   When an employee works on a

Sunday, he or she earns Sunday pay pursuant to G. L. c. 149,

§ 148; therefore, a Sunday pay violation is also a violation of

§ 148 of the Wage Act.   In turn, an employee can bring an action

to recover for Sunday pay violations under the Wage Act's

private right of action.17

     Our decisions in Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC, 489 Mass.

514 (2022); Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257

(2020); and Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337

(2008), do not foreclose this conclusion.   In Devaney, supra at

515, 518-519, we held that the Wage Act's private right of

action cannot be used to pursue a claim for failure to pay

overtime arising solely under the Federal Fair Labor Standards

     17Jordan's also argues that the purposes of the Sunday pay
statute and the Wage Act, as evidenced through their respective
legislative histories, indicate that the Sunday pay statute
cannot be enforced under the Wage Act. However, since the plain
language of the Sunday pay statute and the Wage Act are clear
and unambiguous as to whether Sunday pay constitutes "wages
earned," we need not reach their legislative histories. See
Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019) ("Ordinarily, where
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is
conclusive as to legislative intent" [citation omitted]).
                                                                  22

Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., because the "FLSA's

comprehensive remedial scheme" preempts the Wage Act.    Here,

preemption is not an issue because the Sunday pay statute is a

State law and it does not contain its own remedial scheme.     See

Devaney, supra at 522.

      In Donis, 485 Mass. at 265, we held that, since the

Prevailing Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 26-27H, has its own

private right of action, an employee could not recover for a

violation of this act under the Wage Act's private right of

action, because this "would . . . render the private right of

action created by the Prevailing Wage Act utterly unnecessary,

thereby violating the canon of statutory construction against

superfluity."   Given that the Sunday pay statute does not

contain its own private right of action, there is no risk of

"superfluity" here.   Donis, supra.   Notably in Donis, we also

said that:

      "[h]ad the Legislature intended for violations of the
      Prevailing Wage Act to be remedied under the Wage Act,
      . . . the Legislature simply could have omitted a private
      cause of action from the Prevailing Wage Act, thus implying
      that aggrieved employees would have to look elsewhere for a
      remedy, including under the Wage Act."

Id.   Here, unlike in Donis, the Legislature "omitted a private

cause of action" under G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), "thus implying"

that employees can look to the private right of action under the
                                                                   23

Wage Act to remedy violations of the Sunday pay statute.     Donis,

supra.

     Lastly, in Salvas, 452 Mass. at 372-373, we held that the

Wage Act's private right of action cannot be used to enforce

mandatory unpaid meal breaks, pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 100,

because this provision was not included in the enumerated list

of provisions under G. L. c. 149, § 150.     Our decision in Salvas

does not foreclose the Wage Act's private right of action from

being used to enforce the Sunday pay statute because a Sunday

pay violation also constitutes a violation of § 148, which is

included in the enumerated list.    By contrast, the issue in

Salvas, supra at 374-375, concerned whether the employer

properly provided its employees with unpaid meal breaks, a

benefit that may possess monetary value under a breach of

contract claim despite not constituting actual wages.

     f.   Attorney's fees.   The plaintiff class was entitled to

an award of attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150,

because it prevailed at summary judgment in this matter.     The

Superior Court calculated the attorney's fees owed to the

plaintiff class using the lodestar method, and then enhanced the

award by applying a four times multiplier.    See note 11, supra.

Jordan's argues that the judge abused his discretion in applying

the four times multiplier.    The plaintiff class also challenges

the judge's calculation of attorney's fees, but on the grounds
                                                                   24

that the judge erred in discounting the time that counsel for

the plaintiff class spent in settlement negotiations.18

     We review a judge's award of attorney's fees for an abuse

of discretion.   See LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 475

Mass. 757, 772 (2016).   "The amount of a reasonable attorney's

fee, awarded on the basis of statutory authority[] . . . is

largely discretionary with the judge, who is in the best

position to determine how much time was reasonably spent on a

case, and the fair value of the attorney's services."     Fontaine

v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324 (1993).   However, a judge's

discretion in calibrating such an award is not limitless.    "We

find abuse of discretion when we determine that a decision

resulted from a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors

relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls

outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and

     18The plaintiff class also requests reasonable attorney's
fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal. The
plaintiff class is statutorily entitled to appellate attorney's
fees and costs, pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, insofar as the
plaintiff class has prevailed on the issues raised on appeal by
Jordan's. See Reuter v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 476 n.8 (2022).
Accordingly, the plaintiff class may, within fourteen days of
the date of the rescript, file with the clerk of the court for
the Commonwealth an application for fees and costs, together
with any supporting material. See Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9,
10-11 (2004). Thereafter, Jordan's shall have fourteen days
within which to respond to the plaintiff class's application.
                                                                      25

citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 768

(2021).

       i.   Lodestar multiplier.   The lodestar method is generally

used for calculating attorney's fees under fee-shifting

statutes.     See LaChance, 475 Mass. at 772; Fontaine, 415 Mass.

at 325.     See also Reuter v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 468 (2022)

(lodestar method used in Wage Act case).     The lodestar method is

"calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent

on the case [by] a reasonable hourly rate."     Fontaine, supra at

324.   "The judge may then adjust the lodestar calculation upward

or downward in light of the results obtained."     LaChance, supra.

"In limited circumstances, statutory fee awards may [also] be

enhanced to compensate for the risk of nonpayment."     Fontaine,

supra.

       Here, the motion judge calculated the attorney's fees by

first determining what a reasonable hourly rate would be, using

as a point of reference the "average rate in the community for

similar work by attorneys with the same years' experience."

Killeen v. Westban Hotel Venture, LP, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 791

(2007).     The judge found that the actual hourly rates submitted

by the plaintiff class were "within the range of acceptable

fees" and thus utilized those hourly rates.     The judge then

reviewed the hourly billing statements submitted by counsel for
                                                                    26

the plaintiff class and discounted hours spent toward

"mediation/settlement undertakings."

     After determining the base lodestar amount, the judge then

considered the propriety of a multiplier.    Although the

plaintiff class sought a multiplier of five, the judge concluded

that, despite the "complexity and nuances related to [the]

defendant's compensation methods," a multiplier of four was more

appropriate because the parties agreed to the amount of the

judgment "after dispositive motions were decided unlike those

[cases] identified by [the] plaintiff[ class] in [its] brief."

In doing so, the judge stated that he relied on certain

unspecified "factors"19 and "follow[ed] the precedent identified

in cases cited by [the] plaintiff[ class] where multipliers

ranging up to 'four are frequently awarded in common fund cases

where the loadstar method is applied.'"     See, e.g., In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283,

341 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999).        We

conclude that the judge abused his discretion by relying

exclusively on common fund cases -- which involve policy

     19The judge did not delineate the factors he referenced in
his decision, but it is our understanding that these factors may
have been listed in a footnote in a memorandum of law submitted
by the plaintiff class in support of the petition for attorney's
fees and costs. This memorandum was not included in the record.
                                                                  27

considerations different from fee-shifting cases such as this

one -- in calculating the award of attorney's fees.

     Common fund cases are those in which "a litigant or a

lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons

other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable

attorney's fee from the fund as a whole" (citation omitted).      In

re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza

Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 305 (1st Cir. 1995).    Thus, "the

key distinction between common-fund and fee-shifting cases is

whether the attorney's fees are paid by the client (as in

common-fund cases) or by the other party (as in fee-shifting

cases)."   In re The Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1079 (11th

Cir. 2019).

     For the calculation of attorney's fees, while "the lodestar

method is entrenched in the statutory fee-shifting context," the

"percentage of the fund" (POF) method is utilized in common fund

cases, whereby "the court shapes the counsel fee based on what

it determines is a reasonable percentage of the fund recovered

for those benefitted by the litigation."   In re Thirteen Appeals

Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56

F.3d at 305.   After calculating attorney's fees via the POF

method in common fund cases, courts generally also conduct a

lodestar analysis and use the resulting lodestar value as a

"cross-check" to determine if the attorney's fees are
                                                                   28

reasonable.   In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722,

742 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 889 (2001).    "[L]odestar

cross-check calculation need not entail mathematical precision

or bean-counting, and is not a full-blown lodestar inquiry"

(quotations and citations omitted).     In re AT & T Corp., 455

F.3d 160, 169 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006).

     Much ink has been spilled on the different purposes

undergirding an award of attorney's fees in common fund cases

and statutory fee-shifting cases.     See, e.g., Skelton v. General

Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

493 U.S. 810 (1989) ("Because there is a difference between

statutory fee-shifting cases and common fund cases with respect,

inter alia, to who bears the direct burden of compensating

plaintiffs' attorneys, different policies may govern the two

types of cases").   Among these differences, an award of

attorney's fees in common fund cases is in part intended to

prevent the unjust enrichment of class members who benefited

from but did not contribute to the costs of the lawsuit, whereas

the purposes of fee-shifting statutes, like the Wage Act, are to

disincentivize unlawful conduct and incentivize attorneys "to

provide representation in cases that otherwise would not be

financially prudent for them."   Ferman v. Sturgis Cleaners,

Inc., 481 Mass. 488, 492–493 (2019).    Given these differences,

caution should be exercised in statutory fee-shifting cases to
                                                                     29

ensure that excessive multipliers do not "inequitably burden

defendants."     Skelton, supra at 253.

     Further, a fee-shifting statute "creates an exception to

the 'American rule' that the prevailing litigant is ordinarily

not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the

loser" (quotation and citation omitted).     Brundle v. Wilmington

Trust, N.A., 919 F.3d 763, 786 (4th Cir. 2019).     "In contrast,

the common fund doctrine -- though often similarly described as

an exception -- better accords with the American rule by holding

the beneficiaries of a judgment or settlement responsible for

compensating the counsel who obtained the judgment or settlement

for them."     Id.   Accordingly, awards made pursuant to fee-

shifting statutes should generally utilize "more conservative"

principles than those made pursuant to the common fund doctrine.

Sack v. Sack, 328 Mass. 600, 605 (1952).     For this reason, in

determining lodestar multipliers, we strongly caution judges

against relying exclusively on common fund case law in a fee-

shifting case such as this one.

     Here, because the motion judge neither explicitly

identified all the factors that he considered nor provided an

explanation of the weight that he assigned to each factor, our

appellate review is significantly impeded.     See Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (important for judges to

"provide a concise but clear explanation of [their] reasons for
                                                                   30

the fee award").   Still, a four times multiplier may have been

excessive in this case given the judge's exclusive reliance on

common fund cases, which do not utilize the more conservative

approach that is required in fee-shifting cases.20

     We vacate the award of attorney's fees and remand the

matter to the Superior Court for recalculation of the award.      On

remand, if the judge seeks to enhance the base lodestar figure

by a multiplier, he must set forth expressly the factors that he

relies on and the weight he ascribes to those factors, without

reliance solely on common fund cases where the lodestar figure

was used as a cross check.

     ii.   Time spent on mediation and settlement negotiations.

We now turn to the plaintiff class's argument that the judge

erred in excluding hours spent in "mediation/settlement

undertakings," which were unsuccessful, when making the lodestar

calculation.   In support, the plaintiff cites Pérez-Sosa v.

Garland, 22 F.4th 312, 323 (1st Cir. 2022), where the United

     20Indeed, significantly lower multipliers have been applied
in fee-shifting cases even where the facts arguably were more
favorable. For example, in Ridgeway v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,
269 F. Supp. 3d 975, 996-999 (N.D. Cal. 2017), the court applied
a two times lodestar multiplier in a wage case brought under a
fee-shifting statute where, among other considerations, the
plaintiffs' counsel spent $1.7 million in out of pocket expenses
on the case, the plaintiffs risked an unfavorable jury verdict
but counsel secured a $60.8 million judgment after trial, and
the defendant "vigorously defended" the case by raising
"numerous novel, difficult, and complex issues" over the course
of nearly nine years.
                                                                   31

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that it was

error to "categorically exclud[e] time spent on settlement

negotiations from the lodestar calculation."   In rejecting the

"[s]peculative" notion that including such time in the lodestar

calculation could frustrate settlement, the court reasoned:

      "We think it is unrealistic to assume that the marginal
      cost of counsel's work on settlement will scare off
      defendants in a substantial number of cases. Litigants
      settle cases because doing so is cheaper and less risky
      than fighting tooth and nail to the bitter end. The extra
      expense of compensating time reasonably spent in settlement
      negotiations scarcely alters this calculus. Nor will
      attorneys be tempted to drag out talks unnecessarily
      because the court will later trim away time wasted as
      unreasonably expended."

Id.   Thus, the court concluded that "time reasonably spent in

pursuit of settlement is worthwhile and, therefore, generally

fit for inclusion in a fee award."   Id.

      We find this reasoning to be persuasive and therefore

conclude the same.   When calculating an award of attorney's fees

pursuant to the lodestar method, a judge cannot categorically

discount all time spent in the pursuit of a possible settlement.

Instead, a judge must determine whether -- and if so, to what

extent -- that time was "reasonably spent" in pursuit of

settlement.   Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324.   The mere fact that a

case did not ultimately settle does not render time spent toward

such a pursuit unreasonable.
                                                                    32

     Accordingly, we conclude that the motion judge erred by

categorically excluding time spent on settlement negotiations

and mediation from the calculation of the base lodestar figure.

On remand, to the extent that the judge discounts any such time,

he must provide a clear explanation as to why it was spent

unreasonably.   See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

     3.   Conclusion.   So much of the second amended judgment as

awarded attorney's fees is vacated, and the matter is remanded

to the Superior Court for further proceedings to recalculate the

award of attorney's fees in accordance with this opinion.21    In

all other respects, the second amended judgment is affirmed.

                                     So ordered.

     21We also conclude that the plaintiff class is entitled to
reasonable appellate attorney's fees. See note 18, supra.