Court Opinion

ID: 9556582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 19:01:02.316277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:22.671198
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALIM S. URMANCHEEV,                             No. 21-664
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A075-117-610
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                       Argued and Submitted July 19, 2023
                           San Francisco, California

Before: SILER**, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Alim Urmancheev petitions for review of a final order issued by the

 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) finding him removable for having committed

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation.
 an aggravated felony and denying his application for protection under the

 Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition for review.

        We review questions of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for

substantial evidence. Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). The

BIA’s decision must be upheld if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and

probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502

U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (cleaned up). When the BIA independently reviews the record,

as here, we review the BIA’s decision but can refer to the findings of the Immigration

Judge (IJ). Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010).

   1.         The BIA properly determined that Matter of Ibarra, 26 I. & N. Dec.

809 (BIA 2016), applied retroactively to Petitioner’s case. In Ibarra, the BIA

concluded that a conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 211 constituted an aggravated

felony theft as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).         We reached the same

conclusion in United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, 932 F.3d 1198, 1205–07 (9th

Cir. 2019).

        Petitioner argues that the IJ and BIA should have applied the five-factor test

outlined in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982), to

decide whether Ibarra applied retroactively. But “a change in law must have

occurred before Montgomery Ward is implicated.” Olivas-Motta v. Whitaker, 910

F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 2018). And a new agency decision does not constitute a

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change in law unless the decision “consciously overrules or otherwise alters its own

rule or regulation, or expressly considers and openly departs from a circuit court

decision.” Id. at 1277 (quotations omitted). Ibarra was the first BIA decision

holding that Cal. Penal Code § 211 constituted an aggravated felony theft. Thus, the

BIA did not overrule precedent nor depart from a circuit court decision.1

    2.        The BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s CAT claim was supported by

substantial evidence. An applicant seeking CAT protection bears the burden of

proving it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to the

proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). To establish the likelihood

of future torture based on alleged past torture, “a petitioner must show that severe

pain or suffering was specifically intended—that is, that the actor intend[ed] the

actual consequences of his conduct, as distinguished from the act that causes these

consequences.” Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).

         Petitioner argues that he should be granted CAT protection because the

Russian government’s previous actions regarding his forced psychiatric

1
  In his reply brief, Petitioner argues that there is an intra-circuit split between our
holdings in Olivas-Motta and Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 951 (9th
Cir. 2007). This argument is without merit because unlike in Olivas-Motta, in
Miguel-Miguel we confronted a situation where the BIA “consciously overrule[d] or
otherwise alter[ed] [the BIA’s] own rule or regulation,” Olivas-Motta, 910 F.3d at
1277, meaning that it was proper to apply the Montgomery Ward factors to decide if
the precedent applied retroactively. See Miguel-Miguel, 500 F.3d at 951.

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hospitalization were torturous. But substantial evidence supports the BIA’s ruling

that Petitioner’s prior experiences were not torturous, as Petitioner did not

demonstrate that any of the individuals involved acted with the intent to torture him.

Poor conditions and “misunderstanding of the nature of psychiatric illness” do not

constitute torture. Villegas, 523 F.3d at 989. Petitioner further argues that he is

likely to face future torture based on his mental illness. However, as the IJ explained,

Petitioner controls his mental health issues with medicine, has not been to the

hospital for these issues since 2006 or 2008, and the medications he uses to control

his mental illnesses are available in Russia.

      Regarding Petitioner’s religion, the IJ also explained that “[g]iven the low

number of Jehovah’s Witnesses with reported interactions with the government in

relation to the total number of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia [], Respondent’s risk

of harm due to his religion is slight. By extension, his risk of torture is even less

likely.” The IJ then included a statistical analysis of the small number of Jehovah’s

Witnesses—less than 1% of the Jehovah’s Witness population in 2019—who were

suffering at the hands of the Russian government because of their beliefs.

      The IJ also found that Petitioner was unlikely to be tortured based on his prior

political activism. The court noted that thirty years had passed since Petitioner was

beaten by police for protesting. In that time, the government has changed, and

Petitioner has returned to Russia multiple times and been involved in multiple anti-

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government protests, without having been subject to torture. Accordingly, the IJ

found that Petitioner did not meet his burden of proving that he is more likely than

not to face torture if he returns to Russia. Based on this record, the BIA’s decision

was based on substantial evidence.

      Lastly, Petitioner asserts that the agency failed to consider the aggregate risk

of torture he would be subject to based on his religion, mental illnesses, and political

activism. But the IJ considered this argument, writing, “the Court has considered

his ‘aggregate risk of torture from all sources,’ and for the following reasons,

concludes he has not established eligibility for protection under CAT.” The IJ then

provided a multi-page discussion of why none of Petitioner’s arguments, separately

or together, led the IJ to believe Petitioner was more likely than not going to suffer

torture if removed.

      The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The

motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.

      PETITION DENIED.

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