Court Opinion

ID: 9889427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 14:09:43.494299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:34.211677
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of State College,                :
                        Appellant        :
                                         :
            v.                           :   No. 696 C.D. 2022
                                         :
Borough of State College                 :   Argued: September 11, 2023
Police Association                       :

BEFORE:     HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
            HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE McCULLOUGH                               FILED: October 6, 2023

            The Borough of State College (Borough) appeals from the May 26, 2022
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court), which denied the
Borough’s petition to vacate a grievance arbitration award it had filed against the
Borough of State College Police Association (Association). Upon review, we affirm.

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
            On December 3, 2020, Officer Joseph Scharf (Grievant) was terminated
from the Borough Police Department (Department) after an investigation of three
internally generated complaints regarding Grievant’s performance.        (Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 740a.) The first incident occurred on June 14, 2020, after Grievant
drove at a speed of 87 miles-per-hour (mph) in a 25-mph zone and passed a civilian
vehicle at a speed 72 mph while in pursuit of a motorist who had been exceeding the
speed limit and did not even realize that a police officer had been attempting to catch
up to him. Id. at 657a-60a. The second incident occurred on June 23, 2020, after
Grievant failed to report a high-speed vehicle pursuit until three days afterwards despite
being advised to make a timely report by two different detectives. Id. at 832a. The
third incident occurred on July 12, 2020, after Grievant, while on patrol on a bicycle,
unlawfully and improperly deployed pepper spray into the driver’s side window of a
motorist’s moving vehicle during what should have been a routine traffic stop for a
headlight violation. Id. at 744a.
              The Department’s internal affairs policy (Regulation) establishes an
internal affairs board, referred to as the Conduct and Procedures Review Board
(Review Board), under the authority of the Police Chief.1 Id. at 1144a, 1150a. Three
separate internal affairs files were opened for the July 2020 pepper spray incident and
the two June 2020 driving incidents. The Review Board investigated the June 23, 2020
pursuit pursuant to Section 2.3.1.05.4 of the Regulation,2 and concluded that Grievant

       1
         The Review Board has the power to review incidents, including making findings of fact, and
has the power to recommend disciplinary action. (R.R. at 1150a.) The Review Board is composed
of four officers of different ranks (fellow Police Union members) and a Division Commander who
serves as a non-voting chairperson. Id. at 184a-87a, 1150a.

       2
        Section 2.3.1.05.4 of the Regulation sets forth that the Review Board shall summarize the
evidence reviewed and forward a recommendation of action to the Chief of Police:

              At the conclusion of the conduct review, the Conduct and Procedures
              Review Board, in writing, shall summarize the evidence, make findings
              of fact based on the evidence, and forward such to the Chief of Police
              with a recommendation for action. The involved officer shall be
              provided a copy of this memorandum. The recommendation should
              include the following information:

                      A. The particular rule or rules alleged to have been
                      violated.

                      B. The dates and the places the alleged acts or omissions
                      occurred.

                      C. A statement of the alleged acts or omissions.

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 2
violated five Department policies: (1) Unsatisfactory Performance, (2) Department
Reports, (3) Completion of Reports, (4) Pursuit Officer Responsibilities, and (5)
Submission of Reports. The Review Board reviewed Grievant’s use of pepper spray
and determined that it was unjustified and in violation of three Department policies:
(1) Use of Force, (2) Authorized Use of Force Options and Their Appropriate
Application, and (3) Use of Authorized Less Lethal Weapons-Oleoresin Capsicum.
The Review Board investigated the June 14, 2020 high speed chase and concluded that
Grievant violated two Department policies: (1) Emergency Vehicle Driving, and (2)
Unsatisfactory Performance. Based on its findings, the Review Board recommended a
five-day suspension and a written reprimand. Id. at 224a-25a, 745a-46a, 799a, 833a-
35a, 906a-12a. Pursuant to Section 2.3.1.06.3 of the Regulation,3 the Review Board
forwarded its findings and recommendation to the Police Chief.
              The Police Chief, John Gardner, reviewed the Review Board’s findings,
report, and recommendation. As for the June 14, 2020 high-speed chase, in addition
to the policies the Review Board found were violated, Chief Gardner concluded that

                      D. The recommended disciplinary or nondisciplinary
                      action which can include a SIL [(specific incident log)]
                      entry, written warning, counseling, training, written
                      reprimand, suspension, demotion, or termination.
       3
          Section 2.3.1.06.3 of the Regulation provides that the Chief of Police may then do one of
three things:
                A. sustain the charge(s) and impose the recommended corrective or
                disciplinary action. Disciplinary action by the Chief of Police may be
                up to and including a written reprimand. In disciplinary actions that
                involve suspension, demotion, or termination, the Chief of Police will
                make a recommendation to the Borough Manager in writing. The
                Manager will, after his review, make a decision on the incident;

              B. modify the recommended action; or

              C. exonerate the charged officer.

                                                  3
Grievant also violated three additional policies: (1) Department Reports, (2)
Completion of Reports, and (3) Submission of Reports. As for the June 23, 2020
pursuit, Chief Gardner concluded that Grievant violated two additional policies that
the Review Board did not find were violated: (1) Motor Vehicle Pursuit Procedure and
(2) Initiation & Continuation of Pursuit. (R.R. at 592a-95a.) Chief Gardner also
considered two prior incidents involving Grievant, including a 2018 Performance
Improvement Plan and a 2018 Written Warning. Id. at 596a-97a. Chief Gardner
additionally considered the following history of Grievant’s prior corrective actions:

             May 8, 2017 – [Grievant] was issued a corrective SIL
             documenting a highly unprofessional Interaction with [a
             Doctor] at Mount Nittany Medical Center. His actions and
             demeanor toward the Doctor were disrespectful,
             unprofessional, and unacceptable. In retrospect, this Incident
             should have resulted in an Internal Affairs Investigation,
             however it was hoped that corrective action at the patrol level
             would resolve and rectify the issues.

             December 1, 2018 – [Grievant] was placed on a Performance
             Improvement Plan (PIP) due to performance challenges
             focusing on: Criminal Law and Ordinances, Department
             Policies and Procedures, Field Operations/Tactical &
             Procedural,   Investigative    Skills,    and      Written
             Communications.

             [Grievant] was issued a SIL dated November 11, 2018, that
             became the impetus for the (PIP) and addressed [Grievant’s]
             improper search of three (3) males following a lawful traffic
             stop and his subsequent incomplete written reporting of the
             Incident, [Grievant] searched the males without consent and
             without probable cause. Case law and [D]epartment policy
             were not followed, and these searches were outside those
             parameters. He also submitted a report that lacked sufficient
             detail to identify all persons present, the probable cause for
             the searches, a description and location of evidence in the

                                           4
               vehicle and whether any of the occupants were arrested. The
               (PIP) was in effect from December 1, 2018, through April
               30, 2019.

               February 27, 2020 – [Grievant] was issued a corrective SIL
               by Sergeant Foster for leaving a female DUI defendant
               unattended in the field to engage in a profanity laden
               argument with the defendant’s husband. It was noted that
               [Grievant’s] actions were unnecessary and created a safety
               risk for himself, fellow officers, and the public.

Id. at 1042a-46a.
               Chief Gardner recommended to the Borough Manager, Thomas
Fountaine, that Grievant’s employment with the Department be terminated.4 Chief
Gardner explained his reasoning as follows:

               Given the severity of the sustained violations and the
               continuing pattern of behavior exhibited by [Grievant], I
               cannot agree with this recommendation. I do not believe the
               [Review] Board’s recommended discipline will prove
               effective in bringing about the positive change in
               performance and behavior that is required.

               In the three (3) current Internal Affairs incidents, [Grievant]
               had fifteen (15) policy charges sustained as Improper
               Conduct. He has two (2) additional sustained policy charges
               as Improper Conduct from a prior internal investigation. As
               of this date, [Grievant] will have seventeen (17) total policy
               charges sustained as Improper Conduct.

                                          ***
               He has been issued several corrective action SILs to address
               performance issues and was placed on a Performance

       4
         In cases that involve suspension, demotion, or termination, the Police Chief makes a written
recommendation to the Borough Manager, who is the final decision-maker pursuant to Section
2.3.1.06.3(A) of the Regulation. (R.R. at 1152a.)

                                                 5
             Improvement Plan (PIP) from December 1, 2018 through
             April 30, 2019 to address many of the same issues expressed
             in the current investigations. . . . All previous efforts to
             address [Grievant’s] performance issues in a progressive
             manner, have failed to elicit the desired or required changes
             sought.

             Based on the aforementioned information, it is my
             recommendation that [Grievant’s] employment with the []
             Department be terminated.
Id. at 1045a-46a.
             Borough Manager Fountaine reviewed Chief Gardner’s recommendation
and determined that Grievant’s use of pepper spray at a moving motorist, standing
alone or in combination with the other incidents, warranted his termination of
employment. Id. at 738a-40a. On December 3, 2021, Borough Manager Fountaine
notified Grievant of his termination.
             On December 4, 2020, Grievant filed a grievance, pursuant to Article VIII
of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which began at Step 4 because
the matter was one processed by Internal Affairs. Id. at 1204a. On December 17, 2020,
the Step 4 meeting was held, and the grievance was denied by letter dated December
21, 2020. Id. at 1206a. Arbitration was requested on January 14, 2021, and proceeded
before an Arbitrator.
             The parties stipulated that the issue to be determined by the Arbitrator was
whether Grievant was terminated for just cause. Id. at 21a. Both parties presented
multiple witnesses and the Arbitrator heard testimony over three days. The Borough
argued that Grievant’s termination was for just cause because his actions were far
below the standards set for proper policing. In the Borough’s estimation, the pepper
spray incident, together with the other offenses which also endangered public safety,
warranted dismissal.    The Borough argued that Grievant’s conduct evidenced a

                                           6
persistent tendency to act on his own, disregard of police rules and training, proceeding
on his own conjecture, and an inflated sense of urgency, regardless of better judgment
and public safety. It asserted that termination is the only remedy for his conduct.
             The Association argued that the Regulation, setting forth the
Department’s Internal Affairs policies, once promulgated by the Borough, became part
of the CBA process. Citing Section 2.3.1.06.3 of the Regulation, the Association
argued that the Borough failed to follow its own internal affairs policy because Chief
Gardner considered the totality of everything in making his recommendation for
termination. It asserted that, meanwhile, the Review Board had reviewed only the July
2020 pepper spray incident, and the June 14, 2020 and June 23, 2020 driving incidents,
in identifying the violations and recommending that Grievant be subjected to a five-
day suspension without pay. The Association argued that by finding other violations
that had been rejected by the Review Board and “overruling” the conclusions of the
Review Board, Chief Gardner violated Section 2.3.1.06.3 of the Borough’s Regulation,
which allows the Police Chief only to “sustain the charge(s) and impose the
recommended corrective or disciplinary action,” “modify the recommended action” or
“exonerate” the officer. Furthermore, the Association asserted that, contrary to Chief
Gardner’s rationale for terminating Grievant, SILs cannot be cited as disciplinary
history to support a termination. The Association argued that strict adherence to
disciplinary rules is an essential part of due process, and when the employer fails in
this regard, it violates the due process component of just cause.
             The Arbitrator issued her Arbitration Award on November 5, 2021,
sustaining the grievance. The Arbitrator concluded that “the addition of [violations]
that had not been part of the [Review] Board’s deliberation ran counter to the
Regulation[].” (Arbitration Award at 20.) She reasoned that “the additional matters

                                           7
Chief Gardner brought up and passed on to Borough Manager Fountaine, with one
exception, were not prior discipline and could not have been contested or grieved. As
a result, [violations] that had not been adjudicated by the [Review] Board were added
to the statement of charges for which [] Grievant was terminated.” Id. at 18. The
Arbitrator found that “for due process to prevail, alleging violations that were not or
could not have been adjudicated by the [Review] Board cannot be justified.” Id.
Accordingly, the Arbitrator concluded that “Grievant’s termination was not supported
by just cause.” Id. The Arbitrator sustained Grievant’s grievance, rescinded his
termination, ordered that he shall receive a five-day suspension, and ordered that as a
condition of his reinstatement, Grievant must undergo “rigorous retraining” to curb
“his rogue, lone wolf tendencies.” Id. at 20. The Arbitrator further conditioned
Grievant’s reinstatement on a “last chance agreement,” warning that “any repetition of
the conduct and violations seen in this case shall result in his immediate termination
without recourse to the grievance procedure or arbitration.” Id.
             On December 3, 2021, the Borough filed a petition to vacate the
Arbitration Award with the trial court, arguing that the Arbitrator went outside of the
CBA in concluding that, under the Regulation, the Police Chief may modify the level
of discipline recommended by the Review Board but not deviate in any respect with
the Review Board’s conclusions. The Borough further argued that the Arbitration
Award violates public policy that a police department is not obligated to employ a
police officer who engages in gross misuse of police authority, and that the Arbitration
Award impairs the Borough’s ability to carry out its government function of providing
safe and reliable police services to the community. (R.R. at 14a-15a.)
             On May 26, 2022, the trial court issued an order affirming the Arbitration
Award. Utilizing the narrow certiorari scope of review, the trial court rejected the

                                           8
Borough’s argument that the Arbitrator acted outside of her jurisdiction. The trial court
held that the Arbitrator acted within her jurisdiction when she applied and interpretated
the Regulation that was incorporated into the CBA and concluded that the Borough did
not have just cause to terminate Grievant because it violated its own Regulation in
deciding to terminate him. The trial court rejected the Borough’s contention that the
Arbitrator ordered the Borough to commit an unlawful act by reinstating Grievant.
Finally, the trial court opined that, although the mandatory reinstatement of a police
officer found to be a danger to public safety and a threat to the citizens of Pennsylvania
is “certainly repugnant to public policy,” it nevertheless noted that it was “constrained
to follow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination that such a result is in fact
the intention of the legislature.” (Trial Ct. Op., May 26, 2022, at 4-6.)

                                        ISSUES
             On appeal, the Borough raises the following four issues:

          1. Whether the Arbitrator exceeded her powers and jurisdiction
             by failing to confine her opinion to the issue submitted to her
             for decision.

          2. Whether the Arbitrator exceeded her powers and jurisdiction
             by infringing on the Borough’s managerial prerogative to
             direct its workforce.

          3. Whether the Arbitrator exceeded her powers by ordering the
             Borough to carry out an unlawful act.

          4. Whether the Arbitration Award should be vacated because
             reinstatement of the police officer to employment with the
             Borough is repugnant to well-defined, dominant public
             policy.
(Borough’s Br. at 5-6.)

                                            9
                                          DISCUSSION
                The CBA between the Borough and the Association was covered by the
Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, commonly referred to as Act 111
(Act 111).5 This Court recently stated and summarized the narrow certiorari scope of
review as follows:
             In Act 111 cases, our scope of review is limited to “narrow
             certiorari,” which allows inquiry only into: (1) the
             jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2) the regularity of the
             proceedings; (3) whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers;
             or (4) the deprivation of constitutional rights. Pennsylvania
             State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Association
             (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83, 90 (Pa. 1995). If an arbitration
             award cannot be vacated on one of these bases, then it must
             be upheld. Id. A mere error of law is insufficient to support a
             court’s decision to reverse an Act 111 arbitrator’s award.
             Appeal of Upper Providence Police Delaware County Lodge
             #27 Fraternal Order of Police, 526 A.2d 31[5], 322 (Pa.
             1987).
Uwchlan Township, Pennsylvania v. Uwchlan Township Police Association (Uwchlan
Township) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 259 C.D. 2020, filed October 9, 2020), slip op. at 4.6
                Further, as long as an arbitrator’s award concerns terms and conditions of
employment and does not require performance of an illegal act, or one that a party
could not do voluntarily, the “authority” prong of narrow certiorari is “generally met.”
City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 224 A.3d 702,
712 (Pa. 2020). An argument that an arbitrator misinterpreted a CBA is not within the
confines of the narrow certiorari review. Id. at 713. This Court’s scope of review is a

       5
           Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12.

       6
        See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to . . .
an unreported memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. [ ]
Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).

                                                 10
“plenary, non-deferential standard where the resolution of the issues turns on a question
of law or application of law to undisputed facts.” City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal
Order of Police Lodge No. 5, 932 A.2d 274, 279 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
                                           1.
             In its first issue, the Borough argues that the Arbitrator acted outside her
jurisdiction by failing to confine her opinion to the issue submitted to her for decision,
which was whether the Borough discharged Grievant for “just cause” under the parties’
CBA. (R.R. at 166a.) The Borough contends that the Arbitrator found that Grievant’s
conduct warranted discharge but then went outside of the CBA to reinstate his
employment under her interpretation of the Department’s Regulation. Specifically, she
concluded that under the Regulation, the Police Chief may modify the level of
discipline recommended by the Review Board but may not deviate in any other respect
from the Review Board. The Borough submits this was error because in suspension or
termination cases, the Review Board is not the final decision-maker and there is nothing
in the Regulation requiring the Police Chief to exactly mirror the conclusions and
considerations of the Review Board. (R.R. at 1152a.) It contends that the Arbitrator
acted outside her jurisdiction by attempting to bestow such final decision-making
authority on the Review Board, and thus limiting the authority of the Police Chief and
Borough Manager under the Regulation, through her interpretation thereof. The
Borough argues that by basing her decision on the Regulation, rather than on “just
cause” under the CBA, the Arbitrator exceeded her jurisdiction.
             An arbitrator exceeds her jurisdiction when she addresses issues not
properly submitted to her. City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
No. 5, 181 A.3d 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). An arbitrator thus may not modify the terms
of an existing collective bargaining agreement. See Marple Township v. Delaware

                                           11
County F.O.P. Lodge 27, 660 A.2d 211, 215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (“Arbitrators are
required to address the issues submitted within the context of the positions of the parties
and effectuate the relief requested, not to reform the collective bargaining
agreements.”). However, an arbitrator has wide latitude to address any issues that are
properly submitted to her, and “may speak to an issue if it is reasonably subsumed
within the issues properly before the arbitration panel.” Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5,
of Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 129 A.3d 1221, 1231 (Pa. 2015).
             Here, the issue before the Arbitrator, as stipulated to by the parties, was
whether Grievant was terminated for just cause. While the Borough is correct that an
arbitrator does not have the power to rewrite the CBA by creating a new procedural
policy, an arbitrator necessarily must have the ability to interpret the CBA in order to
determine the rights and powers of the parties involved. Here, the CBA grants
jurisdiction to an arbitrator to determine whether the discharge of a police officer is
justified under the just cause standard. Article XXX of the CBA states:

             The [Borough] shall not suspend, demote, or discharge
             without just cause. If an employee alleges that the
             disciplinary action was without just cause, he may elect to
             appeal . . . through the grievance procedure commencing
             with the third step and including arbitration.
(R.R. at 1368a.)
             Further, in the CBA, the Borough specifically agreed that it would comply
with its own Regulation in the administration of all matters covered by the CBA.
Article IV, Section B of the CBA provides, in this regard: “In the administration of all
matters covered by this agreement, the parties are all governed by provisions of existing
. . . [R]egulations.” Id. at 1346a. In effect, the CBA authorizes the Arbitrator to
determine whether the Borough complied with its Regulation. To that end, the
Arbitrator interpreted the pertinent Regulation and found that the addition of extra

                                            12
charges that were not part of the Review Board’s deliberation ran counter to the
Regulation. (Arbitration Award, at 20.) Thus, she concluded, in response to the
stipulated question posed to her, that “Grievant’s termination was not supported by just
cause.”   Id.     The determination that the Borough did not comply with its own
Regulation amounted to her interpretation of the CBA because the CBA incorporated
that Regulation into CBA. Pennsylvania Department of General Services v. Fraternal
Order of Police #85, Capitol Police, 684 A.2d 219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). As such, it
was the Arbitrator’s interpretation to make. Id. See also Uwchlan Township (propriety
of an arbitrator’s interpretation of disciplinary regulations incorporated into contract
was beyond narrow certiorari scope of review).
                Whether just cause exists is a matter of contractual interpretation.
Because the issue of whether the additional charges the Police Chief cited as reasons
for discharge were properly before the Review Board is related to the issue of just
cause, the Arbitrator was permitted to consider and interpret what actions the Police
Chief was entitled to undertake under the Regulation and CBA. Therefore, we must
find that the Arbitrator did not act beyond her jurisdiction.
                                            2.
                In its second issue, the Borough contends that by directing the level of
“retraining” needed for a “rogue” officer to return to work, the Arbitrator exceeded her
powers and jurisdiction by infringing on the Borough’s managerial prerogative to direct
its workforce. It asserts that Article III (Management Responsibilities) of the parties’
CBA vests the Borough with the managerial right to establish and maintain “standards
of quality and performance.” (R.R. at 1345a.) It argues that the Arbitration Award
infringes on the Borough’s managerial rights by imposing a vague “retraining”

                                            13
standard, fraught with risk, as a condition for Grievant performing his statutorily-
defined job duties.
             We find the issue to be without merit. First, the cases cited by the Borough
all involve interest arbitration, not Act 111 grievance arbitration. Second, the Borough
also does not point to any established managerial prerogative that conflicted with the
Arbitrator’s reinstatement of Grievant on the condition that he undergo further rigorous
training. It would seem that the Arbitrator’s Award requiring “rigorous” training was
consistent with the Borough’s interests and in any event, it completely left to the
Borough to decide what the rigorous training would entail. Thus, we find that there
was no infringement upon the Borough’s managerial prerogative that rendered the
Arbitrator’s Award beyond her jurisdiction.
                                            3.
             In its third issue, the Borough argues that the Arbitrator exceeded her
powers by ordering the Borough to carry out an unlawful act, namely, employing a
police officer that cannot unconditionally carry out his statutorily-defined job duties.
(Borough’s Br. at 46-47.)
             An arbitrator under Act 111 exceeds her authority (1) by ordering either
of the parties to the dispute to commit an illegal act, or (2) by ruling on a matter which
is not a mandatory subject of bargaining under Act 111. City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal
Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 938 A.2d 225 (Pa. 2007). Conversely, an
arbitrator does not exceed her authority by ordering either party to commit an act which
it could legally and voluntarily perform, or by ruling on a matter that is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under Act 111. Appeal of Upper Providence. Errors of law are
unreviewable by a court if the determinations themselves do not exceed the authority

                                           14
of the arbitrator. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Association
(Smith & Johnson), 741 A.2d 1248, 1252 (Pa. 1999) (Smith & Johnson).
             The discharge and reinstatement of police officers are mandatory subjects
of bargaining under Act 111. Moreover, Grievant was reinstated subject to a written
reprimand, a five-day suspension without pay, further training, and a last chance
agreement. The reinstatement of Grievant with these conditions is something the
Borough could have done voluntarily. There is no law that would prohibit the Borough
from reinstating Grievant on the condition that he undergo rigorous training and with
a last chance agreement if the Borough wished to do so. The Arbitration Award does
not, in any way, require the Borough to do something that it could not have legally
done on its own. Therefore, we are constrained to find that the Arbitration Award did
not exceed the Arbitrator’s authority.
                                          4.
             In its final issue, the Borough asserts that the Arbitration Award should
be vacated because reinstatement of Grievant to employment with the Borough is
repugnant to well-defined, dominant public policy.
             The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected that contention in Smith &
Johnson, explaining as follows:

             Broadening the narrow certiorari scope of review to include
             a provision which would allow the courts to interfere with an
             arbitrator’s award whenever that award could be deemed to
             be violative of “public policy” - however that nebulous
             concept may be defined by a particular appellate court -
             would greatly expand the scope of review in these matters. If
             we were to adopt [the appellant’s] recommendation to
             include this ill-defined term within the narrow certiorari
             scope of review, we would markedly increase the judiciary’s
             role in Act 111 arbitration awards. This would undercut the

                                          15
             legislature’s intent of preventing protracted litigation in this
             arena.
741 A.2d at 1252-53. We are bound by this Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly,
the standard of review for Act 111 cases does not encompass, and this Court cannot
expand it to include, a public policy exception under the excess powers prong of narrow
certiorari. See also Borough of Gettysburg v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 776, 233 A.3d 1002 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (on judicial review of an arbitration
award arising under Act 111, there is no public policy exception under the excess
powers prong of narrow certiorari).
             For all the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                                            ________________________________
                                            PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

President Judge Cohn Jubelirer did not participate in this decision.

                                           16
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of State College,             :
                        Appellant     :
                                      :
            v.                        :    No. 696 C.D. 2022
                                      :
Borough of State College              :
Police Association                    :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of October, 2023, the May 26, 2022 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge