Court Opinion

ID: 9396558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 00:00:23.604517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.819477
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10451        Document: 00516759258             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/22/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                             May 22, 2023
                                      No. 22-10451
                                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Felicia Munoz,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:21-CR-43

   Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Our prior panel opinion, United States v. Munoz, 65 F.4th 274 (5th Cir.
   2023), is WITHDRAWN. The following opinion is SUBSTITUTED:
         Appellant Felicia Munoz was a caretaker for a retired Texas Depart-
   ment of Public Safety trooper and his ailing wife (known pseudonymously as
   R.R. and K.R.). Over the course of Munoz’s employment, she and her

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10451      Document: 00516759258           Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/22/2023

                                     No. 22-10451

   boyfriend stole hundreds of firearms, eight silencers, a wedding ring, two ten-
   nis bracelets, earrings, and two other rings from the elderly couple. Munoz
   eventually pleaded guilty to possession of stolen firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).
   In connection with her plea agreement, she waived the right to appeal except
   as to a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. The district court sen-
   tenced Munoz to 108 months’ incarceration and ordered her to pay restitu-
   tion in the amount of $75,605.97 to compensate for the stolen firearms. She
   appealed the restitution order.
          The questions presented are whether Munoz’s appeal waiver bars her
   from challenging the restitution award and, if not, whether the district court
   erred in calculating the proper amount of restitution. Assuming arguendo
   that the appeal waiver does not bar her challenge, her substantive arguments
   fail. The district court committed no error in ordering restitution in the
   amount of $75,605.97. Accordingly, that judgment is AFFIRMED.
                                          I
          As introduced above, R.R. worked as a DPS trooper for his living. In
   the words of his daughter, S.R., he was an avid gun collector and their family
   often enjoyed firearm sports together. Upon R.R.’s retirement, he and K.R.
   began to need assistance in their day-to-day life. Specifically, R.R. developed
   diabetes and K.R. was diagnosed with brain cancer. When their health con-
   tinued to decline, they hired Munoz as a caretaker.
          Munoz used her employment to steal from the couple. She took pic-
   tures of R.R. and K.R.’s possessions and sent them to her boyfriend, Albert
   Guzman. When Munoz took the couple to doctor appointments, she would
   text Guzman to alert him that then was a good time to steal whatever posses-
   sions she had previously identified. As noted above, Munoz and Guzman
   stole 130 firearms, eight silencers, a wedding ring, two tennis bracelets, ear-
   rings, and two other rings. They sold many of the stolen firearms to a gun

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                                     No. 22-10451

   shop in San Antonio. And they sold others “on the street.”
          Law enforcement officers eventually discovered the scheme. Munoz
   was charged with possession of stolen firearms, aiding and abetting the pos-
   session of stolen firearms, and possession of unregistered firearms. She then
   entered into a plea agreement whereby she agreed to plead guilty to the first
   charge in exchange for the Government’s dropping the other two charges.
   Munoz also agreed to waive her entitlement to appeal, but reserved the right
   to, among other things, “bring a direct appeal of . . . a sentence exceeding the
   statutory maximum punishment.”
          In connection with the sentencing proceedings, the probation office
   inventoried the stolen guns. Law enforcement recovered 57 of the 130 fire-
   arms that Munoz and Guzman stole. For the other seventy-three, the proba-
   tion office listed the make, model, serial number, and an estimate of the value.
   R.R. and K.R. were unable to assist with the estimates because they had died
   in 2021. And so the probation office relied on S.R. to approximate the value
   of each firearm. According to the pre-sentence report, S.R. calculated those
   values using R.R.’s detailed records of the firearm collection, her experience
   with firearms generally, and her familiarity with the particular guns at issue.
   She also accounted for the fact that “many of the firearms were family heir-
   looms” and thus irreplaceable. Relying on S.R.’s estimates, the probation
   office calculated the value of the lost firearms as $79,039.
          Munoz objected to the probation office’s calculation. She introduced
   a competing estimate of the firearms’ value—conducted by James Hill, the
   owner of a gun range in Abilene. Hill offered two estimates: one using the
   retail (or replacement) price of the lost firearms, and one using the market
   value, which reflected a discounted price due to the guns’ used condition.
   He concluded that the stolen firearms were worth $70,716 according to retail
   value and $52,540 according to market value. Hill candidly noted that he had

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   not examined the weapons and could not testify as to their precise condition.
   Munoz requested that the district court order restitution according to the
   discounted market value.
          The Government then amended its requested restitution award in two
   respects. First, it agreed to rely on Hill’s affidavit because S.R. declined to
   testify. But it contended that the district court should use retail value instead
   of market value. This reduced the sum to $69,816. (The Government had
   recovered one additional firearm, worth $900, so it subtracted that amount
   from its request.) Second, the Government explained that S.R. had elected
   to abandon the eight silencers because she could not take possession of them
   without opening a probate proceeding and pursuing them in court. For this
   reason, the Government asserted, Munoz should pay restitution for the re-
   placement value of the silencers, which was calculated at $5,789.97. The
   Government therefore requested a revised restitution amount of $75,605.97.
          At the sentencing hearing, Munoz renewed her objection that the dis-
   trict court should use market value instead of replacement value to calculate
   the restitution award. (Notably, she did not object to the silencers’ inclusion
   in the calculation.) The district court overruled the objection—finding that
   “[t]he firearms here held unique, intangible, and sentimental value to the vic-
   tim, so the fair market value inadequately measures the harm.” The district
   court thus ordered restitution in the amount of $75,605.97.
                                          II
          Munoz presents two issues on appeal. First, she maintains that the
   district court erred by calculating the restitution award using retail value, ra-
   ther than market value. Second, she argues that the Government failed to
   prove that she proximately caused financial loss relating to the silencers. Be-
   cause appeal waivers do not deprive us of jurisdiction, we assume arguendo
   that consideration of these claims is not precluded by the waiver, and we

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                                     No. 22-10451

   conclude that they lack merit. See United States v. Madrid, 978 F.3d 201 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (holding that appeal waivers are not jurisdictional).
                                          A
          We consider de novo the legality of a restitution award and the method
   used to calculate loss. See United States v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir.
   2011). But we review the factual findings supporting the restitution order for
   clear error. See United States v. Sharma, 703 F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2012).
          As an initial matter, we perceive no clear error in the district court’s
   determination that R.R. and K.R.’s gun collection was unique in nature. The
   district court considered the question at length, ultimately concluding that
   “the firearms here held unique, intangible, and sentimental value to the vic-
   tim.” We cannot say that this finding leaves us with the “definite and firm
   conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Sharma, 703 F.3d at 322.
          With that holding in mind, we conclude that the district court did not
   err in choosing to use the guns’ replacement values to calculate the amount
   of restitution. This court and several other circuits have recognized that the
   MVRA is silent on how restitution is to be calculated, and “contemplate[s]
   the exercise of discretion by sentencing courts in determining the measure of
   value appropriate to restitution calculation in a given case.” United States v.
   Gunselman, 643 F. Appx. 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.
   Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006)). Although the fair market value
   of property will ordinarily compensate a victim for his or her loss, that metric
   may at times “inadequately measure” the relevant harm. Id. (quoting
   U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i)). In such a case, replacement cost may be
   “best suited to make [the] victims whole.” Id. (collecting cases). Having
   properly determined that the firearm collection was unique, the district court
   committed no legal error in calculating the amount of restitution by using the
   replacement value instead of the fair market value.

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                                          No. 22-10451

                                                B
           We now turn to the question whether the Government proved that
   Munoz proximately caused S.R. to lose the value of the silencers that S.R.
   elected to abandon rather than pursue in probate proceedings. At the outset,
   however, we emphasize that Munoz did not raise this objection in the district
   court. In fact, the record is devoid of any objection to including the silencers
   in the restitution calculation. Thus, we review for plain error only. United
   States v. Melendez, 57 F.4th 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2023).1
           To demonstrate plain error, Munoz must show “(1) the district court
   erred; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected [her]
   substantial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Vargas, 21 F.4th 332, 334
   (5th Cir. 2021)). And even then, we have discretion to decline to correct the
   error if our doing so would not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
   public reputation of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting Vargas, 21 F.4th at 334).
           Assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we cannot say that the
   error was clear and obvious. Munoz does not dispute that she stole the eight
   silencers, or that her actions put S.R. in a position to choose whether to aban-
   don them or initiate probate proceedings to claim them. Instead, Munoz ar-
   gues that S.R.’s actions sever the chain of causation with respect to Munoz’s
   stealing the silencers, or at least sufficiently dilutes it such that she cannot be
   said to have proximately caused S.R.’s loss. The Government responds that
   it would be impracticable for S.R. to claim the silencers. Gov. Br. at 24–25
   (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)) (the defendant must pay the value of
   the property “if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible,

           1
            The Government argued for plain-error review for this issue in its brief. Munoz
   neither addressed this topic in her opening brief nor filed a reply brief. As such, it is un-
   contested that this standard of review applies.

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                                     No. 22-10451

   impracticable, or inadequate”). Assuming the Government failed to carry its
   burden to prove that Munoz proximately caused harm relating to the silenc-
   ers, and assuming that the district court erred in including the value of the
   silencers in the restitution calculation, we conclude that any such error was
   not clear and obvious. Munoz thus fails to demonstrate plain error.

                                 *        *         *
          Having considered Munoz’s arguments on the merits, we conclude
   that the district court did not err in ordering restitution in the amount of
   $75,605.97. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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