Court Opinion

ID: 9725284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:38:50.267946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.406181
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
STRUTZ, Judge.
Appellants have filed ,a vigorous petition for rehearing in this case, pointing out that this court, in the case of Kessler v. Board of Education of City of Fessenden (N. *822D.), 87 N.W.2d 743, has previously decided that the laws of this State provide for payment of tuition by parents of nonresident children.
The decision in the Kessler case no longer is applicable. That decision was based on Section 15-2908 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, as amended by Chapter 134 of the 1957 Session Laws, appearing in the 1957 Supplement to the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 as Section 15-29082. Section 15-29082 of the 1957 Supplement became Section 15-29-08.2 of the North Dakota Century Code on adoption of that Code in 1959.
Thereafter, the 1961 Legislature enacted Chapter 158 of the 1961 Session Laws. Section 1 of that chapter provides that several chapters of the North Dakota Century Code, including Chapter 15-29, “are hereby amended and reenacted to read as follows: * *
Then follows a complete reenactment of Chapter 15-29. Such amendment and reenactment wiped out Section 15-29-08.2 of the North Dakota Century Code, since it had been a part of Chapter 15.29.
 It is true that the subsequent section of Chapter 158 of the 1961 Session Laws, which purports to be the repeal section, does not mention Chapter 15-29. But, since Chapter 15-29 was specifically amended and reenacted by Chapter 158 of the 1961 Session Laws, Chapter 158, in effect, did repeal every part of Chapter 15-29 and that entire chapter no longer is the law except as it was reenacted. It may be argued that Chapter 158 of the 1961 Session Laws did not, in its repeal clause, specifically repeal Chapter 15-29. However, this be material, that chapter was repealed by implication. This court has held that repeals by implication are not favored. Nevertheless, where a new statute covers the entire subject of a former law in such a way as to set up a complete plan of action pertaining to the subject-matter, which is inconsistent with that contained in the former statute, the old law no longer remains in force. Figenskau v. McCoy, 66 N.D. 290, 265 N.W. 259.
Thus the decision in the Kessler case no longer is the law since it is based on a statute no longer in existence.
As we pointed out in our decision in this-case, Section 15-40-17 of the 1961 Supplement to the North Dakota Century Code provides that the whole amount of the tuition for nonresident high school' pupils, “except as hereinafter provided,” shall be paid by the district from which the nonresident high school pupil is admitted. The only exception made is in. the following language:
“This chapter, however, shall not affect the right of a school district to charge and collect such tuition as may be fixed by agreement from students who are not residents of this-state.”
The high school pupils admitted into the defendant district’s schools did not come within that exception.
The general authority given to a school district to admit pupils from another district, “when it can be done without injuring or overcrowding the schools,” would not authorize a district to admit high school pupils except under the conditions heretofore set out. The same subsection specifically provides:
“ * * * The admission of nonresident high school students shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 15-40.”
Thus this general authority must be read in the light of the specific provisions for the admission of high school pupils.
Nonresident high school pupils, therefore, except such for whose tuition the home district of the child would be liable under the provisions of this statute, were improperly admitted by the defendant district.
*823Having by clear and unmistakable language indicated that nonresident high school pupils were not to be admitted by any school district except in cases wheré such attendance is necessitated by shorter distance or by other reasons of convenience, or where the district of the residence of such pupils approves the attendance in another district, or where the student is not a resident of this State, the Legislature, in the same chapter, provided for the admittance of elementary pupils from other districts in the following language:
“ * * * When an elementary pupil is admitted from another district, credit on his tuition shall be given by the district admitting him to the extent of school taxes paid in the admitting district by the parent or guardian of the admitted pupil. If the attendance of an elementary pupil from another . district is necessitated by shorter distance or other reasons of convenience, approval or disapproval shall be given by a three-member committee consisting of the county judge, state’s attorney, and the county superintendent of schools within fifteen days after consulting the school boards of both districts concerned, and the balance of the tuition, after credit for taxes paid and the credit allowed for county equalization fund payments according to the provisions of section 15-40-26, shall be paid by the district from which ' the pupil is admitted, but the whole amount of the tuition shall not exceed the average cost of elementary education per child in the county. Such cost shall include expenditures from the general and sinking and interest funds and annual receipts of the building fund. Districts not complying with the decision of the committee herein provided shall forfeit their county equalization payments to the schools receiving the pupils. The board may admit pupils residing in unorganized territory adjacent to the district to the schools in the district and may arrange with the parents or guardians of such pupils for the payment of tuition. * * *” Sec. 15-29-08, subd. 14, 1961 Supp., N.D.C.C.
' Thus the tuition for nonresident elementary pupils is to be paid “by the district from which the pupil is admitted.” The only exception made is for pupils residing in unorganized territory adjacent to the district, in which case the pupils from such unorganized territory may be admitted to such school in the district and the district “may arrange with the parents or guardians of such pupils for the payment of tuition.”
These exceptions not being applicable in the case at bar, we adhere to our former decision and the petition for rehearing is denied.
MORRIS, C. J., and TEIGEN, BURKE and ERICKSTAD, JJ., concur.