Court Opinion

ID: 9906516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 11:23:46.586589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:35.073148
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00156-CR
          No. 02-23-00157-CR
     ___________________________

CEDRICK DEWAYNE JACKSON, Appellant

                    V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
           Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. 1730610, 1730611

   Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Cedrick Dewayne Jackson appeals his sentences of ten years’

incarceration for aggravated robbery and five years’ incarceration for evading arrest or

detention with a vehicle.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.03(a), 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A). In

a single point, Jackson asserts that his sentences are grossly disproportionate to his

offenses. We will affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

       In May 2022, Jackson approached seventy-seven-year-old Columbus Jones III

while he was loading items into his vehicle in a Home Depot parking lot, pointed a

gun at him, and demanded his vehicle. After a brief struggle during which Jackson

placed Jones in a headlock and threatened to shoot him, Jones gave Jackson the key to

his vehicle. While fleeing from police, Jackson wrecked the stolen vehicle, breaking his

leg in the process.

       Jackson was indicted for aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The evading-

arrest indictment included a deadly-weapon-finding notice alleging that Jackson had

used the stolen vehicle in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Jackson pleaded guilty to both offenses without a charge bargain or sentencing

       The trial court established separate cause numbers for each of the two counts:
       1

Cause No. 1730610 for aggravated robbery and Cause 1730611 for evading arrest.
Jackson has filed separate appeals in each case. We address both appeals in this
opinion.

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bargain and pleaded “true” to the deadly-weapon-finding notice in the evading-arrest

indictment.

      After allowing time for a presentence investigation report (PSI) to be prepared,

the trial court held a sentencing hearing. After considering the PSI and hearing the

testimony of Jackson’s mother and his second cousin’s ex-wife, the trial court

sentenced Jackson to ten years in prison for aggravated robbery and five years in

prison for evading arrest.2 This appeal followed.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

      In a single point, Jackson argues that his sentences—despite being well within

the statutory limits—are grossly disproportionate to the offenses for which he was

convicted. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

      “Generally, punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive,

cruel, or unusual punishment.” Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2005, no pet.) (first citing Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App.

1973); and then citing Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2001, no pet.)). Indeed, a trial court has “essentially ‘unfettered’” discretion to impose

      2
        These sentences, which are to run concurrently, are well within the statutory
limits for Jackson’s offenses. The statutory punishment range for Jackson’s first-
degree-felony aggravated-robbery offense is five to ninety-nine years or life in prison
and up to a $10,000 fine. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32. The punishment range for his
third-degree-felony evading-arrest offense is two to ten years in prison and up to a
$10,000 fine. Id. § 12.34.

                                            3
any sentence within the prescribed statutory range, Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990)), and any sentence within the statutory limits is virtually

“unassailable” on appeal provided that it is based upon the sentencer’s informed

normative judgment. Id. at 324. But a narrow exception to this general rule exists: the

Eighth Amendment prohibits noncapital punishment within the statutory limits if the

sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–

60, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021–22 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–1001,

111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702–05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment); State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Although the

“precise contours [of the gross-disproportionality exception] are unclear,” one thing is

certain: it applies “only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at

998–1001, 111 S. Ct. at 2703–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment); see also Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23; Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323–24.

      To determine whether a noncapital sentence qualifies for this uncommon and

“somewhat amorphous” exception, we engage in a three-step review beginning with a

threshold analysis comparing the gravity of the offense to the severity of the sentence.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Chavez,

213 S.W.3d at 323–24. Assessing the gravity of the offense requires us to consider

(1) the harm that the defendant caused or threatened to the victim and to society,

(2) the defendant’s culpability, and (3) the defendant’s prior adjudicated and

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unadjudicated crimes. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. We weigh these factors against

the defendant’s sentence, looking to precedent for guidance as to the constitutional

limits of proportional severity. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75, 102 S. Ct. 703,

706 (1982) (per curiam) (chastising lower courts for extending gross-disproportionality

exception beyond the limits of precedent); McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 317 (5th

Cir. 1992) (holding sentence was not grossly-disproportionate in light of both the

Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s precedent). In the rare case in which this

threshold analysis indicates gross disproportionality, we proceed to steps two and

three by comparing the defendant’s sentence with those received by similar offenders

in this jurisdiction and with those imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296–300, 103 S. Ct.

3001, 3012–15 (1983) (applying steps two and three).

B. Threshold Analysis

      Jackson’s gross-disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold test.

Indeed, considering the factors set forth above, see Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323, we

conclude that Jackson’s sentences are well within constitutional bounds.

      First, Jackson’s violent and dangerous offenses caused or threatened significant

harm to both the victim and society. During the robbery, Jackson physically attacked

Jones and threatened to shoot him. Jones, a Vietnam War veteran, suffers from post-

traumatic stress disorder, and Jackson’s actions reignited his symptoms, causing

ongoing harm to his mental health. Further, by fleeing from police in the stolen

                                            5
vehicle and ultimately wrecking it, Jackson caused significant property damage 3 and

placed the police and other motorists in danger.

      Second, because Jackson pleaded guilty, his culpability for the offenses is clear.

See Saravia v. State, No. 02-22-00138-CR, 2023 WL 2805902, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Wade v. State,

No. 02-21-00206-CR, 2023 WL 1859797, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Although he showed contrition,

his remorse appears to be tied to how his actions affected his mother and himself, not

how they affected Jones or endangered police and other motorists. Further, while

Jackson has a history of mental illness, the record shows that he has contributed to his

poor mental health by repeatedly failing to take his prescribed medication and trying

to treat his symptoms with marijuana. Indeed, while in jail awaiting sentencing,

Jackson refused his prescribed medication and ignored his mental health even though

the jail medical staff repeatedly adjusted the medication to minimize side effects.

      Third, while it is true—as Jackson points out—that he has no prior felony

convictions, he has been convicted of misdemeanor assault of a family member (his

mother). Indeed, he has a history of aggression and violent acts towards his family.

      3
       Jones’s vehicle was “totaled.”

                                            6
Most recently, he allegedly assaulted his grandparents while staying at their home in

Arizona, and five officers had to subdue him and transport him to jail. 4

         Taking all of these factors together, we cannot say that Jackson’s five- and ten-

year sentences, which are on the low end of the statutory ranges for his offenses,5 give

rise to an inference of disproportionality.6 Accordingly, we overrule Jackson’s sole

point.

                                    III. CONCLUSION

         Having overruled Jackson’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                        /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                        Elizabeth Kerr
                                                        Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 30, 2023

       Jackson was charged with multiple offenses based on this incident, including
         4

aggravated assault of an officer, resisting arrest, and “assault–touched to injure.”
These charges remain pending.

         See supra note 2.
         5

         Because Jackson’s disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold
         6

test, we need not compare his sentences to others for the same offenses in Texas and
elsewhere. See Bolar v. State, 625 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no
pet.); see also Nunnally v. State, No. 03-19-00807-CR, 2021 WL 4995502, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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