Court Opinion

ID: 9752182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:42:35.819787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:09.053780
License: Public Domain

Condon, C. J.,
dissenting. The ineluctable effect of the court’s decision is to provide a definite term for the city clerk, namely, life, whereas sec. 4.01 of the charter plainly provides that it shall be indefinite. I assume that no one will deny that an appointment for life is for a definite term. The certainty of death marks the limit of such a term. Now an appointment cannot be both definite and indefinite, consequently in my opinion the court has amended the charter. This is an exercise of the power of legislation which is beyond its jurisdiction. What it cannot lawfully do directly it may not do indirectly under the guise of judicial construction. Because I think it has done so, I dissent.
On my view of the pertinent language of sec. 4.01 the appointment of the city clerk was at the will of the city council and as such it does not come within the purview of sec. 3.18. Like a tenancy at will in the law of real estate this is one of the weakest of tenures, if not the weakest. Why the people of Cranston chose to provide so weak a tenure for the city clerk we do not know. It may be that since he is by virtue of his office also clerk of the council *89and as such its chief administrator, they intended the council to have absolute freedom of choice in the appointment and retention of an officer so intimately connected with it. This is not an unreasonable inference and as counsel for petitioner suggests seems to be particularly pertinent in view of the fact that the charter provides for party government by means of partisan elections.
Gallogly, Beals, Tiernan & S.weeney, David F. Sweeney, for petitioner.
James L. Taft, Jr., for respondent.
In that connection it is significant that the court’s decision will nullify such intention and impose upon the new majority party in the council as its clerk a member of the rejected minority party in whom it has no confidence. Be that as it may there is no need to search for hidden reasons why the people chose to provide a special tenure for the city clerk so markedly different from the tenures of other appointive officers. In the present instance we need go no further than the clear and unambiguous language of sec. 4.01 and apply it as it is written.
That language needs no construction. In such circumstances to' attempt to construe it is to strain for a result that is in effect legislative amendment and not judicial construction. Thus in the case at bar the court’s construction has resulted in providing a definite term of office for the city clerk whereas sec. 4.01 expressly provides for an indefinite term. I find it impossible to view this result as anything but legislation under the guise of construction. On this view I regret that I cannot concur in the court’s decision but must dissent.