Court Opinion

ID: 9678824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:33:19.095906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:08.207218
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
concurring.
This is a close case. It is also disturbing. Both Justice Andell’s and Justice Nuchia’s opinions have much to commend them.
This case exposes the conflicting agendas of the judicial system and the health care system. Much evidence shows that appellant is sick. The health care system exists solely to provide care for the sick. The judicial system has the same concern, as reflected by the Health and Safety Code, but that code also strictly limits the imposition of forced mental health treatment.
The potential for abuse from government ordered mental health treatment is well documented in this and other countries. Certainly, nothing in this case suggests any abusive motive or treatment, but I believe the potential for it is what persuaded the legislature to pass a restrictive statute and persuaded two of our sister courts to set aside orders for forced mental health treatment despite evidence arguably stronger than here. See Broussard v. State, 827 S.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (describing appellant as a delusional paranoid schizophrenic who needed further treatment to avoid deterioration and to protect her from harming herself and others); In re J.S.C., 812 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ) (explaining appellant was catatonic, hallucinating, delusional, helpless, unable to care for himself or to remember, disoriented, his speech was 50% irrelevant, and he was “totally out of it”).
Why would the legislature and the courts make it so hard for the State to give treatment without consent to people who are mentally ill? See Broussard 827 S.W.2d at 622 (‘While we are reluctant to deny court-ordered treatment to a woman who is obviously ill, we cannot lower the requirements imposed under § 574.034(c) of the Texas Mental Health Code regarding proof by clear and convincing evidence.”). The reason must be to keep the State out of the business of forced treatment except in compelling cases, as defined by Health and Safety Code § 574.034 (Vernon 1992). While the State has a strong interest in protecting the mental health of each citizen, including appellant, it has an even greater interest in preserving the civil liberties of all citizens. This is no abstract proposition. It means that some people who need treatment will not get it, and for that, they and others will probably suffer.
Freedom is not cheap, much less free. The price for civil liberties must be paid, however reluctantly. Today, I choose to pay it by voting to reverse this order for forced treatment.