Court Opinion

ID: 9710100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:01:59.87649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.201747
License: Public Domain

MACK, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
In large measure for reasons apparent in the majority opinion, I would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
I am well aware of the limited extent to which this court may review sentences which are within statutory limits. This does not mean however that the sentencing process is immune from appellate scrutiny. It is well established that this court may review the sentencing process where a trial court has failed altogether to exercise discretion or has applied legally impermissible criteria which undermine the proceedings. See In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429 (D.C.1988). In the instant case, the trial judge applied legally impermissible criteria in the imposition of sentence. This was error requiring resentencing.
The comment of the sentencing court speaks for itself. The judge said he was imposing the maximum sentence of one year because the accused chose to go to trial with no defense “at all,” and that if the defendant had come “before the court” and admitted *172that he possessed “a little stuff’ and “needed a little extra money”1 the court would have been more lenient.
I cannot read the trial court’s comment in this case as being merely “disturbing” or as simply reflecting the court’s decision to sentence appellant on the basis of individualized circumstances. I cannot in principle distinguish this comment from that at issue in Scott v. United States, 135 U.S.App. D.C. 377, 380, 419 F.2d 264, 267 (1969),2 where three appellate judges (Chief Judge Bazelon and Judges Wright and Leventhal) unanimously agreed that a defendant must be resentenced when the trial judge had remarked:
Now the Court didn’t believe your story on the stand, the Court believes you deliberately lied in this case. If you had pleaded guilty to this offense, I might have been more lenient with you.
Thus in the instant case, as in Scott, the trial court’s words reflect a reaction of annoyance because of a personal belief3 in the guilt of one who insists on putting the government to its proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 395, 419 F.2d at 276; see United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 3511, 87 L.Ed.2d 640 (1985).
Moreover, in the instant ease, since our concern is with what the trial judge said, we cannot simply infer that the court was basing its decision upon a presentence report; it did not say so. In fact, if we could infer at all, it would be far more “plausible” to infer that the court was not basing its decision on this report since, just prior to explicitly stating its reason for imposing the maximum sentence, it stated its intention to ignore the most serious listing on that report (a conviction which was under collateral attack). For the same reason, we cannot simply borrow from ABA Standards or United States Sentencing Guidelines that speak of downward adjustments for “Acceptance of Responsibility” with respect to guilty pleas,4 infer the converse for upward adjustments, and apply this process to confer legitimacy upon sentencing errors. Cf. United States v. Jones, 302 U.S.App. D.C. 273, 997 F.2d 1475 (1993) (where the federal court in a hotly contested en banc decision interpreted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1065, 114 S.Ct. 741, 126 L.Ed.2d 704 (1994). As far as District of Columbia law is concerned, the lower and upper limits for incarceration for possession of marijuana are zero and one year. See D.C.Code § 33-541(d) (1993 Repl.). Nowhere in the statute, or case law, are there “baseline” provisions for adjustment, downward or upward.
In Williams v. United States, supra, note 2, we found constitutional error where a sentencing judge considered the fact that the defendant had refused to disclose the source of the narcotics he had been found to possess. We vacated the sentence imposed even though it was one half of the statutory maximum. The error in the instant case, where the trial judge explicitly indicated that he was imposing the maximum sentence because the defendant exercised his right to go to trial is just as egregious as that in Williams. Moreover, the error here is exacerbated by the court’s indication that it was punishing a seller rather than a buyer — thus relying upon inaccurate information. In re L.J., supra, 546 A.2d at 434. The majority cannot justifiably simply dismiss Williams, supra, by reference to ABA Standards and United States Sentencing Guidelines.
*173In short, the majority here, having recognized the fact that our jurisdiction to review sentencing is limited to errors of law, is in fact disturbed by such errors, but declines to vacate the sentence. In so doing, despite its disavowal, it has looked not to what the court said, but to what the prosecutor and the probation report said. In point of fact, by its reasoning, what is said is less important than what could have been said.5 In other words, there was no error because an error might have been avoided if the trial court had said nothing or had said more.
I would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

. The majority notes that this comment is perplexing. It is more than perplexing since it indicates that the court was imposing a sentence on a faulty recollection of the facts and the charge.

. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971), with respect to the precedent we are required to follow. See also Williams v. United States, 293 A.2d 484 (D.C.1972).

. In the context of the instant case, the reference to “I never understood why you went to trial” and the personal "amazement" as to the success of the defense lawyer as being able to come up with even "something plausible” add to the depth and intensity of the personal reaction.

.United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (1995) ("Manual”), Note that, were the United States Guidelines applicable here, the sentencing range would have been two to eight months, even if appellant did not receive a downward adjustment for "acceptance of responsibility.” Id. at §§ 2D2.1(a)(3); 4A1.1; and Grid at p. 272.

. The majority’s reasoning ignores the substantial support for a lesser sentence that could be found in appellant's successful completion of pri- or probationary terms, as well as the fact that his offense was possession of less than one gram of marijuana.