Court Opinion

ID: 9900495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:24:07.021302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.464836
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                         CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                         E-filed: May 04 2023 05:43PM
                                                         Clerk Review: May 04 2023 05:43PM
                                                         Filing ID: 69950199
                                                         Case No.: 2022-SCC-0019-CIV
                                                         Judy Aldan

                           IN THE
                    Supreme Court
                          OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

 ANAKS OCEAN VIEW HILL HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, LTD.,
                  Petitioner-Appellant,

                              v.

                  PERRY INOS, JR. ET AL.,
                   Respondents-Appellees,
                           AND
                ATKINS KROLL SAIPAN, INC.,
                     Applicant-Appellee.

          Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0019-CIV

  ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND MOTION FOR
                    RECONSIDERATION
                     Cite as: 2023 MP 4

                    Decided May 4, 2023

             CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
          JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE ROBERT J. TORRES, JR.
          JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO

           Superior Court Civil Action No. 22-0103-CV
         Judge Pro Tempore David A. Wiseman, Presiding
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

PER CURIAM:
¶1      This matter comes before the Court on Appellee Atkins Kroll Saipan,
 Inc.’s (“Atkins Kroll”) petition for rehearing and motion for reconsideration of
 the Court's March 7, 2023 order. In the order, the Court found that the Superior
 Court had jurisdiction to hear ANAKS’ petition. Atkins Kroll argues that the
 Court (1) erred by determining that the Zoning Board issued the conditional use
 permit (“CUP”) to Atkins Kroll on April 13, 2022; (2) overlooked or
 misapprehended ANAKS’ challenge to the Zoning Board’s oral vote on March
 18, 2022; (3) did not consider the applicability of the Open Government Meetings
 and Records Act; (4) infringed on the Legislature’s power to set the appeal period
 under 1 CMC § 9112(b); and (5) should grant a rehearing to avoid manifest
 injustice.
¶2      ANAKS moves for this Court to issue the mandate forthwith pending
 resolution of Atkins Kroll’s petition or issue a temporary stay of the permit.
 ANAKS also seeks clarification of the Court’s order as to whether it may move
 again for a stay of the permit in the Superior Court upon remand.
¶3     We DENY Atkins Kroll’s petition for rehearing and motion for
 reconsideration. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

                       I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶4      On January 4, 2022, 1 Atkins Kroll applied for a conditional use permit to
 construct and operate a Toyota/Lexus car dealership and vehicle repair facility
 next to ANAKS’ condominiums in Puerto Rico, Saipan. On March 18, 2022, the
 Zoning Board held a special meeting and, by oral vote, unanimously approved
 Atkins Kroll’s application, subject to nineteen express conditions. The Zoning
 Board Administrator signed the conditional use permit on March 25, 2022, in
 accordance with the permit’s written terms. The permit’s terms also required
 Atkins Kroll to sign each page and declare, under penalty of perjury, that the
 permit “was and still is true and correct” and that it had “reviewed this permit
 and underst[ood] the contents of this permit and its conditions.” Conditional Use
 Permit No. 2020-10382 at 4. An Atkins Kroll representative signed the permit on
 April 13, 2022. The Zoning Board issued a written order that restated the permit’s
 terms on April 21, 2022. ANAKS filed its petition for judicial review on May 13,
 2022.
¶5      The Superior Court dismissed with prejudice ANAKS’ petition. It found
 that the court did not have jurisdiction because the oral vote on March 18
 constituted the final agency action that started the 30-day window to appeal under
 1 CMC § 9112(b). We reversed and found that the permit issued to Atkins Kroll

1
    In the Court’s order, we noted that Atkins Kroll stated that “they applied for a
    conditional use permit on December 17, 2021. But the permit issued on April 13 states
    that Atkins Kroll applied for the permit on January 4, 2022.” ANAKS, 2023 MP 1 ¶ 5
    n.6.
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

 was the final agency action from which ANAKS may appeal. ANAKS v. Atkins
 Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1 ¶ 43. We further determined that the CUP’s date of
 issuance was on April 13, 2022, and because the permit was issued on this date,
 we found that ANAKS’ petition on May 13 was timely filed under 1 CMC §
 9112(b). Id. ¶ 41.
¶6      Atkins Kroll now petitions for a rehearing and moves for reconsideration.
 It contends that the permit was issued on March 25, 2022, and not on April 13,
 2022. Atkins Kroll Pet. for Rehearing and Mot. for Reconsideration at 6.
¶7     Atkins Kroll’s submission appears to treat a Petition for Rehearing and a
 Motion to Reconsider interchangeably. A Petition for Rehearing and a Motion to
 Reconsider are governed by different rules with different procedural
 requirements. Compare NMI SUP. CT. R. 40 with 27-2(d). Therefore, we first
 address its petition for rehearing and subsequently its motion for reconsideration.

                              II. PETITION FOR REHEARING
                                   A. Standard of Review
¶8      Petitions for rehearing “must state with particularity each point of law or
 fact that the petitioner believes the Court has overlooked or misapprehended and
 must argue in support of the petition.” NMI SUP. CT. R. 40(a)(2). Such petitions
 “[do] not ordinarily allow the petitioner to raise the same issues and repeat the
 same arguments already heard and decided on appeal, nor does it allow the
 raising of new issues or contentions not formerly raised on appeal, except under
 extraordinary circumstances.” In re Estate of Deleon Guerrero, 1 NMI 324, 326
 (1990). “Nor should a petition for rehearing be made routinely or as a matter of
 course.” Id. at 327–28. See also N. Marianas Coll. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2007
 MP 30 ¶ 2. Rather, a successful petition requires showing “how ‘the Court
 ignored or incorrectly construed legal issues or factual matters’ in resolving the
 case.” Commonwealth v. Bashar, 2016 MP 2 ¶ 3 (quoting Commonwealth Ports
 Auth. v. Tinian Shipping Co., 2008 MP 2 ¶ 3).
¶9      Moreover, “[o]ther courts have similarly ruled on this standard, reiterating
 that a petition for rehearing serves a limited purpose of allowing the court to
 correct an error, and does not provide a party an opportunity to reargue its case.”
 Estate of Ogumoro v. Ko Han Yoon, 2020 MP 4 ¶ 7 (citing several cases from
 the Eighth and Ninth Circuits). “Parties should take care to limit their arguments
 on rehearing to those that allege the Court missed or misinterpreted points of law
 or fact.” Id.
                         B. Date of the Permit’s Issuance
¶ 10     The Court found that the Zoning Board issued Atkins Kroll the CUP on
  April 13, 2022. ANAKS, 2023 MP 1 ¶ 5. Atkins Kroll argues that March 25, 2022,
  is the date of issuance because that is when the Zoning Board Administrator
  signed the CUP. We review each argument and determine whether Atkins Kroll
  sufficiently showed the Court overlooked or misconstrued this fact. Estate of
  Ogumoro, 2020 MP ¶ 8 (citing Bashar, 2016 MP 2 ¶ 3).
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

¶ 11    Atkins Kroll contends that the Zoning Board Administrator’s signature
  alone was the Zoning Board’s “last word on the matter” and when the 30-day
  appeal period began. ANAKS’ petition, filed on May 13, was thus late by 49
  days.
¶ 12     Atkins Kroll’s reliance on the Zoning Board Administrator’s signature is
  misplaced. While the CUP states it was “issued by” the Zoning Board
  Administrator, it remained incomplete because a critical step was required by its
  own terms: the signing, under penalty of perjury, by a representative of Atkins
  Kroll. Atkins Kroll’s signature affirmed that the application “was, and still is true
  and correct” and that it “reviewed this permit and underst[ood] the contents of
  this permit and its conditions.” Conditional Use Permit No. 2020-10382 at 4. The
  CUP also required Atkins Kroll to initial each page of the permit. Id.at 1-4.
¶ 13 When viewed under the Commonwealth Administrative Procedure Act
 (“CAPA”) and established precedent, Atkins Kroll’s signature is necessary for
 two reasons. First, the signature operates as an affirmation that the permit’s
 contents remain “true and correct.” The Zoning Board required Atkins Kroll to
 verify that there have been no changes, modifications, errors, inaccuracies, or
 any other statements or information that would be contrary to the Zoning Board’s
 determination or the reasons for its decision on March 18. If there were, Atkins
 Kroll would have had to notify the Zoning Board and not sign the permit. That
 process would be changed if Atkins Kroll could not make such a representation.
 Thus, the signature consummates the Zoning Board’s decision-making process
 because it provides the assurances so the permit can be issued.
¶ 14 Second, the permit must be signed by Atkins Kroll “under the penalties of
 perjury.” The permit offers no discretion regarding this requirement. That
 criminal penalties mandatorily apply indicates the importance of this step to the
 decision-making process of the Zoning Board.
¶ 15 However, Atkins Kroll characterizes its signature as merely a written
 acknowledgment it received the permit. Atkins Kroll Pet. for Rehearing & Mot.
 for Reconsideration at 6. (citation omitted). In support, it cites Pac. Saipan Tech.
 Contractors v. Rahman, 2000 MP 14 ¶ 26, which held that “issuance of a decision
 cannot be construed to mean the receipt of such decision.” (citation omitted).
 This case addressed when a 15-day appeal period began to run after the
 Department of Labor and Immigration (now the Department of Labor) decided
 on a labor complaint filed under the repealed Nonresident’s Workers Act. Id. ¶
 15. The Court found that the date of issuance of the Secretary’s decision was “the
 date the decision is entered or filed.” Id. ¶ 18.
                        ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

¶ 16     To begin, the Court’s order did not characterize Atkins Kroll’s signature
  as a “receipt.” 2 Instead, the signature line operates as an affirmation, 3 one that
  the Zoning Board explicitly requires applicants to sign. Atkins Kroll is correct
  that “receipt” cannot be construed to mean issuance. The Pac. Saipan Court
  quoted a 1996 Federal Circuit Court decision clarifying the definition of
  “issuance” for the National Childhood Vaccine Act. It states:
          The term “issuance” in section 12(e)(1) cannot be construed to
          mean “receipt.” The pertinent common meaning of the verb “issue”
          is “to be given out officially, to be published,” and its legal meaning
          is “to send out officially . . . to publish or utter.” Both of those
          definitions denote promulgation of the decision by the
          decisionmaker, to its subsequent receipt by the parties. To be sure,
          the term “issuance,” as used in section 12(e)(1), could be accorded
          several slightly different meanings. For example, it could be
          interpreted to mean rendition, to mean public announcement, or to
          mean formal filing with the clerk of the court. Rule 23 of the
          Vaccine Rules, R. Ct. Fed. Cl., Appendix J, interprets the term
          “issuance” to mean filing, so that the 30-day review period begins
          to run when the special master's decision is filed with the clerk of
          the Court of Federal Claims. That interpretation is a reasonable
          one, and it has the virtue of providing an unambiguous and well-
          documented starting point for the 30-day period.
          Hervey v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 88 F.3d 1001–02
          (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

    Hervey found a reasonable interpretation that the date of issuance meant “filing.”
    However, this finding does not prevent other reasonable interpretations of
    “issuance” for other agency decisions within the Commonwealth, particularly
    where those other agency decisions are governed by different statutes that lack
    the language the Hervey court found persuasive. In the National Childhood
    Vaccine Act and other similarly written statutes, the filing date could be the date
    of issuance. This is not the case here because no statutory language defines
    issuance.
¶ 17     As the Court stated in its order, “each jurisdiction must look to its own
  statutory scheme to determine how best to resolve the issue before it.” ANAKS,
  2023 MP 1 ¶ 40. When looking at the applicable authority, it is unclear when a
  decision is made final, let alone the date of issuance. For example, the Court
  reviewed 2 CMC § 7221(j)(2), which states that “no decisions of the Zoning
  Board shall be made other than in a duly noticed public meeting.” The Court

2
     “A receipt is the written acknowledgment that something has been received.” Black’s
     Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2010).
3
     An affirmation is a “solemn declaration made under penalty of perjury, but without an
     oath.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

 found, however, that this statute was too vague in determining whether such
 decisions are final or need to be in writing. As we stated:
        Section 7221(j)(2) sets forth the procedures of Zoning Board
        meetings and how they operate. It provides, inter alia, how often
        the Zoning Board must meet, the notice requirements of such
        meetings, the parameters of what can be discussed at meetings,
        and addresses the opportunity for public participation. The key
        clause at issue mandates that “no decisions of the Zoning Board
        shall be made other than in a duly noticed public meeting.” Id. The
        confusion arises with the term “decisions” and whether such
        decisions made during a Zoning Board meeting are considered
        final for judicial review of a final agency action under Section
        9112. It is also unclear whether such a decision must be made
        either in writing or may be expressed orally.

        A well informed person could conclude that the term “decisions” is
        ambiguous because it is capable of more than one meaning. The
        clause fails to specify whether decisions made during a Zoning
        Board meeting are considered final and whether such decisions alter
        the legal rights and obligations under the Commonwealth.
        Id. ¶¶ 29–30.

 Due to the ambiguity of Section 7221(j)(2), the Court cannot rely on it for a
 determination of when the Zoning Board’s final agency action occurred. Instead,
 the Court’s determination that April 13, 2022 is the operative date provided an
 “unambiguous and well-documented starting point for the 30-day period.”
 Hervey, 88 F.3d at 1002. As we explained:
        From a general policy standpoint, relying on the clear and exact
        written terms of the permit allows for a uniform, consistent, and
        explicit establishment of when a party’s rights or obligations have
        been determined or from which legal consequences will flow. This
        aligns with the requirements of Cody & Marianas Ins. Co. This
        also best serves the public interest to require explicit
        documentation outlining the terms by which a party is bound.
        ANAKS, 2023 MP 1 ¶ 38.

¶ 18     Accordingly, the Court did not overlook or misapprehend a point of law
  or fact and did not err in finding that the Zoning Board issued the conditional use
  permit on April 13, 2022.

                            C. The Legal Wrong Challenged
¶ 19    Atkins Kroll advances that the “legal wrong” suffered by ANAKS from
  which it appeals occurred during the Zoning Board’s oral vote on March 18,
  2022. Atkins Kroll Pet. for Rehearing & Mot. for Reconsideration at 7.
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

¶ 20 This argument, however, overlooks the finality requirement of an agency
 action. 1 CMC § 9112(d) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
 agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
 to judicial review.”). It is also not the standard by which the date of a final agency
 action is determined and from when the time for an appeal is calculated.
¶ 21     The Court addressed this issue in its order, which expounded on the two-
  part Cody test and why the issuance of the CUP on April 13, 2022 satisfied those
  two critical elements. ANAKS, 2023 MP 1 ¶¶ 19–25. This reasoning need not be
  restated herein.
¶ 22     Moreover, Atkins Kroll contends that the first conceivable “legal wrong”
  by an agency in Section 9112(b) triggers the 30-day appeal period under Section
  9112(d). We reject this argument. This is not the standard under our
  jurisprudence. Cody and Mariana Ins. Co. require a final agency action to trigger
  the 30-day appeal period. Id. Alleging that a particular agency decision was a
  “legal wrong” does not render that decision a final action for judicial review. The
  Court’s order does not misapply Section 9112(b) and follows established
  precedent.
                             D. Applicable Laws and Statutes
¶ 23    Atkins Kroll next argues that the Court overlooked the applicability of the
  Open Government Meetings and Records Act (“OGA”). It cites 1 CMC
  § 9902(b), which states that a “final action” “means a collective positive or
  negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the members of a governing
  body when sitting as a body or entity, upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order
  or ordinance.” Thus, the final action of the Zoning Board could only have
  occurred at the March 18 vote and not through any later action that occurred.
  Atkins Kroll Pet. for Rehearing & Mot. for Reconsideration at 8.
¶ 24 Atkins Kroll’s reliance on Section 9902 is misplaced. The provision is not
 in the Commonwealth’s Administrative Procedure Act (“CAPA”). Section 9902
 clarifies that its definitions only apply to “this chapter,” meaning Chapter 9,
 Division 9, of Title 1. The CAPA is in Chapter 1. It would be a misreading of our
 law to apply this definition to 1 CMC § 9112(d).
¶ 25 Moreover, it is important to note that the two-part Cody test specifies how
 to determine when the final agency action occurred to calculate the appeals
 period. The first prong of the Cody test requires an examination of when the
 agency’s decision-making process was consummated. This could not have
 occurred on March 18 because issuing the CUP was still forthcoming. Instead,
 consummating the Zoning Board’s decision-making process did not occur until
 the CUP was signed by Atkins Kroll under penalty of perjury. Once this occurred,
 Atkins Kroll’s rights and obligations were determined, thus satisfying the second
 prong of the Cody test.
¶ 26    Further, Atkins Kroll argues that the Court improperly relied on
  inapplicable cases from other jurisdictions. Yet, it overlooks the Court’s
  recognition of the limitations of these cases. The Court noted in ¶¶ 39–40 the
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

 lack of uniformity across jurisdictions in the United States and the importance of
 reviewing each jurisdiction’s statutory scheme independently to assess when a
 final decision occurred. Id. The Court explicitly stated that due to the lack of
 uniformity across jurisdictions, the cases “offer little guidance on resolving the
 issue before us and offer little persuasive value.” Id. ¶ 40.

                   E. The Legislature’s Power to Set the Appeal Period
¶ 27     Atkins Kroll’s assertion that the Court’s order infringes upon the
  Legislature’s power is also misplaced and unsupported. The Court’s order
  follows the explicit terms of CAPA and the statutory scheme about the Zoning
  Board, its decisions, and when those decisions are no longer appealable. Atkins
  Kroll points to no authority that would indicate that the Court erred, that the intent
  of the Legislature was violated, or that the Legislature’s ability to specify appeals
  periods was infringed. On the contrary, if the Legislature wishes to amend the
  applicable statutes herein to achieve a different result, it can do so.

                                    F. Manifest Injustice
¶ 28      Finally, Atkins Kroll overstates the alleged manifest injustice that would
  result if the Court upheld its original determinations. Contrary to its assertions,
  the Court’s holding and clear delineation of when a Zoning Board’s decision
  becomes appealable for the first time provides clarity on this issue. Atkins Kroll
  would have this Court dismiss ANAKS’ appeal, and ultimately its entire case,
  due to the “chaos” that could ensue and the alleged manifest injustice that would
  result.
¶ 29     This Court is not addressing, and has not addressed, the merits of any
  party’s respective positions on the Zoning Board’s decision. Instead, the Court’s
  opinion is limited to the jurisdictional issue and the timeliness of ANAKS’
  appeal. The Court has not ruled on the merits of a stay or injunction as it would
  be inappropriate to do so. The Superior Court also has not yet addressed the
  merits of whether a stay would be appropriate, and it remains pure speculation as
  to what the underlying court will do. Risks inherent in litigation do not rise to the
  level of manifest injustice to a party that suffers an unfavorable result. See Young
  v. Thomas, No. 0:14-cv-02550-JMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67517 at *4
  (D.S.C., May 26, 2015) (“[W]hile the manifest injustice ground acts as a catch-
  all provision, it is not meant to allow a disappointed litigant to attempt to
  persuade the court to change its mind.”).
¶ 30    Additionally, we are unpersuaded that the Court’s order would result in
  fundamental unfairness to Atkins Kroll. Again, Atkins Kroll remains free to
  continue with its construction if it so chooses. The Court’s order, which would
  simply let ANAKS present its arguments in the lower court, would not lead to
  manifest injustice.
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

                          III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
¶ 31     “A motion to reconsider an order entered by the full Court shall be decided
  by the full Court.” NMI SUP. CT. R. 27–2(d)(3)(C). The full Court reviews for
  “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
  the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v.
  Eguia, 2008 MP 17 ¶ 7 (citing Camacho v. J.C. Tenorio Enter., Inc., 2 NMI 407,
  413–14 (1992)). “A clear error exists only if after reviewing all the evidence we
  are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re
  Estate of Pangelinan, 2019 MP 12 ¶ 13 (internal quotations omitted). We review
  a motion to reconsider de novo. See generally Owens v. Commonwealth Health
  Ctr., 2011 MP 6.
¶ 32    First, Atkins Kroll is not alleging an intervening change of controlling law
  presented. The Commonwealth Administrative Procedure Act, the Saipan
  Zoning Law of 2013, and relevant regulations remain unchanged and govern the
  Zoning Board. Second, no new evidence was presented.
¶ 33     Instead, Atkins Kroll argues that the Court made a clear error in
  determining that the Zoning Board issued the CUP on April 13, 2022, and that it
  will suffer manifest injustice. In Section II above, we addressed these arguments,
  and our reasoning remains the same.

                     III. ANAKS’ MOTION TO ISSUE MANDATE
¶ 34    ANAKS moves this Court to issue the mandate forthwith or issue a
  temporary stay while considering Atkins Kroll’s petition for rehearing and
  motion for reconsideration. After issuance of this order, the mandate shall issue
  forthwith. 4

                               IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 35    We DENY Atkins Kroll’s petition for rehearing and motion for
  reconsideration. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

         SO ORDERED this 4th day of May, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
ROBERT J. TORRES, JR.
Justice Pro Tempore

4
    ANAKS also seeks clarification as to whether it may refile its motion to stay upon
    remand to the Superior Court. The order did not address the merits of ANAKS’ Motion
    to Stay.
                        ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 4

 /s/
F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
Justice Pro Tempore

                                    COUNSEL
Kathryn B. Fuller & Colin M. Thompson, Saipan, MP, for Appellant.

Rodney J. Jacob, Hagåtña, GU & Sean E. Frink, Saipan, MP, for Co-Appellee.

J. Robert Glass, Jr. & Keisha Blaise, Saipan, MP, for Co-Appellee.

Joey P. San Nicholas, Saipan, MP, for Co-Appellee.

                                          NOTICE

This order has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication in the
permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In the event
of discrepancies between this order and the order certified for publication, the certified
opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715, fax (670)
236–9702, email Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.com.