Court Opinion

ID: 9825662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:53:42.673646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:15.751464
License: Public Domain

McCulloch, C. J., dissenting. The following words of warning were written by Judge McCrary in his work on Elections, section 523: “The power to reject an entire poll is certainly a dangerous power, and though it belongs to whatever tribunal has jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of a contested election case, it should be exercised only in an extreme case, that is to say, a case where it is impossible to ascertain with „ reasonable certainty the true vote.” These words find echo in the following statement by this court in Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 266: “Elections are not to be lightly set aside, though the law has not been strictly complied with.” The majority have, in their decision, overturned not only' the certificate of the sworn election officials, but the findings of fact made by the circuit judge in drawing the inferences from the evidence adduced before him. The rule as to conclusiveness of the findings of the trial court upon conflicting evidence applies to a contested election case. Schuman v. Sanderson, 73 Ark. 187. It seems to me that the court has done violence to the utterance in Powell v. Holman, 50 Ark. 85, as follows: ‘ ‘ The duly certified official returns of election officers are not subject to the same rules of suspicious reflections and doubtful imputations as attend the ballot's under certain circumstances. The official returns are quasi records and stand with all the force of presumptive regularity, and prima facie integrity, not only till suspicion is east upon them, but until their self-authenticated verity is overcome by affirmative proof that they do not speak the truth.” The effect of the decision in the present case is to hold that the validity of the certificate of the election officers, concerning the number of votes that were cast at the election in August, 1914, is overturned by the county clerk’s certificate of the number of poll taxes paid the preceding year in DeRoan township. It is conceded that the other facts proved by the contestants do not establish fraud conclusively, and that testimony can not be pieced together with the conflict between the two certificates in order to set aside the trial court’s finding of fact. The turning point of the case then comes down to this: Does the prior certificate of the clerk, concerning the number of poll taxes paid, as a matter of law overturn the apparent conflicting certificate of the election officórs ? I say that it does not. The two certificates are of equal dignity. The first was based upon and related back to an assessment of taxes made more than a year before this election was held, and there being more than a year intervening, the presumption of regularity ought to attend the last certificate, which was that of the election officers, until it'is overturned by sufficient evidence. At least, it ought to, and does in my judgment, raise such a presumption as, in the absence of proof, the trial court is authorized to. draw the inference of regularity. The discrepancy is indeed large, but we have authority for the application of the rule of presumption concerning a much larger discrepancy than that. Todd v. Cass County, 31 Neb. 150, 47 N. W. 196. The intervening period of time between the original assessment for taxes in the year 1913, and the election held in August, 1914, was sufficient to make it possible for there to have been a substantial increase in the number of voters. This could have been brought about by the coming of age of young men, and the removal of voters into the township from otner sections of the State, inside as well as outside of the county. There was no proof offered on this score, but the trial court had the right, in determining what inferences to draw from the two conflicting certificates, to find that it was possible for the number of voters to have been very substantially augmented. In addition to that, there may have been many mistakes in the original assessment rolls as to the residences of voters, whether in the school districts composing that township or in other portions of the county; and also mistakes of the collector in registering the paid poll taxes. It is true that there was no proof introduced on that subject, and the court’s opinion constitutes an imposition on the contestees of the duty of making that proof. It is said in the opinion of the majority that when it appeared that the certificate of the election officers was in conflict with the prior certificate of the county clerk, the burden of proof shifted to the appellees to make an affirmative showing of the correctness of the last certificate. I do not think that is the correct statement of the law, for the burden of proof does not shift. It abides throughout the trial with the contestants, upon whom rests the duty of establishing the affirmative of the issue which they present. The statutes of this State declare that “the party holding the affirmative of an issue must produce the evidence to prove it,” and that “the burden of proof in the whole action lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.” Kirby’s Digest, § § 3106-7. In the American and English Encyclopedia of Law (Vol. V, page 22) the rule with respect to the burden of proof is stated as follows: “The burden of proof in the sense of the duty of producing evidence passes from party to party as the case progresses, while the burden of proof meaning the obligation to establish the truth of the claim by a preponderance of evidence rests throughout upon the plaintiff; and unless he meets this obligation upon the whole case, he fails. ’ ’ That rule has been adopted in several well considered cases. Egbers v. Egbers, 177 Ill. 82; Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees v. Stensland, 206 Ill. 124; Maxwell v. Wright, 160 Ind. 516; Shepard v. Western Union Tel. Co., 143 N. Car. 244; Boardman v. Lorentzen, 155 Wis. 566. The rule is also stated substantially the same in Ruling Case Law, Vol. X, page 897: “G-enerally speaking, the burden of proof, in the sense of the duty of producing evidence, passes from party to party as the case progresses, while the burden of proof, meaning the obligation to establish the truth of the claim by a preponderance of evidence, rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue, and unless he meets this obligation upon the whole case he fails. This burden of proof never shifts during the course of a trial but remains with him to the end. ’ ’ Now, the application of that rule to the present case it seems to me is this: Conceding that the production of the prior certificate made out a prima facie case in favor of the contestants,which, unless overcome, warranted the inference of the falsity of the last certificate, and in that sense the burden was shifted to the eontestees, yet the burden upon the .whole case of establishing the affirmative of the issue was upon the contestants, and as long as it was impossible to draw different inferences of fact from the conflict in the two certificates it was within the province of the trial court to determine which of the inferences should be drawn. The findings of the trial court, based upon legitimate inferences, should not be overturned because, as has already been decided by this court, there is a conclusive presumption in'favor of the findings of the trial court if there was evidence upon which it is based. Even if there was an irreconcilable conflict between the two certificates, why should we say that the circuit court erred in concluding that the certificate of the election officers was correct and that the former certificate of the clerk concerning the number of poll taxes was incorrect. Is that consistent with the oft repeated rule that the official returns are quasi records and stand with all the force of presumptive regularity and prima facie integrity, not only till suspicion is cast upon them, but until their self-authenticated verity is overcome by affirmative proof that they do not speak the truth? But the two certificates, are not in irreconcilable conflict, for it is possible to harmonize the two upon the assumption that the number of qualified electors had increased by reason of the coming of age of young men, ánd removals into the precinct. It was the duty of the circuit judge to reconcile those two certificates if possible to do so, and I do not think that we ought to say, as a matter of law, that the circuit court erred simply because the eontestees failed to introduce proof tending to show that there had been an increase in the number of voters. As long as the certificate of the election officers bore the verity which the law says shall be attached to it, it cast upon the contestants the burden of offering proof tending to show that there had been no change in the number of voters since the last assessment. That was not compelling them to prove a negative, but to offer proof which overcame the prima facie case made out by the certificate of the election officers. Some significance is attached, in the opinion, to the fact that there were more votes cast at this election than at the last preceding general election and the next succeeding one, and the majority of the judges expressed the view that there is more interest manifested at general elections than at a special election of this kind. I think it may be stated to be a matter of common knowledge, at least in Arkansas, that no kind of an election excites keener interest than a contest over the removal of a county seat. It is a matter of common knowledge, too, that in this State a nomination by the dominant political party is equivalent to an election, and that there is comparatively little interest manifested in the general elections. Therefore I think the fact that the vote in the general elections, preceding and subsequent, falls short of the number of votes cast at the special election, which is being 'contested, ought not to be east into the sca]es against the contestees so as to make them account for the discrepancy. This case seems to have received the most painstaking care and attention of the trial judge, and I am unwilling to say that he erred in refusing to declare as a matter of law that the discrepancy between the two certificates concerning-the number of poll tax payers in that township made out an undisputed case of fraud which destroyed the integrity of the polls. I dissent, therefore, from the conclusions of the majority.