Court Opinion

ID: 9680484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:32:31.269499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:49.302330
License: Public Domain

WHITHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine a State’s witness about a misdemeanor charge of passing a worthless check. Accordingly, I would sustain appellant’s first ground of error and reverse and remand.
The love affair between appellant and the deceased ended when appellant shot her to death on June 7, 1981. Exactly when appellant began to exhibit violent or aggressive behavior towards the deceased became a principal issue at trial. The State sought to prove that appellant’s aggressive behavior towards deceased began in February of 1981. The State, in its cross-examination of appellant, was very persistent in questioning appellant about aggressive or violent behavior towards the deceased in February of 1981. On at least two occasions, the State was careful to elicit denials of such behavior. In rebuttal, the State called Esther Randall to testify to occasions in February of 1981 when the appellant acted violently towards the deceased. The prosecutor in his closing argument stressed the significance of the contradiction. Appellant sought to cross-examine witness Randall and impeach her by showing that she had a misdemeanor charge of passing a worthless check pending against her at the time of her testimony. The court precluded appellant from this line of cross-examination.
Thus, in the present case the trial court refused to allow the accused to show bias and motive on the part of an important witness whose testimony contributed vital information not already before the jury. See Mutscher v. State, 514 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). In my view the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to show bias and motive on the part of this rebuttal witness. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a defendant’s right to cross-examination is paramount to a State’s statutory scheme which would limit that right by restricting an accused’s cross-examination of a key State witness. Although Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 38.29 (Vernon 1979) prohibits impeachment of a witness by the use of a pending charge which has not resulted in conviction, that statute must give way to an accused’s right to cross-examination in an area which would show any fact tending *953to establish ill feelings, bias, motive and animus on the part of any witness testifying against him. Simmons v. State, 548 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). In Evans v. State, supra, the court reversed a murder conviction because the trial court refused to allow the defendant to show for the purpose of establishing interest, bias and motive that a State’s key witness was under felony indictment at the time of his testimony. In Castro v. State, 562 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (en banc), the court pointed out that it has stated many times that “great latitude should be allowed a defendant in showing any fact which would tend to establish ill feelings, bias, motive and animus on the part of any witness testifying against him,” citing Jackson v. State, 552 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Robinson v. State, 550 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Smith v. State, 516 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); and Blair v. State, 511 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
In the present case the district attorney of Dallas County had the responsibility for the prosecution of both appellant and the witness Randall. Appellant sought to cross-examine witness Randall about the criminal charge pending against her for the purpose of showing bias and motive on her part to testify for the prosecution in appellant’s case. It was important for appellant to show the jury that Randall’s damaging testimony could be tainted by the possibility that in exchange for her favorable testimony for the State she might expect, or have some hope of, leniency from the prosecution in the charge pending against her. I would hold that in the present case the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine a State’s witness about the criminal charge pending against her. Moreover, I cannot agree that the error in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine witness Randall on this point was harmless to appellant. Great significance was attached to her testimony by the prosecutor. She was the prosecution’s only rebuttal witness and her testimony served to contradict appellant’s emphatic denials of any violent behavior towards the deceased after a peace bond was issued. Further, the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument about Randall’s testimony emphasized its damaging nature.
The majority fails to tell us that witness Randall was called as the sole rebuttal witness. The State saved witness Randall for rebuttal for the purpose of identifying appellant as a liar. I simply cannot agree that an accused has not been harmed when denied the right to show bias and motive on the part of a sole rebuttal witness used for this purpose by the State. I would hold that appellant had the right to pursue the line of cross-examination in question and that it was reversible error for the trial court to preclude appellant from this line of cross-examination.
GUILLOT, ROWE and VANCE, JJ., join in this dissent.