Court Opinion

ID: 9836995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:55.00489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.714064
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent because the majority conducts a flawed abuse-of-discretion analysis and fails to analyze this case based on harmless error.
FACTS
The first alleged offense involving the victims, herein referred to as the Rucker boys, occurred in February 1994, and the second offense in June 1995. On July 13, 1995, charges were preferred against appellant. At that time, the defense became involved in the Article 32, UCMJ, 10 USC § 832, investigation which was completed on August 10, 1995.
On September 14, 1995, the judge docketed the case to be tried beginning on October 4, 1995. Some time prior to September 25, the Government informed the defense that it intended to present the live testimony of two boys, herein referred to as the Devens boys, who had testified regarding sexual-abuse allegations at a previous court-martial at Fort Devens at which appellant was acquitted.
During the arraignment on October 3, 1995, trial defense counsel requested a further delay until November 16, 1995. The judge denied this request and on defense counsel’s request for reconsideration, he continued the trial until October 12, 1995. The judge also deferred ruling on the defense request to exclude the Devens boys’ testimony under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b). Later, during the trial, the judge apparently ruled that the Devens boys could testify without first judging their credibility.
Shortly before October 12, appellant hired a civilian defense counsel, Michael J. Cough-lin, who had been his defense counsel at the Fort Devens trial. Based on Mr. Coughlin’s request, the judge granted a continuance until November 29 to accommodate civilian defense counsel’s schedule. On November 20, 1995, the judge held a telephonic RCM 802 session with counsel, at which time the defense requested a continuance to secure the assistance and testimony of “an expert in false sexual abuse allegations,” Dr. Edwin Mikkelsen. Dr. Mikkelsen would be procured at no expense to the Government.
Dr. Mikkelsen provided critical testimony for the defense at the Fort Devens court-martial. The defense here indicated that *467they “wish[ed] to utilize Dr. Mikkels[e]n to independantly [sic] examine the [Rucker] victims, their records and statements, to ascertain whether the boys [sic] actions and behavior may instead constitute or be consistent with that of false allegations.” The defense wanted a delay for an indefinite period, at least until January 10, 1996. Both the civilian defense counsel and the expert lived near each other, but civilian counsel had apparently not contacted the expert prior to requesting the continuance. The defense had been on notice since early July 1995 of the Government’s theory of the case.
The Government agreed to procure the expert’s testimony through alternate means, such as video-teleconference or a deposition. The defense suggests that the judge was reluctant to grant any continuance other than the first requested to accommodate civilian defense counsel’s initial appearance.
The defense proffered that Dr. Mikkel-sen’s testimony and assistance was necessary for several reasons:
1. to aid the military judge and the members in assessing the credibility of the [Devens] boys whom the government intended to call to testify to prior bad acts allegedly committed by appellant but for which appellant was acquitted, in large part due to the testimony of Dr. Mikkelsen;
2. to provide the basis for cross-examination of the [Devens] boys on the concept of “transferred abuse,” the questioning of which was challenged by the Government in the absence of expert testimony, such as Dr. Mikkelsen’s, to explain the theory to the members;
3. to provide expert assistance to evaluate whether the [Rucker] boys’ allegations were a product of psychological manipulation, to prepare cross-examination questions to impeach the [Rucker boys,] and to provide expert testimony on the nature and causes of false sexual abuse reporting; and
4. to provide expert assistance and testimony to rebut the child sexual abuse expert listed by the Government as a sentencing witness.
Final Brief at 6-7 (footnote omitted).
The judge denied this request.
The court below held, first, that Dr. Mik-kelsen’s unavailability could have been prevented by the defense. Second, it rejected the defense’s transference theory since, contrary to the Devens brothers’ situation, there was no evidence that the stepfather of the Rucker boys had physically abused them. Third, the court found that the doctor’s opinion as to the credibility of the Rucker boys would not be admissible as it made him the functional equivalent of a “human lie detector.” 48 MJ at 575.
DISCUSSION
Given the proffer by the defense, the judge did not abuse his discretion. Certainly, the defense expert could not testify as to the credibility of the Rucker boys. See, e.g., United States v. Birdsall, 47 MJ 404, 406 (1998). Furthermore, the judge could not compel these boys to undergo psychiatric or physical examination by a defense expert. United States v. Owen, 24 MJ 390, 395 (CMA 1987). There is no hint in this case that they would cooperate voluntarily or were even asked to undergo such examinations.
As to the second proffer regarding the transference theory, that would not be relevant because there is no evidence that the stepfather of the brothers had physically abused them. In any event, that would not be reliable evidence. Francis A. Gilligan, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Theory of “Unconscious Transference”: The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L.Rev. 107 (1996).
As to the third proffer the information is not sufficient even to indicate how the expert would be employed.
As to the last proffer, this would be covered by the Government’s offers of an alternative expert in the local area to assist the defense or to provide alternative means for Dr. Mikkelsen to participate.
*468Courts have broad discretion on questions of continuances, and their decisions will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of that discretion. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); Ungar v. Sorafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). The defense became involved in this case in July 1995. Mr. Coughlin was hired in early October 1995, had received one continuance, and then sought another continuance for an indefinite period. Given the proffers made by the defense, the Government offered reasonable alternatives to accommodate the defense. Appellate review of whether a judge has abused his discretion in denying a continuance requires a balancing analysis, weighing the public’s right to prompt and efficient justice against an appellant’s right to present his defense. “The public has a strong interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice; the public’s interest in the dispensation of justice that is not unreasonably delayed has great force.” United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C.Cir.1978). Clearly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance under these circumstances.
The majority does not apply a harmless-error test as required by Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a). Here, the defense theory of the case was that the Rucker boys, or at least the older Rucker boy, had unlawfully obtained information about appellant’s prior court-martial and was seeking to blackmail him for $60. There is little evidence to support this theory. In fact, as the defense asserted, there was no verbatim record of trial from the first court-martial: probably only a skeletal record exists because of appellant’s acquittal. No record of trial or other documents from Fort Devens were ever produced at trial to show the potential for an alleged blackmail, even though such would be in the possession of appellant.
Because of the majority’s failure to analyze properly the facts in the case and apply the harmless-error test, I dissent.