Court Opinion

ID: 9479007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:05:54.328111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:46.454088
License: Public Domain

WALD, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
As citizens, we owe wholehearted support to law enforcement officials on the front lines in the war against illegal drugs. As judges, our duty is to ensure that our laws continue to govern the conduct of our law enforcement officials. Otherwise we are at risk of losing an even more important battle — the battle to remain a law-abiding society, in the face of law violators as destructive as drug dealers. The majority’s rationale renders practically meaningless an essential element of § 3109 in drug search warrant cases, despite the fact that Congress has not seen fit to exempt these cases from its knock, announce, and wait rule. I believe, whatever its wisdom, we must enforce that statute as we find it.
Unlike my colleagues, I think this is a very difficult case, and I would follow the standard procedure this court has laid down for such close § 3109 cases in the past: i.e., require careful factual and legal findings from the trial judge about the circumstances surrounding entry. See Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C.Cir.1963); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 74, 78-79 (D.C.Cir.1975). Such findings are absent from this record. Only by continuing, even in crisis, to require that trial judges set out their findings as to what transpired and whether refusal to admit or exigent circumstances did in fact occur in § 3109 cases, can we assure that, until Congress sees fit to take another path, the constraints laid down by the legislature on police entry into private residences are honored.
My reading of the majority opinion leads me to conclude that henceforth police officers armed with a valid search warrant for drugs may forcibly enter a private residence as soon as they have knocked and announced their presence at the door of an occupied apartment, without waiting for any particular length of time afterward to see if a response is forthcoming.1
*831If, then, a warrant to search for drugs and the knowledge that the residence is occupied is enough to dispense with any waiting period after the officers’ purpose is announced, the statute is effectively cut in two and reduced to a simple knock and enter requirement.2 Had Congress meant *832to let it go at that, it would be one thing, but that is not what Congress said. It laid down a second post-knock requirement: that the officers be refused admittance.
The majority repeatedly characterizes this second statutory requirement of admittance refusal as “trivially minor.” See Maj. op. at 827. Yet in a prior case, this court rejected the notion that proof of refusal was less important once the announcement had been complied with.
There has been some judicial leaning toward giving less weight to the need specified in section 3109 that admittance be refused before a forced entry than to the need for announcement of identity and purpose. We should be slow to accede to such a judicial interpretation of the statute when it is applied to the execution of a search warrant in the course of investigation of a nonviolent crime, as here [drug distribution], or where urgency is not required to protect anyone from personal danger_ “[T]he Anglo-American tradition of respect for the privacy of the home and the dignity of the citizen even when suspected of criminal behavior forecloses a grudging application of the statute.”
United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 74, 81 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1975). Today, as then, it is not our prerogative, in my view, to read the refusal requirement out of the statute.
The majority stresses the weight of a valid search warrant with its inherent finding that probable cause exists to believe drugs are inside. It follows from that — the majority reasons — that the occupants will instantly hide them, flee, or prepare to attack the police as soon as they hear the knock. Thus, refusal (or exigent circumstances excusing the refusal requirement), must always be assumed in drug warrant cases. But, § 3109 presumes the existence of a valid search warrant, yet insists on the knock and the refusal to admit. And, although drug warrant cases are unfortunately more numerous now, they were definitely not unknown at the time of the enactment of § 3109.3 Yet Congress did not exclude them from the ambit of the statutory requirement.
Holding that a warrant and indication of occupancy are enough for a forcible entry after knocking and announcing a police presence departs radically from preexisting case law, though my colleagues say otherwise. Every case they cite to bolster the result in this case evidences some significant additional fact, not found in this case. The police here did not, as in United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.1973), see Maj. op. at 825 and 828, execute the warrant just after having personally observed a suspect transport a crate known to the police to contain drugs to the suspect’s own residence or, as in United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C.Cir.1970), see Maj. op. at 824, after finding an identified getaway car with its engine still warm outside the known residence of an armed robbery suspect. The police here did not, as in Jackson v. United States, 354 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1965), see Maj. op. at 825, *833and United States v. Leon, 487 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.1973), see Maj. op. at 827, wait ten seconds in silence after knocking in order to listen for indications of whether the suspect was going to respond. The police here did not, as in United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.1986) and McClure v. United States, 332 F.2d 19 (9th Cir.1964), see Maj. op. at 826, 828, see someone run from a room in response to a police knock or observation of police through a window or, as in United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.1983), see Maj. op. at 828, see someone inside who simply “refused to answer.” These officers did not have information that the premises were the home of the primary drug supplier of a known distributor who had that evening completed a purchase as an undercover agent for the police, United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 (D.C.Cir.1979), see Maj. op. at 826. This search did not culminate an undercover operation in which the suspect had been under surveillance from the time she entered the premises to the time when an undercover police agent completed a purchase of drugs from her, as in United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1976), see Maj. op. at 826 and 828, and United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902 (1st Cir.1983), see Maj. op. at 828; nor was it conducted directly after an undercover officer had left the premises, ostensibly to get money out of his car, for a drug purchase negotiated with the occupants inside, as in United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005 (11th Cir.1982), and United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363 (11th Cir.1984), see Maj. op. at 828. See also, supra, n. 1 (distinguishing Masiello, James and Smith). The barren record here is unparalleled in any prior case upholding a forcible entry.
In some cases there was the knowledge that identified suspects were inside the premises with guns or contraband, giving rise to a legitimate inference that they were poised to respond to an announced police presence with violence or evidence destruction.4 In others, the directly observed behavior or distinguishable sounds of flight or destruction established that the occupants were not going to admit the police officers. In all, there were specific circumstances above and beyond the drug warrant, indicating refusal to admit or an exigency that justified immediate entry. By eliminating the need for any such particularized evidence of flight or destruction in this case, the majority has, in my view, taken a qualitative leap forward from prior precedent and gauged a generic exception for drug cases from the statute’s several requirements.
The drug crisis in the District of Columbia, horrifying as it is, is not unique. Other circuits tormented by drug trafficking have refused to create a judicial exemption from the statute for drug cases. The Ninth Circuit has announced no “basis exists for nullifying [a knock-and-announce] statute in all narcotics cases, and, by logical extension, in all other cases involving easily disposable evidence. The statute does not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction.” Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir.1967).5 As destructive as the drug trade is, we too should resist the temptation to chip away at the statute, remembering Justice Brandéis’ admonition that “[experience *834should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficient.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). I would remand the record in this case for specific factual and legal findings as to the nature of the sounds heard within the apartment and any other particularized information available to the police on which they might have relied to form a belief that flight or destruction of evidence was imminent. In the absence of such findings, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the convictions.

. I do not read the majority opinion as relying to any significant degree on the nondescript "thumping” sound heard in the apartment to justify entry. If it does, there is definitely conflicting evidence in the record that needed to be resolved by a trial court finding about the nature of the sounds. Two officers testified differently about the sounds within the apartment. Gales, the lead officer who directed the forcible entry, was asked on direct examination about any sounds he heard, and said: "At this particular time, I can't exactly recall. It seems as though I may have heard_” This testimony was objected to as speculative. Gales then said: "It seems as though I could hear some faint thumping or bumping inside the premises, and I ordered that the door be forced.” On cross-examination, Gales was asked whether the sounds he heard were "coming toward the door as if someone were coming to answer it.” Gales testified that he "could not tell exactly where it was coming from” and that only after he was inside and saw the layout of the apartment did he decide that the sound had not indicated someone coming toward the door. Asked again on *831redirect, "[a]nd the bumping, the sounds that you heard, once you got in, you determined that those were not sounds that had come from that immediate area [from the couch towards the door],” Gales replied, "Well, I did not make that judgment at that particular time. However, in retrospect, I've come to that conclusion.” Such ambiguous testimony by itself certainly cannot lend much support to the case for refusal of admittance or even exigent circumstances.
In addition, whatever slight probative weight may attach to what was heard only by an officer other than the one who made the decision to enter, the transcript also suggests that the judge implicitly discredited Neills’ testimony that the sound was of "footsteps running from the door.” An occupant of the apartment not involved in the arrest testified that the suspects were in the back rooms of the apartment when the knock came; indeed, that is where the police found them seconds later when they forced the door. Consequently, there was no corroboration of Neills’ testimony that he heard footsteps running away. Cf. Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121 (D.C.Cir.1963) ("rustling” noises suggesting the burning of flash-paper known to be used by gamblers confirmed by burnt paper found on entry); United States v. James, 764 F.2d 885 (D.C.Cir.1985) (sound of someone running down back staircase confirmed by discovery of suspect in basement on entry). The trial judge never stated what the evidence established as to the sounds; indeed, he said only that "one police officer indicated that they heard some movement inside, I think.” Surely if the judge had been persuaded by Neills’ testimony, he would have referred to it more specifically as retreating footsteps instead of "some movement.”
In sum, if the "movement” inside is in any way a necessary factor in the majority’s calculus, the trial judge should have determined the nature of the sounds at the culmination of a lengthy suppression hearing. See e.g., United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 74 (D.C.Cir.1975) (remand for explicit findings as to refusal of admittance where record contained evidence of ambiguous sounds); United States v. Smith, 524 F.2d 1287 (D.C.Cir.1975) (affirmed in light of finding on remand that sounds established shuffling thought to be movement away from door). All we have is the trial court’s finding that there was a "movement" — presumably signifying nothing except what the officers already knew, i.e., someone was inside. Indeed, the lead officer testified it was not until he was already inside that he decided the sound was inconsistent with someone getting up to answer the door. Since, if the sounds indicated someone coming to the door, forcible entry would have been barred even under the majority’s rationale, the need for specific findings was especially critical here. Unlike the majority, see Majority Opinion (“Maj. Op.”) at 826 n. 7, I do not think that requiring specific findings is an empty request for a "bare legal conclusion,” id.; Maj. op. at 828 n. 10; I am confident that any required finding will be backed up by careful, focused assessment on the part of the district judge who hears the evidence.

. The majority suggests that I have mischarac-terized their legal analysis by indicating that they rely on no particular evidence beyond the search warrant. Maj. op. at 826 n. 7. My point is that the information available to the police here was of the most generic type, likely to be present in every case in which a warrant lawfully issues to search for evidence of drug trafficking. The affidavit supporting the warrant in this case, submitted three days prior to the execution of the search, consisted in relevant part of the following:
Within the past seventy-two hours this affiant has received information from a confidential and reliable source referred to here after as SE, of narcotic activity to-wit: Cocaine being sold from within the above premises. [Affi-ant then established SE’s credibility and reliability.]
Within the past seventy-two hours this affiant has met with the above SE, during which it was searched and found free of drugs and money and then driven to the area of the above premises. SE was then given an amount of MPDC funds and let out of the vehicle and then followed to the entrance way of the above premises, where it was observed to enter. A short time past and SE returned to where the affiant was waiting and turned over to the affiant one Sno-Seal packet containing white powder which was searched and found free of drugs and money. SE then related that it went directly to the premises marked 3-4-7-8 and knocked and was let inside by a B/M subject known as James. This subject for the sum of MPDC funds filled the Sno-Seal packet with white powder while the SE waited from an amount which was located on a table. SE then left out and returned back to where the affiant was waiting.
At least that amount of information must be available to the police in any case in which a valid search warrant for narcotics trafficking has been issued. Similarly, the other factors relied on by the majority, see Maj. op. at 824-27, will also be present in any drug search case. The panel emphasizes that drugs are easily destroyed, drug dealers often are armed, and those in the drug trade are attuned to the need to respond, with violence or evidence destruction, to the first indication of police presence. *832But all of these factors are generic, true in every execution of a valid drug search warrant. In practice, so is the additional information that someone is inside the premises (it was not known in this case who that someone was or what connection he or she had to the earlier drug sale(s) in the apartment). Finally, I fail to see the significance of the majority's fourth factor, i.e., that an announcement had been made. Maj. op. at 825. Even though the apartment was small and the hour not late, the three seconds between the announcement and the forcible entry certainly was not enough to allow an innocent inhabitant to respond, much less to allow a police officer to conclude that there would be no response. Since I can find no other relevant facts in the record (apart from the ambiguous noises, see n. 1 supra ), it seems to me that the majority does indeed conclude that execution of any valid search warrant for narcotics trafficking creates a sufficient exigency to allow police officers to enter as soon as they have completed their knock and announcement.

. The knock-and-announce requirement was first enacted as a general criminal provision under national emergency conditions in 1917 as part of a major and controversial bill designed to aid in detection and prosecution of espionage and arms smuggling to enemy forces during World War I. Congress thus was acutely aware of the applicability of the statute to cases involving weapons and indicated an awareness also of its applicability to cases involving destructible evidence such as opium, liquor and gambling paraphernalia. See, e.g., H.R. 291, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., Cong.Rec. 1,839; 2,070 (1917).

. The majority suggests, in its effort to liken this case to Davis, that, once the police have probable cause to believe there has ever been a sale of narcotics from a premises, it is irrelevant whether they have further information establishing that those individuals who might see a need to destroy evidence are inside as opposed to innocent residents. See Maj. op. at 824 n. 2, 828 n. 10. I find such additional knowledge quite relevant in establishing the likelihood of evidence destruction, especially where, as here, the earlier drug sale took place several days prior to the entry and there is no record that the perpetrator lived in the apartment.

. Cf. Kamisar, LaFave & Israel, Modem Criminal Procedure 335-36 (1980) (quoting People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299, 66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489 (1968)).
[E]ntry without notice is proper "when the officer acts on a reasonable and good faith belief that compliance would increase his peril, frustrate an arrest, or permit destruction of evidence. Such a belief, however, must be based on the facts of the particular case. It cannot be justified by a general assumption that certain classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely than others to resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence."