Court Opinion

ID: 9459829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:32:48.384327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:21.276008
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s statement of the law is precise, however, my disagreement lies with the application of the law to this case. In short, the majority holds that the District Court had a duty to direct an acquittal on the grounds that the evidence was equally strong to infer innocence since the phrases alleged by the Government to be false were so ambiguous as to indicate that the defendant could not have had the requisite mens rea. Implicit in such a holding is the conclusion that the jury has not made a reasonable inference that the defendant “knowingly and wilfully” made false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Concededly, the phrases “being constructed” and “being built” and the factual circumstances in this case could lead to differing inferences. One inference that could be made and could have been accepted by the jury is that the defendant interpreted his initial dealings with Universal and Eimco to mean that the tank and plant were “being constructed” and “being built,” and, therefore, his statements to HUD were not false and he did not possess the requisite mens rea. Another inference can be made and must have been found by the jury, since a verdict of guilty was rendered. The jury, in order to have been consistent with its verdict, must have concluded that the defendant knew that the tank and plant were not now “being constructed.” A “hold by” status was placed on the water system two weeks prior to the statements and no actual “on site” work was being performed at the time the defendant made the statements to HUD. Quite conceivably, the Kansas City construction strike was a convenient coincidence for the defendant to claim later that he was constructing the water system at the time the statements were made based on the preliminary matters accomplished and that his statements in this context were ambiguous. The fact that the water system was at the least being delayed and the failure of the defendant to so inform HUD can be viewed as strong evidence that the statements made were false and that the defendant knew them to be false. Further, the jury could have properly considered that, even despite the construction strike, a “hold” given at the defendant’s direction on May 5, 1969, on the fabrication of the plant at Eimco’s factory, was not necessary and offered circumstantial evidence on the defendant’s wilfullness. A diligent developer would certainly have continued with the fabrication of the system, so that it could be installed immediately after the construction strike was terminated.
I cannot say, as the majority concludes, that the Government’s evidence was “equally strong to infer innocence of the crime charged as it is to infer guilt.” United States v. Kelton, 446 F. 2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1971) (emphasis *392added). In reviewing the record in this case, I find that the Government’s evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements made were false and that the defendant “wilfully and knowingly” made these false statements. The sole purpose of the statements was to secure HUD’s approval of the project. Approval was predicated on representation of an existing fact that an adequate water supply system was in the process of being constructed and would be completed within the near future. Obviously the requirement is for the protection of the public in dealing with promoters who are long on promises and short on performance.
A reviewing court must accept the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1966). Further, all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences as might be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Valez, 431 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Holt, 427 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1970); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 108 (8th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1119, 89 S.Ct. 995, 22 L.Ed.2d 124 (1969); Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 361 (8th Cir. 1968); Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 1967). Our jurisprudence is interwoven with the concept of democracy and accordingly places reliance upon a jury to try the facts of each case. The jury resolves conflicts in evidence, determines questions of fact, and reaches a verdict. The question of the defendant’s wilfullness and the interpretation of the contested statements involved factual determinations for the jury to resolve. The jury’s reasonable inferences that the statements were false and that the defendant knowingly and wilfully made those statements should be accepted by this Court.
Since the case was properly presented to the jury by the District Court’s instructions, the jury’s factual determinations should stand. I would affirm a judgment of conviction.