Court Opinion

ID: 9539760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:09:39.231788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:18.703434
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion here has caused me to clearly see the error of my ways in concurring in the judgment in Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga. App. 321 (342 SE2d 690) (1986). Even though Brim serves only as a physical precedent rather than a binding precedent under Rule 35 (b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals since there was a general concurrence by less than a majority of the judges, I still see a crying need to *41specifically overrule it.
Decided October 30, 1986
Rehearing denied November 24, 1986
Michael J. Goldman, for appellant.
James D. Meadows, Jerry B. Blackstock, for appellee.
As pointed out by the majority, Brim unquestionably controls this case since it also involves an issue of substantial compliance with the service of process requirements. However, in a matter as important as service of process, we need hard and fast rules such as are provided in the statute and not a nebulous principle such as “substantial compliance” that can change as often as the weather, as is provided for in Brim.
The Brim decision talks about the law not being blind to the legislative intent. While legislative intent is our touchstone, we must first begin with the statute in question itself. “[W]here the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is unnecessary. [Cits.]” Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 318 (297 SE2d 227) (1982). Indeed, “ ‘where the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden. [Cit.]’ ” Williamson v. Lucas, 171 Ga. App. 695 (4) (320 SE2d 800) (1984). What could be clearer than the following statement: Service of process may be had upon an individual by serving “the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. . . .” OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (7). (Emphasis supplied.)
I also see no need as was done in Brim to go back to the Justinian Code or to the purposes of the Civil Practice Act of 1965. We need only look to the statute itself, defer to the legislative wisdom contained therein, and apply the law to the facts. Such was the approach taken prior to Brim and by the dissent in Brim, the wisdom of which I now incorporate by reference.
The position taken here would have no effect on Trammel v. Nat. Bank of Ga., 159 Ga. App. 850 (285 SE2d 590) (1981), since Trammel simply sought to determine when a person would be of reasonable age and discretion to accept service. What I seek to do here is to put asunder the erroneous interpretation given in Brim to the clear language contained in a statute.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.