Court Opinion

ID: 9613497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:17:34.633145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:29.509795
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J.
I dissent.
The majority holds that a party seeking review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge to a trial judge can do so only by petitioning for a writ of mandate within 10 days of notice of the disputed ruling, and not by post-judgment appeal. Although the majority’s holding has practical advantages— immediate writ review generally will avoid reversal and retrial, thus promoting judicial economy—it finds no support in the statutory scheme.
I. The Two Removal Methods
The Code of Civil Procedure1 sets out two separate methods by which a party may prevent a trial judge or other judicial officer from presiding over a particular legal action. A party can seek to remove a judge under sections 170.1 and 170.3 (commonly called a “for cause” disqualification), or it can exercise a peremptory challenge against the judge under section 170.6, as defendant did here.
Section 170.1, subdivision (a) lists the grounds for disqualifying a judge “for cause.”2 Section 170.3 sets forth the procedure for such disqualification. A judge who “determines himself or herself to be disqualified” must notify the court’s presiding judge of the recusal. (§ 170.3, subd. (a).) A disqualified *277judge may, however, seek a waiver from the parties after disclosing the basis for disqualification “on the record.” (§ 170.3, subd. (b).)
If “a judge who should disqualify himself or herself refuses or fails to do so,” the party seeking the disqualification must file a verified, written statement with the clerk of the court objecting to the hearing or trial before the judge and “setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification.” (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) The judge can either consent to the disqualification or file a verified answer admitting or denying the allegations in the challenger’s statement and adding any additional facts material ‘to the question of disqualification.” (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(3).) Unless there is a recusal by the challenged judge, the question of disqualification must be heard and “determined” by another judge agreed to by the parties. (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(5).) That determination may be based on the challenger’s statement and the answer filed by the challenged judge, or by evidence presented at a hearing. (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(6).) Thus, when a judge’s disqualification is contested, the challenging party must establish the facts supporting its claim of bias or prejudice to the satisfaction of a neutral judge, who is to determine whether there is “cause” for disqualification.
As noted earlier, a party seeking to remove a judge from hearing a particular matter involving a contested issue of law or fact is not restricted to filing a challenge based on any “cause” contained in section 170.1, but may seek removal simply by filing a peremptory challenge to the judge under section 170.6.
Section 170.6 prohibits a judge, or other judicial officer, from hearing a matter when that judicial officer is “prejudiced” against any party or lawyer in the proceeding. (§ 170.6, subd. (I).)3 Prejudice under this section is established merely by “an oral or written motion without notice” supported by a sworn affidavit stating that the judge is prejudiced against either the party or the attorney for the party making the motion “so that the party or attorney cannot or believes that he or she cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge . . . .” (§ 170.6, subd. (2).)
Thus a “for cause” disqualification of a judge (§ 170.1) and a peremptory challenge (§ 170.6) differ in the following important respect: A “for cause” disqualification requires the challenger to establish bias or prejudice as a fact *278to the satisfaction of an impartial judge, but the allegation of bias in a peremptory challenge may not be contested and removal is automatic upon the filing of an affidavit of prejudice. (Oak Grove School Dist. v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 703 [32 Cal.Rptr. 288] [contrasting former § 170, subd. (5), from which § 170.1 was derived, with § 170.6].)
II. Appealability
Before enactment of the provision at issue here, the rules for appellate review of orders on “for cause” disqualifications (§ 170.1) and on peremptory challenges (§ 170.6) were the same. Such orders were not separately appealable, but were subject to review by extraordinary writ and also on appeal from final judgment. (Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 825, fn. 1 [69 Cal.Rptr. 321, 442 P.2d 377]; Briggs v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 336, 342 [10 P.2d 1003]; People v. Whitfield (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 299, 306 [228 Cal.Rptr. 82]; Garcia v. Superior Court (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 670, 679 [203 Cal.Rptr. 290].)
In 1984, as part of its amendment of the statutory scheme governing “for cause” disqualifications, the Legislature added the following limitation on appellate remedies: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding.” (§ 170.3, subd. (d), italics added.) The issue here is whether this provision (hereafter subdivision (d)) applies only to “for cause” disqualifications or also to peremptory challenges. Subdivision (d)’s placement and language show that the Legislature intended it to apply only to “for cause” disqualifications.
The Legislature placed subdivison (d) in section 170.3. Each of section 170.3’s other subdivisions relates exclusively to the procedure for disqualification of judicial officers “for cause.” The procedure for peremptory challenges of judges, on the other hand, appears in a different statute, section 170.6. Subdivision (d) makes no reference to section 170.6, nor does section 170.6 refer to subdivision (d). Because the Legislature grouped it with the procedures governing rulings on “for cause” disqualifications, the most reasonable inference is that the Legislature intended subdivision (d)’s limitation on appellate remedies to apply exclusively to such rulings.
This inference is strongly reinforced by the language of subdivision (d). Other subdivisions of section 170.3 use the term “disqualification” and the phrase “question of disqualification” (often in conjunction with the word “determines”) when referring to the procedure for removing a judge “for *279cause.” For example, subdivision (c)(5) of section 170.3 states that “the question of disqualification shall be heard and determined by another judge,” while subdivision (c)(6) of the same section states that the judge deciding “the question of disqualification” may do so on the basis of the statement and answer filed by the parties or may set the matter for a hearing, that the judge shall permit argument at a hearing on “the question of disqualification,” and that notice is to be given the presiding judge if the impartial judge “deciding the question of disqualification determines” that the judge is disqualified.
In contrast, the peremptory challenge provision, section 170.6, never uses the words “determine,” “question,” or “disqualification.” Moreover, the reference in subdivision (d) to the “determination of the question of disqualification” would be an inapt and improbable description of the procedure for a peremptory challenge of a judge: because judicial removal under section 170.6 is automatic (see People v. Whitfield, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 299, 303), a peremptory challenge presents no question of disqualification to be determined. Thus, subdivision (d)’s use of the language “determination of the question of disqualification” should be construed to apply only to rulings on disqualifications “for cause,” and not to peremptory challenges.
The majority reasons that its limitation of the appellate review of rulings on peremptory challenges will eliminate “possible delay, waste, and the relitigation of issues” that occur when such rulings are reviewed on post-judgment appeal. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 273.) As the majority points out, public policy favors pretrial writ review because it permits the appellate court to remedy an erroneous denial of any judicial challenge, usually without the necessity of reversing a judgment. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 272.)4
I agree that public policy favors immediate writ review. That policy, however, does not empower us to rewrite a statute. (Nott v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1106 [251 Cal.Rptr. 842].) Whether any policy is sufficiently important for a statutory mandate is a question for the Legislature, not this court. (See People v. National Association of Realtors (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 459, 475 [174 Cal.Rptr. 728].) Because in the case of a peremptory challenge under section 170.6, the Legislature has not limited appellate review to a petition for writ of mandate filed within 10 days, the issue can be raised by defendant on this postjudgment appeal. (See Pen. Code, § 1259; Briggs v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal. 336, 342; People v. *280Whitfield, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 299, 306; In re Christian J. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 276 [202 Cal.Rptr. 54].)
III. Defendant’s Peremptory Challenge
Defendant contends her section 170.6 peremptory challenge against the judge assigned to preside over her trial was timely and thus should have been granted. I agree.
Section 170.6, subdivision (2) specifies the time within which a peremptory challenge must be asserted: “If directed to the trial of a cause where there is a master calendar,” the peremptory challenge must be presented to the judge supervising the master calender court “not later than the time the cause is assigned for trial.” But this provision cannot be interpreted to require the filing of a peremptory challenge motion before counsel for the moving party learns the identity of the assigned judge. (People v. Bonds (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024 [248 Cal.Rptr. 5]; People v. Montalvo (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 790, 794 [173 Cal.Rptr. 51].)
Here, the master calendar court assigned defendant’s case for trial before Judge Pierson on Friday, October 27, 1989. Because the defense had not been ordered to appear on that date, neither defendant nor her counsel was present. The next court day, Monday, October 30, 1989, when defense counsel learned of the assignment, was therefore the earliest possible opportunity to present to the master calendar court defendant’s peremptory challenge of Judge Pierson. Thus, defendant’s peremptory challenge, presented to the master calendar court on October 30,1989, was timely. (See People v. Bonds, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at 1024; People v. Montalvo, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at 794.)
When the issue of judicial removal is raised on postjudgment appeal, a determination by the reviewing court that the trial judge should have been removed requires reversal. (See Briggs v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal. 336, 342; People v. Whitfield, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 299, 306.) As I have explained, defendant’s peremptory challenge to Judge Pierson was timely and should have been granted. Because the issue is properly before us on postjudgment appeal, that judgment should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 20, 1992. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

All further statutory references are to this code.

A judge may not hear a case when he or she (1) has personal knowledge of the facts to be decided, (2) has served as a lawyer in that case or a closely related case, (3) has a financial interest in the outcome of a proceeding, (4) is related by blood or marriage to a party, or to an officer of a corporate party, (5) is related to an attorney involved in a proceeding, (6) believes that the recusal would further the interests of justice, or entertains a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial or that “a person aware of the facts" might entertain such a doubt, or (7) has a permanent or temporary physical impairment that prevents the judge from properly perceiving evidence or conducting a proceeding. (§ 170.1, subd. (a).)

Section 170.6, subdivision (1) provides: “No judge, court commissioner, or referee of any superior, municipal or justice court of the State of California shall try any civil or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character nor hear any matter therein which involves a contested issue of law or fact when it shall be established as hereinafter provided that the judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against any party or attorney or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in the action or proceeding.”

As the majority acknowledges, writ review under subdivision (d) would not always be pretrial. Here, defendant’s peremptory challenge to the trial judge was denied on October 30, 1989, and her trial began that same day. Thus, even if she had filed a petition for writ of mandate within 10 days of the ruling, relief from the improper denial of her motion could not be pretrial.