Court Opinion

ID: 9580833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:26.024891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:33.438293
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because the evidence could be construed in the plaintiff - respondent’s favor, and must be according to our law, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Pettigrew’s testimony regarding the location of her fall is not a model of clarity, as much of it is given while she and the lawyers examine and mark color photographs with colored pens. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to follow written *343testimony that describes spatial relationships by pointing to a photograph, as was done in this case.3
Pettigrew had worked at Adel Memorial Hospital for 12 years, but left the job in 1995, because she anticipated that the hospital was going to lay off its older employees. In March 2003, she went to visit her sister in the hospital. She parked and walked up the right side of the circular driveway to the front entrance, which had a “drive-thru [sic] cover.” She saw an older man having a hard time trying to open the front door, so she “stepped around him to open it.” Her foot slipped out from under her and she broke her ankle. During her deposition, Pettigrew marked an X on the photograph, highlighted in yellow, to show where the older man was standing and a red X to show where her feet were when she slipped. Both marks were made on a black rug at the entryway, which had not been there when she fell. Those marks do not show up well in the photocopied photograph in the record. Pettigrew answered yes when defense counsel asked, presumably while pointing at a picture, “So you had already gone over this step here, the ramp,” and “You were already up here on the concrete about to open the door when you slipped.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defense counsel asked Pettigrew nothing about the configuration of the ramp itself.
Pettigrew’s lawyer began his direct examination by asking her to describe the ramp. She said it was “sort of split like a slanted split into the ramp ... like slanted curb ” When she stepped around the man to help him with the door, her foot slipped. She marked the picture to show her recollection of the entry way, explaining, “It was like this. As far as •— it was sort of slanted down like that.” (Emphasis supplied.) On cross-examination, continuing to illustrate the questions and answers by referring to the picture, Pettigrew said it was flat where the red dot representing her foot was located, but there was a slant off to the right. Then the following exchange took place:
Q. Where this line here on the right side, this short line, is that where the slant started this way or was it slanted at that point?
A. It was slanted, sort of slanted this way.
Q. Was this flat where the red dot is?
A. Yes.
Q. Or was it on the slant?
A. It was sort of flat.
*344Q. So it was flat there but there [is] a slant off to the right.
A. There [were] slants off to the left and the right.
Q. This slant — was this a slant going down here or was this really just a slant going off this way to the right — I mean to the left?
A. The slant going off — but I was over here on this slant going to the right.
Pettigrew had come up the right slant, “and stepped there around [the older man] to open the door. When I opened the door, my foot slipped up on that square part.” (Emphasis supplied.)
From this exchange, along with Pettigrew’s earlier testimony that she had already negotiated the curb and the marked, photocopied pictures, the majority concludes Pettigrew contradicted herself about whether she was on a flat surface or a slanted surface when she fell. However, “for purposes of summary judgment, we must construe the evidence in [Pettigrew’s] favor.” Edwards v. Ingles Market, 234 Ga. App. 66, 67 (1) (506 SE2d 205) (1998). Construing this testimony against the party who moved for summary judgment, one could conclude from the record that Pettigrew came up a slanted surface to the right of the door, then stepped onto a flat surface to assist the older man with the door before she fell. One could also conclude that after she negotiated the curb, Pettigrew stepped backward to assist the older man with the door, and was no longer standing on a flat surface when she fell. Therefore we need not apply the Prophecy rule to disregard any of Pettigrew’s statements.
Further, I cannot agree that Pettigrew’s testimony regarding how the entryway in a photograph differed from the entryway when she fell was an “attempt to change her testimony with regard to the configuration of the curb or ramp.” When defense counsel first showed her a set of photographs, Pettigrew said they looked “familiar” but immediately noted that the warning to “Watch Your Step” had not been there when she fell. Also, “the yellow strip wasn’t down there. It was just like a slant, like going up to the door.” Counsel did not explore what Pettigrew meant about “the slant... going up to the door,” but asked what else was different. Pettigrew said the rugs had not been there, and rather than exploring any further differences in the entry way, counsel proceeded to ask Pettigrew which direction she had been going. He never returned to the photographs or the configuration of the ramp, and he never asked Pettigrew to confirm that no other differences existed between the entrance as depicted in the photographs and as it was when she fell. Again construing the evidence in favor of respondent Pettigrew, no inconsistency exists requiring us to apply the Prophecy rule to disregard Pettigrew’s testimony about the entryway.
*345Decided July 5, 2007.
Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, ThomasM. Burke, Jr., for appellant.
The issue in this slip-and-fall case is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances existing at the time and place of the fall, the invitee exercised the prudence that an ordinarily careful person would use in this situation. Pettigrew did not slip in a puddle of rain at the covered entryway. She contends that she fell because moisture had condensed on the bare concrete (slanted or not), making the concrete slippery, and because she was helping an older man who was struggling with the front door, as an ordinarily reasonable person would do. “The invitee is not bound to avoid hazards not usually present on the premises and which the invitee, exercising ordinary care, did not observe, and the invitee is not required, in all circumstances, to look continuously at the floor, without intermission, for defects in the floor.” (Citations omitted.) Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 741 (1) (493 SE2d 403) (1997). A jury question exists as to whether Pettigrew failed to exercise ordinary care by not keeping her eyes on the ground at all times. Her explanation as to what she was doing when she fell creates a fact issue for jury determination, and constitutes some evidence that Pettigrew exercised reasonable care for her own safety in entering the hospital. McDonald’s Restaurant &c. v. Banks, 219 Ga. App. 667 (466 SE2d 240) (1995).
Further, “[g]iven that defendant used the ramp continuously, it can be inferred that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge” that the concrete was bare. Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791, 792 (504 SE2d 198) (1998). The danger allegedly posed by the entryway resulted from a combination of the moist bare concrete, the slope of the ramp, and the presence of an elderly man having trouble opening the door. “It cannot be said as a matter of law that an individual using the ramp would have appreciated the danger posed by the combination of these elements.” Id. at 793.
Finally, while we have held that a plaintiff could not recover when she slipped on a wet ramp at a hospital entryway, in that case, “[t]he record shows only that she stepped on a wet ramp.” (Footnote omitted.) Emory Univ. v. Smith, 260 Ga. App. 900, 902 (581 SE2d 405) (2003). In this case, the record shows much more than that.
For these reasons, the trial court properly denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller joins in this dissent.
*346Farrar & Hennesy, Douglass K. Farrar, for appellee.

 ‘‘[WJhile those documents are in the record on appeal, this court cannot determine where on the document a witness is pointing.” Hall v. Christian Church of Ga., 280 Ga. App. 721, 726 (1) (634 SE2d 793) (2006).