Court Opinion

ID: 9635718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:01:35.837011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:33.899488
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
I believe that this case provides a good example (1) why we should abandon the ancient doctrine that the party producing a witness vouches for his truthfulness and (2) why we should admit the prior inconsistent statements of witnesses as evidence concerning the matters contained in the statement.
In this case the police took statements from approximately half a dozen eyewitnesses to the killing. Apparently1 several of these witnesses stated that decedent was a member of a gang, that the clash which resulted in his death was a gang fight, and that someone, possibly decedent, had a cane during the fight which preceded the killing. These statements tended to corroborate appellant’s claim that decedent attacked him with a cane and that he killed to protect himself from serious bodily harm.2
Sometime after these statements were given, however, all but one of these witnesses changed their testimony. The Commonwealth called the one witness whose testimony did not change. He testified that he saw no cane and that neither he nor decedent were members of a gang. The Commonwealth refused to call the other witnesses because they were felt to be unreliable, having changed their stories.
*144In an effort to use the statements which tended to verify appellant’s version, appellant’s counsel called two of the witnesses who had changed their minds and asked them about the incident. When they testified in accordance with their changed stories, appellant’s counsel plead surprise and asked that he be allowed to impeach on the basis of the prior inconsistent statements. The trial court did not allow him to do so. Although the trial court explaned to appellant and his counsel before the witnesses were called that it would not allow any claim of surprise, and though this ruling was probably sustainable, I believe that we should reverse the ruling which kept these relevent and freely given statements from the jury.
It is important to realize that the earlier statements given by the witnesses to the police shortly after the killing were probably as reliable or more reliable than the corresponding in-court testimony.
“In many cases, the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation.”
Comment, California Evidence Code § 1285.
Moreover, the witnesses who made the statements are available for cross-examination concerning the earlier statements and the conditions under which they were given.3 The trier of fact may observe the witness as he *145explains or denies giving the earlier statement.4 Nothing is lost to the normal procedure in which the jury evaluates the weight and credibility to be accorded the witness’ testimony.5 The practice of admitting a witness’ prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence has been accepted in many jurisdictions. See Fed.R. Evid. 607, 801(d)(1) (prior inconsistent statement admissible as substantive evidence upon request of any party); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis.2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969), cert. denied 399 U.S. 929, 90 S.Ct. 2229, 26 L. Ed.2d 796 (1970) (prior inconsistent statement admissible as substantive evidence when in writing and declarant is available for cross examination); Cal.Evid.Code § 1235 (prior inconsistent statement admissible as substantive evidence when declarant available for cross-examination) ; Kansas Stat.Anno. § 60-460 (a) (prior statement admissible as substantive evidence if declarant is a witness, without regard to consistency of statement); New Jersey R.Evid. 63(1) (prior inconsistent statement admissible as substantive evidence when used to impeach witness); Utah R.Evid. 63(1) (prior inconsistent statement admissible without regard to use for impeachment); Uniform R.Evid. 801(d)(1) (similar to Fed.R. Evid. 801(d)(1) that prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence).
Allowing such statements to be admitted in evidence for the truth of the matters stated would require just two changes in the law of evidence as it presently exists *146in Pennsylvania. First, any party should be allowed to impeach any witness. If this were not allowed, only the party who did not call the witness could use a prior inconsistent statement. This would be virtually the same as present law. Second, the prior inconsistent statement would be admissible not only to impeach the witness, but would be substantive evidence. These changes are not drastic, as evidenced by their acceptance in the jurisdictions listed above.6
The majority’s result serves only to keep relevant and reliable evidence from the jury. Its result serves no greater principle than judicial inertia. I believe that a trial is, fundamentally, a search for an objective account of the events upon which the criminal charges are based. An evidentiary rule which forces the searcher to ignore relevant clues whose reliability can be tested by cross-examination serves no purpose. I, therefore, dissent from the majority’s result.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. None of these statements are in the record, therefore, we must rely on partisan descriptions to determine what they contain.

. The majority asserts that these statements addressed only matters collateral to the central inquiry. I cannot believe that a claim of self-defense and evidence supporting such a claim are collateral to a murder prosecution.

. “It does not follow, however, that prior self-contradictions, when admitted are to be treated as having no affirmative testimonial value, and that any such credit is to be strictly denied them in the mind of the tribunal. The only ground for doing so would be the hearsay rule. But the theory of the hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial statement is rejected because it was made out of court by an absent person not subject to cross-examination .... Here, however, by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis for his former *145statement. The whole purpose of the hearsay rule has been already satisfied.”
3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1018, at 996 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (emphasis in original).

. “If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court.”
Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand, J.).

. See McCormick, Evidence § 251 (1972).

. This result would also appear to be required by Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).