Court Opinion

ID: 9716706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:48:52.097417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.132125
License: Public Domain

*457ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.
¶ 74. {concurring). I join in the majority opinion and concur with that opinion in that the majority concludes that the defense failed to meet its burden to show "that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits." Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) (emphasis added).
¶ 75. Indeed, the circuit court erred in applying a balancing test in the case at issue. It was the circuit court's duty to consider the two conditions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2): (1) the circuit court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission when the presentation of the merits of the action will be sub-served thereby, and (2) the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. Instead of making findings as to the prejudice element, the circuit court wrongfully applied a balancing test. As a result, one remedy could be to remand this case to the circuit court to reach a conclusion regarding prejudice. However, given the record in this case and the timing of the relevant events, a remand is unnecessary.
¶ 76. I concur with the majority opinion in that the defense failed to meet its burden to show that withdrawal of the admission would prejudice them in maintaining an action or defense on the merits. The circuit court gave the defense an opportunity to produce such evidence, but the defense failed to do so. As a result, upon review of this record, the defense did not make a showing that at the time the admission was obtained, it could have gone back several years previous to determine whether Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state.
*458¶ 77. As for the critical nature of the timing in this case, the parties now agree that as of July 22, 2005, Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state. See majority op., ¶ 4. Between April 1, 2001, and June 21, 2001, Ms. Luckett's medical records indicate that Ms. Luckett was aware of events and was responsive to questions. On June 22, 2005, the defense sought the relevant admissions regarding Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state. The relevant admissions were obtained in July of 2005. Ms. Luckett died a few months later, on October 2, 2005. On January 18, 2007, the plaintiff sought to withdraw the previously made admission.
¶ 78. These facts beg the following question in this case: Had the admission not been made in July of 2005, what could the defense have done in 2005 or 2007 to evaluate Ms. Luckett's condition in 2001? The defense did not produce any proof that it was prejudiced in pursuing a defense on the merits. In other words, the trial court was not presented with any persuasive argument that had the defense not obtained the 2005 admission, or had the admission not been withdrawn in 2007, that the defense could have done something different to have refuted the 2001 interval. If there was an admission or if there was not an admission, it is almost irrelevant, given the timing of the admission and the fact that as of the time of the 2005 admission she was in a persistent vegetative state. There is nothing in the record to reflect that the withdrawal of the admission affects the defense differently now. This case is not one in which the admission is made contemporaneously with or on the heels of a lucid interval. Had that been the case, we could certainly reach a different conclusion, so long as some evidence was presented regarding prejudice. In this case, Ms. Luckett was responsive in 2001; the admission was in July of2005, a time when everyone agrees Ms. Luckett *459was in a persistent vegetative state; her death was on October 2,2005; the withdrawal occurred on January 18, 2007. It is difficult to determine how anything other than a paper review could have been conducted in 2005 and the same is true for 2007 or even at present. Nothing exists in the record to refute that conclusion.
¶ 79. The problem with the defense's argument now is that even if the defense is placed back in the position they would have been at the time of the admission, the defense fails to show that an expert would be able to do something different than he or she could do now. The burden was on the defense to show the circuit court how they are prejudiced by that admission being withdrawn and how it impacts their ability to go back any differently than it does now. If the timing of the persistent vegetative state admission and withdrawal were different, then the outcome in this case could be different. There simply is no showing of that prejudice.
¶ 80. Finally, I would note that the trial court is in a position to create a fair process by which a trial on the merits can occur and that there is no undue prejudice as this case goes forward. There may be issues that arise regarding the effect of the late withdrawal on the expert's opinions. The trial court will need to address those in due course and create an even playing field. Trial courts utilize a variety of techniques to ensure fairness and this trial court should do the same.
¶ 81. For the foregoing reason I concur.
¶ 82. I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence.