Court Opinion

ID: 9688083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:01:16.441374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.899905
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 23-50012

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No. 3:20-cr-
                                                03113-TWR-1
    v.

CARLOS ARMANDO ESTRADA,                             OPINION

                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Southern District of California
         Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding

             Argued and Submitted July 18, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                     Filed August 24, 2023

    Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Danielle J. Forrest,
    Circuit Judges, and Kathleen Cardone, * District Judge.

                  Opinion by Judge Tashima

*
 The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
2                         USA V. ESTRADA

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment on the
third revocation of Carlos Armando Estrada’s supervised
release.
    Applying the rationale of United States v. Castro-
Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), which involved the
same issue in the context of probation revocation, the panel
held that because Estrada was serving a term of supervised
release when he committed the instant violation, the district
court had jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release and
impose an additional term of imprisonment, regardless of
any error in the sentence imposed on the second revocation.
    The panel declined to reach Estrada’s argument that the
term of supervised release imposed on his second revocation
exceeded the statutory maximum. Consistent with Castro-
Verdugo and earlier precedent, the panel held that an appeal
challenging a supervised release revocation is not the proper
avenue through which to attack the validity of the underlying
sentence.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       USA V. ESTRADA                      3

                        COUNSEL

Todd W. Burns (argued), Burns & Cohan Attorneys at Law,
San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
Amy B. Wang (argued) and Zachary J. Howe, Assistant
United States Attorneys; Daniel E. Zipp, Assistant United
States Attorney, Appellate Section Chief, Criminal Division;
Randy S. Grossman, United States Attorney; United States
Attorney’s Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

                        OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

    Carlos Armando Estrada challenges the district court’s
judgment on the third revocation of his supervised release.
He contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because, at the time of his third violation, he was serving a
term of supervised release that exceeded the applicable
statutory maximum.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the
district court had jurisdiction over the third revocation of
Estrada’s supervised release. We decline to consider his
improper collateral attack on the supervised release term
imposed on his prior, second revocation of supervised
release.
4                      USA V. ESTRADA

                     BACKGROUND
    Estrada was arrested at the United States border in 2020
with fentanyl concealed on his person. He pleaded guilty to
one count of importation of fentanyl, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. The district court imposed a time-
served term of imprisonment and a three-year term of
supervised release.
    Estrada repeatedly violated the conditions of his
supervised release. On the first revocation of his supervised
release, the court imposed an eight-month term of
imprisonment and three-year supervised release term. On
the second revocation of his supervised release, the court
imposed a time-served 38-day term of imprisonment and 58
months of supervised release. Estrada did not object to or
appeal from this sentence. On the third revocation of his
supervised release, the district court imposed ten months of
imprisonment without any further term of supervision.
Estrada timely appealed.
               STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the district court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over revocation proceedings regardless of any
failure to object before the district court. See United States
v. Pocklington, 792 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2004).
                       DISCUSSION
    Estrada contends that the district court lacked
jurisdiction or power to revoke his supervised release and
impose an additional ten-month term of imprisonment.
Estrada asserts that the court lacked jurisdiction because, at
the time of his violation, he was serving an unlawful term of
supervised release. Specifically, Estrada contends that the
                       USA V. ESTRADA                        5

58-month term of supervised release imposed on the second
revocation of his supervised release exceeded the maximum
term of supervision authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1)
and United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir.
2009).
    Relying on United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d
1065 (9th Cir. 2014), the government contends that the
district court had jurisdiction over the third revocation
proceedings and that Estrada is procedurally barred from
challenging a prior supervised release sentence on a direct
appeal from a subsequent revocation. The government also
contends that the supervised release term imposed on
Estrada’s second revocation was statutorily permissible
because 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(F) trumps the maximum set
forth in § 3583(b)(1) and authorizes a lifetime term of
supervision.
    In Castro-Verdugo, the district court imposed a sentence
on an illegal reentry conviction that included both probation
and a stayed custodial sentence. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d
at 1067. This exceeded the court’s statutory authority under
18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3) (stating that a defendant may not be
sentenced to probation in conjunction with a term of
imprisonment), but the defendant did not move to correct
this sentence. Id. On appeal from a subsequent probation
revocation, the defendant argued that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because he was
not serving a valid probation term at the time of his
revocation. Id. at 1068. Explaining that the “the only criteria
necessary to create jurisdiction over probation revocation
proceedings are: (1) that the defendant still be serving a term
of probation and (2) that the defendant violate its
conditions,” we concluded that the district court had
jurisdiction because, regardless of the error in the underlying
6                      USA V. ESTRADA

sentence, the defendant was serving a term of probation at
the time of his violation. Id. at 1069. We also reaffirmed
our prior precedent holding that a defendant cannot
challenge the validity of an underlying sentence in a
subsequent probation revocation proceeding. See id. (“[A]n
underlying sentence may not always be valid, but . . . a court
tasked with conducting or reviewing probation revocation
proceedings may not investigate the validity of the original
sentence.”); see also United States v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293,
1295 (9th Cir. 1993) (“An appeal challenging a probation
revocation proceeding is not the proper avenue through
which to attack the validity of the original sentence.”);
United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“[A]n appeal from a probation revocation is not the proper
avenue for a collateral attack on the underlying
conviction.”). We clarified that this type of collateral attack
should be brought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, because to
hold otherwise “would circumvent the statutorily defined
procedure” provided in § 2255. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d
at 1069–71.
    Although Castro-Verdugo addresses this issue in the
context of probation revocation, rather than supervised
release revocation, we agree with the government that the
rationale of Castro-Verdugo controls the outcome of this
appeal. See United States v. Cate, 971 F.3d 1054, 1057–58
(9th Cir. 2020) (applying precedent barring a collateral
attack on an underlying conviction in probation revocation
proceedings to supervised release revocations); United
States v. Gavilanes-Ocaranza, 772 F.3d 624, 627 (9th Cir.
2014) (explaining that this court treats revocation of parole,
probation, or supervised release similarly in a number of
circumstances).     Any distinction between probation
                       USA V. ESTRADA                        7

revocation and supervised release revocation proceedings is
immaterial in the context of this case.
    Here, Estrada was serving a term of supervised release
when he committed the instant violation. This is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on the district court. Thus, regardless
of any error in the sentence imposed on his second
revocation—an issue we do not decide—the district court
had jurisdiction over proceedings on the third revocation of
Estrada’s supervised release. See Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d
at 1068–69.
    As we have indicated, we decline to reach Estrada’s
argument that the term of supervised release imposed on his
previous revocation of supervised release exceeded the
statutory maximum. Consistent with Castro-Verdugo and
our earlier precedent, we hold that an appeal challenging a
supervised release revocation is not the “proper avenue”
through which to attack the validity of the underlying
sentence. See id. at 1068–71; Gerace, 997 F.2d at 1295;
Simmons, 812 F.2d at 563.
    We are unpersuaded by Estrada’s attempts to distinguish
his case from this precedent. Estrada contends that Castro-
Verdugo does not bar this collateral attack for three different
reasons. First, Estrada argues that his case will not subvert
the one-year limitations period for a § 2255 motion because
the instant challenge to the legality of his prior supervised
release term occurred within that one-year period. In
Castro-Verdugo, we explained that “[a]llowing a collateral
attack on the underlying sentence of probation in an appeal
from a probation revocation proceeding would also thwart
Congress’ statute of limitations for correcting a sentence” set
forth in § 2255(f)(1). See Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d at 1071.
However, we did not rely on the statute of limitations alone;
8                       USA V. ESTRADA

we also concluded that allowing such a collateral attack
would circumvent other statutorily defined procedures in
§ 2255. Id. at 1070–71 (“In short, Congress has told us in
§ 2255 both how and when we may entertain a challenge to
a sentence that was imposed in excess of statutory
authority.”). Moreover, nothing in Castro-Verdugo suggests
that a challenge to an underlying sentence might be
permissible on appeal from a subsequent revocation if raised
within the one-year statute of limitations in § 2255. See id.
at 1070 (describing our “clear rule that the validity of an
underlying sentence of probation must be challenged under
28 U.S.C. § 2255” (emphases added)).
    Second, Estrada relies on United States v. Swanson, 943
F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991), to contend that this court has
discretion to consider a claim on direct appeal even if it could
be raised in a § 2255 motion. But Swanson addresses when
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim might be brought
on direct appeal rather than in a § 2255 motion and is
therefore inapposite. See Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1072.
    Finally, Estrada contends that Castro-Verdugo is limited
to circumstances where a defendant seeks to challenge the
validity of the sentence on his original conviction and is not
applicable where, as in this case, a defendant seeks to
challenge a sentence imposed on a later revocation. We do
not view our holding in Castro-Verdugo so narrowly. Like
the defendant in Castro-Verdugo, Estrada seeks to
collaterally attack the validity of his underlying sentence on
direct appeal from a subsequent revocation. Estrada offers
no valid reason to treat his case differently because his
collateral attack is directed to a prior supervised release term
imposed on revocation, rather than the original judgment of
conviction.
                        USA V. ESTRADA                        9

                      CONCLUSION
        Because Estrada was serving a term of supervised
release at the time of the instant violation, the district court
had jurisdiction to revoke Estrada’s supervised release for a
third time and impose an additional term of imprisonment.
We do not reach Estrada’s argument that the supervised
release term imposed on his second revocation exceeded the
district court’s statutory authority because he may not
collaterally attack his underlying sentence in these
proceedings.
   AFFIRMED.