Court Opinion

ID: 9459679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:28:04.862639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:16.699522
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
This case, we are told, may be decided “by analogy to the cases considering the sufficiency of affidavits which rely on tips from informers.”1 I fail to perceive a reason for this. No contention is made that an informant played a part in providing the information set forth in the warrant affidavit; indeed, mention is made of “reliability” and “credibility” only in connection with Government Agent Peoples, who, being the warrant affiant, was not an informer as I understand the term.2 To class the informer cases as inapposite, however, is not to say that no law bears on the topic. Quite to the contrary, numerous cases of the Supreme Court have dealt with precisely the issue before us. On their authority, I submit that the decision made today is plainly in error.
It is a proposition long settled that a warrant may not issue upon a sworn al*1183legation that an officer “has cause to suspect and does believe” that illegal activity is taking place upon specified premises. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). More must be alleged:
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough. 290 U.S. at 47, 54 S.Ct. at 13.
This mandate exists to insure that the inference of probable cause from facts known to an officer be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than the officer himself, “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). Where an officer has personally uncovered the facts upon which he grounds his request for a warrant, the law requires an affirmative sworn allegation that he speaks with personal knowledge of the matters set forth in his affidavit. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). When others have provided him, wholly or in part, with information detailed as hearsay in his affidavit, additional data must be presented. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 27 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). As was stated in a narcotics case:
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887, was “credible” or his information “reliable.” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
The informant must have firsthand knowledge of the illegal transaction and the officer must vouch for his credibility. But the cases have never held that the officer must vouch for his own credibility or obtain an independent verification of his reliability.
Nevertheless,, the majority opinion is replete with references to a duty incumbent upon Agent Peoples “to support the credibility and reliability” of the conclusory statement of offense made by Peoples in what the majority terms the “first affidavit.” This is plainly a bootstrap technique. By grafting a credibility requirement onto the personal knowledge requirement of Giordenello, the majority impermissibly dilutes the factual showing long required of the Government when it seeks a search warrant. The Government, it is said, need allege only a few of the facts upon which it bases a claim of illegal activity; if these facts tend in some manner to support a conclusory and general allegation of crime made by the government agent in the same affidavit, credibility of the affiant has been shown and the conclusory allegation is to be taken at face value. This is a logical feat that will not bear muster. The credibility of a police officer is irrelevant in this context. History has taught that conclusory statements made by law enforcement agents are presumptively incredible; the agents must adduce facts and, while they may indicate their conclusions, must leave to a magistrate the final say on probable cause. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933).
*1184The sole question we must decide is whether the papers placed before the magistrate set forth facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The majority divides these papers into two groups: the first page comprises the “first affidavit,” the remainder makes up the “second affidavit.” 3 By so doing, it may be inferred that the majority views each as containing factual matter relevant to the general allegation of wrongdoing made on the first page. I disagree. The “first” affidavit is the general allegation of wrongdoing and nothing more.4 This is plain on its face. After describing the suspect premises and listing the chemicals involved in the supposed attempt to manufacture DMT, the affidavit continues:
And [the affiant represents] that the facts tending to establish the foregoing grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows:
See Attached Affidavit
The “Attached Affidavit” is, of course, the “second” affidavit.
The conclusion is inescapable that the warrant stands or falls on the factual allegations of Agent Peoples set out in the “second” affidavit. Given this view, even the majority may agree that the warrant must fall.5 I would like, nonetheless, to develop this conclusion. Four chemicals are mentioned in the second affidavit. Three are innocuous solvents. The last, lithium aluminum hydride, is at worst a “red flag” meriting suspicion. United States v. Failla, 343 F.Supp. 831 (W.D.N.Y.1972). Expert witnesses for both the defendant and the Government agreed that DMT could not be manufactured from these four chemicals, in direct contradiction to the representation in the affidavit that the chemicals were “the essential precursors and reagents necessary to produce the Schedule I Controlled Substance Dimethyltryptamine.” No mention is made of any other chemicals, much less that other chemicals were observed to enter Hibma’s house. The affidavit, moreover, fails to reveal even slightly suspicious conduct on the part of any defendant. For all the magistrate knew, no fictitious names were employed, no activity was observed at unusual hours, and no other indica of guilt or clandestine activity were seen to occur. See United States v. Moore, 452 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1971). The case, I submit, is essentially on all fours with United States v. Failla, 343 F.Supp. 831 (W.D.N.Y.1972), insofar as that case dealt with the issue of probable cause.
*1185I would therefore hold that the evidence obtained by the search warrant should have been suppressed and reverse the convictions.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF SWYGERT, C. J., DISSENTING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the Northern District of Illinois
Magistrate’s Docket No.......
Case No. 5310
United States of America vs. A single story' single family frame house covered in false yellow brick siding and having a concrete block foundation, known as 436 West 118th Street being the second house west of the intersection of 118th St. & Eggleston Ave located on the north side of 118th St.
Affidavit For Search Warrant
BEFORE
Name of Magistrate
219 South Dearborn Chicago, Illinois
The undersigned being duly sworn deposes and says:
That he (is positive) that (on the premises known as)
A single story single family frame house covered in false yellow brick siding and having a concrete block foundation, known as 436 West 118th Street being the second house west of the intersection of 118th Street and Eggleston Avenue located on the North side of 118th Street'.
the Northern District of Illinois there is now being concealed certain property, namely 1000 grams lithium aluminum hydride, 1000 grams methanoyl, 1 gallon acetone, 6 pounds of ethyl ether, 1 pint tetrahydrofuran, 1 ounce indole crystal, 25 grams oxayl chloride, 1 gallon renzine petrol, 1 quart petroleum ether, 5 pounds sodium sulfate, 1 quart chloroform spectro, 1 pound sodium-hydroxide, 1 pound aluminum mesh and all other fruits and instrumentalities of the crime of possession of a schedule one controlled substance, Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which are precursors and reagents of a schedule 1(c) controlled drug and the possession of which is illegal pursuant to Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (2) when possessed with the intent to manufacture.
is evidence of the crime of possession of a Schedule one Controlled Substance, Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
And that the facts tending to establish the foregoing grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows:
See Attached Affidavit.
Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence,
John T. Peoples,
Special Agent, BNDD
November 5, 1971
*1186STATE OF ILLINOIS 1 COUNTY OF COOK J SS
AFFIDAVIT
JOHN T. PEOPLES, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, being duly sworn on oath deposes and says as follows:
1. He is a Special Agent of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and that in the course of his duties he was assigned to conduct an investigation concerning the order of precursors and reagents of controlled drugs used for the production of a specific Schedule I Controlled Drug, Dimethyltryptamine.
2. That he has been informed by Darrell Skaggs, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, that a person named Robert ROTHROCKS had ordered from a chemical company, VENTRON CORPORATION, Beverly, Massachusetts, 1000 grams of lithium aluminum hydride and that ROTH-ROCKS requested that it be sent to 10727 South Prairie and attached a telephone number which could be called in order to insure delivery of the chemical. This number was 841-1795.
3. A check of the telephone records of Illinois Bell Telephone revealed that the telephone subscriber was Harold ROTHROCKS, 14518 South Kenwood, Dolton, Illinois.
4. Affiant was further advised by Special Agent Darrell Skaggs that on November 4, 1971, Agent Skaggs attempted to deliver the above described chemical to 10727 Prairie with negative results. Special Agent Skaggs advised affiant that he was disguised as a United Parcel Service delivery man at the time of the attempted delivery.
5. That Special Agent Skaggs then called the above telephone number and advised the party answering the telephone, who identified himself as Robert ROTHROCKS, that an attempted delivery of the package had been made but that no one was present at 10727 Prairie by the name of Robert ROTHROCKS and that Special Agent Skaggs would not deliver the package to anyone but Robert ROTHROCKS.
6. Special Agent Skaggs further advised affiant that Robert ROTHROCKS then told him to leave the package with Robert A. NORIEKIS at the 10727 Prairie address on November 5, 1971 and indicated to Special Agent Skaggs, that he, Robert ROTHROCKS, would be present to claim the package.
7. On November 5, 1971, Special Agent Skaggs delivered the package of chemicals to 10727 Prairie to 2 individuals identifying themselves as Robert NORIEKIS and Robert ROTHROCKS at approximately 10:45 a. m.
8. Prior and subsequent to the delivery of the package surveillance was conducted on the 10727 Prairie address and the vehicle of Robert ROTHROCKS by your affiant, and other Special Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and during this surveillance the individual known as Robert ROTH-ROCKS came out of the dwelling located at 10727 Prairie carrying the package which had just been delivered and a large shopping bag.
9. Thereafter, this individual known as Robert ROTHROCKS entered a 4 door Plymouth automobile, bearing Illinois license plate number HE 7831 and drove said automobile to 436 West 118th Street, Chicago, Illinois, and after arriving, got out of the car and carrying the package and shopping bag, entered the bungalow house at this address.
10. A check of license plates of a motorcycle parked at the rear of 436 West 118th Street, bearing license number S7581, revealed that it was registered to a George C. HIBMAN, who lived at 436 West 118th Street, Chicago, Illinois.
11. A short while later Robert ROTHROCKS left the 436 West 118th Street address and drove to 1405 North LeMoyne, the location of FISHER SCIENTIFIC COMPANY, a chemical company, where he was observed to pick up 1 gallon of methanoyl, 1 gallon of acetone, 5 pounds of ethyl ether. These *1187chemicals were delivered to him by Special Agent Thomas L. Thompson, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, who was disguised as an employee of FISHER SCIENTIFIC COMPANY.
12. Thereafter Robert ROTHROCKS drove directly back to 436 West 118th Street where he left his automobile and entered, carrying the packages of chemicals.
13. That the above described chemicals are known to your affiant as the essential precursors and reagents necessary to produce the Schedule I Controlled Substance Dimethyltryptamine.
14. That based upon the foregoing information your affiant believes that probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant for the above described premises.
John T. Peoples

. Judge Pell writes that the informer cases provide support “in part” for the conclusion that the warrant was properly issued. I am unable to discern any supportive rationale separate from the informant analysis.

. Agent Skaggs, whom Peoples repeatedly mentions in his affidavit, could conceivably fit that category. What he reported to Peoples appears entirely as hearsay in the affidavit. But the affidavit does mention that Skaggs was an agent of the BNDD, an allegation which may act to establish Skaggs’ reliability and satisfy the requirement of the informer cases. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) ; 8A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 41.04 [3] (1972).

. See Appendix to this dissent.

. The first page does not reveal whether:
[T]he affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein; it does not indicate any sources for the complainant’s belief; and it does not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be made. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1957).

. They state:
If the magistrate had relied only upon the second affidavit, the validity of the issuance of the warrant would have been questionable.
I am perplexed, however, by another statement:
A magistrate could conclude that one who had assembled or possessed those [13] chemicals [needed to make DMT] was in fact doing so with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance even-though . . . [the first affidavit] did not include every essential chemical. (my emphasis).
The sentence appears to contain its own contradiction. If it does not, and the thirteen chemicals listed on the first page do not comprise all of the materials essential for DMT manufacture, I read it to hold that the presence of all chemicals essential to such manufacture need not be alleged in even a conclusory fashion prior to obtaining a valid warrant. I can scarcely agree, particularly where the affidavit fails to set forth suspicious conduct on the part of defendants.