Court Opinion

ID: 9488512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:47:38.594612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:56.044889
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that defendant was not punished when his vehicle was forfeited to the government as drug proceeds. Therefore, I also agree that defendant was not placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. I write separately, however, to make clear the practical implications of our decision.
I agree that we should follow United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 574, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994), but Tilley presents several problems in application. Since the government based the forfeiture in this case on a theory that Salmas purchased the vehicle with drug money, Tilley indicates that defendant is not protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir.1995), however, we held that the forfeiture of property used to facilitate the drug trade under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) was punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, if the government had sought forfeiture of Salinas’ automobile on the grounds that he used the car to carry narcotics from Texas to Michigan, Ursery might have barred this criminal prosecution. Thus, after Ursery and our decision today, double jeopardy protection will often depend on which theory the government utilizes to justify the civil forfeiture.
When the prosecutor seeks a forfeiture under § 881(a)(6), this may avoid possible double jeopardy problems under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). Therefore, when the government seeks forfeiture of drug proceeds under § 881(a)(6), we must take care that it offers evidence to support a proceeds theory. Because § 881(a)(6) limits forfeiture to “all proceeds traceable to” a drug exchange, the government must come forward with some evidence that can directly link the purchase of the res with prior drug transactions. United States v. $67,220.00 in United States Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 284 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that government must show “a reasonable ground for belief, supported by more than mere suspicion, that there is a substantial connection between the seized [property] and an illegal drug transaction”). In my view, merely proving that the res is owned by a drug dealer is not sufficient. United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221 n. 11 (9th Cir.1994), reh’g granted, modified on other grounds, 56 F.3d 41 (1995). By distinguishing between drug proceeds and property used to facilitate drug trafficking, we may render the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause contingent on artful pleading. Nevertheless, I find Tilley persuasive authority in the instant case.
Because the government sought forfeiture on a proceeds theory and Salmas did not contest whether the government could trace the car to a drug transaction, I agree that he was not punished twice for the same offense. I, therefore, CONCUR.