Court Opinion

ID: 9478111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:40:23.038577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:14.446255
License: Public Domain

BISSELL, Circuit judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that this case should be transferred to the Claims Court. Because the majority, however, has fundamentally misconstrued binding precedent, I concur only in the result reached by the majority.
*1554This court has already decided that its exclusive jurisdiction over district court cases based in whole or part on the patent laws also gives it exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the district court actually had jurisdiction under the patent laws. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877-78, 219 USPQ 197, 200-01 (Fed.Cir.1983). The majority makes the uncanny statement that this holding is merely dictum. Maj. op. at 1549-50. The impact of the majority’s position not only denies the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate authority to determine a district court’s jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act, but also denies the Federal Circuit has this power in patent cases. It is obvious from reading Bard, however, that the noted holding was essential to the disposition of the case.
In Bard, a patent licensee appealed a district court decision dismissing the licensee’s declaratory judgment action. 716 F.2d at 875-76, 219 USPQ at 199. On appeal, this court considered whether it had authority to decide if the district court’s jurisdiction rested on the patent laws. Id. at 877, 219 USPQ at 200. The court concluded that it had such authority for two reasons. First, it stated that it had inherent power to determine its own jurisdiction. Id. Because the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction only if the district court’s jurisdiction rested on the patent laws, the court could inquire into the basis of the district court’s jurisdiction. Second, the court held that our jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982), gave us exclusive authority to determine if the district court actually had jurisdiction under the patent laws. Id. at 877-78, 219 USPQ at 200-01. It cannot be seriously argued that this construction of section 1295 was an unnecessary part of the decision.
In interpreting section 1295, the court in Bard relied on legislative history revealing that Congress intended the courts to construe section 1295 in a manner consistent with promoting national uniformity in patent, Little Tucker Act, and other areas entrusted to the Federal Circuit. Bard, 716 F.2d at 877-78, 219 USPQ at 200. Referring to this legislative history, the court stated that “Congress intended this court to have the exclusive authority under § 1295 to decide the issue, necessarily an integral part of a case, whether a district court has jurisdiction [under the patent laws].” Id. at 878, 219 USPQ at 201.
This decision is binding precedent that we can reject only if sitting in banc. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1982). The reasoning in Bard, moreover, governs this case. It is clear that Congress wanted national uniformity in the adjudication of Little Tucker Act claims. The jurisdictional aspects of Little Tucker Act claims, however, are inextricably linked to the merits of the claims. For example, the jurisdictional question presented here — whether Smith stated a valid Little Tucker Act claim when the amount of damages grew during the course of litigation to exceed $10,000 — is an essential aspect on the merits of his claim. In view of the congressional intent to promote uniformity in Little Tucker Act caselaw, it is inconceivable that Congress could have intended the twelve regional circuits, along with this court, to determine such questions independently. Such a situation would offer the potential for the development of thirteen different interpretations of the matter. For these reasons, I would hold that we have exclusive appellate authority to determine whether a district court’s jurisdiction is based on the Little Tucker Act.
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hohri, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987) supports this conclusion. There the Court held that section 1295 granted us exclusive jurisdiction over a mixed appeal consisting of an issue within our jurisdiction and an issue outside of our jurisdiction. Id. at 2253. In arriving at this decision, the Court explicitly stated that section 1295 should be read broadly because of the congressional intent to promote national uniformity in the areas of the law entrusted to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Id. at 2251-52. This holding is ample support for the broad reading of section 1295 that I propose.
*1555The majority greatly relies on the recent Supreme Court decision in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). In that case, the Court stated that when one appellate court transfers a case to another appellate court, the doctrine of the law of the case generally requires the second court to accept the first court’s conclusion as to jurisdiction. At-, 108 S.Ct. at 2177. The Supreme Court, nonetheless, noted that an appellate tribunal has the power to reconsider the transferor court’s jurisdictional decision in certain extraordinary circumstances notwithstanding the doctrine of the law of the case:
A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”
At -, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)).
The Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine of the law of the case must bow when the prior decision was clearly erroneous. To my mind, any prior jurisdictional decision in a transferred case inconsistent with the statutory construction I propose would fall into the “clearly erroneous” category, and consequently, would not be binding on the court. As a practical matter, furthermore, this court will not face a law of the case jurisdictional question denying our jurisdiction because the issue will arise only when another circuit has recognized our jurisdiction and transferred the case to us. For these reasons, I do not see how Colt hinders us from holding that we have exclusive appellate threshold jurisdiction in Little Tucker Act appeals.
Although I recognize that the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351 (8th Cir.1986) and the Third Circuit’s decision in Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 349 (3d Cir.1987) are to the contrary, I must respectfully disagree. Both Shaw, 795 F.2d at 1356, and Chabal, 822 F.2d at 357, involved back pay claims against the government that accrued to exceed $10,000. In Shaw, the Eighth Circuit determined that it could decide whether a district court’s jurisdiction rested on the Little Tucker Act because it had inherent power to determine its own jurisdiction and to supervise the exercise of jurisdiction by the district courts below it. Shaw, 795 F.2d at 1353 n. 2. The Third Circuit in Chabal made the same decision by invoking the “overarching principle that requires us continually to inquire into our own jurisdiction because as courts of limited jurisdiction we cannot act without assuring ourselves of the statutory predicate for such action.” Chabal, 822 F.2d at 355.
The equitable powers on which the Eighth and Third Circuits based their decisions, nonetheless, must yield to statutory directive. For the reasons already given, I would hold that section 1295 directs only the Federal Circuit to decide whether a district court’s jurisdiction rests on the Little Tucker Act.
My position does not go so far as to deny that the regional circuits may determine whether the Little Tucker Act is fairly at issue. Cf. Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 796 F.2d 1469, 1470-71 (Fed.Cir.1986) (holding that although Federal Circuit has no jurisdiction to reach merits of discrimination claim, the court must determine threshold question of whether non-frivolous discrimination claim is at issue in appeal). Under my analysis, if a regional circuit concluded the Little Tucker Act was not at issue, it would decide the case. If it ruled the Act was at issue, it would transfer the case to us.
Because the majority miscontrues binding precedent that should lead it to conclude that only the Federal Circuit has the power to determine whether the district court’s jurisdiction rested on the Little Tucker Act, I concur only in the result.