Court Opinion

ID: 9963463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:03:50.548121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.757518
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Kirby, 2024-Ohio-1582.]

                                    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff- Appellee,             :
                                                             No. 112518
                          v.                      :

ZINO KIRBY,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                     JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 25, 2024

              Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                  Case No. CR-21-662722-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Michael Lisk, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Paul B. Daiker, for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

                  Defendant-appellant Zino Kirby appeals his convictions for attempted

rape and abduction. Because we find the trial court did not err in excluding evidence
at trial, Kirby’s convictions were based on sufficient evidence, and those convictions

were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.

            PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS

          Procedural History of the Case and Kirby’s Conviction

             On September 1, 2021, Kirby was charged in an indictment with four

counts: attempted rape, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and

2907.02(A)(2); attempted rape, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.02

and   2907.02(A)(2);    kidnapping,     a   first-degree   felony   in   violation   of

R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) with a sexual motivation specification in violation of

R.C. 2941.147(A);   and abduction, a third-degree felony in violation                of

R.C. 2905.02(B).

             On December 22, 2022, Kirby waived his right to a jury trial and tried

his case to the bench. During trial, certain testimony was excluded pursuant to

R.C. 2907.02(D) and 2907.02(E) (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Rape

Shield Statute”). On January 5, 2023, the trial court found Kirby guilty of two counts

of attempted rape and abduction, acquitting him of the kidnapping charge. On

February 15, 2023, the trial court determined the charges were allied offenses of

similar import and imposed a sentence of community-control sanctions on one

count of attempted rape.

                                 Trial Testimony

             The state presented M.M.; M.M’s coworker; an investigator with the

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office; and a law enforcement officer as witnesses.
Kirby presented a defense, calling himself and another witness.              The parties

presented contrasting versions of what transpired; M.M. testified Kirby attempted

to force her to perform oral sex on him; Kirby testified he had a consensual

encounter with M.M.

             M.M. testified that she worked for Oriana House, a rehabilitation

facility for offenders, monitoring and installing GPS tracking units for pretrial

detainees and probationers in Cuyahoga County. Kirby was a release officer with

whom she would interact. On the morning of July 26, 2021, M.M. received a referral

from Kirby that GPS units were ready so she went to the release offices. There, she

talked outside Kirby’s office with a deputy court bailiff, Myron Lavender, about

vacations.

              She and Lavender knocked on Kirby’s door. Kirby opened it and asked

M.M. to sit down. She entered, and Kirby shut the door and sat at his desk. M.M.

said they had a conversation about vacations and that Kirby “randomly” said he was

aroused. She testified she was leaning forward to pick up her tote bag and then

Kirby, with his erect penis out of his pants, grabbed her tightly by the neck. She

yanked back, and Kirby then grabbed her ponytail and told her to perform oral sex.

She told him “no.” Kirby’s phone rang, and he let go of her to answer it. M.M.

gathered her belongings and left the office.

             M.M testified she didn’t disclose what happened to anyone that day,

but did call her supervisor later to tell her that she did not want to go back to the jail.

The next day, she told Tom Hilbert, her coworker about the incident. Hilbert
testified at trial that he works with M.M. at Oriana House and that the day after the

incident, M.M. was not her normal self, instead she was subdued and quiet. Hilbert

related that M.M. was crying. When she told him about a sexual assault, he said he

encouraged her to report the incident. He also reported the incident to their

program manager.

             During her testimony, M.M. testified that after the incident with Kirby,

they exchanged text messages. Timothy Clark, a Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s

Office special investigator, testified he retrieved those messages from M.M.’s phone.

The messages were entered into evidence. They reveal that at 5:45 p.m. on the day

of the incident, M.M. texted Kirby, writing:

      I thought you should know I felt uncomfortable with you pulling on
      my head to try to get you to suck your dick. Don’t do that ever and we
      good. That not something I’m into and yeah no. You still got my word
      about not mentioning it to Veronica though.1

M.M. explained that she sent the message because she was told by her supervisor

that she would have to go back to the justice center. Kirby replied to the text, writing,

“My humblest apologies.” M.M. said the next day, Kirby both called and texted her.

In response to Kirby texting “Good morning,” M.M. replied: “Not really, I’m, still a

little triggered about yesterday. That wasn’t okay. I felt violated on so many levels.

Maybe later.” Kirby replied: “It was not at all. It was definitely not cool. You

deserve to hear an apology not read one. I have the utmost respect for you. But I

1 Veronica was Kirby's fiancée.
will respect your space, If you ever feel up to it, let me know if and when we can

talk.” Two days after the incident between them, Kirby texted M.M., stating, “Good

morning. I just want you to know I’m truly remorseful and I never intended to

disrespect you. That’s not how you start a friendship. Again apologize and I

apologize for texting you.”

               In addition to the text messages, M.M. later taped two phone

conversations she had with Kirby. The trial court heard the conversations and ruled

one not to be relevant to the trial.

               During cross-examination, Kirby’s trial counsel asked M.M. for

details of her conversations with Lavender and Kirby. M.M. denied that the

conversations about vacations led to other discussions, that they discussed any

websites, or that she discussed any activities on her vacation. The state objected to

this line of questioning, and the objection was sustained. Trial counsel also asked

about discrepancies between M.M.’s testimony and prior statements to police.

              Cleveland Police Department Detective Daniel Flannery testified he

was assigned to investigate M.M.’s complaint of sexual assault and that during his

investigation, he met with M.M. and recorded two statements from her. He also

verified that M.M. and Kirby were present at the justice center at the time M.M. said

the allegations occurred.

               Kirby called Myron Lavender to testify on his behalf. Lavender

testified that he was a bailiff at the municipal court and that on the day of the

incident, he talked with M.M. and Kirby. He said the conversation between the three
of them was about Put-in-Bay and how M.M. went there for vacation. He testified

M.M. told them that at Put-in-Bay, they put hot sauce on people’s feet and that she

liked to have her toes sucked. The state objected, but the trial court allowed the

statement, noting it wasn’t probative and that the trial court would take the

statement “for what it is.” Lavender testified they talked about a website called

“Chaturbate”2 as well as a certain female sex toy.

               Kirby testified that on the day of the incident, he spoke with M.M. and

Lavender in the hallway outside his office. He said M.M. said she would be on

vacation next week and that her toes would be in someone’s mouth. Kirby was asked

if he learned anything during the conversation with M.M. that “piqued his interest.”

Kirby testified he learned M.M. was interested in starting a Chaturbate website. The

trial court told Kirby that he could not talk about “what things [M.M.] might like,

sexually speaking.”

               Kirby said that after he talked with Lavender and M.M., he went into

his office and that later he called M.M. to come to his office because he wanted to

know more about what she was talking about in the hall. Kirby said he let M.M. in

his office and then sat at his desk. M.M. handed him her phone that had a sexual

video pulled up on the screen. Kirby said he asked M.M. to close the door to his

office and she did. After seeing the video, he said he complimented her and handed

the phone back. M.M. then pulled up another picture and handed the phone back

2 Chaturbate is a sexually explicit website.
to him. Kirby described the picture as being of a sexual matter. Kirby asked her if

he could look through the pictures on the phone, and she allowed him to do so.

               After seeing the pictures, Kirby said he told M.M. that he was sexually

aroused. He said M.M. nodded “with a smile,” so he asked if she wanted to see “it.”

She “nodded,” so he said he stood, pulled his penis out, and walked toward her. He

said M.M. “rubbed” and “stroked” his penis. Kirby thought she wanted to perform

oral sex so he told her to do so. He then put his hand on the back of her head and

pulled her towards him. He said M.M. pulled away from him but continued to

“stroke” him. M.M. stopped, he went back to his desk and then heard someone

walking in the hallway, so he put his penis back in his pants. He said they then talked

about “swinger” clubs. He said he then he got up and engaged in sexual activity with

M.M., stating he pulled back her ponytail, leaned down, kissed her on her neck, and

began to rub her breasts. He said that she lifted her shirt and he licked her breast

and tried to rub her vagina. M.M. stopped him, and they continued to talk. He said

the phone rang, and he answered it. He told M.M. he had to get a delivery and would

be right back, then left his office.

               Kirby said he was “shocked” about the text from M.M. the next day

and that he did not understand where it came from. Kirby believed his encounter

with M.M. was consensual and thought M.M. was upset because she regretted the

encounter because he was engaged. Kirby explained his apologies to M.M. were

because he engaged in inappropriate behavior at work.
           Trial Court’s Rulings Under the Rape Shield Statute

              During trial, Kirby’s counsel sought to elicit specific testimony about

conversations between M.M., Lavender, and Kirby. During M.M.’s testimony, trial

counsel asked M.M. about the topics of conversation as well as information

regarding pictures and videos on her phone. The state objected to the line of

questioning, which, after a sidebar discussion, was sustained.         Following the

discussion, the trial court informed Kirby’s counsel that a proffer could be made at

a later point in time; no proffer of testimony was made part of the record.

              During Lavender’s testimony, the trial court allowed Lavender to

testify over the state’s objection that M.M. “liked her toes sucked.” Lavender also

testified about M.M.’s interest in the website “Chaturbate.” He also testified as to

asking M.M. about a sex toy. During Kirby’s testimony, he testified that during the

conversation between he, Lavender, and M.M., she said that she was going on

vacation and her toes would be in someone’s mouth. The state objected, and the

trial court struck the statement. The trial court said it did so “because [Kirby] was

not allowed to tell [the trial court] about what she was talking about.” Kirby’s

counsel attempted to ask him whether the discussion turned to the internet. The

state again objected, and the court sustained that objection.

              Kirby testified that when he was talking with M.M., he “learned that

she was interested in starting a Chaturbate web site.” The state objected. The trial

court told Kirby’s counsel that “you can’t talk about her — what things that she might

like, sexually speaking” and that it didn’t want another question where Kirby would
answer something regarding “sex about the victim.” A sidebar discussion was had

and afterwards, the trial court informed Kirby that his counsel indicated Kirby

would testify about being shown a sexually explicit video. The trial court instructed

him to refrain from describing details of the video.

                             LAW AND ARGUMENT

           The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Excluding
                Evidence at Trial Under the Rape Shield Statute

               Kirby’s first assignment of error reads:

      The trial court abused its discretion in its rulings concerning the
      interpretation and/or application of the Rape Shield Law.

               Kirby argues that the trial court improperly excluded testimony

regarding conversations between Kirby, Lavender, and M.M. prior to the sexual

assault for which he was found guilty as well as excluding testimony regarding the

photos and videos Kirby alleges M.M. showed him and Lavender on her phone.

Kirby argues the evidence he was attempting to elicit from Lavender and himself

regarding the nature of the videos and pictures shown, discussion of sex toys, and

sexual activity was relevant to the issue of his state of mind and whether M.M.

consented to sexual activity. Kirby further argues he did not intend this evidence to

be used to impeach M.M.

               The state first argues that the evidence should have been excluded

because Kirby’s counsel failed to provide a notice of an intent to use evidence of the

complainant’s sexual activity prior to trial in violation of R.C. 2907.02(E). The state

next argues that the trial court properly excluded evidence under the Rape Shield
Statute and notes that the trial court allowed some testimony from Lavender and

Kirby regarding M.M.’s sexual activity, her use of a pornographic site, and an

interest in sex toys. Further, the state notes that the trial court heard Kirby’s

testimony that M.M. showed him explicit material.

                Ohio’s Rape Shield Statute provides in pertinent part:

      (D) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity,
      opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation
      evidence of the victim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this
      section unless it involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy,
      or sexually transmitted disease or infection, or the victim’s past sexual
      activity with the offender, and only to the extent that the court finds
      that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its
      inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
      value.

      (E) Prior to taking testimony or receiving evidence of any sexual
      activity of the victim or the defendant in a proceeding under this
      section, the court shall resolve the admissibility of the proposed
      evidence in a hearing in chambers, which shall be held at or before
      preliminary hearing and not less than three days before trial, or for
      good cause shown during the trial.

R.C. 2907.02.

                Sexual conduct, sexual contact, and sexual activity as used in

R.C. 2907.02 are defined as follows:

      (A) “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a male and
      female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons
      regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion,
      however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus,
      or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another.
      Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal
      intercourse.
      (B) “Sexual contact” means any touching of an erogenous zone of
      another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock,
      pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of
      sexually arousing or gratifying either person.
      (C) “Sexual activity” means sexual conduct or sexual contact, or both.
R.C. 2907.01

               The trial court has discretion to determine the admission or exclusion

of evidence under the Rape Shield Statute in the first instance. State v. Brisco, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76125, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3835, 13 (Aug. 24, 2000). As

such, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under the Rape

Shield Statute for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dawson, 2017-Ohio-965, 86

N.E.3d 672, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Miller, 63 Ohio App.3d 479, 483, 579

N.E.2d 276 (12th Dist.1989).

               “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”         Cleveland v. Wanton, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109828, 2021-Ohio-1951, ¶ 8, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “‘An abuse of discretion also occurs when a

trial court “‘applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard,

or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.’”’” State v. Nix, II, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111803, 2023-Ohio-1143, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Walton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 87347, 2006-Ohio-47718, quoting S. Euclid v. Datillo, 2020-Ohio-4999, 160

N.E.3d 813, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401,

2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

               In State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St.3d 160, 165, 450 N.E.2d 265 (1983),

the Ohio Supreme Court held that
      R.C. 2907.02(D) will render inadmissible evidence of the rape victim's
      sexual activity with one other than the accused where the evidence:
      does not involve the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the
      victim's past sexual activity with the offender; is offered simply to
      impeach the credibility of the victim; and is not material to a fact at
      issue in the case.

As such, the Rape Shield Statute “essentially prohibits the introduction of any

extrinsic evidence pertaining to the victim’s sexual activity, with limited exceptions.”

Dawson at ¶ 21. However, the law is not absolute; evidence otherwise prohibited

may be admissible when offered for more than the impeachment of a witness where

the evidence is “directly probative of a material issue in the case.” State v. Williams,

21 Ohio St.3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986).

               The exclusion of evidence under the Rape Shield Statute may serve to

inhibit a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront, cross-examine, and call

witnesses. State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 17, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979), citing

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297

(1973). Because of this, when reviewing the application of the Rape Shield Statute

to exclude evidence, courts balance the state’s interest in applying the Rape Shield

Statute against the probative value of the evidence excluded. Id. In consideration

of this need to balance respective rights, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the state

had several legitimate interests in applying R.C. 2907.02:

      First, by guarding the complainant’s sexual privacy and protecting her
      from undue harassment, the law discourages the tendency in rape
      cases to try the victim rather than the defendant. In line with this, the
      law may encourage the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime
      prevention.      Finally, by excluding evidence that is unduly
      inflammatory and prejudicial, while being only marginally probative,
      the statute is intended to aid in the truth-finding process.

(Footnote omitted.) Id.

               We first address the state’s argument, brought without citation to any

precedent, that Kirby’s failure to provide notice of its intent to use evidence covered

under the Rape Shield Law precluded admission of that evidence at trial. The failure

to provide notice or intent to use the evidence prior to trial does not preclude

admission of that evidence; pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(E), a court may determine

the admissibility of evidence during trial. Accordingly, we do not find merit to the

state’s argument.

               In this case, we have no proffer of the specific testimony that would

have been offered by Lavender or Kirby. However, the record does reflect that the

trial court did allow testimony from Lavender and Kirby regarding the nature and

tone of the conversations they had with M.M. Lavender testified that M.M. said she

“liked her toes sucked.” He also testified they discussed a website “Chaturbate” and

a female sex toy. Further, although Kirby’s testimony was limited to exclude specific

detail or statements about M.M.’s sexual activity or conduct, he testified the

conversations were sexualized and M.M. showed him explicit material.

               The record reflects the trial court precluded evidence specific to M.M.

that would be prohibited by R.C. 2907.02(D). It did not exclude Kirby from

presenting his evidence that the conversations had were of a sexualized nature or

that M.M. showed him explicit photos and videos. As such, we cannot say Kirby’s
rights were violated by the exclusion of evidence regarding M.M. pursuant to the

Rape Shield Statute, nor can we find that the trial court abused its discretion.

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

   The Convictions Were Based on Sufficient Evidence and Were Not
             Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              We address Kirby’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error

together because within each assignment of error, Kirby argues the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. They read:

      II. The trial court’s finding of guilt with regard to Counts One, Two
      and Four are not supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the
      requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
      Amendment to the United States Constitution.

      III. The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s Motion for
      Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Criminal Rule 29.

      IV. The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s renewed Motion
      for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Criminal Rule 29.

              Kirby argues the evidence was insufficient because M.M.’s testimony

was contradictory to both her prior statements and to Kirby’s and Lavender’s

testimony and that no rational trier of fact could find her testimony credible. He

also argues the state failed to present evidence as to all elements of the crime of

abduction. The state argues that there was sufficient evidence presented on all

elements of all charges to sustain the convictions.

              We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence admitted at trial

and determine whether the evidence, if believed, would convince the average person

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d
259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. When reviewing the evidence, we are mindful that

circumstantial and direct evidence “possess the same probative value.” Id. at 272.

Our review of the evidence is not to determine “whether the state’s evidence is to be

believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a

conviction.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

               Kirby was convicted of two counts of attempted rape and one count

of abduction. In order to prove the crime of attempted rape, the state was required

to present evidence that Kirby’s actions, if successful, would constitute sexual

conduct with M.M. by compelling her to submit by force or threat of force.

R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2907.02(A)(2). In order to prove the crime of abduction, the

state was required to present evidence that Kirby, without privilege and by force or

threat, restrained M.M.’s liberty under circumstances that created a risk of physical

harm or placed her in fear. R.C. 2905.02(A)(2).

               “This court has noted that Ohio courts consistently hold that a

victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a rape conviction” and that the

testimony need not be corroborated. State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111870,

2023-Ohio-1670, ¶ 20. The evidence presented at trial during M.M.’s testimony was

that as she gathered her belongings to leave the office, Kirby, with penis out, grabbed

her tightly by the neck. She pulled away, and Kirby grabbed her by her ponytail and
told her to engage in oral sex. M.M. said that her face was so close that “it almost

touched him.” M.M. also testified that she was “scared” and “began to panic.”

               By grabbing M.M.’s neck first and then her hair while telling her to

engage in sexual conduct as she was about to leave the office, we find the state

presented sufficient evidence to support Kirby’s two convictions for attempted rape

and abduction. M.M.’s testimony described an attempt to use force for her to

perform oral sex. Further, her testimony reveals Kirby’s actions caused her to panic

and be in fear. Accordingly, we find there was sufficient evidence presented to

sustain the convictions and that the trial court did not err by denying Kirby’s

motions pursuant to Crim.R. 29.

               The second, third, and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

               Kirby’s fifth assignment of error reads:

      V. The trial court violated Appellant’s rights to due process and a fair
      trial by entering a judgment of convictions on counts one, two, and
      four against the manifest weight of the evidence.

               A manifest weight challenge to a conviction asserts that the state has

not met its burden of persuasion in obtaining the conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541. A manifest weight challenge raises factual issues

and our court’s review is one in which it will, after

      “reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
      inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
      whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its
      way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
      conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.                The
      discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in
        the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
        conviction.”

Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st

Dist.1983); State v. Townsend, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107177, 2019-Ohio-544,

¶ 20.

               When we examine witness credibility, we are “mindful that ‘the

choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with

the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that

of the finder of fact.’” State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-794, 132 N.E.3d 1233, ¶ 28 (8th

Dist.), quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986).

Further, we recognize that the trier of fact may accept or reject a witnesses’

testimony in whole or in part. State v. Grimes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110925,

2022-Ohio-4526, ¶ 53, citing Parma v. Singh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106935,

2018-Ohio-5235, ¶ 21. Accordingly, inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness’s

testimony do not automatically entitle a defendant to a reversal of trial. State v.

Solomon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109535, 2021-Ohio-940, ¶ 62, citing State v.

Nitsche, 2016-Ohio-3170, 66 N.E.3d 135, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.).

               Kirby argues that the convictions are the product of an unreasonable

resolution of the competing narratives presented at trial and are therefore unjust.

Kirby posits that his testimony was more plausible than M.M.’s because of

contradictions between M.M.’s testimony and her prior statements, her motivation

to lie, and that Lavender’s and his testimony was more plausible. The state argues
the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence when

considering M.M.’s testimony in light of Kirby’s apologies.

               Despite Kirby’s arguments, our review of the record reveals that

M.M.’s testimony was not inherently so incredible that a reasonable trier of fact

could not believe it. Moreover, M.M.’s testimony was bolstered by Kirby’s apologies.

Further, the trial court was able to hear the testimony, observe the witnesses’

demeanors, and was in the best position to weigh their credibility and resolve any

conflicts in the testimony.      After weighing the testimony and evidence and

inferences to be drawn therefrom, and in consideration of the credibility of the

witnesses’ and their testimonies, we cannot say that the trial court clearly lost its way

in entering guilty verdicts in this case or that this case is one in which a manifest

miscarriage of justice occurred.

               The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                   CONCLUSION

               We affirm Kirby’s convictions for attempted rape and abduction. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting testimony pursuant to the Rape

Shield Statute. Kirby’s convictions were not based on insufficient evidence where

the state presented evidence to each element of the offenses through M.M.’s

testimony, and the trial court did not err by denying Kirby’s motions brought

pursuant to Crim.R. 29. Further, the convictions are not against the manifest weight

of the evidence and we cannot say the trial court lost its way in resolving conflicts in
the evidence and testimony or this case is the exceptional case in which a manifest

miscarriage of justice occurred.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.           The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR