Court Opinion

ID: 9950804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:03:04.873846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:54.888065
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 Dowling v. Uriostegui CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 GREGORY DOWLING as                                          B323346
 Trustee, etc.,
                                                             (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                         Super. Ct. No.
                                                             16STPB03890)
           v.

 DIANE URIOSTEGUI,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lee R. Bogdanoff, Judge. Affirmed.
      Rob Uriostegui for Defendant and Appellant.
      Gifford, Dearing & Abernathy and Henry H. Dearing for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       In her prior appeal Diane Uriostegui challenged the
probate court’s ruling that an amended trust created by Prescott
Scott, which disinherited his son Gregory Dowling and named
Uriostegui the trustee and sole beneficiary, was invalid because
Uriostegui procured it by undue influence and Prescott lacked
capacity to amend the trust. We concluded substantial evidence
supported the probate court’s findings and affirmed the
judgment. (Dowling v. Uriostegui (Mar. 16, 2020, B294046)
[nonpub. opn.] (Uriostegui I).
       The judgment, now affirmed, required Uriostegui to provide
an accounting to allow the probate court to determine the amount
of money she had wrongfully taken from the trust while she was
trustee. When after three attempts Uriostegui failed to submit a
proper accounting, Gregory, the successor trustee, filed a petition
seeking restitution, damages, and interest. On July 12, 2022 the
probate court held a hearing and awarded Gregory $1,293,138.27
in restitution, plus $552,500 in interest.
       Uriostegui appeals from the probate court’s July 12, 2022
order, arguing that the court violated the one final judgment rule
and that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over her.
We conclude both arguments are legally incorrect and affirm the
probate court’s order. We do not reach Uriostegui’s challenges to
various other probate court rulings between 2018 and 2020
because she did not appeal from those orders and the time to do
so has long since expired.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     Uriostegui Uses Undue Influence To Get Prescott
             To Amend the Family Trust, and the Probate Court
             Voids It
      As we explained in Uriostegui I, in 2005 Prescott and Ellen
Dowling created a revocable trust naming the couple’s two
children, Gregory and Richard, as beneficiaries, but provided that
Richard’s share would go to Gregory in the event Richard
predeceased either Prescott or Ellen. The trust was amended in
2009, but maintained essentially the same distribution
provisions. Ellen died in July 2011; Richard in March 2012.
      In March 2012 Uriostegui, who dated Richard in the 1990s,
inherited property on Olive Street. In May 2012 Prescott
contributed $359,138 to pay off a promissory note secured by a
deed of trust on the Olive Street property. In a letter Prescott
wrote Uriostegui, he described the payoff as an investment that
would allow Uriostegui to live in the home during her lifetime
and allow Uriostegui’s son, Rob Uriostegui, and Gregory to “have
the option, to either sell the house or keep it for a rental at their
discretion” after both Prescott and Uriostegui died.
      By 2014 Prescott was becoming increasingly angry with
Gregory, and in 2015 an attorney named John Morris prepared
an amended trust (the 2015 Trust). The 2015 Trust disinherited
Gregory and Gregory’s children and made Uriostegui the sole
beneficiary of the trust.
      Prescott died on June 21, 2016. Uriostegui took
$1.8 million of trust assets, put it in her personal account, and
began to spend it. Although she testified she could not remember

                                 3
how much she spent, by the time of trial Uriostegui had returned
to her lawyers’ trust account only $750,000 of the $1.8 million.
       In October 2016 Gregory filed a petition under
Probate Code section 17200 to void the 2015 Trust on the grounds
that Uriostegui procured it through undue influence and that
Prescott lacked the capacity in 2015 to amend the trust. Gregory
sought an order distributing the trust assets pursuant to the
2009 version of the trust Prescott and Ellen had signed. Gregory
also brought a cause of action for financial elder abuse.
       Following a court trial, the probate court issued a 108-page
statement of decision on August 15, 2018 and entered judgment
on November 2, 2018. The probate court declared the 2015 Trust
void because Uriostegui procured it through undue influence and
because Prescott lacked the capacity to amend the trust as a
result of “delusions.” The court ordered Gregory as the successor
trustee to administer the trust according to the terms of the 2009
trust documents. The court ordered Uriostegui to return the
trust assets she had taken (plus interest), transfer title to
Prescott’s residence to Gregory as the successor trustee of the
trust, file an accounting as a constructive trustee, refrain from
making any transfers that would impede the court’s orders, and
pay Gregory his attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ordered
Uriostegui to transfer to Gregory an ownership interest in the
Olive Street property “equal to the current value of the share of
the residence purchased by Prescott Dowling” and imposed a lien
on Uriostegui’s remaining interest in the property. Finally, the
court found that Uriostegui committed financial elder abuse and
that Gregory was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
       Uriostegui appealed. We concluded substantial evidence
supported the probate court’s findings that Uriostegui procured

                                4
the 2015 amendment through undue influence and that Prescott
lacked capacity in 2015 to amend the trust. We modified the
judgment, however, to delete the provision ordering Uriostegui to
transfer an ownership interest in the Olive Street property to
Gregory because his petition did not include a claim seeking an
interest in the property. (Uriostegui I, supra, B294046.)
      On remand the probate court entered an amended
judgment, dated August 31, 2020, consistent with our opinion.
The amended judgment included a provision from the
2018 judgment, not affected by our opinion in Uriostegui I, “that
an evidentiary hearing regarding restitution and damages be
held in conformity of this ruling [i.e., the 2018 judgment], said
hearing to commence after approval of [Uriostegui’s] accounting.”

      B.     The Probate Court Conducts Further Proceedings on
             the Accounting
       Uriostegui never filed a satisfactory accounting the court
could approve. On February 7, 2019 she filed her first
accounting. The probate court sustained Gregory’s objection to
that accounting and ordered Uriostegui to prepare a new one.
Uriostegui filed a second accounting, which the probate court
rejected too. Uriostegui filed a third accounting, which she called
a first supplement to her second accounting. Gregory again
objected, arguing that Uriostegui was improperly claiming
certain credits, that some of her claimed expenditures while she
was trustee were improper, and that an “in-court examination is
necessary to both explain and track such expenditures.” Gregory
also asked the court to order Uriostegui to pay him

                                5
$1,393,138.27,1 plus interest, to make the trust whole. The
probate court sustained Gregory’s objections and instructed him
that, to the extent he sought affirmative relief, he should refile
his objections as a petition.
       On February 11, 2021 Gregory, as directed, filed a petition
seeking restitution, compensatory damages, and interest in the
amount of $1,393,138.27. Uriostegui filed a special motion to
strike under Code of Procedure section 425.16, arguing her
accountings were “protected by the First Amendment and
litigation privilege” because she submitted them to the probate
court. The probate court denied the motion, ruling Gregory “is
not arguing [Uriostegui’s filing of] these accountings caused
$1,393,189.26 plus interest and remedies in damages. The
claimed award amount is based on what [Gregory] contends is
necessary to ‘make the trust whole’ from [Uriostegui’s] earlier
misappropriation of Trust assets and wrongful conduct.
[Citation.] This request follows the language of the Judgment
which provides that an evidentiary hearing is to be held
‘regarding restitution and damages.’ [Citation.] The fact that
[Gregory] disputes the accuracy of the accountings and uses them
in coming to the requested reward amount merely involves an
evidentiary matter.” We denied Uriostegui’s petition for writ of
mandate challenging the probate court’s order denying her

1     Gregory claimed this amount included attorneys’ fees not
properly chargeable to the trust ($50,000); improper cash
withdrawals ($135,770.77); her retained portion from the
attorney trust account ($230,655.75); insurance ($6,080.96),
telephone charges ($5,013.10) and internet charges ($2,092.61)
that were not related to the administration of the trust; personal
items improperly characterized as miscellaneous trust expenses
($955,028.95); and an improper gift to her son ($8,496.13).

                                6
special motion to strike. (Uriostegui v. Superior Court (Nov. 3,
2021, B315917) [order].)2
        Uriostegui filed a demurrer, arguing the probate court
lacked jurisdiction “because there is a judgment and remittitur in
this case.” She also claimed Gregory’s petition was barred by the
statute of limitations and claim preclusion and that he had not
sufficiently pleaded the causes of action in the petition. The
probate court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.
        Gregory filed a first amended petition on January 10, 2022,
claiming an order awarding restitution, compensatory damages,
and interest was “necessary to make the trust whole without the
necessity of an approved accounting, because it was obvious that
Uriostegui had no intention to file an approvable accounting for
her administration of the trust estate.” Gregory asked the court
to order Uriostegui to return $1,393,138.27 plus interest to the
trust. Uriostegui objected to the petition, arguing the probate
court lacked jurisdiction.
        Uriostegui then sought to disqualify the probate court
judge under Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1,
subdivision (a)(6), and 170.3, subdivision (c)(1). In support of the
motion to disqualify the judge, counsel for Uriostegui (her son
Rob) submitted a declaration stating that Gregory “concocted an
illicit scheme to collaterally attack the remittitur and amended
judgment by filing pretextual objections to . . . Uriostegui’s
accountings and sought exemplary damages in addition to
compensatory damages in the objections” and that the probate

2     An order denying a special motion to strike is appealable
(Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World
Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 645) and therefore generally
not reviewable by writ.

                                 7
court judge “allowing Gregory . . . to seek additional damages
after the remittitur was issued would cause a reasonable person
to have doubt that [the judge] could be impartial in this matter.”
The probate court struck the statement of disqualification,
stating: “To the extent Ms. Uriostegui maintains that the Court
ruled incorrectly, . . . her remedy for an erroneous ruling is not a
motion to disqualify, but rather review by appeal or writ from the
ruling.” We denied Uriostegui’s ensuing petition for writ of
mandate, which argued the probate judge showed “disobedience
to the Remittitur of this Court” because “the Remittitur
prohibited Gregory Dowling from filing supplemental pleadings
post-remittitur.” (Uriostegui v. Superior Court (Aug. 3, 2022,
B321845) [order].)
       On July 12, 2022 the probate court ruled on Gregory’s first
amended petition. After concluding Uriostegui was entitled to a
$100,000 credit (resulting from a malpractice action Gregory filed
against Morris, the attorney who prepared the 2015 Trust for
Uriostegui), the court ruled that it had previously ordered
Uriostegui to make the trust whole and to pay interest at the rate
of 7 percent, that the court had ordered Uriostegui to file an
accounting, and that Uriostegui failed three times to submit an
acceptable accounting. The probate court awarded Gregory, as
successor trustee of the trust, $1,293,138.27, plus $552,500 in
interest. Uriostegui timely appealed from the July 12, 2022
order.

                                 8
                        DISCUSSION

      A.     Standard of Review
      “The probate court or judge is the guardian of estates of
deceased persons and all proceedings are under the direction of
the judge.” (County of Los Angeles v. Morrison (1940) 15 Cal.2d
368, 371; accord, Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 103.)
This power includes the right to order a party to provide an
accounting. (Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
370, 376; see Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
1135, 1141-1142 [Probate Code authorizes the probate court to
compel a trustee to provide an accounting]; Christie v. Kimball
(2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413 [“Determining the need for an
accounting is a matter within the trial court’s sound
discretion.”].)
      We review the probate court’s orders to supervise and
protect the assets of a trust or estate for abuse of discretion.
(Estate of Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 103-104; Estate of
Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 718; Manson v. Shepherd
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1258.) We review de novo issues
regarding the probate court’s jurisdiction and authority.
(Conservatorship of Kane (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 400, 405.)

                               9
      B.     The Probate Court’s July 12, 2022 Order Does Not
             Violate the One Final Judgment Rule
       Uriostegui’s primary argument is that the probate court
lacked jurisdiction on July 12, 2022 to enter what she calls a
“second judgment” because “‘[t]here can only be one judgment in
any case between the same parties.’” Uriostegui’s argument is
doubly wrong.
       Uriostegui is referring to the one final judgment rule,
which is a procedural principle of appellate jurisdiction that
concerns the appealability of an order or judgment; it has nothing
to do with superior court jurisdiction. The rule avoids piecemeal
appeals by limiting “appellate review to trial court judgments
that finally dispose of all issues.” (Kurwa v. Kislinger (2017)
4 Cal.5th 109, 114; see Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc.
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 384 [“‘The one final judgment rule is a
“fundamental principle of appellate practice that prohibits review
of intermediate rulings by appeal until final resolution of the
case.”’”]; Walton v. Magno (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1240
[“‘The “one final judgment rule” has been denominated a basic
principle of appellate practice’”].) “Under the one final judgment
rule, ‘“an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an
entire action.”’” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751,
756; see Hoveida v. Scripps Health (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1466,
1468 [under the one final judgment rule “[a]n appeal cannot be
taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all causes of action
between the parties”].) The one final judgment rule has no
relevance to whether the probate court had jurisdiction on
July 12, 2022 to award restitution or attorneys’ fees.
       But even if this court’s jurisdiction under the one final
judgment rule were somehow relevant to whether the probate

                                10
court had jurisdiction to make the July 12, 2022 order, the rule
would not apply. The rules governing probate appeals are
different from those governing civil appeals.
       “The right to appeal is purely statutory.” (Conservatorship
of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67; see Estate of
Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 801; see also Dow v. Lassen
Irrigation Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 482, 483 [“The right to
appeal is purely statutory, since neither the federal Constitution
nor state Constitution provides for it.”].) In civil cases, the
appellant may appeal only from a single, final judgment that
determines “the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 577; see Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v.
Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 [“A judgment is the final
determination of the rights of the parties [citation] ‘“‘when it
terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the
case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined.’”’”].) Code of Civil Procedure
section 904.1 “codifies the ‘one final judgment rule,’ which
provides that an ‘“‘appeal may be taken only from the final
judgment in an entire action.’”’” (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138; see
Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments, Inc., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
p. 382.)
       In probate cases, however, an appellant may appeal from a
variety of orders made appealable by the Probate Code, as set
forth in Probate Code sections 1300 through 1304. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a) [“[a]n appeal, other than in a limited civil
case, may be taken . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (10) [f]rom an order made
appealable by the Probate Code”]; Kalenian v. Insen (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 569, 575-576 [“the Probate Code provisions

                                 11
concerning appealability are exclusive,” and the “appealability of
probate disputes in general is governed by [Probate Code]
section 1300”]; Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118,
1125-1126 [“It is well established that ‘[a]ppeals which may be
taken from orders in probate proceedings are set forth in . . . the
Probate Code, and its provisions are exclusive.’”].) This is
because the administration of a trust or estate is a “series of
separate proceedings, each of which is intended to be final.”
(Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.2d 150, 156; accord, In re Loring
Estate (1946) 29 Cal.2d 423, 428; Meyer v. Meyer (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 983, 992; see Ross, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate
(The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 3:3 [probate “is a continuous
proceeding” which “involves a series of stages, each of which may
result in an appealable order or judgment”].)
      Thus, a probate court order may be appealable under the
Probate Code even if it does not resolve all claims and issues in
the action. Which for purposes of this appeal means that, even if
Uriostegui were challenging our jurisdiction rather than the
probate court’s jurisdiction, the one final judgment rule would not
apply. Either way, the probate court had jurisdiction to make
further orders after we issued our remittitur in Uriostegui I.

      C.    The Remittitur in Uriostegui I Did Not Preclude the
            Probate Court From Making Its July 12, 2022 Order
      Uriostegui argues the July 12, 2022 order was a “material
variance” from the probate court’s 2018 judgment and this court’s
remittitur in Uriostegui I. (See Medina v. Superior Court (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1226 [“‘[t]he order of the reviewing court is
contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the

                                12
jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned’”].)
Uriostegui mischaracterizes our opinion in Uriostegui I.
      In Uriostegui I we concluded substantial evidence
supported the probate court’s findings that the 2015 Trust was
invalid and that the trust’s assets should be distributed pursuant
to the 2009 trust documents. We left undisturbed that part of the
judgment requiring Uriostegui to return to the trust assets she
had taken (plus interest), file an accounting as a constructive
trustee, not make any transfers that would impede the court’s
orders, and pay Gregory his attorneys’ fees and costs. That is
exactly what the probate court did on July 12, 2022. (See Estate
of Jenanyan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 703, 708 [“The probate of an estate
consists of a series of procedures, from the initial appointment of
an executor or administrator to the final distribution of the
estate.”].)
      Although the amended judgment contemplated Uriostegui
would provide an accounting before the probate court conducted
an evidentiary hearing to set the amount of restitution,
Uriostegui never prepared an acceptable accounting, which in
turn required Gregory (as directed by the court) to file a petition
asking the probate court to set an amount of restitution. The
probate court ruled on this petition on July 12, 2022 by awarding
Gregory $1,845,638.27 in restitution and interest. That’s what
the probate court was supposed to do. (See Prob. Code, § 17206
[“The court in its discretion may make any orders and take any
other action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters
presented by the petition”]; Babbit v. Superior Court, supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 [“‘To preserve [a] trust and to respond
to perceived breaches of trust, the probate court has wide,
express powers to “make any orders and take any other action

                                13
necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented” by [a]
section 17200 petition.’”]; Schwartz v. Labow (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427 [“Proceedings in the probate court
‘concerning the internal affairs of the trust’ are commenced with
the filing of a petition.”]; see also Christie v. Kimball, supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [probate court has “‘inherent
equitable power’ to take ‘remedial action’”].) There was no error.3

      D.     The Probate Court Did Not Lack Personal
             Jurisdiction over Uriostegui
      Uriostegui argues that all the orders in this case, including
the July 12, 2022 order, are void because “[n]o summons for the
personal appearance of [her] as an individual defendant was
issued [or] served upon [her].” According to Uriostegui, because
probate matters are in rem proceedings, her appearance in
response to Gregory’s petition under Probate Code section 17200
was not a general appearance as an individual and did not
subject her to the jurisdiction of the probate court. Wrong again.
      “Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem,” which means
the “court’s jurisdiction is based on its authority over property

3      Uriostegui also argues the July 12, 2022 order is void
because the first amended petition “did not allege a cause of
action” and “[t]here was no justiciable controversy.” She argues
that, “[i]f trial courts are allowed to ignore these bedrock rules of
finality by one judgment, litigation will never end”; that Gregory
“had the audacity to attack this Court’s Remittitur improperly
collaterally with frivolous objections and petitions,” and that
Gregory “pulled these litigation stunts because he was enabled by
the Superior Court.” This argument, to the extent we understand
it, appears to be a recasting of Uriostegui’s other arguments, and
fails for the same reasons.

                                 14
within its territory.” (Capra v. Capra (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
1072, 1082; see Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 443
[“A probate proceeding is essentially an in rem proceeding, in
which the decedent’s assets within the state constitute the res.”].)
Probate Code section 17003, subdivision (a), however, states that,
“[b]y accepting the trusteeship of a trust having its principal
place of administration in this state the trustee submits
personally to the jurisdiction of the court . . . .” By submitting to
personal jurisdiction, trustees like Uriostegui do not have to be
personally served with a summons for the probate court to have
personal jurisdiction over the trustee (though notice is still
required). (See Prob. Code, § 17203, subd. (a)(1) [trustees must
be given notice by mail of petitions under section 17200].)
       In any event, Uriostegui made a general appearance in the
probate court as an individual by filing objections, a demurrer, a
special motion to strike, and a petition to disqualify the probate
judge, and by appearing at trial, which “is equivalent to personal
service of summons on such party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50,
subd. (a); see Estate of Poder (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 786, 791
[“[e]ven where improper notice . . . would otherwise deprive a
court of jurisdiction to make an order or pronounce judgment, the
order or judgment will not be declared void if the complaining
party has waived the defect,” and a “general appearance
constitutes such a waiver”].)

      E.    We Do Not Have Jurisdiction To Review Uriostegui’s
            Challenges to Other Probate Court Orders
      Uriostegui challenges several orders not identified in her
notice of appeal. For example, Uriostegui argues the
November 2, 2018 judgment and the August 31, 2020 amended

                                 15
judgment after Uriostegui I are void for uncertainty because they
provided the court would calculate the amount of restitution at a
later time and because Gregory filed his petition pursuant to
Probate Code section 17200 and not Probate Code section 850.4
Uriostegui also argues we should vacate the November 2, 2018
judgment, as well as the August 31, 2020 amended judgment,
because the judge who conducted the trial in 2018 (and who has
since retired) did not have jurisdiction to rule on the financial
elder abuse cause of action,5 improperly circumvented the one
final judgment rule by requiring Uriostegui to provide an
accounting after judgment, and was biased against her “by
ignoring the evidence in this case.” Uriostegui also attacks the
February 20, 2019 cost award and the March 7, 2019 attorneys’
fees award, arguing the probate court could not amend the
judgment to include these fees and costs while Uriostegui I was
pending.6

4       Contrary to Uriostegui’s argument, Gregory properly
challenged the validity of the 2015 Trust under Probate Code
section 17200, subdivision (b)(3), which provides that
“[p]roceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust
include . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . determining the validity of a trust
provision.” (See Estate of Heggsted (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943,
951 [the argument a petition under Probate Code section 17200
“cannot resolve the legal status of disputed trust property
. . . defies common sense and finds no support in the law”].)
5     Which is incorrect. The probate court has concurrent
jurisdiction over elder abuse matters. (See Estate of Bowles
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 696; Conservatorship of Kayle (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)
6    Which is also incorrect. Attorneys’ fees and costs are
generally ancillary or collateral to the appeal. (Varian Medical

                                  16
        Uriostegui’s notice of appeal, however, did not identify any
of these orders or judgments. The notice of appeal states she is
appealing only from the July 12, 2022 order. Our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing that order. (See Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“We have no jurisdiction over an order not
mentioned in the notice of appeal.”]; Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 963, 967 [“While a notice of appeal must be liberally
construed, it is the notice of appeal that defines the scope of the
appeal by identifying the particular judgment or order being
appealed.”]; Estate of Bearns (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 221, 223
[reviewing court does not have jurisdiction to review an order not
mentioned in notice of appeal].)
        But even if Uriostegui had listed some or all of these
various orders and judgments in her notice of appeal, we would
still lack jurisdiction to review them because the probate court
made them more than 180 days ago, and her appeal would be
untimely. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) & (e)
[appeal must be filed within 180 days of judgment or order]; see
also Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106,
113 [“the filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional

Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191; see United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
142, 161 [“‘The primary example of collateral matters not affected
by a notice of appeal are awards of attorney fees or sanctions.’”];
Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 365, 369 [“filing of a notice
of appeal . . . does not prevent the trial court from determining a
proper award of attorney fees claimed as costs”].) In addition,
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a),
makes an award of attorneys’ fees and costs mandatory when the
plaintiff proves financial elder abuse. (See also Prob. Code, § 859
[attorneys’ fees and costs are recoverable for elder abuse].)

                                17
prerequisite”]; In re A.O. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148 [“One
of the most fundamental rules of appellate review is that the time
for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional”]; Dakota Payphone,
LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 509 [“‘A party who
fails to take a timely appeal from a decision or order from which
an appeal might previously have been taken cannot obtain review
of it on appeal from a subsequent judgment or order.’”].) This
rule applies equally to probate court orders. (See Estate of Reed
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1127 [“‘orders listed as appealable in
the Probate Code must be challenged timely or they become final
and binding’”].) Of course, Uriostegui did appeal from the
November 2, 2018 judgment, which resulted in Uriostegui I.
There is no reason to decide that appeal again. (See Malatka v.
Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082 [“on an appeal from an
appealable ruling, an appellate court will not review earlier
appealable rulings”]; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement
System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356,
1370-1371 [“‘Upon an appeal’ from an appealable order or
judgment, ‘the reviewing court may review . . . any intermediate
ruling, proceeding, order or decision’ [citations], but it may not
review an earlier appealable ruling. (Fn. omitted.)”]; Berge v.
International Harvester Co. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 152, 158, fn. 1
[“On appeal from a final judgment, the appellate court may not
review any order from which an appeal could have been taken
but was not.”].)

                                18
                         DISPOSTION

      The July 12, 2022 order is affirmed. Uriostegui’s motion to
augment the record on appeal with documents not relevant to
this appeal is denied. Gregory is to recover his costs on appeal.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

           We concur:

                        FEUER, J.

                        MARTINEZ, J.

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