Court Opinion

ID: 9779411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:50:05.785668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.233199
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING
In their motion for rehearing, appellants for the first time raise several previously unassigned and unpreserved points of error. They contend that because these new points are fundamental errors, it is permissible to raise them for the first time on rehearing.
The new issues before us are:
1) whether the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to appoint an attorney to represent and defend the persons cited by publication as mandated by Tex.R. Civ.P. 759;
2) whether the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to join the United States of America as an indispensable party;
3) whether the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to follow the rules pertaining to partition of real property, Tex.R.Civ.P. 760-769; and
4) whether the trial court committed fundamental error in entering judgment for appellees, because the record reflects the citation by publication was quashed and a new citation was not issued.
The general rule is that points of error raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing are too late and will not be considered. Watson v. Glen Falls Insurance Company, 505 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1974); Great Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Olton State Bank, 607 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1980, no writ) (on rehearing). However, fundamental error may be raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing. City of Arlington v. Bardin, 478 S.W.2d 182, 191 (Tex.Civ.App.— Fort Worth 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (on rehearing). As a general rule
Error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally was specifically held to be fundamental in Ramsey v. Dunlop [, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947) ]. Error in assuming jurisdiction where none exists was held *227to be fundamental in McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957). On the other hand, errors occurring in the trial process have been consistently held not to be fundamental. See State v. Sunland Supply Co., Tex.Sup., 404 S.W.2d 316 (1966); Kimbrough v. Walling, Tex.Sup., 371 S.W.2d 691 (1963); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962); Wagner v. Foster, 161 Tex. 333, 341 S.W.2d 887 (1960); Texas Co. v. State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955); City of Deer Park v. State, 154 Tex. 174, 275 S.W.2d 77 (1955); Worden v. Worden, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W.2d 187 (1949).
Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.1968).
In the first new complaint, appellants contend the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to appoint an attorney to represent and defend persons cited by publication as mandated by Tex.R. Civ.P. 759.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 759 is a requirement specifically applicable to partition suits. Although the original suit involving the 4,647 acres did contain a partition request, it has since been severed and is not before this court. The only cause before this court is appellees’ cross action as to the 29.44 acres which is based purely on an adverse possession claim. Since the cause of action before us is not a partition suit, Tex.R.Civ. P. 759 does not apply. We note nevertheless, that appellants were apparently properly served, were before the court, and were represented by counsel in the original cause of action. We also note that appellants’ counsel, after filing a general denial on behalf of the appellants in the original cause of action, were properly notified as to the cross action which is the subject of this appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 124.
Further, although we need not reach the issue, under these circumstances it is doubtful that the failure to appoint an attorney for persons cited by publication would be considered fundamental error as to appellants. We note that such a failure would not fall under the fundamental error definition of the Texas Supreme Court, that appellants were represented by counsel at all times, and that the Supreme Court has held that the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor is not fundamental error. Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d at 422. The point is overruled.
Appellants next contend that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to join the United States of America as an indispensable party.
Failure to join an indispensable party is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on a motion for rehearing. City of Arlington v. Bardin, 478 S.W.2d at 191. However, it is appellants’ burden to establish before this court that the United States claims an interest in the 29.44 acre tract which is the subject of this appeal. Unless appellants carry out this burden, the United States cannot even be considered as a possible indispensable party. As more clearly set out in this court’s original opinion regarding the jurisdiction complaint, appellants have failed to carry out their burden in this respect. The point is overruled.
Appellants next contend the trial court committed fundamental error in failing “to follow the rules pertaining to partition of real property, Rules 760-769, T.R.C.P.”
As more fully discussed in the first new point of error on rehearing, the cause of action before this court is not a partition suit, and the rules complained of do not apply. Further, although we need not reach the issue, this complaint does not appear to fall under the fundamental error definition of the Supreme Court. Neuman v. King, 433 S.W.2d at 422. The point is overruled.
In the last new complaint, appellants argue that the trial court committed fundamental error because the record reflects the citation by publication was quashed and a new citation was not issued.
The publication citation referred to was issued in the original cause of action involving the 4,647 acres which, we repeat, has been severed and is not before this court. Since no complaint is made to the service in *228the cause before this court, the point is irrelevant.
Furthermore, the judgment on the cross action involving the 29.44 acres, which is before this court, “finds and determines that all parties to this action were properly given due notice.” “[Ojrdinarily presumptions are made in support of a judgment (including presumptions of due service of citation when the judgment so recites).” McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965). Where a presumption in favor of a judgment exists, an appellant has the burden of clearly and affirmatively showing his allegations by the record to overcome the presumption. Alexander v. Russell, 682 S.W.2d at 375; Williams v. Holley, 653 S.W.2d at 641.
In this case, appellants rely entirely on a docket notation that the original citation by publication in the original suit was quashed. However, the trial statement of facts of the cause before us indicates that although the original publication citation was quashed, a new one was reissued and served. Further, the record reflects that appellants were apparently properly served, filed a general denial through their attorney of record, and received proper notice of the cross-action through their attorney of record. Tex.R.Civ. 124. Therefore, even if we considered this complaint, we must hold that appellants have failed to overcome the presumption of proper service. The last complaint is overruled.
The remaining rehearing complaints have been addressed in the original opinion.
The motion for rehearing is denied.