Court Opinion

ID: 9683048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:21:30.095835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:44.326886
License: Public Domain

Lyle Brown, Justice, concurring. I agree this case should be reversed because of error in instructions. However, I believe the opinion fails to give proper consid-' eration to some important points which were raised and which are most likely to occur in the event of another trial. This cause first was called for trial on February 14, 1966. On behalf of Tatum (plaintiff), his attorney asked this question on voir dire examination: “Bernard Whetstone — My question is, gentlemen of the jury, do you or any member of your family now, or have you in the past, worked for or own any stock in or have any interest in any casualty or liability insurance company!” Counsel for Hester (defendant) immediately asked for a mistrial and the court promptly granted the motion. Although a prior question asked is not in the record, it is apparent from the statements made by the presiding judge that the question regarding insurance was immediately preceded by another question. In substance, the first question inquired of the panel whether the apparent ability or inability of the defendant to pay a judgment would affect the findings of the jury. After granting the mistrial, the court expressed the view that the propounding of these two questions “back to back” were meant to impress upon the jury the fact that the defendant probably had insurance. This reasoning seemed to impel the trial court to grant the mistrial. The second trial began May 25, 1966. On voir dire examination Mr. Whetstone inquired of juror Smitherman, in substance, if he could disregard the apparent ability or inability of a defendant to pay a judgment. Mr. Shackleford objected and the question was unanswered. The court overruled the objection and proceeded to take over the questioning- of the panel. After numerous questions were asked by the court, Mr. Whetstone requested a conference at the Bench. After some discussion, the judge and attorneys retired to Chambers. The judge addressed this question to Mr. Whetstone: “As I understood your motion, you wanted to ask each one of the jurors individually the question whether or not they would try this case and render a judgment for the plaintiff if they feel the law and evidence justified it, without considering his. apparent ability or inability to pay the judgment. Now is that the question you wanted to ask? ” (To which Mr. Whetstone replied in the affirmative.) The court denied the motion and gave three reasons therefor; the reasons are summarized in italics, and the balance constitutes my comments: 1. To propound the same question individually to 23 jurors would be too much of a burden on the jury and the court and is unnecessary. The court was certainly acting within the bounds of discretion in so ruling. 2. The question is improper because the ability or inability to pay a judgment cannot be involved in a case. It is not a proper thing for the jury to take into consideration. Ability or inability to pay cannot be introduced into evidence. On this point I believe the court is in error, assuming it to have been ruled that the question is never proper under any circumstances. It is human nature for most people to sympathize with the poor, the unfortunate, or the underprivileged. Direct testimony is not necessary for jurors to reach a conclusion or impression that a party to a case has ability or inability to pay. A question of the same content is in fact not infrequently propounded by counsel for a large corporation when it is being sued by a widow or on behalf of minor children whose parent has suffered death in an accident. To admit the propriety of this question, when asked in good faith, knowing it is a cause wherein the jury will undoubtedly reach definite impressions about the ability or inability to pay, still does not remove from the trial court all its discretion. Acting in sound discretion, the court is privileged to conclude that the question is not proper in a particular case. 3. The purpose of this question is to indicate to the jury that liability insurance is involved, “that this •man (defendant) does not have the ability to pay but he has plenty of insuranceHerein lies the danger of coupling the two questions. And in this situation the court’s discretion comes into play. The court passes on the question of good faith, knows the attorneys, their mannerisms in asking the questions, the word emphases they may use — all of which are important in discerning good faith. The appellate court does not have this advantage. So, unless from the record itself we can glean an abuse of discretion, we should not say the trial court erred in this respect. Lawyers have the right to question jurors, separately and individually, to determine whether they are subject to challenge for cause, or to elicit information on which to base the right of peremptory challenge. But all this is subject to the right of the court, acting in sound discretion, to control the extent of the examination. Then, too, the court would seem to have the responsibility of moving forward on questions concerning statutory qualifications. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 39-226 (Repl. 1962). The case and statutory law relative to voir dire examination are not complicated when compared to other fields of trial procedure. When a problem in fact is anticipated it can undoubtedly be settled by raising it in pre-trial conference. In those rare instances where it might not be settled in pre-trial, the record can there be made and the time and patience- of jurors are not jeopardized. GIeorge Rose Smith, J., joins in this concurrence.