Court Opinion

ID: 9704189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:26:25.01511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:17.035803
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Ordinarily, when we are involved in statutory interpretation, we should establish a mental concept that a statute cannot go beyond its text. However, to effectuate its purpose, courts have held that a statute may be implemented beyond its text. Durr v. Hardesty, 76 S.D. 232, 239, 76 N.W.2d 393, 397 (1956); Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428, 430, 66 N.W.2d 910, 911 (1954). Perhaps these two conceptual approaches bring us to the horns of an interpretative dilemma in this case. Often, we see learned individuals in the law who will unequivocally. state that the statute is clear upon its face and, when standing alone, it is fairly susceptible of but one construction and, therefore, a particular construction must be given to it. Other individuals, learned in the law, will interpret the same statute and be convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that the statute is not clear upon its face and that it is susceptible of various constructions. What is right, and what is wrong, is often seen in the eyes of the beholder. It is subjective analysis, oftentimes, as to whether the statute is clear upon its face.
This case truly involves the reading and construction of more than one statute. Before expressing these statutes, the issue should be set forth. We are to determine if an employee of the Department of Transportation, Highway Division, can recover attorney’s fees from the Department in a worker’s compensation case, based upon a refusal to pay which is allegedly vexatious or without reasonable cause.
Key statute number one is SDCL 58-12-3. The statute expressly refers to “any insurance company.” It is obvious that the South Dakota Department of Transportation is not an insurance company. This then leaves the language “including any reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, on any policy or certificate of any type or kind of insurance....” Ofstad, claimant and appellant, has not brought an action under any policy or certificate of insurance. There is no suggestion of any reciprocal or interinsurance exchange.
Key statute number two is SDCL 58-1-2(2), which provides: “ ‘Insurer,’ [is defined as] every person engaged as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance.” (Emphasis supplied mine.) Factually, it is beyond the realm of reasonable dispute that the South Dakota Department of Transportation is not in the business of entering into contracts of insurance. Conclusion: Said Department does not fit within the statutory definition of an insurer. Therefore, it cannot be brought within SDCL 58-12-3 and be required to pay attorney’s fees as a part of costs.
Key statute number three is SDCL 62-4-33, which provides, inter alia, that the Department of Transportation or the State Cement Plant Commission shall pay claims from funds available for the maintenance of the Department or the Commission and further excepts the employees of the Department or Commission from the provisions of SDCL 62-4-32; the thrust therefore being that the employer does pay claims from its departmental funds.
Key statute number four is SDCL 62-5-4, which expressly sets forth the action which must be taken for an employer to become self-insured. Said statute provides for the approval of the Department of La*542bor for self-insurer status. Acting upon this request, the Department of Labor is to issue a certificate to the effect that an employer is self-insured. There is no hint - that this was ever done in the case at hand. Perforce, the Department of Transportation is not a self-insurer under the worker’s compensation law.
Lastly, these attorney’s fees were awarded as costs. Costs are recoverable only if specifically provided for by statute. SDCL 15-17-7; Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Mordian, 379 N.W.2d 840, 844 (S.D.1985); Lowe v. Steele Constr. Co., 368 N.W.2d 610, 614 (S.D.1985). There are no South Dakota statutes which specifically allow recovery of attorney’s fees against the South Dakota Department of Transportation, predicated upon a concept that it is a self-insurer or an insurance company, and thus they cannot be awarded under SDCL 58-12-3 by using statutory construction which strains the object and goal of said statute. We should not disregard the unequivocal requirements of the statute. We cannot question the wisdom or policy of SDCL 58-12-3. Temple v. City of Petersburg, 182 Va. 418, 29 S.E.2d 357 (1944). For, after all, was not this statute created amid a healthy debate and democratic process in our legislative halls? Instead, we should consider all of the above statutes and construe them so as to give effect to all provisions thereof. Hot Springs Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Fall River Landowners Ass’n, 262 N.W.2d 33, 36 (S.D.1978). We should construe the statutes together and harmonize them. If so done, the minority’s conclusion is untenable.
Moulton v. State, 363 N.W.2d 405, cited in the majority opinion as authority for “the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the statute” finds great disfavor with me not only because it is inapposite to the issue before us, but also because said case was not decided upon any ordinary or popular meaning. The strained interpretation in Moulton was dangerous in proportion to the degree of reasonableness which it tried to express. I will not permit the error in Moulton to frost the windows of my mind. And I certainly will not join in its repetition as a citation for any proposition pertaining to the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of a statute. Rather, there are cases in this Court which pertain to logically arriving at the intention of the legislature; and to presume that the words of the legislature have been used to convey their ordinary, popular meaning, unless the context or the apparent intention of the legislature justifies any departure from the ordinary meaning. I cite Wood v. Waggoner, 67 S.D. 365, 293 N.W. 188 (1940), and Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict v. Janklow, 308 N.W.2d 559 (S.D.1981). Guiding observation: One given to a past dissenting viewpoint must protect one’s flank when joining new writings. Read, also, SDCL 2-14-1, which provides: “Words used are to be understood in their ordinary sense except also that words defined or explained in § 2-14-2 are to be understood as thus defined or explained.”
Accordingly, I specially join the majority opinion in affirming the trial court.