Court Opinion

ID: 9915204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 21:00:45.721712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:42.376510
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4703      Doc: 19         Filed: 01/03/2024    Pg: 1 of 4

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4703

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JAMES SCOTT, JR.,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:07-cr-00066-HEH-1)

        Submitted: October 30, 2023                                       Decided: January 3, 2024

        Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Joseph S. Camden, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond,
        Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Heather Hart Mansfield,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               James Scott, Jr., appeals the 51-month sentence imposed following the revocation

        of his supervised release. On appeal, Scott argues that the district court imposed a plainly

        unreasonable sentence by improperly considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)

        sentencing factors. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

        supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

        maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436

        (4th Cir. 2020). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we

        first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,

        evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review of

        original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we do when

        reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015)

        (cleaned up).

               “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

        explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

        Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United

        States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted);

        see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to revocation proceedings).

        “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the

        circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant

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        should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               In fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence, a district court must consider the

        statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) applicable to revocation sentences through 18

        U.S.C. § 3583(e). Coston, 964 F.3d at 297. Absent from the statutory factors enumerated

        in § 3583(e) is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which requires the court to consider the need for the

        sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

        provide just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see 18 U.S.C.

        § 3583(e). In United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013), however, we held

        that § 3583(e) does not “prohibit a court from referencing [the § 3553(a)(2)(A)] factors

        omitted from the statute.” 1 Indeed, “the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) are intertwined

        with the factors courts are expressly authorized to consider under § 3583(e).” Id. Thus,

        although a district court may not base a revocation sentence “predominately” on the

        § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render a

        revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and

        considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 642.

               Applying Webb, we discern no error in the district court’s explanation. Although

        the court referenced respect for the law in discussing the appropriate sentence, it also

               1
                  Scott argues that Webb is not binding authority because it conflicts with United
        States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006), Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011),
        and Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). We readily conclude that Webb
        is good law and controlling in this case. See Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 654-55
        (4th Cir. 2021) (discussing nonbinding effect of dictum).

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        discussed the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, the court referenced the need to

        protect the community and suggested that Scott’s poor performance on supervision

        implicated the need for deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (citing § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C)).

        Thus, viewed in its full context, nothing in the court’s explanation suggests an

        impermissible reliance on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. 2

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation order. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

               2
                  Scott also argues that the district court erred in considering the Sentencing
        Guidelines policy statement range. He contends that, in directing the sanctioning of a
        defendant’s breach of trust, the policy statement invokes the punitive § 3553(a)(2)(A)
        factors excluded from § 3583(e) and thereby violates the statute. See U.S. Sentencing
        Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A (2021). However, even if we were to assume the court’s
        consideration of the policy statement range amounted to the consideration of a
        § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor, on the whole, the court’s explanation did not express a principally
        retributive aim. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 642. Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits
        of Scott’s challenge to the Guidelines policy statement as ultra vires.

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