Court Opinion

ID: 9701483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:20:54.321984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:24.066370
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Roberts:
While I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice O’Brien in his dissenting opinion, I feel it necessary to point out what I believe to be another error in the majority’s opinion. It is my view that we need not be concerned with whether Milmoe was driving the automobile, because the previous litigation has foreclosed the issue to Royal.
*107Royal is the insurance carrier-garnishee here and, as such, it stands in the shoes of the judgment debtor, Milmoe. It would have been open to Milmoe, in the original negligence suit, to defend on the ground that she was not liable because she was not the driver. In both actions it was averred that the automobile was driven by Milmoe at the request and under the control of McGinn, the other occupant of the automobile, or, in the alternative that McGinn was the driver as agent, at the request and under the control of Milmoe. Thus the default judgment may properly be viewed as a judgment that Milmoe was liable either as driver, or as the party who controlled the driver. Thus the question of whether she was the driver, like the question of whether she controlled the driver, is now foreclosed to her since judgment has been entered in the suit. The insurance carrier-garnishee can be in no better position—it cannot reopen the matter.
This principle is reflected in Rule 3145(b) of our Rules of Civil Procedure: “The garnishee in his answer under ‘new matter’ may include ... (2) any defense or counterclaim which he could assert against the defendant if sued by him but he may not assert any defense on behalf of the defendant against the plaintiff . . . .” Thus this rule makes clear that Royal may not now assert that Milmoe, the renter, was not the driver, since this would have been one of her defenses against the plaintiff.
Rule 3145, and the rule of law it mirrors, embody wise policies. Plaintiffs here should not be forced to try their suits twice. The proper time to determine who was driving the automobile was in the original negligence suit. Once that judgment was final, the plaintiff should not have to worry about litigating this issue once more. Although in this case it is obvious that both Milmoe and McGinn could not have been driving the automobile, that issue is no longer open to *108Milmoe in further litigation to enforce the judgment. Similarly, it is not open to Royal, who stands in Milmoe’s shoes.
I dissent.