Court Opinion

ID: 9633306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:42:15.636635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:32.890491
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I am in complete agreement that Johnson’s conviction should be affirmed. The evidence of guilt, even apart from what Langley had to say, is compelling and overwhelming. I also agree that the admission of Langley’s statement can be justified under Wyo.R.evid. 804(b)(6). I am not, however, disposed to adopt so readily the views of the Supreme Court of the United States set forth in the majority opinion in Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). I am satisfied that Justice Kennedy’s approach in his dissent in Williamson is more sound.
In following Williamson, the majority opinion describes Langley’s statement that BlackCrow “gave up or passed out. Art Johnson rolled him over and banged his head on the floor * * as incriminating Johnson not Langley. Langley’s statement is quoted more completely, however, and I simply am unable to parse that statement as finely as the majority opinion. Langley made the critical statement under oath as part of the factual basis for his plea of guilty to being an accessory after the fact in a homicide case. In order for his plea to be accepted, it was essential that Langley know that a crime had *371been committed, and the critical language described in the majority opinion demonstrates that knowledge. I would hold that Langley’s statement clearly is a “statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, * * * that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.” Wyo.R.evid. 804(b)(3).
Even conceding that this testimony was offered pursuant to an arrangement for a plea of guilty, it still stands as one that subjected Langley to criminal liability. First, it subjected him to liability for the offense for which he was pleading guilty; but second, if the statement were to be determined to be untrue, he was subject to further criminal liability for perjury. While there seems to be an assumption that Langley was home free on the charge of homicide at the time he made the statement, he was not. The court could have refused to accept the plea tendered, and Langley would still have been charged as a principal on the homicide. Wyo.Stat. § 6-1-201 (1988). In that context, the entire statement was against Langley’s penal interest and properly was admitted into evidence pursuant to Wyo.R.Evid. 804(b)(3).
I confess some conceptual difficulty with a conclusion that the statement had sufficient equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness so as to be admissible under Wyo. R.Evid. 804(b)(6) and, yet, is suspect as a statement against penal interest pursuant to Wyo.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). With the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, Langley’s statement must be perceived as true. If true, it certainly served to implicate him in a way that subjected him to criminal liability.
My normal posture is to give credence to opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States addressing interpretations of the rules of evidence. In this instance, however, I perceive the Supreme Court of the United States as having engaged in straining gnats, and I would not follow their lead. Clearly, Williamson is distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the informant was simply furnishing information to an investigative agent; made inconsistent statements; and his statement was not under oath. I would limit the thrust of Williamson strictly to its facts and would not expand it to encompass statements under oath given to support a factual basis for a plea of guilty.
I would affirm Johnson’s conviction by holding Langley’s statement was admissible under Wyo.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) and 804(b)(6).