Court Opinion

ID: 9476952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:09:53.707029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:36.314017
License: Public Domain

RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in most of Judge Boggs’s well-written and thorough opinion, I disagree with the conclusions reached in Part IV. In my opinion, while the economic benefit theory espoused by the majority opinion is sound, it cannot serve to sustain the conviction in this case because it was never advanced by the government at any time.
The cases relied upon by the majority recognize the well-established proposition that
[w]here two instructions are given to the jury, one erroneous and prejudicial and the other correct, it is impossible to tell which one the jury followed and it constitutes reversible error....
Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir.1934). These cases also establish an exception to this rule; that is, when the verdict gives assurance that no prejudice in fact occurred, the judgment may be affirmed. Nonetheless, each of these cases involves a situation where the jury was actually instructed, albeit erroneously, on a theory or count advanced at trial. United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir.1975) (in finding defendants guilty of assault “by use of a dangerous weapon,” jury necessarily found all facts necessary for a conviction on charge of unlawful use of a firearm in the commission of a federal felony; it was thus immaterial that jury may also have considered count erroneously charged); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 282-83 (2d Cir.1973) (if jury found a conspiracy on erroneous view, it would have found every element necessary to support a conviction on second theory); United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir.1973) (jury’s finding on conspiracy count has controlling effect on substantive count, and thus, even though there was reversible error on conspiracy intent instruction, conviction on substantive count can stand); United States v. Baratta, 397 F.2d 215, 226 (2d Cir.1968) (instruction as to scienter with respect to the substantive offense was sufficient, and since jury found defendants guilty of substantive offense, they necessarily found defendants had requisite knowledge as to related offense); see also United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir.1975).
The present case is more akin to United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.1976). In that case, defendant was indicted for counterfeiting alien registration receipt cards for Mexican citizens, and for encouraging and inducing the unlawful entry into the United States of the same Mexican citizens. The indictment charged that two of the counts were committed in Tucson, Arizona, and although the jury so found, the court of appeals held that that finding was not justified by the evidence. In deciding whether the defendant was prejudiced by the jury’s erroneous finding *1195as to where the acts were committed, the court stated:
An attorney viewing the Government’s case on Counts II and IV at the close of the evidence, and knowing that the court would instruct the jury that the crimes charged in Counts II and IV had to occur in Arizona, might very well have chosen to rest on the weakness of the Government’s proof rather than to risk improving the Government’s case by calling witnesses in defense. That choice was made here. Had the case been made upon the theory which we have advanced, an entirely different problem would have been presented. The strength of the Government’s case as to the happenings in Mexico might very well have persuaded defendant’s counsel that the defendant's sole chance for acquittal lay in the calling of witnesses, including perhaps the defendant, to rebut some parts of the Government’s evidence. Perhaps nothing different would have happened, but we are not in a position to say that the defendant did not suffer prejudice.
539 F.2d at 13.
In the instant case, the government contended that Runnels, as a union official, had an obligation to render fair and impartial services to the members of Local 22, and that he engaged in a scheme to defraud union members of their right to honest, fair and impartial services by accepting payments in exchange for referring union members to Shapero’s firm for representation in worker’s compensation cases. In other words, the government contended that Runnels’ deprived the union members of their intangible rights.
In contrast, the theory now advanced by the majority is based on the “fraud that occurs when a fiduciary breaches his duty by appropriating an economic benefit that properly should be the principal's.” The majority contends that because Runnels had a fiduciary duty to Local 22 and its members, and because he accepted an economic benefit in the form of bribes, which amounts to a violation of Runnels’ fiduciary duty, the economic benefit or bribes properly belong to the principal who has been wronged. This is a far cry from the government’s theory that Runnels deprived Local 22 members of their intangible rights.
As in Castillo-Felix, had defendant been faced with the “economic benefits” theory, an entirely different problem would have been presented. Even had Runnels chosen to present the same defense, he may have made dramatically different tactical decisions in advancing his position. Thus, even though conviction on the intangible rights theories may encompass all the factual findings necessary to a conviction on the economic benefits theory, in my opinion, defendant is prejudiced by not having the opportunity to prepare a defense based on the latter theory. Cf. United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319, 1323 (3d Cir.1974) (evidence was sufficient to convict under theory not advanced at trial, although charged in indictment).
Accordingly, I would REVERSE the judgment of the district court.