Court Opinion

ID: 9471254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:28:06.505443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:19.844537
License: Public Domain

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I do not agree that we should grant a writ of habeas corpus to petitioner.
In approaching this matter, I think it necessary to bear in mind that, even on my colleagues’ premise, petitioner was not tried before a jury that was per se unconstitutional. While the average age of all those called for jury duty in the county might have been somewhat older than in the general population, that fact alone would not, as my colleagues concede, render the jury unfit or incompetent in any absolute sense. Had the age disparity resulted from proper exemptions (such as exemption of mothers of young children), or objective circumstances (such as that young people did not register to vote in as large numbers as older people), petitioner would clearly have had no complaint notwithstanding any statistical imbalance.
To be sure, the mere fact a trial before this exact same jury (selected against a background of the same disproportionality) could be constitutional does not necessarily make it so if the failure to provide a more accurate cross-section was due to the state’s misconduct. Here the court found that the State of New Hampshire did not carry its burden of proving that underrepresentation of people between 18 and 34 was due to lawful exemptions or to objective circumstances beyond the state’s control.
I question, however, whether misconduct by the State of New Hampshire was shown sufficient to justify granting the writ of habeas corpus in these circumstances. Given that petitioner’s jury was basically fit and competent, the authorities should not be put to the burden of a new trial unless a new trial is required to punish the state or to force it to take more effective future measures to obtain a genuine cross-section. No such necessity exists in this case.
First, the State of New Hampshire has demonstrated its good faith by legislatively changing the challenged system from a “key man” system to a random one. There is no need to retry petitioner in order to send a message to the state. That message was transmitted by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire some time ago and was received and acted upon by the state legislature.
Second, the key man system which my colleagues now find productive of unconstitutional results is the same system that this very circuit sustained in United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir.1970). Unless we mean to suggest that this court acted irresponsibly in 1970, New Hampshire cannot be charged with bad faith in maintaining the system under which petitioner was tried. The most, it seems to me, that can be said now is that “evolving standards” since Butera have caught up with New Hampshire, compelling alteration of what had previously been thought to be (in the very best circles) a perfectly constitutional system. If that is what happened, it is an empty gesture to force New Hampshire to retry petitioner. He was fairly tried before a jury whose only possible fault lay in a slightly enhanced risk that more of its members were somewhat older than ideally they might have been. And this was done in good faith and without deliberate discrimination. It does not seem to me that the defect involves a sufficient chance of *506unreliability — or any unreliability — as to warrant a new trial. Were New Hampshire refusing to change with the times, perhaps a new trial would be required to signal that the court means business.1 Clearly a new trial is not needed for that purpose here.
My colleagues’ basic position appears to be that they are “compelled,” even perhaps against their own better judgment, to hold petitioner’s trial unconstitutional because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). I do not agree.
Duren was a case involving a state law which specifically provided that women could opt out of jury service. It was one of a number of cases which, in the last decade, have disfavored laws making overt distinctions grounded on gender. Not only does the present case not involve underrepresentation of a “suspect class” such as blacks or women, which have historically been the targets of discrimination, it does not involve a dubious state law which placed the people shown to be statistically underrepresented in a special category for jury-service purposes. No New Hampshire statute expressly places “young people” (however defined) in a special position with respect to jury service. New Hampshire’s key-man system is facially neutral. And indeed it is conjectural whether that system caused the statistical imbalance complained of, or whether other, constitutionally acceptable, factors did. There is scant evidence that any town officials consciously or actually shied away from 18- to 34-year olds in picking jurors.2 That in New Hampshire women with children under 12 may request exemption is an alternative factor which could have contributed to a smaller pool of younger voters. And the fact that many people between 18 and 34 may be away — either in the military or at educational institutions — is another plausible reason that could have contributed to disproportionality. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584, 587 n. 10 (10th Cir.1976). It is recognized that younger people are less likely to register to vote. See, e.g., United States v. Leonetti, 291 F.Supp. 461, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y.1968). Yet voting lists are universally accepted for juror qualification. See, e.g., United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1977). And even the statistics in the present case were dependent on voluntary responses to questionnaires. Young people may well be poorer respondents than their elders. See United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 389 (4th Cir.1968).
Factors such as the above led this court in Butera to hold that, while 21-34 year olds were a “distinctive group,” the government had adequately explained away their statistical underrepresentation (which in Butera was as great as it is here). The court today carries forward Butera’s holding that young people are a “distinctive” group — a holding that other courts have since rejected — while refusing to follow Butera’s holding that the government met its burden of explanation. My colleagues insist that Duren, decided after Butera, requires this result. But as already pointed out, Duren is factually very different, involving a state law providing a blanket gender-based exemption from jury service. Given the latter, it is small wonder the Duren court adopted a tough show-me attitude towards other explanations put forward to explain away the statistical disparity between men and women.
Here, absent anything similar to the express gender-based exemption in Duren, the neutral explanations offered for why the statistical disparity exists are far more plausible and deserve more weight than my colleagues give. I would thus hold that even assuming, arguendo, that people between 18 and 34 are a distinctive group, the *507petitioner never established — as Duren required to make out a prima facie case — that the statistical disparity “is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” 439 U.S. at 364. Too many other plausible reasons exist for an appellate court to make this leap as a matter of law.
Finally, I question that persons age 18-34 are a “distinctive group” for purposes of a prima facie case under Duren.3 “Distinctive group” has been used by the Court to identify discrete classes possessing immutable characteristics like blacks or women whose presence, or absence from the jury pool is a matter of particular constitutional significance. The sensitive nature of such groups justifies placing a heavy burden of explanation upon the state when their members are absent in substantial numbers from the jury venire. Neither in Duren nor elsewhere did the Court indicate that it meant to place a similar burden of justification whenever a statistical showing of imbalance was made with respect to some other more-or-less group. Young people, in particular, is an amorphous concept — does it include people below 45, below 35, or what? And to what degree does age constitute a valid distinction among jurors? One can similarly — and perhaps more convincingly— synthesize groups around the level of education, geography, job-skills, or the like. And if this were done, and if statistical anomalies in the proportion of persons called for jury service relative to total population were found, should those trials also be upset?
In the case of non-suspect classes, I do not believe that unconstitutionality should be inferred as eagerly as do my colleagues simply from a statistical showing of under-representation. When dealing with such groups, I would require evidence of deliberate exclusion, or at least of the existence of clear-cut barriers, with the burden of proof on the petitioner, not the state.
To be sure, we thought young people were “distinctive” in Butera, but when we did so we did not have in mind the draconian burden of justification my colleagues now extract from Duren and propose to apply so broadly. If Duren is to be read as strictly as do my colleagues, it should, I think, be limited to “suspect” categories such as women, minorities or the like which are the only groups the Supreme Court has so far dealt with in these terms. Otherwise, there will be no end of the sociological groups whose absence in strict proportions from the venire will lead to fortuitous new trials.
Thus, I cannot see any proper basis for issuing a writ of habeas corpus in this case. My colleagues’ opinion raises far more questions than it settles. Not only does it overturn our decision in Butera insofar as But-era upholds “key man” selection, it unsettles the already cloudy law in this area by suggesting that there is virtually no limit to the “distinctive groups” which, it can now be insisted by any criminal defendant, must be statistically represented among all the persons from whom jurors are selected if his conviction is to hold. I dissent both from the result and the analysis.

. I realize that in law we like to deal in absolutes — absolute right or absolute wrong, constitutional or unconstitutional conduct, etc. My relativism is not without some precedent, however. See, e.g., Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir.1974).

. While a few selectmen testified to views or actions which might imply inadvertent age bias, others testified to the contrary. The New Hampshire court, after an evidentiary hearing, found no systematic exclusion. In a habeas proceeding such as this, the state court’s finding is entitled to substantial weight, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), a point my colleagues do not mention at all.

. The great weight of authority since our decision in Butera supports the proposition that an age grouping such as this one (18-34) is not a distinctive group. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 590-93 (10th Cir.1976). See Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing cases).