Court Opinion

ID: 9379178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 21:02:28.276414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.420902
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/23 P. v. Anderson CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C094040

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE011579)

           v.

 BRUCE ANDERSON,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Bruce Anderson guilty of pimping, persuading another
person to become a prostitute, and procuring another person for prostitution based, in
part, on testimony related to Facebook and text message exchanges he had with a variety
of individuals. On appeal, defendant asserts some evidence, primarily portions of this
testimony, was inadmissible because it involved uncharged prior misconduct and referred
to the sex workers at issue in the counts as “victims.” Defendant also contends he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not object to
portions of the testimony that opined on the ultimate issue of his guilt. Finally, defendant

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challenges CALCRIM No. 1151, which allows a defendant to be convicted of pandering,
even if the target of the pandering is already a prostitute. We find no merit in defendant’s
contentions and will affirm the judgment.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        The prosecution charged defendant with one count of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h,
subd. (a); count one)1 and four counts of pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2), (6); counts two
through five). The prosecution also alleged defendant had a 2009 burglary (§ 459)
conviction, which is a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c). Each of the
counts identified a specific victim under various aliases, B.D. (counts one and two), A.D.
(count three), J.D. (count four), and R.D. (count five).
        As relevant to this appeal, the prosecution, through the testimony of Detective
William Fry, who investigated defendant’s conduct, introduced a number of Facebook
and text messages into evidence.2 The detective explained he had set up an undercover
appointment with B.D. at a motel. Once he had her location, he backed out of the
appointment. The next day, he and several officers arrested B.D. at the motel. They also
seized her cell phone.
        Detective Fry reviewed a large number of Facebook and text messages as part of
his investigation, including messages from B.D. and defendant. Defendant’s alias in the
messages was “Supaman” or “Blu.” Among other things, the two texted about sex buyers
arriving and departing her location, and their activities at the location. Detective Fry
explained defendant likely waited out in a parking lot for buyers to arrive and monitored

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The specific messages at issue in this appeal are discussed in greater detail, where
relevant, below.

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B.D.’s activities. Exploiters3 often do this to ensure the safety of their victims and to
control their victims. Detective Fry said the messages were consistent with B.D. meeting
sex buyers. In an interview with B.D., clips of which were played at trial, B.D.
confirmed to Detective Fry that defendant monitored her phone use, which the detective
explained was a common way for exploiters to control sex worker activities.4
        In one instance, the two discussed nearby police. Detective Fry explained
exploiters typically conduct surveillance to determine whether law enforcement was
nearby.
        The exchanges also included terms used in the prostitution subculture and
discussions of prostitution business practices. Defendant referred to B.D. “choos[ing]
up,” which Detective Fry explained was used to describe a situation where a victim
would leave one exploiter to work for another. Typically, the victim would have to pay a
“choosing fee” to the new exploiter. B.D. referred to defendant as “Daddy,” which the
detective explained is a term used to reference an exploiter or pimp, though he
acknowledged the word could be used in a nonprostitution context. B.D. also discussed
creating an online ad for a commercial sex Web site.
        In messages between R.D. and defendant, the two referred to R.D. as defendant’s
“bottom bitch,” or highest earning sex worker. They also discussed the amount of money
she would give him.
        In a set of messages between defendant and A.D., A.D. discussed placing an
Internet ad for commercial sex work, and defendant referenced his knowledge of
prospects for sex work in San Diego. They also discussed sex work in Merced. In
another, he made references to “snow,” which the detective interpreted as meaning that

3   At trial, the witnesses used the terms “exploiter” and “pimp” interchangeably.
4   B.D. also testified at trial about her relationship with defendant.

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defendant was “exploiting a white female sex worker.” They discussed Web sites and
practices for commercial sex workers. They also discussed various configurations of
exploiter/sex worker relationships. In one exchange, defendant asked A.D. to do sex
work for him. He sent similar messages to other women, as well. In one set of messages,
defendant negotiated with another exploiter about taking one of their sex workers. In
other messages, defendant referred to himself as a pimp.
       Sergeant John Sydow, an expert in sexual exploitation, pimping, pandering, and
human trafficking, testified for the prosecution. Among other things, he explained that
pimps frequently use social media, like Facebook, to reach potential sex workers. The
prosecutor gave Sergeant Sydow an extended hypothetical, which included messages
such as those exchanged between defendant and the victims, and asked whether the
individual in the hypothetical was pandering another individual represented in the
hypothetical. The sergeant replied that he was.
       The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, and the court found true the prior
conviction allegation.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                             I
                              Uncharged Conduct Evidence
       Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted several
items of evidence concerning his prior uncharged misconduct. In particular, defendant
objects to the admission of evidence that he was convicted in 2015 of promoting
prostitution in Washington state, and 11 Facebook message exchanges from defendant
referencing pimping or prostitution. We find no merit in defendant’s argument.
       A.     Background
       Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence of 11
exchanges that occurred between 2018 and 2020 to show evidence of defendant’s
attempts to persuade women to engage in prostitution, along with his 2015 Washington

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conviction. The motion explained the exchanges, each of which was ultimately
introduced at trial during Detective Fry’s testimony.
       In the first exchange, defendant exchanged messages with another man in an
attempt to obtain a sex worker. The two used jargon common in the prostitution
subculture.
       In the second exchange, defendant messaged a woman referring to himself as a
“p,” or pimp, and offering to make the woman his “main bitch.” The detective explained
this exchange was an example of an exploiter grooming and recruiting a potential sex
worker.
       In the third exchange, defendant messaged a man and discussed Web sites used for
commercial sex work and discussed various logistical issues in sex work.
       In the fourth exchange, defendant messaged someone and said, “My bitch gt a date
coming so I can’t be on the video shit,” which the detective read to mean defendant had a
sex buyer on the way to meet up with one of his sex workers.
       In the fifth exchange, defendant messaged someone referring to himself as a
“pimp.”
       In the sixth exchange, defendant had a series of messages with a woman, which
Detective Fry interpreted as an attempt to recruit a new sex worker.
       In the seventh exchange, defendant exchanged messages with a woman; Detective
Fry interpreted the messages as another attempt to recruit a new sex worker.
       In the eighth exchange, defendant told a man that he “just lost [his] hoe,” and
referenced one of his sex workers having a “call.”
       In the ninth exchange, defendant messaged a woman who had recently left her
exploiter. Defendant told her he was “the real p tho,” and discussed various Web sites for
commercial sex workers.
       In the 10th exchange, defendant messaged a woman and exchanged sexually
charged messages and pictures, saying, “You go be my bottom.”

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       In the 11th exchange, defendant messaged a woman asking if she was “ready to be
my bottom,” and asked her if she “be postin or blade.” Detective Fry explained this
meant defendant was looking for a “bottom bitch or a main sex worker, his highest
earning sex worker.” He testified defendant was trying to recruit the woman as a sex
worker.
       The motion also sought to admit defendant’s 2015 Washington state conviction for
promoting prostitution.
       The court granted the prosecution’s motion, saying the Facebook messages “are
relevant to material issues in dispute because they tend to show that [defendant], if he
committed any of the acts alleged did so with the mental state required for each charge in
this case.” The messages were relevant to count one because they tended to show he had
knowledge that B.D. was engaging in prostitution, and they were relevant to the other
counts because they tended to show he had the specific intent to influence B.D., A.D.,
J.D., and R.D. to engage in prostitution. The degree of similarity between the uncharged
conduct and the charged conduct was substantial, so they fell under Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (b).
       Balancing the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, the court considered the
frequency, date proximity, and number of messages at issue, and concluded the probative
value was substantial and outweighed any risk of undue prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or undue consumption of time.
       A similar analysis applied to the prior conviction. Although the conviction was
fairly prejudicial, the court concluded the probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the prejudicial impact. The court also considered whether, taken together,
the evidence would be cumulative or lead to undue prejudice, and concluded it would not.
The court noted the prosecution would not be permitted to introduce the particular details
of the prior conviction.

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       During trial, while the messages were being introduced into evidence, defense
counsel reiterated her objection to the messages, saying they were becoming cumulative.
The court overruled the objection, saying that although many of the exchanges were
similar to each other, the similarity was, in part, what made them admissible under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The parties agreed the People took slightly
over one hour to introduce the evidence.
       B.     Analysis
       A trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Moore (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 73, 92.) As
such, “we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling ‘except on a showing the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.)
       Generally, evidence “of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character
(whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct
on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, uncharged acts are
admissible “when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than [a
person’s] disposition to commit such an act.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
       The admissibility of uncharged acts “ ‘ “depends upon three principal factors: (1)
the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the
uncharged [act] to prove or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or
policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Moore, supra,
6 Cal.App.5th at p. 92.) “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “ ‘ “[T]he trial

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court [has] broad discretion when weighing the probative value and prejudicial effect of
proffered evidence” ’ [citation], and that exercise of discretion ‘will not be disturbed on
appeal unless the prejudicial effect of evidence so admitted clearly outweighed its
probative value.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Clark (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 270, 291.)
       To prove pimping, the prosecution was required to prove defendant “knew that
[B.D.] was a prostitute.” (See CALCRIM No. 1150.) To prove pandering, the
prosecution was required to prove defendant intended to influence B.D., A.D., R.D.,
and/or J.D. to be a prostitute. (See CALCRIM No. 1151.)
       We find persuasive the analysis of a similar situation in People v. Clark, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th 270. In Clark, the defendant was convicted of trafficking a minor,
attempted pimping of a minor, and pandering. (Id. at p. 273.) The prosecution
introduced several text messages with third parties, including messages in which the
defendant referred to himself as “ ‘P’ ” and messages with women encouraging them to
do sex work for him. (Id. at pp. 276-277.) On appeal, the defendant asserted the
evidence was improper character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 and should
have been excluded. (Clark, at p. 289.) The court disagreed, saying the evidence was
relevant to the issue of the defendant’s intent because it “gave ‘meaning to the
conversations that [the defendant had] with [the victim].’ ” (Id. at p. 290.) Similarly, the
evidence was highly probative under Evidence Code section 352 because the “defendant
used language that is unique to the pimping subculture, [and] the evidence provided the
jury with context necessary to understand defendant’s communications.” (Clark, at
p. 291.) Although there was a risk of undue prejudice because of the emotional bias it
might induce, the evidence was within the trial court’s discretion to admit. (Id. at
pp. 291-292.)
       Here, as in Clark, defendant referred to himself as a pimp in many of his messages
and, according to Detective Fry’s testimony, attempted to induce women to become
prostitutes. The messages demonstrated defendant’s knowledge and use of jargon

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common in the prostitution subculture, as well as common practices for prostitutes,
tending to prove he would have known B.D. was a prostitute. As such, the court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the messages and conviction were admissible under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
       For similar reasons, the evidence had great probative value under Evidence Code
section 352. And, as in Clark, although the messages, either alone or in conjunction with
the prior conviction, were prejudicial, we cannot say the prejudicial effect clearly
outweighed the probative value of providing context for defendant’s messages to the
victims. In any case, the trial court’s legal analysis shows it did not make its evidentiary
ruling in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner. Thus, defendant has shown
no abuse of discretion.
                                             II
                             Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to object to
testimony by Detective Fry that “was tantamount to Fry [expressing an] opinion that
[defendant] was guilty of Count 4, [pandering] which required proof that [defendant]
agreed to give money or a thing of value to procure or attempt to procure [J.D.] for the
purpose of prostituting her.” Defendant also asserts Detective Fry expressed an opinion
that defendant was guilty of count three, “which required proof of [defendant’s]
inducement of [A.D.] to prostitute for him.” According to defendant, the failure to object
to this testimony was improper and prejudicial. We disagree.
       A.     Additional Background
       Defendant objects to two specific exchanges in Detective Fry’s direct
examination. In the first, the prosecutor asked the detective to interpret a message from
defendant to A.D., reading “so when you go fuck with me, can I be Daddy?” The
detective explained, “He’s asking to basically have [A.D.] as his victim in order to
exploit her as a sex worker. As Daddy is a term that exploiters will often require their

                                              9
victims to call them as it’s similar to the power dynamic, where they don’t view them as
equals, and you are supposed to respect the father or Daddy.”
       In the second, defendant exchanged a series of messages with another man, with
defendant saying, “Aye P if you ain’t serving me no news or the bitch finna choose dnt
hit me p.” The other man eventually responds, “WIt her man bruh . . . Fall back bruh fA
real.” Asked to interpret this sequence, Detective Fry explained, “So, it’s basically an
exploiter trying to take another exploiter’s victim, such as knocking a new victim.” After
reading more of the conversation, he expanded on his answer, saying, “I developed the
opinion that [defendant] was scrolling on Facebook. He was attempting to contact other
females who he was attempting to exploit, or pander, or encourage to work as a sex
worker. [¶] He contacted this female based on the messages. I don’t believe it was that
female communicating. I believe it was another exploiter, and that exploiter was telling
him to, hey, back off. Don’t knock this girl. You are not going to knock her. [¶] And
then later on, they come to an agreement that the exploiter was willing to sell her in order
to be exploited by another exploiter.”
       B.     Analysis
       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987)
43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) To show prejudice, a “defendant must also show ‘ “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Torres (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 37, 49.) A reviewing court may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel without addressing both components if a defendant makes an insufficient
showing as to either prong. (Strickland, at p. 697.)

                                             10
       Defendant has not shown Detective Fry’s testimony in these two exchanges was
prejudicial. The basic conclusion in the first statement, that defendant was asking A.D. to
work for him as a sex worker, was amply supported by other evidence. Defendant had
multiple conversations with A.D. involving commercial sex work, including prospects for
working in various locations. He told her he wanted to “build this empire with you,”
which meant that he wanted her to work for him as a sex worker so that they could make
a lot of money. Moreover, the jury received similar testimony from Sergeant Sydow in
the form of an expert hypothetical that included the messages between A.D. and
defendant.
       As to J.D., Sergeant Sydow also explained the mechanics by which exploiters
would exchange sex workers with each other for money or goods. The jury then received
a set of messages between defendant and another man discussing one such transaction,
with the other man saying, “She[‘s] taken,” but later saying he would “bring her to u”
next to a mention of a “donation.”
       The jury received instructions permitting it to “disregard all, or any part of an
opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence” and
cautioning that it was not required to accept opinions as true or correct. And, Detective
Fry’s two statements comprised only a small part of his testimony, among dozens of
message exchanges in documentary exhibits. Given the context of those statements, it is
not reasonably probable the jury’s conclusion would have been different absent Detective
Fry’s characterization of the conversations. Thus, even if defense counsel should have
objected to the statements, defendant has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel.
                                              III
                                     “Victim” References
       Defendant argues the two portions of Detective Fry’s testimony identified above
in section II also ran afoul of the trial court’s in limine ruling prohibiting the parties from
referring to the complaining witnesses as “victims.” Defendant argues these two

                                              11
references rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair” and violated his federal constitutional
right to due process. We disagree.
       A.     Additional Background
       Defendant initially filed a motion in limine asking that the complaining witnesses
be referred to using their first names, rather than as “victims.” The trial court granted the
motion, but added the caveat that “the Court certainly is mindful that the use of the word
‘victim’ is exceedingly common in criminal cases, and even more common specifically
among law enforcement officers, so, it might even be safe to say -- that it’s safe to say
there could be a slip during the trial. [¶] And if that occurs, we will address it
accordingly. But I guess the reason I’m telling you this is because if somebody does slip
in good faith and uses that term, it isn’t going to result in a mistrial right off the bat. So, I
just want to make sure everybody is on the same page about that.”
       The prosecutor asked to clarify the court’s ruling, noting that she might need to
ask questions about prostitution subculture that could refer to victims generically, and
defense counsel clarified that she only objected to the use of victim as to the specific
“named individuals in the complaint.” The court confirmed that generalizations about
persons other than the named victims would be acceptable.
       Defendant’s objection on appeal arises out of the same two Facebook messaging
exchanges referenced above. In particular, defendant points to the detective’s
interpretation of the question, “can I be Daddy?” The detective’s response included the
term “victim,” saying, “He’s asking to basically have [A.D.] as his victim in order to
exploit her as a sex worker.” In the second exchange, which involved defendant’s
attempt to procure a new sex worker, Detective Fry explained, “So, it’s basically an
exploiter trying to take another exploiter’s victim, such as knocking a new victim.”

                                               12
       B.     Analysis
       Defendant relies on People v. Williams (1860) 17 Cal. 142 to argue that Detective
Fry’s two references to victims effectively characterized defendant as a criminal,
depriving defendant of his due process rights.
       In Williams, the defendant argued that a jury instruction referring to the deceased
subject of the case as a victim prejudiced the jury against him in his murder trial. (People
v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal. at p. 147.) While our Supreme Court did not reverse the
judgment on these grounds, it cautioned that “[t]he word victim, in the connection in
which it appears, is an unguarded expression, calculated, though doubtless
unintentionally, to create prejudice against the accused. . . . The Court should not,
directly or indirectly, assume the guilt of the accused, nor employ equivocal phrases
which may leave such an impression.” (Ibid.) Although the Supreme Court was
unwilling to “critici[z]e language very closely in order to reverse a judgment of this sort,”
it emphasized that in the face of conflicting evidence, “an equivocal expression coming
from the Judge, may be fatal to the prisoner.” (Ibid.) Thus, Williams underscored the
idea that the trial court, as a neutral body, must be cautious about indirectly influencing a
jury through its use of language, and specifically, use of the term victim. (Ibid.)
       As the Attorney General notes, the California Supreme Court distinguished
Williams in People v. Wolfe (1954) 42 Cal.2d 663. In Wolfe, the defendant and
prosecutor referred to the deceased as “ ‘the victim’ ” during the defendant’s cross-
examination. (Id. at p. 666.) The Supreme Court disagreed that the prosecutor’s use of
the term victim assumed the defendant’s guilt and created reversible error, however.
(Ibid.) Specifically, the Supreme Court noted it was the prosecutor, rather than the trial
court, who referred to the deceased as the victim. (Ibid.) It further noted the jury was
properly instructed that it was the sole judge of the value and effect of evidence and was
also instructed on the reasonable doubt standard, insulating from any prejudicial effect
the victim reference might create. (Ibid.)

                                             13
       Here, as in Wolfe, the references defendant complains of did not come from the
trial court, or even from the prosecutor, but from a prosecution witness who was
characterizing a series of confusing messages between defendant and others. Thus,
consistent with Wolfe, the use of the term here would not have improperly influenced the
jury as suggested in Williams. And, as in Wolfe, the trial court instructed the jury that it
was the sole judge of any fact in issue, it could accept or reject any testimony by any
witness, it was entitled to disregard any opinion or characterization it determined was not
supported by the evidence, and the prosecution was required to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. We presume the jurors understood and followed all instructions.
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 447.) Accordingly, to the
extent Detective Fry’s statements implied the named complainants were victims, we see
no reversible error.5
                                             IV
                                      Jury Instructions
       Defendant argues the trial court erred when it instructed the jury using a
constitutionally flawed CALCRIM No. 1151, which explains that, for the purposes of the
pandering charges, it does not matter whether the victims were already prostitutes.
Defendant acknowledges the California Supreme Court’s contrary holding in People v.
Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 981, that a defendant can be convicted of pandering under
section 266i by encouraging someone who is already a prostitute to engage in
prostitution, but argues the decision should be reversed.

5 Because we find no error and/or prejudice in any of defendant’s evidentiary
contentions, and because the bulk of the asserted error arises out of only two
comparatively minor statements by one witness, we likewise reject defendant’s
conclusory argument that the cumulative nature of the errors in his case deprived him of
his right to due process.

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      We are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Zambia, supra,
51 Cal.4th 965 (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), and
we must reject defendant’s challenge accordingly.
                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                EARL, J.

We concur:

    /s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

    /s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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