Court Opinion

ID: 9634342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:09:01.477808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.812349
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting:
I
Introduction
The majority here determines that the five defendants in the four criminal cases decided in this appeal did not demonstrate that there was either an “abuse of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter of law” when their respective cases were postponed and rescheduled for trial on dates beyond the 180-day period prescribed by Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1983 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 591,1 and *465Maryland Rule 746.2 Consequently, the majority holds that the motions to dismiss in each of the four cases should have been denied. I do not agree. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
II
State v. Frazier and State v. Shaw
The majority in Frazier and Shaw determines that “[w]hen the administrative judge or his designee postpones a case beyond the 180-day deadline because of court unavailability, there is a violation of § 591 and Rule 746 only if it is demonstrated that the change of trial date, or the period of time until a new trial date, represented a clear abuse of discretion.” It concludes that “[n]o such abuse of discretion was shown in the present cases.”
In my view, court unavailability can, under certain circumstances, constitute good cause for postponement of a criminal case beyond the 180-day period prescribed by Art. 27, § 591 and Md.Rule 746. Unavailability of a court resulting from “chronic court congestion,” in and of itself, ordinarily does not constitute good cause; whereas unavailability of a court resulting from “nonchronic court congestion” ordinarily constitutes good cause. Because, in my view, in Frazier and Shaw the unavailability of a court resulted from “chronic court congestion,” there was no good cause for postponement. Therefore, I, unlike my colleagues, find that an abuse of discretion was shown in these cases.
*466The terms “chronic court congestion” and “nonchronic court congestion” are derived from the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial (1980), and its accompanying Commentary. Standard 12-2.3 provides in pertinent part:
“The following periods should be excluded in computing the time for trial:
“(b) the period of delay resulting from congestion of the trial docket when the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances... . ”
The Commentary to ABA, Speedy Trial Standard 12-2.3(b) at 28-29 provides in pertinent part:
“Although it is appropriate to allow added time under certain exceptional circumstances, such as those that result in the unavailability of the prosecutor or the judge at the time the trial is scheduled, delay arising out of the chronic congestion of the trial docket should not be excused. ... Under the Supreme Court balancing test, docket congestion may be considered.
“Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose of the usual business of the courts promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose the same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an inordinate number of cases for court disposition. Thus, when a large-scale riot or other mass public disorder has occurred, some leeway for additional time is required to ensure that the many resulting cases will receive adequate attention from the prosecutor's office, defense counsel (possibly a single defender office), and the judiciary.” (Footnotes omitted).
Thus, although the term “exceptional circumstances” has not been expressly defined, the Commentary describes “exceptional circumstances” as congestion arising from unique, nonrecurring events that create a particular scheduling problem or produce an inordinate number of cases for court disposition. Events such as the illness or death of a prosecu*467tor, defense counsel or judge on the day a trial is scheduled, or riots or other public disturbances are illustrative of such unique, nonrecurring events.
Courts in some jurisdictions having statutes or rules similar to Art. 27, § 591 and Md.Rule 746 that have considered the circumstances in which court congestion constitutes the requisite cause for postponement have determined, as stated by the majority, that “chronic court congestion is ordinarily not regarded as good cause for postponement, [but] non-chronic congestion does not preclude a finding of good cause.”3 Illustrative is the case of People v. Forrest, 72 Mich.App. 266, 273, 249 N.W.2d 384, 388 (1976), where the Court of Appeals of Michigan said:
“In the case at bar the people have not made an affirmative showing of unavoidable delays which might justify this inaction. A mere recitation of the factor of a crowded docket, without more, cannot warrant visiting on the incarcerated defendant a longer imprisonment than might otherwise be in store. If congestion and delay result from inadequate court staffing or funding, the inevitable results of those delays must fall upon the people, who have the power to remedy court congestion.”
The rationale underlying the view that “chronic court congestion” does not ordinarily constitute good cause was expressed in the Commentary to ABA, Speedy Trial Standard 12 — 2.3(b) at 29 as follows:
*468“... (1) the defendant can be prejudiced by delay, whatever the source; (2) such delays are contrary to the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases; (3) if congestion excuses long delays, there is insufficient inducement for the state to remedy congestion; and (4) the calendar problems that arise out of trying to make maximum use of existing facilities do not ordinarily require time beyond that otherwise allowed. But, while delay because of failure to provide sufficient resources to dispose of the usual number of cases within the speedy trial time limits is not excused, the standard does recognize congestion as justifying added delay when ‘attributable to exceptional circumstances.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it has been recognized that if “chronic court congestion” ordinarily constitutes good cause for delay, the purposes of statutory prompt trial requirements will be undermined. It is for this reason that I am persuaded that “chronic court congestion” ordinarily should not be regarded as good cause for postponement.
This conclusion is also supported by the historical development of Maryland’s statutory prompt trial requirements.4 The requirement that criminal cases be tried promptly is deeply rooted in our English law heritage. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). This requirement first appeared in the Magna Charta of 1215 and is presently embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the constitutions of almost all of the 50 states. See, e.g., Md. Declaration of Rights, ■ Art. 21. By 1960, court systems throughout the United States had become burdened by “chronic court congestion” manifested by overcrowded dockets, backlogs, and unavailability of courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. This “chronic court congestion” inevita*469bly caused delay in the trial of criminal cases. As stated by the American Bar Association in 1968:
“Congestion in the trial courts of this country, particularly in urban centers, is currently one of the major problems of judicial administration. Notwithstanding the usual rule that criminal cases have priority over civil cases, this congestion has created serious difficulties for the administration of criminal justice. The continued pressures upon existing resources have been such that it is extremely difficult to dispose of all criminal cases with promptness and with due regard for fair procedures.
Several approaches to this problem are possible and desirable. The most obvious, but perhaps the most difficult, is that of finding means for reducing the amount of criminal conduct, such as by attacking poverty and other crime stimuli. Another is to overcome society's reluctance to provide the necessary resources — more prosecutors, judges, courtrooms, and court personnel — for prompt processing of all cases reaching the courts. Still other approaches involve the structuring of improvements in criminal procedure, particularly by advancing the efficiency of the process while at the same time ensuring its fairness and effectiveness.” ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial at 1 (Approved Draft 1968) (emphasis added).
Recognizing that “chronic court congestion” inevitably causes delay in the trial of criminal cases, Maryland, like many other states, adopted the approach of enacting statutes and promulgating court rules requiring that criminal trials be held within a prescribed period of time. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 846, 847 (1957). By ch. 212 of the Acts of 1971, the General Assembly declared a “legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges. ... ” State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316, 403 A.2d 356, 359, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368 (1979). That act required that all criminal cases be tried within six months unless the trial was postponed for “extraordinary cause.” These re*470quirements were subsequently embodied in former Md.Rule 740, effective 1 June 1972. Nevertheless, because these requirements were held to be “directory,” not mandatory, Young v. State, 15 Md.App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, summarily aff’d, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972), the legislative policy, designed to obtain the prompt disposition of criminal charges, was “largely unheeded” and, therefore, not implemented. Hicks, 285 Md. at 317, 403 A.2d at 360.
In 1977, this Court promulgated Md.Rule 746 which required that all criminal cases be tried within 120 days unless the trial was postponed for “extraordinary cause.” Subsequently, in Hicks, 285 Md. at 334-35, 403 A.2d at 369, we overruled Young. There, we made it clear that “[t]he provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient.” Hicks, 285 Md. at 318; 403 A.2d at 360. Additionally, we made it clear that “dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the State fails to bring the case to trial within the 120-day period prescribed by the rule and where ‘extraordinary cause’ justifying a trial postponement has not been established.” Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. We expressly stated that the dismissal sanction was “a prophylactic measure designed to insure compliance with the requirements imposed on the State regarding prompt trials of criminal cases.” Hicks, 285 Md. at 337, 403 A.2d at 370. By employing the sanction of dismissal in all criminal cases that are not tried within the statutorily prescribed time period, unless the requisite cause is shown, this Court attempted to create an incentive for trial courts to design and implement efficient and fair procedures that would eliminate delay caused by “chronic court congestion.” Thus, we “put teeth” into the requirements governing prompt trials. Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.
Subsequently, considerable concern arose as to the practicability of the principles articulated in Hicks. In 1979, this Court amended Md.Rule 746 to prescribe a 180-day period, rather than a 120-day period, for the trial of all criminal *471cases. By ch. 378 of the Acts of 1980, the General Assembly amended Art. 27, § 591 to prescribe a 180-day, rather than a six-month, period for the trial of all criminal cases and a “good cause” rather than an “extraordinary cause” standard for postponement.
As the majority recognizes, the legislative history of the 1980 amendment “clearly intended to expand those circumstances furnishing the requisite cause for postponing a trial date beyond 180 days.” Indeed, Delegate John A. Pica, Jr., a sponsor of one of the proposals to change “extraordinary cause” to “good cause” said:
“What we are really doing here is attempting to amend the law in order to offer the courts some leeway in the disposition of an extremely heavy case load.
The growth of the number of cases being brought into criminal court has dramatically increased, resulting in crowded and backlogged court dockets. The Hicks decision suggests that a defendant’s confinement out of state may be extraordinary cause but that crowded court dockets may not.
The third, and perhaps best alternative, H.B. 615, allows a court to do what they do best — to consider all the circumstances and grant delay of the trial based upon the facts of the case, and without harm or prejudice to the defendant. The bill accomplishes this result by removing the extraordinary cause requirements for a postponement and replacing it with the requirement of showing ‘good cause’ for a change in trial date.” Testimony on H.B. 351, 614 and 615 before the House Judiciary Committee, 12 February 1980.
Although Delegate Pica indicated concern that under Hicks “crowded court dockets may not” be regarded as “extraordinary cause,” he did not, however, suggest that “chronic court congestion,” in and of itself, should constitute “good cause.”
*472I agree with the majority that the 1980 amendment “clearly indicated a legislative intent that crowded court dockets may constitute sufficient cause for trying a case beyond the 180-day deadline.” In my view, however, that amendment does not show that the General Assembly intended that “chronic court congestion,” in and of itself, should constitute good cause. Rather, particularly in light of Delegate Pica’s testimony, that amendment shows that the General Assembly intended that the question whether court unavailability constituted good cause — whether it resulted from “chronic” or “nonchronic court congestion” — like every other question relating to “good cause,” should be determined by the administrative judge’s exercise of discretion based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Finally, the legislative history of the 1980 amendment also reveals that the General Assembly consistently rejected the notion of restricting the application of the dismissal sanction or eliminating it entirely. Thus, the General Assembly evidenced its intent that the prophylactic sanction of dismissal be retained.
The basic approach adopted by the General Assembly is clear. All criminal cases were to be tried within the statutorily prescribed time period unless postponed for good cause. The administrative judge was authorized to determine on a case-by-case basis whether court unavailability constituted good cause — whether it resulted from “chronic” or “non-chronic court congestion.” The sanction of dismissal was to be retained as an incentive for trial courts to continue to implement efficient and fair procedures that would eliminate delay caused by “chronic court congestion.” Manifestly, the 1980 amendment to the statutory prompt trial requirements did not alter the General Assembly’s purpose of eliminating delay caused by “chronic court congestion.”
In 1980, this Court amended Md.Rule 746 to conform to the statute. In 1982, in Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982), we reaffirmed the principles established in Hicks *473that “put teeth” into the requirements governing prompt trials.
My review of the historical development and legislative history of Maryland’s statutory prompt trial requirements compels me to conclude that “chronic court congestion,” in and of itself, ordinarily does not constitute good cause for postponement. This conclusion is also supported by the existing interrelationship between the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and the statutory prompt trial requirements. I agree with the majority that “§ 591 and Rule 746 were not intended to be codifications of the constitutional speedy trial right but stand ‘on a different legal footing.’ ” Nevertheless, in my dissenting opinion in Hicks I expressed the view that the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and the statutory prompt trial requirements are interrelated. There, I said:
“It is clear, therefore, that statutory prompt trial requirements are intended to, and do in fact, broaden the scope and applicability of the Sixth Amendment requirement and increase its effectiveness in reducing delay by mandating that trials be held more promptly than is required by the Sixth Amendment. Those statutory requirements implement, effectuate, and ‘put teeth’ into the Sixth Amendment. Given this interrelationship, it would be, in my view, incongruous to interpret a statutory requirement as being narrower in scope and applicability and, therefore, less effective than the Sixth Amendment requirement.” Hicks, 285 Md. at 327, 403 A.2d at 365 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
I adhere to the view that the statutory prompt trial requirements were intended to implement the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and to increase its effectiveness in reducing delay.5 If this objective is to be effectuated, the *474statutory prompt trial requirements must be interpreted as being broader in scope and applicability than the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that under the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement the responsibility for delay caused by “chronic court congestion” manifested by overcrowded dockets, unavailability of courts, and scheduling problems rests upon the courts and, therefore, that unintentional delay caused by “chronic court congestion” is inexcusable and must be weighed against the State. Wilson v. State, 281 Md. 640, 652, 382 A.2d 1053, 1063, cert, denied, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S.Ct. 126, 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978); Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 12, 367 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2177, 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977); Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 529, 531, 350 A.2d 628, 633, 634-35 (1976); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 114-15, 345 A.2d 62, 74 (1975). Thus, in Epps v. State, 276 Md. at 114-15, 345 A.2d at 74 (1975), we stated:
“[A] delay in affording a criminal defendant a ‘speedy trial’ because of over-crowded court dockets and scheduling problems, the responsibility for which rests upon both the courts and the prosecutors, cannot be classified as wholly ‘neutral’ and must be included within the period of *475delay in determining whether there has been a denial of this constitutional right.”
Consequently, this Court has recognized that under the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement, the State has a duty to provide a prompt trial even though “chronic court congestion” exists and its failure to do so is inexcusable.
Under the statutory prompt trial requirements, the State has a duty to provide a prompt trial unless there is good cause for postponement. If “chronic court congestion” is regarded as good cause then, under the statutory prompt trial requirements, the State has a duty to provide a prompt trial unless “chronic court congestion” exists. Such an interpretation leads to the conclusion that under the statutory prompt trial requirements the State has no duty to provide a prompt trial when “chronic court congestion” exists. Thus, its failure to provide a prompt trial is, excused. Indeed, that failure not only is excused, but is itself a justification for delay. Thus, the State’s failure to comply with a standard of the Sixth Amendment requirement is transformed into a justification for delay. This transformation narrows the scope and applicability of the statutory prompt trial requirements and makes them less effective in reducing delay than the Sixth Amendment requirement. Such a result is incongruous. For this reason, too, I am persuaded that “chronic court congestion” ordinarily does not constitute good cause for postponement.
The majority, without defining the term “chronic court congestion,” finds that in Baltimore City “the proportion of criminal cases which must be postponed by the administrative judge beyond the 180-day deadline ... is less than two percent” and, therefore, that “[t]he Circuit Court for Baltimore City is not ‘chronically congested.’ ” It concludes that under these circumstances the unavailability of a court, in and of itself, constitutes good cause for postponement beyond the statutorily prescribed time period.
There is, however, nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the General Assembly intended that all crimi*476nal cases be tried within 180 days, except for two percent of the cases.6 More important, the record shows that in both Frazier and Shaw the only reasons assigned for the postponement beyond the statutorily prescribed time period were premised upon the unavailability of a court and the number of cases on the “move list.” Thus, there is nothing to show that the unavailability of a court that caused the postponement in Frazier and Shaw resulted from unique, nonrecurring events. There is nothing to show that the unavailability of a court was caused by an abrupt and unexpected increase in the number of criminal cases filed, or by a sharp and unexpected decrease in the number of available judges. Rather, the unavailability of a court here resulted from the ordinary recurrent events associated with the regular procedures utilized to handle the usual business of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Therefore, there was nothing to show that the unavailability of a court was caused by anything other than what I define as “chronic court congestion.” Accordingly, there was nothing to show that the postponements in Frazier and Shaw were caused by anything other than “chronic court congestion.” Under these circumstances, the majority’s application of the principle announced in these cases, in my view, establishes that “chronic court congestion” that causes delay, in and of itself, constitutes “good cause” for delay. Such a result is untenable.
In determining that the court unavailability, resulting from “chronic court congestion” in Frazier and Shaw, in and of itself, constitutes good cause for delay, the majority has, in my view, undermined the purpose of both the General Assembly and this Court — to eliminate the delay caused by “chronic court congestion.” It has obviated the necessity for the administrative judge to exercise his discretion in determining whether court congestion constitutes good cause for delay. It has impeded the right of society and the accused *477to have all criminal cases tried within 180 days, notwithstanding the existence of “chronic court congestion.” In so doing, it has restricted the applicability of the dismissal sanction, thus destroying the incentive for trial courts to comply with the statutorily prescribed time period. In short, the majority has extracted the “teeth” that this Court in Hicks inserted into the requirements governing prompt trials of criminal cases.
Although I agree with the majority’s principle that court unavailability can, under certain circumstances, constitute good cause for postponement, I do not agree with the majority’s application of that principle here because it is both illogical and destructive of the purpose of the statutory prompt trial requirements. In my view, under the present circumstances, the unavailability of a court resulting from “chronic court congestion” did not constitute good cause for a postponement in either Frazier or Shaw. Consequently, there was an abuse of discretion in granting these postponements. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial courts’ judgments dismissing these cases.7
Ill
State v. Weems and Patton and State v. Richardson
In Weems and Patton, the majority determines that “the courtroom clerk’s mistake on October 14, 1981, in not assuring that the postponement form was filled out and transmitted to the Assignment Office,” constitutes good cause for *478delay because allegedly it was an “isolated instance.” In Richardson, the majority determines that “the Division of Correction’s failure to identify . .. which of three Mark Richardsons was the defendant,” in time to bring him to court on the day of his trial constitutes good cause for delay because allegedly it was an “isolated instance.” I do not agree.
This Court has frequently described negligence as a lack of ordinary care under all circumstances. It consists of a failure to do what a reasonably prudent person would have done under similar circumstances. Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 426, 177 A.2d 701, 709 (1962); Vickers v. Starcher, 175 Md. 522, 531, 2 A.2d 678, 682 (1938); Geiselman v. Schmidt, 106 Md. 580, 584, 68 A. 202, 204 (1907). Moreover, in applying the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement, this Court has reiterated that it is the duty of the State to bring the accused to trial, Wilson, 281 Md. at 642, 382 A.2d at 1055; Jones, 279 Md. at 7, 367 A.2d at 6; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2190, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and that “dereliction on the part of the State’s Attorney’s office or the assignment office,” Smith, 276 Md. at 530, 350 A.2d at 634, as well as the State’s failure to locate a defendant, particularly one incarcerated in Maryland, constitutes a breach of that duty, Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 267, 434 A.2d 574, 577 (1981).
According to the majority, the record in State v. Weems and Patton shows, with respect to the 5 November 1981 trial date, that:
“[T]he Assignment Commissioner indicated that the Assignment Office clerk attending the administrative judge’s hearing on October 14,1981, should have seen to it that the necessary data was placed on the form and delivered to the Assignment Office.”
According to the majority, however, the Assignment Office clerk at the 14 October 1981 postponement hearing failed “to follow the normal procedure of filling out the standard postponement form and submitting it to the Assignment *479Office.” Manifestly, the Assignment Office clerk’s failure to follow established procedures evidences a lack of ordinary care. Thus, this conduct constitutes negligence and is a breach of the State’s duty to bring an accused to trial.
Additionally, the record in Weems and Patton shows, as the majority recognizes, that the supervisor in the Assignment Office who initially scheduled the case for trial beyond the statutorily prescribed time period testified that she chose the earliest available date but did not ascertain whether that date was within the prescribed period. She stated that she relied upon the postponement clerk who normally checks to determine whether the trial date is within 180 days. The postponement clerk, however, testified that she did not follow her normal procedure of checking to determine whether the trial date was within the statutorily prescribed time period. Rather, she assumed that the supervisor who had selected the trial date “would have already screened it.” The Assignment Commissioner acknowledged that there had been a “slip up” in his office’s checking of the matter. He indicated that if the personnel in his office had been aware that the trial date had been set beyond the statutorily prescribed time period, an earlier trial date might have been secured. Nevertheless, he said that it was the ultimate responsibility of the State’s Attorney’s Office to monitor the trial dates and to notify the Assignment Office of a problem. For unexplained reasons, the State’s Attorney’s Office did not notify the Assignment Office of any problem. Manifestly, the failure of both the Assignment Office and the State’s Attorney’s Office to follow established procedures evidences a lack of ordinary care. Thus, this conduct constitutes negligence and is a breach of the State’s duty to bring the defendants to trial.
The record in Richardson shows that before a trial set for 7 January 1982, the defendant, Mark Richardson, was in the custody of the State Division of Correction serving a sentence on an unrelated conviction. On the morning of trial, the Division of Correction failed to locate the defendant, then in its custody, and therefore failed to bring him to the *480Circuit Court for Baltimore City for trial. The only explanation offered was that there were three persons named Mark Richardson in the Division’s custody; that the Division “can’t tell which Mark Richardson is which”; and that according to the State’s Attorney, the Division of Correction “inadvertently brought the wrong defendant.”
The administrative judge directed that all three persons named Mark Richardson be brought to the courthouse for a “line up” at which time the defendant could be identified. Additionally, the administrative judge found that the State’s failure to locate the defendant constituted good cause for delay. The Assignment Office set a trial date beyond the statutorily prescribed time period.
The record shows that there was no reason offered to explain why the Division of Correction was unable to determine which of the three persons in its custody named Mark Richardson was the defendant. Nor was there any reason offered to explain why the Division failed to pursue the obvious alternative, pursued by the administrative judge, of bringing all three persons named Mark Richardson to the courthouse on the morning of trial. Moreover, there was no reason offered to explain why the case had been scheduled for trial beyond the statutorily prescribed time period. Indeed, there was no evidence to show that a date within the statutorily prescribed time period was not available.
In my view, in the modern age of numbering systems, data processing, computers, photographs, and fingerprints, it is inexcusable neglect on the part of the Division of Correction not to know at all times the name, identity, and whereabouts of a person entrusted to its custody. That inexcusable neglect, coupled with the Division’s failure to pursue the alternative of bringing all three persons named Mark Richardson to the courthouse on the day of trial, exacerbated by the unexplained failure to schedule the trial within the statutorily prescribed time period, constitutes negligence and is a breach of the State’s duty to bring a defendant to trial.
*481The record shows that in Weems and Patton negligence and a breach of duty on the part of the Assignment Office was the cause of the postponement, and negligence and a breach of duty on the part of the Assignment Office and the State’s Attorney’s Office was the cause of the length of the delay. In Richardson, negligence and a breach of duty on the part of the Division of Correction was the cause of the postponement, and negligence and a breach of duty on the part of the Assignment Office was the cause of the length of the delay. Under these circumstances, the majority’s application of the principle announced in these cases, in my view, establishes that negligence and a breach of duty on the part of the State, in and of itself, constitutes “good cause” for delay.
In my view, the concept that negligence and a breach of duty cannot constitute “good cause” is too elementary to require explication. E.g., Sanders v. Heise, 117 Ariz. 524, 526, 573 P.2d 924, 926 (Ariz.App.1978) (failure of prosecutor’s office to be properly apprised of its trial schedule and availability of witnesses); Johnson v. State, 243 Ark. 812, 813, 422 S.W.2d 417, 418 (1968) (failure of prosecutor’s office to secure presence of defendant incarcerated outside of state); Batey v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.App.3d 952, 957, 139 Cal.Rptr. 689, 693 (1977) (failure of prosecutor’s office to replace unavailable prosecutor with available prosecutor); Jaramillo v. District Court In & For the County of Rio Grande, 174 Colo. 561, 569,484 P.2d 1219,1222 (1971) (failure of prosecuting attorney to proceed because of efforts to obtain defendant’s testimony in other criminal cases); State v. Glaindez, 346 A.2d 156, 157 (Del.1975) (failure of prosecutor’s office to be apprised of unavailability of witness); State ex rel. Smith v. Rudd, 347 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.App. 1977) (failure of prosecuting attorney to provide correct scheduling information); People v. McRoberts, 48 Ill.App.3d 292, 295, 6 Ill.Dec. 274, 275-76, 362 N.E.2d 1096, 1097-98 (1977) (failure of prosecuting attorney to proceed because of mistaken belief that plea bargain was imminent); People v. Powell, 43 Ill.App.3d 934, 936, 2 Ill.Dec. 558, 560, 357 N.E.2d *482725, 727 (1976) (failure of prosecutor’s office to locate defendant incarcerated within state); Holt v. State, 262 Ind. 334, 336, 316 N.E.2d 362, 363 (1974) (failure of prosecuting attorney to explain or give reason for delay); State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Iowa 1973) (failure of prosecuting attorney to explain or give reason for delay); State v. Cranmer, 306 So.2d 698, 701 (La.1975) (failure of prosecuting attorney to explain or give reason for delay); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 371 Mass. 726, 731, 359 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1977) (failure of prosecuting attorney to explain or give reason for delay); People v. Haynes, 5 Mich.App. 641, 648, 147 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1967) (failure of Department of Corrections to inform prosecutor’s office of defendant’s ability to stand trial); State v. Stevens, 189 Neb. 487, 488, 203 N.W.2d 499, 500 (1973) (failure of prosecuting attorney to proceed because of mistaken belief that statutory prompt trial requirements applicable only to prosecutions on indictments and informations and not applicable to prosecutions on complaints); People v. Fuggazzato, 96 A.D.2d 538, 540, 464 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (2d Dept.1983) (failure of prosecutor’s office to transmit required warrant); Commonwealth v. Collins, 266 Pa.Super. 340, 346, 404 A.2d 1320, 1323 (1979) (failure of prosecutor's office to locate defendant); Commonwealth v. Woodson, 248 Pa.Super. 545, 547, 375 A.2d 375, 376 (1977) (failure of prosecutor’s office to secure presence of defendant incarcerated within county); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 247 Pa.Super. 302, 308, 372 A.2d 473, 476 (1977) (failure of sheriff’s office to advise prosecutor’s office that defendant then incarcerated within state had been located); Lyles v. State, 653 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (failure of prosecutor’s office to secure presence of defendant because of mistake by sheriff’s office in processing bail bond); State v. Lindbo, 94 Wash.2d 112, 115, 614 P.2d 1277, 1279 (1980) (failure of prosecuting attorney to explain or give reason for delay). In light of the statutory prompt trial requirement that mandates that all criminal cases be tried within 180 days, except for good cause, the fact that the *483negligence in Weems and Patton and in Richardson may have been isolated instances is immaterial.
In my view, under the present circumstances, the negligence of the State did not constitute good cause for either the postponement or the length of the delay in Weems and Patton and in Richardson. Consequently, there was an abuse of discretion in these cases. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial courts’ judgments granting the motions to dismiss.
IV
Conclusion
In my view, the majority establishes the following four principles today:
1) All criminal cases are to be tried within 180 days except for two percent of the cases.
2) “Chronic court congestion” is “nonchronic court congestion.”
3) “Chronic court congestion” that causes delay is “good cause” for delay.
4) Negligence and a breach of duty on the part of the State is “good cause” for delay.
Even in the year 1984,1 cannot in good conscience subscribe to such principles.

. Art. 27, § 591 provides in pertinent part:
“(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of counsel or the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal matter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the circuit court in which the matter is pending, shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date shall be not later than 180 days from the date of the arraignment of the person accused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving party and only with the permission of the administrative judge of the court where the matter is pending.” (Emphasis added.)

. Md.Rule 746 provides:
“a. General Provision.
“Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723.
“b. Change of Trial Date.
“Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him may grant a change of trial date.”

. E.g., Garrison v. State, 270 Ark. 426, 605 S.W.2d 467, 469 (App. 1980); People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d 557, 571, 606 P.2d 738, 747, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 440 (1980); Arreola v. Municipal Court of Ventura County, 139 Cal.App.3d 108, 114, 188 Cal.Rptr. 529, 532 (1983); State v. Lord, 63 Hawaii 270, 272, 625 P.2d 1038, 1039 (1981); State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983); State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1975); People v. Schinzel, 97 Mich.App. 508, 511-12, 296 N.W.2d 85, 86 (1980); State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 289, 202 N.W.2d 604, 609 (1972); Ordunez v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); State v. Mack, 89 Wash.2d 788, 793-94, 576 P.2d 44, 47 (1978); see also Carr v. District Court In & For the Eighth Judicial District, 190 Colo. 125, 126, 543 P.2d 1253, 1254 (1975).

. Throughout the remainder of this opinion, the term “statutory prompt trial requirements” refers to the requirements embodied in Art. 27, § 591 and Md.Rule 746.

. Courts in other jurisdictions have found that statutory prompt trial requirements were intended to implement the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement. E.g., Stobaugh v. State, 614 P.2d 767, 770 (Alaska 1980); People v. Bell, Colo., 669 P.2d 1381, 1383 (1983); *474Underhill v. State, 129 Ga.App. 65, 66, 198 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1973); People v. Jones, 84 Ill.2d 162, 168, 49 Ill.Dec. 287, 290, 417 N.E.2d 1301, 1304 (1981); State v. Warren, 224 Kan. 454, 457, 580 P.2d 1336, 1339 (1978); State v. Driever, 347 So.2d 1132, 1134 (La. 1977); State v. Wells, 443 A.2d 60, 63 (Me.1982); Commonwealth v. Fields, 371 Mass. 274, 279, 356 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (1976); State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 291, 202 N.W.2d 604, 610 (1972); State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 221, 416 N.E.2d 589, 591 (1980); Jones v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 490, 499, 434 A.2d 1197, 1201 (1981); State v. Wilmot, R.I., 461 A.2d 401, 404 (1983); State v. Mack, 89 Wash.2d 788, 791-92, 576 P.2d 44, 47 (1978); State v. Lacy, 232 S.E.2d 519, 522 (W.Va. 1977).
In addition, the legislative history of the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (1983 Cum.Supp.), indicates that the federal statutory prompt trial requirements were intended to implement the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement. See H.R.Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong.2d Sess., reprinted in, [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7401-05.

. I note that there is nothing in the record to indicate the statistical derivation of the two percent figure.

. Additionally, in my view, in Frazier the unavailability of a court did not constitute good cause for the length of the delay. At the 23 March 1982 hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the statutory prompt trial requirements the trial court said:
“I know my Court has been available on a number of occasions over the crucial period when this case was supposed to be tried____”
There was no reason offered to explain why, under these circumstances, the case had been scheduled for trial beyond the statutorily prescribed time period. Thus, there was nothing to justify the length of the delay.