Court Opinion

ID: 9848673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:24:55.805703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:36.365105
License: Public Domain

Kelly, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I find in the language of the instruments at issue sufficient evidence that the testator did not contemplate or reasonably expect the inclusion of adopted children. I am convinced that almost any layman would conclude that the language used in these trusts would exclude adopted children. Two portions of the will are particularly relevant. Paragraph 13 of the will provides in relevant part:
“* * * [A] fter the death of my daughter, a part of said net income shall be paid to the child or children of my said daughter, issue of her body, until the death of such child or of the last survivor of such children in being at the time of my decease, and, if a/ny be bom after my decease, for an additional period of twenty-one (21) years after the death of said last survivor if any such child or children survive so long; and that, finally, after the respective deaths of said beneficiaries, first above named, *412a part — and, upon the expiration of the period limited for the payments to the children of my daughter, the issue of her body, the whole — of said income shall be paid to the various religious, educational, charitable and philanthropic institutions named in paragraphs Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen of this will, to provide, in perpetuity, for the assistance and maintenance of the work and purposes for which they are respectively authorized to undertake and carry on." (Italics supplied.)
Paragraph 14, item 2, of the will provides, in pertinent part:
“Of said principal of said Trust Estate, I direct that the net income of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) thereof shall be paid by said Trustee to my daughter, LAURA BELLE HUDSON, so long as she shall live, and, upon her death, that said income shall be paid by said Trustee to her children, the issue of her body, until the death of the last survivor of said children in being at the time of my decease, and, if any children be born to my said daughter after my decease, then, for the further period of twenty-one (21) years after the death of said last survivor, if any such after-born child or children shall live so long. Upon the death of the last survivor of all said children, or at the expiration of twenty-one (21) years from and after the death of the last survivor of said children in being at the time of my decease, said net income shall be paid by said trustee to [charitable beneficiary].” (Italics supplied.)
These elaborate provisions appear in substance throughout the will and trusts.
The language of the will and trusts, including the language set forth above, contemplates a single class of child beneficiaries who are carefully and continually described throughout as the issue of the body of Laura Belle Hudson.
I find that the language of these trusts, including the careful and consistent references to “issue of her body”1 as well as ref*413erences in context to children born to Laura Belle Hudson and children in being, evinces an intent to include only natural-born children of Laura Belle Hudson.2
The net result of the majority opinion is that beneficiaries in trusts similar to the ones here in question are in effect given a power of appointment. That power may be exercised by the simple expedient of adopting adults as in the present case. Such adoptive adults might include in-laws, friends, or even persons that the trustor would under no circumstances want as beneficiaries. It should be pointed out that the trustor in this case knew appellants and had he desired that they participate in the trusts, he could have made them contingent beneficiaries. Similarly, if he wanted his daughter to have a power of appointment, he could have so provided. While I personally favor adoptive children being treated equally with “issue of the body,” I think the trustor should make that decision and that in this case it is clear that he did intend to exclude adopted children.
It should be noted that this case presents a further question which this court is not passing on because the trial court held that all private interests in the trusts terminated on the death of Laura Belle Hudson. This decision rendered moot the question of the duration of the trusts. Because the Dodge adult adoptees *414were neither “children” in being at the time of trustor’s death nor born thereafter, some “rewriting” of the will by a court will be necessary to conclude that the trusts extend beyond Laura Belle Hudson’s death. Some of that language is as follows:
“* * * [S] aid net income shall be paid by said Trustee to the children of my said daughter, the issue of her body, until the death of the last survivor of said children in being at the time of my decease, and, if any children be born to my said daughter after my decease, then for the further period of twenty-one (21) years after the death of said last survivor, if any after-born child or children shall live so long. Upon the death of the last survivor of all said children, or at the expiration of twenty-one (21) years from and after the death of the last survivor of said children in being at the time of my decease, said net income shall be paid [to a named charity].” (Italics supplied.)
This portion of the will was no doubt intended to preclude any conflict with the rule against perpetuities. It also had another function — that of determining when the trust would terminate in relation to the non-charitable beneficiary and when the charity would become entitled to the net income from the trust. It seems obvious that neither the scrivener nor the testator contemplated that adopted children would be included under the phrase “the issue of her body.”
I would affirm the trial court’s decision.
Peterson, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Kelly.

 While I am reluctant to rely on the case law of other jurisdictions because of the unique strength of the Minnesota policy in favor of *413adopted children, one case cited by the parties seems relevant. Although Oklahoma has enacted the Uniform Adoption Act, which includes a liberal provision in favor of adopted children, the Oklahoma Supreme Court nonetheless held that the adopted child of testator’s daughter was not “issue of her body.” Moore v. McAlester, 428 P. 2d 266 (Okla. 1967). The court commented: “The phrase ‘issue of her body’ has a clear and well defined meaning. It is not ambiguous or doubtful. It is such a phrase as is customarily used (as distinguished from the word ‘issue’) for one purpose and one purpose only — to exclude adopted children from the class described.” 428 P. 2d 270.

 Appellant would have this court disregard the “issue of her body” language as mere surplusage, by analogy to the trustor’s use of “my beloved” to refer to his daughter, Laura Belle Hudson. I would reject any such analogy.