Court Opinion

ID: 9486611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:54:18.451257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:49.920673
License: Public Domain

*353REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority’s holding that the district court erred in releasing grand jury transcripts to plaintiffs’ counsel in the Empire Motors litigation pursuant to an ex parte petition from the Assistant United States Attorney. I disagree, however, with the majority’s statement that there may be “unusual cases” in which it would be appropriate for the government to employ the ex parte procedure permitted by Rule 6(e)(3)(D) on behalf of a private party. Under a proper reading of Rule 6(e) and its accompanying comments, it is clear that ex parte proceedings are only permissible when the government is the real party in interest or when the government acts on behalf of a state or subdivision thereof.
Rule 6(e) makes a basic division between disclosures at the behest of the government and those at the behest of private parties. Where the government seeks the disclosure of information it can do so at an ex parte hearing. When a private party seeks that same information, the Rule provides precisely the opposite. There must be written notice to interested parties and a reasonable opportunity for them to appear and be heard. By allowing the government to act as the agent for private parties and obtain disclosure for their benefit ex parte, the majority undoes the clear division the Rule establishes between governmental and private parties’ rights and interests in disclosure proceedings, and permits private parties to circumvent the basic safeguards so clearly, established in the Rule.
The majority’s interpretation of Rule 6(e) is based entirely on one subsection of the Rule and one sentence from the relevant comment. The majority notes that the ex parte proceedings described in subsection (e)(3)(D), though limited to instances when the government is the petitioner, are not explicitly limited to instances when the government petitions on its own behalf. The majority also notes that the comment discussing subsection (e)(3)(D) anticipates the government acting as an accommodation to a state agency. What the majority fails to note is equally significant, however.
First, it is notable that there are only three points where Rule 6(e) explicitly provides that a government attorney may aid in the release of grand jury materials as an accommodation for another party: subsection (e)(3)(A)(ii), subsection (e)(3)(C)(iii), and subsection (e)(3)(C)(iv). The first subsection pertains to disclosure to government personnel, including personnel “of a state or subdivision of a state,” the second pertains to disclosure to another federal grand jury, and the third again pertains to disclosure to personnel “of a state or subdivision of a state.” Thus, the only non-federal parties provided for are state parties — there is no provision for disclosure to private parties.
Second,. the majority’s quotation of the comment to Rule 6(e) begins mid-sentence. The phrase omitted by the majority explains why ex parte proceedings might be appropriate when the government is the petitioner, as opposed to other petitioners. It notes that “internal regulations limit further disclosure of information disclosed to the government.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 6, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983 Amendment. As this case exemplifies, there are no such safeguards for materials disclosed to a private party. See majority opinion supra (“Osborne is faced with the possibility of future disclosure of copies in the hands of unknown persons”). Although the comment indicates that ex parte disclosure might be less appropriate when a state agency is involved, the fact that such disclosure might ever be appropriate is indicative of the fact that state parties, unlike private parties, can be assumed generally to have internal controls limiting future disclosure.
In short, although Rule 6(e) and its comment explicitly anticipate government accommodation “of a state or subdivision of a state” — “e.g., a state agency” — nowhere does the Rule provide for the government to petition for ex parte disclosure on behalf of a private party. By stretching Rule 6(e) be*354yond its reasonable limits, the majority’s opinion serves to undermine the important interests protected by grand jury secrecy.1

. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3137, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983).