Court Opinion

ID: 9652686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:30:16.248743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:53.534573
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Since our original opinion was issued in this case, the Supreme Court of the United States has issued an opinion in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). Again, that Court struck down legislation which governed the solicitation of charitable con*793tributions by professional fund-raisers. The North Carolina statute prohibited professional fund-raisers from retaining an “unreasonable” or “excessive” fee according to a three-tiered schedule. A fee up to twenty percent of the gross receipts collected was deemed reasonable. A fee between twenty percent and thirty-five percent was deemed unreasonable upon a showing that the solicitation did not involve the dissemination of information related to public issues. A fee exceeding thirty-five percent was presumed unreasonable, but the presumption could be rebutted upon the fund-raiser showing that the fee was necessary under certain specified standards.
The Court in that case followed its prior holdings in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980), and in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984), and held that using percentages to decide the legality of a fund-raiser’s fee is not narrowly 'tailored to the State’s interest in preventing fraud.
Unlike the three recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, our case does not involve legislation which sets standards based upon a percentage of the fee as related to gross receipts collected, and it does not place any burden on the fund-raiser to show “reasonableness” of a given percentage in order to qualify for a permit or license. It only requires a “truthful disclosure” to those solicited for a charitable contribution. If the city or state is not required to “sit idly by and allow their citizens to be defrauded” as Justice Brennan said, then a simple disclosure to the prospective giver, who should under any test decide what is “reasonable” and what may be “fraudulent” in the fee arrangement, is a least restrictive means of regulation which the courts should approve to protect all charities and all prospective contributors.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.