Court Opinion

ID: 9732421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:19:37.817487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:27.076867
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, P. J.
(dissenting). Unlike the majority, after reviewing the entire evidence in this case, I am not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Surely my colleagues would agree that the trial judge was not mistaken when he noted that “what the whole case narrows down to is believability between two witnesses * * *." The trial judge continued:
“And I have no question in my mind that in the past — as shown — in the past, on occasions, she has been guilty of telling untruths, as have a lot of children.
“However, in this particular case, I can find no strong motive as to why she would want to lie in this particular situation.
“Now, even as to her complaint back when she was ten years old, I am inclined to believe even that, except as to what, perhaps, was finally consummated, as to whether it was rape, or something else, but I feel that something took place back at that time. And, at the same time, I see no reason, Mr. Hubbard, to place any more credibility on your testimony either — I mean, as far as what kind of a citizen you are.
“There is one thing about the case, however, that bothers me, and that is this: Dr. Ries’ testimony. *415I realize that your daughter was not taken to Dr. Kies in the period of time that he would think was necessary to determine whether there was a rape committed here. He said it would he impossible for him to determine that. So, therefore, he couldn’t help the court as to whether he found that there was any sexual intercourse committed here.
“So, I feel that even if we were to give you the benefit of the doubt on that — which I am going to do, is to give you the benefit of the doubt on that— I still feel that there was an assault here with intent to commit rape.
“And as I say, the rape may have been committed, but I’m not going to — I am going to give you the benefit of the doubt that that didn’t happen.”
I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that the trial judge was reluctant to believe the testimony of the prosecutrix. It is clear that the trial judge believed her testimony. Thus, the trial court could have found defendant guilty of rape, since testimony corroborating that of defendant’s daughter was unnecessary. People v. Inman (1946), 315 Mich 456. Had the trial judge found defendant guilty of rape, I would affirm, since I am of the opinion that the record in this case does not reflect the testimony of a thoroughly discredited witness. We should not overlook the special opportunity of the trial court to determine the credibility of those witnesses who appear before it. See GCR 1963, 517.1.
The trial court, however, gave the defendant the benefit of the doubt created by the inconclusive testimony of Dr. Kies. The court stopped short and found that sexual intercourse had not occurred. It is apparent that the trial judge was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that penetration had occurred. This does not, however, compel the conclusion reached by the majority that defendant’s con*416vietion for assault -with intent to commit rape could only have been based upon “improbable theory.”
“It is true that upon this record the proof upon one side shows the completed act of sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 14 years, while upon the other a denial of any offense is made. Under such proof it cannot be denied that a verdict of assault with intent to rape is illogical. But an assault with intent to commit rape is necessarily included in every rape. The defendant’s counsel are alleging, not an injurious error, but one which, if it could be called an error, has resulted to defendant’s advantage.” People v. Miller (1893), 96 Mich 119, 120.
I would affirm defendant’s conviction. People v. Miller, supra; People v. Martin (1919), 208 Mich 109; People v. Bradovich (1943), 305 Mich 329.