Court Opinion

ID: 9545771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:19:25.547973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:32.064841
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
I must dissent from the disposition of this case made by the majority opinion. It is my understanding that the effect of the majority holding, in this instance, is that the district court, sitting in probate, did not abuse its discretion in accepting an appraisal of real property in the estate that was not accomplished according to the statute. I cannot conceive of that approach being anything other than an abuse of the probate court’s discretion. In publishing his Last Will and Testament, the only appraised value James A. McCue could have alluded to is the statutory appraisal. The adoption of an alternative appraisal arrived at in a different manner than that prescribed by statute is antithetical to our established rule that the intent of the testator controls.
The appellant essentially seeks to establish a value for the purpose of exercising an option to purchase real property contained in the Last Will and Testament of James A. McCue. That option is articulated as follows:
“ * * * I hereby direct my Executor hereinafter named to sell all real property which I may own at the time of my death, provided however, my son Robert A. McCue shall have the first right to purchase said real property at its appraised value.”
In accordance with well-established principles of law, the option speaks of the date of the testator’s death.
The statute which governs estate appraisals provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) Within one hundred twenty (120) days after the timely filing by the personal representative of the inventory of assets of the estate of the decedent, pursuant to W.S. 2-7-403, the personal representative shall file under oath a report of appraisal of values of estate assets listed in the inventory. The report shall be in compliance with such of the following requirements as may be applicable: “(i) As to all assets listed in the inventory which have a readily determinable market value, the value of each asset as of date of death shall be stated in writing by one (1) disinterested person;
“(ii) As to all assets listed in the inventory that do not have a readily determinable market value, the personal representative shall employ disinterested persons to determine the fair market value of each such asset, as of the date of death. A separate written report as to the value of each asset, showing the appraiser’s basis for arriving at the value, shall be attached to the report.” (emphasis added) Section 2-7-404, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp.1988).
The statute is clear that the appraisal is to be made as of the date of death which, of course, matches the effective option date articulated in the will.
Consequently, I can find no room for the court to exercise its discretion and adopt a different appraisal, at least in relation to the option. Since, in the context of this appeal, that is the only concern of Robert A. McCue, the case should be reversed and *747remanded with direction that Robert A. McCue’s option is to be exercised, if at all, with respect to the first appraisal made which was as of the date of the testator’s death. While the designation of those appraisers does not match the statute just quoted in all respects, I am satisfied that substantially those appraisers were nominated by the personal representative and, even though court approval was sought, that did not affect the validity of the appraisal that those appraisers furnished.
I am appalled by the suggestion that it is appropriate to adopt an appraisal accomplished by a different method even if agreed upon by the heirs and approved by the court. For me, that is no different from approving a distribution different from that provided by the testator if the heirs agree to it. That does not comport with the law recognizing the power of any person to dispose of his property as he sees fit.
Certainly, if the case were to go beyond the option and the real property were ordered sold at public sale or a private sale apart from the option, I would have no difficulty with the exercise of the discretion of the probate court in doing whatever might be necessary to assure that a fair value was obtained as of the date of the sale. That is not the problem in this case, however, and it should be reversed and remanded with directions to apply, for purposes of the option, the initial appraisal made by Joe W. King, Milton B. Williams, and Robert E. McKee, who appraised the decedent’s interest in the ranch lands at the time of his death at a value of $140,904.31 ($65 per acre). In my judgment, that appraisal established the value at which Robert A. McCue should have the first right to purchase the real property.
This appeal is from an order approving an appraisal, which brings me to a further concern about the case. I am not able to identify any authority from this court which would recognize an order of the probate court accepting an appraisal as a final order pursuant to Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P. It is not such an order as determines the action and prevents a judgment. It is not such an order made in a special proceeding as truly affects a substantial right because the appraisal is not a special proceeding. My analysis causes me to conclude that the order accepting an appraisal is interlocutory in the truest sense, and some further request for relief was required by Robert A. McCue before a final order could be entered. I speculate that perhaps a complaint seeking a declaration of his rights under the will, or an offer to purchase based upon the appraisal followed by a rejection by the personal representative could result in a final order. Consequently, while I have addressed the resolution on the merits made in the majority opinion, my disposition would be to dismiss this appeal as one taken from an interlocutory order that is not a final order as defined in Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P.