Court Opinion

ID: 9957105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:11:50.621207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.291166
License: Public Domain

J-A25008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHAWN LEE WARNER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 274 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-07-CR-0000307-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY COLINS, J.:                      FILED: APRIL 3, 2024

       I fully agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by

denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. I write separately, however, to highlight

that the result here is mandated by the standard outlined in Commonwealth

v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2021), which, under the instant factual scenario,

punishes the Commonwealth for a period of delay over which it had no control.

Rather, during the first half of 2021 when the court system was emerging

from the COVID shutdown, this matter was twice relisted en masse by court

administration. The Commonwealth had no say over that necessary

administrative decision, and that decision put trial past the adjusted run date.

To attribute the resulting delay to the Commonwealth and thereby dismiss the

case pursuant to Rule 600 undermines society’s right to punish and deter

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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crime. Harth, however, obligates us to first review the Commonwealth’s

diligence since the inception of the case, which was prior to the pandemic.

Here, the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of its diligence and,

accordingly, I concur in the result.

      In Harth, the Supreme Court mandated that the Commonwealth must

always demonstrate its due diligence whenever the trial court is a possible

cause of delay, in whatever circumstances. The result is that we must dismiss

proper prosecutions even where the Commonwealth was not at fault and could

have done nothing to speed the case along during the time in question. This

is contrary to the long-standing rule that, “[s]o long as there has been no

misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the

fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, [Rule 600] must be construed

in a manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime.”

Commonwealth        v.   Bradford,      46   A.3d   693,    702    (Pa.   2012);

Commonwealth        v.   Monosky,      511   A.2d   1346,   1348   (Pa.   1986);

Commonwealth v. Genovese, 425 A.2d 367, 371 (Pa. 1981); See also

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238–1239 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc).

      Harth treats all possible court delay as one category and forged a one

size fits all rule. Harth, 252 A.3d at 618 (“we hold that, in ruling on a

defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss, a trial court must first determine

whether the Commonwealth has met its obligation to act with due diligence

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throughout the life of the case; … only then may the trial court rely upon its

own congested calendar or other scheduling problems as justification for

denying the defendant’s motion”). But not all court delay is the same.1 The

rule announced in Harth was reasonable under the circumstances presented

because     there    were    multiple    continuances   of   trial   caused   by   the

Commonwealth and/or the court. See Harth, 252 A.3d at 603-606. Strict

application of Harth is less reasonable, and contrary to developed case law,

where the court is the principal cause of delay.2 For example, delay caused by

court administration scheduling pre-trial events was excludable at the

discretion of the trial court prior to Harth. See Commonwealth v. Mills, 162

A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. 2017) (trial courts “have discretion … to differentiate

between time necessary to ordinary trial preparation and judicial delay arising

out of the court’s own scheduling concerns”). Sometimes the key period of

delay is the application of a court-administered policy transferring a class of

____________________________________________

1 By delay, I refer to any period of time that passes before trial is held and

the cause of it, in the same way as it is used in Speedy Trial jurisprudence.
See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657 (1992) (“Barker made it
clear that ‘different weights [are to be] assigned to different reasons’ for
delay”) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972)). “Justifiable”
court delay in processing the case carries no weight in the balancing. See
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986); Commonwealth
v. Ware, 329 A.2d 258, 264 (Pa. 1974). Court delay caused by docket
congestion carries nominal weight. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531;
Commonwealth v. Hailey, 368 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 1977).

2 Former Rule 600 “was rescinded and new Rule 600 adopted to reorganize

and clarify the provisions of the rule in view of the long line of cases that have
construed the rule.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, comment.

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cases to a specific court for hearing to process all cases more efficiently at the

preliminary hearing stage, which delay was formerly deemed “excusable” to

extend the run date. See Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1104 (“Since the complexity

of this case and the clogged trial court docket are circumstances beyond the

control of the Commonwealth, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that the 82–day period between May 22 and August 12, 2003 is

excusable”). Where the Commonwealth has no ability to affect administrative

scheduling by the court, Harth only creates a windfall for an accused without

meaningfully increasing the incentive or opportunity to hold trial on time.

      This case presents a variation on the administrative (re)scheduling of

court dates. Here, the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County suspended Rule

600 from November 25, 2020, to February 23, 2021, and then tried to address

the backlog of criminal cases. There were too many cases for the March 22

trial list review, and so this case along with “all cases involving non-

incarcerated defendants” were en masse set for the trial list review on May

24, and then this case was “again administratively moved” to the August 2,

2021, trial list review. Maj. Dec. 10. The order relisting the case explicitly

stated that the time attributable to the delay should be charged to the court

for the purposes of an accused’s eligibility for nominal bail. At issue here, is

whether that time, 159 days from February 24 to August 2, 2021, should be

attributed to the court or the Commonwealth for calculating the run period.

Supplementary Trial Court Opinion, 4. The trial court ruled that the delay was

attributable to the court. Indeed, common sense says that the 159 days of

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necessary delay caused by court administration rescheduling the case as the

entire system emerged from the judicial emergency should be attributed to

the court.

      Harth requires a different result. The trial court found a lack of due

diligence by the Commonwealth a year before the period at issue.

Supplementary Trial Court Opinion, 7. More specifically, the trial court found

that the Commonwealth lacked due diligence at the very start of the pandemic

when this case was not listed, by court administration, for the preliminary trial

conference on April 27, 2020, after the formal arraignment had been held on

March 13, 2020. N.T. 6/9/22, 17-18. The testimony from the court

administrator witness was inconclusive as to fault, but established that the

key procedural meeting to ensure proper scheduling likely did not occur during

March and April 2020. N.T. 6/9/22, 19. More importantly, this oversight

occurred when Rule 600 was in fact suspended by the President Judge, from

March 15, 2020, two days after the preliminary arraignment, until June 15,

2020, which was more than six months before the judicially caused delay of

159 days from February 24 to August 2, 2021 at issue in this appeal. Trial

Court Supplemental Order, 3.

      In addition, the trial court ruled the Commonwealth did not calculate

when the “case should be called for trial.” Supplementary Trial Court Opinion,

7. The failure of the Commonwealth to evaluate potential Rule 600 issues in

a given case is a proper factor to weigh in the due diligence inquiry. See

Commonwealth v. Browne, 584 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. 1990). On the issue of

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due diligence, the Commonwealth had the burden of proof. Commonwealth

v. Kearse, 890 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. Super. 2005). As the majority rules, the

Commonwealth “failed to present any evidence or argument that it acted

diligently,” which thereby precludes consideration of the obvious judicial delay

from February 24 to August 2, 2021. Maj. Dec., 12.3

       Harth requires this result, but I believe that the rule in Harth is

overbroad and should not require the Commonwealth to prove its due

diligence with respect to court administration scheduling over which it had no

control and no opportunity to change.4 I concur in the result, because it is the

____________________________________________

3 In evaluating the Commonwealth’s due diligence, the majority recites the
allegations by defense counsel that he made several calls to the assigned
prosecutor in April and May of 2020, and then to the First Assistant District
Attorney in June and July 2020. Maj. Dec. 8. In my opinion, a defense
attorney’s phone call to a prosecutor should not create an obligation on the
prosecutor to do something to demonstrate diligence, because it would only
incentivize defense counsel to make busywork for the prosecution in the hope
of creating a due diligence trap. In this instance, the purpose of the calls, as
described by counsel, were to inform the prosecutor of his belief, based on
“hearsay,” that the complainant wanted to withdraw charges against his client
and to then “resolve” the case. N.T. 6/9/22, 5-7. The Commonwealth is not
obligated to offer a plea deal or to withdraw charges because a complainant
wishes to. Therefore, I believe that it should not be tasked for due diligence
purposes with an obligation to respond to defense phone calls seeking either
result.

4 I note that the Supreme Court may soon give greater guidance on how this

Court and the trial courts should view the intersection of Rule 600 and judicial
emergencies. See Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 719 (Pa. Super.
2023), appeal granted in part, No. 240 MAL 2023, 2023 WL 6416182 (Pa.
Oct. 3, 2023) (“whether a court must assess the Commonwealth’s due
diligence during a worldwide pandemic for purposes of Rule 600 before it
excludes delay attributable to a local judicial emergency during which the
president judge cancelled and suspended all trials”).

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role of this Court to “apply the decisional law as determined by the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania,” Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 986 (Pa. Super. 2019),

and I find no fault in the majority’s application of binding caselaw.

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