Court Opinion

ID: 9571920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:36:15.843428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:10.349399
License: Public Domain

Barrow, X,
dissenting in part.
The evidence was undisputed that the husband purchased the automobile and the furniture, before the parties were divorced, with funds acquired from his salary. His salary was not property acquired by inheritance or gift or from the exchange or sale of separate property. All property acquired during a marriage is marital property unless acquired by inheritance, gift, of from the sale or exchange of separate property. Code §§ 20-107.3(A)(l) and 20-107.3(A)(2). Thus, the evidence established, without the aid of any presumption, that these assets were marital, not separate, property.
The majority disagrees. It concludes that, for purposes of equitable distribution, the parties’ marriage ended, not upon their divorce, but upon their last separation. The controlling statute, however, does not say, nor did the General Assembly intend for it to say, that for purposes of equitable distribution a marriage ends at the time of permanent separation.
Nothing in the statute or elsewhere indicates that “during the marriage” means anything other than the period of time during which the parties are legally married, a period ending upon divorce. Some state legislatures, wanting to describe a different date upon which to terminate consideration of marital property, have expressly done so. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986) (marital *219property is that acquired “during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(l) (1992) (marital property is that acquired “before the date of separation of the parties”); W. Va. Code § 48-2-l-(F)(5)(9) (1992) (separate property is that acquired after the separation of the parties “next preceding the filing of an action” and which “continues . . . without interruption”); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3501(a)(4) (1991) (separate property is that acquired “after final separation until the date of divorce”); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(a) (Burns 1957) (allows division of property acquired before the “date of filing of the petition for dissolution of the marriage); see also 5 Equitable Distribution Journal 37 Endpoint for Accumulation of Marital Property (1988).
The statutory presumption, relied on by the majority, does not provide an endpoint for determining marital property. It requires that one presume that property “acquired by either spouse during the marriage, and before the last separation of the parties . . . is . . . marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is separate property.” Code § 20-107.3(A)(2). This presumption avoids the necessity of proving how property is acquired, if acquired before the last separation. Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 229, 355 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1987). If acquired before the last separation of the parties, it is presumed to be marital property and the party challenging that classification must prove its acquisition by inheritance, gift, or from the exchange or sale of marital property. See id. On the other hand, if acquired after the last separation of the parties, the property is not presumed to be marital and, therefore, must be classified as separate “absent a showing by [the proponent] that marital assets were used to purchase” it. Id.
The majority interprets the absence of a presumption after the separation of the parties as changing the definition of marital and separate property. The majority now classifies such property based upon the quality of the marriage at the time of acquisition, i.e., at a time when “some vestige of the marital partnership continued.” This language is not the language of the statute; it is the language of the majority. The statute defines marital and separate property, whether acquired before or after the date of last separation, solely on the basis of how the property is acquired. The majority, recognizing that the beginning and end of a marriage “is a more complex and dynamic concept than the day on which marital vows are exchanged or a court finally dissolves a marriage,” rewrites the General Assembly’s definition. The General *220Assembly provided only that after the date of last separation, property acquired during the marriage would be marital property; it did not provide that such property would be presumed to be separate property.
In no other context are marital property rights defined in these psychodynamic terms. The law in Virginia has long recognized that rights of a spouse in the property of a deceased spouse are not terminated until divorce. See Gum v. Gum, 122 Va. 32, 39, 94 S.E. 177, 179 (1917); Marshall v. Baynes, 88 Va. 1040, 1044, 14 S.E. 978, 979 (1892). It is anomalous that, although a spouse may retain rights of inheritance in the other spouse’s property, even if acquired after they have separated, such property is not marital property. This inconsistency suggests that the General Assembly, which has expressly terminated statutory rights of inheritance only in a deserting spouse, Code § 64.1-16.3, did not intend to limit marital property to that acquired before the last separation of the parties, regardless of fault. It did not chose to do so, perhaps, for good reason.
The majority’s definition of marital property adds a new battlefield for warring spouses. A divorce is a readily determinable and unequivocal event; the last separation of the parties, when one of them intends that the separation be permanent, is not. In the past, identifying the actual moment when a married couple separated and one formed the intent that the separation would be permanent was of little economic significance. Few were moved to draw a line in the sand over this issue; now, because of the economic consequences flowing from the majority’s holding, many will.
The General Assembly did not intend to create an ambiguity, encouraging litigation, when it defined marital and separate property. On the contrary, in domestic relations disputes the General Assembly has sought less discord, and in this instance has carefully avoided the more ambiguous definitions used by some other states.
Furthermore, the legislature’s definition, unencumbered by the majority’s gloss, better allows a trial court to arrive at an equitable division of property acquired during the marriage. If property acquired during the marriage by means other than gift or inheritance is treated as marital, rather than separate property, a trial court may adjust each party’s equitable interest by considering the contributions each has made to the acquisition and maintenance of the property acquired after the date of last separation, as well as other proper considerations. By limiting marital property to that acquired before the parties’ last *221separation, the majority excludes this property from such adjustment regardless of the contributions of each party to the acquisition or maintenance of the property, or any other proper consideration. On occasion, when both parties are involved in the operation of a business, when they continue to own property jointly, or when one is residing in the house of another, one spouse may contribute to the well being of the other’s property. Although it may be unrealistic to assume that after the parties have separated the marital partnership continues to function as before, it is equally unrealistic to assume that the parties’ affairs are no longer intertwined once they are separated.
For these reasons, I would hold that the undisputed evidence that the husband in this case acquired a new automobile and furniture after the parties separated, but before they were divorced, by means other than gift, inheritance, or in exchange for or from the proceeds of sale of separate property, proved that this property was marital property, and that the trial court erred in classifying it as separate property. I would, therefore, reverse the monetary award and remand the proceeding for reconsideration in light of such a holding.