Court Opinion

ID: 9585578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:48.003704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.084199
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the summary judgment granted by the trial court to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. If the FDIC is attempting to recover from Davidson West on the checks themselves, then it is not entitled to summary judgment because the FDIC has neither placed the checks in evidence nor alleged that it is in possession of the checks. To establish status as a "holder” and sue on a negotiable instrument, possession is the first requirement. Code Ann. § 109A-1 — 201 (20); Lloyd v. Lawrence, 472 F2d 313 (5th Cir. 1973). Although suits to enforce negotiable instruments are among the most suitable types of cases for summary judgment, 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17[8], the FDIC must first establish that it is in possession of the instruments.1 Lloyd v. Lawrence, supra. Because the FDIC has not alleged possession of the checks or placed them into evidence, any determination by either this court or the Court of Appeals about the holder or holder in due course status of the FDIC in particular or of a drawee bank in general is premature.
If the FDIC’s alternative theory of recovery is that West is obligated on the checks as its depositor, then it is still not entitled to summary judgment. Code Aon. § 109A-4 — 401 (1) states that "[a]s against its customer, a bank may charge against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account even though the charge creates an overdraft.” The Official Comment states that the draft itself authorizes payment from the account "and carries an implied promise to reimburse the drawer.” The account was opened in the name of "Davidson-Sarasota,” not Davidson West. The *401true identity of the depositor can not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment; therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct in requiring a trial of the case on this issue.

 Exceptions to the requirement of possession do exist. Code Ann. § 109A-3 — 804; Sheild v. Shields, 269 Ore. 236 (524 P2d 1209) (1974); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Sahadi, 32 Conn. Supp. 172 (345 A2d 53) (1975).