Court Opinion

ID: 9645210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:16:24.04865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:24.974734
License: Public Domain

STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated robbery, where following appel*336lant’s plea of guilty the jury assessed punishment at five (5) years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections.
On original submission, the panel opinion reversed the conviction on the basis of the appellant’s first ground of error that the court erred in permitting the State to ask an improper “have you heard” question while cross-examining one of appellant’s reputation witnesses. On rehearing, the State contends the panel erred in reversing the conviction. Upon further consideration, we agree and grant the State’s motion for rehearing.
Appellant’s initial ground of error is that the “trial court committed reversible error by refusing defendant’s motion for mistrial when the prosecutor asked a ‘have you heard question’ that asserted the truth of matter questioned.”
Burl Loving testified for the defense that appellant’s reputation for being a peaceful and law abiding citizen was good. In his brief, appellant calls our attention to the one question asked which he contends entitled him to a mistrial in view of the objection made. On cross-examination Loving related he had heard that the appellant was absent without leave from the Army because the interrogating prosecutor had told him so the day before. The witness was then asked:
“Q If it were shown to you that in fact he was absent without leave from the Army, would that cause you to change your opinion about him?
“MR. VICK (Defense Counsel): Your. Honor—
“A None whatsoever, sir—
“MR. VICK: —I object.
“A —because he was a good worker. Okay?
“MR. VICK: Excuse me. Your Hon- or, I will have to object again because that’s a different question and that’s an improper phrase of the question and it assumes something as being true, whereas a question is not supposed to, and I would ask the Jury to be instructed to disregard it, and I further move for a mistrial at this time and ask you to instruct the — ”
Counsel later repeated “not a proper phrasing” objection. The court then overruled the objection, the motion to instruct the jury to disregard, and the mistrial motion. The question set out above was the only question asked Loving to which the objection, now the basis of the appeal, was made and where a mistrial motion was requested.
To better understand the setting in which the question was asked and the objection made, we must begin with the State’s casein-chief. The record shows that the robbery was committed by a man who had a sawed-off rifle and who was wearing a gorilla mask. John Downey, apparently an uncle of appellant’s by marriage, testified for the State that he owned a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle and a gorilla mask and that he had not see such items since July 26, 1978 (the day of the alleged robbery). They were missing from his house. On cross-examination, appellant elicited from his uncle that his (appellant’s) reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was good. On re-direct examination, Downey was asked, “. . . Have you heard that Donald Pemberton in fact is absent without leave from the Army, have you heard that?” Appellant objected to the question on the ground “as not being a character trait for a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.” 1 The objection was overruled. The witness answered the question “No.”
After the State rested its case, the appellant called Burl Loving as a reputation witness as noted above. After he testified that appellant’s reputation was good, the record on cross-examination shows:
*337“Q Now, I’m going to ask you a question—I guess you and I both know the answer to this—have you heard that Donald Pemberton in fact is absent without leave from the Army?
“MR. VICK (Defense Counsel): Your Honor, can I have a running objection to this question that I made earlier?

******

“THE COURT: I will grant you a running objection to that question.
* * * * * *
“Q All right. Mr. Loving, have you heard that?
“A I did not hear that until I heard it from you yesterday, sir.”
Thereafter, the question about whether the witness would change his opinion and on which the appellant based his ground of error followed as set out in the beginning of this opinion.
In Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this court stated the rule for cross-examining reputation witnesses. The State is permitted to ask such witness if he has heard of a specific act of misconduct of the defendant. However, the State may not ask whether the witness has personal knowledge of the act (did you know . ?), nor may the question be framed so as to imply that the act has actually been committed—an assertion of the truth of the matter.
The first so-called “have you heard” question asked Loving was improper as an assertion of the truth of the matter. The State so concedes. However, the objection to the question was not on that basis. Appellant only asked for a running objection “to this question that I made earlier.” The objection taken by itself is a general objection and presents nothing for review. Certainly the question had not been previously asked the witness Loving. If it can be tied into the question asked Downey and the objection then made, it should be observed that such objection was not that the “have you heard” question was improperly phrased as asserting the truth of the matter, but on the basis that “have you heard” questions should not be extended to specific acts of misconduct such as A.W.O.L. See Pace v. State, supra. Thus, the so-called “have you heard” first question directed to Loving was not objected to on the ground now urged on appeal.
We do not understand appellant to contend that the overruling of his objection to the “first” question to Loving calls for reversal. He does not even mention it in his brief. His ground of error is directed to the second question—“If it were shown to you that in fact he was absent without leave from the Army, would that cause you to change your opinion about him?” The form of the question objection was overruled as to this interrogation, as well as the motion for mistrial. It is observed that the question also came after the witness testified he had heard appellant was A.W.O.L. because the prosecutor had so informed him the day before. It did not assert the truth of matter stated. The inquiry was simply if an A.W.O.L. was proven would this change the opinion stated by the witness as to appellant’s objection. We cannot characterize the question as a “have you heard” question asserting the truth of an A.W.O.L. or as a “did you know” question. Whatever question of propriety may be raised concerning the interrogation, the objection directed against the particular question is without validity. Appellant’s contention is without merit.
In his second ground of error, appellant contends the court erred in refusing his motion for mistrial due to improper jury argument by the prosecutor. He contends the prosecutor was arguing outside the record when he stated that officer Danny Cobb had not promised the appellant probation as he (Cobb) knew from dealing with the District Attorney’s office that it would not recommend probation.
The record shows that on cross-examination Cobb denied that he had promised appellant probation if he cooperated with the police. Fellow officer Jerry Galler denied on cross-examination that he heard Cobb promise the appellant probation. In his testimony, appellant never claimed he was promised probation by Cobb, but stated he fully cooperated with the police. In his jury argument, appellant’s counsel stated:
*338“I don’t think anybody, any witness who got on the stand told you a lie. I just flat don’t think so. I don’t think a single one for the State or for the Defendant. I think there were some mistakes; one, that Danny Cobb said he didn’t tell him that he would get probation. I think Donald remembered that and it’s more important to Donald . . .”
Appellant’s counsel was in effect asserting that the appellant had testified as to a promise of probation when he had not.
In discussing whether a promise of probation had been made, the prosecutor subsequently stated:
“. . . and he knew when the police picked him up, I think he knew in his heart that it was over, that the best thing that he could do would be to cooperate. He tells you that Danny Cobb promised him probation. Danny Cobb told you that he did not promise probation. Danny Cobb would know from his dealings with our office that we would not recommend probation. He testified he made no such promise. It has never been the policy of our office to recommend probation for—
“MR. VICK: Objection, Your Honor, that’s outside of the record.
“MR. BAYS (Prosecutor): Your Hon- or, the Defense Counsel testified outside of the record when he testified to—
“THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection.
“MR. VICK: Your Honor, we ask — I will ask that the Jury be instructed to disregard it.
“THE COURT: The Jury will be instructed to disregard.
“MR. VICK: And I ask for a mistrial.
“THE COURT: Your mistrial motion is denied in all things.”
The State argues that its argument was invited, and that where the defense counsel goes outside the record in argument the prosecutor is permitted to go outside the record in response thereto. Reynolds v. State, 505 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). However, such invitation does not grant to the prosecution a license to stray beyond the scope of the invitation. Kincaid v. State, 534 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Appellant’s counsel argued that while officer Cobb had testified he had not promised probation he was mistaken, and going outside the record counsel told the jury that appellant remembered otherwise as it was important to the appellant. He thus sought to discredit Cobb’s testimony. In response the prosecutor not only recalled Cobb’s testimony, but in order to bolster such testimony, went outside the record to state Cobb knew the policy of the prosecutor’s office as to probation and then started to state that policy. It clearly appears that such argument was invited by appellant’s counsel and was within the scope of the invitation and pertaining to the same subject matter — the correctness or truthfulness of Cobb’s testimony. Even if it could be argued that the prosecutor’s argument was not within the scope of the invitation, it is observed that the court sustained appellant’s objection to such argument and instructed the jury to disregard the argument. The error, if any, was cured by the action of the trial court. Bolding v. State, 493 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The court did not err in denying the mistrial motion.
State’s motion for rehearing is granted. The judgment is affirmed.
ODOM, J., concurs in the result.

. See Pace v. State, 398 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. Cr.App.1965) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing); Gaines v. State, 481 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). In Pace it was held that inquiries made by the State upon cross-examination of character or reputation witnesses at the trial of a defendant for driving while intoxicated as to whether the witness had heard that the defendant was charged with being A.W. O.L. was prejudicial and tended to deprive him of a fair trial.