Court Opinion

ID: 9545427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:12:14.458307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:45.953446
License: Public Domain

Manoukian, J.,
dissenting:
This is an appeal involving a claim for personal injuries by plaintiff-appellant, Susan E. Nehls, which arises out of an accident which occurred at the intersection of Desert Inn Road and Paradise Road in Las Vegas. The impact occurred when the automobile driven by defendant-respondent, Claire V. Leonard, followed by a vehicle driven by one Launius, in which appellant was a passenger, attempted to negotiate right hand turns from the west bound lanes of Desert Inn Road, northbound on to Paradise Road. Both vehicles were in a right-turn traffic lane which was defined by a triangular concrete island. Respondent’s vehicle stopped initially and then progressed forward, with the Launius vehicle doing likewise. The accident occurred when the preceding vehicle stopped for a second time and the Launius vehicle failed to similarly stop.
The majority opinion states, inter alia that “it appears factual issues exist as to whether respondent was negligent in stopping as she did, and as to whether such action proximately caused appellant’s injury. At a trial, the evidence may persuade the jury that respondent Leonard stopped suddenly and without adequate warning, that the stop unnecessarily exposed appellant to unreasonable risk, and that the stop constituted a substantial factor in causing the collision in which appellant sustained injuries.’’ I cannot agree, and for the following reasons, dissent.
The salient facts are uncontroverted and the issue that I perceive to be before us is the interpretation given to these facts. It *330is clear to me that respondent was driving carefully, making the turns in the turn-off of the right hand traffic lane and was observing approaching traffic on Paradise Road, which is a heavily traveled thoroughfare in Las Vegas.
Appellant’s assertion that respondent’s negligence in coming to a second stop is the sole cause of the collision, is simply without factual or legal support. Both appellant and respondent have characterized the respondent’s vehicle’s second stop as sudden. Even so, both vehicles were moving quite slowly, appellant herself discerned the potential for the rear-end collision and timely brought her concern to the attention of Ms. Launius. It is undisputed that Launius was not attentive to respondent’s vehicle. Moreover, it is apparent from appellant’s own testimony given during the taking of her deposition, that Ms. Launius turned her head to look to the left and simply was not able to react quickly enough to the second stop of respondent’s vehicle. Launius’ own deposition testimony is consistent with that of appellant. Finally, the evidence shows that respondent’s rear brake lights were on, signalling the second stop. This satisfies the requirement of NRS 484.345. Appellant cannot successfully contend that the second stop was unanticipated. Rhoades v. DeRosier, 546 P.2d 930, 933 (Wash.App. 1976); Miller v. Cody, 252 P.2d 303, 305 (Wash. 1953).
There are circumstances in which the physical setting itself provides sufficient notice to obviate the need for a signal. I believe that the instant case presents such an obvious instance. Even had there been no oncoming traffic, in view of the heavily travelled thoroughfare in question, I do not believe that respondent’s second stop to double check violated any duty owed to appellant. Indeed, it was a reasonable act. See Massingille v. Meridith, 408 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky.App. 1966) (directed verdict for defendant).
On this record, I, as was the case with the trial court, am unable to find any evidence of negligence on the part of respondent in making the second stop. It is also determinable from the undisputed facts that the vehicle in which appellant was riding was negligent in following too close to respondent’s vehicle and not being attentive to respondent’s vehicle, rather than looking to the left until she was certain that respondent had entered the thoroughfare and was proceeding therefrom. Folse v. Spruell, 203 S.2d 908, 911 (La.App. 1967). Moreover, it is the second, not the lead driver, that has the primary duty of avoiding a collision. See Jarboe v. Pine, 366 P.2d 783 (Kan. 1961); Miller v. Cody, 252 P.2d 303, 305.
In my view, the driver of the second vehicle had the obligation to maintain a very close look-out for a sudden stop by the *331preceding driver, or, borrowing the language of NRS 484.319, which governs vehicles entering intersections not controlled by police officers or traffic lights, to “proceed cautiously.” Again, the second stop cannot be said to be unanticipated. Rhoades v. DeRosier, 546 P.2d at 933. I believe that respondent met, but Launius failed to meet, the reasonable motorist test. See Ewing v. Izer, 412 P.2d 795, 797 (Ore. 1966). The trial court properly concluded that the driver of the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident.
No genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial on the merits. NRCP 56(c). Compare Gunlock v. New Frontier Hotel, 78 Nev. 182, 370 P.2d 682 (1962) (evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish negligence and proximate cause). Accordingly, I would affirm the lower court’s order granting summary judgment to respondent.