Court Opinion

ID: 9809944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:34:45.3322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:14.212373
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.,
dissenting.
In 1878 the plaintiff (now a feme sole), being then a married woman, residing in South Carolina, united with her husband in the conveyance of the land in question, which has since become valuable, the town of Star bejng built thereon. She now seeks to recover the land. The deed was executed to one Hursey, his heirs and assigns, and contains a covenant of warranty of title to said Hursey, who has since conveyed by deed with warranty to these defendants and others who have improved the property which was stated on the argument to be now worth some $40,000.
The deed by plaintiff and husband recited the receipt of the purchase-money, some $130, the payment of which is not denied. In South Carolina the wife was then, and is now, fully empowered to make any contract with reference to her separate estate, and the doctrine of estoppel applies to married *109women. Crenshaw v. Julian, 26 S. C., 283; 4 Am. St. Rep., 719; Rigbee v. Logan, 45 S. C., 651. In that State a married woman can convey realty or malee any contract, not only without privy examination, but without the joinder or assent of her husband. Rev. Stat. 1893, Secs. 101, 102, 108; Rev. Stat. 1873, Secs. 104, 105, 111, and Chap. C, Secs. 1, 2, 3, of same. The privy examination not having been taken according to the requirements of our statute, and the land lying in this State, the deed was improperly admitted to registration here, and as, until recently, the statute of limitation did not run against married women, the long undisturbed possession by her grantee and these defendants, did not ripen what was a just and honest title.
But while the deed was not legally registered here, the contract of conveyance and the contract of warranty of title were valid in South Carolina where made, and being valid there, are valid everywhere else. The personal contract is enforcible everywhere if valid where made. 11 A. & E. Ency. L., 402, 415 (2d Ed.) ; Wood v. Wheeler, 111 N. C., 231; Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N. C., 377.
We have express authority that a covenant of warranty by a married woman, which, good as a personal contract, because competent according to the law of the place of contract, is good and enforcible as a personal contract, though the deed was void as a conveyance in the State where the land lay. Railroad v. Conklin, 29 N. Y., 587; 11 A. & E. Ency. L., 402 (2d Ed.). In Basford v. Pearson, 89 Mass., 504, a deed was executed by a married woman residing in Massachusetts for land lying in New Hampshire. It was properly executed according to the laws of Massachusetts, but not according to the laws of New Hampshire. The Court held that the married woman was estopped by her covenant of warranty, and says: ‘‘The covenant may be good and valid and' effectual against the party making it, if she is duly authorized to contract in *110that manner, although the deed in which it is cQntained might not be sufficient under the laws of another State to convey the lands therein situate.”
And such is the universally recognized law. A married woman is estopped by her covenant of warranty in all cases where she is competent to contract according to the law of the place of contract. Harris on Contracts of Married Women, page 267, Sec. 318; Kolls v. DeLeyer, 41 Barb., 208; Richmond v. Tibbles, 26 Iowa, 474.
In Zimmerman v. Robinson, 114 N. C., 39, Avery J., says: “The right, with the concurrence of her husband, to execute conveyances as if she were a feme sole has been held to empower her to create a lien upon her separate real estate (Alexander v. Davis, 102 N. C., 17; Newhart v. Peters, 80 N. C., 166), and if the Courts are to allow her deed to operate to any extent, as if she were not under coverture, it must be conceded that the power to convey carries with it, by implication as an incident, the liability to estoppel by the covenants usually contained in conveyances.”
In Armstrong v. Best, 112 N. C., 59 (34 Am. St. Rep., 473), (25 L. R. A., 188), the married woman was domiciled in this State and made, while temporarily in Maryland, a contract valid there, but invalid here. It was held, when sued in this State, that being resident here, she would receive the protection of the disability imposed by our law, but the Court was careful to approve the general rule laid down in Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N. C., 377, that the “validity of a contract (of a married woman) is to- be determined by the law of the place wheie the contract is made, and if valid there it is valid everywhere,” and further cites with approval Robertson v. Quenn, 87 Tenn., 445; 3 L. R. A., 214; 10 Am. St. Rep., 690, which held that where a married woman domiciled in Kentucky made a contract valid there, recovery could be had thereon in Tennessee, though the same contract made by a *111married woman 'domiciled in Tennessee would be void. That case is on all-fours with. this.
Upon the authorities above cited from our own reports and the uniform decisions of other States, the contract made by the plaintiff in South Carolina having been valid there, is valid here. The deed of conveyance is invalid here, because forms requisite to authorize its registration here are lacking. But the contract of conveyance (not contract to convey) is valid, and when the plaintiff seeks'to disregard it and take back the land, her valid contract that she “has conveyed” is a complete answer to her in a Court of Equity, and the defendants claiming under a deed from Hursey are privies thereto. Certainly when the plaintiff has made an admittedly valid contract-.that, in consideration of receipt of the purchase^ money, she has conveyed to Hursey and has put him in possession, and has acquiesced in that possession since 1818, she can not be allowed by a Court of Equity to put him and his grantees 'out and recover by violating her valid contract, $40,000 worth of property, when she has stood by so many years and allowed others to build upon and add great value thereto. If the plaintiff had put Hursey into possession with a valid contract reciting she had conveyed and would warrant the title, and acknowledged receipt of the purchasermoney, she could not, under the present system, combining law. and equity, recover possession because she had not executed a deed, and the defendants axe in no worse condition because a defective deed was superadded.
This is not the case of such a contract made by a married woman domiciled here as to whom the contract would be invalid. Nor do the cases as to one purchasing with notice of our statutes of disability as to married women apply; for here the purchaser knew that the law of South Carolina rendered valid the conveyance and the contract contained in the deed. The conveyance became ineffectual in this State by *112reason of our registration laws requiring proof of her assent by a privy examination, but, by all tbe authorities, the contract of conveyance being valid there when she seeks to recover the land in our Courts by reason of the defect in the deed, a Court of Equity will refuse her the possession of the,land, in violation of her valid contract that she has conveyed it and received the purchase-money. The cases as to enforcing an executory contract of a married woman have no application. The deed is defective for the non-observance of the mode of proof of execution of the deed which is required by our statutes, and which governs the registration of titles to realty in our State, but the .contract that she has conveyed and acknowledged receipt of the purchase-money is an executed contract, as is also the contract of warranty.
A second ground which also defeats the plaintiffs! recovery i's, that the execution of the contract, the receipt of the purchase-money, the putting ITursey in possession, and the standing by while defendants (in privity with ITursey) have held possession ever since 1818, and built upon and improved the property, constitute an estoppel in pais against this plaintiff who was competent to contract, and is estopped by matter in pais in South Carolina as fully as if she had remained a feme sole, or as if she were a man. (Even if domiciled in this State, a married woman is, by virtue of Chapter 617, Laws 1901, responsible for buildings put upon her own land by her consent.) When her conduct would be a complete estoppel upon her, had she sued in her own forum, she can not be relieved from that estoppel by suing in ours.
There is still a third defense: She contracted with ITursey by a perfectly valid and binding contract, that she would warrant and defend this title. Had she sued in South Carolina, that would be binding on her, and she can not shake off and vitiate such personal contract, which our authorities hold to be valid here when valid there, by suing in our Courts. To *113this the technical objection is made that snch contract being to Hnrsey, without the addition of the words, “heirs and assigns,” it does not run with the land, and, therefore, the defendants do not take benefit under it. By the Statute of Anne, Revised Code, Chap. 43, now Section 1334 of The Code, warranties are now held personal covenants, and a warranty which would prevent the plaintiff from recovering the realty from Hnrsey would prevent her getting it back from these defendants who hold under him. This is not an action by the defendants against the plaintiff for breach of her contract with their grantor, but sued by her to recover the rem, the title of which she had warranted by a contract which she was competent to make, they set up that warranty to Hnrsey (under whom they hold) as a defense, being in privity with him, and entitled to the protection of such defenses as would have prevented a recovery against him, had he remained in possession.
“Covenants which run with the land lie for or against the assignee at common law, though not named. Bally v. Wells, 3 Wills, 25. * * * Covenants that do not run with' the land may be assigned in equity to enforce them by action in the name of the covenantee to use of assignee. 1 Smith Leading Cases, 179; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall., 571. * * * If this covenant had not passed with the estate in the land, the conveyance would operate as an equitable assignment of his (grantor’s) interest in it and of his right to enforce it in his name to her.” Hager v. Buck, 44 Vt., 290; 5 Am. Rep., 368.
“For a covenant which runs with the land, an action lies for or against the assignee at common law, although the as-signee be not named in the covenant. Citing Cro. Eliz., 553 ; 1 Ro. Rep., 359; Cro. Car., 221.” Bally v. Wells, 3 Wills., 25 (1769). To same effect, Willard v. Tayloe, supra.
In Coleman v. Bresnahan, 61 N. Y., 622, it is said:
*114‘'Equity for the purposes of justice repudiates the distinction between covenants which do and do not run with the land.” in Trustees v. Lynch, 70 N. Y., 449 ; 26 Am. Rep., 615, it is said: “Whether it was a covenant running with the land or a collateral covenant, or a covenant in gross, or whether an action of law could be sustained upon it, is not material as affecting the jurisdiction of a Court of 'Equity.”
In Wead v. Larkin, 54 Ill., 489 ; 5 Am. Rep., at page 153, the Court says: “Our conclusion is that where the cove-nantee takes possession and conveys, the covenant of warranty in the deed to him will pass to his grantee.”' Doty v. Railroad, Tenn.; 48 L. R. A., 160, is a recent case where the subsequent grantee of the land was held liable on a covenant in the conveyance, though the covenant did not refer to “assigns.” In Miller v. Railroad, 132 U. S., 691, it is held that where (as in this case) the habendum is to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, this is not restricted by a more limited warranty following, and the grantor and his heirs are estopped to set up an adverse claim against the grantee.
In' the more or less distant past, there was a highly technical distinction, resting upon feudal reasons long since extinct, between covenants running with the land and not running with the land. As stated in several of the above cases, this distinction is not recognized by Courts of Equity, when to do so would work injustice. It certainly should not be allowed that effect (even if the defendants’ case depended upon that one proposition) in a case like this, where the plaintiff was equally competent by the lex loci contractus to make a valid contract of conveyance, a valid contract of warranty and a valid deed, and where she received the purchase-money, put her grantee in possession, stood by for seventeen or eighteen years without objection, allowed the defendants to improve the property, and now when it has become worth probably $40,000, seeks to get it back with this enormously increased value, in spite of her enforcible contract to warrant the title. *115Had she sued in ber own Courts, this would bare been a valid defense, and when sbe comes into our Courts ber contract made in South Carolina is equally valid against ber bere as in. South Carolina, though the deed proves invalid, because .not executed with the formalities as to proof of execution required by our statute as a prerequisite to registration. The defense. is in equity, not at law, and a contrary result would be so unjust as to shock the moral sense.
It must also be noted that, though the deed is invalid because proof of its execution is not as required by our statute, the contract of the married woman, 'even if she had been resident in this State, is valid to affect either her real or personal estate (having been made with assent of her husband) by the very terms of our statute. Code, Sec. 1826.
If there is any precedent anywhere which can be construed to countenance the plaintiff’s recovery, there is no better time to repudiate it than now. A precedent so mischievous and subversive of every element of natural justice should not be left standing, upon which to ask the judgment of a court which will work such an injustice. In the very recent ease of Thompson v. Taylor (17 June, 1901), decided by the highest Court in New Jersey, 49 Atl., 544, that Court holds, reversing the Supreme Court of that State, that where a married woman, domiciled in New Jersey, executes a note to her husband, invalid in New Jersey, which is taken by her husband, with her acquiescence, to New York and there endorsed by him and delivered, this became a New York contract, and, such contract being valid in New York, the liability of the wife will be enforced in New Jersey. This case is much stronger than ours and is a full discussion by a very able Court, showing how completely the doctrine of the legal nonentity and legal incapacity of women is now discredited, even in those States whose laws still retain some trace of it.
Precedents, even when unbroken and admitted, are not to be *116preferred or continued when they work a patent and undeniable wrong.
Upon the facts found, judgment should have been entered for the defendants.