Court Opinion

ID: 9706111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:31:45.519389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:50.511587
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting.
Upon considerable contemplation of the instant dispute and of the majority’s resolution of it, I must express my inability to join their disposition in the present case. Although I readily agree with their conclusion that the statutory provisions governing the imposition of probationary *157sentences will not allow the order of forfeiture, I would go another step forward and indicate my opinion that the result cannot follow under the guise of common law forfeiture either.
As a starting point it cannot escape notice that there is a strong sense of suspicion emitted in the majority’s opinion regarding the logical and legal soundness of some of the earlier precedent to which the majority now, in apparent reluctance, submits to. Such faithfulness to the concept of stare decisis is to be commended yet, in my opinion, the majority is perhaps more deferential to this concept than is necessary considering the facts of this case.
First of all, it can be readily discerned from a review of the majority’s opinion that the decisions of the Superior Court on the issue in question are in conflict to a significant degree. The majority asserts at page 239 of their opinion, that there is a “difference of opinion” in the Superior Court, as evidenced by the opinions in Petition of Maglisco, 341 Pa.Super. 525, 491 A.2d 1381 (1985), and Estate of Peetros v. County Detectives, 341 Pa.Super. 558, 492 A.2d 6 (1985), as to whether derivative contraband must be forfeited or is merely forfeitable. Although left out of this particular discussion, the majority had previously noted the Superior Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Schilbe, 196 A.2d 361, 175 A.2d 539 (1961), decided previous to Peetros and Maglisco, which held that derivative contraband could not be forfeited absent statutory authority. Thus, it would seem that any course of action taken by us in the present case, short of certification to the court en banc, would run afoul of some prior authority. This is a rather ironic scenario as the majority’s opportunity to pledge allegiance to the doctrine of stare decisis is apparently occasioned only upon the apparent refusal of prior panels of this court to do the same. Consequently, under the present circumstances, the majority’s loyalty to prior precedent takes on an appearance of selective, and perhaps even expedient, application of stare decisis rather than some sort of faithful and principled adherence to it. Further, in light of the conflict of authori*158ty and the majority’s own expressed reservations on the logical and legal underpinnings of the cases authorizing forfeiture under the present circumstances, it is indeed rather dubious to suggest that stare decisis requires homage be paid to the suspect authority. It seems that the present circumstances present one of the rare situations when departure from the principle is not only allowable but, perhaps, advisable or necessary; particularly when the weight of the authority, as the majority seems to concede, contrasts with the authority the court feels compelled to follow.
I am further confused, to a degree, by the majority’s belief that they must follow certain prior precedent, yet feel free to embark upon a pronouncement of extensive procedures and standards for determining questions of forfeitability as part of the court’s responsibility to define this area of common law. This effort is really nothing short of judicial legislation and appears, to me at least, as invasive and out of place, if not more, than simply exercising the court’s more accepted ability to limit the reaches of a common law rule. This is not to say that I am against the intent of the majority in this endeavor. I would welcome the changes espoused by the majority far more so than I would a pronouncement that the vehicle must be forfeited. However, I feel that the majority must reach as far to make the pronouncements and changes they do as would be required to simply find that the vehicle is not subject to forfeiture under the circumstances presented. Furthermore, the pronouncements made by the majority simply do not go far enough and could quite possibly create a whole new set of problems. For instance, the majority appears to be establishing a rule that if the vehicle is found to be “derivative contraband” the decision of whether or not it will be forfeited will be left to the discretion of the trial court considering all the facts of relevance. In the present case, this practice would appear to be a mere formality preceding an order of forfeiture. Most of the factors suggested for consideration by the majority were in fact *159made aware to the trial court and the trial court responded with a sua sponte order of forfeiture. Certainly the same result is possible, if not likely, to follow a remand here. Further, should forfeiture be ordered after the majority’s course is followed, to what degree will the forfeiture determination be reviewable and what standard of review will apply? Will the trial court’s determination be subject to review by the appellate courts and, if so, what will the appellate courts need to find to upset the order of forfeiture?
My concerns regarding this area of law actually begin with a rather fundamental aspect of it, the definition given to derivative contraband. Although well supported by the majority, in terms of case law, I have considerable difficulty with the definition expressed in the majority’s opinion. If, as here, a legally possessed piece of property is used in the commission of a crime, describing it as “derivative” contraband appears to be a true misnomer. The property, as such, is not “derived” from illegal activity at all, as the term would seem to suggest. Rather only the contraband status itself could possibly be said to be derived from the illegal activity. More correctly, the property could possibly be considered “associative” contraband, as the lawfully possessed property becomes guilty by its association with the commission of a crime. However, calling it derivative contraband seems to be rather inappropriate. I make this commentary because it appears to me intuitively speaking, that, there is a substantial difference between considering one’s lawfully possessed property contraband because of a transitory connection with an illegal act, and considering gains derived from an illegal act or enterprise contraband, as the term seems to more correctly imply.
It is a well established principle in our jurisprudence that one should not be allowed to profit from an illegal act. Thus, gains from an illegal act or enterprise would seem to be properly forfeitable, thus qualifying it as contraband (of a derivative nature). However, to allow the fruits of honest labor to be forfeited seems to be another proposition alto*160gether. Our founders did insist, after all, that we not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Their belief that individuals should be secure in their possessions obviously played a part in the inclusion of this language. Thus, although there may indeed be circumstances where forfeiture of property due to its association with or utilization in an illegal act would offend neither concepts of due process nor justice, certainly such circumstances are far more limited than a situation where the forfeited property is derived from illegal acts or an illegal enterprise. It is entirely possible that the term derivative contraband has been used loosely enough over the years to bring within its scope a classification of property not properly includable within it so as to legitimize a type of forfeiture that should be utilized only very sparingly. It is this development with which I have great difficulty. In fact, only a few of the reported cases really apply the principle utilized by the majority here.
Many of the reported forfeiture cases have resulted in the forfeiture of derivative contraband. However, they were more representative of a true “derivative” contraband situation. Some of these cases hinged upon a question of lawful possession of the property as opposed to those which rested upon mere usage of the property in an illegal act. In these cases, the items of property in question were not contraband per se. However, just as surely, like contraband items, there were impairments to a claim of good or lawful title. Commonwealth v. Doranzo, 365 Pa.Super. 129, 529 A.2d 6 (1987), is perhaps most representative of these cases. In Doranzo the petitioner was seeking a return of items which were found to be stolen. Thus, it would appear, in that case, the forfeiture was essentially predicated upon the fact that, under thqse circumstances, the petitiener ceuld not claim a legitimate right of possession to this property. They were not items to which the petitioner had legitimate title but lost due to their usage in the commission of a *161crime.1
Similar to a large degree are the cases of Sugalski v. Cochran, 365 Pa.Super. 370, 529 A.2d 1104 (1987), Commonwealth v. Landy, 240 Pa.Super. 458, 362 A.2d 999 (1976), and Commonwealth v. Coghe, 294 Pa.Super. 207, 439 A.2d 823 (1982). Sugalski, which did not find a successful forfeiture, and Landy are most similar to a true derivative contraband situation and are, therefore, perhaps even more instructive. At issue there, were the alleged monetary proceeds of illegal gambling and drug selling transactions. Of course, to the extent the money could be proven to have been derived from such illegal activity, the petitioners would be hard pressed to establish a right to its return. Coghe is also somewhat similar in that the money sought to be returned was the product or consideration of an illegal contract. It is logical to assume that to the same extent one could not enforce performance of or sue for the default of such a contract in civil court (the murderer, had he performed the act, would be unable to sue the conspirator for nonpayment of the contract) one would be unable to seek return of the money in a Rule 324 context either.2 Thus, in Coghe, there was also a question of right of possession. With these cases separated from the rest, only Estate of Peetros and Petition of Maglisco can be said to have involved situations similar to the present one.
*162In both Maglisco and Peetros, the property found forfeitable was used in the commission of a crime, thus, providing the basis for the forfeiture. And, like the present case, the property was neither derived from the illegal act, nor was there a question of lawful title. Nevertheless, and apparently without regard to the Schilbe decision, the property was found to be derivative contraband and subject to forfeiture. The majority finds this authority materially indistinguishable and, thus, follows it despite expressed reservation. This is where I part company with the majority, I do believe there is a material difference between Maglisco, Peetros and the present case.
In Maglisco, supra, we discussed Schilbe, Landy and Coghe, as well as common law forfeiture, and concluded that Landy and Coghe implied, contrary to Schilbe, that forfeiture was allowable without statutory authority. Yet, even in Maglisco the problems of common law forfeiture and the fact that it is essentially a penalty were acknowledged. Further, certain reforms in this area of law were also acknowledged and endorsed. Thus, Maglisco cannot be cited as a uniform and unequivocal adoption of common law forfeiture of property connected to the commission of a crime. It certainly implies that there exists a limitation upon its reaches, although the opinion is silent as to where the line may be found. The question that remains in light of Maglisco and Peetros, is whether all property that is used in, or connected to, the commission of a crime constitutes derivative contraband subject to forfeiture? If not, then where shall the line be drawn?
In Maglisco, the subjects of controversy were a pistol which had been used in a deliberate assault upon, or perhaps even an attempt to kill, another individual, and some rifles found at the petitioner’s residence which were not used in violation of the law. We concluded that there was no basis to support forfeiture of the rifles but that the pistol was properly forfeitable as derivative contraband. We discussed, among other things, the concepts of blameworthiness and proportionality and concluded, in essence, *163that in voluntarily using the pistol in the assault the owner had “forfeited” her right to possession of it. In contemplation of the Magliseo opinion one can perhaps see some of the motivation behind a finding that the pistol was derivative contraband. First, there was a deliberate and intentional attempt to injure another individual.3 Secondly, the *164loss resulting from the forfeiture of the pistol was neither substantial nor does it appear to me, in an intuitive sense, to be disproportionate to the crime committed.
Similarly, in reviewing Estate of Peetros, supra, perhaps the most dominant theme in the opinion, aside from the obvious holding that the subjects of controversy, loan sharking record books, were used in the commission of a crime, is the fact that the books found forfeitable had essentially no other legitimate use or purpose, and although it was not necessarily illegal to possess the books, neither was it truly foreseeable that upon their return they would serve any legal or legitimate purpose. This is significant because in Maglisco we also recognized that a goal of forfeiture is to remove the operating tools of a crime from criminals.
Thus, Maglisco can be reasonably cited to allow common law forfeiture of an instrumentality used in the deliberate attempt to injure or kill another individual, and Peetros could be reasonably cited to allow forfeiture of items which essentially are instruments of crime without much prospect of lawful or legitimate use. However, I remain unconvinced that these opinions compel extension of the principle to points unknown. The majority misses the thrust of my analysis of these decisions. I am not asserting that Maglisco and Peetros can only be cited for the propositions I have attributed to them. However, they can certainly be reasonably cited for these propositions, and, just as certainly they do not compel citation beyond these propositions. Part of our responsibility as an appellate court is the interpretation, explanation, extension and limitation of prior precedent. *165It is a fundamental appellate tenet that decisions be read narrowly upon their facts and that the application of legal principle is developed over a period of exposure to various factual patterns, similar in some ways, yet different in others. Undoubtedly, the principle enunciated in Maglisco and Peetros can be applied here if we wish — it could also, from a logical standpoint, be applied to take a blind man’s walking stick from him should he use it to jaywalk — but just as undoubtedly there is a difference in important factual matters which also would justify non-adherence, or, more accurately stated, refusal to extend the principle to this class of case. More importantly, if we find the vehicle forfeitable in this case where shall we draw the line?
If the forfeiture of an automobile is allowable here, would it not also be allowable when an individual exceeds the speed limit or attempts to beat out a red light but fails, or when an individual changes lanes or makes a turn without signalling? In short, will every violation of the motor vehicle code require or allow forfeiture of one’s vehicle? These laws, just like those prohibiting driving while intoxicated, are passed to provide a safe driving environment and every breach of them creates an increased risk of an injurious or fatal collision or accident. To use the majority’s analysis, it would be a deliberate breach of the law and the fact that fortuitously no one was injured or killed as a result of the driver’s indiscretion would be irrelevant. Thus, will one be under substantial risk of forfeiting the vehicle being driven every time one enters a vehicle? I doubt that few drivers make even a routine trip to work or the shopping mall without somewhere technically violating a section of the vehicle code. We could simply set the radars on our highways at 56 miles per hour and confiscate and forfeit thousands of vehicles. What about vehicles parked in no parking zones? Shall they be towed away never to be driven by their rightful owners again? These are just examples involving automobiles; I am certain that many other harsh examples could be found in virtually *166every facet of life and affecting all conceivable types of property if the basic principle is applied without limitation.
There would seem to be a significant difference, even if only an intuitive one, between declaring burglary tools or gambling or drug paraphernalia contraband and removing such contraband from one’s possession and declaring one’s automobile or other legally held property contraband simply because it can be connected to an illegal act. It would seem somewhat apparent that removing property that has little if any potential for legal or legitimate use is substantially different than removing from one’s possession legitimate and legal property that has been somewhat tainted by a transitory brush with a transgression of the law. The majority states their belief that the principle of Peetros and Maglisco must be similarly applied in this case. Yet the appellant here, although engaging in careless conduct, did not deliberately attempt to injure another, nor is the automobile an instrument of crime which will likely be used for only illegitimate purposes. Thus, I believe, the present case is distinguishable to a degree which I would consider material, and I believe the more prudent approach is to leave to the legislature any significant extension of the principle in question: particularly in light of the authority stating that forfeiture without statutory authorization is uncommon, supra, and authority indicating that forfeiture is not favored in the law. See, In re Fisher’s Estate, 442 Pa. 421, 276 A.2d 516 (1971).
For these reasons, I would find that the principles of common law forfeiture neither require nor allow the forfeiture of the vehicle in question here. Thus I dissent.

. Note that the houses used to facilitate the fencing operation were not seized as contraband. If the theory asserted here by the trial court were adopted, ostensibly, the houses would be subject to forfeiture. The same statement could be made in Sugalski. Needless to say, the attempt to seize and forfeit such property would seem unduly harsh and controversial.

. Although not presenting itself in Coghe, the best procedural context to bolster the majority’s position would have been an attempt by the authorities to forfeit an agreed upon, but yet unpaid, sum for the contract killing. Or, alternatively, an attempt to have forfeited the sum paid to the hired assassin but returned to the husband after the failed attempt. If the money truly became contraband because of its usage in the commission of a crime, then it would seem that possession of it by the appellant would not be of relevance and the order of forfeiture, under those circumstance, would have been of greater significance.

. The majority takes issue with my characterization of the Magliseo opinion, an opinion drafted by myself for the panel, saying that my characterization is lacking in factual support on the face of the Magliseo opinion. However, my general assertion, that there was assaultive behavior in Magliseo, is reasonably inferable from the information contained in the opinion. We state at the beginning of Magliseo that appellant shot her husband. Although there is no direct expression that the shooting was something more than accidental, there is certainly plenty of indications that the panel, myself included, acted with the understanding or belief that it was. First of all, in common experience, when individuals state that somebody shot someone there is a connotation of intentional behavior. That is why one more often sees the phrase "accidentally shot” than “intentionally shot.” Intention appears, in common parlance, to be read into the phrase "shot” more often than not, thus, necessitating the qualifying word "accidentally” where applicable. Secondly, we concluded that a crime had been committed with the pistol. This, by itself, rules out any innocent behavior or accident. There would have to be at least a finding of criminally negligent behavior to make this conclusion. Thirdly, we mention the trial court’s motivation of preventing another firearm incident, something which would seem unnecessary if the shooting were purely accidental. Fourthly, we state that appellant's actions were “quite blameworthy”, 491 A.2d at 1385, and that forfeiture would be "quite reasonable in light of the seriousness of appellant’s offense.” Id. These references suggest, I believe, deliberate and culpable behavior even if not explicitly so stated. Thus, when the entire opinion is read together I do not believe the majority’s assertion, that there is an inference raised that Mrs. Magliseo did not have the intent to shoot her husband, rings true. Rather, I believe the inference is raised that the panel was operating under the assumption that the shooting was intentional.
The majority further states that even were they to read Magliseo as dealing with a deliberate shooting they would still find it applicable as there is no indication that the drinking and driving were not deliberate. I believe they miss the point of my discussion. There is no dispute that appellant deliberately consumed alcohol and then deliberately drove. However, there is a substantial difference in the nature and culpability of deliberately shooting someone and driving a vehicle after having consumed alcohol. The difference is the state of mind or mens rea. There is no indication that appellant attempted or intended to strike someone with his vehicle, there is no indication that appellant intended anything more than to drive home, safely one would presume, even if he was unsuccessful in his attempt. Certainly, the majority would not contest the assertion that there is a substantial difference in intending to injure or kill someone and intending an act *164which is negligent as to the safety of others. The difference in a homicide case is the difference between a potential death sentence and a few years imprisonment. We treat the different crimes so differently because of the importance we place on the state of mind to the eventual same result. Consequently, if we assume that Maglisco dealt with a deliberate shooting then certainly a reasonable individual would have to concede that there exists a distinguishing factor in the present case, even if one eventually concluded that that factor was not substantial enough to compel a different result.