Court Opinion

ID: 9955083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 17:01:12.513955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.870913
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  ____________

                                       No. 23-1380
                                      ____________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

       KHALIF TUGGLE a/k/a KHALIF TUGGLES a/k/a KHALIF DOWNING,

                                      Khalif Tuggle,
                                        Appellant
                                      ____________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                         (District Court No. 2-20-cr-00273-001)
                     District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
                                     ____________

          Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on March 8, 2024
                                    ____________

               Before: SHWARTZ, AMBRO, and CHUNG Circuit Judges

                                  (Filed: March 27, 2024)
                                       ____________

                                        OPINION *
                                      ____________

CHUNG, Circuit Judge.

*
       This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does
not constitute binding precedent.
       In 2017, Khalif Tuggle shot Thomas Petersen in his car, robbed him, stole his car,

and left him in his injured state. Petersen later died from his wounds. Local authorities

prosecuted Tuggle in state court, and he pled guilty to state-law murder, robbery, and

firearms charges. In 2019, the state court sentenced him to 13.5–27 years in prison.

       Federal authorities also prosecuted Tuggle for the 2017 incident, and in 2022, he

pled guilty to three federal offenses: (1) carjacking and aiding and abetting, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and 2; (2) use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and (3) murder in the course of using and

carrying a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Those offenses carry heavy

penalties. The maximum terms of imprisonment for both Count One and Count Two is

life, and the minimum term of imprisonment for Count Two is a consecutive term of ten

years. 1 The undisputed total Guidelines range for imprisonment was 480 months.

       Per their agreement, the parties jointly recommended that the District Court

sentence Tuggle to a total term of imprisonment of 480 months, adjusted “in a manner

consistent with U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).” 2 Resp. Br. 9. Because Tuggle had already served

1
      Count Three is a lesser-included offense of Count Two and therefore merges with
Count Two for purposes of sentencing.
2
       U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) provides that if “a term of imprisonment resulted from
another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction,” then (1) “the
court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment already served on the
undischarged term of imprisonment if the court determines that such period of
imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons,” and
(2) “the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the
remainder of the undischarged term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1).

                                              2
69 months on his state sentence, which the Bureau of Prisons would not credit, the parties

both concluded that a sentence of 411 months, to run concurrently with the undischarged

portion of Tuggle’s state sentence, would be consistent with their agreement.

       The District Court found that the appropriate sentence on all counts was a total

term of imprisonment of 600 months. It declined to reduce that term, per U.S.S.G. §

5G1.3(b), by the 69 months Tuggle had already served in state prison, but did order the

federal sentence to run concurrently with the remainder of Tuggle’s state sentence.

During the sentencing hearing, the Court explained the several considerations that led it

to sentence Tuggle above the parties’ recommendation.

       Tuggle appeals, arguing that the District Court’s sentence is substantively

unreasonable. 3 A defendant making a substantive-reasonableness challenge faces a

“heavy burden.” United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 2013). We presume

that a sentence is substantively reasonable where, as here, it is within the Guidelines

range. See United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897, 912 (3d Cir. 2022). We will affirm

a sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence

on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v.

Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d. Cir. 2009) (en banc). Here, Tuggle makes two main

arguments that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Both fail to meet his burden.

3
       The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review a district court’s sentencing
decision for abuse of discretion and give “due deference” to the district court’s
application of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d.
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

                                             3
       First, Tuggle argues that “the sentence imposed was far greater than necessary to

account for all the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Opening Br. 14. In

particular, he argues that the Court failed to comply with § 3553(a)(4)–(5) 4 when it

declined to adjust the sentence to account for time served in state custody under U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.3. 5 The record reflects that the District Court considered these factors, however,

including considering the policy embodied in § 5G1.3(b) and any possible effect it might

have on a term of imprisonment. More specifically, the Court recognized that § 5G1.3

contemplates a court’s consideration of circumstances where a defendant has already

served time on a state sentence for relevant conduct and § 5G1.3(b)’s effect on a federal

term of imprisonment. It nonetheless found the sentence imposed appropriate in light of

all § 3553 factors, specifically noting (a) “[t]he seriousness of the crime, the violence of

it, the fact that a human life was taken,” App. 111; and (b) that the need to protect the

public would not be served by a 411-month sentence in light of “Tuggle’s background,”

which reflected that Tuggle would not be “safe to be turned back into society at age 65,”

4
       Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)–(5), a court is to consider “the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range established for … the applicable category of offense committed
by the applicable category of defendant,” as set forth by the Sentencing Commission’s
Guidelines, id. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i), as well as “any pertinent policy statement … issued by
the Sentencing Commission,” id. § 3553(a)(5)(A).
5
        Tuggle did not object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence when it was
imposed and has forfeited any such argument that the District Court was compelled to
apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). In any case, the record reflects that the District Court fully
considered the state time Tuggle had already served and still concluded, from the totality
of its analysis of all relevant factors, that the 600-month sentence was appropriate. See
United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir. 2013).

                                              4
id. at 112. Tuggle has not shown that no reasonable court considering the same facts

would have declined to adjust his sentence under § 5G1.3.

       Tuggle makes other arguments in support of his first point. He argues that the

sentence was greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing because the

parties considered the sentencing factors and recommended a shorter sentence. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 6 He also cites federal sentencing statistics to argue that mean and

median sentences in cases involving the same offenses are shorter. All those points

establish, however, is that the District Court could have imposed a shorter sentence but

did not.

       Second, Tuggle argues that the District Court’s sentence did not give adequate

weight to his “individual circumstances.” Opening Br. 30. Individual circumstances that

Tuggle identifies include his difficult personal history and his acceptance of

responsibility when he pled guilty. As to Tuggle’s difficult history, the Court

acknowledged such difficulties before noting that many people with “similar[ly] tough

lives” do not commit the crime he did. App. 111. As to his acceptance of responsibility,

6
       Under § 3553(a)(2), a court must consider:
       (1)   the need for the sentence imposed –
             (a) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
                 for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
             (b) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
             (c) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
                 and
             (d) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
                 vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
                 treatment in the most effective manner;
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

                                             5
the Court explained that he might have pled guilty simply because the government had a

strong case against him, and also noted that Tuggle sought at one point to withdraw his

plea.

          Tuggle further argues that the “particular circumstances of [his] offense” made his

crime less serious than some other carjacking-murders and that the District Court

improperly treated his crime as on par with those more serious cases. Opening Br. 22.

Although the District Court took occasion during Tuggle’s sentencing to remark on the

scourge of carjackings generally, as well as to mention another carjacking-murder that

had happened nearby just days earlier, the Court’s statements do not suggest that it

attributed the facts of those other crimes to Tuggle.

          In sum, the record reflects that the District Court considered all of the § 3553

factors and Tuggle’s arguments and found his crime warranted the within-guidelines

sentence imposed. We cannot conclude that no reasonable court would have given him

the same sentence.

          Because the District Court’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable, we will

affirm.

                                                6