Court Opinion

ID: 9533613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:10.714213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:06.099035
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.
(dissenting): In my opinion the plaintiff, Arley D. Haga, the appellant herein, has established by his evidence contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law.
All of the evidence in this case presented by the plaintiff was in the nature of physical facts and circumstances, since there were no eye witnesses. The plaintiff himself by reason of a brain injury incurred a retrograde amnesia which impaired his recollection of the circumstances surrounding the collision in which he received his injury.
The factual situation presented by the record is important in this decision. Set forth in the most favorable light to the plaintiff, as the facts must be in ruling a demurrer to the evidence in accordance with the rules correctly set out in the majority opinion, they are as follows:
An improved gravel highway runs north of Eureka, Kansas, and at a point ten miles north turns one mile east, and then extends north four and one-half miles past what is known as the Burket Lease. This one mile stretch running east and west is twenty-six feet wide, marked in the center with a black center line with thirteen feet on each side. Upon the north half it has a windrow of gravel varying in width from four and one-half feet to six feet and in height from twelve to eighteen inches. This is the one mile stretch of road upon which the accident occurred.
Six and one-half miles to the northeast of the west intersection of this one mile stretch of road is Thrall where the Sinclair Lease is located.
The plaintiff, Arley D. Haga, was employed on the Burket Lease and lived at Eureka. For some period of time prior to the accident he drove over the one mile stretch of road in question twice each day. Other witnesses were employed on either the Burket Lease or the Sinclair Lease, and drove the one mile stretch of road in question at approximately the time the accident occurred. Approximately midway between the east and west intersections of this one mile is a driveway entering the Grooms residence to the *183north. This driveway is used as a point from which distances are estimated and measured in connection with the accident and the use of the one mile stretch of road in question.
On the 12th day of January, 1954, that being the date of the accident, Edward E. Arnold, a witness who worked at the Sinclair Lease, left the lease at approximately 5:00 o’clock p. m. on said day. Arnold testified that he was proceeding in an easterly direction about forty to forty-five miles per hour and overcame the vehicle driven by Armstrong on the one mile east-west stretch of road heretofore described. At the time he came upon Armstrong he was driving about twenty miles per hour going east, driving part of the time on the left side and part of the time on the right side of the road; that it was necessary for him to continually sound his horn, shift the automobile into second gear and straddle the gravel windrow on the north side of the highway to overtake and pass the Armstrong vehicle, which would not pull over onto its proper side of the road. He saw Armstrong driving and his sister sitting in the front of the car and recognized them to be old people, and particularly recognized a cane between them. The point of passing was fifteen hundred feet east of the west intersection. After Arnold passed the Armstrong auto and about one thousand feet west of Grooms driveway he met the Baumgardner car coming from the opposite direction, and about five hundred feet east of Grooms driveway he met the Haga car also coming from the opposite direction. It was being driven by the plaintiff, whom he recognized. At the time of passing the Armstrong car the right side of his vehicle was only about twelve to fourteen inches from the left side of the Armstrong vehicle. At all times in question he could observe perfectly, the weather was clear and sunshiny and he had no difficulty seeing vehicles as they approached. He could see two vehicles coming from the east on this one mile east-west section of road.
Four persons worked on the Burket Lease and left at or near 5:00 o’clock on the day in question. The first to leave was A1 Baumgardner who left about 5:00. With Baumgardner was riding John Runyan. The second was Merle Braymer who was driving a pick-up truck, and the third to leave was the plaintiff, Arley D. Haga. They all traveled over this one mile stretch of road in a westerly direction. Mr. Baumgardner drove approximately forty-five miles per hour for the entire distance, which was approximately *184five miles to the scene of the accident. He first met the vehicle driven by Arnold and then met the vehicle driven by Armstrong about one thousand feet west of Grooms driveway. At that time he had to slow up and went a foot or more into the edge of the gravel windrow to play safe and avoid the Armstrong vehicle going in the opposite direction. The Armstrong vehicle was described as being pretty much on the witness’s side of the road. Haga in traveling from the Burket Lease, overtook the vehicle driven by Braymer and met with the Armstrong vehicle where the accident occurred ninety-six feet west of the entrance to Grooms driveway. As a result of the accident Mr. Armstrong and his sister were killed and Mr. Haga was severely injured, which injury resulted in his having a complete loss of memory. About midpoint between the east intersection on this road and the point of the accident Braymer saw the two vehicles stopped ahead of him.
Specific reference is here made to the testimony of Charles B. Williams, Highway Patrolman, quoted in the majority opinion.
For clarity plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 used in evidence which was drawn to scale, and described as correct by all the witnesses who were questioned concerning it, is set forth:

*185

*186All witnesses who testified said there was at least one-half mile of clear vision on this road.
This court will take judicial notice that a half mile is two thousand six hundred forty feet. This was the range of clear vision on the road in question in which Arnold at the time he overtook Armstrong west of Grooms driveway could see the Haga vehicle east of Grooms driveway. All the events heretofore related on this one mile stretch of road occurred at points between the location of Arnold and Haga as just related.
The driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is, in law, presumed to have seen and heard that which he could have seen and heard had he kept a proper look-out and exercised ordinary care and caution.
Haga, therefore, in law is charged with seeing everything that occurred as heretofore related on this one mile east-west stretch of road on the day of the accident. Haga was familiar with the road and’ knew there was a hazard by virtue of the windrow of gravel. He also knew that this windrow of gravel would, to some degree, prohibit or hinder him in turning to the right in order to give the oncoming driver the right of way which he was claiming.
The defendant presented his case in this court upon the admission that Armstrong was guilty of negligence. The defendant says:
“In the instant ease there would appear to be little question but what Armstrong was guilty of negligence. He was crowding the center line and had been partially on the wrong side of the road during all the time that it had taken him to drive from the corner west to the place of the accident. . . .”
According to the witnesses, Armstrong’s speed was from ten to twenty miles per hour, depending on the estimate of the particular witness.
The defendant demurred to the evidence of the plaintiff and the trial court sustained the demurrer. The sole question raised here is whether or not plaintiff by his own evidence is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In the case of DeGraw v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713, 228 P. 2d 527, this court held:
“While as a general rule it may be said that a driver, absent knowledge to the contrary, may assume that an approaching vehicle will obey the rules of the road and thus get over and stay on its own side of the road, yet he will not be permitted to act on the assumption where the factual basis for it has disappeared, as for example, where it appears that the driver of such vehicle on the wrong side of the road either will not or cannot turn back to his own side.
*187“The purpose and object of rules of the road are to avoid accidents, but one is not justified in asserting his right to use his side of the road when, by not doing so, he can avoid a collision. The fact a motorist is on the proper side of the road does not entitle him to make an unreasonable use thereof nor relieve him of the duty to exercise due care to avoid injury to others, including those who may be on the wrong side of the road.
“It is the duty of every driver of a motor vehicle to keep a proper look-out at all times, the extent of such observation being dependent upon the conditions and circumstances then existing, such as weather, traffic, condition of the highway, special hazards, and the like, and not to drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and proper under such conditions, and at all times to use due care.” (Syl. ¶ 4, 5, 6.)
In the DeGraw case the defendant’s demurrer to the evidence was overruled and the defendant presented no evidence whatever. The case went to a jury without further evidence being presented by the defendant, and this court affirmed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that the contributory negligence of the decedent was a question in controversy and should go to the jury. There the parties are in the reverse position from the parties in the instant case. The next of kin of the decedent brought the action in the DeGraw case as plaintiffs, and in this case it is the administrator of the decedent that is being sued as a party defendant. This is material because the decision in the DeGraw case was based upon the fact that the contributory negligence of the decedent was a matter in controversy and for the jury to determine, while in this case the evidence of the plaintiff clearly established beyond any doubt the negligence of the decedent which is admitted by the defendant, the decedent’s representative.
We thus have here presented clearly a situation which calls for the application of the law in the DeGraw case.
Applying all the rules applicable in connection with ruling a demurrer to the evidence, the plaintiff is charged in law with knowing that the decedent driver Armstrong was driving on both sides of the highway within a one-half mile range of vision before the two vehicles collided; that the Arnold vehicle had difficulty in passing the Armstrong vehicle by straddling the center of the gravel strip and that the Baumgardner vehicle had difficulty and was required to pull into the gravel windrow in meeting the Armstrong vehicle coming from the opposite direction. He is likewise charged with knowing that the east-west one mile stretch in question was divided by a black center line, upon which the evidence is uncontradicted, and that a gravel windrow approximately six feet wide at its widest *188part occupied the north part of this highway in his lane of traffic; and that Armstrong was using not only all of the south half of the highway which was south of the black center line, but also a portion of that north of the black center line, at least part of the time, and that in so doing the driver Armstrong at his slow rate of speed was consistent in the negligent operation of his vehicle within a range of approximately one-half mile prior to the time the plaintiff met him.
The facts of the accident itself show that the vehicles of Haga and Armstrong collided with such speed and force that both occupants of the Armstrong vehicle were killed. And this force in colliding was sufficient after Haga had laid down thirty feet of skid-marks, with his vehicle three feet on the south side of the black center dividing line and the left wheels ten feet south of the south edge of the gravel windrow, to drive the Armstrong vehicle nine feet in the reverse direction killing both of its occupants.
The best evidence presented by the plaintiff was that approximately four-fifths of the front of each of the vehicles met head-on. The physical facts determined from the location of the vehicles at the time of the collision, also indicate that there was sufficient room for the plaintiff’s vehicle to safely pass the Armstrong vehicle on its proper side of the black center line without driving onto or in the gravel windrow.
Cases similar on the factual situation to the instant case in which a demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff was sustained are Most v. Holthaus, 170 Kan. 510, 227 P. 2d 144, and Dolloff v. City of Wichita, 147 Kan. 63, 75 P. 2d 221.
The contention of the appellant, in an effort to explain the location of the Haga vehicle, is that the center line of the road has shifted three feet to the south, since with six feet of the north lane being occupied by the gravel windrow, the remaining traveled portion of the roadway was only twenty feet wide. Our statute (G. S. 1949, 8-537) provides:
“Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: (1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement; (2) when the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair;” . . .
The evidence is uncontradicted that there was sufficient room on the right half, between the black center line and the south edge of the gravel windrow, for the Haga vehicle to travel without using *189the windrow to drive on. Further, no part of said road was closed to traffic as the gravel windrow could be used and was used for a passageway of vehicles at a reasonable rate of speed.
Even if it were assumed that the center line of the road shifted three feet to the south, Haga is charged with knowing that Armstrong claimed and was using all of that portion south of the black center line in regard to other' vehicles using the highway.
Where both vehicles are crowding the center of the road, the case of Fodor v. Interstate Transit Lines, 149 Kan. 174, 86 P. 2d 574, explains the law of negligence in regard to the center of the road:
“. . . The fact is that the wheels of each vehicle could be on the right side of the middle mark, but right up to it, and due to the part of each vehicle that extends beyond the wheels a collision such as we have here could have taken place . . . The fact is both drivers were negligent under the circumstances by being right up to the middle mark, regardless of which one crossed it.”
This court further said in Beecher v. Stepanian, 170 Kan. 201, 224 P. 2d 1017:
“Driving a motor vehicle on the left-hand or wrong side of the highway in violation of G. S. 1947 Supp. 8-537, except under the circumstances provided in G. S. 1947 Supp. 8-538 and 8-540, proximately resulting in a collision with an oncoming motor vehicle on its right-hand side of the highway, is actionable negligence.”
Even under this theory, regardless of what may have been the correct center line on the one mile stretch of road, both Armstrong and Haga were crowding the center line of what they may have regarded as their proper side of the road as taken from the location of the vehicles on the road at the point of impact and the testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses.
The language of this court in the case of Krey v. Schmidt, 172 Kan. 319, 240 P. 2d 153, on facts reflecting negligence of the plaintiff which closely parallel the negligence of Haga is enlightening: ,
“Manifestly it is wholly unreasonable to assume appellee would have maintained his position in the center of his side of the highway without yielding an inch if he had seen the truck directly in front of him for a distance of 600 feet. The only rational conclusion that can be reached is that appellee did not look and did not see what the law holds him responsible for having seen when, in the exercise of reasonable care, he could have seen it. Just recently and in harmony with many past decisions it was held there can be no recovery where a person strikes a stopped motor truck in his lane of traffic which could have been seen in the nighttime from a distance of 300 feet and where there was nothing to prevent him from turning aside to avoid the collision. (Bottenberg Implement Co. v. Sheffield, supra [171 Kan. 67, 229 P. 2d 1004.]).” (p. 328.)
*190Under all the facts and circumstances presented by the evidence of the plaintiff, giving full consideration to all laws applicable thereto, it is my opinion that reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion, and that was that Haga was negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. This is especially true when the accident could have been avoided by Haga. He could have slowed down. He could have turned right and straddled the ridge of gravel, or he could have continued in his own traffic lane and the accident would never have occurred.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, since in my opinion the demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff was properly sustained.
Parker, C. J., and Price, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.