Court Opinion

ID: 9667912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:57:36.063724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.477576
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
(dissenting). In general, questions regarding reasonableness of notice, Mutual Electric & Machine Co v Turner Engineering Co, 230 Mich 63; 202 NW 964 (1925), and time which the cause of action accrued, Flynn v McLouth Steel Corp, 55 Mich App 669; 223 NW2d 297 (1974), represent conflicts to be decided by the trier of fact. However, in a few cases, no conflict is presented. I find that this is such a case.
My review of the record convinces me that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether plaintiffs knew or should have known of their cause of action against defendant at a time which would bar their action. Plaintiffs knew that their roof leaked in 1960. This knowledge is clearly manifested by their own attempt to fix the roof. The majority asserts that:
"Knowing that there are leaks and knowing that *208there are leaks caused by faulty material or workmanship in the roof are two different things.” (Footnote omitted.)
On these facts this assertion is a distinction without a difference. Plaintiffs’ house was new. What other than faulty material or installation could cause a new roof to leak? In attempting to fix the roof, plaintiffs should reasonably have ascertained the cause. Plaintiffs’ testimony indicates that in 1960 they blamed defendant for the leaks. Plaintiff Bernard Cartmell testified that he viewed the leaky roof as a minor annoyance found in most new homes. I find this excuse incredible.
According to plaintiff the leakage could have, resulted from many things such as a misplaced tile or a loose seam. Yet it would appear that a misplaced tile or a loose seam would fall within the broad warranty in this case since it reasonably can be said to have resulted from defective installation of the roof. Furthermore, it would appear that a reasonable person would have, at some point in time prior to March 1, 1968, six years prior to the institution of suit, determined that since the leaks had not subsided despite efforts to correct the problem that something was inherently wrong with the roof and would have at least had the roof checked by an expert.
The crux of the majority’s reasoning is that:
"Plaintiffs may have suspected that the leaks were the fault of the defendant, but they did not know this until 1974.” (Emphasis in original.)
Actual knowledge is not required. I perceive little difference between an admission that plaintiffs had reason to suspect that the leaks were defendant’s fault and a finding that they should have known of *209their cause of action. Plaintiffs knew the roof leaked. From personal observation, they should have known why it leaked. They were on constructive notice of the contractual warranty provisions. The majority’s affirmance of the trial court and circuit court represents a holding that a law suit based on breach of express warranty need not be instituted until the plaintiffs have been specifically advised of their cause of action. This is not the law.
Allowing recovery in the instant case violates the policies behind the statute of limitations. Statute of limitations provisions are intended:
"to 'compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend’; 'to relieve a court system from dealing with "stale” claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured’; and to protect 'potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation’.” Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576; 221 NW2d 328 (1974), quoting from 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 17, pp 602-603. (Footnote omitted.)
The lapse of time has materially altered defendant’s position. Defendant’s ability to prove knowledge of the defect is impaired. The cost to defendant of repairing the roof has multiplied over time.
This case also bears on one of the subtle policies behind motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. While we place great importance on the jury system, we do so with a realization of its weaknesses. We know that juries will be inimical to certain types of defendants and favorable to certain types of plaintiffs. This is why we do not allow the presence of an insurance company as a subrogee party to be placed before the jury. Juries will be more favorably disposed toward their peers *210who are alleging damage caused by a corporate defendant than they will be toward the defendant.
Motions for summary judgment and directed verdict interpose a judge between scant evidence and jury prejudice. Given the prejudice possible in cases such as this, courts must take great care in deciding what questions present a sufficient conflict to be submitted to the jury. I believe that such care was not taken here. This dispute should not have been submitted to a jury.
I would reverse the trial and circuit court decisions and order judgment entered for defendant.