Court Opinion

ID: 9655620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:18:04.922634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:20.751255
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting). The ultimate issue on the merits in this case is whether an uninsured owner’s car is "involved” in an accident, when the uninsured owner, while pumping gasoline into his car, was struck by another vehicle, pinned be*155tween the two cars, and as a result sustained injuries. MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.131131 provides that an uninsured motorist shall be denied no-fault benefits if his vehicle is "involved” in an accident. We would hold that plaintiffs car was involved in an accident and that plaintiff is therefore not entitled to receive no-fault benefits. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
I. Facts
Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by another automobile and pinned against his own automobile while he was pumping gasoline into it at a self-service gas station. The automobile owned by plaintiff was not insured as required by Michigan law.
A claim for no-fault benefits from defendant, the insurer of the automobile that struck plaintiff, was denied. Plaintiff then filed suit in Oakland Circuit Court. Plaintiff pled that he "sustained bodily injury caused by an automobile collision * * * arising out of the ownership, operation or use” of defendant’s insured’s automobile. Defendant responded by a general answer, except that it pled "that the said auto collision involved the plaintiff and his automobile, said automobile of the plaintiff being an uninsured vehicle” under the no-fault act. A motion for summary judgment was filed by defendant pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1). The *156trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding that the proximity to and association of the plaintiff with the uninsured vehicle was such that the vehicle was "involved” in the accident.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2 to 1 opinion. Heard v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 93 Mich App 50; 286 NW2d 46 (1979).
II. Issue
Resolution of this case requires this Court to decide whether the statutory language of MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113, which provides that an uninsured motorist is precluded from recovering no-fault benefits if his vehicle is "involved” in an accident, applies to the facts in this case.
III. Discussion
This case presents an issue of first impression regarding the interpretation of the word "involved” as used in § 3113 of the no-fault act. Section 3113 provides that no-fault benefits shall not be recovered if the owner of the vehicle "involved” in the accident was uninsured at the time of the accident.
To determine whether a vehicle is involved in an accident, it is necessary to decide the required causal relationship between the injury and the uninsured vehicle. We would hold that when one is maintaining his vehicle at the time of an accident, as by pumping gasoline, and is pinned between his car and another car as a result of the *157accident,2 there is a sufficient causal connection between his injury and his automobile to constitute involvement.3 The mere fact that plaintiffs automobile was stationary does not mean that the vehicle was not involved. Physically, even if a motor vehicle hits a tree or pole, those things are "involved” in the accident. If those things had not been at the scene, there might not have been any accident at all, and certainly any accident that did occur would be of a different nature without them. Therefore, plaintiffs automobile was involved in the accident, and thus, as an uninsured motorist, plaintiff is precluded from recovering no-fault benefits.
IV. Public Policy
While we understand that to so construe the term "involved”, as we have here, precludes plaintiff from collecting no-fault benefits,4 we feel it is in accord with the legislative intent. The no-fault act was: *158the long payment delays, inequitable payment structure, and high legal costs inherent in the tort (or 'fault’) liability system. The goal of the no-fault insurance system was to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses. The Legislature believed this goal could be most effectively achieved through a system of compulsory insurance, whereby every Michigan motorist would be required to purchase no-fault insurance or be unable to operate a motor vehicle legally in this state. Under this system, victims of motor vehicle accidents would receive insurance benefits for their injuries as a substitute for their common-law remedy in tort.” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 578-579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
*157"offered as an innovative social and legal response to
*158Thus, the no-fault scheme contemplates that every individual owner will have insurance in order to take advantage of the benefits under this system.
As a corollary, the act provides for certain penalties and exclusions for those who are uninsured. See MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2), MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113. The penalties and exclusions are necessary in order to encourage owners and registrants to obtain insurance so that the no-fault scheme can operate as contemplated. Thus, it is important that the penalties and exclusions be given their full force to achieve the goals of the no-fault act.
Another important goal of the no-fault act is that of cost reduction. An important aspect of reducing costs is assuring that benefits be paid only to those entitled to such benefits under the statute. In this case, if plaintiff were insured, he would, as a contributing member to the fund from which benefits are to be paid, be entitled to recover benefits. However, in this case plaintiff was not insured. He was not a contributor to the success of the no-fault scheme. Rather, by this *159lawsuit, he was seeking to take advantage of those who had contributed. We find that the exclusion of § 3113 is applicable and thus precludes plaintiff from recovering and taking advantage of the contributing members. Obviously, to accomplish the goal of cost reduction, it is essential to give effect to the statutory exclusions.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted and affirmed in this case. The statutory language of § 3113, as well as the legislative intent and policy of the no-fault scheme as a whole, supports our conclusion that plaintiff’s vehicle, under the facts in this case, was "involved” in the accident. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, but in part for different reasons.5
Coleman, C.J., and Fitzgerald, J., concurred with Williams, J._

 Section 3113 provides in pertinent part:
"A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:
"(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.” (Emphasis added.)

 Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was standing behind his car when another vehicle struck him from behind and pinned him between the two cars. He states these same facts in response to several different questions.

 We do not hold that physical contact between two cars in an accident is required in order for a motor vehicle to be "involved” in the accident. The fact that the injured person was pinned between the two cars is enough, regardless of whether the two cars happen to come into contact with each other. In another context, this Court held that physical contact was not mandatory to fall under the "occupying” language of an automobile insurance policy. Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Ins Co, 393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896 (1975). Otherwise, recovery and, in this case, denial of recovery will be based on "fortuitous circumstances”. Whether the bumpers actually come in contact or not should not be the decisive factor.

 While it precludes an uninsured person from recovering under these circumstances, our interpretation would permit an insured person to collect from his own insurer.

 We find that plaintiffs car was involved in the accident. Unlike the Court of Appeals, however, we do not rely on MCL 500.3106; MSA 24.13106 relative to parked motor vehicles. A discussion of this section is not necessary in order to reach our conclusion.