Court Opinion

ID: 9486101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:38:00.375131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:31.829280
License: Public Domain

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the evidence, viewed in Clark’s favor, shows that Modern Group’s control employees fired Clark in order to evade taxes. The majority asserts that, under Pennsylvania law, an employer’s intent to break the law will violate public policy only when an actual violation of the law occurs. I dissent because I believe that Pennsylvania — like every state — has an implicit but strong public policy that requires good faith compliance with state and federal laws, a policy entirely consistent with the eases cited by the majority.
I.
The majority appears to accept that Clark’s evidence would suffice to convince a jury that Modern fired Clark with the intent to evade taxes. Three examples illustrate. When Clark first brought the regulation to the board’s attention, one board member responded, in effect, “Don’t report it and we won’t get caught.” Later, when asked why the board would not seek the advice of tax counsel, one board member said, “That ought to be obvious.” Finally, the day before the next board meeting at which Clark could have renewed his argument and questioned why his position was omitted from the minutes of the last meeting, he was fired.
II.
As the facts, viewed in Clark’s favor, illustrate, this case is not one in which “the act to be performed turns upon a question of judgment.” Compare McGonigle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 383 Pa.Super. 223, 556 A.2d 878, 885 (1989). Nor is this case one in which the employee went beyond the scope of his statutory responsibility or beyond the scope of his employment position. Compare Hineline v. Stroudsburg Electrical Supply Co., 384 Pa.Super. 537, 559 A.2d 566 (1989), in which the employee disconnected surveillance cameras but was neither charged by law with enforcing Pennsylvania’s wiretap law nor responsible for his employer’s compliance with it.
Moreover, this case is not one in which the employee complains of illegality but fails to point to any statute for support. Compare Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 424 Pa.Super. 230, 622 A.2d 355 (1993); McGonigle, 556 A.2d at 878. Both Krajsa and McGonigle appear to require the employee to come forward with objective support. That requirement thus implicitly makes relevant both the employee’s and the employer’s “objective” good faith.
Finally, I agree that Pennsylvania cases indicate that an employer does not necessarily violate public policy when acting unethically or reprehensibly. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (marketing defective product); Reese v. Tom Hesser Chevrolet-BMW, 413 Pa.Super. 168, 604 A.2d 1072 (1992) (threat to fire at-will employee was not extortion). The employer’s actions here, however, came too close to actually being illegal. Indeed only the majority’s interpretation (itself subject to debate) of the regulation prevents Clark from asserting that Modern Group actually violated the law. Although the doctrine of “legal impossibility,” upon which the majority relies, has its place as a defense to criminal prosecution, it should have no place in wrongful discharge suits because to apply it as the majority does would countenance an employer’s illegitimate attempt to subvert the law rather than an employer’s legitimate interest in disagreeing with an employee about what the law requires. The majority thus necessarily reads Pennsylvania law to place professionals such as Mr. Clark in a precarious situation when faced with an employer that wishes to break the law.
*337I would therefore hold, albeit narrowly, that, under the following condition, a professional states a cause of action under Pennsylvania’s public policy exception to at-will employment: (1) the professional has urged the employer, with specific statutory support, that the law requires a course of conduct; (2) the employer believes that the employee’s interpretation of the statute is correct and fires the employee to avoid having to comply with the law. Clark has met both of these conditions and thus should be held to have withstood his employer’s motion for summary judgment.
III.
For the foregoing reasons I would vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for submission to a jury the genuine issue of material fact, namely, whether Modern discharged Clark because Clark refused to cooperate in Modern’s alleged effort to violate the law.