Court Opinion

ID: 9746339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:12:51.408039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.300525
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on the Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (the Board). After consideration of the Report of a Hearing Committee (Committee), the Board found that respondent had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in representing Mr. John McLaughlin (DR 6-101(A)(3)), and that he had failed to seek his client’s lawful objectives and to carry out an employment contract for legal services (DR 7-101(A)(l) and (2)).2 Rejecting the Committee’s proposal of a six-month suspension, the Board recommends a thirty-day suspension and restitution in the amount of $500.
D.CApp.R. XI, § 7(3) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so *1248would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or otherwise would be unwarranted.
The Board found that respondent had promised to file a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal in a case where respondent’s client was dissatisfied with his jury award in a personal injury suit. After receiving $500 as a retainer fee, respondent failed to file the motion or the notice. Respondent also failed to return the $500. We accept the Board’s findings of fact as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
A review of the recent precedent also supports the Board’s rejection of the Committee’s recommendation of a six-month suspension. In In re Mendez, No. 84-1159 (D.C. Dec. 14, 1984), this court adopted the Board’s proposal of a ninety-day sanction for an attorney who had committed disciplinary violations similar to the ones in this case. However, we concluded that such a sanction was appropriate because the attorney had a significant history of prior discipline. We have recently observed:
Most important is the fact that [the accused attorneys] have had unblemished records.... This factor weighs heavily in favor of imposing upon them the lightest sanction that will serve the purposes of Bar discipline.
In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 233 (D.C.1986) (en banc). In another similar case, In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C.1983), we opined that a sixty-day sanction was warranted where the violations involved the cases of two separate clients.
Recognizing that respondent has no prior disciplinary history, and that the instant violations stem from a single case, we adopt the Board’s recommendation of a thirty-day suspension. See also In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119 (D.C.1977) (one-month suspension appropriate for an attorney’s first disciplinary violation of a serious nature).3 Accordingly, respondent, Bernard C. Dory, is suspended from the practice of law for thirty days, effective thirty days from the date of this opinion.

So ordered.

. The Board rejected the Committee’s conclusion that respondent had also violated DR 7-101(A)(3).

. On the basis of the Statement filed by the parties, we are cognizant that respondent has made restitution.