Court Opinion

ID: 9906041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:27.306252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.880745
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Mansfield CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    B320480

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. SA101586)
           v.

 MILAN AMADOR MANSFIELD,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Kathryn A. Solorzano, Judge. Affirmed.
      William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and William H. Shin, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 _____________________________
      Appellant Milan Mansfield appeals from the trial court’s
order requiring him to pay $6,802.52 in restitution to Venice Arts
Council for vandalizing a mural. We hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion because the restitution order was
supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On November 1, 2019, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office filed a complaint against Mansfield for felony
vandalism under Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), in
counts 1 through 3 for causing over $400 in damage by graffiti.
The complaint also alleges misdemeanor vandalism in counts 4
through 6 for causing over $400 in damage by graffiti.
      On January 2, 2020, Mansfield pled no contest to count 1
for “unlawfully and maliciously defac[ing] with graffiti” Daniel
Rosen’s property. The court dismissed the remaining counts
conditioned on Mansfield agreeing that he would be punished for
crimes he was not convicted of, a waiver of his rights under
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. As such, Mansfield agreed
to pay restitution for the dismissed counts. Mansfield’s Harvey
waiver for count 2 established at minimum that on or about
May 3, 2019, he unlawfully and maliciously defaced property
belonging to Alejandra Amaya and Emily Winters.
      On October 1, 2021, the trial court held a restitution
hearing. The prosecution called Winters, a member of Venice
Arts Council, to testify. Winters testified that in 1990, she
painted a mural entitled the Endangered Species Mural on a
building located at 801 Ocean Front Walk, Venice, California.
She further testified that the mural was repaired and repainted
on or around June 21, 2019 to remove graffiti. Prior to that, the
mural was repainted only once in 2006. Graffiti had accumulated
on the mural’s lower section over two to three years. The word

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FATSO appeared on the mural several times. The exhibits
included a photograph depicting a large spray painting of FATSO
across the mural, which was from May 1, 2019. The FATSO
lettering covered other graffiti that was also on the wall.
Mansfield testified during the restitution hearing that he
graffitied over other people’s graffiti in the May 1, 2019
photograph. Mansfield claimed that the bottom portion of the
mural was black and had no artwork.
       When Winters made a police report, the police identified
Mansfield as “the guy who always does the ‘FATSO.’ ” Rosen also
testified that in 2019, FATSO lettering appeared several times on
a hummingbird mural on his building located at 12517 Venice
Boulevard, Venice, California.
       Winters testified that because the most recent FATSO
lettering was so large, she could not take it off herself. The
prosecutor then asked:
       “Q: So the actual fixing of the mural, the cost that we just
talked about, was that to fix the larger word “FATSO”?
       A: Yes.”
       Winters further stated that before the FATSO graffiti, the
mural was not so damaged that it needed repair. Prior to the
FATSO lettering, the graffiti was “stuff [she] could take off.”
Winters confirmed that after FATSO appeared on the mural in
2019, the mural required professional cleaning from the Social
and Public Art Resource Center (SPARC). Venice Arts Council
paid SPARC to do the mural repair. An invoice from SPARC to
Venice Arts Council showed $2,957.52 for graffiti removal, $1,800
for wash and coating maintenance, and $2,045 for in-painting
repairs. The total amount was $6,802.52.
       On March 22, 2022, the trial court held a further
restitution hearing. At the hearing, a different prosecutor who

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was not present for Winters’s testimony stated he read the
October 1, 2021 transcript. He understood Winters’s testimony to
mean that “she paid a certain amount back in 2016 [sic] and then
there was damage done to the mural and th[at] only after the
large writing done by the defendant did they redo the entire
mural. So that one was a little tricky. I don’t think anybody
asked her, maybe I missed it, based on the previous damage and
the mural having to be redone, what exactly she was asking for.”
The trial court reserved jurisdiction and set a further restitution
hearing so that the trial court could review the transcript from
October 1, 2021.
       On May 2, 2022, the trial court ordered Mansfield to pay
$6,802.52 to Venice Arts Council and $9,674 to Rosen. The trial
court reasoned that Winters testified that repair was required
because of Mansfield’s FATSO graffiti. The trial court noted that
Winters testified she was repairing the mural with a toothbrush,
“[b]ut after [Mansfield]’s damage, they couldn’t do that. . . .
[T]hey could not fix it themselves. They had to go through a third
party vendor.”
       The trial court concluded: “Just because some of the other
people who put graffiti were not identified doesn’t mean he’s not
responsible as the person who pushed this to a situation where
she could not remedy herself and she had to hire somebody to do
so.”
       Mansfield timely appealed the restitution order as to
Venice Arts Council.

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                             DISCUSSION
I.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
       ordering Mansfield to pay restitution to Venice Arts
       Council
       Mansfield argues that the trial court erred because it
ordered him to pay to remove graffiti that had accumulated over
several years. We disagree. Mansfield failed to rebut the
prosecution’s prima facie case that the mural did not require
repair before Mansfield vandalized the mural with FATSO on or
about May 3, 2019. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
       A.     General legal principles
       Under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), a
restitution order “shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to
fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined
economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal
conduct . . . .” It shall include payment for the value of damaged
property, which, when repairs are made, shall be “the actual cost
of repairing the property.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).)
       “At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for
restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim’s
testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or
her economic loss.” (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7,
26 (Millard).) Once the victim makes a prima facie showing, the
burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of loss
claimed by the victim. (Ibid.) “The standard of proof at a
restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence, not
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
1310, 1319–1320.) A party satisfies its burden by “provid[ing] an
adequate factual basis for the claim.” (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 664.)

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        “Courts have broad discretion in fixing the amount of
restitution, and they may use any rational method, provided it is
reasonably calculated to make the victim whole.” (People v.
Hurtado (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 871, 878.) “We review the
restitution award for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘On appeal,
we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct,
“ ‘[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it
on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Santori (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 122, 126 (Santori).) “No abuse of discretion occurs if
the restitution order is supported by a rational and factual basis.”
(People v. Aguilar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 857, 862 (Aguilar).)
        While a trial court awarding restitution “need not ascertain
the exact dollar amount of the [victim’s] losses,” its calculation
“must have some factual nexus to the damage caused by the
[defendant’s] conduct.” (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014)
59 Cal.4th 300, 309–310.) The trial court “retains broad
discretion . . . to estimate the material, equipment, and labor
costs necessary to repair the damage caused by a discrete act of
graffiti.” (Id. at pp. 304, 310 [analyzing the general restitution
statute applicable to juvenile offenders and noting it is “parallel
to section 1202.4”].)
        Finally, we determine whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s factual findings. (Millard, supra,
175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
        B.    Restitution analysis
        Here, there was a factual nexus between the amount
claimed by Venice Arts Council and the damage caused by
Mansfield’s conduct. Mansfield failed to rebut Winters’s
unequivocal testimony that the mural did not require repair until
the large FATSO lettering appeared on the mural. The FATSO

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lettering also covered other graffiti and thus it was rational for
the trial court to conclude that Mansfield’s FATSO graffiti
prevented Winters from removing the smaller graffiti herself.
The sufficiency of the evidence standard does not require “a per-
minute graffiti removal cost” or “time estimate for remediation of
defendant’s graffiti.” (Aguilar, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 865.)
The trial court relied on Winters’s testimony, the SPARC invoice,
Venice Arts Council’s checks to SPARC, and photographs
showing “the large size and extent of the graffiti.” (Ibid.)
Therefore, the trial court’s determination was based on a
“rational and factual basis” reasonably related to Mansfield’s
vandalism. (Id. at p. 862.) Accordingly, we find no abuse of
discretion.
       In an interim hearing, a prosecutor did express a qualified
belief that Winters did not state “what exactly she was asking
for” regarding the damage that preceded the FATSO graffiti.
Even there, this prosecutor noted, “maybe I missed it.” We find
this statement of limited utility as the record of Winters’s
testimony speaks for itself, and the prosecution plainly asked for
Mansfield to pay for all the remediation work done on the mural.
Here, the trial court took care to read the transcript and reached
its own conclusion about what Winters’s testimony meant.
We find no error in the court’s conclusion. Further, the dollar
amount was supported by the invoice from SPARC. Accordingly,
“[t]he evidence was sufficient to support the People’s prima facie
burden, and [Mansfield] identified no specific error in the
amount.” (Santori, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.)
       Mansfield’s claim that the prosecution failed to tie the
FATSO graffiti to May 3, 2019 is also unavailing. Mansfield pled
that he vandalized the mural “on or about May 3, 2019.”
Mansfield then testified that he was the individual in a

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photograph dated May 1, 2019, who was outlining the word
FATSO over other people’s graffiti on the Endangered Species
mural. Consequently, sufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s determination that the prosecution made a prima facie
showing that on or about May 3, 2019, Mansfield vandalized the
Endangered Species Mural. As such, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that the prosecution made a prima
facie showing and Mansfield failed to rebut this showing.
       Mansfield cites to People v. Chappelone (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1159 (Chappelone) and People v. Pangan (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 574 (Pangan) to support his argument that the
trial court abused its discretion. Both cases are distinguishable
as neither pertains to vandalism nor graffiti repair. The First
District in Chappelone held that the trial court abused its
discretion when it valued damaged goods based on their full
retail value. (Chappelone, at p. 1182.) There, some stolen goods
were damaged prior to being stolen, so there was no basis for the
trial court to have the defendant pay restitution based on the
value of unspoiled goods. (Ibid.) The trial court compounded its
error by awarding the retail value of the goods rather than their
wholesale value. (Id. at p. 1181.) Finally, the court erred when it
awarded both the goods themselves and the value of the goods to
the store. (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, there was evidence in the
record that the entire bill for remediation resulted from the
FATSO graffiti.
       In Pangan, the Fourth District held that the court abused
its discretion by failing to take into account the time value of
money when ordering restitution. (Pangan, supra, 213
Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) There, our colleagues noted that having a
lump sum payment immediately is valuable, and a trial court
cannot arrive at a lump sum payment by simply totaling the

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amount of the monthly payments. (Id. at p. 581.) Here, there is
no lump sum payment to calculate, and any analogy to the
graffiti on the mural is misplaced. Rather, the trial court relied
on the record to conclude that remediating the Endangered
Species Mural was entirely tied to the FATSO graffiti.
       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s restitution order.

                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s restitution order is affirmed.

                                            VIRAMONTES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                         GRIMES, Acting P. J.

                         WILEY, J.

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