Court Opinion

ID: 9710069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:01:20.979316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.922212
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. I agree with the Court’s decision on parental rights and responsibilities and the division of property. I do not agree that a maintenance award providing a permanent equalization of income is appropriate in this case and, accordingly, dissent from the affirmance of the maintenance award.
The main relevant precedent is Delozier v. Delozier, 161 Vt. 377, 640 A.2d 55 (1994), where we reversed a maintenance order virtually identical to that imposed here. We started by noting that “courts have not favored the use of formulas for determining maintenance awards” because “in effect, they modify support payments without regard for modification standards” and “are not responsive to the needs of the parties, and therefore have the effect of either punishing the payor spouse or shortchanging the recipient spouse.” Id. at 384, 640 A.2d at 58, 59. In spite of these criticisms, we held that income equalization awards “may be acceptable when they equalize the parties’ financial status for an appropriate period of time.” Id. at 385, 640 A.2d at 59. On this point, we have recently upheld a one-year equalization award, distinguishing Delozier because there was no risk that, as in Delozier, the income equalization would become punitive rather than compensatory. See Clapp v. Clapp, 163 Vt. 15, 21, 653 A.2d 72, 75 (1994).
On the facts of the specific case, we found in Delozier that numerous factors warranted a permanent maintenance award: the length of the marriage bordered on long term; the parties established a fairly high standing of living during the marriage; the wife gave up career advancement to enhance the husband’s medical career during the marriage; and the wife had custody of a young child with special needs and as a result continued to face limited employment opportunities. Nevertheless, we concluded that the court abused its discretion in awarding maintenance based on permanent equalization of after-tax incomes. We found the award “far too speculative with respect to satisfying the relevant statutory criteria and addressing the purposes of maintenance.” Delozier, 161 Vt. at 386, 640 A.2d at 60 (emphasis supplied). In the language relied upon by the trial court and the majority, we distinguished when permanent income equalization might be appropriate:
Although the permanent equalization of incomes may be appropriate in long-term marriages when the recipient spouse is past middle age or in poor health, that was not the case here. This is a borderline long-term marriage, but plaintiff is relatively young, in good health, and will be able to work as an RN within the next few years. The parties may be employed for a period of time well beyond the length of the marriage. Thus, the permanent equalization of the parties’ income may wind up being punitive rather than compensatory.

Id.

The majority holds that permanent equalization is appropriate here because the marriage is long-term and plaintiff is middle-aged and in poor health. In fact, the differences between this case and *587Delozier axe differences of degree not kind, and plaintiff’s claim for permanent income equalization is weaker than that of the plaintiff in Clapp, where we characterized the facts as “somewhat similar” to those in Delozier. Unless Delozier represents a case factually on the borderline, a characterization difficult to reconcile with our statement that the facts were “far too speculative to satisfy the statutory criteria and purposes of maintenance,” the rationale of Delozier requires us to reverse this order also.
The trial court particularly stressed plaintiff’s health problems, which result from three automobile accidents. It found, however, that she was making a recovery and would make a substantial recovery in one to two years. She is college-educated and is taking classes that qualify her in human services so she should be able to gain the education to start in that field within two years. In many ways, plaintiff’s situation is similar to that of the plaintiff in Delozier, whose employment opportunities were limited by her need to take care of a young child with special needs. In both cases, it is likely that the parties will be employed for a period well beyond the length of the marriage and permanent equalization may wind up being “punitive rather than compensatory.”
This marriage was longer than in Delozier (23 years rather than 14) and plaintiff is older (45 years rather than 39), but there are virtually no findings to support a compensatory component of maintenance based on the “role of the recipient spouse during the marriage.” Id. at 382, 640 A.2d at 58. As in Delozier, it is likely that the parties’ situation will change markedly over the many years this award will be in effect and the resulting income distributions will have little relation to the statutory criteria and purposes of maintenance. As in Delozier, despite the majority’s conclusion to the contrary, the award will reduce plaintiff’s “incentive to make or increase [her] income at a time when it is desirable that she reach her full employment potential.” Id. at 385 n.*, 640 A.2d at 59 n.*. It will also reduce defendant’s incentive to increase his earnings because half of the increase will go to plaintiff.
It is unnecessarily difficult for us to determine where to draw the Delozier lines because we have failed to define the “purposes of maintenance” referenced in the opinion. Although many formulations are possible, the best is contained in an article authored by our judicial colleagues from Maine. See J. Sheldon & N. Mills, In Search of a Theory of Alimony, 45 Me. L. Rev. 283, 285 (1993). They conclude: “As it is presently understood, the purpose of [maintenance] is the prevention of unfairness by forcing ex-spouses to share all of the economic gains and losses that have been produced by the marriage but that are realized after the divorce.” Id. Maintenance is not a post-divorce income-maintenance program to meet all spousal need, however and whenever it arises.
The purpose of maintenance requires a substantial, permanent maintenance award in this case because the post-divorce economic situation of the parties is greatly influenced by economic investments and gains made during the marriage. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 150 Vt. 466, 473-75, 555 A.2d 382, 386-88 (1988). This order, however, goes well beyond the purpose. It makes these parties permanent and involuntary economic partners despite their desire to divorce and get on with their separate lives and despite the fact that much of their economic future will be determined by their own future actions. As Delozier holds, there are cases where a permanent income partnership is justified because the income will be determined by gains and losses produced within the marriage. If plaintiff were so ill or so old that she had no meaningful economic opportunity, the order would be justified. This case does not fit within those limited circumstances.
*588I recognize that we need a method to allocate future income between pre-divorce and post-divorce causes. As an example, two feminist commentators have suggested a starting point that income should be equalized for a period equal to half the length of the marriage. See J. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2227, 2261 (1994); J. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2423, 2455 n.136 (1994). However we make the allocation, it is important we do so rather than continuing to endorse the permanent economic partnership this order reflects.
I dissent.