Court Opinion

ID: 9602235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:36.459441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.642909
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, C.J.
(concurring) — I concur, for reasons stated later, in the result reached by the majority. However, I think that the determination whether a constitutional error is harmless is significantly more complicated than the majority's treatment would indicate. Reaching the correct *6result in this case should not obscure the complexity which will exist in subsequent cases.
The problem of harmless error has long plagued the courts. For a brief summary of the history of the doctrine, see Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 519, 519 (1969); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 999-1002 (1973); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 814 (1970).
The standard which must be met to hold that a federal constitutional error1 is harmless originates. with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967). The court in Chapman, for the first time, held that some errors of a constitutional magnitude do not require reversal. Chapman, supra at 22. The court held that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman, supra at 24.
Thus the rule of harmless constitutional error is clear. What is not clear from Chapman is the proper analysis or methodology an appellate court must use in determining if a constitutional error is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error — A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 27 (1976); Note, supra at 817.
The cases and literature suggest two distinct and vastly different tests to determine whether the constitutional violation is harmless. One is the "contribution" analysis, the other is the "overwhelming untainted evidence" test. Under the first approach, the appellate court looks only at the tainted evidence and asks if it might have played a part in *7(i.e., "contributed to") the fact finder's determination of guilt. The amount and persuasiveness of the untainted evidence is not considered. See Field, supra at 15, 16-19. If the tainted evidence could plausibly have played a part in the conviction, reversal is required.
The theory of the second test is that regardless of how "prejudicial the constitutional error was, a conviction should not be reversed if the case against the defendant was so strong that conviction was inevitable." Field, supra at 30. The appellate court examines the untainted evidence alone and finds the error harmless if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt. If the untainted evidence is merely sufficient to support the conviction, reversal is required. See Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 412-13, 383 A.2d 155, 166 (1978). Field, supra at 17-18 & n.9. In effect, a conviction will be allowed to stand, although a constitutional error did, or could have, played a part in it, if there was other untainted overwhelming evidence which necessarily supported the conviction.
Chapman's analysis suggests the court meant to adopt a "contribution test" as the method for assessing the harmfulness of a constitutional error. In addition, the Chapman court appeared to have perceived the "overwhelming untainted evidence test" to be contrary to the position it adopted. Yet, in one part of its opinion, Chapman, supra at 25-26, the court seemed to imply that the untainted evidence could be weighed and the error thereby possibly found harmless. See Field, supra at 26-27; Note, supra at 817.
While Chapman appears to indicate that the "contribution test" is the appropriate methodology, neither test is inconsistent with Chapman's ultimate "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. "Looking at the error itself, one can require certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that it would not influence a jury; focusing on the other [untainted] evidence, one can require certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that it compels a guilty verdict." Field, supra at 18. Cf. *8People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 84-86, 429 P.2d 606, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Chapman can be read to support either test, but in fact supports the contribution test); Ross v. California, rev'd per curiam, 391 U.S. 470, 20 L. Ed. 2d 750, 88 S. Ct. 1850 (1968); C. McCormick, Evidence § 183, at 431 & n.91 (2d ed. 1972) (arguing that Chapman can be read to support either test but that a standard similar to the overwhelming evidence test seems to be more proper).
While Chapman probably indicates that the contribution test is the proper methodology for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969), casts doubt on this conclusion and further obfuscates the law in this area. In Harrington the court held that the tainted evidence was cumulative of untainted evidence and that the untainted evidence was "so overwhelming" that the error was harmless under Chapman's beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Harrington, supra at 254.
The dissenting opinion in Harrington contended that the majority in effect had overruled Chapman by "shifting the inquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming' support for the conviction", thus violating what it characterized as Chapman's proscription against permitting a constitutional error to make any contribution to a conviction. Harrington, supra at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that Chapman had expressly rejected the overwhelming untainted evidence test. Harrington, supra at 256.
In an apparent response to this dissent, the majority asserted that it was reaffirming Chapman and it was not diluting it by inference. Harrington, supra at 254. While Harrington clearly retained Chapman's ultimate harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, there appears to be general agreement that Harrington apparently approved a methodology consistent with the overwhelming evidence *9test. See State v. Nist, 77 Wn.2d 227, 234, 461 P.2d 322 (1969); C. McCormick, supra at 432; Note, supra at 819. Due to the imprecise analysis in Harrington, however, it is not certain which methodology the court in fact employed. See Field, supra at 38, 58, 60.
Thus, Chapman and Harrington do not indicate clearly which methodology is proper for determining if a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and no consistent pattern emerges from other Supreme Court cases. Perhaps the majority of the cases suggest the overwhelming untainted evidence test is proper. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208, 93 S. Ct. 1565 (1973); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 373, 377, 33 L. Ed. 2d 1, 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-31, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340, 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972); Field, supra at 21, 32. Other cases suggest that the contribution test is the correct methodology. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300, 90 S. Ct. 1757 (1970); Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596, 20 L. Ed. 2d 154, 88 S. Ct. 1229 (1968) (per curiam); Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470, 20 L. Ed. 2d 750, 88 S. Ct. 1850 (1968) (per curiam) (summarily reversing a case in which the California Supreme Court found no harmful error because of the strength of the untainted evidence and in which Justice Traynor's dissent argued that Chapman mandates a contribution test). Given the apparently unrecognized chameleonic quality of harmless error methodology, it is not surprising that support can properly be found for the contribution test, the overwhelming untainted evidence test, or even, to a lesser extent, the "cumulative" test.2 See Field, supra at 16. The "Supreme Court opinions slip back and *10forth from one suggested [methodology] to another, without explicit notice of the change, though the change could produce different results in many cases." [The appropriate methodology therefore] "is less than lucid." Field, supra at 32; see Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 512-22, 378 N.E.2d 51 (1978).
Our cases have been flawed by similarly confusing inconsistency. Shortly after Harrington was decided we characterized that case as holding that a constitutional error "may be held harmless if there is 'overwhelming' untainted evidence to support the conviction." State v. Nist, 77 Wn.2d 227, 234, 461 P.2d 322 (1969). Two years later we cited none of the applicable Supreme Court cases and arguably employed a probability test in a case involving comment on defendant's silence. State v. Gibson, 79 Wn.2d 856, 861, 490 P.2d 874 (1971). In a later case involving comment on silence we appeared to intermingle in an unclear fashion the overwhelming untainted evidence test and Gibson's probability test. State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 396-97, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979). In a recent case we cited Chapman's rule that a constitutional error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and refused to hold the error harmless because the court was unable to conclude that the error "'in no way affected the final outcome of the case.'" State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 191, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). This quotation is arguably consistent with the contribution test.
For a general discussion of the inconsistent course of Washington decisions in this area, see State v. Vargas, 25 Wn. App. 809, 812-16, 610 P.2d 1 (1980).
In this case there was no error regardless of which approach is adopted for the reasons and authority stated in the concurrence by Justice Dore with whom I agree.
In the appropriate case I believe we must examine the foundations and purposes of this doctrine and then formulate a consistent methodology by which we satisfy the purposes of the doctrine and its constitutional foundation.
Dore, J., concurs with Brachtenbach, C.J.

 The standard for determining if a nonconstitutional error is harmless is not the same as that for determining if a constitutional error is harmless. See State v. Cunningham, 93 Wn.2d 823, 831, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980); Saltzburg, supra at 999. Compare Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967) (constitutional error) with Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 90 L. Ed. 1557, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946) (nonconstitutional error).

 The cumulative test asks whether the tainted evidence is merely duplicative of other untainted evidence and is therefore harmless. See Field, supra at 16, 37. Harrington, for example, employed cumulative methodology to a certain extent. See Field, supra at 37. For a general discussion of the cumulative test, see Field, supra at 37-58.