Court Opinion

ID: 9797325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:23.256485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:26.948878
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
—I concur in the opinion of the court.
I write separately to explain why I believe the court is right to conclude that an action by an insured for an insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied in an insurance policy, should not allow an affirmative defense of comparative fault, in whatever form it might take.
A syllogistic argument for an affirmative defense of comparative fault is suggested by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennard in their separate opinions herein: Actions in tort allow an affirmative defense of comparative fault; an action by an insured for an insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and *413fair dealing is in tort; therefore, such an action allows such an affirmative defense.
This argument, however, fails to persuade.
We have held that an action by an insured for an insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds, fundamentally and originally, in contract. (See generally Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 683-684 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373].) The policy is a contract; the covenant is implied therein. Actions in contract do not allow an affirmative defense of comparative fault. Fault, comparative or otherwise, generally does not matter under the law of contracts. What matters, rather, is performance. Hence, performance with fault is sufficient, and nonperformance without fault is not enough.
But we have also held that an action by an insured for an insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be deemed to sound as well in tort. (See generally Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 683-684.) We have done so in order to extend to individual insureds in individual cases against individual insurers the remedies of the law of torts, which are broader and deeper than those of the law of contracts. And we have done that in order to attempt to true the balance in the relationship between insurers and insureds generally in the world at large—a balance that we have found to be skewed in favor of insurers and against insureds—by providing further deterrents against nonperformance on the part of insurers to the detriment of insureds.
All this is not to say that we could not choose to treat an action by an insured for an insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for purposes of the affirmative defense of comparative fault, as sounding in tort.
Any such choice, however, would not be without consequences.
One effect might be to do finer justice on the unique facts of each particular case by equitably apportioning loss.
But another, corresponding, effect would be to limit or restrict the tort remedies extended to individual insureds in individual cases against individual insurers. Yet another effect following on this one would be to undermine the attempt to true the balance in the relationship between insurers and insureds generally in the world at large by removing or reducing deterrents against nonperformance by insurers detrimental to insureds. Still *414another effect following on this one would be to foster more breaches by insurers and hence more actions by their insureds.
The effect first identified might help a handful of parties in the judicial sphere. The others, however, would hurt society as a whole in everyday life.
In conclusion, concurring in the opinion of the court, I join with my colleagues in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal.