Court Opinion

ID: 9631777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:49:47.487746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:11.367039
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION OF
ABE, J.
If I were to assume that the notice requirements of HRS § 46-72 and § 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter are valid and controlling and therefore act as conditions precedent to the liability of the County of Hawaii in tort, then I would have felt constrained to join Mr. Justice Marumoto in his dissenting opinion. I, too, “do not think *220that the description of the place of injury as being ‘on the streets and highways of the County’ complied with the statutory requirements.”
For the reasons stated below, however, I concur with this court’s disposition of this case.
HRS § 46-72 and § 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter both function as statutes of limitations. A person is precluded from advancing a claim against the county if he fails to file a notice within six months of the injury with the proper county authority.1
It appears to me that HRS § 662-4 which was enacted subsequent to the enactment of HRS § 46-72 has impliedly repealed this six-month limitation by instituting a two-year statute of limitation for tort claims against the State and its political subdivisions — the counties. A brief summary of the judicial and legislative erosion of governmental tort immunity in Hawaii will serve to bear out this contention.
HRS § 46-72 has its roots in Section 130 of Act 118, SLH 1907.2 This Act, which created the City 8c County of Honolulu, was enacted when the territory had not consented to suits in the nature of a tort action. See Coffield, v. Territory of Hawaii, 13 Haw. 478 (1901). Section 3 of Act 118, SLH 1907, however, provided that “£s]aid city and county . . . may sue and be sued in all *221courts and places and in all matters and proceedings.” It thus appears that statutory authority to sue the City and County of Honolulu was given by the legislature. But, it also appears that the right to sue the City 8c County of Honolulu was narrowed by the notice of claim provisions of Section 130 of Act 118, SLH 1907.
Act 39, SLH 1905, created the County of Hawaii as well as the other counties of the Territory of Hawaii. Section 9 subjected the counties to the power and liability of suing and being sued in its corporate name. This Act did not contain a notice of claim provision applicable to the counties it created.
The case of Matsumura v. County of Hawaii, 19 Haw. 18 (1908), established that the county of Hawaii, as created by Act 39, SLH 1905, was liable in tort for the negligent acts of its employees.3
In 1943 the territorial legislature enacted Act 181, SLH 1943, which interposed a notice of claim requirement on the counties’ (other than City and County of Honolulu) tort liability. The City & County of Honolulu’s notice of claim provisions was used as a model. See Standing Committee Report 295, Senate Journal 1943, p. 768. At this time, the territorial legislature still had not consented to suits in the nature of a tort action.
In 1955, the territorial legislature consented to tort claims when the subject matter of the suit was covered by insurance. The State’s liability was limited, though, by the amount of insurance coverage. Act 253, SLH 1955; HRS §661-11.
Finally, in 1957 the territorial legislature enacted *222what is now the State Tort Liability Act, HRS Ch. 662. Section 1 of Act 512, SLH 1957 states that “[t]he Territory hereby waives its immunity for liability for the torts of its employees and shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under the circumstances . . . .”
The policy inherent in this development of governmental tort liability is clear — the State as well as its political subdivisions should be held accountable for the misfeasances of their employees, like all private parties. Ruling that HRS § 662-4 has superseded HRS § 46-72 would be consonant with this policy.
This court appears to say that the provisions of Act 235, SLH 1967, would allow a county to enact a charter provision respecting tort liability, and such an enactment would “supersede any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of the county which are in conflict therewith.” HRS § 50-10.
On the other hand, HRS § 50-15 provides:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, there is expressly reserved to the state legislature the power to enact all laws of general application throughout the state on matters of concern and interest and laws relating to the fiscal powers of the counties, and neither a charter nor ordinances adopted under a charter shall be in conflict therewith.”
Section 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter does not appear to be a charter provision “affecting the organization and government of the county.” The provision of HRS § 662-4, however, does seem to be a law of general application throughout the State on a matter of concern and interest. Being so, the two-year limitation on tort actions should be binding on this State’s political subdivisions as well as the State itself. Then, because § 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter conflicts with the provision of HRS § 662-4,1 would hold the charter provision invalid. *223In my opinion HRS § 662-4 also repeals HRS § 46-72. Thus, here, HRS § 662-4 is the applicable statute of limitations. The appellant, having filed her complaint within two years of the accrual of the claim, I would reverse the trial court’s granting of summary judgment and remand the case for a determination of the unresolved issues of material fact.
This court’s interpretation of § 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter and HRS § 46-72 brings about complications in the determinations of collateral matters (e.g., whether the county was prejudiced or misled— query: are these questions of fact or law?) which could be avoided by uniformly applying a two-year statute of limitations on claims against the State or its political subdivisions in the nature of a tort action. I see no necessity for having two separate statutes of limitation — one for tort claims against the State and another its political subdivisions. At first blush it does not appear that the State has suffered due to the lack of the type of “protection” afforded to the counties by HRS § 46-72. Also, holding the statute of limitation provided by HRS § 662-4 is controlling against the county should not prejudice the counties, as a well-pleaded complaint would serve “to inform municipal authorities ‘when, where and how injuries occurred, the extent thereof, and the amount claimed therefor’ ” as well as guard against fraudulent and unfounded claims. Furthermore, it is not manifest that facts are fresher, or conditions more similar six months rather than two years after a claim arises.
It appears to me that this court is setting a trap for the unwary. A person’s ability to recover for personal injuries should not depend on the happenstance of the location of his injury. Yet this court today holds that a motorist who sustains injuries on a road or highway of the county of Hawaii due to the county’s negligence must present his claim within six months. Another person injured a few miles, or even blocks away, however, may *224have two years within which to file a complaint due to the fortuity of having the accident occur on state-controlled property. These inequities and technical roadblocks should be construed out of, rather than into, our laws.

 In the instant case, the notice was given to the mayor of the county of Hawaii. HRS § 46-72 requires the notice to be given to the chairman of the board of supervisors of the county of Hawaii. Section 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter requires that the claimant submit a notice to the county clerk. The Hawaii County Charter, effective January 2, 1969, replaced the board of supervisors of the county of Hawaii with a county council. Section 3-7 of the Charter also created the position of chairman of the council. One must wonder who is the “proper county authority.”

 Section 130 of Act 118, SLH 1907, reads as follows:
“Before the City and County shall be liable for damages to any person for injuries received upon any of the streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks or other public places of the City and County, the person so injured, or someone on his behalf, shall, within one year after receiving such injuries, give the Mayor notice in writing of such injuries, stating fully in such notice, when, where, and how the injuries occurred and the extent thereof.”

 In Kamau & Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Haw. 527, 552 (1957), this court further expanded the scope of the counties’ tort liability. It stated:
"We are of the opinion that the narrow rule heretofore followed as to so-called 'governmental' or public functions, and ‘proprietary’ or private functions should not control the question of municipal liability for its torts; that where its agents are negligent in the performance of their duties so that damage results to an individual, it is immaterial that the duty being performed is a public one from which the municipality derives no profit or that it is a duty imposed upon it by the legislature.”