Court Opinion

ID: 9902657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:21:20.554755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:56.283875
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-2879
                    LT Case No. 2023-CJ-1314
                  _____________________________

J.S., A CHILD,

    Petitioner,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Respondent.
                  _____________________________

On petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Circuit Court for
Duval County. W. Collins Cooper, Judge.

Charlie Cofer, Public Defender, and Elizabeth Hogan Webb,
Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

                       September 26, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     J.S., a thirteen-year-old juvenile, petitions this Court for a
writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he is being wrongfully
detained in extended secure detention care past his initial 21 days
of secure detention. We agree and grant his petition.
     Petitioner is being prosecuted in the juvenile division of the
circuit court on one count of aggravated battery causing great
bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement in
violation of section 784.045(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2023), which
would constitute a second-degree felony if committed by an adult.
The offense allegedly occurred on July 13, 2023. In short, the State
alleges that Petitioner heated a cup of water in a microwave and
threw the water on his sleeping eleven-year-old cousin, who
sustained first- and second-degree burns to twelve percent of her
body. Petitioner was arrested on August 30, 2023. The arrest report
states that, after receiving Miranda warnings, Petitioner admitted
to the charged conduct, stated that he intended it as a prank in
response to an earlier prank in which the cousin had poured water
on him and slapped him, and explained that he did not know how
hot the water was and did not intend to harm his cousin. The arrest
report also notes that Petitioner told officers he had apologized to
his cousin.

     Petitioner scored 18 points on his detention screening
instrument, and on August 31, the court ordered his placement in
secure detention care for an initial 21-day period that would end on
September 20. The State then asked the court to extend the secure
detention for an additional 21 days, and Petitioner asked for release
from secure detention.

     On September 14, the court held a hearing. At the hearing, the
State grounded its extension request on “the facts of the case and
the nature of the charges,” focusing on the nature and extent of the
victim’s injuries rather than on whether the State would need
additional time to prosecute the case. The State also grounded its
extension request on an assertion that Petitioner’s release would
jeopardize public safety. The State argued that the facts of the case,
the serious nature of the charge, and Petitioner’s access to “his
weapons” (water and a microwave) upon release indicate a danger
to the public that warrants extended detention. The State did not,
however, put forward any evidence or argument that Petitioner was
likely to repeat the charged conduct. And indeed, Petitioner
introduced testimony by several family members showing
otherwise. In short, the family members testified that Petitioner
never has had issues with violence or gangs, Petitioner never has
been violent toward his siblings or cousins, Petitioner and his

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family cooperated with the investigation, the victim has returned
to her home in Indiana, and Petitioner would live alone with his
father in Orlando were he released.

     At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the State’s
motion and ordered that Petitioner be securely detained for an
additional 21 days. Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus
in this Court.

    Section 985.26(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2023), provides:

             Upon good cause being shown that the
             nature of the charge requires additional
             time for the prosecution or defense of the
             case or [that] the totality of the
             circumstances, including the preservation
             of public safety, warrants an extension,
             the court may extend the length of secure
             detention care for up to an additional 21
             days if the child is charged with an offense
             which, if committed by an adult, would be
             a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of
             the first degree or the second degree, or a
             felony of the third degree involving
             violence against any individual. The court
             may continue to extend the period of
             secure detention care in increments of up
             to 21 days each by conducting a hearing
             before the expiration of the current period
             to determine the need for continued secure
             detention of the child. At the hearing, the
             court must make the required findings in
             writing to extend the period of secure
             detention. If the court extends the time
             period for secure detention care, it shall
             ensure an adjudicatory hearing for the
             case commences as soon as is reasonably
             possible considering the totality of the
             circumstances. The court shall prioritize
             the efficient disposition of cases in which

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             the child has served 60 or more days in
             secure detention care.

§ 985.26(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023).

      Under section 985.26, “a finding of good cause must be
predicated on a record containing competent evidence of the
reasons for continuing the detention period.” E.D. v. State, 966 So.
2d 994, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). “[A] conclusory motion without
competent evidence to support its conclusory claims” is insufficient,
id., and “good cause” must be “more than merely the grounds relied
upon for a juvenile’s original detention.” B.G. v. Fryer, 570 So. 2d
430, 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Similarly, the State fails to
demonstrate good cause when it merely “parrot[s] the language of
good cause in a motion, without supporting competent evidence or
specificity.” E.D., 966 So. 2d at 996 (citing E.W. v. Brown, 559 So.
2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).

     Here, the State failed to offer evidence that there is good cause
to extend Petitioner’s secure detention care. To begin, the State’s
focus on the nature of the charge in the abstract is misdirected.
Section 985.26 allows for an extension where “the nature of the
charge requires additional time for the prosecution or defense of the
case.” § 985.26(2)(b) (emphasis added). The State presented no
argument that it needed additional time to prosecute the case.
Moreover, while the State did assert that the totality of the
circumstances, including the preservation of public safety,
warranted an extension, it offered no competent evidence to support
that assertion aside from a claim that Petitioner would have access
to water and a microwave upon his release. Petitioner, on the other
hand, offered testimony that he had neither a propensity nor an
opportunity to repeat the charged conduct. That testimony went
unrebutted by the State. Therefore, the State failed to support its
assertion that Petitioner’s continued access to water and a
microwave would jeopardize public safety.

    The State nonetheless relies on our recent decision in A.J.M. v.
State, No. 5D23-2003, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1237 (5th DCA June 21,
2023), but we think the State overreads our precedent. In A.J.M.,
we held that extended secure detention was warranted where the
juvenile had threatened a school shooting with pictures of himself

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holding a firearm, the State had not located the juvenile’s firearm,
and the parties raised a factual dispute over whether the juvenile
continued to have access to the firearm. Id. Unlike in A.J.M., there
is no allegation that Petitioner has threatened future harm to
others and no evidence suggesting that he may harm others in the
future. Having failed to introduce competent evidence showing that
Petitioner could and would repeat the charged conduct or otherwise
would threaten public safety, the State cannot rely on A.J.M. as
authority to extend Petitioner’s secure detention care.

     For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition. The State has
requested that, if we grant the petition, we direct the circuit court
to order home detention with an electronic monitor. We decline to
issue such a directive and instead leave these issues to the circuit
court in the first instance.

    PETITION GRANTED.

MAKAR, LAMBERT, and PRATT, JJ., concur.

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