Court Opinion

ID: 9543790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:49:16.360817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:12.475046
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent to the majority’s treatment of Issue II.
The instrument which charged the habitual offender count reads as follows:
“David Lippens swears that Mickey C. McConnell a/k/a Harry Thomas a/k/a Elvin Bray a/k/a Claude Jackson late of the County and State aforesaid, on or about the 14th day of January A.D. 1981 did then and there, at and in said County and State has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions, then and there being contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.”
Just prior to the trial upon the habitual offender count Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that it was not specific enough. The trial court ruled as follows:
*1108“THE COURT: The Court is denying that motion for the reason that the habitual charge was discussed at the time of the omnibus hearing. A purported copy of the FBI document which shows prior convictions and prior offenses charged against the Defendant was made available to defense counsel. If the specific two crimes the State intended to prove were not charged, at least that document was furnished to Mr. Skinner and I don’t see how it would prejudice his defense by not dismissing it. And if the State proved two other charges rather than the one — if the State proved two other convictions rather than the ones charged, I think all the State would have to do is request that the Information be amended to conform with the evidence. I think the case law has supported that proposition.” (R. at 247-48)
The record contains an order book entry of an “omnibus hearing” held December 3, 1980; however, the record does not contain a transcript of that hearing at which, according to the trial judge, Defendant was furnished with an FBI document reflecting his prior convictions and arrests. Over objection, that document was admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 11 at the habitual offender proceeding. From Defendant’s prior receipt of his “rap” sheet and his failure to move for a continuance, the majority apparently concludes that “defendant was given sufficient notice to defend himself against the habitual offender charge.” But, the record shows that he received the equivalent of no notice at all.
While the habitual offender charge is not a separate offense under the penal code, it is subject to the rules governing the charging of criminal offenses. To invoke the enhanced penalty the State must charge the prior unrelated convictions “ * * * on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument; * * Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8(a) (Burns Supp.1981). (Emphasis added). Thus, the habitual offender count is part of the charging instrument. Under Ind.Code § 35-3.1-l-2(a)(4) (Burns 1979) the form of the charging instrument must contain an allegation “Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition;.” This statute codifies the holding in our cases that “ * * ⅜ the accused has a right to have all the essential elements that enter into the offense, charged in the affidavit, so that he may know what he has to meet, whether those elements are expressed in terms in the statute or enter into the offense by construction.” Borton v. State, (1952) 230 Ind. 679, 683, 106 N.E.2d 392, 394; Accord McCormick v. State, (1954) 233 Ind. 281, 285-86, 119 N.E.2d 5, 7.
The information charging habitual offender status does not comply with this requirement. It merely charges that he had accumulated two prior felony convictions and makes no allegations with respect to when they occurred or what they consisted of. He was entitled to have that information and to' have the State’s evidence confined thereto. Miller v. State, Ind., 417 N.E.2d 339, 342.
Under the now repealed habitual offender statute, Ind.Code § 35-8-8-2 (Burns 1975) the prior convictions are required to be described separately. In our cases we have adhered to this rule of specificity in order to assure that Defendants be properly apprised of the offense charged. Goldstine v. State, (1952) 230 Ind. 343, 351, 103 N.E.2d 438, 442; Accord Shutt v. State, (1954) 233 Ind. 120, 125-26, 117 N.E.2d 268, 271 (cases cited therein).
Citing Lewis v. State, (1975) 166 Ind.App. 553, 562, 337 N.E.2d 516, 520, the majority holds that it is sufficient if the defendant is furnished with information allowing him to reminisce through his criminal past, because he has better knowledge of that past. Lewis is irrelevant to the substance of an habitual offender charge. It treats the time limits upon the prosecutor’s power to amend an information to add a recidivist charge under the now repealed Offenses Against Property Act, Ind.Code § 35-17-5-12(5)(h) (Burns 1975). That the time limits for charging habitual offender status are very liberal in favor of the State does not and should not alter the requirement that *1109the averments of the charge comply with Ind.Code § 35-3.1-1-2 and be specific enough to apprise the defendant of the charge against him.
I do not understand the majority’s reference to the defendant’s having made no motion for a continuance or allegation that he needed more time to investigate the charges, as I am aware of no policy in the law that excuses the State from the exactitude generally required of charging instruments upon the basis that the defendant, by sufficient effort, might become sufficiently enlightened.
Except as to its treatment of those assignments of error concerning the habitual offender count, I concur in the opinion of the majority. But for the reasons stated, I am of the opinion that the motion to dismiss the habitual offender count should have been granted; and I would remand the case with instructions to re-sentence the defendant.
HUNTER, J., concurs.