Court Opinion

ID: 9498047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:06:46.261846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:35.078291
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
with whom O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and BEA, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I part company with the majority’s holding that the Thomas family constitutes a “particular social group” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A),1 because the issue wheth*1190er a nuclear family, without more, is a “particular social group” has never been vetted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
I agree with the majority that our- law on whether a family can be a “particular social group” for purposes of refugee status is in disarray. I also agree that, having taken the case en banc, we should wipe the slate clean. And I agree that, in light of the BIA’s decision in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 1985 WL 56042 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441, 1987 WL 108943 (BIA 1987), and in the absence of more specific guidance from the BIA, a family should not be foreclosed from being a “particular social group.”
However, I disagree that we should go further than to hold that a family may be a “particular social group.” The BIA has never considered whether a family such as the Thomas family is a “particular social group.” It did not do so in this case, no doubt because Thomas’s appeal failed to focus on this ground. The question is important, and has profound implications. We have no business deciding such a question without the BIA’s having first addressed it becau.se we owe deference to the BIA’s interpretation and application of the immigration laws. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam), makes this clear. Instead, having settled our law and established that, in accord with existing BIA precedent, a family may be a “particular social group,” I would remand for the BIA to say under what circumstances a family is a “particular social group” and whether, under whatever test the BIA adopts, the Thomas family qualifies.
Accordingly, I join the majority’s decision that a family may' be a particular social group, but dissent from its remaining discussion.
I
Michelle Thomas, her husband David, and their two children, Tyneal and Shal-don, are natives and citizens of South Africa who entered the United States on May 28, 1997 as visitors. They applied for asylum within a year, but their requests were denied.
The Thomases lived in Durban, where David was' a firefighter. The evidence at the hearing on their renewed request for asylum and withholding of removal showed that Michelle’s father-in-law was a foreman at Strongshore Construction, a large South African company, who was known as “Boss Ronnie.” Boss Ronnie was a racist and abusive to his black workers. Michelle Thomas testified that Strongshore workers were retaliating against her family because of Boss Ronnie. She recounted five incidents that had occurred: In February of 1996 the family dog died, probably from poison. Thomas reported this to the police, but the police said they had too many serious crimes to deal with to make a report. On March 4, 1996, the Thom-ases’ car was vandalized. The police were called, showed up in 10 minutes, and patrolled the area but found no one. In May of 1996 human feces were found at the door of the Thomases’ house. In December of 1996 a Strongshore worker threatened to come back and cut Michelle’s throat. And in March of 1997 four men, who included someone wearing Strong-shore overalls, tried to kidnap Tyneal. It is not clear whether either of these incidents was reported to the police. Boss Ronnie retired in February 1998.
*1191Although she checked the box for persecution on account of “membership in a particular social group” on her asylum application, Thomas argued to the immigration judge (IJ) that she was persecuted partly “on account of political opinion” and partly “on account of race.” The IJ’s decision noted that Thomas’s position was that she and her family were being attacked because of their race. The IJ found that they were suffering from personal retaliation, that there was no government-sponsored violence of blacks against whites, and that Thomas’s personal problems were not on account of the proffered ground of race, or political opinion. Thus, the IJ concluded that Thomas failed to carry her burden of proving that she and her family suffered persecution “based on any of the five statutory grounds whether it is race or political opinion.”
Thomas appealed to the BIA. She sought review for four reasons: (1) the IJ improperly rejected testimony; . (2) the IJ failed to give sufficient weight to documentary evidence; (3) the IJ misconstrued the documentary evidence by failing to conclude that the government is unable to protect its citizens from violent crime; and (4) the IJ improperly concluded that Thomas’s testimony was not credible. Her premise was that “[t]he record established that the Respondents suffered from past persecution on account of their race,” and her claim of error was that the IJ failed to recognize that “[t]he issue is not whether the government is an active participant in the violence against whites, but rather its transparent inability to protect white South Africans from violent crime and lawlessness.” The BIA affirmed the results of the IJ’s decision.
II
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.2004), and there is a question whether the requirements are met in this case. On the one hand, Thomas did not specify membership in a particular social group as a basis of her appeal to the BIA, which we expect petitioners to do in order to exhaust. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir.2004). Clear notice of the basis for appeal is important because the purpose of exhaustion “is to give [the] ... agency the opportunity to resolve a controversy or correct its own errors before judicial intervention.” Id. at 931. On the other hand, reasonable minds can differ about what the record shows in this case, as it does refer to “membership in a particular social group” and Thomas’s fear of harm from black South Africans “who held a grudge against her and her family” because of Boss Ronnie’s abusive actions. Accepting my colleagues’ conclusion that the issue is technically exhausted, we nevertheless do not have license to go beyond what is necessary to align our law with Matter of Acosta. We have accomplished this by saying that a family may be a “particular social group”; beyond this, we should remand for the BIA to determine whether the Thomas family is a “particular social group.”
This is so for a number of reasons. Even if the issue whether the Thomas family is a “particular social group” were raised, there is no question that it was not ruled upon. Neither the immigration judge nor the BIA discussed this ground at all. The agency’s focus, like Thomas’s, was on race. In these circumstances we cannot infer from the IJ’s conclusion that Thomas failed to carry her burden of proving persecution “based on any of the five statutory grounds whether it is race or political opinion” that the IJ, or the BIA, actually considered the ground of membership in a particular social group. When this is the case, we are obliged to remand rather than determine the claim ourselves. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 14, 123 S.Ct. 353.
*1192Further, we are convened en banc primarily for the purpose of curing an intra-circuit conflict. See Fed. R.App. P. 35(a)(1) (establishing uniformity as a basis for rehearing en banc). As the majority opinion explains, some of our decisions have held that a family cannot constitute a “particular social group,” while others have indicated the opposite. Resolving this inconsistency has, evident value given the huge number of asylum cases that depend upon clarity in the law of this circuit. However, uniformity can be achieved by holding that a family “may” be.a “particular social group” for purposes of § 1101(a)(42)(A), as the majority does. Maj. op. at 1187. I have no quarrel with this because it follows from what the BIA said in Matter of Acosta that a family, which has “kinship ties,” may be a “particular social group.” Put differently, to clarify that a family is not foreclosed from being a “particular social group” simply- — • and properly — brings this circuit into line with the BIA’s own interpretation of § 1101(a)(42)(A) and, to this extent,, is faithful to the principle that “a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.” Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16, 123 S.Ct. 353 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943)). But to go further, as the majority does by holding that the Thomas family is a “particular social group,” transgresses this principle by going further than the BIA has ever gone.
The BIA has never addressed whether a nuclear family is a “particular social group.” It has held that taxi drivers are not a particular social group, Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 1985 WL 56042 (BIA 1985); that young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who did not undergo female genital mutilation as practiced by that Tribe are a particular social group, In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA 1996); that the Marehan, a subclan of the Somalian Darood clan who share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities, are a particular social group, In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342-43, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996); and that homosexuals in Cuba are a particular social group, Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 1990 WL 547189 (BIA 1990). It is not immediately obvious that an ordinary family, albeit a social group, is a particular social group akin to a clan or tribe for purposes of § 1101(a)(42)(A). It may be, or it may not be without other indicia of societal recognition. In its considered judgment the BIA may believe that family-plus is required for an ordinary family to qualify, or it may not. However, these are matters for the BIA, not for us, to sort out in the first instance.
The law entrusts the agency to make basic asylum eligibility decisions. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We owe Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the immigration laws. Chevron, USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). And the Supreme Court has made it clear as can be that “a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands. This principle has obvious importance in the immigration context.” Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353. In this case as in Ventura,
every consideration that classically supports the law’s ordinary remand requirement does so here. The agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court la*1193ter determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.
Id. at 17, 123 S.Ct. 353.
For all these reasons we should refrain from deciding ourselves if the Thomas family is a “particular social group.” The majority remands for the BIA to determine whether the threats and attacks against the Thomases rose to the level of persecution and for consideration of other issues such as whether the government of South Africa was unwilling or unable to control the alleged persecution, and whether the Thomases have a well-founded fear of future persecution. There is no logical or practical reason for not also remanding the unaddressed issue of whether the Thomases are a “particular social group.”
Accordingly, I would remand now that we have clarified the law of the circuit that a family may be a “particular social group.” We should not substitute our judgment for the agency’s before it has had an opportunity to draw on its expertise and exercise its discretion. I therefore dissent from the majority’s holding, without prior BIA consideration, that the Thomas family is a “particular social group.”

. Section 1101(a)(42)(A) defines a “refugee" as any person who is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail herself of the protection of, *1190the country in which she last resided because of persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”