Court Opinion

ID: 9730219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:05:27.146895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:05.015740
License: Public Domain

*310TOM GRAY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority has misapplied the standard of review for a no evidence challenge. Because of this, the decision of the majority to reverse the judgment is in error, and I respectfully dissent.
This appeal is from a civil forfeiture proceeding under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The subject of the forfeiture was a 1995 Dodge pickup. The property owner, Robert Anderson, III, contested the forfeiture. In response to the State’s petition, Anderson contended that the State had no probable cause to seize the pickup and that the State did not prove that the pickup was contraband. At the hearing, probable cause was not contested as seriously as the allegation that the pickup was contraband and, thus, subject to forfeiture. The trial court ruled the pickup was contraband. The trial court did not rule on Anderson’s probable cause contention. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed.
Anderson’s issue on appeal is that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that the pickup was contraband. He does not contend on appeal that the State had no probable cause to seize the pickup in the first instance.
I disagree that the State provided no more than a scintilla of evidence to prove the pickup was contraband; i.e., that it was used or intended to be used in the commission of any felony under the Texas Controlled Substances Act. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.01(2)(B)(i) (Vernon Pamp.2003). The majority focuses its attention on the fact that the record “is silent as to how Anderson’s truck was used ...” and that there was no testimony as to when any of the items found in the pickup were placed there. The majority also discounted, as did the trial court, the funnels and the “multiple” empty packages of pseudoephedrine. But that is not the standard of review.
Also, the majority cites case law about probable cause. I question the need for this section. The issue is a no-evidence question, not a probable cause question. It leads the reader to believe that the probable cause standard, a substantial connection between the property and the criminal activity1, is incorporated into the no-evidence review of whether the property is contraband. While I realize that some courts have used it in this manner2, probable cause is not necessarily a part of a no-evidence review. With the first statement in the majority’s analysis being, “[vjehicle forfeiture cases ordinarily involve evidence of a more direct connection to the alleged crime ...” leads me to believe that this is the underlying standard used by the majority in deciding the evidence was insufficient to establish that the pickup was contraband.
I also question the necessity of citing a standard for a circumstantial evidence review at this point. The statement, “circumstances must be proven by direct evidence” is awkward. What the Burlington case said was that no presumption can itself be based on a presumption. Burlington-Rock Island R. Co. v. Pruitt, 160 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1942, writ ref'd). ‘Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove a fact, the *311circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed.” Id. Again, I am led to believe that the majority is really using the probable cause standard to review Anderson’s issue.
Nevertheless, the majority says it remains cognizant of the duty not to indulge in inferences contrary to the judgment. But that is exactly what it is doing. We are supposed to disregard all evidence and inferences that do not support the judgment. We also do not look at only what the trial court considered sufficient evidence. Let’s look at the evidence in the correct light.
David Feucht was trained in the investigation of the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs. The first time he went by Anderson’s residence, at 12:20 a.m., he smelled an odor associated with manufacturing methamphetamine, particularly, ether. He walked by the residence two more times to determine from where the smell was coming. Feucht noticed both the odor of ether and another odor of methamphetamine production emanating from Anderson’s residence.
Feucht then set up surveillance of the residence and noticed that a Ford pickup, which was parked in front of the residence, left the residence. The pickup was driven by Rene Anderson who was stopped and arrested for multiple traffic violations.3 Rene spoke with Feucht and informed him that she and Anderson were getting a divorce. She also told Feucht that Anderson came to the residence at about 12:15 a.m. and said he was going to do some “stuff.” Rene said Anderson went to the back porch. When she went to the back porch to speak with him, Anderson told her to leave. Rene also told Feucht that she smelled an odor while out on the porch which she knew to be associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Feucht prepared an affidavit in support of a search and seizure warrant which was signed by a magistrate at 5:07 a.m. Feucht participated in the execution of the search warrant. Illegal narcotics were found at the residence. The Dodge pickup was also found at the residence. Anderson admitted that he owned the pickup. Feucht also participated in the search of the pickup. In it he located funnels, numerous or multiple empty “blister packs” of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine tablets, and drug paraphernalia. Feucht testified that the funnels would be equipment used in the manufacture of illegal drugs. He also testified that ephedrine or pseudoephedrine tablets were a chemical precursor to the manufacture of illegal drugs.
In the bed of the pickup, investigators found a receipt for two boxes of decongestant and two boxes of “triphed,” a battery strip, and coffee filters. Other items seized elsewhere included: several baggies of a brownish or reddish powder weighing anywhere from 7.5 grams to 1.75 pounds, more coffee filters and a box of # 2 paper funnels, three one gallon jugs of muriatic acid, foil, stir sticks, respirator, paper towels, glass jars, and a red funnel. Feucht testified that based on his knowledge and experience, all the items seized were related to the manufacture and possession of illegal drugs. He also testified that he believed the pickup was used or intended to be used in the commission of a drug offense under the Health and Safety Code.
Granted, the record could have been developed more, but considering the actual evidence and inferences tending to support the judgment, there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s *312finding that the pickup was contraband and subject to forfeiture. We should be affirming the trial court’s judgment; not reversing it.

. $56,700.00 in United States Currency v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1987).

. See, e.g., 1996 Pontiac Four Door v. State, No. 09-01-092-CV, 2001 WL 1692122, 2002 Tex.App. Lexis 180, *5-6 (Beaumont January 10, 2002, no pet.)(not designated for publication); $217,590.00 in United States Currency v. State, 54 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); $7,058.84 v. State, 30 S.W.3d 580, 586-87 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).

. This information about Rene and what she subsequently told Feucht was part of the search warrant affidavit which was admitted into evidence.