Court Opinion

ID: 9793334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:11.196733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:31.313616
License: Public Domain

ROYIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
The rationale for the court’s opinion is its conclusion that to allow a district judge to permit the filing of a direct information, when the district attorney states he will offer direct rather than hearsay testimony, would “constitute approval of the undesirable practice of presenting as little evidence as possible at the preliminary hearing in the county court and then requesting district court consent for a direct filing if no probable cause is found by the county court.” Maj. op. 15.
The majority implies that the district attorney of the Fifth Judicial District engaged in the “undesirable practice” which it condemns. I disagree. The prosecution generally is not required to produce all of its evidence against the defendant at the preliminary hearing, only “that quantum necessary to establish probable cause” that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed it. Hunter v. District Court, 190 Colo. 48, 543 P.2d 1265 (1975); People v. Quinn, 183 Colo. 245, 516 P.2d 420 (1973). The preliminary hearing is primarily a screening device and should not be transformed into something resembling a “mini-trial.” While the prosecution’s decision to withhold the direct testimony of its informant at the county court hearing may have been a tactical error, it was also a perfectly legitimate practice and in no way amounts to the presentation of “as little evidence as possible at the preliminary hearing in the county court.” Maj. op. *1615. See People v. Quinn, supra (hearsay evidence may well be bulk of the evidence at the preliminary hearing).
On the issue of whether the prosecution could file a direct information in the district court, I believe that the offer by the district attorney to put in evidence direct rather than hearsay testimony warranted the conclusion by the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, that a direct information could be filed. The district attorney acted promptly, filing the direct information within two days of the county court hearing. At the request of the trial court, he made an offer of proof outlining the direct testimony that the informant would present. After weighing the offer of proof, the trial court consented to and permitted the direct filing. See People v. Swazo, 191 Colo. 425, 558 P.2d 782 (1976); People v. Freiman, 657 P.2d 452 (Colo.1983).
It is not outside the realm of possibility that the trial court, upon hearing direct rather than hearsay testimony about the alleged drug sale, would determine that probable cause existed. The trial court obviously wanted to hear the informant’s testimony. In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the informations, it indicated that the direct testimony could be considered “additional evidence.” Maj. op. 14. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the conclusion of the trial court was anything other than a proper exercise of discretion under Crim.P. 7(c)(2). Judicial discretion is the responsible exercise of power and contemplates the application of statutes, rules, and legal principles to the facts of a case. Abuse of discretion suggests that such power has been exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, and without consideration for the rights of the litigants.
I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion. Crim.P. 7(c)(2) is permissive and vests in the trial court considerable latitude as to whether a direct information may be filed. It is axiomatic that a ruling by the trial court in an area where it has discretionary power will not be disturbed on review unless it be clearly shown that there was an abuse of such discretionary power. See, e.g., People v. Elmore, 652 P.2d 571 (Colo.1982); Smith v. Smith, 172 Colo. 516, 474 P.2d 619 (1970). No such showing has been made here. I would not overturn the decision of a trial judge under the rubric of abuse of discretion without something more than mere speculation as to what district attorneys may do.
Dismissal of serious criminal charges is not favored and is not warranted under the facts of this case. See People v. Swazo, supra. I would discharge the rule.