Court Opinion

ID: 9364864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 15:06:34.167602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.821650
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Budz v. Somerfield, 2023-Ohio-155.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 GAIL BUDZ et al.                                    :
                                                     :
       Appellees                                     :   C.A. No. 29550
                                                     :
 v.                                                  :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CV 03126
                                                     :
 ROBERT SOMERFIELD ESTATE OF                         :   (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
 et al.                                              :   Court)
                                                     :
       Appellants                                    :

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                     Rendered on January 20, 2023

                                                ...........

ANDREW J. ZIEGLER, Attorney for Appellees

LEE C. FALKE, Attorney for Appellants

                                               .............

EPLEY, J.

        {¶ 1} The estate of Robert Somerfield and Stephen F. Somerfield (“Somerfield”),

its fiduciary, appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment and

its grant of Renee Budz and Gail Budz’s motion for summary judgment. For the following
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reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

                             I. Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} The following facts are derived from Renee and Gail’s evidence in support of

their motion for summary judgment and the publicly-available online dockets of related

court proceedings. See, e.g., Huber Hts. Veterans Club, Inc. v. Grande Voiture d'Ohio

La Societe des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29078, 2021-Ohio-

2695, ¶ 33 (courts may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records that are

accessible via the internet).    Somerfield and the estate did not provide evidentiary

materials in support of their motion for summary judgment.

       {¶ 3} Renee Budz is the niece of Robert Somerfield, who is now deceased. We

infer that Gail is Renee’s mother/Robert’s sister.

       {¶ 4} According to Renee’s affidavit (Pls’ Ex. C), Renee relocated from Chicago to

Dayton in early 2013. While looking for a home to purchase, she found a property

located at 4901 Shiloh View Drive. Renee, however, was unable to obtain financing, and

accordingly, her uncle, Robert, purchased the property. As part of this arrangement,

Robert wanted Renee to give him “spending money” every month and, in exchange,

Robert would give Renee the house upon his death.                  In reliance on these

representations, Renee paid a significant amount of money out of her own funds to

improve the property, as the property was uninhabitable when it was purchased. Pls’

Ex. B, C.

       {¶ 5} Renee moved into the property in July 2013 and began paying Robert

approximately $650 per month in cash.           Renee also paid all real estate taxes,
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homeowner’s insurance, and necessary repairs. The parties agree that, in July 2015,

Robert asked Renee to sign a written residential lease agreement, which she did.

      {¶ 6} Robert died on January 2, 2018. Renee stated that, upon his passing, she

learned that Robert had a trust in Illinois; the trustee told her that she was not going to

receive the property. Because Robert resided in Illinois but had property in Ohio, an

estate was opened in Montgomery County, Ohio as an ancillary administration.

Somerfield was appointed the fiduciary of Robert’s ancillary estate on July 27, 2018. See

In re Estate of Robert Somerfield, Montgomery P.C. No. 2018-EST-01440. In October

2018, Somerfield filed an inventory which identified only the Shiloh View property.

Renee filed an exception to the inventory, claiming that the property should not be

included as an asset of the estate and seeking a constructive trust. Pls’ Ex. A. Soon

thereafter, in November 2018, the estate filed a forcible entry and detainer action against

Renee and Gail in Vandalia Municipal Court. Somerfield v. Budz, Vandalia M.C. No.

CVG1801938.

      {¶ 7} The probate court held a hearing on the exceptions in December 2018, and

the parties reached an agreement that Renee would apply for a mortgage to purchase

the real estate. Renee never obtained financing. On May 23, 2019, the estate obtained

a writ of restitution in the eviction action, but Gail and Renee remained at the property

pending appeal.

      {¶ 8} Four days after the estate received the writ of restitution, a tornado struck the

property, causing significant damage. The damage included broken windows, fallen

trees, roof damage, and complete destruction of the rear porch. Pls’ Ex. C. Renee
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made numerous phone calls to Somerfield regarding the damage caused by the tornado,

but Somerfield did not return any of her calls. Renee states that, “[b]ecause the property

was uninhabitable and the Executor of the Estate refused [to] respond or to take any

action, out of necessity, I was forced to expended [sic] $31,000.00 of my own funds to

protect the property from further damage and cause the property to be habitable. This

included $5,000.00 to repair the porch and $26,000.00 for tree removal.”           Renee

reportedly obtained cash to pay for those repairs by selling gold that she had purchased

over the years as an investment.

      {¶ 9} In October 2019, the estate filed an action against Renee and Gail in

common pleas court, seeking unpaid rent. Somerfield v. Budz, Montgomery C.P. No.

2019 CV 4807.      In response, Renee and Gail raised as an affirmative defense:

“Defendants have made significant repairs and improvements to the property, thus

unjustly enriching Plaintiff, any such demand must be reduced by the amount that

Plaintiffs have been unjustly enriched.” Somerfield v. Budz, Montgomery C.P. No. 2019

CV 4807 (Answer, Jan. 9, 2020).

      {¶ 10} In late November 2019, we affirmed the municipal court’s judgment in the

eviction action. Somerfield v. Budz, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28437, 2019-Ohio-4804.

Gail and Renee were removed from the Shiloh View property on January 22, 2020. See

Somerfield v. Budz, Vandalia M.C. No. CVG1801938 (docket).

      {¶ 11} Two days later, on January 24, 2020, Renee and Gail filed monetary claims

related to the Shiloh View property in the probate case. The first claim sought $25,000

for personal injuries and $25,000 for personal property damage due to the estate’s
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negligence following the 2019 tornado.        Pls’ Ex. D.    The second claim sought

$58,145.00 for reimbursement of repairs Renee had made to the real property. Pls’ Ex.

E.   Both documents were signed by Renee and notarized.            On March 13, 2020,

Somerfield rejected the claim for personal injuries and personal property damage (Pls’

Ex. F), and he asked for a 30-day extension of time to respond to the pending claim (Pls’

Ex. G).   Somerfield never filed a document specifically accepting or rejecting the

reimbursement claim.

      {¶ 12} In August 2020, the parties reached an agreement in the common pleas

court action. They agreed to a judgment of $16,350 in favor of the estate on its claim for

unpaid rent, that the parties would work together to get those funds released from the

municipal court clerk’s office and paid to the estate, and that the fiduciary would file a

notice of satisfaction of judgment when the funds were paid. They further agreed that

“Defendants may pursue a separate action against the estate for alleged personal injuries

suffered as a result of their occupancy in the unit.” Somerfield v. Budz, Montgomery C.P.

No. 2019 CV 4807 (Agreed Dismissal Entry, Aug. 20, 2020). The entry did not address

the pending claim in probate court for reimbursement of repair expenses.

      {¶ 13} A final account was filed in the probate court in November 2020. Pls’ Ex.

H. The final account reflects that the Shiloh View property had been sold. Renee again

objected to the account, noting that her claim for $58,145 had not yet been rejected. Pls’

Ex. I. On November 16, 2020, Somerfield opposed the exception. He noted that Renee

and Gail had raised in the common pleas court action the affirmative defense that they

had made significant repairs and improvements to the property. He further indicated that
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Gail and Renee had failed to notify him about the need for repairs after the tornado and

any repairs made to the property were unauthorized. In addition, Somerfield argued that

the Rejection of Claim filed on March 13, 2020, addressed the entirety of Gail and Renee’s

claims, and they had failed to file a timely suit under R.C. 2117.12. Next, Somerfield

asserted that the claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as was the

subject of the civil proceeding, and the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Somerfield also asserted that, pursuant to R.C. 2117.11, his silence in not allowing the

claim constituted a rejection. Finally, he stated, “in response to Claimants’ Exception to

the Final Account, the Fiduciary has now specifically rejected the portion of Claimants’

filing referred to in their Exception.”

       {¶ 14} A magistrate scheduled a hearing on the final account and exceptions. At

the hearing, Renee reportedly was given additional time to file a reply to Somerfield’s

opposition memorandum. Renee did not file a reply memorandum. Somerfield moved

for approval of final account and dismissal of the exception.     On June 1, 2021, the

probate court approved the final account filed by the estate. Pls’ Ex. J. The probate

court’s entry did not address the exception.

       {¶ 15} On August 2, 2021, Gail and Renee filed the instant suit against the estate

and Somerfield, seeking to recover $58,145 that she failed to receive as part of the final

account. The answer denied that Renee and Gail were entitled to payment on their claim

and sought $5,000 from Renee and Gail as damages for frivolous conduct. The estate

and Somerfield also raised as affirmative defenses that the claims were barred by the

doctrine of res judicata and were not timely filed under R.C. 2117.11.
                                                                                        -7-

       {¶ 16} The estate and Somerfield attached numerous exhibits to their answer: (1)

Renee’s Nov. 12, 2018 exception to inventory; (2) the March 10, 2020 probate court order

noting that Renee was unable to obtain a mortgage to purchase the real estate; (3)

Renee’s exception to final account; (4) Somerfield’s May 6, 2021 motion to approve final

account and dismiss exception; (5) the probate court’s June 1, 2021 entry approving and

settling account; (6) the complaint for back rent in common pleas court; (7) a copy of the

lease agreement; (8) Gail and Renee’s answer to the complaint for back rent; (9) the

agreed dismissal entry in the common pleas court case; and (10) a printout of the docket

sheet for the probate case.

       {¶ 17} On April 28, 2022, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

In their motion, the estate and Somerfield couched Gail and Renee’s action as an

improperly-filed appeal from the probate court’s final judgment approving the final

account.   They asked for summary judgment in the amount of $5,000 on their

counterclaim. No exhibits were attached to the motion.

       {¶ 18} Renee and Gail’s motion for summary judgment asserted that their claim

was properly filed under R.C. 2117.12, which authorizes an action on a rejected claim

within two months after the rejection. They contended that the probate court’s approval

of the final account was a de facto rejection of their claim. As to the merits of the claim

itself, they argued that the estate had been unjustly enriched in two instances: (1) when

Renee spent $27,145 to make the residence habitable, with Robert’s knowledge and

consent, and (2) when she made repairs of approximately $31,000 after the May 2019

tornado. They supported their arguments with ten exhibits, including an affidavit by
                                                                                          -8-

Renee, an itemized list of payments made to Robert, receipts from repairs performed in

2013, 2016, and 2018, copies of the notarized claims against the estate, the rejection of

claim, the request for extension to respond to the pending claim, the final account,

Renee’s exception to the final account, and the probate court’s approval of the final

account.

       {¶ 19} No party filed a memorandum in opposition to the others’ motion for

summary judgment.

       {¶ 20} On July 14, 2022, the trial court granted Gail’s and Renee’s motion for

summary judgment and denied the estate and Somerfield’s motion for summary

judgment. The court first reasoned that Gail and Renee properly filed their claim under

R.C. 2117.12 in the court of common pleas; it rejected the assertion that this matter should

have been brought as an appeal. Upon review of Gail and Renee’s claims, the court

concluded that they had paid $28,170 for repairs, as substantiated by the documents and

receipts attached to their motion for summary judgment. The court noted that the estate

and Somerfield did not refute those amounts or demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact as to those claims. The trial court further stated: “However, although Plaintiffs assert

that the[y] paid an additional $31,000.00 for porch repair and tree removal, there does not

appear to be any evidence in support of this contention, other than Plaintiffs’ statement in

an affidavit. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law, and damages in the amount of $28,170.00.”

       {¶ 21} The estate and Somerfield appeal from the trial court’s judgment. Renee

and Gail have not filed a cross-appeal.
                                                                                         -9-

                       II. Review of Summary Judgment Ruling

       {¶ 22} In their sole assignment of error, the estate and Somerfield claim that the

trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment and granting Renee and

Gail’s motion for summary judgment. First, they argue that Renee and Gail’s claim was

the subject of the prior civil action in common pleas court and, therefore, was barred by

the doctrine of res judicata. As part of that argument, Somerfield and the estate assert

that Renee and Gail had the burden to address affirmative defenses in their motion for

summary judgment. Second, Somerfield and the estate contend that the claims for

reimbursement were barred by the statute of limitations in R.C. 2117.12. We note that

res judicata and statute of limitations are affirmative defenses under Civ.R. 8(C).

       {¶ 23} In response, Gail and Renee assert that Somerfield and the estate have

waived their affirmative defenses by not raising them at the summary judgment phase.

They argue that Somerfield and the estate should not be given a second chance on

appeal to raise issues that first should have been raised in the trial court. Gail and Renee

emphasize that, pursuant to Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-

Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment does not bear the initial

burden of addressing the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses. We agree with Renee

and Gail.

       {¶ 24} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when (1) there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds, after construing the evidence most strongly in

favor of the nonmoving party, can only conclude adversely to that party. Zivich v. Mentor
                                                                                         -10-

Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998). The moving

party carries the initial burden of affirmatively demonstrating that no genuine issue of

material fact remains to be litigated. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 526

N.E.2d 798 (1988). To this end, the movant must be able to point to evidentiary materials

of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in rendering summary

judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The

substantive law of the claim or claims being litigated determines whether a fact is

“material.” Perrin v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2020-Ohio-1405, 153 N.E.3d 832, ¶ 29 (2d

Dist.).

          {¶ 25} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings. Dresher at 293; Civ.R.

56(E). Rather, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond, with affidavits

or as otherwise permitted by Civ.R. 56, setting forth specific facts that show that there is

a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Dresher at 293. Throughout, the evidence

must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

          {¶ 26} We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de

novo. Schroeder v. Henness, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012-CA-18, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42.

De novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should

have used, and we examine all the Civ.R. 56 evidence, without deference to the trial court,

to determine whether, as a matter of law, no genuine issues exist for trial. Ward v. Bond,

2d Dist. Champaign No. 2015-CA-2, 2015-Ohio-4297, ¶ 8.

          {¶ 27} Somerfield and the estate argue that Renee and Gail did not meet their
                                                                                      -11-

initial summary judgment burden because they did not address the affirmative defenses.

Somerfield and the estate rely on ABN AMRO Mtge. Group v. Meyers, 159 Ohio App.3d

608, 2005-Ohio-602, 824 N.E.2d 1041 (2d Dist.), in which we held: “[I]n order to

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact for trial (and thereby to

obtain a complete summary judgment), [the plaintiff-moving party] bore the initial burden

to address the [defendant-nonmoving party’s] affirmative defenses in its motion for

summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 8; see ABN Amro Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Arnold, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 20530, 2005-Ohio-925, ¶ 16.

      {¶ 28} However, the Ohio Supreme Court has since held that “[a] plaintiff or

counterclaimant moving for summary judgment does not bear the initial burden of

addressing the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses.” Todd Dev., 116 Ohio St.3d

461, 2008-Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, syllabus. The Court explained, in part:

      [T]here is no requirement in the Civil Rules that a moving party must negate

      the nonmoving party’s every possible defense to its motion for summary

      judgment.    To the contrary, Civ.R. 56(E) states that a party opposing

      summary judgment may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth

      specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If a moving

      party meets the standard for summary judgment required by Civ.R. 56, and

      a nonmoving party fails to respond with evidence of a genuine issue of

      material fact, a court does not err in granting summary judgment in favor of

      the moving party.

Id. at ¶ 14. Consequently, our holding in ABN AMRO is no longer good law. See Credit
                                                                                            -12-

Invests., Inc. v. Obanion, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26129, 2014-Ohio-5799, ¶ 19

(recognizing that the supreme court “explicitly rejected the rationale this court applied in

ABN AMRO”). Somerfield’s and the estate’s argument regarding Renee and Gail’s initial

burden fails on the authority of Todd, which is dispositive.

        {¶ 29} Renee and Gail argue that we should not address Somerfield and the

estate’s appellate arguments, because they were not raised before the trial court. In

essence, the estate and Somerfield claim on appeal that their affirmative defenses (res

judicata and statute of limitations) have merit and judgment should have been entered in

their favor.

        {¶ 30} It is well settled that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be

considered by an appellate court. Powell v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111338,

2022-Ohio-4286, ¶ 53.       This rule applies when reviewing decisions on motions for

summary judgment. Id.; Whitson v. One Stop Rental Tool & Party, 2017-Ohio-418, 84

N.E.3d 84, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). “[A]lthough we review summary judgment decisions de

novo, ‘the parties are not given a second chance to raise arguments that they should

have raised below.’ ” Hamper v. Suburban Umpires Assn., Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

92505, 2009-Ohio-5376, ¶ 27, quoting Perlmutter v. People’s Jewelry Co., 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-04-1271, 2005-Ohio-5031, ¶ 29. We have held that “[a]ny error committed by the

trial court in granting summary judgment is waived if the non-moving party fails to file a

brief or evidence in opposition or fails to challenge the movant’s evidence.” USA Freight,

L.L.C. v. CBS Outdoor Group, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26425, 2015-Ohio-1474,

¶ 21.
                                                                                         -13-

       {¶ 31} Similarly, if the nonmoving party fails to raise an issue when responding to

the moving party’s motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party has waived that

issue on appeal. E.g., Great Lakes Window, Inc. v. Resash, Inc., 11th Dist. Trumbull No.

2006-T-0114, 2007-Ohio-5378, ¶ 24; Sovereign Bank, N.A. v. Singh, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 27178, 2015-Ohio-3865, ¶ 11 (“When the non-moving party fails to raise an argument

when responding to the motion for summary judgment, the party forfeits the right to raise

that argument on appeal.”); Whitson at ¶ 17 (party appealing a summary judgment ruling

cannot advance new theories or raise new issues to secure reversal); Hanick v. Ferrara,

2020-Ohio-5019, 161 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 115 (7th Dist.) (“The appellate court need not rule on a

new legal argument which was waived by failing to raise it with the trial court when

responding to a summary judgment motion.”); Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Group, Inc.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-760, 2020-Ohio-3291, ¶ 20 (“The failure to raise an

argument in response to a motion for summary judgment waives the argument for

purposes of appellate appeal.”); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Thompson, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 26316, 2015-Ohio-456, ¶ 19 (“In a foreclosure action, a homeowner’s grounds for

challenging a summary judgment decision not raised in the trial court are waived, and

may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

       {¶ 32} This court has recognized limited circumstances where the rule is not strictly

applied.   For example, we permitted a party to raise a new issue on appeal in the

“exceptional circumstance” where there was an intervening change in the law by a higher

authority. Davis v. Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co., 2d Dist. Miami No. 2002-CA-48, 2004-

Ohio-5795, ¶ 18-20 (Galatis constituted a significant change in the law, permitting a legal
                                                                                         -14-

argument to be made on appeal that was not made in the trial court). We have also

stated that, if the nonmoving party raises “the basic question at issue” when opposing

summary judgment in the trial court, “the mere fact that the specific argument being made

in the appellate court was not made in the trial court does not preclude consideration of

the issue,” provided the opposing party is not unfairly surprised. Marcum v. Newbauer,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 10630, 1988 WL 35313, *1 (Mar 17, 1988). Neither of these

circumstances exists here.

       {¶ 33} In this case, Somerfield’s and the estate’s motion for summary judgment

asserted that “this case” was originally filed in the probate court and was “improperly

appealed and filed” in the common pleas court. They wrote: “To be an effective appeal

of a decision of the [probate court], the appeal must be filed in the Ohio Second District

Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, Ohio pursuant to Ohio Revised Code,

§2101.42.” Somerfield and the estate did not seek summary judgment on Renee and

Gail’s claim on the ground that the claim was barred by res judicata, nor did they challenge

the timeliness of the action based on the statute of limitations in R.C. 2117.12. They also

did not file a memorandum in opposition to Renee and Gail’s motion for summary

judgment. In short, Somerfield and the estate failed to seek summary judgment on their

affirmative defenses, and Renee and Gail’s summary judgment motion went

unchallenged in the trial court. Somerfield and the estate cannot raise their defenses

now, for the first time, on appeal.

       {¶ 34} Somerfield’s and the estate’s assignment of error is overruled.

                                      III. Conclusion
                                                            -15-

      {¶ 35} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

                                    .............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.