Court Opinion

ID: 9686961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:12:15.103293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.236898
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I am convinced from a reading of the partial transcript (permitted upon defendant-appellant’s request), the briefs and the exhibits that the defendant’s belated claim of police coercion was completely makeweight. The defendant’s confession, given after full and fair Miranda*
1 warnings, revealed that when defendant confronted the victim about his stepdaughter’s pregnancy the deceased laughed at him. The defendant then strangled him, put his body in the *561trunk, left the car in Southgate and made out a missing person’s report.
This record does not document the fact of the time interval during which defendant was interrogated by the polygraph operator. This is a difficult and sensitive area and, while People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), sanctions polygraph examinations for limited purposes, the black letter law in this state is still that neither the fact of the taking nor the results obtained are admissible in a criminal prosecution. The trial court, therefore, was called upon to exercise its discretion with regard to the conversation, interview and test conducted by Sgt. Romatowski. The court decided not to allow the defendant to claim that he was intimidated by the examiner raising his voice, shaking his fist and threatening him when, on the other hand, the prosecution could not counter with the examiner’s complete denial that any such intimidation occurred and the fact that defendant was shown to be lying on 10 out of the 11 questions relating to the murder. I am not convinced that the trial court erred in its original ruling.
MRE 4032 permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The committee note to the rule states that MRE 403 is identical with Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal cases on this point indicate that broad *562discretion must be accorded a trial judge in determining the question of whether probative value of relevant evidence is outweighed by other considerations. The trial judge’s exercise of discretion should be upheld unless he acted arbitrarily or irrationally. United States v Robinson, 560 F2d 507 (CA 2, 1977), United States v Higgins, 458 F2d 461 (CA 3, 1972).
In the instant case, defendant’s allegations of coercion by the police investigator were unsupported by any other competent evidence. Moreover, these allegations were rebutted, in both of the prior trials, by the testimony of Sgt. Romatowski that no coercion had occurred during the course of the polygraph examination. Indeed, the defendant did not even call the stenographer who took down his statement as a witness regarding the circumstances that existed at the time the statement was taken. Furthermore, the record indicates that the defendant was permitted to present his other allegations of coercion, resulting from mysterious threatening telephone calls made by an unknown person and conversations with his cousin, to the jury. In light of the all-embracing coercion trial strategy adopted by the defendant, and the fact that other allegations of coercion were substantially aired before the jury, I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to limit the defendant’s testimony on a point which could have added further confusion to this case. United States v Harris, 542 F2d 1283 (CA 7, 1976), cert den sub nom Clay v United States, 430 US 934; 97 S Ct 1558; 51 L Ed 2d 779 (1977).
As to the other allegation of error addressed by the majority, I would likewise find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. A substantial part of the defense strategy was the propound*563ing of alternative theories explaining the killing. Defendant argued that the deceased might have been killed as a result of a feud in the Pakistani community or as a result of his involvement in drug trafficking. As a means of substantiating the latter theory, the defendant sought to introduce the deceased’s bank records which indicated only that there had been an $11,000 deposit and withdrawal approximately six weeks prior to the murder. Defendant argues that the exclusion of this evidence served to deprive him of a defense.
I repeat, the trial judge enjoys a wide discretion in the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence. MRE 403. In the present case, the other facts adduced at trial did not support the inference that the deceased had been involved in drug trafficking. The only testimony suggesting an inference of drug trafficking was that of Igbal Monet, stepson of the defendant, who testified that he had seen the deceased selling packages wrapped in aluminum foil. In contrast, all of the other testimony on the "drug trafficking” question rebutted that inference. Sgt. Henry of the Southgate Police testified that a check with various police agencies turned up no criminal record and failed to show that the deceased had been involved in any criminal activities. Similarly, an examination of a camera allegedly involved in drug smuggling indicated no drug residue in its interior. Witness Mohammed Ashraf Khan testified that the deceased had never dealt in drugs. Indeed, even the defendant himself testified on both direct and cross-examination that, in spite of his close friendship with the deceased, he had never known the deceased to either sell or use drugs.
Again, I find no abuse of trial court discretion. Here, the court was confronted with a plethora of *564coercion allegations and makeshift theories explaining decedent’s death. In the presence of such a palpable dearth of testimony substantiating defendant’s drug trafficking allegations and the possibility that such evidence might further confuse the jury, I am not prepared to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence.
I would affirm.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694; 10 ALR3d 974 (1966).

 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”