Court Opinion

ID: 9893318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:12:45.200067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:50.116949
License: Public Domain

J-S36045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ERIC PARKER                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2444 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001426-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 26, 2023

       Appellant, Eric Parker, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following

his bench trial convictions for endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”),

possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), terroristic threats, simple assault,

and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1 We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

          In 2017[,] the minor complainant [J.J. (“Victim”)] was
          residing with his mother Sharita Jones, his two sisters, and
          [Appellant]….     Victim detailed the first two incidents
          involving Appellant that caused him to leave the home. On
          one occasion, he poured his sister’s juice in the wrong cup
          and Appellant threw him into a baby stroller and punched
          him several times. The second incident occurred when
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(a), 907(a), 2706(a), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
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       [Victim]’s mother gave him permission to take a hoagie to
       school for lunch, but Appellant came home that evening
       upset about it and stomped on [Victim] in his shoulder and
       torso area several times for eating the hoagie. [Victim] left
       the home in December of 2019 at age fourteen (14) to stay
       with other family members because he “felt unsafe” and
       “just wanted to get away from the place.” [N.T. Trial,
       10/23/20, at 19.]

       [Victim’s] mother was at that time involved in a custody
       case over his brother…. In January 2020 [Victim] was
       approached by Appellant and his mother after school at the
       transportation center when they forced him to make a video
       stating he “felt safe in the home” and “the only reason why
       (he) did this was because ... (his) Play Station and iPhone
       (were taken).” [Id. at 30-32.] Appellant and [Victim’s]
       mother provided the script for his videotaped statement and
       the voices of both adults can be heard in the actual video.
       Afterward Appellant and [Victim’s] mother took [Victim] to
       reside with them. The video was shown to family who then
       believed [Victim] to be a liar. [Victim] subsequently posted
       a Facebook status indicating the video was untrue and his
       mother was “manipulating them ... (to) turn them against
       (him).”

                                *    *    *

       [T]he third incident occurred when Appellant became upset
       over [Victim]’s Facebook post. When [Victim] had gone to
       bed, sleeping on the living room floor, Appellant came out
       of his bedroom yelling and shouting [and] then started
       stomping [on Victim’s] left side, head, and neck area.
       Appellant stomped [on Victim] 15-20 times and was wearing
       Nike boots that were dark grey with blue stripes. Then
       Appellant took a “thick glass ...alcohol bottle” and threw it,
       hitting the wall—just missing [Victim]’s head. The bottle
       didn’t break.

       Appellant ordered fourteen-year-old [Victim] to leave the
       home that night, barely allowing him to dress and without a
       coat. [Victim] testified Appellant “told me if I go to my
       cousin’s house... he will kill me, and he’ll damn sure kill
       them.” Id. at 60-61. [Victim] left and went to his cousin’s
       home anyway where his family took pictures of him, called

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       the police, and an ambulance. The photographs depicted
       [Victim]’s bruises from the incident.          [Victim] was
       transported to the hospital for treatment and then the Police
       Special Victims Unit.

                               *    *    *

       The parties…stipulated to [Victim]’s certified medical
       records from St. Christopher’s Hospital.        The medical
       documentation indicated [Victim] presented with the
       following injuries: facial injury, bruising and swelling and
       two-centimeter linear contusion to right side of face;
       superficial abrasion to his right upper back; and contusion
       to right earlobe.

       [Victim]’s mother…testified [that] Appellant is her husband
       and she has five children. [Victim’s mother] testified [that]
       DHS was involved in her home because of [Victim]’s
       behavioral issues.      She discussed prior incidents of
       [Victim]’s disobedience but indicated [that] he was never
       physically disciplined by Appellant…. On the night of the
       incident, she recalled [that] Appellant was upset over the
       Facebook post and [an altercation that had occurred at
       Victim’s cousin’s house when they went to pick Victim up].…
       [Victim’s mother] further testified that she felt it was
       appropriate to use “a slight kick to wake a child up…like if
       you see a homeless person or something, and…slightly kick
       the homeless person to wake up so they can move.” Id. at
       148.

       Appellant testified [that] he is married to [Victim’s mother]
       and [has] always had trouble with [Victim]. [Appellant]
       denied physically assaulting [Victim] in either [the juice or
       hoagie] instance…. Appellant discussed the Facebook post
       and indicated [that] he was “super pissed” and was “going
       to kick him [Victim] out.” Id. at 163…. Appellant testifie[d]
       as follows:

          He was asleep. I didn’t kick him, kick him in a manner
          for him to be hurt, just enough for him to get the
          attention.    It’s an attention seeker...       On his
          midsection, as I said in the SVU video. So, but at that
          particular point in time, he got jumpy because I just
          woke him up. He literally just went to sleep and I just

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            woke him up. He’s got his hands up and everything.
            So then I start yelling. He is sitting there all teary
            eyed ... because I hurt his feelings…. I threw the
            bottle at the wall. The bottle didn’t break because it
            was a vodka Amsterdam bottle.

         Id. at 163-164.

         Appellant claimed [Victim]’s “only wound he had to his face
         was ... the three little scratch marks” which were self-
         inflicted because he doesn't cut his nails. [Id. at 165-166.]
         [Appellant] confirmed that if he did not kick [Victim] out he
         would have killed him. Appellant then denied inflicting
         injuries on [Victim] at any time, threatening to hurt or kill
         him.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/4/23, at 2-6) (some record citations omitted).

      Following a bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of all charges

on October 23, 2020.       The court deferred sentencing and ordered a pre-

sentence investigation report (“PSI”) and a mental health evaluation. On May

18, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate of three to six years

of incarceration and five years of probation. Appellant filed a post-sentence

motion on May 19, 2021, which was denied by operation of law on September

21, 2021. On May 16, 2022, Appellant filed a petition to reinstate his direct

appeal rights nunc pro tunc and the court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal

rights on August 22, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro

tunc on September 19, 2022. On September 21, 2022, the court ordered

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal, and Appellant complied on October 21, 2022.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

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         Whether the evidence presented at trial established
         sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of
         law for every element of the crimes for which Appellant was
         convicted.

         Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by
         imposing a sentence that was not based upon the gravity of
         the violation, the extent of Appellant’s record, his prospect
         of rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and
         aggravating factors as noted in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 of the
         Sentencing Code.

(Appellant’s Brief at 7).

      In his first issue, Appellant contends that the only evidence supporting

his convictions was Victim’s testimony, which was not credible because the

evidence demonstrated that Victim is “an incorrigible child with history of

deception.” (Id. at 15). Specifically, Appellant asserts that Victim’s testimony

is unreliable because Victim admitted that he lied to his mother about where

he was when he wrote the Facebook post.           Appellant argues that Victim’s

testimony about the first two instances of physical violence was not supported

with corroborating evidence such as medical records or police reports.

Appellant contends that only the third instance of violence was substantiated

with corroborating evidence, which “only supports a misdemeanor grading, as

the   Commonwealth      failed   to   establish   more   than   one   incident   of

endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id.) Appellant concludes that

the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence to support any of his

convictions, and this Court should vacate his judgment of sentence.              We

disagree.

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      “In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on

appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the

element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was

insufficient.”   Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa.Super.

2016), appeal denied, 640 Pa. 386, 163 A.3d 403 (2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “Such

specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, [Appellant] was

convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that

the    Commonwealth       must    prove     beyond   a    reasonable      doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 321 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 656 Pa. 205, 220 A.3d 531 (2019) (quoting Stiles, supra at 982).

“Therefore, when an appellant’s [Rule] 1925(b) statement fails to specify the

element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient[,] ... the

sufficiency issue is waived on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement presented his sufficiency

challenge as follows:

          The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a
          conviction as a matter of law. No corroborating evidence,
          including physical evidence was presented at trial to support
          the conviction. The trial court erred by failing to grant a
          judgment of acquittal.

(Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 10/21/22, at 1). In response to this boilerplate

challenge, the trial court was left to guess the elements upon which Appellant

based his claim. Because Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement failed to specify

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the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient, the claim

is waived. See Ellison, supra; Stiles, supra.

      Even if Appellant had properly preserved his claim, Appellant’s issue

would merit no relief. Appellant essentially asks this Court to reassess the

credibility of Victim, and to reweigh the evidence presented in Appellant’s

favor. Nevertheless, the trial court found Victim’s testimony to be credible

and we are bound by the court’s credibility determinations that are supported

by the record.    See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21

(Pa.Super. 2005) (explaining that in evaluating challenge to sufficiency of

evidence, this Court may not weigh evidence and substitute our judgment for

the factfinder). See also Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 320

(Pa.Super. 2006) (stating: “It is not for this Court to overturn the credibility

determinations of the fact-finder”).

      Additionally, there is no merit to Appellant’s assertion that the evidence

was insufficient based on a lack of corroborating evidence to support Victim’s

testimony. Victim’s credible testimony alone is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s

convictions.   See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481

(Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 651 Pa. 431, 205 A.3d 315 (2019) (rejecting

claim that victim’s testimony alone was insufficient evidence to sustain

conviction; stating: “[T]he uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is

sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that

testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the charged

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crime”). Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is waived and affords him no relief

in any event.2

       In his second issue, Appellant claims that the court sentenced him to an

aggravated range sentence without justification. Appellant contends the court

failed to consider mitigating factors, “including his consistent and continued

commitment to mental health treatment, his caring and nurturing relationship

with his wife and other family members, and his remorse for the impact to

[Victim] and his extended family.” (Appellant’s Brief at 17). Appellant asserts

that the court only considered the nature of the offense and failed to consider

Appellant’s characteristics and rehabilitative needs. Appellant concludes the

court abused its discretion in imposing an unreasonably excessive sentence,

and this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for

resentencing. We disagree.

       As presented, Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281 (Pa.Super. 2013),

appeal denied, 624 Pa. 671, 85 A.3d 481 (2014) (stating contention that court

focused solely on serious nature of crime without adequately considering

protection of public or defendant’s rehabilitative needs concerns court’s

____________________________________________

2 To the extent that Appellant’s sufficiency challenge as presented on appeal

is more properly construed as a challenge to the weight of the evidence, that
claim is also waived for failure to preserve it in his Rule 1925(b) statement.
See Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal
denied, ___ Pa. ___, 250 A.3d 468 (2021) (reiterating well-settled law that
issues not preserved in concise statement are waived for appellate review).

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sentencing discretion); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super.

2002) (stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges

discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno,

668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 1195

(1996) (explaining claim that court did not consider mitigating factors

challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing).

      “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of

sentencing issue:

         [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P
         902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
         at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
         sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s
         brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
         there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
         from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
         Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

      When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of

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the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”      Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). “A substantial question exists only when

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super.

2011)).

      “[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that

the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 629 Pa. 636, 105 A.3d 736 (2014). See also Commonwealth v.

Trimble, 615 A.2d 48 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding defendant’s claim that court

failed to consider factors set forth under Section 9721(b) and focused solely

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on seriousness of defendant’s offense raised substantial question).          A

substantial question also exists where an appellant alleges the court imposed

a sentence outside of the guidelines without sufficient reasons.          See

Commonwealth v. Holiday, 954 A.2d 6 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied,

601 Pa. 694, 972 A.2d 520 (2009).

      This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the

following standard:

         Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
         sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
         appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of
         discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on
         appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its
         discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
         exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
         partiality, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)).

      “[A] court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the

offense and the character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804

A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1148, 125 S. Ct. 2984,

162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005).        “In particular, the court should refer to the

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. If the sentencing court has the benefit of a

PSI report, the law presumes the court was aware of the relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along

with any mitigating factors.     Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362

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(Pa.Super. 2005).

      When considering the propriety of imposing an aggravated range

sentence, this Court has observed:

         [T]he guidelines were implemented to create greater
         consistency and rationality in sentencing. The guidelines
         accomplish the above purposes by providing a normal for
         comparison, i.e., the standard range of punishment, for the
         panoply of crimes found in the crimes code and by providing
         a scale of progressively greater punishment as the gravity
         of the offense increases….

         The provision of a “norm” also strongly implies that
         deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts
         about the crime that also deviate from the norm for the
         offense, or facts relating to the offender’s character or
         criminal history that deviates from the norm and must be
         regarded as not within the guidelines contemplation. Given
         this predicate, simply indicating that an offense is a serious,
         heinous or grave offense misplaces the proper focus. The
         focus should not be upon the seriousness, heinousness or
         egregiousness of the offense generally speaking, but, rather
         upon how the present case deviates from what might be
         regarded as a “typical” or “normal” case of the offense under
         consideration.

         An aggravated range sentence … will thus be justified to the
         extent that the individual circumstances of [an appellant’s]
         case are atypical of the crime for which [he] was convicted,
         such that a more severe punishment is appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal

citation omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant raised his sentencing issue in a timely post-

sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, and included

in his appellate brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. Further, Appellant’s assertion

that the sentence was manifestly excessive in conjunction with his claim that

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the court failed to weigh his rehabilitative needs and/or consider mitigating

factors raises a substantial question. See Raven, supra; Trimble, supra.

Appellant’s claim that the court failed to set forth adequate reasons for

imposition of the aggravated range sentence also raises a substantial question

for our review. See Holiday, supra. Accordingly, we proceed to address the

merits of Appellant’s sentencing claims.

      Here, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, defense counsel’s

arguments, and statements from Appellant and Victim’s mother at sentencing.

Thus, we can presume that the court was fully aware of and considered

mitigating factors such as Appellant’s history of mental health struggles, his

willingness to seek treatment, and his alleged close relationship with his wife

and children. See Tirado, supra. Further, contrary to Appellant’s assertion,

the court provided an on-the-record statement of reasons why it imposed a

sentence in the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines.       The court

noted Appellant’s history of domestic violence and the severe and prolonged

impact Appellant’s actions had on the young victim as reasons justifying

imposition of an aggravated range sentence. Further, the court did not find

Appellant’s expression of remorse to be adequate or sincere where Appellant

continued to blame Victim for his actions. To address Appellant’s rehabilitative

needs, the court ordered Appellant to complete anger management classes,

parenting classes, and a mental health evaluation for dual diagnosis treatment

as recommended in the PSI report. The record demonstrates that the court

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properly considered Appellant’s history and rehabilitative needs and explained

its rationale for fashioning the sentence it imposed. As such, we discern no

abuse of discretion in court’s determination that a sentence in the aggravated

range was appropriate. See Fullin, supra; McNabb, supra. Accordingly,

Appellant is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 10/26/2023

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