Court Opinion

ID: 9688449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:47:49.476257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:19.094361
License: Public Domain

Gehl, J.
(dissenting). The majority considers the question whether proof of a prior conviction may be made in the *344presence of the jury trying an accused upon the charge of a specific offense as though it had been previously settled by this court, and refers to a number of cases as though they might be considered as authority for its conclusion. The precise question now before us was not before the court in any of these cases.
In the Green Bay Fish Co. Case only the question of whether sufficient proof of a prior conviction had been presented. The court states that proof of that fact must be made and that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial upon the issue. It does not say, however, that it must be determined by the same jury which tries him upon the immediate offense or at the time of his trial upon the charge of that offense; more will be said with respect to that phase of the problem later in this dissent.
Nothing was determined in the Howard Case except that where a defendant admits his conviction of a prior offense it is error to receive evidence thereof in the presence of the jury trying him upon a charge of the second or specific offense. Incidentally, the court, by its language and its conclusion, recognizes that such proof is “highly prejudicial” to the rights of the defendant.
In the Meyers Case it was held that under the circumstances there shown it was not error to permit the state to cross-examine the defendant as to former convictions after he had admitted them. It should be observed that the court pointed out in that case that in any event the evidence of prior conviction was competent upon the question of defendant’s credibility. No other issue was raised or determined.
In the Watson Case the court had for consideration only a matter of pleading and the question whether in the application of the “repeater” statute a charge in the information of previous conviction is the statement of a substantive offense.
*345The criticism of the court in the Miller Case went only to the point that the trial judge in invoking the “repeater” statute treated the prior conviction as though it were a separate offense and sentenced the defendant as though he had been convicted of a separate offense. No other question of practice or procedure was involved upon the appeal.
Nothing can be read out of the Spoo Case with respect to the “repeater” statute except that it was determined that failure to charge a previous conviction in the information does not defeat the right of the court to invoke the statute when at the trial the defendant has admitted the conviction.
In the Ingalls Case there was nothing for consideration except the question of the validity of a repeater statute.
In the Paetz Case it was held that an accused is entitled to be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and that because of failure to plead a former conviction it was error to permit proof thereof. The case is authority for nothing else.
None of these cases deals with the precise question which we have here for consideration, nor have I been able to find one in which this court has been required to determine it.
There can be no quarrel with the conclusion of the majority that to permit the court to impose an additional sentence upon a previous offender, in the absence of his failure or refusal to admit his earlier offense, there must be proof thereof. I disagree, however, with its determination of the manner in which proof may be made.
I am of the opinion that the court erred in permitting the state to show in its presentation of the case and in the presence of the jury, the fact of defendant’s conviction of an offense in 1931. Manifestly, it was not nor could it have been offered for the purpose of impeachment; defendant had not yet taken the stand. At that stage of the trial it had no place in the case except as it might have been received *346for the purpose of imposing sentence under the “repeater” statute.
The purpose of permitting such proof is disclosed in the provisions of sec. 359.14, Stats.
(1) It appears in the chapter entitled “Judgments in Criminal Cases and Execution,” with neither of which the jury has anything to do;
(2) The section itself is entitled “Sentence of persons previously convicted,” again indicating that it was intended to deal with a subject with which a jury is not to be concerned;
(3) It'does not create a new substantive offense and does not contemplate that it be considered by the jury as an element of the offense charged and required to be proved.
The provisions of this statute are incorporated as a part of the law of judgments in criminal cases and the execution thereof.
“This indicates that the legislature did not regard it as part of the criminal code which defines offenses, but treated it as a part of the criminal law regulating the sentence and judgment in cases where persons are guilty of successive state prison offenses.” Howard v. State (1909), 139 Wis. 529, 532, 121 N. W. 133.
The court should hesitate to abandon the rule granting to an accused the fundamental right to be tried only upon evidence which bears upon the specific offense charged against him — an ancient right firmly imbedded in our jurisprudence — and one as valuable to the body of society as it is to the individual on trial. Important to society, because if we permit it here, where it may seem on account of the apparent guilt of the defendant that he has not been prejudiced, it is at least possible that it may be permitted in the case of an innocent person accused of a violation.
“From the time when advancing civilization began to recognize that the purpose and end of a criminal trial is as much to discharge the innocent accused as to punish the *347guilty, it has been held that evidence against him should be confined to the very offense charged, and that neither general bad character nor commission of other specific disconnected acts, whether criminal or merely meretricious, could be proved against him. This was predicated on the fundamental principle of justice that the bad man no more than the good ought to be convicted of a crime not committed by him.” Paulson v. State (1903), 118 Wis. 89, 98, 94 N. W. 771.
Nor should we assume that the legislature in adopting the provisions of the “repeater” statute intended to abandon the safeguard. It stated its purpose in language and form to permit proof of a prior conviction solely for the purpose of empowering the judge to deal differently with a first offender than he might with one of incorrigible and dangerous character. The habitual criminal is, under our system, entitled to the same fair trial as is the first offender.
The majority does not, it cannot, doubt that proof in the presence of the jury of such extraneous matters as the habits, the tendencies, and the previous record of an accused operates to his prejudice. That is known to us as a matter of everyday experience. No one would have the hardihood to suggest otherwise.
“It is beyond controversy that proof of former sentence of the accused must necessarily prejudice the minds of the jurors against his interest when trying him for the offense with which he is charged.” Howard v. State, supra (p. 533).
Referring to former cases this court has said:
“They are cited more especially to show how uniformly courts have held that one cannot be deemed to have had fairly tried before a jury the question of his guilt of the offense charged when their minds have been prejudiced by proof of bad character of accused or former misconduct, and thus diverted and perverted from a deliberate and impartial consideration of the question whether the real evidentiary facts fasten guilt upon him beyond reasonable doubt. In a doubtful case even the trained judicial mind can hardly exclude the *348fact of previous bad character or criminal tendency, and prevent its having effect to swerve such mind toward accepting conclusion of guilt. Much less can it be expected that jurors can escape such effect.” Paulson v. State, supra (p. 99).
Certainly society is entitled to protection against the chronic offender and to treatment of his case upon a basis different from that which is accorded one charged with a first violation. That distinction calls for the process which is provided by the “repeater” statute — a process, the need for which has long been recognized and for quite some years has been available to the courts. But the-right of society to such protection is of no greater moment than is the right of its members to a fair trial upon evidence which bears upon the offense with which they may be charged. Even those who insist that proof of a prior conviction may be offered in the presence of the jury recognize that such proof must necessarily influence the minds of the jury in its determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused of the charge for which he is being tried. The right to trial by an unprejudiced jury is just as important to an accused, and to society itself, as is the right of the body of the people to the removal of one who because of his habits has become a menace to society.
Not much would be left of the burden to prove guilt if we were to permit a jury upon the trial of one charged with a specific offense to be influenced by such extraneous matters as his habits, his record, and his tendencies. The innocent person subjected to trial should not be required to overcome the prejudice which follows inevitably from proof of an offense committed earlier. The possible injustice of such procedure is demonstrated quite clearly in this case where the prior conviction had been had nearly nineteen years before the specific offense here charged.
As has been noted, the court in the Green Bay Fish Co. Case stated that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial upon *349the issue of previous conviction. This is no doubt correct, but the statement need not be interpreted as a direction that he be tried upon that .issue by the same jury and concurrently with his trial of the specific offense charged against him. It seems to me that his rights as well as those of society would be well guarded by following the procedure prescribed by the courts of at least two of the states. Recognizing the fact that proof of the prior conviction tends to prejudice the rights of a defendant, the Connecticut court in State v. Ferrone (1921), 96 Conn. 160, 172, 113 Atl. 452, has said:
“. . . in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698, 110 Atl. 550, we further said, on page 705, that in such an information ‘two separate issues are presented: First, was the defendant guilty of the crime charged ? This relates to the crime only. Second, if guilty, had the defendant twice before been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned ? This relates to the penalty only, and does not involve or state any other or different crime from that first stated. The jury must by their verdict answer each of these issues.’ This plainly indicates that the first issue should be taken up and tried by the jury first and separately; and, if the accused be found guilty on this issue, then the second issue should be tried; ... In the absence of statutory regulation in this state, it is our opinion that a procedure similar to that prescribed by an English statute (24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 37) should be followed. Reg. v. Martin, L. R. 1 Cr. C. 214. The information should be divided into two parts. In the first, the particular, offense with which the accused is charged should be set forth; and this should be upon the first page of the information and signed by the prosecuting officer. In the second part, former convictions should be alleged, and this should be upon the second page of the information, separable from the first page, and signed by the prosecuting officer. The entire information should be read to the accused and his plea taken in the absence of the jurors. When the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the clerk should read to them only that part of the information which sets forth the crime for which the accused is to be tried. The trial should then proceed in every respect as if there were no allegations of former convictions, of which no mention *350should be made in the evidence, or in the remarks of counsel, or in the charge of the court. When the jury retire to consider their verdict, only the first page of the information, on which the crime charged is set out, should be given to them. If they return a verdict of guilty, the second part of the information, in which former convictions are alleged, should be read to them without reswearing them, and they should be charged to inquire on that issue. “Of course, the accused may plead guilty to this part of the information, and then no further proceedings before or by the jury would be necessary. No reason appears why the accused, if he should choose, might not submit this issue to the court without the jury. In this way the well-recognized rights of an accused person will be protected, and the principles of justice and our long-established laws, which have been designed to secure an impartial trial in every criminal cause will be recognized, respected, and obeyed.” See also McWhorter v. State (1903), 118 Ga. 55, 44 S. E. 873.
Nothing in our statute would prevent the use of the practice here recommended. The statute directs that the prior conviction shall be “alleged in the information and proved or admitted on the trial.” A trial is not concluded until judgment is pronounced.
I agree with the majority that the repeater statute, if properly applied, is valid. That is settled by the Ingalls Case. But to give sanction to the practice here approved suggests a doubt as to the validity of the statute, at least when so applied. When a court is called upon to deal with due process of law consideration should be given to fundamental rules of practice and evidence which have long been a part of the common law.
Because of the manner in which the previous conviction was allowed to be proved in this case a new trial should be ordered.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hughes concurs in this dissent.