Court Opinion

ID: 9393775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 14:04:48.56687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.445631
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-995

                     LIGHTHOUSE EARLY LEARNING CENTER

                                       vs.

           MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff, Lighthouse Early Learning Center, appeals

 from orders of the single justice denying (1) its petition to

 reinstate its appeal of an order of the Superior Court

 dismissing its complaint, which had been docketed as 21-P-837,

 (2) reconsideration, and (3) a motion for clarification.                We

 affirm.

       On February 27, 2019, Bahig Bishay purported to file a

 complaint on behalf of Lighthouse in the Superior Court,

 challenging certain decisions of the Massachusetts Commission

 Against Discrimination (commission).           At the time, Bishay, who

 is not an attorney, was "permanently enjoined from filing any

 action at law or in equity against any party in any

 Massachusetts state court of original jurisdiction without fully

 complying with" a specified procedure.           Bell Atl. Yellow Pages
Co. vs. U.S. Auto Exch. Group Ltd., Mass. Super. Ct., No.

0077CV1838 (Essex County Apr. 28, 2014).    That procedure

required, among other things, that any filing must be signed

"pro se or shall be filed on their behalf by a licensed member

of the Massachusetts Bar," and be accompanied by a copy of the

order.   It further provided that any complaint filed by Bishay

or on his behalf would be screened by the Regional

Administrative Justice to determine if the claims were

frivolous.    Finally, the order stated that Bishay was not an

attorney and would not be permitted to make any arguments on

behalf of his wife, a codefendant.

     Notwithstanding this order, Bishay filed this action

purporting to represent Lighthouse.   On March 11, 2019, a judge

of the Superior Court denied permission to file the complaint

for, among other reasons, the lack of signature of a licensed

attorney.    Undeterred, Bishay continued to file motions for

hearing and for reconsideration on behalf of Lighthouse.

Lighthouse's complaint was dismissed in October of 2019, and

judgment entered, actions which Bishay sought to vacate.1    When

those efforts were unsuccessful, he sought to file an appeal on

1 The judge's initial order rejected Lighthouse's complaint for
lack of a legal representative, and stated that to the extent
that the complaint was brought on behalf of Bishay, it failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Ultimately,
judgment entered on the latter ground.

                                  2
behalf of Lighthouse, and filed several motions in the Superior

Court, all of which were denied on the ground that they had not

been signed by an attorney.   A single justice of this court also

issued a similar order on October 7, 2021, in the underlying

case on appeal:

    "In connection with the underlying appeal, the
    plaintiff/appellant is identified as Lighthouse Early
    Learning Center (LELC). In the motion for stay papers, it
    is represented that LELC 'is a community-based daycare
    program offered by Arabic Evangelical Baptist Church,' but
    that LELC is not a corporation. The record does not reveal
    whether LELC is a legal entity. Mr. Bahig Bishay, who
    signed the pleadings in connection with this appeal (and
    also the motion for stay), is not a licensed attorney. The
    motion for stay also represents that Mr. Bishay 'has no
    financial interest in LELC.' As a non-attorney, Mr. Bishay
    may not represent other parties before this court. Burnham
    v. Justices of the Superior Court, 439 Mass. 1018, 1018
    (2003); Varney Enters. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 82
    (1988). Accordingly, in connection with any further
    pleadings or briefs filed by the appellant in this appeal,
    such pleadings or briefs must be signed by an appropriate
    authorized representative or they will not be accepted for
    filing."

Lighthouse Early Learning Center vs. Massachusetts Comm'n

Against Discrimination, Mass. App. Ct., No. 21-P-837 (Oct. 7,

2021).

    Bishay ignored this order as well and continued to file

motions on behalf of Lighthouse.       Lighthouse did not secure

counsel to prosecute its appeal.       This court issued a notice

preceding dismissal of the appeal on November 19, 2021, and

ultimately dismissed the appeal on December 20, 2021, for

                                   3
nonprosecution, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of the Appeals

Court, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1012 (2020).

    At this juncture, Lighthouse secured counsel, and filed a

motion to reinstate the appeal.   The single justice denied the

motion for failure to demonstrate good cause.   Counsel to

Lighthouse filed an amended motion, which was treated as a

motion to reconsider, and was also denied by the single justice.

Lighthouse, through counsel, then filed a motion for

clarification, which was denied, and a motion for

reconsideration which the single justice treated as a notice of

appeal of the denial of the motion to reinstate appeal, the

motion to reconsider, and the motion for clarification.

    The motion to reinstate the appeal and the motion for

reconsideration were directed to the sound discretion of the

single justice.   We review for an abuse of discretion or error

of law.   See Howard v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 96 Mass.

App. Ct. 119, 123 (2019).   "[A] motion to reinstate an appeal is

an extraordinary request and should not be granted lightly."

Commonwealth v. Hurley, 391 Mass. 76, 79 (1984).    "[A]n

appellant . . . must show (1) that the delay was caused by

excusable neglect and (2) a meritorious case on appeal (except

where the delay was caused by a lack of notice)."   Howard,

supra.

                                  4
      We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.     As a

nonlawyer, Bishay was not permitted to represent "other parties

in civil actions . . . without a license to practice law."

Braxton v. Boston, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 717 (2019), quoting

Burnham v. Justices of the Superior Court, 439 Mass. 1018, 1018

(2003).   See also Varney Enters. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 79–

82 (1988).   In this case, the single justice permissibly

declined to reinstate the appeal "because neither in the

complaint nor in his memorandum d[id the appellant] assert any

basis on which [Bishay], as a nonattorney, [wa]s entitled to

represent anyone other than himself."   Burnham, supra.     See

Howard, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 122 & n.11 (authority of single

justice to deny motion to reinstate).   Moreover, Bishay had been

expressly barred from representing others by a previous order of

the Superior Court, an order which he and Lighthouse ignored.

Lighthouse repeatedly failed to comply with the procedural rules

for filing claims and appeals by permitting Bishay to represent

it.   Accordingly, Lighthouse failed to demonstrate good cause,

and the single justice's decision did not "fall[] outside the

range of reasonable alternatives[.]"    L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).   There being no error in the

original single justice order, there was no error in denying the

later filed motions for reconsideration and clarification.

                                 5
     Lighthouse attempts to pull the case back from the brink

with three arguments.    First, it claims that after Bishay filed

a motion for leave to file a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211,

§ 3, seeking relief from the single justice's October 7, 2021

order in 21-P-837, the Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion

on the ground that Bishay had an adequate appellate remedy in

the Appeals Court.     See Lighthouse Early Learning Center vs.

Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, Mass. Supreme Jud.

Ct., No. SJ-2022-M005 (Mar. 9, 2022).    From this order

Lighthouse seeks to extrapolate a command that the appeal be

heard on the merits.    The Supreme Judicial Court's order, which

warned Lighthouse of the dangers of representation by a

nonlawyer, did not require this court to rule in any particular

manner.2   Rather, the court pointed out that the availability of

an appellate remedy militated against the extraordinary remedy

of relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and that it was up to the

Appeals Court to decide whether Bishay could pursue the appeal

"late."

     Second, Lighthouse asserts that the rule requiring that

counsel represent any entity other than a natural person in

2 In pertinent part, the March 9, 2022 order stated "if LELC
insists on representation by Bishay, it can, at its own peril,
await a resolution by a panel of the threshold question whether
Bishay may indeed represent them."

                                  6
court should be revisited.     The law in this area is long-

standing and well established, and we are not at liberty to

deviate from the statutes governing the practice of law, see

G. L. c. 221, § 46A, or to overrule the holdings of the Supreme

Judicial Court.   See Burnham, 439 Mass. at 1018.    Moreover, this

case is particularly ill-suited to such a challenge.    Bishay has

filed scores of cases in the Superior Court, this court, and the

Supreme Judicial Court, prompting a nine year old screening

order in the Superior Court barring the filing of frivolous

pleadings.   The appeal in this case was dismissed because Bishay

did not follow the rules of the court.    This is not the case to

test the proposition that trained lawyers should be retained to

represent and protect parties to litigation.

    Third, Lighthouse claims that the question of commission

procedure presented is an important one and should be heard now

that Lighthouse has counsel.    However, Lighthouse has not cited

any authority to establish that there is jurisdiction to hear

this matter which is pending at the commission.     See Temple

Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against

Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 478 (2012).     Cf. Grandoit v.

Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 95 Mass. App. Ct.

603, 604 (2019) (Superior Court has no jurisdiction to hear

appeal from lack of probable cause finding).    The commission

                                   7
acknowledges that Lighthouse may appeal any properly preserved

issue at such time as the case is decided at the commission.

                                      Single justice orders dated
                                        September 16, 2022,
                                        September 26, 2022, and
                                        October 5, 2022, affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Sullivan,
                                        Desmond & Singh, JJ.3),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    May 11, 2023.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  8