Court Opinion

ID: 9678620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:25:57.90436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:48.594281
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that remands this case for a new sentencing phase.
The prior convictions of Robinson and the testimony concerning the nature of the prior offense were properly admitted during the sentencing phase. KRS 532.055 states in pertinent part that the Commonwealth may offer evidence relative to sentencing including prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor, and the nature of the prior offenses for which he was convicted. In this case, the Commonwealth properly introduced the prior record of Robinson’s conviction through a computer printout certified by the Clerk of an Ohio municipal court.
As was stated in Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 228 (1991), the use of the actual prior judgment during the punishment phase is not necessary. The issue concerns the sentencing phase of the trial as governed by KRS 532.055, which permits background information to assist the jury in its penalty fixing responsibility. The jury is permitted to hear evidence of the prior convictions. The statute does not specify the method for proving such prior convictions so that strict proof requirements for the prior convictions are not required. Robinson had a full opportunity during the sentencing phase to suggest any appropriate corrections to the print*856out certified by the Ohio court but he faded to do so. It would appear that he thereby accepted the printout as accurate. If necessary, I would extend the holding of Hall so as to encompass the situation presented by this case.
I would specifically decline the rather obvious invitation to challenge Hall noted by the majority opinion when it stated “While we are not yet ready to reverse course from that set by Hall, supra ... we will not expand that holding to embrace any compilation of any data by any court or police agency in the absence of exemplification ...” KRS 422.040, noted by the majority, is a statute which requires authentication of judgments from a sister state. The expansion of this statute to include a certified printout which is not a judgment and therefore should not need to be exemplified, is unwarranted.
Clearly a prudent prosecutor must now exemplify such printouts pursuant to the decision of the majority. It would appear we are not quite ready to fully trust the advances of the electronic age.
I also disagree with the majority opinion statement that all that is admissible as to the nature of the prior conviction is a general description of the crime. In this case, the testimony was relevant because the witness described the nature of the 1989 assault conviction. Robinson had several other convictions but the only witness called was the one who described the assault. Such testimony was relevant because the witness was the victim of a strikingly similar fact pattern to the case under consideration. It was admissible pursuant to KRS 582.055. Both were cases of domestic violence. Tragically, for the victim in this case, such violence resulted in death. The pious language of the commonly accepted title of “truth in sentencing” must mean all the truth, not simply a general description of the crime as noted in the judgment.
I believe that the majority opinion has improperly limited the meaning of the phrase “nature” of the prior conviction. The balancing test of KRE 403 is certainly a judgment call, but this Court should not disturb the decision of the trial court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion or there is other clear error. Here, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and the decision of the trial court should not be disturbed.
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the conviction and the sentence in all respects.
GRAVES, J., joins in this dissent.