Court Opinion

ID: 9719149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:43:33.673525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.824772
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.
(concurring). Though I agree with the result reached by the majority, I write separately because I cannot agree that the evidence showing the nature of the felony is irrelevant. The evidence is indeed relevant to prove one of the elements of the crime of which McAl-lister was charged.
In this case, the defendant was charged with a violation of sec. 941.29, Stats., which makes it a crime for a person to possess a firearm if that person has been convicted of a felony. In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove the following elements to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the defendant possessed a firearm; second, that the défendant had been convicted of a felony.
The standard jury instruction for the foregoing offense reads in part as follows:
The second element requires that the defendant had been convicted of a félony before -. -is a felony in Wisconsin.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and had previously been convicted of a felony, you should find the defendant guilty.
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Wis J I — Criminal 1343 (footnotes omitted). The standard instruction would be meaningless unless the blank is filled in with the name of the crime of which the defendant has previously been convicted.
Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less *536probable than it would be without the evidence. Sec. 904.01, Stats. Stated more simply, relevant evidence is "[a]ny fact which tends to prove a material issue." Rogers v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 682, 688, 287 N.W.2d 774, 776 (1980). Evidence of McAllister's prior robbery conviction is, therefore, relevant because it is a recognized means of proving a necessary element of the crime with which he is charged.
Although relevant, evidence may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Sec. 904.03, Stats. McAl-lister's trial counsel objected to the admission of the certified copy of McAllister's prior robbery conviction on the grounds that "it is so prejudicial to the defendant that I don't believe ... it is relevant." The inelegant phrasing makes the precise basis of the objection unclear.
Assuming the trial court understood the objection to be on relevancy grounds, the court correctly admitted the certificate. Assuming the trial court understood the objection to be that identifying McAllister's prior felony was unfairly prejudicial, it was still admissible. Since it was the only evidence in the record to prove the prior felony, and since it was necessary to prove an element of the offense, its probative effect could hardly be outweighed by its being unfairly prejudicial.
The majority opinion seems to hold that the certificate was improperly admitted as "other crimes" evidence. Majority op. at 526-27. Evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the character of the person to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Sec. 904.04(2), Stats. The majority asserts that "[t]he admissibility of evidence that McAllister previously had been convicted of robbery was not exempt from the two-step analysis required under secs. 904.04(2) and 904.03, *537Stats., simply because conviction of a felony was an element of the crime with which he was charged." Majority op. at 527 (citation omitted).
I disagree that this is "other crimes" evidence. McAllister's prior felony conviction — which happened to be robbery — was offered to prove an element of the crime. It was not offered as other crimes evidence under sec. 904.04(2), Stats. McAllister objected to identifying the prior felony conviction as a robbery on the grounds that it was unfairly prejudicial in that it would be used by the jury in the same manner as Whitty evidence. He did not, however, suggest to the trial court any alternative instructions to be used in instructing the jury. Instead, McAllister offered to stipulate, an offer the state refused. I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly concluded it could not force the state to stipulate. The defendant then asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact of a prior felony conviction, and the court properly concluded that that would be directing a verdict as to an element of the offense. That the court could not do. See State v. Leist, 141 Wis. 2d 34, 37-38, 414 N.W.2d 45, 46-47 (Ct. App. 1987).
I fail to see the trial court error in this case. The judge could not compel the state to accept McAllister's stipulation and could not take the element from the jury. The court, lacking suggested alternative instructions, simply proceeded with the standard instructions for the jury. Faced with this record, I find no error and therefore find it unnecessary to go through an analysis of harmless error. I would simply affirm the judgment on the ground that there was no error.