Court Opinion

ID: 9487870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:28:36.20085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:31.837460
License: Public Domain

POSNER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I am deeply troubled by the procedure employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in denying an immigrant visa to Dr. Ghaly and by the unreasoned character of the Service’s decision. But Judge Coffey’s. opinion is persuasive-that the Service’s errors were harmless.
Dr. Ghaly is a distinguished neuroanesthe-siologist whom the University of Illinois would like to employ. The University filed .a petition with the INS for an immigrant visa for Dr. Ghaly. The petition complied with all the requirements for such a visa and was approved. A few months later, however, the INS notified the University that it intended to revoke the petition because “a sworn statement -from Mr. Ghaly’s ex-wife [Wagner] indicates that he married her in order to obtain his Alien Registration Receipt Card (green card) and to remain in the United States.” The notice' of intent to revoke also states that Wagner claimed to have been paid. $1,500 to marry Dr. Ghaly.
If an alien attempts or conspires to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, he is ineligible for an *1436immigrant visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(2). This means that he can never become a citizen of the United States or even reside permanently in this country. It does not matter whether he used the marriage to obtain a visa; Ghaly did not. It is enough that he married — or even just attempted or conspired to marry — with the forbidden purpose.
This is a harsh law, and one would expect the government in enforcing it to make at least modest efforts to guard against mistakes. It is surprising, therefore, that the INS did not make available to the University or to Dr. Ghaly the affidavit of his ex-wife on which the notice of intent to revoke was based. The University requested a copy of the statement but was refused. The University tried to rebut the notice of intent as best it could without having seen the evidence on which the notice was based. It obtained a notarized statement from Wagner in which she said, “We married because we honestly thought we cared about each other and could overcome all obstacles. Because we married too soon after meeting and because of our tremendous cultural differences, I could see he was not the kind of man I really wanted to spend the rest of my life with.” Among other rebuttal materials was an affidavit from Ghaly denying any fraudulent purpose for the-marriage.
The first-line judicial officer to whom the case was submitted ordered Ghaly’s visa revoked on the basis of the ex-wife’s sworn statement. All he said with respect to the rebuttal evidence was, ‘Tour response to revoke is not sufficient to overcome the grounds of intended revocation. The notarized statement from the beneficiary’s [Ghaly’s] ex-wife and the other supporting documents are not sufficient to overcomé the evidence in the Service’s records.” Why these materials were insufficient was not explained. The contents of the sworn statement, which appears to be the only evidence on the basis of which the. visa was revoked, were not revealéd, or even summarized, although as I have mentioned the notice of ■intent to revoke indicated that the ex-wife had claimed to have been promised $1,500 to go through with the marriage.
The University appealed, as it was entitled to do, to an appellate board of the INS. Since it still had not seen the ex-wife’s statement that was, so far as appears, the sole evidence on which the first-line judicial officer had relied in concluding that Ghaly had made a fraudulent marriage, the University asked the board for a copy. The board did not respond. Instead it issued an order dismissing the appeal. The order quotes from the ex-wife’s sworn statement. It is unclear how much,of the statement was quoted, but in the quoted passage she says that she had received $1,500 for marrying Ghaly so that he could obtain a green card. Right after the quotation the order states, “In view of this statement, it must be determined that the beneficiary entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Therefore, the Sendee is statutorily precluded from approving this petition.” End of discussion. And end of the administrative process. The University and Ghaly never had a chance to comment on the ex-wife’s sworn statement as such, as distinct from the •hint of its content in the notice of intent to revoke. They saw the actual statement— part of it anyway — for the first time in the order dismissing the appeal. So Dr. Ghaly is forever barred from becoming a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
The Attorney General may revoke the approval of a visa petition “for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The procedures that he (which is to say the INS, to which he has delegated this authority) is to employ in deciding whether there is good cause to revoke are not prescribed in the Immigration and Nationality Act. But the INS has issued regulations that require that the alien receive notice of intent to revoke the petition and an opportunity to offer evidence, that there be “substantial and probative” evidence of marriage fraud, and that this evidence be disclosed to the alien unless it is confidential, in which event a summary will suffice. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(3)(ii), (iv), 204.2(a)(l)(ii), 205.2. The government concedes that the INS is required to follow procedures rationally adapted to the search for truth and to reach reasoned decisions, and that if it fails to do so — if, in the language of administrative law, *1437its decision is “arbitrary and capricious” — we must reverse. Joseph v. Random, 679 F.2d 113, 116 (7th Cir.1982) (per curiam). The INS did not comply with its own regulations, did not proceed rationally, and did not render a reasoned decision. It dishonored the rule of law.
The refusal to show the University of Illinois Wagner’s sworn statement is inexplicable, offensive, and absurd, as well as contrary to the INS’s regulations. “[A] determination of statutory eligibility shall be based only on information contained in the record of proceeding which is disclosed to the applicant or petitioner.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3)(ii). The exception for classified information, is not claimed to be applicable here. Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127 (8th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
An agency’s failure to follow its- own regulations is reversible error even if the agency could have adopted different regulations, provided that the- error was prejudicial. E.g., Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 495 U.S. 641, 654, 110 S.Ct. 2043, 2050-51, 109 L.Ed.2d 659 (1990); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539, 79 S.Ct. 968, 972-73, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959); American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 742 (D.C.Cir.1990). At first glance it seems pláin that it was here. The ex-wife’s statement was, so far as appears, the entire evidence on which the notice of intent to revoke Ghaly’s visa was based. Without seeing it — -with only a hint of its contents— the University was in a weak position to rebut it. Even if the INS has no obligation to give people an opportunity to rebut charges of fraud — even if it can operate completely in camera — it accorded the University a right of rebuttal in its regulations only to dilute the right by refusing to disclose the evidence that had to be rebutted. It gave with one hand and took away with the other. There is no suggestion that the ex-wife’s statement was privileged. The INS was playing cat and mouse with the University and Ghaly.
The other lapse of rationality is the INS’s failure to give reasons for its decision to revoke the visa on the basis of the evidence before it. If a matter is in dispute, an administrative agency, even the INS, has to give a rational explanation for resolving the dispute one way or another, unless the explanation is obvious. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983); Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir.1992); Zaluski v. INS, 37 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir.1994); Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.1993). Otherwise it is impossible for a-reviewing court to determine whether the agency’s decision is reasoned, and we all agree that the INS is not exempt from the obligation to make reasoned decisions. Neither, the first-fine judicial officer nor the appellate board gave reasons for ruling against the University and Ghaly. The judicial officer merely announced a conclusion: that the rebuttal documents were insufficient to overcome the ex-wife’s sworn statement. He did not say why they were insufficient. He had before him two seemingly inconsistent statements by the ex-wife plus a number of other affidavits which supported the second of her statements, the one favorable to Ghaly. It is true, as the majority opinion points out, that the ex-wife’s statements may not be inconsistent. The second did not deny that she had received money to marry Dr. Ghaly. It merely denied that there had been no hope that the marriage might succeed. The judicial officer did not mention this possible basis for reconciling the two statements, however, and we are not supposed to do his reasoning for him. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459-60, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943); Rodriguez-Barajas v. INS, 992 F.2d 94, 97-98 (7th Cir.1993); Amax Coal Co. v. Franklin, 957 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir.1992).
Neither the first-line officer’s decision nor the appeal board’s contains reasons, but the appeal board’s decision is worse because it implies that the INS is not permitted to consider rebuttal evidence. The decision stated, recall, that “In view of this statement [the ex-wife’s first statement], it must be determined that the beneficiary entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws” (emphasis added). The implication is not that the first statement was more credible than the contrary evidence but *1438that the existence of that statement compelled the revocation of Ghaly’s visa no matter how credible the other evidence in-the record was. This would be irrational. It would mean that the INS would have to revoke a visa on the basis of allegations that the Service itself disbelieved. The appeals board may not have meant anything so stupid; but I cannot figure out what it did mean from the little it said.
The procedural sloppiness demonstrated by the INS in this case, although extraordinary, is not grounds for reversal if it is clear that Ghaly contracted a fraudulent marriage. The rule of harmless error applies to our review of administrative decisions, just'as it does to our review of decisions by federal district courts. Sahara Coal Co. v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 946 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir.1991). There is no point in remánding an administrative decision for a better statement of reasons if the decision on remand is a forgone conclusion, or for further evidentiary proceedings if the outcome of those proceedings is equally foreordained. Cf. Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.1993). Judge Coffey’s opinion persuades me that a remand would indeed be pointless, that it could come out only one way, and that adverse to Ghaly. I reach this conclusion with reluctance. I am reluctant to condone the abuse of administrative process disclosed by the INS’s handling of this case. But I have no choice. The failure of either the ex-wife or the marriage broker to deny that substantial money passed from Ghaly to Wagner, and the second fraudulent marriage, áre the clinchers. It is true that in preparing her second statement Wagner did not have access to the first, the one on which the INS was relying. The INS had however advised Ghaly and the University, in its notice. of intent to revoke the visa petition, that she had said that she had been paid to marry Ghaly. If she had not been paid, she could be expected to deny it in her second statement. She did not deny it. With all the other evidence, her receipt of $1,500 to marry Ghaly must be reckoned conclusive proof of the fraudulent character of the marriage.
•It is arguable, though I think only weakly, that since Dr. Ghaly will have no defense to deportation if his immigrant visa is revoked on the basis of a fraudulent marriage, he is entitled to some of the additional procedural rights, such as that of cross-examination, accorded persons faced with deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3); see Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-36 (5th Cir.1992); Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988). As Judge Coffey notes, the point has not been raised and we are therefore not obliged to consider it. I doubt that if accepted it would change the result in this case. The evidence of fraud is conclusive.