Court Opinion

ID: 9459998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:37:22.280322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:25.619132
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:
On July 13 of this year, we reversed in part a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles L. Brieant, Jr., J., convicting Enriquito Alsondo, Ralph Feola and Henry Rosa of assault on federal narcotics agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111, and conspiracy to violate that provision, 18 U.S.C. § 371.1 At issue now is our disposition of the cases of Feola and Rosa. With respect to the conspiracy convictions, we reversed and dismissed the count. Regarding the substantive assault convictions, we also reversed; we dismissed as to Feola, but remanded Rosa’s case for a new trial.2 Our prior opinion sets forth the underlying facts.
The Government has sought a rehearing of the reversal of the assault convictions of Feola and Rosa. (The Government does not at this time challenge the doctrine of United States v. Crim-mins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941), under which we dismissed the conspiracy counts; that part of the judgment therefore stands.) We asked for, and received, briefs from both sides on the issues. For reasons stated below, we grant the petition for rehearing and affirm Feola’s and Rosa’s convictions of assault against federal agents.
 In our prior opinion, we assumed that reversal of the conspiracy convictions for failure to prove knowledge of the intended victims’ official character necessarily vitiated the substantive assault convictions since a Pinkerton charge had been given.3 Upon the further reflection induced by the Government’s petition, however, we believe that this conclusion was not justified on the facts of this case. It is well established in this and in other circuits that the admissibility of acts of a joint criminal venturer against his partner in crime “rests on basic principles of agency and not on the presence of a conspiracy count.”4 *1347United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 1458 (1967). Similarly, the out-of-court declarations of a co-conspirator are admissible against a defendant where joint venture is shown by the evidence, although conspiracy is not alleged in the indictment. United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 378-381 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 919, 82 S.Ct. 240, 7 L.Ed. 2d 134 (1961); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf. United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 281 n. 25 (2d Cir. 1973).
At various points in the charge, the lower court referred to a conspiracy to assault a federal agent or to violate 18 U.S.C. § 111, as well as to a conspiracy to obtain the buyers’ money by fraud or force.5 Therefore, on these facts the jury’s finding against defendants on the conspiracy count has a controlling effect on the substantive counts of assaulting a federal officer. With regard to the latter, the jury must already have found an agreement — involving Feola — to assault a victim (who turned out to be a federal officer) or to take money from him by fraud or force. In the absence of such a finding, the jury could not have convicted Feola since both the evidence and the charge pointed to Alsondo and Rosa as the only possible assailants. Rosa’s case parallels Feola’s except that the jury could, pursuant to the charge, have found the former personally rather than vicariously guilty of assaulting a federal agent.6 This finding of criminal agreement is sufficient, on general agency principles, to sustain defendants’ liability for their co-conspirators’ actions. Under Pinkerton, supra, there are circumstances where a co-conspirator may be held liable as part of a conspiracy of indefinite scope and duration for a specific crime which he should have foreseen but perhaps did not. This is not such a case. The jury’s finding makes clear that Feola and Rosa were part of a plot to commit the crime that actually occurred. On such facts, the finding of guilt as to each should stand.7
We therefore grant the Government’s petition for a rehearing and affirm the assault convictions of Feola and Rosa. The judgment is modified in accordance with this opinion.8

. Alsondo was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) of unlawfully carrying a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.

. Alsondo’s conspiracy conviction was likewise reversed and the charge dismissed; his convictions on the substantive counts were, however, affirmed.

. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), held that a conspirator was liable for the reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of and during the venture.

. See, e. g., Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393, 394-395 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1026, 88 S.Ct. 1413, 20 L.Ed.2d 283 (1968) ; United States v. Jones, 374 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 40, 19 L.Ed.2d 95 (1967) ; United States v. Smith, 343 F.2d 847, 849 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 824, 86 S.Ct. 55, 15 L.Ed.2d 69 (1965).

. Whereas the former theory is untenable in light of Grimmins, the latter is clearly viable. This juxtaposition of correct and erroneous instructions does not necessitate reversal since, on any sensible view of the matter, the jury on these facts could not have found a conspiracy to assault a federal officer without in addition finding a conspiracy simply to assault or to get the money by fraud or force. United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 282-284 (2d Cir. 1973).

. The record supports a conviction of Rosa as principal, if this in fact occurred.

. P. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Calif.L.Rev. 1137, 1146 (1973).

. We have also considered the remaining arguments raised by defendants Feola and Rosa in their original briefs and find no reason why the assault convictions should not be affirmed.