Court Opinion

ID: 9895836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:04:33.309575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:20.693346
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 Marriage of Miller CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 In re Marriage of JASON                                         B316552
 MILLER and HEATHER
 MILLER.                                                         (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. YD065760)

 JASON MILLER,

           Respondent,

           v.

 HEATHER BROOKS,

           Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gia Bosley, Judge. Affirmed.
     Law Offices of Gregory R. Ellis and Gregory R. Ellis for
Appellant.
     Klausner Johnson, Andrew R. Klausner; Kowal Law Group
and Timothy M. Kowal for Respondent.
                ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Heather Brooks appeals from an order terminating spousal
support. Brooks argues the trial court abused its discretion by
finding she received sufficient notice of the expectation to become
self-supporting, failing to consider relevant factors under Family
Code section 4320,1 and terminating support retroactively.
Brooks also contends the court prejudicially erred by denying her
request for a statement of decision. We find no error and affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Marriage
       Jason Miller and Brooks married in 2003 in Iowa. Brooks
worked as a Sales Manager at JCPenney and Miller worked for a
financial group. Brooks left her position with JCPenney in 2011
after Miller received a promotion that required the couple to
relocate to Los Angeles. In Los Angeles, Brooks was unemployed
for nine months before starting full-time employment at the Duty
Free store at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Brooks’s
annual salary was $70,000. Miller claimed that Brooks could
earn as much as $100,000 with bonuses.
       Within two months, Brooks left her position at LAX. While
Brooks indicated she left because both she and Miller found the
time commitment was detrimental to their marriage, Miller
asserted she unilaterally decided to quit. With Miller’s support,
Brooks decided to pursue photography as a new career.2 She
began studying photography in 2011.

1     All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise noted.

2     Brooks asserted that during this time she traveled often
with Miller on his business trips and contributed to his work by
“giving impressive speeches in front of . . . high-ranking members

                                 2
       In 2013, Brooks and Miller were in a car accident. As
discussed in greater detail below, the parties dispute the severity
of the accident.
       In January 2014, Brooks started her own photography
business. Brooks alleged that in September 2014, Miller
committed an act of domestic violence against her that
exacerbated the injuries she sustained in the 2013 car accident.
Miller denied engaging in any domestic violence and claimed
Brooks falsified the allegations. According to Brooks, “the Court
declined to prosecute” Miller because she “did not release [her]
statement.”
Dissolution and Marital Settlement Agreement
       Miller filed for divorce in October 2014, after an 11-year
marriage to Brooks. In her response to Miller’s petition for
dissolution, Brooks requested spousal support. The matter
proceeded as an uncontested dissolution and, in October 2016,
the court entered a judgment of dissolution that incorporated the
parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA). Both parties were
represented by counsel during the negotiation of the MSA and
each expressly stipulated that they understood the terms of the
agreement.
       Under the terms of the MSA, Miller agreed to pay Brooks
$2,433 per month in spousal support from January 1, 2015 until
June 30, 2017, including a lump sum of $50,853.91 to satisfy his
spousal support obligation from January 2015 through October
2015. The monthly amount was based on Miller’s income of
$9,167 per month and Brooks’s income of $720 per month.

of his company.” Miller denied Brooks had any involvement in
his career.

                                 3
Brooks’s income was based on a 20-hour workweek at the earning
level stated on her income and expense declaration.
       The MSA included a clause titled “Gavron Notice” that
stated: “Notice is hereby given pursuant to In Re Marriage of
Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3rd 705 [(Gavron)]. . . that it is
anticipated that Wife shall seek to be employed full-time at her
own highest earning potential with a goal of becoming
economically not dependent upon spousal support.” The court
retained jurisdiction over spousal support, but the MSA
prohibited any upward modification of support. The parties also
stipulated that beginning July 1, 2017, $50,000 in annual income
would be imputed to Brooks “in the event that she is not
employed full time earning a salary commensurate with her
earnings during the marriage.” Further, the parties agreed to
exchange updated income and expense declarations on or before
May 1, 2017, and stipulated that based on the imputed income as
of July 1, 2017, Miller’s monthly spousal support payment would
be reduced to $874.
       In July 2017, $50,000 in annual income was imputed to
Brooks, per the provisions of the MSA. Brooks understood this
occurred because she was not working full time, and she
understood the Gavron notice to mean that her “goal was to not
have to rely on the spousal support” provided by Miller.
       The MSA did not mention either party’s health.
Miller’s Request for Order Terminating Spousal Support
and Evidentiary Hearing
       In August 2019, Miller filed a request for a court order
terminating spousal support. In a supporting declaration, Miller
asserted Brooks had made no attempt to become self-supporting,

                               4
in violation of the Gavron notice, despite being “in good health.”3
He claimed Brooks performs physical activities and is socially
active, traveling to Europe and engaging in volunteer work. He
attached Brooks’s resume, and retail management vacancies in
her geographic area, to show that although Brooks had the
education and work experience necessary to earn as much as
$100,000 annually, she had made no effort in the preceding four
years to become self-supporting. He asked the court to impute to
Brooks an annual income of $100,000 and terminate further
spousal support.
       Miller also declared that he moved to Illinois in February
2019 and was making approximately “$5,000 less” than when the
court entered the MSA.4 In an accompanying income and
expense declaration, Miller stated he worked full time in sales
and earned a gross salary of $8,333 per month and an average
monthly commission of $18,852.40. He also represented that he
incurred estimated average monthly expenses of $21,653.
       Brooks opposed the request. In her responsive declaration,
Brooks denied Miller’s claim that she was in good health. She
declared that she continues to suffer from injuries sustained

3     Miller retained a vocational examiner and an independent
medical examiner to evaluate Brooks’s ability to work. Brooks
was evaluated but did not agree to release her treating
physician’s records as requested by the examiners. Neither party
sought to introduce reports from the examiners at the hearing on
Miller’s request for order.

4     It appears from Miller’s testimony during the hearing that
his declaration referred to a decrease of $5,000 per month.

                                 5
during the 2013 car accident.5 She indicated she has chronic
pain, even after undergoing several surgical procedures and tests,
and her physical health and injuries worsened over time. She
attested that because of her injuries, it was “challenging and
painful” to hold and handle a camera, she has been unsuccessful
in building her photography business “due to physical constraints
and disabilities,” and now “must pursue a new career path.” She
denied frequently traveling abroad, noting she took only one trip
to Europe to care for a family member. She further asserted she
volunteers only as she is “capable,” and denied completing any
physical activities as a volunteer.
       Dr. David Cho, Brooks’s treating physician, submitted a
letter in October 2019, and a substantively identical declaration
in January 2020. He diagnosed Brooks with cervical radiculitis,
cervical degenerative disc disease, peripheral neuropathy, chronic
postoperative pain of extremity, cervicobrachial syndrome, and
chronic severe headaches. In his letter, Dr. Cho stated that
Brooks’s pain “made it difficult for her to hold or manipulate
heavy objects,” her pain “frequently interferes with her
activities,” and the loss of sensation “has made it difficult to
perform activities she was able to do prior to her accident.” Dr.
Cho stated that Brooks’s symptoms persisted despite treatment,
which included medications, interventional pain treatments,
physical therapy, and surgery, and noted that “there is a high
likelihood that she will continue to have some degree of pain for
some period of time.” Dr. Cho opined in the letter that Brooks
“would benefit from limited activities and no heavy lifting for the

5    Miller claimed in a subsequent responsive declaration that
Brooks “continued to work sometimes 12-hour days with
photography” following the accident.

                                6
immediate future.” He also stated it was “difficult to determine
when it would be appropriate for her to return to work.”
       The trial court held an evidentiary hearing over four days
in July and September 2021, during which Miller, Brooks, and
Dr. Cho testified. Miller testified that from 2017 to 2018, his
income dropped by approximately $100,000. He stated 2021 was
“one of [the] worst years of [his] career” in terms of salary, and
that he was on track to make $320,000 annually. Consistent
with his prior declaration, Miller testified that Brooks worked
full time during the marriage, potentially earning around
$100,000 in annual salary plus bonuses at the LAX Duty Free
store.
       Miller disputed the nature of the 2013 car accident and the
severity of Brooks’s injuries. He described the accident as a
“fender bender” during stop-and-go traffic. Miller testified that
although Brooks complained about a sore neck shortly after the
accident, she continued to engage in “activities that she normally
engaged in prior to the accident” in the following year. These
included horseback riding, biking, hiking, mountain climbing,
and ocean kayaking, many of which lasted several hours and
were done with some frequency following the accident. He stated
there was no “noticeable reduction in the physical activities”
Brooks engaged in between the March 2013 accident and their
separation in October 2014.
       Dr. Cho testified as a percipient witness. He listed the
same diagnoses of Brooks as stated in his letter and testified that
Brooks’s conditions were causing “difficulty in some of her
strength” and decreased sensation, primarily on her right side.
From 2014 to 2016, he conducted three or four interventional
treatments, including cervical epidural steroid injections, trigger

                                 7
point injections, and physical therapy, to treat Brooks’s pain. Dr.
Cho indicated Brooks’s prognosis had been erratic, explaining
“there is sometimes some improvement and sometimes . . . some
worsening of the pain.” He testified it was “difficult to say”
whether Brooks’s condition would improve or deteriorate by a
certain time. However, her condition at the time of the hearing
was “stabilized.”
       With respect to her past employment, Brooks testified she
worked at JCPenney until moving to Los Angeles with Miller.
She was unemployed for nine months before she started working
at the Duty Free store at LAX, which was the last full-time
position she had held. Brooks testified that between her position
at the Duty Free store and her work as a contract photographer,
she supported Miller’s career by traveling with him and giving
presentations during his business meetings and seminars.
       Brooks further testified that the 2013 car accident caused
immediate pain in her back, neck, shoulders, spine, and right
arm. She started treatment within 72 hours of the accident. She
suffered nerve damage to her back, neck, elbow, and hand, for
which she received several treatments, including surgery. Brooks
claimed only some of Miller’s testimony about her recreational
activities following the accident was true. She described her
physical activities before the separation as “moderate.” The
injuries from the accident curtailed her physical activities in a
“gradual process.”
       As to her efforts to find full-time employment since that
time, Brooks testified she had “applied for multiple photography
jobs to equal full-time employment” since January 2017. She had
“searched for jobs,” “contacted people for jobs,” and “applied for
jobs” in 2020. On direct examination in July 2021, Brooks

                                8
testified she had not interviewed for any full-time position since
before the COVID-19 pandemic. Brooks could not identify any
potential employers, or any companies she interviewed with,
between January 2017 and March 2020.
       Although Brooks testified her “chronic pain in [her] neck,
back and shoulder,” nerve damage in her right arm, and chronic
migraines were keeping her from working, she did not apply for
disability at any time. At the continued September 8, 2021
hearing, Brooks testified on cross examination that she had
worked with a recruiter to interview for another photographer
position with Amazon approximately three weeks earlier.
However, she testified she could not perform camerawork full
time and believed she did not get the job because of her injuries.
       Brooks testified she ultimately decided to pursue a new
career in psychology because her injuries prevented her from
building her photography business. As of July 2021, she had
made “inquiries” into psychology programs but had not enrolled
in any. Brooks did not testify to any efforts to find full-time
employment outside photography.
       Brooks earned $8,000 in 2017, $6,000 in 2018, $5,000 in
2019, and $0 in 2020. Her sources of income at the time of the
hearing were spousal support, COVID-19 pandemic
unemployment support, and personal savings. Brooks stated she
had $63,000 to $67,000 in the bank and she had the resources to
pay the costs of litigation, including attorney fees. She also
confirmed that she had $435,000 in a “mutual funds brokerage”
available to her. She testified she used $187,380 from a savings
account but could not account for the expenditures, although she
believed she had used the funds to pay credit card debt and
medical expenses. In May 2018, she settled a personal injury

                                9
lawsuit stemming from the 2013 car accident for $150,000. She
received about $40,000 after attorney fees, which she used to pay
credit card debt and medical bills. Brooks did not disclose the
settlement to Miller because she did not consider it a “property
interest” subject to disclosure under the terms of the MSA.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
       On September 8, 2021, the trial court issued an oral
decision. The court found Brooks’s failure to make efforts to
become self-supporting was a material change in circumstances
warranting termination of spousal support.
       The court analyzed the evidence relevant to the factors in
section 4320. Regarding earning capacity, the trial court found
that although Miller was “gainfully employed” and Brooks was
“not earning,” Brooks is highly educated and has marketable
skills. The court further found that Brooks’s periods of
unemployment during the marriage did not warrant significant
weight in the analysis because the parties had been separated for
seven years. The court considered the extent to which Brooks
“contributed to the attainment [of an] education, training,” a
career position, or license of Miller, but indicated it did not
believe this was a “significant factor.”
       The court noted Brooks and Miller had a marriage of long
duration and the parties enjoyed an “upper middle class”
standard of living during the marriage. The court indicated it
was taking into account the parties’ obligations and assets,
including separate property, and all information in evidence
about Miller’s financial situation to determine his ability to pay
spousal support. The court also accounted for the age of the
parties, both of whom were in their mid-forties; described Miller
as “in good health;” and acknowledged that Brooks testified she

                                10
had “a chronic, ongoing condition.” Because Miller was not
convicted of a crime related to the alleged domestic violence
incident in 2014, the court did not factor any allegations about
the incident into the section 4320 analysis.
       The court then considered the balance of hardships. It
stated that although termination of spousal support would be
detrimental to Brooks because she would no longer receive the
financial support, continuing the support order would be a
hardship to Miller because he would be required “to pay a
significant portion of his income” in support, even when
considering the support payments reduced his taxable income.
       The trial court, in assessing other “just and equitable”
factors under section 4320, subdivision (n), addressed the Gavron
warning and Brooks’s ability to work. The court found the
Gavron warning unambiguously established that Brooks’s goal
was to become self-sufficient and the clause imputing to Brooks a
$50,000 annual income in 2017 was a built-in penalty “if [Brooks]
were to fail to make any efforts to become self-sufficient.” Based
on Brooks’s level of education and representation by counsel
during the negotiations that led to the MSA, the court discredited
Brooks’s claim that she did not understand the warning.
       Regarding Brooks’s ability to work, the court acknowledged
Brooks was injured in the 2013 car accident, but it credited
Miller’s testimony about Brooks’s ability to engage “in social,
athletic-type activities following the accident.” The trial court
also noted Dr. Cho had not testified that Brooks could not work
at all, stating: “I did see the original letter from Dr. Cho
indicating that there may be some limitations in terms of lifting
heavy objects, but the court didn’t hear any evidence that that
was required in any of [Brooks’s] prior types of employment or

                               11
that she had sought any type of employment that would not
require her to lift or to bend or to do any of the types of activities
that would have been restricted given . . . the current state of her
health.”
       The court concluded it was “clear from the testimony . . .
that [Brooks] not only did not make any efforts but has no
intention or had no intention of making any effort at all to be
employed full-time.” The court set spousal support at zero and
ordered “that it be retroactive to the service of the request for
order.”
       On October 7, 2021, Brooks requested a Statement of
Decision under section 3654 on 31 issues related to the dispute.6
The trial court denied Brooks’s request for a statement of
decision as untimely.
                            DISCUSSION
       On appeal, Brooks contends: 1) the trial court failed to
provide sufficient warning before terminating spousal support;
2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
section 4320 factors; 3) the trial court erred by terminating its
jurisdiction and applying the order retroactively; and 4) the trial
court erroneously denied her request for a statement of decision
as untimely. We find no error and affirm the order.
I.     Principles Governing Modification of Spousal
       Support and Standard of Review
       “Modification of spousal support, even if the prior amount
is established by agreement, requires a material change of
circumstances since the last order. [Citations.] Change of

6      Section 3654 provides: “At the request of either party, an
order modifying, terminating, or setting aside a support order
shall include a statement of decision.”

                                  12
circumstances means a reduction or increase in the supporting
spouse’s ability to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the
supported spouse’s needs. [Citations.] It includes all factors
affecting need and the ability to pay. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage
of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 (McCann).) In
ordering or modifying spousal support, “the trial court must
consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in
[section 4320], to the extent they are relevant to the case before
it.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302
(Cheriton); In re Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 595,
602 (Diamond).) “A trial court acts within its discretion in
denying spousal support where the supported spouse has failed to
diligently seek employment sufficient to become self-supporting.”
(In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225,
1238 (Shaughnessy).)
       “Appellate review of orders modifying spousal support is
governed by an abuse of discretion standard, and such an abuse
occurs when a court modifies a support order without substantial
evidence of a material change of circumstances.” (McCann,
supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982–983.)
II.    The Trial Court Properly Concluded the MSA’s
       Gavron Provision Was Sufficient to Put Brooks on
       Notice of the Expectation That She Become Self-
       Supporting
       Brooks challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the
Gavron clause in the MSA provided her with sufficient notice of
the expectation that she would become self-supporting. We find
no error.
       “[I]f a court’s initial spousal support award contemplates
that a supported spouse will take some action to decrease the

                                13
need for spousal support following the issuance of the order and
the supported spouse fails to take that action, the court may
modify the award on the ground of changed circumstances.”
(Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.) However, a
supported spouse must “be made aware of the obligation to
become self-supporting” before the spouse’s failure to make good-
faith efforts to do so can constitute a material change in
circumstances. (Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.)
       Here, the MSA included an unambiguous Gavron warning.
The clause was titled “Gavron Notice” and the provision cited
specifically to the Gavron case. It unequivocally stated the
expectation that Brooks was to seek full-time employment so that
she did not remain dependent on spousal support. Further,
Brooks’s obligation to become self-supporting was presaged by
the parties’ agreement to exchange updated income and expense
declarations in May 2017, and to impute income to Brooks one
month later, resulting in a reduced spousal support award.
       Indeed, in Gavron, the court explained the “prerequisite
awareness of the judicial expectation of future self-sufficiency can
arise in numerous contexts. For example, there may be an
explicit statement by the court at the time of its original support
order regarding employment expectations of the supported
spouse [citation], a motion and ensuing order that the supported
party ‘submit to an examination by a vocational training
consultant’ [citation], a stipulated agreement which addresses
the [supported spouse’s] ability to obtain future employment
[citation], or a justified assumption of continued future
employment based on the supported spouse’s employment during
the parties’ separation and at the time of the original support

                                14
order which contained a reasonable termination date for
support.” (Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.)
       Here, the expectation of self-sufficiency was amply
communicated to Brooks through the explicit Gavron notice in
the MSA, as well as the provision requiring the exchange of
updated financial information, connected to a definite reduction
in spousal support with income to be imputed to Brooks if she
was still earning less than she did during the marriage.
       Brooks argues the Gavron notice was not legally sufficient
because it did not explicitly warn her of the “severe negative
consequences” of failing to become self-supporting. This
argument is unavailing. The central holding in Gavron is that a
supported spouse must be aware of the expectation that she will
become self-supporting. (Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at
p. 712.) Subsequent cases have adopted and applied this holding.
(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Maher & Strawn (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 356, 362 [recognizing as a Gavron warning an
admonishment that the supported spouse “ ‘has an obligation to
become self-supporting within a reasonable time’ ”]; In re
Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 55 [“what has
become known as a ‘Gavron warning’ is a fair warning to the
supported spouse he or she is expected to become self-
supporting”].) That expectation was clearly communicated here.
       Nothing in Gavron or its progeny, including the cases cited
by Brooks, supports the argument that a Gavron warning is
ineffective unless it explicitly advises of the specific consequences
that will result from the supported spouse’s failure to make a
good-faith effort to become self-supporting. The trial court did
not err by finding the unambiguous provision in the MSA

                                 15
sufficient to put Brooks on notice of the “expectation of future
self-sufficiency.” (Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When
       Considering the Section 4320 Factors
       A trial court must consider the factors in section 4320 when
determining whether a material change in circumstances has
occurred.7 (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137,
1150 (Left).) “The court has discretion as to the weight it gives to

7      Section 4320 requires courts to consider the following
circumstances when issuing an order on spousal support: “(a) The
extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to
maintain the standard of living established during the
marriage . . . . [¶] (b) The extent to which the supported party
contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career
position, or a license by the supporting party. [¶] (c) The ability
of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into
account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and
unearned income, assets, and standard of living. [¶] (d) The
needs of each party based on the standard of living established
during the marriage. [¶] (e) The obligations and assets, including
the separate property, of each party. [¶] (f) The duration of the
marriage. [¶] (g) The ability of the supported party to engage in
gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests
of dependent children in the custody of the party. [¶] (h) The age
and health of the parties. [¶] (i) All documented evidence of any
history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between
the parties . . . . [¶] (j) The immediate and specific tax
consequences to each party. [¶] (k) The balance of the hardships
to each party. [¶] (l) The goal that the supported party shall be
self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. . . . [¶]
(m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be
considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal
support award . . . . [¶] (n) Any other factors the court
determines are just and equitable.”

                                16
each factor . . . .” (In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 1262, 1273 (Shimkus).) “ ‘ “[T]he ultimate decision
as to amount and duration of spousal support rests within [the
trial court’s] broad discretion and will not be reversed on appeal
absent an abuse of [its] discretion.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id.
at p. 1273.) But the “ ‘ “court may not be arbitrary; it must
exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration
the applicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the
statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial
abilities.” ’ [Citation.]” (Diamond, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
p. 602.) The court also cannot “ ‘ignore any relevant
circumstance enumerated in the statute.’ ” (Ibid.)
       The trial court in this case expressly considered the
applicable section 4320 factors in its ruling. Brooks argues on
appeal that the court reversibly erred by failing to explain,
describe, or expressly address or weigh certain factors under
section 4320, including Miller’s ability to pay spousal support
(§ 4320, subd. (c)), the needs of each party based upon their
marital standard of living (id., subd. (d)), each party’s obligations
and assets (id., subd. (e)), and the health of the parties (id.,
subd. (h)). This argument lacks merit.
       As the court explained in Diamond, “[a]lthough by statute
the trial court must consider section 4320 factors in deciding
whether to modify a spousal support order, the statute does not
purport to require the court to address each factor expressly.”
(Diamond, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.) The “ ‘trial judge
must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in
setting spousal support,’ ” yet the Diamond court noted there is
no appellate authority for the proposition that the “trial court
must expressly identify each factor and set forth in writing or on

                                 17
the record how it has weighed each of them.” (Ibid.) Brooks has
not provided any such authority in this case. Further, as the
Diamond court explained, “the Legislature has required explicit
findings in other statutory contexts,” and no such language is
found in section 4320. (Ibid.)
       We agree with the Diamond court’s reasoning and find it
applicable here. The trial court’s express ruling in this case
referenced the section 4320 factors, indicating it considered them
in its ruling. No more was required. Indeed, with respect to
several of the factors, Brooks asserts the trial court did not
“consider” the factors, when in fact her argument is that the court
reached the wrong result. This court will not “reweigh the
evidence and substitute our discretion for that of the trial court,”
as these “are not legitimate functions of the Court of Appeal.” (In
re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 897.)
       Brooks further argues the trial court’s balancing of the
parties’ respective hardships under section 4320, subdivision (k)
is not supported by substantial evidence because the trial court
overlooked both Miller’s ability to pay and the “much greater
hardship” Brooks would face without support because her
physical injuries preclude her from working. The record does not
reflect that the court failed to account for Miller’s ability to pay
and Brooks’s health issues with respect to this factor; in fact, the
trial court expressly acknowledged on the record that it was
accounting for both. The trial court assigned little weight to
Miller’s ability to pay and Brooks’s alleged hardship. That
decision is within its discretion. (Shimkus, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 1273.) And, as stated above, the trial court was
not required to make explicit findings regarding the weight it

                                18
assigned to each factor. Brooks has failed to identify any
reversible error.
IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
       Finding That Brooks Did Not Diligently Seek
       Employment
       The trial court found that Brooks’s failure to make diligent
efforts to become self-supporting constituted a change in
circumstances. Substantial evidence supported the court’s
factual findings, and we find no abuse of discretion.
       A supported spouse makes diligent efforts to become self-
supporting by preparing for and seeking gainful employment
suited to the spouse’s abilities. (Shaughnessy, supra, 139
Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.) “When evidence exists that the party to
be supported has unreasonably delayed or refused to seek
employment consistent with her or his ability . . . that factor may
be taken into consideration by the trial court in fixing the amount
of support in the first instance or in modification proceedings.”
(In re Marriage of Rosan (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 885, 896.)
“Whether there has been such unreasonable delay is a question
addressed peculiarly to the trial court which heard the party’s
testimony and observed the party’s demeanor at trial.” (In re
Marriage of Sheridan (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 742, 749.) Further,
as explained above, if the “initial spousal support award
contemplates that a supported spouse will take some action to
decrease the need for spousal support following the issuance of
the order and the supported spouse fails to take that action, the
court may modify the award on the ground of changed
circumstances.” (Shaughnessy, at p. 1238.)
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
court’s order, as we must (In re Marriage of Catalano (1988) 204

                                19
Cal.App.3d 543, 548), the record reflects that when the parties
separated, Brooks had been employed for the majority of their 11-
year marriage in a retail position. She had most recently worked
full time in a managerial position at the LAX Duty Free store.
Brooks testified that even when she was no longer working, she
traveled with Miller and gave presentations during his business
meetings and seminars. There is also evidence that after the
accident in 2013, Brooks frequently engaged in physically
vigorous activities with Miller before they separated in 2014.
The trial court acknowledged Brooks’s testimony regarding her
ongoing chronic condition. However, the court noted there was
no evidence from the treating physician, Dr. Cho, of Brooks’s
inability to engage in any work at all.
       The evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that
Brooks had employable skills based on her education and past
work experience. Yet, there was no evidence that Brooks
attempted to gain employment or become self-sufficient through a
means other than photography. Although Brooks considered a
career change, she did not enroll in programs or take other
concrete steps toward that goal. Brooks also testified that she
worked with a recruiter to find employment in 2021, almost
seven years after the dissolution, but she applied only to one
photography position that she concedes she could not perform
full time. Brooks did not testify with any specificity regarding
her attempts to pursue any other type of full-time employment.
(See In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043 [“A trier of
fact is free to disbelieve a witness, even one uncontradicted, if
there is any rational ground for doing so”].) Based on the
evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Brooks
did not make diligent efforts to become self-supporting.

                                20
       Brooks’s reliance on In re Marriage of Teegarden (1986) 181
Cal.App.3d 401 (Teegarden), for a different result is misplaced.
In Teegarden, the evidence was undisputed that the husband
suffered from lupus and that he received social security disability
payments. (Id., at pp. 404, 407.) The parties’ financial
declarations also showed the husband was on disability. (Id. at
p. 410.) His caretaker testified at length about his severe
impairments as the disease progressed, and the wife testified
that the husband stopped working due to the illness and had
undergone many unsuccessful treatments. (Id. at pp. 408–409.)
Further, the parties stipulated that the husband was disabled
and unable to work. (Id. at p. 410.) The trial court found “[t]he
nature and extent of any physical or emotional disability claimed
by [him] was not established by the evidence,” and concluded the
husband failed to show an entitlement to spousal support. (Id. at
p. 409.) The appellate court reversed. The court explained it
appeared the trial court engaged in a “wholesale disregard of all
the testimony before the court” as not credible. (Id. at p. 410.)
The court reasoned that even if the trial court’s disregard of
evidence was justified, it was still left with the parties’
stipulation that the husband was unable to work, as well as
financial declarations establishing the husband was on disability
and the wife’s income was twice that of the husband. (Ibid.) On
this record, the trial court’s findings were unsupported by the
evidence and the denial of spousal support was an abuse of
discretion.
       Here, in contrast, there was no comparable evidence of
Brooks’s inability to work. The parties did not stipulate to the
fact of her injury or the conclusion that she was completely
unable to work. Miller, in fact, offered testimony calling into

                                21
question the veracity of Brooks’s claims of near-total impairment.
Brooks’s treating physician did not testify that Brooks was
unable to work. Instead, in the letter and declaration he
submitted to the court, Dr. Cho indicated only that it would be
“difficult to determine when it would be appropriate for [Brooks’s]
return to work,” that she “would benefit from limited activities,”
and she should not engage in “heavy lifting for the immediate
future.” At the hearing, he testified that her prognosis was
erratic and her condition “stabilized.” There was no evidence of
any other third-party assessment of Brooks’s injuries suggesting
total or near-total incapacity to work, such as the receipt of social
security disability payments, that would indicate she was
relieved of the obligation to make diligent efforts to become self-
supporting. Brooks testified that she had not filed for disability.
Unlike the trial court in Teegarden, the court here did not act in
“wholesale disregard” of uncontradicted, credible evidence.
(Teegarden, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 410.) Teegarden is
inapposite.
       Finally, Brooks argues the trial court erroneously sustained
objections to her counsel’s questions on direct examination about
the effect of her injuries on her ability to work. Specifically,
Brooks’s counsel asked Brooks if her injuries “impair[ed] [her]
ability to work” full time and part time, and if her chronic pain
“impaired [her] ability to be successful in the photography
business.” The court sustained Miller’s objections to the
questions based on lack of foundation and speculation.
       We review the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections
for abuse of discretion. (Marin v. Department of Transportation
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 529, 536 [evidentiary ruling reversed only
if appellant shows trial court exercised its discretion in an

                                 22
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner resulting in
miscarriage of justice].) “[E]videntiary objections based on lack of
foundation, qualification of experts, and conclusory and
speculative testimony are traditionally left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” (Alexander v. Scripps Memorial
Hospital La Jolla (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 206, 226.)
       The trial court could reasonably conclude that additional
foundation was necessary to establish Brooks had the knowledge
or experience necessary to competently answer the questions
posed. Brooks is a relatively inexperienced photographer with no
vocational training or medical expertise. The examination
leading up to the challenged questions did not establish that
Brooks had sufficient personal knowledge to testify about success
in the photography business, or whether accommodations were
possible that could allow her to still perform in that role.
Further, the preceding examination did not establish that Brooks
could competently opine on whether or to what extent she could
perform full-time or part-time work other than photography.
After the court sustained Miller’s objections, Brooks’s counsel did
not attempt to lay additional foundation for the questions.
       The trial court’s evidentiary rulings were thus not
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. Witnesses must possess
sufficient knowledge to assess a person’s ability to obtain
employment based on age, health, education, skills, employment
history, and the current availability of employment opportunities
in the job market. (See, e.g., § 4331, subds. (a) & (d) [establishing
that vocational training counselor must possess “sufficient
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to assess
“the party’s ability to obtain employment that would allow the
party to maintain their marital standard of living”].) Brooks

                                 23
could, and did, testify about her injuries, her past employment,
and that her injuries kept her from working.
       Moreover, even if the trial court erred by excluding the
testimony, we would find any error harmless. On cross-
examination, Brooks testified that she was unable to work. The
court heard Brooks’s testimony offering her own view of her
abilities. Thus, even if the court erroneously sustained Miller’s
objections to two questions, we would find no basis for reversal.8
       Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion
that Brooks did not make diligent efforts to become self-
supporting. Because the parties’ MSA clearly articulated the
expectation that Brooks would become self-supporting, her
failure to diligently pursue employment constituted a material
change in circumstances supporting an order terminating
support. (Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.)
V.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
       Terminating Its Jurisdiction over Spousal Support
       Brooks argues the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating its jurisdiction over spousal support in a marriage of
a long duration. We disagree.
       Under section 4336, subdivision (a), courts retain
jurisdiction indefinitely over spousal support “where the
marriage is of long duration,” except when terminating spousal
support. The statute expressly states that it does not “limit[ ] the

8     Brooks did not attempt to elicit testimony from Dr. Cho
regarding restrictions on her ability to work. Further, neither
Dr. Cho’s letter nor his declaration explained how Brooks’s
injuries impaired her from performing duties specific to any
particular job, including those of her previous retail management
positions.

                                24
court’s discretion to terminate spousal support in later
proceedings on a showing of changed circumstances.” (§ 4336,
subd. (c); In re Marriage of Christie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 849,
858 [§ 4336 means only “that the court retained jurisdiction
indefinitely until it entered ‘a court order terminating spousal
support’ ”].) Here, the trial court terminated support based on
changed circumstances and we have concluded it did not abuse
its discretion in doing so. The court therefore properly
terminated its jurisdiction.
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Making the
       Termination of Support Retroactive
       Brooks additionally contends the trial court erred by
making its order terminating support retroactive to the date
Miller filed his request in 2019, without considering her income.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Left, supra, 208
Cal.App.4th at p. 1152 [“[a]n order making a modification
retroactive to a certain date is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].)
       Section 3653, subdivision (a) permits a trial court to make
an order terminating support retroactive to the date of the filing
of the notice of the motion to terminate. Although there are no
“explicit statutory standards controlling decisions about
retroactivity,” a trial court’s exercise of discretion under the
statute is based on “ ‘the equitable rights of the parties in light of
their economic needs and abilities’ during the period for which a
retroactive” order is sought. (Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at
p. 312.)
       Here, the trial court had already taken into consideration
the Gavron warning in the MSA which placed Brooks on notice
years earlier of the expectation that she would become self-
supporting; Miller’s declaration regarding his decreased income

                                  25
as of the time the request for order was filed; and its own
reasonable conclusion that Brooks failed to make diligent efforts
to secure full-time or significant employment in the nearly five
years prior to Miller’s request for an order terminating support.
We find no abuse of discretion.
VII. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Issue a
       Statement of Decision
       Brooks argues her request for a statement of decision was
timely and the trial court reversibly erred by denying the
request. We disagree.
       The court properly denied Brooks’s request as untimely.
While section 3654 does not set forth specific timelines for a party
to request a statement of decision, under section 210, “except
where any other statute or judicial council rule is applicable,
‘[t]he rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil actions
generally apply to, and constitute the rules of practice and
procedure in, proceedings under [the Family Code].’ ” (Rojas v.
Mitchell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1451–1452, citing § 210; see
Shimkus, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278 [citing both § 3654
and Code of Civ. Proc., § 632 in resolving statement of decision
issue]; In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1248 [same].) Indeed, Brooks offers no support, and we find
none, for the proposition that requests under section 3654 made
before signing and entry of a final order are timely because Code
of Civil Procedure section 632 does not apply.
       Under Code of Civil Procedure section 632, a party must
request a statement of decision “within 10 days after the court
announces a tentative decision unless the trial is concluded
within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more
than one day in which event the request must be made prior to

                                26
the submission of the matter for decision.” The same provision
mandates that a statement of decision be in writing unless the
“the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than 8
hours over more than one day, [in which case] the statement of
decision may be made orally on the record in the presence of the
parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.)
       Brooks concedes that the parties do not agree on whether
the evidentiary hearing was more or less than eight hours and
that “neither side is able to document by way of existing
admissible evidence the duration of the trial.” “[I]t is the
appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record on appeal that
affirmatively demonstrates error.” (Crasnick v. Marquez (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 9.) Because Brooks has failed to
provide an adequate record to show that the evidentiary hearing
lasted longer than eight hours, we presume it did not. (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘A judgment or order
of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown’ ”].)
       Brooks was therefore required to request a statement of
decision under section 3654 before the matter was submitted for
decision, per Code of Civil Procedure section 632. Brooks made
her request almost a month after the trial court’s ruling. The
trial court did not err by denying Brooks’s request for a
statement of decision as untimely.
       Moreover, even if the trial court erred in finding Brooks’s
request untimely, we would find no basis for reversal. The
California Supreme Court has conclusively held that “a trial
court’s error in failing to issue a requested statement of decision
[under Code of Civil Procedure 632] is not reversible per se, but is

                                27
subject to harmless error review.” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) Citing article VI, section 13 of the California
Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure section 475, our high
court held that a trial court’s failure to issue a statement of
decision is reversible in civil cases only upon a showing of
prejudice. (Id. at pp. 1108–1109.)
       “The primary purpose of a statement of decision is to
facilitate appellate review.” (People v. Landlords Professional
Services, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 68, 70.) Here, the basis for
the trial court’s ruling was clear because the court made explicit
findings on the record. The transcripts of this ruling, the
evidentiary hearing that preceded it, and the materials provided
in the appellant’s appendix provide a ready basis for review of the
trial court’s order terminating support.
       A statement of decision, moreover, is not required to detail
every aspect or basis of a court’s ruling. Indeed, “[a] statement of
decision need not address all the legal and factual issues raised
by the parties. Instead, it need do no more than state the
grounds upon which the judgment rests, without necessarily
specifying the particular evidence considered by the trial court in
reaching its decision.” (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 1106, 1124–1125.) Here, the court’s oral ruling
leaves no question that the court considered all factors under
section 4320 and made all necessary findings for its judgment.
Because Brooks fails to affirmatively show any prejudice
resulting from the absence of a statement of decision, we would
find no basis for reversal in the trial court’s denial of Brooks’s
request for a statement of decision.

                                28
                          DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed. Respondent Jason Miller is entitled
to costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS.

                                          ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                  LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                  EGERTON, J.

                               29