Court Opinion

ID: 9493774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:19:22.653628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:02.208041
License: Public Domain

DENNIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because, in my opinion, the collage of innocent and insubstantial facts to which the prosecution witnesses testified did not provide a reasonable basis for suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping Guerrero-Barajas. The sensate things relied upon by the border patrol agents in forming their suspicions of law violation were that at 12:30 a.m., a low-riding vehicle with tinted windows traveled west on a Texas road located approximately thirty-five miles north of the Mexican border. When the border-patrol car approached from behind, the defendant’s ve-*434hide began to slow and weave within its lane. The majority correctly notes not only that the government bears the burden of proof in proving that this stop was constitutional, United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir.1977), but also that we review de novo whether there was an objective basis for a reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d 877, 880-81 (5th Cir.2000).
“If there is no reason to believe that the vehicle has traveled from the border, the remaining factors must be examined carefully.” United States v. Aldaco, 168 F.3d 148, 150 (5th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998)). The record contains insufficient evidence upon which the border patrol agents could have based a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle had come from the border. The agents had not received any information that the defendant’s sedan had come from the border or was involved in illegal-immigrant smuggling. Indeed, the defendant was driving west on State Road 186, which runs parallel to the border, when the Agents stopped the vehicle. Although the government contends that the defendants turned onto State Road 186 from the north-bound State Road 88, the maps introduced into evidence show numerous roads intersecting State Road 88 between State Road 186 and the border, indicating a greater likelihood that the vehicle did not originate at or near the border.
Even if the evidence had tended to show that the defendant was coming from the border, “that factor ‘alone [is] not disposi-tive in the reasonable suspicion analysis.’ ” United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.1980) (alteration by Lopez-Valdez court)). Although the sedan was less than fifty miles from the border, “[a] vehicle may not be stopped simply because it is traveling on a road near the U.S.-Mexican border.” Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 286 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (stating that presence in a high-crime area does not provide reasonable suspicion)); United States v. Newell, 506 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir.1975) (stating that presence in a border area does not place a citizen “within a deconstitutionalized zone”). This court must examine the “whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), and consider all the factors specified in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
The majority characterizes the road as “a common route for alien smuggling” and the time of day as one when travel by lawful vehicles is “infrequen[t].” The majority does not cite any concrete evidence in the record as a basis for these conclusions. “We previously have held that merely being on a road frequently used for illegal activity is insufficient to justify an investigative stop.” United States v. Diaz, 977 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 47 n. 4 (5th Cir.1992)). The time of day may be a legitimate, yet marginal consideration, in the reasonable suspicion analysis “if other objective facts support a conclusion that persons passing a particular point at a particular time may be involved in illegal activity,” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 420-21, 101 S.Ct. 690, such as travel through a check point at a time when the agents were known to be changing shifts. United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that coming through the border at the time border patrol agents change shifts “does weigh in favor of reasonable suspicion.”).1 In the present case, *435however, the conclusion is not based on other objective facts. Instead, the majority adopts, as a self-proving fact, the prosecution witnesses’ unsupported conclusions that lawful travel at that time and place was infrequent. Maj. Op. at 432-83. Moreover, “[the] decision to travel such roads at less busy hours should not be the difference-constitutionally speaking-determinative of the right of the officers to stop vehicles.” Frisbie, 550 F.2d at 338 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882, 95 S.Ct. 2574).
Furthermore, in light of our hopelessly inconsistent treatment of the factor of a vehicle’s low carriage, it is questionable how much weight, if any, it should be given. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 412 (5th Cir.1984) (“In any event, even if relevant, the fact that defendant’s car was supposedly ‘riding low* has not been given determinate weight in border patrol cases.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Orona-Sanchez, 648 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (“[N]o weight is to be given to the fact that it was apparently heavily loaded.... ”); Pacheco, 617 F.2d at 86 (“[T]his factor has little weight.”) (citing United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.1979)); But see United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 916 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir.1990) (“We believe the district court was entitled to consider ... that the vehicle was heavy in the rear.”) (internal quotation omitted); United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1225 n. 2 (5th Cir.1984) (distinguishing Oronar-San-chez and Pacheco by stating that “the testimony reflects a degree of loading that is more than merely ‘heavy’ but is indeed obvious overloading....”); United States v. Sarduy, 590 F.2d 1355, 1358 n. 4 (5th Cir.1979) (“We have consistently regarded the fact that a vehicle is heavily loaded as a factor justifying a stop.”).2 Assuming that some weight should b.e given to the fact that the vehicle was riding low, this consideration should not be emphasized, as “a ‘heavy load’ is just as consistent with innocent conduct” as illegal activity. Garcia, 732 F.2d at 1230 (Tate, J., dissenting).
Today, tinted automobile windows are so common that they can hardly be considered an indicium of criminal activity. Diaz, 977 F.2d at 165 n. 5 (“Similarly de-emphasized ..., with good reason, were the tinted windows on Diaz’s car; tinted windows are common.”); United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 289-90 (5th Cir.1998) (“[T]inted windows are not uncommon in southwest Texas.... ”). Extremely dark windows may not “allay ... other suspicions],” Villalobos, 161 F.3d at 290, but in the present case, there is no evidence that the tinted windows were “extremely” dark. The officers merely testified that they could not see through the tinted windows at night.
Finally, under the circumstances, the slowing and wavering of the defendant’s vehicle was not suspicious. There was no evidence of evasive or unusually erratic behavior by the driver of the vehicle. Pri- or to being followed by the patrol car, the defendant’s vehicle had been operated in a legal, normal, and safe manner. As the majority notes, the sedan was “traveling at a normal speed” when it passed the agents’ car on the side of the road. Maj. Op. at 431. Only when it became evident that the agents were tailing the sedan did it slow and begin to waver within its lane. Numerous panels of this court have held this situation to be insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d at 882 (“There*436fore, Zapata-Ibarra’s deceleration and swerving on a such a road at nighttime, in response to a rapidly accelerating vehicle with its high-beam lights on, weighs, at best, only slightly in favor of the reasonableness of Zertuche’s suspicions.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Samaguey, 180 F.3d 195, 199 (5th Cir.1999) (stating that swerving in response to an approaching vehicle is “hardly suspicious”); Jones, 149 F.3d at 370 (“[W]hen the officer’s actions are such that any driver, whether innocent or guilty, would be preoccupied with his presence, then any inference that might be drawn from the driver’s behavior is destroyed.”); United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir.1993) (“We find nothing suspicious about a driver changing lanes and slowing down when he realizes a vehicle is approaching from the rear.”); Diaz, 977 F.2d at 165 (holding that a driver’s deceleration to forty miles per hour after agents began pursuit did not create reasonable suspicion, despite the agents’ contention that they feared a “bailout”). Indeed, slowing in response to an approaching vehicle “is a normal reaction if the driver wishes to let the tailing vehicle pass.” Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 127; see also Diaz, 977 F.2d at 165 (“Finally, there is nothing suspicious about a speeding car slowing down after a marked patrol unit turns to follow, with or without flashing lights. Rather than unusual, that is an expected reaction.”). Weaving slightly within one’s lane is often the result of a driver checking his mirror in response to a tailing or tailgating vehicle. The prosecution witnesses testified at the suppression hearing that the driver began to swerve, as if “looking back or something.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, this case appears to be based on nothing more than a mere “hunch” by an experienced agent who has “play[ed] our parlor game and ‘articúlatele!]’ to us virtually any set of facts as triggering suspicion in his mind.” Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir.2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting). With respect to the Brignoni-Ponce factors addressed by the district court, the findings of the district court are insufficient to lead to reasonable inferences of wrongdoing. With regard to the remainder of the Brignoni-Ponce factors, no evidence exists as to the “number, appearance, or behavior of the occupants of the vehicle.” No evidence exists that passengers attempted to hide, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, or that they were “unwashed” or “unkempt,” Garcia, 732 F.2d at 1223. The fact that nine previously unseen immigrants exited the "car after the stop cannot be used to form a basis for a reasonable suspicion of their unlawful presence before the stop occurred. Finally, no evidence was introduced as to any “recent illegal activity” in the area.
In Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d at 282 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), our colleague Judge Wiener declared that “history is likely to judge the judiciary’s evisceration of the Fourth Amendment in the vicinity of the Mexican border as yet another jurisprudential nadir, joining Korematsu [v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944)], Dred Scott [v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856)], and even Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896)] on the list of our most shameful failures to discharge our duty of defending constitutional civil liberties against the popular hue and cry that would have us abridge them.” His dictum has the ring of truth and may prove to be more prophetic than hyperbolic, considering that we currently have no way of knowing how many innocent persons are being subjected to such suspicionless stops. Although, according to the Gospel, “A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country,”3 I hope in this instance the majority of this panel and this court will heed our colleague’s warning and re*437pent for the sake of its own dignity and that of all persons within its jurisdiction.

. But see United States v. Moreno-Chaparro, 180 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1998) ("While we may empathize with the Border Patrol’s concerns regarding increased exposure during times of reduced manpower, we are not willing to sacrifice the constitutional protections of drivers to lessen the perceived adverse impact resulting from the decision of the Border *435Patrol to change shifts at the same time everyday.”).

. Moreover, the border patrol has even, at times, attempted to argue that cars "riding high” are suspicious because “people who smuggle aliens tend to elevate their trunks in order to disguise the presence of a heavy load.” United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712-13 (5th Cir.1977) (rejecting the border patrol’s argument and characterizing its position as "Riding high or riding low, either way a-searching we will go”).

. Matthew 13:57.