Court Opinion

ID: 9773056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:37.362595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:54.316779
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
I first point out that this is not an active disorderly trial or courtroom case, as the majority opinion implicitly tries to make it out to be. It is instead a passive disrespectful courtroom case in which several persons refused to adhere to the ancient, traditional, ceremonial, or symbolic act of persons in a courtroom rising or standing in unison upon command of the court bailiff at the commencement of the court session. I further point out that my research reflects that dignity and decorum in a courtroom are not achieved, nor do they turn on, whether a defendant, a spectator, or a witness refuses to stand or rise or does not refuse to rise or stand in a courtroom when commanded to do so. Given the facts and circumstances of this cause, there is, very simply, insufficient reason to invoke in this cause the awesome power of direct contempt to cope with the petty form of disrespect that the applicants exhibited in the trial court. See Dorsen and Friedman, Disorder in the Courtroom: Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct (Pantheon Books, 1973 edition), at page 113.
Concerning the applicants’ refusal to rise or stand, I am in agreement with the approach that the Justice of the Peace in this cause took when the applicant Krupps’ criminal case, for operating a motor vehicle without liability insurance, was pending in that court. I believe, as the record reflects or indicates that the Justice of the Peace apparently believed, that this kind of problem is best handled much in the same way as you deal with young children. There are just a lot of things you don’t see. In that kind of situation, I believe that it is just better that one not see it. It is obvious to me that the applicants in this cause, for whatever reason, are seeking attention, much like a young child craves attention. Given the facts and circumstances of this cause, I, for one, would not give the applicants the attention they seek, by putting this Court’s seal of approval on their contempt convictions — let them go elsewhere, if they can, to get their attention.
Those who join the majority opinion, however, do not subscribe to my kind of thinking, but trudge onward and try to give legal reasons why the applicants’ convictions for direct contempt of court must be sustained. The majority opinion totally fails to justify sustaining the contempt orders of the trial court. Therefore, I must, like Judge Campbell has done, see the dissenting opinion that he has filed in this cause, because the majority opinion presents such an inviting target, dust off my hunting license and don one of those marvelous British safari hats for the occasion, and a hunting I shall go.
Because of one of the issues in this cause, Ben Milam of Texas history fame’s declaration that “Texans do not stand for any man, but only for their God” is applicable to this cause. What Henry Thoreau declared in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, which I have carefully reworded to fit this cause, “All men are partially buried in the grave of custom, and of some we see only the crown of their heads and the robes that they wear,” may also be applicable to this cause.
The record reflects that Charles Edward Krupps and six other persons were held in direct contempt of court by Hon. Donald J. Floyd, the duly elected judge of County Court at Law No. 3 of Jefferson County, only because they did not rise or stand when ordered to do so after Judge Floyd entered his courtroom on the day in question. Judge Floyd assessed punishment *156for each person at 30 days’ confinement in the Jefferson County Jail. The majority opinion affirms the orders of contempt. I respectfully dissent to such decision.
In dissenting, I first point out that there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record before us that would indicate or reflect that the applicants’ act of not rising or standing was accompanied by any disorder, disturbance, or interruption of the court’s business. At no time did any of the applicants ever speak maliciously, antagonistically, or belligerently either to Judge Floyd or his bailiff, or anyone else for that matter, either inside or outside of the courtroom. Notwithstanding these facts, a majority of this Court sustains Judge Floyd’s orders of contempt. I suppose it does so on the feeble reasoning that not to uphold Judge Floyd’s orders would somehow destroy order in all of our courtrooms, which argument I find closely resembles the one that if a trial judge does not wear a robe when he is on the bench he will not get the respect and attention of those in attendance, and chaos will then reign in our courtrooms. And Judge Pete, we all know that the latter is a bunch of poppeycock, don’t we?
I believe that if one will carefully give the ancient subject of rising and standing in the courtroom, which my research has yet to reveal its real source, a little thought, he will conclude, as I have done, that the ancient, traditional, ceremonial, or symbolic act of persons in a courtroom rising or standing in unison upon command of the court bailiff, or some other person who is directed by the judge to give the command, is not necessary to the carrying out of the court’s business in an orderly fashion.1
The usual reasons given why persons must rise or stand after a trial judge or an appellate court judge enters his courtroom are the following: It is a way of marking the beginning of the court’s session; it probably serves to remind all that attention must be concentrated upon the business before the court; it reminds those present that the judge’s control of the courtroom must be maintained at all times with as little burden on the judge as possible; and it probably instructs all persons present that there must be silence, except as the orderly conduct of business calls for speech. See U.S. ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir.1969). If there was no other way than to require those in the courtroom to rise or stand in unison upon command in order to accomplish the court’s orderly conduct of its business, I might agree with the majority opinion. However, there is another and very simple way to accomplish the above objectives.
If the per se act of refusing to stand or rise in a courtroom actually obstructs or tends to obstruct the proper administration of justice, constitutes disrespect for the court, or its process, interrupts the normal proceedings of the court, causes the formality and seriousness of the court’s business to be disregarded, and directly conflicts with the “imperative need of the community in having an established forum in which controversies between man and man and citizen and sovereign may be decided in a calm, detached, neutral atmosphere,” as the majority claims, I must ask the author of the majority opinion, and those who join his opinion, whether they have actually ever been in a courtroom filled with persons, where the bailiff declares in a rather loud voice, “All rise,” with the trial judge then ascending the bench, and thereafter *157the courtroom sounding much like a stampeding herd of cattle? And, after the bailiff declares in another rather loud voice, “All please sit,” the courtroom’s sound repeats itself? Having witnessed such sights many times in my legal career, in both rural and urban courtrooms, I must state that if the per se act of failing to rise or stand upon command constitutes an obstruction of the proper administration of justice, the rising or standing in unison by persons in the courtroom, upon the command of the bailiff or some other authorized person, equally constitutes an obstruction of the proper administration of justice. The majority opinion’s dog might have been a good hunting dog many years ago, but I find that today, if one carefully examines him, he will easily find that the dog has gotten too old and will no longer hunt as he once did.
If one also places the majority opinion under the microscope, in order to find valid reasons that might justify its holding that the applicants are guilty of direct or criminal contempt of court, he will not find any valid reasons therein why the mere act of the applicants refusal to stand or rise “interrupted the normal proceedings of the formality and seriousness of the court’s function”; or that their mere act of not standing or rising “directly conflicted with the imperative need of the community in having an established forum in which controversies between man and man and citizen and sovereign may be decided in a calm, detached, neutral atmosphere.”
The majority opinion also makes the ludicrous statement that if the rising or standing requirement that was imposed in this cause created a burden on Krupps’ religious beliefs, that burden was removed when Judge Floyd gave him the option of remaining outside the courtroom until after court convened. Would this Court hold that a state statute which authorizes a minute “for meditation or voluntary prayer” in public schools would be a valid statute provided that the statute also contained a provision that those persons who did not wish or desire to participate were given the option of leaving the classroom? Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985). Would this Court uphold a law that made it mandatory that a person in attendance at a public school must salute the American flag if the statute also contained a provision that those persons who did not wish or desire to salute the flag were given the option of leaving? Cf. West Virginia v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). I do not believe that even the present United States Supreme Court would sustain these kinds of state statutes.
In holding that if the rising or standing requirement created a burden on the religious beliefs and freedoms of the applicant Krupps, because he was a party litigant in court that day, the majority opinion overlooks the fact that the Constitutional right to a public trial does not mean one in which a party litigant is permitted to be present in the courtroom part of the time, but not all of the time, as the majority opinion implicitly holds; he is entitled to be present all of the time — provided he behaves himself. Cf. Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Also see Antieau, Vol. 1, Modem Constitutional Law, Section 5:57. I emphasize the fact there is not a scintilla of evidence that the applicant Krupps ever misbehaved when he was in Judge Floyd’s courtroom.
Furthermore, the record is totally absent of any evidence that any applicant made or attempted to make Judge Floyd’s courtroom a forum or circus in order to make their religious beliefs known, or to solicit converts, nor is there any evidence that any applicant ever caused any actual interruption, interference, or obstruction of the judicial process or the operation of Judge Floyd’s courtroom.
Trial judges do not have the untrammeled discretion to punish every act that they might find to be personally offensive as a criminal contempt. Furthermore, summary contempt procedure is to be invoked and applied only as a last resort. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); In re Oliver, *158333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.1985); In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.1981); Ex parte Elmore, 161 Tex. 585, 342 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1961).
The use of the summary contempt power by a trial judge must be consistent with the reasons for criminal or direct contempt, and the bare fact that an individual’s behavior might be offensive to a particular trial judge’s personal sensibilities does not necessarily render it contumacious behavior. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153, 78 S.Ct. 622, 625, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958).
I return to the question that Judge Campbell in the dissenting opinion that he has filed in this cause partly answers as to the applicants except Krupps, whether the applicants’ conduct in intentionally or knowingly failing or refusing to rise or stand when Judge Floyd entered his courtroom is sufficient without more to sustain a direct or criminal contempt conviction?
Notwithstanding my views toward the ancient, traditional, ceremonial, or symbolic act of persons in a courtroom rising or standing in unison upon command of the court bailiff, or some other authorized person, at the commencement of the court session, before the power of summary contempt may be invoked and applied it is universally held that the conduct must interfere with and disrupt the orderly process of a court before it will constitute direct contempt.
The majority opinion states that it finds the Federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion of In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.1972), “persuasive.” Although a number of federal courts have determined that under the federal statutory counterpart to our contempt statute, the rising or standing requirement may be enforced with criminal contempt, they also hold that this kind of contempt power may be exercised only when the failure or refusal to rise or stand is accompanied by a disruption of the proceedings. See, for example, United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975); United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.1985); In re Chase, supra; United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied 422 U.S. 1027, 95 S.Ct. 2621, 45 L.Ed.2d 684 (1975); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.1972); United States ex rel Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir.1969); Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.1969). Also see Commonwealth v. Reid, 494 Pa. 201, 431 A.2d 218 (1981).
In finding that In re Chase, supra, is “persuasive” authority to sustain the contempt convictions of the applicants, the majority opinion overlooks the fact that the Seventh Circuit in Chase, supra, rejected out of hand the government’s argument that the failure to rise or stand in itself created a per se obstruction of judicial administration punishable by criminal contempt. In affirming the defendant’s contempt conviction, the Chase court found it significant that the deputy marshal had to assist the defendant Chase to his feet and that the trial was interrupted at least four times in order for the judge to read the contempt citations. It was these interruptions, and not the mere refusal to rise or stand, that were found to constitute an “actual, material obstruction” contemplated by the federal contempt statute. The Chase court was also careful to point out that the failure or refusal to rise or stand in the courtroom may amount to an actual and material obstruction of judicial administration if it distracts others in the courtroom or provokes a reaction on the part of others in the courtroom or is accompanied by a failure to become silent or focus attention on the business before the court. In re Chase, supra, 468 F.2d at 133.
In our cause, there is not any evidence that might warrant the inference that the act of the applicants not rising or standing provoked a reaction on the part of those other persons who were then in the courtroom or that the applicants were noisy or boisterous when they did not choose to rise or stand after Judge Floyd entered his courtroom on the day in question.
*159Just recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Cameron, 501 Pa. 572, 462 A.2d 649 (Pa.Sup.Ct.1983), also see 38 A.L.R.4th 555, answered the question whether a defendant’s refusal to rise or stand, without more, is sufficient to sustain a direct contempt conviction in the negative. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that although the rising or standing requirement may constitute “misbehavior in the presence of the court,” it is the resulting obstruction of the proceedings that is critical to sustaining a criminal contempt citation.
The annotation in 38 A.L.R.4th 563, entitled “Failure to rise in state courtroom as constituting criminal contempt,” points out that “The relatively few state cases considering the propriety of punishing any person for failing or refusing to stand in a courtroom when required to do so appear to indicate that such misconduct, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify a citation for criminal contempt, and that there must be some active disruption of court proceedings before such a penalty may be imposed.” (564). (My emphasis.) I pause to state the following: Just last week, see Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), an aggressive and assertive majority of this Court found an A.L.R. annotation “persuasive” as authority to support its holding that unobjected to hearsay has probative value in judging the sufficiency of the evidence. However, this week it does not even acknowledge that work. What’s going on here? If that work was authoritative last week, should it not also be authoritative this week? Or, is the reason the author of the majority opinion ignores it this week because what is stated therein is not to his and those judges who join his opinion’s likings?
If one carefully analyzes the majority opinion, I believe that he or she will conclude, as I have done, that the bottom line in the opinion represents nothing less than the fact that the author of the majority opinion, and those members of this Court who join his opinion, believe that the applicants were discourteous to the trial judge in this cause by refusing to rise or stand after he entered his courtroom on the day in question, and that such was both an abuse of process and an obstruction of the administration of justice, and because of this they should be summarily punished for such act, which is, in the view of those who vote for the majority opinion, an act that is apparently “honored only by civilized and sensible men.” In short, they believe that without this ancient, traditional, ceremonial, or symbolic act, chaos would reign in our courtrooms. If there was no other way to mark the beginning of the court’s session; if there was no other way to remind all that attention must be concentrated upon the business before the court; if there was no other way to remind all that the judge’s control of the courtroom must be maintained with as little burden on the judge as possible; and if there was no other way to impress upon persons in the courtroom that at all times there must be silence, except as the orderly conduct of business calls for speech, I might agree with the majority opinion. However, if one subscribes to the agency theory, as the majority opinion apparently does, see the dissenting opinion filed by Judge Campbell in this cause, why cannot the above be reduced to writing and have the agent, whoever that might be, such as the bailiff, court reporter, clerk, court coordinator, probation officer, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, or perhaps all doing it in unison, utter these admonitions loudly to those in attendance in the courtroom? If this is done, and after the trial or appellate court judge takes his bench, a member of the audience violates one or more of the admonitions, and that person is held in direct or criminal contempt of court, then the majority opinion might make a little sense. However, given the facts and circumstances of this cause, it presently makes no sense at all.
Because the majority opinion erroneously holds that a person’s mere refusal to rise or stand upon command after the trial judge enters his courtroom, without more, is sufficient to sustain a direct criminal *160contempt conviction, I am compelled to respectfully dissent. I believe that opinions like this one do not cause our trial courts to gain respect from our citizenry, but, to the contrary, such opinions can actually breed disrespect for our courtrooms and our trial judges, and cause disturbances where before there were none.

. In the concurring opinion that Presiding Judge Onion has filed in this cause, he states that “When this writer commenced his judicial career almost 32 years ago, there was no formal commencement of a trial court session, no traditional rising in unison of persons present in court. All that came later in Texas.” If rising or standing in unison of persons in a courtroom is so extremely important to preserve our court system, then I must ask the following questions: In the preceding 118 years, how on earth did our courts manage to function without persons in the courtroom not rising or standing upon command? Does this mean that from 1836 until 1954, for 118 years, we were a civilized society, and not a barbaric society which the majority opinion implies that we are today?