Court Opinion

ID: 9583821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:42:25.315491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:55.238670
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Judge,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur and join in Part IV of the majority opinion rejecting the defendant’s claim that, under the terms of the plea agreement, he did not grant a present waiver but “simply agreed to give such a waiver in the future.” As to the validity of that wavier provision as construed by the majority, I find it unnecessary to address that question because, in my view, the scope of the defendant’s waiver in this case was limited to *577allowing police officers, including the defendant’s probation officer, to conduct reasonable searches without obtaining a warrant to search the defendant’s person, residence, vehicle, and other places where he might have a protected privacy-interest in order to supervise his probation. The search undertaken in this case was clearly unrelated to the supervision of defendant’s probation, as evidenced by the fact that the officer was unaware of the defendant’s status and the waiver he had executed.
The purpose of the waiver of the reasonableness requirement was to enable law enforcement officers or those persons supervising the defendant’s probation to search him or his protected areas of privacy in order to assure compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation, which required that he not use or possess drugs and that he not violate the law. The waiver did not constitute, in my opinion, a carte blanche forfeiture by the defendant of his Fourth Amendment rights so as to legitimize every search of his person or possessions. Thus, I would hold that the police officers’ warrantless search of the defendant conducted without probable cause or without his consent and without knowledge of or pursuant to the waiver provision was unreasonable and violated the defendant’s protection of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the cocaine, marijuana, and firearm were illegally seized and should have been suppressed based upon the exclusionary rule set down in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).6
The majority, relying upon the California case of In re: Tyrell J., 8 Cal.4th 68, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 (1994), and the North Carolina case of State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C.App. 663, 207 S.E.2d 263 (1974), the latter having been overruled by statute, necessarily holds that the officers’ otherwise illegal search of the defendant was reasonable because, in the waiver, *578the defendant had forfeited his reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of whether the officer knew of or was conducting the search pursuant to the defendant’s waiver. I disagree with that interpretation of the waiver and disagree with the majority’s assertion that “[t]he conduct of the officers is not at issue.” In order for police officers to lawfully seize and search a suspect without a warrant, the officers must have either probable cause to arrest, consent, or be acting in reliance upon or pursuant to a valid waiver. The officers possessed none of these prerequisites.
The majority’s holding, which is based upon the waiver, would validate every otherwise illegal search or seizure of the defendant, presumably in any jurisdiction, even though no probable cause existed to suspect the accused of criminal activity, except, perhaps, where the officers use excessive force. The defendant’s waiver in this case was not, in my opinion, that broad or far-reaching. The purpose of the waiver was to allow law enforcement officers, including the defendant’s probation officer, who knew of the defendant’s probationary status, to be able to monitor the defendant’s conduct and behavior by searching him, his home, his vehicle, or personal belongings without notice and without probable cause. The defendant did not forfeit “whatever claim of privacy he otherwise might have,” as the majority holds.7 A waiver for the limited purpose we have here is, in my judgment, a legitimate and effective enforcement tool, similar to the requirement that probationers submit to urine screens, which enable the authorities to assure that a probationer or convict with a suspended sentence is adhering to the conditions of probation or suspension. The defendant’s waiver was not, in my opinion, a forfeiture of all Fourth Amendment protections. As with consent, unless officers conduct a search within the scope of the consent or waiver, a warrantless search without probable cause is unreasonable. Accordingly, because the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence, I respectfully dissent.

. My view of the case would not necessarily preclude the illegally seized evidence from being used to revoke the defendant’s probation or suspended sentences even if the search was not conducted for the purpose of supervising the defendant’s probation. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 437, 470 S.E.2d 862 (1996); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 172, 462 S.E.2d 907 (1995).

. As previously noted, because of the manner in which I construe the waiver, I do not reach the question of the constitutionality of a waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights.