Court Opinion

ID: 9943470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:01:08.228624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:03.357690
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3150     Document: 010111004657         Date Filed: 02/23/2024     Page: 1
                                                                FILED
                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            February 23, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  LEVI LOVE,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-3150
                                                      (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-03276-JWL)
  DAN SCHNURR, Warden, Hutchinson                                (D. Kan.)
  Correctional Facility,

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
                    _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Levi Love, a state inmate proceeding pro se, seeks a Certificate of

 Appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.

 § 2241 petition. For the reasons explained below, we deny Love a COA.

                                    BACKGROUND

        Love was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree

 murder for shooting two people and killing one. The trial court sentenced Love

 to life imprisonment on the murder charge and 68 years’ imprisonment on the

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 2

 attempted murder charge, with those sentences running concurrently. At

 sentencing, the trial court noted that Love would have to serve 25 years before

 he was eligible for parole on his life sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court

 affirmed his convictions on direct review. State v. Love, 986 P.2d 358, 365

 (Kan. 1999).

       Love then petitioned for post-conviction relief in Kansas state court,

 raising claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and claiming that newly

 discovered evidence warranted a new trial. After the Kansas trial court denied

 his petition and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, Love petitioned the

 federal district court for the same relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district

 court denied his petition, and we denied a COA. Love v. Roberts, 259 F. App’x

 58, 59 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).

       Over a decade later, Love filed another petition for post-conviction relief

 in Kansas state court. Love petitioned for relief because, according to him, the

 Kansas Department of Corrections (DOC) was illegally forcing him to serve his

 68-year sentence. More specifically, Love argued that his life-imprisonment

 sentence should control when he is eligible for parole because it is longer than

 his sentence for 68 years. Because Kansas allows some prisoners serving life

 sentences to be eligible for parole after twenty-five years, Love asserted that

 the DOC was illegally denying him eligibility for parole by listing his 68-year

 sentence as the sentence that “controlled [his] prison term and postrelese [sic]

 supervision.” R. 178. Thus, Love maintains that he should not have to serve his

                                          2
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657      Date Filed: 02/23/2024      Page: 3

 68-year sentence. The trial court rejected his petition, and the Kansas Court of

 Appeals affirmed. Love v. Schnurr (State Appeal), 481 P.3d 193, 2021 WL

 745418, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision). The Kansas

 Court of Appeals ruled that Love’s petition was procedurally barred because

 Love had exhausted his administrative remedies too late. Id. at *4. To exhaust

 his administrative remedies, Love needed to file a grievance with the warden

 “within 15 days from the date of the discovery of the event giving rise to the

 grievance.” Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-15-101b; see id. § 44-15-102(b). And

 “[n]o grievance, regardless of time of discovery, shall be filed later than one

 year after the event.” Id. § 44-15-101b. Had he exhausted his administrative

 remedies by filing a timely grievance, Love would then have had 30 days to file

 a habeas petition. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1501(b). The Kansas Court of Appeals

 found that Love first learned of the allegedly illegal change to his sentence in

 2014 but waited to file a grievance until July 2018. State Appeal, 2021 WL

 745418, at *4. So the court dismissed Love’s petition because his untimely

 grievance served as a jurisdictional bar to judicial review. Id.

       The court also rejected the merits of Love’s argument by ruling that

 parole “is entirely discretionary . . . and might never be granted.” Id. at *2

 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6821). The court explained that “even if Love was

 paroled on his life sentence, he would not be released [from prison] until he has

 served a total of 816 months (68 years) on his other concurrent sentence.” Id.

                                          3
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657       Date Filed: 02/23/2024    Page: 4

 Thus, the court noted, whatever sentence the DOC listed as “Love’s controlling

 sentence appears, on its face, to be of academic interest only.” Id.

       Given that ruling, Love brought another petition in federal court, this

 time under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In this petition, Love challenged his parole-

 eligibility status, cabining his arguments to four legal theories: (1) deprivation

 of a “[p]rotected liberty interest . . . without due process,” (2) “[v]iolation of

 the Double Jeopardy Clause and § 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights,”

 (3) violation of Kansas procedural statutes for his procedural default in state

 court, and (4) fraud and libel against the DOC for denying him parole. R. 12–

 13. The district court denied Love’s petition, finding it procedurally barred and

 rejecting it on the merits. Love v. Schnurr (Court Order), No. 22-3276, 2023

 WL 4295368, at *5–7 (D. Kan. June 30, 2023). Love now seeks a COA to

 challenge the district court’s denial of his § 2241 petition.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Love must obtain a COA before we can address the merits of his habeas

 petition, as it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review. See Montez v.

 McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867–69 (10th Cir. 2000). We deny an applicant’s COA

 “if no reasonable jurist would find it debatable that his application (1) fails to

 state a valid constitutional claim or (2) is procedurally barred.” Winn v. Cook,

 945 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2019).

                                           4
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657      Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 5

                                   DISCUSSION

       We first determine the scope of our review, and then we consider the

 merits of Love’s application.

 I.    Scope of Review

       The district court entered judgment denying Love’s § 2241 petition on

 June 30, 2023, but Love filed his notice of appeal on August 22, 2023—after

 the 30-day appellate deadline passed. 1 See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring

 appellants to file notice of appeal within 30 days of final judgment unless a

 motion is filed that tolls the deadline). Yet he timely filed two motions in the

 district court before the deadline passed—a motion under Rule 59(e) on July 7,

 and a “motion for rehearing” on July 27. R. 4. The district court denied those

 motions on July 10 and July 28, respectively. We know that the Rule 59(e)

 motion tolls the appellate deadline. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). So the

 30-day clock began to run when the motion was denied on July 10, unless the

 motion for rehearing is likewise tolling: then the clock would have started on

 July 28. If the motion for rehearing is not tolling, our review is limited to the

 denial of that motion; but if it is tolling, then we can review the merits of the

 district court’s denial of Love’s § 2241 petition. Cf. Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d

 1300, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2016).

       1
         At the bottom of the notice of appeal, Love (or someone) handwrote,
 “filed 8-2-23; refiled 8-22-23.” R. 521. Nothing in the record shows that the
 notice was indeed originally filed on August 2, 2023. So we take August 22,
 2023, as the official filing date for Love’s notice of appeal.
                                          5
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657      Date Filed: 02/23/2024     Page: 6

       No matter what it is titled, a motion tolls the time to file an appeal under

 Rule 59(e) “if it is served within the specified time period and seeks relief

 appropriate to Rule 59(e) by questioning the correctness of the underlying

 judgment.” See Hayes Fam. Tr. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 845 F.3d 997,

 1004 (10th Cir. 2017). Though called a motion for rehearing, Love’s motion

 satisfies both the timing and substance requirements for us to treat it as tolling.

 For timing, Love filed the motion for rehearing within 28 days after the district

 court entered judgment—the judgment was entered June 30; the motion for

 rehearing was filed July 27. For substance, the motion for rehearing

 “question[s] the correctness of the underlying judgment” by arguing that the

 DOC illegally changed Love’s sentence. See id. Given the timing and substance

 of the motion, we construe Love’s motion for rehearing as a tolling motion

 under Rule 4. And so, we proceed to the merits.

 II.   Merits

       As a state prisoner seeking appellate review of the dismissal of his

 § 2241 petition, Love must first obtain a COA. See Montez, 208 F.3d at 867–69.

 To do so, Love must show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable”

 (1) “whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

 right” and (2) “whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In his opening brief, Love argues

 that the district court erred by denying his habeas petition and declining to hold

                                          6
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 7

 an evidentiary hearing. He also argues that the district court judge “should have

 recused himself.” Op. Br. at 4. We consider each in turn.

       A.     Denial of Habeas Petition

       The district court denied Love’s habeas petition on procedural grounds

 and on the merits. Court Order, 2023 WL 4295368, at *4–6. So Love must

 show that reasonable jurists would debate whether his “petition states a valid

 claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and whether the district court erred

 in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

              1.     Constitutional Claims

       In Love’s habeas petition, he raises claims based on purported

 constitutional and state-law violations. But his “claims of state law violations

 are not cognizable in a federal habeas action.” Montez, 208 F.3d at 865. So we

 only address his federal constitutional claims, of which there are two.

       Love claims that the DOC violated the Due Process and Double Jeopardy

 Clauses by changing his sentence and denying him parole eligibility. To

 support his claims, Love argues that his life-imprisonment sentence should

 control when he receives parole and that he should be eligible for parole

 because he has served over 25 years of his life sentence. Thus, Love asserts that

 the DOC is illegally forcing him to serve his 68-year sentence by declining to

 grant him parole.

       To start, Love has not stated a valid Due Process violation. To show a

 Due Process violation, Love must show that he was deprived of a protected

                                          7
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024     Page: 8

 liberty interest. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70

 (1972). Because there is “no constitutional or inherent right to receive parole,”

 federal law does not create a liberty interest in parole. Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d

 1013, 1015 (10th Cir. 1994). So to succeed, Love must show that Kansas law

 creates a liberty interest in parole. See id. But “as the Kansas Supreme Court

 and panels of this court have held, the Kansas parole statute does not create a

 liberty interest as would be required to maintain a due-process claim.” Heath v.

 Norwood, 772 F. App’x 706, 708 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (citing

 Gilmore v. Kansas Parole Bd., 756 P.3d 410, 415 (Kan. 1988)). Thus,

 reasonable jurists would not debate whether Love has stated a Due Process

 claim.

          Likewise, Love has not validly claimed a Double Jeopardy Clause

 violation. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against three

 separate constitutional violations: “(1) a second prosecution for the same

 offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after

 conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” Anderson v.

 Mullin, 327 F.3d 1148, 1153 (10th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). In one prosecution,

 Love was convicted of two offenses—murder in the first degree and attempted

 murder in the first degree. And he was sentenced to one punishment for each

 offense: life imprisonment for murder and 68 years’ imprisonment for

 attempted murder. Though Love was denied parole eligibility, his sentence has

 not changed. See Carroll v. Simmons, 89 F. App’x 658, 663 (10th Cir. 2004)

                                         8
Appellate Case: 23-3150    Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 9

 (“Because the denial of parole does not change the length of a prisoner’s

 sentence, it is not the imposition of more than one punishment for the same

 offense as prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.” (citation omitted)). And

 even if he were eligible for parole for his life-imprisonment sentence, Love’s

 68-year sentence is a separate sentence for a separate offense, not a subsequent

 “punishment[] for the same offense.” Anderson, 327 F.3d at 1153. Thus, Kansas

 can force Love to serve his 68-year sentence without offending the Double

 Jeopardy Clause. As a result, reasonable jurists would not debate whether Love

 has stated a claim for the denial of a constitutional right.

              2.    Procedural Default

       The district court ruled that Love’s claims were procedurally barred

 because his habeas petition in state court was dismissed on state procedural

 grounds. See Court Order, 2023 WL 4295368, at *4–5. The district court also

 found that Love had not shown good cause and prejudice to excuse the

 procedural default. Id. at *5. As explained below, reasonable jurists would not

 debate this conclusion.

       “When a state court dismisses a federal claim on the basis of

 noncompliance with adequate and independent state procedural rules, federal

 courts ordinarily consider such claims procedurally barred and refuse to

 consider them.” Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1144 (10th Cir. 2012)

 (citing Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 1999)). A state

 procedural rule is adequate if it is “firmly established and regularly followed.”

                                          9
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024     Page: 10

  Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558

  U.S. 53, 60–61 (2009)). A state procedural ruling is independent if “it relies on

  state law, rather than federal law.” Black v. Workman, 682 F.3d 880, 918 (10th

  Cir. 2012) (quoting Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008)).

        The Kansas Court of Appeals dismissed Love’s case because he failed to

  timely file a grievance. See State Appeal, 2021 WL 745418, at *4–5 (citing

  Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-15-101b). This state procedural ruling is adequate

  because the time limits in § 44-15-101b have been firmly established and

  regularly followed by Kansas courts. See, e.g., Walling v. Riggin, 350 P.3d

  1138, 2015 WL 3875085, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished table

  decision); Beauclair v. Heimgartner, 345 P.3d 296, 2015 WL 1514255, at *3–4

  (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished table decision); Thomas v. McKune, 303

  P.3d 727, 2013 WL 3455828, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (unpublished table

  decision). The Kansas Court of Appeals’ ruling is also independent because it

  relied exclusively on state procedural rules and not any federal law. See State

  Appeal, 2021 WL 745418, at *4–5.

        A state procedural default nonetheless may be excused if the petitioner

  can show “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

  Tyron v. Quick, 81 F.4th 1110, 1139 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). To

  show cause, a petitioner must demonstrate that “something external to the

  petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him, impeded his

  efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Id. (quoting Maples v.

                                         10
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657       Date Filed: 02/23/2024    Page: 11

  Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012)). The petitioner then must show “not merely

  a substantial federal claim, such that the errors at trial created a possibility of

  prejudice, but rather that the constitutional violation worked to his actual and

  substantial disadvantage.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 379 (2022) (cleaned

  up). To show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make a

  credible claim of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392

  (2013). The actual-innocence exception “is a markedly narrow one” that is

  “implicated in extraordinary cases where a constitutional violation has probably

  resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Magar v. Parker,

  490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

        First, Love has not shown cause and prejudice because he has not claimed

  that “something external” prevented him from complying with § 44-15-101b.

  See Tyron, 81 F.4th at 1139 (emphasis omitted). Instead, he argues that he

  discovered the allegedly illegal change to his sentence on October 5, 2017, and

  filed a grievance on July 27, 2018. Because one year had not passed, he argues

  that his grievance was timely. But even if Love first discovered the alleged

  change in October 2017, his grievance was still barred by § 44-15-101b. That

  regulation requires prisoners to file a grievance “within 15 days from the date”

  of discovery and mandates that “[n]o grievance, regardless of time of

  discovery, shall be filed later than one year after the event.” Section 44-15-

  101b; see also Van Houten v. Marlett, 330 F. App’x 161, 163 (10th Cir. 2009)

  (unpublished) (“Thus, the sentence permitting filing up to ‘one year after the

                                           11
Appellate Case: 23-3150    Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024    Page: 12

  event’ is an additional limit on the filing time, not an extension.”). So if Love

  discovered the allegedly illegal change on October 5, 2017, then he had 15 days

  from that date to file a grievance. And even if he did file within 15 days, then

  his grievance would still be untimely if it was filed more than a year after the

  DOC allegedly changed his sentence. See id. Thus, Love has not shown cause

  to excuse his default.

        Second, Love also has not shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice

  because he has not made a credible claim for actual innocence. At Love’s trial,

  the state showed that the victim identified Love as the shooter in a pretrial

  photo lineup. Now, Love argues that the victim lied to the police and falsely

  identified Love. To support his claim, Love has produced an affidavit from the

  victim in which the victim testifies that he lied to the police and falsely

  identified Love. Love has also produced affidavits from other people who have

  heard the victim say that he falsely identified Love in the lineup. But Love’s

  recanted-identification evidence is not enough. In general, courts disfavor

  recantations as the basis for actual innocence claims because “recanted

  testimony is notoriously unreliable, ‘easy to find but difficult to confirm or

  refute: . . . witnesses with personal motives change their stories many times,

  before and after trial.’” Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1044 (10th Cir. 2013)

  (citation omitted). We need not speculate about the victim’s personal motive

  for recanting here because he explains it in his affidavit. The victim testifies,

  “The only reason why I am telling the truth in this affidavit is to get even with

                                          12
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657       Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 13

  the court for giving my nephew . . . a life sentence after [the state] had used me

  to convict Levi Love.” Suppl. R. 10. The victim also notes that, if Love gets a

  new trial, the victim will testify for the state—and against Love again—but

  only if the state “give[s] [his] nephew a new trial, or some type of deal.” Id.

  Because the victim is leveraging his recantation to help his nephew, Love has

  not made the “credible” showing necessary to prove actual innocence. 2 See

  McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392.

        Because Love has failed to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental

  miscarriage of justice, reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s

  procedural ruling.

        B.     Denial of Evidentiary Hearing

        Love contends that the district court erred by not holding an evidentiary

  hearing. “A habeas petitioner can obtain an evidentiary hearing in federal court

  by (1) showing he was diligent in developing the factual basis for his claim in

  state court; and (2) asserting a factual basis that, if true, would entitle him to

  habeas relief.” Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810, 836 (10th Cir. 2015) (cleaned

        2
          Love also has not identified a constitutional violation that would have
  resulted in his alleged wrongful conviction. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
  390, 400 (1993) (“Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered
  evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent
  an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state
  criminal proceeding.”). As we have repeatedly noted, a claim of actual
  innocence is not enough: it must be predicated on a constitutional violation for
  us to grant relief. See, e.g., Farrar v. Raemisch, 924 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir.
  2019) (“Actual innocence and false testimony by a private citizen do not entail
  constitutional violations triggering habeas relief.”).
                                           13
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657     Date Filed: 02/23/2024    Page: 14

  up). As discussed above, Love has stated no claims that would entitle him to

  habeas relief. Thus, the district court did not err by denying Love an

  evidentiary hearing.

        C.    Recusal

        Love argues that the district court judge should have recused himself

  because the judge was involved in Love’s first habeas petition. During Love’s

  first habeas petition, Love sent “correspondence” to the chief judge for the

  District of Kansas—the same judge who presided over Love’s current § 2241

  petition. R. 517. In that correspondence, Love “lodged a complaint about his

  case.” Id. The then-chief responded in an order that “a chief judge does not

  have express or implied authority to take action in litigation which has been

  assigned to another judge of the court and remains pending before that judicial

  officer.” Id. From this, Love argues that the district judge is “very much

  interested in Mr. Love’s” current habeas petition. Op. Br. at 4.

        Even if a judge does not have a personal bias in a proceeding, a judge

  still must recuse himself when “his impartiality might reasonably be

  questioned.” United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017)

  (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). This standard mandates recusal when a

  reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, “would harbor doubts about

  the judge’s impartiality.” Id. at 1251 (citation omitted). But “adverse rulings

  cannot in themselves form the appropriate grounds for disqualification.” Id. at

  1252 (citation omitted).

                                          14
Appellate Case: 23-3150   Document: 010111004657      Date Filed: 02/23/2024     Page: 15

        No reasonable person would “harbor doubts” about the district court

  judge’s impartiality here. See id. at 1251 (citation omitted). The district court

  judge’s only involvement in Love’s prior habeas petition was the judge’s

  entering an order that explained why he lacked authority to address Love’s

  complaints. Because “adverse rulings cannot in themselves form the appropriate

  grounds for disqualification,” the district court judge properly declined to

  recuse himself from the present petition. See id. at 1252 (citation omitted); id.

  at 1251 (noting that judges have “a strong duty to sit” when recusal is not

  warranted). Thus, the district court did not err.

                                   CONCLUSION

        For all these reasons, we deny Love a COA.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Gregory A. Phillips
                                            Circuit Judge

                                          15