Court Opinion

ID: 9883521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:45:08.309975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:24.451911
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J., dissenting.
The deed is from a son to his mother. Obviously, the conveyance of a life estate was intended. This intention should control unless “in conflict with some unyielding canon of construction, or settled rule of property, or fixed rule of law, or is repugnant to the terms of the grant.” Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C. 95, 98, 92 S.E. 2d 682, and cases cited. In my opinion, the rules of law enunciated in the cases cited in the Court’s opinion do not require that the intention of the parties be thwarted.
“The heart of a deed is the granting clause.” Griffin v. Springer, supra, and cases cited. The granting clause designates the grantee and the thing granted. Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754, 760, 47 S.E. 2d 228. Consideration of the granting clause requires the construction that the thing granted is not a described tract of land but “a life estate in and to the following described tract of land.” The factual situation is distinguishable from cases where, after conveyance of a described tract of land in fee, a subsequent provision, not an integral part of the granting clause, purports to delimit the fee theretofore explicitly conveyed.
A rule of law which supersedes and frustrates the intention of the parties should not be extended to encompass the present factual situation but should be restricted to factual situations undistinguishable from those heretofore considered.
Rodman, J., joins in dissent.