Court Opinion

ID: 9451696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:21:48.99129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:50.938147
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in so far as it holds that Butler’s “ignorance of the provisions of the Sexual Deviate Law, and the failure of the court and any other person to apprise him of said provisions,” before his waiver of counsel and guilty plea, did not violate the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause.
The Wisconsin courts presumably thought that Butler was of sufficient intelligence and competence to make a valid waiver. There is a difference, however, between Butler’s being “intelligent and competent” to make the waiver of the right to counsel, and his having the knowledge upon which to make an “intelligent and competent” waiver. An intelligent and competent waiver presupposes that in making the waiver judgment, the person has the knowledge that a person of his age, education, station and the like would need for making a prudent judgment under the circumstances.
The district court thought that although the trial court should have advised Butler “more fully,” his waiver of counsel was not rendered “ineffective simply because of his ignorance of the precise provisions” of the Sexual Deviate Act.
The Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), provided the classic delineation of the “waiver” doctrine :
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The deter*125mination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
And in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948), the main opinion of the Court elaborated upon the elements of a valid waiver:
[It] must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and the circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.1
The Wisconsin courts found, as the majority points out, that “Petitioner was not aware of the so-called sex deviate law (sec. 959.15 Stats.)” when he waived counsel and pleaded guilty. The Wisconsin trial court, in my view, had the duty to give him the knowledge.2 Is it fair to assume that if a person in Butler’s circumstances knew what disposition was likely to be made of him under the Sexual Deviate Act, he would have waived counsel? The motive which the Wisconsin court found for his waiver, fear of publicity and absence from work, precludes an affirmative answer. What happened to him was exactly the opposite of what he hoped for and what had motivated him to waive counsel and plead guilty. Is it likely that had he known the possible consequences and employed counsel, the course of events would have been the same?3 It is plain that counsel would, in event of Butler’s conviction, have urged probation under the Sexual Deviate Act for out-patient treatment4 — in view of Butler’s standing and employment and his
We have said: “The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused- — whose life or liberty is at stake — is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.” To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility. [Footnotes omitted.]
ment proceedings can be effective. As reported in Defender Newsletter, March, 1966, p. 2, commenting, as follows, on the brief of petitioner in Baxstrom v. Herold, 86 S.Ct. 760 (Feb. 23, 1966): *126intoxication when arrested for both the prior offense and the offense before us— suggesting suitable conditions to be imposed for protection of the public.
*125“The brief submitted in behalf of Baxstrom contained statistics showing that where counsel had been assigned to represent one allegedly mentally ill, commitment was successfully resisted in 20% of the hearings. The Public Defender of Cook County, Illinois, for the period 1 December 1963 through 30 November 1964 handled 6,174 cases, of which 951 were dismissed. The Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia, in 1964, successfully resisted commitment in 223 cases out of a total of 639. The Atlanta Legal Aid Society handled ten cases and successfully resisted commitment in seven of these. The Public Defender of San Francisco handled 101 cases, 40 eases resulted in non-commitment. * * * (Petitioner’s Brief, Appendix B, No. 219.)”
*126As the majority points out, the Wisconsin courts found Butler “deliberately and knowingly” waived counsel and pleaded guilty, motivated by fear of publicity. Those courts also stated that he was also motivated by fear of losing time at his employment.
Butler’s earlier offense, although described as similar to the one before us but with an adult, was formally charged as disorderly conduct. He was fined $40.00 and he was able to avoid interference with his employment. The judge in the earlier case presided over the trial of the later offense of which he was convicted, and presumably because of the earlier experience, Butler, inexcusably but understandably, was under a misapprehension as to what faced him. He presumably thought that he could again avoid interference, through publicity or absence, with his employment, and that he would avoid publicity and soon return to work by waiving preliminary hearing, submitting to an immediate trial, waiving counsel, and, after hearing the statutory charge read to him, pleading guilty. On the day before his arraignment and conviction, Butler expressed to the chief deputy his concern about the effect of publicity of a court trial on his job and friends, and stated he wanted to get it over with as quickly as possible. The chief deputy informed him that it would take less time and involve less publicity if he waived an attorney and •pleaded guilty to the charge, and that it was doubtful a lawyer could do very much good, but that he could not guarantee anything with respect to the outcome of a court hearing. Butler was told nothing before his waiver of counsel and guilty plea about the likely Sexual Deviate Act consequences, nor, before conviction, of its ranges of confinement and treatment.
My opinion is that for an “intelligent and competent” waiver of right to counsel at this trial, it was necessary for Butler to understand that if convicted he faced the possibilities of detention as a sex deviate until discharged from treatment and of detention beyond the maximum sentence for the alleged offense, with sentence for the offense meanwhile suspended. After Butler had waived counsel and pleaded guilty,5 the court, at the commitment for detention and treat*127ment, told him he was being committed “for treatment, not for punishment,” and that sentence for the offense was being “stayed indefinitely.” This did not remove the harm previously done at the time of waiver and plea.
I would reverse the district court judgment and remand to the district court to retain jurisdiction for a suitable period, at the end of which Butler is to be discharged unless in that period Wisconsin authorities vacate Butler’s judgment of conviction and grant him a new trial.

. Although the Court was speaking of a federal trial, its language has relevance to any criminal ease, where a waiver of right to counsel is involved.

. In Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. at 723-724, 68 S.Ct. at 323 (opinion of Justice Black), it was stated:

. Although the probability of “success” Butler might have had, if represented by counsel, in resisting conviction or obtaining other treatment under the sex deviate act is speculative, it is interesting to note that the role of counsel in civil commit-

. Upon the Welfare Department’s post-conviction report that Butler needed treatment, the court found Butler was sexually deviated, and “could not” and “should not” be granted probation and out-patient treatment. The court under the Act was not required to deny probation for out-patient treatment on the report.

. The transcript of court record for August 13, 1962, shows the following:
Case called by Court.
Court: Mr. Butler, do you understand what you are being charged with? Mr. Butler: Yes, your Honor.
Court: This is a charge where you are entitled to a preliminary examination if you desire to have a preliminary examination, or you may waive your right to it. Do you understand what a preliminary examination is?
Mr. Butler: Yes, your Honor.
Court: Do you wish to have a preliminary examination or do you wish to waive your right to it?
Mr-. Butler: I wish to waive my right to it.
Court: Upon the defendant waiving his right to a preliminary examination, this matter is bound over to the County Court for Walworth County, Branch II, for immediate arraignment.
(Information read to defendant by the District Attorney and filed with the Court.)
Court: Mr. Butler, you have heard the District Attorney read the charge.
Do you understand the charge?
Mr. Butler: Yes, your Honor.
Court: The Court advises you that you are entitled to be represented in these proceedings by an attorney of your own choosing. In the event you are without funds to retain an attorney, the Court, upon application, would then appoint an attorney for you. Do you understand that?
Mr. Butler: Yes.
Court: Do you wish to appear with an attorney or do you wish to proceed without an attorney?
Mr. Butler: I would prefer to proceed without an attorney.
Court: How do you plead to this charge: Are you guilty or not guilty?
Mr. Butler: I plead guilty. Thereafter, on the basis of his plea of guilty and three exhibits introduced by the state, the court found Butler guilty as charged in the Information and requested that Butler be “treated and observed under the provisions of the sex deviate law.”