Court Opinion

ID: 9954695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 19:11:56.188811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:50.391200
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Sharifi, 2024-Ohio-1144.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                                    No. 23AP-217
v.                                                  :            (C.P.C. No. 18CR-1817)

Samuel D. Sharifi,                                  :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                              D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on March 26, 2024

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.

                 On brief: Samuel D. Sharifi, pro se.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Samuel D. Sharifi, acting pro se, appeals a judgment
entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On April 17, 2018, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, indicted appellant on two
counts of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06, one a second-degree
felony and one a third-degree felony, and two counts of operating a vehicle under the
influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse or a combination of them in violation of R.C. 4511.19,
both first-degree misdemeanors. The charges arose from the death of the victim on
March 17, 2018.
No. 23AP-217                                                                               2

       {¶ 3} A jury trial commenced on June 7, 2021. After providing brief preliminary
instructions to the jury, the trial court ordered a lunch recess. During the break, the trial
court, the prosecutor, and appellant’s two defense attorneys discussed the parties’ prior
plea negotiations. Defense counsel represented that appellant had been apprised of the
state’s two pending plea offers and had indicated his intention to proceed with trial. The
trial court detailed both plea offers on the record. Under the first, appellant would plead
guilty to the second-degree felony count of aggravated vehicular homicide charged in the
indictment with no joint sentencing recommendation. Under the second, appellant would
plead guilty to the second-degree felony count of aggravated vehicular homicide charged in
the indictment with a jointly recommended sentence of five years imprisonment. The trial
court asked appellant if he understood both plea offers and intended to proceed with the
jury trial. Appellant answered both questions in the affirmative. Immediately thereafter,
defense counsel indicated that he had “an idea” and requested a brief recess to confer with
appellant. (June 7, 2021 Tr. at 10.)
       {¶ 4} When the proceedings resumed, the prosecutor advised the trial court that
appellant intended to withdraw his previously entered not guilty plea and plead guilty to
the second-degree felony count of aggravated vehicular homicide as charged in the
indictment with no joint recommendation as to sentencing. The prosecutor submitted
appellant’s signed guilty plea form and recommended the court accept appellant’s guilty
plea and enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining counts in the indictment.
       {¶ 5} The trial court then addressed appellant personally.        After ascertaining
appellant’s competency, the trial court engaged appellant in a colloquy regarding the
representation provided by his defense counsel. In response to the trial court’s queries,
appellant indicated he had discussed with his counsel the charges filed against him, his
counsel had answered his questions to his satisfaction, and he was satisfied with his
counsel’s representation. The trial court then asked, and appellant agreed, that he read the
guilty plea form he had signed, reviewed it with his counsel and had his questions answered,
and understood and agreed to what the form stated. The plea form, dated June 7, 2021,
indicates that appellant, represented by counsel, agreed to withdraw his previously entered
not guilty plea and instead enter a guilty plea to the offense indicated above. The plea form
reflects appellant’s understanding of the maximum prison term for his offense, i.e., eight
No. 23AP-217                                                                                 3

years, that any prison sentence imposed would be mandatory and that the prosecution and
defense did not jointly recommend a sentence. The signed plea form further states:
               I understand that the Court upon acceptance of my plea(s) of
               “Guilty” may proceed with judgment and sentence. I hereby
               assert that no person has threatened me, promised me
               leniency, or in any other way coerced or induced me to plead
               “Guilty” as indicated above; my decision to plead “Guilty,”
               thereby placing myself completely and without reservation of
               any kind upon the mercy of the Court with respect to
               punishment, represents the free and voluntary exercise of my
               own will and best judgment. I am completely satisfied with the
               legal representation and advice I have received from my
               counsel.

(Entry of Guilty Plea at 3.)
       {¶ 6} The trial court then explained the maximum penalties that could be imposed
for a second-degree felony—eight years in prison and a fine of up to $15,000—and that any
prison sentence imposed would be mandatory and could not be reduced for any reason.
The trial court further explained that appellant would be subject to suspension of his
driver’s license for a minimum of three years up to a lifetime suspension. Appellant
indicated he understood the potential penalties.
       {¶ 7} Thereafter, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court outlined the
constitutional rights appellant was waiving by entering a guilty plea, i.e., the right to trial
by jury at which the prosecution would be required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to confront witnesses against him, the right to compulsory subpoena
process, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to appeal a guilty verdict.
Appellant indicated he understood the constitutional rights as explained to him and wished
to waive them. The trial court then asked defense counsel if he was satisfied with
appellant’s decision to waive his constitutional trial rights. Defense counsel responded, “I
believe [appellant] is doing it knowingly and voluntarily, yes, sir.” (June 7, 2021 Tr. at 20.)
The trial court then inquired: “With a full appreciation of the potential consequences of his
plea?” (June 7, 2021 Tr. at 20.) Defense counsel responded, “I believe that to be true, sir.”
(June 7, 2021 Tr. at 20.)
       {¶ 8} The prosecutor then provided the following statement of facts on the record:
               [PROSECUTOR]: Judge, this is an incident that occurred in
               the early morning hours of March 17th, 2018. It appears
No. 23AP-217                                                                              4

               [appellant] was out with some friends and at the end of the
               evening was driving home from the campus area with himself
               and Mr. Lowe and two females in the vehicle. He left the area
               of Raising Cane’s, I believe he was in a parking garage nearby,
               and drove to Indianola and 14th where he dropped the girls
               off, and then he and Mr. Lowe continued on.

               They went to 15th Avenue * * * and traveling eastbound on
               15th - - 15th is a one-way westbound road on campus and has
               the fraternities and sororities on it. [Appellant] accelerated
               the vehicle to speeds of about 55 miles an hour.

               When entering the intersection of East 15th and Summit
               Road, at that time, [the victim] was operating a vehicle
               southbound on Summit, and he was entering that
               intersection. [Appellant’s] vehicle hit [the victim’s] vehicle
               passenger side door at speeds of 55, 57 miles an hour. Due to
               the impact and the injuries received by [the victim], he passed
               away that night * * *. [Appellant] and his passenger were able
               to get out of their vehicle after it traveled quite some distance
               and flipped over.

               Police arrived. Medics arrived. The officers noticed an odor of
               alcoholic beverage around [appellant]. They began to
               question him about that, eventually asking him to perform
               field sobriety tests.

               As a result of their investigation that evening, looking at the
               totality of the circumstances, they did place him under arrest
               for OVI. They obtained a search warrant to obtain blood from
               his system. That blood was obtained and sent off to the crime
               lab. It did result in .094 blood alcohol content. It also had
               cocaine, cocaine metabolite and marijuana metabolite in his
               system.

(June 7, 2021 Tr. at 20-22.)
       {¶ 9} Appellant affirmed he understood and accepted the statement of facts
provided by the prosecutor without additions or exceptions. Thereafter, appellant entered
a guilty plea to the second-degree felony count of aggravated vehicular homicide as charged
in the indictment and indicated that such plea was entered freely and voluntarily. After
determining that appellant’s plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, the
trial court accepted the plea, found appellant guilty, ordered a presentence investigation,
and set sentencing for August 17, 2021.
No. 23AP-217                                                                                 5

         {¶ 10} On August 11, 2021, defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum on
appellant’s behalf. In that memorandum, counsel identified the applicable sentencing
range of two to eight years and urged the court to impose a sentence at the lower end of that
range.
         {¶ 11} At the August 17, 2021 sentencing hearing, defense counsel averred that
despite counsel’s legal advice that there was a strong likelihood of success at trial on the
second-degree felony aggravated vehicular homicide count, appellant decided to plead
guilty because he wanted to demonstrate he was taking responsibility for his conduct and
did not want to put the victim’s family through a trial. Appellant expressed remorse for his
actions and sympathy for the victim’s family. Family members of both the victim and
appellant addressed the court. Thereafter, the trial court stated it had reviewed and
considered the facts of the case, the presentence investigation report, appellant’s
sentencing memorandum, evidence submitted at a hearing on appellant’s motion to
suppress, letters submitted on behalf of both the victim and appellant, and the law
applicable to felony sentencing. The trial court imposed a mandatory 7-year term of
imprisonment, a $5,000 fine (which was deferred), and a 15-year driver’s license
suspension. The court memorialized appellant’s conviction and sentence in a judgment
entry issued August 30, 2021.
         {¶ 12} Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal;
however, on January 18, 2022, he filed a notice of intention to voluntarily dismiss the
appeal. This court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal by journal entry. State v.
Sharifi, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-458 (Jan. 20, 2022) (Journal Entry of Dismissal).
         {¶ 13} On March 31, 2022, appellant filed a counseled motion to withdraw his guilty
plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. In the motion, appellant argued that one of his trial
attorneys erroneously informed him that if he did not accept the state’s plea offer, he likely
would be found guilty at trial and could be sentenced to a maximum period of 13 years in
prison. Appellant maintained that even if he was found guilty on all four indicted charges,
his aggregate sentence, after merger, would be no more than 8.5 years; thus, a 13-year
sentence was legally impossible. Appellant asserted that due to the “pressure” exerted by
his trial attorney, he “made the last-minute decision to ultimately forego his trial rights and
plead guilty with no joint sentencing recommendation.” (Mot. at 2.) Appellant argued that
No. 23AP-217                                                                                 6

his guilty plea should be set aside because he “did not enter his plea knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily” due to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Mot. at 3.) Appellant further
asserted that any perceived delay in filing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea could be
attributed to his current counsel’s efforts to adequately research appellate avenues,
interview various parties, confer with appellant (who was imprisoned and thus not readily
accessible) and determine whether filing such a motion was warranted.               Appellant
requested the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion.
        {¶ 14} Appellant attached to his motion his own affidavit and those of his mother,
Julie Beshara, and his father, Nick Sharifi. In his affidavit, appellant attested he planned
to go to trial on June 7, 2021; however, during a conversation held outside the courtroom
prior to the presentation of evidence, one of his trial attorneys informed him that if the jury
found him guilty, he could be sentenced to 13 years in prison. Appellant averred that
“[b]ecause of this information, and because [one of my trial attorneys] repeatedly assured
me my sentence would be much worse after inevitably losing at trial than it would be if I
accepted a plea agreement, I chose to accept a plea offer and forego my right to a trial.”
(Mot. to Withdraw, Ex. A, Aff. of Samuel Sharifi, at ¶ 3.) In their affidavits, his parents
corroborated appellant’s attestations, stating they were present at appellant’s court
appearance on June 7, 2021 and personally witnessed a conversation that occurred outside
the courtroom during which one of appellant’s trial attorneys warned appellant that he
could be sentenced to 13 years imprisonment upon a guilty verdict at trial. Appellant also
attached the transcript of the June 7, 2021 plea hearing to his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
        {¶ 15} The state filed a memorandum contra on April 27, 2022 arguing appellant’s
claims regarding the voluntariness of his plea and ineffective assistance of counsel were
without merit. The state noted appellant had not submitted affidavits from either of his
trial attorneys and that the affidavits submitted by appellant and his parents were self-
serving and lacked credibility. The state further noted that at the plea hearing, appellant
affirmed he had the opportunity to review the plea form with his trial attorneys and he was
not promised anything in exchange for entering a plea. Lastly, the state noted appellant
was advised both in the plea form and at the plea hearing that the maximum prison
sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty was eight years.
No. 23AP-217                                                                                 7

       {¶ 16} Appellant filed a reply on May 4, 2022, reiterating that his trial counsel’s
attempt to dissuade him from proceeding to trial based on the erroneous assertion that he
could receive a 13-year prison sentence if he was found guilty at trial constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.
       {¶ 17} On December 12, 2022, the same trial court judge who accepted appellant’s
guilty plea held a hearing on appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At that hearing,
held via video teleconference, counsel for appellant reiterated the arguments set forth in
the motion, noting appellant and his parents had submitted affidavits attesting that
appellant had been erroneously advised by his trial counsel that if the jury found him guilty,
he would be sentenced to prison for 13 years. Counsel maintained that appellant “being
essentially scared in to [sic] accepting a plea offer by being told that he would get a much
higher sentence than what was even possible” abrogated the knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent nature of his plea. (Dec. 12, 2022 Tr. at 5.)
       {¶ 18} Following counsel’s remarks, appellant testified on direct examination that
although he remembered signing the guilty plea form, he did not recall reading the form or
going over it with his trial counsel. He specifically testified he did not recall reading the
portion of the guilty plea form indicating his understating that the maximum prison term
for the offense to which he was pleading guilty was eight years and he was never informed
by his defense counsel that his maximum sentence would be eight years. Appellant also
averred that although he was aware that one of his trial attorneys filed a sentencing
memorandum on his behalf, he did not read it and thus did not know that it indicated his
maximum sentence would be eight years. The prosecutor subsequently moved to admit
appellant’s June 7, 2021 signed guilty plea form, the August 11, 2021 sentencing
memorandum, and the August 30, 2021 sentencing entry.
       {¶ 19} Prior to cross-examining appellant, defense counsel asserted that appellant’s
affidavit attached to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea provided the trial court with an
adequate explanation of his position. Counsel clarified that the issue before the court was
not whether appellant was aware of the maximum possible sentence he could receive upon
his guilty plea; indeed, counsel conceded that appellant knew the maximum possible
sentence was eight years. Rather, counsel argued, the dispositive issue was that appellant’s
11th-hour decision to forego a trial and enter a guilty plea was based on false information
No. 23AP-217                                                                                  8

provided by one of his trial attorneys, which rendered his plea unknowing, unintelligent,
and involuntary. Counsel moved to admit the affidavits and transcript of the plea hearing
that were attached to appellant’s motion.
       {¶ 20} Noting that neither party objected to the opposing party’s exhibits, the trial
court admitted all proffered exhibits.
       {¶ 21} On January 20, 2023, the trial court issued an entry denying appellant’s
motion on grounds that appellant failed to demonstrate a manifest injustice warranting
withdrawal of his guilty plea. The trial court first considered the factors relevant to
assessing the credibility of the affidavits filed by appellant and his parents. In so doing, the
trial court particularly noted that the instant motion was being reviewed by the same trial
court judge who presided at the plea hearing, and that the affidavits were provided by
persons with an interest in the success of the motion and contained hearsay statements.
The court determined that such factors weighed against affording much weight to the
affidavits. The trial court further averred that even if the affidavits were accepted as fact
and appellant’s trial attorney did provide erroneous information to appellant, such did not
definitively establish ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was nothing in the record to
indicate appellant’s plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.
       {¶ 22} Appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal to this court from the trial
court’s January 20, 2023 judgment. However, this court granted appellant’s App.R. 5(A)
motion for leave to file a delayed appeal and request for production of the plea and
sentencing hearing transcripts at state expense. State v. Sharifi, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-217,
(June 15, 2023) (memorandum decision).
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 23} Appellant appeals and assigns the following two assignments of error for our
review:
               [I.] The trial abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s
               motion to withdraw guilty plea after a clear showing that a
               manifest injustice had occurred in in violation of Defendant’s
               right to Due Process to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
               Amendments, Constitution of the United States; Article I,
               Section 10, Constitution of the State of Ohio.

               [II.] The trial abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s
               motion to withdraw guilty plea sufficient evidence was
No. 23AP-217                                                                                9

                submitted in violation of Defendant’s right to Due Process of
                Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Constitution of the United
                States; Article I, Section 10, Constitution of the State of Ohio.

(Sic passim.)
III. Analysis
       {¶ 24} Appellant’s assignments of error are interrelated and thus will be considered
together. In them, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his post-sentence
motion to withdraw his guilty plea upon a finding that no manifest injustice occurred.
       {¶ 25} “Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by Crim.R. 32.1, which
provides that the motion ‘may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.’ ” State v. Spivakov, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-
32, 2013-Ohio-3343, ¶ 9, quoting Crim.R. 32.1. Here, the motion to withdraw was made
after sentence; thus, the issue to be resolved is whether granting the motion is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Id.
       {¶ 26} “Manifest injustice relates to some fundamental flaw in the proceedings
which results in a miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent with the demands of due process.”
Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1214, 2004-Ohio-6123, ¶ 5. “A
showing of manifest injustice ‘is an extremely high standard, which permits a defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea only in extraordinary cases.’ ” State v. Tabor, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-
1066, 2009-Ohio-2657, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Price, 4th Dist. No. 07CA47, 2008-Ohio-3583,
¶ 11. “A defendant seeking to withdraw a post-sentence guilty plea bears the burden of
establishing a manifest injustice based on specific facts either contained in the record or
supplied through affidavits attached to the motion.” Spivakov at ¶ 10, citing State v.
Barrett, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-375, 2011-Ohio-4986, ¶ 8.
       {¶ 27} “A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and weight of the movant’s
assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” State v. Smith,
49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus. “An appellate court reviews a trial
court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 15. “Abuse-of-discretion review is
deferential and does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that
No. 23AP-217                                                                               10

of the trial court.” State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34, citing State
v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14.
       {¶ 28} Appellant asserts his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made due to ineffective assistance of counsel; thus, a manifest injustice occurred
warranting withdrawal of his plea.       “A guilty plea that was not entered knowingly,
intelligently, or voluntarily, creates a manifest injustice that would entitle a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea.” Williams at ¶ 5, citing State v. Bush, 3d Dist. No. 14-2000-44,
2002-Ohio-6146, ¶ 11; Spivakov at ¶ 13-14 (ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute
manifest injustice requiring post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea where counsel’s
ineffectiveness affected the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea); State v McMichael,
10th Dist. No. 11AP-1042, 2012-Ohio-3166, ¶ 14 (“A guilty plea * * * waives the right to
assert ineffective assistance of counsel unless the counsel’s errors affected the knowing and
voluntary nature of the plea.”).
       {¶ 29} Appellant claims his trial counsel’s assertion at the plea hearing that he had
“an idea,” followed by a request to confer privately with appellant, evidenced “some
deceptive intent on [behalf] of counsel to purposely mislead” him into pleading guilty and
that such deception constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant’s Brief at 6.)
Appellant maintains that “it appears that former defense [counsel] not only misinformed
the Defendant of the sentence the Defendant would receive if found guilty at a trial but that
former counsel purposely misinformed the Defendant of this information as a last-ditch
effort to persuade the Defendant from going to trial.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6.) Appellant
revisits this theme in his reply brief, stating: “when [trial] counsel used the words * * * ‘I
have an idea,’ while addressing the trial court, it appears that something more nefarious
was at play.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3.) Appellant suggests that trial
counsel’s “I have an idea” statement signaled to the trial court, “I know how to resolve this
matter quickly without it going to trial.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3.)
Appellant argues his trial counsel knew that it was legally impossible for him to be
sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. Accordingly, argues appellant, it was objectively
below the standard of reasonable professional assistance for trial counsel to purposely
misinform him about a possible sentencing outcome, and that “[t]here is no feasible way
such a deceptive intent [can] be construed as a reasonable strategic decision, as a defendant
No. 23AP-217                                                                                11

cannot logically weigh the decision to go to trial or accept a plea without knowing the reality
of the sentence he could face following an unsuccessful trial outcome.” (Appellant’s Brief
at 7.)
         {¶ 30} Appellant further maintains that but for trial counsel’s deception, he would
not have entered a guilty plea. Appellant notes that prior to his private conversation with
trial counsel outside the courtroom, he had insisted on going to trial and the plea deal he
accepted was the same one he had previously rejected. Appellant maintains that “[t]his
sudden change in heart for seemingly no identifiable reason following trial counsel’s ‘idea’ ”
corroborates the averments he and his parents made in the affidavits regarding trial
counsel’s assertions that if the jury returned a guilty verdict, he would receive a 13-year
prison term. (Appellant’s Brief at 7.)
         {¶ 31} Appellant also challenges the trial court’s finding that the affidavits
submitted by appellant and his parents were not entitled to much weight. Appellant argues
that under the facts of the case, i.e., he was prepared to go to trial until trial counsel
deceptively dissuaded him from doing so, the trial court should have afforded much more
weight to the affidavits. In addition, appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that his
plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because the record established
he was aware of the consequences of the plea at the time he entered it. Appellant maintains
the issue was never what he knew after deciding to accept the plea, i.e., that the maximum
penalty for the charge to which he was pleading guilty was eight years. Rather, the issue is
whether he could have knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into a plea that was
based on the misinformation trial counsel imparted to him during their private
conversation which ultimately induced him into accepting the plea deal.
         {¶ 32} “A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance
of counsel must show first that counsel’s performance was deficient, and second that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have
agreed to plead guilty.” State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-420, 2008-Ohio-6520, ¶ 15,
citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (1992); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). “A defendant must satisfy both prongs of Strickland to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel; a failure to make one showing or another defeats the claim.” State v.
Montgomery, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-41, 2020-Ohio-5594, ¶ 161.
No. 23AP-217                                                                                                  12

        {¶ 33} Appellant’s claim fails because he did not meet his burden of demonstrating
a manifest injustice due to ineffective assistance of counsel causing him to not enter his plea
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. First, appellant has not demonstrated that his
counsel was deficient. Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s conduct in intentionally
misinforming him about the sentence that would be imposed upon a guilty verdict in order
to dissuade him from going to trial fell below the standard of reasonable professional
assistance.     Appellant’s assertion is based exclusively on the private, off-the-record
discussion he had with trial counsel immediately preceding entry of his guilty plea. In
support of his claim, appellant relies on the affidavit testimony provided by him and his
parents.
        {¶ 34} In State v. Little, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-272, 2022-Ohio-1295, this court
observed that:
                 [I]n assessing the credibility of affidavit testimony, the trial
                 court ‘should consider all relevant factors,’ including whether:
                 (1) the same judge who reviewed the petition also had
                 presided at trial; (2) multiple affidavits ‘contain nearly
                 identical language, or otherwise appear to have been drafted
                 by the same person’; (3) the affidavit relies on hearsay; (4) the
                 affiant is a relative of the petitioner ‘or otherwise interested in
                 the success of the petitioner’s efforts’; and (5) the affidavit
                 contradicts ‘the evidence proffered by the defense at trial.’

Id. at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 285 (1999).1 When a trial court
discounts the credibility of sworn affidavits, the court “should include an explanation of its
basis for doing so in order to permit meaningful review.” (Internal quotations and citations
omitted.) Id. at ¶ 19.
        {¶ 35} Here, the trial court explained its reasons for discounting the credibility of
the affidavit testimony provided by appellant and his parents. The court first noted that the
judge reviewing the motion to withdraw the guilty plea also presided at appellant’s plea
hearing. “As such, the judge was familiar with the underlying proceedings and was in the
best position to observe appellant and judge his credibility.” State v. Silverman, 10th Dist.
No. 06AP-1278, 2007-Ohio-6498, ¶ 26. The court also noted that all three affidavits were

1 In Little, we noted that “ ‘[a]lthough Calhoun involved a petition for postconviction relief, other appellate

courts have applied it in the context of motions to withdraw pleas under Crim.R. 32.1.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting
State v. Yahya, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1190, 2011-Ohio-6090, ¶ 8, fn. 2.
No. 23AP-217                                                                                  13

authored by persons interested in undermining appellant’s guilty plea. “ ‘Ohio courts have
consistently held that affidavits from interested parties such as defendants, co-defendants,
and family members are self-serving and may be discounted.’ ” State v. Miller, 12th Dist.
No. CA2016-01-007, 2016-Ohio-7360, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Robinson, 12th Dist. No.
CA2013-05-085, 2013-Ohio-5672, ¶ 17. The trial court also correctly noted that the
affidavit testimony of appellant’s parents contained and relied on hearsay, as it was based
on statements allegedly made by appellant’s trial counsel. Silverman at ¶ 26. Further,
although not specifically mentioned by the trial court, the affidavits submitted by
appellant’s parents contained identical language. Further undermining the credibility of
appellant’s parents’ affidavit testimony is the fact that neither parent testified at the hearing
on appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We thus conclude the trial court acted
within its discretion in determining that the affidavit testimony of appellant and his parents
lacked credibility.
       {¶ 36} We also find the trial court did not err in determining that even if the
affidavits were accepted as fact and appellant’s trial attorney did provide erroneous
information to appellant, nothing in the record indicated that appellant’s plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered. The record of the plea hearing plainly refutes any claim
of reasonable reliance on the erroneous representation concerning appellant’s maximum
sentence. The trial court informed appellant the maximum sentence the court could
impose for the offense to which appellant was pleading guilty was eight years. Appellant
stated that he understood that eight years was the maximum sentence that could be
imposed. Further, when provided the opportunity to express concerns about his trial
counsel’s alleged misrepresentation about the sentence, appellant averred he was satisfied
with his representation. He further stated he read and understood the guilty plea form,
which indicated that no person coerced or induced him into pleading guilty and that he was
completely satisfied with the legal representation and advice he received from his trial
counsel. Appellant further stated his guilty plea was entered freely and voluntarily. A trial
court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea when the defendant’s bare allegations of coercion are contradicted by his own
statements to the trial court. State v. Moncrief, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-153, 2008-Ohio-4594,
¶ 14, citing State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. No. 2003CA00135, 2004-Ohio-1569, ¶ 20 (holding
No. 23AP-217                                                                               14

that self-serving affidavit asserting coercion which contradicted plea form indicating no
coercion was insufficient to show manifest injustice). Although appellant testified at the
hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea that he did not recall reading the guilty
plea form, the trial court did not mention that testimony, or any of appellant’s testimony,
in its decision. We discern no error in the trial court’s omission because, as noted above,
the trial judge was familiar with the underlying proceedings and was in the best position to
observe appellant and assesses his credibility as to his contradictory testimony regarding
the guilty plea form.
       {¶ 37} Because appellant failed to set forth sufficient facts showing his trial counsel
was deficient or that the alleged deficient performance prejudiced him, he failed to
demonstrate a manifest injustice based on the claim that his plea was not made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We thus conclude the
trial court acted within its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. As a result, appellant’s first and second assignments of error lack merit and are
overruled.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 38} Having overruled appellant’s two assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                        Judgment affirmed.
                        LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.