Court Opinion

ID: 9655143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:01:16.479125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:16.283529
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s resolution as to Deavers, Inc,, and that portion of TXDOT’s issue two that upholds the legal sufficiency of the regular premises defect, but respectfully dissent to the majority’s resolution of issues one, three, four, five and that part of issue two that finds the evidence of a regular premise defect factually insufficient.
Issues One and Three
The majority acknowledges this court’s opinion in State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp. v. Zachary, 824 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied), *767but claims “the temporary presence of four inches of water on the highway did not present an unexpected or unusual road hazard.” This belies their own statement of facts. They acknowledge it was only “misting rain at the time of the accident.” Is it reasonable to expect four inches of water on the highway during a misting rain? Absolutely not! The water was that deep only because the drain in that area habitually collected debris and did not allow proper drainage. There was ample evidence that TXDOT was aware of this condition.
In Zachary, 824 S.W.2d at 815-16, we noted:
On the occasion in question, there was a single eye-witness, Jimmy Kohn, who was in another pickup truck travelling in the left lane about 60 to 100 feet behind the decedent who was travelling in the right lane. This witness testified that not only were he and decedent travelling at about 40 m.p.h., but they both were driving safely for the existing conditions. Mr. Kohn testified that he had driven this same route to work five days a week for 20 years and was travelling in the left lane because on other recent occasions, at this same location, he encountered standing water in the right lane so deep that it almost jerked the steering wheel from his hand when he hit it. Mr. Kohn’s testimony revealed that on the day of the accident, the right lane was completely covered with a large amount of water that was at least three inches deep and at least to the top of the curb and out just past the centerline in the left lane. The Department maintenance supervisor estimated the curb to be about seven inches high at this location. Mr. Kohn testified that the water could not drain on this day because the patch, placed across the buckled concrete to make it smooth, ponded the water and thereby prevented drainage. When the decedent hit the ponded water, he lost control of his pickup truck.
On the day of the accident, Mr. Kohn had driven from his home in Bevil Oaks to the accident site on Cardinal Drive. Even though it started raining earlier that morning, and had rained “on and off’ all day and “was raining all the way” in what he termed a downpour, Mr. Kohn did not pass through any other lanes of road covered with three inches of water. Furthermore, Mr. Kohn experienced no instances of his steering wheel being jerked or almost jerked from his hand, and he did not have to avoid any other lanes because of standing water. Mr. Kohn also remembered seeing water standing at the buckled area when less rain had fallen. He also noted that it did not take a long period of heavy rainfall for water to accumulate there. Since the permanent repairs of June 5, 1987, Mr. Kohn states both the defect and the drainage are repaired, which enable him to drive in the right lane when it is raining.
Expert testimony revealed that when a sheet of water, during a rain storm, covers the roadway, it prevents a person from perceiving different depths of water at various locations, actually camouflaging the deep water. The water and its “sheeting” effect also hides the blowup and the repair patch giving a motorist no reason to suspect danger. According to other expert testimony, the decedent would have had exceeding difficulty in distinguishing the situation he encountered from a roadway free of defects. This expert testified that 40 m.p.h. would be a safe and reasonable speed for decedent if there were no dam and no collection of water.
We believe it significant to provide further excerpts provided by the testimony of appellees’ experts as follows: *768A blowup on a roadway rated for 50 m.p.h. travel, could constitute a dangerous condition on its own; the temporary repair of the blowup created a dam that prevented rain water from flowing to the drain, resulting in a dangerous condition on the roadway that amounted to an obstruction of the roadway for the motoring public at normal speeds; the dangers of pond-ing water were well understood by Department personnel; water covering an entire lane of travel and possibly getting into the adjacent lane is an abnormal and dangerous condition which a driver would not ordinarily expect or encounter; decedent’s truck left the roadway as a result of torquing when he went over the patch-work repair and entered the deeper water; it is not a normal condition for water to be so deep on the public roadway as to almost jerk a steering wheel from a driver’s hand; decedent encountered the ramp created by the patch just before he went down into the deepest part of the ponded water; the Department could have made a temporary repair that did not cause water to pond; ponding water of this severity was an abnormal condition on the roadway; the temporary repair aggravated the ponding of water; a reasonable alternative would have been a warning sign; the temporary repairs were inadequate to eliminate ponding; the ponding on the highway caused decedent to lose control of his truck; the ponding constituted both a dangerous condition and an obstruction of the roadway; the temporary patch did not eliminate the blowup, but did raise the height of the rise in the roadway; without a warning sign, there was nothing to alert the decedent to the dam and the ponded water; once decedent hit the ponded water, there was nothing he could do because there was not enough reaction time for evasive action at 40 m.p.h.
There is simply no logical or legal reason to hold that three inches of water ponding is a special defect and then hold four inches of water ponding is not a special defect1. Even if the reason for the ponding is different, the basic facts are *769still the same: the Department knew of the ponding and could have prevented the ponding in both instances. In both cases, the results were the same — a tragic loss of life.
Issue Two
As noted, I concur in the majority’s finding that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s answer regarding the general premises defect. I disagree the evidence is factually insufficient. There was evidence TXDOT knew of the ponding in previous rains, knew of previous accidents due to the ponding, therefore it is more than a reasonable inference that TXDOT knew of the ponding on this particular day. I would overrule all of issue two.
Issue Five
Issue Five is somewhat problematic. I agree it was error for the trial judge to
redact an exhibit admitted into evidence. However, I do not believe the error rises to the level of reversible. Tex.R.App. P. 44.1. As set out in the majority opinion, the jury heard evidence Mr. Fontenot was partially ejected from his vehicle. The jury assigned fifteen percent of the negligence to Mr. Fontenot. It is reasonable to assume they equated the partial ejection to not wearing a seat belt and factored this into their negligence assessment. I would overrule issue five.
I would reverse and render as to Deav-ers, Inc., but affirm as to TXDOT, with a remand to enter a new judgment.

. As noted in Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Horrocks, 841 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 852 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.1993):
Courts have deemed holes, ice, brush, mud, water, a traffic signal base, and an unmarked termination of a dead end street to be 'special defects’ for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act as it applies to highways, roads, or streets.4 ...
4. See, e.g., Harris County v. Eaton, 573 5.W.2d 177, 178-80 (Tex.1978) (chughole" that varied from six to ten inches in depth and extended over ninety percent of the width of the highway); State Dep’t of Highways v. Kitchen, 840 S.W.2d 505, 507-08 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, n.w.h.) (en banc) (ice on bridge); State Dep’t of Highways v. Zachary, 824 S.W.2d 813, 816-17 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, writ requested) (standing water); City of San Antonio v. Schneider, 787 S.W.2d 459, 466-68 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (wet, slippery road); Chappell v. Dwyer, 611 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1981, no writ) (large brush hiding arroyo); State v. Nichols, 609 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (caved-in portion of highway, three to five feet wide and three to four feet deep); State v. McBride, 601 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (slick and muddy condition of road under repair); Miranda v. State, 591 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) (two feet of floodwater); Andrews v. City of Dallas, 580 S.W.2d 908, 909-11 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1979, no writ) (base of traffic signal extending 26 inches above street level and located six inches from traveled portion of highway); City of Houston v. Jean, 517 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (unmarked termi*769nation of dead end street four feet from ditch).