Court Opinion

ID: 9794307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:03:36.714646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:22.660278
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
specially concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion and have no additional comments on the subjects treated therein. I consider it necessary, however, to comment briefly on the question whether a court has power to appoint a receiver for the purpose of exercising administrative functions.
This question was presented to the Court in the year 1954 soon after the receiver was appointed. An opinion which ruled that the Court lacked jurisdiction was announced on February 11, 1954. Later the city, acting pursuant to a resolution of the Pueblo City Council, requested dismissal of the writ of error. On this basis the opinion was withdrawn. Since then the receiver has been acting with the full approval of Pueblo. The City of Pueblo did not raise the issue of voidness in connection with the present writ of error. It was only after the several questions had been presented that this Court sua sponte demanded that briefs be filed and that hearings be had on this subject.
If the matter were clearly a question of jurisdiction, it would not be possible for either the parties or this Court to breathe life into this receivership and I for one would not advocate that we adopt such an unconstitutional course. I am not convinced, however, that the subject matter under review has this character. My research has uncovered cases which recognize that the legislative branch can invest the judiciary with power to appoint receivers in circumstances like the present ones. See the cases collected in 113 A.L.R. 746 and see *22particularly Warrenville State Bank v. Farmington TP., 81 Fed. Supp. 101, wherein the Court said:
“Here, the parties agreed by contract to the appointment of a receiver in case of a default in bond and interest payments. This eventuality has occurred and the bondholders seek enforcement of the only adequate remedy to protect their rights under that contract. They should have it.”
Suppose in an extreme fact situation that the administrative department should collapse completely to the disadvantage of particular citizens and the public at large. Would a court of equity be powerless to appoint a temporary custodian of the duties of this department? I think not. If the exercise of power were fundamentally violative of the separation of powers principal, the attempted exercise would be void under all circumstances.
In the case at bar the City of Pueblo consented to the exercise of authority by the receiver over a period of years, and thus it is tantamount to authorization by statute or contract. Certainly it has been a consensual arrangement.
In view of these considerations, it would be highly inappropriate for this Court, acting on its own motion, to declare everything null and void and of no effect. Such an irresponsible action on our part would produce great hardship and complexity.
I emphatically agree with Mr. Justice Hall’s suggestion that the mission of this receiver be completed at the earliest possible time consistent with my viewpoint that it is legally possible to have a receiver under extraordinary conditions for a limited period of time.