Court Opinion

ID: 9404928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 19:01:02.91108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:18.239753
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13783   Document: 15-1    Date Filed: 06/26/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13783
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       PAUL ANDREW JACKSON,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
       ASSOCIATIONS,
       as Trustee for the Pooling and Servicing
       agreement dated as of November 1, 2005,
       Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC
       2005-HE1,
       PHH MORTGAGE SERVICE CORPORATION,
       Through Merger Ocwen Loan Servicer,
USCA11 Case: 22-13783         Document: 15-1         Date Filed: 06/26/2023          Page: 2 of 4

       2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-13783

                                                             Defendants-Appellees.

                                ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61919-DPG
                             ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Paul Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s
       order dismissing his pro se civil complaint against Wells Fargo Bank,
       National Association (“Wells Fargo”), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
       (“Ocwen”), and PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”), alleging vi-
       olations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”),
       12 U.S.C. § 2605, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
       (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and 18 U.S.C. § 1011 in connection
       with a state foreclosure action. The District Court concluded that
       Jackson’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as his
       claims sought to undo the state court foreclosure judgment. 1 Jack-
       son argues that his claims were separate from the state foreclosure
       proceedings because, in the District Court, he alleged claims for

       1The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413,
       44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct.
       1303 (1983).
USCA11 Case: 22-13783          Document: 15-1         Date Filed: 06/26/2023           Page: 3 of 4

       22-13783                    Opinion of the Court                                  3

       fraud. He also argues that the foreclosure proceeding was barred
       by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Secu-
       rity Act (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2), 134
       Stat. 281, 516 (2020). 2
              We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a com-
       plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hall v. U.S. Dep’t Vet-
       erans’ Affairs, 85 F.3d 532, 533 (11th Cir. 1996). We review de novo
       the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Lozman v. City of
       Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2013).
               The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from
       reviewing state-court decisions because lower federal courts lack
       subject matter jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. Behr v.
       Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2021). The Rooker-Feldman
       doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complain-
       ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
       district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
       review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
       F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). The
       doctrine applies not only to federal claims raised in state court, but
       also to those that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
       judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).

       2 We need not address this claim because Jackson raises it for the first time on
       appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th
       Cir. 2004); see also Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1352
       (11th Cir. 2011) (refusing to address a theory of liability that was not presented
       to the district court).
USCA11 Case: 22-13783     Document: 15-1      Date Filed: 06/26/2023    Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13783

              A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state-court
       claim when, in substance, it amounts to a direct appeal of the state-
       court judgment, even if the appellant does not refer to the proceed-
       ing as a direct appeal. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. A “claim that at its
       heart challenges the state court decision itself—and not the statute
       or law which under-lies that decision—falls within the doctrine.”
       Id. (quotation marks omitted). Courts must use a claim-by-claim
       basis, deciding “whether resolution of each individual claim re-
       quires review and rejection of a state court judgment.” Id. at 1213.
       Claims that seek “relief from the judgment of the state court” ra-
       ther than damages for constitutional violations are barred. Id. at
       1214.
              Here, the District Court did not err in finding that Jackson’s
       claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. While he al-
       leged fraud, his claims challenged the state court’s judgment that
       authorized the foreclosure sale, as he challenged the validity of the
       documents considered by the state court. As to his RESPA and
       FDCPA claims, he explicitly noted that the state court rejected
       those arguments. His 18 U.S.C. § 1011 claim is also barred because
       its resolution would require review and rejection of the state
       court’s decision that the documents were valid. Further, his only
       requested relief was an injunction against the state court judgment
       and notice of foreclosure sale, rather than damages for constitu-
       tional violations.
             AFFIRMED.