Court Opinion

ID: 9959085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 17:00:59.219938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.742655
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                 File Name: 24a0161n.06

                                         Case No. 23-1473

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                      FILED
                                                                                         Apr 10, 2024
                                                      )                          KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                            )
                                                              ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
                                                      )
v.                                                            STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                      )
                                                              THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
                                                      )
QWAN DE-EL EDISON,                                            MICHIGAN
                                                      )
       Defendant-Appellant.                           )
                                                                                            OPINION
                                                      )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and READLER, Circuit Judges.

       CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Qwan De-El Edison pleaded guilty to possession

with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Following a

37-month term of confinement, Edison was released, subject to conditions imposed by the court.

But he failed to honor those terms, as reflected by his no contest plea to a state law offense. The

district court revoked Edison’s supervised release and sentenced him to an additional 27 months

of confinement and 60 months of supervised release.

       On appeal, Edison faults the district court for failing to credit his “time spent in prison”—

both his pre-revocation and post-revocation sentences—against his new term of supervised release.

In doing so, he challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. Small,

988 F.3d 241, 257 (6th Cir. 2021). Because Edison failed to raise these issues with the district court,

we review only for plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
No. 23-1473, United States v. Edison

       Begin with Edison’s request that his supervised release term be reduced based on his post-

revocation term of imprisonment. Federal law limits the maximum supervised release term a

district court may impose following revocation of an earlier term. The new term “shall not exceed

the term of supervised release authorized by statute” for the original offense, “less any term of

imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).

       In the ordinary case, § 3583(h) is enforced by resorting to elementary math principles. But

Edison’s case has a wrinkle. By congressional design, his original offense had no maximum term of

supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (authorizing “a term of supervised release of at

least 3 years”); United States v. King, 272 F.3d 366, 376 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting “there is no

‘prescribed statutory maximum’ for supervised release in [21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)]”). As a result,

there was nothing from which the district court could meaningfully subtract the 27 months of

imprisonment imposed on Edison following revocation of his supervised release. See United States

v. Samour, 199 F.3d 821, 824–25 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United

States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (conducting no subtraction under § 3583(h) when the original sentenced

was governed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)); see also United States v. Simmons, 69 F.4th 91, 95 (3d

Cir. 2023) (collecting cases). His sentence is therefore procedurally sound. After all, Edison’s 60-

month term of supervised release does not “exceed the term of supervised release authorized by

[§ 841(b)(1)(C)], less [the 27 months] of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of

supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). This is because subtracting from a limitless period of

supervised release still leaves no limit. See Kerry Mullen, Mathematics and Statistics 37 (2018).

       Our decision in United States v. Owens, 750 F. App’x 415 (6th Cir. 2018) does not

say otherwise. Owens reflected a straightforward application of § 3583(h). The defendant’s

original offense carried a maximum of 36 months of supervised release.              Id. at 421–22.

                                                 2
No. 23-1473, United States v. Edison

Following revocation, the district court imposed 24 months of confinement and 36 months of

supervised release. Id. at 422. We vacated that sentence because, under § 3583(h), the new term

of supervised release could not exceed 12 months (36 - 24 = 12). Id. Unlike in Owens, there was

no maximum term of supervised release for Edison’s original offense.

       In response, Edison frames his request as one for “credit” for time served. But § 3583(h)

does not grant credit against a new term of supervised release; it merely reduces the maximum

term of supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2018).

       Edison’s final claim—that his new term of imprisonment should be reduced based on his

initial confinement—is a nonstarter. The limitation in § 3583(h) is based on the post-revocation term

of imprisonment, not the pre-revocation term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). So the

district court considered the proper factors in calculating Edison’s term of supervised release.

                                  *       *       *       *       *

       We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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