Court Opinion

ID: 9682351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:48.02361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:56.109238
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I would affirm. In the dissolution of this marriage of over 35 years and 11 children, the trial court did not characterize the military benefits as either “community property” or “separate property” when it decreed that they be awarded to the husband as his separate property. Rather, the benefits were denominated as “marital property.” Marital property may be either community or separate.
It becomes plain that the trial court did as many others were doing in the interim after the decision of McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). Under the law existing on the date *499of this divorce, the court could neither apportion the military retirement benefits nor consider them in apportioning the community estate. Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex.1981); Gordon v. Gordon, 659 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1983, no writ). However, less than one year after the decree, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Spouses’ Protection Act.
The present court made a finding in its judgment that “the community interest in such military retirement benefits created by said federal law did not exist at the time of said divorce and could not have been awarded to either party, and was not considered by the Court in a division of the community property.” The court then awarded the wife a sum representing 35% of the disposable retired pay disbursed to the husband each month, her share to begin May 1, 1983.
The court in Harrell v. Harrell, 684 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984) stated that the wife’s claim in that case to the husband’s military retirement benefits cannot be barred by res judicata because res judicata applies to those issues which either were previously litigated or could have been litigated in a prior action. Here, held that court, the division of the military retirement benefits was precluded, by law, from being litigated at the time of the divorce. That is, the issue of military benefits as community property could not be litigated then. The same reasoning applies here.
As recognized by the Harrell court, Congress was aware of the anomaly presented by “interim” divorce decrees. S.REP. No. 97-502, U.S.CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1982, pp. 1555, 1596 (July 22, 1982) states:
The provisions of S.1814 reversing the effect of the McCarty decision are retroactive to June 26,1981, the date on which the U.S. Supreme Court issued that decision. That is, the committee intends the legislation to restore the law to what it was when the courts were permitted to apply State divorce laws to military retired pay. Former spouses divorced in the interim period between the McCarty decision and the effective date of this law will have the opportunity to return to court to have their decrees modified in light of this legislation. However, nothing in the bill would mandate payments of retired pay which had been disbursed during the period between the date of the McCarty decision and the effective date of this legislation.
It is plain and in keeping with an equitable result that Congress intended for divorce cases to be reopened for the purpose of receiving additional evidence and argument with respect to valuation and equitable distribution of military retirement benefits. Harrell v. Harrell, supra.
The trial court in this case had never considered the military benefits as community property nor could the issue then be litigated. They can be an important and often substantial community asset. An asset of the marriage, which is now recognized by Congress and community property states as having the character of community property, could not be considered as a community asset by the trial court in an “interim” divorce. It is clear the trial court now may properly hear evidence to consider the same, including all aspects of the valuation and distribution of that community property asset between the parties. The trial court did that here, correctly awarding the wife’s share of 35% with payments to begin after the 1983 enactment of the Spouses’ Protection Act.
For these reasons the judgment should be affirmed.