Court Opinion

ID: 9304911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:16:00.854513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:51.553741
License: Public Domain

McCrary, C. J.
The demurrer raises the question whether the complainant has an adequate remedy at law ? The new bonds, as already stated, were given in lieu of two classes of bonds previously held by the complainant. I will consider the demurrer as it relates to both classes.
1. As to the first class, to-wit, bonds issued under the act of April 29, 1873, the contention of the complainant is that by the construction placed by the supreme court of Arkansas upon the act of March 6, 1877, it is deprived of the right to sue at law and recover judgment upon its debt, and to enforce the payment of the same by levy and collection of the taxes which the county agreed to levy and collect for that purpose, to-wit, such taxes as were authorized by law when the original bonds were issued. The decision referred to ia *548in the ease of Brodie et al. v. McCabe, Collector, (not yet reported,) which was a proceeding by tax payers to enjoin the levy and collection of taxes in excess of the maximum allowed by the Arkansas constitution of 1874.
Section 9 of article 16, of that constitution, provides as follows: “No county shall levy a tax to exceed one-half of 1 per cent, for all purposes; but may levy an additional one-half of 1 per cent, to pay indebtedness existing at the time •of the ratification of this constitution.”
Section 6 of the act of March 6, 1877, under which complainant’s bonds were funded, and the new bonds now held by it were issued, provides that “it shall be the duty of the county courts issuing bonds under the provisions of this act to levy a special tax of sufficient amount to pay the principal and interest of said bonds as they shall become due, not to exceed the limit of taxation, together with all other taxes levied during that year, prescribed in the constitution of the state.”
In commenting upon that clause of the act, the supreme court of Arkansas, in the case supra, observe that “those who took or might take these bonds evidently submitted to the constitutional limit of taxation under the present constitution;” and undoubtedly such is the fair presumption, unless the contrary is made to appear in any given case by the terms of the contract. It does not appear that any of the bonds issued under the act in question were before the court, and it certainly was not called upon to construe, and did not assume to pass upon, the written contracts under which the complainant claims. The most the court could have intended to assert is that where a creditor of the county funds has bonds under the act of 1877, without any stipulation preserving the obligation of the original contract, those obligations are waived and substituted by such as are consistent with the constitution of 1874. But it was clearly within the power of the parties to agree that the non-payment of the compromise bonds, or of the interest thereon, for a specified period, should annul the new bonds, and restore the parties to their rights before the agreement of compromise was entered into. *549Such an agreement was not beyond the powers of the defendant corporation, as insisted by counsel for the defence. It would be an unwarranted enlargement of the doctrine of ultra vires, to hold that a municipal corporation owing an admitted, valid debt, and having the power to pay or compromise the same, may not bind itself by the terms of such a compromise agreement as that set out in the bill, and shown by the exhibits, in this case. What is that agreement ? It is that the complainant shall remit 25 per cent, of its demand, and take new bonds for the balance, upon the condition that, if the new bonds are not met, interest and principal, as they mature, “their acceptance shall not discharge or release said county from any portion of its original indebtedness,” and that the acceptance of the new bonds “is not to be a waiver by the holders thereof of any of the provisions of the act under which the surrendered bonds were issued.” In other words, it was plainly a conditional settlement, to be void if not complied with by the county. By complying with it the county can save 25 per cent, of the amount of the original debt. By default, it clearly becomes liable to pay the whole amount of the original debt, and also to levy all such taxes as were authorized by law, at the time the original bonds were issued, to raise funds for their payment.
It is well settled that where bonds of a county or municipality are issued under authority of law and payable out of the proceeds of taxation, the law providing for such taxation enters into and becomes part of the contract, and cannot Da subsequently repealed by the legislature or changed by constitutional amendment so as to deprive the bond holder of his remedy. At the time of the contract of compromise, therefore, the complainant had a perfect right to demand the levy for the payment of his bonds of whatever taxes were authorized by law for that purpose when such bonds were issued, even if the same should exceed the limit prescribed by the constitution of 1874. It is also well settled that a change in the form of the contract, or the substitution of one evidence of debt for another, does not ordinarily change the rights of parties.
*550The complainant’s debt against the county remained the same debt notwithstanding the substitution of the new bonds for the old. It was, therefore, perfectly competent for the county to agree to the conditions to which I have adverted, and which are plainly stated in the writing set out with the bill. Whether, under the decision of the supreme court of the state, it is now within the power of the county court to levy and collect the taxes necessary to meet the interest on the compromise bonds, is immaterial. The contract in effect was that a failure on the part of the county, from any cause, to meet the interest or principal of said bonds, should render the compromise void, and leave the parties in the enjoyment of their rights under the original contract. A court of equity can never hold that the contract of compromise was effectual for the purpose of taking away the remedies existing under the original contracts, and not effectual for the purpose of securing the payment, in the manner provided, of the reduced amount represented by the new bonds.
From what it has been said it will be seen that in my judgment the complainant has an adequate remedy at law. If payment of the past-due interest on the compromise bonds shall be refused on demand, the complainant can declare in an action at law upon the original bonds. No discovery is necessary, for the bill shows that the complainant can describe the bonds and other evidences of debt with sufficient particularity to enable it to prove the sum due thereon, and it can aver that they are in the possession of the county, or have been by it lost or destroyed.
If, in such a suit, the county shall fail to produce said bonds upon being notified to do so, it will be competent for complainant to prove their contents by secondary evidence. The fact that the bonds surrendered to the county at the time of the compromise may appear to have been by it cancelled, will not defeat the complainant’s right of action. Proof .may be offered, and will be admissible, to prove that the cancellation was in pursuance of the contract of compromise and is of no force or effect.
As to the second class, to-wit, bonds issued under the act *551of March, 1875, and the act supplementary thereto, these appear to have been issued in lieu of county scrip surrendered. Subsequently to their issue, the supreme court of Arkansas held that the said act of March, 1875, and the supplementary act, were void. Still, it is clear that complainant held a valid claim against the county, for, if the bonds were invalid, it was at liberty to seek its remedy upon the original debt represented by the surrendered scrip. It seems to be conceded by counsel on both sides that the bonds issued under the act of 'March, 1875, based, as they were, upon a valid, pre-existing debt, could lawfully be funded under the act of March 6, 1877. The point made by complainant’s counsel is that the decision of the supreme court in Brodie et al. v. McCabe, Collector, does not permit the county to carry out the contract of compromise, as to these bonds, by carrying into them the obligations of the contracts upon which they are founded, and out of which they grew, to-wit, the county scrip aforesaid. In this I think the counsel is wrong. The original debt, for which these bonds were issued, was subject to the limitations as to taxation, for its payment, contained in the ninth section of article 16 of the constitution of 1874.
The supreme court has in that case decided that the bonds were issued subject to that limitation, and it has decided nothing more. The contract between the parties, referred to in the first part of this opinion, will, as respects this class of bonds, be carried out by a levy up to the limit of the constitution, for as to them the original contract provided no other or better remedy. It follows that the complainant’s remedy as to these bonds is at law.
The demurrer to the bill and amended bill is sustained.