Court Opinion

ID: 9653697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:52:09.354289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:00.826251
License: Public Domain

OLIVER, Judge
(concurring).
*725I concur in the result reached in the opinion prepared by the Presiding Judge.
With respect to the element of premeditation, I am in complete agreement that under the evidence in this record the jury was fully warranted in finding that the defendant deliberately and premeditatedly murdered the deceased. As pointed out in the opinion, the Supreme Court of this State has held many times that the elements of premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances of the killing. Edwards v. State, 221 Term. 60, 424 S.W.2d 783.
Concerning the weight and sufficiency of evidence to establish premeditation, and particularly with reference to the nature of the act causing death, many courts have held that deliberation and premeditation may be inferred from the manner in which the killing was committed; and that repeated shots, blows, and other acts of violence are sufficient evidence of premeditation. 3 Warren on Homicide, § 273a, pp. 167-168. Such matters as the atrocity, cruelty, and malignity, appearing in the circumstances under which the killing took place have been passed on frequently by the courts in considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction for first degree murder. 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 328, p. 71.
In this case the defendant deliberately shot the deceased in the head, mortally wounding him, callously shot him again in the back after he fell from his chair to the floor, and then fled the premises.
In State v. McNamara, 116 N.J.L. 497, 184 A. 797, cert. den. 299 U.S. 568, 57 S.Ct. 32, 81 L.Ed. 419, wherein the deceased was killed by multiple close-range *726revolver shots, the Court held that the repeated firing of a revolver is sufficient to establish premeditation.
In State v. Page, Mo., 130 S.W.2d 520, the deceased was killed by a gunshot wound making a hole the size of a man’s fist in the center of the top of his head and his brain fell out when the body was lifted. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the manner of employment of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body is a circumstance from which deliberation may be made to appear.
In State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769, 96 A.L.R.2d 1422, cert. den. 368 U.S. 851, 82 S.Ct. 85, 7 L.Ed.2d 49, the defendant took one officer’s gun, while he was being held by members of an angry crowd, and shot and felled another officer and then walked around him and fired five more shots into his body at close range. Affirming a first degree murder conviction, the Court said that among the circumstances to be considered in determining whether a killing was with premeditation and deliberation is the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless.
Dowell v. State, 191 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.2d 23, was a case involving the killing of three people; one was shot in the back of the head at close range, a child was also shot in the head, and the third deceased’s head was crushed with a blunt instrument, and all the bodies were then thrown into a creek. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the manner in which a killing is effected is a potent fact and circumstance tending to prove or disprove premeditation and deliberation, and that the mere fact that no motive for the crime was established, and *727premeditation and deliberation were not made to affirmatively appear from the State’s testimony, did not render the jury verdict speculative.
In People v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 79 N.E. 978, the deceased received twelve lacerated and ragged wounds on the front and top of the scalp, some of which extended through the scalp to the skull and included a compound comminuted fracture of the skull and lacerations of the brain, as well as facial injuries and a laceration of one finger. The Court held that deliberation and premeditation were shown by the nature and number of the wounds inflicted.
Breeding v. Maryland, 220 Md. 193, 151 A.2d 743, was a murder case wherein the deceased met her death through manual strangulation and a severe beating. The Court held that the triers of fact could properly draw the inference that the killing was premeditated and with malice aforethought.
In Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E.2d 382, cert. den. 304 U.S. 565, 58 S.Ct. 950, 82 L.Ed. 1531, the deceased suffered various skull fractures from repeated head blows with a heavy instrument, the skull was split open, the cheek bone was fragmented and the upper jaw bone fractured, the orbit of one eye was fractured and the greater part of the eye was absent, and it appeared that the victim lived from ten to thirty minutes although unconscious, and the body was then dismembered. The Court held that upon this evidence the jury could find premeditation and malice aforethought and a conscious and fixed purpose to kill.
In my view the evidence in this record unquestionably *728furnishes abundant support for the jury’s verdict of first degree murder and it should be affirmed.
However, I am unable to concur with the Presiding Judge’s statement responding to the defendant’s Assignment of Error that he was denied his constitutional right to a full and complete appellate review by the official court reporter’s failure to prepare a complete transcript of his trial. In the light of legislation enacted subsequent to promulgation of Rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court regarding omission from the Bill of Exceptions of immaterial matters and arguments not seasonably challenged, a mere statement of the rule without any explanation or elucidation regarding its materiality or relevance in a particular case cannot but be insufficient and inappropriate.
Rules of court are never effective to abrogate or modify, and must yield to, a substantive rule of law. In Brewer v. State, 187 Tenn. 396, 215 S.W.2d 798, the Court stated the law upon this subject:
“* * * n is wep axiomatic that no rule of court is ever effective to abrogate or modify a substantive rule of law. In 14 Am.Jur. Sec. 152, p. 357 it is said, ‘As against conflicting statutory provisions such rules are without force. They must be subordinate to the law, and in case of conflict the law will prevail.’ Our own case of Adcox v. Southern Ry. Co., 182 Tenn. 6, 14, 184 S.W.2d 37, 156 A.L.R. 1091 supports the above text.”
In 1965 the Legislature provided the Criminal Courts of this State with official court reporters in all criminal and habeas corpus cases, to be designated by the trial *729judges having criminal jurisdiction and to be paid by the State. Acts 1965, Ch. 221; T.C.A. §§ 40-2029 — 40-2043. The following sections of Tennessee Code Annotated are pertinent here:
“40-2035. Duties of designated reporter — Party permitted private reporter — Use of transcript for appeal. —A designated reporter shall attend every stage of each criminal case before the court and shall record verbatim, by a method prescribed or approved by the executive secretary, all proceedings had in open court and such other proceedings as the judge may direct. The reporter shall attach his official certificate to the records so taken and promptly file them with the clerk of the court, who shall preserve them as a part of the records of the trial. A party at his own expense may retain a reporter other than the reporter provided under §§ 40-2029 — 40-2043 to record and transcribe the proceedings, and a transcript so prepared may be used for purpose of appeal, as provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“40-2037. Certified transcripts — Requested by court for indigents — Requested and paid for by party — Appeal procedure unaffected. — Upon the direction of the court in the case of an indigent defendant, or at the request of any party who has agreed to pay the fee therefor, a reporter designated by the court shall transcribe from the original record such parts of the proceedings as are requested, attach his official certificate and deliver the transcript as requested. In any case the transcript certified by the reporter shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the testimony taken and the proceedings had; provided, however, that *730nothing contained herein is intended to alter or amend the procedure for perfecting appeals as provided in chapter 1 of title 27 of this Code.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“40-2040. Fees for transcripts — Rates—Furnished indigent defendants by state at court request — Payment in advance. — Each reporter may charge and collect fees for transcripts at rates prescribed by the executive secretary. If the defendant prays and is granted an appeal, and is determined by the trial judge to be without sufficient funds to pay for the preparation of the transcript of the proceedings, the trial judge shall direct the court reporter to furnish the defendant a complete transcript of the proceedings, the fee for which shall be paid by the state of Tennessee out of money appropriated for that purpose. The reporter may require any party requesting a transcript to pay the estimated fee in advance except as to transcripts which are to be paid for by the state of Tennessee.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Manifestly, the clear and unmistakable intendment of the foregoing provisions of the statute is that the official court reporter employed and paid by the State is required to record “all proceedings had in open court and such other proceedings as the judge may direct.” Otherwise, it would be an impossibility for the court reporter to furnish a defendant a transcript of “such parts of the proceedings as are requested” or “a complete transcript of the proceedings.” Clearly, it is unarguable that the official court reporter’s duty to record all the proceedings mandates the recording of the voir dire examination of jurors, the arguments of counsel, and the charge of the *731court. Obviously, matters not recorded cannot be transcribed, and the defendant is deprived of a complete record of his trial, whether he be affluent or indigent, and may thereby be denied his constitutional right to an effective appellate review solely by lack of a record upon which to stand.
Evasion of the official court reporter’s plain duties may forever foreclose all possibility of appellate review of fateful questions arising in the course of voir dire examination of jurors, particularly in view of the vital importance that may attach to that phase of the trial, the purpose of which is to secure a fair and impartial jury. Likewise, without a record of the arguments of prosecuting counsel the defendant’s right to appellate review of improper argument may be cut off completely, however much the minds of the jurors may have been deliberately inflamed and prejudicially influenced thereby. The courts have taken notice of the essentiality of the official court reporter’s duties and the imperative demands of the statute creating his office. Nelms v. State, 219 Tenn. 727, 413 S.W.2d 378; Elliott v. State, Tenn., 435 S.W.2d 812; Tucker v. Meadows, D.C., 234 F.Supp. 882; Schoonover v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 448 S.W.2d 90; Isaac Bailey and Leonard Robinson v. State, Tenn.Crim.App., unpublished.
Indeed, it must be ordinary and common everyday knowledge in the legal profession that considered judgment with respect to whether prejudicial error has arisen in the course of a trial may be impossible for counsel, as well as the Court, without a transcript of the record. A partial or incomplete transcript, omitting crucial matters, cannot suffice. As an example, suppose the trial *732judge routinely instructs the official court reporter not to record the voir dire examination of jurors, or the arguments of counsel. If a defendant is thus deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, what recourse does he have without any record of the unconstitutional invasion of his rights?
The ineludible consequence is that Rule 2 may not be regarded as an unqualified and unyielding dictate prohibiting the State’s official court reporter from making a complete record of all trial proceedings, or allowing him to neglect to do so. Indeed, it is inconceivable that the Rule ever was considered subject to such an incredible construction, or that it or any other rule of court could authorize a trial judge to jeopardize or deny the constitutional rights of an accused on trial by instructing the official court reporter to abridge the record of trial or by adopting a rule of court having that effect. In any view of the matter, therefore, Rule 2 cannot have any conceivable bearing upon the statutory duties of the State’s official court reporters.
Moreover, the case at bar is entirely different from the situation presented in Schoonover and Bailey and Robinson, supra, which this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the official court reporter prepared only a partial and incomplete trial transcript by omitting the arguments of prosecution counsel. The significant distinction is that in the present case no question regarding the arguments of prosecution counsel was raised in the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and thus the matter of the prosecution arguments was not called to the attention of the trial court. This was done in Schoon*733over and in Bailey and Robinson. In this case the question is raised for the first time in Green’s appeal.
Of course, an Assignment of Error not incorporated in the motion for a new trial will not be considered on appeal. Wilkerson v. State, 208 Tenn. 666, 348 S.W.2d 314; Kirby v. State, 214 Tenn. 296, 379 S.W.2d 780; Rule 14(4) and (5) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. And questions raised for the first time on appeal are generally not to be considered. Ezell v. State, 220 Tenn. 11, 413 S.W.2d 678; Lawler v. McCanless, 220 Tenn. 342, 417 S.W.2d 548. And errors to which no exceptions were taken in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Troxell v. State, 179 Tenn. 384, 166 S.W.2d 777; Blackwood v. State, 204 Tenn. 682, 325 S.W.2d 262; Kirby v. State, 214 Tenn. 296, 379 S.W.2d 780; Webb v. State, 173 Tenn. 518, 121 S.W.2d 550. Upon these authorities the question regarding the prosecution arguments which is raised for the first time in this Court may be disposed of properly and completely, and should be.