Court Opinion

ID: 9424896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:03.535976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:52.642417
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
The three-judge court below assigned two grounds for dismissing appellants’ complaint: (i) there was no justiciable controversy warranting a declaratory judgment; and (ii) this was an appropriate case for abstention by the federal courts until the Michigan Act is construed by its courts. 336 F. Supp. 248 (1971). This Court today affirms the decision of the court below to abstain, despite rejecting virtually all of the premises upon which it was based.
The opinion of this Court concludes, contrary to the holding below, that the controversy is justiciable and that a case for declaratory judgment relief was stated. The Court also concluded that “abstention was not proper on the majority of grounds given by the District Court.” Nevertheless, and despite general disagreement with the trial court on the major issues, its decision to abstain is now affirmed.
As it seems to me that the central thrust of the Court’s reasoning (with which I agree) requires reversal rather than affirmance of this decision, I file this dissent.
*514There is indeed a serious present controversy, involving important federal issues, and posing for the Lake Carriers an immediate choice between the possibility of criminal prosecution or the expenditure of substantial sums of money for antipollution devices and equipment which may not be compatible with the federal regulations which admittedly in due time will be pre-emptive. This presents a classic case for declaratory relief, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941). As the opinion of the Court states, “compliance [with the Michigan law] is coerced by the threat of enforcement, and the controversy is both immediate and real.”
On the second question, that of abstention, the Court finally finds a ground in the possibility that the state courts of Michigan may construe the statute in a way that will avoid the federal questions. But this is a slender reed on which to rest a judgment. The Michigan statute is not ambiguous on the issue which appellants deem the most critical, namely, whether they are required under Michigan law to install at considerable expense sewage storage devices that may become unnecessary when federal standards become applicable. Section 4 (2) of the Michigan Act is unequivocal, providing that vessels may not use marine toilets in Michigan waters unless equipped with:
“(a) A holding tank or self-contained marine toilet which will retain all sewage produced on the watercraft for subsequent disposal at approved dockside or onshore collection and treatment facilities.
“(b) An incinerating device which will reduce to ash all sewage produced on the watercraft. The ash shall be disposed of onshore in a manner which will preclude pollution.”
*515Section 3 (2) flatly prohibits the discharge of sewage into Michigan waters.1 These two sections unmistakably express Michigan’s decision in favor of retention or incineration of sewage aboard ships rather than its treatment and discharge into state waters.2
The majority opinion of the Court views §3 (1) as affording some flexibility and room for interpretation.3 Yet, it seems clear from the context of the entire statute that §3(1) is a general statement of environmental purpose applicable to all persons (as defined), expressing the overall statutory objective of prohibiting pollution of Michigan waters. This section can hardly be construed to contradict the specific provisions of § 4 (2) which relate to the owners and operators of foreign and domestic vessels engaged in commerce upon Michigan waters. Indeed, the Michigan State Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources and its Director, and the Water Resources Commission and its Executive Secretary all read the statute as “designed to prevent appellants and others in their class from pouring, their *516filth, no matter how well treated, into Michigan waters of the Great Lakes.” (Emphasis supplied.) Brief for Appellees 16.4
Appellants have raised federal questions (as to the merits of which no opinion is expressed) which are important to the public as well as to the litigants. They have sought relief in a federal court, relying on “the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor’s choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 248 (1967). It seems probable that these federal questions will remain in their present posture, whatever interpretation may be placed upon the Michigan statute by a state court. The questions of congressional intent‘to preempt the regulation of marine sanitation devices and of multiple state regulatory schemes which may unduly burden interstate commerce are, in large measure, independent of the particular construction given the Michigan Act.
We have spoken previously of “the delay and expense to which application of the abstention doctrine inevitably gives rise.” England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 418 (1964). The relegation to state courts of this important litigation, involving major federal *517issues and affecting every ship operating in Michigan waters, is likely to result in serious delay, substantial expense to the parties (including the State), and a prolonging of the uncertainty which now exists.
I would reverse the judgment below and direct the District Court to proceed on the merits.

 “It is unlawful to discharge, dump, throw or deposit garbage, litter, sewage or oil from a recreational, domestic or foreign watercraft used for pleasure or for the purpose of carrying passengers, cargo or otherwise engaged in commerce on the waters of this state.” State of Michigan Act 167, Public Acts of 1970, § 3 (2).

 By defining “sewage” in § 2 (d) of the Act to mean all human body wastes, treated or untreated (emphasis supplied), Michigan further precludes any possibility that discharge of treated sewage would be permitted.

 “A person shall not place, throw, deposit, discharge or cause to be discharged into or onto the waters of this state, any litter, sewage, oil or other liquid or solid materials which render the water unsightly, noxious or otherwise unwholesome so as to be detrimental to the public health or welfare or to the enjoyment of the water for recreational purposes.” State of Michigan Act 167, Public Acts of 1970, §3(1).

 Nor do I agree with the majority that § 11 of the Michigan Act affords a reason for abstention. Section 11 provides that any provision or rule under the Act “shall be of such flexibility that a watercraft owner ... is able to maintain maritime safety requirements and comply with the federal marine and navigation laws and regulations.” This language appears to relate only to federal safety, marine, and navigation laws and regulations. It does not refer to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or to federal laws relating to pollution. It is difficult to believe that this single sentence in § 11 of the Michigan Act could be construed to nullify the other affirmative provisions prohibiting altogether the discharge of sewage.