Court Opinion

ID: 9652474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:24:27.777611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.761230
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This is a most unfortunate case. Mary Penny is one of Louise Penny’s eleven children. She is seeking to evict her elderly mother, Louise Penny, who is living on social security, from the home in which the mother has lived for some time. It would be more edifying to resolve this controversy by negotiation than by continuing this protracted litigation. Nevertheless, as my colleagues point out, the controversy over the undertaking — really a kind of protective order1 — is governed by equitable principles. Believing that the results of this case to date have been less than equitable, I respectfully dissent from a part of the majority’s holding.
I
It would be the purest sophistry to suggest that the evidentiary base on which the undertaking rests has any appreciable substance. We have a representation by the daughter’s counsel that the assessed value of the house was $80,000 plus change, that on a mortgage of that size, the monthly payment would be $10 to $15 per $1,000, or $800 to $1200 per month, and (implicitly) that the fair rental value would be in the same general neighborhood. Based on that proffer, Judge Mitchell required the mother to pay $1,000 per month.
Counsel for the mother never contested the accuracy of the proffer, either as to the value of the house or as to the formula which the daughter’s attorney presented to *593the court. The defense provided no evidence or counterproffer as to fair rental value. In the trial court and even on appeal, the mother’s only real objection to the amount of the undertaking was that she could not afford to pay it.2
My colleagues acknowledge that protective orders are often set in the Landlord and Tenant Branch on the basis of proffers of counsel. They correctly point out, however, that in most such cases the agreed rent provides at least a benchmark from which the amount of the protective order may be derived. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 139 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 111, 430 F.2d 474, 484 (1970). In the present case, we have no such benchmark. Having proved nothing, says the majority in effect, the daughter was not entitled to a protective order in any amount.
The question is not free from difficulty. In my opinion, however, a figure derived from an uncontested representation by counsel is more equitable than zero, even where, as here, the proffer is based on a formula whose reliability may be on a par with the Edsel as Car of the Year. If counsel for the mother had challenged his adversary’s proffer, the daughter might have obtained the services of an appraiser, or could perhaps have testified herself as to the fair rental value of the premises. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dikomey Mfg. Jewelers, Inc., 409 A.2d 1076, 1079 (D.C.1979) (owner’s valuation of his or her property admissible without qualification other than ownership).3
Under the majority’s approach, which in effect applies a “plain error” theory, the mother profits substantially from her failure to object. I find that result, and the notion that the daughter must for all practical purposes start all over again, even more inequitable than the setting of an undertaking on the basis of an unreliable but unchallenged proffer. I would therefore affirm, but leave the mother free to seek modification of the undertaking4 in light of the less than ideal manner in which its amount was determined.
II
Although there is probably little if anything that we can do about it so long after the fact, I also think it appropriate to note the problems now posed by the stay entered by this court in December 1986 — almost three years ago — of any protective order or undertaking. For that entire period of time, while the case has proceeded at a less than frenzied pace through our formidable appellate docket, the mother has lived in the house in question without being required to pay the daughter anything or to deposit any money with the court. The protective order device, of which the undertaking in this case is the substantial equivalent, was “created by the courts to maintain an equitable balance during litigation of the suit for possession.” Davis v. Rental Associates, Inc., 456 A.2d 820, 823 (D.C.1983) (en banc). This equitable balance has been sorely tested here.
Let us assume, solely for the sake of argument, that the daughter’s counsel’s valuation and formula are self-serving, and that a proper monthly protective order would have been in the amount of $500. In the months that have passed since the stay, the daughter is already “out” about $18,-000. Moreover, in December 1986, the daughter’s counsel complained that at that time the mother had already lived in the house for nothing for a period of twenty months.
In Judge Wright’s words in Bell, supra, we feel the protective purpose of the rent payment requirement ordinarily will be well served simply by requiring only future payments falling due after the date the order is issued to be paid into the court registry.
*594139 U.S.App.D.C. at 110, 430 F.2d at 483 (Emphasis added); accord, Davis, supra, 456 A.2d at 823. The word “ordinarily” implies that there are exceptions, and at first blush, one might conclude that a case in which there has been no protective order payment for three years is not ordinary but exceptional.
According to the court in Bell, the reason for limiting protective orders to prospective rent is that
inclusion of back rent alleged to be due would depart from this protective purpose, since the landlord cannot recover back rent in a suit for possession,[5] and would be in the nature of a penalty on the tenant.
139 U.S.App.D.C. at 110, 430 F.2d at 483. In the present case it is the daughter who might reasonably claim that she is being penalized where she has received no security for almost three years while her mother has occupied a house to which the daughter holds legal title. If the daughter ultimately prevails, it is unlikely that she will ever receive redress for the financial loss which she will have incurred during the time that no undertaking has been enforced. Under these circumstances, a protective order retroactive to December 1986, when (as the majority recognizes) an undertaking in the proper amount would have been appropriate, may appear theoretically justifiable and superficially (though not sentimentally) appealing.
Theory often founders on reality, however. If a protective order retroactive to 1986 were now entered, the mother would probably be unable to comply with it. If she were unable to pay, then the likely practical consequence would be an order compelling her to vacate the premises, Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C.1981), without the mother first having the opportunity to litigate the merits of her claim of title. Moreover, the daughter still would not recover the fair value of the premises for the period when no undertaking was enforced.
We must live in the real world. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that directing expedition in the trial court is about all that we can reasonably do in late 1989 about what happened in 1986. This case instructs, however, that where a protective order or similar measure is stayed pending' appeal, the court, with the assistance of counsel,6 should attempt to ensure that some equitable interim order is entered, and that any lasting prejudice to any party from the inevitable passage of time be avoided or kept to the minimum.

. I use the two terms interchangeably in this opinion.

. The mother did proffer that she made improvements to the house which ought to be taken into account.

. In this case, of course, ownership is in issue.

.Since the protective order has been stayed, and since further proceedings are contemplated both under the majority's resolution and under mine, the practical consequences of the two approaches are probably the same.

. But see Super. Ct. L & T R. 3, providing that the complaint may include a claim for a money judgment based on rent in arrears, provided that the defendant has been personally served, or has asserted a counterclaim or defense of set-off or recoupment.

. Counsel for the daughter never requested any kind of emergency or other relief, or even expedition, after the protective order was stayed in 1986.