Court Opinion

ID: 9736976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:11:24.995952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:12.001598
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, has moved for reargument raising as a ground, among others, *128that plaintiff should have been assigned counsel below. The Court has rejected this ground on the ground it was not preserved.
As defendants emphasize, plaintiff appearing pro se never raised the right to counsel point although he proceeded in forma pauperis both here and in the trial court. Following the date of submission of this case without argument, this Court decided in a factually similar case that an inmate was entitled to appointed counsel under the Public Defender Act. See Fletcher v. Gorczyk, 159 Vt. 631, 624 A.2d 1132 (1992).
Much of the difficulty in this case is caused by the fact it was presented without the benefit of counsel. Most of plaintiff’s other grounds for reargument go to what counsel would have presented if he had appeared earlier in the proceedings. As in Fletcher, and In re Morse, 138 Vt. 327, 415 A.2d 232 (1980), on which Fletcher relies, “plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to indicate that the court cannot properly rule on the petition until assigned counsel is given the opportunity to amend the petition and present her case.” Fletcher, 159 Vt. at 632, 624 A.2d at 1134. I disagree that Fletcher does not apply to this case. Although pro se plaintiff labelled his complaint a civil rights action, he alleged a deprivation of liberty including a loss of furlough status and good time credits. He sought restoration of those losses. In Fletcher, the allegation was that defendant “improperly segregated her, and added points to her record affecting her status as a prisoner.” Id. at 632, 624 A.2d at 1133. Unless the right to counsel is to turn on the label put on the action by a pro se prisoner, it is impossible to distinguish Fletcher. Rather than reaching a broad prisoner’s rights ruling on an inadequate petition and record and a pro se presentation, we should recall the opinion and remand the case for proper presentation through assigned counsel.
Although we have occasionally granted reargument, we have not developed standards on when it is appropriate. Our decisons speak to when it is inappropriate, stating, for example, that new theories should not be considered on reargument. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Yudichak, 153 Vt. 235, 256, 571 A.2d 592, 604 (1989). This case presents an appropriate exception to that rule. Fletcher was decided after the case came under submission, but was not considered by the Court. Other courts have considered *129such precedents as grounds for reargument even when they address points not raised before if they are “important questions of law.” Lowry v. Bankers Life & Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 523 n.l (5th Cir. 1989) (decided under similar F.R.A.P. 40). I would grant the motion for the limited purpose of recalling the opinion and remanding the case for presentation with counsel.
I am authorized to state that Justice Johnson joins me in this dissent.