Court Opinion

ID: 9915767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:07:55.042868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:27.917256
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia,                    :
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
             v.                          :
                                         :
Fraternal Order of Police,               :   No. 39 C.D. 2023
Lodge No. 5                              :   Argued: November 8, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                          FILED: January 8, 2024

             The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from the Philadelphia County
Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) December 13, 2022 order denying its Petition to
Vacate an Arbitration Award that reinstated City Police Department (Department)
Lieutenant Marc Hayes (Lt. Hayes). The City presents two issues for this Court’s
review: (1) whether this Court should reverse the trial court’s order and vacate the
Arbitrator’s reinstatement of Lt. Hayes because the Arbitrator exceeded his authority
by reforming the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and (2) even if the
Arbitrator did not exceed his authority, whether this Court should modify narrow
certiorari review to allow reversal because the Arbitrator’s Award failed the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) test or the essence test, or was
repugnant to public policy. After review, this Court affirms.
             On August 13, 2018, Lt. Hayes was responsible for supervising the
officers assigned to his squad in the Department’s 24th District (24th District). Over
the course of that day, Lt. Hayes sent multiple, highly inappropriate messages to two
female officers under his supervision - Officer 1 and Officer 2 (collectively,
Officers) - including texts with sexually suggestive comments, innuendos, and
sexual content, culminating in a graphic, disturbing video depicting bestiality
between a woman and a dog.
             On October 30, 2018, the City found an anonymous letter in the 24th
District Headquarters stating that, during work hours on August 13, 2018, Lt. Hayes
“sent videos of beastiality [sic] pornography involving a female and a dog engaged
in sexual acts” to two female officers on his squad and that his conduct “should and
must be addressed.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 329a. The City forwarded the
letter to its Internal Affairs Division (IAD), which commenced investigations
through both its Investigative Support Services team (ISS) and its Equal
Employment Opportunity team (EEO).             On October 30, 2018, ISS and EEO
interviewed both Officers.
             On October 31, 2018, Officer 1 was assigned to work in the operations
room. Lt. Hayes approached Officer 1 and questioned her in the hallway, asking her
whether she still had the video he sent to her. Lt. Hayes told Officer 1 that if she did
not have the video, she could say she did not recall anything when interviewed by
IAD. Officer 1 told the EEO investigator: “He asked if [I] still had the video. I said
no, I didn’t have it. He said something along the lines of[,] if you get called up to
IAB [sic], you could say you don’t recall anything. I told him I wasn’t going to lie.”
R.R. at 479a; see also R.R. at 284a, 319a. Lt. Hayes also saw Officer 2 in the hallway
on October 31, 2018. After asking her whether she still had the video, Lt. Hayes
told Officer 2 that he submitted her name for promotion. According to her statement
to the investigators, Officer 2 then told Lt. Hayes that she did not owe him anything.
                                           2
               On July 9, 2020, based on IAD’s investigation results, the City filed
charges against Lt. Hayes for violating the following provisions of the Department’s
Disciplinary Code (Disciplinary Code): Section 1-§024-10 (any act, conduct or
course of conduct which objectively constitutes sexual harassment); Section 1-§021-
10 (any incident, conduct or course of conduct which indicates that an employee has
little or no regard for his/her responsibility as a member of the Department); Section
1-§025-10 (on-duty or job-related inappropriate, sexually based communication(s)
conveyed in any manner); and Section 8-§003-10 (failure to properly supervise
subordinates). After reviewing the charges and the supporting evidence, Department
Commissioner Danielle Outlaw (Commissioner Outlaw) determined that Lt. Hayes
committed each offense and that his violations warranted dismissal. Commissioner
Outlaw directed that, effective July 9, 2020, Lt. Hayes be suspended for 30 days with
the intent to dismiss.
               On July 13, 2020, Lt. Hayes filed a grievance challenging his
employment termination and, on September 25, 2020, the Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge No. 5 (FOP) demanded arbitration pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen
Collective Bargaining Act, commonly known as Act 111.1 The Arbitrator conducted
hearings on June 17 and June 22, 2022. On July 22, 2022, the Arbitrator sustained
the grievance in part and ordered Lt. Hayes’s reinstatement. The Arbitrator agreed
that Lt. Hayes violated certain City policies and that his actions were highly
inappropriate, but concluded that the City failed to prove sexual harassment and
converted his dismissal to a 50-day suspension without pay. The City appealed from
the Arbitrator’s Award to the trial court. On December 13, 2022, the trial court
affirmed the Arbitrator’s Award, concluding that the Arbitrator acted within his
authority by modifying Lt. Hayes’s discipline. The City timely appealed to this

      1
          Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1 - 217.12.

                                                3
Court. On January 12, 2023, the trial court directed the City to file a Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b) Statement). On February 1, 2023, the
City filed its Rule 1925(b) Statement. On March 9, 2023, the trial court issued its
opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a). On June 8, 2023, the City filed an Application
for en banc review (Application).        On July 6, 2023, this Court granted the
Application.
               The City argues that the Arbitrator acted outside his authority under
narrow certiorari review because he did not merely misinterpret the CBA, but fully
reformed it. Specifically, the City contends that an individual commits sexual
harassment under Section 1-§024-10 of the Disciplinary Code if his misconduct
“objectively constitutes sexual harassment,” R.R. at 177a, i.e., if a reasonable person
would deem the conduct to be unwelcome. The City asserts that Lt. Hayes’s
misconduct objectively constituted sexual harassment; however, the Arbitrator,
without any interpretation or even consideration of Section 1-§024-10 of the
Disciplinary Code, found that Lt. Hayes did not commit sexual harassment because
there was no subjective harassment from the specific perspective of Officers 1 and
2. The City claims that the Arbitrator created a subjective requirement under the
Disciplinary Code, which he was not authorized to do. The City also declares that
the Arbitrator acted outside his authority because the determination of the
Department’s sexual harassment policy is an inherent matter of managerial
prerogative, and is not a term and condition subject to collective bargaining.
               The FOP rejoins that the parties in this matter specifically authorized
the Arbitrator to determine whether the City had just cause to discharge Lt. Hayes,
and, if not, the appropriate remedy. The FOP further maintains that simply because
a provision within a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a managerial
prerogative does not preclude an arbitrator hearing a disciplinary grievance from
                                           4
rendering a decision about the meaning of such a provision; nor does it prohibit that
arbitrator from deciding an issue concerning the provision.
             This Court has explained:

             In Act 111 cases, our scope of review is limited to “narrow
             certiorari,” which allows inquiry only into: (1) the
             jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2) the regularity of the
             proceedings; (3) whether the arbitrator exceeded his
             powers; or (4) the deprivation of constitutional rights.
             [Pa.] State Police v. [Pa.] State Troopers’ Ass[’n]
             (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83, 90 (Pa. 1995). If an arbitration
             award cannot be vacated on one of these bases, then it must
             be upheld. Id. A mere error of law is insufficient to
             support a court’s decision to reverse an Act 111
             arbitrator’s award. Appeal of Upper Providence Police
             Del[.] [Cnty.] Lodge #27 Fraternal Order of Police, 526
             A.2d 31[5], 322 (Pa. 1987).

Borough of State Coll. v. Borough of State Coll. Police Ass’n, 303 A.3d 248, 255-
56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Uwchlan Twp., Pa. v. Uwchlan
Twp. Police Ass’n (Uwchlan Twp.) (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 259 C.D. 2020, filed Oct. 9,
2020), slip op. at 4).

             Further, as long as an arbitrator’s award concerns
             terms and conditions of employment and does not
             require performance of an illegal act, or one that a
             party could not do voluntarily, the “authority” prong
             of narrow certiorari is “generally met.” City of
             Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge
             No. 1, 224 A.3d 702, 712 (Pa. 2020). An argument that an
             arbitrator misinterpreted a [collective bargaining
             agreement] is not within the confines of the narrow
             certiorari review. Id. at 713. This Court’s scope of review
             is a “plenary, non-deferential standard where the
             resolution of the issues turns on a question of law or
             application of law to undisputed facts.” City of Phila[.] v.
             Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5, 932 A.2d 274, 279
             n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

Borough of State Coll., 303 A.3d at 256 (emphasis added).

                                          5
              Regarding the City’s argument that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority by reforming the CBA, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held:

              Certainly, an Act 111 grievance arbitrator should not
              undertake to equitably reform a collective bargaining
              agreement. Absent an indisputably overt instance of
              reformation, however, we find the task of distinguishing
              between such an innovation and errors of law in the
              interpretation to be unmanageable. Cf. [Pa. State Police
              v. Pa. State Troopers Ass’n (Smith & Johnson)], . . . 741
              A.2d [1248,] 1252-53 [(Pa. 1999)] (refusing to incorporate
              review for violations of public policy into narrow
              certiorari, since such a focus “--- however that nebulous
              concept may be defined by a particular appellate court --
              would greatly expand the scope of review . . .
              undercut[ting] the legislature’s intent of preventing
              protracted litigation in this arena”).

City of Pittsburgh, 224 A.3d at 714 (emphasis added). “Presently, [this Court]
agree[s] with the FOP that the [A]rbitrator’s legal reasoning, however flawed,
demonstrates sufficient interpretative focus.” Id. At most, the Arbitrator erred as a
matter of law, and “[a] mere error of law is insufficient to support a court’s decision
to reverse an Act 111 arbitrator’s award.” Borough of State Coll., 303 A.3d at 255
(quoting Appeal of Upper Providence, 526 A.2d at 322).
              Relative to the City’s claim that the Arbitrator acted outside his
authority by ruling on a matter of managerial prerogative, as stated by the Arbitrator:
“The parties have stipulated that the issues to be decided are as follows: 1. Did the
City have just cause to discharge [Lt. Hayes] . . . ? 2. If not, what shall be the
remedy?” Original Record at 62.2

              Clearly, the propriety of [Lt. Hayes’s discharge] was
              submitted to the [A]rbitrator . . . . All matters of discipline
              are grievable pursuant to the parties’ CBA. Thus, [this
              Court] conclude[s] that the [A]rbitrator addressed not only

       2
          Because the original record pages are not numbered, the page numbers referenced herein
reflect electronic pagination.
                                               6
             an issue put before him[,] but one which was arbitrable as
             well pursuant to the CBA, Act 111[,] and our case[ ]law.

Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass’n, 840 A.2d 1059, 1064-65 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004). Accordingly, the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority.
             Next the City argues that even if the Arbitrator did not exceed his
authority by reforming the CBA, this Court should modify narrow certiorari review
to allow reversal because the Arbitrator’s Award failed the JNOV test or the essence
test, or was repugnant to public policy. The City concedes that this Court is
constrained by Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent which clearly holds that in
Act 111 cases our scope of review is limited to narrow certiorari. See City of
Pittsburgh; Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass’n, 901 A.2d
991 (Pa. 2006); Betancourt. However, the City declares that it briefed the question
to preserve the issue for our Supreme Court’s review, and to seek agreement from
this Court that the test should be modified. The FOP agrees that this Court may not
modify the narrow certiorari test as it is bound by the long-established Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decisions. This Court declines to accept the City’s invitation to
reevaluate the narrow certiorari review as it is bound by our Supreme Court’s
precedent. Because the City is only making this argument to preserve it for appeal
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this Court need not further address this issue.
             For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                                        _________________________________
                                        ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

President Judge Cohn Jubelirer dissents.

                                           7
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia,                 :
                   Appellant          :
                                      :
             v.                       :
                                      :
Fraternal Order of Police,            :   No. 39 C.D. 2023
Lodge No. 5                           :

                                 ORDER

             AND NOW, this 8th day of January, 2024, the Philadelphia County
Common Pleas Court’s December 13, 2022 order is affirmed.

                                   _________________________________
                                   ANNE E. COVEY, Judge