Court Opinion

ID: 9637333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:03:42.967314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.442997
License: Public Domain

MAJOR, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
It seems to me that the majority opinion is based upon what plaintiff contends it would show at a trial, rather than upon what was disclosed by the pleadings upon which summary judgment was entered. In fact, that is the manner in which plaintiff’s counsel in its brief approaches the question here. This is evidenced by a recital of what plaintiff now “offers to prove.”
'Plaintiff in response to a motion for further and better particulars stated: “On or about September 1, 1942 plaintiff licensed its distributor United Cheese Co. of Chicago, Illinois to use the trade-mark ‘May Bud’ on labels of its own design bearing the name United Cheese Co. Chicago-Distributors, and some cheese sold under the resultant label (plaintiff’s Exhibit B), has been manufactured elsewhere, but plaintiff has no knowledge by whom.” In other words, according to this admission, plaintiff permitted its trade-mark to be used upon a product not manufactured by it, not even by its distributor, but manufactured by some unknown party. Thus the trade-mark was used without regard to the source or origin of the product.
As was stated in Hanover Star Milling Company v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412, 36 S.Ct. 357, 60 L.Ed. 713: “The primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin or ownership of the article to which.it is affixed. * * * Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a valuable interest in the goodwill of his ■ trade or business, and in the trade-marks adopted to maintain and extend it. The essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those of another.”
Without citing or discussing the authorities further, it is my view that when the owner of a trade-mark permits its use upon a product the origin or source of which is unknown, the reason for its recognition ceases to exist. Under such circumstances the trade-mark no longer furnishes any protection to the owner. Such use also permits a deception and fraud upon the public who are entitled to rely upon it as signifying the origin and source of the product to which it is attached.
The reasoning of the majority and the cases cited in support thereof, in my opinion, evade the issue. None of these cases, as I read them, stand for the proposition that the owner of a trade-mark can permit its use upon goods of an unknown origin without forfeiting its right to enjoin some other party from its use. I agree with the opinion of the District Court, 57 F.Supp. 102, that the plaintiff under its own admission had no standing in a court of equity. I would affirm the judgment.