Court Opinion

ID: 9556554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 18:00:25.043653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:01.092613
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50048    Document: 00516861743       Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/17/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                                   FILED
                                                                       August 17, 2023
                               No. 22-50048                             Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                                   Clerk

   Alejandro Hernandez; Edith Schneider-Hernandez,

                                                        Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                    versus

   West Texas Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C.; Linda Maree
   Walker; Aaron Anthony Enriquez,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:21-CV-96
                 ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
         Pro se Plaintiffs-Appellants Alejandro Hernandez and his wife, Edith
   Schneider-Hernandez, appeal the dismissal of their claims against Defend-
   ant-Appellees West Texas Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C., Linda Maree
   Walker, and Aaron Anthony Enriquez (jointly, the “Defendants”) arising
   from an encounter they had at an estate sale. Because the district court
   abused its discretion, we VACATE and REMAND.
Case: 22-50048      Document: 00516861743          Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                    No. 22-50048

          Plaintiffs allege that, in April 2021, they attended an estate sale
   organized by the Defendants, during which Walker requested that they wear
   face masks because of concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs
   informed Walker that they had disabilities that exempted them from the mask
   requirement and requested an accommodation under the Americans with
   Disabilities Act (ADA). According to the Complaint, Hernandez suffers
   from asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a scarred deviated
   septum, all of which hinder his breathing. Schneider-Hernandez alleges that
   she suffers from PTSD, multiple endocrine disorders, and spinal muscular
   atrophy that affects her ability to breathe and swallow.
          In response to the request, Walker instructed the Plaintiffs to make an
   appointment. But when Schneider-Hernandez asked for a specific time,
   Walker yelled, “[H]ow about I don’t know when!” Schneider-Hernandez
   claims that she felt threatened and told Hernandez that they should leave.
   However, according to the Plaintiffs, tensions escalated when Walker pushed
   Hernandez into Schneider-Hernandez, asserting that she had the power to
   discriminate against anyone for any reason and ordered the Plaintiffs to va-
   cate the premises. Enriquez joined in by yelling that the estate sale was a pri-
   vate business and they could do as they pleased. The Plaintiffs subsequently
   left and later discovered that Schneider-Hernandez had lost her glasses dur-
   ing the altercation. Hernandez attempted to contact Walker about the lost
   glasses using the phone number on her business card, but Enriquez answered
   the call and refused to listen to Hernandez or pass on the message to Walker.
   Instead, Enriquez instructed Hernandez not to return to their business and
   abruptly ended the conversation.
          This suit followed. Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for violations of Ti-
   tles III and V of the ADA as well as assault and battery under state law. Soon
   after, the Defendants filed an answer, and more than a month later, they filed
   an amended answer and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

                                          2
Case: 22-50048          Document: 00516861743             Page: 3      Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                           No. 22-50048

   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In addition, they filed a motion for
   sanctions and to declare the Plaintiffs vexatious litigants.1 Plaintiffs filed re-
   sponses to both motions. Most relevant to this appeal, in their response to
   the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs asked the district court to allow
   them the chance to amend their claims before dismissal if the court deter-
   mined that the complaint lacked a sufficient factual basis.
           On August 19, 2021, the district court dismissed the action in part. As
   to the discrimination claims under Title III, the court found that Hernandez
   did not properly allege that he is disabled under the ADA. Additionally, it
   found that even if both of the Plaintiffs were disabled, they failed to show that
   they were discriminated against based on their disabilities. It also found that
   even if the Plaintiffs could establish a connection between their refusal to
   wear masks and the ban, not wearing a mask during the COVID-19 pandemic
   is considered a direct threat and, therefore, is not protected under the ADA.
   Regarding the retaliation claims under Title V, the district court ruled that
   the Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not provide enough facts to suggest that they
   engaged in a protected activity under the ADA by refusing to wear masks or
   that the Defendants discriminated against them. The district court then dis-
   missed the remaining state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28
   U.S.C. § 1367(c) and denied all pending motions as moot. Plaintiffs now ap-
   peal.
           It is well settled that before dismissing a complaint, a pro se plaintiff
   should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to remedy any defi-
   ciencies. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). In other words,
   leave to amend should be liberally granted, when the plaintiff might be able
   to state a claim based on the underlying facts and circumstances. See Brewster

           _____________________
           1
               These motions were not appealed, and therefore, are not before us.

                                                 3
Case: 22-50048      Document: 00516861743           Page: 4     Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                     No. 22-50048

   v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, a district court
   is not obligated to grant a futile motion to amend, for instance, when “the
   plaintiff has already pleaded his best case.” Id. at 768 (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
          We generally review the district court’s denial of leave to amend a
   complaint for an abuse of discretion. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211
   (5th Cir. 2016). “This court has a strong preference for explicit reasons in
   denying leave to amend, and we have expressly stated that motions to amend
   should be freely granted and that a district court’s failure to explain its rea-
   sons for denying the motion typically warrants reversal.” N. Cypress Med.
   Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 461, 478 (5th Cir.
   2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
   But if the “justification for the denial is readily apparent, a failure to explain
   is unfortunate but not fatal to affirmance if the record reflects ample and ob-
   vious grounds for denying leave to amend.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
          After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that the
   Plaintiffs did not adequately state sufficient facts in their complaint to sup-
   port their claims of disability discrimination. However, accepting the allega-
   tions as true and construing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor,
   they may be able to supply additional allegations to support a plausible claim.
   The district court’s opinion essentially concedes that it could have benefited
   from more detailed pleadings, specifically about the severity of Hernandez’s
   asthma and the impact of PTSD on the Plaintiffs’ daily activities. However,
   the district court did not address the Plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to
   amend their Complaint. Thus, the basis for its decision not to allow leave to
   amend is unknown. Given our well-established precedent, this was an abuse
   of discretion. See Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054.

                                           4
Case: 22-50048      Document: 00516861743          Page: 5    Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                    No. 22-50048

          The district court put forth two alternative holdings for its decision to
   dismiss the complaint, neither of which we deem provides sufficient justifi-
   cation for dismissal. A district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
   miss is reviewed de novo. Vizaline, L.L.C. v. Tracy, 949 F.3d 927, 931 (5th
   Cir. 2020). We accept all well-pleaded facts as true, construing all reasonable
   inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Heinze v. Tesco Corp.,
   971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020). “But we do not accept as true conclusory
   allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (inter-
   nal quotation marks and citations omitted). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
   tion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but
   must prove the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual
   allegations in a complaint that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief
   above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
   2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
          First, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to plead
   facts showing that it is plausible they were discriminated against based on
   their disabilities. We disagree. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiffs re-
   quested an ADA accommodation from Walker after she asked them to wear
   masks. Walker responded by telling them to make an appointment, but when
   Schneider-Hernandez asked for a timeframe, Walker yelled that she did not
   know. As the Plaintiffs were trying to leave the estate sale, Walker pushed
   Hernandez into Schneider-Hernandez and stated that she could discriminate
   against anyone for any reason. Later, when Hernandez spoke to Enriquez on
   the phone, he yelled at him and told Hernandez not to come back to their
   business.
          Accepted as true, as we are required to do at this stage, the Plaintiffs
   allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
   Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The facts put forth suggest that the Defendants
   failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, as the Plaintiffs were expelled

                                          5
Case: 22-50048        Document: 00516861743              Page: 6      Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                         No. 22-50048

   from the estate sale and explicitly instructed not to return after Schneider-
   Hernandez inquired about scheduling an appointment. At this point, that is
   all that is necessary.2 See Taylor, 503 F.3d at 401.
           Second, the district court held that, even if the Plaintiffs had suffi-
   ciently pleaded that they were excluded because of their disability, the “di-
   rect threat” defense applies. The ADA provides a defense to a private entity
   if an “individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.” 42
   U.S.C. § 12182. The term “direct threat” refers to a “significant risk to the
   health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of poli-
   cies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or ser-
   vices.” Id. “The existence, or nonexistence, of a significant risk must be de-
   termined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the . . . accommoda-
   tion, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective
   evidence.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
           There is limited guidance regarding the suitability of a district court
   employing the direct-threat defense under Title III at the motion-to-dismiss
   stage. However, Title I of the ADA includes parallel direct-threat provisions
   that apply in the employment context. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649; see 42 U.S.C.
   §§ 12111(3), 12113(b). Under that framework, we have held that whether an
   individual is a direct threat under Title I “is a complicated, fact intensive de-
   termination, not a question of law,” and that the determination should be
   made “after weighing all of the evidence about the nature of the risk and the
   potential harm.” Rizzo v. Child.’s World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764

           _____________________
           2
              Because we reverse the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ disability discrimination
   claims, we also reverse on their retaliation claims. On remand, the district court may con-
   sider the parties’ other arguments related to these claims.

                                               6
Case: 22-50048       Document: 00516861743           Page: 7     Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                      No. 22-50048

   (5th Cir. 1996). Further, “[a]s with all affirmative defenses, the employer
   bears the burden of proving that the employee is a direct threat.” Id.
          We have held that it is generally inappropriate for a court to consider
   affirmative defenses on a motion to dismiss if it forces the court to look at
   matters outside of the complaint. EPCO Carbon Dioxide Products, Inc. v. JP
   Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006). We read Title
   III’s direct-threat provision as analogous to Title I’s, and therefore find that
   the district court’s determination that the Plaintiffs were a direct threat to
   others as a matter of law was premature.
          In sum, the district court erred by denying without explanation the
   Plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to amend their complaint, and by hold-
   ing that the Plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie case, at least at this
   stage. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is VACATED and RE-
   MANDED for further proceedings.

                                            7