Court Opinion

ID: 9382399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 17:00:40.74006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.231984
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6138     Document: 010110832874       Date Filed: 03/27/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 27, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  MARCUS D. FORD,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 22-6138
                                                      (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00341-HE)
  JANET DOWLING,                                              (W.D. Okla.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Marcus D. Ford appeals pro se1 from the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

 habeas application. The district court dismissed the application as untimely but

 granted a certificate of appealability (COA). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 §§ 1291 and 2253, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
         We liberally construe Ford’s pro se pleadings but do not advocate on his
 behalf. See Childers v. Crow, 1 F.4th 792, 798 n.3 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
 142 S. Ct. 2718 (2022).
Appellate Case: 22-6138    Document: 010110832874        Date Filed: 03/27/2023    Page: 2

                                            I

       In 1998, Ford pleaded guilty in an Oklahoma court to first-degree murder and

 larceny of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life in prison

 without the possibility of parole and twenty years, respectively, and did not appeal.2

       Twenty-two years later, on July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court held in McGirt v.

 Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459-60, 2482 (2020), that Congress did not disestablish

 the lands in Oklahoma reserved for the Creek Nation and those lands remain Indian

 country for purposes of exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Federal Major Crimes

 Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Based on McGirt, Ford sought postconviction relief in

 state court, arguing that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him. The state

 district court denied postconviction relief, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal

 Appeals (OCCA) affirmed. The OCCA relied on its decision in State ex rel. Matloff

 v. Wallace, which held that McGirt announced a new procedural rule that does not

 operate retroactively to invalidate state convictions that were final before McGirt, see

 497 P.3d 686, 688 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Parish v. Oklahoma,

 142 S. Ct. 757 (2022).

       Ford then filed his § 2254 application and a brief in support, claiming that,

 under McGirt, Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because his crimes

 occurred in Indian country and he is partly Native American. See R. at 8, 45, 51.

       2
         We take judicial notice of documents from Ford’s state postconviction
 proceedings. See Pacheco v. El Habti, ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 2576457, at *2 n.2
 (10th Cir. 2022).
                                            2
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 A magistrate judge recommended that the § 2254 application be dismissed as

 untimely, reasoning that it was not filed within one year of the date on which his

 convictions became final and McGirt did not extend the limitations period.3 The

 district court adopted the recommendation, dismissed the application, and granted

 a COA.

                                            II

       We review de novo the district court’s dismissal based on timeliness, see

 Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 2004), and consider only those

 arguments that Ford has adequately presented in his opening brief, see Fairchild v.

 Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 723-24 (10th Cir. 2015).

       Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Ford had one year to file his § 2254

 application, “run[ning] from the latest of” four dates:

       (A)    the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
              direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
              review;

       (B)    the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
              by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
              United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
              filing by such State action;

       3
          The magistrate judge also determined: 1) the limitations period should not be
 tolled during the pendency of Ford’s state postconviction proceedings, see 28 U.S.C.
 § 2244(d)(2); 2) there was no basis for equitable tolling; and 3) Ford offered no
 allegations or evidence that he was actually innocent. Ford did not raise these issues
 in his § 2254 application, nor did he address them in his objections to the magistrate
 judge’s report and recommendation. Moreover, he does not address them in his
 opening brief on appeal, and therefore, we do not consider them. See Fairchild v.
 Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 723-24 (10th Cir. 2015) (recognizing inadequate briefing
 can result in waiver).
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        (C)    the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
               recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
               recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
               applicable to cases on collateral review; or

        (D)    the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
               presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
               diligence.

 Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).

        In adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district

 court determined Ford’s convictions became final on June 1, 1998, and, under

 § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitations period expired on June 1, 1999. Ford filed

 his § 2254 application almost 23 years later, on April 25, 2022, so it was untimely

 under § 2244(d)(1)(A). The district court also determined that Ford appeared to

 invoke § 2244(d)(1)(C) and (D) but neither subsection applied. Subsection (C) was

 inapplicable, the court ruled, because McGirt did not announce a new constitutional

 rule, and subsection (D) was inapplicable because Ford offered no new,

 undiscoverable factual evidence to support his claim.

        On appeal, most of Ford’s brief maintains that Oklahoma lacked authority to

 prosecute and convict him. But these arguments do not address the district court’s

 grounds for dismissal—that the § 2254 application was untimely. See Nixon v. City

 & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The first task of an

 appellant is to tell us why the district court’s decision was wrong. Recitation of a

 tale of apparent injustice may assist in that task, but it cannot substitute for legal

                                              4
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 argument.”); see also id. at 1369-70 (affirming dismissal of claims where appellant’s

 arguments failed to explain how the district court erred).

       Ford does suggest, however, that the limitation period should not accrue until

 the date McGirt issued, July 9, 2020. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (“The date of awareness that

 the Judgment was known to all to be void was recent[,] July 9, 2020[,] McGirt vs.

 Oklahoma[].”). To the extent this argument challenges the district court’s ruling that

 the application was untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(C) and (D), the argument fails.

 Section 2244(d)(1)(C) is inapplicable because “McGirt announced no new

 constitutional right. It self-professedly resolved a question of statutory interpretation

 . . . to determine that the federal government . . . has never” disestablished the Creek

 Reservation. Pacheco v. El Habti, ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 2576457, at *8 (10th Cir.

 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Ford cannot rely on § 2244(d)(1)(C).

       Likewise, § 2244(d)(1)(D) is inapplicable because nothing in McGirt can be

 said to reveal a new factual predicate for Ford’s claim. Notwithstanding Oklahoma’s

 “historical prosecutorial practice of asserting jurisdiction over Indians in state court,

 even for serious crimes on the contested lands,” McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2470, the

 factual basis for Ford’s claim—that Congress did not disestablish the Creek

 Reservation—could have been discovered with due diligence by consulting “Acts of

 Congress,” id. at 2462. Indeed, we recognized the factual predicate for the claim in

 2017. See Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 966 (10th Cir. 2017). And with due

 diligence, Ford might have raised the issue sooner. Cf. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d

 578, 580, 588-89 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing nothing prevented a habeas petitioner

                                             5
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 from raising a question of statutory interpretation before the Supreme Court resolved

 the issue in a different case). Thus, § 2244(d)(1)(D) is unavailing as well.

       Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

                                                   Entered for the Court

                                                   Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                                   Circuit Judge

                                            6