Court Opinion

ID: 9488418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:44:43.390567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:52.807804
License: Public Domain

BLACK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the Board’s construction of § 212(c) is reviewed under the deferential standard of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and Jaramillo v. INS, 1 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc). I dissent because, in my opinion, the majority fails to give proper deference to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of § 212(c), places undue significance on the INS’s motion to reopen regulation, and diminishes the INS’s legitimate interest in finality.
Much has been written on why the Board’s interpretation of § 212(c) is a reasonable one, see Nwolise v. INS, 4 F.3d 306, 309-12 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. - , 114 S.Ct. 888, 127 L.Ed.2d 82 (1994); Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1069-75 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994); Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1147-53 (9th Cir.1993) (en bane) (Trott and Brunetti, JJ., dissenting); Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1412 (1993); Matter of Cerna, Interim Decision, slip op. 3161 at 2-3 (BIA Oct. 7, 1991), aff'd 979 F.2d 213 (11th Cir.1992), so I confine my remarks to explaining why I am unconvinced by the majority’s reasoning. In reviewing the Board’s interpretation of § 212(c), our task is limited to determining whether the Board’s statutory interpretation is reasonable.1 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782; Jaramillo, 1 F.3d at 1153. A brief review of § 212(c)’s text demonstrates the reasonableness of the Board’s interpretation.
Section 212(c) relief is available to “[ajliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(c) (West 1970). The INA defines aliens “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as:
the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in ac*1352cordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.
Section 101(a)(20); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(20) (West 1970) (emphasis added).2 The Board’s position is simply that a final deportation order constitutes a change of status rendering the alien prima, facie ineligible for § 212(c) relief because the alien is no longer lawfully admitted for permanent residence. To me, this interpretation is quite reasonable and not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” — the standard for reversing agency interpretations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782.
The majority relies on 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, which authorizes motions to reopen, finding that the Board’s position is unreasonable because the motion to reopen regulation only prohibits such motions after an alien’s departure from the United States and does not discuss finality. The majority therefore reasons that the regulation authorizes motions like Petitioner’s and purports to “hold the Board to the regulations the INS has adopted.”
The majority’s argument would be powerful if § 3.2 only addressed motions to reopen denials of § 212(c) relief.3 In that case, the Board’s interpretation would effectively repeal § 3.2 without complying with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 1977). But the Board’s interpretation of § 212(c) effects no such repeal because § 3.2 motions to reopen are not confined to persons seeking relief from denials of § 212(c) relief. Instead, § 3.2 and its related regulations4 allow aggrieved litigants to reopen a wide variety of Board proceedings, which are by no means confined to § 212(c) or even deportation proceedings in general. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 n. 10, 108 S.Ct. 904, 912 n. 10, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (stating that “[t]he BIA’s regulation that provides for reopening of deportation proceedings, 8 CFR § 3.2 (1987), applies to all motions to reopen, regardless of the underlying substantive basis of the alien’s claim”). The Board’s interpretation of § 212(c), which bars aliens from reopening § 212(c) denials, leaves § 3.2 intact for many purposes and merely removes a narrow class of movants from the regulation’s scope.
The majority’s § 3.2 argument therefore reduces to claiming that the regulation, by not explicitly permitting the Board to reject motions on prima facie, statutory-eligibility grounds, does not permit any interpretation of § 212(c) (or, presumably, any other INA provision) which renders an alien prima facie ineligible for relief. I reject this'position because it makes statutory interpretation totally dependent on a procedure created solely under the authority of mere “regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322, 112 S.Ct. 719, 724, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992); see INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 2100, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (explaining that motions to reopen are allowed by regulation, not statute).
Interpreting § 3.2 as enumerating the exclusive grounds for denying motions to reopen or reconsider leads to questionable results. Although the regulation does not explicitly require that the alien present a statutory basis for relief when moving to reopen, surely this requirement is assumed. Were it otherwise, the Board would be forced to consider on the merits any claim for relief, no matter how absurd. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that a litigant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought is a valid ground for denying a § 3.2 motion to reopen. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323, 112 S.Ct. at 725; Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. at 912. The Supreme Court accepts *1353the logical notion that, despite § 3.2’s silence on the issue, the motion to reopen regulation must be interpreted to implicitly require a movant to have a valid claim for relief under the INA.
Finally, I believe the majority places insufficient weight on the INS’s interests in finality and administrative convenience. “Underlying considerations of administrative and judicial efficiency” are important considerations when interpreting the INA. Stone v. INS, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1545, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). Such considerations “apply with even greater force in the INS context” and have led the Supreme Court to create a presumption against motions to reopen. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110, 108 S.Ct. at 915; see Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323, 112 S.Ct. at 724-25.
Moreover, although the majority correctly notes that Jaramillo does not compel the Board’s interpretation, Jaramillo and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stone, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1537, certainly suggest that the Board’s interpretation is reasonable. To me, it appears quite logical to hold that because a final deportation order stops the accrual of time during which an alien is considered to have maintained “a lawful unrelinquished domicile,” Jaramillo, 1 F.3d at 1155, and because a final deportation order begins the 90-day period for seeking judicial review of that decision, Stone, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1543-44, that same deportation order terminates an alien’s status as “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(c). Similarly, if a motion to reopen does not render a deportation order non-final for purposes of appeal, Stone, — U.S. at- -, 115 S.Ct. at 1543-44, it does not appear “arbitrary, capricious, and manifestly contrary to the statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, to conclude that such a motion does not render a deportation order non-final for purposes of determining an alien’s status as “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(c).5
In conclusion, I respectfully dissent because the Board’s interpretation of § 212(c), holding that a final deportation order is a change of status terminating Petitioner’s eligibility for § 212(c) relief, is a reasonable one entitled to deference by this Court.

. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Congress, in enacting the INA, did not speak directly to the precise issue of whether a final deportation order renders an alien ineligible for § 212(c) relief. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781; Jaramillo, 1 F.3d at 1152. Nevertheless, if this were a case of pure statutory interpretation, I believe that the Board presents a better interpretation of § 212(c) than does the majority.

. The legislative history sheds no additional light on what Congress intended to accomplish when enacting § 101(a)(20). See H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1684; S.Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).

. The majority’s § 3.2 argument would also be strong if that regulation specifically referred to § 212(c) denials in its text. But § 3.2 makes no such reference, and simply refers to "any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. As I explain more fully below, this phrase, understood in its proper statutory context, implicitly requires that the movant have a valid ground for relief under the INA before she may reopen “any case.”

.See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8; 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b); 8 C.F.R. § 103.5.

. The Board's different treatment of motions to reconsider versus motions to reopen, see Cema, Interim Decision, slip op. 3161 at 3, has been viewed as inconsistent by some courts, see, e.g., Goncalves v. INS, 6 F.3d 830, 834 (1st Cir.1993). To me, that alleged inconsistency is no more anomalous than the majority’s remedy, which would treat § 3.2 motions to reconsider and motions to reopen consistently by holding that a final deportation order is a change of status for some purposes, see Jaramillo, 1 F.3d at 1155, but not for this purpose. Even assuming that these positions are equally inconsistent, Chevron requires that we accept the position chosen by the Board. Moreover, I believe that the different nature of motions to reconsider versus motions to reopen justifies different treatment by the Board. See Cerna, Interim Decision, slip op. 3161 at 3.