Court Opinion

ID: 9759390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:14:56.747978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:04:06.686427
License: Public Domain

*54Bogdauski, J.
(dissenting). The trial court’s failure to consider and apply § 21-9 of the 1947 Manchester charter established by 25 Special Acts 217, No. 193, constituted error as a matter of law. Section 21-9 provides that “[i]n case of any conflict of authority between the town of Manchester and any district incorporated within the limits of said town, the authority of said town shall prevail.” That section demonstrates clearly the legislative intent that when a question of jurisdiction over the same subject matter is involved, no incorporated district within the town shall have rights superior to those of the town. The purpose of that provision was to resolve any and all conflicts which might arise between the town and any incorporated district concerning issues of concurrent jurisdiction.
Despite that legislative mandate, the trial court ruled that § 21-9 did not apply because the only conflict in authority that had occurred was created by the town, in that the town refused to acquiesce in the Eighth District’s assumption of authority over the Buekland Area. The court said, in effect, that if the town had agreed to the Eighth District’s action, there would have been no conflict. That reasoning begs the very issue in the case since it assumes that the town had no right to rely upon its express charter provisions.
Actually, the trial court failed to consider two pertinent provisions of the 1947 town charter: first, § 10-10 of the charter which expressly authorizes the town to furnish fire protection to all portions of the town not included within the Eighth District; second, § 21-9 which mandates that when a conflict of authority arises between the town and the District, such as the present one over the Buekland *55Area, the town shall prevail. Moreover, those charter provisions were not repealed by the Special Act of 1963; 31 Special Acts 184, No. 201; and no claim is made by the plaintiffs to that effect. In any event, “ [r] epeals by implication are not favored and will never be presumed where the old and new statute[s] may well stand together.” Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 404, 294 A.2d 546; Fair Haven & Westville R. Co. v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 442, 447, 53 A. 960; Bissell v. Dickerson, 64 Conn. 61, 29 A. 226.
In ruling that “[t]here is no conflict of authority here except what the defendant town has created” the trial court employed peculiar language since it stands to reason that a town cannot create a statutory conflict of authority. Although a town may be said to create a dispute, it is only the legislature through its statutory enactments and special acts which can create a conflict of authority or jurisdiction between a town and a district.
Such a legislatively created conflict is most evident in this case. It is precisely the conflict between the town’s right to provide fire service pursuant to its charter and the District’s right pursuant to the 1963 Special Act that is the controlling issue. If the 1963 Special Act permits the District to move into localities already served by the town, there is indeed a conflict of authority, and § 21-9 of the 1947 charter applies.
Furthermore, the trial court is without power to render a declaratory judgment where there is no room for reasonable question as to the rights of the parties. Brennan v. Russell, 133 Conn. 442, 445, 52 A.2d 308. The trial court’s conclusion that the only conflict of authority was such as was contrived *56by the town1 had the effect of destroying the court’s jurisdiction. Because that conclusion recognizes no bona fide and substantial issue in dispute between the parties or a substantial uncertainty of legal relationship requiring settlement, as required by § 309 (b) of the 1963 Practice Book, the court lacked jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.
Moreover, the conclusion of no conflict is contrary to the court’s own finding2 that there is actual bona fide and substantial uncertainty as to the legal relationships between the parties. Where the findings cannot support the conclusion reached, the judgment cannot stand. D’Addario v. Commissioner of Transportation, 172 Conn. 182, 186, 374 A.2d 163.
It was error for the court to refuse to consider and apply the provisions of the 1947 town charter; and, having found that there was no bona fide conflict of authority, it was error for the court to render a declaratory judgment.
In this opinion Sedob, J., concurred.

 “There is no conflict of authority here except what the defendant town has created.” “[The town] is not permitted to create a conflict and then point to a provision of its charter that such a conflict must be resolved in its favor.”

 “There is a serious conflict between the parties hereto that vitally affects the public interest.” “There are actual bona flde and substantial questions in dispute between the parties and a substantial uncertainty as to their legal relationship which requires settlement between the parties.”