Court Opinion

ID: 9929369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:09:32.507717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:17.287927
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2891-21

ANGEL MENDEZ,

          Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

     Respondent-Respondent.
____________________________

                   Argued January 22, 2024 – Decided February 2, 2024

                   Before Judges Marczyk and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
                   Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
                   Treasury, PFRS No. xx3001.

                   Herbert J. Stayton, Jr. argued the cause for appellant
                   (Stayton Law, LLC, attorneys; Herbert J. Stayton, Jr.,
                   on the brief).

                   Juliana C. DeAngelis, Legal Counsel, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, Deputy Director of
                   Legal Affairs, attorney; Juliana C. DeAngelis, on the
                   brief).
PER CURIAM

      Petitioner Angel Mendez appeals from the April 13, 2022 final agency

decision of the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System

(the "Board") denying his claim for accidental disability retirement benefits

under N.J.S.A. 43:16:A-7(1).       Based on our review of the record and the

applicable principles of law, we affirm.

      Mendez was employed as a firefighter by the Camden City Fire

Department beginning in April 2006. According to Mendez, on March 25, 2017,

while responding to a fire, he injured his left shoulder while unloading or

"stretching" a four-inch supply line from the fire truck "going towards the [fire]

hydrant" to connect the supply line to the hydrant. Mendez testified "as [he]

was stretching [the supply line he] got jerked back and as [he] got jerked back

[his] left arm went back and [he] felt a sharp pain on [his] left arm . . . ."

      When asked what caused him to be jerked back, Mendez responded,

"[a]pparently a lump sum of the four[-]inch supply line that was sitting on the

hose bed came down on the section I was stretching causing it to get

jammed . . . ."     Mendez "guess[ed] one of the couplings got caught or

something."       He "believe[d] . . . [the supply line] must[have] been stored

incorrectly." Mendez testified it was unusual for a hose to be stored incorrectly.

                                                                                 A-2891-21
                                          2
According to Mendez, when a hose is stored correctly it comes out one layer at

a time, and it was unusual for "a large pile of hose to come down like that."

      After returning to the fire station on the day of the incident, Mendez

completed and signed an injury report in which he stated, "[firefighter] hurt his

left shoulder while repacking [four-inch] hose."        In the supervisor's report

section of the injury report, the fire captain wrote, "[t]he firefighter stated that

while repacking the [four-inch] hose he felt and heard something pop in his left

shoulder."

      Mendez received three months of formal firefighter training before

assuming his position and received additional training every work shift. He was

trained on "[l]oading hose beds, unloading hose beds, hooking up hydrants," and

"[s]tretching hose lines."    In his years as a firefighter, he responded to

"hundreds" of fires.

      On May 30, 2018, Mendez filed an application for accidental disability

retirement benefits. The disability comments section of the application states,

"[a]s a result of attempting to remove a [four-]inch supply line that was

improperly stored on the hose bed I suffered a severe shoulder injury." On

October 19, 2018, Mendez underwent a medical disability examination. The

"description of accident" section of the disability evaluation report prepared

                                                                              A-2891-21
                                         3
following that examination states, "[m]ember was repacking a [four-inch] hose

and felt a pop in his left shoulder."

      On December 11, 2018, the Board denied his application and awarded

ordinary disability benefits because "the event that caused [his] disability [was ]

not undesigned and unexpected." The Board also determined Mendez was

totally and permanently disabled as a direct result of the March 25, 2017,

incident.

      After Mendez contested the Board's denial, a hearing was conducted in

the Office of Administrative Law. Mendez was the only witness who testified.

Following the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") affirmed the

Board's decision in a written decision. The ALJ found "the facts are unclear as

to what happened on March 25, 2017." The ALJ determined Mendez's testimony

was not convincing and noted "he himself did not appear convinced" of what

happened because "he could not articulate what occurred on that date." The ALJ

specifically recounted Mendez testified "'apparently' the accident was caused by

a 'lump sum of the . . . supply line,' he 'guess[ed]' one of the couplings got caught

or something, and he 'believe[d]' there was a lump sum of hose." The ALJ also

found Mendez's testimony was inconsistent with the injury report he signed on

the day of the incident and the October 19, 2018, disability evaluation report,

                                                                               A-2891-21
                                         4
both of which state Mendez was injured while "repacking" the hose, not

"stretching" it from the truck.

      The ALJ found Mendez "was the only person who was unloading the hose,

and he [was] uncertain what occurred." The ALJ determined there was "no

evidence of" a traumatic event that was undesigned and unexpected. The ALJ

concluded Mendez "did not particularize what occurred and [did] not [meet] his

burden of presenting sufficient competent and credible evidence of facts

essential to his claim[]" and "[did] not [meet] the burden of proving . . .

eligibility for accidental disability retirement [benefits] by a fair preponderance

of the evidence."

      Mendez filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the Board. After

considering those exceptions, the Board adopted the ALJ's decision and affirmed

the denial of Mendez's application. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, Mendez argues he proved by a preponderance of the evidence

he is entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits because the event that

caused his disability was undesigned and unexpected, and the Board's decision

was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.       Mendez also argues pension

statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the employee.

                                                                             A-2891-21
                                        5
      "Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of

Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). "An agency's determination on the merits

'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious,

or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo,

206 N.J. at 27).

      "Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful

and   unreasoning    action,   without   consideration    and   in   disregard    of

circumstances. Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when

exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed

that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J.

183, 204-05 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Bayshore Sewerage Co. v.

Dep't Env't Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)).

      In determining whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, we examine: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with

relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible

evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the

                                                                              A-2891-21
                                         6
"agency clearly erred in reaching [its'] conclusion." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J.

182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).

      In Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189

(2007), the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the term "traumatic event"

under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). A claimant for accidental disability benefits must

establish:

             (1) that he is permanently and totally disabled;

             (2) as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
                    a. identifiable as to time and place,
                    b. undesigned and unexpected, and
                    c. caused by a circumstance external to the
                       member (not the result of pre-existing disease
                       that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);

             (3) that the traumatic event occurred during and as a
                 result of the member's regular or assigned duties;

             (4) that the disability was not the result of the member's
                 willful negligence; and

             (5) that the member is mentally or physically
                 incapacitated from performing his usual or any
                 other duty.

             [Id. at 212-13.]

      Under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), a member applying for accidental disability

must prove the event was "undesigned and unexpected." Ibid. As the Court

explained in Richardson, "[t]he polestar of the inquiry is whether, during the

                                                                          A-2891-21
                                         7
regular performance of his job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-

existing disease alone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly

resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member." Id. at 214.

"Undesigned and unexpected" requires "an unanticipated consequence " that "is

extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Id. at 201. The evaluation of

the event is not based on results but instead on what the injured person was doing

at the time. Russo, 206 N.J. at 18.

      Although pension statutes are "remedial in character" and "should be

liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be

benefited thereby," Geller v. Dep't of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969),

"eligibility is not to be liberally permitted," Smith v. State, Dep't of Treasury,

390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007).

      After considering all the evidence presented and the applicable legal

standards, the ALJ determined Mendez failed to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence his disability was caused by an undesigned and unexpected event.

The ALJ specifically noted Mendez was not able to convincingly articulate how

he was injured and "did not particularize what occurred." The ALJ also found

his testimony was inconsistent with the contemporaneous injury report he

completed on the day of the incident as well as the report of his disability

                                                                            A-2891-21
                                        8
evaluation. The ALJ's decision was based on ample findings supported by

substantial credible evidence in the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable. We discern no basis to disturb the Board's decision adopting the

ALJ's findings and denying Mendez's application for accidental disability

retirement benefits.

      To the extent we have not otherwise addressed appellant's arguments, they

are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(D) and (E).

      Affirmed.

                                                                           A-2891-21
                                       9