Court Opinion

ID: 9531942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:16:19.79893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:37.841819
License: Public Domain

Carland, J.
The plaintiff filed an application pursuant to section 10(b)(7) of Part II of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (now MCLA 418.361; MSA 17.237[361]) for specific loss benefits alleging total and permanent disability by reason of loss of the industrial use of both legs. The referee awarded benefits; the appeal board reversed in a split decision. On appeal to this Court, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings stating that as the result of a misapplication of the law by the appeal board, there had been no finding of fact by a majority of that board. Kozlowski v Chrysler Corporation and Second Injury Fund, 25 Mich App 392; 181 NW2d 785, lv den, 384 Mich 782 (1970).
The mandate of the Court of Appeals for further review was couched in the following language:
*102"Of necessity then, for the error of law, we set aside the holding for further consideration of the record already made. The reconsideration should contain specific findings of fact on the question presented by the self-contained test in subsection (7). That question is whether plaintiff lost the 'industrial use’ of both legs, as the quoted term is used in the statute, and not as it was used in the Hutsko opinion where subsection (7), and its own particular test was not involved.
"If total and permanent disability is found on the basis of the test in subsection (7), there should be a further finding of fact as to when it occurred, particularly in relation to the date of the amendment adding this loss to the specific loss schedule.”
In response to the directives so given, the board of appeals in an opinion dated March 30, 1973, concurred in by three members, determined that "[t]he plaintiff has not met the burden of proving that she lost the industrial use of her legs within the period prescribed by statute”. Three other members of the board concurred in the result. An order bearing the same date as the opinion referred to and signed by six members of the board makes a determination of fact in the following language:
"It is ordered, that the decision of the referee shall be and it hereby is reversed, the board finding that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proving that she lost the industrial use of her legs within the period prescribed by statute”.
Plaintiff appeals on leave granted.
As provided in MCLA 418.861; MSA 17.237(861), "[t]he court of appeals and the supreme court shall have power to review questions of law involved in any final order of the board”.
Therefore, the question here involved is whether the order of March 30, 1973, is a final order *103reviewable by this Court and whether it is in fulfillment of the mandate contained in Kozlowski, supra. In other words, does the fact that "a majority” has not concurred in an "opinion” render this Court without jurisdiction to decide the questions presented to it.
On December 31, 1969, the statute in force (MCLA 408.21; MSA 17.6[21]) was repealed and replaced by MCLA 418.261; MSA 17.237(261). This statute provides in the second paragraph thereof as follows:
"Any matter pending on review may be assigned to 4 members of the board for disposition. The composition of panels shall be alternated so that each member of the board serves on panels with other members of the board with a frequency which is as substantially equal as possible. If the 4 members concur in the result, it shall be final. If there is disagreement, the matter shall be reviewed by the full board and its order shall be final.”
Therefore, this, section of the statute makes it clear that the appeal board’s "order” is its final determination. The statute speaks of the finality of such an "order”. Here six members of the appeal board signed the order here involved which contained its finding of fact. It must, therefore, follow that this appeal is properly before this Court. In making its decision that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof imposed upon her, the board has said that it does not believe that the proofs offered by her outweigh those offered in opposition thereto. In Carter v General Motors Corp, 361 Mich 577, 582-583; 106 NW2d 105 (1960), the Court spoke as follows:
"The order of the appeal board is attacked, among other reasons, because no 2 members of the 3 member *104board found plaintiff’s disability compensable under the same section of the act. Nevertheless, the decision of 2 of the 3 members of the board was that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury. Section 11 of chapter 1A of the act creating the workmen’s compensation appeal board (CLS 1956, § 408.11 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp, § 17.6(17)]) provides that the 'decision of a majority of the board shall be the decision of the board’. It is not unusual for members of a body performing a judicial function to arrive at the same conclusion via diverse reasoning. (See for example, Samels v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 317 Mich 149; 26 NW2d 742 [1947], where 6 justices of this Court voted to affirm an award of compensation, 3 justices grounding their decision on part 2 and 3 justices on part 7.) The decision of the board is within the statutory mandate.”
MCLA 418.861; MSA 17.237(861) provides as follows:
"The findings of fact made by the board acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive.”
We conclude that there is sufficient evidence contained in the record to support the board’s finding that plaintiff has not lost the industrial use of her legs as a direct consequence of the injury sustained in the course of her employment at Chrysler.
We affirm.
Bashara, J., concurred.