Court Opinion

ID: 9949458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 18:02:37.557399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.479020
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/11/24 In re Dante C. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

  In re DANTE C., a Person                                    B324829
  Coming Under the Juvenile
  Court Law.                                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. FJ57841)

  THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

  DANTE C.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Robert J. Totten, Commissioner. Affirmed as modified.
      Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Seth P. McCutcheon, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _______________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       After finding Dante C. committed assault by means likely
to produce great bodily injury and robbery, the juvenile court
declared Dante a ward of the court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 and placed him on home probation
for six months. Dante appeals from the court’s jurisdiction
findings and disposition order, arguing substantial evidence did
not support the findings on either count. Dante also contends his
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object when
the People introduced a message sent on a social media
networking service from Dante’s brother to the victim. We
conclude that substantial evidence supported each of the findings
and that Dante has not shown his counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
       Dante also argues, the People concede, and we agree that—
because the juvenile court placed Dante on home probation—the
court erred in setting a maximum term of confinement of
four years. Therefore, we strike from the disposition order the
term of confinement and affirm the jurisdiction findings and the
order as modified.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     A.      Dante and Some Friends Attack Joseph W. at a Park;
             the People File a Petition Under Welfare and
             Institutions Code Section 602
       Dante and Joseph W. were schoolmates. They had been
friends, but recently had been arguing and expressing hostility
toward each other. One morning Joseph was at a park near the
school he and Dante attended. Joseph was wearing a backpack
that contained a laptop, a speaker, and his wallet.
       Dante was at the park with his younger brother, Fabricio,
and three other boys from the school, including a friend named
Brandon. When Dante’s group encountered Joseph, a one- to
two-minute fight ensued. Someone used a cell phone to record
part of the fight. The beginning of the video showed Dante and
Joseph fighting each other, while the other boys watched. But
after Joseph knocked Dante to the ground and kicked Dante in
his torso, three of the boys from Dante’s group intervened,
dragged Joseph to the ground, and began hitting and kicking
him. Dante got up, joined the other boys beating up Joseph, and
kicked Joseph several times while Joseph was on the ground,
including at least once to Joseph’s head or neck. Joseph lost the
backpack during the fight; he never recovered it or any of its
contents.
       The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602 for an order adjudging Dante a ward of the

                                3
court.1 The People asserted two counts against Dante: assault by
means likely to produce great bodily injury and robbery.

       B.    Joseph Testifies About the Fight
       It was undisputed Dante and Joseph had been “talk[ing]
trash” to each other in the weeks and days leading up the fight.
Joseph testified that, a few weeks before the fight, Dante sent
him a text message referring to Joseph’s dead relatives and
stating Dante was “going to catch [Joseph] lacking.” Meanwhile,
Joseph insulted Dante and said, “You need a beating, huh?”
Joseph sent Dante another text message, also before the fight,
that read: “lucky [there] wasn’t school today had me waiting
smoking n posted waiting to beat yo ass pray for tomorrow.”
       When describing the fight, Joseph testified Dante and the
other boys in the group approached him. Dante was clenching
his fists and calling Joseph a “bitch” and other “offensive slurs.”
Either Dante or Brandon threw the first punch (at Joseph). The
other boys in the group joined in and attacked Joseph. Joseph
was attempting to remove his backpack “to get better leverage,”
but he had trouble getting it off; eventually, while Joseph was on
the ground, either Brandon or Fabricio pulled the backpack off
Joseph’s shoulders.
       When shown the partial video recording of the fight, Joseph
explained the recording did not include the beginning of the fight
when the other boys first “jumped” him and took his backpack.
According to Joseph, the video showed the end of the fight, after
the other boys had backed away and gave Dante a chance to fight

1      Dante was 17 years old on the day of the fight and during
all relevant proceedings.

                                4
Joseph by himself. The other boys then jumped in and jointly
attacked Joseph (as depicted in the video) a second time.
       Joseph testified that after the fight he saw Dante and the
other members of the group sitting on a bench in the park.
Joseph’s backpack was directly underneath where Brandon was
sitting. When Joseph approached and asked about his backpack,
Brandon took a swing at Joseph, laughed, and told Joseph to
leave before he “got [his] ass beat” again. Joseph left without the
backpack. Joseph suffered headaches, a broken finger, and a
shoulder injury from the fight.
       Joseph testified that a few days after the fight Dante sent
him a message through a social media service saying he was
“thankful for the speaker” he received. Joseph also discovered
that someone had tried to purchase a computer using his credit
card and his account on an e-commerce technology platform that
was linked to the laptop in the stolen backpack. The intended
shipping address for the computer was Brandon’s residence.

      C.     Dante Gives His Version of the Fight
      Dante gave a different version of the fight and the events
leading up to it. According to Dante, Joseph had threatened his
friends and family before the fight. On the day of the fight,
Dante was riding a scooter with his brother, heading through the
park on his way to school. When he saw Joseph, the two
“exchang[ed] words,” Joseph called him a “bitch,” “mf,” and “all
types of insults,” and Joseph initiated the fight by swinging at
Dante. The two fought “one-on-one” with each other for a couple
of minutes; at one point Dante was “trying to back up,” but
Joseph motioned with his hand to keep fighting (a motion
depicted in the video).

                                 5
       According to Dante, the other boys who intervened in the
fight were just random kids he knew from the park. Dante
“never” asked them to help him fight Joseph. Dante denied
taking Joseph’s speaker and denied sitting with Brandon after
the fight, stating he immediately went home.
       While questioning Dante, the prosecutor introduced a copy
of messages exchanged through a social media networking
service between Joseph and Fabricio. Joseph sent the following
message: “Do whatever bro just know everything you do comes
back good n bad karma.” Fabricio responded: “U think I liked
what Dande di? Rob sumone That’s bummy to . . . Me.”

      D.    The Juvenile Court Sustains the Petition
      The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding Dante
committed assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury
and second degree robbery. The court found credible Joseph’s
testimony that Dante’s group attacked him first and Joseph’s
testimony about “what happened after the fight.” The court
found Dante’s testimony less credible.
      The court declared Dante a ward of the court, placed him
on home probation for six months under the supervision of the
probation department, and ordered him to pay restitution as
determined by the probation department. The court also set a
maximum term of confinement of four years. Dante timely
appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order.

                                6
                           DISCUSSION

      A.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
            Findings

             1.     Standard of Review
      “‘The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of
evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases . . . .’” (In re
A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653; see In re Gary F. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1080; In re Matthew A. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.) “‘[W]e ask “‘whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” . . . [W]e must examine
the record independently for “‘substantial evidence—that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’” that
would support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v.
Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302; see People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 780; In re R.C.
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 302, 309.) “In doing so, we ‘. . . presume
the existence of every fact that the [juvenile court] could
reasonably have deduced from that evidence.’” (Navarro, at
p. 302; see Holmes, McClain and Newborn, at p. 780; In re D.T.
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 693, 698.) “‘We must also “accept logical
inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.”’” (Navarro, at p. 302; see People v.
Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1103.) “We do not question the
credibility of a witness’s testimony, so long as it is ‘not inherently
improbable,’ nor do we reconsider the weight to be given any
particular item of evidence.” (Navarro, at p. 302; see People v.

                                  7
Gaines (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 133; In re Paul C. (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 43, 54.)

            2.       Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding
                     Dante Committed Assault by Means Likely
                     To Produce Great Bodily Injury
       Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4), “makes it a
crime to ‘commit[ ] an assault upon the person of another by any
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.’” (People v.
Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974, 983.) Dante does not dispute that
he committed an assault or that he did so by means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury. Dante argues only the People
failed to prove he did not act in self-defense.
       “‘To justify an act of self-defense for [an assault charge
under Penal Code section 245], the defendant must have an
honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be
inflicted on him.’” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055,
1064; see People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197, 212;
People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014.) “‘In other
words, the defendant’s belief must both subjectively exist and be
objectively reasonable.’” (Cruz-Partida, at p. 212; see Brady, at
p. 1014.) Moreover, the “threat of bodily injury must be
imminent [citation], and ‘. . . any right of self-defense is limited to
the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.’”
(Minifie, at pp. 1064-1065; see Cruz-Partida, at p. 212; Brady, at
p. 1014.) “‘[I]t is not necessary for the defendant’” to prove “‘that
the self[-]defense was true’”; “‘if the evidence is sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was justified,
then he is entitled to an acquittal.’” (People v. Sanchez (1947)

                                   8
30 Cal.2d 560, 571; see People v. Lloyd (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 49,
62.)
       Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
beyond a reasonable doubt Dante was not acting in self-defense
when he committed the assault; indeed, the evidence was not
particularly close on this issue. First, the doctrine of self-defense
“‘may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical attack or the
commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which
his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.’” (People v.
Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761; see People v. Eulian (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333.) “Thus, a victim may respond to an
attacker’s initial physical assault with a physical counterassault,
and an attacker who provoked the fight may not in asserting he
was injured in the fray claim self-defense against the victim’s
lawful resistance.” (Eulian, at p. 1333; accord, People v. Ramirez
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 947; see People v. Sawyer (1967)
256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75, fn. 2 [trial court properly instructed the
jury that, “‘[w]here a person seeks or induces a quarrel which
leads to the necessity in his own defense of using force against his
adversary, the right to stand his ground and thus defend himself
is not immediately available to him’”].)
       Under Joseph’s version of events (which the juvenile court
credited), Dante and his companions were the aggressors who
provoked the fight, and Joseph was the victim who resisted.
Dante approached Joseph, fists clenched and cursing, with four
other boys and attacked (“jumped”) Joseph. When Dante’s
companions temporarily withdrew from the fight, Joseph fought
back against Dante and managed to land a couple of blows.
However, Dante (after receiving assistance from his companions)

                                 9
later kicked Joseph while Joseph was on the ground, including at
least one time to his head. Thus, even if Dante reasonably
believed at some point during his one-on-one fight with Joseph
that injury was imminent, Dante—as a member of the group that
instigated the assault against Joseph—could not claim that
kicking Joseph while he was on the ground was a reasonable
means to defend himself.
       Dante, of course, gave a different version of the events. He
asserts that he did not start the fight and that, “[i]f anything, the
evidence showed that [Dante] and Joseph engaged in mutual
combat.” As discussed, however, Joseph testified the group
attacked him. (See In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824,
830 [“The testimony of just one witness is enough to sustain a
conviction, so long as that testimony is not inherently
incredible.”]; In re Gustavo M. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1497
[“the evidence of a single witness is sufficient for proof of any
fact”].) The juvenile court found Joseph’s testimony was more
credible, stating it “had no problem believing that at the very
beginning . . . this was not mutual combat” and that “there was a
five on one.” We review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, not the defendant, and “[w]e cannot reject the
testimony of a witness that the [juvenile court] chooses to believe
unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is
apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.”
(Daniel G., at p. 830.) Nothing in Joseph’s testimony was
physically impossible or apparently false, nor does Dante even
argue it was.
       Second, even if the fight began as mutual combat (or if
Joseph first attacked Dante), substantial evidence still supported
the juvenile court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt Dante was

                                 10
not acting in self-defense during the latter portion of the assault.
As discussed, to justify an assault as an act of self-defense, the
threat of bodily injury must be imminent and the use of force in
self-defense must be reasonable. (People v. Minifie, supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 1064.)
       The video recording of the fight showed three members
from Dante’s group intervened to help Dante, dragged Joseph to
the ground, and repeatedly punched and kicked him. At this
point, Joseph was not fighting back, instead using his hands and
arms to shield himself against the attack by Dante’s companions.
Dante returned to the group attacking Joseph and kicked Joseph
several times while he was on the ground (including once or twice
to the head). The juvenile court could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that, by the time Dante decided to get his final kicks in,
any threat of bodily injury to Dante had subsided and that
therefore Dante’s use of force was excessive. (See People v.
Harris (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 534, 537 [“‘Even if it is assumed . . .
that [the victim] began the affray, the jury could well have found
that the force used by [the defendant] under the circumstances
far exceeded the amount of force necessary to defend himself.’”].)
These are precisely the types of factual findings we do not disturb
on appeal. (See id. at pp. 537-538 [whether the defendant had
reasonable grounds to fear injury and whether his use of force
was reasonable “presented questions of fact for the jury, with
whose conclusion we will not interfere”]; People v. Bobo (1960)
184 Cal.App.2d 285, 289 [“[w]hether defendant, as a reasonable
man, was justified in believing under all of the circumstances
that he was threatened with imminent danger . . . was a question
of fact for the jury,” and “with the jury’s finding on the factual
conflict we will not interfere”]; see also People v. Nguyen (2015)

                                11
61 Cal.4th 1015, 1044 [“‘“where some of the evidence tends to
show a situation in which a [use of force in self-defense] may not
be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the jury to
determine”’”].) Indeed, when counsel for Dante showed Dante the
video of him kicking Joseph, Dante did not say he was defending
himself; he said he kept kicking Joseph because he “was very
angry.”

            3.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding
                  Dante Committed Robbery
      “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence,
and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(Pen. Code, § 211; see People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249,
254.) Robbery is “‘“‘a species of aggravated larceny.’”’ [Citation.]
Theft by larceny may be committed without force or the threat of
violence and may be completed without the victim ever being
present. [Citation.] To elevate larceny to robbery, the taking
must be accomplished by force or fear and the property must be
taken from the victim or in his presence.” (Gomez, at p. 254; see
People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994.)
      Dante argues there was no evidence he took Joseph’s
backpack or any of the items in it (including the speaker) from
Joseph’s person or in Joseph’s immediate presence.2 Dante cites
Joseph’s testimony that it was either Brandon or Fabricio, not

2      For purposes of robbery, “‘[t]aking,’ . . . has two aspects:
(1) achieving possession of the property, known as ‘caption,’ and
(2) carrying the property away, or ‘asportation.’” (People v.
Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 255.)

                                 12
Dante, who removed the backpack from his shoulders and that
the backpack was sitting directly under where Brandon—not
Dante—was sitting on the bench after the fight. But even if
Dante was not the person who picked up Joseph’s backpack,
substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
beyond a reasonable doubt Dante aided and abetted the robbery.
       “Under [Penal Code] section 31, ‘[a]ll persons concerned in
the commission of a crime, . . . whether they directly commit the
act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, . . .
are principals in any crime so committed.’” (People v. Delgado
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 486.) “‘A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or
purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of
the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.’” (Delgado, at p. 486.)
“‘[F]actors for determining aiding and abetting of a robbery
include presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and
conduct before and after the crime, including flight.’” (People v.
Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 560, review granted July 13,
2022, S2747433; see In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5;
People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1294.)
       Dante approached Joseph with a group that included
Brandon and Fabricio, joined in the assault that enabled either
Brandon or Fabricio to take Joseph’s backpack, and sat with

3     The Supreme Court granted review in People v. Burgos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 550 and will decide whether Penal Code
section 1109, which governs bifurcation at trial of gang
enhancements from the substantive offense or offenses, applies
retroactively to cases that are not yet final.

                                 13
Brandon and the other members of the group immediately after
Brandon gained possession of the backpack. This evidence was
sufficient to show Dante aided and abetted the robbery, even if he
was not the one who took the backpack from Joseph. (See People
v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 869 [under Penal Code section 31,
“the word ‘aid’ . . . mean[s] ‘“to assist, ‘to supplement the efforts of
another’”’”]; In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5
[substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding the
minor aided and abetted a robbery where he approached the
victim with a companion, stood “within touching distance” while
the companion held the victim at knifepoint, and fled with the
companion]; People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409-
410 [substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding the
defendant aided and abetted a robbery where he and a
companion walked past, and returned to, the victims, and the
defendant “assumed [a] position in front of” the victims while the
companion pointed a gun at them and announced it was a
robbery].)
       Dante contends that, though he may have participated in
the fight and eventually ended up with Joseph’s speaker, there
was insufficient evidence he intended to steal any of Joseph’s
belongings “at the time of the incident.” As discussed, to be liable
as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have knowledge of
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and intend to facilitate or
encourage commission of the crime. To aid and abet a robbery,
the defendant “must form the intent to facilitate or encourage
commission of the robbery prior to or during the carrying away of
the loot to a place of temporary safety.” (People v. Cooper (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165; see People v. McDonald (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24.)

                                  14
       The evidence Dante knew of a plan or intended to rob
Joseph prior to the assault was not overwhelming. Because
Dante and Joseph had a preexisting hostile relationship, it is
possible Dante initially intended to attack Joseph, without
necessarily taking his possessions. But “[w]hether a person has
aided and abetted in the commission of a crime is a question of
fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the evidence and attendant
reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the judgment.”
(In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5.) And the “function
of an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence and
substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile court.” (Id. at
p. 6.)
       There was circumstantial evidence from which the juvenile
court could find beyond a reasonable doubt Dante, before or
during the assault, formed the intent to aid and abet the taking
of Joseph’s belongings. (See People v. Glukhoy (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599 [“Aiding and abetting may be shown by
circumstantial evidence.”].) Joseph testified that, when Dante’s
group approached him, he was wearing the backpack Brandon or
Fabricio eventually took, which showed Dante knew Joseph had
the backpack. When the group of boys first attacked Joseph, one
of the group reached into Joseph’s pockets, which suggests theft
was part of the plan. After Brandon or Fabricio removed the
backpack, Dante continued to fight Joseph. After the fight was
over, Dante sat down with the group on the benches, while
Brandon assumed control of the backpack. When Joseph asked
about his backpack and Brandon told him to leave before the
group beat him up again, Dante did nothing. And after the
incident Dante bragged about taking the speaker, and Fabricio
admitted Dante robbed someone (presumably Joseph). The

                               15
juvenile court could reasonably infer Dante—as the instigator of
and a participant in the attack, a companion of whoever took the
backpack, and the ultimate recipient of the loot—formed the
intent to aid and abet the taking of whatever items of value
Joseph had before the group approached. (See People v. Burgos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 560 [“The jury could reasonably infer
that [the defendant] intended to participate in a ‘show of force’ as
one member of the larger group outnumbering the victims,”
where the defendant “was a ‘continuous constituent’ of the group
that committed the robbery”], review granted; People v.
Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409 [“concerted action” by
coparticipants during robbery “reasonably implies a common
purpose,” which demonstrated the defendant’s “conduct during
the attempt to rob [the victim] was a knowing and intentional
effort to assist” his coparticipant].) The juvenile court could also
reasonably infer Dante formed the intent to aid and abet the
taking of Joseph’s belongings after seeing his companions search
Joseph’s pockets and take the backpack during the fight. (See
People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1148 [“‘Aiding
and abetting may be committed “on the spur of the moment,” that
is, as instantaneously as the criminal act itself.’”]; People v.
Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 742 [“advance
knowledge is not a prerequisite for liability as an aider and
abettor”].)

      B.     Dante Has Not Shown His Counsel Provided
             Ineffective Assistance
       As stated, the People introduced a copy of a message on
social media from Fabricio to Joseph stating Dante had robbed
someone. Dante argues that the message was inadmissible

                                16
hearsay and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to object to its admission.4
       “The due process right to effective assistance of counsel
extends to minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings.” (In re
M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1528; see In re Gault (1967)
387 U.S. 1, 41 [87 S.Ct. 1428].) “‘“To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have
been more favorable to the defendant.”’” (People v. Rices (2017)
4 Cal.5th 49, 80; see People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966,
979-980.) “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” (In re Gay (2020)
8 Cal.5th 1059, 1086; see Rices, at p. 80.)
       “‘“A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that
counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus
bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate

4      The People do not argue the message was admissible. They
do argue Dante forfeited his hearsay argument by failing to
object at trial. (See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7
[“Ordinarily, ‘the failure to object to the admission of . . . hearsay
at trial forfeits an appellate claim that such evidence was
improperly admitted.’”].) While there are exceptions that may
excuse an attorney’s failure to object—for example, “‘“where an
objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by
substantive law then in existence”’” (Perez, at pp. 7-8)—Dante
does not argue any such exception applies here.

                                  17
assistance of counsel.”’” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86,
109; see People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 382.) “On
direct appeal, if the record ‘“sheds no light on why counsel acted
or failed to act in the manner challenged,”’ we must reject the
claim ‘“unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to
provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.”’” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488; see
People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.)
       The record does not disclose why Dante’s trial counsel did
not object when the prosecutor introduced Fabricio’s message.5
Dante asserts there was no “logical tactical basis” for counsel’s
failure to object. But there could have been. “‘“Whether to object
to inadmissible evidence is a tactical decision; because trial
counsel’s tactical decisions are accorded substantial deference
[citations], failure to object seldom establishes counsel’s
incompetence.”’” (People v. Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 80;
accord, People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 416; see People v.
Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 188 [counsel’s decision not to
“object to the prosecution’s use of hearsay evidence” is a “tactical
choice[ ] . . . better evaluated by way of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus”]6; People v. Dominguez (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 464,

5     Although the record suggests it was a conscious, tactical
decision. When the prosecutor introduced a copy of the message,
she stated she had provided a copy to Dante’s counsel “a while
ago.” When the People moved to admit the message into
evidence, Dante’s counsel stated, “No objection.”

6     A juvenile may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus and
assert counsel provided ineffective assistance during a juvenile
adjudication proceeding. (See In re Anthony J. (2004)

                                18
467 [“the tactical decision to object or not to object to the
admission of hearsay is for counsel acting in his professional
capacity”].)
      As the People point out, there is at least one reason counsel
for Dante may have decided not to object: She may not have
wanted to risk the prosecutor calling Fabricio to testify. The
primary evidence supporting Dante’s defense was his testimony,
in which he denied the allegations against him and offered a
version of the assault that differed from Joseph’s. Fabricio was a
percipient witness (and potential participant in the assault and
robbery). Had the People called Fabricio to testify about the
message he sent Joseph, his testimony may have been
inconsistent with Dante’s and undermined his defense.
      In addition, the People had already introduced similar
admissible evidence. The primary purpose of introducing the text
message was to show that Dante took Joseph’s speaker. Joseph
had already testified he received a message via social media
directly from Dante bragging about taking the speaker. Counsel
for Dante therefore reasonably may have determined that
objecting to the admission of the text message (even if successful)
would have only a marginal benefit and could highlight the
unfavorable evidence. (See People v. Bona (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
511, 522 [trial counsel was not necessarily deficient by failing to
object to hearsay statements where the statements “were
cumulative of other properly admitted evidence”]; see also People
v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1313 [“‘[T]he decision
whether to object, move to strike, or seek admonition regarding
[undesired] testimony is highly tactical, and depends upon

117 Cal.App.4th 718, 727; In re Butterfield (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d
794, 796-797.)

                                19
counsel’s evaluation of the gravity of the problem and whether
objection or other responses would serve only to highlight the
undesirable testimony.’”]; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81,
165 [same].)

      C.     The Trial Court Erred in Setting a Term of
             Confinement
       Welfare and Institutions Code section 726,
subdivision (d)(1), provides: “If the minor is removed from the
physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian as the result of
an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order
shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical
confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of
imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of
the offense or offenses which brought . . . the minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” When the minor is not
removed from the physical custody of a parent, however, “the
statute [does] not empower the court to specify a term of
imprisonment . . . .” (In re Matthew A., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
p. 541; see In re H.N. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 962, 973; In re A.C.
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 591-592.) Dante argues, the People
concede, and we agree that, because the juvenile court did not
remove Dante from the custody of his parents, the court erred in
setting a term of confinement. Where the court erroneously sets
a term of confinement “‘for a minor who is not removed from
parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term.’” (In re H.N.,
at p. 973; see In re A.C., at p. 592; Matthew A., at p. 541.)

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                         DISPOSITION

      The order setting the term of confinement at four years is
stricken from the disposition order. As modified, the orders are
affirmed.

                                          SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

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