Court Opinion

ID: 9909906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 16:05:44.452408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:16.809930
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                                             RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2023
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0242-MR

JUSTIN RADCLIFF                                                       APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
V.                HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, JUDGE
                             NO. 21-CR-00432

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      Justin Radcliff appeals as a matter of right 1 from the Boone Circuit Court

judgment convicting him of one count of first-degree rape and two counts of

first-degree rape, victim under 12 years of age. The jury recommended a

sentence of thirty-years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

                        I. Facts and Procedural Background

      Radcliff was charged with one count of first-degree rape and two counts

of first-degree rape, victim under 12 years of age, after his fiancée Amanda’s

child, L.R., and L.R.’s friend, A.B., made accusations of sexual assault to their

      1 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
school counselor. 2 In 2018, Radcliff began dating Amanda, who at the time

had one child, L.R. Soon after they began dating, Radcliff moved in with

Amanda; they then got engaged and had a child in 2019.

      At their home, Radcliff would frequently invite L.R., who was 11 years old

at the time, into his bed for “cuddle time.” Amanda eventually asked L.R. if

“cuddle time” was innocent or if something else was happening, and L.R.

disclosed that Radcliff had stuck his fingers inside her vagina during “cuddle

time.” Amanda questioned Radcliff about the incidents, with L.R. present, and

Radcliff responded that L.R. had confused digital rape with the lower

abdominal massages he would give them. Amanda did not call the police or

kick Radcliff out of the house, but rather convinced herself the incidents never

happened and were a product of her anxiety. L.R. felt isolated by Amanda’s

decision and chose not to report the second incident of Radcliff’s abuse to

Amanda.

      Shortly after L.R.’s disclosure of the first incident, Amanda permitted

several of L.R.’s classmates to come over for a slumber party to celebrate L.R.’s

12th birthday. Among the attendees was L.R.’s 12-year-old friend, A.B., who

stayed over an extra night after the slumber party. During the second night of

A.B.’s stay, Radcliff entered L.R.’s bedroom, put his hand over A.B.’s mouth,

      2 Both L.R. and A.B. are biological females who identify as male.  Their
biological sex is relevant because the rape charges stem from allegations Radcliff
penetrated their vaginas. The appellate briefs point out, and the record confirms,
inconsistencies in the accusers’ preferred pronouns. For the sake of clarity, this Court
will refer to the individual accusers as she/her.

                                           2
took her pants off, held her hands over her head and penetrated A.B.’s vagina

with his penis.

      Eventually, L.R. and A.B. (separately) reported the incidents to their

school counselor, Stacy Russell. The day L.R. reported, the school contacted

law enforcement, to whom L.R. disclosed that she had told her mother about

the abuse, but Amanda had done nothing. L.R. agreed to do a recorded phone

call with Radcliff, during which Radcliff admitted to touching L.R. When

Radcliff arrived at the school to pick up L.R., police arrested him. Thereafter,

A.B. reported her incident of sexual abuse to the school counselor.

      Radcliff was indicted by a Boone County Grand Jury on one count of

first-degree rape as to A.B. and two counts of first-degree rape, victim under 12

years of age, as to L.R. While awaiting trial, Radcliff sent two letters to Amanda

from jail, both of which Amanda read aloud at trial. In the first letter, he asked

her to speak with L.R. and beg her and A.B. to give him a second chance and

apologized for “invading their privacy.” In the second letter, Radcliff instructed

Amanda to offer L.R. and A.B. $100 each and a trip to the mall if they would

admit that they lied. Radcliff’s letter implored Amanda to tear up the letters

after reading them.

      Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Radcliff of all three counts

and the trial court imposed the jury’s recommended thirty-year sentence.

Radcliff now appeals.

                                        3
                                        II.   Analysis

   A. The trial court properly denied Radcliff’s motion for separate
      trials.

          Radcliff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his

motion to sever the charges involving L.R. from those involving A.B. and to hold

separate trials. We disagree.

          Trial courts are vested with great discretion in deciding whether to join or

sever offenses and their decision will be disturbed on appeal only if an abuse of

that discretion is shown. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 548 S.W.3d 255, 258

(Ky. 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision was

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principle.”

Lopez v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Anderson v.

Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007)).

          This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on joinder/severance using a

two-step inquiry: first, whether the offenses were properly joined in a single

indictment under RCr 3 6.18 and second, whether RCr 8.31 required separate

trials.

          RCr 6.18 provides:

          Two (2) or more offenses may be charged in the same complaint or two
          (2) or more offenses whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, may be
          charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for
          each offense, if the offenses are of the same or similar character or are
          based on the same acts or transactions connected together or
          constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

          3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                              4
      Meanwhile, RCr 8.31 states, in relevant part: “If it appears that a

defendant or the Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses

or of defendants in an indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation

or by joinder for trial, the court shall order separate trials of counts, grant

separate trials of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.”

      In denying Radcliff’s motion for separate trials, the trial court found that

the offenses were of similar character and inextricably intertwined.

Specifically, it found that:

      In this matter, the alleged sexual abuses here both involved minor
      children of similar ages (L.R. was 11 years old and A.B. was 12 years
      old), occurred at the Defendant’s house, and occurred in the same room.
      At the time these alleged incidents occurred, the mother of L.R. was
      allegedly present in the house. Additionally, the alleged incident
      involving A.B. took place when L.R. was present in the room with
      Defendant and A.B. during L.R.’s birthday sleepover weekend. Lastly,
      Defendant is alleged to have written a letter to L.R.’s mother offering to
      pay both victims to recant their stories.

      While Radcliff did not challenge the adequacy of the indictment below, he

now emphasizes the differences in the offenses: (1) though L.R. and A.B. were

of similar age, the first-degree rape statute used in this case – ages 11 and 12 –

require different proof, elements and jury instructions; (2) the incidents

involving L.R. and A.B. occurred in the same house, but not in the same room;

(3) the letters he wrote would have been admissible in each separate trial; (4)

the sexual crimes were different as L.R. was allegedly penetrated with Radcliff’s

fingers, while A.B. was allegedly penetrated with Radcliff’s penis; (5) A.B.

provided a specific date for the incident, but L.R.’s allegations were within a

one-year period preceding A.B.’s; and (6) the jury’s indication that it was

                                         5
struggling to unanimously agree on the third verdict (as to A.B.) implies

prejudice.

      We find these distinctions lacking for purposes of severance. As the

Commonwealth notes, evidence of the separate crimes against L.R. and A.B.

would have been admissible in separate trials under KRE 404(b). That rule

states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be offered at trial:

      (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
      opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
      mistake or accident; or

      (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case
      that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious
      adverse effect on the offering party.

      Here, the acts of sexual abuse were of similar character and

demonstrated Radcliff’s motive, opportunity, intent, plan and absence of

mistake or accident. L.R. and A.B. were close friends of a similar age; they

were both biological females; all of the sexual acts took place in L.R.’s home

when Amanda was at home; the Commonwealth alleged Radcliff penetrated the

victims’ vaginas – with his fingers in L.R.’s case and his penis in A.B.’s case;

and both victims were young people over whom Radcliff had authority – he was

acting as L.R.’s stepfather and was an adult to whom A.B.’s care, as a minor

child, was entrusted.

      Moreover, the evidence of Radcliff’s acts of abuse against L.R. and A.B.

were inextricably intertwined. After L.R. informed her mother of the abuse,

Amanda chose to host a slumber party at which A.B. was sexually abused.

L.R. was in the room when Radcliff raped A.B. and testified about the incident

                                         6
at trial. Both L.R. and A.B. reported the abuse to the same school counselor.

And Radcliff wrote letters to Amanda from jail about the incidents involving

both children. Lastly, Radcliff’s defense at trial was that L.R. and A.B.

conspired together to lie: this defense would not have been possible in a

severed trial without mentioning the other victim.

      Since evidence of each offense would have been admissible under KRE

404(b) in separate trials, the trials need not be severed. In addition to the

evidence being admissible under KRE 404(b), the trial court’s ruling conformed

with RCr 6.18. See, e.g., Whaley v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.3d 576 (Ky. 2019)

(holding that severance was not required when sexual assaults of minor

children took place in the same home at a slumber party, at which the

assaulting adult was in an authoritative role, since the evidence showed

opportunity, intent, plan, absence of mistake, and modus operandi); Elam v.

Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818 (Ky. 2016) (severance of sexual crimes against

different victims not required when the alleged crimes are part of defendant’s

common scheme or plan to sexually assault little girls of the same age who

depended on him and regularly stayed at his home); Montgomery v.

Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 28 (Ky. 2010) (holding that pattern of conduct for

KRE 404(b) purposes was satisfied when defendant had nighttime contact at

the same house with his stepdaughter victim and her three overnight guests).

Under these circumstances, the trial court’s joinder of the trials was not an

abuse of its discretion, nor has Radcliff demonstrated that he suffered

                                        7
prejudice under RCr 8.31 connected with the joinder sufficient to warrant a

new trial.

   B. The trial court correctly denied Radcliff’s motion to suppress the
      recorded phone call between Radcliff and L.R.

       Radcliff next alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress the recorded phone call between him and L.R. In support, Radcliff

cites protections provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution against warrantless

searches and asserts that L.R., as a minor, lacked the ability to consent to the

recording of phone call, thus rendering it unlawful. The trial court denied his

motion to suppress and overruled his renewed objection at trial.

       The recording of the phone call was obtained following L.R.’s disclosure

to the school counselor that Radcliff had touched her. Law enforcement came

to the school to meet with L.R., and L.R. informed the officers that her mother

had taken no action after learning of the abuse. At the officers’ suggestion,

L.R. agreed to place a recorded phone call to Radcliff, which was played for the

jury at trial:

       L.R.: Justin, I missed the bus I was . . . are you around Mom?

       Radcliff: No.

       L.R.: Okay, good. I missed the bus because I was thinking about telling
       the counselor what you did.

       Radcliff: Do what?

       L.R.: I was thinking about telling the counselor what you did but then I
       chickened out, and I missed the bus. It bothers me because I feel like
       you will do it again to somebody else.

                                         8
Radcliff: Who?

L.R.: Anybody else.

Radcliff: What are you talking about?

L.R.: You know what I’m talking about. You touched me.

Radcliff: Okay, but where are you at right now?

L.R.: I’m in school.

Radcliff: Okay, well, I guess I’ll be there shortly to get you. Can you go
outside and wait?

L.R.: No.

Radcliff: Why?

L.R.: They’re not going to let me stand outside.

Radcliff: Okay.

L.R.: We really need to talk about what you did though.

Radcliff: Okay, well, I’m getting ready to head out to come get you. I
don’t have time to sit and talk right now though.

L.R.: No, I just said we need to talk about this. I don’t care if you don’t
have time.

Radcliff: We can talk about this, yes. Me and you. You can ride with me
to Kroger.

L.R.: No, I want to talk about this now. Don’t come here.

Radcliff: I have to come get you from school if you’re sitting there.

L.R.: No, you don’t. I don’t trust you.

Radcliff: Come on now.

L.R.: Don’t “come on now” me.

Radcliff: Are we going to really go through this?

                                  9
      L.R.: Yes, we are. You shouldn’t have touched me.

      Radcliff: Yes, I’m aware. And I’ve admitted to that, and I’m sorry. Can
      we not do this right now? Can I just come get you from school and drop
      you off?

      L.R.: No. Can Mom get me?

      Radcliff: No, because she’s got to work.

      L.R.: Please? Just ask her.

      Radcliff: She’s at work. I cannot have her leave work to come get you.
      I’m sorry. I am on my way to get you. Please, just, let’s get you home.
      We’ll talk. Please.

      L.R.: You’ll have to come inside to get me.

      Radcliff: Are you alone right now?

      L.R.: Yes, I’m alone.

      Radcliff: Okay, well look. I love you, and I promise nothing’s going to
      happen again. But I need you to understand that I can’t afford this shit
      right now. I love you. I’m on my way there.

      L.R.: Then why’d you do it?

      Radcliff: Lapse of judgment. I’m sorry. Please, just, let’s not do this right
      now. I’m almost to the school to get you. Please.

      L.R.: Okay. Whatever.

      Radcliff: Okay. I love you. I’ll be there shortly.

      L.R.: Bye.

      Radcliff: Bye.

      On appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the

trial court’s factual findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are reviewed

for clear error, and its application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.

Bond v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Ky. 2015).
                                        10
      Eavesdropping is defined as overhearing, recording, amplifying, or

transmitting “any part of a wire or oral communication of others without the

consent of at least one (1) party thereto by means of any electronic, mechanical

or other device.” KRS 526.010. In other words, Kentucky is a one-party

consent state for purposes of recording conversations. Major v.

Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 710 (Ky. 2005) (“The practice of recording

conversations with the consent of at least one party to the conversation has

long been recognized in Kentucky jurisprudence[]”).

      Radcliff argues that L.R.’s age, intelligence, knowledge, and maturity did

not meet the threshold for consent; in support, he makes vague allegations

that L.R. was failing several classes in school and suffering from depression

and other mental health disorders at the time. However, even if that could be

proven, he does not state specifically how L.R.’s ability to consent was affected

by these issues.

      Instead, Radcliff primarily bases his lack of consent argument on L.R.’s

age at the time. Neither he nor the Commonwealth present any Kentucky law

on a minor’s capacity to serve as one party consent for eavesdropping

purposes. Instead, Radcliff directs this Court (as he did the trial court) to

consider a Wisconsin Court of Appeals case, State v. Turner, 854 N.W.2d 865

(Wis. Ct. App. 2014), for guidance in ruling. Wisconsin, like Kentucky, is a

one-party consent state for recording phone calls. In Turner, the defendant

similarly attempted to suppress his minor daughter’s consent to a warrantless,

recorded phone call with him in which he made incriminating statements. Id.

                                        11
at 868. Turner argued because his daughter was a minor at the time, she was

incapable of consenting for purposes of the state’s wiretapping laws. Id.

Ultimately, the Turner court upheld the minor’s ability to consent, focusing on

the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances,

“including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, intelligence, knowledge, and

maturity.” Id. “It is also appropriate to consider the minor’s education and

state of mind, the demeanor and tone of voice of the officers requesting

consent, the location at which consent was given, and the duration of the

encounter.” Id. at 874. “Fundamentally, a minor’s consent must be the

product of an ‘essentially free and unconstrained choice.’” Id. at 868 (quoting

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).

      In its order denying Radcliff’s motion to suppress, the trial court

acknowledged that the officers did not seek to contact L.R.’s mother before

recording the call but noted the reason for that: L.R. had informed the officers

that Amanda had taken no action after learning of the abuse. The court’s order

further discusses its personal observations of, and interactions with, L.R. in

assessing her capacity to consent. The trial court applied the totality of the

circumstances test in determining L.R.’s ability to consent, reasoning as

follows:

      Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds L.R. was able to
      and did voluntarily consent to the recording of her conversation with the
      Defendant. L.R. was not a suspect of a criminal investigation nor was
      she the focus of a search and seizure to be conduced by law enforcement.
      Additionally, L.R. disclosed the alleged sexual abuse to Detective Watson,
      and also reported that she disclosed the sexual abuse to her mother and
      her mother did not want to call the police because the Defendant made

                                       12
      money for the family. Her school counselor was present before and after
      the call. Additionally, the Court interviewed L.R. for another pending
      Motion and finds that interaction adds to the Court’s finding that she
      was able to voluntarily consent to the phone call.

      Radcliff has not alleged that L.R. was coerced into participating in the

controlled call. Instead, if anything, the record reflects that law enforcement

had reason to believe they were protecting L.R. from coercion by her mother

when they did not seek her mother’s consent for the phone call. The record

also shows that the school counselor was present before and after the call,

which reduces the opportunity and likelihood for undue influence on the part

of law enforcement. Notably, L.R.’s testimony about the phone call contained

no hint of coercion or undue influence on the part of the officers. Lastly,

Radcliff reduced his own expectation of privacy by openly discussing the abuse

with his victim. For him to now negate that by arguing the minor he abused

was too young to consent is, as the Commonwealth observes, both

disingenuous and distasteful.

      Because L.M.’s conversation with Radcliff was lawfully intercepted under

the one-party consent exception, Radcliff’s suppression motion was properly

denied.

   C. The trial court properly granted the Commonwealth’s KRE 412
      motion to exclude any mention of a romantic relationship between
      L.R. and A.B.

      Radcliff next contends that the trial court erred by granting the

Commonwealth’s KRE 412 motion to exclude any mention of a romantic

relationship between L.R. and A.B. This Court reviews a trial court’s

                                       13
evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, Lopez, 459 S.W.3d at 873, and

finds that threshold has not been met here.

      During voir dire, while questioning a potential juror at the bench,

defense counsel raised the issue of whether it was more likely that teenagers

would collude and lie when they were romantically involved, as opposed to

being just friends. The potential juror indicated that he thought it would be

more likely for teenagers to collude if they were involved romantically. The

Commonwealth objected to any mention of L.R.’s and A.B.’s romantic

relationship under KRE 412 (known as the “rape shield law”) and pointed out

that defense counsel had not filed a KRE 412(c) written motion prior to trial.

The court indicated it would hear arguments from counsel on KRE 412

following voir dire.

      At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the rape shield law did not

apply because it had no intention of delving into discussion of a sexual

relationship or sexual contact between the victims but thought that evidence of

the relationship itself was fair game because it was relevant to whether they

had motive to lie. Defense counsel further argued that 12-year-old’s being in a

romantic relationship did not imply that they were sexually involved. In

response, the Commonwealth asserted that references to the victims being

romantically involved lent an inference of sexual behavior and the victims’

sexual predisposition, which was prohibited under KRE 412.

      The trial court ruled that it would address objections to specific

statements as they arose during trial but as a general matter, instructed

                                       14
defense counsel to avoid mentioning a romantic relationship between the

victims and to refer to them just as close friends. Radcliff now argues that the

court’s ruling deprived him of developing his theory of defense that L.R. and

A.B.’s relationship influenced a plot to concoct the allegations against him.

        KRE 412 concerns the admissibility of the victim’s character and

behavior in cases involving rape or similar offenses and provides, in relevant

part:

        (a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not
          admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
          misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
               (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
          other sexual behavior.
               (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
          predisposition.

        (b) Exceptions:
              (1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if
          otherwise admissible under these rules:
                   (A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
              alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
              accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
              evidence;
                   (B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
              alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual
              misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the
              prosecution; and
                   (C) any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense
              charged.

        KRE 412 “is meant both to shield the victims of sex crimes from painful

and embarrassing questions and disclosures about their private sexual

activities as well as to preserve the fairness of the proceedings by excluding

irrelevant attacks on the victim’s character and guarding against distracting

the jury with collateral matters.” Montgomery, 320 S.W.3d at 39. In

                                         15
Montgomery, the Court held it was improper under KRE 412 to use evidence of

a sexual relationship between the victim and her brother to substantiate the

defendant’s theory that they had colluded against him since such evidence was

“apt to cast [the victim’s] character in a bad light.” Id. at 44. Montgomery was

permitted to testify about the close relationship between the victim and her

brother – just not a sexual one. Id.

      Similarly, here, the trial court’s restrictions on defense counsel’s line of

questioning kept it within the boundaries of KRE 412. Radcliff was able to

question L.R. about how L.R. resented Radcliff disciplining her because he was

not her real father. Radcliff also presented evidence of the close friendship

between L.R. and A.B., how they were best friends and how A.B. would

frequently sleep over at A.B.’s house and argued his theory that they were

colluding against him and were lying.

      Regardless of whether defense counsel intended to introduce evidence of

sexual contact or a sexual relationship between L.R. and A.B., mention of the

victims being romantically involved is prohibited under KRE 412(a)(2) since it

goes to their sexual predisposition, even though they were only 12 years old.

This is especially so here since, as the Commonwealth points out, the victims’

identification as male, though biologically female, could be controversial, if not

problematic, for the jury and could invite prejudice. While we acknowledge

Radcliff’s position that the jury may have been more swayed to believe the

victims were fabricating the allegations had it known they were romantically

involved, under these facts, introduction of such evidence is barred by KRE

                                        16
412. Thus, we uphold the trial court’s ruling on the Commonwealth’s KRE 412

motion to exclude. 4

   D. The trial court’s denial of Radcliff’s directed verdict motion on the
      charge of first-degree rape against A.B. was proper.

      Radcliff next avers the trial court erred by denying his motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first-degree rape against A.B.

Specifically, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of

showing the rape occurred through forcible compulsion and failed to establish

that A.B. was in imminent fear of death or physical injury. We disagree.

      To succeed on a motion for directed verdict a defendant must meet a

high bar:

      On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
      evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
      questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
      testimony.

Campbell v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 153, 163 (Ky. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)).

      4 As the Commonwealth notes, the jury nonetheless likely formed the

impression anyway that L.R. and A.B. were romantically involved. In one of the letters
Radcliff sent to Amanda, which she read at trial, Radcliff writes that he wants L.R. to
know he is sorry for “invading her privacy and her boyfriend’s privacy.” While A.B.
was not named as the boyfriend in question, the implication is clear. As a result, any
error in the trial court’s KRE 412 ruling was rendered harmless by the introduction of
this evidence.

                                          17
      Upon appellate review, the standard is nearly identical, tasking us with

determining “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Woods,

657 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d

345, 349 (Ky. 2005)); see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 497 S.W.3d 222, 225

(Ky. 2016) (“Our standard of review for denial of a directed verdict is whether,

under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for the jury to

find [the defendant] guilty[]”). The evidence must be of substance and a

directed verdict is appropriate where the Commonwealth produces “no more

than a mere scintilla” of such evidence. Beaumont v. Commonwealth, 295

S.W.3d 60, 68 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Benham, 861 S.W.2d at 188).

      Radcliff was charged with first-degree rape of A.B. under KRS

510.040(1)(a), which allows conviction for a person who “engages in sexual

intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion[.]” “Forcible

compulsion” for these purposes is defined as “physical force or threat of

physical force, express or implied, which places a person in fear of immediate

death, physical injury to self or another person, fear of the immediate kidnap of

self or another person, or fear of any offense under this chapter. Physical

resistance on the part of the victim shall not be necessary to meet this

definition[.]” KRS 510.010(2).

      Caselaw is clear that forcible compulsion may be inferred from the

evidence. This Court has held that “[i]n determining whether the victim felt

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threatened to engage in sex or feared harm from the attacker, a subjective test

is applied.” Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 79 (Ky. 2013).

Sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion exists if “[t]aking into consideration

all of the circumstances, the jury could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that

the [alleged victim] was terror-stricken at the time she submitted to [the

defendant].” Id. (quoting Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. App.

1978)).

      Here, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, a reasonable juror could have inferred from the evidence that

Radcliff used physical force during the rape to place A.B. in fear of physical

injury. A.B. testified that she was raped by Radcliff: she was sleeping and was

awakened to the bedroom door creaking, and Radcliff walked in; Radcliff put

his hand over her mouth, undid her pants and took them off; Radcliff put his

penis inside of her vagina; he took both of her hands in one hand and held

them above her head. A.B. told the jury “I tried to scream but I couldn’t. I

couldn’t breathe . . . I tried to move my hands but he was stronger than I was.”

A.B. stated that Radcliff was heavy, was on top of her, and was breathing

heavily and grunting, with a scowl on his face. A.B. said when Radcliff was

done, he told her not to worry because he was wearing a condom. A.B. cried

herself to sleep afterward. The next day, Radcliff drove A.B. home; A.B.

testified that she was frightened and uneasy during the car ride.

      Certainly, from this evidence a jury could reasonably infer that A.B., 12

years old at the time, was afraid of being hurt during this struggle, especially

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given the testimony that her physical movement was restricted, and breathing

constricted, by an adult male much larger than her. Accordingly, the trial

court correctly denied Radcliff’s motion for directed verdict on this charge.

   E. No cumulative error resulted.

      Cumulative error is “the doctrine under which multiple errors, although

harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to

render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d

577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Cumulative error exists only “where the individual errors

were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the prejudicial.” Id. Given

that we have found no merit in any of Radcliff’s arguments, cumulative error

does not exist.

                                 III.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Boone Circuit

Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Steven Jared Buck
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny Lynn Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

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