Court Opinion

ID: 9444243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:04:00.934654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.784343
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/3/23 Kasparian v. Edge Systems CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

GREGORY J. KASPARIAN,                                       B318216

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                           Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                 18STCV06077

EDGE SYSTEMS LLC,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Dennis J. Landin, Judge. Affirmed.

     Mann & Elias and Imad Y. Elias for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

     CDF Labor Law, Todd R. Wulffson, Ashley A. Halberda
and Alessandra C. Whipple for Defendant and Respondent.
                  _________________________
       Gregory J. Kasparian sued his former employer Edge
Systems LLC dba The Hydrafacial Company (Hydrafacial)
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,
§ 12900 et seq.) for age discrimination and related causes of
action, and causes of action based on Labor Code1 violations
and breach of contract stemming from Hydrafacial’s alleged
failure to pay him earned commissions. The trial court
granted Hydrafacial’s motion for summary adjudication in part.
It entered judgment in Hydrafacial’s favor on all Kasparian’s
claims after he stipulated to dismiss his remaining causes
of action as nonviable in light of the trial court’s ruling.
We affirm the judgment.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       “Because this case comes before us after the trial court
granted a motion for summary [adjudication], we take the facts
from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled
on that motion.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36
Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) In accordance with our standard of review,
we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
Kasparian, the party opposing summary adjudication, and
resolve any doubts concerning the evidence in his favor. (Ibid.)
1.     The parties
       Hydrafacial designs, manufactures, markets, and sells
aesthetic technologies and products. Its corporate office is in
Long Beach, California. Hydrafacial “maintains various regional
sales areas” nationwide but has no physical locations outside

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code
unless otherwise stated.

                               2
California. Dan Watson, the vice president of sales, was
Kasparian’s supervisor from March 2017 when Watson was hired
until the end of Kasparian’s employment.2 Clint Carnell is the
CEO of Hydrafacial.
       Kasparian lives in Georgia. He moved there in February
2018 from Newton Square, Pennsylvania where he had lived
since 2005. After the move, he kept his Newton Square house
as a second home where he stayed when visiting Pennsylvania.
His son lived in the house. Throughout his employment,
Kasparian’s paystubs listed his Newton Square address.
In 2018, he paid Pennsylvania and Georgia state income tax.
       Hydrafacial hired Kasparian—then age 51—in September
2012 while he was in California to interview with the company.
He was an exempt, commissioned, at-will employee. Kasparian
held the position of Corporate Account Director (CAD) and
ran the east coast (east of the Mississippi) domestic sales team
for the “Hydrafacial machine” until Hydrafacial terminated
his employment in July 2018. According to Watson, at the time,
CADs were responsible for selling capital equipment, meaning
Hydrafacial machines, and “closing the deal” for corporate
accounts, such as large hotels or chains.
       Kasparian was a top performer and continually produced
sales. In the last 18 months or so of his employment, he sold
just under $1 million in “rolling sales.” He was told, “ ‘You keep
producing like this, you’re gonna be here a long time.’ ” As a top
achiever during the last two years of his employment, Kasparian

2    Watson was Hydrafacial’s designated person most
knowledgeable.

                                3
earned inclusion in “the coveted Presidents’ Club,” a revenue-
based performance award.
2.     Kasparian’s work in California
       Kasparian “understood that working in California and
traveling to the corporate offices in Southern California was
an essential part of his job duties.” Throughout his employment,
he spent an average of 10 intermittent weeks each year working
in California. He slept a total of eight to 12 weeks in California
during 2015, 12 to 16 weeks during 2016—seven of which were
in the fourth quarter, and 12 to 16 weeks during 2017. The
longest consecutive-day visit Kasparian made to California
during his employment was about two weeks.
       When in California, Kasparian met with Hydrafacial
department heads, employees, the company president, and
his manager. He also met with clients and covered a “vacant
California territory” another employee previously had handled.3
In mid-2016, Kasparian had a dedicated office at Hydrafacial’s
Long Beach facility. He began staying at his former boss Dean
Langdon’s California apartment “for weeks at a time” after
Langdon moved to Florida. Kasparian received personal
mail in California at the Hydrafacial corporate office and
at a coworker’s residence.
       In fall 2016, the person to whom Kasparian reported told
him, “ ‘We really need to solidify the California business, and
I need you to be here. I need you to be here like you live here.’ ”
From 2016 to 2017, Kasparian considered moving to California
because he was spending so much time there due to the turnover

3     By “vacant,” Kasparian seems to mean “unassigned.”

                                 4
in employees. His manager was “pushing hard” for him to do so.
Kasparian never owned property or paid state income taxes
in California.
3.      Hydrafacial’s corporate realignment
        Two private equity companies took over Hydrafacial’s
ownership in December 2016. In mid-2017, Hydrafacial’s
leadership decided to combine its medical (doctors’ offices,
hospitals) and nonmedical (hotels, day spas, resorts) sales
functions and avenues so that sales representatives would be
selling to both types of customers. Before, the sales force had
been split between medical and nonmedical sales. CADs sold to
corporate, nonmedical accounts. It was Watson’s responsibility
to plan the realignment.
        As a result of this corporate realignment, in July 2018
Hydrafacial “let go” of Kasparian, who was then 57 years old,
and about five other employees in corporate account sales—none
was under age 40. At the time, there were about 75 to 80 people
on the sales team. Kasparian was at the corporate headquarters
in California for what he believed was his standard quarterly
business review meeting. Instead, Watson terminated his
employment. Hydrafacial decided to terminate Kasparian’s
employment around June 2018 and advised him of the
termination in July before announcing the realignment
to the company. Watson did not give Kasparian a reason for
his termination nor did he tell him the company was realigning
its sales force to sell to both medical and nonmedical clients.
Kasparian recalled Watson telling him something along the lines
of, “ ‘Well, we’re making some changes. And I know there’s never
a good time for this, but you’ll bounce on your feet, you’ll be fine.

                                  5
This is always a tough situation, but you’re fired’ or ‘you no
longer have a job here.’ ”
      Before the realignment, there were three CADs—
Kasparian (age 57), Tracie Wertz (age 53), and Dan Townsley
(age 39). Hydrafacial retained Wertz as a CAD after the layoffs,
but in a different role.4 Townsley’s CAD position was eliminated
along with Kasparian’s, but Hydrafacial offered Townsley
a capital sales manager (CSM) position—a position for which
Kasparian was qualified—in the Philadelphia area about
40 miles from where Townsley lived. The CSM position was
similar to the CAD position in that both CSMs and CADs sold
Hydrafacial machines, but CSMs sold the machines to individual,
rather than to corporate, accounts. Watson testified Hydrafacial
didn’t look for alternative positions for Kasparian because he
was in Georgia and “there was nothing open[ ] in Georgia.”
      Hydrafacial asserted it let Kasparian go because there were
no available open positions for him in Georgia, and Hydrafacial
considered Wertz to have more experience and connections in
the spa and wellness area—where Watson testified the CAD role
had changed its focus—than Kasparian. Kasparian’s revenue
numbers were higher than Wertz’s and Townsley’s, however,
and he had been at the company longer than both. (Wertz and

4     Watson testified that pre-realignment, a CAD was a
“hunter . . . trying to get capital equipment sales.” CADs received
a base salary and commissions. After the realignment, the sole
CAD (Wertz) had a “marketing type role” that involved meeting
with corporate accounts, “try[ing] to open the door,” and generate
interest. Post-realignment the CAD received a base salary with
a discretionary bonus.

                                6
Townsley were hired sometime in 2017 or early 2018.) He
was the only one of the three CADs who was terminated and
not offered another position.
       After the personnel changes were made, including
Kasparian’s termination, Hydrafacial announced the realignment
to the sales team in a letter emailed from Watson. The letter
stated territories would be smaller and, as a result, Watson’s
sales team would be expanding. The letter announced, “In the
second half of 2018, we’ll be adding 20 new positions in various
account management roles . . . . And we’ll be adding even more
in 2019.”5 The letter also announced Wertz’s role change: “When
it comes to selling capital into Corporate Accounts, Traci Wertz
will continue to report to Dan Watson and will work closely with
Erin and her team to identify and close opportunities both with
new customers and with current customers looking to expand
their businesses.”
       Shortly after his termination, Kasparian learned through
an internet search that a regional sales manager position in
North and/or South Carolina was open. He did not ask anyone
at Hydrafacial about it. Nor did he tell anyone at Hydrafacial
he could have taken the open CSM position in Pennsylvania.
He filed an unemployment claim in Pennsylvania after his
termination but did not finalize it.
4.     Ageist comments
       According to Kasparian, after an informal department
meeting at a bar in Long Beach—on an unspecified date—

5      Through 2020, Hydrafacial doubled the number of CSMs
it hired.

                               7
Hydrafacial’s CEO Clint Carnell said to a group of employees
that included Kasparian, a few other men, and a group of women
off to the side, “ ‘You’re just a bunch of old guys.’ ” During one
of Carnell’s “monologues” at an “OVR meeting,” Carnell also
said, “ ‘Just like a bunch of old guys, just like you, Kasparian.’ ”
Carnell described the company to the board and to the sales team
as “a young and vibrant organization with attractive people”
who “were hip and more happening.”
       Dean Langdon, Kasparian’s former manager whom
Hydrafacial terminated at the end of 2017, apparently told
Kasparian a year or more before Kasparian’s January 28, 2020
deposition, “ ‘They’re getting rid of the old guys and bringing
in a younger crew.’ ”6
5.     Kasparian’s lawsuit
       On November 26, 2018, Kasparian sued Hydrafacial in the
Los Angeles County Superior Court. His operative first amended
complaint (FAC), filed May 10, 2019, alleged ten causes of action
for: age discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination
under the FEHA, as well as wrongful termination in violation
of public policy (first through third causes of action); California
Labor Code violations for failure to pay all wages, failure to
pay wages on termination, failure to provide an itemized wage
statement, and failure to produce personnel and payroll records
(fourth and seventh through ninth causes of action); breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

6     Kasparian testified he was aware Langdon was terminated
for “not being the best team player.” He estimated Langdon
made this statement “about a year” earlier, but he didn’t “really
remember” the exact timing.

                                 8
fair dealing based on failure to pay commissions owed (fifth and
sixth causes of action); and unfair competition based on failure
to pay wages, allowing other employees to take commissions he
earned, and terminating him to avoid paying owed commissions
(tenth cause of action).
       Kasparian alleged Hydrafacial “sought to re-invent itself”
after its ownership change and focused on appealing to younger
consumers. About two months after the change, Hydrafacial
fired the company’s then-president, one of the company’s
“older founders,” and replaced him with a significantly younger
individual. Allegedly, Hydrafacial deliberately began to hire
younger employees “at the expense of older ones, in order
to publicly appear young and dynamic.”7 Kasparian alleged
Hydrafacial “targeted him for lay-off and refused to offer
an alternative position because of his age.”
       Kasparian, who earned most of his wages through sales
commissions and bonuses, alleged Hydrafacial changed his
commission structure and sales target in 2018 to try to “force
[him] out even earlier.” Compared to his 2017 incentive plan,
the 2018 plan doubled his sales target and “constituted a 68
[percent] reduction in variable compensation.” He attached both
plans to the FAC. Kasparian alleged on information and belief
that Hydrafacial changed no other sales employee’s commission
plan, but admitted in his deposition the two other CADs, Wertz

7     Kasparian claimed Hydrafacial engaged in a pattern of
terminating older workers and named a few. Kasparian testified,
however, he did not know the circumstances of those workers’
terminations and thus had no facts on which to base his claim
they were terminated due to their age.

                                9
and Townsley, got the same compensation plan that he signed
in April 2018 when they started in early 2018. Hydrafacial
allegedly paid Kasparian commissions under the less-favorable
2018 plan for sales he made before that plan was in place.
      Kasparian also alleged Hydrafacial paid Langdon
commissions Kasparian had earned from deals Langdon “stole”
in 2016, continuing into 2017. After Kasparian complained,
Hydrafacial took steps to prevent further theft, but Langdon’s
conduct continued, and Hydrafacial refused to determine what
it owed Kasparian.8
      Kasparian alleged Hydrafacial failed to pay him
commissions he earned and was owed, and also terminated
him to avoid having to pay him “significant sums” in owed
commissions.
6.    Motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication
      On March 20, 2020, Hydrafacial filed a motion for
summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Hydrafacial’s supporting evidence included excerpts from
Kasparian’s deposition, Watson’s declaration, Hydrafacial’s

8     Kasparian testified Langdon took credit for business
Kasparian had brought in. He estimated he would have earned
$50,000 to $100,000 in commissions and bonuses had Langdon
not stolen deals from him. The then-CFO reversed some of
the deals, however, leaving what Kasparian guessed was about
$15,000 to $25,000 in unpaid commissions lost to Langdon.
He could not identify the client and the amount of commissions
Langdon misappropriated that Hydrafacial owed him. He said
Hydrafacial had not provided him with the information he
needed to determine that.

                              10
at-will employment policy, Kasparian’s July 27, 2018 wage
statement, and the pleadings. Kasparian opposed the motion
with supporting evidence, including his declaration and excerpts
from his own deposition, excerpts from the depositions of
Watson and Deborah Rodriguez, Hydrafacial’s chief talent
officer, formerly known as the chief human resources officer,
Hydrafacial’s responses and supplemental responses to requests
for admissions and special interrogatories, and employment
documents Kasparian signed.
       The hearing on Hydrafacial’s motion took place on
October 1, 2021. The court issued a tentative ruling granting
summary adjudication in Hydrafacial’s favor on all but
Kasparian’s fourth and eighth causes of action, finding Kasparian
conceivably could be entitled to overtime pay for work he did
in the vacant California territory.9 The court also overruled
Hydrafacial’s objections to Kasparian’s declaration as well
as Kasparian’s objection to Hydrafacial’s use of part of his
deposition in support of two asserted undisputed material facts.10
After hearing argument from counsel, the court took the matter
under submission. On October 8, 2021, the court adopted its
tentative ruling as its final order, granting Hydrafacial’s motion
for summary adjudication as to the first, second, third, fifth,
sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action.

9     The court did not mention the tenth cause of action
for unfair competition based on Hydrafacial’s nonpayment
of commissions. The FAC mislabeled that cause of action as
the ninth cause of action.
10    Neither party contends these evidentiary rulings were
in error.

                               11
       The parties entered a stipulated judgment in favor of
Hydrafacial and against Kasparian “on all claims,” that the court
signed and filed on November 29, 2021. Kasparian agreed that,
because he did not claim Hydrafacial failed to pay him overtime
or misclassified him as an exempt, commissioned employee,
the court’s October 8 order effectively dismissed his fourth cause
of action for unpaid wages. He also agreed that his eighth cause
of action for waiting time penalties and tenth cause of action for
unfair competition were derivative of his fourth cause of action
and thus the court’s order also effectively dismissed those causes
of action. As Kasparian stipulated his fourth and eighth causes
of action were based on only unpaid commissions, and the court
entered judgment in favor of Hydrafacial on all claims, we refer
to the court as having summarily adjudicated those causes of
action.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Summary judgment and standard of review
       “Summary adjudication motions are ‘procedurally identical’
to summary judgment motions.” (Zamora v. Security Industry
Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 28 (Zamora).) A
defendant moving for summary adjudication must show “that one
or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established,
or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The burden then shifts to the
plaintiff “to demonstrate, by reference to specific facts, not just
allegations in the pleadings, there is a triable issue of material
fact as to the cause of action.” (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit
Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1180 (Husman); Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) A triable issue
of material fact exists if “the evidence would allow a reasonable

                                12
trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard
of proof.” (Aguilar, at p. 850.) The court is authorized to grant
summary adjudication only if the motion “completely disposes
of a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
       We review an order granting summary adjudication
de novo and independently decide whether the facts not subject
to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as
a matter of law. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342,
1348.) We consider “all the evidence set forth in the moving
and opposition papers” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz)), and all evidence the parties submitted in
connection with the motion, except that which the court properly
excluded (Merrill v. Navegar Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476).
        “In performing our de novo review, we must view the
evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party
[citation], liberally construing [his] evidentiary submission while
strictly scrutinizing defendant[’s] own showing, and resolving any
evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Saelzler
v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) “A triable
issue of material fact exists if the evidence and inferences
therefrom would allow a reasonable juror to find the underlying
fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.”
(Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 (Featherstone).)
       Our de novo review does not absolve Kasparian of his
burden to show error, however. (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham) [judgment is presumed
correct]; Abdulkadhim v. Wu (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 298, 301.)
“ ‘ “As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s

                                13
responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore,
to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present
by citation to the record and any supporting authority. In other
words, review is limited to issues which have been adequately
raised and briefed.” ’ ” (Abdulkadhim, at p. 301; Kurinij v.
Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 867 [“an appellant
must present argument and authorities on each point to which
error is asserted or else the issue is waived”].) Matters not
properly raised or that lack adequate legal discussion will be
deemed forfeited. (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647,
655–656.)
2.     Age discrimination under the FEHA
       As an initial matter, we reject Hydrafacial’s contention,
 as did the trial court, that Kasparian is barred from bringing
 a FEHA claim because he wasn’t a California resident and
 “no significant tortious conduct occurred within the state.”
 There is no real dispute that Kasparian did not “reside” in
 California: he never rented or owned a home in California or
 paid California state income tax. Hydrafacial’s contention that
 no tortious conduct occurred in California begs the question,
 however, as the evidence shows Hydrafacial is a California
 employer, Kasparian did some work in California, the decision
 to let him go was made in California, and the alleged ageist
 comments Kasparian argues show discriminatory animus were
 made in California. (Cf. Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc. (1996)
 42 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1852, relied on by Hydrafacial [holding the
 FEHA did not apply to nonresident employee of California-based
 company where employee mostly worked outside of California
 and allegedly suffered injuries based on sexually harassing
 behavior that occurred outside the state].) As triable issues

                               14
of material fact exist as to whether Kasparian can invoke
the protections of the FEHA, we consider the merits of his
contention that the trial court erred in granting summary
adjudication on his FEHA and related causes of action.
      a.     Applicable law
      The FEHA prohibits employers from discharging,
or otherwise taking adverse employment actions against,
an employee because of age. (Gov. Code, §§ 12926, subd. (b),
12940, subd. (a) [age refers to the chronological age of an
“individual who has reached a 40th birthday”].) Ultimately,
a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must prove that an
adverse employment action was taken because of his or her age.
(Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
997, 1002 (Hersant).) “ ‘[B]ecause of’ means there must be
a causal link between the employer’s consideration of [the]
protected characteristic,” here, age, “and the [adverse] action
taken by the employer.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013)
56 Cal.4th 203, 215.) In a case involving mixed motives, that
means the plaintiff must prove “discrimination was a substantial
motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating factor” in
the adverse employment action. (Id. at pp. 215, 232.)
      An employee can prove a FEHA violation by direct or
circumstantial evidence. (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 (DeJung).) “Direct evidence is
evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory
animus without inference or presumption.” (Id. at p. 550.)
“ ‘ “Where a plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination that
is believed by the trier of fact, the defendant can avoid liability
only by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the

                                15
 same employment decision without reference to the unlawful
 factor.” ’ [Citation.]” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.)
       When a plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, California courts apply the burden shifting test
established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, to analyze
federal employment discrimination claims. (See Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 354 [burden shifting test “reflects the principle
that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and
that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially”].)
Under that test, the employee has the initial burden at trial
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates
a presumption of discrimination. (Id. at pp. 354–355.) To
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the
FEHA, an employee must present evidence that the employee
(1) is 40 years old or older, (2) suffered an adverse employment
action, (3) was satisfactorily performing his or her job at the
time of the adverse action, and (4) suffered the adverse action
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination, such as having been replaced by “someone
significantly younger.” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 297, 321; Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1003 & fn. 3; see also Guz, at p. 366 [plaintiff may establish
prima facie case of age discrimination in a reduction of force
context by showing “persons significantly younger, but otherwise
similarly situated, were ‘ “ ‘treated more favorably’ ” ’ ”].) The
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. (Guz, at pp. 355–356.)
If the employer meets its burden, the presumption disappears
and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to attack the

                                16
employer’s reason as a pretext for discrimination or to offer
other evidence of a discriminatory motive. (Id. at p. 356.)
       That framework is modified in the context of an employer’s
 motion for summary judgment or adjudication. (Serri v. Santa
 Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861 (Serri).)
 As the moving party, the employer “ ‘has the initial burden
 to present admissible evidence showing either that one or
 more elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or that
 the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate,
 nondiscriminatory factors.’ ” (Ibid.) “[I]f nondiscriminatory,
 [the employer’s] true reasons need not necessarily have been
 wise or correct. [Citations.] While the objective soundness of
 an employer’s proffered reasons supports their credibility . . . ,
 the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted with
 a motive to discriminate illegally. Thus, ‘legitimate’ reasons
 [citation] in this context are reasons that are facially unrelated
 to prohibited bias, and which, if true, would thus preclude a
 finding of discrimination.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358.)
       If the employer meets this burden, “the burden shifts
to the employee to ‘demonstrate a triable issue by producing
substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reasons
were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a
discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination
or other unlawful action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 861.) A FEHA claim also “is not properly resolved on summary
judgment” when triable issues of material fact exist as to
“whether discrimination was a substantial motivating reason for
the employer’s adverse employment action, even if the employer’s
professed legitimate reason has not been disputed.” (Husman,

                                17
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1186.) The stronger the employer’s
showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger
the plaintiff’s evidence must be to create a reasonable inference
of a discriminatory motive. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 362 &
fn. 25.)
       b.     Hydrafacial met its initial burden on summary
              adjudication
       It is undisputed that when Kasparian was terminated
 he was 57 years old, was a high performer, and was not offered
 an alternative position, while a significantly younger employee
 with Kasparian’s same job was. Hydrafacial met its initial
 burden on summary adjudication, however, by presenting
 evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
 for terminating Kasparian’s employment, unrelated to his age:
    • the company underwent a corporate restructuring to
       combine nonmedical sales and medical sales thereby
       eliminating the CAD role Kasparian held, which had
       focused on nonmedical corporate sales;
    • Hydrafacial retained Wertz in the sole reconfigured
       CAD role—responsible for both medical and nonmedical
       corporate sales—because she had more experience and
       greater contacts than Kasparian in the spa and wellness
       area where that role now would focus;
    • Hydrafacial did not offer Kasparian an alternative position
       because no comparable positions were open in the state
       of Kasparian’s primary residence, Georgia; and
    • Hydrafacial offered an open CSM position in Pennsylvania
       to Townsley when it eliminated his CAD position because
       he lived in the state.

                               18
This evidence was credible on its face and addressed why
Hydrafacial released Kasparian but retained the two younger
employees who had held his same position. (Guz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at pp. 357–358 [when issues involve whether employer
“engaged in intentional discrimination” when deciding whom
to retain and release, “employer’s explanation must address
them”].) Thus, Hydrafacial’s explanation sufficiently established
it terminated Kasparian’s employment for reasons “facially
unrelated to prohibited bias.” (Id. at p. 358, italics omitted.)
       c.     Kasparian failed to present sufficient evidence
              to demonstrate his age substantially motivated
              his termination
       To survive summary adjudication, Kasparian had to
 present substantial evidence from which a jury reasonably could
 infer Hydrafacial’s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or
 that it acted with a discriminatory animus so that a reasonable
 trier of fact could conclude Hydrafacial engaged in intentional
 age discrimination. (Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at
 pp. 1004–1005.)
       Kasparian initially argues he presented direct evidence
 of age discrimination through: CEO Carnell’s two “ ‘old guy[ ]’ ”
 comments; his description of the company as “young” and
 “vibrant” with “attractive,” “hip,” and “more happening” people;
 Langdon’s opinion that Hydrafacial was “ ‘getting rid of the old
 guys and bringing in a younger crew,’ ” and the fact Hydrafacial
 released no one under age 40 during the realignment. We agree
 with Hydrafacial this is not direct evidence of a discriminatory

                                19
animus.11 The CEO’s remarks about “old guys” in a setting
unrelated to hiring, retaining, or terminating employees;
the description of an aesthetics company as young, vibrant,
and attractive; and a comment that the company was bringing
in a younger crew from someone terminated well before the
realignment do not “prove[ ] the fact of discriminatory animus
without inference or presumption.” (DeJung, supra, 169
Cal.App.4th at p. 550.) Rather, for comments reflecting a
discriminatory animus to constitute direct evidence of such
an animus, there must be “a causal relationship between the
comments and the adverse job action.” (Ibid.; see also Zamora,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 36–37 [describing federal case
involving direct evidence of age discrimination where evidence
showed members of a board of directors said they wanted to
hire someone age 45 to 50 years old for the job and “were not
considering the plaintiff because they wanted a younger man”].)
      Nor can we conclude the fact that the six employees
Hydrafacial terminated were all over age 40 directly proves
animus—or raises a reasonable inference that Kasparian’s
age was a substantial motivating factor for his termination.
Hydrafacial retained a 53-year-old—only four years younger
than Kasparian—who had held the same position, and the
individual who terminated Kasparian’s employment was about
Kasparian’s age.
      Kasparian cites several cases where discriminatory
or pretextual comments precluded summary judgment of a

11    Indeed, Kasparian described this very same evidence in his
opposition to Hydrafacial’s motion as circumstantial evidence.

                               20
plaintiff’s FEHA claim. In those cases, however, the plaintiff
presented evidence the comments were made in connection with
the adverse employment action raising a rational inference of a
causal link between the discriminatory animus and the adverse
action. (See, e.g., DeJung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 550–
551 [comments from individual on hiring committee to plaintiff
that “ ‘they want somebody younger, maybe in their 40’s,’ ” and
to someone else that plaintiff was “ ‘a great guy but we’re looking
for someone younger,’ ” were evidence of discriminatory animus
and raised an inference that the employment decision itself
was discriminatory]; Price v. Victor Valley Union High School
District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 231, 244–245 [jury could infer
employer’s proffered reason for rescinding job offer—a failed
physical exam—was pretextual and the true reason was
plaintiff’s actual or perceived disability where individual
who rescinded the offer repeatedly told plaintiff she was
“ ‘a liability’ ”]; Doe v. SoftwareONE Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
98, 100–101 [female over 40—who was fired for “poor
performance and redundancy”—presented evidence that “ ‘taken
as a whole, could support a reasoned inference of discriminatory
or retaliatory animus,’ ” including that she was replaced by
younger males, she had been performing well, and a director’s
statements to her that the company was a “ ‘guy’s club,’ ” so she
was “ ‘never going to make it,’ ” and she was a “ ‘bitch’ ”]; Galvan
v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 549, 561–563
[evidence supervisor “consistently demeaned” plaintiff and other
employees about their accents and English-speaking abilities,
and that plaintiff had learned the supervisor planned to fire her
and other foreign-born employees, was sufficient to demonstrate
discriminatory motive and causal nexus between supervisor’s

                                21
 animus toward plaintiff’s national origin and plaintiff’s
 constructive discharge].)
       In contrast, Kasparian presented no evidence that Carnell’s
ageist comments were made in the context of any employment
decision or to suggest Kasparian’s job was in jeopardy due to
his age, unlike the comments with respect to sex/gender and
national origin made in SoftwareONE and Galvan. Indeed,
Kasparian presented no evidence as to the timing between
Carnell’s comments and the decision to terminate his
employment at all to suggest a causal relationship existed
between discriminatory animus and Kasparian’s termination.
Nor did Kasparian ever report Carnell’s comments to anyone
at Hydrafacial during his employment.
       And unlike in DeJung and Price, although Carnell was
 Hydrafacial’s CEO, Rodriguez testified Carnell had no input
 in the decision to terminate Kasparian. Kasparian presented
 no evidence to suggest otherwise and admitted he was unaware
 of any facts demonstrating Carnell had any input in the decision
 to terminate his employment.12 Moreover, Watson—who
 planned the realignment and personnel changes—testified he
 never spoke to Carnell about Kasparian and never heard Carnell
 or anyone else at Hydrafacial make ageist comments.
       Nevertheless, Kasparian asserts a jury could infer
 age substantially motivated Hydrafacial’s termination of
 his employment from the above evidence considered with the
 following additional circumstantial evidence: Kasparian was a

12   Carnell, whom Kasparian estimated was 48 years old,
himself was within the protected group of individuals over 40.

                               22
 top performer; Kasparian was the oldest, had the most seniority,
 and highest revenues of the three CADs and was the only one
 of them not retained or offered another position; Hydrafacial
 did not give him a reason for his termination; he had a home in
 Newton Square close to the open CSM position in Philadelphia,
 for which he was qualified, but was not offered the position;
 Townsley, who was offered the open Philadelphia position,
 was 39 years old, and his home was further from Philadelphia
 than Kasparian’s Newtown Square house; the realignment
 announcement did not mention Wertz’s spa and wellness
 experience; Kasparian had spa and wellness and medical sales
 experience, but no one asked him about that experience before
 terminating him; and Hydrafacial expanded.
       Considering the evidence in its totality, and in the light
 most favorable to Kasparian, we conclude it is insufficient
 to permit a rational trier of fact to infer Hydrafacial was
 substantially motivated to terminate Kasparian’s employment
 because of his age. Kasparian first contends the trier of fact
 reasonably could infer age was the motivating factor in not
 offering the open Philadelphia CSM position to him over
 then-39-year-old Townsley given Kasparian had a better
 performance record and seniority, and Hydrafacial’s knowledge
 that Kasparian owned a home near Philadelphia. In other
 words, Kasparian contends the jury could find the lack of
 an open position in Georgia, in light of the CEO’s comments,
 was a pretext for discriminatory animus.
       We disagree. As we said, there is no evidence the CEO was
involved in personnel decisions surrounding the realignment, and
Watson—who made the decisions—himself was 56 or 57 years
old at the time. A trier of fact thus could not reasonably infer

                               23
Hydrafacial was using the location of the open CSM position
as an excuse to terminate Kasparian’s employment because he
was older. Both Watson and Rodriguez testified they “tried to
find spots” for everyone if they had them. They did not offer
to reassign Kasparian because there were no open positions in
Georgia where he lived.13 And, although Kasparian had traveled
a great deal as a CAD, one of the announced objectives of
the realignment was to create smaller territories. Rodriguez
testified the location of the CSM position was important because
“[o]therwise it costs a lot of money in travel” as CSMs had to visit
customers directly to demonstrate the system. The CSM position
also sold machines to individual, professional accounts, rather
than the multilocation, corporate accounts to which Kasparian
had sold.
       Nor can we conclude Hydrafacial’s decision not to offer
the Philadelphia position to Kasparian, despite knowing he
had a home there, raises a rational inference of animus. It
is undisputed Kasparian had moved to Georgia months before
the realignment and considered his Pennsylvania house a second
home, while Townsley primarily resided in Pennsylvania. Nor
does Kasparian contend Hydrafacial made a younger employee
an unsolicited offer to take an out-of-state position. Moreover,
Kasparian never asked to be reassigned, even after learning of
an open position in one or both of the Carolinas shortly after his
termination.

13    They also testified all personnel changes due to the
realignment were made before sending the announcement letter.

                                 24
      Second, Kasparian contends Hydrafacial’s stated reason for
retaining Wertz over him “doesn’t withstand scrutiny,” and thus
supports an inference, along with Carnell’s ageist comments, that
“[a]ge was the unlawful motive for Wertz’[s] selection over [him].”
He argues no nondiscriminatory reason “explains why
[Hydrafacial] preferred the younger, lesser performing, newly
hired, Wertz, over the older, better performing, experienced
[Kasparian].”
      We cannot agree. Hydrafacial presented uncontroverted
evidence that it chose Wertz to remain in the sole, reconfigured
CAD role because she had more contacts in the spa and wellness
world and more experience in that area than Kasparian. Watson
acknowledged Kasparian would have had some experience in
that area,14 but Wertz was a member of a worldwide organization
called “Global Wellness.” She thus knew “a lot of people” in the
spa and wellness area, “more so than [Kasparian] did.”
       Kasparian argues a jury could infer this reason was false
based on the fact Hydrafacial did not mention Wertz’s spa
experience in its corporate reconfiguration announcement.
That letter generally announced what the new sales team would
look like; it was not an explanation as to why certain individuals
were selected for certain roles. We thus do not see how a jury
reasonably could find the omission of Wertz’s spa experience
from the announcement raises a triable issue of fact as to
whether Hydrafacial impermissibly chose to retain Wertz—

14    Kasparian testified he had spa and wellness experience, as
well as experience in 2012 and 2013 selling Hydrafacial machines
to individual doctors’ offices.

                                25
a 53-year-old—over Kasparian because she was four years
younger than he was.
       Kasparian makes much of his higher revenue generation
compared to Wertz (and Townsley), but Hydrafacial never
asserted it terminated Kasparian for poor performance. Watson
testified sales performance was not a factor specifically related
to whom to retain in the CAD position. Rather, they “tried to
look at it, more realistically, who will be [a] best fit for the gap
that we had going forward.”
       Wertz may have absorbed Kasparian’s old territory in
her new CAD role, but no reasonable factfinder could infer age
motivated Hydrafacial to retain Wertz over Kasparian. (Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358 [prerogative to consolidate positions
does not mean employer “may ‘use the occasion as a convenient
opportunity to get rid of its [older] workers’ ”].) First, Wertz
—at age 53—was a member of the protected class. Second,
at only four years Kasparian’s junior, we cannot say she was
“significantly” younger than Kasparian to raise a triable issue
of material fact that she was treated better than he was due
to her younger age. (Id. at p. 366.)15

15     In an apparent attempt to discount the fact Wertz herself
was within the age group protected under the FEHA, Kasparian
relies on Mahler v. Judicial Council of California (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 82, 92–93, 126, where the court held a disparate
impact claim under the FEHA can be based on the disparate
impact of an employment decision on an older subgroup
within a group of employees aged 40 and older. We agree
with Hydrafacial that Wertz, who also was in her 50s and
only four years younger than Kasparian, “can hardly be
considered to be part of a different ‘subgroup within the

                                 26
       In sum, Hydrafacial’s decision to retain Wertz and
Townsley over Kasparian, despite his seniority and higher
revenue production, may not have seemed fair to some, but
we cannot conclude a trier of fact reasonably could conclude
its stated reasons for doing so “were pretextual and used
merely to veil an act of age discrimination.” (Hersant, supra,
57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005, 1009 [triable issue of whether
employer’s actions were “reasonable and well considered” did
not preclude summary judgment on age discrimination action].)
As the evidence does not raise a triable issue of fact from which
a reasonable juror could infer Hydrafacial’s decision was
substantially motivated by Kasparian’s age, the court did not
err in granting summary adjudication on his first cause of action
for age discrimination and his derivative second and third causes
of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and
failure to prevent discrimination, respectively. (See Featherstone,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1169 [“if an employer did not violate
FEHA, the employee’s claim for wrongful termination in violation
of public policy necessarily fails”]; Trujillo v. North County
Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 284, 289 [finding
of underlying discrimination or harassment under Gov. Code,

protected 40-years-of-age-and-older class’ than [Kasparian].”
(See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 366–367, 369 [implying age
gap of less than 10 years not significant]; K.H. v. Secretary of
Dept. of Homeland Security (N.D.Cal. 2017) 263 F.Supp.2d 788,
796 [three-year age difference “insufficiently substantial”].)

                                27
§ 12940 necessary to support finding employer failed to prevent
discrimination or harassment].)16
3.     Kasparian’s Labor Code and contract causes
       of action
       Kasparian’s causes of action arising under California’s
Labor Code include: the fourth cause of action for failure to
pay wages, seventh cause of action for violation of section 226,
eighth cause of action for failure to pay all wages upon
termination under section 203, and ninth cause of action for
failure to provide payroll records in violation of sections 226
and 1198.5, although Kasparian asserts that cause of action
is “principally based on . . . section 226.” In his opening brief,
Kasparian also concedes his fifth cause of action for breach of
contract “stem[s] from the California Labor Code.”17 He thus
addresses these causes of action on appeal together.

16      The FAC alleged Hydrafacial also terminated Kasparian’s
employment in violation of public policy on the ground it did so
to avoid having to pay him “his owed wages that were due and/or
about to come due by virtue of his commission plan.” Kasparian
asserted no argument on appeal in support of that alternative
basis for his second cause of action. He has forfeited it. He
argued his wrongful termination claim would not necessarily
fail if we were to find FEHA inapplicable, as Hydrafacial argued,
because his claim also could be based on the federal statute
prohibiting age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 623. For the same
reasons Kasparian’s FEHA age discrimination claim fails, so
would his claim based on wrongful termination in violation
of the federal policy against age discrimination.
17    Kasparian makes no argument on appeal at all as to why
the court erred in granting summary adjudication on his sixth

                                 28
      Kasparian based these five causes of action on
Hydrafacial’s alleged failure to pay him earned commissions.
Commissions are defined as “wages” under the Labor Code.
(§ 200, subd. (a) [defining “wages” to include commission
payments]; Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576,
584 [“ ‘It is undisputed that commissions are “wages[.]” ’ ”].)
He does not contend Hydrafacial failed to pay him—or
inaccurately reported—his base salary.
      a.      Applicable law
      As it does on appeal, Hydrafacial relied on Tidewater
Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 to argue
Kasparian lacked standing to enforce the Labor Code because he
never resided, received pay, or worked exclusively or principally
in California. (Id. at p. 578 [“If an employee resides in California,
receives pay in California, and works exclusively, or principally,
in California, then that employee is a ‘wage earner of California’
and presumptively enjoys the protection of [Industrial Welfare
Commission] regulations.”].)
      Hydrafacial presented evidence demonstrating
Kasparian was not a California wage earner under Tidewater.
Throughout his employment: Kasparian permanently resided
in Pennsylvania and then Georgia, not California; he worked
on average only about 10 weeks per year in California, and

cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing or why his tenth cause of action for unlawful
business practices should be reinstated. He thus has forfeited
his appeal as to those causes of action. (Foxen v. Carpenter
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 284, 295 [failure to raise a claim of error
in the opening brief forfeits the argument].)

                                 29
12 to 16 weeks per year in the two years preceding his
termination; he received his pay in Pennsylvania; and he paid
no California state income tax.
      Kasparian, however, contended, as he also does on appeal,
the appropriate standard to apply to his commission-based claims
is that articulated in Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 732 (Ward), and its companion case, Oman v. Delta Air
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 762 (Oman). Both of those cases answered
questions certified by the Ninth Circuit about whether airline
workers—who performed most of their work outside California—
could enforce California’s wage statement requirements under
section 226 (Ward and Oman), and California’s requirement that
employees be paid twice-monthly under section 204 (Oman).18
The trial court granted summary adjudication on Kasparian’s
Labor Code claims, finding Kasparian failed to present sufficient
evidence to demonstrate his having worked three months

18     Kasparian also argues, as he did below, the standard
discussed in Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191,
1201, 1206 (Sullivan) applies here. There, our high court held
California’s overtime laws applied to nonresident employees who
performed full days and weeks of work in California. Sullivan
expressly limited its rationale and holding to California’s
overtime laws, cautioning “one cannot necessarily assume the
same result would obtain for any other aspect of wage law.” (Id.
at p. 1201; see also Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 751 [noting court
did not hold in Sullivan that “the employment laws of another
state can never apply to work performed in California” nor that
“California’s employment laws always apply to every minute
or hour of work performed in this state”].) As Kasparian cannot
claim entitlement to overtime pay, we find Sullivan inapplicable.

                                30
out of the year in California met the “ ‘significant relationship’
standard” set forth in Ward.19 (Ward, at p. 755.)
       Hydrafacial contends Kasparian mistakenly rejected
Tidewater for Ward and Oman (and Sullivan). But, as two of
Kasparian’s causes of action are based on section 226, Ward is
applicable. The plaintiffs there were flight attendants and pilots
for a global airline based outside California, who resided in
California but performed most of their work in airspace outside
California’s jurisdiction. (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 740.)
In determining whether the plaintiffs could enforce California’s
wage statement requirements under section 226, the court
concluded “the Legislature intended for section 226 to apply
to workers whose work is not performed predominantly in any
one state, provided that California is the state that has the most
significant relationship to the work.” (Ward, at p. 755.)
       The court explained, “[T]o determine whether section 226
applies, courts should consider in the first instance whether
the employee works the majority of the time in California, or
in another state. For employees . . . who do not work principally
in any one state, a court should consider secondarily whether
the employee has a definite base of operations in California,
in addition to performing at least some work in the state for the
employer.” (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 760.) Applying that
reasoning to the plaintiffs before it, the court continued, “Thus,

19     The court granted summary adjudication on Kasparian’s
two contract causes of action, however, on the ground Kasparian
“fail[ed] to cite to any legal authority for the proposition that the
failure to pay commissions has a standard separate from the one
established in Tidewater.”

                                 31
if a pilot or flight attendant has a designated home-base airport,
section 226 would apply if that airport is in California, and not
if it is elsewhere.” (Ibid.) The court expressly found “employer
location, employee residence, receipt of pay, and payment of
taxes”—factors listed in the Ninth Circuit’s question—were “not
pertinent.” (Ibid.) The court then answered the Ninth Circuit’s
question as follows: “Section 226 applies to wage statements
provided by an employer if the employee’s principal place of work
is in California. This test is satisfied if the employee works a
majority of the time in California or, for interstate transportation
workers whose work is not primarily performed in any single
state, if the worker has his or her base of work operations in
California.” (Id. at pp. 760–761.)
        In Oman, applying the test articulated in Ward, the
court concluded section 226 did not apply “to work performed
in California during pay periods in which the employee, based
outside California, works primarily outside California.” (Oman,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 776 [“A non-California-based employee
who works in California ‘only episodically and for less than a day
at time’ [citation] is not entitled to a wage statement prepared
according to the requirements of California law.”].) The court
also held that section 204, which dictates the timing of payment
of wages and works together with section 226, “is subject to the
same limits as section 226 and applies only to pay periods during
which an employee predominately works inside California.”
(Oman, at pp. 776, 778.)
        b.     Analysis
        Considering the evidence in the light most favorable
to Kasparian, and applying the test in Ward, the record
demonstrates Kasparian did not principally work in California.

                                32
During the course of his employment, Kasparian spent on
average 10 non-consecutive weeks per year working in California,
and between 12 and 16 non-consecutive weeks per year in 2016
and in 2017. The longest consecutive visit he made to California
for work was about two weeks. A finder of fact also reasonably
could conclude Kasparian did not spend a majority of his time
working in any other state. Kasparian declared he was in
Pennsylvania, where he had his “permanent residence,” for
“significantly less than 50 [percent] of [his] working time”; when
he “wasn’t at the office in California, [he] was on the road in
Texas, Florida, New York, Maryland, and many other states”;
and he “spent the most time on the road and much time at the
California office.”
       Under Ward, the question thus is whether “California’s
relationship to the work is more significant than any other
state’s.” (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 759.) Kasparian contends
it was, declaring that by mid-2016—when he had a dedicated
office20 at Hydrafacial’s headquarters to use—and “in the future,”
California was his “home base of operations.” Kasparian
presented evidence that, during his stays in California, he
attended meetings at Hydrafacial’s headquarters and, at some
point, “covered a vacant California territory” and met with clients
there. Of the weeks he spent in California in 2016, seven were
during the fourth quarter—presumably because he was working
in the vacant territory. Kasparian received personal mail at
Hydrafacial’s headquarters and a colleague’s residence, and

20   He stated he then used an “open office” when the company
moved to a new building.

                                33
stayed at a colleague’s residence. And, from 2016 to 2017,
he considered moving to California because he was traveling
there so often.
       We agree with the trial court that the evidence Kasparian
presented does not demonstrate the work he performed for
Hydrafacial had a more significant relationship to California
than any other state. Akin to a flight attendant’s assigned
“home” airport—from where he or she begins or ends each flight
—Kasparian was assigned to head up sales for the east coast
territory.21 As Hydrafacial has no physical locations outside
California, Kasparian’s “base of operations” so to speak would
have been his home. (See Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 760
[explaining that if a pilot or flight attendant had “a designated
home-base airport, section 226 would apply if that airport is
in California, and not if it is elsewhere”]; Gunther v. Alaska
Airlines (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 341 & fn. 2, 343 (Gunther)
[nonresident flight attendants, who did not perform a majority
of work in one state, were “based” in California because they were
assigned to California, where they began and ended each trip].)
       There certainly is no evidence Kasparian “present[ed]
himself . . . to begin work” in California before traveling to a
state in his assigned east coast, or other brand-related, territory.
(Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 755.) In contrast to the flight
attendants who were based in California and traveled elsewhere,
Kasparian essentially was based in Pennsylvania and—after

21     Beginning in early 2018, CADs theoretically could travel
to anywhere in the country because the territories were set up
by brand. In other words, if a corporate brand had multiple
locations, the CAD would travel to those locations.

                                34
he moved—in Georgia. It was from his home that he traveled
to and from different states for work, including California. True,
Kasparian spent about 20 to 30 percent of his time in California
during his last years of employment. In light of Kasparian’s
job duties—to run the east coast sales team and sell Hydrafacial
machines to multi-location corporate accounts—we cannot
conclude his required travel to the Hydrafacial offices
in California rendered California the state with the most
significant relationship to the work he performed.
       Arguably, while covering the vacant California territory,
Kasparian reported for work in California. Kasparian argues
that, at a minimum, his seventh and ninth causes of action
based on section 226 “are viable” for the portion of time he
worked in California, which comprised full days. Nothing in
the record indicates he was reassigned from the east coast (or
other brand) territory to the California territory, however, to
raise an inference that the additional California work constituted
a change in his base of operations. (See Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 775 [shifts in flight attendant’s employment such as taking
on a new job as a “gate agent” at a California airport or being
“assigned to a different home airport,” thereby changing the
employee’s “base of operations,” would affect whether section 226
applied]; Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2022) 610
F.Supp.3d 1257, 1268, on remand from Ninth Circuit [above
examples support theory “Ward was intended to capture
significant changes in employment—such as being assigned
a different home base airport, or taking on a new position—
and not based on the number of trans state flights scheduled
per each pay period”].)

                                35
       From fall 2016 and into 2017, Kasparian was told to come
to California as if he lived there, and he considered moving. But
given the limited 12 to 16 weeks per year he spent in California
during that period, a trier of fact could conclude only that
Kasparian continued to work primarily in his own assigned
territory or territories and thus had not relocated his base
of operations to California. (Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 776
[concluding “section 226 does not apply to work performed in
California during pay periods in which the employee, based
outside California, works primarily outside California” in
answering Ninth Circuit’s question about flight attendants who
worked “ ‘only episodically and for less than a day at a time’ ”
in California].)
       Moreover, whether Kasparian primarily worked in
California, or was based in California, during a given pay period
is relevant to whether section 226 applies. (Gunther, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 346, citing Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 753
[“The increment of work covered by section 226—the pay period—
is relevant to this inquiry in the sense that the statute ‘does not
operate at an hourly, daily, or even weekly level.’ ”].) Kasparian
declared he worked in California during the entirety of a pay
period but did not state what that pay period was.
       In any event, Kasparian contests only the accuracy of his
commission payments, not his base salary. According to the
CAD Incentive Plan Kasparian signed in April 2018—attached
to his FAC—commissions were paid monthly for completed
equipment sales and quarterly for other types of commissions.
He would have earned commissions for work performed in
California based on Hydrafacial machines (and possibly
consumables) he sold there while he covered the vacant

                                36
California territory. Yet, Kasparian presented no evidence
demonstrating he was “based” in California for an entire monthly
or quarterly commission pay period. Hydrafacial admitted
Kasparian worked in California for a total of seven intermittent
weeks during the fourth quarter of 2016, but Kasparian cited no
evidence in the record showing he worked the vacant California
territory throughout a monthly commission pay period.
       And, as one appellate court put it, Ward does not require
a “pay-period-by-pay-period analysis.” (Cf. Gunther, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at pp. 344, 346–347 [even if flight attendants based
in California spent more time during a particular pay period
in another state, because they were based in California and did
not perform a majority of their work in any one state, section 226
still applied].) Thus, even if Kasparian worked more in the
vacant California territory than in his assigned territory for
one or two pay periods, because he remained based out of the
east coast, section 226 would not apply.
       Nor does Kasparian articulate what commissions he earned
from his work in California that were not paid or accurately
reflected in his wage statement. The FAC alleged Kasparian was
“the procuring cause” of sale to an account in New York for which
he was entitled to commissions, as well as for “tens of additional
clients/contacts,” but did not allege those sales were to California
contacts. Similarly, Kasparian alleged “Langdon stole deals and
commissions” from him but only generally stated those deals
were in “Kasparian’s territory.” Nor does Kasparian cite to
evidence demonstrating, for example, that he sold Hydrafacial
machines, or caused the sale of a Hydrafacial machine, to a client
in the vacant California territory.

                                37
       Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly granted
summary adjudication on Kasparian’s seventh and ninth causes
of action based on section 226 because his work was not based
out of California, and even if it temporarily were, Kasparian cited
no evidence demonstrating he earned commissions from work in
California during a complete pay period there.
       As “the application of California wage and hour protections
to multistate workers . . . may vary on a statute-by-statute basis,”
we separately consider Kasparian’s other claims based on the
Labor Code. (Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 772; see also Ward,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 751 and Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 1201.)
       Asserting that his “[f]ourth [c]ause of [a]ction for failure to
pay wages, and the [f]ifth [c]ause of [a]ction for breach of contract
for which it is based on . . . stem from unpaid commissions, which
are wages,” Kasparian apparently argues those causes of action
are not subject to summary adjudication under Sullivan. He
appears to argue that, like California’s “ ‘strong interest in
governing overtime compensation for work performed in
California,’ ” California would have a strong interest in a claim
for unpaid wages given its worth here, “alleged to be in excess of
$700,000.” He notes he spent up to 16 weeks a year in California,
which is more than the days the plaintiffs in Sullivan spent in
the state.
       As we noted, Sullivan concerned the application of
California’s overtime laws to nonresidents who worked overtime
in California, not to the failure to pay commissions earned by
an exempt employee whose primary job was to sell his employer’s
product in other states. (Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1201,
1206.) We do not find Sullivan analogous. While statute and

                                 38
wage orders govern entitlement to overtime pay, “The right of
a salesperson or any other person to a commission depends on
the terms of the contract for compensation.” (Koehl v. Verio, Inc.
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1330.) The 2017 and 2018
commission plans attached to the FAC do not state they are
governed by California law.22
       To the extent Ward applies to Kasparian’s claims for
nonpayment of wages, which are limited to earned commissions,
his claims fail for the same reasons already discussed. As
Kasparian asserts no other argument as to why the court erred
in granting summary adjudication on these two causes of action,
he has failed to meet his burden on appeal affirmatively to show
error. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.)
       Kasparian’s eighth cause of action for waiting time
penalties based on Hydrafacial’s alleged failure to pay all
commissions it owed him at his termination is derivative of
his cause of action for failure to pay wages. Kasparian argues—
without citation to legal authority—that, because Hydrafacial
terminated his employment while he was in California, his eighth
cause of action for failure to pay all wages upon termination
survives. We reject this contention. (See Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 759–760 [rejecting plaintiff’s proposed test to look “to the

22    Kasparian declared he signed several employment
documents “governed” by the Labor Code. The documents
Kasparian submitted with his declaration included a proprietary
information and invention assignment agreement, a statement
declining Hydrafacial’s California health plan, and a
confidentiality agreement. The agreements state they are
covered by California law.

                                39
location where the conduct supporting liability occurred” as
unworkable in the context of claims of noncompliant wage
statements and inadequate wage payments, as the offending
conduct could be said to have occurred where the payment is
issued, where it is received, or even wherever the employee has
a bank account for direct deposit purposes].) Kasparian makes
no other argument affirmatively to show the court erred in
granting summary adjudication on his eighth cause of action.
       Below, however, Kasparian urged the trial court to apply
the Ward test, noting Oman concluded that test applies to
section 204, another statute governing the timing of the payment
of wages. (Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 776, 778.) Assuming,
without deciding, the test articulated in Ward would apply to
Kasparian’s eighth cause of action based on section 203, his claim
would fail for the same reasons his claims based on section 226
fail.
       Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly granted
summary adjudication of Kasparian’s remaining Labor Code and
contract causes of action.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment in favor of respondent Edge Systems LLC
dba The Hydrafacial Company is affirmed. The parties are to
bear their own costs on appeal.23

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

23     See Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 918, 950–951 (holding appellate courts may not
award costs on appeal to a prevailing FEHA defendant “without
first determining that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or that the plaintiff
continued to litigate after it clearly became so”).

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