Court Opinion

ID: 9756894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:06:44.315059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.699804
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that the jury’s award on damages was inadequate, I must dissent, nevertheless, because I do not believe that we should reach that issue without considering first the issue of the jury’s compromise. Further, I would not remand this case for a new trial on the issue of liability.
Once the jury determined that Officer Bujak’s conduct was willful (established beyond doubt by its answer to the first question submitted to it) and that it was Bujak’s conduct which caused the harm suffered by Catalano (likewise established beyond peradventure by the answer to question number two) the jury could not thereafter return a compromise verdict as that term and concept is properly understood in the law. However, both Catalano and Bujak, as well as the trial court, agree that that is exactly what the jury did in this case. And, once it is concluded that a compromise verdict was reached, it becomes necessary for this Court to examine the propriety of such a verdict where the jury also found that the defendant’s actions were willful, as opposed to merely negligent.
Before reaching this substantive issue, however, there is a threshold issue raised by Bujak that this issue has been waived..
Rule 302(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Willow Grove Veterans Home Association, Inc., 97 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 391, 509 A.2d 958 (1986). We have held in prior decisions that “arguments” and “theories” also cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Borough of Edgeworth v. Lilly, 129 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 361, 565 A.2d 852 (1989), petition for *281allowance of appeal denied, 525 Pa. 659, 582 A.2d 325 (1990), (defendant in adverse possession dispute who had not raised argument based on earlier deed before trial court could not employ argument based on deed for first time on appeal); Perin v. Board of Supervisors of Washington Township, 128 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 313, 563 A.2d 576 (1989) (appellant could not raise legal theory based on nonjurisdictional statute that was not raised before trial court); Janosko v. Pittsburgh National Corp., 83 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 636, 478 A.2d 160 (1984) (plaintiff who had proceeded before trial court on traditional concepts of negligence in personal injury case could not argue on appeal legal theory based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323).
In the case presented, however, the issue before the trial court on Catalano’s motion for post-trial relief, broadly stated, was whether the verdict in question could be explained as a compromise verdict, the same broad issue that is argued by Catalano on appeal to this Court.
Furthermore, Catalano is not raising a new legal theory on appeal to this Court. Catalano argued to the trial court that the verdict could not be factually explained as a compromise verdict because of the jury’s findings of willfulness, but that was, in effect, what the jury actually, and impermissibly, did. Specifically, in paragraph 5 of Catalano’s motion for post-trial relief, Catalano states that “[t]he verdict was not a compromise verdict on the issue of liability since the jury unanimously found ... that the Defendant’s conduct was willful, and that the willful conduct harmed the Plaintiff’ (emphasis added). By this statement, it is apparent that Catalano meant that the jury’s verdict was an improper compromise and that the jury should not have reached a compromise verdict as that term is used with legal significance.
Because the issue was properly raised, therefore, we may then proceed to an analysis of the propriety of a compromise verdict in this case.
A “compromise verdict” is essentially a jury’s own rough *282rendering of a “pure” comparative negligence analysis.1 The jury concludes that the defendant was in fact causally at fault, but not completely responsible for the injury, and thus reduces the plaintiffs award by the amount which it believes the plaintiff had been negligent. The function and effect of a compromise verdict is thus much the same as the function and effect of Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute.2 See Dawson v. Fowler, 384 Pa.Superior Ct. 329, 558 A.2d 565 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 523 Pa. 636, 565 A.2d 445 (1989). In Hill v. Bureau of Corrections, 124 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 172, 555 A.2d 1362 (1989), Judge Craig succinctly summarizes the principles concerning compromise verdicts and notes that a compromise verdict is one where “the jury, in doubt as to defendant’s negligence or plaintiffs freedom from contributory negligence, brings in a verdict for the plaintiff but in a smaller amount than it would have if these questions had been free from doubt.”
Working from the proposition that a compromise verdict is analogous to a comparative negligence analysis, it becomes clear that a compromise verdict can havé no application in a *283case where the jury concludes that an intentional tort has been committed. Comparative negligence principles do not apply to any action except those grounded in negligence. McMeekin v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 365 Pa.Superior Ct. 580, 530 A.2d 462 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 518 Pa. 619, 541 A.2d 746 (1988); Krivijanski v. Union Railroad Co., 357 Pa.Superior Ct. 196, 515 A.2d 933 (1986) (when willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be applied).
In the instant case, the jury specifically found that Bujak’s conduct had been willful3 under Section 8550 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550 (relating to governmental and official immunity).4 This Court has held that willful misconduct in the context of this statute is synonymous with “intentional tort.” Lancie v. Giles, 132 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 255, 572 A.2d 827 (1990); King v. Breach, 115 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 355, 540 A.2d 976 (1988). Given that Bujak’s conduct was in the nature of an intentional tort, the negligence concept of a compromise verdict does not apply. Accordingly, the majority should have reversed and granted a new trial on this basis rather than on the basis of the inconsistency and inadequacy of the damage award.
I further dissent from the majority’s conclusion that on remand, the trial should encompass the issue of liability, as well as damages. The majority bases its reasoning for doing so on the fact that the issue of liability was “hotly contested.” However, a new trial limited to damages may be granted where the issue of liability is either (a) not contested or (b) has been fairly determined so that no substantial complaint can be *284made with respect thereto. See Gagliano v. Ditzler, 437 Pa. 230, 263 A.2d 319 (1970); McIntyre v. Clark, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. 552, 461 A.2d 295 (1983). There was no showing or suggestion that the issue of liability was not fairly determined in this case. To the contrary, it was specifically addressed and answered by the jury.
Furthermore, there is no reason to conclude, as the majority does, that the issue of liability is unduly intertwined with the issue of damages. The issue of liability concerned one single question; essentially, did Bujak act tortuously and willfully vis-a-vis Catalano. The question of what injuries resulted as a consequence of Bujak’s action is entirely separate and distinguishable and involves evidence concerning Catalano’s medical history, his conduct subsequent to the incident, and the testimony of witnesses who observed Catalano after the incident. These categories of evidence have nothing whatsoever to do with the initial question—did Bujak force Catalano over the hood of the car?
Finally, it must be noted that Catalano is the appellant in this manner and that he has requested a new trial on the issue of damages alone. Catalano has not requested a new trial on liability and Bujak has failed to file a cross-appeal. The majority thus goes beyond Catalano’s prayer for relief, and in effect, grants the new trial on liability sua sponte. I cannot help but point out that the majority’s decision places Catalano in a position potentially worse than that which he would have occupied had he not appealed at all.

. A "pure” comparative negligence system is one where the relative negligence of the plaintiff and defendant is compared, and the plaintiff is allowed a recovery reduced by his proportion of the fault regardless of whether the plaintiff was found to be more negligent than the defendant. 57B Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 1141 (1989). This is in contrast to the Pennsylvania doctrine of comparative negligence which would bar recovery if the plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of the defendant’s. Section 7102 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102. That statute provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.—In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
The major difference between the operation of this statute and a compromise verdict lies in the fact that under this statute, a plaintiff may not recover if he or she is found to be more negligent than the defendant. For a discussion of the interrelation of compromise verdicts, comparative, and pure negligence concepts, see Deitrick v. Karnes, 329 Pa.Superior Ct. 372, 478 A.2d 835 (1984).

. See verdict slip,. reproduced on page 317 of majority opinion.

. Section 8550 provides as follows:
In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to official liability generally), 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity), 8548 (relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitation on damages) shall not apply.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8550.