Court Opinion

ID: 9463553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:09:49.787706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:02.835378
License: Public Domain

OPINION SUR PANEL REHEARING
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
On October 11, 1975, the appellant, Ted R. Grayson, without authority left the Al-lenwood Federal Prison camp, where he had been serving a three-year sentence for a controlled substances conviction. Two days later, he was apprehended in New York City.
Indicted for this escape pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 751(a),1 Grayson was tried before a jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His sole defense was duress — that he had been forced to flee from Allenwood because of threats on his life made by inmates to whom he owed gambling debts. The jury, evidently disbelieving Grayson, rejected this defense and found Grayson guilty.
The district court sentenced Grayson to a two-year term of imprisonment which was to commence at the conclusion of the sen-fence that he was then serving. Prior to the actual sentencing, the district court had expressed its belief that Grayson had lied while testifying at trial.2 Thereafter, in imposing sentence the court quite properly noted that it could, without giving any explanation, sentence Grayson to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by the statute, that is, a five-year prison term, see note 1 supra. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958); Government of Virgin Islands v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, the district court proceeded to identify those factors which it had considered in arriving at the two-year sentence and expressly invited appellate review of its action. The district court’s comments were as follows:
“The Court: All right. I’m going to give my reasons for sentencing in this case with clarity, because one of the reasons may well be considered by a Court of Appeals to be impermissible; and although I could come into this Court Room and sentence this Defendant to a five-year prison term without any explanation at all; I think it is fair that I give the reasons so that if the Court of Appeals feels that one of the reasons which I am about to enunciate is an improper consideration for a trial judge, then the Court will be in a position to reverse this Court and send the case back for re-sentencing.
In my view a prison sentence is indicated, and the sentence that the Court is going to impose is to deter you, Mr. Gray-*105son, and others who are similarly situated. Secondly, it is my view that your defense was a complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever. I feel it is proper for me to consider that fact in the sentencing, and I will do so.”
App. at 40.
Grayson advanced three contentions in his direct appeal to this Court, the first two of which we have found to be without merit.3 Only his final argument concerns us here. Grayson argues that the district court judge erred by imposing a sentence “the severity of which was based in part upon the judge’s belief that the defendant had committed perjury during the trial.” Disagreeing with that claim and satisfied that Grayson’s other two contentions should be rejected, we affirmed the judgment of the district court by a judgment order dated September 16, 1976.
Thereafter, Grayson filed a petition for rehearing. The thrust of the petition was that we had failed to follow a prior precedent in this Circuit, Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975). In Poteet, this Court had adopted the following principle of law:
A defendant has a right to defend, and although he is not privileged to commit perjury in that defense, the sentencing judge may not add a penalty because he believes the defendant lied. One reason is evident. A man may not be punished except upon a charge and opportunity for hearing. There having been no charge of perjury or conviction for that crime, due process would be denied if further punishment were inflicted for that crime. Another reason, apart from this procedural obstacle, is that the right to defend would be unduly burdened if a defendant understood that, if convicted, his mere denial of the charge under oath would without more lead to successive convictions for perjury until he or the State was exhausted.
517 F.2d at 395, quoting State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 493, 495-96, 295 A.2d 857, 858 (1972).
Upon reviewing the petition for rehearing, we, rather than the Court in banc,4 reconsidered our prior determination and vacated the judgment order. We conclude that the controlling law in this Circuit on this question is found in Poteet v. Fauver, supra.
I.
Our initial examination of Poteet when it was cited as grounds for reversal in Gray-son’s brief on appeal had persuaded us that Poteet did not control the disposition of this issue. Poteet, which accepted the legal doctrines formulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court but held that they had been applied incorrectly, presented much more egregious circumstances than are found here. In Poteet, the State trial judge was unsuccessful in his attempt to force Poteet to admit his guilt after the verdict and after a co-defendant had been forced to “confess.” The trial judge then added ten years to Poteet’s sentence because of his failure to “confess.” This factual setting *106differs dramatically from that which confronted the district court judge in Grayson’s case. Despite our initial belief that Poteet did not appear to control the result in Gray-son because of its different factual setting, nevertheless when we reexamined Poteet we could not fairly deny that this Circuit had committed itself to the principle quoted above, i. e., that “the sentencing judge may not add a penalty because he believes that the defendant lied.”
The reading given Poteet by the dissent is substantially different than our reading. The dissent claims that
[t]he sentencing judge in Poteet . would have effectively required the defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. Although certain language in Po-teet suggests that a sentencing judge may not add an increment to a sentence in the belief that the defendant lied under oath on the witness stand, no such situation was presented in Poteet. I must therefore conclude that it was the trial judge’s disregard of Poteet’s Fifth Amendment rights which animated this court in that case.
Dissenting Op. at 110. Additionally, the dissent reads Poteet as pertaining only to post-verdict conduct as opposed to perjury committed at any time during trial. Id. at 110. Neither the text of Poteet nor the inarticulated premises of Poteet support such a strained reading.
Nowhere in the Poteet opinion does the Court address the Fifth Amendment concern which Judge Rosenn in dissent would regard as the basis for the Poteet court’s holding. It impresses us that when the author of Poteet (Judge Aldisert) desired to confront Fifth Amendment considerations in the sentencing process in United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976), he did not disguise his intent or leave it to implication. Rather, his discussion of Fifth Amendment considerations leading to the Court’s holding in Garcia was explicit, undisguised and unequivocal.5
We are certain that had the Fifth Amendment considerations attributed to the Poteet court by Judge Rosenn actually been involved in Poteet, the same explicit, undisguised, and unequivocal analysis found in United States v. Garcia, supra, would have been set forth in Poteet. Hence we cannot agree that the governing principle of Poteet and its result were the product of this Court’s Fifth Amendment concerns. Nor can we agree, in interpreting Poteet, that what we consider to be its controlling principle, is “by definition, only dictum.” See Dissenting Op. at 110.
Poteet prohibits a trial judge from increasing a defendant’s sentence because the judge is convinced that the defendant has lied while before him. Although the colloquy between the judge and the defendant that took place in Poteet occurred during sentencing, it resulted from Poteet’s defense at trial, on which the sentencing judge focused.
*107The state sentencing judge, prior to sentencing Poteet, referred to Poteet’s trial defense as “an outrage” and to Poteet as “a liar”, 517 F.2d at 395:
When [Poteet] tells me he wasn’t there, he’s a liar, right? I’m listening. You heard him. He said he didn’t do it. The jury made a mistake. Didn’t you hear him, didn’t you?
The entire basis for the state judge’s remarks at sentencing was the testimony given at trial that Poteet, although found in the getaway car, persistently claimed that he was “a hitchhiker to whom the codefendants had happened to give a ride.” 517 F.2d at 394. It was this “hitchhiker” versus “robber” status that was discussed at length during the state sentencing procedure. Hence, we cannot consider as dictum this Court’s holding in Poteet v. Fauver, which was summarized by Judge Aldisert, the author of that opinion, as:
Considering the totality of the sentencing judge’s comments to Borowski and Poteet, we are not convinced that an increment of prison time was not added to Poteet’s sentence because he persisted in maintaining his innocence after the jury had returned a guilty verdict. We conclude that this contravened fundamental principles so ably and accurately capsul-ated by Chief Justice Weintraub:
There having been no charge of perjury or conviction for that crime, due process would be denied if further punishment were inflicted for that crime.
Id. at 398, quoting 61 N.J. at 495-96, 295 A.2d at 858.
In view of that holding, and despite any other sentencing concepts to which we might otherwise be attracted, we are controlled here by the principles announced in, and the holding of, the Poteet decision.
We are aware of differing views as to what might, or might not, constitute appropriate considerations and standards for sentencing in this context, see, e. g., United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1234-37 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 199, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975); Commonwealth v. Murray, Mass.App., 351 N.E.2d 555 (1976). See also the opinions of Judge Adams, concurring, and Judge Rosenn, dissenting, infra6 Until such time, however, as this Court in banc has renounced the doctrine of Poteet, we, as a panel of this Court, are bound to give it effect.7 So, too, is the district court.
II.
It is no answer to interpret the comment of the district court judge who sentenced Grayson as a wholly gratuitous observation. To us, it is obvious that the district court judge intended to, and did, add an increment to the sentence he might otherwise have imposed on Grayson.
The district court judge had commendably recognized that articulating the basis for his sentence might very well implicate Poteet and the principles established therein. It was for that reason that he invited this Court to focus its attention on the reason for the sentence imposed. He fairly stated that he could have imposed the maximum prison term without any explanation. Such is the law in this Circuit. See United States v. Lee, 532 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1976), Government of Virgin Islands v. Richardson, supra. He also observed that *108his reason for imposing the sentence might be deemed to be improper, and if that were the case then this Court would be in a position to reverse his judgment. Finally, he stated: “It is my view that your [Gray-son’s] defense was a complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever. I feel it is proper for me to consider that fact in the sentencing and I will do so.” App. at 40.
As we have previously stated, Poteet mandates that no additional penalty may be imposed upon a defendant because the trial judge believes that the defendant lied while testifying. Here, Grayson’s sentence was unquestionably increased for just this reason. His sentence, therefore, cannot stand.8
III.
We will reverse and remand to the district court with directions that Grayson’s sentence be vacated and that he be resen-tenced by the district court without consideration of his alleged false testimony given at trial.

. Section 751(a) provides:
§ 751. Prisoners in custody of institution or officer
(a) Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or magistrate, or from the custody of an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; or if the custody or confinement is for extradition or by virtue of an arrest or charge of or for a misdemeanor, and prior to conviction, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

. In its order of April 30, 1976 denying Gray-son’s motion for a new trial, the court had stated: “Grayson’s story was a total fabrication and had no semblance of plausibility.” App. at 47.

. Grayson’s first contention was that the district court had erred in failing to ask his voir dire question “Would you be more likely to find the defendant guilty merely because he has previously been convicted of a crime?” His second claim was that the court had erred in permitting the introduction of evidence of his prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching his credibility.

. This Court’s Internal Operating Procedure 0.2. reads as follows:
0. In Banc Hearing or Rehearing
1. . . .
2. Rehearing In Banc after Decision. Where a petition for rehearing before the panel or in banc has been filed by a party as provided by F.R.A.P. 35(b) or 40(a), unless the petition for panel rehearing under 40(a) states explicitly it does not request in banc rehearing under 35(b), it is presumed that each rehearing petition requests both panel rehearing and rehearing in banc.
a. Panel Rehearing. Each member of the panel concurring in the majority has the right to require rehearing before the panel. Thus, a senior judge of this Court or a justice or a visiting circuit or district judge sitting by designation who was a concurring member of the panel has the right to require rehearing before the panel.
See also Notes on F.R.App.P. 35, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules; Third Circuit IOP 0.3.b.

. In Garcia, Poteet is distinguished, the Court stating:
“No suggestion is made here that the court included in the sentences an increment for an offense other than that to which Antonmar-chi and Garcia pleaded guilty.”
United States v. Garcia, supra, at 683.
Garcia involved a plea agreement under which the defendants pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The district court refused to extend lenity in its sentence, because the defendants had refused to assist in investigations of illicit narcotics traffic. In vacating the sentences and remanding for resentencing, this Court recognized the Fifth Amendment problem by stating:
“In order to obtain lenity on a sentence for a guilty plea in which each had admitted guilt to a narrow compass of facts, then, appellants were in effect coerced to furnish the prosecutor with factual information of a broader and potentially unlimited factual scope. And they were required to disgorge this information without any assurance of immunity from future federal or state prosecutions resulting from the information supplied by them.”
Id. at 685. Whereas the defendants in Garcia ran the risk of additional prosecution as a consequence of divulging the information sought by the district court, in Poteet there was no such risk, for the trial court in Poteet sought only Poteet’s confirmation of the very activity for which he was convicted.

. As the author of this majority opinion, I believe that the only questions before us are (1) whether or not Poteet proscribes an enhanced sentence for lying and, if it does, (2) whether we must follow our earlier decision in that case. Having answered both of these questions affirmatively, I find no need to address the overall reach of sentencing considerations which my brothers, Judges Adams and Rosenn, discuss. Inasmuch as I regard this panel as bound by Poteet, I resist the temptation of joining their discussion.

. Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure M. 2. reads as follows:
2. Avoiding Intra-Circuit Conflict. It is the tradition of this Court that internal stability of its panel decisions be preserved. To avoid conflicts in panel decisions no subsequent panel may overrule a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to overrule a previous decision of this Court.

. We emphasize the narrowness of our holding, which is limited to the one situation where, in sentencing, the district court judge is of the opinion that the defendant lied while testifying. We express no opinion as to any other considerations that may be relevant to, and appropriate in, sentencing.