Court Opinion

ID: 9929437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 17:04:00.204567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:44.817001
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Feb 02 2024, 9:03 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Amy D. Griner                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Griner Legal, LLC                                          Attorney General of Indiana
Lakewood, Colorado
                                                           Ian A. T. McLean
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jake Brunette,                                             February 2, 2024
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-693
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Michael A.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Christofeno, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           20C01-2111-MR-9

                                  Opinion by Judge Mathias
                               Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024                              Page 1 of 7
[1]   Jake Brunette appeals his conviction for murder. Brunette raises two issues for

      our review, which we restate as follows:

              1. Whether Brunette invited any error with respect to the trial
              court declining to hold a full evidentiary hearing on whether
              Brunette was competent to stand trial.

              2. Whether any error in the trial court’s admission of certain
              evidence is reversible.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   On November 17, 2021, Brunette murdered Andy Conley with a knife in

      Elkhart County. Brunette stabbed Conley numerous times before cutting

      Conley’s throat. Johnnie Davidson and Kelly Wagner witnessed Brunette

      attacking Conley and called 9-1-1. After officers arrived on the scene and

      detained Brunette, Brunette told Davidson, “[Conley’s] dead. I killed him.” Tr.

      Vol. 3, p. 46.

[4]   The State charged Brunette with Conley’s murder. In January 2022, Brunette’s

      trial counsel filed a motion to determine Brunette’s competency to stand trial.

      The trial court appointed two psychiatrists to determine Brunette’s competency.

      The two psychiatrists came to opposing conclusions, and the court then

      appointed a third psychiatrist. The third psychiatrist concluded that Brunette

      was competent to stand trial.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024       Page 2 of 7
[5]   After receiving the third report, the court held a hearing and asked Brunette’s

      trial counsel if he wanted “to have a full competency hearing.” State’s App.

      Vol. 2, p. 4. Brunette’s trial counsel responded that, “given the reports that we

      have, no, we do not want to have a full competency hearing. So we would

      stipulate to competency.” Id. The State added that, if Brunette’s trial counsel

      was “satisfied,” the State would agree to proceed without a full competency

      hearing. Id. The court then clarified with Brunette’s trial counsel that he wished

      to “waiv[e] a competency hearing,” and Brunette’s trial counsel said, “Yes,

      Your Honor.” Id. The court then set the matter for trial.

[6]   At the ensuing jury trial, Davidson and Wagner both testified to having

      witnessed Brunette murder Conley. The trial court also admitted into evidence

      several photographs of Conley’s wounds. In particular, the court admitted, over

      Brunette’s objections, State’s Exhibits 15, 16, and 18, which the parties agree

      were graphic depictions of Conley’s wounds, including the cut to his neck. Part

      of Brunette’s objection to the trial court’s admission of those exhibits was that

      they were “cumulative” to several other admitted photographs. Tr. Vol. 3, p.

      72.

[7]   The jury found Brunette guilty of Conley’s murder. The trial court entered its

      judgment of conviction and sentenced Brunette accordingly, and this appeal

      ensued.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024        Page 3 of 7
      1. Brunette invited any error with respect to the trial court not
      holding a full competency hearing.
[8]   On appeal, Brunette first contends that the trial court erred when it did not hold

      a full evidentiary hearing to determine his competency to stand trial. 1 Given his

      counsel’s comments to the trial court, however, Brunette also asserts that he

      cannot waive his right to a full competency hearing. In support of his theory of

      nonwaiver, Brunette cites Smith v. State, 443 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1983). In Smith,

      our Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot waive a request for a

      competency hearing based on the timing of the request. Id. at 1188. In that

      context, our Supreme Court stated that “waiver is an inapposite concept”

      because “the question of a defendant’s competency to stand trial may be raised

      at any time . . . .” Id.

[9]   But the question here is not a question of waiver. It is a question of invited

      error. As our Supreme Court has made clear, “waiver” refers to a procedural

      default that usually precludes appellate review in order to avoid rewarding a

      party for “sitting idly by, ostensibly agreeing to a ruling only to cry foul when

      the court ultimately renders an adverse decision.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d

      1
        Thirteen months passed between the State’s filing of the charging information and the court’s receipt of the
      third psychiatrist’s report on Brunette’s competency to stand trial. As has been noted before, there is a “large
      and ironic lapse in the logic of our criminal justice system,” in which the “initial imperative is to determine
      the competency of defendants prospectively, to assist counsel at trial,” rather than to compel a psychiatric
      examination of a defendant who likely suffers from serious mental illness very early after arrest to determine
      whether the defendant could have possibly had the requisite scienter or mens rea at the time of the crime.
      Habibzadah v. State, 904 N.E.2d 367, 370-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (Mathias, J., concurring); see also, e.g.,
      Wampler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633, 634 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Wampler v. State, 57 N.E.3d 884, 890 (Ind. Ct. App.
      2016) (Mathias, J., dissenting)).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024                                 Page 4 of 7
       645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Invited error, in contrast,

       applies to “errors the party requested of the trial court.” Id. Invited error is not

       based on “sitting idly by” but on estoppel—it “forbids a party from taking

       advantage of an error that [he] commits [or] invites . . . .” Id. And invited error

       precludes appellate review altogether, even on alleged constitutional errors. See,

       e.g., Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014).

[10]   We conclude that the invited error doctrine applies here and precludes appellate

       review of Brunette’s assertion that he was entitled to a full competency hearing.

       Once the trial court received the third psychiatrist’s report, the court called a

       hearing. At that hearing, the court asked Brunette’s counsel if he wanted to

       proceed to a full evidentiary hearing to determine Brunette’s competency to

       stand trial. Brunette’s counsel did not sit idly by here—instead, he affirmatively

       informed the court that he did not want a full evidentiary hearing. After the

       State noted that it was ready to proceed to trial, the court confirmed with

       Brunette’s counsel that he wished to proceed without a full evidentiary hearing

       on the question of Brunette’s competency, and Brunette’s counsel again

       affirmatively informed the court that such a hearing was not necessary. The

       court then relied on the affirmative assertions of Brunette’s counsel and set the

       matter for trial. This record demonstrates that any error in the failure to hold a

       full evidentiary hearing to determine Brunette’s competency to stand trial was

       invited by Brunette.

[11]   That said, we recognize that the competency hearing statute requires the trial

       court to hold a hearing on the issue of a defendant’s competency “[i]f at any

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024          Page 5 of 7
       time before the final submission of any criminal case to the court or the jury

       trying the case the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant

       lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a

       defense.” Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(a) (emphasis added); see also Cotton v. State, 753

       N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 2001) (“Whether reasonable grounds exist to order an

       evaluation of competency is a decision assigned to the sound discretion of the

       trial court[.]”).

[12]   Here, however, the trial court deferred to the parties regarding Brunette’s

       competency. See Appellee’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 2-4 (trial court asking the parties

       whether they would stipulate to Brunette’s competency). The statute, however,

       requires the trial court to make the competency decision. The trial court here

       stated: “[b]y agreement of the parties, Court now finds that the parties waive a

       competency hearing and that the defendant, Jake A. Brunette, is competent to

       stand trial. . . .” Id. at 4. Thus, on this record it is clear that the trial court

       deferred to the parties, most notably to Brunette’s own counsel. While the better

       practice—and what the statute requires—is for the trial court itself to determine

       whether there are reasonable grounds to question a defendant’s competency, on

       this record we are obliged to conclude that any error in the trial court’s failure

       to do so was invited by Brunette. Accordingly, appellate review on this issue is

       not available.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024              Page 6 of 7
       2. Any error in the admission of State’s Exhibits 15, 16, and
       18 was harmless.
[13]   Brunette also argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it

       admitted into evidence State’s Exhibits 15, 16, and 18. We review challenges to

       the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Fansler v.

       State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). We will reverse only where the trial

       court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

       circumstances before the court. Id.

[14]   Any error in the admission of these three exhibits is not reversible error. At trial

       and again on appeal, Brunette conceded that these three exhibits were

       “cumulative” to other photographs the trial court had admitted. Tr. Vol. 3, p.

       72; Appellant’s Br. at 14. But “[t]he improper admission of evidence is harmless

       error when the erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other

       evidence before the trier of fact.” Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 932 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2017), trans. denied. We conclude that these three exhibits were merely

       cumulative to other evidence before the jury. Accordingly, there is no reversible

       error on this issue.

       Conclusion
[15]   For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm Brunette’s conviction.

[16]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-693 | February 2, 2024         Page 7 of 7