Court Opinion

ID: 9756444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:29:05.151827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:22.748547
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MAJORITY OPINION
MAURICE E. AMIDEI, Justice.
Denis Maricler Gomes appeals from her conviction for murder. Following the denial of her motion to suppress her confession, appellant pleaded nolo contendere. The trial court found appellant guilty and, in accordance with her plea-bargained agreement with the State, sentenced her to fifteen years imprisonment. We initially dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction in our unpublished opinion dated March 4, 1999. On July 8, 1999, we issued our opinion on motion for rehearing withdrawing our initial opinion of March 4, 1999, and reinstating this appeal finding we have jurisdiction. This opinion is accordingly issued to review the trial court’s ruling denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant asserts nine, interrelated points of trial court error, contending that: (1) her oral confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) her oral confession was involuntary under Texas law; (3) her post-arrest, videotaped confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; (4) her post-arrest, videotaped confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of her Miranda1 rights; (5) her post-arrest, videotaped confession should have been suppressed because the recording does not show that she waived any rights as re*375quired by article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; (6) her videotaped confession should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (7) her videotaped confession should have been suppressed because it was involuntary, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (8) her videotaped confession should have suppressed because it was involuntary, in violation of Texas constitutional and statutory law; (9) the trial court should have excluded any oral statements related to her offer to take police to the location where the weapon was discarded. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND.
Appellant was an employee of Mexico Lindo, a nightclub located in Houston. On the evening of June 14,1996, appellant met Fidel Marzoa (Marzoa, also known as El Cubano) at the nightclub and agreed to accept $200.00 from him in exchange for sexual favors. Appellant left the nightclub with Marzoa and went to his apartment. Appellant contended that Marzoa refused to pay her and violently raped her. Appellant freed herself from Marzoa and ran out of the apartment, returning to Mexico Lin-do. Appellant stated that she feared Mar-zoa would return to the nightclub and kill her, so she stayed in the parking lot, hiding behind some bushes. Marzoa returned to Mexico Lindo. After exiting his vehicle, appellant approached Marzoa in the parking lot and fired two shots into Marzoa, killing him. Appellant then ran away from the scene and went to her home.
On July 3, 1996, at approximately 8:00 a.m., Houston Police Officers Martinez and Benevitas, respectively, went to appellant’s home and asked her to accompany them to the police department to take a polygraph examination. Appellant agreed and was taken by the officers to the Houston Police Department. Appellant arrived at the polygraph office at 9:40 a.m., and Officer JoAnn Valverde, the polygraph examiner, introduced herself to appellant. Officer Valverde then escorted appellant to a waiting room and excused herself while she talked to Officers Martinez and Benevitas. After talking to the two investigating officers, Valverde returned to talk to appellant 45 minutes later. Valverde told appellant how the polygraph machine worked, and advised her that she did not have to take the polygraph. Valverde told appellant she was free to leave if she did not want to take the test, and that she was not under arrest. Valverde then left appellant alone for about an hour while she prepared the questions she was going to ask appellant. Valverde commenced the polygraph examination at 12.11 p.m., and concluded the test 20 to 25 minutes later. Valverde then told appellant she was not telling the truth, and asked appellant if she wanted to tell her why she did not pass the test. Appellant told Valverde that she was telling the truth, and the machine was lying. Valverde told appellant that when she finished the test, Valverde would know two things about appellant: she would know if appellant was a liar, and she would know if appellant shot El Cubano. At this point, Valverde testified that appellant became very emotional, and started crying. For the next two hours, Valverde talked to appellant about the events that occurred that night. Appellant told Valverde that Valverde, being a woman, would understand; that El Cubano raped her, she was scared, and that she had the -right to defend herself. Valverde stated that she did not threaten appellant, force her to say anything, and that appellant’s subsequent statements were made of her own free will. She then told Valverde how Marzoa raped her, and she ran out of his apartment afterwards. She told Valverde she was angry, and she went back to the club and waited in the bushes for Marzoa to come back. When appellant saw Marzoa getting out of a car, she shot him. She then told Valverde that she left and threw the gun along the way. Valverde paged Officer Martinez, and he came back to the station. Appellant told Officer Martinez about the offense, and he asked appellant if she would give him a statement. Appellant *376agreed to give Martinez a video statement. Appellant begged Valverde to take appellant’s children when she left to go with Martinez, and asked for Valverde’s telephone number. Martinez told appellant he would get a telephone number later because Valverde did not give anyone her number. Valverde never gave appellant her rights warning, and testified that appellant was not in custody and was free to go at anytime. Valverde did not think the warnings were required under these circumstances.
At 4:00 p.m., Officer Martinez took appellant to the Homicide Division for further questioning. The police officers set up a video camera to record appellant’s statement. Appellant was not informed that her statement would be recorded. Officer Martinez informed appellant of her Miranda rights when the video recording started. Appellant confirmed that she understood her rights. Appellant then gave her detailed statement to Officer Martinez concerning the shooting in the parking lot of Mexico Linda. Following her confession, appellant was charged with murder and taken to the Harris County Jail.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Appellate courts should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on “application of law to fact questions,” also known as “mixed questions of law and fact,” if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Appellate courts may review de novo “mixed questions of law and fact” not falling within this category. Id. Guzman applies to appellate review of a motion to suppress a confession. Hernandez v. State, 957 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
In this case, the trial court heard testimony from: (1) Officer Martinez, who took appellant’s videotaped statement; (2) Officer JoAnn Valverde, who administered appellant’s polygraph examination and interrogated her; and (3) appellant who testified through an interpreter. Appellant’s testimony conflicted with the officers’ testimony, and the trial court conducted its own examination of the witnesses on several occasions during the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress. Under these circumstances, where the police and the appellant provided conflicting testimony, resolution of the issues of (1) voluntariness of appellant’s confession, (2) determination of appellant’s custodial status when she made an oral confession to Officer Val-verde, and (3) her right to remain silent, all involved an evaluation of credibility and demeanor of the witnesses because the trial court had to decide which testimony deserved more weight. In this case, our review will “afford almost total deference” to the trial court’s determination of the “application of law to fact questions,” also known as “mixed questions of law and fact,” in accordance with Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We must sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Blanks v. State, 968 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd).
III. DISCUSSION.
A. Oral Confession.
In her first two points of error, Appellant contends that her oral confession made to Officer Valverde following the polygraph examination should have been suppressed because it was involuntary and inadmissible, obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Texas constitutional and statutory law. Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s determination that appellant was not in custody when Val-verde conducted appellant’s polygraph examination and post-polygraph interview that resulted in her oral confession. Appellant claims that her will was overborne *377by techniques used during the police interrogation. First, she claims that the police took advantage of her lack of education and lack of prior experience with the police. Second, she further asserts that she did not understand that she was free to leave, and her isolation at the police station for over an hour while Valverde prepared her questions, was “inherently coercive.” Third, appellant contends she was tired, and had little to eat. Fourth, she contends Valverde “conveyed a sense of inevitability” to appellant telling her she would know from the test if appellant was lying, and that there would be no point in appellant hiding anything. Fifth, Valverde took advantage of appellant’s perception that Valverde, being a woman, would sympathize with appellant’s situation. Appellant asserts that Valverde was using a variation of the “false friend” technique used in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). Sixth, Valverde never administered Miranda warnings which is relevant to the voluntariness of appellant’s confession. Appellant argues that the combined effect of these factors created an inherently coercive atmosphere at the police station to make appellant admit a crime she otherwise would not have admitted. We disagree.
Involuntary confessions offend due process only when they flow from the improper conduct of law enforcement officials. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). In determining whether police conduct is improper, the court should take into account police knowledge of a suspect’s special weaknesses, including youth and low intelligence. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962); Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 693 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Whether a given confession was involuntary as a matter of fact (apart from the prophylactic rules imposed by Miranda) must be decided by the totality of the circumstances on an individual basis. Gallegos, 82 S.Ct. at 1211; Armstrong, 718 S.W.2d at 693. Some relevant circumstances include the length of detention and interrogation, whether the defendant was permitted access to his family or an attorney, and the presence or absence of physical brutality. Armstrong, 718 S.W.2d at 693.
First, appellant contends her lack of experience with the police was an “inherent disadvantage” in dealing with the police. Appellant contends that no prior experience in dealing with the police was a factor deemed important in Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). We find nothing in Haynes to indicate that lack of prior experience in dealing with police was a factor in the case. Haynes held that the defendant’s written confession was involuntary and inadmissible where it was made while the defendant, Haynes, was held by the police incommunicado for at least 16 hours. Id. Haynes was told by police officers that he could not communicate by telephone with his wife until after he made a written confession. Id. We find Haynes is factually dissimilar to this case and it is not applicable.
In this case, the bulk of the evidence shows that appellant had the basic reasoning skills necessary to understand her rights warnings, and readily responded to questioning by Valverde and Martinez. See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 745-46 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). While an appellant’s limited intelligence is a factor to be considered, that alone does not mandate a finding of involuntariness of a confession as a matter of law. See Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 428-429 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). We will consider this factor along with the remaining factors in viewing the totality of the circumstances.
Second, appellant contends she did not realize she was free to leave and her physical isolation in the police station was another “inherently coercive” element. Nothing in the record indicates the police officers forced appellant to wait in the room while Valverde prepared her poly*378graph questions for appellant in another room. Appellant expressed a willingness to take the polygraph test and stay through the afternoon despite her complaint that she was “tired.” The police did nothing that could be remotely characterized as coercive. There were no threats or promises made by the police, there was no violence, and appellant did not suffer from physical illness during the interviews. At most, appellant was inconvenienced by the police investigation, but we fail to see how her will was “overborne” by police coercion. Armstrong, 718 S.W.2d at 693. We will consider this factor along with the remaining factors in viewing the totality of the circumstances.
Third, appellant asserts she was “tired” when she came to take the polygraph examination. Appellant admits the officers did buy her some nachos and a V-8 drink on the way in, but contends there is no evidence that she was ever given anything else to eat. Appellant testified that she only had about five hours of sleep when the officers came to her house at 8:00 a.m. Appellant expressed a willingness to stay and take the polygraph, as well as go with Martinez at 4:00 p.m. and give him her video statement. She made no complaints to anyone about being tired to the point of not wanting to continue the investigation, nor did she complain about being hungry. We will consider this factor along with the remaining factors in viewing the totality of the circumstances.
Fourth, appellant contends Valverde coerced appellant’s confession by conveying a sense of “inevitability” to appellant by telling appellant she would know from the polygraph test whether she was telling the truth. Valverde admits telling appellant that the test showed that appellant lied, and that she told appellant to tell the truth. A similar contention was made by the appellant in Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). In Nen-no, the polygraph examiner determined that the appellant had failed the test, and appellant said: “I failed it, didn’t I?” Id. at 555. Lt. Raney, the polygraph examiner, reminded appellant that he had told him prior to the examination that when the defendant finished the examination he would know whether or not the defendant was telling the truth.2 Id. After testing the appellant in Nenno, Lt. Raney told the appellant he needed to tell him where the complainant was because he knew. Id. Lt. Raney asked for further details, and the appellant stated he had taken the complainant to his bedroom and attempted to have sex with her but could not; he then strangled her and had sex with her. Id. In Nenno, the appellant contended on appeal that the polygraph operator coerced his confession by commanding him to tell the police what happened. Id. at 558. The court of criminal appeals stated: “We do not, however, interpret the polygraph operator’s comment that appellant would ‘have to tell’ the police what happened as meaning that he was legally obligated to do so. Instead, the polygraph operator’s statement conveys that appellant was morally obligated to give the information. Such moral urging does not in itself render an accused’s statement involuntary but is another circumstance to consider.” Id. We will consider Valverde’s “moral urging” as another factor in the totality of the circumstances.
Fifth, appellant contends Valverde took advantage of appellant’s perception that Valverde, being a woman, would sympathize with appellant’s situation. Appellant argues that Valverde was using a variation on the “false friend” technique used in Spano, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1207, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). In Spano, a police officer acquaintance falsely told the defendant that the officer was in trouble and that, if the defendant did not cooperate, the officer could lose his job and be unable to support his family. Id. The Spa-no scenario essentially involves a kind of implied threat to a person perceived by the *379suspect as a friend. Lane v. State, 983 S.W.2d 504, 513 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). That scenario is completely different from a situation in which the officers merely attempt to facilitate communication by being friendly and supportive. Id. The fact that a friendly, supportive, low key, non-confrontational style may prove effective in eliciting incriminating statements does not mean that the style of questioning is improper or that the resulting statements are involuntary. Id. In this ease, the record does not indicate any “implied threat to a person perceived by the suspect as a friend.” Spano is factually dissimilar and not applicable to this case. As was the case in Lane, the record indicates that Valverde used a friendly, supportive, low key, nonconfrontational style in eliciting incriminating statements from appellant. Id. We will consider this factor along with the others.
Sixth, Valverde never administered Miranda warnings'. Appellant was not in custody when Valverde gave appellant the polygraph examination and subsequent interview. Because Valverde’s interview was noncustodial, Miranda warnings were not required. See Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Appellant cites Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 1340, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967) as authority for the presence or absence of warnings being relevant to the voluntariness inquiry. Clewis involved a custodial interrogation by police resulting in an involuntary written statement; the present case involves a noncustodial oral statement. Clewis is not authority for this proposition and we will not consider this factor in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.
Having considered all of the above factors together with all other circumstances, we find that appellant’s will was not overborne. We must sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Blanks v. State, 968 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd). We find the trial court correctly determined that appellant’s oral confession was voluntary, and we overrule point of error one.
In point two, appellant contends that appellant’s oral confession to Valverde was in violation of the Texas due course of law provision in Tex. Const, art. I, § 19, and in violation of article 38.21, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Other than conclusions and generalizations, appellant does not explain why the Texas Constitution provides broader protection than the federal constitution or how that protection differs from the protection guaranteed by the federal constitution. Likewise, she does not explain how article 38.21 should be interpreted so as to eliminate the custodial requirements discussed above in this opinion for oral confessions in a noncustodial interrogation. Appellant cites no authority to support these conclusions and generalizations, and we decline to make appellant’s arguments for her. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h); Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 511 & n. 7; Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 852, 114 S.Ct. 154, 126 L.Ed.2d 115 (1993). Appellant’s point of error two is overruled.
B. Videotaped Confession.
In points three through eight, inclusive, appellant contends that her videotaped confession should have been suppressed because (a) it was obtained in violation of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Texas constitutional law, (b) it was obtained in violation of her Miranda rights, (c) it was obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (d) it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.
1. Violation of Article 38.22 & Miranda. In points three and four, appellant contends her post-arrest videotaped confession should have been suppressed because appellant did not make a knowing, intelligent waiver of the right to terminate the interrogation. A transcription was made of the oral portion of appellant’s *380videotaped statement and the challenged part of that statement states:
INV. MARTINEZ: You have the right to terminate this interview at any time you wish.
APPELLANT: How is that about “terminate” this interview?
INV. MARTINEZ: Uh ... Do you understand your rights? Can you read Spanish?
APPELLANT: Yes.
INV. MARTINEZ: Would read me number five, please? The last one.
APPELLANT: You have the right to terminate this interview at any time you wish.
INV. MARTINEZ: Do you understand that right?
APPELLANT: Úh-huh.
At the hearing on her motion to suppress the videotaped confession, appellant stated she understood she could stop talking to Martinez. She also acknowledged that Officer Martinez read her all of her rights and that she understood all of her rights. The trial court viewed the videotape, heard testimony from Officer Martinez concerning his reading of the warnings to appellant prior to taking her confession, and ordered the tape to be translated by a certified interpreter. Both parties stipulated to the accuracy of the translation of the confession, and the translated copy was made a part of the record. After a lengthy hearing, the trial court determined that the appellant understood her rights and that the confession was admissible. Our own review of the record reflects that appellant was somewhat confused about the right to terminate the interview, but after Officer Martinez explained the right and she read it to him in Spanish, she understood her rights. We find appellant knew her rights when she gave Martinez the video confession.
Appellant argues the recording does not accurately reflect that she knowingly and intelligently waived her rights. Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon 1979 & Supp.1999). The court of criminal appeals has held that the oral confession statute does not require that a recorded statement contain an express verbal statement from an accused that he waives his rights prior to giving a statement. Etheridge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 1, 16-18 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 920, 116 S.Ct. 314, 133 L.Ed.2d 217 (1995). Appellant in this case was informed of her rights during the recording, and she stated she understood those rights. The trial court, as the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses at a suppression hearing, can believe or disbelieve all or any of the witnesses. Id. at 18. See also Dunn v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to suppress defendant’s videotaped confession). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant’s videotaped confession was admissible. Appellant’s points of error three and four are overruled.
2. Lack of Waivers in Videotape. In point five, appellant contends the videotape does not show that she verbally answered Martinez’s questions asking her if she understood she had a right to remain silent and any statement can be used as evidence against her in court. The translation indicates “no verbal answer,” but appellant acknowledged at the hearing she understood Martinez’s questions. She also stated she understood her rights. As we have indicated above, Etheridge does not require that a recorded statement contain an express verbal statement from an accused that he waives his rights prior to giving a statement. 903 S.W.2d at 18. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotaped statement for these reasons. Appellant’s point of error five is overruled.
3. Warrantless Arrest. In point six, appellant contends the video confession should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. Appel*381lant asserts that probable cause to arrest arose when appellant admitted the murder to Officer Valverde. Appellant argues that Valverde should have given appellant her rights warning immediately after she confessed. Appellant contends that failure to do so tainted the subsequent video confession with the illegality of the oral confession. Appellant did not raise this complaint in the trial court in her motions to suppress, nor did she make an objection on these grounds to the trial court during the hearing on the motion to suppress her confessions. Because this is the first time appellant has raised this argument, it is not preserved for our review. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Etheridge, 903 S.W.2d at 16. We overrule appellant’s point of error six.
4. Voluntariness of the video confession. In points of error seven and eight, appellant further contends her video confession should have been suppressed because it was involuntary, in violation of federal and state constitutions, and article 38.21, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Appellant incorporates by reference the “legal discussions of voluntariness in Points of Error One and Two” as reasons why the video confession is also involuntary. The only new matter appellant adds to this contention is that the officers failed to tell appellant they were recording her statement, and there was not a knowing and intelligent waiver or agreement by appellant to the recording. The recording in this case was made July 3, 1996, and article 38.22, § 3, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, no longer required a person to be advised that her oral statement is being recorded. Prior to September 1, 1989, article 38.22, § 3(a)(2), required that an accused be told that a recording is being made prior to the statement but during the recording. This section was amended to delete this requirement effective September 1, 1989. See Etheridge, 903 S.W.2d at 16. This sub-point is without merit. The remainder of appellant’s argument in her brief was discussed in this opinion under points one and two and will not be repeated here. Appellant cites no authority to support her eonclusory argument that all the factors that made her oral confession involuntary also make the video confession involuntary. Appellant has not adequately briefed these points of error, and we decline to make her arguments for her. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h); Eth-eridge, 903 S.W.2d at 12. Points of error seven and eight are overruled.
C. Appellant’s Admission Concerning her Discarding the Gun.
In point nine, appellant contends that after appellant gave Martinez her video confession, she told Martinez she would take them to the place where she threw the gun. The prosecutor asked Martinez what he did at the conclusion of the video confession. Martinez said he called the D.A.’s office, and they told him to charge her. The prosecutor then asked Martinez: “[Ljet’s back up now. Then you probably processed her, booked her and put her in jail, put a hold on her?” Martinez then said, “yes,” and then said they first made a trip to where the shooting had occurred because she said she would show them where the gun was. Martinez’s mention of the trip to find the gun was a nonrespon-sive answer. Appellant argues that this matter is not admissible under article 38.22, section 3(c) (warnings not required for assertions of facts found to be true and which conduce to establish the guilt of the accused). Appellant did not raise this complaint in her motions to suppress, nor did she object to the evidence in the trial court at the hearing on her motion to suppress the confessions. Because this is the first time appellant has raised this argument, it is not preserved for our review. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Etheridge, 903 S.W.2d at 16. We overrule appellant’s point of error nine, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. In this case, Valverde told appellant substantially the same thing.