Court Opinion

ID: 9367005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 16:17:40.079411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.595061
License: Public Domain

J-A21009-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    JAMES M. FRANCIS                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LCP NORTH THIRD, LLC                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 665 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                             No(s): 180702329

    JAMES M. FRANCIS                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LCP NORTH THIRD, LLC                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 666 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 31, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                             No(s): 180702329

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED JANUARY 30, 2023

       LCP North Third, LLC (LCP) appeals from the judgment,1 entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following a non-jury trial. On

____________________________________________

1 LCP filed notices of appeal from both the January 31, 2022 order granting
attorneys’ fees to Francis (665 EDA 2022) and the judgment entered on
February 1, 2022 (666 EDA 2022). Where judgment is entered in the
underlying litigation before the trial court rules on a motion for counsel fees,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A21009-22

appeal, LCP challenges the trial court’s denial of its post-trial motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial, and the award

of attorneys’ fees to Appellee James M. Francis. After review, we affirm.

        The gravamen of this complaint involves the Second Omnibus

Amendment2 of a Settlement Agreement (Second Amendment) between LCP

and Francis. LCP, managed by Alan Leavitt, is a corporation that administers

partnerships and purchases loans. Pursuant to the Second Amendment, LCP

extended an option to Francis for the purchase of property located at 115-17

North Third Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 (Property). The issue

on appeal involves whether LCP stalled in completing construction at the

Property with the intention of defeating Francis’ ability to exercise his purchase

option? For context, Francis, through an entity titled One North Third (ONT),3

purchased the Property in 2004. N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 32. Following ONT’s

default on two construction loans, LCP purchased loan documents related to

the Property and the Property was listed for judicial sale. Id. at 38, 43-45;

____________________________________________

the order on counsel fees is appealable when entered without the need for
entry of judgment on it. See Carmen Enterprises, Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC,
185 A.3d 380, 389 (Pa. Super. 2018), citing Miller Elec. Co. v. DeWeese,
918 A.2d 114, 114 (Pa. 2007). Here, however, the court ruled on Francis’
attorneys’ fee request prior to the entry of judgment. The attorneys’ fee
award was therefore included in the judgment and, as such, the appeal at
docket number 665 EDA 2022 is duplicative and is hereby quashed.

2 A First Amendment had previously been executed involving construction
funds, but it is not germane to this case.

3   At all relevant times, Francis was the owner and manager of ONT.

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id., 9/21/21, at 78. Thereafter, Francis, on behalf of ONT, and LCP entered

into a Settlement Agreement,4 pursuant to which Francis would complete work

at the Property, Francis would make monthly rent payments to LCP, Francis

had an option to purchase the Property which could be executed any time

after Property was transferred to another party at sheriff’s sale5 and prior to

February 17, 2019, and LCP would purchase the Property at sheriff’s sale—

which it later did.6 Id., 9/20/21, at 47; id., 9/22/21, at 153.

        The   following    two    events       prompted   discussions   regarding   an

amendment to the Settlement Agreement.                First, on April 21, 2017, the

Department of License and Inspection (L&I) of the City of Philadelphia issued

a stop-work order on the Property because, inter alia, the sprinkler and fire

suppression systems were not certified. Id., 9/20/21, at 54.7 Francis testified

that following a dispute between him and Benjamin Magness, the plumber and

____________________________________________

4   Exhibit P-2 (Settlement Agreement).

5Francis, through ONT, owned the Property when the Settlement Agreement
was executed.

6   Exhibit D-6 (Deed to Property); see also N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 144.

7 The stop-work order also cited the need to obtain a permit for installation of
heating and air-conditioning systems. Additionally, the building permit was
revoked because it was either issued in error or a condition of the permit had
been violated. Further, the plumbing permit was revoked because it was
issued on the basis of false statements or misrepresentations of fact. The
zoning and/or use registration permit was also revoked because it was issued
in error. Finally, an inspection at the Property showed that the certified plans
did not comply with the Philadelphia Building Construction and Occupancy
Code. See Exhibit P-8 (Notice of Violations from City of Philadelphia).

                                           -3-
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sprinkler system contractor, Magness refused to return to the project to certify

his work.    Id. at 51, 91.      Second, Francis had defaulted on monthly rent

payments to LCP. On November 30, 2017, LCP notified Francis that he owed

$20,500.00 in rent to LCP and, thus, was in default under the Settlement

Agreement. Id., 9/22/21, at 155; see Exhibit D-30 (e-mail notification of

default to Francis).

       Following these events, LCP and Francis discussed an amendment to the

Settlement Agreement, pursuant to which LCP would manage construction at

the Property.     Francis testified that “[LCP] said that [its] people knew []

Magness” and “since [LCP’s] people are familiar with [] Magness, [LCP and I]

came to an arrangement that [LCP] would finish the project[.]” Id. at 85.

Francis and LCP also discussed the need for LCP to obtain a certificate of

occupancy (CO). N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 97. Francis testified that LCP “balked”

at the need to obtain a CO and Francis conceded that he was prepared to

purchase the Property when it was “substantially complete.” Id.

       The parties executed the Second Amendment on February 14, 2018.

Exhibit P-46.     Pursuant to the Second Amendment, LCP would complete

construction of the Property, Francis would provide LCP with contact

information for the contractors and consultants working on the Property,8 and
____________________________________________

8 Francis testified that he provided LCP with all information requested on
February 2, 2017, but that LCP did not use these contractors. N.T. Trial,
9/21/21, at 162; id. 9/23/21, at 45 (Leavitt testifying “[Francis] gave us a list
of contractors he had dealt with, but [due to] the conditions in the building,
the work was C minus at best.”).

                                           -4-
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Francis had either 90 days from the date LCP received the CO for the Property,

or, until June 30, 2018, whichever occurred first, to either exercise or assign

his option. Id., 9/20/21, 132; see also Exhibit P-3 (Second Amendment).

      Leavitt testified that LCP did not bind itself to substantially complete the

property. N.T. Trial, 9/23/21, at 35 (Leavitt testifying, “We said we would

diligently work, but we knew there was a stop[-]work order there. We knew

the first order of business was getting it removed.”); id. at 34 (Leavitt

testifying, “We expected that we would be able to get the project back on

track, at least get the sprinkler [] guys, fire suppression guys back in based

on our relationship.”); id. at 34-35 (Leavitt testifying, “[Y]ou can’t say you’ll

get a CO unless you know what was in the walls. We were not there. We

made it very clear we weren’t going to commit to it.”).

      Leavitt also testified regarding construction at the Property.          The

property needed a new roof, which could not be completed until there were

appropriate weather conditions. Id. at 44-45; id., 9/21/21, at 173 (Leavitt

testifying, “We had a foot of water in the building leaking from the roof and

the building department would only let one contractor in at a time, so it had

to be the roofer first.”). Leavitt also testified, “The only work we did was work

that was permitted by the building department, L&I [], and it was almost all

related to the sprinkler.” Id. at 156.

      On June 29, 2018, Francis exercised his option and scheduled closing

for July 26, 2018. Id., 9/22/21, at 171. LCP sent Francis an updated option

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price calculation,9 which indicated that as of July 10, 2018, the total amount

of money Leavitt spent on construction, including pending liabilities, was

$86,520.0010 Id., 9/20/21, at 185-86. On July 20, 2018, Francis received a

City of Philadelphia certification showing that the stop-work violations had not

been removed. Id. at 182; see Exhibit P-66. LCP attended the scheduled

closing and Francis did not. N.T. Trial, 9/23/21, at 54.

       In July 2018, Francis sued LCP for breach of contract. On September

20, 2021, the case proceeded to a non-jury trial before the Honorable Leon

Tucker. The trial court found that LCP breached its duty of good faith and fair

dealing and awarded Francis $966,126.00 in damages. By separate order,

the trial court awarded Francis $229,482.56 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

LCP’s post-trial requests for JNOV and a new trial were denied. This timely

appeal followed. Both the trial court and LCP have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925. LCP raises the following issues for review:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant LCP’s request
          for JNOV where Francis failed to prove: (i) an express or
          implied contractual duty that required LCP to complete
          construction within a certain timeframe; (ii) that LCP breached
          any contractual duty in the face of undisputed evidence
          establishing that delays were caused by a “stop[-] work” order
____________________________________________

9Pursuant to the Second Amendment, the purchase price of the option was
$4,311,835.00 plus construction expenses. Id., 10/20/21, at 133.

10 The updated option price indicated that $23,810.00 was paid to “Roofer”
and $150.00 was paid for “Use Registration Change” to L&I. The remaining
$62,560.00 was for pending liabilities to be paid within 30 days and included
“HVAC – Roof (Completed),” “Sprinkler & Unit Plumbing,” “Sprinkler –
Electrician,” and “Fire Alarm.” See Exhibit P-64 and P-65.

                                           -6-
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         and/or weather and not by LCP’s conduct; (iii) that Francis, as
         [the] purported non-breaching party, fulfilled his obligations
         under the contract by establishing that he was ready, willing[,]
         and able to “close” on the Property; and (iv) damages, in light
         of the undisputed valuation evidence and evidence regarding
         the staggering substantial construction costs that remained.

      2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees where
         [Francis] failed to prove all elements of his breach of contract
         claim, and thus, cannot properly be considered a “prevailing
         party” under the [parties] agreement?

      3. Whether [Francis] erred in entering judgment in the amount of
         the verdict and attorneys’ fee award after the attorneys’ fee
         award had been separately entered by a different [o]rder and
         judgment on the award should not have been entered twice on
         the same award?

Appellant’s Brief, at 18.

      LCP first alleges that Francis failed to prove breach of contract and, thus,

LCP is entitled to JNOV, or in the alternative, a new trial. When reviewing a

motion for JNOV the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the verdict winner, who must be given the benefit of every reasonable

inference of fact. Fanning v. Davne, 795 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(quotation omitted).    Any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the

verdict winner’s favor. Id. JVOV may be entered: (1) where the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or (2) where the evidence

was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome

should have been in favor of the moving party. Id. at 393.

      On appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion for JNOV, our Court will

reverse the trial court only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion or error of

law that controlled the outcome of the case. Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d

                                      -7-
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305, 311 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Additionally, where credibility

and the weight to be accorded the evidence are at issue, the court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder.    Id. at 311-12 (citation

omitted).

      The standard of review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for

a new trial, is, generally, whether the trial court clearly and palpably abused

its discretion or committed an error of law which controlled the outcome of

the case. Stevenson v. General Motors Corp., 521 A.2d 413, 422 (Pa.

1987). To reverse the trial court, this Court must consider all the evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and conclude that the verdict

would be different if another trial were granted.      Robertson v. Atlantic

Richfield Petroleum Products Co., 537 A.2d 814 (Pa. Super. 1987).

      LCP first argues that Francis did not prove breach of contract.        “To

successfully maintain a cause of action for breach of contract the plaintiff must

establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a

breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) resultant damages.” Hart

v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 332 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      Additionally, Pennsylvania courts impose a requirement of good faith in

performance under a contract, termed the “doctrine of necessary implication.”

Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1992).

      In the absence of an express provision, the law will imply an
      agreement by the parties to a contract to do and perform those
      things that according to reason and justice they should do in order
      to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made and to

                                      -8-
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      refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other
      party’s right to receive the fruits of the contract.

D.B. Van Campen Corp. V. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 195

A.2d 134, 136-37 (Pa. Super. 1963).        “The duty of ‘good faith’ has been

defined as ‘honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’” Somers,

supra at 1213. (Pa. Super. 1992).

      The obligation to act in good faith in the performance of
      contractual duties varies somewhat with the context, and a
      complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but it is
      possible to recognize certain strains of bad faith which include:
      evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking
      off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to
      specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the
      other party’s performance.

Id. (citations omitted).

      LCP’s first two sub-claims allege that there was no duty to complete

construction at the property and, thus, LCP did not breach any duty.

Specifically, LCP contends that the contract language in Section 6 of the

Second Amendment, wherein Francis and LCP acknowledge that LCP “desires

to complete the construction of the Property as promptly as possible,” is

merely precatory. Thus, LCP claims that this language does not create any

duty on LCP to advance construction by a certain date, to obtain a CO, to

spend a certain amount of money on construction, or to grant Francis’ option

extension requests. Appellant’s Brief, at 25-29. Further, LCP alleges that any

delays were caused by the stop-work order, rather than LCP’s conduct. These

claims are unavailing.

                                     -9-
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      Although we agree with LCP that it was not expressly required to

complete the individual prior-mentioned tasks, the record confirms the trial

court’s holding that LCP’s actual behavior demonstrated it had no intention to

complete construction of the Property as promptly as possible despite the

mandate to do so in Section 6, and, thus, LCP breached its duty of good faith.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/21, at 4-5.

      While Francis conceded he “was prepared to take the building when it

was substantially complete [],” N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 97, this does not obviate

LCP’s obligation to move forward with construction in good faith. The parties

disagreed regarding LCP’s need to obtain a CO prior to Francis’ execution of

his option. However, Francis testified that the exclusion of the CO requirement

was because the parties could not control when L&I would perform

inspections. See N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 97 (Francis testifying “I wanted them

to have a certificate of occupancy.     [LCP] balked at that, and one of the

reasons was the amount of time it might take the City to [perform] their

inspection.”). Additionally, LCP advised Francis in an e-mail, dated January

24, 2018, see Exhibit P-29, that LCP was going to “work diligently to obtain a

[CO]” and that Francis would have enough time to obtain financing. See also

N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 98 (Francis testifying e-mail reinforced “[LCP] was

going to get everything done.”).

      Moreover, although LCP was not required to spend a specific amount of

money on construction, from the date the Second Amendment was executed,

February 14, 2018, until July 10, 2018, LCP spent only $86,520.00 on

                                     - 10 -
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construction, including pending liabilities.        N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 202.    A

comparison of the May 16, 2018 and July 10, 2018 option price breakdown11

illustrates that during that two-month period LCP only moved forward with

construction on the roof and fire alarm. Additionally, fire alarm work did not

begin until June 8, 2018.          Id., 9/23/21, at 92.       Moreover, a property

certification from L&I, dated July 20, 2018, shows that none of the stop-work

violations had been removed. Id. at 182 (Francis testifying “[the July 20,

2018 City certification] had every violation that existed based on the stop[-

]work order.”); Exhibit D-21 (Initial Notice of Violation and Order); Exhibit P-

66 (July 20, 2018 License and Inspections Certification Statement).

       The record demonstrates that delays were not only caused by the stop-

work order. LCP failed to schedule weekly phone calls with Thomas Donatucci

from   Knickerbocker       Properties12    until   two   months   after   the   Second

Amendment was executed, see N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 175, even though

Leavitt and Donatucci had scheduled weekly phone calls regarding other

____________________________________________

11See Exhibit P-65 (as of July 10, 2018 total option price $4,398,355.34);
Exhibit P-55 (as of May 16, 2018 total option price $4,376,165.00).

12 Knickerbocker Properties was the general contractor at the Property.
Thomas Donatucci works at Knickerbocker Properties, along with his brother,
Robert Donatucci. Together they have a 4% interest in the Property but do
not have any voting power or decision-making authority. N.T. Trial, 9/23/21,
at 38-39.

                                          - 11 -
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properties on which they were working.13 Further, testimony regarding the

fire alarm system indicates that LCP was sent the sprinkler and fire

suppression system proposal twice before it was approved, delaying the start

of work on the system until June 8, 2018. Id., 9/23/21, at 92. The proposal

was originally sent to LCP on March 7, 2018. Id., 9/21/21, at 170; see also

Exhibit P-86.

       While Leavitt testified that LCP would have made a profit only if Francis

exercised his purchase option, LCP’s conduct prevented Francis from

exercising his purchase option. Id., 9/21/21, at 191 (Leavitt testifying, “I told

[Francis] three times the only way I could have broken even on the job was if

[Francis] exercised his option.”). For example, LCP filed use permit changes

in order to “maximize value” of the Property even though it knew L&I approval

of the changes would take time and that Francis had a limited window to

exercise his option.14 Id., 9/21/21, at 177.

       Further, LCP failed to grant Francis’ two requests for extensions of the

option execution date. Id., 9/20/21, at 175-76; id., 9/21/21, at 179; see

Exhibit P-57 (Francis requesting extension of the option contract because LCP

“deliberately let the job languish to forestall [Temporary COs] being issued in
____________________________________________

13  Knickerbocker Properties and Leavitt are working together on other
projects, such as 248 Market St., Philadelphia, PA 19106, and have weekly
calls scheduled. N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 174; id., 9/23/21, at 38.

14 On April 24, 2018, Leavitt filed a use permit to change zoning of the Property
from 12 units to 15 units. After the changes were approved, Knickerbocker
Properties emailed LCP, “I think you made some money today.” N.T. Trial,
9/23/21, 183 (emphasis added); see Exhibit P-118.

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a timely manner”). Additionally, in an e-mail denying Francis’ request for an

extension, LCP stated:

      LCP may pursue or not pursue the remaining construction work at
      the [P]roperty as it sees fit in its sole discretion.

                                  ***
      [W]hether or not the construction work at the [P]roperty is
      completed, and when, if ever, it is completed, is irrelevant to
      [Francis’] right to exercise his option under the [Second
      Amendment.]

Exhibit P-145. Indeed, the record supports the trial court’s determination that

LCP’s actual behavior confirmed that LCP had no intent of moving work

forward at the Property to enable Francis to exercise his purchase option.

      In light of the foregoing, the record confirms the trial court’s

determination that LCP breached its duty of good faith under the Second

Amendment.

      LCP’s third sub-claim alleges that Francis breached his duties under the

contract. Specifically, LCP claims Francis was not ready, willing and able to

close on the Property because Francis did not receive funding commitments

in excess of the base price amount and Francis failed to attend the set closing

date. Appellant’s Brief, at 39. This claim is belied by the record.

      The trial court determined: “[Francis] was unable to secure financing of

the Property in the then[-]current condition or, alternatively, was not able to

assign the option in accordance with the option agreement. [] Furthermore,

[LCP] refused to give [Francis] relevant documents to confirm the status of

the [Property].” Trial Court Opinion, supra at 8.

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      Indeed, Francis had been negotiating with Marcus and Millichap (M&M)

regarding its purchase of the option. M&M’s proposed sale price or trade price,

for the Property was between $4,950,000.00 and $5,350,000.00; this

information was sent to LCP on April 30, 2018. N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 182-

84; Exhibit P-50. Leavitt acknowledged that M&M is “one of the largest real

estate brokers in the country” and that Francis “was not messing around.”

Id., 9/21/21, at 184.    However, M&M and Francis did not move forward

because construction at the Property was not substantially complete, and

Francis was unable to provide M&M building progress information because LCP

did not provide this requested information to Francis.      Id., 9/20/21, 167

(Francis testifying, “It’s just customary, if I speak to lenders, I need to give

them information[.] I need to see it also, and [LCP] refused to give that to

me.”); Exhibit P-53 (Francis’ request for documents from LCP). Due to LCP’s

conduct, Francis was unable to secure financing.

      In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s determination that Francis’

inability to secure financing was due to LCP’s lack of good faith compliance

with the Second Amendment is supported by the record.

      LCP’s fourth sub-claim alleges that Francis failed to prove damages.

Specifically, LCP argues William Connor, Francis’ damages expert, failed to

consider the valuation evidence and substantial remaining construction costs

on the Property. Appellant Brief, at 42. LCP is entitled to no relief.

      The trial court adopted the expert damages proffered by Reaves Lukens,

Francis’ expert.   The trial court reasoned that Luken’s property appraisal

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method was consistent with the appropriate term net rentable area,15 and was

consistent with M&M’s valuation, which was performed pre-litigation.      Trial

Court Opinion, supra at 10. Additionally, the trial court found LCP’s expert’s

valuation analysis flawed due to his use of the lowest comparable properties

sold in the 19106 ZIP code. Lukens determined that the Property was valued

at $5,600,000.00. N.T. Trial, 9/22/21, at 116.

       The trial court also adopted the analysis of William Connor, Francis’

expert, who determined that the remaining construction costs would be

$322,039.00. Id. Connor considered the cost to complete each individual

unit, the one office unit, and various building systems, including the HVAC and

fire alarm systems. N.T. Trial, 9/22/21, at 19, 27. Connor also considered

the cost to complete roofing work, the storefront, and intercom system. Id.

at 27-28.

       Francis is entitled to the profits he would have received if the Second

Amendment was not breached. See Oelschlegel v. Mut. Real Estate Inv.

Trust, 633 A.2d 181, 184 (Pa. Super. 1993) (“The central principal of the law

regarding contractual damages is that the non-breaching party should be

placed in the position he or she would have been in absent the breach.”). The

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15 The useable square footage of a space is the total area unique to a tenant,
whereas the net rentable square footage includes the portion of the building’s
common spaces also available a tenant. The building’s gross square footage
is    the     total  square      footage     of    a     building.        See
https://aquilacommercial.com/learning-center/rentable-vs-usable-square-
footage-whats-difference/ (last accessed on 12/22/22). The rentable area is
the amount of space you can collect rent on or sell. Id.

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appraised value of the property, as per Lukens, was $5,600,000.00 as of June

30, 2018. Id., 9/22/21, at 166. Pursuant to the Second Amendment, the

total option price ($4,633,874.00) was the base option price ($4,311,835.00)

plus construction expenses ($322,039.00).            Id., 10/20/21, at 133; id.,

9/22/21, at 31. Damages are calculated by subtracting the total option price

($4,633,874.00) from the appraised value of the Property ($5,600,000.00),

and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering $966,126.00

in damages.       Trial Court Opinion, supra at 11; Findings [and Order],

12/3/2021.

        Viewing all evidence, in the light most favorable to Francis, LCP is not

entitled to a JNOV or a new trial because the trial court did not abuse its

discretion.

        In its second issue, LCP claims that Francis is not entitled to attorneys’

fees because there was no breach of contract and no breach of an implied

duty imposed by the contract.          Appellant’s Brief, at 44.   This argument is

meritless.    Francis is the prevailing party, and the parties included a fee-

shifting agreement in Section 17 of the Settlement Agreement,16 to which they

____________________________________________

16   The Second Amendment states:

        17. Attorney’s Fees in the Event of Breach of this Agreement. If
        an action, suit or legal proceeding is brought by any Party to
        enforce of redress a breach of this Agreement, in addition to all
        other relief awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
        substantially prevailing Party shall be entitled to an award of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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also stipulated in court. See N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 26. Mullen v. Kutz, 985

A.2d 769, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2009) (parties may contract to provide for

breaching party to pay prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees arising from actions

contractual damages). See also Bert Co v. Turk, 257 A.3d 93, 117 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (fee-shifting agreements include attorneys’ fees arising from

actions for contractual damages).

       In its third issue, LCP argues that under Samuel-Bassett v. Kia

Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2011), the attorneys’ fees award is

considered ancillary and, thus, should not have been included in the judgment

that was entered after post-trial motions were decided.        This argument is

meritless. In Kia Motors America, our Supreme Court determined that the

trial court retained jurisdiction to order attorneys’ fees reasoning that “a

petition for attorneys’ fees is an ancillary matter, which the trial court retains

authority to decide after an entry of judgment on the verdict.” Id. at 48. Kia

Motors America focuses on the trial court’s jurisdiction to order attorneys’

fees following the entry of judgment once an appeal is filed, id., but does not

stand for the proposition that attorneys’ fees cannot be reduced to judgment.

       Finally, LCP claims that the Prothonotary exceeded the authority

permitted under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure where it entered a

____________________________________________

       reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred in connection with
       such matter.

Section 17 of Second Amendment (entered as Exhibit P-46 at trial).

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judgment in excess of the verdict, and, thus, the judgment should be stricken

as void ab inito. LCP is entitled to no relief.

       In H&H Mfg. Co. v. Tomei, No. 1982 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed

November 21, 2021) (non-precedential decision) (Table),17 this Court

determined that there was no authority for the Prothonotary to enter an award

of attorney’s fees when the attorney’s fees award was not awarded by the

court, rather it was based on an affidavit of counsel. Id. at 18. Here, the

court entered an order on December 3, 2021, awarding $966,126.00 in

damages and finding that Francis was entitled to seek attorney’s fees and

costs as the prevailing party pursuant to the agreement in the Second

Amendment. Findings, 12/3/2021. On January 28, 2022, unlike in H&H Mfg.

Co, the court entered an order granting Francis $229,482.56 in attorney’s

fees. See Trial Court Order, 1/28/22. Subsequently on February 1, 2022,

Francis filed a praecipe to enter judgment which included the award of

attorneys’ fees previously determined by the court. Thus, the Prothonotary

did not exceed its authority.

       Order and judgment affirmed.

____________________________________________

17 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126, unpublished non-precedential memorandum
decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their
persuasive value.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/30/2023

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