Court Opinion

ID: 9367409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 18:00:54.863228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:00.079198
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                               JAN 31 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ASIM SARWAR,                                     No.   18-71479

              Petitioner,                        Agency No. A208-616-883

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted May 10, 2022**
                      Submission Vacated September 20, 2022
                          Resubmitted January 31, 2023
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: TALLMAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,*** District
Judge.
Dissent by Judge BLOCK.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
      Asim Sarwar, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions for review of the

denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a), and deny Sarwar’s petition.

      1.     We reject Sarwar’s argument that the BIA lacked jurisdiction due to a

defective notice to appear (NTA). See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39

F.4th 1187, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2022). Sarwar later received a corrected NTA and

attended his hearing. Sarwar does not present a colorable argument that he was

prejudiced by the initial, defective NTA.

      2.     We reject the government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction to

consider Sarwar’s petition because he did not exhaust his challenge to the IJ’s

adverse credibility finding before the BIA. While we typically lack jurisdiction to

consider issues that were not raised before the BIA, see Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d

1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013), we do not apply the exhaustion doctrine in a

formalistic manner against pro se petitioners, Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1083

(9th Cir. 2011). Instead, we construe pro se filings liberally. Id. Sarwar’s BIA

filings challenged the IJ’s finding that Sarwar was ineligible for asylum because

Sarwar “failed to proffer and present credible evidence of past harm in Pakistan,”

there was a “lack of evidence to support [his] application,” and he could “not

                                            2
elaborate [his] statement correctly.” He argued that he should be provided an

opportunity to “elaborate [his] issue widely and with details.” Liberally construing

Sarwar’s filings, we conclude that Sarwar placed the BIA on notice that he was

contesting the IJ’s credibility finding. Moreover, the BIA considered the merits of

Sarwar’s challenge to the adverse credibility determination, and claims addressed

on the merits by the BIA are deemed exhausted. See, e.g., Vizcarra-Ayala v.

Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2008).

      3.     We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence.

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We will not disturb the

agency’s finding that a petitioner is not credible unless “any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Both

the IJ and the BIA explicitly invoked the totality of the circumstances standard in

their decisions and the IJ identified specific instances in the record for its adverse

credibility determination. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042. The IJ evaluated

Sarwar’s demeanor, nonresponsive answers, and inconsistent statements. For

example, the IJ reasonably relied on Sarwar’s inconsistent statements about when

police in Pakistan broke his arm. The IJ also relied on the fact that Sarwar could

only describe what his political party stood for in vague terms and that it was

implausible that Sarwar could support himself working construction in Brazil if he

                                            3
had broken his arm a few months earlier. We hold that the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination is supported by substantial evidence.

      4.     Sarwar separately argues the BIA erred by affirming the IJ’s decision

to exclude the documentary evidence he offered. The documents were excluded

for lack of foundation because Sarwar had not seen them prior to the hearing and

could not authenticate them. He argues that this was prejudicial error because the

documents could have corroborated his testimony. This overlooks that Sarwar

bore the burden to establish a foundation for the admission of the documents and

the IJ had discretion to determine whether the “balance of the evidence [was]

sufficiently compelling to satisfy him that the documents [were] what [Sarwar]

claim[ed] them to be.” Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.

2007). Because the document from the attorney his brother hired in Pakistan bore

a date that was inconsistent with Sarwar’s own sworn testimony, the IJ had reason

to doubt the veracity of the documents, and did not abuse his discretion by refusing

to admit them without a witness who could authenticate them. See Vatan, 508 F.3d

at 1182. Under these circumstances, we see no evidentiary error nor due process

violation in the IJ’s decision to exclude the records.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                           4
                                                                            FILED
Sarwar v. Garland, No 18-71479                                               JAN 31 2023
                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
BLOCK, Senior District Judge, dissenting:                                 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I agree that the BIA had jurisdiction. I further agree that Sarwar adequately

exhausted his challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.

      I disagree, however, that his challenge lacks merit. The IJ relied principally

on perceived inconsistencies in Sarwar’s testimony regarding the date Pakistani

police broke his arm. While his testimony is not a model of clarity, the

inconsistencies are largely exaggerated.

      Sarwar stated at his credible fear interview that his arm was broken at a

political rally on February 11, 2014. He also described a “second beating” on

August 14, 2014. He referred to both events at the merits hearing before the IJ,

along with a third incident in December 2010. On direct examination, he testified

that “because of these people I broke my arm” without referring to a specific date.

      The IJ muddled the issue on cross-examination, asking Sarwar when he

broke his arm. Sarwar responded, “It happened in 2010.” The IJ then said that

Sarwar had testified earlier that it was broken on August 14, 2014; Sarwar never so

testified. Sarwar referred to “the first incident.” He did not specify which incident

he considered the first, but immediately clarified that “[t]he February one” was

“the worst.” On redirect, Sarwar described December 2010 as “a small event” and
stated unequivocally that his arm was broken in “February . . . when [he] was

beaten the most.”

      Sarwar consistently testified that his arm was broken when Pakistani police

beat him during a political rally. Considering his testimony in its entirety, I cannot

agree that the IJ reasonably focused on some possible confusion as to the date of

the incident as a basis for rejecting Sarwar’s account.

      The other grounds for the adverse credibility finding fare no better. The

majority alludes to the IJ’s statement that Sarwar described the political party he

belonged to in “vague and general” terms. On the contrary, he knew that the

December 2010 incident occurred at the party’s “annual function”; that February

11 was the anniversary of the execution of prominent Kashmiri separatist Maqbool

Bhat (whom he identified by name); and that August 14 was a “black day” for the

separatist movement because it commemorated Pakistani independence.

      The majority does not mention the IJ’s reliance on Sarwar’s statement at the

border that he did not fear returning to his “home country or country of last

residence,” but this, too, was misplaced. Sarwar explained that he understood the

question to refer to Brazil, not Pakistan. That explanation is far more sensible that

the IJ’s logic that a person “who had ample time to consider he story that he was

going to present to the U.S. officials” completely forgot that he needed a story

when he arrived at the border.
      Finally, I cannot agree that the IJ properly excluded documents that would

have corroborated Sarwar’s testimony. Sarwar had no apparent means of

authenticating the documents, which were assembled and sent after he fled

Pakistan, but the ultimate test for the admission of documents in an immigration

proceeding is “whether the evidence is probative and its admission is

fundamentally fair.” Sanchez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012). The

IJ suspected that the documents were created to match Sarwar’s testimony but

inconsistencies in the documents actually undermine that suspicion. Tellingly, the

IJ had no qualms admitting—and presumably considering—documents detailing

terrorist activities in Pakistan despite the complete lack of any connection to

Sarwar. This imbalance in the IJ’s approach to admissibility was, if anything,

fundamentally unfair.

      For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.