Court Opinion

ID: 9628221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:13:17.697872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:43.976849
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error, who will hereafter be referred to by name, or as defendant, seeks reversal of a judgment and sentence of from three to six years in the state penitentiary entered on a jury’s verdict adjudging him guilty of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, namely cannabis, more commonly known as marijuana.
Defendant assigns as error: (1) the general insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and specifically the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the unlawful possession; and (2) that the trial court failed to fully and correctly instruct the jury as to the meaning and definition of the word “possession.”
Upon trial the People established by competent evidence that defendant at the time of his arrest had 50 milligrams of cannibas sativa L. in his pant’s pocket, the cannibas consisting of the leaf structure and possibly the flowering top of the cannabis plant, and being found in the debris taken from his pocket.
The circumstances of defendant’s arrest were that the police in the early morning hours stopped a car in which Duran was a passenger. The driver of the car and a passenger in the front seat were ordered from tine car, at which time the police first noticed defendant apparently asleep on the rear seat. When aroused defendant was “groggy” and appeared to be intoxicated, even though there was no odor of alcohol. Defendant staggered from the car, and police officers upon searching *565the vehicle found on the floor adjacent to the rear seat a woman’s purse, which they examined and in an outside flap thereof discovered two .handrolled cigarettes. Expert testimony established that the two cigarettes were made of cannabis sativa L., which also consisted of the leaf and flowering top of the cannabis plant. When questioned defendant denied any knowledge of the purse or of the marijuana cigarettes, and without further explanation suggested that the police “go ahead and file” if they thought they “had something” on him. Upon trial it was also established that the purse belonged to Pauline Quintana, who was not an occupant of the car at the time defendant was arrested. Defendant offered no evidence, and upon the evidence as summarized above a jury convicted him of unlawful possession of a narcotic.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient, particularly on the issue of possession, to warrant submission of the case to the jury, and a fortiori, that the verdict of guilty and the judgment entered thereon cannot be permitted to stand.
Defendant complains that it is uncertain whether he is charged with unlawful possession of the particles of marijuana found in his pocket, or of the two marijuana cigarettes discovered in the outside flap of the woman’s purse found on the floor near the back seat. The information charges defendant in the words of the statute with the unlawful possession of cannabis. In either event there was sufficient evidence to warrant and require the trial court to submit the case to the jury. Clearly defendant possessed at least 50 milligrams of the prohibited narcotic found on his person. The statute denounces the possession of any amount of the drug, even 50 milligrams. Moreover, the fact and circumstances warranted submission of the case to the jury on the theory that the two marijuana cigarettes found in the purse and within easy reach of defendant, though not on his person were nevertheless under his dominion and control, hence in his possession. See Gonzales v. *566People, 128 Colo. 522, 264 P. (2d) 508; People v. Torres, 98 Cal. App. 2nd 189, 219 P. (2d) 480. The question of “possession,” whether of the cannabis in his pocket or that in the cigarettes, and whether either or both were “knowingly possessed” by defendant, was a matter to be resolved by the jury under proper instructions.
Defendant’s chief criticism of the instructions given by the trial court is that the jury was not clearly and fully informed that in order to constitute possession defendant must “intend to possess” and that he “must know that the object or thing allegedly possessed is a narcotic drug.” A careful review of all the instructions given by the trial court clearly shows this assignment to be without merit. The jury was advised in the exact words of the statute that a crime “consists of the violation of a public law in the commission of which there shall be a union or joint operation of act and intention.” Thereafter the word “intent” was also defined in the words of the applicable statute. The trial court next defined “possession” as follows: “You are instructed that possession as that word is used in these instructions, does not necessarily mean that the object or thing alleged to be possessed is actually on his or her person. Possession as that word is used in these instructions, does mean actual, physical, immediate and knowing dominion or control over the object or thing allegedly possessed.” Finally instruction No. 5 advised the jury that one material allegation of the information, among others, is “that he [defendant] knew that he had a narcotic drug in his possession.”
In this same connection defendant also complains of the refusal of the trial court to give his tendered instruction 1-A defining the word “possession.” Having determined that the jury was adequately and correctly instructed on this point it was not error to refuse the tendered instruction. Concerning the correctness of the instructions pertaining to possession it is of interest to note that counsel for defendant here also appeared in *567Gallegos v. People, 139 Colo. 166, 337 P. (2d) 961, as counsel for Gallegos, and in that case also made substantially the same complaint concerning the instructions defining the word “possession.” In the Gallegos case this Court approved instructions defining possession which are nearly identical with the instructions given in the instant case. In that same case this Court also found no error in the refusal of a tendered instruction defining possession almost identical with the one tendered and refused in the instant case. We conclude that considering the instructions as a whole the jury was adequately and correctly advised as to the full legal meaning of the word “possession.”
The trial court in imposing the sentence of three to six years in the state penitentiary stated that it was to be served concurrently with a sentence of six to ten years imposed at the same time in a different and unrelated criminal prosecution. However, the copy of the mittimus contained in the record indicates that this sentence was to be served consecutively and not concurrently with the other sentence. Accordingly, it is ordered that the mittimus issued herein be corrected to show that the two sentences are to be served concurrently, and not consecutively.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Hall and Mr. Justice Frantz dissent.