Court Opinion

ID: 9697645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:24:11.353916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:49.908719
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.,
dissenting. I am unable to agree with the opinion expressed by the other members of the court. The questions before us for determination are: 1. May a minority of the employees in one state unilaterally cancel and repudiate provisions of a union agreement entered into between their duly designated collective bargain*407ing agent and their employer and covering a national unit found appropriate for collective bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board? 2. Are the provisions of the collective labor agreement herein, executed pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, invalid under the statutes of this state, requiring the weekly payment of wages and restricting their assignment?
I am of the opinion that the first question should be answered in the negative. The complainants and those for whom they sue constitute a minority of the agents employed by the respondent company in the state of Rhode Island and an infinitesimal minority of the agents employed nationally. The agreement involved herein was executed after the respondent company’s agents nationally had designated the respondent union as their collective bargaining agent. Such union has been held by the National Labor Relations Board to be the appropriate bargaining agent for this entire group. The contract contained provisions for the payment of union dues and related fees by the agents. These dues were to be deducted from the earnings of all agents who had signed check-off authorization cards and from those other agents who had failed to notify the company to the contrary within a stated period. They were then to be remitted to the respondent union. Upon appropriate notice by employees, the deductions were to cease on October 1, 1948 or on succeeding anniversaries thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of this contract, the respondent company made these deductions from June 1946 to June 1947, when a temporary restraining order was issued.
It is undisputed that the labor relations of the respondent insurance company with its district agents are subject to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. The principal question here involved is whether a small minority of such agents may within the period for which the contract is to run repudiate a collective bargaining agreement entered into between their employer and their *408exclusive bargaining agent which has unquestioned authority under the National Labor Relations Act.
It seems obvious that the answer to this question must be in the negative if collective bargaining is to have meaning and if contracts are to possess any validity or legal stability. A collective bargaining' agreement is a contract which is binding upon the union and its members, no less than upon the employer. Dooley v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. of Pennsylvania, 130 N.J. Eq. 75; Local 60 of Industrial Union, Etc. v. Welin Davit & Boat Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 551.
As the court stated at page 81 in the Dooley case, supra, quoting from the language employed in Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers, Etc., 126 N.J. Eq. 508: “A collective bargaining agreement is the joint and several contract of the members of the union, made by the officers of the union as their agents. It is enforceable by or against individual members of the union in matters which affect them peculiarly; and it is enforceable by or against the union in matters which affect all the members alike, or large classes of members, for instance, those who are employes of the other party to the contract.”
The majority opinion relies upon the case of Braddom v. Three Point Coal Corp., 288 Ky. 734, as authority for the proposition that employees on whose behalf a collective bargaining agreement was made may repudiate such agreement or some of the provisions thereof during its term. I do not believe that the Braddom opinion goes as far as that nor has it generally been so regarded. While the suit was one to revoke the checkoff of dues, the court concerned itself principally with the question of compulsory union membership, which is not involved in the instant cause. Thus at page 739 it stated the following to be the basic principle upheld in the case: “That principle is, that one who joins a voluntary association for an indefinite period may resign therefrom at will and thus *409terminate his obligation to pay dues not theretofore accrued.”
It accordingly stated at page 740: “* * * we are impelled to hold that the terms of the contract between the Union and the Coal Operators Association did not supply the time element necessary to lend definiteness to the otherwise unlimited duration of the period during which the plaintiffs impliedly contracted to remain members of the Union and permit the Coal Company to deduct dues or assessments from their wages.” (italics mine) If “definiteness” as used in the Braddom case is relevant, such definiteness is certainly present in the instant cause. The time limitations are set forth in the contract itself. The individual agent had the right to terminate checkoff “by giving the employer written notice of desire for such termination” effective on October 1, 1948 or on any anniversary thereafter. The agents collectively could prevent a renewal of the agreement by filing a petition for certification of another union or the decertification of this union' under the National Labor Relations Act. They did not, however, seek relief from the check-off provisions of the agreement in accordance with and in the manner provided by the agreement, but sought relief through an attempted repudiation of the contract itself.
The Braddom case, supra, has never been regarded as authority for the proposition that a dissident union member may repudiate a collective labor agreement executed by the exclusive bargaining agent. On the contrary, its own language as expressed at page 739 appears to accept the principle of majority rule and contract sanctity. Furthermore, a later case in the same jurisdiction, Day v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 295 Ky. 679, expressly holds that a contract lawfully entered into by means of collective bargaining cannot be set aside by an individual who considers himself aggrieved by a particular provision of the agreement. That is the rule of law enunciated by courts of other jurisdictions and by the National Labor Relations Board.
*410I am also of the opinion that the second question should be answered in the negative. While the National Labor Relations Act as originally enacted made no express mention of the checkoff, it is well settled as a matter of law that the checkoff of union dues is one of the things concerning which employees are guaranteed the right to bargain collectively and to provide for by agreement with their employers. Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 319 Mass. 55, citing numerous cases; National Labor Relations Board v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874.
The amendments to the National Labor Relations Act which were made by the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor Management Relations Act 1947) give express recognition to the checkoff as one of the inherent essentials of the process of collective bargaining by prescribing the manner in which and the conditions under which the checkoff may be provided for. I am of the opinion that even if the Rhode Island “Weekly Payment of Wages Act” and the assignment of wages statute, or either of them, are construed as restricting or prohibiting a checkoff, the fact that congress has legislated in the field would supersede the operation and effect of the state statutes in the premises. See article VI, par. 2, of the constitution of the United States.
It is well settled that state laws may not constitutionally derogate from the federal right to bargain collectively. It is fundamental that where congress has occupied a field the states are thereby excluded from legislating contrariwise therein. Erie R.R. v. People of the State of New York, 233 U. S. 671; Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597; Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. State of Washington, 270 U. S. 87. And any attempt by the states by statute or otherwise to limit or restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by congressional enactment or to interfere in matters within the scope of congressional legislation is of no effect. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, and cases cited.
I am impelled to the conclusion that in a field where the *411federal government has operated and given sanction to certain procedures and laws the federal law must govern; that any state constitution or state law in conflict therewith is superseded and no longer applicable; and that the supremacy of the federal constitution and statutes is unquestioned.
James J. McAleer, Ambrose W. Carroll, for complainants.
Perkins, Higgins & McCabe, James A. Higgins, for respondent.
James E. Flannery, Leonard B. Boudin, of New York Bar, for intervening respondents.
For the reasons stated above, I dissent from the conclusions expressed by the other members of the court and am of the opinion that the trial justice was fully warranted and justified under the evidence presented herein and the law applicable thereto in denying and dismissing the bill of complaint. I am of the further opinion that the complainants' appeal should be denied and dismissed, and that the decree appealed from should be affirmed.