Court Opinion

ID: 9660500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:14:38.054973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:12.440435
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s reinstatement of the charges against these defendants, but disagree with the majority’s reasoning. In this case, we consider whether the Fourth Amendment permits a search of a vehicle when the search is premised on a police officer’s perception of an odor of burned marijuana emanating from the vehicle. I disagree with the majority holding that probable cause must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Instead I would hold that the plain smell of burned or unbumed marijuana provides probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant.
I agree with the majority that at the time the police officer perceived the odor of burned marijuana, no seizure had occurred under the Fourth Amendment.
i
In addition to the facts as presented by the majority, I note that testimony from the preliminary hearing indicates that there were two or three arrests made each night for alcohol and dmgs in the parking lot where the arrests occurred. Further, Sergeant Theodore Kneibel, who arrived less than a minute after Officer Walendzik called for assistance, testified that when he approached the defendants’ open vehicle he detected the “strong pungent odor” of marijuana. Sim*597ilarly, Officer Brian Hudenko, who arrived shortly after Sergeant Kneibel, testified that there was a “[v]ery strong odor” of marijuana in the Blazer.
In addition to a loaded revolver seized from defendant Pimpleton, a subsequent search of the defendants and their vehicle revealed, among other things, three additional loaded handguns, a 9-mm round, pagers, and three face masks.
n
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV.1 Searches conducted without warrants are presumed to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 454-455; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971). The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression of the unlawfully obtained evidence. Weeks v United States, 232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914).2
A
There are narrowly drawn exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. These exceptions attempt to balance the tension between a police officer’s duty to protect the public and an individual’s right under the Fourth Amendment to personal *598security. Relevant to the search of the vehicle without a warrant in this case are exceptions based on a police officer’s sensory perception of contraband. This Court has followed federal precedent by adopting both the plain view3 and plain feel4 exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The plain view exception permits police officers to seize items of an immediately apparent, incriminating character without a warrant when the officer is in a lawful position from which to view the item, People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 101; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). “ ‘[immediately apparent’ means that without further search the officers have ‘probable cause to believe’ the items are seizable.” Id., p 102, citing Texas v Brown, 460 US 730, 741-742; 103 S Ct 1535; 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983). The plain feel exception similarly allows seizure without a warrant of objects discovered during a weapons patdown when the identity of the object is immediately apparent and the officer has probable cause to believe the object is contraband. People v Champion, supra, p 101.
The federal courts and an overwhelming majority of state courts hold that probable cause may also be based on distinctive odors. See, e.g., United States v Haley, 669 F2d 201 (CA 4, 1982); United States v Miller, 812 F2d 1206 (CA 9, 1987); United States v Morin, 949 F2d 297 (CA 10, 1991). This Court has not expressly held that the sense of smell can support a finding of probable cause; however, we noted in People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 156, n 3; 499 NW2d 764 *599(1993), that the odor of fresh marijuana could support a finding of probable cause.
I recognize that there is an apparent difference between the plain view exception and the plain feel and smell exceptions to the warrant requirement. With sight, the item to be seized is immediately present and no further search for contraband is required. However, the senses of touch and smell establish the possible presence of contraband, the confirmation of which requires further “searching.” This issue was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v Dickerson:
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context. [508 US 366, 375-376; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L Ed 2d 334 (1993).]
Dickerson does not require consideration of the totality of the circumstances to establish probable cause under the plain feel exception. Similarly, when an officer smells an odor that is immediately incriminating from a lawful vantage point,5 the officer may rely on his sense of smell to determine whether probable cause exists to search a vehicle without the circumspection of a neutral magistrate. Excessively speculative searches are deterred by the Fourth Amendment requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe contraband is present. Dickerson, 508 US 376.
*600b
Probable cause exists to support the plain view6 and plain feel7 exceptions where the incriminating character of the item to be seized is immediately apparent. “[T]he mere fact that the items in question came lawfully within the officer’s plain view . . . alone cannot supplant the requirement of probable cause.” Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321, 327; 107 S Ct 1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987).
There is probable cause to issue a search warrant where there is a “substantial basis” for inferring a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). Although Russo involved a search warrant, the analysis is equally applicable to the question of probable cause in a search conducted without a warrant. See People v Champion, supra, p 113.
The existence of probable cause turns on the degree of certainty held by the police officer that the item to be seized is contraband. There is no bright-line rule; rather, the existence of probable cause is determined by the circumstances of each case. Russo, supra, pp 606-607. Because of the substantially similar nature of the sensory perceptions as foundations for probable cause, I would apply the same probable cause analysis to the plain smell exception.
In the instant case, Officer Walendzik testified that the odor of marijuana in the defendants’ vehicle was *601“very, very strong . . . .”8 Officer Walendzik was not required to ignore this or any other information that was apparent through his senses.9 I would hold that the immediately apparent smell of marijuana provided a substantial basis for inferring that there was a fair probability that contraband was present in the vehicle. I note that probable cause in this case was further supported by the driver’s failure to produce identification when requested and the occupants’ hostile response to the officer’s questions. However, the odor alone provided sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle.
It was only after Officer Walendzik’s perception of marijuana was confirmed by Officer Bivins that defendant Taylor was asked to get out of his vehicle and submit to a protective patdown for weapons. Simultaneously, Officer Bivins made a similar request of defendant Pimpleton and found a loaded handgun on him. Because the search was based on probable cause, the seizure was legal.
I would hold that the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle provided probable cause to believe that there was a present violation of the controlled substance law.10
*602C
In so holding, rather than simply declining to adopt the reasoning of People v Hilber, 403 Mich 312; 269 NW2d 159 (1978) and People v Chernowas, 111 Mich App 1; 314 NW2d 505 (1981), I would address the continuing viability of a distinction in Michigan case law between the odor of unbumed marijuana and the odor of burned marijuana as a basis for probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant. This distinction was first articulated in Michigan in the plurality opinion of People v Hilber, supra.11 In Hilber, two justices reasoned that the odor of smoked marijuana does not provide probable cause for a vehicle search separate and apart from a search of the smoker and the vehicle he is occupying or has just occupied, following his reasonable identification as the smoker.12 *603Relying on the reasoning of only two justices, a Court of Appeals panel in Chemowas found that Hilber stood for the proposition that the odor of marijuana smoke by itself does not constitute probable cause to search a vehicle.13
I would overrule Chemowas, and clarify that the distinction articulated in Hilber between the smell of burned and unbumed marijuana was not controlling.14 Further, I would find that the purported distinction is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause because the odor of unbumed and the odor of burned mari*604juana, when immediately apparent, are equally incriminating.15
m
The plain view, plain feel, and plain smell exceptions share a threshold requirement that police officers be at a lawful observation point when they perceive the presence of contraband. Horton v California, 496 US 128; 110 S Ct 2301; 110 L Ed 2d 112 (1990) (view); Minnesota v Dickerson, supra (feel); United States v Johnston, 497 F2d 397 (CA 9, 1974) (smell). In this case, the vantage point from which Officer Walendzik recognized the odor of burned marijuana was at the driver’s door of the vehicle after defendant Taylor rolled down his window. The preliminary question under the Fourth Amendment is whether this initial encounter amounted to a seizure.
Police questioning, without more, is unlikely to result in a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Immigration & Naturalization Service v Delgado, 466 US 210, 216; 104 S Ct 1758; 80 L Ed 2d 247 (1984). Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 19, n 16; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), defines seizure as a “physical force or show of authority [that] has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . .” Not all encounters 'between police officers and citizens rise to the level of a seizure.16 The encounter must, when *605objectively considering all the circumstances surrounding it, convince a reasonable person that he is not free to leave. United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L Ed 2d 497 (1980).17 The fact that most citizens will oblige a police officer’s request does not transform an encounter into a seizure. Immigration & Naturalization Service v Delgado, supra.
As stated in Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 497; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983):
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter *606into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. [Citations omitted.]
A seizure may be indicated by the “threatening presence of several officers . . . some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, supra, p 554. However, there is no Fourth Amendment proscription against a police officer approaching a person in a public place and putting questions to him if he is willing to listen. Royer, supra.
In this case, a lone police officer approached the vehicle on foot to investigate the intentions of the passengers. I agree with the majority that Officer Walendzik did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching the vehicle and putting questions to the occupants. Given the fact that two or three arrests were made in the parking lot each night, it would have been considered poor police work had Officer Walendzik chosen not to investigate this vehicle. Officer Walendzik’s weapon was not drawn, and he had activated neither his vehicle’s siren nor its flashing lights. There is no evidence that the defendants’ vehicle was blocked by the officer’s vehicle and there was no form of pursuit. Furthermore, I would note that the defendants’ expectation of privacy was reduced because they were in a vehicle. United States v Ross, 456 US 798; 102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982).
The circumstances surrounding Officer Walendzik’s initial encounter with the defendants was substantially less intimidating than the encounters held not to be seizures in other cases. For example, in People v *607Mamon, 435 Mich 1; 457 NW2d 623 (1990), the active pursuit of the defendant by two police officers on foot did not constitute a seizure. Similarly, where two police officers driving a marked police car briefly accelerated to follow the defendant who was on foot, the United States Supreme Court held that the police actions, standing alone, did not amount to a seizure. Michigan v Chesternut, 486 US 567, 574; 108 S Ct 1975; 100 L Ed 2d 565 (1988). No seizure occurred when a police officer saw a person asleep or unconscious in a car and tapped on the window to awaken the subject then asked for identification. Purce v United States, 482 A2d 772 (DC App, 1984).
The initial encounter between Officer Walendzik and the defendants could not have been less threatening to the five occupants of the vehicle or less likely to invoke a perception of seizure.
IV
This case is an example of an initially consensual encounter resulting in á search and seizure. Because the search and seizure was based on probable cause founded in the odor of marijuana, I would hold that it was valid under the Fourth Amendment.
Boyle and Riley, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.

 The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961).

 The Michigan Constitution also protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Const 1963, art 1, § 11. However, the Michigan Constitution does not provide more protection than the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances of this case. People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 158; 499 NW2d 764 (1993).

 Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321; 107 S Ct 1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987); People v Cooke, 194 Mich App 534; 487 NW2d 497 (1992).

 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L Ed 2d 334 (1993).

 See discussion in part HI regarding lawful vantage point.

 Horton v California, 496 US 128; 110 S Ct 2301; 110 L Ed 2d 112 (1990); People v Cooke, n 3 supra.

 People v Champion, supra, p 105.

 Although the officer had been on the force only one year, he had encountered marijuana on numerous prior occasions and was able to distinguish a “slight odor” from a “very strong odor.”

 Officer Bivins testified that he also detected the strong odor of marijuana when defendant Pimpleton rolled down the front passenger window. The perceptions of Officers Walendzik and Bivins were verified by Sergeant Kneibel and Officer Hudenko, who assisted in the arrest of the defendants and described the odor of marijuana in the Blazer as “strong pungent” and “very strong,” respectively.

 The subsequent patdown of defendants Taylor and Pimpleton led to the discovery of a concealed weapon, which, along with other factors, including defendant Vazquez’ attempt to flee, further supported probable cause for the search of the vehicle and the rear-seat passengers.

 In Hilber, two police officers stopped the defendant’s vehicle for speeding. While asking the defendant for his driver’s license and registration, one of the officers smelled the odor of burned marijuana. After examining the documents that the defendant furnished, the officer inquired whether there was marijuana in the vehicle. The defendant got out of the vehicle and handed the officer a pack of cigarettes from the dashboard. They appeared to be marijuana cigarettes, and the defendant was arrested. During the subsequent search of his vehicle, the officers found marijuana paraphernalia, amphetamines, a container of cigarette butts, and a paper bag containing five pounds of marijuana.
The circuit judge suppressed the marijuana cigarettes in Hilber on the ground that they had been obtained in violation of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). However, the judge said that the odor of marijuana had justified the vehicle search without a warrant and denied the motion to suppress the other evidence. The Court of Appeals said that all the evidence should have been suppressed, and reversed the defendant’s conviction. People v Hilber, 69 Mich App 664; 245 NW2d 156 (1976).
A majority of this Court agreed in two separate opinions that, although the question whether the odor of burned marijuana provides probable cause for an arrest or search depends on the circumstances of each case, the evidence was properly suppressed in Hilber.

 These justices explained that although the arresting officer testified that he smelled “ ‘a distinct, strong odor of marijuana’ ” in the defendant’s *603cax, this did not constitute sufficient probable cause that the defendant was the smoker or that there was unsmoked marijuana in the car. 403 Mich 321. The officer had not been trained in determining how long the residual odor of marijuana lingers, and his statements in this regard were too indefinite and indeterminate.
In the concurring opinion, two justices said that an analysis of the particular circumstances in Hilber was unnecessary because the cigarettes were seized illegally, and any evidence seized afterward must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).
The three dissenting justices in Hilber would have found probable cause for a vehicle search on the basis of the odor of marijuana, without regard to whether it was unsmoked, burning, burned, or in some other form.

 In Chemowas, two police officers stopped the defendants’ vehicle for excessive noise and a missing brake light. The driver met one officer at the rear of the vehicle. The officer testified that he detected the “strong odor” of marijuana smoke. When the officer asked the driver whether he had been smoking marijuana, the driver answered affirmatively. However, he said that he did not think there was any more marijuana in the vehicle. The second officer asked the two passengers to produce identification. When they failed to comply, he asked them to get out of the car. He then looked into the vehicle and spotted a paper bag. Upon opening the bag, he saw what he believed to be marijuana. He also saw the butt of a gun protruding from under the front-passenger seat. Two guns were seized from under the seat, and the defendants were arrested. A subsequent protective patdown revealed a loaded gun on one of the passengers.

 I note that the smell of burning marijuana, when immediately apparent, also provides probable cause to justify a search.

 The State of Montana is the only state that expressly retains this distinction. State v Schoendaller, 176 Mont 376; 578 P2d 730 (1978).

 One federal district court noted:
In the years since Terry . . . the Court in case after case of street encounter has had to resolve the “tensions involved” in protecting both the public’s interest in safety and the individual’s right of personal security.
*605[T]he Court increasingly has opted in the favor of public safety. It has done so by electing to raise the threshold of what is meant by a “seizure,” rather than by deciding to lower the standard for the “minimal level of objective justification [required] to validate the detention or seizure.” In sum, in the interest of permitting the police to do their job, consistent with individual rights, the Court apparently has found it preferable to deem nonintimidating police questioning a “consensual encounter,” not a seizure, rather than to risk justifying seizures based on marginally suspicious circumstances which are capable of innocent explanation. [United States v Barnes, 496 A2d 1040, 1044-1045 (DC App, 1985) (citations omitted).]

 In Florida v Royer, 460 US 491; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983), Drug Enforcement Administration agents approached the defendant and requested identification and to see his airline ticket. The United States Supreme Court held that this did not amount to a seizure. Id., p 501. However, where two police officers physically detained a defendant to determine his identity absent some reasonable suspicion, there was an unreasonable seizure. Brown v Texas, 443 US 47; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979).