Court Opinion

ID: 9394048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 00:00:31.199411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.067347
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20555      Document: 00516747509         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                                                          May 11, 2023
                                   No. 21-20555
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                              Clerk

   John Doe,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   William Marsh Rice University, doing business as Rice
   University,

                                                            Defendant—Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:20-CV-2985

   Before Stewart, Elrod, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
          John Doe appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
   William Marsh Rice University d/b/a Rice University (hereinafter, “Rice”
   or “the University”) dismissing his claims under Title IX of the Educational
   Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”) as well as his state law breach-of-
   contract claims. Because our review of the record reveals that disputed issues
   of material fact remain as to Doe’s Title IX claims, we AFFIRM in part,
   REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with
   this opinion.
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                                    No. 21-20555

               I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          In the Fall of 2017, student-athlete Doe began his freshman year at
   Rice on a full-ride football scholarship. Shortly thereafter, Doe met Jane Roe,
   a fellow student at Rice who was in her junior year at the time. Roe and Doe
   began dating, discussed their sexual histories including that Doe had
   contracted herpes and chlamydia in high school, and ultimately engaged in
   several consensual, unprotected sexual encounters before they ended their
   relationship in early December 2017. Later that month, Roe texted Doe
   informing him that she thought she had herpes and that she “most likely got
   it” from him. Doe responded that he “had it a long time ago” after which
   Roe informed Doe that he likely had “dormant herpes.” Doe then asked Roe
   what “dormant” meant and she explained that herpes was an incurable
   disease, meaning one “[has] it for life.” Doe then apologized to Roe,
   acknowledging that there was nothing he could say to remedy the situation.
          On December 15, 2017, Roe contacted the University’s Title IX office
   and stated that she became infected with herpes after a consensual sexual
   encounter with another student who knew he had herpes. She sought
   information about submitting a formal complaint to the University’s Student
   Judicial Programs (“SJP”). Then, on December 18, Roe filed a police report
   with the Rice University Police Department (“RUPD”) alleging that Doe
   failed to inform her that he had herpes prior to their sexual encounters. The
   next day, she informed RUPD that she wanted to press criminal charges
   against Doe, but the department declined to file charges, explaining that the
   State could not prove Doe’s intent to spread herpes to Roe.
          After meeting with SJP in January of 2018, Roe submitted a written
   complaint on February 12, stating that Doe failed to inform her that he had
   herpes during their relationship. On February 13, SJP Director Emily Garza
   notified Doe via email that he was prohibited from contacting Roe and

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   requested to schedule a meeting the following day, to discuss “a disciplinary
   matter.” The following morning, on February 14, Doe’s then-attorney Brett
   Podolsky called Garza to tell her that Doe would not be attending the
   meeting. Garza then informed Podolsky that she would only communicate
   with Doe, so Doe responded to her email seeking to reschedule the meeting
   so he could prepare and obtain further legal advice. Garza confirmed receipt
   of Doe’s email and replied that someone would get in touch with him soon
   regarding rescheduling the meeting.
          Later that day, Doe received an emailed letter from Dean Donald
   Ostdiek informing him that he was immediately placed on an interim
   suspension pursuant to Code section 1.E.1 and 1.E.2 “to ensure the safety
   and wellbeing of members of the University community while the University
   investigates.” The letter explained that the interim status of the suspension
   would be reviewed after Doe engaged in the regular investigative process
   with the University and that he was prohibited from stepping foot on campus
   for any reason, including to attend classes, without the express permission of
   Dean Ostdiek or SJP.
          Doe also received a letter from Garza informing him of the allegations
   that had been made against him and that disciplinary charges had been filed.
   She further stated that SJP was investigating whether Doe had violated the
   University’s Code section II.B.1.a prohibiting “intentionally inflicting or
   attempting to inflict mental or bodily harm on any person” and “taking
   reckless disregard, from which mental or bodily harm could result to any
   person[.]” She also explained that she was investigating whether his conduct
   “may qualify as dating violence” under the University’s Sexual Misconduct
   Policy. The letter stated that Doe had until February 21, to respond to the
   charges but SJP later extended his response deadline to March 6.

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          On March 6, Doe submitted to SJP his written response to Roe’s
   complaint explaining that he and Roe had discussed prior to beginning their
   sexual relationship that Doe had been diagnosed with herpes in high school
   but that he had not had “outbreaks or symptoms” since that time. He
   suggested that Roe might have contracted herpes from another that had
   stated he had sexual relations with Doe and had been subsequently diagnosed
   with herpes. He further alleged that Roe had repeatedly lied and contradicted
   herself in her representations to SJP.
          The following day, on March 7, Doe received an email from Dean
   Ostdiek modifying the terms of his suspension so that he could attend classes
   since the “process [was] now continuing with [his] participation.” On March
   21, another meeting was held between SJP and Doe wherein Doe was
   permitted to have Poldolsky present as a “support person” and meet with
   Garza. During this meeting, Doe reiterated that he had previously told Roe
   in a brief conversation, prior to their sexual relationship, that he had herpes
   in high school. On April 9, Garza informed Doe and Roe that SJP had
   completed its investigation and that both had the opportunity to supplement
   the casefile until April 13.
          On April 17, Garza issued a decision letter stating that, based on a
   preponderance of the evidence standard, “[Doe] failed to adequately notify
   [Roe] of the fact that she was at risk of contracting HSV-1 from [him] if the
   two of [them] engaged in unprotected sex[,]” and “[Doe’s] failure to clearly
   disclose this information to a sexual partner, and then subsequently engage
   in unprotected sex, was a reckless action from which mental or bodily harm
   could result to another person” in violation of the University’s Code. She
   also noted that although Roe acknowledged that Doe mentioned that he had
   herpes early in the relationship, Doe never informed her of the details of the
   disease, the long-term effects, or how it was spread. The letter stated that
   Doe would be immediately disciplined with “rustication,” a sanction that

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   permitted him to be on campus for academics and for other purposes with
   prior permission. The letter further provided that Doe could request to have
   his rustication lifted “no sooner than June 1, 2019.”
          On April 19, 2018, a Rice University Athletics official released Doe
   from the football program and he lost his football scholarship. On April 23,
   Doe filed a Notice of Appeal with Dean John Hutchinson contending that
   Roe gave conflicting testimony during the SJP proceedings, and that no
   reasonable trier of fact would find her credible or sustain the charges against
   him. In addition to listing several instances in which Roe “lied, misled,
   misunderstood, or ‘misremembered’” facts, Doe emphasized that the
   University neglected to hold her responsible for her “reckless personal
   behavior” and failed to interview another student that stated that he had
   contracted herpes from Roe prior to Doe attending the University. Doe
   concluded by alleging that “Garza and others within the SJP were inherently
   biased in favor of [Roe] in their investigation and deliberation of this matter.”
          On May 4, Dean Hutchinson issued a decision denying Doe’s appeal
   and sustaining SJP’s disciplinary sanction against him. Specifically, he
   determined that Doe failed to present evidence of bias, that Doe’s text
   messages to Roe established that his conduct constituted “reckless
   disregard,” and that several of Doe’s allegations did not address the primary
   issue investigated which was whether Doe gave “sufficient notice” about his
   herpes diagnosis. That summer, on July 16, because Doe had lost his football
   scholarship, he was forced to withdraw from the University.
          On September 11, 2019, Doe filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas
   against the University, Garza, and Dean Ostdiek, alleging that the University
   violated Title IX by investigating and adjudicating a punishment in a way that
   was biased against him as a male. In his complaint, he asserted claims of
   erroneous outcome, selective enforcement, and archaic assumptions. He also

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   brought a state law breach-of-contract action on grounds that he was deprived
   of various entitlements conferred when he accepted an offer of admission and
   paid tuition to the University. He sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive
   relief, damages, and attorney’s fees. On May 7, 2020, Garza and Ostdiek
   were dismissed as defendants, and on August 25, the case was transferred to
   the Southern District of Texas.
          On January 16, 2021, the University moved for summary judgment
   and on September 16, the district court granted the University’s motion and
   dismissed Doe’s suit. Addressing the merits of his Title IX claims, the district
   court held that Doe failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. It further
   held that Doe could not establish a breach of contract because the
   University’s Code expressly disclaimed that it provided or created a contract,
   and if it did, there was no breach. Doe filed this appeal.
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We conduct a de novo review of a district court’s grant of summary
   judgment. Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020).
   “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “We review evidence
   in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but conclusional
   allegations and unsubstantiated assertions may not be relied on as evidence
   by the nonmoving party.” Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th
   Cir. 2011). “A panel may affirm summary judgment on any ground supported
   by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.”
   Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal
   quotation marks omitted).

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                                III. DISCUSSION
          On appeal, Doe argues that material issues of fact remain with respect
   to his Title IX claims. He also argues that the district court failed to view the
   evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant as required at this
   juncture. We agree and address each of his arguments below.
          Consistent with Doe’s overarching claims of gender bias against him
   by the University, our review of the record identifies multiple instances
   where the University’s due process procedures were deficient in terms of its
   treatment of Doe. For example, before Doe had a reasonable opportunity to
   present his side of the story with the advice of counsel, he was prohibited
   from entering campus with only 24-hours’ notice. He was then banned from
   athletics—which effectively nullified his full-ride football scholarship. Rice
   treated Doe as guilty, and as a threat to the University’s community, until he
   “participated” in the University’s (and the police department’s)
   investigation without the advice of counsel.
          Additionally, Doe’s lawyer was not allowed to participate in the
   process or view any documents in the disciplinary file in order to counsel
   Doe. Instead, Doe was assigned a Title IX “resource navigator” who also
   met with Roe and a police officer to take Roe’s statement, indicating a
   potential conflict of interest. Further, Doe raised credibility issues about Roe,
   but the University disregarded these credibility concerns, dismissing them as
   “irrelevant,” or otherwise declined to investigate them. Finally, Rice failed
   to clearly notify Doe of the conduct he would ultimately be sanctioned for.
   Roe accused Doe of failing to inform her of his herpes diagnosis, and this was
   the charge Doe defended against. Rice ultimately found that Doe had
   informed Roe of his herpes diagnosis but sanctioned him anyway for failing
   to go further by informing Roe of the risks of having sex with a herpes carrier,
   despite the fact that no such rule appears in Rice’s student code.

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          We further conclude that a rational jury could find that Rice’s one-
   sided procedures resulted from anti-male bias. Doe was kicked off campus on
   24 hours’ notice because of the risk that he might have sex with other
   students and infect them with herpes. And he was ultimately sanctioned with
   what amounted to expulsion for failing to inform a sex partner of the potential
   consequences of having sex with a herpes carrier. Yet when Doe offered the
   University evidence that Roe was doing precisely the same thing, and Roe
   expressly informed the University of her intent not to tell future sex partners
   of her herpes diagnosis, the University did nothing. Instead, the same Dean
   of Undergraduates who thought Doe posed such a threat to the University
   community that he needed to be banned from campus would not require Roe
   to disclose to her sexual partners that she had herpes. We agree that these
   facts taken together, or in isolation, implicate serious due process concerns
   and now turn to the merits of Doe’s Title IX arguments.
          A. Title IX
          “Title IX proscribes gender discrimination in education programs or
   other activities receiving federal financial assistance.” Pederson v. La. State
   Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 877 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The statute is
   “enforceable through an implied private right of action,” and the Supreme
   Court has “consistently interpreted Title IX’s private cause of action broadly
   to encompass diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination.” Klocke v.
   Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 938 F.3d 204, 209–10 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
   140 S. Ct. 1268 (2020) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
   U.S. 274, 281 (1998); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183
   (2005)). “The University, as a recipient of federal funding, can be held liable
   for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex or for deliberate indifference
   to discrimination against or harassment of a student on the basis of sex.”
   Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 777 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (June
   26, 2017) (citation omitted). Title IX also “bars the imposition of university

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   discipline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision.” Yusuf v.
   Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
          Courts have superimposed a number of doctrinal tests onto Title IX’s
   language to aid in its application to school disciplinary proceedings. But this
   circuit has recently joined a growing number of Circuits to recognize that,
   while sometimes helpful, these tests do not abrogate Title IX’s basic
   analytical framework. Rather, “[a]ll of these categories simply describe ways
   in which a plaintiff might show that sex was a motivating factor in a
   university’s decision to discipline a student.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d
   652, 667 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.); see also Van Overdam v. Tex. A&M Univ.,
   43 F.4th 522, 527 (5th Cir. 2022) (adopting the approach of Purdue
   University). The Tenth Circuit has recently modeled how to apply this
   standard at summary judgment. See Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 1 F.4th 822, 830
   (10th Cir. 2021). “[T]he operative question for summary judgment [is
   whether] a reasonable jury—presented with the facts alleged—[could] find
   that sex was a motivating factor in the University’s disciplinary decision.”
   Id. As we will explain below, Doe has met this burden.
          Doe has opted to pursue his claims under three doctrinal tests that
   recur in higher education Title IX cases—those being the (1) erroneous
   outcome, (2) selective enforcement, and (3) archaic assumptions theories of
   liability. We analyze his claims accordingly. At bottom, each demonstrates
   that a reasonable jury—presented with the evidence in this record—could
   conclude that sex was a motivating factor in Rice’s decision to discipline Doe.
                 (1) Erroneous Outcome
          To advance an erroneous outcome claim, a student-plaintiff can argue
   that the disciplinary proceeding came to an erroneous outcome because it
   was infected with bias. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2018).
   To prevail on this type of claim, a plaintiff must show (1) an erroneous

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   outcome and (2) that “gender bias was the motivating force behind” it.
   Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210 (citing Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715). Specifically, “[a]
   plaintiff alleging an erroneous outcome must point to ‘particular facts
   sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of
   the disciplinary proceeding,’” and “demonstrate a ‘causal connection
   between the flawed outcome and gender bias.’” Id. (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d
   at 715).
          As to the issue of erroneous outcome, the district court opined in the
   proceedings below that Doe’s text messages alone indicated that “he did not
   inform or inadequately informed Roe of his herpes status.” It further
   expounded that “Roe’s sexual history and knowledge about the risks of
   having unprotected sex [were] irrelevant and [did] not demonstrate that
   [Doe’s] gender affected the University’s investigation or decision regarding
   the complaint filed against him.” According to the district court, “the
   University’s decision was based on unrebutted evidence about their
   encounter found in the text messages between them and not his gender.”
          To the contrary, Doe has continuously and strenuously questioned
   why Garza did not ask Roe “how many other students she had unprotected
   sex with, did not ask for any names, took no steps to interview any other
   students, and did not even consider interviewing the other student that [] Roe
   was sleeping with at the same time she was sleeping with Doe.” He also avers
   that “Roe could have chosen to abstain [from sex with Doe], to get more
   information, or to require Doe to get tested[,] and Roe did none of those
   things, yet Garza did not hold Roe accountable at all.”
          Doe points out that Garza herself acknowledged repeated
   misrepresentations by Roe during the investigation and that “Roe repeatedly
   changed her story about,” inter alia, “whether Doe told her he had herpes in
   high school, . . . whether she had sex with Doe after she discovered [her

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   outbreak], . . . whether she had other sexual partners during the time she was
   having sex with Doe, and whether she even asked Doe about herpes.” He
   then identifies multiple SJP investigational flaws, including that Garza had
   “acknowledged that . . . forgiving the female’s inconsistencies more easily
   than the male’s would violate the University’s gender discrimination
   policies,” and that “if she was biased in favor of the female, it would violate
   the University’s gender discrimination policies.”
           We agree with Doe that a question of material fact remains as to
   whether the University reached an erroneous outcome in its SJP proceedings
   against him. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (stating that a student-plaintiff can
   plead a Title IX violation by “alleg[ing] particular facts sufficient to cast some
   articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary
   proceeding”). First, and most significantly, we note that contrary to Roe’s
   allegations and the University’s position at the time of Doe’s interim
   suspension, the record supports Doe’s contention that he did inform Roe
   about his history with herpes before the two had sex and that she may have
   had herpes already. Indeed, by her own admission, Roe knew that Doe had
   herpes in his sexual history, but she declined to inquire further about the
   disease or its transmissibility before having unprotected sex with him. 1
   Moreover, as Doe urged in the SJP proceedings, Roe could have contracted
   herpes from one of her other sexual partners prior to beginning her
   relationship with him, a theory which could have been corroborated by
   another male student had the University contacted him to confirm Doe’s

           1
             The record contains a letter from Garza to Doe dated April 17, 2018, stating that
   although “[Roe] told [Garza] that . . . [Doe] mentioned a history with herpes early in the
   relationship, [Roe] was never informed of the details of the disease, the long-term effects,
   or how it is spread.”

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   allegations. 2 In other words, the record supports Doe’s argument that Roe
   knew about Doe’s herpes, had unprotected sex with him anyway, and may
   have already had herpes herself at that time.
           Nevertheless, Rice kicked Doe off campus on 24 hours’ notice
   because he allegedly did not disclose his herpes diagnosis to Roe even though,
   as we have stated, the record clearly contradicts this conclusion, and even
   though it would ultimately immunize Roe for the exact same behavior.
   Furthermore, Rice ultimately sanctioned Doe with what amounted to
   expulsion for failing to inform Roe of all of the risks of having sex with a
   herpes carrier, even though Rice’s student code does not contain such a
   requirement and, again, even though the University would ultimately
   immunize Roe for doing the same thing. This is further evidenced by Dean
   Ostdiek’s deposition testimony that the University would not require Roe to
   disclose to her sexual partners that she had herpes as the University was
   holding Doe liable for failing to do. 3 Likewise, Garza’s deposition testimony
   provided, and the record confirms, that Doe never made any
   misrepresentations or changed his story while Roe consistently
   misrepresented the facts and changed her story. For example, Roe told the
   RUPD that Doe never told her he had herpes prior to their sexual encounters
   but later admitted that Doe did in fact disclose his herpes diagnosis to her
   prior to the two having sex. A rational juror could also find the variance
   between Roe’s allegations and the conduct for which Doe was ultimately
   sanctioned to be explainable by the fact that Roe’s allegations fell apart under

           2
            Garza admits that she did not follow up with Doe’s proposed witness, and she did
   not consider Doe’s impeachment of Roe’s credibility to be “relevant.”
           3
            When asked by Doe’s counsel whether the SJP would have an obligation to ensure
   that Roe disclosed her herpes diagnosis to her sexual partners, Dean Ostdiek replied “[t]he
   SJP would not mandate going forward that she tell all sexual partners. That is something
   that would be done through counseling in a professional setting.”

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   scrutiny. A factfinder would not be unreasonable to conclude, as the Ninth
   Circuit speculated in Doe v. Regents of University of California, that “when
   confronted by a claim that lacked merit, the University rushed to judgment”
   by suspending Doe, “and then sought out a way to find the accused
   responsible for something in order to justify its earlier actions.” 23 F.4th 930,
   939 n.12 (9th Cir. 2022).
          Furthermore, Doe was punished for alleged violations of the
   University code of conduct’s “expectations of civility and respect” but it is
   unclear on these facts exactly how Doe’s failure to describe to Roe how a
   certain strain of herpes is transmitted violated these “expectations of civility
   and respect.” Roe’s behavior, meanwhile, hardly appeared to exemplify
   “civility and respect,” as indicated by her text messages to Doe: “Question:
   are you aware of how much you f***** up. I don’t think you do. But you will,
   do not worry. You don’t f*** w me like that and get away with it.” Despite
   Roe’s expletive-laden threats against Doe, there is no indication that she was
   ever charged with any such violation or that the University took any action
   against her whatsoever. For these reasons, we conclude that material fact
   issues remain as to whether the University reached an erroneous outcome in
   its SJP proceedings against Doe. Id.; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th
   at 941 (“[A]t some point an accumulation of procedural irregularities all
   disfavoring a male respondent begins to look like a biased proceeding.”). The
   district court’s consistent discounting of Doe’s arguments and evidence
   underscores that it did not view the record in the light most favorable to the
   nonmovant. In short, as to the erroneous outcome issue, it weighed evidence
   and made credibility determinations that were prohibited by Rule 56. See
   FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

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                 (2) Selective Enforcement
          A student-plaintiff can advance a selective enforcement claim by
   arguing that “regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the severity of
   the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected by the
   student’s gender.” Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. To succeed on this type of claim, a
   plaintiff must show that either the punishment or the decision to initiate
   enforcement proceedings was motivated by gender bias. Klocke, 938 F.3d at
   213.
          On this issue, the district court stated that the record before it did not
   support Doe’s contention that the University selectively enforced its
   procedures. It pointed out that Roe contacted SJP and filed a formal
   complaint against Doe but a formal complaint was never filed against Roe. It
   continued that “[a]lthough the University handbook provide[d] a number of
   sanctions including suspension and expulsion, [Doe] received social
   rustication for his violation” and “[n]othing in the record indicate[d] that
   [Doe] received a harsher punishment because he was a male or that female
   students receive a lighter punishment.” It concluded that Doe had not
   “presented any statistical or other evidence of gender bias” and on those
   grounds held that he had failed to present a fact issue on his selective
   enforcement claim.
          With respect to his arguments under the selective enforcement
   theory, Doe emphasizes that he “informed [] Garza that Roe had done
   exactly what she was accusing Doe of, except worse[,]” and yet Garza did
   not investigate further. He explains that “[n]one of the email recipients at
   Rice discussed whether Roe posed a danger to other students, yet when
   assessing Doe’s punishment, they considered ‘every other student that
   attends Rice University’ (and who had not filed complaints).” According to

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   Doe, “[t]hese are all instances of the [U]niversity’s selective enforcement of
   its policies against Doe but not Roe.”
          Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Doe, the
   nonmovant, we agree that a material fact question exists as to whether the
   University selectively enforced its policies against him by refusing to treat
   Roe and Doe equally when Doe alleged—in response to Roe’s allegations—
   that she was guilty of the same conduct of which he was charged: failure to
   disclose the risk of STD transmission. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (to prevail on
   this claim, the plaintiff must show that “regardless of the student’s guilt or
   innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the
   proceeding was affected by the student’s gender”). If, as Doe alleges, Roe
   likely had herpes before having sex with him, on the University’s reasoning,
   she should have warned him before they had sex—and she did not. But Garza
   refused to investigate this possibility despite Doe’s telling her about this
   because she claims they “did not have a report about [Roe].” For these
   reasons, we agree that a material fact issue remains as to whether the
   University’s proceedings against Doe were motivated by gender bias. Id.
                 (3) Archaic Assumptions
          A student-plaintiff can also argue that the University’s action was
   based on overly broad and archaic assumptions about one sex or the other.
   See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 881 (“Well-established Supreme Court precedent
   demonstrates that archaic assumptions . . . constitute intentional gender
   discrimination.”). To successfully raise an archaic assumptions claim, a
   plaintiff must show that the University’s actions were based on attitudes
   about gender roles that reflect gender bias. Id. at 880–82. Decisions and
   statements that are predicated on “outdated” and “outmoded” assumptions
   demonstrate a university’s intent to treat one differently because of their
   gender. Id. at 881 (citation omitted).

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          As to this issue, the district court reasoned that “the record [was]
   devoid of any evidence that indicate[d] that the University placed a different
   duty on male students to disclose the risks of unprotected sex than it [did] on
   female students.” It continued that Doe failed to point to any statements that
   the University made to demonstrate that males had a different duty to
   disclose their herpes status. On these grounds, it held that Doe failed to raise
   a fact issue to establish his claim under the archaic assumptions theory.
          Doe on the other hand contends that “[c]ertainly, assuming that an
   adult female college junior is incapable of understanding the risks of sexual
   intercourse without the male educating her is part of” the archaic thinking
   our case law prohibits. According to Doe, “[r]efusing to acknowledge that
   Roe had an accountability for her own actions, her own choices[,] and her
   own conduct is ‘remarkably outdated’” and “[s]ubsequently refusing to hold
   her accountable for the same conduct is outdated, archaic, and outmoded.”
          We agree with Doe that, to the extent a rational jury could find that
   the University’s policy arose from the view that a more-knowledgeable male
   (Doe) had a duty to educate an unwitting female (Roe) about the precise risks
   of herpes transmission, its position rests on an archaic assumption. See
   Pederson, 213 F.3d at 881. Roe, as Garza acknowledged, was a “consenting
   adult female” who, as the record confirms, was rather sexually
   knowledgeable. In fact, it appears that Roe was perhaps even more educated
   about herpes and its transmissibility than Doe as evidenced by their text
   message exchanges wherein Roe informed Doe that herpes was an incurable
   disease and his case was likely dormant, to which Doe replied “what does
   dormant mean[?]” Garza’s decision appeared to depend on the view that it
   was Doe’s responsibility to inform Roe of publicly available information that
   Roe, a capable adult woman, could have ascertained for herself: to wit, “the
   details of the disease, the long-term effects, [and] how it is spread.” A
   rational juror could conclude that to absolve Roe of responsibility for her own

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   risk-assessments—and to place that burden on her male partner—is to act on
   archaic assumptions in violation of Title IX. Id. For these reasons, we agree
   that a material fact issue remains as to whether the University acted on
   archaic assumptions in its investigation against Doe. Id.
          For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in
   granting summary judgment in favor of the University on grounds that the
   record clearly indicates that material fact issues remain in dispute as to
   whether Doe has successfully advanced a Title IX claim against the
   University.
          B. Breach of Contract
          With respect to Doe’s breach-of-contract claim, he argues that an
   implied contract is formed where a private university agrees to provide an
   educational opportunity in exchange for a student’s agreement to
   successfully complete the degree requirements, abide by school guidelines,
   and pay tuition. According to Doe, because Garza testified that the
   University’s policies included not treating students differently on the basis
   of gender, there is at least a material fact issue with respect to this proposed
   breach of contract. We are not persuaded.
          “In Texas, the construction of a contract presents a question of law”
   which this court reviews de novo. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Binnacle Dev., L.L.C.,
   57 F.4th 510, 514 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Under Texas state law,
   “[t]he essential elements of a breach of contract action are: (1) the existence
   of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff;
   (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the
   plaintiff as a result of the breach.” Smith Intern., Inc. v. Egle Grp., LLC, 490
   F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Valero Mktg. &
   Supply Co. v. Kalama Int’l, L.L.C., 51 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Tex. App. 2001).
   Valid contracts can be express or implied, and “the real difference between

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   express contracts and those implied in fact is in the character and manner of
   proof required to establish them.” Haws & Garrett Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
   Gorbett Bros. Welding Co., 480 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. 1972). Although both
   express and implied contracts require mutual agreement, “in the case of an
   implied contract,” it “is inferred from the circumstances.” McAllen Hosps.,
   L.P. v. Lopez, 576 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Tex. 2019) (citation omitted).
          Here, Doe has not alleged any breaches of the University’s Code or
   associated policies. Moreover, as the district court accurately observed in
   evaluating Doe’s breach-of-contract claim, the Code expressly provides that
   “[t]he procedures used . . . by SJP are not those used in court cases and are
   not intended to create contractual rights[.]” In the absence of contractual
   rights and the University’s intent to be bound, we hold that it is entitled to
   summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Doe’s breach-of-
   contract claim. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the district court’s
   order dismissing Doe’s breach-of-contract claim.
                               IV. CONCLUSION
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal
   of Doe’s breach-of-contract claim but REVERSE its summary judgment in
   favor of the University with respect to Doe’s Title IX claims and REMAND
   for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          This case begins and ends with one question: Is there any evidence
   that could lead a rational jury to conclude the University conducted its
   investigation and issued its punishment against Doe because he is a man? The
   answer is a resounding no. An examination of John Doe’s experience with
   the University’s disciplinary process reveals no evidence of gender
   discrimination. Because of this, and because the majority reaches the
   opposite conclusion despite what is required to maintain a Title IX gender
   discrimination claim, I respectfully dissent.
                                         I.
          John Doe began attending William Marsh Rice University in the fall
   of 2017. He met Jane Roe in October, and they began a relationship. At some
   point, Doe and Roe discussed their sexual histories. Doe disclosed that he
   had a “run-in” with herpes in high school and was recovering from
   chlamydia. According to Doe’s statement to the University, this
   “conversation wasn’t deep or graphic, and it was brief.” Neither Doe nor
   Roe recalled, “any further discussion about the disease, the ramifications of
   a diagnosis, or the risk to a partner when engaging in unprotected sex with a
   carrier of the disease.” Roe remembered that Doe told her that he “would
   never have sex with [her] if [he] wasn’t clean.” After this conversation, Doe
   and Roe had consensual unprotected sex many times over five weeks.
          The couple broke up amicably but reconnected two weeks later. On
   December 13, 2017, the couple was about to have sex when Doe noticed sores
   on Roe’s genitals. The couple decided not to have vaginal sex at that time,
   and Doe told Roe to get checked out by a medical professional.
          The following day Roe was tested for and diagnosed with herpes,
   HSV-1. She immediately confronted Doe by text message. Roe suggested the
   sores she had were herpes and that she contracted it from Doe. She then
   asked for clarification of Doe’s herpes status, and mentioned that Doe said

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   he had a “run-in” with herpes in high school, and that if he had herpes, it
   might be dormant. Doe stated, “I think it’s that too, just looks similar.” He
   continued to state, “But yeah I had it a long time ago. And what does dormant
   mean[.]” The conversation continued with Doe stating that he knew that
   “once [you] have herpes you have it for life” and “it never goes
   away . . . there’s not a cure[.]” Doe also stated he knew he had herpes during
   his relationship with Roe but did not tell her until she confronted him.
          Roe filed several complaints against Doe. The important one here is
   her complaint to the University’s Student Judicial Programs (SJP) on
   February 12, 2018. In that complaint, Roe reported Doe for failing to inform
   her about his herpes diagnosis before having unprotected sex with her.
          Emily Garza, the Associate Director of SJP, reviewed the complaint
   and began an investigation on February 13. She first notified Doe of a
   “disciplinary matter,” informed him that he should have no further contact
   with Roe, and asked to have a meeting with him the following day. Doe asked
   to reschedule the meeting so he could have time to “get some legal advice
   and be more prepared.” Garza then sent Doe a summary of the disciplinary
   charges against him pursuant to the University’s Code of Student Conduct.
   Garza stated Doe was charged with violating Section II.B.1.a of the Code of
   Student Conduct, which prohibits “intentionally inflicting or attempting to
   inflict mental or bodily harm on any person . . . taking any reckless action, or
   showing reckless disregard, from which mental or bodily harm could result
   to any person.” At that time, based on the reported conduct, Garza stated
   she was “also concerned that the alleged behavior may qualify as ‘dating
   violence.’” 1 Garza also informed Doe of how he may respond to the charges,
   including submitting a written response.

          1
              The Code of Student Conduct discusses dating violence as follows:

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          That same day, Donald Ostdiek, the Associate Dean of
   Undergraduates, placed Doe on an interim suspension as a measure “to
   ensure the safety and wellbeing of members of the University community
   while the University investigates.” Dean Ostdiek was worried about the
   accusations against Doe but was even more concerned about Doe’s initial
   refusal to cooperate with the University police and SJP investigations. Doe
   had postponed meeting with Garza and had not followed the usual procedure
   for investigating the matter. Dean Ostdiek mentioned that the temporary
   suspension would be reevaluated once Doe participated in the standard
   investigation process.
          On March 6, 2018, Doe provided Garza with his written response to
   Roe’s allegations. Doe stated he informed Roe of his “run in” with herpes in
   high school. 2 He referred to their text messages in which Doe stated, “[a]nd
   you did mention to me that you had a run-in senior year maybe?” Doe

          Dating violence refers to causing physical, psychological or emotional
          harm, or using threats or actions intended to cause physical, psychological
          or emotional harm to one’s current or former intimate partner, domestic
          partner, or dating partner. Dating violence is often referred to as violence
          committed by a person who is or has been in a romantic or intimate
          relationship with the survivor.
          2
              Doe’s statement about the discussion was:
          [Roe] and I specifically talked about my herpes “run in” when I was in
          Highschool [sic], just as she said in her statement to the school and in her
          text messages to me . . . . I was very upfront with her and told her what I
          knew about the situation. This conversation was at the same time we talked
          about me having [c]hlamydia.
          ...
          I did tell her specifically it was herpes. I told her everything I knew about
          the situation. I did not tell her about a “break out” because I never had
          sores or blisters, but as I said, I did tell her I went to the Dr. and tested
          positive for herpes.

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   emphasized that he did not have an outbreak of herpes, suggested Roe had
   herpes before the two had sex, and focused on Roe’s alleged sexual history.
          The following day, Dean Ostdiek modified Doe’s suspension because
   the University’s investigatory process was “now continuing with [Doe’s]
   participation.” Dean Ostdiek permitted Doe to attend classes and enter
   academic buildings and the library to study.
          Throughout March 2018, Garza conducted her investigation pursuant
   to the policy listed in the Code of Student Conduct. This investigation
   included meeting with Doe and his attorney, who was permitted to attend
   meetings as Doe’s “support person.” Doe and his attorney were also
   permitted to review the “disciplinary file” and were informed whenever new
   information or documents were added to it. This means that Doe was
   permitted to read Roe’s statements and listen to audio recordings of her
   interviews with Garza and the SJP. Doe was also permitted to submit
   additional statements in response to his review of the file.
          On April 17, 2018, Garza issued a written decision summarizing her
   investigation and conclusions. Garza found, by a preponderance of the
   evidence, that Doe “failed to adequately notify [Roe] of the fact that she was
   at risk of contracting HSV-1 from [him] if the two of [them] engaged in
   unprotected sex.” Doe’s “failure to clearly disclose this information to a
   sexual partner, and then subsequently engage in unprotected sex, was a
   reckless action from which mental or bodily harm could result to another
   person.” Garza concluded this conduct violated the Code of Student
   Conduct. Garza also concluded Doe did not violate the Sexual Misconduct
   Policy and did not commit “dating violence” as described in the Code.
          Garza’s decision was premised on her finding that Doe did tell Roe
   that he had a history with herpes. In fact, Garza recognized that Roe had
   admitted, both in text messages and in interviews, that Doe “mentioned” his
   run-in with herpes in high school. But even though Doe said he had herpes,

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                                         No. 21-20555

   Garza found he “did not elaborate on the effects of that diagnosis or the risks
   posed to sexual partners as a carrier of the disease.” Garza also found Doe
   failed to inform Roe “of the details of the disease, the long-term effects, or
   how it spread.” Garza stated Doe “failed to adequately notify your sexual
   partner of the physical risk of contracting herpes from [Doe] through
   unprotected sex, and that eliminated [Roe’s] opportunity to make a fully
   informed decision about her sexual activity and health.” These findings were
   based on the descriptions of the conversation from both Doe and Roe and the
   text messages between the two. 3
           Garza’s decision resulted in penalties being imposed on Doe,
   including a punishment known as “rustication,” which restricted Doe from
   being on campus for any reason other than academic purposes without
   permission from SJP. Garza clarified that her office did not have the authority
   to determine whether Doe could participate in football, but if the Athletics
   Department permitted it, he would need to coordinate with SJP for his
   presence on campus.
           Doe appealed Garza’s decision to the Dean of Undergraduates, John
   Hutchinson. Doe raised his concerns about Roe’s credibility and maintained
   that his version of events was “the truth of the matter.” For instance, he
   claimed he never “misrepresented” or “misled” Roe. He relied on Roe’s
   admission that Doe told her about his history with herpes. Doe also raised his
   concern with Garza’s decision to omit Roe’s statement that Roe would in the

           3
             Garza also addressed the conflicting “meaning” behind some of Doe’s text
   messages. Garza stated the text messages showed the face-to-face conversation between
   Doe and Roe about herpes “was insufficient to reach a clear conclusion or understanding.”
   And although Doe contended that he was largely ignoring Roe and only told Roe what she
   wanted to hear so that she would leave him alone, Garza stated she found the more credible
   story to be that Doe was trying to engage with Roe about the issue to the point where he
   asked Roe to send him photos of her genitals to confirm his suspicions about her potential
   herpes diagnosis.

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                                    No. 21-20555

   future withhold her herpes diagnosis and “just use a condom.” Finally, Doe
   raised Roe’s sexual relationship with another student who contracted herpes
   after having sex with Roe and before Doe arrived at the University. Doe
   stated the investigation was biased in favor of Roe, but did not mention the
   alleged bias arose because of either of their respective genders.
          On May 4, 2018, Dean Hutchinson denied Doe’s appeal and sustained
   Garza’s decision. Dean Hutchinson concluded Doe produced no evidence of
   bias and that Doe’s own admissions and statements were enough to
   demonstrate that Doe acted with reckless disregard. Dean Hutchinson
   emphasized that Garza’s decision was focused on the narrow issue of
   whether Doe gave sufficient notice and warning to Roe about Doe’s own
   herpes diagnosis. Dean Hutchinson also importantly noted some of Doe’s
   raised points, whether Doe gave Roe herpes and her relationships with other
   Rice students, were irrelevant to Doe’s own conduct.
          Doe withdrew from the University on July 16, 2018.
          Doe later sued the University, Garza, and Dean Ostdiek asserting that
   the University investigated and punished him based on gender bias in
   violation of Title IX. He also alleged a breach of contract claim for the
   University’s alleged failure to provide him with certain entitlements as part
   of his admission to the University.
          The University moved for summary judgment. The district court
   granted the motion and concluded Doe failed to raise a genuine issue of
   material fact as to whether the University acted with gender bias and whether
   there was a contract or breach. Doe appealed.
                                         II.
          Title IX provides that: “No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be
   excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
   discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
   financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX broadly encompasses

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                                    No. 21-20555

   diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
   Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005), and Doe is free to characterize his claims
   however he chooses, but the ultimate question is always whether there is
   evidence that the University “discriminated against [Doe] on the basis of
   sex[.]” Overdam v. Texas A&M Univ., 43 F.4th 522, 527 (5th Cir. 2022). Still,
   because Doe relies on three specific theories, “we need not speculate on any
   other possible theories of Title IX liability.” Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860
   F.3d 767, 778 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (June 26, 2017).
          First, Doe alleges an erroneous outcome claim in which he contends
   that the University’s investigation and conclusion were “wrong” and gender
   bias was a motivating factor behind them. Second, he alleges a selective
   enforcement claim in which he contends he was punished for the same
   conduct that women, like Roe, committed although only he was investigated
   and punished. Third, Doe states the University based its decision on archaic
   assumptions that only men can educate women about sexually transmitted
   diseases and the risks of unprotected sex.
          Based on his own characterizations or otherwise, there is no evidence
   that could lead a rational fact finder to conclude the University discriminated
   against Doe because he was a man. The district court’s grant of summary
   judgment to the University was, therefore, proper.
                                         A.
          Starting with Doe’s erroneous outcome theory, Doe has produced no
   evidence that the University’s decision was wrong or that it was based on
   gender bias. “A plaintiff alleging an erroneous outcome must point to
   ‘particular facts sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of
   the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding’—for instance, ‘a motive to lie
   on the part of a complainant or witnesses, or particularized strengths of the
   disciplined student’s defense.’” Klocke v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 938 F.3d
   204, 210 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d

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                                    No. 21-20555

   Cir. 1994)). “The plaintiff must also demonstrate a ‘causal connection
   between the flawed outcome and gender bias.’” Id. (citing Yusuf, 35 F.3d at
   715).
           Doe’s main contention is that Roe was not credible because she
   “repeatedly changed her story about whether Doe told her he had herpes in
   high school[.]” It is true that Roe was not entirely consistent from her first
   report and throughout the investigation. Roe started by acknowledging that
   she asked Doe specifically about chlamydia and then asked generally whether
   “he had anything.” Roe then alleged Doe “led [her] on to believe he was
   clean.” Yet she also stated in her first report that she “believe[d] he
   mentioned he had [herpes] in high school[,]” and she “remember[ed] him
   talking about breaking out during [s]enior year of high school with some type
   of sexually transmitted disease.” She still stated Doe “did not mention what
   [the disease] was, and of course he did not say that he STILL had it.” These
   statements appear to allege Doe did not mention herpes at all.
           Nevertheless, in the text messages submitted to SJP, Roe
   acknowledged that Doe told her he had a “run in” with herpes in high school.
   In her subsequent statements and interviews with SJP, she again
   acknowledged that Doe mentioned herpes in some form. In one statement,
   Roe stated that she remembered Doe mentioning his “run in” with herpes in
   high school. And in Garza’s final decision, she summarized Roe’s statements
   in which Roe acknowledged she remembered Doe mentioning his “run in”
   with herpes.
           Despite Roe’s inconsistencies, Doe’s story remained the same—Doe
   contends he told Roe he had herpes in high school. This contention, however,
   does not show that the University’s outcome was wrong. That is because the
   University’s finding was not that Doe did not tell Roe about herpes at all—it
   was that he did not tell Roe enough about his herpes diagnosis. And even more

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                                           No. 21-20555

   important is the fact that the University made this finding based on Doe’s
   own statements and Roe’s statements that were most favorable to Doe.
           No one, not even the University, disputes that Doe mentioned or said
   he had herpes in high school. 4 But even if this is true (notably by Doe’s own
   version of events), the University found Doe in violation of the Code of
   Student Conduct because he did not tell Roe enough about his herpes
   diagnosis before having unprotected sex with her. The University relied on
   Doe’s statements that the conversation with Roe about herpes was “not deep
   or graphic” and “brief.” The University, therefore, found that while Doe did
   tell Roe he had herpes in high school, he did not tell her that herpes is an
   incurable sexually transmitted disease, he is a carrier of that disease for life,
   he can pass the disease to his sexual partners, and the risk of his sexual
   partners contracting the disease is heightened during unprotected sex. It was
   Doe’s failure to tell Roe these other facts about his “run in” with herpes in
   high school that led to the finding that he acted with reckless disregard for
   the physical and emotional welfare of another student in violation of the Code
   of Student Conduct. Consequently, Doe’s erroneous outcome claim is
   focused on whether this finding and conclusion were wrong.

           4
             To the extent Doe continues to attack Roe’s credibility on this fact, her credibility
   was not at issue when the University relied on Doe’s own statements to sustain its finding.
   Doe makes no argument as to why his own statements were unreliable. Nor does he argue
   that the University did not believe his version of events (likely because they did believe his
   own version of events).
           Doe’s general attack on Roe’s credibility is insufficient to show the University’s
   finding was wrong. For instance, Doe does not say which of Roe’s statements were untrue
   and which statements the University should have believed over others. (This is probably
   because the University accepted Roe’s statements that were most consistent with Doe’s
   statements, i.e., that Doe did tell Roe that he had herpes in high school.) Regardless,
   because the University relied on Doe’s statements and recount, Doe cannot show the
   outcome was wrong unless he shows his own statements were untrue or warranted further
   investigation. He has done neither. And Roe’s credibility has no impact on this.

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           But Doe has not disputed or refuted the finding that he did not tell
   Roe the additional relevant facts about his herpes diagnosis. Nor has Doe
   produced any evidence to show that he did inform Roe about these other
   relevant facts. In fact, Doe only repeatedly contends that he told Roe he had
   herpes in high school. That fact, however, was found and accepted by the
   University. And still, that fact alone is not what resulted in the finding that
   Doe violated the Code of Student Conduct.
           The University found Doe did not say anything more about his herpes
   diagnosis, which he was required to do under the Code of Student Conduct.
   The nail in the coffin here is that Doe does not contend he actually did tell
   Roe more information about his herpes diagnosis contrary to the University’s
   finding. 5 This case would be quite different had Doe informed Roe that

           5
             Doe argues he did not know anything more about his herpes diagnosis to disclose
   that information to Roe. He points to his text message to Roe in which he asked her what
   “dormant” means. As an initial matter, Doe’s ignorance as to the meaning of the word
   “dormant” is not the same as ignorance that he has herpes for life, even if asymptomatic.
   But also, Garza explicitly asked Doe to explain the meaning behind his text messages and
   statements to Roe. Doe in response said, “[m]y understanding, at that time, you have an
   outbreak, so either oral in your mouth or on your genitalia, that you can pass it. And that
   you have it for life.” Garza further sought clarification and asked whether Doe understood
   that herpes “is incurable and a carrier of HSV-1 will always be a carrier.” Doe confirmed
   this was his understanding at the time he sent the text messages. Garza acknowledged that
   Doe stated he “didn’t know nearly as much” about herpes but stated this conflicted with
   Doe’s other statements on the issue.
             Doe’s contention is also belied by the record before the University. Once Roe
   clarified what dormant means, i.e., “[o]nce u have herpes you have it for life, you know that
   right[.] It never goes away. Ever there’s not a cure [.]” Doe’s response was,“[y]eah I do
   know that.” He goes on to suggest he knows more about the disease and states, “I have the
   first one. I could explain on the phone[.]” So again, Doe’s own statements and words
   support the University’s finding that Doe knew he had herpes, knew he had it for life, and
   knew he could pass it to others. Doe’s question regarding the meaning of “dormant” does
   not create a triable issue on whether that finding was wrong.
           To the extent Doe relies on his affidavit submitted to the district court, in which
   he stated he “did not know at the time that herpes could lie ‘dormant’ and still be

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                                          No. 21-20555

   although he had herpes in high school, he carries that disease for life, he can
   pass that disease even when he is asymptomatic, and the risk of passing it to
   others increases when he has unprotected sex. However, he neither asserts
   nor maintains that he did.
           There is accordingly no “articulable doubt on the accuracy,” Klocke,
   938 F.3d at 210, of the University’s finding that Doe did not tell Roe
   “appropriate, necessary, and timely information” about his herpes diagnosis.
   As a result, Doe has not raised a triable issue on his erroneous outcome
   theory. See Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210–11 (concluding there was no triable issue
   on erroneous outcome claim despite some statements expressing
   reservations about holding student responsible).
                                                B.
           Doe’s selective enforcement theory also fails because there is no
   evidence that similarly situated women were either not investigated or
   punished in the same way as Doe. A selective enforcement claim requires a
   showing that, regardless of Doe’s culpability, “either punishment or the
   decision to initiate enforcement proceedings was motivated by gender bias.”
   Klocke, 938 F.3d at 213. To make this showing, plaintiffs typically must point
   to similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably. See id.
   (deciding a selective enforcement claim based on whether the evidence
   “permit[ted] the inference that similarly situated female students were
   treated more favorably than” the plaintiff).
           Although Doe contends the University treated Roe differently than
   him by not punishing her for the same conduct, the record shows Roe was

   contagious,” that affidavit was not before the University and is not relevant to assessing his
   claims against it. See Klocke, 938 F.3d at 210 (stating doubt on the accuracy of proceeding
   must be based “on the record before the disciplinary tribunal” (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d at
   715)).

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   not similarly situated to Doe, and any differential treatment was not based on
   gender.
           Start with the obvious—a formal SJP complaint was filed against Doe
   and not against Roe. That is a significant distinction showing Doe and Roe
   were not similarly situated yet treated differently. Although Doe informed
   Garza that he believed Roe gave herpes to another student before he had sex
   with her, no formal complaint, by either Doe or the other student, was ever
   filed against Roe. The University was under no obligation to investigate
   Roe’s behavior, particularly with other students, when no student had
   submitted a complaint about her. See Overdam, 43 F.4th at 528 (discussing
   the difference between two students where one was accused of violating
   policies and the other was not). Although Doe stated the other student was
   willing to “talk” to SJP, that student did not formally file a complaint against
   Roe, nor did Doe. Also, Garza encouraged Doe to review the Code, which
   describes the procedures for filing and investigating formal SJP complaints.
   So, while Roe’s conduct was still irrelevant to Doe’s own culpability, 6 he still

           6
             Doe raised the other student in his response to Roe’s SJP complaint, apparently
   because he thought this fact exonerated him from violating the Code of Student Conduct.
   And while Garza did not address Doe’s allegation in reaching her decision about Doe’s
   conduct (which Doe takes issue with), it is clear that his allegation about Roe’s conduct
   with another student was irrelevant as to whether Doe did or did not violate the Code of
   Student Conduct. Dean Hutchinson made that point clear in his decision letter stating,
   “any activity between [Roe] and [another student] has no bearing on whether you acted
   with reckless disregard.” Still Doe provides no rational reason why Roe’s conduct with
   others had any impact on whether his conduct violated the Code of Student Conduct. His
   argument on this point, at best, suggests he is less culpable because Roe may have had
   herpes before he had sex with her. But to be clear, the likability or sympathetic view of a
   victim is not at issue when determining whether Doe violated the Code of Student
   Conduct. And more importantly, Doe was not charged with giving Roe herpes. He was
   charged with failing to adequately inform her about his own herpes diagnosis and the risk
   of passing it through unprotected sex (regardless of whether she already had it).

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   failed to file a separate complaint against Roe after the fact or to pass along
   this information to the other student who was allegedly harmed by Roe.
           The lack of a formal complaint against Roe shows she is not similarly
   situated to Doe. The University’s alleged failure to open up an investigation
   against Roe or to punish her for allegedly engaging in the same conduct as
   Doe is therefore not reasonably attributable to gender bias. Instead, it is
   attributable to the fact that “[Roe] was not accused of violating the
   University’s policies—only [Doe] was.” Overdam, 43 F.4th at 528; see also
   Klocke, 938 F.3d at 213 (rejecting selective enforcement theory when the
   accused’s proffered comparators were not in a sufficiently similar class with
   the accused).
           Doe next argues that Roe admitted she did not intend to disclose her
   herpes diagnosis to her future sexual partners, and SJP failed to punish her
   for the same conduct he was charged with. This again does not show that Roe
   is similarly situated. Roe’s alleged intent to violate the Code at some time in
   the future is still not a violation of the Code that warranted investigation and
   punishment in the context of investigating Doe’s conduct. No student filed a
   complaint against Roe for this conduct—and at that point in time, it was
   entirely hypothetical. Is the University expected to punish a student for
   prohibited conduct the student has yet to engage in?
           And when Doe raised this issue in his appeal, Dean Hutchinson
   acknowledged that Roe would be appropriately investigated and punished if
   she violated the Code with the same conduct in the future. He explicitly
   stated, Roe “would face her own consequences were that situation to arise.” 7

           7
             Dean Hutchinson also appropriately pointed out that Doe’s concern with Roe’s
   alleged intent to withhold her herpes diagnosis from future partners was “not only
   irrelevant but wildly off point. Whether [Roe] were at some time in the future to
   demonstrate reckless disregard for the welfare of another student does not have anything
   to do with whether it was acceptable for you to disregard the welfare of another student.”

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   Rather than showing bias, this statement shows that the University would
   treat Roe, or any other female student, in the same manner as Doe, if and
   when they engage in the same reckless conduct as Doe.
           Doe argues Roe’s statement shows she is a danger to the University
   community and she should have been punished. This point is irrelevant
   because Doe was not determined to be a danger to the community simply
   because he had herpes. Nor could Roe. Doe was found to be a danger to the
   community because he had herpes, and he failed to disclose the serious
   implications of that diagnosis before he had unprotected sex with another
   student. Roe had yet to engage in this same conduct to make her a similar
   danger to the community. And at best, her statement showed only that she
   wanted to maintain her privacy as she went forward with her new herpes
   diagnosis.
           Next, Doe’s argument based on Dean Ostdiek’s deposition testimony
   in which he said he would “counsel” Roe rather than punish her, is entirely
   out of context—and more importantly does not reveal selective enforcement.
   In response to whether SJP would be required to “act on that information,”
   i.e., the information about Roe’s alleged intentions to withhold her herpes
   diagnosis from future partners, 8 Dean Ostdiek stated he would “have had
   discussions . . . about whether [Roe] was being counseled.” He then stated
   he would want Roe to receive counseling “[b]ecause this is a very troubling
   time with a lot of life-changing decisions she has to make.”

           8
             Doe submitted a transcript of Dean Ostdiek’s deposition testimony, but it is
   notably incomplete and does not include the line of questioning before this question to
   provide context on what “that information” is. It is noteworthy that Doe places great
   emphasis on this testimony, but it is intriguing that the district court and now us on appeal
   do not have access to the relevant context. Nevertheless, it seems that the pertinent inquiry
   pertains to Roe’s purported intentions, as they were brought up in the same way as in this
   case, which was during SJP’s investigation of Doe.

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          While Doe thinks this statement reveals Dean Ostdiek’s intent to treat
   Roe differently, when considered in the accurate context of SJP discovering
   this information in the investigation of Doe’s conduct, this statement only
   reveals Dean Ostdiek’s understanding that Roe had just recently been
   diagnosed with herpes. Dean Ostdiek’s statement is regarding Roe’s status
   as a reporting student and victim who now needs to understand how to move
   forward with her diagnosis. And again, there is no evidence that Dean
   Ostdiek stated he would only counsel Roe in response to a formal complaint
   filed against Roe. In fact, Doe conveniently overlooks Dean Ostdiek explicitly
   stating the opposite; he said if students made an allegation to the University
   that Roe “slept with other students and did not tell them that she had
   herpes,” “that would be investigated and assessed.” Doe, however, points
   to no formal complaint lodged against Roe for this conduct.
          Dean Ostdiek’s statement does not show that he would treat Roe
   differently if a student filed a formal complaint against her for the same
   conduct. Nor does it show that Doe, himself, was treated differently because
   he is a man. And a single out-of-context statement from one University
   official, who did not adjudicate Doe’s charges or his appeal, is simply not
   enough to demonstrate bias in this case. Cf. Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475,
   484 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding allegation that one of many people involved
   in disciplinary process was biased was insufficient to sustain a procedural due
   process claim based on bias).
          The bottom line is that Doe has failed to meet his burden to produce
   evidence that shows the University selectively enforced the Code. Doe has
   produced no evidence of similarly situated comparators to even remotely
   draw an inference that he was treated any differently than any other student,
   female or otherwise. And to the extent he relies on Roe being a comparator,
   he has not shown that she was similarly situated to him because a formal SJP

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   complaint was never filed against her. Doe’s claim based on the selective
   enforcement theory thus fails.
                                         C.
          Doe’s final theory of gender bias, based on the archaic assumptions
   theory, fails because there is no evidence of archaic assumptions regarding
   men and women and their respective abilities to understand sexually
   transmitted diseases and the risks of unprotected sex. In Pederson v. Louisiana
   State University, this court stated, “outdated attitudes about [gender] amply
   demonstrate [an] intention to discriminate” in violation of Title IX. 213 F.3d
   858, 881 (5th Cir. 2000). The court emphasized that intentional gender
   discrimination can be established by “archaic assumptions,” “overbroad
   generalizations,” and “outdated” beliefs “about the different talents,
   capacities, or preferences of males and females.” Id. (citations omitted). In
   Pederson, the archaic assumptions were facially discriminatory, and the
   application of those assumptions, therefore, amounted to intentional gender
   discrimination.
          The record in Pederson was rife with university officials’
   condescending and unfounded comments about women and their athletic
   abilities. See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 881 (listing comments about women
   including “honey,” “sweetie,” “cutie,” a statement calling softball a “more
   feminine sport,” and a justification to treat women differently because “the
   women might get hurt”). There was also evidence of blatantly differential
   treatment of the genders, with female sports having smaller budgets and less
   qualified staff. See id. Here, by contrast, Doe points to no facially
   discriminatory comments made by Garza or any other University official. In
   fact, there are no facially discriminatory comments or assumptions in the
   record at all. Moreover, as discussed, Doe has not produced evidence of
   differential treatment of similarly situated female comparators.

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          Although it is possible, as Doe contends, that “assuming that an adult
   female college junior is incapable of understanding the risks of sexual
   intercourse without the male educating her is part of [impermissible] archaic
   thinking[,]” there is no evidence that occurred here. Rather, the record
   shows the University placed a burden on Doe to adequately inform any and
   all of his sexual partners about his herpes diagnosis, regardless of their
   genders, because he is the “carrier of the infection,” regardless of his gender.
   Other than referring to Doe and Roe by their respective male and female
   pronouns, there is no other discussion or commentary regarding genders, let
   alone the capabilities of one gender compared to the other.
          Doe also argues that the University failed to put any responsibility on
   Roe for her own knowledge, choices, and conduct in engaging in unprotected
   sex. But he fails to acknowledge that the entire point of the charges against
   him was that he did not provide Roe with sufficient information to allow her
   to “make a fully informed decision about her sexual activity and health.”
          It is also worth noting that Doe has not identified “outdated” or
   “archaic” assumptions about the genders and their respective knowledge of
   sexual health that have somehow found their way into the University
   disciplinary process. To make his point on this issue, he relies on a single
   paragraph filled with conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations that the
   University assumed Roe could not understand the risks associated with
   herpes because she is a woman. Those allegations are contradicted by the
   record. The fact that Doe is unhappy that the University placed a burden on
   him because he is the carrier of a sexually transmitted disease is no evidence
   that that burden was instead placed on him because he is a man.
          Because there is no basis for finding the University based its decision
   on archaic and outdated assumptions, Doe’s claim on this theory cannot
   survive summary judgment.

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                                           D.
          Despite Doe’s attempts to prove gender discrimination under the
   three theories above, the ultimate question is: Does the evidence “raise a
   plausible inference that [the University] or its administrators discriminated
   against [Doe] on the basis of sex?” Overdam, 43 F.4th at 527 (recognizing
   different fact patterns may show sex discrimination). It does not.
          Doe has not identified evidence that gender bias affected Garza’s
   investigation and conclusion. Nor has he shown that the provision he was
   charged with, Section II.B.1.a, was selected and enforced because of gender
   bias. To show bias and discrimination, Doe argues Garza more easily forgave
   Roe’s inconsistencies and made assumptions in Roe’s favor. Specifically,
   Doe argues Garza assumed Doe had “some level of knowledge about
   herpes . . . which there was no evidence.”
          But a review of the record reveals no evidence of gender bias. The
   record does not show that Garza only believed Roe or forgave her
   inconsistencies while disregarding Doe’s own statements. In fact, the
   opposite is true.
          Garza assessed Roe’s statement thoroughly, and she sought
   clarification on Roe’s allegations. Garza also asked Roe directly whether she
   remembered that Doe mentioned having herpes in high school. Roe was able
   to review Doe’s response and statements, which were critical of Roe’s
   allegations. Garza summarized all of Roe’s inconsistencies and her
   explanations. Garza’s written decision discussed these inconsistencies and
   stated she considered them when deciding what actually happened between
   Doe and Roe. Rather than showing a rubber stamp approval and acceptance
   of everything Roe said, the record shows Garza thoroughly scrutinized Roe’s
   allegations in the investigation.
          The same is true for Doe’s statements. Garza acknowledged that Doe
   stated he told Roe about his herpes diagnosis. But she also considered Doe’s

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   messages to Roe (before any SJP involvement) that suggest Doe “admitt[ed]
   to having unprotected sex with [Roe] while knowing that [he is] a carrier of
   an incurable sexually transmitted disease that can be transferred to [his]
   partner by unprotected sex, and failing to disclose that information to her.”
   Despite having both Doe’s statements to SJP and his text messages, Garza
   sought further clarification of Doe’s intent and knowledge. She asked Doe to
   elaborate on what he meant in his text messages and to provide context. In
   response, Doe verified his understanding and intentions, which did not
   meaningfully differ from the plain meaning of his messages. This shows,
   again, that Garza engaged in a thorough investigation to understand Doe’s
   side of the story. And importantly, there is no evidence that Garza simply
   disregarded Doe’s statements for any reason, let alone because he is a man.
          Insofar as Doe contends Garza assumed Doe had knowledge about
   herpes without evidentiary support, he fails to account for his own
   statements to Garza. She specifically asked Doe about his understanding of
   herpes. Doe told Garza that he understood herpes was incurable, that he
   carried it for life, and that he could “pass it.” Not to mention there is
   circumstantial evidence of Doe’s knowledge of herpes and its effects based
   on the fact that he went to the doctor and “tested positive for herpes.” Doe’s
   bare allegation that there is no evidence to support his knowledge of herpes
   is obviously wrong.
          It is also relevant that the University gave a nondiscriminatory reason
   for concluding Doe knew about his herpes diagnosis and the relevant effects
   and risks to others. That is because, of course, Doe has herpes. Dean
   Hutchinson specifically noted that Doe had the burden to inform his
   potential sexual partners about his herpes diagnosis and the effects because
   he was “the carrier of the infection.” This is a reasonable, justifiable, and
   nondiscriminatory basis for the University’s decision. Therefore, any

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   “inference of gender bias in these circumstances would necessarily be
   speculative.” Klocke, 938 F.3d at 212.
          The University and Code of Student Conduct place a burden on
   carriers of a sexually transmitted disease to inform sexual partners of that
   disease, the effects of that disease, whether and how the disease can be passed
   to others, and whether certain precautions or choices affect the ability of the
   disease to be passed. In that same vein, the University does not expect
   students who have not been diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease to
   understand these facts about every disease. Hence, if a potential sexual
   partner mentions having chlamydia or “herpes in high school,” it may not be
   adequate information for students to make informed choices regarding their
   sexual health and behavior. That is a reasonable and justifiable basis for the
   University’s conclusion that Doe acted with reckless disregard for Roe’s
   health. And that conclusion has nothing to do with gender.
          Doe appears to think this policy is unfair and unwise. He attributes its
   unfairness to gender bias, and so does the majority. It may well be a less
   onerous burden on Doe, or a better policy, to assume every student should
   know or that Roe should have known the risks of having unprotected sex after
   a potential sexual partner reveals he or she “had herpes in high school.” It
   may also be reasonable to require students to inquire into the details of any
   disclosed sexually transmitted disease. But it is not our place to determine
   whether the University’s policies or the Code of Student Conduct are wise.
   Our job is to determine whether the policy was either motivated by gender
   bias or enforced in a manner that discriminates on the basis of gender in
   violation of Title IX. Doe has overwhelmingly failed to show gender
   discrimination here. And it is simply insufficient to allege the policy is
   unfavorable to Doe when there is no evidence that the policy was adopted or
   is applied to discriminate on the basis of gender.

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                                                E.
           Despite there being no evidence of gender discrimination, the
   majority takes the position that the disciplinary process itself was unfair to
   Doe and his Title IX claims somehow survive summary judgment on that
   basis. The majority raises its concerns with due process and procedural
   irregularities. But Doe has not alleged a due process claim. So, to address this
   appeal, in which Doe appeals the grant of summary judgment to the
   University solely on a Title IX claim, the only issue is whether Doe has
   produced evidence to maintain his Title IX gender discrimination claim.
           Doe does not contend he did not receive due process. He contends the
   process he received was biased because of his gender in violation of Title IX. 9
   While the majority may have concerns with the process Doe received, 10 those

           9
             Most notably, Doe’s opening and reply brief do not mention “due process” once.
   Neither does his briefing on the motion for summary judgment in the district court.
   Although Doe’s complaint mentions due process in passing, he does not raise and has not
   raised due process arguments against the University. Any argument based on a
   constitutional right to due process is therefore forfeited. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th
   393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first
   instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal—or by failing to
   adequately brief the argument on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
            I also note that the University is a private institution. Doe has made no argument
   that the University is an arm of the state or governmental entity and must comply with
   constitutional due process. See Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating
   procedural due process confines governmental decisions that deprive individuals of life,
   liberty, or property interests). Despite this, this circuit has yet to recognize that in
   university disciplinary proceedings, the accused must be given the opportunity to question
   the accuser or other witnesses as part of their right to procedural due process. See id. at
   485; Plummer, 860 F.3d at 775 (declining to state “whether confrontation and cross-
   examination would ever be constitutionally required in student disciplinary proceedings”).
           10
              The majority takes issue with the fact that Garza did not permit Doe to be
   represented by an attorney, did not give Doe a hearing, and did not allow Doe to cross-
   examine Roe. All of these actions were taken, however, consistent with and pursuant to the
   Code of Student Conduct’s description of the relevant process for SJP investigations. The
   record, therefore, shows Doe was provided with the exact process described in the Code

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   concerns are only relevant here if they arose from gender bias. But, as
   explained, that is not the case.
            This appeal does not present the vehicle to address those concerns.
   Instead, we are bound by the claim Doe raised and the elements necessary for
   him to survive summary judgment. That claim, that the University
   discriminated against him on the basis of his gender, must therefore fail
   because there is no evidence to sustain it.
                                                III.
           This case is a straightforward Title IX gender discrimination case. To
   survive summary judgment, Doe is required to produce some evidence that
   can lead a rational fact finder to conclude the University treated Doe
   differently because he is a man. The record demonstrates, however, that the

   (which is neutral regarding gender). And there is no evidence that the University’s
   subscription to the Code’s process in Doe’s case was motivated by gender bias. Doe
   completely fails to present evidence regarding the University’s process and its application
   to any other formally-charged student, male or female.
           As for the merits of these issues, there is little to be concerned about. First,
   although the University does not formally allow lawyers to represent or communicate on
   behalf of students in SJP investigations, Doe’s attorney was permitted to be by Doe’s side
   through the entire process. Doe’s attorney was able to review the charges, assist Doe in
   drafting his response, advise Doe on what to present to SJP, assist Doe in preparing for his
   interviews with Garza, and be present at those interviews with Garza. He was also
   permitted to “pass notes” to Doe during the interviews and to talk to Doe during breaks.
   Second, Doe has not requested a hearing, nor does he point to any specific requirement
   that a hearing be provided in these circumstances. Regardless, Doe was permitted to
   respond to the charges, review the evidence in the file, and submit his own evidence and
   statements to undermine Roe’s theory. Third, the University has made clear that it did not
   rely on Roe’s testimony to conclude Doe’s violation. Because Doe’s own statements were
   “sufficient to sustain the University’s findings and sanctions[,]” there is little concern with
   his inability to cross-examine Roe. Plummer, 860 F.3d at 775. As a result, there is “no
   procedural deficiency” in this regard. Id. at 775–76 (noting reliance on evidence other than
   complainant’s testimony shows cross-examination of complainant would have had little
   impact on proceedings); Walsh, 975 F.3d at 487 (stating cross-examination in some form
   might be constitutionally required “where the outcome depends on credibility”).

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                                    No. 21-20555

   University provided Doe with all the procedural protections listed in the
   Code of Student Conduct and treated him in the same manner as other
   students regardless of gender. The record is devoid of any evidence, and Doe
   points to none, that shows the University acted based on gender bias or sex
   discrimination. I would accordingly affirm the district court’s well-reasoned
   order granting the University’s motion for summary judgment.
          I respectfully dissent.

                                        41