Court Opinion

ID: 9715493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:07:04.178264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.335747
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting in part.
With respect to Issue I, I agree that the State has waived the issue of a belated prac-cipe. I note, however, that the conclusion that failure to file a timely praecipe is a "waivable" defect implies that such failure does not render the appeal defective for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue which can be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. See In re Adoption of H.S. (1985) Ind.App., 483 N.E.2d 777, 780. Further, if such failure to file a timely prac-cipe resulted in our not obtaining subject matter jurisdiction, we would raise this matter sua sponte even had the State never brought the issue to our attention. Id. Thus, while Greer's failure to file a timely praecipe is a "jurisdictional" defect, the defect that results must necessarily be one of jurisdiction over this particular case. See Sanders v. Carson (1995) Ind.App., 645 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 ("Jurisdiction of a particular case refers to the right, authority, and power to hear and determine a specific case within that class of cases over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction."). Judge Garrard's lead opinion in citing to Byrd v. State here agrees that the issue involves Jurisdiction of the particular case. This dis*760tinction, though of longstanding and unquestioned stature within our system of appellate review, has resulted in confusing and often contradictory language in our decisions and those of our supreme court. Compare Byrd v. State (1992) Ind., 592 N.E.2d 690, 691-92 (holding that State had waived issue of whether appellant could file belated praecipe) and Soft Water Utilities v. LeFevre (1973) 261 Ind. 260, 301 N.E.2d 745 (permitting trial court to retroactively post-date ruling on motion to correct errors in order to permit otherwise untimely praecipe to be filed) with Claywell v. Review Bd. (1994) Ind., 643 N.E.2d 330 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hutchens (1973) 260 Ind. 561, 297 N.E.2d 807 for proposition that, "where an appellant fails to file a timely praecipe, the Court of Appeals has 'no choice' but to dismiss") and Jennings v. Davis (1994) Ind.App., 634 N.E.2d 810 (holding that, when praecipe is not filed within thirty days, "we must dismiss the appeal") (emphasis supplied).
In Claywell, our supreme court, while holding that the failure to file an assignment of errors results in dismissal of the appeal,2 approvingly acknowledged the doctrine that, in "rare and exceptional cireumstances", an appellate court may hear a case notwithstanding failure to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites to review. 643 N.E.2d at 331 (citing Lugar v. State ex rel Lee (1978) 270 Ind. 45, 46-7, 383 N.E.2d 287, 289). In my view, the teaching of Lugar can best be understood as acknowledging that the failure of a particular litigant, whose case otherwise falls within the purview of our jurisdiction, to comply with our appellate rules does not result in our failure to obtain subject matter jurisdiction, but rather, jurisdiction over the particular case. Subject matter jurisdiction addresses the nature or class of cases which a court may hear, while jurisdiction over the case addresses the prerequisites a particular litigant must follow in order to proceed in a particular court. See generally Mann v. Mann (1988) Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 821, 822. There is no doubt that we have jurisdiction over the nature or class of cases within which Greer's appeal falls. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(B) (providing that, except for specifically enumerated areas, Court of Appeals has general appellate jurisdiction).3 Thus, Greer's failure to file a timely praccipe does not deprive us of jurisdiction over the subject matter of his appeal, but rather, of jurisdiction over his particular case. Therefore, because the jurisdictional defect was one of jurisdiction over the case, the State was required to raise it at the earliest opportunity, on penalty of "waiving" its "waiver" argument.4
Judge Garrard's lead opinion also cites Howard v. State (1995) Ind., 653 N.E.2d 1389 for the proposition that the belated praecipe countenanced under Indiana Post Conviction Rule 2 has reference only to direct appeals from a conviction. Such holding may well be read to preclude the filing of a belated prac-cipe under P.C.R. 2 as a vehicle to appeal denial of a P.C.R. 1 petition. However, the holding does not preclude belated appeals from matters wholly extraneous to the validity of the basic conviction and the sentence imposed upon that conviction. For this reason, I perceive that consideration of the merits of a challenge to a probation revocation may be obtained, under certain ciream-stances, notwithstanding a praecipe which was not timely. With respect to Issue II, I concur with the lead opinion's treatment of the applicability of the hearsay rule in a *761probation revocation proceeding. As to the lead opinion's treatment of Greer's argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of counsel's failure to object to the admission of Glick's testimony regarding Greer's admission that he had used alcohol, I coneur in result. It appears that, not only does Greer fail to "allege or show by affidavit", Slip Op. at 8, that he did not receive his Miranda warnings, he also does not allege or argue on appeal that he was procedurally precluded from doing so. Thus, there is no reason for us to believe that Greer is actually contesting whether he received his Miranda warnings, and no reason to think that, even had such an objection been made by his trial counsel, the outcome of a hearing might have been favorable to Greer.
I must respectfully dissent, however, from Judge Garrard's conclusions as to Issues III and IV. These issues involve the respective "equal protection" provisions of the Indiana and United States Constitutions. For purposes of the discussion here, there is no reason to differentiate between the two, because I conclude that denial of home detention credit constitutes unlawful discrimination against one segment of the class of persons which is deemed to be "imprisoned".
In Capes v. State (1994) Ind., 634 N.E.2d 1334, our Supreme Court clearly and unmistakably held that a person under home detention is "imprisoned" for purposes of entitlement to credit against his sentence. Home detention, therefore, whether awaiting trial, or as a condition of probation, is therefore imprisonment for sentencing credit purposes just as is incarceration in a secure facility following conviction. The Supreme Court in Capes, did not see fit to differentiate among various "imprisonments" according to the degree of isolation or the severity of the treatment.
It is perhaps accurate to say that the legislative intendment of I.C. 85-50-6-6 at the time of enactment was to prohibit the earning of credit against the sentence for those on probation or parole. However, in 1976, at the time of enactment, home detention as a means of incarceration during probation was not in use. Home detention was not legislatively created or recognized until 1988 with the enactment of 1.0. 85-38-2.5. The General Assembly has chosen not to clarify its intended application of I.C. 85-50-6-6 in light of modern uses of forms of "imprisonment" whether as a term of probation or otherwise. Nevertheless, whether a person is in the status of a probationer or not, if he is on home detention, he is "imprisoned" for purposes of earning credit against his sentence. So saith our Supreme Court, Capes, supra.
To deny credit against the sentence to one who is upon probation but is nevertheless imprisoned on home detention, yet grant credit to one who is upon home detention while awaiting trial, Capes, supra, or to one who is imprisoned in a maximum security penal facility, see .C. 85-50-6-8, or to one who is in a minimum security release program such as work release, .C. 11-10-8, is to deny equal application of the law. If only some of the class of imprisoned persons, i.e., probationers, are denied credit for time served on home detention, such constitutes a denial of equal protection.5
I would hold that to the extent that I.C. 35-50-6-6 denies credit time to a probationer while upon home detention, it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, although I would affirm the revocation of Greer's probation, I would remand for reconsideration of the eredit to be given for the time served while upon home detention.

. Effective February 1, 1996, our supreme court amended the appellate rules so that an assignment of errors is no longer a prerequisite to appellate review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(C), 7.2(A)(1) (1996).

. By comparison, of course, we would not have subject matter jurisdiction over Greer's appeal if he were appealing a death sentence, since that is a class of criminal appeals over which our supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7) (providing that supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from cases in which the death penalty has been imposed). Thus, if such an appeal were presented to us, we would be powerless to do anything other than dismiss such a case even if the State failed to make a jurisdictional argument.

. In this regard, therefore, I agree with Judge Garrard's opinion to the effect that we need not decide the applicability of Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 2 to Greer's case, since, due to the State's waiver, we may consider Greer's appeal irrespective of the rule's applicability to an appeal from revocation of probation.

. In achieving success upon an equal protection argument, a post conviction home detainee may kill the goose that laid the golden egg. It is conceivable that the General Assembly might determine, in its eminent wisdom, that equal application of the laws to all who are imprisoned, is to be achieved by abolishing any credit for time served.