Court Opinion

ID: 9864799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:12:10.662856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:00.226348
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hays
dissenting.
For reasons which will hereinafter appear, I dissent from the majority opinion.
In this case four psychiatrists for the people examined the defendant, to wit: Doctors Ebaugh, Busse, Lyons and Symes. Only the first two of the doctors were called as witnesses in the case, and on the cross-examination of Dr. Busse, defendant’s counsel asked: “Do you ever have occasion to differ among yourselves?” to which the witness answered: “Yes, we do.” On redirect examination the witness was asked by the District Attorney: “Now, did all four of the doctors agree on this Carter case?” to which the witness replied: “They did.”
In' this court’s opinion the above evidence was declared to be hearsay and the admission thereof reversible error. Assuming for the purpose hereof that such evidence is hearsay, I am convinced that it was harmless and that the admission did not constitute reversible error, and in no event is the defendant in a position to raise the question on review.
In volume 3, American Jurisprudence, page 580, section 1028, it is said that the admission in evidence of hearsay testimony, even though erroneous, is not prejudicial error where such evidence “had no bearing on the *351issue involved or only a slight bearing”; or where “there is nothing to indicate that a new trial would result in a different verdict from that already reached”; or where “it was cumulative and related to a fact' otherwise proved by competent evidence or to a fact not in dispute in the case.”
In the instant case, the issue, and the only issue, involved, relates to the guilt or innocence of defendant. Whether or not the four doctors who appeared as witnesses for the people and who examined defendant agreed upon his mental condition, has only a slight, if any, bearing upon the real issue presented. Two doctors testified defendant was sane when the act was committed. The opinions of the absent doctors were cumulative and the sanity of defendant was otherwise fully established by other expert witnesses. In addition, there was no dispute between the people and defendant as to whether or not there was unanimity of opinion even among the doctors who appeared and testified at the trial as to the sanity of defendant. It is evident that psychiatrists disagree on that subject by the very fact that defendant’s psychiatrist testified that in his opinion defendant was insane and the people’s psychiatrists expressed opinions to the contrary. In any event, the testimony related to a collateral issue and not to the main issue, and under such circumstances, its admission did not violate the hearsay rule. It also is clear from an examination of the record that there is nothing to indicate, in the event of a new trial, that the result thereof would be different. In Nance v. McClellan, 126 Tex. 580, 89 S.W. (2d) 774, 106 A.L.R. 117, it is held that where hearsay testimony is merely a reiteration of other testimony and it is not reasonably probable that it influenced the jury, its admission in evidence is not reversible error.
It likewise is held in State v. Gore, 152 Kan. 511, 106 P. (2d) 704, 131 A.L.R. 1108, that error in the admission of expert testimony is not ground for reversal where *352such testimony is merely cumulative and there is abundance of other competent evidence which sustains the opinion of the witness. See, also, Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196 So. 472, 128 A.L.R. 1013.
In connection with the above it is well also to consider that the alleged hearsay testimony herein related to opinion evidence of experts, and that the jury, even if said evidence was admissible, was not bound thereby under the instructions of the court, which contain, inter alia, the following: “The law allows those skilled in that special branch to express opinions on facts in evidence in this cause. But, nevertheless while their opinions are allowed to be given, it is entirely within the province of the jury to say what weight shall be given to them. Jurors are not bound by the testimony of experts, but their testimony is to be considered as that of any other witness; the mere fact that witnesses are called as experts and given opinions upon a particular point, does not necessarily obligate the jury to accept their opinions as to what the facts are in the face of the testimony of witnesses claiming to have actual knowledge of the facts.”
• Assuming therefore, that the evidence was hearsay and inadmissible, it is apparent there was no prejudice to the defendant by reason of the introduction thereof; that it related to a fact not in dispute and had but a slight, if any, bearing on the real issue of guilt of defendant; that such evidence was cumulative and related to a fact otherwise fully proven by competent evidence and also that under the instructions of the court, the jury was not bound by the testimony of experts.
The testimony to which objection was made was elicited by defendant’s counsel on cross-examination of Dr. Busse, one of the psychiatrists called as a witness on behalf of the people, who said, among other things, that “even the best of men in this type of work make mistakes and improper diagnoses,” that all psychiatrists can do “is express an opinion” as to whether or not the *353defendant is sane or insane; that there are frequently vast differences of opinion not only between psychiatrists employed by the public, but also those in private endeavor; that “there are fields of medicine which are much more accurate than psychiatry”; that psychiatry is not an exact science; and that any one of the three psychiatrists who testified at the trial might be right or wrong in his opinion.
All of the above testimony was proper and related to a legitimate subject of inquiry. The jury had the right to weigh and consider such evidence and determine therefrom which opinion, if any, it wished to follow. The purpose of the above evidence was no doubt to emphasize the fact that there were irreconcilable differences of opinion as to the sanity of defendant as between defendant’s doctor and those of the people.
Counsel for defendant, however, did not stop there. He then proceeded to create the inference that there was disagreement as between the people’s psychiatrists, as shown by the following: “Q. By the way, there were four different doctors that examined Mr. Carter, were there not? A. I am sure there were. * * * Q. Do you ever have occasion to differ among yourselves? A. Yes, we do. Q. Does that often occur, doctor, or is it a rather rare occurrence? A. It doesn’t happen too often. In fact, I can only remember one case on the 1927 law that there was some dispute about.”
When the last above question was asked on cross-examination it was the obvious purpose of counsel for the defense to create the inference that the four psychiatrists of the people were in disagreement in the instant case as to defendant’s sanity, and that this case might be the exception to which the witness referred when he said he remembered only one case where there was a dispute among the doctors. It is quite universally recognized that where such inferences are created on cross-examination by defendant’s counsel, it is proper on redirect examination to offer evidence in rebuttal thereof,. *354as stated in 70 C.J., p. 702, §855, to wit: “On redirect examination a witness may properly be interrogated as to facts and circumstances tending to refute, weaken, or remove inferences, impressions, implications, or suggestions which might result from testimony or inquiries on cross-examination, although the facts brought out may be prejudicial to the other party. It has been held improper for the court to exclude such testimony.”
It apparently is the view of the majority that the answer of the witness “They did [agree]” constitutes hearsay because, as indicated, the only way the witness could know whether or not the absent doctors agreed with the opinion of the witness as to defendant’s sanity was to procure such information from the doctors themselves. Applying the same reasoning, the answer of the witness on cross-examination, to wit: “Yes, we do [disagree],” likewise would be hearsay. This court in the majority opinion takes the inconsistent position that hearsay evidence is admissible if elicited by the defendant on cross-examination, but inadmissible and prejudicial on redirect examination, and further that defendant’s counsel on cross-examination of the people’s witness may create inferences of disagreement among the people’s doctors, and that the prosecution is powerless to rebut such inferences in kind. Such position, as I view it, is contrary to long-established pronouncements of this court.
In Miller v. People, 92 Colo. 481, 22 P. (2d) 626, where a similar situation was involved, in refusing to reverse the judgment we said: “Miller’s theory was that the present prosecution was the result of a ‘frameup,’ or conspiracy, and in cross examining the sheriff, Miller’s counsel was seeking, no doubt, to support that theory. As he was the first to go into the- question of the sheriff’s reasons for going to the pit on the night in question, the redirect examination by the district attorney [calling for other reasons] did not, in the circumstances, con*355stitute prejudicial error entitling Miller to a reversal of the judgment.”
In Boles v. People, 37 Colo. 41, 86 Pac. 1030, Dr. Dabney testified that he had examined the defendant and that two fingers of his right hand “were in a contused condition * * * as if the fingers had been bitten.” On cross-examination “he was interrogated as to whether he had inquired of the patient as to the cause of the injured condition of defendant’s hand”; his answer was in the negative. On redirect examination the prosecutor asked why he had not made such inquiries, and this was assigned as error. In refusing to reverse the judgment, we said: “It was proper, on cross-examination, to ask the question that the defense did. It was equally proper, on re-direct examination, for the state to elicit the reason why the doctor had not made inquiry as to the cause of the wound under treatment.” To the same effect, see, Newton’s Admrx. v. American Car Sprinkler Company, 87 Vt. 546, 92 Atl. 831.
Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Alter join in this opinion.