Court Opinion

ID: 9557846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:58:40.252656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:33.995462
License: Public Domain

WARD, J.
I dissent. The reconciliation of estranged spouses before or after an interlocutory decree is in accord with the accepted judicial policy of protecting marital status. In the majority opinion the evidence has been revalued and because no other witness appeared to contest the motion it is held: “There being no evidence and no inference from the evidence to support the implied finding that the forgiveness here involved was unconditional, and the uncontradicted evidence showing that the forgiveness was conditional, we are of the opinion that the action of the trial court in refusing to grant the final decree was an abuse of discretion. ’ ’
The trial judge was justified in denying plaintiff’s motion for a final decree upon either of two grounds: 1. If the trial judge disbelieved the whole or an essential part of the testimony of plaintiff, presented in support of her motion, including the agreement, then the judgment rendered against plaintiff in this case was proper. The issuance of a final decree is discretionary with the trial court. 2. The fact, standing alone, that the return of the spouses to marital relations is conditional, does not justify the issuance of a final decree. Whatever the conditions may be, the trial court must have the right to pass upon the propriety thereof. (9 Cal.Jur. § 116, pp. 767-768.) Instances of proper conditions are too numerous to mention (17 Am.Jur. §116, pp. 211-212), but “A party to an action for divorce is not entitled to have a final decree entered when to do so would be a flagrant abuse of the principles of equity and of the due administration of justice” (9 Cal.Jur. § 117, p. 768).
In this ease the parties entered into a written agreement that the husband would abstain from alcoholic liquor or that “he will waive all legal objection to the obtaining” of a final decree of divorce by the wife. In brief, plaintiff’s position is that she would live in the same abode with the right to defendant of marital relations, but she reserved the right of forgiveness. The husband agreed in writing that if the wife decided his conduct was not all that she desired he would not oppose the *346issuance of a final decree of divorce. This contract attempted to bestow upon the wife an unfair advantage if there should be a difference of opinion relative to the conduct of the husband. Such a contract would permit parties to enjoy marital relations for over 11 months and then upon the whim or caprice of one spouse obtain a final decree irrespective of the declaration of law or the views of the courts on the merits of the motion.
It is not permissible that parties by the terms of a contract may provide that if future disputable questions arise one side will be refused the right to submit the matter to a court of justice. One essential element of a contract is that it must have a lawful object. (Civ. Code, § 1550, subd. 3.) Any contract the object of which is to take away the right of the court to decide an issue over which it has jurisdiction, such as to agree that one party in a divorce proceeding will make no defense, is void. (Loveren v. Loveren, 106 Cal. 509 [39 P. 801]; Beard v. Beard, 65 Cal. 354 [4 P. 229] ; Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 [103 P. 488,134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A. N.S. 880].) Even in contracts adjusting property rights the court may approve or disapprove. (Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82 [142 P.2d 417] ; Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605 [160 P.2d 15].)
To epitomize: 1. The determination of the facts was a question for the trial judge. He observed and heard the plaintiff testify. I am unable to say that he abused his discretion. 2. Irrespective of the truthfulness of the testimony of plaintiff, the contract is void. Its object is unlawful, namely, to take away from the court its function to determine the propriety of the issuance of the final decree.
The judgment denying plaintiff a final decree of divorce should be affirmed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 14,1948. Ward, J., voted for a rehearing.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 13, 1948. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., voted for a hearing.