Court Opinion

ID: 9752374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:02:57.615903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:15.583554
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(dissenting).
In my view the standards set forth in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), are not applicable to pleas of guilty entered prior to January 24, 1974, the date of the Ingram decision. I am also of opin*240ion that the colloquy which was conducted in the case at bar prior to the trial court’s acceptance of the appellee’s pleas of guilty to aggravated robbery and carrying a concealed weapon complied with the law as it stood prior to Ingram. Hence, I must dissent from the Court’s affirmance of the order of the Superior Court reversing the judgments of sentence and remanding the case for trial.1
I.
In Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, this Court held that a plea of guilty should not be accepted unless the record discloses that “the elements of the crime or crimes charged were outlined in understandable terms.” 2 Ingram, supra at 204, 316 A.2d at 80. Today the Court concludes that this requirement constituted no new law and therefore that the question of retroactive application of Ingram does not arise. With respect, I disagree.
The Court bases.its conclusion that no new law was announced in Ingram primarily upon decisions of this Court3 expressing the view that the trial court should *241ascertain that the defendant understands the nature of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty. The Court’s reliance upon these cases is misplaced for two reasons. In the first place, none of the cases cited requires the trial court to put on the record evidence of the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the offenses charged. See the opinion of the Court, ante at 348 n. 3. As I read the opinions in those cases, they merely indicate that such an understanding is relevant to the question whether a plea of guilty was intelligently entered, and advise or suggest that showing that the defendant possessed such an understanding may aid in subsequent determinations of the validity of the plea. This reading is supported by the Ingram opinion itself in which the Court stated that our decisions in Commonwealth v. Campbell, and Commonwealth v. Jackson, note 3 supra, merely “imply” that an on-the-record showing of the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charges should be made, and concluded that “[w]e now expressly hold that there is such a requirement.” 455 Pa. at 204, 316 A.2d at 80 (emphasis added). In the second place, contrary to what the Court implicitly suggests, the nature of an offense and an outline of its legal elements are not synonymous; the former is much broader and less specific than the latter. I submit that, at least in some situations, an understanding of the nature of an offense may be inferred from knowledge of the name by which it is called and the seriousness of the consequences of being convicted of it, and therefore that such an understanding may exist in the absence of knowledge of the legal elements of the crime. In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 *242Pa. 465, 304 A.2d 121 (1973), for example, we found that the defendant understood the nature of voluntary manslaughter even though the trial judge’s explanation of voluntary manslaughter was incorrect and that the term “mens rea” had not been explained to the defendant. It is impossible to believe that this conclusion would be reached by the Court today if a post-Ingram plea entered upon an identical record to that in Campbell were to come before it. The reason, I submit, is that Ingram indeed wrought a change in the law governing the validity of guilty pleas.4
In support of the view that Ingram announced no new law, the Court also relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Boykin, the Court had before it a guilty plea which had been entered upon a record which was entirely silent as to the defendant’s comprehension of the nature and consequences of his plea. The Court held that, because a guilty plea necessarily involves a waiver of important federal constitutional rights,5 it should not be accepted in the absence of an on-the-record showing that the defendant understands ‘what the plea connotes and . its consequences.” Boykin, supra at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d at 280. The Court expressed no view, however, as to what such an on-the-record showing *243should include; nor did it impose any affirmative requirement that the trial court convey any specific information to the accused. Indeed, the federal courts of appeals have repeatedly held6 that Boykin does not require that the trial court inform the defendant of the federal constitutional rights which were enumerated in the Boy-kin opinion, see note 5 supra. As the Fifth Circuit said in McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973):
“[N]o rule of criminal procedure was mandated by Boykin, and there is no express requirement that specific articulation of the three constitutional rights above mentioned be given to the accused at the time of the acceptance of a plea of guilty, but it is necessary that the record show that the guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily made.”
My reading of Boykin is well summed up by Mr. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 538, 254 A.2d 923, 926 (1971):
“[W]e need never overturn a guilty plea simply because there was no on-the-record inquiry at the time the plea was entered, provided that a subsequent record establishes that the plea is otherwise valid. I do not believe that Boykin in any way compels a contrary result.
“Boykin, as I read it, deals with the following situation: at the outset, the trial judge accepted a guilty plea with absolutely no on-the-record inquiry of the defendant as to whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The Alabama Supreme Court af*244firmed, with no further record before it, in effect approving this procedure, at least as a matter of state law. The case then moved on to the Supreme Court of the United States where that Court was faced with a guilty plea, apparently held valid under state law, that had no supporting record as to voluntariness. Under these facts, the Supreme Court of the United States had no choice but to reverse and invalidate the guilty plea.” (Concurring opinion of Roberts, J-, joined by Bell, C. J., and Pomeroy, J.)
Because Boykin is a “silent record” case which imposed no requirements as to the content of guilty plea colloquys, it cannot be authority for the very specific Ingram requirement that the record demonstrate that the elements of each offense charged be explained to the defendant.7
II.
Because I find that Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, effected a change in the then existing law concerning the acceptance of guilty pleas, it is necessary that I address the question whether Ingram is applicable to cases, such as the one before us, in which pleas of guilty were entered before Ingram was decided.
As part I of this opinion demonstrates, Ingram was not required by federal constitutional law as set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.2d 274 (1969), by prior decisions of this Court, or by Rule 319(a) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure. While Ingram was no doubt designed to implement and assure compliance with the constitutional requirements as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas, it is most appropriately viewed as a new rule of criminal procedure, in effect an amendment to Rule 319(a), resting for its authority upon our supervisory powers over the courts and law en*245forcement officials of this Commonwealth and adopted through the medium of an opinion rendered in a case on appeal rather than by the normal rule making procedures of the Court. See Article V, Section 10, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974) [addendum opinion to Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973) ]; Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d 78 (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
Decisions promulgating rules of procedure adopted under our supervisory powers generally have been applied in a wholly prospective fashion. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974); Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d 78 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hynd, 230 Pa.Super. 114, 326 A.2d 434 (1974) .8 That is, such decisions have been applied only to conduct or proceedings occurring after the respective dates upon which their “rules” have been announced.9 Accordingly, in a long line of cases the Superior Court has unanimously declined to apply Ingram retroactively.10 *246I agree with these decisions and would therefore hold that Ingram applies only to pleas of guilty entered after January 24,1974, the date Ingram was decided.11
III.
Prior to this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, a guilty plea colloquy was sufficient if it demonstrated that the plea was “voluntarily and understanding^ tendered.” Pa.R.Cr.P. 819(a).12 In the instant case, the record shows that Minor was informed that he was charged with taking money at knifepoint from the person of one Jack Orgiefsky in a taxicab in Philadelphia, and was advised of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Minor stated that he knew where he was and what he was doing, that his plea was not induced by threats or promises, and that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorney. Nevertheless, Minor argues, and the Superior Court held, that *247the colloquy was deficient under pre-Ingram law because the record fails to demonstrate that he understood the nature of the charges against him. In my view this argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, before Ingram, there was no requirement that the defendant be informed of the nature of the charges against him. The comment to Rule 319(a) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure and our cases merely recommended that this be done. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 467, 304 A.2d 121 (1973). Second, in any event, the record in this case shows that Minor did in fact understand the nature of the charges against him. In the course of the colloquy the trial court asked Minor, “Do you understand the charges which [sic] you appear at the bar of the Court, to wit: Aggravated Robbery and C.C.D.W., that you have an absolute right to have this matter heard by a jury?” Minor responded, “Yes.” Although it would have been advisable for the court to State in full the name of the latter offense (carrying a concealed deadly weapon), I cannot say that failure to do so constitutes a fatal defect in the colloquy. The trial judge asked Minor whether he understood the charges against him; there is no reason to assume that the defendant did not respond truthfully. I agree with the following observations in the opinion of Judge Van der Voort, dissenting in the Superior Court:
“[A]ppellant by this question and answer indicated to the hearing judge that he did understand the charges against him. He had skilled counsel and there is no reason to assume that when he says that he did understand the charges against him that he nevertheless did not.
“[T]he fact that the one charge was identified by its initials would be the greater reason for appellant to indicate that he didn’t understand that charge if in fact *248he did not.” 231 Pa.Super. at 143, 332 A.2d at 497-98

. Preliminarily, I note that the appellee appealed to the Superior Court directly from the judgments of sentence imposed following his pleas of guilty. Since the taking of this appeal, we have several times stated that the proper method of challenging a plea of guilty is to file in the trial court a petition to withdraw the plea. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 460 Pa. 324, 333 A.2d 749, 750 n.-. (1975); Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 333 A.2d 898, 900 n. 1 (1975); Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 301 A.2d 592 (1973). See also my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 465 Pa. 379, 350 A.2d 815 (1976).
Since, however, the appellee’s challenge to his pleas is directed solely to the adequacy of the colloquy and can thus be decided on the record before us, I consider it in order for the Court to reach the merits on this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lee, supra at 326, 333 A.2d at 750 n.-. See also may concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, supra.

. By “elements” the Court appears to have 'meant “basic legal elements”. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra at 203, 316 A.2d at 80.

. Commonwealth v. McNeill, 453 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 51, 53 (1973); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 467, 304 A.2d 121 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 417, 419, 299 A.2d 209 *241(1973); Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 408, 300 A.2d 503 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 449 Pa. 398, 401, 296 A.2d 926 (1972); Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 445 Pa. 311, 317, 285 A.2d 448 (1971); Commonwealth v. Enty, 442 Pa. 39, 40, 271 A.2d 926 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913, 91 S.Ct. 1396, 28 L.Ed.2d 656 (1971); Commonwealth v. Cushnie, 433 Pa. 131, 133, 249 A.2d 290 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. West Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 106, 237 A.2d 196 (1968).

. Appellant does not argue that the Ingram decision is merely interpretative of the comment to Rule 319 of our Rules of Criminal Procedure, which recommends that the trial judge ascertain on the record that the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him, and therefore that Ingram should apply to all cases in which pleas were entered after the adoption of that comment. Nor would there be any merit in such an argument. The comment merely makes recommendations as to the content of guilty plea colloquys, and, as pointed out above, the nature of an offense and its elements are not necessarily the same.

. The Court expressly listed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. Boykin, supra at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.2d at 279-80.

. See Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gearin, 496 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974); Todd v. Lockhart, 490 F.2d 626, 628 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1974); Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973); McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1973); LeBlanc v. Henderson, 478 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1973); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1973); Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1971).

. It is interesting to note that Boykin is not cited, much less relied upon, by the opinion of this Court in Ingram.

. See also Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A.2d 497 (1970); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160 A.2d 215 (1960).
Thus, procedural rules are applied in a manner similar to that in which statutes are applied. Section 1926 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926, provides that “[n]o statutes shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly.”

. An exception to this general rule has been the repeated application by a majority of this Court of the exclusionary rule first announced in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972) , to conduct of the police which occurred prior to the date of the Futch decision. For the reasons which are fully set forth in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 551, 307 A.2d 238 (1973), I believe that the retroactive application of the Futch rule is without foundation in precedent or policy.

. See Commonwealth v. Kearse, 233 Pa.Super. 489, 334 A.2d 720 (1975); Commonwealth v. Minor, 231 Pa.Super. 139, 332 A.2d 495 (1974); Commonwealth v. Mack, 230 Pa.Super. 596, 326 A.2d 881 *246(1974); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 230 Pa.Super. 417, 326 A.2d 537 (1974); Commonwealth v. Schork, 230 Pa.Super. 411, 326 A.2d 878 (1974); Commonwealth v. Turman, 230 Pa.Super. 356, 326 A.2d 891 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hanna, 230 Pa.Super. 194, 326 A.2d 538 (1974).

. See Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969), in which the Supreme Court of the United States denied retroactive application to its supervisory rule decision in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1960) (compliance with guilty plea colloquy requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rqles of Criminal Procedure made mandatory).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A.2d 923 (1969), in which this Court declined to apply retroactively Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (on-the-record showing of voluntariness of guilty pleas required by the federal constitution). If, as was held in Godfrey, Boykin, a federal constitutional decision, is to be given wholly prospective application, a fortiori Ingram, a decision which in my view has no constitutional basis, should not be applied retroactively.

. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Commonwealth v. McNeill, 453 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 51 (1973); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 304 A.2d 121 (1973); Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 417, 300 A.2d 503 (1973).