Court Opinion

ID: 9763333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:41:40.680631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:41.369863
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that a fact issue exists as to whether the parties to this suit entered into a contract to settle the underlying lawsuit, because I, too “perceive a fundamental difference between an agree*735ment concerning a suit and a suit concerning an agreement.” Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex.1984) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
The majority relies heavily on Kennedy to support its position that for a settlement agreement to be enforced in any manner, it must comply with Rule 11. However, Kennedy concerned a disputed oral settlement agreement, and the holding in Kennedy relies on the policy that “oral agreements concerning suits are very liable to be misconstrued or forgotten, and to beget misunderstandings and controversies.” Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 529 [citation omitted]. The case concerning us today turns on the issue of whether a series of writings constitute a contract to settle. While I recognize the propriety of requiring oral negotiations to be memorialized in writing in order to eliminate misunderstandings over what was agreed to, when there exists a writing or writings purporting to establish the agreement, I believe there is no reason to allow one party to arbitrarily repudiate a valid, binding contract simply because it refers to a pending lawsuit. When a party breaches a contract, the party harmed by the breach should be able to bring suit to recover damages caused by the breach, regardless of the fact that the contract was to settle a lawsuit.1
I also find the majority’s holding disturbing in light of modern trial practice. Many agreements to settle pending litigation are made informally over the telephone, or literally “on the courthouse steps” on the eve of trial. To require the parties to immediately rush to the courthouse with a signed document in order to quickly comply with the requirements of Rule 11 before the other party reneges on his agreement goes against the grain of the policy in Texas jurisprudence which favors the settlement of lawsuits.2 As the appellant has argued, when a settlement agreement is reached, the parties obtain peace of mind. Today’s holding removes that peace of mind, as well as any motivation for parties to enter into settlement agreements at all. Why should a party agree to settle when the other party may back out of the agreement at any time before the parties appear before a judge and have judgment rendered on the agreement? Even a written, signed settlement agreement, according to today’s holding, is not worth the paper it is written on, unless the parties rush to the courthouse and file the agreement immediately. And even then, what if one party changes his mind on the way? Or standing in line at the filing office? Or a millisecond before the paper is file stamped? The effect of the majority’s holding is that a written, signed settlement agreement would provide no more protection than an oral discussion between the parties. This is just not consistent with modern trial practice, which even the Kennedy court recognized as a limitation on the rigid requirements of Rule 11. Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 529.
In citing cases such as Buffalo Bag and Samples Exterminators, the majority confuses rendition of a consent judgment based on an agreement to settle with a judgment on a suit to enforce a contract to settle. The case before us today is not a consent judgment case at all, because appellant is not asking the court to render judgment on the agreement. On the contrary, appellant is only asking that the court allow him to pursue a suit for breach of the contract to settle the lawsuit. Because I would find that Rule 11 is not a bar to such a suit, and that a fact issue exists as to the parties’ intent to enter into a contract, I dissent.

. I agree that such a contract could not be specifically enforced, as that would be tantamount to authorizing a consent judgment on an agreement where one party has withdrawn consent to the agreement. See Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 528; Buffalo Bag Co. v. Joachim, 704 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

. See Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.1986); McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex.1968).