Court Opinion

ID: 9775183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:47:15.762811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:22.283504
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Justice
(concurring and dissenting on rehearing).
I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s judgment because of the holding of the majority “that the findings by the jury that the value of ‘the property in question belonging to the plaintiffs’ (whatever that term may have meant) was $5,000 both before and after the diversion of the water, are contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and manifestly unjust.” (p. 929)
I now withdraw my concurrence from that part of the opinion finding that the language of the damage issues rendered the jury’s verdict too ambiguous to support the judgment for some of the reasons outlined by the City of San Antonio in its first assignment in its motion for rehearing, viz: These were plaintiffs’ issues and plaintiffs neither objected to such issues nor requested other issues in different form; plaintiffs had no point on appeal complaining of ambiguity in the verdict or of the form of such issues; and, such a holding, in effect, places the burden upon defendants to see that issues relied upon by plaintiffs are sufficient to support a recovery.
Plaintiffs made no objections to the charge; consequently, all objections thereto are deemed waived under Rule 272. An independent ground of recovery or defense not conclusively established by the evidence is waived if no issue thereon is given or requested. Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Peters, 386 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.1965). For obvious reasons, plaintiffs do not contend that the amount of the damages was established conclusively. No other issues were given or requested by the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, this being a trial to a jury, plaintiffs were required to file a motion for new trial under Rule 324, and were required to specify each ground on which it is founded. Rule 320. Furthermore, under Rule 374, any ground of error not distinctly set forth in the motion for new trial is *932considered as having been waived. See generally, Wagner v. Foster, 161 Tex. 333, 341 S.W.2d 887 (1960).
However, as I read the opinion, I do not find that reversal was ordered because of the ambiguity in the charge or verdict. The reversal as to Lee rests upon a solid and independent basis — the findings on the damage issues are contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. However, for the record, I dissociate myself from the part of the opinion which orders a reversal because of such claimed ambiguity; yet, I concur in the reversal of the judgment as to appellee Lee upon the single ground stated in this paragraph.
I dissent from the order overruling the motion for rehearing filed by City of San Antonio; and, particularly, I would sustain the fourth assignment therein:
“The Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the City incurred liability based solely on the City’s acts in approving a subdivision plat, which acts were in furtherance of a legitimate, legislative, governmental and police function specifically provided for by state statute.”
San Antonio is, of course, a Home Rule City with full rights of local self-government and free to exercise any power not denied it by the constitution or the general statutes. Constitution of Texas, Art. XI, § 5; Art. 1165, V.A.C.S.; 39 Tex. Jr .2d, Municipal Corporations § 312, p. 642, et seq. (1962).
While the legislature has the primary and plenary power to regulate public roads and streets, it may delegate that power to counties or municipalities. State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737, 741 (1960). Municipal planning is designed to preserve the public health and welfare by promoting an harmonious and systematic municipal growth in accordance with the needs of the whole community and is an exercise of the police power. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 83, p. 198 (1949).
In addition to the broad powers conferred by Art. 1175, § 34, V.A.C.S., the legislature has adopted Art. 974a, V.A.C.S., delegating to municipalities the police power to control the platting of subdivisions. Section 4 of the last mentioned statute gives broad power to the municipalities to approve or disapprove such plats “to promote the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community, and the safe, orderly and healthful development of said community.”
Indeed, long before the adoption of Art. 974a, our Supreme Court had upheld the charter and ordinance of Dallas requiring the owner in property within the city limits to conform to abutting streets and alleys as being within the police power. Halsell v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 144, 202 S.W. 317, 321 (1918). The Court disposed of the right to compensation in this manner:
“Coming within the police power, appellants have to submit to these regulations, without regard to compensation." (Id., emphasis supplied)
This is broad legislative delegation of the police power and its exercise “rests largely in the discretion of its governing body.” Kimbrough v. Walling, 371 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex.1963). In Davis v. City of Taylor, 123 Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d 1033, 1034 (1934), the Court said:
“It is equally well settled that, if a power is granted to a city, the exercise thereof is within the discretion of the city, and partakes of a legislative nature. A court will not regulate the exercise of a power expressly granted, unless it is exercised in such a way as to be clearly abusive of the power and an evasion thereof.”
In the famous case of Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478-479 (1934), zoning under delegated police power was upheld notwithstanding its ex*933ercise by the City lessened the value of complainant’s property. Quoting from a text, Chief Justice Cureton said:
“ ‘All property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power; nor are regulations unconstitutional merely because they operate as a restraint upon private rights of person or property or will result in loss to individuals. The infliction of such loss is not a deprivation of property without due process of law; the exertion of the police power upon subjects lying within its scope, in a proper and lawful manner, is due process of law. Moreover, police regulations do not constitute a taking of property under the right of eminent domain; and compensation is not required to be made for such loss as is occasioned by the proper exercise of the police power.’ ” (emphasis in text omitted)
There is no attack upon the constitutionality of Art. 974a and I have cited the authorities holding that the statute is a valid exercise of delegated police power of the State. Under these circumstances, the constitution does not require that compensation be paid for loss occasioned by the exercise of the police power. State v. Spartan’s Industries, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex.1969); State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W.2d 597, 600 (1957).
In approving the plat of the subdivision in question, City was exercising delegated police power and any damages which resulted therefrom are not recoverable under the doctrine of damnum absque injuria — a loss without an injury. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Shaw, 99 Tex. 559, 92 S.W. 30 (1906). Any damage sustained by the plaintiffs was not consequent upon the violation of any right recognized by law. Lea County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. City of Plains, 373 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1963, error ref. n. r. e.).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court as to City of San Antonio.