Court Opinion

ID: 9629731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:47:58.05439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:22.820209
License: Public Domain

Hicks, J.
(dissenting) — The issue presented is whether the Washington State Human Rights Commission exceeded its authority when it adopted a rule under RCW 49.60 in which the prohibition against marital status discrimination was extended beyond a person's marital status per se to the identify or occupation of his or her spouse. The trial court held that the commission's rule was promulgated in excess of its statutory authority. The majority imposes its legislative opinion regarding what the legislature should have enacted, and reverses the trial court. I dissent.
A litany frequently repeated by this court is that absent a statutory definition, words must be given their "ordinary, everyday meaning." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 Wn.2d 44, 47, 541 P.2d 989 (1975). When questioned as to *72"marital status", one does not ordinarily respond by identifying one's spouse and his or her occupation. The appropriate and ordinary response is to indicate whether one is married, single, widowed or divorced "without reference to identity, occupation, affluence or other attributes of the spouse."
While the commission has broad authority to investigate and promulgate rules, it may not exceed the authority granted it to "carry out the provisions" of RCW 49.60. Under the chapter it is an "unfair practice", inter alia, to hire or discharge any person "because of" such person's "marital status" — not because of "(b) who his or her spouse is; or (c) what the spouse does ..." WAC 162-16-150. I am unwilling to sanction the commission's extension of its own powers without legislative authority.
Wright, C.J., and Brachtenbach, J., concur with Hicks, J.