Court Opinion

ID: 9456729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:01:07.122046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:00.097823
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13501    Document: 43-1     Date Filed: 08/04/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-13501
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MICHAEL HILL,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cr-00034-TKW-MJF-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13501

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Because any errors in calculating Michael Hill’s sentencing
       range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines here were
       harmless, we affirm. The district court said that it would have im-
       posed the same 120-month sentence—the statutory maximum—
       even if Hill’s objections to the Guidelines calculation were correct.
       Although Hill’s calculation would yield a Guidelines range of 70–
       87 months, the 120-month sentence would remain reasonable even
       in that case.
                                          I
                It is unnecessary to resolve a disputed Guidelines issue on
       appeal if the alleged error didn’t affect the sentence and the sen-
       tence is reasonable even if an error occurred. United States v. Keene,
       470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court in Keene,
       overruling the defendant’s objection to a sentence enhancement,
       stated that “even if the guideline calculations are wrong, my appli-
       cation of the sentencing factors under Section 3553(a) would still
       compel the conclusion that a 10-year sentence [120 months] is rea-
       sonable and appropriate under all the factors that I considered.” Id.
       at 1348–49. On appeal, we focused on the district court’s statement
       and thereby avoided the enhancement issue. We did so because,
       first, the district court had made clear that even if its interpretation
       and application of the enhancement were wrong, it would still have
       handed down the same 120-month sentence; and second, the
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       21-13501                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

       sentence imposed through this fallback logic was reasonable. Id. at
       1348–50.
              To determine whether the district court’s “even if” conclu-
       sion was reasonable, we assumed that the court had erred—i.e.,
       that the Guidelines issue should have been decided in the way the
       defendant argued and the advisory range reduced accordingly—
       and then analyzed whether the final sentence resulting from con-
       sideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was nonetheless rea-
       sonable. Id. at 1349–50. We will do the same here.
                                              II
               Reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence requires a def-
       erential totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. We “merely ask[]
       whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
       515 F.3d 1179, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United
       States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)). We “will not second guess the
       weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given
       [§ 3553(a)] factor . . . as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is
       reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United
       States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration and
       emphasis omitted). 1

       1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

       and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-
       tence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
       the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the
       sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the
       public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational
       training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13501

              Still, a court may abuse its discretion and impose an unrea-
       sonable sentence if it (1) overlooks relevant significant factors, (2)
       overemphasizes an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a
       clear error of judgment by balancing a proper factor unreasonably.
       United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
       We will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable only if we
       are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
       committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) fac-
       tors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reason-
       able sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190.
               A district court imposing an upward variance must provide
       a justification that is both compelling enough to support the degree
       of the variance and complete enough to allow for meaningful ap-
       pellate review. United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.
       2012). In Early, we affirmed the district court’s 210-month sentence
       where the guideline range was 78–97 months’ imprisonment and
       the government had recommended a sentence at the low end of
       the range. Id; see also id. at 1223 (Martin, J., concurring) (demon-
       strating that we routinely affirm such dramatic upward variances).
       There, the district court explained that it was imposing the vari-
       ance, in part, because the Guidelines range did not adequately ac-
       count for the number of bank robberies Early had committed. Id.
       at 1222. We rejected Early’s contention that the district court had

       Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-
       mission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the
       need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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       21-13501                Opinion of the Court                          5

       abused its discretion by justifying the variance, explaining that his
       position amounted to an argument that the district court had given
       too little weight to the Guidelines range as a relevant § 3553(a) fac-
       tor. It was not our role, we held, to substitute our judgment for
       that of the district court in weighing the relevant factors absent a
       clear error of judgment. Id. at 1223.
               There was no clear error of judgment here. Quite the op-
       posite, the district court’s reasons for increasing Hill’s sentence are
       compelling and complete. First, the court found “most troubling”
       of all that “the offense that [Hill] committed in this case [i.e., felon
       in possession of a firearm] was committed at a point in time when
       [he was] on state probation for, among other things, possession of
       a firearm by a convicted felon.” Doc. 61 at 77:21–77:24. Second,
       Hill wasn’t in possession of any old firearm—it was “a gun with a
       high-capacity magazine in it.” Id. at 78:1. Third, not only did Hill
       ignite a police chase with a minor in his car—in particular, a 17-
       year-old girl whom he had been trafficking for sexual activity—but
       he also crashed the car and then sprinted off, abandoning her. That
       decision, said the district court, “suggests to me someone who has
       no regard for anyone but themselves.” Id. at 78:18–78:19. And
       fourth, Hill’s rap sheet includes (among other offenses) “a violent
       offense involving a discharge of a firearm”—an offense that, the
       district court reckoned, could’ve been charged as “attempted mur-
       der.” Id. at 78:20–79:2. Hill, the district court concluded, “has no
       regard for the law and is a dangerous individual.” Id. at 79:10–
       79:11. Accordingly, the court held, even accounting for some mit-
       igating factors (such as Hill’s rough childhood, mental-health
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13501

       struggles, drug issues, and fatherhood status, id. at 77), the maxi-
       mum sentence here was “appropriate,” id. at 79:13.
              The district court did not clearly err. No relevant factor
       went ignored, and none was overemphasized. The 120-month sen-
       tence is AFFIRMED.