Court Opinion

ID: 9919410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:05:53.164805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:27.844895
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-0678-21

IN THE MATTER OF
LATERA GRIFFIN,
HUDSON COUNTY,
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS.
__________________

                Argued October 11, 2023 – Decided January 18, 2024

                Before Judges Haas and Natali.

                On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
                Commission, Docket No. 2019-1831.

                Arthur J. Murray argued the cause for appellant Latera
                Griffin (Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Stuart
                J. Alterman and Timothy J. Prol, on the briefs).

                Cindy N. Vogelman argued the cause for respondent
                Hudson County Department of Corrections (Chasan
                Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC, attorneys; Cindy
                N. Vogelman, of counsel and on the brief; Priscilla E.
                Savage, on the brief).

                Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
                (Craig S. Keiser, Deputy Attorney General, on the
                statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM

      Appellant Latera Griffin, a corrections officer employed by Hudson

County Department of Corrections (HCDC), appeals from the final agency

decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which affirmed her termination

after the results of a urinalysis conducted pursuant to HCDC's random drug

testing policy indicated the presence of benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite.

Before us, Griffin contends the HCDC's urine screening failed to comply with

the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy (revised April

2018) (Drug Testing policy), which was incorporated into and implemented by

Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2018-2. See Off. of the Att'y

Gen., Law Enf't Directive No. 2018-2, Statewide Mandatory Random Drug

Testing (Mar. 20, 2018). That failure, according to Griffin, deprived her of her

due process right to challenge the results of her positive sample. She also

challenges certain of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) discretionary

procedural and evidentiary rulings. We reject all of these arguments and affirm.

                                       I.

      On August 16, 2018, Griffin was selected for random drug testing

pursuant to the HCDC's "Drug-Free Workplace: Alcohol and Drug Testing"

policy (Drug-Free Workplace policy). Prior to that test, Griffin worked for

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HCDC for approximately thirteen years and had submitted to random drug

testing twice without incident.

      On March 20, 2018, approximately five months before her August 2018

drug test, the Attorney General (AG) promulgated Directive No. 2018-2.

Directive No. 2018-2 stated, "[t]his Directive shall take effect immediately upon

issuance" and "[a]ll drug testing policies shall be adopted and/or revised in

accordance with this Directive within [thirty] days."

      The revised Drug Testing Policy addressed specific sampling procedures

for providing two urine samples. As relevant to the issues before us, the policy

provided "[a] donor whose specimen tested positive may only challenge the

positive test result by having the second specimen independently tested. The

first specimen will not be retested."

      Although HCDC revised its Drug-Free Workplace policy in April 2018, it

did not incorporate the specimen collection procedures outlined in the AG's

Drug Testing Policy. Contrary to the Drug Testing Policy, the HCDC's policy,

which became effective on November 19, 2011, permitted donors to submit two

urine samples, but did not require them to do so. Specifically, HCDC's policy

stated, "[d]onors shall have the option of providing a second specimen that must

be collected at the same time as the first. If the donor chooses not to submit a

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sample, the donor, on a specimen acquisition report, shall sign the waiver of this

option."

      Contrary to both the AG's Drug Testing policy and HCDC's Drug-Free

Workplace policy, Griffin provided only a single urine sample and did not sign

a waiver of her option to provide a second sample. As noted, Griffin's urine

sample tested positive for a cocaine metabolite.

      HCDC issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action and charged

Griffin with: conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(6);

neglect of duty, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(7); and other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

2.3(9).    After a departmental hearing, HCDC terminated Griffin from her

position and entered a final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA). Griffin

appealed the FNDA and the matter was transferred to the Office of

Administrative Law as a contested case.

      Before the ALJ conducted any hearings, Griffin moved for summary

decision, which the ALJ denied without a hearing. The parties then appeared

before the ALJ for hearings on May 30, 2019, July 19, 2019, and September 25,

2019, where HCDC presented testimony of its Deputy Director, Michael

Conrad, Dr. Robert Havier, the acting director of the New Jersey State

Toxicology Laboratory, Detective Gabriel Diaz, and Lieutenant Erika Patterson.

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The ALJ concluded HCDC's witnesses testified directly, credibly, and

consistently with one another with respect to the HCDC's urine collection and

testing processes.

      Director Conrad, Lieutenant Patterson, and Detective Diaz testified

regarding the procedures HCDC implemented during the August 2018 testing.

With respect to Griffin's testing, Detective Diaz recalled she "came in with three

other female officers" and he provided each of the four female officers with two

bottles and recommended they fill both of them. According to Detective Diaz,

he specifically explained "at the time of . . . the testing to [Griffin] that if you're

confident you won't have any issues going forward, you can do one . . . but that

is completely . . . up to you. But . . . if you feel like you're going to have issues

down the road, please do use a second sample." Subsequently, Detective Diaz

testified he specifically "advised her that the only way she could contest a

positive test is a second sample."

      Detective Diaz further testified he provided similar instructions relating

to the second sample to everyone that day, including Griffin. He acknowledged,

however, that he "forgot to use" the waiver form. Although the other three

officers who tested at the same time as Griffin all submitted two samples,

multiple officers who were tested that day provided only one sample.

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                                          5
      Dr. Havier testified with respect to the State Toxicology Laboratory's

testing procedures, including those used to test Griffin's sample. Based on the

test results, he stated Griffin's urine tested positive for benzoylecgonine "and

that his conclusion was made within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty."

Additionally, according to Dr. Havier, the level of benzoylecgonine discovered

in Griffin's sample was "very high" and nothing described in her medication

forms could account for such a result. With respect to split samples, Dr. Havier

testified the State lab began requiring two samples pursuant to the AG's Drug

Testing policy in September 2018, several weeks after Griffin's test.

      Due to a scheduling error by Griffin's counsel, he was unable to cross-

examine Dr. Havier on the date he originally testified. Dr. Havier appeared for

cross-examination on a later date and on cross-examination, Griffin's counsel

sought to introduce a letter from the State Toxicology Laboratory dated

September 5, 2019, as well as email responses he received from Dr. Havier one

day before the September 25, 2019 hearing, both of which counsel claimed

impeached portions of Dr. Havier's direct testimony.

      The ALJ excluded the letter due to counsel's failure to produce the letter

earlier. She similarly determined the emails were inadmissible due to counsel's

failures to timely seek email responses from Dr. Havier and alert opposing

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                                       6
counsel of his intention to introduce the impeachment evidence. The ALJ was

also satisfied Griffin's counsel could sufficiently cross-examine Dr. Havier

about the test results without referencing the email exchange. In light of the

ALJ's determination, Griffin's counsel stated "I'm going to ask for your recusal"

and argued the ALJ was "not letting [him] try this case."

      Derrick James, president of Hudson County's local PBA and a corporal

for HCDC, helped oversee the August 2018 drug testing and testified on

Griffin's behalf. Corporal James testified he was unaware the donors were not

provided waivers until after the test results came back. According to Corporal

James, he then spoke to the HCDC director about HCDC's failure to provide

waivers. The ALJ precluded further testimony pertaining to his conversation

with the director, however, as she determined such testimony could improperly

impact other cases arising from the August 2018 testing and therefore ran afoul

of N.J.R.E. 403(b). She also determined Griffin's counsel failed to identify the

testimony's probative value.    The ALJ concluded Corporal James testified

credibly.

      After the third day of hearings, Griffin renewed her application for a

summary decision and requested to admit "testimony regarding unprivileged

communications between PBA 109 President Derrick James and Director

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                                       7
Edwards" and "email responses of Dr. Havier which he sent on September 24,

2019 in response to inquiries made to him in preparation for his testimony."

Griffin also asked the ALJ to take judicial notice of Directive 2018-2.

      After considering the parties' submissions and oral arguments, the ALJ

denied Griffin's summary decision application and her "evidentiary motions" in

a June 2, 2020 order. In her accompanying statement of reasons, the ALJ

declined to address Griffin's evidentiary objections, relying on her reasoning on

the record during the hearings.

      The ALJ also concluded issues of material fact precluded summary

decision and explained "the record should continue to be fully developed at the

on-going evidentiary hearing." She specifically found issues of material fact

existed with respect to whether Griffin waived the second sample, and whether

HCDC staff properly instructed Griffin pursuant to the applicable guidelines.

      Griffin filed an interlocutory appeal of the ALJ's June 2, 2020 order to the

CSC. The CSC declined to review Griffin's interlocutory motion but reserved

the right to review the issues raised at the time of final determination. Griffin

then filed a motion to recuse the ALJ.

      In support of recusal, Griffin's counsel alleged the ALJ, during a May 12,

2020 Zoom conference, suggested "that [he] and/or other attorneys of [his]

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                                         8
office somehow engaged in conduct which was unethical by corresponding with

Dr. Havier in preparation for Dr. Havier's testimony." As best we can discern

from the transcript of that conference, Griffin's counsel was referencing a

portion of the ALJ's reasoning for excluding Dr. Havier's emails in which she

stated, "[w]hat happened was you reached out to [HCDC's] witness without

telling [its counsel], and you were admonished in court, and then an email that

was not provided to [counsel] was used 'to impeach the expert's testimony.'"

         The ALJ denied Griffin's recusal motion in a July 1, 2020 order. The ALJ

similarly denied Griffin's motion to reconsider that order in an August 28, 2020

order.

         The fourth and final day of hearings took place on June 14, 2021 where

Griffin testified on her own behalf and stated she was never instructed to take a

split sample or even offered the opportunity to do so. She also denied Detective

Diaz's testimony that she refused to take a split sample, and claimed she would

have taken one had she been instructed to do so. She also denied ever using

illegal drugs, including cocaine. The ALJ found Griffin "obviously ha[d] a self-

interest in this matter," and "that she feigned ignorance of her right to give a

split sample." The court also found her testimony to be "wholly unbelievable"

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                                         9
with respect to her knowledge of the split sample process and her assertion she

was only provided with one cup.

      Relevant to one of Griffin's arguments before us, the ALJ determined

written closing submissions were unnecessary, as the case had been ongoing

since 2019 and the parties had previously briefed the contested issues. She

therefore relied on the parties' oral closing arguments and after considering the

testimony and documentary evidence, concluded HCDC proved the charges

against Griffin by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Accordingly, she

affirmed the FNDA removing Griffin from employment.

      In its decision, the ALJ specifically rejected Griffin's argument that the

drug testing procedures were deficient due to the HCDC's failure to mandate she

provide a second sample, as she determined the AG's Drug Testing policy did

not "go into effect until September 1, 2018" and "there was no proof to the

contrary." She further stated, "[t]o that end, this Tribunal was not persuaded by

[Griffin]'s arguments of a mandatory second sample." On this point, the ALJ

credited Dr. Havier's testimony that the State lab did not require two samples

until the month after Griffin's test. She further stated, "[w]hile irrelevant under

the facts in this case, for completeness I agree that any test done after September

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                                       10
2018 when reviewed by the courts will likely be scrutinized for due process

under the" AG's Drug Testing policy.

      The ALJ similarly stated because the Drug Testing policy "and its

requirements were not in effect at the time of the test in question, . . . [she]

cannot conjecture which test violations would be considered fatal flaws to

invalidate positive test results in the future, nor will [she] address that issue as

it is not before me." In a footnote, the ALJ further explained the drug policy

contained a "revised date[] of April 2018" but did not contain an effective date.

The ALJ also observed Griffin never had an independent expert test the "reserve

sample from the initial sample frozen at the lab," despite her counsel's assertions

it would be tested.

      Additionally, the ALJ found "there was no question as to the chain of

custody, and no expert opinion to question the test results." She stated, "the

appropriate procedure was followed and the validity of the uncontested result

was credibly supported by Dr. Havier . . . , [who] opined within a reasonable

degree of forensic scientific certainty that Officer Griffin's sample was positive

for [c]ocaine, which remains uncontested."

      The ALJ specifically found, contrary to Griffin's testimony, she "was

given two . . . specimen containers, . . . she was advised of her rights to a second

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                                        11
sample, knew her rights and chose not to give a second sample." She similarly

found Detective Diaz provided Griffin a clear statement of her rights prior to the

test and she had a thorough opportunity to cross-examine the HCDC's witnesses

with respect to the test's validity. Due to Griffin's "time in the [HCDC]" and

prior experience with drug tests, the ALJ found "she knew that a second sample

was the way to question the validity of a test" and her "due process r ights

remained intact throughout."

      The ALJ also relied on our unpublished opinion in In re Schwaner, No A-

0748-14 (App. Div. Dec. 9, 2016) (slip op.), and explained "not every technical

deviation from a drug testing process warrants the nullification of the results of

that test" or constitutes a due process violation. She further determined Griffin

was similarly situated to the donor in Schwaner because she "undertook no effort

to test the remaining portion" of her urine sample. The ALJ concluded, "[a]s

the policy in effect did not mandate a second sample, . . . there was no deviation

of the drug testing process, other than the absence of the waiver form that

supported [Griffin's] verbal choice to forego the second sample . . . ."

      After an independent evaluation of the record, including Griffin's

supplemental exceptions, the CSC accepted and adopted the ALJ's factual

findings, legal conclusions, and penalty in a September 22, 2021 order. The

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                                       12
CSC also rejected Griffin's "renewed arguments pertaining to the issues

presented in the interlocutory review request" as well as her "argument that the

ALJ should have been recused." This appeal followed.

                                         II.

      Griffin initially contends the CSC's "final administrative determination

was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and lacked fair support in the record"

due to the "indisputabl[e]" due process violations which led to her removal. On

this point, she argues HCDC's "failure to collect a second urine sample, as

mandated by the AG's Drug Testing policy, deprived" her of her "due process

right to challenge the results of her positive drug test."

      Griffin further contends the Drug Testing policy required HCDC to collect

two samples from her and provides the only way to challenge positive results "is

by having the second urine independently tested."            According to Griffin,

HCDC's failure to collect a second sample therefore deprived her of her

"protected property and liberty interest in her continued employment" with

HCDC.

      HCDC contends "the ALJ's findings were proper and supported by

sufficient credible evidence present in the record." It specifically highlights "Dr.

Havier's testimony that the Directive was not to be implemented until September

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                                        13
1, 2018," his testimony "that a valid reserve sample from the initial sample

frozen at the lab had been preserved and was available for testing by an expert

of [Griffin]'s choice," and Detective Diaz's testimony he provided Griffin two

specimen cups and informed her of her rights.

      Relying on State v. Mercer, 211 N.J. Super. 388, 393 (App. Div. 1986),

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 (1984), and State v. Casele, 198 N.J.

Super. 462, 471 (App. Div. 1985), HCDC maintains "not every failure to follow

guidelines or procedures gives rise to a cognizable due process violation ,"

stating, for example, "[the] failure to preserve a primary sample for independent

analysis does not give rise to a due process violation." As such, HCDC argues

"[f]ailure to mandate that an individual provide a second sample, without

showing that such failure resulted in arbitrary action, does not give rise to a due

process violation." It further contends "Griffin has raised no valid risk of

erroneous deprivation" of a protected right in light of the primary sample's

undisputed validity. Relying on an unpublished decision of this court, HCDC

similarly contends Griffin's missing second sample is of "limited significance"

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                                       14
where there is no evidence "that the initial test produced a false result." 1 We

agree, in part, with HCDC's arguments.

                                       III.

      Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited.         In re

Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "In order to reverse an agency's judgment,

an appellate court must find the agency's decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record

as a whole.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State

Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). In our review, we only determine:

            (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
            implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
            follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
            substantial evidence to support the findings on which
            the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
            the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
            erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
            have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

            [In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (quoting
            Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]

1
  We note before us the HCDC and ALJ cite unpublished opinions. Pursuant to
Rule 1:6-7 we have not relied on those authorities as they are of no precedential
value. We cited to In Re Schwaner, supra at pp. 12, 13, merely to explain the
ALJ's reasoning.
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                                       15
      "[I]f substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, 'a court may not

substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might have

reached a different result[.]'" Id. at 483 (quoting Greenwood v. State Police

Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). However, "we are 'in no way bound

by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal

issue[.]'" Utley v. Bd. of Rev., 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (quoting Mayflower

Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). Our review of a "strictly

legal issue" is de novo. In re Langan Eng'g. & Env't Servs., Inc., 425 N.J. Super.

577, 581 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Utley, 194 N.J. at 551).

      As a threshold matter, to determine whether the ALJ correctly applied the

law, it is necessary that we interpret Directive 2018-2. Specifically, we must

determine whether: (1) Directive 2018-2 applied at the time of Griffin's testing;

and, if so, (2) HCDC violated the directive by failing to collect two samples.

"Because such an interpretation presents a purely legal question, we owe no

deference to the" ALJ's interpretation. In re V.L., 441 N.J. Super. 425, 429

(App. Div. 2015).

      "Attorney General directives have 'the force of law for police entities.'"

In re Atty. Gen. Law Enf't Directives Nos. 2020-5 and 2020-6, 465 N.J. Super.

111, 144 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J.

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                                        16
Super. 371, 382 (App. Div. 2009)). "Those directives have the force of law

because the Legislature has expressly provided 'the Attorney General[][]

statutory power to adopt guidelines, directives, and policies that bind law

enforcement throughout our State.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Paff

v. Ocean County Prosecutor's Office, 235 N.J. 1, 20-21 (2018)).

        Here, contrary to the ALJ's findings, the AG's Drug Testing policy became

effective in April 2018 pursuant to Directive 2018-2. As noted, Directive 2018-

2 unambiguously states, "[t]his Directive shall take effect immediately upon

issuance" and "[a]ll drug testing policies shall be adopted and/or revised in

accordance with this Directive within [thirty] days."      Drug Testing policy

therefore became effective, at the latest, thirty days after Directive 2018 -2's

March 20, 2018 issuance date, which is well before Griffin's August 2018 drug

test.

        Additionally, a plain reading of the "Urine Specimen Collection

Procedures" included in the Drug Testing policy leads to the conclusion that

HCDC violated the policy by failing to mandate Griffin provide a second urine

sample. Although the policy does not explicitly state two samples are required,

the collection procedures consistently refer to two samples and specifically

requires the monitor to "instruct[] the donor to void a specimen between 45 mL

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                                       17
and 60 mL into each specimen container." (emphasis added). The policy also

unambiguously states, "[a] donor whose specimen tested positive may only

challenge the positive test result by having the second specimen independently

tested. The first specimen will not be retested."

      HCDC's failure to require Griffin to provide a split sample for testing does

not necessarily entitle Griffin to relief, however, contrary to her contentions.

See George v. City of Newark, 384 N.J. Super. 232, 238-39 (App. Div. 2006);

see also O'Rourke v. City of Lambertville, 405 N.J. Super. 8, 18-19 (App. Div.

2008) (noting a municipality's failure to comply with the Attorney General's

Guidelines for investigating and discipling officers "[did] not rise to the level of

a denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process").   Rather, we must

specifically determine whether HCDC's deviation from the Drug Testing policy

violated Griffin's due process rights or rendered her urine sample

"fundamentally flawed" such that it should be considered invalid. Id. at 239.

      "To establish a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must show

that the defendant deprived [her] of a protected property interest and that the

local and state procedures for challenging the deprivation were inadequate."

Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551, 566 (App. Div.

2006). "In examining a procedural due process claim, we first assess whether a

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                                        18
liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State, and second,

whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation are constitutionally

sufficient." Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 99 (1995).

      Additionally, "[t]o assert a claim for a deprivation of property without

procedural due process, 'the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies

provided by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate.'"

Plemmons, 387 N.J. Super. at 566 (quoting Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.

Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999)). "Consequently,

'[a] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has

made procedural protections available and the plaintiff has simply refused to

avail himself of them.'" Id. at 567 (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116

(3d Cir. 2000)).

      In George, we recognized a police sergeant for the City of Newark had "a

protected interest in his continued employment with the City" as well as "a right

to have a split sample tested at the same threshold as the primary sample." 384

N.J. Super. at 238. In that case, the City of Newark removed the Sergeant from

employment after conducting a random drug test pursuant to the AG's then-

effective drug testing policies. Id. at 235. After the donor's first sample tested

positive for marijuana, he requested his split sample be tested by an independent

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laboratory. Id. at 235-36. The independent laboratory tested the split sample at

the incorrect threshold, however, and reported the sample was negative for

marijuana. Id. at 236. Although the ALJ affirmed the donor's dismissal, the

Merit Systems Board reversed the initial decision, "concluded that it was the

City's obligation to advise the independent lab of the proper threshold," and

determined the City's failure to so advise the lab "rendered the testing process

'fundamentally flawed' and deprived [the donor] of his 'due process' opportunity

to establish that the positive reading was false." Id. at 237.

      Notwithstanding our deferential review of agency action, "we

question[ed] whether the record contain[ed] sufficient evidence supporting the

Board's decision that a due process violation occurred and that the entire testing

process was 'fundamentally flawed.'" Id. at 238-39. We did not find support in

the record that the split sample results would have invalidated the testing of the

primary sample and concluded the Board "mistakenly underestimated the weight

of the test results in reaching its conclusion that the entire testing process was

flawed." Id. at 239-40.

      We also observed "there were neither rules nor guidelines that placed the

notification burden on the City at the time of [the donor]'s test," and he "was

able to challenge several aspects of the State's lab test." Id. at 240-41. We also

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                                       20
rejected the Board's conclusion that relief was warranted because the donor was

deprived of evidence to refute the initial test result. Id. at 241. On that point,

we concluded the donor's situation was "analogous to the plight faced by

criminal defendants when the State loses or otherwise damages or suppresses

favorable evidence." Ibid.

      We noted, in the absence of bad faith by the State, "relief should be

granted only when there is a showing of manifest prejudice or harm arising from

the failure to preserve evidence." Id. at 243 (quoting State v Dreher, 302 N.J.

Super. 408, 489 (App. Div. 1997)). After rejecting the Board's conclusions as

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, we remanded for further

consideration of whether "the City's failure constituted a due process violation

and rendered the testing process 'fundamentally flawed.'" Id. at 245.

      In an analogous context, we have held that an agency's failure to comply

with guidelines promulgated by the AG, although insufficient to constitute a

denial of procedural due process, may nevertheless require an employee be

reinstated. See O'Rourke, 405 N.J. Super. at 18. In O'Rourke, the City adopted

policies related to internal investigations pursuant to AG guidelines and N.J.S.A.

40A:14-181, which "'requires [e]very law enforcement' agency in this State to

'adopt and implement guidelines' that are 'consistent with the guidelines' that

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                                       21
have been promulgated by the [AG], through the Police Bureau in the Division

of Criminal Justice." Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 40A:14-

18.1). It then failed to abide by those policies when investigating the plaintiff's

misconduct. Id. at 20-21.

      We rejected the City's argument "that the deficiencies in the investigative

process [were] trivial and were cured by the evidentiary hearing," concluding

"[a] fair and objective investigation of the allegations is an essential part of the

disciplinary process envisioned by the [AG]'s Guidelines and established by the

City's rules." Id. at 21-22. We also observed the deviations from the guidelines

in that case "undermined the fairness of the process at its inception and tainted

the entire proceeding." Id. at 22. And although we rejected the plaintiff's due

process argument, we nevertheless determined "when a law enforcement agency

adopts rules pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 to implement the [AG]'s

Guidelines, the agency has an obligation to comply with those rules." Id. at 23.

Accordingly, we held "the City's decision to remove plaintiff from his position

cannot stand." Ibid.

      We are satisfied HCDC's technical deviations from the AG's Drug Testing

policy did not deprive Griffin of her due process rights or render the testing

process fundamentally flawed. See George, 384 N.J. Super. at 239. As noted,

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                                        22
the ALJ determined, based on the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing

and her credibility findings, that Detective Diaz fully informed Griffin of her

option to provide a second sample, she knew providing a second sample was her

only avenue to challenge a positive test result, and she nevertheless refused to

provide a split sample. The ALJ's conclusions were fully supported by the

testimony of HCDC's witnesses, particularly Detective Diaz.          Accordingly,

Griffin failed to avail herself of the due process protections offered to her by

HCDC, notwithstanding HCDC's technical failure to mandate she provide a

second sample, and it therefore "cannot be held to have violated due process

requirements." See Plemmons, 387 N.J. Super. at 567.

      We are also satisfied the testing procedures were not "fundamentally

flawed" such that the positive result should be invalidated. As noted, the ALJ

found it was uncontested Griffin's sample tested positive for a "very high" level

of benzoylecgonine, which was supported by Dr. Havier's testimony, in which

he described the testing process and testified as to his confidence in the results.

Notably, Griffin does not challenge the validity of the initial test results, the

efficacy of the testing procedures as they relate to that sample, or the chain of

custody of that sample. HCDC's deviations from the AG's Drug Testing policy

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therefore did not "undermine[] the fairness of the process at its inception [or]

taint[] the entire proceeding." See O'Rourke, 405 N.J. Super. at 22.

      Further, to the extent Griffin was prejudiced by HCDC's deviation from

the policy, see George, 384 N.J. Super. at 243, we are satisfied any prejudice

was self-inflicted and resulted from Griffin's own refusal to submit a second

sample. Indeed, the fact Griffin refused to provide a second sample after being

informed of her right undermines her due process challenge and validates the

urine collection process, notwithstanding HCDC's deviation from the collection

procedures mandated with the AG's Drug Testing policy.            In reaching this

conclusion, we fully acknowledge the second sample is an integral feature of the

specimen collection procedures, as it provides the sole avenue for challenging a

positive test result, but conclude HCDC's deviation from the AG's Drug Testing

policy does not require Griffin's reinstatement under the idiosyncratic

circumstances presented here, which include: 1) the fact the validity of the

positive test result is uncontested; 2) HCDC having informed Griffin she needed

to complete a second sample in order to challenge a positive test result ; 3) the

ALJs finding she chose not to avail herself of that protection.

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                                      24
                                        IV.

      Finally,   having   determined     Griffin's   urine   sample   was    valid,

notwithstanding the HCDC's deviation from the Drug Testing policy, we reject

Griffin's argument that the ALJ's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and

unreasonable. In doing so, we fully acknowledge certain of the ALJ's findings

cannot withstand scrutiny even under the panel's deferential standard of review.

See e.g., Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194. Specifically, it is clear the ALJ's analysis

was animated in large part by her incorrect conclusion, contrary to the effective

date implemented by Directive 2018-2, that the Drug Testing policy did not go

into effect until September 2018.      Further, she also erroneously concluded

Griffin failed to avail herself of the opportunity to challenge the initial test

results by having the first sample tested by an independent laboratory. The AG's

Drug Testing policy clearly states, however, that a donor "may only challenge

the positive test result by having the second specimen independently tested" and

"[t]he first specimen will not be retested."

      Notwithstanding those errors, the ALJ's determination that Griffin

violated HCDC's drug policy was supported by substantial credible evidence in

the record. See Carter, 191 N.J. at 483. Specifically, Dr. Havier testified

Griffin's sample tested positive for a cocaine metabolite substantially over the

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                                       25
positive testing threshold. As noted, there is no contention, nor any evidence in

the record, that the first test was improperly collected or tested. Addition ally,

the ALJ found Griffin's testimony that she never used illegal drugs self-

interested and incredible.

                                       V.

      Griffin also argues the ALJ's determination was arbitrary, capricious, and

unreasonable due to the "multitude of procedural errors and issues wit h the

handling of this matter by the ALJ." According to Griffin, the ALJ's erroneous

procedural and evidentiary rulings "compound the due process violations which

occurred, amount to further denial of due process, and require reversal of the"

ALJ's initial decision and the CSC's final decision. She specifically asserts the

ALJ improperly: (1) "denied [her] motion for summary decision"; (2) "held a

non-existent privilege applied to communications with PBA local 109 President

and [HCDC] administration"; (3) "excluded impeachment testimony and

evidence"; (4) "failed to take judicial notice of AG Directive 2018-02"; (5)

"refused to allow written closing submissions"; and (6) declined to recuse

herself. We are unpersuaded by any of these arguments, which we address

seriatim.

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                                       26
      A. Summary Decision

      Griffin contends the ALJ erred in denying her summary decision

application because "no material facts were in dispute" and she "was entitled to

decision in her favor as a matter of law."      She specifically argues it was

undisputed that "the [AG] Guidelines . . . became effective in April 2018", the

guidelines required HCDC to collect two urine samples, and, contrary to the

guidelines, it took only one sample. Because HCDC failed to adhere to the

guidelines, Griffin maintains she was unable to challenge the urine test results

and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

      "Because an agency's summary decision is a legal determination, our

review is de novo." L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192, 204

(2015). The standard for granting summary decision is "substantially the same"

as that governing a motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding under

Rule 4:46-2. Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J. Super. 106, 121 (App.

Div. 1995). Thus, a summary decision is proper if the record demonstrates "no

genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment . . . as a matter of law." Burnett v. Gloucester Cty. Bd.

of Chosen Freeholders, 409 N.J. Super. 219, 228 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting R.

4:46-2(c)). We consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented,

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                                      27
when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in

consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a

rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-

moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).

      We are satisfied genuine issues of material fact precluded summary

decision. See Burnett, 409 N.J. Super. at 228. Notably, at the time of her

motion, Griffin had yet to testify with respect to the testing procedures and

whether she refused to provide a second sample, as recalled by Detective Diaz.

Additionally, even were the panel to accept there were no genuine issues of

material fact at the time of her motion, Griffin was not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. As explained supra, HCDC's failure to mandate she provide a

second sample, alone, did necessarily deprive her of her due process rights or

invalidate the positive result. See George, 384 N.J. Super. at 239.

      B. Privilege and Impeachment Testimony

      Griffin next argues the ALJ improperly excluded Corporal James'

testimony with respect to his conversation with the HCDC director as privileged.

According to Griffin, such conversations do not fall within any privilege

provided for in the New Jersey Rules of Evidence and "testimony regarding

those conversations is not protected, is relevant to the matter currently before

                                                                            A-0678-21
                                       28
the [c]ourt, and was admissible." She further asserts the ALJ's exclusion of such

evidence "materially prejudiced" her defense.

      Griffin also argues the ALJ erroneously excluded evidence of emails she

sought to introduce to impeach Dr. Havier's testimony. According to Griffin,

her counsel's email exchanges with Dr. Havier "constituted trial preparations"

that "were not required to be turned over or provided as any form of discovery."

She similarly argues the statements contained in the emails "did not constitute

evidence of prior inconsistent statements until Dr. Havier contradicted the

answers he gave . . . during his testimony on September 25, 2019." We are

unpersuaded.

      In administrative proceedings, evidence rulings "shall be made to promote

fundamental principles of fairness and justice and to aid in the ascertainment of

truth." N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(b). Unless specifically provided otherwise in the

Administrative Code, neither the common law of evidence, statutory evidence

law, or the New Jersey Rules of Evidence are binding in administrative

proceedings. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(a); N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(c).

      However, "the fundamentals of fair and adequate procedure constituting

due process must be observed, and cross-examination and rebuttal have been

held to be basic elements of an administrative hearing essential to due process."

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                                      29
In re Application of Howard Sav. Bank, 143 N.J. Super. 1, 6-7 (App. Div. 1976).

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided in the Code,

and an ALJ has discretion to exclude evidence if "its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the risk its admission will either necessitate undue

consumption of time or create substantial danger of undue prejudice or

confusion." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(a); N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(c).

      Administrative agencies have a great deal of discretion in many areas and

exercises of discretion "are entitled to respectful review under an abuse of

discretion standard." Serenity Contracting Group, Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee,

306 N.J. Super. 151, 157 (App. Div. 1997). Such discretion includes that to

limit or preclude any cross-examination deemed unnecessary to "a full and true

disclosure of the facts." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(a); N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1. A court

abuses its discretion "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting

Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260,

1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

      First, we are satisfied although Griffin argues the ALJ excluded evidence

of Corporal James' conversation with the HCDC director as privileged, it is clear

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                                      30
from the record the ALJ excluded evidence of the conversation under N.J.R.E.

403(b). Indeed, she determined the evidence could prejudice HCDC in its ability

to defend suits concerning the August 2018 testing and lacked probative value

in the case. The ALJ was within her discretion to limit cross-examination as

unnecessary. In any event, even were we to agree the ALJ abused her discretion,

we are satisfied any error was harmless, see Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.

Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2023) (recognizing the applicability of Rule

2:10-2 in administrative appeals), as Griffin sought to introduce a conversation

about HCDC's failure to use waivers at the August 2018 drug testing, which was

already firmly established by Detective Diaz's testimony and accepted as fact by

the ALJ.

      We also find the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by refusing to admit

evidence of emails Griffin's counsel received from Dr. Havier the night before

he was scheduled to testify on cross-examination. As noted, Dr. Havier testified

on July 19, 2019, and would have been subject to cross-examination on that day

but for Griffin's counsel's scheduling errors. It is clear the ALJ determined

HCDC would be prejudiced by counsel questioning Dr. Havier with documents

obtained after his initial testimony and which Griffin failed to provide to

opposing counsel in a timely manner.

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                                       31
      C. Judicial Notice

      Griffin also contends the ALJ's initial decision "must be reversed" because

she failed to take judicial notice of Directive 2018-02. According to Griffin,

judicial notice "became necessary as a result of Dr. Havier's testimony regarding

the effective date of the New Jersey State Laboratory's policy," as his testimony

contradicted the effective date imposed by Directive 2018-02.

      HCDC contends a "fact[ual] dispute[] regarding the pertinent date of

implementation of the AG Directive" precluded judicial notice. On this point,

it notes "[b]oth Dr. Havier and Lt. Patterson testified that it was their

understanding that, effective September 1, 2018, the State Laboratory would

begin requiring two samples."

      Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.2, "[o]fficial notice may be taken of judicially

noticeable facts as explained in N.J.R.E. 201 of the New Jersey Rules of

Evidence." Because Directive 2018-2 carries the force of law, it is judicially

noticeable under N.J.R.E. 201(a). Under N.J.R.E. 201(d), "[t]he court shall take

judicial notice if a party requests it on notice to all other parties and the court is

supplied with the necessary information." We review a court's decision on a

request to take judicial notice under the harmless error standard. See Est. of

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                                         32
Kotsovska ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 433 N.J. Super. 537, 550 (App. Div.

2013).

      We agree the ALJ erred in failing to take official notice of Directive 2018-

2 pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201(d).       As noted, the ALJ incorrectly treated the

implementation date as a factual question due to Dr. Havier's testimony the State

laboratory did not begin mandating two urine samples until September 2018,

despite the effective date mandated in the directive. Nevertheless, in light of

our conclusion Griffin was not entitled to relief even considering the AG's Drug

Testing policy as effective on the date of her urine test, we accordingly conclude

the ALJ's failure to take judicial notice of Directive 2018-2 was harmless error.

      D. Written Closing Submissions

      Without citation to any legal authority, Griffin contends the ALJ's

decision not to allow written closing submissions "undermine[d] the carriage of

justice, prejudice[d] [Griffin], and requires reversal." In light of Griffin's failure

to explain how the ALJ's failure to allow written closing submissions in any way

prejudiced her, we conclude her argument is without merit.

      E. Recusal

      Finally, Griffin contends we should reverse the CSC's decision due to the

ALJ's refusal to recuse herself. On this point, she argues only the following:

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                                         33
"[b]ecause of the [ALJ]'s conduct in this matter, [Griffin] was forced to request

that the [ALJ] recuse herself. Said request was denied despite logical and cogent

reasons to do so that is incorporated by reference herein." Again, we disagree.

      "[R]ecusal motions are 'entrusted to the sound discretion of the judge and

are subject to review for abuse of discretion.'" Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J.

Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45

(2010)). Judges must act in a way that "promotes public confidence in the

independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Code of Jud. Conduct, r. 2.1.

"[J]udges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived

as partial." DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 514 (2008). To determine if an

appearance of impropriety exists, we ask "[w]ould a reasonable, fully informed

person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?" Id. at 517; see also State v.

Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997).

      Judges must recuse themselves from "proceedings in which their

impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be

questioned," Code of Jud. Conduct, r. 3.17(B), or if "there is any other reason

which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might

reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). "A movant

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                                      34
need not show actual prejudice; 'potential bias' will suffice." Goldfarb, 460 N.J.

Super. at 31. "The mere appearance of bias may require disqualification."

Marshall, 148 N.J. at 279. However, "bias is not established by the fact that a

litigant is disappointed in a court's ruling on an issue." Id. at 186. "[T]he belief

that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 279.

      We discern no abuse of discretion in the ALJ's denial of Griffin's recusal

motion. Goldfarb, 460 N.J. Super. at 30. As noted, Griffin's counsel first

asserted he was going to seek the ALJ's recusal after she excluded Dr. Havier's

emails during the September 25, 2019 hearing. In his letter brief in support of

the recusal application, Griffin's counsel referred to comments the ALJ made

during the May 12, 2020 Zoom conference in which she summarized her

reasoning for excluding those emails. It is clear from the record Griffin's recusal

application was based merely on her counsel's disagreement with the ALJ's

evidentiary ruling, see Marshall, 148 N.J. at 279, and we are therefore

unpersuaded any "reasonable, fully informed person" would doubt the ALJ's

impartiality. DeNike, 196 N.J. at 514.

      Affirmed.

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