Court Opinion

ID: 9739255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:16.243727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.107896
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The State does not argue that the seizure of the small container and its search were valid. Rather, it contends that the admission of the evidence thus derived was harmless error. In my view, the majority's validation of the seizure and search is inappropriate.
At the time Jackson was taken into custody, the officers had discovered a handgun in the car but had absolutely no articulable cause, reasonable or otherwise, to suspect that drugs were contained on Jackson's person, or within the car, or within a container within the car. To be sure, they had every reasonable cause for their own safety and protection to carry out a thorough search for additional weapons, but it cannot be reasonably argued that the small green bubble gum container could contain a weapon.
In this regard, it should be noted that neither Lindley v. State (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 398, nor Romack v. State (1988) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 1346, relied upon by the majority, indicate that search of a container was involved.
More importantly, however, even the most recent case emanating from the United States Supreme Court, California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 114, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, discloses that the seizure and search here would not pass constitutional muster. The majority opinion clearly retains in place the principle that before a container search may be had, there must be probable cause to believe that it contains contraband:
"'The interpretation of the Carroll doe-trine set forth in Ross now applies to all searches of containers found in an automobile. In other words, the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause. The Court in Ross put it this way:
'The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... is not defined by the *592nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.' 456 U.S., at 824, 102 S.Ct., at 2172.
It went on to note: 'Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab." Ibid. We reaffirm that principle. In the case before us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the automobile's trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 111 S.Ct. at 1991.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Acevedo emphasizes the continuing and present status of the law:
"I would reverse the judgment in the present case, not because a closed container carried inside a car becomes subject to the 'automobile' exception to the general warrant requirement, but because the search of a closed container, outside a privately owned building, witk probable cause to believe that the container contains contraband, and when it in fact does contain contraband, is not one of those searches whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant." (Emphasis supplied.) 111 S.Ct. at 1994.
The record before us is totally devoid of any evidence which would provide probable cause to believe that the small green container contained either contraband or a weapon. I would reverse the conviction based upon the evidence obtained as a result of the search of the container.