Court Opinion

ID: 9800305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 08:11:22.284437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:16.844660
License: Public Domain

Burgess, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned,
¶ 50. dissenting in part. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s unfounded presumption *57that petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing. Assuming, without agreeing under the circumstances here, that defense counsel’s advocacy fell short of an effort reasonably expected,1 petitioner failed utterly to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s shortcomings, there was “a reasonable probability” of a different result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1994).
¶ 51. That the majority sua sponte and summarily disqualifies the sentencing judge upon remand suggests more concern with petitioner’s sentence (not claimed to be an abuse of discretion, and for which reconsideration “in calm reflection” under 13 V.S.A. § 7042 was available, State v. Therrien, 140 Vt. 625, 627, 442 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1982), but never sought) than with the quality of his lawyer’s tactics or advocacy (to which no prejudice can be attributed).2
*58¶ 52. As noted by the majority, a “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” In re LaBounty, 2005 VT 6, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 635, 869 A.2d 120 (mem.) (quotation omitted). In the sentencing context, this requires a reasonable probability that petitioner would have received a different sentence. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per curiam). “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). It was for petitioner to declare what about his life and circumstance was neglected by defense counsel that could have made a difference to the sentencing court. See In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. 209, 216 n.*, 647 A.2d 316, 322 n.* (1994) (recognizing that to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, petitioner bears “burden of affirmatively showing what the potential evidence would have been and how it would have produced a different result”).
¶ 53. In this case, petitioner failed to articulate, and the PCR court failed to identify, any favorable evidence or balancing portraiture omitted by defense counsel. If there was some more pro-social history or a positive light that might have led to a different sentencing result, petitioner offered nonesuch. Indeed, the PCR court recognized that the “defense did manage to get the mitigating factors in the PSI before the sentencing judge and that it was likely a complete list.” Moreover, the PCR court *59confirmed that petitioner had not presented evidence “as to precisely what additional material would have turned up” in further investigation. The majority does not contradict what the PCR court established: that regardless of their shared perception of defense counsel’s shortcomings, the sentencing court was deprived of nothing that could have made a difference in the outcome. That defense counsel’s performance resulted in no actual prejudice to petitioner is beyond cavil.
¶ 54. Identifying no prejudice in fact, the PCR court resorted, instead, to presuming prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), allowed in instances where defense counsel “entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Id. at 659.3 This exemption from Strickland’s required proof of prejudice is, however, extremely narrow and inapposite here. As reiterated in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (2002), the Cronic exception applies only to extreme situations as when defense counsel is denied altogether, absolutely fails to advocate or is thrust into circumstances by the trial court that defeat any competent representation. Before absolving petitioner of the need to prove his case, the critical inquiry is not whether his counsel could have done something more or differently, but whether counsel did nothing at all in his defense. Id. at 696-97 (explaining that proof of actual prejudice could not be avoided under Cronic when petitioner argued not that his lawyer “failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points”).
¶ 55. The lack of performance claimed here — low-keyed advocacy and failure to develop additional mitigating information — are practically indistinguishable from similar failings claimed, *60but still requiring proof of actual prejudice to justify PCR, in Bell. Id. at 697-98 (noting that “aspects of counsel’s performance challenged by respondent — the failure to adduce mitigating evidence and the waiver of closing argument — are plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice components”). For petitioner and the PCR court to prevail in their presumption of prejudice without evidence of same, the “attorney’s failure must be complete,” as in “entirely” failing to contest the State’s presentation at sentencing. Id. at 697 (quotation omitted and emphasis added).
¶ 56. There was no such wholesale failure here. The majority is inaccurate in saying that “the defense offered almost nothing of substance in petitioner’s defense.” Ante, ¶ 44. Defense counsel argued to the sentencing court that mitigating factors in this case outweighed the aggravating ones, and counsel highlighted all available mitigating factors. Counsel emphasized that petitioner was “a good decent kid” who had committed an unlawful act that resulted in the unintentional deaths of four innocent people. He recounted the circumstances of petitioner’s childhood, explaining that petitioner had been abused by his stepfather and placed in state custody as a result. He noted that despite spending over seven years in state custody, petitioner had no drug, alcohol, or delinquency problems. It was pointed out that petitioner graduated from a technical program and was steadily employed. Counsel portrayed petitioner as a foster-care success story who was well-liked by others.
¶ 57. Counsel emphasized petitioner’s youth and the tough road that he had endured during his nineteen years. Counsel explained that those who had worked with petitioner in the foster care system had seen signs of depression, problems with self-esteem, and problems with impulse control. Nonetheless, petitioner had no criminal record of any kind before this offense. Since being incarcerated, petitioner was attending classes and working in the kitchen. He had no disciplinary violations and was sending money home to help support his siblings.
¶ 58. Counsel also noted that at the time of the offense petitioner was depressed over the breakup with his girlfriend caused by his best friend. Counsel added that petitioner took full responsibility for his actions and, in doing so, saved everyone the trauma of a protracted trial. Petitioner accepted the fact that, *61given the agreed-upon 60-year maximum, he would, for all practical purposes, be under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for the rest of his life. Counsel reiterated that petitioner did not intend to kill anyone, and that he had helped as best he could to get others out of the burning apartment building.
¶ 59. Finally, counsel pointed to petitioner’s “deep and genuine remorse” for the pain his actions had caused. Counsel maintained that all of these mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors in this case, particularly in light of the fact that the deaths were unintended. Counsel posited that the imposition of a twenty-year minimum — thirty years less than allowed by plea agreement and recommended by the State — accorded both punishment and rehabilitation, and that this was not the kind of case that lent itself to deterrence. Petitioner also testified at the sentencing hearing, taking responsibility for his actions and their consequences, and expressing remorse and regret.
¶ 60. This is no record “barren,” as the PCR court erroneously characterized it, of any proposed justification for a sentence below the State’s fifty year minimum recommendation. All of petitioner’s “positive” attributes were noted in the PSI and by petitioner’s attorney. The same positives were known to the court. The PCR court found this as fact, recognizing that trial counsel asserted mitigating factors in the PSI before the sentencing judge and that there was likely nothing to add. Moreover, the record reflects that the sentencing court considered defense counsel’s argument in reaching its decision.
¶ 61. Albeit brief, counsel’s presentation left nothing available unsaid. No law obligates counsel to engage in redundancy, or to develop witnesses with nothing helpful to offer. If any material information was omitted by counsel, only petitioner knows so and he offered nothing on that account. That a different judge may prefer a different sentence, or a different attorney might have pursued a different tactic, does not render the lawyer’s presentation prejudicial or the court’s sentence invalid. Nor can I agree with the majority that, absent any evidence of prejudice, the same tactic somehow amounts to “actual prejudice” per se. Ante, ¶ 48.
¶ 62. Most telling on this point is the evident inability of petitioner, the PCR court, and the majority here, to recite anything omitted by counsel that could have made a difference. Whatever we think of the sentence, this shortcoming is fatal to petitioner’s argument. It is not for the PCR court or this Court *62to cancel petitioner’s burden of proof. See Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382, 1392 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that, for claims of prejudice that rest on counsel’s failure to investigate, petitioner must make “a comprehensive showing as to what the investigation would have produced,” and focus of inquiry “must be on what information would have been obtained from such an investigation and whether such information . . . would have produced a different result” (quotation omitted)); Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 552 (Del. 1998) (recognizing that a defendant “must make specific allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them” (quotation omitted)); Conahan v. State, 118 So. 3d 718, 730-31 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence in penalty phase, explaining that petitioner failed to present any additional mitigation evidence in post-conviction review proceeding, or identify any experts or witnesses that would have been available that counsel failed to present).
¶ 63. The facts of Outten are illustrative. In Outten, as in this case, the petitioner alleged that counsel was deficient in his presentation of mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. The court found that the petitioner made only conclusory allegations that uncalled witnesses would have influenced his sentence, but failed to identify those witnesses or their potential testimony. “That other witnesses might have been available, alone, is insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel,” the court explained, and it refused to “speculate on what testimony these other witnesses might have presented.” 720 A.2d at 553 (quotation omitted). So, too, in the instant case, we cannot fault defense counsel for failing to “develop the positive information about petitioner,” ante, ¶ 48, without a showing of what the additional positive information was. In Outten, the court concluded that the petitioner failed to show what actual prejudice was suffered from his claim of counsel’s failure to investigate and present these witnesses. 720 A.2d at 553; see also Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 947-48 (R.I. 2010) (rejecting argument that counsel was ineffective at sentencing hearing, and finding that defendant failed to point to any significant mitigating evidence not provided to trial court through the presentence report and also failed to identify any, additional information that might have been obtained through further investigation).
¶ 64. Petitioner proffers nothing to justify the majority’s free ride. As the U.S. Supreme Court makes clear, it “is not enough *63for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rather, petitioner must show that, but for counsel’s shortcomings, there was a reasonable probability of a different result. Id. at 694. In Strickland, the Court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet this standard, finding “[t]he evidence that respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.” Id. at 699-700. We cannot even go so far in this case, as no missing evidence is identified at all. The PCR court’s remand should be reversed in light of undisputed proof that defense counsel did not roll over and play dead for the prosecution as required for presumed prejudice under Cronic and Bell, and for petitioner’s absolute failure to prove any prejudice in fact from counsel’s conduct of petitioner’s defense.

 Adopting petitioner’s expert’s criticism of defense counsel’s performance as its own, the PCR court focused on counsel’s failure to develop more of a positive personal history or sentencing memorandum on petitioner’s behalf, and defense counsel’s lack of “feeling,” “heart,” or “passion” in presenting essentially the same information in abbreviated form to the sentencing court. Neither petitioner’s expert nor the PCR court, however, posited what such mitigating or flattering information might have been that was not already known to the sentencing court through the PSI and counsel’s representations. The balance of his performance faulted as dispassionate, then, amounts to little more than faulting defense counsel for lack of drama. Whether an infusion of theatrics might have influenced a more lenient sentence in this particular case defies measurement. Of course, casting sympathy on petitioner carried its own danger, given his acknowledged responsibility for killing three children and their grandmother due to a patent disregard of an obvious and likely catastrophe. That such a potentially quixotic tactic could backfire, particularly in the presence of the surviving family members and absent any additional articulable sympathetic facts, arguably posed no less risk than defense counsel’s more humble approach. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (explaining that “judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight," and defendant must overcome the “presumption that,' under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy” (quotation omitted)). Thus, Strickland directs attention to the available “facts” of a case, and to steer clear of assessing appeals to emotion in determining professional competency. Id. at 689-90.

 The cases cited in support of assigning a different judge to avoid “inadvertent prejudice” at resentencing are quite inapposite. All are premised on the original sentencing judge having considered or relied on purported facts or invalid claims improperly presented. See State v. Koons, 2011 VT 22, ¶ 16, 189 Vt. 285, 20 A.3d 662 (holding that trial court’s reliance on undisclosed acquitted conduct was kind *58of error that might impair integrity of judicial process and tarnish its reputation for fairness, and thus defendant’s sentence was vacated and case remanded for resentencing before different judge) (citing United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that, where sentencing court improperly relied on undisclosed information, sentence must be vacated and cause remanded for resentencing before a different judge “to maintain the perception of impartiality”) (additional citations omitted)); In re Meunier, 145 Vt. 414, 423, 491 A.2d 1019, 1025 (1985) (finding that prosecutor breached plea agreement by advocating for particular sentence at sentencing hearing, and matter would be remanded for resentencing before a different judge “[i]n order to insure no inadvertent prejudice”); State v. Neale, 145 Vt. 423, 436, 491 A.2d 1025, 1033 (1985) (holding that, where sentencing court improperly relied on hearsay evidence in imposing sentence, the Court would remand the case for resentencing before a different judge); State v. Williams, 137 Vt. 360, 365, 406 A.2d 375, 377 (1979) (where improper hearsay evidence presented at sentencing concerning criminal acts for which defendant was never charged or convicted, matter reversed and remanded for resentencing before different judge). There is no such contaminating influence here, and the original judge is no less qualified than any judge to impose a sentence informed by whatever new approach by a new defense counsel is imagined by the majority.

 The majority’s recitation that counsel’s performance resulted in “actual prejudice,” ante, ¶ 48, is just not supported by the PCR court’s decision or by the record. Although it opined on reconsideration “that there may indeed have been actual prejudice” to petitioner “in the lack of advocacy on the part of his attorney,” no prejudice in fact was found by the PCR court. The PCR court considered the lack of a witness list and no sentencing memorandum to be “a barren record” prejudicial per se, but this was not supported by any evidence either. It is undisputed that counsel advocated on behalf of petitioner — certainly more than the utter nonfeasance necessary to trigger presumed prejudice, and nothing in the record supports the notion that defense counsel failed to marshal actual mitigating evidence that could or should have been before the sentencing court. The undisputed evidence was that counsel and the PSI raised whatever mitigating facts there were, and petitioner pointed to no neglected evidence.