Court Opinion

ID: 9689151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:22:06.123522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:31.186529
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in .part and dissenting in part). While I concur with part n of the majority’s opinion, I write separately to dissent from part m because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with Michigan to support an assertion of limited personal jurisdiction. Instead, in this case, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, which held that an exercise of limited personal jurisdiction in this instance would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.
The majority correctly finds that the initial step in this personal jurisdiction inquiry is satisfied, and that P. D. George’s conduct falls within the purview of § 5 of Michigan’s long-arm statute. MCL 600.715(5); MSA 27A.715(5). However, the personal jurisdiction analysis does not end at this initial stage because this Court must also determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist under International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310; 66 S Ct 154; 90 L Ed 95; 161 ALR 1057 (1945), and its progeny to sustain the imposition of personal jurisdiction. It is with regard to this second inquiry that the majority and I disagree. I would hold that the facts of this case do not support a finding of sufficient minimum contacts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendant.
*316In determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist, the touchstone of constitutionality is whether P. D. George purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities or business in Michigan to an extent that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.1 This Court has found that
[t]his “purposeful availment” requirement insures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts ... or as the result of the “unilateral activity of another party or a third person,” Helicopteros Nacionales De Columbia, SA v Hall, 466 US 408, 417; 104 S Ct 1868; 80 L Ed 2d 404 (1984).
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the evidence does not establish that P. D. George “purposely availed” itself of the benefits of Michigan law. P. D. George’s contacts with this state were, rather, minimal and incidental and were, therefore, insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause for exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 295; 100 S Ct 559; 62 L Ed 2d 490 (1980).
The facts reveal that P. D. George neither maintained offices in Michigan nor sent its agents into the state.2 Moreover, P. D. George neither solicited nor *317chose to do business in Michigan.3 Rather, R D. *318George had no choice over who would dilute the primary mix that it supplied. The original agreement between P. D. George and Pollack provided that P. D. George would send the teak oil directly to Starbrite in Florida. Pollack unilaterally changed that provision in the original agreement, chose Excelda Manufacturing Corporation as final processor, and subsequently required P. D. George to send its teak oil to Excelda, which is located in Michigan. However, despite Pollack’s directive that P. D. George send its product to Excelda, I would agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals that P. D. George did not purposefully direct its goods toward Michigan. Rather, the facts establish that P. D. George shipped its product “f.o.b. St. Louis,”4 which means that P. D. George only agreed to supply Excelda with its product in Missouri, not Michigan. Finally, P. D. George’s shipping invoices stated that Missouri law was to govern any potential disputes between P. D. George and Excelda.5
*319For these reasons, I respectfully dissent with respect to part III of the majority’s analysis and would find that P. D. George did not purposely avail itself of the benefits of Michigan law. Therefore, I would find that P. D. George had insufficient minimum contacts with Michigan to sustain Michigan’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over P. D. George.6 Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals minimum-contacts analysis and conclusion that, on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction, the trial court’s denial of P. D. George’s motion for summary disposition must be reversed.
Riley, J., concurred with Weaver, J.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Witbeck v Bill Cody’s Ranch Inn, 428 Mich 659, 666; 411 NW2d 439 (1987), citing Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 474; 105 S Ct 2174; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985). See also Cooley v Jefferson Beach Marina, Inc, 177 Mich App 26, 30; 441 NW2d 21 (1989).

 P. D. George did send agents into the state after problems arose that forced P. D. George to litigate a collection action against Excelda. P. D. George had to litigate the matter in Michigan because it had to choose a *317forum with personal jurisdiction over Excelda. However, litigation of that collection action should not be used, and is not being used by the majority, to exercise personal jurisdiction over P. D. George in this action. I would, therefore, agree with the following assertion of the Court of Appeals in this case:
The policy of encouraging remediation would be thwarted if P. D. George were punished for having made a visit to Michigan or telephone calls to resolve a problem. [211 Mich App 475, 484; 536 NW2d 558 (1995).]

 The fact that P. D. George neither solicited nor chose to do business in Michigan distinguishes the instant case from McGee v Int’l Life Ins Co, 355 US 220; 78 S Ct 199; 2 L Ed 2d 223 (1957), a case relied upon by the majority. See ante, p 311, n 10. In McGee, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a binding judgment against the Texas-based insurance company, even where the insurance company had never solicited or done any business in California other than assuming the insurance contract at issue in that case. The Court based its decision on the fact that the insurance company agreed to assume a life insurance contract with a California resident and delivered the reinsurance contract to California. Moreover, the California resident mailed insurance premiums from that state for over two years until his death, at which time he was still a resident of that state.
In this case, P. D. George had very limited contact with Excelda and did not specifically contract with the Michigan corporation. Rather, P. D. George contracted with a Florida corporation, which would use its product in a compound to be marketed and sold in Florida. The subject matter of the contract was not, therefore, intentionally and exclusively located in Michigan, as it was in McGee.
Furthermore, in McGee, the Court considered a specific California statute that subjected foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts with residents of that state, Cal Ins Code, §§ 1610-1620, and reasoned:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. . . . When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum — thus in effect making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses — as here on the company’s defense of suicide — will be found in the insured’s locality. [Id. at 223.]
Similar policy concerns have not been specifically addressed by Michigan’s Legislature, however. Moreover, in this case, many crucial witnesses *318will be found in Missouri, not Michigan, because the complaint alleges that P. D. George’s teak oil, which was made in St. Louis, was defective.
I would, therefore, find that McGee is distinguishable and disagree with the majority’s assertion that even more compelling facts exist in this case than in McGee.

 F.O.B. is a delivery term under the Uniform Commercial Code, which is codified at MCL 440.2319; MSA 19.2319. This term indicates that, at the point of shipment and once the goods are in the possession of the carrier, title and risk of loss shifts to the purchaser. In this case, once the primary mix that P. D. George prepared was delivered to the carrier, P. D. George had no further interest in, or control over, the product, which was to eventually be distributed in Florida, not Michigan.

 The United States Supreme Court has held that choice of law provisions, while insufficient to confer jurisdiction standing alone, are relevant in determining whether a party “has ‘purposely invoked the benefits and protections of a State’s laws’ for jurisdictional purposes.” Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, n 1 supra at 482.

 Because I would find that R D. George did not puiposely avail itself of the benefits of Michigan law, I would find it unnecessary to address the remaining two prongs of the minimum-contacts test employed by the majority. Ante, p 309, Jeffrey v Rapid American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 186; 529 NW2d 644 (1995), quoting Mozdy v Lopez, 197 Mich App 356, 359; 494 NW2d 866 (1992).