Court Opinion

ID: 9683979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:42:03.732476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.708305
License: Public Domain

PHILLIP R. GARRISON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and, accordingly, would affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.” Rule 74.05(d) provides that a default judgment may be set aside “[u]pon motion stating facts constituting a meritorious defense and for good cause shown.” That rule also provides that “[g]ood cause includes a mistake or conduct that is not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process.” As noted in the majority opinion, compliance with the “good cause” requirement is the determinative issue in this appeal.1
The majority opinion cites Great Southern Sav. & Loan v. Wilburn, 887 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Mo. banc 1994), and Myers v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Mo.App. S.D.1996), for the proposition that Appellants may satisfy the good cause requirement by showing that their conduct was not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process. Indeed, both cases contain general statements to that effect. The majority interprets that language to mean that a movant need not allege or prove facts explaining the failure to file a responsive pleading in order to fulfill the “good cause” requirement of Rule 74.05(d). I disagree.
In both Great Southern and Myers, the trial courts had before them the faetuál explanations for the respective failures to file responsive pleadings. Both appellate decisions were based on a review of those facts. Thus, those courts were not confronted with a factual setting in which there was no explanation for the failure to file an answer. To the contrary, in this case Appellants’ motion failed to allege any explanation for their failure. Instead, Appellants’ sole allegation with reference to the “good cause” requirement of Rule 74.05(d) in their motion to set aside the default was as follows:
With regard to a showing of “good cause” according to Rule 74.05, “[a] defaulted defendant shows good cause by proving that he or she did not recklessly or intentionally impede the judicial process.” Great Southern Savings & Loan Association v. Dan Wilburn et ux., 887 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Mo.1994). Examples *506of such reckless or intentional behavior include conduct such as ignoring the summons, Stradford v. Caudillo, 972 S.W.2d 483 at 486 (Mo.App. W.D.1998), or failing to respond to a lawsuit in any manner, Mullins v. Mullins, 91 S.W.3d 667 at 672 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). However, a review of the docket sheet clearly indicates that [Appellants] made no attempt of any kind to impede the judicial process, and therefore good cause exists for setting aside this default judgment.
These allegations relate only to Appellants’ contention that they did not recklessly or intentionally impede the judicial process, but they do not speak to the reason or reasons they were in default.
Whether good cause is satisfied merely by a lack of evidence showing an intention to impede the judicial system was confronted squarely in Crain v. Crain, 19 S.W.3d 170 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). There the trial court, as in this case, denied a motion to set aside a default judgment. Id. at 172. The western district of this Court, in affirming, said:
[Appellant] must first show that he had good cause for the failure to answer the petition. Good cause contemplates conduct not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process and which demonstrates his freedom from negligence in allowing the default to occur.... [Appellant] argues that there is not a scintilla of evidence that his conduct was intentionally designed to impede the judicial system. That argument miscasts the issue. It is [Appellant’s] burden to demonstrate his reasonable excuse for failure to respond to the summons.
Id. at 174(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, Appellants here argue that their participation in other proceedings in the ease, as shown in the docket sheet, indicates that they made no attempt to impede the judicial process, and “therefore good cause exists for setting aside this default judgment.” As in Crain, however, there was no explanation for the failure to respond to the summons.
Several other cases are consistent with the holding in Crain. “Under the explicit terms of Rule 74.05(d), a motion to set aside a default judgment must state facts constituting both a meritorious defense and good cause for the default.” Stradford v. Caudillo, 972 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Mo.App. W.D.1998). As stated in Reed v. Reed, 48 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Mo.App. W.D.2001), “[t]he party filing the motion to set aside a default judgment must plead and then demonstrate both that he had good cause for not filing a responsive pleading and that he had a meritorious defense to the plaintiffs petition.” See also H.J.I. by J.M.I. v. M.E.C., 961 S.W.2d 108, 118 (Mo.App. W.D.1998); and Brants v. Foster, 926 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Mo.App. W.D.1996) C“[g]ood cause shown’ is an excuse for nonappearance”). Also, this Court said, in In re Marriage of Balough, 983 S.W.2d 618, 624 (Mo.App. S.D.1999), that the “good cause” element of Rule 74.05(d) is good cause for allowing the case to go by default. It is, therefore, clear to me that the good cause requirement of Rule 74.05(d) relates to the reason a responsive pleading was not filed, and is not satisfied by a mere showing that the judicial system was not impeded by the defaulting party’s conduct. Significantly, as it relates to this case, a motion that fails to plead facts constituting good cause under Rule 74.05(d) does not meet the pleading requirements of that rule. Sears v. Dent Wizard Intern. Corp., 13 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Mo.App. E.D.2000).
It is logical, considering the phrasing of Rule 74.05(d), that the “good cause” element of the rule relates to the excuse for the failure to file a responsive pleading, *507thereby permitting the case to be in default. As indicated earlier, the rule provides, in part, that “[g]ood cause includes a mistake or conduct that is not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judb cial process.” (emphasis added). It is clear that this portion of the rule refers to whether the “mistake or conduct” causing the default was or was not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process. I see nothing in Rule 74.05(d) that would authorize a default to be set aside simply because the defaulting party had participated in other proceedings in the case without regard to that party’s reasons for not filing a responsive pleading.
Without an explanation for why an answer was not filed, how can a court determine whether the reason for the default was “good cause” that may include “a mistake or conduct that is not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process”? This premise is made clearer by the definitions of “intentional” and “reckless.” “To be reckless, a person makes a conscious choice of his course of action, ‘either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of the facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable man.’ ” Reed, 48 S.W.3d at 640 (quoting from In re Marriage of Williams, 847 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo.App. S.D.1993)). “Recklessness involves some element of deliberateness and of risk.” Reed, 48 S.W.3d at 640 (quoting Brueggemann v. Elbert, 948 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Mo.App. E.D.1997)). “Intentional” is defined as “relating to intention or design.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976). The fact that Appellants participated in other portions of the proceedings, including discovery, is insufficient to establish that their failure to file a responsive pleading was not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Whether the trial court was correct in entering a default in the first place is not an issue on this appeal.