Court Opinion

ID: 9780680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:25:38.297666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:10.515075
License: Public Domain

WINCHESTER, J.,
with whom EDMONDSON, J., joins, dissenting:
T1 I dissent to today's majority opinion because I do not believe that a juror's personal experiences constitute an external influence under the meaning of Section 2606(B). The majority affirms the granting of a new trial based solely on the affidavit of one of the jurors in the case alleging that the jury foreperson "shared her knowledge of the proper care and treatment of diabetic patients" in jury deliberations.1 I do not believe that the jury's free deliberation pro*1041cess should be tampered with on such thin grounds. Thus, I would sustain the jury verdiet and find the proposed juror affidavit inadmissible.
T2 It is the court's duty to protect jury verdicts from unwarranted intrusions. Jurors may not testify to invalidate their own verdict unless extraneous prejudicial information is brought to their attention or an improper outside influence is brought to bear upon them. 12 0.8.2001 § 2606 (B). The rule that jurors may not impeach their verdict was designed to encourage free and frank discussion among jurors, promote verdict finality, protect jurors from harassment by losing parties, and preserve the viability of the jury system. U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir.2008). The majority opinion threatens these goals.
T8 Prior to trial, the parties and their counsel were well aware of the foreperson's work experience as a home health nurse who had dealt with diabetic patients on numerous occasions. In fact, the juror was questioned about her employment in-depth on voir dire. She freely disclosed that she was a licensed practical nurse and she also admitted that diabetics were common among her patients. Despite this knowledge, and the ability to dismiss the juror during voir dire, the parties and their counsel opted to retain her as a juror and thereby waived any objections to her qualifications.
T4 The majority claims that the foreperson's conduct improperly injected extraneous prejudicial information into the deliberation process. In support of this claim, the majority places heavy reliance on the fact that the foreperson stated she would not substitute her experiences for those of the testimony from the trial witnesses, going so far as to claim that the foreperson ed under oath during voir dire.2 Notably, there is not one shred of evidence that the foreperson, or any of the other jurors, did not base her decision on the evidence presented in the case. That she may have applied personal observations, obtained from her job as a home health nurse, to the facts of this case does not present the catastrophic prejudice the majority contends it does.
1 5 In Benally, the Tenth Circuit cautioned courts to be careful "not to confuse a juror who introduces outside evidence with a juror who brings his personal experiences to bear on the matter at hand." U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir.2008)(citing Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.2005)("A juror's personal experience, however, does not constitute 'extraneous prejudicial information'"). In Marques v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.2005), a juror's experience training police dogs was specifically relevant to the case at issue and it was learned that the juror had, in fact, discussed that experience to help the jury determine the issue before it which was whether the use of a police dog constituted excessive force. The Tenth Circuit held that the juror's comments were not extraneous, prejudicial information. Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.2005).3
*1042T6 Attacking a jury verdict with juror comments made during deliberation imper-missibly leads to public exposure of what was intended to be a private discussion, exactly what § 2606(B) was designed to avoid. Internal influences on a verdict during the jury's deliberative process do not constitute outside influences and evidence thereof is inadmissible to impeach a jury's verdict. Here, there is absolutely no evidence that the foreperson brought any extraneous facts specific to the litigants or the case into the jury room or that she conducted any independent fact-finding regarding the case. Rather, the statements attributed to her came from her own work experience dealing with diabetic patients. Diabetes is, unfortunately, a common ailment that many people have either dealt with personally or who have family members or friends that have it, as indicated by several of the jurors during voir dire.
T7 The necessity of democracy requires juries to have great latitude during deliberation. All jurors enter the jury system with a variety of life experiences, including their work experience. It is difficult to fathom any jury arriving at a verdict in a case without some, if not all, of the members drawing on their own experiences and asserting their individual ideas and opinions on the matters submitted to them. A juror's personal experience, be it professional or otherwise, so long as not directly related to the facts and parties in the underlying litigation, does not constitute a prejudicial, external influence necessitating a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.

. The jury verdict was 9-3 in favor of the defendants. Juror Baker, the affiant, apparently was not unduly influenced by the foreperson as she did not join the verdict for Defendants. Regardless, Section 2606(B) prohibits a juror from testifying as to "the effect of anything upon the juror's mind or another juror's mind or emotions *1041as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes during deliberations." 12 0.5.2001 § 2606 (B).

. "[Alllowing juror testimony through the backdoor of a voir dire challenge risks swallowing the rule. A broad question during voir dire could then justify the admission of any number of jury statements that would now be re-characterized as challenges to voir dire rather than challenges to the verdict. Given the importance that Rule 606(b) places on protecting jury deliberations from judicial review, we cannot read it to justify as large a loophole as [the defendant] requests." United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir.2008).

. Significantly, not one of the cases cited by the majority finds that the personal or professional experience of a juror is the type of extraneous influence allowed to be exposed by the affidavits of other jurors after trial. Rather, all of the cited cases deal with actual, concrete influences such as external exhibits, independent investigations or the injection of facts outside the record of the specific case. There were no such external influences brought to bear on the instant matter. Numerous other jurisdictions have held that a juror's statements made during deliberation, when based on personal knowledge that is gained through work or otherwise and not directly related to the litigation at issue, do not constitute prejudicial, extraneous information. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2nd Court has never suggested that jurors, whose duty it is to consider and discuss the factual material properly before them, become 'unsworn witnesses' within the scope of the confrontation clause simply because they have considered any factual matters going beyond those of record. To resort to the *1042metaphor that the moment a juror passes a fraction of an inch beyond the record evidence, he becomes 'an unsworn witness' is to ignore centuries of history and assume an answer rather than to provide the basis for one."); Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir.1989)("'It is expected that jurors will bring their life experiences to bear on the facts of a case); Bethea v. Springhill Memorial Hosp., 833 So.2d 1 (Ala.2002)(jurors' discussion during deliberation of their personal knowledge of or experience with induced labor, which was at heart of dispute, held not extraneous, prejudicial information); Brooks v. Zahn, 170 Ariz. 545, 826 P.2d 1171, 1177-1178 (Ariz.App.1991)("'We expect jurors to draw upon their common sense and experience and use their knowledge to assist in reaching a verdict. ... [We [must] distinguish between a juror's knowledge, opinions, feelings or bias and 'the type of after-acquired information that potentially taints a jury verdict.' . [The juror's] statements are the product of her own experience and knowledge. We reject the invitation to categorize specialized knowledge possessed by a juror and discussed during deliberations as extrinsic or extraneous information. To do so would cause endless examination into jurors' comments during deliberations to determine whether a particular juror drew upon unusual or expert knowledge to reach a verdict."); Leavitt ex rel. Leavitt v. Magid, 257 Neb. 440, 598 N.W.2d 722 (1999)(legal knowledge of attorney» juror on issue of proximate cause, brought into jury deliberations, was not prejudicial, extraneous information); Baker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.App.1987)(in negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, jurors could not testify as to medical information supplied by another juror who was a registered nurse since the source of the information was inside the jury, not outside); Caldararo v. Vanderbilt Univ., 794 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.App.1990)(foreman's claim during deliberations that because he was married to nurse he had specialized knowledge about diabetics was not extraneous information}.