Court Opinion

ID: 9453511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:15:46.141168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:41.482103
License: Public Domain

MARVIN JONES, Senior Judge,*
(dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority opinion that the policy should be construed to include the type of vehicle involved in the instant case. The policy was written specifically to cover a pickup truck. It would be a rather strained construction to hold that the placing of double, rather than single, wheels on the rear of two axles would take the coverage altogether away from the vehicle. Courts throughout the country, in interpreting automobile insurance policies, have construed the term “automobile” as broadly inclusive. In Continental Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 143 N.E.2d 169, 75 Ohio Law Abst. 79, (Ohio C.P., Franklin County 1957), a rented U-Drive-It truck was held to be an automobile. In Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709, 38 A.L.R.2d 861, (Ky.Ct.App. 1953), it was stated the term “automobile” covers practically all kinds of self-propelled vehicles.
However, I cannot agree with the conclusions reached by the majority on the other two issues. The principal issue is whether the truck was “furnished for the regular use of” Gibbs. I concede the closeness of this question, but a careful analysis of the facts in the light of previous decisions convinces me that the conclusions reached by the trial court are correct.
I do not interpret the principles announced in Grantham v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 245 S.C. 144, 139 S.E.2d 744 (1964), as being applicable to this case. In the Grantham case the car involved was furnished by the county to the deputy sheriff on a full-time basis, not only for his official use, but also for his personal use. He was in complete control of the car at all times. Clearly it was furnished for his regular use.
In the case at bar Gibbs was employed by the Lelands, who operated two farms on which were grown different kinds of produce, including cabbage. One of the farms was located on John’s Island, the other on Wadmalaw Island. Ordinarily the Lelands would keep four or five hands, but during the planting and harvesting seasons they would frequently use twenty-five or thirty.
Gibbs was employed as a general farm helper. His principal duties were to drive tractors and trucks, but he did other work as well. R. 68A. It was necessary to transport the employees to work. The Lelands owned a pickup truck and two larger trucks. I quote from Mr. Leland’s testimony:
Q. But he’s principally a truck driver and tractor driver?
A. Yes, sir. Tractor driver and truck driver. These trucks are very seldom that we, other than getting to and from work, we’re not using them continuously through the day. That’s why I can’t say he was principally a truck driver because he certainly drove a tractor and other farm work during the day. [R. 69A.]
The employees and Gibbs lived not very far from one of the farms. The Le-*799lands would designate one of the trucks for Gibbs to use in transporting himself and other employees to and from their homes, which did not require Gibbs to go off the main road to his own home. The men would walk to the main road where they would be picked up. When more men were needed additional workers would come to the roadside and be picked up along the way. This was not done every day. The Lelands lived near one of the farms, and at times they would transport the workers and Gibbs to their homes. On such days Gibbs would not be assigned any truck. R. 66A. When Gibbs used a truck, he was permitted to keep it overnight which was more convenient. Gibbs reported each morning to the Leland’s home place to get his instructions. R. 66A. Asked whether the truck was assigned to Gibbs, Leland replied:
No, sir. * * * None of my trucks are assigned to Dan [Gibbs]. He drives a truck that I designate for him to drive on any particular day.
Q. And on this particular date this truck was designated, you had designated * * *?
A. Yes, sir. [R. 69A.]
Different trucks were designated on different days. Usually the pickup truck was designated when only the four or five men were working, but in times when a greater number of workers were needed a larger truck was designated for Gibbs. And sometimes another truck would be used by one of the Lelands to haul some of the workers when a large number of workers were needed.
Gibbs worked for the Lelands many years, but was paid always at the end of each week for the number of days he had worked that particular week.
Nearly everything grown on a produce farm is perishable. The product must be gathered or harvested when it is ready. In the modem, practical world men do not walk distances to work. It was necessary to transport them several miles in this case.
It was most natural that the Lelands should permit Gibbs to keep one of the trucks overnight. Otherwise it would have been necessary for Gibbs to drive the men to their homes, then take the truck back to the Lelands’ home, and then have the Lelands drive Gibbs to his home. This simply would not make sense. Permitting Gibbs to keep the truck overnight was a convenience to the Lelands and saved gasoline and time as well.
Q. [to Leland] Now, why did you let Daniel Gibbs have the truck over night?
A. Well because it was convenient. It saved me having to carry these people home, and gas, which it saved gas. [R. 64A.]
Clearly the facts do not fall within the ambit of the Grantham opinion. Certainly there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact from which we quote:
* * * The transportation of the laborers was admittedly to the benefit of the Lelands. The Lelands considered that the bringing of the farmhands .to work was on their business. According to Aaron W. Leland the truck was not assigned to Gibbs. The principal duty of Gibbs, as his employer considered it, was to drive tractors for production and not, simply, to transport the workers. The transportation duties were on occasion taken by Mr. Aaron Leland himself. [R. 8A.]
It also justifies the trial court’s conclusions, from which we quote:
Although Gibbs' use of the truck may have occurred frequently in this instance the conclusion must be that the Lelands did not furnish or make available to the insured the truck for his regular use. To the contrary, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the Lelands directed the use of the truck on a day to day basis for Gibbs’ transportation to work and for their business purposes only. Nowhere does *800the record reflect that Gibbs ever had general and regular use of the truck. The same limitations on Gibbs’ use of the truck obtained from day to day so long as the conditions of his employment remained the same. That this situation was a lasting one and that Gibbs frequently used the truck does not alter the arrangement between Gibbs and Leland. The use was casual from day to day and it was not for the regular use of Gibbs. Gibbs was not excluded by the “regular use” provision of the policy.
* * * The truck was within the definition of a nonowned automobile: it was not available for Gibbs’ “regular use.” It was therefore covered if it was not excluded. [R. 12A.]
The prevailing rule that a trial court’s factfindings must be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support them is based on reason and human experience. The trial judge sees the witnesses face to face and is more familiar with all the surrounding circumstances.
It is generally recognized in contract cases that any ambiguity or provision of doubtful meaning is construed against the party who wrote the contract.1
This frequently arises in insurance policies, which have been the basis of a great deal of litigation.2 Insurance policies cover a wide field, including almost every form of individual and business activity.
In this particular case there are several exclusionary clauses that carry more than one exception to the paragraph which provides the exclusion. Some of these are rather difficult to interpret.3 They were evidently written by a very clever lawyer, one who was at least not unfriendly to the Seaboard Fire & Marine Insurance Co. This is not a criticism; it is merely a comment. In law, as in life, these human tendencies sometimes appear.
The cases cited in the District Court’s opinion are well analyzed and applied.
I would affirm.

 Sitting by designation of the Chief Justice.

. Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333 (1965); Aleksich v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 118 Mont. 223, 164 P.2d 372 (1945); Lilley-Ames Co. v. United States, 293 F.2d 630, 632, 154 Ct.Cl. 544, 548 (1961).

. Baxley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 332, 128 S.E.2d 165 (1962); United States Lines Co. v. Eastburn Marine Chem. Co., 221 F.Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y.1963).

. As an example of the complicated language I quote paragraph 6 of the policy:
“Exclusions

“This policy does not apply:

“Under the Liability, Medical Expense and Accidental Death Benefit Coverages,
“(a) to any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, but this exclusion does not apply with respect to the occupancy of a non-owned automobile by the named insured or a relative, other than as an operator thereof;
“(b) to any automobile while used in the automobile business, but this exclusion does not apply to the use of an owned automobile (1) by the named insured or a relative, or (2) by any other insured in an automobile business in which the named insured has an interest as proprietor or partner;
“(c) to a non-owned automobile while used in any other business or occupation, except a private passenger automobile operated or occupied by the named insured or his private chauffeur or domestic servant, or a utility trailer used therewith or with an owned automobile;” [R. 73A-73B.]