Court Opinion

ID: 9583316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:37:33.528134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:56.784002
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. The testator indisputably desired and intended, and in fact did, by executing the power of appointment, vest in his wife sole power to dispose of the property therein, without limitation, and even to- utter strangers if she- so desired. By executing the covenant that she would appoint the described property to her grandchildren, she thereby manifested beyond dispute her desire. When all this has been effectuated, the known wish of the only two- persons entitled to have a wish has been completely fulfilled. Now what are the insuperable obstacles to this court’s allowing those known wishes to be fulfilled? Undoubtedly, we should allow *421them to be defeated only if thére are compelling legal grounds that demand their defeat.
The majority attach legal importance to the fact that the instrument containing the covenant to appoint grandchildren contains another clause purporting to convey in praesenti the property, which is prima facie void. Seemingly, they conclude that such void clause renders invalid the covenant clause. Such reasoning instantly collides with the legal principle, well stated in Restatement of the Law, Trusts (2d), § 65, as follows: “If a provision in the terms of the -trust is ■ illegal, the trust fails altogether if, but only if, the illegal provision cannot be separated from the other provisions without defeating the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust.” This same principle of law has been applied in our statutory law in both wills and contracts. See Code §§ 113-108 and 20-501. See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, ■ restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 (15 S. E. 2d 210), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 (102 S. E. 2d 488); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 (105 S. E. 2d 730). What is the proper and legitimate function of courts in such matters? Ascertainment and effectuation of the intent as evidenced by the document. Obviously, if the clause containing the covenant here relied upon in any degree, however remote, is made dependent upon the conflicting clause which is invalid, it must meet the fate of such clause; but, since it is in no wise connected with or dependent upon such invalid clause, it is likewise unaffected by the infirmities • of that clause. This recital of hard facts ought to eliminate completely all such invalid clauses from a search for the meaning and validity of the clause here involved.
When the majority come to grips with this valid clause, they instantaneously -becloud it by seizing upon the fact that, instead of one document dealing with all twelve grandchildren, twelve simultaneous, separate but identical, documents, each referring to only one of the twelve grandchildren, were employed, and by *422this reasoning conclude that the covenants are not to “members of a limited class” as provided in the law (Code Ann. § 37-612; Ga. L. 1945, p. 340). They are wrong for two reasons, either of which demands a contrary conclusion, to wit: (1) Since the law authorizes a covenant to appoint to members of a limited class, it authorizes such covenant in behalf of any single member of that class. If it includes all of them, then obviously it must include each of them. Thus, when covenanted to- a grandchild who is a member of the class “grandchildren,” the beneficiary of the covenant is a person whom the law allows to receive such a covenant to appoint. Averit v. Alleam, 23 Ga. 382. (2) But if plain English and sound logic, which support the foregoing, be rejected in order to conclude that the covenant must embrace all the members of the class, then the facts and law demand the conclusion that this case meets that test. Documents dealing with the same subject matter — executed as these twelve covenants were, simultaneously, and being identical, save as each contains the name of only one of the twelve grandchildren, and describes different percentages of the property— must be construed together, and in legal effect, are the equivalent of one document, containing all twelve grandchildren, and defining their respective shares. Anderson v. Brown, 72 Ga. 713; Read v. Gould, 139 Ga. 499, 504 (77 S. E. 642); Dyal v. Foy & Shemwell, Inc., 159 Ga. 848 (126 S. E. 783); Mathewson v. Brigman Motors Co., 23 Ga. App. 304, 305 (98 S. E. 98); Albany Federal Savings &c. Assn. v. Henderson, 200 Ga. 79, 112 (36 S. E. 2d 330). In addition, the record discloses that the parties stipulated that all the instruments were the same, and the petition in this case alleges the execution of twelve identical covenants to all twelve grandchildren. To even contend that, since the power to appoint directs that it be done by will, and the testator provided that if not so exercised, the property would revert to testator’s estate and be placed in a trust fund, the covenant to appoint, executed pursuant to law, is invalid, is simply to ignore the plain law and refuse to allow the donee of the covenant her clear rights under the law. Such rights can not be destroyed by a failure to obey the covenant. Indisputably, the covenantor had a duty to appoint by will, and if in life, *423a court of equity would compel performance. But death before performance can not take away a single “jot nor tittle” from the covenantee because, as held in Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 658 (78 S. E. 30, 44 L. R. A. (NS) 773), equity considers done that which ought to be done and decrees accordingly. To the same effect see Gordon v. Spellman, 145 Ga. 682, 685 (89 S. E. 749, Ann. Cas. 1918A 852).
Of course, in cases seeking specific performance, it must appear that the contract is fair and just, and, where a consideration is involved, it must be shown as well as the value in order to enable the court to determine if it is just. But in this case such criteria are neither required nor relevant. Here the covenant is just and fair because the law provides for it. To pay a consideration therefor would cause the covenantor to violate her trust. She was not given the property nor any interest therein except the privilege of giving, not selling, it to whomsoever she chose. By this covenant she made that choice. For the court to refuse to enforce it would be judicial nullification of a solemn act of the legislature, the validity of which has not been questioned.
The court should obey the mandate of the law, protect the right given thereunder, and decree title in accord with the covenant. The will did not convey as the covenant demands because limitations are placed thereon. For all the foregoing reasons I dissent.