Court Opinion

ID: 9353874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 23:00:27.223713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:13.609866
License: Public Domain

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                                                             [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-13735
                           ____________________

        LANDCASTLE ACQUISITION CORP.,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        RENASANT BANK,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00275-RWS
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit
        Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               This case arises out of the insolvency of the Crescent Bank
        and Trust Company (“Crescent”) and the conduct of its customer-
        lawyer Nathan Hardwick, a manager of his law firm, Morris
        Hardwick Schneider, LLC (“Hardwick law firm”). In 2009,
        Crescent, a Georgia bank, made Hardwick a loan for $631,276.71.
        Hardwick, as his law firm’s manager, signed a security agreement
        that pledged, as collateral, his law firm’s certificate of time deposit
        (“CD”) for $631,276.71. So far, all looked hunky-dory, or facially
        valid in legal speak.
               For five years, Hardwick’s loan remained current. When
        Crescent failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
        (“FDIC”), as receiver, took over and sold Hardwick’s loan and CD
        collateral to Renasant Bank. Hardwick then made loan payments
        to Renasant, and Renasant held the CD collateral.
              When Hardwick defaulted in 2014, the security agreement
        permitted Renasant to liquidate the CD collateral to pay the loan
        balance, which Renasant did. Renasant notified the Hardwick law
        firm of the loan default and CD liquidation but received no
        response—much less any objection—from the law firm.
              Eventually, Hardwick’s and his law firm’s financial troubles
        caught up with them. The law firm filed for bankruptcy, and
        Hardwick was convicted of wire and financial fraud. See United
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        20-13735                  Opinion of the Court                               3

        States v. Maurya, 25 F.4th 829, 835 (11th Cir. 2022). The bankrupt
        law firm had countless creditors, including plaintiff Landcastle
        Acquisition Corporation (“Landcastle”), which was assigned the
        law firm’s potential claims against others. 1
               In 2017, Landcastle sued Renasant (as successor to the FDIC
        and Crescent), claiming Renasant was liable for $631,276.71, the
        CD amount. Landcastle’s lawsuit seeks to invalidate the Hardwick
        law firm’s security agreement.
               That security agreement is unconditional and facially valid.
        But Landcastle alleges that Hardwick, the law firm’s agent and
        manager, lacked authority to pledge its CD as collateral. In its
        attempt to invalidate the security agreement, Landcastle
        introduces and relies on the law firm’s corporate records and
        testimony. Landcastle’s evidence thus comes from outside the
        failed bank’s records.
               This case requires us to apply federal law developed from a
        combination of federal common law and a statute, known
        collectively as the “D’Oench doctrine.” See D’Oench, Duhme &
        Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 676 (1942); 12
        U.S.C. § 1823(e). That estoppel doctrine applies when the FDIC
        takes over a failed bank and sells it to a solvent bank. See D’Oench,
        315 U.S. at 460, 62 S. Ct. at 681. Just as the parol evidence rule bars
        extrinsic evidence to contradict a written contract, the D’Oench

        1 In 2016, the bankruptcy court approved Landcastle’s $300,000 bulk purchase
        of any claims that the Hardwick law firm potentially had against others.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court               20-13735

        doctrine bars the use of evidence outside the failed bank’s records
        to challenge the validity of a facially valid note, guaranty, or
        collateral pledge acquired by the FDIC from a failed bank and sold
        to a solvent bank, like Renasant. To be clear, D’Oench does not
        bar such challenges; rather, it limits what evidence can be used to
        mount those challenges.
                 Courts have developed this robust federal common law
        because the FDIC must be able to rely upon the failed bank’s
        official records when it quickly estimates and sells a failed bank’s
        assets—loans and collaterals—to a successor bank that takes over
        the failed bank’s deposit liabilities. The FDIC’s immediate sale
        enables the purchaser-successor bank, like Renasant, to open the
        failed bank the next morning with deposits (the failed bank’s
        liabilities) available to customers without interruption. See
        Langley v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 91–92, 108 S. Ct.
        396, 401 (1987); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gordy, 928 F.2d
        1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1991). Practically too, D’Oench affords the
        FDIC a super-charged, holder-in-due-course protection.
             There’s more relevant D’Oench law and more to
        Hardwick’s tale but that gets us to the certified question:
              Does D’Oench bar a claim (or defense) that the agent
              [Hardwick] who signed the agreement [the CD
              security agreement] with the bank [Crescent]
              purportedly lacked authority to do so?
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        20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       5

              Applying the Supreme Court’s and our Circuit’s D’Oench
        precedent, we hold that Landcastle’s lack-of-authority claims are
        barred because they rely on evidence that was outside Crescent’s
        records when the FDIC took over that failed bank and sold the
        Hardwick loan and CD collateral to Renasant.
              Indeed, none of Landcastle’s evidence was in Crescent’s
        records. Undisputedly too, Crescent had no knowledge that
        Hardwick lacked authority to pledge his own law firm’s CD.
               Although D’Oench bars Landcastle’s non-bank-records
        evidence, Landcastle tries to escape D’Oench’s estoppel doctrine
        altogether. Landcastle makes a novel argument that seeks to slip
        in and use its non-bank-records evidence through another avenue.
               To do that, Landcastle isolates the 2009 transaction and then
        tries to use the same non-bank-records evidence to claim the
        security agreement was “void,” a legal nullity, and non-existent.
        From that, Landcastle argues Crescent itself never had any interest
        in the CD security agreement, the FDIC took over nothing from
        Crescent, the FDIC sold nothing to Renasant, and D’Oench
        protection was never triggered.
               But to allow Landcastle to do indirectly—introduce
        non-bank-records evidence—what it cannot do directly in an FDIC
        case would eviscerate D’Oench equitable protection of the FDIC.
        That would mean every facially valid and unqualified note,
        mortgage, or collateral pledge assumed and sold by the FDIC as
        receiver would be subject to after-the-fact litigation based on
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      20-13735

        non-bank-records evidence alleging a former customer’s manager
        lacked authority. That use of evidence outside the bank’s records
        is precisely what D’Oench is designed to avoid.
               The Supreme Court teaches us that even if a note is
        “voidable,” a failed bank can “transfer to the FDIC voidable title,
        which is enough to constitute ‘title or interest’ in the note” for
        purposes of the D’Oench doctrine. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94,
        108 S. Ct. at 402. Therefore, agent Hardwick’s lack of authority,
        even if proven by non-bank-records evidence, 2 would render the
        security agreement, at most, voidable by the principal, but not
        void. So Crescent had and transferred at least a voidable interest
        to the FDIC, which is adequate for D’Oench purposes.
              Simply put, D’Oench bars Landcastle’s attempt to use
        non-bank-records evidence to challenge the facially valid and
        unconditional security agreement acquired by the FDIC as receiver
        from the failed bank Crescent and sold by the FDIC to Renasant.
               We divide our opinion into these six parts:
              (1) we discuss the loan documents in Crescent’s records
        when the FDIC took over;

        2 The district court found fact issues existed as to whether Hardwick had
        apparent authority to pledge the CD given that all three managers,
        shareholders, and directors commingled their personal finances with those of
        their law firm. Further, the law firm’s CD was held as collateral for over five
        years and liquidated without objection by the law firm—yet another fact
        evincing Hardwick’s apparent authority.
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        20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       7

              (2) we examine the procedural history and Landcastle’s
        evidence that all comes from outside the failed bank’s records;
              (3) we review Supreme Court and our precedent developing
        the D’Oench estoppel doctrine as federal common law;
              (4) we apply those D’Oench principles and explain that
        Landcastle’s lack-of-authority claims are barred because they are
        based on only evidence outside Crescent’s records;
              (5) we outline why we reject Landcastle’s attempt to escape
        the D’Oench estoppel doctrine altogether; and
              (6) lastly, we respond to the dissent.
                I.     CRESCENT’S LOAN AND CD RECORDS
              The FDIC, created by Congress, works to insure deposits at
        banks and savings institutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a). When
        Crescent failed in 2010, the FDIC took over as receiver and,
        overnight, sold Crescent’s assets and liabilities—including the
        Hardwick loan and CD collateral—to Renasant.
               Prior to Crescent’s failure, Hardwick induced Crescent in
        2009 to make him a loan for $631,276.71: (1) by procuring a CD for
        $631,276.71 in the name of “Morris Hardwick Schneider, LLC”;
        and (2) by signing, on the same day, an agreement granting
        Crescent a security interest in the CD as collateral for his loan.
        Crescent also had his law firm’s corporate resolution as to that CD.
              When the FDIC took over as receiver, Crescent’s bank
        records included Hardwick’s note and these documents: (1) a
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                20-13735

        Hypothecation Agreement (the “security agreement”) granting
        Crescent a security interest in the CD; (2) an Assignment of the CD;
        and (3) the Hardwick law firm’s Corporate Resolution as to the
        CD. We review each in turn.
              A. Security Agreement as to the CD
                The parties to the security agreement are: (1) Crescent, the
        “Lender”; (2) Nathan Hardwick, the “Borrower”; and (3) the
        Hardwick law firm, the “Pledgor.” The first page of the agreement
        states, “[I]n consideration of loans granted by Lender [Crescent] to
        Borrower [Hardwick], the [Pledgor Hardwick law firm] . . . hereby
        assigns the Lender all its right, title and interest to, and grants
        Lender a security interest in,” the CD collateral, described as CD
        #55529696. Hardwick signed for the Pledgor Hardwick law firm
        as “MANAGING MEM[BER].”
              The security agreement provides that in the event of default,
        Crescent may dispose of the CD collateral as a secured party.
        Undisputedly, the plain terms of the agreement permitted
        Renasant to liquidate the CD to pay off Hardwick’s loan balance.
              B. Assignment of CD
               The CD was also assigned to Crescent as security for the
        payment of Hardwick’s loan. The Assignment states, “Assignment
        of deposit or share account: For value received, I [the Hardwick
        law firm] assign and transfer to you [Crescent], and I give you a
        security interest in the following account(s): CRESCENT BANK
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        20-13735              Opinion of the Court                     9

        CD# 55529696.” Hardwick signed the Assignment as the
        “MANAGING MEM[BER]” of the Hardwick law firm.
              C. Law Firm’s Corporate Resolution as to the CD
               Crescent’s records contain a third document, entitled
        “Resolution of Corporation, Partnership & LLCs.” The corporate
        resolution was signed by: (1) Hardwick, as both “MANAGING
        MEMBER” and “DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE” of the
        Hardwick law firm; and (2) Robert Driskell, the Hardwick law
        firm’s Chief Financial Officer, as an “AUTHORIZED SIGNER.”
        The corporate resolution was addressed to Crescent.
              The second page of the corporate resolution states,
        “RESOLUTION APPLIES TO (check all that apply).” That second
        page has this box: “■ SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS ACCOUNT
        NUMBER(S): 55529696.” That box was checked. That number is
        the CD number.
                Below that checked box, the corporate resolution lists
        Hardwick and Driskell as the “Authorized Parties.” The corporate
        resolution concludes with the proclamation: “IT IS FURTHER
        RESOLVED AS FOLLOWS, the Entity [the Hardwick law firm]
        certifies to the Financial Institution [Crescent] that: Unless
        specifically designated, each of the Authorized Parties [Hardwick
        and Driskell] whose signature appears above may sign without the
        other(s).”
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         10                     Opinion of the Court               20-13735

                         II.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               In 2017, Landcastle filed this lawsuit against Renasant to
         recover the funds from the liquidated CD, alleging conversion and
         breach of contract. Landcastle asserted that Hardwick lacked
         authority to pledge the Hardwick law firm’s CD as collateral for his
         personal loan.
               A. Summary Judgment Evidence
                Following discovery, both parties moved for summary
         judgment. Landcastle introduced documents about the Hardwick
         law firm’s structure. None of these documents were in Crescent’s
         records. Yet we must review them because Landcastle bases its
         claims on them.
                Landcastle’s documents revealed that the lawyers in the
         firm’s name—Arthur Morris, Hardwick, and Randolph
         Schneider—were not even “members” of the LLC law firm. In
         actuality, the law firm was owned by a corporation called
         MHSLAW, P.C. The designated “sole member” of the firm was
         MHSLAW, P.C.
               Landcastle emphasizes that (1) although Hardwick was a
         manager, he was not a “member”; (2) only MHSLAW, P.C. was a
         “member”; and (3) only MHSLAW, P.C. had authority to pledge
         the CD.
               Of course, nothing about MHSLAW, P.C. was in Crescent’s
         records. Instead, the CD was in the name of the Hardwick law
         firm. Plus, Landcastle’s documents show Hardwick (1) owned
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         20-13735                 Opinion of the Court                            11

         50% of MHSLAW, P.C.’s stock, (2) was “President” and a
         “director” of MHSLAW, P.C., and (3) was a “Manager” of the
         firm. 3 Hardwick ran the show, so to speak.
                Now comes the twist that Landcastle tries to use, derived
         from a deep dive into MHSLAW, P.C.’s corporate structure.
         MHSLAW P.C.’s bylaws—also evidence outside the failed bank’s
         records—state that a “director” cannot guarantee a debt over
         $10,000 “without the affirmative vote of the majority of the votes
         entitled to be cast by the shareholders.” And the law firm’s
         operating agreement provides that a “Manager” cannot guarantee
         a debt over $10,000 “without the affirmative vote of the Members
         holding a majority interest.”

         3Hardwick’s broad authority as President of MHSLAW, P.C. is demonstrated
         by how MHSLAW, P.C.’s bylaws describe his President’s role:
                The President shall be the chief executive officer of the
                Company and shall have general and active management of
                the operation of the Company. He shall be responsible for the
                administration of the Company, including general supervision
                of the policies of the Company and general and active
                management of the financial affairs of the Company, and shall
                execute bonds, mortgages, or other contracts in the name and
                on behalf of the company.
         Similarly, the law firm’s operating agreement designated Hardwick as a
         “Manager” and provided Hardwick with “complete power and authority to
         act on behalf of the Company, enter into contracts on behalf of the Company
         and otherwise bind the Company in any other manner.”
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         12                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

                Because Hardwick owned only 50% of MHSLAW, P.C. and
         not a majority interest, Landcastle contended (1) Hardwick needed
         the vote of another shareholder of MHSLAW, P.C., and (2) thus
         Hardwick lacked authority to unilaterally pledge his law firm’s CD.
         Landcastle also filed declarations from Morris and Schneider—who
         each owned 25% of MHSLAW, P.C.’s stock—stating that they “did
         not vote to authorize either MHSLAW, P.C. or Morris Hardwick
         Schneider, LLC to pledge the CD as collateral.”
               B. District Court’s Order and Certification
               In 2020, the district court denied both parties’ summary
         judgment motions. The district court determined that “it is
         beyond dispute that Crescent Bank did not know that Hardwick
         lacked authority to pledge the CD.”
                In denying Renasant’s motion, the district court identified as
         a threshold issue whether D’Oench bars Landcastle’s claims, based
         on non-bank records, that Hardwick lacked authority to execute
         Crescent’s security agreement. The court likened Hardwick’s lack
         of authority to a “forgery” that resembles “fraud in the factum.”
         The court concluded that “fraud in the factum” rendered the CD
         security agreement “void” and thus D’Oench did not apply.
                In denying Landcastle’s motion, the district court found that
         the corporate documents of MHSLAW, P.C. and the Hardwick law
         firm revealed that Hardwick did not have actual authority to
         pledge the CD because (1) the “sole member” of the law firm was
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         20-13735                  Opinion of the Court                              13

         MHSLAW, P.C., and (2) Hardwick, despite owning 50% of its
         stock, needed the vote of another shareholder to pledge the CD.
                Nonetheless, the district court ruled that genuine fact issues
         existed as to whether Hardwick had apparent authority to pledge
         the CD. The court observed, inter alia, that all three managers of
         the LLC (who were also shareholders and directors of the LLC’s
         sole member MHSLAW, P.C.) failed to follow corporate
         formalities and routinely commingled their personal finances with
         those of the company. 4
               In its same order, the district court certified two questions of
         law for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This
         Court granted Renasant’s petition for an interlocutory appeal as to
         only the threshold question: “Does D’Oench bar a claim (or

         4  The dissent incorrectly claims that there is no evidence that Morris and
         Schneider—the other two managers, shareholders, and directors—knew
         about Hardwick’s purchase of the law firm’s CD or his pledge. Dissenting Op.
         at 3. But the record creates fact issues about what Morris and Schneider knew.
         For example, Morris testified he knew of Hardwick’s financial troubles, and he
         “was [Hardwick’s] daddy for ten years” because Morris knew the law firm
         “[couldn’t] afford to have a major partner file for bankruptcy”; so Morris used
         personal funds and “weekly [bonus] payments” from the law firm given the
         “constant pressure on [Hardwick] from creditors for immediate funding.”
         Even the district court found that “Renasant’s evidence—in particular, the
         managers’ use of [firm] funds to pay off Hardwick’s personal debts” raised fact
         issues about how Morris and Schneider conducted firm business. In short,
         Morris and Schneider were self-acknowledged enablers of Hardwick’s use of
         firm funds for his personal debts.
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         14                    Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         defense) that the agent who signed the agreement with the bank
         purportedly lacked authority to do so?”
                C. Standard of Review
                 “We review de novo a question of law certified by the
         district court pursuant to § 1292(b).” Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v.
         Preston, 873 F.3d 877, 880 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks
         omitted). While we “may not reach beyond the certified order, we
         may address any issue fairly included within the certified order.”
         Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020)
         (quotation marks omitted).
         III.   SUPREME COURT AND OUR D’OENCH PRECEDENT
               In this appeal, the certified question assumes that Hardwick
         “purportedly” lacked authority to unilaterally pledge the CD. We
         proceed on that basis. In addition, Renasant stands in the shoes of
         the FDIC, and Landcastle in those of the Hardwick law firm.
                Given D’Oench is not a doctrine we apply every day, we set
         forth the Supreme Court’s D’Oench and Langley decisions and
         then five Eleventh Circuit decisions holding D’Oench barred a
         broad array of claims against the FDIC when based on evidence
         outside the failed bank’s official records.
                A. D’Oench Doctrine
                In 1942, the Supreme Court decided D’Oench, Duhme &
         Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., creating what is known as
         the D’Oench doctrine. 315 U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 676. In D’Oench, the
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                      15

         FDIC conducted a purchase-and-assumption transaction of an
         insolvent bank and acquired a loan where the collateral was a
         demand note by the D’Oench company. Id. at 454, 62 S. Ct. at 678.
         When the FDIC sued to collect on the demand-note collateral, the
         D’Oench company asserted the defense of failure of consideration
         because the failed bank had agreed the note would not have to be
         paid. Id. at 456, 62 S. Ct. at 679. The undisclosed agreement was
         evidenced by written “receipts,” stating: “This note is given with
         the understanding it will not be called upon for payment.” Id. at
         454, 62 S. Ct. at 678.
                 Yet the Supreme Court barred the D’Oench company’s
         defense to the note as a matter of law. The Court concluded that
         the enforceability of the note was determined by federal common
         law rather than state law because of the federal policy to protect
         the FDIC. See id. at 457–61, 62 S. Ct. at 679–81. More specifically,
         the Supreme Court held that “secret agreements” could not be a
         defense to suit by the FDIC because such agreements would
         contravene “a federal policy” that “protect[s] [the FDIC] and the
         public funds which it administers against misrepresentations as to
         the securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which
         [the FDIC] insures or to which it makes loans.” Id. at 457–58, 62 S.
         Ct. at 679–80 (emphases added). The written receipts reflecting the
         insolvent bank’s agreement—that the note would not be paid—
         were not in the bank’s official records when the FDIC assumed the
         bank’s assets and liabilities, and thus were not enforceable against
         the FDIC. Id. at 461, 62 S. Ct. at 681.
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         16                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

                B. Langley and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
                 Eight years after D’Oench, Congress passed The Federal
         Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, which broadened D’Oench’s
         protection of the FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). Section 1823(e)
         imposes various requirements on “any agreement which tends to
         diminish or defeat the interest” of the FDIC in any asset acquired
         from an insolvent bank. Id. An agreement—that “tends to
         diminish or defeat” the FDIC’s interest in an asset—is only valid
         against the FDIC if it, inter alia, is in writing, is continuously an
         official record of the failed bank, is executed by the bank itself, and
         satisfies other approval and filing requirements in § 1823(e). Id.
                Thirty-seven years later, the Supreme Court in Langley v.
         Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. concluded that the D’Oench
         doctrine also protected the FDIC from claims raising “undisclosed
         conditions” and “fraud” as to “a facially unqualified note” the FDIC
         acquired from an insolvent bank. 484 U.S. at 92–93, 108 S. Ct. at
         401–02 (emphasis added). In Langley, the FDIC sought to collect
         on the acquired note. Id. at 88–90, 108 S. Ct. at 400. The borrowers
         alleged their note was “entirely void” and no contract was formed
         because the failed bank itself procured their note through
         fraudulent misrepresentations about the land being purchased with
         the note’s proceeds. Id. at 88–89, 108 S. Ct. at 400 (emphasis
         added).
               Although the failed bank committed fraud, the Supreme
         Court concluded that the borrowers could not use evidence
         outside the bank’s official records to assert a fraudulent-
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         20-13735                Opinion of the Court                        17

         inducement defense to the FDIC’s enforcement of “a seemingly
         unqualified note.” Id. at 92–93, 108 S. Ct. at 402. The Court
         discussed how, when a bank fails, the FDIC must decide whether
         to (1) liquidate the bank’s assets (its loans) and much later pay the
         bank’s customers their deposits; or (2) provide public-funds
         financing for a solvent ongoing bank to purchase the failed bank’s
         assets (its loans) and assume its liabilities (its deposits), thus
         avoiding an interruption in banking services. See id. at 91, 108 S.
         Ct. at 401. The FDIC’s evaluations “must be made with great
         speed, usually overnight” so that the successor bank opens the next
         morning with deposits accessible to customers without
         interruption and with assigned loans roughly equal to the assumed
         deposit liabilities. See id., 108 S. Ct. at 401 (quotation marks
         omitted).
                The Supreme Court concluded that the FDIC would not “be
         able to make reliable evaluations if bank records contained
         seemingly unqualified notes that are in fact subject to undisclosed
         conditions.” Id. at 92, 108 S. Ct. at 401. The Court clarified that
         “[a] condition to payment of a note . . . is part of the ‘agreement’ to
         which the writing, approval, and filing requirements of 12 U.S.C.
         § 1823(e) attach.” Id. at 96, 108 S. Ct. at 403.
                In Langley, the borrowers’ “fallback position” was that a
         bank’s misrepresentation should fall outside the scope of D’Oench
         and § 1823(e) “when the misrepresentation was fraudulent and the
         FDIC had knowledge of the asserted defense at the time it acquired
         the note.” Id. at 93, 108 S. Ct. at 402. In rejecting that claim, the
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         18                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         Supreme Court distinguished between “fraud in the factum” and
         “fraud in the inducement.” See id. at 93–94, 108 S. Ct. at 402.
                 The Court observed that fraud in the factum (1) is “the sort
         of fraud that procures a party’s signature to an instrument without
         knowledge of its true nature or contents”; (2) which “would take
         the instrument out of § 1823(e), because it would render the
         instrument entirely void”; and (3) would leave the FDIC with “no
         right, title or interest that could be diminished or defeated.” Id.,
         108 S. Ct. at 402 (cleaned up).
               On the other hand, the Court explained that “fraud in the
         inducement . . . renders the note voidable but not void,” and “[t]he
         bank therefore had and could transfer to the FDIC voidable title,
         which is enough to constitute title or interest in the note.” Id. at
         94, 108 S. Ct. at 402 (emphases added and quotation marks
         omitted). The Court reasoned that (1) “[t]his conclusion is not only
         textually compelled, but produces the only result in accord with
         the purposes of the statute,” and (2) “[i]f voidable title were not an
         ‘interest’ under § 1823(e), the FDIC would be subject not only to
         undisclosed fraud defenses but also to a wide range of other
         undisclosed defenses that make a contract voidable.” Id., 108 Ct.
         at 402 (emphasis added).
                The Court held that “neither fraud in the inducement nor
         knowledge by the FDIC is relevant to the section’s application.” Id.
         at 93, 108 S. Ct. at 402. The Court pointed out that “a voidable
         interest is transferable whether or not the transferee knows of the
         misrepresentation or fraud that produces the voidability.” Id. at 94,
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         108 S. Ct. at 403. The Court stressed that “the equities [that] the
         statute regards as predominant” are those protecting the FDIC.
         See id. at 94–95, 108 S. Ct. at 403 (emphasis added).
              Langley teaches three federal common-law lessons under
         D’Oench: (1) even if the failed bank itself made material
         misrepresentations and fraudulently induced the borrower to enter
         into a promissory note, the bank’s admitted fraud against a
         borrower renders the borrower’s note only “voidable but not
         void”; (2) the failed bank’s transfer of a voidable note to the FDIC
         is enough to grant the FDIC title or interest in the note; and (3) a
         borrower cannot use documents outside the failed bank’s official
         records to challenge a facially valid and unqualified note acquired
         by the FDIC from a failed bank. See id. at 93–94, 108 S. Ct. at 402–
         03.
                 We now review our Circuit and other precedent faithfully
         applying these D’Oench principles as federal common law.
         Repeatedly, our Court has emphasized that the FDIC cannot make
         a reliable evaluation, nor can a successor-purchaser bank, if a failed
         bank has facially valid and unconditional loan assets that are sold
         and then much later a party can challenge them based on
         documents outside the failed bank’s records.
                C. FSLIC v. Two Rivers Associates, Inc.
                 In 1989, this Court faced a situation where the failed bank’s
         official records did provide some support for the borrower’s
         defense. Nonetheless, this Court concluded that the D’Oench
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         20                       Opinion of the Court                    20-13735

         doctrine still protected both the FDIC and the Federal Savings and
         Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) from claims relying on
         official bank records, unless those bank records contained an
         “explicit acceptance” of a specific legal obligation by the failed
         bank. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880
         F.2d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Two Rivers”). 5
                 In Two Rivers, after a bank failed, the FSLIC as receiver
         instituted foreclosure proceedings against a borrower that had
         defaulted on its mortgage. Id. at 1270. A subordinate creditor
         opposed the foreclosure and filed affidavits from officials at the
         insolvent bank stating that the bank had agreed to fund the
         borrower’s entire project. Id. at 1273. The creditor argued, inter
         alia, that D’Oench should not apply because the bank’s agreement
         to fund the entire project was not “secret” but reflected in the failed
         bank’s own records. Id. at 1275.
                The FSLIC contended that under federal common law the
         creditor was “estopped from asserting his defenses and
         counterclaims” based on documents and an agreement not in the
         failed bank’s records. Id. at 1273. In holding D’Oench barred the
         creditor’s claim against the FSLIC, this Court found the failed
         bank’s records contained evidence of an “obligation to provide an

         5As to the FSLIC, this Court agreed with other circuits that D’Oench “should
         protect the FSLIC to the same extent it protects the FDIC.” Two Rivers, 880
         F.2d at 1274–75. On August 9, 1989, the FSLIC was abolished, and the FDIC
         became its statutory successor. See Gordy, 928 F.2d at 1559 n.1.
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                        21

         additional” loan. Id. at 1275–76 (emphasis omitted). This Court,
         however, still applied D’Oench to bar the creditor’s claim because
         the bank’s records contained no “explicit acceptance of the
         obligation to fund the entire project.” Id. at 1276.
                In so ruling, this Court observed that the D’Oench doctrine
         “allow[s] the FDIC to rely on bank records . . . when taking over a
         failed bank.” Id. at 1275. Adhering to Langley, our Court
         emphasized that “neither the FDIC nor the state banking
         authorities would be able to make a reliable evaluation if bank
         records contained seemingly unqualified notes that are in fact
         subject to undisclosed conditions.” Id. at 1276 (alterations adopted)
         (quoting Langley, 484 U.S. at 91–92, 108 S. Ct. at 401).
                Our Court also stressed: While the creditor’s arguments and
         affidavits “might be appropriate in a suit against [the insolvent
         bank]” had the bank not failed, they were “not sufficient in this case
         to survive summary judgment against the FSLIC.” Id. In other
         words, while under state law a creditor’s claim may be viable
         against a failed bank, under federal common law, the creditor “[i]s
         estopped” from asserting claims based on documents not in the
         failed bank’s records. See id. at 1277.
                D. FDIC v. McCullough
                Extending the federal common-law D’Oench doctrine
         further, this Court has held D’Oench barred borrowers’ claims that
         a note and mortgage were entirely “void” based on “failure to
         perform a condition precedent, failure of consideration, and
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         22                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         fraudulent inducement.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McCullough,
         911 F.2d 593, 600–02 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
               McCullough is particularly instructive here. In that case,
         Charles Little borrowed over $1 million from Twin City FSB, a
         local bank, secured by a mortgage on various properties. Id. at 595.
         The borrowers assumed Little’s debt held by Twin City. Id. at 595–
         96. When Twin City failed, the FSLIC, as receiver, sued the
         borrowers to recover the debt. Id. at 596. In defense, the
         borrowers contended that (in consideration of their assuming
         Little’s debt) the failed Twin City had promised to convey to them
         title to certain properties and oil leases. Id.
                The borrowers argued: (1) “the note and mortgage should
         be considered void because Little and [the failed] Twin City had
         fraudulently induced them to assume Little’s prior indebtedness”;
         (2) “the transaction should be declared void due to a failure of
         consideration”; and (3) “the mortgage being sued upon was legally
         insufficient because the notarization was not conducted in
         accordance with Alabama law.” Id. (emphases added).
                 In affirming the grant of summary judgment for the FSLIC,
         this Court addressed the scope of D’Oench. Id. at 599. Even
         though D’Oench involved a secret agreement, we observed that
         “the policy considerations leading to the development of federal
         common law in D’Oench have resulted in extension of the
         D’Oench estoppel doctrine well beyond” its initial factual setting.
         Id. at 600. Borrowers’ claims and defenses based “upon unrecorded
         promises or schemes”—even if creating claims of fraudulent
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                      23

         inducement or failure of consideration—“are now also generally
         precluded by D’Oench and its progeny.” Id. Our Court again
         underscored that “[s]uch defenses if allowed against the FSLIC or
         the FDIC would, like the defense at issue in D’Oench, contravene
         the primary federal policy that the FSLIC and the FDIC must be
         able to rely upon financial institutions’ records in order to best
         protect the public funds they administer.” Id. (emphasis added).
                Our Court concluded, to put the FSLIC on notice of the
         failed bank’s obligation to transfer the mortgaged or other
         property, there must be “explicit documentation evidencing [the
         failed bank’s] obligation to transfer specific properties to the
         McCulloughs.” Id. at 601. While there were two documents in the
         bank’s records with references to transfers of additional property,
         those documents were legally insufficient under D’Oench to give
         notice to the FSLIC that the failed bank “had made a fixed
         commitment” to transfer property. Id.
                This Court also rejected the McCulloughs’ argument that
         the mortgage securing the note was legally insufficient. Id. at 602–
         03. “Although facially appearing to be a valid, legal mortgage, the
         parties agree[d] that the mortgage was not witnessed or
         acknowledged in proper fashion” under Alabama law. Id. at 602.
         The borrowers argued that under state law this flaw rendered the
         bank’s mortgage “voidable” and “insufficient to pass legal title” to
         the property described in the mortgage. Id. (emphases added).
              In holding D’Oench barred that claim, this Court compared
         D’Oench’s protection of the FDIC and FSLIC as analogous to state
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         24                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         law protection of “a holder in due course.” Id. Our reasoning was:
         “Although the error in acknowledgement might render the
         mortgage voidable were this suit between two private parties
         litigating under state law, we conclude that the FSLIC’s federal
         common law defenses bar the McCulloughs’ claim of improper
         notarization. On its face, the mortgage appears valid.” Id.
         (emphasis added).
               Our Court also concluded that the FSLIC, if accorded
         holder-in-due-course status under Alabama law, “could not be said
         to have had notice of the irregularity of which the McCulloughs
         now complain.” Id. at 604. In any event, the irregularity in the
         mortgage is not cognizable against a holder in due course. Id. So
         long as the disputed note or loan in the bank’s records appears
         facially valid, the FDIC as receiver is allowed to rely on it with the
         protection of the D’Oench doctrine. See id. at 602.
               E. Twin Construction, Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc.
                 Once more this Court faced a scenario where a document in
         the failed bank’s official records supported a party’s claim against
         the FDIC. Nevertheless, this Court held that a document in the
         failed bank’s records is not enough to bring a party’s claim outside
         of D’Oench protection unless the document was executed by the
         failed bank. See Twin Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F.2d
         378, 382–84 (11th Cir. 1991). We discuss Twin Construction as it
         (1) rejected arguments that D’Oench bars only borrowers’ claims;
         (2) concluded that D’Oench applies to collateral pledge agreements
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                      25

         securing a loan; and (3) emphasized that D’Oench requires courts
         “to look beyond contract law.” See id.
               A shopping center owner obtained a loan from Old Vernon
         bank and pledged the property as collateral in a mortgage. Id. at
         379–80. Twin Construction built the shopping center. Id. at 380.
         A document in the bank’s official records, entitled “Contractor’s
         Consent,” stated that the bank would reserve sufficient funds in the
         owner’s loan to pay and satisfy the owner’s agreement with Twin
         Construction (the “bank document”). Id. Twin Construction
         signed Old Vernon’s bank document. Id.
                When Old Vernon did not pay, Twin Construction sued the
         bank: (1) to foreclose its mechanic’s lien for $1.5 million and to
         elevate that lien above Old Vernon’s mortgage; (2) for breach of
         the bank’s written contract to reserve funds to pay Twin
         Construction; and (3) for fraud. Id. In a separate action, Old
         Vernon sued the shopping center owner for defaulting on its loan
         and mortgage. Id. Old Vernon alleged its mortgage had priority
         over Twin Construction’s lien. Id. Twin Construction joined that
         lawsuit, making similar allegations as those in its own suit. Id.
         Thereafter, the bank failed. Id.
               Ultimately, the FSLIC, as receiver, took over, consolidated
         the cases, and contended D’Oench barred Twin Construction’s
         claims against Old Vernon (now the FSLIC). Id. Twin
         Construction responded that D’Oench did not apply to its claims
         based on an official bank record and barred only (1) claims asserted
         by the borrower (the shopping center owner), and (2) unwritten
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         26                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         agreements between the borrower and the failed bank. Id. at 381.
         Because the bank document in the failed bank’s own records
         represented Old Vernon would reserve loan funds to pay Twin
         Construction, Twin Construction contended there was no secret
         agreement. Id. at 383.
               This Court held D’Oench barred Twin Construction’s
         claims. Id. at 384–85. In doing so, our Court outlined the evolution
         of the federal “D’Oench common law” and how it protects the
         FDIC, the FSLIC, and their successors “from claims of state and
         common law fraud, violation of state or federal securities laws, and
         the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, unjust enrichment,
         failure of consideration and usury.” Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
                We rejected Twin Construction’s argument that D’Oench
         applies only to claims asserted by a borrower. Id. We pointed out
         that “D’Oench and section 1823(e) have affected monetary
         obligations including a mortgage, a letter of credit or personal
         guaranty or collateral pledge agreement securing a loan, rental
         payments under a lease, and a refund provision in an insurance
         contract.” Id. (emphasis added). D’Oench applies to any asset of
         the failed bank acquired by the FDIC or FSLIC because “[f]ederal
         regulatory authorities need to make reliable evaluations of the
         assets of a financial institution.” Id.
               As to whether D’Oench barred Twin Construction’s claims
         against the FSLIC based on a document in the failed bank’s records,
         this Court made clear that D’Oench requires courts “to look
         beyond normal contract law.” Id. at 383 (emphasis added). Since
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                      27

         Old Vernon’s bank document was signed by only Twin
         Construction and not by the bank, it “does not establish that the
         non-signatory [bank] is required to perform any obligations
         contained in the document. Instead, it would be necessary to
         resort to an assessment of the non-signatory’s words or acts in
         order to determine whether that party is so bound.” Id. at 384.
                 This Court also stressed that “[b]ank examiners must
         reliably evaluate the worth of a bank’s assets ‘with great speed,
         usually overnight, in order to preserve the going concern value of
         the failed bank and avoid an interruption in banking services.’” Id.
         (quoting Langley, 484 U.S. at 92, 108 S. Ct. at 401). “That a
         document is written and in the bank’s records is not enough to
         bring the case outside D’Oench and section 1823(e).” Id. at 383. In
         order to impose any legal obligation of the bank on the FSLIC, the
         document must be “executed,” i.e., signed, by the bank, as well as
         in the bank’s records. Id. at 384; see 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2).
               F. FSLIC v. Gordy
                In a similar vein, this Court in Federal Savings & Loan
         Insurance Corp. v. Gordy held that D’Oench protected the FSLIC
         from a guarantor’s fraud claim that the failed bank had falsely
         misrepresented its financial statements. 928 F.2d at 1559–60, 1566.
         In Gordy, two individuals (guarantors of a letter of credit)
         negotiated a plan to acquire and develop a hotel. Id. at 1560.
         During the negotiations, the bank provided them with “a written
         statement of [the bank’s] financial condition,” portraying “a sound
         financial condition,” even though the bank was insolvent. Id.
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         28                     Opinion of the Court               20-13735

               After the bank failed, the FSLIC sought payment from the
         guarantors. Id. The guarantors argued D’Oench was inapplicable
         because the bank’s own misrepresentations constituted fraud in the
         factum. Id. at 1561.
                The Gordy Court held that D’Oench applied to bar the
         guarantor’s fraud claim. Id. at 1564. The bank’s financial statement
         in Gordy was a “condition of payment” that was not
         “memorialized in writing or otherwise made explicit such that the
         FSLIC or the FDIC would have knowledge of the bank’s
         obligations during an evaluation of the bank’s records.” Id.
         (quotation marks omitted). So D’Oench applied to protect the
         FSLIC from the guarantor’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
         Id.
               D’Oench applied “even in the absence of bad faith,
         recklessness or negligence” on the part of the guarantors seeking
         to invalidate their guaranty. Id. at 1566; see Baumann v. Savers
         Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1515 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
         D’Oench doctrine applies even where the customer is completely
         innocent of any bad faith, recklessness, or negligence.”).
                 Similar to the Supreme Court’s Langley, this Court
         explained the material difference between fraud in the factum and
         fraud in the inducement. Gordy, 928 F.2d at 1565. The Gordy
         Court held that the false financial statement was not fraud in the
         factum, but was “fraud in the inducement,” and D’Oench applied.
         Id. at 1566. This Court described fraud in the factum “as ‘the sort
         of fraud that procures a party’s signature to an instrument without
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         20-13735                   Opinion of the Court                              29

         knowledge of its true nature or contents,’” rendering the
         agreement entirely void. Id. at 1565 (quoting Langley, 484 U.S. at
         93, 108 S. Ct. at 402). Conversely, fraud in the inducement “does
         not go to the very essence of the agreement but rather merely
         induces the party to enter the agreement,” rendering the
         agreement “voidable and thus capable of transfer.” 6 Id.
                G. First Union National Bank of Florida v. Hall
                 Significantly, this Court has instructed that the
         “common-law” D’Oench doctrine serves as a super-charged parol
         evidence rule that precludes evidence of an agreement that tends
         to diminish or defeat the FDIC’s interest in any asset acquired from
         a failed bank. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d 1374,
         1379 n.9, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 1997). In Hall, First Union sued Hall
         to collect on his defaulted note that it acquired through a purchase-
         and-assumption agreement with the FDIC. Id. at 1376. Hall
         claimed that the insolvent bank “had agreed to limit its remedies in
         the event of default.” Id. Hall offered affidavits and documents to
         prove that such an agreement existed, including the affidavit of
         Harrison, a former bank officer. Id. at 1380. First Union argued
         that D’Oench barred Hall’s claim and evidence. Id. at 1376.

         6 To be complete, this Court has created an exception to D’Oench for “free
         standing tort claims that are not related to a specific asset acquired by the
         FDIC.” Vernon v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 981 F.2d 1230, 1233–34 (11th Cir.
         1993); Vernon v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 907 F.2d 1101, 1108 (11th Cir. 1990). Here,
         no party relies on this free standing tort exception, so we need not discuss it.
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         30                     Opinion of the Court               20-13735

                 This Court ruled that the “common-law” D’Oench doctrine
         “flatly prohibits parol evidence.” Id. at 1380. “Allowing Hall to
         present parol evidence, such as Harrison’s affidavit, would force
         the FDIC and its transferees to look beyond the plain terms of the
         documents. That is a burden of which the D’Oench, Duhme
         doctrine seeks to relieve them.” Id. at 1381. This Court, therefore,
         held that Hall’s parol evidence was barred by the “common-law”
         D’Oench doctrine. Id. at 1379 n.9, 1381.
                Although this concludes our outline of relevant Circuit
         precedent, we review one state decision because it applies the
         federal D’Oench doctrine to bar a lack-of-authority claim.
               H. Federal Financial Co. v. Holden
                Applying federal common law, the Georgia Supreme Court
         has held that D’Oench protects the FSLIC as receiver from a
         property owner’s claim that a partner lacked authority to pledge a
         security interest in property. Fed. Fin. Co. v. Holden, 485 S.E.2d
         481, 483 (Ga. 1997). In Holden, three brothers, who were three of
         the four members of a partnership, executed a security deed
         conveying to a bank title to property owned by the partnership. Id.
         at 482. The three brothers lacked authority to convey the
         partnership property. Id. The bank failed, the FSLIC became
         receiver, and Federal Financial, as the FSLIC’s successor, became
         the assignee of the security deed and the note it secured. Id.
              Plaintiff Holden was not paid for his work on the property.
         Id. He filed a lien and sued to set aside the failed bank’s senior
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         20-13735              Opinion of the Court                      31

         security deed. Id. Holden claimed the bank’s security deed was
         worthless because the three brothers lacked authority from the
         partnership to pledge the property as security. Id. Fact issues
         existed as to who owned the property, what authority the brothers
         had, and what the bank knew. See id. A jury found “that the
         property was partnership property, that the bank had knowledge
         that the property was partnership property, and that the brothers
         did not have authority from the partnership to execute the security
         deed.” Id. (emphases added). The state trial court canceled the
         bank’s security deed and established Holden’s lien. Id.
                Based on the federal D’Oench doctrine, the Georgia
         Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment as a matter of law
         for Federal Financial, the FSLIC’s successor. Id. at 483. The Court
         pointed out that Holden’s attack on the security deed was based on
         “two unrecorded agreements” that were not in the bank’s official
         records: (1) the partnership agreement, and (2) the agreement
         between the brothers and the bank permitting them to pledge
         partnership property. See id. Even where the failed bank knew the
         property was partnership property and the brothers lacked
         authority to pledge it, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that
         D’Oench still protected the FSLIC from claims based on
         documents that were not in the bank’s official records. Id.
               We now apply these D’Oench principles.
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         32                    Opinion of the Court                20-13735

              IV.    APPLICATION OF D’OENCH TO THIS CASE
                To begin, the factual scenario here fits squarely within
         D’Oench. Overnight, the FDIC as receiver took over the failed
         Crescent and sold its assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits) to
         Renasant. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 91, 108 S. Ct. at 401.
         Undisputedly, the Hardwick note and the pledged CD collateral are
         loan assets the FDIC sold to Renasant.
               A. Failed Bank’s Records
               Next, to apply D’Oench, we must examine what the failed
         bank’s records showed.
                Those records contained the security agreement that
         unambiguously and unconditionally pledged the Hardwick law
         firm’s CD to Crescent as security for Hardwick’s personal loan. See
         McCullough, 911 F.2d at 600. Hardwick executed the agreement
         as managing member of the Hardwick law firm. Crescent even
         had the law firm’s corporate resolution as to the CD, which listed
         Hardwick as the managing member and authorized party to sign
         for the law firm. For D’Oench purposes, the agreement itself
         appeared facially valid.
                Then for over three years, and after the FDIC’s sale to
         Renasant in 2010, Hardwick continued to pay on his loan, and
         Renasant continued to hold the law firm’s CD as collateral for
         Hardwick’s personal loan. When Hardwick defaulted in 2014, the
         terms of the security agreement plainly permitted Renasant to
         liquidate the CD to pay off Hardwick’s personal loan balance.
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                      33

               B. Landcastle’s Evidence Outside the Bank’s Records
                Now applying D’Oench, we conclude that Landcastle’s
         claims against the FDIC and Renasant—that Hardwick lacked
         authority to sign the security agreement—are barred because they
         rely on evidence outside the bank’s records. D’Oench “flatly
         prohibits” consideration of Landcastle’s “parol evidence.” See Hall,
         123 F.3d at 1380. For purposes of summary judgment, we accept
         that (1) those outside documents prohibited Hardwick, although
         President and 50% owner of MHSLAW, P.C. and a manager of the
         Hardwick law firm, from guaranteeing debt over $10,000 without
         the vote of another shareholder; (2) the testimony states that no
         such vote occurred; and (3) Hardwick lacked authority to enter
         into and execute the security agreement.
                However, none of the law firm’s documents, nor any of this
         testimony, was in the failed bank’s own records. The D’Oench
         doctrine thus protects the FDIC from a claim or defense that relies
         on documents and evidence not found in the failed bank’s official
         records. Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 595 (11th
         Cir. 1995) (en banc); see Two Rivers, 880 F.2d at 1274;
         McCullough, 911 F.2d at 600; Hall, 123 F.3d at 1379.
                Throughout its brief, Landcastle argues that D’Oench
         applies only to oral and written “agreements” outside the bank’s
         records. Landcastle mistakenly focuses narrowly on the word
         “agreement” in § 1823(e). As explained above, D’Oench is a federal
         common-law doctrine that extends well beyond § 1823(e) and
         broadly protects the FDIC from a claim or defense based on fraud,
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         34                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         undisclosed conditions, failure of consideration, and pre-conditions
         to payment, when based on documents not in the bank’s records.
         Landcastle’s claims fit that description, as they rely on outside law
         firm documents and testimony to show that Hardwick lacked
         authority to sign the security agreement with the failed bank.
                C. Crescent’s Lack of Documentation
                Shifting its argument, Landcastle asserts that it is not the law
         firm’s governance documents but Crescent’s lack of
         documentation from the law firm that makes D’Oench
         inapplicable. Landcastle contends that (1) the corporate resolution
         did not go far enough and expressly authorize Hardwick to pledge
         the law firm’s CD as collateral; (2) the insolvent bank thus lacked
         adequate documentation that Hardwick had authority; and
         (3) because Hardwick was pledging his law firm’s CD for his
         personal loan, the loan transaction was suspicious and should have
         placed Crescent on notice that Hardwick lacked authority.
               To be clear, nothing herein addresses what claims or
         evidence the Hardwick law firm might have made or used against
         Crescent if Crescent had not failed and had liquidated the CD.
         Rather, this case is only about what claims and evidence can be
         made or used against the FDIC as receiver (and Renasant).
               As to the FDIC, Landcastle attempts to impose a
         pre-condition—the bank’s obtaining a written authorization of
         Hardwick’s authority from the law firm—on the otherwise
         unconditional terms of the security agreement. Landcastle’s
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       35

         authority requirement would condition the validity and
         enforceability of the security agreement on obtaining something
         outside the bank’s records. Nothing in the terms of the security
         agreement required a law firm or corporate resolution for its
         validity. As to the FDIC, the security agreement was facially valid.
                 Regarding the lack of documentation, both parties debate
         the legal effect of the Hardwick law firm’s corporate resolution that
         was in the bank’s records. However, as the district court found:
         “[I]t is beyond dispute that Crescent Bank did not know that
         Hardwick lacked authority to pledge the CD.”
                 We need not resolve the debate over the legal effect of the
         corporate resolution, if any, because nothing in the corporate
         resolution limits or disclaims Hardwick’s authority to pledge the
         CD. Nothing in the corporate resolution varies, contradicts, or
         alters the plain terms of the security agreement.
               At bottom, Landcastle’s claims—that Hardwick lacked
         authority to unilaterally pledge the CD—rely on MHSLAW, P.C.’s
         and the law firm’s documents and testimony outside the failed
         bank’s records and are thus barred by the D’Oench doctrine.
         V.     LANDCASTLE’S CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO D’OENCH
               What Landcastle is left to argue all revolves around its
         attempt to escape D’Oench’s estoppel doctrine altogether.
                Landcastle isolates the loan-CD transaction and argues that
         Hardwick’s lack of authority rendered the security agreement
         entirely “void,” a legal nullity, and non-existent back in 2009, and
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         36                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         incapable of being transferred to the FDIC. From that, Landcastle
         argues the FDIC obtained nothing from Crescent—no title to or
         interest in the security agreement—and thus the FDIC sold nothing
         to Renasant and D’Oench has no application here. Landcastle also
         argues that Hardwick’s exceeding his authority constitutes fraud in
         factum.
                 In response, Renasant and amici (the FDIC and the
         American and Georgia Bankers Associations) argue persuasively
         that: (1) no fraud in factum occurred; (2) agent Hardwick’s lack of
         authority, at most, rendered the security agreement potentially
         “voidable” by the principal law firm, but not “void”; and (3) thus
         Crescent had and did transfer an interest in the security agreement.
         They emphasize Langley which instructed: “Fraud in the
         inducement . . . renders the note voidable but not void. The bank
         therefore had and could transfer to the FDIC voidable title, which
         is enough to constitute ‘title or interest’ in the note” for D’Oench
         purposes. Langley, 484 U.S. at 94, 108 S. Ct. at 402 (emphases
         added and citation omitted).
               We address each of Landcastle’s arguments in turn.
               A. Fraud in the Factum
                We first reject Landcastle’s claims that Hardwick’s
         exceeding his authority constitutes fraud in the factum. The
         Supreme Court in Langley made clear that “fraud in the factum” is
         only the narrow sort of real fraud that “procures a party’s signature
         to an instrument without knowledge of its true nature or
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         20-13735                  Opinion of the Court                              37

         contents.” Id. at 93, 108 S. Ct. at 402. Similarly, this Court has
         described “fraud in the factum” as “fraud which occurs within the
         instrument itself, and as fraud arising when a party signs a
         document without full knowledge of the character or essential
         terms of the instrument.” Gordy, 928 F.2d at 1565 (quotation
         marks and citation omitted). There must be fraud in the
         procurement of a person’s signature itself that leaves the signer
         unaware of the nature of the document he has signed. See Langley,
         484 U.S. at 93, 108 S. Ct. at 402.
                 Landcastle does not dispute that Hardwick actually signed
         the security agreement and knew what he was signing. There is no
         allegation that Crescent engaged in the fraudulent procurement of
         Hardwick’s signature, and accordingly there is no forgery or fraud
         in the factum here. Just the opposite, Hardwick’s apparent fraud—
         purportedly lacking authority to pledge the CD—induced Crescent
         to make him a loan because it was fully collateralized by a CD in
         precisely the same amount of $631,276.71. 7
                B. Landcastle’s “Void” Claim
              To avoid D’Oench altogether, Landcastle also argues that
         Hardwick’s lack of authority rendered the security agreement

         7 There is no fraud in the factum here, so we need not address whether a fraud-

         in-the-factum claim is an exception to the D’Oench doctrine. See
         McCullough, 911 F.2d at 602 n.7 (“Although it is possible that a claim of fraud
         in the factum would survive [the] FSLIC’s invocation of the D’Oench doctrine,
         we need not decide this issue.” (citation omitted)).
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         38                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         “void,” a legal nullity, and non-existent, and incapable of transfer
         to the FDIC. From that, Landcastle contends the FDIC obtained
         nothing, and D’Oench categorically does not apply here.
                Landcastle’s arguments fail to recognize the material
         differences between “void” and “voidable” contracts. As explained
         below, even if Hardwick lacked authority, the security agreement
         was not a “void” contract but, at most, a “voidable” contract.
         Here’s why.
                It is axiomatic that a “void” contract, as distinct from a
         “voidable” one, is “a legal nullity.” 1 Williston on Contracts § 1:20
         (4th ed. Oct. 2022 Update). A void contract has “no legal effect”
         whatsoever. Void, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
         “Whenever technical accuracy is required, void can be properly
         applied only to those provisions that are of no legal effect
         whatsoever—those that are an absolute nullity.” Id. “A contract
         may be void because it is technically defective, contrary to public
         policy, or illegal.” Void Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
         2019).
                While voidable contracts are “a common occurrence in the
         law,” 1 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1:20, examples of wholly
         void contracts “are not very numerous,” 1 Corbin on Contracts
         § 1.7 (Rev. ed. 2018). They include illegal bargains or bargains that
         are contrary to express statutes or that violate public policy. 1
         Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1:20; see, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-1
         (“A contract to do an immoral or illegal thing is void.”), 13-8-2(a)
         (“A contract that is against the policy of the law cannot be
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                        39

         enforced.”), 13-8-3(a) (“Gambling contracts are void[.]”). Void
         promises are not legally binding, have no legal effect, and therefore
         are not contracts. 1 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1:20; see
         Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1981)
         (“A promise for breach of which the law neither gives a remedy nor
         otherwise recognizes a duty of performance by the promisor is
         often called a void contract.”).
                In contrast, the term “voidable” contract is defined as
         “[v]alid until annulled,” and “capable of being affirmed or rejected
         at the option of one of the parties.” Voidable, Black’s Law
         Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Our Court has distinguished void from
         voidable contracts: “A contract is void ab initio if it seriously
         offends law or public policy, in contrast to a contract that is merely
         voidable at the election of one party to the contract.” Griffin v.
         Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 989 F.3d 923, 934 n.6 (11th Cir.
         2021) (citing Black’s definitions of void and voidable).
                The treatises agree that a “voidable” contract is one where a
         party may elect to reject and avoid the legal relations created by
         the contract or by ratification may extinguish the power to avoid.
         Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 7 (“A voidable
         contract is one where one or more parties have the power . . . to
         avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification
         of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance.”); 1 Williston
         on Contracts, supra, § 1:20 (same, quoting Restatement (Second)
         of Contracts § 7); 1 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1.6. It bears
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         40                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         repeating that a “voidable contract is a common occurrence.” 1
         Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1:20.
                Further, “a voidable contract imposes on the parties the
         same obligations as if it were not voidable. If a contract is voidable,
         it remains intact until the party who has the power of avoidance
         elects to exercise it, and a party who has the power of avoidance
         may extinguish that power by ratification of the contract.” Id.
         (footnote omitted); 1 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1.6 (“In the case
         of a voidable contract, there is usually both a power to avoid and a
         power to validate by ratification.”).
                 The concept of a voidable contract “rests primarily on the
         traditional view that the transaction is valid and has its usual legal
         consequences until the power of avoidance is exercised.”
         Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 7 cmt. e; see also 1
         Williston on Contracts, supra, § 3:6 (“When a contract is ‘voidable’
         as a result of an invalidating cause, it nevertheless remains valid and
         enforceable unless and until the party entitled to avoid the
         obligation exercises that right.”).
                Examples of voidable contracts include situations where an
         invalidating cause, like duress, fraud, mental illness, or minor
         status, render a facially valid contract “voidable.” Restatement
         (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 7 cmt. b; 1 Williston on Contracts,
         supra, § 1:20; see, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 13-3-20 (minor status),
         13-3-24(a) (mental illness or incompetency), 13-3-25 (intoxication),
         13-5-5 (fraud), 13-5-6 (duress).
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                        41

                 The same is true for lack of authority. Specifically, if an
         agent without authority signs a written contract on behalf of a
         principal, the resulting contract is “voidable” by the principal, but
         it is not “void.” 2A C.J.S. Agency § 163 (Nov. 2022 Update) (“Acts
         or transactions in excess of the agent’s authority ordinarily do not
         bind the principal, subject to ratification by the principal, and are
         generally voidable but not void.”); id. § 56 (same); 3 Am. Jur. 2d
         Agency § 164 (2d ed. & Nov. 2022 Update) (explaining that an
         agent’s execution of a contract “that exceeds the scope of the
         agency” is “merely voidable, not void,” and that “without the
         principal’s subsequent ratification, the contract must be set aside”).
                Both state and federal courts applying state law have held an
         agent’s lack of authority renders a contract voidable, not void. See,
         e.g., Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 735 F.3d 220, 226
         (5th Cir. 2013) (stating that, under Texas law, “a contract executed
         on behalf of a corporation by a person fraudulently purporting to
         be a corporate officer is, like any other unauthorized contract, not
         void, but merely voidable at the election of the defrauded
         principal”); Fejta v. GAF Cos., 800 F.2d 1395, 1396 (5th Cir. 1986)
         (stating that, under Louisiana law, “a contract entered into by an
         agent, though voidable for lack of authority to act, may be ratified
         by the principal”); Eaglebank v. BR Pro. Sports Grp., Inc., 649
         F. App’x 209, 211 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he effect of an officer
         exceeding the scope of his or her authority in entering into a
         contract is to make that contract voidable . . . .”); Perri v. United
         States, 53 Fed. Cl. 381, 401 (2002) (stating that when an official
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         42                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         makes an agreement without actual authority to bind the
         government, the resulting contract is “voidable at the option of the
         government” and citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra,
         § 7), aff’d, 340 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Stamatakos v. Wells Fargo
         Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2018 WL 1441233, at *7 (D. R.I. Mar. 22, 2018)
         (“The law of Rhode Island is clear that, even if the signatory to an
         assignment (or other contract) lacks the proper authority, the
         assignment is rendered voidable rather than void.”); Sauers v. Bank
         of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 12108140, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2013)
         (explaining that the “lack of authority makes th[e] assignments
         merely voidable, not void”); Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. v. Beesley,
         2012 WL 5383555, at *5 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2012) (concluding
         plaintiffs’ challenge to assignment of their mortgage based on
         signing agents’ lack of authority was a challenge to “a voidable, not
         void, contract”); Scott v. United States, 2011 WL 13308717, at *2
         (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2011) (“[A]n agreement entered into by an
         unauthorized agent is a voidable, not void, agreement.”); Ristic
         Elec. LLC v. AH Holdings LLC Series A, 2016 WL 4161966, at *10
         (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 4, 2016) (concluding a company agent’s lack of
         authority to execute a deed “would merely render it voidable” and
         “the company may later ratify the contract”); see also Roberson
         Advert. Serv., Inc. v. Winnfield Life Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 662, 665
         (La. Ct. App. 1984) (acknowledging that a contract entered by an
         agent is voidable for lack of authority).
               While we do not apply state law here, we note these state
         law cases are consistent with the general void/voidable principles
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         20-13735                  Opinion of the Court                            43

         established in the treatises and legal dictionary definitions,
         discussed above, which draw a demarcation more easily applied.
                Applying these general principles here, we conclude that the
         written and facially valid security agreement, signed by Hardwick
         as agent and manager, created legal relations until it was avoided
         or ratified by agent Hardwick’s principal. Hardwick’s lack of
         authority, even if proven, would at most render the security
         agreement voidable.8 And Langley teaches us that a failed bank has
         and can transfer a voidable interest or title in an asset to the FDIC,
         and that is enough to constitute an interest in the asset to trigger
         D’Oench protection of the FDIC. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 94, 108
         S. Ct at 402.
                Tellingly, Landcastle’s brief argues only that the security
         agreement was “void,” never mentions “voidable” contracts, and
         never acknowledges the void-voidable dichotomy. We readily
         reject Landcastle’s argument that the security agreement, like a
         gambling contract or illegal bargain, was void, of no legal effect,
         nonexistent, and incapable of transfer. Rather, as Renasant and the
         amici agree, the security agreement was, at most, voidable and
         capable of transfer to the FDIC.

         8 Notably, before the FDIC took over Crescent, the Hardwick law firm took
         no steps to avoid the security agreement. After the FDIC took over and sold
         the security agreement, Renasant continued to hold the law firm’s CD as
         collateral for five years. When Renasant notified the law firm of the loan
         default and CD liquidation, it received no response, much less any objection,
         from the law firm.
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         44                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

               C. Fraudulent Inducement Does Not Prevent Transfer of an
                  Interest to the FDIC, and Neither Should Hardwick’s
                  Lack of Authority
                Landcastle’s attempt to categorically exclude lack-of-
         authority claims from D’Oench is also inconsistent with the broad
         equitable protection afforded the FDIC from claims based on
         evidence outside the bank’s official records. As noted earlier, the
         Supreme Court has held that D’Oench protects the FDIC from
         even fraud-in-the-inducement claims and defenses. Id. at 93, 108 S.
         Ct. at 402 (holding that a claim based on the failed bank’s fraud—
         that induced the borrower to borrow money and sign a note—was
         barred by D’Oench and § 1823(e)); see McCullough, 911 F.2d at
         599–600 (holding that D’Oench bars fraud-in-the-inducement
         claims); Twin Constr., Inc., 925 F.2d at 382 (stating the D’Oench
         doctrine broadly protects the FDIC and its successors “from claims
         of state and common law fraud”).
               Under Langley, a failed bank’s fraud against its own bank
         customer renders the customer’s note only “voidable” and does
         not prevent the bank from transferring title to or an interest in that
         customer’s note to the FDIC for D’Oench purposes. By analogy,
         Hardwick’s lack of authority also renders the security agreement at
         most “voidable” and capable of transfer to the FDIC.
                Let’s remember that D’Oench is an estoppel doctrine. We
         do not consider legal issues, such as lack of authority in this
         D’Oench setting, in the abstract or in a vacuum, but in the context
         of the factual circumstances presented in this case. Our decision as
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         20-13735              Opinion of the Court                      45

         to a legal issue can reach only as far as the factual circumstances
         frame the precise issue presented. See Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602
         F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010); Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
         Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006); Watts v. BellSouth
         Telecomms., Inc., 316 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2003).
                Three contextual facts surround Landcastle’s lack-of-
         authority claims in this D’Oench setting: (1) at a minimum,
         Hardwick was an agent and manager of the Hardwick law firm;
         (2) the failed bank had no knowledge that Hardwick lacked
         authority to pledge the CD; and (3) Hardwick induced the bank to
         make a loan by securing it with his law firm’s CD in the same
         amount of $631,276.71.
                Under these circumstances, we reject Landcastle’s argument
         that Hardwick’s lack of authority prevented Crescent’s transfer of
         an interest in the security agreement to the FDIC as receiver.
               D. Equities Protect the FDIC
               Landcastle’s approach—categorically excluding lack-of-
         authority claims from D’Oench’s prohibition of non-bank-records
         evidence—would defeat D’Oench’s equitable purposes.
                Our thorough review of D’Oench precedent above
         demonstrates that courts consistently have applied D’Oench as a
         federal equitable doctrine that protects the FDIC as receiver from
         a broad array of claims and defenses to a facially valid and
         unconditional note, guaranty, or collateral pledge acquired by the
         FDIC from a failed bank. See, e.g., Langley, 484 U.S. at 92–93, 108
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         46                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         S. Ct. at 401–02 (protecting the FDIC from claims raising
         “undisclosed conditions” and “fraud in the inducement”);
         McCullough, 911 F.2d at 601–02 (protecting the FDIC from
         “defenses of failure to perform a condition precedent, failure of
         consideration, and fraudulent inducement”); Twin Constr., Inc.,
         925 F.2d at 382 (protecting the FDIC “from claims of state and
         common law fraud, violation of state or federal securities laws, and
         the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, unjust enrichment,
         failure of consideration and usury”).
                Landcastle’s lack-of-authority claims pale in comparison to
         the severity of the other types of claims already held barred by
         D’Oench’s prohibition of non-bank-records evidence. These
         claims already barred by D’Oench nonetheless provide a close
         analog, certainly a much closer analog than anything Landcastle or
         the dissent proposes.
                Think about this, too. Landcastle’s categorical approach
         would mean every facially valid and unconditional bank
         transaction assumed and sold by the FDIC as receiver can now be
         subjected to exhaustive litigation by alleging that a manager or
         officer of a business lacked authority to enter into the transaction.
         As here, a manager or officer often does have considerable
         authority to handle the affairs of the business but may allegedly
         exceed that authority in a particular transaction.
                Yet under Landcastle’s proposed categorical rule, when
         deciding whether to sell or liquidate a failed bank, the FDIC would
         no longer be able to rely on the bank’s official records but would
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         20-13735                 Opinion of the Court                            47

         have to look beyond the plain terms of each and every note,
         guaranty, or security agreement and investigate whether each
         party in each transaction in fact possessed the precise authority to
         execute a particular agreement that their signature and title imply.
         That is precisely the burden of which the D’Oench doctrine
         relieves the FDIC when it must quickly sell a failed bank in order
         to provide customers’ access to their deposits without interruption
         and protect the federal funds it administers. The FDIC’s ability to
         rely on the official failed bank records is the purpose of D’Oench’s
         federal estoppel doctrine.
                Here, in taking over and selling Crescent’s assets to
         Renasant, the FDIC was entitled to rely on Crescent’s official
         records, which contained the unqualified and facially valid security
         agreement pledging a CD for $631,276.71 as collateral for a
         $631,276.71 loan. Barring under D’Oench Landcastle’s lack-of-
         authority claims—based on non-bank-records evidence—properly
         allocates the risk to the principal (MHSLAW, P.C. and the law firm)
         who hired Hardwick—as its President, director, and manager—
         rather than to the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank. 9 Severing
         Hardwick’s lack of authority from his fraudulent inducement of the

         9  Indeed, the law firm failed to give Crescent its corporate governance
         documents that limited Hardwick’s authority as President and Director of
         MHSLAW, P.C., or as Manager of his law firm. By doing so, the law firm lent
         itself to an arrangement—the purchase of a CD for $631,276.71 and a loan for
         $631,276.71 collateralized by the CD—that would tend to mislead the bank
         examiners and the FDIC.
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         48                      Opinion of the Court               20-13735

         bank would favor the interests of borrowers over the interests of
         depositors by shifting, in the context of FDIC receivership, the risk
         of internal corporate-governance problems from the business
         entity (here a law firm) to the FDIC.
                As the Supreme Court emphasized in Langley, the equities
         that the D’Oench doctrine regards as predominant are those
         protecting the FDIC. 484 U.S. at 94–95, 108 S. Ct. at 403. We need
         go no further than rejecting Landcastle’s attempt to exclude its
         lack-of-authority claims—which are based on non-bank records—
         from D’Oench’s estoppel doctrine.
                       VI.     RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT
                The bulk of the dissent is not about D’Oench cases but is a
         discussion of different agency and contract principles. Dissenting
         Op. at 14–36. The dissent insists we create a “radical” new rule that
         an agent without authority binds its principal in contract. Id. at 1,
         10, 36–38. The dissent uses various forms of the word “bind” 55
         times. But that is not what we rule, say, or intend to do here.
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       49

               A. Agreement on Basic D’Oench Principles
                Before addressing the core dispute, let’s list D’Oench
         principles the dissent does not dispute:
               (1) the D’Oench doctrine protects the FDIC from claims or
         defenses based on evidence outside the failed bank’s records,
         Dissenting Op. at 1, 11;
               (2) the D’Oench doctrine applies when the claim or defense
         based on outside evidence “tend[s] to diminish or defeat” the
         FDIC’s interest in an asset of the failed bank, id. at 11;
                (3) the D’Oench doctrine protects only interests the failed
         bank already had at the time of the takeover; it does not create new
         interests, id. at 12; and
                 (4) a “voidable” contract is enough to constitute an interest
         that is transferable to the FDIC, and the D’Oench shield would bar
         claims that seek to defeat a “voidable” contract, id. at 13–14.
         What the dissent does hotly dispute is that the security agreement
         was voidable. Our core dispute is over whether for D’Oench
         purposes the security agreement was (1) automatically void, a
         nullity, and non-existent at execution, or (2) merely voidable by the
         law firm at its option and transferable.
               Deciding this case does not require the dissent’s lengthy
         debate about agency and contract principles. See id. at 14–36.
         Rather, this case can be narrowly decided using the void-voidable
         dichotomy for D’Oench-transfer purposes. As discussed in Section
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         50                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         V.B., the general definitions of void and voidable found in treatises
         and legal dictionaries draw a clear demarcation easily applied to
         this case. The security agreement was not an illegal contract; it did
         not contravene a statute or violate public policy. Under Langley,
         it was a facially valid, unqualified agreement, held by Crescent and
         transferable to the FDIC.
                The dissent tries to expand the issues and make this case
         about whether the law firm was bound by that contract. The bulk
         of the dissent is under this heading: “An Agent Without Authority
         Cannot Bind a Principal in Contract.” Id. at 14–36. The dissent
         argues that no binding contract was formed because Hardwick
         lacked authority, and Crescent had nothing to transfer.
                 Here, though, we need not, and do not, decide what
         evidence would have been allowed if Crescent had not failed and
         the law firm challenged the enforceability of the agreement. What
         D’Oench precludes is not the challenge itself, but the law firm’s
         (now Landcastle’s) use of documents outside the failed bank’s
         official records to mount that challenge.
                It is undisputed that Landcastle’s lack-of-authority claims are
         based on non-bank records. Accordingly, our holding, as already
         stated, is:
               Applying the Supreme Court’s and our Circuit’s
               D’Oench precedent, we hold that Landcastle’s lack-
               of-authority claims are barred because they rely on
               evidence that was outside Crescent’s records when
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         20-13735                  Opinion of the Court                              51

                the FDIC took over that failed bank and sold the
                Hardwick loan and CD collateral to Renasant.
         Majority Op. at 5, 33.
                It’s hard to know what to respond to and what to ignore
         because the dissent strays so far afield from the narrow D’Oench
         path that decides this case. Yet the dissent cannot go wholly
         unanswered because it asserts that the majority (1) relies on a
         “radical . . . interpretation of agency law” that allows the FDIC to
         “steal assets from third parties when it takes over a failed
         bank,” (2) “creates serious Takings Clause concerns,” (3) adopts a
         “new rule” that “greatly disrupts commercial relationships” in
         Georgia, and (4) fails to get the message of the Supreme Court and
         three sister Circuits that “the Deposit Corporation cannot acquire
         an interest that is void before the Deposit Corporation purports to
         acquire it.” Dissenting Op. at 1–2, 40, 42, 47.
                Oh my goodness. “[L]ike most apocalyptic warnings,” the
         dissent “proves a false alarm.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S.
         —, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018). 10 Nonetheless, given the dissent’s
         accusations, we must respond and do so in seven parts.

         10 As to the Takings Clause, the dissent accuses the majority of “licens[ing]
         governmental theft” and “creat[ing] serious constitutional problems without
         any discussion.” Dissenting Op. at 47. We do not discuss the Takings Clause
         because Landcastle never mentioned it in the district court or in its appellate
         briefs. That’s why the dissent resorts to suggesting that “Landcastle should be
         free on remand” to raise a Takings Clause claim. Id. at 43.
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         52                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

                First, we address three D’Oench decisions that the dissent
         cites to charge we failed to get the message of our sister circuits.
         Dissenting Op. at 14, 46–47. Those cases support our ruling, not
         the dissent.
               Second, we refute the dissent’s groundless accusation that
         we “greatly disrupt[] commercial relations” in Georgia. Id. at 40.
               Third, we reply to the dissent’s baseless charge that we
         invent a new rule and rely on “a radical” interpretation of agency
         law that allows the FDIC to “steal assets from third parties.” Id. at
         1. We explain how contracts are formed by agents, and how if an
         agent exceeds his authority, the principal (here, the law firm)
         always has the option to reject or affirm that contract, which
         renders the contract voidable, not void. No radical ideas here.
                Fourth, we respond to the dissent’s no contract or void
         contract arguments. Id. at 14–36. None of the dissent’s authorities,
         including the three cited Eleventh Circuit cases, involve failed
         banks, D’Oench issues, or whether a contract is void or voidable
         for D’Oench transfer purposes. Rather, the cases involve whether
         a principal was bound by an agent’s unauthorized act. The dissent
         also relies on conflicting state law, which we view as unnecessary
         and unwise to unravel.
                Fifth, we address the dissent’s cites to Federal Arbitration
         Act (“FAA”) cases that are not on point.
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                        53

               Sixth, we discuss how the security agreement was ratifiable
         and thus voidable and why the dissent’s void-contract claim is
         incorrect.
                Seventh, we explain why the Restatement comments the
         dissent cites do not support its argument that the security
         agreement was void.
               B. Dissent’s Claim that Three Other Circuits “Got the
               Message” that the “Majority Misunderstands”
                The dissent alleges “[t]he majority misunderstands the
         D’Oench doctrine, even though . . . at least three of our sister
         circuits got the message: the Deposit Corporation cannot acquire
         an interest that is void before the Deposit Corporation purports to
         acquire it.” Id. at 47 (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bracero &
         Rivera, Inc., 895 F.2d 824, 830 (1st Cir. 1990); Grubb v. Fed. Deposit
         Ins. Corp., 868 F.2d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 1989); Andrew D. Taylor
         Tr. v. Sec. Tr. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 844 F.2d 337, 342–43 (6th
         Cir. 1988) (“Taylor Trust”)); see id. at 14 (citing same). The dissent
         claims these cases show the security agreement here was void and
         not transferable. These cases support our ruling, not the dissent.
                The dissent summarily dismisses the fact that these cases
         concerned bank assets that were already voided by a court
         judgment, paid, or fully extinguished before the FDIC took over as
         receiver. That total cancellation of the asset before the takeover is
         what precluded the FDIC from acquiring an interest in the
         contract. In stark contrast, here there was no change to,
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         54                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         cancellation of, or diminishment of the security agreement before
         the FDIC took over.
               In Grubb, for instance, the Tenth Circuit held that the FDIC
         could not “claim the protection of D’Oench” because, before the
         bank in that case failed, i.e., before the FDIC took over as receiver,
         the district court had entered a judgment for the plaintiff and
         explicitly “voided” the asset at issue. 868 F.2d at 1158–59. Here, if
         the Hardwick law firm had sued Crescent while the bank was still
         solvent, and a court had entered judgment voiding the 2009
         security agreement before the FDIC took over as receiver in 2010,
         then Crescent would not have had a transferrable interest in the
         security agreement when it failed. The Hardwick law firm did not
         challenge the 2009 security agreement before the FDIC took over
         or during the next seven years. For over five years Renasant Bank
         held the law firm’s CD as collateral and liquidated it in 2014—all
         without objection by the law firm. The law firm’s actions belie the
         dissent’s claims of no transferable interest. It was only in 2017 that
         Landcastle (who bought potential claims in the law firm’s
         bankruptcy) challenged the 2009 security agreement.
               The dissent’s next case—Bracero & Rivera—also supports
         our holding. The First Circuit held that D’Oench did not apply to
         a canceled mortgage note in the bank’s records before the FDIC
         took over. 895 F.2d at 829–30. The First Circuit concluded that the
         D’Oench doctrine did not apply because (1) “the note was
         discharged by the payment and cancellation of the underlying debt
         before [the] FDIC ever obtained it,” and (2) bank documents
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                      55

         evidencing that discharge and cancellation “were in the hands of
         [the] FDIC at all relevant times.” Id. The note was paid and not
         an asset protected by D’Oench or § 1823(e). Id. at 830.
                Just the opposite is true here. The security agreement was
         never challenged—much less canceled—before the FDIC took
         over, and Landcastle’s challenge came seven years later. That the
         dissent resorts to Grubb and Bracero & Rivera to discredit the
         majority reveals how baseless the dissent’s accusations are.
                Likewise, Taylor Trust does not help the dissent because the
         Sixth Circuit held the agent trustee acted with authority. Taylor
         was the trustee of his minor son’s savings account. Taylor Tr., 844
         F.2d at 339. However, Taylor, as president of Security Trust,
         executed collateral agreements pledging, inter alia, his minor son’s
         savings-account trust. Id. Taylor executed the pledge agreements
         to secure advances made by Security Trust to two Hawaiian real
         estate ventures under lines of credit. Id. at 340. After Taylor was
         discharged as president and both Hawaiian real estate ventures
         defaulted, Security Trust claimed the pledged accounts. Id. The
         minor’s savings-account trust then sued Security Trust to have the
         pledge agreements declared invalid, arguing that Taylor lacked
         authority to pledge the minor’s trust. Id. at 340, 343. While the
         action was pending, Security Trust was declared insolvent, and the
         FSLIC took over as receiver. Id. at 340.
               The Sixth Circuit summarized the trust’s argument that
         because Taylor lacked authority to pledge his son’s trust, the
         pledge agreements were void ab initio, taking them out of the
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         56                          Opinion of the Court                        20-13735

         D’Oench doctrine. Id. at 342–43. The Sixth Circuit did not decide
         that issue because it concluded that Taylor had the authority to
         revoke the minor’s trust. Id. at 344. Thus, the Sixth Circuit
         concluded D’Oench applied, and the FSLIC prevailed. Id. 11
                 C. Dissent Misstates Georgia Law
                As discussed later, the dissent largely cites state cases and
         federal diversity cases—applying applicable state law—to support
         its proposition that the security agreement was void because no
         contract is ever formed when an agent lacks authority. As part of
         that argument, the dissent alleges: “Georgia law dictates that lack
         of authority prevents contract formation,” and therefore “the
         majority’s new rule greatly disrupts commercial relationships.”
         Dissenting Op. at 40. That is not Georgia law, nor what we do
         here.
                 In claiming an agent’s lack of authority always prevents
         contract formation, the dissent cites four Georgia cases and
         O.C.G.A. § 10-6-51. Id. at 40–41. See Hagan v. Asa G. Candler,
         Inc., 5 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. 1939); Lynn v. Lowndes Cnty. Health Servs.,
         LLC, 840 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020); Berger v. Ga. Power Co.,

         11In a parenthetical, the dissent notes that Taylor Trust “stat[ed], though in
         dicta, that an agent’s lack of authority . . . renders the contract void ab initio,
         rather than merely voidable.” Dissenting Op. at 36 (quotation marks omitted).
         That was not even dicta. The Sixth Circuit was merely reciting the party’s
         argument, not opining itself. Taylor Tr., 844 F.2d at 342–43. Taylor Trust did
         not explore the differences between void and voidable agreements. There was
         no reason to do so because it concluded Taylor had authority to act.
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                        57

         49 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948); Buena Vista Loan & Sav. Bank
         v. Stockdale, 192 S.E. 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937).
                Those Georgia cases relied on by the dissent have nothing
         to do with the contract-formation issue here. The Berger and
         Buena Vista cases involved (1) the endorsements of checks and not
         formation of a contract between two parties, (2) the effect of a third
         party’s unauthorized signature endorsement on a check under a
         former Georgia statute, and (3) whether the third party’s
         endorsements were forged or genuine. See Berger, 49 S.E.2d at
         669; Buena Vista, 192 S.E. at 247. Plus, neither case involved an
         agent, much less one who exceeded his authority.
                 Contrary to the dissent, Georgia law recognizes that an
         agent routinely forms a contract on a principal’s behalf, and if an
         agent acted without authority, the principal may either repudiate
         or ratify that contract. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 10-6-51 (“The principal
         shall be bound by all the acts of his agent within the scope of his
         authority; if the agent shall exceed his authority, the principal may
         not ratify in part and repudiate in part; he shall adopt either the
         whole or none.” (emphasis added)).
               Further, Lynn and Hagan, the dissent’s agency law cases, do
         not support the dissent’s no-contract-formed or void-contract
         argument. The Georgia court in Lynn explained that, under
         Georgia law, where the principal is fully informed of the agent’s
         unauthorized act and does not repudiate it within a reasonable
         time, ratification is presumed and takes effect as if originally
         authorized. 843 S.E.2d at 631. The Lynn court did not mention
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         58                     Opinion of the Court                20-13735

         the terms “void” or “void contract.” And the Lynn court ultimately
         concluded that the principal, a mentally disabled, 50-year-old man
         with Down Syndrome who could not read, write, or speak, was
         incapable of forming an agency relationship with his mother. See
         id. at 628–31. Here though, Hardwick was an admitted agent of his
         law firm and for years the law firm’s CD was held and then
         liquidated without objection of the law firm. Lynn is wholly
         inconsistent with the dissent’s interpretation of Georgia law.
               Hagan also does not help the dissent because the alleged
         principal there was non-existent. 5 S.E.2d at 740. The issue was
         whether “an agent who executes a contract on behalf of a
         non-existent principal is himself liable on the contract.” Id.
                Instead, as discussed before, the more informative case as to
         void contracts is our Griffin decision applying Georgia law. In
         Griffin, this Court expressly addressed whether assignments of
         certain benefits were void or “merely voidable,” where the
         assignors’ benefit plans contained an anti-assignment provision.
         Griffin, 989 F.3d at 934 (11th Cir. 2021). We observed that whereas
         void contracts are “[o]f no legal effect” and “void,” voidable
         contracts are “[v]alid until annulled.” Id. at 934 & n.6 (quoting
         Black’s 2019 definitions of void and voidable).
               We held the assignments were “merely voidable” because
         they were not illegal, did not contravene public policy, and had
         nothing to do with gambling—the three “void” contracts under
         Georgia law. Id. at 934 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-1, 13-8-2, 13-8-3).
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         20-13735                Opinion of the Court                          59

                Griffin is instructive. First, Griffin observed that, unlike void
         contracts, voidable contracts are valid until annulled. Id. at 934 &
         n.6. Second, Griffin demonstrates that the security agreement here
         was not a void contract under Georgia law because it was not
         illegal, did not contravene public policy, and had nothing to do
         with gambling. See id. at 934.
                Tellingly too, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Holden
         that D’Oench protects the FSLIC as receiver from a property
         owner’s claim based on non-bank records that a partner lacked
         authority to pledge a security interest in the partnership’s property.
         485 S.E.2d at 483 (applying federal common law). The Georgia
         Supreme Court reasoned that invalidating the agreement in
         Holden would strip away the D’Oench doctrine’s protection of
         bank depositors, bank authorities, and guarantors. Id. This
         reasoning is equally applicable to the case at bar: Invaliding the
         security agreement defeats D’Oench’s equitable purposes and
         protects Landcastle and the Hardwick law firm at the expense of
         bank depositors, bank authorities, and guarantors. Therefore, the
         dissent’s allegation that we “greatly disrupt[] commercial
         relationships” in Georgia is wholly unfounded. Dissenting Op. at
         40. 12

         12Speaking of commercial relationships, banks fail, the FDIC sells them
         overnight to successor banks like Renasant, who open them the next day
         without interruption. For years, Hardwick made his loan payments to
         Renasant but then defaulted, and Renasant liquidated the CD collateral.
         Landcastle now, many years later, wants to use parol evidence—outside the
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         60                       Opinion of the Court                    20-13735

                D. How Contracts Are Formed by Agents
               Next, we respond to the dissent’s charge that we invent a
         new, radical agency rule. This accusation also is baseless.
                To set things straight, general agency principles recognize
         that there can be (1) “agents” who have some actual authority from
         a principal but may act outside of it or outside of their apparent
         authority; (2) other actors who appear to third parties to be
         “agents” but who lack any actual authority and therefore are not
         “agents” for the principal at all; and (3) persons, either agents or
         actors purporting to be agents, whose acts can be ratified by the
         principal such that “the act is given effect as if done by an agent
         acting with actual authority.” Restatement (Third) of Agency,
         §§ 3.01, 3.03, 4.01(1), 4.03 (Am. L. Inst. 2006).
                According to the certified question, Hardwick was the law
         firm’s “agent.” He was not merely an actor appearing or
         purporting to be an agent. No one disputes that Hardwick was an
         agent of both the law firm (as a manager) and MHSLAW, P.C. (as
         President and a director). Therefore, we look first to those agency
         principles applicable to “agents.”
                It is a “basic principle that when an agent enters into a
         contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, the principal and the
         third party are parties to the contract. A principal is disclosed when

         failed bank’s records—to set aside the 2009 security agreement. That’s what
         would be disruptive.
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         20-13735                 Opinion of the Court                           61

         the third party has notice that an agent is acting for a principal and
         has notice of the principal’s identity.” Id. § 6.01 cmt. a.
                A valid contract requires “a bargain in which there is a
         manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a
         consideration.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 17(1)
         (emphases added); 1 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 3:2 (same).
         Mutual assent and consideration are required elements for contract
         formation. In the agency context, however, it is the agent who
         manifests the assent to the exchange with the third party, not the
         principal. Restatement (Third) of Agency, supra, § 6.01 cmt. b (“An
         agent enters into a contract on behalf of the agent’s principal by
         manifesting assent to an exchange that constitutes valid
         consideration.”). The principal does not manifest the assent to the
         exchange because that is the agent’s job. See id. A contract is
         formed upon the agent’s manifestation of assent to the exchange
         on the principal’s behalf.
                Whether the contract so formed by the agent later subjects
         the principal to liability (i.e., binds the principal) or later is voidable
         by the principal is a separate legal matter. As discussed earlier, if it
         turns out the agent was acting outside the scope of his authority
         when he manifested assent to the exchange with the third party,
         the resulting contract is voidable by the principal, not entirely
         “void.”
                At the risk of beating a dead horse, an agent who lacks
         authority merely forms a contract that is voidable at the option of
         the principal. A voidable contract is not the same as a binding
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         62                         Opinion of the Court                      20-13735

         contract. Whether a voidable contract ultimately will be binding
         is a decision for the wronged party in the transaction. Upon notice
         of the contract, the principal has the power to either ratify and be
         bound by it or disaffirm and avoid it. And the contract becomes
         either enforceable or unenforceable against the principal upon the
         principal’s exercise of this power.
                For D’Oench purposes, the fact that the principal retains this
         power to ratify or disaffirm means the contract formed by the agent
         is merely “voidable,” and not void at inception. That distinction
         matters because D’Oench recognizes voidable interests are
         transferrable from the failed bank to the FDIC.
                E. Dissent’s No Contract or Void Contract Arguments
               In an attempt to escape D’Oench altogether, the dissent
         claims the security agreement is no contract or a void contract.13
         Dissenting Op. at 14–36.

         13 Specifically, the dissent argues: (1) that because “an agent cannot bind a
         principal in contract when he lacks the authority to do so,” the “resulting
         purported contract is void”; (2) “for present purposes, there is no meaningful
         difference between saying that the agent formed no contract” or “formed a
         void contract”; and (3) “[n]o contract is formed between the principal and the
         third party because a principal is not subject to liability when an agent acts
         without authority.” Dissenting Op. at 16–19, 25 (emphases added) (quotation
         marks omitted). The dissent frames the issue as whether there is a binding
         contract or whether the principal is bound and subject to liability. Once again,
         that’s a very different issue than whether the bank had an interest in the
         security agreement, even if voidable, that was transferable to the FDIC.
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         20-13735                Opinion of the Court                        63

                First, the dissent states that “when an agent purports to
         ‘enter[] into [a] contract on [its] principal’s behalf . . . without
         actual or apparent authority,’ the ‘principal is not a party to [that]
         contract.’” Id. at 16 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)
         (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency, supra, § 6.05 cmt. b).
                That quoted comment b to § 6.05, however, addresses only
         the circumstances under which the principal “is subject to liability”
         when the agent makes a contract with a third party that is
         unauthorized in part. Restatement (Third) of Agency, supra,
         § 6.05(1) & cmt. b (emphasis added). Comment b speaks to the
         principal’s liability under the contract the agent makes, not to
         whether a contract was formed in the first place or the effect of an
         agent’s lack of authority on the formation of a contract. See id.
                 Next, the dissent cites three Eleventh Circuit cases for its no
         contract or void contract argument. Dissenting Op. at 17–19, 31–
         32 (citing GDG Acquisitions LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 849 F.3d 1299
         (11th Cir. 2017) (“GDG”); In re JLJ Inc., 988 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir.
         1993) (“JLJ”); Gymco Constr. Co. v. Architectural Glass &
         Windows, Inc., 884 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Gymco”)). By
         taking these cases wholly out of context, the dissent makes it
         appear they apply here, but they do not. We therefore must discuss
         these cases in detail. As we shall see, none of these precedents
         involve application of the D’Oench doctrine, none discuss the void-
         voidable dichotomy, all are materially and easily distinguishable,
         and one actually supports our position.
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         64                     Opinion of the Court               20-13735

               Gymco v. Architectural Glass
                The dissent relies heavily on our 1989 Gymco decision,
         applying Georgia law, but, unlike the Georgia Supreme Court’s
         1997 Holden decision, Gymco did not involve a failed bank, the
         FDIC, or D’Oench. In any event, Gymco is about whether the
         principal was bound by its agent’s oral contract when the other
         party to the contract knew the agent lacked authority.
                 In Gymco, a written contract between Gymco Construction
         (“Gymco”) and Architectural Glass & Windows (“AGW”) required
         AGW to install a glass façade for Gymco. 884 F.2d at 1363. Gymco
         knew that AGW’s President signed the written contract, submitted
         all the pay orders, and negotiated the conditions. Id. at 1366. Yet
         Gymco claimed that Young, a sales representative for AGW, orally
         agreed to substitute stainless steel, and Gymco sued AGW when it
         refused to provide a stainless steel façade. Id. at 1364–65.
                On appeal, this Court held that AGW was not liable for
         damages to Gymco because (1) Young lacked actual authority to
         enter a new oral contract for steel; and (2) it was unreasonable for
         Gymco to assume Young had authority because it was AGW’s
         President who had demonstrated his complete authority over the
         contract terms. Id. at 1366. We explained: “The evidence of the
         parties [sic] dealings makes clear that Gymco knew that Young
         only had limited authority.” Id. at 1367. We stressed that
         substituting stainless steel for glass would be enforcing a new oral
         contract with “a materially different obligation,” and because
         “Young lacked the authority to enter into a new contract obligating
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       65

         AGW to install the stainless steel,” we held that “there was no oral
         contract between Gymco and AGW.” Id. at 1365–67.
                We also rejected Gymco’s argument that Young could
         orally agree to modify the written contract given that the contract
         required modifications to be in writing. Id. at 1367. We also
         pointed out that AGW had “repudiated” Young’s oral agreement
         to provide steel in lieu of glass as soon as it learned of it and
         terminated Young immediately. Id. at 1364, 1366.
                So that’s the case. Now let’s look at how the dissent uses
         Gymco wholly out of its context. The dissent cites Gymco for this
         purported principle: “that because an agent ‘lacked authority to
         enter into a . . . contract’ between his principal and a third party,
         ‘there was no [such] contract.’” Dissenting Op. at 17 (alterations in
         original). The first quote leaves out the word “oral,” and the latter
         quote changes “there was no oral contract” to “there was no [such]
         contract.” Gymco involved an oral contract that the third party
         knew the agent lacked authority to enter and that the principal
         promptly repudiated. These facts alone are sufficient reasons to
         discard it.
               Gymco is further materially distinguishable because there is
         no analysis of contract-formation principles, much less contract
         formation by an agent where: (1) the agent executed a facially valid
         written contract, with plain and clear terms; (2) the agent who
         signed for the principal was its President, manager, and director;
         and (3) the other party (Crescent) undisputedly had no knowledge
         of any limits on the officer’s authority. Significantly, too, Gymco
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         66                     Opinion of the Court               20-13735

         was about whether AGW was bound by Young’s oral acts when
         Gymco knew he lacked authority. To repeat ad nauseam, whether
         the principal law firm was bound by agent Hardwick’s acts is not
         the narrow issue here.
               Gymco never used the word “void.” Gymco did not
         suggest, much less hold, that Young’s oral agreement was a void
         contract, as the dissent implies. Id. Gymco is but one example of
         how the dissent’s cites do not support the proposition offered.
         Holden, not Gymco, is relevant here.
               In re JLJ Inc.
                The dissent argues JLJ is relevant because it shows an agent
         lacking authority “cannot bind a principal in contract” and “the
         resulting purported contract is void.” Id. at 18–19. Of course, the
         inquiry in JLJ was whether the contract was binding on the
         principal. JLJ did not address the void-voidable dichotomy or even
         mention the term voidable. Also, JLJ did not involve a failed bank,
         the FDIC, or D’Oench. Here’s what happened.
                 In a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Karen Rush and her
         estranged husband’s company RBC both claimed they owned the
         debtor’s note. 988 F.2d at 1115. Her husband had Karen’s power
         of attorney and assigned the note to RBC. Id. The issue was
         whether the assignment contract was valid against Karen. Id. at
         1116. The bankruptcy court awarded the note to RBC, but the
         district court reversed and entered judgment for Karen, finding she
         had impliedly revoked the power of attorney. Id. at 1114–15.
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         20-13735                   Opinion of the Court                              67

               This Court vacated the district court’s judgment and
         remanded for the bankruptcy court to make factual findings
         regarding whether Karen had orally revoked the power of attorney
         before her husband assigned the note. Id. at 1117. Applying federal
         procedural rules, our Court held that the district court “exceeded
         the proper scope of review” and invaded “the province of the
         bankruptcy court as the trier of fact” when it “independently found
         that Karen’s and Edward’s estrangement impliedly revoked the
         power of attorney.” Id.
               We reasoned that “[i]f Karen orally revoked the power of
         attorney when she fled [her husband] Edward’s threats of violence,
         then the assignment Edward executed one week later would be
         void.” Id. at 1116.
                We conclude JLJ is not instructive here. First, the validity of
         the assignment in JLJ involved substantive Alabama law. See id. at
         1116–17. 14 Second, and in any event, the JLJ Court did not address

         14 We  know that the JLJ Court applied substantive Alabama law because both
         our Court and the bankruptcy court cited Alabama law. See JLJ, 988 F.2d at
         1116–17; In re JLJ, Inc., 115 B.R. 324, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (applying
         Alabama law to determine whether Karen revoked the power of attorney). It
         is well settled that “[t]he interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a
         question of state law” and “[t]he substantive law of the forum state [Alabama
         here] governs issues of state law that arise in bankruptcy proceedings.” In re
         Chira, 567 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); see In
         re Northington, 876 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Even in the uniquely
         ‘federal’ bankruptcy context, ‘[p]roperty interests are created and defined by
         state law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
         48, 55, 99 S. Ct. 914, 918 (1979))). The dissent acknowledges JLJ expressly
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         68                        Opinion of the Court                    20-13735

         the issue presented in this case: whether an agreement entered by
         an agent without authority is void or merely voidable.
                Third, our Court, albeit in an unpublished opinion, recently
         singled out Alabama court decisions for using the word “void”
         imprecisely, including when the court means a contract is voidable.
         See United States v. Ruan, 796 F. App’x 672, 675–76 (11th Cir.
         2020). Our Court observed that “Alabama ‘judges and text-book
         writers have frequently used the words voidable and void
         indiscriminately’” when referring to contracts. Ruan, 796 F. App’x
         at 675 (quoting Ex parte Banks, 64 So. 74, 75 (Ala. 1913)).
                 Fourth, many have lamented that courts imprecisely use
         “void” where “voidable” is meant. For example, Black’s Law
         Dictionary has explained that “[t]he distinction between void and
         voidable is often of great practical importance,” and although the
         “strict meaning of void” is “[o]f no legal effect,” “the word [void] is
         often used and construed as bearing the more liberal meaning of
         ‘voidable.’” Void, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also
         Void Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (again
         acknowledging that “the word ‘void’ has been used, even by judges
         and the framers of statutes, where ‘voidable’ is meant”).

         relied on Alabama law “to determine under what circumstances the power of
         attorney could be revoked,” but the dissent attempts to separate from
         Alabama law JLJ’s statement the contract would be void if the agent’s power
         of attorney was revoked. Dissenting Op. at 19. However, the entire question
         as to the validity of the assignment in JLJ involved substantive Alabama law,
         meaning that JLJ is not instructive here.
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         20-13735                Opinion of the Court                        69

                This is not a new phenomenon. See Ham v. Blankenship,
         194 F.2d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 1952) (observing a “lack of preciseness”
         in the use of the word void, which causes confusion generally);
         Haggart v. Wilczinski, 143 F. 22, 27 (5th Cir. 1906) (“The word
         ‘void’ is so often used in the sense of ‘voidable’ . . . .”). Recently,
         our Court pointed out the imprecise use of void where voidable is
         meant. See Griffin, 989 F.3d at 934 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2021).
                For these reasons, JLJ is not helpful guidance here.
                GDG v. Government of Belize
                The dissent’s final case from this Circuit is GDG. The
         dissent argues GDG shows an agent’s unauthorized contract is
         “void” until ratified. Dissenting Op. at 31. GDG hurts, not helps,
         the dissent. GDG supports our conclusion that a contract entered
         by an agent without authority is not “void” ab initio.
                GDG involved a contract dispute between the government
         of Belize and a company leasing equipment. 849 F.3d at 1302. A
         Belizean minister executed a lease waiving sovereign immunity.
         Id. at 1302–03. When GDG sued Belize for rent, Belize argued its
         minister lacked authority to waive immunity. Id. at 1302.
         Applying agency ratification principles, this Court concluded Belize
         ratified its minister’s actions by performing, making payments, and
         retaining equipment. Id. at 1302, 1312.
                Importantly, we rejected Belize’s argument that the lease
         was “void ab initio” and could not be ratified. Id. at 1310. We
         stated Belize “misapprehend[ed] the nature of ratification,” which
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         70                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         “starts with the assumption that the agent did not have actual
         authority at the time he acted.” Id. Therefore, it was “of no
         moment” that the minister lacked authority when he entered the
         agreement. Id.
                GDG is entirely consistent with our reasoning here.
         Specifically, GDG reasoned that even if an agent enters a contract
         without authority, that contract is not void ab initio because the
         principal can ratify the contract.
                 Contrary to the dissent’s claims, our Court did not
         “recognize[] that a contract entered by an agent who lacked
         authority initially ha[s] no legal effect on the principal, but the
         principal [is] empowered to ratify it later.” Dissenting Op. at 32.
         Quite the opposite. We rejected Belize’s argument that the lease
         was “void ab initio” and could not “be enforced against [it] under a
         ratification theory.” 849 F.3d at 1310 (quotation marks omitted).
         Nothing in GDG’s reasoning suggested, much less held, that the
         lease was “initially” void and somehow rendered not void by
         Belize’s ratification.
                Other Federal and State Court Cases Cited by the Dissent
                In Section V.B, we cited many state law decisions holding
         that a contract signed by an agent without authority makes that
         contract merely voidable at the election of the principal, but not
         void. However, we recognize that the dissent cites other state
         court cases, a Fifth Circuit case applying Mississippi law, and a First
         Circuit case applying Puerto Rico law for the inverse proposition
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         20-13735                Opinion of the Court                        71

         that a contract signed by an agent without authority is void.
         Dissenting Op. at 20–21.
                 Candidly, both we and the dissent are citing conflicting, but
         non-binding, state court and federal cases applying state law. And
         we appreciate the dissent’s frankness in observing that agency law
         in this area is not a model of clarity, not always precise, and easily
         gives rise to confusion. Id. at 15, 27, 30, 32.
                Given this landscape and that D’Oench is a federal estoppel
         doctrine, it is unnecessary and unwise to take on the difficult, if not
         impossible, task of reconciling this divergent state agency law.
                 Instead, in deciding this case, we rely on: (1) Langley’s
         holding that D’Oench bars evidence outside the bank’s records
         because even fraud in the inducement renders a contract merely
         voidable, not void, and transferable to the FDIC; (2) our own
         well-developed circuit precedent squarely applying the D’Oench
         parol-evidence-like bar to a broad array of claims and defenses to a
         facially valid and unconditional note or collateral pledge acquired
         by the FDIC from a failed bank; and (3) the general definitions of
         “void” and “voidable” found in treatises and legal dictionaries, as
         discussed earlier, which demonstrate that the security agreement
         was a voidable contract. To repeat, Landcastle’s lack-of-authority
         claims based on non-bank records pale in comparison to the
         severity of other types of claims this Court has held subject to
         D’Oench’s prohibition on non-bank-records evidence. Our
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         72                        Opinion of the Court                    20-13735

         D’Oench precedent on those claims provides a much closer analog
         than anything the dissent proposes. 15
                F. Federal Arbitration Act Cases
                Although the parties’ briefs do not discuss any arbitration
         cases, the dissent tries to employ FAA cases as “informative.”
         Dissenting Op. at 21. The cases are not on point or instructive.
                  The dissent’s reliance on Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
         Cardegna is misplaced because the Court declined to address
         whether an arbitration agreement is valid when the signor lacked
         authority to commit the principal. 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1, 126 S. Ct.
         1204, 1208 (2006) (“Our opinion today . . . does not speak
         to . . . whether the signor lacked authority to commit the alleged
         principal . . . .”); see also Rintin Corp., S.A. v. Domar, Ltd., 476 F.3d
         1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the Supreme Court in
         Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. “deemed irrelevant” the distinction
         between void and voidable contracts). Our decision in Chastain v.
         Robinson-Humphrey Co., also relied upon by the dissent, provides
         no guidance here, as the parties in that case agreed the appellee
         never signed the arbitration clauses at issue—a situation akin to
         fraud in the factum that would render a contract void. 957 F.2d

         15We already know from D’Oench itself and our McCullough precedent that
         the D’Oench estoppel doctrine bars even a failure of consideration claim if
         based on non-bank records. See D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 456, 460–61, 62 S. Ct. at
         679, 681; McCullough, 911 F.2d at 601–02.
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                        73

         851, 853, 855 (11th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by First
         Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
                We need not wade into the quagmire of FAA law to
         recognize a fundamental difference between this case and the FAA
         cases cited by the dissent. For D’Oench purposes, we must
         determine whether the FDIC had an interest (including a voidable
         interest) that could be diminished or defeated. See Langley, 484
         U.S. at 92–93, 108 S. Ct. at 401–02. In the arbitration context,
         however, courts look at whether an arbitration agreement is
         binding on the principal. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v.
         Container Store, Inc., 904 F.3d 70, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2018) (“A party
         seeking to compel arbitration must demonstrate that . . . the other
         party is bound by th[e arbitration] clause . . . .” (emphasis added
         and quotation marks omitted)). The dissent’s FAA cases, therefore,
         have no bearing on whether an agent lacking authority enters a
         void or voidable contract for purposes of D’Oench transfers.
               G. That the Security Agreement Was Ratifiable Shows It
               Was Voidable, Not Void
                 The dissent concedes, as it must, that a principal can ratify
         an agent’s unauthorized act and the security agreement was
         ratifiable by the law firm. Dissenting Op. at 15, 29–30. Even so,
         the dissent argues that “capacity for ratification does not
         undermine the [dissent’s] conclusion that contracts purportedly
         formed by agents who lack authority are void.” Id. at 29. We
         disagree.
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         74                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13735

                 Fundamental principles of agency and contract law establish
         that only a voidable contract is capable of ratification. Restatement
         (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 7 cmt. e (“[T]he term voidable
         contract is appropriate if ratification by one of the parties would
         terminate his power of avoidance and make the contract
         enforceable against him.”); Voidable, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
         ed. 2019) (defining “voidable” as “capable of being affirmed or
         rejected at the option of one of the parties”); 1 Williston on
         Contracts, supra, § 1:20 (observing that because a voidable contract
         “is capable of ratification, it affects from the outset the legal
         relations of the parties” and “is properly defined as a contract”); 1
         Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1.6 (explaining that “[i]n every case
         [of a voidable contract], . . . it will be found that one of the parties
         has a legal power, either of avoidance or of ratification, or of both”
         and that it is equally accurate to describe such contracts as
         “ratifiable”).16
                In stark contrast, a truly void contract cannot be ratified and
         become enforceable. 1 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1:20 (“[I]f
         a promise is void, it creates no legal obligation[,] and the promisor
         is without power to ratify promise [sic].”); Restatement (Second)

         16Even if agent Hardwick manifests an assent to a contract with Crescent
         without authority, the principal in turn has two choices: it may elect to ratify—
         that is, manifest an assent to be bound by—the contract, or to avoid it. 12
         Williston on Contracts, supra, § 35:22 (“When an agent lacks actual authority
         to agree on behalf of the principal, the principal may still be bound if it
         acquiesces in the agent’s action, or fails promptly to disavow the unauthorized
         conduct after acquiring knowledge of the material facts.”).
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         20-13735                      Opinion of the Court                           75

         of Contracts, supra, § 163 cmt. c (explaining, as to the distinction
         between void and voidable contracts, that “the recipient of a
         misrepresentation may be held to have ratified the contract if it is
         voidable but not if it is ‘void’”). It is, was, and always will be a legal
         nullity that is enforceable against no one.
                We do recognize that the dissent identifies decisions,
         applying state law, that conclude that void contracts can be ratified.
         Dissenting Op. at 30. 17 On the other hand, we located many other
         decisions, applying state law, which held a “void” contract is
         incapable of ratification. See, e.g., Wamsley v. Champlin Refin. &
         Chems., Inc., 11 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Promises that are
         void cannot be ratified.”) 18; Kelley v. Kelley, 798 S.E.2d 771, 777
         (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“It is well settled that a void contract cannot
         be the basis for ratification or estoppel.”); Kellar v. Est. of Kellar,
         291 P.3d 906, 917 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“[A] contract that is void
         at its inception, as opposed to merely voidable, is an absolute

         17 The dissent cites mostly state cases, but its cited federal case also applies
         state law. See Jensen v. Ray Kim Ford, Inc., 920 F.2d 3, 4 (7th Cir. 1990)
         (applying Illinois law).
         18   The Fifth Circuit’s explanation is apt here:
                   Promises that are void cannot be ratified. The reason for this
                   is simple: Void promises are not legally binding and thus, are
                   not contracts. [Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra,] § 7
                   cmt. a. Without an antecedent contract to ratify, there can be
                   no ratification.
         Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 539.
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         76                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13735

         nullity and is incapable of ratification.”); Ockey v. Lehmer, 189 P.3d
         51, 56 (Utah 2008) (“A contract or a deed that is void cannot be
         ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity in court. In
         contrast, a contract or deed that is voidable may be ratified at the
         election of the injured party.” (footnotes omitted)); Est. of Molino,
         81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 512, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Void contracts
         cannot be ratified.”); Richmond Printing v. Port of Hous. Auth.,
         996 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“As a general rule, void
         contracts cannot be ratified.”). In sum, we are faced with
         nonbinding authority on both sides of that issue.
               Again, it is unnecessary and unwise to enter this state-law
         fray. As we observed in Section VI.E, courts sometimes use the
         terms “void” and “voidable” interchangeably. See Griffin, 989 F.3d
         at 934 n.7. And if we take this case authority at face value and
         assume that courts always correctly use the terms “void” and
         “voidable,” the conflicting decisions—void contracts can versus
         cannot be ratified—seem impossible to reconcile.
                 Instead of trying to reconcile these decisions applying state
         law, we again rely on Langley, our D’Oench precedent, and the
         general definitions of “void” and “voidable,” found in treatises and
         legal dictionaries, which establish that a principal’s power to elect
         to ratify an agent’s unauthorized contract by definition makes the
         contract merely voidable. See Voidable, Black’s Law Dictionary
         (11th ed. 2019); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 7 cmt.
         e; 1 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1:20. While the principal may
         elect to avoid the contract, the contract is not “void” in the
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       77

         technically accurate meaning of that term. See Griffin, 989 F.3d at
         923; Haggart, 143 F. at 27. Because all agree that the Hardwick law
         firm could have ratified the security agreement in this case, that
         agreement was voidable and constituted an interest that was
         capable of transfer for purposes of D’Oench. See Gordy, 928 F.2d
         at 1565.
                At bottom, the dissent fails to distinguish voidable contracts
         from binding contracts. Rather, the dissent conflates binding
         contracts with voidable contracts and applies a binding v. void
         dichotomy. For example, the dissent argues that: “The status of a
         contract executed by an agent as void or voidable turns on whether
         the agent has the authority to bind the principal.” Dissenting Op.
         at 15. As we have explained, the question is not whether the
         contract was ultimately binding on the Hardwick law firm.
         Instead, the proper and narrow inquiry for D’Oench transfer
         purposes is whether the facially valid and fully executed written
         contract was already void or merely voidable when the FDIC took
         over. The void-voidable dichotomy should be applied here, and
         the security agreement was voidable because it was capable of
         being affirmed or rejected at the option of the law firm. See supra
         Section V.B at 37–43.
               H. Comment c to § 4.01 of the Third Restatement of
               Agency (2006) and comment a to § 82 of the Second
               Restatement of Agency (1958)
             Finally, we address the dissent’s reliance on Restatement
         comments. The dissent attempts to “mak[e] sense of the
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         78                       Opinion of the Court                    20-13735

         conflicting authority in this area of law,” but admits that “is no easy
         task.” Dissenting Op. at 32. To do so, the dissent cites (1) comment
         c to § 4.01 of the Third Restatement of Agency; and (2) comment a
         to § 82 of the Second Restatement of Agency. Id. at 33–34. While
         the dissent purports to “shed[] light on the matter,” it misconstrues
         these two comments to support its arguments that no contract, or
         only a void contract, was formed. See id. at 32.
                Neither comment states, or even suggests, an agent’s
         unauthorized contract is void unless ratified by the principal.
         Indeed, the dissent alleges only that comment a to § 82 of the
         Second Restatement “strongly implies that a contract entered by
         an agent who lacks authority, prior to ratification, is void.” Id. at
         32–33. There is also no use of the term “void” in the corresponding
         text of the Restatement where these comments appear. At a
         minimum, these comments do not bear the heavy weight the
         dissent places on them.
                The dissent also argues that under agency law “a principal
         must take affirmative steps to ratify a contract formed by an agent
         who lacked authority.” Id. at 35. The Third Restatement,
         however, makes clear that ratification can also result from a
         principal’s failure to act. Restatement (Third) of Agency, supra,
         § 4.01 cmt. f. Specifically, a principal with notice “may ratify an act
         by failing to object to it or to repudiate it” or by delaying
         “expressing an objection to an unauthorized act.” Id. In fact, the
         principal need not even communicate the ratification to the agent
         or the third party for it to be effective. Id. § 4.01 cmt. d. It is telling
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         20-13735               Opinion of the Court                       79

         that the dissent fails to explain how ratification-by-silence is an
         affirmative act that binds the principal.
                In addition, even assuming for sake of argument that the
         principal must affirmatively manifest assent to ratify a contract
         entered by an agent, that contract still would be ratifiable and thus
         voidable. The Restatements’ commentary does not support the
         dissent’s contention that “a contract entered by an agent who lacks
         authority, prior to ratification, is void, not voidable.” Dissenting
         Op. at 32–33.
                               VII.   CONCLUSION
               We conclude that Landcastle’s lack-of-authority claims are
         barred under D’Oench because they rely on evidence that was
         outside Crescent’s records when the FDIC took over and sold the
         Hardwick loan and CD collateral to Renasant.
                We do not “invent” any new, much less “radical and
         untenable,” rules of agency or contract law. Id. at 1, 37–38. Rather,
         we also conclude that Hardwick’s acting outside the scope of his
         authority did not render the security agreement void but, at most,
         only voidable. As Langley teaches, a voidable interest is sufficient
         to pass the CD security agreement to the FDIC and to trigger the
         D’Oench shield. See 484 U.S. at 94, 108 S. Ct. at 402.
                Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order, dated June
         8, 2020, and remand with instructions to enter final judgment in
         favor of Renasant.
               REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   1

         WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, dissenting:
                 This appeal concerns whether the Federal Deposit Insurance
         Corporation can steal assets from third parties when it takes over a
         failed bank. Named after the Supreme Court decision in which it
         was first recognized, D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
         Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942), the D’Oench doctrine bars
         private parties from raising claims or defenses that rely on evidence
         outside the failed bank’s records. But the doctrine applies only
         when the claim or defense would “diminish or defeat” an “interest”
         that the failed bank transferred to the Deposit Corporation. See 12
         U.S.C. § 1823(e); see also Lindley v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 733
         F.3d 1043, 1052–53 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, a private party argues
         that its agent lacked the authority to enter into a purported agree-
         ment on its behalf and that the principal was not bound, so the
         failed bank obtained no “interest” in the purported agreement that
         could have been transferred to the Deposit Corporation in the first
         place. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). In that context, the D’Oench doc-
         trine is not implicated, so I would affirm the judgment of the dis-
         trict court.
                The majority erroneously determines, as a matter of federal
         common law, that the D’Oench doctrine applies anyway. To reach
         this conclusion, it relies on a radical and untenable interpretation
         of agency law. According to the majority, an agent acting without
         actual or apparent authority can nevertheless bind its purported
         principal. The principal must then take affirmative steps if it wishes
         to avoid the contract the unauthorized agent made. Because the
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         2                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting          20-13735

         majority’s decision relies on fundamental misunderstandings about
         agency relationships and contract formation, creates serious Tak-
         ings Clause concerns, and contradicts Supreme Court precedent, I
         respectfully dissent.
                                 I. BACKGROUND
                The relevant facts in this appeal are largely undisputed. Na-
         than Hardwick was a named partner at Morris Hardwick Schnei-
         der, LLC, a law firm wholly owned by MHSLAW, P.C. MHSLAW
         was the sole member of Morris Hardwick. Hardwick and the firm’s
         other named attorneys, Arthur Morris and Randolph Schneider,
         were managers of Morris Hardwick and owners of MHSLAW.
         Hardwick owned 50% of MHSLAW, and Morris and Schneider
         each owned 25%.
                Morris Hardwick’s operating agreement and MHSLAW’s
         bylaws governed how the respective companies’ assets could be
         pledged. Morris Hardwick’s operating agreement prohibited any
         manager from causing the company to guarantee the obligation of
         a person “without the affirmative vote of the [m]embers holding a
         [m]ajority [i]nterest.” (Emphasis omitted.) Because MHSLAW was
         the sole member of Morris Hardwick, the operating agreement ef-
         fectively required MHSLAW to vote to pledge Morris Hardwick’s
         assets to guarantee a third party’s obligation. MHSLAW’s bylaws,
         in turn, prohibited directors from pledging assets “without the af-
         firmative vote of the majority of . . . the shareholders.” (Emphasis
         omitted.) So, none of the named attorneys, including Hardwick,
         could pledge any firm asset to guarantee a third party’s obligation
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         20-13735         WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   3

         unless Hardwick and at least one of the other named attorneys
         voted to authorize the guarantee.
                 In 2009, Hardwick entered into several agreements with
         Crescent Bank & Trust Company, some of which he signed in his
         personal capacity and some of which he signed as a “managing
         member” of Morris Hardwick. First, he used $631,276.71 to pur-
         chase a certificate of time deposit from Crescent. The parties dis-
         pute who owned the funds that Hardwick used to purchase the cer-
         tificate, but both parties agree that Crescent issued the certificate
         to Morris Hardwick. Hardwick then took out a personal loan from
         Crescent for the same amount, $631,276.71. Next, to secure his per-
         sonal loan with sufficient collateral to satisfy Crescent, Hardwick—
         purporting to act as “managing member” of Morris Hardwick even
         though he was not a member—pledged the certificate to Crescent.
                Hardwick executed four separate documents. He executed
         a commercial security agreement, which listed the certificate as his
         personal property and as collateral on the personal loan. He also
         executed several documents as a “managing member” of Morris
         Hardwick: a corporate resolution, an assignment of the certificate
         to Crescent, and a hypothecation agreement. Robert Driskell, Mor-
         ris Hardwick’s Chief Financial Officer, also signed the corporate
         resolution as an “authorized signer” for the certificate-of-deposit
         account. Neither party disputes that no shareholder vote author-
         ized Hardwick to execute these documents, and there is no evi-
         dence that Morris or Schneider knew about these particular trans-
         actions.
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         4                 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

                The corporate resolution “grant[ed] . . . [d]eposit authority
         by the governing body of the business entity to specified individu-
         als.” The document is formatted as a checklist of possible authori-
         zations. The resolution specifies that the “[w]ords or phrases pre-
         ceded by a [box] are applicable only if the [box] is marked.” No
         boxes on the document were marked even though some authori-
         zations specified whether Hardwick and Driskell—instead of Hard-
         wick alone—were given the particular authorization. The potential
         authorizations included the authorization to make “deposits to”
         and “withdrawals from” the certificate account and to “[t]ransfer
         funds from the account[] . . . to any account” and “[t]ransfer funds
         to the account[] . . . from any account.” From the document, we
         can infer that those authorizations were not granted.
                 Hardwick purported to execute the assignment and hypoth-
         ecation agreement on behalf of Morris Hardwick. The assign-
         ment—the key document of interest in this case—represented that
         Morris Hardwick “assign[ed] and transfer[red] to [Crescent Bank],
         and . . . [gave Crescent] a security interest” in the certificate. The
         assignment was “to secure the payment of . . . all present and future
         debts” Hardwick personally owed Crescent. The hypothecation
         agreement provided that in the event of default, Crescent could
         marshal the certificate to satisfy the debt.
               In 2010, Crescent failed. The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
         poration closed Crescent and put it into receivership. Renasant
         Bank then purchased Crescent’s assets.
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    5

                  The Deposit Corporation administers the federal deposit in-
         surance system, which was created by Congress in 1933 and works
         to insure deposits at banks and savings institutions. See 12 U.S.C.
         § 1811(a). The Deposit Corporation supervises and regulates banks
         to identify and address risks to the insurance funds. When a bank
         fails, the Deposit Corporation must quickly decide whether to liq-
         uidate the failed bank’s assets to pay its depositors and other credi-
         tors or to enter into a purchase-and-assumption agreement where
         another institution purchases the assets and assumes the liabilities
         of the failed bank.
                  Because these decisions must “usually” be made “over-
         night,” a combination of federal common law and statute called the
         D’Oench doctrine helps the Deposit Corporation make informed
         decisions. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir.
         1982), abrogated on other grounds by Langley v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
         Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987). The most accurate “method of eval-
         uating” the options “is relying on the books and records of the
         failed bank to estimate what assets would be returned by a purchas-
         ing bank and to estimate which of those assets ultimately would be
         collectible.” Id. at 870. The D’Oench doctrine aids the Deposit Cor-
         poration by barring private parties from seeking to defeat or dimin-
         ish its interests by relying on evidence outside the failed bank’s rec-
         ords. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 93. By relying on the failed bank’s
         official records, the Deposit Corporation is able to more easily ob-
         tain a reliable estimate of the failed bank’s assets. See Gunter, 674
         F.2d at 870. If it could not obtain such an estimate, the purchase-
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         6                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         and-assumption option might be “effectively foreclosed,” see id.,
         because potential purchasers might hesitate before accepting that
         level of risk.
                 Although the record does not establish when Hardwick
         stopped making payments on the loan, Renasant determined in
         2014 that Hardwick was in default and applied the proceeds of the
         certificate to offset the amount that Hardwick owed. That same
         year, Morris Hardwick assigned its interest in the certificate to
         Landcastle Acquisition Corporation.
                Landcastle then filed an administrative claim with the De-
         posit Corporation to recover the amount of the certificate. After
         the Deposit Corporation refused to pay the claim, Landcastle sued
         Renasant for conversion and breach of contract, alleging that Re-
         nasant did not have the right to liquidate the certificate or to use
         the proceeds to offset Hardwick’s personal loan. Landcastle and
         Renasant both moved for summary judgment.
                Landcastle contended that Hardwick lacked the authority to
         pledge the certificate as collateral for his personal loan. It argued
         that Hardwick lacked actual authority because the governing doc-
         uments of Morris Hardwick and MHSLAW conditioned actual au-
         thority on a shareholder vote. Landcastle further argued that Hard-
         wick lacked apparent authority because his pledge of a firm asset as
         collateral for a personal loan was not “apparently for the carrying
         on in the usual way the business and affairs” of Morris Hardwick.
         See GA. CODE § 14-11-301(c)–(d). Landcastle asserted that self-inter-
         ested transactions are categorically not “carrying on . . . the
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    7

         business and affairs” of a company “in the usual way.” See id. § 14-
         11-301(c).
                 Renasant agreed that Hardwick lacked actual authority to
         bind Morris Hardwick, but it argued that he had apparent authority
         to execute the agreements because Morris Hardwick had not satis-
         fied its burden to offer facts about its usual way of business. Re-
         nasant also argued that Hardwick had apparent authority because
         the managers collectively failed to observe corporate formalities,
         the company and managers commingled the managers’ personal
         finances with company funds, and Crescent was familiar with Mor-
         ris Hardwick and Hardwick individually.
                Renasant also made an alternative argument about the
         D’Oench doctrine. It argued that even if Hardwick lacked author-
         ity, the D’Oench doctrine barred Landcastle from asserting its
         claim because Landcastle necessarily relied on evidence outside the
         bank’s records to defeat its interest in the certificate. And it argued
         that Hardwick’s lack of authority rendered the agreements at worst
         voidable, and not void, so the D’Oench doctrine applied.
                The district court denied Renasant’s motion. It first con-
         cluded that the D’Oench doctrine does not bar private parties from
         asserting as a claim or defense that the agent who executed the
         agreement lacked authority to do so. The district court reasoned
         that enforcing a claim (or establishing a defense) based on lack of
         authority does not require a court to enforce an agreement with or
         obligation against the bank that is not within its records. It deter-
         mined that, in those circumstances, the bank is the party that is
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         8                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting          20-13735

         trying to enforce the agreement or obligation that might or might
         not exist. The district court likened lack of authority to forgery,
         which it concluded resembles fraud in the factum. And the district
         court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Langley v. Federal
         Deposit Insurance Corp., which stated that the D’Oench doctrine
         would not bar a “fraud in the factum” defense because fraud in the
         factum renders an agreement entirely void. See 484 U.S. at 93.
                The district court also denied Landcastle’s motion for sum-
         mary judgment. It reasoned that, under Georgia law, Landcastle
         had the initial burden of proving the absence of apparent authority.
         It then explained that Landcastle had flipped the burden to Re-
         nasant to establish the presence of apparent authority because
         Landcastle had established that Hardwick entered the transaction
         for personal purposes. And it concluded that Renasant had satisfied
         that burden with enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of
         fact but not enough to warrant summary judgment in its favor.
                 The district court certified its summary-judgment order for
         immediate appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court stated
         that there were two controlling questions of law for which there
         are substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an inter-
         locutory appeal would materially advance the litigation. See id.
         First, “[d]oes D’Oench bar a claim (or defense) that the agent who
         signed the agreement with the bank purportedly lacked authority
         to do so?” And second, “[u]nder [Georgia Code Section] 14-11-301,
         who bears the burden to demonstrate whether an agent who
         pledged company assets for personal use was ‘apparently carrying
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    9

         on in the usual way the business and affairs’ of the [limited liability
         company], and what is the nature of that burden?”
                Renasant timely filed a petition for interlocutory appeal but
         chose to pursue only the D’Oench question. We granted review
         and clarified that we would consider only whether the D’Oench
         doctrine “bar[s] a claim (or defense) that the agent who signed the
         agreement with the bank purportedly lacked authority to do so.”
         The parties briefed whether the D’Oench doctrine bars a claim or
         defense based on lack of authority, and, if so, whether the doctrine
         would bar Landcastle’s claim in this case.
                            II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review certified questions of law de novo. Johnson v.
         City of Fort Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228, 1229 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998);
         see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). But our appellate jurisdiction is not
         limited to the question of law identified by the district court. Bar-
         rientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020). In-
         stead, we have jurisdiction over the order certified, and we “may
         address any issue fairly included within the certified order.” Id.
         (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199,
         205 (1996)). But we have counseled that the “legal question” in a
         section 1292(b) appeal “must be stated at a high enough level of
         abstraction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence or
         facts of a particular case and give it general relevance to other cases
         in the same area of law.” See McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381
         F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). So, we have the discretion to limit
         our review to the “discrete and abstract legal issue the district court
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         10               WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         identified.” Barrientos, 951 F.3d at 1275; Moorman v. UnumProvi-
         dent Corp., 464 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006); see also 16
         CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
         § 3929 (3d ed. Apr. 2022 update). To the extent that we review the
         order beyond the pure question of law identified by the district
         court, we employ our normal standards of review. Here, the dis-
         trict court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, so
         we review that order de novo. See Tillis ex rel. Wuenschel v.
         Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).
                                  III. DISCUSSION
                I divide my discussion into three parts. First, I explain why
         Landcastle’s claims are not barred by the D’Oench doctrine. Sec-
         ond, I explain the basic principles of agency law that prevent an
         agent who lacks authority from binding a principal in contract.
         Third, I explain the problems created by the majority’s new rule.
         A. The D’Oench Doctrine Does Not Apply to Lack of Authority,
          Which Prevents a Failed Bank from Obtaining an Interest That
                Can Be Transferred to the Deposit Corporation.
                Although the D’Oench doctrine is a messy combination of
         common law and statute, it “is simply a rule” that protects federal
         deposit insurers and their successors in interest from some claims
         or defenses that the insurers could not have discovered by examin-
         ing the failed bank’s records. See Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1051; Vernon
         v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 907 F.2d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 1990). It applies
         when a private party who has “lent himself to a scheme or
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                     11

         arrangement whereby” the bank insured by the federal deposit in-
         surer “was or was likely to be misled,” D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 460,
         asserts a claim or defense that “tends to diminish or defeat the in-
         terest” of the federal deposit insurer, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e); see also
         Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1052–53.
                 When the doctrine applies, a private party is barred from re-
         lying on any evidence outside the failed bank’s records to support
         his claim or defense. See Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1051. And when the
         asset at issue is an instrument, federal deposit insurers and their
         successors in interest have “a quasi-holder-in-due-course status,”
         see Vernon, 907 F.2d at 1106, even when they would not be enti-
         tled to holder-in-due-course status under state law, see Fed. De-
         posit Ins. Corp. v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593, 603 n.10 (11th Cir.
         1990). This status benefits the Deposit Corporation and its succes-
         sors in interest because “[t]he right of . . . holder[s] in due course to
         enforce the obligation of a party . . . is subject” only to a limited
         number of “real defenses.” See U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1), (b) & cmt. 1
         (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (internal quotation marks
         omitted).
                The D’Oench doctrine does not protect federal deposit in-
         surers from all claims and defenses. See, e.g., Langley, 484 U.S. at
         93–94; Vernon, 907 F.2d at 1106 n.4. The doctrine applies only to
         claims and defenses that “tend[] to diminish or defeat the interest”
         of the federal deposit insurer in an asset. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e);
         Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1052–53. The D’Oench doctrine does not apply
         where the failed bank did not have and could not have transferred
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         12                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting              20-13735

         an interest to the insurers. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94. That is,
         the D’Oench doctrine protects preexisting interests; it does not cre-
         ate new ones.
                 The Supreme Court explained this limitation in Langley.
         W.T. and Maryanne Grimes Langley had executed a facially un-
         qualified promissory note in favor of a bank, which later trans-
         ferred the note to the Deposit Corporation. Id. at 88–89, 93. De-
         fending against the enforcement of the note, the Langleys argued
         that the note was “procured by [the bank’s] misrepresentations.”
         Id. at 88–89. The Langleys argued that the D’Oench doctrine did
         not apply to fraudulent representations or warranties at all. Id. at
         93. The Court rejected that broad argument but explained that
         “[t]he presence of fraud could be relevant . . . [to] the requirement
         that the agreement in question tend to diminish or defeat the . . .
         interest” of the federal deposit insurer. Id. (alteration adopted) (in-
         ternal quotation marks omitted).
                The Supreme Court concluded that the D’Oench doctrine
         does not bar private parties from asserting a fraud-in-the-factum
         defense, id., even though that defense will almost always be based
         on evidence “not found in the failed bank’s official records,” see
         Maj. Op. 33. It explained that “the real defense of fraud in the fac-
         tum” would “render the instrument entirely void,” and an instru-
         ment that is “entirely void” creates “no . . . ‘interest’” that “c[an be]
         transfer[red] to the” Deposit Corporation. Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–
         94 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
         OF CONTRACTS § 163 & cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981); Laborers’
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   13

         Pension Fund v. A&C Env’t, Inc., 301 F.3d 768, 780 (7th Cir. 2002)
         (“[A]ssent procured by fraud in the [factum] renders the agreement
         void and the purported contract . . . nonexistent.”). And because
         there is no interest in a void instrument that can be transferred to
         the Deposit Corporation, establishing a fraud-in-the-factum de-
         fense would not “ten[d] to diminish or defeat” the Deposit Corpo-
         ration’s “interest” in the asset. Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94 (altera-
         tion in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
                But the Supreme Court concluded that the D’Oench doc-
         trine does apply to defenses that render a contract voidable—as op-
         posed to void—such as fraud in the inducement. See id. at 94, 96.
         It explained that the bank’s alleged misrepresentations in Langley
         “constitute[d] only fraud in the inducement,” not “fraud in the fac-
         tum.” See id. at 94. It then examined whether, if the note were pro-
         cured by fraud in the inducement, the bank would have obtained
         any interest in the note that it could have transferred to the Deposit
         Corporation. See id. Fraud in the inducement “renders [a] note
         voidable but not void.” Id. A voidable note is a contract that “is
         valid and has its usual legal consequences until” a party elects to
         avoid it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. e. So,
         in Langley, the failed bank obtained “voidable title” in the note.
         Langley, 484 U.S. at 94. That is, the bank obtained an “interest,” 12
         U.S.C. § 1823(e), in the note that was “valid . . . until” the Langleys
         elected to void it, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7
         cmt. e. The Supreme Court concluded that voidable title is an “in-
         terest” that can be “diminish[ed] or defeat[ed]” for purposes of the
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         14               WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         D’Oench doctrine. Langley, 484 U.S. at 94 (alterations in original)
         (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
                  B. An Agent Without Authority Cannot Bind a
                          Principal in Contract.
                Because the D’Oench doctrine applies only to preexisting in-
         terests, courts must first determine whether, if the claim or defense
         is successful, the failed bank ever had an interest in the asset that
         could be “diminish[ed] or defeat[ed].” See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e); ac-
         cord Andrew D. Taylor Tr. v. Sec. Tr. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 844
         F.2d 337, 342–43 (6th Cir. 1988); Grubb v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
         868 F.2d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 1989); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
         Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895 F.2d 824, 830 (1st Cir. 1990). So, the
         outcome of the present case turns on whether, if Hardwick lacked
         authority to pledge Morris Hardwick’s certificate, Crescent ever
         held an interest in the certificate that it could have transferred to
         the Deposit Corporation.
                To answer that question, we look to general commercial
         law. The asset at issue in Langley, a promissory note, was governed
         by Louisiana law. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 88. But the Supreme
         Court, as a matter of federal common law, looked to general com-
         mercial law in considering the legal effect that fraudulent induce-
         ment and fraud in the factum would have had on the note, with
         reference to the Uniform Commercial Code, the Second Restate-
         ment of Contracts, and Farnsworth’s casebook on contracts. Id. at
         93–94.
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    15

                The common law of agency and contracts is not always a
         model of clarity, but we can still derive a few fundamental princi-
         ples that suffice to resolve the case before us. First, a contract can-
         not be formed without the mutual assent of the parties bound by
         it. Second, an agent who purports to form a contract on a princi-
         pal’s behalf—but, in fact, lacks the authority to do so—does not
         form a contract enforceable against the principal. Third, the pur-
         ported contract becomes enforceable against the principal only if
         he takes affirmative steps to ratify it, which manifest his assent to
         the agreement.
                   The status of a contract executed by an agent as void or void-
         able turns on whether the agent has the authority to bind the prin-
         cipal. Contra Maj. Op. 50. A voidable contract binds the parties un-
         til it is repudiated, but a void contract never binds the parties. And
         whether a contract is void or voidable, in turn, determines whether
         an interest was ever created for purposes of the D’Oench doctrine.
         Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94. So, the following discussion, which ad-
         dresses when an agent can bind a principal in contract, is not “far
         afield” from the certified question but rather goes to the very heart
         of it. Contra Maj. Op. 51.
                According to the first key principle, a contract can only be
         formed with the consent of the parties bound by it. With limited
         exceptions not relevant here, “the formation of a contract” under
         general contract law “requires . . . mutual assent to the exchange.”
         RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1). “The manifesta-
         tion of mutual assent . . . ordinarily takes the form of an offer or
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         16                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting              20-13735

         proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party
         or parties.” Id. § 22(1). An agent can act on behalf of a principal to
         make or accept an offer in accordance with the law of agency. See
         id. § 52 cmt. c. For this act to occur, the following steps are re-
         quired: the principal “manifest[s] assent to the agent’s power”; the
         “agent enters into a contract on behalf of [his] principal by mani-
         festing assent to an exchange”; and “[t]he third party manifests as-
         sent . . . to the agent.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01
         cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006).
                 According to the second key principle, when an agent lacks
         authority to form a contract on the principal’s behalf, no contract
         results. So, when an agent purports to “enter[] into [a] contract on
         [its] principal’s behalf . . . without actual or apparent authority,”
         the “principal is not a party to [that] contract.” Id. § 6.05 cmt. b
         (emphasis added). In other words, “[a]n agent can bind its principal
         to a contract” only if “the agent has actual authority” or if the “con-
         tract[] [is] made by the agent . . . within the scope of the agent’s
         apparent authority.” 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 83 (Nov. 2022 Update);
         see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01. An agent acting
         without authority cannot bind a principal unless the principal takes
         an affirmative step to bind himself, known as “ratification.”
                 An agent’s false representation of authority does not alter
         the fact that he lacks authority. It is a “basic proposition that a prin-
         cipal is not accountable simply because the agent has succeeded in
         misleading the third party about the extent or nature of the agent’s
         authority.” Id. § 2.03 cmt. c. No contract is formed between the
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   17

         principal and the third party because “[a] principal is not subject to
         liability when an agent” acts without authority, even if the agent
         “defrauds a third party.” See id. § 7.08 cmt. c(2); see also id.
         § 6.11(1) (“When an agent for a disclosed . . . principal makes a false
         representation about the agent’s authority to a third party, the prin-
         cipal is not subject to liability unless the agent acted with actual or
         apparent authority in making the representation and the third party
         does not have notice that the agent’s representation is false.”).
                 Settled precedent recognizes this principle. As long ago as
         1852, the Supreme Court held that “it is a well-settled principle of
         law, and nowhere controverted, that if an agent exceed[s] his au-
         thority his acts in such excess do not bind his principal.” Very v.
         Levy, 54 U.S. 345, 349 (1852). More recently, we held in Gymco
         Construction Co. v. Architectural Glass & Windows, Inc. that be-
         cause an agent “lacked authority to enter into a . . . contract” be-
         tween his principal and a third party, “there was no [such] con-
         tract.” 884 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1989).
                The majority’s attempts to distinguish our precedent in
         Gymco are unavailing. The Gymco decision rested on alternative
         holdings. We held that the agent “lacked authority to enter into a
         new contract,” and we alternatively held that the agent “could not
         agree to modify the written contract orally.” Id. That the purported
         contract between the agent and the third party was an oral contract
         was necessary only to the latter alternative holding. Contra Maj.
         Op. 64–65. The former holding confirms that an agent cannot cre-
         ate a contract on a principal’s behalf without authority—a
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         18                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         fundamental principle that does not depend on the details of
         Gymco’s facts. Our holding also did not rely on a determination
         that the principal had repudiated the contract, as opposed to the
         fact that no contract was formed, to reach its conclusion. Contra
         id. at 65. We mentioned repudiation only to support the proposi-
         tion that the agent lacked actual authority, but we proceeded to
         assess apparent authority separately. See Gymco, 884 F.2d at 1366.
         That the third party could not reasonably have believed that the
         agent had authority was necessary to establish that apparent au-
         thority did not exist. See Maj. Op. 64–65. Our holding was clear:
         the agent formed no contract because he lacked the authority to do
         so. And that principle applies beyond the facts of Gymco.

                In In re JLJ Inc., 988 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993), we likewise
         held that a contract purportedly made by an agent who lacked au-
         thority to bind the principal was “void.” We considered the validity
         of an assignment of debt by an agent acting under power of attor-
         ney. We held that “[i]f [the principal] orally revoked the power of
         attorney . . . , then the assignment [the agent] executed one week
         later would be void.” Id. at 1116 (emphasis added). We remanded
         the case “to the bankruptcy court for factual findings regarding
         whether [the principal] orally revoked the power of attorney be-
         fore [the agent] assigned the debtor’s promissory notes . . . on [the
         principal’s] behalf.” Id. at 1117. Although the agent in JLJ allegedly
         lacked authority because the principal had revoked it—in contrast
         with the agent here, who allegedly exceeded his authority—the
         same principle applies: an agent cannot bind a principal in contract
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         20-13735         WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                  19

         when he lacks the authority to do so. The resulting purported con-
         tract is void.

                The majority’s attempt to distinguish JLJ is also unavailing.
         This Court reasoned that the assignment “would be void if [the
         principal] orally revoked the power of attorney before [the agent]
         executed the assignment.” Id. at 1116. So, it directly stated that an
         agreement entered by an agent who lacked authority is void. Con-
         tra Maj. Op. 67–68. Because that determination was necessary to
         the disposition of the appeal—in fact, it was the only reason this
         Court remanded the case to the district court, JLJ, 988 F.2d at
         1117—it constituted part of our holding, see United States v. Kaley,
         579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (“What matters in discern-
         ing whether a rule of law expounded by a court is in fact holding is
         whether it was necessary to the result reached . . . .”). The JLJ
         Court expressly relied on Alabama law only to determine under
         what circumstances the power of attorney could be revoked. See
         JLJ, 988 F.2d at 1116–17 (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 91 So. 82, 84
         (Ala. 1921)). Contra Maj. Op. 67 & n.14. But it did not suggest that
         its holding that the assignment of the notes would be void if the
         agent’s power of attorney had been revoked depended on a peculi-
         arity of Alabama law. And our statement in a separate, unpublished
         opinion that courts in general, and Alabama courts in particular,
         tend to use the terms “void” and “voidable” imprecisely does not
         alter the weight of existing precedent. Contra Maj. Op. 68 (citing
         United States v. Ruan, 796 F. App’x 672, 675–76 (11th Cir. 2020)).
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         20                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

                Many courts have similarly concluded that when an agent
         who lacks authority purports to bind a principal in contract, the
         resulting instrument is void. See, e.g., United States v. Marin, 651
         F.2d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Since [the agent] lacked authority to
         contract for the corporation, and since the corporation never rati-
         fied his action, the . . . lease [that the agent had purportedly signed
         on the principal’s behalf] was void.”); Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank
         Wyo., 90 P.3d 724, 733 (Wyo. 2004) (explaining that “[u]ltra vires
         acts of a corporate president or other agent are void unless” appar-
         ent authority existed or the act was later ratified); Spengler v. Son-
         nenberg, 102 N.E. 737, 739 (Ohio 1913) (“If the agent assumes to
         make a contract in excess of this authority, the agreement is void
         and unenforceable.”); Siena at Old Orchard Condo. Ass’n v. Siena
         at Old Orchard, L.L.C., 75 N.E.3d 420, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“A
         contract executed by a party that does not have authority is void
         ab initio.” (Citation omitted)); O’Neal v. O’Neal, 803 S.E.2d 184,
         189 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (holding, where an agent acted under an
         invalid grant of power of attorney, that “the deeds that [the agent]
         executed pursuant to [the purported agency relationship] were
         void ab initio”); 1230 Park Assocs., LLC v. N. Source, LLC, 852
         N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that a third-party
         lender “did not have a valid and enforceable security interest in the
         [principal’s] collateral, as [the agent] had no authority, apparent or
         otherwise, to pledge [the principal’s] property as collateral for the
         loans”).
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         20-13735           WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                      21

                 Notably, the Fifth Circuit concluded in a context particularly
         analogous to this appeal that a contract purportedly formed by an
         agent who lacks authority is void. See In re Northlake Dev. L.L.C.,
         643 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2011). At issue was whether a contract made
         by a minority member of an LLC, who deeded “substantially all of
         the LLC’s real estate” to his own company “without authority,”
         was “(i) voidable, such that it [was] subject to the intervening rights
         of a subsequent bonafide purchaser for value and without notice,
         or (ii) void ab initio, i.e., a legal nullity[.]” Id. at 450 (quoting In re
         Northlake Dev., L.L.C., 614 F.3d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 2010)). Based on
         the Mississippi Supreme Court’s answer to its certified question,
         the Fifth Circuit determined that “the deed was . . . ‘void and of no
         legal effect’ because” the agent “lacked actual or apparent authority
         to convey” the property “and [the principal] never ratified the pur-
         ported transfer.” Id. at 450 (quoting Northlake Dev. L.L.C. v. Bank-
         Plus, 60 So.3d 792, 794 (Miss. 2011). It cogently explained that
         “[w]here no actual or apparent authority exists to transfer a princi-
         pal’s property, . . . the deed is void unless and until later ratified.”
         Id. at 451 (alteration adopted) (quoting Northlake Dev. L.L.C., 60
         So.3d at 797).

                An informative line of caselaw also arises under the Federal
         Arbitration Act. These decisions address whether courts or arbitra-
         tors should decide disputes over whether a contract that includes
         an arbitration clause was formed by an agent who lacked authority.
         If no contract exists, no agreement to arbitrate binds the parties.
         Although it did not address the issue on the merits, in a footnote,
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         22                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         the Supreme Court classified the question “whether the signor
         lacked authority to commit the alleged principal” as bearing on
         “whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee
         was ever concluded.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
         546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006) (emphasis added). So, the Supreme
         Court—in a decision applying “federal substantive law,” id. at 445–
         47 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984))—
         understood that an agent who purports to form a contract on be-
         half of his principal but lacks authority to do so forms no contract
         at all.
                 The majority’s attempt to undermine our reliance on Car-
         degna is unavailing. See Maj. Op. 72. In Rintin Corp., S.A. v. Do-
         mar, Ltd., we recognized that the Cardegna Court “held that under
         the Federal Arbitration Act, a challenge to the validity of a contract
         containing an arbitration clause, rather than to the arbitration
         clause itself, should be determined in the first instance by the arbi-
         trators.” 476 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2007). So, the distinction
         between void and voidable contracts was ultimately “irrelevant.”
         Id. But we, like the Supreme Court, recognized a distinction “be-
         tween challenges to the validity of a contract with an arbitration
         clause and arguments that a party never consented to such a con-
         tract.” Id. at 1259 n.3; see also Cardegna at 444 n.1. Because Rintin
         did not argue that it had “never effectively consented to the Agree-
         ment,” we determined that “we need not pursue the line of cases
         mentioned in [the Cardegna footnote].” Rintin Corp., 476 F.3d at
         1259 n.3. The statements in both Cardegna and Rintin
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   23

         distinguishing questions of contract validity from questions of con-
         tract formation—and, in Cardegna, the statement indicating that
         an agent’s lack of authority created an issue of contract for-
         mation—are informative, even if only dicta.
                   What’s more, a majority of our sister circuits have agreed
         that if an agent was not authorized to form the contract, no con-
         tract exists, nor does an agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., Nat’l
         Fed’n of the Blind v. Container Store, Inc., 904 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir.
         2018) (“A challenge to formation can also be done by showing that
         . . . a signatory did not possess the authority to commit the princi-
         pal . . . .”); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 109 (3d
         Cir. 2000) (explaining that a “failure to demonstrate how the arbi-
         tration agreement exists if [the agent] lacked authority to bind [the
         principal] places the [arbitration] clause’s validity in dispute”);
         Berkeley Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Hub Int’l Ltd., 944 F.3d 225, 238 (4th
         Cir. 2019) (“[I]f the agent . . . lacks authority to bind his principal
         . . . to a contract with a third party . . . yet purports to do so any-
         way, no contract is formed between the principal and the third
         party.”); Arnold v. Homeaway, Inc., 890 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir.
         2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that the category of
         arguments that question the very existence of an agreement in-
         clude[s] . . . whether the signor lacked authority to commit the al-
         leged principal . . . .” (Internal quotations marks omitted)); Sphere
         Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2001)
         (Easterbrook, J.) (explaining that, when a contract was purportedly
         formed by “a faithless agent who lacked authority to make that
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         24                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

         commitment,” “no contract came into being”); GP3 II, LLC v. Li-
         tong Cap., LLC, 35 F.4th 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[A] signor’s
         authority to bind a purported principal is an issue of contract for-
         mation . . . .”); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton &
         Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the ques-
         tion of “whether the signatory had authority to bind the plaintiffs
         to the agreement” must be decided by a district court because it
         “go[es] to the very existence of a contract that a party claims never
         to have agreed to”); see also Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co.,
         957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining, in a forgery case, that
         the determination of whether a “non-signing party can nonetheless
         be bound by the contractual language,” including under agency
         principles, goes to “the very existence of any agreement”).
                 The majority’s attempt to disregard this entire line of
         caselaw is unpersuasive. See Maj. Op. 72–73. It contends that the
         Federal Arbitration Act cases are irrelevant because “[f]or D’Oench
         purposes, we must determine whether the FDIC had an interest
         (including a voidable interest) that could be diminished or de-
         feated,” whereas “[i]n the arbitration context . . . courts look at
         whether an arbitration agreement is binding on the principal.” Id.
         at 73. But the majority identifies two sides of the same coin. An
         interest can be created only through a binding contract. So, author-
         ities that address when an agent forms a binding contract to arbi-
         trate inform our understanding of when an agent forms a binding
         contract that creates an interest for the purposes of the D’Oench
         doctrine.
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    25

                 Like our precedents and many persuasive authorities, I refer
         to a purported contract created by an agent who lacks authority
         alternatively as either “no contract” or “void.” A “void” contract is
         “[a] promise for breach of which the law neither gives a remedy
         nor otherwise recognizes a duty of performance by the promisor.”
         RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a. “[S]uch a prom-
         ise is not a contract at all; it is [a] ‘promise’ or ‘agreement’ that is
         void of legal effect.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 1 WILLISTON ON
         CONTRACTS § 1:20 (4th ed. Oct. 2022 Update) (“Void promises are
         not legally binding, have no legal effect, and, therefore, are not con-
         tracts.”). Likewise, where the Restatement of Agency refers to “an
         agent mak[ing] a contract with a third party” without authority,
         RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.05(1), the comments clarify
         that “[o]rdinarily[] a principal is not a party to [such] a contract,”
         id. cmt. b (emphasis added). At least for present purposes, there is
         no meaningful difference between saying that the agent formed no
         contract, formed a void contract, or formed a contract to which the
         principal was not party. In any event, no valid contract was formed
         involving the principal.
                 Yet the majority concludes that a contract can be formed in
         this circumstance. Renasant, and the amici that support it, argue
         that the D’Oench doctrine applies because an unauthorized agent
         can form a voidable contract between his purported principal and
         a third party. So, they determine that the failed bank obtained an
         interest in the contract that it could transfer to the Deposit Corpo-
         ration. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94.
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         26                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting             20-13735

                 I have already explained why, based on fundamental princi-
         ples of contract and agency law, an agent who lacks authority can-
         not form a contract that is enforceable against the principal. By con-
         trast, the formation of a voidable contract would lead to very dif-
         ferent implications. According to the Restatement of Contracts,
         “[t]he propriety of calling a transaction a voidable contract rests pri-
         marily on the traditional view that the transaction is valid and has
         its usual legal consequences until the power of avoidance is exer-
         cised.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. e; see also
         1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra, § 1:20 (“Unless rescinded, a
         voidable contract imposes on the parties the same obligations as if
         it were not voidable.”); Voidable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
         ed. 2019) (defining “voidable” as something that is “[v]alid until an-
         nulled” and as “a valid act that may be voided rather than an invalid
         act that may be ratified” (emphasis added)). To hold that an agent
         who lacks authority to bind the principal can create a presump-
         tively valid contract contravenes the most basic tenets of agency
         and contract law.

                The majority attempts to take a middle road. It contends
         that “[a] voidable contract is not the same as a binding contract.”
         Maj. Op. 61–62. And it asserts that I “conflate[] binding contracts
         with voidable contracts.” Id. at 77. Here, the majority invents a
         new category of contract: neither void nor binding. No such cate-
         gory exists. See Griffin v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 989
         F.3d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[I]f the assignments are merely
         voidable, then they are effective unless and until they are
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    27

         challenged.”). Even the majority elsewhere acknowledges that “a
         voidable contract imposes on the parties the same obligations as if
         it were not voidable” and that a voidable contract “remains intact
         until the party who has the power of avoidance elects to exercise
         it.” Maj. Op. 40 (quoting 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra,
         § 1:20); see also id. at 39 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary for the
         proposition that “voidable” means “[v]alid until annulled”). In
         other words, a voidable contract binds the parties unless and until
         the party who enjoys the power of avoidance chooses to exercise
         it.
                With respect to terminology, agency law is not always as
         precise as one might hope. See generally Void, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
         TIONARY, supra (explaining that “[t]he distinction be-
         tween void and voidable is often of great practical importance” but
         that “the word [void] is often used and construed as bearing the
         more liberal meaning of ‘voidable’”). The majority identifies some
         nonbinding authorities that refer to contracts formed by agents
         who lack authority as “voidable.” See Maj. Op. 41–42. But the ma-
         jority has not cited a single judicial decision holding a principal
         bound, over its objection, by the act of an agent who lacked au-
         thority unless the principal later ratified the contract. See id. at 41–
         42, 75–76.
                And some of the authorities that the majority cites expressly
         state that an agent cannot bind the principal without some affirm-
         ative act of ratification. For instance, one authority states that
         “[t]he principal is not bound by any act that exceeds the agent’s
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         28                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

         authority, . . . unless the principal ratifies the agent’s acts.” 2A
         C.J.S. AGENCY § 163 (footnotes omitted). Another explains that
         “[w]ithout authority for an agent to bind its principal in a contract
         with a third party, or without the principal’s subsequent ratifica-
         tion, the contract must be set aside.” 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency, supra,
         § 164; see also 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra, § 35:22 (“[R]at-
         ification . . . supplies original authority to execute the contract.”);
         Fejta v. GAF Companies, Inc., 800 F.2d 1395, 1396–97 (5th Cir.
         1986) (holding that, when an agent was not authorized to “trans-
         act[] the sale or ratify[] the contract, . . . under Louisiana law the
         contract to sell was unenforceable”).
                 In theory, I share considerable common ground with the
         majority. I maintain—and at times the majority appears to agree—
         that a contract created by an agent who lacks authority cannot be
         enforced against the principal without his consent. See Maj. Op.
         61–62. But we disagree as to the characterization of the resulting
         purported agreement. By logical implication, and consistent with
         our precedent, the purported agreement is a void contract that is
         unenforceable unless ratified, not a “voidable” contract that is
         “[v]alid until annulled.” Voidable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, su-
         pra. I also maintain—and the majority agrees—that such an agree-
         ment can be ratified by the principal. See generally Maj. Op. 73–74.
         We again disagree regarding what the principal’s power to ratify
         implies about the nature of the purported contract, an issue to
         which I now turn.
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                     29

                 According to the third key principle, a principal can become
         bound by a contract that his agent who lacks authority purports to
         enter on his behalf, but only if he takes an affirmative step to bind
         himself. “Through ratification, a person may become a party to a
         contract purportedly made on that person’s behalf by another who
         acted without actual or apparent authority.” RESTATEMENT
         (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 cmt. b. (emphasis added). “When the
         prior act did not otherwise affect the legal relations of the ratifier,
         ratification provides the basis on which the ratifier’s legal relations
         are affected by the act.” Id. § 4.01 cmt. b. Ratification in this context
         is a retroactive manifestation of assent that “creates claims not oth-
         erwise present ” and “giv[es] . . . the third party enforceable rights.”
         3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency, supra, § 186 (emphases added). Ratification
         may occur by silence, but only when the principal “has notice that
         others are likely to draw such an inference from silence.” RESTATE-
         MENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmt. f. In those circumstances, si-
         lence is an affirmative choice. See Maj. Op. 78–79. Ratification
         binds a principal to an agreement to which he was not bound be-
         fore; it forms a contract where none earlier existed.
                 The majority erroneously states that the very possibility of
         ratification establishes that the contract was not void but voidable.
         Id. at 73–75. It contends that “only a voidable contract is capable of
         ratification.” Id. at 74. Though it does not matter to this appeal
         whether a void contract can be ratified, I explain why the capacity
         for ratification does not undermine the conclusion that contracts
         purportedly formed by agents who lack authority are void. Again,
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         30                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting             20-13735

         imprecise language in some authorities easily gives rise to confu-
         sion. In our effort to apply the general commercial law, we must
         hew closely to fundamental principles and follow the guidance of
         our own precedent.
                 Although the majority cites some decisions—none of which
         are binding on this Court—that state that only voidable contracts
         can be ratified, see id. at 75–76, other courts have reached the op-
         posite conclusion, see, e.g., Jensen v. Ray Kim Ford, Inc., 920 F.2d
         3, 4 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a “contract is a nullity and does
         not bind” the plaintiffs because “a forged note is by the common
         law absolutely void, unless it has in some way been ratified by the
         payor” (citation omitted)); Scott D. Erler, D.D.S. Profit Sharing
         Plan v. Creative Fin. & Invs., L.L.C., 203 P.3d 744, 754 (Mont. 2009)
         (“While acknowledging that void contracts do not legally exist and
         transfer no rights, we have nonetheless permitted ratification of
         such contracts.”); Bush v. Evans, 598 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala. Civ. App.
         1992) (“Where the statute of frauds applies, a contract made by an
         agent without authority in writing from his principal is void unless
         ratified by the principal.”); Bethune v. Larson, 544 N.E.2d 49, 52
         (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“A void act of an agent can be ratified by a prin-
         cipal where the principal has knowledge of the facts.”); cf. Hancock
         v. Kulana Partners, LLC, 452 P.3d 371, 374 n.4 (Haw. 2019) (“We
         note that the courts are split as to whether a void deed can be rati-
         fied.”). See generally Voidable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
         (“[Voidable] describes a valid act that may be voided rather than an
         invalid act that may be ratified.” (Emphasis added)).
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                    31

                Indeed, some decisions in analogous cases have concluded
         that a contract purportedly formed by an agent without authority
         is void until ratified. E.g., Marin, 651 F.2d at 29 (“Since [the agent]
         lacked authority to contract for the corporation, and since the cor-
         poration never ratified his action, the . . . lease was void.” (Empha-
         sis added)); In re Northlake Dev. L.L.C., 643 F.3d at 450–51
         (“Where no actual or apparent authority exists to transfer a princi-
         pal’s property, . . . the deed is void unless and until later ratified.”
         (Quoting Northlake Dev. L.L.C., 60 So.3d at 797 (alterations
         adopted) (emphasis added)); Northlake Dev. L.L.C., 60 So.3d at 797
         (explaining that when a contract is void for lack of authority,
         “[a]bsent ratification—and prior to ratification—nothing
         changes”); Woods, 90 P.3d at 733 (explaining that “[u]ltra vires acts
         of a corporate president or other agent are void unless under
         agency principles” there has been “ratification [by] the corpora-
         tion” or apparent authority exists).
                 Our precedent supports the same conclusion. In GDG Ac-
         quisitions LLC v. Government of Belize, Belize argued that a min-
         ister who signed a contract “lacked the authority to waive sover-
         eign immunity.” 849 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017). Nonetheless,
         we held that Belize was bound by the contract because it had rati-
         fied the waiver. Id. We observed that “[w]hile ‘[o]nly interactions
         that are within the scope of an agency relationship affect the prin-
         cipal’s legal position,’ the principal may also ratify his agent’s un-
         authorized actions, thus becoming bound by their legal conse-
         quences.” Id. at 1308 (internal citation omitted) (quoting
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         32                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

         RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c). Belize objected
         that “an agreement that is void ab initio cannot be enforced against
         a sovereign under a ratification theory because subsequent pay-
         ments cannot create actual authority that did not exist at the time
         of the actions.” Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted). In-
         stead of holding that the agreement was not void, we explained
         that Belize’s “argument misapprehends the nature of ratification.”
         Id. “It is precisely on account of the principal’s subsequent consent
         that the prior unauthorized act ‘is given effect as if done by an agent
         acting with actual authority.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
         OF AGENCY § 4.01(1)). Contrary to the majority’s response, our
         Court did not “reject[] Belize’s argument that the lease was ‘void
         ab initio.’” Contra Maj. Op. 69 (citation omitted). We instead re-
         jected the argument that a contract formed without authority
         could not be ratified. GDG, 849 F.3d at 1310. We recognized that a
         contract entered by an agent who lacked authority initially had no
         legal effect on the principal, but the principal was empowered to
         ratify it later.
                 Making sense of the conflicting authority in this area of law
         is no easy task, but a comment to the definition of “ratification” in
         the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which we have cited favora-
         bly, sheds light on the matter. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
         AGENCY § 82 (AM. L. INST. 1958); see also McDonald v. Hamilton
         Elec., Inc. of Fla., 666 F.2d 509, 514 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing the Re-
         statement provision favorably). The first comment to Section 82
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                  33

         strongly implies that a contract entered by an agent who lacks au-
         thority, prior to ratification, is void, not voidable.
                It explains that ratification in the agency context is unique—
         it must be “distinguished from the affirmance of a voidable trans-
         action,” and it binds the principal to a contract that previously had
         no legal impact on him:
                         Ratification, as the word is here used, repre-
               sents a legal concept in the law of agency describing
               the relations between the parties after affirmance by
               a person of a transaction done or purported to be
               done for him. . . . Ratification is to be distinguished
               from the affirmance of a voidable transaction because
               of fraud or mistake, and from the affirmance of a
               transaction, voidable because of partial lack of capac-
               ity. . . . In the sense in which the word is used in the
               Restatement of this Subject, ratification connotes that
               the act was done or purported to be done for a person
               who acquired no rights or liabilities because of it, ex-
               cept the right to elect to become a party to it.

               RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 cmt. a (emphasis
         added).
                 The comments to the Third Restatement’s definition of “rat-
         ification” offer the same explanation. A comment entitled
         “[r]elated doctrines apart from agency” states that an affirmative
         action is necessary in order for a principal to be bound by the “legal
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         34                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         consequences” of the contract purportedly entered by the agent,
         unlike in other legal contexts:
                      The agency-law doctrine of ratification is not
               the exclusive instance in the law of a person choosing
               to become bound by a transaction not otherwise
               binding or becoming subject to the legal conse-
               quences of another’s act. For example, a person may
               elect to become bound by a contract that is voidable
               because assent was induced by fraud, mistake, or du-
               ress. See Restatement Second, Contracts § 7, Com-
               ment b. A minor, or a person who otherwise lacks ca-
               pacity, may elect to be bound by a voidable contract
               once capacity is present. See id. The agency-law doc-
               trine of ratification, in contrast, requires manifesting
               assent or otherwise consenting to a prior act done by
               another person and thereby adopting its legal conse-
               quences.
                RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmt. c (emphasis
         added). The next comment further explains that “[r]atification re-
         quires an objectively or externally observable indication that a per-
         son consents that another’s prior act shall affect the person’s legal
         relations.” Id. § 4.01 cmt. d. In this way, ratification in the agency
         context is distinct from ratification in other areas of law.
                For these reasons, the majority’s attempts to compare ratifi-
         cation in the agency-law context to ratification in other contexts
         are unavailing. See Maj. Op. 74–75. In agency law, ratification is
         different in kind from the mere termination of the power of avoid-
         ance described by contract-law authorities. See RESTATEMENT
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   35

         (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. e; Maj. Op. 74. In other contexts,
         “action may be necessary in order to prevent the contract from pro-
         ducing the ordinary legal consequences of a contract.” RESTATE-
         MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. e. Such is not the case
         when an agent who lacks authority purports to form a contract,
         because the purported contract is void.
                 To be sure, not all void contracts can be ratified. Several of
         the authorities that the majority cites for the proposition that a void
         contract cannot be ratified fall into this category. See Maj. Op. 75–
         76. For instance, a contract that violates public policy can never be
         ratified. Est. of Molino v. Boldt, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 512, 519, 520–21
         (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Nor can one that is “substantively and proce-
         durally unfair.” Kellar v. Est. of Kellar, 291 P.3d 906, 918 (Wash. Ct.
         App. 2012). In these cases, the problem is not a lack of mutual as-
         sent but rather a defect that ratification cannot cure.
                In the end, our precedents make clear that contracts entered
         by agents who lack authority are void unless ratified, though capa-
         ble of ratification. See generally Gymco, 884 F.2d 1362; JLJ, 988
         F.2d 1112; GDG Acquisitions, 849 F.3d 1299. Three fundamental
         principles of agency and contract law—that a contract cannot be
         formed without mutual assent, that an agent who lacks authority
         cannot bind a principal, and that a principal must take affirmative
         steps to ratify a contract formed by an agent who lacked author-
         ity—compel the same answer. The Supreme Court in Langley held
         that a “void” instrument falls outside of section 1823(e) because it
         “leav[es] no right, title or interest that could be diminished or
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         36                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

         defeated.” Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94 (alterations adopted) (internal
         quotation marks omitted). At bottom, a purported contract, exe-
         cuted by an agent who lacks authority and not ratified by the prin-
         cipal, cannot convey a right, title, or interest.
                Because a third party (here, Crescent) obtains no interest
         when it enters into a purported agreement with an agent (Hard-
         wick) who lacks authority to bind his principal (Morris Hardwick),
         the D’Oench doctrine cannot apply. See Taylor Tr., 844 F.2d at
         342–43 (stating, though in dicta, that an agent’s lack of authority “is
         a real defense to the formation of a contract and renders the con-
         tract void ab initio, rather than merely voidable” in the context of
         a D’Oench analysis). The D’Oench doctrine is a powerful shield
         that the Deposit Corporation and its successors in interest can
         wield to protect interests they acquire from a failed bank. But it is
         not a sword that can be wielded to create an interest that the De-
         posit Corporation did not already have. If Landcastle can prove that
         Hardwick lacked the authority to pledge the firm’s certificate as
         collateral for his personal loan, then it would establish that Cres-
         cent never obtained an interest that it could have transferred to the
         Deposit Corporation. And if there is no interest, then the D’Oench
         shield is of no use to Renasant.
                        C. The Majority’s New Rule Is Flawed.
                The majority “reject[s] Landcastle’s argument that Hard-
         wick’s lack of authority prevented Crescent’s transfer of an interest
         in the security agreement to the FDIC as receiver.” Maj. Op. 45. It
         does not “consider legal issues, such as lack of authority in this
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         20-13735           WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                     37

         D’Oench setting, in the abstract or in a vacuum.” Id. at 44; see also
         id. (asserting that “[w]e . . . consider legal issues . . . in the context
         of the factual circumstances presented in this case”). But see McFar-
         lin, 381 F.3d at 1259 (explaining that the “legal question” in a sec-
         tion-1292(b) appeal “must be stated at a high enough level of ab-
         straction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence or
         facts of a particular case”). The majority considers it relevant that
         Hardwick represented to Crescent that he had authority from Mor-
         ris Hardwick. See Maj. Op. 45. And it invents a new rule that when
         an agent misrepresents to a third party that he has authority, he can
         form a voidable contract between the third party and his principal.
         Id. But that factual context is irrelevant, and the majority’s new rule
         is constitutionally dubious.
                The majority’s added “context[]” does not change the legal
         effect of Hardwick’s purported lack of authority. Id. That Hard-
         wick “induced the bank to make a loan” also should not change the
         result. See id. Even where “an agent defrauds a third party,” his
         “principal is not subject to liability” for that fraud if the agent acts
         without authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08
         cmt. c(2). And it is a “basic proposition that a principal is not ac-
         countable simply because the agent has succeeded in misleading
         the third party about . . . the agent’s authority.” Id. § 2.03 n.c.
                Although the majority does not dispute that an agent acting
         without authority does not have the same power to bind the prin-
         cipal as a duly authorized agent, see Maj. Op. 61–62, it somehow
         imagines that an agent’s misrepresentation creates a binding
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         38                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

         contract between his principal and a third party that is “[v]alid until
         annulled,” see Voidable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra. Alt-
         hough it at times insists that the principal must ratify the agent’s
         action, see Maj. Op. 61–62, it nevertheless holds that the principal
         should be bound despite a lack of any authority, see id. at 45. In
         effect, it asserts that if the agent fraudulently represented his au-
         thority to a third party, the agent’s act would bind the principal
         unless the principal affirmatively acted to repudiate it. See id.
                That rule does not come from Langley or any other source
         of law. Contra id. at 44–45. Because Langley ’s fraudulent-induce-
         ment rule does not apply here, the majority charts its own path
         even as it purports to apply Langley. And federal common law does
         not provide that a principal becomes a party to a contract and is
         bound when an unauthorized agent purports to enter into that con-
         tract on his behalf so long as that agent engages in fraudulent be-
         havior. General agency law, like black-letter agency law in every
         American jurisdiction, rejects that proposition.
                Because the majority invents a new rule while purporting to
         rely on federal common law, it conveniently avoids engaging in the
         analysis required to create a new rule of federal common law. See
         In re Prudential of Fla. Leasing, Inc., 478 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir.
         2007). The decision to create a new federal common-law rule “is a
         matter of judicial policy dependent upon a variety of considera-
         tions always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental in-
         terests and to the effects upon them of applying state law.” Id.
         (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728
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         20-13735         WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                  39

         (1979)). But before creating a new rule, we must consider at least
         three factors: “the need for uniformity,” whether and the extent to
         which “application of state law frustrates important federal poli-
         cies, and the impact” the federal common-law rule would have “on
         preexisting commercial relationships premised on state law.” Id.;
         see also Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728–29.
                 When we have previously created new common-law rules
         to protect the Deposit Corporation, we have found it critical that
         the new rule did not disrupt commercial relationships. See, e.g.,
         Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872; McCullough, 911 F.2d at 603–04; Fed. De-
         posit Ins. Corp. v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1517–18 (11th
         Cir. 1984); see also In re Prudential, 478 F.3d at 1298 (“The pre-
         sumption [against creating a federal common-law rule] ‘is particu-
         larly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal re-
         lationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations
         would be governed by state-law standards.’” (Quoting Kamen v.
         Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991))). Our decisions
         highlighted that the interests of the private parties there were not
         indefeasible. See Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872; McCullough, 911 F.2d at
         603–04; Gulf Life Ins., 737 F.2d at 1517–18; see also Langley, 484
         U.S. at 95–96 (explaining that section 1823(e) is in some respects
         similar to the requirement that a secured creditor record his secu-
         rity interest). So, giving a deposit insurer a quasi-holder-in-due-
         course status defeased only that already-defeasible interest. See
         Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872; McCullough, 911 F.2d at 603–04; Gulf Life
         Ins., 737 F.2d at 1517–18.
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         40                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting             20-13735

                 Here, by contrast, the majority’s new rule greatly disrupts
         commercial relationships. Georgia law dictates that lack of author-
         ity prevents contract formation. See Lynn v. Lowndes Cnty.
         Health Servs., LLC, 840 S.E.2d 623, 628–31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (ex-
         plaining that an agreement formed by a purported agent who
         lacked authority is unenforceable unless ratified by the principal);
         GA. CODE § 10-6-51. The majority contends that “if an agent acted
         without authority,” Georgia law permits the principal to “either re-
         pudiate or ratify that contract.” Maj Op. 57. But the majority does
         not specify whether the principal is bound by default under Geor-
         gia law. The Georgia statute that the majority cites provides only
         that “if the agent shall exceed his authority, the principal . . . shall
         adopt either the whole or none [of the contract].” GA. CODE § 10-
         6-51. I do not dispute the possibility of presumptive ratification by
         silence, for that doctrine further confirms that ratification is still
         necessary. See Maj. Op. 57 (citing Lynn, 840 S.E.2d at 631, for the
         proposition that “under Georgia law, where the principal is fully
         informed of the agent’s unauthorized act and does not repudiate it
         within a reasonable time, ratification is presumed”). But Georgia
         law has long been clear: “An agent, constituted for a particular pur-
         pose . . . cannot bind his principal by any act in which he exceeds
         his authority; for that would be to say, that one man may bind an-
         other against his consent.” Hardeman & Hamilton v. Ford, 12 Ga.
         205, 207 (1852).
                Without contract formation, the third party obtains no in-
         terest from the principal, and the principal loses no interest. See
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   41

         Gymco, 884 F.2d at 1365–67; Hagan v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 5
         S.E.2d 739, 743 (Ga. 1939); see also Buena Vista Loan & Sav. Bank
         v. Stockdale, 192 S.E. 246, 247 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937). And a principal
         can raise a lack-of-authority defense to defend against the enforce-
         ment of a negotiable instrument by a holder in due course. See GA.
         CODE §§ 11-1-201(b)(41), 11-3-302(a)(2)(iv), 305(a)–(b), 308(b),
         401(a), 402(a), 403(a); Buena Vista, 192 S.E. at 247; Berger v. Ga.
         Power Co., 49 S.E.2d 668, 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948); see also U.C.C.
         §§ 1-201(b)(41), 3-302(a)(2)(iv), 3-302 cmt. 2, 3-305(a)–(b), 3-308(b),
         3-401(a), 3-402(a), 3-402 cmt. 1, 3-403(a), 3-403 cmts. 1–2; UNIF. NE-
         GOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS L. § 23, U.L.A. Appendix I (2020). So, the
         majority’s new rule gives the federal government an interest it did
         not have while depriving the private party of an interest it did have.

                 In response, the majority cites Griffin, 989 F.3d 923, for the
         proposition that contracts formed by agents who lack authority are
         voidable under Georgia law. See Maj. Op. 58–59. That decision
         identifies three types of contracts that are rendered void under the
         Georgia Code: contracts “to do immoral or illegal things,” con-
         tracts that contravene public policy, and gambling contracts. Grif-
         fin, 989 F.3d at 934 (citing GA. CODE §§ 13-8-1, 13-8-2, 13-8-3). And
         it suggests that all other contracts are at most voidable. Id. at 935;
         see also Maj. Op. 58–59. But the decision has nothing to do with
         agency law or contract formation. If there were no contract—due
         to a lack of mutual assent or consideration or some other funda-
         mental defect—a purported contract would not be simply voida-
         ble. On the contrary, under Georgia law, no contract would exist.
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         42                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting            20-13735

         See GA. CODE § 13-3-1 (“To constitute a valid contract, there must
         be parties able to contract, a consideration moving to the contract,
         the assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject
         matter upon which the contract can operate.”). So, it is here, too.

                 The majority also discusses the Georgia Supreme Court’s
         decision in Federal Financial Co. v. Holden, 485 S.E.2d 481 (Ga.
         1997). See Maj. Op. 30–31, 59. The majority cites Holden for the
         proposition that commercial relationships will not be disrupted by
         its decision. Maj. Op. 59. But the plaintiff in Holden was a creditor
         who sought “to establish his lien as senior.” Holden, 485 S.E.2d at
         482. That decision did not enforce an agreement executed by
         agents who lacked authority against a principal and over his own
         objection. So, Holden did not disrupt property rights in the way
         the majority does in this appeal.
                Because the majority’s new rule deprives private parties of
         property rights and gives those rights to the federal government, it
         creates serious Takings Clause concerns. See Horne v. Dep’t of
         Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (“[A]n appropriation . . . of per-
         sonal property” “is a per se taking that requires just compensa-
         tion.”); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
         155, 164–65 (1980) (applying the Takings Clause to interest earned
         on a deposit fund); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522–23 (1998)
         (plurality opinion) (applying the Takings Clause to required money
         payments). To illustrate, at time one, a principal has an indefeasible
         right to an asset, and a failed bank has no interest in that asset. At
         time two, the federal government acts and takes over the failed
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   43

         bank. As a result of the federal government’s action, the federal
         government appropriates the asset, and the principal loses all rights
         in the asset. Courts ordinarily call that a “taking,” see, e.g., Horne,
         135 S. Ct. at 2426; the majority calls it “[e]quit[y],” Maj. Op. 45.
                 The majority’s new rule gives Landcastle a plausible Takings
         Clause claim against the Deposit Corporation. In fact, Landcastle
         should be free on remand to argue that, because the D’Oench doc-
         trine claim is unconstitutional as applied to its lack-of-authority
         claim, it can state claims for conversion and breach of contract. See
         City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
         687, 717 (1999) (plurality opinion) (explaining that an uncompen-
         sated taking is “not only unconstitutional but unlawful and tortious
         as well”); Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2180 (2019)
         (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that “ordinary remedial prin-
         ciples [of] . . . common-law tort claims” are available in response to
         a taking). But the majority has apparently resolved that question
         sub silentio because it remands with instructions to enter judgment
         in favor of Renasant. Maj. Op. 79. Left for another day is whether
         Landcastle might still be able to bring a separate claim against the
         Deposit Corporation for an unconstitutional taking. See Knick, 139
         S. Ct. at 2170; City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion).
                Before today, the D’Oench doctrine did not implicate the
         Takings Clause because the Supreme Court limited its application
         to protect only those interests that the Deposit Corporation already
         had. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 93–94. But the majority’s extension of
         the D’Oench doctrine places it on much shakier constitutional
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         44               WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         ground. Because the majority purports to apply the preexisting
         D’Oench doctrine, see Maj. Op. 44–45, it fails to engage in the Kim-
         bell Foods analysis. And in that analysis, these Takings Clause prob-
         lems would preclude creating this rule.
                 Even after considering the three Kimbell Foods factors, the
         decision to create a new federal common-law rule is “a matter of
         judicial policy.” In re Prudential, 478 F.3d at 1298 (quoting Kimbell
         Foods, 440 U.S. at 728). So, we must balance the competing policy
         considerations before we exercise our limited discretion to create
         new rules. And in this respect, the majority’s new rule falls woe-
         fully short.
                Consider the following hypothetical. Butch Cassidy is the
         Vice President of Finance at Coca-Cola. He has authority to enter
         into many kinds of transactions on behalf of Coca-Cola. In fact, he
         has entered into several high-dollar agreements, taken out loans,
         and pledged collateral on behalf of Coca-Cola. Cassidy has a family
         and a house with a white picket fence in the suburbs. Everything
         appears to be going well, but he has badly mismanaged his fi-
         nances. A bad turn of luck with a cryptocurrency investment and a
         nasty gambling habit have left him in dire straits. He is in default
         on his mortgage with no way to cure it and is days away from fore-
         closure.
                So, Cassidy finds a small Atlanta-area bank named Old Bank
         that is severely distressed. He borrows enough money to pay off
         his mortgage and give him a little breathing room. He signs a
         promissory note, but Old Bank, of course, demands collateral to
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   45

         secure the loan. Cassidy, an agent of Coca-Cola for many purposes,
         signs an agreement as “Butch Cassidy, Vice President of Coca-
         Cola.” The agreement assigns all interests in Coca-Cola’s secret for-
         mula to Old Bank. Even though he lacks both actual and apparent
         authority, he falsely represents to Old Bank that, as a benefit to sen-
         ior officers, Coca-Cola gave him the authority to pledge the secret
         formula to secure personal debts. Old Bank fails, and the Deposit
         Corporation takes over as receiver. Our main character, Butch Cas-
         sidy, then defaults on the loan because, unsurprisingly, he contin-
         ues to mismanage his finances.
                Under the majority’s new rule, the federal government now
         owns Coca-Cola’s secret formula free and clear! The Deposit Cor-
         poration has legal title to the secret formula, and Coca-Cola is out
         of luck. And the majority does not even attempt to deny that its
         rule would require this absurd result.
                 Perhaps the majority seeks to protect the Deposit Corpora-
         tion because it believes the Deposit Corporation is more deserving
         than the private party in this case. A criminal, who has now been
         convicted for similar crimes, see United States v. Maurya, 25 F.4th
         829, 835–36 (11th Cir. 2022), misrepresented his authority to a
         small bank. On this misrepresentation, Hardwick pledged an asset
         of his law firm—which the majority suspects is at fault, see Maj.
         Op. 13 n.4, and which sold its interests at a discount to an acquisi-
         tion firm—to secure a personal loan that he never repaid. The De-
         posit Corporation came to the rescue and found a benevolent
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         46                WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting           20-13735

         buyer who saved the residents of Georgia who had relied on the
         failed bank.
                 But the majority is mistaken. The “[e]quities” do not favor
         the Deposit Corporation, contra id. at 45, because the equities can-
         not favor governmental theft. “If th[e] requirement[s] [of the Con-
         stitution] make[] some regulatory programs unworkable in prac-
         tice, so be it—our role is to enforce the Takings Clause as written.”
         Cf. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation and
         internal quotation marks omitted).
                 Moreover, the Deposit Corporation is not powerless to de-
         fend itself against claims or defenses based on lack of authority. For
         example, it can require banks, as a condition of insurability, to keep
         records documenting an agent’s authority for every transaction.
         See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815(a)(1), (4), 1816(5) (requiring the Deposit Cor-
         poration to consider “[t]he risk presented” by a bank before insur-
         ing it); id. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(i) (allowing the Deposit Corporation to
         terminate insurance if the bank is “engaging in unsafe or unsound
         practices”); cf. Langley, 484 U.S. at 95 (explaining that the Deposit
         Corporation is vulnerable only when it is “unable to detect” poten-
         tial liability). If Crescent had required Morris Hardwick to provide
         documentation establishing Hardwick’s authority to engage in the
         transaction, we would not be here.
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
               The majority misunderstands the D’Oench doctrine, even
         though the Supreme Court has explained it and at least three of our
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         20-13735          WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., dissenting                   47

         sister circuits got the message: the Deposit Corporation cannot ac-
         quire an interest that is void before the Deposit Corporation pur-
         ports to acquire it. See Taylor Tr., 844 F.2d at 342–43 (stating,
         though in dicta, that an agent’s lack of authority “is a real defense
         to the formation of a contract and renders the contract void ab ini-
         tio, rather than merely voidable” in the context of a D’Oench anal-
         ysis); Grubb, 868 F.2d at 1158 (explaining that, because the notes at
         issue “already had been voided by [a] judgment when the FDIC
         purchased [the bank’s] assets,” “the FDIC acquired no right, title or
         interest” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Bracero
         & Rivera, 895 F.2d at 830 (holding that, “because the note [at issue]
         was discharged by the payment and cancellation of the underlying
         debt before FDIC ever obtained it,” “the note was not an asset pro-
         tected by section 1823(e)”). Similarly, in this appeal, no interest ex-
         ists because the contract purportedly conveying the interest was
         void. The majority misunderstands the general commercial law of
         agency and contract. As a result, the majority’s decision licenses
         governmental theft, creates serious constitutional problems with-
         out any discussion, and contradicts Supreme Court precedent. I
         would affirm the judgment of the district court.
                I respectfully dissent.