Court Opinion

ID: 9379677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 06:00:10.693656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.673829
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KIM ANNE FARRINGTON,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-1221-09-0543-B-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: March 15, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Stephanie L. Ayers, Esquire, and Thad M. Guyer, Esquire, Medford,
             Oregon, for the appellant.

           Elizabeth J. Head, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied corrective action in this individual right of action appeal. On petition for
     review, the appellant makes the following arguments: (1) the statute at 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(f)(2) does not apply to her because her disclosures were not made in the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     normal course of her duties; (2) she proved that her disclosures were a
     contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take various personnel actions
     against her; (3) the agency abandoned its laches defense and the administrative
     judge erred in her analysis of this issue; and (4) she was prejudiced by the
     administrative judge’s delay in issuing the initial decision and her credibility
     determinations were erroneous.       Farrington v. Department of Transportation,
     MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-09-0543-B-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 27.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fa ct;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
¶2         After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that t he
     petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY
     the initial decision to find that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) applies to this matter
     because the appellant’s disclosures were made in the normal course of her duties .
     We VACATE the administrative judge’s findings regarding laches and the
     agency’s burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence t hat it would have
     taken the actions absent the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures . Except as
     expressly modified herein, we AFFIRM the initial decision. 2

     2
       The Association of Flight Attendants-Communications Workers of America requested
     leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the appellant. PFR File, Tab 16. The
     Board, in its discretion, may grant such a request if the organization has a legitimate
                                                                                             3

     The statute at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) applies to this appeal because the appellant
     made her disclosures in the normal course of her duties , and we agree with the
     administrative judge that the appellant did not prove that the agency took the
     personnel actions against her in reprisal for her disclosures.
¶3          Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) , an
     appellant may establish a prima facie case of retaliation for whistleblowing
     disclosures and/or protected activity by proving by preponderant evidence that
     (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
     protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), 3
     and (2) the whistleblowing disclosure or protected activity was a contributing
     factor in the agency’s decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to
     take, a personnel action against her. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Webb v. Department
     of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6 (2015). If the appellant makes out a prima
     facie case, the agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing
     evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the
     whistleblowing disclosure(s). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Webb, 122 M.S.P.R. 248,
     ¶ 6.
¶4          Prior to the WPEA’s enactment, disclosures made in the normal course of
     an employee’s duties were not protected.         Salazar v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 2022 MSPB 42, ¶¶ 10-12.         However, under a provision of the WPEA
     codified as 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2), such disclosures are protected if the appellant
     shows that the agency took a personnel action “in reprisal for” the disclosures.

     interest in the proceedings, and such participation will not unduly delay the outcome
     and may contribute materially to the proper disposition thereof.                 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.34(e)(3). We find that an amicus curiae brief from the Association of Flight
     Attendants will not materially contribute to the proper disposition of this matter, and we
     deny its request.
     On December 30, 2022, the appellant filed a motion for leave to file a new pleading,
     which appears to be a request to expedite processing of this matter. PFR File, Tab 44.
     Because this order is a final decision in this matter, we deny the appellant’s motion.
     3
        This appeal does not involve protected activity as set forth in 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
                                                                                         4

     Id., ¶ 10 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2)). This provision imposed an “extra proof
     requirement” for these types of disclosures such that an appellant to whom
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) applies must prove by preponderant evidence that the
     agency took a personnel action because of the disclosure and did so with an
     improper, retaliatory motive. Id., ¶ 11 (discussing S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 5-6
     (2012)).
¶5         The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (2018
     NDAA), signed into law on December 12, 2017, amended 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2)
     to provide that disclosures “made during the normal course of duties of an
     employee, the principal job function of whom is to regularly investigate and
     disclose wrongdoing,” are protected if the employee demonstrates that the agency
     “took, failed to take, or threatened to take or f ail to take a personnel action” with
     respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure. Salazar, 2022 MSPB 42,
     ¶¶ 13-14; Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(B)(ii), 131 Stat. 1283, 1618 (2017).
     As we held in Salazar, 2022 MSPB 42, ¶¶ 15-21, the 2018 NDAA’s amendment
     to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2), which clarified the prior version of that statute enacted
     in the WPEA, applies retroactively to appeals pending at the time the statute was
     enacted.
¶6         The administrative judge found that the appellant, as an Aviation Safety
     Inspector who was responsible for ensuring compliance with Federal Aviation
     Administration regulations and investigating and reporting wrongdoing, was
     covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). Farrington v. Department of Transportation,
     MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-09-0543-B-2, Remand File, Tab 38, Initial Decision
     (ID) at 13-14, 17.    The administrative judge, in analyzing the “extra proof
     requirement” regarding each personnel action, appears to have implicitly found
     that each of the appellant’s four disclosures were made during the normal course
     of her duties. ID at 29-40. On review, the appellant contends that the case is
     governed by the Board’s earlier decision in Farrington v. Department of
     Transportation, 118 M.S.P.R. 331 (2012), and its finding that “there was no duty
                                                                                        5

     speech.” PFR File, Tab 27 at 26. We supplement the initial decision to explicitly
     find that the appellant made her disclosures in the normal course of her duties.
¶7         In its earlier decision, the Board relied on the appellant’s position
     description and concluded that she failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that
     her disclosures to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were not
     made within her normal job duties within the normal channels of reporting.
     Farrington, 118 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 9. The appellant’s position description stated
     that, as part of her surveillance duties and responsibilities, she is expected to
     “conduct investigations of . . . aircraft incidents and accidents” and to
     “[p]articipate[] in cabin safety related incident/accident i nvestigations of air
     carriers and air operators.” Farrington v. Department of Transportation, MSPB
     Docket No. AT-1221-09-0543-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 19, Subtab B
     at 1-2. The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged with “investigating
     every civil aviation accident in the United States,” it determines the probable
     cause of accidents, and it issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing
     future accidents.    National Transportation Safety Board, About the NTSB,
     https://www.ntsb.gov/about/pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2023). The
     appellant provided the head of the NTSB Survival Factors Group with a copy of
     her May 2003 written report and she was interviewed by the NTS B Survival
     Factors Group after the NTSB initiated its investigation into the March 26, 2003
     AirTran incident. Based on these facts, we supplement the initial decision to find
     explicitly that the appellant’s two disclosures to the NTSB were made within the
     normal course of her duties.
¶8         We now turn to the two disclosures that the appellant made to the Division
     Manager, including (1) the May 2003 written report, which discussed, among
     other things, lack of management support and funding approval, complaints a bout
     training at AirTran facilities, and inability to perform surveillance activities, and
     (2) her meeting with the Division Manager following an “All Hands” meeting on
     June 17, 2003 (for which the Division Manager took some handwritten notes). ID
                                                                                      6

     at 18-20; IAF, Tab 19, Subtabs F, H. In its Opinion and Order, the Board noted
     that there was a material dispute of fact concerning whether the appellant’s
     communications to the Division Manager followed typical customs and practices
     in the workplace for reporting regulatory and safety issues to higher-level
     management. Farrington, 118 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 8. The Board defined “normal
     channels” as when an “employee conveyed duty-related information to a
     recipient, who in the course of his or her duties, customarily receives the same
     type of information from the employee and from other employees at the same or
     similar level in the organization as the employee.” Id., ¶ 6. The Board identified
     some of the factors that were relevant to the determination, including whether the
     communication complies with the formal and informal customs and practices in
     the employee’s workplace for conveying such information up the chain of
     command, whether the organization enforces a strict hierarchical chain of
     command requiring that communications must go through lower-level supervisors
     before being elevated to higher management, and whether the information was
     conveyed to the recipient in the organization’s commonly accepted manner or
     method for presenting such information for management consideration. Id.
¶9        The appellant’s position description stated that she would have “frequent
     contact” with, among other groups, “field and regional office management” and
     that the “purpose of these contacts is to . . . provide feedback, communicate
     findings, or resolve issues and problems.” IAF, Tab 19, Subtab B at 2. It is
     undisputed that the Division Manager was the appellant’s fourth- or fifth-level
     supervisor, Farrington, 118 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 8, and the information that she
     disclosed in the written report and subsequent meeting with the Division Manager
     was information that she learned during the normal course of her duties.       On
     review, the appellant cites to the Division Manager’s testimony that he had an
     “open door policy,” but she was never told that she had a duty to provide the
     Division Manager with the written report or speak to him after the June 17, 2003
     meeting. PFR File, Tab 27 at 12, 15. In her deposition, the appellant testified
                                                                                        7

      that she never spoke to the Division Manager prior to sending him the May 2003
      report and she had never gone to him on a work -related issue. IAF, Deposition,
      Subtab 10 at 276 (testimony of the appellant). However, she acknowledged that ,
      when there was a disagreement at the local level about an issue, the issue was
      elevated, and she does not appear to dispute the testimony of the Division
      Manager and the Assistant Division Manager that it was common for Aviation
      Safety Inspectors to work through local managers or to raise directly issues to the
      regional level.   IAF, Deposition, Subtab 1 at 12 (testimony of the Division
      Manager), Subtab 7 at 3 (testimony of the Assistant Division Manager) ,
      Subtab 10 at 277 (testimony of the appellant).
¶10        Concerning the May 2003 written report, the appellant acknowledged in h er
      deposition that she raised issues that she had attempted to pursue through her
      normal supervisory channels. IAF, Deposition, Subtab 10 at 276 (testimony of
      the appellant).   The Assistant Division Manager responded in writing to the
      appellant’s May 2003 report to the Division Manager, she acknowledged the
      safety issues that the appellant raised involving AirTran and her concerns about
      her own work environment, and she described the steps that the agency was
      taking to investigate these concerns. IAF, Tab 19, Subtab G. Given that the
      content of the May 2003 report was information that she learned during the
      course of her duties as an Aviation Safety Inspector, she provided the report to
      someone in her chain of command, it was a common practice for aviatio n safety
      inspectors to elevate disagreements on such issues to a higher level, and the
      agency’s formal response to her concerns, we find that the appellant’s May 2003
      written report to the Division Manager was made in the course of her normal
      duties through normal reporting channels.
¶11        Concerning the June 17, 2003 meeting, the Division Manager’s handwritten
      notes from this meeting included references to, among other things, “no crew
                                                                                             8

      members trained hands on” with an arrow and the citation “121.417.” 4                IAF,
      Tab 19, Subtab H. The appellant on review cites her testimony that she reported
      to the Division Manager that her findings and recommendations were not being
      addressed, that flight attendants had not been trained on the proper tail cone exit,
      and that passengers were at risk. PFR File, Tab 27 at 12. Thus, the appellant
      discussed with the Division Manager during this meeting her concerns based on
      information that she learned as an Aviation Safety Inspector.           Neither party
      disputes that the Division Manager held regular “All Hands” meetings in the field
      offices, and he would often invite Aviation Safety Inspectors to speak with him
      afterwards, he had an “open-door policy,” and Aviation Safety Inspectors
      “[r]outinely” took advantage of his open-door policy to speak to him about
      various issues.     IAF, Deposition, Subtab 1 at 10-12, 17-18 (testimony of the
      Division Manager).       Given that the appellant’s conversation with the Division
      Manager occurred in the workplace, after a meeting in which the Division
      Manager invited Aviation Safety Inspectors to speak with him privately
      afterwards, the content of their conversation focused on work-related issues, and
      her position description contemplates such communications with field and
      regional office managers, we find that any disclosures made to him during this
      meeting were made during the normal course of her duties through normal
      reporting channels. Because we have found that all of the appellant’s disclosures
      were made in the normal course of her duties as an Aviation Safety Inspector , the
      statute at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) applies to this matter.
¶12           Even if we assume for the purposes of our analysis that the appellant proved
      that she disclosed a violation of law, rule, or regulation and/or a substantial and
      specific danger to public health and safety pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A),
      we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to prove that the
      agency took the personnel actions against her in reprisal for her disclosures. ID

      4
          The regulation at 14 C.F.R. § 121.417 discusses crewmember emergency training.
                                                                                         9

      at 29-40. Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding in this regard, we
      need not address the appellant’s arguments on review concerning contributing
      factor or whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have taken the action(s) at issue absent the disclosures. PFR File, Tab 27
      at 28; see Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28 (2016)
      (finding that it was inappropriate for the administrative judge to determine
      whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      denied the appellant’s access to restricted areas and classified documents in the
      absence of his whistleblowing when she found that he failed to prove his prima
      facie case).   To the extent that the administrative judge made findings about
      laches that relieved the agency of its obligation to prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the appellant’s
      disclosures, ID at 41-45, we vacate the administrative judge’s findings in this
      regard.

      The appellant’s arguments regarding the quality of the hearing recording, the
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations, and her delay in issuing the
      initial decision do not warrant a different outcome.
¶13        The appellant contends on review that the administrative judge’s “extreme”
      delay in issuing the initial decision “severely prejudiced” her and violated her due
      process rights, Board procedures, and statutory mandates. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6,
      Tab 27 at 5. In pertinent part, she asserts that she was prejudiced because the
      audio recording from the 2-day hearing in 2013 was inaudible and that due to the
      delay in issuing the initial decision, the original court reporter passed away, the
      original court reporting company dissolved, and there was no usable audio
      recording of the hearing. PFR File, Tab 27 at 5-6. The submissions on review
      describe the parties’ efforts to jointly contract with another court reporter to
      generate a transcript of the hearing under these circumstances. E.g., PFR File,
      Tabs 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11. The Office of the Clerk of the Board subsequently granted
      the appellant’s motion to file transcripts of the hearing proceedings. PFR File,
                                                                                           10

      Tabs 20, 22.      However, instead of filing the transcripts in their entirety, the
      appellant reprinted excerpted portions of the 2013 hearing transcript in her
      supplemental petition for review. PFR File, Tab 27 at 12 -26.
¶14         We acknowledge that the audio recording of the 2013 two-day hearing is
      virtually inaudible. The appellant’s arguments on review do not persuade us that
      she was prejudiced by the delay between the close of the record and the date that
      the initial decision was issued. For instance, she asserts on review that the initial
      decision should be disregarded because it “barely contains any purported quotes
      of testimony,” and “has few if any references to some witnesses,” and she
      requests that the Board review the administrative judge’s “harsh” credibility
      findings.    Id. at 7.    However, the administrative judge who issued the initial
      decision is the same administrative judge who was present during the 2-day
      hearing in 2013.         The administrative judge’s credibility determinations are
      implicitly based on witness demeanor, Little v. Department of Transportation,
      112 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 4 (2009), and the appellant’s disagreement with the
      administrative judge’s findings, without more, is insufficient to overcome the
      deference to which such determinations are entitled.            See, e.g., Purifoy v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining
      that the Board must give “special deference” to an administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based credibility determinations, “[e]ven if demeanor is not explicitly
      discussed”); Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
      2002) (stating that the Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the
      observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may
      overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
      doing so). Importantly, the appellant does not contend that the administrative
      judge was incapacitated or otherwise unable to take notes during the hearing or
      observe     the   testimony   of   witnesses,   which   might   call   her   credibility
      determinations into question, nor does the appellant provide any authority to
                                                                                          11

      support her assertion that the administrative judge erred by failing to include any
      quoted testimony.
¶15         We have reviewed the excerpts of the 2013 hearing transcript, which largely
      involve testimony concerning the appellant’s disclosures, various agency
      officials’ knowledge of the disclosures, circumstances surrounding some of the
      personnel actions, and the clear-and-convincing factors. E.g., PFR File, Tab 27
      at 12-26.   However, the excerpted testimony does not change our analysis of
      whether any of the appellant’s disclosures were made in the normal course of her
      duties through normal channels or whether she proved that the agency took the
      personnel actions in reprisal for her disclosures.
¶16         Finally, to the extent that the appellant may be arguing that her rights were
      harmed by the virtual inaudibility of the hearing tapes, we disagree. In Harp v.
      Department of the Army, 791 F.2d 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected a petitioner’s claim that the
      unavailability of a hearing transcript constituted harmful error per se, requiring
      reversal of the Board’s decision. The court found that “such loss is not fatal” to
      the court’s ability to review a Board appeal. The court analyzed several factors to
      determine whether a fatal flaw occurred, such as whether the appellant
      established that he was prejudiced by the loss of the hearing transcript, whether
      the appellant showed that the administrative judge failed to consider or misused
      any particular testimony from the hearing, and whether other evidence existed i n
      the record that would support the administrative judge’s findings. Id.; see also
      Kemp v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 154 F. App’x 912, 914 (Fed. Cir.
      2005) 5; Henderson v. Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 5 n.1
      (2008). Here, we find that the appellant did not show that she was prejudiced by
      the virtual inaudibility of the hearing tapes and she did not demonstrate that the

      5
        The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the Federal Circuit when, as here,
      it finds its reasoning persuasive. Morris v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 662,
      ¶ 13 n.9 (2016).
                                                                                     12

administrative judge failed to consider or misused any particular testimony of the
witnesses that might have caused a different result in this case. Furthermore,
although some or all of the hearing tapes may have been virtually inaudible, the
record in this case was sufficiently developed to provide a meaningful review of
the issues raised by the appellant. 6

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

6
 We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        13

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that su ch action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                14

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later t han 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     15

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              16

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.