Court Opinion

ID: 9898410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:31.483784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:44.132919
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint
Petition of:                                      No. 83696-0-I

JAMALL SHONREE BAKER,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
                            Petitioner.

                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION

       CHUNG, J. — Jamall Baker petitions for relief from unlawful restraint claiming that

he was not competent to enter his guilty plea and he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. He contends the competency evaluations failed to consider medical records

showing anoxic brain injury after cardiac arrest. Because we cannot ascertain whether

the medical records would have altered the evaluators’ opinions on Baker’s competency

or whether his trial counsel was ineffective with regard to this aspect of his case, we

remand to the trial court to conduct a reference hearing.

                                          FACTS

       Our opinion on Baker’s direct appeal set out these underlying facts:

       In February 2008, Baker was arrested for the murder of Nicky
       Schoonover. He was then brought to the emergency room for an overdose
       after apparently ingesting multiple substances around the time of his
       arrest. In April, the court ordered Baker to be evaluated by Western State
       Hospital [WSH] for competency. A psychologist at [WSH] ultimately
       evaluated Baker three times, and an independent psychologist also
       evaluated Baker in January 2010. Both psychologists concluded that
       although Baker suffered from mental illness, he was competent to stand
       trial. On February 19, 2010, the court ordered that Baker was competent.
No. 83696-0-I/2

State v. Baker, No. 80227-5-I, slip op. at 1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. August 2, 2021)

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/802275.pdf. In March 2010,

Baker pleaded guilty to one count of murder in the first degree. Id. at 2. The court

accepted Baker’s plea and sentenced him to 325 months. Id.

       On direct appeal, Baker challenged the validity of his plea, claiming he was not

properly informed of the sentencing consequences and that this misinformation

constituted ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. Baker also challenged the length of

his community custody term and inclusion of his out-of-state offenses in his offender

score. Id. at 2-3. This court concluded that none of Baker’s asserted errors rendered his

plea invalid, but remanded for resentencing to strike or clarify several conditions of

community custody. 1 Id. at 8-12. The Washington Supreme Court denied review. State

v. Baker, 198 Wn.2d 1033, 501 P.3d 132 (2022).

       Baker then filed a CrR 7.8 motion to withdraw his plea in the superior court. As

one of the bases for withdrawing his plea, Baker raised the issue of his competency to

plead guilty because he was “neurologically not competent due to an anoxic assault.”

The “anoxic assault” referred to the aftermath of ingesting drugs around the time of his

arrest; Baker subsequently experienced a seizure and cardiac arrest requiring

resuscitation and hospitalization for several days. In support of his motion, Baker

submitted his hospital records, which he claimed should have been considered in

       1 In this PRP, Baker again claims he was not properly informed of the sentencing consequences

on the same three grounds. These claims were dismissed as frivolous under RAP 16.8.1(b). We do not
review them here.

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No. 83696-0-I/3

evaluating his competence, as well as an expert report from Dr. Galina Nikolskaya, a

neurologist he retained to conduct a record review and to opine on his competence.

       The superior court transferred the motion to this court for consideration as a

personal restraint petition (PRP). After counsel was appointed on his claim that his plea

was not voluntary, Baker advised this court that he had also raised a claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel, and we ordered supplemental briefing. Thus, we

address both his claims regarding competency and ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                         ANALYSIS

       In a PRP, the court of appeals will grant relief to a petitioner who is subject to

unlawful restraint. RAP 16.4(a). The restraint is unlawful if it violates the Constitution of

the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of Washington. RAP

16.4(c)(2). Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and a

petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled

judgment. In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). A

petitioner must show a constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial

prejudice or a nonconstitutional error involving a fundamental defect that inherently

results in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint of Swagerty, 186

Wn.2d 801, 807, 383 P.3d 454 (2016). A showing of actual and substantial prejudice

requires that there be an error of substance, not merely of procedure. State v.

Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51, 68, 409 P.3d 193 (2018). A personal restraint petitioner bears

the burden of demonstrating prejudice. In re Pers. Restraint of Brockie, 178 Wn.2d 532,

539, 309 P.3d 498 (2013).

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No. 83696-0-I/4

        We have three available options when reviewing a PRP. In re Pers. Restraint of

Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). We may dismiss the petition if the

petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing of actual prejudice for a constitutional

error or a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice for a

nonconstitutional error; we may grant the petition if the alleged error is sufficiently

proven; or we may transfer the petition to a superior court for a reference hearing if the

petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing but the merits of the claim cannot be

determined by the record. Id. at 17-18. “To establish a prima facie showing required for

a reference hearing, a petitioner must offer ‘the facts underlying the claim of unlawful

restraint and the evidence available to support the factual allegations.’ ” Id. at 18

(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 885–86, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992)).

        Here, Baker raises constitutional challenges to his restraint, claiming violations of

his due process right not to be tried when incompetent to stand trial and of his right to

effective assistance of counsel. 2 Baker claims he should be allowed to withdraw his plea

because his competency evaluations did not consider the medical records related to his

overdose and, therefore, failed to meet the standard of care for such evaluations. He

also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to

ascertain there were unreviewed medical records and failed to ensure the evaluators

review those records.

        2 The State argues Baker’s challenge is statutory under RCW 10.77.060 and, therefore, he must

show a fundamental defect that resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice in order to prevail on this
PRP. Because we determine that remand is appropriate here, we need not resolve which standard
applies.

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No. 83696-0-I/5

       A criminal defendant has a fundamental right not to be tried while incompetent to

stand trial. State v. Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d 898, 903, 215 P.3d 201 (2009). Washington

law affords greater protection in its codification of this right: “No incompetent person

shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such

incapacity continues.” RCW 10.77.050; Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d at 904. The failure to

follow procedures to protect this right is a denial of due process. Id. The competency

standard for pleading guilty is the same as the competency standard for standing trial.

In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853, 862, 16 P.3d 610 (2001). “A

determination that a criminal defendant is not competent to stand trial precludes his

effective entry of any plea.” Id. at 864.

       The procedures for determining competency outlined in RCW 10.77.060 are

mandatory. Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d at 904. When there is any doubt about a defendant’s

competency to stand trial, the trial court must order a qualified expert or professional

person “to evaluate and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.” RCW

10.77.060(1)(a). If an appointed expert conducts the examination in a substantially

unqualified manner, “the fundamental purpose of the requisite appointment,

examination, and report will have been thwarted and both the statute and the trial

court’s order will have been violated.” State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 621, 290

P.3d 942 (2012). Therefore, the trial court “has the power and the obligation to ensure

that a statutory competency evaluation is conducted in a qualified manner.” Id.

       Here, the trial court ordered three separate competency evaluations. Dr. Barry

Ward, a psychologist at WSH, conducted three evaluations and provided reports dated

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No. 83696-0-I/6

June 13, 2008, March 26, 2009, and August 5, 2009. In addition, a psychologist

employed by Baker, Dr. Lee Gustafson, provided a report dated January 21, 2010. All

four reports included forensic interviews and mental status exams. While noting

psychiatric symptoms, the four evaluations all concluded Baker was competent to stand

trial. At a contested hearing on competency on February 19, 2010, the court heard

testimony from both Dr. Ward and Dr. Gustafson. Baker’s counsel acknowledged that

the doctors agreed Baker could assist in his defense competently. After the hearing, the

trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law concluding Baker was

competent to stand trial.

       Baker contends his four competency evaluations were insufficient to support the

conclusion that he was competent because the evaluators failed to review the medical

records from his cardiac arrest due to overdose, which detailed the anoxic brain injury.

In support, Baker provides a May 2021 report from Dr. Galina Nikolskaya, who

assessed his competence and whether the prior expert opinions on competence were

“within the standard of care given the conclusions were reached without a full review of

medical history.” Dr. Nikolskaya opined:

       Mr. Baker’s condition of permanent anoxic encephalopathy as a result of
       having suffered cardiopulmonary arrest on 2/24/2008 made him
       incompetent throughout the time of proceedings including the time when
       he entered into a plea without understanding. From a neurological
       standpoint, there is solid evidence that Mr. Baker was not competent to
       participate in his legal defense many months following his cardiac arrest.
       Even having made some recovery, given the markers seen in the 2008
       medical records, along with the symptoms endorsed, Mr. Baker’s brain
       damage post cardiac arrest was permanent leading to significant cognitive
       limitations.

                                            6
No. 83696-0-I/7

      The standard of care for cognitive competence determination by any
      mental health professional, including clinician or a forensic
      neuropsychologist, requires that such a professional reviews all of the
      relevant prior medical records including hospitalizations which can have
      any conditions that can result in impairment of cognitive function and
      render a patient incompetent, including history of cardiopulmonary arrest
      and anoxia. This standard for analysis of cognitive competency was owed
      to Mr. Baker and this medical standard was clearly not met.

The report further concluded that the prior experts who found Baker competent “did so

without having had access to material medical facts about Mr. Baker’s cognitive

abilities; their opinions reached on his competence did not meet the quality standards

required for a medical or neuropsychological opinion to be valid medical opinion, given

the conclusions were made based on incomplete data analysis.”

      The record shows the competency evaluators did not review the medical records

from Baker’s cardiac arrest. While Dr. Ward requested these hospital records from

Providence Everett Medical Center at the time of the first evaluation, he had not

received them by the time of his first report. The reports from subsequent evaluations by

Dr. Ward do not mention the hospital records among those reviewed. Instead, Dr. Ward

based his assessment of the event on Snohomish County jail records and provided this

description of the cardiopulmonary arrest:

             [D]uring booking, Mr. Baker appeared “distraught” and was talking
      “loudly.” He fell to the floor, banging his head, “as if he was having a
      seizure.” Emergency responders began CPR and transported him to
      Providence Everett Medical Center.
             . . . Mr. Baker “ingested a baggy of drugs,” sometime just before his
      arrest and the time of booking. Urinalysis conducted at the hospital was
      positive for benzodiazepines, cannabis, opioids, and cocaine. Mr. Baker
      was proscribed Seroquel (antipsychotic), Doxepin (antidepressant),
      Klonopin (anticonvulsant), and Depakote (anticonvulsant).
             Mr. Baker was transferred back to the jail . . . and was
      subsequently housed on the Mental Health Unit.

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No. 83696-0-I/8

This description of the episode does not indicate that Dr. Ward appreciated the anoxic

encephalopathy3 that resulted from Baker’s cardiac arrest and how that could have had

a long-term impact on his cognitive ability. Like Dr. Ward, Dr. Gustafson also relied on

the Snohomish County jail medical records and described the event in even less detail,

noting that “when Mr. Baker was admitted from Providence Hospital after a life-

threatening overdose, he appeared to be psychotic.”

        According to Baker and Dr. Nikolskaya, the competency evaluations conducted

without the Providence records fell below the standard of care. “No rule of general

applicability can be effectively constructed to govern the adequacy of competency

evaluations in every case,” and “there is no clear consensus on a standard of practice

for competency evaluations.” Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d at 622. Nevertheless, the trial court

“has the power and the obligation to ensure that a statutory competency evaluation is

conducted in a qualified manner.” Id. at 621. We cannot determine from this record

whether Drs. Ward and Gustafson conducted their evaluations in a qualified manner

when they were aware of but did not review the Providence medical records. Nor can

we determine whether the evaluators would have arrived at a different conclusion about

Baker’s competency had they reviewed the Providence medical records and known of

the anoxia suffered prior to resuscitation. Remand to the trial court for a reference

hearing is necessary to determine these facts.

         3 Dr. Nikolskaya describes anoxic encephalopathy as “abnormal brain function following an event

of cardiac arrest.”

                                                   8
No. 83696-0-I/9

       Without understanding the impact of these records, we also cannot determine

conclusively whether defense counsel was ineffective as to this aspect of Baker’s

representation. For a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish both objectively deficient performance and resulting prejudice. State v.

Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 754-55, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). We approach an ineffective

assistance of counsel argument with a strong presumption that counsel provided

effective representation. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 673, 101 P.3d 1

(2004). A petitioner can “ ‘rebut this presumption by proving that [their] attorney’s

representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the

challenged action was not sound strategy.’ ” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986)).

This court evaluates the reasonableness of counsel’s performance from “ ‘counsel’s

perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.’ ” Id.

(quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384).

       In this case, Baker’s trial counsel had already identified the need for a

competency assessment and initiated the request for such a hearing. The trial court

ordered the first and third competency evaluations on motions by Baker’s counsel

asserting there was reason to doubt competency. Baker’s counsel demonstrated

sufficient concern about Baker’s competency that he arranged for a fourth forensic

evaluation by Dr. Gustafson rather than the State’s evaluator.

       The record is unclear as to when Baker’s counsel became aware of the incident

that required Baker to be sent to the Providence emergency room, though the incident

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No. 83696-0-I/10

was noted in Snohomish County jail medical records. At the latest, Dr. Ward’s first

evaluation would have alerted counsel to the lack of associated medical records and

that the jail medical records noted that that Baker “appeared psychotic” after he

ingested the drugs and overdosed. However, the record does not show that counsel

took any action to ensure that subsequent evaluations included access to the

Providence medical records, nor did counsel point out this lack or seek a continuance of

the evaluation or the competency hearing in order to obtain the records.

      Counsel has a duty to provide an expert with the relevant information that would

allow the expert to draw a conclusion. In re Pers. Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 868,

881, 16 P.3d 601 (2001) (citing Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.1999)

(although aware of defendant’s chronic exposure to neurotoxicants, counsel failed to

provide examining experts with the information necessary to make an accurate

evaluation of neurological system)); State v. K.A.B., 14 Wn. App. 2d 677, 708, 475 P.3d

216 (2020) (counsel had an affirmative duty to investigate which experts were needed

to establish diminished capacity and then provide the expert with relevant information).

Upon discovering the existence of medical records concerning the overdose and

cardiac arrest, Baker’s counsel had a duty to ensure the experts could review the

records in the context of the competency evaluation, or to challenge an opinion that

Baker was competent on the basis that the assessments were not conducted in a

qualified manner due to failure to review all relevant records. Moreover, there is no

ascertainable strategic advantage to not obtaining the Providence medical records or

cross-examining the State’s expert on the basis of his opinion in the absence of review

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No. 83696-0-I/11

of those medical records, so the failure to ensure a competency evaluation included a

review of those records was deficient performance.

       As Baker has demonstrated trial counsel’s deficiency, we must assess whether

the deficiency resulted in prejudice. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a

reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different without the

attorney’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. In the context of a

PRP, the petitioner must state specific facts which entitle him to relief. Rice, 118 Wn.2d

at 886. Where a petitioner makes at least a prima facie showing of actual prejudice but

we cannot determine the merits solely on the record, we will remand for a reference

hearing. Id. at 885.

       Here, Baker has provided an expert neurological report that his anoxic

encephalopathy likely caused brain damage which may have impacted his competency.

Baker has also shown that none of the experts who conducted his competency

evaluations had reviewed the medical records or knew the severity of the overdose

incident. However, we do not know the impact those records would have had on the

competency evaluations. We cannot determine whether, had counsel obtained the

records or otherwise ensured that Drs. Ward and Gustafson reviewed them, it would

have changed their evaluation of Baker’s competency. A reference hearing will allow the

trial court to make this determination regarding prejudice.

       We remand to the trial court for a reference hearing. The trial court will determine

whether the evaluations presented to the court in 2008, 2009 and 2010 were conducted

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No. 83696-0-I/12

in a qualified manner in the absence of any consideration of the relevant medical

records; whether review of the Providence records relating to Baker’s cardiac arrest and

resulting anoxic brain injury would have made a difference in each expert’s assessment

of Baker’s competence to stand trial; and whether counsel’s failure to ensure that the

competency evaluation included reviewing the additional medical records established a

reasonable probability that the result of the competency hearing, and thus, Baker’s

ability to enter a guilty plea, would have been different.

        We remand to the trial court for a reference hearing to be held within 90 days of

this decision 4. The trial court will determine whether the evaluations presented to the

court in 2008, 2009 and 2010 were conducted in a qualified manner in the absence of

any consideration of the relevant medical records; whether review of the Providence

records relating to Baker’s cardiac arrest and resulting anoxic brain injury would have

made a difference in each expert’s assessment of Baker’s competence to stand trial;

and whether counsel’s failure to ensure that the competency evaluation included

reviewing the additional medical records established a reasonable probability that the

result of the competency hearing, and thus, Baker’s ability to enter a guilty plea, would

have been different. The trial court shall enter findings of fact, which shall be forwarded

to this court within 30 days after the reference hearing.

         4 If the trial court determines that additional time is needed to prepare for the hearing it may grant

the parties additional time, but this court should be advised of any delay.

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No. 83696-0-I/13

      WE CONCUR:

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