Court Opinion

ID: 9737877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:36:23.098594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.303494
License: Public Domain

*452LEVINE, Justice,
concurring in result.
This case should be decided and affirmed on the limited ground that there is a preponderance of evidence in support of the hearing officer’s conclusion that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Wiederholt was in actual physical control. After all, it doesn’t take a Sherlock Holmes to deduce from the circumstantial evidence of fresh tire tracks all over a road that lead to a vehicle, previously identified, now at rest, with the driver in it, that the driver was in actual physical control before the vehicle came to rest.
Not satisfied with resolving this case on a narrow ground, the majority, instead, needlessly roams far and wide over rocky jurisprudential terrain. I refer specifically to State v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 637 (N.D.1983), which answered only the question asked in that case — whether the statutory language “elsewhere throughout the state,” contained in NDCC § 39-10-01(2) applied to an open field, privately owned.1 It did not analyze or address the unasked question whether section 39-10-01(2) applied at all to the offense of actual physical control. Novak assumed it did. However, if the court had addressed that issue, it would have had to conclude from the express language of the statute in effect at the time of the offense and from the legislative history of the subsequent amendments that section 39-10-01(2) does not apply to being in actual physical control of a vehicle. The legislature simply did not intend to criminalize conduct constituting actual physical control if that conduct took place on property not accessible to the public. The Novak court said it relied on subsequent amendments as an aid in arriving at the correct meaning of the statutes it was construing. 338 N.W.2d at 640.
During the legislative session preceding the decision in Novak, section 39-10-01 was amended. S.L.1983, ch. 436, § 1. The bill, as introduced, made three changes relevant to this discussion. First, it added to section 39-10-01(1) the language “or other places open to the public for the operation of vehicles” to make the motor vehicle laws apply not only “to the operation of vehicles upon highways,” but also to “other places open to the public for the operation of vehicles.” Second, it added actual physical control and implied consent to the list of offenses specifically made applicable “upon highways and elsewhere” in section 39-10-01(2). Third, it shortened the phrase interpreted in Novak from “and elsewhere throughout the state” to “and elsewhere.” H.B. 1647, 49th Legislative Assembly (1983).
The House Transportation Committee was told the bill was introduced to make traffic laws applicable on frozen lakes. Minutes of House Transportation Committee, Feb. 10, 1983 (comments of Bruce Burkett, Vice-President, North Dakota Peace Officers Association). The bill’s sponsor, Representative Hjelle, was asked why actual physical control and implied consent were included in subsection two. He told the committee that the staff of the Legislative Council added that language when they drafted the bill for him. Id. The committee deleted the actual physical control and implied consent references. I deem that deletion meaningful and fairly indicative of an intent not to include actual physical control.
Before the Senate Transportation Committee, the evil sought to be avoided through the amendment was identified, again, as driving on frozen lakes. Minutes of Senate Transportation Committee, March 4, 1983 (comments of Wilmer Pich, North Dakota Game & Fish Dept.). Senator Lashkowitz voiced his concern over the phrase “and elsewhere” in subsection two because it might “permit [s«<?] a person from doing what he wants to on his own property.” Id. The senate committee amended the “and elsewhere” provision to make subsection two apply to highways “or *453other places open to the public for the operation of vehicles.” Id.
The House Transportation Committee considered the bill a second time in preparation for the conference committee meeting. It was told the Highway Patrol wanted “and elsewhere” in the law because under the Senate version (restricting jurisdiction to “highways or other places open to the public for the operation of vehicles”) any violator “could drive off into a field and no one could touch him.” Minutes of House Transportation Committee, March 25, 1983 (comments of Rep. Schoenwald, conference committee chair). The-committee’s final position on the Senate version is not clearly stated in the minutes. The minutes of the conference committee, however, indicate that the house committee did not concur in the amendment to subsection two narrowing the reach from highways “and elsewhere” to “places open to the public.”
The conference committee discussed the proper reach of subsection two. It discussed the effect the bill had on the offense of actual physical control; however, its understanding is not recorded. Minutes of Conference Committee, March 29, 1983. The minutes reflect the highway patrol’s concern over the elimination of “and elsewhere” by the senate amendment, and cite “an intoxicated driver in a field or pasture” as an example of offenses put beyond the patrol’s reach by the amendment. Id. The language added by the Senate, “other places open to the public,” made subsection two applicable “only to a parking lot primarily.” Id. (comments of Norm Evans, North Dakota Highway Patrol). The conference committee receded from the senate amendment.
I draw from this record some clear intentions. There was no debate over the amendment to subsection one, the general provision making motor vehicle laws applicable to “highways or other places open to the public.” There was debate over the proper reach of subsection two, the provision making listed offenses applicable to “highways and elsewhere.” From this debate, I find an intent that the language in subsection two, “and elsewhere,” reach further than subsection one’s “other places open to the public,” which was understood to apply to parking lots. There is also a clear intent that “actual physical control” not be a part of the listed offenses in subsection two. Novak interpreted the “and elsewhere” language as the legislature intended, but ignored in its entirety the absence of actual physical control from the statute and the legislative intent to exclude actual physical control.
The majority relies on the inaction of the legislature subsequent to the Novak decision as evidence that the legislature has acquiesced to that interpretation of the reach of section 39-10-01(2) and its applicability to the offense of actual physical control. Legislative inaction is a “ ‘weak reed upon which to lean’ and a ‘poor beacon to follow’ ” in construing a statute. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland’s Statutory Construction § 49.10 (4th ed. 1984). Because the legislature last amended section 39-10-01(2) before Novak was decided and the history of that amendment reveals an intent contrary to the interpretation given in Novak, I cannot think of a weaker reed or dimmer beacon than that provided in this ease. In my view, Novak should be revisited in the appropriate case. It is not the last word on anything except the meaning of the “and elsewhere” language in section 39-10-01(2).
I concur in the result.
GIERKE, J., concurs.

. Although State v. Thomas, 420 N.W.2d 747 (N.D.1989), held that the legislature did not intend to alter Novak by restructuring NDCC § 39-08-01, it correctly interpreted section 39-08-01 to prohibit actual physical control in a privately owned parking lot because we concluded, in effect, that the parking lot was an area to which the public had a right of access for vehicular use.