Court Opinion

ID: 9468512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:16:40.254674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:54.116206
License: Public Domain

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting):
The majority holds that handicapped individuals have no private right of action under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793. It takes this rigid position in the face of appellant’s charge that United Air Lines discriminated against him because of his handicap since it believes that the demands of the four-factor Cort test have not been met. I cannot agree. A careful analysis in keeping with the Cort approach does not compel this harsh result to Davis, a diagnosed epileptic placed on unpaid “extended illness status” and then terminated by his employer. Accordingly, I dissent.
The threshold question under Cort is whether the plaintiff was one of the class for whose “especial benefit” § 503 was enacted. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 80-82, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, 2089, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). This inquiry focuses on whether Congress intended to benefit a clearly defined class rather than to protect the general public. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-92, 99 S.Ct. at 1954-55 (1979). Looking to the language of the statute may provide evidence of this intent. Id. Here, the language of § 503(a) and (b) specifically identifies the class, “handicapped individuals,” and provides equal employment opportunities for all who fall within it. Indeed, *128relying on this approach to the first Cort factor, virtually all of the district courts analyzing § 503, including those that ultimately found no private right of action, have concluded that the statute was enacted for the “especial benefit” of the handicapped. See, e. g., California Paralyzed Veterans Assn. v. FCC, 496 F.Supp. 125, 128-29 (C.D.Cal.1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F.Supp. 66, 68 (N.D.Cal.1979); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co., 468 F.Supp. 934, 936 (E.D.Ohio 1979).
The majority, however, contends that when § 503 is examined for “right- or duty-creating language,” Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13, 99 S.Ct. at 1954, no indication of an intention to establish a federal right in favor of the plaintiff can be found. See Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. While the absence of such a “talismanic incantation,” Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1092 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), is less relevant than the substance of the obligations created, the affirmative action language of § 503 may appear to create, when scrutinized closely, a duty for federal agencies, it is argued, not for employers. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., supra, 611 F.2d at 1079.
Although the duty-creating phrases are not conclusive in either direction, an analysis of the second and more important Cort factor, contrary to the majority’s position, offers exceedingly strong evidence for giving a right of action to the handicapped individual. In considering whether the legislative history of § 503 sheds light on the private right of action question, see Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, three statutes carry weight and are directly relevant to our determination: the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, and the attorney’s fees provisions of the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978.
I do not quarrel with the assertion that the legislative history of the 1973 Act provides little assistance. Debate primarily focused on the establishment of federally-funded programs for the handicapped, not on the relatively non-controversial antidiscrimination provisions of §§ 503 and 504. Nor is an examination of the history surrounding the 1974 Amendments to the Act particularly enlightening, because discussion centered on redefining “handicapped individual,” not on explicating the full meaning of §§ 503 and 504. The conference report, however, lends guidance. It states that § 504 permits a “judicial remedy through private action,” S.Conf.Rep.No. 93-1270, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 26 (1974), and notes, as the majority recognizes, that both sections will be administered to effect a uniform approach to discrimination against handicapped persons. Id. at 27. Such' language, I believe, should fairly be read to suggest that, since Congress recognized a private right of action under § 504, such a remedy would not be inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in § 503. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., supra, 611 F.2d at 1096 (Goldberg, J. dissenting). In addition, during the Senate debate, Senator Robert Stafford, one of the principal sponsors of the original Act and its later amendments, stated that enforcement of both sections would be similar to that of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act and § 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972. 120 Cong.Rec. 30551 (1974). Although a private right of action was found to exist for the Education Amendments in Cannon, supra, the majority denigrates the value of Senator Stafford’s remarks.
More conclusive evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a private action is found in the 1978 attorney’s fees amendments. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). This provision explicitly presumes private judicial actions because attorney’s fees are made available to parties “other than the United States” and because the language looks to actions before “courts,” not administrative agencies. The Senate Report and Senate debates also indicate that private actions were envisioned. The majority concedes that the accompanying Senate Report explicitly stated that the availability of attorney’s *129fees was intended to aid handicapped individuals in “vindicating private rights of action in the case of section . . . 503 cases.” S.Rep.No.890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978). The majority further acknowledges that H.R.Rep.No.1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 7312, 7332, took precisely the same position.
My brothers have decided that this legislative material is “unpersuasive” and virtually dismiss it. They adopt the rationale that failure to discuss the then-existing case law indicates that references to the availability of a § 503 private right of action were “inadvertent.” I realize that “even Homer nods,” but such a bald refusal to acknowledge a clear, express statement of congressional intent is inexcusable. Granted, the evidence surrounding the passage of the 1978 attorney’s fees amendments carries less weight than contemporary legislative history, but this evidence is strongly relevant in determining what members of Congress assumed they had done several years previously. It is clear from the legislative history that Congress premised the attorney’s fees provision on the existence of an implied remedy. Furthermore, interpreting an attorney’s fees amendment to reveal Congress’s intent is surely not a novel method of construction, as the majority’s position would appear to suggest. In Cannon, interpretation of the legislative background of the attorney’s fees amendment to § 901 of Title IX served as the basis for the Court’s recognition of a private right of action. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952. Indeed, Congress is generally considered to be a creditable interpreter of its actions, and judicial deference to these interpretations is appropriate. See, e. g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1075, 60 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 77 S.Ct. 381, 1 L.Ed.2d 363 (1958).
Here, the notion that the view of a subsequent Congress forms a weak foundation for inferring the intent of an earlier one, see Consumer Product Safety Comm’n. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2060, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980), is not a persuasive argument. Many members .of the relevant committees in 1978 were also members of those committees in 1973. I doubt that these distinguished members of Congress who labored over trail-blazing legislation would have forgotten what they had intended a mere five years before the 1978 amendments. Contrary to the majority’s poorly-supported and tenuous conclusion that the legislative history is ambiguous, the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress, in passing the attorney’s fees amendments of 1978, assumed that a private right of action was created with the passage of § 503 in 1973. This assumption does not reflect a subsequent desire to amend the original enactment; rather, it illuminates the initial intent of the draftsmen.
The third factor of the Cort analysis considers whether a private right of action would support Congress’s purpose in enacting the statutory scheme. See Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. Implication of a private right of action is not inconsistent with the underlying purr pose of § 503 — effective administrative enforcement. The Department of Labor and its office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, it is interesting to note, have stated that the existence of an implied remedy would enhance informal conciliation and administrative enforcement in general. See Chaplin v. Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., 482 F.Supp. 1165, 1172 (S.D.N.Y.1980). Although the majority lightly dismisses these agency opinions, courts generally believe they are deserving of substantial weight. See, e. g., Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 99 S.Ct. 957, 59 L.Ed.2d 194 (1979); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra.
My brothers, in concluding that the mandates of the third Cort factor are not fulfilled, rely on an analysis contained in CETA Workers’ Org. Comm. v. City of New York, 617 F.2d 926 (1980). Such reliance is *130misplaced because CETA is readily distinguishable. The statutory presumption in favor of administrative enforcement is much more potent under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (“CETA”) than it is under the Rehabilitation Act. Section 106 provides, in great detail, a sophisticated scheme for enforcement of CETA. In particular, the Secretary of Labor is required to reach a final determination on a complaint within 120 days. CETA § 106(b), 29 U.S.C. § 816(b). This complex enforcement mechanism suggests the “primacy” and “exclusivity” of the administrative grievance procedures. CETA Workers’ Org. Comm. v. New York, supra, 617 F.2d at 931.
No such detailed machinery exists under the Rehabilitation Act, and even the accompanying Regulations contain no deadlines for the processing of complaints. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26(e) (1980) (“The Department of Labor shall institute a prompt investigation of each complaint . . . ”). Surely, it does not require straining the legislative interpretation to envision a private right of action complementing the statutory enforcement mechanism for § 503. Indeed, the Department of Labor endorses this view. I submit that analysis of the third Cort factor differs for the two statutes. More importantly, it indicates that Congress would be more inclined to create a private right of action for a statute where provisions for administrative enforcement are not detailed and precise. But the majority, admitting that the CETA scheme is more fully developed, still finds the distinctions between the two of little significance even in light of the Department of Labor’s statement that an implied right of action for § 503 violations should be permitted. The majority, it appears, attaches greater weight to tangential exempla than to direct, explicit evidence.
My brothers do not contend that the requirements of the fourth Cort factor — preemption of matters typically the concern of state courts — have not been met. As they acknowledge, invidious discrimination has always been addressed by federal legislation. Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, 441 U.S. at 708-09, 99 S.Ct. at 1963-64 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1218, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974).
In light of what I have said, I would hold that a private right of action under § 503 is clearly authorized. Handicapped persons are the “especial class” Congress meant to benefit from the enactment of § 503, and the 1978 attorney’s fees amendments demonstrate that Congress assumed that the 1973 Congress intended to create this private right of action. Moreover, implication of a private right of action is not inconsistent with the goal of administrative enforcement of the statute’s antidiscrimination provisions. We should be mindful that the handicapped must overcome not only physical and mental obstacles to full participation in society but also must surmount the barriers raised by discrimination caused by society’s attitude toward them. Congress in § 503 sought to safeguard them from such discrimination and this protection includes providing for a private right of action.
I am aware that recent Supreme Court decisions counsel that private remedies are not to be inferred cavalierly, and, therefore, a cautious analysis is in order. The majority, however, has taken this advice to the extreme and has failed to acknowledge exceptions that have been carved out and clear indications of congressional purpose. I believe the only reasonable conclusion to be reached from applying the Cort analysis is that Congress intended handicapped individuals to have a private remedy under § 503. If the legislative history is not clear and precise, as the majority believes, Justice Holmes’s counsel should not be ignored. He instructed us in 1908 that “[where Congress] has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed.... [I]t is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.” Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). The general scheme of the legislation, indeed, indicates that Congress, in affording new rights and privi*131leges to the handicapped, wished to redress the inequities borne by them. To hold otherwise is to take from an entire group of individuals who suffer odious discrimination an important right given them by Congress,