Court Opinion

ID: 9697717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:27:35.925399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:34.845027
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority’s decision to affirm the denial of Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief and write only to clarify my reasoning concerning denial of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the failure to pursue mental health evidence as a mitigating circumstance at the penalty phase of trial.
It is my belief that, in some cases in which the defendant’s mental state is legitimately at issue, evidence of the defendant’s mental health history and/or expert psychiatric evidence has the potential to carry substantial weight with a jury *90in terms of establishing a mitigating circumstance and, correspondingly, a defense to the Commonwealth’s effort to obtain a sentence of death. See Commonwealth v. Rivers, 567 Pa. 239, & n. 1, 786 A.2d 923, 927 & n. 1 (2001)(Saylor, J., dissenting).1 Certainly, there is also a risk in some cases that the presentation of such evidence may create an unfavorable impression with jurors. Thus, trial counsel are charged with collecting and evaluating the relevant evidence and, in consultation with their clients, making reasoned, strategic decisions specific to the facts at hand as to whether, and to what extent, available evidence should be put before the sentencing jury.
In light of the above, however, I do not believe that the inherent nature of mental health proofs alone, and generalized risks that may be said to accompany their presentation, are sufficient to obviate the review and weighing process in the post-conviction courts upon the proffer of a properly-supported claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mental health evidence at the penalty hearing. See generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 544 Pa. 406, 425, 676 A.2d 1178, 1187 (1996) (allowing for the possibility of post-conviction relief if “it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued”)(quoting Commonwealth v. Pirela, 510 Pa. 43, 59, 507 A.2d 23, 31 (1986)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 614, 136 L.Ed.2d 538 (1996); Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 245-49, 732 A.2d 1167, 1187-90 (1999). Therefore, in such circumstances, I have supported the provision of a post-conviction hearing and, correspondingly, the requirement of adequate factual findings and legal conclusions by the post-conviction court. See, e.g., id.2
*91Despite the fact of such hearing in this case, the majority rests its disposition of the penalty-phase, mental health issue primarily upon a passage from trial counsel’s post-conviction testimony which, in large part, merely identifies generalized risks associated with the presentation of mental health evidence. Notably, such testimony was offered in response to a general question concerning dangers in presenting mental health issues (“The danger that you described to presenting certain mental health issues, what are those dangers?”); does not take into account the specifics of the available mental health evidence pertinent to the case at issue or reflect the attendant weight and potential benefit vis-a-vis other available defenses; and does not represent the sum and substance of trial counsel’s reasons for not pursuing mental health evidence at the penalty phase in the present case. If these sorts of generalized concerns about the presentation of mental health evidence on their own can be said to provide a reasonable basis for failing to investigate and/or present mental health evidence in mitigation, there would rarely be a need for a hearing on this issue, since these considerations will apply in virtually every capital case. As demonstrated by the present appeal, however, this has not been the course ■ chosen by careful PCRA judges (here, the Honorable Kevin A. Hess) who, in appropriate circumstances, have undertaken the necessary task of sifting through and weighing the evidence. Thus, the following additional considerations are critical to my assessment of the present appeal.
At the post-conviction hearing, it was initially disclosed that trial counsel had contacted several mental health professionals, who were unwilling or unable to examine Appellant in contemplation of the presentation of a defense at the penalty phase of his trial.3 Trial counsel ultimately obtained a referral *92to Dr. Carolynn Crutchley, a psychiatrist, but later decided not to allow her to examine Appellant. In his testimony, trial counsel initially refused to disclose the basis for this action, citing the attorney-client privilege on questioning by the Commonwealth:
THE COURT: And you’re telling me that you cannot answer [the question why mental health evidence was not presented] without doing violence to the attorney client privilege?
THE WITNESS: I don’t believe I can.
Trial counsel later invited inquiry from PCRA counsel as to his strategy (“I have a recollection about a very specific thing that Dr. Crutchley and I discussed, which I will tell you if you are asking me to do so”), but PCRA counsel avoided the asking. Ultimately, on questioning by the Commonwealth, the PCRA court directed trial counsel to disclose his strategy in the following passage:
Q: What specific thing was it that you and Dr. Crutchley discussed that caused you — convinced you not to use her?
A: I think I would have to disclose attorney client—
THE COURT: And I think on this narrow issue according to the law it is waived, and I will direct you to answer it.
[PCRA cnsl.]: As to what Dr. Crutchley told him?
THE COURT: Yes, as to why he opted not to pursue the mental health defect that is at the very heart of this case. You don’t have to tell me the words that your client said, but what was the underlying reason?
A: As I understood what Dr. Crutchley and I were discussing, one of the things that was important to her was whether there were or were not going to be expressions of remorse. That’s the way I recall our conversation.
Q: No further questions, Your Honor.
[PCRA cnsl.]: Nothing else, Your Honor.
Based upon this testimony, the PCRA court found:
[Trial counsel] was concerned with the interaction between [Appellant] and the defense expert, Dr. Crutchley. When *93trial counsel met with Dr. Crutchley, he requested that she not discuss the crime itself with the petitioner out of fear that [Appellant] would not appear remorseful enough. When Dr. Crutchley could not comply with this request, trial counsel became concerned that her testimony would be potentially more harmful than helpful.4
As the majority footnotes, the PCRA court also rejected Appellant’s expert testimony in favor of that offered by the Commonwealth to the effect that Appellant did not suffer from a serious mental defect.
It is because the PCRA court made the requisite credibility assessments and judgments specific to this case on an adequate record, properly concluding that Appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proof in light of such findings, that I am able to join in the majority’s disposition.

. Indeed, in the present case, the PCRA court opened its analysis of the pertinent claim as follows: "No authority is necessary for the rather obvious proposition that where one's criminal conduct results from a real and serious mental defect, even though it might not rise to the level of a defense, that criminal conduct becomes easier to understand and any penalty for it ought, arguably, to be mitigated."

. I do not suggest that a post-conviction hearing is necessary in every capital case in which this form of claim is presented — pursuant to sound policy as reflected in our rules, a hearing is necessary only where the pleadings and essential affidavits establish a material factual dispute *91concerning a central element of a viable claim. See generally Pa. R.Crim.P. 909(C).

. Trial counsel's engagement in this process alone provides some degree of support for the conclusion that an underlying, strategy-based assessment grounded the decision to forego the presentation of mental health evidence to the sentencing jury, as opposed to mere default on the part of trial counsel.

. The actual explanation for trial counsel’s strategy remains undeveloped on the record, since counsel was permitted to refrain from disclosing the details of his conversations with Appellant. This deficiency cannot redound to Appellant’s benefit, however, since he bore the burden of proof at the post-conviction stage. In these circumstances, it was simply not possible for Appellant to satisfy this burden while concealing critical facts utilizing the shield of the attorney-client privilege and a course of artful questioning.
Notably, this Court has imposed limitations on the subsequent use of post-conviction testimony from trial counsel in appropriate circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478, 511, 738 A.2d 406, 424 (1999).