Court Opinion

ID: 9910007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 18:02:38.533612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:26.082089
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/14/23 P. v. Sandoval CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085161
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. F22901227)
                    v.

 ROBERT ANTHONY SANDOVAL,                                                                 OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B.
Conklin, Judge.

         John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and
Robert C. Nash, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Defendant Robert Anthony Sandoval argues the trial court failed to instruct the
jury on a lesser included offense and improperly took judicial notice of the flash point of
gasoline. We affirm.
                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On July 1, 2022, the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office filed an amended
information charging defendant with arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, § 451,
subd. (b); count 1), and possession of a destructive device (id., § 18710, subd. (a); count
2).
       On July 6, 2022, a jury convicted defendant of both counts. Defendant was
sentenced to the middle term of five years on count 1, and the middle term of two years
on count 2, concurrent, for an aggregate term of five years in prison.
       On October 25, 2022, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                          FACTS
       We summarize the facts relevant to the issues presented in the instant appeal.
       On February 27, 2022, around 9:00 a.m., Brenda M. heard something fall on the
roof of her house. When she went outside, she saw a fire on the roof of her house, in the
area closest to the alley. Jose F., who also lives at that address with his family, went up
on the roof and put the fire out. Brenda M. found a broken, smoking bottle on the
ground, and Jose F. found a bottle on the roof that had rolled behind one of the solar
panels. Surveillance footage of the property, which was shared with law enforcement,
showed someone throwing the bottles.
       Officers Daniel Renteria and Justin Batty were dispatched to the scene. Renteria
examined the roof and found a glass bottle with a black rag hanging out of it near one of
the solar panels. Renteria also noted the solar panels closest to the alley had been burned
and the shingles were still hot. Finally, Renteria saw defendant yelling in the corner of a

                                             2.
backyard in the neighboring residence. Renteria recognized defendant from prior law
enforcement contacts and from his shaved head and the tattoos on his face.
       The bottle Renteria recovered from the roof had burnt residue inside it, and both
the bottle and the rag smelled of gasoline. It also had a brand sticker on the bottle. The
broken bottle found on the ground also smelled of gasoline and had a rag stuffed in it, but
only the neck of the bottle remained.
       Renteria reviewed the surveillance footage and noted a figure with a shaved head,
wearing dark clothing, walking in the backyard of the neighboring residence. Shortly
afterward, two items were tossed over the fence, one striking the roof of Brenda M.’s
house and the other falling to the ground where the broken bottle was found.
       Renteria and Batty proceeded to the neighboring residence to speak with
defendant. Defendant was alone in the backyard and had not moved from the corner
where Renteria first saw him. While speaking with defendant, Renteria noticed in a trash
can near defendant several bottles matching the bottles found on the roof of Brenda M.’s
home with the same brand stickers. Renteria also located a half-empty gas can at the
front of the residence.
       Batty spoke with defendant, who denied knowing anything about the burning
bottles. When defendant was searched incident to his arrest, Batty recovered a lighter
from his possession.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     The Trial Court’s Lack of Instruction on the Lesser Included Offense of
       Recklessly Burning an Inhabited Structure Was Invited Error
       Defendant argues the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of recklessly burning an inhabited structure, in violation of his due process rights.
We find the error was invited and defendant is barred from relief.

                                             3.
       A.     Background
       The trial court discussed jury instructions with defendant and the prosecution,
where defendant requested the trial court not instruct on the lesser included offense:

               “THE COURT: Now let’s clarify, also, finally, the lesser-included.
       [¶] The Court, yesterday, informed the defense that it believes the lesser-
       included of Count 1, the [Penal Code section] 451(a), is [section] 452. And
       [section] 452, reading from the statute, [section] 452 is, unlawfully causing
       a fire. The only difference, essentially—and I’m summarizing—is the state
       of mind necessary. [Section] 451 requires ‘maliciously’ and [section] 452
       is ‘recklessly.’

              “The Court was of the opinion that there might be somewhat of a
       close call—there might be an interpretation of the evidence from which the
       jury could conclude that, be it [defendant] or whoever it was, that
       apparently threw the container out of the backyard of the Duff [Avenue]
       location into the—onto the roof where the fire occurred, was, rather than
       malicious, was reckless.

             “So I’ll turn to [defense counsel] and ask him, for sentencing
       reasons, if he is requesting the Court not provide the lesser.

              “[Defense counsel], your position on that?

             “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: My position is I’m asking the Court not to
       provide the lesser-included CALCRIM 1515 and 1531.

               “THE COURT: And that seems very appropriate to the Court. It
       appears to the Court that the critical issue here has been presented by both
       defense counsel and the prosecution, and that is identity of the person that
       threw the bottles; for [defense counsel] to then argue to the jury it wasn’t
       his client, but if it was his client, it was only a lesser-included and appears
       to be internally inconsistent.

               “I therefore understand [defense counsel’s] tactical position. It
       appears he’s providing exactly the representation he should provide. It is a
       tactical decision that the Court feels is more than justified. And for those
       reasons, I will not provide the lesser-included instructions.”
       B.     Analysis
       The well-established doctrine of invited error prohibits an appellant from “gaining
reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest.” (People v.

                                              4.
Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1234 (Bunyard), abrogated on other grounds in People
v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.)
       “For the doctrine to apply, ‘it must be clear from the record that defense counsel
made an express objection to the relevant instructions. In addition, because important
rights of the accused are at stake, it also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical
reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[t]he existence of
some conceivable tactical purpose will not support a finding that defense counsel invited
an error in instructions. The record must reflect that counsel had a deliberate tactical
purpose.’ [Citation.]” (Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1234.)
       “Despite the circumstance that it is the court that is vested with authority to
determine whether to instruct on a lesser included offense, the doctrine of invited error
still applies if the court accedes to a defense attorney’s tactical decision to request that
lesser included offense instructions not be given. Such a tactical request presents a bar to
consideration of the issue on appeal. [Citations.]” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1179, 1265.)
       Primarily, defendant concedes the invited error doctrine bars reversal in this case.
We agree. The record clearly states defendant’s trial counsel requested the court not give
the lesser included instruction on recklessly burning an inhabited structure. The trial
court noted this was a tactical decision because defendant’s primary defense was that he
was not the person who caused the fire, and the lesser included instruction was not
internally consistent with defendant’s tactical position.
       Therefore, defendant clearly made an express objection to the instruction and
acted for a deliberate, tactical purpose and not out of ignorance or mistake. (Bunyard,
supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1234.) The doctrine of invited error forecloses defendant relief on
this issue.

                                               5.
II.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Taking Judicial Notice of
       the Flash Point of Gasoline
       Defendant argues the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the flash point
of gasoline because it was not a proper subject for judicial notice, and defendant was not
provided adequate notice as required by Evidence Code section 453. We find the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
       A.     Background
       On July 5, 2022, the prosecution requested the trial court take judicial notice of the
flash point of gasoline pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). The court
commented as follows:

              “THE COURT: [¶] … [¶] And, finally, the People’s request for
       judicial notice pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 452(h) which allows
       for judicial notice of facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject
       to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by
       resources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.

              “[Prosecutor], as an officer of the court, has represented that the
       flashpoint [sic] of gasoline is ….

              “[PROSECUTOR]: Your honor, the People would be asking for the
       Court to take judicial notice in regards to the flashpoint [sic] of gasoline
       being negative 45 degrees Fahrenheit.

              “THE COURT: And the source of that information is?

               “[PROSECUTOR]: And the source for that information is the National
       Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Guide from the CDC, Centers
       for Disease Control and Prevention website.

              “THE COURT: Okay. So [the prosecutor] has made that request.
       The Court is going to defer final ruling to allow [defense counsel]—he has
       noted that he does not have notice of this request. I believe both parties are
       doing their best. I’m going to give [defense counsel] the remainder of the
       day to do any research he feels is necessary. And either at the end of the
       day today or tomorrow morning, the Court will make a final determination.

              “It does appear to be a matter that the Court can take judicial notice
       of pursuant to [Evidence Code section] 452(h), but, again, that’s my

                                             6.
       tentative. But I’m going to defer any final ruling to allow [defense counsel]
       the time necessary to conduct his research.”
       On July 6, 2022, defendant filed opposition to the prosecution’s request for
judicial notice. Defendant argued he was not provided sufficient notice because the
prosecution had provided notice by e-mail on July 4, 2022, a holiday, one day before trial
was set to begin. Defendant argued the evidence requested judicially noticed was also
generally proffered by an expert witness. Defendant did not indicate he had a substantive
objection to the requested judicial notice.
       On July 6, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the matter.

              “THE COURT: [¶] … [¶] Yesterday, the People provided authority
       obtained from, I believe—was it the CDC?

              “[PROSECUTOR]: It was the ‘National Institute for Occupational
       Safety and Health Guide,’ and it was from the CDC website.

              “THE COURT: Which appears to be, as defined in Evidence Code
       [section] 452(h), ‘sources of reasonably, indisputable accuracy’; it’s a cite.
       And also looking at [Evidence Code section] 452(h), which is what factors
       or what the Court may take judicial notice of, ‘includes facts and
       propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of
       immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably,
       indisputable accuracy,’ which [the prosecutor] has provided to the Court.

              “I’m not aware nor has any counsel provided any argument that the
       flashpoint [sic] of gasoline is anything other than something that is not
       reasonably subject to dispute.

             “I did receive a written objection from [defense counsel]. [Defense
       counsel’s] objections are timely. They were made immediately yesterday.
       [Defense counsel] was not objecting to the factor of judicial notice alone,
       but was objecting to the timeliness of the notice.…

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your Honor. My argument is
       essentially such that, when we received the trial disclosures, I reviewed
       them. I saw who the witnesses were, made a determination that there was
       nobody on that list that could proffer expert testimony about the flashpoint
       of gasoline. Therefore, I did not get a fire expert.

                                              7.
              “THE COURT: Do you have … any information that the flashpoint of
       gasoline or that it’s reasonably subject to dispute, what the flashpoint of
       gasoline is?

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have no authority at this point as to
       whether or not that is actually in dispute pursuant to [Evidence Code
       section] 452(h). However—and that’s the status of my knowledge at this
       time. Whether or not that could have changed based on consultation with
       an expert, remains to be seen. [¶] … [¶]

             “THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that. I don’t believe it is, but I
       appreciate your argument.

               “Also, this is a unique case in the sense that whatever flammable
       liquid was there itself, was burned off. The officer did state—at least one
       or both officers talked about the red container that was containing gasoline,
       but that’s not the item that was used to start the fire. I know the argument
       is the gasoline came from the red container into [the bottles], but that was
       all burned off.

              “So I understand your position, but I believe the notice was timely
       enough to allow Defense to provide additional information if necessary.
       We’ll show the objection was made, the objection was timely, though the
       objection is overruled.”
       B.     Legal Standard
       “[A]ny person … who, within this state, possesses any destructive device … is
guilty of a public offense.” (Pen. Code, § 18710, subd. (a).) A destructive device
includes, in relevant part, “[a]ny breakable container that contains a flammable liquid
with a flashpoint of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less and has a wick or similar device
capable of being ignited, other than a device which is commercially manufactured
primarily for the purpose of illumination.” (Id., § 16460, subd. (a)(5).)
       A trial court must take judicial notice of any matter specified in Evidence Code
section 452 if a party requests it, gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request,
through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the
request, and furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial
notice of the matter. (Id., § 453.)

                                              8.
       Otherwise, judicial notice may be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are not
reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by
resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
Unlike compulsory notice under Evidence Code section 453, discretionary notice under
section 452 does not require notice of the request to the adverse party.
       “Judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h) is intended to
cover facts which are not reasonably subject to dispute and are easily verified. These
include, for example, facts which are widely accepted as established by experts and
specialists in the natural, physical, and social sciences which can be verified by reference
to treatises, encyclopedias, almanacs and the like or by persons learned in the subject
matter.” (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.)
“Matters of scientific certainty are subject to judicial notice.” (McAllister v. Workmen’s
Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 408, 414.)
       Finally, with respect to any matter specified in Evidence Code section 452 that is
of substantial consequence to the determination of the action, “[i]f the trial court has been
requested to take or has taken or proposes to take judicial notice of such matter, the court
shall afford each party reasonable opportunity, before the jury is instructed or before the
cause is submitted for decision by the court, to present to the court information relevant
to (1) the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter and (2) the tenor of the matter to
be noticed.” (Id., § 455, subd. (a).)
       We review any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence, including
rulings on requests for judicial notice, for abuse of discretion. (People v. Alvarez (1996)
14 Cal.4th 155, 201; Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 175, 182.)

                                              9.
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant argues he was not given enough time to prepare because the
prosecution first sent notice on July 4, a holiday, and the court ultimately ruled on the
request on July 6.
       Neither Evidence Code section 453 nor 455 requires that notice be given any
specific amount of time prior to the trial court ruling on a request for judicial notice. In
both instances, notice must only be “sufficient” for an adverse party to prepare for the
request (id., § 453) or the party be given a “reasonable opportunity” to present
information relevant to the request (id., § 455).
       We cannot say that notice in this case was insufficient. On July 6, defense counsel
stated, “I have no authority at this point as to whether or not [the flash point of gasoline]
is actually in dispute pursuant to [Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h)].”
Defendant argued he needed two to three weeks to locate a fire expert to form a
conclusion whether or not the flash point of gasoline is subject to debate. Defendant now
argues that only a trained scientist can know whether a variety of factors influence the
flash point of gasoline.
       However, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), defendant need
only have found any authority which rendered the question “reasonably subject to
dispute.” Defendant need not have solved the actual flash point of gasoline to challenge
the request for judicial notice. One day’s notice was sufficient for defendant to conduct
preliminary research into a single scientific issue and prepare for the request.
       Defendant then argues the flash point of gasoline is not a proper subject of judicial
notice. The prosecution presented the flash point of gasoline as -45 degrees Fahrenheit,
as stated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Guide from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web site. Absent any evidence to the
contrary, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that the flash point

                                              10.
of gasoline is a “[matter] of scientific certainty … subject to judicial notice.” (McAllister
v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 414.)
       Defendant argues there is no way to know whether the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health Guide relied upon by the prosecution addressed all the
myriad factors that could influence the flash point of gasoline. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd.
(h).) That the flash point of gasoline is affected by a “myriad of factors” is speculation
by defendant not supported by the record. Defendant did not introduce any evidence or
authority before the trial court that indicated the flash point of gasoline changes based on
any factors. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Guide from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention Web site was a source “of reasonably indisputable accuracy” for purposes
of judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
       Because defendant was given sufficient notice, considering the nature of the
request for judicial notice, and presented no authority that rendered the flash point of
gasoline reasonably subject to dispute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking
judicial notice of the flash point of gasoline as described on the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health Guide from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention Web site.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                    PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.
                                             11.