Court Opinion

ID: 9584348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:47:09.386046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:37.222304
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
I respectfully dissent. I would decline to address the issue whether the trial court erred in reverse piercing of the corporate veil because, even if we accept the plaintiff’s argument on that issue, her suit would still be barred by MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1).
Subsection 827(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act states, in part:
Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies .... [MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1) (emphasis added).]
The negative implication of this subsection is that a worker who receives worker’s compensation benefits may not sue “a natural person in the same employ or the employer” for work-related injuries, and Michigan courts have consistently interpreted this provision in that manner. Welch, Worker’s Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice (3d ed), § 5.8, pp 5-11 to 5-14. Farrell v Dearborn Mfg Co, 416 Mich 267, 283; 330 NW2d 267 (1982); Pettaway v McConaghy, 367 Mich 651, 654-655; 116 NW2d 789 (1962).
*437Therefore, even if the Court accepts plaintiffs arguments that Wakim is not Bitar’s employer, the Court must still ask if he is a “natural person in the same employ” as Bitar. He clearly is. In his affidavit and deposition testimony, Wakim stated that he is the president of Beirut Bakery, Inc. Plaintiff does not dispute this. In fact, plaintiff’s reply brief admits that Wakim is a “worker — like anyone else.”1 Thus both Wakim and Bitar work for the same employer. The central holding of Pettaway, supra at 654, is that all natural persons who are carrying out the activities of the employer are included within the scope of subsection 827(1), regardless of what those activities may be.
In fact, Pettaway is similar to the present case. In Pettaway, the defendant was the sole shareholder and president of American Asbestos Products, Co. The plaintiff was injured at work, received worker’s compensation benefits, and then sued the defendant individually for negligence. This Court unanimously held that the suit was barred by the precursor of § 827.2
The lead opinion declines to address this argument, stating that it was not developed by the lower court or the parties. I do not believe that this is accurate. The argument is presented in the defendant’s brief to this Court, and is clearly presented by both amici curiae Michigan Defense Trial Counsel and Michigan Self-Insurers’ Association. Furthermore, this Court has the authority to decide cases on grounds not *438presented below. MCR 7.316(A)(3); Wayne Co v Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608, 620, n 9; 563 NW2d 674 (1997). While one may take issue with the effectiveness of defendant’s presentation of this argument to this Court, the fact that the amici curiae clearly present the argument certainly enables this Court to consider it. See Allen Park Village Council v Allen Park Village Clerk, 309 Mich 361, 363; 15 NW2d 670 (1944).
On July 31, 1997, this Court directed the parties to brief whether plaintiff’s suit was barred by § 827. 568 NW2d 87. When this order was entered, this Court was well aware that this issue had not been presented to the lower courts. Nevertheless, the order was entered. Now, after the parties have incurred the expense of researching and preparing the requested supplemental briefs, the lead opinion declines to consider the very issue for which it ordered supplemental briefs.
In Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 183; 521 NW2d 499 (1994), this Court stated “absent unusual circumstances, issues not raised at trial may not be raised on appeal.” This Court’s ordering of supplemental briefs certainly satisfies the unusual circumstance prerequisite. Under such circumstances, this Court should address § 827.
My reading of the record and the law suggests there are no relevant facts left to be developed. A remand would merely prolong litigation and potentially waste judicial resources.
Taylor, J., concurred with Weaver, J.

 At oral argument, plaintiff’s attorney again acknowledged that Wakim is the president of Beirut Bakery, Inc.

 The precursor of § 827 was previously codified at MCL 413.15; MSA 17.189. The language was not changed.