Court Opinion

ID: 9704944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:52:51.785488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.840101
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Jackson’s control of the Property. Furthermore, I believe that the result reached by the majority is extraordinarily bad public policy. This decision, which holds that a person who sells a parcel of land pursuant to a contract that explicitly transfers possession of the Property to the buyer and instructs the buyer to treat the Property as his own is somehow still responsible for conditions on that Property, extends liability to an uncomfortably attenuated degree. The majority focuses in part on the fact that Smith’s down payment constituted less than 17% of the property’s value. Initially, I observe that a 17% down payment is by no means abnormal. Moreover, if Smith’s down payment had constituted a greater percentage of the Property’s value, would the majority’s decision have been different? What if he had made a 25% down payment? 50%? 75%? There is no logical way to draw that line and I do not believe that it is a useful way to analyze these issues.
*1059Additionally, the majority quickly dispenses with the terms of the undisputedly valid, binding Contract governing the relationship between Jackson and Smith. Specifically, the majority concludes that “[t]he fact of a land-sale contract is not itself dispositive as to the vendor’s liability. The distinction lies in what the Contract provided versus what actually happened.” Op. p. 1055. The majority provides no authority in support of these statements and, indeed, I do not believe that the document itself can or should be so easily dismissed.
After the parties executed the Contract, Smith was to “treat [the Property] as his own,” subject only to his agreements to avoid committing waste and to receive permission from Jackson before constructing any improvements on the Property. Appellant’s App. p. 86-87. The latter two limitations served only to protect Jackson’s aforementioned security interest and do not, in and of themselves, suffice to reach a conclusion that Jackson controlled the Property. Thus, the fact that Smith sought Jackson’s approval before making improvements to the Property does not establish or create an inference that Jackson was exerting control over the Property-
Even more compelling, the Contract includes the following indemnification provisions:
1. [Smith] hereby assumes all risk and responsibility for accident, injury or damage to person and property arising from [Smith’s] use and control of the real estate....
2. Regardless of whether or not separate, several, joint or concurrent liability may be imposed upon [Jackson, Smith] shall indemnify and hold harmless [Jackson] from and against all damages, claims and liability arising from or connected with [Smith’s] control or use of the real estate, including, without limitation, any damage or injury to person or property.... If [Jackson] without fault shall become a party to litigation commenced ... against [Smith], then [Smith] shall indemnify and hold [Jackson] harmless....
Id. at 90-91. These provisions establish the parties’ clear intent that Smith would be in control of the Property and responsible for any damages stemming from his use thereof.
Furthermore, I cannot agree that evidence regarding the municipal code violation creates a genuine issue of fact. The City sent Jackson a notice regarding certain trees on the Property that needed to be trimmed near the end of 2004. The parties executed the contract on December 31, 2004, after which time Jackson sent the notice to Smith, which was the only possible course of action Jackson could have taken, inasmuch as he had no right to enter the Property without Smith’s permission and it was Smith’s responsibility to treat the Property as his own. That Smith “agreed,” appellant’s app. p. 134, to trim the trees in no way suggests that Jackson was exercising control over the Property. It merely reveals that Jackson transmitted the City’s notice to Smith, who agreed to fulfill his contractual obligation by maintaining the Property.
Moreover, I do not agree that Smith’s decision to retain Jackson’s property insurance policies and Jackson’s agreement to act as a conduit for Smith’s premium payments create an issue of fact regarding Jackson’s control of the Property. The undisputed evidence establishes that Smith decided to keep the policies in place after the execution of the Contract because Jackson was satisfied with the insurance coverage. There is no indication in the record that the policies were maintained so that Jackson could retain control over the *1060Property. There is not an iota of support for the majority’s conclusion that the parties’ insurance-related decisions create an issue of fact regarding Jackson’s control over the Property.
Finally, the majority notes the frequency with which Jackson drove past the Property, neglecting to mention the undisputed evidence in the record that the only reason Jackson drove by the Property was because his family owned the adjacent lot. There is not one bit of designated evidence supporting a conclusion that Jackson’s drives past the Property had anything whatsoever to do with his relationship to the Property. That the tree on the Property was visible to Jackson when he drove past is beside the point — the question is whether, having seen the tree, he had any legal obligation to remedy the situation. I do not believe that he did. Given that he had sold the Property, that Smith was to treat the Property as his own, that Smith had agreed to assume all risk of ownership, and that nothing in the record establishes that Jackson asserted any control over the Property, I conclude that there is no question of material fact regarding Jackson’s liability as an owner or mortgagee of the Property. Thus, I would affirm the trial court.