Court Opinion

ID: 9692643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:59:12.193445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:35.736646
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). In my view, the majority has misconstrued federal precedent and too broadly construed "the rule of exclusivity” applied by the merc in this case. In view of the fact that the majority has cited no federal precedent in support of its conclusion and the merc has provided no federal authority for its rule of exclusivity, I believe that a remand is necessary to assure that the merc’s test can in fact be harmonized with relevant federal authority. If the merc remand does so, it may affirm its original dismissal. I would retain jurisdiction pending this clarification.
The broad issue in this case is whether the employer, City of Southfield, committed an unfair labor practice under § 10(l)(e) of the pera, MCL 423.210(l)(e); MSA 17.455(10)(l)(e), by unilaterally transferring work from the Southfield Police Officer’s Association’s bargaining unit. However, this issue quickly devolves into whether the transfer of this work from the bargaining unit was a mandatory subject of bargaining under § 15 of the pera. MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). As the majority observes, unilateral action on the part of a public employer with respect to a mandatory subject of bargaining is deemed to be a refusal to bargain and hence an unfair labor practice under § 10(l)(e) of the pera.
Thus, the issue is simply whether the pera provision in question includes the transfer of bargaining unit work within the phrase "other terms *191and conditions of employment.”1 Our own precedent establishes that § 15 of the pera was adopted with the legislative intent that the merc and the Michigan courts would rely on the legal precedents developed under the nlra, § 8(d) in construing the duty to bargain in the public sector. My review of federal law indicates that the unilateral transfer of bargaining unit work, where motivated by economic considerations, is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the nlra.
I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that this case should be resolved by construing the exclusivity rule as permitting dismissal of an unfair labor practice petition whenever the work in dispute has been interchangeably performed by more than one bargaining unit. I do not read the merc opinion in this case, to require as a sine qua non that "the unit must establish that the work was performed exclusively by its unit members.” Ante, p 185. Nor can I agree, absent contrary legislative indication, that the potential for conflict between competing bargaining units in the public sector, furnishes a sufficient reason to construe the exclusivity rule as does the majority. If the assignment of a particular duty has become a term or *192condition of employment, the employer must bargain about its reassignment.
i
A
The question before the Court, the proper construction of the pera, § 15, is one of law. See Const 1963, art 6, § 28. It is the Court’s duty to set aside any agency decision which is in violation of the constitution or a statute. MCL 24.306(l)(a); MSA 3.560(206)(l)(a).
This is not to say that an agency’s interpretation of its enabling act is irrelevant. In explaining the role of a reviewing court under the comparable judicial review provision of the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 USC 706, the United States Supreme Court has written:
Although not determinative, the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to great deference, particularly when that interpretation has been followed consistently over a long period of time. See Piper v Chris-Craft Industries, Inc, 430 US 1 [97 S Ct 926; 51 L Ed 2d 124] (1977). [United States v Clark, 454 US 555, 565; 102 S Ct 805; 70 L Ed 2d 768 (1982).]
But the United States Supreme Court has also written:
On the other hand, the "deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.” American Ship Building Co v NLRB, 380 US 300, 318 [85 S Ct 955; 13 L Ed 2d 855] (1965). Accordingly, while reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible *193constructions of an agency’s enabling Act, NLRB v Iron Workers, [434 US 335, 350; 98 S Ct 651; 54 L Ed 2d 586 (1978)], they must not "rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.” NLRB v Brown, 380 US 278, 291-292 [85 S Ct 980; 13 L Ed 2d 839] (1965). See Chemical & Alkali Workers v Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 404 US 157, 166 [92 S Ct 383; 30 L Ed 2d 341] (1971). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 89, 97-98; 104 S Ct 439; 78 L Ed 2d 195 (1983).][2]
Longstanding and well-reasoned administrative precedent should be accorded great deference. Isolated agency decisions and even those longstanding agency decisions unsupported by persuasive reasoning should be accorded less deference. In the end, it is our constitutional and statutory duty to construe enabling acts — to discern the legislative intent underlying them. See, generally, U of M Regents v Employment Relations Comm, 389 Mich 96, 102-103; 204 NW2d 218 (1973). However, an indispensable tool in the Court’s fulfillment of that duty is a thoughtful and carefully reasoned agency decision. The task at hand is to discern the legisla*194tive purpose underlying the pera, § 15 and to give effect to that purpose.
B
We have addressed the legislative intent underlying § 15 of the pera in a number of previous decisions.
In Pontiac Police Officers Ass’n v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674; 246 NW2d 831 (1976), we held that the use of a civilian trial board in disciplinary proceedings was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In the lead opinion, Justice Levin explained:
It may, indeed, be desirable, because of the unique "para-military” nature of police departments, to guarantee some degree of civilian control, insulated from the uncertainties of the collective bargaining process.
If the Legislature deems it appropriate to redefine the scope of the collective bargaining obligation of the public employers generally or of particular public employers and the representatives of their employees to include "wages, hours, and some other terms and conditions of employment,” it may do so.
This Court cannot properly decide ad hoc that what has uniformly been regarded a "condition” of employment is not such a condition as applied to a particular public employer although it continues to be such a condition for other employers, public and private. By eschewing redefinition, we underscore the prerogative of the Legislature to give such consideration as it deems warranted to the claims of public employers that the scope of the collective bargaining obligation impinges unduly on their power to govern. [Id. at 684.]
In Central Michigan Univ Faculty Ass’n v Central Michigan Univ, 404 Mich 268; 273 NW2d 21 (1978), a majority of the Court adopted and ex*195tended Justice Levin’s broad reading of the phrase "other terms and conditions of employment.” In holding that the elements, procedures and criteria for faculty evaluation are mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Court explained:
The Legislature in adopting the very words of the nlra chose to adopt the industrial model for public sector collective bargaining. In decreeing that "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, the Legislature focused on the effect a particular aspect of the employment relationship has on the employees’ status, not the effect it has on the "business,” i.e., the effect on educational policies. The statutory test of the pera is whether the particular aspect of the employment relationship is a "term or condition of employment.” Under the act, a particular aspect of the employment relationship is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, even if it may be said to be only minimally a condition of employment. [Id. at 279-280. Emphasis added.]
We have acknowledged from the inception of the act that a broad construction of § 15 flows from the very language employed by the Legislature:
Section 15 of pera undoubtedly was patterned after § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (nlra). Both statutes use almost identical language in describing the duty to bargain. The decision by the Michigan Legislature to adopt the language of § 8(d) of the nlra is significant. Section 8(d) has been part of the nlra since the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947. The terms of § 8(d) have been litigated in numerous cases before the National Labor Relations Board (nlrb) and the Federal courts. Although we cannot state with certainty, it is probably safe to assume that the Michigan Legislature intentionally adopted § 15 pera in the form that it did with the expectation *196that merc and the Michigan courts would rely on the legal precedents developed under nlra, § 8(d) to the extent that they apply to public sector bargaining. Edwards, The emerging duty to bargain in the public sector, 71 Mich L Rev 885, 895 (1973). [Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 53; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). Accord Local 1277, Metropolitan Council No 23, AFSCME v Center Line, 414 Mich 642, 652-653; 327 NW2d 822 (1982); Bay City Ed Ass’n v Bay City Public Schools, 430 Mich 370, 375; 422 NW2d 504 (1988).]
We have also acknowledged that the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector may be limited by concerns about the effects of unionization on the political process. As explained in Bay City Ed Ass’n, 430 Mich 376:
[C]ertain subjects are within the scope of management prerogative, and the public employer, who remains politically accountable for such decisions, must not be severely restricted in its ability to function effectively.
Moreover, we have postulated that application of the peea may be affected by fiscal crisis and resulting potentials unique to the public sector. See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 428 Mich 79, 91; 404 NW2d 595 (1987) (lead opinion by Boyle, J.). However, there is no assertion in this case that the staffing change was the product of fiscal crisis, nor can we assume that the staffing of the auto pound would severely restrict the policy-making role of those who remain politically accountable for the decision.
Absent any indication that this issue severely restricts policy making, or entails a fiscal crisis, and in view of our prior rulings that § 15 of the pera was patterned after § 8(d) of the nlra, I *197believe that on remand the merc should look to federal private sector decisions for guidance.3
ii
I agree with the majority that the Fibreboard Paper Products Corp v NLRB, 379 US 203; 85 S Ct 398; 13 L Ed 2d 233 (1964); First Nat’l Maintenance Corp v NLRB, 452 US 666; 101 S Ct 2573; 69 L Ed 2d 318 (1981), is inapplicable to the question presented here. This dispute does not involve subcontracting.
Properly reviewed under § 8(d) of the nlra, this case would appear to fall within a line of authority involving three distinct, though interrelated categories of issues: (1) bargaining unit disputes, (2) jurisdictional disputes, and (3) work assignment disputes. On remand, the merc should examine all three of these categories to place this dispute in its proper context.
Bargaining unit disputes arise in the context of collective bargaining when one party, typically the employer, attempts to negotiate the scope of the type of employees to be covered by the agreement.4 As explained in Newspaper Printing Corp v NLRB, 625 F2d 956, 963 (CA 10, 1980):
*198Insistence on a modification in the scope of the bargaining unit, whether established by Board certification or voluntary recognition, is an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the Act. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v NLRB, 602 F2d 73, 76 [CA 4, 1979]; Hess Oil & Chemical Corp v NLRB, 415 F2d 440, 445 [CA 5, 1969], cert den 397 US 916; 90 S Ct 920; 25 L Ed 2d 97 [1970]; accord, Douds v International Longshoremen’s Association, 241 F2d 278, 282-283 [CA 2, 1957]. The reason is that § 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees and § 9(a) obligates the employer to recognize the union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit. Newport News, supra at 76. See also, NLRB v Southland Cork Co, 342 F2d 702, 706 [CA 4, 1965].
Accordingly, it has been said that "there [can] be no genuine bargaining as contemplated by the Statute until complete recognition [has] been granted as the Act requires,” McQuay-Norris Mfg Co v NLRB, 116 F2d 748, 751 [CA 7, 1940], cert den 313 US 565; 61 S Ct 843; 85 L Ed 1524 [1941], and that "[t]he parties cannot bargain meaningfully about wages or hours or conditions of employment unless they know the unit of bargaining.” Douds, supra at 282. Moreover it is equally well established that insistence to impasse upon a non-mandatory subject of bargaining violates § 8(a)(5). NLRB v Wooster Division of Borg- Warner Corp, [356 US 342, 349; 78 S Ct 718; 2 L Ed 2d 823 (1958)]. And the description or size of the bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v NLRB, supra at 76; National Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Co v NLRB, 565 F2d 1331, 1334 [CA 5, 1980],
It is important to note that, while the scope of the bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, neither is there a right of the employer to unilaterally implement changes in the *199bargaining unit. Any attempt to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice, Westvaco Corp, supra.
A jurisdictional dispute is a controversy as to whether certain work should be performed by workers in one bargaining unit or another.5 True jurisdictional disputes are limited to situations involving competing claims between rival groups of employees. See NLRB v Plasterers' Local Union No 79, 404 US 116, 134, n 30; 92 S Ct 360; 30 L Ed 2d 312 (1971). The United States Supreme Court has explained the operation of the nlra in jurisdictional disputes as follows:
While § 8(b)(4)(D) [29 USC 158(b)(4)(D)] makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike to get an employer to assign work to a particular group of employees rather than to another, the Act does not deal with the controversy anterior to a strike nor provide any machinery for resolving such a dispute absent a strike. The Act and its remedies for "jurisdictional” controversies of that nature come into play only by a strike or a threat of a strike. Such conduct gives the Board authority under § 10(k) [29 USC 160(k)] to resolve the dispute. [Carey v Westinghouse Corp, 375 US 261, 263-264; 84 S Ct 401; 11 L Ed 2d 320 (1964).]
The § 10(k) dispute resolution mechanism substitutes for collective bargaining and requires the board to decide jurisdictional disputes on the merits.6
A work assignment dispute is also a controversy *200as to whether certain work should be performed by a bargaining unit. However, work assignment disputes do not involve a neutral employer victimized by rival unions. They instead arise as bilateral disputes between one bargaining unit and the employer. Work assignment disputes therefore do not trigger proceedings under § 10(k) of the nlra. See Kaynard for and on Behalf of the NLRB v Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 306 F Supp 344, 347 (ED NY, 1969).7 As explained in Kaynard, 306 F Supp 347:
This is not to say that the presence of two unions is essential to the characterization of a dispute as jurisdictional under the statute. So, for example, the nlrb has termed jurisdictional a union demand for jobs which have been and are held by a group of employees belonging to no labor organization. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and its Local 639, 138 NLRB 689 (1962); International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1248, 151 NLRB 312, 317 (1965). And statutory protection has been afforded the perambulating employer whose transfers of its own non-union employees to changing construction sites creates problems as these men enter spheres of influence staked out by unions whose members have not theretofore held the specific jobs. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No 453, 158 NLRB 426 (1966) (jobs on new construction site); Local 87, International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, AFL-CIO, 163 NLRB [899] (1967) (same). These *201are cases where a union seeks to obtain jobs its members have not held.
The statutory language may not be extended to cover traditional forms of economic disputes between an employer and union attempting to retain specific jobs historically held by particular employees.
Application of federal work assignment dispute principles is somewhat clouded because federal bargaining unit certifications are frequently defined by job or craft descriptions. Disputes in federal practice therefore arise when an employer insists to impasse regarding an issue that it believes to be a work assignment issue and the union believes to be a bargaining unit dispute.8 Analysis of work assignment disputes under federal law is further clouded by the frequent practice of federal courts in referring to work assignment disputes as "jurisdictional,” even when there are no competing claims of rival unions and it is clear that the dispute is merely between a union and the employer.9 Nevertheless, what appears to have emerged as the general and uniform rule of the circuits is that work assignments are mandatory subjects of bargaining.10 Although the question has not yet reached the circuits, the board has further refined this rule by explaining that the transfer of bargaining unit work to nonunit employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining if the transfer is motivated by economic considerations such as *202wage rates or efficiency.11 No other exceptions exist to the federal rule that a work assignment dispute is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
I conclude that federal precedent is relevant and persuasive, directly contrary to the rule expressed by the majority, and that the merc has not articulated a basis to decline to follow federal precedent.
hi
While I do not believe it is necessary to endorse the Court of Appeals view that the pera should be construed more liberally than federal precedent, I of course do not believe that it is appropriate to resolve the remand under federal precedent alone. As the majority has emphasized, there are a number of previous decisions by the merc in this area. I agree that the consistency and duration of the merc’s adherence to the rule of exclusivity is a significant consideration. I do not believe that it is the sole consideration. Given that the merc rule deviates from federal precedent upon which the Legislature intended that we rely, I believe that overriding significance should be accorded the reasoning and policy discussions supporting the merc rule. Unfortunately none has been provided.
The merc opinion refers to the "sound” rationale of the Court of Appeals in Detroit Police & Sergeants Ass’n, unpublished opinion per curiam, decided February 22, 1982 (Docket No. 52931). It is indisputable that unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals have no precedential value. MCR 7.215(C)(1). Moreover, this unpublished opinion states no rationale for the rule of exclusivity. Indeed, it is not even clear that the Court of *203Appeals adopted a rule of exclusivity in Detroit Police & Sergeants Ass’n, because the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the merc for a determination of whether the work was "bargaining unit work,” despite recognizing that the investigative work in question was not the exclusive province of the union.
iv
Finally, we are left with the majority’s own rationale for the rule of exclusivity. Initially, the majority reasons:
The exclusivity rule is a reasoned interpretation of the pera and a sensible solution to what otherwise would be, for the employer, an insoluble "Catch-22” situation. The exclusivity requirement goes to the very heart of the parties’ bargain. It reinforces the bargaining process by recognizing that in the absence of a negotiated agreement which requires that work will be performed exclusively by one unit, employers and employee representatives have, in effect, agreed that the employer is free to assign work. Very significant are the ramifications for the public employer if the exclusivity rule were not given credence. In such an event, the public employer’s transfer of nonexclusive work would always be subject to challenge by whichever unit loses the work. In the present case, for example, public safety technicians, police officers, and command officers all may have a claim to the disputed work. It is not unrealistic to expect that the employer would become snared in inter-union rivalries. [Ante, pp 185-186.]
Even if I assume arguendo that this is a jurisdictional dispute between rival labor unions, I could not agree with a construction that would resolve the dispute by leaving the question of work assignment in the sole discretion of the employer. If the *204potential for conflicting demands is to preclude an issue from the category of mandatory subjects of bargaining, very little is left for the bargaining table. The required process under Act 312 anticipates disputes of this character, and the statute provides for intervention in the arbitration process. MCL 423.236; MSA 17.455(36).
I would not conclude that the Legislature did not intend to make this a controlling consideration in categorizing bargaining issues as mandatory or permissive, nor am I able to conclude without further clarification from the merc that the exclusivity rule is being applied to establish an irrebuttable presumption that what would otherwise apparently constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining under federal law is not an unfair labor practice under the pera.
The majority is correct in asserting that a sweeping categorization of this issue as a permissive subject of bargaining will preserve public resources and minimize "time-consuming and expensive challenges” to management decisions under Act 312. However, this is an argument for categorizing all bargaining issues as permissive subjects of bargaining — an argument that the Legislature has expressly rejected. Section 1 of Act 312 declares:
It is the public policy of this state that in public police and fire departments, where the right of employees to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes, and to that end the provisions of this act, providing for compulsory arbitration, shall be liberally construed. [MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31).]
*205I therefore find no support for the merc rule of exclusivity in the rationale of the majority.
v
Assuming that the rule of exclusivity is viable, the merc’s application of the rule in this case does not support the broad brush construction that the majority adopts. While I acknowledge that the decision of the hearing referee in this case and other merc opinions may be construed as the majority suggests, what the merc actually and carefully said in regard to this claim was:
[T]he mere fact that an employer assigns more of the work to one of [interchangeable units] should not give rise to a bargaining obligation. . . . However, . . . where there is a substantial change in the nature of the work assigned outside the [bargaining] unit, a duty to bargain may arise.
The board also observed that there was no testimony as to what the officer in charge of the auto pound did and concluded:
The mere fact that a job has been assigned to a member of another bargaining [unit] sometime in the past does not mean that the work is not bargaining unit work [citations omitted]. Where the work has been assigned exclusively to a unit member for a substantial period of time, and there is no agreement that said assignment is temporary, the Employer has an obligation to bargain before transferring the work.
The merc then concluded that the charging party had not met its burden of proof.
Thus, the exclusivity rule as conceived by the merc may be a method to determine functionally, *206by resort to the parties operating practices, the question whether the job in question was bargaining unit work. Where there is no definition in the certification or contract by which the charging party could claim exclusivity, the unions involved have had an opportunity to demand bargaining over these assignments in the past, and the work has been performed interchangeably by members of different units, none of which has a legal claim to the work by unit description, the exclusivity rule may operate to interpret the parties practices in order to determine whether the assignment in fact was bargaining unit work as understood by the parties.
I am unwilling to conclude that the merc has adopted a policy of slavishly applying the exclusivity rule to dismiss the legitimate charges of a refusal to bargain over work assignments. When a charging party has advanced evidence in support of these claims, the merc can, and I believe would, act to uphold the integrity of the collective bargaining process. The majority’s construction of the merc’s policy would create an irrebuttable presumption of law that unless all of the work at issue is performed exclusively by petitioner’s members, the work is not bargaining unit work. Such a construction would excuse the board from the legal obligation to factually determine what is and is not bargaining unit work and under what circumstances a transfer is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The board’s obligation to use its expertise to determine whether by custom or practice the relationship has created bargaining unit work, should not be so readily dismissed.
VI
CONCLUSION
Federal precedent in this area is relevant and *207persuasive. Work assignment is a mandatory subject of bargaining regardless of "exclusivity,” as the majority has interpreted it, if the transfer is motivated by economic considerations, such as wage rates or efficiency. However, given the merc’s expertise and its primary role in administering the pera, I would remand this case, while retaining jurisdiction, rather than construe the rule, as has the majority, in a manner that, in my view, is unwarranted.

 The full text of MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15) provides:
A public employer shall bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees as defined in section 11 and is authorized to make and enter into collective bargaining agreements with such representatives. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract, ordinance or resolution incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.

 In 5 Davis, Administrative Law (2d ed), § 29:16, p 403, it is further explained that
[deference for an agency’s interpretation of law is typically unmentioned in Supreme Court opinions in which the Court substitutes its interpretation for the agency’s. Indeed, such deference seems to be absent whenever the Court disagrees with the agency’s interpretation. "Deference” becomes a concept that is useful when the Court is in doubt about the interpretation but is satisfied to let the agency’s decision stand.
Cases in which the Supreme Court substitutes judgment are quite numerous — far more numerous than deference cases. The Court substitutes judgment in some cases even when the question of interpretation involves policymaking within the agency’s specialized area.

 It is clear from a comparison of § 8(d) of the nlea, that § 15 of the pera was patterned after federal prívate sector labor relations law. Under federal public sector law, there is a specific management rights provision reserving work assignments, contracting out, and the assignment of personnel. See 5 USC 7106(a)(1)(B). But see also United States Naval Ordinance Station, Louisville Kentucky v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 818 F2d 545 (CA 6, 1987) (certain qualifications of employees are negotiable even though they might affect on work assignments). Cf. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Services v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 844 F2d 1087 (CA 4, 1988) (the union’s proposal to require the department to make contracting-out decisions in accordance with Office of Management and Budget guidelines was not negotiable).

 See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v NLRB, 602 F2d 73 (CA 4, 1979); Newspaper Printing Corp v NLRB, 625 F2d 956 (CA 10, 1980), cert den 450 US 911 (1981); Westvaco Corp, 289 NLRB No 45; 131 LRRM 1044 (June 22, 1988).

 As the Court in Carey v Westinghouse Corp, 375 US 261, 266; 84 S Ct 401; 11 L Ed 2d 320 (1964), explained, another variety of “jurisdictional” dispute is one concerning which union should represent the employees. These are, perhaps, better characterized as "representational” disputes. See Metromedia, Inc, KMBC-TV v NLRB, 586 F2d 1182, 1189-1190 (CA 8, 1974).

 NLRB v Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 364 US 573; 81 S Ct 330; 51 L Ed 2d 302 (1961). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, § 8(b)(4) of the nlra in general is limited to *200protecting employers in the position of neutrals. Nat’l Woodwork Mfgrs Ass’n v NLRB, 386 US 612, 625; 87 S Ct 1250; 18 L Ed 2d 357 (1967).

 See also Cuneo v Local 472, Int’l Hod Carriers’ Bldg & Common Laborers’ Union of America, AFL-CIO, 175 F Supp 131, 137 (D NJ, 1959).

 See, e.g., The Idaho Statesman v NLRB, 267 US App DC 48; 836 F2d 1396 (1988); Newspaper Printing Corp v NLRB, 692 F2d 615 (CA 6, 1982); The Boeing Co v NLRB, 581 F2d 793 (CA 9, 1978); University of Chicago v NLRB, 514 F2d 942 (CA 7, 1975).

 See, e.g., The Idaho Statesman, n 8 supra.

 Indeed, the rule cuts across all ideological lines. Compare The Idaho Statesman, n 8 supra (opinion by D. H. Ginsburg, J.), with University of Chicago (opinion by Clark, J.).

 See, e.g., Connecticut Color, Inc, 288 NLRB No 81; 128 LRRM 1211 (April 28, 1988); Kohler Co, 292 NLRB No 70; 131 LRRM 1172 (January 27, 1989).