Court Opinion

ID: 9534680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:00.435186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:00.467128
License: Public Domain

*442Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I do not agree with the majority’s views on the current status of Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A. 2d 670 (1965). Nor do I believe that the defendant’s confession should have been admitted.
I
Since the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966), limiting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964), to its narrowest reading and holding that Escobedo need not be applied to trials prior to June 22, 1964, the date of that decision, there has been considerable speculation as to the effect of Johnson upon our holding in Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A. 2d 670 (1965). Complicating this situation is the fact that as of June 13, 1966, the date of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), all the rights granted by Negri are unquestionably incorporated in the law of this Commonwealth; indeed in light of Miranda, the rights of the accused during in-custody interrogation are even greater than those specified in Negri.
Since the trial in the instant case occurred in February 1965, seven months prior to Negri, and since the evidence fails to support the defendant’s claim that he requested counsel, the majority’s discussion of Negri is not necessary. See Commonwealth ex rel. Wilkes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 113, 116, 222 A. 2d 856, 858-59 (1966) ; Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A. 2d 291 (1966). Frankly, I suspect that all the speculation on this point is academic and would not find it necessary to express my views except for the fact that the majority today goes out of its way to overrule Negri, retrospectively no less.1
*443It must be remembered that neither Escobedo nor Miranda amended the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States: “We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 442. However, for pragmatic and understandable reasons the Supreme Court of the United States has held that “the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective” application of resurrected constitutional rights. In determining retrospectivity or non-retrospectivity the Court must “weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1738 (1965). Whether a particular right is denied retrospective application, however, “in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved” Johnson v. New Jersey, 728 U.S. at 728 (1966) (Emphasis supplied).
A study of Johnson leaves no doubt that Miranda and Escobedo were not applied retrospectively because of the Court’s fear that to do so would seriously disrupt the administration of criminal justice: “Law enforcement agencies fairly relied on these prior cases [of the Supreme Court of the United States], now no longer binding, in obtaining incriminating statements during the intervening years preceding Escobedo and Miranda.” Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. *444731.2 In Commonwealth v. Negri, supra, we held that Escobedo could not be limited to those cases where the defendant had made an actual request for counsel. Thus, at least from September 29, 1965, the date of Negri, law enforcement agencies in Pennsylvania were on notice as to the defendant’s in-custody rights.3 Thereafter there was no excuse for them not to fully comply with these rules nor is there any reason for us to admit a confession obtained in derogation thereof.
In Linldetter v. Walher, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961) (exclusionary rule of fourth amendment incorporated into fourteenth amendment), was not to be applied retrospectively. As the opinion freely admits this was a departure from the Court’s pri- or practice, as all previous constitutional decisions had, sub silentio, been given retrospective effect. Id. at 628, 85' S. Ct. at 1737. Also, because Mapp had, again sub silentio, been applied to non-final decisions, the impact of Linldetter was necessarily limited to those cases which had become final4 prior to June 19, 1961, the date of Mapp. Id. at 622, 85 S. Ct. at 1734. In Johnson, however, the Court held that the date of trial, rather than the date of finality, was the crucial one for determining the applicability of Escobedo or Miranda.
In any criminal trial after June 13, 1966, a confession, even if obtained five or more years ago, cannot *445be ■ admitted unless the law enforcement officials adhered to the guidelines set forth at length in Miranda. However, for a trial prior to that date we may utilize any rule ive desire unless the holding of Escobedo has been violated. Johnson, 86 S. Ct. at 1781. Since the essential rationale of these decisions seems to be deterrence of improper police practices I can see no sensible reason for making the trial date the determinative one.5 See Linkletter v. Walker, at 637, 85 S. Ct. at 1742. In my view the crucial date ought to be the date the confession was elicited and I would judge its admissibility according to the standards judicially announced at that time.
In summary, I would be willing to modify Negri to this extent: Any incriminating statement elicited before September 29, 1965, which was in conformity with Escobedo, would be admissible in any trial prior to June 13, 1966. However, any incriminating statement taken after Negri was decided would be inadmissible unless the warnings set forth therein were given.
II
My own review of the record convinces me that the defendant-appellant’s confession was improperly admitted. In addition, I believe that the majority’s approach is inconsistent with that mandated by the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
For the reasons discussed in Part I, I agree that the admissibility of Schmidt’s statements must be judged under the concept of voluntariness as that term has been defined in the coerced confession cases arising under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitu*446tion of the United States. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S. Ct. 735 (1961) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781 (1945) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 171, 220 A. 2d 628 (1966); Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A. 2d 727 (1962); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 367 Pa. 135, 79 A. 2d 193, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 954, 71 S. Ct. 1007 (1951). While neither Escobedo nor Miranda involved coerced confessions, we may not ignore the impact of these decisions upon the legal definition of voluntariness in this area. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966).
Originally coerced or involuntary confessions were excluded from state trials under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because of a fear that they were apt to be untrustworthy. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936). However, shortly after Brown, the Supreme Court of the United States began to abandon the trustworthy test in favor of one in which the central focus was on whether the confession resulted from “the accused’s Tree choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’ [Citations omitted.] The shift reflects recognition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 [1961], 81 S. Ct. 735, 739.”' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493 (1964); see generally id. at 4-8, 84 S. Ct. at 1491-94. As a result, “it is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession . . . and even though *447there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S. Ct. 1774,1780 (1964).
The responsibility for insuring the vitality of these fundamental principles lies with the appellate courts. In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 1344 (1963), and cases cited therein, the Supreme Court of the United States explained its obligation not to rubber stamp the findings of the court below, even if that court is the highest court of a state. As state appellate judges our responsibility can be no less, and like the Supreme Court of the United States “we cannot be precluded by the verdict of a jury from determining whether the circumstances under which the confession was made were such that its admission in evidence amounts to a denial of due process.” Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 550, 62 S. Ct. 1139, 1141 (1942), quoted in Haynes v. Washington, supra at 516, 83 S. Ct. at 1344. In my view the majority abdicates the essence of our responsibility in this area when it approves the introduction of the defendant’s statements on the basis of its “studied conclusion [of the manner in which the statements were obtained] that the question of the voluntariness . . . was for the jury to decide.”
I do not dispute the proposition that the jury’s findings, especially since they are in accord with the views of the hearing judge, are entitled to some weight. Nevertheless, there is a strong possibility that a jury, notwithstanding proper instructions, may not understand the policies behind excluding involuntary, but true, confessions and may thus utilize an involuntary confession in reaching its conclusion as to the defendant’s ultimate guilt. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386-89, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1786-87 (1964). This danger renders the practice, previously utilized in this Commonwealth, of submitting all challenged confessions to the jury, without a prior independent deter-*448ruination of their voluntariness by a judge, unconstitutional. Jackson v. Denno, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Corbin v. Myers, 419 Pa. 139, 213 A. 2d 356 (1965). Even though a separate hearing was held in this case, these same reasons preclude us from placing too much weight on the jury’s conclusion that the confession was voluntary. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer v. Cavell, 423 Pa. 42.5, 223 A. 2d 730 (1966).
My review of the undisputed evidence in this case precludes me from giving any weight to the majority’s conclusion, upon which it seems to rely heavily, that Schmidt effectively waived his right to the assistance of counsel. The only evidence that Schmidt waived his right to counsel is contained in the testimony of Detective Tercsak who stated that on the day of the defendant’s arrest he warned him of his constitutional right to remain silent and of his right to be represented by counsel. Significantly, while Detective Tercsak recorded on a “police action sheet” that he had informed the defendant of these rights, he did not record the fact that the defendant responded by saying that he did not want counsel at that time. If Tercsak’s purpose was to make a record of his action in case of a future challenge, as it evidently was, I find it inconceivable that he did not also record the denial.6 Moreover, the interrogation took place prior to the decision in Escobedo and it was admitted by the police at the hearing that at the time of the instant interrogation they did not as a general rule inform suspects of their right to representation. In response to a question as to why he made an exception in this case, Tercsak replied “because they were juveniles.” I fail to see how Tercsak, or this Court, can conclude that while *449the defendant was so young that he needed a special warning, nonetheless, he was mature enough to make an intelligent and knowing decision to decline the assistance of counsel.7 “[C]ourts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and not presume acquiescence in their loss.” Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 69, 202 A. 2d 303, 305 (1964); accord, Commonwealth ex rel. O’Loch v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 204 A. 2d 439 (1964) ; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
The record also discloses that, except for one-half hour visit with a priest, the defendant was held incommunicado from the time of his arrest, 10:30 A.M., Monday, June 15, 1964, until after his confession Friday evening. During this period he was subjected to intensive interrogation by eight teams of interrogators consisting of two men each. While there is some dispute as to the exact number of hours spent in interrogation, it appears to have been in the neighborhood of forty. Defendant’s mother was denied permission to see him although she was in the police station and made a specific request. Moreover, it is undisputed that Schmidt knew about his mother’s presence, although there is some dispute as to whether the police threatened to detain her if he did not co-operate. In *450these circumstances the mere fact that he was warned of his right to silence is not persuasive. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948); see Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966).
During this interrogation the defendant consistently denied his participation in the burglary resulting in the murder, for which he now stands convicted, until after his accomplices had repeated in his presence their confessions implicating him. If it were clear that this, and not police pressures, were the precipitating force in eliciting the confession, it would be admissible. But it is impossible to determine at this date to what extent the incommunicado interrogation had taken its toll. If at the time of the confession Schmidt’s will was “overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534. The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) (Emphasis supplied). Thus, although I have doubts and difficulties, I believe the admission of this confession violates due process. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602, 68 S. Ct. 302, 305 (1948) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
I dissent.

 We are, of course, only free to apply our solution in those cases tried prior to June 13, 1066, now pending on direct appeal, *443and in an occasional habeas corpus petition. Moreover, I trust the police have been complying with Negri since the date of that decision.

 But see Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 131, 213 A. 2d 670, 677 (1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion) ; Comment, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 832 (1966).

 Negri was decided after the Third Circuit had held that Eseoiedo could not be limited to those situations where the suspect made an actual request for counsel. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F. 2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965), decided May 20, 1965, rehearing denied Oct. 13, 1965. One could argue that May 20 should be the applicable date, but I believe that Negri, not Russo, finally determined the guidelines in this Commonwealth for the period preceding Miranda. Cf. State v. Coleman,, 46 N.J. 30-38, 214 A. 2d 393, 400-04 (1965).

 For the Court’s definition of finality, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 n.5 (1965).

 While the Court applied the new rules to Miranda and the three defendants in the companion cases, by denying certiorari on the other direct appeals pending on June 13, 1966, it refused to apply them to numerous defendants similarly situated.

 There was considerable dispute as to tbe accuracy of these police action sheets. On this point the testimony of Detective Tercsak and his fellow officers was in conflict.

 One of the basic impetuses behind the decision in Miranda was to prevent tbe determination of whether the defendant waived a basic constitutional right from degenerating into a swearing contest between the accused and his interrogators. Cf. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943). Although the issue of an effective waiver may still arise, it ought to arise with less frequency. In any event the state has, as it always has had, a heavy burden to shoulder if it desires to prove a waiver. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. at 1628.