Court Opinion

ID: 9526109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:12:29.055762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:25.826824
License: Public Domain

Dissent.
Mote, J.
Having carefully studied appellant’s brief filed in this'appeal, and having reached the conclusion that prima fade error has not-been, established, I cannot lend my approval to a reversal of this case.
It is' a well established law that the responsibility for weighing the evidence is within the exclusive province of the trial court and not the reviewing court. The evidence in the case, as reported by appellant’s Concise Statement of the Record, is replete with' facts and legitimate inferences Which support the finding and judgment of the trial court, despite the fact that we aré considering only appellant’s version of the same.
In finding the allegations of the defendant to be true and awarding him an absolute divorce, the trial court obviously drew legitimate inferences as to the immoral conduct of the appellant in violation of her marital vows, which could include adultery, notwithstanding the statement in the majority opinion that appellant was not guilty of such, and displayed no abuse of discretion in doing so.
Having established the miscreant behavior of, the-appellant,-we must consider the real question at issue: Does appellant’s brief present a prima fade case that the' trial court abused its discretionary power by awarding to the appellee nearly all the property accumulated by the said- parties during their seventeen years of married life?
In the case of Gray v. Miller (1952), 122 Ind. App. 581, 106 N. E. 2d 709, this Court, after, a thorough review of the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court on the subject, construing the provisions of *102Chapter 120 of the Acts of 1949, §3-1218, Burns’ 1946 Replacement (1951 Supp.), stated:
“While the foregoing statute is primarily, an alimony statute, the legislative intent is apparent to adopt the policy.of recognizing the case law which grants broad powers to a divorce court to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties and order the transfer of real estate between the parties in proper cases.”
A somewhat analogous award to the one found in the case at bar in that of Proctor v. Proctor (1955), 125 Ind. App. 692, 125 N. E. 2d 443, in which the judgment granted to appellee an absolute divorce, the care and custody of the minor children of the parties, and all the property, both real and personal, of the parties, including the home which was owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties.
In another appeal before this Court, Wallace v. Wallace (1953), 123 Ind. App. 454, 111 N. E. 2d 90, in which cross actions for divorce were involved, the trial court found, in favor of the appellee-husband and the reviewing court held that the trial court had authority and properly exercised it in directing transfer of property held as tenants by the entireties to the husband. In this case the reviewing court also stated:
. . While it is well recognized that- a court which grants a husband a divorce for misconduct-of the wife may grant .her alimony, it is not bound to do so. . . See also Proctor v. Proctor, supra.
•If appellant's brief is to make an apparent or prima facie showing of reversible error, it is necessary for ■appellant to demonstrate to this' Court sufficient evidence to establish the facts, which she relies upon for reversible error until contradicted or overcome by other evidence. In view of --the broad discretionary *103power afforded the trial court and the evidence presented in appellant’s brief, it is my opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, ánd the appellant has failed to establish a -prima facie showing of reversible error.
It should also be noted that in the case of Sheldmyer v. Bias (1942), 112 Ind. App. 522, 45 N. E. 2d 347, this .Court declared that where the record is simple and uncomplicated, and the claimed errors are of such a nature that the court can safely pass upon them without the aid of a brief from appellee, the-Appellate Court owes a duty to the trial court to consider the merits of the appeal.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Nora — Reported in 205 N. E. 2d 555.