Court Opinion

ID: 9707251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:06:38.980342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:29.888218
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOODWARD dissenting. I respectfully dissent. In order to subject the respondent to involuntarily admission, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person who is mentally ill and who, because of her illness, is unable to provide for her basic physical needs, so as to guard herself from serious harm. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91V2, pars. 3-808, 1-119 (now 405 ILCS 5/3-808, 1-119 (West 1992)).) The reviewing court will normally uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that respondent may engage in dangerous conduct. (In re Williams (1987), 151 Ill. App. 3d 911, 920.) The trial court’s decision that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. In re Long (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 334. The majority’s attempt to rationalize the respondent’s behavior is simply not convincing. John LaRue, a registered nurse who worked on the respondent’s ward, opined that she could not guard herself against harm. He recounted some of respondent’s persistent delusions, namely, that she was diabetic, though medical records showed otherwise, and that she was pregnant with three fetuses, despite negative pregnancy tests. The respondent had attempted to leave the hospital on numerous occasions, becoming angry and sometimes violent when restrained. Daniel Figiel, a clinical social worker, examined respondent on July 31, 1992, and August 3, 1992, and filed a detailed report of his findings. Mr. Figiel testified that respondent suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, which manifests itself in marked delusions and confused thinking. His examination revealed a complex system of delusional thought processes. During one examination, the respondent said that she believed a being referred to as “Hail Mary” has been with her on several occasions. She claimed to have been Hail Mary on one occasion. Additionally, the respondent believed that she was under continual observation by “a camera with eyes.” She stated to Mr. Figiel that her brain is “picked at” by the Singer hospital staff. Importantly, Mr. Figiel observed that the respondent was disoriented as to time and place. Further, she told him that she was not ready to leave Singer and had no place to live. Mr. Figiel found that the respondent had no ability to make realistic plans for herself. In his opinion, if she were allowed to leave the hospital, respondent’s delusions would render her confused to the point where “she would not be able to function on a daily basis.” The trial court, upon observing the respondent at the hearing, stated: “It is clear that she is suffering from a very active mental illness. The microphone couldn’t even be pointed towards her because she felt that the electricity from it was going to affect her mentally. The speakers in the quiet room add static, according to her, which affected her mentally and other patients.” The testimony of Mr. LaRue and Mr. Figiel and the trial court’s observations of the respondent’s behavior provide ample support for the ruling that her behavior was so delusional that she could not take care of herself outside of the hospital setting. The majority emphasizes the trial court’s view that, if the respondent acted upon her delusions regarding diabetes and pregnancy, then she would put her safety at risk. Admittedly, acting on these delusions would probably not pose much risk to the respondent. Nevertheless, this distorted thinking does demonstrate her significant disorientation and serves to support the trial court’s decision that she is unable to care for herself. Also, the majority stresses that the evidence did not show respondent had no place to temporarily stay upon release. Yet the respondent stated to Mr. Figiel that she was not ready to leave Singer because she had no place to live. This is evidence of her lack of housing upon release. Given that testimony, it was incumbent upon the respondent to come forward with evidence that she did have a place to live. In conclusion, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates the following. At the time of the hearing, the respondent was floridly psychotic. She was delusional prior to the hearing and at the hearing. The testimony of a nurse, who worked on respondent’s ward, and the clinical social worker, who evaluated her mental condition, left no doubt that the respondent’s paranoid schizophrenia substantially interfered with her ability to address the problems of daily life. Having observed the respondent’s delusional behavior at the hearing and having listened to the testimony, the trial court’s decision that the respondent, due to her active psychosis, was a danger to herself is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.