Court Opinion

ID: 9840286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 19:05:40.118796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:01.328949
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/15/23 County of Los Angeles v. Heape CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,                                          B315372

        Respondent,                                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
        v.                                                      20CWCS09157)

SHAWN HEAPE,

        Appellant;

NORA NELLIE HEAPE,

        Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Frank W. Chen, Judge. Dismissed in part and
affirmed in part.
      Arnold Freedland for Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Gregory D. Brown, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy
Attorney General for Respondent County of Los Angeles.
      No appearance for Respondent Nora Nellie Heape.

              __________________________________

      This appeal concerns a form voluntary declaration of
parentage (Parentage Declaration) that appellant Shawn Heape
(Shawn) signed in 2007 after his ex-wife Nora Heape (Nora) gave
birth to a son, C.H. In 2020, the Los Angeles County Child
Support Services Department (the Department) filed suit to
obtain an order requiring Shawn to pay child support for C.H.
Shawn responded by filing an application to set aside the
Parentage Declaration he signed years earlier. The trial court
denied Shawn’s application and we consider whether Shawn’s
request to set the Parentage Declaration aside was timely,
whether the declaration is otherwise void, and whether Shawn
properly appealed an order denying a request to join C.H.’s
unnamed biological father to the action.

                         I. BACKGROUND
      In September 2020, the Department filed a complaint to
compel Shawn to begin paying child support for C.H. (The
application sought child support on a going-forward basis; it did
not attempt to compel Shawn to pay child support for years prior
to the filing of the complaint.) The Department’s complaint
alleged Shawn and Nora had signed a Parentage Declaration that
was forwarded to the Department.

                               2
       A.    Shawn Applies to Rescind the Parentage Declaration
       In April 2021, Shawn filed a form application to rescind his
Parentage Declaration. He identified the following reasons for
his request: fraud; material mistake of fact; his own mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect; and failure of the hospital to
explain the form it gave him to sign. In support of the
application, Shawn submitted a memorandum of points and
authorities arguing he was entitled to a court-ordered DNA test
and to an order setting aside the Parentage Declaration if the
DNA test proved he was not C.H.’s father. He also submitted a
declaration and attached a barely-legible copy of April 2021 DNA
test results that he asserted established he was not C.H.’s father.
       Shawn’s declaration stated he and Nora were married and
later divorced in 2005. They had two children together, both of
whom are past the age of majority and who now live with Shawn
in Lake County, California. Nora called Shawn in early 2007,
informed him she was pregnant, and said she wanted to come to
Lake County because she did not want her mother to know about
the pregnancy. Shawn rented a home for Nora and their
children, rented a car for Nora, and helped pay her bills. Nora
called him for assistance in getting to the hospital to deliver the
baby. Shawn picked her up and drove her some distance, but he
did not accompany her into the hospital.
       According to Shawn’s declaration, Nora asked him to take
her home from the hospital after C.H. was born. He agreed, and
when he arrived at the hospital, he was given paperwork to sign
in order for Nora to leave. No one explained the paperwork. If he
had known one of the papers asserted he was C.H.’s father, he
would not have signed it.

                                3
       Shawn further declares that Nora moved back to Los
Angeles with all three children within six months after C.H.’s
birth. Shawn subsequently heard she was telling people he was
C.H.’s father. He and Nora obtained a DNA test that revealed
Shawn was not C.H.’s father. Nora told Shawn that C.H.’s father
was a member of a local gang who had been stabbed to death
before C.H. was born. Shawn saw C.H. over the years when
visiting his children in Los Angeles. When Shawn took his two
children out, Nora would not allow C.H. to accompany them.
Shawn and Nora were in court in 2013 or 2014 regarding support
for Nora. Nora listed C.H. on her court papers, but she later
agreed Shawn was not responsible for C.H.

       B.    The Department Opposes Recission
       The Department opposed Shawn’s request to rescind the
Parentage Declaration, arguing Shawn did not meet the
requirements for recission and his attempt to challenge the
declaration was untimely and unsupported.
       The Department attached Shawn’s Parentage Declaration
to its response (only the signed page of the form declaration,
which references at least one other page of information, was
attached). The declaration names Shawn as the father of C.H.
and includes a signature in a box for the father’s signature. The
following language appears above the father’s signature box: “I
declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State
of California that I am the biological father of the child named on
this declaration and that the information I have provided is true
and correct. I have read and understand the rights and
responsibilities described on the back of this form. I understand
that by signing this form I am consenting to the establishment of

                                 4
paternity, thereby waiving those rights. I am assuming all of the
rights and responsibilities as the biological father of this child. I
wish to be named as the father on the child’s birth certificate. [¶]
I have been orally informed of my rights and responsibilities.”

      C.     The Trial Court Denies the Application to Rescind the
             Parentage Declaration
       The trial court held a hearing on Shawn’s application to
rescind the Parentage Declaration. During the hearing, the trial
court asked Shawn if he recognized the signature on the
Parentage Declaration as his own signature. Shawn was unable
to locate a copy of the document during the hearing, but he did
not dispute the signature was his.
       After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court
denied Shawn’s application and prepared a statement of decision.
In the two paragraphs that follow, we recount the particulars.
       The Parentage Declaration Shawn and Nora signed, which
was filed with the Department, has the same force and effect as a
court-issued judgment of parentage. The provisions of the Family
Code that became operative on January 1, 2020, apply to Shawn’s
April 2021 request to set aside the Parentage Declaration. Since
the set aside request was not filed within two years of the
effective date of the Parentage Declaration, Shawn’s request was
barred under current Family Code section 7576.1 The Parentage

1
       Subdivision (a) of this statute provides that after a 60-day
period during which a Parentage Declaration can be rescinded, a
person who signed a Parentage Declaration may commence a
proceeding to challenge the declaration on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact within two years of the filing
of the declaration with the Department of Child Support

                                  5
Declaration creates a paternity judgment that must be set aside
before a court may order genetic testing. A prior judgment of
parentage is determinative, even if subsequent testing
establishes a person is not a biological parent.
       Contrary to Shawn’s contentions, since-superseded versions
of pertinent Family Code statutes do not apply and would not
require the court to order a DNA test anyway. The only
circumstance in which the two-year statute of limitations does
not apply under the current law is where the Parentage
Declaration is void under section 7573.5, but Shawn did not
argue any circumstance described in that statute applied in his
case. Nor did Shawn argue the Parentage Declaration was
deficient on its face or that there were procedural defects in its
signing or filing that rendered it void. There is no authority
supporting Shawn’s argument that the hospital had a duty to
explain the documents he signed. It is not appropriate, as a court
of equity, to set aside the Parentage Declaration because the
Legislature enacted the current Family Code sections as a
comprehensive statutory scheme with strict statutory time
limits—and it is not the court’s role to evaluate the policy
judgments made by the Legislature.

Services. Subdivision (b) of the statute states that the limitations
period specified in subdivision (a) of the statute “shall not apply if
the voluntary declaration of parentage is void under Section
7573.5 [enumerating six circumstances that, if true at the time of
signing, establish a declaration is void].”
      Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Family Code.

                                  6
      D.     Subsequent Proceedings
      Shawn filed a notice of appeal on September 14, 2021,
identifying the order being appealed as the “Denial of
Respondent’s Request to Set Aside/Cancel a Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity Dated March 4, 2007.”
      Later the same month, Shawn filed a request for an order
joining C.H. and his biological father to the action. The
Department opposed the request. It argued joinder would be
improper because the only person who could properly be joined to
the action was Nora. The trial court denied Shawn’s request for
joinder at a hearing in November 2021 (and in a subsequently
issued “Order After Hearing” filed on December 22, 2021). The
court found Family Code section 17404, subdivision (a) prohibits
joinder and the biological father had not been identified and was
not indispensable. Shawn did not notice an appeal from the trial
court denial of his joinder request.

                          II. DISCUSSION
       Shawn’s arguments urging reversal of the trial court’s
orders are unpersuasive. His application to rescind the
Parentage Declaration is governed by the current version of the
relevant Family Code sections, and those sections impose a two-
year statute of limitations on such requests—rendering his
efforts to set aside the Parentage Declaration untimely by more
than a decade. Shawn’s attempt to avoid the two-year limitations
period by arguing the Parentage Declaration was void at the time
of signing, which is a question governed by the Family Code
statutes in effect at that time, is unavailing. Finally, we have no
jurisdiction to decide Shawn’s challenge to the trial court’s denial

                                 7
of his request to join C.H.’s biological father to the Department’s
action because Shawn did not notice an appeal from that ruling.

      A.     Parentage Declarations and Statutory Application
             Rules
             1.    Purpose of parentage declarations
       Section 7570, which discusses legislative findings and
declarations related to Parentage Declarations, states: “There is
a compelling state interest in establishing parentage for all
children. Establishing parentage is the first step toward a child
support award, which, in turn, provides children with equal
rights and access to benefits, including, but not limited to, social
security, health insurance, survivors’ benefits, military benefits,
and inheritance rights.” (§ 7570, subd. (a)(1).) Section 7570
further pronounces that, “[a] simple administrative system
allowing for establishment of voluntary parentage will result in a
significant increase in the ease of establishing parentage, a
significant increase in parentage establishment, an increase in
the number of children who have greater access to child support
and other benefits, and a significant decrease in the time and
money required to establish parentage due to the removal of the
need for a lengthy and expensive court process to determine and
establish parentage and is in the public interest.” (§ 7570, subd.
(a)(2).)

             2.     Applicability of amendments to the Family Code
       Section 4 establishes the rules for when amendments to the
Family Code apply to orders and events that occur before and
after the effective date of such amendments. The rules are
important in this appeal because many years passed between the

                                 8
date on which Shawn signed the Parentage Declaration and the
date on which the Department commenced this action—in the
interim, the pertinent statutes were repealed and reenacted with
significant revisions.
       Pursuant to section 4, a new (or amended) law generally
“applies on the operative date to all matters governed by the new
law, regardless of whether an event occurred or circumstance
existed before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not
limited to, commencement of a proceeding, making of an order, or
taking of an action.” (§ 4, subd. (c).) But “[i]f an order is made
before the operative date, or an action on an order is taken before
the operative date, the validity of the order or action is governed
by the old law [the law in effect before the operative date of the
new law] and not by the new law.” (§ 4, subd. (e).) “[P]roceedings
after the operative date to modify an order made, or alter a
course of action commenced, before the operative date” are
permissible “to the extent proceedings for modification of an
order or alteration of a course of action of that type are otherwise
provided in the new law.” (Ibid.) In addition, “[i]f a party shows,
and the court determines, that application of a particular
provision of the new law or of the old law in the manner required
by this section or by the new law would substantially interfere
with the effective conduct of the proceedings or the rights of the
parties or other interested persons in connection with an event
that occurred or circumstance that existed before the operative
date, the court may, notwithstanding this section or the new law,
apply either the new law or the old law to the extent reasonably
necessary to mitigate the substantial interference.” (§ 4, subd.
(h).)

                                 9
       Shawn signed the Parentage Declaration in 2007. After
that (but before the Department filed the current action in
September 2020), there were various amendments to the Family
Code. As pertinent here, the Uniform Parentage Act, enacted in
2018, repealed the relevant, then-existing Family Code sections
and replaced them with substantially amended versions that
would become operative on January 1, 2020. (Stats. 2018, ch. 876
[A.B. 2684], §§ 28-38.) Under both the current and prior versions
of section 7573, a completed Parentage Declaration that has been
filed with the Department has the same force and effect as a
judgment for paternity or parentage. (§ 7573, subd. (d);
former § 7573.) Because Shawn’s Parentage Declaration qualifies
as an order made before the operative date of the Uniform
Parentage Act, its validity is governed by the prior versions of the
pertinent Family Code sections. (§ 4, subd. (e).) Shawn’s petition
to rescind the Parentage Declaration, on the other hand, is
governed by the current versions of the statute because it was
filed, heard, and decided after the Uniform Parentage Act’s
operative date. (§ 4, subd. (c), (e).)

      B.     Shawn’s Request to Rescind the Parentage
             Declaration Is Untimely
       As we summarized in the margin earlier, under current law
a Parentage Declaration may be rescinded by filing a form with
the Department within 60 days of the latest date of execution of
the declaration. (§ 7575.) A signatory may also challenge the
declaration in court on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact within two years of the date the declaration is
filed with the Department. (§ 7576.) The only identified
exceptions to these limitations periods are for Parentage

                                10
Declarations that are void under section 7573.5.2 (§ 7576, subd.
(b).)
       The Parentage Declaration submitted by the Department
reflects Shawn signed the document on March 4, 2007, and
parentage was established on March 19 of the same year. Shawn
does not contend his Parentage Declaration is void for any of the
reasons enumerated in section 7573.5. (He does argue the
declaration is void for other reasons, which are unpersuasive for
reasons we will next discuss.) Shawn’s deadline to challenge the
Parentage Declaration was thus in March 2009, and his petition
is untimely.
       In rejoinder, Shawn asserts that if current law applies, his
statute of limitations to challenge the Parentage Declaration
should have begun to run on the statute’s operative date, not the
operative date of the Parentage Declaration. Shawn does not
adequately develop the argument and, regardless, the plain
language of the statute contradicts his assertion. If the
Legislature had intended the statute of limitations for Parentage

2
       Pursuant to section 7573.5, a Parentage Declaration is void
when, at the time the declaration is signed, (1) the child has a
presumed parent other than the woman who gave birth and the
person seeking to establish parentage, (2) a court has entered a
judgment of parentage, (3) another person has signed a voluntary
declaration of parentage, (4) the child has a parent under section
7613 [conception using a semen or ova donor] or 7962
[reproduction via gestational carriers] other than the signatories,
(5) the person seeking to establish parentage is a sperm or ova
donor, or (6) the person seeking to establish parentage asserts
they are a parent under Section 7613 and the child was not
conceived through assisted reproduction. (§ 7573.5, subd. (a).)

                                11
Declarations signed prior to January 1, 2020, to run from the
statute’s operative date, it would and could have so stated.3
       Shawn also protests the trial court’s refusal to admit his
DNA test results. However, the refusal to admit the test results
is irrelevant to our determination. Shawn cites to no authority,
nor are we aware of any, that provides the Parentage Declaration
would be void even if there is evidence Shawn is not C.H.’s
biological father.

      C.     Shawn Has Not Established the Parentage
             Declaration Is Void
             1.    Pertinent statutory provisions
       Shawn devotes much of his appellate briefing to arguing
various asserted defects or deficiencies in his Parentage
Declaration render it void. As we have already explained, the
versions of the relevant statutes that were in place when Shawn
signed the Parentage Declaration govern its validity. We
summarize those statutes below.
       Former section 7571 provided “upon the event of a live
birth, prior to an unmarried mother leaving any hospital, the
person responsible for registering live births . . . shall provide to

3
       For the first time in his reply brief, Shawn asserts former
versions of the Family Code statutes should apply to his request
to set aside the Parentage Declaration under section 4,
subdivision (h)—i.e., he argues application of current law would
be inequitable. We will not address this argument, however,
because it was not raised in Shawn’s opening brief. (E.g., People
v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 [“It is axiomatic that
arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be
entertained because of the unfairness to the other party”].)

                                  12
the natural mother and shall attempt to provide, at the place of
birth, to the man identified by the natural mother as the natural
father, a voluntary declaration of paternity together with the
written materials described in Section 7572. Staff in the hospital
shall witness the signatures of parents signing a voluntary
declaration of paternity and shall forward the signed declaration
to the Department of Child Support Services within 20 days of
the date the declaration was signed. A copy of the declaration
shall be made available to each of the attesting parents.”
(Former Fam. Code § 7571, subd. (a) [effective October 12, 2001,
to December 31, 2012].)
       Former section 7572 identified the information that was to
be contained in the written materials provided to unmarried
parents, including information that an alleged father has the
right to have the issue of paternity decided by a court, and that
the father would voluntarily waive that right by signing the
Parentage Declaration. (Former Fam. Code § 7572, subd. (b)
[effective January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2009].)
       Former Family Code section 7573 provided that, subject to
certain exceptions not relevant here, “a completed voluntary
declaration of paternity, as described in Section 7574, that has
been filed with the [Department] shall establish the paternity of
a child and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for
paternity issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
voluntary declaration of paternity shall be recognized as a basis
for the establishment of an order for child custody, visitation, or
child support.” (Former Fam. Code, § 7573 [effective September
28, 2000, to December 31, 2011].)
       Former section 7574 provided a form Parentage
Declaration was required to include, among other things, (1) “[a]

                                13
statement by the mother that she has read and understands the
written materials described in Section 7572, that the man who
has signed the voluntary declaration of paternity is the only
possible father, and that she consents to the establishment of
paternity by signing the voluntary declaration of paternity,” and
(2) “[a] statement by the father that he has read and understands
the written materials described in Section 7572, that he
understands that by signing the voluntary declaration of
paternity he is waiving his rights as described in the written
materials, that he is the biological father of the child, and that he
consents to the establishment of paternity by signing the
voluntary declaration of paternity.” (Former Fam. Code, § 7574,
subd. (b) [effective September 28, 2000, to December 31, 2018].)

             2.    Shawn’s voidness arguments are unpersuasive
       The form Parentage Declaration submitted by the
Department is a single page entitled “Declaration of Paternity.”
The form instructs “PAGE 1 AND 2” should be read before
signing it. It contains fields for information regarding C.H.’s
birth, and for identifying information for Shawn and Nora. It
contains a declaration signed by Nora asserting she is “the
unmarried natural mother” of C.H. and the man signing the form
“is the only possible father of this child.” It also contains a
declaration signed by Shawn asserting that he is C.H.’s biological
father, that he read and understood his rights and
responsibilities, and that he consented to the establishment of
paternity and waived those rights. The form also appears to have
been duly signed by a representative of the hospital. The form
bears a seal, and reflects parentage was established on March 19,
2007. The form, which appears to satisfy the statutory

                                 14
requirements in place when Shawn signed the Parentage
Declaration, is facially valid.
       Shawn argues the Parentage Declaration is nevertheless
void for four reasons: (1) he was not a person who was permitted
to sign a Parentage Declaration as provided in current sections
7571 and 7573; (2) he received no advice at the hospital regarding
the effect of the Parentage Declaration and the hospital staff was
not competent to give him advice regarding the document; (3)
Nora lied when signing the Parentage Declaration because she
knew Shawn was not C.H.’s only possible father; and (4) the
Parentage Declaration provided by the Department was only one
page rather than two, and did not have the written materials
identified in section 7572 attached. All of these contentions lack
merit.
       First, the current versions of sections 7571 and 7573 do not
control the validity of the Parentage Declaration, which was
signed in 2007 and is thus governed by the prior version of the
statute. (§ 4, subd. (e).) Unlike the current statute, the prior
version did not specifically enumerate the individuals, other than
an unmarried mother, who are permitted to sign a Parentage
Declaration. This same point about the law that applies
similarly renders Shawn’s reliance on H.S. v. Superior Court
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1502 inapposite—a case he cites for the
proposition that a Parentage Declaration is void if a party who
signed it is not statutorily permitted to do so. In addition, that
case is also unavailing on its own terms. The opinion held the
specific Parentage Declaration before it void, but as relevant
here, it explains Parentage Declarations executed by persons
(married mothers) who were not permitted to sign Parentage
Declarations are merely voidable (not void). (Id. at 1508.)

                                15
       Second, Shawn’s contention that the Parentage Declaration
is void because hospital staff was not competent to advise him
and did not in fact advise him is not supported by the statute.
Former section 7571 required hospital staff to provide the
Parentage Declaration “to the natural mother” and “attempt to
provide . . . [the Parentage Declaration] to the man identified by
the natural mother as the natural father.” It did not require
hospital staff to advise Shawn in any way. Because hospital staff
was not statutorily required to provide him with any advice, their
competence to do so is irrelevant.
       Third, Shawn’s contention that Nora lied by signing the
Parentage Declaration and thereby falsely asserted only Shawn
could be C.H.’s natural father does not void the Parentage
Declaration. Shawn cites no statutory or other authority, and we
are aware of none, that provides an untruthful statement on the
Parentage Declaration alone voids the document.
       Fourth, Shawn’s argument that the Parentage Declaration
submitted by the Department includes only the actual signature
page and not the additional information that was required to be
provided to the signor does not render it void. By signing the
Parentage Declaration, Shawn declared under penalty of perjury
that he was C.H,’s biological father, had read and understood his
rights and responsibilities, was consenting to establishment of
paternity and waiving his rights, and was assuming the rights
and responsibilities as C.H.’s biological father. The Parentage
Declaration was filed with the Department, as demonstrated by
the stamp on the form and the fact that the Department
produced the document in the trial court. (See Kevin Q. v.
Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1136 [“The certified copy
of [a Parentage Declaration] leaves no doubt it was submitted to

                               16
the [the Department]”]; In re Raphael P. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
716, 738 [Evidence Code section 664’s presumption that “‘official
duty has been regularly performed’” includes proper filing of a
Parentage Declaration].) That the Department did not produce,
when filing the declaration in court for this action, the additional
documentation that was to be provided to Shawn when he was
given the Parentage Declaration does not negate the force and
effect of the signed document.
       Moreover, Shawn’s declaration does not assert he was only
provided with the page he signed and not provided with the
appropriate explanatory paperwork, or that he read the
explanatory information and it somehow fell short of meeting its
informational obligations. He merely states that no one
explained the form to him. That is insufficient to render the
document he signed void.

      D.     Joinder
      Shawn argues the trial court erred by refusing to join
C.H.’s unidentified (and, according to Shawn, deceased),
biological father as a party. The Order After Hearing denying
Shawn’s request for joinder was entered in December 2021.
Shawn, however, did not file a notice of appeal from the order
denying his request for joinder at any time, much less within 180
days of that order. That is the outer limit for a timely notice of
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).)
      “[T]he filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
prerequisite. ‘Unless the notice is actually or constructively filed
within the appropriate filing period, an appellate court is without
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the appeal and must
dismiss the appeal.’ [Citations.]” (Silverbrand v. County of Los

                                 17
Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113.) We accordingly lack
jurisdiction to review Shawn’s contentions regarding the request
for joinder.

                           DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed insofar as it challenges the trial
court’s denial of Shawn’s request for joinder. In all other
respects, the court’s order is affirmed. The Department shall
recover its costs on appeal.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            BAKER, J.

We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      KIM, J.

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