Court Opinion

ID: 9905246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 22:08:23.226322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:53.467754
License: Public Domain

11/28/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                          Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023

                   STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHN BUTLER

              Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
    No. W2100939, W2100942, C2104512, C1204513     Paula L. Skahan, Judge
                   ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-00566-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

The Appellant, John Butler, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated assault and
one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and was placed on judicial
diversion with a probationary period of six years. The State subsequently alleged that the
Appellant violated his probation, and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the
Appellant’s diversion and entered judgments of conviction imposing an effective sentence
of three years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the Appellant contends the trial
court erred in revoking the Appellant’s diversion and in ordering confinement. Upon our
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER,
J., joined. ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., filed a concurring opinion.

Phyllis Aluko, District Public Defender, and Barry W. Kuhn (on appeal) and Nick Cloud
(at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the Appellant, John Butler, IV.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney
General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Theresa McCusker, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

       By criminal information submitted in September 2021, the Appellant was charged
with three counts of aggravated assault committed against three different individuals on
May 6 and May 7, 2020, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon
against a group of individuals on May 6, 2020. The record does not provide an account of
the facts supporting the charges; however, at the revocation hearing, the trial court recalled
that the Appellant “had gone into a store, gotten a beer out of the cooler, [and] attempted
to steal it.” When the store clerk told him he could not have the beer unless he paid for it,
the Appellant “got angry, walked out of the store, got a black assault rifle out of the back
passenger seat . . . . [w]alked back into the store, pointed the rifle at him and said[,] ‘you
don’t know who I am. I got you.’” Several months later, the Appellant was at an event
with his brother, who had gotten drunk, and was asked to leave. The Appellant returned
with his brother, brandished guns at the people at the event, and fought with security. On
December 1, 2021, the Appellant entered a guilty plea to each criminal information and
was granted a judicial diversion with a probationary sentence of six years.

        On August 16, 2022, a probation violation report was filed alleging various
“technical only” violations committed by the Appellant. The report alleged that on August
2, 2022, the Appellant was referred to Harbor House for drug treatment for twenty-eight
days and left the treatment facility without successfully completing treatment in violation
of Rule 7. The report further alleged the Appellant failed to report and did not follow-up
on the following special conditions ordered by the court: (1) referral to the Community
Resource Center to address educational and residential needs by February 15, 2022; (2)
referral to the Cognitive Based Intervention Program by June 15, 2022; and (3) referral to
the forensic social worker for assessment on aggression, monthly drug screens, court cost
installments, $10 per month by court order and restitution, all in violation of Rule 10. The
report alleged the Appellant did not report to have a sanction put into place for his failure
to attend the above resource programs. Additionally, the Appellant was scheduled for
intake with Innovative Counseling for Drug Offender School on June 29, 2022, and he
failed to attend the appointment. The appointment was rescheduled to July 13, 2022, and
the Appellant again failed to attend. The Appellant also failed to report to have a sanction
put into place for this violation. Although the Appellant had repeatedly failed to report or
maintain contact with his probation officer, the report did not allege that the Appellant had
absconded.

        The report listed three prior sanctions imposed by community supervision: (1) on
December 9, 2021, the Appellant was sanctioned to see a forensic social worker due to
testing positive for cocaine; (2) on June 21, 2022, the Appellant was sanctioned to a curfew
for ninety days for failing to report as instructed; and (3) on August 8, 2022, the Appellant
was sanctioned to see a forensic social worker for testing positive for cocaine. The affidavit
in support of the probation violation report was filed on September 30, 2022, and a warrant
for the Appellant was issued the same day.

       A revocation hearing was held on March 27, 2023, and D’Angelo Griffin, the
Appellant’s probation officer, testified consistently with the allegations in the violation
report. Griffin testified that the Appellant had been placed on judicial diversion on
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December 1, 2021, with an end date of December 1, 2027. Griffin had been supervising
the Appellant for the entirety of his probation, and the Appellant had not complied with the
terms and conditions of his probation. The Appellant was on diversionary probation and
the juvenile sex offender registry, for which he was required to abide by the specialized
conditions for juvenile sex offenders. Although the circumstances of the juvenile offenses
are not entirely clear from the record, the probation violation report notes that the Appellant
had been placed on the juvenile sex offender registry and classified as “a violent juvenile
sex offender[.]” The Appellant originally met his juvenile sex offender registry
requirements by reporting to the police; however, once he was placed on probation in this
case, the Appellant’s registry requirements under the juvenile sex offender registry were
transferred to Griffin.

        Griffin explained that the Appellant’s failure to report to the probation and parole
office had been a consistent problem. The Appellant was required to report to Griffin at
the office once a month, and Griffin was also required to conduct monthly home or “in the
field” visits. The last time Griffin saw the Appellant was “around August” at the
Appellant’s uncle’s house. Because the Appellant “kept bouncing around from different
houses,” Griffin changed the Appellant’s residential status to homeless and placed him on
GPS monitoring on August 9, 2022. When the GPS device did not work correctly, Griffin
required the Appellant to report to the office immediately to fix the device and further
advised the Appellant that he would be required to report on Tuesdays and Fridays to have
the device switched out. The Appellant never reported as directed, and August 9, 2022,
was the last day Griffin saw the Appellant. Griffin initiated the paperwork for the instant
violation report on August 16, 2022, and the Appellant was arrested on February 23, 2023,
five months after the violation of probation warrant was issued.

       Griffin testified that participating in monthly, random drug screens was also one of
the Appellant’s special conditions required from the court. Because the Appellant was not
reporting, the monthly drug screens were incomplete. Griffin tried to accommodate the
Appellant by conducting the drug screening where the Appellant was located; however, the
Appellant was “hard to find” which prevented compliance with this condition. Under
Griffin’s supervision, the Appellant completed a single drug screen conducted at another
person’s home and tested positive for THC and cocaine. Based on the positive test, Griffin
recommended the Appellant enroll in Harbor House, a twenty-eight-day rehabilitation
program. Griffin was subsequently notified by an administrator at Harbor House that the
Appellant enrolled in but did not complete the program.

       Another court ordered condition required the Appellant to report to various
community resource programs. Griffin referred the Appellant to the community resource
center for educational and residential needs, and the Appellant was given a certain date to
report. Griffin said the Appellant never reported as required. Griffin also referred the
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Appellant to a cognitive-based intervention program for behavioral issues, and the
Appellant missed the first appointment. When Griffin obtained approval for the Appellant
to have a second appointment, the Appellant did not report again. Finally, Griffin said the
Appellant had multiple sex offender registry violations for not registering. The Appellant
was required “to register quarterly, and he [had] to register every month.” The Appellant
failed to do so. Asked if the Appellant provided an explanation for his failure to comply,
Griffin said, “He would always be nonchalant or it would seem like he would -- maybe
was, like, on a drug or he’s just always didn’t seem like he was present.” Griffin opined
that the Appellant was on drugs during their interaction, which was later confirmed by the
positive drug test.

        On cross-examination, Griffin agreed that he noted in the violation report that the
above violations were technical-only. He also agreed that this was not “an absconding
situation[.]” He explained, however, that “he [had not] done another violation because he
had not been supervising [the Appellant] because [the Appellant has] been in warrant
status. But technically [the Appellant] did abscond.” Regardless, Griffin agreed the
Appellant had no new arrests to his knowledge, there was no use of methamphetamine
involved in this case, and this was not a graduated zero-tolerance violation.

       At the close of the proof, defense counsel argued against revoking the Appellant’s
diversion and probation because the violation report was based solely on technical
violations. Relying on State v. Munn, No. W2022-00675-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL
2607676, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2023), defense counsel noted that “the
question becomes if [the failure to report for seven months] amounts to absconding . . .
which is defined as to go into a clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt.”
Defense counsel maintained that the Appellant did not leave the jurisdiction or attempt to
avoid process. Moreover, each time the probation officer searched for the Appellant,
including when a warrant was issued, the Appellant was eventually located. Defense
counsel stated that failure to report for eight months did not constitute absconding. Finally,
citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(e), defense counsel argued that for a
technical violation of failure to report the trial court was limited to imposing a penalty of
no more than fifteen days confinement because this was the Appellant’s first revocation
proceeding. As the Appellant had established jail credit for the maximum amount the trial
court could impose for the revocation, defense counsel moved the trial court to release the
Appellant and place him back on probation.

      After further discussion, the trial court terminated the Appellant’s diversion and
revoked his probation reasoning as follows:

              I think very clearly [the Appellant] has violated the terms and
       conditions of his diversion, in that he tested positive for drugs; that he was
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      referred to Harbor House for drug treatment and left the treatment facility
      without successfully completing the drug treatment; that he was not reporting
      to his probation officer; that after being originally placed on GPS monitoring,
      he was taken off that; that he was going -- he did not have -- apparently he
      was classified as homeless because he was going from place to place. He did
      not have any kind of permanent address and so he’s placed on GPS. He was
      not using it correctly[,] so he was advised to come into the probation office,
      which he did not do. So[,] they lost track of him and never came back. If
      that’s not absconding I understand the -- this Court of Criminal Appeals gave
      a definition in Judge Lammey’s case from last week. I didn’t bring it back
      out here with me, but to be absent from reporting since last August and failing
      to cooperate in any way, shape, or form appears to me to be absconding. Just
      failing to cooperate at all.
              ....

              I did give [the Appellant] an opportunity to keep both of these cases
      off of his record, placed him on diversion for six years, was very concerned
      about [the Appellant’s] attitude and attempted to deal with his attitude by
      placing serious conditions on him. Referral to community resource center to
      address educational and residential needs since I believe he had a ninth[-
      ]grade education, referral to forensic social worker to assess for aggression.
      Everything I could think of, monthly drug screens and basically [the
      Appellant] refused to cooperate with anything, continued to use drugs, was
      sent to get treatment for this drug issue, went into the program and left
      without making use of that program, refused to make use of any of the other
      programs. So basically[,] once he stopped living in his apartment on North
      Evergreen and went from house to house and his probation officer put him
      back on the GPS program, he would not cooperate with that GPS monitoring
      system, refused to go back into his probation office. And essentially in this
      [c]ourt’s opinion, absconded from supervision. I do find he has absconded.
      I do find -- you want to call this technical because he has not picked up a new
      case, I am finding that I am – by certainly a preponderance of the evidence
      he has violated terms and conditions of diversion.

       On the same day as the hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating the
Appellant’s diversion and judgments reflecting imposition of a concurrent term of three
years in confinement for the aggravated assault convictions and one year for the reckless
endangerment with a deadly weapon conviction. The Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal, and this case is now properly before this court for review.

                                      ANALYSIS
                                           -5-
       The Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking the order of diversion and
sentencing him to serve time in the penitentiary because of a lack of proof that he had
absconded from supervision out of the jurisdiction. The State responds that the trial court
made sufficient findings regarding the existence of each specific probation violation that
properly supported the Appellant’s diversion revocation, and that even if there was error,
it was ultimately harmless as the non-technical violation of the Appellant’s was supported
by the record. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

        Appellate courts review a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s probationary
sentence under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness, “so
long as the trial court places sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the
revocation and the consequence on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759
(Tenn. 2022). “Reviewing courts will find an abuse of discretion only when the trial court
applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that causes an
injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008).
When determining whether a violation of diversionary probation has occurred, “the trial
court should follow the same procedures as those used for ordinary probation revocations.”
Alder v. State, 108 S.W.3d 263, 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (citing State v. Johnson, 15
S.W.3d 515, 519 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)). Probation revocation involves “two distinct
discretionary decisions, both of which must be reviewed and addressed on appeal.”
Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 753, 757-58. After finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
a defendant violated the terms of their probation, a trial court “must determine (1) whether
to revoke probation, and (2) the appropriate consequence to impose upon revocation.” Id.
at 753.

       Although not addressed by the parties, the pivotal question in the wake of the
passage of the Public Safety Act of 2016 (PSA), and its subsequent amendments, is the law
in effect at the time of the Appellant’s offenses of conviction. Prior to the enactment of
the PSA, trial courts “possess[ed] the power, at any time within the maximum time that
was directed and ordered by the court for the suspension, after proceeding as provided in
§ 40-35-311, to revoke and annul the suspension.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310(a). The
procedure governing a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation or suspended
sentence provided:

       (d) The trial judge may enter judgment upon the question of the charges as
       the trial judge may deem right and proper under the evidence adduced before
       the trial judge.

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       (e)(1) If the trial judge finds that the defendant has violated the conditions of
       probation and suspension by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court
       shall have the right by order duly entered upon the minutes of the court to
       revoke the probation and suspension of sentence, and:

              (A) Cause the defendant to commence the execution of the
              judgment as originally entered, or otherwise, in accordance
              with §40-35-310; or

              (B) Resentence the defendant for the remainder of the
              unexpired term to any community[-]based alternative to
              incarceration authorized by chapter 36 of this title; provided,
              that the violation of probation and suspension is a technical one
              and does not involve the commission of a new offense.

Id. § 40-35-311(d), (e)(1)(A)-(B).

       The PSA became law on January 1, 2017, and added, as relevant here, Title 40,
Chapter 28 which created a graduated system of sanctions for violating a sentence
involving release into the community to be imposed under the authority of the Tennessee
Department of Probation and Parole. See 2016 Pub. Acts, c. 906. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-311 was not materially altered by the PSA at that time other than
to permit the trial court to “consider the results of an offender’s validated risk and needs
assessment in determining the appropriate disposition of the probation violation charge and
requesting an updated validated risk and needs assessment be performed.” Effective July
1, 2021, the legislature amended section 40-35-311, see 2021 Pub. Acts, c. 409, §§ 24, 25,
which now provides, in pertinent part:

       (d)(1) The trial judge may enter judgment upon the question of the charges
       as the trial judge may deem right and proper under the evidence adduced
       before the trial judge. If the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the
       evidence that the defendant has violated the conditions of probation and
       suspension of sentence, then the court may revoke the defendant’s probation
       and suspension of sentence, in full or in part, pursuant to § 40-35-310. The
       court may sentence the defendant to a sentence of probation for the remainder
       of the unexpired term.

       (2) Notwithstanding subdivision (d)(1), the trial judge shall not revoke a
       defendant’s probation and suspension of sentence for a felony offense,
       whether temporarily under subdivision (e)(1) or otherwise, based upon one
       (1) instance of technical violation or violations.
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      (3) Deleted by 2022 Pub.Acts, c. 981, § 3, eff. July 1, 2022.

      (e)(1) If the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
      defendant has violated the conditions of probation and suspension of
      sentence for a felony offense by engaging in conduct that is a second or
      subsequent instance of a technical violation pursuant to subdivision (d)(2),
      then the trial judge may temporarily revoke the probation and suspension of
      sentence by an order duly entered upon the minutes of the court, and:

             (A) Impose a term of incarceration not to exceed:

                    (i) Fifteen (15) days for a first revocation;

                    (ii) Thirty (30) days for a second revocation;

                    (iii) Ninety (90) days for a third revocation; or

                    (iv) The remainder of the sentence for a fourth or
                    subsequent revocation; or

             (B) Resentence the defendant for the remainder of the
             unexpired term to a sentence of probation that includes the
             condition of participating in a community-based alternative to
             incarceration as provided in § 40-35-104(c)(9); provided, that
             the violation of probation and suspension is a technical
             violation and does not involve the commission of a new
             offense.
             ....
      (g) As used in this section, “technical violation” means an act that violates
      the terms or conditions of probation but does not constitute a new felony,
      new Class A misdemeanor, zero tolerance violation as defined by the
      department of correction community supervision sanction matrix,
      absconding, or contacting the defendant’s victim in violation of a condition
      of probation.

       As a general rule, a criminal offender must be sentenced pursuant to the statute in
effect at the time of the offense. State v. Tolle, 591 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tenn. 2019); State
v. Saint, 284 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (“[T]he sentencing law in effect at
the time of the offenses [is] the proper framework for establishing the defendant’s
sentences.”); State v. Mason, No. E2018-01310-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3992473, at *4
                                           -8-
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2019) (concluding that the defendant had waived any claim
regarding the absence of graduated sanctions at his revocation hearing and noting that the
statute relied upon was inapplicable because the defendant’s offenses were committed
before the effective date of the statute). This is because “[w]hen the trial court revokes a
defendant’s probation, any action it takes thereafter relates back to the sentence previously
imposed.” Tolle, 591 S.W.3d at 546. The Appellant committed the offenses in this case
in 2020, therefore, we apply the law in effect prior to the amendments to Tennessee Code
Annotated 40-35-311 subsections (d) and (e), and the creation of subsection (g).

       On appeal, as he did before the trial court, the Appellant relies largely upon State v.
Munn, No. W2022-00675-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2607676, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar.
23, 2023), as grounds for relief. The probation violation report in Munn alleged that the
defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation on the following grounds: (1)
that defendant had “open warrants” issued for various felony offenses; (2) that defendant
failed to obtain lawful employment; (3) that defendant failed to report to his probation
officer; (4) that defendant failed to provide a current and valid address; and (5) that
defendant had contact with one of the victims of the aggravated assault. Munn, 2023 WL
2607676, at *1.

        The violation report did not formally allege that the defendant had absconded. The
proof at the hearing established that the defendant had reported as instructed until he was
arrested in June 2021. The probation officer testified that she had had no contact with the
defendant after April 2021, despite attempts to contact him through home visits and by
phone in June. During questioning by defense counsel, the prosecutor objected stating that
the questioning was “outside the bounds of absconsion.” An extensive discussion between
the trial court and defense counsel then ensued regarding the scope and propriety of defense
counsel’s questions. The trial court then limited defense counsel to presenting only proof
that the defendant did not abscond. At the close of the inquiry, this court observed that
“[b]efore inquiring whether [d]efendant chose to testify or present any evidence, the trial
court found simply, ‘by a preponderance of the evidence [the defendant] has violated
probation.’” Munn, 2023 WL 2607676, at *3.

        This court reversed the trial court’s revocation of the defendant’s sentence in Munn
on multiple grounds. First, we concluded that the trial court did not make sufficient
findings to support the revocation of the defendant’s probation or provide its reasoning for
imposing incarceration in accordance with Dagnan. Second, we declined de novo review
upon concluding that due process principles required a new hearing because the trial court
relied on absconding as a ground to revoke the defendant’s probation without notice to the
defendant of that allegation in the probation violation warrant. Third, we concluded that
the trial court compounded the due process violation by severely limiting defense counsel’s
cross-examination of the probation officer to matters related only to absconding. Id. In so
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holding, we rejected the State’s argument that the allegations within the violation report
that the defendant “failed to report and failed to provide a current and valid address served
as the bases for the violation, which the court ‘collectively’ labeled ‘absconding[.]’”

       Significantly, relying on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(g), we
reasoned that absconding is specifically excluded from technical violations such as failure
to report, and that nothing in the probation violation report met the definition of abscond,
which is “‘[t]o go in a clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the courts, or to lie
concealed, in order to avoid their process. To hide, conceal, or absent oneself
clandestinely, with the intent to avoid legal process.’” Munn, 2023 WL 2607676, at *3.
Accordingly, Munn stands for the proposition that, under the most recent version of the
PSA, which distinguishes between technical and nontechnical violations, the State is
required to formally allege in a violation report or warrant that a probationer has absconded
before an evidentiary hearing is held in order to provide notice of the claim.

       While we agree with the essence of Munn, we conclude that it is distinguishable.
As previously discussed, the law in effect at the time of a defendant’s offense of conviction
controls. Although an offense date was not included in Munn, our decision in that case
rested, in part, on application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(g). Under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(g), notice of being formally charged with
absconding, a non-technical revocable violation, as opposed to failure to report, a technical
nonrevocable violation, is particularly significant because it dictates the type and degree of
penalty the trial court may impose. A defendant may choose not to contest a failure to
report and choose to accept the relatively minor, statutorily required penalty of fifteen days
incarceration for a first revocation under the (e)(1)(A) graduated sanctions matrix.
However, if the trial court sua sponte elevates the failure to report to an absconding charge,
a defendant is not on notice of the array of harsher penalties attendant to such a non-
technical violation. None of the concerns in Munn regarding the State’s failure to give
formal written notice that the charge the Appellant was facing for violating probation was
absconding are implicated here because the Appellant’s offense of conviction date
preceded Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-311(e)(1)(A) and (g).

       Upon our review, the proof at the revocation hearing established that for a period of
seven months, the Appellant failed to report to his probation officer, failed to undergo
monthly drug screens, and failed to report to or comply with any of the community resource
programs as directed by the court. Unlike the trial court in Munn, the trial court here made
extensive findings in support of its determination that the Appellant had absconded. The
court detailed the Appellant’s prior sanctions by community supervision “in that he tested
positive for drugs” and further observed that the Appellant “was referred to Harbor House
for drug treatment and left the treatment facility without successfully completing the drug
treatment; that he was not reporting to his probation officer; that after being originally
                                            - 10 -
placed on GPS monitoring, he was taken off that . . . [and] classified as homeless[.]” The
Appellant did not have a permanent address and could not operate the GPS monitoring
system correctly. When the Appellant was advised to come into the probation office to
correct the issue with the GPS, he never came back.

        The court acknowledged the probation officer’s obligation to classify the
Appellant’s conduct as “technical” because he had not committed a new offense, however,
it disagreed and determined that in “failing to cooperate in any way, shape, or form,” the
Appellant had absconded. The record supports the determination of the trial court. See
e.g. State v. Taylor, No. M2017-01526-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1768731, at *2 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2018) (affirming revocation of probation based on defendant’s failure
to twice report as directed and probation officer’s testimony he initiated absconder
proceeding after learning the defendant no longer lived at her reported address). The
“primary goal of probation . . . is rehabilitation of the defendant[,]” see State v. Burdin,
924 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tenn. 1996), which becomes impossible to do when a defendant wholly
fails to comply with any of the reporting conditions of probation. In other words, a
probation officer cannot supervise a probationer who refuses to report. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Appellant’s diversionary probation and
imposing a sentence of three years in confinement.

                                     CONCLUSION

         Based upon the above reasoning and authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

                                     ___________________________________________
                                       CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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