Court Opinion

ID: 9905784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 15:05:57.864729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.930124
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1628-21
                                                                   A-1629-21

NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.B. and D.H.,

     Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF S.B.,
a Minor.
____________________________

                   Argued September 18, 2023 – Decided November 30, 2023

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
                   Docket No. FN-16-0160-20.

                   Ted G. Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
                   cause for appellant D.B. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
              Defender, attorney; Ted G. Mitchell, of counsel and on
              the briefs).

              Beth Anne Hahn, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
              for appellant D.H. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
              Defender, attorney; Beth Anne Hahn, on the briefs).

              Michelle J. McBrian, Deputy Attorney General, argued
              the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
              General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney
              General, of counsel; John Joseph Lafferty, IV, Deputy
              Attorney General, on the brief).

              Cory Hadley Cassar, Designated Counsel, argued the
              cause for minor S.B. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
              Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis
              Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Cory
              Hadley Cassar, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

        In these consolidated appeals, defendants D.B. 1 (mother) and D.H. (father)

appeal from the August 31, 2021, Family Part order finding they abused or

neglected their then four-year-old daughter, S.B., within the meaning of

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), by using narcotics while caring for S.B. and allowing S.B.

to have access to drug paraphernalia, including empty glassine packets of

suspected heroin and capped and uncapped syringes. The August 31 order was

1
    We use initials to protect the privacy of the family. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

                                                                              A-1628-21
                                         2
perfected for appeal by a December 21, 2021, order terminating the litigation.

We affirm.

                                       I.

      On June 28, 2020, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency

(Division) executed an emergency removal of S.B., pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.29 and -8.30, following a police referral prompted by defendants' arrests. A

fact-finding hearing was conducted over three days in June and August 2021,

during which several witnesses testified for the Division and documentary

exhibits were admitted into evidence. Defendants also testified on their own

behalf.

      At the hearing, Paterson Police Officer Randy Nouh, a seven-and-one-half

year veteran, testified that before 7:30 a.m. on June 28, 2020, he and two other

officers responded to D.B.'s apartment based on a 911 call reporting a

"[d]omestic assault."      As Nouh approached the front door, he heard

"[s]creaming, yelling, a lot of noise in the background, [and] a little girl's voice."

After Nouh "knocked on the door" to announce the officers' presence, a child,

later identified as S.B., "opened the door." Through the open door, Nouh

observed an individual, later identified as D.H., "[standing] in the

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                                            3
background . . . staring into thin air." Nouh and the other officers "entered the

apartment" to investigate the reported domestic dispute.

      Once inside, Nouh observed that the apartment "was in disarray." He

recounted that "empty heroin glassin[e] packets" were "everywhere" and within

S.B.'s reach. Nouh also observed that D.H.'s "eyes were bloodshot red," "his

clothing was disheveled," and "he did[ not] appear to be in his right state of

mind." While speaking to D.H., D.H. told Nouh that "he needed help" and

volunteered that he "was under the influence" of "heroin and . . . crack" and that

he had been "up all night" using the illicit substances. Next, Nouh spoke to

D.B., who had initially locked herself inside the bathroom. After exiting the

bathroom, D.B. "admitted to using heroin" "earlier in the morning" and admitted

to taking unprescribed "Xanax." In addition, both defendants presented needle

exchange program cards to Nouh, demonstrating their ability to obtain sterile

syringes "[f]or their heroin addiction," and Nouh observed "capped and

uncapped" "syringes throughout the home."

      During cross-examination, Nouh admitted that he did not "collect th[e]

heroin packages" to preserve as evidence, "test the packages for residue of

heroin or other drugs," or "take picture[s] of [the glassines and syringes]." Nouh

also acknowledged that he did not have a warrant to enter and search D.B.'s

                                                                            A-1628-21
                                        4
apartment, that he "[was] not given . . . consent by an adult to enter," and that

he did not "provide [D.B. or D.H.] with a Miranda [2] warning" before speaking

with them. However, Nouh maintained that "[he] did not interrogate [D.B. or

D.H.]" and that defendants voluntarily "made admissions" about their drug use.

       After obtaining supervisory approval, both defendants were arrested for

child endangerment and a referral was made to the Division. According to

Nouh, D.H. was transported to St. Joseph's University Medical Center (St.

Joseph's) after he requested "medical attention." Although D.B. initially refused

medical treatment, she was also transported to St. Joseph's "for a pre[-]existing

injury on her right wrist which appeared . . . infected."

       According to D.B.'s certified medical records from St. Joseph's, which

were admitted into evidence without objection, D.B. "report[ed] shooting [four]

bags of heroin around 7:30 [a.m.] to 8[:00 a.m.]" the day of her arrest and

"not[ed] that it[ was] . . . normal to her." D.H.'s certified medical records were

also admitted into evidence, "[s]ubject to the [c]ourt excluding any embedded

hearsay."3 According to his medical records, D.H. "admit[ted] to using cocaine

2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
   Although the judge sustained D.H.'s objection to the admission of any
embedded hearsay contained in the medical records, D.B. did not join D.H.'s
objection.
                                                                            A-1628-21
                                        5
[the night before], [two] bags of IV heroin a few hours ago, and drinking

[alcohol] overnight."

      After receiving the police referral, Zulay Beltran, a Division supervisor,

responded to the Paterson police station and interviewed D.B. Beltran testified

that D.B. made several admissions to her regarding illicit drug use. Beltran also

testified that D.B. "appeared . . . very drowsy" and "under the influence," and

recalled that D.B. "would lose her balance" when she was standing.

      Jenny Sierra, a Division caseworker, accompanied Beltran to the police

station and interviewed S.B. 4 S.B. told Sierra that she lived with both parents

and police had come to her house earlier that day because "her mother had a

temper tantrum . . . [after] her father accused her mother of taking his stuff."

When Sierra asked "what [S.B.] meant by stuff," S.B. "indicated that it was

mom['s] and dad's medicine," which they took to "ma[k]e them feel better." S.B.

described the medicine as "white stuff" that her parents put "in a needle" which

they "would then put . . . in their arm[s]." S.B. stated that she "would observe

both [parents] taking the medicine together," and that the "medicine" would

make them "very tired and sleepy." S.B. also stated that her father "would get

4
  Although Nouh had indicated that S.B. "appeared to be fine," Sierra testified
that S.B. "looked dirty" and "[h]er body odor had a foul smell to it."
                                                                           A-1628-21
                                       6
mad . . . when he didn't take his medicine" and that he would "throw [D.B.]

around the house" and "push [D.B.]," and that D.B. would then "hide in the

bathroom."

        Both defendants testified, refuting the Division's proofs. D.H. denied that

"there were syringes, capped and uncapped, and glassine baggies in plain sight"

in the apartment. D.H. also claimed that "[Nouh] was lying" when he testified

that he (D.H.) had made admissions about drug use. D.H. denied "ever us[ing]

drugs in front of [S.B.]" and accused the Division of "concoct[ing]" the entire

case.

        According to D.H.'s version of events, he went to D.B.'s apartment around

6:30 a.m. on the morning in question to see his daughter before work. During

the visit, he got into a heated verbal argument with D.B., as a result of which

D.B. retreated into the bathroom and a neighbor complained about the noise.

When the police arrived, D.H. claimed they handcuffed him and questioned him

without advising him of his Miranda rights. D.H. stated he was asked whether

he lived in the apartment, what he was doing in the apartment, and what his

relationship was to D.B. D.H. testified that after he was questioned, the officers

"pulled [D.B.] out of the bathroom," "put her in handcuffs," and "proceeded" to

search her "drawers" and "closet" inside her bedroom. Although D.H. admitted

                                                                             A-1628-21
                                         7
requesting medical attention, he denied telling anyone at the hospital about drug

use. He explained that he wanted medical attention because he thought he "was

going to pass out" from the police encounter. D.B.'s testimony mirrored D.H.'s.

      After the hearing, in an August 31, 2021, oral opinion, the judge found

that the Division met its burden of showing that D.B. and D.H. "abused or

neglected [S.B.]" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).           After

recounting the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary exhibits, the

judge posited he was "faced with competing testimony" and "exact opposite

stories," with D.B. and D.H. "basically den[ying] everything." To resolve the

"[c]ompletely divergent positions" taken by the parties, the judge found the

"hospital records" particularly persuasive, explaining:

            When someone goes to the hospital[,] in order to treat
            someone they have to take a detailed history from that
            patient. Because in order to be able to treat them they
            have to know what their symptoms are and what their
            recent history is. And I note hospital workers are not
            law enforcement officers. They have no ax[e] to grind
            in this case.

      The judge summarized the evidence contained in the hospital records as

follows:

            [D.B.] tells the person that took the history, "Patient
            reports shooting four bags of heroin around 7:30 a.m.
            to 8[:00] a.m. noting that it's normal to her." Now this

                                                                           A-1628-21
                                       8
             is something that's asked of her while the hospital has
             to determine her treatment and what's wrong with her.

                    I also note [D.H.] when asked by the hospital
             staff, he stated[,] "He admits to using cocaine last night.
             Two bags of I.V. heroin a few hours ago and drinking
             alcohol overnight. Patient states that he did not use
             these substances in an attempt to harm or kill himself."

      Then, in specifically assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the judge

found Nouh's testimony to be "credible," "reasonable," and "inherently

believable." The judge noted that Nouh was "an experienced police officer,"

"provided forthright answers," had a "good demeanor," and had "no special

interest in th[e] case."      The judge also found that Nouh's "testimony

was . . . supported by the hospital records as to the statements made by both

defendants in terms of using . . . illicit substances." The judge also credited

Sierra's testimony about S.B.'s statements. However, the judge noted that the

information S.B. provided to Sierra during the interview about defendants' drug

use was "not the basis for [his] decision."

      In contrast, the judge "[did] not find either [D.H.] or [D.B.] . . . to be

credible [witnesses]." The judge explained that during D.H.'s testimony, he

"came across . . . as being angry" and "his testimony [was] largely contradicted

by . . . [the] credible testimony of . . . the hospital records . . . and . . . Nouh."

As to D.B., the judge acknowledged that D.B. "gave straight answers and . . .

                                                                               A-1628-21
                                          9
did not really avoid questions," but concluded that her testimony was also

"largely contradicted by other credible testimony, mainly the hospital record,

and . . . the credible testimony of . . . Nouh."

      Next, to determine the admissibility of Nouh's testimony regarding the

drug paraphernalia he observed while inside the apartment, the judge addressed

whether Nouh lawfully entered D.B.'s apartment. The judge concluded that "the

police . . . had the right to enter [D.B.'s] apartment to investigate the emergency

that they were responding to under the [c]ommunity [c]are [t]aking [d]octrine."

Because the officers were responding to a domestic dispute, the judge found that

the "officer[s] had a duty, not just to stand and speak with the two parents" but

to "investigate" if there was "anyone . . . causing danger to the child or the parties

in that home." Critically, the judge pointed out that the drug paraphernalia

"[was] found in plain view."

      Turning to the Miranda issue defendants raised to challenge the

admissibility of their unwarned admissions of illicit drug use, the judge noted

that the officers were "responding to an emergency," "there were no accusatory

questions asked," and the questioning occurred "when the police first came in

the apartment."     The judge concluded that "Miranda warnings were not

necessary" for defendants' admissions to Nouh at the apartment. However, the

                                                                               A-1628-21
                                         10
judge determined he would not consider D.B.'s admissions to Beltran during her

interview at the police station.

      Following the evidentiary rulings, the judge applied the pertinent

provisions of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) to the credible evidence presented at

the hearing and concluded that the Division met its burden "by a preponderance

of the evidence." The judge determined that defendants "failed to exercise a

minimum degree of care in protecting their child by using strong narcotics . . .

while their four-year-old child was in their care and by allowing the child to

have access to various items of narcotics paraphernalia, including empty

glassines and capped and uncapped syringes." The judge found that these

circumstances were "sufficient proofs of [imminent] danger and substantial risk

of harm" and "enter[ed] a finding of abuse and neglect" against defendants.

      In these ensuing appeals, in A-1628-21, D.B. raises the followings points

for our consideration:

            [POINT I]

            UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO A HOME, CUSTODIAL
            QUESTIONING AND INVESTIGATIVE FAILURES
            TO GATHER SUPPOSEDLY AMPLE EVIDENCE OF
            DRUG USE SHOULD HAVE BARRED USE OF A
            POLICE OFFICER'S CLAIMS ABOUT WHAT HE
            OBSERVED OR STATEMENTS HE ATTRIBUTED
            TO A MOTHER TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT WITH

                                                                          A-1628-21
                                      11
INDELIBLE,     LIFE-LONG         CONSEQUENCES
UNDER N.J.S.A. [9:6-8.21(C)(4)].

     A.   A Police Officer's Entry Into [a]
     Home [t]o Investigate [a] Neighbor's Noise
     Complaint After [a] Child Opened [t]he
     Door Was Not Justified [b]y [t]he
     Community Caretaking Doctrine, Barring
     Use    of    [t]he    Officer's   Alleged
     Observations.

     B.    The Trial Court's Use [o]f
     Statements Attributed [t]o [a] Mother By
     [a] Police Officer Who Questioned Her
     While [i]n Custody and [i]n [t]he Presence
     of Her Child Violated Her Right [t]o
     Notice [o]f [a] Right [t]o Remain Silent,
     [t]o Counsel and [t]o Due Process.

[POINT II]

A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO A MOTHER
AFTER BEING ARRESTED, CONTAINED IN A
HOSPITAL RECORD BUT LEFT UNEXPLAINED
BY ANY [DIVISION] WITNESS AND OBTAINED
WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY, WAS NOT
ADMISSIBLE AS A STATEMENT MADE FOR
PURPOSES OF DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT AND
ITS USE WAS PLAIN ERROR[.] (NOT RAISED
BELOW).

[POINT III]

EVEN ASSUMING DRUG USE BY D.B. WHILE
CARING FOR HER CHILD, EVIDENCE DID NOT
SHOW SHE PROVIDED LESS THAN THE
MINIMUM DEGREE OF CARE, CREATED

                                                  A-1628-21
                        12
      IMMINENT DANGER OR A SUBSTANTIAL RISK
      TO VIOLATE N.J.S.A. [9:6-8.21(C)(4)(B)].

In A-1629-21, D.H. raises the following points for our consideration:

      POINT I

      THE PATERSON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
      WARRANTLESS, NON-CONSEN[S]UAL SEARCH
      OF [D.B.]'S APARTMENT AND QUESTIONING OF
      [D.H.] WERE ILLEGAL; THEREFORE, THE
      STATE'S SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION IN THIS
      QUASI-CRIMINAL MATTER LACKED THE
      COMPETENT EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO
      SUSTAIN A TITLE 9 JUDGMENT.

            A.   The Officers' Non-Consensual Entry
            and Warrantless Search of [D.B]'s
            Apartment Were Not Authorized by the
            Community      Caretaking      Doctrine;
            Therefore, Any Evidence or Testimony
            Generated as a Result of the Search Are
            Inadmissible.

                  ....

            B.    Contrary to the Trial Court's
            Conclusion, Miranda Warnings Were
            Required; Absent these Warnings, the
            Fruits of the Police Investigation Were
            Inadmissible in the State's Title 9
            Prosecution.

      POINT II

      HOSPITAL RECORDS OBTAINED IN THIS
      INVOLUNTARY FASHION, IN A CUSTODIAL
      SETTING, WERE NOT FOR DIAGNOSIS OR

                                                                   A-1628-21
                               13
            TREATMENT      AND    ARE    THEREFORE
            INADMISSIBLE. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

            POINT III

            EVEN    IF    THE    PATERSON    POLICE
            DEPARTMENT'S SEARCH AND INTERROGATION
            WERE LEGAL, AND HOSPITAL RECORDS
            ADMISSIBLE, [THE DIVISION] NEVERTHELESS
            FAILED TO PROVE [D.H.] ABUSED OR
            NEGLECTED HIS DAUGHTER WITHIN THE
            MEANING OF TITLE 9.

      Both the Division and the Law Guardian urge us to reject defendants'

arguments and affirm the judge's abuse and neglect finding.

                                      II.

      We begin with a recitation of the governing principles. To succeed in a

Title 9 fact-finding proceeding, the Division must prove "that the child is 'abused

or neglected' by a preponderance of the evidence, and only through the

admission of 'competent, material and relevant evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)).

An "abused or neglected child" is, in relevant part, a child under eighteen

            whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has
            been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
            impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or
            guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . .
            in providing the child with proper supervision or
            guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to
            be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof[.]

                                                                              A-1628-21
                                       14
            [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).]

      A parent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care "refers to conduct

that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." Dep't of

Children & Fams. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 305 (2011) (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of

Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999)).          Willful or wanton negligence

"implies that a person has acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others."

G.S., 157 N.J. at 179. It is "done with the knowledge that injury is likely to, or

probably will, result[,]" and "can apply to situations ranging from 'slight

inadvertence to malicious purpose to inflict injury.'"      Id. at 178 (citations

omitted). "However, if the act or omission is intentionally done, 'whether the

actor actually recognizes the highly dangerous character of [the] conduct is

irrelevant,' and '[k]nowledge will be imputed to the actor.'" N.J. Div. of Child

Prot. & Permanency v. S.G., 448 N.J. Super. 135, 144 (App. Div. 2016) (second

alteration in original) (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. at 178).

      "Because the primary focus is the protection of children, 'the culpability

of parental conduct' is not relevant." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C.

III, 201 N.J. 328, 344 (2010) (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. at 177).

            "Whether a parent or guardian has failed to exercise a
            minimum degree of care is to be analyzed in light of the
            dangers and risks associated with the situation." G.S.,

                                                                             A-1628-21
                                       15
             157 N.J. at 181-82. "When a cautionary act by the
             guardian would prevent a child from having his or her
             physical, mental or emotional condition impaired, that
             guardian has failed to exercise a minimum degree of
             care as a matter of law." Id. at 182. The mere lack of
             actual harm to the child is irrelevant, as "[c]ourts need
             not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably
             impaired by parental inattention or neglect." In re
             Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999)
             (citation omitted).

             [S.G., 448 N.J. Super. at 144-45 (alteration in
             original).]

       When evaluating these appeals, "our standard of review is narrow." Id. at

142.

                    We will uphold a trial judge's fact-findings if
             they are "supported by adequate, substantial, and
             credible evidence." [N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.
             v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014)]. We "accord
             deference to fact[-]findings of the family court because
             it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the
             witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses
             special expertise in matters related to the family." [N.J.
             Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448
             (2012)].

             . . . . No deference is given to the court's legal
             conclusions which are reviewed de novo. N.J. Div. of
             Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.G., 445 N.J. Super. 324,
             342 (App. Div. 2016).

             [N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.H., 460
             N.J. Super. 212, 218 (App. Div. 2019) (second
             alteration in original).]

                                                                           A-1628-21
                                        16
      If the trial court's rulings "'essentially involved the application of legal

principles and did not turn upon contested issues of witness credibility,' we

review the court's corroboration determination de novo." N.J. Div. of Child

Prot. & Permanency v. A.D., 455 N.J. Super. 144, 156 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 513, 521 (App.

Div. 2017)). "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken'

or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene . . . to ensure that there

is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.

88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596,

605 (2007)).

      In reviewing evidentiary rulings, "we afford '[c]onsiderable latitude . . .

[to a] trial court in determining whether to admit evidence, and that

determination will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'"

N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521 (alterations in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Child

Prot. & Permanency v. N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 478, 492 (App. Div. 2016)). "An

abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis."'" Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App.

Div. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

                                                                              A-1628-21
                                        17
      Defendants challenge both the admissibility and the adequacy of the

evidence relied on by the judge in concluding that S.B. was abused or neglected

within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).         As to admissibility,

defendants contend that because Nouh's warrantless entry into D.B.'s apartment

was not justified under the community-caretaking exception to the warrant

requirement, Nouh's observations should have been suppressed under the

exclusionary rule.

      Under the community-caretaking doctrine,

                   [c]ourts have allowed warrantless searches . . .
            when police officers have acted not in their law
            enforcement or criminal investigatory role, but rather
            in a community caretaking function. In today's society,
            police officers perform "dual roles." On the one hand,
            they carry out traditional law enforcement functions,
            such as investigating crimes and arresting perpetrators.
            On the other hand, police officers perform a wide range
            of social services, such as aiding those in danger of
            harm, preserving property, and "creat[ing] and
            maintain[ing] a feeling of security in the community."

            [State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009) (second and
            third alterations in original) (citations omitted).]

      In Bogan, our Supreme Court recognized that the community-caretaking

role of law enforcement "extends to protecting the welfare of children" and

reflects "the State's general parens patriae duty to safeguard children from

harm." Id. at 75. As a result, as long as the role was not "a pretext to conduct

                                                                          A-1628-21
                                      18
an otherwise unlawful warrantless search," the Court would not "handcuff police

officers from fulfilling a clear community caretaking responsibility, particularly

one that might prevent imminent harm to a child, merely because the officers

are engaged in a concurrent criminal investigation." Id. at 77. Thus, in Bogan,

the Court concluded that a police officer did not "engage[] in an unlawful

search" when the officer "had an independent basis, separate from any criminal

investigation, to inquire whether a responsible adult was attending to [a child]

and to ask a parent simple questions concerning a child's safety and welfare."

Id. at 79. The Court held the officer "was lawfully on the premises . . . , and

given the plain view doctrine, the police did not have to wait for judicial

permission to question and eventually take [the] defendant into custody." Ibid.

       However, without "some species of exigent circumstances, the

community-caretaking doctrine is not a basis for the warrantless entry into and

search of a home." State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 321 (2013). Instead, when

exigent circumstances are present, "[p]olice officers serving in a community -

caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a home under

the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." Vargas, 213 N.J. at

323.    The emergency aid doctrine "is derived from the commonsense

understanding that exigent circumstances may require public safety officials,

                                                                            A-1628-21
                                       19
such as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for the purpose of

protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." State v. Hathaway,

222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J.

586, 598 (2004)).

      Under the emergency-aid doctrine, the State must show "(1) the officer

had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency require[d] that

he [or she] provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to prevent

serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus between the emergency and

the area or places to be searched." Id. at 470 (first alteration in original) (quoting

State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 132 (2012)).           Still, "[t]he emergency-aid

doctrine . . . must be 'limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted' the

need for immediate action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134 (quoting Frankel, 179

N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in plain view by a public

safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not exceeding the scope of

the search,' that evidence will be admissible."        Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600).

      While there are similarities between the emergency aid and community

caretaking exceptions, the two exceptions are doctrinally separate and distinct.

See Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1598 (2021) (rejecting

                                                                               A-1628-21
                                         20
that a police officer's "'caretaking' duties creates a standalone doctrine that

justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home"); see also State v.

Witczak, 421 N.J. Super. 180, 192 (App. Div. 2011) (explaining that the

community caretaking and emergency aid exceptions are "related, but separate

exceptions[ that] have been used interchangeably in the past"). "The community

[-]caretaker exception asks whether the police are 'engaged in "functions, [which

are] totally divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence

relating to the violation of a statute."'" Witczak, 421 N.J. Super. at 192 (second

alteration in original) (quoting State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104, 109 (App.

Div. 1998)). The emergency-aid exception focuses on an objectively reasonable

belief an emergency exists, immediate action is needed to avert potentially

serious harm to an individual, and there is a reasonable nexus between the

emergency and the area to be searched. Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470.

      Here, police were dispatched to D.B.'s apartment after a neighbor reported

a domestic dispute. Upon arrival, Nouh heard "[s]creaming, yelling, a lot of

noise in the background, [and] a little girl's voice." After Nouh knocked, S.B.

opened the door and revealed D.H. standing in the background "staring into thin

air." Based on Nouh's confirmation that a domestic dispute was in progress, the

fact that a child rather than an adult answered the door, and Nouh's observation

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                                       21
of a seemingly intoxicated male standing in the apartment, Nouh had a duty to

enter the apartment to inquire whether a responsible adult was caring for the

child and to ascertain whether the other party to the domestic dispute required

immediate emergency assistance.

      Police officers need not "'stand by in the face of imminent danger and

delay potential lifesaving measures while critical and precious time is expended

obtaining a warrant.'" Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 469 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at

599). Under the circumstances, Nouh had "an objectively reasonable belief that

immediate action was needed to avert potentially serious harm to an individual,

and . . . delay in securing a warrant was not an option." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at

136. Nouh's warrantless entry into D.B.'s apartment was therefore equally

justified under both the community-caretaking and the emergency-aid doctrine.

      Once Nouh was lawfully inside, he observed the apartment in disarray

with "empty heroin glassin[e] packets" in plain view and within S.B.'s reach.

Nouh also observed "capped and uncapped" "syringes throughout the home."

"We do not believe that a police officer lawfully in the viewing area must close

his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view." State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210,

237 (1983); see Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470 ("If . . . contraband is 'observed in

plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not

                                                                           A-1628-21
                                      22
exceeding the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." (quoting

Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600)). "The question is not whether the police could

have done something different, but whether their actions, when viewed as a

whole, were objectively reasonable." Bogan, 200 N.J. at 81.

      We are satisfied that overall, the officers' "carefully modulated response"

to "swiftly moving events and uncertain circumstances" was objectively

reasonable. Id. at 80. Because Nouh was justified under the circumstances in

entering D.B.'s apartment, his testimony about his observations once inside the

apartment was admissible. See Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 140 (explaining that the

officers' entry into a home to assure the safety of a child following an anonymous

9-1-1 report of domestic violence was permissible under the emergency aid

doctrine "[b]ut once there was no longer an objective basis to believe that an

emergency was at hand, '[t]he privacy interests of the home [were] entitled to

the highest degree of respect.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting

State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 384 (2003))); Bogan, 200 N.J. at 65 (upholding

under the community-caretaking doctrine an officer's entry into an apartment to

ascertain the welfare of a child who was home from school with no apparent

excuse in a residence that had been the site of a reported sexual assault earlier

that day).

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                                        23
      Defendants also argue that the judge should have excluded their

admissions as violative of their Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants contend

their incriminating statements regarding illicit drug use were inadmissible

because Nouh failed to administer Miranda warnings when the officers entered

D.B.'s apartment.

      "The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that '[n]o

person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself.'" State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 100 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting

U.S. Const. amend. V). "In New Jersey, the privilege is derived from the

common law and is codified in our statutes and rules." Id. at 101; see N.J.S.A.

2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503.

      It is well established that

            the prosecution may not use statements, whether
            exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
            interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
            the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
            privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
            interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
            enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
            custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
            in any significant way.

            [Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.]

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                                       24
       Thus, to trigger the need for Miranda warnings, "the defendant must be in

custody and the interrogation must be carried out by law enforcement." P.Z.,

152 N.J. at 102. "The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been

a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the

objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the

status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors." Id.

at 103.

       "[P]olice may conduct general on-the-scene questioning of a suspect, as

authorized by Terry v. Ohio,[5] without giving Miranda warnings." State v. Toro,

229 N.J. Super. 215, 220 (App. Div. 1998). For example, in State v. Pierson,

223 N.J. Super. 62, 65, 67-68 (App. Div. 1988), the defendant was detained for

thirty minutes at the scene of a fire investigation while police requested

identification, asked why he was there, and then investigated his story. We

explained that "[t]he investigative techniques adopted by the officer were neither

harassing nor intimidating." Id. at 67. We concluded that "[a]s [the] defendant's

restraint constituted a permissible investigatory detention rather than rendering

him in custody, the absence of Miranda warnings did not preclude the

5
    Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
                                                                             A-1628-21
                                        25
evidentiary use of [the] defendant's responses to the officer's questions."

Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. at 68.

      In State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425, 431 (App. Div. 2005), we

addressed "the applicability of Miranda warnings in the context of an officer's

response to a call about a domestic dispute" by analogizing the situation to "field

investigations" under Terry and "traffic stops" authorized by Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). We "recogniz[ed] that police action subsequent

to entering the residence is likely to involve some restraint on the occupants'

freedom of action." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431. However, we explained that

"[d]espite the restraint on freedom of action involved in Terry and traffic stops,

an officer is not required to give Miranda warnings before asking questions

reasonably related to dispelling or confirming suspicions that justify the

detention." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431.

      We saw "no basis for applying a different analysis or standard in

determining the need for Miranda warnings when the police encounter with the

person questioned begins with the officer's response to a call about a domestic

dispute," and held that "[t]he fact that such an investigation typically takes place

in the suspect's home away from the public view is not an inherently coercive

circumstance." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 432. Thus, when police officers

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                                        26
respond to a domestic dispute call, "[t]he question is whether a reasonable

person, considering the objective circumstances, would understand the situation

as a de facto arrest or would recognize that after brief questioning he or she

would be free to leave." Ibid. In Smith, we concluded that Miranda warnings

were not necessary because "[t]he questioning was brief, lasting a matter of

moments," "[was] related to dispelling or confirming the officer's suspicion,"

"[was] neither harassing nor intimidating," and "was not a stratagem or phrased

to coerce an admission." Id. at 435.

      Applying these principles, like the judge, we conclude that under the

totality of the circumstances, Miranda warnings were not necessary. Nouh

responded to D.B.'s home after a neighbor reported a domestic disturbance.

When he arrived at the scene, Nouh heard yelling inside the apartment and a

little girl's voice. After Nouh entered the apartment, by D.H.'s own admission,

he was asked: "[D]o you live here?" "[W]hat are you doing here?" and "[W]ho

is [D.B.] to you?" Based on Nouh's testimony, which the judge credited, the

questioning occurred at the beginning of the encounter, prior to Nouh receiving

supervisory approval to arrest defendants. "Custody at the time of questioning,

from the perspective of the reasonable person, not the likelihood of future

custody, is determinative." Smith, 347 N.J. Super. at 433.

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                                       27
      As in Smith, Nouh's "questioning" of defendants was "brief," "related to

dispelling or confirming [Nouh's] suspicion" that defendants were engaged in a

domestic dispute and was "neither harassing nor intimidating."        Id. at 435.

Indeed, Nouh's questioning was "not a stratagem or phrased to coerce an

admission," ibid., and the incriminating statements regarding illicit drug use

were volunteered spontaneous admissions, see State v. Brabham, 413 N.J.

Super. 196, 210 (App. Div. 2010) ("Miranda has no application to statements

that are 'volunteered.'" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478)).          Thus, the

evidentiary use of defendants' statements was permissible. 6

      Next, defendants challenge the admissibility of the medical records from

their June 28, 2020, visit to St. Joseph's following their arrest as well as their

statements recorded within the medical records. They assert their out-of-court

statements made to medical personnel constitute inadmissible hearsay that was

6
  We need not consider and express no opinion as to the admissibility of D.B.'s
incriminating statements to Beltran at the police station because they were not
considered by the judge. See State v. Helewa, 223 N.J. Super. 40, 51-52 (App.
Div. 1988) (equating Division caseworker to a law enforcement officer and
requiring the caseworker to administer Miranda warnings to a parent who was
arrested and confined during interview); State v. Flower, 224 N.J. Super. 208,
220 (Law Div. 1987), aff'd, 224 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988) (suppressing a
confession a defendant made to a Division investigator while arrested and
confined in a county jail because the investigator failed to inform the defendant
of his Miranda rights).
                                                                            A-1628-21
                                       28
not subject to the medical-treatment exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E.

803(c)(4), because the examination was not for purposes of diagnosis or

treatment but for incarceration.

      At the fact-finding hearing, D.B.'s medical record was admitted into

evidence without objection. Therefore, we review the admissibility of D.B.'s

medical record and her out-of-court statements embedded within the medical

record for plain error.   Plain error is any error that is "clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. "[A]n appellant faces an especially high

hurdle in an appeal from a civil bench trial to establish that the admission

of . . . evidence constitutes 'plain error.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency

v. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2016). Indeed, "hearsay subject to

a well-founded objection is generally evidential if no objection is made." Id. at

348-49. D.H.'s medical record was admitted subject to D.H.'s limited objection

to the admission of any embedded hearsay.            Therefore, we review the

admissibility of D.H.'s medical record for plain error but review the

admissibility of D.H.'s out-court-statements embedded in the medical record for

abuse of discretion. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231

N.J. 354, 366 (2017).

                                                                             A-1628-21
                                       29
        Hearsay is an out-of-court statement "offer[ed] in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted." N.J.R.E. 801(c). Generally, "[h]earsay is not

admissible except as provided by [the New Jersey Rules of Evidence] or by other

law."    N.J.R.E. 802.    One such exception is the so-called business record

exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), which excludes from the hearsay rule:

              [a] statement contained in a writing or other record of
              acts, events, conditions, and, subject to [N.J.R.E.] 808,
              opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time of
              observation by a person with actual knowledge or from
              information supplied by such a person, if the writing or
              other record was made in the regular course of business
              and it was the regular practice of that business to make
              such writing or other record.

        Thus, "[t]o qualify as a business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), a writing

must meet three conditions: it must be made in the regular course of business,

within a short time of the events described in it, and under circumstances that

indicate its trustworthiness." State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 387-88 (2015)

(citing State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 29 (1985)). Hearsay embedded in

otherwise admissible business records "must satisfy a separate hearsay

exception." J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 347-48; see N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. R.W., 438 N.J. Super. 462, 466-67 (App. Div. 2014) (noting that

notwithstanding the admissibility of Division records that meet the business

records exception, hearsay embedded therein must meet other hearsay

                                                                              A-1628-21
                                        30
exceptions in order to be admitted); N.J.R.E. 805 (providing that "[h]earsay

within hearsay"—such as the content of a business record—"is not excluded by

the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with

an exception to the rule").

      Another pertinent exception to the prohibition against hearsay are

statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.           Such

statements:

              (A) [are] made in good faith for purposes of, and is
              reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment;
              and

              (B) describe[] medical history; past or present
              symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their
              general cause.

              [N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4).]

      Our Supreme Court has long recognized "the declarations of a patient as

to his [or her] condition, symptoms and feelings made to his [or her] physician

for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment are admissible in evidence as an

exception to the hearsay rule." Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 501 (1971). The

"rationale for that departure from the hearsay rule is that such statements possess

inherent reliability because 'the patient believes that the effectiveness of the

treatment he [or she] receives may depend largely upon the accuracy of the

                                                                             A-1628-21
                                        31
information he [or she] provides'" the medical professional. R.S. v. Knighton,

125 N.J. 79, 87 (1991) (quoting Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on

Evidence § 292, at 839 (3d. ed. 1984)). Nonetheless, hearsay obtained during

evidence gathering and medical consultations conducted purely in preparation

for litigation remain inadmissible. State in the Int. of C.A., 201 N.J. Super. 28,

33-34 (App. Div. 1985).

      Additionally, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) exempts party statements against

interest from the general hearsay exclusionary rule. This includes statements by

the party declarant which, at the time of its making, were contrary to declarant's

"pecuniary, proprietary, or social interest, or so far tended to subject declarant

to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in declarant's position

would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true." Id.

"The statement-against-interest exception is based on the theory that, by human

nature, individuals will neither assert, concede, nor admit to facts that would

affect them unfavorably.       Consequently, statements that so disserve the

declarant are deemed inherently trustworthy and reliable." N.T., 445 N.J. Super.

at 498 (quoting State v. White, 158 N.J. 230, 238 (1999)).

      Further, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), a "[d]efendant's own statements

are admissible as statements of a party-opponent" if the statements are offered

                                                                               A-1628-21
                                        32
against him in the action.      J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 348 (citing N.J.R.E.

803(b)(1)). "[W]hen the proffered evidence is 'the [opposing] party's own

statement,' there is no pre-condition to admissibility requiring a legal conclusion

drawn by 'application of [the New Jersey] Rules of Evidence to adduced facts.'"

Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 419-20 (App. Div. 2012) (citation

omitted) (first quoting N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1); and then quoting Est. of Hanges v.

Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383 (2010)). "The issue is purely a

factual one—whether the party-opponent made the statement." Id. at 420.

      Guided by these principles, we discern no error and no abuse of discretion

in the admission of the medical record as to either defendant. The records were

admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and the

embedded hearsay was admissible under several other exceptions, including the

medical diagnosis or treatment exception, as well as a statement against interest

and of a party-opponent. Although defendants were arrested prior to treatment,

given their respective medical conditions, there can be no question that their

statements about drug use were made to hospital personnel for the purpose of

                                                                             A-1628-21
                                       33
diagnosis and treatment, and no credible dispute that the incriminating

statements were made by the parties themselves.7

      We reject defendants' suggestion that because they had already been

arrested when they were being treated, hospital personnel acting in a law

enforcement capacity had a duty to administer Miranda warnings. Defendants'

proposition is unsupported by any legal authority. See Flower, 224 N.J. Super.

at 218 (noting that "not all questioning . . . constitute[s] acting in a law

enforcement capacity").     We also reject D.B.'s belated contention that her

medical record was not properly authenticated.             "[I]t is settled that

circumstantial evidence is acceptable for authentication of written material."

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.T., 354 N.J. Super. 407, 413 (App. Div.

2002).

      Here, an attached certification stated that each defendant's medical record

was signed by the director of medical records services. The certification also

7
  "Our conclusion that various embedded hearsay statements were evidential is
not at odds with N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(2), which states that 'only competent,
material and relevant evidence may be admitted' in a fact-finding hearing.
Hearsay does not relate to proof's relevance, see N.J.R.E. 401, or competence,
see N.J.R.E. 601." J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 350 n.5. "Indeed, based on the
doctrine of invited error, inadmissible hearsay was deemed acceptable evidence
in M.C. III, 201 N.J. at 342," to sustain a finding of abuse and neglect. J.D., 447
N.J. Super. at 350 n.5.
                                                                             A-1628-21
                                       34
stated that the record had been "made in the regular course of business of th[e

hospital]," that "it was in the regular course of business of th[e hospital] to make

said records," and that "[t]he records were made at the time of condition and/or

occurrences reported therein or within a reasonable time thereafter and

accurately reflect[ed] the condition and/or occurrence." Such a certification

from the records custodian provides satisfactory evidence and suffices to

authenticate the records for purposes of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). See N.T., 445 N.J.

Super. at 500 (holding that an "employee's certification" supported the

admissibility of a record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)).

      Finally, defendants contend that even if all the evidence was admissible,

it was inadequate to support the judge's finding of abuse or neglect. 8 D.B. asserts

"[t]he record did no[t] contain sufficient credible evidence that [her] drug

use . . . amounted to gross negligence that created imminent danger and a

8
  Because we have decided that defendants' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
were not violated in the circumstances of this case, we need not address whether
the exclusionary rule even applies to a Title Nine proceeding. See Delguidice
v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79, 84, 92 (1985) (applying a balancing test to
decide whether "application of the exclusionary rule [was] appropriate" and
concluding "the Law Division's finding of entrapment and dismissal of criminal
proceedings should not prevent the use of the incriminating evidence in
appellant's licensing hearing before the Racing Commission"); see also P.Z., 152
N.J. at 112 ("We decline to tip the balance by requiring additional protections
for the parents of abused children to be imported from our criminal
jurisprudence into Title Nine proceedings.").
                                                                              A-1628-21
                                        35
substantial risk of harm to [S.B.]," or that she "was impaired." Similarly, D.H.

argues the Division failed to produce "[a]dequate, substantial, credible, and

competent evidence supporting any level of impairment, such that it

impacted . . . [D.H.'s] ability to care for [S.B.]" or that he provided less than a

minimum degree of care for S.B.

      We reject defendants' contentions and affirm substantially for the reasons

expressed in the judge's comprehensive August 31, 2021, oral opinion. The

judge's conclusion that defendants "failed to exercise a minimum degree of care"

and placed S.B. in imminent danger and at substantial risk of harm was amply

supported by competent and credible evidence. In N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. V.F., we affirmed a finding of abuse or neglect within the

meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) predicated on two officers' testimony that

the defendant was under the influence and unable to care for his minor children .

457 N.J. Super. 525, 537-38 (App. Div. 2019). Based on their observations, the

officers testified that the defendant "had blood shot eyes, was groggy, had

slurred speech, was unable to provide coherent responses to simple questions,

and had to use the wall for support while attempting to walk or stand on his

own." Id. at 537. We rejected the defendant's contention that the proofs were

deficient because the Division relied solely on the officers' observations and

                                                                             A-1628-21
                                       36
"presented no physical evidence, such as blood or urine tests, to prove he was

under the influence at the time" and there was no evidence "of drug

paraphernalia in his house that would indicate drug use." Id. at 536-37.

      Here, the evidence included Nouh's and Beltran's observations,

defendants' incriminating statements to Nouh, and the contents of defendants'

medical records. The proofs showed defendants were under the influence of

"strong narcotics" while caring for S.B. and exposed S.B. to danger by allowing

her to have access to drug paraphernalia, "including empty [heroin] glassines

and capped and uncapped syringes." See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency

v. B.O., 438 N.J. Super. 373, 385 (App. Div. 2014) ("Parents who use illegal

drugs when caring for an infant expose that baby to many dangers due to their

impaired judgment.").

      Affirmed.

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                                      37