Court Opinion

ID: 9729508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:38:57.167386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.083840
License: Public Domain

MINTON, Chief Justice,
Dissenting.
While it superficially recognizes the existence of the concept of color of title, which appears in the nature of a defense in KRS 364.130 to temper the punitive aspect of treble damages, the majority effectively abolishes the color of title doctrine by making the standard to prove its existence impossibly high. According to the majority, any “uncertainty as to whether the description [in a deed] embraces the land in question” means that a “claim of color of title fails.” Majority opinion, p. 10. Such a high standard is unwarranted and much more stringent than what has always been required. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
Color of title only means “appearance of title....” Hurst v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 824, 125 S.W.2d 772, 774 (1939). So that “any instrument, however defective or imperfect, and no matter from what cause invalid, purporting to convey the land and showing the extent of the tenant’s claim, may be ‘color of title’.... ” Shutt v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 187 Ky. 350, 218 S.W. 1020, 1021 (1920) (Emphasis added). And “questions as to the sufficiency of the description of land in an instrument claimed to constitute color of title are considered fact questions for the jury on conflicting or doubtful evidence.” 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 297 (2008).26
I believe the majority engages in appellate revision rather than appellate review by doing its own fact-finding. The trial court had direct contact with the evidence in this case, and we should defer to the trial court as the fact finder. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 (“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.)”
The trial court found that Feldman “possessed an arguably sufficient deed.” Instead of giving due deference to that finding, which is sufficiently supported by the record, the majority engages in its own fact-finding and simply concludes that since surveys did not mathematically and precisely align with the boundary description in the Feldman deed, then Feldman did not have color of title. But mathematical precision is not necessary to constitute color of title because even “an ambiguous description may be sufficient to afford col- or of title.” 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 92 (2008). Under Kentucky law, gener*638ally, if there is a “bona fide dispute” between persons who each claim to be the owners of a tract of land, the party who ultimately is found not to be the record title owner may, nonetheless, have color of title if that party “had reasonable grounds” for his or her ownership belief. Hurst, 125 S.W.2d at 774 (“it cannot be said that the line claimed by appellant did not furnish appearance or ‘color’ of title. It is clear that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties and appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that the line claimed by him was the correct one.”).
In the case at hand, Feldman claimed ownership of the disputed land because he had a deed that purported to describe it. Although he ultimately was found to not be the record title owner of the disputed land, and although his deed perhaps contained inaccuracies in its description of the boundaries, the trial court concluded that Feldman’s deed was sufficient to constitute color of title. And based upon its findings, the trial court declined to award treble damages against Feldman. The majority has pointed to nothing to show that the trial court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous, preferring instead to overturn precedent by creating a heightened standard necessary to show color of title. I submit, however, that perfection and absolute certainty should not be required for someone to possess mere color of title.
Since the Feldman deed appeared on its face arguably to include the disputed land and since Feldman had engaged the services of a surveyor to stake the boundaries for him, I cannot take issue with the trial court’s findings or conclusions. I question whether application of the majority’s heightened color of title requirement would result in Meece — the judicially acknowledged record title owner of the land in question — lacking color of title since Meece’s deed also contained at least one erroneous call.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm both the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
CUNNINGHAM, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Much of the precedent regarding color of title revolves around the doctrine of adverse possession. Precedent from adverse possession cases should be applicable to this case as an aid for this Court to determine what constitutes color of title and whether Feldman met the requisites. See, e.g., The Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. The County of Oneida, New York, 217 F.Supp.2d 292, 302 n. 6 (N.D.N.Y.2002) (recognizing that color of title precedent involved adverse possession but utilizing it, nonetheless, in factually distinguishable case).