Court Opinion

ID: 9963389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 15:00:48.612393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:48.391700
License: Public Domain

23-1156-cv
    Dasler v. Washburn

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                       SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

               At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
    Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th day of April, two thousand
    twenty-four.
    PRESENT:
               JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
               STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                     Circuit Judges,
               ORELIA E. MERCHANT,
                     District Judge. ∗
    _____________________________________

    Timothy P. Dasler, for himself and on
    behalf of T. D.,
                         Plaintiff-Appellant,
                    v.                                                 23-1156
    Dalene Washburn,
                  Defendant-Appellee.
    _____________________________________

    ∗
     Judge Orelia E. Merchant of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
    York, sitting by designation.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                            TIMOTHY P. DASLER, pro se, Orford,
                                                    NH.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:                             JENNIFER E. MCDONALD, Downs
                                                    Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington,
                                                    VT.

       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Vermont (Reiss, J.).

       UPON       DUE     CONSIDERATION,              IT   IS    HEREBY       ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

       Plaintiff-Appellant Timothy Dasler, pro se on his own behalf and seeking
to act on behalf of his minor child, T.D., sued Dalene Washburn, the therapist his
ex-wife selected for T.D., claiming that Washburn was not acting in T.D.’s best
interest. He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and Vermont state law. The
district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim but permitted
Dasler to move to amend his complaint. Dasler did not initially amend in time;
instead, he moved after judgment was entered to file an amended complaint that
raised additional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court
denied leave to amend as futile, reasoning that Dasler failed to state a § 1983
claim and that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction applied. 1
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural history, and the
issues on appeal.

1 We conclude that we have jurisdiction to review both the dismissal of the original
complaint and the denial of leave to amend because we may liberally construe Dasler’s
district court submissions as seeking vacatur of the judgment and leave to amend his
complaint, tolling his time to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)-(v); see also Ruotolo
v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A party seeking to file an amended
complaint postjudgment must first have the judgment vacated or set aside pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b).”).
         We review de novo the denial of leave to amend based on futility, applying
the same standard used to evaluate a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Nielsen
v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). We construe the complaint liberally, accept
all of its well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor in order to determine whether the complaint
states a plausible claim for relief. See id. On a judgment dismissing a complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error
and legal conclusions de novo. Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
2008).

         I.    Dismissal of the Original Complaint

         The district court properly dismissed the claims that Dasler brought on
behalf of his child. A non-attorney may not bring claims on his child’s behalf.
Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990).
While Dasler argues that the district court should have granted his requests to
appoint counsel for T.D., there is no right to counsel in civil cases except when
facing the prospect of imprisonment. See Guggenheim Cap., LLC v. Birnbaum, 722
F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2013). The discretionary denial of counsel was not an abuse
of discretion because, as discussed below, Dasler’s claims were not “likely to be
of substance.” Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)).

         Dasler’s claims were otherwise properly dismissed. He failed to plead
race- or class-based animus, as required to state a § 1985 claim. Mian v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir. 1993). Vermont common-
law breach of patient confidentiality requires a doctor-patient relationship.
Lawson v. Halpern-Reiss, 210 Vt. 224, 232-33 (2019). But Washburn was his child’s
doctor, not Dasler’s.

         Dasler did not otherwise meet Vermont’s “high” bar of pleading
“outrageous conduct” sufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. Dalmer v. State, 174 Vt. 157, 171 (2002). He alleged that Washburn
obstructed access to her practice by requiring Dasler to include his ex-wife on
emails and by prohibiting him from bringing his child to sessions, amounting to
an abuse of power. But, especially in the context of a divorce proceeding between
Dasler and his ex-wife, Washburn’s requests to have both parents copied on
email communications about their child and to have the ex-wife bring the child
to sessions were not outrageous.

      II.    Denial of Leave to Amend

      Dasler challenges the district court’s denial of leave to amend the
complaint, but the denial was not erroneous. As discussed above, claims brought
on behalf of the child were properly dismissed. Furthermore, Dasler did not add
facts to his proposed amended complaint that would have cured the deficiencies
identified in the district court’s first order.

      A. Section 1983 Claim

      The district court properly concluded that Dasler failed to state a § 1983
claim. A § 1983 claim requires the violation of a federal right by a defendant
acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C § 1983. But Washburn is a private
individual, and a private individual acts under color of state law only when
(1) the state compelled the individual’s conduct, (2) the individual acted jointly
with the state, or (3) the individual fulfilled a role that is traditionally a public
function performed by the state. Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc.,
546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008).

      Dasler did not allege facts demonstrating that Washburn, a private
therapist, was compelled to act by the state, that she acted jointly with the state,
or that she fulfilled a traditional public function. While he contends that
Washburn was a state actor by virtue of being selected as the child’s therapist by
his ex-wife, who was authorized to do so by court order, the order did not
appoint Washburn as the child’s therapist. Instead, it merely authorized Dasler’s
ex-wife to select a private provider; she chose Washburn.
       B. State Law Claims

       We conclude that Dasler’s proposed state law claims fail on the merits. See
Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 396 n.2 (2d Cir. 2018)
(observing that we may affirm on any ground with support in the record). 2 In
his proposed amended complaint, Dasler asserted state law claims for
defamation, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
abuse of process. 3

       In Vermont, the elements of defamation—including libel and slander—are
“(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) some negligence,
or greater fault, in publishing the statement; (3) publication to at least one third
person; (4) lack of privilege in the publication; (5) special damages, unless
actionable per se; and (6) some actual harm so as to warrant compensatory
damages.” Russin v. Wesson, 183 Vt. 301, 303 (2008) (quoting Lent v. Huntoon, 143
Vt. 539, 546-47 (1983)). Dasler alleged that Washburn’s clinical appointment
notes contained a number of statements about his relationship with his child. But
the notes recorded statements the child made during therapy, not statements
made by Washburn about Dasler. Dasler also alleged that Washburn spread
unspecified false allegations to childcare providers and other mutual contacts.
But because Dasler failed to allege actual statements that were false and
defamatory, Dasler’s claim that Washburn made “false” statements about him to
others must fail.

       Dasler also failed to state a claim for breach of contract based on

2 We have subject matter jurisdiction because “the domestic relations exception
encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree,” and this case does not involve those matters. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 704 (1992).
3
  Dasler also asserted a claim styled “Duty of Care.” It appears that Dasler is asserting
that Washburn had a duty of care toward him as part of a negligence claim. Dasler did
not assert any of the other elements of a negligence claim, so he fails to state a claim for
negligence.
Washburn’s failure to comply with a subpoena and the Vermont state court’s
failure to enforce it. “To prove breach of contract, [a] plaintiff must show
damages.” Smith v. Country Vill. Int’l, Inc., 183 Vt. 535, 537 (2007). Dasler did not
allege what damages he suffered from Washburn’s failure to produce the
documents. He stated that he was deprived of discovery before the Vermont
court entered a final divorce decree. But he did not allege that the documents
would have been essential to an element of his claims in state court.

      The remaining state claims also fail. Negligent infliction of emotional
distress requires physical peril or fear of injury, see Brueckner v. Norwich Univ.,
169 Vt. 118, 125 (1999), but Dasler pleaded neither. And abuse of process fails
because Dasler did not plead facts suggesting an improper use of a court. See
Weinstein v. Leonard, 200 Vt. 615, 625 (2015).

      III.   Unredacted Material

      Finally, we note that Dasler’s opening brief, reply brief, and appendix
contain the full first name of his minor child, and the appendix recites the child’s
date of birth. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(5), which incorporates
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, requires redaction of this information.
Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to SEAL from public view
documents 30, 31, and 70 on this court’s docket. While we do not remand, the
district court may wish to seal similar filings.

                                   *      *        *

      We have considered Dasler’s remaining arguments, which we conclude
are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court