Court Opinion

ID: 9950698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:16:42.427633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:43.228899
License: Public Domain

J-A29029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KAYLA YOUNKERS                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1437 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 24, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-11-CR-0000831-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                        FILED: March 14, 2024

       Kayla Younkers appeals pro se from the order denying her latest petition

for review of her sentence. Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and an

accompanying Anders brief.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial

of post-conviction relief and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.

       The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: On February

4, 2020, Younkers pled guilty to criminal use of a communication facility. On

____________________________________________

1 As this appeal is from the denial of post-conviction relief, counsel was
required to comply with the less restrictive procedural requirement of
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). However, counsel filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which is
applies to requests to withdraw from a defendant’s direct appeal. Because an
Anders brief provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may
accept an Anders Brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter. Commonwealth
v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004). Thus, we will
consider counsel’s petition to withdraw under the Turner/Finley standards.
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July 8, 2020, the trial court sentenced her 11½ to 23 months in the county

prison, followed by a two-year probationary term. At that time, the trial court

granted Younkers credit for time she spent incarcerated prior to the disposition

of her case, a period of approximately four months. Younkers did not file an

appeal.

      Thereafter, Younkers was paroled from this sentence, effective January

4, 2021. However, on July 14, 2021, following a violation hearing, the trial

court resentenced Younkers to serve 24 to 48 months in a state correctional

institution with a recommendation that she be enrolled in the state drug

treatment program.

      On September 15, 2021, Younkers filed a pro se petition pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Among the

issues raised in this petition, Younkers asserted that she was denied credit for

time served for the pre-disposition time for which she was incarcerated.

Without appointing counsel, the PCRA court denied this petition on September

23, 2021.

      On December 6, 2021, Younkers filed a second PCRA petition. The PCRA

court appointed counsel. On March 22, 2022, the PCRA court held a status

conference, at PCRA counsel’s request, in order to determine from Younkers,

the precise relief she was requesting. Addressing the court directly, Younkers

testified:

      [YOUNKERS]:      [Y]ou wanted me to max-out in the Cambria
      County Prison on my sentence on Case Number 0831-2019, which
      would have been a max of 2 years. So I asked you to go upstate

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     on July 8, 2020 to get the State Drug Treatment Program. You
     and [the probation officer] agreed to that. I’m not qualified for
     the State Drug Treatment Program, but I am qualified for the
     other state programs. I’m already comfortable upstate. I’m
     already involved in other state programs, but I would like to
     reduce my sentence to a 1 to 2, so I can remain upstate and get
     done with my programs. Instead of having a 2 to 4, can we reduce
     that to a 1 to 2 upstate with RRRI, because I’m not eligible for the
     State Drug Treatment Program.

N.T. 3/22/22, at 4.

     On March 29, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw and “no-

merit” letter pursuant to Turner/Finley, supra.        In this letter, counsel

asserted that Younkers’ request for sentence modification was not cognizable

under the PCRA. By order entered April 19, 2022, the PCRA court granted

counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed Younkers’ second PCRA petition.

     Following this denial, Younkers filed a series of pro se filings with the

lower court. On August 12, 2022, Younkers filed a handwritten letter in which

she once again asked for certain periods of credit for time served. By order

entered August 24, 2022, the lower court denied Younkers’ request.

     On September 2, 2022, Younkers filed a handwritten letter in which she

states that she would like to appeal the August 24, 2022 order. The court

took no action on this request.      Younkers then filed two more pro se

documents and ultimately filed an appeal to Commonwealth Court. By order

entered November 22, 2022, that court transferred the appeal to this Court.

On January 18, 2023, the lower court appointed present counsel to represent

Younkers in this appeal. As noted above, present counsel has filed a motion

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to withdraw and an Anders brief. Both Younkers and the lower court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

       Present counsel raises the following issue on appeal:

       1. Whether [Younkers] has presented any nonfrivolous issues in
          the present appeal?

Anders Brief at 4.

       In the Anders brief, PCRA counsel first argues this appeal should be

quashed as untimely filed.        Thus, we address whether Younkers’ appeal is

timely.    Commonwealth Court received Younkers’ petition for review on

October 27, 2022. In this petition she stated she was appealing from the

court’s August 24, 2022 order. However, as mentioned above, the court below

did not act on Younker’s September 2, 2022 letter, in which she essentially

sought to appeal the court’s denial of relief in the August order. Given that

this communication was filed within ten days of the court’s order, we will

consider this appeal timely. See Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d

157, 160 (Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that this Court has declined to quash

otherwise     untimely      appeals     in     circumstances   where   extraordinary

____________________________________________

2 As readily revealed above, the procedural history of this case involves a
multitude of handwritten letters and other pro se filings after the court denied
her second PCRA petition.          Importantly, because all of Younkers’
communications were filed thirty days after her resentencing, they should
have been treated as petitions under the PCRA. See generally, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5505. This was not always done here.

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circumstances exist such as where “the failure to file a timely appeal [resulted

from] a breakdown in the court system”).

      We note that Younkers’ August 12, 2022 request for time credit should

have been treated as a petition under the PCRA.     The PCRA statute provides

that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and

encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same

purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9542. Claims that are cognizable under the PCRA

must be brought under that statute. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136

A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016).      A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the

conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). Id. A claim regarding time credit goes to the legality

of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super.

2018). The PCRA is the exclusive avenue to collaterally attack the legality of

a sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vii). Thus, Younkers’ request for time

credit was a serial PCRA petition.

      Next, we address PCRA counsel’s application to withdraw. As this Court

has summarized:

             The Turner/Finley decisions provide the manner for post-
      conviction counsel to withdraw from representation. The holdings
      of those cases mandate an independent review of the record by
      competent counsel before a PCRA court or appellate court can
      authorize an attorney’s withdrawal. The necessary independent
      review requires counsel to file a “no-merit” letter detailing the
      nature and extent of his review and list each issue the petitioner
      wishes to have examined, explaining why those issues are
      meritless. The PCRA court, or an appellate court if the no-merit
      letter is filed before it, then must conduct its own independent

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      evaluation of the record and agree with counsel that the petition
      is without merit.

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted). Additionally, “counsel is required to contemporaneously serve upon

his client his no-merit letter and application to withdraw along with a

statement that if the court granted counsel’s withdrawal request, the client

may proceed pro se or with privately-retained attorney.” Id.

      Counsel has substantially complied with Turner/Finley.                  Thus, we

proceed to determine whether we agree with counsel that Younkers’ appeal is

wholly frivolous. PCRA counsel asserts that, “given the factual and procedural

history of the of the present matter and a review of the case law relevant to

same, [Younkers] does not have any nonfrivolous issues which can be

presented in support of her appeal.” Anders Brief at 9.            In the Rule 1925(b)

statement, counsel identified the issue Younkers wished to challenge on

appeal as the denial of time credit. Before considering this claim, however,

we must determine whether, under the PCRA, we have jurisdiction to consider

it.

      The   timeliness   of   a   post-conviction       petition     is   jurisdictional.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an

exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

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       The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.        Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his or her petition “within one year of

the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to    address   the    substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth      v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Here, Younkers’ judgment of sentence became final on August 7, 2020,

thirty days after she failed to file a direct appeal to this Court.      See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Younkers had until August 9, 2021, to file

a timely PCRA petition.3 As Younkers filed the petition for review at issue in

2022, it is untimely unless she has satisfied her burden of pleading and
____________________________________________

3 Because the one-year limitation fell on a Saturday, Younkers would have had

until the following Monday to file an appeal. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

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proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies.      See Hernandez,

supra.

      Younkers has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time

bar. Instead, having not received the sentence modification she requested in

her second PCRA petition, Younkers reverts to her argument that she did not

receive proper credit for time served. As noted above, this claim involves the

legality of her sentence. Gibbs, supra. An appellant must present an illegal

sentencing claim in a timely PCRA petition over which we have jurisdiction.

See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (explaining

that, “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the

PCRA, claims must first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions

thereto”).

      In sum, Younkers’ 2022 petition for review of her sentence was a serial

PCRA petition, it was untimely, and she has not established a time-bar

exception. As such, both the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to

consider her substantive claim. Derrickson, supra. Thus, we agree with

PCRA counsel that her appeal is frivolous, and we grant counsel’s application

to withdraw.

      Order affirmed.

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DATE: 03/14/2024

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