Court Opinion

ID: 9557724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:56:12.520987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:30.272625
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
BRETT, Presiding Judge.
The defendant lays great stress on the trial court’s exclusion of evidence which might have been elicited by certain questions, fully detailed in the dissenting opinion, had the trial court not sustained objections thereto before the answers were given. It is asserted that a different light might have shown upon the matter had witnesses been required to answer the questions propounded by defendant’s counsel. That speculation may be true, but under the decisions of this Court, we are not per*485mitted, on the showing made by the asking of hare questions, to engage in supposition as to what the answers might have been. If the defendant’s counsel knew what the answers would be, he could readily have made the questions available to this Court by making an offer of proof as to what the answers to the questions would have been. This he did not do, but instead left the answers to the questions as a mere matter of speculation and supposition. Hence, we are not at liberty to consider the questions, standing alone, as of any probative value. It has so been expressly held. In Cheeves v. State, 18 Okl.Cr. 480, 196 P. 726, 729, the rule is stated:
“Error cannot be predicated upon a ruling excluding testimony, where the testimony desired is not shown in the record, nor any statement made as to what the proposed testimony would be. White v. State, 4 Okl.Cr. 143, 111 P. 1010; Warren v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 1, 115 P. 812, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 1121; Stouse v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 415, 119 P. 271.”
A fair illustration of this situation is found in Johnson v. State, 15 Okl.Cr. 297, 176 P. 256, 258, where, in the body of the opinion, it was said:
“Where it is contended that the court erred in refusing to admit competent evidence offered by the defendants, there must be some showing as to what the witness would have testified to had he been permitted to answer the question. Counsel argue, ‘Suppose the answer of the witness had been favorable to the defendant.’ This court cannot deal in suppositions in connection with the alleged errors of this kind. The burden is upon the appellant to show that he was prejudiced by the court’s action; the rule in this jurisdiction being that injury is not presumed because of error, but that the burden is upon the appellcmt to show not only error, but injury resulting therefrom.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Fain v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 556, 174 P. 296. In Tolbert v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 110, 245 P. 659, 660, syllabus four reads:
“When a reversal is sought on account of exclusion of evidence, the record must show an offer of such evidence so that this court may determine whether or not it was material and proper, and whether or not the defendant was injured by its exclusion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Pruett v. State, 35 Okl.Cr. 359, 250 P. 1029, 1031, it was said:
“It is impossible to determine from the record what evidence was intended to be introduced, because no offer or statement was made as to what the proposed testimony would be. * * * Error cannot be predicated upon a ruling excluding testimony, where the testimony desired is not shown in the record, nor a statement made as to what the proposed testimony would be.”
In Watson v. State, 46 Okl.Cr. 36, 287 P. 816, 817, it was held:
“Failure to show what the evidence would have been had the answer been permitted prevents defendant from raising the question of the improper exclusion of evidence. Before this court can pass intelligently and safely upon a question of this kind, it would have to know just what the witness would have testified to.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases are too numerous on this point to warrant further quotation. The great weight of authority supports this view.
The object of the procedure in the foregoing cases is two-fold. First, in fairness to the trial court it informs him relative to the proposed evidence sought to be elicited by the questions propounded so that he may correct his mistake, if in error. Second, it removes the matter from speculation and provides the appellate court with substance and not just a shadow with which to deal. It may appear at first that since this ques*486tion arises on a motion to suppress the evidence and not on the trial of the merits, that the foregoing cases are not in point, and for the further reason the witnesses in such proceeding are generally adverse and unfriendly and thus it may be contended it is error for the trial court to> sustain objections to the questions as are detailed in the record and in the dissenting opinion. With the latter contention we are not entirely in disagreement, but find it efficacious only if injury patently appears, for it has been repeatedly held that error without injury is not a basis for reversal. Hence, the applicability of the rule herein. By laying a proper predicate as provided in the cases cited, the questions and the proof sought to be elicited are presented to the Court on a substantial and not a suppositive basis. With only the questions as a basis for the contention on appeal, we are presented an entirely suppositive matter for consideration because the answers to the questions may have been either favorable or unfavorable to the defendant.
If we are allowed to engage in supposition at all, it could not logically be concluded the trial court’s failure to permit or allow answers to the propounded questions resulted in injury to the defendant. This is obvious, since the witnesses were adverse and had already given testimony contrary to the defendant’s cause. It therefore follows as a logical supposition that the testimony in answer to the propounded questions would have been unfavorable rather than favorable to the defendant. Of course, if it were perfectly manifest what the answers would have been and those answers would have been favorable to the defendant, then injury would result and such showing would constitute ground for reversal. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1789, n. 64-67, p. 592. But, such is not the situation in the case at bar. As hereinbefore stated, the answers to the questions proposed could have been either positive or negative and the defendant offered nothing to relieve the situation. Hence, although this was error, it was harmless error. The petition for rehearing is accordingly denied.
POWELL, J., concurs.