Court Opinion

ID: 9539450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:04:30.074481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:49.710126
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. While I agree with the majority that the “any evidence” rule applies to the findings made by a trial court in a bench trial, my review of the rec*148ord turns up no competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of temporary mutual departure. Obviously, this is a case akin to David and Goliath. The majority opinion gives great weight to the fact that Exxon failed to notify Butler promptly of a stolen credit card. No matter how emotionally satisfying reliance on this aspect of the case may be, nonetheless, under the competent evidence of record, it is legally irrelevant to the issue of temporary mutual departure. In order to fully explain my dissent, I must expand the recitation of facts set out in the majority opinion.
Earl Butler d/b/a Lakeshore Exxon, Gainesville, Georgia (Butler) brought suit against Exxon Corporation (Exxon) for money allegedly wrongfully withheld by Exxon. The money in issue involved credit transactions at Butler’s station in Gainesville. Exxon defended on the ground Butler had failed to perform a condition precedent in the contract, in that he failed to follow required procedure in filling out the credit tickets. Butler contended that the condition precedent was inapplicable due to a mutual departure from the contract terms.
The franchise agreement between Exxon and Butler provided that Butler would allow credit to customers holding valid Exxon charge cards for purchases at the station. The contract stipulated that upon the submission of credit tickets to Exxon showing such credit transactions, Exxon would reimburse Butler for the credit purchases, provided that Butler followed the directives in Exxon’s credit manual which was incorporated into the contract by reference. The contract gave Exxon the right to reassign to Butler any credit tickets not conforming to the requirements of the manual. Further, the contract provided that the value of such reassigned credit tickets would be due and owed to Exxon immediately. Among other requirements, the credit manual required Butler to fill out the credit tickets completely with customer name and number, the date of purchase, product purchased, quantity, unit amount, and total sale, along with the customer signature. The credit manual stated explicitly that all tickets not properly completed could be charged back to the dealer. No time limit upon this right appeared in the franchise agreement or in the credit manual.
At trial, Butler testified that Exxon had charged back to him tickets made upon the card of Ellen Silverstone. He later learned that the card was stolen. Butler contended in his testimony that Exxon was obligated to inform him within 30 days of any credit card stolen, and that Exxon had not done so in this case. He attempted to testify that he had been told this was Exxon’s policy by one of its sales representatives; however, counsel for Exxon objected to the testimony as hearsay, and the objection was properly sustained. Later, on cross-examination, Butler acknowledged that nowhere in the contract or in the credit manual was any requirement that Exxon notify any dealer *149within any particular time that a credit card was stolen. The obvious reason the agreement between Exxon and its dealer, Butler, did not provide for any time limitation for notification of stolen credit cards is that the agreement contemplates that any loss suffered would be solely Exxon’s, provided the dealer followed the agreement in filling out the credit tickets.
Butler attempted to testify that he had a practice of sending in to Exxon improperly filled-out tickets, and that Exxon accepted them. Again, counsel for Exxon objected and again the objection was sustained. Later in his testimony, Butler tried to say that no dealer filled the cards out in accord with the contract and credit manual. Another objection was made and sustained. On cross-examination, Butler admitted that the tickets charged back to him were not filled out in accordance with the contract and credit manual. He also admitted that tickets ón customers other than Ellen Silverstone had been charged back to him for being improperly filled out. Butler presented no other witness or other evidence to support his claim that Exxon was obligated to notify him within 30 days or any other period that a credit card had been stolen. Butler presented no competent evidence that Exxon had, at any time, accepted tickets which were not filled out in accordance with the contract.
Exxon adduced evidence showing that the Silverstone tickets charged back to Butler were so charged to him because they were not filled out in accordance with the credit manual. The witness for Exxon acknowledged that, under the contract, if the tickets were completely filled out, Exxon would bear the loss on a stolen credit card and the dealer would be paid for the credit tickets. Exxon further adduced evidence showing that during the period covered by the Silverstone tickets, it had charged back tickets involving other customer accounts to Butler for failure to follow the credit manual.
“Where parties, in the course of the execution of a contract, depart from its terms and pay or receive money under such departure, before either can recover for failure to pursue the letter of the agreement, reasonable notice must be given to the other of intention to rely on the exact terms of the agreement. The contract will be suspended by the departure until such notice.” OCGA § 13-4-4. “ ‘While a distinct stipulation in a contract may be waived by the conduct of the parties, it must appear that it was the intention of the parties to treat such stipulations as no longer binding. The mere fact that one party so intended would not bring about this result. It must appear that it was the mutual intention; that is, the circumstances must be such as, in law, to make practically a new agreement as to the stipulations in the original contract.’ ” Southern Feed Stores v. Sanders, 193 Ga. 884, 887 (20 SE2d 413) (1942). “Though a quasi new agreement arises where the parties mutually depart from the terms of the origi*150nal agreement and pay or receive money under such departure [cit.], there must be more than a simple breach on the part of one of the parties; there must be a mutual departure.” Crawford v. First Nat. Bank of Rome, 137 Ga. App. 294, 296 (223 SE2d 488) (1976).
The evidence at trial showed only that Butler consistently failed to complete the credit tickets as required by the contract in the use of Silverstone’s credit card. The evidence shows other occasions with other customers in which Butler failed to comply with the contract and Exxon charged back the tickets to Butler for non-compliance with the contract. Thus, there is evidence that Exxon at all times pertinent insisted on adherence to the contract as written. Although Butler contended that there was a pattern or course of conduct by Exxon of accepting credit tickets which did not comply with the requirements of the credit manual, the record is devoid of any evidence to support this. Under the contract the issues of when the credit card was stolen, and when Exxon knew of it, and when Exxon notified Butler it was stolen, are irrelevant, for if Butler had complied with the credit manual requirements and the contract, as Exxon had every right to presume he would, the entire loss would be to Exxon. The record shows no evidence, either in the contract or otherwise, which would require Exxon to charge back the credit tickets within any particular time.
Thus, the evidence at trial showed only Butler’s breach of the contract. This is not sufficient to show a mutual intention by Butler and Exxon to depart from the requirements of the contract. See also Newby v. Bank of Pinehurst, 159 Ga. App. 890 (285 SE2d 605) (1981); Williams v. Doster, 153 Ga. App. 174 (1) (264 SE2d 707) (1980). Therefore, based upon the competent evidence of record, I am constrained to find that Butler did not prove his case, and that there is no evidence of record to support the trial court’s findings. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.