Court Opinion

ID: 9628593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:25:45.811296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:08.182562
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN,
(dissenting) :
I think the district court was warranted in finding that the note and mortgage were given to facilitate the matter of obtaining a divorce and hence, were opposed to public policy and void.
Plaintiff testified that when she mentioned to her husband that she was g*oing to procure a divorce he stated that he would resist it unless she agreed “to his terms of the property settlement.”
Defendant told plaintiff, “he wouldn’t prevent me [plaintiff] from getting a divorce if we made this property settlement and he got what he wanted. ’ ’
I do not attach much importance to the fact that both parties went to an attorney to- prepare the necessary papers. The attorney thought he represented both parties and refused to testify for plaintiff unless defendant waived any privilege that he might have and this his counsel refused to- do-. The general rule is stated in 17A Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, sec. 888, p. 77, as follows: ‘‘ * * * a property settlement or separation agreement which substantially facilitates or promotes a separation or divorce is contrary to public policy and is therefore void. Any provision for support contained in a contract or agreement between husband and wife which, by its terms or effect, is conducive to a relaxation or a severance of the marital ties is void as contrary to public policy and will not be upheld or maintained. Hence, an agreement to withdraw opposition to, or *163not to contest, divorce proceedings cannot form a valid consideration for a contract, and the fact that the transfer of property is to be effected through a trustee in no way changes the illegal aspect of the transaction.” This court has declared this to be the rule. Stebbins v. Morris, 19 Mont. 115, 47 Pac. 642; Sherman v. Sherman, 65 Mont. 227, 211 Pac. 321; Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 167 Pac. (2d) 848, 164 A.L.R. 1211.
The point of difference between the parties turns upon the question whether the agreement is separable so that the agreement as to property rights may stand even though the divorce itself might fall as being contrary to public policy.
This court in Herrin v. Herrin, 103 Mont. 469, 63 Pac. (2d) 137, 139, which had to do with a contract entered into to facilitate a divorce said: “But we think it repugnant to sound principles of equity to permit one to profit by the provisions of such an agreement and then avoid its objectionable parts by invoking the rule mentioned, and we therefore hold the contract to be separable. * * * The contract is therefore held to have been entered into for the purpose of facilitating a divorce, and as to that it is void as contrary to public policy, but as to the property settlement it is valid and binding upon both parties.”
The Herrin case overlooks section 13-504 of our statute which reads:
“If any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the entire contract is void.”
I think the correct view was stated in Beard v. Beard, 65 Cal. 354, 4 Pac. 229, 230, where an agreement such as the one here was under consideration. The court in that case said: “In this case the agreement of the defendant to abandon her defense in the divorce case, and to give the notes and mortgage, were parts of one and the same transaction, and constituted the consideration of the transfer of property by the plaintiff to her.”
Where the agreement to execute the note and mortgage and the agreement not to resist the divorce form parts of one trans*164action both must fall. Beard v. Beard, supra; Stebbins v. Morris, supra.
In the Stebbins case, which was an action seeking to enforce such a contract this court said: “It is a general and uniform rule that any agreement entered into' between husband and wife with a view to facilitating the dissolution of their marriage contract is void.”
The court did not undertake to say that the agreement, so far as it affected property rights, could be enforced but that the part relating to the divorce should fall.
As above-noted, the court in Herrin v. Herrin held that the agreement as it affected property could stand irrespective of the fact that the provisions relating to the divorce were void. I think the holding in the Herrin case should be overruled. The agreement with reference to property was interwoven with the provision respecting the decree of divorce and one cannot stand without the other. I think it was inconsistent for the court to hold that the agreement was valid though the divorce was void and yet uphold both the agreement and the divorce.
The ease of Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381, 3 Pac. (2d) 402, condemned the right of a party to accept the part of the decree awarding the divorce and rejecting that part relating to alimony. The issue in the Grush case was whether a provision requiring the husband to- pay alimony could be sustained when the decree showed that the divorce was granted because of an offense on the part of the wife. The husband contended it could not because of section 21-139. That issue is not in this case. Here there was no alimony provision in the decree. Also in that case the appeal was from an order refusing to modify the divorce decree by striking out a clause awarding alimony to the wife. The husband sought to stand on the decree so far as it awarded the divorce but to reject that part requiring him to pay alimony.
The case of Ryan v. Ryan, 111 Mont. 104, 106 Pac. (2d) 337, is also one where the husband was required to pay alimony in order to facilitate the granting of a divorce in his favor. That *165case followed the Grush ease and the opinion points out that the issue in the Grush case was whether a provision for alimony could stand when the decree named the wife as the offending party. A showing was made in both the Grush and Ryan cases that in truth and in fact the husband was the offending party, but that in reliance on the agreement with respect to alimony the wife did not oppose the action.
The only issue here is whether the wife may be compelled to give up her interest in the property acquired through the joint efforts and contributions of the parties because she executed a note and mortgage to facilitate the divorce granted in her favor. Here the husband is not paying alimony. Since the wife obtains no alimony it is of no consequence as to who may be determined to be the offending party.
Another reason for invalidating the agreement, here involved, is because it makes a grossly inadequate provision for the wife. Here the foreclosure of the mortgage will leave her stranded with no property rights whatsoever. Under the agreement she gave up all her property rights and her right to alimony.
The rule is that while it is competent for the husband and wife to enter into a property settlement agreement and for the wife to release her right to support, such agreements may be held void not only “where it is part of a collusive bargain for a divorce” but also where it “makes a grossly inadequate provision for the wife in lieu of support.” 17A Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, sec. 894, p'. 82.
“"When a husband and wife are living together as such, and they make a contract, they occupy a confidential relationship, or a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is generally assumed that the husband has a dominant influence over the wife, for which reason it is held that a contract, to be valid, must be fair and reasonable as to the wife.” Id., sec. 898, p. 85.
And when the wife signs a contract prepared by the attorney for the husband it must be fair and reasonable or she may avoid it. Id., sec. 898, p. 85 and 86, note 3.
Here no provision was made for the payment of the wife’s *166support. The agreement made no provision for alimony, suit money, costs or attorney’s fees. Under it the wife was the one giving up valuable property rights. If the mortgage be foreclosed she will have practically nothing.
Under the agreement the husband obtained the benefit of a note on Arizona property with a balance of $11,500 due; he received the benefit of the withdrawal of $4,500' from their joint bank account, a Columbia House Trailer worth about $3,000, a Mercury automobile worth about $2,500, a 1951 Ford Truck worth about $1,500, real property on the Colorado Bdver worth $6,000, cash in banks amounting to about $900, and the note and mortgage in question here, and the wife obtained the divorce and the- use of a pick-up truck until the fall of 1953 and the Melrose house. The agreement is grossly inequitable from her standpoint.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled under facts very similar to those here that a note and mortgage given to facilitate the procuring of a divorce are without consideration and void. Stoutenberg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St. 228.
I think that both the agreement and the divorce should fall even though both parties are willing that the divorce should stand. This court has the authority to set aside the divorce sua sponte. Hall v. Hall, 70 Mont. 460, 226 Pac. 469, and see State ex rel. Sparrenberger v. District Court, 66 Mont. 496, 214 Pac. 85, 33 A.L.R. 464; Grush v. Grush, supra.
My associates place much reliance on a letter written by plaintiff to defendant. It is questionable whether this letter should have been admitted in evidence in its entirety. But, assuming that it was properly admitted it does not prove as much as my associates would indicate. It does not prove that she owed her husband any money but only that he claimed she did. It does not prove she went to her own attorney. The attorney as above-noted assumed to represent both parties. It is true she did not inform the court of the property settlement, but neither did he. There was more reason for him doing so than for her to do so, he was benefited by the agreement; she was not. He had a *167motive for having it approved by the court, but she did not. She was releasing her dower or community interest in Arizona property — giving up her right to support money, costs and attorney’s fee in the divorce action all without any consideration moving from him to her.
This being the first opportunity for the court to scrutinize the agreement in question here, it should not hesitate to set it aside where as here it is unfair and unjust. 27B C.J.S. Divorce, sec. 301(1), subd. c, particularly pp. 406 and 407.
I think the judgment should be affirmed, but as I said before I favor setting aside the divorce as well as the note and mortgage.