Court Opinion

ID: 9592930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:18:07.812627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:32.695185
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Appellee was in her car, waiting in the exit from the K-Mart parking lot for the purpose of making a left turn onto Austell Road. Austell Road consisted of three lanes, a traffic lane in either direction and a center turn lane. The traffic moving from left to right in front of appellee in the northbound traffic lane was backed up from a traffic light, but a pickup truck had stopped before the K-Mart exit so as to leave a gap open for vehicles to leave the K-Mart parking lot. The driver of the pickup truck motioned for appellee “to come out,” and this she did. While appellee testified that she looked to the right, it is clear from her testimony that her vision to the left, the direction from which appellant was approaching, was entirely obstructed by the proximity and size of the pickup truck. Appellee testified: “I gradually pulled out to see around the pickup truck.” In other words, ap-Ipellee blindly pulled into the path of anyone moving northward in the turn lane and was struck by the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger.
Appellee’s reliance upon blind luck and the driver of the pickup [truck, clearly resulted in her failure to yield the right-of-way in com[pliance with OCGA § 40-6-73. Resolution of whether the vehicle occupied by appellant was improperly using the turn lane may be an in*204teresting academic exercise, but the answer is irrelevant since OCGA § 40-6-73 is applicable without regard to whether the approaching vehicle is doing so in an illegal manner. See Munday v. Brissette, 113 Ga. App. 147, 160 (10) (148 SE2d 55), rev’d on other grounds, 222 Ga. 162 (149 SE2d 110).
I cannot agree with the majority’s construction of the decision in Munday v. Brissette, 113 Ga. App. 147, 160 (10), supra. This decision is based on a straightforward reading of the clear and concise statutory language now set forth in OCGA § 40-6-73, which provides: “The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.” (Emphasis supplied.) The crux of the statute lies in the two emphasized words which were likewise emphasized in Munday. There are no exceptions, qualifications or conditions attached to these two words. As appellee sought to enter the roadway from an adjacent parking lot, she was required by this statutory language to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway (including the automobile carrying appellant), period, end of discussion.
I would also hold that the judicial revision of OCGA § 40-6-73, created by our decision in Simpson v. Reed, 186 Ga. App. 297, 299 (9) (367 SE2d 563), is not well founded and should be overruled. In Simpson, an exception to the rule set forth in OCGA § 40-6-73 was created by judicial fiat, removing the obligation of a motorist entering a roadway to yield to an unseen vehicle approaching on the roadway. Not only does the Simpson exception lack support from the authority cited therein or from the statutory language, it undermines the basic statutory scheme. OCGA § 40-6-73 should be read as requiring that a motorist may not enter or cross a public roadway unless such motorist can see approaching traffic sufficiently well as will permit the motorist j to comply with the statutory obligation to yield to all vehicles approaching on the roadway. Where the vision of a motorist entering I the roadway is obscured, the statute should be construed to prohibit the motorist proceeding blindly and to require the motorist to wait or | seek another route of access to the roadway.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving appellee’s I requested charge based on OCGA § 40-6-46, regarding no-passing J zones. Since the resolution of the issue thus addressed, as to whether! the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger was properly using thej turn lane, does not alter appellee’s duty to yield to all vehicles ap-l proaching on the roadway pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-73, the charge onl OCGA § 40-6-46 is not adjusted to the evidence presented at trial.I Since the improper charge may have contributed to the verdict which! is adverse to appellant, I would reverse. For the stated reasons, I re-| spectfully dissent.
*205Decided March 15, 1991.
C. Lawrence Jewett, Jr., for appellant.
Bovis, Kyle & Burch, Charles M. McDaniel, Jr., for appellee.