Court Opinion

ID: 9591639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:06:11.474327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:47.424130
License: Public Domain

BECTON, Judge.
After the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant, defendant, pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (1983), entered a plea of guilty to trafficking in methaqualone in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(2)(b) (1981 & Supp. 1983) and trafficking in marijuana in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(l) (b) (1981 & Supp. 1983). Defendant was sentenced to a term of fourteen years. From the court’s ruling on his motion to suppress, the defendant appeals.
I
Defendant first assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant contends, first, that the warrant was not issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate” as required by law; and, second, that the trial court erroneously prevented preservation of evidence to this effect for the record on appeal.
The Fourth Amendment requirement that warrants be issued only upon the determination by a “neutral and detached magistrate” that probable cause exists has long been recognized by the courts of the country. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 92 L.Ed. 436, 68 S.Ct. 367 (1948). Our examination of the law as it has developed since Johnson reveals that the broad requirement of a “neutral and detached magistrate” involves two distinct concepts. First, the office held by the person issuing the warrant must be independent of “connection with any law enforcement activity or authority which would distort the independent judgment the Fourth Amendment requires.” Shadwick v. City of Tampa, *493407 U.S. 345, 350-51, 32 L.Ed. 2d 783, 789, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 2123 (1972). For example, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a state attorney general was not a neutral and detached magistrate by virtue of his office, saying: “[TJhere could hardly be a more appropriate setting than this for a per se rule of disqualification rather than a case-by-case evaluation of all the circumstances.” Id. at 450, 29 L.Ed. 2d at 573, 91 S.Ct. at 2029. Similarly, in Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 50 L.Ed. 2d 444, 97 S.Ct. 546 (1977), the Supreme Court held that an official who was compensated on a per warrant basis could not be considered neutral and detached.
We turn now to the second concept. It is not enough, say our courts, that the office be neutral and detached. The person holding office must perform his duties in a neutral and detached manner. In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 60 L.Ed. 2d 920, 99 S.Ct. 2319 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer lost “whatever neutral and detached posture [that] existed at the outset” when he “allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation.” Id. at 327, 60 L.Ed. 2d at 928-29, 99 S.Ct. at 2324. In State v. Miller, 16 N.C. App. 1, 190 S.E. 2d 888 (1972), modified and aff’d, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E. 2d 353 (1973), this Court held that a warrant was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate where the official failed to read the affidavit offered in support of the warrant application. Under those circumstances, said this Court, the magistrate “utterly failed to perform the important judicial function which it was his duty to perform. . . .” Miller, 16 N.C. App. at 10, 190 S.E. 2d at 894.
In the case before us, the motion to suppress on grounds that the warrant was not issued by a neutral and detached official necessitated inquiry by the trial judge into whether the warrant was issued by a person holding proper independent office. Because defendant had produced no evidence to the contrary, this initial inquiry required only that the judge determine from the face of the warrant that it was in fact issued by an official authorized to do so in this State. The issuing official, Janet Handy, as a Deputy Clerk of Superior Court in Wilkes County, was clearly authorized to issue search warrants. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-243(b)(2) (1983) and N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-180 to 181 (1981).
*494With regard to the second requirement, the trial judge had to consider the manner in which Ms. Handy performed her judicial function of determining, from the evidence before her, the existence of probable cause. Although the record discloses that Ms. Handy read the supporting affidavit supplied by the officers who requested the warrant and questioned one of the officers as to the contents of the affidavit, these facts do not conclusively demonstrate that Ms. Handy performed her duties in a neutral and detached fashion. Defendant specifically asserted that Ms. Handy’s decision to issue the warrant was based on personal reasons and personal relationships. We hold that the trial court erred in denying, on relevancy grounds, defendant an opportunity to develop, even for purposes of the record, matters that could show that Deputy Clerk Handy did not perform her function in a neutral and detached way.1
The “neutrality” and “detachment” of the issuing official can be challenged on the basis of personal, political, or economic conditions or relationships. See generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2 (1978). It begs the question to suggest that defendant’s inquiry is irrelevant and goes to a “person’s personal life” when defendant’s inquiry is specifically designed to show that Ms. Handy issued the warrants because of her personal convictions and social relationships with other parties vitally concerned with the judicial function involved.
If the circumstances under which the neutrality and detachment of the issuing official can be challenged are not here presented, will they ever be? Consider the following factors, in the light most favorable to the defendant, known by the trial judge at the suppression hearing:
*495a. On 17 March 1982, Wilkes County Magistrate Barry Wood, on the basis of information submitted to him by three law enforcement officers, concluded that there was no probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant for Staley’s Restaurant in Wilkes County;
b. Michael Ashburn, the District Attorney for the Twenty-Third Judicial District, in a telephone conversation with Magistrate Wood and the three law enforcement officers, confirmed that there was no probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant;
c. On the following day, the three law enforcement officers received from Janet Handy, a Deputy Clerk of the Superi- or Court of Wilkes County, a warrant to search Staley’s Restaurant without advising her that Magistrate Wood had turned down a search warrant for the same premises the night before. (The affidavit presented to Ms. Handy presumably included an allegation that an informant had observed methaqualone in Staley’s Restaurant within the past 48-hour period.);
d. At the time Ms. Handy issued the search warrant she was allegedly dating one or two of the law enforcement officers who applied to her for the search warrant. (Indeed, the trial court, not being concerned with hearsay at the suppression hearing, allowed Magistrate Wood to testify that he had heard that one or both of the S.B.I. agents were dating Janet Handy at the time the search warrant was issued.);
e. Ms. Handy, at the suppression hearing, stated, among other things, that “I am interested in how much time he *496[the defendant] is going to get.” She further testified that she would like to see Mr. Holloway get some time out of this; and
f. The search warrant was procured on the basis of statements allegedly made to the law enforcement officers by a confidential source of information, later identified as Michael Walter Jarvis. Michael Walter Jarvis, however, testified at defendant’s suppression hearing and disavowed every allegation of fact attributed to him by the law enforcement officers in their application for the search warrant.
Now, we do not suggest that the law enforcement officers were forever bound by Magistrate Wood’s determination on 17 March 1982 that no probable cause then existed. Nor do we suggest that the trial court could not consider the personal interest or “stake” Michael Walter Jarvis had in disavowing that he was a confidential informant. Rather, we suggest that the factors listed above show that defense counsel was not on a fishing expedition. Defense counsel had a good faith basis for trying to develop a record that Ms. Handy’s bias or interest (just like Michael Walter Jarvis’ bias or interest) affected the manner in which she purported to perform her duties.
This is not a case in which a defendant merely alleges that the magistrate or other issuing official and the law enforcement officer who seeks the search warrant are neighbors, hunting partners, or lifelong friends. On those facts, the trial court’s decision might gain our concurrence. The facts and circumstances in this case are substantially more compelling, however, and defendant is entitled to a plenary hearing to develop an adequate record, at least for appellate purposes, to support his contentions. On the basis of the information available to it, the trial court erred in restricting defendant’s examination of Ms. Handy and in concluding that Ms. Handy’s personal life should not be called into court.
After all, the search warrant process interposes an orderly procedure in which an impartial magistrate can make an informed decision on the issue of probable cause. 2 W. LaFave, supra p. 4, § 4.2, at 29. Were it otherwise, there would be no need to inquire into a magistrate’s attributes, motives, or particular conduct in is*497suing a search warrant. Fortunately, the law recognizes that a magistrate may have such a personal interest in a case that the magistrate cannot be deemed to be impartial. It is the quid pro quo — the issuing of a warrant in exchange for some benefit — that is important. Simply put, defendant’s reliance on Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 50 L.Ed. 2d 444, 97 S.Ct. 546 (1977) is not misplaced since his
situation, again, is one which offers a ‘possible temptation to the average [woman] as a judge ... or [it] might lead [her] not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.’ It is, in other words, another situation where the defendant is subjected to what surely is judicial action by an officer of a court who has ‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in [her] conclusion to issue or deny the warrant.
Id. at 250, 50 L.Ed. 2d at 448, 97 S.Ct. at 548.
II
Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress since there was no probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. Defendant attacks the affidavit used to secure the warrant alleging “that the confidential informant described therein was a complete and total fabrication on the part of the law enforcement officers.” At the hearing on his motion, defendant presented evidence from one Michael Jarvis who denied each allegation of fact attributed to the confidential informant and stated that he never gave any information to the law enforcement officers as a confidential informant. The law enforcement officers who procured and executed the search warrant then testified that Michael Jarvis was their confidential source and that he gave the information attributed to a confidential source in the search warrant.
Defendant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that false statements were knowingly and intentionally included in the warrant and affidavit by the affiant. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L.Ed. 2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978). The trial court found the following pertinent facts:
[T]he court further finds that Officer Sam Winters testified that the confidential informant, on whom he relied, was Mi*498chael Jarvis; and that Officer Winters further testified that the information set forth in the affidavit furnished to the magistrate had indeed been furnished to him by said Michael Jarvis. The court further finds that Michael Jarvis had earlier testified that he was not the confidential informant relied upon by Agent Stubbs or Deputy Sheriff Winters; and that Michael Jarvis, in his testimony, denied furnishing any information to the officers concerning the affidavit used to secure the issuance of this search warrant. The court further finds that prior to taking the stand and testifying, Michael Jarvis took an oath on the Bible to tell the truth and that Detective Winters took an oath on the Bible to tell the truth. The court further finds the court has absolutely no reason to doubt the veracity of Officer Sam Winters; and therefore, the court relies upon the testimony of Detective Winters in reaching its conclusion as to the reliability of the information furnished in the affidavit used to secure the issuance of this search warrant.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f) (1983) requires the trial court to make findings of fact after a hearing on a motion to suppress. The weight given the testimony is properly for the finder of fact. The facts found by the trial court are binding if supported by competent evidence. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E. 2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L.Ed. 2d 1137, 100 S.Ct. 3050 (1980). The record reveals sufficient competent evidence to support the court’s findings of fact. Therefore, defendant having failed to carry his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there were false statements knowingly included in the affidavit, the assignment of error is overruled.
Ill
Defendant finally contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from the basement portion of the searched premises. After executing the search warrant in the upstairs portion of the premises, which was used as a restaurant, the law enforcement officers proceeded to the basement, which could only be entered from outside the premises. Upon finding the basement locked the officers attempted to obtain a key. When they were told that defendant had just left for Winston-Salem, with the only key, they cut the lock from the door *499and proceeded to search the basement. A search of the basement revealed 792 pounds of marijuana and 8,450.9 dosage units of methaqualone.
Defendant contends the officers’ forced entry into the basement violated the restrictions set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-251 (1983) which provides:
An officer may break and enter any premises or vehicle when necessary to the execution of the warrant if:
(1) The officer has previously announced his identity and purpose as required by G.S. 15A-249 and reasonably believes either that admittance is being denied or unreasonably delayed or that the premises or vehicle is unoccupied; or
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would endanger the life or safety of any person.
Defendant argues that since the upstairs portion of the premises was occupied, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-251 required that the officers place the premises under guard and await the return of Mr. Holloway, and that their forced entry was thus unauthorized. The suggested procedure would cause an unreasonable delay and is clearly not mandated by the statute.
Defendant further argues that the marijuana should be suppressed because marijuana was not listed as an item to be seized and because it was not in plain view. The marijuana was discovered while the officers were searching the premises for methaqualone pursuant to a search warrant. “When officers are conducting a valid search for one type of contraband, and find other types . . . , the law is not so unreasonable as to require them to turn their heads.” State v. Oldfield, 29 N.C. App. 131, 135, 223 S.E. 2d 569, 571, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 96, 225 S.E. 2d 325 (1976). The marijuana was properly seized when it was found during the search for methaqualone. The assignment of error is overruled.

IV

For the reasons set forth in part I of this opinion we hold that the trial court’s decision to deny defendant an opportunity to *500develop, even for purposes of the record on appeal, matters that could show that the person who issued the search warrant did not perform her function in a neutral and detached way was error. Defendant is entitled to a plenary hearing in an effort to support his contention, and this case is accordingly
Reversed and remanded.
Judge Hedrick dissents.
Judge Eagles concurs.

. The basis for the trial court’s decision is shown in the following excerpt from the Record:
Q. Now, did you have any type of social relationship with any of the officers?
Mr. Ashburn: Objection.
Court: Sustained.
Mr. Willardson: I think at this point this could be important to our motion. We think this goes to the heart of the matter.
*495Court: It is going to be a sad thing if a person’s personal life is going to be called into court. If that happened to me, I would quit, if I worked in the Clerk’s office — if I were called into court and had to be questioned about my personal life. That objection is sustained.
Mr. Willardson: I ask that it be answered for the record.
Court: I sustained the objection.
Mr. Willardson: Can she whisper the answer for the record?
Court: I sustained the objection.