Court Opinion

ID: 9521004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:55:04.810459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:29.348817
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge.
On October 21, 1977, G.L.W. filed a petition to establish paternity of her daughter, A.W., under IND.CODE § 31-4-1-1 et seq.1 Her petition alleged that T.R. was the father of A.W., and responsible for her support. Following trial by jury, a verdict was rendered in favor of TR.
On March 31, 1983, A.W., by her next friend, Lee Pearson, Director of the Noble County Welfare Department, filed a petition under IND.CODE § 81-6-6.1-1 et seq. alleging that TR. was her father. TR. filed a motion for summary judgment contending that this petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court denied this motion. On T.R.'s petition, this issue was certified for interlocutory appeal to this Court.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the same man can be prosecuted a second time for paternity where the same facts and legal issues have been fully litigated and resolved in his favor by a court of competent jurisdiction.
In order to apply the doctrine of res judicata, the following elements must be satisfied:
(1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits;
(3) the matter now in issue was, or might have been, determined in the former suit; and
(4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between parties to the present suit or their privies.
Williams v. Williams, (1981) Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 727, Gloss v. Continental Assur. Co., (1981) Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 126.
The only element at issue in this case concerns parties or their privies. At the time A.W.'s mother brought the original paternity action, mother and daughter were clearly in privity.
For purposes of issue preclusion, the element of privity contemplates a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights or interests which were the subject matter of prior adjudication. In Indiana, a " '[plrivy' is one who after rendition of the judgment has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment." Smith v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., (1972) 154 Ind.App. 259, at 269, 289 N.E.2d 788, at 793.
Under the paternity statute in effect at the time of G.L.W.'s 1977 lawsuit, paternity actions could be commenced by the mother as the child's representative for the purpose of recovering from the father a reasonable share of the child's necessary support. IND.CODE § 31-4-1-1 et seq. Under the present statute, the state or county departments of public welfare may *97also act as the illegitimate's representative in a suit to enforce support. See, IND. CODE § 31-6-6.1-2(b). Under either statute, the child is the real party in interest, and the purposes served by any representative is the same, i.e., to enforce the child's support.
The record clearly indicates that G.L.W. fully represented A.W.'s rights in the 1977 suit. This trial was held before a jury. Evidence was first presented by G.L.W., then by T.R., and finally rebutted by G.L W. The trial judge properly instructed the jury on the law, and a verdict finding that T.R. was not A.W.'s father was returned. The issue of paternity was not clouded by the possibility of compromise because of other issues to be decided, as might happen in a dissolution proceeding. The suit dealt exclusively with the question of paternity and the concomitant obligation of support in the event paternity was established. It is exactly this sort of case in which issue preclusion must be invoked. The issues now forwarded are identical to those forwarded in the 1977 suit, and liability in both cases is based on the same facts. The issues were fully and conclusively litigated in the first action and may not be relitigated.
Not only were the elements of issue preclusion present, but the policies favoring preclusion clearly outweigh the reasons for retrying this matter. First, courts favor the final repose of decisions. The purpose of our court system is to resolve disputes. If different parties representing the same interest are allowed to successively reliti-gate the same facts and issues, final judgment would become an illusive, if not unattainable goal.
Second, courts should promote policies which discourage inconsistent judgments. While relitigation of this case is not certain to produce contrary results, the possibility is not inconceivable.
Third, the need to avoid harassing litigation is a legitimate concern, worthy of consideration in barring subsequent suits. In 1977, TR. successfully defended the suit brought by A.W.'s mother, G.L.W., which was based on the same facts and legal issues now forwarded. T.R. now faces the same ordeal, embarrassment, and expense incurred in the 1977 suit. Were this a criminal matter, he would be protected by the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Indiana constitutions. It seems fundamentally unfair to make him run the same gambit a second time.
Finally, the failure to invoke preclusion in this case results in an unnecessary delay and additional burden on an already overcrowded court system. Seven years have passed since the original trial resolved this issue in T.R.'s favor.
From the child's perspective, the imposition of preclusion will not dilute any rights not already forwarded by her mother in the first suit. The present statute, by joining the mother, child, and putative father as necessary parties to paternity actions avoids the problem now considered. It does not, however, extend to the parties or their privies a new cause of action where their cases have been fully litigated under the prior statute.
For these reasons, the doctrine of issue preclusion bars retrial of this. case. The decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to grant T.R.'s motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
STATON, P.J., concurs.
GARRARD, J., dissents with opinion.

. Repealed by Acts 1978, P.L. 136, Section 57. See now, IND.CODE § 31-6-6.1-1 et seq.