Court Opinion

ID: 9732021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:05:25.141143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.574595
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
concurring and dissenting. The Court holds that defendant did not timely assert his privilege against self-incrimination because he “failed to appear for the deposition and, at the time, provided no explanation whatsoever. His silence does not constitute an assertion of the privilege.” The Court goes on to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under V.R.E. 401-403, distinguishing State v. Benneig, 146 Vt. 391, 505 A.2d 1192 (1985). For the reasons that follow, I do not agree that the Court’s analysis adequately addresses defendant’s claims in Part II of its opinion and, therefore, I concur in Part 11(A) and dissent in Part 11(B).
Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting the court to prohibit the State from calling Duncan Kilmartin, a *28lawyer representing Co-operative Fire Insurance Association of Vermont, the fire-loss carrier. According to the motion, the purpose of Mr. Kilmartin’s testimony was to inform the jury that defendant, several weeks after he had been charged with arson, did not appear at a noticed deposition to answer questions about the fire. Defendant’s first claim was that such evidence was irrelevant and, if relevant, unduly prejudicial. V.R.E. 401-403. He also raised the Vermont Constitution, Chapter I, Article 10, as a bar to such evidence. The State sought to introduce the evidence because, as the prosecutor argued at the motion hearing, defendant “didn’t want to talk about this fire because he did it.” The trial court ruled that the evidence had some relevance and that Article 10 did not come directly into play. It did not indicate that a V.R.E. 403 balancing was undertaken.
Mr. Kilmartin was allowed to testify. He stated that he sent a letter to defendant on January 6, 1987, requesting him to appear at an examination under oath in accordance with his fire insurance policy, which required the insured to cooperate with the insurer. The letter instructed defendant to appear at Kilmartin’s office on January 28, 1987, and warned him that noncooperation might “cause forfeiture of all his rights under the policy.” Defendant did not appear on January 28 and did not communicate with Kilmartin as to why not. The following day, January 29, defendant was sent a letter informing him that his policy had been voided due to his noncooperation. Kilmartin did not thereafter communicate with defendant nor defendant with him.
I.
Chapter I, Article 10 provides, in relevant part:
[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person . . . [cannot] be compelled to give evidence against himself....
This prohibition does not render inadmissible a “statement that is freely and voluntarily given, without any compelling influence.” State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 70, 258 A.2d 815, 824 (1969). When a statement is procured by a representative of the State, its admissibility against the defendant under Article 10 depends on compliance with Miranda. State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. *29347, 355 n.11, 534 A.2d 198, 204 n.11 (1987) (“evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is also in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination in Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution.”).
These Article 10 considerations simply did not arise in this case. First, Duncan Kilmartin was not an agent of the State, and defendant was not in custody as a result of anything Kilmartin did. He merely represented a private insurance company, and his purpose was to carry out the investigative function under defendant’s insurance contract. The fact that Mr. Kilmartin would undoubtedly turn over any results of his investigation to the prosecution does not trigger Article 10. See State v. Killary, 133 Vt. 604, 606, 349 A.2d 216, 217 (1975) (any statement given spontaneously and voluntarily without any compelling influences is admissible into evidence, even if given to an undercover agent, as long as the agent was not “planted” for the sole purpose of investigating the accused). Second, representing a private interest, Mr. Kilmartin was not required to issue Miranda warnings to defendant prior to asking him questions about the fire.
II.
The crux of defendant’s claim is the law of relevancy. V.R.E. 402 states, “Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” V.R.E. 401 provides:
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
The test of relevancy involves the application of logic, common sense, and experience, and for purposes of this inquiry raises the question, “Is the evidence probative of the proposition for which it is offered?” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.E. 401, at 334.
Here, the evidence that defendant did not show up at the insurance deposition was claimed to be probative of the proposition that defendant “didn’t want to talk about this fire because he did it.” The weakness of the probative value of this evidence for a proper evidentiary purpose, however, is readily apparent.
The logic employed by the prosecution is quite simple. A person’s silence under circumstances when an innocent person *30would ordinarily speak is evidence of guilt. The silence is viewed as a statement tending to inculpate. An example illustrates this proposition. X, who has just shot Y, is asked, “Why did you shoot Y?” X says nothing. At trial, the defense is self-defense. X’s silence is evidence tending to prove that the shooting was not in self-defense because had it been X would have said so when asked why.
We know, however, that not only guilty people are silent in the face of an accusation. Just about everyone has heard of “Miranda rights” and knows at least that “you have a right to remain silent.” The standard lawyer’s advice to defendant clients — innocent as well as guilty — is to refrain from discussing the case with anyone until and if there is reason to do so. The strength of the inference that defendant would have answered Kilmartin’s questions if he had been innocent is sapped by the competing explanation that, having been charged with arson several weeks before the scheduled deposition, defendant would not be so naive as to submit to an insurance deposition.
State v. Benneig, 146 Vt. 391, 397-98, 505 A.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1985), is instructive. There, a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination and refusal to answer questions about his involvement were, we held, “simply not relevant, probative evidence.” The defense in Benneig argued, as the State argues here, that guilt may be inferred from silence. The court prohibited the defense from arguing to the jury that the witness had a guilty mind and even instructed the jury that no inferences may be drawn from the witness’s silence.
We were clear in Benneig that a refusal to answer questions about a matter that might tend to incriminate the witness was “simply not evidence” and quoted with approval a Michigan case, People v. Diaz, 98 Mich. App. 675, 684, 296 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1980):
As a matter of public policy, we believe the exercise of a witness’s constitutional right to remain silent should not be used as evidence to support an inference for either side. Such an inference is wholly speculative since it rests on litigants’ perception of juries’ foibles. A jury may infer the refusal to testify is a confession implicating defendant or may somehow believe defendant was not involved since his accomplice would not testify. Neither inference is desirable *31because the former is obviously prejudicial to defendants while the latter inference cannot be combated by the truth testing device of cross-examination due to the constitutional rights of the witness. Nor can the evidence be termed “relevant evidence”. Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . . The wholly speculative inference advanced by defendant does not make the existence of any fact of consequence more probable or less probable.
It is certainly no point of distinction to hold, as the Court holds today, that defendant here did not claim his privilege as the witness in Benneig did. The probative value of defendant’s silence would have been no different if he had responded to Mr. Kilmartin’s invitation to come to his office but refused to answer questions while there. Defendant was under no legal compulsion to attend the deposition. He had every right to decline the invitation; no R.S.V.P. was needed. His decision not to attend may have been motivated by the entirely legitimate purpose of refraining from discussing with Mr. Kilmartin the crime with which he was charged. Thus, it would not “have been ‘natural’ for the person to have come forward with the exculpatory information under the circumstances.” People v. Cetlinski, 435 Mich. 742, 760, 460 N.W.2d 534, 542-43 (1990).
The point to be gleaned from Benneig is that it is impermissible to encourage the jury to infer guilt from silence in the face of accusatory interrogatories. If the accused — guilty or innocent — did not have the right to remain silent in such circumstances, then silence would be relevant evidence. The privilege against self-incrimination strips silence of its otherwise probative worth, and we can no longer say that the circumstances are such that an innocent person would speak. We cannot know in the face of the right of silence whether silence is indicative of guilt because both the guilty and innocent have the right to remain silent. To infer that silence means guilt assumes too much. Silence, when one is legally entitled to be silent, is equivocal behavior at best. Benneig’s rationale cannot be distinguished as the Court would wish.
*32This is not a case where defendant’s silence was used to impeach his credibility. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1980) (fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege not violated when prosecution impeaches defendant with pre-arrest silence, but a state may prohibit such evidence as more unduly prejudicial than probative); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (same effect when post-arrest silence is used to impeach defendant’s credibility). No United States Supreme Court case has yet to allow evidence of one’s silence to be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
I am mindful that trial courts have broad discretion in making relevancy determinations under V.R.E. 401. E.g., State v. Hooper, 151 Vt. 42, 46, 557 A.2d 880, 882 (1988); cases cited in Reporter’s Notes, V.R.E. 401, at 334-35. Even if Benneig is wrong in its analysis of the relevancy of silence, the discretion to admit marginally relevant evidence is narrowed by V.R.E. 403. That rule states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Thus, we have held that evidence of prior convictions, admissible to impeach credibility under V.R.E. 609, must be balanced against the chilling effect on defendant’s right to testify. State v. Jarrett, 143 Vt. 191, 194, 465 A.2d 238, 240 (1983); see also State v. Percy, 146 Vt. 475, 483-84, 507 A.2d 955, 960 (1986) (expert opinion that rapists typically claim consent or amnesia not admissible, even if relevant, because its probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).
That the Kilmartin testimony engendered unfair prejudice to defendant was obvious. The testimony was an implicit comment, during the State’s case-in-chief, on defendant’s failure to come forward before trial and deny his guilt. Defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination was adversely affected because he would naturally feel compelled to testify in order to rebut any inference that he was hiding the truth. Had he not taken the stand, defendant would have been doubly disadvantaged. First, he would have left the jury with no legitimate reason for his not attending the deposition, and second, the jury would be *33left with the impression — reinforced by his pretrial silence— that defendant at trial had something to hide. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (pressure to testify in the face of adverse comment if defendant remains silent undermines the privilege “by making its assertion costly”). Moreover, the Kilmartin testimony was introduced both to attack defendant’s credibility and to show his consciousness of guilt — areas we have previously identified as most critical in demonstrating unfair prejudice. State v. Valley, 153 Vt. 380, 387, 571 A.2d 579, 583 (1989).
The Court does not address these considerations at all, let alone indicate what rationale would support the trial court’s ruling in face of them. The Court merely incants the abuse-of-discretion boilerplate and leaves the application of the incantation to the facts of this case a mystery for the reader to figure out.
The Court’s reliance on United States v. Nabors, 707 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1983), to justify the admission of defendant’s silence is misplaced. Nabors leased an airplane, which was flown, landed, and burned by a man named Warner. The plane contained marijuana. Warner testified against Nabors saying defendant hired him to smuggle the marijuana into the United States. In its case-in-chief, the prosecution presented evidence that Nabors did not respond to an insurance company’s request, which was sent one and one-half years before Nabors was indicted, concerning Nabor’s involvement in the use of, and damage to, the airplane. The court ruled the evidence did not violate defendant’s privilege under the fifth amendment. The court noted that “Nabors objected and appealed purely on fifth amendment grounds” and stated, “We decide the constitutional issue on the assumption that the evidence was relevant.” Id. at 1298. The court acknowledged that “[t]he constitutionality of admitting the evidence is difficult to decide.” Id. Thus, the issue I discuss here was not before the court in Nabors, and its analysis assumes that Nabors’ silence somehow was relevant evidence. The Nabors court said:
We need not concern ourselves as to whether there were innocent explanations for this action that rob it of evidentiary value. None were argued.
*34Id. at 1299. Finally, Nabors did not address a balancing under F.R.E. 403, apparently because it was not raised.
There is no doubt in my mind that defendant was greatly and unfairly prejudiced by the Kilmartin testimony and admitting it in the face of V.R.E. 403 was an abuse of discretion. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.