Court Opinion

ID: 9725791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:10:34.184121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.814265
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SULLIVAN, dissenting: For several reasons I am in disagreement with the majority concerning certain aspects of its opinion. First, it appears to me that it has not been established that the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards were applicable to the seagoing vessel involved here (a river towboat). The only evidence in this regard came from McLean — plaintiff’s expert witness — who gave opinions over objections that the standards applied to seagoing vessels and that the ladders in question here were unsafe because they failed to meet three of the ANSI standards for fixed ladders. However, the record discloses that McLean was an industrial engineer who, while having considerable experience in the design and construction of industrial plants and some experience with fixed ladders in such plants, had no experience or training in the design or construction of fixed ladders on river towboats or any other seagoing vessels. In fact, McLean admitted that his only knowledge concerning such fixed ladders was from visual observation of them. Moreover, from McLean’s testimony, it appears that the ANSI standards for fixed ladders apply only to industrial usage. He testified that the ANSI was “a group of people who have collected these various standards from industry. *** They simply have codified under one group that is known as the American National Standards Group all of the standards that are used in industry today, and they have been very active since about 1970.” On another occasion, he testified that ANSI was formed “to coordinate all of the several standards that have been adopted in industry generally,” and although plaintiff argues that McLean was qualified to give the opinions in question on the basis that he had extensive experience in marine engineering, it is noted that he had never been involved in the design or construction of any seagoing vessel and, as noted above, his only knowledge concerning fixed ladders on seagoing vessels was his visual observation of them. It thus is my belief that foundation for McLean’s opinions was lacking and that the objections thereto should have been sustained. Secondly, even if the American standards were applicable to seagoing vessels, it is clear that they did not become effective until 1970, and there is nothing in the testimony of McLean or elsewhere in the record indicating that they applied to a seagoing vessel constructed in 1952, as was the case here. McLean did testify that in 1970, when ANSI was created, it adopted the American Standards Association recommendations for ladders, but he did not state what those recommendations were, when they were adopted or whether they applied to seagoing vessels, and particularly he did not state that they were in effect in 1952. Thus, since there was no foundation for McLean’s testimony that the ANSI standards were applicable to seagoing vessels and, further, because there is nothing in the record to support their applicability to a vessel constructed prior to 1970, the testimony concerning them should not have been admitted. Thirdly, McLean’s testimony as to the ANSI variances should not have been admitted for the further reason that there was no testimony from it or any other witness relating plaintiff’s fall to any of these variances; namely, that the ladder was too narrow, that it was too close to the bulkhead, and that the ladder centerline was not in the middle of its width. The only testimony by plaintiff as to his fall was as follows: On direct examination, he said that while transferring over to the other ladder, “my right foot was coming on there and as I remember, I slipped then.” Subsequently, on his direct examination, after plaintiff testified that in transferring to the other ladder he put his left foot down first and then put his right foot up, his attorney then asked, “When you put your right foot up, I take it you put it on one of the rungs?” and he answered, “Yes.” The next question asked by his counsel was, “How did that feel?” and he answered, “Well I guess slippery. I slipped.” Thereafter, on cross-examination, when asked what happened when he was trying to swing over with his right foot, he answered, “My right foot, apparently slipped and my hand too, whatever. I don’t know exactly.” Thus, it appears clear that the only reason plaintiff gave for falling was that his foot slipped because the rung was slippery, and there thus is nothing in his or any other testimony that any of the ANSI variances testified to by McLean was a proximate cause of his fall. While, as stated by the majority, citing Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 74, 79, 117 N.E.2d 74, 78, proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, the court in Ney, which involved a statutory violation, also pointed out that “[t]he injury must have a direct and proximate connection with the violation of the statute before liability will be held to exist.” The same rule, of course, would apply to ANSI variances, and because there was no testimony connecting plaintiff’s injury to any of the variances, the admission of McLean’s opinion concerning them was erroneous. Because plaintiff’s counsel argued at length, in closing arguments, that defendant was negligent and the vessel in question unseaworthy because of the variances and that at least one of them was a proximate cause of his injuries, it is my belief that defendant was so prejudiced by the improper admission of McLean’s testimony concerning the variances that a new trial is required. I also disagree with the majority concerning the propriety of the verdict forms submitted to the jury. As stated by the majority, the trial court informed the jury that they should use “Verdict Form A” (IPI Civil 2d No. 45.01) if they found no contributory negligence; but, if they found there was a combination of negligence and contributory negligence, they should use “Verdict Form C”1 (IPI Civil 2d No. A45.06 (Supp. 1981).) “A” is as follows: “We, the Jury, find for the plaintiff and against the defendant. We assess the damages in the sum of $__” The first three paragraphs of “C” read as follows: “We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and against all of the defendant(s) and further find the following: First: Without taking into consideration the question of reduction of damages due to the negligence of the plaintiff, *** [we assess plaintiff’s damages in the sum of] $__ Second: Assuming that 100% represents the total combined negligence of the plaintiff and of the defendant(s) [or the unseaworthiness of defendant’s vessel,] we find that the percentage of negligence *** attributable solely to the plaintiff is_percent (%). Third: After reducing the total damages sustained by the plaintiff by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, we assess plaintiff’s recoverable damages in the sum of$__” In Hunter v. Sukkar (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 169, 443 N.E.2d 774, where “C” was given, plaintiff asserted error because IPI Civil 2d No. A45.09 (which is the equivalent of “A”) was not given. The court found that the giving of “C” was appropriate whenever the negligence of plaintiff was an issue, and under such circumstances there was no need to give “A”. In the cases cited by plaintiff and relied upon by the majority, the propriety of giving those two verdict forms was neither at issue nor discussed. In Stromquist v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 37, 444 N.E.2d 1113, the trial court refused a special verdict form but gave a general verdict form to the jury. Neither was identified as to content in the opinion. This court found that the special verdict form was properly refused because it was defective, and held that the use of a general verdict form was proper where it adequately charges the jury. In Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 450 N.E.2d 1199, defendant alleged error in the refusal of a non-IPI computational comparative negligence verdict form. Given were IPI Civil 2d No. A45.05 (1981 Supp.) (outlining how to reduce damages if there is contributory negligence) and a modified IPI general verdict form (IPI Civil 2d No. A45.09 (Supp. 1981)) (not set forth in the opinions). This court, noting that defendant did not object to either of them, found that the refusal of the non-IPI computational form was not error since the combination of IPI A45.05 and the modified IPI A45.09 was adequate for the jury to reach a verdict. In Coleman v. Hermann (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 448, 452 N.E.2d 620, the trial court refused plaintiffs general verdict form (IPI Civil 2d No. A45.09 (Supp. 1981)), and gave defendant’s non-IPI special verdict form, which set forth five separate issues, each calling for a yes or no answer by the jury. At issue was whether defendant’s instruction violated section 2 — 1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1108). This court found that under the circumstances of the case, the verdict form as submitted was error, but held it to be harmless because there was no prejudice to plaintiff since under the circumstances there, “the submission of what was, in form, a special verdict but, in substance, a general verdict” satisfied the requirement of section 2 — 1108, that the jury “shall render a general verdict.” The problem I see in the instant case is that “A” and “C” are both general verdict forms in that each provides for a finding in favor of plaintiff and the assessment of damages against defendant. A finding for plaintiff would be accomplished in “C” by the jury’s use of “zero” as the percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff. The submission of two such general verdict forms, each allowing the assessment of full damages against defendant, is improper and, adhering to the reasoning in Hunter v. Sukkar (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 169, 443 N.E.2d 774, I believe where — as here — plaintiff’s negligence was in issue, that only “C” (IPI Civil 2d No. A45.06), should have been given; but not “A”, which was IPI Civil 2d No. A45.01. As stated in the “Notes on Use” under IPI Civil 2d No. A45.06, at 37 (1981 Supp.), “[wjhere there is no issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, IPI 45.01 or 45.03 should be used.” For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for a new trial.  “Verdict Form B” was the second half of IPI Civil 2d No. 45.01 providing for a finding for defendant and against plaintiff.