Court Opinion

ID: 9849602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:07.652664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.714670
License: Public Domain

TOAL, Justice:
I respectfully dissent, believing that this case ought to be reversed.
Essentially, the majority finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed error granting summary judgment on a finding that the Department of Mental Health had no duty to warn grandmother that it was releasing mother. The majority rightly concludes that the Department had specific knowledge that mother was a threat to grandmother. Further, the majority finds that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting Rogers v. South Carolina Department of Parole & Community Corrections, 320 S.C. 253, 464 S.E.2d 330 (1995) to require a specific threat made while mother was in custody. Nevertheless, the majority upholds, on the ground of intervening negligence of grandmother, the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
It is improper for the majority to base its holding .on intervening negligence inasmuch as this issue is procedurally barred. In fact, a double preservation sin is being committed here. First, the issue of intervening negligence was not raised to, or addressed by, the trial court. See Medlin v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.C. 195, 480 S.E.2d 739 (1997) (Issue not ruled upon by the trial court is procedurally barred.). Second, the issue was never raised to, *93or briefed for, this Court. See State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981) (An issue not argued in the appellant’s brief is deemed abandoned.). Certainly, under Rule 220(c), SCACR, the appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, or judgment upon any ground appearing in the record on appeal. However, here we do not have any ground in the record to justify affirmance. The issue has not been raised legally, nor has it really been developed factually. If there has not been factual development about grandmother’s negligence, on what basis can this Court affirm? To make a factual determination, there must be facts before us. To suggest that we may affirm on the basis of the mere allegations of the parties is to impermissibly expand the scope of Rule 220(c). With its decision, the majority has, in effect, changed Rule 220(c) from affirmance on the basis of “any” ground in the record, to affirmance on the basis of “no” ground in the record.
However, even if we assume that this Court may properly reach the issue of intervening negligence, it is improper for us to rule upon the issue as a matter of law because it is quintessentially a question of fact. See Dixon v. Besco Engineering, Inc., 320 S.C. 174, 463 S.E.2d 636 (Ct.App.1995) (Whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection is a question for the fact-finder.); Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 316 S.C. 479, 450 S.E.2d 609 (Ct.App.1994) (The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk ordinarily present questions of fact for the jury, and only rarely become questions of law for the court to determine. The same thing may be said of the defense of intervening third-party negligence.).
The majority declares that the evidence is susceptible of only one inference. To the contrary, there are at least two other reasonable inferences. Although there is little to no evidence of grandmother’s negligence, there is evidence that grandmother may have acted reasonably. The one fact that may clearly be derived from the record is that grandmother had been threatened. The mental examination report, prepared by a licensed physician, states: “[Mother] is a danger to her mom [i.e. grandmother] and her daughter. Threatened mom last pm.” Another medical report states: “Possibly into satanism. Threatened mother and daughter.” Further, “Threatened daughter & mother last night. ‘Put me in the *94hospital and I’ll kill you.’ ” Because grandmother had been threatened (even with death), we may well infer that she could have still felt intimidated of mother, even after her release, and that she gave up the child to mother for fear of harm.
Alternatively, we may infer that when grandmother learned that the Department had released mother, she could assume that the Department had correctly diagnosed and treated mother. It is alleged that mother, after her release, visited with grandmother for several hours. Perhaps mother was acting normally during these hours, leading grandmother to conclude that mother had been treated by the Department. On this basis, grandmother may have allowed mother to take the child.
Accordingly, whether grandmother allowed the child to be taken by mother because she was intimidated, or whether she felt mother had been treated, is a factual question that must be determined on remand by a jury on the basis of evidence to be presented, and not by this Court on the basis of a factually undeveloped record.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand this matter for trial.
WALLER, J., concurs.