Court Opinion

ID: 9827877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:54:16.488322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:29.593415
License: Public Domain

WALKER, J.
I concur with my Brethren in overruling appellant’s assignments of error, but I respectfully dissent from their construction of Wright v. Macdonnell, 88 Tex. 140, 30 S. W. 907. The proposition announced by them:
“Where the title is reserved expressly in lessee and time for its removal stipulated, the failure to remove within the time stipulated, in the absence of any provisions for forfeiture, does not forfeit the property or divest the title out of lessee, but subjects him to pay whatever damages may be suffered by the lessor by reason of delay in removal. In such cases the provision for removal in a given time gives the lessee the right to remove his property free from any liability for and during that time, •but if he fails to remove same, his failure does not lose the title to the property, but would subject him only to pay whatever damages may result from its removal later”
—certainly has no support in that case. The contract discussed by Chief Justice Gaines in Wright v. Macdonnell reserved in lessee the title to the improvements placed on the leased premises under its terms. The Supreme Court expressly recognized that the title to such improvements was subject to forfeiture if not removed within the time allowed by law for their removal. Chief Justice Gaines said:
*160“How long the plaintiff could have left the property upon the land without forfeiting his right' to remove it, we need not determine.”
If the Supreme Court had entertained the view o.f law now expressed by the majority of this court, as evidenced by the proposition which I have just quoted, doubtless they would have said that, inasmuch as the title to this property was reserved in the lessee, the failure to remove it within the time allowed by law did not work a forfeiture, because the contract did not contain a clause declaring forfeiture. They did not so declare the law, but said:
“In the absence of a special stipulation to the contrary, fixtures placed upon the demised premises by the tenant are personal property, subject, however, to become parts of the realty, if not removed by him during the time allowed him by law for their removal.”
. On authority of the proposition just quoted, this court reversed and remanded T. & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Clevenger, 223 S. W. 1036, with instructions to the district court to retry it on the law as stated in that proposition. This disposition of that case met with the unanimous approval of the court as then constituted. As I understand the proposition now advanced, they are in direct conflict with our holding in the Clevenger Case. Possibly they would distinguish Wright v. Macdonnell and Railway Co. v. Clevenger on the ground that, while the contracts in those cases recognized .that the improvements were personal property belonging to the lessees with right of removal, such title was not “reserved expressly.” If so, I cannot agree with them in that distinction. The legal effect of the contract is the same, whether its conditions are “reserved expressly” or such conditions must necessarily follow from a construction of the language used. It is only using different language to express the same idea. So, as I construe the contracts in Wright v. Macdonnell and in Railway Co. v. Clevenger, the title to the improvements was “reserved expressly” in the lessees.
As I understand the law, improvements placed on these premises with the right of removal are subject to forfeiture if not removed within the time allowed by law. The law reads into contracts of this character a clause declaring a forfeiture. This provision of the law must be waived by the terms of the contract. This is the converse of the proposition advanced by my Brethren. It is their position that the right of forfeiture does not exist unless expressly reserved.
However, as I agree with them in an af-firmance of the case on other grounds, I shall not further discuss this issue nor its application to the contract involved in this case. In view of the fact that they have given this proposition such prominence in their opinion, I thought it proper to make my own position clear; hence I enter this dissent.