Court Opinion

ID: 9833356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:39:04.324962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:01.924198
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On a former day of the present term of this court, as shown by our original opinion filed in this cause, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered that the cause be remanded for further proceedings.
As a full statement of the cause and the result of the trial appears in our original opinion, it is not necessary to restate the same here.
Since the filing of our original opinion counsel for appellee has filed an able and convincing motion for rehearing.
As stated in our former opinion, the sole question submitted for our determination is, Did the trial court err in holding that S. Arai, as the qualified administrator of the estate of Simon Siro,, had no such interest in the subject-matter, the estate, as would authorize him to contest the probate of the purported will of Siro, which was offered for probate, and upon such holding sustaining appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction of the court?
■ Counsel for appellee in his motion for rehearing again, as he did in the trial court and in his brief in this court, contends that Arai, as administrator only, had no such “interest” in the estate of Siro, as that term is used in article 3315 of our Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, as would entitle him to contest the probate of the purported will of Siro offered for probate, and that therefore the trial court did not err in sustaining ap-pellee’s plea to the jurisdiction of the court.
After reviewing the opinions in the cases of Pena y Vidaurri’s Estate v. Bruni (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 315, and the cases (therein cited; Thompson v. Dodge (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 586; Daniels v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 224 S. W. 476, 477; Haines v. Little (Tex. Civ. App.) 242 S. W. 266; Abrams v. Ross’ Estate (Tex. Com. App.) 250 S. W. 1019; Moore v. Stark, 118 Tex. 565, 17 S.W.(2d) 1037; Estate of Parsons, 63 Cal. 240, 3 P. 817; John W. Bralliel v. Reuther, 270 Mo. 603, 193 S. W. 283 — cited by counsel for appellee and commented upon in his motion for rehearing, we have reached the conclusion that we erred in holding, as we did in our original opinion, that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction of the court, and upon such holding reversing the trial court’s judgment.
In Pena y Vidaurri’s Estate v. Bruni (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 315, the court held that the expression “person interested” used in article 3315, Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, includes only him who either absolutely or contingently is entitled to share in the estate or the proceeds thereof, as husband, wife, legatee, next of kin, heir, devisee, etc.; that it is apparent from the wording of the statute that a person authorized to contest the probate of a will must be interested in the estate.
In Moore v. Stark, 118 Tex. 565,17 S.W.(2d) 1037,1041, the court said:
“Article 3315 of our statute concerning estates of decedents provides: ‘Any person interested in an estate may, at any time before any character of proceeding is decided upon by the court, file opposition thereto, in writing, and shall be entitled to process for witnesses and evidence, and - to be heard upon such opposition as in other suits.’ This is but a concrete statement of the universal rule of parties that no person will be permitted to maintain a proceeding without showing an interest in the subject-matter thereof. * * *
“In Abrams et al. v. Ross’ Estate et al., *386250 S. W. 1019, the Commission of Appeals, through Presiding Judge Gallagher, said:
“ ‘Obviously the burden is upon every person appearing to oppose the probate of a will to allege, and, if required; to prove, that he has some interest in the estate of the testator which will be affected by such will if admitted to probate. In the absence of such interest a contestant is a mere meddlesome intruder.’ * * *
“In Dickson v. Dickson, 5 S.W.(2d) 744, Presiding Judge Short, for the Commission of Appeals, cited, with approval, the Abrams v, Ross Case and other cases holding that such interest entitling one to contest the probate of a will means that such person would but for the will have an interest in the estate. This evidently is the common-sense-meaning of this statute. The interest to be protected is the right that would otherwise be jeopardized. One who confessedly would receive no benefit from the court’s decision cannot invoke its judgment.”
We think it clear that Judge Fly, writing the opinions for the San Antonio Court, in the two cases of Pena y Vidaurri’s Estate v. Bruni and Thompson v. Dodge, supra, in effect held that no one except those who had an interest in the estate itself, or its proceeds, can contest a will offered for probate, and in the latter said that the fact that the administrator might be interested to the extent of such fees and commissions as he might earn, if the administration should be continued, would not constitute him a “person interested” in the estate as that term is used in article 3315 of our Civil Statutes.of 1925.
Upon a reconsideration of the case of Drew v. Jarvis cited in our original opinion, we have concluded that the facts of that case do not entitle it to the construction we gave it in our original opinion, when applied to the facts of the present case.
The writer, while entertaining grave doubts as to our duty to affirm the judgment of the trial court, persuaded by the authorities cited, joins his associates in the conclusion that we erred in ordering the judgment reversed by our original opinion, and, since such conclusion has been reached, the motion of ap-pellee for a rehearing is granted and our former judgment is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Granted.