Court Opinion

ID: 9714608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:41:24.566689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.961219
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Jackson, J.
I am unable to concur in the majority opinion and dissent thereto.
Appellant was charged by indictment with the crime of first degree murder, said indictment reading in pertinent part as follows:
“The Grand Jury of the County of Grant, State of Indiana, upon their oath do present that GLENN EVERETT STEWART and EDITH LOUISE SCHMIDT, on the 7th day of May, 1966, at the County of Grant, State of Indiana, did unlawfully, feloniously and purposely and with premeditated malice, kill and murder one LARRY LEE SCHMIDT, by then and there unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and with premeditated malice, stabbing said LARRY LEE SCHMIDT through his heart with a sharp instrument as a result of which stabbing and wound the said LARRY LEE SCHMIDT did then and there die, being contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.”
On May 27, 1966, warrants were issued out of the Grant Circuit Court for the arrest of the defendants so named in the indictment. On June 9, 1966, the Grant Circuit Court issued the following order:
“Court being duly advised that it has the duty to guarantee fair trial from prejudicial publicity and the cause herein has received certain publicity, court now issues contempt order herein prohibiting counsel involved, Prosecuting Attorney of Grant County, Indiana, and Law Enforcement Agencies of Grant County, Indiana, from communicating with or making public statements to news-media on any aspect concerning probably evidentiary matter of this cause herein for purpose of insuring judicial processes against any prejudicial outside interferences.”
On June 20, 1966, appellant filed her answer in abatement, said plea in pertinent part reads as follows:
*459“Defendant Edith Louise Schmidt, for her pleá in abate-ment, says that:
1. The indictment herein charges her and Glenn Everett Stewart with the murder of her husband, Larry Lee Schmidt.
2. On or about 24 May 1966 Ted Null, Marion police chief, stated to all available news media that she was involved in said murder. Most news media in Indiana reported this announcement; the newspapers and radio and television stations in Grant County gave it special prominence.
3. 8 June 1966 said Null called a press conference at police headquarters in Marion City Hall. At this televised press conference, Null and Stewart’s attorney told the assembled reporters and the television audience that a polygraph test had conclusively proven Stewart’s innocence and this defendant’s guilt.
4. News media in Grant County include two daily newspapers, the Marion Leader-Tribune and the Marion Chronicle, radio stations WBAT and WMRI, and television station WTAF. These news media reach virtually every adult resident of Grant County.
5. News media from elsewhere in Indiana also reach most adult residents of this county.
6. Station WTAF, Marion, televised and telecast the aforesaid news conference. Most news media in Indiana carried full reports of said conference, including the prejudicial statements of Null and said attorney. Newspapers and stations in Grant County gave special prominence to these reports and statements.
7. This improper, televised press conference called by said Null, and conducted by him and Stewart’s attorney at Marion City Hall, amounted to a public kangaroo trial of this defendant effectively designed to prejudice potential jurors against her and to deprive her of her constitutional right to a fair trial, by an impartial jury, in this county.
8. In consequence of the foregoing, an impartial jury could not now be impanelled for the trial of this defendant.
9. The misconduct of said Null, as chief of Marion police, and the prejudicial statements and reports aforesaid, have effectively denied this defendant her constitutional right to a fair trial, by an impartial jury, in Grant County.
WHEREFORE said defendant asks abatement of this action and all other proper relief.”
*460The State filed its motion to strike appellant’s answer in abatement on June 23, 1966. Said motion to strike was overruled by the court on July 5, 1966. On July 15, 1966, the State filed its demurrer to appellant’s answer in abatement, said demurrer reading in pertinent part as follows:
“Plaintiff STATE OF INDIANA demurs to the ANSWER IN ABATEMENT filed by defendant EDITH LOUISE SCHMIDT for the reason that said ANSWER does not state facts sufficient to abate the action stated in the Indictment.

Memoranda

Defendant’s Answer in Abatement is addressed solely to the point that publicity given the crime allegedly committed by the defendant has not prevented her from receiving a fair trial in Grant County, Indiana. First of all, defendant should not be permitted to claim such prejudicial publicity since defendant herself gave birth to the publicity which the case has had. Secondly, if the action is abated, the defendant would be then free from any further action in this case since the publicity can hardly now be retracted and erased from the minds of those who read and heard it. Thirdly, publicity given to such a crime does not constitute grounds for abatement of a criminal action; if defendant feels she cannot have a fair trial in Grant County, Indiana, she can seek change of venue to some other county.”
The court sustained the State’s demurrer to appellant’s answer in abatement on August 5, 1966.
On November 3, 1966, defendant Stewart filed his motion for severance, and the court granted him a separate trial.
On December 2, 1966, appellant filed her motion to suppress evidence, said motion reading in pertinent part as follows:

“MOTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

Defendant Edith Louise Schmidt respectfully shows the Court that:
1. On or about 23 May 1966 the Sheriff of White County, Tennessee, arrested her without a warrant, and took her to the White County Jail, in Sparta, Tennessee. The investigation of an alleged murder then focused upon her.
*4612. Defendant was then held a prisoner, in custody at said Jail. Then and there said Sheriff and policemen from Marion, Indiana, interrogated her at length.
3. At the outset of such interrogation, she was not informed, in clear and unequivocal terms, that she had a right to remain silent.
4. At the outset of such interrogation, she was not warned that anything she said could be used against her in Court.
5. At the outset of such interrogation, she was not clearly informed that she had a right to confer with an attorney before questioning, and to have the attorney with her during interrogation.
6. At the outset of such interrogation, she was not informed that if she was indigent a lawyer would be appointed for her prior to any questioning.
7. In the circumstances, the interrogation of this defendant violated her privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
8. Throughout such interrogation, this defendant was denied her right to counsel, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
9. Said defendant did not waive any of her constitutional rights.
10. During the afternoon of said day the aforesaid policemen, by artful lies, trickery, and deceit, persuaded defendant to sign certain waivers. By falsely saying they only wanted her as a material witness, and would not bring charges against her, they induced her to waive extradition. They then brought her to the police station in Marion, Indiana, and later that night temporarily released her to her brother.
11. Early the next morning Marion policemen rearrested her without a warrant and took her back to the police station. The investigation of the alleged murder then focused upon her again.
12. Defendant was then held a prisoner at said police station, and policemen then and there interrogated her relentlessly for more than seven hours.
13. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not informed, in clear and unequivocal terms, that she had a right to remain silent.
14. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not warned that anything she said could be used against her in Court.
*46215. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not clearly informed that she had a right to confer with an attorney before questioning, and to have the attorney with her during interrogation.
16. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not informed that if she was indigent a lawyer would be appointed for her prior to any questioning.
17. In the circumstances, this interrogation of defendant violated her privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
18. Throughout this interrogation, defendant was denied her right to counsel, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
19. Before and at this interrogation, she did not waive any of her constitutional rights.
20. The State then filed a preliminary charge of first-degree murder against her, and she was taken to Marion City Court, which held a hearing on said preliminary charge. At this hearing, said Court remanded her to the Grant County Jail.
21. The next morning, 25 May, Marion police took defendant to their police station and again questioned her at length.
22. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not informed, in clear and unequivocal terms, that she had a right to remain silent.
28. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not warned that anything she said could be used against her in Court.
24. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not clearly informed that she had a right to confer with an attorney before questioning, and to have the attorney with her during interrogation.
25. At the outset of this interrogation, she was not informed that if she was indigent a lawyer would be appointed for her prior to any questioning.
26. In the circumstances, this interrogation of defendant violated her privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
27. Throughout this interrogation, and at the aforesaid preliminary hearing, defendant was denied her right to counsel, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
28. Before and at this interrogation, she did not waive any of her constitutional rights.
*46329. Before and during all these interrogations, and at said hearing, and until 11:00 A.M. on 25 May 1966, defendant had no attorney to advise and represent her. During these interrogations, she neither had the opportunity nor the funds to hire an attorney, and none was assigned to her.
30. During these interrogations, she may have made one or more statements.
WHEREFORE said defendant asks that any statements and other evidence elicited from her on 23 May, 24 May, and 25 May 1966 be suppressed, and not be used against her or any other person, and that she be granted all other proper relief.”
The court overruled appellant’s motion to suppress on December 12, 1966.
On November 25, 1966, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime as charged and requested a trial by jury. Appellant, on November 28, 1966, filed her affidavit for change of venue from Grant County, and the court granted this motion the next day. Venue was changed to Jay County, and the court ordered the clerk to send to Jay County a transcript of all the proceedings herein, together with all pleadings and papers filed. This cause No. 7430 in the Grant Circuit Court became cause No. 5989 in the Jay Circuit Court.
The trial of this cause began on March 20, 1967, with voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Also on said date appellant filed a verified motion for production of the tapes made of her interrogation by the Marion police. On March 24, 1967, the jury was selected and sworn. On April 3, 1967, the State rested, and the defendant then moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. The court overruled this motion, and after defendant presented her evidence she filed a second motion for directed verdict, which the court also overruled.
On April 4, 1967, the jury returned the following verdict:
“We, the Jury find the Defendant, Edith Louise Schmidt, guilty of murder in the First Degree and that she shall be imprisoned in the State Prison during life. We further find that her true age is twenty-six years.”
*464On April 14, 1967, a pre-sentence investigation report was filed by the probation officer of Jay County. On the same date, the court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment in the Indiana Women’s Prison.
Appellant filed her motion for new trial on May 1, 1967; said motion contained sixteen (16) grounds accompanied by memoranda, addenda to certain specifications, questions, objections, motions and rulings of the court, as well as certain instructions, objections thereto, arguments and rulings. It is obviously impossible to include so much record in this opinion, consequently only brief mention will be made of the various grounds.
1. The court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit No. 16 into evidence over objection. Exhibit No. 16 is a photograph of decedent’s dismembered corpse.
2. The court erred in overruling defendant’s motion, made at the close of all the evidence, to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
3. The court erred in overruling defendant’s motion, made at the close of the State’s evidence, to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
4. The court erred in sustaining the State’s demurrer to defendant’s plea in abatement.
5. The court erred in denying defendant Schmidt’s motion to suppress evidence.
6. The court erred in allowing the State to force or compel the defendant to relinquish her constitutional right to be tried in the county wherein the alleged crime occurred.
7. The court erred in refusing to give to the jury, at the request of the defendant, defendant’s proposed instruction No. 1, which was written, tendered, and requested by the defendant.
8. The court erred in giving to the jury, at the request of the State, each of the State’s tendered instructions numbered one and three, to the giving of which defendant timely ob*465jected by oral objections. The objections are set out in the record but omitted here.
9. The court erred in admitting into evidence, over the objection of the defendant, State’s Exhibit No. 4 which purports to be her statement. She claims the taking thereof violated her privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel guaranteed by the Federal and Indiana Constitutions. She noted that Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U. S. 436, required the exclusion of said exhibit. This objection, together with objections to State’s Exhibits Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 was tried by the court in a special fact-finding hearing outside the presence of the jury. Defendant incorporates her detailed objections and argument which appear in the record of the hearing, all of which is omitted here.
10. The court erred in admitting into evidence, over the objection of the defendant, State’s Exhibit No. 5. This exhibit was among those discussed in the preceding paragraph, and the language contained therein applies with equal force here.
11. The court erred in admitting into evidence, over the objection of the defendant, State’s Exhibits numbered 6, 7 and 8. These exhibits were among those discussed in paragraph 9 above, the language thereof applies with equal force here.
The following addenda to Specifications 9, 10 and 11 are hereby incorporated into said specifications and should be considered an integral part thereof:
“9. State’s Exhibit #4 was a roll of magnetic tape which contained the recorded part of defendant’s interrogation by Marion police at Sparta, Tennessee. The playing of this tape took 35 minutes.
10. State’s Exhibit #5 was a typewritten manuscript of six pages, typed by Robert Foust, then Prosecutor of Grant County. It purported to represent defendant’s statement to the Marion police. Defendant’s alleged signature appeared at the bottom of the last page.
11. State’s Exhibit #6 was a roll of magnetic tape which contained the first recorded part of defendant’s interrogation by Marion police at the Marion police station. State’s *466Exhibits numbered 7 and 8 were rolls of magnetic tape which contained, respectively, the second and third recorded parts of said interrogation. When played, Exhibit number 6 ran 50 minutes, and Exhibits numbered 7 and 8 each ran 65 minutes.”
12. The court erred in admitting into evidence, over defendant’s objection, State’s Exhibit No. 9 offered during the direct examination of one Ted Null. This exhibit was a roll of magnetic tape which contained the last recorded part of defendant’s interrogation by Marion police at the Marion police station. Said tape took 55 minutes to play. The offer of this exhibit, objections and rulings of the court follow in the record, but are omitted here.
13. The court erred in denying defendant’s motion to strike State’s Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 made at the conclusion of the State playing the magnetic tapes in Exhibit 9.
14. The verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.

“MEMORANDUM

The indictment charged defendant Edith Louise Schmidt with first-degree murder, and the jury convicted her of this. First-degree murder requires that defendant (1) unlawfully has killed a human being, (2) purposely, (3) maliciously, and (4) after premeditation. There was not a scintilla of evidence that Edith Schmidt killed anyone.
Having no evidence that Edith committed murder, the State proceeded on the theory that she was an accessory before the fact. To convict her as such an accessory, the State had to prove that (1) Glenn Stewart, the alleged principal, committed first-degree murder, that (2) Edith aided or abetted the murder, or counselled, encouraged, hired, commanded, or otherwise procured its commission, and that (3) she did so purposely, (4) maliciously, and (5) after premeditation. Stewart’s intent, malice, and premeditation could not be imputed to her.
The State had to prove all five of these elements. There was no evidence to establish any of them. At most the evidence merely showed that Edith Schmidt was present in the house when an insane man killed her husband. The prosecution failed to prove that Glenn Stewart committed *467first-degree murder. The evidence does not show that Edith Schmidt compassed her husband’s death. It does not show purpose, malice, or premeditation on her part. Hence it is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict.”
15. The verdict of the jury is contrary to law. Accompanying this specification is a four page typewritten memorandum omitted here in the interest of brevity.
16. The court erred in entering judgment upon the verdict while the alleged principal, Glenn Stewart, remains in custody untried.
The court overruled appellant’s motion for new trial on June 29, 1967. Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error on appeal is that: “1. The court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial.”
The statute under which this prosecution was instituted is found in Burns Ann. Stat. § 10-3401 and reads as follows:
“Murder — First Degree — Penalty. Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the first degree, and on conviction shall suffer death or be imprisoned in the state prison during life. (Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 1, p. 447).”
Accessory before the fact is defined by Burns Ann. Stat. § 9-102, which reads as follows:
“Accessory before the fact. Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a felony, or who shall counsel, encourage, hire, command, or otherwise procure a felony to be committed, may be charged by indictment, or affidavit, tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal, either before or after the principal offender is charged, indicted, or convicted; and, upon such conviction he shall suffer the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal. (Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 224, p. 584).”
The factual situation in the case at bar is extremely unusual in that the only evidence concerning the actual death of *468appellant’s husband comes from the appellant herself. From the unsworn statement in writing obtained from the appellant and from certain taped statements made by police officers at Sparta, Tennessee, and Marion, Indiana, it appears that appellant and Glenn Everett Stewart had been having an affair for approximately one year, and that appellant’s husband was not only aware of the fact, but had often times tried to break it up. On one occasion he had appellant committed to a mental institution for ten to twenty days, and after her release both had attempted to persuade Stewart to stay away from both appellant and their home. It appears that appellant and her husband were afraid of Stewart.
On Friday evening, May 6, 1966, Stewart was present in appellant’s home and at that time told her that he wanted her to leave with him, but she refused to do so. He said that if she didn’t he would kill her husband. Appellant claimed that she did not believe that he would kill her husband, but was merely pressing her to accede to his wishes.
At approximately 11:55 p.m. on the following Saturday night, Stewart returned to appellant’s home, obviously intoxicated, brandishing a long handled knife with a six-inch blade. Appellant’s husband returned home shortly thereafter, and he and Stewart began to argue. Her husband cursed Stewart, went into the bedroom and took off his shirt, and then Stewart walked into the bedroom and began struggling with appellant’s husband. Stewart struck him in the chest with the knife, and Schmidt yelled to his wife to call a doctor. She started for the door, but Stewart stopped her, then slapped her. Meanwhile, her husband laid across the bed, blood streaming everywhere. He slid to the floor, tried to get to his feet, but Stewart kicked him knocking him down. Appellant’s husband died there.
Stewart then told appellant that if her children saw the body or the blood he would have to kill them, and then he forced her to help him take the body downstairs into the basement. Stewart made her clean up the blood from the floor *469and on the rugs. Appellant passed out several times while cleaning up the blood, and Stewart kept slapping her and kept her at it until the mess was cleaned up. Later on Stewart spent hours in the basement cutting up the body, and he threatened that she would die next if she didn’t keep her mouth shut.
On Sunday, Edith Schmidt’s brother and his wife and family came to the house three times to see his sister and her husband, each time Stewart saw them coming and hid in the attic. He had a .45 pistol and threatened to kill Edith if she talked. Appellant was afraid to say anything to her brother about what had happened, but she told him that her husband was gone and tried to hint that something was wrong.
Early Monday morning, Stewart became frightened and stated to appellant that they would have to leave. Appellant tried to get him to leave without her, but he put her daughter in the car and told her that they would all have to go or harm would befall the child. Stewart drove them to Arkansas where he kept them for eleven days during which time he completely dismantled the car and forced appellant and her children to bury the various parts thereof in the woods. During all of this time Stewart had a rifle, revolver, and ammunition. While in Arkansas Stewart contacted his parents, and he was finally persuaded to allow appellant and the children to visit her parents in Tennessee. She arrived at the home of her mother and step-father, Thurman Conley, near Sparta, Tennessee, on Thursday, May 19, 1966.
When she was sure that Stewart had not followed her, appellant told her mother and' step-father what had happened, but they did not believe her. On the following Sunday she called the sheriff of Sparta (White County), Tennessee, a Mr. Joe Cummings. Cummings drove out to the home of appel-' lant’s step-father, and there appellant informed him that her husband had been killed in Marion, Indiana. She also told him that “Buzz” Stewart had held her and her two children *470in Arkansas and that Stewart had threatened their lives. She gave Cummings the address of her home in Marion. He then returned to Sparta, and called the Marion police. They soon called back and informed Cummings that they had found the body.
Cummings returned to the Conley home, promised appellant protection from Stewart, and told her that she would have to return to Marion. She agreed to return. Cummings called the Marion police and told them to send someone for her. About midnight he went back to the Conley residence, accompanied by ten to fifteen newspaper reporters. They talked to appellant while Cummings listened casually. She told them that her husband had been murdered, that Stewart had held her and her children, and that she and the children had escaped from him. She added that she would return to Marion.
At approximately 11:00 a.m., May 23, 1966, Cummings and two Marion policemen (Officers Harrigan and Eltzroth) drove to the Conley home. The Marion policemen asked her if she was ready to go back to Indiana “to testify and file her complaint.” Appellant said that she was. They then drove to Cummings’ office at the White County jail, where Harrigan and Eltzroth interviewed appellant. This interview was recorded on tape. About 1:00 p.m. on the same date Harrigan and Eltzroth left for Marion with appellant.
Upon her return to Marion, Indiana, appellant was taken to her brother’s home for the night. She was to return to the police station the next day. At 11:00 a.m. the next morning Harrigan saw appellant. The Grant County prosecutor, Investigator Hickman, and approximately twenty reporters were with him. Harrigan took appellant to an interrogation room, about 8 by 12 feet, containing a wooden table and two or three folding chairs; the room was so equipped that a recorder elsewhere could tape a conversation therein. He told her that she might be a suspect, that she had a right to an attorney, and that any statement she made could be used against her. She stated that she did not need the services of *471an attorney. The chief of police started the recording equipment. About 2:00 p.m. Harrigan sent for the prosecutor who came to the interrogation room with his secretary, Miss Tremaine. They joined Hickman in the interrogation room and asked appellant if she would give a typed statement. She told them that she would. The statement was typed by the prosecutor as he and Hickman asked the appellant numerous questions. Appellant then signed the typed statement.
Four tapes were taken during the interrogation. The typed statement was identified at the trial as State’s Exhibit No. 5. The four tapes were identified as State’s Exhibits No. 6, 7, 8 and 9. Portions of said exhibits No. 6, 7, 8 and 9 were inaudible.
Although appellant presented sixteen specifications of error in her motion for new trial and argued extensively on six of these alleged errors in her appeal brief, I deem it unnecessary to encumber this opinion with a discussion of any of them other than those questions which relate to the admissibility of State’s Exhibits 4 through 9 and the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the court below.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibits 4 through 9 into evidence over the timely objections of her counsel, due to the fact that the police, in obtaining said exhibits, violated her privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel guaranteed by the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Exhibit No. 4, called the “Sparta tape”, was a tape recording taken in Sparta, Tennessee; Exhibit No. 5 is a typewritten statement signed by the appellant; and Exhibits Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 comprised the taped statements of appellant taken in the interrogation room of the Marion police department.
More specifically, appellant contends that the State did not effectively comply with the law as set forth in the case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694. Said decision declared quite clearly that a defendant’s statement cannot be used as evidence against *472him in court if the taking thereof violated his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. Miranda very explicitly states that a violation occurs unless the police deliver certain specific warnings at the-outset of the interrogation, and the defendant then knowingly and intelligently waives his privilege. A heavy burden of proof rests upon the State and not upon the defendant. It is quite important that the warnings be given at the outset, before the questioning begins, and not after the State secures the statements or confessions that it desires.
The State would dismiss this argument for the reason that the case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, was not handed down by the United States Supreme Court until three weeks after the interrogation in question, and that, therefore, the case of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, and the warnings enunciated therein should control. However, in Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 U. S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, decided June 20, 1966, the Supreme Court held that Miranda governs “cases in which the trial began after the date of our decision one week ago.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 885. Since appellant’s trial did not begin until March 20, 1967, the legal principles announced in Miranda clearly govern her case.
The Miranda rules apply whenever the police have a suspect in their custody or otherwise restrain him of his liberty. Early in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Supreme Court said:
“Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706.
*473Later in the opinion the Court added:
“The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725.
In particular, the Miranda rules apply to all questioning in a police station or jail. The whole thrust of Miranda is aimed at such interrogation. The Court noted:
“As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 716.
Again, the Court stated:
“The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 714.
Before interrogation begins, the police must give the suspect four specific warnings. First, they must warn him that he has a right to remain silent. The Court said:
“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 720.
If this warning is not given prior to questioning, the statement elicited from the defendant is inadmissible, even though he may actually have known of his right to remain silent.
Second, the police must warn the suspect that anything he says may be used against him. On this point, the Court said:
*474“This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it * * *. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system—that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 721.
Third, the police must warn the suspect that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, and if he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. The Court stated:
“Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 722.
Fourth, the police must inform the suspect that if he is indigent he can have a lawyer appointed for him prior to questioning. The Court stated:
“In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one * * *. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 723.
The right to counsel during interrogation is essential to the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court said:
*475“The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 721.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution also guarantees the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the Fourteenth Amendment extends this right to State proceedings. This Sixth Amendment right also applies to situations in which there is evidence of custodial interrogation. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra; Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Thus, both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the third and fourth warnings enunciated above be given.
The accused need not raise the question of the presence of counsel. The police have the absolute duty to warn him of this right. On this point the Court stated:
“An individual need not make a preinterrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 721.
The burden of proof with respect to whether or not the warnings previously described were in fact given falls heavily upon the State. The prosecution must prove not only that the warnings were given, but also that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. With respect to such burden of proof, the Supreme Court stated:
“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
*476self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel * * *. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, * * * and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 724.
The fact of lengthy interrogation is in itself strong evidence that the defendant did not validly waive his constitutional rights. The Court declared:
“Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 724, 725.
When the State’s interrogators testified at the extensive fact-finding hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, held in the Grant Circuit Court, they stated merely that appellant was warned of her rights prior to any questioning by Investigator Hickman in general terms. They said that warnings were given immediately after the introduction; however, when appellant was asked whether or not she was warned of her rights to counsel and to remain silent, she replied either “no” or that she did not recall. On one occasion, she stated, “Well, he (Mr. Hickman) started in on me accusing me the first thing” of killing her husband. (Tr. p. 201). At one point, in response to a question whether or not the police told her of her right to counsel at the outset, she said: “No, not when they started.” (Tr. p. 181). This certainly was a clear and unequivocal statement.
The following colloquy also appears in the record at page 182:
*477“Q. * * * But at the start of this questioning they didn’t tell you that you didn’t have to talk to them at all?
A. No.
Q. Didn’t tell you that you could be quiet, keep your mouth shut. They wanted you to answer the questions? Did they tell you at the beginning of this questioning, Mrs. Schmidt, that anything you said could be used against you in Court?
A. After I signed the statement.”
Mrs. Schmidt testified that the officers who interrogated her told her that the judge would appoint a lawyer for her. However, they did not say when and never suggested that she could have a lawyer present in the interrogation room. Instead, she was questioned without the aid of counsel.
The transcript further shows the following significant colloquy:
“Q. Did they tell you that anything that you said could be used against you in Court, this was on the morning of the 25th, Wednesday morning?
A. No, they didn’t.
Q. And did they tell you that you had the right to talk to a Lawyer ?
A. They told me that the Judge would appoint me a Lawyer.
Q. Did they say when ?
A. They didn’t give me any specific date or time, no.
Q. But in the meantime they went ahead and questioned you?
A. Yes.
Q. And they didn’t get you a Lawyer ?
A. No.
Q. Did they tell you that if you didn’t have the money to hire a Lawyer that the State of Indiana would get you a Lawyer, would furnish you one ?
A. This I didn’t know until after I signed the statement, I didn’t know if I had to hire one or anything.
*478Q. But they didn’t tell you that, this is when they started questioning you, on Wednesday morning ?
A. No, sir.
Q. And they didn’t tell you that you could have a Lawyer in with you while they were questioning you ?
A. No, sir.” (Tr. pp. 183,184)
The very tenor of the foregoing shows that appellant not only expected, but desired the services of an attorney at the time of her interrogation. Her testimony raises the question why she had no counsel, and was given none, when counsel was so obviously necessary. The right to the effective assistance of counsel at each of the critical stages of the criminal process is meaningless to the accused if the prosecutor is permitted to defer warning the suspect of his rights until after he has successfully trapped the accused. Here the prosecutor’s gallant offer then to have a lawyer appointed for appellant— eventually, did not satisfy the constitutional requirement.
The State seeks to justify and support its position with respect to the warnings by relying on the fact that appellant stated that she did not want an attorney and that she would rather “get this whole thing over with.” However, a close examination of the record will show that appellant made these statements on Tuesday morning, May 24, 1966, and that the police again, on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday, May 25, interrogated her without reiterating the substance of the warnings required by Miranda. In Miranda the Court stated that:
“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning that * * * he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 723. (Emphasis supplied)
This case certainly differs from Sampson v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 625, 237 N. E. 2d 254, wherein this Court construed the warnings made necessary by Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In that case Sampson stated on direct examination that “They *479asked me if I would tell them where I was during that period of time and I told them I didn’t have to tell them anything.” Clearly Sampson understood his rights and waived them. Just as clearly Edith Schmidt did not understand fully her rights and did not waive them. When Investigator Hickman testified that he had given her the proper warnings, he did not claim he had stated, at the outset of the questioning, that she could have a lawyer present during the interrogation. There is certainly no corroboration for any such preliminary warning. It is, at the very least, a strange coincidence that the police taped virtually all of the interrogation except for the beginning. Miranda clearly requires that four specific warnings and an intelligent waiver be given prior to any questioning. Merely informing appellant after she signed the typed statement that she could expect to have a lawyer appointed for her the next day when she went to court did not suffice.
It is quite apparent that State’s Exhibit No. 5 (the typed statement) which the prosecutor read to the jury has no initial warnings at all on the face thereof. Some police statements have mimeographed, prefixed warnings which are seldom read to suspects, but which, nevertheless, appear at the top of the page. State’s Exhibit No. 5 has no such pro forma. It would be safe to assume that appellant, if given counsel, would not have submitted to interrogation and would not have signed this statement, since the police got no further statements from her after an attorney was assigned to her. This absence of counsel at such a critical time certainly amounted to a denial of counsel in violation of her constitutional rights, particularly for such an uneducated, inexperienced, and disadvantaged person.
At the beginning of the “Sparta tape,” State’s Exhibit No. 4, Officer Harrigan did tell appellant the following:
“Edith, it is my duty to advise you at this time. I am going to advise you that we are making a tape recording in the above mentioned office, and that anything that is said can be used against you or for you in a court of law and *480that you have at this time signed—you understand that first question?
A. Yes.” (Tr. p. 315)
I re-affirm, however, that this was only one of the four warnings required by Miranda, and it is the only warning which appears on tape. Miranda implied requires that complete warnings be given at each separate session of questioning.
Therefore, the State has failed to sustain its burden of proof concerning the giving of the requisite warnings and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. It was incumbent upon the State to prove that all four warnings were given at the start of each day’s questioning. There was some vague evidence of some uncertain warnings at uncertain times, but this does not meet the requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court. There was no corroborated evidence that all four warnings were given at the proper time. The police transcribed taped statements, both at Sparta, Tennessee, and Marion, Indiana; surely, if the proper warnings had been given, they would have been recorded in order that they may have been used as evidence. Miranda contemplates corroborated evidence; the Court stated:
“Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.” 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 724.
Without said warnings so given at the proper times, Mrs. Schmidt could not have knowingly and intelligently waived her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Therefore, the court below erred in admitting, over appellant’s objection, State’s Exhibits 4 through 9, arrived at in violation of her constitutional rights.
Without intending to unduly belabor this opinion, I do, however, feel compelled to answer the question raised by appellant’s allegation that the evidence presented to the *481trial court was wholly insufficient to sustain her conviction. A thorough examination of the record in this case reveals that the only evidence presented by the State from which the guilt of appellant could be inferred, if at all, was the taped statements taken during interrogation of appellant at Sparta, Tennessee, and Marion, Indiana (State’s Exhibits No. 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9), and the typed statement signed by appellant (State’s Exhibit No. 5), all of which statements were purely exculpatory in nature. The primary inquiry, therefore, is whether or not the State successfully met its burden of proving appellant guilty of the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt, solely upon the basis of statements given by her, which by their very nature tended to show that she was innocent.
Although this precise question has been given due consideration by the courts of other jurisdictions, notably Texas, the cases in Indiana directly on point are minimal. However, I do feel that a rule has been sufficiently established in Indiana which would cause the reversal of appellant’s conviction here.
In the case of Buffkin v. State (1914), 182 Ind. 204, 106 N. E. 362, this Court held:
“If appellant’s testimony stood alone to be taken as the whole truth of the res gestae, it would have to follow that he acted in self-defense.”
The appellant’s conviction in that case was affirmed due to the fact that there was a witness, other than appellant himself, to the immediate acts leading up to the homicide, and that the testimony of said witness was “in irreconcilable conflict in many particulars” with that of appellant, thereby leaving to the jury the function of deciding which testimony to believe.
Such is not the case here. There is no other testimony, no other statements rebutting the truth of appellant’s statements, nor was there any concrete evidence of probative value to indicate that she was, in fact, guilty of active participation jn the murder of her husband,
*482Citing Buffkin v. State, supra, this Court in Pollard v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 62, 94 N. E. 2d 912, stated:
“It is true that if that part of a statement of an accused which is in his favor is not disproved by other evidence, such favorable portion is deserving of as much consideration as the parts which make against the accused.”
In that case also the appellant’s conviction was affirmed, however, as the court clearly pointed out on page 68 of its opinion, “* * * the evidence as to the killing is not confined to the written statements.” Such fact is not evident in the case at bar.
In State v. Carter (1961), 254 N. C. 475, 119 S. E. 2d 461, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated:
“When the State introduces in evidence exculpatory statements of the defendant which are not contradicted or shown to be false by any other facts or circumstances in evidence, the State is bound by these statements * * *.
And when the State’s evidence and that of the defendant is to the same effect, and tend only to exculpate the defendant, his motion for judgment as of nonsuit should be allowed * * *.
While the State by offering this evidence was not precluded from showing that the facts were different, no such evidence was offered, and the State’s case was made to rest entirely on the statements of the defendant, which the state presented as worthy of belief.”
The principles enunciated in the aforementioned .cases should be controlling in the case at bar. If the State believed appellant’s statements concerning the circumstances, surrounding the murder of her husband, then she certainly was entitled to an acquittal, for such statements clearly tended to free her of any alleged fault or guilt. If, on the other hand, her statements were not to be believed, then there was absolutely no evidence upon which her conviction could stand.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and this cause remanded with instructions to grant appellant’s motion for new trial.
Note.—Reported in 265 N. E. 2d 219,