Court Opinion

ID: 9383641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 21:01:11.307465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.206578
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4716

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        SHANIQUAWA LATIFAH HILL,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00064-HEH-1)

        Submitted: January 3, 2023                                        Decided: March 29, 2023

        Before WYNN, THACKER AND RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
        DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States
        Attorney, Angela Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Shaniquawa Hill (“Appellant”) pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a

        firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 75

        months imprisonment. Appellant challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level

        enhancement for an offense involving three to seven firearms pursuant to the United States

        Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). Specifically, Appellant challenges

        (1) the admissibility and reliability of Appellant’s uncorroborated post-Miranda statements

        pertaining to three additional firearms (other than the firearm of conviction); and (2) the

        Government’s failure to recover and/or examine any of the four separate and additional

        firearms the district court attributed to Appellant (other than the firearm of conviction).

               As an initial matter, “[f]ederal courts historically have exercised . . . broad

        discretion to consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent

        with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.” Concepcion v. United

        States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (2022). Turning first to Appellant’s challenge to her own

        prior statements, “[i]t is well established that, at sentencing, the district court ‘may consider

        relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence

        applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to

        support its probable accuracy.’” United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the rules of evidence

        are inapplicable to sentencing proceedings). And, even where the rules of evidence do

        apply, statements against interest -- supported by corroborating circumstances clearly

        indicating the statements’ trustworthiness -- serve as an exception to the rule against

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        hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 804(3)(A)–(B). Therefore, we need not assess the admissibility of

        Appellant’s prior statements. Rather, we review whether the district court abused its

        discretion in determining that the statement was sufficiently reliable to be considered at

        sentencing. See United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993).

               The Government bears the burden of proving the applicability of a sentencing

        enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Bullard, 301 F.

        App’x 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[a]t sentencing, the Government bears the

        burden of proving the facts necessary to show that enhancements are warranted by a

        preponderance of the evidence”). Here, Appellant provided a post-Miranda statement to

        law enforcement where she detailed the (1) number of firearms she discharged; (2) type of

        firearms; (3) location where she discharged the firearms; and (4) manner in which the

        firearms were discharged. J.A. 88–89. Based upon the level of detail and context

        surrounding Appellant’s statement, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

        determining that Appellant’s post-Miranda statement bore an indicium of reliability. See

        United States v. Blue, 536 F. App’x 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that the

        district court did not err in crediting defendant’s post-arrest statement to support drug

        quantities for purposes of sentencing). Moreover, Appellant’s statement was corroborated

        by text messages wherein she sought to acquire firearms, photographs of Appellant with

        objects identified by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives as actual

        firearms, and Appellant’s possession of a Taurus PT111 G2A 9mm firearm on the date of

        her arrest. See United States v. Cummings, 337 F. App’x 313, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (per

        curiam) (holding that the district court did not err in utilizing post-arrest statements for

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        purposes of determining defendant’s appropriate offense level where those statements have

        established reliability).

               Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level

        enhancement per U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(b)(1)(A) for an offense involving three to seven

        firearms. We need not reach the merits of Appellant’s challenge to the four remaining

        firearms because attributing the three firearms detailed in Appellant’s post-Miranda

        statement to Appellant, plus the firearm of conviction, * is sufficient to warrant a two-level

        enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1).

               For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s imposition of a two-level enhancement

        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) is

                                                                                        AFFIRMED.

               *
                 As the Taurus PT111 G2A firearm is a 9mm, it is conceivable that this is the “9”
        Appellant admitted to discharging at her grandfather’s home the day prior to her arrest.
        However, this does not impact the two-level enhancement as, even assuming duplication
        on this firearm, there remain three firearms attributable to Appellant.

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