Court Opinion

ID: 9573560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:50.849145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:37.290633
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
dissenting:
I agree with the decision of the trial court, and in so doing, must disagree with the majority opinion of this court. It seems to me that the trial court’s determination of this case is correct beyond peradventure. Rules of construction, semantics and history are on the side of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court; they are against the opinion of this court.
In 1948 Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution of this state was amended. As amended, it provided that “The general supervision of the public schools of the state shall be vested in a board of education whose powers and duties shall be as now or hereafter prescribed by law.” In succeeding sentences it directed how the board shall be established, after which appears the following paragraph:
“From and after the general election of 1948, the office of superintendent of public instruction shall be known as the office of commissioner of education, and from and after the expiration of the two-year term of that office next following said general election, such commissioner shall be appointed by said board of education and shall not be included in the classified civil service of the state.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that the only appointive power vested in the board relates to the commissioner, and that the only person excluded from the classified civil service is again the commissioner, all of which makes manifest the narrow confines of the power of appointment vested in the board. Having designated the commissioner of education as the officer who shall be appointed by the board, and providing only for his appointment and his exclusion only from the classified civil service, leaves the board with no other appointive power. See State v. *522Tucson Gas, etc. Co., 15 Ariz. 294, 138 Pac. 781; State v. Turner, 117 Kan. 755, 233 Pac. 510; People v. Brady, 275 Ill. 261, 114 N.E. 25.
A recognized rule of construction is to the effect that the express mention of a person or thing as being within the terms of a constitutional provision impliedly excludes other persons or things not mentioned. State v. Tucson Gas, etc. Co., supra; In re Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 37 N. Mex. 194, 20 P. (2d) 918. If the language of Article IX, Section 1 is ambiguous or uncertain, or the intent is difficult of ascertainment, this technical rule of construction may be resorted to for the meaning of the provision. However, it appears to me to contain a clear statement, and consequently leaves nothing for interpretation except to follow its manifest mandate.
“As a general thing, it is supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution.” 1 Cooley’s Const. Lim. 135 (8th ed.). True, this is not an inflexible rule, but it has been applied to the constitutional article concerning education. Wilmore v. Annear, 100 Colo. 106, 65 P. (2d) 1433. The phrase “educational institutions” has in context, by constitutional indication and in decisions of this court, come to have a constitutional sense dissentient from that expressed in the majority opinion. People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610.
In part the civil service amendment (Article XII, Section 13, Constitution of Colorado) provides that the “classified civil service of the state shall comprise all appointive public officers and employees and the places which they hold, except the following: * * * officers and teachers in educational institutions not reformatory or charitable in character.” It concludes with the direction that “This section shall be self-executing.”
“Educational * * * institutions * * * shall be established and supported by the state, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Article VIII, Section 1, Colo*523rado Constitution. “The following educational institutions., to-wit: the University at Boulder, the Agricultural College at Fort Collins, the School of Mines at Golden, and the Institute for the Education of Mutes, * * * at Colorado Springs, are hereby declared to be institutions of the state of Colorado,” etc. Article VIII, Section 5. “No religious test or qualification shall ever be required of any person as a condition of admission into any public educational institution of the state, either as a teacher or student; and no teacher or student of any such institution shall ever be required to attend or participate in any religious service whatever. No sectarian tenets or doctrines shall ever be taught in the public schools, nor shall any distinction or classification of pupils be made on account of race or color.” (Emphasis supplied.) Article IX, Section 8, Colorado Constitution.
It is proposed that “educational institutions,” by virtue of the context and interplay of constitutional provisions, has a very limited meaning. Beside the several sections cited, other sections lucidly recognize distinction between “educational institutions” and “public schools.” And this court gave due recognition to the distinction, and in so doing, defined terms in this wise:
“The fifth point is that it creates a religious test or qualification as a condition of admission to a public educational institution of the state, contrary to article IX, section 8.
“An ‘educational institution of the state’ means one of the so-called state institutions; e.g. University of Colorado, School of Mines or State Teachers’ College. People v. Higgins, 67 Colo. 441, 443, 184 Pac. 365, is analogous. It is only the last sentence of this section that refers to public schools.” People v. Stanley, supra.
In the consideration of portions of the Constitution concerning education, this court said in Wilmore v. Annear, supra:
“ ‘ * * * That bill, of course, has always contained appropriations for State educational institutions. These are *524provided for by Article VIII of the Constitution, which, according to section 1 thereof, are “established and supported by the State in such manner as may be prescribed by law.’ ” It will be observed that section 1, article VIII of the Constitution uses the term ‘educational * * * institutions’ in referring to schools other than the constitutionally required public schools.
“In the sentence structure of section 32, ‘for public schools’ is a prepositional phrase joined by the correlative conjunction ‘and’ to other similar phrases that set forth various independent purposes for which appropriations may be made. We think this clearly is a constitutional recognition of power in the general assembly to make an appropriation for the public schools of the state. ‘Public Schools’ is the term used in sections 2 and 15 of article IX and as so used, from the subject matter of the sections, clearly applies there to schools that serve only those between the ages of 6 and 21 residing in the district. ‘In construing the meaning of a particular word, resort may be had to other sections of the same instrument for the sense in which the word is used, since a word repeatedly used in a constitution will generally be given the same meaning throughout the instrument, whether such meaning is technical or popular in its character.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us advert again to Article IX, Section 1. Does it in any way modify the civil service amendment other than to remove the ‘commissioner of education’ from the classified civil service? The opening sentence establishes that it does not, for it reads, “The general supervision of the public schools of the state shall be vested in a board of education whose powers and duties shall be as now or hereafter prescribed by law.” Public schools are involved, but public schools are not “educational institutions” of the state; and since the only exemption of the civil service amendment relates to certain “educational institutions of the state,” and Article IX, Section 1 exempts only the commissioner of education, all other offi*525cers and employees created by statute pursuant to the latter constitutional provision are subject to civil service.
Mr. Justice Knauss and Mr. Justice Hall join in this dissent.