Court Opinion

ID: 9568201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:01:22.877367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:27.322173
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of the majority opinion, but not in its statement of the record or its analysis of the legal issues.
In the early part of October 1995, severe storms associated with hurricane Opal knocked out power in parts of Atlanta, including the area where the Briarcliff Summit apartments (Summit) were *633located. Although McCullough rented an apartment as a residence at Summit, on October 2 and 3 he stayed at his wife’s residence, which was located in an area of Atlanta which had power. McCullough returned to his apartment on the night of October 4, even though the area in which Summit was located was still without power, and the apartment building was without power and completely dark. McCullough testified that, if he had known the power was still out at Summit before he arrived there, he probably would have stayed at his wife’s residence. The elevators in the building were not operating because of the lack of power. In order to reach his sixth floor apartment, McCullough walked up a darkened stairwell without incident and then felt his way from the stairwell entrance along a hallway for about 40 feet until he reached his apartment where he spent the night. On the morning of October 5 the power was still out in the area, and the building was still unlighted except for natural sunlight through windows. McCullough said he probably left his apartment and walked down the same stairs to the first floor lobby to retrieve a newspaper, then walked back up the stairs to his apartment. The stairwell remained darkened at the time because of the lack of power and the absence of any windows in the stairwell to admit sunlight. Later that morning, McCullough again left his apartment and walked down the same darkened stairwell. This time, however, he lost his footing on the stairs because he could not see in the dark, fell, and was injured.
The darkened stairwell in which McCullough fell on the morning of October 5 was located about 40 feet down the hallway from the door to his apartment. A second stairwell which McCullough could have used to exit the building that morning was located about 80 to 100 feet down the hallway from the door to his apartment. The second stairwell had windows on the exterior of the building and was lighted with natural sunlight on the morning of October 5. McCullough testified that he knew about the second stairwell but had never used it. Despite having lived in the building for five years, he said he was unaware that the second stairwell was lighted by exterior windows.
In the event of power outages, Summit was equipped with an emergency power generator to provide light to the building, including the stairwells. There was evidence that the generator was required by law. When Summit first lost power, the generator worked briefly and restored power, but then failed sometime on October 4. Evidence showed that the generator may have failed because of flooding in the generator room. Evidence also showed that Summit immediately sought to have the generator repaired or replaced, however, it was not repaired or replaced before McCullough fell on October 5. Although the evidence shows that Summit acted diligently in *634attempting to repair or replace the generator after it failed on October 4, there was also evidence that Summit knew or should have known prior to October 4 that the generator was at risk of failing because of previous flooding in the generator room.
Obviously, the initial loss of power to the building caused by the severe storms cannot be attributed to any negligence by Summit. There is, however, evidence in the record creating a jury issue as to whether the lack of power to light the building and the stairwells on the morning of McCullough’s fall was caused by Summit’s negligent failure to provide a reliable emergency generator as required by law. Nevertheless, the general rule is that, even if Summit negligently created and knew about the hazardous darkened condition of the stairwell which caused McCullough’s fall, Summit would still not be liable for the fall if McCullough had equal or superior knowledge of the darkened condition of the stairwell. Although a landlord has a statutory duty to keep the premises in repair, the landlord is not an insurer of its tenant’s safety. OCGA §§ 44-7-13; 44-7-14; Standard Mgmt. Co. v. Scott, 229 Ga. App. 36, 38 (493 SE2d 216) (1997). Even where a landlord negligently allows a hazardous condition to exist on the premises, the landlord is not liable to a tenant injured by the hazard if the tenant had equal or superior knowledge of the hazard. Id. If the tenant was equally aware of the hazard and could have avoided it by the exercise of reasonable care, the case is subject to summary adjudication in favor of the landlord. Hall v. Thompson, 193 Ga. App. 574, 575 (388 SE2d 381) (1989). The record clearly shows that McCullough had equal knowledge of the darkened hazardous condition of the stairwell, yet chose to assume the risk of walking the stairs in the dark.
Although application of the “equal or superior knowledge rule” would support the grant of summary judgment in favor of Summit, the record shows that a factual issue precluding summary judgment is presented under the “necessity rule” exception to the “equal or superior knowledge rule.” The “necessity rule” tempers application of the “equal or superior knowledge rule” by recognizing that a tenant’s equal or superior knowledge of a hazard does not as a matter of law bar recovery against the landlord where a factual question exists as to whether, by necessity, the tenant had no alternative but to assume the risk and traverse a known hazard in order to enter or leave an apartment rented as the tenant’s dwelling place. Grier v. Jeffco Mgmt. Co., 176 Ga. App. 158, 159-160 (335 SE2d 408) (1985).
There is evidence that McCullough was not required to assume the risk of walking down a darkened stairwell to leave his apartment on the morning of October 5. Evidence showed there was another stairwell lighted through exterior windows on the building only 40 to 60 feet down the hallway from the darkened stairwell McCullough *635chose to use. But McCullough testified that, although he knew about the other stairwell, he never used it and never became aware during the five years he lived in the building that there were windows on the exterior of the building that provided light in the other stairwell. There was also evidence that McCullough and his wife maintained two residences. Although McCullough maintained a separate residence at Summit, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that he had the alternative of staying at another residence rather than assuming the risk of the known hazardous conditions at Summit. On the present record, a jury issue was presented as to whether McCullough, by necessity, had no alternative but to assume the risk of traversing the hazardous conditions which caused his fall.
Decided April 13,1999.
Reid & Morgan, Donald W. Singleton, for appellant.
Cobb, Grabbe & Spillers, Nancy L. Pasterz, Nikolai Makarenko, Jr., for appellees.