Court Opinion

ID: 9830721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:24:53.676753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:26.009215
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, J.
Appellee sued appellant and Billie Good upon a promissory note executed by them. Good made no appearance in the case. The case was tried before Hon. John B. Littler, special judge, who acted as such by virtue of an agreement, entered into between appellant and appellee, which reads:
“The regular judge being absent from court and under quarantine restrictions, the parties hereto agree to try the cause before Hon. J. B. Littler, Esq., of the Big Springs bar, waiving all formalities, except the swearing the said judge, as relates to qualification.”
Upon trial, judgment was rendered in ap-pellee’s favor against Dunn and Good for the amount of the note. Dunn, being a surety, recovered judgment over against Good.
[1] It is assigned as fundamental error that the' judgment entered is void for want of authority in Littler to act as judge. This position is well taken. Section 11 of article 5 of the Constitution authorizes parties by consent to appoint a proper person to try a case pending in the district court, where the judge thereof is disqualified. A right of selection is also conferred upon the parties by article 1676, Revised Statutes, in cases where a disqualification of the regular judge exists. The record here shows no disqualification of the regular judge. It appears that he was absent from the court. In such case the statute provides that the practicing attorneys of the court may proceed to elect a special judge, who shall proceed to hold the court and to conduct the business thereof. Article 1678, R. S. It thus appears that there was no constitutional or statutory authority for the parties to agree upon a judge to act in lieu of the regular judge, and the statutory provision governing under the existing condition was disregarded.
[2] Where a mode of selection of special judges is prescribed by the Constitution, and the causes for such selection are indicated, other modes and other causes are thereby excluded. Parties cannot, independent of constitutional or statutory provisions, confer judicial authority, and where it is attempted to be done a judgment rendered by the appointee is a nullity; and the parties will not be estopped, by their consent, from denying the jurisdiction. 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Pl. & Pr. 788, and cases there cited; also 23 Cyc. 601. This rule has been applied by the Oourt of Criminal Appeals of this state in Summerlin v. State, 153 S. W. 890. See, also, Whittington v. Butler, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 790; Castles v. Burney, 34 Tex. 470; Mitchell v. Adams, 1 Posey, Unrep. Cas. 117.
Our constitutional and statutory provisions exclude the idea that one other than the regular judge can undertake to exercise judicial authority, except in those instances there mentioned; and when the facts exist authorizing the selection of some one to act in the place of the regular judge, the parties must proceed in the mode prescribed by the statute. The regular judge not being disqualified, the parties were without authority to appoint a special judge by agreement.
[3, 4] The judgment herein rendered was coram non judice. As such it was a nullity, and the parties are not estopped to raise the question. It affects the jurisdiction of the *701court, and is therefore a. fundamental error, which may be first raised upon appeal. Our attention is directed to Schultze v. McLeary, 73 Tex. 92, 11 S. W. 924; Ford v. Bank, 34 S. W. 684; Ry. Co. v. Rowland, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 158, 22 S. W. 134; Hall v. Jankofsky, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 29 S. W. 517; Campbell v. McFaddin, 31 S. W. 436. These cases do not conflict with the views here expressed. In them statutory authority existed for the selection of a special judge; here there is an inherent lack of authority to select by consent. It was a case governed by article 1678, B. S., requiring an election by the practicing lawyers present.
There are other questions presented for review arising out of errors alleged to have been committed upon the trial; but in view of the fact that the trial was an unauthorized proceeding, it is unnecessary, and we would perhaps not be justified in passing upon the same. Summerlin v. State, supra.
Beversed and remanded.

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