Court Opinion

ID: 9957696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 21:00:28.580943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:34.252775
License: Public Domain

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                                               PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-2010

        SALEH SHAIBAN,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        UR M. JADDOU, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services;
        ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, Secretary of Homeland Security; UNITED
        STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

                             Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:18-cv-00153-FDW-DCK)

        Argued: December 6, 2023                                          Decided: April 3, 2024

        Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Dismissed by published opinion Senior Judge Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge
        Gregory and Judge Harris joined.

        ARGUED: Eric Hisey, GOLDBERG & ASSOCIATES, Bronx, New York, for Appellant.
        Alexander Halaska, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
        for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Julie A. Goldberg, GOLDBERG & ASSOCIATES, Bronx,
        New York, for Appellant. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
        General, William C. Peachey, Director, Yamileth G. Davila, Assistant Director, District
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        Court Section, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

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        FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:

               Saleh Shaiban is a citizen and national of Yemen who entered the United States in

        1999 on a false passport and B-2 visitor visa. After an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) eventually

        granted him asylum in 2006, Shaiban submitted an application for adjustment of status to

        U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). USCIS denied his application

        because it deemed him ineligible on terrorism grounds.

               We conclude that we have no jurisdiction over Shaiban’s appeal and must dismiss

        it for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                    I.

               Shaiban, a Yemeni national, applied for asylum in December 2000. Immigration

        and Naturalization Services (“INS”) issued a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings

        before an IJ within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). On October

        11, 2001, the IJ ordered the Department of State’s embassy in Yemen to complete a

        consular investigation into Shaiban’s nationality and identity.        JA 180-81.   Shaiban

        appeared at removal proceedings, and in February 2002, the IJ denied his application for

        asylum. JA 227–38 (transcript of IJ’s oral decision).

               Shaiban appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and

        the appeal was dismissed in February 2003. Shaiban then appealed to the U.S. Court of

        Appeals for the Second Circuit, which remanded the case to a new IJ for a de novo hearing.

        On remand, the IJ granted him asylum. Years later in November 2008, Shaiban submitted

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        an application for permanent residence to USCIS, also called an Application to Register

        Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. In September of 2013, USCIS informed Shaiban

        that his case had been put on hold because he appeared to be “inadmissible pursuant to the

        terrorist-related grounds of inadmissibility” under Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration

        and Nationality Act. JA 131.

               In January 2018, USCIS sent Shaiban a request for additional evidence related to

        his application. JA 133-35. USCIS explained that in his 2000 asylum application and 2001

        and 2002 immigration proceedings, Shaiban disclosed he was a member of the Yemeni

        Socialist Party, that he actively fought in Yemen’s civil war in 1994, and that he had been

        imprisoned in Yemen during the war. However, in his application for permanent residence,

        Shaiban failed to disclose that information. USCIS requested information to resolve

        discrepancies in his identification information and his participation in organizations. JA

        134. After the January request for additional evidence, Shaiban filed suit under the

        Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) in the Western District of North Carolina to

        compel adjudication of his application for permanent residence. In July 2018, USCIS sent

        Shaiban a Notice of Intent to Deny his application because they believed he was ineligible

        for adjustment of status because his participation in certain Yemeni organizations qualified

        as terrorist activities.

               A month later, USCIS sent Shaiban a letter denying his application on the same

        grounds set forth in its July 2018 Notice of Intent to Deny. In July 2021, the district court

        granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. Shaiban argued the government

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        was collaterally estopped from denying his application because his previous grant of

        asylum had already determined the terrorism bar did not apply. The court rejected

        Shaiban’s argument because it found the record of the 2002 asylum hearing did not indicate

        whether the issue of terrorist activities was “actually litigated.” JA 271.

               Shaiban asks us to review the district court’s grant of summary judgment and

        decision to deny the expansion of the administrative record to include the transcript of the

        2006 asylum proceedings. After oral argument, this Court issued an order for supplemental

        briefing on whether we had jurisdiction to review Shaiban’s requests. We now decline to

        issue a decision on the merits of Shaiban’s case because we lack jurisdiction to hear it.

                                                     II.

                                                     A.

               Federal courts have an independent duty to confirm their own jurisdiction even

        when, as here, it initially went unquestioned by the parties. See Va. Dep’t of Corr. v.

        Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2019). We determine de novo whether we have

        jurisdiction. Kouambo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2019).

               After a foreign national has been granted asylum and has been physically present in

        the United States for one year, they may apply to USCIS for adjustment of status to become

        a lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2). The decision whether to adjust the

        status of a noncitizen granted asylum to that of a lawful permanent resident lies in the

        discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security (“Secretary”) and the Attorney General

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        of the United States. Id.

               In immigration cases, Congress has prescribed when courts of appeals have

        jurisdiction to review claims from noncitizens. Therefore, we look to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the

        provision that identifies when we have judicial review of final orders of removal, to

        determine whether we have jurisdiction to review Shaiban’s case. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)

        provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . and

        regardless of whether the . . . decision . . . is made in removal proceedings, no court shall

        have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of . . . the Secretary of

        Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in [their]

        discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).∗ Because § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of

        jurisdiction to review enumerated relief that does not apply in this case, we look to (ii).

               First, we consider whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips this Court of jurisdiction to

        review the denial of relief Shaiban requests, adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).

        When we interpret statutes, our starting point is the text of the statute itself. Cela v.

        Garland, 75 F.4th 355, 364 (4th Cir. 2023). Where the statutory language provides “a clear

        answer, [our inquiry], ends there.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438

               ∗
                  Section 1252(a)(2)(D) contains a single exception that allows review of
        constitutional claims and questions of law raised in a petition for review of a final removal
        order. See Lee v. USCIS, 592 F.3d 612, 620 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent Congress
        decided to permit judicial review of a constitutional or legal issue bearing upon the denial
        of adjustment of status, it intended for the issue to be raised to the court of appeals during
        removal proceedings”). However, because Shaiban is not in removal proceedings and not
        asking this Court to review a final removal order, that exception is not applicable here.

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        (1999). And “no amount of policy-talk can overcome . . . plain statutory” text. Niz-Chavez

        v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021). The most straightforward reading of both the statute

        and recent guidance from the Supreme Court in Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022),

        lead us to find Congress did not intend for us to review Shaiban’s claim.

               We address the relevant statutes first. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) tells us we cannot

        review “any other decision” “the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to

        be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.”

        Therefore, the question is whether the decision to adjust (or deny adjustment of) Shaiban’s

        status is in the discretion of the Attorney General or Secretary. Here, § 1159(b), the statute

        that lays out the requirements to adjust status, gives us our answer. Section 1159(b) states

        that “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General” “may adjust [] the

        status of” a foreign national granted asylum “in the Secretary’s or the Attorney General’s

        discretion.” Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that we do not have jurisdiction over

        decisions the authority for which is specified to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.

        Section 1159(b) is explicit that it is in the discretion of the Attorney General whether to

        grant an adjustment of status. Therefore, a plain reading of the statutes leads us to conclude

        Congress did not intend judicial review of a claim like Shaiban’s.

               Patel v. Garland supports this reading of the statutes. 596 U.S. 328 (2022). In Patel

        v. Garland, the petitioner applied to USCIS for an adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C.

        § 1255(i), one of the enumerated provisions that placed it within the province of

        § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which similarly strips courts of jurisdiction to consider such judgments.

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        While his application was pending, petitioner checked a box on a driver’s license

        application indicating he was a U.S. citizen. USCIS denied his application because it

        determined he falsely represented himself to be a citizen.         The IJ, during removal

        proceedings, concluded petitioner’s testimony was not credible and denied his petition to

        adjust status. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded review

        of the IJ’s factual determination regarding credibility. Patel v. United States Att’y Gen.,

        971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).

               As explained in Patel, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of “any judgment regarding

        the granting of relief under” the specified provisions. Patel, 596 U.S. at 333. The Supreme

        Court held “judgment” means “any authoritative decision.” Id. at 337. It held the

        jurisdictional bar encompasses “any and all decisions relating to the granting or denying of

        discretionary relief,” including “factual findings,” within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdiction-

        stripping language. Id. (cleaned up). The Supreme Court explained the word “any” has an

        expansive meaning, and “regarding” likewise has a “broadening effect, ensuring that the

        scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.”

        Id. at 339 (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner in active

        removal proceedings may not seek judicial review of the fact finding underlying an

        agency’s previous judgment pursuant to § 1255. Id.

               While Patel v. Garland is instructive, it does not conclusively resolve this exact

        issue. Patel interpreted § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and not § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Further, Patel

        dealt with a case in removal proceedings and explicitly declined to resolve the question

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        presented here, which is a decision made outside the removal context. See id. at 345

        (“Those decisions are made outside of the removal context . . . . The reviewability of such

        decisions is not before us, and we do not decide it.”). However, the Supreme Court, in

        dicta, suggested that Congress may have “intend[ed] to close that door” on such review

        through § 1252(a)(2)(B), and thus “foreclosing judicial review unless and until removal

        proceedings are initiated would be consistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural

        protections in the context of discretionary relief.” Id.

               This case has two complexities not presented in Patel. Therefore, we must ask: (1)

        does Patel apply outside the removal context, and (2) does the broad construction of

        “judgment” in subclause (i) also apply with equal force to “any other decision or action”

        under subclause (ii)?

               As noted above, the Supreme Court has signaled the answer to the first question is

        yes. Any other conclusion is difficult to square with the language of the beginning of

        § 1252(a)(2)(B), which states courts shall not have the jurisdiction to hear cases

        enumerated in subclauses (i) and (ii) “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or

        action is made in removal proceedings.” While Patel did not conclusively resolve the

        issue, we find the dicta persuasive and are unable to find a contrary reading that squares

        with the plain meaning of statutes and Supreme Court precedent.

               As to the second question, this Court is unable to identify any basis for concluding

        that Patel’s broad construction of clause (i) should not equally apply to clause (ii) of

        § 1252(a)(2)(B). This is because subclause (ii) acts as a catchall provision of subclause (i).

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        See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 246 (2010) (“To the clause (i) enumeration of

        administrative judgments that are insulated from judicial review, Congress added in clause

        (ii) a catchall provision . . . .”). Further, the Supreme Court in Kucana stated “[t]he

        proximity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them —‘any other decision’—

        suggests that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i.e., those made

        discretionary by legislation.” Id. at 246–47. A plain reading of the statute shows that (ii)

        is a catchall provision, and it would make little sense that (ii) would be narrower than (i).

               Shaiban argues this case is not subject to § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s jurisdiction-stripping

        language because USCIS’s inquiry into the adjustment of status under § 1159(b) involves

        a nondiscretionary decision since someone who has been deemed to be engaged in terrorist

        activity under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 is ineligible for an adjustment of status. In short, Shaiban

        argues that because the denial of adjustment of status is nondiscretionary in these

        circumstances, the strip of jurisdiction regarding discretionary decisions of the Secretary

        does not affect judicial review here, where the underlying decision was nondiscretionary.

        However, the plain words of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) show Congress intended to strip courts of

        jurisdiction to review “decisions that are statutorily specified to be in the discretion of the

        Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Patel, 971 F.3d at 1272. In

        determining whether Shaiban engaged in terrorist activity, USCIS was acting under the

        authority contained in § 1159(b), which is defined as discretionary. The most logical and

        straightforward application of Patel v. Garland and the relevant statutes lead us to hold we

        are without jurisdiction to hear Shaiban’s appeal.

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                                                     B.

               A closer question, we believe, is whether Moore v. Frazier, 941 F.3d 717 (4th Cir.

        2019), provides otherwise. We find Moore does not give us a route to jurisdiction.

               In Moore v. Frazier, we held the district court had jurisdiction to consider

        petitioner’s claim. Specifically, we held § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar judicial review of

        petitioner’s claim that USCIS applied the incorrect statute in adjudicating Moore’s I-130

        Petition for Alien Relative, which is the first step in reclassifying a noncitizen’s

        immigration status based on a familial relationship to a U.S. citizen. Id. at 719–20. We

        held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdiction-stripping language did not apply because the

        Moores were not challenging how the agency exercised its discretion, subjecting their claim

        to (ii), but instead were challenging which version of the statute Congress intended the

        agency to use when adjudicating the petition. Id. at 724 n.6. In making this distinction,

        we stated that “Congress did not designate to USCIS’s discretion the decision of which

        version of § 1154 would apply to I-130 Petitions pending at the time the Adam Walsh Act

        amendments were adopted.” Id. at 723. Because that inquiry is entirely separate from

        other discretionary decisions and involves a question of USCIS’s statutory authority, (ii)

        did not strip us of jurisdiction in Moore’s case.

               Shaiban nonetheless argues that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply because he raises

        only questions of law in this appeal, namely whether USCIS was collaterally estopped from

        considering the terrorism bar. Here, USCIS under § 1159(b) applied a fact-bound estoppel

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        determination, which was subject to the overarching discretionary determination. This is

        distinct from the question in Moore over the inherent legal question of the applicability of

        the correct version of a statute.

               Further, as this Court has recently recognized in an unpublished decision, Patel

        clarified how we view § 1252(a)(2)(B). See Uvalle v. Garland, No. 21-2418, 2023 WL

        2446717, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2023). The remaining avenue for Shaiban for his

        adjudication of his denial of adjustment of status is provided in § 1252(a)(2)(D), which

        allows review of “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in removal proceedings,

        “upon a petition for review [of a final order of removal] filed with an appropriate court of

        appeals.” § 1252(a)(2)(D). As Patel foreshadowed, some courts have used its analysis to

        close the door on adjustment of status review outside of the removal context. See, e.g.,

        Abuzeid v. Mayorkas, 62 F.4th 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

               While there are valid public policy arguments to maintain judicial review of

        Shaiban’s claims and others that petitioners in similar situations may raise, “policy

        concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text.” Patel, 596 U.S. at 346.

               Based on the plain meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), and the reasoning of Patel v.

        Garland, we do not have jurisdiction to review Shaiban’s claim and therefore dismiss his

        appeal.

                                                                                       DISMISSED

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