Court Opinion

ID: 2672379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-05-02 02:27:43.222239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:27:03.974897
License: Public Domain

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Donald .?oseph Conley, Petitioner,
against Reoord No. 0575~10-1
Conimonweo:lth of Virginia, 1 Respon,dent.

Upon Rernand from the Suprerne Court of Virginia

In accordance with the mandate of the Suprerne Court of Virginia entered on Novemher 20, 2012
and the opinion of that Court rendered on Novemher 1, 2012, the order previously entered by this Court
en banc on Deeernher 16, 2011 is reversed and annuiied, the Juiy 14, 2011 stay of the pa,nei’s june 15,
2011 decision iS vatoated,r the panei"s june 15, 2011 judgment is reinstated, a.nd the matter is remanded to
the Cireuit Court of the City of the City of Chesapeake for sentencing for a conviction of driving under
the intinenee, second offense

This order shall he certified to the Cireuit Court of the City of Chesapeake.

A Copy,
Teste;

original order signed by the Clerk ofihe
Court cfAppeals of Vz'rgz`nz`a at the direction
ofthe Court

Cierk

 G§N§A:

 

go ida gained of e:)§{zéheof's of ‘/Mfrz.§r'.n:fa ore Wednesclay t;v'iia 15th

des of luna zorl,

Donald joseph Conley, Petitioner,
against Record No. 0575~l0-l
Cornmonwealth of Virginia, Respondent.

Upon a Petition for a Writ of Actual innocence

Before judges Franl<, Beales, and Powell

Andrew G. Wiggin (Aridrew G. Wiggin, PC, on hriefs), for petitioner.

Eugene l\/iurphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth 'f.

Cuccinelii, ll, Attorney Generai, on hrief}, for respondent

Donald Joseph Conley petitioned this Court for a writ of actual innocence based upon
ncwly-discovered, non-biologicai evidence, pursuant to Chapter 19.3 of Title 192 of the Code of
Virginia, alleging that his june 28, 2004 conviction for driving under the iniluence, third offense
(hereinafter "third offense DUl") should he vacated because the April 26, 2004 conviction (hereinafter
"second offense DUI") used to prove the predicate offense was subsequently dismissed on appeal for
violation of his right to a speedy trial when he appealed that conviction from general district to circuit
court For the reasons that follow, we grant Conley’s petition for a writ of actual innocence.
l. Background
On June 28, 2004, Conley was convicted of third offense DUl and was sentenced to five years,

with three years suspended As proof of the third offense, the Cornnionwealth entered a general district
court conviction order for his second offense DUi. This Court affirmed his third offense DUi conviction
in a memorandum opinion issued on Decernber 20, 2005. _S_»_;e_e Coniev v. Cornnionwealth. Record No.

28i3»04-l (Va. Ct. App. Decern’oer 20, 2005).

On Septernber l¢l, 2005, Conley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Suprerne Court
of Virginia asking, inter aiia, for leave to appeal his second offense DUl conviction to the circuit court.
'l`he Suprerne Court of Virginia granted Conley’s request for a writ of habeas corpus on l\/larch l7, 2006.
No further action was taken in that case until counsel was appointed on Novernber 15, 2009.

On January 22, 2010, Conley moved the circuit court to dismiss his second offense DUl charge,
alleging a violation of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights. The circuit court dismissed the
second offense DUl charge and entered a release order on february 25, 20l0. On March 26, 2010,
Conley filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence arguing that he is actually innocent of felony third
offense DUl because the misdemeanor second offense DUl used to prove third offense DUl no longer
exists

ll. Analysis

'l`he Court of Appeals of Virginia has original jurisdiction to consider a petition for a writ of
actual innocence based on newly'~discov'ered, non-biological evidence filed by any individual "con‘victed
of a felony upon a plea of not guilty." Code § l9.2-327.l0; see also Carpitcher v. Cornmonwealth,

273 Va. 335, 342, 64l S.E.Zd 486, 490 (2007). "The writ shall lie to the court that entered the
conviction. . . ." Code § l9.2-327.l0.

l`o obtain a vvrit of actual innocence, a petitioner must allege, inter olioi, that the
newly-discovered evidence

(l) "was previously unknown or unavailable to the petitioner or his trial
attorney of record at the time the conviction became final in the circuit
court;" Code § l9,2-327.l l(A)(iv);

(2) "is such as could not, by the exercise of diligence, have been
discovered or obtained before the expiration of 21 days following entry of
the final order of conviction by the court;," Code § 19.2~327.1 l(A)(vi);

(3) "is material and when considered with all of the other evidence in the
current record, will prove that no rational trier of fact could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;"’ Code § l9.2-327.l l(A)(vii);
and

_;_

{4) "is not merely cumulative, corroborative or collateral." Code
§ l9.2-327.l l(A)(viii).

C@itcher, 273 Va, at 343-44, 64l S.E.Zd at 49l.

Conley’s petition for a writ of actual innocence presents this Court with a very unique set of facts
that distinguishes it from other cases that have come before this Court. As stated above, Conley was
convicted of Dlll second in general district court on April 26, 2004 An appeal from that conviction was
not timely perfected Conley was subsequently awarded a writ of habeas corpus ordering that he be
permitted to pursue an appeal from his general district court conviction to the circuit court.

Here, petitioner argues that he is actually innocent of his conviction for third offense DUI
because his conviction for second offense DUl was ultimately dismissed before going to trial in circuit
court The Attorney General argues that we should consider the distinction between legal innocence and
factual innocence, asserting that a prior conviction remains available as a predicate offense until the
petitioner has been shown to be factually innocent of the prior offense "l`he Attorney General"`s
argument fails for at least two reasons First, "because the appeal of a conviction from the general
district court to circuit court results in a trial de novo, perfecting the appeal in the district court renders
the judgment a nullity." Corbin v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. l96, 208, 604 S.E.Zd lll, ll7 (2004)
("An appeal de novo from a general district court to a circuit court a:nnuls the fortner judgment as
completely as if no trial had ever occurred."). "[T]he judgment appealed from is completely annulled,
and is not thereafter available for any purpose." Preston v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 73 l , 7 33, 4l9
S.E. 2d 238, 299 (1992). ”l`herefore, the conviction for second offense DUl could not, as a matter of law,
serve as a predicate offense Second, on an appeal from general district court to circuit court, once the
conviction is armulled, the defendant is presumed innocent.

lt is in this light that we consider whether the newly-discovered evidence that Conley cannot be
convicted of DUl second for the offense that previously led to his April 26, 2004 general district court

conviction "when considered with all of the other evidence in the current record, will prove that no

-3_

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt{.l"} Code

§ l9.2-327.l ltA)(vii). 'l`he Attorney General asserts that it is the record at the time of Conley’s
conviction that ought to be considered, but the Code clearly contemplates that we consider "all of the
other evidence in the current record" when determining whether "no rational trier of fact could have
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt{.]" l;d. (emphasis added). Thus, the concern for this
Court when evaluating a petition for a writ of actual innocence is the evidence before us today and not
only what was known on the day that Conley was convicted of third offense DUl.z

"Code § l8.2-27O sets forth the penalties for a defendant convicted of driving while intoxicated

or under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2~266.” l\/lcBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 30,
33, 480 S.E,Zd `1`.26, l27 (1997). A person convicted of D`Ul for the first or second time is guilty of a
Class l misdemeanor. Code § l8.2~27f)(A), Code § 18.2-270(€) provides that "[ajny person convicted
of three or more offenses of § 182-266 committed within a lO-year period shall upon conviction of the
third offense he guilty of a Class 6 felony , . . ." (emphases added). The prior convictions must be

alleged and proven for the increased penalty to be appropriate

l "l` he dissent contends that through the exercise of diligence Conley or his attorney could have
learned that the appeal of the DUl second had not been properly perfected before Conley was convicted
of DUl third 'fhis assertion focuses on the wrong "fact" as it is the fact that Conley can never be
convicted of DUl second for the offense that resulted in the April 26, 2004 general district court

conviction that is the newly-discovered evidence, not the fact that the appeal was not properly perfected

Additionally, the dissent focuses on whether Conley exercised due diligence by not informing
the trial court of the missed appeali l`he dissent goes on to discuss what the trial court might have done
with this information. Because the focus of this case is on the fact that the DUI second was
subsequently dismissed and because the discussion of what the trial court would have done with the
information of a missed appeal calls for speculation, the decision in this case cannot be based on that
argument

2 At oral argument, the Attorney General argued that the term "previously unknown or
unavailable" evidence envisioned evidence that actually existed at the time of trial but was just either
unknown or unavailable We reject this very limited interpretation lt appears that the legislative
drafters intended a more expansive read as they referred often to "recanted testimony" or "confessions”
as the evidence on which a writ might be based Because it is not unusual for a recantation or a
confession to be made after the trial, the evidence cannot logically be limited to only that evidence that
actually existed at the time of trial.

_4.,

The purposes of an allegation in a warrant or indictment that an accused
has been previously convicted of a similar offense are to put him on notice
that proof of his prior conviction will be introduced in evidence, and to
permit the imposition of a heavier punishment if the second or subsequent
offense is proved For the heavier punishment to be imposed by the jury
or the court trying the case without a jury, "the prior offense must be
charged and proven."

Calfee v. Comrnonwealth 2l5 Va. 253, 254-»55, 208 S.E.Zd 740, 74l-42 (1974) (quoting
Cornrnonvvealth v. Ellett, 174 `Va. 403, 409, 413, 4 S.E£d 762, 764, 766 (]1939)) (decided under a prior
statute). Thus, for a person to be guilty of the Class 6 felony, the Cornmonwealth must prove that the
defendant was previously convicted of DUI on at least two prior occasions

"‘ {T]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to legislative intent."’ Conger v. Barrett, 280 Vau 627, 63(), 702
S.E.Zd l l7, l 18 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v.
Comrnonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.Zd 337, 338 (1983)), "‘When
the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain
meaning of that language."’ Cornrnonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76,
705 S.E.Zd 5(}3, 505 (ZOl l) (quoting Convers v, Martial Arts World of
Richrnond lnc., 273 `Va. 96, l04, 639 S.E.Zd 174, l78 (2007)). And "‘{i}f
a statute is subj ect to more than one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute
LC_L (quoting Conyers, 27 3 Va. at l04, 639 S.E,Zd at 178).

 

737

Commonwealth v. Amerson 28i Va. 414, 418-19, 706 S.E.Zd 879, 882-83 (201 l). "fhe language of
Code § 182-270 is unambiguous and clearly speaks in terms of convictions A conviction is "[t]he act
or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved guilty[;l [t]he
judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crirne." Blacl<’s Law Dictiongy_ 384 (9th ed.
2009). An offense, however, is simply the underlying "violation of the law . . . ." _l_d; at l 186 Here,
with the conviction for second offense DUI being rendered a nullity upon appeal to the circuit court and
the subsequent dismissal of that offense without a trial, the record before us reveals one, not two, prior
convictions "fhus, upon consideration of all the other evidence in the current record, no rational fact

finder could find proof of Conley’s guilt of DUl third beyond a reasonable doubt

lll. Conclusion
for the foregoing reasons, we grant Conley’s petition for a writ of actual innocence and remand

the matter for sentencing for a DUi second conviction

Beales J,, dissenting

l respectfully dissent Conley has not actually produced the required newly discovered evidence
that could not have been - with proper diligence ~ discovered before this matter left the jurisdiction of
the trial court

Conley essentially presents only one fact that is even potentially material to whether the trial
court "could have" convicted Conley of felony third-offense DUl beyond a reasonable doubt, Code
§ l9.2-327.l l(A)(vii) - i.e., the fact that Conley’s April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUI conviction was
never appealed from the general district court to the circuit court, despite Conley’s specific instruction to
his counsel at the time to pursue Conley"s absolute right to appeal for a trial de novo under Code
§ l6.l-l32.3 'fhe trial court relied on evidence of this prior conviction (and another prior conviction that
is not at issue here) when it found Conley guilty of felony D`Ul.

However, Conley has not shown clearly and convincingly that the failure to appeal this prior
misdemeanor DUl conviction simply could not "have been discovered” by Conley or by Conley’s trial
attorney, with "the exercise of diligence," and communicated to the trial court during the felony DUl
trial on lurie 28, 2004 ~ or at any time before "the expiration of 2l days following entry of the final
order" convicting Conley of a felony third DUl offense on Novernber 9, 2004. Code § l9.2-327.i l(iii),
(vi). Sirnply put, Conley fails to show that he exercised the necessary (and basic)» diligence to ensure

that the trial court was aware of a relevant and material fact at his felony DUl trial.

3 Code § l6.l-l32 provides, in pertinent part, "Any person convicted in a district court of an
offense not felonious shall have the right, at any time within ten days from such conviction, and whether
or not such conviction was upon a plea of guilty, to appeal to the circuit court."

_5.,

Conley’s lack of diligence during the felony DUl trial is especially important here because he
could have presented the trial court with more than just a bare allegation that his counsel in the general
district court had frustrated his intent to appeal one of his predicate Dlll convictions Conley did,
eventually, file a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking a delayed appeal of the April 26,
2004 misdemeanor DUI conviction ~ which the Supreme Court graiited only about six months after
Conley filed his habeas corpus petition Significantly, the Cornmonwealth conceded that Conley was
entitled to a delayed appeal of that misdemeanor DUI conviction less thanfow‘ months after Conley
filed his habeas corpus petition. More thonfoar months elapsed between Conley’s june 28, 2004 felony
DUI trial and his November 9, 2004 sentencing hearing, when the trial court entered its final felony DUl
conviction order ~ and the trial court, of course, retained jurisdiction for an additional twenty-one days
until Noveinber 30, 2004 under Rule l:l - more than five months after the trial. lf Conley had simply
acted with any diligence to file his habeas corpus petition, he would have had plenty of time to present
the trial court with what vv/ould have been at least the inevitable coricession by the Comnionwealth that
Conley was entitled to a delayed appeal of the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUI conviction.

Sirnply put, Conley fails to prove clearly and convincingly that he acted with the diligence
required under the actual innocence statute Since this Court lacks authority to issue a writ of actual
innocence unless all of the statutory requirements enacted by the General Assenibly have been proven
by clear and convincing evidence, Code § l9.2-327,l3(ii), l must respectfully dissent.

l. BACKGRoUNi)

Conley was convicted of his second misdemeanor DUl on A,pril 26, 2004. Conley had ten days

to appeal this conviction to the circuit court for a trial de novo Code § lé. l»-l32. Siinply appealing that

general district court conviction to the circuit court would have "negate{d] any judgment entered in that

prior proceeding," thereby "aiinul[ling] the judgment of the inferior tribunal as completely as if there

had been no previous trialf’ Baker v. Elmendorf, 271 Va. 474, 479, 628 S.E.Zd 358, 36l (2006)..

Therefore, if the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUI conviction had been appealed to the circuit court for
,7-

a trial de rtovo, the certified copy of the general district court’s conviction would not have been valid
proof of a prior misdemeanor DUl conviction §ge_ Preston v. Comrnonwealth, 14 Vat App. 7 3 l , 7 33,
419 S.E.2d 238, 290 (l992).

lt is undisputed that Conley instructed his counsel in the general district court proceeding to
appeal - and that Conley’s counsel never pursued this appeal. Consequently, even though Conley
sought an appeal to the circuit court, Conley’s misdemeanor DUl conviction in the general district court
became final when the ten-day appeal period expired

lndced, the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUl conviction became final weeks before Conley was
even indicted for felony DUl, third offense, on June l, 2004. "l`hus, the fact that this misdemeanor DUl
conviction had not been appealed (contrary to Conley’s instructions) could have been discovered before
Conley’s felony DUl trial even occurred on lurie 28, 2004. Certainly, the failure to appeal the
misdemeanor DUl conviction could have been discovered and communicated to the trial court at
Conley’s felony DUI trial ~ or when Conley vv'as sentenced months later, on Novernher 9, 2004, or at
any time during the next tvventy-one days that the trial court retained jurisdiction, §_e§ Rule l:l.

However, the trial court was never informed that the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUl
conviction should have been ~ but was not ~ appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Finding
that Conley had a pair of valid prior misdemeanor DUl convictions, the trial court convicted Conley of
felony DUL third offense

On Septeinber l4, 2005 - nearly a year after the trial court lost jurisdiction over the felony DUl
charge ~ Conley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been denied his right to
appeal the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor D`Ul conviction through the inaction of his counsel in the
general district court. On january 9, 2006, the Conimonwealth conceded that Conley had been denied
his right to appeal due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Supreme Court granted Conley a
writ of habeas corpus on l\/larch .'Sl , 2006. 'l`he Supreme Court restored Conley’s right to appeal his

April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUl conviction, and Conley appealed to the circuit court for a trial
-g_

de novo. On february 25, 2010, the circuit court granted Conley’s motion to dismiss this misdemeanor
Dlll charge on speedy trial grounds

ln his petition for a writ of actual innocence, Conley does not allege or establish that he could not
have discovered the failure to appeal the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor Dlll conviction in time to raise
that fact to the trial court’s attention. Moreover, Conley does not allege or establish that he was unable
to pursue a delayed appeal through habeas corpus relief during the many months that the trial court
exercised jurisdiction over the felony DUl charge

ll. ANALYsis
A. REQUIREMENTS ro OBTAIN A `WRrr or ACTUAL INNOCENCE

A petitioner seeking a writ of actual innocence faces a high burden of proof 'l`he General

Assembly requires that petitions for writs of actual innocence:

shall allege categorically and with specificity, under oath, all of the
following (i) the crime for which the petitioner was convicted, and that
such conviction was upon a plea of not guilty/g (ii) that the petitioner is
actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted; (iii) an exact
description of the previously unknown or unavailable evidence supporting
the allegation of innocence; (iv) that such evidence was previously
uril273 Va. 3 l5, BZl-ZZB o4l S.E.Zd 48(), 484 (2007);
Caroitcher v. Cornrnonwealthi 273 Va. 335, 343-44, 64l S.E.Zd 486, 49l (2007).

l. 'i`he Nature of`Actual innocence

Given that "{a]ctual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency,"  
L_§J_'ii_ikted States, 523 U.S. 6l4, 6l 5 (l998), "the General Assembly intended to provide relief [under the
Virginia actual innocence statutes] only to those individuals who can establish that they did not, as a
matter of fact, commit the crimes for which they were convicted." Ca@itcher, 273 Va. at 345, 641
S,E.Qd at 492. A writ of actual innocence is available only when a petitioner "affirrnatively prov[es] in
court that he is innocent" of the crime for which he was convicted, Wilson v. Cornmonwealth, 54 Va.
App. 631, 642-43, 6Sl S.E.Zd 74, 80 (2009), and a petitioner cannot rely solely on legal effects or
interpretations in satisfying this burden §e_,e In re Newrnan, 44 `Va. App. l46, 148, 603 S.E,Zd 654, 655
{2GG4).

"l`he General Assenibly created the writ of actual innocence to provide limited relief from the
constraints of Rule l:l, which provides that all final judgments and orders "shall remain under the
control of the trial court and subj ect to be rnodified, vacatedi or suspended for twenty-one days after the
date of entry, and no longer," "l`he General Assembly recognized that affirmative evidence of a person’s
actual innocence sometimes comes to light long after the trial court relinquishes _iurisdiction. However,
the General Assernbly also placed the burden on the petitioner for a writ of actual innocence to establish
that the previously unknown or unavailable evidence "could not be discovered or obtained prior to the
trial court’s loss of jurisdiction." in re Adarns, 44 Vat App. 266, 267, 604 S.E.Zd 746 (2004).

For the purpose of writs of actual innocence, therefore, the General Assernbly’s intent is clear.
Writs of actual innocence should be based on the presentation of newly discovered affirmative evidence
of irmocence, C@itcher, 273 Va. at 345, 64l S.E.Zd at 492 »~ not on the “retroactive interpretation and

application of the legal effect of decisions of law."" in re Rhodes, 44 Va, Apnr 145 l5-l6, 692 S.E.Zd
_1@_

408, 409 (2004). if such affirmative evidence of innocence is in any way available to a defendant or the
defendant’s trial attorney, then that evidence cannot later be used to support the issuance of a writ of
actual innocence §§ Code § 192-327 .l l(A)(iii) (requiring that the newly discovered evidence be
"previously unknown or unavailable to the petitioner or his trial attorney of record at the time the
conviction became final in the circuit court") (ernphasis added).
2. The Required "Exercise of Diligence"

Under the statutory test enacted by the General Assernbly for determining actual innocence, the
previously unknown or undiscoverable evidence must have been unavailable to the petitioner or to the
petitioner’s trial attorney Code § l9.2-32'7.l l(A)(ii). 'l`hus, this Court must examine the diligence of
both the petitioner and the petitioner’s trial attorney of record when this Court considers whether a writ
of actual innocence should be granted Code § 19.2-327.1 l(A)(vi). lf the newly discovered evidence
was available to the petitioner, or to the petitioner’s trial attorney, or to both, then the petitioner fails to
satisfy the General Assernblyf’s requirement of exercising diligence in order to obtain a writ of actual
innocence in short, both the petitioner and his trial attorney must exercise diligence in bringing any
factual problems of which they are aware (or should be aware) to the attention of the trial court - and at
least making the trial court aware of them

"fhe Supreme Court of Virginia has defined "diligence" as "‘devoted and painstaking application
to accomplish an undertaking,"’ and has noted that the use of the noun "diligence" is often associated
with the legal concept of "due diligence,” Dennis v. .Jones, 240 Va. l2, l9, 393 S.E.Zd 390, 393 (390)
(quoting Webster’s "l`hird New international Dictionarv 633 (1981)). "Due diligence" is "{sluch a
measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected frorn, and ordinarily exercised
by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute
standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case." S"l`B l\/larketing Corp. v. Zolfaohari,
240 Va.. 140, i44, 393 S.E.Zd 394, 397 (l990). Although due diligence does not "require that every

59

possibility, no rnater how rernote, be exhausted, due diligence does require "a good faith, reasonable

_}1_

effort" by a litigant McDonnough v. Cornmonwealth, 25 `Va. App. 120, l29, 436 S.E.Zd 570, 574
(l 997).

While there is apparently no published caselaw specifically discussing "the exercise of
diligence" requirement enacted by the General Assernbly for petitions for writs of actual innocence
based on newly discovered, non~biological evidence, the "reasonable diligence" standard for motions for
a new trial based on after-discovered evidence perhaps is instructive here Under this standard, "‘a party
who seel209 Va. 602, 609,

leo S.E.Zd 248, 253 (1!969) (quoting Fulcher v. Whitlow, 298 Va. 34, 38, l55 S.E. 362, 365). "‘["l`]he
burden is on the mover to show to the court that he has exercised due or reasonable diligence to
ascertain relevant facts before trial, and that such diligence did not reveal the existence of, nor show the
probability of the existence of, the evidence now relied upon."’ Orndorff v. Cornrnonwealth, 27l Va.
436, 592, (20@6) (quoting lvlason v, Conirnon‘w~'ealth, l54 Va. 890, 894-95, i53 S.E. 684, 685 (1930)).
Furtherrnore, "{ilt is not sufficient to say that the evidence could not have been discovered by the use of
due diligence. The applicant for a new trial must set forth in affidavits facts showing what his efforts
were to obtain the evidence and explaining why he was prevented from securing it." n, 269 Va. at
609, 166 S¢E.Zd at 253 (internal quotation marks and citation ornitted).

Unlike the granting of a motion for a new trial, the issuance of a vvrit of actual innocence does
not rnerely order a new trial, but instead vacates a conviction upon a finding that no rational factfinder
could have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt A declaration of actual innocence is
extraordinary relief §5;§ Burl<:s v, Dubois, 55 F.Bd '7l2, 7l8 (lst Cir. 1995). lt logically follows,
therefore, that the "exercise of diligence" standard for actual innocence petitions in Virginia must be at
least as exacting as the "reasonable diligence" standard for motions for a new trial ~ if not even more

exacting

_j_;_

B. WHY CoNrEY FAILS to SATISFY run REQUIREMENTS ron ACTUAL INNoCENcE
l, Conlev’s Claim of Actual innocence
llere, Conley claims that he is actually innocent of felony DUl, third offense. However, he relies

on a retroactive application of the Supreme Court of Virginia’s March l7, 2006 order granting Conley
leave to file a delayed appeal of his April 26, 2004 misdemeanor DUI conviction by the general district
court __S;_e_§ in re Rhodes, 44 Va. App. at l5-l6, 602 S.E.Zd at 409. Both Conley’s subsequent appeal of
that misdemeanor conviction to the circuit court for a trial de novo - as well as the circuit court’s
ultimate dismissal of that charge on speedy trial grounds - resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision
of law that Conley had originally been denied his right to appeal the April 26, 2004 misdemeanor
conviction due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. "fhey reflect legal consequences flowing from
the Suprerne Court’s decision of law - not pieces of evidence proving that "no rational trier of fact
could have fou.nd" Conley factually guilty of DUl, third offense, at his felony trial.l Code

§ l9.2-327tl l{A)(t’ii). Contra United States v. Maybecl< 23 F.Bd 388, 892 (fith Cir. 1994) (where
l\/laybecl< proved that he did not, z'nfact, have a prior state conviction for armed robbery and, therefore,
was actually innocent of being a career offender under the federal sentencing guidelines at the time of
his trial in federal district court); §§ United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 282 (4th Cir. 20l0)

( explaining that the actual innocence standard is not satisfied when a petitioner shows that he is legally -
but not factually ~ innocent).

Conley’s reliance on consequences subsequent to the Supreme Court”s decision of law cannot

cure the fact that he simply did not exercise the diligence required under the actual innocence statute

when the felony DUl charge was still within the trial court’s jurisdiction The failure to appeal the April

4 'l`he circuit court’s february 25, 20l0 dismissal of the second misdemeanor Dlll charge
resulted front Conley’s delayed appeal of that matter to the circuit court ”l`his delayed appeal was
available to Conley only through the Supreme Court’s decision to grant Conley habeas corpus relief
Therefore, the events forming the basis for Conley’s claim of actual innocence flow entirely from the
Supreme Court’s decision of law that Conley had been denied his right to appeal the April 26, 2004
misdemeanor conviction due to the inaction of his counsel in the general district courtt

_13-

26, 20@4 misdemeanor DUl conviction could have been discovered by Conley or by Conley’s trial
attorney representing him on the felony third-offense DUI charge, but apparently was not ever presented
to the trial court in this case.§ Conley has not presented any evidence that he alerted the trial court that
he tried to appeal the second DUI conviction in addition, he did not file a habeas corpus petition during
the many months that this matter was before the trial court. l`herefore, in rny view, Conley has failed to
satisfy the clear requirement established by the General Assernbly for "the exercise of diligence” in the
trial court.
Z. The importance of Exercising Dili,<;ence Here

ln order to convict Conley of felony DUI, third offense, the Comrnonwealth was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Conley had, in fact, been convicted of two prior DUI offenses
within the required time period Code § 18.2-270(€). Proof of Conley’s two valid prior misdemeanor
DUl convictions loomed, of course, as a highly material issue of fact to be decided at Conley’s felony
DUl trial 'l“herefore, any evidence raising a reasonable doubt about either prior conviction potentially
was affirmative evidence of Conley’s innocence from a third DUI offense

However, either Coniey’s trial attorney did not ask Conley whether those convictions had been
appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo, or Conley simply did not tell his trial attorney that he
thought the April 26, 2004 conviction had been appealed to the circuit court (as Conley had instructed
his previous counsel to do). Regardless of the reason, Conley’s trial attorney apparently was not aware
prior to or at the felony DUI trial that one of Conley’s recent prior DUl convictions should have been

appealed ~ but was not appealed m to the circuit court

5 As the petitioner seeking a writ of actual innocence, Conley is certainly required to present a
stifficient record for this Court to conclude that he has met all of the requirements for obtaining a writ of
actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. §e_e_ Code § l9.2-327.l3(ii). However, nothing in
the materials supporting Conley’s petition for a writ of actual innocence establishes or even hints that
the trial court was made aware that the second misdemeanor DUI conviction had not been appealed to
the circuit court despite Conley’s instruction to his counsel in general district court to appeal that prior
conviction

_i4_

When the Cornrnonwealth offered the certified copy of the general district court’s April 26, 2004
conviction order at Conley’s felony trial, Conley certainly could have mentioned that he had instructed
his counsel in general district court to appeal that prior conviction to the circuit court §;e§ People v.
Barnslater, 373 lll. App. 3d 5l2, 526 (lll. Ctr App. 2007) ("[D]ue diligence assumes at least some level
of deductive reasoning in an active effort to discover evidence based on the knowledge and information
already possessed by the litigants.”) (internal quotation marks and citation ornitted). However, Conley
never raised this objection (nor did his trial attorney make it). 'l`hus, even though Conley had
specifically instructed that the April 26, 2004 conviction be appealed to the circuit court, Conley did not
exercise enough diligence at his own felony DUl trial to ensure that his trial attorney, the prosecutor,
and especially the trial court were aware that there was a problem with the appeal of this prior
conviction

a. Corzley Should Have A!erted the Trial Conrt

We carinot l§norv what the trial court might have done if it had l~;rro\vn that the April 26, 2064
predicate misdemeanor DUl conviction was not appealed due to the inaction of Conley’s counsel in the
general district court. "Had petitioner, however, raised this issue at the trial level, which he failed to do,
the [trial] court at least would have been able to address it." Wilson v. Ercole, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23447, at *27-28 (E.D.N.Y. l\/iar. 23, 2@09) (finding that the petitioner was procedurally barred from
raising an actual innocence claim under the federal standard due to his lack of diligence at trial) (citing
C'arvey v. Duncan, 485 F‘Bd 709, 7l9 (Znd Cir. 2907)). lt was incumbent upon Coz'zley, either himself or
through his trial attorney, to discover and bring the failure to appeal the second misdemeanor DUI
conviction to the trial court’s attention so that the trial court could even have the opportunity to act. Qf_.
Weidrnan v. Babcocl<, Zdl `Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.Zd l64, 167 (l99l) (explaining the principle that a trial
court must be afforded "an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding

unnecessary appeals and reversals").

-]5..

if Conley had simply mentioned that he had instructed his counsel in the general district court to
appeal the April 26, 2004 prior misdemeanor DUl conviction, then the trial court might not have found
him guilty of felony D`Ul, third offense on .lune 28, 2004. For exa,rnple, the trial court might have
agreed to continue the felony DUl trial while Conley sought to obtain leave from the Supreme Court to
pursue a delayed appeal of the second prior DUl conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of
counsel - the very same basis for the Supreme Court’s March l7, 2006 order granting Conley leave to
pursue a delayed appeal of that prior conviction Even if asking for a continuance (or for any other relief
available to Conley under the circurnstances) might have appeared futile at the time,é the apparent
futility of such a request was not sufficient cause to relax the diligence requirement under the actual
innocence statute C_f Bouslev v. llnited States, 523 U.S. 6l4, 623 (l998) ("[F]utility cannot constitute
cause if it means simply that a claim was ‘unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time "’)
(quoting Engle v. lsaac, 456 U.S. l07, l30 n.§ (1982)). Conley simply fails to clearly and convincingly
establish that he acted in a "devoted and painstal