Court Opinion

ID: 9560759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:55:13.857703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:10.453510
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. I would hold the
warrant as used to authorize the search of Mr. Martinez violated the protections guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. I do not believe the general descriptions given were "other means reasonable under the circumstances ..." (italics mine), State v. Rollie M., 41 Wn. App. 55, 59, 701 P.2d 1123 (1985).
A search warrant for a person must meet the same specificity and accuracy tests as required for search of a place. Rollie M., at 59. Guidance as to what a defendant must show in order to attack the validity of a search warrant's description of a place to be searched is given in State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 967-68, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). The problem with particularity of description in Fisher was the address. There, the court upheld the warrant, noting:
There is nothing in the record which would show adequate precautions were not taken except the allegation that there are four other Madisons in Pierce County. There is no showing there was a similar residence that could have been mistaken at the alternative addresses nor any attempt by defendants to show that the officers *402did not know the house in question or if the affiant was among the searching officers. In other words, the defendants made no showing that a mistaken search could have occurred. ... on its face it appears that a reasonable person could ascertain the Madison location.
Fisher, at 967-68. Because no evidence was offered to indicate a mistake could have occurred, even with reasonable efforts by police, the warrant was deemed valid.
Here, on the other hand, the defendant has definitely undermined assurances that a mistaken search could not have occurred:2 (1) The officers waited for an hour to allow approximately 10 people to leave the building before searching for the Mexican males described in the warrant; several of those who left were Hispanic. There was no determination made that the two males described had not already left when the search occurred. (2) Given the number of Hispanics at the home when the officers approached and the police officers' uncertainty whether any of these individuals met the informant's description, there was an adequate showing Hispanics meeting the general description left between the first approach and the search. (3) The affiant officer did not base the physical description of the Mexican males on his own observation, but upon a general description by an informant; prior to executing the warrant, nothing in the record would indicate the affiant officer had ever seen the two described suspects. (4) The house was a place where there were usually a lot of people coming and going. (5) The amount of clothing and personal articles found in the residence indicated at best the individuals were not long-term residents of the house, nor in fact was anyone. Thus, this is not a situation where the warrant *403could be construed to authorize the search of the owners or renters of a normally occupied residence.
The majority cites three cases in a footnote which contain broad descriptions of the person to be searched which, on their face, look as general as here. However, the facts of each make them not only distinguishable, but highlight the deficiencies of the search warrant in this case. In United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1987), the affiant officer had personal knowledge of Mr. Espinosa's description, having conducted extensive surveillance of his movements; he knew his man, but not his name. Thus, there were ample assurances the officers would be searching the right person.
Likewise, in State v. Malave, 127 N.J. Super. 151, 316 A.2d 706, 708 (1974), the search warrant was upheld because the affiant officer who executed the search based the description contained in the affidavit and the search warrant partly on his personal knowledge of the defendant, having had the person specifically pointed out by the informer and having placed him under surveillance for several days.
Finally, in United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971), the officers had independently verified the described individual's link to the residence by observing him at the apartment, apparently doing the act which they were investigating, i.e., taking bets on a telephone.
There is no question a general description would be sufficient if it is coupled with the fact an officer with personal knowledge of that individual's identity will be at the search scene to identify the subject of the warrant. This is not the case here. The descriptions given were too vague and were an unreasonable means to identify the sought-after individuals, under the circumstances of this case. I would *404reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Martinez' motion to suppress.
Review denied by Supreme Court September 1, 1988.

The situation that presented itself when the officers arrived at the house made it virtually impossible for them to determine who the warrant authorized them to search.