Court Opinion

ID: 9826904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:56:17.032126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:18.810247
License: Public Domain

. Hicks, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, based principally upon his construction of the statutes requiring registration for like securities, Code, section 7192: “Personalty; Mortgages of, to be in writing, etc. — All mortgages and trusts of personalty shall be in writing, acknowledged and registered as hereinafter provided, to be valid against the creditors of the bargainor, or purchasers under him for value, and without notice.”
The learned judge was of the opinion that a trust receipt fell within the classification of “Trusts of personalty.” The court at this time is not required to apply this statute because mortgages and like securities which are required to be registered are nevertheless good between the parties, and as far as this record shows the contest is between the holder of the trust receipt and a third party whose title is not shown, and who may be standing in the shoes of the dealer.
The court is of the opinion that a trust receipt as between the parties is not void, and the defendant not having shown that it was an innocent holder for value and without notice, or advanced credit upon the faith of the goods, it is in no position to insist upon a judgment in its favor, upon this state of the record. The trial court erred in directing a verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony, and the case will be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The plaintiff in its pleading designated this receipt as a conditional sales contract, and the defendant insists- that it is ju*99dicially estopped to deny that the contract is a conditional sales contract. We think this a mistake in judgment of what the law is, and is not binding as a judicial estoppel.
The defendant in error will pay the cost of the appeal, the cost of the lower court will abide the final result.