Court Opinion

ID: 9745539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:08:50.044414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.407550
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that Zehr requires that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. I disagree with the majority where they find that the trial court erred in giving People’s instruction No. 11. In People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415, 420 N.E.2d 151, cert, denied (1981), 454 U.S. 845, 70 L. Ed. 2d 131, 102 S. Ct. 160, concerning the inference of burglary where the defendant had exclusive possession of recently stolen property and there was no reasonable explanation of its possession, the court stated the inference used did not infringe upon the defendant’s due process right if (1) there was a rational connection between his recent possession of property stolen in a burglary and his participation in the burglary; (2) his guilt of burglary is more likely than not to flow from his recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of burglary proceeds; and (3) there was evidence corroborating the defendant’s guilt. The second paragraph in the instruction made it clear to the jury that they had an option to accept or reject the presumption. In Flowers which concerned only the first paragraph of the instruction given in the case at bar, the instruction was found to be mandatory and violated due process. There was, however, no second paragraph giving the jury the option of using the presumption. In People v. Killings (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 431 N.E.2d 1387, this court found the requirements of Housby to have been met in that (1) there was a rational connection between concealment and removal of the merchandise beyond the last pay station and a presumed intent to steal the merchandise; (2) her intent to steal the merchandise was more likely than not to flow from her concealment and the removal of the goods from beyond the last pay station; and (3) there was evidence corroborating the defendant’s guilt of retail theft. Here, an employee of the food store saw the defendant put the cigarettes up her shirt, walk past the last checkout lane and out of the store without paying. When she was asked to go back into the store, she initially denied having anything hidden on her and after the manager revealed to her what information he had, she unzipped her pants and pulled out two packs of cigarettes. When asked if she had more, she handed over four more packs. The evidence that the defendant intended to steal the cigarettes is overwhelming and uncontradicted. Error, if any, in giving of the instruction by the trial court was harmless. It should be noted also that the jury was instructed that they should consider all of the evidence in light of their own observation and experience in life, that the State must prove the defendant knowingly took possession of the merchandise with the intent to permanently deprive, that only if each of the elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they should find the defendant guilty, that the defendant was presumed to be innocent and the burden of proof required of the State. These instructions were similar to those given in Housby which stated: “[T]he remaining instructions in the charge, when taken together with the permissive wording of the instruction objected to, adequately informed the jury that it had the option of disregarding the presumption if it so chose.” People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415, 434, 420 N.E.2d 151, 160.