Court Opinion

ID: 9819241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:44.215781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.638484
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, dissenting: Claimant bears the burden of establishing that the heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment. Vesco Ventilation & Equipment Sales v. Industrial Comm’n, 168 Ill. App. 3d 959, 964 (1988). It is axiomatic that within this burden of proof there are two elements that must be shown. Whether claimant sustained his heart attack during the course of his employment depends upon the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. Esco Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 169 Ill. App. 3d 376, 382 (1988). The second element, whether claimant’s heart attack arose out of his employment, requires proof of a causal connection between claimant’s employment and the attack. Esco, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 383. “The risk of injury must be peculiar to the work such that the employee is exposed to it to a greater degree than the general public by reason of the employment.” Esco, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 383. For work-related stress to be a causative factor leading to a heart attack, such stress must have been “unusual.” One factor to consider in determining “unusualness” is whether the stress subjected the employee to a greater emotional strain than that to which all employees are subjected. Esco, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 383. Another factor to consider is whether the stress was “unusual” when compared to the strain of the claimant’s normal working conditions. Esco, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 383; 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Laws § 38.65(d)(4)(i), at 7 — 297 (1997). In the instant case, there is no evidence to suggest that claimant’s job put him at risk of heart attack to a greater degree than the general public. Claimant was a shift commander for the Waukegan police department, which entailed supervising 20 to 30 officers. He also states that it was his job to appease the public and to defuse situations that occurred on his shift of command. Although claimant states that these situations were “stressful” and “adversarial,” he did not elaborate on the frequency or nature of these situations. Claimant also testified that he was subject to “second-guessing” by his supervisors. ' I respectfully submit that the above in no way establishes that claimant was subject to a greater risk of stress and/or heart attack than the general public. His job was routine and the situations he described were situations that anyone engaged in police work would be subjected to on a daily basis. On a scale of 1 to 10, claimant’s job was at best a two when compared to the stress that most Americans are exposed to at the work place on a daily basis. Nor is there any evidence that the stress claimant was exposed to was unusual. The only evidence claimant offers is that a firing range had broken down and that his supervisors were not willing to make the recommended repairs. Is this the type of “unusualness” that can be said to subject an employee to greater emotional strain than that to which all employees are subjected? Can it be said to be “unusual” when compared to the stress of claimant’s own normal conditions? I respectfully submit that the answer is no. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that claimant’s employment did not subject him to a risk of heart attack greater than that to which the general public is exposed. The decision of the Commission is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence, and an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. McCULLOUGH, EJ., joins in this dissent.