Court Opinion

ID: 9895805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 18:04:14.442117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:43.486928
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 P. v. Hendrix CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B324605

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. TA004901)
         v.

ALTRIKEE EUGENE
HENDRIX,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Allen J. Webster, Judge. Affirmed.
      Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                             ******
      Defendant and appellant Altrikee Eugene Hendrix appeals
from the order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6, entered after an evidentiary hearing
held pursuant to subdivision (d) of that statute.1 Defendant
contends the finding that he could still be convicted of murder
after amendments to sections 188 and 189 is not supported by
substantial evidence. We conclude the trial court’s finding that
defendant was a direct aider and abettor of the murder and thus
remains guilty under current law is supported by substantial
evidence and we affirm.

                          BACKGROUND
       In 1991, a jury convicted defendant of the first degree
murder of James Dailey, first degree robbery with the use of a
firearm, and two counts of second degree robbery. His conviction
was affirmed on appeal in People v. Hendrix (Sept. 24, 1992,
B062672) (nonpub. opn.). He was sentenced to 25 years to life
plus 11 years in prison.
Relevant 1991 trial evidence
       Sylvia Bentley was home with her mother, son, and six
other children on the evening of January 21, 1990. Dailey had
been there that evening and left between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. At
10:05 p.m. defendant rang the doorbell. Bentley had met
defendant by the nickname “Alboo” a few months earlier through
Dailey.2 When Bentley asked who was at the door, she heard,
“It’s Alboo.” Defendant then asked if Dwight (her son) was there.

1     All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2     Dailey’s nickname was “Speedy.”

                                2
As Bentley unlatched the door, defendant yanked the door open
and two other men ran in wearing dark clothing and ski masks
with openings only for the mouth and eyes. Defendant wore dark
clothing and a knit beanie around his head. Defendant directed
where the other two men were to go. While one of them held a
gun to Bentley’s mother’s head in the bedroom, the other man
ran to Bentley’s room and came out with her Louis Vuitton purse.
He then grabbed the VCR. The men also took jewelry Bentley
and her son were wearing and her driver’s license. All the while
defendant stood at the front door pointing a silver-colored gun at
her. Bentley thought the gun looked like a nine-millimeter, but
could not be sure. After they left Bentley went to tell Dailey and
his mother about the robbery and to call the police, as the robbers
had disabled her phone.
      Earlier in the evening of January 21, 1990, between 7:00
and 9:30 p.m., Margie Owens was sitting in a car talking with
friends when three men approached the car. Owens identified
defendant in court as one of them. One of the men passed a thick
chrome- colored gun (not a revolver) to another, who then asked
for money. Owens gave them the $11 or $12 she had.
      Later that night Owens was near Dailey, who she knew
only as “Speedy,” at the phone booths near the local 76 gas
station on Imperial Highway (hereinafter the gas station).
Owens saw defendant and another man standing near the gas
pumps and told Speedy they were the ones who had robbed her.
She again saw defendant standing with another person in front of
a motel across the street from her residence. She watched them
cross the street to the back of the gas station and out of sight.
Owens went to the nearby market and when she returned, she

                                3
saw Dailey lying on the ground with an ambulance and police
nearby.
       In the early hours of January 22, Urilonda Richardson was
in the vicinity of the gas station when she saw two men standing
across the street. She did not see their faces. After a white car
passed by and turned into the gas station, the driver (Dailey) got
out and went to the telephone booth. The two men then
approached the car and one got into it. Dailey tried to get his
keys from the ignition, but “after they showed him ammunition,”
Dailey ran out into the street. The man in his car got out and
shot Dailey in the head while the other man stood there. The
shooter’s companion tried and failed to get into the white car with
the shooter but it was moving too fast. The shooter drove away
in the car while his companion ran away on foot. Richardson
described the shooter as having braids and the other man as
wearing a black beanie. Both men wore black pants and white
T-shirts, and both were dark-complected.
       Another eyewitness, Bregetta Green, was at a hamburger
stand on Avalon Boulevard near Imperial Highway between 1:00
and 2:00 a.m. on January 22, talking with an acquaintance. She
saw two men in the back of the gas station peeking around the
corner toward the front, and then she no longer saw them. She
then heard a gunshot, and an unknown man ran past her. She
saw the side of his face and was able to identify photograph No. 3
in a photographic lineup as resembling the man who ran past
her. Later, in court she identified that man as defendant.
       Viko Souchaseum, the manager of the motel at Avalon Blvd
and Imperial Highway across the street from the gas station,
testified that late on the night of January 21 into January 22,
while on duty, he saw three men in the parking lot near the five-

                                4
foot wall that surrounds the motel compound. Souchaseum
ordered them to leave, which they did, but two of them returned
after about five minutes. When Souchaseum approached, he
found only one man standing on the driveway entrance to the
motel. He told the man not to come back and then returned to
the office. When he came back out to see what the other two men
were doing, he heard a gunshot and saw a man fall by the
roadside. One man ran away. A white car turned into the gas
station, stopped shortly and then drove away. When shown a
photographic lineup, Souchaseum selected No. 3 as someone who
very much resembled one of the men he saw that night at the
motel. Souchaseum identified defendant in court as that man.
The men wore black and defendant appeared to be holding a
black handkerchief or small towel.
       The victim’s brother Argusta Dailey (Argusta) testified that
he saw his brother parked at the gas station at Avalon Boulevard
and Imperial Highway on January 21, 1990, where they had a
short conversation. When Argusta drove up, he saw two men
near the back of the station on the east side. He recognized one
of them, and after speaking to his brother they walked around
the gas station to check on the two men but did not find them.
Argusta then put gas in his car, told Dailey he would be back
after he took his wife and kids home, and left. Argusta identified
defendant as one of the two men he saw at the gas station.
Defendant was wearing dark-colored clothing, a dark sweatshirt,
and a black beanie. When shown a photographic lineup, Argusta
selected No. 3, and identified defendant in court as the person
depicted in photograph No. 3.

                                 5
       Argusta explained that Dailey regularly used the telephone
at that gas station for narcotic sales transactions as it was close
to home.
       On March 27, 1990, Los Angeles Police Detective Charles
W. Merritt interviewed defendant at the police station regarding
the murder and the robbery after defendant waived his Miranda
rights.3 Defendant denied the murder but admitted to the
residential robbery of Bentley and the street robbery of someone
the day before. He described the property taken from Bentley’s
home, which included some drugs and cash, and said he took $5
from a woman the day before when he did not have a gun. He
admitted having a gun during the Bentley robbery but did not
know what kind of guns his accomplices had.
       Defendant said he knew Dailey from school and he knew
Bentley was Dailey’s girlfriend. Defendant had purchased rock
cocaine from Dailey on occasion, which Dailey sold from Bentley’s
house. Defendant said he needed money to buy more drugs and
support his habit, so that evening he and two accomplices decided
to rob the house because they knew Dailey kept money and
cocaine there. Defendant explained he did not wear a mask so
Bentley would recognize him and let him in. Defendant told
Detective Merritt he thought Dailey would kill him for robbing
his girlfriend, and sometime after the robbery Dailey drove by his
house with another person and yelled, “Alboo, you’re dead.”
Section 1172.6 motion
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 1437, amending the laws pertaining to felony murder
and murder under the natural and probable consequences

3     See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444-445.

                                6
doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature also added a procedure for
those convicted of murder to seek retroactive relief if they could
not be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as amended effective
January 1, 2019. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).)
       In January 2019, defendant filed a petition alleging the
three conditions required to show prima facie eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6. Among other allegations and as relevant
here, defendant alleged (1) he was charged with murder under a
theory of felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, (2) he was convicted of murder, and (3) he could not
presently be convicted of murder because of changes to section
188 or 189, effective January 1, 2019. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       The trial court found defendant had not made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6 and
summarily denied the petition. We reversed that order and
remanded to the trial court with directions to appoint counsel for
defendant, allow defendant to file a reply to the opposition,
consider the issuance of an order to show cause, and then proceed
in accordance with the statutory requirements.
       In September 2021, the trial court appointed counsel for
defendant, who filed a brief regarding prima facie review and
requested the issuance of an order to show cause. The court
continued the matter a number of times over a nine-month
period, and according to the court’s minutes the “prima facie
hearing [was] completed” on September 28, 2022. Although the

                                 7
court ordered the prosecution to file copies of the trial transcripts,
it does not appear from this record that the trial court issued an
order to show cause or received a response from the prosecutor as
required by section 1172.6, subdivision (c). The matter was
continued to October 4, 2022, when an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d) was held with defense
counsel’s implied consent.4
       During the hearing, the trial court indicated that it had
read the 1991 trial transcripts provided by the prosecution, and
the parties argued the issues based upon the transcripts without
presenting additional evidence. The trial court orally analyzed
the issues and evidence and denied the petition upon finding
beyond a reasonable doubt the evidence showed defendant would
still be guilty of murder under the amended murder laws as a
direct aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill. The
court also found defendant was a major participant in the crime
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order
denying his petition.

                         DISCUSSION
     Defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling was not
supported by substantial evidence.

4     At the outset of the hearing, when the court invited the
prosecutor to proceed first, counsel reminded the court that “at
this point, the (d)(3) . . . burden is on the People to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [defendant] is guilty of murder under the
changed law. So he has to go first.”

                                  8
I.     Standard of review
       At the evidentiary hearing conducted pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d), the trial court sits as an independent fact
finder. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) The
court must “‘review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard.’” (People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480, quoting People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) On appeal from the denial of a petition
after hearing, our task is to determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have made the same determination beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Vargas, supra, at p. 951.) We apply
the substantial evidence standard of review. (See People v.
Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233-234.)
       Under the usual substantial evidence standard, “we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and
must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People
v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)5 “The same standard applies
when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) “The standard is deferential, but the
evidence in support of the judgment must be reasonable, credible,
and of solid value; ‘a mere possibility’ or ‘[s]peculation is not
substantial evidence [citation].” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3

5      We base our review for substantial evidence upon the 1991
trial record not subsequent interpretations of the evidence.

                                 9
Cal.5th 1, 120.)6 “[B]ecause ‘we must begin with the presumption
that the evidence . . . was sufficient,’ it is defendant, as the
appellant, who ‘bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.’”
(People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1430.) Reversal
on a substantial evidence ground “is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conclusion of the trier of
fact].’” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
II.     Direct aiding and abetting murder
        “Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and
abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to
murder must possess malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848.) A defendant is liable for murder
perpetrated by an accomplice if he “‘aided or encouraged the
commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission.’” (In re
Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 585.)

6      Defendant asserts that the trial court’s ruling was based on
speculation and improper inferences, and that the trial court
acknowledged as much when it commented “‘that it had to ‘deal
with’ ‘a lot of conjecture.’” Defendant concludes that the trial
court must have accepted the prosecutor’s theories, which were
not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant relies on two
phrases from the reporter’s transcript of the hearing, although
the entirety of the court’s comments make clear they were
directed to the attorneys’ arguments, not the court’s own
analysis. The court then also made clear that it would rely upon
its own evaluation of the evidence. We thus decline defendant’s
invitation to review the prosecutor’s arguments for substantial
evidence.

                                10
       Factors relevant to determining whether substantial
evidence supports a finding that defendant was an aider and
abettor include “‘presence at the scene . . . , companionship, and
conduct before and after the crime, including flight.’” (People v.
Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 924, quoting People v. Haynes
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1294.) “[A] person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge
of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and [with] (2) the
intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v.
Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) Thus the aider and abettor of
murder must have shared the killer’s intent to kill, and to share
the actual perpetrator’s intent to kill that intent must have been
formed beforehand. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635,
676.)
       Defendant challenges the inferences from which the trial
court concluded defendant aided and abetted the shooter with an
intent to kill. Defendant quotes the following excerpt from the
court’s reasoning: ‘“No one ever said that Mr. Hendrix was the
shooter. But he ran away. And so I guess the question is: if there
was no intention to kill this particular man, why did he run
away? Or even more so, why would he even go to the scene if [he]
was not involved in that? . . . But he went to the gas station.
Why? I basically think to make sure that he killed Mr. Daily [sic]
before Mr. Daily [sic] killed him. That’s the only inescapable
conclusion that this court can come up with beyond a reasonable
doubt. He placed himself voluntarily at the scene of the
shooting . . . the evidence strongly suggests beyond a reasonable
doubt that he aided and abetted this particular crime.’”

                               11
      From these statements, defendant concludes the trial court
inferred intent to kill from the fact “(1) [defendant] voluntarily
placed himself at the scene; [¶] (2) he knew that the decedent
was out to kill him; [¶] (3) he knew his accomplices were armed;
and [¶] (4) he ran away after the killing.”
      Defendant claims each of these inferences was
unreasonable and speculative, arguing that there was no
evidence defendant knew the shooter was armed or intended to
kill Dailey, that the men with him at the gas station were the
same men who participated in the earlier two armed robberies, or
that defendant and his accomplices intended anything other than
to steal the car. Quoting In re Lynette G. (1976) 54
Cal.App.3d.1087, 1095, defendant also asserts that flight may be
explained “‘by a desire merely to disassociate oneself from an
unexpected criminal activity.’” It may be, but the court was not
required to adopt that view as the substantial evidence discussed
below supports a reasonable inference that defendant’s flight
indicated a consciousness of guilt. (See ibid.) Our task is to
determine whether the judgment is supported by substantial
evidence, not to determine whether substantial evidence supports
contrary findings. (See People v. Saterfield (1967) 65 Cal.2d 752,
759.) Ultimately, it is the court’s ruling, not its reasoning that
must be supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.)
      Considering all the circumstances of the night and early
morning of January 21 and 22, the evidence yields much more
than the contrary inferences suggested by defendant. All the
events occurred within a period of about six hours, suggesting
defendant was indeed with the same companions he knew were
then armed. Defendant committed the Owens and Bentley

                               12
armed robberies earlier the same night as the shooting, each
crime including two accomplices. Owens testified defendant and
one of the robbers handled a thick chrome-colored gun that was
not a revolver. Bentley testified defendant used a chrome-colored
nine-millimeter gun and one of the accomplices held another gun.
A nine-millimeter spent bullet casing was found at the scene of
the shooting. Defendant and his two accomplices committed the
Owens robbery between 7:00 and 9:30 p.m., the Bentley robbery
just past 10:00 p.m., and Dailey’s shouted threat was made after
that. Argusta saw defendant at the gas station sometime before
midnight, and other witnesses later saw defendant and two
companions watching the gas station from behind the gas station
and from the motel parking lot behind a five-foot wall. Dailey
was killed between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m.
      Having considered the totality of the circumstances,
including the evidence of defendant’s motive, his presence and
behavior at the scene, defendant’s and his companions’ conduct
before and after the crime, we find that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that defendant went to the gas
station intending to either kill Dailey or that an accomplice kill
Dailey. We conclude that any rational trier of fact could have
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty
of murder as a direct aider and abettor under section 188, as
amended effective January 1, 2019. We thus find no error in the
denial of defendant’s petition.
      Defendant argues that his admission to law enforcement
that he thought Dailey would kill him for robbing his girlfriend
was not probative of an intent to kill. It may not be conclusive as
to defendant’s intent, but it did provide evidence of an “intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating” killing Dailey

                                13
before Dailey could kill him, particularly in light of Dailey’s
threat made after the robbery, “Alboo, you’re dead.”
       Defendant also asserts that his “mere presence at the scene
of a crime” was insufficient to prove he was armed or knew the
shooter was armed. The evidence showed defendant’s secretive
behavior with the shooter and another man at and near the gas
station. The Bentley robbery and Dailey’s threat took place in
the evening hours of January 21, and the events that followed
took place that same night during the overnight into the early
morning hours of January 22 at or near the nearby gas station.
Five witnesses identified defendant as one of two or three men
they saw at the gas station, first near the pumps, then behind the
gas station and from behind a five-foot wall at the motel across
the street from the gas station. Owens saw him at the motel and
later at the back of the gas station. Argusta, who knew
defendant, saw him and another man at the back of the gas
station, approached the area where they were seen, but did not
find them. Later, Richardson saw two men in the back of the gas
station peeking around the corner toward the front of the gas
station, and then disappearing out of sight. When Dailey drove
into the gas station alone, the shooter and his companion crossed
the street and approached from the motel. Richardson then
heard a gunshot and a man she identified as defendant ran past
her after trying but failing to get into the car as the shooter fled.
Defendant argues that there was no evidence he was
accompanied by the same accomplices of the two armed robberies
he committed that night at the time of the shooting. In the
alternative defendant argues if he intended to aid and abet a
crime, the evidence showed the only crime intended was car theft.
In fact, the evidence shows Dailey may not have been in the car

                                 14
when they approached, but he was very close, as Richardson
testified that Dailey tried to get his keys from the ignition, but
“after they showed him ammunition,” Dailey ran out into the
street. Ultimately, “[t]he focus of the substantial evidence test is
on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of fact,
rather than on ‘“‘isolated bits of evidence.’”’” (People v. Cuevas
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261.)
       As we have determined substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s ruling on a direct aiding and abetting theory, we
need not reach the issue whether there was sufficient evidence
supporting the alternate theory of felony murder under current
law. (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1003.)

                          DISPOSITION
     The October 4, 2022 order denying defendant’s section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.

                                      ___________________________
                                      CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

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