Court Opinion

ID: 9716707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:48:52.106595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.142219
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 83. (dissenting). In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the major*460ity seriously undermines the value of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) (2007-08)1 and rewrites the law on erroneous exercise of discretion. To understand the damage that is being done, we must examine the facts and law in full.
I
¶ 84. Chapter 804 in the Wisconsin Code of Civil Procedure pertains to "Depositions and Discovery." Wisconsin Stat. § 804.11, entitled "Requests for admission," is a vital part of this chapter.
¶ 85. Under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(l)(a), "a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of s. 804.01(2)." Section 804.01(2)(a) explains that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 86. This is straightforward. The rationale for the rule is explained in a 1976 commentary on "new" Chapter 804 in the Marquette Law Review: "This rule [section 804.11] replaces former section 889.22 with the language of Federal Rule 36 and offers a much improved procedure for obtaining from a party admissions of facts and other items of proof over which there is no dispute and which can be costly and time-consuming to prove at trial." Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure Chapter 804, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 463, 519 (1976) (emphasis added).
*461¶ 87. In this case, one of the defendants sent three requests for admission to the plaintiffs, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.11. The requests were sent on June 22, 2005. By that time, the parties had taken depositions of every named physician-defendant as well as the following treating health care providers: Julie Cavey, Sandra Daniels, Jessica Graessner, Chung Mea Ha, M.D., Marilyn Kuester, Helen Meissner, and Richard Mueller. Inasmuch as the parties already had depositions from many of the fact witnesses, it was completely reasonable for the defendants to seek admissions of facts "over which there [wa]s no dispute and which [could] be costly and time-consuming to prove at trial." Id. Most competent advocates would do no less.
¶ 88. The majority puts an ominous spin on these common sense requests for admission:
The defendants had the opportunity to make an independent medical examination of Ms. Luckett before the admissions. They did not, even though their requests] for admission[], along with the accompanying interrogatories and request for production, demonstrate that the question whether Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state was not settled. As the court of appeals stated, the "defendants had numerous opportunities to request an order for a medical examination in connection with several... scheduling orders issued between the commencement of this litigation ... and the July 22, 2005, admission[s] at issue here. None of the defendants made such a request."
Majority op. ¶ 63 (emphasis added).
¶ 89. Elsewhere in the opinion, the majority asserts that "[t]he defendants had the same 2,000 pages of medical records" as the plaintiffs. Id., ¶ 17.
¶ 90. There are implications in these statements. The first is that the defendants should have combed *462through 2,000 pages of medical records and conducted a medical examination of Tywanda Luckett, even though the plaintiffs did not. The second implication is that perhaps the defendants did comb through the medical records and unearth what the plaintiffs eventually discovered. In that event, the defendants' requests for admission were nothing more than a skillful effort to euchre plaintiffs' counsel into making fatal admissions. If this is what happened, then defendants' counsel were not surprised and ought not complain about their self-created predicament.
¶ 91. The problem is that these expectations and suspicions are not grounded in the record. Without justification, the majority treats the defendants as though they possessed unlimited time and money to conduct investigation and discovery and their requests for admission were an effort to pull a fast one on the plaintiffs rather than employ a valuable tool to narrow the facts in dispute.2 When the supreme court engages *463in this sort of second-guessing, it invites courts to speculate about the motivation behind requests for *464admission and undermines the value of this discovery tool in civil practice.
II
¶ 92. It is against this background that we examine the majority's review of the circuit court's decision.
¶ 93. On June 22, 2005, Aurora Sinai Medical Center and the Medical Protective Company sent the plaintiffs three requests for admission. On July 22, 2005, plaintiffs' counsel responded in the affirmative to each of the three requested admissions and said that the interrogatories and the request for production were "not applicable." On January 18, 2007, the day before the final pretrial conference, plaintiffs' counsel notified defendants' counsel that the plaintiffs were withdrawing their three admissions. Counsel's e-mail to that effect was sent at 2:57 p.m. The hearing on the request to withdraw the admissions was held at 9 a.m. the next morning.
¶ 94. It should be noted that plaintiffs' counsel did not send the aforementioned e-mail to the circuit court. The court did not learn about plaintiffs' discovery and request to withdraw admissions until the following morning. The circuit court, intently focused on multiple pending motions, was given no advance notice about *465the critical decision it would be asked to make. At the informal hearing in chambers, the court may not have been given copies of the medical records in question or a copy of the e-mail, because it is clear that the court, like several of the attorneys, occasionally misstated the facts.
¶ 95. When there is a motion or request to withdraw admissions previously made, the court must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2). That subsection reads, in part, as follows: "The court may permit withdrawal... when the presentation of the merits of the action will he subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal... will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits." Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).
¶ 96. The majority opinion correctly states that the text of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), as well as the case law, demonstrates that" 'a court may permit withdrawal if both statutory conditions are met[.]'" Majority op., ¶ 30 (quoting Mucek v. Nationwide Commc'ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶ 34, 252 Wis. 2d 426, 643 N.W.2d 98) (emphasis and alteration in majority opinion).
¶ 97. The majority opinion also correctly states that the circuit court's decision is a discretionary decision. Id., ¶ 31. "This court will uphold the circuit court's order if the circuit court [1] applies a proper standard of law, [2] examines the relevant facts, and [3] reaches a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach, [4] demonstrating a rational process." Id. (citing Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 25 (citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982))).3
*466¶ 98. In reviewing a discretionary decision, each of these factors should be considered.
¶ 99. First, the circuit judge applied an incorrect standard of law because he stated that the answer "lies in the balancing of the two prongs" (factors). This is what the judge wrote:
[T]here is a two-pronged analysis required in assessing the propriety of withdrawal of an admission. First, will the presentation of the merits of the action be sub-served!?] Second, will the party who previously obtained and relied upon the admission he prejudiced!?] • • • [T]he resultant obligation to prove a fact that had been conclusively established does not establish prejudice. However, resultant adjournment and additional discovery is sufficient to establish prejudice so as to justify denial of the request to withdraw an admission.
I have little hesitance in concluding that the first prong of the analysis is established....
The second prong is more difficult to assess. We are on the verge of trial. All parties have expended consid*467erable time, effort and resources in preparation for trial. We have dedicated a significant block of our calendar (as have all the lawyers and, to a lesser extent, some of the witnesses) to this trial. Allowing the withdrawal, necessitating additional expert evaluation, testimony and related discovery, requires adjournment of the impending trial and adds significant expense.
The proper answer to this dilemma lies in the balancing of the two prongs. In that regard, I have little difficulty reaching the conclusion that the motion should be granted.
Letter from Christopher R. Foley, Circuit Judge, Milwaukee County, to Counsel for the Parties (Jan. 19, 2007) (emphasis added (internal footnotes and citations omitted)) [hereinafter Letter from Judge Foley].
¶ 100. The court applied the wrong standard of law, and it is quite obvious that the court relied upon the wrong standard of law to overcome the existence of prejudice. The court acknowledged that "significant prejudice concerns exist." Id. The court spelled out some of those concerns in its letter. Id. And the court explained its understanding that "resultant adjournment and additional discovery is sufficient to establish prejudice." Id. In short, the court found prejudice. Nonetheless, it still permitted withdrawal of the three admissions. At a minimum, this court should remand the case for an evaluation of a motion to withdraw, applying proper legal standards. This is precisely what the court ordered in Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 239, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983).
¶ 101. The second deficiency in the circuit court's determination is that the court failed to "examine[] the relevant facts." Majority op., ¶ 31 (citing Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 25 (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 414-15)).
*468¶ 102. The defendants requested three admissions:
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 1: Admit that Tywanda Luckett is presently in a persistent vegetative state.
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 2: Admit that Tywanda Luckett has been in a persistent vegetative state since she was admitted to the Silver Spring Health and Rehabilitation Center.
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 3: Admit that the persistent vegetative state of Tywanda Luckett is permanent.
The plaintiff admitted each request.
¶ 103. Eighteen months later and less than three weeks before a scheduled trial, the circuit court permitted the plaintiffs to withdraw each admission.
¶ 104. The plaintiffs arguably submitted evidence to justify the withdrawal of their admission to request number two. The plaintiffs submitted evidence that, on April 11, 2001, April 26, 2001, and June 21, 2001, doctors made notes indicating signs of Ms. Luckett's consciousness and comprehension.
¶ 105. Conversely, plaintiffs did not submit any evidence of Ms. Luckett's consciousness or comprehension during the last half of 2001, or at any time in 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005. Hence, there was no evidence submitted to justify the withdrawal of admission number one and no evidence submitted to justify the withdrawal of admission number three.
¶ 106. Plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly suggested that the trial would have to explore Ms. Luckett's consciousness up to her death, and the circuit court adopted that suggestion. Clearly, the court intended to *469open up the entire period between September 29, 2000, and October 2, 2005, a five year period. The court stated as follows:
This brief letter will serve to apprise you of my decision with respect to Mr. End's[, plaintiffs' counsel,] motion to withdraw his admission that Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state from late August, 2000, until the time of her death.... The admission acknowledged an inability on the part of Ms. Luckett to [refute proof that she was in a persistent vegetative state] during the period between late August, 2000 and the time of her death.... If, as the entries in the medical records referenced in this morning's arguments arguably indicate, Ms. Luckett was capable of and did experience pain and suffering for the extended period between the time she lapsed into a coma to the time of her death, it is appropriate for the jury to consider that fact....
Letter from Judge Foley (emphasis added).
¶ 107. The circuit court's decision not only forced the defendants to face exposure for all of 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and nine months of 2005 but also justified its decision, in part, on consideration of pain and suffering during a period of time in 2000 (late August and most of September), when there was no admission of a persistent vegetative state requested and no admission given. This period in 2000 was already open to proof of pain and suffering.
¶ 108. In short, the court expanded the defendants' exposure to a claim of pain and suffering from roughly two months to approximately 60 months (October 2000 to September 2005), when there was no evidence proffered to support a conclusion that Ms. Luckett was not in a persistent vegetative state during *47051 of those 60 months (July 2001 to September 2005) and at least one other fact was misunderstood.
¶ 109. In making its decision to permit withdrawal of admissions one and three, the court did not have any facts to justify withdrawal. The court could not have examined the relevant facts if there were no facts to examine.
¶ 110. The third deficiency in the circuit court's determination is that, after significantly expanding the defendants' period of exposure to damages, the court reached a decision that no reasonable judge could reach. The court commented as follows: "The [Wisconsin Patients Compensation] Fund .. . noted in their argument in opposition to the motion their concern with respect to significantly increased exposure. I don't view that as a pertinent consideration on the prejudice prong." Id. The circuit court did not give a legal reason for its answer. It gave a factual reason:
If the plaintiff can establish [that] Ms. Luckett experienced pain and suffering during this period as a result of negligence on the part of any of the health care providers, damages should be awarded. If she did not, or if the plaintiff cannot adequately prove that she did, no damages will be awarded.

Id.

¶ 111. This answer completely misses the point. Noneconomic damages for pain and suffering are not a fixed amount unless there is a cap on them. Thus, no reasonable judge would open up defendants to an additional 51 months of exposure to unlimited noneconomic damages unless there were facts to justify that additional exposure. The plaintiffs submitted no such facts, yet the circuit court made its decision anyway.
*471¶ 112. In my view, and also in the view of the majority, the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard. The court also failed to examine the relevant facts in that there were no facts to support withdrawal of two of the three admissions. It misstated facts in its written decision in relation to August and September 2000, showing that it was operating under a misunderstanding. Finally, the court concluded that requiring the defendants to defend 30 times the period of exposure that they had to defend before the requested withdrawal was a factor that it could not even consider in assessing prejudice.
¶ 113. This was an erroneous exercise of discretion. When the majority disregards a court's multiple errors, it rewrites the law on erroneous exercise of discretion.
Ill
¶ 114. Luckett v. Bodner represents a perfect storm for defendants in a medical malpractice case.
¶ 115. The Wisconsin legislature imposed a cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in 1995. See 1995 Wis. Act 10. Among other things, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4) to limit total noneconomic damages for each occurrence in a medical malpractice case on or after May 25, 1995, to $350,000, which amount was to be adjusted at least annually to reflect changes in inflation measured by the consumer price index. See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (1997-98). The constitutionality of the cap was upheld in Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶¶ 1, 25, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776. In July 2005, the cap stood at $445,755. This was the amount Ms. Luckett was *472slated to receive, and it was likely the amount that the defendants would have conceded if their liability was established.
¶ 116. On July 14, 2005, the supreme court decided that this cap was unconstitutional. Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶ 187, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440. Hence, the statute that existed and limited noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice case at the time when Ms. Luekett suffered injury no longer exists. A new statute has been enacted, but it was not effective until April 6, 2006, more them six months after Ms. Luckett's death. See 2005 Wis. Act 183. Consequently, there is no statutory limitation on noneconomic damages in this case.
¶ 117. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 is Wisconsin's wrongful death statute. The cap on nonpecuniary wrongful death damages in the case of a deceased adult is $350,000. Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). This award covers "loss of society and companionship [and] may be awarded to the .. . children ... of the deceased." Id.
¶ 118. In Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶ 6, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, this court determined that the noneconomic damages recoverable against health care providers for wrongful death in a medical malpractice case were limited to the statutory cap for noneconomic damages from wrongful death. This cap was in lieu of, not in addition to, the statutory cap on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice. See id. Significantly, the facts in Maurin involved a child who died less than 48 hours after the medical malpractice and was not conscious for most of that time. Id., ¶¶ 10-13.
¶ 119. In Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶ 3, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216, the court overruled Maurin. The July 7, 2006 decision reflected a divided court on the ques*473tion of whether plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs here, can collect medical malpractice noneconomic damages and wrongful death noneconomic damages. See id., ¶ 4.
¶ 120. Ferdon was the law of Wisconsin when the plaintiffs in this case made their admissions in July 2005. Ferdon and Bartholomew were the law in 2007 when the circuit court permitted the admissions to be withdrawn.
¶ 121. To sum up, under the law of Wisconsin on January 19, 2007, the circuit court knew that it was exposing the defendants to an award of unlimited noneconomic damages for pain and suffering over a potential five-year period. Yet, like the majority opinion, it refused to take that factor into account in evaluating prejudice.
¶ 122. The majority writes as follows: "We agree with the circuit court that the defendant's 'increased exposure ... [is not] a pertinent consideration on the prejudice prong' of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2)." Majority op., ¶ 70 (alteration and ellipsis in majority opinion). Then, the majority adds the following: "The defendants' increased exposure results from the defendants having to litigate a question (Ms. Luckett's capacity to experience conscious pain and suffering) that the defendants would have had to litigate in the absence of admissions." Id.
¶ 123. The latter statement is unsupported and plainly wrong. Had there been no admissions, the defendants would have forced the plaintiffs to go through the medical records 18 months sooner based on the defendants' interrogatories and request for production. The defendants' own experts also would have examined the records, and they would have been able and motivated to examine Ms. Luckett when it was still possible to do so. Almost certainly, the defendants *474would have been able to reduce the period of exposure and would seriously have explored settlement. The case would not have come to this court.
IV
¶ 124. Unique among discovery procedures, requests for admission under Wis. Stat. § 804.11 are used "to define and limit the controversy between parties to a lawsuit, thus freeing the court and the parties to concentrate on the matters at the heart of the dispute." Robert B. Corris and Mark M. Leitner, Requests for Admission, in Wisconsin Discovery Law and Practice, § 5.4 (Feb. 2006).4 In 1962, Professor Ted Finman explained the importance of defining and limiting the issues in a law suit through the use of requests for admission:
*475A definition of the controversy is essential.... A precise statement of the opposing contentions focuses the attention of the litigants and the tribunal on the critical questions. This permits the litigants to direct their necessarily limited investigative capacities to the determinative issues. . .. And, since obscurely defined questions sometimes cause erroneous decisions, a precise definition promotes an accurate and just resolution of the dispute.
A controversy should be limited as well as defined. It is self-evident, even in an adversary system, that contentions not subject to good faith dispute should be resolved through concession rather than by submission to a judge or jury.. .. [W]hen a contention cannot be honestly and reasonably disputed, the adversary approach delays and even endangers a just resolution of the case. ...
Through such definition and limitation, admissions promote both efficiency and economy in resolving disputes. If a point is conceded, litigants need not expend effort in investigations concerning it nor incur expense in presenting evidence to prove it. Judicial administration is also aided. Admissions reduce the time required to try a case... . Finally, admissions encourage litigants to evaluate realistically the hazards of trial and thus tend to promote settlements.
Ted Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 375-76 (1962) (internal footnotes omitted).5
*476¶ 125. The reason requests for admission are so effective in defining and limiting the issues in a controversy is because, unlike other forms of discovery, such as depositions and interrogatories, "matter[s] admitted under [Wis. Stat. § 804.11 are] conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).6 In fact, because admissions are considered "conclusively established" once made, they supersede the pleadings. Jay E. Grenig and Jeffrey S. Kinsler, 8 Wisconsin *477Practice Series: Civil Discovery § 12:61 (2d ed. 2005); Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Requests for Admission in Wisconsin Procedure: Civil Litigation's Double-Edged Sword, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 657 (1995).
¶ 126. As a result, " 'the party securing admissions [may] rely on their binding effect.'" Schmid, 111 Wis. 2d at 236 n.4 (quoting Rainbolt v. Johnson, 669 F.2d 767, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).7 "This binding effect [is what] sets requests for admission apart from all other discovery procedures and, in effect, places such admissions on par with judicial admissions." Kinsler, supra, at 657.
¶ 127. Considering this binding effect, counsel faced with a request for admission must provide a deliberate, " 'studied response.'" Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:61 (quoting McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp. 628, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1963)); see also Finman, supra, at 421 ("[T]he procedure through which a party becomes bound [is not] 'technical.' Admissions are not the result of inadvertence or inattention to procedural niceties but of a litigant's deliberate, conscious choice."); *478Kinsler, supra, at 657 ("An answer to a request. . . is . . . a studied response, made under sanctions against easy denials.. .In particular, "[t]he more harmful the impact an admission may have upon a case, the more scrutiny an attorney should devote to uncovering objections or drafting good-faith qualifying answers or denials." Kinsler, supra, at 647. If counsel is careless or inattentive in making the admission, "it would be neither fair nor just to" allow withdrawal of the admission "at the risk of harming [the] opponent" who reasonably relied on the admission's binding effect. Fin-man, supra, at 424.
¶ 128. If counsel makes a mistake in responding to a request for admission, the circuit court has authority to grant withdrawal of the admission, but "only if 'the merits of the action will be subserved' and if the party who benefits from the admission 'fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal. . . will prejudice' the benefitting party."8 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 26 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2)) (emphasis added and ellipsis in original). However, "courts should be cautious in permitting the withdrawal... of admissions." Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 657.9 In fact, *479doubt over whether to allow withdrawal "should be resolved against the party seeking withdrawal, since the opposite approach would undermine reliance on admissions." Finman, supra, at 423 n.205. Professor Finman even suggests that "a showing of exceptional circumstances should always be required" for a court to allow withdrawal of an admission. Id. at 426.
¶ 129. Moreover, under Wis. Stat. § 804.11, courts generally apply a broad standard when determining whether prejudice exists in a particular case.10 Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71 ("The courts have applied a somewhat liberal standard in determining the existence of prejudice."); Kinsler, supra, at 663 (same). Specifically, "any adverse effect on a litigant's 'general preparation' of an aspect of its case caused by belated.. . withdrawal of admissions may constitute prejudice." Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24 (quoting Schmid, 111 *480Wis. 2d at 239 (emphasis added)); Jay E. Grenig, 3 Wisconsin Practice Series: Civil Procedure § 411.5 (3d ed. 2003); Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662-63; see also Finman, supra, at 422.
¶ 130. Typically, "[prejudice stems from the requesting party's reliance on the binding effect of the admission." Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662.11 In fact, prejudice is most likely to be found in cases where trial is imminent and the party benefitting from the admission forgoes discovery on the matter admitted. Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 663.12 In such a situation, allowing the withdrawal of an admission would likely result in delay or adjournment of the trial, added time and cost for additional discovery, and possibly a much more costly search for evidence or witness testimony, all of which have been found to be prejudicial. See Kinsler, supra, at 663.13
*481¶ 131. In this case, the prejudice that will result from allowing the plaintiffs to withdraw their admissions is conspicuously obvious. As Judge Fine stated in his dissent in the court of appeals, "The prejudice to the defendants here is palpable and outrageous." Luckett v. Bodner, No. 2007AP308, unpublished slip op., ¶ 29 (Wis. Ct. App. April 22, 2008) (Fine, J., dissenting).
¶ 132. When the circuit court decided to allow the withdrawal of the three admissions, it knew the prejudicial consequences of its ruling. The projected three-week trial scheduled for February 5, 2007, would have to be rescheduled. This would cause additional delay in a case that had been ongoing since December 5, 2003, and had already been bumped once the year before. This was prejudice in and of itself because it delayed the final disposition of the matter, it caused an increase in costs, and it disrupted the judicial process.14 Judge Foley recognized this in his letter to the parties granting the request to withdraw the admissions. Letter from Judge Foley, supra ("[RJesultant adjournment and *482additional discovery is sufficient to establish prejudice so as to justify denial of the request to withdraw an admission.") (citing Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 32 n.8).
¶ 133. Approving the circuit court's decision now confirms and exacerbates this prejudice. The defendants will be required "to undertake a lengthy, laborious and costly search for additional evidence," regarding whether Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state and when she entered that state. Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71.15 This is not to say that, if plaintiffs' counsel would have denied the requests for admission in July 2005, the defendants would not have had to undertake such a search for this evidence. They would have done so immediately, which is evidenced by the interrogatories and request for production included with the requests for admission. See, supra, ¶ 9 n.2. However, having to undertake that search for evidence now, as opposed to July 2005, significantly prejudices the defendants for several reasons. First, Ms. Luckett passed away on October 2, 2005, more than two months after the admissions were made. Therefore, the defendants were unable in January 2007 and are unable now to conduct an independent, physical examination of Ms. Luckett so that their expert or experts can opine on her *483neurological status and any other matters of significance concerning a claim for conscious pain and suffering.16
¶ 134. Second, the defendants' expert witness, retained to analyze Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state,17 was called-off after the admissions were made. *484Since that time, the widely recognized expert witness also passed away. This will require that the defendants find and retain a new expert or experts who must start the analysis from the beginning without any knowledge of the case, thus increasing the defendants' costs. This constitutes prejudice because it "relates to the difficulty [the defendants will] have in proving [their] case because of a sudden need to obtain evidence supporting the matter previously admitted." Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; see also Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662.
¶ 135. Finally, because the defendants never focused on whether Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state — it was assumed all along that she was — they may be required to re-depose many, if not all the witnesses who cared for or treated Ms. Luckett. This is yet another example of the prejudice that will result from allowing the withdrawal of these admissions. See Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24 ("[A] party is prejudiced when trial is imminent and the party, in reliance on its opponents' admissions, has forgone discovery that would have explored facts established by the admissions."); Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71 (same); Kinsler, supra, at 663 (same).
¶ 136 In addition, as noted, permission to withdraw the admissions greatly increased the defendants' exposure in terms of time (from two months to more than 60 months) and in terms of noneconomic damages. See, supra, ¶¶ 114-23. Defendants' various counsel told the *485circuit court that withdrawal "impacts the damages in this case," "turns this case... upside down at this stage," "potentially changes the value of [this] case by millions of dollars, [18]" and "dramatically affects the positions of the insurance companies and Fund." To deny the prejudicial effect of these withdrawals is to deny reality.19
¶ 137. Furthermore, counsel for one of the defendants complained that there was no excusable neglect. The motion to withdraw the previously made admissions was not motivated by the discovery of new evidence. Instead, the basis for the motion to withdraw the *486admissions was four notes created in April and June 2001, which were in the plaintiffs' counsel's possession long before he responded affirmatively to the requests for admission. As Professor Finman stated, "Admissions are not the result of inadvertence or inattention to procedural niceties but of a litigant's deliberate, conscious choice." Finman, supra, at 421. It is hard to excuse the neglect of a party that made these key admissions without first examining existing records in its possession or conferring with pertinent health care providers at Silver Spring Health and Rehabilitation Center. See Kinsler, supra, at 647 ("The more harmful the impact an admission may have upon a case, the more scrutiny an attorney should devote to uncovering objections or drafting good-faith qualifying answers or denials."). Given counsel's oversight, "it would be neither fair nor just to protect [the plaintiffs] at the risk of harming" the defendants who reasonably relied on the admissions. Finman, supra, at 424.
¶ 138. It should be noted that Judge Foley was concerned at the January 19, 2007 hearing that delaying the trial might remove him from the case. In fact, unless special arrangements are made, Judge Foley will not handle this case on remand because of judicial rotation. Additionally, Attorney Paul Grimstad, counsel for Dr. Bodner and Physician's Insurance Company of Wisconsin, like Ms. Luckett and the expert witness, has now passed away. The ill-advised and unsupported decision of the circuit court essentially nullified years of work and vast amounts of money at the expense of the defendants.
¶ 139. The circuit court's conclusion is not one that a reasonable judge could have made after considering the relevant facts and applying the proper standard of law. It is not supported by the record. Therefore, *487this court should remand this case to the circuit court for a determination of prejudice.
¶ 140. Finally, in order for requests for admission to continue to play a useful and effective role in pretrial discovery, parties must be able to rely upon the binding effect of the admissions once they are made. Therefore, admissions must be difficult to withdraw. Otherwise, lawyers may stop making requests for admission, causing needless litigation, costly discovery, and less-efficient trial practice. The majority opinion in this case makes it altogether too easy for parties to withdraw their previously made admissions. In so doing, the majority tacitly diminishes the value and effectiveness of requests for admission in civil practice.
V
¶ 141. The majority refuses to remand this matter for a new hearing on the plaintiffs' request to withdrawal the three admissions. In light of that decision and multiple other factors discussed herein, I respectfully dissent.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.

 The majority claims that the issue of "whether Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state was not settled" because counsel made the requests for admission, which were also accompanied by interrogatories and a request for production. Majority op., ¶ 63. The majority's statement implies that the parties thought Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state was in doubt. However, the majority's claim is unsupported by the record. In fact, the record supports the opposite conclusion, i.e., the parties in this case were proceeding under the assumption that Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state from the time she entered the Silver Spring Health and Rehabilitation Center until the time of her death. It was not until the late afternoon of January 18, 2007, when plaintiffs' counsel states he first uncovered the notes from 2001, that this working assumption was questioned.
Requesting the admissions and including an interrogatory and request for production does not suggest that the issue of *463Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state was in question, because "requests for admission are not designed to discover facts." Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Requests for Admission in Wisconsin Procedure: Civil Litigation's Double-Edged Sword, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 632 (1995). In particular, the party requesting the admission "is assumed [to] ... know[] the facts before asking an adverse party to admit that the statement is true." Id.
In addition, interrogatories and other requests for discovery are often included with requests for admission. See, e.g., Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Each of the requests for admissions was accompanied by an interrogatory...."). This is often the case because the responding party may not provide straight-forward, unequivocal answers to the requests. See Kinsler, supra, at 631. If the responding party denies the requests for admission, then the interrogatories and other forms of discovery are used to probe the facts and reasoning allegedly supporting the denial. See, e.g., Asea, 669 F.2d at 1244 ("[The interrogatories] asked that if the railroads' response was anything other than an unqualified admission, they should state the facts, documents and witnesses upon which the response was based."). The interrogatories and request for production in this case were propounded for this latter purpose:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: If you deny that Tywanda Luckett is in a persistent vegetative state or, alternatively, deny information sufficient to form a belief as to whether she is in a persistent vegetative state, then itemize each and every behavior, action or response either solicited or observed by any health care provider or lay person, which you contend is inconsistent with a diagnosis of persistent vegetative state. Identify, by name, address and, if relevant, position title, of each individual who has seen any such behavior or actions on the part of Tywanda Luckett which are inconsistent with a persistent vegetative state.
ANSWER: Not applicable.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify (by name and professional address) any health care providers who have reached a diagnosis other than a persistent vegetative state to explain Tywanda Luckett's condition.
*464ANSWER: Not applicable.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce any medical records, notes or other written or visual documentation which evidences that Tywanda Luckett is in a neurologic condition other than a persistent vegetative state.
ANSWER: Not applicable.
In light of these considerations, the majority's claim that Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state was in doubt when the requests for admission were made is unsupported.

 In 1981, this court explained what is necessary to sustain a circuit court's exercise of discretion:
*466A discretionary determination, to be sustained, must demonstrably be made and based upon the facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law. Additionally, and most importantly, a discretionary determination must be the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination.
Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981) (emphasis added). On the other hand, "if the facts of record fail to support the trial court's decision, or if our review of the record indicates that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, we will reverse the trial court's decision as an erroneous exercise of discretion." Johnson Bank v. Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc., 2001 WI App 159, ¶ 8, 246 Wis. 2d 828, 632 N.W.2d 107 (citing Meier v. Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., 2001 WI 20, ¶ 42, 241 Wis. 2d 605, 623 N.W.2d 94).

 See also Mucek v. Nationwide Commc'ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶ 31, 252 Wis. 2d 426, 643 N.W.2d 98 ("The purpose of the admissions process 'is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true .. . thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.'" (ellipsis in original) (quoting Asea, 669 F.2d at 1245)); Edwin E. Bryant, 4 Wisconsin Pleading and Practice § 31:44 (4th ed. 2003) ("The purpose of the admissions process is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true, thus narrowing the range of issues for trial."); Jay E. Grenig, 3 Wisconsin Practice Series: Civil Procedure § 411.1 (3d ed. 2003) ("Section 804.11 is intended to expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that will not be disputed at trial, the truth of which is known to the parties or can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry."); Jay E. Grenig and Jeffrey S. Kinsler, 8 Wisconsin Practice Series: Civil Discovery § 12:61 (2d ed. 2005) ("The admissions serve to eliminate disputes of material fact...."); Kinsler, supra, at 632 ("Requests for admission define and limit the controversy between parties to a lawsuit, freeing the court and the parties to concentrate on matters at the heart of the dispute.").

 See also Kinsler, supra, at 633
No suit can be tried without some definition of its factual and legal boundaries. A definition of the controversy is essential. Admissions facilitate the defining of a controversy by eliminating issues from the case that are not in controversy and by narrowing those issues that are in controversy....
*476A controversy should be limited as well as defined. Contentions not subject to good faith dispute should be resolved through concession rather than by submission to a judge or jury. When a contention cannot be honestly and reasonably disputed, the adversarial approach delays and even endangers a just resolution of the issues. Limiting the controversy promotes efficiency and economy in civil litigation, resulting in lower costs for clients and lawyers.
(Internal footnotes omitted.)

 See also Estate of Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2006 WI App 248, ¶ 38, 297 Wis. 2d 70, 727 N.W.2d 857 ('When a party responds to a request for an admission by admitting a matter, the admission conclusively establishes the issue, unless the court permits withdrawal.") (citing Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2)); Bryant, supra, § 31:50 ("Unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission, any matter admitted under the statute is conclusively established."); Robert B. Corris and Mark M. Leitner, Requests for Admission, in Wisconsin Discovery Law and Practice, § 5.10 (Feb. 2006) ("Perhaps the most significant fact about requests for admissions is that, with very few exceptions, a response that admits the matter requested conclusively puts that matter to rest."); Grenig, supra, § 411.5 ("A matter admitted under Section 804.11 is conclusively established, unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."); Kinsler, supra, at 657 ("Any matter admitted under section 804.11 is conclusively established, unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.").

 See also Corris and Leitner, supra, §5.10 ("[SJection 804.11 permits the party securing admissions to rely on their binding effect.") (internal quotations omitted); Grenig, supra, § 411.5 ("The party securing admissions may rely on the binding effect of the admissions."); Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:61 ("The requesting party is entitled to rely on the binding effect of the admission."); Kinsler, supra, at 657 ("The party securing admissions may rely on the binding effect of the admissions."). In addition, the Advisory Committee Notes on the 1970 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 state that the amendments clarify "the binding effect of an admission." See Ted Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 418 n.188 (1962) ("It seems likely that the draftsmen of the Rules intended admissions to be binding and conclusive.").

 Circuit courts have discretionary authority to permit withdrawal of a litigant's response to a request for admission, but that discretion must be exercised within the two-prong test set forth in Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2). Estate of Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶ 38; Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662. A circuit court's discretionary decision is to be upheld if it "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, demonstrating a rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach." Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 25 (citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)).

 See also Finman, supra, at 422
*479Easy withdrawal.. . would make reliance on admissions impossible and thus would tend to destroy the value of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 36. Consequently, though courts should have power to grant relief, the rules regulating this matter should be designed to prevent injudicious exercise of\;hat power.

... If a decision permitting withdrawal would make lawyers reluctant to rely on admissions, relief should he denied.

(Emphasis added.)

 In the context of Wis. Stat. § 804.11, prejudice "relates to the difficulty a party may have in proving its case because of a sudden need to obtain evidence supporting the matter previously admitted." Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; see also Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662. In other words, "[prejudice means more than an adverse effect on the requesting party's case," Kinsler, supra, at 663, or "that the party who obtained the admission now has to convince the jury of' the truth of the matter previously admitted, Bergemann v. United States, 820 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 1987).

 See also Finman, supra, at 422 ("If a decision permitting withdrawal would make lawyers reluctant to rely on admissions, relief should be denied.").

 See also Finman, supra, at 422
Evidence available at one stage of a case may be unavailable at a later date. Consequently a party who assumes that an admission has eliminated the need for evidence can be prejudiced by its withdrawal. He may be unable to obtain evidence that was previously available to him. Clearly, if a court concludes that withdrawal would cause prejudice to a party who has relied on the admission, withdrawal should be denied.

 See also Estate of Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶¶ 39-40 (deciding that prejudice would result if the withdrawal was allowed in light of the following facts: (1) the party relying on the admission operated under the assumption that the admitted matter was not an issue and conducted no discovery on it, and (2) there would need to be "a substantial amount of new discovery" that would "caus[e] additional delays in an already *481very long process"); Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 32 n.8 ("An adjournment of the trial and the need to again attempt discovery would itself constitute prejudice to [the party relying on the admissions]." (citing EEOC v. Jordan Graphics, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 126, 128-29 (W.D.N.C. 1991))).

 Estate of Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶ 40 ("If the amendment would have been allowed... this late in the game,... logically a substantial amount of new discovery would have been required, causing additional delays in an already very long process.... [T]he judicial process itself[] would have been prejudiced." (internal quotations omitted)); Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶ 32 n.8 ("An adjournment of the trial and the need to again attempt discovery would itself constitute prejudice ...."); Kinsler, supra, at 663 ("Prejudice has been found when the withdrawal... will require a delay of the trial or additional discovery.").

 See, e.g., Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 68 F.R.D. 663, 666-67 (N.D. W. Va. 1975)
From the record before the court, it can be ascertained that while the introduction of such evidence could in all probability be accomplished, the task would be lengthy, laborious and extremely costly to Belco. In considering the weight of prejudice in such circumstances, the court must not treat lightly such burdens when visited upon a litigant, especially when that litigant has properly utilized the [Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure to advance his litigation toward a just, speedy, and inexpensive conclusion.
(Internal ellipses, quotations, and citation omitted.)

 Both the majority and concurring opinions argue that "[t]he defendants offer no evidence or argument that a medical examination of Ms. Luckett between July and October 2005 would have enabled [the defendants' expert] or any other medical examiner to evaluate Ms. Luckett's condition from September 29, 2000, through July 22, 2005." Majority op., ¶ 62; see also concurring op., ¶¶ 76, 78-79. This argument fails to appreciate that the circuit court allowed withdrawal of all three admissions, which covers the period of time from July 22, 2005, the date of the admissions, through October 2, 2005, the date of Ms. Luckett's death. Certainly, if the requests for admission were denied in July 2005, the defendants could have undertaken an independent medical examination of Ms. Luckett to determine whether she was currently in a persistent vegetative state and whether her condition was permanent.
Moreover, the majority and concurring opinions hold defendants' counsel to an unreasonably high standard. It must be remembered that the first notice of the motion to withdraw the admissions came less than 24 hours before the hearing. Counsel can hardly be expected to have formulated highly technical medical arguments for what an expert could or could not do in evaluating Ms. Luckett if given the opportunity in July 2005. Counsel did the best they could under the circumstances by making the obvious point that their ability to defend against a claim of conscious pain and suffering was impaired by the fact that the patient was no longer living when withdrawal of the admissions was permitted.

 The defendants had retained the preeminent medical expert regarding persistent vegetative states, Dr. Ronald Cranford. Dr Cranford is well-known for his commentary on the Terri Schiavo matter in 2005. See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, The *484Power of Images to Create a Cause, N.Y. Times, March 27, 2005, at 3; Benedict Carey and John Schwartz, Most Experts Say They See Little Chance of Recovery, N.Y. Times, March 26, 2005, at 9; John Schwartz and Denise Grady, A Diagnosis With a Dose Of Religion, N.Y. Times, March 24, 2005, at 20. Dr. Cranford passed away on May 31, 2006.

 Attorney Paul Grimstad for the defense also made the following statement to the circuit court:
We have, in fact, relied upon these admissions as we prepared this case for trial. Not only relied upon them as part of our preparation but we have reported to our respective clients when we have been asked to analyze, to evaluate, this case in terms of potential value. We have used those admissions as part of our evaluation....

 See Zimmermann v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 254, 268 (D. Mass. 2008) ("If Defendants' attempt to withdraw their admissions is ... a change in litigation strategy... it would betray the underlying purpose of [requests for admission] to allow withdrawal of these admissions when discovery has been conducted and motions have been prepared in reliance on a particular legal theory."); Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Deutz-Allis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 655, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1988):
When a party directs its resources, fiscal, physical and otherwise, to those issues it reasonably believes are the only ones left to be resolved, an abrupt change in the status of the litigation occasioned by motion of opposing counsel, which had it occurred early on would likely have effected a distinctly different allocation of resources, should only be allowed upon a showing that the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 36(b) Test is met by clear and convincing evidence.