Court Opinion

ID: 9385154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 23:02:25.778557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.794241
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/5/23 P. v. Trejo CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          G061472

      v.                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 99NF0024)
 BENITO RAY TREJO,
                                                                         OPINION
      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish. Affirmed.
                   Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                                      1
              We appointed counsel to represent Benito Ray Trejo on appeal. Counsel
filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client
but advised the court he found no issues to argue on his behalf.
              Counsel filed a brief following the procedures outlined in People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The court in Wende explained a Wende brief is one that
sets forth a summary of proceedings and facts but raises no specific issues. Under these
circumstances, the court must conduct an independent review of the entire record. When
the appellant himself raises specific issues in a Wende proceeding, we must expressly
address them in our opinion and explain why they fail. (People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 120, 124.)
              Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), to assist the
court with its independent review, counsel provided the court with information as to five
issues that might arguably support an appeal: (1) whether this court should conduct an
independent review of the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436; (2) what is
the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court’s findings; (3) did the court
err by finding the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt Benito was guilty of the
murder and the attempted murder; (4) did the court prejudicially err by permitting the
prosecution to rely on a theory of implied malice murder; and (5) did the court commit
prejudicial evidentiary error by allowing the prosecution to introduce the transcript of
Benito’s parole suitability hearing as part of their rebuttal case.
              We gave Benito 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf, which
he did. In his brief, Benito argues the following: (1) his second degree murder
conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because

1
             Some of the individuals in this case share family names. To avoid
confusion, we use first names.

                                               2
there was no evidence he aided and abetted the shooting while the victim was still alive;
(2) the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing the
jury to convict on a legally invalid theory of murder and attempted murder and by failing
to instruct sua sponte that a principal cannot be convicted of crimes committed by others
before he joined the underlying felony; (3) the case must be remanded for resentencing
                                                 2
under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.03 ; and (4) the case must be remanded to
consider recent legislate amendments to section 186.22.
             We invited Benito and the Attorney General (AG) to file a supplemental
brief addressing People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Benito and the
AG agree Benito was never notified his appeal could be dismissed as abandoned if no
supplemental brief was received. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) Both parties therefore request this
court issue new no-merits orders that comply with the procedures set forth in Delgadillo.
             We have independently reviewed the record and found no arguable issues
on appeal. We affirm the postjudgment order.
                                         FACTS
             A detailed recitation of the facts is provided in our prior nonpublished
opinion People v. Trejo et al. (Dec. 17, 2003, G028757) (Trejo). A brief recitation will
suffice.
             Johnny Julian Trejo and Rachel Seelke were dating. Rachel knew Johnny
and Benito Trejo were members of the Atwood Street (AS) gang, and Edmundo Juarez
was a member of the Cambridge Street (CS) gang. Johnny invited Rachel to a New
Year’s Eve party hosted by his gang’s members, and asked her to bring her sister, Judah
Seelke, and her friends, including Veronica Manzo. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)

2
             All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                            3
             The girls drove two different cars to the street where the party was to be
held. Johnny had told Rachel the street but failed to tell her the house number. Veronica
drove Judah in one car while Melissa Meade drove Rachel and Paula Gano. (Trejo,
supra, G028757.)
             That night, Veronica, who had a shaved head, wore overalls and a
checkered shirt over a white T-shirt. She slowly drove down the street looking for the
party, made a U-turn, spoke to Rachel in the other car, and returned to the same block
searching for parking. Veronica saw several men in baggy clothing running after her
car—three of them had guns in their hands, including Johnny. As Johnny rapidly gained
on her car, Veronica accelerated. The men shot at Veronica’s car hitting it numerous
times. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
             From a distance, Rachel and Paula saw Johnny and Juarez running towards
Veronica’s car carrying guns. Paula also saw Steven Fernandez, a known AS gang
member, sitting on a fence. He whistled when Veronica’s car drove past his location.
Immediately after he whistled, the men in baggy clothing gave chase and started shooting
at the car. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
             When Veronica accelerated, another group of men emerged and began
firing at her car. Rachel recognized Benito as one of the gunmen. Rachel jumped out of
her car and yelled at Johnny that they were shooting at her sister. Johnny was surprised
because he thought it was rival gang members. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
             When Veronica was safe, she noticed her arm was bloody and bruised. She
saw Judah was slumped over motionless in her seat. She touched Judah’s head and
discovered blood on her hand. Judah died of a single gunshot wound to the back of her
head from a bullet of either a .40-caliber or 10-millimeter size. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
             AS gang member Maurice Henao told the police that when Fernandez
warned “vatos” were cruising the street, Johnny suggested they stop the apparent rivals’

                                            4
cars by shooting at them from the street. Later, Henao returned to the party and
overheard Benito and Ronnie David Cruz bragging about having emptied their handguns
at the car from their positions in the second group of shooters. Henao saw a large stash
of guns taken from the gang members after their return to the party, which were then
handed over the fence to get rid of them. He denied all of this at the trial, saying he failed
to actually see who was doing the shooting. He also denied overhearing Benito or Cruz.
(Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              After his arrest, Johnny told the detectives various stories regarding the
night’s events ranging from lack of knowledge of the shooting to shooting twice at the
car. Juarez also talked with the police after his arrest. Like Johnny, Juarez told the
detectives various stories regarding the night’s events ranging from lack of knowledge of
the shooting to shooting a .38-caliber handgun about six times over the car. (Trejo,
supra, G028757.)
              Benito told the police he arrived at the party after the shooting, but other
witnesses said Benito was at the party from the very start. Cruz told the detectives
various stories regarding the night’s events ranging from he was with his girlfriend to
firing a single shotgun blast into the air as the suspect vehicle passed his location. (Trejo,
supra, G028757.)
              As relevant here, a jury convicted Benito of second degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). We affirmed.
(Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              In 2019, Benito filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
         3
1170.95. The trial court denied the petition on the sole ground that Senate Bill No. 1437

3
              Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. For clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion.

                                              5
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (SB 1437) was unconstitutional. We
reversed. (People v. Trejo (June 8, 2020, G058025) [nonpub. opn.].)
              On remand, the trial court ruled Benito’s petition set forth a prima facie
case for relief and issued an order to show cause. The court heard evidence and
argument. Specifically, the court admitted into evidence the transcript from Benito’s
parole board hearing. At the parole board hearing, Benito admitted the night of the
crimes, he had his gun out, took a shooter’s stance, and started shooting at the car. He
also admitted that although for a long time he denied being at the party, he was in fact at
the party.
              The trial court denied the petition in a written ruling. The court issued an
amended written ruling again denying the petition. The court ruled the evidence
established Johnny, Benito, and Cruz responded to a perceived gang threat and responded
as gang members. The court further found they were part of a machine that acted in
concert to kill, although without knowing the victims’ identities. The court opined that
although the fatal shooter was unknown, Johnny, Benito, and Cruz aided and abetted in a
classic sense with a shared intent to kill. The court reasoned their response to the
warning about rivals, the immediate forming of groups to shoot at the car from two
different spots, and the sheer volume of shots fired demonstrated premeditation and
deliberation. The court concluded, “the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Judah] was murdered with premeditation and deliberation and that all three petitioners
aided and abetted in the murder of [Judah] as members of the mass that mobbed and shot
at the car and enabled the killing. The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all
three petitioners had the specific intent to aid and abet and had the specific intent to kill
[Judah]. The court also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners after
premeditation and deliberation and with specific intent to kill did attempt to kill
[Veronica].” Benito filed a timely motion of appeal.

                                               6
                                       DISCUSSION
              In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, our Supreme Court held the
procedures in Wende and Anders do not apply to appeals from the denial of
postconviction relief under section 1172.6. The court instructed that on appeal from an
order denying section 1172.6 relief, a counsel who finds no arguable issue should file a
brief informing the appellate court of that determination and include a concise factual
recitation. (Id. at p. 231.) The appellate court shall send a copy of the brief to the
defendant informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief and that if one
is not filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If a
supplemental brief is filed, we must evaluate the contentions in it. (Id. at p. 232.) If a
supplemental brief is not filed, we may dismiss the appeal as abandoned without a written
opinion. (Ibid.) However, we retain discretion to independently review the record.
(Ibid.) We exercise our discretion to independently review the record.
              We did not provide Benito the notice required by Delgadillo as our order
predated Delgadillo. But because we exercise our discretion to independently review the
record, there is no need to advise Benito of the possibility of dismissal.
              SB 1437 amended sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, to
eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder, and to limit the scope
of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis).)
Under sections 188 and 189, as amended, murder liability can no longer be “imposed on
a person who [was] not the actual killer,” who “did not act with the intent to kill,” or who
“was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) SB 1437 also added
section 1172.6 which, as originally enacted, set forth a procedure whereby a “person
convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences
doctrine or theory” could petition for resentencing relief. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

                                              7
              Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 775), effective January 1,
2022, amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a), to expand the individuals entitled to
petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a), of that
section now expressly permits individuals convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for
resentencing relief. A section 1172.6 petition is required to make “‘a prima facie
showing’ for relief. [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) In Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at page 971, our Supreme Court held “[t]he record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing
the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.”
              Benito stands convicted of both second degree murder and attempted
murder, and under current law, he is entitled to petition for resentencing, which he did.
There is no question he made a prima facie showing for relief and the trial court
appointed counsel. It is also not disputed the court instructed the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. After the filing of the petition for resentencing, the
court issued an order to show cause, allowed briefing by all parties, and held an
evidentiary hearing. The only issue before us is whether the court properly denied the
petition on the merits.
              Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) provides the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing. To sustain its burden, the prosecution may rely on the record of conviction
or offer new or additional evidence and the judge must determine whether the
prosecution has sustained its burden of proof.
              Here, the trial court held the prosecution to the proper standard of proof and
found beyond a reasonable doubt Judah was murdered with premeditation and

                                              8
deliberation and that all three petitioners aided and abetted in her murder. The court
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners had the specific intent to
aid and abet and had the specific intent to kill Judah. The court also found beyond a
reasonable doubt that all three petitioners after premeditation and deliberation and with
specific intent to kill did attempt to kill Veronica.
              Although the trial court independently determines whether the prosecution
met its burden to establish a defendant is not entitled to resentencing under section
1172.6, we review the court’s findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) “Under this familiar standard, ‘“we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” [Citation.] We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing
court “presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’ [Citations.] Substantial evidence also ‘“includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.”’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
              The trial court acted as an independent fact finder to determine Benito’s
eligibility for relief. The court made its factual finding based on the record of conviction
applying the proper standard and found Benito was ineligible for relief. This finding was
supported by substantial evidence.
              The facts as to Benito’s involvement in the killing render him ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. Relief requires a finding the petitioner was not the actual
killer. The actual killer remains unknown, but the petitioner must also show he did not

                                               9
act with the intent to kill and that he was not a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Benito cannot satisfy either of those
requirements.
                The evidence established that as Veronica accelerated down the street a
second group of men emerged and began firing at her car. Rachel recognized Benito as
one of the gunmen in this second group. Henao overheard Benito and Cruz bragging
about having emptied their handguns at the car from their positions in the second group
of shooters. When he spoke to the police, Benito admitted he was an AS gang member,
but claimed he arrived at the party that night after all the excitement was over. This was
contradicted by other witnesses who said Benito was at the party from the very start.
These facts demonstrate Benito was a major participant and support a finding he acted
with the intent to kill. We find the trial court’s conclusion of ineligibility is supported by
substantial evidence.
                Counsel queries whether the trial court prejudicially erred by permitting the
prosecution to rely on a theory of implied malice murder. We find no error. In People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850, our Supreme Court held second degree murder may
be based on a “direct aiding and abetting theory.” “Such a theory requires that ‘the aider
and abettor . . . know and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.’” (Ibid.)
“For implied malice, the intent requirement is satisfied by proof that the actual
perpetrator ‘“knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and . . . acts with
conscious disregard for life.”’” (Ibid.) The court found beyond a reasonable doubt
Benito aided and abetted in the murder of Judah with the intent to kill. The court also
found Benito aided and abetted the attempt to kill Veronica.
                Counsel’s last issue relates to the trial court’s admission of the transcript
from the parole board. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides, in part, “The
admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that

                                               10
the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and
matters judicially noticed.”
              In People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 705-706, the court
explained the following: “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
protects persons from being compelled by ‘“governmental coercion”’ to serve as
witnesses against themselves in ‘“any criminal case.”’ [Citation.] A section [1172.6]
hearing, however, ‘“is not a trial de novo on all the original charges.” [Citation.] Rather,
it is a postconviction proceeding “due to the Legislature’s inclusion of section [1172.6] in
[SB] 1437 . . . , [as] an ‘act of lenity’ [citation], allowing for the retroactive application of
the new law governing accomplice liability for felony murder [citation] for defendants
already serving valid sentences for murder.”’ [Citations.] Because a sentence
modification under section [1172.6] is an act of lenity and not a criminal trial, the
wrongful admission of evidence does not implicate defendant’s constitutional rights
under the Fifth Amendment.” Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held
the Fifth Amendment applies through original sentencing but has stated that
incrimination is complete in cases in which the sentence has been fixed and the judgment
of conviction has become final. (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326.)
              Here, the trial court did not err by admitting the transcript of Benito’s
parole suitability hearing. We now address the issues Benito raises in his supplemental
brief.
I. Fourteenth Amendment
              Benito argues his second degree murder conviction violates the Fourteenth
Amendment because there was no evidence he aided and abetted the shooting while the
victim was still alive. In the initial appeal, Benito asserted the same argument arguing
the evidence was insufficient he aided and abetted the perpetrator before the victim was

                                               11
dead. (Trejo, supra, G028757.) We rejected that claim on the merits. We reasoned that
this argument assumes Judah was killed in the first volley of shots and that anyone who
shot at the car thereafter was not responsible for the death. We explained on review for
the sufficiency of evidence, “appellate courts must review ‘the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment’ and decide ‘whether it discloses substantial evidence . . .
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ . . . [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hatch (2000)
22 Cal.4th 260, 272.) After conducting the appropriate review, we found the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
II. Jury Instruction
              Benito contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua
sponte that a principal cannot be convicted of crimes committed by others before he
joined the underlying felony. This issue was also raised and rejected in his previous
appeal. (Trejo, supra, G028757.) In rejecting this claim, we found Benito was focused
solely on his version of the evidence and overlooked all the contradictory evidence.
Viewing the whole record as we must, we rejected this claim. (Ibid.)
              Benito raised his Fourteenth Amendment claim and his claim of
instructional error in his appeal, and both claims were rejected. Collateral estoppel
prohibits relitigation of issues argued and decided on their merits in prior proceedings.
(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341-343.)
III. Sections 1170.03 and 186.22
              Benito asserts that because section 1170.03 increased the trial court’s
authority to modify the judgment and requires the court to take into account he was a
youth at the time of the offense, his case must be remanded. He also argues his case must

                                             12
be remanded due to recent amendments section 186.22 relating to the gang
enhancements.
              Neither of these statutory changes were raised in the trial court. In order for
an appellate court to make a determination of whether the trial court erred, there must be
a record that demonstrates what the trial court’s decision-making process was in reaching
its conclusion. In cases such as this, where the issues were not raised in the trial court,
we are left without any ability to evaluate the trial court’s decision. (People v. Nelson
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 227.) Therefore, we do not address these claims.
              We have reviewed the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and
Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and considered the possible issues raised by appellate
counsel. We found no arguable issues on appeal.
                                       DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                                  O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

MOORE, J.

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