Court Opinion

ID: 9586041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:36.720474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:19.310731
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. The only evidence to show that a demand was made on the defendant was as follows: “Q. And did you demand that she turn over the furniture and the automobile to you? A. Yes, sir. I told her that, if I couldn’t get— Q. Just tell the judge in your own words just how you went about it and what happened. A. We told her we were going to have to have something on the account in order to carry it, and she told us that she wasn’t in position to pay, she *450had other bills to pay, and I would have to have Cíate pay it. And I told her then I would have to have that furniture and the automobile, because I couldn’t carry it further for reasons of nonpayment.” I do not think that such a demand is a sufficient demand within the requirements of the law. However, assuming for the sake of argument that such did constitute a valid demand, I do not think that there was a refusal to redeliver the property by the defendant sufficient to show a conversion. The defendant’s uncontradicted evidence was that she was never in possession of the automobile, that she had never driven the automobile, could not drive an automobile, did not possess a driver’s license and had not ridden as a passenger in the automobile over six times. She further testified that at the time when the alleged demand was made on her she did not know where the automobile was. The evidence further shows that the alleged demand was made on her around March 12 or 13, 1957; that on February 2, 1957, the Atlanta Police Department had impounded the automobile and that it was placed in custodia legis because the automobile had been involved in a collision and had been abandoned by the driver. There is no evidence that the defendant ever made the statement that she would not deliver the property to the plaintiff or ever made any statement disputing the plaintiff’s right of possession. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that after the alleged demand was made on her the defendant just did nothing. Under the evidence I do not think that there was any refusal on the part of the defendant to deliver the automobile after the alleged demand or that she was in a position to deliver the automobile in response to the alleged demand, and that her lack of possession was due to any conversion on her part. See in this connection, 61 A. L. R. 628, IV; 129 A. L. R. 646, IV; 53 Am. Jur. 844, Trover and Conversion, § 47. “A demand and refusal is not conversion; it is only evidence of conversion, and to make it such, it must appear that the defendant had it in his power to deliver.” (Emphasis supplied.) Seago v. Pomeroy, 46 Ga. 227, 230. It was further held in that case (headnote 1) “It is error in the court to charge the jury in a trover case, that a demand and refusal is proof of conversion, it not appearing that the property sued for was in the possession, power, or control of the *451defendant, at the time, of the demand and refusal.” “In trover the gist of the action is conversion, which is ‘an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over personal property belonging to another, in hostility to his rights; an act of dominion over the personal property of another inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized appropriation.’” Wood v. Frank Graham Co., 91 Ga. App. 621, 622 (86 S. E. 2d 691). There are various means whereby conversion may be shown, and demand and refusal is just one of these means. Actually the refusal of a demand must be such a refusal as would amount to an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership in hostility to the plaintiff’s rights or an act of dominion inconsistent with his rights or an otherwise unauthorized appropriation. I think under the evidence in this case that no such refusal was shown.
In her answer, the defendant disclaimed all title and interest in and right of possession to the automobile. The defendant on the stand also made such disclaimer. Under the evidence in this case and in view of such disclaimer, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show a valid demand and a valid refusal to redeliver. Wood v. Sanders, 87 Ga. App. 84, 86 (73 S. E. 2d 55). This, I think, the plaintiff failed to do.
Since the legal title of the automobile was jointly in the defendant and her husband as against each other, they each had equal right to possession of the automobile. The evidence fails to disclose that a demand was ever made on the defendant’s husband who from the evidence in fact had exclusive possession of the automobile as against the defendant. Under the allegations of the petition the defendant and her husband were joint tortfeasors. See Council v. Nunn, 41 Ga. App. 407, 411 (153 S. E. 234). Especially since the evidence showed that the defendant’s husband in fact had exclusive possession of the automobile as against the defendant, I think that before the defendant could be guilty of the tort of conversion against the plaintiff and before a demand and refusal on her part could be shown to be conversion, there must also have been a demand made on the husband and a refusal on his part to redeliver. See 89 C. J. S. 562, Trover and Conversion, § 58 (c); Mitchell v. Williams & *452Roberts, 4 Hill’s Reports (N.Y.) 13; Jessop v. Miller (N.Y.), 1 Keyes 321.
I think that, under the evidence, a verdict was demanded for the defendant.
Gardner, P. J., concurs in this dissent.