Court Opinion

ID: 9691524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:37:16.083742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:22.081642
License: Public Domain

*455DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the resolution of issue five in which the majority finds no trial court error in the admission into evidence of Adams’ prison disciplinary records. Adams argues the documents were not relevant. I agree.
The majority says the records are “probative of a fact in consequence, that is, whether Adams has a behavioral abnormality making him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” However, the majority concedes that only four of the over one hundred incidents were sexual in nature. And, overlooked entirely by the majority is the remoteness of all of these incidents.
When determining whether to admit evidence of extraneous acts in criminal cases, we consider the remoteness of the act as a factor. James v. State, 554 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Reyes v. State, 69 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd). I believe remoteness should be a factor here. My review of Adams’s disciplinary records, most of which concerned minor rule infractions, show that over fifty percent of them occurred before 1992, or ten years prior to his trial. Significantly, there are no reports after 1998. So, for the four years immediately prior to trial, Adams apparently was controlling his behavior in accordance with prison regulations.
The nature of the vast majority of the incidents coupled with their remoteness undermines their relevance. Admission of such records increases the likelihood that the jury will focus improperly on the incidents or defendant’s “bad character.” See Tamez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). I would find the trial court erred in admitting the disciplinary records into evidence and reverse and remand for a new trial.