Court Opinion

ID: 9667811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:55:31.062504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:40.633309
License: Public Domain

Scott, Justice.
Laurie Ann Davies, a 13-year-old child who was born to unwed parents who never married and was subsequently adopted by her natural father, appeals from an order of the Hennepin County District Court which construed a trust so as to exclude her from beneficiary status because of her illegitimacy or adoption.
In 1921 William H. Davies and Mary F. Davies conveyed property into a trust which was to run during the lives of seven specified persons. The trustees were to pay income to the settlors during the life of William, then to certain named persons including the settlors’ son, Edward C. Davies.
The trust provided that after the death of Edward C. Davies and his widow, if any, his share should be paid over to “* * * the children of said Edward C. Davies who may survive from time to time, in equal shares, share and share alike, the issue surviving from time to time of a deceased child taking the share their parent would have taken if living * * *.” Before he died, Edward C. Davies had two children, Esther and Dorothy. Esther predeceased him, however, leaving three offspring of her own. These are Gordon Simons, Jr., John V. Danielson, Jr., and Laurie Ann Davies (now known as Laurie Ann Peck). These three, then, if they are “issue surviving from time to time of a deceased *245child” are entitled to the share that would have been paid to their mother, Esther, if she were alive. The dispute in this case is whether Laurie Ann, because of her illegitimacy or the adoption by her natural father, is excluded from the class denominated “issue surviving from time to time.”
The trust provides that at the termination of the trust the principal should be paid over to whoever is then entitled to income distributions.
The trustee, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, brought suit in the district court of Hennepin County requesting a determination whether illegitimacy or adoption prevents Laurie Ann from being entitled to receive trust distributions. The two sons of John V. Danielson, Jay and Judd, appeared by guardian ad litem as contingent beneficiaries. On cross-motions for summary judgment the district court ordered judgment that Laurie Ann is not entitled to receive distributions of either principal or income from the trust.
It is axiomatic that a court’s cardinal purpose in construing a trust is to ascertain the intent of the settlor. In re Trust Created by Moulton, 233 Minn. 286, 46 N. W. 2d 667, 24 A. L. R. 2d 1092 (1951). In the instant case, however, settlors’ intent is ambiguous. The trust uses both the term “issue” and the term “legal issue,” in different provisions.
The use of these terms could imply several testamentary intents. Settlors could have intended that the use of the term “issue” refer to all biological issue and added the term “legal issue” because they believed that the issue of legally adopted children might not be “issue.” If settlors’ purpose was to exclude illegiti-mates, it is unlikely that they would have used the term “legal issue” in one part of the trust and yet been satisfied with using simply “issue” elsewhere to convey the same meaning. If they had wished to restrict the term “issue” to legitimate issue, they would have used the term “legal issue” there as well. Alternatively, it can be argued that “issue” meant only legitimate issue because there is no provision specifically referring to illegitimate *246children whereas there is provision for adopted children. It may be, however, that settlors simply did not wish to contemplate the possibility of illegitimate offspring on the face of the family trust.
Respondents argue that at the time the trust was written “issue” was understood at common law to exclude illegitimates.1 It is not certain, however, that the settlors of this trust intended to give the word its common-law meaning, nor is it certain that social policy in Minnesota at the time favored denying illegitimate offspring the right to qualify as “issue” in a trust.2 There are no Minnesota cases on this question, but this court did criticize the common law’s prejudice against illegitimates in Reilly v. Shapiro, 196 Minn. 376, 379, 265 N. W. 284, 286 (1936), as follows:
“* * * Every human instinct is moved toward extending a helping hand to such child, already laboring under a handicap impossible of removal. That is why the old and harsh rules of the common law have been modified and in many instances removed by statutory enactments.”
When there is some doubt, either from family circumstances, *247the behavior or knowledge of a settlor, or from the trust instrument itself, this court will hold that illegitimate issue are to be included as issue.3 It has been argued that one of the usages of the term “legal issue” in- this trust instrument is mere sur-plusage. This does not convince us that all uses of the adjective “legal” before the term “issue” are frivolous, however. While the evidence admittedly is tenuous, there is sufficient evidence in the wording of the trust to indicate that the settlors may have intended only to exclude the illegal issue of legally adopted children and to include all issue of natural children. This evidence prevails over the common law’s prejudice against illegiti-mates.
We express no opinion on whether the use of the word “issue” would be adequate in other circumstances to restrict a testamentary transfer only to legitimate children. It is understandable that a settlor may not wish to explicitly contemplate the idea that his lineage might include children bom out of wedlock in the words of the family trust. Legislation defining the terms “issue” and “children” for the purpose of testamentary dispositions is certainly appropriate.4
■The right of appellant to receive distributions from the trust, moreover, was not terminated by her adoption out of the family. While the settlors provided for children to be adopted into the family, no provision was made for children adopted out; hence settlors’ intent remains ambiguous. The social policy evinced at *248the time the trust was written, however, favors allowing an adopted-out child to inherit from his natural parents. In Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Minn. 140, 199 N. W. 581 (1924), this court held that an adopted-out child would inherit under intestate succession because the legislature had not spoken expressly to this point in the adoption statute, G. S. 1917, § 7157. This court similarly held in In re Estate of Sutton, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N. W. 925 (1925), that a second adoption did not change the status of the adopted child as heir of the first adoptive parents. While these cases involved intestate succession rather than the distribution of property under a trust, they evince a social policy favoring adopted-out children.5
Consistent with settlors' intent and social policy at the time of this trust’s drafting, we hold that neither appellant’s illegitimate birth nor her adoption out of the family prohibits her inheritance under this trust.
Reversed.

 An illegitimate child in Minnesota is now entitled to inherit under intestate succession. Minn. St. 525.172. Because this case involves a trust written in 1921, however, that statute has no direct relationship to the case at hand. Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 91 A. 191 (1914); Id. 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 196 (1914), allowed an illegitimate child to qualify as “children” under a will when testator knew of the illegitimate child. Other jurisdictions, however, refused to include illegitimates as “children” or “issue.” See, 2 A. L. R. 930, 972. That authority is ambiguous, how-, ever, in that it indicates that the term “issue,” where used as a word of purchase, “does not include illegitimate offspring unless a different intention appears from the context." (Italics supplied.)

 At the time this trust was drafted, Minnesota inheritance law, G. S. 1913, § 9412(8), stated: “The word ‘issue,’ as applied to the descent of estates, shall include all the lawful lineal descendants of the ancestor.” It is not clear whether the word “include” was a word of enlargement or limitation, however.

 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 619, 203 N. W. 2d 40, 43 (1973), defined the term “children” to include illegitimate children under the provisions of a will where the illegitimate child was “a part of the family circle.” The illegitimate grandchild had been born before his parents were married, and the marriage of his father and mother was entered into without court permission required because the father was under court order to provide support for the child of a prior marriage. The court found that in these special circumstances, although the testator never knew the illegitimate child, exclusion of the child could not have been intended.

 See, Note, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 173.

 Since then, Minnesota has amended the law providing that an adopted-out child should not inherit, Minn. St. 259.29, but this is not relevant here.