Court Opinion

ID: 9384067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 17:08:05.541608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:50.242299
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Martin v. Mac's Convenience Stores, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-1077.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                     NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                 )

MICHAEL MARTIN, et al.                                    C.A. No.      30008

        Appellants

        v.                                                APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                          ENTERED IN THE
MAC'S CONVENIENCE STORES, LLC,                            COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
d/b/a CIRCLE K, et al.                                    COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
                                                          CASE No.   CV-2020-09-2439
        Appellees

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 31, 2023

        SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Plaintiffs-Appellants Michael L. Martin and Anjanise Brown (collectively

“Appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas,

dismissing their action against Defendants-Appellees MAC’s Convenience Stores, LLC and

William C. Day (collectively “Appellees”). For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms.

                                                     I.

        {¶2}     Appellants filed a complaint in Summit County Court of Common Pleas on July 6,

2015 (“2015 Complaint”), alleging that Appellees were liable for injuries Appellants sustained in

a motor vehicle collision on July 7, 2013. On September 7, 2016, Appellants voluntarily dismissed

their lawsuit.

        {¶3}     Appellants subsequently refiled their lawsuit on August 26, 2017 (“2017

Complaint”), noting on the face of the complaint that it was a refiling of the 2015 Complaint. The

trial court later dismissed that complaint without prejudice on September 19, 2019.
                                                  2

        {¶4}    Appellants then filed a third complaint on September 2, 2020 (“2020 Complaint”),

indicating on the face of that complaint that it was a refiling of the 2017 Complaint. In their

answer, Appellees asserted the affirmative defense that the allegations contained in the 2020

Complaint were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellees then filed a “Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment” on October 1, 2010. In that

motion, Appellees argued that Appellants’ 2020 Complaint was barred by the statute of limitations

because Appellants had already utilized R.C. 2305.19, Ohio’s savings statute, when they filed their

2017 Complaint. Appellants responded in opposition. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion

and dismissed the complaint, finding the savings statute could only be used one time after the

statute of limitations had expired.

        {¶5}    Appellants timely appealed, assigning one error for this Court’s review.

                                                  II.

                                    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE TRIAL COURT [ERRED] IN DISMISSING THIS MATTER ON THE
        PLEADINGS.

        {¶6}    In their sole assignment of error, Appellants argue the trial court erred in dismissing

their complaint because R.C. 2305.19(A) allowed them to permissibly refile their complaint

despite the statute of limitations expiring. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

                               R.C. 2305.19 – Ohio’s Savings Statute

        {¶7}    “Savings statutes operate to give a plaintiff a limited period of time in which to

refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred.” Internl. Periodical Distrib. v.

Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452, 2002–Ohio–2488, ¶ 7. The savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A),

provides, in relevant part, that:
                                                 3

       [i]n any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, * * * if the
       plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * may commence a
       new action within one year after * * * the plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the
       merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations,
       whichever occurs later.

See also R.C. 2125.04 (savings statute for wrongful death claims also requiring refiling within one

year). “Thus, in order to employ the savings statute, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements: ‘(1)

commencement of an action before the statute of limitations has expired, and (2) failure otherwise

than upon the merits after the statute of limitations has expired.’” Wick v. Lorain Manor, Inc., 9th

Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010324, 2014-Ohio-4329, ¶ 8, quoting Herbert v. Farmer, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2013-02-016, 2014-Ohio-877, ¶ 14, quoting Boggs v. Baum, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 10AP-864, 2011-Ohio-2489, ¶ 30. A savings statute may only be used once to refile a case.

See Thomas v. Freeman, 79 Ohio St.3d 221, 227 (1997). See also Vogel v. Northeast Ohio Media

Group, LC, 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0003-M, 2020-Ohio-854, ¶ 11; Wick at ¶ 8; Herbert at ¶

19–20; Brown v. Solon Pointe at Emerald Ridge, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99363, 2013-Ohio-4903,

¶ 23; Wright v. Proctor-Donald, 5th Dist. Stark No.2012-CA-00154, 2013-Ohio-1973, ¶ 13; Rall

v. Arora, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-6, 2013-Ohio-1392, ¶ 19-20; Gao v. Barrett, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 10AP-1075, 2011-Ohio-3929, ¶ 13.

       {¶8}    In the trial court below, Appellees filed a motion arguing they were entitled to

dismissal as a matter of law because Appellants’ claims were time barred, and because Appellants

had already used the savings statute once to refile their claim, use of the savings statute was not

available to them.1 In their response in opposition to Appellees’ motion, Appellants conceded the

       1
          Appellees filed a motion titled “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment.” The trial court, in granting the motion, did not specify which
motion it was granting, and stated, “The [c]ourt therefore ORDERS [Appellees’] Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment shall be GRANTED.”
                                                  4

law of the Ninth District supported Appellees’ position, but argued that the “position is created

from whole cloth by the courts and is not supported by the plain language of the statute.”

Appellants argued “[t]here is no limitation contained in the plain language of the statute which

would limit the application of the saving statute more than one time.” The trial court rejected

Appellants’ arguments, and Appellants now raise the same arguments on appeal.

        {¶9}   This Court has repeatedly held that the savings statute can only be used one time to

refile a complaint. See Vogel, supra; Wick, supra. While this Court has not expressly rejected the

notion that the savings statute contains no limiting language, our sister district has considered, and

rejected, this same argument. In Graf v. Cirino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96011, 2011-Ohio-3473,

¶ 5, the Eighth District Court of Appeals indicated:

         [Appellants] assert that the plain text of the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A),
        contains no limitations on the number of times it may be used. They claim that
        the savings statute permits a plaintiff to refile a case within one year of a failure
        “otherwise than upon the merits” and that there is no reason why a third filing may
        not relate back to the original filing for limitation purposes. We find no merit to
        their arguments.

        {¶10} Appellants also argue the 2004 amendment to the statute allowed for a more

“expansive application” of the statute because the absence of language limiting the number of

times the statute could be used “demonstrate[s] an intent against such a limitation.” Ohio courts

have consistently rejected this argument. The Sixth District Court of Appeals examined this

argument in Dagart v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-06-19, 2006-Ohio-6179, ¶

21, stating:

        Despite the broadening language in the amendment of R.C. 2305.19, we are of the
        opinion that the legislature did not intend to obviate the foregoing precept by
        allowing endless filings of the same case so long as the filings were within one year

Appellants’ assigned error specifically argues that the trial court erred in granting a motion to
dismiss on the pleadings. Appellants do not contest the facts, admitting that they utilized the
savings statute once previously.
                                                   5

        of a dismissal otherwise than upon the merits. The legislative history of the current
        version of R.C. 2305.19, as set forth infra, supports this opinion. The new version
        of the statute was enacted to prevent the disparate treatment of “similarly situated”
        plaintiffs. Appellant’s case cannot be likened to that of a plaintiff whose case was
        dismissed other than on the merits before the statute of limitations ran. We thus
        conclude that because appellant employed the saving statute once to refile his
        lawsuit in the Court of Claims, he cannot use the saving statute to bring the same
        cause of action a third time.

In Wright, 2013-Ohio-1973, the Fifth District Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that the

2004 amendment to the statute had any effect on the long-held principle that the savings statute

could not apply twice to the same case:

        Prior to the 2004 amendment of R.C. 2305.19, the Ohio Supreme Court held the
        savings statute could only be used once to re-file a case and could not be used to
        keep actions alive indefinitely. The rationale behind this limitation on the savings
        statute is to obtain finality of decisions and so the purpose of the civil rules to
        prevent indefinite filings is not frustrated. After the amendment of R.C. 2305.19,
        courts analyzing the statute have continued to hold that the savings statute cannot
        apply twice to the same case.

(Internal citations omitted.) Wright at ¶ 13. See also Eichler v. Metal & Wire Products Co., 7th

Dist. Columbiana No. 07 CO 14, 2008-Ohio-3095, ¶ 20 (“[T]he changing of the word “an” to

“any” in the first phrase of the statute does not change the rule of law that the savings statute can

only be used once. Holding otherwise would mean that the savings statute would permit actions

to be kept alive indefinitely. If that were the case, there would be no finality to decisions and, thus,

the purpose of the civil rules to prevent indefinite filings would be frustrated.”).

        {¶11} We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive. Here, the motor vehicle collision

that gave rise to this action occurred on July 7, 2013. Appellants filed the 2015 Complaint before

the statute of limitations expired but voluntarily dismissed that complaint on September 7, 2016.

R.C. 2305.19 provided Appellants with one opportunity to refile their complaint, which they did

on August 26, 2017. Thus, with the statute of limitations expired, and Appellants’ previous

utilization of the savings statute to file the 2017 Complaint, the 2020 Complaint was barred by the
                                                 6

statute of limitations. Therefore, Appellees were entitled to dismissal of the complaint as a matter

of law.

          {¶12} Appellants’ assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

          {¶13} Appellants’ sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

          There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

          We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

          Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

          Costs taxed to Appellants.

                                                       BETTY SUTTON
                                                       FOR THE COURT
                                         7

CARR, J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellants.

BRIAN D. SULLIVAN, ROBERT D. WARNER and BRIANNA M. PRISLIPSKY, Attorneys at
Law, for Appellees.