Court Opinion

ID: 9730094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:01:09.785089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.105931
License: Public Domain

CHRISTIAN, J.
I respectfully dissent.
Amendment of this complaint was not a matter of course but was at the discretion of the trial court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) Amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings should be allowed with liberality. (See 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, § 1040, p. 2618.) But under the circumstances here present, respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s request to amend his complaint on the eve of arbitration.
Although the moving party has the burden of showing that the ends of justice will be served by the amendment (Plummer v. Superior Court (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 841, 843 [28 Cal.Rptr. 294]), petitioner has never suggested any benefit to him that can result from his proposed amendment. The amendment would plead a theory of negligent entrustment against the corporation in addition to theories, already pleaded, of liability as employer and owner. The allegation in the proposed amendment is that it was negligent to entrust the vehicle to Frederick Vickers when it was known that he “was a careless and reckless driver of automobiles ... . ” Although the theory of negligent entrustment may in the abstract be based on other grounds (see Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Abdulla (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 81, 90 [156 Cal.Rptr. 254]), as concretely presented to respondent court the new theory was dependent upon a finding that petitioner’s injuries were caused by foreseeable “carelessness” or “recklessness” on the part of Frederick Vickers, just as the two already pleaded theories are based on vicarious responsibility for his negligence. If Vickers was careless or reckless, petitioner will recover on the negligence theories already pleaded; the new theory cannot enhance his prospects of recovery. If Vickers was not negligent, petitioner cannot recover on either of the theories already pleaded or on the theory of negligent entrustment as sought to be pleaded in the proposed amendment.
While the new theory will thus open to petitioner no legitimate advantage, respondent court could reasonably expect it to compromise the fairness of the trial by opening the door to evidence that is irrelevant on the issue of Vicker’s negligence but prejudicial to the defense on a *492broader basis. Specifically, proof of previous unsafe driving by Frederick Vickers is clearly portended. At trial the court could in the exercise of its discretionary power exclude such evidence, on the basis of its prejudicial effect on the issue of Vickers’ negligence, where the negligent entrustment theory could add nothing to the prospect that petitioner might legitimately prevail. (Evid. Code, § 352.) It cannot be an abuse of discretion to reject an amendment which could have no other effect than to open the trial to evidence that could nevertheless properly be excluded in the exercise of discretion. (See Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 519, 524-525 [113 Cal.Rptr. 277].)
Respondent court could also reasonably determine that the amendment was not timely. It would introduce a new set of facts which must be dealt with by both parties at a time when the case is ready for arbitration. Petitioner’s excuse for delay was that petitioner did not have his present attorney until June 1980. Assuming petitioner was without counsel for the entire time since the accident (which is not established by the record), petitioner has not suggested why he delayed two and one-half years in seeking representation. The new attorney belatedly has thought of a legal theory that can gain petitioner no additional recovery, will risk prejudicing with irrelevant matter determination of the basic issue upon which liability rests and will inject a new issue which may require further investigation or discovery procedures.
We should remember that we are not called upon to second-guess the trial court or to give effect to our own inclinations as to how we would handle a discretionary decision if we were hearing a trial court’s law and motion calendar. To avoid disrupting the administration of justice in the trial court, we should not intervene in matters pending in the trial courts unless action is truly necessary to prevent harm to the interests of justice. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend. (Cf. Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp. (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d 240, 257-259 [95 Cal.Rptr. 901].) Intervention by this court is not warranted.
I would deny the writ.