Court Opinion

ID: 9675785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:05:46.903183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:39.147864
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
concurring.
While I concur in the result the court reaches today, I cannot join in all parts of the court’s opinion. Instead of confining itself to the question presented, the court today reaches out on its own initiative to decide an issue that has no bearing on the facts of this case. In the process, the court overrules settled case law and engrafts new language onto a statute. This is judicial activism at its worst.
The issue presented in this case is straightforward: When an excessive claim for prejudgment interest appears solely in a pleading, does that claim constitute a “charge” within the usury statute? 1 Our answer today is no; “[ujsury statutes are designed to correct abusive consumer and commercial credit transactions, not to serve as a trap for the unwary pleader in a court proceeding.” At 605. That reasoning decides the case.
The flow of that reasoning, however, takes a bizarre and unexpected turn in the preceding paragraph. Expressly disapproving Hagar v. Williams, 593 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1979, no writ), the court abruptly declares that “[a] charge must be communicated to the debtor.” At 605.
That declaration, of course, has nothing to do with this case, either factually or legally. Factually, the statement is inapplicable: there is no suggestion from either party that the alleged “charge” in this case was not communicated to the debtor. Legally, the statement is simply irrelevant: even if the rule were otherwise — i.e., if a charge does not have to be communicated — the outcome of this case would be the same, since the usury statute does not apply to claims made solely in the context of judicial proceedings.
If the court’s “communication” statement were settled law, then the court might defensibly refer to that law for illustrative purposes. In fact, though, the only two published opinions addressing the issue resolve it by holding that a charge need not be communicated. See Williams v. Back, 624 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1981, no writ); Hagar v. Williams, 593 S.W.2d at 788. Nonetheless, the court fervently rejects that view, without citing any authority for the new law stated today.
The court’s overruling of Williams v. Back and Hagar v. Williams will no doubt come as a surprise to Carpet Services, in whose favor the court rules. Carpet Services has never suggested that those cases should be overruled, nor has it criticized them in any way.2 The reason is obvious: both cases are irrelevant. Under Carpet Services’ reasoning, which the court today *607adopts, the claim at issue here falls outside the scope of the usury statute whether it was communicated or not.3 Thus, even if Williams v. Back and Hagar v. Williams are correct, the outcome of this case remains the same. Given that fact, which the court does not deny, reaching out to overrule the cases is inexcusable.
There are countless reasons why courts should refrain from deciding issues not presented, but the one most apparent here is a practical one. In ruling on the “communication” issue, the court is acting in the dark, without the benefit of an adversarial presentation, and without considering the manifold implications of its ruling. If the issue were fully presented, different considerations would no doubt come to light. For instance, in Williams v. Back, the court considered some of the real problems of communication: the creditor had mailed a notice containing an allegedly-usurious charge to the debtor, but the debtor had not received it. The court ruled that the notice was a “charge” within the usury statute, even though it had not been communicated to the debtor. 624 S.W.2d at 275. This court now summarily rejects that approach, without any consideration of the competing interests involved.4
Today’s uninvited ruling has no basis in either the language or the intent of the usury statute; nor is it necessary to the disposition of the case. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals; but I would refrain from deciding the “communication” issue until it is actually presented.

. It is worth emphasizing that there was no charge of interest in this case outside of the judicial context, as counsel for Carpet Services noted in oral argument:
Carpet Services never once added any amount to any account, never billed excessive interest in an invoice, they never did anything — no general ledger, no books of account, no journals, no nothing — no demand letters; Carpet Services never once charged any interest. The only basis of usury in this case — the sole and exclusive basis of usury — was the one allegation, the one sentence, in the original petition.
Oral argument of David M. Berman, Counsel for Respondents, May 28, 1991.

. Carpet Services’ brief cites fifty-one cases, but Hagar v. Williams is not among them. The brief does cite Williams v. Back once, but not to criticize it; on the contrary, Carpet Services relies on the case to support its argument on legislative intent.

. The argument that Carpet Services presented to this court had nothing to do with communication of a charge:
I believe that pleadings, as a matter of law, cannot be a vehicle for usury.
When I'm filing a pleading on behalf of a client, the nature of the transaction is fundamentally different.... It is not a commercial transaction. It’s not rooted in a free contractual relationship.
An original petition is far from a bill or invoice. It’s not the same thing. The nature of
the transaction is fundamentally different. That difference in nature means that the legislature couldn’t have intended the word "charge” to apply in litigation.
Oral argument of David M. Berman, Counsel for Respondents, May 28, 1991.

. See generally Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp., 751 S.W.2d 473, 476-77 (Tex.1988) (recognizing that the purpose of usury statutes is to punish the lender’s conduct, rather than to compensate the borrower).