Court Opinion

ID: 9547732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:51:14.93543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:01.383344
License: Public Domain

Dimmick, J.
(dissenting) — Officer Harris engaged in two searches, each of which must be separately analyzed. The first, a pat-down search of defendant's person, was made in order to discover whether defendant possessed any weapons. The majority concedes that under the circumstances Officer Harris might have reasonably apprehended danger and that the patdown was related to that concern. Majority opinion, at 566.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the search in the instant case exceeded its permissible scope. It was midnight, defendant was disoriented, her car was wrecked in an area where she had no reason to be and a concealed weapons permit was found. The officer instructed Brandt, the airport security officer, to pat her down for weapons. Brandt testified that he felt a hard object in defendant's loose jeans pocket and could not determine what the item was. The object was hard, and by actual measurement, was 2 7/32 inches long by 11/16 of an inch wide. It had a small handle on the side 3/8 of an inch wide, projecting 3/8 of an inch from the container. Officer Harris testified that according to his experience, feeling such an object in a person's pocket would alert him to the fact that it might be a weapon. He asserted in this regard that there are pistols small enough to fit in the palm of a person's hand.
The question is whether there were reasonable grounds to suspect the object was a weapon and thus lawfully remove it from defendant's pocket. The situation was extraordinary and under all the circumstances I would hold that such reasonable grounds existed herein. This is not a case where an officer feels a soft cigarette package in a shirt pocket and removes it on the pretense that he was searching for a weapon. The fact that the object turned out to be a cocaine sniffer does not destroy the lawfulness of the pat-*571down search.
The majority relies upon a statement by Brandt that he was looking for drug paraphernalia as well as weapons when he performed the patdown. Such testimony is irrelevant as Brandt was an airport security officer, and not a police officer. Harris was the police officer in charge and his only purpose for the search was to "check for a concealed weapon, if she had a knife or gun or anything like that.” Brandt's mental view cannot destroy the primary and permissible justification for the search by Officer Harris. In addition, Brandt's testimony was not as unequivocal as the majority indicates in this regard.1
Defendant was convicted of violating the controlled substances act and placed on probation for 3 years without jail *572time. Defendant was not convicted for possessing the cocaine sniffer. Rather she was convicted for possession of marijuana and phencyclidine found when Officer Harris made a completely separate search of defendant's tote bag at the hospital. Officer Harris' stated purpose in making this second search was to determine defendant's identification and any other information useful in her treatment. Thus, even if the pat-down search was not lawful, the evidence obtained in the second separate search was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the alleged taint of the pat-down search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). Knowledge of the tote bag's contents was gained through an independent source — the search for identification.
The majority states that the search of the tote bag was initiated by Officer Harris and the hospital personnel merely acceded to his request. I strongly disagree as the relevant testimony of the nurse present when Officer Harris searched the bag indicates otherwise:
Q Okay, are items found in patients' purses sometimes useful at the hospital in deciding how to deal with a patient?
A Um hum.
Q For what kind of reasons?
A Well, if they've been taking prescription medication, sometimes that will affect other medications that we give them.
Q Okay, do people with different kinds of medical conditions sometimes have notice of that fact in their purse?
A You mean like if they're diabetic or something, do they carry something like that, yes.
Q Well, did you take any part in causing the purse to be searched?
A Because I felt that I needed to know her name and address and some information about her, yes I did.
*573The majority unnecessarily binds the hands of police officers and possibly hospital personnel in their attempts to determine the identity of a person in need of prompt medical attention. Anyone who has ever attempted to gain admittance to a hospital, even in an emergency, is aware that it is almost an impossibility until identification and medical history have been established, as well as insurance coverage. The majority uses hindsight in its conclusion that because defendant gained consciousness after treatment there was no emergency requiring prompt identification. This ignores the fact that both the officer and the hospital personnel had made inquiries of defendant as to her name while she was being treated. When defendant did not respond, the officer searched her bag for identification. When he made the search there was no indication that defendant would become coherent. As noted by the majority, courts consistently uphold searches made for the purpose of finding identification. Majority opinion, at 567-68. There are many policy reasons for such a result. In addition to medical reasons, family members must be notified.
I conclude that Officer Harris' subjective motive as stated was to render aid or assistance. In addition, upon reviewing all the facts objectively, it was reasonable for Officer Harris to have determined the situation required his attempting to ascertain defendant's identity in this manner. Again, the fact that the officer found marijuana and phencyclidine, as well as defendant's identification, does not destroy the validity of the search. As noted by the majority, items inadvertently discovered while conducting a search for identification are admissible.
In sum, the officer's actions herein were appropriate and necessary. There were no unreasonable searches. The purpose of the exclusionary doctrine — to prevent unlawful police conduct — is not at all served in this case where the officer conducted himself in what appears to me, as it also *574appeared to the trial court, and the Court of Appeals, to be a reasonable manner. Therefore, I dissent.
Brachtenbach, C.J., concurs with Dimmick, J.

During cross examination by defendant’s attorney, Brandt testified as follows:
Q Okay, now you patted her down before putting her in the car?
A Right.
Q And, the reason for that was what?
A To search her for any weapons or anything she might injure herself with.
Q And, you patted her down for weapons, is that correct?
A I searched her for anything that I thought would do anyone any harm, weapons, matches.
A I wanted to search her before she went in the car for weapons. Well, anything else, because I wouldn't put anybody in the back of anybody's car, even if they were giving them a ride.
Q So now, your testimony is you were not only searching her for weapons, you were searching her for any other— What do you mean by anything else?
A Obviously what turned up, this paraphernalia, or—
Q You were searching her for drugs then?
A I was searching her for anything that would do anybody harm in that car.
Q And, when you say you searched for things that might do any harm, you're saying that in the connection of them being harmful to one of the officers who was transporting her; isn't that true?
A Or herself. Because if she had any other kind of weapon, she could harm herself.
During redirect examination Brandt testified:
Q Would you say the primary object of your search was to protect the officers that would be transporting her?
A Yes.