Court Opinion

ID: 9965479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:09:47.816584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.506342
License: Public Domain

No. 12                          May 2, 2024                                249

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                    STATE OF OREGON

                    HOTCHALK, INC.,
           both individually and derivatively on
              behalf of Concordia University,
           aka Concordia University—Portland,
                       Plaintiff-Relator,
                               v.
       LUTHERAN CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD;
   Lutheran Church Extension Fund—Missouri Synod,
               Concordia University System;
   Concordia University, St. Paul; Concordia University,
           aka Concordia University—Portland;
     Charles E. Gerken; Kathleen Hone; Terry Wilson;
       Jerry Baltzell; David O. Berger; Michael Borg;
    Charles E. Brondos; Gerald Koll; Paul Linnemann;
 Jeff Oltmann; Kurt Onken; Timothy Pauls; Bev Peloquin;
      Rod Wegener; Sam Wiseman; Brian T. Yamabe;
    Thomas John Zelt; Thomas Ries; Richard Doughty;
         Concordia Foundation; Chris Dunnaville;
   George Thurston; Lutheran Church Extension Fund;
                        John Andrea,
                Defendants-Adverse Parties.
              (CC 20CV15620) (SC S069765)

    Original proceeding in mandamus.*
    Argued and submitted June 22, 2023.**
   James T. McDermott, McDermott Weaver Connelly
Clifford LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for plaintiff-relator. Also on the briefs was Gabriel M.
Weaver.

______________
          * On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Eric L. Dahlin, Judge.
          ** Bushong, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case. Nakamoto, J., Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral
argument, but did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
250    HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod

   Timothy R. Volpert, Tim Volpert. P.C., Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse party
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. Also on the brief
were Thomas L. Hutchinson and Laura C. Caldera Loera,
Bullivant House Bailey PC, Portland.
   In a combined brief, Rian Peck, Visible Law LLC,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial
Lawyers Association; Peter Janci, Crew Janci LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae CHILD USA, Zero
Abuse Project, and Oregon Abuse Advocates & Survivors
in Service, with Shiwanni Johnson, Crew Janci LLP, also
on the brief; Meg Garvin, The National Crime Victim Law
Institute at Lewis & Clark Law School, filed the brief for
amicus curiae The National Crime Victim Law Institute;
and Kristian Roggendorf, The Zalkin Law Firm, San Diego,
California, filed the brief for amicus curiae The National
Center for Victims of Crime.
   Colton L. Stanberry, The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, Washington, D.C., filed the brief for amicus curiae
The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty. Also on the brief
were Eric C. Rassbach and Nicholas R. Reaves.
   Herbert G. Grey, Portland, filed the brief for amici cur-
iae Religious Organizations the General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, Queens Federation of Churches,
and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Also
on the brief were Gene C. Schaerr and James C. Phillips,
Schaerr | Jaffe LLP, Washington, D.C.
  Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, James and Masih, Justices, and Walters, J., Senior
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
JAMES, J.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as improvi-
dently allowed.
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)   251
252      HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod

           JAMES, J.
          HotChalk, LLC1 filed suit against the Lutheran
Church—Missouri Synod (Synod) and 22 other defendants,
alleging breach of contract and fraud, among other claims,
in the closure of Concordia University - Portland (the uni-
versity). HotChalk alleges that the Synod orchestrated the
university’s closure to financially enrich itself and its affili-
ates while freezing out the university’s creditors. During the
course of discovery, the Synod sought a protective order under
ORCP 36 C to shield from disclosure a subset of documents
related to internal religious matters. The trial court con-
ducted in camera review, then issued the protective order—
in essence, denying a motion to compel discovery of those
documents. HotChalk filed a petition for mandamus, and we
issued an alternative writ. As we now explain, our statu-
tory authority to issue a writ of mandamus is limited: “[A]
writ shall not be issued in any case where there is a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.”2 ORS 34.110. Because we conclude that HotChalk has
not established that the normal appellate process would not
constitute a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in this case,
we dismiss the alternative writ as improvidently allowed.
                          I. BACKGROUND
         We take the facts from the record in the underlying
trial court proceedings. Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
361 Or 115, 117 n 1, 390 P3d 1031 (2017). In 2018, HotChalk
and the university entered into a 20-year contract—the
Administrative Services Agreement (ASA)—under which
the parties agreed to share costs and tuition revenue to sup-
port and grow the university’s educational programs. The
ASA required the university to make weekly revenue share
payments to HotChalk. In return, HotChalk was responsi-
ble for a proportional amount of operational expenses and
for providing services to support the university’s marketing,

    1
      HotChalk was originally registered as a corporation but has since changed
corporate form to a limited liability company.
    2
       We are not called upon to decide, and do not decide, whether this court’s
constitutional mandamus authority is so limited, see Oregon Const, Art VII
(Amended), § 2 (“[T]he supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original
jurisdiction in mandamus[.]”).
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)                                                  253

recruiting, enrollment, student support services, and infor-
mation technology.
         After that contract was executed, the Synod—which
is a synodical union of certain Lutheran congregations—
closed the university. HotChalk filed this civil action against
the Synod raising claims that focused on the alleged role
that the Synod played in the university’s closure. HotChalk
sent the Synod its first request for production, requesting
that the Synod produce all Synod board meeting minutes,
all communications between the defendants, all documents
and communications related to the university’s closure, and
any documents and communications concerning HotChalk.
After the parties agreed on search terms, the Synod pro-
duced more than 33,000 documents, including handbooks,
bylaws, other governing documents for the Synod and its reli-
gious affiliates, and final minutes of its Board of Directors
meetings since 2016.3
         The Synod moved under ORCP 36 C for a protec-
tive order limiting the scope of permissible discovery by
prohibiting HotChalk “from discovering (1) internal church
communications related to religious doctrine; (2) internal
church communications regarding church governance; and
(3) internal church communications regarding employment
decisions, including who, if anyone, should be approved as
the president of [the university].”4 The Synod argued that
the production of those “private religious communications”
would violate the Synod’s First Amendment right to freely
exercise its religious beliefs, including church governance
and selection of ministers and other employees. The Synod
argued that the framework articulated by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F3d 1147
(9th Cir 2010), applied to this case. Under that framework,
the party opposing discovery must make a “prima facie
    3
       By the time of this mandamus proceeding, the Synod had produced “about
180,000 documents” in response to HotChalk’s requests for production. The total
ultimately withheld pursuant to the trial court’s protective order was roughly
1500, approximately 0.83% of the total discovery in the case.
    4
       Another defendant, Concordia University System (CUS), joined the Synod
in the motion for a protective order. CUS advanced the same arguments as the
Synod and was ultimately subject to the trial court’s protective order before the
trial court granted CUS’s motion to dismiss. HotChalk is currently pursuing an
appeal of that dismissal order in the Court of Appeals (A179825).
254      HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod

showing of arguable First Amendment infringement.” Id. at
1160.5 After that showing has been made, the burden then
shifts to the party requesting discovery to show, among
other things, that the information being sought is “highly
relevant” to the requesting party’s claims and that discov-
ery would not unduly infringe on protected activity. Id. at
1161.
         In response, HotChalk argued that the trial court
should deny the motion for a protective order because there
was no First Amendment privilege for the documents that
the Synod sought to protect. Instead, HotChalk argued that
the trial court should apply the regular discovery standard
provided in ORCP 36 B(1), which allows parties to “inquire
into any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery.”6 Under that rule,
discovery is not limited to information that would be admis-
sible at trial “if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.
         During a hearing on the Synod’s motion for a pro-
tective order the trial court equated the Synod’s motion to
a motion under ORCP 36 C to restrict discovery “to protect
a party or person from * * * embarrassment.”7 Rather than
issuing any substantive rulings, the trial court deferred
    5
      In Perry, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning relied solely on case law dealing
with associational rights protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 1160-61.
Because we decide this case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not decide whether
Perry can be appropriately applied to other First Amendment rights, including
those at issue in this case.
    6
      ORCP 36 B(1) provides:
        “For all forms of discovery, parties may inquire regarding any matter,
    not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seek-
    ing discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
    existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
    documents, or other tangible things, and the identity and location of persons
    having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not a ground for objection
    that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the informa-
    tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
    sible evidence.”
    7
      ORCP 36 C provides, in part:
        “On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
    and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make
    any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
    embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including * * * that
    the discovery not be had.”
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)                                                   255

full argument and decision until it could perform in camera
review of the withheld documents. The trial court ordered
the Synod to compile a numbered list of those documents so
that it could randomly select a subset of them for review.8
         After completing its final in camera review, the trial
court granted the Synod’s motion for a protective order. After
some further hearings clarifying the order, HotChalk ulti-
mately filed a timely petition for mandamus in this court.
This court issued an alternative writ of mandamus direct-
ing the trial court to either vacate its order or show cause
why the trial court should not do so. The trial court declined
to vacate its order. As a result, the parties proceeded to
argument in this court. Among other issues addressed in
the briefing, the Synod argued that the writ should be dis-
missed because HotChalk has a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
                             II. ANALYSIS
        “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and serves
a limited function.” Lindell v. Kalugin, 353 Or 338, 347, 297
P3d 1266 (2013). ORS 34.110 governs the issuance of a writ
and provides, in part:
         “A writ of mandamus may be issued to any inferior court
    * * * to compel the performance of an act which the law spe-
    cially enjoins * * *; but though the writ may require such
    court * * * to exercise judgment, or proceed to the discharge
    of any functions, it shall not control judicial discretion. The
    writ shall not be issued in any case where there is a plain,
    speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
    law.”

         To determine whether mandamus will lie, we
engage in a two-pronged inquiry. First, we assess whether
the trial court had a legal duty to act in a certain way. State
ex rel. Maizels v. Juba, 254 Or 323, 327, 460 P2d 850 (1969)

     8
       Initially, the Synod had withheld approximately 2,017 documents. While
compiling the numbered list for the trial court, the Synod removed several doc-
uments from its asserted privilege because they were (1) third-party documents
or (2) publicly available. The Synod also discovered and produced two documents
that mentioned the university’s finances. Ultimately, the Synod provided the trial
court with a list of 1,534 documents that it sought to withhold from production.
256    HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod

(“Generally, the court has said that when the facts are not in
dispute and there is a clear rule of law requiring the matter to
be decided in a certain way, mandamus will lie.”). Accordingly,
mandamus is appropriate to review only obligatory—not dis-
cretionary—action. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or
413, 421-22, 255 P2d 1055 (1953), overruled on other grounds
by Maizels, 254 Or 323 (“It has become hornbook law in this
state that the writ of mandamus cannot be used as a means
of controlling judicial discretion, nor as a substitute for appel-
late review. The statute restricts its use to instances involv-
ing the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins.
Mandamus will never lie to compel a court to decide a matter
within its discretion in any particular way.”).
         The second preliminary question that we consider
is whether the party seeking the writ has other means of
recourse and, if so, whether the relief provided thereby is
“plain, speedy, and adequate[.]” ORS 34.110; see also Durham
v. Monumental S. M. Co., 9 Or 41, 44 (1880) (“The existence,
or non-existence, of an adequate and specific remedy at law
under the ordinary forms of legal procedure, is * * * one of
the first questions to be determined in all applications for
the writ of mandamus[.]”).
         The fact that this court issued an alternative writ
at the outset of a mandamus proceeding does not resolve
whether those preliminary requirements are met. See, e.g.,
Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp., 363 Or 810, 813, 429 P3d 727
(2018) (dismissing writ after briefing and argument); State
ex rel. Portland Habilitation Center, Inc. v. PSU., 353 Or
42, 51 n 4, 292 P3d 537 (2012) (considering a circuit court’s
issuance of an alternative writ and explaining that the cir-
cuit court was required to dismiss that writ if it later deter-
mined that the preliminary requirements were not met);
State ex rel. Le Vasseur v. Merten, 297 Or 577, 582, 686 P2d
366 (1984) (dismissing alternative writ after concluding that
relators had an adequate remedy at law); State ex rel. Boe v.
Straub, 282 Or 387, 389-90, 578 P2d 1247 (1978) (same).
         Before us, the Synod argues that HotChalk is not
entitled to mandamus relief because the issues that it raises
can be resolved on direct appeal and that HotChalk has not
established that direct appeal is not an adequate remedy
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)                                     257

in this instance. The Synod cites State ex rel. Anderson v.
Miller, 320 Or 316, 324, 882 P2d 1109 (1994), and State ex.
rel. Automotive Emporium, Inc. v. Murchison, 289 Or 265,
611 P2d 1169 (1980), for the proposition that, generally,
relief from a discovery ruling must be pursued through an
ordinary appeal and that “[d]irect appeal is an adequate
remedy unless the relator would suffer a special loss beyond
the burden of litigation by being forced to trial.” Murchison,
289 Or at 269; see also Fredrickson, 363 Or at 813-14 (to
same effect).
         The Synod is correct that we have previously cau-
tioned that the availability of mandamus to resolve a discov-
ery dispute is limited: “[N]ot every pretrial discovery order
is subject to mandamus,” because “[m]any pretrial discovery
errors do not have systemic implications and can be reme-
died on appeal.” Anderson, 320 Or at 324; Murchison, 289
Or at 268 (stating that mandamus in the discovery context
is generally inappropriate because “direct appeal is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy”). In Murchison, this court rea-
soned that “the prospect of suffering the burden of litigation”
was insufficient in itself to justify mandamus. 289 Or at 269.
The court concluded that appeal was a “plain, speedy and
adequate” remedy so long as the relators did not “suffer[ ]
an irretrievable loss of information and tactical advantage
[that] could not be restored to them on direct appeal.” Id.
         That rule is not absolute, and, on occasion, we have
issued writs of mandamus to resolve issues of pretrial dis-
covery. For example, in Anderson, this court concluded that
appeal was not a sufficient remedy where the trial court had
denied the relator’s request to record a deposition via vid-
eotape. 320 Or at 323. In that case, the trial court issued a
“protective order requiring that the deposition be recorded
stenographically only and that videotape not be used.” Id.
at 318. This court concluded that appeal would not remedy
that error because the method used to record and present
deposition testimony at trial could have a subtle yet signifi-
cant impact at trial:
   “Use of tape recorders, video tape, and similar devices may
   facilitate less expensive procedures. They have a further
   advantage in that the finder of fact at trial often will gain
258      HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod

    greater insight from the manner in which an answer is
    delivered and recorded by audio-visual devices. Moreover,
    a recording, video tape, or a motion picture of a deposition
    will avoid the tedium that is produced when counsel read
    lengthy depositions into evidence at trial.”
Id. at 323 (quoting 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure 426, § 2115 (1970) (footnotes omitted)).
         As another example, in Gwin v. Lynn, 344 Or 65,
70-71, 176 P3d 1249 (2008), the relator had sought to depose
a witness who, although designated as an expert, was also
involved in the cases in a direct and personal way. When the
relator sought to depose the witness because of her direct
involvement in the actions giving rise to that case, the
opposing party objected on the grounds that they planned
to call her as an expert witness at trial, and the trial court
sustained that objection. Id. at 69.9 Before this court, the
relator argued that he had a right to depose the witness on
matters not covered by the bar on expert discovery. Id. at
70-71. We issued the writ, concluding that a witness may
be both an expert and a fact witness and, therefore, may
be deposed concerning only those facts pertinent to the wit-
ness’s direct involvement in or observation of the relevant
events. Id. at 67.
          In this case, in its petition for a writ of manda-
mus, HotChalk claimed that mandamus was appropriate
“because the trial court’s order proscribes discovery into
key aspects of HotChalk’s complaint” and “direct appeal is
not * * * adequate [to] remedy” that purported error. At the
petition stage, HotChalk asserted that, “without knowing
the content of the communications improperly withheld as
privileged, [it] will be prejudiced in prosecuting its validly
pleaded tort and contract claims.” However, in its briefing
in this court, HotChalk does not reply to the Synod’s argu-
ment in its brief on the merits or to the cases that it cites.
HotChalk asserts only that relief on appeal would “come too
late.” But, HotChalk does not give us more.

    9
      As this court has previously stated, while ORCP 36 B authorizes discovery
of any relevant nonprivileged matter, it does not authorize trial courts to order
pretrial disclosure of the identity and intended testimony of expert witnesses.
Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 84 P3d 140 (2004).
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)                                 259

         HotChalk has not addressed Murchison at all, let
alone persuaded us that the general rule of Murchison—that
“[a]ny claim of prejudice arising from a denial of discovery
is reviewable on direct appeal”—is not applicable. 289 Or at
268. HotChalk has not persuaded us that whatever harm it
may have suffered as a result of the trial court court’s rul-
ing equates to the type of irretrievable loss of information
and loss of tactical advantage discussed in Murchison. In
particular, we note that the trial court ordered the Synod
to produce a detailed privilege log with entries for each of
the withheld documents. Given that log, the nature of the
dispute and parties’ arguments, and the records in the pro-
ceeding below, HotChalk does not explain how direct appeal
would be inadequate, and, on this record, we perceive no
impediment to meaningful appellate review sufficient to
make traditional appeal an inadequate remedy so as to jus-
tify the extraordinary relief of mandamus.
         Accordingly, we now conclude, as we did in
Fredrickson, that “the questions raised in the mandamus
petition are better resolved in the ordinary trial and appel-
late process.” 363 Or at 813. We therefore exercise our discre-
tion to decline to resolve those questions on mandamus, and
we dismiss the alternative writ as improvidently allowed.
       The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as
improvidently allowed.