Court Opinion

ID: 9912864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-25 08:09:01.865797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:50.094553
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued December 21, 2023

                                       In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                           First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-23-00548-CV
                            ———————————
           IN THE INTEREST OF A.B.A. A/K/A A.B.S., A CHILD

                    On Appeal from the 313th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2022-00726J

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this case, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”

or “the Department”) sought termination of the parental rights of H.B.S. (“Mother”)

and G.F.A. (“Father”) to their minor daughter, A.B.A. a/k/a A.B.S. (“Alice”).1 Upon

1
      In this opinion, we use pseudonyms for the minor child, her parents, her brother,
      and her extended family members to protect their privacy. See TEX. R. APP. P.
      9.8(b)(2).
the associate judge’s recommendation following a bench trial, the trial court signed

an order terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to three statutory predicate

grounds for termination and terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to two

statutory predicate grounds. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The

court also found that terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in

Alice’s best interest. The court appointed DFPS as Alice’s sole managing

conservator.

      On appeal, Mother raises six issues and Father raises five issues. Both parents

argue that: (1) the trial court erred by terminating their parental rights because at

trial, the Department abandoned the grounds for termination alleged in its live

pleading and therefore the judgment was not supported by the pleadings; (2)–(3) the

evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Family

Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O); (4) the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in

Alice’s best interest; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the

Department as Alice’s sole managing conservator. In an additional issue, Mother

challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support termination

of her parental rights under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D). The Department waived

its opportunity to file a brief and stated it was “taking no position in this appeal.”

      We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                           2
                                     Background

      Mother and Father have two children together: K.F.A. (“Kendall”), a son born

in 2017, and Alice. Mother has two older sons from prior relationships, and Father

also has a son from a prior relationship. None of these children live with Mother or

Father. In June 2018, a Liberty County district court terminated Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights to Kendall. Kendall was adopted by Mother’s cousin A.G.

(“Amanda”) and her husband Z.G. (“Zane”). Mother still has her parental rights to

her older sons.

      Alice was born in April 2022.2 At the time, Mother, Father, and Father’s

mother all lived together at a hotel in Baytown, Texas. The Department immediately

became    involved    in   Alice’s   life   because    Mother     tested   positive   for

methamphetamine while at the hospital. Although Alice did not test positive for

methamphetamine in her urine, her meconium did test positive. Father also took a

drug test, and although his urinalysis results were negative for the presence of drugs,

his hair follicle tested positive for methamphetamine. At the time of Alice’s birth,

Father was on parole for a possession of a controlled substance offense.

2
      Alice was born prematurely, and she also tested positive for “non-reactive syphilis”
      at birth. However, she was healthy and had no medical concerns at the time she was
      discharged from the hospital. At the time of trial, Alice was “about two months
      behind” on her developmental milestones due to her premature birth, but she was
      healthy and was not receiving any special services. Alice’s current doctor had no
      concern about the prior syphilis diagnosis.
                                            3
        The Department filed an “Original Petition for Protection of a Child for

Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship.” The Department requested that if Alice could not safely be reunited

with either Mother or Father, the court appoint a relative, another suitable person, or

the Department itself as Alice’s sole managing conservator. In the alternative, the

Department sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and asserted

several statutory predicate grounds as the basis for termination.

        The trial court appointed DFPS as Alice’s temporary managing conservator.

While this proceeding was pending, the Department placed Alice with Amanda and

Zane.

        The trial court ordered Mother and Father to comply with family service plans.

Among other things, the service plans required Mother and Father to obtain

appropriate, safe, and stable housing; maintain stable income; refrain from using

illegal substances and comply with random drug screening; participate in a drug and

alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations given; complete a psychosocial

evaluation; participate in and complete parenting classes; and refrain from criminal

activity.

        At the start of an April 2023 trial setting before the associate judge, DFPS’s

counsel requested that before proceeding with trial, the court rule on a “motion for

monitored return.” DFPS’s counsel acknowledged that both Mother and Father had

                                           4
a history of drug use, but Father’s last positive drug test was in April 2022 and

Mother’s last positive test was in June 2022. They had “completed all of their

services,” they had obtained housing, and Father was employed with Harris County.

The DFPS caseworker, Iris Darrington, believed that Mother and Father were

committed to their sobriety and to demonstrating that their lifestyles had changed.

Both Mother and Father had actively engaged in the services required of them and

had “mediate[d] the concerns that brought [Alice] into care.”

      Mother and Father had engaged in weekly supervised visits with Alice as the

case progressed. Counsel stated that the Department was “ready to start transitioning

[Alice] home,” and it had a proposed “transition plan that would begin with

unsupervised visits.” Darrington testified that the transition plan started with two

unsupervised four-hour visits. If those visits were successful, DFPS planned to

gradually increase the unsupervised visits to six hours, then day visits for eight

hours, and then overnight visits. Darrington testified that the Department wished to

place Alice with Mother and Father after six weeks of increasing unsupervised

visitation and then monitor the placement for an additional six months. DFPS would

continue to require drug testing during this monitoring period, and it would provide

additional services if necessary, such as daycare services if Mother became

employed and “aftercare service” that provides parenting support and therapy.

                                         5
Darrington believed it was in Alice’s best interest to be returned to Mother and

Father’s care.

       Both Alice’s ad litem attorney and the child advocate assigned as Alice’s

guardian ad litem, Alicia Lee, had reservations about this plan.3 The ad litem

attorney was concerned with Mother’s and Father’s past drug history, their prior

drug-related criminal convictions, Mother’s history with DFPS with respect to her

older sons, the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Kendall in

2018, and the fact that they had only recently obtained a sponsor through their

AA/NA program.

       Darrington also acknowledged that although Mother and Father had

completed the services required by their service plans, Amanda still had “concerns

about safety, security, [and] stability,” and she was opposed to reuniting Alice with

Mother and Father. Father agreed that he and Mother did not have a good

relationship with Amanda, but if the court returned Alice to him and Mother, he was

willing to facilitate Alice’s continued relationship with her brother Kendall.

Amanda, however, was not willing.

       After hearing testimony from Darrington, Father, Mother, Amanda, and Lee,

the trial court stated:

3
       When asked about her opinion on the transition plan, Lee testified: “We think we
       should go week by week and see what develops. We also, again, would continue to
       encourage [Mother and Father] to maintain their sobriety and to take steps to do so.”
                                             6
       First of all, all the evidence I heard right now, I’m going to take under
       consideration for trial. So the monitored return at this point is denied.
       What we’re going to do is start the trial. I want you to present some of
       the exhibits that we can put in, then I’m going to recess, set the parties
       to mediation with [Amanda] and we will resume in about a month
       because I want to see if there’s any ideas for attempting to have the
       adults work together for the child. But I’m agreeing with the ad litem
       and Child Advocates that, right now, I’m not doing the monitored
       return.

The court admitted eighteen exhibits offered by DFPS and stated: “[W]e just listened

for an hour and a half of testimony. The Court’s taking that into consideration as part

of the trial record.”4

       Trial resumed two months later in June 2023 before the associate judge. At

the beginning of this trial setting, DFPS, Mother, and Father all re-urged the motion

for monitored return. Alice’s ad litem attorney and Lee opposed returning Alice to

Mother and Father’s custody.5 The trial court declined to reconsider its prior ruling

4
       Mother’s counsel objected, noting that she “thought it was one kind of hearing” and
       she “would have been a bit more vigorous in terms of objections if it had been a
       trial.”
5
       Lee testified that she believed Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Alice should
       be terminated. Lee’s concerns included Mother’s and Father’s delay in obtaining
       sponsors, Lee’s inability to speak with Mother’s and Father’s sponsors, and Alice’s
       status as a nonverbal one-year-old who would not be able to “verbalize anything
       that may [have] potential to cause her harm, abuse or neglect.” Lee did not believe
       Mother and Father had completed their substance abuse treatment or that they had
       addressed, “to [Lee’s] satisfaction, their addiction and coping strategies for high risk
       situations that may lead to a relapse.” Lee further believed that Alice was thriving
       in her current placement with Amanda and Zane and that staying in that placement
       was in her best interest.
                                              7
“at this time.” However, the court noted that “[w]e’re in trial” and monitored return

“may be appropriate when everyone’s finished putting on their evidence.”

      Darrington testified that since the April trial setting, Mother and Father had

continued weekly supervised visits with Alice and those visits continued to be

appropriate. They had also continued meeting with their sponsors, and those visits

were also going well. Mother had obtained employment. DFPS’s current goal was

family reunification,6 and it wanted to monitor Alice in Mother’s and Father’s home.

Mother and Father had completed all required services and maintained sobriety, and

the Department did not have any safety concerns, but the parties had not been able

to exercise monitored return.

      Darrington agreed with Father’s counsel that DFPS was not seeking

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. She testified that family

reunification was in Alice’s best interest because Mother and Father “have alleviated

the concerns of the Agency. [Mother and Father] have demonstrated a lifestyle

change. They have demonstrated their willingness unlike they have done before.

They have shown they are able to meet the child’s needs and they are willing to put

the child’s needs before their own.”

6
      The Department’s alternate goal was “relative conservatorship” with Amanda and
      Zane, but Darrington did not consider that a workable goal because Amanda “has
      made it clear she is not in favor of facilitating that goal.” Darrington agreed that if
      the trial court ordered “relative conservatorship” with Amanda, Mother and Father
      both had legitimate fears that they would end up having no relationship with Alice.
                                             8
      At the beginning of closing arguments, counsel for DFPS stated, “We are

abandoning our termination grounds. Of course, we are reurging the monitored

return. Parents have alleviated the concerns of the Agency.” Upon a question from

the trial court, counsel agreed that the Department did not abandon its termination

grounds before trial but that it was “just doing it now.” Counsel again stated: “We

are reurging the motion for a monitored return. In the alternative, we are asking for

[permanent managing conservatorship] to the current caregivers [Amanda and Zane]

with parents named as [possessory conservators].”

      Alice’s ad litem attorney agreed with Lee’s request for termination of

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The ad litem attorney acknowledged that

Alice’s only pleading on file was an original answer.

      Following conclusion of the trial, the trial court signed a final judgment

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Alice. The court terminated

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E),

and (O). The court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to subsections

161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O). The court also found that termination of both parents’

rights would be in Alice’s best interest. The court appointed the Department as

Alice’s sole managing conservator. This appeal followed.

                                         9
                             Abandonment of Pleadings

      In their first issues, both Mother and Father argue that the trial court erred by

terminating their parental rights to Alice because, at the close of trial, counsel for the

Department stated on the record that the Department was abandoning the grounds

for termination that it had pleaded in its original and amended petitions. No other

pleadings seeking affirmative relief were on file with the trial court. Mother and

Father therefore argue that the trial court’s judgment terminating their parental rights

was not supported by the pleadings.

A.    Standard of Review and Governing Law

      The trial court’s final judgment must be supported by the pleadings. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 301. “An order terminating parental rights that is not supported by a

pleading seeking termination of the parent-child relationship is erroneous and

reversible.” In re E.H., No. 04-20-00440-CV, 2021 WL 799890, at *2 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Mar. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re T.M., No. 07-20-00103-CV,

2020 WL 4773207, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“If the trial court enters an order not supported by the pleadings, it commits

reversible error.”). “When a party abandons a claim in its live pleading, that pleading

will no longer support a judgment on the abandoned claim.” In re E.H., 2021 WL

799890, at *2; In re T.M., 2020 WL 4773207, at *3.

                                           10
      A party who abandons any part of its “claim or defense, as contained in the

pleadings, may have that fact entered of record, so as to show that the matters therein

were not tried.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 165; In re C.C.J., 244 S.W.3d 911, 921 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, no pet.). Whether a party has abandoned a pleading is a question of law

that we review de novo. In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d 227, 245 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2019, pet. dism’d); In re J.M., 352 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011,

no pet.). A party may abandon a pleading by stipulation, “such as an agreement or

concession ‘made in a judicial proceeding by the parties or their attorneys respecting

some matter incident thereto.’” In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d at 245 (quoting In re J.M.,

352 S.W.3d at 826–27).

      “A party abandons a pleading when it unequivocally states in open court it no

longer seeks the pleaded relief.” In re E.H., 2021 WL 799890, at *2 (concluding that

DFPS expressly abandoned its pleading for termination of father’s parental rights

when counsel announced at beginning of trial that Department was no longer seeking

termination and caseworker unequivocally testified that Department was instead

requesting that father be named possessory conservator, which was in child’s best

interest). Formal amendment of the pleadings is not required to show abandonment.

In re N.H., No. 02-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 4374638, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 1998, no pet.).

                                          11
B.    Whether the Department Abandoned its Pleadings Seeking Termination of
      Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights

      Here, in its original and amended petitions, the Department requested that if

reunification of Alice with Mother and Father was not possible, the trial court name

a relative of Alice, another suitable person, or the Department itself as Alice’s sole

managing conservator. In the alternative, the Department sought termination of

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Alice under several statutory predicate

grounds. No other party had pleadings requesting affirmative relief on file.

      At the first trial setting in April 2023, the Department’s counsel requested that

the trial court first consider its motion for monitored return. Counsel and Darrington,

the DFPS caseworker, both explained the “transition plan” that had been formulated

to reunite Alice with Mother and Father. Under this plan, Mother and Father would

gradually have longer and longer unsupervised visits with Alice, including overnight

visits if shorter unsupervised visits were successful. After six weeks of these visits,

DFPS planned to return Alice to Mother and Father and monitor the placement for

six months, offering additional services to Mother and Father if needed. Darrington

testified that Mother and Father had completed the services required by their family

service plans and had committed to their sobriety and lifestyle change, resolving the

Department’s concerns about leaving Alice in their care.

      Although counsel for the Department, Mother, and Father all requested that

the trial court grant the request for monitored return, both the ad litem attorney and

                                          12
Lee on behalf of Child Advocates opposed it. Ultimately, the trial court denied the

motion and considered the testimony in support of the request for monitored return

as testimony relevant to trial on the termination grounds. The trial court recessed the

trial proceedings until June 2023.

       At the beginning of the June 2023 trial setting, counsel for the Department,

Mother, and Father again urged the trial court to reconsider its ruling on the request

for monitored return. The ad litem attorney and Lee again opposed this request. The

trial court stated:

       So I’m not going to change the order at this time. We’re in trial. I mean,
       that [monitored return] may be appropriate when everyone’s finished
       putting on their evidence. I don’t know. But it seems to me that we
       should be just going forward, finishing the trial and then, of course, you
       can argue whatever the evidence is, as can the others.

Darrington, Zane, and Lee all testified, with Darrington’s and Lee’s testimony

primarily focusing on any changes since the April 2023 trial setting.

       Darrington testified that the Department’s current goal for Alice was “family

reunification,” and the Department “would like to monitor the child in the home.”

She testified that Mother and Father had “completed their services and maintained

sobriety.” The Department had no safety concerns with allowing Alice in the home,

but it had not been “able to exercise [its] goal.” The Department’s alternative goal

was “[r]elative conservatorship,” continuing Alice’s placement in Amanda and

Zane’s home. Darrington agreed with Father’s counsel that DFPS was not seeking

                                          13
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Darrington testified that family

reunification was in Alice’s best interest because she believed Mother and Father

had “alleviated the concerns of the Agency,” “demonstrated a lifestyle change,”

“demonstrated their willingness unlike they have done before,” and had “shown they

are able to meet the child’s needs and they are willing to put the child’s needs before

their own.”

      At the beginning of closing arguments, the Department’s counsel and the trial

court had the following exchange:

      Counsel:      We are abandoning our termination grounds. Of course,
                    we are reurging the monitored return. Parents have
                    alleviated the concerns of the Agency. When we were here
                    in April, two lingering concerns were continuing—
      The Court: So did you abandon your termination before we started
                 trial or are you just doing it now?
      Counsel:      Now, Judge.
      The Court: Okay.
      Counsel:      Two lingering concerns we heard last time were parents
                    continuing with a sponsor, which they’ve done since the
                    last setting. It was also raised the concern that Mom was
                    not employed and she has found employment since then.
                    We are reurging the motion for a monitored return. In the
                    alternative, we are asking for [permanent managing
                    conservatorship] to the current caregivers [Amanda and
                    Zane] with parents named as [possessory conservators].

Although Mother’s counsel repeatedly expressed confusion over what was before

the trial court at the time, Father’s counsel “support[ed] the position of DFPS.” The

                                          14
ad litem attorney supported termination and also confirmed on the record that his

only pleading on file was an original answer. The trial court later signed a written

judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Alice and appointing

DFPS as Alice’s sole managing conservator.

      We conclude that the Department—through Darrington’s testimony and its

counsel’s statements on the record during closing argument—unequivocally

abandoned the portion of its pleading seeking termination of Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights. See In re N.H., 2022 WL 4374638, at *8; In re E.H., 2021 WL

799890, at *2; In re T.M., 2020 WL 4773207, at *3; In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d at 245;

In re J.M., 352 S.W.3d at 827–28. As a result, there was no pleading before the court

that requested termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Alice. See In

re E.H., 2021 WL 799890, at *2 (concluding that mother, who had not filed pleading

and did not seek leave to file one, could not rely on claim for termination abandoned

by DFPS to uphold termination of father’s parental rights). We hold that the trial

court’s judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Alice was not

supported by a pleading seeking termination of their rights and was therefore

erroneous. See In re N.H., 2022 WL 4374638, at *7; In re E.H., 2021 WL 799890,

at *2; In re T.M., 2020 WL 4773207, at *2.

                                         15
      We sustain Mother’s and Father’s first issues.7

                                      Conclusion

      We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

7
      In light of our resolution of Mother’s and Father’s first issue, we remand the case
      for the trial court to reconsider the question of conservatorship of Alice.
      Furthermore, because we hold that the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s
      and Father’s rights was not supported by the pleadings, we need not address
      Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues and Father’s second and third issues—all
      of which challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
      statutory predicate grounds for termination—or Mother’s fifth issue and Father’s
      fourth issue—which challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
      supporting the trial court’s finding that termination of their parental rights was in
      Alice’s best interest. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (stating that court of appeals must
      hand down written opinion that addresses “every issue raised and necessary to final
      disposition of the appeal”).
                                           16