Court Opinion

ID: 9603629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:08:19.912539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:41.674823
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
concuring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction for obstructing an officer and dissent to the affirmance of his conviction for negligent homicide.
Title 21 O.S.1981, § 540 makes punishable willful actions which delay or obstruct an officer in the discharge of his duty. Nowhere in the statute does it refer to physical force. Clearly, physical force may indeed cause a delay or obstruction of an officer, but physical force is not the only way in which a police officer may be hindered from carrying out his duties as a police officer. While we have never interpreted 21 O.S.1981, § 540 to include actions such as those of the appellant, Ratcliff v. State, 12 Okl.Cr. 448, 158 P. 293 (1916), several other jurisdictions, which have similar statutes, have determined that wilfull actions like those of appellant are sufficient to constitute a violation of statutes dealing with obstruction of an officer. See Newton v. State, 698 P.2d 1149 (Wyo.1985); State v. Latimer, 9 Kan.App.2d 728, 687 P.2d 648 (1984). I agree with the rationale in these cases in that there are many ways to obstruct an officer other than physical force. Hence, our ruling in Ratcliff v. State, supra, should be overruled to the extent that it conflicts with the holding in the present case. I concur in the affirmance of this conviction.
However, I must vigorously disagree with affirmance of appellant’s conviction for negligent homicide. The comments of prosecutor Sharon Ashe so prejudiced the appellant that reversal for a new trial is warranted. Ms. Ashe repeatedly attempted to inflame the passions of the jury by her continuous efforts to introduce the bloody clothing of the four-year-old victim; by her comments about the lack of remorse shown by the appellant; by her statements as to the future reckless conduct of the appellant; and by her comments on the “great deal of material wealth” of the ap*918pellant. While several of these comments were objected to by defense counsel and such objections were sustained, in a case as close as this one, the comments clearly influenced the outcome. Statements made by the prosecutor to invoke sympathy for the victim are improper as are comments relating to “future criminal acts.” Williams v. State, 658 P.2d 499, 500 (Okla.Crim.App.1983); Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54, 58 (Olka.Crim.App.1982).
Ms. Ashe’s conduct regarding the introduction of the victim’s bloody clothing warrants special comment. She attempted to introduce the clothing in order to prove the identity of the victim. Several times, defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the identity of the victim, and Ms. Ashe refused his stipulation. Apparently, she was not satisfied with a stipulation as to identity, but instead wanted to arouse the sympathies of the jury by introducing the child’s bloody clothing. While the trial court refused to allow the introduction of this evidence due to its prejudicial effect, it is unclear from the record whether this clothing could be viewed by the jury. Although Ms. Ashe’s conduct was not as egregious as that of the prosecutor in Brewer v. State, supra, actions such as these, which are designed purely to influence the jury, cannot be condoned. Id. at 57.
Because of the emotional impact of Ms. Ashe’s behavior, and its prejudicial effect, especially in light of the fact that appellant was charged with the negligent homicide of a four-year-old child, I must dissent. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the charge of negligent homicide.