Court Opinion

ID: 9455096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:11:11.158886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:27.141964
License: Public Domain

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The court’s disposition of this habeas appeal is wholly unwarranted. Resolution of factual issues is not the business of an appellate court. That is a matter for the District Court.
Here, as the opinion notes, the District Court denied the writ without holding an evidentiary hearing. It concluded that all critical factual issues had been resolved by the Washington State Court and that the findings of that court were fairly supported by the record; consistent with the suggestion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 it deferred to the state court’s determinations.
However, we now not only hold that the District Court was mistaken, but in addition we grant the writ. We have, as the opinion shows, resolved conflicts in the evidence and made findings of our own, without of course holding a hearing. For example, the decision that Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated is predicated upon this court’s factual conclusions that the parole officer’s entry into Smith’s room was in furtherance of the Sheriff’s “plan” to “pursue — his investigation by enlisting the aid and concerted action of Smith’s parole officer to investigate the suspect” and that the *166parole officer’s entry was pursuant to the prior request of the law enforcement officials and in concert with them. The court also finds Smith did not consent to the entry nor otherwise waive his right to object. Still further, the court finally settles the issue concerning the sufficiency of the Miranda warning, although expressly stating that the record of the state court on the matter is “confused and conflicting.”
This court’s findings, I grant, are not without evidentiary support, but as already stated our function is to review not to make findings. We should, if the majority is correct, do no more than declare the federal district court erred and return the matter there for a full hearing and valid findings.
However, I experience no difficulty in accepting the state findings. There was substantial proof that the parole officer was not the sheriff’s alter ego; that Smith consented to the entry and that the essential Miranda warning was given.
I would likewise reject Smith’s denial of fair trial contention, a point not passed upon in the opinion.
The proposition is widely recognized that proof of general bad character of an accused is highly prejudicial; it is also well settled that the introduction of such proof is error unless relevant for some purpose other than to show the likelihood that the accused committed the crime charged because of that character. But it does not follow as a matter of law that the erroneous disclosure of bad character is an error of constitutional magnitude requiring a new trial. Rather, the effect of the error must be considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, save in the rare instance, not indicated in this record, where the effect is unmistakable.
Here, the record at most shows (1) a passing reference by the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement to Smith’s “parole officer,” (2) testimony by a witness giving his occupation as a parole officer and (3) three statements which possibly suggest Smith was under parole supervision. However, the proof that Smith committed the crime as charged was direct, it was essentially un-contradicted and it “fairly shrieked” Smith’s guilt. The District Court, presumably applying federal standards, concluded that the error did not impinge upon constitutional rights. I cannot fairly say that conclusion was wrong. The judgment should be affirmed.