Court Opinion

ID: 9472811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:11:40.875597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:09.830164
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
I join in the result on the ground that the “separation” order in this case was not a true severance of the patent claim (in the sense envisaged by Congress) but rather an artificial (and perhaps temporary) separation motivated solely by the purpose to direct the appeal of the copyright injunction to the Seventh Circuit — i.e., not a true severance into distinct cases for all purposes. Chief Judge Markey points out in detail the facts and circumstances compelling this conclusion, but I do not join in his order because (a) though it purports to put aside all other types of cases and issues, its discussion is so unnecessarily broad in very many places that it tends to suggest (or lead to) particular answers in those other cases, answers with which I am not ready to agree (or even to consider); and (b) the order, in my view, is too strong, too broad, and not fine-tuned enough (again, unnecessarily) in its appraisal of the statutory langauge, the legislative history, and the Congressional purposes. It bites off far more than it needs to or should chew. Because it seems to give mixed signals, I am afraid that it does little to truly reduce confusion in the other cases bound to come to this court. In a word, I would confine this decision to the actual case before us — a meretricious separation (not a severance) requested and made solely for the purpose of manipulating appellate jurisdiction.
I do not disagree, in this instance, to the application of Seventh Circuit copyright law. There is no reason here for the court to depart- from that law, or to develop or apply the relevant copyright law on its own. There is also no need to go further and trench far into the general question of the substantive law we should apply in non-patent areas in District Court appeals.