Court Opinion

ID: 9858196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:18:14.257165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:28.470007
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
concurring in part and in the result.
The majority goes through an elaborate analysis before it concludes that there is no dram shop liability when a “superseding, intervening cause” breaks the causal link between dram shop fault and the injury inflicted by the intoxicated person. I agree with the conclusion, but not with the analysis. In essence, the majority first incorporates into the current version of the dram shop statute our holding in Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474 (N.D.1986), in which we construed a provision of the old statute, and then backs away from Meshefski ⅛ strict liability implications by discussing in detail the familiar tort-law doctrine of causation.
In Meshefski, we applied the old dram shop statute, which said:
“Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication, shall have a right of action against any person who caused such intoxication by disposing, selling, bartering, or giving away alcoholic beverages contrary to statute for all damages sustained, and in the event death ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to such damages as defined in section 32-21-02.” NDCC § 5-01-06 (1975).
We recognized that the old statute provided two grounds for recovery: for injury “by any intoxicated person,” and for injury “in consequence of intoxication.” Meshefski, supra at 476. We distinguished the two grounds and held that the former, injury by any intoxicated person, imposed strict liability on the dram shop, and thus causation between the dram shop violation and the injury was not a necessary element of the plaintiffs’ claim for relief. Id. We concluded that to recover under the first ground of the old statute, the plaintiffs need not show that the intoxication was a proximate cause of their injuries, only that there was a dram shop violation and the plaintiffs were injured by the intoxicated person. Id. at 476-77.
In 1987, the legislature repealed section 5-01-06, and enacted a new dram shop statute, which says:
“Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any obviously intoxicated person has a claim for relief for fault under section 32-03.2-02 against any person who knowingly disposes, sells, barters, or gives away alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously intoxicated person, and if death ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to damages defined in section 32-21-02. No claim for relief pursuant to this section may be had on behalf of the intoxicated person nor on behalf of the intoxicated person’s estate or personal representatives; nor may a claim for relief be had on behalf of an adult passenger in an automobile driven by an intoxicated person or on behalf of the passenger’s estate or personal representatives.” NDCC § 5-01-06.1.
In overhauling the dram shop statute, the legislature intended to remove strict liability from dram shop actions and apply negligence principles. See Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee on H.B. 1474 (Feb. 2, 1987); Minutes' of the Senate Judiciary Committee on H.B. 1474 (Mar. 11, 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Stenehjem: “What this bill does is to repeal the dram shop statute as we know it, in so far as it makes a strict liability offense[,] and it transfers it into a negligence action.”); Legislative Council, Bill Summary for H.B. 1474 (Mar. 27, 1987) [stating that bill “provides that comparative negligence principles apply to an action for damages resulting from intoxication”]. The statute refers to section 32-03.2-02, which adopts comparative “fault” (indicating that it covers all tort liability, not just negligence1), in *51modified form, for tort claims in North Dakota. The comparative fault statute was part of a major tort reform and abolished the existing contributory negligence standard. See Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee on H.B. 1571 (Mar. 11, 1987) (testimony by Thomas F. Kelsch, attorney). Again, the legislature expressed its intent to remove dram shop actions from strict liability. Report of the Tort Reform Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on H.B. 1571 (Feb. 16, 1987) (statement by Rep. Shaft).
The change from contributory negligence to modified comparative fault had no effect on proximate causation requirements. See NDCC § 32-08.2-01 [“Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault.”]. By construing section 5-01-06.1 to retain Meshefski’s strict liability, i.e., the plaintiff need show only that the dram shop violation contributed to the intoxication and the plaintiffs injuries were caused by the intoxicated person, the majority ignores the legislature’s efforts to remove dram shop actions from strict liability and the statute’s plain reference to comparative fault as the basis for liability. The majority attempts to throw in some semblance of the “[l]egal requirements of causal relation,” ie., proximate cause for tort actions based on negligence or reckless or willful conduct, by precluding liability where a “superseding, intervening cause” breaks the chain of causation. The effect of the majority’s roundabout analysis is to impose liability where the chain of causation between the dram shop violation and the injury is not broken by a “superseding, intervening cause.” In other words, there is liability where there is proximate causation between the dram shop violation and the injury.
I see no reason to rely on a case which was based on language no longer contained in the statute to reach that result. Certainly, by creating a claim for relief in a tort action based on comparative fault, the legislature intended that the basic tort principles of causation apply. Thus, to infer that the statute imposes liability on the dram shop where the dram shop violation contributes to the intoxicated person’s intoxication, the injury is inflicted by the intoxicated person, and there is no “superseding, intervening cause” that breaks the chain of causation between the intoxication and the injury, one only need apply fundamental tort law. I would construe “[l]egal requirements of causal relation” as simply incorporating the basic tort principles of proximate causation.
Because I agree that the existence of a “superseding, intervening cause” is ordinarily a question of fact not resolvable by summary judgment, see W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 45, at 321 (5th ed. 1984), I concur in the reversal on this issue and join in the reversal.

. The majority's reading of the statutory definition of fault as separating negligence and dram shop liability on the basis of theory is, I think, wrong. An equally reasonable reading would be that it simply includes dram shop liability, which is not included in commonlaw torts based on *51negligence or reckless or willful conduct because it is a statutorily created liability. To infer that by naming dram shop liability, the legislature intended a different theory of liability to apply to dram shop actions goes beyond the plain meaning of the statute and is contradicted by the legislative history.