Court Opinion

ID: 9778273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:57:53.26765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:06.460749
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In our original per curiam opinion, we concluded that this post-answer default judgment was not final because it did not expressly dispose of the counter-actions or contain the phrase “all relief not expressly granted is denied.” We dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the judgment was not final. Appellee’s motion for rehearing raises the additional argument that the judgment is final because it disposes of the defendants’ counter-actions by necessary implication. We agree, hold the judgment was final, but nevertheless dismiss the appeal.
This case involves a joint venture agreement to purchase ostriches in Africa and raise them in Costa Rica. Asserting breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and violations of the DTP A, Joseph Sutton sued Albert Durham and Durham’s company, Strut-Cam Dimensions, Inc. Sutton later expanded his suit to include Durham’s business partner, Brian Vermaak. The defendants answered and filed counter-actions seeking specific performance of the joint venture agreement and other affirmative relief based on their interpretation of the contract. The affirmative relief sought by the defendants was predicated on the same contract sued on by the plaintiff.
The trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of Sutton when the defendants failed to appear at trial. The judgment did not mention defendant’s counter actions and did not include the language, “All relief not expressly granted is denied.”
The trial court granted judgment for the plaintiff based expressly on the plaintiffs interpretation of the joint venture agreement. By this judgment, the trial court necessarily denied the relief requested in the defendants’ counter-actions; to do otherwise would leave pending an action seeking an irreconcilable interpretation of the same agreement that was interpreted by the de*802fault judgment. Accordingly, the defendants’ counter-actions were disposed of by necessary implication. See Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). The judgment was final.
Because the post-answer default judgment was final, the appellate time table began to run from the date that the judgment was signed. Allowing for the defendants’ motion for new trial, the transcript was due to be filed with this court on June 22, 1994. The transcript was not filed until the fifth of August. The court of appeals may grant an extension to file the transcript only if the appellant requests an extension in a motion filed not later than fifteen days after the deadline. Tex.R.App.P. 54(c); B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 860 (Tex.1982). We have received no such request from the defendants. The rules further provide that the appellate court lacks “authority to consider a late filed transcript” although the failure to file the transcript does “not affect the jurisdiction of the court.” Tex.R.App.P. 54(a); Office of Pub. Util. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Tex., 878 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex.1994). As a result, we have jurisdiction over this ease but no authority to consider the transcript.
The motion for rehearing is granted and the appeal is dismissed.