Court Opinion

ID: 9759203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:08:35.363512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.238830
License: Public Domain

Shea, J.
(dissenting). I would reject this reservation because of certain procedural irregularities but, more importantly, because the stipulation does not contain some information which is essential for an adequate resolution of the questions propounded.
The relief sought by the plaintiff is primarily a declaratory judgment upon whether the defendants have any valid claim under the insurance policy *401issued by the plaintiff. A temporary injunction to prohibit arbitration pendente lite and general equitable relief also are requested but it is clear that such relief would ordinarily be unavailable in view of General Statutes § 38-175c (a) which mandates binding arbitration for determination of uninsured motorist coverage questions. Oliva v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 181 Conn. 37, 41, 434 A.2d 304 (1980). Since the parties have implicitly waived their rights to arbitration of the questions reserved, we are not barred from considering them by virtue of that statute.
The complaint contains no allegations which would satisfy the requirements of Practice Book § 390 for rendering a declaratory judgment. No answer or other responsive pleading has been filed. Instead the parties proceeded to file a stipulation in accordance with Practice Book § 3134. The stipulation does resolve the issues of fact raised by the complaint, but does not indicate whether any special defenses will ultimately be raised or whether the conditions precedent to the issuance of the declaratory judgment sought as set forth in § 390 have been met.
In Cavalli v. McMahon, 174 Conn. 212, 215, 384 A.2d 374 (1978), we refused to entertain a reservation under similar conditions: “Thus, the issues have not been joined, and the case is not ready for final judgment in the trial court.” See Gannon v. Sanders, 157 Conn. 1, 4, 244 A.2d 397 (1968); Bronson v. Thompson, 77 Conn. 214, 219, 58 A. 692 (1904). There the court also found that there was nothing in the record to indicate that all persons having an interest in the subject matter had been notified as required by Practice Book §390 (d). *402The same situation may well exist here. The basis for accepting the reservation urged upon us at oral argument was that many other cases would be resolved by our answering the questions reserved. Neither the pleadings nor the stipulation indicate that any effort has been made to notify the parties in those actions of this litigation. See Salamandra v. Kozlowski, 173 Conn. 136, 137-38, 376 A.2d 1103 (1977).
My major reason for declining to answer the questions reserved requires some discussion of the merits of the issues raised. The majority opinion has over-simplified the holding in Safeco Ins. Co. v. Vetre, 174 Conn. 329, 387 A.2d 539 (1978). In part I of Safeco, where we considered a question of inter-policy stacking, we held simply that a reduction of coverage by the “other insurance” clause contained in the policy was invalid because it did not fall within the permissible scope of such clauses sanctioned by § 38-175a-6 (d)1 of the regulations. The general insuring agreement required by § 38-175a-6 (a) of the regulations that the insurer undertake to pay “all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages ...” was *403then relied upon to require stacking of the two separate policies issued by the same insurer which were considered in that portion of the opinion.
Part II of Safeco dealt with a policy, like the one before us, in which two vehicles were covered and separate premiums were charged for each item of coverage for each vehicle, including uninsured motorist coverage. The question was one of intrapolicy stacking. The policy contained a clause stating that “[w]hen two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each.” Relying upon this clause we adopted the contention of the claimant in that case “that the language of the policy is clear: the one instrument constitutes two policies with identical language and coverage including separate uninsured motorist endorsements affording $20,000 coverage per person.” Id., 334. Since we had declared in part I that stacking was required for separate policies of insurance, the conclusion that the policy considered in part II constituted two separate policies meant that stacking of the uninsured motorist coverages provided for each vehicle was necessary.
The policy before us contains no provision similar to that relied upon in Safeco but provides the contrary: “The insuring of more than one person or vehicle under this policy does not increase our Uninsured Motorists payment limits .... In no event will any insured be entitled to more than the highest limit, applicable to any one motor vehicle under this . . . policy . . . .”
The regulation; Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 38-175a-6 (d); mandates that the insurer’s liability under the uninsured motorist coverage be not less *404than the limits specified in General Statutes § 14-112 for bodily injury liability, $20,000 per person, and that this statutory minimum not be subject to reduction, except in the three instances cited, none of which is applicable here. The policy before us complies with this regulation by affording the statutory minimum coverage and does not purport to reduce that minimum. I see nothing in the regulations which bars giving effect to the unambiguous language of the policy provision obviously intended to prevent intra-policy stacking.
Although Safeco, part II, appears to have rested primarily upon a policy provision diametrically opposed to the clause here which precludes intrapolicy stacking, that opinion also cited with approval the view expressed by some courts and reiterated by the majority in this ease that “[w]here two premiums are paid for two vehicles, whether in one policy or two, total coverage for the named insured is doubled, since a person can reasonably expect double coverage when he pays double premiums.” Yacobacci v. Allstate Ins. Co., 33 Conn. Sup. 229, 231, 372 A.2d 987 (1976). Whether such an expectation is reasonable in the case of a single policy containing a clause like the one we are considering which unambiguously precludes intrapolicy stacking is greatly to be doubted. Nevertheless, insurance policies are “contracts of adhesion,” not subject to the normal bargaining procedures of ordinary contracts and it would be unconscionable to permit an insurer to collect a premium twice for the same risk. The difficulty in applying that principle to this case is that we do not know from anything in the record whether the premium charged for uninsured motorist coverage with respect to each of the two vehicles is double the *405premium applicable to a single vehicle. Although some additional premium for a second car would be justified, corresponding to the greater risk which its coverage might entail, that risk would not be increased with respect to persons falling within the “named insured” classification, since they are covered whether they occupy an owned vehicle, a non-owned vehicle, or no vehicle at all. Whether the policy before us fairly reflects in the premiums charged this reduction in risk which arises when two cars owned by an insured are covered rather than one we can only surmise.
Since I have concluded that the answers to the questions reserved may ultimately depend upon whether the plaintiff insurer is in fact collecting twice for the same risk, an issue which is capable of resolution by competent actuarial evidence, I would reject the present reservation and remand the ease to the trial court for further proceedings.
Accordingly, I dissent.

Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 38-175a-6 (d) provides as follows: “limits op liability. The limit of the insurer’s liability may not be less than the applicable limits for bodily injury liability specified in subsection (a) of § 14-112 of the general statutes, except that the policy may provide for the reduction of limits to the extent that damages have been (1) paid by or on behalf of any person responsible for the injury, (2) paid or are payable under any workmen’s compensation or disability benefits law, or (3) paid under the policy in settlement of a liability claim. The policy may also provide that any direct indemnity for medical expense paid or payable under the policy or any amount of any basic reparations benefits paid or payable under the policy will reduce the damages which the insured may recover under this coverage and any payment under these coverages shall reduce the company’s obligation under the bodily liability coverage to the extent of the payment.”