Court Opinion

ID: 9912317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 06:05:17.561516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:48.199127
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

STACY L. ERWIN OAKES,                                                UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     December 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 363616
                                                                     Saginaw Circuit Court
TEAM ONE CREDIT UNION,                                               LC No. 21-044411-NZ

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURRAY and M.J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff Stacy L. Erwin Oakes, an attorney acting in propria persona, appeals as of right
the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendant Team One Credit Union in accordance
with this Court’s order granting defendant’s motion for sanctions and directing the trial court to
determine the amount of damages incurred by defendant as a result of plaintiff’s prior vexatious
appeal. However, a review of plaintiff’s appellate brief reveals that she is in fact not challenging
the judgment, but is instead appealing the trial court’s order granting defendant summary
disposition, arguing that the court failed to give her an opportunity to amend her pleadings.
Further, she asserts, “The record reflects the lower court did not adhere to the January 1, 2020
Michigan Court Rules, specifically, MCR 1.105 and MCR 2.302 (A).” We affirm.

                        I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        On May 3, 2021, plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit by filing a 10-paragraph complaint,
which fails to identify a specific cause of action, but references fraud. She alleges she owned a
single-family home used as an office, and that defendant issued her a line of credit but stopped
applying her payments, did not respond to requests to identify the loan type so she could pay the
outstanding balance, and published a mortgage sale notice for public auction. Plaintiff
concurrently moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent defendant from selling,
transferring, or assigning title of the property.

       Following the initiation of her case, plaintiff moved to disqualify trial court Judge Joseph
K. Sheeran, and moved to add a defendant and amend her complaint, which she appears to have
done multiple times throughout the lower court proceedings.

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         Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), asserting that
plaintiff’s complaint fails because it states no discernable cause of action, and that if plaintiff
intends to plead fraud, she must do so with particularity. In her response in opposition, plaintiff
requested leave to amend her complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(5) in the event the court granted
summary disposition, and reminded the court of her pending motion to add a defendant and amend
her complaint. In reply, defendant argued that plaintiff effectively conceded her complaint failed
to state a claim, and that plaintiff did

        not argue in her Brief that amendment would be justified. She [did] not provide the
        Court with a proposed amended complaint so that the merits of her claims [could]
        be assessed. She [did] not even outline a fraud claim with particularity in her Brief
        in Opposition. Accordingly, the evidence before the Court is clear. Said evidence
        demonstrates that an amendment [would not be] justified in this case.

        At a hearing on August 2, 2021, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to disqualify, and
on October 13, 2021, it entered an order to that effect, which also indicated the decision could be
referred to a judge for de novo review, and stayed the case. Two days later, plaintiff filed a claim
of appeal in this Court, challenging the trial court’s disqualification order. This Court dismissed
that appeal for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that the disqualification order was not appealable as
of right, but that plaintiff could file a delayed application for leave to appeal. Erwin Oakes v Team
One Credit Union, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 26, 2021 (Docket
No. 358926).

         However, rather than apply for leave to appeal, plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which
this Court denied, Erwin Oakes v Team One Credit Union, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered November 30, 2021 (Docket No. 358926), and then applied for leave to appeal
to our Supreme Court, which it ultimately denied, Oakes v Team One Credit Union, 509 Mich 976
(2022). As a result of plaintiff’s actions, this Court granted defendant’s motion for sanctions,
stating:

                 The motion for sanctions for vexatious proceedings is GRANTED to the
        following extent. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine the
        amount of appellee Team One Credit Union’s actual damages as a result of this
        appeal, including but not limited to actual attorney fees incurred; and to enter
        judgment against appellant Stacy Erwin Oakes in the amount of Team One’s actual
        damages plus an additional award of punitive damages in an amount equal to Team
        One’s actual damages. MCR 7.216(C)(2). We DENY the request for additional
        relief as to requiring appellant to post a bond before filing further appeals. [Erwin
        Oakes v Team One Credit Union, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
        entered January 20, 2022 (Docket No. 358926).]

        The trial court lifted the stay on September 14, 2022, and held a hearing on October 24,
2022, to determine defendant’s damages in accordance with this Court’s order and consider
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The court awarded defendant $14,713.50, and
codified that award in a judgment entered on October 31, 2022. With regard to summary
disposition, defendant reiterated its argument that plaintiff’s pleadings and other filings fail to state
a valid claim, and acknowledged plaintiff’s ability to amend her pleadings under the court rules,

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but asserted any amendment would be futile. In response, plaintiff reminded the court of her
motions to amend or supplement the complaint, and asserted the existence of a factual dispute to
survive summary disposition. Ultimately, the court granted defendant summary disposition on the
record under MCR 2.116(C)(8), but did not enter a written order to that effect until November 8,
2022.

                                             II. ANALYSIS

                                          A. JURISDICTION

           Initially, we address defendant’s jurisdictional challenge. In its brief on appeal, defendant
asserts:

                   Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is questionable. The Claim of Appeal was
           filed on 10-31-22 and only identifies orders and judgments entered on 10-31-22 as
           the orders and judgments being appealed. However, neither the Order nor the
           Judgment entered on that date were “final orders” as that term is defined in MCR
           7.202(6)(a)(i). . In fairness, a “final order was eventually entered on November 8,
           2022 from a hearing that was held on October 24, 2022 but it is not at all clear as
           to the effect of filing a premature Claim of Appeal and identifying only non-final
           orders has on this Courts [sic] appellate jurisdiction. What is clear is that neither
           of the orders identified in the Claim of Appeal are “final orders”.

       This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of right from final orders with certain exceptions
that do not exist here. MCR 7.203(A). Non-final judgments are appealable by leave granted.
MCR 7.203(B). A final order is “the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties . . . .” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i).

        Plaintiff filed her claim of appeal on October 31, 2022. In response, this Court sent plaintiff
a defective holding file letter, asking, in part, that she forward “a copy of the judgment or order
appealed from under MCR 7.204(C)(1) or MCR 7.205(B)(2)[.]” Plaintiff filed both the October
31, 2022 money judgment against her for filing the prior vexatious appeal, and the court’s order
granting summary disposition. However, the judgment is not a final order appealable as of right
under MCR 7.203(A), and it is clear from plaintiff’s brief on appeal that she is challenging the
court’s summary disposition order rather than the judgment.

        Although the trial court granted defendant summary disposition on the record at the
October 24, 2022 hearing, it did not enter the corresponding order until November 8, 2022, after
plaintiff filed her claim of appeal on October 31, 2022, and a court speaks through its written
orders, City of Sterling Hts v Chrysler Group, LLC, 309 Mich App 676, 682; 873 NW2d 342
(2015). Thus, as defendant asserts, plaintiff’s claim of appeal was premature. Nevertheless, for
the sake of judicial economy, we will exercise our discretion to address the issues raised in
plaintiff’s appeal. See Wardell v Hincka, 297 Mich App 127, 133 n 1; 822 NW2d 278 (2012).

                                             B. STANDING

        Defendant also asserts in its appellate brief that plaintiff is no longer the real party in
interest and lacks standing to pursue this appeal because defendant “was the successful bidder at

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the sale of [plaintiff’s] intangible personal property rights which included both this cause of action
and the right to appeal in this case.” Defendant raised the same argument in support of its motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal, which this Court denied because defendant failed to establish any
grounds for dismissal under MCR 7.211(C)(2), Erwin Oakes v Team One Credit Union,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 31, 2023 (Docket No. 363616).

       This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal as of right filed by an aggrieved party. MCR
7.203(A). As our Supreme Court stated in Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich
286, 291-292; 715 NW2d 846 (2006):

       [S]tanding refers to the right of a party plaintiff initially to invoke the power of the
       court to adjudicate a claimed injury in fact. In such a situation it is usually the case
       that the defendant, by contrast, has no injury in fact but is compelled to become a
       party by the plaintiff’s filing of a lawsuit. In appeals, however, a similar interest is
       vindicated by the requirement that the party seeking appellate relief be an
       “aggrieved party” under MCR 7.203(A) and our case law. This Court has
       previously stated, “To be aggrieved, one must have some interest of a pecuniary
       nature in the outcome of the case, and not a mere possibility arising from some
       unknown and future contingency.” An aggrieved party is not one who is merely
       disappointed over a certain result. Rather, to have standing on appeal, a litigant
       must have suffered a concrete and particularized injury, as would a party plaintiff
       initially invoking the court's power. The only difference is a litigant on appeal must
       demonstrate an injury arising from either the actions of the trial court or the
       appellate court judgment rather than an injury arising from the underlying facts of
       the case. [Citations omitted.]

        Defendant may or may not be correct, but we need not consider the merits of its argument,
as plaintiff’s woefully inadequate briefing necessitates our rejection of the issues raised on appeal.

                                 C. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

        In an argument spanning only half of a page, plaintiff asserts that when a motion for
summary disposition is granted under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the court shall give the parties an
opportunity to amend their pleadings, and “[t]he record reflects the lower court did not give
[plaintiff] an opportunity to amend the pleadings pursuant to MCR 2.118.”

        This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) “to determine whether the opposing party failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Charter Twp of Pittsfield v Washtenaw Co Treasurer, 338 Mich App 440, 448; 980
NW2d 119 (2021), citing Dalley v Dykema Gossett PLLC, 287 Mich App 296, 304; 788 NW2d
679 (2010). “A trial court’s decision on a motion to amend a complaint is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.” Long v Liquor Control Comm, 322 Mich App 60, 67; 910 NW2d 674 (2017). If a
trial court grants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), “the court shall give the parties an
opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before
the court shows that amendment would not be justified.” MCR 2.116(I)(5); see also Ghanam v
Does, 303 Mich App 522, 543; 845 NW2d 128 (2014).

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       As referenced earlier, plaintiff did file motions below to add a defendant and amend her
complaint, but she does not reference or address those motions as part of her argument on appeal.
She also requested leave to amend her complaint in her response to the summary disposition
motion, which the trial court was reminded of at the hearing, but she entirely failed to explain what
amendments she would make and why such amendments would remedy any deficiencies in her
complaint, or to attach a proposed amended complaint.

        She exhibits the same minimal effort on appeal, providing no argument regarding why any
amendment would not be futile, nor providing any citation to the record at all in support of her
assertion. Thus, although the trial court did not appear to specifically consider or rule on plaintiff’s
request for amendment,1 on the basis of what little is before us, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to do so. See Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 519-
520; 934 NW2d 64 (2019) (“A party may not simply announce a position and leave it to this Court
to make the party’s arguments and search for authority to support the party’s position. Failure to
adequately brief an issue constitutes abandonment.”) (citations omitted); see also Pegasus Wind,
LLC v Tuscola Co, 340 Mich App 715, 754; 988 NW2d 17 (2022) (“An appellant may not merely
announce a position then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the
appellant’s claims; nor may an appellant give an issue only cursory treatment with little or no
citation of authority.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                 D. DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS

        In the second half of her single-page argument, plaintiff cursorily states, “The record
reflects the lower did not adhere to the January 1, 2020 Michigan Court Rules, specifically, MCR
1.105 and MCR 2.302(A).”

        MCR 1.105 provides that the court rules are to be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and economical determination of every action, and MCR 2.302(A) governs initial
disclosures. Plaintiff’s argument is devoid of any indication that she challenged the trial court’s
application of these rules below, any citation to the lower court record or to legal support, and any
substance at all. Thus, even if this Court was inclined to entertain her assertions, plaintiff has

1
  Under certain circumstances, a trial court’s apparent failure to directly address a request for
amendment in response to the granting of summary disposition may constitute an abuse of
discretion. However,
       “[a]mendments must be filed in writing . . . .” MCR 2.118(A)(4). When a party
       makes an oral request to amend the complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(5), that party
       must also offer a proposed amendment in writing. Lown v JJ Eaton Place, 235
       Mich App 721, 726; 598 NW2d 633 (1999). If a plaintiff fails to do so, the plaintiff
       has failed to comply with the court rule and the trial court does not abuse its
       discretion by denying the request to amend. Id. [Twp of Grayling v Berry, 329
       Mich App 133, 151-152; 942 NW2d 63 (2019).]

Plaintiff fails to produce evidence that she presented the trial court with a proposed amended
complaint.

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entirely failed to provide the tools to do so, thereby abandoning the issue. See Seifeddine, 327
Mich App at 519-520; Pegasus Wind, LLC, 340 Mich App at 754.

       Affirmed. As the prevailing party, defendant can tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                           /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                           /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                           /s/ Michael J. Kelly

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