Court Opinion

ID: 9396634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 14:00:31.117574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.534925
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11136    Document: 45-1      Date Filed: 05/23/2023   Page: 1 of 36

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-11136
                           ____________________

        AFRICA GROWTH CORPORATION,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-21995-KMW
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      21-11136

        Before WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and COVINGTON,∗
        District Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               Between 2016 and 2017, an Angolan Army general conspired
        with Angolan oﬃcials to steal tens of millions of dollars of prop-
        erty from Plaintiﬀ-Appellant Africa Growth Corp (“AFGC”). 1 Af-
        ter AFGC failed to recover its property using the Angolan legal sys-
        tem, it began a global lobbying campaign against Angola. And it
        sued Angola in the District of Columbia.
               While that lawsuit was ongoing, the parties met in Lisbon to
        discuss settling. At the meeting, Angola agreed to pay $47.5 million
        dollars in exchange for AFGC’s release of its claims against Angola
        and AFGC’s promise to stop lobbying against Angola. When An-
        gola didn’t pay, AFGC sued again, this time in the Southern District
        of Florida.
              The parties dispute whether Angola has foreign sovereign
        immunity. The answer turns on what the “gravamen” of the action
        is. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, if the “gravamen”
        of the action is Angola’s expropriation of AFGC’s property, then

        ∗ Honorable Virginia M. Covington, United States District Judge for the Mid-
        dle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
        1 We accept AFGC’s well-pleaded facts as true for purposes of reviewing the
        district court’s order granting Angola’s motion to dismiss. Am. Dental Ass’n v.
        Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). The actual facts may or may
        not be as stated.
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        21-11136              Opinion of the Court                       3

        Angola has immunity. But if the “gravamen” of the action is the
        breach of the settlement agreement—and if the breach of the set-
        tlement agreement is commercial, not sovereign, in nature—then
        the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s exception for commercial
        activity applies and Angola isn’t immune from suit.
               So to resolve this appeal, we must determine what the gra-
        vamen of the action is. While the case law nationwide is in some
        tension with itself, ultimately our precedent provides the answer.
        If a sovereign expropriates property and then breaches a contract
        to provide compensation for the taking, the gravamen of the ac-
        tion—what injured the plaintiﬀ—is the taking, not the breach of
        the contract.
              After a thorough review of the record, and with the beneﬁt
        of oral argument, we conclude that Angola’s taking of AFGC’s
        property was what injured AFGC here. For that reason, we aﬃrm.

                               I. BACKGROUND
                In 2015, AFGC, a Nevada corporation, bought four real-es-
        tate and commercial properties—through subsidiaries—in the An-
        golan capital, Luanda. The next year, the Angolan government
        used “fraudulent documents, abuse of power, forgery, intimida-
        tion[,] and force of arms” to take control of the subsidiary compa-
        nies and thereby, the properties. Although AFGC obtained Ango-
        lan court orders in its favor, the Angolan government “actively re-
        fused to enforce [the] orders.”
               So AFGC mounted a two-pronged attack. On the public-
        relations side, AFGC began a “global lobbying eﬀort” against
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11136

        Angola. Meanwhile, on the legal side, AFGC sued Angola, in the
        District of Columbia, for expropriation. Afr. Growth Corp. v. Republic
        of Angl., 2019 WL 3253367 (D.D.C. July 19, 2019).
              While the D.C. case was pending, AFGC oﬀered to meet
        with Angolan President João Lourenço to settle the dispute. Dr.
        Eduarda Rodrigues Neto—Angola’s Deputy Attorney General—
        responded that President Lourenço had directed her to meet with
        AFGC instead.
                The next month, the parties met in Lisbon. Dr. Rodrigues
        Neto represented “that she was the specially authorized representa-
        tive for the Oﬃce of the Angolan Attorney General and was attend-
        ing the settlement meeting at the express direction of President
        Lourenço.” The parties reached an agreement that Angola would
        pay AFGC $47.5 million in exchange for AFGC relinquishing all
        rights and claims to the properties and—upon payment in full—a
        promise that AFGC would dismiss its D.C. lawsuit and end its lob-
        bying eﬀorts against Angola. The parties agreed to meet the next
        week to sign a written settlement agreement. Dr. Rodrigues Neto
        added that “the sole reason for creating the subsequent writing for
        signature was to accommodate certain formalities required by the
        National Bank of Angola for the payment of funds outside An-
        gola.”
               But the parties never reconvened. And when AFGC advised
        Dr. Rodrigues Neto that it expected Angola to uphold its end of the
        bargain, she denied agreeing to anything, explaining that she had
        “clearly stated” that she had no power to bind the Angolan state.
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        21-11136                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

               When Angola failed to pay AFGC by the agreed-upon date,
        AFGC sued again, this time in the Southern District of Florida. 2
        AFGC asserted a cause of action for breach of contract, seeking the
        $47.5 million owed for the expropriated property and “further con-
        sequential damages, which collectively total in excess of USD 95
        million.” 3 AFGC explained that the extra $95 million was com-
        prised of $72 million in lost shareholder value and $23 million in
        lost opportunities, lost proﬁts, and costs. In the alternative, AFGC
        asserted a claim against Angola for unjust enrichment.
                Angola moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court
        lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the Foreign Sovereign
        Immunities Act (“FSIA” or “the Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq. In
        Angola’s view, the Act’s broad grant of immunity applied, and
        AFGC’s pleading didn’t satisfy the commercial-activity exception.
        See id. § 1605(a)(2). Angola said that AFGC’s suit was “based on”
        the expropriation of AFGC’s property, not a breach of contract. So

        2 The D.C. lawsuit was dismissed on sovereign-immunity grounds, and AFGC
        voluntarily dismissed its appeal—both long after the events at issue in this
        case. Afr. Growth Corp. v. Republic of Angl., 17-cv-02469 (D.D.C.), ECF Nos. 72–
        73, 76-1.
        3 We aren’t sure whether the “collectively” refers to both the expropriated
        property and the consequential damages or just to the consequential damages.
        If it refers to both, then AFGC is seeking collectively $95 million. If it refers to
        only the consequential damages, then AFGC is seeking about $142.5 million
        ($47.5 million in expropriated property and $95 million in consequential dam-
        ages). Either way, as we explain below, AFGC alleged that all its harm oc-
        curred before Angola breached the contract.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-11136

        because expropriation wasn’t commercial activity, Angola con-
        cluded, the general FSIA immunity applied, not subject to a limited
        exception.
               The district court agreed and granted Angola’s motion to
        dismiss. In explaining the basis for its decision, the district court
        said that “the gravamen of this case is the expropriation of real
        property,” so Angola retained its immunity. AFGC now appeals.

                         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo a district court’s determination of
        whether it had jurisdiction under the FSIA. Devengoechea v. Bolivar-
        ian Republic of Venez., 889 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2018).

                             III. DISCUSSION
              AFGC contends that the gravamen of its complaint is the
        breach of contract and that the breach of contract was commercial,
        not sovereign in nature. We disagree.
               We proceed in three steps. First, we outline how the Foreign
        Sovereign Immunities Act works and how its exceptions apply. Sec-
        ond, we conclude that this lawsuit is “based on” Angola’s expropri-
        ation of AFGC’s property. Third, we determine that Angola’s ex-
        propriation isn’t commercial activity that satisﬁes the FSIA’s com-
        mercial-activity exception.
                  A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in General
               Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, “a foreign
        state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United
        States courts; unless a speciﬁed exception applies, a federal court
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        21-11136                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign
        state.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993); see 28 U.S.C.
        § 1605 (listing exceptions). Because AFGC argues only that the
        commercial-activity exception applies, we limit our discussion to
        that exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
                As relevant here, the third clause of the commercial-activity
        exception provides jurisdiction over a foreign state when “the ac-
        tion is based . . . upon an act outside the territory of the United
        States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
        elsewhere and that act causes a direct eﬀect in the United States.”
        Id. § 1605(a)(2). 4
               We’ve explained that, to invoke jurisdiction under this
        clause, “(1) the lawsuit must be based upon an act that took place
        outside the territory of the United States; (2) the act must have
        been taken in connection with a commercial activity; and (3) the
        act must have caused a direct eﬀect in the United States.” Deven-
        goechea, 889 F.3d at 1224 (quoting de Csepel v. Republic of Hung., 714
        F.3d 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (cleaned up).
              Only the second and third prongs are at issue. 5 The parties
        dispute which act the lawsuit is “based on” and whether the act

        4 The commercial-activity exception has other clauses, but because AFGC
        doesn’t argue that those clauses supply jurisdiction, we don’t discuss them.
        See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
        5 Either way, the act took place outside the United States. If the act in question
        was the expropriation, then it took place in Luanda, Angola. And if the act
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                     21-11136

        (whatever it was) was taken in connection with a commercial ac-
        tivity as well as whether that act (again, whatever it was) caused a
        direct effect in the United States. We first must decide what act
        this lawsuit is “based on.”
           B. AFGC’s lawsuit is “based on” the expropriation of its property.
               “[A]t the first step in a commercial-activity-exception case,
        we must identify the conduct upon which the suit is based.” De-
        vengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1222 (citing OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs,
        577 U.S. 27, 33 (2015)). Unfortunately, “[t]he Act itself does not
        elaborate on the phrase ‘based upon,’” Sachs, 577 U.S. at 33, and
        the Supreme Court has noted that “the relatively sparse legislative
        history offers no assistance.” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357.
               When assessing what act a suit is “based upon,” we must
        look at its “basis” or “foundation.” Id. (citations omitted). “That,
        in turn, requires us to look at ‘the “particular conduct” that consti-
        tutes the “gravamen” of the suit.’” Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1222
        (quoting Sachs, 577 U.S. at 33). “In other words, we focus on the
        ‘core’ of the suit—the foreign state’s ‘acts that actually injured’ the
        plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Sachs, 577 U.S. at 33); see also Gravamen,
        Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “gravamen” as
        “[t]he substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or com-
        plaint.”). We look to the “elements of a claim that, if proven,

        was the breach of the settlement agreement, then it took place in Lisbon, Por-
        tugal.
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        21-11136                  Opinion of the Court                               9

        would entitle a plaintiff to relief.” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357. 6 And we
        compare the plaintiff’s “theory of the case” and the facts her “claims
        turn on” with the act she claims lies at the basis of her suit. Sachs,
        577 U.S. at 35.
               To explain what this means, we consider two Supreme
        Court decisions that flesh out this analysis. We concede, though,
        that neither gets us all the way to an answer in this case.
                First, in Sachs, the plaintiff bought a European train ticket in
        California. Id. at 30. Unfortunately, she fell and injured herself in
        Austria. Id. The Supreme Court determined that the “gravamen”
        of her tort claim was the wrongful failure to warn and the danger-
        ous conditions that resulted in her injury—both of which occurred
        in Austria. Id. at 35–36 (explaining that there was nothing wrongful
        about the sale of the ticket standing alone so, without the unsafe
        boarding conditions, there would have been nothing to warn the
        plaintiff about). So despite a commercial aspect (buying the train
        ticket), the Supreme Court determined that the gravamen of the
        suit was the slip-and-fall in Austria. Id.
               Next, in Nelson, the plaintiff signed an employment agree-
        ment to work at a government-run hospital in Saudi Arabia. 507
        U.S. at 358. Regrettably, during the plaintiff’s stay in that country,
        the Saudi government arrested and tortured the plaintiff. Id. at

        6 We don’t engage in a “one-element approach.” Under that approach, if an
        act establishes “a single element of a claim,” then a suit raising the claim is
        “based upon” the act. Sachs, 577 U.S. at 395–96.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11136

        352–53. The plaintiff sued for tort claims in connection with his
        employment agreement, but the Supreme Court again determined
        that the “gravamen” of the plaintiff’s claims centered on Saudi Ara-
        bia’s tortious conduct. Id. at 358.
               These cases are helpful, but as we mentioned, they don’t
        help us to fully resolve the case before us. That’s because in those
        cases, only one wrongful act—the tortious act—occurred. See
        Sachs, 577 U.S. at 35 (“[T]here is nothing wrongful about the sale
        of the Eurail pass standing alone.”). Here, though, two wrongful
        acts—the expropriation and the breach of the settlement agree-
        ment—happened. Id. at 36 n.2 (“[W]e consider here only a case in
        which the gravamen of each claim is found in the same place.”). So
        a case with just a single wrongful act does not fully enlighten us as
        to what the “gravamen” of a case is when two wrongful acts are
        alleged.
               As it turns out, though, our precedent does. Indeed, it com-
        pels the outcome here. In Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Pa-
        kistani government seized millions of dollars of property from the
        plaintiff there. 353 F.3d 1323, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003). The Pakistani
        government offered the plaintiff “an alternative parcel of land,”
        which Beg accepted. Id. But the Supreme Court of Pakistan re-
        fused to enforce the agreement because the Pakistani government
        didn’t have title to the alternative parcel. Id. Though Beg sued, we
        determined that the gravamen of his claim was the expropriation—
        which was a sovereign taking, not a commercial activity. Id. We
        rejected Beg’s argument that agreement between himself and the
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        21-11136              Opinion of the Court                      11

        government was enough to invoke the commercial-activity excep-
        tion because “[d]etermining whether or how to compensate prop-
        erty owners for takings is also a sovereign function, not a market
        transaction.” Id. at 1327. In Beg, then, the government expropri-
        ated the plaintiff’s land, agreed to compensate him, and then re-
        neged.
              This case is materially indistinguishable. So we must con-
        clude that AFGC’s suit is “based upon” Angola’s expropriation.
        That’s so for two reasons.
               First, in both Beg and AFGC’s case, the government took
        property and then reneged on its deal with the plaintiff to compen-
        sate the plaintiff for having taken the property. So while AFGC’s
        claims and its theory of the case partly turn on Angola’s breach of
        the settlement agreement, the settlement agreement was the means
        of compensating AFGC for the property Angola allegedly expropri-
        ated. Id. (explaining that a contract offer was a method of deter-
        mining whether or how to compensate a property owner for a tak-
        ing). As AFGC’s complaint explains, the agreement was reached
        to resolve the “dispute relating to Angola’s unlawful seizure and
        expropriation of assets and real properly lawfully owned by AFGC
        and its Angolan subsidiaries[.]” Doc. 50 ¶ 2. The settlement agree-
        ment, according to AFGC, was designed to remedy the injury
        caused by Angola’s expropriation. Id. ¶ 58. (“Angola agreed to pay
        AFGC USD 47.5 million in exchange for and as compensation for the
        AFGC Angolan Assets, in addition to other negotiated terms.”)
        (emphasis added).         We don’t see how this scenario is
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                   21-11136

        distinguishable from the one in Beg—the government took prop-
        erty and then reneged on a contract to compensate. AFGC’s at-
        tempts to distinguish Beg are unpersuasive. For instance, while
        AFGC argues that Beg didn’t make a contract claim in his com-
        plaint, our precedent—which we must follow—makes clear that
        the precise language Beg used didn’t matter. Beg, 353 F.3d at 1327
        (“Beg contends that the Punjabi regional government’s agreement
        to compensate him is the equivalent of a contract and, therefore, is
        commercial activity. This analogy is not persuasive.”).
                Second, in both Beg and AFGC’s case, the plaintiff was “actu-
        ally injured” by the expropriation—not the breach. See id. In both
        cases, the agreement was the means of redressing an injury previ-
        ously inflicted. When we determine what act a lawsuit is “based
        upon,” we must “zero[] in on the . . . acts that actually injured [the
        plaintiff].” Sachs, 577 U.S. at 35. Here, the breach of contract did
        not injure AFGC; the expropriation did. Angola’s obligation under
        the settlement agreement was to remedy the expropriation injury.
        Cf. France.com, Inc. v. French Republic, 992 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir.
        2021) (explaining that the conduct that “actually injured” the plain-
        tiff was the seizure of France.com, not the later use of the website
        for tourism).
              Although AFGC characterizes the initial expropriation as ir-
        relevant to its theory of the case, its complaint tells a different story.
        AFGC doesn’t just seek $47.5 million in compensatory damages; it
        seeks $142.5 million—triple the amount of its alleged settlement
        agreement. To be sure, AFGC says in one paragraph that the extra
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        21-11136               Opinion of the Court                        13

        $95 million is an estimation of “further consequential damages . . .
        resulting from the breach.”
               But allegations earlier in the complaint belie that characteri-
        zation. Paragraph 25 brings the reader back to the negotiating table
        between AFGC and Angola:
              25. AFGC explained at that point how it had arrived
              at its compromise settlement offer of USD 55 million,
              as stated in the February 1 Letter. As related to Dr.
              Rodrigues Neto and her colleague, the foreseeable
              and actual loss to AFGC arising from Angola’s seizure
              of the AFGC Assets, if AFGC was not properly and
              promptly compensated by Angola, was approxi-
              mately USD 95 million. This USD 95 million amount
              is comprised of a continuing loss of shareholder value
              at USD 72 million (8 million issued shares valued at
              the time of merger at USD 10/share, then trading at
              USD 1/share), plus the loss of new and pending in-
              vestment opportunities into AFGC, lost reve-
              nue/profits, reputational damage and significant fees
              and expenses incurred by AFGC in prosecuting its
              claims against Angola.
        Id. ¶ 25. AFGC, in other words, is seeking $95 million in conse-
        quential damages resulting from the expropriation of its property.
        Here’s how we know: AFGC and Angola hadn’t reached a deal
        when AFGC says it suffered the $95 million loss. So Angola’s later
        breach of the settlement agreement cannot be the source of the $95
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11136

        million dollars in consequential damages because AFGC alleges
        that those damages had already occurred when it was negotiating the
        settlement agreement.
              In sum, Beg controls this case.
               We respectfully disagree with Judge Wilson’s thoughtful dis-
        sent because we don’t read Beg the same way as he does. Judge
        Wilson distinguishes Beg in two ways. He says first, that Beg didn’t
        speak to the question at hand and second, that AFGC has alleged a
        harm that the Beg plaintiff didn’t. Wilson Dissent at 8–9, and 11–
        12.
                On the first point, as we’ve explained, we think Beg is mate-
        rially indistinguishable. Both in Beg and here, the sovereign coun-
        try took property from the plaintiff. Beg, 353 F.3d at 1325. Simi-
        larly, in both Beg and here, the plaintiff accepted compensation in
        principle for the taking. Id. And in both Beg and here, the sovereign
        country reneged on compensating the plaintiff. Id. The only dif-
        ference, as we see it, is that Pakistan offered Beg land in exchange
        and Angola offered AFGC money. But we think that is a meaning-
        less distinction here and doesn’t alter the “gravamen” of the action.
        To be sure, Judge Wilson (rightly) points out that Beg didn’t explic-
        itly hold that the gravamen of the case was the expropriation. Wil-
        son Dissent at 8. Rather in Beg, we held that expropriation was a
        sovereign rather than commercial act. Id. But in so doing, we nec-
        essarily decided that the gravamen of the case was the expropria-
        tion rather than the breach of contract. Id. Indeed, Beg’s analysis
        would have looked quite different if the Beg panel thought the
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        21-11136               Opinion of the Court                      15

        gravamen of the case was the breach of the contract with the plain-
        tiff. If that were the case, the analysis would have resembled Judge
        Wilson’s rather than the Beg panel’s analysis of expropriation. But
        that’s not what happened, and so, in our view, Beg is materially in-
        distinguishable from our case.
                As to Judge Wilson’s second point—that AFGC was bargain-
        ing for something different than the Beg plaintiff because AFGC dis-
        missed its lawsuit and ended its lobbying efforts—we read AFGC’s
        complaint differently. Wilson Dissent at 11. When we “zero[] in”
        on the gravamen—the basis—of the suit, it is for expropriation.
        Sachs, 577 U.S. at 35. AFGC’s harm stems from the expropriation,
        not the breach, because AFGC admits that the harm occurred be-
        fore the contract was formed—in other words, from the expropri-
        ation, not from the breach of the contract. Nor does AFGC assert
        that it forewent lobbying against Angola or dismissed its lawsuit
        because of Dr. Neto’s alleged agreement (nor could it, given that
        AFGC promised to do both only upon payment in full, which it
        never received). So AFGC hasn’t explained how the alleged breach
        of the contract was what “actually injured” it.
              AFGC tries to parry this conclusion with five responses.
        None is persuasive.
                One, AFGC says that the reason that Angola entered the con-
        tract isn’t relevant. The Supreme Court, AFGC continues, rejected
        the proposition that a court should enquire into the “purpose” of a
        transaction to determine whether the transaction is commercial.
        That’s true, but it’s not relevant here.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11136

               Indeed, in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607
        (1992), the Supreme Court explained that the purpose—or the
        why—of an act was irrelevant for the second-order question of
        whether an act is commercial. Id. at 614. But that analysis doesn’t
        answer our first-order question: whether an act is the basis of a law-
        suit. And we don’t have to inquire into the purpose of the settle-
        ment agreement to see that it amounts to an agreement to com-
        pensate AFGC for the expropriation. That’s simply what the agree-
        ment is: a promise to pay for property taken in exchange for a re-
        lease of claims for the taking of the property.
               Two, AFGC relies on Guevara v. Republic of Peru, which held
        that Peru’s offer of compensation for information on a fugitive was
        “commercial activity.” 468 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). But
        again, Guevara also dealt with only a single wrongful act: the
        breach of contract. So it cannot help us determine which act is the
        gravamen of AFGC’s complaint.
                Three, AFGC points to our Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic
        of Venezuela decision for the proposition that the conduct that actu-
        ally injured AFGC is the breach of the contract. 889 F.3d at 1222.
        But we think that Devengoechea is also distinguishable. There, the
        plaintiff owned a collection of rare antiquities that had belonged to
        Simon Bolívar. Id. at 1217. The plaintiff allowed Venezuela to bor-
        row the collection to see if it would purchase the collection from
        him. Id. Venezuela took the collection back to Venezuela and then
        refused to return it. Id. Devengoechea is distinguishable because the
        wrongful act in Devengoechea was breaking a bailment, not
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        21-11136               Opinion of the Court                        17

        expropriation. Id. at 1221. Indeed, Venezuela came into possession
        of the collection only because the plaintiff gave Venezuela the col-
        lection under a bailment arrangement. So “[e]ven Venezuela [had]
        not characterized itself as having exercised sovereign powers to ob-
        tain or retain the Collection.” Id.
                Four, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in de Csepel v. Republic of
        Hungary is to similar effect. 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013). There,
        during the Second World War, the defendant confiscated the plain-
        tiff’s valuable art. Id. at 595–96. But after the war, Hungarian mu-
        seums and a university “arranged with representatives of the [plain-
        tiff’s] Heirs to retain possession . . . so that the works could con-
        tinue to be displayed in Hungary.” Id. Then, fifty years later, the
        plaintiffs demanded possession back and Hungary refused. Id.
               The D.C. Circuit explained that “by entering into bailment
        agreements to retain possession of the expropriated artwork and
        later breaching those agreements by refusing to return the artwork,
        Hungary took affirmative acts beyond the initial expropriation to
        deprive the family of their property rights in the Collection.” Id. at
        600. In other words, by entering the bailment arrangements, Hun-
        gary’s expropriation of the art ended, and Hungary effectively rec-
        ognized that the plaintiffs owned the property, even though the
        property remained in Hungary’s possession at that time. Id. So
        when Hungary refused to return the art, it wasn’t continuing an
        expropriation, as that had already ended. Rather, it was breaching
        the subsequent bailment agreement. As in in Devengoechea, then,
        in de Csepel, the harm—the gravamen, the focus—was the breach
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11136

        of the bailment, not the expropriation. Here, though, Angola’s fail-
        ure to compensate AFGC did not go “beyond the initial expropria-
        tion,” id.; it was part and parcel of it. Cf. Beg, 353 F.3d at 1327 (ex-
        plaining that a government’s failure to compensate a party for a
        taking and the taking itself are two sides of the same expropriation
        coin, which happens to be a sovereign activity). Indeed, the expro-
        priation never ended here.
               Five, AFGC relies on Petersen Energía Inversora S.A.U. v. Argen-
        tine Republic and YPF S.A., 895 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2018). In Petersen,
        YPF was a company that was wholly owned by Argentina. Id. at
        199. Argentina offered the public the opportunity to buy shares in
        the company—an initial public offering. Id. To encourage invest-
        ment, Argentina and YPF amended YPF’s bylaws to protect inves-
        tors from “attempts by Argentina to renationalize the company.”
        Id. For instance, if Argentina later reacquired 49% or more of YPF’s
        shares, then Argentina was required to make a tender offer for the
        remaining shares. Id. at 199–200. Put differently, if Argentina be-
        came (close to) a majority shareholder of YPF, it was required to
        give the remaining owners a chance to exit the company. Id. Later,
        Argentina expropriated from a third party a controlling position in
        YPF but refused to make a tender offer to the remaining sharehold-
        ers, violating the bylaw. Id. at 202 (Argentina’s Deputy Economy
        Minister describing as “fools . . . those who think that the State has
        to be stupid and buy everyone according to YPF’s own law, re-
        specting its by-law.”). One shareholder sued, arguing that Argen-
        tina had breached its promise to comply with the bylaws. Id. at
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        21-11136               Opinion of the Court                        19

        203. Argentina, of course, countered that the suit was for expro-
        priation. Id.
               The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s harm was
        the breach of the tender-offer provision, not the expropriation. Id.
        at 207. This conclusion is unsurprising, given that none of the
        plaintiff’s property was expropriated (only a third party’s property
        was expropriated). So Petersen doesn’t change our conclusion be-
        cause it involved only one harm to the plaintiff—the breach of the
        bylaws.
                                         ***
               To recap, if a sovereign power forms a contract with a pri-
        vate party and then reneges on it, the sovereign power is engaging
        in commercial activity—even if the way that the sovereign reneges
        is through what may look like expropriation. So if a sovereign
        power accepts performance by the private party and then refuses
        to perform, perhaps it could be said to have expropriated the per-
        formance, but the gravamen of the subsequent lawsuit is for breach
        of contract, regardless. Cf. Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1222 (retaining
        possession of artifacts); de Csepel, 714 F.3d at 600 (same).
               On the other hand, when a sovereign power expropriates
        property and promises to repay the property holder but then
        breaches that promise, we think that Beg compels the conclusion
        that the gravamen of the lawsuit is the expropriation. “But even if
        we thought [Beg] wrong, the prior panel precedent rule is not de-
        pendent upon a subsequent panel’s appraisal of the initial decision’s
        correctness.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1301–02 (11th Cir.
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11136

        2001) (cleaned up). Given that we must follow Beg, whether we
        agree with it just isn’t relevant.
                Having identified the gravamen of the suit, we next deter-
        mine whether the expropriation satisfies the FSIA’s commercial-ac-
        tivity exception. It does not.
         C. Angola’s expropriation and failure to compensate AFGC were sover-
               eign acts not taken “in connection with a commercial activity.”
                Given our conclusion that AFGC’s suit is “based upon” An-
        gola’s expropriation and failure to compensate, our prior precedent
        compels the conclusion that these actions are sovereign. See Beg,
        353 F.3d at 1326 (“The power of eminent domain is a sovereign
        power.”) (citing United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236–37
        (1946)); id. at 1327 (“Determining whether or how to compensate
        property owners for takings is also a sovereign function, not a mar-
        ket transaction.”).
               Under the FSIA, an activity is “commercial activity” if it is
        “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular com-
        mercial transaction or act.” Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1220 (quoting
        28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)). To decide whether an activity is commercial,
        we look at “whether the particular actions that the foreign state
        performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions
        by which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or com-
        merce.’” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
        270 (6th ed. 1990)). Assessing the commercial character of an act
        “is a question of behavior, not motivation.” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360.
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        21-11136                Opinion of the Court                        21

                A country engages in commercial activity “only where it acts
        in the manner of a private player within the market” or “where it
        exercises only those powers that can also be exercised by private
        citizens, as distinct from those powers peculiar to sovereigns.” Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other side of the same
        coin, “[p]ublic acts . . . require sovereign power and thus cannot be
        performed by a private party.” Beg, 353 F.3d at 1325 (citing Wel-
        tover, 504 U.S. at 614–16). Public acts “make use of the state’s sov-
        ereign authority.” Id.
                Having decided the gravamen of the lawsuit is the expropri-
        ation, the answer is straightforward under our precedent: Angola’s
        acts are not commercial activity. Expropriations and compensa-
        tion for expropriations are sovereign functions. Beg, 353 F.3d at
        1326 (“The power of eminent domain is a sovereign power.”); id.
        at 1327 (compensating for a taking is a “sovereign function”); Garb
        v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 2006). (“[E]xpropria-
        tions . . . do not fall within the ‘commercial activity’ exception of
        the FSIA [because] [e]xpropriation is a decidedly sovereign—rather
        than commercial—activity.”).
                AFGC’s authorities are well-taken but misplaced because
        not one of its slew of cases involves the use of a contract to com-
        pensate a plaintiff for the injuries caused by a foreign country’s un-
        questionably sovereign acts. More importantly, not one of its cases
        involves the use of a contract where the contract itself amounts to
        an execution of a sovereign function. See, e.g., Hond. Aircraft Regis-
        try v. Gov’t of Hond., 129 F.3d 543, 548–49 (11th Cir. 1997) (breach
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11136

        of contract to pay for “goods and services”—a “marketplace activ-
        ity” available to “private persons”); Guevara, 468 F.3d at 1301
        (“[T]he oldest American decision recognizing a commercial activi-
        ties exception to sovereign immunity involved a reward for cap-
        ture.”); Weltover, 504 U.S. at 615 (explaining that “[t]he commercial
        character” of the bonds was “confirmed by the fact that they [were]
        in almost all respects garden-variety debt instruments[]”); Deven-
        goechea, 889 F.3d at 1221–22 (“Nothing about [breaching a bailment
        agreement] is uniquely or peculiarly sovereign in nature.”).
               This is not a case that involves the use of a contract to
        achieve a sovereign function. Cf. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614–15 (“[A]
        contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a ‘commercial’ activ-
        ity, because private companies can similarly use sales contracts to
        acquire goods.”). Rather, this is a case in which the formation and
        breach of the contract is itself a sovereign function. See MOL, Inc.
        v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1984)
        (holding that when a country terminates “an agreement that only
        a sovereign could have made,” that breach qualifies as the exercise
        of a sovereign function).
               Contrary to AFGC’s suggestion, rather than “look[ing]
        through” the alleged settlement agreement to see whether a sover-
        eign act underlies it, we need look at only the agreement. In its
        complaint, AFGC characterized the agreement as a contract to
        compensate it for the expropriation it suffered. That is a quintes-
        sentially a sovereign act because private parties are generally not in
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        21-11136                  Opinion of the Court                             23

        the business of providing compensation for expropriated property.
        Beg, 353 F.3d at 1327. 7
                As we’ve noted, we respectfully disagree with Judge Wilson
        that Beg is distinguishable. Judge Wilson distinguishes Beg because
        there, the plaintiff sought compensation for expropriated property,
        while in this case, AFGC allegedly accepted compensation in ex-
        change for dismissing its lawsuit, giving up its claims to land, and
        ceasing its lobbying efforts. Wilson Dissent at 11. But that analysis
        misplaces the gravamen of the lawsuit, which as we’ve explained,
        is the failure to compensate for the expropriation, as evidenced by
        the fact that all $95 million in damages to which Dr. Neto allegedly
        agreed occurred before Angola ever breached the alleged contract.
        In short, the gravamen of the lawsuit—as our precedent requires
        us to view it—is the failure to compensate for expropriation, not
        the settling of the lawsuit. And that is a sovereign act. Id.

                           IV. CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dis-
        missing AFGC’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
               AFFIRMED.

        7 We do not deal with a situation in which a private party exercises the power
        of eminent domain through a grant of delegated authority. See, e.g., Ga. Power
        Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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        21-11136                  WILSON, J., dissenting                            1

        WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
               I respectfully dissent. In my view, plaintiff Africa Growth
        Corporation’s (AFGC) case against the Republic of Angola is based
        upon a breach of a contract, which in this case falls within the For-
        eign Sovereign Immunity Act’s (FSIA) commercial activity excep-
        tion to immunity from suit.
                As the majority notes, under the FSIA, “a foreign state shall
        be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
        and of the States” unless an identified exception applies. 28 U.S.C.
        § 1604. One such exception is a claim based on “commercial activ-
        ity.” Id. § 1605(a)(2). Under that exception, foreign states are not
        immune from the jurisdiction of federal or state courts if an action
        is 1) “based . . . upon an act” that took place “outside the territory of
        the United States,” 2) “in connection with a commercial activity of
        the foreign state elsewhere,” and 3) caused “a direct effect in the
        United States.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Devengoechea v. Boli-
        varian Republic of Venezuela, 889 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). 1 I
        will address my views regarding how each of these elements apply
        to this particular case in turn.

        1 As the majority rightly notes, while the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
        describes other scenarios related to commercial activity that would bar im-
        munity for foreign states, they are not invoked by AFGC. See Maj. Op., at 7
        n.4.
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        2                         WILSON, J., dissenting                     21-11136

                                    I.      “Based Upon”
               I diverge from the majority on the initial question: What act
        is AFGC’s action based upon? The majority’s analysis comes to the
        conclusion that AFGC’s action in the district court is “based upon”
        the expropriation of its property by the Angolan government—a
        decidedly sovereign activity that would be immune from suit un-
        der the FSIA. My analysis reaches a different conclusion. In my
        view, the action is “based upon” a breach of contract, which as I
        will describe below, is a commercial activity subject to the jurisdic-
        tion of our courts. 2
              Three questions guide me to the conclusion that this case is
        “based upon” a breach of contract. First, what does it mean to be
        “based upon” in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)? Second,
        what are the relevant facts of this particular dispute? And third,
        how does the answer to the first question apply to that of the sec-
        ond?
               Regarding the first question, the Supreme Court has pro-
        vided guidance as to the meaning of “based upon,” concluding that
        “the phrase is read most naturally to mean those elements of a
        claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his

        2 The initial element in our FSIA commercial activity framework also requires
        a determination that the act at issue took place “outside the territory of the
        United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). I agree with the majority that regard-
        less of whether the act is based on the expropriation of property or the breach
        of a contract, the act took place outside of the territory of the United States.
        Maj. Op., at 7 n. 5.
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        21-11136               WILSON, J., dissenting                       3

        theory of the case.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993).
        Put another way, what forms the “basis,” “foundation,” and “gra-
        vamen” of the complaint? OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S.
        27, 33–34 (2015) (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356–57).
               As an example, in Nelson, plaintiff Scott Nelson contracted to
        work at a state-run hospital in Saudi Arabia. 507 U.S. at 351–52.
        According to the complaint, agents of the Saudi Government later
        arrested, imprisoned, and tortured him. Id. at 352–53. After his
        release, he and his wife Vivian attempted to sue the Saudi Govern-
        ment for various intentional torts, negligent failure to warn, and
        derivative injuries. Id. at 353–54. In their argument to the Supreme
        Court, the plaintiffs argued that their claims were based upon the
        recruitment and hiring activity conducted by the Saudi Govern-
        ment and that there was a “sufficient nexus between those com-
        mercial activities and the wrongful acts that had allegedly injured
        [them].” Id. at 355. The Court roundly rejected that argument and
        found the Saudi Government was entitled to immunity under the
        FSIA. The Court explained:
              In this case, the Nelsons have alleged that petitioners
              recruited Scott Nelson for work at the hospital, signed
              an employment contract with him, and subsequently
              employed him. While these activities led to the con-
              duct that eventually injured the Nelsons, they are not
              the basis for the Nelsons’ suit. Even taking each of
              the Nelsons’ allegations about Scott Nelson’s recruit-
              ment and employment as true, those facts alone enti-
              tle the Nelsons to nothing under their theory of the
              case. The Nelsons have not, after all, alleged breach
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        4                         WILSON, J., dissenting                     21-11136

               of contract . . . but personal injuries caused by peti-
               tioners’ intentional wrongs and by petitioners’ negli-
               gent failure to warn Scott Nelson that they might
               commit those wrongs. Those torts, and not the argu-
               ably commercial activities that preceded their com-
               mission, form the basis for the Nelsons’ suit.
        Id. at 358.
                With the meaning of “based upon” established, I move now
        to the second question: What are the relevant facts of this particu-
        lar dispute? The majority does a sound job of laying out these facts,
        but I will repeat the relevant parts from AFGC’s amended com-
        plaint for ease of reference.3
                In 2015, AFGC (through its wholly-owned subsidiaries) ac-
        quired various pieces of real estate and commercial property in Lu-
        anda, Angola. A year later, the Angolan Government unlawfully
        seized and expropriated AFGC’s assets in the country. AFGC sub-
        sequently filed suit in the United States District Court of the Dis-
        trict of Columbia seeking to recover 1) the fair market value of and
        rents derived from the stolen properties, 2) lost profits from those
        properties, 3) damages from investment opportunities that were
        lost as a result of the expropriation, 4) damages from AFGC’s tar-
        nished reputation, and 5) treble damages under civil RICO statutes.

        3 As the majority rightly reminds us, Maj. Op., at 2 n.1, because this is an ap-
        peal of the district court’s order granting Angola’s motion to dismiss, we are
        required to accept all AFGC’s well-pleaded allegations as true. Kennedy v. Flo-
        ridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021).
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        21-11136               WILSON, J., dissenting                      5

               The parties eventually agreed to send representatives to Lis-
        bon, Portugal for the purpose of settling the dispute. Negotiations
        went back and forth as to the amount Angola would pay AFGC,
        but (according to AFGC) the parties eventually came to an agree-
        ment, which an AFGC representative reduced to writing. That
        agreement provided that Angola would deposit 47.5 million dollars
        into the Florida bank account of AFGC’s attorneys within 15 days
        of the meeting. As consideration, AFGC would waive and relin-
        quish its rights and claims to its properties in Angola, withdraw its
        pending lawsuit in the District of Columbia, and end its global lob-
        bying efforts against Angola.
              AFGC asked the Angolan representative to sign the agree-
        ment; however, while the representative assured AFGC that the
        agreement was valid and had the approval of the Angolan Govern-
        ment, she stated that her government would memorialize the
        agreement in a more formal writing and reconvene in Lisbon the
        following week to execute it. The subsequent meeting never hap-
        pened, Angola never signed the formal agreement, and Angola
        never paid AFGC.
               AFGC then filed this new lawsuit in the United States Dis-
        trict Court for the Southern District of Florida. Its claims are
        straightforward: breach of contract (Count I) and unjust enrich-
        ment (Count II)—both premised on the formation of a settlement
        agreement that Angola subsequently breached.
              The facts in place, I turn now to the third question: Applying
        the meaning of “based upon” in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) to the facts
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        6                       WILSON, J., dissenting                21-11136

        at hand, what forms the foundation of AFGC’s complaint? That is,
        what are the “elements of [AFGC’s] claim that, if proven, would
        entitle [it] to relief under [its] theory of the case”? Nelson, 507 U.S.
        at 357; see also Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1222.
                It seems to me that AFGC’s claims—breach of contract and
        unjust enrichment—are based upon the alleged breach of a settle-
        ment agreement, rather than the alleged expropriation that
        brought the parties to the negotiation table. This becomes clearer
        once we consider what AFGC would and would not have to prove
        in order to obtain relief should it proceed to trial. Take AFGC’s
        breach of contract claim: AFGC would have to prove that 1) the
        parties formed a valid contract—whereby (according to the
        amended complaint) Angola committed to pay 47.5 million dollars
        in consideration for AFGC agreeing to waive all rights and claims
        to its Angolan properties (regardless of how rightful those rights
        and claims were), withdraw its pending lawsuit in the District of
        Columbia, and end its lobbying efforts against the country; 2) that
        Angola breached that contract; and 3) that AFGC suffered damages
        as a result of Angola’s breach. AFGC would not have to prove that
        Angola actually seized and expropriated its property unlawfully.
        Indeed, whether or not Angola wrongfully took AFGC’s property
        is irrelevant to AFGC’s claims. While AFGC was surely harmed by
        Angola’s alleged expropriation, it was also separately harmed by
        Angola’s breach of contract. Yet, AFGC only brings suit for the
        latter harm, so it is the latter harm that its suit is based upon.
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        21-11136                WILSON, J., dissenting                        7

               To briefly parrot the Supreme Court, while Angola’s seizure
        and expropriation “led to the conduct that eventually injured
        [AFGC], they are not the basis for [AFGC’s] suit. Even taking each
        of [AFGC’s] allegations about [Angola’s seizure and expropriation]
        as true, those facts alone entitle [AFGC] to nothing under [its] the-
        ory of the case.” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358. Rather, what entitles
        AFGC to relief—what it has alleged and what forms the basis of its
        suit—is that a settlement agreement was created, Angola breached
        that agreement, and AFGC was harmed as a result.
                To reach the opposite conclusion that AFGC’s lawsuit is
        based on the expropriation of its property, the majority relies heav-
        ily on, and provides a thoughtful analysis of, our case in Beg v. Is-
        lamic Republic of Pakistan, 353 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). However,
        Beg is distinguishable from the dispute before us today.
               According to the allegations in Beg, the Government of Pa-
        kistan expropriated the plaintiff’s land in the Punjab region of the
        country. 353 F.3d at 1324. Later, the Pakistani Government sent
        an official to the United States to offer the plaintiff an alternative
        parcel of land, which the plaintiff accepted. Id. Unfortunately for
        the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Pakistan determined the Gov-
        ernment of Punjab did not have good title to the new parcel and
        rejected the plaintiff’s claims of title. Id. The plaintiff subsequently
        sought compensation through litigation in United States federal
        court. Id.
                Assessing the claims in Beg, we largely skipped over any anal-
        ysis of what the plaintiff’s suit was “based upon,” focusing instead
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        8                      WILSON, J., dissenting               21-11136

        on the nature of the conduct at issue. See id. at 1325. In doing so,
        we held that Pakistan did not engage in commercial activity be-
        cause the lawsuit involved the Government’s power of eminent
        domain, a uniquely sovereign power. Id. at 1326. We further held
        that “[d]etermining whether or how to compensate property own-
        ers for takings is also a sovereign function, not a market transac-
        tion.” Id. at 1327. The plaintiff argued that the Pakistani Govern-
        ment’s agreement to compensate him was “the equivalent of a con-
        tract and, therefore, [was] a commercial activity.” Id. We found
        this argument unpersuasive, emphasizing that “the dispositive is-
        sue in determining whether an activity is commercial is whether
        private actors could undertake this type of activity in a market.” Id.
        (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
               At first glance, it might appear that Beg controls here. After
        all, both involve a government’s exercise of eminent domain and
        an eventual failure to pay the property’s owner. However, we
        have to remind ourselves of where we are in the analysis. At this
        stage, all we are asking is, “What is the action based upon?” For
        this question, Beg offers little guidance. Indeed, Beg provides almost
        no input on how to determine what an action is based upon when
        a sovereign power breaks an agreement to compensate someone
        for the use of its eminent domain power. Rather, Beg stands only
        for the proposition that when a party is ultimately seeking compen-
        sation for a foreign government’s takings abroad, its claims are
        based upon an act (whatever that act might be) that is sovereign in
        nature.
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        21-11136                 WILSON, J., dissenting                      9

               So, while Beg might have much to say about whether the
        conduct at issue is commercial or sovereign, it has little to say
        about what the conduct at issue is. For that, we must look to cases
        like Nelson and Sachs, which task us with determining what ele-
        ments a plaintiff must prove to obtain relief. Nelson, 507 U.S. at
        357; Sachs, 577 U.S. at 33–34. Here, AFGC must prove that an
        agreement existed, Angola breached that agreement, and AFGC
        was harmed by that breach. Thus, it is the breach of the settlement
        agreement that AFGC’s action is “based upon.”
              Of course, this still leaves the question of whether Angola’s
        conduct in breaching the parties’ agreement was commercial or
        sovereign.
                           II.     Commercial or Sovereign?
               As noted above, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) excepts from immun-
        ity cases “in which the action is based . . . upon an act . . . in con-
        nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”
        (emphasis added). The FSIA provides that a commercial activity is
        “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular com-
        mercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity
        shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of con-
        duct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
        purpose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). Therefore, “the question is not
        whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or
        instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.”
        Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614. “Rather, the issue is whether the partic-
        ular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive
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        10                     WILSON, J., dissenting              21-11136

        behind them) are the type of actions by which a private party en-
        gages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’” Id. Here, I believe An-
        gola’s actions are “commercial” within the meaning of the FSIA.
                 As a starting point, we have previously held that a foreign
        state’s breach of a contract with a private party can qualify as com-
        mercial activity under the FSIA. In Guevara v. Republic of Peru, the
        issue we faced was “whether a foreign state’s offer of a reward in
        return for information enabling it to locate and capture a fugitive”
        fell within the commercial activity exception. 468 F.3d 1289, 1292
        (11th Cir. 2006). The district court found that “offering a reward
        for capturing a fugitive involves uniquely sovereign objectives,”
        and was not a commercial activity. Id. at 1295. On appeal, we re-
        versed and reasoned that “[t]he location and capture of a fugi-
        tive . . . may be a sovereign act, but that is not what this case is
        about.” Id. at 1298. We noted that the plaintiff was not seeking to
        compel Peru to capture the fugitive; he was only seeking to enforce
        Peru’s promise that it would pay 5 million dollars for information
        leading to his capture. Id. at 1298–99. We held that “[t]he under-
        lying activity at issue—the exchange of money for information—is
        ‘commercial in nature and of the type negotiable among private
        parties.’” Id. at 1299.
               Similarly, here, while taking property and “[d]etermining
        whether or how to compensate property owners” for that taking
        may be a sovereign act, Beg, 353 F.3d at 1327, that is not what this
        case is about. Rather, this case is about Angola entering into and
        breaching a contract with AFGC, and this is precisely the type of
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        21-11136                WILSON, J., dissenting                        11

        action “by which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or
        commerce.’” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.
                Now, here is where Beg fits into the analysis and muddies the
        waters. However, heeding 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)’s directive that the
        “commercial character of an activity shall be determined by refer-
        ence to the nature of the . . . particular transaction or act, rather
        than by reference to its purpose,” I believe there is an important
        distinction between that case and the dispute before us. In Beg, the
        plaintiff argued that the Government of Pakistan reneged on a deal
        to compensate him directly for the land it expropriated. 353 F.3d
        at 1327. That is, the Pakistani Government took the plaintiff’s land,
        promised to give him an alternative parcel of land in exchange, and
        then never did. Id. Here, however, the parties were bargaining for
        something else. AFGC, after having its property taken away,
        brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
        Columbia and apparently started a lobbying effort against Angola.
        Angola then (allegedly) agreed to pay 47.5 million dollars in ex-
        change for AFGC withdrawing its lawsuit, waiving any claims it
        thought it had to the Angolan property, and ending its lobbying
        efforts. So, while the nature of the act in Beg was a deal to pay the
        plaintiff for the property that was taken, the nature of the act here
        is a deal to pay the plaintiff for dropping its lawsuit, rights, and lob-
        bying efforts. The former is an act of a sovereign; the latter is an
        act that I can imagine any private entity undertaking. And, in my
        view, digging any deeper into the purpose of Angola’s action runs
        afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
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        12                      WILSON, J., dissenting              21-11136

              For these reasons, I believe that AFGC’s action is based upon
        Angola’s breach of a settlement agreement, and I further believe
        that Angola’s act was in connection with commercial activity.
              This brings me to the final portion of this FSIA analysis,
        which requires a court to determine whether the act of the sover-
        eign defendant caused a direct effect in the United States.
                     III.    “Direct Effect” in the United States
                As mentioned just above, the commercial activity exception
        only applies if the alleged act of the foreign sovereign “cause[d] a
        direct effect in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also
        Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617–19. Based on the allegations in AFGC’s
        amended complaint, this element is clearly met. According to
        AFGC, the contract it entered into with Angola required Angola to
        deposit 47.5 million dollars into an attorney trust bank account in
        the State of Florida, which would be held for the benefit of AFGC,
        a business incorporated in the State of Nevada. This allegation is
        sufficient to establish a direct effect in the United States. See Wel-
        tover, 504 U.S. at 617 (“Because New York was thus the place of
        performance for Argentina’s ultimate contractual obligations, the
        rescheduling of those obligations necessarily had a ‘direct effect’ in
        the United States: Money that was supposed to have been delivered
        to a New York bank for deposit was not forthcoming.”).
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        21-11136              WILSON, J., dissenting                     13

                                  IV.   Conclusion

                For the above reasons, I would hold that the commercial ac-
        tivities exception applies, and that the Republic of Angola is not
        immune from this particular suit. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.