Court Opinion

ID: 9707340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:09:16.978375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:31.491940
License: Public Domain

MORAN, J., dissenting: The majority has ordered a new trial in this case because of the trial court’s refusal to allow defendant William T. Shaver to testify and because of the claimed erroneous admission of Exhibit No. 11 prepared by Witness Carr. Defendant for all practical purposes conceded in the trial court that Shaver was disqualified from testifying and therefore should not be permitted to raise this question in this court. At the end of plaintiff’s testimony and before plaintiff had rested his case, plaintiff, in chambers, announced to the court that he would invoke section 2 of the Evidence Act as a bar to Shaver’s testimony. In answer, defendant’s counsel in so many words admitted that Shaver was an incompetent witness, his only contention being that plaintiff’s motion was premature and that plaintiff would have to make his objection when Shaver was offered as a witness. Defendant’s counsel stated, “The right to invoke Section 2 of the Evidence Act is the right the plaintiff is entitled to in this cause, and we must exercise that right at the proper time.” After this conversation and after defendant had made another objection, the court discharged the jury to be reconvened at 9 o’clock the next morning. The court reconvened the next day at 9:45 a. m., with both counsel present and the jury in the box. The court then announced that plaintiff had rested his case. The defendant then called Shaver as his first witness. He was sworn. Plaintiff: “Your Honor, inasmuch as the plaintiff brings this action as administrator, we ask that the witness be barred from testifying.” The Court: “All right, I will grant the motion.” Defendant: “The defendant and counterplaintiff would like to call defendant’s next witness.” At this state of the proceeding it was incumbent on the defendant to urge upon the trial court some reason why the defendant was qualified to testify, but he said nothing. At no time in the trial was the trial judge or opposing counsel notified of the contention that defendant now makes in this court — that is, that Shaver was qualified to testify against Mrs. Cunningham on Count II. If he had, I am sure plaintiff’s counsel would have dismissed Count II since there was only $1,149 involved. Instead, both parties accepted as true the fact that Shaver was disqualified generally to testify. Under these circumstances we should follow the rule that a point not raised in the trial court cannot be urged on appeal. Dirksmeyer v. Barnes, 2 Ill App2d 496, 119 NE2d 813; Ragen v. Bennigsen, 10 Ill App2d 356, 135 NE2d 128; Daily v. Meredith, 56 Ill App2d 230, 205 NE2d 640. I cannot agree that at any place in the record counsel for defendant in any way or at any time urged in the trial court that Shaver was a competent witness for any reason. In fact, this must have been a complete afterthought, because he did not urge it in his original post-trial motion, but did by amendment to his post-trial motion. I also disagree with the conclusion that Carr was not qualified to testify as an expert. To be an expert, one must have qualifications superior only to that of the general public in the particular field in which he is testifying. Qualifications are almost always a problem exclusively for the trial court unless such qualifications are so bad that it is an abuse of discretion to permit such testimony as an expert. See Gard on Evidence, Rule 219. The record discloses that drafting was a regular part of Carr’s employment for sixteen years and he functioned as a petroleum engineer whereby he had to be able to make maps, surveys and do all types of drafting work. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Carr to testify as an expert. The testimony of Carr as to the length of the trailer, the location of the lights, and the height of the bottom of the trailer was proper — assuming that there was no testimony in the record as to what these actual distances were — because he testified that he knew the size of the wheel and from this he could make this schematic drawing from plaintiff’s exhibit No. 2, which was admitted into evidence without objection. Disregarding his testimony that he could determine the distance involved when he once knew the size of the wheel, there was other testimony in the record which substantiated the drawing. Assuming that the exhibit was not accurate in all details, I still do not think it was error to admit it. This exhibit was in the nature of demonstrative evidence, the purpose of which was to make more clear to the jury the contentions of the plaintiff. Great latitude has been allowed in the admission of such exhibits and the admission or rejection of such evidence has universally been held to be within the discretion of the trial court. This is true even when the drawings have not been completely accurate. See annotation in 9 ALR2d 1044. In Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Lotta, 27 Ill2d 455, 189 NE2d 238, at p 458, our Supreme Court said that whether a map constitutes a fair representation of the facts is a matter for the trial judge to decide in the first instance. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.