Court Opinion

ID: 9929397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 16:07:42.448928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:05.890199
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,641

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                      FREDDY WAYNE MILLER,
                                            Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Barton District Court; CAREY L. HIPP, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed February 2, 2024. Affirmed.

        Jennifer C. Roth, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for
appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., SCHROEDER and COBLE, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Freddy Wayne Miller appeals the district court's revocation of his
probation, claiming the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Miller argues
that, because he was arrested after his probation term had ended by an arrest warrant that
was never signed by a judge, the 30-day extension period established in K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 22-3716(e) did not apply and the district court therefore lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to revoke his probation. But because the court did issue a notice for Miller to
appear to address the probation violations before the end of the 30-day extension period,
Miller's claim fails.

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                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Miller pled no contest to one count of violating the Kansas Offender Registration
Act for conduct in which he engaged in January 2019. The district court granted Miller's
motion for a downward dispositional departure and sentenced him to 24 months of
probation with an underlying prison term of 34 months.

         Miller did not do well on probation. He ultimately admitted to repeatedly violating
the conditions of his probation six times, the first five of which resulted in intermediate
sanctions. Miller's probation term was scheduled to end July 3, 2022.

         On July 11, 2022, eight days after Miller's probation term ended, his intensive
supervision officer (ISO) filed an affidavit alleging that Miller had again violated the
conditions of his probation by continuing to consume alcohol, failing to report, and
failing to attend outpatient treatment in the final week of his probation. Several other
documents were filed with the affidavit, including an arrest warrant that had been filled
out and received by the Barton County Sheriff on July 12 but, on its face, not signed by a
judge.

         Miller was arrested on July 18 pursuant to the unsigned warrant, and the executed
copy of the arrest warrant with the officer's return still lacked a judge's signature. Above
the signature line was a statement that the warrant was "[d]ated, signed and issued this
12th day of July, 2022." The date was handwritten in along with "no bond until sees
Judge." Because Miller did not challenge the validity of the warrant at any time, there is
no evidence in the record as to who made the handwritten notes on the warrant.

         Miller had his first appearance before a judge on the same day as his arrest on the
warrant, July 18, 2022. The judge went over the alleged violations, appointed counsel,
and released Miller with notice of a probation violation hearing on August 12, 2022. At

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the probation violation hearing, Miller admitted to the violations alleged in the affidavit.
The district court revoked Miller's probation and ordered him to serve his underlying 34-
month prison term.

       Miller timely appealed.

                                          ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Miller claims that he "is serving an illegal prison sentence because the
district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and send him to prison."
See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3504(c)(1) (sentence imposed without jurisdiction is an illegal
sentence). Miller relies on K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(e), which establishes a 30-day
extension period after a defendant's probation term has ended for the district court to
issue an arrest warrant or notice to appear to the defendant to respond to alleged
probation violations. Miller argues that because he was arrested during the 30-day
extension period under an arrest warrant that was never signed by a judge, K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 22-3716(e) does not apply and the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to
revoke his probation.

The Issue Was Properly Preserved

       The State first disputes whether Miller properly preserved his jurisdictional claim
for this court's review. Miller concedes that he did not challenge the district court's
subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. But subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556,
560, 486 P.3d 591 (2021). Indeed, this court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own
initiative. State v. Marinelli, 307 Kan. 768, Syl. ¶ 1, 415 P.3d 405 (2018). Miller's failure
to challenge the district court's subject matter jurisdiction before the district court does
not bar him from making that argument on appeal because parties cannot confer subject

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matter jurisdiction on a court by consent, waiver, or estoppel; nor can parties confer
subject matter jurisdiction on a court by failing to contemporaneously object to its lack of
jurisdiction. State v. Soto, 310 Kan. 242, 249, 445 P.3d 1161 (2019). And if the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke Miller's probation, its revocation of his
probation must be reversed, and the imposition of his underlying prison term vacated. See
State v. Darkis, 314 Kan. 809, 813, 502 P.3d 1045 (2022).

Our standard of review is unlimited.

       Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to revoke Miller's
probation is a question of law subject to this court's unlimited review. See State v.
Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 775, 511 P.3d 883 (2022).

Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's power to hear and decide an action.

       Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and decide a particular
type of action. State v. Smith, 311 Kan. 109, 111, 456 P.3d 1004 (2020). A court must
have subject matter jurisdiction as a prerequisite to entering a valid judgment. In re
Marriage of Johnston, 54 Kan. App. 2d 516, 529-30, 402 P.3d 570 (2017). A judgment
rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is therefore void, and a void judgment is a
nullity that may be vacated at any time. State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 905, 295 P.3d
1039 (2013). As stated above, parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court
by consent, waiver, estoppel, or failing to contemporaneously object to the court's lack of
jurisdiction. Soto, 310 Kan. at 249.

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A district court's jurisdiction over a probationer ceases with the termination of the
probationary period unless the court issues a warrant or notice to appear within 30 days
of said termination.

         Generally, a district court's jurisdiction over a probationer ceases with the
termination of the probationary period. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(a) ("At any time
during probation . . . the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for
violation of any of the conditions of release or assignment . . . ." [Emphasis added.]). But
state law does provide a 30-day extension or grace period at the end of the probation term
for the court "to issue a warrant for the arrest or notice to appear for the defendant to
answer a charge of a violation of the conditions of probation, assignment to a community
correctional service program, suspension of sentence or a nonprison sanction." K.S.A.
2018 Supp. 22-3716(e). But the violations still must have occurred during the term of the
probation. Moreover, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that "this 30-day extension
applies only if the court issues a warrant or notice to appear," not when "an intensive
supervision officer (ISO) issues an arrest and detain notice." (Emphasis added.) Darkis,
314 Kan. at 809.

         We also note that the statute does not put any limit on how many warrants may
issue or how many notices to appear, as long as they are issued within the 30-day grace
period for violations that occurred during the term of probation. In other words, it is not
one strike and you are out with regards to maintaining jurisdiction to commence an action
to revoke a defendant's probation during the 30-day grace period.

An arrest warrant was issued within the 30-day grace period, but it was not signed by the
judge.

         Here, there is no dispute that no action was taken until after Miller's probation
term ended. Therefore, for the district court to have had subject matter jurisdiction to

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revoke Miller's probation under the 30-day extension period established in subsection (e),
the district court—not the ISO—must have issued the arrest warrant or a notice to appear
within 30 days of the termination of Miller's probation term. It is undisputed that the
warrant by which Miller was arrested was never signed by a judge. See K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 22-2304(a) (requiring that arrest warrants be signed by a magistrate). The record
lacks any evidence that the district court issued the arrest warrant. Consequently, based
on the record before this court, the warrant under which Miller was arrested was not
issued by the district court, and the 30-day extension period established in K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 22-3716(e) did not apply to give the district court subject matter jurisdiction unless
the court issued another one within the 30-day grace period, or the court issued a notice
to appear within the 30-day grace period.

The judge did provide Miller with notice to appear in district court within the 30-day
grace period.

       After Miller was arrested on the unsigned warrant, and still within the 30-day
grace period provided for in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(e), the judge personally went
over the alleged violations with Miller, appointed counsel for him, and released Miller
from custody, on the same day he was arrested, with a notice to appear at a probation
violation hearing on August 12, 2022. The notice to appear to answer the charges at a
probation revocation hearing, via Zoom, was signed by the judge. The only conditions of
Miller's release were that he stay in Kansas, not use drugs or alcohol, not violate the law,
stay in contact with his attorney, and report to his probation officer. The district court's
notice and order lacks any money bond requirement on its face, nor is there any
indication of such a requirement in the record on appeal.

       We fail to see how this does not comply with the requirement that the judge issue
a "notice to appear for the defendant to answer a charge of a violation of the conditions of
probation," as required by K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(e), and Miller does not argue to

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the contrary. If we assume that the warrant was not a valid way to extend jurisdiction in
the case—which we must under Darkis—certainly the notice to appear was. Whether the
sheriff had the authority to arrest Miller on an unsigned warrant is not the issue before us.
And the arrest became irrelevant when the judge immediately released Miller with a
notice to appear, all within the statutory 30-day grace period.

       We recognize that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-2202(o) defines a notice to appear as a
"written request, issued by a law enforcement officer, that a person appear before a
designated court at a stated time and place." But K.S.A 2018 Supp. 22-3716(e) modifies
that definition by requiring that the court, not a law enforcement officer, issue the notice
to appear. The district court had jurisdiction to issue a notice to appear within 30 days of
the conclusion of Miller's probation for violations that occurred during its term, and it
did.

       Accordingly, we find the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to revoke
Miller's probation and order him to serve his underlying prison term when, within 30
days of the end of his probation term, it issued a notice for Miller to appear "for hearing
on the allegations of probation violation."

       Affirmed.

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