Court Opinion

ID: 9785138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:05:39.441845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:07.371956
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the Majority opinion. I write separately out of self-indulgence and to purge my conscience. During my time on the Court, my views have come full circle on the general issue of whether a trial court should be required to ask a voir dire question, if requested to do so, whether the prospective jurors in a criminal case “have such strong feelings concerning (insert nature of pertinent crime charged) that they would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.” In its first manifestation after I joined the Court, State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002) (narcotics offense), I joined Judge Raker’s concurring opinion, 369 Md. at 217-19, 798 A.2d at 575-76, which expressed the view that, assuming a trend of case-by-case consideration of such inquiries, a blurring will occur eventually between the acquisition of information in aid of for-cause strikes and peremptory strikes, with a concomitant limiting of the discretion of trial judges in the control of voir dire. Id. To avoid repetitive litigation necessitated by a case-by-case approach, Judge Raker and I endorsed generally “a voir dire process that would enable a lawyer to elicit sufficient information to develop a rational basis for excluding a potential juror, whether for cause or by peremptory challenges.” Id. at 218-19, 798 A.2d at 575-76.
Next came Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 806 A.2d 265 (2002) (child molestation), where I stood again with Judge Raker (writing for the Majority) to require a like form of question. Id. at 9-10, 806 A.2d at 270-71.
Departing from my previous jurisprudential policy position, I veered in another direction in Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593, 903 A.2d 922 (2006) (use of handgun), joining the Majority opinion justifying denial of a voir dire request for a question, in a trial involving, among other charges, multiple counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun in the *61commission of a crime of violence, regarding “strong feelings concerning the use of handguns.” Id. at 596-97, 903 A.2d at 924-25. In hindsight, it seems that handgun use is nearly as likely to inspire potential strong feelings among law-abiding venire persons as narcotics and child molestation. I in no way here purport to re-imagine or critique the reasoning of the Majority opinion in Curtin so as to evade for myself the question of whether I, for one, was consistent there with the prior views I associated myself with in Judge Raker’s concurrence in Thomas and her Majority opinion in Sweet. Suffice it to say that perhaps I was moved to join the Majority in Curtin because the inexorable case-by-case march feared in the Thomas concurrence was coming to pass, and I thought to erect a stop sign of sorts to discourage future cases. That failed obviously. At this point in time, I am content to abide Judge Adkins’s rationalizations (Maj. op. at 49-53, 12 A.3d at 678-80) in the opinion in Shim’s case that Curtin “should ... be limited to its facts.” Id. at 16, 806 A.2d 265.