Court Opinion

ID: 9840172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:47.448335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:48.545685
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 15, 2023
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                             EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                  OF WEST VIRGINIA

Timothy C.,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-0147 (Jackson County 18-C-13)

Shawn Straughn, Superintendent,
Northern Correctional Center,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Timothy C. appeals the January 28, 2022, order of the Circuit Court of Jackson
County denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the circuit court erred in
concluding that he did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate counsel. 1,2,3
Upon our review, finding no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error, we determine
that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s
order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21(c).

                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                                A. Conviction and Direct Appeal

       1
         Petitioner appears by counsel Edward L. Bullman. Respondent Shawn Straughn,
Superintendent of the Northern Correctional Center, appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick
Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General Gail V. Lipscomb.
       2
        We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
       3
          Petitioner included a statement in his brief that his counsel filed the brief “on behalf of
the Petitioner under West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(c)10(a)(b) [sic].” Upon our
review of the appendix record, we determine that petitioner’s brief complies with Rule 10(c)(10)(a)
of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that, when appellate counsel
“lacks a good faith belief that an appeal is reasonable and warranted under the circumstances,”
counsel should file a brief on petitioner’s behalf “rais[ing] any arguable points of error advanced
by the client.”

                                                 1
        In 2013, a Jackson County grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner with
several sex crimes involving two children, M.C. and A.O. Two of the charges, which named A.O.
as the victim, are relevant to this case: one count of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of
sexual abuse by a custodian or person in a position of trust.

        Prior to petitioner’s trial in 2014, the State filed a motion seeking to obtain a saliva sample
from petitioner to compare his DNA to the DNA of semen discovered on a shirt belonging to M.C.
The trial court granted the State’s motion over petitioner’s objection. DNA testing excluded
petitioner as having produced the semen on the shirt, and the State sought to exclude the evidence
from petitioner’s trial. The trial court granted the State’s request that the DNA evidence be
excluded over petitioner’s objection.

        At petitioner’s trial, the State presented the testimony of two minors—E.A. and R.E.—
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence for the purpose of showing
petitioner’s lustful disposition for children. Both E.A. and R.E. testified that petitioner had
molested them. During petitioner’s case-in-chief, he presented evidence “show[ing]
inconsistencies in the statements given by” E.A. and R.E. “concerning their allegations against the
petitioner.” State v. Timothy C., 237 W. Va. 435, 442, 787 S.E.2d 888, 895 (2016). Additionally,
he presented evidence that criminal charges against petitioner “arising from R.E.’s allegations
were dismissed.” Id. Petitioner “also presented testimony that R.E. had been encouraged by her
mother to make false accusations against the petitioner.” Id. Finally, petitioner presented evidence
that both M.C. and A.O., after first making their allegations against petitioner, had denied those
allegations before the trial. Id.

        The jury found petitioner guilty on five counts—three concerning M.C. and the two
concerning A.O. Petitioner was sentenced as to each of the five counts. Relevant to this appeal, for
the counts involving A.O., petitioner was sentenced to five to twenty years of incarceration for
first-degree sexual abuse and ten to twenty years of incarceration for sexual abuse by a custodian.
The two sentences were set to run consecutively to each other.

        Petitioner appealed to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding the DNA
evidence that established he did not produce the semen found on M.C.’s shirt. In Timothy C., the
Court agreed with petitioner’s argument that the DNA evidence was wrongfully excluded and
reversed the three convictions involving M.C. In so deciding, the Court said, “[I]nasmuch as this
evidentiary issue is unique to M.C., we further find this error was harmless as to the convictions
involving A.O.” Id. at 446, 787 S.E.2d at 899. Petitioner also argued on appeal that the evidence
was insufficient to justify his conviction for sexual abuse by a custodian. The Court concluded that
“there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the petitioner of being a custodian at the time
he sexually abused A.O.” Id. at 451, 787 S.E.2d at 904. The Court remanded the matter to the trial
court for further proceedings regarding the convictions it reversed, affirming the remainder of the
convictions. Petitioner was not tried again following remand of the case to the trial court. Petitioner
is presently incarcerated solely on the convictions relating to A.O.

                              B. Petitions for Habeas Corpus Relief

       In February 2018, petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit

                                                  2
Court of Jackson County. Petitioner set forth multiple grounds upon which he claimed respondent
held him unlawfully, including that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because his
counsel conducted “No investigation[,] wouldn’t interview (404-B) witnesses or at trial,” and that
his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because the State “didn’t have probable cause to
get” his DNA. The circuit court appointed counsel to represent petitioner, and counsel filed an
amended petition and Losh list. 4 The amended petition restated the grounds for relief set forth in
the pro se petition and asserted, “During the meeting with the Petitioner, counsel explained that . .
. the DNA evidence the Petitioner contends was obtained without probable cause . . . was
exculpatory not inculpatory and not an issue to raise in habeas review.” The amended petition
further said, “The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to ask 404(b) witness R.E. and alleged
victim M.C. if their mothers put them up to making accusations against the Petitioner.” Petitioner’s
habeas counsel included a statement in the amended petition averring that, upon reviewing the
record, “interview[ing] trial counsel regarding the allegations made in the petition,” consulting
with his client, and reviewing the law, “some, most or all of the grounds the client wishes to
advance are not supported by the law or evidence.”

        The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on October 25, 2021. In support of his
argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, petitioner testified that “there’s was
[sic] two statements made . . . , plus the DNA evidence . . . because the chain of custody was not
kept, but the judge still issued the warrant, . . . because of that, and the chain of custody should
have been kept for a warrant.” Regarding his trial counsel’s investigation and questioning of E.A.
and R.E., petitioner testified: “Because I got three or four statements in my evidence somewhere
that them girls were made to put up to say that, and he wouldn’t ask them questions . . . .” On
cross-examination, petitioner was asked about his trial counsel’s strategy in questioning M.C. and
R.E. Petitioner admitted that his trial counsel had talked with him prior to the trial about how
questioning would proceed, and he admitted that the way in which trial counsel questioned the
witnesses was part of trial counsel’s trial strategy. Petitioner’s trial counsel was not called to testify
at the evidentiary hearing; the only evidence presented was petitioner’s own testimony.

        The circuit court entered an order on January 28, 2022, denying petitioner’s request for
habeas relief. The circuit court determined that the Court’s decision in Timothy C. constituted “a
final adjudication on all issues but Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim,” and,
therefore, all issues but the ineffective assistance of counsel claim had either been waived or
subject to res judicata. As for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court decided that
petitioner failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Specifically, regarding
petitioner’s allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective in his investigation and questioning of
witnesses, the court said that his trial counsel “was able to elicit testimony that a victim had
previously stated Petitioner never touched the victim,” “was able to show inconsistencies in the
Rule 404(b) statements,” and was able to “present evidence that a victim was encouraged to make
false accusations.” The court concluded that trial counsel’s questioning of witnesses “was strategic
in nature” and was made “in consultation with Petitioner.” The court continued, “Petitioner’s
assertion that [his trial counsel] did not investigate the underlying case is inconsistent with the trial

        4
          See Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 768-70, 277 S.E.2d 606, 611-12 (1981) (setting
forth the checklist of grounds typically used in habeas corpus proceedings).
                                                    3
record of the underlying case.” Ultimately, the court decided, “Petitioner failed to provide evidence
to support a ground for which relief may be granted.”

                                        II. DISCUSSION

       Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s January 28, 2022, order, asking this Court to
reverse the circuit court’s decision. “We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under
an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard;
and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W.
Va. 411, 787 S.E.2d 864 (2016) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633
S.E.2d 771 (2006)).

        Through two assignments of error, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance
from his trial and appellate counsel. Habeas relief is available through an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim when it is shown that counsel’s “performance was deficient under an objective
standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part,
State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

       In reviewing counsel’s performance,

       courts must apply an objective standard and determine whether, in light of all the
       circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the broad range of
       professionally competent assistance while at the same time refraining from
       engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of [petitioner’s] counsel’s strategic
       decisions. Thus, a reviewing court asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have
       acted, under the circumstances, as [petitioner’s] counsel acted in the case at issue.

Id. at 6-7, 459 S.E.2d at 117-18, Syl. Pt. 6, in relevant part. Our scrutiny of counsel’s performance
is “highly deferential.” Id. at 16, 459 S.E.2d at 127 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). “When assessing whether counsel’s performance was
deficient, we ‘must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance[.]’” Miller, 194 W. Va. at 15, 459 S.E.2d at 126 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). “A defendant seeking to rebut this strong
presumption of effectiveness bears a difficult burden[.]” Id. at 16, 459 S.E.2d at 127.

                                 A. Collection of DNA evidence

        Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective by “not raising or appealing the issue
of the obtaining of DNA samples from himself and the victims because there was a break in the
chain of custody and the samples were obtained by violating the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” Petitioner cannot obtain relief on this basis. Regarding the collection of his
own DNA, to the extent that petitioner claims that his counsel did not raise the issue before the
trial court, the claim is based on a false premise; the record demonstrates that his counsel objected
to the collection of petitioner’s DNA. Regarding the collection of the victim’s DNA, petitioner did
not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of his victims, and so his counsel’s

                                                 4
failure to assert such a claim could not have been deficient. See State v. Payne, 239 W. Va. 247,
257, 800 S.E.2d 833, 843 (2015) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights [that] . . . may
not be vicariously asserted[.]” (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). We
are bewildered by petitioner’s claim that his counsel should have argued on appeal that the DNA
evidence was collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that there was a “failure to
establish a chain of custody supporting the admission of the DNA results.” The DNA evidence
was exculpatory, and its existence led the Court to reverse the convictions involving M.C. Further,
because the evidence was excluded from petitioner’s trial, the collection and handling of the
evidence, even if it had been collected or handled illegally, had no effect on petitioner’s
convictions regarding A.O. and therefore could not warrant a new trial as to the charges involving
A.O. For these reasons, petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient under an objective
standard of reasonableness, and the circuit court did not err in concluding that petitioner did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel as to the collection and handling of the DNA evidence.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner was not
entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

                                B. Investigation and Questioning

        Petitioner also argues on appeal that his counsel was “ineffective for failing to fully
investigate the potential testimony and background of his accusers and failing to ask the victims
named in the indictment and the Rule 404(b) witnesses who testified at trial if they were put up to
testify against him falsely at trial by family members.” This argument presents two issues: (1)
whether petitioner’s counsel conducted an inadequate investigation and (2) whether petitioner’s
counsel should have asked E.A. and R.E. at trial whether they were encouraged by family members
to fabricate their claims against petitioner.

        In support of his argument on the first issue, petitioner asserts only that “a more thorough
investigation by trial counsel would have revealed animosity and evidence of inconsistencies in
the accusations made against him” and “reasons to doubt the only evidence of the charges against
him.” We find no merit to this argument. Petitioner presented no evidence at the evidentiary
hearing as to what animosity may have existed and what inconsistencies his trial counsel should
have discovered. Moreover, in Timothy C., we observed that petitioner presented evidence of
inconsistencies in the statements given by E.A. and R.E., that R.E. had been encouraged by her
mother to make false accusations against the petitioner, and that both victims had recanted their
accusations against petitioner before reasserting them at trial. In short, petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that his counsel’s investigation of the case was deficient under an objective standard
of reasonableness.

        In support of his argument on the second issue, petitioner states, “[H]ad the witnesses been
asked if their testimony [was] fabricated at the encouragement of others and they had admitted that
their testimony was influenced by others[,] [] the result[] of his trial would have been different.”
Petitioner cannot prevail on this argument. In Timothy C., we noted that petitioner presented
evidence suggesting that R.E. fabricated her allegations against petitioner at the encouragement of
her mother. Regarding A.O., E.A., and R.E., petitioner presented no evidence at the evidentiary
hearing that any of these witnesses would have admitted at trial that their testimony was fabricated
had they been asked, nor did he present the testimony of his trial counsel as to counsel’s cross

                                                 5
examination strategy. In sum, the circuit court was left “to determine whether ineffective assistance
of counsel was apparent on the face of the trial transcript, without the benefit of testimony from
‘“the most significant witness, the trial attorney.”’” Frank A. v. Ames, 246 W. Va. 145, 168-69,
866 S.E.2d 210, 233-34 (2021) (quoting Tex S. v. Pszczolkowski, 236 W. Va. 245, 253-54, 788
S.E.2d 694, 702-03 (2015)). While “an attorney’s strategy is rarely obvious from the trial transcript
or appellate record,” Painter v. Ballard, No. 15-0540, 2016 WL 3349168, at *3 (W. Va. June 15,
2016) (memorandum decision), in this instance, petitioner himself testified that it was part of his
counsel’s strategy not to question M.C. and R.E. about whether others had encouraged them to
fabricate their testimony. We have previously recognized that, in cases where a witness is a minor
and a victim of sexual abuse or assault, trial counsel may reasonably and strategically limit his or
her questioning of the witness. See, e.g., Frank A. 246 W. Va. at 169, 866 S.E.2d at 234 (“[M]any
of the petitioner’s complaints stem from his apparent belief that counsel should have more
aggressively cross examined A.A. However, although there was quite a bit of impeachment
evidence available on which to challenge A.A.’s credibility . . . counsel could reasonably have
chosen to refrain from ‘hammering’ a young woman who was reliving a trauma[.]”); Harold B. v.
Ballard, No. 16-0029, 2016 WL 5210852, at *5 (W. Va. Sept. 19, 2016) (memorandum decision)
(“[I]t is more than reasonable to believe that a harsh cross-examination of a five year old alleged
sexual assault victim would prove distasteful to a jury. Therefore, because trial counsel made
reasonable tactical decisions regarding the victim’s cross-examination, this ground is not sufficient
to support a claim for habeas corpus relief.”). Because we must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, we can
reasonably presume that trial counsel’s questioning of A.O. and E.A. was also strategic. In the
absence of trial counsel’s testimony explaining his strategy, we must conclude, as the circuit court
did, that petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of establishing that his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness. Therefore, the circuit
court did not err in concluding that petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as
to the investigation of the witnesses and questioning of the witnesses. Ultimately, the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on this
ground. 5

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

       5
           In a third assignment of error, petitioner asserted:

               [T]here was insufficient evidence Petitioner was a guardian or person in a
       position of trust and whether he should have been granted a new trial regarding the
       offenses alleged to have been committed against A.O. based upon the exclusion of
       DNA evidence at trial. Those issues have been fully litigated before this Court.
       They are raised here to preserve them for possible federal review.

As the issues in this assignment of error were decided in petitioner’s direct appeal, we will not
address them here.
                                                    6
ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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