Court Opinion

ID: 9905692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 21:03:14.74976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:50.426302
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 Wolfson v. Gevorgian CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 SAMUEL WOLFSON et al.                                             B317054

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. 18VECV00094)
           v.

 ALEXIS GEVORGIAN et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Huey P. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed.
     Law Office of Julie A. Herzog and Julie A. Herzog for
Defendants and Appellants.
     Luna & Glushon, Robert Leland Glushon, Sean M. Bryn;
Ferguson Case Orr Patterson and John A. Hribar for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
                    _____________________
       The poet Robert Frost observed that although good fences
may make good neighbors, before building one might “ask to
know What I was walling in or walling out, And to whom I was
like to give offence.” (Frost (1914) “The Mending Wall.”) In this
case, Samuel and Joyce Wolfson (the Wolfsons) claim their next-
door neighbors, Alexis Gevorgian and Odet Najarian (the
Gevorgians)1 planted a row of Italian cypress trees near the
boundary separating their respective homes not as good
neighbors, but instead out of spite and to annoy the Wolfsons in
retaliation for disagreements between the families. The Wolfsons
filed suit against the Gevorgians, claiming the row of trees was a
private nuisance and a spite fence under both state and
municipal law. The trial court agreed and, after a bench trial,
entered judgment requiring the Gevorgians to comply with the
provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC)
establishing height limits for fences and hedges. The court also
awarded the Wolfsons $60,000 in damages.
       The Gevorgians challenge the trial court’s spite fence
finding, arguing that they were not motivated by spite, and that
the trees are not a fence. The Gevorgians raise several additional
contentions: that the Wolfsons lacked standing to bring a cause of
action under the municipal code, that the suit was time-barred,
that the Wolfsons are equitably estopped from bringing their
claims, that the court erred by barring their expert witnesses
from testifying, that the award of damages is excessive, and that
the judgment is too vague to be enforceable. We reject all of these

      1 Najarian does not use her husband’s last name, but we
follow the practice of both parties in this case by referring to
defendants jointly as the Gevorgians, and Alexis Gevorgian
individually by his last name.

                                  2
contentions, as we explain below, and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
            FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
       In April 2002, the Wolfsons bought their home, located on a
hillside lot in the Encino neighborhood of the City of Los Angeles
with sweeping views in back of the San Fernando Valley. A few
months later, the Gevorgians2 bought the property located
directly behind the Wolfsons. The Gevorgians’ property is
“landlocked,” with no access to the street other than a 15-foot
easement at the edge of the Wolfsons’ land that the Gevorgians
and the prior owners used as a driveway. In addition, the
Gevorgians’ home is located downhill from the Wolfsons.
According to Gevorgian, the difference in elevation between the
graded areas of the two homes is approximately 15 feet.
       Soon after he and his wife purchased the property,
Gevorgian met with the Wolfsons and told them he planned to
demolish the home that then stood on the lot and build a new
one. He asked the Wolfsons if they would expand the easement
to include an additional corner of the Wolfsons’ lot so that
vehicles could turn on the Gevorgians’ property more easily. The
Wolfsons said they would consider the proposal, but requested
consideration in exchange—a payment, along with a promise that
the Gevorgians’ new home would not disturb the Wolfsons’ view,
and that the workers building the new home would not make
noise early on the weekends. Gevorgian refused these conditions
and, according to the Wolfsons, told them that if they did not
agree to expand the easement, he would build his new home in a

      2 The Gevorgians own the property through a living trust.

                                 3
way that would block more of their view. Gevorgian described
the situation differently. He claimed that expanding the
easement was necessary to lower the elevation of his driveway,
which in turn would have allowed him to build the new home at a
lower elevation, thereby minimizing the impact on the Wolfsons’
view.
       The Gevorgians went forward with construction without
the additional easement. As construction continued over the
course of several years, the Gevorgians and the Wolfsons
continued to come into conflict. In 2003, Gevorgian requested
that the Wolfsons remove a pepper tree growing on the easement
that, according to Gevorgian, was blocking him from using the
easement. Alternatively, Gevorgian offered to remove and
replant the tree himself if the Wolfsons gave him permission.
According to the Wolfsons, they requested Gevorgian not remove
the tree, but Gevorgian cut down the tree anyway. Gevorgian
asserts he gave the Wolfsons advance notice that he planned to
cut down the tree, and told them they could file for an injunction
or restraining order if they wanted to prevent him. Gevorgian
also claimed the easement was 18 feet wide, rather than 15 feet,
and planned to pave the easement at that width. As construction
on the new Gevorgian house continued, the Wolfsons were
annoyed by the construction noise early in the morning on
weekends. Gevorgian wrote, in an email to the Wolfsons, “you
were once complaining about the fact that our construction
equipment would be waking you up on Saturday. Now, this is the
least of your concerns.” Later in the same email, Gevorgian
wrote, “Trust me when I say that you can and will make matters
much worse for yourself if you continue to threaten me.”

                                4
       As the work was nearing completion in 2006, the Wolfsons
grew concerned that the new home was blocking their view, and
that its height exceeded the maximum allowed under the city’s
zoning laws. The Wolfsons hired a surveyor, who determined
that the Gevorgians’ home would exceed the 36-foot maximum
height for homes in the area. When Gevorgian refused to address
the issue with them directly, the Wolfsons filed a formal
complaint with the Los Angeles Department of Building and
Safety (LADBS), which ordered construction on the home to stop,
delaying the project for several months and ultimately costing
the Gevorgians at least $50,000. In 2006, the parties reached a
cooperation agreement addressing the height of the Gevorgians’
home, the construction of a wrought iron fence along the property
line, and the paving of the easement.
       The 2006 agreement led to a temporary reduction in the
tensions between the families. This respite came to an end in
2008, when the Gevorgians planted Italian cypress trees in their
yard. Of the 130 trees Gevorgian ordered, he planted
approximately 40 close together in a row just inside the wrought
iron fence that marked the property line between his home and
the Wolfsons’. He planted many additional cypress trees along
the border with another neighbor. At the time of planting, the
trees were 10 to 20 feet high and were spaced less than three feet
apart from one another.
       Previously, in 2003, Gevorgian had offered to select two
types of trees for landscaping, and to allow the Wolfsons to choose
which of the two he planted. The Wolfsons believed the
Gevorgians instead planted the hedge-like, fast-growing cypress
trees in retaliation for the Wolfsons’ complaint to the city
regarding the height of the Gevorgians’ house. Gevorgian denied

                                5
that he planted the trees out of spite, but instead claimed he
chose the Italian cypress trees to complement the Tuscan
architectural style of his home, to provide shade and privacy, and
also because they do not shed leaves in the fall and are easy to
maintain. The Wolfsons filed a complaint with the city, which in
May 2008 issued an order directing the Gevorgians to reduce the
height of the trees to a maximum of 42 inches. The parties
disagree as to whether the city later dismissed the order, but the
Gevorgians did not comply, and at some point, the city’s
enforcement efforts ceased.
      In 2009, the families reached another agreement. This
time, the Gevorgians agreed to allow the Wolfsons at their own
expense to trim the cypress trees to a maximum height of
approximately seven feet from ground level3 every six months for
up to 18 months. The parties agreed not to file complaints or
lawsuits against one another, and to toll any claims or defenses
against one another while the agreement was in place. The
agreement would remain in effect for two years, but would
automatically roll over indefinitely unless one side notified the
other that it intended to terminate the agreement within 60 days
of its expiration.
       The trees were trimmed twice under this agreement, once
in the summer of 2009 and again in early 2011. After the second
trimming, Gevorgian complained that the Wolfsons’ landscaper
had entered onto his property to mark the trees for trimming and
did so at the wrong time. He notified the Wolfsons that he

      3 The agreement provided a formula to allow for a uniform
height, with the first 12 trees trimmed to six and one-half feet,
and the rest to seven feet.

                                 6
intended to terminate the agreement and wrote that if the
Wolfsons wanted “to trim the trees in the future[, it] will be done
as a neighborly accommodation in which I reserve all rights in
my sole and absolute discretion.”
       In the years that followed, the families were unable to come
to an agreement to have the trees trimmed. After terminating
the prior agreement in early 2011, Gevorgian wrote to the
Wolfsons that they should revisit the issue in six months. In
November 2011, the Wolfsons’ regular tree trimmers entered the
Gevorgians’ land and began trimming the cypress trees. The
Wolfsons claim this happened inadvertently, but Gevorgian, who
had not given permission, called the police.
       By 2014, the trees had again grown tall enough to obstruct
the Wolfsons’ view, and the Wolfsons requested permission to
trim them again. Gevorgian proposed the parties create a view
easement to deal with the problem permanently, but he never
pursued that idea further, and a few weeks later wrote an email
to Joyce Wolfson stating, “You cannot trim,” alleging that dirt
runoff from the Wolfsons’ yard was clogging his drains.
Gevorgian again denied the Wolfsons permission to trim the trees
in 2015. In 2017, Gevorgian agreed to allow the Wolfsons to trim
the trees on the condition that they also remove dirt from his
property. Gevorgian insisted that before the landscapers
trimmed the trees, they mark them so that Gevorgian could see
where they would be cut. Two days before the trimming was
scheduled to take place, Gevorgian wrote to Samuel Wolfson that
the trimmers “will not be able to mark and trim the same day as
it is unlikely I will be here to approve it.” According to Samuel
Wolfson, the tree trimming company was unwilling to come to the
house on two separate days to do the job. Negotiations over the

                                7
potential tree trimming continued in the succeeding months, but
according to the Wolfsons, Gevorgian ultimately agreed to allow
them to trim only the 12 northernmost trees.
       The Wolfsons testified at the 2020 trial that the trees
averaged 20 feet tall, with some as high as 30 feet, much taller
than when they were last trimmed in 2011, and that from all the
windows of their house, the primary view is of the trees.
Gevorgian acknowledged that some of the trees have grown taller
than the roof of his house, which is 30 feet. In addition to the row
of trees immediately facing the Wolfsons’ house, the Gevorgians
also planted a row of cypress trees bordering the property to the
south, which have grown to an average of 30 feet tall in 2020.
According to Samuel Wolfson, these additional trees were tall
enough to impact the view from his home. Because of the trees,
the Wolfsons use their yard less often than they did in the past.
Samuel Wolfson estimated the damages he suffered from the
trees at $1,000 per week.
       Joyce Wolfson works as a real estate broker, though she is
not licensed as an appraiser. She testified that she believes her
house would be worth at least $100,000 more if not for the trees,
and that she has suffered $50,000 per year in damages, based on
“the diminution of value and . . . that we had to sit through this
and deal with it.”
       In October 2018, the Wolfsons filed a lawsuit against the
Gevorgians alleging four causes of action, all based on the cypress
trees: (1) private nuisance; (2) spite fence under state law (Civ.
Code, § 841.4);4 (3) spite fence under municipal law (LAMC,

      4 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Civil Code.

                                    8
§ 41.30); and (4) violating municipal law on maximum fence
height (LAMC, § 12.22C.20(f)). The Wolfsons demanded an order
requiring the Gevorgians to reduce the height of the trees, as well
as compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees.
       While the case was pending, the Wolfsons filed another
complaint against the Gevorgians with LADBS, which in May
2019 issued another order requiring the Gevorgians either to
trim the trees to a maximum height of six feet, or to remove some
of the trees to create at least three feet of separation between
each tree. The LADBS inspector later issued a noncompliance fee
and prepared to send the case to the department’s legal liaison
for further enforcement, but the Gevorgians paid the outstanding
fees in protest. According to the inspector, a row of trees is
deemed to be a hedge, and therefore subject to the municipal
code’s height limit for fences and hedges, if the trees are planted
less than three feet apart, or if their leaves intermingle at any
point below six feet in height. The inspector testified that
LADBS places a low priority on cases such as this one, and the
department lacked resources to follow up and ensure compliance
with its orders. Orders to comply are appealable, but the
inspector received no notification that the Gevorgians filed an
appeal. The inspector also did not know if the case had actually
been forwarded to the city attorney.
       After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in
favor of the Wolfsons, awarding $50,000 in damages to Joyce and
$10,000 in damages to Samuel Wolfson, and ordering the
Gevorgians to “comply with the strict letter of [LAMC section]
12.22C.20(f)(1)-(3), without exemptions or exceptions, within 45
days of entry of [j]udgment.” The court filed a statement of
decision explaining its finding that the row of trees is a spite

                                9
fence. The court wrote that, “The evidence presented at trial
establishes that the Gevorgians are maintaining the trees on the
shared property line in a manner to annoy, harass, frustrate,
anger and retaliate against the Wolfsons for refusing to grant
certain easements for the use of the Wolfson property that were
demanded by [the Gevorgians] and for [the Wolfsons] making
complaints to LADBS” (capitalization omitted). The court stated
that the Gevorgians’ explanation that they planted the trees for
privacy and shade “is not credible for identifying the dominant
purpose for the tree-wall.”
                          DISCUSSION
A.     Background on State and Municipal Law Regarding
       Spite Fences
       The Wolfsons accused the Gevorgians of maintaining a
spite fence under both state and municipal law. We begin by
discussing the background of these laws.
      1.    State Law
      The court in Wilson v. Handley (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1301
(Wilson) provided a useful history of the California spite fence
statute. In the 19th century, American common law rejected “the
English doctrine of ‘ancient lights,’ under which a landowner
could acquire an easement over adjoining property for the
passage of light and air.” (Id. at p. 1307.) The theory in the
United States was that “ ‘society had a significant interest in
encouraging unrestricted land development. Moreover a
landowner’s rights to use his land were virtually unlimited . . . .
In contrast, light had little social importance beyond its value for
aesthetic enjoyment or illumination.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) This led
to abuses, as in one anecdote involving railroad baron Charles

                                10
Crocker in the 1870s. “Crocker sought to purchase an entire city
block on San Francisco’s Nob Hill on which to build a mansion,
and [when] a local undertaker named [Nicholas] Yung would not
sell his small lot to Crocker, Crocker bought the remainder of the
block and built a fence 40 feet high on his property around Yung’s
lot. [Citation.] Eventually, Yung sold out and Crocker procured
the entire block.”5 (Ibid.)
       Beginning in the late 19th century, jurisdictions began
enacting spite fence statutes declaring unnecessarily high fences
built to spite one’s neighbor to be private nuisances. (Wilson,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1308.) California’s spite fence statute
was enacted in 1912, was codified as section 841.4 in 1953
(Stats.1953, ch. 37, § 2), and has not been amended since.
Section 841.4 defines a spite fence as “[a]ny fence or other
structure in the nature of a fence unnecessarily exceeding 10 feet
in height maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of
annoying the owner or occupant of adjoining property.” Under
the statute, a spite fence “is a private nuisance,” and an “owner
or occupant of adjoining property injured either in his comfort or

      5 The Wilson court’s account elided the end of this story.
The spite fence outlasted both Yung and Crocker, who died in
1880 and 1888, respectively. Yung’s children finally sold the lot
in 1904, at which point Crocker’s children tore down the fence.
(https://www.kqed.org/news/10449405/boomtown-memories-the-
nob-hill-fence-that-spite-built [as of Nov. 21, 2023].) The Crocker
mansion commanded its entire block for just two more years, at
which point one might say karma struck and the mansion burned
down in the great San Francisco earthquake. Crocker’s family
later donated the land to the Episcopal Church, which built
Grace Cathedral on the site. (https://gracecathedral.org/history/
[as of Nov. 21, 2023].)

                                11
the enjoyment of his estate by such nuisance may enforce the
[same] remedies” applicable to any other private nuisance. (Ibid.)
These include bringing a civil action, or, in appropriate
circumstances, employing self-help. (§§ 3501-3503.)
       Two published California cases have held that a row of
trees can constitute a “structure in the nature of a fence”
(§ 841.4) for purposes of the spite fence statute. (See Vanderpol
v. Starr (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 385, 393–394; Wilson, supra, 97
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1306–1309.) The court in Wilson analyzed the
issue in detail. First, the court noted that it was “bound by the
rule of liberal construction that applies to the Civil Code.”
(Wilson, supra, at p. 1306.) Under either a broad definition of the
word structure as “ ‘something arranged in a definite pattern of
organization’ ” (ibid., quoting Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed.
2000) p. 1163, col. 2), or a narrower definition as “ ‘something
constructed or built’ ” (ibid., quoting Webster’s New Internat.
Dict. (2d. ed. 1938) p. 2501, col. 1), the court reasoned that a row
of trees can be a structure because “any enterprising individual
with a shovel and some saplings can construct a row of trees by
simply planting the saplings in their proper place and order.”
(Wilson, supra, at p. 1307.)
       The Wilson court further concluded that a row of trees can
have “the nature of a fence” (§ 841.4) for purposes of the statute,
reasoning that “spite fence statutes were enacted to prevent what
would otherwise be the lawful practice of a landowner erecting or
maintaining an unnecessarily high barrier between his or her
property and an adjoining property to annoy the neighboring
landowner.” (Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1309.) A row of
trees can indeed annoy one’s neighbor, even if it does not
“prevent intrusion from without or straying from within” as an

                                12
ordinary fence would. (Ibid.) The court in Vanderpol agreed with
the Wilson court’s conclusion, noting that “If the rule were
otherwise, we potentially would be creating an exception to the
statute that could swallow the rule” because a row of trees can
block a neighbor’s light and air as easily as a fence. (Vanderpol v.
Starr, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 394.) Indeed, trees can be a
more effective tool to spite one’s neighbor because “unlike a fence,
trees grow and certain trees can grow very quickly.” (Ibid.)
       Although courts have accepted a broad definition of “fence”
when interpreting the spite fence statute, they have more strictly
applied the requirement that the defendant be motivated by
spite. In Wilson, the court “adopt[ed] the ‘dominant purpose’ test
for determining whether the ‘malice’ element of section 841.4 has
been satisfied.” (Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.) This
test originated in a 19th century Massachusetts case interpreting
the nation’s first spite fence statute. To violate that statute,
“ ‘The fences must be “maliciously erected, or maintained for the
purpose of annoying” adjoining owners or occupiers. This
language clearly expresses that there must be an actual
malevolent motive, as distinguished from merely technical
malice. . . . [W]e are of opinion that it is not enough to satisfy the
words of the act that malevolence was one of the motives, but
that malevolence must be the dominant motive,—a motive
without which the fence would not have been built or maintained.
A man cannot be punished for malevolently maintaining a fence
for the purpose of annoying his neighbor merely because he feels
pleasure at the thought he is giving annoyance, if that pleasure
alone would not induce him to maintain it, or if he would
maintain it for other reasons, even if that pleasure should be
denied him.’ ” (Wilson, supra, at p. 1312, quoting Rideout v. Knox

                                 13
(1889) 148 Mass. 368 [19 N.E. 390, 392].) A strict understanding
of the malice requirement also finds support in Bar Due v. Cox
(1920) 47 Cal.App. 713, the first case to interpret the California
spite fence statute. The court held that the malicious motive was
necessary to render the law constitutional, and cited Rideout for
support. (Bar Due, supra, at p. 716.)
      2.    The LAMC
       As part of its zoning code, the LAMC regulates the height
of fences in residential areas. Section 12.22C.20(f) of the LAMC
allows owners homes in a hillside area to build “a fence or wall
not more than six feet in height” in their yard.6 (Id.,
§ 12.22C.20(f)(2), (f)(3).) The height may be increased to eight
feet with the authorization of a zoning administrator. The code
provides that “the terms ‘fence’ and ‘wall’ shall include
latticework, ornamental fences, screen walls, hedges or thick
growths of shrubs or trees. Fence and wall height shall be
measured from the natural ground level adjacent thereto.”
(LAMC, § 12.22C.20(f)(1).)
       Separate from these regulations, the municipal code
includes its own spite fence statute, which states that “No person
shall maliciously construct, erect, build, plant, cultivate or
maintain any fence or wall or any hedge or similar growth
unnecessarily exceeding six . . . feet in height, for the purpose of
annoying the owners or occupants of adjoining property.”
(LAMC, § 41.30.)

      6 The municipal code distinguishes between front yards and
side or rear yards, but the fence height limits are the same for
the Gevorgians’ property for all categories of yards. (See LAMC,
§ 12.22C.20(f)(2), (f)(3).)

                                 14
B.     The Wolfsons Had Standing to Allege Violations of
       the LAMC
       The Gevorgians contend that the Wolfsons lack standing to
bring the third and fourth causes of action, which allege
violations of the LAMC.
       Before we address the merits of this issue, we must
consider the Wolfsons’ claim that the Gevorgians forfeited the
issue by failing to ask the trial court to dismiss the third and
fourth causes of action for lack of standing.7 Although it is true
that “ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court
cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal” ’ ” (Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548), that
rule does not apply here because “the issue of standing can be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.” (Save
Agoura Cornell Knoll v. City of Agoura Hills (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 665, 681.) A lack of standing is a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be waived. “ ‘ “[A] complaint by a party
lacking standing fails to state a cause of action by the particular
named plaintiff, inasmuch as the claim belongs to somebody else.
[Citation.] A more accurately stated rationale would be that
there is a defect in the parties, since the party named as plaintiff
is not the real party in interest.” ’ ” (Cummings v. Stanley (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 493, 501.) It may have been preferable for the
Gevorgians to have filed a demurrer asserting a lack of standing
at the outset of the case, but failing to do so did not waive the
question of standing.

      7 The Gevorgians appear to have raised the issue of
standing for the first time in their proposed statement of decision
at the end of trial.

                                 15
       Although the Gevorgians’ argument on standing is not
waived, it nevertheless fails on the merits. The Gevorgians are
correct that “citizens of a municipality ordinarily have limited
standing to enjoin violations of a municipal ordinance, absent
authorization in the ordinance itself.” (Major v. Silna (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1485, 1498.) But there is an exception to this rule
“when the violations work a special injury on the citizen.” (Id. at
pp. 1498–1499.) This exception applies to alleged zoning
violations. (Pacifica Homeowners’ Assn. v. Wesley Palms
Retirement Community (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1152–1153.)
This exception squarely applies here, as the alleged violations of
the LAMC constituted a nuisance that inflicted a special injury
on the Wolfsons.
       In support of their argument that the Wolfsons lack
standing, the Gevorgians rely on Mendez v. Rancho Valencia
Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, where the court
rejected an effort by plaintiff homeowners to obtain an injunction
to bar a neighboring resort from hosting loud outdoor events on
its property. In reaching that conclusion, the court recognized
the exception we noted above. It stated that “a zoning violation
cannot be enjoined by a private individual in the absence of proof
that the violation also constitutes a private nuisance, has caused
the individual special damages of a kind different from the
general public, or that the ordinance was enacted to protect the
particular welfare of a community of which the private individual
is a member.” (Id. at p. 268.) The court did not hold that the
plaintiffs lacked standing, but rather affirmed the trial court’s
judgment against them after a bench trial because the plaintiffs
failed to show that the defendant’s violation of municipal law
constituted a private nuisance. (Id. at pp. 269–270.)

                                16
C.     The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar the
       Wolfsons’ Claims, Nor Are the Wolfsons Equitably
       Estopped from Asserting Their Claims
       The Gevorgians contend the Wolfsons’ claims were time-
barred. The statute of limitations for an injury to real property is
three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (b).) The Gevorgians
argue that the Wolfsons’ claim accrued in 2008, when the trees
were first planted. In the Gevorgians’ view, it was then tolled for
two years under the terms of the 2009 agreement, but then began
to run again when Gevorgian terminated the 2009 agreement
and expired at some point in 2013 or 2014, long before the
Wolfsons filed suit in 2018.
       A three-year statute of limitations indeed applies to private
nuisance claims, but its application depends on whether the
nuisance is permanent or continuing. (Madani v. Rabinowitz
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 602, 607.) If a nuisance is permanent,
“ ‘the statute of limitations begins to run on the creation of the
nuisance and bars all claims after its passage . . . .’ [Citation.]
By contrast, ‘each repetition of a continuing nuisance is
considered a separate wrong which commences a new period in
which to bring an action for recovery based upon the new injury.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, if a trespass or nuisance is
continuing, ‘ “an action may be brought at any time to recover the
damages which have accrued within the statutory period,
although the original trespass occurred before that period.” ’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 608.)
       In determining whether a nuisance is permanent or
continuing for purposes of the statute of limitations, the key
question “ ‘is whether the . . . nuisance can be discontinued or
abated.’ ” (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1996) 12 Cal.4th

                                17
1087, 1097.) In our Supreme Court’s formulation, a nuisance can
be abated if it “can be remedied at a reasonable cost by
reasonable means.” (Id. at p. 1103.) Thus, an encroaching fence
was a continuing, not a permanent, trespass, where the
defendant testified it would cost $5,000 to $6,000 to move the
fence off of the plaintiff’s property. (Madani v. Rabinowitz,
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) And, more directly relevant to
this case, in a case where the plaintiffs sought on the basis of a
San Francisco ordinance to remove a tree that blocked their view,
the court held that the nuisance was abatable. (Kahn v. Price
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 223, 238.)
       The Gevorgians do not claim that the trees were a
permanent condition under this standard. Instead, they argue
that the tolling provision in the 2009 agreement between the
parties supersedes the continuing nuisance doctrine. In the 2009
agreement, the parties agreed “to toll all statute[s] of limitations
and other time defenses that might be applicable to any and all
claims, actions, demands, losses or liabilities of each other” while
the agreement remained in effect. But as we noted above, “ ‘each
repetition of a continuing nuisance is considered a separate
wrong which commences a new period in which to bring an action
for recovery based upon the new injury. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Madani v. Rabinowitz, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) We do
not see how the Wolfsons’ 2009 agreement to toll their existing
claims prevented them from filing suit based on causes of action
that, under the continuing nuisance doctrine, are deemed to have
accrued years later, after the Gevorgians terminated the
agreement.
       The Gevorgians also argue that the 2009 agreement
equitably estops the Wolfsons from claiming that the trees are a

                                18
spite fence. We find this claim equally unpersuasive. The 2009
agreement was designed to resolve the dispute over the trees, and
if it had remained in effect to the present, the Gevorgians might
legitimately point to the agreement as the final resolution of the
dispute, barring the Wolfsons from bringing the present case.
But Gevorgian terminated the agreement in 2011, and the trees
continued growing. Nothing in the agreement itself suggests that
it would continue to prevent the Wolfsons from bringing legal
action after its termination, and we do not understand how the
Gevorgians could have reasonably believed the agreement
continued to protect them after they elected to terminate it.
D.    A Spite Fence Need Not Be Located Precisely on a
      Boundary Line
      The Gevorgians contend that the row of cypress trees
cannot be a spite fence because the trees are not located on the
boundary between their land and the Wolfsons’. Instead, a
wrought-iron fence marks the boundary.
      But a spite fence need not be located precisely on the
boundary between two properties. The court held in Wilson that
“a row of trees planted on or near the boundary line between
adjoining parcels of land can” constitute a spite fence.8 (Wilson,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1309, italics added.) We are aware of
no case law to the contrary, and for obvious reasons. If the spite
fence statute applied only to fences built exactly on a property
boundary, a landowner could defeat the intent of the statute
simply by building a fence inches away from the line.

      8 The Gevorgians cite this passage from Wilson in this
section of their opening brief, but they blithely ignore the crucial
phrase “or near” when making their argument.

                                 19
      In this case, the cypress trees were apparently close enough
to the property line that, in a 2009 email, Gevorgian asked the
Wolfsons if a landscaper could trim the cypress trees “from [the
Wolfsons’] side” of the property line, and Samuel Wolfson replied
that his “landscaper advises that he can trim the cypress [trees]
from our side of the fence.”
E.     A Spite Fence Need Not Offend the Senses
       The Gevorgians argue that the cypress trees do not meet
the definition of a nuisance under California law, in that they are
not “injurious to health, . . . indecent or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property.” (§ 3479.) Cases have
held that “a building or structure may not be complained of as a
nuisance merely because it interferes with the passage of light
and air to adjoining premises.” (Venuto v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 127.)
       The problem with this argument is that the Gevorgians
base it upon law pertaining to nuisances in general, not the spite
fence statute. As the court explained in rejecting a similar
argument in Wilson, “It might be true that, absent the spite fence
statute, a fence that interfered only with light and air would not
be a nuisance under the general definition of a ‘nuisance’ in . . .
section 3479. [Citation.] That does not mean, however, that a
fence which violates the spite fence statute must interfere with
something more than light and air to be a nuisance under that
statute. Section 841.4 specifically provides that a fence or other
structure in the nature of the fence that meets certain
requirements ‘is a private nuisance.’ Section 841.4 does not
specify that the fence must interfere with something more than
light and air to be a nuisance, and we are not at liberty to read
any such additional requirement into the statute.” (Wilson,

                                  20
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1310–1311, fn. omitted.) Indeed, the
history of the spite fence statute described earlier in this opinion
suggests that the statutory purpose is to protect access to light
and air.
F.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Relying on the
      LADBS Definition of “Hedge”
      The Gevorgians contend the trial court misinterpreted the
LAMC rules on fence and hedge height by relying on an LADBS
manual for its definition of the term hedge. According to the
Gevorgians, the LADBS manual, which defines a row of trees
planted less than three feet apart or with leaves intermingling
below six feet as a hedge, is not authoritative and is based on an
outdated version of the municipal code.
      We are not persuaded. The Gevorgians are correct that
although the municipal code restricts the height of hedges, it does
not define the term hedge. “ ‘When a term goes undefined in a
statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning.’ ”
(Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Sream, Inc. (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 721, 730, quoting Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan,
Ltd. (2012) 566 U.S. 560, 566 [132 S.Ct. 1997, 182 L.Ed.2d 903].)
The Gevorgians propose the following definition for hedge: “ ‘a
fence or a boundary formed by a dense row of shrubs or trees to
act as a fence.’ ”9 That definition is of little help, in that it does
not specify how densely planted a row of trees must be to

      9 The Gevorgians cite Webster’s Dictionary as the source of
this definition, but they cite no specific edition. We find a similar
definition in the online version of the Merriam-Webster
dictionary: “a fence or boundary formed by a dense row of shrubs
or low trees.” (https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hedge, def. 1.a [as of Nov. 21, 2023].)

                                   21
constitute a hedge. The Wolfsons offered the LADBS standard,
which, although not authoritative, has apparently guided the
LADBS in deciding this issue for decades. The Gevorgians could
have presented the court with an alternative standard under
which the row of cypress trees did not constitute a hedge, but
they failed to do so. The trial court did not err in relying on the
only available standard presented to it for deciding what
constitutes a hedge under the LAMC.
G.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
      Factual Findings
      The Gevorgians argue that, although the cypress trees were
more than 10 feet tall, they are not a spite fence because they do
not “unnecessarily exceed[ ]” that height limit. (§ 841.4.) They
also argue that the trial court erred by finding the trees were
“maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying
the” Wolfsons (ibid.) because even if the Gevorgians were partly
motivated by malice, that was not “the dominant purpose”
(Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313) for planting and
maintaining the trees.
      Although these arguments are framed differently, they are
closely related. The Gevorgians argue that malice was not their
dominant purpose in planting and maintaining the cypress trees,
but rather that they chose the trees because they were easy to
maintain and provided shade and privacy from the Wolfsons.
They argue the trees needed to be taller than 10 feet for the same
reasons. Regardless of how this is framed, it is primarily a

                                22
factual question—what was the Gevorgians’ primary motivation
for planting the trees?10
       We review the trial court’s factfinding in a bench trial for
substantial evidence. “This traditional standard of review is
highly deferential. It has three pillars. First, we accept all
evidence supporting the trial court’s order. Second, we
completely disregard contrary evidence. Third, we draw all
reasonable inferences to affirm the trial court. These three
pillars support the lintel: We do not reweigh the evidence.”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581.)
       The trial court heard testimony from Gevorgian regarding
his motivation for planting the cypress trees but found his
testimony “not credible for identifying the dominant purpose for
the tree-wall.” The court’s conclusion is amply supported in the
record. The Wolfsons introduced multiple emails from Gevorgian
in which he warned he would retaliate against them if they did
not comply with his wishes. In one email from 2003, just one
year after he bought the property, Gevorgian wrote that if the
Wolfsons did not accept what he offered them, they would “los[e]
more and more,” and if they “continue to try to take what is not
yours, this pattern will continue to a point in which you will lose

      10 The Gevorgians also challenge the trial court’s factual
findings on a third ground. They argue that the Wolfsons’
nuisance claim fails because “[t]here were no pictures admitted
into evidence showing blockages from the rear-view windows or
from vantage points in the backyard.” But Samuel Wolfson
testified that, as of 2020, the trees were visible from all the
windows of the house and were “one of the predominant features
of our backyard.” This was sufficient. There was no requirement
to introduce photographs to corroborate this testimony.

                                23
opportunity for any agreement.” Later he wrote, “Trust me when
I say that you can and will make matters much worse for yourself
if you continue to threaten me.” The trial court could reasonably
conclude from such statements that when the Wolfsons filed a
complaint with the LADBS and delayed construction on
Gevorgian’s house, he retaliated by planting the cypress trees
with the primary purpose of ruining the Wolfsons’ view.
        Other evidence also called into question the sincerity of
Gevorgian’s professed motivations for planting the trees. He
claimed he needed the cypress trees for privacy, but Samuel
Wolfson testified that even without the trees, the Gevorgian
house was not visible from the main level of the Wolfsons’ home.
He could see the Gevorgians’ home clearly only if he climbed
down to a rarely visited lower level of the back yard. Many of
Gevorgian’s complaints about the Wolfsons were pretextual.
Gevorgian claimed he needed the cypress trees because of
teenagers partying at the Wolfson house, but the Wolfsons’
youngest child was 35 years old in 2020. Gevorgian complained
in a 2017 email about a telescope on the Wolfsons’ balcony, but
Samuel Wolfson testified that he and his wife had removed the
telescope a decade earlier at Gevorgian’s request. “[I]n a bench
trial, the trial court is the ‘sole judge’ of witness credibility”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582), and
there is no reason to depart from that principle in this case.
H.    The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Barring
      Testimony from the Gevorgians’ Expert Witnesses
      The Gevorgians sought to introduce testimony from two
expert witnesses regarding LADBS procedures, but the trial
court barred them from testifying on the ground that their
testimony would be irrelevant. The Gevorgians allege this was

                               24
error. “[W]e review [the trial court’s] ruling excluding or
admitting expert testimony for abuse of discretion” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55
Cal.4th 747, 773), and we conclude that the trial court did not
exceed the scope of its discretion.
       The Gevorgians’ first expert witness was Thomas Ysasi, a
construction consultant who frequently dealt with the LADBS,
including on orders to comply and applying for variances and
modifications. Ysasi acknowledged, however, that he had no
experience with the municipal code provisions on trees and
hedges. The trial court barred Ysasi from testifying as an expert
regarding the variance process because “he’s not qualified to do
that” and “It’s not relevant.”
       The second expert witness was Eric Lieberman, whom the
Gevorgians’ attorney described as an “expediter” in dealing with
the LADBS. Lieberman stated that he had worked for years
obtaining variations and modifications from the LADBS to allow
projects to move forward, including some instances where the
rules regarding fences and hedges were at issue, and many
instances where his clients had to challenge an order to comply.
The court expressed skepticism as to whether Lieberman could
offer relevant testimony but allowed him to begin testifying
subject to a motion to strike. Lieberman testified briefly about
his view of the intent of the LAMC, after which the trial court
struck the testimony.
       The Gevorgians argue the trial court erred by barring the
expert testimony because the experts could have testified about
the city’s appeal and variance process, under which the
Gevorgians could have sought to contest the city’s order to
comply. This misunderstands the nature of the proceeding,

                               25
which was not an enforcement action brought by the city. The
primary question in this case was whether the cypress trees were
a private nuisance. The Wolfsons were able to bring causes of
action under the LAMC because, as we noted above (see
Discussion, Part C, ante), they alleged that the Gevorgians’
violations of the municipal code “work[ed] a special injury on”
them. (Major v. Silna, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1498–1499.)
As part of its inquiry, the court needed to determine whether the
Gevorgians’ trees indeed violated the relevant provisions of the
municipal code, and if the Gevorgians had sought to obtain expert
testimony on the question of whether the trees were a hedge or
produced a hedge-like effect, it may have been admissible. But
that was not the expert testimony they offered.
       Furthermore, even if the decision to bar the experts from
testifying constituted error, it would not require reversal because
the exclusion would have made no difference in the outcome of
the case. (Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 129, 185 [“A judgment of the trial court may not be
reversed for the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence
unless the error was prejudicial, resulting in a miscarriage of
justice”].) The Wolfsons alleged that the Gevorgians’ trees
violated not only the municipal code height restrictions, but also
its spite fence statute. That statute (LAMC, § 41.30) bars
malicious fences and hedges above six feet tall, with no apparent
allowance for variances or exceptions. The Gevorgians’ experts
professed no experience with that statute, which would have
required the same result in this case—to remove or trim the trees
in order to abate the nuisance.

                                26
I.     There Was Sufficient Evidence Supporting the
       Award of Damages
       The Gevorgians contend that no evidence supported the
trial court’s award of $50,000 in damages to Joyce Wolfson, and
$10,000 to Samuel Wolfson. We review a trial court’s award of
damages after a bench trial for substantial evidence (see
Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
481, 519), the same standard we described above (see Discussion,
Part F, ante). Under this standard, we affirm.
       “Damages recoverable in a successful nuisance action for
injuries to real property include not only diminution in market
value but also damages for annoyance, inconvenience, and
discomfort [citation]; actual injuries to the land [citation]; and
costs of minimizing future damages. [Citation.]” (City of San
Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 464.) Both Wolfsons
testified that the presence of the spite fence caused them to use
their backyard less often than they otherwise would have, and
that they find the view of the trees stressful and unpleasant.
Both estimated their total damages from the spite fence at
$50,000 per year.
       The Wolfsons’ estimate of the damages they suffered was
not tethered to any financial data, but this is the nature of
noneconomic damages. “ ‘ “ ‘No method is available to the [trier
of fact] by which it can objectively evaluate such damages, and no
witness may express his subjective opinion on the matter.
[Citation.] In a very real sense, the [trier of fact] is asked to
evaluate in terms of money a detriment for which monetary
compensation cannot be ascertained with any demonstrable
accuracy.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cameron v. Las Orchidias
Properties, LLC, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.) The lack of a

                               27
precise method of calculation does not mean that damages are
unavailable, and in this case, the trial court’s estimate was not
unreasonable given the Wolfsons’ testimony.
       The Gevorgians also argue that the trial court erred by
allowing Joyce Wolfson to offer her opinion as to the diminution
of the value of her property as a result of the Gevorgians’ trees.
Joyce Wolfson testified that she was a real estate broker, but she
did not claim to be an appraiser, and she offered no basis for her
opinion that her home was worth $100,000 less than it would
have been if not for the Gevorgians’ trees other than her
experience as a real estate broker. A property owner may testify
as to the value of her property (Evid. Code, § 813), but “is bound
by the same rules of admissibility as any other witness regarding
the value of real property.” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 935, 950–951.) In particular, an opinion on the
value of property must be “based on matter perceived by or
personally known to the witness or made known to the witness at
or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type
that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion as to the value of property.” (Evid. Code, § 814.)
       As with any other purported error involving the admission
of evidence, however, an error in admitting improper testimony
on valuation is reversible only if prejudicial. (Ajaxo, Inc. v.
E*Trade Financial Corp., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 185.) In
this case, any error was harmless because the statement of
decision shows the trial court did not rely on Joyce Wolfson’s
estimate of diminution in value as a basis for awarding damages.
In their proposed statement of decision, the Wolfsons requested
$125,000 each in damages. The trial court awarded them less
than 25 percent of that amount, with Samuel Wolfson receiving

                                28
$10,000 and Joyce $50,000. The court stated that its award was
based on the Wolfsons’ “loss of use and enjoyment of [their]
property as well as damages to Joyce . . . Wolfson for emotional
distress” (capitalization omitted). Thus, the trial court’s award
was attributable to noneconomic factors and was not based on the
diminution in value of the Wolfsons’ home. There is no
reasonable probability that the amount of the damages award
would have changed if Joyce Wolfson had not been allowed to
offer her opinion as to the loss in her home’s value.
J.     The Judgment’s Injunctive Provision Is Not
       Impermissibly Vague
       As part of the judgment, the trial court issued a mandatory
injunction ordering the Gevorgians “at their sole cost, [to] comply
with the strict letter of [LAMC section] 12.22C.20(f)(1)-(3),
without exemptions or exceptions, within 45 days of entry of
Judgment.”
       The Gevorgians contend that the injunction is too vague to
be enforced, in that it leaves several questions unanswered that
are necessary for them to comply with the injunction: “1.) how to
determine the grade elevations as this site . . . slopes and what
does ‘adjacent’ mean? 2.) how far apart can the trees be and does
that include the tree stump, the leaves, and what if the leaves are
trimmed and they grow back? 3.) is the wrought iron fence
considered the fence or are the trees considered the fence as the
intent of the ordinance is to not have a tall fence 4.) what is the
definition of a ‘hedge’ or ‘hedge effect’ and 5.) how do you define a
front yard versus side yard[?]”
       We are not persuaded that these alleged issues render the
trial court’s injunction so ambiguous that the Gevorgians cannot
“determine from the order what [they] may and may not do.”

                                 29
(Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 534.)
Given that the injunction simply mandates compliance with
certain provisions of the LAMC, plaintiffs in effect are
challenging those municipal code provisions as unconstitutionally
void for vagueness. We do not find the LAMC provisions at issue
impermissibly vague, as plaintiffs fail to overcome the “strong
presumption that statutes must be upheld unless their
unconstitutionality is clear, positive, and unmistakable.” (Ivory
Education Institute v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 975, 981.)
       In any event, the trial court addressed most of the
Gevorgians’ concerns in its statement of decision. First, the
record demonstrates that the court’s order pertained to the trees,
not the wrought iron fence behind them. Next, the trial court
implicitly accepted the LADBS inspectors’ interpretation that a
row of trees planted less than three feet apart or with leaves
touching below six feet constitutes a hedge. To the best of our
knowledge, the Gevorgians have never suggested or advocated for
an alternative definition. The question of what constitutes a
front or side yard is immaterial because under the relevant
provisions of the LAMC, the fence or hedge height requirements
are the same regardless. The question of how to measure the
height of the trees is of little consequence, as the LAMC
provisions referenced in the injunction make clear they are to be
“measured from the natural ground level adjacent thereto.”
(LAMC § 12.22C.20(f)(1).) Finally, the injunction creates a
continuing duty to comply with the LAMC. If the trees grow back
after they are trimmed so that they are no longer in compliance,
the Gevorgians must trim them again.

                               30
      The Gevorgians lastly complain that the trial court’s
direction that they comply with the LAMC height requirements
“without exemptions or exceptions” deprives them of their right
to seek a variance from the LADBS, or to appeal the LADBS’s
decision. Again, the Gevorgians have mistaken the nature of this
proceeding, in which the LADBS was not a party. The court’s
function here was to determine whether the Gevorgians’ cypress
trees were a private nuisance, and having done so, to craft the
appropriate remedy for that nuisance. The fact that the trial
court referred to the LAMC in crafting injunctive relief does not
mean that the Gevorgians were entitled to the ordinary LADBS
procedures for seeking a variance or appeal from the trial court’s
decision.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The Wolfsons
are awarded their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

                                31