Court Opinion

ID: 9711550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:34:11.444925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.836845
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: Robert C. Hall, the harassed homeowner in this case, bought his home in December 1974 for $45,000. At the time of the purchase, the home was in poor condition. Hall substantially improved the home by renovation, remodeling and repairs. The cost of this work exceeded $20,000. In January 1977, after completion of the renovation, the assessor for the city of Peoria increased the fair market value figure on the house to $88,680. This compares with the 1974 fair market value figure of $45,500. In other words, an increase in value of almost 95%. As authorized by statute, Hall filed an application for both the homestead improvement exemption and the homestead maintenance and repair exemption. The Peoria County Board of Review denied Hall’s petition. He then appealed to the Property Tax Appeal Board of the State of Illinois (the Board). During the subsequent hearings held by the Board, the Peoria City Assessor testified that the increase in valuation was not due to any improvements or repairs made by Hall, but rather stemmed from a general increase for the entire neighborhood. He testified that the increase was based upon a “sales ration study” for the area. He had never viewed Hall’s home, nor had any knowledge of the improvements and repairs. However, other evidence at the hearings adduced the fact that $19,050 of the home’s increased value was attributable to the improvements made by Hall and $8,450 attributable to repairs. Regardless, the Board affirmed the denial of the exemptions. Hall appealed. The Circuit Court of Peoria County reversed the Board and remanded for further specific findings as to the renovation and its effect on fair market valuation. On remand, the Board found that the improvements and repairs had together increased the value of the property by $27,500, but curiously found that none of this work resulted in the increase in assessed valuation. Hall again appealed, and the circuit court again reversed the Board. The maximum exemptions permitted under the statute were granted to the tenacious taxpayer. The Property Tax Appeal Board of Illinois and the Peoria County Board of Review brought instant appeal. In reversing the trial court, the majority renders the exemption statutes a nullity. Under the rubric of “plain meaning” the majority construes the statute so hypertechnically as to defeat the obvious legislative intent to provide not only relief but incentive to individuals to renovate their aging homes. Such legislative provision was intended to combat the blight of decay in older urban residential areas. In our judicial analysis we should certainly start with the plain meaning of the words- of a statute. However, words are not islands in meaningless juxtaposition. The statute must be read as a whole and with a view towards legislative intent. Courts have traditionally considered the consequences of alternative statutory interpretations. (Dignan v. Midas-International Corp. (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 188.) Where exquisite adherence to a perfectly precise literal definition of a word would result in absurdity, we should adopt an interpretation which would render the statute reasonable and wholesome. People ex rel. Simpson v. Funkhouser (1944), 385 Ill. 396; People ex rel. Cason v. Ring (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 305. Hall’s home before the renovation had a fair market value of $45,500; after the renovation, the fair market value increased to $88,680. Plaintiff’s testimony indicated that the collective improvements and repair increased the home’s fair market value by $27,500. Simple subtraction reveals that $15,680 of the increase was not attributable directly to the renovation. Therefore, the majority reasons, since the increased value is not due solely to the improvements, the exemption must be denied. In this case, the city assessor increased the value of all the homes in the neighborhood. This was done according to a fixed rate for all the homes. The present condition of each dwelling, the improvements or lack thereof were not considered by the city in arriving at the new valuation figure. While a municipality may properly increase valuations according to some rational formula, such increase should not defeat a homeowner’s lawful right to take advantage of legislative encouragement for home repair and improvement. We should not permit this blanket increase in valuation by the city of Peoria to defeat the exemption rightly earned by this homeowner. Taxpayer Hall, after all, is concerned with the valuation placed on his house. The valuations placed on the other houses are of interest only for purposes of comparison. Perhaps the other valuations were improperly increased? We do not know, since those valuations were not taken to court. Hall’s valuation is before the court. And the simple point is that with regard to Hall’s property, his improvements and repairs resulted in an increase in the fair market value of his home of $27,500. His claims for a homestead improvement exemption and a repair exemption under the statute were given no efficacy by either the Peoria County Board of Review or the Property Tax Appeal Board of the State of Illinois. The trial court, however, gave him relief. In reversing the trial court, the majority converts the tax exemption statutes to effectual nullities premised on the interpretation and construction of the statute that exemptions are allowed only if the increase in assessed value is attributable solely to a new improvement. In other words, if 10 cents of the increased value of one’s home is due to inflation, then the taxpayer’s claim to a home improvement exemption must be disallowed since it cannot be demonstrated that the increase in value is due solely to the improvements. Ho hum. The majority further finds that the taxpayer’s evidence as to repairs and the maintenance was insufficient. Again, I disagree. I agree with the taxpayer. I think that he abundantly demonstrated his entitlement to both exemptions. I would affirm the decision of the circuit court.