Court Opinion

ID: 9557861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:59:05.594439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:36.198556
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion of
ACOBA, J.
First, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that evidence in the record established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant-Appellant Omi Pantoja (Defendant) had a prior prostitution conviction. However, I respectfully express serious reservations about the majority’s analysis of this issue as it may affect future cases.
Second, I believe the record fails to demonstrate that Defendant’s prior prostitution conviction was counseled, and thus the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The majority adopts this position, but on rationale I cannot assent to.
I.
A.
As to the first issue, I do not agree with the majority’s emphasis on certain discrete factors in concluding that Defendant was the person described in the “Offender Identification Summary” (the abstract). These factors are elevated beyond the well-established and comprehensive rule already in place, and thus, invite confusion as to the appropriate standard to be applied.
*499B.
The majority relies on the abstract1 because it “contained physical identifying information” and then asserts that “[bjeeause Defendant was in the courtroom, the [District [Cjourt [of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division, (the court) ] had the opportunity to evaluate whether Defendant met the physical description of the Omi Pantoja referred to in the abstract.” Majority opinion at 1086 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). But, the fact that the court had the “opportunity” to do so is not linked to any proof in the record. There is nothing there to support the conclusion that the court actually compared the physical description- contained in the abstract with Defendant’s appearance. The majority, in a footnote, concedes that it “would have been preferable if the [court] had stated, on the record, that” the description matched the Defendant. Majority opinion at 1086 n.3. This implies that the court merely neglected to announce its finding, an implication not borne out by the record.
There is no evidence that at her sentencing hearing Defendant appeared to be of the requisite age, height, or weight stated in the abstract. Nothing was introduced to prove she was born at the stated place of birth. The abstract’s description of the “offender’s” race as being “0” was of no probative value.
I see very little factual basis for relying on racial factors. As the Hawai'i Supreme Court has noted, “[generally races, as selected populations differing in the frequency of occurrence of particular inherited characteristics, possess measurable physical traits which overlap considerably between groups of people.” Almeida v. Correa, 51 Haw. 594, 602 n. 9, 465 P.2d 564, 570 n. 9 (1970) (emphasis added). Thus,
[t]he. fact that [Hawai'i] represents a unique population, where interracial unions are common, only underscores the need for a focused examination of “racial characteristics” by the fact finder under expert guidance. See A. Montagu, Human Heredity 57 (2d ed.1963); Morton, Chung, Mi, Genetics of Interracial Crosses in Hawaii (Monographs in Human Genetics 1967). Most anthropologists agree that the Mongoloid, European and Negroid features are all “blended” in the Polynesian. See E. Hooton, Up From the Ape 616 (2d ed.1946).
Id. For similar reasons, I cannot agree that “the name ‘Omi Pantoja’ is rather unusual, at least in Hawai'i.” Majority opinion at 1086. Given the racial and ethnic diversity of Ha-wai'i and its global crossroads location, I would reject an uncommon name test.
II.
A.
Rather, the general rule to be applied in this state is that the prosecution must prove “the defendant being sentenced to be the same person who was previously convicted.” State v. Nishi, 9 Haw.App. 516, 528, 852 P.2d 476, 482 (1993). In Nishi, this court observed that “ ‘[u]nless conceded by the defendant, the [S]tate is required to show ... the fact of the defendant’s prior conviction[.]’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Afong, 61 Haw. 281, 282-83, 602 P.2d 927, 929 (1979)).
In State v. Holbron, 78 Hawai'i 422, 895 P.2d 173, reconsideration denied, 79 Hawai'i 424, 903 P.2d 729 (App.1995), the fact of a prior conviction was an element of the crime charged. A copy of a prior judgment was offered to prove the defendant’s prior conviction, without any other evidence establishing that defendant was the person referred to in the judgment. We said that “the State should have obtained ... testimony or evidence tying [the djefendant to the [prior] judgment.” Id. at 429-30, 895 P.2d at 180-81. Similarly, in State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai'i 507, 540, 928 P.2d 1, 34 (1996), the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that “[e]ven when a redacted copy of a judgment of conviction has been properly authenticated ... the prosecution must also adduce other testimony or evidence connecting the defendant to the previous judgment of conviction.” (Emphasis added.)
*500Thus, on appeal, this court’s inquiry should focus on whether Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaii (the State) has “identified the defendant being sentenced to be the same person who was previously convicted.” Nishi, 9 Haw.App. at 528, 852 P.2d at 482. Such an inquiry rests on an evaluation of all of the circumstances in the case.
B.
In my view, the relevant circumstances follow. The case was called as “Case 12A, Omi Pantoja” on the court’s calendar. The prosecutor read the charge against Defendant as being “the petty misdemeanor offense of prostitution in violation of [sjection 712-1200 sub-section (1) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes [ (HRS) ]” committed “on or about June 16, 1997 in ... the City and County of Honolulu.”
Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Daniel Bean testified he was a Honolulu police officer on the prostitution detail and that Defendant was Omi Pantoja, the person he had arrested on June 16, 1997, while on duty.
In the defense case, defense counsel confirmed with HPD Officer Wilson Lau that “Miss Pantoja was arrested on ... June 16, 1997.”
When Defendant testified, she stated her full name was “Omi Pantoja.”
With respect to the foregoing matters on the record, the abstract stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
NAME: PANTOJA, OMI
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2. ON 04/02/96, SUBJECT WAS ARRESTED BY THE HONOLULU POLICE DEPT FOR PROSTITUTION (HRS 712-1200 [ (1993) ]) WHICH IS CODED AS BEING A PETTY MISDEMEANOR. ON 07/11/96, SUBJECT WAS FOUND GUILTY. ON 07/11/96, SUBJECT WAS SENTENCED TO $500 FINE....
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4. ON 06/16/97, SUBJECT WAS ARRESTED BY THE HONOLULU POLICE DEPT FOR PROSTITUTION (HRS 712-1200) WHICH IS CODED AS BEING A PETTY MISDEMEANOR. ON 06/17/97, THE CASE WAS CONTINUED ... (HONOLULU DISTRICT COURT)....
The information in the abstract was corroborated in the record.
The previous prostitution conviction of July 11, 1996 reported in the abstract referred to the “subject.” The subject on the abstract had the same name as Defendant, who testified she was “Omi Pantoja.” The subject had been previously convicted on July 11, 1996, “for prostitution [under] HRS [§ ] 712-1200[ ] ... coded as ... a petty misdemeanor.”
The subject was again arrested by HPD on June 16, 1997, the date on which the HPD officers testified they arrested Defendant. The charge, according to the abstract, was for the same offense, HRS section, and grade for which Defendant was charged at trial and for which the subject had been convicted on July 11, 1996. The abstract refers to “(HONOLULU DISTRICT COURT),” the court where Defendant’s trial took place.
The foregoing circumstances were sufficient, in my opinion, to establish that Defendant was the “subject” referred to in the abstract, and to prove Defendant was the same person who had previously been convicted of prostitution.
III.
With respect to the second issue, I believe that Defendant’s sentence should be vacated and remanded because the record fails to demonstrate that Defendant had the benefit of counsel or had properly waived counsel in the prior prostitution conviction proceedings in accordance with our holding in State v. Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i 421, 435, 918 P.2d 228, 242 (App.1996).
While neither party directly raises this issue on appeal, I would recognize plain error in this case2 because the court itself was *501duty-bound to “ensure that any prior felony, misdemeanor, and petty misdemeanor convietion relied on was a counseled one.” Id.
A.
In this case, the abstract itself did not indicate whether Defendant was represented by counsel or waived her right to counsel at the time of her prior conviction. After receiving the abstract and hearing argument on the issue of whether the abstract sufficiently identified Defendant as the person in the abstract, the court simply ruled as follows:
All right. The [c]ourt is in receipt of the certified abstract of one, Omi Pantoja, social security number, 103-56-2260, setting forth ... [DJefendant’s conviction history for this offense in violation of [HRS § ] 712-1200. And the [cjourt is prepared to sentence ... [DJefendant in something other than a first conviction.
The sentence is a $500.00 (five hundred dollar) fine and 30 (thirty) days imprisonment. ...
(Emphasis added.)
In Sinagoga, we concluded that “the current rule in our jurisdiction ... prohibits the use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction as a basis for the imposition or enhancement of a prison sentence.” 81 Hawai'i at 434, 918 P.2d at 241 (emphasis added). This holding “applies] to uncounseled petty misdemeanors as well.” Id. Our reason for adopting this rule was “that in the absence of a valid waiver of counsel, an uncounseled conviction is not reliable for purposes of imposing or enhancing a sentence of imprisonment.” Id.
B.
We further observed that when prior convictions are “ ‘used to enhance the penalty for another offense, the record in each case must show that the defendant was represented by counsel during the alleged prior offenses of which he [or she] was convicted, or that he [or she] intelligently and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional right to counsel.’ ” Id. at 432, 918 P.2d at 239 (italicized emphasis and some brackets in original; underscored emphasis added) (quoting State v. Morishige, 65 Haw. 354, 367, 652 P.2d 1119, 1129 (1992) (internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citation omitted)). This is consistent with the Hawai'i Supreme Court’s direction that “[u]nless conceded by [a] defendant, the [S]tate is required to show ... the fact of [a] defendant’s representation by counsel, or the waiver thereof, at the time of his [or her] prior conviction.” Afong, 61 Haw. at 282-83, 602 P.2d at 929 (citations omitted). Further, “ ‘[p]resuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible.’ ” State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 638, 548 P.2d 632, 639 (1976) (quoting Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962)).
There is no question that Defendant’s pri- or conviction was offered by the State to enhance the penalty for her present conviction. The court used the prior conviction as the basis for imposing the greater penalty. Under Sinagoga, the court was required to ensure that the record demonstrated Defendant was represented by counsel on the prior *502conviction. 81 Hawai'i at 435, 918 P.2d at 242. The record discloses that the court failed to do that.
IV.
A.
In Part IV.B.4. of the Sinagoga opinion,3 the majority adopted a procedure for lower courts to follow in “ordinary sentencing” situations where “there is a possibility that the court may use [a] defendant’s prior conviction(s) as a basis for the imposition or enhancement of a prison sentence.” 81 Hawai'i at 447, 918 P.2d at 254. Under that procedure, after the court notifies the defendant of any prior conviction(s), the defendant is required to “respond with a good faith challenge on the record stating, as to each challenged conviction, the basis or bases for the challenge.” Id. While the Sinagoga challenge procedure would seemingly apply here, the majority disavows it and requires the State to prove a counseled conviction on the authority of Afong.
In doing so, the majority reasons that because the sentence here is a mandatory one, this case does not involve an “ordinary sentencing” situation, but is akin to Afong where mandatory minimum prison terms for “repeat offenders” were prescribed under HRS § 706-606.5 (1993). This assertion, however, directly contradicts its statement in Sinago-ga that the good faith challenge procedure applies “with respect to ordinary sentencing situations such as ... [Jmandatory minimums [.] ”4 81 Hawai'i at 444, 918 P.2d at 251 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, to the extent that this part of the majority’s holding may be read as partially overruling the Sina-goga challenge requirement, I would concur, but on the ground that all prior convictions relied on in imposing a prison sentence must be counseled. See discussion, infra.
B.
With all due respect to the majority, I see no gain in the distinction drawn by it. In Sinagoga, we recognized that only counseled prior convictions can be relied on by a court in imposing or enhancing a sentence of imprisonment as a matter of constitutional imperative. 81 Hawai'i at 435, 918 P.2d at 242. Our opinion in Sinagoga was based on the premise that “under our constitution, an un-counseled conviction is not reliable for purposes of sentencing.” Id. (emphasis added).
V.
Because the majority reaffirms the good faith challenge requirement, I must reiterate my disagreement with this procedure:
Since it is ordinarily the State which seeks to subject the defendant to an enhanced sentence, then it is the State which would know in advance of sentencing, whether it will rely on prior convictions at the sentencing hearing, and if so, which ones. I see no gain achieved in first requiring a defendant to make a “good faith challenge” before the State is put to the task that it would have to undertake anyway. The State is obviously the only party which can define that part of a defendant’s criminal record it will use to support its request for [enhanced] sentencing....
... I foresee a great deal of unnecessary time and expense engendered for *503both the State and the defense by the majority’s proposal, since the effort the defense expends in satisfying its “good faith challenge” will ultimately have to be duplicated by the State in verifying the prior convictions it relies on, as it must because of our holding prohibiting reliance on uncounseled convictions. ... It appears rational, logical, and efficient, to require the proponent of any evidence of a prior conviction to ascertain its validity and to carry the burden of going forward with proof in that regard. ...
... The majority also ignores the reality that the State and the court, through its probation office, as opposed to an individual defendant, have greater and easier access to law enforcement and court records. Ultimately, the administrative burden on the State of proving that the prior convictions relied on were counseled is minimal. ...
More importantly, however, I question the fairness of requiring a defendant, in effect, to disprove the State’s sentencing case. In the framework of HRS chapter 706, the burden is placed on the State to produce proof of the relevant prior convictions whenever prior convictions are used as a basis for an increased sentence. Ordinarily, the State would have the responsibility of presenting certified evidence that a prior conviction was a counseled one. State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 277, 602 P.2d 914, 925 (1979).
Placing the burden on the State is logically consistent with the fact that it is the State which seeks to enlarge an ordinary sentence, and thus, for the reasons of economy and fairness, it is the State which should come forward with proof of the validity of the relevant prior convictions. To require otherwise shifts the burden of going forward with the proof onto the defendant, contrary to the Hawaii Penal Code’s procedural approach to the enlargement of ordinary sentences.
Id. at 435-36, 918 P.2d at 242-43 (Acoba, J., dissenting in Part IV.B.4.) (footnotes omitted) (emphases added). See also Casenote, State v. Sinagoga: The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions in Hawaiii, 19 U. Haw. L.Rev. 813 (Fall 1997) (authored by Shirley M. Cheung) (suggesting that in contrast to the majority’s sentencing procedure set forth in Sinagoga, the “better rule” would be to “place the burden on the [State]” to prove that prior convictions had been counseled, or that the defendant had voluntarily waived his or her right to representation).
The majority now also affirms what it had only previously intimated, that is, that placing the burden on the defendant to challenge the convictions establishes a presumption that all convictions are counseled unless otherwise demonstrated by the defendant. Majority opinion at 1087. My objections remain the same:
Under the presumptive approach adopted by the majority, a defendant’s failure to raise an uncounseled conviction constitutes, in effect, a waiver of his state constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, without provision for the required procedures for the knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and permits the State to use such a conviction, even if uncounseled, in the sentencing process.
Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i at 437, 918 P.2d at 244 (Acoba, J., dissenting in Part IV.B.4.) (emphases in original).
I believe that Defendant’s sentence should be affirmed if the State proves the prior prostitution conviction was counseled. If this showing is not made, then Defendant should be resentenced.

. Because the issue is not raised, I do not reach the question of whether the "Offender Identification Summary” was an appropriate record from which a conviction may be proven or whether an appropriate foundation was established for its consideration in this case.

. The majority seemingly raises this issue sua sponte. At the time of sentencing, neither the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division (the court) nor the parties raised the issue of *501whether Defendant-Appellant Omi Pantoja (Defendant) had been represented by or waived her constitutional right to counsel at the time of her prior convictions.
On appeal, Defendant alludes to the issue:
In construing the application of the recidivist statutes consistent with due process, [Ha-wai'i cjourts have always held that before enhanced sentencing may be imposed, the prior conviction must be established by satisfactory evidence and the Defendant must have been represented by counsel or knowingly waive[d] representation at the time of the prior conviction.
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.)
With respect to the foregoing statement, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i (the State) observes that Defendant "states nothing else in her [ojpen-ing [bjrief on this topic," and, thus, "the State will not respond to any of Defendant's complaints on that irrelevant matter. The State maintains[J instead!,] that Defendant's prior conviction was established by satisfactory evidence as the primary issue in the State’s [ajnswering [bjrief." (Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the State's position, the obligation was on the court to find that the prior conviction was counseled before imposing a sentence of imprisonment premised on that prior conviction. Thus, it is my belief that this court may properly recognize plain error and address the issue.

. In State v. Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i 421, 437, 918 P.2d 228, 244 (App.1996), all members of our court were in agreement except with respect to Part IV.B.4. of the opinion.

. In footnote 7, the majority apparently attempts to distinguish its statement in Sinagoga from the present case by noting that the statutes it discussed in that case "vested discretion in the sentencing judge as to whether to impose the enhanced sentence." Majority opinion at 1087 (emphasis added.)
I do not believe that this is a correct statement, at least with respect to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-606.5 (1993) and State v. Afong, 61 Haw. 281, 602 P.2d 927 (1979), which concerned HRS § 706-606.5. The majority cites to HRS § 706-606.5(4), which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may impose a lesser mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without possibility of parole than that mandated by this section where the court finds that strong mitigating circumstances warrant such action.” (Emphases added.) Reading HRS § 706-606.5(1) and (4) in conjunction with each other, it is clear that the sentencing court has some discretion in determining the length of the sentence imposed, but absolutely no discretion as to whether to impose a mandatory sentence.