Court Opinion

ID: 9883260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:39:12.527097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:17.501885
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge:
dissenting.
I dissent to the Court’s decision in this case due to the fact Appellant did not object at trial. Had she done so, this may be a different matter, as the instructions were arguably somewhat confusing. The record reflects she did not object and given that an instruction defining murder by child abuse was given, I have no “grave doubts” this failure had a “substantial influence” on the outcome of the trial. Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okl.Cr.1994).
Appellant complains this is a strict liability crime, as it eliminated the requirement to prove criminal mens rea. That is simply incorrect.
A statute is not of the strict liability variety simply because it permits conviction of the defendant without proof that he *796was aware his conduct was criminal. Although a statute might be drafted in such a way that such awareness is required for conviction, ... in the absence of such a requirement there usually exists a mens rea requirement that defendant intend or know what he is doing in a physical sense (apart from knowledge as to its legality).
1 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 3.8 n. 1 (West 1986). A company who dumps Plutonium in the Cimarron River without knowing about it may be subject to punishment for violating a strict liability crime; a company who knows about it possesses a mens rea.
The following instructions were given at trial:
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
A person commits Murder in the First Degree when the death of a child results from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using or unreasonable force by said person or who shall wilfully cause, procure or permit any of said acts to be done upon the child pursuant to Section 843 of this title.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
No person may be convicted of Murder in the First Degree unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime. These elements are: First, the death of a human; Second, the death was unlawful; Third, the death was caused by the defendant; Fourth, the death was caused within a year and a day of the infliction of the injury causing death.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
“Malicious”—The term imports a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person.
“Torture”—Infliction of severe pain by unlawful acts.
“Unreasonable Force”—More than that ordinarily used as a means of discipline.
“Wilful”—Purposeful. ‘Wilful” does not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
(O.R. 129-31).
As I read the opinion, the instructions would have been sufficient had the definition of “willful” not contained the phrase “or to injure another.” See supra, at 795. It is this phrase “or to injure another” which troubles the majority. As the following discussion shows, there is no merit to this whatsoever.
The definition of “willful,” which the majority would believe is incorrect, is based on a statute. It reads:
The term “willfully” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
21 O.S.1991, § 92 (emphasis added). To say that the trial court did not define “willful” correctly is to say the statutory definition of the term, as passed by the legislative body of this State, is incorrect. This cannot be.
This Court has rejected the argument that the term “willful” means with a special intent. See Tarver v. State, 651 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Okl.Cr.1982) (appellant convicted of manslaughter in the killing of an unborn quick child; in rejecting his argument “willful” meant “specific intent,” this Court said “the word ‘willfully’ is equivalent to ‘knowingly,’ as opposed to ‘accidentally’ or ‘involun-' tarily.’ ”).
One need not “know” injury will follow in order to be guilty of a crime. The murder-by-child-abuse statute is in reality nothing more than a specialized form of felony murder. Cf. subsection B1 and Subsection C2 of Section 701.7 or Title 21. In such eases, a defendant need not have the intent to kill, or even to injure. Rather, it is the danger inherent in the felony itself which allows it to *797serve as a predicate for felony murder. See Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993, 1002 (Okl. Cr.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 878, 108 S.Ct. 35, 98 L.Ed.2d 167 (1987); Wade v. State, 581 P.2d 914, 915-16 (Okl.Cr.1978). It makes no difference whether a defendant intended to kill his victim after Mdnapping him, or even to injure him; it is sufficient that he knew the act was wrong. Likewise, it makes no difference whether a defendant intended to kill her child, or even to injure her; it is sufficient that she knew using unreasonable force against the child was wrong. That is a jury question, which here was resolved against Appellant.
The question at trial was whether this Appellant knew she was using unreasonable force against her child. If she was, by Legislative definition, she was doing an improper act; an act which, also by legislative definition, could serve as the underlying felony for a charge of first degree murder.
Because the opinion concedes the instructions adequately stated the applicable law; and because there was no error in defining a mens rea term the way the Legislature intended it to be defined, I must respectfully dissent.

. Which reads:
B. A person also commits the crime of murder in the first degree when he takes the life of a human being, regardless of malice, in the commission of forcible rape, robbeiy with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, escape from lawful custody, first degree burglary, first degree arson, unlawful distributing or dispensing of controlled dangerous substances, or trafficking in illegal drugs.

. Which reads:
C. A person commits murder in the first degree when the death of a child results from the willful *797or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable force by said person or who shall willfully cause, procure or permit any of said acts to be done upon the child pursuant to Section 843 of this title.