Court Opinion

ID: 9866549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 13:13:35.424596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:00.737182
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing. The motion for rehearing is on these grounds: “1. That the court erred in restricting appellant to an interest charge of 6% when the statute, chapter 152, Session Laws of 1919, permits a charge of 8% per annum. “2. That the court erred in holding as a matter of law that cross-appellants should be allowed a set-off for penalties already paid under protest.”  The first of these propositions is now presented for the first time. The judgment was not excepted to on that ground. It is not among the points relied on for reversal. ■On the contrary, appellant stated in its opening brief: “The sole question-raised by this .appeal, so far as the appellant is concerned, is whether or not the City , of Roswell could legally provide for the imposition of a penalty for failure on the part of property owners to pay paving assessments when they became due.” Well-established principles of review preclude consideration of the proposition at this time. On the second proposition, if we erred at all, we think it was in following appellant’s counsel in considering the credit demand as a set-off or counterclaim. The credit is for payments made on the very assessment sought to .be realized upon. Before there could be any relief, the amount remaining unpaid must be determined. The obligation or liability, even though not personal, is “the very foundation of the right to foreclose.” Young v. Vail, 29 N. M. 324, loc. cit. 353, 222 P. 912, 918, 34 A. L. R. 980. The defense of payment or part payment was of course open to the cross-appellants; and that without reference to or reliance upon the principles of set-off or counterclaim. Appellant was entitled to the foreclosure of its lien after the amount had been judicially established. The amount necessarily is the original assessment, with lawful interest, less payments made. That is really all this question amounts to. Appellant clouded the issue by invoking the inapplicable general principle that a suit to recover or enforce a tax is not subject to set-off or counterclaim. The motion for rehearing may stand denied. HUDSPETH, J., and OWEN, District Judge, concur. SADLER, BICKLEY, an'd ZINN, JJ., did not participate.