Court Opinion

ID: 9964350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 18:12:24.22642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:19.587927
License: Public Domain

J-S04029-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: B.M., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: D.M., FATHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 2161 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 25, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-DP-0002711-2018

 IN THE INTEREST OF: B.C.M., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: D.M., FATHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 2162 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered July 25, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000285-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                           FILED APRIL 29, 2024

      D.M. (“Father”) appeals from the July 25, 2023 decree granting the

petition of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his daughter, B.M. a/k/a B.C.M.

(“Child”), born in January 2013, pursuant to 23 pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
J-S04029-24

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1, 2 Father further appeals from the July 25,

2023 order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to the

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.             After careful review, we affirm the

termination decree and dismiss Father’s appeal from the goal change order as

moot.

        We glean the following factual and procedural history from the certified

record. In August 2018, in-home services were opened as a result of Mother

and Child’s youngest sibling, J.R., testing positive for illegal substances at the

time of his birth. Notably, Mother had a history of substance abuse and mental

health issues. See N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 21-22.

        DHS obtained protective custody of Child less than six months later, on

December 24, 2018, following J.R.’s death. Child was placed in kinship care

with a paternal aunt.3 At a shelter care hearing on December 26, 2018, the

court maintained DHS’s legal and physical custody of Child. See id. at 21,

31.

____________________________________________

1  By separate decree entered the same date, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of any unknown father. No unknown father
filed an appeal or participated in the instant appeals.

2Child’s mother, I.P. (“Mother”), is deceased. She passed away in March
2021 from a drug overdose. See N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 22, 54-55.

3 Child was placed with her younger sister, A.R., who is not a subject of this

appeal. At the time of the subject hearing, Child and A.R. were placed in a
pre-adoptive general foster care home, their fourth placement since coming
into care. See id. at 31-33, 41, 49-50.

                                           -2-
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       The court adjudicated Child dependent on January 4, 2019, and

established a permanency goal of reunification.4 The court further ordered

Father be referred for, inter alia, domestic violence services; to the Clinical

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for full drug and alcohol screen, dual diagnosis

assessment, monitoring, and 3 random screens; and to the Achieving

Reunification Center (“ARC”) for appropriate services.          See Order of

Adjudication and Disposition, 1/4/19, at 2. While the court ordered supervised

visitation, Father’s visitation was noted as suspended.5         See id.     In

furtherance of reunification, DHS established a single case plan with objectives

in conjunction with the aforementioned directives of the court.       See DHS

Exhibits 3, 4, 6 (single case plans); N.T, 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 27, 30, 43.

       Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted

regular review hearings at which it maintained Child’s commitment and

placement. The court consistently characterized Father as non-compliant with

the permanency plan. See DHS Exhibit 2 (dependency orders). Father also

has an extensive criminal history and was in and out of prison throughout the

dependency process. See N.T, 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 27-28, 30, 43, 47, 59,

67; see also DHS Exhibit 2 (dependency orders).

____________________________________________

4 On December 21, 2020, the court instituted a concurrent goal of adoption.

5 Visitation with Father was suspended due to the issuance of a Protection
from Abuse order against him on behalf of Mother and Child. See N.T.,
7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 36.

                                           -3-
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       On August 24, 2020, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination

of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5),

(8), and (b), as well as a petition to change Child’s permanency goal from

reunification to adoption.       After being continued and held in abeyance on

numerous occasions over the next several years, the trial court held a

combined evidentiary hearing on July 25, 2023.

       Father, who was incarcerated and not present, was represented by

counsel.    Captain William Hans, Commanding Officer Philadelphia Sheriff’s

Office, Family Court, testified as to efforts to secure Father’s presence and/or

participation at the July 25, 2023 proceeding. See N.T, 7/25/23 (Volume 1),

at 11-16. Specifically, Captain Hans testified that Father’s name appeared on

a list of inmates to be brought to court that day as a result of a “bring down”

request.6 Father was removed from his prison housing unit and brought to

the receiving room, where he refused to get on the bus for transport and

“caused a disturbance.” Id. at 11-12. In response to further inquiry from the

court, Captain Hans reported that Father additionally refused to participate in

the hearing via video conference.7 Id. at 14.

____________________________________________

6 The record reveals previous bring down requests in September 2022,
November 2022, January 2023, March 2023, and April 2023. Notably, the
court acknowledged that in April 2023, Father similarly refused to get on the
bus for transport to court. See id. at 7-8, 10.

7 Subsequently, when given the opportunity to question Captain Hans
regarding this specific inquiry by the court, counsel for Father then raised an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Counsel questioned Child, then ten years old.8        Additionally, DHS

presented the testimony of former Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case

manager Selvin Belzine, and current CUA case manager Isabel Robles.

       By decree dated and entered July 25, 2023, the trial court involuntarily

terminated Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). By separate order also dated and entered

July 25, 2023, the court also changed the Child’s permanency goal from

reunification to adoption.

       On August 23, 2023, Father, through court-appointed counsel, filed

timely notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Father’s appeals

were consolidated by this Court sua sponte on September 5, 2023. The trial

court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 13, 2023.

       On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of Father under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

____________________________________________

objection based upon hearsay. The court noted counsel’s objection but found
Father’s refusal to participate deliberate and of his own volition. See id. at
15-16.

8 Child was represented by a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal
counsel, Susan Rubinovitz, Esquire, and Angelina Dagher, Esquire,
respectively. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). While both joined DHS’s argument
in favor of termination and goal change at the conclusion of the subject
hearing, see N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 78, neither submitted briefs to this
Court.

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       2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of Father under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?

       3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of Father under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?

       4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of Father under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?

       5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of Father under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

       6. Whether the trial court erred by determining it to be in the
       child’s best interest to change the goal from reunification to
       adoption?

       7. Whether it was a violation of Father’s due process rights by not
       granting a continuance because Father was not brought to the
       goal change and termination of parental rights hearing and he was
       not available to participate by video so that he could have an
       opportunity to be heard and participate meaningfully in the
       hearing?

       8. Whether it was error to allow hearsay testimony by a
       Philadelphia Sheriff Supervisor to testify about why Father was not
       brought to court and why Father did not participate by video at
       the goal change and termination of parental rights hearing?

Father’s Brief at 5-6 (cleaned up) (suggested answers omitted).9

____________________________________________

9  We note with disapproval Father’s failure to cite to the record in the
statement of the case portion of his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) (requiring
in part, “A closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form, of all
the facts which are necessary to be known in order to determine the points in
controversy, with an appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the
record where the evidence substantiating the fact relied on may be found.”)
(internal citation omitted). However, as we are able to discern the general
issues raised and related arguments, and as we perceive no prejudice, we
proceed with the merits of Father’s appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (stating,
“Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the
requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Our standard of review in this context is well-established:

       In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
       appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
       decree of the termination court is supported by competent
       evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
       accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
       determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
       orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
       an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
       unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

       An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
       reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
       facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
       may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
       of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
       will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
       courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
       hearings.

       In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
       court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
       decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
       child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
       protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
       significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
       child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
       party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
       evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
       convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
       without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

       The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See

____________________________________________

case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in
the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal
or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.”).

                                           -7-
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.       The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven

enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a).             Only if the court

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the

petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing

evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d

343, 359 (Pa. 2021).

       In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the

underlying decrees, however, we need only agree with the court’s decision as

to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b). See

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we

limit our discussion to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),10 which provide as follows:

          (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
          child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
          following grounds:
____________________________________________

10 This corresponds with Father’s second and fifth issues.Given our disposition
herein, we need not address Father’s first, third, and fourth issues.

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                                     ...

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
            neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
            to be without essential parental care, control or
            subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
            being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
            abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
            remedied by the parent.

                                     ...

         (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for

termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super.

2021). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs,

not the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read

to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong

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continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of

the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect

for reuniting it.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted) (emphasis in

original).    Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not limited to affirmative

misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform

parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021),

abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1110 n.23

(Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent

efforts    towards   the   reasonably    prompt   assumption    of   full   parental

responsibilities. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      In In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), our Supreme Court,

in addressing Section 2511(a)(2), concluded,

      incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor,
      in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under §
      2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a
      parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without
      essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes
      of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

Id. at 328-29.

      In concluding that DHS established the statutory grounds to terminate

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a), the trial court stated as

follows:

      Child was adjudicated dependent on January 14, 2019. The record
      and testimony presented at the termination hearing demonstrated
      Father’s ongoing inability to provide care for or control of his child.
      Father’s failure to remedy the conditions that brought Child into
      care indicate a continuing disregard of his parental duties. Father

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      was derelict in achieving his single case plan objectives. Father’s
      drug use and frequent periods of incarceration continued
      throughout the life of the case. Father appeared unwilling to work
      with CUA as ordered by the court and his lack of cooperation was
      to his detriment.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/23, at 8.

      Father, however, argues that any incapacity can be remedied.                He

asserts that he participated in parenting and anger management while

incarcerated,   as    well    as   two-month    consistent   visitation   while   not

incarcerated. See Father’s Brief at 18-19. This argument fails.

      Upon review, the record supports grounds for termination under Section

2511(a)(2). The record reveals that Father failed to complete his goals aimed

at reunification of which he was made aware, and which remained consistent

throughout the dependency proceedings. See N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at

25-27, 30, 36-37, 44-45; see also DHS Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 (single case

plans and letters).    As detailed supra, the court conducted regular review

hearings at which it consistently characterized Father as non-compliant with

the permanency plan.         See DHS Exhibit 2 (dependency orders); see also

N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 57, 61. Further, both Ms. Belzin and Ms. Robles

indicated that Father failed to comply with referrals to the CEU for assessment

and screening, as well as referrals for services including domestic violence,

parenting, anger management, and employment. See N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume

1), at 34, 39, 46, 60.

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      Additionally, Father has an extensive criminal history and was in and

out of jail throughout the dependency proceedings. See id. at 27-28, 30, 43,

47, 59, 67. As to this impact, Ms. Belzin testified as follows:

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And did that have an impact on the case
      planning?

      THE WITNESS: Yes.

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: His going in and out of jail?

      THE WITNESS: Yes.

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: What type of impact did it have?

      THE WITNESS: Case manager was not able to maintain regular
      contact with [F]ather. Father wasn’t able to go to submit the
      randoms. He wasn’t able to do the dual diagnosis or the drug and
      alcohol.

Id. at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Moreover, at the time of the subject hearing, Father was incarcerated.

See id. at 7, 10. Based upon the bring down requests in the certified record,

it appears that he had been incarcerated since at least September 2022. The

nature of the specific charges and length of sentence are not clear from the

certified record. It is thus entirely speculative when and if Father will be in a

position to care for Child. This prospect is simply unacceptable for Child, who,

at the time of the hearing, had already been in care for over four years.

      Hence, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding

that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) is warranted.        The record

substantiates the conclusion that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity,

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neglect, or refusal has caused Child to be without essential parental control or

subsistence necessary for her physical and mental well-being. See A.H., 247

A.3d at 443. Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. See

id. Father’s failure to comply with his objectives in furtherance of reunification

has caused Child to be without essential parental control or subsistence

necessary for their physical and mental well-being. Further, that he has done

so for over four years belies any suggestion of future compliance and progress.

As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a

parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope

for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.

2006).

      Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords “primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”          23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b).   “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.            The

‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond.”         See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267

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(internal citations omitted).   As our Supreme Court recently explained in

Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023):

      [A] court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must consider
      more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from
      severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the
      parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b)
      analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is
      necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the
      bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
      needs and welfare.

K.T., supra (emphasis added).

      The evaluation of a child’s respective bonds is not always an easy task.

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.”   In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).

      In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must

also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing

an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must

consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record,

including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency and the length of

time in foster care [. . .]; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of

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love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.”   Id. (footnote omitted); see

also id. at n.28 (emphasis in original).

      Preliminarily, Father baldly asserts that the evidence is insufficient to

terminate his parental rights under Section 2511(b).       He requests therapy

sessions with Child to re-establish a bond with her. See Father’s Brief at 21-

22. As such, we conclude that any assertion of error as to Section 2511(b) is

waived for failure to address this issue in a meaningful way or develop it a

meaningful fashion with citation to pertinent legal authority and/or reference

to the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(d); see also In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330,

339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super.

2010)) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim

with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”); see also In re

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted)

(reiterating that a claim is waived where an appellate brief fails to provide any

discussion of the claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop

the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review).

      Even if not waived, we would deem Father’s claim to be without merit.

Instantly, in determining that termination was additionally proper under

Section 2511(b), the trial court found that Child shared a parent-child bond

with her foster mother. The court stated as follows:

      The trial court noted that Child is placed in foster care with a
      supportive caregiver. The trial court found that the testimony and

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      evidence indicated that Child and her caregiver share a parental
      bond, and the caregiver is providing for Child’s daily emotional
      and physical needs. In contrast, the trial court found that Father
      lacked the capacity to address Child’s basic emotional and physical
      needs.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/23, at 8-9 (cleaned up); see also id. at 12 (“It

was clear to the trial court from the testimony that a parent/child bond existed

between the Child and her current caregiver.”). In support of its conclusions,

the court continued:

      Ms. Robles testified that Child does not want to see or hear from
      Father and noted that Child refused to engage in a virtual visit
      with Father because he disparages her deceased mother
      whenever they speak. Ms. Robles informed the court that Child
      wishes to remain with her current caregiver. Ms. Robles testified
      that Child is bonded to her current caregiver and refers to her as
      [“Auntie.”] Ms. Robles does not believe that terminating Father’s
      parental rights would irreparably harm Child. Ms. Robles testified
      that it is in Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be
      terminated so that Child would be free for adoption with her
      current caregiver as Child looks to the caregiver for her daily
      needs. Ms. Robles described a loving relationship between Child
      and her current caregiver. She stated that they are very well
      bonded and that Child feels safe and secure in the caregiver’s
      home.

      Child also testified about her relationship with Father and her
      feelings toward her current caregiver. Child testified that she does
      not have a relationship with her father, and she does not want to
      live with him. She added that he has never taken care of her,
      never taken her anywhere, and never given her a gift. She
      testified that she does not want to be around Father and that
      Father feels like a stranger to her. She told the court that her
      father is nothing to her and that she wishes to have no future
      contact with him and wants to continue living with her current
      caregiver.

      Ms. Robles testified that Father has not completed any of his SCP
      objectives throughout the course of this case despite being
      ordered to do so by the court on numerous occasions. She added

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       that Father has been in and out of jail throughout this case and,
       with the exception of the two months of supervised visits,11 has
       made no effort whatsoever toward reunification.

Id. at 11-12 (cleaned up) (citations to record omitted).

       On cross-examination by Child’s GAL, Ms. Robles testified as follows:

       [CHILD’S GAL]: Who meets [Child’s] daily needs?

       THE WITNESS: The caregiver.

       [CHILD’S GAL]: Who do[es she] look to when [she is] sad or sick?

       THE WITNESS: The caregiver.

       [CHILD’S GAL]: Who do[es she] look to as [her] parental – who
       do[es she] have [a] parental relationship with?

       THE WITNESS: The caregiver.

       [CHILD’S GAL]: Do[es she] have any sort of parental relationship
       with [her father]?

       THE WITNESS: No.

       [CHILD’S GAL]: What is [Child’s] demeanor when you mention her
       father?

       THE WITNESS: She gets very upset. She gets angry. She gets
       triggered . . . . Like she holds her fist, and she gets angry, and
       she just shuts down.

       [CHILD’S GAL]: So the near mention of him is very upsetting?

       THE WITNESS: Very.

____________________________________________

11 Ms. Robles testified that Father engaged in supervised visitation for a period

of two months from March through May 2021. She explained that a single
visit was “cut short” as he “appeared under the influence.” Thereafter, Father
stopped attending visits and Ms. Robles eventually learned that Father was
incarcerated again. N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 46-49, 67.

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      [CHILD’S GAL]: Would it cause . . . any irreparable harm if . . .
      biological father[’]s and any unknown father[’]s parental rights
      were terminated?

      THE WITNESS: No.

N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 62-63. Describing Child and A.R.’s relationship

with their foster mother, Ms. Robles further observed, “And then being with

[their foster mother] they’re just so – they love her. They are so well bonded

and everything as you know they know that she’s going to take care of them.”

Id. at 64.

      This was confirmed by Child’s legal counsel, who also reported that Child

was doing well and wanted to remain in her current foster home. See id. at

70-72. Child’s counsel stated, “Your Honor, as a result of my interaction with

[C]hild, observing [C]hild for over an hour in the home, her comfort level, I

will submit that [C]hild is well adjusted and is being loved and cared for. And

it’s obvious that [her foster mother] cares for [her].” Id. at 72.

      As the trial court’s findings pursuant to Section 2511(b) are supported

by the certified record, and free from legal error, we will not disturb them.

Father and Child do not share a necessary and beneficial relationship pursuant

to Section 2511(b). See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Indeed, the record reveals

no parent-child bond exists between Father and Child. Rather, Child shared a

parent-child bond and beneficial relationship with her foster family, where she

desires to remain.

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       Given our disposition concerning termination, Father’s challenge of the

goal change order, reflected by his sixth issue, is moot.12 See Interest of

A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-1273 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding issues

regarding goal change moot in light of termination of parental rights); A.H.,

247 A.3d at 446 (“[T]he effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s

termination decree necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision

to change Child’s goal to adoption”).

       Lastly, we will address Father’s seventh and eight issues together, as

they are interrelated. Specifically, Father asserts that the trial court violated

his guarantee of due process under the 14th Amendment of the United States

Constitution for failure to grant a continuance as he was not able to

meaningfully participate in the subject proceeding. See Father’s Brief at 23-

24. He further argues that the trial court erred in its consideration of hearsay

testimony with respect to this determination.        See id. at 24-25. Father’s

claims are without merit.

       It is well-settled that infringement on parental rights implicates a natural

parent’s 14th Amendment right to due process. See Interest of A.P., 692

A.2d 240, 242 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that natural parents have a

“fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of

____________________________________________

12 Even if not moot, for the reasons we have already discussed throughout
this memorandum with respect to termination, the record confirms that
changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption is in her best interest. See In
re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-1089 (Pa. Super. 2011).

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their children”) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct.

1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). “It has long been established that the

right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of one's

children is one of the oldest fundamental rights protected by the Due Process

Clause of the United States Constitution.” In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 979–80

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 885 (Pa. 2006),

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1304, 127 S.Ct. 1876, 167 L.Ed.2d 363 (2007). “Due

process requires nothing more than adequate notice, an opportunity to be

heard, and the chance to defend oneself in an impartial tribunal having

jurisdiction over the matter.” In re J.N.F., 887 A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. Super.

2005). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as

the situation demands.” In re Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297, 300

(Pa. Super. 1996) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct.

893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

      As the record is devoid of any request for and denial of a continuance,

any such claims would be waived for failure to raise them before the trial

court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues not first raised in

lower court); see also Interest of T.M., 239 A.3d 193, 201 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(“[O]ur Supreme Court has frequently stressed the necessity of raising claims

at the earliest opportunity to eliminate the possibility that an appellate court

will be required to expend time and energy reviewing claims on which no trial

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[court] ruling has been made.”) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis omitted).

        Moreover, the trial court concluded that “Father’s absence was a result

of his own doing.”       Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/23, at 10.       As the court

explained at the time of the subject hearing:

        The [c]ourt finds that [Father]’s reluctance to participate in this
        hearing is his own doing. . . . And of his own volition. . . . I find
        that [Father] has deliberately refused to participate. Given
        opportunities to come down on April 13th as well as July 25th.
        And as well as the ability to participate video, by video conference
        today. So I find that [Father]’s refusal is his own doing. . . .

N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 15-16. Indeed, Father was appropriately served

and for at least the second time refused to attend and/or participate. See

DHS Exhibit 9 (service documents); N.T., 7/25/23 (Volume 1), at 7-8, 11-14.

Notwithstanding, Father was represented by counsel who represented his

interests throughout the proceeding.        Any claims challenging due process

thus fail.

        Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree involuntarily terminating

Father’s parental rights and dismiss the appeal of the goal change order as

moot.

        Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed.

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Date: 4/29/2024

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