Court Opinion

ID: 9574833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:49.332784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:32.785826
License: Public Domain

PRATT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The prevailing opinion has jumped into two conclusions from a premise that will support only one.
Let us quote the provision in Volume 1, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, pertaining to the professions, that was repealed and not included in the Revised Statutes of 1898.
*333It reads:
“To license, tax and regulate lawyers, surgeons, physicians, dentists, and other like professions * * ' *.”
At the time that the quoted section appeared in the laws of 1888, the following section also appeared:
“To raise revenues by levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any private * * * business within the limits of the city * * (For purposes of this discussion this is the same as Sec. 15-8-80 in the prevailing opinion.) (Italics added.)
Obviously the legislature at that time did not think that the word “business” included “professions,” so a section was put in the law to cover “professions.” (The first quotation above.)
The Boreman case holds:
“By repealing the clause providing for licensing and taxing lawyers, and enacting the general clause referred to, leaving lawyers and the professions generally out of such re-enactment, impels the conclusion that the legislature intended to deprive the cities of the power to impose a license fee or tax upon lawyers that they had formerly possessed. There must have been an object and purpose in this deliberate repeal in one section and omitting to insert its provisions in the act as re-enacted, having special reference to licensing and taxing in cities. And when subdivisions 87 is considered with reference to subdivision 38 and the repeal of subdivision 6 of Sec. 288, it is evident that it was not intended that lawyers should be licensed or taxed under its provisions.” (Italics added — subdivision 6, Sec. 283 is the first quotation above.)
Subdivision 38 referred to is the one which is comparable to section 15-8-39, U. C. A. 1943, quoted in the prevailing opinion. It enumerates the various kinds of business that may be licensed and regulated. It is the present detail of this section which the prevailing opinion says we need not consider any longer. The reason? Because Section 15-8-80, U. C. A. 1943 (quoted in the prevailing opinion), includes these words:
«* • * * no enumeration of powers of cities contained in title 15, chapter 8, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby conferred.”
*334This brings us to the conclusion, adopted by implication in the prevailing opinion, that is not supported by that premise.
It is true that the clause last above quoted, throws the field wide open for the application of Section 15-8-80, U. C. A. 1943, to all kinds of business; but there is no reason nor logic for concluding that as the result of the opening of that field that “professions” have suddenly become kinds of “business” and thus included in the terms of Section 15-8-80. The distinction between a profession and a business is still recognized.
We have repeatedly recognized the practice of law as a profession. We’ve recognized it in our cases by using such terms as “legal profession,” or “professional capacity.” Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P. 2d 325, 144 A. L. R. 839; In re Jones, 68 Utah 213, 249 P. 803. We recognize it in our rules governing “Professional Conduct.” Section 6-0-14, U. C. A. 1943, refers to “professional” misconduct. These are but a very few specific instances pertaining to lawyers. Section 79-9-18, U. C. A. 1943, defines “unprofessional conduct” as it applies to the medical profession. Section 79-6-8, U. C. A. 1943, defines the “unprofessional conduct” in the practice of dentistry. It seems rather superfluous to mention these facts, but I wish to emphasize the point that “profession” and “professions” are not just passing words to be discarded as merely decorative of a means of livelihood. It is interesting to note that the Commission who enacted the Ogden City ordinance in question were very particular to define “engaging in business” as including “the rendition of services by persons engaged in any profession.” (See Section 20b of the Ordinance.) If “business” included “profession” this was sur-plusage.
The State has not authorized the cities to license professions.
*335There is no question about the fact that under proper authority and under proper enactments cities may license the professions. Abraham v. City of Roseburg, 55 Or. 359, 105 P. 401, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 599; 5 Am. Jur. 269, Sec. 13 and notes. Newlin v. Stuart, 273 Ky. 626, 117 S. W. 2d 608.
Little or nothing has been said about the wording of this ordinance. I can’t escape the belief that, as the majority of this court upholds it as a valid exercise of city licensing power, it will become the foundation for similar enactments throughout the State. If so, I think it is so broad and uncertain as to how it will be applied to the professions, that it cannot be justly enforced. The power of final determination of the amount of the license lies with the City Recorder (Sec. 18) who presumably will be a layman unfamiliar with what is meant by the practice of law, and upon whose shoulders will lie the burden of deciding issues under such provisions as:
“Only receipts from that portion of business engaged in within the corporate limits of” — blank city — “shall be included in gross receipts as used herein.” (Sec. 20c.)
The practice of law is not defined by the ordinance, nor are any rules provided to aid the Recorder in allotting business between offices if an attorney conducts an office in each of two cities and his practice is State wide. Such broad unrestricted power as is contemplated by the ordinance will lead to arbitrary action.
WADE, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of PRATT, C. J.