Court Opinion

ID: 9552210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:06:20.756442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:45.436603
License: Public Domain

OPINION HERNANDEZ, Judge. This is the second time that this Workmen’s Compensation case has been before us, Martinez v. Earth Resources Co., 87 N.M. 278, 532 P.2d 207 (Ct.App.1975). However, it is not necessary to refer to the prior appeal with the exception of the following part of the judgment which was affirmed: “That as a natural and direct result of said accident proximately caused within the scope of plaintiffs employment said plaintiff has been totally disabled since the date of the accident on December 25, 1972 and will be totally disabled for a period of six months from the date of trial January 4, 1974 which will be July 4, 1974 at which time the Plaintiff may bring the matter before the Court for a determination of his disability status as provided by law.” [Emphasis ours.] On April 26, 1976, plaintiff filed a petition requesting a hearing to determine his disability status and alleging that he was disabled. In support of his petition he attached a letter dated March 9, 1976, by the doctor who had treated him at the time of the original injury indicating a continuing disability and a “distant” possibility of surgery. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, upon what grounds we do not know, since a copy of the motion does not appear in the record. However, at the hearing on the motion defendants argued that plaintiff’s motion was barred by Section 59-10-13.6(A), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1974) which provides in part: “If an employer or his insurer fails or refuses to pay a workman any installment of compensation to which the workman is entitled * * *, after notice has been given * * *, it is the duty of the workman * * * to file a claim therefor * * * not later than one [1] year. * * * [I]f the workman fails to file a claim * * * within the time required * * *, his right to the recovery of compensation and the bringing of any legal proceeding for the recovery of compensation are forever barred.”  We would note parenthetically that defendants’ contention that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional is erroneous. The statute of limitations is a privilege which defendant may interpose or which he may waive or be estopped by his conduct from asserting. Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, 85 F.Supp. 410 (D. N.M. 1949). “Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent of the parties, much less waived by them.” State ex rel. Over-ton v. New Mexico State Tax Com’n., 81 N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613 (1970); Martinez v. Research Park, 75 N.M. 672, 410 P.2d 200 (1965).  The trial court in granting defendant’s motion stated the following as its reasons for doing so: “It was the intention of the Court in going back and interpreting Paragraph 6 of the Final Judgment that was entered in this case, the Court found that the petitioner was disabled for a period of six months beyond the date of the trial, and gave to the Petitioner an opportunity to come before the Court at the expiration of that period of time in the event that he felt, based upon medical testimony, that that time should be expanded. “The Court feels that the authority in this case is governed by Section 25 of the Workmen’s Compensation law and not the general statute of limitations within the statute itself. I believe that the petitioner has exceeded the time that was given to him for purposes of making that determination, and it was not the Court’s intent to give to the Petitioner an unlimited time in which to make the determination that he did need an expansion or enlargement of the time.” [Emphasis ours.] The plaintiff alleges four points of error. However, we need consider only two of the questions raised in order to resolve this appeal: Whether plaintiff’s petition was barred by § 59-10-13.6(A) supra; and whether the trial court had the authority to place a time limitation on plaintiff’s right to petition to re-open the original judgment to determine if his disability had increased or become aggravated. Section 59-10-25(A), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1974) provides in pertinent part: “The district court in which any workman has been awarded compensation . may, upon the application of the . workman . . ., fix a time and place for hearing upon the issue of claimant’s recovery and if it shall appear upon such hearing . . that the disability of the workman has become more aggravated or has increased without the fault of the workman, the court shall order an increase in the amount of compensation allowable as the facts may warrant. Hearings may not be held more frequently than at six-month intervals . . . .” As can be seen, there is no time limit in the section within which applications specified must be filed. Our Supreme Court in Norvell v. Barnsdall Oil Co., 41 N.M. 421, 70 P.2d 150 (1937), which involved an application for decrease or termination, answered the question of whether there was unlimited time in which to file applications and whether § 59-10-13.6(A), supra, fixing the time limit within which to file the original claim for compensation, applied to applications to reopen: “[An] application to decrease or terminate compensation under a prior award not being an original proceeding is not affected by the provision of the act fixing the time within which original proceedings for compensation must be instituted and is not affected by the Code provision applicable to modification of judgments generally, and in the absence of controlling statute or rule may be presented at any time within the period for which compensation is allowable . . .” The maximum duration of benefits at the time of plaintiff’s accident on December 25, 1972, was 500 weeks. Therefore, his application filed on April 26, 1976, was timely.  The trial court was obviously under the impression that § 59-10-25, supra, gave it the authority to place a time limitation on when plaintiff could file an application to reopen. The trial court was mistaken; there is no such provision in this section or in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Did the trial court, as a court of general jurisdiction, nonetheless have inherent authority to impose such a limitation? The answer is no. “[T]he Workmen’s Compensation Act of New Mexico is sui generis and creates rights, remedies and procedures which are exclusive.” Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The legislature having granted the substantive right to reopen the original judgment and having established the procedure for enforcement thereof, the courts cannot nullify or change such a right or the procedure. “We are not authorized judicially to eliminate rights conferred by the legislature.” Gonzales v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 51 N.M. 121, 179 P.2d 762 (1947).  For the guidance of the trial court upon the rehearing of this matter we think it is necessary to comment further on jurisdiction. Section 59-10-13.7, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1, 1974) provides in part that: “Claims to recover compensation benefits shall be filed in district court and shall be in the nature of a civil complaint wherein the workman shall be designated ‘plaintiff’ and his employer and the insurer shall be designated ‘defendants.’ ” This section satisfies the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. The defendants subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they entered a general appearance in the original action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Should it be determined that plaintiffs disability continued beyond July 4, 1974 and should plaintiff be awarded further compensation beyond what he has already received, then in awarding attorney’s fees the trial court should take into consideration the services of plaintiff’s attorneys in this appeal. Appellant is to be allowed $1,250.00 for the services of his attorneys. IT IS SO ORDERED. LOPEZ, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., specially concurring.