Court Opinion

ID: 9695431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:19:22.691035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.379099
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting)- — I understand how the majority decides this case, but I am in doubt as to why. I know the result, but do not understand the reason.
The majority cites no authority for its decision. So far as I can discover any basis for the ruling made, it is that the court was busy and perhaps did not have time to consider the application for continuance during the term; it had inherent power *926to continué the" application for continuance to the next- term; it had discretion to continue the matter to the next term; and “We do not think the language of the rule or any previous decision of'ours” compels a holding that the- continuance must be made at the dismissal term.
I do not agree that the inherent power of the court, or its discretion, permitted it to abrogate the plain meaning of rule 215.1, R. C. P. As I read the rule, its language is decisive. So far as pertinent,Ahé rule says:
“All cases at law or in equity where the petition has been filed more than one year prior to July 15 of any year shall be for trial at the next term commencing after August 15 of said yeai;. * * * . ■ ;.
.“All-such cases shall be assigned and tried or dismissed without prejudice .at plaintiff’s costs unless satisfactory reasons for want of prosecution or grounds for continuance be shown by application and'ruling thereon after notice and not ex parte, # * * . . .
“No continuance under this rule shall be by stipulation of parties alone but must be by. order of court.” -(Italics supplied.)
It is clear beyond dispute that the rule means that all cases to which it refers must be tried or continued at the “next succeeding term” after the notice is given by the clerk. That is the purpose of the rule. But without citation of authority the majority eliminates the words “and ruling thereon” from the rule. It would not be contended that an application for continuance filed at the term following the “try or continue o.r. dismiss’? term would be timely, or that the inherent power of the court, or its discretion,- would -permit it to consider it. But rule 215:1 does not, bjr its terms, contemplate that it is sufficient to file a -motion for continuance during that term, with ruling thereon to be made during a later term.It' says “by application and’ ruling thereon.” ■ The plain language of- the rule requires that 'the motion be ruled upon during the “try or continue or dismiss” term. A case in which the motion for continuance is filed during the term; but no ruling is made, is not continued during that term; No continuance is had merely by the filing of a motion therefor; it is made only-by-the ruling of-the court. .
*927Our cases have uniformly proceeded upon the theory that a cause must be dismissed unless it is tried or continued during the next term after the clerk’s notice is givén. In Talbot v. Talbot, 255 Iowa 337, 341, 122 N.W.2d 456, 459, we said: “Thus it may be said the case, when so noted for trial, is automatically placed in the assignment and, unless it is tried or continued by proper order of court during that term, it is to be dismissed.” (Italics supplied.) In Windus v. Great Plains Gas, 254 Iowa 114, 123, 116 N.W.2d 410, -415, we held: “Nowhere in the' rule does the permissive word ‘may’ appear, but the mandatory verb ‘shall’ appears eight times. * * *■ Only" under "the conditions specified in the rule is there any authority for its suspension, and in those cases only where there is a finding made of record.” In Windus v. Great Plains Gas, 255 Iowa 587, 592, 593, 122 N.W.2d 901, 904, we again stressed the words “[unless] satisfactory reasons for want of prosecution or grounds for continuance * * * be shown by application and ruling thereon.” In Gammel v. Perry, 256 Iowa 1129, 1133, 130 N.W.2d 550, 552, we stated this rule: “From the second Windus case, supra, * * * and the rule itself, the alternatives are 1, assigned and tried, 2, dismissal without prejudice and 3, continued upon showing of satisfactory reasons for want of prosecution or grounds for continuance by application and ruling thereon after notice and not ex parte.” It is true that in the latter case we said that it was only necessary to decision to hold the motion for continü’ance must be on file prior to the expiration of the next' term after August 15. ' ’ ■
It is also true that in Gammel and in the other cases fr<M which excerpts are quoted above no motion for continuance had been filed. So it may be thought that our pronouncements therein were merely dieta. I suggest, however, that in each case we were dealing with the meaning of a new rule," and interpreting it for the benefit of the courts and litigants. The expressions must be taken as the considered views of this court, in which all justices concurred. If the statements were dicta they were considered dicta and entitled to much-weight. They were not inadvertent expressions made without thought; they were intended as a guide to the legal profession in operating under rule 215.1. *928Moreover, they were in exact accord with the language of the rule itself; fairly interpreted, it says plainly there must be a ruling during the “try or continue or dismiss” term.
The holding of the majority is an invasion not only of the letter but of the spirit of the rule. It constitutes a weakening of the purpose for which the rule was enacted; it gives another opportunity for delay in the trial of cases, which the rule was intended to remedy. Now the majority interjects the matter of discretion of the courts in dealing with the rule, a consideration which we have uniformly rejected in previous cases.
■Stress is placed upon the late date upon which, the motion for continuance was filed, and the fact that the court may haA^e been too busjT to hear' it before the end of the term. But the burden of securing a continuance, if a ease cannot be tried, is placed upon the applicant, by the rule. Surely the fact that the case could not be tried must have been apparent a sufficient time before the end of the term that the motion could have been filed more promptly. ■ And the detennination of a motion for continuance is not ordinarily a difficult or time-consuming matter. If we are to consider these extraneous matters, it is also proper to note that the major delay in the ease was due to the failure of the plaintiff to file a recast petition in accordance with the court’s order, for a period of seA^eral months; that this petition was finally filed on October 17, 1964, and the end of the September term in Shelby County was either October 28 or 24; so that it must have been known to the plaintiff for a considerable time that the case could not be tried at that term. The motion for continuance was not filed until October 21, and notice given to the defendant by mail on October 23, one or two days before the close of the term.
I'do not agree that these things permit a change in the clear meaning of the rule. I recite them to shoAV that the rule is not as harsh on this point as the majority urges. In any reasonable situation the endangered party will know far enough in advance that a continuance may be necessary so that an application can be filed and notice given well before the end of the term. So it was here. There is no showing, in fact, that the plaintiff asked In’s motion be heard before the end of the term; so far as the *929record shows he acquiesced in the order setting it for the next term. Even in the limited time, if he had requested it, the court might well have given him a hearing before the end of the term. But he delayed his compliance with the order of the court to recast his petition unduly, and until the case could not be tried at the September term; he delayed filing his motion for continuance until almost the end of the term; and he made no protest when his motion was set for hearing at the next term. The rule is plain, and should be followed as written, or amended or repealed by proper procedure, which does not mean by a ruling of this court which ignores clear and unequivocal language.
I would reverse.
LarsoN, J., joins in this dissent.