Court Opinion

ID: 9520543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:43:14.894176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:24.852548
License: Public Domain

NAJAM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that "the reasoning set forth in Jeff-boat and Beene is the better rationale for determining the reasonableness of an employer's attendance policy," and that Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(d) "is written in the disjunctive such that we may analyze an attendance issue under section (d)(2) or section (d)(8)" Op. at 482, 484. In Jeffboat and Beene, this court analyzed a claimant's entitlement to unemployment benefits under Section (d)(@2), rather than Section (d)(8), even though those claimants were terminated for ab*485sence-related issues. See Beene v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Employment & Training Servs., 528 N.E.2d 842 (Ind.Ct.App.1988); Jeffboat v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment See. Div., 464 N.E.2d 377 (Ind.Ct.App.1984); but see Love v. Heritage House Convalescent Ctr., 463 NE.2d 478, 482 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (holding that "(al rule which subjects an employee to discharge for exeused, as well as unexcused{,] absences[ ] is unreasonable" for purposes of Section (d)(2)). I cannot agree with the majority's holdings, and I vote to reverse the Review Board's determination of Beck-ingham's claim for benefits and remand with instructions that it consider her claim under Section (d)(8).
I would follow the reasoning of the majority opinion in Giovaronmi. There, this court held as follows:
Having examined the relevant case law, and mindful of the [Unemployment Compensation Act's] purpose to provide benefits to individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own, we believe that Love, rather than Jeffboait, provides the sounder model for determining eligibility for unemployment benefits when an employee is discharged for attendance issues. Under Love, an attendance rule that subjects an employee to discharge for excused as well as unexcused absences is per se unreasonable, but an employee who is discharged for problem attendance will be disqualified from unemployment benefits if the employee cannot show good cause. We believe that Love protects the employee from a denial of benefits where good cause exists for absences and tardiness, yet does not restrict the employer's right to terminate an employee who violates its attendance rule. In contrast, Jeffboat and Beene expose an employee to disqualification and a denial of benefits even where the employee is absent or tardy with good cause and suffers termination through no fault of his own. We think that the risk of inconsistent results will be reduced if discharges due to unsatisfactory attendance, whether or not pursuant to an attendance rule, are analyzed under Section (d)(8) as was done in Love. Thus, we agree with Judge Mathias that termination for unsatisfactory attendance must be analyzed solely under Section (d)(8).[1]
Giovanoni v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 900 N.E.2d 437, 443-44 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (emphasis original); see also Ind.Code § 22-4-1-1 (stating that the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to "provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own ") (emphasis added). In contrast to Giovanoni, the majority here applies the holdings of Jeffboat and Beene. In doing so, the majority asserts that following those holdings will "protect[ ] [an employer] against an employee *486who abuses the policy by being frequently ill." Op. at 483 (quotations omitted). But unemployment benefits do not strip an employer of its right to terminate an employment relationship on the basis of absenteeism. Rather, they merely provide terminated employees with relief in the event that their absenteeism is "through no fault of their own." Ind.Code § 22-4-1-1; see also Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(8) (stating that employees terminated for ab-senteecism are entitled to unemployment benefits if that absenteeism is for "good cause").
The majority also holds that Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(d) "is written in the disjunctive," and, accordingly, this court must apply Section (d)(2) to give effect to the statute's plain meaning. See op. at 488-84; see also Giovanoni, 900 N.E.2d at 445 (Brown, J., dissenting) (noting that it is up to the General Assembly to change the wording of the statute if Section (d)(2) is not intended to apply to attendance issues). Undoubtedly, an unambiguous statute must be given its plain meaning. But applying Section (d)(2), which applies only generally to "enforced rule[s] of an employer," to attendance issues nullifies Section (d)(8), which applies specifically to "unsatisfactory attendance." In interpreting a statute, we must "strive to avoid a construction that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous." Vanderburgh County Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh County Democratic Cent. Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 511 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). The majority's construction of Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(d) renders Section (d)(8) both meaningless and superfluous to Section (d)(2).
Finally, the General Assembly, in drafting Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(d), must have been aware of the likelihood that the "enforced rule[s] of an employer" would generally include rules on attendance. See Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(@). Yet the General Assembly still included a specific provision pertaining to "unsatisfactory attendance." Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(8). Another rule of statutory construction "directs that a more specific statute will supersede a more general one." State v. Downey, 770 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind.2002). Here, application of that rule of statutory construction requires that Beck-ingham's claim for benefits be analyzed under the more specific provision of Seetion (d)(8) rather than under the more general provision, Section (d)(2).
The ALJ and the Review Board here only considered Beckingham's claim in light of Section (d)(2). Because the only issue is whether Beckingham is entitled to unemployment benefits in light of her absenteeism, I would hold, in accordance with Giovanoni and our rules of statutory construction, that the ALJ and the Review Board erred as a matter of law by not considering her claim under Section (d)(8). As such, I vote to reverse the Review Board's decision and remand for consideration of Beckingham's claim in light of Section (d)(8).

1. Judge Mathias expressed this viewpoint in two separate cases of similar names. See Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 735 N.E.2d 1197, 1206-07 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (Mathias, J., concurring in result), trans. denied; Stanrail Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Review Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (Mathias, J., concurring), trans. denied ('Stanrail I"). I also concurred in Stanrail I, albeit not separately, and I note that we expressly did not address the conflict between Jeffboat and Love in that case. Stanrail I, 734 N.E.2d at 1105-06 ("'Even assuming the parties are correct with respect to the conflicting nature of the holdings in Jeffboat and Love, we must decline the invitation to resolve that conflict."). Instead, we held that the Review Board erred for basing its decision on employment policies unrelated to the stated reason for termination and for disregarding the facts found by the ALJ. Id. at 1106 ("In this case, the Board erred in going beyond the stated reason for discharge and taking the opportunity to review all facets of Stanrail's employment policies.").