Court Opinion

ID: 9639208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:08:15.218616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:14.031179
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent and would affirm on the basis of the unpublished Superior Court opinion which follows:
Before Rowley, Hester and Roberts, JJ.
*63MEMORANDUM:
Appellant James Hoare alleges he was injured on May 10, 1979 when he fell on a sidewalk. An action in trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County was instituted by summons issued on May 8, 1981 by appellants James Hoare and his wife against Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania,1 and Monarch Furniture Company, a corporation t/d/b/a Slumber City. On August 28, 1981, appellants filed a motion to add Milton Kotler as an additional defendant pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2252. The lower court en banc denied the motion on June 16, 1982. A timely appeal was filed therefrom on July 12, 1982. We reverse.
The issue is whether appellants may amend their pleadings and add an additional defendant after the statute of limitations has run.
The facts may be briefly summarized. The injuries occurred on May 10, 1979. At the time of the accident, Slumber City was owned and operated by Milton Kotler as a sole proprietorship. Kotler also owned and operated Monarch Furniture Company as a sole proprietorship. Both of these entities were registered under the Fictitious Names Act.2 Furthermore, Monarch was registered as “Monarch Furniture Company t/d/b/a Slumber City.”
On November 19, 1979, some six months following the accident, Monarch Furniture Company was incorporated. The assets of Slumber City were transferred to Monarch. All outstanding stock of Monarch was owned by Kotler and his wife. Kotler was designated President of “Monarch Furniture Company, a corporation, trading and doing business as Slumber City.”
This action was instituted by Writ of Summons in Trespass on May 8, 1981. Appellants’ interrogatories were filed on July 2, 1981. By order of July 2, 1981, appellants were granted twenty days after appellees filed their answers to *64the interrogatories to file a complaint in trespass. Appellees filed their answers on August 21, 1981. Appellants filed their motion to add Kotler as an additional defendant on August 28, 1981.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033 provides: A party, either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at any time change the form of the action, correct the name of a party or amend his pleading
Our rules allow liberal amendment of the pleadings in order to secure a proper determination of the merits. Saracina v. Cotoia, 417 Pa. 80, 208 A.2d 764 (1965); Spain v. Vicente, 315 Pa.Super. 135, 461 A.2d 833 (1983). See Tate v. MacFarland, 303 Pa.Super. 182, 449 A.2d 639 (1982).
Appellees contend that appellants are attempting to add a new and unrelated party after the statute of limitations has run. The Supreme Court has agreed with similar arguments, but only in certain circumstances. Girardi v. Laquin Lumber Co., 232 Pa. 1, 81 A. 63 (1911). See also Saracina v. Cotoia, supra (which held that an amendment to a complaint, after the statute of limitations had run, to bring in a new party to the action where there was no indication that defendant had concealed the identity of the party, could not be permitted).
The operative test is whether the right party was sued, but under a wrong designation. If such is the case, an amendment of the complaint should be permitted. It has been found proper to permit an amendment whose effect is to correct the name of the defendant, for example, an individual for a business entity, after the statute of limitations has run. Wicker v. Esposito, 500 Pa. 457, 457 A.2d 1260 (1983); Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 436, 89 A.2d 527 (1952); Fretts v. Pavetti, 282 Pa.Super. 166, 422 A.2d 881 (1980); Pattinato v. Moody, 248 Pa.Super. 32, 374 A.2d 1302 (1977). But Cf. Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa.Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984).
In Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., supra, the court noted that in certain circumstances the word “company” *65used in the name of a business enterprise reasonably suggests a corporation. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to amend, noting further that his error in pleading may have resulted from deception, whether intended or not, by the defendant.3
The instant case presents an analogous fact situation. The name “Monarch Furniture Company” was maintained throughout the change of form from sole proprietorship to corporation.4 Moreover, answers to interrogatories which disclosed the corporate status were delayed. We note that appellants have not raised the issue of fraud or concealment. Nonetheless, appellants should not be prevented thereby from pursuing their action. Cf. Cianchetti v. Kaylen, 241 Pa.Super. 437, 361 A.2d 842 (1976).
Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

. The sidewalk upon which the injuries were sustained was owned by Bell Telephone. It was raining and appellant slipped on a piece of styrofoam.

. 54 P.S. § 28.1.

. Note: In 19 Pa.Code § 17.B(c), Corporations and Business Associations, the use of the word "company" or any derivation or abbreviation thereof by a proprietorship or corporation shall be permissible.

. Appellee’s answer to appellants’ interrogatory # 13 was that prior to November 19, 1979, Monarch Furniture Company, corporation, "was operated as a sole proprietorship by Milton Kotler t/d/b/a Monarch Furniture Company.”