Court Opinion

ID: 9733793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:17:27.852482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:56.294807
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLACE,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Termination of parental rights issues are extremely difficult. Each ease requires a delicate balance between the overlying constitutional considerations of the right of a parent to care and provide for one’s child, and “the State’s parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347, 736 A2d 1246 (1999). That balance is struck “through the best interest of the child standard.” Ibid. The Legislature adopted that standard, which was set forth by this Court in New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 512 A.2d 438 (1986), for the termination of parental rights. As codified, the standard provides that parental rights may be terminated upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) The child’s safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his foster parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child’s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a.]
*515Here, the focus is essentially on the third prong; thus, we are concerned with whether there was clear and convincing evidence that DYFS sufficiently considered alternatives to termination of parental rights. Before explaining why I agree with the Appellate Division that DYFS did not, some further background is required.
Initially, I approach this case with the admonition that “all doubts must be resolved against termination of parental rights.” K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347, 736 A2d 1246. In many cases, the evidence is overwhelming that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. However, in the situation where a grandparent or a close relative is the caregiver, our case law provides greater flexibility. In AW., supra, the Court expressly recognized that a common alternative to termination of parental rights is placement with a relative. 103 N.J. at 609, 512 A.2d 438. In reaching that conclusion, the Court quoted a law review article to the effect that:
When a child is placed with a relative, termination is both unnecessary and unwise unless the relative wishes to adopt the child or is unwilling to provide long-term care. As long as the relative is willing to provide care until the parents can resume custody, the child’s need for stability and attachment are satisfied. In fact, initiating termination might place the relative in the awkward position of having to act against the parents.
[Ibid, (quoting Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of Children from, Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L.Rev. 623, 697 (1976)).]
The Legislature reached that same conclusion and expressly gave DYFS discretion not to file a petition seeking the termination of parental rights if “[t]he child is being cared for by a relative and a permanent plan for the child can be achieved without termination of parental rights.” N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.3a.
In the present case, the Appellate Division canvassed the record and found insufficient reasons “why a permanent plan for the children could not be achieved without termination of parental rights.” I agree.
The children have been cared for consistently by their grandparents. J.P., since she was twenty months old, has been with her *516paternal grandmother, and B.P., since birth, has been with her maternal grandmother. Under those circumstances, an appropriate alternative to termination of parental rights may be kinship legal guardianship. N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7. This is “another alternative, permanent placement option, beyond custody, without rising to the level of termination of parental rights, for caregivers in relationship where adoption is neither feasible nor likely.” N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-lc. A kinship legal guardian is a caregiver
who is willing to assume care of a child due to parental incapacity, with the intent to raise the child to adulthood, and who is appointed the kinship legal guardian of the child____ A kinship legal guardian shall be responsible for the care and protection of the child and for providing for the child’s health, education and maintenance.
[N.J.S.A 3B:12A-2.]
Kinship legal guardianship is different from termination of parental rights in that: (1) the birth parent “retains the authority to consent to the adoption of the child or a name change for the child”; (2) the birth parent remains obligated to pay child support; and (3) the birth parent maintains the right to enforce a visitation agreement. N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6e. In addition, kinship legal guardianship does not destroy any rights the child may have “relating to inheritance or eligibility for benefits or insurance.” Ibid.
In my view, DYFS and the law guardian failed to recognize and investigate whether a permanent plan could be developed with the present relative caregivers without the necessity of termination of parental rights. Further evaluation and efforts by DYFS may reveal that this is an appropriate ease for kinship legal guardianship. Moreover, because there are separate grandparents caring for different children, it may be that kinship legal guardianship may be appropriate for one child but not for the other. Simply put, the record does not support the conclusion that DYFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that it pursued alternatives to termination of parental rights.
To be sure, the wisdom of the Appellate Division holding has been borne out by developments after that decision. Prior to oral *517argument, DYFS informed the Court that although the maternal grandmother remains committed to adopting B.P., the paternal grandmother no longer commits to the adoption of J.P. DYFS added that an updated bonding evaluation conducted by Dr. Dyer revealed that the “unique nature of the relationship that has developed since the trial of this matter between J.P. and her biological parents is such that adoption may not serve her best interest.” Consequently, DYFS advised that the petition before the Court as to J.P. may be moot.
In sum, given the history of this case, including the continuing affectionate relationship between the parents and their children, the progress of the parents in their respective recovery efforts, the successful visitation between the parents and their children, and the uninterrupted relative placements, greater consideration should have been given to a permanent plan without the necessity of termination of parental rights.
Because the majority recognizes that changed circumstances requires the Court to conclude “substantially as has the Appellate Division and to remand for further ‘evaluation of the mother and father’ and consideration of any change in respect of the grandparents’ wishes vis-á-vis adoption,” I concur in the result.
For affirmance as modified/remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN — 4.
For concurrence in part/dissent in part — Justices YERNIERO and WALLACE — 2.