Court Opinion

ID: 9517782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:32:27.921051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:45.718716
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: The trial court sustained a motion to suppress defendant’s confession on the basis that the confession was involuntary because it was induced by a promise of help. Defendant made oral and written confessions that he mixed paint remover with the milk in his 14-month-old baby’s bottle, knowing that it would be fed to the child and in fact was ingested by the child. The trial court found that the defendant’s confession was based on a promise of help in the form of treatment rather than punishment. I respectfully dissent because I conclude that the interrogating officer’s remarks to the defendant preceding his confession cannot reasonably be construed as a promise of help or leniency to the defendant in exchange for his confession. In the instant case, the record discloses no evidence of any promise of any kind which prompted a confession. In addition, the evidence surrounding defendant’s confession in this case clearly demonstrates that defendant’s will was not overborne in any way, and that his confession was voluntary and not induced by any promise of leniency. Officer Loughran was the only witness who testified in the hearing on the motion to suppress. His undisputed testimony showed that shortly after his assignment to investigate the complaint of aggravated battery against the child, the first time he saw the defendant, who was married and 25 years of age, was at 10:30 p.m. in a police station interview room. The officer told defendant that he and his partner were investigating an aggravated battery. Officer Loughran read defendant his Miranda rights and defendant said he understood those rights and was willing to answer questions. Defendant was then taken to a different interview room in the police station. During the following hour, Officer Loughran spoke with the victim’s mother and with a brother-in-law. During this time the officer also spoke to defendant briefly on two or three occasions to inquire if defendant needed food, drink, or other essentials, but the officer did not question defendant regarding the crime, make him any promises, or talk to defendant in a threatening manner. The defendant did not indicate that he was unwilling to talk to the officers; defendant was alert and responsive and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Officer Loughran returned to question defendant at approximately 11:30 p.m. The officer first “explained to [defendant] that [the officer] had talked to a couple of people who were involved with the case and [that the officer] had additional information.” This information was that the police “could put [defendant] in the kitchen where the bottles were located in the refrigerator, and [that the police] had statements that were made stating that it [sic] was clinking of bottles and what have you in the kitchen and that he [defendant] was the only one present.” Defendant then asked Officer Loughran “what would happen if he was found guilty of this.” The officer explained the range of sentences which could be imposed if defendant were convicted. The officer further responded that the punishment was “out of our hands completely. It was basically up to the Judge.” After this conversation about the court system and the sentencing alternatives, which lasted approximately 10 minutes, defendant orally confessed to Officer Loughran his commission of the crime. This oral confession took approximately 20 minutes. The police officer then prepared a written report which stated the following: “After approximately one hour of periodically interviewing him, he asked that if he did do what he is accused of doing, he could get help. When told that he could get— probably get help through the courts, he related the following,” and that the defendant thereafter gave an oral confession. An assistant State’s Attorney was then called to the police station. Outside the presence of the defendant, the assistant State’s Attorney spoke to witnesses to the crime and then to Officer Loughran. Officer Loughran told the assistant State’s Attorney the substance of the defendant’s oral confession, that the defendant had asked about various sentences and help he might receive if he were found guilty, and that the officer had explained these to the defendant. Defendant was then given his Miranda warnings by the assistant State’s Attorney at approximately 1:45 a.m., and made an oral confession to the assistant State’s Attorney in the presence of Officer Loughran. Thereafter defendant also gave a written confession to the assistant State’s Attorney. Defendant asked no questions about sentence alternatives, felony probation, or psychiatric counseling during these periods of questioning by the assistant State’s Attorney. After the defendant signed the written confession, he included at the end of the confession “Jerry Shaw stated he is sorry this happened and that he wants help for himself and the police told him he can get help.” Based upon the foregoing, the trial court found, and the majority agrees, that the defendant’s confession was involuntary and predicated upon a promise of help. I disagree. The record here does not show that the defendant’s confession was involuntary because his will was overborne by an interrogating officer’s promise that he would receive help or would be given a particular sentence in exchange for that confession. Officer Loughran never promised defendant anything; he did not promise leniency, probation, or psychiatric counseling. The record is replete with Officer Loughran’s denial of any sort of promise. Rather, at best, the record shows that in response to defendant’s questions regarding forms of punishment if he were found guilty, that Officer Loughran informed defendant of possible sentences, including that he might receive felony probation and psychiatric treatment if he were found guilty. The defendant expressed in his confession his unilateral desire that he be given psychiatric counseling, and the police did no more than inform him that counseling was a possibility, available only if ordered by the court. Viewing the evidence most favorably to defendant, there are no words or conduct which might reasonably be construed as a promise of help. There are no words expressed, implied, or from which an inference could be drawn as indicative of any assurance that defendant would receive help or a particular sentence if found guilty. Officer Loughran unequivocally, repeatedly, and explicitly indicated to the defendant at all times during which they conversed that defendant’s sentence or expectation of help or counseling was totally within the control or discretion of the court. The trial court did not question the credibility of Officer Loughran. As justification for its conclusion that defendant’s confession was involuntary, the majority emphasizes that defendant requested that a sentence be added to the written statement he gave to the assistant State’s Attorney which said “Jerry Shaw stated he is sorry this happened and that he wants help for himself and the police told him he can get help.” The phrase, “the police told him he can get help,” was interpreted by the trial court and majority as a promise of help, without which he would not have confessed. In my view, the police telling him that he “can” get help is indicative of a possibility of help, rather than a promise of help. Black’s Law Dictionary states that the word “can” is “[ojften used interchangeably with ‘may.’ ” (Black’s Law Dictionary 186 (5th ed. 1979).) Defendant did not say that the police told him he would get help, but rather merely said the officer told him he “can” get help. The cases cited by the majority support the conclusion that there was no promise of leniency to render the confession involuntary. Neither the interrogating officer nor the assistant State’s Attorney in the case at bar assured the defendant that “nothing will come of this, probably you won’t stay overnight and we can get you some help,” as in People v. Veal (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 619, 500 N.E.2d 1014. Nor did the officer or the assistant State’s Attorney tell defendant that he would intercede on defendant’s behalf and recommend “the lowest” sentence, as in People v. Baine (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 604, 403 N.E.2d 57. Furthermore, similar to Veal and Baine, the record here does not show that defendant relied on a promise of leniency that overcame his free will and rendered his confession involuntary. I am persuaded that People v. Noe (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 762, 408 N.E.2d 483, upon which the majority also relies, further supports this conclusion. In Noe, although the police officer told defendant that professional help was a possibility, the appellate court emphasized that “no definite promises were made [to the defendant], but only vague suggestions of the possibility of psychiatric help. The possibility of leniency, to be distinguished from psychiatric help, was not even suggested.” (86 Ill. App. 3d at 766.) In concluding that the defendant’s confession in Noe was voluntary, the appellate court concluded that “the vague suggestions of the possibility of psychiatric help in the instant case were not likely to induce an innocent man to confess to the repugnant crimes involved herein.” 86 Ill. App. 3d at 767. The reasoning of the court in Noe is equally applicable to the case at bar. The statements of Officer Loughran here were at most vague suggestions that psychiatric help for defendant was a possibility. When considered in the overall context of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession, the officer’s representations in response to defendant’s questions were not likely to induce an innocent man to confess to mixing paint remover with milk in the victim’s baby bottle, knowing that it would be fed to the baby and in fact was ingested by the child. See also People v. Sellars (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 744, 750 (interrogating officers’ promise to seek low bond, conditioned on advice that ultimate decision on bond would be that of the judge, held to be an equivocal promise, and “not so coercive as to induce defendant to admit to a crime he did not commit,” citing People v. Carroll (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 946, 365 N.E.2d 1352). People v. Harris (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 91, 386 N.E.2d 933, relied upon by the State in this appeal but not considered by the majority, is closely analogous to the case at bar and also demonstrates that the defendant’s confession here was not involuntary. In Harris, the interrogating officers represented to the defendant, a heroin addict, that a number of programs were available to help with his drug problem. They also incorrectly informed the defendant with respect to a mandatory sentence to be imposed upon conviction of armed robbery. The court rejected defendant’s argument that “the interrogating officers’ representations regarding the availability of drug treatment programs and their misstatement of the minimum sentence for armed robbery amounted to broken promises of leniency which prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.” (69 Ill. App. 3d at 93.) The court reasoned that even though defendant was not eligible for sentencing and treatment under the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 91%, par. 120.1 et seq.) defendant failed to show that he would be denied access to other drug abuse programs. The court observed that the record was devoid of any indication that the officers’ statement about the prison term was a material factor in the defendant’s decision to make a confession. 69 Ill. App. 3d at 93. Similar to the circumstances in Harris, there is nothing in the record before us to show that Officer Loughran’s statements were intended as subterfuge or purposeful misrepresentation, rather than response to defendant’s inquiry. There is also nothing in this record to demonstrate that defendant would be denied access to psychiatric counseling if he were convicted. The record shows Officer Loughran repeatedly testified that he made no promises to defendant and repeatedly informed him that the nature of the sentence to be imposed was a decision which had to be made by a court. Although the officer referred to probation as a possible sentence, he never informed defendant that he would receive probation if found guilty. Since defendant’s confession makes no reference to the possibility of probation, the record does not indicate that Officer Loughran’s reference to probation was a material factor in the defendant’s decision to confess. It is undisputed that defendant was not physically abused, threatened, or coerced during questioning, and was given and waived his Miranda rights before he asked Officer Loughran about sentencing alternatives if he were found guilty. Defendant was questioned for only a short period of time while being held and was permitted access to food and drink. There is nothing to indicate that defendant was intimidated in any fashion, nor is there any evidence that defendant, who was 25 years old, was suffering from any physical or mental disability at the time he gave his confession. Accordingly, there was no evidence in this case from which the trial court could properly conclude that the defendant’s confession was involuntary. Although I am unable to find anything in Officer Loughran’s conversation with defendant that would support a promise of leniency or help, assuming that a promise of leniency were made, such promise is only one of many factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances attending a defendant’s confession. The proper inquiry is whether, on the totality of the circumstances in each particular case, a promise of leniency can be said to have overborne the defendant’s will, rendering his confession involuntary. (See, e.g., People v. Stachelek (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 391, 402, 495 N.E.2d 984; People v. Eckles (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 276, 470 N.E.2d 623; People v. Wright (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 747, 469 N.E.2d 351; see generally People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601.) The totality of the circumstances, detailed above in Officer Loughran’s undisputed testimony, does not justify a finding of involuntariness. Although the majority recites the rule that a confession must be considered in the context of all the circumstances surrounding the making of a confession, the majority failed to apply this rule to the facts of the instant case. The majority justifies its failure to consider all of the circumstances attending the defendant’s confession in the case at bar by observing that, in this case, “one factor [i.e., the alleged promise of leniency] so overwhelmingly overshadows the others as to support, in and of itself, a finding of involuntariness.” (180 111. App. 3d at 1095.) In my opinion, the record utterly fails to disclose a promise of leniency, such as to make unnecessary the consideration of other appropriate factors in the determination of the voluntariness of a confession. Proper application of binding precedent to the facts of this case demonstrates that the interrogating officer, given the circumstances presented here, made no promise of psychiatric help or leniency to the defendant to support a finding of involuntariness. Because the confession was not shown to be involuntary under the totality of the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the trial court’s decision was manifestly erroneous, is not supported by the evidence, and should be reversed.