Court Opinion

ID: 9578033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:52.278258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:24.916132
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I would affirm the district court. I believe that court recognized the necessary boundary line between that authorized and authorizable by the legislature and that authorized and authorizable by the courts. The district judge said in his opinion letter:
“I am frank to say that the State of Wyoming should provide strict liability without regard to causation for the discharge or emission of any pollutant into the waters or upon the lands of this state, * * * »
He went on to recognize the failure of § 35-11-301, W.S.1977, to do so. If he were in the legislature, the district judge would have enacted a strict liability requirement in the premises. But he recog*215nized that a majority of those who were in the legislature had not yet made the same decision.
The decision, one way or the other, would depend upon weighing the preciousness of every, drop of water to the state of Wyoming and the need for such to be pollution free against the cold economic facts of everyday life and the importance of national defense requirements. A strict liability statute could result in abandonment of pipelines or of an increase of five or ten cents per gallon for fuel. It could result in a boost to foreign competitors, and, in case of national emergency, the lack of an immediately available supply of necessary fuel for mobilized armed forces. But it could also result in the enjoyment of fishing and other recreational use for coming generations, and it could mean an availability of agricultural products necessary to survival. The point is that these considerations are for the legislature in enacting pertinent laws relating thereto1 and not to induce the courts to effect that which they might like to have the laws reflect.
Regardless of that which the legislature might do, the plain fact is that it has not as yet imposed the strict liability found by the majority opinion. It did not do so in enacting the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, § 35-11-101, W.S.1977, et seq. This for whatever reason we need not speculate. As noted by the trial court, §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302, W.S.1977, were patterned after the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and the legislative history negates them as a strict liability enactment with reference to unintended oil spills at other than point discharges (enlarged upon infra). This does not mean that the appellants had no recourse for recovery of penalties and damages, it only means that fault for the rupture must be established.2 Scurlock Oil Company v. Harrell, Tex.Civ.App., 443 S.W.2d 334 (1969), R.N.R.E.; Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Dalton, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W. 619 (1922).
Appellants did not allege the necessary “fault” (be it negligence or willfulness) in their Complaint. They simply alleged that appellee’s “pipeline ruptured and discharged” oil into the North Platte River. The district court found that proof of only this fact would not be sufficient for recovery. In this, the district court was correct.
Although the majority opinion applies a liberal construction to the statute, it must be borne in mind that we are concerned with a penal statute.3 Penal statutes must be strictly construed. Baker v. Board of Com’rs of Crook County, 9 Wyo. 51, 59 P. 797 (1900); Brown v. Jarvis, 36 Wyo. 406, 256 P. 336 (1927); Horn v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 925 (1976). Section 35-11-301, W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent part:
“(a) No person, except when authorized by a permit issued pursuant to the provisions of this act, shall:
“(i) Cause, threaten or allow the discharge of any pollution or wastes into the waters of the state;
*216“(ii) Alter the physical, chemical, radiological, biological or bacteriological properties of any waters of the state.”
The verbs “cause,” “threaten,” “allow,” and “alter” are words of volition — either in the active sense or in the passive or negligence sense. Standing alone, they , could serve to negate the potential for interpretation of strict liability for the prohibited result.
Perhaps this should be sufficient for a holding that strict liability is not imposed by the statute. However, I agree with the majority opinion that the statute, when read with the rest of the enactment of which it is a part, is unclear and ambiguous.4 The definition of an ambiguous contract is appropriate for the definition of an ambiguous enactment:
“ * * * one capable of being understood in more ways than one. * * * obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness of expression or because a double meaning is present. [Citation.]” Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1359, 1361 (1980).
Accordingly, as recognized by the majority opinion, we must construe the statute in accordance with the legislative intent.
In this instance, the cause for, and the circumstances surrounding, the enactment of §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302 in 1973 make the legislative intent clear and positive. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act had been amended in 1972 to provide for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, i.e., 33 U.S.C. § 1342. This system is a permit system. It concerned discharges of pollutants at specified points. It made necessary the issuance of a permit by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency before such pollutants could be discharged into the navigable waters of the United States (including the North Platte River). It provided, however, that a state permit system found to be satisfactory by the administrator could operate in lieu of the federal operated system. Sections 35-11-301 and 35-11-302 directly concern water quality. Section 35-11-301, quoted supra, is premised by “except when authorized by a permit.” Section 35-11-302 directs that the rules, regulations, standards and permit systems to be issued for the purpose of promoting the purposes of the act “shall prescribe” among other things:
“(v) Standards for the issuance of permits as authorized pursuant to section 402(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. § 1342] as amended in 1972, and as it may be hereafter amended.”
Sections 35-11-301 and 35-11-302 concern the issuance of permits for specified points of pollution. They were legislatively intended to satisfy the requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1342 necessary to accomplish state supervision in lieu of federal supervision of pollution sources. The federal act was in recognition of existing specified points or sources of pollution and the necessity to allow sufficient time to decrease and ultimately eliminate such sources.
“(a) * * *
“(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
sjc ⅜ # ⅝ * *
“(b) * * * It is the policy of Congress that the States * * * implement the permit programs under sections 402 and 404 of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1342, 1344]. * * * ” 33 U.S.C. § 1251, p. 107.
The legislature intended §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302 to implement 33 U.S.C. § 1342 and to provide that necessary for the state to have primary control over the permit system as a means of decreasing and of ultimately eliminating water pollution. Such sections, were not designed to apply to nonintended pollution sources.
*217“There is no question that the impetus for the act [§§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302, W.S.1977] and its structure was a direct consequence of the Federal Water Quality Act Amendments of 1972. * * * ” (Footnote omitted and bracketed material added.) The Wyoming Water Quality Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Comparison, Land and Water Law Review, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 79 (1974).5
Also see Ipsen and Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Land and Water Law Review, Yol. IX, No. 2, p. 369 (1974). The timing of the enactment of §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302, its obvious purpose to provide state administration in lieu of federal administration, the direct reference in it to 33 U.S.C. § 1342, its predication on a permit system — all reflect the legislative intent for the act to supplement and pertain to that encompassed by 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
Inasmuch as this is so and inasmuch as the federal act referred to does not apply to oil spills or nonintended pollution sources, the Wyoming act similarly does not so apply-
There is a federal act which does impose strict liability for oil spills and spills of hazardous substances, i.e., 33 U.S.C. § 1321. It is entitled “Oil Spill and Hazardous Substance Liability” and was originally enacted in 1970. It provides for cleanup and payment therefor. It provides that the owner may recover its cleanup costs and penalties from third parties causing the spill. A $35,-000,000.00 fund is established for cleanup if the owner cannot or does not accomplish it. Appellants acknowledged in argument to the trial court that the federal government has proceeded under this act in connection with this spill and that appellee has performed cleanup and has made payments pursuant thereto. Sections 35-11-301 and 35-11-302 were not enacted by the legislature with respect to the Federal Oil Spill and Hazardous Substance Act. They were not intended to apply to nonintended oil spills and to strict liability therefor. The intention of the legislature in enacting §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302 was to implement the permit, system, as authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 1342, which has reference to reduction and ultimate elimination of pollution from specific points. It has no application to the oil spill in this case.
The majority opinion attempts to avoid the logic and common sense of the foregoing by attaching to it a label of “undiluted sophistry.” The use of a label, however, cannot refute the relationship of the federal legislation with §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302, the legislative history of both enactments and the plain wording of the Wyoming enactment, all of which reflect the legislative intent to have the Wyoming enactment apply to a permit system for point discharges. The majority opinion uses twisted reasoning in contending that a statute with a defined purpose may not pertain to only one means of accomplishing the purpose. It reasons that since the purpose of § 35-11-301 is to “prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution” (see § 35-11-102, W.S. 1977), it cannot pertain only to permit requirements for point discharges. This reasoning is similar to that which would exist if it were contended that since the purpose of a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit on the highway is to prevent accidents and promote safety, another requirement that vehicles be driven on the right side of the highway cannot exist and that all efforts at safety must be governed by the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The federal government has two statutes to accomplish reduction and elimination of pollution: (1) a permit system for point discharges, and (2) a strict liability system (with provisions for costs and penalty recovery and money for cleanups if the owner could not finance, etc.) for spills. Wyoming has a statute, enacted pursuant to terms of the federal permit statute, to reduce pollution by means of a permit system for point discharges. It has not *218yet enacted a strict liability statute for spills. It is not the province of the courts to do so. It is the legislature’s province to decide if such should exist.
The majority opinion slides into an argument premised upon the “malfunctioning or breakdown” of appellee’s equipment. There is absolutely nothing in the record to reflect such occurrence. If the complaint had hinted of such, it probably would not have been dismissed. Argument directed at this strawman is irrelevant.
A final comment must be made relative to imposition of strict liability in a penal statute. Normally, general intent is required as an element of a crime. In other words, the act must be done voluntarily. Slaughter v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 481 (1981); Dorador v. State, Wyo., 578 P.2d 839 (1978). Although the legislature may make an act criminal without knowledge or intent of the actor, the legislative intent to do so must clearly appear.
“Generally speaking, when an act is prohibited and made punishable by statute only, the statute is to be construed in the light of the common law and the existence of a criminal intent is to be regarded as essential, although the terms of the statute do not require it. * * * ” State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280, 285 (1941).
See People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167, 302 P.2d 5, 55 A.L.R.2d 705 (1956). The legislative intent to impose strict liability for oil spills does not clearly appear in § 35-11-301. The silence of the statute with reference to the element of knowledge or intent certainly does not satisfy the requirement that such must clearly appear. Thus, knowledge or intent is a necessary element of the offense.
Under the present status of Wyoming law, the decision of the district court should be affirmed.

. It may be that legislative action need not be either black or white. It may opt for a special type of construction for the pipelines when they are over or near streams, or for special and regular inspections of the lines, or perhaps for armed guards to prevent a disgruntled former employee or other motivated saboteur from maliciously breaking the line. Strict liability as established by the majority opinion, makes appellee liable for a break resulting from sabotage or an act of God.

. As part of its motion to dismiss, appellee moved the court:
“ * * * pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), W.R. Civ.P., for an order either dismissing the Complaint against the defendant, or ordering that an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, be made a party to this suit. It is claimed that the indispensable party in this action is The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell), an entity subject to service of process, in that in its absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, * *

. The statute contains criminal sanctions. But, even if it contained only civil penalties, strict construction is required.
“ * * * Statutes imposing penalties are likewise subject to this rule of strict construction; they will not be construed to include anything beyond their letter, even though it may be within their spirit * * 36 Am. Jur.2d Forfeitures and Penalties, § 8, p. 616.

. For example, the prohibition in the statute (§ 35 — 11—301(a)(ii), W.S.1977) against altering “the physical, chemical, radiological, biological or bacteriological properties of any waters” would ban the placing of a worm or other bait from the end of a line into a stream or pond; it would ban the taking of a fish from a stream or pond; it would ban the exhaust emissions from a motor boat into a stream or pond; and it would ban livestock from stream or pond use. Yet the definition of pollution in the act (§ 35-ll-103(c)(i), W.S.1977) anticipates agricultural and recreational use of the water.

. Portion by Ted E. Orf of a four-part comment regarding the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act of 1973.