Court Opinion

ID: 9392560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 15:00:46.589536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.581876
License: Public Domain

20-4124
     Soyza v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                           Hom, IJ
                                                                      A205 901 198
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 5th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 8            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 9            MICHAEL H. PARK,
10                 Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   GIHAN SUNIMAL WIJEMUNI SOYZA,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                  20-4124
17                                                          NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20            Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                    Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, New
24                                      York, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian M. Boynton, Assistant
27                                      Attorney General; Jonathan A.
28                                      Robbins, Sherease Pratt, Senior
 1                                 Litigation Counsel, Office of
 2                                 Immigration Litigation, United
 3                                 States Department of Justice,
 4                                 Washington, DC.

 5       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 8   is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

 9       Petitioner Gihan Sunimal Wijemuni Soyza, a native and

10   citizen of Sri Lanka, seeks review of a November 9, 2020,

11   decision of the BIA affirming a June 25, 2018, decision of an

12   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

13   withholding   of   removal,   and       relief   under   the   Convention

14   Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re Gihan Sunimal Wijemuni Soyza,

15   No. A 205 901 198 (B.I.A. Nov. 9, 2020), aff’g No. A 205 901

16   198 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 25, 2018).                We assume the

17   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

18   history.

19       We have considered both the IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for

20   the sake of completeness.”       Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

21   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                  The applicable

22   standards of review are well established.                 See 8 U.S.C.

23   § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are

                                         2
 1   conclusive             unless      any    reasonable         adjudicator        would     be

 2   compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v.

 3   Holder,          562       F.3d    510,    513       (2d    Cir.      2009)     (reviewing

 4   factfinding for substantial evidence and questions of law de

 5   novo).

 6             Soyza alleged that officers in the Sri Lankan navy

 7   arrested, beat, and interrogated him because they suspected

 8   he    was    helping         his    employer,         a    wealthy      and    influential

 9   fisherman named Kingsley Silver, transport alleged terrorists

10   (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (“LTTE”)) from a refugee

11   camp in Sri Lanka.                 As set forth below, we find no abuse of

12   discretion in the IJ’s exclusion of late-filed evidence, and

13   we deny the petition as to asylum and withholding for lack of

14   nexus       to    a     protected         ground.          We    remand       for   further

15   consideration of the CAT claim.

16        I.     Late-filed Evidence

17             The IJ did not abuse his discretion by excluding Soyza’s

18   late-filed evidence.                 Soyza filed this evidence beyond the

19   February         2018       deadline      set    by   the       IJ.     IJs    have    broad

20   discretion            to    set     filing      deadlines         and    may    deem    the

21   opportunity to file documents waived when deadlines are not

                                                      3
 1   met.    See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(h); Matter of Jesus Interiano-

2    Rosa, 25 I. & N. 264, 265–66 (B.I.A. 2010) (discussing IJ’s

3    authority to deem opportunity to file supporting documents

 4   waived); see also Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d

5    Cir. 2006) (“IJs are accorded wide latitude in calendar

6    management, and we will not micromanage their scheduling

7    decisions.”).       Because Soyza had notice of the deadline and

8    more than a year to compile his evidence, the IJ did not abuse

 9   his    discretion    in   declining   to   consider   the   late-filed

10   evidence.    See Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191–92 (2d

11   Cir. 2008) (reviewing rejection of late-filed evidence for

12   abuse of discretion).

13     II. Asylum and Withholding of Removal

14          Soyza had to demonstrate that “one central” motivation

15   for his arrest was his persecutors’ belief that he supported

16   the LTTE.    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Quituizaca

17   v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that

18   the “one central reason” standard applies to both asylum and

19   withholding of removal).        Substantial evidence supports the

20   agency’s conclusion that he failed to establish a nexus.          See

21   Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282 (2d Cir. 2006)

                                       4
 1   (reviewing nexus determination for substantial evidence).

 2       Soyza testified he piloted a fishing trawler and after

 3   the war with the LTTE ended in 2009, his employer required

 4   him to illegally transport displaced people from refugee

 5   camps.    Soyza testified that he believed he was transporting

 6   displaced   people,   not   terrorists,       and   that   he   knew   the

 7   activity was illegal.       When he was arrested by the navy,

 8   Soyza explained that he did not know the people he was

 9   transporting were linked to the LTTE, but he was arrested

10   because transporting displaced people is a criminal act.                He

11   testified that he was released when he gave up Silver’s name.

12   Based on this evidence, the agency reasonably concluded that

13   he did not establish that the navy was motivated by a belief

14   that he supported the LTTE, but rather arrested him because

15   of the illegal activity and to discover who employed him.

16   See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir.

17   2005)    (requiring   “direct   or       circumstantial    evidence”   of

18   persecutors’ motivation); Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122,

19   130 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that applicant has “burden . . .

20   to show that his persecutors actually imputed a political

21   opinion to him” (quotation marks omitted)).           Soyza’s argument

                                          5
 1   that the agency failed to perform a mixed motive analysis

 2   fails because the agency considered why he was arrested and

 3   the evidence reflected that he was intercepted for engaging

 4   in criminal activity and beaten to obtain his employer’s name,

 5   not because he was suspected of supporting terrorists.           See

 6   In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007)

 7   (A    protected   ground   “cannot    be   incidental,   tangential,

 8   superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”);

 9   see also Chun Gao, 424 F.3d at 130 (burden on applicant to

10   prove opinion was imputed).

11        III. CAT claim

12          We do not reach a conclusion regarding the ultimate merit

13   of Soyza’s CAT claim, but remand for further consideration by

14   the agency given the lack of clarity and errors in the IJ’s

15   decision.    A successful CAT claim requires a showing that the

16   applicant will “more likely than not” be tortured by or with

17   the    acquiescence   of   government   officials.   See   8   C.F.R.

18   §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a).       “Torture is defined as any act

19   by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,

20   is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as

21   obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a

                                       6
1    confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a

2    third        person    has   committed           or   is   suspected      of    having

3    committed, intimidating or coercing him or her or a third

4    person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,

5    when such pain or suffering is inflicted by, or at the

6    instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a

7    public official acting in an official capacity or other person

 8   acting in an official capacity.”                      Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). 1        “In

9    assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant

10   would be tortured” the agency “shall” consider “all evidence

11   relevant to the possibility of future torture . . . including,

12   .   .    .    “[e]vidence       of    past       torture     inflicted     upon     the

13   applicant,”           ability    to     relocate           within   the        country,

14   “[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human

15   rights within the country of removal,” and “[o]ther relevant

16   information regarding conditions in the country of removal.”

17   Id. § 1208.16(c)(3).

18           In denying CAT relief, the IJ stated that Soyza “claimed

19   he was mistreated during interrogation” but there was “no

20   evidence to show that [he] was a victim of torture before his

     1Citations are to the version of the regulations in force at the
     time of the agency’s decisions.
                                                  7
1    departure.”       This statement does not explain how Soyza’s

2    testimony about his beating by naval officers to obtain

3    information about alleged crimes did not rise to the level of

4    torture.     See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (defining torture).

5    The IJ compounded the error by stating there was no evidence

 6   that     Soyza      “suffered    torture        by     [the   government’s]

 7   acquiescence” even though Soyza testified he was beaten by

 8   members of the military.         The IJ may have intended to make

9    an adverse credibility determination, but the credibility

10   section of the IJ’s decision does not identify grounds for

11   finding     Soyza    not   credible       and   the    conclusion    of     the

12   credibility analysis is incoherent.                   See Certified Admin.

13   Record at 38 (“The court did not find the respondent’s claim

14   that   he   was     persecuted   based      upn      an   impute    claim    of

15   persecution as he was suspected to the a LTTE supporter.”).

16   While the BIA and the Government take the position that Soyza

17   waived his CAT claim on appeal, he flagged the IJ’s improper

18   reliance on credibility grounds.            Given the BIA’s failure to

19   address that point and the obvious problems with the IJ’s

20   decision, we remand for further consideration of the CAT

21   claim.    See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.

                                           8
 1   2005) (“requir[ing] a certain minimum level of analysis from

 2   the IJ and BIA opinions denying asylum . . . if judicial

 3   review is to be meaningful”).

 4       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 5   DENIED in part as to asylum and withholding of removal and

 6   GRANTED in part and remanded for further consideration of the

 7   CAT claim.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED

 8   and stays VACATED.

 9                               FOR THE COURT:
10                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                               Clerk of Court

                                     9