Court Opinion

ID: 9852465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:30:53.659192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.361527
License: Public Domain

MOISE, Justice (dissenting). The opinion of the majority, while announcing the correct rules of law applicable for reviewing proceedings of administrative agencies, disregards these rules completely in deciding the case and, in doing so, arrives at an erroneous conclusion. It will be my purpose to demonstrate that this is true. It is stated that in reviewing decisions of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, such of the commission’s findings of fact as are supported by substantial evidence shall be adopted by the court which shall then make conclusions of law which legally follow therefrom. With this statement there can be little quarrel. It is the same rule of review approved by us in Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449; Yarbrough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91, 214 P.2d 769; Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708; Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809; and most recently restated in Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763. I see nothing in § 21-1-1 (81) (c), N.M.S.A.1953, requiring a different review from that approved for other administrative agencies, and specifically agree with the statement of the majority that anything said in M. R. Prestridge Lumber Co. v. Employment Security Commission, 50 N.M. 309, 176 P.2d 190, which might be considered in conflict, should be now set aright. The majority, after their discussion of the scope of review, proceed to consider the actions of the district court in making its own findings of fact, the same being, in the main, contrary to and conflicting with those made by the commission. The majority state that the district court “determined that the Commission’s findings, conclusions and decisions were unsupported by substantial evidence.” Only in the case involving employees who were members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is this true. However, I do not assert that it was necessary that such a determination be made. By its findings which conflict with those made by the commission, I assume the court was necessarily concluding that there was an absence of substantial support for the findings of the commission. This being true, the evidence before the commission must be reviewed. It is in the performance of this task that the majority fall into error. It is clear from their opinion that they have reviewed the evidence with a view to determining if the findings of the trial court are supported thereby; whereas, the proper approach is to determine if the commission’s findings were supported by the evidence. The distinction is not a purely academic one. Its importance is apparent when consideration is given to conflicting evidence which would support findings favoring either side of the dispute. It is the fact finder’s duty — in the instant case, the Commission — to resolve the conflicts. When this has been done, substantial evidence being present, the findings are not to be overturned by the district court. This is the rule that binds us on appeal in reviewing facts as found by the trial court, Montano v. Saavedra, 70 N.M. 332, 373 P.2d 824, and is the rule by which the trial court is bound in reviewing findings of the commission. See Johnson v. Sanchez and the other cases discussing scope of review, cited supra. It follows that on appeal from the district court, we must determine if the trial court has applied the correct rule of review. I direct attention to three separate occasions in the opinion where the majority have not followed the rules governing review as announced by them. The majority state that they “cannot say that a finding by the court of fear on the part of claimants is unsupported by the evidence, nor that the commission’s findings to the contrary were so supported.” The true question, as already pointed out, is, was the commission’s finding supported by substantial evidence, not was the finding of the trial court so supported. Again, it is stated that certain findings of the commission were “erroneous as a matter of law, and were correctly vacated by the district court.” Further, that “the district court then properly made its own findings and conclusions * * * ” and that it is now our function to review the findings and conclusions of the district court to see if they are substantially supported. It is difficult for me to understand the statement that certain findings are erroneous as a matter of law. Findings as made may be unsupported by substantial evidence, but how can they be erroneous as a matter of law? I repeat that the court has completely disregarded the rule announced by it, and that the proper determination should have been whether or not the commission’s findings were so supported. On still another occasion, in discussing the question of “interest” of appellees, the following language is used: “ * * * we cannot say the district court erred in determining the Commission’s findings to be without substantial support in the evidence.” As already noted, the district court did nof so determine except as to the members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The correct rule of review is here again being disregarded. It seems to me that it is significant that nowhere in the opinion do the majority directly find an absence of substantial evidence to support any particular finding of the commission. Even where they state that there was no substantial evidence of work being made available at Kennecott, or that appellees were so advised, or that the employment office had directed any claimant to available work, it should be noted that the commission had made no such findings, nor were they necessary to support the decision of the commission. Compare Cottini v. Cummins, 8 Ill.2d 150, 133 N.E.2d 263. I cannot agree that the review of the evidence made by the majority in their discussion concerning certain aspects of the case is a fair statement of the facts which would support the findings of the commission. Instead, it is a statement of the facts best calculated to support the contrary view of the district court. It would serve no useful purpose for me to discuss the numerous cases from other jurisdictions interpreting and applying the law in comparable situations. Suffice it, to say, that when the findings of the commission are based upon substantial evidence, and support a conclusion that the employees have failed to show that they are not disqualified because they come within the exceptions of § 59-9-5(d), N.M.S.A.1953, such conclusion should be affirmed. Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill.2d 329, 131 N.E.2d 64. It is clear that the burden is on the employee to establish that he is not disqualified for benefits under § 59-9-5 (d), N.M.S.A. 1953. Appeals by Employees of Poison Lumber & Shingle Mills, 19 Wash.2d 467, 143 P.2d 316; Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343, 43 S.E.2d 382. While recognizing the rule, neither the district court nor the majority apply it. The majority would seem to find support for their position in the provision of § 59-9-5 (c), N.M.S.A.1953. In so doing, they completely ignore or lose sight of the provisions of § 59-9-5(d), N.M.S.A.1953, and its proper application as discussed above. From my examination of the proceedings before the commission, I am satisfied that its findings are substantially supported, and its conclusions properly follow. It is not a question of liberal or strict interpretation or application of the statute. That the law is to be liberally construed is not open to question. Graham v. Miera, 59 N.M. 379, 285 P.2d 492; Parsons v. Employment Security Commission, 71 N.M. 405, 379 P.2d 57. However, I do not see in the decision of the commission any failure to apply the statute properly. Having concluded that the findings of the commission had substantial support in the evidence, it follows that the trial court should have sustained them. Further, these findings supported the conclusions reached by the commission. It is my considered judgment that the trial court having reversed the commission should, in turn, be reversed. I respectfully dissent from the contrary conclusion reached by the majority. CARMODY, J., concurs.