Court Opinion

ID: 9824570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 10:53:44.811372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:51.218094
License: Public Domain

HARWOOD, Judge.
The appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree. She was by a jury found guilty of murder in the second degree and her punishment fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of ten years.
At her trial below the appellant pleaded not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity.
On May, 14, 1943 the appellant, the deceased, Mrs. Ida Collier, and some six or seven other persons, including the daughters of the deceased were in a field in Col*25bert County chopping cotton. They had just reassembled after the noon recess. The appellant had been in the field before noon, but had not engaged in chopping cotton. During the noon recess the appellant had gone to her house, a short distance away, changed from the dress she was wearing in the morning and returned to the field wearing overalls. Shortly after her return, and when only a few feet from Mrs. Collier she suddenly pulled a pistol and fired twice at Mrs. Collier. One of the bullets wounded Mrs. Collier in the left arm, and the other penetrated her left side, entered the spine and severed the cord. Mrs. Collier was as a result of the spinal cord injury paralyzed from the waist down. She lingered until August 6, 1943, when she died of hypostatic pneumonia. Dr. R. D. Wright, her attending physician, testified that the primary cause of her death was the gunshot wound.
Under the provisions of Section 425, Title 15, Code of Alabama, 1940, the appellant was admitted to Bryce Hospital on October 16, 1943 for observation by an Sanity Commission as provided by said act.
This commission, composed of Dr. W. D. Partlow, Superintendent of the Bryce Hospital, Dr. W. M. Faulk, Assistant Superintendent, and Dr. F. A. Kay, Assistant Physician, rendered its report on May 16, 1944. It was the opinion of the commissioners, separately and jointly, that Mrs. Grissom “is constitutionally subnormal mentally to some extent, but in addition to this deficiency it is our opinion that she has suffered of a paranoid psychosis or paranoid condition, which together with her weak mentality caused her to be inherently suspicious, and that upon a basis of this mental condition she developed distinct delusions relative to the conduct of her husband and the woman she murdered. It is our opinion that the criminal act was directly due to the suspicions and delusions which caused her to feel jealous and bitter toward the woman she killed.
“We are of the opinion that the above described mental condition existed at the time Mrs. Grissom was admitted to the hospital, and in a large measure has existed ever since, though we are able to observe that supervision and regulation here in the institution under a different environment has had a beneficial effect. As she is now we would judge her probably able to return and stand her trial in court, though no one would be able to predict whether or not returning to the same environment she came from at her home might stimulate similar delusions, apprehensions, feelings and resentment toward her husband and toward any other woman who might be in any way associated in the community.
“While we are unable to state positively an opinion of Mrs. Grissom’s condition prior to her admission to The Bryce Hospital, yet from the history of her case and from a general knowledge of such mental condition as above described in her case, we are of the opinion that her mental condition was substantially the same when the crime was committed as when she was admitted to the hospital, or as described in the third paragraph above.”
Upon receipt of said report the appellant was returned to the Colbert County jail to await trial.
In this state, when a defendant interposes a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity the burden is on him to establish the issue of legal insanity, raised by his plea, by a preponderance of the evidence. He must establish by a preponderance of the evidence to the satisfaction of the jury that he was affected with a mental condition when the crime was committed which either prevented a knowledge of right or wrong as applied to the particular crime, or which destroyed his power of choice. Section 422, Title 15, Code of Alabama 1940; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am.Rep. 193; Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 So. 953; Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So. 575; Lee v. State, 246 Ala. 343, 20 So. 2d 471.
To sustain the burden of the issue of insanity raised by her plea the appellant introduced in evidence the testimony of Drs. Partlow and Kay, taken by deposition, and with the consent of the solicitor the report of the Sanity Commission was received in evidence. The appellant also introduced some eight or nine lay witnesses to testify on this issue.
In their interrogatories the doctors above mentioned made the same diagnosis of the *26mental condition of Mrs. Grissom as that set out in the report of the Sanity Commission.
In answers to the cross-interrogatories propounded by the state, Dr. Partlow was of the opinion that on the date of the crime Mrs. Grissom “in an inferior way knew right from wrong, but was influenced in her acts by delusions of persecution.”
In his interrogatory Dr. Kay stated that it was his opinion that on May 14, 1943 (the date of the killing) Mrs. Grissom, “because of her paranoid condition, was influenced in her behavior by her delusions of persecution and abnormal jealousy to the extent that she could not refrain from wrong.” However in his answers to the state’s cross-interrogatory this witness stated that on that date Mrs. Grissom “probably knew right from wrong,” and in answer to the question: “Was the alleged crime, that is the unlawful shooting and killing of another woman, so connected with such mental disease of the Defendant in the relation of cause and effect as to have been the product of it solely?” he answered “Essentially yes.”
The testimony of the lay witnesses introduced by the defendant was to the effect that Mrs. Grissom often went into fits of rage and anger, directed toward her husband because of his affairs with other women with which she charged him without foundation; that she was often forgetful, and would leave seasoning out of food she was preparing, or let the fire in the stove go out; that she on several occasions “ran away” from her home, etc.
The state’s evidence rebutting the issue of insanity of appellant consisted of the testimony of some seven or eight lay witnesses. These lay witnesses like those of the state, were persons who had known the appellant well for a long number of years. According to these witnesses the appellant attended to her farm and domestic chores in a normal manner, kept simple accounts of tibe amounts due cotton pickers on the farm on which she and her husband resided, and in general conducted herself in normal fashion.
Whether a lay witness is sufficiently qualified by acquaintance, association, and opportunity of observation of a defendant to give opinion evidence as to the defendant’s sanity is a question addressed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court should not disturb the rulings of the trial court on such question unless there is a palpable abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Moye v. State, 12 Ala.App. 127, 67 So. 716; Jones v. State, 181 Ala. 63, 61 So. 434; Odom v. State, 174 Ala. 4, 56 So. 913, 915; Bass v. State, 219 Ala. 282, 122 So. 45. Evidence of any abuse of such discretion on the part of the trial court is lacking in this case.
The verdict of the jury indicates that the appellant failed to establish her plea of insanity to the satisfaction of the jury. Their verdict was not unwarranted, even though it was the opinion of the expert medical witnesses that appellant was suffering from a paranoic condition at the time of the commission of the offense. Lee v. State, supra.
Consonant with our duty we have carefully examined this entire record for error. The trial court’s ruling was invoked a number of times in reference to the admission or exclusion of certain testimony. In no instance have we detected any irregularity in the rulings sufficient to justify a discussion. The court was liberal in admitting testimony touching on the question of appellant’s sanity. This was proper. The background of our decisions clearly reflects an attitude of liberality of evidence in inquiries into a person’s mental capacity. Russell v. State, 201 Ala. 572, 78 So. 916; Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 So. 171; Birchfield v. State, 217 Ala. 225, 115 So. 297; Deloney v. State, 225 Ala. 65, 142 So. 432; Grammer v. State, 239 Ala. 633, 196 So. 268; George v. State, 240 Ala. 632, 200 So. 602; Naugher v. State, 241 Ala. 91, 1 So.2d 294.
The court’s oral charge to the jury covered in a clear, accurate, and competent manner all the legal principles involved in this trial. No written charges were requested by the appellant in the trial below, nor was any motion for a new trial made. In our opinion the record is free from error materially affecting the substantial rights *27of the appellant and this cause is due to be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Affirmed.