Court Opinion

ID: 9730872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:53.41914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:10.346669
License: Public Domain

GARDEBRING, Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
I respectfully dissent as to the admission of the Spreigl evidence. I believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting defendant’s 1976 conviction for choking a woman and his actions toward the waitress on the night of the murder.
Evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible if it is offered to prove that the accused acted in conformity with a character trait when committing the charged offense. Minn.R.Evid. 404(b) (1992). Such evidence may be admissible, however, if it is offered “to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, identity or common scheme or plan.” State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn.1990) (citing State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965)). Admission of such evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision is not to be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.
We have also held that “Spreigl evidence is ‘admissible only if the trial court finds the direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant’s identity is otherwise weak or inadequate, and that it is necessary to support the state’s burden of proof.’ ” State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn.1991) (quoting State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967)) (emphasis added in DeWald). The rationale for the requirement that the Spreigl evidence come in only where the state’s case is weak is because of its extraordinary potential for prejudice.
Prejudice can arise * * * from facts that arouse the jury’s hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence. Thus, evidence of convictions for prior, unrelated crimes may lead a juror to think that since the defendant already has a criminal record, an erroneous conviction would not be quite as serious as would otherwise be the case. A juror influenced in this fashion may be satisfied with a slightly less compelling demonstration of guilt than he should be.
*608Edward W. Cleary, et al., McCormick on Evidence, [hereinafter McCormick on Evidence] § 185 at 545 (3d. ed. 1984). As the majority here states, there was “overwhelming evidence pointing to defendant’s guilt of the crime charged.” Ante, at 606. The choking conviction was a dissimilar, unrelated crime that occurred fifteen years earlier. Defendant’s actions toward the waitress were unrelated to his relationship to the victim. Neither piece of evidence helps the jury identify the crime charged as one typically committed by defendant, nor do they in any way suggest a motive. On the other hand, proof of defendant’s propensity for violence could have easily aroused the jury’s hostility. Because the potential for prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence and where the physical and scientific evidence linking appellant to the crime was so powerful, there was no need to allow the admission of the Spreigl evidence, and every reason to disallow it. It should not have been admitted.
Furthermore, the state argues that the Spreigl evidence is admissible because it shows a “repeating pattern of very similar conduct” of violence toward women. I disagree. Past crimes may be offered as proof of motive when they show “the existence of a larger plan, scheme, or conspiracy.” McCormick on Evidence, § 190 at 559. Motive is more generally understood as the “[cjause or reason that moves the will and induces action.” Black’s Law Dictionary 914 (5th ed. 1979). The offered Spreigl evidence does not show a larger plan, nor does it add proof as to why defendant would have murdered the victim. I therefore conclude that it fails to show motive.
To prove identity, Spreigl evidence must be similar to the charged offense either in time, location, or modus operandi. State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn.1991). Identity can also be shown by “other crimes by the accused so nearly identical as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused.” McCormick on Evidence, § 190 at 559. Although defendant’s actions toward the waitress were similar in time to the murder of the victim, neither piece of Spreigl evidence was so nearly identical to the crime charged as to earmark it as the handiwork of defendant. The Spreigl evidence does prove a pattern of animosity towards women, but it does not show a repeating pattern of crimes committed in a similar manner. As the evidence does not show motive or identity, I believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it.
The horrifying nature of the crime at issue here can hardly be overstated, and the escalation of violence against women in our society is deeply disturbing. However, proof that an accused has been violent in the past proves little as to guilt of the charged crime and is unnecessary where real proof of guilt is so abundant. The majority opinion in this case sanctions the misapplication of what is, at best, a highly risky rule of evidence.
I dissent as to this portion of the opinion.