Court Opinion

ID: 9577388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:34:25.974808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:30.692999
License: Public Domain

*540RUSSELL, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion states valid legal principles, but they are entirely inapplicable to the facts of this case. The policy itself provides:
You may examine this policy and if for any reason you are not satisfied with it, you may cancel it by returning the policy with a written request for cancellation to our Administrative Office .... If you do this, we will refund the premium that was paid.
The address of our Administrative Office is shown on page 3. You should send premiums and requests to that address unless instructed otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
On page three of the policy, there appears:
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE: EQUITABLE VARIABLE
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
EAST CENTRAL SERVICE CENTER
P. O. Box 1122 COLUMBUS, OH 43216
The sole issue in the case is whether the insured was “instructed otherwise.”
When the insured indicated her desire to cancel the policy, the agent sent her two forms, one captioned “Notice of Withdrawal Right,” the other captioned “Request for Withdrawal.” The “notice” provided: “Should you desire to exercise this right of cancellation, complete the enclosed form and return your policy as outlined in the instructions on the form . . . .” (Emphasis added). The “request” form contained the following:
- Instructions - Please Read Carefully
*5412. Mail this notice together with your policy (if received by you) to:
Equitable Variable Life Insurance Company [See Address of Administrative Office Above]
At the top of the form is typed:
Administrative Office East Central Service Center P. O. Box 1122 Columbus, OH 43216
The agent’s letter to the insured, which sent her the forms described above, did not instruct her “otherwise.” On the contrary, the agent wrote to the insured from his office in Rockville, Maryland, but his letter concluded: “P.S. I have the EVLICO policy in your folder which I will return to Equitable for cancellation upon receipt of your signed form.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, the contractual provisions governing cancellation, which existed between insurer and insured, required that cancellation would be effective only when the requisite notice was received in the insurer’s administrative office in Ohio. The agent, whatever his apparent or actual authority may have been, did nothing to alter those contractual provisions. Rather, he informed the insured in writing that he would forward the papers to the insurer for cancellation. That is a far cry from indicating to the insured that cancellation would become effective upon his receipt of the papers at his office in Maryland.
The parties entered into a stipulation of fact. It is to the same effect: “[The agent] would testify that he instructed [the insured] to return the Request for Withdrawal to him so that he could then forward to the Regional Service Center the Request for Withdrawal together with the policy . . . .” (Emphasis added).*
*542I therefore conclude that the provisions of the policy continued to govern the relationships between the parties, that the agent did nothing to vary those provisions, and that the cancellation, which was not received in Equitable’s administrative office until nine days after the death of the insured, never became effective. Accordingly, I would affirm.
CARRICO, C.J., and POFF, J., join in dissent.

 The majority opinion lays stress upon a concession by counsel in response to a question from the bench during oral argument, wherein counsel opined that if the insured had sued to recover the premium, the agent’s apparent authority would have bound the insurer to effect a cancellation upon receipt by the agent. For the reasons stated above, I think that opinion was erroneous under the facts of this case. In any event, the “concession,” if such it was, was a conclusion of law, not a stipulation of fact. We are not bound by the opinions of counsel concerning questions of law, even where opposing counsel agree. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 111 (n. 5); 334 S.E.2d 838, 846 (1985).