Court Opinion

ID: 9580857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:42.267302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:34.345427
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant on motion for rehearing urges that this court’s opinion filed June 2, 1977, is “directly contrary” to the holding in State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493, 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) , which adopted the approach expressed in Rule 703, Federal Rules of Evidence, regarding the use of facts not in evidence as a basis for an expert’s opinion. Contra, International Harvester Company v. Chiarello, 27 Ariz.App. 411, 555 P.2d 670 (1976) . Inasmuch as the identical rule1 has been promulgated by the Supreme Court of Arizona to take effect prior to any re-trial of this action, we supplement our opinion.
As a basis for an expert’s opinion or inference, Rule 703 permits use of facts or data not admissible in evidence “[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, . . ..” The importance of this limitation as a safeguard against the use and possible introduction of all sorts of otherwise inadmissible evidence was recognized by the supreme court in Clark, and by the State Bar Committee on the Rules of Evidence in its Note on Rule 70S:
“This rule, along with others in this article, is designed to expedite the reception of expert testimony. ' Caution is urged in its use. * * * The question of wheth*465er the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts is in all instances a question of law to be resolved by the court prior to the admission of the evidence. If the facts or data meet this standard and form the basis of admissible opinion evidence they become admissible under this rule for the limited purpose of disclosing the basis for the opinion unless they should be excluded pursuant to an applicable constitutional provision, statute, rule or decision.
“Evidence which is inadmissible except as it may qualify as being ‘reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field’ has traditionally included such things as certain medical reports and comparable sales in condemnation actions.”
The last quoted paragraph parallels the application of the Rule 703 approach in Clark. The issue there involved the admission in evidence of a psychiatrist’s opinion based in part upon records and charts which were not in evidence. The court said:
“The use of charts of appellant’s medical history by a psychiatrist engaged in an examination of appellant clearly falls within the category of information relied upon by psychiatrists.” 112 Ariz. at 496, 543 P.2d at 1125.
The issue here is quite different. The trial court found it had improperly admitted an economist’s opinion as to appellant’s future economic losses because there was “insufficient foundational evidence”, and ordered a new trial. The weak link in the foundational chain relied on by appellant was information the economist acquired from unidentified sources on hiring practices in “most of the mines that I surveyed.” There was no evidentiary showing that the facts or data so acquired were “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject”, although the economist testified:
“Q. Do you use certain recognized sources in your profession and field in compiling these figures?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Can you explain some of the sources you used in respect to Dewey Ray?
“A. On this particular case I did have an interview with Dewey and in addition I gained some information from Doctor Robert Johnson, vocational rehabilitation expert. Then I went to some published sources to determine wage rates for varying occupations in the Tucson area. These are put out by the Department of Economic Security of the State of Arizona.”
Appellant and Doctor Johnson both testified at trial to the information they had made known to the expert. The wage rates published by the Department of Economic Security satisfy the Rule 703 test of facts and data reasonably relied upon by economists. For lack of a similar showing, however, the information in question was properly disregarded as “foundational evidence” by the trial court.
Motion for rehearing denied.
HOWARD, C. J. and HATHAWAY, J., concurring.

. Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.