Court Opinion

ID: 9743249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:29:11.123941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.058122
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: I disagree with the majority in this case for the same reason I dissented in People v. Hoskins (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 209. The majority, after concluding that the warrant-less search in the instant case was justified as an inventory search, also states that the search was justified as a search incident to an arrest. While I do not agree that the warrantless search of the contents of the defendant’s wallet can be justified as an inventory search, I certainly do not agree that the search can be justified as a search incident to an arrest. The majority quotes from Illinois v. Lafayette (1983), 462 U.S. 640, 646, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 71, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609, where the United States Supreme Court stated: “At the station house, it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an arrested person who is to he jailed.” (Emphasis added.) Besides the fact that in the instant case it had not been established that the defendant was going to be jailed and that his possessions should be inventoried, taking the wallet and listing its existence is different than searching the contents of the wallet and a packet within it. Section 108 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 108 — 1) delineates the instances when a police officer may lawfully search a person incident to a lawful arrest. Section 108 — 1 provides: “When a lawful arrest is effected a peace officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of: (a) Protecting the officer from attack; or (b) Preventing the person from escaping; or (c) Discovering the fruits of the crime; or (d) Discovering any instruments, articles, or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, an offense.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 108 — 1. In this case, the defendant’s wallet was not searched to protect the officers from attack. The defendant’s wallet was on a table in the police station, and it could not be used to attack the officer. The wallet was also not searched to prevent the defendant from escaping. Clearly, the wallet could not have been utilized in any fashion to effectuate an escape. The wallet was not searched to discover the fruits of the crime for which the defendant was arrested because the defendant had been stopped because “his rear license plate light was out,” and bond forfeiture is not an offense for which there are discoverable fruits. Finally, there was no justification for the search of the wallet for the purpose of discovering any instruments, articles or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, an offense, because there was no probable cause for the police officer to believe that a person stopped for a burned-out light, or a person who forfeited bond for an ■unknown offense, would have any illegal substances in his wallet. I do not believe there is any justification for the warrantless search of the contents of the defendant’s wallet as an inventory search or under section 108 — 1 and therefore I respectfully dissent. GOLDENHERSH and SIMON, JJ., join in this dissent..