Court Opinion

ID: 9819683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:30:57.526227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:03.136194
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I dissent. In reversing the trial court’s well-reasoned decision, the majority find that the trial court’s holding “disregards Ortega’s professed choice of counsel.” 329 Ill. App. 3d at 123. In support of this pronouncement, the majority rely almost entirely upon cases which addressed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This approach has been squarely rejected by our supreme court. In People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d 204, 222 (1990), as here, the defendant appealed on the basis of a claim of denial of counsel of choice. In rejecting defendant’s claim, our supreme court held: “[W]e think it is obvious that different standards of review apply to claims of ineffective assistance and to claims of denial of counsel of choice. Because the standards in ineffective assistance claims are inapplicable to the case at bar, we now turn to discussions of the standard that does apply to defendant’s claims.” 141 Ill. 2d at 220. The court then interpreted the holding in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988). There, the defendant sought a substitution of counsel in order to be represented by the same attorney who represented two other defendants in the same drug-conspiracy case. After a hearing, the trial court denied the request for substitution, stating that an irreconcilable conflict of interest existed which could not be waived. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding: “The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 152, 108 S. Ct. at 1700. In following Wheat, our supreme court observed: “[A] trial court must pass on the issue of whether to allow waiver of a conflict of interest ‘not with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly.’ (486 U.S. at 162, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 151, 108 S. Ct. at 1699). For this reason, the Wheat Court concluded that a trial court ‘must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers’ not only where an actual conflict exists, but also ‘in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exits which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.’ (486 U.S. at 163, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 151, 108 S. Ct. at 1699).” (Emphasis added.) People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 223. In Holmes, the defendant was charged in 1982 with an armed robbery that had taken place in 1980. The State filed a motion to remove Holmes’ attorney, Leo Holt, from the case because of a conflict of interest. In 1984, a hearing was conducted at which it was determined that Holt had represented the State’s primary witness and defendant’s codefendant, Ulrich Williams, on an armed robbery charge in 1972 and in a stolen car case in 1977 or 1978. Attorney Holt testified at the hearing that he had conversations with Williams some time in the previous five years and in those conversations he received information that was covered by the attorney-client privilege. The supreme court affirmed the trial court and appellate court in granting the State’s motion to remove Holt. “The State also has a right to have defendant represented by counsel who would not cross the bounds of propriety by cross-examining a critical State witness regarding matters which were the subject of a prior attorney-client relationship.” Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 226. The court continued: “[A]s the trial court noted, the State has a right to fair trial. Defendant may have wanted Holt to represent him precisely because of Holt’s relationship with Williams. Holt no doubt knew more about Williams than a lawyer with no prior connections with Williams. This knowledge potentially would have given defendant an unfair advantage. See United States v. O’Malley, (7th Cir. 1986), 786 F.2d 786, 790-91; United States v. James, (2nd Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 40, 45.” Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 227. The supreme court also found that the trial court properly took into account the probability that, had the court accepted defendant’s waiver of conflict-free counsel and had defendant then been convicted, defendant would have appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on the conflict of interest. The supreme court also acknowledged the trial court’s concern with the appearance of impropriety, “should the jurors become aware, as they undoubtedly would, of Holt’s prior representation” of Williams. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 226. The facts in the instant case provide much more support for the trial court’s refusing to accept defendant’s waiver than did the facts in Wheat and Holmes. As pointed out by the majority, Donald Novelle represented the State’s primary witness, Montez, at the time Montez was “organizing the cocaine purchase from which Ortega now appeals.” 329 Ill. App. 3d at 114. Donald Novelle allegedly learned from Montez that his firm’s client, Eugenio Natal, was involved in this cocaine purchase but he would not be charged. Donald Novelle represented Montez in his efforts to compel the Metropolitan Enforcement Group to abide by their agreement to give Montez consideration, in the form of a lesser sentence on pending charges, for his help in this case. Montez still owes fees to the Novelle firm for their representation in this matter. Donald Novelle told the trial court that he could freely discuss Montez’ cases with his brother, Robert Novelle, who represented Natal and Ortega. In addition to Holmes, in People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 85 (1989), and People v. Woidtke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 399, 411 (2000), the courts held that when courts review claims of conflict of interest based on the prior representation of a prosecution witness (Flores) or a different suspect (Woidtke), they should consider whether the attorney acquired privileged information from this prior client. In People v. Fife, 76 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1979), our supreme court found that there is a conflict of interest when one member of a law firm represents a criminal defendant and another member of the firm “has an affiliation with the Attorney General,” even if that affiliation only involves workmen’s compensation matters. Consequently, due to Donald Novelle’s representation of Montez, all members of the Novelle firm should be disqualified from representing Ortega and Natal. The majority hold that “[a] defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive an alleged conflict of interest.” 329 Ill. App. 3d at 121. While this may be true, the conflict of interest in this case is not alleged, it is per se and actual. The majority cite People v. Johnson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 117 (2001), People v. Fife, 76 Ill. 2d 418 (1979), United States v. Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658, 667 (7th Cir. 1992), and Rosenwald v. United States, 898 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1990), as support. All four of these cases involved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel rather than claims of denial of counsel of choice. Consequently, per People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 222, they are inapplicable to this case. Like the holding in Fife, the holding in Sims does not provide support for the majority’s position. The defendant in Sims was charged with murdering two of her children. Her trial attorney also represented her husband, who was also a suspect in the case. The defendant had told the police and the trial court that her husband had nothing to do with the murders. In spite of this, appellate counsel raised conflict of interest as an issue. In rejecting this argument, the appellate court said “the interests of a defendant and of another suspect can often remain entirely compatible. As long as their interests remain constant, counsel can represent both ***. Should their interests ever diverge, counsel would be obliged to withdraw from the representation.” People v. Sims, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 414. Clearly, Montez’ interests have diverged from the interests of Ortega and Natal. Consequently, the Novelles had an obligation to withdraw. I also disagree with the majority’s finding that defendant knowingly waived his right to conflict-free representation. When the trial court asked defendant “What is your understanding?” of this issue, defendant replied:'“Well, that it could be some problems between me and Natal becoming, you know, Mr. Novelle, a lawyer, or we could have discussion between us during the trial or during the sentence that we were to have.” This is gibberish and in no way shows that defendant actually understood “how the conflict could affect his attorney’s representation” as required by People v. Coleman, 301 Ill. App. 3d 290, 301 (1998). In Holmes, our supreme court noted that “the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected a per se disqualification rule, even where an actual conflict exists, in favor of a balancing test. O’Malley, 786 F.2d at 790.” People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 228. The majority say that Ortega is “opting at his peril to retain counsel in spite of a conflict of interest” (329 Ill. App. 3d at 122-23) and “Whether it was a mistake to waive the conflict of interest is something that will become clear in the fullness of time as the trial progresses” (329 Ill. App. 3d at 123). Ortega is not opting to retain Novelle at his peril; this court is allowing Ortega to retain Novelle at the peril of the State’s right to a fair trial, Montez’ right to nondisclosure of privileged information given to his attorney, and the trial court’s right to rely upon the clear precedent of our supreme court. One does not need to await the fullness of time to see that a mistake is being made.