Court Opinion

ID: 9742563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:15:58.643545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:33.769072
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I am not pleased with the adoption of a "same transaction” test to define the constitutional protection against double jeopardy for the "same offense”.
Obviously, the word transaction is broader than the word offense. It is conceded by the majority that a single transaction may encompass more than one offense, and it is equally clear that the Court intends to limit the people to a single prosecution, even where separate and distinct offenses have been committed.
The reference to People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590; 202 NW2d 278 (1972), is particularly instructive. In Grimmett, the defendant killed one man and wounded another during the perpetration of a felony.
By overruling Grimmett, the Court makes clear its conclusion that separate offenses must be prosecuted together.
The Court desires to eliminate seriatim prosecutions, recognizing the evil attendant upon permitting a prosecuting attorney to pursue or discontinue separate prosecutions, depending upon whether he may be satisfied or dissatisfied with the outcome of other cases.
But I submit that this danger can be overcome by the adoption of a court rule requiring joinder of charges.
There is a great deal of difference between mandatory joinder and double jeopardy.
Mandatory joinder would simply require the people to include, as separate counts in a single *264information, all known offenses chargeable against the defendant and arising out of the same transaction or event.
In such a case, the defendant might be convicted of one or more of the counts and acquitted on others. He might be found guilty as charged on some counts, but guilty of lesser included offenses on others. Being separate offenses, the defendant is judged separately on each. The mandatory joinder merely expedites the administration of justice and relieves the defendant of the burden of defending upon a series of individual prosecutions.
Since mandatory joinder does not rise to the dignity of a rule of constitutional law, it is possible to permit the severance of counts for trial, in the discretion of the trial court, where desirable to assure orderly presentation of proofs and avoid jury confusion.
Similarly, where the prosecutor is required to join related offenses by a mandatory joinder court rule, it is entirely consistent to permit the defendant a right to demand severance whenever he feels prejudiced by a multicount information.
But, when the rule is stated in constitutional terms, and founded upon a broadened interpretation of double jeopardy, the Court attempts to get a square peg into a round hole.
A cannot be tried separately for the murder and manslaughter of B. Neither can he be convicted of both murder and manslaughter of the same human being. If a jury were to attempt to return such a verdict, the court could not receive it, nor pronounce judgment upon it.
Murder and manslaughter of a given human being are the "same offense” within the meaning of double jeopardy protection.
But, suppose A is charged in a single prosecution with the murders of B and C. Is it intended *265that the jury must choose which murder to convict upon?
Certainly, if the murders of B and C are the "same offense” within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause, by reason of having been committed in the same transaction, then it is patently unconstitutional to permit the jury to return a verdict of guilty on both charges.
By definition, the defendant would stand twice convicted for the same offense.
Similarly, if the jury acquits A of the murder of B, but convicts him of the murder of C, how is the verdict to be received if the murders of B and C are regarded as a single offense?
It may be said that the double jeopardy clause protects against multiple prosecutions, but not against multiple convictions.
If that be true, then there would be no constitutional bar to a verdict of guilty as to both the manslaughter and the murder of a single victim.
Further, it would seem that the word jeopardy refers to exposure to the danger of conviction, and it is patently impossible for a person to be twice convicted without having been exposed to the danger of being twice convicted.
My disagreement with the majority lies not in the objective of curbing prosecutorial discretion. It is, rather, with the logic of the route chosen to achieve the objective.
While I would support an amendment to the court rules mandating joinder of related offenses, I would affirm the conviction at bar, the same having been obtained in accordance with the procedural rules extant at the time of the proceedings below.
M. S. Coleman, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.
Levin, J., did not sit in this case.