Court Opinion

ID: 9797542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:23:21.443304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:07.401158
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
with whom EASTAUGH, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The principle that should govern this case is that the boundaries of property claimed by adverse possession not under color of title must be established by visible evidence of possession for the statutorily required ten-year period. The judgment of the superior court violates this principle in two ways. First, the acts that give rise to the visible evidence of possession on which the court relied to establish boundaries were carried out less than ten years before the end of the ten-year period. Second, there was no visible evidence of possession extending to the southern or western boundaries which the court ordered established. Therefore the Judgment of the court must be reversed and this case should be remanded with instructions to the court to draw boundaries that are coterminous with acts creating visible evidence of possession that took place ten years or more before the end of the statutory period.
It is well established that the extent of land adversely possessed not under color of title must be defined by visible possession of the land for the statutory period.1 The authoritative treatise Thompson on Real Property notes that the possession must, among other elements, be "visible" "during the time necessary to create a bar under the statute of limitations."2 Thompson goes on to observe that
the extent of the ground claimed must be indicated in some way and be of such character as to clearly show that such ground is claimed by the party asserting to the right thereto. There must be such marks as indicate that the land is under the actual control of the party claiming it.3
*29In order to determine whether land has been adversely possessed. for at least ten years there must be a date that ends the ten-year period. From this a beginning date can be calculated. Activities demonstrating possession that take place before the beginning date can serve to establish the boundaries of the adversely possessed land, but those that come after the beginning date cannot for they do not meet the ten-year requirement. In this case the superior court appears to have settled on the end of the summer of 1998 as the ending date of the ten-year period.4 Therefore the beginning of the ten-year period was the end of the summer of 1988. Activities before then can serve as boundary markers, but activities occurring after then may not because they do not satisfy the ten-year statute.
The record shows that Green's activities on the land in 1982 consisted of clearing the preexisting access road from the west, clearing a pre-existing trail that went to the bluff at the east of the property, and doing "some" clearing of the property. In addition Green placed a chain at some unspecified point across the road from the west and hung a "no trespassing" sign from it. In 1988 Green did "more" land clearing and sold "very small quantities" of rock from the bottom of the Shaw Creek bluff. Given an end of summer of 1998 ending date for the ten-year adverse possession period, the boundaries of the adversely possessed property must be limited to the areas encompassed by these activities.
But the trial court did not limit itself to the 1982 and 1983 activities in fixing the boundaries of the property. Instead, the court relied on clearing, construction, and gardening activities that took place in 1984 and later, even though these encompassed new land.5 The court erred when it relied on *30"expanded" activities that occurred after the summer of 1983 in fixing the boundaries. The evidence of possession resulting from post-19883 activities does not meet the ten-year requirement of AS 09.10.0830.
Moreover, even if all of Green's activities, no matter when they occurred, were used to measure the boundaries on the land, the west and south boundaries established by the court would still not be justified. Most of the approximately twelve acres awarded by the court lie to the south, southwest, and west of the house. Apart from the cleared area where the house sits, said to be no more than one-half of an acre, no other work was done to the southwest. To the west, all that was done was clearing the road, stretching a chain across it, and putting up a no trespassing sign. The road work can justify awarding Green an easement by prescription in the road where it crosses land not otherwise possessed by her. The clearing around the house to the south and west can justify awarding land so cleared to her. But the south and west boundaries are located hundreds of feet away from this clearing. As to the land to the south, southwest, and west between this clearing and these boundaries there is simply no evidence of visible acts of possession.
In summary, in deciding the boundaries of the land adversely possessed by Green the court impermissibly relied on activities that did not occur ten years or more before the end of the statutory period. In addition, the boundaries as set by the court encompassed much land to the south, southwest, and west that was never actually possessed by Green by any activities indicating her control, no matter when those activities might have taken place.
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand with directions to redraw the boundaries to encompass only the land that she actually possessed for the applicable ten-year period.

. In fact the, principal feature that distinguishes color of title cases from those adverse possession cases not involving color of title-apart from the different statutory periods-is that in color of title cases the description in the document of title defines the boundaries of the property possessed, whereas in non-color of title cases boundaries are defined by the extent of the actual possession. We made this point in Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 847 (Alaska 1984) "The supposed conveyance must accurately describe the land claimed and it is the description, not the physical use of the land by the claimant, that determines the boundaries of the land that may be acquired by adverse possession under color of title."

. 10 Thompson on Real Property § 87.01, at 75 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed.1998).

. Id. § 87.06, at 122.

. The court did not make formal written findings. Instead, the court's oral decision serves to meet the findings and conclusions requirement of Civil Rule 52(a). The court did not directly say that the summer of 1993 would be the end of the ten-year period, but I believe that is the import of the court's remarks:
The boundaries of the times of evidence, with minor exception, are the periods from 1982 through the summer of 1993 and that period of time primarily is all evidence presented by the plaintiff and of events recounted by plaintiff concerning that property. I say with rare exception because with the exception of what we can call "Earthmover's evidence," there is no evidence presented by the defense that falls within the statutory period.

. I set out here the transcript of the court's findings concerning Green's activities from 1984 through 1991.
But continuing with the facts. In 1984, spring and summer, Ms. Green continued her 'activities: sleeping on the bluff in a trailer, setting it up on the bluff, clearing, hand excavation, excavation of the foundation with employees hired from the Delta area. Art McTag-gart, brother or cousin James, Jeff Scully, Cummings cleared enough to be safe from fire and this-and, in this regard, I find it significant that Ms. Green dealt with public officials and, in particular, the Delta Fire Department or fire authorities that she had come up to the property to advise the necessary distance to clear trees to have a practical fire break. Trees were cut on the south and east of the property-of the house to improve her road, yet to contain-continue invisibility from the road below. The absence of heavy equipment by her wish caused the work to be longer and harder but, through use of axes, chain saws, trucks for stumps, the area of the house and, then, the back area for the drive and turnaround area was cleared. It was in these years, through the mid- and late-'80's, that the chicken and turkeys were put in coops and chicken wire on the property and, as she expanded her activities out backwards and forwards, to clear woods of dead trees and thin the area.
Trees were cleared through to the telephone line which is what's commonly called the parallel east/west road to the north of the structure.
Block work went in in 1985. A contractor was hired with whom she eventually-whose services she eventually terminated. In '85 she went in early enough to go in by snowmachine, I believe, and in, as Mr. McTaggart testified, on numerous years he would open the house after it was constructed for Ms. Green by snowma-chine and close it down afterwards.
In 1986, waiting for Mr. Cummings to continue-or to build the foundation and she eventually terminated him and hired Mutt Montgomery to build in '87. In 1986 to the summer of '87, she wintered in Fairbanks and snowma-chined into the property during the winter. Construction began in 1987. In 1987 she began to live in the rough structure; worked on windows and doors, a pantry; hired a cabinet man for the kitchen in 1988. Prepare area for the propane stove, cabinet and wood stove and lived in Fairbanks in the winter of '87, visiting her property also during the winter. In 1988 the closets went in, shelving and other activities. The turkeys, as I mentioned before, were added in '88. In 1985 or 1986 a telephone was *30put in and, although in later years, there might be some uncertainty, it was listed in the directory at the time. A garden was planted, fruit trees were planted and trees were thinned in areas that are still visible in the 1993 photo, AB. (Emphasis added.)