Court Opinion

ID: 9916747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 16:03:08.910177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:52.876737
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                       ALEJANDRO F. BORGES,
                             Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-2177

                           [January 10, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Scott Suskauer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502020CF006579.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Timothy Wang, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

   Appellant Alejandro F. Borges (“Defendant”) timely appeals his
sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in including certain points on
his scoresheet and failing to make a written “danger to the community”
finding. We agree, but affirm, determining resentencing is unnecessary
and that only a limited remand is warranted.

                               Background

   Defendant was charged with written threats to kill or do bodily injury.
He entered into a plea agreement for three years’ probation. Shortly after
his probation began, he contacted the victim and began to threaten her
again. Based on this conduct, the trial court found Defendant violated his
probation. A few weeks later, Defendant was convicted of aggravated
stalking, based on the same actions that violated his probation.

   At sentencing, the trial court found Defendant had met his burden of
showing grounds to downwardly depart from the recommended minimum.
However, the trial court declined to depart, reasoning that Defendant
violated his probation soon after it was imposed with the same actions that
caused the original probation term and agreed with the State that a fifteen-
year sentence was proper.

   Defendant then filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that his
scoresheet contained 24 points for being a violent felony offender of special
concern (“VFOSC”), but the trial court had incorrectly added 12 of those
points for the aggravated stalking charge as a “new felony conviction.” He
also argued that the trial court failed to make a written “danger to the
community” finding. As the trial court did not timely rule on this motion,
the motion is deemed denied. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B).1
Defendant’s appeal followed.

                                    Analysis

  We review sentencing errors de novo. See Brooks v. State, 199 So. 3d
974, 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

   Defendant first argues that under section 921.0024(1)(b)2.b., Florida
Statutes (2022), a “new felony conviction” is one that is obtained before or
at the same time as the court determines a defendant violated his or her
probation. Because Defendant’s aggravated stalking conviction was
entered after the violation of probation conviction, he asserts his
aggravated stalking conviction is not a “new felony conviction.”

   Section 921.0024(1)(b)2.b. governs the VFOSC point allocation for
community sanction violations and allocates 24 points “for each
successive violation of felony probation or community control where the
violation includes a new felony conviction.” (emphasis added).

   However, the “new felony conviction” must be secured before or at the
same time as the violation of probation. First, the model scoresheet in
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.992(a) states that a defendant is
given 24 points for a “new felony conviction” “if [the] new offense results in
a conviction before or at the same time for violation of probation.”
(emphasis added).        Second, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.704(d)(16) states that 24 points are allocated “if the violation results from
a new felony conviction.” By using “results from,” rule 3.704(d)(16) implies
a causal component, in that the new felony conviction (as distinct from

1  Although the trial court entered an order granting the motion to correct
sentence in part, the trial court’s order was a nullity as it was not filed until 63
days after the motion. See Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA
2005) (“A 3.800(b)(2) motion is deemed denied, and the trial court’s jurisdiction
ends, once 60 days elapse without rendition of an order ruling on the motion,
and any order rendered more than 60 days after a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion is filed
is a nullity.”).
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the new felony) was the cause of the probation violation. A felony
conviction cannot be the cause of a violation of probation if the felony
conviction is not secured until after the violation of probation.

   Here, Defendant entered the aggravated stalking plea after the trial
court found he violated his probation. As the conviction for aggravated
stalking was not entered before or at the same time as the violation of
probation, it was not a “new felony conviction.” The State concedes that if
the aggravated stalking conviction was not a “new felony conviction,” then
Defendant’s score sheet should have reflected 12 points and not 24.

    Thus, a remand is appropriate for the trial court to enter a corrected
scoresheet. However, resentencing is not necessary. Applying the “would-
have-been-imposed” test, we conclude the record conclusively shows the
trial court would have imposed the same sentence with a corrected
scoresheet. See Ray v. State, 987 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
(quoting Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 241–42 (Fla. 2007)).

   Where a trial court rejects a request for a downward departure and
indicates its sentence does not depend on the lowest permissible sentence,
any error on the scoresheet will be harmless. See Jenkins v. State, 332
So. 3d 1013, 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); see also Moreno v. State, 266 So.
3d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Here, the trial court chose a sentence
significantly above the lowest permissible sentence, while at the same time
noting it had the discretion to downwardly depart from the lowest
permissible sentence. The trial court even reminded defense counsel it
was considering consecutive sentences on both the violation of probation
and the aggravated stalking convictions. Accordingly, Defendant is solely
entitled to a remand to correct his scoresheet. See Naugle v. State, 244
So. 3d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

    Defendant next argues the trial court erred when it failed to make a
written finding under section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2022), that he
was a danger to the community. The State agrees that the trial court never
entered the requisite written order and that a remand for a written order
is required. See Arnone v. State, 204 So. 3d 556, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

   However, Defendant is not entitled to resentencing. Resentencing is
not required where the trial court orally pronounces a reason that is
consistent with one or more of the factors it must consider under section
948.06(8)(e)1. See McCray v. State, 282 So. 3d 158, 161–62 (Fla. 2d DCA
2019).    One of those factors is “[t]he offender’s amenability to
nonincarcerative sanctions based on his or her history and conduct during
the probation or community control supervision from which the violation

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hearing arises and any other previous supervisions.” § 948.06(8)(e)1.c.,
Fla. Stat. (2022).

   Here, the trial court orally expressed its concern that Defendant had
violated his probation with the same conduct which was the basis for his
underlying conviction. This seemingly “fits the bill,” making resentencing
unnecessary and remanding solely for a written order addressing the trial
court’s “danger to the community” finding sufficient. See McCray, 282 So.
3d at 162; Thompson v. State, 265 So. 3d 700, 703–04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

                               Conclusion

   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s sentence. However,
we remand for the trial court to enter a corrected scoresheet and to enter
a written order reducing to writing the trial court’s danger to the
community finding.

   Affirmed; remanded for correction of scoresheet and addition of written
“danger to the community” finding only.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and KUNTZ, J., concur.

                           *        *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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