Court Opinion

ID: 9660347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:10:45.930569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:06.778066
License: Public Domain

DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.
¶ 19. (dissenting). I conclude that the pollution exclusion at issue in this case is unambiguous and that exhaled carbon dioxide is a "pollutant" that was "discharged" into the workplace under the definitions of the policy. Coverage was properly denied in this case because a "reasonable insured" would not expect coverage for injuries resulting from exhaled breath. I would therefore affirm the court of appeals decision upholding the grant of summary judgment to the Hanover Insurance Company.
f 20. The insurance policies at issue in this case contain a clear and unambiguous absolute pollution exclusion. The policies define "pollutant" with careful specificity, intending the term to encompass a broad range of pollutants. See majority op. at 228, 231. The majority attempts to create ambiguity where none exists so that it might interpret the contract in favor of coverage for the insured. It writes that "the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous because ULI could reasonably expect coverage on the facts of this case." Majority op. at 233. However, the mere fact that the *236parties disagree over coverage is insufficient to render a term ambiguous. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499, 504, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991), citing Bartel v. Carey, 127 Wis. 2d 310, 314, 379 N.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1985).
¶ 21. A word, phrase, or term is not ambiguous merely because the parties involved may disagree about its meaning. Id. As the majority notes, if a word, phrase, or term is plain on its face, then this court should not apply the rules of construction to rewrite the language of the contract. Majority op. at 230-31 (citation omitted). Instead, this court is required to apply the meaning of the language as it is used in the contract or policy.
¶ 22. In the case at bar, the term "pollutant" is clearly, plainly, and explicitly defined in unambiguous terms as:
any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
Like the court of appeals, I conclude that the term "pollutant" unambiguously includes exhaled carbon dioxide because it is a "gaseous irritant" in certain concentrations, and carbon dioxide is "waste" that is expelled from the human body.
¶ 23. Although the majority quickly dismisses its importance in a footnote, see majority op. at 231, note 4, the Ace Baking case is relevant to the issues involved in the case at bar. In Ace Baking, ice cream cones manufactured by Ace were stored in a warehouse next to some fabric softener. One of Ace's customers complained that the cones had an odd taste and an *237investigation was subsequently conducted. The investigation revealed that a fragrance additive, linalool, from the fabric softener rendered the ice cream cones unusable. Ace Baking presented a claim to its insurer, who subsequently denied coverage under the insurance policy's pollution exclusion clause.
¶ 24. The language of the pollution exclusion policy in Ace Baking was similar to that of Hanover at issue in this case. It excluded losses "caused by or resulting from. . .[rjelease, discharge or dispersal of 'pollutants.'" Ace Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 501. However, the policy did not include a definition of "pollutant." Id. For this reason alone, the majority cursorily concludes that Ace Baking "is not germane to the instant analysis." Majority op. at 231, note 4. I conclude that Ace Baking is indeed germane to the instant analysis.
¶ 25. The Ace Baking court concluded that the linalool was a "pollutant" within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause and, therefore, coverage was excluded under the terms of the policy. It decided this despite the fact that "[t]he parties agree that linalool is harmless when properly used in appropriate products." 164 Wis. 2d at 502. The court explained that a normally harmless and commonplace product can still be a "pollutant" within the commonly accepted definition of the term. "[I]t is a rare substance indeed that is always a pollutant; the most noxious of materials have their appropriate and non-polluting uses." Id. at 505. In fact, the court explains, even something as universal and generally harmless as water may be a pollutant under the wrong conditions. Id.
¶ 26. Like the linalool in Ace Baking, exhaled carbon dioxide can be a "pollutant" under certain circumstances even though it is characterized by the majority as "universally present and generally harm*238less." Majority op. at 234. The summary judgment record in this case presents affidavits and exhibits which clearly demonstrate that this "generally harmless" substance can become extremely harmful in high concentrations. The mere fact that it is a common and natural product does not, as the majority suggests, mean that it cannot also be considered a "pollutant" within the meaning of the policy. See Ace Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 505.
¶ 27. I am further compelled to conclude that the pollution exclusion clause unambiguously covers exhaled carbon dioxide by the fact that it clearly falls within one of the specific examples of a "pollutant" listed in the policy — "waste." It is a commonly accepted fact that exhaled carbon dioxide is a waste product of the natural process of breathing. Because the language of the policy uses only the general term "waste," it makes sense to assume that the insurer and the insured anticipated that all waste would be covered under the exclusion.
¶ 28. Despite the fact that Hanover made the argument regarding waste before this court, the majority opinion fails to discuss, or even mention, this issue. Perhaps this is because the majority sees no way to get around this unambiguous example provided in the language of the policy.
¶ 29. The majority also never reaches the second issue in this case: whether the exhalation of carbon dioxide is a "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape" of a pollutant. I conclude that it is a "discharge" that falls within the language of the pollution exclusion.
¶ 30. The dictionary describes a "discharge" as "a flowing out or pouring forth; emission; secretion." The American Heritage Dictionary 530 (3d ed. 1992). Simi*239larly, the dictionary defines "exhale" as "to emit air or vapor." Id. at 641. Based on these common definitions, exhaled or emitted breath is clearly a discharge within the meaning of the pollution exclusion because it is an "emission" from the human body that "pours forth" into the air.
¶ 31. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I stress that the standard to be applied is whether a reasonable insured would anticipate coverage in a certain circumstance. See General Cas. Co. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 561 N.W.2d 718, 722 (1997). I conclude that a reasonable insured would not expect that insurance would cover injuries caused from breathing in exhaled breath. If we accept the majority's assertion, then it follows that one would expect coverage for illnesses caused from inhaling secondhand smoke. After all, secondhand cigarette smoke, like carbon dioxide, is "universally present" and is "generally harmless" if inhaled in small quantities. Would a tavern owner expect coverage in a suit by bar patrons who have become sick from inhaling exhaled cigarette smoke? I think not. Similarly, I conclude that a "reasonable insured" would not expect coverage for injuries resulting from breathing exhaled carbon dioxide.
¶ 32. The language of the pollution exclusion in this case is unambiguous. Exhaled carbon dioxide is both a "pollutant" within the meaning of the policy, and "discharged" within the meaning of the policy. A reasonable insured would not have anticipated coverage in this case: Consequently, I conclude that the Hanover Insurance Company properly denied coverage to ULI under the pollution exclusion clause. The court of appeals should be affirmed in this case.
*240¶ 33. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.