Court Opinion

ID: 9582955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:09.995005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:47.367798
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
specially concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case but would adhere to the analysis in State v. Long, 106 Or Ap 389, 807 P2d 815 (1991), and Denton Plastics, Inc. v. City of Portland, 105 Or App 302, 804 P2d 1199 (1990), for the reasons stated in my dissent in City of Portland v. Jackson, 111 Or App 233, 245, 826 P2d 37 (1992).
I must point out, though, an inconsistency between this decision and Jackson. The majority is willing to read a state of mind requirement into the challenged ordinance here but was unwilling to do that in Jackson. The argument that Portland’s public exposure ordinance requires at least a “reckless” intent is stronger than the argument that Dallas’s ordinance requires an “intentional” state of mind. I fail to see how an element that was not proven beyond a reasonable *232doubt at trial can be added to an ordinance via the magic of in pari materia reasoning.
Joseph, Rossman and Durham, JJ., join in this specially concurring opinion.