Court Opinion

ID: 9378544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 19:02:47.242231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.012478
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/10/23 Antonio A. v. Superior Court CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 ANTONIO A.,
             Petitioner,
 v.
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF                                                   A166810
 SONOMA COUNTY,
             Respondent;                                                 (Sonoma County
 SONOMA COUNTY DEPARTMENT                                                Super. Ct. No. DEP-6516-01
 OF HUMAN SERVICES,
             Real Party in Interest.

         Antonio A. (father) petitions this court for extraordinary writ relief
from a juvenile court order denying his request for a continuance and
terminating his reunification services at the six-month review hearing for his
one-year-old daughter, Velma B. (minor). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd.
(e).)1 We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in denying his
continuance request and that he voluntarily forfeited his right to challenge
the termination of his services. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

       Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the
         1

Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                                               1
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        Minor was born in November 2021, to father and Bobbie B. (mother).2
At birth, minor tested positive for methamphetamine.
I.      The Petition.
        On December 2, 2021, a petition was filed pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) (risk of serious physical harm/illness) and (j) (sibling abuse
or neglect) on behalf of minor and her three-year-old brother, Daniel B.
According to the petition, mother tested positive for methamphetamine at
minor’s birth, had minimal prenatal care, and was unwilling to participate in
safety planning for minor. Father was also unwilling to participate in safety
planning or take additional protective actions to mitigate risks to minor. In a
prior dependency proceeding, Daniel was detained from parents on or about
October 12, 2018, due to mother’s alcohol and methamphetamine use. The
family ultimately reunified, and the case closed in August 2019. However,
mother failed to successfully reunify with minor’s half sister, Juanita B., and
the child was adopted in 2016.
II.     Detention and Amended Petition.
        On December 3, 2021, a detention hearing was held, after which minor
and Daniel were detained and a jurisdiction hearing was set for December 29,
2021.
        An amended section 300 petition was filed on December 27, 2021,
which added an allegation under subdivision (b) that parents’ pattern of
escalating domestic conflict placed children at risk of serious physical harm
or illness. The amended petition further alleged eight service calls were
made to the home in the prior four months that required law enforcement

      Mother has not filed a writ petition. As such, she is mentioned only
        2

when relevant to the issues raised in father’s petition.

                                        2
intervention. Law enforcement responders assessed father as under the
influence of alcohol at the time.
III.   Jurisdiction and Disposition.
       According to the jurisdiction/disposition report filed on December 27,
2021, mother reported separating from father and asking him to leave home
because she was concerned about his alcohol use and his possible sexual
interest3 in Daniel. She did not feel supported by father because he kept
alcohol in the home. She had requested that he not keep alcohol there.
       Father reported feeling surprised by minor’s positive toxicology at
birth, as he did not know mother was using drugs and believed she was
taking good care of Daniel and minor. He also reported not having a phone,
and when the social worker tried to schedule a formal interview, he failed to
call on the given dates and time frames.
       On December 22, 2021, during a meeting between mother and the
social worker, the latter asked to speak to father, who was present with
mother. When the social worker asked him to respond to the allegations
against him, he provided no information other than to say, “ ‘We are good
parents.’ ”
       Parents had at least two visits with the children during which parents
seemed “distracted,” as if arguing. The department recommended supervised
visitation until mother’s accusations of father’s drinking and sexual interest
in Daniel could be investigated. The department noted that father struggled
with alcohol misuse and that Daniel had been living in a toxic and chaotic
environment with parents.

       The department opined it was unclear whether mother’s accusations
       3

of sexual interest were truthful, as mother’s information was quite vague.

                                       3
       In an updated report filed on February 2, 2022, the social worker
reported making several attempts to engage with father before finally
interviewing him on January 18, 2022. He reported that his relationship
with mother was marred by domestic violence for the prior three years and
that she was the aggressor. He explained that mother became aggressive
while high, frequently hitting him all over his body. Mother had also
prevented him from leaving the house, which caused him to lose jobs; taken
his cell phone; and threatened to beat him if he did not oblige her. He
reported losing weight because mother did not let him enter the kitchen to
eat.
       Father confirmed Daniel witnessed mother hitting father at least 10
times. Daniel also exhibited highly dysregulated behaviors that included
hitting others and self-harm. Father denied mother’s accusation that he
expressed sexual interest in Daniel.
       The police were summoned to parents’ home on November 20, 2021,
due to a domestic disturbance. The police report identified mother as the
offender and mentioned a previous incident, a week prior, when mother hit
father but he declined to report it because he “ ‘loved her.’ ” The reporting
officer described father’s statements as incoherent and wandering because he
consumed alcohol before calling 911. Mother denied any domestic violence.
       Another incident of domestic violence occurred on January 12, 2022,
which led to mother’s arrest. Father reported mother hit him twice in the
torso with a closed fist during an argument over the children. According to
the police report, mother was animated and rambling and had difficulty
answering questions. Father declined to seek an emergency protective order
or sign a medical release form. Mother later denied being the aggressor or
using drugs or alcohol.

                                       4
      The social worker noted some areas of progress. Parents “appear[ed] to
[have] officially separate[d] from each other,” and father found temporary
housing and a new job, after losing another one. He also obtained a reliable
cell phone so he could stay in better contact with the department and
participate in in-person and video visits with the children. He was also
seeking assistance from Family Justice Center Sonoma County.
      After several continuances, the jurisdiction/disposition hearing was
held on March 21, 2022. The court found true the allegations in the amended
section 300 petition as to both children and ordered reunification services for
father while bypassing services for mother. The court also set a sixth-month
review hearing for September 15, 2022.
IV.   De Facto Parent Order and Six-month Review.
      On July 11, 2022, minor’s caretakers, who had taken care of minor
since she was one day old, filed a de facto parent statement. In their
statement, the caretakers described helping minor through withdrawals from
narcotics, alcohol, and tobacco and working with a variety of medical
providers, including Early Start and UCSF Health Orthopedics and Genetics,
to ensure minor received the best possible early services and health care.
      At the September 15, 2022, six-month review hearing, the court
granted the caretakers’ de facto parent request. The court also granted the
department’s continuance request and trailed the review hearing for the
children to October 5, 2022.
      In its report for the six-month review hearing, the department
recommended terminating father’s reunification services as to both children
and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. The social worker noted
that father was no longer living with mother but was in regular contact with
her despite the toxicity of their relationship. Father did not see this as a

                                        5
problem. The social worker described father as extremely codependent on
mother.
          Father worked three or four days a week as a gardener and had his
own vehicle but was paid in cash and did not have a bank account. He also
lacked permanent housing. Due to his lack of stable employment, the social
worker opined it would be difficult for father to find such housing. He also
denied having a drug or alcohol problem and declined to participate in
random testing or attend substance abuse meetings.
          The social worker opined father did not seem to understand the amount
of work and commitment that parenting requires, especially for children with
special needs such as Daniel. In fact, he failed to take regular care of his own
medical concerns (diabetes), which regularly resulted in serious side effects.
While father was referred to weekly individual therapy sessions, he
completed only nine sessions in five months and his progress was minimal.
Father only sporadically participated in weekly supervised visits4 with the
children despite appearing genuinely to love them. Further, father’s
parenting teacher was concerned he was not grasping the information and
skills that were being taught, describing him as unaware of the children’s
needs and clueless as to how to care for them.
          The social worker, her assistant, father’s therapist, and his parenting
provider all believed he “may have some cognitive deficiencies, that will
impact his ability to keep his children safe and adequately care for.” Father’s
case plan instructed him to participate in a psychological evaluation, which
was scheduled for November 11, 2022, and to follow through with treatment
recommendations.

          4   Father missed, canceled, declined or was late for 18 of 31 scheduled
visits.

                                             6
      Meanwhile, the de facto parents expressed a desire to adopt minor, and
were described as loving and attentive to her needs. Minor appeared to be
thriving and was receiving a plethora of therapies and developmental
services.
      The six-month review hearing, originally scheduled for September 15,
2022, was continued several times, at least once, on October 5, 2022, at the
department’s request. On November 2, 2022, the six-month review hearing
was continued again, to November 22 and December 12, 2022, in light of the
fact that father’s psychological evaluation was scheduled for November 17,
2022. However, the minute order from November 22, 2022, states that father
“did not attend” his psychological evaluation on November 17 and that it was
rescheduled for December 1, 2022. Nonetheless, the December 12, 2022, date
for the six-month review hearing stayed on calendar.
      On December 12, 2022, father requested another continuance of the
hearing. His counsel argued that while father had met twice with the
psychologist, they had not yet received the evaluation. This evaluation,
counsel argued, would address whether father had cognitive issues that
would influence whether he had received reasonable services.
      The department opposed father’s continuance request, arguing that
father delayed participating in the psychological evaluation and minimally
participated, or failed to participate, in other services. Moreover, the 12-
month review date was rapidly approaching on January 30, 2023, and there
was not a substantial likelihood the children could be returned to father’s
care with an extended reunification period.
      The juvenile court agreed with the department and denied father’s
continuance request. The six-month review hearing thus went forward.
Father’s counsel expressed father’s willingness to stipulate to the termination

                                        7
of his reunification services for minor in exchange for receiving further
services for Daniel until the 12-month date. After questioning father, the
juvenile court accepted father’s waiver of his rights to challenge the
termination of his reunification services for minor as knowing and intelligent.
The juvenile court further found father made minimal efforts with his case
plan, despite the department’s making reasonable efforts to return minor
through its provision of reasonable services. As such, the court (1) found that
returning minor to father would create a substantial risk of detriment to her
safety or well-being; (2) terminated his services as to minor; and
(3) scheduled her section 366.26 hearing for April 6, 2023.
      On December 16, 2022, father filed his notice of intent to file a writ
petition.
                                DISCUSSION
      Father raises two issues for our review: Did the juvenile court err in
(1) denying his request for a continuance of the six-month review hearing and
(2) terminating his reunification services as to minor at that hearing after
finding that the department offered him reasonable services?
I.    The court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s request
      for a continuance.
      A request for a continuance is governed by section 352, which provides
that a juvenile court may grant a continuance of a hearing only upon a
showing of good cause and only if the continuance is not “contrary to the
interest of the minor.” (§ 352, subds. (a), (b).) “In considering the minor’s
interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt
resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with
stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary
placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).) As this language reflects, the Legislature

                                        8
intended section 352 to serve as “an express discouragement of continuances.
[Citation.]” (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179–180.)
        We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a request for
continuance for abuse of discretion. (In re B.C. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 129,
143–144.) An abuse of discretion may be found only when “ ‘ “ ‘the trial court
has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
641.)
        Here, father contends the juvenile court’s denial of his continuance
request was an abuse of discretion because the court could not properly
assess whether the department provided him reasonable services regarding
minor without first receiving and considering the psychological evaluation
that was ordered as part of his case plan. Father notes that several of his
service providers, including his social worker and individual therapist,
expressed concern that he may have cognitive issues that impacted his ability
to parent. The psychological evaluation, father reasons, could have shed light
on those issues, as well as whether he needed specific services to address his
cognitive condition.
        Undisputedly, father was referred for the psychological evaluation in
August 2022, at which point the department discovered a contractual issue
with its service provider that delayed scheduling it. It was not until
November 17, 2022, that father’s appointment was finally scheduled.
However, the November 22, 2022, minute order states that father “did not
attend” this appointment and it was rescheduled for December 1, 2022. On
that day, and for a second day, father did participate in his psychological
evaluation. However, the psychologist’s report was not received by the
parties in time for the contested six-month review on December 12, 2022.

                                        9
      In considering father’s continuance request under these circumstances,
the juvenile court acknowledged, “[O]bviously the psych eval [sic] would be
perhaps helpful, you know, it would tell us one way or the other whether
[father] has the ability to do this, it’s questionable that he does have the
ability to do what is necessary to reunify, but we don’t know that and we’re
sort of guessing. And it seems to me that it would be—I mean, I’d prefer to
have that information.” Ultimately, however, the court denied his request,
reasoning that “there [were] multiple failures here.” Among other things,
father “hasn’t done drug treatment”; “hasn’t gotten a full-time job to work
and support his family”; “doesn’t trust banks” and “won’t have a bank
account”; “has a relationship continuing with the mother, which is very
troubling because of her drug use, continued excessive drug use”; “doesn’t
follow through with individual therapy”; “doesn’t follow through with taking
care of himself” despite having “a multitude of medical issues”; and, “on top of
all that, he’s missed 18 out of 31 scheduled visits as of the date of the October
report.”
      Nonetheless, the juvenile court offered, “[W]hen the report comes in, if
there’s some—I would liberally construe any issues for a [section 388 motion
to modify or set aside a prior order] if that becomes necessary or whatever
remedy you might be asking for, because there a [sic] multitude of issues and
we are all quite late in the game and all of these things have been offered to
[father], he hasn’t taken enough advantage of.”
      On this thorough record, there are no grounds for concluding the
juvenile court “ ‘ “ ‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (In re Caden C.,

                                       10
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)5 On the contrary, the court considered
numerous relevant factors before resting its decision on the need to “give
substantial weight to [minor’s] need for prompt resolution of . . . her custody
status, the need to provide [minor] with stable environments, and the
damage to [minor] of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).)
That is exactly what our juvenile dependency policy requires. (In re Karla C.,
supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 179–180.) Accordingly, the denial of father’s
request for continuance stands.
II.   Father knowingly and voluntarily forfeited his right to
      challenge the termination of his reunification services as to
      minor.
      Father’s remaining challenge is to the court’s termination of his
reunification services as to minor. Father does not deny that his case plan
progress was minimal. Rather, he contends the department’s provision of
services was not reasonable. The department counters (inter alia) that father
forfeited his right to challenge the termination of his services by agreeing in
open court to their termination in minor’s case in exchange for an extension
of services in Daniel’s case. We agree with the department.
      At the six-month review hearing, father’s counsel advised the juvenile
court: “I believe that we have an agreement to bifurcate the proceedings,

      5 Father paints his challenge to the juvenile court’s ruling as a violation
of due process. However, father makes no claim that he did not have
adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard before the court denied his
request. (See In re Matthew P. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841, 851 [“In juvenile
dependency litigation, due process focuses on the right to notice and the right
to be heard”].) Moreover, as the department notes, father could have
subpoenaed the individual who conducted the psychological evaluation to
discuss his cognitive condition. But father did not, which “weighs against
finding a due process violation.” (J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 530, 537.) Accordingly, we review his challenge only for an
abuse of discretion.

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meaning that we will terminate reunification services on Velma since she
was the child that was under age three and father was only entitled to three
months of reunification services. [¶] I am sorry. Six-months of reunification
services.” “For Daniel, the question was whether or not he should be
considered part of the sibling group, even though they were removed from
parental custody at the same time, the Court would have factors to consider
under [section] 366.21(e)(4). [¶] And so that being the case, the Department is
willing to continue offering Daniel services for father, the 12 full months of
reunification services under Daniel, but terminating for Velma.”
      The court then queried, “He’ll have further services for Daniel until the
12-month mark, which is coming up pretty quickly. [¶] And he’ll agree to
terminate FR for Velma, is that—is that what you understand you’re
agreeing to, sir?” Father responded, “I understand.” The court also asked
father whether he had any questions, to which father answered, “I accepted
this because I don’t want to lose both kids honestly.” The court cautioned
him that “the 12-month mark is coming up related to Daniel on the 30th of
January” and that “giving up one will [not] necessarily make the second issue
[regarding his participation in services for Daniel] easier. It’s a very uphill
climb at this point given where we are and how young your children are.”
The court also emphasized, “I just want to have the discussion so that we are
not misleading [father] in any way. [¶] So, [father], do you have any questions
for the Court?” Father responded, “I am in shock. I have a big knot in my
throat. I can’t talk. I can’t speak. I am sorry. I can’t.”

                                       12
      The following colloquy between the juvenile court and father then
occurred:
      “THE COURT: Okay. [Father], I understand that you and your lawyer
have discussed and that you are willing to waive reunification services for
Velma, is that correct?
      “[FATHER]: If I waive those rights, she’ll go onto adoption?
      “THE COURT: That is the path she’ll be on, yes.
      “[FATHER]: And Daniel?
      “THE COURT: Well, first of all, do you understand that if you waive
the reunification services, the next will be to terminate your rights and to
move to adoption for Velma? That’s what we’re talking about with Velma.
[¶] Do you understand that part?
      “[FATHER]: Yes.
      “THE COURT: Okay. Then the next thing is you’re agreeing to
participate in services related to reunification with Daniel.
      “[FATHER]: Yes.
      “THE COURT: And you need to jump in [on] those services now today
because you’re way behind the eight ball.
      “[FATHER]: I’ll do whatever they ask me to do.
      “THE COURT: Okay, but they’ve been asking you all year to do to [sic]
things and you’re not doing them. So I am just saying—
      “[FATHER]: I am sorry. I apologize for failing.”
      Finally, after additional discussion about Daniel’s case, the court asked
again, “So but is this what you want to do? You want to pursue services for
Daniel and you will agree to terminate your services related to Velma, is this
correct?” Father agreed, and the court asked him to confirm: “Are you doing
this freely and voluntarily?” “And you’ve had enough time to think about it?”

                                       13
At this point, father replied that he needed “more time” to consider it, but the
court told him, “Sir, there is no more time. Your children have been waiting
for you all year to get off the dime and do what you’re supposed to do. [¶] So
the time is up with Velma.” Father replied, “I don’t feel well.” The court
pressed, “So do you want to agree that you’ll waive services and continue
reunification services for Daniel?” Father stated, “Yes, that’s fine,” before
asking to “get some air.”
      On this record, we agree with the juvenile court that father knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to a contested hearing on the continuation
of his reunification services for minor after making minimal progress with his
case plan. When, as here, a child is under age three on the date of initial
removal from the physical custody of his or her parents, services should not
exceed six months unless the court finds a substantial probability of return
with an extended 12- or 18-month period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); In re J.C.
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528.) Further, a “parent may waive his or her
constitutional rights to relationships with the child ‘as long as the waivers
are “voluntary [citations] and knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’
[Citations.] It does not matter at what stage of the proceedings the waiver
occurs for the court to find it was knowing and intelligent.” (Cynthia C. v.
Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1201.)
      Here, there is no evidence demonstrating that father was misled,
coerced, or confused when he agreed in open court6 to the court’s termination

      6 Father points to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(14), whereby a parent,
represented by counsel, may voluntarily waive his or her right to receive
reunification by executing a waiver of services form. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(14).)
Under this statute, the court must advise the parent “of any right to services
and of the possible consequences of a waiver of services, including the

                                       14
of his services as to minor. On the contrary, the juvenile court asked father
to confirm several times that he understood that his attorney was stipulating
on his behalf to the termination of these services in exchange for the
department’s agreement to extend services in Daniel’s case to the 12-month
mark. Father acquiesced and then expressly confirmed that his decision to
waive his right to challenge this termination was knowing and voluntary.
While the record also reflects that father was emotionally drained by his
decision, as he told the court he felt unwell and needed to “get some air,” this
does not diminish the fact that given the court’s thoughtful examination,
father fully appreciated his decision and its consequences. (See San Diego
County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 1, 10
[“ ‘voluntary [citations] and “knowing [waivers are] intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences” ’ ”].)
      Accordingly, we decline to consider father’s challenge to the
termination of his services as to minor on forfeiture grounds. (In re A.K.
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 500 [contentions not raised before the juvenile
court are forfeited on appeal]; In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 442
[when a parent voluntarily waives reunification services, the parent also
waives his or her right to complain of their adequacy on appeal].)

termination of parental rights and placement of the child for adoption. The
court shall not accept the waiver of services unless it states on the record its
finding that the parent . . . has knowingly and intelligently waived the right
to services.” (Ibid.) As father notes, he did not execute a waiver form.
However, father did not waive his right to receive services under section
361.5. Rather, he waived his right to contest the termination of his services
at the six-month mark after only minimally participating in them. As such,
there was no requirement that he execute a waiver form.

                                       15
                                       DISPOSITION
       Father’s petition for writ of extraordinary relief is denied.

                                                _________________________
                                                Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Simons, J.

_________________________
Burns, J.

A166810/Antonio A. v. Superior Court

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