Court Opinion

ID: 9812912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:51:50.589154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:14.074689
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.
(dissenting): In State v. Covington, at last Term, (117 N. C., 834,) it was held, affirming the construction of the statute theretofore made by McRae, J., in State v. Gilchrist, 113 N. C., 673, and by Avery, J., in State v. Norwood, 115 N. C., 791, that “ the Act of February 11, 1893 ” (which divided the crime of murder into two degrees) “ does not give jurors a discretion, when rendering their verdict, to determine of what degree of murder a prisoner is guilty. They must render a verdict according to the evidence; and, believing a prisoner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first degree, it is their duty so to find, however much inclined to show mercy by rendering a verdict for a lesser offence. Their obligation in that respect has not been changed by the statute, and is the same as it was upon the trial for homicide before its enactment, and the question was whether the prisoner was guilty of murder or manslaughter. This question has been settled by our decisions, not only in construing the Act under consideration, but also the similar one dividing the crime of burglary into two degrees. State v. Alston, 113 N. C., 666; State v. McKnight, 111 N. C., 690; State v. Fleming, 107 N. C., 905.” From this most recent deliverance of the Court (so clearly restating the law and citing with approval the former authorities) it is plain that the degree of murder for which the verdict can be rendered is not a matter of discretion with the jury, but must be in accordance with the evidence. It *1160necessarily follows, therefore,that if there is no evidence of murder in the second degree it could not be error to so instruct: the jury. Here, there is no question of a presumption to be drawn from the use of a deadly weapon, nor does any question arise as to premeditation and deliberation. These points are not presented in this case. The statute makes “ the killing by lying in wait” murder in the first degree. If the evidence was sufficient to show that the prisoner killed the deceased at all, it showed that he slew him while lying in wait. If it was not sufficient to show that the prisoner slew the deceased from ambush, it was not sufficient to prove that he killed him at all. There was no evidence whatever of murder in the second degree, nor of any killing by the prisoner in any mode except by lying in wait, which was murder in the first degree. The judge therefore could not have erred in telling the jury that “there was no evidence of murder in the second degree.” and “ that if the killing was by lying in wait and shooting the deceased from behind a tree, and the jury were satisfied of this beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the killing was willful and premeditated, it would be murder in the first degree.” His Honor states that the charge is not sent up in full, but, in accordance with repeated recommendations of this Court, only so much is sent up as is pertinent to the exceptions. Bank v. Bridgers, 114 N. C., 107; Durham v. Railroad, 108 N. C., 309. In charging upon this state of facts that the jury should find the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree, if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he slew the deceased by lying in Avait and shooting him from behind a tree, and if not so satisfied to acquit him, Judge Hoke followed the law as laid down in State v. Covington, at last Term, and adopted the identical charge Avhich was approved in that case and in the several cases cited therein. A careful inspection of *1161the evidence will show, as the judge correctly stated, no evidence whatever of murder in the second degree, for it either proved that the murder had been committed by the prisoner’s shooting the deceased by lying in wait, or it did not show that he had killed the deceased at all. The evidence of murder in the first'degree was sufficient to convince the jury, and the trial judge refused to set the verdict aside. It need not be marshalled here, as its sufficiency is not before us. The Attorney General’s statement, in his argument, was that the evidence “ was consistent with murder in the first degree and inconsistent with murder in the second degree.” The issue of fact was properly left to the jury and in every aspect presented by the evidence.
MONTGOMERY, J.: I concur in the dissenting opinion.