Court Opinion

ID: 9703562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:00:29.848477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:08.143560
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60743     Document: 00516873781         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/25/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                  FILED
                                                                       August 25, 2023
                                  No. 21-60743                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                 Clerk

   State of Texas; Greg Abbott, Governor of the State of Texas;
   Texas Commission on Environmental Quality; Fasken
   Land and Minerals, Limited; Permian Basin Land and
   Royalty Owners,

                                                                     Petitioners,

                                      versus

   Nuclear Regulatory Commission; United States of
   America,

                                                                   Respondents.
                   ______________________________

                 Appeal from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                               Agency No. 72-1050
                  ______________________________

   Before Jones, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
          Nuclear power generation produces thousands of metric tons of nu-
   clear waste each year. And such waste has been accumulating at nuclear
   power plants throughout the United States for decades. Congress has man-
   dated that such waste be permanently stored in a geologic repository. But the
   development, licensing, and construction of that repository has stalled.
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           To address this problem, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has as-
   serted that it has authority under the Atomic Energy Act to license tempo-
   rary, away-from-reactor storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel. Based on
   that claim of authority, the Commission has issued a license for Interim Stor-
   age Partners, LLC, a private company, to operate a temporary storage facility
   on the Permian Basin, in Andrews County, Texas. Fasken Land and Miner-
   als, Ltd., a for-profit organization working in oil and gas extraction, and Per-
   mian Basin Land and Royalty Owners (“PBLRO”), an association seeking to
   protect the interests of the Permian Basin, have petitioned for review of the
   license. 1 So has the State of Texas, which argues, inter alia, that the Atomic
   Energy Act doesn’t confer authority on the Commission to license such a
   facility.
           Texas is correct. The Atomic Energy Act does not confer on the Com-
   mission the broad authority it claims to issue licenses for private parties to
   store spent nuclear fuel away-from-the-reactor. And the Nuclear Waste Pol-
   icy Act establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme for dealing with nu-
   clear waste generated from commercial nuclear power generation, thereby
   foreclosing the Commission’s claim of authority. Accordingly, we grant the
   petition for review and vacate the license.
                                             I.
           This case is the latest development in a decades-long debate over nu-
   clear power and waste regulation. Accordingly, we provide a brief overview
   of relevant historical and technical background before delving into the specif-
   ics of the licensing proceedings challenged here.

           _____________________
           1
            For the remainder of this opinion, we use the term “Fasken” to refer to Fasken
   Land and Minerals, Ltd. and PBLRO collectively, unless addressing an issue where it’s
   necessary to distinguish them.

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                                         A.
          The United States began producing nuclear waste in the 1940s, first
   as a byproduct of nuclear weapons development and then as a byproduct of
   the commercial nuclear power industry. Blue Ribbon Commission
   on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary
   of        Energy           19       (Jan.        2012)       https://www.en-
   ergy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf [here-
   inafter BRC Report]. The first nuclear reactor was demonstrated in 1942,
   and Congress authorized civilian application of atomic power through the
   Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conser-
   vation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983).
          The Act granted regulatory authority over nuclear energy to the
   Atomic Energy Commission. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735
   F.2d 1437, 1443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But the Energy Reorganization Act of
   1974 disbanded that agency and redistributed its authority, as relevant here,
   to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id. After Congress passed the
   Atomic Energy Act, commercial production of nuclear energy boomed.
          Commercial nuclear energy is produced through a series of industrial
   processes, which include the mining and processing of nuclear fuel, the use
   of the fuel in a reactor, and the storage and ultimate disposal or reprocessing
   of that fuel. BRC Report at 9. Once nuclear fuel has been used in a reactor
   for about four to six years, it can no longer produce energy and is considered
   used or spent. Id. at 10. That spent fuel is removed from the reactor. Id.
          Spent nuclear fuel is “fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear
   reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not
   been separated by reprocessing.” 42 U.S.C. § 10101(23). It’s “intensely ra-
   dioactive” and “must be carefully stored.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at
   195. The spent fuel is first placed in wet pool storage for cooling, where it

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   remains for at least five years, but may remain for decades. BRC Report
   at 11. Once the spent nuclear fuel has cooled sufficiently in wet storage, it’s
   generally transferred to dry cask storage. Id.
          At first, there was little concern regarding storage for spent fuel. See
   BRC Report at 19–20; Idaho v. DOE, 945 F.2d 295, 298–99 (9th Cir. 1991).
   There was a widespread belief within the commercial nuclear energy industry
   that spent fuel would be reprocessed. Idaho, 945 F.2d 295, 298–99 (9th Cir.
   1991). But the private reprocessing industry collapsed in the 1970s, id., and
   growing concerns led President Ford to issue a directive deferring commer-
   cial reprocessing and recycling, which President Carter later extended. BRC
   Report at 20. Although President Reagan reversed that policy, “for a va-
   riety of reasons, including costs, commercial reprocessing has never re-
   sumed.” Id.
          After years of accumulating spent nuclear fuel in nuclear power plants
   throughout the country, see 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(3), Congress enacted the
   Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. That Act sought to “devise a permanent
   solution to the problems of civilian radioactive waste disposal.” Id. It tasked
   the Department of Energy with establishing “a repository deep underground
   within a rock formation where the waste would be placed, permanently
   stored, and isolated from human contact.” Nat’l Ass’ of Regul. Util. Comm’rs
   v. DOE, 680 F.3d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Yucca Mountain in Nevada was
   chosen as the only suitable site for the repository. See 42 U.S.C. § 10172.
   The decision drew widespread opposition in Nevada. BRC Report at 22.
          Decades of delay ensued. Despite a Congressional mandate that the
   Department of Energy start accepting waste from the States by January 31,
   1998, see 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B), “by the mid-1990s, the Department of
   Energy made clear that it could not meet the 1998 deadline, and it came and

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   went without the federal government accepting any waste.” Texas v. U.S.,
   891 F.3d 553, 555–56 (5th Cir. 2018).
          In 2008, the Department of Energy finally submitted its license appli-
   cation for the Yucca Mountain repository to the Commission. In re Aiken
   Cnty., 725 F.3d 742, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But the Commission “shut down
   its review and consideration” of the application. Id. By its own admission,
   the Commission had no intention of reviewing the application, id., even
   though the Nuclear Waste Policy Act mandates a decision be made within
   three years of submission. See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d).
          In light of the delays and controversy, the Obama Administration de-
   cided to halt the work on the Yucca Mountain repository. BRC Report at
   vi. The Obama Administration instead formed the Blue Ribbon Commission
   on America’s Nuclear Future, which concluded that a consent-based ap-
   proach to siting nuclear waste storage facilities would be preferred to the
   Yucca Mountain policy. See id. at vii–x.
          Spent nuclear fuel continues to accumulate at reactor sites across the
   country. Some estimates suggest the U.S. inventory of spent nuclear fuel
   may exceed 200,000 metric tons by 2050. BRC Report at 14. The com-
   mercial nuclear power industry as a whole is estimated to generate between
   2,000 and 2,400 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel each year. Id. And there
   are thousands of metric tons of spent fuel in various sites where commercial
   reactors no longer operate. Id.
                                           B.
          After the Blue Ribbon Commission embraced a consent-based ap-
   proach for siting nuclear waste storage facilities, the governments of Texas
   and New Mexico expressed support for establishing facilities within the
   states. Then-Governors Rick Perry of Texas and Susana Martinez of New
   Mexico wrote letters supporting the establishment of facilities within their

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   respective states. And Andrews County—a rural community located near
   the Texas-New Mexico border—passed a resolution in support of siting a
   spent nuclear fuel facility there.
          Based in part on these expressions of support, Waste Control Special-
   ists, LLC applied to the Commission for a license to operate a consolidated
   interim storage facility for high-level spent nuclear fuel in Andrews County.
   Andrews County is located within the Permian Basin, one of the country’s
   largest oil basins and a top global oil producer.
          The Commission began its environmental review of the proposed fa-
   cility in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. See 42
   U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. But the application anticipated that the Department of
   Energy would take title to the spent nuclear fuel. Some stakeholders chal-
   lenged the legality of that provision as prohibited by the Nuclear Waste Policy
   Act. Waste Control Specialists then asked the Commission to suspend its
   review.
          Approximately a year later, Interim Storage Partners, LLC—a part-
   nership between the original applicant, Waste Control Specialists, and an-
   other company—asked the Commission to resume its review of the now-re-
   vised license application. In its summary report on the scoping period, the
   Commission noted that it had received comments expressing concerns that
   the facility would become a de facto permanent disposal facility and that the
   license would be illegal under existing regulations. The Commission re-
   sponded that such comments were outside the scope of the environmental
   impact statement.
          In December 2019, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board—the in-
   dependent adjudicatory division of the Commission—terminated an adjudi-
   catory proceeding regarding the license application. Before the proceeding
   was terminated, Fasken timely filed five contentions alleging that the

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   Commission violated the National Environmental Policy Act and its own reg-
   ulations. The Board denied each one. The following month, Fasken filed a
   motion to reopen the record along with a motion to amend a previously filed
   contention. The Board denied the motions.
          The Commission published a draft environmental impact statement
   in May 2020. The Commission received approximately 2,527 unique com-
   ments on the draft environmental impact statement, and many opposed the
   facility. One comment was a letter from Texas Governor Greg Abbott urging
   the Commission to deny the license application because of the lack of a per-
   manent repository and the importance of the Permian Basin to the nation’s
   energy security and economy. The Texas Commission on Environmental
   Quality submitted a comment that the licensing lacks public consent and
   doesn’t properly account for the possibility that Texas would become the
   permanent solution of spent nuclear fuel disposal if the permanent repository
   isn’t developed by the expiration of the facility’s 40-year license term.
          Fasken also submitted various comments. Its comments noted the
   uniqueness of the Permian Basin, the danger of transporting spent nuclear
   fuel to the facility, the lack of community consent, and the possibility that the
   facility could become a de facto permanent facility. Based on the draft envi-
   ronmental impact statement, Fasken also filed a second motion to reopen the
   adjudicatory proceeding. The Board once again denied the request.
          The Commission issued the final environmental impact statement in
   July 2021. It recommended the license be issued, and noted that concerns
   regarding Yucca Mountain and the need for a permanent repository fell out-
   side its scope. In an appendix, the Commission responded to timely com-
   ments, including those from Petitioners. The Commission responded to con-
   cerns that the facility would become a de facto permanent repository by noting
   the application was only for a temporary facility.

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          The following September, the Texas Legislature passed H.B. 7. The
   statute makes it illegal to “dispose of or store high level radioactive waste”
   in Texas. Governor Abbott sent a letter to the Commission with a copy of
   H.B. 7. He reiterated that “the State of Texas has serious concerns with the
   design of the proposed ISP facility and with locating it in an area that is es-
   sential to the country’s energy security.” The next day, Fasken submitted
   an environmental analysis critiquing various aspects of the final environmen-
   tal impact statement.
          A few days later, the Commission issued the license.
          Texas and Fasken have now petitioned this court for review of the li-
   cense. Texas asks that the license be set aside. And Fasken asks that we
   suspend all further activities on the facility and remand to the Commission
   for a hard look analysis. While this case was pending before this court,
   Fasken and others who sought but were denied intervention in the agency
   adjudication had a petition for review pending before the D.C. Circuit appeal-
   ing the denials of their intervention. See Don’t Waste Michigan v. NRC, 2023
   WL 395030 (Jan. 25, 2023). The petition was denied in January 2023. Id. at
   *1. Interim Storage Partners, LLC intervened in this case to represent its
   interests.
                                          II.
          We begin with jurisdiction. The Commission challenges this court’s
   jurisdiction to hear the petitions for review for lack of both constitutional
   standing and statutory standing. We consider each argument in turn and find
   neither succeeds.
                                          A.
          As a preliminary matter, the Commission suggests that Petitioners
   forfeited constitutional standing by failing to argue it in their opening briefs.
   We disagree.

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          Neither Petitioner argued constitutional standing beyond their gen-
   eral jurisdictional statements. Generally, a petitioner is required “to present
   specific facts supporting standing through citations to the administrative rec-
   ord or affidavits or other evidence attached to its opening brief, unless stand-
   ing is self-evident.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2015) (em-
   phasis added, quotation omitted). A petitioner may reasonably believe stand-
   ing to be self-evident when “nothing in the record alerted [the] petitioners to
   the possibility that their standing would be challenged.” Am. Libr. Ass’n v.
   FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2005). That’s the case here.
          From the earliest stages of this proceeding, the Commission has chal-
   lenged jurisdiction on statutory standing grounds only. It twice moved to
   dismiss, but neither motion challenged constitutional standing. Accordingly,
   Petitioners could reasonably assume it was self-evident. Cf. Ctr. for Biological
   Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533, 542 n.4 (5th Cir. 2019) (“overlook[ing] Peti-
   tioners’ decision to include only a cursory discussion of standing because . . .
   they had a good-faith (though mistaken) belief that standing would be both
   undisputed and easy to resolve”). And—once constitutional standing was
   challenged—both Petitioners provided well-developed legal arguments with
   citations to the record and evidence to show their standing. Petitioners ha-
   ven’t forfeited constitutional standing.
          The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing requires that
   Petitioners “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
   to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be re-
   dressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,
   338 (2016). The causation elements of the constitutional standing analysis
   are easily met: Petitioners’ alleged injuries directly result from the issuance
   of the license (traceability), and an order from this court could vacate the li-
   cense (redressability). So only injury in fact is at issue.

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            The Commission argues that the licensing and eventual operation of
   the storage facility doesn’t injure either Texas or Fasken. We disagree. Be-
   cause “the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article
   III’s case-or-controversy requirement,” we may proceed even if only one of
   the Petitioners has standing. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006).
   But here both Petitioners successfully assert an injury resulting from the li-
   cense.
            Texas meets the injury-in-fact requirement because the license
   preempts state law. Texas has “a sovereign interest in the power to create
   and enforce a legal code.” Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d
   393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted) (holding that Texas has standing
   to challenge the FCC’s assertion of authority over an aspect of telecommu-
   nications regulation that the State believed it controlled). And we have held
   that the preemption of an existing state law can constitute an injury. Texas v.
   United States, 787 F.3d 733, 749 (5th Cir. 2015). “A state has standing based
   on a conflict between federal and state law if the state statute at issue regu-
   lates behavior or provides for the administration of a state program, but not
   if it simply purports to immunize state citizens from federal law.” Id.
   (cleaned up). Here the issuance of the license and resulting operation of the
   facility directly conflicts with H.B. 7.
            The Texas Legislature has enacted legislation that prevents the stor-
   age of high-level radioactive waste, including spent nuclear fuel, within the
   State except at currently or formerly operating nuclear power reactors. The
   legislation also amends Texas statutes to add that “a person, including the
   compact waste disposal facility license holder, may not dispose of or store
   high level radioactive waste in this state.” Tex. Health & Safety
   Code § 401.072. Although a non-binding, declaratory state statute would
   not be enough to confer standing, here there’s an enforceability conflict be-
   tween the license and operation of the facility, which authorizes storage of

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   high-level radioactive waste in Texas, and H.B. 7, which proscribes such stor-
   age. Cf. Virginia v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 270 (4th Cir. 2011) (a state statute
   that is merely a “non-binding declaration [and] does not create any genuine
   conflict . . . creates no sovereign interest capable of producing injury-in-
   fact”). That’s enough for Texas to assert an injury.
          Fasken also has standing based on its proximity to radioactive materi-
   als. To establish injury in an environmental case, there’s a “geographic-
   nexus requirement.” Biological Diversity, 937 F.3d at 538. “The Supreme
   Court has ruled that geographic remoteness forecloses a finding of injury
   when no further facts have been brought forward showing that the impact in
   those distant places will in some fashion be reflected where the plaintiffs
   are.” Id. (cleaned up). See also id. at 540 (“when a person visits an area for
   aesthetic purposes, pollution interfering with his aesthetic enjoyment may
   cause an injury in fact,” if “the aesthetic experience was actually offensive to
   the plaintiff”). Fasken has provided evidence of its members’ geographic
   proximity to the facility. Some of Fasken’s members own land within four
   miles of the facility, draw water from wells beneath the facility, drive within
   a mile of the facility, use rail lines the facility would use, and travel on high-
   ways within a few hundred feet of the rail lines that transport spent nuclear
   fuel to the facility. In the context of radioactive materials, such proximity is
   sufficient to establish injury. See Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Env’t Study Grp.,
   Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (“[T]he emission of non-natural radiation into
   appellees’ environment would also seem a direct and present injury.”). See
   also Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
   (finding a petitioner living 18 miles from Yucca Mountain had standing); Kel-
   ley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1509 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding petitioners who
   “own[] land in close proximity to . . . the proposed site for spent fuel storage”
   had “alleged sufficient injury to establish standing”).

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          PBLRO also has associational standing. “Associational standing is a
   three-part test: (1) the association’s members would independently meet the
   Article III standing requirements; (2) the interests the association seeks to
   protect are germane to the purpose of the organization; and (3) neither the
   claim asserted, nor the relief requested requires participation of individual
   members.” Biological Diversity, 937 F.3d at 536 (quoting Texas Democratic
   Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2006)). Each of those elements
   is met. First, some of its members have an injury because they live, work, or
   regularly drive close the facility. And as we’ve already noted, see supra, the
   causation elements are met. Next, “the germaneness requirement is unde-
   manding and requires mere pertinence between the litigation at issue and the
   organization’s purpose.” Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Texas
   Med. Bd., 627 F.3d 547, 550 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). This
   factor is easily met because PBLRO was created specifically to oppose the
   facility. Last, there’s no reason to believe that PBLRO is unable to represent
   its members’ interests without their individual participation. See id. at 551–
   53 (noting this prong usually isn’t met when the relief sought is damages for
   individual members or the claim requires fact-intensive-individual inquiry).
                                           B.
          Petitioners seeking to challenge a final order from the Commission
   also need standing under the Administrative Orders Review Act, generally
   known as the Hobbs Act. See Reytblatt v. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 720 (D.C. Cir.
   1997) (“[T]he Hobbs Act requires (1) ‘party’ status (i.e., that petitioners par-
   ticipated in the proceeding before the agency), and (2) aggrievement (i.e.,
   that they meet the requirements of constitutional and prudential standing).”)
   (citation omitted).
          The Hobbs Act vests “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, sus-
   pend (in whole or in part), or determine the validity of . . . final orders of the”

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   Commission on the federal courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2342. (The Act
   actually refers to the Atomic Energy Commission. But the Energy Reorgan-
   ization Act of 1974 abolished that agency and transferred its licensing and
   related regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See 42
   U.S.C. § 5841(a), (f).)
          Under the Act, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the final order may . . . file a
   petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.” 28
   U.S.C. § 2344. Courts “have consistently held that the phrase ‘party ag-
   grieved’ requires that petitioners have been parties to the underlying agency
   proceedings, not simply parties to the present suit.” ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885
   F.3d 687, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2018). See also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. ICC, 673 F.2d
   82, 84 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“The word ‘party’ is used in a definite
   sense in the [Hobbs Act], and limits the right to appeal to those who actually
   participated in the agency proceeding.”). The Commission argues that nei-
   ther Texas nor Fasken has standing under the Hobbs Act because neither is
   a “party aggrieved.”
          “To be an aggrieved party, one must have participated in the agency
   proceeding under review.” Wales Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774, 776 n.1
   (5th Cir. 1984). Here, both Petitioners participated in the agency proceed-
   ing—Texas commented on its opposition of the issuance of the license and
   Fasken attempted to intervene and filed contentions. But according to the
   Commission, neither form of participation is sufficient to confer party status
   under the Hobbs Act.
          The Commission argues that Texas doesn’t have party status because
   “participating in the appropriate and available administrative procedures is
   the statutorily prescribed prerequisite to invocation of the Court’s

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   jurisdiction,” and submitting comments doesn’t accord with the degree of
   formality of the proceedings in this license adjudication. 2
           The Commission takes a different approach with Fasken. It argues
   that, as a party denied intervention, Fasken may only challenge the order
   denying it intervention. From the Commission’s perspective, if a putative
   intervenor has failed to obtain party status, it can’t later seek review of the
   final judgment on the merits.
           The plain text of the Hobbs Act merely requires that a petitioner seek-
   ing review of an agency action be a “party aggrieved.” 28 U.S.C. § 2344. The
           _____________________
           2
              In the alternative, the Commission argues that “even if this Court were to
   determine that dismissal of [Texas’s] Petition for Review is not required as a matter of
   jurisdiction, the same result is nonetheless required as a matter of non-jurisdictional,
   mandatory exhaustion.” Not so. The Commission relies on Fleming v. USDA, which held
   that “even nonjurisdictional exhaustion requirements . . . forbid judges from excusing non-
   exhaustion” and that “if the government raises [such an] exhaustion requirement, the
   court must enforce it.” 987 F.3d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2021). But neither the Hobbs Act
   nor the Atomic Energy Act impose a mandatory exhaustion requirement. The
   Commission’s argument implicitly equates the exhaustion requirements in the Horse
   Protection Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act—both of which are discussed in
   Fleming—to the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act. These statutes aren’t comparable.
   Both the Horse Protection Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act have explicit
   exhaustion requirements. See 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) (“[A] person shall exhaust all
   administrative appeal procedures established by the Secretary [of Agriculture] or required
   by law before the person may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction.”); 42
   U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
   section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
   or other correctional facility until such an administrative remedies as are available are
   exhausted.”). But neither the Hobbs Act nor the Atomic Energy Act do. See 28 U.S.C. §
   2344 (no exhaustion requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (same).
            It’s also worth noting that caselaw suggests that so long as the petitioner is a “party
   aggrieved” and the basis for the challenge was brought before the agency by some party—
   even if not the by the petitioner—that’s enough for the case to move forward. See Reytblatt,
   105 F.3d at 720–21; Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
   It’d make little sense to interpret the Hobbs Act as imposing an exhaustion requirement
   while allowing a petitioner to bring a claim it did not itself bring before the agency.

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   text makes no distinction between different kinds of agency proceedings. See
   Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Nor does it suggest that
   a petitioner who went through the procedures to intervene in an adjudication
   can’t be a party aggrieved. In fact, it’s clear that the function of the “party
   aggrieved” status requirement is to ensure that the agency had the oppor-
   tunity to consider the issue that petitioners are concerned with. See, e.g., id.
   at 1219 (“The ‘party’ status requirement operates to preclude direct appel-
   late court review without a record which at least resulted from the fact-
   finder’s focus on the alternative regulatory provisions which petitioners pro-
   pose.”) (emphases omitted).
          In sum, the plain text of the Hobbs Act requires only that a petitioner
   have participated—in some way—in the agency proceedings, which Texas
   did through comments and Fasken did by seeking intervention and filing con-
   tentions. But caselaw suggests that’s not enough.
          Precedent from other circuits suggests that neither Texas nor Fasken
   are parties aggrieved for Hobbs Act purposes. The D.C. Circuit has read the
   Hobbs Act to contemplate participation in “the appropriate and available ad-
   ministrative procedures.” Id. at 1217. And it has interpreted this to mean
   that the “degree of participation necessary to achieve party status varies ac-
   cording to the formality with which the proceeding was conducted.” Water
   Transp. Ass’n v. ICC, 819 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see ACA Int’l,
   885 F.3d at 711–712 (noting that in at least some limited circumstances com-
   menting may be enough in certain non-rulemaking proceedings). The D.C.
   Circuit and at least one other circuit apply this heightened participation re-
   quirement. See Ohio Nuclear-Free Network v. NRC, 53 F.4th 236, 239 (D.C.
   Cir. 2022); Alabama Power Co. v. ICC, 852 F.2d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
   See also State ex rel. Balderas v. NRC, 59 F.4th 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 2023).
   The D.C. Circuit has also said that, when an agency requires intervention,
   those who sought but were denied intervention lack standing to seek judicial

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                                          No. 21-60743

   review. Water Transp. Ass’n, 819 F.2d at 1192. See also NRDC v. NRC, 823
   F.3d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“To challenge the Commission’s grant of a
   license renewal . . . a party must have successfully intervened in the proceed-
   ing by submitting adequate contentions under [the Commission’s regula-
   tions].”).
           The D.C. Circuit embraces readings of the Hobbs Act that impose an
   extra-textual gloss by requiring a degree of participation not contemplated in
   the plain text of the statute. We think the fairest reading of the Hobbs Act
   doesn’t impose such additional requirements. But we ultimately don’t need
   to resolve that tension, because the Fifth Circuit recognizes an exception to
   the Hobbs Act party-aggrieved status requirement that’s dispositive of this
   issue here.
           This circuit recognizes an ultra vires exception to the party-aggrieved
   status requirement. In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. ICC, this court
   noted “two rare instances” where a “person may appeal an agency action
   even if not a party to the original agency proceeding”—(1) where “the
   agency action is attacked as exceeding [its] power” and (2) where the person
   “challenges the constitutionality of the statute conferring authority on the
   agency.” 673 F.2d at 85 n.4 (quotation omitted). 3

           _____________________
           3
             The Commission’s various arguments that this exception isn’t applicable are
   unavailing. It’s true that we’ve recognized the exception is “exceedingly narrow.”
   Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911, 922 (5th Cir. 1993). And it’s also true
   that other circuits have refused to adopt it. See Balderas, 59 F.4th at 1123–24; Nat’l Ass’n
   of State Util. Consumer Advocs. v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006); Erie-Niagara
   Rail Steering Comm. v. STB, 167 F.3d 111, 112–13 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Chicago, Milwakee,
   St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 799 F.2d 317, 334–35 (7th Cir. 1986). But the exception remains good
   law in this circuit. Neither the Commission nor the court have identified any case
   overturning the exception. And to the extent that the Commission claims the exception
   was mere dicta in American Trucking, that argument fails because we’ve since applied the

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            This exception only allows us to reach those portions of the Petition-
   ers’ challenges that argue the Commission acted beyond its statutory author-
   ity. See Wales Transp., 728 F.2d at 776 n.1 (allowing petitioner to proceed
   despite not having participated in the agency proceeding on only those claims
   that challenged the agency’s authority under the statute). Accordingly, we
   must consider which, if any, of the Petitioners’ challenges fall within that cat-
   egory.
            Texas makes three merits arguments: (1) the Commission lacks the
   statutory authority to license the facility; (2) the license issuance violated the
   Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) the Commission violated the National
   Environmental Policy Act by failing to assess the risks of a potential terrorist
   attack. The first argument falls within the exception. It attacks the Commis-
   sion for licensing a facility without the authority to do so under the Atomic
   Energy Act, and in conflict with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
            Fasken makes four merits arguments: (1) the Commission violated the
   National Environmental Policy Act and Administrative Procedure Act by al-
   lowing a licensing condition that violates the Nuclear Waste Policy Act; (2)
   the Commission’s assumptions about when the permanent repository will be
   operational are arbitrary and capricious; (3) the Commission adopted an un-
   reasonably narrow purpose statement; and (4) the Commission violated the
   National Environmental Policy Act and Administrative Procedure Act by

            _____________________
   exception in Wales Transportation, Inc. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774, 776 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984). Under
   our circuit’s rule of orderliness, we are bound to follow American Trucking and Wales
   Transportation because they haven’t been overturned by the en banc court. The
   Commission is also wrong in suggesting the exception is limited to challenges of ICC
   orders. While it’s true that both American Trucking and Wales Transportation involved
   challenges to ICC orders, neither case limits the exception’s application to the ICC. See
   Am. Trucking, 673 F.2d at 85 n.4 (referring to agency proceedings, not ICC proceedings);
   Wales Transp., 728 F.2d at 776 n.1 (same).

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                                     No. 21-60743

   accepting the applicant’s unreasonable site selection. The first of these chal-
   lenges falls within the exception. Fasken’s argument centers on the conten-
   tion that the Commission acted beyond its statutory authority by issuing a
   license with a condition expressly prohibited by the Nuclear Waste Policy
   Act.
                                         III.
          The Commission has no statutory authority to issue the license. The
   Atomic Energy Act doesn’t authorize the Commission to license a private,
   away-from-reactor storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. And issuing such a
   license contradicts Congressional policy expressed in the Nuclear Waste Pol-
   icy Act. This understanding aligns with the historical context surrounding
   the development of these statutes.
                                          A.
          Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission retains jurisdiction
   over nuclear plant licensing and regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 5842. It has
   authority to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
   See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13. See also Union of Concerned Scientists, 735
   F.2d at 1438–39 (summarizing the two-step licensing procedure for nuclear
   power plant operation).
          The Act also confers on the Commission the authority to issue li-
   censes for the possession of “special nuclear material,” see 42 U.S.C. § 2073,
   “source material,” see id. § 2093, and “byproduct material,” see id. § 2111.
   See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(aa), (z), (e) (defining each term, respectively).
   Special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material are constit-
   uent materials of spent nuclear fuel. See Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F.3d 536, 538
   (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Commission argues that, because it has authority to
   issue licenses for the possession of these constituent materials, that means it
   has broad authority to license storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel.

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          But this ignores the fact that the Act authorizes the Commission to
   issue such licenses only for certain enumerated purposes—none of which en-
   compass storage or disposal of material as radioactive as spent nuclear fuel.
          Sections 2073 and 2093 specify that licenses may be issued for various
   types of research and development, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(a)(1)–(a)(2),
   2093(a)(1)–(a)(2). It also permits such other uses that the Commission either
   “determines to be appropriate to carry out the purposes of th[e] chapter,”
   id. § 2073(a)(4), or “approves . . . as an aid to science and industry,” id. §
   2093(a)(4). Principles of statutory interpretation require these grants be read
   in light of the other, more specific purposes listed—namely for certain types
   of research and development. Cf. U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S.
   162, 185 (2011) (“When Congress provides specific statutory obligations, we
   will not read a ‘catchall’ provision to impose general obligations that would
   include those specifically enumerated.”).
          Both these sections also allow the agency to issue licenses “for use
   under a license issued pursuant to section 2133 of th[e] title.” Id. 42 U.S.C.
   §§ 2073(a)(3), 2093(a)(3) (same). Section 2133 details the Commission’s au-
   thority to issue licenses for “utilization or production facilities for industrial
   or commercial purposes.” Id. § 2133(a). Utilization and production have
   specific definitions under the statute. See id. §§ 2014 (cc) (defining utiliza-
   tion facilities); 2014(v) (defining production facilities). And the definitions
   of utilization and production facilities are about nuclear reactors and fuel fab-
   rication or enrichment facilities—not storage or disposal, as the Commission
   admits in its briefing. See id. Neither § 2073 nor § 2093 confers a broad grant
   of authority to issue licenses for any type of possession of special nuclear ma-
   terial or source material.
          The same is true for § 2111. That section authorizes the Commission
   “to issue general or specific licenses to applicants seeking to use byproduct

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                                       No. 21-60743

   material for research or development purposes, for medical therapy, indus-
   trial uses, agricultural uses, or such other useful applications as may be de-
   veloped.” Id. § 2111(a). It also specifies conditions under which certain
   types of byproduct material may be disposed. Id. § 2111(b). And the types of
   byproduct material covered by § 2111(b) emit radiation for significantly less
   time than spent nuclear fuel.
          That section cross-references the definition of byproduct materials in
   § 2014(e)(3)–(4), which refers to radium-226 and other material that “would
   pose a threat similar to the threat posed by . . . radium-226 to the public health
   and safety.” That’s important because some of the isotopes in spent nuclear
   fuel have much longer half-lives than radium-226. The “intensity of radia-
   tion from radioactive materials decreases over time” and the “time required
   for the intensity to decrease by one-half is referred to as the ‘half-life.’”
   NRC, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Regarding Ra-
   dium-226            §        A.1,         https://scp.nrc.gov/narmtoolbox/ra-
   dium%20faq102008.pdf. Radium-226 has a half-life of 1600 years. Id. Spent
   nuclear fuel, on the other hand, is composed of a variety of radioactive iso-
   topes of elements produced in the nuclear fission process. NRC, Radio-
   active                  Waste                 Backgrounder                      1,
   https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0501/ML050110277.pdf. Some of these iso-
   topes—strontium-90 and cesium-137—have half-lives of about 30 years. But
   others “take much longer to decay.” Id. One of these isotopes is plutonium-
   239, which “has a half-life of 24,000 years”—fifteen times that of radium-
   226. Id. There’s no plausible argument that spent nuclear fuel, which con-
   tains radioactive isotopes with half-lives much longer than radium-226, is the
   type radioactive material contemplated in the disposal provision in § 2111(b).
          So these provisions do not support the Commission’s claim of author-
   ity. In response, the Commission and Interim Storage Partners, LLC point
   to two cases from sister circuits. Both are unpersuasive.

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                                     No. 21-60743

          In Bullcreek v. NRC, the D.C. Circuit denied petitions for review of
   the Commission’s Rulemaking Order and held that the Nuclear Waste Policy
   Act did “not repeal or supersede the [Commission]’s authority under the
   Atomic Energy Act to license private away-from-reactor storage facilities.”
   359 F.3d at 537–38. The D.C. Circuit essentially assumed that the Atomic
   Energy Act had granted the Commission authority to license away-from-re-
   actor storage facilities, despite explicitly recognizing that the Act “does not
   specifically refer to the storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel.” Id. at 538.
   Rather than focus on the text of the statute, it merely noted that “it has long
   been recognized that the [Atomic Energy Act] confers on the [Commission]
   authority to license and regulate the storage and disposal of such fuel.” Id.
   But none of the cases the D.C. Circuit cited provide a textual analysis of the
   Atomic Energy Act and whether it allows away-from-reactor spent nuclear
   fuel storage. Each of those cases dealt with separate questions of preemption
   and the role of states in this scheme. See generally Pac. Gas. & Elec. v. State
   Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Jersey Cent.
   Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1985); Illinois v.
   Gen. Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982). They are irrelevant to the ques-
   tion before us.
          So the D.C. Circuit provided no textual basis for its assumption that
   the statute authorized the Commission to issue such licenses. See id. (dis-
   cussing the Atomic Energy Act). Bullcreek may be correct that the Nuclear
   Waste Policy Act didn’t repeal portions of the Atomic Energy Act since “re-
   peals by implication are not favored,” but it doesn’t actually address what
   authority the Commission had under the Atomic Energy Act. Morton v.
   Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974).
          The other case the Commission cites—Skull Valley Band of Goshute
   Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004)—is just as unhelpful. It
   merely relies on Bullcreek to “not revisit the issues surrounding the

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                                    No. 21-60743

   [Commission]’s authority to license away-from-reactor [spent nuclear fuel]
   storage facilities.” Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1232. It too assumes the Com-
   mission’s authority without analyzing the statute.
                                        B.
          Moreover, the Commission’s argument cannot be reconciled with the
   Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
          Spent nuclear fuel wasn’t a concern in the 1940s and 1950s when the
   Atomic Energy Act was passed and amended. “Prior to the late 1970’s, pri-
   vate utilities operating nuclear reactors were largely unconcerned with the
   storage of spent nuclear fuel.” Idaho, 945 F.2d at 298. “It was accepted that
   spent fuel would be reprocessed.” Id. “In the mid-70’s, however, the pri-
   vate reprocessing industry collapsed for both economic and regulatory rea-
   sons.” Id. “As a consequence, the nuclear industry was confronted with an
   unanticipated accumulation of spent nuclear fuel, inadequate private facili-
   ties for the storage of the spent fuel, and no long term plans for managing
   nuclear waste.” Id. See also BRC Report at 20 (noting these problems
   and describing passage of the Act as “mark[ing] the beginning of a new chap-
   ter in U.S. efforts to deal with the nuclear waste issue”). This led Congress
   to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982.
          The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides a comprehensive scheme to
   address the accumulation of nuclear waste. Congress recognized that “Fed-
   eral efforts during the [prior] 30 years to devise a permanent solution to the
   problems of civilian radioactive waste disposal ha[d] not been adequate” and
   that “State and public participation in the planning and development of re-
   positories is essential in order to promote public confidence in the safety of
   disposal of such waste and spent fuel.” 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(3), (6). “The
   Act made the federal government responsible for permanently disposing of
   spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste produced by civilian

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                                          No. 21-60743

   nuclear power generation and defense activities.” Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util.
   Comm’rs v. DOE, 680 F.3d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 2012). See also 42 U.S.C. §
   10131(a)(4) (“[T]he Federal Government has the responsibility to provide
   for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and such spent nu-
   clear fuel as may be disposed of in order to protect the public health and safety
   and the environment.”).
           The Act also tasked the Department of Energy with establishing “a
   repository deep underground within a rock formation where the waste would
   be placed, permanently stored, and isolated from human contact.” Nat’l
   Ass’n of Regul. Util Comm’rs, 680 F.3d at 821. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 100133–
   34 (tasking the Energy Secretary with site characterization and public hearing
   duties related to the Yucca Mountain site selection). Yucca Mountain was
   chosen as the only suitable site for the repository when the Act was amended
   in 1987. See 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (selection of Yucca Mountain site). But the
   project stalled, even though the Nuclear Waste Policy Act “is obviously de-
   signed to prevent the Department [of Energy] from delaying the construction
   of Yucca Mountain as the permanent facility while using temporary facili-
   ties.” Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 519 (D.C.
   Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10168(d)(1)).
           In addition to the establishment of the permanent repository, see 42
   U.S.C. §§ 10131–10145, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also established other
   measures to deal with spent nuclear fuel. 4

           _____________________
           4
             All these measures are subject to the proviso in 42 U.S.C. § 10155(h), which states
   that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to encourage, authorize, or require the
   private or Federal use, purchase, lease, or other acquisition of any storage facility located
   away from the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor and not owned by the Federal
   Government on” the date of enactment.

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                                     No. 21-60743

            One is temporary storage. See id. §§ 10151–10157. The Act places
   “primary responsibility for providing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel”
   on “the persons owning and operating civilian nuclear power reactors.” Id.
   § 10151(a)(1). It tasks the Commission and the Secretary of Energy to “take
   such actions as . . . necessary to encourage and expedite the effective use of
   available storage, and the necessary additional storage, at the site of each ci-
   vilian nuclear power reactor.” Id. § 10152 (emphasis added). See also id. §
   10153 (“The establishment of such procedures shall not preclude the licens-
   ing . . . of any technology for the storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel at the
   site of any civilian nuclear power reactor.”) (emphasis added). It further
   tasks the Secretary of Energy with “provid[ing] . . . capacity for the storage
   of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear power reactors.” Id. § 10155(a)(1).
   Moreover, the Act provides that “the Federal Government has the respon-
   sibility to provide . . . not more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for interim
   storage of spent nuclear fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors that cannot
   reasonably provide adequate storage capacity” where it is necessary for the
   “continued, orderly operation of such reactors.” Id. § 10151(a)(3). Moreo-
   ver, the Act provides that “the Federal Government has the responsibility to
   provide . . . not more than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for interim storage of
   spent nuclear fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors that cannot reasonably
   provide adequate storage capacity” where it is necessary for the “continued,
   orderly operation of such reactors.” Id. § 10151(a)(3). Here, the license per-
   mits storage of at least 5,000 and as much as 40,000 metric tons of nuclear
   waste.
            The other measure is monitored retrievable storage. See id. § 10161–
   10169. See also id. § 10101(34) (defining “monitored retrievable storage fa-
   cility”). Under the statute, “[t]he Secretary [of Energy] is authorized to site,
   construct, and operate one monitored retrievable storage facility subject to
   the conditions described [in the relevant sections of statute].” Id. § 10162(b).

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                                     No. 21-60743

   And one of those conditions is that “[a]ny license issued by the Commission
   for a monitored retrievable storage facility under [the statute] shall provide
   that . . . construction of such facility may not begin until the Commission has
   issued a license for the construction of a repository [i.e., Yucca Mountain].”
   Id. § 10168(d)(1).
           Reading these provisions together makes clear that the Nuclear Waste
   Policy Act creates a comprehensive statutory scheme for addressing spent
   nuclear fuel accumulation. The scheme prioritizes construction of the per-
   manent repository and limits temporary storage to private at-the-reactor stor-
   age or at federal sites. It plainly contemplates that, until there’s a permanent
   repository, spent nuclear fuel is to be stored onsite at-the-reactor or in a fed-
   eral facility.
           In sum, the Atomic Energy Act doesn’t authorize the Commission to
   license a private, away-from-reactor storage facility for spent nuclear fuel.
   And the Nuclear Waste Policy Act doesn’t permit it. Accordingly, we hold
   that the Commission doesn’t have authority to issue the license challenged
   here.
           When read alongside each other, we find these statutes unambiguous.
   And even if the statutes were ambiguous, the Commission’s interpretation
   wouldn’t be entitled to deference.
           Last year, the Supreme Court directed that, “[w]here the statute at
   issue is one that confers authority upon an administrative agency, that inquiry
   must be shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of the question pre-
   sented—whether Congress in fact meant to confer the power the agency has
   asserted” and whether there are “reason[s] to hesitate before concluding
   that Congress meant to confer such authority.” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.
   Ct. 2587, 2607–08 (2022) (quotations omitted) (adopting the major ques-
   tions doctrine).

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                                    No. 21-60743

          Disposal of nuclear waste is an issue of great “economic and political
   significance.” Id. at 2608. What to do with the nation’s ever-growing accu-
   mulation of nuclear waste is a major question that—as the history of the
   Yucca Mountain repository shows—has been hotly politically contested for
   over a half century. Congress itself has acknowledged that “high-level radi-
   oactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have become major subjects of public
   concern.” 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) (findings section of the Nuclear Waste
   Policy Act). “A decision of such magnitude and consequence rests with Con-
   gress itself, or an agency acting pursuant to clear delegation from that repre-
   sentative body.” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616 (emphasis added). Here,
   there’s no such clear delegation under the Atomic Energy Act. And the Nu-
   clear Waste Policy Act belies the Commission’s arguments to the contrary.
                                        ***
          We grant the petitions for review, vacate the license, and deny the
   Commission’s motions to dismiss.

                                         26