Court Opinion

ID: 9852403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:56.74157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.525268
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I concur fully in the majority opinion, I write specially only to emphasize the fact that in a proper case, dismissal of the charge would have been appropriate.
In dealing with the failure of the state to preserve evidence which might have exonerated the defendant, a court must determine both whether the evidence was material and whether the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence. To meet the standard of constitutional materiality, the evidence must possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Milton v. State, 232 Ga. App. 672, 678-679 (6) (503 SE2d 566) (1998). In this case, as the majority correctly points out, the trial court did not make the required findings and the evidence did not warrant such findings.
*361Decided December 1, 2009.
Robert D. James, Jr., Solicitor-General, Sophia E. Haynes, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellant.
Frank J. Costa, LeeAnne Anthony, for appellee.
Accordingly, I concur in the majority opinion fully and specially.