Court Opinion

ID: 9541548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:31.979318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:16.084182
License: Public Domain

*227HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent, since I believe the main opinion quite radically has departed from elementary principles of appellate review : that the Supreme Court does not decide cases or even take cognizance of matters not raised on appeal, or raised for the first time on appeal.1
The main opinion sets out a letter addressed by an agent of the defendant, Federated Milk, to an agent of Limb, plaintiff real estate broker and decides the entire case on the fact that the listing letter was addressed only to Williamson, — not to Limb.
It is reflected in the record by all principals that Williamson was Limb’s agent and acted in every instance as a salesman for the latter. Several conversations were had between the defendant’s representatives and Limb himself as principal for whom Williamson acted, and at no time before trial, at trial, or on this appeal did anyone question Williamson’s authority to act for Limb. This fact is about the only one that is certain and undisputed, — yet the main opinion ignores it. The majority arbitrarily rejects any opportunity for hearing by the simple conclusion that a letter addressed to an individual, though conceded by all parties to be an authorized agent, negatives any possibility of a listing contract because not addressed to the broker personally. Contrary to such a novel conclusion, all the parties here considered that there had been and continued to be a valid listing, so that the letter which seemed to the main opinion to be so lethal in preventing a binding listing agreement, was not so calamitous to the people who treated it as, and understood it to be, a valid listing agreement. The addressee and/or address were of no moment to anyone except the main opinion. There was an oral and written effort made by defendants to terminate a concededly existing contract.
Mr. Justice Ellett in footnote No. 2 of his opinion says this dissent is without merit. He cites and quotes from 5 C.J.S. “Appeal & Error” § 1464(1). The quotation, lifted out of context nonetheless presumes to state the law for every state on the scope of appellate procedural review, and the law in this case. This, or any other statement from the compilation, may be an easy generalization of principles, but its mere quotation has nothing to do with this case.
In this case there is nothing in the record that affirmatively sustains the trial court on the unwarranted theory advanced to the effect that there was no contract because the letter was addressed to one not *228the plaintiff. The record clearly shows that all the parties admitted that there was a listing agreement, and so intended. Plaintiff’s complaint sounded ex contractu. The record shows by the admissions and conduct of the parties, — that Williamson was Limb’s agent. This and defendant’s points on appeal that 1) the contract was terminated and without consideration, 2) that plaintiff was estopped from recovering a commission thereon, and that 3) there can be no recovery because defendants’ defenses were not ruled upon, all show an agency and a contract with plaintiff.
. The record itself reflects the antithesis of the main opinion’s gratuitous interjection into this case of a new theory, — not raised at all by any of the litigants either before or after the appeal, — but by the sua sponte, uninvited and unwarranted conclusion of this court itself, and by its own point raised for the first time on appeal. I think, therefore, that the main opinion is out on a Limb.
Mr. Justice Ellett’s cited generalization found in Corpus Juris Secundum, at least requires and concedes that for affirmance there be grounds therefor, which are “apparent on the record.” This does not mean that the appellate court must supply a reason if there be a conceivable one, in or out of the record, to support one view not pointed out by anyone on appeal. Such tedium would put a premium on idolence and inefficiency of a party litigant. To do so casts the appellate court in the role of advocate and counselor for one side in derogation of equal empathy for the other. Such procedure at least suggests some sort of preferential treatment. It seems that logically one must conclude from the main opinion that rules on appeal and briefs are of little or no value and thus dispensable.
I am of the opinion that to maintain some modicum of order on appellate review, a healthy, fair and highly practical rule is that which already we have enunciated in many cases, to the effect that if error is not raised at all or is claimed for the first time on appeal, we will not entertain it, — and particularly should this prevail where anyone on the court sua sponte and for the first time on appeal raises a point that cannot be sustained anywhere in the record by any amount of searching.
The distinction made in the main opinion between “affirming” and “reversing” seems to be one without purpose or substance. If we “affirm” because the record reflects correctness of a lower court decision, — whether the “reason” for reversal was pointed out for the first time on appeal by a litigant, and ignored by this court, thus affirming the lower court, or the court spots in the record the reason for affirming irrespective whether a point is or is not raised for the first time on appeal, thus affirming the trial court, the net product is the same, — affirmance, and there seems to be no necessity to talk about *229“reversal.” But if this court simply affirms where the record shows that there is no reason at all to sustain the lower court, whether by ignoring points raised for the first time on appeal or by the court manufacturing a nonexistent basis for af-firmance, — it follows that an appellate court simply is undiscerning, or unwittingly illogical and inaccurate.
This writer, in a case like the instant one, prefers to adhere to the simple, fair and fundamental principle of appellate review repeatedly enunciated by this court and reflected in Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952), where it was said:
* * * Without pointing out any specific errors relied on, defendants maintain that on the whole record the trial court erred in admitting undesignated testimony and in failing to grant a motion to dismiss. * * *
ifc i}C iji
As to any prejudicial error claimed, none of the many rulings on admission of evidence was assigned specifically on appeal as constituting prejudicial error, so that any decision thereon zvould require disczission of all objections, — no one of which plaintiff has had an opportunity to meet in her brief because of such non-designation. Therefore, we feel constrained not to review those matters which plaintiff cannot defend against because not called to attention by her op-pon ents.
The Utah cases are legion that support the contention and principle enunciated in the Lepasiotes case and in this dissent. We might refer to a few.
In the Matter of the Estate of Ekker,2 a 1967 case penned by Mr. Justice Callister, concurred in unanimously, including Mr. Justice Ellett, author of the main opinion, and his brethren concurring with him, it says:
Neither of the first two points were raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial. Therefore, they cannot be considered for the first time on this appeal.
In Riter v. Cayias,3 another 1967 case, a unanimous decision, also concurred in by Mr. Justice Ellett, Mr. Chief Justice Crockett had this to say:
Plaintiff in her brief makes the claim that if the ditch referred to is not on her property, she has acquired an easement in its use. This is not an issue which was presented, tried and determined by the trial court. Accordingly it cannot properly be considered for the first time upon appeal.
About the same thing has been said by the author of this dissent.4
*230Mr. Justice McDonough, in the 1963 case of Chumney v. Stott,5 said:
This argument was not presented or discused below, but is first urged on appeal. It is generally held, and this court has so held, that matters not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.
In Neilson v. Eisen,6 Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe said this in a unanimous opinion:
It is not necessary for us to examine on their merits the three contentions raised by Mr. Eisen upon this appeal. They are all matters of defense which should have been raised below and cannot now be heard here for the first time.
In Flemetis v. McArthur,7 Mr. Justice Latimer reiterated the principle when he said:
This is a case which well illustrates how wandering and vagrant can be the issues if we permit defendants to assert new theories in this court. * * * This court will not found a reversal upon defects which were not put in issue in the court below, but which are suggested for the first time on appeal.
As early as 1910, Mr. Justice Frick in Fee v. Nat’l Bank of the Republic,8 expressed the same conclusion, as did Mr. Justice McCarty in 1908, in the case of Aaron v. Holmes,9 adding to the other cases that agree, but which are not mentioned.
I am also of the opinion that it would be palpably unfair to decide a case on a theory raised by the court sua sponte, where the unsuccessful party on appeal has absolutely no idea or advance notice what this court will decide or the reasons therefor, being left cold and the victim of a theory never advanced and with no chance to meet it.10
Let the losing lawyer in this appeal and decision try to explain to his client.
As to other phases of this case relating to disputed facts, the record reflects sufficient controversion as to present a situation not subject to a summary judgment.
Because of the unwarranted departure of the majority with respect to principles of appellate review, and the existence of claimed facts not admitted but the subject of dispute, it would seem that we should return this case with instructions to try it to a recognized trier of the facts.

. With the possible exception that in a proper case an appellate court may, sua sponte, question its own authority on constitutional grounds, or where an individual’s constitutional rights may grossly have been neglected, — neither of which circumstances is present here.

. 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967).

. 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967).

.Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Improvement Dist. No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, *230390 P.2d 235 (1964) ; Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962) ; Westerfield v. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262, 311 P.2d 787 (1957) ; Dolores Uranium Corp. v. Jones, 14 Utah 2d 280, 382 P.2d 883 (1963) ; Carson v. Douglas, 12 Utah 2d 424, 367 P.2d 462 (1962).

. 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P.2d 84 (1963).

. 116 Utah 343, 209 P.2d 928 (1949).

. 119 Utah 268, 226 P.2d 124 (1951).

. 37 Utah 28, 106 P. 517 (1910).

. 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450 (1908).

. Lespasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952).