Court Opinion

ID: 9475664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:34:42.321917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:51.387570
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I must regretfully dissent. The doctrine established in Erie R.R. Company v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), has particular significance in cases involving Puerto Rican tort law (derecho de daños), in which the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has stated that “both as to its form and content, the tort law applicable in Puerto Rico is the civil law system.” Valle v. Amer. Inter. Ins. Co., 108 D.P.R. 692, 695 (1979) (my translation). In Valle, “the utilization of common law precepts to resolve civil law problems” was specifically rejected. Id. at 696-97 (my translation).
Although the majority correctly states the Puerto Rican law as to res ipsa loqui-tur, Community Partnership v. Presbyterian Hosp., 88 P.R.R. 379, 386 (1963) (for res ipsa loquitur to apply “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendant; [and] (3) it must not be due to any voluntary action on the part of plaintiff.”), it overlooks well-established jurisprudence in applying that law to the circumstances of this case.
The majority concludes that the first requirement of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., inference of negligence arising from the occurrence of the accident, “was met because an escalator handrail probably would not stop suddenly while the escalator continues moving unless someone had been negligent.” Ante, at 5. Although disclaiming reliance on the common law cases cited therein as ratio decidendi for its conclu*1109sions, the majority, in footnote 2, cites various cases which stand for the dubious proposition that an escalator is a common carrier.5 Id. n. 2.
In my view, solely because the handrail stopped and Mrs. Colmenares fell, without further evidence as to why or how the handrail malfunctioned, does not give rise to an inference of negligence by the Ports Authority. See Widow of Blanco v. Metropolitan Bus Authority, 89 P.R.R. 722 (1963); Nevares v. Municipality of Vega Baja, 101 P.R.R. 103 (1973). The case of Widow of Blanco is particularly a propos because it did involve a public carrier, a bus company, and the accident was similar in nature to that alleged in the present case, i.e., a passenger fell when the bus she was riding suddenly lurched. Yet, notwithstanding the high standard of care required in that case,6 and the total control exercised by the bus company over the instrumentality causing the accident, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico stated that “a carrier is not an insurer,” id. at 723, and refused to find an inference of negligence merely from the fact that the passenger fell as a result of the bus’ sudden, unexpected lurch. Id. at 724. In Nevares v. Municipality of Vega Alta, supra, that Court specifically refused to apply res ipsa loquitur to the fall of a lighting pole at a public plaza, concluding that such an event, without additional proof, did not raise an inference of negligence. Id. at 109.
The malfunctioning of an escalator presents an even stronger argument against the raising of an inference of negligence without additional proof as to the cause of the malfunction. Although a court can take notice that an escalator is a complicated piece of machinery, it has no basis of common knowledge for inferring that its malfunction is the result of the operator’s negligence.7 Expert testimony is required to establish the basis for such an inference. Community Partnership v. Presbyterian Hospital, 88 P.R.R. at 389. See also Fed.R.Evid. 702.
Puerto Rican tort law is enacted in Article 1802 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141, which succinctly states: “A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault [culpa ] or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.” Fault (culpa) involves delictive conduct of an affirmative or voluntary nature. Reyes v. Heirs of Sanchez Soto, 98 P.R.R. 299, 303-04 (1970). Civil law negligence is “not anticipating and foreseeing the rational consequences of an act, or of the failure to perform an act which a prudent person could have foreseen under the same circumstances.” Ramos v. Carlo, 85 P.R.R. 337, 342 (1962); Ramirez v. American R.R. Company of P.R., 17 P.R.R. 440 (1911). The essence of fault or negligence lies in the lack of diligence and foresight on the part of the wrongdoer. See J. Castan, Derecho Civil Español, Común y Foral, at 146 (8th ed. 1954). Appellant presented no evidence from which a jury could infer lack of diligence or foresight by appellees, and thus negligence.
Because of the above, I respectfully dissent.

. Traditionally, even at common law, a common carrier is one "required by law to convey passengers or freight without refusal if the approved fare or charge is paid." Black’s Law Dictionary 249 (5th ed. 1979).

. The Court referred to the standard required, as "the highest degree of care and prudence.” Widow of Blanco, 89 P.R.R. at 724.

. Even in a common law jurisdiction one court has refused to apply res ipsa loquitur to falls caused by escalator malfunctions, because "among the causes of bumping on an escalator are foreign objects, such as parts of sneakers, buttons, etc. dropped by passengers on the escalator, which have eluded the combing mechanism ... and gotten swept into the internal workings of the machinery." Birdsall v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., 109 A.D.2d 969, 486 N.Y.S.2d 461 (N.Y.App.Div.), aff’d, 65 N.Y.2d 913, 493 N.Y.S.2d 456, 483 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1985).