Court Opinion

ID: 9523995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:49:04.718081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:44.540107
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I believe that the issue briefed by both parties should be addressed: whether counsel should have informed the defendant that he could have subjected the pubic hairs found in the victim's apartment to DNA testing.
Section 4-3.8(b) of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (3d ed. 1993) states that "[d]efense counsel should explain developments in the case to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." The commentary to § 4-3.8 states that "[t]he client should *173be given sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so."
Prior to trial, the defendant's counsel was aware that the pubic hairs found in the victim's apartment could be subjected to a new form of DNA testing. Counsel did not inform the defendant of this option. I believe that defense counsel should inform an accused of the prospect of DNA testing and that the decision whether or not to proceed with testing should be made by the accused. As the commentary to § 4-3.8 states, "[a] lawyer must remember that the case is the defendant's case, and the defendant is entitled to know of the progress of the lawyer's work."
In view of my conclusion regarding counsel's obligations, I turn to the question of whether the defendant was prejudiced. I agree with the dissent that the defendant cannot meet the burden prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984), requiring him to show "that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different" if the alleged errors had not been made.
I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because, as I have stated previously, I conclude that under Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and this court's longstanding harmless error analysis, State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), the State should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that errors made by an accused's counsel were harmless. See State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 239, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). The State's own trial strategy placed a great deal of emphasis on an assumed *174match between the pubic hairs found in the victim's apartment and the defendant's pubic hairs. Hence I conclude that the State cannot meet the burden of proving that there is no reasonable probability that the alleged error contributed to the conviction.
For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate.