Court Opinion

ID: 9945806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 16:06:59.470094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:41.069183
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                               MINDY LEE,
                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                ANIMAL AID, INC., and RHODA MANN,
                             Appellees.

                            No. 4D2023-0049

                           [February 28, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE18-
005692.

   V. Ashley Paxton and Thomas L. Hunker of Hunker Paxton Appeals &
Trials, Fort Lauderdale, and Shai Ozery of Robert N. Hartsell, P.A.,
Pompano Beach, for appellant.

  Kevin H. Fabrikant and Patrice Paldino of Fabrikant & Associates,
PLLC, Hollywood, for appellee Animal Aid, Inc.

LEVINE, J.

    Appellant, Mindy Lee, volunteered for appellee, Animal Aid, Inc., until
she was no longer allowed to volunteer for the organization due to
complaints about her. 1 Animal Aid then sued Lee, alleging that Lee made
defamatory statements about Animal Aid. Lee moved for summary
judgment and in part relied on section 768.295, commonly referred to as
the Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statute.
The parties subsequently attended non-binding arbitration, and the trial
court adopted the arbitrator’s findings and dismissed both Animal Aid’s
complaint and Lee’s counterclaim with prejudice. Lee moved for an award
of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court
denied.

1 Appellee Rhoda Mann was Lee’s codefendant.   She has not made any filings in
this appeal.
   On appeal, Lee argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion
for attorney’s fees under the Anti-SLAPP statute. We find that the trial
court correctly denied Lee’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Anti-
SLAPP provision since the trial court made no specific findings that Animal
Aid’s actions violated the Anti-SLAPP statute. Without the trial court
making such an express finding that Animal Aid’s defamation suit violated
the Anti-SLAPP statute, then, as a result, Lee would not be entitled to
attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.295(4). Thus, we affirm.

   Animal Aid operates a not-for-profit corporation, offering services such
as a low cost spay clinic and homeless pet recovery and adoption center.
Animal Aid filed a complaint against Lee, a former volunteer, for
defamation. Animal Aid’s complaint described Lee as “very often a difficult
person to work with,” and alleged that Lee was “harsh, overly direct,
hostile, and at times manipulative.” Animal Aid also alleged that Lee began
to harass and pick on other volunteers while she was volunteering for
Animal Aid. Following a complaint by a fellow volunteer, Animal Aid told
Lee that her conduct was unacceptable, asked her to leave, and told Lee
that she would not be called upon to volunteer again.

    Animal Aid’s complaint alleged that, after Lee had been discharged from
volunteering for Animal Aid, Lee began publishing false statements about
Animal Aid, including that Animal Aid used non-sterile surgical tools, did
not use pain medications, and did not use protective cones or collars after
surgical procedures. According to Animal Aid, Lee also suggested that
Animal Aid’s veterinarians were “not licensed true veterinarians.” In sum,
Animal Aid alleged that Lee “claim[ed] that Animal Aid is a scam, takes
donation money, and does not provide the services or animal care it claims
to.” Animal Aid alleged that Lee published the defamatory statements in
various ways, such as by posting on Facebook, contacting local
government agencies and news outlets, and posting negative comments on
Yelp and Google reviews.

    Following years of litigation, the trial court ordered the parties to
submit to non-binding arbitration. Before the parties attended arbitration,
Lee moved for summary judgment, which in part alleged that Animal Aid’s
defamation suit violated the Anti-SLAPP statute and was brought “to
silence public criticism of operations.” Animal Aid did not respond to Lee’s
motion for summary judgment, and significantly Lee did not obtain a
ruling from the trial court on her motion for summary judgment.

   Subsequently, the parties attended non-binding arbitration. The
arbitrator found that Lee was not liable to Animal Aid for defamation. The
arbitrator determined that Animal Aid was a limited public figure, and

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Animal Aid failed to show evidence that Lee acted with actual malice,
which is required to prove defamation of a limited public figure. Further,
the arbitrator found that Lee’s statements were either opinion or supported
by her good faith belief in their truth. The arbitrator also found that Lee
did not prove her counterclaims. Thus, the arbitrator’s ultimate opinion
was to enter judgment in favor of Lee on Animal Aid’s claims and in favor
of Animal Aid on Lee’s counterclaims. The arbitrator recommended that
no damages be awarded to either party. Entitlement to an award of
attorney’s fees and costs was deferred to the trial court.

   The trial court entered a final order fully adopting the arbitrator’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, noting that neither party had
moved for a trial de novo within the time allotted by Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.820. 2 The order dismissed Animal Aid’s complaint and Lee’s
counterclaim with prejudice. The trial court retained jurisdiction to
entertain any post-judgment motions, including motions for attorney’s
fees.

    Lee then moved for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section
768.295(4), Florida Statutes (2018), the Anti-SLAPP statute. Though Lee
had been previously represented by counsel, she filed this motion pro se
alleging “with assistance of Counsel,” without further elaboration. Animal
Aid filed a response, arguing in part that the arbitrator did not make any
finding or ruling as to whether Animal Aid’s complaint was a lawsuit
precluded by the Anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied Lee’s motion
for attorney’s fees “as without baseis [sic].” This appeal follows.

   “Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for attorneys’ fees is
reviewed for abuse of discretion; ‘[h]owever, where entitlement depends on
the interpretation of a statute or contract the ruling is reviewed de novo.’”

2 “Any party may file a motion for trial. . . . If a motion for trial is not made within
20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to
the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be
required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5),
Florida Statutes.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h); § 44.103(5), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“An
arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within
the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.”); Vitesse, Inc. v.
MAPL Assocs., 358 So. 3d 437, 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (“Under the rule’s plain
language, unless a party files a motion for trial de novo within twenty days of the
arbitrator’s decision, the trial court must enforce the arbitration award.”); Stowe
v. Univ. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 937 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[F]ailure
to request a trial de novo within the time provided in the rules creates a ‘right to
enforce an arbitration award that has become final and binding as a result of a
failure to request a trial.’”) (citation omitted).

                                            3
Kelly v. BankUnited, FSB, 159 So. 3d 403, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
(citation omitted).

   Lee’s claim for attorney’s fees fails because the trial court never made
a finding that Animal Aid’s actions violated the Anti-SLAPP statute.
“Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute prohibits a person from filing a cause of
action that is (a) ‘without merit’ and (b) ‘primarily’ because the defendant
‘exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue.’” Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., No. 19-14472-CIV, 2021 WL
4976287, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2021) (quoting § 768.295(3), Fla. Stat);
WPB Residents for Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio, 284 So. 3d 555, 558
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“A SLAPP is a ‘lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-
claim, or counterclaim’ filed against a person or entity that is ‘without
merit’ and filed ‘primarily because’ the person or entity engaged in the
exercise of a right protected by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.”) (citation omitted).

  The legislature outlined within the statute the purpose of the Anti-
SLAPP provision:

      It is the intent of the Legislature to protect the right in Florida
      to exercise the rights of free speech in connection with public
      issues, and the rights to peacefully assemble, instruct
      representatives, and petition for redress of grievances before
      the various governmental entities of this state as protected by
      the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and s.
      5, Art. I of the State Constitution. It is the public policy of this
      state that a person or governmental entity not engage in
      SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the
      right of persons to exercise such constitutional rights of free
      speech in connection with public issues.

§ 768.295(1), Fla. Stat. (2018).

   Further, section 768.295 provides for an award of attorney’s fees to a
party who prevails on an Anti-SLAPP claim:

      A person or entity sued by a governmental entity or another
      person in violation of this section has a right to an expeditious
      resolution of a claim that the suit is in violation of this section.
      A person or entity may move the court for an order dismissing
      the action or granting final judgment in favor of that person
      or entity. The person or entity may file a motion for summary
      judgment, together with supplemental affidavits, seeking a

                                       4
      determination that the claimant’s or governmental entity’s
      lawsuit has been brought in violation of this section. The
      claimant or governmental entity shall thereafter file a
      response and any supplemental affidavits.           As soon as
      practicable, the court shall set a hearing on the motion, which
      shall be held at the earliest possible time after the filing of the
      claimant’s or governmental entity’s response. The court may
      award, subject to the limitations in s. 768.28, the party sued
      by a governmental entity actual damages arising from a
      governmental entity’s violation of this section. The court shall
      award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs
      incurred in connection with a claim that an action was filed
      in violation of this section.

§ 768.295(4), Fla. Stat. (2018).

   A party who prevails on an Anti-SLAPP claim is entitled to attorney’s
fees under section 768.295(4). In Bongino, for example, the trial court

      adjudicated the merits of Plaintiff’s anti-SLAPP claim before
      Plaintiff filed his dismissal notice. . . . [The trial court]
      concluded that Plaintiff’s suit is “without merit” because
      Plaintiff failed to state a claim for defamation, and it arises of
      out “free speech in connection with a public issue” because it
      involves a news report on a public figure.

2021 WL 4976287, at *5. The trial court in Bongino found that the
defendant was the prevailing party under the Anti-SLAPP statute, and, as
a result, was entitled to attorney’s fees. Thus, Bongino is unlike the
present case, since the trial court here did not adjudicate at all on the
merits of the Anti-SLAPP claim.

   Merely raising the Anti-SLAPP statute as an affirmative defense, where
the court’s order granting summary judgment neither mentioned nor relied
on the Anti-SLAPP provision, will not entitle the party to fees under the
Anti-SLAPP statute. Wentz v. Project Veritas, No. 6:17-cv-1164-Orl-
18GJK, 2019 WL 4621069, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2019). The court in
Wentz concluded that merely raising Anti-SLAPP was insufficient, and
such an argument was contrary to the “plain meaning of the Anti-SLAPP
act and would permit entitlement to fees simply by raising the anti-SLAPP
act as a defense, without any ruling as to its applicability.” Id.

   It is clear that there must be an express finding by the trial court that
the petitioner’s suit violated the Anti-SLAPP statute for the defendant to

                                      5
be entitled to fees under section 768.295(4). 100PlusAnimalRescue, Inc. v.
Butkus, No. 17-61893-CIV, 2021 WL 4635819, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 14,
2021). In 100PlusAnimalRescue, the trial court determined:

      Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.
      Defendant raised the anti-SLAPP statute in both her motion
      to dismiss and her motion for summary judgment. However,
      after reviewing the transcript on the motion to dismiss, the
      order denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
      and the order entering judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, the
      undersigned finds that no ruling was made in regard to the
      anti-SLAPP statute.

Id. The trial court in 100PlusAnimal Rescue concluded that the “[p]laintiffs
are not the prevailing party under the anti-SLAPP statute because the
Court rendered no such ruling.” Id. at *3. Similarly, in the present case,
the trial court also rendered no such ruling, so, as a result, Lee is not the
prevailing party under the Anti-SLAPP statute.

   In this case, neither the arbitrator, nor the trial court, made any specific
finding that Animal Aid’s suit violated the Anti-SLAPP statute. The
arbitrator and trial court never determined that Animal Aid’s claim was
“without merit” or that the claim was filed “primarily” because Lee
“exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue.” Bongino, 2021 WL 4976287, at *4. Lee even admits that
“the arbitrator did not affirmatively (or at least, expressly) assume the task
of determining whether Animal Aid’s defamation action violates section
768.295, Fla. Stat.”

   Lee had ample opportunities to obtain a ruling on this issue. However,
Lee never scheduled a hearing on her motion for summary judgment.
Further, Lee did not move for a trial de novo following the non-binding
arbitration. At any of these points during the proceedings, Lee could have
had the Anti-SLAPP claim adjudicated.

   Because Lee did not have the merits of the Anti-SLAPP claim
adjudicated at the trial court, Lee also effectively waived any challenge
involving this claim on appeal. Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
Mendez, 98 So. 3d 604, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Part of the preservation
requirement is the securing of a ruling, and the Palm Beach County class
has not secured one.”); Hamilton v. R.L. Best Int’l, 996 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla.
1st DCA 2008) (“The preservation of error requirement is not ordinarily
completed until the aggrieved party has obtained a ruling on the motion
or objection made in the lower tribunal.”).

                                      6
    We can also affirm the denial of attorney’s fees due to the fact that Lee
filed her attorney’s fees motion raising the Anti-SLAPP statute pro se.3
Although Lee claimed that this motion was filed “with assistance of
Counsel,” there was no attorney of record for the case or for this particular
motion. It goes without saying that non-attorneys proceeding pro se are
not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S.
432, 435 (1991) (“[A] pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to
attorney’s fees.”) (emphasis omitted); Massengale v. Ray, 267 F. 3d 1298,
1302-03 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Because a party proceeding pro se cannot have
incurred attorney’s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a
violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney’s fee as part
of a sanction.”); City of Riviera Beach v. Lozman, 672 Fed. Appx. 892, 899
(11th Cir. 2016) (“[A]ttorneys’ fees are not available to pro se parties even
if a counseled party would be awarded them as a matter of right.”); U.S. v.
Evans, 561 Fed. Appx. 877, 880 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[P]ro se litigants are
entitled to an award of attorney fees only to the extent that the ‘services of
an attorney were utilized and fees incurred.’”) (citation omitted); Torres v.
Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 15-24013-CIV, 2019 WL 1281213, at * 3 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 20, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees . . . is denied as he is
a pro se, non-lawyer, litigant not entitled to such fees.”); DeBose v. Univ.
of S. Fla. Bd. of Tr., No. 8:15-cv-2787, 2018 WL 8919870, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 19, 2018) (“[A] pro se plaintiff, as a matter of law, cannot recover
attorney’s fees for representing herself.”).

   In summary, the trial court correctly denied Lee’s motion for attorney’s
fees under the provision of the Anti-SLAPP statute since Lee never
obtained a ruling that Animal Aid’s claim violated the Anti-SLAPP statute.
Further, Lee, as a pro se litigant on her Anti-SLAPP motion, was not
entitled to attorney’s fees. As such, we affirm.

   Affirmed.

3 Even if there had been an express finding by the trial court that Animal Aid’s

suit violated the Anti-SLAPP statute—which there was not—the Anti-SLAPP
statute “provides only for ‘attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a
claim that an action was filed in violation of this section’—in other words, fees
and costs incurred in connection with the SLAPP motion itself.” Berisha v.
Lawson, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1157 n.8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2018) (quoting §
768.295(4), Fla. Stat.). Lee does not specifically delineate that she incurred any
attorney’s fees in connection with the filing of this particular Anti-SLAPP motion.
Rather, Lee relies on the fact that she has incurred attorney’s fees for “four years
in this case and incurred attorneys’ fees up until just prior to the arbitration.”

                                         7
KUNTZ and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                         *       *        *

  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                 8