Court Opinion

ID: 9670717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:24:34.231869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.101031
License: Public Domain

APPEL, J.
(specially concurring).
I specially concur in the outcome of this case. I write separately because I believe the majority applies the wrong legal framework to resolve the issue presented in this appeal.
In his petition, Swanson seeks judicial review of a final agency action, which held that he was not entitled to a contested case hearing in connection with disciplinary matters under the applicable administrative procedures. He desires an evidentia-ry hearing before the agency to determine the validity of the underlying discipline.
These claims were brought under the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA). When a party seeks review of final agency action under the IAPA, two separate and distinct questions arise. The first question is whether the party seeking judicial review is “aggrieved” under the IAPA. The second question involves a judicial determination of the type of agency action involved, specifically, whether the matter involves a contested case proceeding or whether the matter involves “other agency action.” See Hurd v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 580 N.W.2d 383, 387-88 (Iowa 1998); Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Iowa 1983).
In this case, the first question is whether Swanson was aggrieved by the final agency action, namely, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. In my view, Swanson is so aggrieved. It is undisputed that as a result of the disciplinary reports, the department reduced Swanson’s level of privileges at the facility. In addition, Swanson was adversely affected in that the existence of disciplinary reports, even if they might not automatically or necessarily extend his confinement, would constitute a stigma that would make his early release less likely.
Swanson’s legal interest, therefore, in challenging the department’s imposition of discipline was sufficient to confer standing under the IAPA. The standard for determining whether a person is aggrieved under the IAPA is not demanding.
First, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision.... Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the decision.
City of Des Moines v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1979). I believe that Swanson has met this test.
The State argues that the discipline meted out against Swanson is “therapy” and as a result, Swanson cannot be considered “aggrieved” as a matter of law. There is nothing in the record to suggest that professional medical judgment was brought to bear on any of the disciplinary proceedings against Swanson. The proceedings were adjudications in the sense that they involved application of established principles of conduct to past actions. *311Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir.2002). The processes invoked under the handbook are akin to prison disciplinary proceedings, where a system of rewards and punishment are established to control behavior. As a result, resort to Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), misses the mark.
But the determination that Swanson met the relatively low requirements of “an aggrieved person” under the IAPA is not the end of the inquiry. Even assuming that Swanson was aggrieved, the question remains whether he was entitled to a contested case hearing under the IAPA. See Iowa Code § 17A.2(5) (2005) (definition of contested case). That is a fundamentally different question than whether he was aggrieved by the final agency action.
Swanson appears to claim he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the handbook. There is nothing in the handbook, however, that suggests that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in connection with disciplinary proceedings. As a result, there is no basis for Swanson’s claim that he was afforded the right to an evidentiary hearing by the agency’s adoption of a discretionary policy.
Under the IAPA, however, an aggrieved party is entitled to a contested case proceeding if he or she is entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing by statute or by constitution. Hurd, 580 N.W.2d at 388. Swanson does not claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing by statute, and, as a result, his sole remaining argument is that, as a matter of constitutional law, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Whether due process entitles a person, who is subject to civil confinement under sexual predator statutes, to an evidentiary hearing on disciplinary matters is a question that has not been addressed by the courts. In the case of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), however, a divided United States Supreme Court held that placing a prisoner in solitary confinement as a result of a disciplinary proceeding did not give rise to a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections. The majority held that the change in privileges was insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest. The court further concluded that the mere fact that the disciplinary proceedings might be a factor in the discretionary decision to release the prisoner on parole was too attenuated to give rise to due process protections. Id. at 487, 115 S.Ct. at 2302, 132 L.Ed.2d at 432. Four justices dissented in Sandin, noting, among other things, that the stigma associated with the disciplinary proceedings was sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest.
The Sandin case is not directly applicable, however, as this case presents a civil commitment rather than a penal context. Nonetheless, based on Sandin, I conclude that the United States Supreme Court would reject any claim that the reduction in privileges experienced by Swanson as a result of the disciplinary proceedings in the civil commitment context gives rise to a liberty interest protected by due process. The question of whether the stigma that arises from the disciplinary proceedings is sufficient under the facts and circumstances of this case to give rise to a liberty interest is a somewhat closer question. It is undisputed that a person confined as a result of Iowa’s sexual predator statute, unlike the prisoner in Sandin, does not have a specific release date. But does this clear distinction make the stigma of discipline in this case even more powerful than that in Sandin?
In light of the strong language of the majority opinion in Sandin, however, I conclude that if the matter were presented to the United States Supreme Court today, *312the court would hold that the mere stigma associated with disciplinary proceedings is insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest and therefore does not form the basis for a contested case proceeding. Swanson has not argued that the interpretation of the due process clause under the Iowa Constitution should be approached differently and, as a result, we treat its proper interpretation as identical with its federal counterpart. Pfister v. Iowa Dist. CL, 688 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Iowa 2004). Therefore, Swanson loses on the central question he has presented on appeal — whether he was entitled to a contested case proceeding before the agency.
In this case, Swanson did not claim that he was entitled to judicial review of “other agency action” under the IAPA. The language in the majority opinion implying that Swanson was not sufficiently aggrieved under the IAPA to invoke review of “other agency action” is, in my view, incorrect and, in any event, is not necessary to the outcome of this case.