Court Opinion

ID: 9372403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 16:00:47.932218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.199131
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9519    Document: 010110815123       Date Filed: 02/21/2023   Page: 1
                                                                 FILED
                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                   February 21, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  VERONICA DEL CARMEN
  MARROQUIN-BENITEZ; JULIO
  ERNESTO SANTAMARIA-
  MARROQUIN; JOHN DOE,

        Petitioners,
                                                             No. 22-9519
  v.                                                     (Petition for Review)

  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Veronica Del Carmen Marroquin-Benitez (“Marroquin-Benitez”) and her sons,

 Julio Ernesto Santamaria-Marroquin (“Julio”) and John Doe (“A.N.M.”), 1 seek review of

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
        Marroquin-Benitez’s youngest son is identified in the caption as “John Doe”
 because he is a minor. We follow the convention in Petitioners’ brief in referring to
 him as A.N.M.
Appellate Case: 22-9519     Document: 010110815123         Date Filed: 02/21/2023      Page: 2

 a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing their appeal from an

 Immigration Judge’s (IJ) removal order. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

 we deny the petition.

                                       BACKGROUND

        Marroquin-Benitez and her sons are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They

 allege that El Salvadoran gang members threatened Julio, stating that the gang would kill

 him and his family if he did not join the gang. “[A]fter they threatened [him], a car came

 by and [the gang members] thought it was a police patrol car and so they took off

 running.” Id. at 132.

        Julio, who was fifteen at the time, recounted the incident to his mother.

 Marroquin-Benitez was frightened and remained inside the house with her sons for a

 week or more. Several years earlier, gangs had murdered a teenage nephew for refusing

 to join a gang and another nephew for cooperating with police after joining the gang, and

 she “didn’t want the same thing to happen to [her] children or to [herself].” Id. at 107.

 So, Marroquin-Benitez and her sons fled El Salvador.

        On November 30, 2015, they entered the United States without inspection. The

 Department of Homeland Security took them into custody and charged them as

 noncitizens present in this country without admission or parole. They conceded

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 removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

 Convention against Torture (CAT). 2

        Represented by counsel, they appeared before an IJ for an asylum hearing.

 Marroquin-Benitez testified that she “personally hadn’t had any problems with the gang

 before this,” id., and that the gang’s threat included her and A.N.M. to make it “very

 painful for” Julio if he did not join, id. at 123. She said that she did not report the

 incident to the police because she feared gang retaliation. Finally, she testified that her

 siblings and parents remain in El Salvador and have not been harmed since she fled.

        Julio testified that the only reason the gang threatened his family was to “force

 [him] to join.” Id. at 134. He feared the gang would threaten or harm him upon returning

 to El Salvador “[b]ecause [he] didn’t obey them when they asked [him] to join,” and

 “[t]hey wanted . . . [him] to be with them supporting them in all that they were doing.”

 Id. at 137. But he did not want to join the gang because he did not want to “go around

 with them killing people or stealing,” and he feared the “opposing gang” would “come

 after [him].” Id. at 133. Finally, Julio explained that he did not contact the police

 because he feared the gang would kill him.

        The IJ denied relief and ordered Marroquin-Benitez and her sons removed to

 El Salvador. They appealed to the BIA, asserting, among other things, that they had

 shown persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution due to (1) their

        Marroquin-Benitez designated her sons as derivative beneficiaries of her
        2

 asylum application. Julio and A.N.M. “also filed their own asylum applications[,]
 which arise out of the same set of operative facts.” R., Vol. I at 3 n.1.
                                                3
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 membership in social groups comprising “Julio’s Immediate Family Members” and

 “Salvadoran Males Resisting and Fleeing Gang Recruitment,” and (2) “Julio’s political

 opinion.” Id. at 62-63. As for their CAT claims, they argued that “[c]ountry conditions

 and the family’s personal experience make it clear that the government would acquiesce

 to their torture and that the gang will certainly torture and murder them if they are forced

 to return to El Salvador.” Id. at 32.

        The BIA dismissed their appeal, concluding, in regard to asylum, that

 Marroquin-Benitez and her sons “did not establish that they suffered past persecution or

 have a well-founded fear of persecution in El Salvador on account of a protected

 ground.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The BIA explained that when threats of gang

 violence are centrally motivated by resistance to gang recruitment, there is an insufficient

 nexus between persecution and a protected ground. See Orellana-Recinos v. Garland,

 993 F.3d 851, 855-56 (10th Cir. 2021) (observing that persecution qualifies as “on

 account of” if the asylum “applicant . . . possess[ed] a protected characteristic and that

 protected characteristic . . . motivated the persecutor to harm the applicant” (internal

 quotation marks omitted)). Next, the BIA noted that because Marroquin-Benitez and her

 sons failed to meet the requirements for asylum, they necessarily could not meet the

 higher standard for withholding of removal. Finally, the BIA stated that their CAT

 claims failed because they did not show they “are personally at risk of torture.” R., Vol. I

 at 4. The BIA acknowledged that there are “widespread issues of gang violence and

 corruption in El Salvador” and that two “extended family members were killed by gang

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 members in 2010 and 2011,” but that evidence alone did not indicate they will likely be

 tortured if removed to El Salvador. Id.

                                        DISCUSSION
                                  I. Standards of Review

        “Because a single member of the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in a brief order,

 we review the BIA’s opinion rather than the decision of the IJ.” Neri-Garcia v. Holder,

 696 F.3d 1003, 1008 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). But “resort to the IJ’s decision

 is appropriate in situations where the BIA incorporates the IJ’s rationale or a summary of

 its reasoning.” Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2006).

        “When reviewing BIA decisions, an appellate court must look to the record for

 substantial evidence supporting the agency’s decision: Our duty is to guarantee that

 factual determinations are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence

 considering the record as a whole.” Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 2007)

 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

                                           II. Asylum

        “To qualify for asylum, a noncitizen must demonstrate either past persecution or a

 well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

 membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d

 1263, 1269 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). A protected ground must

 “be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C.

 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). This court “interpret[s] ‘one central reason’ to mean [that] the

 protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of

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 future mistreatment and cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to

 another reason for harm.” Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 996 (10th Cir. 2015)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). The persecutor’s “motive [is] critical to” the asylum

 analysis. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “In this circuit, the ultimate determination whether an alien has demonstrated

 persecution is a question of fact, even if the underlying factual circumstances are not in

 dispute and the only issue is whether those circumstances qualify as persecution.”

 Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

 omitted). Thus, we may not reverse unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be

 compelled to conclude to the contrary” as to persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

                      A.     Membership in a Particular Social Group 3

 1.     Julio’s Immediate Family Members

        Petitioners contend that the evidence in this case “make[s] it clear that the gang

 persecuted [Marroquin-Benitez and A.N.M.] because they are Julio’s immediate family.”

 Opening Br. at 18. They suggest that the gang’s threat to harm Marroquin-Benitez and

 A.N.M stemmed from animus against the family unit, separate from the gang’s criminal

 objectives.

        But they ignore the testimonial evidence in this case. Both Julio and Marroquin-

 Benitez testified that the gang threatened her and A.N.M. in order to pressure Julio to join

        3
         Like the BIA, we assume, without deciding, that Petitioners’ proposed social
 groups are cognizable, and that the single threat uttered to Julio qualified as persecution.
 But we note, in regard to Petitioner’s proposed social group of “Salvadoran Males
 Resisting and Fleeing Gang Recruitment,” that this court has held that a similarly defined
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 the gang. Their membership in the social group of Julio’s immediate family members “is

 relevant only as a means to an end—that is, [their] membership enables the persecutors to

 effectuate their objectives,” Orellana-Recinos, 993 F.3d at 856, which, as the agency

 noted, are “to expand their criminal enterprise,” R., Vol. I at 64.

        Nevertheless, Petitioners argue that the gang had mixed motives—“one motivation

 . . . to maintain control of the Salvadoran population” and one motivation “specifically

 target[ing] . . . Julio’s immediate family.” Opening Br. at 12 (emphasis omitted).

 Although “a persecutor can have multiple motives for targeting someone,” Orellana-

 Recinos, 993 F.3d at 855, there is no evidence in this case that the threat against

 Marroquin-Benitez and A.N.M. was uttered for any reason other than as a recruitment

 tool, let alone evidence to suggest that one central reason for the threat might have been a

 protected ground, see id. (stating that “even when the protected ground is intertwined

 with unprotected reasons, the protected ground must still be a central reason” (internal

 quotation marks omitted)). 4

 social group is not cognizable. See Rodas-Orellana, 780 F.3d at 991, 992 (holding that
 the group of “El Salvadoran males threatened and actively recruited by gangs, who resist
 joining because they oppose the gangs” is not a cognizable social group because its
 members “are . . . not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed
 the gang[] or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests” (internal quotation
 marks omitted)).
        4
          Petitioners assert, without citation to the record, that “had Julio decided to
 join the gang, that would not have saved his family from the wrath of the gang.”
 Opening Br. at 18. But even if true, record evidence indicates that the reason
 Marroquin-Benitez and A.N.M. might have remained in danger is because gangs
 threaten families of forcible recruits to ensure “compl[iance] with gang members’
 demands,” R., Vol. III at 994, not because of “hostility toward the family unit,”
 Orellana-Recinos, 993 F.3d at 858.
                                               7
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        Because the record does not compel the conclusion that Marroquin-Benitez’s and

 A.N.M.’s membership in “Julio’s Immediate Family Members” was or will be one

 central reason for their persecution, we uphold the BIA’s decision regarding this

 particular social group.

 2.     Salvadoran Males Resisting and Fleeing Gang Recruitment 5

        Petitioners argue that the “evidence in this matter demonstrates that one central

 reason Julio will be persecuted in the future is his membership in the particular social

 group [of] Salvadoran males who resisted and fled gang recruitment.” Opening Br. at 21.

 But Petitioners ignore Julio’s own testimony that he feared the gang would threaten or

 harm him in the future because he refused to be recruited and they wanted his “support[]

 . . . in all that they were doing.” R., Vol. I at 137. This testimony supports the agency’s

 conclusion that the threat of future harm to Julio exists, if at all, because of his resistance

 to the gang’s “desire to increase its power and the reach of [its] criminal enterprise,” id. at

 63. Indeed, Julio did not testify that he feared future harm from any other gangs, just the

 particular gang he refused to join. “[M]embership in a particular social group should not

 be considered a motive for persecution if the persecutors are simply pursuing their

 distinct objectives and a victim’s membership in the group is relevant only as a means to

 an end.” Orellana-Recinos, 993 F.3d at 856 (emphasis omitted).

        5
         This proposed social group necessarily applies only to Julio’s fear of future
 persecution, because at the time he was threatened, he had not yet resisted and fled
 gang recruitment.

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          Because the record does not compel the conclusion that Julio’s membership in

 “Salvadoran Males Resisting and Fleeing Gang Recruitment” is one central reason for his

 fear of future persecution, we uphold the BIA’s decision regarding this particular social

 group.

                                    B.     Political Opinion

          Petitioners claim that “Julio’s actions demonstrate an anti-gang political opinion”

 and the gang “imput[ed] his opinion to [Marroquin-Benitez and A.N.M.],” “putting them

 at risk.” Opening Br. at 26. Preliminarily, we note Petitioners cite no part of the record

 indicating that Julio held any political opinions, or that if he did, he communicated them

 to the gang.

          In any event, “[t]he Supreme Court has clarified that a group’s attempt to

 coercively recruit an individual is not necessarily persecution on account of political

 opinion.” Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 646 (10th Cir. 2012). Indeed, Julio

 testified that he did not want to join the gang because he did not want to be a murderer or

 a thief, and he feared harm from a rival gang. Those are not political grounds.

          Moreover, “even if it were clear that [Julio] resisted on political grounds, he would

 need to make the additional showing that” the gang’s threat to kill him and his family

 “was motivated by more than anger at h[is] unwillingness to join [the gang] and a desire

 to coerce h[im] into joining.” Id. at 647. But as we previously indicated, the testimonial

 evidence in this case shows that the gang threatened Julio and his family in response to

 his refusal to join and to compel him to join.

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         Instead of identifying evidence that Julio held an anti-gang political opinion or that

  the gang issued its threat because of that opinion, Petitioners argue that Julio’s resistance

  to recruitment is necessarily political because the gang that likely threatened him, MS-13,

  “operates politically as a de facto government in El Salvador.” Opening Br. at 26. We

  do not consider this argument, however, because it was not exhausted in the BIA. See

  Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1282 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Ordinarily, a petitioner

  must exhaust all administrative processes available to hear his arguments before he may

  seek to bring those arguments to court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6

         Because the record does not compel the conclusion that Julio’s political opinion

  was one central reason for the gang’s threat against him and his family, we uphold the

  BIA’s decision on this protected ground.

                                 III. Withholding of Removal

         “To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate that

  there is a clear probability of persecution because of his race, religion, nationality,

  membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Zhi Wei Pang v. Holder,

  665 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because

  Petitioners have not met the requirements for asylum, they cannot “satisfy the higher

  standard of eligibility for withholding of removal.” Id. at 1234.

         6
          We deny Petitioners’ request for judicial notice of a document purportedly
  showing negotiations between El Salvador’s current government and the country’s gangs.
  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting judicial review to “the administrative record on
  which the order of removal is based”).

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                                         IV. CAT Relief

         “Article 3 of the [CAT] prohibits the return of an alien to a country where it is

  more likely than not that he will be subject to torture by a public official, or at the

  instigation or with the acquiescence of such an official.” Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales,

  406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

  The BIA affirmed the denial of Petitioners’ CAT claims because they failed to show a

  sufficient likelihood of torture upon returning to El Salvador. In so concluding, the BIA

  acknowledged the murders in 2010 and 2011 of Julio’s cousins and that corruption and

  gang violence are widespread in El Salvador, but the BIA said the evidence was

  insufficient to show that Petitioners “are personally at risk of torture.” R., Vol. I at 4.

         Petitioners address whether a public official will acquiesce in their torture, but

  they offer little discussion addressing the BIA’s determination that they had not shown a

  likelihood of torture. It is insufficient for Petitioners to merely point out that Julio’s

  cousins were killed by gangs four and five years before he was threatened and to broadly

  state that “[c]ountry conditions evidence corroborates that people who refused the

  gangs[’] demands are tortured and murdered by the gangs as are their family members,”

  Opening Br. at 42. Indeed, one of Julio’s cousins was a gang member who was killed for

  cooperating with police. See R., Vol. I at 99-100. Julio’s circumstances are not similar.

  Further, generalized country conditions do not quantify the risk “that a particular person

  would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country.”

  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 592 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

  marks omitted); accord Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 911 (5th Cir. 2019) (observing

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  that “[g]eneralized country evidence tells us little about the likelihood state actors will

  torture any particular person”); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.

  2010) (stating that “generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is not

  particular to Petitioners and is insufficient to meet th[e] [CAT] standard”); Lin v. Dep’t of

  Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring “particularized evidence” beyond

  general country conditions to support a CAT claim).

         Because Petitioners have not identified evidence that would compel a reasonable

  adjudicator to conclude they would more likely than not be tortured upon returning to El

  Salvador, we cannot overturn the BIA’s CAT determination. See Nasrallah v. Barr,

  140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (holding that the BIA’s CAT “findings of fact are

  conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

  contrary” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                          CONCLUSION

         We deny the petition for review.
                                                 Entered for the Court

                                                 Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                                 Circuit Judge

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