Court Opinion

ID: 9754884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:17:34.147938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:00.375141
License: Public Domain

Wendell Griffin, Judge, dissenting. Unfortunately, the udge, the role of a “super trial court.” The role of an appellate court is to review the lower court’s proceedings for error, not make its own findings of fact. As a result, appellate judges must sometimes conclude that, while we might have decided a case differently, the trial court decision must be affirmed under the applicable standard of review. In today’s opinion, the majority has neglected the applicable standard of review. I must respectfully dissent. In Huffman v. Fisher, 337 Ark. 58, 987 S.W.2d 269 (1999) (.Huffman I), our supreme court held that a circuit court’s findings regarding a name-change petition are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard. In other words, the circuit court’s ruling must be upheld unless “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 69, 987 S.W.2d at 274 (citing RAD-Razorback Ltd. Partnership v. B.G. Coney Co., 289 Ark. 550, 713 S.W.2d 462 (1986)). Further, a reviewing court is supposed to defer to the circuit court’s superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weigh their testimony. Huffman v. Fisher, 343 Ark. 737, 38 S.W.3d 327 (2001) (Huffman II). The standard of review in traditional cases of equity, such as domestic-relations proceedings, contemplates that the reviewing court may disagree with the circuit court’s decision but is obligated to affirm it unless clear error exists. As stated in the majority opinion, when considering whether a change in a minor child’s surname is in the best interest of that child, a court should consider at least the following factors: (1) the child’s preference; (2) the effect of the change of the child’s surname on the preservation and development of the child’s relationship with each parent; (3) the length of time the child has borne a given name; (4) the degree of community respect associated with the present and proposed surnames; (5) the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment that the child may experience from bearing the present or proposed surname; and (6) the existence of any parental misconduct or neglect. Huffman I, 337 Ark. at 68, 987 S.W.2d at 274. 1. The child’s preference. The majority finds error in the circuit court’s ruling that the child was too young to have a preference because he had been known as “Dawson Gangi” all of his life and that, when asked his name, he responds “Dawson Gangi.” Not only has the majority substituted its own judgment for that of the circuit court’s when analyzing this factor, it has disregarded that in Huffman II, the circuit court also found that the child, age three-and-one-half years at the time, was too young to have an opinion as to which name he preferred. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to change the child’s surname to that of the father. The majority does not hide the fact that it is assuming the role of fact-finder when it states: Contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, we believe that there is significant evidence on this (child preference) issue in that the child knows his name, is able to tell people what it is; and it is no great leap, and does not require resort to speculation, to logically conclude that Dawson Gangi would prefer to be known to others by the same name as he knows himself. The court erred in finding this evidence, which is the only evidence presented on this factor, to be insignificant. This reasoning is flawed for at least two reasons. First, while the majority finds error in the circuit court’s decision to find the evidence on the child-preference factor insignificant, the circuit court actually declared that it was not going to consider the factor because of Dawson’s age. Had the circuit court considered the factor regardless of Dawson’s age, it might have agreed with the majority; however, that was a decision for the circuit court to make, and given Dawson’s age, the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Further, by declaring that Dawson would prefer the surname Gangi simply because he knows himself by that name, the majority engages in rank speculation. The majority cites no testimony of authority to support its conclusion. Aside from the fact that there is no proof showing why the child’s preference is what the majority imagines it to be, the majority does not explain why its rationale would not essentially always make the preference of two-year-old children binding on circuit courts entrusted with determining whether it would be in the best interest of such children to grant petitions to change their surnames. While I agree that the circuit court should not disregard evidence dealing with the child’s preference, the fact that a circuit court comes to the conclusion that a factor is not relevant is not the equivalent to a court not considering the factor at all. See Bell v. Wardell, 72 Ark. App. 94, 34 S.W.3d 745 (2000). There is no reason to make the child’s preference more than what Huffman I made it to be: one factor among six that circuit courts should consider when determining whether it would be in the child’s best interest to grant a petition to change a child’s surname. 2. The effect of the name change on the preservation and development of the child’s relationship with each parent. The majority finds error in the circuit court’s finding and opines (1) that the circuit court effectively reversed the burden of proof by requiring appellant to produce evidence that the name change would not negatively harm the child and (2) that the circuit court did not identify any evidence that it had considered in finding that the name change would strengthen Dawson’s bond with his father. However, the majority misconstrues the circuit court’s findings. The circuit court merely found that there was no evidence that the surname change would negatively harm the child’s relationship with appellant. That finding is both logically permissible and factually substantiated. The majority has cited no authority that forbids a party who seeks to prove that a surname change will not harm the relationship between the child and a parent from meeting its burden by proving that no harm in the relationship between the child and a parent is likely to occur. Proof by the petitioner that no harm is likely to result in the relationship between the child and a parent by the surname change does not reverse the burden of proof; however, such proof might induce a party opposing the petition to produce evidence to the contrary. The circuit court’s statement regarding this point did not operate to reverse the burden of proof; it was simply an assessment of the proof on this matter. The majority does acknowledge appellee’s feelings regarding the bond that he would have with Dawson by Dawson having his surname. This court should be mindful of the circuit court’s analysis of this factor in Huffman II: Jacob spends the majority of his life with the maternal side of his family. No proof was offered which would indicate that a surname change from Huffman [the mother] to Fisher [the father] would have a detrimental effect on Jacob’s relationship with his mother and her family. Nick did testify that he felt Jacob wpuld form a second connection to him if he had the name Fisher. There would be no detrimental effect on Jacob concerning the preservation of his relationship with either Nick or Kara if his name was changed to Fisher. Huffman II, 343 Ark. at 744, 38 S.W.3d at 330. If Huffman II was affirmed, then I see no reason why this court should reverse with similar evidence before it on this factor. 3. The length of time the child has borne his present surname. The majority finds error in the circuit court’s ruling because Dawson had borne his surname for twenty-seven months, long enough for him to recognize his name. Again, the majority is substituting its own judgment for that of the trier-of-fact. This court has previously affirmed a name-change petition when the child was four years old, stating that there would be little stigma if the child’s surname were changed prior to the child’s attendance in kindergarten. See Carter v. Reddell, 75 Ark. App. 8, 52 S.W.3d 506 (2001). Even in the original Huffman cases, the child had his prior surname for three-and-a-half years before the circuit court granted the petition for a name change on remand from the supreme court. I acknowledge that the Huffman litigation had been pending the entire life of the child, while appellee did not initiate name-change proceedings until Dawson was twenty months old. Again, the circuit court’s finding on this point was not clearly erroneous, only different from what the majority (and appellant) prefer. 4. The degree of community respect associated with the present and proposed surnames. Out of all of the factors, the majority’s analysis of this factor is most puzzling. The majority has elected to search the record for evidence of this factor despite appellant’s concession in her brief that neither party presented any evidence regarding the reputation of either family name in their respective communities. However, the majority now finds that there was ample evidence for the circuit court to consider this factor based on evidence of appellant’s driving, criminal, and academic histories. Nevertheless, this factor refers to the degree of community respect. The majority has cited no evidence proving lack of community respect for the Edmonds name in Lincoln County. Yes, the majority has listed appellee’s prior bad acts. But, there was no evidence that the community knew about that conduct, let alone viewed the conduct as a curse on the Edmonds name. If there was no evidence that the community knew about any of these acts, then how exactly is this factor implicated? I see no reason to find that the circuit court’s ruling was clearly erroneous in its analysis of this factor. 5. The difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment that the child may experience for bearing the present or proposed surname. The majority holds that the evidence did not allow for an inference similar to what was affirmed in Huffman II; in other words, the majority holds that it was error for the circuit court to conclude that Dawson would suffer difficulties by bearing his mother’s surname. Without conceding that the circuit court’s analysis of this point was improper — because it does not require speculation to assume that a child with the mother’s surname would receive questions about his familial status — I still do not agree that it is the majority’s role to act as fact-finder and reverse this case based on the different conclusions reached. The majority appears to be impressed by the fact that appellant had adopted the name “Gangi-Baker”; however, the trial court also considered the following testimony on the issue: Appellee’s Counsel: Would you state your name, please. Appellant: Tatum Mae Gangi. Counsel: All right. And is it Baker now? Appellant: No, sir. Counsel: Okay. I thought at one point you were married. Appellant: Yes, sir, I am married. I kept — I’m retaining my last name. Counsel: Okay. Appellant: Gangi. It’s a family name. Counsel: Okay. Well, the reason I — okay. Were you — did you take the name of Baker at one time? Appellant: No. I got married. I haven’t changed my name. My social security is still Tatum Gangi. Counsel: Okay. Do you go by the name of Baker? Appellant: Some people call me Mrs. Baker. Some people — a lot of people still call me Tatum Gangi. I’m self-employed with my business and it is all Tatum Gangi. Counsel: Okay. The reason I asked about your name is, is that — are you aware that there have been pleadings filed by you in this case under the name of Tatum Baker? Are you aware of that?1  Appellant: Well, I, all of a sudden, was being addressed as Tatum Baker from the other side, and I just — no, but I’ve seen Tatum Baker, and I still seeTatum Gangi on the sheets that come from the courtroom. They come in both forms. Counsel: But you — and when you sign off on documents, do you sign off as Tatum Gangi? Appellant: Yes, Tatum Gangi or Tatum Baker. On my checkbook, IsignTatum Baker,but sometimes I sign Gangi too. Counsel: Okay. The reason I asked is — Appellant: For work. Counsel: — is you remember the motion for ex parte order for drug testing that was filed the beginning of last month. Appellant: Um-hum. Counsel: You were seeking to have Mr. Edmonds drug tested. Do you remember that? Appellant: Um-hum. Counsel: That was filed under the name Tatum Baker. Do you remember that? Appellant: Yes, I do. Counsel: And do you remember also that the affidavit that you attached to the motion was signed not as Tatum Gangi, but as Tatum Baker. Do you remember that? Appellant: Yes. For all — for all intents and purposes, retaining my child’s name to be Dawson Gangi, I’m keeping the name Gangi, and I will no longer ever again go by Tatum Baker. Counsel: Okay. But you have gone — Appellant: I have, yes, sir. Counsel: When were you married, by the way? Appellant: February the 8th. Counsel: Okay. And when did you stop using the name Baker? Appellant: Stop. I’ve only used it a — / don’t — I use both. I’ve always used both. (Emphasis added.) Appellant may have stated that she went by “Tatum Gangi,” but when confronted with evidence to the contrary, she admitted that she went by both Gangi and Baker. It does not take speculation to recognize the difficulties posed to a child with a surname unlike that of both parents. The circuit court was not clearly erroneous when it found that Dawson would have fewer difficulties if he assumed his father’s surname. 6. The existence of any parental misconduct or neglect. The majority spends more space addressing this point than any other. A person reading only the majority opinion would think that the circuit court failed to consider any of the evidence on this point. On the contrary, the circuit court was very mindful of it: The Court has had opportunity to observe the parties as they testified and has also been able to assess their credibility. The Court finds that [appellee] has successfully explained [appellant’s] allegations concerning his alleged misconduct and the Court accepts those as adequate. The Court further will accept his assurances that he will not transport Dawson without being properly restrained in a car seat in the future. The circuit court could have interpreted the testimony as the majority has in this case; however, it did not do so, choosing to accept appellee’s explanations of the allegations. The majority completely ignores appellee’s testimony that he has had his driving privileges restored, that he will no longer allow Dawson to sit in his lap while he drives, that he denied all other allegations of misconduct, and that he told the circuit court that appellant repeatedly threatened to move Dawson out of state to thwart his visitation. In other words, the majority shows absolutely no deference to the circuit court’s determinations of credibility and the weight to be afforded testimony, as we are bound to do. See Huffman II, supra. Conclusion The majority has found that the circuit court committed reversible error as to each of the six Huffman factors. In each instance, the majority is not content to reverse and remand to the circuit court for reconsideration based on what it deems to be a correct analysis. Rather, the majority has installed itself as a “super trial court” for the purpose of deciding whether the name-change petition should be granted. Respectfully, the idea that appellate judges might have reached a different decision had they been presiding at trial should not be the standard for holding circuit-court findings-of-fact clearly erroneous. Because I believe that the circuit court’s decision should be affirmed, or at least remanded for further consideration in light of any alleged error, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Roaf joins in this dissent.   The majority ignores several court documents where appellant is referred to as “Tatum Baker.” These documents include an affidavit dated September 29,2003 (just a little over a month prior to the November 10,2003, hearing), wherein appellant refers to herself as “Tatum Baker.”