Court Opinion

ID: 9782250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:13:52.649285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:54.280097
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I join the Chief Justice’s concurring and dissenting opinion, but offer these additional observations on the complex sentencing issues involved.
The issue on which the Chief Justice and I disagree with the majority involves the interplay between three sentencing provisions: the “One Strike” law (Pen. Code, § 667.61),1 the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)),2 and a five-year enhancement provision for prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).
The One Strike law imposes long sentences on defendants who commit forcible sex crimes when specified aggravating circumstances are present. Four of those aggravating circumstances are listed in section 667.61, subdivision (d); seven more are listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e). A defendant convicted of a forcible sex offense involving an aggravating circumstance listed in subdivision (e) “shall be punished” by a prison term of 15 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (b).) A prison sentence of 25 years to life is imposed when a defendant commits a forcible sex offense that involves one *138or more of the aggravating circumstances described in subdivision (d), or that involves two or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in subdivision (e). (§ 667.61, subd. (a).)
A defendant’s prior conviction for a forcible sex offense is an aggravating circumstance listed in subdivision (d) of section 667.61. Here, defendant Greg Acosta3 had two such prior convictions, thus subjecting him to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison under the One Strike law.
But those two prior convictions also brought Acosta under the sentencing provisions of the Three Strikes law. Under that law, a defendant convicted of a felony who has two prior convictions for violent or serious felonies is sentenced to an indeterminate term in prison, the minimum term of which is the greatest of these three options:
“(i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions.
“(ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.
“(iii) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A), italics added.)
The trial court used Acosta’s prior convictions under the One Strike law to elevate his sentence (which otherwise would have been between three and eight years) to a term of 25 years to life. The trial court then applied that part of the Three Strikes law italicized in the preceding paragraph to triple the minimum term of 25 years established by the One Strike law, thereby arriving at an indeterminate sentence of 75 years to life. Finally, the trial court added a determinate term of five years for each prior conviction based on subdivision (a) of section 667, which mandates a five-year enhancement for prior serious felonies, resulting in a total of 85 years to life.
Did the trial court’s use of all three of these sentencing provisions, which increased Acosta’s sentence from a maximum of eight years in prison to a minimum of 85 years, an increase of more than 1,000 percent, reflect the Legislature’s intent? The answer is “no.”
On point here is subdivision (f) of section 667.61 (section 667.61(f)), part of the One Strike law. That subdivision states: “If only the minimum number *139of circumstances specified in subdivision (d) or (e) which are required for the punishment provided in subdivision (a) or (b) to apply have been pled and proved, that circumstance or those circumstances shall be used as the basis for imposing the term provided in subdivision (a) or (b) rather than being used to impose the punishment authorized under any other law, unless another law provides for a greater penalty. However, if any additional circumstance or circumstances specified in subdivision (d) or (e) have been pled and proved, the minimum number of circumstances shall be used as the basis for imposing the term provided in subdivision (a), and any other additional circumstance or circumstances shall be used to impose any punishment or enhancement authorized under any other law. Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall not strike any of the circumstances specified in subdivision (d) or (e).” (Italics added.)
Thus, under section 667.61(f) of the One Strike law, a trial court may use a defendant’s prior convictions to increase the defendant’s sentence either under that law or under “any other law,” but not both. Rather, the court must determine whether use of the priors under the One Strike law or under “another law” will provide the “greater penalty” (ibid.), and, based on that determination, impose the greatest sentence possible.
Here, if the trial court had applied the One Strike law to Acosta’s prior convictions, his minimum term of confinement would have been 25 years. (§ 667.61, subd. (a).) Had the trial court used his prior convictions under other sentencing laws, his minimum prison term would have been 35 years, because of the 25-year-to-life term under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)) and an additional five years for each of the two prior convictions as a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)).4 But if the trial court had used one of Acosta’s prior convictions under the One Strike law and one of Acosta’s prior convictions under other sentencing provisions, his minimum prison term would have been 55 years, because the trial court could use one of his prior convictions to impose a sentence of 25 years to life under the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (a)), and use the second prior conviction under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)) to double the 25-year minimum term and then to enhance it by five years (§ 667, subd. (a)). This is the sentence the trial court should have imposed.
The majority insists that Acosta’s sentence of 85 years to life was not “imposed under both the One Strike law and the Three Strikes law” but “only under the Three Strikes law, with the minimum term of that indeterminate term set by reference to the One Strike law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. *140130.) The majority is wrong. As I have explained, the trial court used Acosta’s prior convictions to increase his sentence under three different provisions: the One Strike law, the Three Strikes law, and the five-year enhancement for serious felonies. Section 667.61(f) does not permit this triple use.
The majority asserts that if section 667.61(f) of the One Strike law does not permit the trial court’s triple use of Acosta’s prior convictions, that section conflicts with the Three Strikes law, which states that its provisions apply “in every case” and “[n]otwithstanding any other law.” (§ 667, subd. (f)(1).) If two laws conflict, the more recent one controls. (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 828 [135 Cal.Rptr. 526, 558 P.2d 1].) Here, it is unclear which law is more recent: The Legislature enacted the One Strike law after it enacted the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) but before the voters adopted the identically worded Three Strikes initiative (§ 1170.12), and the One Strike law’s effective date occurred after the effective dates of both the Three Strikes law and the Three Strikes initiative.
In this unusual circumstance, I would hold that the Three Strikes law does not abrogate section 667.61(f) of the One Strike law, stating that courts may not use the same prior conviction to increase a defendant’s sentence under both the One Strike law and another section, such as the Three Strikes law. This is consistent with the Three Strikes law’s general purpose of imposing long sentences on recidivist offenders: Section 667.61(f) precludes use of a defendant’s prior convictions under the Three Strikes law only when those convictions could be used to impose an even greater sentence under the One Strike law.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reduced defendant’s sentence from 85 years to life to 55 years to life.

 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

 After the Legislature enacted the Three Strikes law, the voters ratified the “Three Strikes” initiative (§ 1170.12), which is virtually identical to the Three Strikes law. I use the term “Three Strikes law” to refer to both measures, except in one instance where I discuss the significance of the dates when the two provisions were enacted. (See p. 140, post.)

 At issue in this appeal are two unrelated cases that this court has consolidated. The question addressed in part 3 of the majority opinion and discussed here pertains only to defendant Acosta’s case.

 As this court has stated in the past, the trial court may use the prior convictions both under the Three Strikes law and as serious felony enhancements. (See People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554-560 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56].)