Court Opinion

ID: 9913043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 19:00:23.672379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:52.762672
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BENJAMIN BEERMAN,                               DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         AT-0752-17-0720-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: December 22, 2023
  TRANSPORTATION,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Adam Jerome Conti , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

      Ailya Zaidi , Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

      Jack Foster Gilbert , Lakewood, Colorado, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed his removal for failure to follow instructions. For the reasons discussed
below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the
administrative judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                  2

affirmative defense, nexus, and penalty, and REMAND the case to the regional
office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                BACKGROUND
      Prior to the removal at issue in this appeal, the agency employed the
appellant as a Senior Structural Engineer, GS-14, with the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), Office of Technical Services, Resource Center. Initial
Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 22, Tab 7 at 6, Tab 16 at 4. On Thursday, March 30,
2017, a bridge portion of Interstate 85 (I-85) in Atlanta, Georgia, collapsed as a
result of a fire. IAF, Tab 7 at 6. Senior FHWA officials, including the Acting
Administrator and Georgia Division Administrator, represented FHWA in
offering support to the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT). Id. Early
in the morning on Friday, March 31, 2017, the appellant offered to assist the
senior officials, and his supervisor emailed him to “please standby” and
instructed him to “let me and [the Director of the Office of Bridges and Structures
(Director)] know if your [sic] contacted by anyone for possible help on this
matter.” IAF, Tab 8 at 25-26. The appellant responded, “will do.” Id. at 25.
Later that day, without further communication with his supervisor, the appellant
went to the site of the bridge collapse.    IAF, Tab 19, Hearing Compact Disc
(testimony of the appellant). Afterwards, he emailed photos of the site to the
GDOT state bridge engineer, the Director, his supervisor, and others. Id.; IAF,
Tab 8 at 32-33.
      On the morning of Saturday, April 1, 2017, the appellant emailed the
GDOT state bridge engineer regarding his suggestion to repair the bridge using
the “in-fill” methodology and his estimate regarding the timeframe for completing
the repairs.   IAF, Tab 8 at 46-49.     He copied the FHWA Georgia Division
Administrator and a Georgia Division Structural Engineer (L.K.), but he did not
copy his supervisor. Id. at 46. Less than 2 hours later, his supervisor emailed
him stating the following:
                                                                                3

      Did someone ask you to go to the bridge site? If so, why didn’t you
      tell me and [the Director] per my instructions provided earlier?
      I am not sure what your involvement with this effort has been so far.
      Please call me to discuss this on Monday. In the meantime, I don’t
      want you to have any involvement with this effort without my
      approval.
Id. at 36. The appellant responded that L.K. had asked him to go to the site and
that he had been providing technical assistance. Id. at 38.
      On Sunday, April 2, 2017, the GDOT state bridge engineer forwarded the
appellant’s email regarding the in-fill method to the GDOT chief engineer, who
responded to the appellant’s email thanking him for his suggestions and
informing him that GDOT had determined that the best approach was to begin
construction of permanent replacement bridges. IAF, Tab 8 at 46. The appellant
emailed her to thank her for her consideration. Id. at 45. Shortly thereafter, he
sent her another email with a hand-written note attached apparently showing his
estimate for completing the bridge repair using the in-fill method. Id. at 44-45;
IAF, Tab 6 at 49. In the email, he stated the following:
      I don’t mean to lean on you, but I’ll leave you w/ this “from the hip”
      estimate. Of course there are other considerations to think of.
      I’ll stay out of your way. If you need anything more, you have my
      contact information.
IAF, Tab 8 at 44. The FHWA Georgia Division Administrator then emailed the
GDOT chief engineer to inform her that FHWA was in “full agreement with
GDOT’s approach to reopening I-85.”        Id. at 50.   That evening, the Georgia
Division Administrator called and emailed the appellant’s supervisor regarding
the appellant’s interference with their efforts to restore I-85 and asking him to
“direct [the appellant] to cease all communication with GDOT and members of
[his] staff.” Id. at 8, 41. The appellant’s supervisor then emailed the appellant
instructing him to “cease and desist your involvement with the i85 [sic] effort.
The Division don’t [sic] want your involvement with this project.” Id. at 42.
                                                                                     4

      On May 30, 2017, the appellant’s supervisor proposed to remove him on
the basis of one charge of failure to follow instructions. IAF, Tab 7 at 6-12. The
agency set forth the following three specifications in support of the charge:
      Specification 1: On March 31, 2017, you went to the I-85 bridge site
      and involved yourself in the bridge event. Your conduct was in
      direct opposition to the March 31 email instruction in that you did
      not remain on standby and did not let me know that you were
      contacted for help by [L.K.], Structural Engineer, Georgia Division.
      [L.K.] is not in your supervisory succession and was not able to
      override my instruction to you.
      Specification 2: On April 1, you continued to involve yourself in the
      bridge event without telling me first, as instructed, that you had been
      contacted for help, or getting my approval before becoming involved.
      Your conduct was in direct opposition to the March 31 and April 1
      email instructions.
      Specification 3: On April 2, you continued to involve yourself in the
      bridge situation using email communication. This involvement was
      in direct opposition to the March 31 and April 1 email instructions.
      After being alerted to your continued involvement, I was prompted to
      issue a third instruction for you to cease and desist.
Id. at 7. The appellant provided an oral and written response to the proposed
removal. IAF, Tab 5 at 33-87, Tab 6 at 4-259. In an August 7, 2017 decision, the
deciding official found that each specification was supported by preponderant
evidence and that removal was an appropriate penalty.         IAF, Tab 5 at 23-32.
Thus, she removed the appellant, effective immediately. Id. at 23.
      The appellant appealed his removal to the Board arguing that the charge
was not substantiated because L.K. asked him to go to the bridge collapse site,
“his response was an essential function of his official duties,” he made a good
faith effort to keep his supervisor apprised of his involvement, and no one asked
him to leave the bridge collapse site. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. He also argued that his
removal did not promote the efficiency of the service and that the penalty of
removal was unreasonable. Id. He further argued that his “professional advice
and   counsel   regarding   the   response   to   the   catastrophe”   constituted   a
whistleblowing disclosure because he reported a gross waste of funds and a
                                                                                         5

substantial and specific danger to public health and safety and that the agency
removed him in reprisal for this disclosure. Id.
        In an order and summary of the prehearing conference, the administrative
judge    indicated    that   he   struck   the   appellant’s   affirmative   defense    of
whistleblower reprisal because his alleged disclosure—namely, his suggestion to
GDOT and agency officials that the in-fill method would be faster and more
economical than their approach—was a policy recommendation rather than a
protected disclosure. IAF, Tab 17 at 3-4. He further found that any funds or
mismanagement would be on the part of the Georgia state government, rather than
the Federal Government. Id. at 4. The appellant objected to this ruling during
the prehearing conference and subsequently submitted a written objection.              Id.;
IAF, Tab 18 at 4-6.
        After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
issued an initial decision affirming the removal action.           IAF, Tab 21, Initial
Decision (ID).       The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial
decision, the agency has responded, and the appellant has replied. Petition for
Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.

                                       ANALYSIS
The administrative judge properly sustained the charge.
        As noted above, the agency charged the appellant with failure to follow
instructions supported by three specifications concerning his conduct in the
aftermath of the I-85 bridge collapse. IAF, Tab 7 at 6-12. To prove a charge of
failure to follow instructions, an agency must establish that the employee was
given proper instructions and that he failed to follow the instructions, without
regard to whether the failure was intentional or unintentional.          Powell v. U.S.
Postal Service, 122 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 5 (2014).           Here, the administrative judge
found that the agency proved specification 1, which concerned the appellant’s
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conduct on March 31, 2017, and specification 3, which concerned his conduct on
April 2, 2017, but did not prove specification 2. 2 ID at 7-10.
      Regarding specification 1, the administrative judge credited L.K.’s hearing
testimony that he did not ask the appellant to go to the site of the bridge collapse
on March 31, 2017.        ID at 5-6 (citing Hillen v. Department of the Army,
35 M.S.P.R. 453, 459-60 (1987)). Thus, the administrative judge found that the
appellant violated his supervisor’s instruction to “standby” when he went to the
bridge site that day on his own initiative. ID at 6-7. The administrative judge
further found that, even if L.K. did ask the appellant to come to the bridge site,
the appellant still disobeyed his supervisor’s instruction because he failed to
inform him that anyone contacted him for assistance. ID at 7. On review, the
appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in crediting L.K.’s testimony
that he did not ask him to go to the bridge site and, in any event, no one told him
not to go to the bridge site, he had a legitimate basis for going, and, if the
Georgia Division Administrator had truly been upset by his presence at the bridge
site, he should have asked him to leave. 3        PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-13.        These
arguments are unavailing.       First, the appellant’s mere disagreement with the
administrative judge’s credibility determination is insufficient to overturn it. See
2
  In declining to sustain specification 2, the administrative judge found that there was
no evidence that the appellant engaged in actionable misconduct on April 1, 2017. ID
at 10. Neither party challenges this finding on review, and we therefore do not disturb
it.
3
  In support of his contention that L.K. asked him to go to the bridge site on the
morning of March 31, 2017, the appellant submitted for the first time on review his
cellular phone statement showing, in relevant part, that he received a call at 8:10 a.m.
that morning. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-98. The Board generally will not consider
evidence submitted for the first time on review unless the appellant shows the
following: (1) the documents and the information contained in the documents were
unavailable before the record closed despite due diligence; and (2) the evidence is of
sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision.
Cleaton v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1126
(Fed. Cir. 2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The appellant’s March/April cellular phone
statement is not a new document because it was available before the close of the record
below and it is not material because the fact of the call is not disputed. Thus, we do not
consider it.
                                                                                          7

Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining
that t he Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations
when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of
witnesses testifying at a hearing and may overturn such determinations only when
it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).                    In addition, as the
administrative judge correctly found, if L.K. did ask the appellant for help, he
failed to follow his supervisor’s instruction to let him know if anyone reached out
to him for assistance.         ID at 6-7.    Finally, the appellant’s belief that it was
appropriate for him to go to the bridge site on March 31, 2017, does not establish
that his supervisor’s instruction was not proper or that he followed it.
Accordingly,       we   find    that   the   administrative   judge    properly   sustained
specification 1.
      Regarding specification 3, the administrative judge found that the appellant
failed to follow his supervisor’s April 1, 2017 instruction to not have any further
involvement with the bridge repair effort without prior approval when, on April 2,
2017, he emailed GDOT’s chief engineer. ID at 7-10; IAF, Tab 6 at 49, Tab 8
at 36, 44-45. The appellant argues that his response did not constitute “further
involvement” in the incident because he only transmitted a “previously compiled
cost estimate . . . [which] was a follow-up to his prior assessment,” he expressly
stated therein that his participation had ended, and his email constituted a
whistleblower disclosure. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. These arguments, even if true,
do not establish that the administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant
failed to follow his supervisor’s April 1, 2017 instruction not to have “any
involvement with this effort without my approval” when, on April 2, 2017, he
emailed the GDOT chief engineer with his estimate for completing the bridge
repair and stated, “I don’t mean to lean on you, but I’ll leave you w/ this ‘from
the hip’ estimate.” IAF, Tab 6 at 49, Tab 8 at 39, 44-45. Thus, we find that the
administrative judge properly sustained specification 3.
                                                                                        8

      In light of the foregoing, we find that the administrative judge correctly
found that the agency proved the charge.             ID at 7-10; see Burroughs v.
Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that, when
more than one factual specification supports a single charge, proof of one or
more, but not all, of the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the
charge).

We remand the appellant’s affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal for
notice and further adjudication.
      Generally, in an adverse action appeal, an appellant’s claim of
whistleblower reprisal is treated as an affirmative defense.                 Campbell v.
Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 11 (2016). In such appeals, once
the agency proves its adverse action case by a preponderance of the evidence, the
appellant must show by preponderant evidence that he engaged in whistleblowing
activity by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and that
the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action. 4 Id.;
5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C).
      As   noted    above,   the    administrative   judge   struck    the    appellant’s
whistleblower reprisal affirmative defense at the prehearing conference on the
ground that he failed to nonfrivolously allege that he made a protected disclosure
within the meaning of the Whistleblower Protection Act. IAF, Tab 17 at 3-4.
The appellant objected to this ruling during the prehearing conference and
subsequently    submitted    a     written   objection   arguing      again    that   his
recommendations to GDOT and FHWA personnel that the in-fill method would
save time and money on bridge repair constituted a protected disclosure. Id. at 4;
IAF, Tab 18 at 4-6. He also argued in his written objection that his managers
perceived him to be a whistleblower because “they feared he would disclose to
outside parties at the incident site the Agency’s negligence in permitting the
4
 Preponderant evidence is defined as the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                  9

storage of combustible materials as well as the existence of a skateboard under an
Interstate Highway.” IAF, Tab 18 at 6.
      In the initial decision, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s
objection to his decision to strike the whistleblower affirmative defense but found
no merit to his contention that he made a protected disclosure. ID at 12-13. He
acknowledged the “perceived whistleblower” theory raised in the appellant’s
written objection to the prehearing order and summary but declined to consider it
because the appellant did not raise it in his prehearing submission or during the
prehearing conference and failed to show good cause as to why the additional
claim should be allowed. ID at 14 n.5. On review, the appellant argues that the
administrative judge erred in striking his whistleblower reprisal affirmative
defense prior to the hearing without providing him notice of his burden of proof
to establish this affirmative defense and by refusing to consider his perceived
whistleblower claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-20. We agree.
      The Board has consistently required administrative judges to apprise
appellants of the applicable burdens of proving a particular affirmative defense,
as well as the kind of evidence required to meet those burdens. Erkins v. U.S.
Postal Service, 108 M.S.P.R. 367, ¶ 8 (2008). When an administrative judge fails
to inform the parties of their burdens and methods of proof, the Board typically
remands the appeal so the administrative judge can afford such notice and an
opportunity to submit evidence and argument under the proper standard.          Id.
Here, the administrative judge failed to provide the appellant notice regarding his
whistleblower reprisal affirmative defense.        Accordingly, we vacate the
administrative judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal
affirmative defense and remand this appeal for further adjudication.
      On remand, the administrative judge shall inform the appellant of his
burden of proof regarding his whistleblower reprisal affirmative defense,
including his perceived whistleblower claim, and afford the parties an opportunity
to submit evidence and argument on these issues. If desired by the parties, the
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administrative judge shall hold a supplemental hearing. 5 See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)
(1).   The administrative judge then must issue a new initial decision that
addresses the appellant’s affirmative defense and its effect on the outcome of the
appeal, if any.
       An adverse action is sustainable only if the appellant cannot establish his
affirmative defenses. Hall v. Department of Transportation, 119 M.S.P.R. 180,
¶ 8 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service ,
2022 MSPB 21. Here, it would be premature for the Board to consider whether
there is a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the
service and whether the agency-imposed penalty is reasonable given that
additional adjudication of the appellant’s affirmative defense is required.            Id.
Thus, we vacate the administrative judge’s findings regarding nexus and penalty.
However, if the appellant does not prevail on his affirmative defense on remand,
the administrative judge may incorporate into the new initial decision his original
findings with respect to the issues of nexus and the reasonableness of the penalty
of removal. Id.

5
   Below, the administrative judge struck the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal
affirmative defense after the period for completing discovery had ended. IAF, Tabs 2,
17. It is within the administrative judge’s discretion whether or not to allow the parties
to conduct additional discovery on remand.
                                                                          11

                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the regional
office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                           ______________________________
                                         Jennifer Everling
                                         Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.