Court Opinion

ID: 9488218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:39:14.129521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:45.487723
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I concur in the conclusion reached by the majority, I write separately to explain that there is another important principle at stake in this case — the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The majority opinion emphasizes that it is an historical rule that a judge may not impeach his or her judicial determinations. Nevertheless, this rule of judicial finality must not be construed as always precluding relief from a claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the instant case, Judge Del Rio’s statement, when considered in its full context, does not evidence a clear equal protection violation warranting habeas corpus relief. Still, I believe that there could well be a case where a judge testified post-decision and it was so clear that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated that justice would demand acknowledging the judge’s testimony and reversing the judge’s discriminatory action.
Respondent LeCureux argued that cases addressing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)1 were irrelevant to the instant case because the rule applies only to jurors. I find, however, that cases addressing Rule 606(b) illuminate the care with which the clash of principles at issue in the instant case must be examined. For instance, in Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir.1987) the Seventh Circuit held that a juror’s post-verdict testimony of an alleged racial slur made by another juror during deliberations could not be used to impeach the jury verdict, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). *222In so ruling, however, the court noted the following:
The rule of juror incompetency cannot be applied in such an unfair manner as to deny due process. Thus, further review may be necessary in the occasional case in order to discover the extremely rare abuse that could exist even after the court has applied the rule and determined the evidence incompetent. In short, although our scope of review is narrow at this stage, we must consider whether prejudice pervaded the jury room, whether there is a substantial probability that the alléged racial slur made a difference in the outcome of the trial.
Id. Similarly, the following statement discussing the courts’ application of Rule 606(b) to allegations of juror bias is instructive:
Evidentiary rules that insulate from discovery the violation of constitutional rights may themselves violate those rights.
.... As a consequence of this collision of constitutional principles, blanket rules either excluding all juror testimony of bias or admitting all such testimony are inappropriate. A balance must be struck, protecting parties from the most egregious cases of jury bias while leaving the jury free to decide most cases without fear of judicial intrusion. While lines may be difficult to draw in many cases, it should be clear that among the most serious cases of jury bias are those involving racial prejudice. Eradication of the evil of state supported racial prejudice is at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. This suggests that the constitutional interests of the affected party are at their strongest when the jury allegedly employs such bias. The operation of racial prejudice undermines the jury’s ability to perform the role of preventing governmental oppression and, in fact, converts the jury itself into an instrument of that oppression. This also suggests that the policy interests behind the enforcement of Rule 606(b) are at their weakest in such a case.
27 Charles A. Wright and Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6074 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see also Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F.Supp. 1566, 1571-74 (N.D.Ga.1989), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir.1991), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993).
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit’s statement in United States v. Crouch, I do not believe that “[t]he trial judge’s statement of his mental process is so impervious to attack that even if he were to come forward today and declare that his memorandum misstated his reasons for the mistrial, we could not consider his explanation.” 566 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir.1978). Instead, in cases where a strong rule and a constitutional principle stand at odds, this court must not blindly enforce the rule, but must examine the competing interests at issue and seek to find the appropriate balance between them. We fail to properly use the scales of justice if we do otherwise.

. Rule 606(b) states the following:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
Fed.R.Evid. 606(b).