Court Opinion

ID: 9654476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:22:34.102756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:09.726990
License: Public Domain

*725Kelly, J.
(dissenting). Today, without acknowledging the test adopted by this Court in Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources,1 and more importantly, without recognizing the independence of the state and its citizens and their ability to enact a constitution that gives them greater protection than the federal constitution, the Court abdicates its constitutional responsibility to undertake an independent analysis of its own state’s constitution. The majority holds for the first time that United States Supreme Court precedent construing the Fourth Amendment is binding on this Court’s interpretation of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
Part m of the majority’s opinion states that our Equal Protection Clause provides no greater protection than its federal counterpart. Ante at 714. Under that reasoning, United States Supreme Court precedent holding that a statute does not violate federal equal protection means that the statute is constitutional under the equal protection provision in our state constitution, as well. Id.
In part IV of the opinion, the majority extends this analysis to Const 1963, art 1, § 11, and the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution:
As noted in the preceding section, the Supreme Court’s disposition of [Wright v Indianapolis2] in this manner is a decision on the merits that is stare decisis with regard to the issues presented, including, of course, the question of pervasive regulation. Thus, we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has determined that the massage parlor industry is a pervasively regulated business and that inspections of massage parlors conducted without warrants *726pursuant to a comprehensive licensing and regulation ordinance are permissible under the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. [Ante at 717 (citations omitted).]
The United States Supreme Court dismissed Wright v Indianapolis for lack of a substantial federal question. It is error for this Court to hold that the dismissal in Wright prevents us from undertaking an independent analysis of the issues presented here under our own constitution. A finding that the massage parlor industry is pervasively regulated in Indiana does not dictate that regulation is pervasive in Michigan, or in any other state. It does not follow from the mere finding that an industry is pervasively regulated that warrantless searches of commercial premises used in that industry are constitutional under Michigan law. Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Wright does not mean that § 7-265 of the Femdale ordinance is permissible under art 1, § 11 of the state constitution.
The citizens of this state are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by Const 1963, art 1, § 11, which provides:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
This Court adopted the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement of art 1, § 11 in Tallman. There, we fashioned a seven-part test to determine whether a provision for searches *727without warrants satisfies the requirements of the Michigan Constitution.3
In Toallman, this Court made clear that, when examining a statute alleged to fit under the exception for searches without warrants, it will undertake an independent analysis. At issue there was a fish and game statute that provided for warrantless searches of commercial fishing vessels.4
In adopting the exception and applying it under the state constitution, the Tallman Court did not simply follow federal precedent. It undertook its own analysis, engaging in an extensive analysis of federal regulation of fishing and fisheries. The fact that several federal circuits had held that fishing was a pervasively regulated industry did not end the Court’s inquiry. 421 Mich 608-613.
*728Nor did the Tallman Court end its inquiry after turning to the regulations in several of our sister states and examining decisions holding administrative searches permissible under their constitutions. Id. at 613-616. Neither the federal precedent nor the decisions of our sister states commanded an identical result under our constitution.5 Instead, the Court went on to examine both the history and scope of commercial fishing regulations within this state. At length, it decided that commercial fishing is a pervasively regulated industry in Michigan. Id. at 619-626.
In addition, merely finding the industry to be pervasively regulated did not end the Court’s constitutional inquiry. In Tallman, the Court adopted a seven-factor test, only one of whose factors dealt with pervasive regulation. See note 3. The Court expressly noted that its test was different from the federal test.6 But only after examining all seven factors did it conclude that the statute was constitutional under art 1, § 11. Id. at 618-630. In the years since, our state courts have used these seven factors to determine whether statutes and ordinances providing for searches without warrants satisfy the minimum requirements of the Michigan Constitution.7
In Sitz v Dep’t of State Police,8 this Court held that the protection of art 1, § 11 is not limited to that provided by the federal constitution. The Court recog*729nized that the expansion of art 1, § 11 should occur only when there are compelling reasons for it. However, we noted that
“compelling reason” should not be understood as establishing a conclusive presumption artificially linking state constitutional interpretation to federal law. As illustrated by the question presented today, a literal application of the term would force us to ignore the jurisprudential history of this Court in favor of the analysis of the United States Supreme Court announced in Sitz.[9] Properly understood, the Nash[10] [compelling reason] rule compels neither the acceptance of federal interpretation nor its rejection. In each instance, what is required of this Court is a searching examination to discover what law “the people have made.” [Id. at 758-759.]
A “searching examination” of art 1, § 11 is conspicuously absent from the majority opinion. Instead, it merely holds that federal precedent compels its conclusion, an approach Sitz v Dep’t of State Police explicitly rejected. It is not obvious to me that compelling reasons exist to expand the section’s coverage in this area. However, I am certain that the Court errs when it fails to undertake an independent analysis of the state’s own constitutional provisions.
I would vacate the Court of Appeals opinion on this issue and remand to the trial court for application of the seven-factor test adopted in Tallman.

 421 Mich 585; 365 NW2d 724 (1984).

 439 US 804; 99 S Ct 60; 58 L Ed 2d 97 (1978).

 Id. at 617-618. The Court explained:
We conclude that conflicts arising under art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution between the enforcement needs of governmental agencies and the privacy interests of regulated commercial actors should be resolved by balancing the following factors:
(1) the existence of express statutory authorization for search or seizure;
(2) the importance of the governmental interest at stake;
(3) the pervasiveness and longevity of industry regulation;
(4) the inclusion of reasonable limitations on searches in statutes and regulations;
(5) the government’s need for flexibility in the time, scope, and frequency of inspections in order to achieve reasonable levels of compliance;
(6) the degree of intrusion occasioned by a particular regulatory search; and
(7) the degree to which a business person may be said to have impliedly consented to warrantless searches as a condition of doing business, so that the search does not infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy.

 MCL 308.1b(2)(e); MSA 13.1491(2)(2)(e).

 “[F]ederal and state cases provide guidance and persuasive authority for our adoption of the ‘pervasively regulated industry’ doctrine as the law of this state.” Id. at 616-617.

 421 Mich 618. “These seven factors differ only slightly from the five factors applied in the federal courts.” Id.

 See, for example, People v Pashigian, 150 Mich App 97; 388 NW2d 259 (1986), and People v Barnes, 146 Mich App 37; 379 NW2d 464 (1985).

 443 Mich 744; 506 NW2d 209 (1993).

9 Michigan Dep’t of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444; 110 S Ct 2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990).

10 People v Nash, 418 Mich 196; 341 NW2d 439 (1983).