Court Opinion

ID: 9699531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:31:09.112585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:52.212159
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones:
This, appeal presents a question of first impression in this Court.
The factual background of this appeal is most important. Frazier was indicted on two bills of indictment: first, a bill which'charged him with the murder of his wife and second, a two-count bill which charged him with (a) voluntary manslaughter in the felonious killing of his, wife and (b) involuntary manslaughter in the unlawful killing of his wife.
In July 1962, Frazier was tried upon the bill of indictment which charged him with murder: after trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Frazier “guilty of voluntary manslaughter”.1 On appeal, from the judgment of sentence on that charge, this Court (411 Pa. *215195, 191 A. 2d 369) reversed because of errors in the; trial court’s instructions to the jury.
■In June 1965, Frazier was tried on the bill’ of. indictment which charged him with voluntary manslaugiL ter and involuntary manslaughter.2 At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Frazier’s counsel demurred to the evidence and the court below, sustained the demurrer. This appeal followed.
A review of the record indicates clearly that the;, evidence of the Commonwealth would support a charge? of murder but not a charge of voluntary manslaughter. What the Commonwealth now urges, in effect, . is that;?, even though Frazier has once been tried and acquitted of the charge of murder and, therefore, cannot, be tried, for murder again, yet the evidence of the Commonwealth, clearly showing commission of the' greater crime of murder, will justify a finding of guilt of the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter even though the elements of the lesser crime are evidentially absent.
The reasoning of the Commonwealth is based on our decisional law which holds that, where there is an indictment charging murder and manslaughter, there may; be conviction of the latter offense even though the evidence establishes the former offense; Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 423; Hilands v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 372, 6 A. 267; Commonwealth v. Weinberg, 276 Pa. 255, 120 A. 406; Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 A. 166; Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 66 A. 2d 825; Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A. 2d 343.3 In Commonwealth v. Arcuroso, 283 Pa. 84, *216128 A. 668, the Court said: “It has long been settled law of this Commonwealth, following the common law rule, that, where an indictment charges an offense which includes within its description another offense of lower grade or degree, the jury may find the accused guilty of the less offense; this rule is universally applied in criminal cases, and, under an indictment charging murder, defendant may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter and a conviction for the latter crime will be sustained though it may clearly appear from the evidence that defendant was in fact guilty of a higher grade: [citing an authority]”, (at p. 87)
However, in the case at bar, the bill of indictment does not charge murder; on the contrary, the bill of indictment charges voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Under our law, in view of Frazier’s trial on and acquittal of the charge of murder, Frazier could not be charged with and tried for murder. If the Commonwealth’s position is correct, Frazier can be convicted of voluntary manslaughter not upon evidence which proves the elements necessary for a conviction of that crime but upon evidence which proves only the elements necessary for a conviction of murder, a crime for which he has been tried and acquitted. I cannot accept the concept that a person may be convicted of an unproven crime upon proof of another crime.
The majority opinion places great stress on the importance to society of sustaining a conviction under the instant circumstances. I yield to no one in my desire to protect society’s interests and I firmly believe that in recent years too much importance has been placed upon the due process due the criminally accused and too little importance has been given to the due process due society.
Nevertheless, I believe the result reached by a majority establishes a bad precedent and I dissent from the enunciation of a rule of law which would sustain *217the conviction of a person of a crime of which there is no proof.

 Such verdict was consonant with our law: Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 573, 97 A. 2d 343.

 Frazier could no longer be tried for murder since Ms conviction of voluntary manslaughter operated as an acquittal of murder: Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 17, 70 A. 275; Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 157, 200 A. 632; Green v. U. S., 355 U.S. 184, 192, 78 S. Ct. 221, 226.

 The factual postures in those cases differ from that in the instant appeal.