Court Opinion

ID: 9706422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:43:16.016328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:22.596030
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The erudite explication of the majority’s conclusion that the ESP machine used in this case was an electric device within the meaning of section 3368(c) of the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(c), does not address the underlying issue in this appeal. We are not here faced with a challenge to the accuracy of this device nor is it questioned that this is an approved timing device under section 3368(d), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(d). The issue here, in my judgment, is whether there is justification to impose a prophylactic rule, by implication, under section 3368(c).
In this appeal the evidence established that the posted speed limit was 25 miles per hour and that appellant was *193driving at the rate of 36 miles per hour. The accuracy of the ESP reading is not being challenged. Accepting that the municipal authorities were using a device that the State Police were allowed to use, are we thereby mandated to ignore this clear violation of the speed laws? There is no express per se requirement under the provisions of this section, and I for one do not believe we are justified in inferring it.1
Implicit in the logic of the majority is that the legislature views the operation of its laws regulating the speed of vehicular traffic as a contest between law enforcement officials and the motorist. There is an implicit assumption that there is a required element of fairness to balance the rivalry.2 I realize that the most law abiding and conscientious motorist may on occasion be guilty of a violation. This does not erase the fact that it is a violation. These laws are designed to protect the safety of the public, including the driver. This slight incursion could have been the direct cause for the loss of the life of a small child *194chasing a ball, who had the misfortune to proceed in the path of appellant’s vehicle.
I therefore dissent.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The imposition of a prophylactic sanction which requires the discarding of incriminating evidence is only justified where there is widespread abuse by police officials that offend a fundamental right of the citizen. Commonwealth v. Floyd, 494 Pa. 537, 541, 431 A.2d 984, 986-87 (1981); Commonwealth v. Kulp, 476 Pa. 358, 362-63, 382 A.2d 1209, 1211-12 (1978); Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 372, 312 A.2d 597, 599-600 (1973); see generally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Assuming that there is widespread abuse, which has not been demonstrated on this record, there certainly is no fundamental right intruded upon in the detection of a speeding car upon a public highway.

. The majority gleans this intention from statements of some of the legislators during the debates. We have repeatedly stated that such statements should not be relied upon to aid in the ascertaining of legislative intent. Martin v. Soblotney, 502 Pa. 418, 424 n. 5, 466 A.2d 1022, 1025 n. 5 (1983); Bowers v. Pennsylvania State Relations Board, 402 Pa. 542, 557, 167 A.2d 480, 487 (1961); Martin Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 283, 74 A.2d 120, 122 (1950); National Transit Company v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 454, 197 A. 239, 241 (1938); Tarlo’s Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 325, 172 A. 139, 140 (1934). Although some of the legislators may have shared this position, the General Assembly did not express that view by expressly requiring the imposition of a prophylactic rule for a violation of section 3368(c). 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(c).