Court Opinion

ID: 9940663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 21:04:16.152319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:19.536211
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/24 P. v. Hernandez CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B327241

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. PA096975)
         v.

FRANKLIN ANTONIO AMAYA
HERNANDEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Franklin Antonio Amaya
Hernandez (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after
he was convicted of reckless driving causing injury. Challenging
only the sentence imposed, defendant contends that Penal Code
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) mandated the dismissal of one
of two enhancements added to his sentence.1 Finding no merit to
defendant’s arguments, we affirm the judgment.

                         BACKGROUND
      Defendant was charged with reckless driving causing
injury in violation of Vehicle Code section 23103, subdivision (a)
(count 1) and driving on the wrong side of a divided highway
causing injury or death in violation of Vehicle Code section
21651, subdivision (a) (count 4). The information alleged that
defendant proximately caused Susan D. to fracture a bone, within
the meaning of Vehicle Code section 23105, subdivision (a), and
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon K.D. and A.D. within
the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a).2 The
following aggravating factors, listed in California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1) were alleged: the offenses involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness;
and, as permitted by rule 4.421(c), that defendant was speeding
on a public street, endangering the lives of others.
      Defendant was found guilty as charged and the
enhancements were found true as to count 1. In a bifurcated trial

1     All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2     As K.D. and A.D. are minors, we do not use their surname
or the shared surname of relatives mentioned here.

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of the aggravating factors the jury found both true. On
January 4, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant on count 1
to seven years four months in prison, comprised of the low term
of 16 months plus two 3-year great bodily injury enhancements.
The sentence in count 4 was stayed pursuant to section 654.
       Defendant filed a premature, but deemed timely, notice of
appeal from the judgment.
Prosecution evidence
       On June 21, 2021, between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.,
Susan D. drove her white Toyota Highlander home from the
market with her seven-year-old son K.D., her 10-year-old
daughter A.D., her husband’s cousin Rolman D. and a friend also
in the car. Rolman testified that after he heard Susan scream,
“Look at that car,” he saw a car travelling at a high rate of speed
recklessly overtaking slower cars by using the middle turn lane.
As the driver tried to move the car back to the right side of the
road, it began to zigzag and the driver appeared to lose control.
The car crossed to the wrong side of the street toward the front of
Susan’s car, where they collided, despite Susan’s efforts to avoid
contact. Rolman heard two collisions, one in the front and
another on their right side. The impact was very hard and
sounded like a loud explosion.
       Susan testified the speed limit was 35 or 40 miles per hour.
She estimated defendant’s speed while he was passing other cars
to be around 60 or 70 miles per hour. It appeared to her that
defendant was racing other cars. Susan had tried to move to the
right, but defendant’s car hit her car and caused her car to crash
into other cars.
       Two eyewitnesses testified to having seen two cars racing
before the collision. Danny Dominguez saw them in his rearview
mirror travelling about 70 miles per hour, when one of the cars

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lost control, drove on the wrong side of the road, and collided with
an oncoming vehicle. The other racing vehicle was not involved
in the crash and drove off. Sariah Castanon was sitting with her
children and boyfriend near a food truck when she saw the two
racing cars weaving in and out of traffic trying to pass each other
at a high rate of speed. She saw one car drive on the wrong side
of the street and collide with another car close to the food truck.
       Following the crash, Susan saw the driver of the car that
hit her car and identified him both on the scene and in court as
defendant. Susan and her passengers were taken to the hospital.
Susan sustained five fractures in the toes of her left foot, a
fracture to her right ankle bone, an injury to the top part of her
leg, a concussion, a contusion to the right side of her breast, and a
fracture to the left side of her face. She was confined to a bed
with her legs raised for three months. K.D. suffered an injury to
the vertebrae in his lower back, was confined to his bed for six
weeks and had to relearn to walk using a walker. He also lost a
small part of his tongue. A.D. suffered fractures to both of her
femurs, which required two surgeries as well as physical therapy
for a year. Rolman suffered two broken teeth and bruises on his
arm, hip, back and lower back.
Defense evidence
       Defendant testified that he was driving his Honda Civic
when it crashed into the Highlander but claimed his car
experienced mechanical problems, which caused it to go out of
control and veer to the left into the path of oncoming traffic. He
claimed to have swerved the Civic toward the sidewalk to avoid a
collision and found he was unable to steer the car, which did not
stop when he applied the brakes, but zigzagged and collided with
the Highlander. Defendant had owned the car for a year but

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denied he had prior knowledge of any mechanical problems. He
also denied ever participating in street races.

                           DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)
prohibits the imposition of more than one enhancement in a
single case. He concludes that one of the great bodily injury
enhancements should therefore be dismissed, based upon the
Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in subdivision (c)(2)(B) of
section 1385, which reads in part that “all enhancements beyond
a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” Defendant cites the
general rule of statutory construction the word “shall” is
mandatory, relying on People v. Heisler (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d
504, 507. However, defendant does not refer to the observation in
that case that “the word ‘shall’ has sometimes been judicially
construed as directory or permissive.” (Id. at p. 506.)
       “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 136, 142.) “‘Because the statutory language is generally
the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the
words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary
meaning.’” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105.)
“Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory
duty is a question of interpretation for the courts.” (People v.
Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 225.) “‘[T]here is no simple,
mechanical test for determining whether a provision should be
given “directory” or “mandatory” effect.’” (People v. Allen (2007)
42 Cal.4th 91, 101-102.)

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        In People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396-399
(Walker), review granted March 22, 2023, S278309,3 our court
observed that “on its face and considered in isolation, the phrase
‘all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed’ seems to fairly unambiguously dictate that, if there is
more than one enhancement, all but one ‘shall’ be dismissed.”
(Id. at p. 396, italics added.) However, “we are not permitted to
pluck this phrase out of its placement in the statute and consider
it in isolation; instead, we are required to consider where it fits
into the ‘“‘context of the statute as a whole.’”’” (Ibid., quoting
People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 358.)
        Section 1385 governs the trial court’s authority to strike or
dismiss enhancements. Subdivision (c)(1) provides that the court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute. Subdivision (c)(2) allows, “[i]n exercising
its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the

3     The California Supreme Court granted review and limited
the issue to be briefed to the following issue: “Does the
amendment to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c) that
requires trial courts to ‘afford great weight’ to enumerated
mitigating circumstances (Stats. 2021, ch. 721) create a
rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement
unless the trial court finds dismissal would endanger public
safety?” (Walker, S278309, Supreme Ct. Mins., Mar. 22, 2023,
p. 338.)

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enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.”
       Of the nine mitigating factors listed in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(A) through (I), defendant relies on (B):
“Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed.” The language relied on by defendant is only one of
nine mitigating circumstances the court must consider in
affording great weight to evidence offered by the defendant.
       In Walker we concluded that section 1385’s use of the
phrase “great weight” in addition to the “‘shall/unless’
dichotomy . . . erects a [rebuttable] presumption in favor of the
dismissal of the enhancement unless and until the court finds
that the dismissal would ‘endanger public safety’ as that term is
defined in section 1385.” (Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 391, 397, 399, review granted.) Furthermore, we held: “As
the plain text of section 1385 repeatedly emphasizes, its purpose
is to grant trial court discretion to dismiss enhancements.” (Id.
at p. 397.)
       Section 1385 grants discretion in subdivision (c)(1) to
dismiss enhancements “in furtherance of justice” and in
subdivision (c)(2) by listing mitigating circumstances for the court
to consider “[i]n exercising its discretion under this subdivision”
to prove that any of them, “unless the court finds that dismissal
of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” Following
the mitigating factors is subdivision (c)(3): “While the court may
exercise its discretion at sentencing, this subdivision does not
prevent a court from exercising its discretion before, during, or
after trial or entry of plea.” Subdivision (c)(4) provides that the
mitigating circumstances are not exclusive.

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       Taken together these provisions communicate a
requirement of balancing of factors, in other words, exercising
discretion. In Walker we reviewed the legislative history of
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which lead to
subdivision (c) of section 1385. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721 § 1; see
Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 397-398, review granted.)
“[T]he purpose of Senate Bill No. 81, as reflected in the
Legislative Digest, is to encourage exercise of that discretion by
making dismissal mandatory if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, and to specify the mitigating circumstances that are to
be given great weight in that exercise of discretionary balancing.
Nothing in Senate Bill No. 81 indicates an intent to deprive trial
courts of their discretion altogether—either generally or more
specifically in the subset of cases where multiple enhancements
are alleged.” (Walker, at pp. 397-398.)
       Defendant asserts that Walker was incorrectly decided,
while acknowledging that other courts have also rejected the
argument that the word “shall” in section 1385, subdivision (c)
precludes any exercise of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295-296 (Mendoza); People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238-240, review granted
April 19, 2023, S278786 (Anderson); People v. Ortiz (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1087, 1096-1098, review granted April 12, 2023,
S278894 (Ortiz);4 People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 18-

4     The California Supreme Court deferred further action in
Anderson and Ortiz pending consideration and disposition of the
appeal in Walker, S278309. Both the Anderson and Ortiz courts
disagreed with Walker that “shall” created a rebuttable
presumption. (See Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 240,
review granted; Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096-1098,
review granted.)

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21; see also People v. Hiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 335, 351.)
Defendant contends that these cases were wrongly decided as
well.
       Defendant argues that a rule of statutory construction
requires every word in a statute be given a meaning, and
construing the word “shall” as discretionary would cause it to be
“written out” of the statute in violation of that rule. Defendant
has neglected to cite authority for his argument, and we disagree
that the cited cases were wrongly decided. Other rules of
statutory construction require, “in reviewing the text of a statute,
we must follow the fundamental rule of statutory construction
that requires every part of a statute be presumed to have some
effect and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely
necessary. ‘Significance should be given, if possible, to every
word of an act. [Citation.] Conversely, a construction that
renders a word surplusage should be avoided.’” (People v. Arias
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 180.) This rule does not support
defendant’s argument, as our interpretation in the context of the
provisions of subdivision (c) of section 1385 does not “write out”
the word “shall” or render it surplusage. Rather, it is qualified by
the term, “unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (See Walker, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 391, 397, review granted.) Disregarding
that qualification would render it surplusage, as it “would require
a court to dismiss any enhancement when application of the
enhancement could result in a sentence greater than 20 years
regardless of whether dismissal would endanger public safety.”
(Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296.)
       Moreover, “[w]e also must avoid interpretations that lead to
absurd results.” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296,
citing People v. Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, 106.) Without the

                                 9
public safety qualification, the sentencing court could be required
to risk public safety, an absurd result that cannot be what the
Legislature intended. (Mendoza, supra, at p. 296.)
       Here the trial court expressly found that dismissal of an
enhancement would endanger public safety, as defined by section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) as a “likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” The court based its decision on defendant’s
failure to show any concern for anybody’s safety both before,
during, or after his racing; that defendant showed no remorse;
and that he lied during his testimony. By convicting him the jury
demonstrated their disbelief of defendant’s testimony, and the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that
his acts disclosed a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness. Defendant has not claimed the court abused its
discretion, nor has he pointed to any evidence in the record that
might contradict the court’s assessment of defendant’s
dangerousness or the jury’s findings. We conclude the trial court
did not err.

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                     ________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, J.
I concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

                                10
People v. Hernandez, B327241
ASHMANN-GERST, J., Concurring in the judgment.

       I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in
refusing to strike one of the enhancements added to defendant’s
sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1385.)5 I write separately to clarify the
basis for my opinion.
       Defendant argues that “[t]he sentence for one of the great
bodily injury enhancements should be dismissed because section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) forbids imposition of more than one
enhancement in a case.” Like my colleagues, I am not convinced.
       “Prior to January 1, 2022, section 1385 provided trial courts
with discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements in the
interest of justice. The statute did not provide direction as to how
courts should exercise that discretion. In October 2021 the
Legislature passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 81
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) . . . , which, effective January 1, 2022,
amended section 1385 to provide guidance regarding the exercise
of discretion in dismissing sentencing enhancements.
       “Section 1385, subdivision (c), now provides in part,
‘(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless

5     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.’” (People v. Anderson (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238–239, review granted Apr. 19, 2023,
S278786.) The mitigating circumstance relevant here provides,
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).)
       Defendant argues that the use of the word “shall” in the
statute required the trial court to dismiss all but one of the
sentencing enhancements. Consistent with our decision in People
v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, review granted Mar. 22,
2023, S278309 (Walker), I disagree. As we noted in Walker, “the
text and purpose of section 1385 in general, and Senate Bill No.
81 in particular, as well as the canons of statutory construction,
counsel in favor of concluding that the phrase ‘all enhancements
beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed’ in subdivision
(c)(2)(B) does not obligate trial courts to automatically dismiss all
but one enhancement whenever a jury finds multiple
enhancements to be true.” (Walker, supra, at p. 396; see also
People v. Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239; see also
People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295–298.)
       Defendant argues that Walker and its progeny were
wrongly decided. Unless and until the Supreme Court tells us
otherwise, I adhere to our opinion in Walker. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(e).)

                         __________________________, J.
                         ASHMANN-GERST

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