Court Opinion

ID: 9425419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:39.035613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:55.419380
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
The food stamp program was established in 1964 for the twin purposes of promoting the agricultural economy and alleviating hunger and malnutrition among the needy members of “the other America.” 7 U. S. C. § 2011. Under this program, currently needy households whose members comply with a work requirement, 7 U. S. C. §§ 2014 (b), (c), are entitled to purchase enough food stamps to provide those households with nutritionally *515adequate diets. In 1971, Congress became concerned with the possibility that nonneedy households were receiving food stamps, and its response was the enactment of Pub. L. 91-671. While the curbing of abuses in the administration of a government program is assuredly a legitimate purpose, that statute has given rise to constitutional questions in the present case and its companion, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, post, p. 528.
The challenged provision in the present case is § 5 (b) of the Pood Stamp Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (b), as amended, 84 Stat. 2049. That section renders ineligible for food stamps any household that includes a member over 18 years of age who has been claimed as a tax dependent by a taxpayer who is not himself eligible for the stamps. What little legislative history there is suggests that the sole reason for enactment of this section was to prevent the receipt of food stamps by the sons and daughters of more affluent families. 116 Cong. Rec. 41979, 41981, 41993, 42021; cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 483-484.
Rather than requiring an individualized determination that a particular household linked to a relatively more affluent household by a claimed tax dependency was not in fact needy, Congress chose instead to utilize a conclusive presumption. The simple fact that a household member has been claimed as a tax dependent by a non-indigent taxpayer results in the complete termination of benefits for that entire household in the relevant tax period and in the subsequent 12 months as well. 7 U. S. C. § 2014(b). It matters not whether that dependency claim was fraudulent, what the amount of support from the non-indigent taxpayer actually was,1 *516whether that support was still available at the time the welfare officials learned of it, or even whether the claimed dependent was still living in the household.
This Court recently declared unconstitutional, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Connecticut statute establishing a permanent, conclusive presumption of nonresidency for purposes of qualifying for reduced tuition rates at a state university. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441. As we said in that case:
“In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates.” Id., at 452.
See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645; Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535.
Similarly, I think, the conclusive presumption that led to the termination of the appellees’ benefits without *517any opportunity for them to prove present need denied them due process of law.2 Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court.

 Even if the amount of support received from the taxpayer leaves the household with income below the income eligibility standards, the statute under consideration would terminate benefits. A 5-person *516household, for example, might receive $120 in public assistance each month, plus $121 from a divorced non-indigent spouse. If that household had within it a child who was age 18 or older, and if the spouse claimed that child as a dependent, the household would be ineligible for food stamps. Yet in this hypothetical situation, the household's monthly income would be $241, whereas under the Department of Agriculture’s own income standards a household of five can earn up to $440 per month without being disqualified for food stamps. 37 Fed. Reg. 7724. The opinion of the Court points out how totally arbitrary the challenged statute is in operation.

 The Congress has alternative means available to it by which its purpose can be achieved. The Food Stamp Act, as amended, already provides that households must demonstrate present neediness to qualify, 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (b), and that its members must under certain circumstances accept available employment, id,., §2014 (c). There is no reason that enforcement of these provisions cannot be strengthened if the Congress believes that fraud is taking place. There are already criminal penalties in effect for fraudulent acquisition, use, or transfer of food stamps. Id., §§2023 (b), (c).