Court Opinion

ID: 9470448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:06:37.164572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:54.563403
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This Court has defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasoning mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.1981). This oft-cited language is not, however, a self-executing formula for adjudication; our decisions make clear that determination of the existence vel non of substantial evidence is not a mere quantitative exercise. A single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve a conflict created by, countervailing evidence. Cf. id. at 706 (ALJ must explain why certain evidence has been accepted and why other evidence has been rejected; there is a “particularly acute need” for explanation when record contains conflicting probative evidence). Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence, particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians), or if it is not really evidence but a mere conclusion. See id. (“ ‘Substantial evidence’ can only be considered as supporting evidence in relationship to all the other evidence in the record.”) (footnote omitted). The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of Social Security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.
I cannot agree that the Secretary’s decision in this case is based on substantial evidence. In my view, the Secretary has failed to acknowledge, much less come to grips with, serious inconsistencies in the *756record. The Secretary has ignored critical evidence. He has misinterpreted both the medical and vocational evidence. He has even misapplied the governing provisions of his “grid” regulations. Under these circumstances, I believe that the majority has erred in affirming the district court’s judgment in the Secretary’s favor. See Cotter v. Harris, supra, 642 F.2d at 704-06. I therefore dissent.
It is undisputed that appellant, whose employment history is as a mover, gravedigger, groundskeeper, trash collector, and janitor, suffers from a severe and chronic lower-back syndrome and from anxiety; it is also undisputed not only that he can never return to heavy work, but also that he can never perform anything more strenuous than sedentary work. Moreover, it is agreed that appellant is a functional illiterate who reads at a second-grade level and who tests as retarded.
At the core of this case is the question whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s conclusion that the appellant nevertheless retained a residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work — in particular, certain sedentary jobs existing in the national economy. The majority’s affirmative conclusion depends primarily on the testimony of the Secretary’s vocational expert, Philip Spergel, Ed.D., and two physicians, Robert J. Doman, M.D., a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, and Erwin R. Schmidt, Jr., M.D., an orthopedic surgeon. This reliance, however, is misplaced. In upholding the Secretary’s determination of non-disability under the grids, the majority relies upon Dr. Spergel’s conclusion that the appellant “retains transferable skills.” This conclusion, however, which is necessary to put appellant’s case within the grids, clashes with the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that “the claimant’s past work activities did not impart skills that are transferable to work other than that previously performed.” (Emphasis added.) Neither the majority nor the Secretary has explained this inconsistency; in fact, there does not appear to be any support in the record for Dr. Spergel’s conclusion that appellant possesses transferable skills. Dr. Spergel’s report therefore cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.1
The Secretary also focuses on Dr. Spergel’s assertion that appellant retains a residual functional capacity to perform twelve specific sedentary jobs existing in the national economy. These jobs include base brander, ampoule examiner, coil winder, marker, solderer-assembler, thermostat assembler, and electrical-accessories assembler. But this conclusion is at odds with the medical report of Samuel P. Ivins, M.D., the Secretary’s own neurologist and psychiatrist, who opined that appellant, because of his condition, should be totally restricted from activities that would bring him in contact with moving machinery. The above jobs appear to involve such activity. The Secretary has not addressed this apparent inconsistency in the evidence.2
Ability to perform sedentary work also depends on whether the employee is sufficiently free from physical pain to enable him to focus on his labors. There is evidence in the record that appellant suffers from constant and severe pain upon even the most modest exertion. That evidence, if credited, obviously would reflect upon appellant’s ability to perform the kinds of *757jobs listed by Dr. Spergel. The ALJ’s treatment of this contention is confined to one conclusory statement in his opinion:
The evidence of record does not show that the claimant’s impairments and symptoms, including those of pain, continued at a level of severity so as to preclude him from performing work activity beyond October 16, 1980.
This off-hand dismissal of subjective pain does not pass muster under the decisions of this Court. Smith v. Califano, 687 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.1981) (failure seriously to consider subjective evidence of pain can itself constitute grounds for reversal); see Cotter v. Harris, supra, 642 F.2d at 704 (“administrative decision should be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests”). Relevant, too, is our admonition in Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir.1979), that “[tjestimony of subjective pain and inability to perform even light work is entitled to great weight, particularly when ... it is supported by competent medical evidence.” It is so supported here, and there is no medical evidence advanced by the Secretary to the contrary.
The Secretary relies heavily on the reports of Dr. Doman and Dr. Schmidt. Dr. Schmidt, a member of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, is appellant’s treating physician. Dr. Doman’s report, dated December 10, 1980, concludes that appellant can perform sedentary (though not light) work.3 Although neither Dr. Schmidt’s report of October 16,1980, nor his “functional assessment” of January 21, 1981, is inconsistent with Dr. Doman’s conclusion, these reports must be considered in light of Dr. Schmidt’s subsequent report dated March 18,1981, less than two months later. That report, which was submitted to the Appeals Council, states that “Mr. James Olsen is continuing under medical care [and] is totally disabled for any work, even sedentary. He is being admitted to a rehabilitation center in the very near future for further care.” (Emphasis added.) The Appeals Council totally disregarded this last report, stating only that Dr. Schmidt’s assessment was “not supported by clinical findings.” This pronouncement, however, completely ignores the fact (of record) that Dr. Schmidt was appellant’s treating physician and that he had examined appellant a number of times. It also ignores the precept that a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to substantial weight. Cotter v. Harris, supra, 642 F.2d at 704; cf. Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir.1978) (expert opinions of treating physician as to existence of disability are binding on fact-finder unless contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary). The Secretary, therefore, without any basis in fact, has utterly disregarded critical evidence relating to appellant’s inability to work on account of his back condition.4
Finally, there are serious problems with the Secretary’s application of the grids. In Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 934 (3d Cir.1982) (emphasis added), this Court wrote:
[I]t must be kept in mind that the grids do not govern — and indeed were not intended to govern — all disability cases. For example, the regulations specifically dictate that “a conclusion of disabled or not disabled is not directed” if an individual’s vocational profile is not precisely contained in Appendix 2. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569 & Appendix 2, § 200.00(d); see Thomas v. Schweiker, 666 F.2d 999, 1004 (5th Cir.1982) (“use of the Guidelines is inappropriate where their evidentiary underpinnings do not coincide exactly *758with the evidence of disability appearing on the record” (emphasis added)).
The Santise Court explained further that, “[i]f a claimant’s characteristics do not fit neatly into one of the many categories defined by the tables, the ALJ is permitted to arrive at a conclusion as to disability independent of, but consonant with, the regulations.” Id. at 928 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
In the present case, appellant’s non-exertional impairment is undisputed. Even Dr. Spergel reported:
Mr. Olson [sic] is presently functioning within the borderline range of intelligence (Full Scale I.Q. 75). There is a marked discrepancy between his verbal (I.Q. 82) and performance (I.Q. 69) scores suggestive of a moderate depressive reaction. Intersubtest scatter and pattern analysis [sic] reflect marked personal adjustment difficulties characterized by considerable anxiety.
Nevertheless, the ALJ ignored appellant’s non-exertional impairment and concluded instead that he was “directed” by the regulations to find appellant not disabled. As we explicitly recognized in Santise, however, “the rules ‘may not be fully applicable’ where a claimant suffers from non-exertional, instead of or in addition to exertional, impairments.” 676 F.2d at 934-35 (quoting 20 C.F.R., part 404, Appendix 2, § 200.00(e)). Thus, the regulations only “direct” a finding of disabled or not disabled in those cases in which the claimant’s impairment is strictly exertional and his/her individual profile coincides exactly with the guidelines. This is not such a case. Because Mr. Olsen’s mental retardation represents a critical non-exertional impairment, the ALJ’s failure to reach a conclusion independent of the grid regulations constitutes an application of an incorrect legal standard.5
The ALJ’s error is even more obvious in light of our holding in Burnam v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 456 (3d Cir.1982). Building upon Santise, Burnam declared:
Having determined on the basis of the grid that Burnam was not disabled based on his exertional impairments, the administrative law judge failed to follow the regulatory directive that he then consider “how much [Burnam’s] work capability [was] further diminished in terms of any types of jobs that would be contraindicated by [his] nonexertional limitations.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 200.-00(e)(2) (1981).
The administrative law judge thus erred in treating Burnam’s exertional and nonexertional impairments separately and in then determining on the basis of the medical-vocational grid that substantial gainful work existed in the national economy that Burnam could perform. The administrative law judge, instead should have considered whether work existed for a person with the combination of impairments Burnam possessed. See Gagnon v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 666 F.2d 662 (1st Cir.1981). Because the administrative law judge failed to consider Burnam’s physical and mental condition as a whole, the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 457-58. The ALJ here did not follow the teachings of Burnam. The closest that he came was in observing that Dr. Spergel had considered the combined effect of appellant’s physical and mental impairments and in ultimately concluding that appellant could perform sedentary work. But even these statements are in derogation of Burnam’s requirement that the AU (rather than the Secretary’s witness) consider the claimant’s physical and mental condition as a whole.
Moreover, I note that appellant’s profile fits almost four-square into a grid guideline that would mandate a finding of disability. *759Like the person in the example set forth in the margin,6 appellant (who was 34 years old at the time of the 1980 administrative hearing) cannot perform a full range of sedentary work.
The majority affirms the Secretary by the exercise of extreme deference, in apparent reliance upon what can be described only as colorable compliance with the obligations that this Court has imposed upon administrative law judges in Social Security disability cases. As I read the record, including the opinions of the ALJ and the Appeals Council, this colorable compliance masks an infidelity on the part of the ALJ and the Appeals Council to the demands of their respective roles at the de novo hearing and on review — the demand that they give meaningful and critical consideration to evidence, resolve serious conflicts in the evidence, and correctly apply the law. I do not go so far as to suggest that summary judgment should have been granted for appellant. In view of the considerations set forth above, however, I would vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the Secretary for resolution of the glaring inconsistencies in the record, for proper application of the grids, and for consideration of evidence improperly ignored, including Dr. Schmidt’s latest report.

. The Secretary contends that Dr. Spergel’s finding of “transferable skills” does not conflict with the AU’s finding because a “fair reading” of Dr. Spergel’s report demonstrates that he is using the phrase “transferable skills” to refer to skills retained despite appellant’s impairments rather than to skills acquired and retained from past work activities. 1 find this attempted distinction unconvincing.

. Nor has the Secretary addressed the conflict in Dr. Spergel’s assertions (1) that “SEPTA [public transportation] is available and is approximately 15 minutes from [appellant’s] home,” and (2) (on the very next page of the report) that “Mr. Olson [sic] is able to walk for two city blocks and then notes a burning sensation in his right leg. When this occurs, he must stop to rest.” This conflict relates directly to the question whether appellant could maintain employment at any of the twelve jobs listed by Dr. Spergel.

. “Sedentary” and “light” work are terms of art, defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. “Sedentary work” involves “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” Id. § 404.1567(a). “Light work,” by contrast, “involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” Id. § 404.1567(b).

. Nor has the Secretary even begun to evaluate the impact upon employability of the condition known as arachnoiditis (inflammation of the spinal cord), from which appellant concededly suffers.

. The majority suggests that, because the ALJ stated that he had considered “all the testimony given at the hearing and documents contained in the exhibit file,” he was not “directed” with regard to the effect of the regulations. With all respect, I believe that the ALJ’s language speaks for itself.

. Section 201.00 (in 20 C.F.R.), which introduces Table No. 1 (containing criteria for determining disability), provides, in subsection (h), examples of individuals whose particular characteristics do not specifically meet any of the rules in Appendix 2 and for whom Table No. 1 is therefore not conclusive on the question of disability. Example 2 describes:
An illiterate 41 year old individual with mild mental retardation (IQ of 78) is restricted to unskilled sedentary work and cannot perform vocationally relevant past work, which had consisted of unskilled agricultural field work; his or her particular characteristics do not specifically meet any of the rules in Appendix 2, because this individual cannot perform the full range of work defined as sedentary. In light of the adverse factors which further narrow the range of sedentary work for which this individual is qualified, a finding of disabled is appropriate.