Court Opinion

ID: 9713230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:11:29.558318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:16.136236
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Craig :
I must dissent because the majority's view represents a sharp departure from the established doctrine of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as followed by this Court, that mandamus is a fully appropriate remedy to obtain or regain a building permit where the proposed development has complied with all requirements in effect at the time of application, and a later prohibitory amendment was not then legally “pending.” Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963); Monroeville v. Effie’s Ups & Downs, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 279, 315 A.2d 342 (1974). The clarity and consistency of the pattern of this Court’s decisions should not be marred by such an abrupt change in a procedural doctrine on which the public and legal counsel have come to rely.
The present case clearly falls into the “pending ordinance” category of cases, under which, if a prohibitory amendment is inapplicable because not “pending,” the mandamus remedy is proper. Lhormer, supra.
Here the building and zoning permits for the 23-unit apartment building were issued in August and September of 1973. There is no dispute concerning the clear entitlement to those permits under the ordinance applicable at that time; indeed, the issuance of *608the permits by the city authorities was good evidence of compliance because they based their later revocation of the permits, not on any violation of the preexisting ordinance requirements, but upon the provisions of a prohibitory amendment which was not even introduced until November, 1973 — after the issuance of the permits — and was enacted thereafter, in December, 1973.
There is no question but that the new amendment, the sole alleged reason for the revocation, was not “pending” in the Lhormer sense until after the permits had been issued.
In the Lhormer case (as well summarized by Judge Blatt in Monroeville, supra) the plaintiff sought a building permit, which was denied because a proposed amendment to the local zoning ordinance would have prohibited the planned use in the district concerned. The Supreme Court approved mandamus to require issuance of the permits because the proposed amendment, as here, was not “pending” at the time of application. The Lhormer decision and our Monroeville decision both follow the well-established doctrine that a zoning appeal need not be used and mandamus is available when “the right to the permit is clear. ...” Lhormer, supra, 410 Pa. at 514, 188 A.2d at 749-50; Monroeville, supra, 12 Pa. Commonwealth. Ct. at 283, 315 A.2d at 283; Vagnoni v. Bridgeport Borough Council, 420 Pa. 411, 218 A.2d 235 (1966); Verratti v. Ridley Township, 416 Pa. 242, 206 A.2d 13 (1965); Lawrence U. Ginter, Inc. v. Borough of Atglen, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 430, 296 A.2d 293 (1972).
In a permit revocation case, as here, the entitlement to mandamus is even stronger than in a permit denial case such as Lhormer because the local authorities themselves have admitted the clear entitlement to the permit by actually issuing it — unless they claim an error in issuance, which is not the situation here.
*609Our recent decision in Fassman v. Skrocki, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 302, 390 A.2d 336 (1978) is not applicable because, as Judge Blatt pointed out in her concurring opinion there, entitlement to a permit in that case was not clear because of a debatable procedural history.
Also, Unger v. Hampton Township, 437 Pa. 399, 263 A.2d 385 (1970) is no authority for denial of mandamus here because Unger involved an attempt to use mandamus to attack the validity of the existing zoning — and mandamus has never been available for that purpose, precisely because clear entitlement to a permit cannot be present where an attack on the validity of a requirement is necessary in view of noncompliance with its terms.
For these reasons, we should not depart from the Supreme Court’s Lhormer doctrine in circumstances where the permit entitlement is at least as strong, and perhaps stronger, than it was there.
I would affirm the decision of the court below, at least as to the propriety of the mandamus remedy.
Judge Wilkinson, Jb. joins in this dissent.