Court Opinion

ID: 9926854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 20:02:18.946159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.981439
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 Vardanyan v. VJ’s Touch Beauty Salon CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 GOHARIK VARDANYAN,                                              B320308

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. BC711065)
          v.

 VJ’s TOUCH BEAUTY SALON,
 INC. et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William A. Crowfoot, Judge. Affirmed.
      Stephan Filip, Stephan Airapetian and Eugenia
Bagdassarian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Daniels, Fine, Israel, Schonbuch & Lebovitz and Mark R.
Israel, for Defendants and Respondents.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Plaintiff Goharik Vardanyan fell and broke her hip while
standing up from a shampoo chair at VJ’s Touch Beauty Salon
Inc. (the Salon). She subsequently sued the Salon, its owner
Varoug Gharibi, and related business entity VJ’s Touch
(collectively defendants).1 The complaint alleged Vardanyan fell
and was injured after catching her foot on the chair’s severely
damaged footrest. Defendants moved for summary judgment,
offering evidence the chair was neither damaged nor dangerous.
In opposing summary judgment, Vardanyan asserted for the first
time that not only were defendants liable because the salon chair
was dangerous, but also because defendants negligently failed to
help her stand up from the shampoo chair. The trial court
concluded Vardanyan’s complaint alleged only a theory of
liability based on the condition of the chair. The court denied
Vardanyan’s request to amend her complaint to allege an
additional theory of liability and granted summary judgment.
We find no error in the trial court’s rulings and affirm the
judgment.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In June 2018, Vardanyan filed a Judicial Council form
complaint against defendants for premises liability and general
negligence. Both causes of action were based on nearly identical
factual allegations: “Plaintiff was getting her hair washed while
sitting on the chair of the shampoo backwash unit (hereinafter
‘Chair’), at the premises owned and/or operated and/or controlled
by all defendants named in this complaint. While being left on
the chair of the shampoo backwash unit (hereinafter ‘Chair’) for

1     The complaint also named as defendants “Leonard, Paul
And Dorit a Trs” and Leonard Family Trust. These entities are
not parties to the instant appeal.

                                2
about 10-15 minutes after hair wash [sic], Plaintiff heard strange
sounds. Plaintiff called for help, but no one came to her calling.
Thereafter, Plaintiff tried to get up but her foot got stuck on the
Chair’s leg-rest, the leg-rest was severely damage[d], and fell.
The fall resulted in Plaintiff suffer[ing] serious injuries, including
broken bones.”
       In the general negligence cause of action, the complaint
further alleged defendants were responsible for “negligent hiring,
entrancencement [sic], retaining, appointing, selecting, training,
and/or supervising of those persons responsible for the foregoing
acts and or omissions.”
       In January 2019, defendants served special interrogatories
on Vardanyan, requesting, among other things, all facts and
documents supporting her contention that the Salon or Gharibi
were negligent. Vardanyan objected to the contention
interrogatories as premature and provided no substantive
response. In July 2021, defendants served a supplemental
interrogatory requesting any new information relevant to their
initial discovery requests. Vardanyan responded that she had no
changes to her earlier responses.
       Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing there
was no evidence of any dangerous condition at the Salon. In
support of the motion, Gharibi declared that the shampoo chair
was not damaged or defective, it had been in use at the Salon for
over 15 years, and no other customer had ever fallen while using
it. Defendants also argued Vardanyan’s impermissibly vague
and “factually devoid” responses to their interrogatories
supported summary judgment in their favor.
       Defendants deposed Vardanyan in November 2021.
According to her testimony, she visited the Salon every six to

                                  3
eight weeks from 2011 to 2016. On the day of the incident,
Vardanyan went to the Salon to have her hair washed. Karine, a
Salon employee, led Vardanyan to one of the Salon’s shampoo
chairs. The chair had a footrest.2 According to Vardanyan,
employees always assisted her and other clients on and off the
chair because it was high off the ground. Karine washed
Vardanyan’s hair, wrapped it in a towel, and left.
      Vardanyan testified that she expected Karine to return
because the Salon’s employees always helped her get out of the
chair. She called Karine’s name, but no one came. Vardanyan
soon felt the veins on her neck “pulling.” After three to five
minutes, she decided to get out of the chair on her own.
Vardanyan felt something like a stool in front of the chair and
stepped on it with her left foot. She then stepped forward with
her right foot and “ended up on the floor.” She did not know why
she fell.
      At Gharibi’s subsequent deposition, he testified that the
Salon’s employees stay with clients during the hair-washing
process and also help clients sit up if they are “elderly or they
have a back issue or some condition.” Either an employee or the
customer pushes the footrest in. According to Gharibi, a
customer can stand up without pushing the footrest in. However,

2      Although the complaint referred to a “footrest,” or a “leg
rest,” at Vardanyan’s deposition she testified that “in the past
there used to be high chairs in the salons, and in front of the
chair there was something that people would use in order to step
on it to get onto the chair and then to step on it to get off of the
chair, to get down from the chair.” She testified that “something”
was attached to the chair, but when asked if it was “like a
footrest where you put your feet,” she answered, “It’s to step on it
to go up and step on it to go down.”

                                 4
it was pushed in “not to cause an obstacle for those who go into
the restroom.” If a customer is unable to push the footrest in, an
employee does it out of “responsibility so that the person will feel
good.”
       Vardanyan’s opposition to the motion for summary
judgment argued there was a triable issue of fact as to whether
defendants breached their duty of care by failing to push in the
footrest and failing to help Vardanyan out of the shampoo chair.
In support of these arguments, the opposition cited and attached
the deposition testimony of Vardanyan and Gharibi described
above.
       Vardanyan also submitted a declaration and supplemental
interrogatory response along with her opposition to summary
judgment. For the first time, Vardanyan asserted she had told
defendants on numerous prior visits that she needed help getting
on and off the shampoo chair; she had told defendants that lying
on the chair hurt her neck and made her dizzy; she generally had
difficulty getting on and off the chair; therefore, defendants
always stayed by her side and helped her.
       Defendants’ reply argued Vardanyan’s opposition presented
a new theory of liability based on the alleged failure to help her
out of the shampoo chair, but that she still failed to demonstrate
a triable issue of fact.
       The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting summary
judgment. The court concluded defendants had presented
sufficient evidence the shampoo chair was not damaged or
dangerous, thus shifting the burden to Vardanyan to establish a
factual dispute as to whether any dangerous condition existed in
the Salon. The court determined Vardanyan failed to meet that
burden. In addition, the court concluded the complaint did not

                                 5
allege negligence based on a failure to help Vardanyan out of the
chair and tentatively declined to consider whether Vardanyan
had identified a triable issue of fact under the new theory.
       At the hearing on the motion, Vardanyan argued the
complaint’s allegations were sufficient to assert a theory of
negligence based on defendants’ failure to help her out of the
chair. She asked for leave to amend the complaint if the court
concluded otherwise. The trial court ordered supplemental
briefing. In her brief, Vardanyan argued she had timely
requested leave to amend after learning of the court’s tentative
ruling, and that her proposed amendment would not prejudice
defendants. Defendants contended Vardanyan’s request for leave
to amend was untimely.
       The court denied Vardanyan’s request to amend the
complaint, reasoning the request was untimely because the
proposed amendment was based on facts known to Vardanyan on
the date of the incident. The court also concluded permitting the
amendment would prejudice defendants. The court therefore
adopted its tentative decision and granted summary judgment.
Vardanyan’s appeal followed.3

3      Vardanyan filed her notice of appeal before the trial court
entered judgment. However, this court “may treat a notice of
appeal filed after the superior court has announced its intended
ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately
after entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).)
We exercise our discretion to treat Vardanyan’s notice as filed
immediately after entry of the June 13, 2022 judgment.

                                6
                            DISCUSSION
I.     The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary
       Judgment
       A.       Standard of review
       Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618.) A defendant moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of showing a cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 853 (Aguilar).) The movant need only “negate plaintiff’s
theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving
party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not
included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.) If the defendant satisfies this
initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present
evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact
based on specific facts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2);
Aguilar, at p. 849.)
       “ ‘ “ ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ’
[Citation.]” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347.)

                                 7
      B.     Premises liability and negligence related to the
             chair and footrest
       “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability
claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and
proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) A landowner “is not an insurer of
the safety of its patrons,” but it does “owe them a duty to exercise
reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.”
(Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 (Ortega).) A
landowner thus has a duty to reasonably inspect the premises for
dangerous conditions, and if any such conditions exist, “the
landowner must, ‘ “use the care required of a reasonably prudent
[person] acting under the same circumstances.” ’ [Citations.]
Failure to do so constitutes a breach of duty of care.” (Jones v.
Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1208 (Jones).)
       Vardanyan’s complaint alleged her foot got stuck on the
severely damaged footrest of the chair, she fell, and was injured.
These factual allegations identified the footrest as a dangerous
condition. (Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1117,
fn.7 [complaint that points out particular part of premises and
particular condition sufficiently informs defendant of alleged
negligent act].) Defendants sought summary judgment on the
ground that Vardanyan could not establish there was any
dangerous condition at the Salon that caused her fall.4 They

4     Defendants also contended they had no duty to Vardanyan
because any danger was open and obvious. Because we conclude
there was no triable issue of fact as to whether the chair or
footrest was dangerous, we need not reach this issue. We also
note that although Vardanyan alleged defendants willfully failed
to warn her about a dangerous condition on the property, she did

                                 8
presented evidence that the shampoo chair was in good condition,
was not damaged or defective, and had been used for over 15
years without incident. This was sufficient to shift the burden to
Vardanyan to identify “ ‘specific facts showing that a triable issue
of material fact exists’ ” as to whether the chair or footrest
constituted a dangerous condition. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 849.)
       Vardanyan did not meet that burden. Her deposition
testimony indicated only that the footrest was used as a step to
get in and out of the chair and that she did not notice any
damage to the footrest on the day of the incident. She further
testified that she was “unable to tell” why she fell. (Harpke v.
Lankershim Estates (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 143, 145 (Harpke)
[evidence insufficient to support finding of dangerous condition
where plaintiff did not know what caused her to slip].)
       In her declaration in support of the opposition to summary
judgment, Vardanyan declared she tripped and fell on the
footrest when she tried to stand up from the shampoo chair.
However, as the court explained in Howard v. Omni Hotels
Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403 (Howard), “[t]he
fact that an accident occurred does not give rise to a presumption
that it was caused by negligence. [Citation.] Instead, the injured
plaintiff must establish sufficient facts or circumstances that
support an inference of a breach of duty, to defeat a summary
judgment motion by a defendant that is asserting due care was
exercised. It is not enough for the plaintiff to provide speculation
or conjecture that a dangerous condition of property might have

not argue this theory in the trial court or on appeal. We consider
any failure to warn theory abandoned. (Delta Stewardship
Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075.)

                                 9
been present at the time of the accident.” (Id. at p. 432; Harpke,
supra, 103 Cal.App.2d at p. 145 [no inference of negligence arises
from the mere proof of a fall].)
       Here, Vardanyan proffered no evidence that the footrest
was in any way defective or damaged, that there had been any
other accidents involving the footrest, or that she had been
imperiled by the footrest in her prior five years of regular
patronage at the Salon. Neither her deposition testimony nor her
declaration indicated there was anything unusual, out of place, or
unexpected regarding the footrest. (Cf. Walsh v. Maurice
Mercantile Co. (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 45, 46–47 [evidence
sufficient to go to jury to decide whether defendant used ordinary
care to maintain aisle in reasonably safe condition where scale
was out of place and protruded into aisle].) She further offered
no evidence that defendants had actual or constructive
knowledge that the footrest was a dangerous condition, or that
defendants should have realized the footrest created an
unreasonable risk of harm to salon patrons. (Ortega, supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 1206.) She failed to adduce any evidence from
which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the extended
footrest on the shampoo chair was unsafe or created an
unreasonable risk of danger. (Harpke, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d at
p. 146 [plaintiff who slipped and fell on stairway had minimum
duty to show stairway “was in fact unsafe and that she fell
because of that condition”].)
       Besides the fact of her fall, Vardanyan’s only other evidence
was that the Salon employees had helped her in and out of the
chair in the past; employees stayed with clients during the hair-
washing process and escorted them from the shampoo chair to
another salon chair; and either an employee or the customer

                                10
typically pushed in the footrest. The evidence of the Salon’s
practices did not suggest the footrest endangered patrons’ safety.
When asked the reason for the Salon’s practice of pushing in the
footrest for some clients, Gharibi testified it was “a matter of
politeness,” and that it was the Salon’s responsibility to make
customers “feel good.” Vardanyan had no evidence to contradict
this explanation. Her evidence did not support a reasonable
inference that the footrest created a dangerous condition at the
Salon or that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in
keeping the premises reasonably safe.
       C.    The trial court correctly concluded the
             complaint did not allege negligence based on
             the failure to help Vardanyan out of the chair
       Vardanyan argues the complaint was not limited to a
theory of negligence based on a damaged or extended footrest.
Instead, she asserts the complaint additionally alleged
defendants had a duty to help her out of the chair, and that
defendants breached their duty of care by failing to do so.
       The trial court reasonably rejected Vardanyan’s
characterization of the complaint. The general negligence cause
of action alleged that Vardanyan heard strange sounds, she
called for help, and no one came. However, the complaint failed
to allege that this was the cause of her injuries. Instead, the
complaint alleged that Vardanyan tried to get up, her foot was
stuck, the footrest was damaged, and she fell and was seriously
injured.5 The complaint’s allegations were only sufficient to put

5     While the complaint asserted claims such as negligent
hiring and supervision, there were no additional allegations to
suggest these were anything other than derivative claims

                                11
defendants on notice that Vardanyan was asserting legal theories
of negligence having to do with the footrest.
      Vardanyan contends she alleged defendants breached a
“duty to help.” Yet, her explanation of this theory only
undermines her argument that it was encompassed in the
operative complaint. Vardanyan appears to contend that aside
from keeping the premises reasonably safe, defendants
additionally owed her a duty under a negligent undertaking
theory. She repeatedly quotes the following portion of the Second
Restatement of Torts: “One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect
his undertaking.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 324A.) She similarly relies on
Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680
(Peredia), which explained, “California recognizes a legal duty of
care in certain circumstances where the defendant undertakes to
render services to someone other than the plaintiff.” (Id. at
p. 687.)
      Vardanyan’s complaint did not expressly allege this
negligent undertaking theory, nor did it allege any facts to
support such a theory. There were no allegations that
Vardanyan suffered harm as a result of defendants’ failure to
exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another party.
Even if the theory explained in Peredia could apply under the
circumstances of this case, the allegations of the complaint did
not encompass it.

stemming from the alleged negligence related to the condition of
the shampoo chair.

                                 12
       Nor did the complaint allege facts or terms that would
encompass any other undertaking theory. As explained in
another authority Vardanyan cites, Paz v. State of California
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 550, 558–559, a negligent undertaking theory is
an exception to the general rule that a person who has not
created a peril is not liable in tort for failing to take affirmative
action to protect another unless they have some relationship that
gives rise to a duty to act. The complaint alleged harm related to
defendants’ alleged creation of a peril, in the form of the footrest
and shampoo chair. It did not allege defendants undertook to aid
Vardanyan or that there was a relationship, separate from that of
landowner or business owner and invitee, giving rise to an
affirmative “duty to help.”
       “[W]here specific allegations need be alleged, the form
complaint is like a partially completed painting. It is up to the
pleader to add the details that complete the picture.” (People ex
rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1480, 1486.) The complaint did not allege that
defendants had or breached any affirmative duty to Vardanyan
beyond that related to the duty to keep the premises safe.
(Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital (1941) 18 Cal.2d 97, 101 [to
sufficiently allege breach plaintiff must indicate the acts or
omissions which are said to have been negligently performed].)
Indeed, the vagueness of Vardanyan’s explanation on appeal of
her “duty to help” theory illustrates defendants could not have
had fair notice of the theory from the complaint.6 (Howard,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.)

6     As noted above, Vardanyan appears to assert she alleged a
theory based on defendants’ undertaking to render services to

                                 13
       The authorities Vardanyan cites do not suggest a contrary
result. In Blair v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 221
(Blair), the court found the plaintiff’s government tort claim
asserting negligence in the construction and general maintenance
of a highway was sufficient to allow him to proceed on a factual
theory in his subsequent complaint that the road was defective
due to the lack of guard rails, the slope of the road, and a failure
to warn. The claim had only specifically mentioned the
accumulation of ice on the highway. The court concluded that not
only did the claim satisfy minimum statutory requirements, but
the charge of “negligent construction” could reasonably
encompass the defects the plaintiff alleged in his complaint. (Id.
at p. 226.)
       Here, however, the trial court was to “read the pleadings
broadly, ‘in the light of the facts adduced in the summary
judgment proceeding,’ if those pleadings give fair notice to the
opposing party of the theories on which relief is being sought.
[Citation.] The test is whether such a particular theory or
defense is one that the opposing party could have reasonably

someone else which they should have recognized as necessary for
her protection (consistent with section 324A of the Second
Restatement of Torts), without identifying the intended recipient
of the services. However, she also asserts defendants “undertook
the task of washing [Vardanyan’s] hair while [she] was
seated/laying [sic] on the shampoo chair”; that because
defendants were in “direct control of [the] hair wash,” that control
extended to getting Vardanyan off the shampoo chair and
defendants were “directly in control of the client’s actions”; but
also that Vardanyan was defendants’ customer and defendants’
employee was helping Vardanyan “thereby creating a duty to
help.”

                                14
anticipated would be pursued, and whether a request for leave to
amend accordingly would likely have been granted . . . .”
(Howard, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) In Blair, all of the
plaintiff’s theories concerned negligent construction and
maintenance of the highway. The only divergence between the
tort claim and the complaint was the nature of the alleged
defects. In this case, Vardanyan asserts her complaint alleged
two distinct theories of negligence, based on different duties and
different facts. The complaint as pled did not give fair notice that
Vardanyan was pursuing a negligent undertaking theory, or any
theory other than one related to the allegedly dangerous footrest.
(Cf. Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258
[pleading alleging car accident was caused by inadequate sight
distance, lack of warning signs, and devices at intersection did
not encompass allegations involving other lanes or vehicle
striking light pole or other object].)
       Likewise, Jones, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, is inapposite.
In Jones, the plaintiff opposed summary judgment with evidence
of code violations on defendants’ stairs and a negligence per se
argument. (Id. at p. 1211.) Even though the complaint did not
expressly allege negligence per se, the court reasoned it is an
evidentiary doctrine that may apply generally in any negligence-
related cause of action to establish a breach of due care. (Ibid.)
In contrast, here, the complaint identified a damaged footrest as
the source of negligence, which implied a particular duty of care.
The claim that defendants’ failure to help Vardanyan out of the
chair created a separate basis for liability, independent of the
condition of the footrest, was a new, unpled theory.

                                15
II.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
       Denying Leave to Amend
       Vardanyan alternatively argues the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her leave to amend the complaint. We
disagree.
       Generally, trial courts “will liberally allow amendments at
any stage of the proceeding.” (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc.
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280 (Falcon).) But this policy of
liberality “ ‘should be applied only “[w]here no prejudice is shown
to the adverse party. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Atkinson v.
Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 (Atkinson).)
       “Further, unwarranted delay in seeking leave to amend
may be considered by the trial court when ruling on a motion for
leave to amend [citation], and appellate courts are less likely to
find an abuse of discretion where, for example, the proposed
amendment is ‘ “offered after long unexplained delay . . . or where
there is a lack of diligence” ’ [citation]. Thus, when a plaintiff
seeks leave to amend his or her complaint only after the
defendant has mounted a summary judgment motion directed at
the allegations of the unamended complaint, even though the
plaintiff has been aware of the facts upon which the amendment
is based, ‘[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat
[the] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a
“moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.’ [Citations.]”
(Falcon, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1280; Record v. Reason
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 [unwarranted delay in presenting
amendment may of itself be valid reason for denial of leave].)
Leave to amend is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. (Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39
Cal.4th 235, 242 (Branick).)

                                 16
       Here, the trial court found Vardanyan’s request was
untimely and would prejudice defendants. The record amply
supported the trial court’s reasoning. The incident occurred in
2016. Vardanyan filed her complaint in 2018. She did not seek
leave to amend until 2021. Yet, the facts underlying the
proposed amendment were based on Vardanyan’s personal
knowledge and could have been included in the initial complaint.
The court reasonably rejected Vardanyan’s argument that the
facts related to her new theory only came to light during
Gharibi’s deposition since she testified at her own deposition
about the Salon’s practices as she had experienced them as a
regular patron for five years before the incident occurred.
(Falcon, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1280; Melican v. Regents of
University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176 [no
abuse of discretion in denying oral request to amend at summary
judgment hearing where amendment was based on facts known
to plaintiff five years earlier].)
       Likewise, the record supported the trial court’s assessment
of prejudice. Defendants propounded discovery seeking the basis
for Vardanyan’s negligence theory in January 2019 and again in
July 2021. She failed to provide substantive answers.
Defendants expended time, effort, and cost in moving for
summary judgment based on the only theory of liability identified
in the complaint. As the trial court noted, it would be
“implausible and unfair” to expect defendants to “divine” that
Vardanyan intended to proceed on any other theory.
       Indeed, Vardanyan did not supplement her discovery
responses until the day before her opposition to the summary
judgment motion was due. Contrary to Vardanyan’s argument on
appeal, nothing in the record suggests defendants were aware of

                               17
Vardanyan’s new theory of liability, or that they had the
opportunity to fully explore it through discovery. (Nelson v.
Specialty Records, Inc. (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 126, 139 [no abuse of
discretion in denying leave to amend “where the proposed
amendment interjects a new issue [citations], which may require
further investigation”].)
       The authorities Vardanyan relies upon for a contrary result
are inapposite. In Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989)
213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, the court concluded the amendment
would not prejudice the defendant. In Atkinson, supra, 109
Cal.App.4th at page 761, the defendant did not argue it would be
prejudiced by the requested amendment. In this case, defendants
were prejudiced in undertaking the cost and burden of summary
judgment, and would be further prejudiced if forced to re-engage
in discovery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend. (Falcon, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1282; Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 242.)

                               18
                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants to recover their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                        ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P. J.

                 EGERTON, J.

                              19