Court Opinion

ID: 9826141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:24:38.511012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:52.442426
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Cothran:
I dissent from the conclusion ■of reversal announced in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fraser. I think that the order of Judge Shipp, rescinding his order directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants, was entirely proper, and shall endeavor to so demonstrate.
The action is upon an account for two truck tires, alleged to have been sold to the defendants Barron and Mobley, a partnership, under the name of B. & M. Motor Company; and the point in the case is whether one member of a partnership, which has been dissolved by mutual consent, and ceased to do business, is liable upon an obligation contracted by the other partner in the name of the partnership after such dissolution, in the event that the partner sought to be charged has not complied with Section 3877, Vol. 3, Code *345of 1922. The evidence tends to establish the following facts:
About November 1, 1919, the defendants Barron and Mobley formed a partnership' under the name of B. & M. Motor Company, and engaged in the business of selling and repairing automobiles, and selling gasoline, oil, and accessories, in the city of Rock Hill, S. C. They conducted the business until January 1, 1921, at which time the partnership was dissolved, the liabilities and assets divided, and the business ended; in the terse language of the counsel for the plaintiff, put into the mouth of the defendant Mobley: “You just divided up and quit.” The building in which the busr iness had been conducted was controlled by the defendant Mobley, who, after the dissolution, rented the repair shop to Blackman Bros., the front part of the building, with the gas tanks, to W. L. Smith, and 'storage space for three trucks to Barron, who had acquired these in the distribution of the assets following the dissolution. He operated the three trucks in “general moving work,” quite distinct from the business in which the partnership had been engaged: The representative of the plaintiff made calls every 30 days upon Smith, who operated the front part of the building and the gas tank, and solicited business from him, which continued until Smith ceased to handle his line of goods.
Early in October, 1921, the defendant Barron ordered over the telephone, from a salesman of the plaintiff, in Charlotte, N. C., two truck tires of a certain class. It does not distinctly appear that he ordered them in the name of the old partnership. On October 5th the plaintiff addressed a letter to the B. & M. Motor Company at Rock Hill, referring to the telephone order, and stating that they could not supply the tires of the class ordered, and asking to be allowed'to substitute another class. Barron answered this letter, agreeing to the substitution, signing his letter “B. & M. Motor Company, Wilson Barron.” The tires were shipped on Oc*346tober 14th, addressed and billed to B. & M. Motor Company, delivered by the expressman to Barron, and signed for by “B. & M. Motor Company, W. B.” They were place upon one of the trucks, the individual property of Barron, used in his moving work. It was conceded that Mobley, after the dissolution, did not comply with the requirements of Section 3877.
Upon the trial of the case, his Honor, Judge Shipp, directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against both of the defendants (the defendant Barron being in default), upon the ground, so far as Mobley was concerned, that “where a person does not give notice to the clerk of the dissolution, he is made liable for the debts of the firm theretofore or thereafter contracted”; at the same time announcing: “I have not had time to look into it thoroughly. If I find I am wrong I will set it aside. I will take this answer and look at it thoroughly, and, if T am satisfied I am wrong about it, I shall set the verdict aside.”
Of his own motion, upon the last day of the term, his Honor, Judge Shipp, filed an order setting aside the verdict as to Mobley, upon the ground that he had erred in his construction of the statute. From this order the plaintiff has appealed.
I think that the last order was correct, and should be affirmed, for these reasons:
(1) Section 3877 has no application to a case of the dissolution of a partnership by mutual consent, followed by an immediate liquidation of the business and an absolute cessation of its activities. By its terms it applies only to a case of the change of the personnel of the partnership, brought about by the retirement of one of the partners, and this necessarily contemplates a continuation of the business by the partner not retiring. There can be no retirement of one partner from a business which by mutual consent has come to- an end.
*347(2) If the plaintiff should rely upon the duty of Mobley to give notice of the dissolution of the partnership, there is ample evidence, for submission to a jury, of the issue of actual notice by the plaintiff of the dissolution. Simmel v. Wilson, 121 S. C., 358; 113 S. E., 487. There was evidence tending to show that no business was thereafter conducted in the name of the dissolved partnership; that the building was subrented to other parties; that the plaintiff’s representative made periodical solicitations of business from the new occupants.
. (3) It appears that the defendant Barron was an individual purchaser of the tires for a truck used by him in a distinct line of business, and had not done a single act. in furtherance of the concluded business of the dissolved partnership.