Court Opinion

ID: 9819408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:24:42.146422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:17.417678
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: Section 19(e) of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides in pertinent part: “In the event either party requests oral argument, such argument shall be had before a panel of 3 members of the Commission ***. *** A decision of the Commission shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing.” 820 ILCS 305/ 19(e) (West 1996). In this case, oral argument was requested and had before a panel of three commissioners. At the time the Commission’s decision was issued, however, the term of one of the commissioners had expired. The two remaining commissioners were unable to agree on a result and wrote separate decisions. A third commissioner, who was not present at oral argument, pursuant to Zeigler v. Industrial Comm’n, 51 Ill. 2d 137 (1972), signed one of the decisions. I believe the issuance of a decision under such circumstances does not comport with the unambiguous language of section 19(e), that is, the decision was not approved by a majority of the commissioners present at the hearing. Secondly, I do not believe Zeigler is applicable in this instance as it interprets an earlier and quite different version of section 19(e). I therefore must dissent. In Zeigler, claimant’s cause was heard before five commissioners, a majority of the Commission. Before any decision was issued, three of the five commissioners’ terms expired. After these three commissioners were replaced, the Commission issued its decision. Claimant argued that the Commission’s decision was invalid because it was not signed by the commissioners who heard oral argument. In support of the validity of the Commission’s decision, employer submitted an affidavit from one of the departing commissioners stating that, prior to the departure, the Commission had reached a decision. That decision was then entered on the file jacket. The affidavit stated that it was customary for the commissioners to reach a decision, write it on the file jacket, and then have the court reporter type the decision so a copy could be sent to the parties. The court rejected claimant’s argument that the Commission’s decision was invalid, finding that the decision was made by the same commissioners who heard oral argument and considered the evidence. 51 Ill. 2d at 142. According to the court, the formalizing of a decision by preparing the written document, filing it and sending copies thereof to the parties was independent of the act of making a decision. Such ministerial functions did not have to be undertaken by the same commissioners who reached the decision in the case. 51 Ill. 2d at 142-43. The language of section 19(e), however, has been amended since the decision in Zeigler. At the time of Zeigler, no language required the Commission’s decision to be approved by a majority of the commissioners present at the hearing. Instead, the statute provided that a hearing was to be had before not less than a majority of the Commission. After such hearing, the Commission should file its decision in its office and forward copies to the parties. The statute was silent as to who was required to approve a decision. The current version of section 19(e) unambiguously requires that a Commission decision be approved by a majority of the commissioners present at oral argument. While it is not apparent from a review of the legislative history why this amendment was made, the purpose is not necessary to our inquiry. “Changes in wording and phrasing are presumed to have been deliberately made [citation], and when the legislature amends an act ***, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law in that respect.” Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm’n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 440 (1994). In construing statutory provisions, we are to give effect to the intention of the legislature. In re Application of the County Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Delinquent Taxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237 (1998). Because the language used by the legislature is the best indication of legislative intent, we must first look to the words of the statute. 181 Ill. 2d at 244. When the words themselves are unambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning of the words will be given effect without resorting to extrinsic aids for construction. Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. 2d 80, 87 (1995). “[OJnly where the statutory language is unclear may a court look beyond it.” Denton v. Civil Service Comm’n, 176 Ill. 2d 144, 149 (1997). Again, section 19(e) provides: “In the event either party requests oral argument, such argument shall be had before a panel of 3 members of the Commission ***. *** A decision of the Commission shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing ***.” 820 ILCS 305719(e) (West 1996). The language is unambiguous. It is axiomatic that the words “at such hearing” refer to oral argument had in the matter. Further, the language “decision *** shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing” requires a majority of the three panel members present at oral argument to approve the final decision. 820 ILCS 305719(e) (West 1996). The legislature could not have stated this any clearer. I find further support for my position under the analogous Supreme Court Rule 22(c) (145 Ill. 2d R. 22(c)) governing appellate court decisions. Rule 22(c) provides: “Three judges must participate in the decision of every case, and the concurrence of two shall be necessary to a decision.” 145 Ill. 2d R. 22(c). The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 22(c) to require that when one of the judges on a panel departs from the court, the remaining two judges must concur in order for the decision to be valid. Proctor v. Upjohn Co., 175 Ill. 2d 394, 396 (1997). Given the similarity between Rule 22(c) and section 19(c), I find the supreme court’s reasoning in Proctor instructive. In this instance, the Commission’s decision was issued more than one month subsequent to the expiration of Acting Commissioner Hagan’s term. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of affidavits, file jacket entries, or any other indicia of Acting Commissioner Hagan’s decision which would support a ruling under Zeigler. Acting Commissioner Kane, who signed in Hagan’s stead, was not present at oral argument and, thus, could not approve the decision in accordance with section 19(e). The two commissioners who remained could not agree on the outcome; consequently, the decision issued was invalid. Because a majority of the commissioners who were present at the hearing did not approve the decision, I believe we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. I would therefore dismiss the appeal and remand the cause to the Commission to enter a valid decision. COLWELL, J., joins in this dissent.