Court Opinion

ID: 9479928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:33:06.064886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:22.568669
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the “separate and distinct criminal episode” test is the appropriate analysis to determine the applicability of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). However, I respectfully disagree that this analysis, when applied to the facts of this case, justifies the enhancement of Mr. Schieman’s sentence. My brothers conclude that Mr. Schieman is liable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because he was convicted of having committed two crimes on the same evening. However, it is clear that the two incidents were in reality part of a single criminal episode: Mr. Schieman committed a robbery, walked three blocks away to make a telephone call to arrange transportation away from the scene, and, in an attempt to evade apprehension, pushed a police officer at the phone booth. The pushing incident occurred approximately five minutes after the robbery.
In an attempt to justify its characterization of this event as two separate criminal episodes, the majority states that “[o]nce the original crime is complete, there is no principled way to distinguish between an attack in response to an investigation commenced within ten minutes of the burglary and an attack in response to an investigation commenced a day after the burglary.” Ante at 913. This rationale ought not stand for two reasons. First, it is contrary to the express intent of Congress. Secondly, the analytical methodology necessary to make such a “principled” distinction is well-established in our criminal law.
A
The legislative intent with respect to this section is certainly no mystery. Indeed, *914the executive branch, responsible for the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, has acknowledged the congressional mandate and, at least on a national level, attempted to remain faithful to it. During the 1984 legislative hearings, then Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott described the Armed Career Criminal Act as aimed at persons who, having already been involved in a serious criminal episode, return to such antisocial behavior:
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that locking them up and letting them go doesn’t do any good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let them go, it doesn’t do any good, they are back for a third time. At that juncture, we should say, “That’s it; time out; it is all over. We, as responsible people, will never give you the opportunity to do this again.”
Armed Career Criminal Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1984) (quoted in Brief of Solicitor General at 8-9, Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987)). In similar fashion, in a brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987), the Solicitor General examined the legislative history of the statute:
[References throughout the legislative reports and the floor debates to “career criminals,” “repeat offenders,” “habitual offenders,” “recidivists,” “revolving door” offenders, “three time loser,” “third-time offender,” “[defendants] convicted three times,” and to defendants committing a “third or subsequent robbery,” are inconsistent with the notion that Congress intended [the statute], unlike in other federal enhanced penalty provisions, to count previous convictions on multiple felony counts arising from a single criminal episode as multiple “previous convictions.”
Id. at 7.
Our colleagues in other circuits have recognized this congressional mandate and have been scrupulous in observing the congressional limitations on the scope of this potent enhancement provision. See, e.g., United States v. Pedigo, 879 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir.1989) (remanding for a determination as to whether the predicate convictions constituted requisite number of criminal episodes). Even when dealing with situations that more clearly fall within the scope of the statute, they have carefully differentiated those situations from the type before us now.1 Certainly the two cases cited by the majority hardly support its conclusion that Mr. Schieman’s actions on the night of May 1, 1974 must be considered as separate episodes. Indeed, in United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2456, 104 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1989), the court determined that two incidents, which together resulted in four felony convictions of kidnapping and rape, constituted two prior episodes, not four. Id. at 891. After examining the legislative history of section 924(e), the court concluded:
It seems quite clear that this section of the Act was intended to target recidivists, i.e., those who have engaged in violent criminal activity on at least three separate occasions, and not individuals who happen to acquire three convictions as a result of a single criminal episode (or, as here, two such criminal events).
Id. at 891. In the second case cited by the majority, United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 87, 102 L.Ed.2d 63 (1988), the defendant had committed two burgla*915ries on the same night. However, the crimes were separate and distinct. They occurred at different locations. One was not the continuation of the other. By contrast, here the crimes were committed as part of the same operation or episode — a burglary and the immediate escape. The crimes do not meet the rigorous standard that should be met for determining separate criminal episodes. See United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 684 (3d Cir.1989) (en banc) (“I believe that the separate criminal episode requirement must be read rigorously and that we must insist that the government prove convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes of which they were part) were truly separate.”) (Becker, J., concurring).
B
The majority’s suggestion that no principled distinction is possible between a crime committed to elude detection within ten minutes of the original crime and one committed a day later ignores the fact that similar distinctions are made often in our criminal law. For instance, the same type cf determination is made in the case of felony-murder. Under Indiana law, a homicide committed during the asportation of stolen property is considered to occur within one continuous transaction. Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind.1986). “A transaction is continuous when the commission of both the homicide and felony are closely connected in time, place, and continuity of action.” Sheckles v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind.1986). Certainly, ever since Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), “[t]his circuit has followed the Supreme Court’s admonition and has required that the government prove ‘continuity plus relationship’ in order to show a pattern [of racketeering activity] for purposes of RICO.” United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1329 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1345, 103 L.Ed.2d 813 (1989). See also United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir.1987). There is no reason why the same sort of assessment cannot be made here. The congressional intent is clear: the enhancement is to apply to the person who turns anew to criminal activity after an earlier and completed episode. The factual assessment necessary to implement that legislative intent is the traditional fare of the judicial process. It is hardly an impossible task.
Today’s holding places this circuit well outside the mainstream of judicial interpretation on this issue. This penalty enhancement provision is an important tool in the maintenance of a peaceful society. There is no more certain way to weaken it than to stretch it beyond recognition.

. See United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1028-29 (6th Cir.1989) (determining whether acts constitute a single "crime spree” is a difficult question; not presented in that case, since burglaries committed in different months); United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 n. 1 (5th Cir.1988) (not addressing issue of “whether multiple convictions for crimes committed over a period of days or hours as part of a criminal spree constitute single or multiple criminal transactions”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2074, 104 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir.) (sufficient predicate convictions even if two burglaries on same night treated as single episode), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 147, 102 L.Ed.2d 119 (1988).