Court Opinion

ID: 9658398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:58:35.071414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:54.725232
License: Public Domain

T. G. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). John Robert Taylor pleaded guilty to a charge of breaking and entering a business establishment1 in Jackson County and was sentenced on May 14, 1965. An application for delayed appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals on December 2,1966, and some time subsequent to an order of remand by that Court, the trial court released John Robert Taylor on bond. On February 1, 1968 the Court of Appeals ([1968], 9 Mich App 333) reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for further proceedings. On February 9, 1968, on its own motion this Court ordered a stay of proceedings in the cause and directed that it be certified to this Court as granted application for leave to appeal by the people. Justices Adams, T. M. Kavanagh and Souris dissented.
The only issue decided by the Court of Appeals was that by failing to inform the defendant of the maximum sentence possible the court failed to fol*373low the requirements of GrCR 1963, 785.3(2), because such advice is involved in the determination required by the rule that the plea was “freely, understandingly and voluntarily made without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.”
We find no error in the Court of Appeals order and consequently we affirm, but because of the importance of this matter to the administration of justice in Michigan we set forth the considerations which hopefully explain our decision for the guidance of the bench and bar.
The importance of the guilty plea, the non-adversary method of determining guilt, and its role in the administration of justice cannot be too strongly emphasized. In Michigan it has become the method of disposing of 87.6 %2 of the criminal cases.
Because of this fact it behooves us to do whatever we can to make certain this procedure comports with our notions of fair play. The history of the criminal law is largely the recounting of judicial efforts to assure the accused a fair trial in the adversary process. We cannot now in good conscience do less to assure justice in this non-adversary proceeding.
The determination of guilt can come in either of two ways — by a trial — the adversary manner, or by the acceptance of a guilty plea — the non-adversary manner.
In either instance the trial judge3 has a unique and important role. In the adversary manner of de*374termining gnilt the trial judge has the ultimate responsibility for assuring a fair trial to the accused.
In a non-adversary method of determining “guilt” what can a trial judge do to guarantee to a person the due process and equal protection of the laws contemplated in our constitutions and jurisprudence?
Stated simply, all he can do — the most and the least — is do everything reasonably calculated to make certain that one who offers to have his guilt determined without a trial knows what he is doing and does it freely.
To this end the statutes and court rules have tried to set down standards and guidelines to provide some uniform practice in accomplishing it. The court rule requires that the court inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequence of his plea; and as a condition of accepting the plea, examine the accused and ascertain that the plea was made freely, understandingly, and voluntarily.
“It is not too much to require that, before sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the few minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and determine whether they understand the action they are taking.” McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 US 459, 471, 472 (89 S Ct 1166, 22 L Ed 2d 418).
These conclusions of the trial judge are not rulings of law or findings of fact.
Nor is his acceptance of a guilty plea a ruling of law or finding of fact. It is merely a determination by the accepting court that he is satisfied the accused freely, understandingly and voluntarily, without undue influence, compulsion or duress and without promise of leniency waived his right to a trial and *375the adversarial determination of guilt and voluntarily submitted himself to the court for punishment according to law.
Our court rule was intended to prescribe a standard practice for making this determination.
Appellate review of such determination can test only the question of whether the pleader knew what he was doing and did it voluntarily.
Appellate courts can go only by the record.
If the record does not show that the accused was informed that he was entitled to counsel, to process for the production of witnesses, to take or not to take the stand, to cross-examine the witness against him and to have the jury or judge convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, the conclusion that he voluntarily relinquished these rights which are incidental to a trial is not warranted.
In informing the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequence of his plea it is not necessary to conduct a full-fledged law course or to anticipate all of the remote effects of the plea. It is enough if it can be said with reasonable certainty from an examination of the record that the accused knew what he was pleading guilty to and for all practical purposes what the result of such a plea would be.
Unless the record shows that the accused was advised of the maximum penalty to which his plea exposed him, it can not reasonably be concluded that he pleaded understandingly and freely.
Whatever other consideration may have prompted the accused to plead guilty, his possible sentence— his maximum exposure no less than his possible minimum — would seem to be a necessary element to an understanding and voluntary choice.
On behalf of the Court of Appeals, Judge Gilmore listed as minimum requirements for accepting a plea *376of guilty in felony cases whether or not the defendant has counsel the following:
“First, a verbatim record of the entire proceedings shall be made.
“Second, the court must inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation. In doing so the court should avoid police jargon or catch titles and inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation in terms that a layman should comprehend under the circumstances. Additionally, the court shall determine whether the information has been read to the defendant and read or cause the same to be read to him unless he expressly waives the reading thereof.
“Third, the court must advise the defendant of the consequence of a plea of guilty. This means the court must inform him that he waives the right to trial by jury or the judge without jury and all the incidents thereof.
“Fourth, the court shall inquire as to whether the defendant has made any confession to the police prior to the time of his plea of guilty and ascertain if the confession is a reason for making the plea. If it appears that the confession is a basis for the plea, before accepting the plea the court shall advise the defendant that he is entitled to a Walker-type evidentiary hearing to ascertain if the confession was freely, voluntarily and constitutionally made. In applicable cases this hearing shall be had unless expressly waived.
“Fifth, the court must ascertain before accepting the plea that the plea has been freely, understandingly and voluntarily made, without any undue influence, compulsion, duress or promise of leniency. This means that the court must determine whether or not any promises of any kind have been made by anyone as to the court’s disposition of the case, and if such were made, refuse the plea. It must advise the defendant that no promises can be made as to *377the disposition. Further, the court must satisfy itself on the record that the defendant understands that he has no obligation to plead guilty and that he subjects himself to anything up to the maximum punishment by doing so. The court must advise defendant of the maximum sentence that can he imposed and the minimum sentence if there is a mandatory minimum. The court shall ascertain if the defendant is on probation or parole, and inform him of the possible consequence of probation or parole violation.
“If at this point the court is satisfied that the defendant thoroughly understands the consequence of his plea, that he made the plea freely, understandingly and voluntarily and without any promise of leniency, or any undue influence, compulsion or duress, the court shall determine from a narration by the defendant or an interrogation of him that the defendant actually committed the crime to which he has pleaded guilty. In other words, the defendant should he asked to state on the record what he did and the court must satisfy itself from the defendant’s narrative or responses that the defendant actually is guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged. Then and only then can the court accept the plea of guilty.”
The foregoing, and the questions4 helpfully suggested by Judge Gilmore satisfy the letter and spirit of the statute and court rule. But no formula or list of questions will guarantee against any eventuality the questioning of a guilty plea.
Only if the record discloses that the trial judge met the foregoing minimum requirements and reasonably concluded that the plea was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made under all circumstances can we say that the accused was accorded all *378of his rights as guaranteed by the Federal and State constitutions, statutes and court rules.
We cannot say so here.
Affirmed.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. Gr. Kavanagh, J.

 CL 1948, § 750.110, as amended by PA 1964, No 133 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Snpp § 28.305).

 During the calendar year of 1968, 14,466 criminal cases were processed through the circuit courts of this State. Of this number, 12,671 (87.6%) were disposed of without trial, presumably the most by guilty pleas. (1968 Judicial Statistics for the State of Michigan, Office of the Court Administrator.)

 There is no intrinsic reason why a judge must accept a guilty plea (or for that matter impose a sentence).
Nothing special in the training and/or experience of a judge or lawyer equips him for such task. No reason for utilizing valuable judicial manpower in performing this basically non-adjudicating *374task seems sound unless it be somehow an attempt to import to this non-adversary manner of determining guilt some of the devices, techniques and attitudes intended to assure due process and equal protection so carefully crafted in our adversary procedure.

 People v. Taylor (1968), 9 Mich App 333, 337, 339-341.