Court Opinion

ID: 9495293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:58:51.752971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:55.387234
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I have previously written about the upside down world of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 483 (8th Cir.1993) (Bright, J., dissenting) (suggesting that sentences imposed under the guidelines where no rules of evidence apply and where sentencing judges often summarily approve probation officer recommendations seem to come from an Alice in Wonderland world where up is down and down is up); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 438 (8th Cir.1992) (Bright, J., dissenting) (comparing sentences imposed under the relevant conduct provisions of the guidelines to an Alice in Wonderland world in which words lose their real meaning and down is up and up is down). I am not alone in making such a comparison. United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 393 (Oakes, J., concurring).
Here we have another example of the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to inflate a sentence for reasons that seem nonsensical.
Jedediah Regenwether challenges the district court’s application of a three-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) based upon Regenwether’s possession of a shotgun, which the district court deemed relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The government argues that the gun possession was relevant conduct connected to Regenwether’s 1998 robbery activities, which were incorporated into the instant offense via the conspiracy count.
Regenwether argues that the three-level increase should not apply because possessing the shotgun is not relevant conduct with respect to his 1999 crimes in light of defendant’s intervening arrest, prosecution, and incarceration for one of the 1998 robberies.1 Police seized the gun when they arrested Regenwether in 1998. The present case stems from 1999 robbery activities. The 1998 possession of a shotgun should have no impact on the instant case, according to Regenwether, because the gun played no role in the 1999 robberies as evidenced by the fact that the indictment makes no mention whatsoever of the gun, *970and the facts reveal that the gun was not used in the planning or execution of the 1999 robberies.
In Regenwether’s view, the government is trying to use the conspiracy count to pull in the 1998 pre-incarceration gun possession as relevant conduct in order to enhance Regenwether’s sentence.2 I think that Regenwether is absolutely correct. Unfortunately, the law of conspiracy and the applicable sections of the Sentencing Guidelines allow precisely this type of enhancement.
The jury convicted Regenwether of a conspiracy going back to March of 1998. The attempted Radcliffe bank robbery was an object of this conspiracy, as was the March 31 meeting between Regenwether and Olszewski. Based on the jury’s verdict and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, the trial court could properly determine that the gun was conduct relevant to the conspiracy count.
Frankly, it is situations like this that have led me to conclude that many of the Guidelines make little sense. The defendant committed certain crimes in 1998, he served time for the charges the government brought at that point, and surrendered his shotgun. Now his offense level is enhanced three levels for possession of a gun that he surrendered before the vast majority of the unlawful conduct charged by the government occurred. This may be the current state of the law, but does it make sense?
Even though I am obligated under existing law to concur, I say it is time for a change. Again, I reiterate my call for abolishing or radically changing the Sentencing Guidelines and adopting a more fair and just system. See e.g., United States v. England, 966 F.2d 403, 411 (8th Cir.1992) (Bright, J., concurring) (“In too many instances, the sentences directed by the guidelines waste the lives of men and women. ... It is time for a re-evaluation and change.") (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir.2000) (Bright, J., concurring) (“ ‘Is anyone out there listening?’ If not, isn’t it about time?”).

. As the majority notes, Regenwether pleaded guilty to the 1998 Credit Union robbery, but the government did not file charges on the two alleged 1998 attempted robberies of the Radcliffe Bank. Those attempted robberies, however, are included in the conspiracy count of the instant case, and form the basis for including the shotgun as relevant conduct.

. Regenwether's full argument is that relevant conduct, like conspiracies, must have a beginning and an end. He argues that his intervening incarceration should prevent the 1998 gun possession from being considered rele-van! conduct in the 1999 robberies. Regen-wether’s 1998 conspiracy with Abney is a distinct conspiracy from the 1999 association with Kirk.