Court Opinion

ID: 9774594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:25:56.790325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:11.204140
License: Public Domain

STORCKMAN, Judge
(concurring in result) .
I regret that I cannot agree with the rationale of the majority opinion which ratifies and confirms a category of instructions *246for which I can find no authority in § 546.070(4), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. and S. Ct. Rule 26.02(6). With respect to this group or class of instructions, the majority opinion states “it became the established rule that, even as to a collateral matter, if the defendant offered an erroneous instruction, it was the duty of the court to give a good one on the subject.” Later in the opinion further modifications and exceptions are noted. I would not recognize such a rule. I can see no reason nor justification for adding this category to the class or classes comprehended by the statute. I think the statutory standards are sufficient, more trustworthy and more easily applied.
Section 546.070(4) provides: “Whether requested or not, the court must instruct the jury in writing upon all questions of law arising in the case which are necessary for their information in giving their verdict; which instructions shall include, whenever necessary, the subjects of good character and reasonable doubt; and a failure to so instruct in cases of felony shall be good cause, when the defendant is found guilty, for setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial”. Italics added.
Supreme Court Rule 26.02 varies somewhat in verbiage but seems to be to the same legal effect as the statute. If there is any difference, I think the statute would control since the grant of a new trial is required for failure to instruct in accordance with the mandate of the statute. In my opinion, this is a substantive right which the court has no authority to change by rules of practice and procedure. Art. V, § 5, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S.
Either the instruction in a felony case involves questions of law with reference to which it is necessary to inform the jury in arriving at its verdict or it does not. If it does, then under § 546.070(4) the trial court must give a proper instruction whether requested or not; the statute is mandatory. If it does not, then § 546.380 controls and the duty is, or should be, upon the defendant to request an instruction in proper form' before he can claim error. The giving of' such an instruction would be discretionary- or nonmandatory. I can see no sound reason for making the right to an instruction* depend upon the happenstance of a defendant submitting a written request although, erroneous.
My views regarding the categories are in: general accord with those stated by Judge-Ellison in State v. Foster, 355 Mo. 577, 197 S.W.2d 313, 317-318, which is cited and quoted from in the majority opinion. For.convenient reference the statement is:
“Our statutes divide the instructions in-a criminal case into two general classes. The first includes those which Sec. 4070(4) [§ 546.070(4)] mandatorily requires the-court to give whether requested or not, ‘upon all questions of law arising in the-case which are necessary for their (the jury’s) information in giving their verdict;: which instructions, shall include, whenever necessary, the subjects of good character- and reasonable doubt.’ It is held these instructions must cover ‘ “all the essential elements of an offense embraced within the charge,” ’ or, as put another way, they must declare the law ‘ “applicable to every crime, or grade of crime, of which, under the evidence, the jury might convict the accused.” ’ Instructions not belonging-in that class, such as instructions on evidence and procedure, are called ‘collateral,’ and fall in the second class. As to them,. Sec. 4083 [§ 546.380] provides ‘the court. may instruct the jury in writing on any point of law arising in the cause.’ But the-defendant must request or tender instructions of that class, save exceptions and preserve the point in his motion for new-trial.”
The term “law of the case” had acquired a technical meaning by court decisions prior to the first enactment o £ the - statute in 1879. It appears to have been carried over and applied in lieu of or as a.. convenient expression of the longer and more inclusive statutory provision.
*247Perhaps the earliest case and the one most relied upon for the use of the term ■“law of the case” in a criminal prosecution is State v. Matthews, 20 Mo. 55, 57. In that case no instructions whatever were given and the court held: “It was the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law of the case. The instructions asked by the defendant’s counsel may have been objectionable in their phraseology, but the court should not, therefore, have neglected to give such as the law of the case required.” In Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607, 609, the trial judge had given the jury a law book and advised them orally that they were the judges of the law and fact. Holding this to be error was the occasion for the supreme court to make this statement, apparently intending it to apply to civil cases as well: “It is the duty of the judge of a criminal court, as well as of all other courts of record, to instruct the jury in all the law arising in the case, * *
There is no reason to suppose that the general assembly intended to do no more than enact the common law when it adopted what has become § 546.070(4). The language of the statute is broader than the common-law definition of “the law of the case”.
Likewise, there is no statutory basis for the term “collateral” instructions. This class should include everything that is not mandatory. Using these judicially created terms is like taking the long way around. They in turn have to be defined. Application of the statutory term directly to the problem would tend to simplification.
My research on the problem is not as extensive as I would like but all that time permits. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the approach to which the court is committed is unsound in that it virtually constitutes an abandonment of the mandate of the statute. If the legal question is one as to which it is necessary to inform the jury, I think it is fundamentally unsound to make the defendant’s right to it depend upon whether his counsel has presented a written request. The statutory mandate is there whether a request is made or not. If it is not within the mandate of the statute, then the defendant should be required to present a proper instruction before he can complain.
The majority opinion does not deal with them, but it casts doubt upon the cases generally holding that a rule of evidence is a collateral matter as to which the court is not required to instruct. In State v. Miller, Mo., 292 S.W. 440, 441 [4-6], decided in 1927, the court stated: “It is further complained that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the fact of defendant’s previous conviction and sentence to the penitentiary should be considered by the jury only as affecting the credibility of the witness, and should not be considered in determining whether he was guilty of the offense charged. The defendant likewise asked no instruction upon that proposition. It is purely a collateral matter. The court, whether requested or not, is required to instruct on all the law of the case, which is defined to mean all the essential elements of the offense embraced within the charge. State v. Lackey, 230 Mo. [707] 720, 132 S.W. 602. This relates to the purpose of certain evidence. We have held that a rule of evidence is a matter collateral, and not an essential element of the offense. State v. Murray (No. 27357) [316 Mo. 31] 292 S.W. 434, not yet [officially] reported; State v. Davis, Mo.Sup., 267 S.W. 838, loc. cit. 841.”
In State v. Gatlin, 1902, 170 Mo. 354, 70 S.W. 885, 891 [12], the court stated: “Concerning the admission in evidence of Crite’s testimony as taken and written down before the coroner, there was no error in this, as the evidence was entirely competent wherewithal to impeach Crite, who was defendant’s witness; and, if defendant wanted that testimony limited to such purpose, an instruction should have been asked, and an exception saved in case of refusal. State v. McMullen [McMullin] (decided at present term) [170 Mo. 608] 71 S.W. 221.” This appears to be the precise subject mat*248ter involved in the present case. See further the Missouri Digest, Criminal Law, instructions as to evidence in general, and more particularly @^824(8), instructions as to pui-pose and effect of evidence. See also State v. Douglas, 258 Mo. 281, 167 S.W. 552, 554 [3],
I see no merit in a legal principle which requires the trial court to give a correct instruction on a so-called collateral matter simply because defense counsel has requested an improper one. It is not based on the controlling statute and is subject to abuse. If the subject matter of the instruction offered is of such importance that the court must redraft and give one in correct form, then it seems to me that it is a matter necessary for the information of the jury within the meaning of the statute and that the court should be required to instruct on it whether a written request is made or not.
Nor do I think that instructions can be put into mandatory or nonmandatory classes without regard to the circumstances of the case in which it is offered. The circumstances may be such as to make it necessary to limit the effect of evidence in one case and not in another.
This case presents an opportunity to simplify the instruction practice in felony cases by adhering to the language of the statute which has been stabilized for a number of years. The majority opinion is a scholarly analysis of prior statutes and decisions, but it falls short of relieving the confused and difficult situation which must confront a trial court and counsel in preparing instructions in a felony case. I make no pretense that this opinion solves the problem, but I believe it points the direction.
The statutory term “all questions of law arising in the case which are necessary” for the information of the jury should be given a liberal construction in order to effectuate its intent and purpose. Some of the present difficulty seems to arise from continued adhérence to common-law rules and definitions developed before the statute was enacted. When the statutory provision has been resorted to, its meaning-has often been constricted and construed too» narrowly.
The majority opinion says that our statute was taken almost verbatim from the Kansas laws and that State v. Conway, 241 Mo. 271, 145 S.W. 441, reviewed the Kansas cases construing it and found them to be in harmony with our construction. As I understand the Conway case, the Kansas, decisions held it necessary to instruct only on the offense charged and that the defendant must make a request, even though erroneous, on degrees thereof and included offenses. Conway, in part, quotes from, State v. Winters, 81 Kan. 414, 105 P. 516, as follows (241 Mo. loc. cit. 288, 145 S.W. loc. cit. 447) : “From all the decisions noted it may be concluded that the statute means, what it says and should be followed, but that a duty rests on counsel for the defendant to aid, and not to ambush, the court,, and consequently instructions should be requested covering all lesser degrees or lesser' crimes involved in the main charge which the defendant desires to he considered.”' Italics added. Our decisions hold instructions on these subjects to be mandatory under the statute when supported by the evidence. See State v. Weinberg, 245 Mo. 564, 575, 150 S.W. 1069; State v. Enochs, 339 Mo. 953, 98 S.W.2d 685, 687; and State v. Foster, 355 Mo. 577, 197 S.W.2d 313, 317. But if we were in complete harmony with, the Kansas courts, I would feel no justification in following a practice which I consider to be unsound, needlessly complicated,, and out of keeping with the intent and purpose of the statute.
Section 546.070(4) and our own Rule-26.02(6) seem quite clear and sufficient for-application to a given case. But the decisions have injected such standards as “main, issue”, “law of the case”, “collateral issues”,. and subdivisions of these terms in lieu of' the language of the statute and rule. Most of the cases are devoted to 'defining these terms instead of applying directly the statute and our rule to the circumstances of the-*249particular case. I do not think we can or should try to classify each type of instruction in advance as being necessary or not necessary under the statute. There are certain kinds of instructions which all could readily agree are necessary but beyond that it would depend on the circumstances of •each case. As stated in State v. Weinberg, 245 Mo. 564, 575, 150 S.W. 1069, 1072: “In deed, it might be difficult to make such a distinction as would be applicable in all cases and inadvisable to attempt it.”
The majority opinion states that the court ■need not rewrite and give an instruction on •every proposition on which the defendant ■offers an incorrect instruction, but goes on to say that once counsel has called the ■court’s attention to a “collateral question •considered to be of importance to the defense by offering an instruction covering it”, no undue burden is imposed on the court to give the instruction or to modify it so as to correctly submit the question. This seems to add to rather than to reduce the confused situation. I do not think that clarification can be achieved by this approach. Nor do I think it makes any difference whether the counsel is court-appointed or otherwise. The excellence of the representation in this case demonstrates this concern to be needless. The statute and ■our rule provide a standard which is conducive to a fair trial and which is equally fair to all.
To me the Foster case (197 S.W.2d 313, 317) correctly interprets the two statutes applicable to criminal cases, — §§ 546.070 (4) and 546.380. As to the first, an instruction is required whether reqttested or not. As to the latter category (whatever is included therein) I think the defendant should offer a correct instruction before he can complain.
It might be well to disregard a great deal that has been said in defining “the law of the case” and “collateral” legal questions and instead use the language of the statute as the standard for determining the respective areas of mandatory and nonmandatory instructions. The inquiry would then be: Does the given situation involve “a question of law arising in the case” which is necessary for the information of the jury in giving its verdict?
Applying this test, I would say the one before us is such a question and that it was mandatory in the circumstances of this case for the trial court to give a proper instruction whether requested or not.
Furthermore, I am not convinced that the instruction offered should have been refused because it is repetitious. It has that drawback, but I think the jury would not have been misled or confused by it but would have correctly understood its purpose.
For the reasons given, I concur in the result.