Court Opinion

ID: 9656059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:33:00.471874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:27.465733
License: Public Domain

Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
I am of the opinion that defendant has been subjected to double jeopardy.
Defendant was first tried and acquitted under M. S. A. 620.01, which was enacted under the authority of Minn. Const, art 9, § 12. *70See, 2 M. S. A. p. 337; Farmers & M. State Bank v. Consol. School Dist. No. 3, 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W. 163, 65 A. L. R. 1407. Art. 9, § 12, as originally enacted, provided that “any failure to pay over or produce the state or school funds intrusted to such person, on demand, shall be held and taken to be prima facie evidence of such embezzlement.” (Italics supplied.)
Section 620.01, which effectuated this constitutional provision, sets forth four methods of proof sufficient to establish the one offense defined — misappropriation and falsification of accounts by public officers — in substance a felony. Under the constitutional definition (art. 9, § 12), the offense is synonymous with embezzlement and has been so regarded in all decisions of this court made thereunder (State v. Czizek, 38 Minn. 192, 36 N. W. 457; State v. Ring, 29 Minn. 78, 11 N. W. 233; State v. Baumhager, 28 Minn. 226, 9 N. W. 704; Mims v. State, 26 Minn. 494, 5 N. W. 369; State v. Munch, 22 Minn. 67); and evidence of wilful refusal of a public official to pay over to his successor public funds entrusted to him is sufficient to sustain a conviction therefor. State v. Czizek, 38 Minn. 192, 36 N. W. 457.
But, § 620.03, under which defendant was brought to trial the second time and under which he was convicted, likewise relates to misappropriation of public funds and in substance merely sets forth in statutory form the common-law offense of embezzlement. The proof required to convict under this statute is identical to that required to convict under § 620.01(1) or (4). See majority opinion. It is significant that in the annotations to § 620.03 (40 M. S. A. p. 648) the cases cited are only those in which defendants had been tried under § 620.01, indicating the identity of the two statutes. It is true that § 620.03 is limited in its application to county treasurers; but since defendant here was tried in that capacity under §§ 620.01 and 620.03, this limitation would be of no consequence, in this instance at least.
The conclusion is inescapable that both §§ 620.01 and 620.03 define the crime of embezzlement. Section 620.01(1) fits compactly within the framework of § 620.03. Proof required under § 620.03 is identical to that required under § 620.01(1) or (4). The synonymity of these *71two statutory provisions, no doubt, motivated the repeal of § 620.03 at our most recent legislative session. See, L. 1953, c. 362, § 2.
It would follow that, when defendant was first tried under § 620.01, he was tried for embezzlement, and proof thereof was sought to be established under (4). After his acquittal thereunder, it seems clear that he could not have been tried under § 620.01 again, even if it was intended that proof under one of the remaining three subdivisions thereof would establish his guilt. To hold otherwise would effectuate a rule that the state might proceed four times against a single individual for the same offense, with the only justification that it did not use the proper evidence in each of its former endeavors. The four methods of proof under § 620.01 are simply four different ways of establishing the one offense — embezzlement.
But, if the state could not proceed against defendant more than once under § 620.01, then by the same principle it should not be able to move against him for a second trial under § 620.03 where the offense and method of proof are identical to those defined under § 620.01. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the judgment of conviction should be reversed.