Court Opinion

ID: 9628484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:22:01.091583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:06.215996
License: Public Domain

WARDEN, J.,
dissenting.
Because I agree with plaintiff that his deposition testimony, submitted by defendant to support its motion for *190summary judgment, raises a genuine issue of material fact, I dissent.
In his complaint plaintiff alleges:
“That the foreign material was on the floor for such a period of time that Defendant either knew or should have known of its presence.”
In his deposition he described the material that caused him to fall as “a clump of greenish dried * * * leaves” and “flattened, compressed greenish leaves.” When asked by defendant’s counsel, “Was it wet or dry?,” plaintiff answered, “It was dry.” The evidence that the leaves were compressed permits an inference that the material had been there long enough to have been stepped on by others before plaintiff or to have been run over by grocery carts. The evidence that it was “dry” or “dried” permits an inference that it had been on the floor long enough to have lost some of its moisture. These permissible inferences raise a genuine issue of material fact alleged in plaintiffs complaint, i.e., whether the material had been on the floor long enough that defendant knew or should have known of its presence.
The majority makes something out of nothing in stating:
“Plaintiff was unable to tell what kind of leaves they were, and there was no evidence that there were displays of products containing that type of leafy vegetation near where plaintiff fell. Thus there was no basis for concluding that the material came from a display in the store.” (70 Or App at 188.)
In so stating, the majority implies that, unless plaintiff can identify the species of plant and establish that it came from a display in the store, he has no maintainable claim. Neither is required. Plaintiff need only establish facts from which it may be inferred that the material was on the floor for such period of time that defendant (or its employes) knew or could have known of its presence.
The error of the majority’s result is shown most clearly in two statements:
“Neither is it sufficient that there are equal probabilities that the material was there for two seconds or two hours.” (70 Or App at 188.)
*191and
“At best, there is an equal probability that the leaves were on the floor for two seconds or for two hours.” (70 Or App at 189.)
The resolution of such probabilities is clearly still a jury’s fact-finding function. It is not a question to be decided on motion for summary judgment, i.e., one cannot conclude that the material was on the floor for such a short time that defendant had not time to learn of its presence as a matter of law.
It was error to grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. Therefore, I dissent.
Joseph, C. J., and Van Hoomissen and Rossman, JJ, join in this dissenting opinion.