Court Opinion

ID: 9837985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 21:01:03.829331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:41.108415
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1374

        MYRON HUBBARD,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Columbia. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (3:20-cv-02482-JMC)

        Submitted: June 28, 2023                                     Decided: September 1, 2023

        Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Myron Hubbard, Appellant Pro Se. Charles J. Boykin, BOYKIN & DAVIS, LLC,
        Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Myron Hubbard appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to remand his

        employment discrimination action to state court and subsequent grant of summary

        judgment in favor of his former employer, the South Carolina Department of Mental Health

        (“Defendant”). Hubbard argues that his action, filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

        Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII), was improperly removed

        to federal court and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant

        on his claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. For the

        following reasons, we affirm.

               Hubbard argues that Defendant’s notice of removal was defective because it was

        not filed within 30 days of Defendant’s receipt of service. We review de novo the denial

        of a motion to remand to state court. Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 362, 366 (4th

        Cir. 2013). “A defendant may remove any action from a state court to a federal court if the

        action could have originally been brought in federal court.” Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102

        F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441). “The notice of removal of a civil

        action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through

        service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon

        which such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

               Under South Carolina law, to perfect service on a state agency, a plaintiff must

        “deliver[] a copy of the summons and complaint to such . . . agency and . . . send[] a copy

        of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General at

        Columbia.” South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure (“SCRCP”) 4(d)(5). Service on state

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        agencies is not otherwise allowed by certified mail. See SCRCP 4(d)(8). “The proof of

        service shall state the date, time and place of such service and, if known, the name and

        address of the person actually served[,] . . . [or] if not known, then the date, time and place

        of service and a description of the person actually served.” SCRCP 4(g). Finally, a

        voluntary appearance by a defendant is equivalent to personal service. SCRCP 4(d). Here,

        service was not perfected until Defendant voluntarily appeared in state court. Therefore,

        we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to remand.

               Next, Hubbard argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

        Defendant on his discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. “We

        review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d

        708, 712 (4th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine

        dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we

        view the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to

        the nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).

               To establish a prima facie case of race-based discrimination under Title VII,

        Hubbard was required to show: “(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job

        performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly

        situated employees outside the protected class.” Polk v. Amtrak Nat’l R.R. Passenger

        Corp., 66 F.4th 500, 507 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with

        the district court that Hubbard failed to show that he was treated differently from similarly

        situated employees outside his protected class. Because Hubbard fails to name any

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        potential comparators, we conclude that he has not established a prima facie case of

        discrimination based on his race.

               Turning to the hostile work environment claim, to succeed on such a claim, “a

        plaintiff must show that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s

        race; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of

        employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the

        employer.” McIver v. Bridgestone Ams., Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 407 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned

        up). Harassment is considered sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms or

        conditions of the employment if a workplace is “permeated with discriminatory

        intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard for

        proving an abusive work environment is intended to be a high one because it is designed

        to “filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” Faragher

        v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

        the plaintiff must show not only that he subjectively believed his workplace environment

        was hostile, but also that a reasonable person could perceive it to be objectively hostile.

        McIver, 42 F.4th at 407.

               We agree with the district court that the alleged harassment was neither sufficiently

        severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment nor was the harassment imputable

        to Defendant. It is indisputable that use of the n-word and the posting of a monkey poster,

        as Hubbard alleged, were highly unwelcome and based on racial animus. But these

        incidents were isolated. Moreover, Hubbard never alleged that a supervisor or manager

        used the offensive word. See Chapman v. Oakland Living Ctr., Inc., 48 F.4th 222, 231 (4th

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        Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “even a single use of the n-word or a similar racial slur by a

        supervisor can engender a hostile work environment”). And even if these incidents were

        severe enough to alter the conditions of Hubbard’s employment, Defendant immediately

        attempted to rectify the situation after Hubbard reported the incidents. See Webster v.

        Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404, 415 (4th Cir. 2022) (“An employer may be held

        liable for a hostile work environment if it knew or should have known about the harassment

        and failed to take effective action to stop it by responding with remedial action reasonably

        calculated to end the harassment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

               Finally, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Hubbard needed to “show (1)

        that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that his employer took an adverse action against

        him; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the adverse activity and the protected

        action.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 578 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned

        up). Hubbard failed to present any evidence showing that Defendant was aware of his

        protected activity directed toward a previous employer. He has also failed to show that

        Defendant took any adverse action against him after he first complained of racial

        discrimination in April 2019. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in

        granting summary judgment on this claim.

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               Accordingly, we grant Hubbard’s motion for leave to file his reply brief out of time

        and to exceed the length limitations for his reply brief, and we affirm the district court’s

        judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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