Court Opinion

ID: 9897421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:20.958375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:46.035670
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Apr 20 2023, 8:32 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Wieneke Law Office, LLC                                     Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
                                                            Robert M. Yoke
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brandon L. Pritcher,                                        April 20, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-2196
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Vigo Superior
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            84D03-2009-MR-3218

                                Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                           Judges Vaidik and Weissmann concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023                               Page 1 of 21
      Case Summary
[1]   Following a jury trial, Brandon Pritcher was convicted of murder and sentenced

      to the maximum term of sixty-five years of incarceration. Pritcher appeals and

      claims that: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct constituting fundamental

      error by misstating the law during closing argument; (2) the State failed to

      present sufficient evidence to support Pritcher’s conviction; and (3) his sixty-

      five-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of Pritcher’s offense and

      his character. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Pritcher presents three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

              I.       Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct
                       constituting fundamental error by misstating the law
                       during closing argument.

              II.      Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
                       Pritcher’s conviction.

              III.     Whether Pritcher’s sixty-five year sentence is inappropriate
                       in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
                       offender.

      Facts
[3]   In 2020, Pritcher lived with his girlfriend, Felicia Mize, Pritcher’s seven-year-

      old son, L.P., and Mize’s daughter. In June of that year, Pritcher’s relationship

      with Mize ended, and he and L.P. lived alone. After the breakup of his

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023           Page 2 of 21
      relationship with Mize, Pritcher became very angry and was “short fused.” Tr.

      Vol. II p. 161. Although their relationship ended, Pritcher and Mize still texted

      and telephoned each other.

[4]   In September 2020, Pritcher became irate with L.P. because, Pritcher claimed,

      L.P. had stolen money out of a piggy bank belonging to Mize’s daughter.

      L.P.’s mother, Raven Layton, also saw Pritcher acting “irritable and angry”

      toward L.P. Id. at 162. On September 17, Pritcher telephoned Mize and

      informed her that he believed L.P. had stolen Pritcher’s loaded handgun. On

      September 18, Valarie Wade, Pritcher’s neighbor, saw Pritcher outside with

      L.P. Pritcher went to Wade’s home and told her that L.P. had been stealing

      and asked Wade to speak with L.P. about the alleged stealing. Wade observed

      that L.P. was crying, shaking, and appeared to be terrified.

[5]   On September 19, Mize woke up shortly before 5:00 a.m. and saw that she had

      missed several calls from Pritcher and that Pritcher had sent her several text

      messages. Among the messages Pritcher sent to Mize were, “Not kidding

      nothing I accidentally kill lamp,” and, “I’m going to jail for a while I love you

      hate me I think I.” Ex. Vol. VI, State’s Ex. 37 (spelling and grammatical errors

      in original). Mize believed “lamp” was how Pritcher’s phone auto-corrected

      L.P.’s first name. Tr. Vol. II p. 125. Mize responded by texting, “Whats going

      om are you ok,” and “Why do you keep saying you’re going to jail.” Ex. Vol.

      VI, State’s Ex. 37 (spelling and grammatical errors in original). Pritcher

      responded, “I’m going to jail.” Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023       Page 3 of 21
[6]   At 5:03 a.m. on September 19, Pritcher called 911, and Detective Darryl

      Cooley of the Terre Haute Police Department (“THPD”) arrived on the scene

      four minutes later. When Detective Cooley arrived, Pritcher came out of his

      house carrying L.P.’s limp body. Detective Cooley performed CPR on L.P.

      until emergency medical personnel arrived. The medics put a breathing tube in

      L.P. and transported him to a local hospital. Due to the severity of his injuries,

      L.P. was flown to Riley Children’s Hospital in Indianapolis.

[7]   Between 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on September 19, Mize spoke with Pritcher on

      the phone. Pritcher told Mize that L.P. was stealing money but that L.P.

      denied doing so. Accordingly, Pritcher said, he “beat [L.P.’s] ass.” Tr. Vol. II

      p. 127. Pritcher told Mize that L.P. went into his bedroom and began to beat

      his head against the metal bunkbed and choked himself. Pritcher claimed that,

      after this, L.P. made a strange sound and fell to the floor unconscious. Pritcher

      told Mize that he attempted to revive L.P. by splashing cold water on the boy’s

      face. He also claimed to have performed CPR on L.P. until the police arrived.

[8]   At approximately 5:30 a.m. that morning, Pritcher telephoned L.P.’s mother,

      Layton, but hung up before she could answer the phone. Layton repeatedly

      tried to call Pritcher back, and when he finally answered, Pritcher told Layton

      that he “whipp[ed] [L.P.’]s ass” because he caught the boy looking in the couch

      for change. Id. at 165. Pritcher repeated his story that L.P. locked himself in

      his room and banged his head until he was unconscious. Pritcher told Layton

      that she needed to go to the local hospital where L.P. had been taken.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023       Page 4 of 21
[9]    When L.P. arrived at Riley, he was alive but in very poor condition. Medical

       examination of L.P. revealed that he had suffered from horrific abuse. He was

       covered in bruises “from head-to-toe,” Tr. Vol. III p. 139, and had bruises on

       both ears, his eyes, forehead, arms, legs, both buttocks, and had scratches on his

       side. The bruises were consistent with repeated, high-velocity blows, which is

       consistent with child abuse. The bruising on L.P.’s buttocks were from a

       spanking injury, and the bruises to L.P.’s ears were caused by someone

       grabbing the child “by the ear and shak[ing] [his] head.” Id. at 57. L.P. had

       anemia due to internal hemorrhaging in his brain. Doctors at Riley determined

       that L.P. would not survive, and he was pronounced dead the following day.

       L.P. died as a result of blunt-force injuries to the head that caused numerous

       subgaleal hemorrhages and a subdural hemorrhage. The death was determined

       to be a homicide.

[10]   As L.P. was being transported to the hospital, Pritcher spoke with Detective

       Cooley at Pritcher’s home. Pritcher told Detective Cooley that L.P. was a

       pathological liar who had been stealing money to give to L.P.’s mother,

       Layton. Pritcher also claimed that L.P. had “anger issues.” Tr. Vol. II p. 194.

       Pritcher admitted that he had spanked L.P. for his alleged stealing, after which,

       Pritcher claimed, L.P. locked himself inside his bedroom. Pritcher told Cooley

       that he had to break down the door to L.P.’s room, at which point L.P. began

       to bang his head against the wall and bunkbed. After this, Pritcher claimed,

       L.P. “squeal[ed],” fell to the floor, and was unresponsive. Id. Pritcher told

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023       Page 5 of 21
       Detective Cooley that he did not immediately call 911 because he thought L.P.

       would “come around.” Id. at 199.

[11]   The police took Pritcher to the police station, where they advised him of his

       Miranda rights. Pritcher agreed to speak with the detectives. Pritcher repeated

       his claims that L.P. was stealing money and was a pathological liar. Pritcher

       stated, “it’s f**king obvious I beat his ass, but he’s in there banging his f**king

       head off of s**t. . . . I mean, I beat his ass . . . I whipped his ass[.]” Tr. Vol. III

       p. 78. Pritcher stated that he let anger “get the best of [him],” that he “[k]ept

       whipping [L.P.] because [L.P.] was going to tell the f**king truth,” and that he

       “kept whipping him then [L.P.] went into his room,” where, Pritcher claimed,

       L.P. beat his own head and punched and smacked himself. Id. at 83. Pritcher

       admitted that he “popped [L.P.] on the back of the head.” Id. at 95.

[12]   The police subsequently searched Pritcher’s home and discovered blood, later

       determined to be L.P.’s, on the floor and wall of the hallway. They also

       observed two round dents in the wall below the thermostat. These dents

       appeared to have been made by L.P.’s head hitting the wall. L.P.’s blood was

       found on the sink, toilet, and floor of the bathroom. The police found a belt

       belonging to Pritcher that had L.P.’s blood on it. L.P.’s bedroom door had

       been torn off the frame, but the police found no dents or blood on the frame of

       L.P.’s bed. The police also searched Pritcher’s cell phone and discovered that

       he had deleted the text messages he had sent to Mize on the morning of

       September 19, in which he stated he thought he had killed L.P.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023           Page 6 of 21
[13]   On September 22, 2020, the State charged Pritcher with Count I: murder, a

       felony; Count II: neglect of a dependent resulting in death, a Level 1 felony;

       Count III: aggravated battery of a child less than fourteen years of age, a Level

       1 felony; Count IV: domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a

       person less than fourteen years of age, a Level 3 felony; and Count V: neglect of

       a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 3 felony.

[14]   The trial court held a jury trial from July 11 to July 14, 2022. During closing

       statements, the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury that, to meet the

       statutory definition of “knowingly,” Pritcher “had to have known when he did

       this that it could result in [L.P.]’s death.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 54. Defense counsel

       argued that Pritcher did not knowingly kill L.P. In rebuttal, the prosecuting

       attorney’s arguments included the following statements:

               This is knowingly. A person . . . engages in conduct knowingly
               if, if he engages in this conduct, he is aware of a high probability
               of doing so. In other words, he’s not sleep-walking; he’s not
               doing, he didn’t stumble over somebody. He is aware of a high
               probability of what he’s doing. He doesn’t have to know that
               when he hits that kid on the back of the head it’s gonna kill
               him. Doesn’t have to know that. He just has to know that
               when he’s throwing that kid down or against the wall or
               whatever, that he is aware that that is what he’s doing. That’s
               what knowingly is. He doesn’t have to know this is gonna
               result in this death. He has to know . . . what he’s doing. And
               then the other element is, that did result in his death. He
               doesn’t have to know that that’s what’s gonna happen.
               However, he knew that what he was doing was pretty damn bad.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 7 of 21
       Tr. Vol. IV p. 69 (emphasis added). Pritcher did not object to these statements,

       request an admonishment, or move for a mistrial.

[15]   The trial court’s final instructions to the jury included the statutory definition of

       the charged crime of murder as follows:

               A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human
               being commits Murder, a Felony.

               Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have
               proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

                    1. The Defendant Brandon L. Pritcher;

                    2. knowingly or intentionally;

                    3. killed;

                    4. L.P.

               If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a
               reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty of
               Murder, a Felony, as charged in Count 1.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 122. The trial court also instructed the jury on the

       statutory definition of the mens rea of “knowingly,” as follows:

               A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in
               this conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.

       Id. at 128. This is an almost verbatim quote of Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-

       2(b). The court’s instructions also informed the jury that “[s]tatements made by

       the attorneys are not evidence,” id. at 137, and that the court’s instructions “are

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023         Page 8 of 21
       your best source in determining the law.” Id. at 117. The jury found Pritcher

       guilty as charged on all counts.

[16]   The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 16, 2022. The court found

       as aggravating that Pritcher’s history of juvenile and adult criminal behavior,

       though not terribly lengthy, was “quite disturbing and reflects poorly on his

       character.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 246. Specifically, Pritcher had juvenile

       adjudications for what would be, if committed by an adult, sexual battery, a

       Class D felony, and criminal confinement, a Class D felony. The factual basis

       for this adjudication was that Pritcher forced his victim to have sex while

       another individual held her down and placed a shirt in her mouth to gag her.

[17]   As an adult, Pritcher had a criminal conviction for underage consumption of an

       alcoholic beverage, a Class C misdemeanor. The court also found as

       aggravating that L.P. was only seven years old when Pritcher killed him. The

       trial court assigned great aggravating weight to the fact that Pritcher was L.P.’s

       father and had care and custody of L.P. The court also found as aggravating

       that L.P.’s injuries were “some of the most disturbing evidence this Court has

       observed.” Id. at 247. Lastly, the court noted that, after fatally beating L.P.,

       Pritcher chose to call and message his girlfriend instead of immediately seeking

       medical aid, which demonstrated a “shocking disregard for the life and health

       of his child.” Id.

[18]   As mitigating, the trial court noted that: Pritcher had a history of mental health

       issues, including bipolar disorder, PTSD, and borderline personality disorder;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 9 of 21
       Pritcher had been a victim of sexual abuse as a child; and Pritcher had suffered

       from concussions as a juvenile. The trial court assigned these factors little

       mitigating weight and determined that the aggravators greatly outweighed the

       mitigators. The trial court entered judgment of conviction only on the murder

       verdict, due to double jeopardy concerns, and imposed the maximum sixty-five

       year sentence. Pritcher now appeals. 1

       Discussion and Decision
       I. Fundamental Error Due to Prosecutor’s Misstatements of the Law

[19]   Pritcher first argues that fundamental error occurred because the prosecuting

       attorney committed misconduct by misstating the law regarding the State’s

       burden of proof during the State’s rebuttal to Pritcher’s closing statement.

       Pritcher argues fundamental error because he acknowledges that he failed to

       object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial and failed to request an

       admonishment to the jury or move for a mistrial. These steps are required to

       preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal. Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d

       663, 667 (Ind. 2014).

[20]   When a claim of prosecutorial misconduct has been waived due to failure to

       properly raise the claim in the trial court, the defendant on appeal must

       establish not only the grounds for prosecutorial misconduct but must also

       1
        We held oral argument in this case on March 16, 2023, at Andrean High School in Merrillville, Indiana.
       We extend our thanks to the administration, faculty, and students of the school for their hospitality, and we
       commend counsel for the quality of their arguments.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023                               Page 10 of 21
establish that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted fundamental error. Ryan, 9

N.E.3d at 667-68 (citing Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817-18 (Ind. 2002)). In

Ryan, our Supreme Court explained in some detail the difficulty of establishing

fundamental error on appeal:

        Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the
        waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of
        showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the
        defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial impossible. In other
        words, to establish fundamental error, the defendant must show
        that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not sua
        sponte raising the issue because alleged errors (a) constitute clearly
        blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due
        process and (b) present an undeniable and substantial potential
        for harm. The element of such harm is not established by the fact
        of ultimate conviction but rather depends upon whether [the
        defendant’s] right to a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the
        denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth
        to which he otherwise would have been entitled. In evaluating
        the issue of fundamental error, our task in this case is to look at
        the alleged misconduct in the context of all that happened and all
        relevant information given to the jury—including evidence
        admitted at trial, closing argument, and jury instructions—to
        determine whether the misconduct had such an undeniable and
        substantial effect on the jury’s decision that a fair trial was
        impossible.

9 N.E.3d at 668 (internal citations, quotations, and footnote omitted). The

Ryan Court also noted that an appellant “is ‘highly unlikely’ to prevail on a

claim of fundamental error relating to prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. (citing

Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 80, 99 (Ind. 2011)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023         Page 11 of 21
[21]   In the present case, Pritcher argues that the prosecutor, during the State’s

       rebuttal, told the jury that “Pritcher had to be aware of a high probability that

       he was . . . battering L.P.’s head, and not the prohibited conduct of killing L.P.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 13. This, Pritcher argues, is incorrect because, to convict

       Pritcher of murder, the State had to prove that Pritcher was aware of a high

       probability that he would kill L.P., not simply batter him. Because the

       prosecutor misstated the law, Pritcher claims that the prosecutor committed

       prosecutorial misconduct. The State counters that the prosecutor’s statements,

       taken as a whole, did not misstate the law.

[22]   We think it clear that the prosecutor’s statement during rebuttal misstated the

       law. The prosecutor essentially argued that the jury need find only that Pritcher

       was aware of a high probability that he was beating L.P., not that he was aware

       of a high probability that he would kill L.P. Yet, in order to convict Pritcher of

       murder, the State had to prove that Pritcher was aware of a high probability

       that his conduct would kill L.P.

[23]   The question, then, is whether the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law

       constitutes fundamental error. Pritcher claims that the prosecutor’s

       misstatement of the law made a fair trial impossible because the jury could

       convict Pritcher for murder if he only knowingly beat L.P., even if he did not

       knowingly kill L.P. The State argues that, because the trial court properly

       instructed the jury with regard to the State’s burden of proof and the elements

       of the crime, no fundamental error occurred. We agree with the State.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023       Page 12 of 21
[24]   It is well settled that “the jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions

       and not law recited by counsel during arguments.” Laux v. State, 985 N.E.2d

       739, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, our courts have long held that any

       misstatement of law during closing arguments is presumably cured by the trial

       court’s final jury instructions. See Santiago v. State, 985 N.E.2d 760, 764 n.2

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Laux, 985 N.E.2d at 750 (both citing Hudgins v. State, 451

       N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind. 1983)). “[C]losing arguments are rightly received by

       the jury as partisan advocacy, not impartial statements of the law, and thus are

       likely to have little effect on the jury’s understanding of the law.” Castillo v.

       State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 469 n.11 (Ind. 2012); accord Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668.

[25]   Here, the trial court’s final instructions properly informed the jury that, before it

       could convict Pritcher of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable

       doubt that Pritcher “knowingly” killed L.P. The final instructions also correctly

       defined the “knowingly” mens rea. Read together, the final instructions properly

       informed the jury that, to convict Pritcher of murder, the State had to prove

       beyond a reasonable doubt that Pritcher engaged in conduct by beating L.P.

       and that he was aware of a high probability that L.P. might die as a result. See

       Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 882 (Ind. 2017) (“A person knowingly kills

       when they are ‘aware of a high probability’ that their actions may kill.”)

       (quoting I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b)). Under these facts and circumstances, the

       prosecutor’s misstatement of the law did not amount to fundamental error.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023         Page 13 of 21
       II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[26]   Pritcher next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his

       conviction for murder. Claims of insufficient evidence “warrant a deferential

       standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness

       credibility.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020) (citing Perry v.

       State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (Ind. 1994)). We consider only the evidence

       supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that

       evidence. Id. (citing Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert.

       denied). “We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of

       probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the

       defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We affirm the

       conviction “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the

       crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the

       evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is

       sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the

       verdict.” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting

       Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[27]   To obtain a conviction for murder, the State was required to prove that Pritcher

       knowingly or intentionally killed L.P. “A person knowingly kills when they are

       ‘aware of a high probability’ that their actions may kill.” Leonard, 80 N.E.3d at

       882 (quoting I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b)). “Knowledge and intent are both mental states

       and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the

       reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 14 of 21
       determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to

       commit the offense in question.” Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022), trans. denied; see also Leonard, 80 N.E.3d at 883 (“Because

       knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the trier of fact must resort to

       reasonable inferences of its existence.”). “In deciding whether a defendant was

       aware of the high probability that his actions would result in the death of a

       victim, the jury may consider the duration and brutality of a defendant’s

       actions, and the relative strengths and sizes of a defendant and victim.”

       Williams v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. 2001) (citing Childers v. State, 719

       N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Ind. 1999)).

[28]   Pritcher acknowledges that there was sufficient evidence to prove that he struck

       L.P. on the head and that L.P. died as a result of injuries to his head. Pritcher

       argues, however, that the State failed to prove that Pritcher knowingly killed

       L.P. Specifically, he contends that the State argued and proved only that, when

       Pritcher beat L.P., he could 2 cause L.P.’s death. In so arguing, Pritcher refers

       2
          Pritcher briefly argues that the prosecutor also misstated the law by arguing that, to knowingly kill L.P.,
       Pritcher had to be aware that his actions “could” result in L.P.’s death, as opposed to “would” result in his
       death. Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181 (Ind. 2021). In
       Ramirez, the trial court used the word “could” instead of “would” when giving a supplemental instruction to
       the jury regarding the “knowingly” mens rea in a murder case. The Court held that this was not a
       misstatement of the law, noting that the trial court’s instruction was “prefaced by requiring that the jury must
       find the defendant was aware of ‘a high probability that said injury could cause the death of the other
       person.’” Id. at 199 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court held that, “the instruction’s use of the phrase
       ‘high probability’ clearly told the jury that a probability—not a possibility—was required.” Id. The Court
       further noted that “appellate courts have used ‘could’ instead of ‘would’ when describing the level of
       culpability required to find that a defendant ‘knowingly’ killed a victim.” Id. (citing Jones v. State, 689 N.E.2d
       722, 725 (Ind. 1997)). Again, here, any error in the use of the word “could” was during the State’s closing
       argument, not the trial court’s instructions, which properly defined the “knowingly” mens rea. Given the
       holding in Ramirez, Pritcher’s argument regarding the prosecutor’s use of the word “could” is unavailing.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023                                  Page 15 of 21
       again to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law in its rebuttal argument. The

       State counters that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s

       verdict are sufficient to prove that Pritcher knowingly killed L.P.

[29]   We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Pritcher’s

       conviction. Pritcher was alone with L.P. when the boy’s injuries were inflicted;

       thus, there is no question about whether another caretaker inflicted the injuries.

       Pritcher claims that many of L.P.’s injuries could have been self-inflicted. The

       only evidence, however, supporting this theory is Pritcher’s own self-serving

       testimony, which the jury was free to discredit. Moreover, the forensic

       pathologist who testified at trial explicitly explained that L.P.’s injuries could

       not have been self-inflicted. Indeed, there was testimony that L.P.’s injuries

       were caused by repeated, forceful blows to the boy’s head. When speaking with

       the police, Pritcher also admitted to “beat[ing]” and “whipp[ing] [L.P.’s] ass.”

       Tr. Vol. III p. 78.

[30]   In spite of all of this evidence, Pritcher argues that he did not “knowingly” kill

       L.P. Pritcher, however, was a full-grown man who stood 6' 2" tall and weighed

       over 240 pounds. L.P., in contrast, was 4' 5" tall and weighed just seventy-

       seven pounds. Pritcher’s beatings also inflicted horrific injuries on L.P., who

       had bruises all over his body, in addition to severe bleeding in his brain.

[31]   In cases involving adults beating small children, the requisite intent to kill may

       be “inferred from repeated severe blows to a child where anyone with

       reasonable judgment would know that blows of such magnitude could fatally

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 16 of 21
       injure the child.” Anderson v. State, 466 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1984). Given the

       nature and severity of L.P.’s injuries, sufficient evidence was presented from

       which the jury could reasonably conclude that Pritcher was aware of a high

       probability that his actions of beating L.P. might kill the boy. See Burns v. State,

       59 N.E.3d 323, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“[W]here blows of magnitude are

       repeated, a jury [can] conclude that the defendant had an intent to kill.”) (citing

       Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 1992)).

       III. Appropriateness of Pritcher’s Sentence

[32]   The trial court entered judgment of conviction only on the murder verdict and

       sentenced Pritcher to the maximum sixty-five year sentence. Pritcher argues

       that this sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution authorizes

       independent appellate review and revision of a trial court’s sentencing decision.

       See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020).

       Our Supreme Court has implemented this authority through Indiana Appellate

       Rule 7(B), which allows this Court to revise a sentence when it is

       “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the

       offender.” Our review of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not an act of

       second guessing the trial court’s sentence; rather, “[o]ur posture on appeal is [ ]

       deferential” to the trial court. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind.

       2016) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 946 (Ind. 2014)). We exercise our

       authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) only in “exceptional cases, and its exercise

       ‘boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate.’” Mullins v. State, 148

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 17 of 21
       N.E.3d 986, 987 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d

       158, 160 (Ind. 2019)).

[33]   The principal role of appellate review of sentences is “to attempt to ‘leaven the

       outliers.’” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Cardwell v.

       State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). The point is “not to achieve a

       perceived correct sentence.” Id. “Whether a sentence should be deemed

       inappropriate ‘turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity

       of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to

       light in a given case.’” Id. (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224). When

       determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the

       starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the

       crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014).

[34]   Pritcher received the maximum sentence for murder. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-

       3(a). “The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that ‘the maximum possible

       sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.’” Martin v.

       State, 179 N.E.3d 1060, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Buchanan v. State,

       767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied.

               This is not, however, a guideline to determine whether a worse
               offender could be imagined. Despite the nature of any particular
               offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or
               hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario. Although
               maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the worst
               offenders, we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders
               that warrant the maximum punishment. But such class
               encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and offenders.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 18 of 21
       Id. (quoting Buchanan, 767 N.E.2d at 973).

       A. Nature of the Offense

[35]   Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the nature,

       extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense. See Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d

       1, 5 (Ind. 2014). Deference to the trial court’s sentence “should prevail unless

       overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the

       offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of

       brutality).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). We may also

       consider whether the offender “was in a position of trust” with the victim.

       Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011).

[36]   In the present case, Pritcher acknowledges that the killing of a child is always

       an egregious offense, but he repeats his claim that there was no evidence that he

       knowingly killed L.P. This merely restates his sufficiency-of-the-evidence

       argument, which we have rejected above. We can find no compelling evidence

       that would portray the nature of Pritcher’s offense in a positive light. Pritcher

       savagely beat his own seven-year-old son and inflicted numerous, horrific

       injuries that resulted in the young child’s untimely death. The photos of L.P.’s

       severe injuries, which were admitted into evidence and included in the record,

       are difficult to look at, even for those who are accustomed to seeing photos of

       murder victims. Pritcher showed no restraint, regard, or lack of brutality while

       beating his son to death. We also cannot overlook the position of trust that

       Pritcher was in as L.P.’s father. Pritcher was the sole physical custodian of his

       own son and abused this position of trust in one of the most unspeakable ways
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023       Page 19 of 21
       imaginable. The nature of Pritcher’s offense in no way suggests that Pritcher’s

       maximum sixty-five year sentence is inappropriate.

       B. Character of the Offender.

[37]   Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a

       defendant’s qualities, including the defendant’s age, criminal history,

       background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d

       91, 100 (Ind. 2021). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a

       defendant’s character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the gravity,

       nature, proximity, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current

       offense. Pierce, 949 N.E.2d at 352-53. “Even a minor criminal history is a poor

       reflection of a defendant’s character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014), trans. denied). Again, deference to the trial court’s sentence “should

       prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light . .

       . the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent

       examples of good character).” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[38]   Pritcher notes that he has only one adult criminal conviction, for the minor

       offense of underage consumption of alcohol. But his juvenile history for sexual

       battery and criminal confinement reflects poorly on his character. During the

       sentencing hearing, moreover, L.P.’s mother, Layton, testified that the only

       point during the trial in which Pritcher showed any emotion was when

       Pritcher’s ex-girlfriend, Mize, showed up to the trial accompanied by another

       man. And Mize testified that Pritcher physically abused her during their
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023        Page 20 of 21
       relationship by punching and choking her on several occasions. Pritcher’s poor

       character was further evidenced when Pritcher chose to call and text Mize

       instead of immediately calling 911, which, as the trial court noted, showed a

       “shocking disregard for the life and health of his child.” Appellant’s App. Vol.

       II p. 247.

[39]   Although Pritcher argues that his gainful employment reflects well on his

       character, we have long held that most people are gainfully employed, and this

       does not weigh in favor of a lesser sentence. Hale v. State, 128 N.E.3d 456, 465

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2017), trans. denied). Considering the brutal and heinous nature of Pritcher’s

       offense and his lack of good character, and giving due deference to the trial

       court’s sentencing decision, we cannot say that Pritcher’s sixty-five year

       sentence for the beating death of his seven-year-old son is inappropriate.

       Conclusion
[40]   The prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during closing argument did not

       constitute fundamental error because the trial court properly instructed the jury

       regarding the elements of murder and the correct definition of the requisite mens

       rea of knowingly. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Pritcher’s

       conviction, and Pritcher’s sixty-five year sentence is not inappropriate.

       Accordingly, we affirm Pritcher’s conviction and sentence.

[41]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2196 | April 20, 2023      Page 21 of 21