Court Opinion

ID: 9384098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 19:03:23.649798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:50.570927
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                      Electronically Filed
                                                      Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                      CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                      31-MAR-2023
                                                      08:18 AM
                                                      Dkt. 58 SO

                               NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

                     IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

                             OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

                 STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                   v.
           RYLEE ANUHEA FETUAO RAMSEYER, Defendant-Appellant

          APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                            KĀNE#OHE DIVISION
                        (CASE NO. 1DTA-18-02818)

                          SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
         (By:     Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Nakasone, JJ.)

                Defendant-Appellant Rylee A.F. Ramseyer (Ramseyer)
appeals from the "Order and Notice of Entry of Order" entered by
the District Court of the First Circuit (District Court)1 on
February 12, 2021, in which she was convicted after a bench trial
of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant
(OVUII) in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-
61(a)(1).2

     1
          The Honorable Sherri-Ann L. Iha presided.
     2
          HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) (Supp. 2018) provides:

                (a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle
                under the influence of an intoxicant if the person operates
                or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle:
                      (1)   While under the influence of alcohol in an
                            amount sufficient to impair the person's normal
                            mental faculties or ability to care for the
                            person and guard against casualty[.]
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

          On appeal, Ramseyer raises five points of error: (1)
the District Court erred in relying on the testimony of Honolulu
Police Department (HPD) Sergeant Sherman Dowkin (Sgt. Dowkin)
because he testified that he did not have a present recollection
of Ramseyer's Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST)
performance; (2) the District Court erred in denying Ramseyer's
motion to suppress the results of the SFST because the medical
rule-out questions constituted "custodial interrogation"; (3) the
District Court erred in denying her motion for new trial due to
fundamental fairness; (4) the District Court's Tachibana colloquy
was defective; and (5) the Complaint did not meet the
requirements of HRS § 805-1.
           For the following reasons, we agree with Ramseyer's
second point of error, that the District Court's denial of
Ramseyer's motion to suppress the medical rule-out questions must
be vacated. To the extent that Ramseyer's third and fifth points
of error are relevant on remand to the District Court, we also
address these points below.
           At approximately 1:50 a.m. on August 7, 2018, Sgt.
Dowkin observed Ramseyer's vehicle in the left lane on Kailua
Road "weaving continuously". Ramseyer's vehicle then entered
into the left-turn lane on Kailua Road and came to a stop three
quarters of the way past the white stop line, halfway blocking
the crosswalk. Ramseyer's vehicle then "turned left wide onto
Kalaniana#ole Highway onto the right shoulder where it remained
for about a hundred feet, weaving on the shoulder." Sgt. Dowkin
observed Ramseyer's vehicle slowly drift back into the lane after
about a hundred feet. At some point, Kalaniana#ole Highway
turned into two lanes and Sgt. Dowkin observed Ramseyer's vehicle
continue to slowly weave between lanes, and paced Ramseyer's
speed over the speed limit.
           Sgt. Dowkin pulled Ramseyer over, observed that
Ramseyer was the only occupant in the vehicle, informed her of
the reasons for the stop, and requested Ramseyer's driver's
license, registration, and no-fault insurance card. Sgt. Dowkin

                                  2
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

observed Ramseyer had red, watery, bloodshot eyes, noticed a very
strong odor of alcohol coming from her breath, and that she was
slurring her speech. Sgt. Dowkin then offered Ramseyer the SFST
to which she consented and exited her vehicle. Sgt. Dowkin asked
her the medical rule-out questions and after the SFST, HPD
Officer Francis Yanagi arrested Ramseyer for OVUII, and Sgt.
Dowkin issued a citation for "[d]isregarding a red light and for
crossing a solid white line which separates the shoulder from the
main travel portion of the roadway."
          (1) We first address Ramseyer's second point of error
as it is dispositive. Ramseyer contends the District Court erred
in failing to suppress Ramseyer's responses to the medical rule-
out questions and the results of the SFST as "fruit of the
poisonous tree" because the medical rule-out questions
constituted custodial interrogation which triggered Miranda
warning requirements. Ramseyer argues that the District Court
cited her performance on the SFST as one of the primary factors
in its decisions and without Ramseyer's responses to the medical
rule-out questions and the subsequent SFST, there was no
substantial evidence to support conviction.
          "An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to
suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was 'right' or
'wrong.'" State v. Weldon, 144 Hawai#i 522, 530, 445 P.3d 103,
111 (2019) (quoting State v. Tominiko, 126 Hawai#i 68, 75, 266
P.3d 1122, 1129 (2011)).
          In addressing Ramseyer's argument that the medical
rule-out questions constituted custodial interrogation, we first
review the District Court's finding that Ramseyer was not in
custody at the time Sgt. Dowkin asked the medical rule-out
questions and conducted the SFST.
          The Hawai#i Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that
a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings as
required by the Hawai#i Constitution:
          [I]f an objective assessment of the totality of the
          circumstances reflects either (1) that the person has become
          impliedly accused of committing a crime because the

                                    3
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

          questions of the police have become sustained and coercive,
          such that they are no longer reasonably designed briefly to
          confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion or (2) that the
          point of arrest has arrived because either (a) probable
          cause to arrest has developed or (b) the police have
          subjected the person to an unlawful "de facto" arrest
          without probable cause to do so.

State v. Hewitt, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 2023 WL 2523652, at *8-9 (Haw.
Mar. 15, 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Ketchum, 97
Hawai#i 107, 126, 34 P.3d 1006, 1025 (2001)). In Hewitt, the
Hawai#i Supreme Court expressly overruled its previous holding in
State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 151 Hawai#i 283, 511 P.3d 783
(2022), to the extent that the majority in Sagapolutele-Silva
"eliminated the bright-line 'probable cause' test for custody and
required analyzing 'custody' based on multiple factors[,]"
including probable cause as a factor. Hewitt, 2023 WL 2523652,
at *10. Therefore, Miranda warnings are required when probable
cause to arrest has developed. Id. (citing Ketchum, 97 Hawai#i at
126, 34 P.3d at 1025).
          Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
          within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonably
          trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to
          warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
          offense has been committed. This requires more than a mere
          suspicion but less than a certainty.

State v. Maganis, 109 Hawai#i 84, 86, 123 P.3d 679, 681 (2005)
(emphasis and citation omitted).
          During the hearing on Ramseyer's motion to suppress,
Sgt. Dowkin testified that as he observed Ramseyer's driving, he
thought that the driver may be impaired "[p]ossibly when the
person stopped past the stop line." Sgt. Dowkin also testified
that after he stopped Ramseyer, he observed that Ramseyer's eyes
"appeared to be red, bloodshot and watery[,] [t]here was a very
strong alcoholic-type beverage odor on her breath and her speech
sounded a little bit slurred." Sgt. Dowkin testified Ramseyer's
speech was slurred in that the words were indistinct, ran
together, and some words "drug out some of the syllables." He
also noticed the odor of alcohol almost immediately upon
approaching her window. Sgt. Dowkin asked Ramseyer to produce

                                    4
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

her driver's license, vehicle no-fault insurance and vehicle
registration, and she complied. Prior to asking Ramseyer if she
was willing to perform the SFST, her documents were in Sgt.
Dowkin's possession and she was not free to leave.
          Given the record in this case, we conclude that based
on Sgt. Dowkin's testimony of his observations of Ramseyer's
driving and his interactions with her after the stop, there was
sufficient probable cause that she was operating her vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant, such that Ramseyer
was in custody prior to the medical rule-out questions. See State
v. Ogata, NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2020 WL 3430060, at *3 (Haw. App.
June 23, 2020) (SDO) (holding officer had probable cause to
arrest defendant for OVUII after defendant was removed from his
vehicle and officers observed, inter alia, that defendant could
not respond to questions or verbal commands, and "was very
disoriented; had red, bloodshot, and watery eyes; slurred speech;
gave off a strong odor of alcohol; and could not stay on his
feet"); State v. Bayardelger, NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2020 WL
3056088, at *2 (Haw. App. June 9, 2020) (SDO) (holding there was
substantial evidence to convict defendant of OVUII even without
evidence of the SFST based on officer's testimony that he
observed defendant's vehicle drift out of its lane of travel five
times over the course of about a mile, and after stopping
defendant, noticed a very strong odor of alcohol coming from
inside the vehicle, the odor appeared stronger or coming from
defendant, and defendant had red, watery, and glassy eyes); State
v. Brown, NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 1323990, at *1 (Haw. App.
Mar. 25, 2019) (SDO) (holding there was substantial evidence to
convict defendant for OVUII where officer testified Brown's
vehicle swerved from one lane of traffic into another lane,
almost hit a vehicle, and accelerated through a red light; after
the officer pulled Brown over for the traffic violations, the
officer noticed Brown had red, water, and glassy eyes, slurred
speech, and had the strong smell of alcohol coming from his
breath).

                                  5
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

           In this case, probable cause to arrest Ramseyer for
OVUII had developed and therefore, Ramseyer was in custody before
being asked the medical rule-out questions. We thus turn to
whether the medical rule-out questions and the SFST were
"interrogation" requiring Miranda warnings prior to questioning
and administration.
           In State v. Skapinok, 151 Hawai#i 170, 185, 510 P.3d
599, 614 (2022), the Hawai#i Supreme Court held that all seven
medical rule-out questions preceding the SFST while Skapinok was
in custody, were likely to elicit an incriminating response and
therefore Miranda warnings were required, and Skapinok's answers
must be suppressed. Here, based on Sgt. Dowkin's testimony, the
seven medical rule-out questions in Skapinok are the same or
substantially similar to the questions Sgt. Dowkin asked
Ramseyer.3 Therefore, the medical rule-out questions Sgt. Dowkin
asked Ramseyer while she was in custody were "interrogation"
requiring Miranda warnings and the District Court erred in
failing to suppress Ramseyer's responses to the medical rule-out
questions.
           Finally, Ramseyer argues that her performance on the
SFST should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree"
because the medical rule-out questions constituted custodial
interrogation which triggered Miranda warning requirements. We
disagree.
           "The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine prohibits
the use of evidence at trial which comes to light as a result of
the exploitation of a previous illegal act of the police."
Skapinok, 151 Hawai#i at 186, 510 P.3d at 615 (brackets,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). In Skapinok,
the Hawai#i Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause Skapinok was in

      3
         During the hearing on Ramseyer's motion to suppress, Sgt. Dowkin
testified that one of his questions during the medical rule-out questions was
whether Ramseyer was wearing corrective lenses. During the bench trial on
January 14, 2021, Sgt. Dowkin testified that he asked Ramseyer whether she had
an artificial or glass eye, the same question in Skapinok. 151 Hawai#i at 184,
510 P.3d at 613.

                                      6
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

custody at the time the officer asked [the medical rule-out
questions], Miranda warnings were required, and her answers to
them must be suppressed." Id. at 185, 510 P.3d at 614. However,
the supreme court explained, "[a]lthough they immediately
preceded the SFST in time, the medical rule-out questions did not
give the officers information that led them to search for
evidence of intoxication, nor did the medical rule-out questions
pique their suspicions such that their investigation was
'directed' towards discovering evidence of intoxication." Id. at
186, 510 P.3d at 615 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Manion, 151 Hawai#i 267, 273, 511 P.3d
766, 772 (2022)).
          In both Skapinok and Manion, the officers had already
set out to administer the SFST before asking the medical rule-out
questions and both defendants agreed to participate in the SFST
prior to any interrogation, i.e., the medical rule-out questions.
Skapinok, 151 Hawai#i at 187, 510 P.3d at 616; Manion, 151 Hawai#i
at 273, 511 P.3d at 772. The same is true in this case. Prior
to asking the medical rule-out questions and administering the
SFST, Sgt. Dowkin offered Ramseyer the SFST and Ramseyer agreed
to participate. Therefore, "[t]he officers did not exploit the
illegality by continuing to gather evidence that they had already
set out to gather." Skapinok, 151 Hawai#i at 187, 510 P.3d at
616 (quoting Manion, 151 Hawai#i at 273, 511 P.3d at 772).
          Therefore, the District Court did not err in admitting
Ramseyer's performance on the SFST into evidence.
          (2) Ramseyer argues that the District Court abused its
discretion in denying her Motion for New Trial due to fundamental
fairness because the State failed to advise her of a forthcoming
plea offer to similarly situated defendants. Ramseyer argues
that after she was found guilty on January 14, 2021, the
prosecutor's office sent out an email to all deputy prosecuting
attorneys on January 25, 2021, setting forth terms of a plea
offer developed to address the backlog of OVUII cases that arose
due to the pandemic.

                                  7
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

          As a general matter, the granting or denial of a motion for
          new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court
          and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
          discretion. . . . The trial court abuses its discretion when
          it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules
          or principles of law or practice to the substantial
          detriment of a party litigant.

State v. Yamada, 108 Hawai#i 474, 478, 122 P.3d 254, 258 (2005)
(citation omitted).
          Although Ramseyer claims the plea deal was offered to
"[d]efendants in the same situation as Ramseyer[,]" she fails to
show that, even if the District Court granted her motion, the
State would have offered the plea to her. To the contrary,
during the hearing on April 1, 2021, the State argued that
          if there was a new trial, it will be up to the
          State or the next deputy to see if we're going to
          extend that plea offer to you folks. But with
          that being said, I can't even guarantee that we're
          going to offer, even if a trial was granted, we're
          going to offer the same deal in the future[.]

          Moreover, based on our review of the record, it appears
there were two hearings during which the District Court heard
arguments related to a Motion for a New Trial. Although Ramseyer
provides the transcripts for the April 1, 2021 hearing, she fails
to provide transcripts for the February 11, 2021 hearing. See
State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai#i 333, 334, 3 P.3d 499, 500 (2000)
("When an appellant desires to raise any point on appeal that
requires the consideration of the oral proceedings before the
court appealed from, the appellant bears the burden to show error
by reference to matters in the record, and he or she has the
responsibility of providing the relevant transcript.")
          The District Court's minutes for the February 11, 2021
hearing state: "Defense stated that they filed a Motion for a New
Trial, and if granted, she was hoping to take advantage of the
State's offer. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Dominic Jancaterino
stated for the record that the State objects, trial had, and she
was found guilty." Thereafter, the minutes state that, "Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney Chase Sakai present, informed Court that he

                                    8
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

was able to talk to his boss, State's position is that they would
be objecting, and would not be offering the deal."
          Without the transcripts for the February 11, 2021
hearing, we are unable to fully review the District Court's
decision to deny Ramseyer's Motion for New Trial during the April
1, 2021 hearing, which references the discussion from the
February hearing. Based on this record, the District Court did
not err in denying Ramseyer's Motion for New trial.
          (3) Finally, Ramseyer relies on State v. Thompson, 150
Hawai#i 262, 500 P.3d 447 (2021) and contends the Complaint in
this case did not comply with the requirements of HRS § 805-1
because the Complaint was signed by the deputy prosecuting
attorney but was not supported by a declaration and was not
signed by a complainant.4
          The Hawai#i Supreme Court recently held that under the
plain language of HRS § 805-1 and case law interpreting past
versions of HRS § 805-1, the statute only applies to complaints

     4
         HRS § 805-1 (2014) provides:

           §805-1 Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint is made
           to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any offense,
           the prosecuting officer shall examine the complainant, shall
           reduce the substance of the complaint to writing, and shall
           cause the complaint to be subscribed by the complainant
           under oath, which the prosecuting officer is hereby
           authorized to administer, or the complaint shall be made by
           declaration in accordance with the rules of court. If the
           original complaint results from the issuance of a traffic
           summons or a citation in lieu of an arrest pursuant to
           section 803-6, by a police officer, the oath may be
           administered by any police officer whose name has been
           submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been
           designated by the chief of police to administer the oath, or
           the complaint may be submitted by declaration in accordance
           with the rules of court. Upon presentation of the written
           complaint to the judge in whose circuit the offense
           allegedly has been committed, the judge shall issue a
           warrant, reciting the complaint and requiring the sheriff,
           or other officer to whom it is directed, except as provided
           in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to bring the
           accused before the judge to be dealt with according to law;
           and in the same warrant the judge may require the officer to
           summon such witnesses as are named in the warrant to appear
           and give evidence at the trial. The warrant may be in the
           form established by the usage and practice of the issuing
           court.

                                        9
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

that seek a penal summons or an arrest warrant. State v.
Mortensen-Young, SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2023 WL 2519396 *7, *11-13
(Haw. Mar. 15, 2023). In Mortensen-Young, a consolidated appeal,
the appellees were charged in separate cases with the offense of
OVUII. Id. at *1, *4 n.5. When the State filed the complaints,
the appellees had already been arrested and released on bail
before forty-eight hours had passed. Id. at *9, 14. The supreme
court rejected the appellees' arguments that Thompson and HRS
§ 805-1 applied to their cases because the State did not use the
complaints to seek a penal summons or an arrest warrant. Id. at
*7. The court held that under the circumstances in that case,
the state properly initiated the criminal proceedings pursuant to
Rule 7 of the Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP). Id. at
*14.
          Here, similar to Mortensen-Young, Ramseyer was arrested
for OVUII after being stopped, and she was released on bail the
same day with notice to appear in the District Court on September
4, 2018. See HRPP Rule 5(a). Thus, a penal summons or an arrest
warrant was not issued in this case and was not necessary.
Ramseyer makes no argument that the complaint failed to comply
with HRPP Rule 7.
          Given our rulings above, we need not address Ramseyer's
first and fourth points of error.
          Therefore, based on the foregoing, the February 12,
2021 "Order and Notice of Entry of Order" entered by the District
Court of the First Circuit is vacated. This case is remanded for
a new trial consistent with this opinion.
          DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, March 31, 2023.

On the briefs:                        /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
                                      Chief Judge
Alen M. Kaneshiro,
for Defendant-Appellant               /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
                                      Associate Judge
Donn Fudo,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,          /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
for Plaintiff-Appellee                Associate Judge

                                 10