Court Opinion

ID: 9404542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 14:05:40.934818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.110585
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0137-MR

LANORA KAY REEDY                                                    APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 21-CI-00274

JEREMY S. LOGSDON,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND JEREMY S.
LOGSDON, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS GRAYSON COUNTY
ATTORNEY                                                            APPELLEES

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Lanora Kay Reedy appeals the order of the Grayson Circuit

Court, entered January 6, 2022, dismissing her complaint. After careful review of

the briefs, record, and law, we affirm.
             BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                At issue is Logsdon’s conduct in Reedy’s ongoing criminal case,

Grayson County Action Number 16-M-00453. In the underlying complaint, Reedy

alleged that the former Grayson County Attorney, conspiring with other

community members, brought criminal actions against her and her husband in an

effort to force them to relinquish or diminish their rights to a disputed roadway.

She further claimed that, subsequent to his election as the current Grayson County

Attorney, Logsdon participated in this conspiracy by continuing to prosecute the

meritless charges against her and by offering her a plea deal contingent on her

abandonment of related state and federal civil suits against Logsdon and others.

By this conduct, Reedy maintains that Logsdon, in both his official and individual

capacities, violated his oath of office as provided by Section 228 of the Kentucky

Constitution, his duty to seek recusal pursuant to KRS1 15.733, and the Kentucky

Rules of Professional Conduct; thus, she is entitled to compensatory and punitive

damages.

                Invoking the right to absolute immunity, Logsdon moved to dismiss

the action pursuant to CR2 12.02(f). By order entered January 6, 2022, the

Grayson Circuit Court agreed, concluding that sovereign and prosecutorial

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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immunity barred Reedy’s suit, and dismissed the complaint. This appeal timely

followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             CR 12.02(f) authorizes judgment in favor of a defendant for a

plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” When

considering a motion to dismiss, “the pleadings should be liberally construed in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations taken in the complaint to be

true.” Cotton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 587 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Ky. App.

2019) (quoting Mims v. Western-Southern Agency, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Ky.

App. 2007)). “Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no

deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the

issue de novo.” Id. (quoting Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010)).

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

             Reedy asserts the court erred by dismissing her complaint when she

alleged therein that Logsdon acted in bad faith and, pursuant to O’Connell v.

Theineman, was therefore not entitled to qualified official immunity. 616 S.W.3d

704 (Ky. App. 2020). In response, Logsdon contends Reedy’s claims of error are

irrelevant given the court’s conclusion he was entitled to absolute immunity in

both his official and individual capacities. We agree with Logsdon.

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             The court’s conclusion that sovereign immunity precludes Reedy’s

suit against Logsdon in his official capacity is supported by well-established law.

“Sovereign immunity ‘is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that precludes

the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its consent or

otherwise waived its immunity.’” Independence Bank v. Welch, 636 S.W.3d 528,

532 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Ky. 2001)).

This protection extends to counties as basic subdivisions of the Commonwealth

and to county employees acting in their representative official capacities since an

action against them is essentially an action against the county. See id. (citing

Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2004));

Harrod v. Caney, 547 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Ky. App. 2018). Accordingly, to the

extent Logsdon was sued in his official capacity, he is entitled to sovereign

immunity unless Reedy can demonstrate that immunity was explicitly waived by

the General Assembly. Ruplinger v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, 607

S.W.3d 583, 586 (Ky. 2020) (citing Dep’t of Corrs. v. Furr, 23 S.W.3d 615, 616

(Ky. 2000)). Reedy has made no attempt to satisfy her burden of proof.

             Similarly, Reedy has failed to demonstrate that the court erred in

concluding Logsdon, individually, was absolutely immune from suit by virtue of

prosecutorial immunity. Kentucky has long recognized that “[a] prosecutor acting

as such and in accordance with the duties of office as defined by Kentucky law

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should have absolute immunity.” McCollum v. Garrett, 880 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Ky.

1994) (see also Dugger v. Off 2nd, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Ky. App. 1980)).

“To determine the extent to which a public official shall have protection of the

doctrine of absolute immunity, it is necessary to examine the lawful authority,

including such discretionary authority as may reasonably be implied[.]”

McCollum, 880 S.W.2d at 535 (quoting Compton v. Romans, 869 S.W.2d 24, 27

(Ky. 1993)). Applying this standard, we have no difficulty in concluding that the

acts of which Reedy complains – continuing a criminal prosecution and plea

negotiations – are well within the scope of the lawfully established duties of the

County Attorney. See KRS 15.725(2);3 Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319,

321 (Ky. 1992).4 Though Reedy argues that O’Connell mandates a contrary

conclusion, her reliance thereon is misplaced.

               Reedy asserts that O’Connell “specifically recognized that a County

Attorney, [i]ndividually, does [not] have qualified official immunity[] when he acts

in bad faith as to matters outside the scope of the authority of his office.” This,

however, is an incorrect statement of the law. Analyzing both prosecutorial and

qualified official immunity, the Court recognized that the former affords greater

3
   “The county attorney shall attend the District Court in his county and prosecute all violations
. . . of criminal and penal laws[.]”
4
  As part of the process of prosecuting violations of criminal law, the decision “whether to
engage in plea bargaining is a matter reserved to the sound discretion of the prosecuting
authority.”

                                                -5-
protection, being absolute, even when acts are committed with malice, but its

applicability is more narrowly confined to only those duties imposed on a

prosecutor by law, and not merely within the scope of employment. 616 S.W.3d at

709-11.

             This distinction is highlighted by the Court’s application of both

doctrines. At issue in O’Connell was a prosecutor’s allegedly defamatory

comments made during a speech at an event sponsored by the Jefferson County

Law Library. 616 S.W.3d at 706. Though the defendant did not invoke

prosecutorial immunity, the Court nevertheless analyzed his entitlement thereto

and, after reiterating the above referenced standard, concluded it was unavailable

because the prosecutor’s statements were not related to his function as the County

Attorney. Id. at 710-11. However, applying the test established in Yanero, 65

S.W.3d at 522, the Court remanded the matter for a determination of whether the

defendant prosecutor could invoke the more general protections of qualified

official immunity, which turned on whether he acted with malice. O’Connell, 616

S.W.3d at 711.

             Here, as stated above, plea negotiations and continuing a criminal

prosecution plainly fall within the duties imposed by law upon Logsdon as the

Grayson County Attorney. Thus, he is afforded prosecutorial immunity, and

Reedy’s claims of malice are immaterial. After all, “it is the very function of

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absolute immunity to defeat a suit from the outset and immunize even capricious

decisions motivated by prejudice, bias, or greed.” Sangster v. Kentucky Bd. of

Med. Licensure, 454 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Ky. App. 2014) (citations omitted).

Consequently, the court did not err in dismissing Reedy’s complaint.

                                 CONCLUSION

            Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Grayson

Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:

Harry B. O’Donnell, IV                   Aaron D. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky                     J.A. Sowell
                                         Bowling Green, Kentucky

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