Court Opinion

ID: 9762633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:27:40.198209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:36.078207
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WALKER,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Section 16 of Article 1269m, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Civ. Stat., provides, “that [n]o employee shall be suspended or dismissed by the Commission * * * except upon a finding by the Commission of the truth of the specific charges against such employee.” Such a requirement is sound for a num*299ber of reasons.1 It was included in the present statute to insure, among other things: (1) that no fireman or policeman would be suspended or dismissed unless at least two members of the Commission concluded that he was guilty of some specific charge made against him, and (2) that no suspension or dismissal would be upheld by the courts on a ground not found against the accused by the Commission.
A summary of the nine charges originally made against respondent will be found in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. 347 S.W. 2d 643. Specifications 7 and 8 were dismissed before conclusion of the hearing when the City Attorney admitted there was no evidence to support the same, and Specification 9 was dismissed because the alleged misconduct occurred more than six months before the date of respondent’s suspension. When the Commission retired to reach a decision, therefore, respondent stood charged with six separate and distinct acts of misconduct. It was alleged that he had: (1) requested P. Y. Snow to talk with his brother, Billy D. Snow, about the testimony the latter ¡would give in the case of Milner v. National Airlines, and stated that the brother would be paid several hundred dollars if he changed his testimony; (2) attempted to intimidate William Hill, Jr., a police officer; (3) made a false statement under oath on October 6, 1959, when he stated that he had not talked with Billy D. Snow about the case; (4) gave false testimony at the trial of the case when he declared that he had not attempted to influence anyone’s testimony; (5) made a false statement under oath on October 6, 1959, when he stated that he had not offered anyone money to testify falsely in the case; and (6) at various times attempted to influence and tamper with witnesses subpoenaed in the case.
The Commission carefully avoided saying anything that might disclose which or how many of these charges it found to be true. The order states only that respondent was “guilty of improper and wrongful conduct, well within the specifications remaining before us”. This falls somewhat short of a finding that he had committed each and all of the six alleged acts of misconduct. “Within” means encompassed by or inside the limits of, and the quoted excerpt from the order cannot fairly be construed as anything more than a finding that respondent was guilty of one or more of the charges. The majority seem to reason that the Commission found there was substance to the charges, but there is no recital in the order to that effect. It states that the evi*300dence left no doubt “as to the substance of the issues”. This is simply another way of saying that the members of the Commission understood the real nature of the questions they were required to decide. “Issue” means point or question in controversy, and a statement that the Commission was satisfied as to the substance of the issues is not a finding that all six charges made against respondent are true.
Recitals of this character should not be given a strained and unnatural construction when the language could have been and probably was used by the administrative body in an entirely different sense. Under the majority holding-, an administrative agency will no longer be required to face squarely the issues presented for determination, and a party who is prejudiced by administrative action cannot be assured of fair and adequate appellate review. If each member of the Commission concludes that a different specification is true, they will be free to decide that the accused was “guilty of improper and wrongful conduct well within the specifications” and should be suspended even though no two members can agree that even one of the charges is true. In a case where one of two opposing parties is entitled to administrative action under the law if Facts A, B, and C are established, there may be allegations and substantial evidence to support all three of such facts. If the agency finds only two of the essential facts but decides to grant the relief sought, the order can simply recite that the moving party has established “facts well within the allegations”. On appeal the order would necessarily be upheld on the theory that all three facts had been found, although that is not true and under the law the order should be set aside. In my opinion, the construction given by the majority to the order in this case defeats the purpose of the Legislature in requiring specific findings. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
CHIEF JUSTICE CALVERT and JUSTICE SMITH join in the dissent.
Opinion delivered January 31, 1962.

. See McGinnis and Temple, Administrative Agencies Should Tell Us Why. 24 Tex. Bar Jour. 211; Davis, Administrative Law, Vol. 2, page 444, Sec. 16.05.