Court Opinion

ID: 9589812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:49:00.645624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:51.348541
License: Public Domain

Per curiam.
This is a habeas corpus case. Appellant and two others were convicted of burglary after a joint jury trial, and the conviction was upheld on direct appeal. Jacobs v. State, 133 Ga. App. 812 (212 SE2d 468) (1975).
Prior to the trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress certain evidence obtained in a search incident to arrest, alleging that the arrest was made without probable cause. When neither appellant nor his counsel appeared at the hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the motion on the ground it had been abandoned.
The record contains no objection at the trial when this evidence, in the form of testimony of the arresting officer, was introduced. Also introduced at the trial through the testimony of a police officer was an alleged confession made to the officer by one of appellant’s co-defendants (who was represented by separate counsel) which implicated the appellant and the third co-defendant as the perpetrators of the burglary. After a substantial Jackson-Denno hearing (out of the jury’s presence), the court concluded that the statement was freely and voluntarily made. The co-defendant, who allegedly made this statement, did not take the stand.
I.
Appellant claims that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments in admitting evidence, unobjected to at trial, which was obtained in an illegal search. We find no merit in this claim for the following reasons.
Code Ann. § 50-127 provides that grounds for the writ of habeas corpus exist where: "in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Georgia or the laws of the State of Georgia. . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
*462In Stone v. Powell, — U. S.— (96 SC 3037, 49 LE2d 1067) (1976) the Supreme Court held that "a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review.” Id., n. 37 at 96 SC 3052, 49 LE2d 1088. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that, "Post-Mapp decisions have established that the [exclusionary] rule is not a personal constitutional right.” Id. at 96 SC 3048, 49 LE 2d 1083. (Emphasis supplied.) Rather, "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” Id., quoting from United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (94 SC 613, 38 LE2d 561) (1974). The court recognized the "minimal utility of the rule when1 sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding,” Stone v. Powell, n. 37, supra, and concluded that any possible deterrent effect to be gained by applying the rule on collateral review was "outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice.”
From this it is clear that the introduction of evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure is not a "substantial denial” of a defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States. The further question is whether it is necessary to impose the exclusionary rule, in a state habeas corpus proceeding, in order to effectuate the protections of the Fourth andFourteenth Amendments. We believe the test announced by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, supra, regarding federal habeas corpus review would serve equally well for state habeas corpus review, and we therefore adopt it.
From the record, it appears that the appellant did have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims at trial and on direct review. We note, and emphasize, that the test is "full and fair opportunity”-, not whether the claim was, in fact, litigated. Code Ann. § 27-313 sets out the procedure by which a claim of unlawful search and seizure is tested. We believe Code Ann. § 27-313 provides the defendant a "full and fair opportunity” to have his Fourth Amendment claims *463considered prior to his trial, and it provides a method by which a defendant may secure a record on these issues that will enable a court, on direct appeal, to review the trial court’s ruling. The appellant here, after filing a pre-trial motion to suppress under Code Ann. § 27-313, failed to appear at the evidentiary hearing; failed to move for a continuance; failed to object at trial to the dismissal of his motion entered on the ground that the motion was abandoned; and failed to object to the introduction of the evidence at trial. Under these circumstances we find nothing to indicate that appellant was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Therefore, his claim, based on the introduction at his trial, of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure, does not warrant habeas corpus relief.
In view of our holding today, Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277 (196 SE2d 445) (1973), to the extent that it is in conflict with what we hold here, will no longer be followed. That case was decided before this court had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stone v. Powell, supra.
II.
Appellant also complains that his conviction must be set aside because highly prejudicial testimony as to a "confession” made by one of his co-defendants, who did not testify, was not excluded from the evidence.
The record reveals that the introduction of testimony regarding the statement made by the appellant’s co-defendant was objected to on the ground that the statement was not made voluntarily. Although the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SC 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968) would clearly have required exclusion of the highly damaging testimony, the applicability of the Bruton rule was not relied on in the objection. After a Jackson-Denno hearing the objection was overruled and the testimony was admitted into evidence.
We find, under the circumstances of this case, that appellant’s claim has merit. After a thorough examination of the record, we are unable to find that appellant was not harmed by the introduction of the evidence and we therefore must reverse the judgment of *464the habeas court and order that the appellant be given a new trial.
Argued November 22, 1976 —
Decided February 18, 1977
Rehearing denied March 8, 1977.
Thomas M. West, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Kirby G. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Gunter, J., who concurs in Division II and in the judgment, Jordan, J., who concurs specially as to Division II, Ingram, J., who concurs in the judgment only and Nichols, C. J., and Hall, J., who concur in Division I, but dissent to Division II and to the judgment.