Court Opinion

ID: 9846606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:12.412818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:40.225594
License: Public Domain

GEER, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I do not believe that dismissal is warranted in this case in light of Ellis v. Williams, 319 N.C. 413, 355 S.E.2d 479 (1987), I respectfully dissent. I would instead address the merits of this appeal, reverse the trial court’s grant of JNOV as to the fraud claim, reinstate the jury verdict finding Harrelson and Smith Contractors, LLC (“H&S”) liable for fraud in the amount of $31,815.00, reverse the trial court’s entry of judgment as to Jones’ unfair and deceptive trade practices (“UDTP”) claim, and remand the case for entry of judgment *489in the amount of $95,445.00 and for the court to consider, in its discretion, whether to award attorney’s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1 (2005).
Appellate Rules Violations
The majority opinion orders dismissal of Jones’ appeal based on its conclusion that Jones’ assignments of error fail to comply with Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. I cannot agree. In any event, any violation of Rule 10 is purely technical and cannot justify the sanction of dismissal under Rules 25 and 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A. Jones’ Compliance with the Appellate Rules
The majority opinion states that Jones’ assignments of error regarding the grant of the directed verdict on the UDTP claim and the entry of JNOV as to the fraud claim do not comply with Rule 10 because they fail to state the legal basis for Jones’ contention that the trial court erred in making these rulings.1 In doing so, the majority disregards the nature of the rulings that are being challenged. With respect to Jones’ assignments of error that the trial court erred in granting H&S’ motion for JNOV as to the fraud claim and in granting a directed verdict as to Jones’ UDTP claim, the only legal ground that could be relied upon is that sufficient evidence existed for those claims to go to the jury. See Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 754, 758, 381 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1989) (“Motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict are properly granted only if the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict for the nonmovant as a matter of law.”), aff’d in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part on other grounds, 329 N.C. 727, 407 S.E.2d 819 (1991).
Unlike other appeals that have been dismissed for inadequate assignments of error, there is no other legal ground that could be applicable with respect to these assignments of error. To dismiss Jones’ appeal for failure to include language necessarily implicit in the assignment of error itself — or, in other words, for failing to state the obvious — is to elevate form over substance to an extent that our Supreme Court could not have intended in Viar.
*490Indeed, the majority’s approach cannot be reconciled with our Supreme Court’s analysis of assignments of error with respect to orders granting summary judgment, in which the trial courts similarly weigh the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury. In Ellis v. Williams, 319 N.C. 413, 355 S.E.2d 479 (1987), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals when it dismissed an appeal because the appellant had failed to list any exceptions or assignments of error to a summary judgment order at all. The Supreme Court held:
The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate formal trial when the only questions involved are questions of law. Thus, although the enumeration of findings of fact and conclusions of law is technically unnecessary and generally inadvisable in summary judgment cases, summary judgment, by definition, is always based on two underlying questions of law: (1) whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and (2) whether the moving party is entitled to judgment. On appeal, review of summary judgment is necessarily limited to whether the trial court’s conclusions as to these questions of law were correct ones. It would appear, then, that notice of appeal adequately apprises the opposing party and the appellate court of the limited issues to be reviewed. Exceptions and assignments of error add nothing.
This result does not run afoul of the expressed purpose of Rule 10(a). Exceptions and assignments of error are required in most instances because they aid in sifting through the trial court record and fixing the potential scope of appellate review. We note that the appellate court must carefully examine the entire record in reviewing a grant of summary judgment. Because this is so, no preliminary “sifting” of the type contemplated by the rule need be performed. Also, as previously observed, the potential scope of review is already fixed; it is limited to the two questions of law automatically raised by summary judgment. Under these circumstances, exceptions and assignments of error serve no useful purpose. Were we to hold otherwise, plaintiffs would be required to submit assignments of error which merely restate the obvious; for example, “The trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment in their favor.” At best, this is a superfluous formality.
Id. at 415-16, 355 S.E.2d at 481 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for this Court to review the case on its merits. Id. at 417, 355 S.E.2d at 482.
*491The majority opinion in this case likewise requires Jones to restate the obvious — a “superfluous formality,” id. at 416, 355 S.E.2d at 481 — when it dismisses this appeal simply because Jones failed to specify in her assignments of error that the evidence was sufficient to support her claims for fraud and UDTP. As with summary judgment decisions, a directed verdict or entry of JNOV involves only a single question of law: whether the evidence was sufficient to support the claim. I see no meaningful distinction between this case and Ellis. As this Court recently pointed out in Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 177 N.C. App. 595, 602-03, 630 S.E.2d 221, 227 (2006) (applying- Ellis to hold that appeal should not be dismissed when assignment of error challenged a summary judgment order without specifying a specific legal basis), we are bound to follow Ellis just as we are bound to follow Viar.
With respect to the prejudgment interest assignment of error, also condemned by the majority opinion, it is difficult to determine what is inadequate about that assignment of error. It reads: “Did the Trial Court err by refusing to award, in its judgment, interest from the date of the conversion of -the plaintiffs house?” What more could be added? The majority opinion does not answer that question. Perhaps, Jones could have asserted that the failure to award prejudgment interest was contrary to the law set forth in Lake Mary Ltd. P’ship v. Johnston, 145 N.C. App. 525, 551 S.E.2d 546, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 363, 557 S.E.2d 538-39 (2001), but our courts have never required the citation of legal authority in an assignment of error.
The majority opinion also states that “ [plaintiffs assignments of error failed to cite any record page reference to the order she purports to appeal from . . . .” The assignments of error as to the fraud and UDTP claim specifically refer to the appropriate page of the transcript at which the trial court orally rendered its ruling. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1) (“An assignment of error is sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript references.” (emphasis added)). Thus, as to the fraud and UDTP assignments of error, there has been no violation of the rules sufficient to warrant the extreme sanction of dismissal.
With respect to the prejudgment interest assignment of error, Jones does cite to the wrong page of the record — she mistakenly refers to a page other than that of the judgment setting forth the ruling as to prejudgment interest. Nevertheless, I would not refuse to address that assignment of error based on a typographical error when *492it is clear that Jones intended to refer to the final judgment that appears three pages later in the record on appeal.
Finally, as to Jones’ other assignments of error, I agree with the majority opinion that Jones has abandoned those relating to the omission of certain evidence by failing to bring those assignments of error forward in her brief. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). With respect to the remaining assignments of error, I do not believe that those questions need to be resolved on appeal and, therefore, it is unnecessary to consider whether those assignments of error comply with the Appellate Rules.
B. Substantial Compliance Precludes Dismissal
Even if Jones could be viewed as having violated the appellate rules, the violations would at best be merely technical ones that in no way affect the ability of the appellee or this Court from addressing the questions that she has raised on appeal. Only three years ago, this Court wrote: “This Court has held that when a litigant exercises ‘substantial compliance’ with the appellate rules, the appeal may not be dismissed for a technical violation of the rules.” Spencer v. Spencer, 156 N.C. App. 1, 8, 575 S.E.2d 780, 785 (2003) (emphasis added). Today, in direct opposition to this proposition, certain panels of this Court hold that appeals must be dismissed even for technical violations of the rules. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Stann v. Levine, 180 N.C. App. 1, 14, 636 S.E.2d 214, 222 (2006), I do not believe that this approach is mandated — or even intended — by Viar.
I am not unmindful of the fact that the current state of affairs is the result, to a large extent, of the somewhat casual attitude adopted by many in the North Carolina Bar towards North Carolina’s appellate courts and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Apparently, not all attorneys necessarily experience the same degree of urgency with respect to state court appeals. This perspective is troubling and cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, as I indicated in my dissent in Stann, I would address violations of the rules that do not impact this Court’s ability to decide issues properly preserved for review by imposing sanctions on counsel under Rules 25 and 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition to not punishing parties for the mistakes of their attorneys, this approach would also ensure that counsel for appellants and appellees alike are subjected to the same scrutiny.
I believe such an approach is mandated by Rules 25 and 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 25(b) provides:
*493A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that such party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply with these appellate rules. The court may impose sanctions of the type and in the manner prescribed by Rule 34 for frivolous appeals.
(Emphasis added.)
Dismissal of an appeal is the ultimate sanction and is authorized by Rule 34(b)(1) (“A court of the appellate division may impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal of the appeal . . . .”). Yet, Rule 34 expressly limits the instances in which sanctions may be imposed:
(a) A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that an appeal or any proceeding in an appeal was frivolous because of one or more of the following:
(3) a petition, motion, brief, record, or other paper filed in the appeal was so grossly lacking in the requirements of propriety, grossly violated appellate court rules, or grossly disregarded the requirements of a fair presentation of the issues to the appellate court.
N.C.R. App. R 34(a)(3) (emphasis added).
In short, the Appellate Rules themselves seem to limit this Court’s ability to dismiss an appeal for rules violations to those when the party or attorney has “substantially failed to comply” or when there has been a gross violation of the rules. I do not believe that we should disregard the plain language of the appellate rules. Under those rules, because Jones has not substantially failed to comply and there has been no gross violation of the rules, I do not believe dismissal is a permissible sanction.
I would also point out that although the majority opinion states that the Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory, it is silent with respect to violations by the appellee. Under Rule 28(c), an appellee is not required to include a statement of facts in its brief, 'but if it does so, it must be “a non-argumentative summary of all material facts underlying the matter in controversy which are necessary to under*494stand all questions presented for review, supported by references to pages in the transcript of proceedings, the record on appeal, or exhibits, as the case may be.” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5). H&S’ statement of facts is replete with argument — indeed, it is almost entirely argument. See Stann, 180 N.C. App. at 5, 636 S.E.2d at 216-17 (dismissing appeal in part because appellant included insufficient citations to the record in the statement of facts). Further, in the final section of H&S’ brief, H&S urges this Court to grant it a new trial rather than simply reverse the trial court’s rulings. H&S, however, in violation of Rule 10, did not cross-assign error to the trial court’s denial of its motion for a new trial, and, in violation of Rule 28(b)(6), did not cite any authority at all supporting the grant of a new trial to H&S.
In sum, I do not believe that Jones has substantially violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure. I would address the merits and, for the reasons, set out below, I would reverse the trial court as to the fraud and UDTP claims.
The Merits of the Appeal
A. Grant of JNOV on Fraud Claim
Jones’ first argument is that the trial court erred in granting H&S’ motion for JNOV on the fraud claim. A motion for JNOV is a renewal of an earlier motion for a directed verdict, and the standards of review are the same. Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 368-69, 329 S.E.2d 333, 337 (1985). In considering a motion for directed verdict, “the trial court must view all the evidence that supports the non-movant’s claim as being true and that evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant, giving to the non-movant the benefit of every reasonable inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence with contradictions, conflicts, and inconsistencies being resolved in' the non-movant’s favor.” Id. at 369, 329 S.E.2d at 337-38.
“The essential elements of actionable fraud are: ‘(1) [f]alse representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured party.’ ” Becker v. Graber Builders, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 787, 793, 561 S.E.2d 905, 910 (2002) (quoting Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974)). In this case, the parties centered their arguments around the third element of fraud, the intent to deceive. The required scienter for fraud is not present without both knowledge and an *495intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 568, 374 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1988).
Here, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, with all inferences drawn in her favor, both knowledge and intentional deception can be ascribed to H&S. There is no dispute that H&S had knowledge of the requirement that the houses be relocated outside the flood plain. Further, Jones showed Harrelson, a principal of H&S, where she planned to move the house, which would permit a jury to infer that H&S knew she intended to move the house within the flood plain. Jones offered evidence that, despite this knowledge, Harrelson said nothing about the requirement that the house be moved outside of the flood plain, but rather helped her find a house-mover to move the house to the new location.
Jones’ evidence also indicated that once H&S learned that the county was aware that the salvaged house had not been moved outside the flood plain, H&S falsely told the county’s agent that it had written contracts requiring the new owners to comply with the flood plain requirement. H&S then, according to Jones’ evidence, created after-the-fact “contracts” designed to cover-up H&S’ failure to disclose the flood plain requirement and failure to have written contracts. Finally, there was evidence in the record that H&S fabricated documents pertaining to other elements of its contract with the county and similarly misled two other purchasers of houses— evidence from which the jury could conclude that H&S had an overall scheme of deceit with respect to the contract with the county in order to maximize its profit. A jury could infer an intent to deceive from this evidence.
Apart from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an intent to deceive, H&S argues on appeal that the form signed by Jones, stating that it was her responsibility to move the house outside the flood plain, amended the parties’ contract.2 According to H&S, Jones was, therefore, limited to suing for breach of contract. H&S, however, cites no authority supporting its assumption that a plaintiff cannot sue for fraud if she has a breach of contract claim. The law is, in fact, to the contrary: a plaintiff may assert both claims, although she may be required to elect between her remedies prior to obtaining *496a verdict. See First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 256-57, 507 S.E.2d 56, 65 (1998) (individual who had been fraudulently induced to purchase property may elect between a contract or a tort remedy).
Moreover, Jones contends that the form represented an attempt by H&S to cover up its fraud in the sales of the three houses, including Jones’ house, and, therefore, is evidence of H&S’ intent to deceive. Our courts have acknowledged that evidence insufficient to establish a breach of contract may nonetheless be admissible to prove that a contract was fraudulently induced or that the defendant committed unfair and deceptive trade practices. See McNamara v. Wilmington Mall Realty Corp., 121 N.C. App. 400, 413, 466 S.E.2d 324, 333 (holding that evidence of the parties’ negotiations was inadmissible on the breach of contract claim, but was admissible to prove fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices), disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 307, 471 S.E.2d 72 (1996). It was for the jury to decide what inferences should be drawn from the form and what weight to give it. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial judge’s entry of JNOV with respect to the jury’s fraud verdict.
I disagree with Jones, however, as to what amount of damages should be awarded based on the conversion and fraud verdicts. Jones’ fraud claim arose out of H&S’ failure to inform Jones that she would need to move the house outside the flood plain, while her conversion claim arose out of H&S’ removal and eventual destruction of her house. Jones argues that she is entitled to recover both the damages awarded for conversion and the damages awarded for fraud, for a total amount of $61,815.00.1 cannot agree.
As to Jones’ damages from the fraud, the trial court instructed the jury: “The plaintiff’s actual damages are equal to the fair market value of the property ... at the time that the plaintiff was defrauded.” It then instructed the jury to award damages for conversion based on the “fair market value of the property at the time it was converted.” It is apparent from these instructions that the jury’s awards of $31,815.00 for fraud and $30,000.00 for conversion — each involving the fair market value of the same property at a different time — represent overlapping damages.
Jones is not entitled to recover the fair market value of the house twice. The doctrine of the election of remedies prevents “ ‘double redress for a single wrong.’ ” United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 335 N.C. 183, 191, 437 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Gulf Oil *497Corp., 239 N.C. 360, 368, 79 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1954)). “[T]he underlying basis” of this rule is “the maxim which forbids that one shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause.” Smith, 239 N.C. at 368, 79 S.E.2d at 885. Accordingly, I would hold that Jones is entitled to judgment in the amount of $31,815.00, the greater of the two overlapping amounts entered by the jury.
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Jones next assigned error to the trial court’s entry of a directed verdict on Jones’ UDTP claim. The basis of that ruling is not entirely clear since the trial judge stated that he was dismissing only Jones’ independently pled UDTP claim, but would still allow Jones to argue, during the punitive damages stage of the bifurcated trial, that UDTP principles should apply in the calculation of damages, if the jury found liability on the basis of either fraud or conversion.
The court’s ruling appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of a Chapter 75 claim brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2005). A UDTP claim is a substantive claim, the remedy for which is treble damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2005). Chapter 75 is not a remedial scheme for other substantive claims. See Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 245, 400 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1991) (noting that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 “was enacted to establish an effective private cause of action for aggrieved consumers in this State” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As this Court has stated, “[p]laintiffs can assert both UDTP violations under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and fraud based on the same conduct or transaction. Successful plaintiffs may receive punitive damages or be awarded treble damages, but may not have both.” Compton v. Kirby, 157 N.C. App. 1, 21, 577 S.E.2d 905, 918 (2003). The approach followed by the trial court, in this case, of dismissing the UDTP claim, but allowing counsel to argue it in connection with punitive damages, was in error.
With respect to the trial court’s dismissal of Jones’ substantive UDTP claim, it is well-settled that “a plaintiff who proves fraud thereby establishes that unfair or deceptive acts have occurred.” Bhatti, 328 N.C. at 243, 400 S.E.2d at 442. See also Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (“Proof of fraud would necessarily constitute a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts . . . .”); State Props., LLC v. Ray, 155 N.C. App. 65, 74, 574 S.E.2d 180, 187 (2002) (“[A] finding of fraud constitutes a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.”), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 694, *498577 S.E.2d 889 (2003). Once the plaintiff has proven fraud, “thereby establishing prima facie a violation of Chapter 75, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he is exempt from the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” Bhatti, 328 N.C. at 243-44, 400 S.E.2d at 442 (internal citation omitted).
Because the jury found in favor of Jones on the fraud claim and because H&S made no attempt to argue that it is exempt from the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1,1 would hold that Jones is entitled, under Bhatti, to recover treble damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. I would, therefore, remand for entry of judgment in favor of Jones on her UDTP claim and for trebling of her fraud damages. Upon remand, the trial court would also be required to consider whether to exercise its discretion to award attorney’s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1. Bhatti, 328 N.C. at 247, 400 S.E.2d at 444.3
Conclusion
In this case, the majority has chosen to dismiss this meritorious appeal because the appellant failed to state the obvious in her assignments of error. Even if this is viewed as a technical violation of the appellate rules, it cannot be deemed a lack of substantial compliance or a gross violation as required by Rules 25 and 34 of the Appellate Rules. Because I disagree with the majority opinion as to whether Jones violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and I disagree with the majority opinion’s implicit conclusion that it has authority under those rules to dismiss an appeal that is in substantial compliance, this dissent represents a different scenario from that presented in Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 67, 511 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1999), in which the Supreme Court limited its review under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30(2) (2005) to the dissent’s assertion that the majority opinion erred in failing to exercise its discretion under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

. This is not a case in which the appellant has argued in her brief a contention not contained in her assignment of error, such as occurred in Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (2005) (per curiam).

. This form was sent by H&S after the houses had been moved and after H&S had falsely sent a letter to the county’s consulting firm stating: “We would like to assure you that the three owners that purchased the houses . . . were informed with a written contract that the houses were to be relocated above the 100-year floodplain and they were to accept all expense & responsibility.” (Emphasis added.)

. Although Jones also challenged the trial court’s entry of judgment on her punitive damages claim, Jones stated on appeal that she elected to receive treble damages under her UDTP claim rather than punitive damages. See Compton, 157 N.C. App. at 21, 577 S.E.2d at 918 (“Successful plaintiffs may receive punitive damages or be awarded treble damages [under Chapter 75], but may not have both.”). Jones has, thereby, rendered the punitive damages issue moot. With respect to the prejudgment interest issue, I agree with H&S that the trial court properly applied Lake Mary Ltd. P’ship and awarded interest from the date the action was commenced as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(b) (2005).