Court Opinion

ID: 9774767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:32:57.531481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.350908
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
Under the statutory definition in KRS 500.080(15), the issue is not whether there was proof of an act that could cause serious physical injury (i.e., “substantial risk of death,” etc.). The issue is whether there was proof of an injw'y inflicted of such a nature that it did in fact cause “serious physical injury.”
The only proof here relevant to the issue was of a simple, nondisplaeed linear skull fracture, followed by symptoms of concussion (temporary loss of consciousness and amnesia) with no diagnosis or proof of neurologic *326injury. This does not meet the statutory standard by any stretch of the imagination, but it is all we have here by way of proof of significant injury from which to judge.
Contrary to the Majority Opinion, except in obvious cases, medical evidence should be required to prove serious physical injury. The Majority believes the “jurors’ common sense” is enough to prove serious physical injury occurred. If “common sense” means “speculation” rather than “reasonable inference” from proof, as it must in present circumstances, it is not enough. “Common sense” is not evidence, and cannot cure the lack of evidence to prove serious injury.