Court Opinion

ID: 9737104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:16:03.684678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.554057
License: Public Domain

McCown and Smith, JJ.,
dissenting.
We respectfully dissent. The district judge in granting the writ of habeas corpus here specifically stated the basis for the order. He did not believe the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing established the crime of manslaughter. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A. L. R. 3d 974, was effective. Objections were interposed and argued on the basis of Miranda, both at the preliminary examination and in the briefs here. The trial judge specifically found that: “* * * substantially all the evidence even if it does establish a crime was obtained in my opinion in violation of the rules set forth in the Miranda decisions and therefore inadmissible * *
It is deemed necessary to review the record with respect to the statements of the defendant, the facts surrounding the taking of them, and which portion of the evidence at the preliminary hearing was established by the defendant’s statements.
Shortly before 10:35 a.m., detective Homes of the Fremont police department was just leaving the police station with a camera to go- to the scene of the fire when he was met by the county attorney on the steps of the police station. The county attorney told him that Mrs. Delay would be coming in to the station and identified Mrs. Delay when she came.
The defendant’s first statement was taken from her by detective Homes at the police station commencing at 10:35 a.m. Detective Homes at that time advised the defendant that she did not have to tell him anything and that anything she said could be used in court against her. *516He typed the statement as he talked to her. This first statement showed that on that morning the defendant had gotten up sometime after 7 a.m., had some coffee, and that the children were still in bed asleep when she left the house; that she had walked downtown and had just run out of the house for a little while; that she had stopped at Saeger’s Bar and had a bottle of pop; that this was the first and only place she went downtown; and that while there, she was contacted by a representative of the welfare department who told her that there had been a fire at her house and she was supposed to call the police department. She hung up the telephone and walked directly to the police department.
At this point appears the only blank line in the statement. The remainder of this first statement deals with her prior habits and customs when she left the children alone and revealed also that she was familiar with and frequently visited at least two local bars. The first statement was completed at approximately 11:15 a.m.
Detective Homes testified that he was conferring with the county attorney on and off all day long; and that he talked to him at noon and gave him the information obtained from the defendant. The defendant was never told at any time that she was free to leave and when she left the room to use the restroom, Mrs. Losee, the police clerk, went with her.
At 2:20 p.m. that afternoon, detective Homes took another statement from the defendant. Essentially, this statement had nothing whatever to do with her actions or conduct on the day of the fire, but dealt only with her conduct in connection writh the children prior to that day. This statement showed that about 2 months before, she had started as a regular thing to leave the children home alone, usually in the mornings; that she never had anyone stay with them; and that the times she left were sometimes before 9 a.m. and her return was sometimes as late as shortly before noon. It also showed *517that a representative of the welfare department had given her “the devil” for leaving the children alone. This statement was concluded and signed by the defendant at approximately 2:50 p.m.
At 3:40 p.m., the defendant asked to consult with a lawyer when she was told she would be held on a charge of manslaughter. She talked to her lawyer briefly by telephone and she and detective Homes were told that he would be there at approximately 5 p.m. The defendant was booked on a manslaughter charge at 5 p.m. and taken to jail. At 9:30 p.m. that night, detective Homes and another police officer went to the jail and again began “visiting” with the defendant. In detective Homes’ words, they were “trying to fix the time she would have left the house.”
At this conversation, the defendant told them that upon leaving the house she had gone to the apartment of a bartender, and that she had been going there for several months; and that she was there that morning after leaving the house, and had gone from the apartment to Saeger’s Bar to call a taxicab and go home at the time she, received the call to contact the police. She also told them that some weeks before she had installed a hook and eye lock on the outside of the one door to the house which was not obstructed. This was after a welfare department representative had found her children running around outside. She also told them that she had been locking the lock for several weeks, and had locked it that morning when she left.
All of these statements of the defendant, both written and oral, were admitted over strenuous objection at the preliminary hearing. At none of them were the required Miranda warnings given, and the last and most damaging one was taken after the officers knew the defendant had a lawyer.
Except for the defendant’s own statements, the evidence at the preliminary hearing established only that there had been a fire at defendant’s house at 9:45 a.m.; *518her children were in the house alone; that no one, including the fireman who testified, knew how the fire commenced nor how long it had been burning; that the defendant was not present; and that her daughter was dead as a result of the fire.
This case is subject to the requirements of Miranda as well as prior and related cases dealing with in-custodial interrogation and the right to counsel. It seems crystal clear that the constitutional requirements applicable to in-custody interrogation of the defendant were not met. If trial had been involved rather than a preliminary hearing, the statements of the defendant could not have been introduced in evidence. Her own statements were the only evidence which might have completed the required proof that a crime had been committed.
In 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 340, p. 879, it is stated: “* * * although the magistrate is not strictly governed by technical rules in the reception of evidence, the admissibility of evidence at the preliminary examination is governed by the same rules as those governing admissibility at trial.” It is also stated: “* * * the principle, stated infra § 345, that less evidence is required to hold accused for trial than is exacted to support a conviction, does not go to the competency, relevancy, or character of the evidence.”
In Cotner v. Solomon, 163 Neb. 619, 80 N. W. 2d 587, we held that the sufficiency of evidence adduced at a preliminary examination to hold an accused to answer for a crime with which he is charged may be raised and tried in habeas corpus proceedings, and also held that even a voluntary confession is insufficient standing alone to prove that a crime has been committed.
At a preliminary hearing we see no justifiable reason why the admissibility of a confession, admission, or statement of a defendant stemming from custodial interrogation should not be governed by the same constitutional rules as those governing its admissibility at trial. This *519is emphatically true where the confession, admission, or statement is necessary to prove the essential requirement at a preliminary hearing that a crime has been committed.
The prosecution at the preliminary hearing only had the burden of establishing a body of facts sufficient to show that the crime of manslaughter was committed and that there was probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. It should' not be permitted to flesh out the bare bones of the factual skeleton with confessions, admissions, or statements of the accused, obtained in violation of her constitutional rights, which would be inadmissible at the trial itself. When such statements are admitted not only to prove probable cause that the defendant was the one chargeable with responsibility, but also to establish the essential foundation fact that a specific crime has been committed, the effect of the error may well be compounded later. From the standpoint of efficient judicial administration, it is far better to correct such an error at an early stage when it may still be remediable.
While we can say nothing favorable as to the conduct of the defendant, either as a mother or otherwise, and this dissent in no way reflects a determination that she was innocent of any crime other than manslaughter, she is entitled to the constitutional rights of every citizen.
The district court found that the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing in this case did not establish the crime of manslaughter, and that substantially all of the evidence at the preliminary hearing was obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant and was, therefore, inadmissible. We believe that the determination was correct in all respects and should have been affirmed.