Court Opinion

ID: 9899012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 19:00:31.679986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:19.903502
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10126        Document: 00516968334             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/15/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                               November 15, 2023
                                       No. 22-10126                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                      Clerk

   James Richard Weeks,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal
   Justice; Brad Livingston, Executive Director, Texas Department of
   Criminal Justice; Lannette Linthicum, Texas Department of Criminal
   Justice Health Services Division Director; Bobby Lumpkin, Director,
   Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division;
   Denise DeShields, Texas Tech University Health Sciences
   Center/Correctional Managed Health Care Executive Medical Director, Et al.,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 2:18-CV-125
                     ______________________________

   Before Southwick, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 22-10126     Document: 00516968334           Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                    No. 22-10126

          James Weeks, Texas Prisoner # 1489149, filed a pro se complaint in
   2018 against numerous Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) de-
   fendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged several constitutional violations
   due to the defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference. Weeks now appeals
   the district court’s dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. We AFFIRM.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          In late June 2018, James Weeks filed a Section 1983 complaint in the
   United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, bringing claims
   against 110 defendants from multiple TDCJ units. Weeks alleged these
   defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with the diagnosis
   and treatment of his colon cancer and gallstones, resulting in numerous
   collateral consequences. Weeks further alleged that various defendants
   continuously treated his medical conditions improperly despite his repeated
   complaints, improper treatment that he claims sunk to the level of deliberate
   indifference. The most serious condition was undiagnosed colon cancer,
   which was stage three metastatic cancer by the time of diagnosis in July 2016.
          Weeks also made numerous allegations concerning the handling and
   outcomes of a multitude of prison grievances; acts of retaliation by prison
   guards; his housing unit assignments; the conditions of his confinement,
   including the availability and quality of food, toiletries, and commissary
   supplies; and the confiscation of his property. He sought compensatory
   damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.
          The district court temporarily granted Weeks leave to proceed in
   forma pauperis when it granted Weeks his first leave to amend his complaint.
   However, because Weeks filed suit pro se, the district court ordered the Texas
   Attorney General to submit Weeks’s authenticated records to allow the court
   to fully analyze Weeks’s allegations. After reviewing these records, the court
   dismissed Weeks’s complaint with prejudice without conducting a Spears

                                         2
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334           Page: 3    Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10126

   hearing. This court established Spears hearings to allow courts to determine
   whether claims by in forma pauperis inmates are legally frivolous. Spears v.
   McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 1985).
          The district court divided Weeks’s allegations into three groups that
   totaled 21 claims: nine claims of deliberate indifference; six claims relating to
   the confiscation or deprivation of his private property; and six claims alleging
   violations of his right of access to the courts, retaliation by prison officials,
   and mishandling of grievances.        The court determined that Weeks’s
   deliberate indifference claims regarding his pre-cancer diagnosis and
   treatment were time-barred because he brought them more than two years
   after the discovery of his cancer in “early 2016.”
          The district court further concluded that Weeks’s deliberate
   indifference claims regarding his serious post-diagnosis medical needs
   between December 2017 and January 2018 were frivolous because the
   medical records reflected Weeks received regular care during that time. As
   for Weeks’s deprivation-of-property claims, the court found that there was
   an adequate state post-deprivation remedy. The court determined Weeks’s
   remaining claims should be dismissed because they were either conclusory,
   without merit, or lacking constitutional magnitude. To the extent that Weeks
   was challenging the result of certain disciplinary convictions and
   punishments, the court determined the claims were barred under Heck v.
   Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
          Weeks timely filed a notice of appeal and moved for leave to proceed
   in forma pauperis. The district court denied Weeks’s motion to proceed in
   forma pauperis, concluding that his appeal was not taken in good faith under
   28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3).
   Weeks later filed in this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
   We granted the motion, determining that Weeks demonstrated his financial

                                          3
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334           Page: 4   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10126

   eligibility and that the appeal involved at least one non-frivolous issue:
   whether Weeks’s claims regarding his pre-cancer diagnosis and treatment
   were properly dismissed as untimely. The Office of the Texas Attorney
   General (“OAG”) then appeared as amicus curiae.
                                    DISCUSSION
          A district court dismisses a Section 1983 complaint of a prisoner
   proceeding in forma pauperis as frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law
   or fact.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). Dismissals of
   claims brought by in forma pauperis prisoners are subject to two different
   standards of review, depending on factors that need not be discussed today.
   Id. The district court here dismissed Weeks’s complaint pursuant to three
   separate statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and 42 U.S.C.
   § 1997e(a). Because the district court referred to all three relevant statutes
   in its opinion, we collectively review the issues de novo. Geiger, 404 F.3d at
   373.
          Weeks raises 28 issues on appeal, but not all are addressed in his brief.
   Although pro se briefs are liberally construed, the litigants must sufficiently
   brief arguments if they wish to preserve them. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222,
   224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). We only address the issues for which Weeks
   provided adequate legal analysis or discussion. See Weaver v. Puckett, 896
   F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1990). All others are abandoned. Yohey, 985 F.2d at
   224–25.
     I.   Statute of limitations.
          Weeks challenges the district court’s dismissal of his pre-diagnosis
   deliberate indifference claims as untimely.
          “A district court may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte in an
   action under [Section] 1915.” Davis v. Young, 624 F. App’x 203, 207 (5th

                                          4
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334           Page: 5   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10126

   Cir. 2015). “[D]ismissal is appropriate if it is clear from the face of the
   complaint that the claims asserted [by the prisoner] are barred by the
   applicable statute of limitations.” Id. (citation omitted). There is no
   specified limitations period for Section 1983 actions, thus a state statute must
   be “borrowed.” The OAG argues the applicable state statute here is the
   Texas health care liability statute. Under this statute, the claim must be
   brought within “two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from
   the date the medical or health care treatment . . . or hospitalization for which
   the claim is made is completed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251.
   The OAG argues this is the proper statute because Weeks’s claims sound in
   negligent course of treatment or lack of treatment, and the individuals who
   treated him are “healthcare providers” as defined by statute.
          The Supreme Court, though, has held that the proper state statute of
   limitations for a Section 1983 claim is the one for general personal-injury tort
   claims. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The applicable limitations
   period in Texas is two years from the date on which the cause of action
   accrues. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). We apply that statute.
          The next issue is the accrual date for the claim. Wallace, 549 U.S. at
   387–88. “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of
   federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Id. at 388.
   Consequently, we reject the OAG’s effort to convince us that Texas law
   applies to the date of accrual. Under federal law, an action accrues when the
   plaintiff becomes aware of both the existence of an injury and its cause. In re
   FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir.
   2011), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402
   (2015). This federal “discovery rule” delays the accrual period until the
   plaintiff knew of the injury and its cause or should have discovered the injury
   and its cause through reasonable diligence. Id.

                                          5
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334           Page: 6   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10126

          The federal discovery rule clarifies the accrual date for a Section 1983
   claim is when the plaintiff becomes aware of both the existence of an injury
   and its cause. Id. Weeks became aware of both his cancer and its alleged
   cause on July 11, 2016, at the earliest. His colonoscopy indicated a large pre-
   cancerous tumor, and the diagnosing doctor asked why nothing had been
   done about Weeks’s condition despite his complaints. On July 15, 2016, the
   tumor was removed and determined to be Stage 3 cancer.
          The facts relevant to Weeks’s deliberate indifference claims resulting
   in or preventing earlier treatment of his colon cancer could not be known
   until the cancer diagnosis was made or at least suspected. Weeks had no
   knowledge of his cancer, nor should he have discovered it or its cause through
   reasonable diligence, on the date of his last interaction with the defendant
   health care providers. That date was March 28, 2016. The district court
   seemingly accepted that date when finding the claim accrued “in early 2016”
   for any claim. We disagree. Weeks would have no reason to know of his
   injury at that time, as the diagnosis of colon cancer occurred later.
          We find that the earliest accrual date for Weeks’s pre-diagnosis claims
   was July 11, 2016, the date his post-surgery biopsy showed the precancerous
   mass. Weeks’s complaint is dated June 28, 2018, postmarked July 3, 2018,
   and docketed as filed on July 5, 2018. His claims are thus timely.
    II.   Deliberate indifference.
          Weeks asserted two categories of deliberate indifference claims: pre-
   diagnosis and post-diagnosis. The district court dismissed all claims as
   frivolous and for failure to state a claim. We analyze each deliberate
   indifference claim separately.
          When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, all well-pleaded
   facts are accepted as true and viewed “in the light most favorable to the
   plaintiff.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff

                                          6
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334            Page: 7    Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                      No. 22-10126

   must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and plead facts “that
   allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
   for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
   (citation omitted). Threadbare recitals of causes of action and conclusory
   statements are insufficient. Id.
          Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
   cruel and unusual punishment when they are deliberately indifferent to a
   prisoner’s serious medical needs. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir.
   2006). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference “only if (A) he
   knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and (B) he
   disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Gobert
   v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
   “Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice
   do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement
   with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Id.
          Instead, a prisoner must provide evidence “that prison officials
   refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him
   incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a
   wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Id. (quotation marks and
   citations omitted). This court defines a “serious medical need [a]s one for
   which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so apparent
   that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Id. at 345 n.12.
   Overall, “[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”
   Id. at 346 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
              a. Pre-diagnosis.
          The district court did not reach the merits of Weeks’s pre-diagnosis
   deliberate indifference claims, finding them untimely and frivolous. Because
   we disagree as to timeliness, we now need to examine their merits.

                                           7
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334            Page: 8   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                      No. 22-10126

          While incarcerated, Weeks complained of blood in his stool on several
   occasions. Following each report to medical staff, Weeks was provided a
   Fecal Occult Blood (“FOB”) test. Under prison policy, a positive result for
   blood had to appear in two of three FOB tests before a colonoscopy could be
   ordered. Prior to March 2016, Weeks’s FOB tests were negative. After two
   FOB tests returned positive in March 2016, Weeks received his July 11, 2016,
   colonoscopy. The diagnosis of colon cancer led to surgical removal of
   Weeks’s tumor, his gallbladder, and 30 lymph nodes.
          Weeks argues the manner in which his complaints were addressed
   constitutes deliberate indifference. Responding to serious medical needs
   with cursory or minimal, ineffective treatment and delay of care can amount
   to deliberate indifference. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir.
   1999); Easter, 467 F.3d at 463–64. Weeks received routine tests for blood
   found in stool and the policy-required colonoscopy only when two of those
   tests returned positive results.
          Is there evidence of cursory, minimal, ineffective treatment? Weeks
   contends that FOB tests were not the proper procedure for his condition
   because those tests are for hidden blood, yet he reported visible blood in each
   of his complaints. There is evidence in the record that the more sensitive
   Fecal Immunochemical Test is preferred for cancer screening. Further,
   Weeks’s diagnosing doctor questioned why a different procedure had not
   been done. Weeks argues from all this that the policy and procedure of the
   medical providers prescribing Fiber-Lax and performing no physical tests
   other than the FOB tests support deliberate indifference.
          These actions must be measured against the rule that “the decision
   whether to provide additional treatment” and the choice between forms of
   treatment are “classic example[s] of a matter for medical judgment,” and are
   not deliberate indifference. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Estelle v. Gamble, 429

                                           8
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334          Page: 9     Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                    No. 22-10126

   U.S. 97, 107 (1976).       Weeks provides no evidence to support the
   disagreement about the proper tests. It is understandable that he believes his
   complaints should have caused a more in-depth examination, but a belief does
   not amount to deliberate indifference. Further, there is nothing in the record
   indicating he had two positive FOB tests prior to March 2016, and those tests
   led to the proper diagnosis and surgery.
          We find no support for Weeks’s assertion that any member of the
   medical staff delayed his care or ignored his complaints. At most, the
   conduct of the medical providers would rise to negligence or even gross
   negligence, but “deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a
   negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious
   harm.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (quotation marks and citations omitted). Weeks has failed to state a claim of
   deliberate indifference regarding his pre-diagnosis treatment.
             b. Post-diagnosis.
          Weeks alleges the defendants’ following conduct establishes instances
   of deliberate indifference regarding his care after the diagnosis of colon
   cancer. Nurse Judith Thomas ordered Weeks’s post-surgical staples to be
   removed from his partially healed wound, replaced the staples with steri-
   strip, and discontinued his blood thinner. Thomas then told Weeks that
   there was no order for the blood thinner medication and that another nurse
   told Thomas the medication had been discontinued because Weeks was “up
   and about.” Weeks was told in response to a grievance that after consultation
   with the pharmacist, there was no indication to continue the medication
   because Weeks was “ambulating freely.”           The discontinuation of the
   medication allegedly caused an infection at his incision.
          Weeks claims he suffered from nausea and vomiting for 48 hours after
   chemotherapy, and none of the nurses provided any treatment. The enema

                                         9
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334            Page: 10   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                      No. 22-10126

   he was given prior to his colonoscopy was, according to Weeks, unnecessary,
   and he was uncomfortable throughout the preparation. Weeks alleges nurse
   Kelly Morrison intentionally injected more Phenergan into his thigh than he
   was prescribed, causing pain and bruising.            Additionally, Weeks was
   transferred from the 12-hour medical unit to the 24-hour medical unit after
   completing half of his chemotherapy treatments, and he contends the
   medical attention in the 12-hour unit was better and faster.
           These allegations do not raise a facially plausible deliberate
   indifference claim. A healthcare provider’s failure to follow the advice of
   another provider, without more, supports only a difference in medical
   opinion, not deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; See Estelle,
   429 U.S. at 107. Weeks states that nurse Thomas’s “malice can be inferred”
   from her conduct and that nurse Morrison’s injection was improper. Neither
   his disagreement with Thomas’s use of steri-strips rather than staples nor his
   general dissatisfaction with his course of treatment from both nurses
   constitutes deliberate indifference “absent exceptional circumstances.”
   Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. Weeks has not asserted any.
           Instead, Weeks’s complaint contains facts that nurses on duty
   responded to his complaints of nausea and attended to his needs during his
   chemotherapy. He was also routinely given anti-nausea medication and
   responded to treatments. Overall, the record establishes that after Weeks
   was diagnosed with colon cancer, he received regular care from the medical
   providers that coincided with their medical judgment.
           Weeks has not raised a viable deliberate indifference allegation against
   any defendant.
    III.   Deprivation of property.
           Weeks contends officials allowed his property to be stolen while he
   was being treated. “Prisoners have a cognizable constitutionally protected

                                          10
Case: 22-10126     Document: 00516968334           Page: 11     Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                    No. 22-10126

   property interest in their personal property.” Eubanks v. McCotter, 802 F.2d
   790, 793–94 (5th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, “[u]nder the Parratt/Hudson
   doctrine, a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest
   caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized conduct does not give
   rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to provide
   an adequate postdeprivation remedy.” Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147, 149
   (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).           The Texas
   administrative and judicial systems allow prisoners to raise ordinary tort
   claims like conversion or an administrative remedy for lost or damaged
   property. See Cathey v. Guenther, 47 F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1995); Spurlock
   v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002).
          We examine Weeks’s individual claims.               He alleges that his
   identification card and shower shoes were taken and not returned to him
   when he returned from the hospital after certain defendants failed to follow
   proper inventory procedures. Although Weeks has a protected property
   interest in this personal property, “[a] prison official’s failure to follow the
   prison’s own policies, procedures or regulations does not constitute a
   violation of due process, if constitutional minima are nevertheless met.”
   Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and
   citations omitted). We previously held that a similar due process claim was
   properly dismissed because Texas law provides the adequate post-
   deprivation remedy of conversion when property is taken without proper
   procedures. Id. We find the same here. Weeks has an adequate state post-
   deprivation remedy under Texas law and thus does not have a Section 1983
   due process claim.
          As for Weeks’s craft shop materials, he alleges the failure to transfer
   his materials was the result of negligence. The Supreme Court has held that
   “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an
   official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”

                                          11
Case: 22-10126     Document: 00516968334           Page: 12   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                    No. 22-10126

   Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Thus, Weeks failed to
   sufficiently state a claim for relief under Section 1983 because, again, Texas
   provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.
          With respect to his craft chemicals, Weeks argues he was deprived of
   the chemicals pursuant to prison policy. This claim requires a different
   analysis because post-deprivation remedies “do not satisfy due process
   where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established
   state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action.” Hudson v.
   Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984).          “Conduct is not ‘random and
   unauthorized’” if the state delegates the power to the defendants “to effect
   the very deprivation complained of.” Allen, 388 F.3d at 149.
          Weeks alleges in his complaint that he was advised his chemicals could
   not be transferred between medication units, he had 60 days to arrange for
   their pickup or mailing, and the chemicals would be discarded if he did not
   make the arrangements. He describes no actions he took to file a grievance
   about this issue or the policy. The prison officials’ explanation of prison
   procedures Weeks needed to follow provided him with constitutional
   minimum protections.      His lack of action and Texas’s adequate post-
   deprivation remedy of conversion establish that his claim was properly
   dismissed.
          Weeks also asserts a general property interest in the prison grievance
   system. He contends that the numerous grievances he filed, yet did not
   specifically identify in his complaint, were not properly or timely processed.
   According to Weeks, this resulted in a denial of his constitutional rights.
   Weeks “does not have a federally protected liberty in having [his prison]
   grievances resolved to his satisfaction,” and any claim related to that process
   is not cognizable under Section 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1983; Geiger, 404 F.3d at
   374. The claim has no merit.

                                         12
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334             Page: 13   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                       No. 22-10126

    IV.   Right of access to the courts.
          Weeks’s alleges his constitutional right to present his case was
   impeded by prison officials when they confiscated items from his cell.
   Prisoners have “a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts”;
   this does not extend to “more than the ability of an inmate to prepare and
   transmit a necessary legal document to a court.” Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d
   816, 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1993). “An inmate alleging the denial of his right of
   access to the courts must demonstrate a relevant, actual injury stemming
   from the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct.” Brewster, 587 F.3d at 769.
   The inmate must “allege that his ability to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous,’
   ‘arguable’ legal claim was hindered” and “describe the underlying claim well
   enough to show that its ‘arguable nature . . . is more than hope.’” Id.
   (citations omitted).
          Weeks contends his stamps and envelopes were confiscated,
   depriving him of “service upon a defendant via U.S. mail, causing that
   defendant to go unserved.” Weeks does not identify the claims that were
   hindered as a result of the conduct, offer evidence showing that any
   defendant hindered his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim, or show
   any actual injury stemming from the defendants’ conduct. Weeks has failed
   to state a claim for relief on this issue.
    V.    Retaliation by prison officials.
          Weeks asserts numerous acts of retaliation by defendants for his filing
   grievances and complaints on his and other prisoners’ behalf. He argues the
   defendants fabricated rules in order to charge him with violations.
   Specifically, Weeks argues Officer McBroom wrote a disciplinary charge
   against him in retaliation for providing legal assistance to other prisoners, and
   he was subsequently charged with contraband in his cell.

                                             13
Case: 22-10126     Document: 00516968334            Page: 14   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10126

          Retaliation by a prison official against a prisoner who is seeking to
   access the courts or is complaining about misconduct violates the First
   Amendment.       DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2019).
   Retaliation claims are “regarded with skepticism” to avoid enmeshing
   federal courts in prison disciplinary actions. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161,
   1166 (5th Cir. 1995). To prevail on a retaliation claim, “a prisoner must
   establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to
   retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a
   retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682,
   684 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is only
   actionable if the retaliatory conduct is “capable of deterring a person of
   ordinary firmness from further exercising his constitutional rights.” Id. at
   686. The action must be more than de minimis to form the basis of a Section
   1983 claim, id. at 684–85, and the prisoner must show the adverse act would
   not have occurred but for the retaliatory motive to establish causation.
   McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998).
          Weeks does not have a constitutionally protected right to meet with
   another prisoner and provide legal assistance or advice. Shaw v. Murphy, 532
   U.S. 223, 228 (2001). He therefore cannot satisfy the first element of a
   retaliation claim. Weeks also fails to identify any punishment resulting from
   his contraband charges that could be considered more than de minimis.
   Confiscation of Tylenol and soap would not deter an ordinary person from
   pursuing his claims. Cf. Morris, 449 F.3d at 686–87. Additionally, Weeks
   fails to provide any specific support for his claim of retaliatory conduct
   against Officer McBroom.
          Weeks’s allegations amount to no more than conclusory statements of
   his “personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation,” which is insufficient
   to state a claim for relief. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir.
   1997) (citation omitted).

                                          14
Case: 22-10126      Document: 00516968334               Page: 15   Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                         No. 22-10126

    VI.   Punishment and prison condition.
          Weeks raises numerous complaints regarding prison life and use of
   restraints during transport. He argues there are several conditions that make
   prison life difficult and confusing, and he alleges that use of a “black box”
   restraint constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.
          Regarding the prison conditions, Weeks fails to identify any specific
   constitutional violations or injuries he suffered, and he has not alleged
   conditions “so serious as to deprive him of the minimal measure of life’s
   necessities, as when denied some basic human need.” Berry v. Brady, 192
   F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). None of the conditions rise to the level of a
   constitutional violation.
          Concerning restraints, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
   cruel and inhuman punishment is implicated when handcuffs or restraints are
   used to subject prisoners to “great pain” either “deliberately, as
   punishment, or mindlessly, with indifference to the prisoners’ humanity.”
   Fulford v. King, 692 F.2d 11, 14–15 (5th Cir. 1982). Weeks does not contend
   that he suffered any injury or great pain, nor has he provided any facts
   showing that restraints were used as punishment or to cause him harm. To
   the contrary, he states that the guards explained they were using the “black
   box” restraints during his transport because another prisoner attempted
   suicide during their previous transport. Weeks has failed to sufficiently plead
   a claim for relief on either issue.
   VII.   Entitlement to amend.
          Weeks’s final argument is the district court should not have dismissed
   his entire complaint if amending would have cured the deficiencies. See
   Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). Weeks filed a Rule 59(e)
   motion to be permitted to amend. “Generally, a district court errs in
   dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim . . . without giving the

                                              15
Case: 22-10126     Document: 00516968334            Page: 16    Date Filed: 11/15/2023

                                     No. 22-10126

   plaintiff an opportunity to amend.” Id. The district court is not required to
   allow such an opportunity, though, if the prisoner’s claims are clearly
   frivolous, Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994), or if the prisoner has
   pled his best case in the current complaint. Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982
   F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020).
          When a pro se litigant’s complaint is dismissed without allowing an
   opportunity to amend, this court considers whether the plaintiff’s
   “allegations, if developed by a questionnaire or in a Spears dialog, might have
   presented a nonfrivolous section 1983 claim.” Eason, 14 F.3d at 9. If, “[w]ith
   further factual development and specificity” the plaintiff’s “allegations may
   pass . . . muster,” we generally remand to give the prisoner “an
   opportunity . . . to offer a more detailed set of factual claims.” Id. at 10.
          In his Rule 59(e) motion, Weeks did not specify what issues he would
   have raised or how he would have cured any deficiencies in his complaint.
   He already presented, in his initial complaint, 225 pages of allegations to
   support his over 100 claims against 110 individual defendants. He provided
   detailed facts supporting his claims and the alleged conduct of the defendants
   that violated his constitutional rights. Weeks already had a considerable
   opportunity to present his best case. Without more in his motion for leave to
   amend, the district court did not err in denying it.
          AFFIRMED.

                                          16