Court Opinion

ID: 9378537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 19:02:46.397979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.886372
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/10/23 P. v. Fullmore CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097204

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 09F06445)

           v.

 DAVID EDWARD FULLMORE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Appointed counsel for defendant David Edward Fullmore asked this court to
review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.
(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) However, because defendant has appealed
from a nonappealable order, we will dismiss the appeal. (People v. Mendez (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 32, 34; People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1208.)

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                                     BACKGROUND
       On March 11, 2011, a jury convicted defendant of three counts of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211;1 counts one through three) as well as false imprisonment
(§ 236; count four). The jury also found true allegations that defendant had personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) in the commission of counts two and three and that
defendant had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) during the commission
of count four. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court determined defendant had
suffered two prior strikes. (People v. Fullmore et al. (Nov. 13, 2013, C068389) [nonpub.
opn.].) The trial court struck one of defendant’s prior strikes and sentenced him to an
aggregate prison term of 37 years. We upheld this judgment in an unpublished opinion
issued in 2013. (Ibid.)
       On September 19, 2022, defendant filed a petition in propria persona for
resentencing under former section 1170. Defendant’s petition referenced numerous
legislative enactments, as well as a “Vargas motion (juvenile strike)” and a “Romero
Motion to (strike my juvenile strike) juvenile adjudication.” While the petition generally
referenced changes made to the trial court’s discretion to impose a sentence exceeding
the midterm, legislation invalidating prior prison enhancements, and amendments
requiring dismissal of an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice, the petition did
not request specific relief.
       On October 12, 2022, the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition on the grounds
the court was without jurisdiction to modify defendant’s sentence. Defendant timely
appealed.

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
                                       DISCUSSION
       As this court explained in People v. Chamizo (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 696: “ ‘A
defendant may appeal from a final judgment of conviction or from any order after
judgment which affects his or her substantial rights. ([ ]§ 1237.) “[J]udgment is
synonymous with the imposition of sentence [citation] . . . .” (People v. Perez (1979)
23 Cal.3d 545, 549, fn. 2.)’ (People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719, 1725.)” (Id. at
pp. 699-700.)

       “Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to
resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced.”
(People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344.) Thus, once judgment is rendered, except
for limited statutory exceptions that are inapplicable here (e.g., §§ 1170.126, 1170.18),
the sentencing court is without jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence except
pursuant to the provisions of former section 1170, subdivision (d) (now § 1172.1, subd.
(a)(1)). (See, e.g., Portillo v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1829, 1834-1836.)
       Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) currently provides: “When a defendant, upon
conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or to the custody of the county correctional
administrator pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the court may, within 120 days
of the date of commitment on its own motion, at any time upon the recommendation of
the secretary . . . , recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence
the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether
or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no
greater than the initial sentence.”
       Thus, under current section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), a sentencing court may, on
its own motion, recall and resentence a defendant subject to the express limitation that the
court must act to recall the sentence within 120 days after committing the defendant to
prison. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); see also Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 456

                                              3
[analyzing former § 1170, subd. (d)].) The trial court further maintains jurisdiction to act
upon recommendations of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (as well as other identified parties) to recall and resentence a defendant,
provided the new sentence is not longer than the original. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
       Here, defendant was sentenced to prison on May 20, 2011. On September 19,
2022, defendant filed his petition for resentencing under former section 1170. This is
over 11 years after the trial court sentenced defendant to prison, and thus, is outside the
120-day limitation on the trial court’s own motion jurisdiction. (People v. Loper (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1155, 1165-1166 [trial court’s jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s motion to
recall under former § 1170, subd. (d) ended 120 days after the date of commitment];
People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719, 1724-1725 [same].)
       Under these circumstances, the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s former
section 1170 petition could not have impacted his substantial rights. (See People v.
Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1165-1166 [because the court in Chlad lacked own-
motion jurisdiction to resentence, its refusal to resentence could not have affected
defendant’s legal rights]; People v. Chlad, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1726 [same]; see
also People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 325-326 [denial of motion to strike
firearm enhancement brought outside of 120-day window].) Therefore, we must dismiss
this appeal as being from a nonappealable order. (Chlad, at p. 1726; People v. Dynes
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 523, 528.)

                                              4
                                    DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

                                                    \s\                    ,
                                                McADAM, J.*

We concur:

    \s\                    ,
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

    \s\                    ,
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

*       Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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