Court Opinion

ID: 9553707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:33:36.746244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:06.594758
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
with whom BURKE, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
I agree with the court’s resolution of the directed verdict issue, including its conclusion that the contract formed and to be enforced is a contract to procure insurance. For reasons hereafter stated, I suggest that the court may have misapplied the measure of damages for breach of contract to procure insurance in this factual setting. Further, invocation of the “plain error doc*1038trine” to achieve a remand of this case is without any basis in fact.
I.
As this court has observed, consideration of an issue not raised by the parties may be appropriate where the issue has been called to the parties’ attention and they have been afforded an opportunity to brief it. Vest v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks, 659 P.2d 1233, 1234 n. 2 (Alaska 1983), rehearing granted, 670 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1983). Here the court has resolved a damage issue on a theory that has not been subjected to the adversary process, affording the parties no opportunity to brief it. Precedent suggests that the theory may not have survived adversarial debate. A number of courts have considered the appropriate measure of damages in cases with nearly identical fact patterns: someone breaches a promise to purchase insurance, but the promisee, who suffers a loss, is covered nonetheless by another insurer; the prom-isee or his subrogated insurer sues for damages against the promisor. Some courts have held that the promisee, because his loss is fully reimbursed, suffers no damage, and neither he nor his subrogated insurer has any rights against the promisor. L.W. & P. Armstrong, Inc. v. The Mormacmar, 196 F.2d 752, 755 (2nd Cir. 1952); Bentley v. Fayas, 260 Wis. 177, 50 N.W.2d 404, 409 (1951); Mid-Century Insurance Company v. Hutsel, 10 Cal. App.3d 1065, 89 Cal.Rptr. 421, 424 (1970).
In Bentley, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling virtually indistinguishable from our ruling today: “the [lower court] judgment provided that Reynolds [the promisor] was a co-insurer with Milwaukee Auto [the promisee’s insurer] on the basis of the ‘other insurance’ clause of the Hardware Mutual policy [policy on which promisor was to name the promisee as an insured] so that Reynolds and Milwaukee Auto would share the liability to the plaintiffs in proportion to the liability limits of the Hardware Mutual and Milwaukee Auto policies.” 50 N.W.2d at 409. In reversing this holding, the court remarked that the “liability of one who breaches a contract to procure insurance is to pay damages, and is not that of an insurer.” Id. Since the promisee’s insurer would cover the entire amount of the prom-isee’s loss, the promisee had sustained no damage.
Similarly, we have held that “when a promise to obtain insurance is breached, the promisor does not thereby become an insurer, but is liable only for damages.” Alyeska Pipeline Service v. H.C. Price Co., 694 P.2d 782, 786 (Alaska 1985) (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Hutsel, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 423)). Indeed, GAI admits that Clark is not an insurer. Nonetheless, while paying lip service to this rule, today we inexplicably choose to ignore it, treating Clark exactly as an insurer. There is no evidence, nor is it argued, that Clark contracted with GAI to procure insurance for Terra Nova, GAI’s own insurance carrier. Neither is there evidence or argument that from past dealings, GAI or Clark had reason to believe Clark was procuring insurance for Terra Nova. Whatever Terra Nova’s damage, GAI’s damage amounted to $1,000. The jury awarded GAI precisely that amount, and arguably its verdict should be affirmed.
As the court notes in footnote 8, there is a contrary view which it chooses to adopt. For my part, I deem it appropriate to point out only that another view has been espoused and adopted. I deem it inappropriate to engage in a debate over the issue, especially since the litigants have been relegated to the status of observers, no longer having any voice in the production or direction of the play.
II.
If we assume that Clark is an insurer, and further assume, as the court declares, that Clark stipulated to damages in the amount of $48,948.42, and that they were not in dispute, a remand of “the damage issues ... to the superior court for further proceedings” is unsupportable.
A person might reasonably question why a remand is necessary if damages have been stipulated to and are not in dispute. The court’s answer is that “the superior *1039court committed plain error in ruling that $48,948.42 in damages were recoverable by GAI.” Op. at 14. To correct this plain error, the superior court is instructed as to the steps it must take:
First, the superior court must determine whether Clark’s policy would have covered GAI’s liability in this case. Second, the question of liability between co-insurers, and in turn the amount of damages GAI is entitled to recover, cannot be resolved until the superior court examines the “other insurance clauses” of both Clark’s and GAI’s insurance policies. In regard to this later issue the record fails to disclose that the superior court had both insurance policies before it prior to making its ruling that the jury’s damage verdict should be vacated and that a judgment for damages in the amount of $48,948.42 should be entered in favor of GAI.
Op. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
According to repeated pronouncements by this court, “[ujnder the ‘plain error’ doctrine, an issue not raised at trial may nonetheless be considered by this court if it appears that an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” State v. Northwestern Construction, Inc., 741 P.2d 235, 239 (Alaska 1987), citing Miller v. Sears, 636 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Alaska 1981). See also Matter of L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1986); City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 171 (Alaska 1977); Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. Peck, 520 P.2d 87, 91 (Alaska 1974).
Neither party ever asserted in the superi- or court, nor does either assert in this court, that the superior court committed plain error in failing to answer unasked questions regarding insurance policies which neither party offered into evidence at trial, and which are not before this court in any shape, manner or form. The declaration that plain error has been committed is a sua sponte conclusion by the court, without any basis in the record to support it.
It is not obvious that any mistake has been made, much less one that “creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” The record, briefs and arguments are barren of information that could lead to such a conclusion. As this court observed in Werley v. United States Automobile Association, 498 P.2d 112, 116 (Alaska 1972), “other insurance” clauses take a variety of forms.1 It therefore cannot be said that plain error has been committed. Even the questions the court poses make it obvious that it cannot be a proper application of the plain error doctrine that is being utilized to achieve the result it directs. Indeed, this is a misapplication of the plain error doctrine, which should not be countenanced. By this misapplication, the decision whether a litigant gets a new trial becomes wholly arbitrary. The court’s inability to answer this issue serves only to confirm the arbitrariness of the result it directs.

. Specifically, the court identifies three types of "other insurance" clauses:
Most, perhaps all, automobile liability insurance policies contain "other insurance" clauses providing that in the event of other application insurance, (1) this insurance shall not apply (an "escape" clause), or (2) that this insurance shall be excess only (an “excess” clause), or (3) there shall be a proration of the loss (a “proration” clause). Combinations of these are also found.
Werley, 498 P.2d at 116 (footnote omitted).