Court Opinion

ID: 9373656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:31.653806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.072771
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     EDITH ONORATO,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-315H-16-0645-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: June 7, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Mark Wonders, Ozark, Alabama, for the appellant.

           Sally R. Bacon, Esquire, Fort Lee, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     VACATE the initial decision in part, and REMAND the case to the Atlanta
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND

¶2        The Department of Veterans Affairs has recognized the appellant as having
     a service-connected disability with a disability rating of 100%. Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 6 at 5-6.    The agency appointed her to a competitive-service
     position on June 1, 2015, subject to a 1-year probationary period. IAF, Tab 11
     at 4. The Standard Form 50 documenting her appointment reflects that she was
     preference eligible and had 3 years and 3 days of creditable military service. Id.
     at 6. On May 16, 2016, the appellant reported to agency police that the previous
     day, her supervisor “swung a sheet of paper with a closed fist at [the appellant’s]
     face causing her to have to lean back to avoid being struck. ” IAF, Tab 6 at 8. On
     May 29, 2016, the agency terminated her on the basis of her absence without
     leave (AWOL). IAF, Tab 10 at 17. The termination notice advised the appellant
     of her options for obtaining review of the agency’s decision, including her option
     to seek corrective action from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), followed by
     an appeal to the Board. Id. at 17-18. The notice also stated that, alternatively,
     she could file a whistleblower reprisal appeal directly with the Board. Id. at 18.
     Nothing in the record suggests the appellant sought corrective action from OSC ,
     and her appeal form indicates she did not file a whistleblower complaint with
     OSC. IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
¶3        The appellant filed this appeal, in which she alleged that the agency
     wrongfully terminated her because of her service-connected disability of Post
     Traumatic Stress Disorder. IAF, Tab 1 at 4-6, Tab 7 at 4-7. The administrative
     judge issued an order that notified the appellant of her jurisdictional burden.
     IAF, Tab 3. In particular, the administrative judge explained that to be entitled to
     a hearing on jurisdiction, the appellant was required to make nonfrivolous
     allegations that she was an “employee” with chapter 75 adverse action appeal
                                                                                         3

     rights, the action was due to partisan political reasons or her marital status, or the
     agency took the action for preappointment reasons without complying with
     certain mandated procedures.      Id.   In response, the appellant alleged that the
     Board had jurisdiction over her appeal because: (1) she advised the agency of her
     preexisting service-connected disability when she was appointed, and that
     condition precipitated her AWOL; and (2) during her probationary period, s he
     was denied an accommodation, assaulted by her supervisor, and the agency
     “seemingly retaliated against” her by denying her request for sick leave for the
     absences in question “a mere 10 days after [her] first-line supervisor assaulted
     her.” IAF, Tab 7. The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction, arguing that the appellant was terminated for her conduct during the
     probationary period, and not for a preappointment reason. IAF, Tab 9.
¶4         The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     lack of jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing. IAF, Tab 1
     at 2, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. She reasoned that the parties did not
     dispute that the appellant was terminated during her probationary period. ID at 2.
     Further, the administrative judge determined that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that she was terminated            based on marital status
     discrimination or partisan political affiliation, or for conditions arising before her
     appointment. ID at 2-3. The appellant has filed a timely petition for review, to
     which the agency has not responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.
¶5         On review, the appellant reiterates her position that the Board has
     jurisdiction over her appeal because she was terminated for absences precipitated
     by her preexisting medical condition. Id. at 4, 11.        She now argues that the
     agency should have designated her absences as protected under the Family and
     Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). Id. at 6-11. She also asserts for the first
     time on review that she “filed a police report on her supervisor for assaulting her”
     and reprisal for that report was “the [l]one factor in [the] [t]ermination
     [d]ecision.” Id. at 5.
                                                                                        4

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge properly found that the Board lacks jurisdic tion under
     chapter 75 and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations over the
     appellant’s probationary termination.
¶6        To establish Board jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, an appellant must
     show, among other things, that she satisfies one of the definitions of “employee”
     in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d); Sosa v. Department of
     Defense, 102 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶ 6 (2006) (explaining that an “employee” within the
     meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) has appeal rights from certain agency actions,
     such as a removal for cause). For an employee in the competitive service, this
     generally means she must either not be serving a probationary peri od under an
     initial appointment or have completed 1 year of current continuous service under
     other than a temporary appointment of 1 year or less. 2 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A);
     McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1341-43 (Fed. Cir.
     2002). However, an employee in the competitive service who does not satisfy
     either definition may nevertheless establish Board jurisdiction under OPM
     regulations if she shows she was discriminated against based on her marital status
     or for partisan political reasons when terminated, or that her termination was
     based on preappointment reasons.        Tarr v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     115 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 10 (2010); 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-315.806.
¶7        It is undisputed that, at the time of her termination, the appellant did not
     meet the statutory definition of “employee” with Board appeal rights under
     chapter 75. ID at 2. Further, the appellant has not challenged the administrative
     judge’s finding that she failed to nonfrivolously allege discrimination based on
     marital status or for partisan political reasons, and we discern no reason to disturb

     2
       Effective November 25, 2015, 10 U.S.C. § 1599e(a), along with statutory amendments
     to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), outline that individuals appointed to a permanent
     competitive-service position at the Department of Defense must serve a 2-year
     probationary period.    However, the appellant’s appointment began before these
     statutory changes. IAF, Tab 11 at 4.
                                                                                         5

     that finding on review. PFR File, Tab 1. Rather, she raises an FMLA claim. Id.
     at 4, 11. The Board, however, distinguishes a preexisting condition and the effect
     a preexisting condition has on an employee’s performance or conduct during the
     probationary period.    See West v. Department of Health & Human Services,
     122 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 10 (2015). The appellant’s AWOL during her probationary
     period, even if necessitated by her preexisting medical condition, cannot qualify
     as a preappointment reason for her termination. See Holloman v. Department of
     the Navy, 31 M.S.P.R. 107, 110 (1986) (finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction
     over a probationary appellant’s attendance-based termination even if his absences
     were caused by a preexisting medical condition). 3
¶8        The appellant also reiterates her allegations that, during her probationary
     period, she was denied an accommodation and subjected to retaliation. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 5; IAF, Tab 10 at 48-49. The administrative judge correctly found that
     neither the appellant’s failure-to-accommodate claim nor her retaliation claim, as
     raised below, provided an independent basis for Board jurisdiction. ID at 3; see
     Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012) (finding that, in the
     absence of an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacks jurisdiction over a
     claim of discrimination based on a disability); Jafri v. Department of the
     Treasury, 68 M.S.P.R. 216, 219-21 (1995) (observing that an allegation of
     postappointment retaliation based on an equal employment opportunity claim

     3
       Absent an otherwise appealable action, we are without authority to adjudicate the
     appellant’s FMLA claim, even if the Board ultimately has jurisdiction over a potential
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal under the Whistleblower Protect ion
     Enhancement Act of 2012, or a discrimination claim under the Uniformed Services
     Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.
     §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA), as described below. See Lua v. U.S. Postal Service,
     87 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 12 (2001) (declining to adjudicate an appellant’s FMLA claim in the
     absence of chapter 75 jurisdiction); Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2
     (1980) (providing that prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are not
     independent sources of Board jurisdiction), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir.
     1982).
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      filed prior to the appointment cannot supply jurisdiction), aff’d, 78 F.3d 604
      (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).

      We remand for further proceedings because the appellant did not receive explicit
      notice of what is required to establish Board jurisdiction based on her allegations.
¶9         We find that the instant appeal needs to be remanded for further
      proceedings, because it appears that the appellant may be attempting to raise an
      individual right of action (IRA) appeal under the Whistleblower Protection
      Enhancement Act of 2012, or a discrimination claim under the Uniformed
      Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as
      amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA). 4
¶10        An appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to
      establish Board jurisdiction.     Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Burwell v. Department of the Army,
      78 M.S.P.R. 645, ¶¶ 8-9 (1998) (remanding appeal due to the administrative
      judge’s failure to advise the appellant what was required to establish Board
      jurisdiction over an IRA appeal).      The administrative judge’s orders, initial
      decision, and agency’s submissions did not provide the appellant with notice on
      the jurisdictional requirements of an IRA appeal. IAF, Tabs 3, 9; ID at 2-3; see
      Harris v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 9 (2009) (stating that an
      administrative judge’s failure to provide an appellant with proper Burgess notice
      can be cured if the agency’s pleadings or the initial decision contain the notice
      that was otherwise lacking). Although her appeal form indicates she did not file a
      whistleblowing complaint with OSC, the appellant may have been under the
      impression that she was not required to exhaust her OSC remedy due to the
      agency’s notice of termination, which suggested she could file an IRA appeal in

      4
        The Board’s jurisdiction over a USERRA claim is not dependent on an appellant
      invoking USERRA. Yates v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 145 F.3d 1480, 1485
      (Fed. Cir. 1998). USERRA claims are broadly and liberally construed. Tindall v.
      Department of the Army, 84 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 6-7 (1999).
                                                                                              7

      the first instance with the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 10 at 18. This guidance
      was in error, because an individual seeking corrective action for whistleblower
      reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 1221 is required to seek corrective action from OSC
      before seeking corrective action from the Board in an IRA appeal. Edwards v.
      Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 15 (2013). The appellant has
      alleged that the agency retaliated against her after she filed a report with agency
      police that her supervisor assaulted her. IAF, Tab 7 at 5-6; PFR File Tab 1 at 5-6.
      Because it appears the appellant participated in an investigation into the assault
      incident by agency police, she may have engaged in protected activity by
      “cooperating with or disclosing information to . . . [an agency] component
      responsible for internal investigation or review.” IAF, Tab 6 at 8-9; 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C). Further, a claim of assault may be a protected disclosure of a
      violation of law, rule, or regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i); see Lewis v.
      Department of Commerce, 101 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 11 (2005) (determining that the
      disclosure of an assault is a disclosure of a violation of law, rule, or regulation).
¶11         The appellant needs to be advised that to establish Board jurisdiction over
      an IRA appeal, she must show that she exhausted her administrative remedies
      before OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations of the following:            she made a
      protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
      protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D);
      and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a), (e)(1); Salerno v. Department
      of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). Because the appellant was not so
      informed, it is necessary to remand this appeal to the regional office to provide
      her with an adequate opportunity to establish jurisdiction. Burwell, 78 M.S.P.R.
      645, ¶ 9.
¶12         Regarding her possible USERRA claim, the appellant stated that she is a
      decorated disabled veteran and provided evidence that she has a 100% disability
                                                                                          8

      rating. IAF, Tab 6 at 5-6, Tab 7 at 4-5. She may have been attempting to raise a
      claim that the agency discriminated against her due to her service -connected
      disability. IAF, Tab 7 at 4-6. If the fact that the appellant incurred the injury
      during military service is incidental to her claim of disability discrimination, then
      it does not, on its own, make her claim a USERRA claim. McBride v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 78 M.S.P.R. 411, 415 (1998). Conversely, if the appellant is alleging the
      agency’s actions, culminating in and including her termination, were motivated
      by her status as a disabled veteran, the Board may have jurisdiction over her
      claim. Lazard v. U.S. Postal Service, 93 M.S.P.R. 337, ¶ 8 (2003). Neither the
      administrative judge nor the agency’s submission provided the appellant with
      notice on the jurisdictional requirements of a USERRA claim. IAF, Tabs 3, 9; ID
      at 2-3.
¶13         Therefore, the appellant also needs to be advised that to establish Board
      jurisdiction over a USERRA discrimination claim under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), she
      must nonfrivolously allege that: (1) she performed duty or has an obligation to
      perform duty in a uniformed service of the United States; (2) the agency denied
      her initial employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or any benefit of
      employment; and (3) the performance of duty or obligation to perform duty in the
      uniformed service was a substantial or motivating factor in the denial. Hau v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 11 (2016), aff’d sub nom.
      Bryant v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 878 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see
      Bryant, 878 F.3d at 1325-26 (articulating the “substantial or motivating factor”
      standard) (citation omitted).

                                            ORDER
¶14         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
      The administrative judge may adopt her prior findings regarding the Board’s lack
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of jurisdiction over the appellant’s termination under chapter 75 and 5 C.F.R.
§§ 315.805-.806 in her remand initial decision.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                         Jennifer Everling
                                         Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.