Court Opinion

ID: 9957520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:01:22.738249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:24.107254
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 4 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50068

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                3:20-mj-04538-AHG-TWR-1
 v.

GUSTAVO LAZCANO-NERIA,                          MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of California
                   Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted February 14, 2024
                              Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Judge W. FLETCHER.

      Gustavo Lazcano-Neria (“Lazcano-Neria”) was convicted of “illegal entry”

under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) on the basis of a post-arrest statement and other

evidence. Lazcano-Neria appeals the trial court’s admission of his post-arrest

statement and also challenges the constitutionality of § 1325. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      “The adequacy of a Miranda warning is a question of law that is reviewed

de novo.” United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 2002).

“Whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent is a question of fact that we

review for clear error.” United States v. Price, 980 F.3d 1211, 1226 (9th Cir.

2019) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted), amended by 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005)).

      1. An adequate Miranda advisal must warn, among other things, of “the

right to remain silent [and] the right to the presence of an attorney.” Florida. v.

Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59–60 (2010) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

479 (1966)). The warning must “reasonably convey” the rights to the defendant,

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (cleaned up), and the wording

“cannot be affirmatively misleading,” San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 387.

      Lazcano-Neria first argues that Border Patrol Agent Christian Rivas’s

statement that “you don’t want to answer questions, you don’t answer

them . . . until you have your attorney,” incorrectly suggested that Lazcano-Neria’s

right to silence ends once he has an attorney. But before and after making that

statement, Agent Rivas correctly read a standard form Miranda advisal to

Lazcano-Neria, which warned Lazcano-Neria that he has “the right to remain

silent,” that if he begins answering questions without an attorney, he “will

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[always/still] have the right to stop answering whenever [he] like[s],”1 and that he

has “the right to stop answering whenever [he] like[s], until you are able to speak

with an attorney.” Rivas’s statement sufficiently reflected the warning in the form

advisal, such that “taken together [they] conveyed” that Lazcano-Neria’s right to

remain silent did not extinguish with the appointment of counsel. United States v.

Loucious, 847 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).

      Lazcano-Neria also argues that Agent Rivas mislead him as to his right to

“selectively” waive Miranda rights, see United States v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 503

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d

895 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A defendant may selectively waive his Miranda rights by

agreeing to answer some questions but not others.”), when Agent Rivas responded

negatively—“No . . . that can’t be . . . [chosen/selected]”—to Lazcano-Neria’s

question regarding a scenario where “I do answer it, and maybe, the next time, I

don’t.” But to the extent Agent Rivas’s answer was misleading, Agent Rivas

immediately clarified by suggesting that it was “better” to reread the form advisal,

and he proceeded to do so “one more time, for you to understand [it] well.”2 Cf.

1
  This transcription and translation were provided by the defendant during the
bench trial. The brackets appear in the original translation where the translator felt
alternative translations were possible.
2
  We share the dissent’s position that a misstatement of the law requires correction.
San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 389. But we view Rivas’s statements as providing that
correction: Rivas clarified that the form advisal was “better.” This applies with

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San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 389 (finding a Miranda violation when the agent

provided a warning not consistent with Miranda, and did not “clarify to the

arrested party the nature of his or her rights”). Thus, the second reading of the

Miranda form advisal clarified that Lazcano-Neria could control the timing and

extent of questioning.

      2. Lazcano-Neria’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and

intelligent. Factors relevant to this determination include “whether the defendant

signed a written waiver[,] . . . whether the defendant was advised in his native

tongue[,] . . . whether the defendant appeared to understand his rights[,] . . . [and]

whether the defendant’s rights were individually and repeatedly explained to him.”

United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court did

not clearly err in determining Lazcano-Neria’s waiver was knowing and intelligent,

where the interview was conducted in Spanish, the advisal was read twice, after the

second Miranda form advisal Lazcano-Neria did not ask similar questions about

his right to remain silent, and he signed a written waiver.

      3. Finally, while Lazcano-Neria argued in his opening brief that

8 U.S.C. § 1325 is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection, Lazcano-

equal force to the first alleged incorrect statement; while, contrary to the dissent’s
characterization, we do not view the statement “you don’t want to answer
questions, you don’t answer them . . . until you have your attorney,” as incorrect
taken together with the form advisal, even if it were incorrect, Rivas clarified
which standard was appropriate before his second reading of the form advisal.

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Neria now concedes the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in United States v.

Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2023) forecloses this argument.

      AFFIRMED.

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                                                                            FILED
Lazcano-Neria, No. 22-50068
                                                                                APR 4 2024
W. Fletcher, J., dissenting.                                             MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

       I respectfully but strongly disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that

Lazcano-Neria’s post-arrest statement was properly admitted into evidence.

Before Lazcano-Neria made that statement, Agent Rivas had incorrectly advised

him of his Miranda rights.

       It is black-letter law that a Miranda advisal “cannot be affirmatively

misleading.” United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 2002).

We have held that “[r]egardless of circumstance, the Miranda warning must be

read and conveyed to all persons clearly and in a manner that is unambiguous.” Id.

at 389. Miranda requires “meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in

language which [they] can comprehend and on which [they] can knowingly act.”

United States v. Connell, 869 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1989) (alteration in

original).

       Agent Rivas read a form Miranda advisal to Lazcano-Neria. Lazcano-Neria

then asked Rivas questions about his Miranda rights. Rivas gave two legally

incorrect answers. First, he told Lazcano-Neria that he would not have to answer

questions until his attorney was present. This answer necessarily implied that once

his attorney was present, Lazcano-Neria would be required to answer questions.

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Second, he told Lazcano-Neria that he could not answer questions selectively,

answering some and refusing to answer others.

      Here is the full exchange between Agent Rivas and Lazcano-Neria

(translated into English):

      Lazcano-Neria: I have a question.
      Agent Rivas: [Tell me/Go ahead.]
      Lazcano-Neria: Um, in other words, if one question, I don’t want to
      answer it, I don’t answer it?
      Agent Rivas: Yes, so, you don’t want to answer questions, you don’t
      answer them—
      Lazcano-Neria: —but—
      Agent Rivas: —until you have your attorney.
      Lazcano-Neria: I’m referring . . . to all of them? Or . . . or, for
      example, you guys ask me, I don’t know, “Hey, so this is like this or
      like that?” And the—
      Agent Rivas: —No, well—
      Lazcano-Neria: —I don’t . . . I do answer it, and maybe the next
      time, I don’t—
      Agent Rivas: —No, it’s that, that can’t , that can’t be . . .
      [chosen/selected].
      Lazcano-Neria: Ah, that’s what—
      Agent Rivas: —That’s why, it’s better, but, I’m going to read it to
      you one more time, for you to understand [it] well.

(Emphasis added.)

      The panel majority does not dispute that Agent Rivas’s answers to Lazcano-

Neria’s questions were incorrect. However, the panel majority concludes that

when Agent Rivas re-read the form Miranda advisal, he made to clear to Lazcano-

Neria that his answers had been incorrect. The panel majority concludes that after

                                         2
giving his incorrect answers “Rivas clarified that the form advisal was ‘better.’”

Mem. Dispo. at 4, n.2. I strongly disagree.

      First, as is evident from the exchange quoted above, Agent Rivas did not

“clarify” that the form advisal was “better.” Mem. Dispo. at 4, n.2. He used the

word “better,” but he did not say that the form advisal was “better” than his

answers. Second, even if Agent Rivas had clarified that the form advisal was

“better” (which he did not), the form advisal was not, in fact, “better.” The form

advisal did not answer Lazcano-Neria’s two questions. Agent Rivas had answered

those questions, and he had answered them incorrectly. There was nothing in the

form advisal that contradicted Agent Rivas’s answers.

      Even if the re-reading of the advisal had addressed Lazcano-Neria’s

questions and had contradicted Agent Rivas’s misstatements (which it did not),

that would not have cured the problem. In that event, Lazcano-Neria would have

heard contradictory statements. We have held that the government cannot presume

after giving “two sets of contradictory warnings to an individual that [the

Defendant] possesses sufficient legal or constitutional expertise to understand what

are his or her rights under the Constitution.” San Juan–Cruz, 314 F.3d at 388.

Once Rivas misstated the law, he had the obligation to correct—not merely to

contradict—his misstatements.

                                          3
     The error was not harmless. In finding Lazcano-Neria guilty, the Magistrate

Judge relied on statements he made after Agent Rivas’s improper Miranda advisal.

      Because Agent Rivas’s Miranda advisal—the form advisal supplemented by

Agent Rivas’s incorrect answers—was not “meaningful advice to the unlettered

and unlearned in language which [they] can comprehend and on which [they] can

knowingly act,” I respectfully but strongly dissent. Connell, 869 F.2d at 1351.

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