Court Opinion

ID: 9546299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:27:09.224366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:15.214081
License: Public Domain

WADE, Justice
(concurring).
I concur, but I do not consider the excluded evidence of the amount of the bid for repairing the premises to be hearsay. I believe that a bona fide bid for making such repairs by a responsible person in the due course of his business is evidence which in reason and logic tends to prove the reasonable, value or cost of such repairs and that such a statement is not hearsay but is a circumstance which tends to prove a material issue in the case. Here plaintiff merely gave evidence that there was a bid but failed to show that it was bona fide, made by a responsible person or in the regular course of business and thus failed to establish sufficient foundation for its admission so it was properly excluded.
The lease agreement required the lessee to surrender the premises in as good repair as when it took them. Plaintiff’s manager testified that after the premises were surrendered the plaster was damaged by the removal of fixtures which would require *115filling and repainting, that he secured a hid from a painter for making such repairs hut the court sustained objection to him stating the amount of such hid on the ground that it would be hearsay. At the time, plaintiff’s counsel did not urge that the answer would not he hearsay but stated that the amount bid was $850 and that he would produce the bidder as a witness, which he failed to do.
It is generally recognized that all relevant evidence, that is evidence which in reason or logic tends to prove or disprove a material issue, is admissible unless excluded by some rule of evidence or by precedent.1 The hearsay rule excludes only, “evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at a hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”2 Such a statement is not admissible because it would be used as testimony of the existence of the facts stated by a witness who does not purport to have personal knowledge of such facts and the person making such statement who has personal knowledge of such facts is not a witness subject to cross-examination.3 However, if the fact of whether or not the statement was made is a material issue in the case, or the statement accompanies an ambiguous or equivocal act serving to complete and give it definite legal significance it is a verbal act which constitutes a material fact in the case or if the fact that such statement was made is a circumstance which tends to prove a material issue in the case such a statement is not being used as testimonial evidence of the statement made on the credit of the person, making the statement who is not a witness and therefore is not hearsay evidence. Where the “question is not whether the statements are true, but whether they were made”4 such statements are not excluded by the rule against hearsay. On this question Wigmore says;5'
“The theory of the Hearsay rule (ante, § 1361) is that, when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore the assertion can be received only when made upon the stand, subj ect to the test *116of cross-examination. If, therefore, an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to evidence the matter asserted, but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply. The utterance is then merely not obnoxious to that rule. It may or may not be received, according as it has any relevancy in the case; but if it is not received, this is in no way due to the Hearsay rule.
* * * * * *
“The prohibition of the Hearsay rule, then, does not apply to all zvords ■or utterances merely as such. If this fundamental principle is clearly realized, its application is a comparatively simple matter. The Hearsay rule excluded extrajudicial utterances only when offered for a special purpose, namely, as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted.
* * * * * *
“ * * * The classes of utterances thus exempt may be grouped under three heads:
“1. Utterances material to the case as a part of the issue;
“2. Utterances accompanying an ambiguous or equivocal act, itself material, and serving to complete the act and give it definite legal significance; i. e. verbal parts of an act;
“3. Utterances used circumstantially, as giving rise to indirect inferences, but not as assertions to prove the matter asserted.”
On the question of a verbal act that author says :6
“A second kind of situation in which utterances are not offered testimonially arises when the utterance accompanies conduct to which it is desired to attach some legal effect. The conduct or act has intrinsically no definite significance, or only an ambiguous one, and its whole legal purport or tenor is . to be more precisely ascertained by considering the words accompanying it. The utterance thus enters merely as a verbal part of the act, or, in the common phrase, a ‘verbal act.’
“Thus the words are used in no sense testimonially, i. e. as assertions to evidence the truth of a fact asserted in them. On the one hand, therefore, the Hearsay rule interposes no objection to the use of such utterances, because they are not offered as assertions (ante, § 1766). Oil the other hand, so far as they may contain assertions, these are not to be used or argued about testimonially, nor believed by the jury; for this would be to use them in violation of the Hearsay rule. In short, the utterances enter irrespective of the *117truth of any assertion they may contain; and they neither profit nor suffer by virtue thereof.”
On utterances or statements used as circumstantial evidence of a material issue he says:7
“The Hearsay rule forbids merely the use of an extrajudicial utterance as •an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (ante, § 1766). Such a use would he testimonial, i. e. we should he asked to believe the fact because Doe asserted it to be true, precisely as we should be asked to believe Doe’s similar assertion if made on the stand. What the Hearsay rule forbids (ante, § 1361) is the use of testimonial evidence — i. e. assertions' — uttered not under cross-examination. If, then, an utterance can be used as circumstantial evidence, i. e. without inferring from it as an assertion to the fact asserted (ante, § 25, 245), the Hearsay rule does not oppose any barrier, because it is not applicable.”
As an illustration of what is and what is not hearsay evidence of value, Wigmore points out that knowledge of value must generally he acquired by personal observation not hearsay. That instances of offers and acceptances of prices, averaged into a mean figure are what constitute value. That statements of persons declaring the prices they offer to give or receive are not taken on the credit of such persons as truthworthy assertions of value, but are items of conduct which in themselves make up what we call value. He then says: 8
“ * * * Thus, if A sits in a merchant’s office and listens to the terms accepted and rejected for a dozen articles, he acquires a first-hand knowledge of value; but if he goes in and asks the merchant to tell him the value of a given article, his knowledge is based on a belief in the truth of the merchant’s assertion. In the former case, his knowledge is not based on hearsay. But in the latter case his knowledge is based on the hearsay assertion of another person, and therefore is inadmissible (under the principle of § 657, ante). The distinction depends upon whether the utterances heard represent in themselves a series of individual offers or transactions, or are merely reports of the net result of offers or transactions already made.”
Under this test the amount of the bid which the excluded answer called for was not hearsay evidence. It constituted a part of a transaction between the witness, plaintiff’s manager, and the bidder, it did not call for an estimate or an opinion by the bidder of the reasonable value or cost of making such repairs nor a report by the *118bidder of other transactions but was a direct offer by the bidder to do the job for a specified price. Such an offer is one of the constituents or an inherent part of the transactions which constitute value. Thus it constitutes one of the elements of a material issue in the case and is not hearsay evidence.
Here the excluded answer in substance and effect would have been that the bidder said: I offer or make a bid to repair the damages for $850. It was not offered to show on the credit of the person making the statement that the fact stated was true. The making of such statement by the bidder to plaintiff’s manager in law constituted the making of a bid for that amount, and whether or not the bidder made such a statement was within the personal knowledge of the witness who was available for cross-examination. However, whether such a bid was made was not the issue which this evidence was offered' to prove, that question was material only as circumstantial evidence of the reasonable cost of making such repairs, otherwise, whether such an offer was made was immaterial in this case. The question called for no statement by the bidder of his opinion or knowledge of the reasonable cost of making such repairs. Such answer could only show the reasonable cost of such repairs by circumstantial but not by testimonial evidence or as one of the elements or integral parts which go to establish such reasonable cost or value. Thus such evidence is not hearsay.
As we have seen this statement which was excluded as hearsay was not an expression of the bidder’s opinion of the reasonable value or cost of such repairs but was a circumstance which tends to show such value or cost. However, the amount of the bid was based on and indirectly indicated the bidder’s opinion of what the amount of such value or cost would be. It might be inadmissible if offered only to show the bidder’s opinion of what the amount of such cost or value would be for the rule against hearsay has been held to exclude implied as well as express assertions.9 If the proper foundation were laid *119-this evidence would have an additional value beyond merely indicating the bid•der’s opinion on the amount of such value •or cost it would also show that he was willing to risk undertaking the liability to make such repairs for the amount of such bid in case it was acceptable to the ■owner. The making of such bids and the ■acceptance of one of them are the ingredients which determine and constitute the reasonable value or cost of such repairs for reasonable value or cost of such repairs is the price required to obtain them on the •open market. Thus, such evidence is a •circumstance which in reason and logic tends to show such value and is admissible as such even though it also indicates the opinion of the bidder on the amount of such value or cost and might wrongfully be considered as testimonial evidence of the bidder’s opinion of the reasonable value or cost of making such repairs. For evidence which is admissible for one purpose, having satisfied all the requirements for admissibility in that capacity is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the requirements of admissibility under some other rule. This is called the multiple admissibility rule,10 and has been accepted by this court.11 Of course in a jury case the court should instruct the jury that such evidence should be used only as circumstantial evidence and not as testimonial evidence of the bidder’s opinion, and in a non-jury case the judge should keep this distinction in mind in determining the facts.12
We have yet to consider whether evidence of such bid is relevant to the issue of what is the reasonable market value or cost of such repairs. “Market Value” is said to be “the price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy.” 13 Although this definition was used with reference to the market value of property the same principles apply to this case where we are concerned with the reasonable market value or cost of such repairs. On the question of value of property Wig-more says:14
*120“ * * * For evidential purposes, Sale-Value is nothing more than the nature or quality of the article as measured by the money which others show themselves willing to lay out in purchasing it. Their offers of money not merely indicate the value; they are the value; i. e. since value is merely a standard or measure in figures, those sums taken in net potential result are that standard.”
If there were a reasonable number of bids, including one which was accepted by the owner seeking such repairs in the absence of any compulsion, the reasonable market value or cost of such repairs would be established. One bid, although far from conclusive, is an important integral part of such process and if shown to be a bona fide bid made in the due course of business by a reliable and competent bidder it would tend to show the reasonable market value or cost of such repairs and therefore would be relevant and admissible. We must keep in mind that here we are dealing only with admissibility and not with the weight 'or credibility of such evidence.
The use of bids in determining the value or cost of construction and repairs is very widespread in business and governmental affairs and courts receive without question the amount paid or agreed to be paid for the repair of damaged property. While such evidence is much stronger than evidence of one unaccepted bid it is admissible on the same principle both as to relevancy and hearsay. Some courts, failing to note the distinctions herein pointed out have held such evidence hearsay while also emphasizing its weaknesses and pointing out that it might cause confusion by bringing in collateral issues, especially where the bid was for other property.15 Others have held that a bid on the property involved in the action is admissible16 and some have excluded such evidence on the ground that a proper foundation had not been laid.17 As previously stated sufficient foundation was not laid in this case and the evidence was properly excluded.

. See Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Rule 1(2) and comment thereon and Rule 7(f) and comment; American Uaw Institute’s Model Code of Evidence, Rule 1(12) and comment thereon and Rule 9 (f) and comment. Also see 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., secs. 9, 10, 12 and 13; Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise, 265-8. Also State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016; State v. Neal, Utah, 254 P.2d 1053, at page 1056.

. Quoted from Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63, see comment to that rule and 5 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., secs. 1361, 1362, 1363, 1364.

. See reference to Wigmore on Evidence in note 2.

. See United States v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 594.

. See 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 1766, at pages 177, 178 and 180.

. See 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 1772, pp. 190-1.

. See 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 1788, at page 234.

. See 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 719 at page 52.

. See leading English case of Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & E. 670, 739, (1838) and same case at 7 Ad. & El. 313; Wigmore on Evidence, sections 267, 268-273 and 459, where he seems to confine the hearsay rule to “utterances”; Hinton, State of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. of C.L.Rev. 394-423; and McCormick on Evidence, § 229, where after discussing the cases and views of text-writers and commentators concludes: “ * * * The present writer believes, accordingly that much the more viable path to improvement is the alternative theory which would limit hearsay to assertions, namely to statements, oral or written, or acts intended to be communicative, such as signals and the sign-language, when offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted. Other acts and conduct, including silence, when offered to show belief to prove the fact believed, would be classed (as many decisions have classed it) as circumstantial evidence.”
*****
“This approach is adopted by the decisions, forming a numerous though a minority group, which decline to treat *119conduct as hearsay, see notes, 16-25, supra. It is persuasively advocated by Murchison, 24 N.C.L.Rev. 274, 282 (1946). This seems also to be the view adopted in Uniform Rule 62(1), which includes in the definition of statement ‘non verbal conduct * * * intended * * * as a substitute for words in expressing the matter stated,’ and Rule 63, which limits ‘hearsay’ to ‘statement.’ ”

. See 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 13, pp. 299 to 303; 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 1790, pp. 237 to 240.

. See State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, at page 452, 57 P.2d 750; State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 327; State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016; State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764, at page 768; State v. Neal, Utah, 254 P.2d 1033, at page 1056.

. See note 10 supra.

. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 250 P.2d 938, at pages 940, 942.

. See 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., sec. 463 at page 503.

. Yellowstone Park R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co., 34 Mont. 545, 87 P. 963, where evidence of offers for other lands were excluded stating all of the above mentioned grounds, however the proof offered is not sufficiently stated to show whether or not it was hearsay, this case admitted evidence of an offer for the land involved in the case on another ground. On the question of collateral issues see State, By and Through Its Engineering Comm. v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630.

. See Heiner v. Crosby, 3 Cir., 24 F.2d 191, at page 193; Appeal of Pennsylvania Co., etc., 282 Pa. 69, 127 A. 441, at page 444; Harrison v. Glover, 72 N.Y. 451; Kankakee Park District v. Heidenreich, 328 Ill. 198, 159 N.E. 289; Tharp v. Massengill, 38 N.M. 58, 28 P.2d 502, 504; Arts v. Jones, 196 Ark. 1177, 118 S.W.2d 574; Christopher v. Musolino, 241 Mass. 202, 135 N.E. 124; Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N.Y. 174, 158 N.E. 64.

. Jefferson Park District v. Sowinski, 336 Ill. 390, 168 N.E. 370; Wiget v. Becker, 8 Cir., 84 F.2d 706;