Court Opinion

ID: 9490498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:45:06.061195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:07.919810
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that this appeal is moot, I respectfully dissent.1
The Supreme Court repeatedly has reaffirmed that “[t]o qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’ ” Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1068, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (citation omitted). Stated differently, “[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Id. at - n. 22, 117 S.Ct. at 1069 n. 22 (quotation marks and citations omitted). When a case becomes moot on appeal, an Article III case or controversy no longer exists, and we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317, 108 S.Ct. 592, 600-01, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988).2 As the majority *465correctly notes, when presented with such a situation, we must vacate the judgment below and remand the case with instructions for the action to be dismissed. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 106-07, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).
Ascertaining the meaning of “case or controversy,” however, is not the simplest of tasks. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (“As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government.”). Yet this does not mean that we lack the tools to reach the correct decision. In analyzing issues of mootness it is helpful to keep in mind that “[tjhese problems often require a highly individualistic, and usually intuitive, appraisal of the facts of each ease.” 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 211-12 (2d ed.1984). We also know that a case is not justiciable if it is not “presented in an adversary context [or] in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 95, 88 S.Ct. at 1950. After analyzing the unusual facts of this case, I believe that the requirement of an adversary context is lacking.
Dion McPherson brought this action so that he could play basketball for his high school team. The first part of the preliminary injunction granted McPherson this request, providing: “Defendants are restrained from taking any action to prevent Plaintiff from participating in interscholastic athletic competition for the Plaintiffs remaining senior year in high school during the pendency of this suit____” Because McPherson has since graduated from high school and will play no more games, the majority correctly concludes that this portion of the injunction is moot. I also agree with the majority that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception as traditionally formulated does not apply in this situation, because there is no reasonable expectation that McPherson himself will be subjected to the same conduct by the MHSAA.3
*466Focusing on the part of the injunction prohibiting the MHSAA from penalizing the school district for McPherson’s participation in interseholastie athletics, the majority concludes that this dispute as a whole is not moot. According to the majority, this controversy remains live because the MHSAA wishes to sanction the school district for McPherson’s participation and because McPherson himself retains an interest in preventing the MHSAA from erasing his team’s victories and his own performances. As for the first reason, the school district is not a party to this appeal; we are without power, therefore, to adjudicate any dispute between the MHSAA and the school district. On this point, Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 16 F.3d 785 (7th Cir.1994), is instructive. In Jordan, the Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) argued that a dispute presenting remarkably similar facts to the instant case was not moot because the IHSAA desired to sanction the plaintiffs high school for the plaintiffs athletic participation. Rejecting this argument, the court stated:
[BJecause Snider High School is no longer a party to this suit, any actions the IHSAA may take against it or its basketball team are irrelevant in determining whether a “live” controversy exists between Herman Jordan and the IHSAA---- It is axiomatic that a case or controversy must exist between the actual parties to a law suit for a federal court to have jurisdiction under Article III. Thus, the fact that the IHSAA may require Snider High School to forfeit team victories or return team awards does not give this court jurisdiction to hear an appeal where Snider is not a party.
Id. at 788; see also Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172, 1173 (11th Cir.1997) (relying on Jordan and reaching the same conclusion in a ease presenting similar facts); Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, § 3533.1, at 149 n. 17 (2d ed. Supp.1996) (stating that “[t]he blend of standing with mootness is nicely illustrated by Jordan ”). Because the school district is not a party to the appeal in the present dispute, if there is a live controversy at all, it must be between McPherson and the MHSAA.
The majority states that a live controversy exists between McPherson and the MHSAA because McPherson has an interest in preventing the MHSAA from erasing his team’s victories and his own performances.4 At the least, it should be noted that the eases are in conflict as to whether these factors alone imbue a plaintiff with enough of a stake in the outcome to satisfy Article III. Compare Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir.1994) (controversy regarding eligibility of high school basketball player not moot when the athletic association intended to sanction the school district), with Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788 (controversy moot when the plaintiff merely had participated on the team and had not achieved any individual records). The relevant inquiry can be phrased as follows: if the MHSAA were to force Huron High School to forfeit the games in which McPherson competed, would McPherson have standing to bring an action contesting this sanction? Although valid arguments exist to support either an affirmative or negative answer to this interesting question, I believe the present dispute is moot regardless of which answer is adopted.
“[I]t is elemental that there must be parties before there is a case or controversy.” Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434, 95 S.Ct. 1691, 1696, 44 L.Ed.2d 274 (1975). Indeed, “[tjhere can be no doubt that an action is mooted if the plaintiff voluntarily withdraws.” Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, *467§ 3533.2, at 231 (2d ed.1984). Although McPherson has not formally withdrawn from this dispute, concessions by his counsel at oral argument come about as close to a withdrawal as I can imagine. McPherson’s counsel began her argument by stating: “This issue is moot with respect to my client.” At another point in the argument, she stated that McPherson had no further interest in continuing the injunctions. In light of these explicit concessions and McPherson’s counsel’s unwavering position that this case is moot, I cannot comprehend how we can vest McPherson with a stake in the outcome that he no longer desires to hold. While a formal withdrawal by McPherson would have sent an even more emphatic message regarding his interest in this matter, there is no requirement that a party who no longer maintains any interest in an action must withdraw before a court can declare the action moot. See, e.g., Ellis, 421 U.S. at 434, 95 S.Ct. at 1696 (stating that, because the plaintiffs no longer showed any visible interest in the litigation, “it is highly doubtful that a case or controversy could be held to exist”); Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788-89 (dismissing case as moot when plaintiff had only argued for a finding of mootness and had not dismissed the matter); Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986) (“The plaintiff has directed his counsel to withdraw from active participation and to conduct no additional business on his behalf in this case____ There can be no live controversy without at least two active combatants.”).
As explained above, the case is moot now with regard to plaintiff McPherson; the school district is not a participant in this appeal; and there is no other appellee defending the injunction. This presents us with the absence of an Article III case or controversy at this stage of the litigation. We are now faced with both the absence of an adversary process and the uncertainty whether a current dispute even exists. We should recognize, however, that the school district, while not a party to this appeal, is still a named party in the action in district court. Although named as a defendant along with the MHSAA, the school district has sided with McPherson in this matter. The school district presumably did not appeal from the injunction because it would like the injunction to continue.5 After vacating the injunction restraining the defendants from preventing McPherson from athletic participation on the ground of mootness, we should, therefore, remand the remaining matter' — the injunction prohibiting the MHSAA from penalizing the school district— to the district court so that that court can determine whether the school district remains an interested party in the litigation and, if so, then can afford the parties the opportunity to align themselves according to their real interests in this dispute.
Before we can rule on the merits of the preliminary injunction restraining the MHSAA from penalizing the school district, we must be satisfied that an actual dispute continues between interested parties. We cannot assure ourselves of this requirement until the district court summons in the school district and ascertains its current litigation posture. Only if the school district objects to dissolution of the remaining preliminary injunction and fights to retain it can there be the constitutionally requisite case or controversy under Article III warranting a decision on the merits by this court or any other court. Because this action is moot with respect to McPherson, if the school district wishes to continue the injunction, its participation in this matter is critical to the adversary process. If, however, the school district *468is not adverse to the MHSAA, then the entire controversy is moot and the remaining injunction should be vacated promptly by the district court. At that point, the MHSAA could decide to sanction the school district and/or high school for McPherson’s participation, and there might then exist an interested party or parties to challenge the sanction. A court of competent jurisdiction then could rule on the merits. In other words, numerous channels exist through which the MHSAA can have the merits of its relevant rules and arguments considered.
The majority may believe that its decision to address the merits at this time is supported by notions of judicial economy. Our judicial system is constitutionally limited, however, and we cannot act where we lack jurisdiction under Article III. The majority, by reaching out to resolve the merits, ignores its responsibility to decide only those cases permitted by Article III of the Constitution. With the case moot as to McPherson, and the school district not a party to the appeal, we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits. In this situation, we should vacate the injunction regarding McPherson and remand to the district court to determine whether the remainder of the litigation also lacks the constitutionally required case or controversy. I respectfully dissent.

. The majority begins its mootness analysis by stating that the mootness issue was not raised by either party. This is somewhat of an overstatement. MHSAA’s supplemental memorandum in support of en banc review begins with a discussion as to why the Sixth Circuit panel in this case erred in its mootness analysis. Additionally, as Chief Judge Martin stated at the beginning of oral argument in this matter, we granted en banc review because of the potential conflict between the panel's mootness analysis and our opinion in Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.1995). The remainder of oral argument confirmed this observation: the parties spent the majority of the time allotted for argument on the mootness issue.

. Although the current caselaw indicates otherwise, some jurists and academicians believe that when a case becomes moot on appeal, Article III does not require dismissal of the case. In his concurrence in Honig, Chief Justice Rehnquist openly questioned whether the mootness doctrine should be based upon Article III. To sup*465port his argument, he gave the following illustration involving the "capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception: “If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us by the case or controversy requirement of Art. Ill itself, we would have no more power to decide lawsuits which are 'moot' but which also raise questions which are capable of repetition but evading review than we would to decide cases which are 'moot' but raise no such questions.” Honig, 484 U.S. at 330, 108 S.Ct. at 608 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 Harv L.Rev. 603, 612, 623-36 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1383-85 (1973). In Arizonans For Official English, however, a unanimous Supreme Court once again reaffirmed the conclusion that the mootness doctrine derives directly from Article III. - U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1068-69.

. Similar to the issues raised regarding the relationship between the mootness doctrine and Article III, a question has been raised as to whether the "capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception should always be limited to disputes involving the same parties. In Honig, Justices Scalia and O'Connor suggested that the Court did not always limit the "capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to situations involving the same parties:
Roe[ v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)], at least one other abortion case, and some of our election law decisions differ from the body of our mootness jurisprudence not in accepting less than a probability that the issue will recur, in a manner evading review, between the same parties; but in dispensing with the same-party requirement entirely, focusing instead upon the great likelihood that the issue will recur between the defendant and the other members of the public at large without ever reaching us.
484 U.S. at 335-36, 108 S.Ct. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Had Justice Scalia's interpretations of the Court’s mootness jurisprudence commanded a majority of the Court, cases similar to the present dispute potentially would qualify under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. A student will not know whether the MHSAA will recognize an exception to the eight-semester rule until the student attempts to participate in high school athletics after completing eight semesters. By that time, graduation will be near, and the chance for appellate review before graduation likely will be nonexistent. Because a majority of the Court has never agreed with Justice Scalia's interpretation, the present dispute cannot fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. Even if Justice Scalia's views had prevailed, however, I would still find this appeal moot based on the current posture of the parties for the reasons stated in this dissent.

. The record in this case contains virtually no evidence regarding either McPherson’s individual performances or his team's record. In its appellate brief, the MHSAA asserts that McPherson participated in fourteen games during the period in which the injunction was in effect, that Huron High School was victorious in two of these games, and that McPherson was the second-leading scorer on the team. Appellant’s Br. at 5-6. At oral argument, counsel for the MHSAA informed the court that McPherson averaged 6.8 points per game. Nowhere does the MHSAA contend that McPherson obtained any individual records. Cf. Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788 n. 3 ("While it is not entirely clear, we assume that the word 'records’ refers to achieving the highest individual performance level in several recognized statistical categories such as scoring and rebounding.”).

. McPherson recognized early on that the school district was likely to support his position. His complaint provides in relevant part: "While Plaintiff believes that [the district] will not be adverse to Plaintiff's requests for relief, [the district] is named as a defendant in order to permit this Court to protect [the district] from the imposition of penalties by the MHSAA, and to permit this Court to effect complete injunctive relie! in the event the Court rules in Plaintiffs favor.” J.A. at 152 (Plaintiff's Compl. ¶ 4). In light of the fact that the school district sided with McPherson at the district court level, it would have been wise for the MHSAA to have filed a cross-claim against the school district. At oral argument, the MHSAA contended that a conclusion of mootness with respect to this appeal would jeopardize its ability to have the merits of its arguments and rules considered. This concern largely would have been alleviated, however, had the MHSAA taken the simple step of filing a cross-claim — a step that would have placed all interested parties before this court on appeal. Alternatively, the MHSAA could have named the school district as an appellee on appeal.