Court Opinion

ID: 9536351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:57:59.248177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:26.963627
License: Public Domain

O’NEAL, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to concur in the opinion approved by the majority of the court.
In this action the plaintiff, Godchaux Sugars, Inc., sued the defendant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., of Muskogee, a corporation in the district court of Muskogee county for $1,110.26, alleged to be the balance due on an open merchandise account. The defendant filed an answer denying generally the allegations of plaintiff’s petition. Thereafter defendant filed amended answer and cross-petition. The amended answer denied generally the allegations of plaintiff’s petition and in the cross-petition defendant seeks damages in the sum of $16,500 for an alleged wrongful attachment. Thus there is $17,610.26 involved under two separate and distinct issues.
I do not agree that under the proviso in 12 O.S. 1941 §439, as amended in 1945, (1) the financial responsibiltiy imposed therein necessarily limits attendance under a notice to take depositions to either the party notified or his attorney; nor do I agree (2) that an attorney’s fee is not part of the actual and reasonable expenses incurred in attending for the purpose of taking depositions.
As to the first proposition it may be conceded that in many cases the attendance of both the party notified of the intended taking of a deposition and his attorney is not necessary. On the other hand, it may be highly necessary that the party and his attorney both be present at the taking of depositions, especially where the issues are complicated. Under the statute expenses recoverable must be actual and necessary. At the hearing on a motion to tax the expenses, such as is here involved, it is for the trial judge to determine from the evidence whether the expenses claimed were actually incurred, and whether the same, if actually incurred, are reasonable.
In the instant case, the uncontradicted evidence is that the actual and necessary expenses of George William Colvert, the president and general manager of defendant company, in attending in response to the notice to take depositions, was $241. The reasonableness thereof as to the amount is not questioned. During the hearing, and at the close of all the evidence, counsel for plaintiff, in response to the claim for the expenses of Mr. Colvert, stated:
“How about the expenses of Mr. Colvert? The attorney doesn’t have to take his client with him.”
whereupon the court stated:
“It would be gross negligence for him not to do so, in my opinion.”
With that statement of the trial court I fully agree. Neither defendant nor counsel for defendant had any means of knowing the names of the witnesses whose depositions were to be taken, nor as to which of the two issues their testimony might relate.
*697I think the word “or” as used in the phrase “and the party served, or his or their attorney attend as notified ...” should be construed as meaning “or” and “and.” The context clearly indicates that would be the meaning. It is said that the word “or” is often referred to as an empty term with no inherent meaning, or a mere colorless particle deriving its meaning or course from what comes before and after. 46 C.J. 1124.
While the word “or” in its primary sense expresses a disjunctive meaning and not a conjunctive meaning, it may, subject to certain limitations, be used in a conjunctive sense, and hence may be construed as meaning “and,” especially where so doing prevents an absurd or unreasonable result. 46 C. J. 1126. The word “or” is often used in the sense of both “or” and “and.” 46 C. J. 1125. I think, from the context, it is clearly intended to mean both “or” and “and” in the statute here involved, and that if either the party served, or his or their attorney, or both the party served and his or their attorney attend, the party who gives the first notice and fails to give the second notice becomes liable to the adverse party upon compliance with the provisions of the statute as to filing claim therefor for the actual and reasonable expenses of both.
With respect to the attorney’s fee, I think the trial court properly included that item as a part of the actual and necessary expenses incurred by defendant in attending or attempting to attend the taking of the depositions.
It may be that an attorney’s fee cannot properly be allowed in case of the attendance of an attorney employed on a contingent basis, or in case of an attorney employed on a flat fee basis. But we are not here dealing with a case of either of the two kinds. The uncontradicted evidence is that defendant paid its attorney, A. Camp Bonds, the sum of $250 solely for his services rendered in attempting to attend the taking of the depositions. The trial court, under the evidence, held that it “was a special attorney’s fee only to appear for the taking of the depositions.”
Many cases might be cited where phrases such as “actual expenses”; “all just and reasonable expenses”; “all reasonable expenses incurred,” and “costs and expenses” were held to include reasonable attorney’s fee without expressly mentioning the same. 25 C.J. 173.
In Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 58 Okla. 470, 160 P. 465, it is said:
“ ‘Expense of litigation,’ as commonly understood, does not include interest, though interest may accumulate as the result of the litigation. An agreement to pay the ‘expense or cost of making a defense’ to an action at law, in the common and well understood acceptance of the term, fairly and reasonably contemplates the attorney fees, the court costs, stenographer fees, and other expenditures necessary and directly required to present the defense, and does not include the collateral and indirect results of doing so.”
That statement is clearly in line with the many cases which hold that “expenses” and other similar terms include attorney’s fees without specific mention thereof.
This is a proceeding under a special statute apparently designed to permit recovery of incidental damages growing out of the wrongful acts or negligence of a party, or his counsel, in the matter of giving notice in connection with the taking of depositions. The statute giving the right to recover actual and reasonable expenses fairly and reasonably contemplates attorney’s fees. It is the unquestioned right of a party to have proper notice from the opposite party of intention to take a deposition. He is entitled to be present and to be represented by his attorney for the protection of his rights. It is often essential that a litigant be represented by an attorney in the taking *698of a deposition in order that his rights may be protected. Reasonable attorney’s fees actuálly paid or incurred should be allowed under the statute upon a proper showing. I think a proper showing was made in the instant case, and that there was no error in allowing the attorney’s fees.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice WELCH concurs in the views herein expressed.