Court Opinion

ID: 9898028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:55.290482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.212775
License: Public Domain

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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

           CITY OF SAMMAMISH, a Washington
           municipal corporation,                             DIVISION ONE

                                 Appellant,                   No. 83886-5-I

                         v.                                   PUBLISHED OPINION

           JOHN TITCOMB, JR. and LINDE R.
           BEHRINGER, husband and wife, and
           the marital community comprised
           thereof; and KING COUNTY,

                                 Respondents.

                 DWYER, J. — In determining whether a municipality possesses the

          requisite authority to condemn private property, our focus is the purpose of the

          condemnation as articulated by the relevant legislative body. When such

          authority exists, we must determine whether the condemnation is for a public use

          and whether the property condemned is necessary to accomplish that use.

          While the former is a judicial question, the latter is largely a question for the

          legislative body seeking condemnation.

                 Here, the city council of the City of Sammamish enacted Ordinance No.

          O2021-526 (the Ordinance) authorizing the condemnation of property rights in

          the water flowing from George Davis Creek, which runs through the property and

          beneath the home of John Titcomb and Linde Behringer. The Ordinance
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          No. 83886-5-I/2

          authorized condemnation for the purposes of reducing and eliminating storm

          drainage conveyance system capacity issues, improving traffic safety, and

          providing flood protection, as well as supporting kokanee salmon recovery by

          removing barriers to fish passage. Following the enactment of the Ordinance,

          the City of Sammamish (the City) filed in the superior court a petition in eminent

          domain and a motion for an order adjudicating public use and necessity. Titcomb

          and Behringer opposed the City’s motion. The superior court denied the motion.

                 Because the City has the statutory authority to condemn private property

          for the purposes set forth in the Ordinance, and because the City has

          demonstrated both public use and necessity, we reverse the superior court’s

          order denying the City’s motion and dismissing its eminent domain action.

                                                   I

                 In July 2018, the City initiated the George Davis Creek Fish Passage

          Project (the Project) “to replace storm drainage infrastructure and to eliminate

          existing barriers to fish passage.” George Davis Creek (the Creek), located in

          Sammamish, runs downhill to East Lake Sammamish Parkway (ELSP), a main

          arterial that parallels the waterfront homes along Lake Sammamish. The last

          downstream portion of the Creek runs through the property of Titcomb and

          Behringer before flowing into the lake. The Creek flows beneath Titcomb and

          Behringer’s residence, where they have constructed a daylit fish ladder

          integrated into the home’s foundation.

                 Christopher Coenen, senior stormwater program manager for the City,

          described the impetus for and purposes of the Project. According to Coenen, the

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          need to improve the drainage capacity of the Creek’s stormwater infrastructure

          “goes back decades.” In the 1990s, King County installed a bypass system at

          the Creek’s juncture with ELSP, which was intended to “capture overflow water

          for occasional storm-related flooding.” However, the current system is

          inadequate to convey stormwater “without significant maintenance to remove

          accumulated sediment within the drain system.” Moreover, according to Coenen,

          the “culverts, pipes, and other drainage infrastructure within the Creek prevent

          Lake Sammamish Kokanee salmon from reaching upstream spawning grounds.”

          Thus, Coenen indicated, the Project is intended “to reduce or eliminate storm

          drainage conveyance system capacity issues, improve traffic safety of adjacent

          roadways by reducing hazardous flooding conditions, and provide greater flood

          protection. Likewise, the Project would remove barriers to fish passage.”

                 In late 2018, City staff conducted a project analysis to compare four

          alternatives for the Project. Alternative 1 involved the replacement of multiple

          culverts beneath ELSP and other roadways and the construction of an open

          channel through the Titcomb and Behringer property, which would maintain the

          open channel beneath and downstream of their residence. Alternative 2 would

          not have impacted the Titcomb and Behringer property, but would have involved

          the replacement of culverts and the construction of a series of open channel

          stream sections on other property. Alternative 3 involved the replacement of

          multiple culverts beneath ELSP and other roadways, construction of an open

          channel through the Titcomb and Behringer property, reconstruction of an open

          channel beneath the residence, and reconstruction of the existing channel

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          between the residence and Lake Sammamish. Finally, Alternative 4 involved the

          replacement of the same culverts, acquisition of the private property adjacent to

          the Titcomb and Behringer property (the Sigmar property), and construction of

          the stream through that City-owned property and into Lake Sammamish. After

          considering these project alternatives, City staff and the project consultant team

          indicated that Alternatives 3 and 4 best met the City’s goals for implementing the

          Project.

                 The project alternatives analysis was presented to the Sammamish City

          Council (the SCC) at its March 2019 meeting. The SCC thereafter directed City

          staff to pursue Alternative 4, involving acquisition of the Sigmar property and

          rerouting of the Creek through that property. The SCC concluded that the

          proposed stream relocation “is necessary due to constraints with the existing

          stream course through the Titcomb-Behringer property.” An alternative involving

          modification of the stream through the Titcomb and Behringer property, the SCC

          concluded, “would be unsuccessful because it would fail to meet critical project

          requirements,” including state fish passage rules, the capacity “to convey the

          100-year flow event,” and acquisition of the requisite federal permitting.

                 In March 2020, the City purchased the Sigmar property. The City attorney

          advised the SCC that “the project’s relocation of the stream’s water flow may

          constitute a taking of the Titcomb-Behringer’s property rights associated with the

          value of the stream.” Thus, City staff and the City attorney “pursued a course to

          provide just compensation” to Titcomb and Behringer. To that end, City staff

          engaged in extensive efforts to reach a settlement agreement. When, over the

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          course of 12 months, negotiations had not been productive, the City concluded

          that further discussions were unlikely to result in such an agreement.

          Accordingly, the Ordinance was proposed to authorize the initiation of

          condemnation proceedings.

                 On March 2, 2021, the SCC held a public hearing at which members of

          the public, including Titcomb, testified against the condemnation. At the hearing,

          the objectives of the Project were presented, including the need to reduce the

          risk of flooding, improve the capacity of a critical public facility, reduce

          maintenance demands, and, additionally, support kokanee salmon populations.

          According to the summary of the Project, it would address the “clear public need”

          of the inadequacy of the current storm drain system, as well as supporting

          kokanee salmon, and “can only be completed if the stream is moved.”

                 The SCC voted 6-1 to adopt the Ordinance authorizing exercise of its

          power of eminent domain in order to acquire the Titcomb and Behringer property

          for the Project. The Ordinance is entitled:

                 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF SAMMAMISH,
                 WASHINGTON, DECLARING PUBLIC USE AND NECESSITY
                 FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS FOR THE
                 GEORGE DAVIS CREEK FISH PASSAGE PROJECT;
                 AUTHORIZING USE OF CONDEMNATION PURSUANT TO
                 CHAPTER 8.12 RCW AS REQUIRED FOR THE GEORGE DAVIS
                 CREEK FISH PASSAGE PROJECT; AUTHORIZING PAYMENT
                 FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS FOR THE
                 GEORGE DAVIS CREEK FISH PASSAGE PROJECT FROM THE
                 CITY’S STORMWATER ENTERPRISE FUND AND OTHERWISE
                 FROM THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE CITY; PROVIDING FOR
                 SEVERABILITY; AND ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE DATE

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          The Ordinance recognizes the goal, set forth in the City’s comprehensive plan,

          “to maintain and protect surface water resources, and to encourage restoration of

          such resources,” as well as “to acquire property to provide public control to the

          water’s edge of State regulated shorelines.” It further recognizes our state

          legislature’s enactment of legislation “establish[ing] a fish barrier removal board

          to identify and prioritize the removal of fish barriers from rivers and streams.”

                 The Ordinance references that the “culverts, pipes and other drainage

          infrastructure within George Davis Creek are not adequate to convey the two-

          year storm event, which results in periodic flooding, additional facility

          maintenance, and reduced traffic safety on adjacent roadways,” and that the

          Project “will reduce or eliminate storm drainage conveyance system capacity

          issues, improve traffic safety of adjacent roadways by reducing hazardous

          flooding conditions, and provide greater flood protection.” The Ordinance

          additionally notes the “significant barriers to fish passage” where the Creek flows

          through the Titcomb and Behringer property. It indicates that the Project “will

          support kokanee salmon recovery by providing barrier-free passage for fish

          migrating to spawning grounds, and improve in-stream habitat and passage for

          juvenile fish returning to Lake Sammamish.” In adopting the Ordinance, the SCC

          determined that acquisition of the Titcomb and Behringer property “is for a public

          use, in the public interest, and is necessary for that public use.”

                 On July 21, 2021, the City filed in the superior court a petition in eminent

          domain “condemning all property rights in the water flowing from George Davis

          Creek necessary for the George Davis Creek Fish Passage Project.” On

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          December 10, 2021, the City filed a motion for an order adjudicating public use

          and necessity. The City therein asserted that it is authorized by statute to

          condemn the Titcomb and Behringer property for stormwater facilities, and that

          such condemnation constitutes a public use and is necessary to accomplish that

          use. Titcomb and Behringer opposed the motion, contending that the City does

          not have statutory authority to condemn private land for fish passage purposes.

                 On February 14, 2022, the superior court denied the City’s motion for an

          order adjudicating public use and necessity and dismissed the City’s

          condemnation action. The City thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration,

          which the superior court denied. On March 14, 2022, Titcomb and Behringer

          filed a motion requesting attorney fees and costs pursuant to RCW

          8.25.075(1)(a). The superior court granted the motion but reduced the amount of

          the requested award.

                 The City appeals.

                                                   II

                 The City contends that the superior court erred by dismissing its

          condemnation action. According to the City, it is statutorily authorized to

          condemn the Titcomb and Behringer property for stormwater facilities purposes

          pursuant to RCW 8.12.030. Moreover, the City asserts, the condemnation is

          both for a public use and necessary to accomplish that use. We agree.

                                                   A

                 The power of eminent domain is an inherent power of the state that may

          be delegated to its political subdivisions, including cities or counties. Cent. Puget

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          Sound Reg’l Transit Auth. v. WR-SRI 120th N. LLC, 191 Wn.2d 223, 233, 422

          P.3d 891 (2018) (WR-SRI). However, “[a] political subdivision’s authority to

          condemn property extends ‘only so far as statutorily authorized.’” WR-SRI, 191

          Wn.2d at 233 (quoting Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. State, 182

          Wn.2d 519, 534, 342 P.3d 308 (2015)). Thus, “the scope of the eminent domain

          authority of a governmental unit is a matter of statutory interpretation,” and

          specific rules guide our interpretation of statutes conferring such authority. WR-

          SRI, 191 Wn.2d at 233-234. The power to condemn “must be conferred in

          express terms or necessarily implied.” In re Petition of City of Seattle, 96 Wn.2d

          616, 629, 638 P.2d 549 (1981). However, “[a]lthough a legislative grant of such

          power to a municipality is to be strictly construed, it is not to be construed so

          strictly as to defeat the evident purpose of the grant.” City of Tacoma v. Welcker,

          65 Wn.2d 677, 683, 399 P.2d 330 (1965); see also WR-SRI, 191 Wn.2d at 235.

                 It is well established that municipalities “have clear statutory authority to

          condemn property for roadways and for storm water control facilities.” Cowlitz

          County v. Martin, 142 Wn. App. 860, 867, 177 P.3d 102 (2008). See also City of

          Bellevue v. Painter, 58 Wn. App. 839, 842, 795 P.2d 174 (1990) (recognizing

          statutory authority for “condemnation for drains and sewers or any other public

          use within or without the limits of a city”). Indeed, our legislature has expressly

          delegated such authority:

                 Every city and town . . . within the state of Washington, is hereby
                 authorized and empowered to condemn land and property . . . [for]
                 culverts, drains, ditches, . . . and to condemn land and other
                 property and damage the same for such and for any other public

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                 use after just compensation having been first made or paid into
                 court for the owner in the manner prescribed by this chapter.

          RCW 8.12.030.

                 Here, the parties do not dispute that the City has statutory authority to

          condemn private property for stormwater facilities purposes. See Br. of Resp’t at

          21 (“Respondents do not dispute that cities have statutory authority to condemn

          property for stormwater purposes.”). Indeed, such a position would be contrary

          to the express language of RCW 8.12.030. Instead, Titcomb and Behringer

          assert, as they did in the superior court, that the City lacks statutory authority to

          condemn their property because the Project is “a fish passage project.” Br. of

          Resp’t at 16. We disagree.

                 Whether a municipality possesses the requisite authority to condemn

          private property is determined based on the purpose of the condemnation as

          articulated by the relevant legislative body. In the Ordinance, the SCC clearly

          articulated purposes consistent with the statutory grant of authority set forth in

          RCW 8.12.030. The Ordinance states that the current infrastructure is “not

          adequate to convey the two-year storm event,” resulting in “periodic flooding,

          additional facility maintenance, and reduced traffic safety on adjacent roadways.”

          It provides that the Project will address these issues, “reduc[ing] or eliminat[ing]

          storm drainage conveyance system capacity issues, improv[ing] traffic safety of

          adjacent roadways by reducing hazardous flooding conditions, and provid[ing]

          greater flood protection.” These are precisely the purposes for which RCW

          8.12.030 empowers municipalities to condemn private property. See, e.g.,

          Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 867; City of Bellevue, 58 Wn. App. at 842. That

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          the Project additionally provides fish passage benefits does not divest the City of

          its authority, conferred by our legislature in RCW 8.12.030, to condemn property

          for stormwater facilities.1

                  Titcomb and Behringer nevertheless assert that the City is precluded from

          condemning their property because the City has received funding pursuant to the

          “Salmon Recovery Act,” chapter 77.85 RCW, to implement some part of the

          Project. The Salmon Recovery Act was enacted by our legislature “in an attempt

          to improve salmonid fish runs throughout the state.” Cowlitz County, 142 Wn.

          App. at 865; RCW 77.85.005. The act allows counties, cities, and tribal

          governments to apply for state funds to repair and improve salmonid fish runs

          after designating the repair or improvement in a “habitat project list.” RCW

          77.85.050, .150, .170. As relevant here, the act provides that “[n]o project

          included on a habitat project list shall be considered mandatory in nature and no

          private landowner may by forced or coerced into participation in any respect.”

          RCW 77.85.050(1)(a). Titcomb and Behringer assert that, because the City has

          received grant funding pursuant to the Salmon Recovery Act for a certain portion

          of the Project, their property may not be condemned for any part of the Project.

                  1 Indeed, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Washington Department of Fish and

          Wildlife, any water crossing structures over fish-bearing waters, including culverts, must be
          designed “to allow fish to move freely through them at all flows when fish are expected to move.”
          WAC 220-660-190(2)(a). For permanent water crossing structures, “[t]he water crossing design
          must provide unimpeded passage for all species of adult and juvenile fishes.” WAC 220-660-
          190(3)(a). As senior stormwater engineer Coenen explained, “any storm drainage improvements
          to the drainage system are required by State law to be made fish passable” due to the Creek’s
          status as a state water and a fish-bearing stream. That the City is complying with state
          regulations regarding fish passage in constructing the Project does not, as Titcomb and Behringer
          assert, render the Project a “fish passage project[].” Br. of Resp’t at 3.

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                  The Ordinance provides, however, that compensation for the property

          rights acquired through condemnation “will be made from the City’s Stormwater

          Enterprise Fund and otherwise from the general funds of the City.” Titcomb and

          Behringer do not dispute that this is true. Instead, they simply assert that the

          grant funding received pursuant to the Salmon Recovery Act may not be used for

          condemnation purposes. That is a separate question, however, from those that

          we are tasked to decide—whether the City has statutory authority to condemn

          the property and whether the Project constitutes a public use and the

          condemnation is necessary for that use. Disputed issues involving the

          expenditure of funds are not relevant to this appeal. Moreover, there is no

          indication in the record that the City will use the RCO funds to compensate

          Titcomb and Behringer. Titcomb and Behringer’s assertion that the City is

          precluded from condemning their property pursuant to the Salmon Recovery Act,

          chapter 77.85 RCW, is without merit.2

                  Titcomb and Behringer additionally assert that the court’s decision in

          Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. 860, demonstrates that the City is without

          statutory authority for condemnation. That case, however, is inapposite. There,

          Cowlitz County filed a petition for condemnation to acquire an expanded

          easement over private property to replace an existing culvert. Cowlitz County,

                  2 Titcomb and Behringer assign great weight to the name of the Project—the “George

          Davis Creek Fish Passage Project.” However, it is the elected city council to whom our
          legislature has granted the power of condemnation. Accordingly, it is the Ordinance enacted by
          the SCC—not the title assigned to the Project by an executive branch employee—that delineates
          the purpose of that Project. As discussed supra, the Ordinance provides ample evidence that the
          purposes of the Project fall within the statutory authorization for condemnation set forth in RCW
          8.12.030.

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          142 Wn. App. at 862. The county applied for and received a grant from the

          Salmon Recovery Fund. Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 862. Its engineering

          manager “explained that the County wished to replace the Baxter Creek culvert

          solely because it posed an impediment to fish passage.” Cowlitz County, 142

          Wn. App. at 862 (emphasis added).

                 The relevant legislative authority, the county board of commissioners,

          passed a resolution authorizing the county prosecuting attorney to file a petition

          for condemnation. Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 862. The resolution stated

          that the project was “‘necessary to remove and replace the existing culvert that

          has been identified as a barrier to fish passage and the Salmon Recovery

          Funding Board has awarded a grant for the project.’” Cowlitz County, 142 Wn.

          App. at 862. In the condemnation petition, the county prosecuting attorney for

          the first time alleged an additional reason for the condemnation—that the existing

          culvert was insufficient to handle storm stream flows. Cowlitz County, 142 Wn.

          App. at 863.

                 Notwithstanding the county’s assertion that the project was also

          authorized as a county road project, Division Two of this court held that the

          county did not have authority to condemn the property. Cowlitz County, 142 Wn.

          App. at 868. Looking to the resolution enacted by the relevant legislative

          authority, the court determined that “the project had no road improvement

          purpose independent of the culvert replacement under the Salmon Recovery

          Act.” Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 867. Moreover, the court held, the county

          prosecuting attorney—who had, for the first time, articulated inadequacy for

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          storm stream flows as a purpose of the project—lacked the authority to provide a

          purpose that had not been embraced by the county board of commissioners.

          Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 867.

                  Thus, the court in Cowlitz County held that our legislature had “clearly

          elected not to grant eminent domain power . . . for projects solely funded and

          regulated by the Salmon Recovery Act.” 142 Wn. App. at 866 (emphasis added).

          The record there did “not reflect that the commissioners considered or were even

          aware of [the storm stream flow] issue when they made their finding that

          condemnation was necessary.” Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 865. Rather,

          the commissioners had “authorized condemnation solely for the purpose of fish

          passage by means of a project funded and regulated by the Salmon Recovery

          Act.” Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 866 (emphasis added). Indeed, the board

          of commissioners “made no other finding of necessity” and the record “reflect[ed]

          no other basis for such a finding.” Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App. at 868.

                  Here, in contrast, the Ordinance enacted by the SCC clearly articulates

          that the Project was initiated both “to eliminate existing barriers to fish passage

          and replace storm drainage infrastructure” in the Creek. Unlike in Cowlitz

          County, the purposes for which condemnation has been authorized were

          properly articulated by the legislative authority to whom the power of eminent

          domain was granted.3 Because the Project is a stormwater facilities project, the

                  3 Although it is the purpose articulated by the relevant legislative body that determines

          whether statutory authority for condemnation exists, we note that the record here, beyond the
          Ordinance, further supports the City’s assertion that a primary purpose of the Project is to
          improve stormwater facilities.
                  Consistent with the Ordinance, the presentation regarding the Project made at the public
          hearing identified reduction of flood risk, improvement of the capacity of the public facility, and

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          City is statutorily authorized to condemn the Titcomb and Behringer property

          pursuant to RCW 8.12.030.

                                                         B

                  The City additionally asserts that condemnation of the Titcomb and

          Behringer property is for a public use and that acquisition of the property is

          necessary to accomplish that use.4 We agree. It is well established that

          condemnation by municipalities for stormwater facilities constitutes a public use.

          Moreover, given the deference afforded to the legislative authority seeking to

          reduction of maintenance demands as the public needs supported by the Project, in addition to
          noting that the Project supports the kokanee salmon. The presentation listed “storm drainage” as
          a “project driver.” The SCC’s agenda for the meeting indicated that the proposed stream
          relocation to the Sigmar property is necessary both to comply with fish passage rules and create
          capacity “to convey the 100-year flow event.”
                    Moreover, senior stormwater engineer Coenen explained that the Project is
          “fundamentally a stormwater facilities improvement project.” He explained that “[t]he Project—
          and the City’s acquisition of the Behringer property—would fix [the] flooding issues on the ELSP
          and reduce or eliminate the need for extensive maintenance to ensure the base-level function
          envisioned by the design.” Senior stormwater engineer Stephanie Sullivan concurred, explaining
          that the Project “will remove a concrete dam further upstream, increase flow and sediment
          transport capacity, eliminate the need for a sedimentation pond and diversion system, and reduce
          or eliminate maintenance for those systems.”
                    4 Notwithstanding that the motion before the superior court was one requesting the

          “adjudication of public use and necessity,” Titcomb and Behringer provide no argument regarding
          whether the City has demonstrated that the Project meets those requisite showings. Instead,
          they rely solely on their assertion that the City lacks statutory authority for condemnation.
          Nevertheless, they contend that, if we conclude that the City has statutory authority to condemn
          their property, remand for an evidentiary hearing is necessary “to resolve the question of public
          use and necessity” and to resolve purported factual disputes. Br. of Resp’t at 37-39.
                    We disagree. Because the motion before the superior court explicitly sought the
          adjudication of public use and necessity, this issue has already been litigated. We decline to
          provide Titcomb and Behringer a “second bite at the apple.” Moreover, an evidentiary hearing is
          not necessary for a determination of public use and necessity. The purported factual disputes
          raised by Titcomb and Behringer need not be determined to resolve this case. As discussed
          infra, once the judicial determination of public use has been made, we owe great deference to the
          legislative condemning authority regarding whether acquisition of the property is necessary to
          accomplish that use. See, e.g., HTK Mgmt., LLC v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wn.2d
          612, 629, 121 P.3d 1166 (2005). The purported factual disputes raised by Titcomb and Behringer
          are inconsequential to the resolution of this case. Accordingly, we deny their request to remand
          for an evidentiary hearing.

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          condemn property, we conclude that acquisition of the Titcomb and Behringer

          property is necessary to accomplish the proposed public use.

                 The power of eminent domain is limited by both the Washington State

          Constitution and by statute. State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v.

          Evans, 136 Wn.2d 811, 816-17, 966 P.2d 1252 (1998) (Convention Ctr.). Article

          I, section 16 prohibits the State from taking private property for private use.

          Convention Ctr., 136 Wn.2d at 817. Pursuant to RCW 8.04.070, a proposed

          condemnation must be necessary for the public use. Convention Ctr., 136

          Wn.2d at 817.

                 Washington courts have developed a three-part test to evaluate eminent

          domain cases. Convention Ctr., 136 Wn.2d at 817. For a condemnation to be

          lawful, the municipality must demonstrate that “(1) the use is really public, (2) the

          public interest requires it, and (3) the property appropriated is necessary for that

          purpose.” HTK Mgmt., LLC v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wn.2d 612,

          629, 121 P.3d 1166 (2005). “The latter two findings are generally subsumed

          under the definition of ‘necessity.’” In re Petition of City of Seattle, 104 Wn.2d

          621, 623, 707 P.2d 1348 (1985). Whether a proposed condemnation is really for

          a public use “is solely a judicial question.” Welcker, 65 Wn.2d at 684. However,

          “[w]hether condemnation is necessary is largely a question for the legislative

          body of the jurisdiction or government agency seeking condemnation.” Cent.

          Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth. v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 403, 411, 128 P.3d 588

          (2006). “A declaration of necessity by a proper municipal authority is conclusive

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          in the absence of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct, as would

          constitute constructive fraud.” HTK Mgmt., 155 Wn.2d at 629.

                 In enacting RCW 8.12.030, our legislature authorized municipalities to

          condemn property for the purpose of stormwater facilities. Although the question

          of public use is a judicial one, decisional authority confirms that condemnation for

          that purpose constitutes a public use. See, e.g., Cowlitz County, 142 Wn. App.

          at 867; City of Bellevue, 58 Wn. App. at 842. The Ordinance enacted by the

          SCC clearly articulates the proposed public use of “reduc[ing] or eliminat[ing]

          storm drainage conveyance system capacity issues, improv[ing] traffic safety of

          adjacent roadways by reducing hazardous flooding conditions, and provid[ing]

          greater flood protection.” Accordingly, we conclude that the proposed use of the

          Project is a public one.

                 We next turn to the issue of necessity. Because questions concerning

          whether a property acquisition is necessary to carry out a proposed public use

          are legislative, we defer to the legislative body seeking condemnation with regard

          to such determinations. Convention Ctr., 136 Wn.2d at 823. “This deference to

          the condemnor’s decision regarding necessity has its root in the concept of

          eminent domain itself.” In re Petition of Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 28 Wn.

          App. 615, 618, 625 P.2d 723 (1981). “The power to assert eminent domain

          rights is an attribute of state sovereignty—exercised through the legislature—and

          is thus subject to judicial review only to determine whether the State exceeded its

          lawful authority.” Petition of Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 28 Wn. App. at

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          618. Our Supreme Court has articulated the wisdom of this constrained judicial

          review:

                 Once the purpose for which the lands are taken has been adjudged
                 to be public, the kind and type of roadway, the route to be followed,
                 the design and engineering details become the subject of
                 administrative decision. . . .

                        Although the courts may well determine from the evidence
                 whether a project is for the public benefit, convenience or
                 necessity, they are not trained or equipped to pick the better route,
                 much less design and engineer the project. Thus, the rule that
                 leaves these decisions to the administrative agencies is a sensible
                 one consistent with the idea that the public’s business be carried
                 out with reasonable efficiency and dispatch by those possessing
                 the superior talents to accomplish the public purposes.

          Deaconess Hosp. v. Wash. State Highway Comm’n, 66 Wn.2d 378, 405, 403

          P.2d 54 (1965).

                 “When reasonable minds can differ, courts will not disturb the legislative

          body’s decision that necessity exists so long as it was reached ‘honestly, fairly,

          and upon due consideration’ of the facts and circumstances.” Miller, 156 Wn.2d

          at 417-18 (quoting Welcker, 65 Wn.2d at 684). Indeed, “[e]ven if the decision

          was partially motivated by improper considerations, it will not be vacated so long

          as ‘the proposed condemnation demonstrates a genuine need and . . . the

          condemnor in fact intends to use the property for the avowed purpose.’” Miller,

          156 Wn.2d at 418 (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Petition of Port of

          Grays Harbor, 30 Wn. App. 855, 864, 638 P.2d 633 (1982)). Moreover,

          “necessary” in the context of condemnation does not mean absolute necessity.

          Rather,

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          No. 83886-5-I/18

                         [t]he word ‘necessary,’ as used in connection with eminent
                 domain statutes, means reasonable necessity under the
                 circumstances. State ex rel. Lange v. Superior Court, 61 Wn.2d
                 153, 377 P.2d 425 (1963). It does not mean immediate, absolute,
                 or indispensable need, but rather considers the right of the public to
                 expect or demand that certain services be provided. Tacoma v.
                 Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 399 P.2d 330 (1965).

          City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wn.2d 130, 140, 437 P.2d 171 (1968).

          Accordingly, “[a] legislative body’s determination of necessity is conclusive

          unless there is proof of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct

          amounting to constructive fraud or the government fails to abide by the clear

          dictates of the law.” Miller, 156 Wn.2d at 417.

                 Here, the SCC considered four project alternatives and the analysis set

          forth by City staff in comparing the relative merits of each. The SCC thereafter

          concluded that the Project required acquisition of the Titcomb and Behringer

          property. Relocation of the stream is necessary, as determined by the SCC,

          “due to constraints with the existing stream course through the Titcomb-

          Behringer property.” The SCC rejected an alternative involving modification of

          the stream course through that property because “it would fail to meet critical

          project requirements,” including state fish passage rules, the capacity “to convey

          the 100-year flow event,” and the requisite federal permitting. Thus, the

          Ordinance enacted by the SCC states that condemnation is “necessary for the

          public use of the construction of the George Davis Creek Fish Passage Project.”

                 The SCC’s necessity determination was reached following due

          consideration of the merits of multiple project alternatives. Titcomb and

          Behringer nowhere assert that the City acted fraudulently or in an arbitrary and

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          No. 83886-5-I/19

          capricious manner; nor would the record support such an assertion. Our

          deference to the legislative authority in determining necessity for condemnation

          is rooted both in our respect for the other branches of government and our

          recognition of the institutional competence of courts. Miller, 156 Wn.2d at 421.

          In the absence of proof of fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct, we will not

          disturb the SCC’s determination that the acquisition of the Titcomb and Behringer

          property is necessary for the proposed public use. HTK Mgmt., 155 Wn.2d at

          629.

                 The stormwater facilities purpose of the Project, articulated in the

          Ordinance adopted by the SCC, constitutes a public use. The record

          demonstrates no fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of the City.

          Extending the deference owed to the SCC, we conclude that acquisition of the

          Titcomb and Behringer property is necessary to accomplish the proposed public

          use. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s order denying the City’s motion

          for an order adjudicating public use and necessity and dismissing the City’s

          petition in eminent domain.

                                                      III

                 The City further asserts that the superior court erred by awarding attorney

          fees and costs to Titcomb and Behringer. We agree.

                 The superior court awarded attorney fees and costs to Titcomb and

          Behringer pursuant to RCW 8.25.075(1)(a). The statute provides that, in a

          condemnation action, the superior court “shall award the condemnee costs

          including reasonable attorney fees . . . if . . . [t]here is a final adjudication that the

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          condemnor cannot acquire the real property by condemnation.” RCW

          8.25.075(1)(a). Because we conclude that the City has demonstrated the

          requisite public use and necessity to condemn the Titcomb and Behringer

          property, the statute does not authorize such an award. Accordingly, we reverse

          the award of attorney fees and costs awarded by the superior court to Titcomb

          and Behringer.

                Titcomb and Behringer additionally request an award of attorney fees and

          costs on appeal. Again, the relevant statutory authority, RCW 8.25.075(1)(a),

          permits such an award only upon a final adjudication that the condemnor cannot

          acquire the property by condemnation. Thus, for the same reason that we

          reverse the superior court’s award of fees and costs, we decline to grant such an

          award to Titcomb and Behringer on appeal.

                Reversed.

          WE CONCUR:

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