Court Opinion

ID: 9579870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:26.560062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:51.279886
License: Public Domain

Quillian, Justice.
1. Where, as here, the evidence discloses that the defendant wilfully and wantonly violates statutes designed to insure the safety of the traveling public on the thoroughfares of the State and the natural and probable result of his conduct is to take human life, malice is implied, and if the infractions of the statutes cause the death of another the defendant may be found guilty of murder. Powell v. State, 193 Ga. 398 (1) (18 SE2d 678); Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. 180 (1), 182 (4) (115 SE2d 338); Code § 26-1009.
The evidence authorized the conclusion that the defendant wilfully committed each of the offenses in the manner alleged in the indictment and killed the deceased as therein charged. There is no merit in the insistence that the verdict was without evidence to support it. Kemp v. State, 214 Ga. 558 (2) (105 SE2d 582), and cases cited therein.
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence we have considered the contention borne out by the record that the testimony of the State's witnesses was not altogether in harmony and some of them contradicted that of others concerning vital issues of the case, for instance: as to whether there was a marked center line on the highway and at the point where the collision occurred, and also as to whether the defendant was on the occasion driving under the influence of intoxicants. However, some of the State’s witnesses, in some instances, corroborated by the defendant's witnesses and his own testimony, did furnish proof of every material allegation of the indictment. The discrepancies and conflicts in the evidence given by the witnesses is a problem which addresses itself to the jurors, “the doctors of doubt,” in arriving at the truth of the case. Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (8); Almand v. State, 149 Ga. 182, 184 (4) (99 SE 795).
Particularly applicable here is the pronouncement of Barber v. State, 3 Ga. App. 598, 600 (60 SE 285): “The fact that a witness introduced by the State testified in behalf of the defend*134ant, or at least testified to a state of facts which showed that the defendant could not be guilty of the offense charged, at the time and place with reference to which he was accused, is of no consequence after a verdict of guilty, if other evidence was introduced by the State sufficient to authorize conviction.” One witness as to each fact necessary to make out a case submitted to the jury supports a verdict, although the testimony is contradicted by any number of other witnesses. Moseley v. City of Thomasville, 9 Ga. App. 500 (1) (71 SE 765); Hayslip v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 509 (1) (34 SE2d 319).
Grounds 1 and 2 of the amended motion for new trial attack the judge’s charge as being confusing and unduly restricting the consideration of the jury to particular issues of the case to the exclusion of other material issues. The charge, read as a whole, is not confusing but was a clear enunciation of the law of the case, and gave full and fair instructions as to every issue of the case. The time honored rule of practice is observed: “An exception to an excerpt from a charge because of incompleteness of statement of a particular legal proposition is not good when the incompleteness is supplied in appropriate context by the general charge.” Spence v. Morrow, 128 Ga. 722 (2) (58 SE 356). “Where an excerpt from a charge isolated from its context appears to be confusing, but, when construed with the remainder of the charge, is plain and explicit, a ground of a motion for new trial that segregates the excerpt from the whole charge and attacks it as misleading or confusing is without merit.” Glover v. Maddox, 98 Ga. App. 548 (7) (106 SE2d 288). See City Council of Augusta v. Tharpe, 113 Ga. 152 (2) (38 SE 389); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Cole, 135 Ga. 72 (2) (68 SE 804).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Head, P. J., and Mobley, J., who dissent.