Court Opinion

ID: 9741361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:54:07.349179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.661920
License: Public Domain

Nolan, J.
(dissenting). Today will be regarded as a sad and frustrating day in the history of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Today, a majority of this court upholds, and thereby endorses, a trial judge’s flagrant violation of the free speech rights, of citizens of this Commonwealth. The majority acquiesces in a judge’s order instructing a private group that if it wishes to express itself at all, it must include in its expression a particular idea, one with which the group does not agree. One must strain to recall or even to imagine such an obvious violation of the revered right to free speech.
The majority upholds a Superior Court judge’s decision that the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council’s (Veterans Council) exclusion of the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) from the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade violates GLIB’s members’ statutory right to be free from discrimination on the basis of their sexual preference in places of public accommodation, and that the application of the statute to the facts of this case does not violate the Veterans Council’s rights under the First Amendment. It is because I conclude that the Veterans Council’s rights were violated by the judge’s decision and order compelling it to allow GLIB to march and express its message in the Veterans Council’s parade that I dissent from the decision of the majority.
1. G. L. c. 272, §§ 92A, 98. The majority finds no error in the judge’s determination that the conduct of the Veterans Council in excluding GLIB from its parade violates the Commonwealth’s public accommodation law, G. L. c. 272, §§ 92A, 98. I do not fully concur with the judge’s reasoning in determining the applicability of the statute. Further, for *254reasons discussed, infra, I do not agree that the judge’s findings support his conclusion that the conduct of the Veterans Council violated the statute, even if it otherwise applies. I reserve extended discussion on these matters, however, and proceed to issues concerning rights under the First Amendment. I shall assume for the purpose of the following discussion that the statute applies to the conduct of the Veterans Council.
2. First Amendment. The judge limited his discussion of the First Amendment to the freedom of expressive associatian. He ruled that the freedom of speech was not at issue. This determination is erroneous. The defendants’ freedom of speech is certainly at issue in this case — and was properly raised and argued1 — and is violated by the judge’s application of G. L. c. 272, §§ 92A, 98.
a. Freedom of speech. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads, in part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the First Amendment limitation on Congress’s power to legislate is applied to the legislative power of the States. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985). Further, “[tjhat the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). Thus, it is as constitutionally objectionable for a judge sitting in a court of this Commonwealth to issue an order improperly “abridging the freedom of speech,” as it is for Congress to enact a law doing the same.
As a general proposition, the State acts within its power when it enacts reasonable “time, place and manner” regula*255tians which affect speech or expression. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (“If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the streets”). Conversely, restrictions on the content of speech are generally improper. See Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (“[The State’s] content-based regulation is subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny”); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975), quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraint . . . ‘comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity’ ”); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views”). The freedom of speech comprises both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking. Riley, supra at 795. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). Thus, “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of individuals ... to refuse to foster ... an idea they find morally objectionable.” Wooley, supra. “Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.” Riley, supra.
In the present case, the judge’s decision and order requires the Veterans Council to allow the members of GLIB to march in the parade as an identifiable group.2 As noted by the judge and the majority, GLIB’s organizational purposes are expressive in nature: to express its members’ pride in their sexual preference; to demonstrate to the community the *256diversity which exists therein; and to show support for homosexuals and bisexuals in New York who sought to march in a St. Patrick’s Day Parade in New York City. The Veterans Council, as license holder of the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuatian Day Parade, determines who marches in the parade. Except for GLIB, there would be no group marching in the parade whose message supports homosexuality or bisexuality. Therefore, the judge’s decision and order permitting GLIB to march as an identifiable group results in GLIB’s message being added to the parade. This is “[mjandating speech that [the Veterans Council] would not otherwise make,” and is thus content-based regulation. Riley, supra.
Supreme Court cases concerning content-based regulation of speech examine such regulation with a strict scrutiny, or “exacting” scrutiny standard. See, e.g., Riley, supra at 798; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1986); Wooley, supra at 716. If we assume that evisceration of discrimination on the basis of sexual preference is a compelling State interest, the judge’s action in this case is not narrowly tailored to attaining that end: “[T]he State can serve that interest through means that would not violate [defendants’] First Amendment rights.” Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra at 19. To compel the Veterans Council to express GLIB’s message is not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest. It unnecessarily hampers the free speech of the Veterans Council. It goes beyond merely regulating discriminatory conduct, and requires a private group, the Veterans Council, to promote GLIB’s ideals. This is unconstitutional: “[Wjhere the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.” Wooley, supra at 717.
It is important to note that the Veterans Council does not need a narrow or distinct theme or message in its parade for it to be protected under the First Amendment. Both the judge and the majority try to illustrate that the parade is a public celebration with no distinct, unified theme; the impli*257cation is that it is not expressive activity, and is therefore not worthy of First Amendment protection. This analysis is erroneous for two reasons. First, regardless of whether the parade has one message, ten messages, or no message at all, if GLIB’s particular message is not in the parade, it cannot constitutionally be forced on the Veterans Council. Thus, although an individual who drives his automobile may have no expressive purpose for doing so, the State cannot require him to foster a message while driving that he otherwise would not. Wooley, supra at 717 (violation of the First Amendment to require defendants to display “Live Free or Die” on their license plates). Second, the finding that the parade lacks an expressive purpose is clearly erroneous. The Veterans Council obtains a license, collects funds, and privately organizes the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade each year. They do so knowing that their efforts will provide entertainment to the hundreds of thousands of spectators who line the streets of the South Boston section of Boston to watch in celebration of St. Patrick’s Day and Evacuation Day. The judge would have us believe that the Veterans Council and all the parade participants show up solely for their own entertainment, and that any entertainment of the viewing public is merely incidental.3 This defies logic, yet is just one of many gaps in reason created by the trial judge’s flagrant efforts to forgo extending to the Veterans Council their deserved First Amendment rights.
The judge’s order clearly violates the Veterans Council’s freedom of speech.
b. Freedom of association. The judge determined, and the majority agreed, that the Veterans Council’s First Amend*258ment freedom of expressive association is not unconstitutionally infringed by requiring GLIB to march as a group in the parade. I disagree.
The freedom of expressive association is the “right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment — speech, [among others].” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). Much like the related, broader freedom of speech, “[freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” Id. at 623, citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-235 (1977). Infringements on the right not to associate are examined under strict scrutiny: “Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, and cases cited. It is established, however, that, “[i]f a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club’s members wish to promote,” the law may not require association. New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,13 (1988).
As discussed above, the Veterans Council organizes the parade for expressive purposes: to entertain the hundreds of thousands of spectators who view the parade each year in celebration of St. Patrick’s Day and Evacuation Day. Again assuming, without deciding, that evisceration of discrimination on the basis of sexual preference is a compelling State interest, State regulation in furtherance of this end must be narrowly tailored to attaining it. Thus, requiring the Veterans Council not to exclude the members of GLIB on the basis of their sexual preference may be a constitutionally valid infringement on the Veterans Council’s rights; however, preeluding the Veterans Council from disallowing the members of GLIB from expressing themselves as a group is not related to the State’s interest, and is therefore unconstitutional. In other words, because the judge’s decision and order require the Veterans Council to allow GLIB to express itself, they *259violate the rule that, “[where] a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club’s members wish to promote, the Law [may] erect [ ] no obstacle to this end.” New York State Club Ass’n, supra.
It is important to note that this case is distinguishable from those that involve exclusion of individuals whose message and protected status may be inseparable. For example, in Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor, Bd. of Comm’rs, & Chief of Police of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988), a private group comprising numerous African Americans sought to enforce against the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) an antidiscrimination statute in an effort to participate in the KKK’s planned parade. The Federal District Court determined that permitting the group to participate would be unconstitutional, as the mere presence of African Americans in the KKK’s parade would frustrate the KKK’s message of white separatism. Id. at 289. This is distinguishable from the present case: the mere presence of homosexuals or bisexuals in the parade likely would not frustrate any message of the Veterans Council. This is so because GLIB’s message is separable from its members’ status as homosexuals or bisexuals. Thus, the presence of homosexuals or bisexuals, not outwardly identifiable as such, in the parade would likely not affect any message of the Veterans Council, while the presence of those same individuals marching as an identifiable group — the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston — would.
As discussed above, mandating mere association in this case may be constitutional; mandating a message is not. At the very least, the judge’s decision and order, insofar as it compels the Veterans Council to allow the members of GLIB to march and express themselves as a group in the Veterans Council’s parade violates the First Amendment.
3. Other matters. Aside from the judge’s improper refusal to address the issue of freedom of speech and his erroneous analysis of the issue of freedom of association, his decision and order includes other serious errors of law, reason, and fact which warrant discussion.
*260In his decision, the judge equates excluding a group on the basis of its message or values with exclusion on the basis of its members’ sexual preference: “The defendant’s final positian was GLIB would be excluded because of its values and its message, i.e., its members’ sexual orientation” (emphasis added). This is clear error, and may have led to a baseless finding that the Veterans Council discriminated on the basis of GLIB’s members’ sexual preference. If the Veterans Council excluded GLIB because of its message, and not specifically because of its members’ sexual preference, then the statute was not violated. See G. L. c. 272, § 92A. Indeed, overwhelming evidence exists throughout the record which indicates that GLIB was excluded because of its message, and not because of its members’ sexual preference.4 Conversely, the only evidence which supports a finding of discrimination was that many of GLIB’s members are homosexual and GLIB was excluded, and that the Veterans Council had, in the past, proffered different reasons for its decision to exclude GLIB.5
Belatedly, the judge stated that, even if the Veterans Council’s assertion that it excluded GLIB under a policy of excluding all sexual themes was true, “[ejxcluding all sexual themes . . . contravenes the First Amendment’s prohibition on content-based restrictions.” This is a flagrantly erroneous statement of law. The judge found that there was no State action here; certainly private parties may exclude any topic *261or theme they want from their expression. This statement is an example of quintessential content-based regulation of speech which is plainly prohibited by the First Amendment, and it illustrates the confused understanding of the First Amendment by the judge and by this court, through its acquiescence.
4. Conclusion. That the judge’s decision and order requiring the Veterans Council to allow GLIB to march and to express itself as a group is a flagrant violation of the Veterans Council’s First Amendment rights is an unavoidable conclusion. The judge’s crude regulation of the content of the Veterans Council’s speech is epitomized by the last sentence of his decision: “Inclusiveness should be the hallmark of [the Veterans Council’s] parade.”
We have never been in the business of protecting only internally consistent, narrowly focused, politically sensitive speech. It is a travesty that we today vacate this precedent. Our holding today, while, to some, seemingly pushes us forward, really pushes us back over 200 years, to an era that lacked the protection guaranteed by the First Amendment. I dissent.

The Veterans Council presented argument on the freedom of speech throughout the proceedings in this case. In particular, argument on the issue was presented at trial, in the defendants’ memorandum in support of proposed findings of facts and proposed conclusions of law, and in the defendants’ briefs on appeal.

The judgment states in part: “[The defendants] shall accommodate in the Parade in all respects representatives of [GLIB] on the terms and conditions generally applicable to all other Parade participants.” His decision makes clear that this entails allowing the members of GLIB to march in a group, identifying themselves as members of the group, and identifying the group through a banner.

The judge relies on the Supreme Court case of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), wherein the Court ruled: “the activity of . . . dance-hall patrons — coming together to engage in recreational dancing — is not protected by the First Amendment.” The case is inapposite. Unlike the participants in the Veterans Council’s parade, patrons in the dance hall did not gather to dance for the purpose of entertaining others in celebration of a holiday. The parade is conducted for the entertainment of hundreds of thousands of people; the dance-hall patrons whose conduct was at issue in Dallas, did not gather for the purpose of entertaining others.

There is no evidence in the record that the Veterans Council ever inquired into the sexual preference of any person intending to march in the parade, including the members of GLIB;'there is no evidence that the Veterans Council ever excluded any homosexual or bisexual not a member of GLIB; the judge found that not all members of GLIB are homosexual or bisexual; there is evidence in the record that the Veterans Council would let the members of GLIB march without a banner identifying the group.

It is important to note that each of the reasons for excluding GLIB proffered by the Veterans Council is not discriminatory. At various times throughout the past years, the Veterans Council proffered the following reasons for excluding GLIB: the Veterans Council was not provided with enough information about GLIB on its application; it was concerned with the safety of the group’s members and the members of the public; and it excluded all sexual themes from the parade.