Court Opinion

ID: 9656949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:08:58.725835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:38.883620
License: Public Domain

RONALD L. WALKER, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I strongly agree in holding that the First Amendment bars defamation suits by government entities. “This action is out of tune with the American spirit, and has no place in American jurisprudence.” City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86, 91 (1923). However, I write separately contending that this appeal is frivolous and sanctions should be leveled.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45 authorizes us, after giving notice and opportunity for response, to award “just damages” for the filing of a frivolous appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 45. I cannot find and do not believe that there is here a “good faith challenge” to existing law. Furthermore, two of our sister courts have held that Tex.R.App. P. 45, unlike its predecessor Tex.R.App. P. 84, does not require proof of subjective bad faith on the part of an appellant; instead, an appeal can be *354frivolous because it is filed with no reasonable hope of reversal. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 2 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.)(“Under the current rule, ‘just damages’ are permitted if an appeal is objectively frivolous and injures the appel-lee.... Bad faith is thus no longer disposi-tive or necessarily even material.”); Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)(“We hold that bad faith is not required under Rule 45 and disavow language to the contrary ... ”)1 Other courts have implicitly agreed by holding that sanctions are justified if an appeal was filed without reasonable hope of reversal or in bad faith. Njuku v. Middleton, 20 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied); Diana Rivera & Assocs. v. Calvitto, 986 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
Appellants’ counsel did a skillful job of defending an indefensible position. However, as the majority states, “No basis exists for a contrary ruling on this settled issue[.]” Under Rule 45, as under Rule 84, I look at an allegedly frivolous appeal through the eyes of an advocate and discern whether the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that the case would be reversed. Smith, 51 S.W.3d at 381; Jim Arnold Corp. v. Bishop, 928 S.W.2d 761, 772 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, no pet.). By this standard, this appeal is objectively frivolous; no reasonable attorney could fail to conclude this court would uphold the trial court’s summary judgment. And it has unquestionably harmed the appellees to the degree that they have incurred legal fees to defend against it. All spurious appeals are offensive; this one is worse than most because of the chilling effect that the threat of such litigation has upon the exercise of First Amendment rights. I would give notice to appellants to show cause why they should not be subject to a sanction at least equal to appellee’s attorney’s fees on appeal. See Mid-Continent, 2 S.W.3d at 397; Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d at 799. Since I stand alone, I shall go hence without day.

. Smith is noteworthy because it is an en banc decision which explicitly disavows “bad faith” language in several of the 1st Court's recent panel opinions. Id. at 381; note following sentence affirming the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 382.