Court Opinion

ID: 9493092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:58:01.61375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:38.934355
License: Public Domain

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Talk about chutzpah. The defendant, represented by counsel, requested a continuance of the preliminary hearing. He was addressed by the judge and personally confirmed that he wanted a continuance. The judge granted the motion and excluded the time. Then, after having obtained the benefit of the very continuance that he himself requested, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his own motion to continue should not have been granted. The only thing more bizarre than this is that he wins.
Contrary to what the majority says, this anomalous result is not compelled by either our precedents or the Speedy Trial Act itself. As we said in United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 562-3 (9th Cir.1992):
Where a defendant’s own actions contribute to the need for an “ends of justice” continuance under the STA [Speedy Trial Act] the defendant cannot complain that a continuance violates his or her speedy trial rights. See United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 331 (6th Cir.1988) (where defendant’s vacillation in changing to a guilty plea lulled the government into suspending its trial preparation, delay attributed to him not government); United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319, 322 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1029, 111 S.Ct. 683, 112 L.Ed.2d 674 (1991) (need for continuance due to defendant’s last minute vacillations regarding representation and waiver of STA rights attributed to him because defendant cannot “string the court along by delaying in retaining counsel and then use the [STA] as a sword to dismiss a proper indictment, rather than as a shield to protect against unnecessary and unfair delays.”); cf. Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 387, 88 L.Ed.2d 339 (1985) (under Nevada state law equivalent of STA, when defendant’s dilatory tactics prevent trial from commencing within the statutory period state will not be charged with the responsibility for the delay).
Although Lewis’s actions alone did not trigger the need for the “ends of justice” continuance, his whole-hearted and seeming good faith participation in plea negotiations, as well as his provision of the stilted and unnatural ... [handwriting] exemplars clearly played a major role in prompting the need for a continuance. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the ends of justice would be served by a continuance to permit the government adequate time to obtain satisfactory exemplars and to prepare for a trial that otherwise would not be able to proceed without the exemplars. [Footnotes omitted.]
In United States v. Shetty, 130 F.3d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir.1997), the district court granted a series of trial continuances supported by written stipulations signed by the government’s lawyer, defense counsel and the defendant himself. Ten days prior *1160to trial, the defense moved to dismiss the indictment for'Violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the same sort of crafty stratagem pulled here. We held:
As clearly demonstrated by the record, however, the defense never objected to any of the continuances, even when the district court gave it direct opportunities to do so. Instead, Shetty personally stipulated to six of the eight continuances (and each of the three continuances upon which he focuses on appeal).
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In light of those stipulations, and in the absence of any objection by the defense, it is inappropriate for Shetty to seek reversal of his conviction under the Speedy Trial Act and dismissal of the indictment, with or without prejudice. Cf. United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.1994) (where defendant stipulates to the need for trial preparation, he cannot maintain that continuances give rise to a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.)
The majority is of the view that a defendant never can waive his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, no matter what. Apparently, a defendant can waive his right to trial, his right to counsel, his right to be charged by indictment, his right to be tried by a jury, his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, his right to testify in his own behalf, his right to refuse to testify, his right to present a defense, his right to compel the attendance of witnesses, his right to appeal — but not, according to the majority, his right to have an indictment filed against him within 30 days of his arrest. The majority derives this conclusion from the non sequitur that because society has an interest in speedy justice, no waiver of any speedy trial deadline is ever possible, and therefore, dismissal for any “violation” is mandated. The Supreme Court recently debunked that view. New York v. Hill, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000).
In Hill, the Court considered the effect of a waiver of the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a statutory scheme analogous to the Speedy Trial Act. For a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia wrote:
[Respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive society’s rights. It is true that a “right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not - be waived or released if such a waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy.”. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, “[i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979). We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests.
Id. at 665. (Second emphasis in original.)
The majority’s reliance on United States v. Perez-Reveles, 715 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.1983) is misplaced as well. In Perez-Rev-eles, we held that plea negotiation is not one of the factors supporting the exclusion of time upon the granting of a trial continuance. The exclusion of time in the present case, however, was for filing of the indictment.1 Besides, as the district judge *1161found, there was more to this continuance than just plea negotiations. Because these proceedings were in their infancy, defense counsel required time to investigate the case and to develop the trust of the defendant, whom she just met, before advising him whether to accept a take-it-or-leave-it plea bargain calling for two years in prison. This circumstance is in sharp contrast to a last minute motion to continue a trial so that the parties can engage in plea discussions that should have been pursued long before.
Finally, it is the height of irony that in the name of upholding society’s right to a speedy trial, the majority not only sets aside the result of an errorless trial, but it gives the coup de grace to the Southern District of California’s innovative fast-track policy, a delay reduction program designed to promote the early disposition of certain types of cases prior to indictment, a program previously praised by this court. United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757 (9th Cir.1995).2 As is often said, the Speedy Trial Act is a shield, not a sword. In this case, unfortunately, the majority allows it to be used to skewer both good court administration and a valid conviction. I respectfully dissent.

. In Perez-Reveles, the defendant at least registered his objection to the supposedly untimely trial before the trial began. In the instant case, the time for the filing of the indictment came and went without any objection'whatsoever. The defendant never said boo about it until after the plea negotiations failed and until after the indictment was returned. If the defendant did not intend to waive his right to be. indicted within thirty days of his arrest, he should have moved to dismiss the complaint sometime after day number thirty but before the indictment was *1161filed. As I see it, when a defendant has a meritorious motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to indict in time, but he doesn’t see fit to assert it until after the indictment is filed, the motion is waived. This is because the filing of an indictment supersedes the complaint, Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 (1965) and kicks off the running of a new 70-day time limit. 18U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

. In Estrada-Plata, we said:
In light of the overall crime problem in the Southern District of California, the Government chooses to allow section 1326 defendants the opportunity to plea to a lesser offense, if done so at the earliest stage of the case. Like the district court, we find absolutely nothing wrong (and quite frankly, a great deal right) with such a practice. The policy benefits the government and the court system by relieving court congestion. But more importantly, the policy benefits 1326(b) defendants by offering them a substantial sentence reduction. These defendants have nothing to lose and much to gain from the fast-track policy.
Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d at 761.