Court Opinion

ID: 9734122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:25:55.507153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.825813
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in disallowing cross-examination of the minor-prosecutrix as to prior specific acts of sexual intercourse with men other than appellant. Appellant attempted to present testimony *306of such acts of promiscuous intercourse as a defense to charges of statutory rape and of corrupting the morals of a minor.
In May of 1973, the mother of the prosecutrix reported her fourteen-year-old daughter as missing to the Warren County Sheriff’s Office. On May 25, the Warren County Police located the juvenile and turned her over to the county probation office. On May 29, while detained in the county juvenile detention center, the juvenile told a female Sheriff that she had been staying with the appellant in his mobile home during her absence from her own home and that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with him during that time.
Thereafter, on May 30, 1973, the appellant was arrested and arraigned on charges of statutory rape and of corrupting the morals of a minor. The grand jury returned a true bill on all charges against the appellant on October 1, 1973. On October 18, 1973, appellant was tried by a jury.
At trial, the appellant attempted to cross-examine the witness concerning her prior acts of sexual intercourse with other men. The trial court ruled that such testimony was inadmissible. Subsequently, the appellant took the stand in his own behalf and admitted the acts of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. He attempted to defend on the ground that he was unaware of the juvenile’s true age.
The jury acquitted the appellant of statutory rape, but found him guilty of fornication, a lesser included offense, and of corrupting the morals of a minor. On December 14, 1973, appellant was sentenced to serve one and one-half to three years on the charge of corrupting the morals of the minor and to pay a $100.00 fine on the charge of fornication. Appellant’s motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied by the court below on November 21, 1973. This appeal followed the order of the court denying those motions.
*307The trial court in its opinion rejected the appellant’s contention that he should have been allowed to introduce evidence that the prosecutrix had engaged in promiscuous intercourse because “ [t] he statutory rape charge may be reduced to fornication if the jury believes the victim to be of bad repute in the community...” The reference is to the section of the old Crimes Code that defined “Rape” and set up defenses to that charge.1 A long line of cases decided under that statute has held that “[t]he meaning of the word ‘repute’ in the statute is not doubtful. It means the reputation of the person for chastity in the community in which she lives: that is, what she is reputed to be; not what she actually is ...” Commonwealth v. Emery, 51 Pa. Superior Ct. 55, 58 (1912). See e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A. 2d 441 (1959); Commonwealth v. Dulacy, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 475, 205 A. 2d 706 (1964); Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 375, 185 A. 2d 799 (1962); Commonwealth v. Sutton, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 105, 90 A. 2d 264 (1952); Commonwealth v. Wink, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 96, 84 A. 2d 398 (1951); Commonwealth v. San Juan, 129 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 195 A. 433 (1937); Commonwealth v. Kester, 58 Pa. Superior Ct. 509 (1914); Commonwealth v. Howe, 35 Pa. Superior Ct. 554 (1908).
The principle was-enunciated at common law early in the legal history of the Commonwealth. See Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336 (1817). It was codified at least as early as 18872 as an element in the defense to the crime of forcible rape. Despite the longevity of the rule, that a party may prove character only by reputation in the community has been criticized as “illogical, unscientific, and anomalous, explainable only as archaic survivals of *308compurgation or of states of legal development when the jury personally knew the facts on which their verdict was based.” 32 C.J.S. Evidence §433. Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 474 n. 5 (1948), which upholds the rule for use in the federal courts, but which also discusses the limitations of the rule.3 The origin of the doctrine according to Professor Wigmore was grounded in a misreading of legal history. 7 Wigmore Evidence §§1981,1982 (3d ed. 1940).
In the instant case, despite the questionable nature of the rule, the trial judge was correct that the appellant could not introduce evidence of specific acts of misconduct as a defense to the charge of statutory rape. The appellant’s contention, however, is that he was entitled to present evidence of promiscuous sexual intercourse as a defense to the charge of corruption of the morals of a minor, whether or not that evidence was admissible on the statutory rape charge. Because of serious doubt concerning the wisdom of the reputation rule, I am hesitant to extend the rule if not required by statute or by precedent.
The lower court stated that “[a] Defendant cannot exonerate himself on a charge of corrupting by simply showing that the victim was already specifically corrupted by others.” The court does not cite any authority for that proposition. The court does cite Commonwealth v. Blauvelt, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 66, 140 A. 2d 463 (1958), for the idea that a minor cannot consent when the charge is corruption of the morals of a minor. The appellant in *309the present case, however, does not attempt to prove consent, but rather advances the theory that the juvenile’s morals were already corrupted so that his actions did not contribute thereto. Thus while there are copious citations to cases decided under §4721 in which testimony was limited to the reputation of the prosecutrix, I have been able to find no cases that have applied that rule to cases wherein the charge was corruption of the morals of a minor.4
Hence the case is one of first impression in this Court. It is significant to note that under the new Crimes Code5 specific acts of prior promiscuous intercourse are admissible in defense to a charge of corruption of the morals of a minor. Section 3104 provides that “It is a defense to prosecution under section 3125 of this title (relating to corruption of minors) ... for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged victim had, prior to the time of the offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with others.” The statute is not controlling in the instant case because the offense occurred in May of 1973.
There is a persuasive rationale for the rule permitting proof of specific acts. Inherent in the meaning of the terms “corruption” and “morals” is the idea that there is an innocent victim who is capable of being led astray. At some point, a child is sufficiently corrupt, and in turn, capable of corrupting others that to hold the participating adult criminally liable becomes a perversion of justice *310and fairness.6 The Comment to the Model Penal Code, the basis for the new Code in Pennsylvania, supports the idea that a minor may have already been so corrupted that any further act by an adult cannot fairly be considered a “corrupting” influence on an “innocent” victim. “Previous sexual experience ... might betoken previous victimization, which should not be a defense to a subsequent vic-timizer. However, one can envision cases of precocious lA-year-old girls and even prostitutes of this age who might themselves be the victimizers. Accordingly the draft which, while rejecting the concepts of ‘virtue’, ‘chastity’ or ‘good repute’, permits the defense that the... [alleged victim engaged] in promiscuous sex relations.” Model Penal Code, Comment to §213.6, T.D. No. 4, p. 254 (emphasis added).
Thus this Court is not compelled by precedent to apply a rule of questionable fairness to the instant case. Further, the Legislature has recently rejected the course that *311the Majority now takes. The Majority’s decision deprives the appellant the opportunity to introduce evidence highly relevant to and probative of a critical element of the offense with which he has been charged. Because specific acts of promiscuous sexual intercourse would have been probative on the charge of corrupting the morals of a minor, the order of the court below should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Spaeth, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §721,18 P.S. §4721, repealed by Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, effective June 6, 1973.

. Act of May 19,1887, P.L. 128, §1.

. See also, McCormick, Evidence §44 at p. 91: “. . . the question is whether the choice of reputation instead of experience and observation has not eliminated most of the objectivity from the attempt to appraise character, and has not encouraged the parties to select those who will give voice, under the guise of an estimate of reputation, to prejudice and ill-will. The hand is the hand of Esau, but the voice is the voice of Jacob. And, in addition, reputation in modern, impersonal urban centers is often evanescent, fragile, or actually non-existent.”

. In Commonwealth v. Wink, supra, the appellant was charged with both contributing to the delinquency of a minor and statutory rape. The Court reiterated the rule that under §4721 only evidence of reputation, not of specific acts, was admissible in defense to the charge of rape. The conviction for contributing to the delinquency of the minor was reversed; the issue of whether specific acts were admissible as relevant to the contributing charge was not discussed.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1 et seq., 18 Pa. C.S. §101 et seq.

. I can recall several instances from my own experience as a presiding judge in Philadelphia Juvenile Court that underscore the injustice possible when a defendant charged with corrupting the morals of a minor cannot prove the prior corruption of the juvenile as a defense. In one instance, as a committing magistrate, I was compelled to hold for action by the grand jury a young man who engaged in sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old female. She had been a prostitute for at least two years prior to the offense. Similarly, several individuals were held for action by the grand jury on charges of corruption of the morals of a minor in an instance in which the female juvenile admitted to performing over 2000 acts of intercourse. Another example that comes to mind involved a 19-year-old youth who was charged with corrupting the morals of a minor and with theft. The youth entered a store with a 16-year-old friend who had a history of arrests for shoplifting that dated back at least five years. (The critical age of the juvenile under §4532 of the old code was eighteen years of age.) See also, Ploscowe, Sex and the Law, 181, 182, 194 (1951). The author recounts a case that involved two juvenile prostitutes operating out of a New York hotel. The activity of the two females resulted in charges of statutory rape and related offenses brought against eleven men.