Court Opinion

ID: 9663103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:27:44.184635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.642739
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
As a matter of law, according to the majority, the stairway in question “serves no purpose but to provide access” to Barbara *640Hiatt’s upstairs apartment, and, therefore, such exclusive use negated any characterization of the stairway as a common area. As a matter of fact, there was every indication that the stairway was a common area utilized by the tenants in the two-apartment structure.
Barbara Hiatt and Mary Ann Tallmage were Krug’s tenants since September 1980 — over 2 years before the accident. Tallmage lived with her children and her mother in the ground-level apartment, while Hiatt and her young son lived upstairs. At the base of the stairway there was no door or any other obstruction prohibiting movement up or down the stairs. Although the apartment had a backyard where the children played, as acknowledged by Tallmage’s mother, during cold or inclement weather the Tallmage children and the Hiatt boy played on the porch and would “play games on the steps.” Tallmage also verified that her children and young Hiatt played on the porch and ran “up and down the stairs.”
Phyllis Deloa, a visitor to the Hiatt apartment, testified that during her visits for 2 weeks before the accident, she observed “piles of dog excretion” on the porch-entry and on the lower stairs. The Tallmages, in particular Mother Tallmage, scrubbed the porch with Pine-Sol. Krug testified that the porch was a common area belonging “to both apartments. They both used it.” Further, Krug admitted receiving Hiatt’s letter approximately 10 days before the accident. That letter contained Hiatt’s complaint about the dog problem.
The real issue in this case is whether the stairway was a common area under the control of Krug.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that a porch or roof of an apartment, when used as a playground or recreational area by children of tenants, may constitute a common area. See, Henry v. Haussling, 114 N.J.L. 222, 176 A. 564 (1935) (roof); Bolcar v. Mintz, 119 N.J.L. 219, 195 A. 619 (1937) (porch); Campagna v. Cozzi, 59 Ill. App. 2d 208, 207 N.E.2d 739 (1965) (porch); Gill v. Jakstas, 325 Mass. 309, 90 N.E.2d 527 (1950) (piazza). The same rationale applies in cases of hallways or stairways so used.
In this case the evidence points to a common use of the stairway by Hiatt and Tallmage. There is strong circumstantial *641evidence that Tallmage’s dog used the stairway, euphemistically speaking, as an exercise area. More important, there is positive, direct testimony that the children of the tenants used the porch and stairway as a playground or recreational area. Such use in common by the tenants may well have been an adjunct in the enjoyment of the apartment rented by each tenant and may have been a mother’s salvation on a rainy day. At least there was a jury question.