Court Opinion

ID: 9404560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 14:13:35.466398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.957134
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 54

                  SUPREME COURT           OF    WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:               2021AP1732-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:         State of Wisconsin,
                                  Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                             v.
                        Eric J. Debrow,
                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                           REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                           Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 511, 979 N.W.2d 817
                                      (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:          June 23, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:          April 17, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:               Circuit
   COUNTY:              Dane
   JUDGE:               John D. Hyland

JUSTICES:
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN,
JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general, with whom
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral argument by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general.

       For    the      defendant-appellant,   there   were   briefs    filed   by
Megan Lyneis, assistant state public defender. There was an oral
argument by Megan Lyneis, assistant state public defender.
                                                                         2023 WI 54
                                                                 NOTICE
                                                   This opinion is subject to further
                                                   editing and modification.   The final
                                                   version will appear in the bound
                                                   volume of the official reports.
No.       2021AP1732-CR
(L.C. No.    2018CF202)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                      FILED
      v.                                                         JUN 23, 2023

Eric J. Debrow,                                                   Samuel A. Christensen
                                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Appellant.

KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN,
JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                 Reversed.

      ¶1     JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.         Here we are asked to decide

whether the circuit court1 erroneously exercised its discretion

when it denied Eric J. Debrow's motion for a mistrial after a

witness,     who   was    testifying   about   his     suspicion       of    Debrow,

      1The Honorable John D. Hyland of the Dane County Circuit
Court presided.
                                                               No.     2021AP1732-CR

stated that he "looked on CCAP."2             Debrow believed this testimony

implicated      his   prior    sexual     assault     conviction,      which    the

circuit court had already ruled inadmissible.                        The court of

appeals held that the circuit court erroneously exercised its

discretion and reversed Debrow's conviction.                   The State seeks

review of the court of appeals' decision.                We conclude that the

circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when

it   denied    Debrow's   request       for    a   mistrial.     Therefore,      we

reverse the court of appeals' decision and affirm the judgment

of conviction.

                              I.   BACKGROUND
      ¶2      Debrow was charged with second-degree sexual assault

of a child under the age of 16 as a persistent repeater3 after

Mary,4 his girlfriend's daughter, reported that Debrow sexually

assaulted her in January 2018.                Later, Debrow was additionally

charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child under the

age of 135 for the sexual assault of Nancy, Mary's sister.                      The

cases were consolidated for trial.

      2CCAP, which stands for Consolidated Court                       Automation
Programs, makes certain information about circuit                      court and
appellate court cases available to the public.
      3   See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(2) & 939.62(2m)(2017-18).
      4To protect the privacy and dignity of the victims in this
case, we refer to them using pseudonyms.     Wis. Stat. § 809.86
(2021-22).
      5   See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) (2017-18).

                                         2
                                                           No.    2021AP1732-CR

    ¶3      Prior to trial, Debrow sought to exclude evidence of

his 2004 child sexual assault conviction on the grounds that its

probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair    prejudice.      The   State   agreed,   and   the    circuit   court

granted Debrow's motion to exclude the evidence.

    ¶4      At trial, the State first called Mary, who testified

that Debrow was her mother's boyfriend and lived with the family

in January 2018.          She reported that she awoke early in the

morning on January 17, 2018 to a person "touching [her] butt and

thigh," and that she was "100 percent" sure that person was

Debrow.    Mary testified that she screamed, the dogs in the house

started barking, and Debrow left her room.

    ¶5      When asked whether she had awoken to Debrow in her

room before, Mary testified that she had once woken up to Debrow

sitting on her bed, at which point Debrow told her, "shh, it's

just a game," and directed her not to tell her mother.                    Mary

also testified that she had a conversation with her mother about

what to do if "anything were to happen" in her room in the
middle of the night, and that "the general consensus was that I

would scream."

    ¶6      The   State    then   called    its   second      witness——Isaac,

Mary's brother.        Isaac testified that as he was lying awake in

bed on January 17th, he saw Debrow enter Mary's bedroom.                  Five

to ten minutes later, Isaac heard his sister scream and saw

Debrow exit the room immediately after.           Isaac testified that he

"had the feeling of something that was going on" and that he
called the police after he got home from school that same day.
                                        3
                                                                    No.    2021AP1732-CR

      ¶7      During        Isaac's    redirect      examination,          the    State

requested a sidebar.               During the sidebar, the State sought to

ask   Isaac    leading       questions      about   why    he    thought   "something

strange    was   going       on    inside   of   [Mary's]       room."      The   State

explained     that     it    wanted    to   rebut    the    idea    that    Isaac   was

"jumping to conclusions based on absolutely nothing."                        According

to the State, Isaac knew about Debrow's prior conviction, but he

would avoid discussing it in accordance with the court's ruling.

Instead, Isaac would testify as to why he was vigilant about

Debrow and his sisters.             Debrow's counsel expressed concern that

the   proposed       line     of    questioning     would       elicit    inadmissible

evidence concerning the 2004 conviction and indicated that he

would move for a mistrial if Isaac gave "the wrong answer."                         The

court said it would allow the State to pursue its proposed line

of questioning "in not a directly leading fashion but in a very

direct or indirect but not leading manner."                         The court also

noted that it would be "on pins and needles as well to jump in"

if Isaac began to reference the prior conviction.
      ¶8      Soon after the State's redirect of Isaac resumed, the

following exchange occurred:

      [Prosecutor]: . . . At any point . . . had you learned
      anything or heard anything that led you to be on alert
      that night on January 17th of 2018?

      [Isaac]: Yes.

      Q And were those based on things your sisters had
      mentioned?

      A No.

                                             4
                                                               No.       2021AP1732-CR

    Q Are those things that you heard from your mom?

    A It's things that I --

    Q -- I don't want to get into that --

    (Unreportable simultaneous interjections by Counsel.)

    . . . .

    [Defense]: -- Objection, Your Honor. Objection, move
    to strike. Another motion in a minute.

    THE COURT: I'll -- I'll move to strike. The question
    was were those things you heard from your mother, and
    if you can just give yes or no . . . .    We can't get
    into what they are, because that's hearsay.

    [Isaac]: Well, my mom did tell me --

    THE   COURT:  --   all  right,  that's   fine.  That's
    all . . . We can't -- we can't put her words into your
    mouth in front of the jury. That's why she's a witness
    if she testifies.

    [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I have no further questions.

The court then addressed         the      jury   and    gave       the     following
curative instruction:

    THE COURT: . . . And -- and to the extent that -- as
    the State was -- was raising an interjection the
    answer beyond what he gave just now will be -- I'll
    direct the jury to strike anything else that they --
    they heard beyond the witness's statement that he
    heard from his mother but not the content of anything.
    ¶9    After this exchange, the jury was excused, and the

parties met to discuss Isaac's testimony.                   Although the court

reporter was unable to record Isaac's response to the State's

question about why he was on alert, the parties and the court

agreed that he said, "I looked on CCAP."

    ¶10   Debrow   moved   for    a       mistrial     on    the     grounds     that
Isaac's statement was inadmissible as it pertained to Debrow's

                                      5
                                                                  No.    2021AP1732-CR

prior    sexual      assault      conviction.        More    specifically,     Debrow

argued that the jury would assume that Isaac's reference to CCAP

meant that Isaac had learned about Debrow's criminal record and

that "it's going to be an easy assumption and leap to the idea

that    --    that   what    he    found   on   CCAP   was    a   sexual   assault."

Debrow argued that no curative instruction would be adequate to

remedy the situation because the jury is "not going to unlearn

what they learned."          In response, the State argued that the jury

may not have heard the reference to CCAP over the interjection

by the court and the attorneys, that the State had attempted to

characterize the problem as a hearsay issue to draw the jury's

attention away from the substance of the statement, and that a

curative instruction would be "probably the most drastic thing

that is necessary."

       ¶11      The circuit court denied the motion for mistrial.

It explained that the jury may not be familiar with CCAP, saying

"to them, it might mean nothing," and emphasized that Isaac did

not say what he found on CCAP.                     The court continued "if any
juror is thinking to themselves, well, I know on CCAP you can

find    out    about   any     public      court    record,    then     they   may   be

presuming criminal, they may be presuming small claims, they may

be presuming civil, whatever –- divorce, whatever."                      The circuit

court concluded that "on this record with that minimal bit of

information that the jury picked up upon if they were listening

carefully . . . certainly doesn't say for example, well, I knew

he had a prior conviction, I knew he had done this before."

                                            6
                                                                          No.    2021AP1732-CR

      ¶12     The circuit court further mentioned that the jury's

attention     was    quickly    directed         to     a    possible       hearsay       issue

rather than the substance of Isaac's statement, saying: "it was

stopped based upon people pointing out that you can't get into

hearsay, and not saying you can't say that, you can't say that

part, but just -- but directing it towards a hearsay that can't

be brought before the jury."                 Finally, the circuit court then

discussed available remedies, saying "we're open to striking, I

already told them to strike anything, we're open to giving the

instruction     on     striking,    we're        open       to   curative       instructions

that don't redirect their attention to it two days from now."

      ¶13     The trial proceeded to its conclusion, and Debrow did

not   renew    his     motion     for    mistrial.               Debrow     requested       the

standard jury instruction regarding stricken testimony at the

close of trial, which was given, but he did not request any

additional     jury     instructions         specifically          related       to   Isaac's

testimony.      The jury convicted Debrow of second-degree sexual

assault of Mary and acquitted him of the charges related to
Nancy.      Consistent with the persistent repeater enhancer, the

court    sentenced       Debrow     to       life       imprisonment            without     the

possibility of extended supervision.

      ¶14     Debrow    appealed    the       circuit        court's       denial     of    his

mistrial motion.         In granting Debrow's request for a new trial,

the court of appeals held that the circuit court's attempt at a

curative instruction for Isaac's statement regarding CCAP was

insufficient and therefore that "the circuit court erroneously
exercised      its     discretion       in       denying         Debrow's       motion      for
                                             7
                                                                 No.    2021AP1732-CR

mistrial."        State v. Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, unpublished slip

op., ¶36 (Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022).                   We granted the State's

petition for review and reverse the court of appeals' decision.

                                    II.    ANALYSIS

    ¶15     When faced with a motion for mistrial, "the circuit

court     must     decide,     in     light      of     the   entire    facts     and

circumstances, whether . . . the claimed error is sufficiently

prejudicial to warrant a mistrial."               State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138,

¶29, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61.                We review a circuit court's

decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial for an erroneous

exercise     of    discretion.            Id.     "An    erroneous     exercise     of

discretion may arise from an error in law or from the failure of

the circuit court to base its decisions on the facts in the

record."     Id., ¶28 (quoting State v. Raye, 2005 WI 68, ¶16, 281

Wis. 2d 339, 697 N.W.2d 407).                   "Discretion is not synonymous

with decision-making.          Rather, the term contemplates a process

of reasoning."        State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶3, 270 Wis. 2d

535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263,
277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).

    ¶16     Here, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise

its discretion when it determined, in light of the facts and

circumstances of the case, that Isaac's statement regarding CCAP

was not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.                        Before the

circuit    court      denied     Debrow's        mistrial     motion,       it   first

considered       arguments   and     counterarguments         from   both    parties,

allowing each attorney ample time to make their case outside the
presence of the jury.            The circuit court then considered the
                                            8
                                                                        No.    2021AP1732-CR

possible extent of prejudice to the defendant.                           In finding the

error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial,

the court highlighted two things.                   First, it was not reasonable

to assume that Isaac's statement regarding CCAP would lead a

juror     to    infer       that   Debrow        had     a     prior     sexual      assault

conviction.          Second, Isaac's statement was mitigated when the

circuit      court    immediately      struck      the       testimony     and      drew    the

jury's attention away from the substance of Isaac's statement

and towards a hearsay issue.

       ¶17     The    circuit      court     also        considered           the    various

alternatives to what it correctly deemed the "most serious of

remedies," a mistrial.             It concluded that striking the testimony

was appropriate, which it had already done.                            The circuit court

also     invited      the    defense    to        request       an     appropriate         jury

instruction.          However, the defense requested only the standard

jury instruction regarding stricken testimony at the close of

trial.

       ¶18     All    of    this    evinces        an        appropriate       process       of
reasoning.            The    circuit    court          considered       the      facts     and

circumstances in the record, heard arguments from both parties,

assessed available remedies, and concluded that the error was

not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.                         No error of law is

evident.       As such, we conclude that the circuit court properly

exercised       its    discretion      in        denying       Debrow's       request      for

mistrial.

       ¶19     The court of appeals reached a different result and
erroneously focused on the sufficiency of the court's curative
                                             9
                                                                        No.    2021AP1732-CR

instruction to "strike anything else that they [the jury] --

they heard beyond the witness's statement that he heard from his

mother but not the content of anything," rather than whether the

circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying

Debrow's mistrial motion.             See Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, at ¶36

(Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022) ("The court's attempts to cure the

prejudicial effect of this testimony were insufficient and did

not properly instruct the jury to disregard that testimony when

deliberating.").         The question of whether the court erroneously

exercised its discretion in denying the mistrial is separate

from the question of whether its instruction actually cured the

error.        Debrow    challenged        the   court's         decision       to    deny    a

mistrial.         He did not alternatively challenge the adequacy of

the court's curative instruction, so that issue is not before us

today.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

      ¶20     The    circuit      court   did   not       erroneously         exercise      its

discretion in denying Debrow's mistrial motion.                           It considered
the facts and circumstances of the case, heard arguments from

both sides, considered alternative remedies, and determined that

the   error    was     not   so    prejudicial       as    to   warrant       a     mistrial.

Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision is reversed.

      By    the     Court.—The     decision     of    the       court    of    appeals      is

reversed.

                                           10
                                                                  No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

     ¶21   PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.                      (concurring).      A jury

convicted Eric J. Debrow of second-degree sexual assault of a

child under the age of 16 at the conclusion of a three-day

trial.1    Debrow       moved     for      a       mistrial   following    the    second

witness's testimony, which the circuit court denied.                           The court

of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the

jury instruction given was insufficient to address the prejudice

caused by the second witness's statement.2

     ¶22   I conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously

exercise its discretion in denying Debrow's mistrial motion when

reviewed in light of the entire trial, including the sufficiency

of the jury instruction.            Accordingly, I would reverse the court

of appeals decision and conclude that Debrow is not entitled to

a new trial.

     ¶23   I     concur     in    the      result       reached    by    the    majority

opinion,   but    I   do    not     join       the    opinion.     It   lacks    a   full

analysis   of     the      entire    proceeding,          which    is    necessary    in

addressing the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court.
                                    I.   BACKGROUND

     ¶24   On January 17, 2018, officers from the City of Madison

Police Department responded to Debrow's residence to investigate

the sexual assault of a child that Debrow reportedly committed

earlier that day.           At the time of his arrest, Debrow resided

     1 The Honorable John D. Hyland of the Dane County Circuit
Court presided.
     2 State v. Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, unpublished slip op.,
¶4 (Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022).

                                               1
                                                          No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

with his girlfriend, Kathy,3 and her three children:                Isaac, 17;

Mary, 13; and Nancy, 11.

    ¶25    Debrow was charged with second-degree sexual assault

of a child under the age of 16 based on the report that he had

touched Mary's buttocks in the early morning.                   See Wis. Stat.

§ 948.02(2).        Due to a prior 2004 conviction for child sexual

assault,   Debrow     also   was   charged    as   a    persistent     repeater

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(a) and (b), which imposes a

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of

parole.    The State later charged Debrow in a separate case with

first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 13 as a

persistent      repeater      contrary        to       §§ 948.02(1)(e)       and

939.62(2m)(a) and (b) for sexual assault of Nancy.                     The two

cases were consolidated for trial.4            Debrow pled not guilty to

all charges.

    ¶26    The circuit court        ruled on a number of motions in

limine prior to the jury trial.              Relevant to our review, the

court granted Debrow's motion to exclude evidence of his 2004
conviction     of    child   sexual   assault      on     grounds    that    the

    3  I use pseudonyms for the victims and their family members
in this case pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 950.04(dr) and § (Rule)
809.86 (2021-22).   For consistency, I use the same pseudonyms
the parties used before this court.

     All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.
    4  Because Debrow challenges his conviction on charges
relevant to Mary alone, I do not address the merits or evidence
related to Debrow's charges related to Nancy.

                                      2
                                                               No.    2021AP1732-CR.pdr

conviction        was   more    prejudicial     than    probative.         The     State

agreed the conviction was "too prejudicial."

       ¶27    Trial commenced, and Mary was the first witness.                      She

testified that Debrow came into the bedroom she shared with

Nancy early one morning.            Mary disclosed that she woke to Debrow

massaging or gripping her buttocks over her clothes, and that he

rubbed her thighs as she slept on her stomach.                       Mary stated she

screamed at Debrow to get out "numerous times at the top of

[her] lungs," and the dogs started barking.                    After she screamed,

Debrow stopped touching her and left her bedroom.                      She explained

she knew Debrow rather than Isaac was the person in her bedroom

because      of   identifiable      physical    differences      between      the    two

men.

       ¶28    Mary also testified that on an earlier occasion she

woke to find Debrow sitting on her bed, and Debrow said, "[S]hh,

it's just a game . . . you don't have to tell your mom about

it."    She did not tell her mom that Debrow was in her bedroom

that   first      time.        However,   based    on   conversations        with    her
mother, Mary testified that she was instructed to scream "if

anything were to happen" in her bedroom.                       The defense cross-

examined      Mary      about    interviews     she     gave    as    part    of    the

investigation, and she admitted that she had told Debrow many

times that she "did not like him."                Mary stated that she did not

want to be thinking about Debrow touching her.

       ¶29    Isaac testified next.            Although Isaac knew Debrow had

been convicted of child sexual assault in 2004, Isaac also was
aware that he could not testify about Debrow's prior conviction

                                           3
                                                            No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

"unless and until" the court allowed the prosecutor to bring it

up.   Isaac testified he lay awake in bed early one morning with

his bedroom door open, and he saw Debrow enter the girls' room.

Five to ten minutes later, Isaac heard Mary repeatedly scream

"get out," the dogs began to bark, and Isaac saw Debrow leave

his sisters' bedroom.

      ¶30    Isaac testified that he called the police later that

afternoon to report Debrow, even though he did not hear anything

from the room besides Mary yelling "get out," and his sisters

did not mention anything to him.                 Isaac stated he "wanted to

call the police the whole day when [he] was at school" and that

he "had the feeling of something that was going on."                  Isaac said

that when he got home from school he told his mom and Debrow

that he was going to call police, and Debrow told him not to

call the police.      Isaac testified that Debrow was like "a father

figure until all this stuff happened," after which Isaac did not

like Debrow anymore.      Isaac stated he and Debrow had gotten into

physical altercations on six occasions.
      ¶31    During   Isaac's       re-direct,     the    State     requested      a

sidebar in which it expressed its desire to provide the jury an

explanation for why Isaac thought "something strange was going

on inside of [his sisters'] room," and why he later called the

police;     the   prosecution   wanted      to    show   that     Isaac    did   not

"jump[] to conclusions based on absolutely nothing."

      ¶32    Subsequent   to    a    lengthy     sidebar,    in    which    Debrow

contended the State's proposed inquiry would surely bring out
"evidence that had already been ruled inadmissible," the court

                                        4
                                                  No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

allowed the State to pursue its proposed line of questioning "in

a very direct or indirect but not leading manner."           The court

noted the State should be cautious, and that it would sustain

any defense objections because the defense already opposed the

line of questioning.      The court stated it would be on "pins and

needles [and would] jump in" if Isaac started to testify about

the 2004 conviction.      The defense made its intent clear to move

for a mistrial if Isaac gave the "wrong answer."

    ¶33    After three questions, defense counsel objected:

    [Prosecutor]: . . . At any point . . . had you learned
    anything or heard anything that led you to be on alert
    that night on January 17th of 2018?

    [Isaac]:   Yes.

    Q   And were those based on things your sisters had
        mentioned?

    A   No.

    Q   Are those things that you heard from your mom?

    A   It's things that I –-

    Q   -- I don't want to get into that –-

         (Unreportable        simultaneous   interjections      by
    Counsel.)

    . . . .

         [Defense]:      -- Objection, Your Honor. Objection,
    move to strike.      Another motion in a minute.

           THE COURT:    I'll – I'll move to strike.

    . . . .

           [Isaac]:     Well, my mom did tell me –-

           THE COURT:     -- all right, that's fine.       That's
    all.

                                   5
                                                                    No.       2021AP1732-CR.pdr

       . . . .

            We can't -– we can't put her words into your
       mouth in front of the jury.    That's why she's a
       witness if she testifies.

       . . . .

            [Prosecutor]:        Your        Honor,     I    have        no     further
       questions.

            THE COURT: . . . And –- and to the extent that
       –- as the State was –- was raising an interjection the
       answer beyond what he gave just now will be –- I'll
       direct the jury to strike anything else that they –-
       they heard beyond the witness's statement that he
       heard from his mother but not the content of anything.
The jury was excused for the day.

       ¶34    Outside    the     presence        of     the    jury,            the     parties

discussed what occurred.               Although the court reporter did not

catch what Isaac said, the parties agreed they heard Isaac say

"I looked on CCAP," which is the Consolidated Court Automation

Programs.      Among other things, CCAP enables the public to access

some information about circuit court and appellate cases.                                  The

court stated "the jury couldn't possibly have heard anything

else."

       ¶35    Debrow moved for a mistrial.                  He argued that the jury

would    assume      Isaac   found      information         about        a     prior    sexual

assault on CCAP, and that the assumption would be so "damaging"

that "there's no way around it," the jury cannot "unlearn what

they learned."          Debrow asserted striking the statement or a

curative      instruction      would    be    insufficient          to       remedy     Isaac's

statement.

       ¶36    The State argued that it was hard to know "what, if
any,     of   that    the    jury      could     have       heard        and     made    out."

                                             6
                                                                  No.    2021AP1732-CR.pdr

Accordingly, the State's position was that the statement did not

require a mistrial or even a curative instruction; striking the

statement would sufficiently cure any error.

      ¶37    Following     a    lengthy    colloquy        in    which    both   parties

developed their positions, the court acknowledged that mistrial

is   "the    most     serious      of   remedies."          In    initially      denying

Debrow's     motion    for     mistrial,       the   circuit      court     placed    its

reasons for denial on the record, which I discuss below.                              The

court stated that, upon Debrow's request, it was "open to giving

the instruction on striking" and "open to curative instructions

that don't redirect [the jury's] attention to it two days from

now."

      ¶38    The trial proceeded for two more days, during which

Nancy, Kathy, two officers, and two detectives testified for the

State.      Nancy testified that on January 17, 2018, her sister

woke her up because she screamed "get out," and Nancy saw a

"shadow     go   outside     the    room   and       the   door    closed."         Nancy

identified the shadow as Debrow because of physical differences
between Debrow and Isaac.

      ¶39    Kathy testified she had a "ground rule" that the boys

and girls were not allowed in each others' bedrooms, and Kathy

instructed the girls to be loud enough to "wake all of Madison

up" if something were to happen.                 The State read and published

to the jury text messages between Kathy and Debrow.                           The State

also played a recorded phone call Debrow made to Kathy from

jail.       In both the text messages and the phone call, Kathy
confronted Debrow about a pornographic video he had watched, the

                                           7
                                                                    No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

graphic title of which implied a stepfather sexually abusing a

stepdaughter while his wife was asleep.

       ¶40    An officer testified he informed Debrow of probable

cause to charge him with second-degree sexual assault of a child

as he arrested Debrow.              Debrow asked the officer why it "had to

be     second-degree . . . and              not     just     fourth       degree         sexual

assault,"         which    the     officer    clarified       for       the   jury       is     a

misdemeanor         involving       nonconsensual          sexual       contact      between

adults.

       ¶41    A     detective       testified       that     she      knew       Mary     from

occasions prior to Debrow's arrest, and that she responded to

the apartment on January 17, 2018.                     The detective stated that

once       Mary    recognized       her,     Mary    "put[]       her     head      in    [the

detective's]        chest    and    cried    for     about    a    minute-and-a-half."

Another      detective       testified      that    the    girls     each     had    a    Safe

Harbor interview.5

       ¶42    Debrow did not testify, and the defense did not call

any witnesses.            Debrow did not renew his motion for mistrial at
the    circuit      court;       however,    he    appealed       contending      that        the

circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying

his motion for mistrial.              The defense also did not challenge or

request a specially drafted jury instruction related to Isaac's

testimony.         The jury convicted Debrow of second-degree sexual

       Safe Harbor is a child advocacy center that provides for
       5

the forensic interviewing of children who are victims of sexual
and physical abuse. Safe Harbor forensic interviews are video-
recorded for court use, though children are still required to
testify.

                                              8
                                                                 No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

assault of Mary, but acquitted him for the charges related to

Nancy.     Consistent with the persistent repeater enhancer, the

court    sentenced    Debrow          to     life     imprisonment       without     the

possibility of parole.

    ¶43     Relevant to our review, the court of appeals concluded

Isaac's statement, "I looked on CCAP," was unfairly prejudicial

to Debrow, and that the court's instruction relevant to Isaac's

testimony was insufficient.                 It therefore concluded that "the

circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying

Debrow's motion for a mistrial."6                   The court of appeals granted

Debrow a new trial.        The State petitioned us for review.

                                 II.       DISCUSSION

                           A.    Standard of Review

    ¶44     "A   motion    for    mistrial          is    committed    to   the    sound

discretion of the circuit court."                    State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138,

¶28, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61.                    In ruling on a motion for

mistrial, a circuit court determines "in light of the whole

proceeding,      whether        the        claimed       error   was     sufficiently
prejudicial" to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.                        State v.

Ross, 2003 WI App 27, ¶47, 260 Wis. 2d 291, 659 N.W.2d 122;

State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, ¶24, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674

N.W.2d 894.      See also Ford, 306 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29; State v. Doss,

2008 WI 93, ¶¶69-71, 312 Wis. 2d 570, 754 N.W.2d 150.                                "An

erroneous exercise of discretion may arise from an error in law

or from the failure of the circuit court to base its decisions

    6    State v. Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, ¶36.

                                             9
                                                                    No.    2021AP1732-CR.pdr

on the facts in the record."                 State v. Raye, 2005 WI 68, ¶16,

281 Wis. 2d 339, 697 N.W.2d 407.

                        B.   Debrow's Motion for Mistrial

      ¶45       The    Constitution       does    not    guarantee         an   error-free

trial, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983),

and not all errors warrant a mistrial.                        In order to preserve

review of a claimed evidentiary error, the disadvantaged party

must make a contemporaneous objection and move for a mistrial.

State v. Guzman, 2001 WI App 54, ¶25, 241 Wis. 2d 310, 624

N.W.717.         When improper evidence comes before the jury, the

circuit     court       decides        whether    a     curative          instruction    is

necessary as part of the exercise of its discretion in ruling on

a mistrial motion.           Sigarroa, 269 Wis. 2d 234, ¶¶24-26.                     "[T]he

law   prefers         less   drastic      alternatives       [than        mistrials],    if

available and practical."                 State v. Adams, 221 Wis. 2d 1, 17,

584 N.W.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1998).

      ¶46       Accordingly,       I     review    whether         the     circuit   court

erroneously exercised its discretion in determining that Isaac's
statement fell short of the high prejudicial bar to warrant a

mistrial.7        Sigarroa, 269 Wis. 2d 234, ¶27.                        As part of this

review,     I    examine     the       sufficiency      of   the    jury     instructions

relative to the objected-to testimony.                       Hardison v. State, 61

Wis. 2d 262, 273, 212 N.W.2d 103 (1973).

      7Neither party argues that Isaac's statement rises to
structural   error;   therefore,  automatic reversal  is   not
appropriate.   State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶42, 306 Wis. 2d 1,
742 N.W.2d (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8
(1999)).

                                             10
                                                                     No.    2021AP1732-CR.pdr

      ¶47   We   previously           have    explained       that     sound       discretion

includes "acting in a deliberate manner taking sufficient time"

to   respond     to      a     request,        giving       both     parties        a      "full

opportunity"       to        argue     their        positions,        and        "considering

alternatives     such        as   a    curative          instruction       or     sanctioning

counsel."     State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 383,

661 N.W.2d 822.         A court that "reason[s] its way to a rational

conclusion"      while        considering          the     relevant        law    and      facts

exercises sound discretion.                  Id.     See generally State v. Moeck,

2005 WI 57, ¶¶43, 72, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783.                                       The

question is not whether we would have reasoned identically to

the circuit court, but rather, whether the court arrived at its

conclusion "by the consideration of the relevant law, the facts,

and a process of logical reasoning."                        Hartung v. Hartung, 102

Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).

      ¶48   Directly         following        Debrow's       mistrial           motion,     both

parties argued their positions at length outside the presence of

the jury, with considerable counterargument from both sides.                                  In
short, both parties had a "full opportunity" to advance their

arguments, and the court devoted sufficient time to the issue.

It   also   weighed      "less        drastic"       alternatives          to    address     the

"blurted    out"      and      "stopped"           statement.         The        court     noted

striking, which it had done, and a curative instruction were

available alternatives.

      ¶49   The circuit court further reasoned there was no way to

know whether any of the jurors were familiar with CCAP.                                  A juror
who was familiar with CCAP may have had familiarity due to small

                                              11
                                                                   No.     2021AP1732-CR.pdr

claims, civil, divorce, or other court record, not necessarily a

criminal      conviction.           In    addition,          Isaac's       response        was

overridden      by     directing       the        jury's     attention        to    hearsay

concerns.      All of those reasons "lessen[ed] the necessity of

granting" Debrow's mistrial motion.                    Lastly, the circuit court

stated it could not grant a mistrial for "that minimal bit of

information" that the jury may have heard.

       ¶50   The     court    correctly      noted        that    Isaac's     interrupted

testimony      did    not     state      anything         about    a      prior    criminal

conviction,     let    alone    a     conviction       for       sexual    assault    of     a

child.       Although Debrow argues the phrase "I looked on CCAP"

leads to a string of inferences necessarily culminating in the

most    prejudicial     assumption,        we      have    said    before      that   "this

court    cannot      assume     that      more      specific       information        of    a

prejudicial nature was involved."                   Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d

344, 366, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1977).                  Instead, the focus must remain

on whether the error was so prejudicial that the only remedy

capable of addressing it is granting a mistrial.                            See generally
Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Wis., 119 Wis. 2d 129, 136, 349

N.W.2d 466 (1984).           See also McClinton v. State, 464 S.W.3d 913,

914 (Ark. 2015) ("Declaring a mistrial is proper only where the

error is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any curative

relief.").     Here, the court properly exercised its discretion by

unpacking the string of potential inferences to conclude Isaac's

comment was capable of remedy by less drastic means.

       ¶51   The circuit court appropriately, but narrowly, based
its decision on the record before it.                        Factually, all we have

                                             12
                                                                          No.    2021AP1732-CR.pdr

here is the statement, "I looked on CCAP."                                The court reporter

did    not       capture       this    statement         because       of       "[u]nreportable

simultaneous interjections by Counsel."                            That is a far cry from

disclosure that in 2004 Debrow was convicted of sexual assault

of a child.

       ¶52       However, more analysis is needed because whether the

circuit      court        appropriately           exercised         its     discretion          when

denying a motion for mistrial includes assessing whether the

circuit court gave reasoned consideration to the possibility of

a curative instruction relative to the claimed error.                                     State v.

Williams, 2004 WI App 56, ¶31 n.3, 270 Wis. 2d 761, 677 N.W.2d

691.        In        Moeck,   280     Wis. 2d         277,   we     again       addressed       the

importance of cures other than mistrial for errors during trial.

We concluded that "the circuit court did not exercise sound

discretion        in     declaring      a    mistrial         when    it        failed    to    give

adequate consideration to the State's ability to refer to the

defendant's silence and to the effectiveness of a curative jury

instruction."           Id., ¶71.
       ¶53       In    Debrow's       trial,      I    conclude      that        review    of   the

complained-of statement in the context of the whole proceeding

confirms that the statement was not so prejudicial as to affect

the fairness of his trial.                  One central question with mistrials

"is    to        determine        under          the     facts       if         the   error      is

prejudicial . . . in             light      of    the    whole       proceeding.           If    the

evidence presented in a case was extremely weak and the same

error occurred, it could justifiably be deemed grounds for a
mistrial."            Oseman v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 523, 528-29, 145 N.W.2d

                                                 13
                                                                         No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

766 (1966).              See also Ford, 306 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50; Adams, 221

Wis. 2d      at    17.       Therefore,     I     consider         the     strength       of    the

State's      evidence       against      Debrow    and       the    sufficiency           of    the

instruction given to the jury that relates to Isaac's testimony.

       ¶54    Mary, Isaac, Nancy, and Kathy consistently testified

that   on     the        morning    of   January       17,    2018,        Mary       repeatedly

screamed "get out," which caused the dogs to bark.                                  Mary, Nancy,

and Isaac all identified Debrow as in the girls' bedroom when

that happened, and the sisters both explained how they knew the

person in their room was Debrow.                       Testimony from officers and

detectives who interviewed Mary as part of the investigation

confirmed         that    Mary's    account      of    Debrow's          actions       had     been

consistent.

       ¶55    The jury heard Mary testify that she woke to find

Debrow in her room on a prior occasion, but that he told her

"it's just a game, [so] you don't have to tell your mom."                                      Mary

did not tell Kathy.                Mary and Kathy both testified that Kathy

had instructed her daughters to scream if anything of concern
were to happen in their bedroom.                  Kathy testified that there was

a   "rule"    in     the     home    prohibiting        the    girls           and    boys     from

entering one another's bedrooms.

       ¶56    The jury heard a phone recording in which Debrow told

Kathy, "I got something in my mind that I need help," and in

which Kathy confronted Debrow about a pornographic video he had

watched,      the        graphic    title   of        which    implied          a     stepfather

sexually      abusing       a   stepdaughter       while       his       wife       was   asleep.
Jurors saw text messages about the same conversations.

                                            14
                                                                      No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

      ¶57     An     officer       testified          that       Debrow          specifically

questioned     the    degree       of     sexual     assault          for   which        he    was

arrested——asking why it was second-degree and not fourth.

      ¶58     Jurors also heard impeachment evidence.                        For instance,

they heard Mary and Isaac state they did not like Debrow.                                  Isaac

disclosed that he and Debrow had gotten into multiple physical

altercations, and Kathy testified that she and Debrow got back

together briefly some weeks after the January 2018 incident,

although they were not together at the time of trial.

      ¶59     The   circuit       court       offered      to    consider         a    specially

drafted curative instruction that Debrow did not request when

counsel and the court had their instructions conference.                                       The

court also offered standard Civil Jury Instruction 150, which

was   given    and    provided:          "During      the       trial,      the       Court    has

ordered     certain        testimony      to    be      stricken.           Disregard          all

stricken      testimony."              This    instruction            directly         addressed

Isaac's testimony which was stricken as soon as it was given.

      ¶60     Last,   the       jury    simultaneously           convicted            Debrow   for
assaulting     Mary    while      it    acquitted        him     of    assaulting         Nancy.

Accordingly,        when    considered         in    the    context         of    the     "whole

proceeding," it is "quite clear" that whatever prejudice the

statement "I looked on CCAP" may have caused Debrow, it fell

short of the high bar to warrant a mistrial.                           Oseman, 32 Wis. 2d

at 529.       "[N]o reasonable jury could have fairly come to any

other decision."           Id. at 530.

                           C.   Court of Appeals Decision

                                               15
                                                                          No.    2021AP1732-CR.pdr

    ¶61     The        court        of     appeals           concluded       that       the          jury

instruction was insufficient to ameliorate Isaac's statement and

therefore Debrow was entitled to a new trial.                                     See State v.

Debrow,     No. 2021AP1732-CR,                       unpublished          slip       op.,             ¶36

(Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022) ("The court's attempts to cure the

prejudicial effect of this testimony were insufficient and did

not properly instruct the jury to disregard that testimony when

deliberating.").               Debrow          did     request       standard       Civil            Jury

Instruction       150,        which       was        given    and       focuses     on       Isaac's

testimony    because          his     statement         was       stricken      immediately            on

Debrow's objection and motion for a mistrial.                                I conclude under

the entire proceedings, Instruction 150 was sufficient.

                                      III.      CONCLUSION

    ¶62     A     jury        convicted          Debrow        of    second-degree            sexual

assault of a child under the age of 16 following a three-day

trial.     Debrow moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the

second witness's testimony, which the circuit court denied.                                             I

conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion in denying Debrow's mistrial motion when reviewed in

light of the entire trial, including the sufficiency of the jury

instruction.       Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals

decision    and    conclude          that       Debrow       is   not     entitled      to       a    new

trial.

    ¶63     I     concur       in        the    result        reached      by     the    majority

opinion,    but    I     do    not       join    the     opinion.          It    lacks       a       full

analysis    of     the        entire       proceeding,            which    is     necessary           in
addressing the court of appeals reversal of the circuit court.

                                                 16
                                            No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

    ¶64   I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL

BRADLEY joins this concurrence.

                                  17
    No.   2021AP1732-CR.pdr

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