Court Opinion

ID: 9928886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 15:00:47.897481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:51.521688
License: Public Domain

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                                                            [PUBLISH]

                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13612
                           ____________________

        CARELYN FYLLING,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-21953-JEM
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                    21-13612

        Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
                Because “[t]he great value of the trial by jury certainly con-
        sists in its fairness and impartiality,” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
        49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.), we have long required ex-
        cusal of biased jurors and required district courts to adequately in-
        vestigate potential juror bias when specific facts suggesting such
        bias surface.
                The parties to this personal injury action tried the case to a
        jury for two weeks. Following voir dire, the jury was selected and
        sworn, and the trial began. Shortly after opening arguments, the
        district court became aware that one of the impaneled jurors—Ju-
        ror Eight—had a niece who worked for the Defendant, Royal Car-
        ibbean Cruises, Ltd. The district court did not remove Juror Eight,
        did not subject her to any questioning about her niece and any po-
        tential for bias, and eventually, permitted her to deliberate—even
        though there were enough jurors to return a verdict without her.
        The jury found Royal Caribbean negligent, but it assessed a com-
        parative-negligence finding against Plaintiff Carelyn Fylling that re-
        duced her recovery by ninety percent.
               After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by not in-
        vestigating whether Juror Eight could impartially discharge her re-
        sponsibilities after learning that her niece worked for Royal Carib-
        bean and by allowing her to participate in deliberations. We there-
        fore reverse and remand for a new trial.
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        21-13612               Opinion of the Court                        3

                             I.     BACKGROUND
               On March 4, 2017, Fylling tripped, fell, and struck her head
        while entering deck five of Royal Caribbean’s Harmony of the Seas
        cruise ship. Fylling sued Royal Caribbean for negligence in the
        United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
               The case proceeded to trial. The parties both submitted pro-
        posed voir dire questions. One of Royal Caribbean’s proposed
        questions, which Fylling did not object to, was whether the pro-
        spective jurors “[knew] or [were] related to anyone employed by a
        cruise line.” After filing proposed questions, Fylling filed an unop-
        posed motion for limited attorney voir dire. The district court de-
        nied the motion, explaining its typical practice of not allowing law-
        yers to ask questions during voir dire.
                Jury selection began on September 13, 2021. The district
        court allowed counsel for each party to introduce themselves, their
        clients, and others in the courtroom with them. Royal Caribbean’s
        counsel introduced himself, his co-counsel, his paralegal, his IT
        consultant, and Royal Caribbean’s corporate representative. The
        district court asked the venire panel, “Do you know any of these
        folks?” No one said yes. The district court then requested that the
        parties read their witness lists and asked the members of the venire
        panel if they knew any of the witnesses. Again, no one said yes.
               Next, the district court individually asked each prospective
        juror a series of questions. The district court asked the prospective
        jurors to state their names, occupations, and marital statuses, and
        asked them whether they had been involved in any lawsuits, had
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-13612

        served on any juries, or had any immediate family members who
        had been involved in a lawsuit. The district court also asked the
        panel members whether they had children and, if so, what their
        children’s occupations were.
               After individual questioning, the district court posed several
        questions to the venire panel as a group. Those questions included
        whether panel members knew any other prospective juror before
        that day, whether they belonged to a religion or group that would
        prevent them from judging the case, whether they or someone
        close to them had been injured on a cruise ship, whether they had
        ever suffered a concussion or a brain injury, whether they would
        accept their role as the factfinder, and whether they had any phys-
        ical, emotional, or language problems that would make it difficult
        for them to participate. The district court did not ask Royal Carib-
        bean’s proposed question about whether the prospective jurors
        had any relatives who worked for a cruise line.
               Finally, the district court asked, “Can you think of any rea-
        son why you cannot sit on this jury and render a fair and impartial
        verdict based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?” Only
        one prospective juror raised his hand. The district court asked him
        what his reason was. The prospective juror answered that he was
        an investor in Royal Caribbean. The district court replied, “You
        are. Okay. That’s easy. Thank you. You’re excused.” The district
        court again asked, “Anybody else? Think of any reason why you
        could not be fair and impartial?” No one on the panel responded.
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        21-13612               Opinion of the Court                          5

              The parties then selected the jury, with each party exercising
        several challenges. Eight jurors were selected in total. The jury
        was impaneled and sworn, and the district court gave the jury pre-
        liminary instructions.
                After opening statements, the district court dismissed the
        jury for the day. It then informed the parties and their lawyers that
        while the courtroom deputy was gathering the jurors’ information,
        “one of the jurors”—Juror Eight—“said that her niece worked for
        the Defendant.” The district court stated, “I don’t know that that’s
        disqualifying because I did ask is there anything that you—have any
        reason to think that you might not be fair and impartial in this case”
        and explained that it was “considering what to do about it.” Fyl-
        ling’s counsel suggested that the juror should be excused because
        she would likely “be reluctant to return any kind of significant ver-
        dict.” The district court responded, “If she thought it was going to
        put them out of business, that would be one thing. I doubt that
        this case is significant as it is to put them out of business.” Ulti-
        mately, the district court advised the parties that it would likely
        “wait until the end of the case and if we have still eight jurors, ex-
        cuse her as an alternate.” “[I]f we have eight,” the district court
        reasoned, “I would not have a problem with excusing her and tell-
        ing her that she was an alternate all along. But if we had six, I think
        that she’s covered herself by her answers to the questions.”
               The parties tried the case to the jury for ten days. On the
        ninth day of trial, the district court informed the parties that it had
        changed its mind about Juror Eight’s fitness to deliberate,
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13612

        reasoning that “she has indicated that she could be fair.” It also
        observed that even though, “[a]dmittedly, [Fylling] might have
        used a peremptory challenge on her,” Fylling “had already used all
        of [her] peremptory challenges, long before we got to this juror.”
        When Fylling’s counsel protested that Fylling could not have
        known about Juror Eight’s niece when exercising her challenges,
        the district court reiterated that Juror Eight’s niece’s employment
        did not justify her removal from the jury, reasoning that any ver-
        dict “is not going to break Royal Caribbean and therefore, her niece
        is not likely to get fired.” Royal Caribbean, for its part, emphasized
        that Juror Eight had indicated that she could be fair and impartial
        in response to the district court’s questions. The district court
        agreed, stating that any family relationship to the parties is “cov-
        ered by asking [jurors] if they could be fair and impartial in the
        case.” Juror Eight remained on the jury and participated in delib-
        erations.
               The jury returned a verdict soon after being instructed. It
        found that both Royal Caribbean and Fylling were negligent. More
        specifically, it found that Fylling’s negligence accounted for ninety
        percent of her damage and Royal Caribbean’s negligence ac-
        counted for ten percent. As for damages, the jury determined that
        Fylling suffered $750,000 in non-economic damages, but—in light
        of the ninety-percent comparative-negligence finding—awarded
        Fylling only $75,000.
               The district court entered judgment in accordance with the
        verdict. Fylling timely appealed.
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        21-13612                    Opinion of the Court                               7

                           II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review a district court’s decision on whether to dismiss
        a juror for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brown, 40 F.3d
        1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2021). The abuse of discretion standard allows
        “a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does
        not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Kelly, 888
        F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989).
                                      III.   ANALYSIS
                Fylling raises two distinct jury-related challenges on appeal.
        First, Fylling argues that the district court’s voir dire questioning
        was insufficient to reveal the biases of prospective jurors, as shown
        by the post-voir dire revelation that Juror Eight’s niece worked for
        Royal Caribbean. Second, Fylling contends that even if the district
        court did not reversibly err in conducting voir dire, the district
        court abused its discretion when it declined to excuse, or at least
        individually question, Juror Eight after discovering her family con-
        nection to Royal Caribbean during trial. We address only Fylling’s
        second argument.1
                “One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact—
        ‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence
        before it.’” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,
        554 (1984) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). “Civil

        1 On appeal, Fylling also challenges one of the district court’s evidentiary rul-

        ings and its refusal to give two of Fylling’s proposed jury instructions. We do
        not address these issues, however, as we conclude that Fylling is entitled to a
        new trial.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13612

        juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must follow the law
        and act as impartial factfinders.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
        500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991). To that end, we have held that a district
        court must dismiss a juror for cause if the juror reveals actual bias
        or if bias is implied because of the juror’s relationship to a party.
        See United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1976). 2
                A corollary of the requirement to excuse biased jurors is the
        duty to investigate colorable claims of juror bias when they arise.
        When a district court becomes aware of potential juror bias, “the
        trial judge must develop the factual circumstances sufficiently to
        make an informed judgment” as to whether bias exists. United
        States v. Corey, 625 F.2d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 1980). Developing an
        adequate record sometimes requires “specific and direct question-
        ing” of an individual juror. Id. We have explained that “specific
        questioning is necessary” when, “under all of the circumstances
        presented, there is a reasonable possibility that a particular type of
        prejudice might have influenced the jury.” Berthiaume v. Smith, 875
        F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, “[b]road, vague questions
        of the venire will not suffice” when a reasonable possibility of bias
        develops. Corey, 625 F.2d at 707.
               To be sure, “the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies
        in the first instance with the trial judge.” United States v. Montgom-
        ery, 772 F.2d 733, 735 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v.

        2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

        this Court adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued
        prior to October 1, 1981. See id. at 1209.
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        21-13612                Opinion of the Court                            9

        United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981)). Pretrial voir dire is the pri-
        mary vehicle through which the district court can detect potential
        juror bias. Voir dire examination serves to protect against a partial
        trier of fact “by exposing possible biases, both known and un-
        known, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough, 464 U.S. at
        554. Accordingly, we have recognized that district courts have
        “ample discretion in determining how best to conduct voir dire.”
        Montgomery, 772 F.2d at 735 (quoting Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189);
        see also, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a) (affording district courts substan-
        tial discretion over the questioning of prospective jurors during
        voir dire); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (“Jury
        selection . . . is ‘particularly within the province of the trial judge.’”
        (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1976))).
               But a district court’s obligation to protect the right to an im-
        partial jury does not end when the jury is impaneled and sworn.
        For example, in United States v. Cannon, 987 F.3d 924 (11th Cir.
        2021), we reviewed a district court’s dismissal of a juror whose hair-
        dresser was the defendant’s wife. Id. at 936. The district court did
        not learn of the juror’s connection to the defendant until the sec-
        ond day of trial. Id. Still, the district court placed the juror under
        oath to question her about the relationship and invited both parties
        to participate and present authority. Id. at 945.
               Ultimately, the district court in Cannon dismissed the juror,
        and we affirmed. Id. In doing so, we observed that the juror had
        “told the district court the relationship would not impact her ability
        to perform her duties,” but we explained that “[d]espite her
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13612

        statement of no actual bias, the court was still required to determine
        if there would be implied bias due to the relationship.” Id. (empha-
        sis added). Thus, even when a “reasonable possibility” of juror bias
        is revealed after trial has begun, Berthiaume, 875 F.3d at 1358, the
        district court “must develop the factual circumstances sufficiently
        to make an informed judgment on the existence of actual bias,” Co-
        rey, 625 F.2d at 707; see also United States v. Gemar, 65 F.4th 777, 781
        (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that a district court abused its discretion by
        declining to individually question a juror when that juror’s poten-
        tial bias came to light after trial); Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475,
        484 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing a trial judge’s “responsibility to
        conduct an adequate investigation” when potential bias “surface[s]
        during . . . trial”).
               Fylling argues that Juror Eight’s revelation about her niece’s
        employment required either her removal or further investigation
        by the district court. Royal Caribbean responds that no further in-
        vestigation was necessary because, before learning about Juror
        Eight’s niece, the district court had asked the venire panel as a
        group whether there was any reason they could not be impartial,
        and Juror Eight did not raise her hand or speak. That broad ques-
        tion during voir dire, according to Royal Caribbean, reasonably as-
        sured Juror Eight’s impartiality.
                Royal Caribbean’s position conflicts with our precedents.
        We have held that “when a defendant is trying to prove presumed
        bias, the court has the duty to develop the facts fully enough so that
        it can make an informed judgment on the question of ‘actual’ bias.”
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        21-13612               Opinion of the Court                       11

        Nell, 526 F.2d at 1229 (citing United States v. Montelongo, 507 F.2d
        639, 641 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Cannon, 987 F.3d at 945 (applying
        this rule to potential bias discovered after trial began and noting
        that the district court “was . . . required” to determine whether ju-
        ror was impliedly biased). Thus, it follows that when a juror re-
        veals a familial connection to a party, the district court must—at
        minimum—develop a record adequate to rule on whether the ju-
        ror is actually or impliedly biased. See Corey, 625 F.2d at 707. And
        that task, in turn, requires “specific questioning.” Berthiaume, 875
        F.3d at 1358.
                Our predecessor court’s decision in United States v. Nell
        makes clear a district courts’ obligations when presented with con-
        crete facts suggesting potential bias. The Nell court reversed and
        remanded for a new trial because the district court failed to ade-
        quately question a potentially biased juror. Id. at 1230. The juror,
        Mr. Schane, knew who the defendant was and disclosed that his
        union previously “had a little problem” with the defendant’s union.
        Id. at 1228. The defendant’s counsel informed the court that the
        “little problem” was a riot prompted by a jurisdictional dispute be-
        tween the two unions, and the conflict between the organizations
        was an issue in the case. Id. The defense moved to strike Schane
        for cause and alternatively requested that the district court ques-
        tion Schane further about his place in the inter-union conflict, but
        the district court denied both requests. Id. The district court
        “never went beyond quite general questions regarding Schane’s ac-
        tual association with [the defendant]” and Schane insisted “on sev-
        eral different occasions that he believed he could be impartial.” Id.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   21-13612

        The district court denied the defendant’s for-cause challenge to
        Schane, forcing the defendant to use a peremptory challenge. Id.
        at 1229.
                 In reversing, the former Fifth Circuit first emphasized that
        “presumed bias depends heavily on the surrounding circum-
        stances,” so when a party attempts to establish presumed bias, “the
        [district] court has the duty to develop the facts fully enough so that
        it can make an informed judgment on the question of ‘actual’ bias.”
        Id. (citing Montelongo, 507 F.2d at 641). Our predecessor court un-
        derscored that “[t]his duty cannot be discharged solely by broad,
        vague questions once some potential area of actual prejudice has
        emerged.” Id. at 1229–30. Turning back to the record, the court
        explained that “in light of counsel’s proffered information about
        the close connection between Schane’s union and [the defendant]’s
        union . . . , we think the court erred in refusing to question Schane
        further about the particulars of these matters.” Id. at 1230. The
        court declined to “say that Schane was actually prejudiced” based
        on the record, but it noted that “further questioning might have
        elicited an admission or have revealed sufficient circumstances . . .
        so that bias could be presumed.” Id. The court therefore reversed
        because the district court “failed to explore Schane’s potential bias
        adequately.” Id.
               Here, too, the district court did not fulﬁll its investigative ob-
        ligation. As this Court has concluded, the district court’s discov-
        ery—after impaneling the jury—that Juror Eight’s niece worked for
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        21-13612                   Opinion of the Court                                13

        Royal Caribbean triggered its duty to investigate the potential bias.3
        See, e.g., Berthiaume, 875 F.3d at 1358. But the district court did not
        do so. It did not place Juror Eight under oath to ask her speciﬁc,
        direct questions about whether she could serve impartially despite
        her niece’s employment by Royal Caribbean. And the district court
        allowed Juror Eight to deliberate when it could have excused her
        for cause and still had enough jury members to return a verdict.
        See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) (“A jury must begin with at least 6 and no
        more than 12 members, and each juror must participate in the ver-
        dict unless excused under Rule 47(c).”). Permitting Juror Eight to
        remain on the jury without questioning her further was an abuse

        3 To be clear, the familial relationship at issue here is not a direct one between

        a juror and a party, but one between a juror and an employee of a party. But
        that fact does not eliminate the reasonable possibility that bias existed; it
        merely highlights the need to have a clear record to determine whether im-
        plied bias warranted removal. See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1532
        (11th Cir. 1984) (“A relationship between a juror and a defendant, albeit a re-
        mote one, can form the basis of a challenge for cause.”); United States v. Mitch-
        ell, 690 F.3d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that although “little case law ex-
        plores the outer boundary of the kinship category” of juror bias, some courts
        find “implied bias whenever a juror shares ‘any degree of kinship with a prin-
        cipal in a case’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d
        750, 754 (7th Cir. 2009))). Because the district court did not ask Juror Eight
        any specific questions about her relationship with her niece or her niece’s em-
        ployment, we have no way of knowing key facts that would confirm or dispel
        the reasonable possibility of bias. We cannot know, for example, whether Ju-
        ror Eight’s niece is compensated with stock options, works in Royal Carib-
        bean’s legal or risk management departments, or gives Juror Eight cruise dis-
        counts. Without this specific and direct questioning, we conclude that the
        district court abused its discretion in allowing Juror Eight to participate in de-
        liberations.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13612

        of discretion. See Nell, 526 F.2d at 1229–30 (“[T]he court has the
        duty to develop the facts fully enough so that it can make an in-
        formed judgment on the question of ‘actual’ bias. This duty can-
        not be discharged solely by broad, vague questions once some po-
        tential area of actual prejudice has emerged.” (citation omitted));
        Corey, 625 F.2d at 707 (“Because presumed bias depends entirely on
        surrounding circumstances, the trial judge must develop the factual
        circumstances suﬃciently to make an informed judgment on the
        existence of actual bias. Once a party has raised the spectre of po-
        tential actual prejudice, speciﬁc and direct questioning is necessary
        to ferret out those jurors who would not be impartial.”).
                In defense of its decision, the district court pointed to Juror
        Eight’s silence in response to its general question whether anyone
        could think of a reason they could not be impartial. Royal Carib-
        bean echoes this rationale. The problem is that our precedent in
        Nell rejected that exact argument. In Nell, the former Fifth Circuit
        admonished district courts entertaining claims of implied juror bias
        “to develop the facts fully enough so that [they] can make an in-
        formed judgment,” emphasizing that “[t]his duty cannot be dis-
        charged solely by broad, vague questions once some potential area
        of actual prejudice has emerged.” 526 F.2d at 1229–30. Indeed, we
        and our predecessor court have repeatedly rejected the view that
        general questions can satisfy a district court’s duty to explore po-
        tential juror bias. See, e.g., United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335,
        1350–51 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the obligation to explore
        potential bias is not discharged by the general question, “Is there
        any reason you cannot fairly and impartially try this case?” (quoting
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        21-13612                  Opinion of the Court                               15

        United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1972))), overruled
        on other grounds by United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1221–22
        (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Corey, 625 F.2d at 707 (“Once a party has
        raised the spectre of potential actual prejudice, specific and direct
        questioning is necessary to ferret out those jurors who would not
        be impartial. Broad, vague questions of the venire will not suf-
        fice.”); United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 268 & n.3 (5th Cir.
        1980) (holding that a district court’s voir dire questions, including
        one that asked the venire panel generally whether there was any
        reason they couldn’t render an impartial verdict, were “too
        broad”).4
               The district court also suggested that it could reasonably ex-
        pect Juror Eight to be impartial because Fylling was not seeking a
        verdict large enough to put Royal Caribbean out of business or
        cause Royal Caribbean to fire Juror Eight’s niece. Royal Caribbean
        makes a similar argument, asserting that “the employment of Juror
        [Eight’s] niece likely held little to no weight in Juror [Eight’s]
        mind.” Maybe, or maybe not—but on the record before us, we can
        only speculate about facts that might have affected Juror Eight’s
        decision-making. And such speculation is an inadequate substitute
        for a complete record. See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 976 (9th

        4 Accord Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We cannot

        say that an ambiguous silence by a large group of venire persons to a general
        question about bias is sufficient to support a finding of fact in the circum-
        stances of this case.” (quoting Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748, 753–54 (8th
        Cir. 1992))); Lewin, 467 F.2d at 1138 (general questions insufficient when po-
        tential source of actual prejudice is apparent).
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                   21-13612

        Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[A] judge investigating juror bias must find
        facts, not make assumptions . . . .”); United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64
        F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]t was the district court’s obligation to
        develop the relevant facts on the record, not merely presume
        them.”). Without a record speaking to the details of Juror Eight’s
        relationship with her niece or of her niece’s employment, we can-
        not assume that the district court’s failure to investigate was harm-
        less. See Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1112, 1128–29 (11th
        Cir. 1992) (reversing and remanding for a new trial because, among
        other reasons, the district court left “inadequately explored” an is-
        sue bearing on a juror’s ability to be impartial); Nell, 526 F.3d at
        1230 (“Doubts about the existence of actual bias should be resolved
        against permitting the juror to serve . . . .”).
               In sum, when it discovered during trial that one of the jurors
        had a niece who worked for Royal Caribbean, a party in the trial,
        the district court was obligated to investigate the matter further
        and exercise its discretion properly by developing “the facts fully
        enough so it [could] make an informed judgment on the question
        of actual bias.” Nell, 526 F.3d at 1229–30. Because the district court
        did not conduct such an inquiry, we hold that the district court
        abused its discretion by failing to make an informed judgment on
        the question of the Juror Eight’s bias and by allowing Juror Eight
        to deliberate over the objection of Fylling’s counsel.
                               IV.     CONCLUSION
             For all these reasons, we reverse the judgment below and
        remand for a new trial.
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        21-13612           Opinion of the Court                    17

              REVERSED AND REMANDED.