Court Opinion

ID: 9737811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:34:51.420589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.467579
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
Respectfully, I dissent. The trial court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant Wayne County because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie showing that any of her constitutional rights were violated as the result of a Wayne County policy or custom.
i
The threshold inquiry in any 42 USC 1983 action is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a particular right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Martinez v California, 444 US 277; 100 S Ct 553; 62 L Ed 2d 481 (1980), reh den 445 US 920 (1980).1 Section 1983 " 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’ ” Graham v Connor, 490 US 386, 393-394; 109 S Ct 1865; 104 L Ed 2d 443 *281(1989), quoting Baker v McCollan, 443 US 137, 144, n 3, 99 S Ct 2689; 61 L Ed 2d 433 (1979).
It is true that some federal courts have assumed that inmates and detainees have a constitutional right to privacy;2 however, the United States Supreme Court has neither formally acknowledged such a right nor explored its contours.3 Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that "[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights . . . .” Price v Johnston, 334 US 266, 285; 68 S Ct 1049; 92 L Ed 1356 (1948). One federal court, while recognizing such a right, has conceded that "[o]ne of the most important rights which is necessarily limited as a result of one’s incarceration is the right to be free of unwanted intrusions into one’s personal privacy.” Smith v Fairman, 678 F2d 52, 54 (CA 7, 1982), cert den 461 US 907 (1983).
*282In Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 537; 99 S Ct 1861; 60 L Ed 2d 447 (1979), the United States Supreme Court explained that a detainee’s rights may be restricted for less than compelling reasons. "Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility. A detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.” Id. at 546. "[Maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Id. Moreover, the Court stated,
the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. . . . "Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” [Id. at 547-548, quoting Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817, 827; 94 S Ct 2800; 41 L Ed 2d 495 (1974). Emphasis added.]
H
Whether Wayne County can be held liable under § 1983 on the record in this case must be determined against the backdrop of a substantial body *283of § 1983 jurisprudence. In the leading case of Monell v Dep’t of Social Services of New York City, 436 US 658, 694; 98 S Ct 2018; 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978), the United States Supreme Court ruled that § 1983 applies to a municipality only when "execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . /. .” The Court expressly rejected local governmental liability based on respondeat superior. The Court stated: "[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Id.
Because of the importance of distinguishing between direct and vicarious liability, the United States Supreme Court has required proof of a direct causal connection between a governmental policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 824-825, n 8; 105 S Ct 2427; 85 L Ed 2d 791 (1985) (requiring an "affirmative link” between municipal policy and the constitutional violation); Polk Co v Dodson, 454 US 312; 102 S Ct 445; 70 L Ed 2d 509 (1981) (the municipal policy must be a "moving force” behind constitutional deprivation). As Justice O’Connor has explained:
In some sense, of course, almost any injury inflicted by a municipal agent or employee ultimately can be traced to some municipal policy. Finding § 1983’s causation requirement satisfied by such a remote connection, however, would eviscerate MonelTs distinction . . . between vicarious liability and liability predicated on the municipality’s own constitutional violations. The limits on municipal liability imposed by § 1983 require more careful analysis, in each instance, of the municipal policy alleged in the case, and whether a jury *284reasonably could conclude that the city’s conduct was the moving force in bringing about the constitutional violation. [Springfield v Kibbe, 480 US 257, 267-268; 107 S Ct 1114; 94 L Ed 2d 293 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Emphasis in original.]
It is incumbent upon a § 1983 plaintiff to point to a particular policy or custom of the local governmental unit and to establish that the policy or custom has directly deprived the plaintiff of a specific constitutional right. To apply § 1983 to a municipality when the proofs show only that one of its employees has engaged in unconstitutional conduct would amount to the imposition of vicarious liability in violation of MonelFs instruction.
To be sure, courts have not limited § 1983 application to those municipal policies or customs which have been established by resolution or ordinance. But in the absence of such formal action, courts have required § 1983 plaintiffs to prove at least a pattern of violations from which it may be inferred that the conduct implements the municipality’s policy or custom. See, e.g., Fiacco v City of Rensselaer, 783 F2d 319 (CA 2, 1986), cert den 480 US 922 (1987) (multiple incidents are required for the finding of a policy or custom evincing deliberate indifference); Patzner v Burkett, 779 F2d 1363 (CA 8, 1985) (a municipality may be liable if it has notice of prior misbehavior); Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc, 771 F2d 194 (CA 7, 1985) (one intimidating phone call by the police department does not constitute a policy or custom); Languirand v Hayden, 717 F2d 220, 227 (CA 5, 1983), cert den 467 US 1215 (1984) (a municipal liability for failure to train requires "evidence at least of a pattern of similar incidents”); Wellington v Daniels, 717 F2d 932 (CA 4, 1983) (a failure to supervise only gives rise to § 1983 liability where there *285is a history of widespread abuse); Turpin v Mailet, 619 F2d 196 (CA 2, 1980), cert den 449 US 1016 (1980) (mere evidence that the police board of commissioners failed to discipline an officer in connection with a prior incident is insufficient to establish a pattern of harassment); Reed v Schneider, 612 F Supp 216 (ED NY, 1985) (one incident, although perhaps a constitutional violation, is insufficient to establish a municipal policy or custom); Giarrusso v Chicago, 539 F Supp 690 (ND Ill, 1982) (a mere conclusory allegation of the deprivation of a constitutional right on the basis of a single unconstitutional act is insufficient to impose municipal liability).
The principle which clearly emerges is that single or isolated incidents of unconstitutional conduct per se are insufficient to establish a custom or policy necessary to charge a local governmental unit with § 1983 liability.
The facts of this case are remarkably similar to facts encountered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Fisher v Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 690 F2d 1133 (CA 4, 1982). There, a pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 suit against the sheriff in charge of a county facility in which she was detained. Asserting deprivation of her constitutional right of privacy, the plaintiff complained that she was placed in a cell adapted for suicidal inmates and detainees in a section which also housed males. Because she was considered to be suicidal, all clothing, except her underpants, was taken away. It was her testimony that male deputies outside her cell made derogatory remarks concerning her appearance.
On appeal from a directed verdict for the sheriff, the court recognized that a pretrial detainee enjoys a
*286general right, constitutionally protected, not to be subjected by state action to involuntary exposure in a state of nakedness to members of the opposite sex unless that exposure was reasonably necessary in maintaining her otherwise legal detention. [Id. at 1142.]
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the directed verdict, ruling:
Only if the evidence showed that conduct directly causing the deprivation was done to effectuate an official policy or custom for which [the sheriff] was responsible could he be liable. . . . The evidence would not support such a finding.
This is obvious when attention is focussed on the specific deprivation charged. It is not . . . that [the plaintiff] was placed in a detention cell with her clothes removed following her feigned suicide attempt. This might well have been done in effectuation of a general policy respecting the treatment of such detainees for which [the sheriff] was responsible. Indeed, his own testimony probably established a willing acceptance of responsibility for such a policy. But the deprivation charged here was more narrowly the exposure to male viewing that was alleged then to have ensued. There is nothing in the evidence either directly or indirectly supporting any determination that such an exposure was also in keeping with established policy or developed custom chargeable to [the sheriff]. Instead, all the evidence on the point was to the contrary: that the policy was to protect a detainee such as [the plaintiff] whose clothing had been removed under these circumstances from indiscriminate viewing by any but female custodians. That this policy may have been violated on this occasion by unauthorized subordinate conduct —or by sheer accident beyond the control of any official—cannot be charged to [the sheriff] under developed § 1983 doctrine. . . .
For this reason, the district court did not err in *287directing a verdict in favor of the defendant ... on this federal claim. [Id. at 1143. Emphasis added.]
In the case before us, the claim of this plaintiff is not based on the fact that she was placed in a women’s ward in a cell without clothing except for her underpants. The precaution of removing her clothing was taken upon order of the jail psychologist after plaintiff’s sister called and warned that plaintiff had threatened suicide. Following an examination, the psychologist found plaintiff to be potentially suicidal.4
Plaintiff contends in her brief in this Court that she is entitled to § 1983 relief because Wayne County "through institutional policies, customs and high official decisions allowed the Plaintiff to be viewed by men and other prisoners without any justification.” Specifically, plaintiff asserts that her right of privacy was abridged because (1) a male deputy was among those present when her clothing, except underpants, was taken from her; (2) a male janitor stood in front of her cell on several occasions; and (3) a group of medical students, which included males, toured the facility and walked past her cell.
Under § 1983 jurisprudence, plaintiff may succeed in imposing liability on Wayne County only if she has shown that it was the policy or custom of Wayne County to permit such acts. However, this record is utterly devoid of any evidence that Wayne County had such a policy or custom, that it had knowledge of such acts, that it encouraged *288such acts, that it permitted such acts, or that there was a prior pattern of such acts.
hi
The lead opinion leans heavily on City of Canton v Harris, 489 US 378; 109 S Ct 1197; 103 L Ed 2d 412 (1989), wherein the United States Supreme Court recently said that "the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id., p 388.
The Court made clear that "[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a 'deliberate’ or 'conscious’ choice by a municipality—a 'policy’ as defined by our prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.” Id., p 389. Further, the Court cautioned that, standing alone, a local governmental unit is not automatically liable under § 1983 if one of its employees happens "to apply the policy in an unconstitutional manner, for liability would then rest on respondeat superior.” Id., p 387.
In her instructive concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor pointed to circumstances where failure to train might constitute a policy or custom sufficient to impose municipal liability. First, she stated:
Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied. Only then can it be said that the municipality has made *289" 'a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from among various alternatives.’ ” [Id., p 396 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Citations omitted, emphasis added.]
It cannot be said that Wayne County had actual or constructive notice prior to plaintiff’s incarceration in 1976 of the constitutional privacy right which plaintiff now claims. The lead opinion asserts, upon the basis of its view of the record, that "the jury could have found not only that policymakers failed to instruct employees in the constitutional limitations on the stripping and exposure of inmates, but also to formulate any policy in this regard.” Ante, p 262. For support, the lead opinion cites several federal court decisions;5 however, it is significant that each of those cases which addressed an inmate’s or detainee’s alleged right of privacy was decided after the period during which plaintiff was housed at the Wayne County Jail.6 Since such a constitutional right was not widely recognized prior to 1976, it cannot be said that Wayne County had actual or constructive knowledge that the conduct alleged would violate *290a constitutional right of detainees such as plaintiff.7
Justice O’Connor further noted in Canton:
The claim in this case—that police officers were inadequately trained in diagnosing the symptoms of emotional illness—falls far short of the kind of "obvious” need for training that would support a finding of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights on the part of the city. As the Court’s opinion observes, . . . this Court has not yet addressed the precise nature of the obligations that the Due Process Clause places upon the police to seek medical care for pretrial detainees who have been physically injured while being apprehended by the police. . . . There are thus no clear constitutional guideposts for municipalities in this area .... [Id., pp 396-397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Emphasis added.]
Similarly the United States Supreme Court has not yet formally recognized an inmate or detainee’s constitutional right of privacy or examined the precise nature of the obligation that the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision may impose upon local governments with respect to the privacy of inmates and detainees. Such a right had not been recognized by this Court, nor had it been recognized by the vast majority of federal courts at the time that this plaintiff was detained in the Wayne County Jail. Thus, at the time of plaintiff’s detention, there were no "clear constitutional guideposts” requiring the county to train its employees in the manner *291that the lead opinion, with keen hindsight, now suggests they should have been trained.8
Justice O’Connor also indicated that failure to train might amount to a custom or policy where
it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations involving the exercise of police discretion. In such cases, the need for training may not be obvious from the outset, but a pattern of constitutional violations could put the municipality on notice that its officers confront the particular situation on a regular basis, and that they often react in a manner contrary to constitutional requirements. [Id., p 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Emphasis added.]
Under this analysis, again, plaintiff must demonstrate a "pattern of violations from which a kind of ’tacit authorization’ by [county] policymakers *292can be inferred.” Id. As already noted, the record is devoid of any evidence of a pattern of violations from which it might be inferred that Wayne County was aware of and acquiesced in the conduct about which plaintiff complains.
iv
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege, and the proofs do not show, that any specific policy or custom on the part of Wayne County was in effect which could provide the basis for her § 1983 action. Furthermore, plaintiff has not alleged or proven that there was inadequate training of personnel at the Wayne County Jail prior to plaintiff’s incarceration. Indeed, the only evidence of policy or custom presented at trial strongly demonstrates that the conduct of which plaintiff complains, if it occurred, in fact violated the policy or custom then in effect at the jail.
While conceding that there was no written policy, Wayne County Jail Administrator Frank Wilkerson testified that it was the custom at the jail to have female employees handle female inmates. He stated that it was not normal, nor was it regular or ordinary, for a male janitor to be on the fourth floor while females were unclothed. While admitting that staff shortages might necessitate the presence of a male janitor, Wilkerson’s testimony was that he insisted upon a matron announcing to inmates the impending presence of a male and accompanying any male onto the floor.
Wilkerson’s testimony was corroborated by Sergeant M. A. Clipper, a female who was the command officer of her shift in the women’s division in Ward 411 for more than eighteen years. Moreover, Sgt. Clipper testified that she worked the day shift between June 8 and June 12, 1976, the days which *293plaintiff was housed at the Wayne County Jail. Sgt. Clipper testified that, in her experience, males were not allowed in Ward 411. The only exceptions were maintenance and medical personnel. Sgt. Clipper said that the routine or habit at the jail in regard to males coming on the floor included (1) an announcement to the inmates that males are entering the ward, (2) a female member of Sgt. Clipper’s staff accompanying the male onto the ward, and (3) the staff member preceding the male to make sure everything was all right. She further testified that although male janitors were permitted on the ward, it was standard practice to announce their presence and to accompany them whenever possible. Sgt. Clipper also testified that it would have been a departure from practice and custom at the Wayne County Jail for a male deputy to be present when clothing was removed from a female inmate.
Wilkerson testified that while student tours of the women’s floor were allowed, it was policy that such a group was not permitted to walk by a cell where an unclothed female was housed. He testified that all such tours were required to be approved by him, that he kept records of such tours, and that he searched his records and found no record of a tour during the days when plaintiff was in the Wayne County Jail. Wilkerson’s testimony concerning such tours was corroborated by Sgt. Clipper.
Of course, it is recognized that the posture of this case is such that the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Nevertheless, such a standard should not blind us to the fact that the only evidence relating to policy or custom presented in this case supports the conclusion that it was the policy or custom of the jail to prevent the very acts of which this plaintiff complains. *294Indeed, if the acts occurred, they violated the policy and custom then in place at the jail.
v
In City of Canton, supra, the Supreme Court stated:
That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program. ... It may be, for example, that an otherwise sound program has occasionally been negligently administered. [Id., pp 390-391. Emphasis added, citations omitted.]
The evidence in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, reveals several egregious but isolated incidents. The record indicates, at worst, that on this particular occasion a sound program was negligently administered. Under the analysis provided by City of Canton, this is not sufficient to impose § 1983 liability on Wayne County. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Griffin, J.

 Although it is true, as the lead opinion points out, that defendant did not press the argument that Rushing lacked a protected liberty interest, a constitutional right cannot be created by concession. Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 378 Mich 689, 705; 148 NW2d 767 (1967) (a court is not bound by concessions of counsel on questions of law). See also 73 Am Jur 2d, Stipulations, § 5, p 539.

 In one case cited by the lead opinion, Fisher v Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 690 F2d 1133 (CA 4, 1982), the court cites Lee v Downs, 641 F2d 1117 (CA 4, 1981), for authority that inmates have a constitutional right to privacy. However, the court in Fisher noted that the source of such a constitutional right was not identified in Lee.

 In Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520; 99 S Ct 1861; 60 L Ed 2d 447 (1979), the United States Supreme Court merely assumed, without deciding, that pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to privacy. Moreover, the federal courts which hold that inmates and detainees have a constitutional privacy right are in disarray as to what does and does not constitute a violation of the right. See, e.g., Smith v Fairman, 678 F2d 52 (CA 7, 1982), cert den 461 US 907 (1983) (limited frisk searches of males by female guards do not violate the constitutional right of privacy); Davis v Butcher, 853 F2d 718 (CA 9, 1988) (an inmate’s constitutional right of privacy was not violated when the state corrections officer exhibited nude photographs of the inmate’s wife to other inmates and made derogatory remarks to the desk sergeant regarding his wife’s anatomy); Bagley v Watson, 579 F Supp 1099 (D Or, 1983) (clothed pat-down frisk searches and visual observation of male inmates by female guards does not violate an inmate’s right to privacy); Hodges v Klein, 412 F Supp 896 (D NJ, 1976) (requiring anal inspections of an inmate when entering or leaving an institution or following visits with friends or relatives do not violate the inmate’s right to privacy). Cf. Woods v White, 689 F Supp 874 (D Wis, 1988) (an inmate infected with aids has a constitutional right to privacy with respect to his medical records).

 As the lead opinion has explained, three months prior to plaintiff’s detention, a three-judge panel of the Wayne Circuit Court had issued an order requiring removal from potentially suicidal inmates of all clothing, except brief underwear bottoms. See ante, pp 252-253, n 1.

 While these cases can be read for the broad proposition that inmates have a general constitutional right of privacy, the recognition of such a right is not universal. See, e.g., Bagley v Watson, 579 F Supp 1099 (D Or, 1983) (noting that since the United States Supreme Court in Bell v Wolfish, supra, had held that body cavity searches of detainees were constitutional, clothed pat-down frisk searches and visual observation of males by female guards were constitutional); Griffin v Dep’t of Corrections, 654 F Supp 690 (ED Mich, 1982) (inmates did not possess protected privacy rights under the federal constitution against being viewed while naked by correctional officers of the opposite sex); Chapman v Rhodes, 434 F Supp 1007 (SD Ohio, 1977), rev’d on other grounds 452 US 337; 101 S Ct 2392; 69 L Ed 2d 59 (1981) (convicted maximum security inmates have no constitutional right of privacy).

 The lead opinion cites only one case, York v Story, 324 F2d 450 (CA 9, 1963), decided prior to plaintiff’s detention. However, York dealt with the privacy rights of a private citizen rather than the rights of an inmate or detainee.

 Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in 1978, two years after plaintiff was detained at the Wayne County Jail, that the United States Supreme Court had provided little specific guidance in defining privacy rights. Plante v Gonzalez, 575 F2d 1119, 1134 (CA 5, 1978), cert den 439 US 1129 (1979).

 It should not be overlooked that plaintiff did not raise the issue of defendant’s failure to train jail personnel either in the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff presented no evidence, whatsoever, that defendant either inadequately trained or altogether failed to train its employees. Although plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in 1977, an amended complaint was filed in 1981, the same year in which the trial occurred. By 1981, several federal courts had accepted the theory that § 1983 liability could be predicated upon a failure to train. Therefore, liability based upon a failure to train was not unknown or unrecognized at the time Rushing came to trial. See, e.g., Reeves v City of Jackson, 608 F2d 644 (CA 5, 1979); Owens v Haas, 601 F2d 1242, 1246 (CA 2, 1979); McClelland v Facteau, 610 F2d 693 (CA 10, 1979); Burton v Waller, 502 F2d 1261, 1285 (CA 5, 1974), cert den 420 US 964 (1975); Beverly v Morris, 470 F2d 1356 (CA 5, 1972); Carter v Carlson, 447 F2d 358, 365 (CA DC, 1971), rev’d on other grounds sub nom District of Columbia v Carter, 409 US 418; 93 S Ct 602; 34 L Ed 2d 613 (1973); Popow v City of Margate, 476 F Supp 1237, 1246 (D NJ, 1979); Leite v Providence, 463 F Supp 585, 590-591 (D RI, 1978).
In the past, this Court has been reluctant to review questions not pressed and passed upon in the lower courts. See, e.g., Poelman v Payne, 332 Mich 597, 605; 52 NW2d 229 (1952), and cases cited therein. Due to plaintiff’s failure to pursue a theory of liability predicated upon Wayne County’s failure to train, this Court is, in effect, saying to plaintiff "here, you missed a potential theory of liability—have another go at it.”