Court Opinion

ID: 9713974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:28:03.199059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.484034
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 I disagree with the Majority Opinion’s interpretation of newly-amended Pa. R.A.P.1925 permitting a criminal defense attorney’s filing of an untimely court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. The result of the Majority’s Opinion is that there is no longer a mandatory time limit for criminal defense attorneys to respond to a trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order. In fact, the Majority’s Opinion now gives defense criminal attorneys the power to unilaterally extend time requirements in filing Rule 1925(b) statements. Thus, the Majority’s Opinion is an open invitation for attorneys to disregard the twenty-one day time limit expressly provided in the newly-amended Rule.
¶ 2 From a practical standpoint, there is now no consequence when a criminal defense attorney files a late statement. Although the statement in the case sub judi-ee is only one day late, attorneys no doubt will begin to file statements whenever they choose, even well beyond the twenty-one day period. The delay in the administration of justice which will result from the late filings, as well as the unfairness to the pro se appellants, and to the Commonwealth, who must comply with the twenty-one day limit, and to appellants who properly seek an extension of time, is simply unacceptable. Those who follow the Rules will now be subservient to those who do not.
¶ 3 As Castillo1 indicates, the central purpose of Rule 1925 is to have timely, consistent administration of the Rules. The Majority’s Opinion does not further the goals set forth by our Supreme Court regarding the application of Rule 1925, and in fact, frustrates the goals.
¶ 4 As will be discussed infra, I specifically conclude (1) the bright-line waiver rules established in Lord,2 Castillo, and *438their progeny, have not been superseded by newly-amended Rule 1925; (2) the Majority’s interpretation of newly-amended Rule 1925 does not comport with the Rules of Statutory Construction,3 and in fact, contradicts, expands, and renders meaningless the plain language of Rule 1925; and (3) the Majority’s Opinion is anything but “fair” and creates, not prevents, “paradoxical results.”
¶ 5 Therefore, I would affirm Appellant Michael Burton’s judgment of sentence on the basis his issues have been waived due to his defense counsel’s obvious failure to file a timely court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. In particular, I find that newly-amended Rule 1925 does not supersede Castillo.
¶ 6 In Lord, regarding the pre-amended version of Rule 1925, our Supreme Court eliminated any aspect of discretion and established a bright-line rule for waiver under Rule 1925(b). Specifically, the Supreme Court held that any issues not raised in a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived on appeal. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted the following:
The absence of a trial court opinion poses a substantial impediment to meaningful and effective appellate review. Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate process.
Lord, 553 Pa. at 419, 719 A.2d at 308.
¶ 7 Thereafter, in Castillo, our Supreme Court was called upon to reconsider its bright-line rule in Lord as it relates to the filing of untimely court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statements.4 Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether courts have discretion to accept untimely filed Rule 1925(b) statements. In reaffirming the bright-line rule announced in Lord, the Supreme Court held that, when ordered to do so, an appellant must file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement and courts do not have the discretion to accept untimely filed statements. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that:
[T]he Lord ... rule remains necessary to insure trial judges in each appealed case the opportunity to opine upon the issues which the appellant intends to raise, and thus provide appellate courts with records amendable to meaningful appellate review. This firm rule avoids the situation that existed prior to Lord where trial courts were forced to anticipate which issues the appellant might raise and appellate courts had to determine “whether they could conduct a ‘meaningful review’ despite an appellant’s failure to file a Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement or to include certain issues within a filed statement.” Moreover, the system provides litigants with clear rules regarding what is necessary for compliance and certainty of result for failure to comply.
Castillo, 585 Pa. at 402, 888 A.2d at 779-80 (citation omitted). That is, the Supreme Court concluded that when an appellant, without explanation or leave of court, files an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, the waiver of all claims on appeal is the appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court concluded that such a bright-line rule was necessary to guarantee predictable consequences for all litigants regarding the failure to file a timely statement,5 placed a *439minor burden upon appellants, and focused the trial court’s attention upon the drafting of beneficial Rule 1925(a) opinions.
¶ 8 Acknowledging that waiver for the filing of an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement appeared to be harsh, the Supreme Court accepted as a remedy “the ability of criminal defendants to seek relief by challenging the effectiveness of their counsel” Castillo, 585 Pa. at 402, 888 A.2d at 780. Moreover, the Supreme Court indicated that “the severity of the sanction is less burdensome due to the minimal requirements for compliance under Rule 1925(b) and the trial court’s demonstrated willingness to grant extensions to proactive appellants prior to the expiration of the filing period.” Castillo, 585 Pa. at 402-03, 888 A.2d at 780 (footnote omitted).
¶ 9 Subsequent to Castillo, under the pre-amended version of Rule 1925, the appellate courts did not hesitate to find all issues to be waived when an appellant filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement without leave of court. See Commonwealth v. Hooks, 921 A.2d 1199 (Pa.Super.2007) (indicating all issues are waived when an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement is filed; however, such untimeliness will be overlooked if the appellant did not receive proper notice of the order); Commonwealth v. Williams, 920 A.2d 887 (Pa.Super.2007) (noting that generally all issues are waived when an untimely statement is filed; however, legality of sentencing claims are an exception to the general rule); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 900 A.2d 936 (Pa.Super.2006) (extending Castillo’s prohibition to untimely filed supplemental Rule 1925(b) statements without leave of court).
¶ 10 In the case sub judiee, there is no doubt that, if Appellant were subject to the pre-amended version of Rule 1925, this Court would conclude that Appellant’s untimely filed Rule 1925(b) statement results in waiver of all of his claims on appeal pursuant to Castillo and its progeny. However, as the Majority acknowledges, the amended version of Rule 1925, which became effective July 25, 2007, is applicable to the case sub judiee, and the issue which this Court must resolve is whether Castillo’s bright-line waiver rule has been superseded by newly-amended Rule 1925, at least as it relates to untimely statements filed by criminal defense attorneys. Contrary to the Majority, I conclude that Castillo’s waiver rule remains valid under the recent amendments.
¶ 11 In examining the Explanatory Note and text of the amended Rule, I find no evidence that the Supreme Court intended to supersede its opinion in Castillo. First, if it intended to do so, the Supreme Court would have included in the Explanatory Note a clear reference to Castillo and the fact that untimely filed statements would no longer result in waiver of all claims on appeal. Instead, regarding remanding in criminal cases, the Supreme Court begins its Explanatory Note for Subdivision (c)(3) with the plain statement that “[t]his paragraph allows an appellate court to remand in criminal cases only when the appellant has completely failed to respond to an order to file a Statement.” While the Supreme Court then makes reference to remanding when “no timely Statement” is filed and served, the Supreme Court cites to Halley6 and West,7 which discuss the *440complete lack of filing of a Rule 1925(b) statement.8
¶ 12 Moreover, the text of the newly-amended Rule continues to require appellants to file their court-ordered statements within a particular time period, which has been enlarged from fourteen to twenty-one days, and provides a procedure, which is to be followed if counsel desires an extension of time or requires relief nunc pro tunc. Subdivision (b)(3)(iv), regarding the contents of a trial court’s order, expressly states that the trial court shall advise appellants in the Rule 1925(b) order that “any issue not properly included in the statement timely filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be deemed waived.”
¶ 13 If the Supreme Court did not intend waiver to result in the face of an untimely filed statement, then it would have been unnecessary to include a time limit, procedures to be followed when faced with an inability to meet the time limit, and a warning to appellants that issues not included in a timely filed and served statement will result in waiver. By including these provisions, the Supreme Court signaled its intent that the Pennsylvania courts strictly enforce the time limitations, which are set forth in the amended Rule. Simply put, to hold otherwise would render meaningless substantial portions of newly-amended Rule 1925(b). See 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions.”).
¶ 14 Also, while I am mindful that Rule 1925(c) sets forth instances under which the appellate courts may remand a matter instead of finding waiver, I conclude that such remand is unnecessary when an appellant has clearly filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement without leave of court. Of particular relevance to this case are Subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(3). Subdivision (c)(1) discusses the fact an appellate court may remand if there is a question as to whether a statement has been filed and/or served or timely filed and/or served.9 Notably, in choosing the language for Subdivision (c)(1), the Supreme Court took steps to separately set forth the complete lack of filing from an untimely filing. Also, Subdivision (c)(3) explicitly indicates that:
*441If an appellant in a criminal case was ordered to file a Statement and failed to do so, such that the appellate court is convinced that counsel has been per se ineffective, the appellate court shall remand for the filing of a Statement nunc pro tunc and for the preparation and filing of an opinion by the judge,
(emphasis added).
¶ 15 The clear, plain language of Subdivision (c)(3) anticipates the complete failure of appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement such that it is necessary to remand due to trial counsel being per se ineffective. Not only does the language “and failed to do so” support this conclusion, but the fact the remedy is a remand for the filing of a statement nunc pro tunc supports this conclusion. That is, if the Supreme Court intended untimely filed statements to fall within the purview of Subdivision (c)(3), it would not have stated the remedy as a “remand” for a statement, since a statement, albeit untimely filed, already exists. To hold otherwise would be to read a meaning and purpose into Subdivision (c)(3), which was not explicitly stated by the Supreme Court. See 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).
¶ 16 In sum, prior to the pre-amended Rule, the appellate courts treated differently situations where criminal defense attorneys filed statements late and those where no statement was filed. While the Supreme Court clearly intended to relax the time limit under Rule 1925(b), I disagree that it intended to totally eliminate the time limit for certain litigants. Also, while I agree with the Majority that the Supreme Court intended to provide some leniency in adopting the amended Rule, I conclude this goal was achieved by enlarging the time period from fourteen to twenty-one days. I would find that neither the text nor the Explanatory Note to newly-amended Rule 1925 includes a clear mandate from our Supreme Court indicating that it intended to nullify Castillo or otherwise disregard waiver when an appellant files an untimely court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. As such, I disagree with the Majority reading such a result into the text of and Explanatory Note to newly-amended Rule 1925. See Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780 (“[W]e specifically voice our disapproval of prior decisions of the intermediate courts to the extent they have created exceptions to Lord and have addressed issues that should have been deemed waived.”) (citations omitted).
¶ 17 Moreover, I conclude that Castillo’s policy reasons for requiring waiver in the face of an untimely filed statement, without leave of court, remain viable, and I conclude the Majority’s approach will create uncertainty and “paradoxical results” when it is applied to various waiver situations. The Majority has interpreted the twenty-one day time period to be discretionary in certain situations and has now held that, no matter when a criminal defense attorney responds to a court’s 1925(b) order, the trial court is obligated to accept that statement as being timely filed and draft a Rule 1925(a) opinion. If the trial court does not accept the statement, then this Court will deem the statement to be timely and remand for the preparation of a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Such a holding causes an additional burden upon the trial court, will lead to judicial delay, and creates inconsistency for those appellants who follow the mandates of Rule 1925.
¶ 18 Regarding fairness and consistency, I note that, pursuant to the Majority’s Opinion, when a criminal defense attorney files a late Rule 1925(b) statement, this Court is to overlook the untimeliness and *442not find waiver because counsel is “per se ” ineffective. However, such a theory would not apply when a criminal defendant is proceeding pro se on appeal or the Commonwealth files an appeal, and thus, waiver is the result for the pro se appellant’s or Commonwealth’s late filing.
¶ 19 Moreover, recently, in Commonwealth v. Hopfer, 965 A.2d 270 (Pa.Super.2009), a pro se criminal appellant filed a timely petition seeking an extension of time, and the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, this Court specifically held that, when an appellant timely files for an enlargement or extension of time within which to file his Rule 1925(b) statement, the trial court must explain why it finds that good cause was not shown before it may deny the request. Integral to our analysis was the conclusion that, if no good cause is shown, the trial court may properly deny the request and not accept a late Rule 1925(b) statement. Under such a scenario, an appellant, who is pro se or represented by counsel, attempting to comply with the mandates and time limits of Rule 1925(b), will be treated more harshly than a represented appellant who’s criminal defense attorney does not seek an extension of time and just files a late statement, without leave of court.
¶ 20 In sum, I disagree with the Majority’s interpretation of newly-amended Rule 1925. The Majority’s holding harkens back to the time prior to Castillo when uncertainty and unfairness existed. The Supreme Court intended to continue to have a bright-line rule regarding timeliness, while creating a limited exception when defense counsel completely abandons his client by failing to respond in any manner to the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order. This result achieves the desired goals set forth by our Supreme Court, comports with the Rules of Statutory Construction, and leads to the most fair and just result. Therefore, for all of the reasons discussed supra, I would find Appellant’s issues to be waived in the case sub judice, and I would affirm his judgment of sentence on this basis.

. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005).

. Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (1998).

. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1901-1991.

. When Castillo was decided, the prior version of Rule 1925 was in effect.

.Prior to Castillo, there was an inconsistency in the treatment of untimely filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements. Some trial court judges would refuse to accept untimely filed state*439ments, and thus decline to draft an opinion addressing the merits of the issues presented in the untimely statements, while other trial court judges would accept the untimely filed statements and draft an opinion addressing the merits.

. Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005).

. Commonwealth v. West, 883 A.2d 654 (Pa.Super.2005).

. Specifically, in Halley, the Supreme Court held that, in a post-conviction case, a petitioner need not demonstrate actual prejudice when seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights due to counsel's ineffectiveness in failing entirely to file a court-ordered Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that the failure to file a statement constituted a constructive denial of counsel in that the direct appeal was not "perfected." Therefore, counsel was deemed to be per se ineffective such that the petitioner’s direct appeal rights were reinstated without regard to the merits of the underlying substantive issues. Following Halley, in West, after counsel filed a petition seeking an extension of time, counsel failed to file any statement raising any issues. On direct appeal, the defendant alleged counsel was ineffective in entirely failing to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. This Court concluded that counsel was per se ineffective such that the ineffectiveness claim could be addressed on direct appeal and found the remedy to be a remand for the filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. This Court indicated that "[t]he Halley rule applies only where counsel has completely failed to file a substantive Concise Statement, resulting in waiver of all issues.” West, 883 A.2d at 658 (footnote and citation omitted).

. In the case sub judice, based on the record before this Court, there is no question as to whether the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was untimely filed. Moreover, aside from indicating he attached a copy of the court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement to his brief, Appellant has made no allegations and has provided no explanation regarding the untimely filing of his statement. Also, aside from noting the issue raised in Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, the trial court has raised no concerns regarding the circumstances surrounding Appellant's untimely filing.