Court Opinion

ID: 9673751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:17:44.236483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.908253
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin,
joined by Justices Sharp and Taylor, dissenting.
I am of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court on jury findings should be affirmed.
We start out with certain well-settled legal principles:
1. If there is any evidence in the record to support the jury’s findings we must affirm the cause. Texas Power & Light Co. v. Doering Hotel Co., 139 Texas, 351, 162 S. W. (2d) 938 (2) ; Schelb v. Sparenberg, 133 Texas 17, 124 S. W. (2d) 322; Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. State, 122 Texas 530, 62 S. W. (2d) 107; Merrell et ux. v. Dorothy Hume Timmons et al., 138 Texas 250, 158 S. W. (2d) 278; Beer v. Landman, 88 Texas 450, 31 *532S. W. 805; 11 Tex. Jur. p. 871, Courts, sec. 113, and authorities there cited.
2. On error to review judgment of Court of Civil Appeals affirming trial court’s judgment, Supreme Court must consider all testimony in light most favorable to support trial court’s judgment. Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 137 Texas 399, 153 S. W. (2d) 953; Henderson v. Shell Oil Co., 146 Texas 467, 208 S. W. (2d) 863(8) ; 3 B Tex. Jur. p. 443, Appeals Error sec. 935, and authorities there cited.
“The holding of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals that the undisputed evidence showed the train crew to be the servants of the construction company, and within their exclusive dominion, requires us, in reviewing the correctness of its decision, to search the record for, and give consideration to, the facts and circumstances in the record which are most favorable to the contention of the plaintiff in error on the question as to whether there is evidence of probative force tending to show that the train crew whose negligence was complained of were the agents and servants of the defendant in error, or the joint servants of it and the said Kenefick-Hammond-Quigley Construction Company. The jury has found favorably to the contention of the plaintiff in error upon this question. If there is any evidence to support their finding, the case should not have been reversed and rendered against the plaintiff in error. To determine this question it is not now' essential or appropriate to present the evidence herein which is favorable to the opposite contention, the inquiry being directed entirely to a determination whether there was any evidence to support the verdict of the jury.” (Emphasis ours.) Manning v. Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co., 181 S. W. 687.
3. It is the jury’s province to weigh all of the evidence and to decide what credence should be given to the whole or to any part of the testimony of each witness. The jury are the judges not only of the facts proved, but of the inferences to be drawn therefrom, provided such inferences are not unreasonable. Lockley v. Page, 142 Texas 594, 180 S. W. (2d) 616; Sid Katz, Inc. v. Walsh & Burney Co. et al., 142 Texas 232, 177 S. W. (2d) 49; Stephenville, N. & S. T. R. Co. v. Shelton (Tex. Com. App.) 208 S. W. 915, 916; 3 B Tex. Jur. p. 435 top of page; 36 Tex. Dig. p. 204, Trial, sec. 142, and authorities there cited.
Respondent relied upon three grounds of negligence for a recovery, the first one was that the operator of the bus was negligent in permitting the fellow passenger to take his port*533able radio aboard the bus with him, although the operator “* * * at the time realized and appreciated or by the exercise of even ordinary care should have realized and appreciated that there was danger that the said passenger might place the said portable radio in the rack over the heads of other passengers and that the said portable radio might, as it did, fall from said rack and strike one of defendant’s passengers and inflict serious and painful injuries upon them, as it did.
The duty owing by the carrier to the passenger resulting from the falling of baggage from racks is well stated as follows:
“A railroad company is bound to exercise more than a reasonable degree of care in protecting its passengers from the risk of baggage falling from racks provided for its stowage. The furnishing of racks for the purpose of stowing hand baggage invites passengers to use them to the extent of the apparent limit of safety and is generally viewed as imposing on the railroad, when the racks are so used, the duty of operating its trains so as not to endanger passengers sitting in the seats underneath the racks. However, the viligance and caution of the carrier in this respect are obviously proportioned to the hazards of the particular situation.” 10 Am. Jur. p. 198, Carriers, sec. 1310.
“The true rule, as laid down by this court, is that given in the case of International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Halloren, 53 Texas 46, 37 Am. Rep. 744, as follows:
“ ‘Railroad companies, however, are not insurers of the safety of their passengers further than could be required by the exercise of such a high degree of foresight as to possible dangers, and such a high degree of prudence in guarding against them, as would be used by very cautious, prudent, and competent persons under similar circumstances.’ (Citing numerous authorities.) * * * (Emphasis ours.)
“In no case called to our attention has it been held by any appellate court that the degree of care defined in the Halloren case is incorrect, and we are convinced that the definition there given is the accepted one in this state.” Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 113 Texas 472, 260 S. W. 561, 1.c. 562, 1st col., 32 A. L. R. 1183.
This court held in the case of Houston Electric Co. v. Bragg (Comm.) 276 S. W. 641 that it was a jury question as to whether or not the motorman of the street car was negligent in permit*534ting a passenger to take into the car the suitcase over which Mrs. Bragg stumbled and thereby was injured.
In the Bragg case the trial court had sustained certain exceptions of the Electric Company to Mrs. Bragg’s petition wherein she alleged as negligence the failure of the company to have a conductor aboard the street car to see that the aisles were left free of obstructions and particularly the suitcase over which she stumbled. That léft Mrs. Bragg’s petition only with her allegations as to the negligence of the motorman in permitting the passenger to take the suitcase aboard. Evidence was heard on these allegations, but at the close of the testimony the trial court refused to submit any issue to the jury and gave the jury instructions to bring in a verdict for defendant, which was done. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (264 S. W. 245) at Beaumont held that the sustaining of the exceptions was error. It also held:
“* * * It may be that the question will be for a jury to say whether the motorman should discharge the duty of protecting his passengers ‘against all dangers that are naturally and according to the usual course of things to be expected’ by observing his passengers as they enter the car, and preventing them from carrying with them to their seats instruments or baggage that might prove a source of danger to the other passengers. Giving full recognition to the rule that a passenger has the right to carry with thim into the car his personal baggage and to dispose of it in the car, yet if the nature of the baggage is such, because of its size or otherwise, that a motorman should have anticipated danger to his passengers from such baggage, the duty would devolve upon him to see that the baggage was properly disposed of. In certain instances, it would be for a jury to say whether that duty should be discharged by preventing the passengers from carrying the baggage with, him to his seat.”
When the case reached the Supreme Court, after affirming the Court of Civil Appeals in its ruling on the demurrers, the court said:
“(5) We are also of opinion that the trial court erred in peremptorily instructing a verdict for plaintiff in error. After the court had required the defendant in error to by amendment eliminate her allegation, based on the failure to furnish some person with the duty to see that the aisle was kept free of obstruction, there still remained an allegation that plaintiff in error negligently permitted the suitcase to be placed in the *535aisle, and to be there at the time the car was stopped for her to alight therefrom. There was evidence to support every material allegation with reference to this issue tendered in the pleadings, and the issue should have been submitted to the jury.
“The issues tendered in the pleadings in this case should not be confused with those cases in which it is held that mere proof that the accident occurred is not proof from which it can be inferred that the carrier knew, or by exercise of diligence should have known, that the obstruction was in the aisle. Here the alleged, negligence is lack of care in permitting the obstruction to be placed there. The negligence here alleged does not depend on knowledge of the presence of the obstruction after it is placed in the aisle, but is based o nthe anticipation of the obstruction and failure to use care to prevent it.” (Emphasis ours.) 276 S. W. 643.
I will not attempt to set out the evidence in detail as the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals does this at great length.
The evidence justifies the logical inference that there was a regulation on the part of the bus company preventing passengers from stowing radios in the baggage rack. The driver remonstrated with the soldier at the time he became a passenger about his taking the radio aboard, and tried to get the soldier to deliver the radio to the driver to be placed in the baggage compartment.
There is evidence in the record justifying a jury finding to the effect that every seat in the bus was full at the time the soldier got on the bus as a passenger and that the driver knew the soldier could not place the radio in the seat beside the soldier as the driver instructed the soldier to do. There is also evidence in the record which would justify a jury in finding there was not room under the bus seat to stow the radio as the bus driver also directed. Giving the evidence the most favorable meaning to which it can be construed in order to uphold the jury’s verdict — as we must do — I think there was evidence to go to the jury supporting respondent’s allegation of negligence on the part of the bus driver in permitting the soldier to take the radio aboard with him. And I also think there is evidence to support the jury’s answer to this issue.
“It has been said that ‘a violation of rules previously adopted by a defendant in reference to the safety of third persons has generally been admitted in evidence as tending to show negli*536gence of the defendant’s disobedient servant for which the defendant is liable.’
«* * * *
“A rule or regulation may be viewed as indicating the carrier’s appreciation of danger with relation to the matter sought to be regulated. Negligent enforcement of such a rule, papably designed to render safe a situation dangerous if unregulated, serves to engage the carrier’s liability. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Rev. Ed., Zipp, Vol. 3, sec. 506, pp. 1281 & 1282.
Paraphrasing the language of the Commission of Appeals in the case of Houston Electric Co. v. Bragg, 276 S. W. 641 (judgment adopted by the Supreme Court). The bus company owed to Mrs. Caver the duty to exercise that high degree of care which a very cautious and prudent person would have exercised, under the facts alleged, to have prevented her injury. Whether the exercise of such care required it to prevent the passenger from carrying the radio aboard under the circumstances of this case, would depend upon the conclusion which reasonable minds would reach from the facts stated. If it can be said that all reasonable minds must conclude that it would be unreasonable to require that the bus driver prevent the passenger from taking the radio aboard with him, under the circumstances here alleged, the duty to exercise care in this respect, as a matter of law, does not exist. If, on the other hand, reasonable minds might differ as to whether the bus driver should prevent the passenger from taking the radio aboard the bus with him,- the failure to prevent the radio from being taken aboard would be a predicate upon which negligence could be based.
It seems to me that the majority opinion disregards all evidence favorable to the jury verdict and the judgment of the two courts below; and only considers the evidence which is against the verdict. This is not the law, but directly contrary to the law governing us in this case, under this record.
The quotation in the majority opinion from 10 Am. Jur., sec. 1642 that rules of a carrier are not admissible in evidence, is from a New York case wherein it is said that only ordinary care was required to be exercised by the carrier to prevent injury to the passenger. Such is not the degree of care required in this state and the case of Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Shildes, 9 Texas Civ. App. 652, 28 S. W. 709, cited by the majority, expressly so holds. The Halloren case referred to in the extract from Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 113 Texas 472, *537260 S. W. 561, 32 A. L. R. 1138, quoted by me above, is quoted in the Shields case as authority for rejecting the contention in the New York and Pennsylvania cases cited that only ordinary care is required.
On the second point I agree with the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals for the reasons stated, and will not discuss the matter further.
Believing that there is evidence in this record to sustain the jury’s answers and believing that we are not to constitute ourselves a jury, but must sustain the jury’s finding, I would affirm the judgments of both courts below.
Opinion delivered January 25, 1950.
Rehearing overruled February 22, 1950.