Court Opinion

ID: 9726532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:55:22.390906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.073407
License: Public Domain

STONE, P. J.
I dissent. I agree with that part of the opinion which concludes that since the school board has the authority to establish rules governing attendance, it may invoke reasonable regulations concerning a student’s dress and condition of his hair.
Admittedly, such rules of conduct circumscribe a student’s freedom to *338a certain extent. This is not novel; traffic laws, zoning laws, and ecologically motivated restraints likewise restrict the conduct of an individual. Such intrusions upon broadly defined constitutional freedoms are essential when the welfare and continued existence of society are weighed against the freedom of the individual to do as he pleases.
The matrix of our complex social structure is the Constitution; thus it is implicit in the Constitution itself that the rights of an individual may be impinged upon when such limitations are reasonably related to the overall purpose inherent in the Constitution. The California Supreme Court, in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241], held education to be a social function in which the public interest is paramount. Quoting from the United States Supreme Court, the California court said, at page 606: “ ‘Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. . . ” (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 [98 L.Ed. 873, 880, 74 S.Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180].)
This does not mean, of course, that because the public interest in education transcends the unbridled liberty of the individual attending school, the governing board of a school has plenary power to unreasonably regulate student conduct. To justify restriction of a constitutional right of an individual student, the regulation must be reasonably related to the public function involved. That is to say, the regulation itself must be “reasonable,” as that term is used in a constitutional sense.
This brings us to the critical question in the case, whether the regulation here was reasonable in relation to the approved objective; did the school board exceed its authority by promulgating this particular regulation? I find the question moot. The regulation was changed subsequent to the filing o-f this action; it is no longer in existence and its only relevancy would be to appellant herein. As to appellant, he complied with the regulation and was promoted at the end of the year. He cites no special damage for us to consider. The opinion states that appellant was suspended from school until he complied, but such a disciplinary mark on a man’s record is innocuous—I hope. To me it comes within the legal classification “de minimus non curat lex."
I would dismiss the appeal as moot.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 15, 1971, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 13, 1972. Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.