Court Opinion

ID: 9624884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:20:41.318222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:47.451093
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
While I concur entirely with Presiding Judge McMurray, I suggest the following analysis that shows that the limitations of OCGA § 51-1-40 do not apply and that the third party criminal conduct was foreseeable so that the defendants’ wrongful conduct were concurrent causes of the death with the acts of the killer, Patton.
The evidence raises factual issues that Sherri Etheridge engaged in various possible acts of criminal conduct in her apartment and in the apartment complex in having the party for her minor daughter: knowingly serving alcohol to minors, OCGA § 3-3-24; knowingly furnishing alcohol to an underage person, OCGA §§ 3-3-23, 3-3-23.1; contributing to the delinquency of minors, unruliness, OCGA § 16-12-1 (b) (1) delinquent act, and (2) to be an unruly child; maintaining a disorderly house, i.e., encouragés drinking, other misbehavior, or common disturbance of the neighborhood or ordinary citizens, OCGA § 16-11-44. Since Ms. Etheridge knowingly engaged in criminal conduct involving others, then it was foreseeable that others would also engage in criminal conduct, fighting, arising from the drunken and disorderly circumstances created by her, a loud drunken party.
The landlord had constructive notice through the resident manager who had actual knowledge that criminal conduct on the premises was occurring, because the resident manager saw and heard such conduct both inside and outside the apartment in the parking *413area and saw the empty beer cans. Instead of calling the police and waiting to see that the party was ended and the participants left peacefully, the resident manager beat a hasty retreat on the pretext that she had business off-site, abdicating her duty to keep the premises safe for those she knew were present. Where the owner and occupier of the premises has actual or constructive knowledge of the drunken conduct and condition of the persons on the premises, a duty arises to exercise ordinary care to protect those legitimately present from the risk of harm from such drunken and disorderly conduct; in this case, Ms. Etheridge and the resident manager of the landlord had actual notice of the drunkenness and disorderly conduct of the persons at the party. See OCGA § 51-3-1; Borders v. Bd. of Trustees, V. F. W. Club 2875, 231 Ga. App. 880 (500 SE2d 362) (1998).
OCGA § 51-1-40 was created by Ga. L. 1988, pp. 1692, 1693-1694, § 1. The descriptive title of the act reads: “To amend Chapter 1 of Title 51 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to general tort provisions, so as to provide that certain persons shall not be liable for the acts of intoxicated persons who are of legal drinking age; to provide that certain persons may be liable for the acts of certain intoxicated persons; to provide for certain legal proofs and assumptions; to provide that under certain circumstances certain persons who own, lease, or occupy premises shall not be liable for the acts of certain intoxicated persons; to provide for certain legislative findings; to provide for related matters; to provide for applicability.” Such language of OCGA § 51-1-40 is in derogation of common law that made a social host liable to third persons for furnishing alcohol to a guest who causes injury as a result of such intoxication. Sutter v. Hutchins, 254 Ga. 194, 195-197 (1) (327 SE2d 716) (1985).
Therefore, OCGA § 51-1-40, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed against the party seeking to use it as a shield from liability. Bo Fancy Productions v. Rabun County, 267 Ga. 341, 343 (1) (478 SE2d 373) (1996); Johnson v. State, 114 Ga. 790, 791 (40 SE 807) (1901). OCGA § 51-1-40 (b) seeks to deal only with tort liability from knowingly furnishing alcohol which results in injuries or death from drunk driving. Riley v. H & H Operations, 263 Ga. 652, 653-654 (1) (436 SE2d 659) (1993). OCGA § 51-1-40 (b) does not exclude liability against a person who furnishes alcohol to minors or underage persons with actual knowledge. Riley v. H & H Operations, supra at 654-655 (2). It therefore follows that a tortfeasor who furnishes alcohol to an underage person can be liable for causing such intoxication which in turn causes a tortious injury by means other than driving, because OCGA § 51-1-40 (b) only seeks to regulate liability for drunk driving, which limitation is in derogation of common law, and the “legal presumption of causation,” which is a legal presumption in derogation of common law, in a strict construction of the *414statute, applies only to drunk driving. Strict construction of this statute confines its exclusion from liability only to drunk driving. See generally Sutter v. Hutchings, supra at 196-198.
Decided April 3, 1998
Reconsideration denied May 4, 1998
Adams & Adams, Charles R. Adams III, Carl A. Veline, Jr., for appellants.
Howard G. Sokol, Phyllis J. Holmen, Lisa J. Krisher, Martin, *415Snow, Grant & Napier, Thomas P. Allen III, Michael M. Smith, for appellees.
*414Thus, the defendants may be liable for furnishing alcohol or allowing the furnishing of alcohol to underage persons and persons visibly intoxicated, who while intoxicated are injured. Griffin Motel Co. v. Strickland, 223 Ga. App. 812, 814 (479 SE2d 401) (1996); see generally Sutter v. Hutchings, supra. Further, this Court has held that OCGA § 51-1-40 does not exclude liability under another statute that imposes tort liability, i.e., OCGA § 51-3-1. See Eldridge v. Aronson, 221 Ga. App. 662, 663 (1) (472 SE2d 497) (1996); Borders v. Bd. of Trustees, VFW, supra. OCGA § 51-1-40 (b) excludes liability where the intoxicated person injures himself but does not exclude liability where the drunk is injured by a third party, as in this case. Griffin Motel Co. v. Strickland, supra at 813-814.
As to causation, a fight at a drunken and disorderly party is not too remote to be reasonably foreseeable and occurred at the premises where Ms. Etheridge was supervising the party and where the resident manager had actual knowledge that the party had gotten out of hand and a duty to control the unsafe environment of the party. Ms. Etheridge caused the victim to become drunk as well as other participants in the fight, although she did not cause Patton to become drunk. Ms. Etheridge’s conduct was not the proximate cause but a concurrent proximate cause; it was reasonably foreseeable that a fight would break out at this out of control party. Thus, her conduct was a concurrent proximate cause. “We therefore find that the defendant hostess and her daughter owed a duty to those [guests at the party] not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm by furnishing alcohol to a person under [21] who was noticeably intoxicated and who these defendants knew would [be at risk from others’ wrongful conduct at the out of control party].” Sutter v. Hutchings, supra at 197. Likewise, the resident manager could not abdicate her duty to keep the premises safe from the conduct of mean drunks at an out of control party by leaving before the situation was made safe.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.