Court Opinion

ID: 9540660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:38.653894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:09.363842
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOLFSON, dissenting: Every once in a while a reviewing court has to choose between following the law and reaching a fair result. The majority reaches a fair result, but it does not follow the law. The legislature made the decision for us. We must accept it, even though we might not like it. Section 5 of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act (Act) (815 ILCS 513/5 (West 2004)) is a statement of public policy. It tells us the “business of home repair and remodeling is a matter affecting the public interest.” 815 ILCS 513/5 (West 2004). The goal is to “increase consumer confidence, reduce the likelihood of disputes, and promote fair and honest practices in that business in this State.” 815 ILCS 513/5 (West 2004). With that goal in mind, the legislature enacted section 30 of the Act, entitled “Unlawful acts”: “It is unlawful for any person engaged in the business of home repairs and remodeling to remodel or make repairs or charge for remodeling or repair work before obtaining a signed contract or work order over $1,000 and before notifying and securing the signed acceptance or rejection, by the consumer, of the binding arbitration clause and the jury trial waiver clause as required in Section 15 and Section 15.1 of this Act.” 815 ILCS 513/30 (West 2006). Here, K. Miller Construction Co., Inc. (Miller), ignored every provision of section 30. There was no signed contract or work order. There was no binding arbitration clause or jury trial waiver. I agree with the majority that Miller’s failure to comply with section 30 means it cannot pursue a contractual claim, oral or written, but I do not agree with the idea that a contractor who acts unlawfully, in violation of the public policy made explicit in the statute, has the right to seek the equitable remedy of quantum meruit. This exact issue was raised and decided against the contractor in Smith v. Bogard, 377 Ill. App. 3d 842 (2007). In Smith, failure to comply with provisions of the Act barred the contractor from recovering any amounts he claimed for work performed, whether by contract or quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. Why? The court said: “Allowing a contractor a method of recovery when he has breached certain provisions of the Act would run afoul of the legislature’s intent of protecting consumers, would reward deceptive practices, and would be violative of public policy.” Smith, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 848. Miller cites Fraud Act cases to bolster his claim that he can resort to equitable remedies. See 740 ILCS 80/1 et seq. (West 1992) (Frauds Act). But the legislature created the Home Repair and Remodeling Act as a separate statute, for a specific purpose. When that happens, as it did in Machinery Transports of Illinois v. Morton Community Bank, 293 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1997), a case concerning the Illinois Credit Agreement Act, traditional equitable remedies are barred when there is no written agreement. See also McAloon v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc., 274 Ill. App. 3d 758 (1995). No authority has been cited, nor have I found any, supporting the proposition that an act declared unlawful by the legislature can be sanitized by filtering it through a court of equity. Miller is asking us to find an implied in law contract to avoid a harsh result. True, it appears that in this case it is the contractor who needs protecting. Then, again, we would not be wrestling with this issue if the contractor had done what the statute clearly told him to do — put it in writing. The legislature’s obvious purpose was to protect all consumers who come within the terms of the Act from the unseemly conduct of contractors. In addition, there is something to be said for predictability of cost and consumer expectation. There is nothing new about the need to suggest the exercise of judicial self-restraint when it becomes tempting to intrude into the legislative field. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or in other words, to the will of the law.” Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866, 6 L. Ed. 204, 234 (1824). I respectfully dissent.