Court Opinion

ID: 9692255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:48:41.587518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.611461
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
HARRELL, Judge.
I concur in the judgment because I would conclude that the sentencing judge erred in not conducting a hearing on Tweedy’s Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence (insofar as Tweedy sought to offer reasons for Ms involuntary nonappearance at sentencing) and thereby failed to engage in necessary fact-finding and the drawing of conclusions as required by Pinkney (but see Majority op. at 498-99, 845 A.2d at 1228-29 where it avoids deciding directly this question (“We need not address ... whether the trial court made an adequate inquiry into whether Petitioner’s absence was voluntary ... ”)). I hold this view notwithstanding the sentencing judge’s apparent prior knowledge of similar reasons tendered for Tweedy’s earlier “no-shows,” as well as the State’s express incredulity as to the contemporarily proffered reasons {See Respondent’s Brief at 23). I have some problems with a number of things in the Majority opinion.
First, the Majority opinion observes that “[a] trial judge has the discretion to sentence a defendant in absentia.” Majority op. at 495, 845 A.2d at 1226-27. Yet, in almost the next breath, the Majority so circumscribes that discretion as to suggest that its exercise to do so hardly ever will be affirmed (“While we do not suggest that a defendant can never be sentenced in absentia, sentencing in absentia should rarely occur ... ”. It should only be the ‘extraordinary case’ ... where proper exercise of judicial discretion results in sentencing in a defendant’s absence.” Majority op. at 499, 845 A.2d at 1229 (emphasis in original)). This treatment creates mere illusions. If sentencing judges are to be said to possess this discretion, and we outline neutrally the proper considerations to guide them in its exercise, that should be enough to be said. *501An appellate court should standdown at that point and decide each appeal according to whether abuse is found (or not) in each case.
Second, I disagree with the analytical viewpoint, and hence the result, of Part II of the Majority opinion. The Majority chooses to focus critically on only a particular part of the plea hearing, a slice in time if you will, instead of considering the proceeding as a whole or as a continuum. Not illogically perhaps, the Majority seizes upon the trial judge’s utterance of the phrase “[ajccept the pleas,” made immediately following counsels’ interrogation of Tweedy and his co-defendant as to their understanding of the proposed plea agreements. According to the Majority, it was at that moment in time that an enforceable plea agreement arose, notwithstanding that the State had yet to satisfy the need for a factual basis to accept the plea. There is no doubt, however, that the judge made clear before the proceeding concluded what would happen if Tweedy failed to appear for sentencing or failed to cooperate with the State. Tweedy knew it. His counsel knew it. They said nothing to evidence their disagreement or non-acceptance of the judge’s added requirement. Thus, if viewed as a whole, the 16 April 2001 hearing resulted in the court’s acceptance of Tweedy’s negotiated plea agreement with the State, conditioned on the court’s requirement of Tweedy’s presence at sentencing, together with the known consequences of Tweedy’s failure to meet that and the pre-existing requirements. In effect, further negotiations occurred on the record of the hearing and Tweedy acquiesced in the added condition in order to receive the court’s acquiescence. The additional condition imposed a minimal additional “burden” on Tweedy. Thus, until the proceeding on 16 April 2001 was concluded, the terms of the plea agreement acceptable to the court were not cast in concrete.
Alternatively, I would adopt the view of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and hold that implicit in every plea agreement is the requirement that the defendant appear for sentencing. See U.S. v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4th Cir.1995). Tweedy walked from the courtroom on 16 April 2001 knowing exactly what would happen if he failed to appear at sentencing *502(unless he could persuade the sentencing judge, pursuant to Pinkney, that his absence was other than voluntary). It was in resolving the latter question that the trial judge erred, for the reasons explained previously.