Court Opinion

ID: 9381302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:01:48.629541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.525996
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 22 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRITTANY ANN STILLWELL,                         No.    22-55312

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:21-cv-07040-GW-MAR
 v.

FASHION NOVA, LLC, a California                 MEMORANDUM*
Limited Liability Company; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees,

and

DANIEL R. MARKEL, an individual;
DOES, 1 through 10,

                Defendants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 22, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

      Appellant Brittany Stillwell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing and striking claims that arose out of a commercial relationship between

her company The Compliance Firm (TCF) and Appellee Fashion Nova Logistics

(FNL) pursuant to which TCF was to provide COVID-19 testing to FNL

employees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      The district court did not err in granting in part both of FNL’s anti-SLAPP

motions against the original and amended complaints. We review the district

court’s grant of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo where, as here, the movant

challenged the legal sufficiency of the pleading and the district court applied the

Rule 12(b)(6) standard. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ctr. for Med.

Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2018). In both of the anti-SLAPP motions,

FNL met its initial burden to show that the stricken allegations and claims attacked

allegations it made and positions it took in earlier-filed litigation, quintessential

acts in furtherance of FNL’s right to petition the courts. Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 425.16(e). Stillwell could not carry her burden to show a probability of

prevailing on her claims because she could not overcome the California litigation

privilege, which similarly protects allegations and claims made in court

submissions. See Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 741 (9th Cir. 2014).

Because FNL made a challenge to the legal sufficiency of Stillwell’s complaints,

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Stillwell was not entitled to conduct discovery before the court ruled on the

motions. See Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 833.

      We review a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Lacey v.

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The district court

did not err in dismissing Stillwell’s three claims for forced labor under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1589. 1 Stillwell did not state a claim under § 1589(a)(2). Stillwell did not allege

that FNL obtained labor from her “by means of serious harm or threats of serious

harm” because a reasonable person with her background and in her circumstances

would not have felt compelled to perform labor for FNL. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2);

see also United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly,

Stillwell did not state a claim under § 1589(a)(3) because FNL, in filing its own

action because of TCF’s alleged breaches of contract and fraud, did not use the

legal process in a “manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed.”

Id. § 1589(c)(1). Because Stillwell did not plausibly allege FNL used an unlawful

method of obtaining her labor, she did not plausibly allege a claim under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1589(b) for benefitting from participating in a venture that obtained labor

1
  Stillwell argues that the district court struck these claims under the anti-SLAPP
statute because she did not show a probability of prevailing. But the district court
actually dismissed them under Rule 12(b)(6). Because Stillwell is a pro se litigant
and because the same legal framework applies to both arguments in this case, we
will construe her argument as one against the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. See Woods
v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed.”) (cleaned up).

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through unlawful means.

        The district court did not err in dismissing Stillwell’s claim under the

California Trafficking Victims’ Protection Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.5. Stillwell

did not allege that FNL obtained her labor through “substantial and sustained

restriction of [her] liberty” through “confinement or restraint.” People v. Oliver,

54 Cal. App. 5th 1084, 1096 (2020), citing Cal. Pen. Code § 236.1(h)(5).

        Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second

opportunity to amend. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 989

(9th Cir. 2009). The district court had previously given Stillwell leave to amend

most of her claims and provided her with guidance on those claims’ deficiencies; it

was not required to give her further leave to amend. Nor did the district court

abuse its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration. Smith v. Pac.

Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). Stillwell identified no

new material facts or points of law that the district court overlooked in its orders.

See 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).

        AFFIRMED.2

2
    The request for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED.

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