Court Opinion

ID: 9579415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:55.741135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:30.014320
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, P. J.,
dissenting.
The trial court found that, after the officers lifted defendant off the floor, “they saw a plastic baggy part way out of a shirt pocket with the substance they believed to be meth.” The court then opined:
“The statute in question, [ORS] 133.605, gives the officers permission to use force in executing warrants. It indicates that, short of deadly force, the officers can use the necessary force for the execution of the search warrant with all practicable safety.
“The question is not whether or not the officers could order the defendant to be on the ground or frisk him because clearly the officers could do that.
“But the question is, did they need to, for safety reasons, handcuff him. Had that actually not occurred, * * * it is unlikely the officers would have noticed the baggy or discovered the baggy.
* * * *
“* * * The reasons that the officers articulated [as a basis for their safety] concern was that there were weapons. There were people in the house who were associated with violent acts and with weapons, and they were in the process of searching the house.

“They wanted to immobilize anyone in the house so that that person would not pose a threat to them. Was that action reasonably necessary to effectuate the execution of the search warrant with practical safety? And the answer is yes.

“So based on my findings of the facts, and [ORS] 133.605, I do find that the police officers in executing the warrant did not exceed the force allowed by the statute. I *566am going to deny the defense’s motion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
That conclusion is supported by our recent opinion in State v. Barnett, 132 Or App 520, 888 P2d 1064, rev den 321 Or 137 (1995) (where informant reported that firearms were kept in the house, officer safety concerns justified handcuffing all occupants during execution of search warrant). As the Supreme Court said in State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524, 747 P2d 991 (1987):
“[I]t is not our function to uncharitably second-guess an officer’s judgment. A police officer in the field frequently must make life-or-death decisions in a matter of seconds. There may be little or no time in which to weigh the magnitude of a potential safety risk against the intrusiveness of protective measures. An officer must be allowed considerable latitude to take safety precautions in such situations.”
Because I agree with the trial court’s analysis and believe that its conclusion is proper in the light of Barnett, I would affirm. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.