Court Opinion

ID: 9739348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:12:46.178096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.779291
License: Public Domain

Jansen, P.J.
(concurring). I concur with Justice Kavanagh’s decision to reverse the decision of the *57Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission and remand for the reasons set forth in the opinion. I write separately to emphasize a growing trend of the wcac to exceed its administrative reviewing authority and deny benefits to eligible employees. That is, the wcac, with increasing regularity, is setting aside the findings of the magistrates and substituting its own findings. This constitutes improper review de novo.
This case, as do many other worker’s compensation cases before this Court, requires the correct application of the standard of review set forth in MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3). I write separately to emphasize that the standard of review set forth in this statutory provision is not a de novo standard of review and the wcac may not simply substitute its opinion for that of the magistrate.
Beginning October 1, 1986, under 1985 PA 103, review de novo by the wcac was eliminated. Thereafter, findings of fact by a worker’s compensation magistrate were to be considered conclusive, on administrative appellate review by the wcac, if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3); Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 261; 484 NW2d 227 (1992). A review of the evidence by the wcac must include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence and ensure a full, thorough, and fair review of the evidence. MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13). Our Supreme Court has made clear that the wcac’s findings must be consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than review de novo of the magistrate’s decision, but is a more searching review by the wcac than the "any evidence” standard. Holden, supra, pp 261-262; Farrington v *58Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 218; 501 NW2d 76 (1993).
The present case is an excellent example of the growing trend of the wcac to exceed its statutory authority and engage in what is essentially review de novo of the record to deny benefits to eligible workers. The record in this case provided overwhelming evidence to support the magistrate’s decision. Indeed, a claimant in a worker’s compensation case need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence both a personal injury and a relationship between the injury and the workplace. Jishi v General Motors Corp (On Remand), 207 Mich App 429, 432; 526 NW2d 24 (1994).
This growing trend of the wcac is particularly troubling in light of the purposes of the worker’s compensation act. The worker’s compensation act is remedial legislation and, as such, is to be liberally construed in favor of injured employees. Gardner v Van Buren Public Schools, 445 Mich 23, 49; 517 NW2d 1 (1994); Smeester v Pub-N-Grub, Inc (On Remand), 208 Mich App 308, 312; 527 NW2d 5 (1995). The primary purpose underlying the worker’s compensation act is to provide compensation to eligible persons for covered disabilities. Therefore, any statutory ambiguity generally should be construed in favor of awarding compensation. Gardner, supra, p 49. As aptly stated by our Supreme Court:
The statutory workers’ compensation scheme was enacted for the protection of both employees and employers who work and do business in this state. The system assures covered employees that they will be compensated in the event of employment-related injuries. In addition, employers are assured of the parameters of their liability for such injuries. By agreeing to assume responsibility for all employment-related injuries, employers pro*59tect themselves from the possibility of potentially excessive damage awards. In order to effectuate these policies, the statute has been liberally construed to provide broad coverage for injured workers. [Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 651; 364 NW2d 670 (1984).]
Thus, the worker’s compensation act is not intended to benefit employees only. The statutory scheme represents a compromise to both employees and employers. Therefore, while one policy underlying the worker’s compensation act is prompt payment to injured employees, the liability of employers is limited because they are shielded from common-law tort actions. Badon v General Motors Corp, 188 Mich App 430, 441; 470 NW2d 436 (1991). Employees, therefore, may collect only worker’s compensation benefits for personal injury or occupational disease against the employer, and the only exception is a claim for an intentional tort. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131X1).
I reiterate these purposes underlying the worker’s compensation act because the wcac is required to act within the scheme of the worker’s compensation act. As Justice Kavanagh correctly notes, the wcac may not review a magistrate’s decision de novo and may not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate. Kovach v Henry Ford Hosp, 207 Mich App 107, 111; 523 NW2d 800 (1994).
Finally, I do not agree with Justice Kavanagh’s statement, in footnote two, that the issue of a pro-employer bias on the part of one of the wcac panel members was not preserved for appellate review because plaintiff did not raise the issue below. Requiring a party to raise this issue of bias in front of the same panel member is onerous, given that it is extremely doubtful that the panel member would concede such an assertion. As this *60Court has noted, a failure to object to the conduct of a trial judge is understandable given that counsel may be reluctant to challenge a judge’s own behavior on the bench. People v Sterling, 154 Mich App 223, 231; 397 NW2d 182 (1986).
Further, this claim is a serious one, resulting in all seven justices of our Supreme Court to remand this case, on reconsideration, to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. See 444 Mich 977 (1994). Contrary to Judge Corrigan’s suggestion, I would not foreclose the opportunity of the commissioner to respond. I would not, however, dispose of the claim because of a so-called preservation requirement. Because there does appear to be a trend in the wcac to exceed its reviewing authority and deny benefits, I would not so plainly dismiss this claim.