Court Opinion

ID: 9775923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:12:47.103766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.037216
License: Public Domain

EDELMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully withdraw my concurrence with, and dissent from, the opinion of the majority that a defendant must admit the truth of evidence offered in support of a plea of guilty or no contest in order for that testimony to be sufficient to support the conviction.
As the majority opinion correctly recognizes, Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides an exception to the requirement of a jury trial to convict a defendant of a felony where the defendant waives his right thereto and the State introduces sufficient evidence of guilt to convict. Tex. Code Crim.PROG.Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 1992). *574If the defendant further waives his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses, the evidence of guilt may be “stipulated” as specified in Article 1.15. Id.
Importantly, however, the necessary evidence can consist solely of a “judicial confession,” i.e., the defendant’s admission that the allegations of the indictment are true. Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 352-53 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Alternatively, however, “it is settled that, as a matter of Texas criminal law, the term ‘stipulation,’ at least as used in Art. 1.15, ... includes inter alia agreements as to what particular evidence or testimony would be, if presented in full in open court, without conceding the truthfulness of that evidence or otherwise waiving the need for proof.” Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 799-800 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (emphasis in original). Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[w]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
The correct disposition of this case is illustrated by Ellard v. State, 650 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). There, the defendant stipulated that “without admitting the truth of any of the allegations, the State’s witnesses would testify as to facts that if believed, would satisfy on the elements of proof in the indictment.” Id. at 841. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that “this stipulation — that witnesses would testify to facts that would satisfy the elements of proof in the indictment — would support the trial court’s finding that the appellant was guilty of the alleged offense independent of any [other] evidence that was alleged to have been unlawfully obtained.” Id.
Article 1.15 is simply a means for a defendant to waive a trial and, correspondingly, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. In order to be convicted under this alternative, a defendant need not admit the truth of the prosecution evidence, any more so than he would to be convicted at trial. Based on the foregoing, I believe that a guilty or no contest plea which is otherwise supported by a stipulation that sufficient evidence of guilt exists is not required to also include the defendant’s admission that the evidence is true. Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction in this case.