Court Opinion

ID: 9829113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:00:31.793317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.491669
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[16,17] It is insisted that there was fundamental error in not sustaining the twentieth assignment, which is to the effect that the cross-petition only sought a recovery for $1,000 actual damages, while the verdict is for $1,010. This is based on the prayer for $1,000 actual damages and $2,000 exemplary damages, and for general and equitable relief to which in law appellants may be. entitled. It may be said that we overlooked the prayer in the original opinion, as the body of the petition set out two items of actual damages, one for $1,000 and the other for $100. It is evident by the petition appellee sought a recovery for both items. We do not think it fundamental error to recover an amount sued for simply because the prayer left out one item. This would not limit the cause of action to the amount stated in the prayer. The prayer would authorize the recovery of the amount stated in the body of the petition where it should be stated. Ry. Co. v. Canyon, 102 Tex. 478, 119 S. W. 294. As to the testimony of Mrs. Bates, of which complaint was set out in the fourteenth assignment, we will state that under the assignment in the brief there was included much testimony admissible under the allegations for exemplary damages; but if the bill in the record properly segregated the evidence in regard to the effect the acts of appellant had upon Mrs. Bates’ feelings, etc., we see no just ground upon which we could base a reversal. The admission of appellant and the uncontradict-ed facts show that appellants not only threatened to put Mrs. Bates and her family off the premises, and to have her arrested, but it also shows that he did immediately follow up his threat by sequestrating the property, and by having Mrs. Bates arrested for driving his cattle off their accustomed range; that is, off of the standing feed in the field of the appellees. These facts, we think, were admissible to show the animus *174Of appellant in instituting the proceedings out of which! this suit grew. A jury of ordinary intelligence would understand that such acts would humiliate and trouble any one. The mere fact that she stated it did would not add any force to the uncontradicted facts as to what was actually done, and it is not at all likely or probable that any injury resulted from her mere statement that it did worry her or affect her feelings. It may be we should take judicial notice that it was dry, and that no crops were made in that part of the country in 1918; hut we know of no rule that would authorize us to base a reversal upon our knowledge, or to set aside the verdict of the jury based on evidence. When appellant breached the contract he took the risk of a recovery at that time. In the light of subsequent events he may have conferred a favor on appellees, but eases cannot be reversed upon such contingencies. We can only look to the evidence, and, if we believe the court and the jury had evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict, it is- our duty, as we understand it, not to set their verdict or judgment aside.
The motion will be overruled.