Court Opinion

ID: 9472519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:03:13.77737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:59.658852
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority in this case construes the warrant requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1982)) so narrowly, and provides a remedy so harsh, that the enforcement of the currency reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982))1 and the regulations promulgated thereunder *1355will be severely curtailed. Because I disagree both with the majority’s conclusion that section 1105 was violated in this case and with its implicit assumption that such violation mandated the application of the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence seized, I respectfully dissent. I first turn to the constitutional authorization for this search, and second to the statutory authorization therefor. Third, I will analyze whether Congress intended that an exclusionary rule be applied as a remedy for violations of the statute, and fourth, if not, whether we should use our supervisory power to do so. Finally, I will discuss whether the “inevitable discovery” rule, see Nix v. Williams, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), precludes the application of an exclusionary rule, regardless of its source, in this case.
I
I first note that the statutory warrant requirement is not required by the Constitution. It would clearly be constitutional under the fourth amendment for Congress to authorize a search of a passenger boarding an international flight, and his carry-on baggage, under the “exigent circumstances” search warrant exception once the searching officer had probable cause. See United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 289, 58 L.Ed.2d 262 (1978); see generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 5.4(b), 5.5(c) (1978). Second, although this circuit has not addressed the issue, many courts are of the view that searches at the international border, or its functional equivalent, of outgoing passengers, like such searches of incoming passengers, are within the executive’s plenary authority to make “without any modicum of suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 164 (11th Cir.1982). See also United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 839-40 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 245, 78 L.Ed.2d 234 (1983); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1982), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2436, 77 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1983); United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1979). Accordingly, the Constitution did not prohibit the search in this case.
II
I next turn to whether the search violated the statute. Section 1105 provides a warrant requirement, which, as the majority correctly states, the legislative history *1356shows to be the generally intended means of enforcing the currency reporting provisions of section 1101. (The discovery of the money by any other lawful search is proper only if such discovery is “incidental to the main purpose of the search”, S.Rep. 1139, 91 Cong.2d Sess. 7 (1970), and authorized by other authority of the Secretary.) In order to obtain a warrant under section 1105, the customs officials must be able to show probable cause that objects sought in connection with a crime will be found. See United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1981) (discussing probable cause requirement for issuing a search warrant). Since it is not a crime to carry money out of the United States, but rather only a crime to fail to fill out the necessary form when carrying out the money, the crime is not clearly threatened until the potential offender is at a point where he no longer has access to the relevant forms and has presumably committed himself to travelling across the border. Almost without exception, such a status could not arise until the traveller was in the waiting area, preparing to board the plane. Accordingly, the agents could only have probable cause to search after they had observed the offender’s conduct at the airport. See United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 165-6 (11th Cir.1982) (agents did not have probable cause to search until observations of defendant on the jetway about to enter the plane).2
Under the majority’s interpretation of section 1105, customs agents will only be able to search a traveller or his possessions if the traveller consents, id., or if the plane is sufficiently delayed that a warrant can be obtained between the time the passenger starts to board and the time the plane departs. In contrast, I would interpret the statute to allow what we have in this case, a search of the passenger’s person, incident to a lawful arrest for violation of currency laws and for making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1983), which, though it yielded currency, is proper on the theory that the main purpose of a search incident to arrest is to find weapons and prevent destruction of evidence. See generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2 (1982). Allowing this kind of search would promote the statutory objectives, giving the officers a reasonable ability to enforce the currency laws without inconveniencing any passengers whom the police did not have probable cause to arrest. Agents could arrest the passenger without a warrant on probable cause that he was violating currency laws, and they could search him consistent with the “search incident to arrest” exception. They could also seize his baggage and hold it pending the issuance of a warrant to search the baggage.
Such a search would not violate the statutory language; section 1105(b) states that its warrant requirement is “not in derogation of the authority of the Secretary under any other law.” Nor would such a search fall afoul of the congressional intent exhibited in the legislative history. The history provides:
However, nothing in the bill would limit the authority of the Secretary to conduct searches under existing law. Should unreported currency be discovered pursuant to a search by the Bureau of Customs under its existing legal authority, the person transporting the currency would be subject to the penalties under this legislation if the discovery of the unreported currency was incidental to the main purpose of the search.
S.Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
The authority to search incident to arrest has long been recognized. See LaFave, supra, at § 5.2. The main purpose of a search incident to arrest is not to go on a fishing expedition for evidence; probable cause to arrest must already exist. Rather, the arresting officers search the arres-tee for weapons and for any evidence on *1357his person of the crime for which he is arrested because of the probability that he might destroy it.
In this case, the Customs officers, before they searched Chemaly, had probable cause to arrest him on the currency charge and for making a false statement. Customs had received three calls from an informant, who previously had provided reliable information,3 indicating that Chemaly would be taking a particular flight, the September 30, 1982 Eastern Airlines flight 23, to Aruba, with a substantial amount of cash in a cardboard box with yellow tape for the purpose of buying cocaine. The agents determined that Chemaly was booked on the flight and saw him with a man carrying a yellow and brown bag with a brown box inside. The agents, having found that Che-maly had not filed the requisite treasury form, actively made him aware of the currency reporting requirements. He did not undertake to fill one out. He stated to the agents as he proceeded to the jetway that he was carrying under $5,000. At that point, based on the high degree of accuracy of the tip and Chemaly’s failure to file the form by the time he got to the jetway, the agents had probable cause to arrest him on both charges. See Rojas, supra (noting that probable cause to arrest existed on similar facts).
In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the Supreme Court held that once the police clearly had probable cause to arrest the petitioner, “[wjhere the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of the petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.” Here, Chemaly was arrested shortly after the search in question. Probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search. I would accordingly find no statutory violation.
Ill
In my view, before considering whether to apply our supervisory power to impose a remedy for a statutory violation, we should look to what remedy Congress intended to create when it enacted the statute. Since section 1105 contains no express remedy, in determining whether we should imply the remedy of suppression of evidence from section 1105 itself we should look to the standards of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975).4 The Supreme Court in Cort addressed whether to imply from a statute a certain remedy accruing to a certain party. This is the identical question we face here, whether Congress intended to create a remedy of suppression accruing to the benefit of the violator of the currency reporting regulations.
The test the Supreme Court used in Cort asked:
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute *1358was enacted,” — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088 (citations omitted.) The answer to the first and fourth questions is clearly in the affirmative. Regarding the first, the warrant requirement was enacted to protect international travel-lers from undue harassment by border officials. Regarding the fourth, international border activity is certainly an appropriate subject for a federal remedy.
The second inquiry, however, yields no dispositive information regarding whether we should imply a suppression remedy. Neither the statute in this case nor the legislative history gives any hint of what remedy, if any, Congress intended to provide for violations of the search warrant provision. Giordano, supra note 4, and the wiretap statute, illustrate that Congress both knew how to write a statute requiring the suppression of evidence as a remedy for a purely statutory violation and would do so, even when prior case law indicated the courts would suppress such evidence without a directive. Moreover, it cannot be said that, when section 1105 was enacted, the state of the case law was so plain that Congress, by remaining silent, intended that the courts continue to apply the exclusionary rule. Only one case, United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.1979), holds that evidence should be suppressed as a remedy for a pure border search conducted in violation of a statute, or for searches made without sufficient exigent circumstances or probable cause. I have found only four Supreme Court cases that prescribed suppression of evidence as a remedy for a statutory violation.5 All of these cases are limited in scope; their holdings do not constitute broad statements of law to be applied on other facts.
Neither the Congressional silence as to the remedy that should flow from a violation of section 1105 nor the legislative history, then, is particularly helpful. Arguably, we have a slight inference that Congress did not intend suppression as a remedy and certainly no inference that Congress did intend it.
The third Cort inquiry is the most difficult here. Cort asks whether the remedy sought is consistent with the underlying purposes of the federal scheme. Under the view the majority takes of the statute, I would be forced to answer that it is not. As I have pointed out, see supra section II, the majority’s interpretation of the statute would allow the currency reporting requirements at issue to be enforced only if the subject consented to a search, or if the plane was substantially delayed between the time the passengers began to board and the time the plane left, thus allowing a warrant to be obtained. I cannot conclude that Congress created the reporting requirements with the intention that they not be enforced. The requirements are already perilously close to being unenforceable. Application of the suppression remedy would place a further damper on the statute’s enforceability.
I would note at this point that suppression is not the only alternative; an implied cause of action for money damages in favor of the offender is a possibility. In fact, it is possible that Congress intended no remedy, but rather simply intended the warrant requirement as a direction to the Secretary. In evaluating which alternative is most consistent with the statutory scheme, I believe that we must consider the gravity of the problem that these currency *1359reporting requirements collaterally address, that is, large scale movement of drugs and contraband into the country by persons exiting the country temporarily with large amounts of currency. The spirit of the warrant requirement is to avoid harassment of innocent travellers, regarding whom no probable cause to search or arrest exists. Because of the seriousness of the drug problem, I believe that Congress must have intended as remedy the least onerous means that would deter Customs officers from disobeying the warrant requirement. Either of the other two alternatives I have mentioned, an implied cause of action for damages or simply Secretary-enforced disciplinary requirements, would deter Customs officers from wrongful conduct and yet would vindicate the public interest in punishing violators of the currency laws. In contrast, suppression over-expands the spirit of the warrant requirement by extending protection from harassment to guilty travellers, and goes against the public interest by allowing violators of currency laws, in spite of all the ramifications their conduct has on the drug market, to go unpunished. For all the reasons I have stated above, it would be inconsistent with the statutory purposes to imply suppression as a remedy.
IV.
I now turn to whether we should use our supervisory power to fashion a remedy of suppression. The Supreme Court in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1978, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), described the supervisory power as follows:
“[GJuided by considerations of justice,” McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress. The purposes underlying use of the supervisory powers are threefold: to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights, to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury, and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct.
(Citation omitted.) The supervisory power doctrine is an extraordinary one which should be “sparingly exercised.” Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 1388, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); see United States v. Jones, 433 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1613, 29 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971) (reversing district court’s exercise of supervisory power to suppress evidence when no constitutional violation; apparently no statute governed conduct).
In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 292, 100 L.Ed. 233 (1956), the Supreme Court addressed a government agent’s violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c) by seizing property under an insufficient warrant based on unsworn statements, in an otherwise constitutional seizure. The question before the Court was whether the agent could present the evidence in a state prosecution he had initiated. The Court noted: “We put all the constitutional questions to one side ... [W]e have then a case that raises not a constitutional question but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies.” Id. at 216-217, 76 S.Ct. at 294. The Court then determined that suppression was required because the Federal Rules “are designed to protect the privacy of the citizen, unless the strict standards set for searches and seizures are satisfied. That policy is defeated if the federal agent can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or state proceedings.” Id. at 218, 76 S.Ct. at 294. The Court did not discuss any countervailing interests that might have existed.
In contrast, in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979), the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule, through its supervisory power, to suppress evidence seized in violation of Internal Revenue Service regulations. The Court noted the deterrent effect on the Internal Revenue Service’s establishment of clear and definite regulations that application of the exclusionary *1360rule might have and determined that such an effect would not be in the public interest.
I would find the interests in this case more similar to Caceres than to Rea. The practical effect of a rigidly enforced exclusionary rule in this case will severely limit the power of the federal government to enforce section 1101’s currency reporting requirements. As I have described, the agents are forced to rely on a delayed plane, so they can obtain a warrant, or on a valid consent to search luggage. Since the likelihood of either of the above occurring is extremely small, the agents, if they know that any misjudgment on their part will result in the exclusion of evidence, will be strongly discouraged from attempting to enforce the law. This problem would be somewhat alleviated were the search incident to arrest exception approved, see supra section II; however, as the statute stands it is not, in my opinion, an appropriate exercise of our supervisory power to hamper so severely its enforcement.
V.
Even if the court should extend its supervisory power to provide a remedy of suppression, I would not apply the remedy in this case because, as the agents had probable cause to arrest Chemaly, they would certainly have arrested him on the jetway, brought him and his belongings back to the station, and, upon obtaining any necessary warrant, found the money. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), “The goals that are implicated by supervisory powers are not, however, significant in the context of [a case where] the errors alleged are harm-less____” Id. at 1979.
In Nix v. Williams, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), the Court articulated the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule. While that case involved the sixth amendment, the Court cited fourth amendment cases and discussed the policy reasons for the exception in a manner applicable to any unlawfully obtained evidence. The Court explained:
The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the Exclusionary Rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections____ On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.
... The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation. That doctrine, although closely related to the inevitable discovery doctrine, does not apply here; ... but that is not the whole story. The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse position than they would have been in if no police error or misconduct has oc-curred____ [Ejxclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would also put the government in a worse position, because the police would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken place. Thus, while the independent source exception would not justify admission of evidence in this case, its rationale is wholly consistent with and justifies our adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the Exclusionary Rule.
Id. at_, 104 S.Ct. at 2508-09.
This theory applies in full in the case at hand. It is inconceivable to me that, having probable cause to arrest Chemaly, the agents would have let him get on the plane even had they not searched him. Were the arrest purely a result of the search, obviously the inevitable discovery doctrine would not apply; the defendant would never have been arrested had he not been *1361searched, and nothing would have been discovered. It is clear to me from the record, however, that once the agents had made their final pass at getting Chemaly to fill out the forms, they had sufficient probable cause to arrest and indeed would have done so absent the search. As in Rawlings, supra, the search and the arrest were part and parcel of the same encounter. Accordingly, I would find the money to have been inevitably discovered and the admission of the evidence to have been proper.

. Section 1101 provides in relevant part § 1101. Reports
*1355(a) Persons required to file
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, whoever, whether as principal, agent, or bailee, or by an agent or bailee, knowingly—
(1) transports or causes to be transported monetary instruments—
' (A) from any place within the United States to or through any place outside the United States, or
(B) to any place within the United States from or through place outside the United States, or
(2) receives monetary instruments at the termination of their transportation to the United States from or through any place outside the United States
in an amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion shall file a report or reports in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. (b) Contents of filed report
Reports required under this section shall be filed at such times and places, and may contain such of the following information and any additional information, in such form and in such detail, as the Secretary may require:
(1) The legal capacity in which the person filing the report is acting with respect to the monetary instruments transported.
(2) The origin, destination, and route of the transportation.
(3) Where the monetary instruments are not legally and beneficially owned by the person transporting the same, or are transported for any purpose other than the use in his own behalf of the person transporting the same, the identities of the person from whom the monetary instruments are received, or to whom they are to be delivered, or both.
(4) The amounts and types of monetary instruments transported.
The penalty for the violation of § 1101 is found at 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (recodified at 31 U.S.C. 5322 (1982)), which provides § 1058. Criminal penalty
Whoever willfully violates any provision of this chapter or any regulation under this chapter shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
These provisions were recodified substantially unchanged.

. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(b) (1983) provides that reports "shall be filed ... at the time of departure" (emphasis added).

. That an informant has in the past given reliable information increases the trustworthiness of the current information not only because of the inference from past conduct but also because the more the informant is known to the police the more likely that the statutory sanction for making a false statement to the police, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001, could be imposed.

. While in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-530, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1831-33, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), the Supreme Court did not apply Cort to determine whether Congress intended suppression as a remedy for a statutory violation, there the court was engaged in statutory construction of an express suppression remedy in the wiretapping provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2516, et seq. Giordano thus supports the proposition I put forth in this section; i.e., that whether Congress intends a remedy, and the scope of the remedy Congress intends to authorize, should be the preliminary questions. The only question the Giordano court addressed was whether Congress intended the suppression of evidence for violation of the wiretapping provisions even though no constitutional violation had occurred. The Court indulged in no presumptions one way or the other, but merely parsed the statutory language and the legislative history with an eye to giving effect to all sections of the wiretap law. Id. at 526-528, 94 S.Ct. at 1832. The Court also quoted that portion of the legislative history showing that Congress intended to incorporate the holding of Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937) (suppressing evidence seized in violation of the wiretap law, though not discussing source of Court’s power to do so.) Id. at 529, 94 S.Ct. at 1833.

. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 292, 100 L.Ed. 233 (1956); Nardone, supra.