Court Opinion

ID: 9373087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:39.223627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.221508
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SHERYL EVON CHAPMAN,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-1221-17-0376-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: January 18, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sheryl Evon Chapman, Jacksonville, Florida, pro se.

           Judith A. Fishel, APO, APO/FPO Europe, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
     with this Remand Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2         The appellant previously held a GS-13 Human Resources Specialist position
     with the agency in Wiesbaden, Germany. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 12.
     In August 2016, the agency proposed her removal for (1) declining a Priority
     Placement Program offer and (2) failure to abide by the terms of a rotational
     agreement.   Id. at 12-14.    After receiving her response, the deciding official
     upheld the removal, effective October 2016. Id. at 16-18.
¶3         On March 12, 2017, the appellant filed the instant appeal. IAF, Tab 1. The
     administrative judge construed it as an IRA appeal and provided the
     corresponding jurisdictional burden. IAF, Tab 3. He ordered the appellant to file
     a statement, accompanied by evidence, listing the following: (1) her protected
     disclosures or activities; (2) the dates she made the disclosures or engaged in the
     activities; (3) the individuals to whom she made any disclosures; (4) why her
     belief in the truth of any disclosures was reasonable; (5) the actions the agency
     took or failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take, against her because of
     her disclosures or activities; (6) why she believed a disclosure or activity, or a
     perception of such a disclosure or activity, was a contributing factor to the
     actions; and (7) the date of her complaint to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
     and the date that it notified her it was terminating its investigation of her
     complaint, or if she had not received such notice, evidence that 120 days have
     passed since she filed her complaint with OSC. Id. at 7.
¶4         Pursuant to the jurisdictional order, the appellant had until March 24, 2017,
     to respond. Id. at 1, 7. Within that deadline, the appellant submitted several
     pieces of correspondence with OSC. IAF, Tabs 7, 9-10. Several days after her
     jurisdictional deadline, the appellant filed a narrative jurisdictional argument.
     IAF, Tab 11. The agency submitted a timely response. Compare IAF, Tab 3 at 7,
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     with IAF, Tab 5 at 3, Tab 8 at 1, Tab 12. Despite the administrative judge’s
     instruction that the record on jurisdiction was then closed, IAF, Tab 3 at 7 -8, the
     appellant filed a reply, IAF, Tab 13, which the administrative judge did not
     consider, IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 3.
¶5         Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge dismissed
     the appellant’s IRA appeal. ID. The appellant has filed a petition for review.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR
     File, Tab 3.
¶6         To establish jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, an appellant must show by
     preponderant evidence that she exhausted her remedies before OSC, and make
     nonfrivolous allegations that (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
     was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
     personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 2 Corthell v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016). A nonfrivolous allegation is
     one that (1) is more than conclusory, (2) is plausible on its face, and (3) is
     material to the legal issues in the appeal.         5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).       In cases
     involving multiple alleged protected disclosures and per sonnel actions, an
     appellant establishes Board jurisdiction over her IRA appeal when she makes a
     nonfrivolous allegation that at least one alleged personnel action was taken in

     2
        In the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order, he provided the complete
     jurisdictional standard for an IRA appeal such as this, discussing both
     section 2302(b)(8) and section 2302(b)(9). IAF, Tab 3 at 2-3. However, in the initial
     decision, the administrative judge’s explanation of the Board’s jurisdictional limitations
     referred only to disclosures protected under section 2302(b)(8), without acknowledging
     that activities protected by section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) may also fall
     within the Board’s purview. ID at 3. On remand, the administrative judge should
     ensure that he utilizes the complete jurisdictional standard, concerning both disclosures
     protected by section 2302(b)(8) and activities protected by section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
     (B), (C), or (D).
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     reprisal for at least one alleged protected disclosure. Baldwin v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 6 (2010).

     The administrative judge improperly dismissed the appellant’s IRA appeal.
¶7         Although the administrative judge described the initial decision as a
     dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, we find that the decision is, in essence, a
     dismissal for failure to prosecute.     The administrative judge found that the
     appellant proved the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) but failed
     to meet the remaining portion of her jurisdictional burden —nonfrivolous
     allegations of protected disclosures or activities that were a contributing fa ctor in
     the decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. ID at 3 -7. However, in
     reaching that conclusion, the administrative judge explained that the appellant
     failed to comply with the specific requirements of his order, listed above, and
     instead presented only vague and conclusory assertions, unaccompanied by
     affidavit or other evidence.       ID at 6-7; supra ¶ 3.         More notably, the
     administrative judge relied only on the appellant’s deficient narrative response,
     without considering any of the allegations described in her correspondence with
     OSC. ID at 6-7.
¶8         The administrative judge was correct to note that the appellant did not
     comply with the instructions in his jurisdictional order. Compare IAF, Tab 3 at 7,
     with IAF, Tab 11 at 4-5. The appellant’s narrative response essentially recites the
     jurisdictional standard for this IRA appeal and asserts that she met that standard,
     without complying with the administrative judge’s specific instructions or
     providing any substantive explanation. IAF, Tab 11 at 4-5. However, that single
     failure does not warrant a dismissal for failure to prosecute. Compare Toombs v.
     Department of the Army, 69 M.S.P.R. 78, 81 (1995) (recognizing that an
     administrative judge should not dismiss for failure to prosecute based on an
     appellant’s failure to comply with a single order), with Heckman v. Department of
     the Interior, 106 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 16 (2007) (affirming a dismissal for failure to
     prosecute when the appellant failed to comply with multiple orders and warnings
                                                                                          5

      over a period of more than 2 months). Therefore, we find that it was improper for
      the administrative judge to dismiss the appellant’s appeal, without considering
      her OSC submissions to determine whether they satisfied her jurisdictional
      burden. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589
      (1980) (recognizing that an initial decision must, inter alia, summarize the
      evidence and identify all material issues of fact and law).

      On remand, the appellant must comply with the administrative judge’s order and
      meet her jurisdictional burden.
¶9          OSC’s January 2017 closeout letter provides the most succinct explanation
      of the allegations before it. IAF, Tab 7 at 2-3. The closeout letter described the
      appellant’s alleged protected disclosures or activities as follows:
            [Y]ou alleged retaliation for disclosing that your supervisors were
            violating agency regulations concerning the approval and
            documentation of overseas tour extensions, that the Deputy Chief of
            Staff did not have the authority to approve exceptions to bypass
            selections of candidates entitled to military spouse preference . . .,
            and filing complaints with the Office of Inspector G eneral . . . . In
            addition, you declined to provide false data on overseas tour
            extensions to command leadership and develop a Staff Action
            Summary . . . for approval of overseas tour extensions that was
            inconsistent with controlling Department of Defense . . . regulations.
      Id. at 2. OSC’s closeout described the alleged retaliatory activities as follows:
            You asserted that your duties, responsibilities, and working
            conditions were changed in retaliation. For example, you were
            assigned GS-7 grade level duties, you were denied computer access
            and attendance at meetings, you experienced issues with your work
            station, and several of your emails were deleted. You further alleged
            that you were not approved to attend training, your overseas tour was
            not extended, you were not selected for a Human Resources . . .
            Specialist position, your request for Voluntary Early Retirement
            Authority . . . /Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment . . . was
            denied, and you were removed from your position.
      Id.
¶10         While the aforementioned explanation provides some pertinent details, it
      does not include others. For example, it does not clearly explain to whom the
                                                                                          6

      appellant made her disclosures, who was aware of those disclosures or other
      activities that might be protected, and whether or to what extent those individuals
      may have been involved in the alleged retaliatory personnel actions. Although we
      reviewed the documents submitted by the appellant in search of those details, that
      correspondence is difficult to follow.     For example, the appellant repeatedly
      refers to individuals and agency components by abbreviation, such as “G1” and
      “HDQA,” without clearly identifying who or what they are or how they may have
      contributed to any alleged personnel actions. E.g., IAF, Tab 10 at 6. Moreover,
      it appears that the appellant may have intended to pursue only some of the
      allegations presented to OSC in the instant appeal. For example, in her OSC
      complaint, the appellant appears to have attributed the alleged retaliation to six
      agency officials, including her immediate supervisor and the proposing official to
      her removal. IAF, Tab 9 at 7, Tab 12 at 12-14. By contrast, in her petition for
      review, the appellant appears to attribute the alleged retaliation to only one
      individual, whose role in any alleged personnel action is less clear. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 4.
¶11         Because the appellant failed to comply with the adminis trative judge’s
      order, it remains unclear what allegations the appellant intends to pursue in the
      instant IRA appeal and whether those allegations are within the Board’s
      jurisdiction.   IAF, Tab 3 at 7.     On remand, the administrative judge should
      provide the appellant with a second opportunity to comply with his order and
      satisfy her jurisdictional burden.     The order should warn of the potential
      consequences for failing to comply. See generally Morris v. Department of the
      Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 11 (2016) (discussing the Board’s regulations
      pertaining to a party’s failure to comply with an order or failure to prosecute).
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                                          ORDER
¶12        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.