Court Opinion

ID: 9913815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 20:07:07.602614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:03.910933
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Jodka v. Toledo, 2023-Ohio-4796.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

                                               SAM JODKA,

                                         Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                     v.

                                        CITY OF TOLEDO,

                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                             Case No. L-23-1108

                                     Civil Appeal from the
                         Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio
                                    Case No. CI0202002400

                                         BEFORE:
                Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.
                            Seventh District Court of Appeals,
                                  Sitting by Assignment

                                                JUDGMENT:
                                                  Affirmed.

Atty. Andrew R. Mayle, Atty. Benjamin Padanilam, for Plaintiff-Appellant and

Atty. Dale R. Emch, Director of Law, Atty. Jeffrey B. Charles, Chief of Litigation, Atty
Tammy G. Lavalette, Senior Attorney, Atty. John T. Madigan, Senior Attorney for
Defendant-Appellee.

                                     Dated: December 27, 2023
                                                                                      –2–

Robb, J.

       {¶1}   Appellant, Sam Jodka, appeals the April 24, 2023 judgment issued by the
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granting Appellee, City of Toledo, summary
judgment. Appellant argues the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of res judicata
and finding Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Instead, Appellant
claims these defenses are inapplicable because the underlying administrative
proceedings were contrary to law and a nullity.
       {¶2}   For the following reasons, we affirm.
                               Statement of the Facts and Case
       {¶3}   Appellant filed his class action complaint on June 25, 2020 on behalf of
himself and those similarly situated against the city of Toledo. Appellant alleged that
Toledo’s traffic camera ordinance was invalid in whole or in part. Claiming the city lacked
jurisdiction and the authority to act, among other things, Appellant claimed Toledo should
not retain the benefit of its unlawful traffic camera tickets and administrative process.
Thus, Appellant sought restitution on behalf of himself and the putative class. (June 5,
2020 Complaint.)
       {¶4}   Appellee filed its answer, which did not include the affirmative defenses of
res judicata or the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (August 17, 2020 Answer.)
       {¶5}   After the initial status hearing, the trial court set summary judgment and
discovery deadlines, and scheduled the case for trial on December 6, 2021. (September
3, 2020 Pretrial Order.)
       {¶6}   Appellant’s violation or Notice of Liability Number SH00388708 was issued
on November 6, 2019 for a speeding violation. It consists of four pages. The notice page
identifies Samual J. Jodka and alleges the depicted vehicle was registered to Sara Jodka
and was traveling 80 mph in a 60 mph zone in violation of Toledo Municipal Code Section
313.12. (January 12, 2021 Motion for Leave to File Notice of Liability Instanter.)
       {¶7}   The instruction page of the notice states the driver/owner has three options:
Payment, Affidavit, or Right to a Hearing. Option “A Payment” indicates no points will be
assessed and no record of the violation will be sent to the driver/owner’s insurance. It
also sets forth options and directions for payment.       Option “B Affidavit” states the

Case No. L-23-1108
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owner/driver can submit an “Affidavit of Non-Responsibility” identifying the actual driver
of the vehicle on the date in question or if the vehicle was stolen. Option “C Right to a
Hearing” provides to “have the matter reviewed by a Hearing Officer you must * * *
Complete [the] Request for Hearing Coupon” and mail or hand deliver it to the Toledo
Police Traffic Section by December 11, 2019. (January 12, 2021 Motion for Leave to File
Notice of Liability Instanter.)
       {¶8}    The Options Page is divided into three boxes corresponding with the three
options designed to be completed by the owner/driver. The first box is for Option A and
is titled “Payment Coupon”. The second box is a form affidavit by which the owner of the
vehicle could attest that her vehicle was driven by another on the date of the violation or
that the vehicle or license plate was stolen.       The third box is labeled “OPTION C:
HEARING REQUEST”.            It states in part, “Complete ONLY if you want a hearing
scheduled”. (January 12, 2021 Motion for Leave to File Notice of Liability Instanter.)
       {¶9}    It is undisputed that Appellant paid the $120 fine. (Affidavit of Sam Jodka.)
Thus, he chose option A.
       {¶10} On November 25, 2020, Appellant moved for partial summary judgment,
seeking the court to determine the Toledo ordinance was legally invalid as of July 3, 2019
and he is entitled to restitution. Appellant alleged he was entitled to restitution since
Toledo Municipal Code (TMC) Section 313.12 was invalid as of July 3, 2019 when R.C.
1901.20 was amended and gave “exclusive jurisdiction” over civil speeding violation
adjudications to municipal courts, not the municipality. Appellant’s traffic violation is dated
September 12, 2019. Appellant urged the trial court to find the section previously deemed
invalid by the Ohio Supreme Court was not severable, thus the whole provision was
invalid. Appellant also contends his violation of TMC 313.12 is a nullity since the
ordinance is invalid because it contravened the municipal court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
In his affidavit in support of his motion, Appellant states in part he “paid the $120 financial
sanction * * *.” (November 25, 2020 Partial Summary Judgment Motion.)
       {¶11} The court subsequently approved the parties’ joint stipulation and agreed to
address the merits of the parties’ summary judgment motions before proceeding with
“class discovery” and class-certification issues. (December 10, 2020 Order.)

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       {¶12} Appellee filed a combined motion for summary judgment and opposition to
Appellant’s summary judgment motion. As grounds, Appellee claimed Appellant failed to
exhaust the available administrative remedies; he lacked standing to bring an unjust
enrichment claim; and the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to address his claim. (December 23, 2020 Motion for Summary Judgment.)
       {¶13} The trial court granted Appellee’s first summary judgment motion in part on
May 25, 2021. It overruled Appellant’s summary judgment motion, and it granted the
city’s motion in part, finding Appellee failed to assert the affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. It also held Appellant lacked standing to bring the
unjust enrichment claim since he paid the applicable fine and did not avail himself of the
applicable quasi-judicial process.     However, the trial court denied the city’s motion
regarding Appellant’s second claim for class action certification.          (May 25, 2021
Judgment.)
       {¶14} Appellee subsequently moved to amend its complaint to add the affirmative
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which the trial court granted the
next day. (June 16, 2021 Motion for Leave & June 16, 2021 Order.) Appellant opposed,
asserting Appellee should not be allowed to add this defense, especially in light of the
court’s denial of summary judgment based on Appellee’s failure to assert it.
       {¶15} Appellant then appealed the court’s summary judgment decision to this
court, which we dismissed as lacking a final, appealable order because the court’s
judgment did not dispose of all claims. (March 9, 2022 Order.)
       {¶16} Thereafter, Appellee filed a motion for leave to file a second amended
answer to add the defense of res judicata.         (January 23, 2022 Motion.)      Appellant
opposed, but the trial court allowed the amendment.
       {¶17} Appellee filed a new motion for summary judgment and raised several
arguments. Appellee first alleged it had secured a preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), among other sections affected by House Bill 62.
Appellee also sought summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata and the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, lack of standing, and political subdivision immunity.
Attached as Exhibit A to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment is the June 23, 2019
Opinion issued by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in case number

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                                                                                       –5–

CI0201802922 captioned City of Toledo vs. the State of Ohio. Among other things, it
grants a preliminary injunction and enjoins the state from enforcing R.C. 1901.20(A)(1),
pending a resolution of the case on the merits. (March 13, 2023 Motion, Exhibit A.)
       {¶18} Appellant opposed summary judgment, arguing in part that he was not a
party to the injunction litigation and that TMC 313.12 is unconstitutional in whole or part.
The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. It concluded that Appellant
has standing to bring the claims asserted. Relying on the decision in Lycan v. Cleveland,
2022-Ohio-4676, recon. denied, 169 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2023-Ohio-554, 203 N.E.3d 744,
it also held res judicata applied and Appellant failed to exhaust the available
administrative process. The trial court likewise dismissed Appellant’s class action claim,
impliedly found the violative provision in the ordinance was severable, and concluded
there is no just cause for delay. The trial court did not address the parties’ arguments
regarding the injunction or immunity. (April 24, 2023 Order.)
                                       Assignment of Error
       {¶19} Appellant raises one assigned error on appeal, which asserts:
       “Citing the res judicata and exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrines, the
trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Toledo when it should have granted
partial summary judgment to Jodka because the nominal ‘administrative remedy’ that the
city relies upon here is invalid: ‘R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) expressly vests exclusive jurisdiction
over noncriminal traffic-law adjudications in the municipal courts. Toledo therefore has no
Jurisdiction to conduct its own quasi-judicial proceedings.’ State ex rel Magsig v. Toledo,
160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, ¶ 20.”
       {¶20} Appellant divides his assignment of error into three main arguments. His
first argument contends the trial court erroneously applied the defenses of res judicata
and failure to exhaust. Second, Appellant claims the trial court erred by allowing Appellee
to add these defenses after it had already addressed the parties’ summary judgment
arguments and found these defenses were inapplicable because they were not raised.
Last, Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying his motion for partial summary
judgment.
       {¶21} We review Appellant’s argument about the motions to amend Appellee’s
answer first.

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                              Motions to Amend Appellee’s Answer
        {¶22} Trial courts have broad discretion when addressing a motion to amend the
pleadings. Wilmington Steel Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 60 Ohio
St.3d 120, 122, 573 N.E.2d 622 (1991). Thus, we do not substitute our judgment for the
trial court’s but may reverse only when the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable. Id. quoting Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482
N.E.2d 1248 (1985).
        {¶23} Motions to amend pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 15(A), which states in
part:
        A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-
        eight days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to which a responsive
        pleading is required within twenty-eight days after service of a responsive
        pleading or twenty-eight days after service of a motion under Civ.R. 12(B),
        (E), or (F), whichever is earlier. In all other cases, a party may amend its
        pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.
        The court shall freely give leave when justice so requires.
Appellee’s motion to amend was filed well beyond the time for doing so under the rule,
and it did not obtain Appellant’s counsel’s consent. Thus, the city needed leave of court.
Id.
        {¶24} “[T]he language of Civ.R. 15(A) favors a liberal amendment policy and a
motion for leave to amend should be granted absent a finding of bad faith, undue delay
or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 465
N.E.2d 377 (1984), holding modified by Jim's Steak House, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 81
Ohio St.3d 18, 688 N.E.2d 506 (1998).
        {¶25} As Appellant contends, the parties had already filed competing motions for
summary judgment, which the trial court ruled on. It determined in part that Appellee had
failed to assert the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust. Thereafter, the trial court
allowed Appellee to amend its answer twice, once before the initial notice of appeal and
once after. The trial court granted Appellee leave to add these affirmative defenses. The
first leave to amend its answer was granted nine months after the city’s initial answer, and
the second leave was granted 17 months after Appellee’s first answer.

Case No. L-23-1108
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       {¶26} In Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 465 N.E.2d 377 (1984), the Ohio
Supreme Court found the “Appellants were not prejudiced by the addition of the * * *
defense [because] they faced no obstacles by the amendment which they would not have
faced had the original pleading raised the defense.” Id. at 6. Like Hoover, Appellant does
not identify an additional obstacle caused by the delay.
       {¶27} Although we may disagree with the trial court’s decision to do so after
denying summary judgment in part for the failure to raise this defense of failure to exhaust,
we cannot conclude that its decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Thus, Appellant’s
first argument lacks merit.
                      Toledo Municipal Code 313.20 & Relevant Caselaw
       {¶28} Appellant’s remaining arguments involve TMC 313.20 and relevant
caselaw.
       {¶29} TMC 313.12, as detailed in the trial court’s April 24, 2023 judgment,
governing automated red light and speeding civil violations, provides in pertinent part:
       [(a)](2) The City of Toledo Division of Transportation, the Toledo Police
       Department, and the Toledo Department of Law shall be responsible for
       administering the Automated Red Light and Speeding System. * * *
       ***
       (3) A citation for an automated red light and speeding system violation
       pursuant to this Section, known as a “Notice of Liability” shall:
       A. Be processed by officials or agents of the City of Toledo;
       ***
       C. Clearly state the manner in which the violation may be appealed.
       ***
       (c) Offense.
       ***
       (2) The owner of a vehicle, or the party named per TMC Subsection
       313.12(c)(4)A, shall be liable for a penalty imposed pursuant to this Section
       if such vehicle is operated at a speed in excess of those set forth in TMC
       Section 333.03.
       ***

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       (d) Penalty; Administrative Appeal.
       ***
       (2) Any violation of subsection (c)(2) herein shall be deemed a noncriminal
       violation for which a civil penalty of $120.00 shall be assessed and for which
       no points authorized by Ohio R.C. 4507.021 * * * shall be assigned * * *.
       ***
       (4) A notice of appeal shall be filed with the Hearing Officer within twenty-
       one (21) days from the date listed on the “Notice of Liability.” The failure to
       give notice of appeal or pay the civil penalty within this time period shall
       constitute a waiver of the right to contest the citation and will be considered
       an admission. Appeals shall be heard through an administrative process
       established by the City of Toledo Police Department. A decision in favor of
       the City of Toledo may be enforced by means of a civil action or any other
       means provided by the Ohio Revised Code.
       {¶30} This section was challenged and critically analyzed by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474. Bradley
Walker, appellee, received a notice of liability for a traffic violation under TMC 313.12,
and he paid the city $120 without pursuing an administrative appeal. He then filed a class-
action complaint against Toledo and Redflex for unjust enrichment, seeking their
disgorgement of all civil penalties.         The complaint asserted TMC 313.12 is
unconstitutional because it usurps the jurisdiction of the municipal court, is
unconstitutionally vague, and violates due process. Appellants filed motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6),
which the trial court granted. Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39
N.E.3d 474, ¶ 10. Although the Supreme Court in its decision acknowledges that Walker
did not file an administrative appeal from his citation, this case does not discuss the
defenses of failure to exhaust or res judicata since it was reviewing a motion to dismiss.
Thus, we do not rely on it for authority for these issues.
       {¶31} The court in Walker held in part:
       [M]unicipalities have home-rule authority under Article XVIII of the Ohio
       Constitution to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an

Case No. L-23-1108
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       administrative enforcement system * * *; R.C. 1901.20, which sets the
       jurisdiction of municipal courts, do[es] not endow municipal courts with
       exclusive authority over civil administrative enforcement of traffic-law
       violations.     Finally, we hold that Ohio municipalities have home-rule
       authority to establish administrative proceedings, including administrative
       hearings, related to civil enforcement of traffic ordinances, and that these
       administrative proceedings must be exhausted before offenders or the
       municipality can pursue judicial remedies.
Id. at ¶ 3. Walker was decided December 18, 2014.
       {¶32} In response, the legislature amended R.C. 1901.20 with the changes
effective as of July 3, 2019. R.C. 1901.20 now states:
       (A)(1) The municipal court has jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor cases
       committed within its territory and has jurisdiction over the violation of any
       ordinance of any municipal corporation within its territory, including
       exclusive jurisdiction over every civil action concerning a violation of a state
       traffic law or a municipal traffic ordinance.
       ***
       (D) As used in this section, “violation of a state traffic law or a municipal
       traffic ordinance” includes, but is not limited to, a traffic law violation
       recorded by a traffic law photo-monitoring device, as defined in section
       4511.092 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) now gives exclusive jurisdiction to municipal
courts, unlike when Walker was decided.
       {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court again addressed TMC 313.12 in State ex rel.
Magsig v. Toledo, 160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, 156 N.E.3d 899, after the July 3,
2019 amendments. In Magsig, the Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition preventing
the city of Toledo from conducting its own quasi-judicial proceedings. The relator Susan
Magsig received a notice of liability indicating she had a speeding violation. Magsig
requested a hearing, and before the hearing commenced, she filed suit seeking a writ of
prohibition to prevent Toledo from conducting the administrative hearing because the city
lacked jurisdiction.

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       {¶34} Magsig challenged the validity of TMC 313.12, which sets forth the city’s
civil-enforcement system for speeding-camera violations, among other things.                  The
Supreme Court held in part: “Toledo’s patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction to
carry out its red-light and speeding-camera civil-enforcement system is clear on the face
of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1).” Id. at ¶ 7. The court in Magsig further explained:
       R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended by H.B. 62, provides that a municipal court
       ‘has jurisdiction over the violation of any ordinance of any municipal
       corporation within its territory, including exclusive jurisdiction over every civil
       action concerning a violation of a state traffic law or a municipal traffic
       ordinance.’    (Emphasis added.)       The express language of the statute
       confers exclusive jurisdiction on the municipal courts to adjudicate civil
       actions for municipal traffic-law violations. Toledo's ordinance allowing an
       administrative-hearing officer to adjudicate noncriminal traffic-law violations
       contravenes the statute's plain language.
       ***
       R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) expressly vests exclusive jurisdiction over noncriminal
       traffic-law adjudications in the municipal courts. Toledo therefore has no
       jurisdiction to conduct its own quasi-judicial proceedings.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 8, 20.
       {¶35} The Supreme Court in Magsig did not find that the violation or notice of
liability under TMC 313.12 was unlawful or invalid. Magsig did not conclude the city of
Toledo lacked jurisdiction or authority to issue the speeding violation or accept payment
for a violation. Instead, Magsig found the administrative appeal process set forth in TMC
313.12(d)(4) violated R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended July 3, 2019.
       {¶36} In a similar action for a writ of prohibition before the Ohio Supreme Court
involving a speeding violation with an administrative appeal process governed by the
municipality, the court acknowledged this in dicta stating:
       Magsig does not declare traffic citations such as that involved here invalid;
       it holds only that the challenges must be heard by the municipal court and
       that municipalities have no jurisdiction to conduct their own quasi-judicial
       proceedings. 160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, 156 N.E.3d 899, at ¶

Case No. L-23-1108
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       20. So, [the vehicle owner] is not entitled to have her traffic citation
       “dismissed.”
State ex rel. Maxwell v. Brice, 167 Ohio St.3d 137, 2021-Ohio-4333, 189 N.E.3d 771, ¶
31. The court in Maxwell denied the writ and found the issue was moot since the village
had stopped holding administrative hearings on traffic citations. Id. at ¶ 31-33. The
Supreme Court was not concerned with the fact that the village continued to issue
citations. Id.
       {¶37} In Wright v. Brice, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-320, 2021-Ohio-2246, ¶ 10,
the Tenth District Court of Appeals found a hearing officer’s decision regarding a driver’s
violation was void in light of the decision in Magsig. The violation in Wright was issued
after the July 3, 2019 amendment to R.C. 1901.20. Thus, Wright’s appeal to the trial court
was construed as a motion to vacate a void judgment. Id. at ¶ 17. The appellate court
vacated the municipal hearing officer’s decision for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Because the municipality lacked jurisdiction to appoint a municipal hearing officer to
oversee administrative appeals, the hearing officer’s decision was a nullity. The court did
not invalidate the violation, but only the hearing officer’s decision. Id. ¶ 17-18.
                  Res Judicata & Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
       {¶38} Appellant asserts the trial court erroneously applied the defenses of res
judicata and failure to exhaust since the available administrative remedies were invalid
as of July 3, 2019 when the amendments to R.C. 1901.20 became effective and gave
“exclusive jurisdiction” to municipal courts. He claims any hearing officer appointed by
the city lacked jurisdiction to preside over an administrative appeal from the imposition of
a civil speeding violation, and as such, Appellant’s failure to exhaust an invalid
administrative proceeding is of no consequence.
       {¶39} The application of res judicata is a question of law, which we review de
novo. Lycan v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676, recon. denied, 169 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2023-
Ohio-554, 203 N.E.3d 744. Whether a claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is also a question of law that we review de novo. San Allen, Inc.
v. Buehrer, 2014-Ohio-2071, 11 N.E.3d 739, ¶ 64, (8th Dist.), cause dismissed sub nom.,
143 Ohio St.3d 1408, 2015-Ohio-2755, 34 N.E.3d 135.

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       {¶40} One’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense,
which the defendant has the burden of proving. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Kent State
Univ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-822, 2010-Ohio-2906, ¶ 48. However, “[w]here an
administrative agency has no power to afford the relief sought or an administrative appeal
would otherwise be futile, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to
seeking judicial relief.” San Allen, Inc. v. Buehrer, supra, at ¶ 64.
       {¶41} As stated, the municipality’s administrative appeal process was illegal and
invalid as of July 3, 2019 with the amendment of R.C. 1901.20. Thus, we do not find
Appellant’s failure to avail himself of the invalid appeal process after he received a notice
of violation in November of 2019 warrants dismissing his claims. Instead, the defense of
exhaustion of remedies does not apply since Appellant’s failure to appeal would have
been futile. Id. When an administrative body lacks the power to afford relief, the failure
to exhaust defense is inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 74.
       {¶42} In light of the determination that the administrative appeal process has been
found to violate R.C. 1901.20, we cannot find Appellant’s claim should be barred for failure
to avail himself of this process. Thus, we find the argument that Appellant failed to
exhaust the available administrative remedies inapplicable since the remedies were a
nullity. The municipalities lacked authority to preside over administrative appeals of civil
traffic penalties. See Maxwell v. Brice and Wright v. Brice, supra.
       {¶43} However, this determination does not preclude the application of res
judicata. While the quasi-judicial appeal process detailed in TMC 313.20 was determined
to be invalid, the citation or notice of liability was not. Appellant contends the citation is
invalid because the appeal of the citation to the municipality’s hearing officer was illegal,
unconstitutional, and contrary to law. We disagree.
       {¶44} As the court in Wright v. Brice noted, effective July 3, 2019, municipal courts
have the authority to review civil-enforcement speeding violations. Because Appellant
paid the violation and did not seek to challenge it in the applicable municipal court, res
judicata or issue preclusion applies. Thus, we conclude Appellant’s act of paying the fine
in the Notice of Liability ended the controversy. His payment admitted liability.
       In Ohio, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related
       concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by

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       judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” O'Nesti
       v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d
       803, ¶ 6. “Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same
       parties or their privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction
       that was the subject matter of a previous action.” Id. The previous action is
       conclusive for all claims that were or that could have been litigated in the
       first action. See Holzemer v. Urbanski (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 129, 133, 712
       N.E.2d 713.
State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 121 Ohio St.3d 526, 2009-
Ohio-1704, 905 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 27.
       Res judicata should not to be rigidly applied “‘when fairness and justice
       would not support it.’ State ex rel. Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d
       231, 2009-Ohio-786, 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30, citing Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores,
       Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491, 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (res judicata is not to
       be so rigidly applied as to defeat the ends of justice or to create an
       injustice).”
AJZ's Hauling, L.L.C. v. TruNorth Warranty Programs of N. America, --N.E.3d --, 2023-
Ohio-3097, ¶ 18. The doctrine should not be employed when its application results in a
manifest injustice or when it contravenes an overriding public policy. Id.
       {¶45} The four elements of res judicata or claim preclusion are (1) a prior valid
judgment on the merits; (2) a second action involving the same parties; (3) the second
action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the first; and (4) both actions
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Sheridan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 182
Ohio App.3d 107, 2009-Ohio-1808, 911 N.E.2d 950, ¶ 12, (10th Dist.) citing Reasoner v.
Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-800, 2005-Ohio-468, ¶ 5, and Grava v. Parkman
Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381-382, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995).
       {¶46} The fact that the administrative remedies were already deemed illegal and
invalid is of no consequence because Appellant did not invoke them or any appeal
process. Moreover, there is no dispute that the current action involves the same parties
and arises from the same occurrence. Further, Appellant’s payment of the violation
without appealing to the municipal court acts as a valid prior judgment.

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       {¶47} Appellant admitted liability by paying the citation and took no further action
until filing suit for unjust enrichment. This is not a case where the illegal quasi-judicial
process was invoked or triggered, which would have resulted in an invalid decision from
a municipality hearing officer. Instead, Appellant lodged no challenge and admitted
liability. Thus, the aspect of the statute that was contrary to law was inapplicable. TMC
313.12(d)(4).
       {¶48} This result is consistent with that in Lycan v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676,
recon. denied, 169 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2023-Ohio-554, 203 N.E.3d 744. In Lycan, the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded the doctrine of res judicata applied to challenges to a similar
ordinance by drivers who paid their fines. The court in Lycan explained in part: “That
appellees decided to take a shortcut in the administrative process does not mean that
they did not participate in the process. They chose an available route: to not dispute their
tickets and pay their fines. And in doing so, they ended the case between themselves
and the city.” Id. at ¶ 27. Lycan expressly found the payment of the violation coupled
with the failure to challenge it satisfied the res judicata requirement of “a prior final, valid
decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction * * *.” Id. at ¶ 29.
       {¶49} In light of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court and find Appellant’s
cause of action for unjust enrichment is precluded by res judicata.
                        Constitutionality of TMC 313.12 after July 3, 2019
       {¶50} Appellant’s final argument contends the trial court erred by denying him
partial summary judgment. He claims TMC 313.12 is unconstitutional and the citation
issued to him after July 3, 2019 is a nullity. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
Appellee and impliedly overruled Appellant’s arguments. (April 24, 2023 Judgment.)
       {¶51} Municipal ordinances are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality,
and the burden is on the party challenging the ordinance to prove it is unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt. Hudson v. Albrecht, 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 458 N.E.2d 852
(1984), and State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17.
       {¶52} Appellant wants us to determine he is entitled to unjust enrichment
because the Toledo Municipal Code did not afford him a legal or viable option to challenge
the speeding violation. His argument to the trial court alleged TMC Section 313.12 was
invalid as of July 3, 2019 when R.C. 1901.20 was amended and gave “exclusive

Case No. L-23-1108
                                                                                       – 15 –

jurisdiction” over civil speeding violation adjudications to municipal courts, not the
municipality. Appellant’s traffic violation is dated September 12, 2019. Appellant urged
the trial court to find the section previously deemed invalid by the Ohio Supreme Court
was not severable, thus the whole section was invalid. Appellant also contends his
violation of TMC 313.12 is a nullity. (November 25, 2020 Partial Summary Judgment
Motion.)
       {¶53} We disagree. As stated, the appeals process in TMC 313 was found to
violate R.C. 1901.20—the city’s authority to issue the violation was not invalidated. In
Magsig, the court concluded the adjudication aspect of TMC 313.20 authorizing a city
hearing officer to preside over appeals violated R.C. 1901.20(A)(1). Id. The Supreme
Court reiterated this conclusion in State ex rel. Maxwell v. Brice, 167 Ohio St.3d 137,
2021-Ohio-4333, 189 N.E.3d 771, ¶ 31, when noting the vehicle owner in that case was
“not entitled to have her traffic citation ‘dismissed.’”
       {¶54} Furthermore, after the July 3, 2019 amendment to R.C. 1901.20, Appellant
could have appealed his violation to the municipal court. He did not. Res judicata
precludes the litigation of a claim that was or could have been raised in a prior proceeding.
Clinton Tp. Bd. of Trustees v. Yackee, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-03-001, 2003-Ohio-5180, ¶
19-22. Appellant’s payment of the violation and failure to challenge it preclude him from
doing so now.
       {¶55} Thus, this aspect of Appellant’s assigned error lacks merit and is overruled.
                                              Conclusion
       {¶56} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s assigned error has merit in part. It has
merit to the extent the trial court employed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It lacks merit, however, because the trial court did not err granting summary
judgment on the basis of res judicata and not finding Appellant’s violation invalid.
       {¶57} Because Appellant paid the citation and admitted liability, his claims are
precluded by res judicata. Appellant’s act of paying the ticket ended the controversy
between the parties. Thus, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.

Case No. L-23-1108
[Cite as Jodka v. Toledo, 2023-Ohio-4796.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the
Appellant.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                       NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.