Court Opinion

ID: 9793272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:45:29.081628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:15.289119
License: Public Domain

LANKFORD, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree that the state failed to show a sufficient factual basis for defendant’s conviction under the resisting arrest statute, A.R.S. § 13-2508. While the prosecutor might easily have charged the defendant with a lesser crime under the circumstances, the factual basis is sufficient to convict defendant for resisting arrest.
I.
The facts recited by the prosecutor at the time of defendant’s change of plea are as follows.
St. Johns police officer Lloyd Wolfe observed defendant operating a motorcycle without a tail light. The officer, who was *115driving a marked police vehicle, attempted to stop the motorcycle. As Officer Wolfe did so, the defendant looked back at him and then sped away.
Officer Wolfe activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and siren. He and an officer in another police vehicle chased defendant at speeds between 70 and 80 miles per hour through a residential district. On one occasion, the defendant lost partial control of the motorcycle and entered a residence's yard. On two occasions, the police saw him drive through stop signs.
After a chase of several miles, the officers arrested defendant. Defendant did not offer any physical resistance to the officers. A subsequent search of defendant revealed a substance later determined to be marijuana.
Defense counsel argued at the change of plea hearing that there was an insufficient factual basis to find defendant guilty of resisting arrest. The trial judge disagreed and found that a factual basis for the plea existed and that the plea was knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made.
The statute which defines the offense, A.R.S. § 13-2508, states in pertinent part:
A. A person commits resisting arrest by intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent a person reasonably known to him to be a peace officer, acting under color of such peace officer’s official authority, from effecting an arrest by:
1. Using or threatening to use physical force against the peace officer or another; or
2, Using any other means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another.
(Emphasis added). Defendant was charged with resisting arrest under subsection (A)(2).
Whether flight by vehicle from a pursuing police officer constitutes resisting arrest appears to be an issue of first impression under this statute. In interpreting a statute, we look first to its language. Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., 145 Ariz. 374, 377, 701 P.2d 1182, 1185 (1985). The statutory elements of the offense under subsection (A)(2) are these:
(1) the effectuation of an arrest is prevented by defendant’s conduct;
(2) the interfering conduct is intentional;
(3) the attempt to arrest is by one reasonably known to the accused to be a peace officer and is acting as a peace officer;
(4) the interference is by means creating a substantial risk of physical injury to the officer or another.
In my judgment, a suspect’s flight is conduct which prevents the effectuation of an arrest. This interpretation of the statute flows from a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. See State v. Flores, 160 Ariz. 235, 240, 772 P.2d 589, 594 (App.1989) (words of statute given ordinary meaning unless from context it appears that a different meaning intended). This interpretation is also supported by the legislative policy and the historical background of the statute. See Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457, 752 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1988) (primary principle in statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent); Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 144 Ariz. 291, 294, 697 P.2d 684, 687 (1985) (legislative intent determined by considering policy behind statute); State v. Hoag, 165 Ariz. 215, 216, 797 P.2d 1233, 1234 (App.1990) (legislative intent determined by policy and historical background of statute).
As noted by the majority, our current resisting arrest statute was derived from Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 710-1026. The comment to the Hawaii statute suggests that mere flight from a pursuing police officer alone is not sufficient conduct to constitute this offense. Comment, Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 710-1026 (1985 replacement). Accord R. Gerber, Criminal Law of Arizona, § 13-2508 at p. 358 (1978); Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 242.2 at 214 (1980).
However, flight is an offense when it endangers a pursuing police officer or others. Hawaii’s statute accords with the Model Penal Code.2 Comment to Hawaii *116Rev.Stat. § 710-1026. In turn, the official commentary to the Model Penal Code specifically indicates that high-speed flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, unlike merely running away from a policeman, is an offense. The comment states that a resisting arrest statute like Arizona’s “reaches certain situations in which the circumstances of flight from arrest expose the pursuing officers to substantial danger.” Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra at 214.
The Arizona statute thus applies, as its language suggests, when two elements join: flight by the accused and resultant danger. It is beyond doubt that a high speed vehicular chase poses substantial risk both to the pursuing officers and other motorists, pedestrians and bystanders who may be present. The risk is particularly clear in this case, in which the pursuit traversed a residential neighborhood at speeds so great they exceeded even the permissible speeds for a controlled access interstate highway in a rural area.
I vigorously disagree with the suggestion that the danger to the pursuing police officer and others is the officer’s own doing. (See at 113, 847 P.2d at 614.) By the majority’s reasoning, police officers are not entitled to pursue a fleeing motorist when the chase is hazardous. To require the officer to cease pursuit encourages suspects to flee in a dangerous manner, thereby perverting the purpose of the statute. The statute is intended to deter such dangerous behavior by criminalizing it, not to handcuff peace officers seeking to effectuate an arrest.
Nor can I agree that the record lacks evidence that defendant used a “means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another.” A.R.S. § 13-2508(A)(2). Two police officers engaged in a high-speed chase of defendant through a residential district and on a route past two stop signs. The risk to the officers was obvious. While there is no evidence that others were present and subjected to a particular danger, it is the risk of injury to others which the statute forbids. The inference is strong that at least some residents were present in the residential neighborhood in which this chase took place. As the majority concedes, “the dangers [are] inherent in a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood ...” (At 114, 847 P.2d at 615). In my view, the evidence of the circumstances of the chase — including the location in an inhabited area — is sufficient to demonstrate substantial risk to others. Finally, even if the evidence were insufficient for this purpose, it is enough under the statute that the pursuing officers were endangered.
Although not clearly argued, defendant’s brief suggests that he cannot be convicted of resisting arrest because the initial attempt to make a traffic stop did not constitute an arrest. I agree that a peace officer who stops a vehicle for a traffic violation does not necessarily “arrest” the violator. See State v. Taras, 19 Ariz.App. 7, 9-10, 504 P.2d 548, 550-51 (1972). However, the attempt to stop this defendant was only the beginning of the events which transpired. Cf. State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 529, 582 P.2d 175 (1978) (sustaining defendant’s conviction for obstructing justice after officer’s pursuit of vehicle for erratic driving).
Defendant does not contest that the officer was entitled to stop defendant’s vehicle because of the missing or inoperable tail light. See A.R.S. §§ 28-925, 937, 939 (requiring rear lights on vehicles). Defendant responded to the officer’s effort to stop defendant’s vehicle by speeding away. The officer then used his lights and siren and pursued the defendant.
As soon as the officer activated his lights and siren, defendant’s continued attempt to elude the officer constituted unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, a class 5 felony pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-622.01. Defendant admitted his guilt to this offense and does not challenge the factual basis for it on appeal.
*117Having thus committed the offense of unlawful flight, defendant was clearly subject to arrest by the officer. When the officer ultimately effected the arrest, the defendant did not physically resist. However, actual custody is not required for the crime of resisting arrest to occur. To hold otherwise would reward successful resistance of lawful authority. This court has previously held that ultimately acceding to arrest did not exculpate a defendant who successfully resisted an earlier attempt to arrest him by making threats to a lone officer. State v. Harney, 128 Ariz. 355, 625 P.2d 944 (App.1981).
This defendant resisted arrest when he continued to elude the officer by dangerous high-speed flight after it became apparent that he was subject to arrest for unlawful flight. Whether an arrest has occurred “rests upon an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable man innocent of any crime would have thought he was being arrested if he had been in defendant’s shoes.” State v. Waicelunas, 138 Ariz. 16, 18, 672 P.2d 968, 970 (App.1983). Similarly, a person resists arrest when he prevents a peace officer from effecting what a reasonable person would believe is an attempt to arrest him.
The factual basis in this case is sufficient to satisfy this definition. Any reasonable person would believe he would be arrested after initiating a high speed chase to avoid a traffic stop.
I therefore conclude that the defendant’s conduct in this case provided an adequate factual basis for conviction under A.R.S. § 13-2508 for resisting arrest.
I now turn to defendant’s contention that the factual basis was insufficient to establish his culpable mental state. The resisting arrest statute, A.R.S. § 13-2508, requires that the defendant act with “intent.”3 The defendant argues that another statute, § 13-202(A), renders the intent requirement applicable to all elements of the offense. Defendant’s argument relies upon A.R.S. § 13-202(A), which provides:
If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall apply to each such element unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.
Because § 13-202(A) requires intent for every element of the offense, defendant argues the state must prove that he intended not only to prevent the officers from making the arrest but also to expose the officers or others to possible physical injury. Defendant does not seriously dispute that he intended to prevent his own arrest when he .fled. However, he asserts that the facts were insufficient to show that he acted with the objective of creating risk of injury.
Defendant offers no authority for his argument. I find nothing in the language, purpose, or history of the present statute to support the construction he urges.
The statutory language is clear. The intent required for resisting arrest is set forth in paragraph (A) of § 13-2508, the paragraph establishing as an element of the offense the act of preventing an officer from effecting arrest. Subparagraphs one and two separately set forth additional elements of the offense and do not refer to intent. The Legislature required intent, but required it only as to the first element of the offense. By setting forth the elements separately, the resisting arrest statute sufficiently “distinguish[ed] among the elements of [the] offense.” Thus, by the language of A.R.S. § 13-202(A) itself, the rule that the intent requirement applies to all elements is not invoked. The defendant therefore need not have intended to place the officers at risk of injury; all the statute *118requires is that defendant’s conduct created such a risk.4
However, except for strict liability crimes, a minimum requirement of culpability is required for each material element of an offense. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02(1) at p. 225 (1980). When the culpability requirement for a material element is not prescribed by law, “such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto”. Id. at 226.
More precisely, under the Model Penal Code formulation of the resisting arrest statute (which is similar to the Arizona statute), the state need not show the defendant’s intent to injure the officers. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 242.2 at 220. Under the Model Code, a showing of defendant’s recklessness “will suffice with respect to the elements that the actor created a substantial risk of bodily harm____” Id. A defendant is reckless when he is aware of and disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstance exists or that the result will occur. A.R.S. § 13-105(6)(C). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. A defendant acts knowingly when he is aware or believes that his conduct is of the nature specified by the statute or that circumstances described by the statute exist. A.R.S. § 13-105(6)(B). Furthermore, proof of the state of mind of a defendant is generally circumstantial, and what the defendant does or fails to do may be evidence of that state of mind. See State v. Vann, 11 Ariz.App. 180, 463 P.2d 75 (1970) (intent of defendant can be inferred from defendant’s conduct).
In this case, the evidence provided a factual basis for a finding that the defendant’s conduct was knowing or reckless. He drove at 70-80 miles per hour through a residential district disregarding stop signs. The defendant disregarded an apparent and grave risk that his conduct could cause serious physical injury to the officers or to an innocent passerby.
The record of defendant’s change of plea shows that defendant intended to avoid arrest. It shows that he operated his motorcycle in flight from police at great risk to others. The statute does not demand that the state establish a separate intent to expose the pursuing officers or others to that risk.
The evident purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect our police officers and citizens from substantial risk of physical injury. The record shows that this defendant’s conduct in evading arrest created such a risk. I would affirm the conviction.
Retired Judge JOHN F. TAYLOR was authorized to participate in this appeal by order of the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, pursuant to art. 6, section 20 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. section 38-813 (1985).

. Model Penal Code § 242.2 states in pertinent part:
*116A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, ...

. A.R.S. § 13-105(6), defining culpable mental states, provides:
(a) "Intentionally" or “with the intent to” means, with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, that a person’s objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct.

. We further note that defendant’s assertion is contrary to the common law doctrine which required only that the defendant intend the act rather than the crime’s result. 1 C. Torcia, Warton’s Criminal Law § 25, p. 115-122 (14th ed. 1978). See also State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5 (1978) (criminal intent is simply the state of mind that coexists with the doing of an act).