Court Opinion

ID: 9761118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:31:59.568492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.202267
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
Because the record before us does not support the conclusion of the majority, I must vigorously dissent.
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished, yet well-reasoned opinion, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to show that the knife used by appellant was a deadly weapon. I set forth that opinion:
“This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years imprisonment. We affirm.
“The sole ground of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of whether or not the knife employed during the robbery was a deadly weapon. A knife is not a deadly weapon per se, but may be found to be a deadly weapon if its use or manner of intended use during the commission of an offense renders it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Davidson v. State, 602 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Danzig v. State, 546 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). It is not necessary that wounds be actually inflicted, or express verbal threats be made in conjunction with the display or use of the weapon. Dominique v. State, 598 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Its characterization as a deadly weapon may flow from its physical characteristics, the proximity of the parties, and the physical manner of its use. Nor is expert testimony necessary to support a jury’s conclusion as to the deadly capacity of such an instrument. Denham, supra; Cruz v. State, 576 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Lewis v. State, 628 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.App. — Amarillo, 1982).
“In this case, the Appellant entered a grocery store and carried several items to the cashier. When she opened the register to insert his money, he placed his left hand over the cash tray. The clerk grabbed his hand and said, ‘[n]o.’ He replied, ‘[y]es,’ and produced a lock-blade knife with his right hand. The clerk backed up, Appellant removed the money from the drawer and backed out of the store. The knife was recovered and introduced as State’s Exhibit A. A photograph appears in the record. An adjacent ruler indicates a blade length of two and one-fourth inches.
“Appellant was within reach of the complainant, thus within range of inflicting injury with the knife. The common experience and understanding of the lay juror is sufficient to assess the ability of a two and one-fourth inch blade to inflict death or serious bodily injury, as defined by Tex. Penal Code sec. 1.07(a)(34). This capacity was clearly utilized by Appellant in his non-verbal communication to the complainant that further efforts to forestall the robbery would result in actual use of the knife. Sufficient evidence was before the jury to justify its conclusion that the knife was a deadly weapon within this context. Tex. Penal Code Ann. secs. 1.07(a)(ll)(B) and 29.03 (Vernon 1974). Ground of Error No. One is overruled.
“The judgment is affirmed.”
In overruling the Court of Appeals, the majority concludes “[n]o threat of serious bodily injury, express or implied, was made by appellant. Appellant made no gesture with the knife which would indicate that he was about to use same. The evidence merely reflects that appellant had a knife *113in his right hand.” I ask, what was he going to do with the knife, clean his fingernails while cleaning out the cash register?
During the trial, the complaining witness testified:
“Q. (Prosecutor) Would it be implicit, do you feel like he would have to swing the knife around or come at you with it to feel threatened, or did you feel threatened when he held it up in front of you?
“A. I felt threatened then.
“Q. Threatened of fear of death or serious bodily injury?
“A. Yeah, I figured he could have — as a matter of fact, I thought he would have.”
The witness’ response clearly indicates that she felt threatened, that she figured the appellant could have caused her death or serious bodily injury, and that he would have done so had she not stepped back and allowed him to have the money.
The case at bar is obviously stronger than the one presented in Vaughn v. State, 634 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). The facts of Vaughn, which were held sufficient to show that the knife used was a deadly weapon, show:
“... Although the sixty-seven year old complainant, Stanford Phifer, testified, ‘No, sir,’ when asked if the appellant placed him in fear of imminent bodily injury, he also testified that: ‘He [appellant] had his knife.’ ‘He was holding it like this [indicating].’ ‘He told me to give him my money.’ T guess he was going to cut me.’ In addition the evidence shows that the complainant felt threatened with bodily injury by the appellant’s actions holding the knife, that the appellant made him a little afraid that he might use the knife, that appellant displayed the knife in front of him and he thought appellant would hurt him with the knife if he didn’t give him the money.”
Common sense and human experience dictate that when a knife is used or exhibited in the manner exemplified by the instant facts, the victim is warranted in his conclusion that the actor fully intends to cause serious bodily injury or death to the victim if the actor’s requests are not complied with. Henceforth, potential victims are admonished that they should inquire of a robber who is exhibiting a knife whether the robber intends to cause the victim death or serious bodily injury if the robber’s requests are not honored.
To the unrealistic perception of the facts the majority has made, I vigorously dissent.
ONION, P.J., and W.C. DAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissent.