Court Opinion

ID: 9735995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:39:16.2587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.234819
License: Public Domain

Murphy, District
Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein, and in that connection I submit the following observations.
The question of the constitutionality of the applicable statutes, particularly sections 42-318 and 42-321, R. R. S. 1943, to the extent they may function as limitations upon the broad chancery powers of the district courts (Article V, section 9, Constitution of Nebraska) is a question which suggests itself, but was neither presented nor determined in the trial court, and which has not been presented here. In her brief, plaintiff relies upon those statutes. It is a question, therefore, which we should not now consider. Madison County v. Crippen, 143 Neb. 474, 10 N. W. 2d 260; De Lair v. De Lair, 146 Neb. 771, 21 N. W. 2d 498; Ebberson v. School Dist. No. 64, ante p. 119, 141 N. W. 2d 452; Read v. City of Scottsbluff, 179 Neb. 410, 138 N. W. 2d 471. Rather, we must accept the statutes as we find them.
The effect of the majority opinion is to award the *653plaintiff a property settlement in excess of the net worth of the parties, and thus to require an invasion of defendant’s future income. It goes far beyond any mathematical limitation previously expressed by this court, and beyond the limits of the statute.
The statute, section 42-318, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “Upon every divorce * * *, if the estate and effects restored or awarded to the wife shall be insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of herself * * * the court may further decree to her such part of the personal estate of the husband and such alimony out of his estate as it shall deem just and reasonable, having regard to the ability of the husband, the character and situation of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.” While the terms “property settlement” and “alimony” are sometimes used interchangeably, here it is obvious that the word “alimony” is used in the proper sense of an allowance for future support. It seems to me that the statute allows an award of alimony only upon a finding that the property settlement made will be insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of the wife, and permits consideration of the husband’s “ability” only in that particular instance.
This is the effect of the statement quoted in the majority opinion from Prosser v. Prosser, 156 Neb. 629, 57 N. W. 2d 173, and with which I wholeheartedly agree as a statement of the controlling law of the case. While the majority opinion here treats of the added sum of $3,000 in the name of alimony, it is a restoration to plaintiff of an inheritance and not a provision for plaintiff’s future support and maintenance. It appears to be a penalty assessed against the defendant for his fault in having caused the divorce, and because the parties lived beyond his means. Both the opinion and plaintiff’s brief in this regard place their reliance not on the future, but on the basis of compensation for the past. I cannot agree that the statute either requires or permits this.
*654In any event, the decree of the trial court, from which the defendant does not appeal, grants to the plaiptiff practically , 1Ó0 .percent of the current net assets of the parties. It grants defendant assets worth $2,090 and requires him to pay liabilities in the amount of $2,900, disregarding. the note of $6,105 to his mother. It sufficiently provides for the suitable support and maintenance of plaintiff. . It goes far beyond any past-stated mathematical limitation. I would deem it to be neither unjust nor unreasonable.