Court Opinion

ID: 9528385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:40:38.707678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:49.858067
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
The main issue before the trial court was whether or not Maurice Blache had the ability to comply with the trial court’s order. In support of the contention that he had such ability, it was shown that large real estate holdings of the value of approximately $250,000 and a bank account in a sum in excess of $15,000 had stood for some time in the joint names of said Maurice Blache and petitioner and that said Maurice Blache had purported to transfer to petitioner any interest which he had in said real property and in said bank account at a time when negotiations were pending for a settlement between said Maurice Blache and his wife, Anna Blache. It was claimed that said Maurice Blache still had an interest in said property and in the money which had been withdrawn from bank account and that he still had control over and access to the same. Questions were therefore directed to petitioner to ascertain what she had done with the money which she had withdrawn from said bank account and where the money was located thereafter and at the time of the hearing. In my opinion, the questions relating to the disposition made of the money after it had been withdrawn from the bank were material. The plaintiff was not bound by the mere conclusion of the witness that said Maurice Blache had no interest therein and it was appropriate for the trial court to allow plaintiff the widest latitude in the examination of the witness in order to ascertain all the facts which might throw light upon the issue which the trial court was called upon to determine.
In reply to pertinent questions relating to the disposition and location of the money, petitioner gave purported answers on each of the several days of the hearing. The trial court *695was most patient with the witness and continued the hearing from time to time with the advice that she must .answer the questions addressed to her on this subject. The nature of the answers given by petitioner to these questions is illustrated by the following which were given at various times: (1) “Why should I tell you?” (2) “I will not tell where I have it. That is my money. ” (3) “It is in my possession. I would not say where. Why should I say where?” (4) “Well, it is buried under a tree in the country.” (5) “I cannot point it from here.” (6) “The tree is in the country.” (7) “Well, it is in my place in the country.” (8) “Well, I don’t remember when I buried it because I have to be very careful. It may be a day or two days after I drew it out, I don’t remember.” (9) “I don’t remember saying that I buried the money under a tree. I was too excited that day. I don’t remember whether I buried it or not. I might have, I cannot be sure.” (10) “I don’t remember drawing any money from that bank account.” (11) “I am not sure what you mean by a bank account. I would not be sure of anything.” (12) “I don’t know what I did with the money now. I know I have it somewhere but I don’t remember where now.” (13) “I won’t have anybody asking me those kind of questions.”
The foregoing answers are but a few of the contradictory and defiant answers given by the witness upon the numerous hearings. Her first answers were to the effect that the money was in her possession but she absolutely refused to disclose the place where it was located. She was directed to answer and then testified that she had buried the money under a tree in the country. Thereafter she claimed she did not remember so testifying and took refuge in the claim that she did not remember what she had done with the money. During the final hearings, her counsel interposed numerous objections and challenged the right of the trial court to compel her to answer the questions. The trial court overruled the objections and directed the witness to answer whereupon her counsel stated, “I think the witness has several times indicated her purpose not to answer that question”. The only reasonable conclusion which can be reached upon a reading of the record is that the statements of the witness to the effect that she did not know or did not remember were mere attempts to evade *696answering the questions and constituted a refusal to answer said questions.
The trial court made full and complete findings in its order for the warrant of commitment to issue. It was there found, among other things, that the questions were material; that the witness had the ability to answer the same; that the only answers given in response thereto were sham, evasive, false and vague answers; and that the refusal of the witness to answer said questions constituted a wilful and deliberate refusal to answer as a witness. I believe that all of these findings are amply sustained by the evidence and that the trial court was entirely justified in holding petitioner in contempt under the circumstances. A witness may not avoid a charge of contempt by stating, “I do not knowor “I do not remember ’ ’ when it is apparent that the witness has the ability to answer but refuses to do so. (In re Stein, 7 Fed. (2d) 169; Schleier v. United States, 72 Fed. (2d) 414; O’Connell v. United States, 40 Fed. (2d) 201; People v. Hanley, 121 Misc. 624 [202 N. Y. Supp. 87]; In re Schulman et al., 167 Fed. 237; In re Schulman et al., 177 Fed. 191; Becker v. Gerlich, 72 Misc. 157 [129 N. Y. Supp. 614]; Haimsohn v. United States, 2 Fed. (2d) 441.)
I find no merit in any of the points raised by petitioner in this proceeding and, in my opinion, the writ should be discharged and the petitioner should be remanded to custody.