Court Opinion

ID: 9950705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:16:50.140737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:55.426701
License: Public Domain

J-A01013-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  IAN BRADLEY CORBIN                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 704 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-39-CR-0005062-2019

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                            FILED MARCH 14, 2024

       Ian Bradley Corbin appeals, pro se, from the judgment of sentence,

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, after a jury convicted

him of two counts of manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to

manufacture or deliver (heroin and fentanyl/heroin) (PWID)1 and one count

of possession of a controlled substance (heroin and cocaine).2 After review,

we affirm.

       The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows:

       On October 8, 2019[,] at approximately 9:24 a.m., Officer Kyle
       French was dispatched for a report of a domestic disturbance
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2 Id. at § 780-113(a)(16).
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      involving a knife. He received a description of [Corbin] and was
      told the suspect was headed to a 7-[Eleven] store on
      Susquehanna Street in Allentown, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania.
      Officer French and Officer Andrew Holvec[k] made contact with
      [Corbin] as he was walking back from the 7-[Eleven] store[.]
      [Corbin] was patted down due to possibly having a knife. Officer
      French felt something in [Corbin’s] pocket[,] which he testified he
      immediately recognized as the packaging for marijuana. He
      reached in [Corbin’s] pocket and found black latex gloves with two
      bags of an off-white powdery substance and small, rock-like[,]
      white substance. Officer French also located blue wax baggies.
      The substances field tested positive as heroin and cocaine.

      In the meantime, Officer Holvec[k] followed up with the victim,
      Jessica Maxfield. [] Maxfield indicated [Corbin] woke up angry
      and could not find his drugs. She is a drug user and she admitted
      to previously stealing drugs from [Corbin], who she identified as
      a drug dealer. [] Maxfield indicated that [Corbin] accused her of
      stealing his drugs, then pulled a knife on her and threatened to
      kill her if she did not find the drugs. She provided Officer
      Holvec[k] a written statement to that effect.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/23, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Corbin was charged with the aforementioned drug offenses. On June

10, 2020, Corbin filed a motion to suppress evidence due to lack of probable

cause.   The court held a hearing on April 29, 2021, denied the motion to

suppress, and scheduled the case for trial. See Order, 5/25/21. Prior to trial,

Corbin insisted on proceeding pro se, and the court appointed Robert E.

Sletvold, Esquire, as standby counsel.

      Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Corbin of all three charges.

The court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI) and, on February

14, 2022, sentenced Corbin to an aggregate term of 5½ to 12 years’

imprisonment. On March 7, 2022, Corbin filed a pro se notice of appeal. On

March 8, 2022, the court entered an order directing Corbin file a Pa.R.A.P.

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1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On March 18,

2022, Corbin filed a pro se post-sentence motion, which the court denied

based on the fact that Corbin had already filed his notice of appeal.       See

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (except as otherwise prescribed, after appeal is taken, trial

court may no longer proceed further in matter). Corbin filed his Rule 1925

(b) statement on April 8, 2022 after the court granted his request for an

extension of time.

      On April 21, 2022, Corbin filed a second pro se notice of appeal and a

motion for bail pending appeal, which the trial court granted. On appeal, this

Court remanded for appointment of counsel, and the trial court appointed

Matthew Rapa, Esquire, to represent Corbin. On June 3, 2022, Corbin was

convicted in an unrelated criminal matter; the trial court revoked Corbin’s bail,

and Corbin filed a third pro se notice of appeal on June 28, 2022.

      On or about July 22, 2022, Attorney Rapa advised the court that
      he would be withdrawing the duplicative appeals [Corbin had]
      filed. The same day, the court entered an order directing counsel
      to file an amended [Rule 1925] concise statement identifying any
      issues [Corbin] sought to raise on appeal so that [he] would not
      be inadvertently prejudiced by the discontinuance of his serial
      appeals. The counseled concise statement was filed on August
      11, 2022.

      The court issued a [Rule] 1925(a) opinion on August 25, 2022.
      On August 30, 2022, [Corbin] filed a motion for withdrawal of
      counsel in [the trial] court while his matter was on appeal to the
      Superior Court. The counseled concise statement was filed on
      August 11, 2022. On October 4, 2022, the Superior Court
      remanded the matter with instructions for the court to conduct an

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       on-the-record Grazier[3] hearing. The court held that hearing on
       October 24, 2022 and[,] at the close of that hearing[,] granted
       court-appointed counsel leave to withdraw and [permitted Corbin]
       to represent himself. The matter was then returned to the
       Superior Court.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/23, at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       Thereafter, in November 2022, Corbin filed several pro se motions. This

Court remanded the case once again and directed the trial court to provide

Corbin with any requested notes of testimony and documents deemed

necessary and relevant to Corbin’s issues on appeal and directed Corbin to file

a Rule 1925(a) concise statement within twenty-one days of receipt of those

materials.4 Both Corbin and the trial court have complied with Rule 1925.

       Corbin raises the following issues on appeal:

          1. Did law enforcement officers exceed permissible bounds
             during a Terry[5] stop and frisk, and unlawfully enter
             [Corbin’s] pocket and remove items, where: the nature and
             scope of the search were unrelated to the justification that
             prompted the search; the officer was not in fear of [his]
             safety; and the incriminating nature of the contraband was

____________________________________________

3 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

4 On remand, the trial court ordered Corbin to specify materials he needed.

On January 17, 2023, Corbin filed a pro se request for documentary and other
evidentiary material, including preliminary hearing transcripts and audio
recordings and transcripts of a 911 call. On January 31, 2023, the court
ordered certain material be provided to Corbin, but denied his request for
preliminary hearing transcripts, as they did not exist. On February 8, 2023,
Corbin filed his pro se Rule 1925(b) concise statement, but did not serve it on
the trial court. On March 28, 2023, Corbin filed a pro so “Motion for
Recognition,” asking the trial court to accept his Rule 1925(b) statement,
which the court granted on April 4, 2023.
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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          not immediately detectable based upon its               tactile
          impression, in violation of the plain feel doctrine?

       2. Did law enforcement have probable cause or a warrant to
          subject [Corbin] to a custodial detention, [and] to extend
          the search beyond the scope permissible in Terry[,] for any
          domestic violence allegation or marijuana-related offense,
          prior to the intrusion into [Corbin’s] pocket?

       3. Were the statements that were obtained from the
          complainant sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the
          original illegality, as law enforcement officers used illegally
          obtained evidence to [e]licit an incriminating statement
          against [Corbin], whereby the fruit of the poisonous tree
          doctrine would apply?

       4. Was the evidence the Commonwealth used during the
          criminal proceedings and trial obtained in violation of Article
          1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution[,] and the
          Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
          [guaranteeing] freedom from unreasonable searches and
          seizures, and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
          process of law and equal protection under the law, as
          determined by the [United States] Supreme Court?

       5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [Corbin’s]
          petition for writ of habeas corpus/motion to suppress
          evidence and dismiss due to lack of probable cause,
          following an unjustifiably excessive Terry search, illegal
          arrest, and further law enforcement misconduct?

       6. Were the comments and conduct of the Commonwealth’s
          agents during the trial proceedings, and in closing argument
          to the jury, prejudicial and biased and [in] violati[on of]
          Article 1, Sections 1 and 9 of the Pennsylvania
          Constitution[,] and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
          of the United States Constitution, denying [Corbin] a fair
          and just trial by an impartial jury?

       7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to provide
          the jury with the affirmative defense of justification (18
          Pa.C.S.A. § 503)?

       8. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence for the
          charge of [PWID] (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30))?

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Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6.

       We address issues two, four, and five together, as each challenges the

the lawfulness of the officers’ initial encounter with Corbin.6 Corbin argues

that law enforcement exceeded the permissible bounds of the Terry stop and

frisk and violated the plain feel doctrine and, therefore, the drugs seized from

his pocket were fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-15, citing Terry, supra and Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1965).

       In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Court’s role is

to determine whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual

findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from

those findings. Commonwealth v. Turner, 772 A.2d 970, 972 (Pa. Super.

2001), citing Commonwealth v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23, 26 (Pa. Super.

2000). Moreover,

       [s]ince the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may
       consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the
       evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in
       the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports
       the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts
       and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are
       in error.

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (Pa. 2003).

____________________________________________

6 Corbin combines issues 1 and 2 in his first argument section (I) in his brief,

argues issue 3 in the second argument section (II) of his brief, and argues
issue 6 in section (V) of his brief, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

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      Initially, we note that for a search to be reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, the police must obtain a warrant, supported by

probable cause, and issued by an independent judicial officer, prior to

conducting the search.    Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa.

2014). There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement, however,

and one is relevant here: Terry frisks for officer safety based on an officer’s

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id.

      It is well-established that a police officer may conduct a brief
      investigatory stop of an individual if the officer observes unusual
      conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal
      activity may be afoot. Terry, 392 U.S. [at] 30 []. Moreover, if
      the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
      articulable facts, that the detained individual may be armed and
      dangerous, the officer may then conduct a frisk of the individual’s
      outer garments for weapons. Since the sole justification for a
      Terry search is the protection of the officer or others
      nearby, such a protective search must be strictly “limited
      to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
      which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.”
      Thus, the purpose of this limited search is not to discover
      evidence, but to allow the officer to pursue his
      investigation without fear of violence.

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 744 A.2d 1261, 1264-65 (Pa. 2000)

(emphasis added; some internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, under

the plain feel doctrine, an officer

      may seize non-threatening contraband detected through
      the officer’s sense of touch during a Terry frisk if the officer
      is lawfully in a position to detect the presence of
      contraband, the incriminating nature of the contraband is
      immediately apparent from its tactile impression[,] and the officer

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      has a lawful right of access to the object. [Minnesota v.]
      Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366[,] 373-75 [(1993).] As Dickerson
      makes clear, the plain feel doctrine is only applicable where the
      officer conducting the frisk feels an object whose mass or contour
      makes its criminal character immediately apparent. Immediately
      apparent means that the officer readily perceives, without further
      exploration or searching, that what he is feeling is contraband. If,
      after feeling the object, the officer lacks probable cause to believe
      that the object is contraband without conducting some further
      search, the immediately apparent requirement has not been met
      and the plain feel doctrine cannot justify the seizure of the object.

Id. at 1265 (emphasis added; some internal citations omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2006) (under plain feel

doctrine, officer may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through

officer’s sense of touch during Terry frisk if officer is lawfully in position to

detect presence of contraband, incriminating nature of contraband is

immediately apparent from tactile impression, and officer has lawful right of

access to object).

      Here, Officers French and Holveck responded to a “report of a domestic

disturbance in which an African-American male was described as threatening

a person with a knife.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/23, at 8. The report specified

the male was wearing “a black jacket with white stripes on the sleeves and

heading toward the 7-[Eleven] on E[ast] Susquehanna Street.” Id. at 8-9.

Based on the physical description of the suspect, the clothing he wore, and

the reported location, the officers had reasonable suspicion, based on these

articulable facts, that Corbin was the suspect in the domestic disturbance

report and that he was armed with a knife. Given what the officers knew

about the time, place, and characteristics of the actor, their detention of

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Corbin was justified. The officers, therefore, did not exceed the permissible

scope of a Terry pat-down. See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d

1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2022) (to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, detaining officer

must articulate something more than inchoate and unparticularized suspicion

or hunch, and we examine totality of circumstances through eyes of trained

officer, not ordinary citizen).

      However, whether the seizure of the contraband was within the

permissible bounds of the plain feel doctrine is a separate issue.               In

Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court applied the plain feel doctrine

and found the seizure of the contraband was unconstitutional. 508 U.S. at

379. There, the officer had determined that the lump was contraband only

“after squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of the

defendant’s pocket—a pocket which the officer already knew contained no

weapon.”     Id. at 378.    Since the incriminating character of the lump in

defendant’s pocket was not “immediately apparent,” the further search of

defendant’s pocket was unconstitutional and, therefore, the seizure of cocaine

that followed was likewise unconstitutional. Id. at 379.

      Unlike the particular facts in Dickerson, here, the identity of the

contraband    was   “immediately   apparent”    to   Officer   French   during   a

constitutionally permissible pat-down.     At the suppression hearing, Officer

French, a twelve-year veteran of the Allentown Police Department, testified

that following the dispatch, he arrived at the 7-Eleven at 11 East Susquehanna

within one to two minutes, located the suspect behind the 7-Eleven store, and

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approached him while wearing his body-worn camera. See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 4/29/21, at 103-06. Officer French stated:

      I initially made contact with [Corbin] to identify him because he
      matche[d] the description that we were given as the party
      involved in the domestic. And he does give us his name, but he
      was really—the best way to describe it[,] squirrely, and because
      there was a knife involved, [Officer Holveck and I] were afraid he
      still had it on him. . . . I advised him we were going to detain
      him, pat down for any weapons. He did not want to be detained.
      It appeared he wanted to get away, like he was going to run if he
      had the opportunity. . . . We put handcuffs on him. His hands
      [were] handcuffed behind his back. He was a little resistant to
      that. We struggled a little bit, but nothing overbearing.

Id. at 107-08. Officer French described the ensuing Terry search as follows:

      With my hands, the palm of my hands, [I] started at the
      waistband. That’s typically where a lot of weapons are kept.
      Because the knife was involved, I didn’t know if it was a kitchen
      knife, folding knife. Check his pockets, because you can store a
      folding knife in the pockets, and work my way down. . . . In his
      right front pocket I felt a bulge that was very similar to the feel of
      marijuana. . . . When I felt that bulge, it felt like the feeling of
      marijuana. You could hear like a crinkle, like it was in plastic. At
      that point, I looked up at Mr. Corbin, and I said, “You have
      marijuana on you?” And he said, “No, it’s not marijuana.” [I]
      then pulled out that item. . . . It was a black latex glove inside
      another black latex glove. Inside that glove was a plastic bag full
      of rice with loose heroin in it, a bundle of heroin, as well as two
      cocaine rocks.

Id. at 108-11.   Thereafter, Officer French testified that he had performed at

least 20 prior pat-downs where he found marijuana, id. at 112, and his tactile

impression that the bulge was marijuana was “based on [his] training and

experience.” Id. at 127. The questioning continued:

      BY MR. CORBIN:

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      Q: [] So would you say—you said on prior statements and
      prior hearings that you did manipulate my pocket, right?

      A: After the first time I felt it, yeah. . . . After I felt what I
      believed to be the marijuana, and I did grab it, yes.

Id. at 126-28 (emphasis added).

      This testimony confirms that, unlike the pat-down in Dickerson, here

there was no “sliding, and otherwise manipulating” the baggie in order to

ascertain its contents—Officer French testified that he immediately recognized

that the bulge consisted of a controlled substance, what he believed was

marijuana.    There is nothing in the record to suggest that Officer French

further manipulated the bulge in order to determine its identity. See id. at

111 (“When I felt that bulge, it felt like the feeling of marijuana. You could

hear like a crinkle, like it was in plastic.”).   See also Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 631 A.2d 1335, 1336 (Pa. Super. 1993) (lawful Terry search

included crunching and squeezing). The fact that the suspected marijuana

was actually heroin/fentanyl and cocaine is of no moment.       Furthermore,

Officer French was still in the process of frisking Corbin for weapons; he had

not already concluded that no knife was present on Corbin’s person.

Therefore, under these facts, we conclude that Officer French had probable

cause to believe what he felt was contraband and that he was “both justified

and duty-bound under Dickerson to seize such contraband.” In Interest of

B.C., 83 A.2d 919, 926 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also Commonwealth v.

Stevenson, 744 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. 2000) (under plain feel doctrine “a

police officer may seize non-threatening contraband detected through the

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officer’s sense of touch during a Terry frisk if the officer is lawfully in a position

to detect the presence of contraband, the incriminating nature of the

contraband is immediately apparent from its tactile impression[,] and the

officer has a lawful right of access to the object.”). Cf. Commonwealth v.

Mesa, 683 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. Super. 1996) (absent testimony officer felt

possible weapon or recognized item to be contraband, police officers are not

justified in conducting intrusive search).

       In issue three, Corbin argues the statements obtained from the

complainant were “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and, therefore, were

inadmissible.7 Appellant’s Brief, at 26, 32. Because we have determined that

the Terry search and the ensuing seizure of the contraband were valid, the

fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply. See Commonwealth v.

Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 290 (Pa. 2017) (evidence constitutes “fruit of the

poisonous tree,” and must be suppressed, if it was obtained by exploitation of

illegality of seizure), citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 476.

       Next, Corbin argues the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial

misconduct during opening statements, trial, and in closing argument to the

jury. See Appellant’s Brief, at 46. He claims the prosecutor’s comments were

____________________________________________

7  At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a handwritten statement by the
complainant, provided to Officer Holveck, in which the complainant wrote,
“woke up talking bout (sic) missing drugs & pulled a knife said if I dont (sic)
find the stuff he[’]ll kill me[.]” See Exhibit C-6; N.T. Jury Trial, 12/3/21, at
137, 179.

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prejudicial and biased, and he was denied a “fair and just trial[.]” Id. No

relief is due.

      In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we are limited to

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth

v. Hall, 701 A.2d 190, 198 (Pa. 1997).            Further, we are mindful that a

defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Commonwealth v.

Rios, 721 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Pa. 1998). Even if a prosecutor’s remarks are

intemperate or improper, relief is warranted only if the unavoidable effect of

the remarks is so prejudicial as to form in the jury’s mind hostility and bias

toward the defendant, such that the jury could not weigh the evidence

objectively and render a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 742 A.2d

390, 404 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Ervin, 766 A.2d 859, 864 (Pa.

Super. 2000).

      Corbin     takes   issue   with   the   prosecutor’s   opening   and   closing

statements, which portrayed Corbin as a drug dealer—the theory of the

prosecution’s case based on the amount and packaging of the drugs found on

Corbin’s person. “A prosecutor is generally allowed to vigorously present and

argue his case, as long as the comments are supported by evidence and

contain inferences which are reasonably derived from that evidence.”

Commonwealth v. LaCava, 666 A.2d 221, 231 (Pa. 1995), citing

Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 546 A.2d 1101, 1109 (Pa. 1988).                     Our

Supreme Court has consistently held that prosecutorial misconduct “will not

be found where comments were based on evidence or proper inferences

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therefrom or were only oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289

A.3d 959, 1039 (Pa. 2023), citing Commonwealth v. Clancy, 192 A.3d 44,

58 (Pa. 2018).

       Here, the      prosecutor’s comments        did not   create   a misleading

characterization but, rather, were consistent with the evidence and testimony

presented. We find no abuse of discretion. Hall, supra.

       Corbin next argues that the court’s failure to sequester witnesses, in

particular Detective Matthew Trettor, who testified on behalf of the

Commonwealth as an expert in drug packaging and trafficking amounted to

prosecutorial misconduct. See Appellant’s at 49. Corbin did not include this

claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement and, therefore, it is waived.             See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vi) (issue not included in Rule 1925 statement and/or

not raised in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(4) are waived).8

       Corbin also argues that the prosecutor’s questioning of defense witness,

Ms. Maxfield, the complainant, amounted to witness intimation.                See

Appellant’s Brief, at 53. This claim, too, is waived because Corbin failed to

include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vi).

____________________________________________

8 Even if not waived, this claim is meritless.
                                             The purpose behind Pennsylvania
Rule of Evidence 615, the rule permitting sequestration, is to prevent a
witness from molding his or her testimony to the testimony of other witnesses.
Detective Tretter was not a fact witness and, therefore, the sequestration
order did not apply to him. Detective Tretter’s expert testimony was essential
to the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case, see Pa.R.E. 615(3), and it
was necessary that he hear the factual basis of the charges in order for him
to give his opinion.

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      In his next issue, Corbin argues the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to provide the jury with an instruction on the affirmative defense of

justification.   See Appellant’s Brief, at 57-58, citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 503.

Corbin contends that his defense was premised on the theory that he

possessed the narcotics to protect Maxfield and her unborn child, insofar as

he was preventing Maxfield, who admitted to a thirteen-year heroin addiction,

from using the drugs.

      Our standard of review regarding jury instructions is well established:

      We review jury instructions for a clear abuse of discretion or an
      error of law. A jury charge is erroneous only if the charge as a
      whole is inadequate, not clear, or has a tendency to mislead or
      confuse a material issue. The trial court properly gives a jury
      instruction if there is an evidentiary basis on which the jury
      could find the element, offense, or defense that is the
      subject of the instruction.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 963 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added).

      Corbin argues:

      [Corbin] could reasonably expect that his actions would be
      effective to avoid greater harm or evil in possessing the drugs to
      prevent Ms. Maxfield from ingesting substances that could be
      harmful to her and her pregnancy. (See N.T. 12/3/21, at 132
      (Ms. Maxfield’s addiction results in a miscarriage)). [] This case
      provides a very unique and authentic situation, regarding factual
      elements and the application of the law, in regard to: Possession
      of a Controlled Substance []; Possession with Intent to
      Manufacture or Deliver []; and the affirmative defense of
      justification. [] There can be no debate as to the harm or evil that
      is inherent in the use, abuse, and addiction of drugs[,] which is
      even more elevated when it relates to heroin and fentanyl. It can
      also be considered morally reprehensible [] for [Corbin], in failing

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      to act, [to] have allowed Ms. Maxfield to consume the drugs in
      question without removing them from her presence when he had
      knowledge of their existence, especially considering her being
      pregnant with his offspring.

Appellant’s Brief, at 63.

      Section 503 provides:

      (a) General rule.--Conduct which the actor believes to be
      necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is
      justifiable if:

            (1) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct
            is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
            defining the offense charged;

            (2) neither this title nor other law defining the offense
            provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific
            situation involved; and

            (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed
            does not otherwise plainly appear.

      (b) Choice of evils.--When the actor was reckless or negligent in
      bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or
      in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification
      afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any
      offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be,
      suffices to establish culpability.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 503 (emphasis added).

      Following our review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that a

justification defense was not available to Corbin. In order to be entitled to an

instruction on justification by necessity as a defense to a crime charged,

Corbin would have had to offer evidence to show: (1) there was a clear and

imminent harm to Ms. Maxfield; (2) he could reasonably expect that his

actions would be effective in avoiding the harm; (3) there was no legal

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alternative effective to abate the harm; and (4) the legislature has not

precluded the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values

at issue. See Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d 806, 809 (Pa. 1985)

(holding that if defendant’s proffer on one element of justification is deficient,

“the trial court has the right to deny use of the defense and not burden the

jury with testimony supporting other elements of the defense”).

      Here, the trial court concluded that, although subsections (a)(2) and

(a)(3) may have been met, the evidence did not establish that “the harm or

evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be

prevented by the law defining the offense charged[.]” See N.T. Jury Trial,

supra at 181. See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 503(a)(1). Corbin was in possession

of the following: Item 1.1—bag containing .55 grams of cocaine; Item 1.2—

bag containing 1.25 grams of heroin; Item 1.3—bag containing 7.15 grams of

heroin and fentanyl; and Item 1.4—10 glassine packets each of .02 grams

heroin and phenobarbital. See N.T. Jury Trial, supra at 61-63. The amount

and packaging of the drugs aside, the trial court noted that Corbin could easily

have disposed of the drugs before he left the residence. As a result, the court

determined that since there was no evidence of clear and immediate harm,

Corbin did not meet the requirements of subsection (a)(1). We agree. Though

Corbin presents a sympathetic argument, his claim that his possession of the

drugs was justified by necessity is implausible. The trial court, therefore, did

not abuse its discretion in refusing Corbin’s request for an instruction on the

defense of justification. Hall, supra.

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       Corbin’s final issue on appeal challenges the weight of the evidence with

respect to his conviction of PWID. A challenge to the weight of the evidence

must be preserved by a motion for a new trial.        See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)

(claim that verdict was against weight of evidence shall be raised with trial

judge in motion for new trial orally, on the record, before sentencing, by

written motion before sentencing, or in post-sentence motion).         As stated

above, Corbin filed a post-sentence motion on March 18, 2022,9 after he had

filed his notice of appeal. The trial court had no jurisdiction to act on the

motion and, therefore, we conclude Corbin did not properly preserve his

weight of the evidence claim. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d

478, 490 (Pa. Super. 2014) (failure to properly preserve weight claim will

result in waiver, even if trial court addresses issue in opinion).10

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

9 This motion was untimely filed.  See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (post-sentence
motion shall be filed within ten days of sentencing).

10 Even were we to address this claim, we would find it meritless. “The jury

was free to make credibility determinations and accept or reject [Corbin’s]
testimony, and all the other testimony, as it chose.” Commonwealth v.
West, 937 A.2d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2007). As this Court has repeatedly
stated, it not our function to re-weigh the evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[I]t is not the function
of the appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for
that of the trial court. The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is
exclusively for the fact finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal
if they are supported by the record.”) (emphasis added; citations omitted);
see also Commonwealth v. Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super.
2021); Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013);
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000).

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Date: 3/14/2024

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