Court Opinion

ID: 9883762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:17:08.330324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:59.353952
License: Public Domain

MEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Under a straightforward application of First Amendment principles to the facts of this case, I would conclude that the Maplewood Review reporter has the right to keep his sources anonymous. The majority applies Minnesota’s Free Plow of Information Act to deny the reporter the First Amendment’s protection, even though the purpose of the Free Flow Act is to provide a shield against disclosure of confidential sources — a shield that was intended to give more protection to reporters than is available under the First Amendment. The majority reaches a paradoxical result, finding the reporter unpro*676tected by the shelter of the Act, despite the presence of constitutional protection against compelled disclosure.
I begin with some observations about the essential role of a free press in a democratic society. Reporters’ use of anonymous sources strengthens our system of democracy, allowing knowledgeable individuals to critique public officials or policies without fear of reprisal. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (“An untrammeled press is a vital source of public information, and an informed public is the essence of working democracy”) (internal alterations and citation omitted); Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 97, 104-07 (2002). Courts protect the anonymity of reporters’ sources in part so that whistleblowers’ speech is not chilled. As a federal circuit court stated:
A journalist’s inability to protect the confidentiality of sources s/he must use will jeopardize the journalist’s ability to obtain information on a confidential basis. This in turn will seriously erode the essential role played by the press in the dissemination of information and matters of interest and concern to the public.
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir.1979) (citations omitted); accord The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Agents of Discovery: A Report on the Incidence of Subpoenas Served on the News Media in 1999 15 (2001) (noting that the burden that subpoenas place “on newsgathering strikes at the very notion of the press as an independent, impartial watchdog that has provided an essential service in this country for centuries”). The concern is not merely hypothetical, but has been borne out in practice. Newspapers in states that protect journalists from subpoenas of their anonymous sources conduct more investigative reports than do their counterparts in states without such laws. Alexander, supra, at 102.
The majority fails to give any First Amendment context to its decision, which is where I would begin my analysis. I would analyze this case first under traditional constitutional principles, and then apply the factors set forth in Minnesota’s Free Flow of Information Act. The foundational United States Supreme Court case regarding a reporter’s First Amendment privilege to maintain the confidentiality of his or her sources is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). In that case, the Court considered four consolidated cases. In two of them a Kentucky reporter wrote about local drug use by utilizing confidential subjects, and refused to identify the subjects when subpoenaed by state grand juries. Id. at 667-70. In the other two cases, journalists who had covered the Black Panthers refused to answer questions from grand juries regarding the group’s activities. Id. at 672-79. The Court phrased the legal issue narrowly, as “the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime.” Id. at 682. The Court held that requiring reporters to testify before state or federal grand juries when they are subpoenaed in criminal cases does not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 690. In reaching that conclusion, the Court considered the absence of a reporter’s privilege to refuse queries of a grand jury, the pivotal role of grand juries in our criminal system, the public interest in law enforcement, and the small quantity of confidential news sources that *677would be implicated in criminal cases. Id. at 685-700.
The Bmnzburg opinion does not determine the issue before us, however. Bmnz-burg limited itself to the question of reporters’ refusals to produce information to a grand jury called by the government to investigate suspected criminal activity.1 The Supreme Court has not considered whether reporters can be forced to turn over names of confidential sources outside the context of a legitimate criminal investigation. However, the underlying rationale in Bmnzburg and federal circuit courts’ interpretations of Bmnzburg offer guidance on the constitutional treatment of this issue in the context of a civil case.
Bmnzburg implicitly accepts that in order to determine the constitutionality of a court’s compelled disclosure from a journalist, the government’s interest in obtaining the information must be balanced against the newspaper’s interest in keeping it confidential. See id. at 690, 92 S.Ct. 2646. The Court stated: “[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result.” Id. The Court then stated that “we cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants.” Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
A balancing test was more explicitly adopted by Justice Powell in his Bmnz-burg concurrence, which offered this test:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony * * *. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
Id. at 710.
Since Bmnzburg, the majority of federal circuit courts have fashioned balancing tests to determine whether reporters may maintain the confidentiality of their sources in actions where the news gatherer or publisher is not a party.2 See Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir.2000); Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir.1995); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7-9 (2d Cir. 1982); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712-14 (D.C.Cir.1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716-17 (3d Cir.1979). Although courts have articulated different factors to weigh in the balancing, three common factors are: whether, the information sought is material, whether it is obtainable from another source, and whether it is necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim. See, e.g., Ashcraft, 218 F.3d at 287; Barouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. *6781988); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 7-9.
Several circuit courts have applied the factors above and found that the reporter could maintain the confidential nature of his or her source. See Shoen, 48 F.3d at 416 (involving a nonparty author who refused to identify a source in a libel action); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 9 (involving a nonparty publisher who refused to turn over documents naming confidential sources in an antitrust suit); Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714-15 (involving a nonparty reporter who refused to identify his sources in a civil action); Riley, 612 F.2d at 716-18 (involving a nonparty reporter who refused to identify a confidential source in a civil action). I would reach the same result when balancing the three common factors in Weinberger’s case— whether the information sought is material, whether it is obtainable from another source, and whether it is necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim.
In balancing Weinberger’s interest in protecting his reputation against the public interest in robust and uninhibited public debate,3 I find two factors weigh heavily against compelling the reporter to disclose his sources. Weinberger has made no showing that the information is material, nor that the information is necessary or critical to his case. On the first point, it is not clear that identifying the sources of the statements in the article would be material to Weinberger’s case because he has presented scant evidence of the statements’ falsity, which is the first element in a prima facie case of defamation. Reading through the depositions and affidavits submitted by Weinberger, only one of the statements from the article that the district court identified as potentially libelous was contradicted. While one of the statements says Weinberger “gave a severe tongue-lashing to several .of his players at halftime during” a football game between Tartan and Park High School, a number of people signed affidavits swearing that Weinberger did not berate, ridicule, or verbally abuse his players during halftime at that game.4 The majority of the affidavits support the article’s general thrust— that school officials allegedly received numerous complaints about Weinberger’s behavior both as a coach and teacher, and had decided to discipline him.
Even more importantly in the context of the First Amendment, Weinberger has not established that identifying the source of the quotes is necessary to maintaining his case.5 The majority assumes that Wein-berger must possess the identities of the sources quoted in the article in order to pursue his claim; however, Weinberger does not need that information to prove any element of his case because his defamation suit is not based solely on the *679statements made in the newspaper. While the quotes in the article may have further harmed his reputation in the teaching community, the affidavits he has presented offer ample evidence that similar statements of his alleged behavior were communicated to third parties on multiple occasions. Many affiants refer to the defendants’ oral statements regarding allegations of Weinberger abusing students and deserving disciplinary action. Indeed, Weinberger’s complaint focuses more on the defendants’ allegedly defamatory statements to coaches, administrators, students, and parents than on the defendants’ alleged statements to the Ma-plewood Review. Because evidence is available that allegedly defamatory statements were published via means other than the newspaper articles, the information Weinberger seeks is neither necessary nor critical to his ability to maintain the defamation action against defendants.
In contrast to the marginal benefit to Weinberger’s defamation claim of forcing the Maplewood Review reporter to divulge his confidential sources, the harm to the public would be significant. By publishing the story, a local newspaper was attempting to air serious allegations against a popular local teacher and coach, serving an important role in keeping the community informed about the education of its children. The reporter received information from both confidential and attributed sources about the reasons for Wein-berger’s impending departure, and verified those sources sufficiently to avoid being sued for defamation. The public has a legitimate interest in issues surrounding public education and the conduct of public officials in the exercise of their duties. Requiring the disclosure of a reporter’s sources in this context will have the effect of chilling other stories of public interest. Courts should not discourage confidential sources from adding to the public debate by compelling reporters to disclose the sources’ identities, but instead should assist reporters’ efforts to maintain confidential sources, especially in a case like the instant one where there has been little showing that the sources are material or necessary to the plaintiffs case. I would hold that the Federal Constitution protects the reporter’s claim of privilege in this case.
I turn to the application of the Free Flow of Information Act to the facts of this case. Minnesota was one of many states that passed legislation in direct response to the Branzburg ruling, to insure that news gatherers were afforded definite protection from subpoenas and lawsuits. Alexander, supra, at 110,112-13. Minnesota enacted the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act in order to “insure and perpetuate, consistent with the public interest, the confidential relationship between the news media and its sources.” Minn.Stat. § 595.022 (2002); see also State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 631 (Minn.1996) (noting the statute “was a reaction to the Branz-burg decision, and was intended to provide additional protection to reporters and their employers against subpoenas from litigating parties”). As a general rule, our statute says:
[N]o person who is or has been directly engaged in the [newsgathering process] * * * shall be required by any court, grand jury [or other political agency or subdivision] * * * to disclose in any proceeding the person or means from or through which information was obtained * * * whether or not it would tend to identify the person or means through which the information was obtained.
Minn.Stat. § 595.023 (2002). Because the straightforward application of this general rule clearly protects the reporter’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of his sources in this case, the majority attempts *680to fit this case into an exception to the general rule. The majority uses the exception for defamation actions in Minn. Stat. § 595.025 (2002), and concludes that Weinberger has met all three conditions of disclosure listed: that the source’s identity mil lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice; that there is reason to believe the source has relevant information about the issue of defamation; and “that the information cannot be obtained by any alternative means or remedy less destructive of first amendment rights.”6
I turn to the majority’s application of the Free Flow of Information Act to the facts of this case. Although clearly intended to expand the reporter’s constitutional privilege after Brcmzburg, the majority applies the Free Flow of Information Act to give Weinberger less protection than he deserves under the Constitution. I would apply the statute differently, and conclude he has not satisfied the three conditions of the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 595.025. The first prong of the statute asks a plaintiff to “demonstrate that the identity of the source will lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice.” Minn.Stat. § 595.025, subd. 1. Applying this prong, the majority accepts Weinberger’s assertion of relevance and writes “it is self-evident that the identity of the speaker will lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice.”7 Even if we accept that Weinberger meets the first prong because knowledge of the sources’ identities, when combined with other information, may provide evidence relevant to the question of actual malice, he cannot meet the second prong of the statute. The second prong requires that the plaintiff provide “probable cause to believe that the source has information clearly relevant to the issue of defamation.” Minn.Stat. § 595.025, subd. 2(b). There is no defamation without falsity, so to satisfy the second prong a plaintiff must make an initial demonstration that there is a material dispute as to the truth or falsity of the statements at issue. As discussed above, Weinberger has not made a sufficient showing that the quotes in the article were false. Nor has he met the third prong by showing that there is no remedy less destructive of First
*681Amendment principles. See Minn.Stat. § 595.025, subd. 2(b). A less destructive remedy is available: Weinberger is free to proceed with known evidence of publication of similar statements to those printed in the Maplewood, Review. I would conclude that Weinberger fails to meet the second and third prongs of the statute and, therefore, cannot compel disclosure under the Free Flow of Information Act.
I dissent because I believe that Wein-berger’s interest in determining whether these four defendants made any of the allegedly defamatory statements in the newspaper articles is slight compared with the damage that compelling disclosure in such a case could do to the free flow of public information. A defamation plaintiff cannot transform a reporter from a neutral observer into an informant for the plaintiff when the information sought is not necessary to maintain the plaintiffs case. The confidentiality of the sources is protected both by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Minnesota’s Free Flow of Information Act. I would affirm the court of appeals.

. We have applied Branzburg in criminal cases. See State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn.1996). However, some courts have provided reporters more protection and have applied a constitutional balancing test even in criminal cases. See United. States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir.1980).

. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169, 99 S.Ct 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979), the Supreme Court noted that there are special concerns in a defamation suit where the media is the defendant. When a reporter or newspaper is being sued, they must make available information that is key to the outcome of the plaintiffs case. See id. at 170, 99 S.Ct. 1635.

. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979) (noting that individuals have a protected interest in their reputation); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (remarking on the public interest in a robust debate on public issues).

. Even those statements do not directly contradict the article’s summary, however. A tongue-lashing does not necessarily imply berating or ridiculing. And, at least one affiant suggested that Weinberger's language at halftime was strong, saying Weinberger's "initial comments were emotional [at halftime] and served to get the playersf] attention and impart the urgency of the situation.”

.Weinberger must prove four things to win his defamation case against defendants: the statements about the plaintiff are false; the statements were "published” without privilege; such publication harmed the plaintiff's reputation; and the statements were made with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statements were false or reckless disregard of their truthfulness. See Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn.1991).

. The majority does not fully analyze the third prong of the statute's test, whether the information can be obtained by a means less destructive of First Amendment rights, but rather relies on the district court’s determination and the parties’ agreement on the question. The parties' agreement on that question has no bearing on our application of the statute. I would not relinquish our duty to determine the Constitutional impact of the grant of a particular remedy. In this case, there is an alternative remedy that is “less destructive of First Amendment rights”: sending Wein-berger to trial without the identities of the anonymous sources in the newspaper. Wein-berger can rely on the defendants' statements to third parties and the attributed statements in the newspaper.

. The majority's broad interpretation of this prong dilutes it to the point where it is meaningless, because any defamation plaintiff could satisfy it. If we accept the level of nominal relevance defined by the majority, all defamation plaintiffs seeking to compel disclosure from reporters will meet this prong, because if the plaintiffs invoke this statute, they must seek the identity of the reporters’ anonymous source. Such an interpretation of the statute violates our mandate to consider the purpose of the statute and assume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. §§ 645.16-.17 (2002). The legislature's purpose in enacting this statute was to "insure and perpetuate * * * the confidential relationship between the news media and its sources.” Minn.Stat. § 595.022. With that in mind, I think it is likely that the legislature intended this statute to apply only when the reporter is being sued for defamation. In such a case, relevant evidence would include the identity of a reporter's source, because the source would have information about the reporter’s knowledge at the time of publication. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169-70, 99 S.Ct. 1635.