Court Opinion

ID: 9588656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:39.232269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:39.828875
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting, but concurring in the remand for a new trial.
The statute under which Kenneth Davis was prosecuted required the Commonwealth to prove that Davis drove or operated his motor vehicle “while [having] a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or more by weight by volume as indicated by a chemical test administered in accordance with the provisions of § 18.2-268.” Code § 18.2-266(i). The majority and I agree that Code § 18.2-266 unambiguously proscribes driving while having a blood alcohol concentration of .1 percent or more by weight by volume.1 I also agree with the majority that the Commonwealth is required to prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See Clemmer v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 661, 666, 159 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1968). I disagree with the majority, however, concerning whether a presumption exists to aid the Commonwealth in proving a violation of Code § 18.2-266.
*303The majority reads into the statute a presumption which has the effect of relieving the Commonwealth of its burden of proof. I can find no basis upon which to conclude that the General Assembly intended or that the case law allows the creation of a presumption to absolve the Commonwealth of its burden of proving the elements of this offense. While I do not dispute that the General Assembly could have enacted a statute which provided a rebuttable presumption, it did not do so in Code § 18.2-266(i). When the General Assembly has intended to create a presumption, it has had no difficulty in making its intent clear. See, e.g., Code § 18.2-269 (“the amount of alcohol ... as indicated by a chemical analysis . . . shall give rise to . . . rebuttable presumptions”). I find nothing in either the text or logic of 18.2-266(i) that leads me to conclude the General Assembly intended anything other than that guilt would be proved beyond a reasonable doubt according to the normal processes of human reasoning and experience. Without any guidance as to legislative intent, I believe that the majority has simply re-written the statute. In my judgment, it simply defies human logic and experience to adopt a presumption, absent explicit legislature direction, that the results of an after-administered blood alcohol test provide an accurate measurement of blood alcohol level at an earlier point in time.
In discharging its burden of proving a violation of the statute, the Commonwealth must do more than simply offer proof of an after-administered chemical test showing a blood alcohol concentration of .1 percent or greater. The Commonwealth must prove that the accused had a blood alcohol concentration of .1 percent at the time he was operating his motor vehicle. Clemmer, 208 Va. at 664, 159 S.E.2d at 666 (“gravamen of the [intoxicant] offense [s] is driving while” in violation of the prohibition). Moreover, “the Commonwealth must establish both essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. To prove its case under the statute, the Commonwealth should be required, through expert testimony or otherwise, to relate back the .1 percent reading from 10:17 p.m. (the time the test was administered) to “sometime prior to 9:00 p.m.” (the time of the accident). See State v. Rollins, 141 Vt. 105, 109, 444 A.2d 884, 886 (1982).
When the statute is viewed in this light, the evidence that Davis attempted to offer as proof concerning his condition at the time he was driving was relevant. Because the test result must be related *304back to the time of the driving, the trier of fact must be permitted to scrutinize evidence which is offered concerning the driver’s condition at the time of driving and any other relevant evidence probative of the driver’s blood alcohol level at the time of operation. Accordingly, Davis should have been permitted to offer evidence concerning his observable condition at the time of driving or upon his arrest.
[T]he defendant’s physical condition at the time of arrest was logically relevant. . . . “It can well be argued that if a person exhibited no physical signs of intoxication whatever but that the chemical test for alcohol shows a level above .10% that the test was inaccurate.” 1 R. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, § 16.05, at 16-25 (3d ed. 1981). Accord, State v. Clark, supra, 286 Or. at 39-40, 593 P.2d at 126-27; Denison v. Anchorage, 630 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). The converse is equally true — observable symptoms support the accuracy of test findings. Most importantly, the evidence [might tend] to show that the alcohol level was elevated at the time of operation, not just at the time of the test. See State v. Swaregin, 12 Or. App. 290, 291, 506 P.2d 729, 729 (1973). This is a critical element of the prosecution’s case. Thus, evidence on the defendant’s drunkenness was probative on matters at issue in the case, and was properly admitted.
Rollins, 141 Vt. at 110, 444 A.2d at 887.
Because any evidence relevant to establishing whether the test reading of .1 percent at 10:17 p.m. accurately reflected Davis’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident should have been admitted, the trial judge erred in excluding Davis’ evidence concerning his condition at the time of the accident. See People v. Kappas, 120 Ill. App. 3d. 123, 128, 458 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1983) (“Based on the totality of the circumstances, a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant’s [blood alcohol content] at the time he was driving was .10%”); Rollins, 141 Vt. at 110, 444 A.2d at 886-87 (“any evidence relevant to whether the [subsequent] reading accurately reflected the defendant’s blood alcohol level at [the time he was driving] was not only admissible, but indispensable to the . . . case”).
*305Of course, evidence concerning the symptoms of intoxication must be treated with care in a prosecution for driving with .10% or more alcohol in the blood. Prejudice to the defendant would result if the jury was unclear about the offense charged, and confused the .10% offense with driving under the influence. The trial court’s scrupulous instruction on the elements of the offense [must safeguard] . . . against any such prejudice in the trial. . . .
Rollins, 141 Vt. at 110, 444 A.2d at 887.
Thus, although I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial, I would not read into the statute a presumption and, thereby, relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to bring forth evidence to prove the requisite facts beyond a reasonable doubt.

 Code § 18.2-268(B) provides that “[a]ny person . . . who operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway in this Commonwealth shall be deemed thereby, as a condition of such operation, to have consented to have samples of his blood or breath or both blood and breath taken for a chemical test to determine the alcoholic . . . content of his blood, If such person is arrested for a violation of § 18.2-266 . . . within two hours of the alleged offense.” This Code section further provides the procedure by which the chemical tests are performed and for the admissibility of the test results. Compliance with this Code section is not at issue in this case.
This is not to say that the chemical test results create a presumption of guilt. Obviously, the Commonwealth must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence that the accused was also driving or operating a motor vehicle.
The problem of proof inherent in this statute would easily be remedied by the enactment of a statute that prohibits driving after having consumed alcohol sufficient to elevate the blood alcohol level of the driver to .10 percent or more within a specified period after driving. While I am sympathetic to the laudable goal of sure and swift punishment for those who drink and drive, it is the function of the legislature, not this court, to enact legislation that meets the goal.