Court Opinion

ID: 9623511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:34:55.496257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:58.286418
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Justice
dissenting.
The officer here stopped defendant for “impeding traffic,” because defendant delayed for thirty seconds after a traffic light had turned green before making a legal turn. These were the only reasons articulated for stopping defendant’s vehicle, and I do not agree that these reasons, without more, provide a reasonable basis for the stop. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle and from his person when he was stopped in the early morning hours of 2 December 2004 and to suppress any in-custody statements in connection with the incident. Defendant contended that “he was illegally seized and detained by Officer Maltby . . . without reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing or probable cause for his arrest.” Therefore, he argued, the physical evidence and statements he made were all fruits of his illegal search and seizure. The trial court found as fact that defendant “remained stopped for some 30 seconds without any reasonable appearance of explanation for doing so, and the officer observed that the victim [sic] was impeding traffic, if nothing else.” Based solely thereon, the court denied defendant’s motion. Although Officer Maltby testified that in his opinion, based on his training and experience, the delay “definitely would be an indicator of impairment,” the trial court did not find this to be a reason for the stop.
It is well established that an officer may make a brief, investigatory stop of a vehicle if there are “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). “[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909 *261(citation omitted). On review, we must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer possessed the reasonable, articulable suspicion needed to justify the stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981); Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70.
The State argues that there are no controlling authorities and that defendant cites no cases dealing with a thirty second delayed reaction to a green light. After also noting that this Court is not bound by the decision in State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 592 S.E.2d 733, disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 240, 594 S.E.2d 199 (2004), in which an eight to ten second delay was held not to justify a stop, the State also distinguishes Roberson on the basis that a thirty second delay cannot be explained as reasonable. However, in conducting its reasonable suspicion analysis, this Court does not review the thirty second delay in isolation, but rather, views the delay as part of the totality of the circumstances.
Here, in addition to the basis noted by the trial court, the circumstances included that the officer had followed defendant and observed no problems with his driving and that after the delay at the stoplight, defendant made a legal turn. Further, defendant contends that the sheer presence of a police cruiser immediately behind a vehicle can distract even law abiding citizens and that the officer’s own testimony supports this reasonable, innocent explanation for the delay at the stoplight. The officer testified that the delay could have been due to the fact that “Defendant was paying particular attention to the rear view mirror and noticing [the officer] and not the actual traffic light.”
It appears that the officer and the trial court here mistakenly believed that impeding the flow of traffic was a violation of the law which justified the stop and that the trial court rested its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress solely on this mistaken belief and the thirty second delay. Because impeding the flow of traffic is not a violation of law and because the thirty second delay is easily explained as innocent, I do not agree that under the totality of these circumstances, the officer here had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.