Court Opinion

ID: 9557721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:56:08.832932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:30.023156
License: Public Domain

*48WORTHEN, Justice
(concurring).
I am of the opinion that the order granting a new trial unless defendant agrees to the increased judgment is proper.
It is observed by Mr. Justice CROCKETT that “We know of no case in which this court has directed an increase of an award of damages, but * * * there appears to be no persuasive reason for any differentiation between doing so and ordering a reduction because the verdict is excessive.” In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice HENRIOD is in agreement with Mr. Justice CROCKETT as to no case having increased an award of damages but disagrees that there is no persuasive reason for differentiation between decreasing and increasing the amount of the verdict.
In this connection it should be observed that our statutes from the Revised Statutes of 1898 to and including Utah Code Annotated 1943 did not authorize granting a new trial for inadequate damages. Subdivision (S) of Section 104-40-2, U.C.A. 1943 relating to new trials provided “(5) Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.”
Rule 59(a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure adopted January 1, 1950, changed ground number (5) to read as follows: “Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.”
It would seem that if this court has been right over the years in requiring a remitti-tur of part of an excessive verdict under the statute prior to the effective date of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it should likewise be privileged to order an increase in the amount of the verdict as an alternative for granting a new trial.
I am not impressed with the examples set out in the majority opinion. |n both examples if the evidence shows without dispute the amount of plaintiff’s damage the court should not submit that question to the jury, but only the question of liability. If that were done the right to a new trial or modification of the amount of damages would not be presented.
I am of the opinion that notwithstanding the long established practice of our courts in ordering new trials conditionally, the entire subject should be thoroughly reviewed to determine if our conclusion in this respect is warranted. It will be conceded that subdivision (5) of Rule 59(a) is not warrant for granting a new trial conditionally. It authorizes granting of a new trial, without conditions, for “Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.” (Emphasis ours.)
The majority opinion states the rule which has obtained in this jurisdiction as follows:
“There is implicit within the authority of the court to grant a new trial *49* * * the power to order a new trial conditionally: that is, to order that a new trial be granted unless the party adversely affected by the order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of the damages to an amount within proper limits as viewed by the court.”
It is submitted that in any case in which this court has made a conditional order for a new trial it was first necessary to determine that grounds existed for granting a new trial.
In the case of Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co.,1 the jury awarded damages in the amount of $9,000. This court made the following order:
“It is ordered that the judgment appealed from be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant, unless respondent shall, within 15 days from the date of filing of this opinion, file in this court a remittitur in the sum of $4,000 and accept a net verdict of $5,000 * *
A similar order was made in the case of Mecham v. Foley cited in the main opinion.
In this case the order grants a new trial unless the defendant agrees to the increase of the judgment from $100 to $500.
Is it not strange to give the privilege and option to the party other than the one who requested and who is entitled to a new trial to consent to a reduction or an increase and thereby avoid the new trial?
In the Duffy case, supra, this court holding, as it did, that the defendant was entitled to a new trial, should have given the defendant the option of paying the $5,-000 or of being granted a new trial. Why in this case should not the court, after concluding that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, give plaintiff and not the defendant the option of accepting the additur or of having a new trial.
The House of Lords has held that no remittitur can be effective to avoid a new trial where damages are excessive unless both parties consent to the same.2 I am in accord with that view and believe that this court would take a more realistic view if we adopted the same. The logic in this position is clear. The right to a new trial lies with the aggrieved party who has been the object of a jury’s impassioned or prejudiced verdict. Should that party’s right be subject to the narrow view of the trial judge as to what should constitute a fair verdict without his consent and with only the consent of the party not entitled to a new trial.
Once it is concluded that a new trial is warranted because of excessive damages it becomes a bargain between the trial judge or this court and the party not entitled to *50any relief, in which bargain the aggrieved party has no voice.

. 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080, 1085.

. Watt v. Watt (1905) A.C. (Eng.) 115, 6 B.R.C. 1, 2 Ann.Cas. 672.