Court Opinion

ID: 9562545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:31:18.757091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:23.838736
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Snyder v. Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975). The issue in Snyder was whether certiorari review pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) was the exclusive method for judicial review of rezoning ordinances. However, the fact that rezoning ordinances are subject to certiorari review does not affect their status as legislative acts.
Here, the issue is whether rezoning ordinances and amendments to the master plan are subject to the referendum process. The referendum power reserved to the people must be liberally construed. See Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 450 P.2d 653 (1969). And, contrary to the majority view, I consider Fort Collins v. Dooney, 178 Colo. 25, 496 P.2d 316 (1972), as persuasive on this issue.
In Dooney, our Supreme Court held that the referendum process was available to review a rezoning ordinance under the Fort Collins charter. The charter reserved the referendum process for all ordinances except for three types — none of which encompassed zoning.
*363Lakewood is a statutory city, and thus, Colo. Const., Art. V., Sec. 1, applies. That section provides:
•“The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by this section are hereby further reserved to the legal voters of every city, town and municipality as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in or for their respective municipalities.”
No exception appearing in the Constitution for rezoning ordinances, it is apparent that rezoning decisions are not exempt. Therefore, the referendum process applies.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.