Court Opinion

ID: 9583992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:38.094431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:22.249641
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
Although I would concur in Division 2,1 respectfully dissent with respect to Division 1 and would therefore reverse the conviction for possession of cocaine.
Defendant was not given the opportunity to post her valid driver’s license in lieu of bail or deposit of money or formal recognizance or incarceration, which she was entitled to do under OCGA § 17-6-11 (a).
When the law was originally enacted in 1973, it provided that the arrestee “may, upon agreement with the arresting officer deposit his chauffeur’s or driver’s license with the apprehending officer in lieu of” the more severe restrictions. That limitation, which required the agreement of the officer, was eliminated in 1982 when the statute was revised. Ga. L. 1982, pp. 1136, 1138, § 3; p. 1142, § 6. The limitation has not been added back, despite legislative amendment of the section three times since. The title of the 1982 statute reinforces the intention of the legislature to afford this option to persons arrested for certain offenses, for it includes as one of its purposes “to amend an Act permitting driver’s licenses to be deposited as bail on arrest for certain traffic offenses ... so as to authorize driver’s licenses to be deposited in certain cases; . . .” Ga. L. 1982, p. 1136. It appears that the legislature intended to provide a simpler and less invasive and less disruptive procedure for assuring the attendance at court, of *76those charged with certain vehicle-connected offenses, than full booking at the jail.
The deputy sheriff who searched the purse was the intake officer processing the inmates in. He received all prisoners into the jail. He testified: “We take all their personal property that they have on them . . . When a female is brought in we process them in, fill out the medical screening sheet, fill out the U.C.R. which is just personal information on them. We inventory all the property they have as far as any jewelry, cash, shoe laces, belts, anything the[y] may have in their purse. For security reasons we inventory everything . . . The policy is that we inventory everything that comes through the back door to prevent contraband from going in. Whenever I inventory the property then I am responsible and the County is responsible for whatever that person has on them so we taken an inventory to make sure that any jewelry or money is accounted for . . . And, it’s also to protect the person so that they get their stuff back too.”
With respect to defendant, she “was brought in by (the arresting officer) on (four) traffic citations.” The deputy sheriff inventoried the purse with defendant directly in front of him on the other side of the cage. It was then that he found the suspected cocaine.
Defendant had been arrested at her child’s nursery school some four to five blocks from home. She was driving a borrowed car and was arrested pursuant to OCGA §§ 17-4-20 and 17-4-23 for speeding, expired tag, no proof of insurance, and failure to completely stop at a stop sign. The officer impounded the car, examined defendant’s purse for weapons, took her in handcuffs to the jail and turned her purse over to the custody of the sheriff’s deputy.
No reason is given for processing defendant into jail as a prisoner rather than permitting her to deposit her driver’s license, which the officer had already confirmed was valid. Had she been afforded the option to do so, she would have left with the receipt and there would have been no purpose in, or basis for, searching her purse. In my opinion, the inventory search was the product of a violation of OCGA § 17-6-11, and its fruits should have been suppressed.
The majority writes that OCGA § 17-6-11 applies only to instances when the officer elects to issue a citation instead of effecting a custodial arrest. However, the issuance of a citation, which is authorized by OCGA § 17-4-23 (a), is by its nature non-custodial. A person leaves the scene, and it is only if he or she “fails to appear as specified in the citation” that a custodial arrest is effected, by issuance and enforcement of an arrest warrant. OCGA § 17-4-23 (b).
Consequently, if the permission given to the charged person to deposit his or her driver’s license applied only to persons who received citations, there would be no benefit to the citizen to be gained from such a surrender. The purpose of submitting the license is to *77avoid being immediately brought before a judicial officer and is in lieu of bail, recognizance, and incarceration. The statute expressly states that it applies to “any person who is arrested by an officer for the violation of” certain laws. It also states that the deposit is “in lieu of being incarcerated by the arresting officer,” and this “arresting officer” must give a receipt.
Decided November 26, 1991.
Smith, White, Sharma & Halpern, Marilymn B. Kelm, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Daniel J. Cahill, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
After the procedure set out in OCGA § 17-6-11 (a) is followed, the officer is authorized by OCGA § 17-6-11 (b) to release the person.
Brock v. State, 196 Ga. App. 605 (396 SE2d 785) (1990), and Polk v. State, 200 Ga. App. 17 (406 SE2d 548) (1991), should be reversed insofar as they are contrary.