Court Opinion

ID: 9637337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:03:45.20135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.488962
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Clifton, for himself and as agent for 47 other persons, brought this action against the E. C. Schroeder Company, Inc.,1 to recover overtime compensation and liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,2 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
The facts are not in dispute. By the Act of June 28, 1938, 52 Stat. 1215, 1219, Congress authorized the construction of the Denison Dam and Reservoir for flood control and other purposes. Work was commenced on the project in the early part of 1942.
Because the waters impounded by the completed dam would inundate portions of the railroad track of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, an interstate railroad and an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and U. S. Highway No. 70, an interstate highway and an instrumentality of interstate commerce, the United States entered into contracts with various contractors for the relocation of approximately 18.71 miles of railroad and approximately 3.8 miles of highway. The relocation sites for the railroad and highway were upon raw, unimproved land. It was necessary to survey, clear, grade, fill, and excavate the relocation sites. Piling was driven and concrete superstructures constructed. New roadbeds, one bridge for the relocated highway, and two bridges for the relocated railroad track were built. The plans and specifications called for cushion and riprap rock to be placed on the approaches to the bridges where the waves from the lake would beat against them. Schroeder sold to the prime contractors the cushion and riprap rock delivered onto trucks at its quarries. The entire cost of construction was paid by the United States. The rock quarries were situated in Oklahoma. They were opened and operated especially to produce the gravel and rock for the relocation projects. During the period of construction no traffic passed over the new segment of railroad. After it was completed, interstate commerce did, and has continued to, move over it. During the period of construction and on the date the judgment was rendered below, no traffic had moved over the new segment of highway. When it is completed, interstate commerce will move over it. The cushion and riprap rock was all produced within the State of Oklahoma, and did not at any time go out of the State of Oklahoma nor cross any state line.
Cumberland Oil Field lies along the banks of the Washita River in Bryan and Marshall Counties, Oklahoma. But for the construction of the dike, hereinafter referred to, water from the dam would have inundated the oil field. The United States awarded, as a part of the dam and reservoir project, a contract for the construction of a dike to confine the impounded waters so they would not inundate the oil field. Had the dike not been built, the production of oil would have been interfered with substantially. Oil produced from the field moves in interstate commerce. The prime contractor for the dike subcontracted a part of the work to Lambert Bros., Inc., and that company made a subcontract with Schroeder to furnish the rock for the dike. The rock used in the dike was produced from the quarries in Oklahoma, and was not moved outside the state.
Certain of the plaintiffs below were laborers, mechanics, and power shovel operators engaged in the work of producing the cushion and riprap rock at the quarries. The rock was hauled and placed on the highway and railroad by other workmen.
Certain of the plaintiffs below were engaged in the work of producing rock at the quarries for the dike. Some were engaged in hauling the rock to the dike *392and dumping it on or near by the dike. The rock not dumped directly in the dike was moved into place by a crane.
The trial court held tha.t the workmen engaged in producing rock for the railroad and highway projects were within the coverage of the Act and that the other workmen were not. It awarded judgment accordingly. Schroeder appealed and the plaintiffs below cross-appealed.
The Employees Engaged in the Production of Cushion and Riprap Rock for the Highway and Railroad
The question is whether the employees engaged in the production at the quarries of the cushion and riprap rock for the new segments of railroad and highway were engaged in commerce. The test under the Act “to determine whether an employee is engaged in commerce, is not whether the employee’s activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it.’’3
In Rucker v. First National Bank of Miami, Old., 10 Cir., 138 F.2d 699, 704, we said: “Whatever may have been the doubts and differences along the way, it now seems fairly plain that the phrase ‘engaged in commerce,’ when used to measure coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, encompasses only employment actually in the ‘movement of commerce,’ or activities so closely related thereto as to be practically a part of it. In other words, ‘engaged in commerce’ means engaged in the interstate transportation or movement of commerce.”
In construing the “in commerce” provision in the Act, the Supreme Court has drawn from its decisions construing an analogous provision of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. In Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation, 318 U.S. 125, 131, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498, 87 L.Ed. 656, the court said: “The Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act are not strictly analogous, but they are similar. Both are aimed at protecting commerce from injury through adjustment of the master-servant relationship, the one by liberalizing the common law rules pertaining to negligence and the other by eliminating substandard working conditions.”
And, in McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 495, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 87 L.Ed. 1538, the court said: “Judicial determination of the reach of the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act ‘in commerce’ must deal with doubtful instances. There is no single concept of interstate commerce which can be applied to every federal statute regulating commerce. See Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. [517], 520, 62 S.Ct. [1116], 86 L.Ed. 1638. However, the test of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that activities so closely related to interstate transportation as to be in practice and legal relation a part thereof are to be considered in that commerce, is applicable to employments ‘in commerce’ under the Fair Labor Standards Act.” See, also, Rucker v. First National Bank of Miami, Old., 10 Cir., 138 F.2d p. 703.
If the cushion and riprap rock had been used to repair or maintain an existing operating railroad, the question here presented would be more narrow.4 However, such rock was used in the construction of new segments of railroad and highway 'to take the place of segments of an existing railroad and highway that would be inundated by the lake. At the time the labor was performed, neither new segment was being used as an instrumentality of commerce.
In Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 151, 152, 33 S.Ct. 648, 649, 57 L.Ed. 1125, the court held that an employee who was injured while carrying bolts to be used in repairing a railroad bridge, over which interstate trains passed, was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. It was pointed out that the tracks and bridges were indispensable to interstate commerce, and “that the work of keeping such instrumentalities in a proper state of repair while thus used is so closely related to such commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a part of it.” But the court was careful to distinguish between existing instrumen-talities of interstate commerce and construction which had not yet become such instrumentalities, saying: “Of course, we are not here concerned with the construction of tracks, bridges, engines, or cars, which have not as yet become instrumen-talities in such commerce, but only with *393the work of maintaining them in proper condition after they have become such in-strumentalities and during their use as such.”
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act does not apply to original or new construction.5
In Bamberger Electric R. Co. v. Winslow, 10 Cir., 45 F.2d 499, 500, we said: “Where an employe is engaged in work upon or directly in connection with an instrumentality which is being used in interstate commerce, such employe is employed in interstate commerce. On the other hand, where the instrumentality, upon which the employe is at work or in connection with which he is employed, has not yet been dedicated to use in interstate commerce, although it may be intended for use ultimately in such commerce, such work ordinarily is not so closely related to interstate commerce as to be practically a part of it.”
In New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 191, 192, 37 S.Ct. 247, 248, 61 L.Ed. 667, L.R.A.1917D, 1, Ann.Cas.1917D, 629, the court said: “The admitted fact that the new station and tracks were designed for use, when finished, in interstate commerce, does not bring the case within the Federal act. The test is, '‘Was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?’ Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 36 S.Ct. 188, 60 L.Ed. 436, 438, L.R.A.1916C, 797. Decedent’s work bore no direct relation to interstate transportation, and had to do solely with construction work, which is clearly distinguishable, as was pointed out in Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 152, 33 S.Ct. 648, 57 L.Ed. 1125, 1128, Ann.Cas.1914C, 153. And see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 180, 36 S.Ct. 517, 60 L.Ed. 941, 942; Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 43, 37 S.Ct. 268, 61 L.Ed. 583.”
Since the new construction had not yet become instrumentalities of interstate commerce at the time the labor was performed, it is my opinion that the activities of the employees who produced the rock were not actually in or so closely related to the movement of interstate commerce as to be a part of it.6
Counsel for the Administrator filed a brief as amicus curiae, in which a new theory of the meaning of the words “in commerce” is advanced. They urge that under the holdings in the so-called Ice Cases,7 the workmen producing the rock were engaged in the production of goods for commerce. It is my view that the doctrine of the Ice Cases has no application in the instant cases. The rock was not produced to supply the needs of interstate commerce, to serve as an essential part of such commerce, nor to aid or facilitate the carrying on of such commerce by essential instrumentalities or facilities of commerce. It was produced in order to construct new segments of railroad and highway that had not yet become instrumentalities in such commerce.
The Workmen Engaged in Quarrying and Hauling Rock for the Construction of the Dike
The dike itself was o not an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The dike was constructed to confine the waters on lands acquired by the United States and prevent the inundation of the oil field. The government could have condemned the oil field, or otherwise acquired the title, and permitted the waters to inundate the field. It chose to construct the dike and prevent inundation of the oil field. The government constructed the dike to confine the waters within the area where it had the lawful right to impound them. That was the primary purpose for constructing the dike. The instant case, in my opinion, is distinguishable from watchmen or firemen employed to protect factories or manufacturing plants engaged in the production of goods for commerce. *394See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 65 S.Ct. 165; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638; Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 10 Cir., 129 F.2d 655. In those cases, the workmen were employed primarily to protect the manufacturing establishments engaged in the production of goods for commerce. Here, the workmen were employed primarily to construct a dike to confine the waters within an area which the United States had the right to submerge. The oil producer had no relationship, contractual or otherwise, with the United States, the contractors who constructed the dike, or such contractors’ employees.
In solving the problem what is required is a “practical judgment as to whether the particular employer actually operates the work as part of an integrated effort for the production of goods,”8 and as was said by the court in 10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc., v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 582, 65 S.Ct. 1227, 1229, “We cannot ‘be unmindful that Congress in enacting this statute plainly indicated its purpose to leave local business to the protection of the states.’ We must be alert, therefore, not to absorb by adjudication essentially local activities that Congress did not see fit to take over by legislation.”
It is true that the dike will protect the oil field from inundation. But, inundation would have resulted not from any condition present in the oil field, any natural condition surrounding the field, nor any factor incident to the production of oil, but solely because of the construction of the dam and reservoir. Therefore, it seems to me the work in constructing the dike was not a part of an integrated effort for the production of oil.
It is my opinion that the work of the employees in quarrying the rock and hauling it to the dike did not have such a close and immediate tie with the process of production for commerce in the oil field as to be regarded as necessary to such production within the meaning of § 3 of the Act.
Accordingly, I concur in the reversal in No. 3176 and would affirm in No. 3178.

 Hereinafter referred to as Schroeder.

 Hereinafter referred to as the Act.

 McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 87 L.Ed. 1538.

 See Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation, 318 U.S. 125, 63 S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656.

 New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 191, 192, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667, L.R.A.1917D, 1, Ann.Cas.1917D, 629; Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 43, 37 S.Ct. 268, 61 L.Ed. 583; Hallstein v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 30 F.2d 594, 595, and cases there cited.

 See Nieves v. Standard Dredging Corp., 1 Cir., 152 F.2d 719.

 Hansen v. Salinas Valley Ice Co., 62 Cal.App.2d 357, 144 P.2d 896; Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, Administrator, 4 Cir., 127 F.2d 165; Atlantic Co. v. Walling, Administrator, 5 Cir., 131 F.2d 518; Chapman v. Home Ice Co. of Memphis, 6 Cir., 136 F.2d 353.

 Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 130, 65 S.Ct. 165, 167; Walling, Administrator v. Amidon, 10 Cir., 153 F.2d 159.