Court Opinion

ID: 9654195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:09:30.520389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:06.654328
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
On original submission the appellant failed to file a brief. We shall now discuss his informal bills of exception.
Bill of Exception No. 13 complains of the testimony of Dr. Mason in which he gave the results of the blood test. The objection is two-fold. The first objection relates back to Dr. Mason’s testimony in which he told of the findings of the American Medical Association as to the percentage of alcohol in the blood which indicated intoxication. The grounds of the objection were that this constituted hearsay evidence. In Jones v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 29, 261 S.W. 2d 161, in discussing a similar contention, we said, “Experts, in giving opinion testimony may, *438however, refer to scientific authorities and state the results thereof.”
The second relates to the chain of custody of the blood specimen, which the appellant contends was not sufficiently shown. Officer Chaffin testified that on March 13 he was present when the specimen was taken from the appellant, that the bottle containing the same was sealed and marked for identification, and that he personally placed it in a refrigerator in the laboratory in a place marked for blood samples. Dr. Mason testified that on March 14 he took the sealed blood sample bearing the appellant’s identification from that portion of the icebox in his laboratory which was reserved for the preservation of blood samples. This we conclude was a sufficient showing of the chain of custody. Gilderbloom v. State, 160 Texas Cr. Rep. 471, 272 S.W. 2d 106.
Bill of Exception No. 8 relates to the testimony of the arresting officer to the effect that the appellant agreed to take the blood test. The objection was that he was under arrest at the time. The officer did not attempt to relate his conversation with the accused; he merely stated that the appellant agreed to take the test. Under our holding in Brown v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 144, 240 S.W. 2d 310, it was proper for the state to show that the blood test was taken with the consent of the accused. No error is reflected by the bill.
Bills of Exception Nos. 10 and 11 complain that the arresting officer was permitted to testify that in his opinion the appellant was very drunk and too drunk to drive an automobile. Clearly, the officer was entitled to give his opinion as to the degree of appellant’s intoxication based on appellant’s appearance and conduct at the time of his arrest. We know of no rule which would prevent the witness from giving his opinion as to the degree of intoxication which the accused was laboring under.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.