Court Opinion

ID: 9481391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:17:42.36312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:17.307910
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant Gregory L. Donald contends that on February 7, 1987, Officer Rast, who was driving a police van, negligently collided with appellant’s vehicle. Appellant contends that Officer Hogan, who investigated the accident, falsely arrested appellant and charged him with driving while under the influence of alcohol. Furthermore, appellant contends that Officer Beach deliberately falsified the results of a breathalyzer test to show an erroneous blood alcohol content of .13 to support the false DUI charge. Appellant’s theory of case is that the police officers took these actions in order to protect Officer Rast from possible departmental disciplinary action based on the fact that the February 7, 1987 accident was the second time that Officer Rast was involved in an automobile accident with a police vehicle in three months. The first incident occurred in November 1986 and, as a result of that incident, Officer Rast received a letter of reprimand from the chief of police.
Appellant was denied his request to introduce several key pieces of evidence tending to prove his theory of the case. Among them, appellant sought to introduce the findings of the AU in appellant’s license suspension proceeding wherein the AU stated that the breathalyzer test results were unreliable because “the needle mark did not appear realistic.” The AU also questioned the conclusion that appellant’s blood alcohol content was .13 because such level was inconsistent with appellant’s activities prior to the collision.
The appellant also sought to introduce state court records showing that the DUI charges against him had been dismissed for want of prosecution when the city prosecutor failed to appear for trial. Appellant was also denied the opportunity to introduce evidence that Officer Hogan had been suspended from the force on at least two occasions, including an incident in which he was reprimanded for not being wholly truthful in his account of a vehicular accident in which he was involved.
Given the highly questionable nature of the events herein, I believe that appellant was deprived of the opportunity to present his theory of the case and was, therefore, denied the opportunity of a fair trial. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this evidence was properly excluded and, accordingly, I dissent.