Court Opinion

ID: 9965091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:06:02.081781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.041466
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    May 01 2024, 9:25 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                   Jonathan D. O’Connor,
                                        Appellant-Defendant

                                                   v.

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                             May 1, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-CR-2233
                              Appeal from the Henry Circuit Court
                           The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                         33C02-1812-F3-17

                                  Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                Judges May and Vaidik concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024                   Page 1 of 10
      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   Jonathan D. O’Connor appeals his convictions for Level 1 felony attempted

      murder and Level 3 felony aggravated battery. 1 O’Connor raises the following

      two issues for our review:

              1. Whether his two convictions violate Indiana’s protections
              against double jeopardy.

              2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
              conviction for attempted murder.

[2]   We affirm O’Connor’s conviction for attempted murder, but, following our

      Supreme Court’s recent opinion in A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2024),

      we reverse his conviction for aggravated battery as contrary to Indiana’s

      protections against double jeopardy. We remand to the trial court with

      instructions to vacate O’Connor’s conviction and sentence for that offense.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Alejandra Tellez used to purchase pain pills from Christopher Williams.

      However, she ceased doing so and cut off communication with Williams

      around June 2018 because Williams had become romantically interested in

      Tellez, and she did not share that interest in him.

      1
        O’Connor does not appeal his convictions for Level 6 felony criminal confinement or Class A misdemeanor
      theft.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024                              Page 2 of 10
[4]   Williams and O’Connor knew each other, and O’Connor also had previously

      sold pills to Tellez. On June 11, after Tellez had cut off communication with

      him, Williams used O’Connor’s phone to contact her. He told her he had some

      pills that he could sell her on June 12, and she agreed to meet Williams.

[5]   On the morning of June 12, Williams met with O’Connor at O’Connor’s

      apartment. There, the two discussed abducting and raping Tellez. Williams

      said, “let’s go do this,” and the two took O’Connor’s car to where Williams had

      arranged to meet with her. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 219. On the way, it became clear to

      O’Connor that Williams also intended to “murder” Tellez. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 6-7.

[6]   Williams drove O’Connor’s vehicle to the arranged location. There, Tellez got

      into the back seat. She was “surprised” to see that O’Connor also was in the

      back seat. Id. at 69. Williams drove off with Tellez in the vehicle. O’Connor

      then tied Tellez’s hands and feet together with duct tape.

[7]   At some point, O’Connor and Williams switched places in the vehicle.

      O’Connor drove the vehicle from Indianapolis to Henry County. While driving

      on a back road, he saw Williams strangling Tellez and thought that Williams

      had killed her. O’Connor then pulled next to a ravine, and Williams threw

      Tellez down it. Afterwards, O’Connor drove Williams to two different

      locations, where Williams disposed of Tellez’s cell phone and other personal

      belongings.

[8]   Tellez survived the ordeal, and, in the evening hours of July 13, nearby

      motorists located her after hearing her struggling to yell for help. At a nearby

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024            Page 3 of 10
       hospital, she was treated for several injuries, including a brain injury resulting

       from oxygen deprivation and petechiae, or hemorrhages in the eyes, which are

       usually caused by strangulation.

[9]    Law enforcement officers identified Williams and O’Connor as the likely

       perpetrators, and O’Connor later made incriminating statements to officers.

       The State charged O’Connor in relevant part with Level 1 felony attempted

       murder and Level 3 felony aggravated battery, both of which were under a

       theory of accomplice liability. According to the charging information,

       O’Connor had aided Williams in Williams’s attempt to murder Tellez by

       strangulation. The charging information similarly alleged that O’Connor had

       aided Williams in Williams’s commission of aggravated battery when Williams

       “knowingly or intentionally inflict[ed] injury” on Tellez, which caused

       impairment to her “eye.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 128.

[10]   Tellez testified against O’Connor. The State also had O’Connor’s statements to

       officers admitted into evidence. During closing argument, the State discussed

       part of the evidence underlying the allegation of attempted murder as follows:

       “The marks around her neck, the petechiae eye and her eyes, and the anoxic

       brain injury are all consistent with establishing that Christopher Williams

       strangled Alejandra to the near point of death.” Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 181-82. And,

       with respect to the aggravated battery allegation, the State described the

       relevant evidence similarly: “Alejandra’s testimony was that she was

       temporarily blind [after the attack]. . . . And there’s no evidence to suggest that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024            Page 4 of 10
       anything other than the strangulation was the cause of her loss of vision.” Id. at

       184.

[11]   The jury found O’Connor guilty of Level 1 felony attempted murder and Level

       3 felony aggravated battery. The court then entered its judgment of conviction

       and sentenced O’Connor accordingly. This appeal ensued.

       1. O’Connor’s two convictions are contrary to Indiana’s
       protections against double jeopardy.
[12]   On appeal, O’Connor first contends that his convictions for Level 1 felony

       attempted murder and Level 3 felony aggravated battery are contrary to

       Indiana’s protections against double jeopardy. We review such questions de

       novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024).

[13]   Indiana’s protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple

       convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066. To

       determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we apply a

       “three-part test based on statutory sources . . . .” Id. The first step is to look to

       the statutory language of the offenses at issue; if that language “clearly permits

       multiple punishments,” then “there is no violation of substantive double

       jeopardy.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, O’Connor and the State agree

       that the first step is not dispositive, and so we proceed to the second step.

[14]   Under the second step, as clarified by our Supreme Court in A.W., we look to

       the face of the charging information to discern if the factual bases identified for

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024               Page 5 of 10
       the charges implicate our statutory definitions of an “included offense.” Id. In

       particular, the Indiana Code defines an included offense as an offense that:

               (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
               than all the material elements required to establish the
               commission of the offense charged;

               (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
               offense otherwise included therein; or

               (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
               serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
               public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
               establish its commission.

       Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (2017). As we have previously recognized,

       aggravated battery is included in attempted murder where the fact-finder

       “would necessarily have to find that all of the material elements of aggravated

       battery” have been met in order to find that the means used to commit the

       attempted murder were met. Demby v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1035, 1045 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2021), trans. denied.

[15]   Here, the face of the charging information identifies the factual basis of the

       means used to commit attempted murder as Williams’s strangulation of Tellez.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 128. However, the face of the charging information

       does not identify a factual basis for the aggravated battery allegation. Id.

       Instead, the charging information for that allegation simply tracks the statutory

       language of the offense. See I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5 (2017).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024                Page 6 of 10
[16]   Thus, the charging information here is ambiguous as to whether the aggravated

       battery charge may have been included in the attempted murder charge. In such

       circumstances, our Supreme Court made clear in A.W. that we “must

       construe those ambiguities in the defendant’s favor, and thus find a presumptive

       double jeopardy violation” at this step in the analysis.2 A.W., 229 N.E.3d at

       1069. We therefore conclude that O’Connor has established a presumptive

       double jeopardy violation, and we turn to step three.

[17]   Under step three, the State may rebut the presumptive double jeopardy

       violation by using the facts presented at trial to demonstrate a “distinction

       between what would otherwise be two of the ‘same’ offenses.” Id. at 1071.

       However, “if the facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory

       offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative

       convictions. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[18]   Here, the State cannot demonstrate a distinction between the attempted murder

       allegation and the aggravated battery allegation based on the facts from the

       trial. To the contrary, the prosecutor made clear in his closing remarks that the

       factual basis for the aggravated battery allegation was Williams’s strangulation

       of Tellez, which was also the means used by Williams in his attempt to murder

       2
         We also recognize that, if the State were to allege one factual basis in its charging information but then
       attempt to prove that charge using a different factual basis at trial, the State would implicate the defendant’s
       fundamental due process rights under our Supreme Court’s analysis in Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 724-28
       (Ind. 2015).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024                                     Page 7 of 10
       her. Accordingly, the facts show only a single continuous crime between the

       two allegations.

[19]   Where a defendant is found guilty of both the greater offense and an included

       offense, the proper procedure is to vacate the conviction for the included offense

       and to enter a judgment of conviction and sentence only upon the greater

       offense. See, e.g., Demby, 203 N.E.3d at 1046. We therefore reverse O’Connor’s

       conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery and remand to the trial court

       for it to vacate that conviction and sentence accordingly.

       2. The State presented sufficient evidence to show that
       O’Connor committed attempted murder.
[20]   O’Connor also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to

       support his conviction for attempted murder. For sufficiency of the evidence

       challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that

       support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191

       (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.

       Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the

       elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[21]   As our Supreme Court has held, to prove attempted murder under a theory of

       accomplice liability, the State must show that the defendant

               knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused [his
               confederate] to commit the attempted murder of [the victim]. The
               accomplice liability statute permits a defendant to be found guilty
               as an accomplice without the jury finding that the defendant

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024          Page 8 of 10
               committed every element of the crime when that defendant
               “knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another
               person to commit an offense.” For many crimes, it is sufficient to
               prove that a defendant either “knowingly” or “intentionally”
               performed a prohibited act. It is well settled, however, that a
               conviction for attempted murder requires proof of specific intent
               to kill. See Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind.1991).

       Bethel v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Ind. 2000) (statutory citation

       omitted). O’Connor argues only that the State failed to show that he had the

       requisite intent to support his conviction.

[22]   We disagree and conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could have readily

       found that the State presented sufficient evidence to support O’Connor’s

       conviction for attempted murder. The day prior to the abduction, O’Connor

       allowed Williams to use his phone to contact Tellez. The following morning,

       Williams and O’Connor discussed abducting and raping Tellez. O’Connor then

       went with Williams to execute that plan, and, en route, it became clear to

       O’Connor that Williams also intended to murder Tellez. O’Connor nonetheless

       continued with Williams to locate, abduct, and bind Tellez, and O’Connor

       drove Tellez and Williams to a remote location in another county. O’Connor

       then watched Williams strangle Tellez and throw her body down a ravine, after

       which he helped Williams dispose of Tellez’s personal property in multiple

       locations.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024             Page 9 of 10
[23]   The State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder

       could conclude that O’Connor acted with the specific intent to kill Tellez. We

       therefore affirm his conviction for attempted murder.

       Conclusion
[24]   For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm O’Connor’s conviction for Level 1

       felony attempted murder and we reverse his conviction for Level 3 felony

       aggravated battery. We remand to the trial court with instructions for it to

       vacate O’Connor’s conviction and sentence for Level 3 felony aggravated

       battery.

[25]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

       May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Lisa Diane Manning
       Plainfield, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Daylon L. Welliver
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2233 | May 1, 2024         Page 10 of 10