Court Opinion

ID: 9868560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:41:25.482241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:50.545223
License: Public Domain

Mb. Justice McKinney
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a compensation suit in which the trial court awarded Dotson $6 per week for three hundred weeks. The company has appealed and assigned numerous errors.
*403By the second assignment of error it is insisted that the trial conrt was in error in awarding petitioner a recovery because he did not give the company thirty days’ written notice of the injury, as provided in section 22 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Pub. Acts 1919, chapter 123).
Dotson testified that on August 6, 1924, while lifting some heavy crates, he strained or wrenched his side receiving a sharp pain. It was near the close of the day. When he arrived at his home, he had his wife to rub his side with turpentine liniment, and he was greatly relieved. He continued at his work without making any complaint or giving the company any notice. The pain increased until he concluded there was something serious the matter with him, and on September the 4th, or twenty-nine days after the accident, he reported his trouble to his foreman, and the foreman sent him to the superintendent. The superintendent made a written report of the accident, and gave Dotson a written order to the company’s physician, Dr. Williams, for treatment. Dr. Williams called in Dr. Jacobs, medical examiner for the company who was carrying insurance for the plaintiff in error. They examined Dotson, and Dr. Williams gave him a truss to wear. He returned several times, at their request, for further medical attention, and was told that he had hernia and would have to undergo an operation, .or that he needed an operation. On one of these visits he was told that the truss did not fit and was promised another, which was never furnished him. On the same day that Dotson reported his injury, the superintendent made a personal investigation of the accident.
*404The petitioner was retained in the employ of the company for more than a month after the injury was reported to it, and for more than a month after the thirty days’ period had expired, the work given him being light, however, and he quit of his own volition, being unable to work longer because of pain resulting from the injury.
At the time the company was given actual notice of the injury it was under no obligation to furnish petitioner medical treatment and a truss; to furnish him light work, or to retain him in its employ. It obtained all of the information from the petitioner as to the injury, made an independent investigation, and turned him, over to its doctor for treatment. Thus the petitioner was led to believe that the company was recognizing its liability.
' In these circumstances, we are of the opinion 'that the petitioner was excused from giving the thirty days ’ written notice, and that the company, by its conduct, waived same.
From the testimony of the physicians examined it is most likely that petitioner’s injury, to begin with, was slight, a very small tear that grew larger, or progressed, due to exercise, strain, etc. ■
Dotson was a young man, thirty-five years of age, strong, vigorous, and a good worker until he received this injury. He evidently considered that he had only received a sprain or wrench that would soon pass away. He had never had anything of this kind before. From his testimony we judge that he is ignorant and illiterate..
What we have said above shows the good faith of the man; there is no doubt but that he is in a serious condition, and there is no suggestion that this hernia was *405produced in any other manner than that testified to by him. We are unable to find any evidence of fraud.
It is true that Dotson did not give this notice, hut he gave verbal notice to the foreman of the company, as required by its rules, except that, for the reason stated above, he did not give same immediately.
Under somewhat similar circumstances this court, in Vester Gas Range & Mfg. Co. v. Leonard, 148 Tenn., 665, 257 S. W., 395, held that the company, by its conduct, waived notice. The fact that in that case the verbal notice was given in ten days instead of twenty-nine days could not affect the principle of law involved.
For the foregoing reasons the second assignment of error will be overruled..
By the first assignment of error it is said that defendant in error should be precluded because he refused to undergo an operation.
. This assignment of error is not supported by the evidence.
When the conditions are such as those appearing in Sun Coal Co. v. Wilson, 147 Tenn., 118, 245 S. W., 547, the employee would have to submit to an operation. That is to say, where it appears that an operation is necessary, that he is in condition to undergo same, that it would in all probability be successful, and the company tenders it to him, and offers to defray all expenses, he would have to submit. The court would be very loath to further extend- the rule announced in that case.
■ - There is no provision in the act requiring an injured employee to have an operation at his own expense. Dot son testified that he was not able financially to have the operation performed.
*406In the third place, error is assigned on the finding of the trial court that the accident occurred on August the 6th.
Dotson and his wife both so testified, hence there is some evidence to support the finding on this question.
In view of what we have already said, the fourth assignment of error becomes immaterial.
The fifth assignment of error is without merit for the reasons stated in reply to the first assignment of error.
Replying to the sixth assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that Dotson testified that he was unable to work.
The seventh assignment of error relates to the question of notice, which has been previously disposed of.
Replying to the eighth assignment of error, which complains of the decree in awarding $6 per week for three hundred weeks when there is no proof that disability would continue for that length of time, section 38 of the act provides a method for future modification of the decree in case of increase of capacity, and this provision of the act is impliedly read into the decree.
We fully appreciate the fact that the provision of the act as to notice should not be treated lightly, and failure to give such notice promptly will, in many cases, work prejudicially to the employer. But in the instant case the employer was not prejudiced because the physicians testified that had they been apprised of the injury at the time the only cure would have been an operation.
We feel that the merits of this case have been reached. All of the assignments of error will be overruled, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.