Court Opinion

ID: 9765172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:54:31.999922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:01.544311
License: Public Domain

NAHMIAS, Justice,
concurring specially.
I join all of the majority opinion except the final sentence of the first paragraph of Division 9 on page 516, which states:
Furthermore, Martin’s acquittal on the malice murder charge is a relevant factor which “ ‘strongly supports the conclusion that the assistance rendered by the attorney fell within that broad range of reasonably effective assistance ... .’ [Cit.]” Carter v. State, 265 Ga. App. 44, 50 (4) (c), fn. 25 (593 SE2d 69) (2004). See also [string cite].
Perhaps an acquittal is always “relevant” in some sense to the conclusion that a defense lawyer performed with reasonable effectiveness, since an acquittal is always better in some sense than a conviction. But in my view, the mere fact that a defendant was acquitted on one or more charges, without more, does not “strongly” support such a conclusion. An acquittal may be strongly relevant where the record reflects that defense counsel overcame what appears to be strong evidence against the defendant, as opposed to reflecting the simple absence of strong proof of the charge. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 304 Ga. App. 592, 595 (696 SE2d 512) (2010) (quoting the “strongly supports the conclusion” language after *518explaining that, “despite the overwhelming evidence — including DNA identification and Williams’s flight — trial counsel succeeded in obtaining a directed verdict of acquittal on one count and a jury verdict of acquittal on another”). An acquittal may also be more significant where the defendant was acquitted of many serious charges or of a charge that substantially reduced his sentence. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 265 Ga. App. 44, 44, 50, n. 25 (593 SE2d 69) (2004) (quoting the “strongly supports the conclusion” language after explaining that “counsel developed a successful defense to both the murder and aggravated assault charges, obtaining a not guilty verdict on both” and a conviction on voluntary manslaughter instead); Green v. State, 218 Ga. App. 648, 651 (a) (463 SE2d 133) (1995) (in the case that appears to be the original source of the “strongly supports the conclusion” language, explaining that “trial counsel secured acquittals of each felony charged in the indictment, i.e., burglary, rape, kidnapping, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault, with defendant’s sole conviction being for the misdemeanor of sexual battery”).
The majority opinion does not identify any particular strategy that defense counsel used to obtain Martin’s acquittal on the malice murder and related firearm charge. Instead, those acquittals appear simply to reflect the evidence that the murder resulted from a robbery gone bad rather than a planned killing, with both Moon and Martin saying afterward that the victim drug dealer was killed because he “bucked” and resisted the robbery. See Maj. Op. at 512. Nor did the acquittals benefit Martin in any significant way. He was still convicted of murder (felony murder) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and he received the same sentences — including a life sentence — that he would have received had he been convicted on all counts, since the felony murder would have been vacated by operation of law and the related firearm conviction would have been merged as well.
In a recent case decided unanimously by this Court, the defendant had been convicted of felony murder based on misuse of a firearm while hunting and acquitted of three other serious charges — malice murder, aggravated assault, and felony murder based on aggravated assault. See Henderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 535 (697 SE2d 798) (2010). But he still received a life sentence, and the Court did not mention the acquittals as a factor “strongly supporting]” the conclusion of effective performance by his counsel when we upheld the grant of habeas corpus relief based on the ineffective assistance that his counsel had provided. See id. at 537-540.
In sum, there are certainly cases in which a defendant’s acquittal on one or more counts “strongly supports the conclusion” that his trial counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance. That *519is why it is not improper for the language quoted by the majority to exist in the case law. But as revealed by closer analysis of both the nine Court of Appeals cases the majority cites and more than a dozen others that quote the same language, the circumstances discussed in the opinion often do not justify that statement. Instead, the language seems to have become a mantra quoted by the Court of Appeals whenever an ineffective assistance claim is raised in a case involving an acquittal on any count, however insignificant to the sentence and however unrelated to defense counsel’s actual performance.
Decided February 7, 2011.
Nathanael A. Horsley, for Moon.
Cook, Noell, Tolley & Bates, Edward D. Tolley, Ronald E. Houser, for Martin.
Kenneth TF Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher R. *520Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
*519As far as I can tell, this Court had not previously endorsed or relied upon that mantra. The only case from this Court listed in the majority’s long string cite, Fogarty v. State, 270 Ga. 609 (513 SE2d 493) (1999), was focused not on the standard Strickland analysis but on a conflict of interest issue. See id. at 609-613. The opinion does state, without citation of any authority (much less quotation of the “strongly supports” language), that the defendant’s acquittal on six of the twelve charges against him demonstrated that his trial counsel was reasonably effective. See id. at 613. That conclusion may have been correct on the facts of that case, so Fogarty does not implicate the generalized approach the Court of Appeals has taken, and the facts of this case are quite different.
Here, the majority offers no reason to believe that Martin’s acquittals did him any good or that they prove anything, much less “strongly support” a conclusion, about his trial counsel’s effectiveness. Moreover, the discussion of the acquittals is entirely unnecessary to the result, because the majority explains why, for other reasons, Martin’s ineffective assistance claim fails on both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs. See Maj. Op. at 515-517. I believe that we should not encourage the Court of Appeals to continue using the “strongly supports the conclusion” language as a mantra, unrelated to the specific facts regarding an acquittal, in its ineffective assistance cases, and this Court too should use that language only where the conclusion is actually supported by the circumstances of the case. For these reasons, I respectfully join all except the final sentence of the first paragraph of Division 9 of the majority opinion.