Court Opinion

ID: 9820038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:49:41.776216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:35.562523
License: Public Domain

Majstzanet-Daniels, J.
(dissenting). The officers in this case responded to a radio run of a burglary in progress at 3341 Country Club Road, a commercial establishment. Before stopping defendants, the only information the officers possessed was that a burglary had occurred in the vicinity. The radio run provided no information concerning the number or description of the perpetrators (compare People v Michimani, 115 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1036 [2014], 23 NY3d 1040 [2014]; People v Cintron, 304 AD2d 454 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 579 [2003]). It provided no details regarding the identity or reliability of the 911 caller. When the officers observed defendants, on a weekday morning at 9:30 a.m., there was no indication that they were engaged in illegal or suspicious activity. Given the extremely limited information possessed by the officers, they were justified, at most, in conducting a level one request for information. They did not have the requisite level of suspicion to order defendants to stop, or to pursue Nonni after he fled. I would accordingly grant defendants’ respective suppression motions and order a new trial.
To evaluate whether police conduct was proper, we must consider whether the action was justified at its inception and whether the intrusion was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that rendered its initiation permissible (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). The most minimal intrusion, level one, is a request for information “when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality” (id.). Level two, a common-law inquiry, is “activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” (id.).
The majority’s contention that the officers had a founded suspicion of criminality that permitted them to make a level-*60two inquiry is untenable. The officers had no description of the alleged suspects and no information concerning the 911 caller. Defendants were observed to be in the vicinity of a country club, a commercial establishment in a residential area in the Bronx — hardly the “secluded” area described by the majority— during the daytime. Specifically, they were observed leaving the driveway of the club and walking down the street at an unhurried pace. The entry and exit of individuals from a commercial establishment during normal business hours cannot be deemed out of the ordinary, as the majority would appear to suggest. Given the limited information conveyed by the radio run, the officers had, at best, sufficient cause to conduct a level-one request for information (see e.g. Matter of Manuel D., 19 AD3d 128, 129 [1st Dept 2005] [where the police had no description of the perpetrators and no information regarding the initial call to police, and the only information the officers possessed was the fact that a burglary was in progress at a certain location, the officers had no more than “an objective credible reason to request information”], lv denied 5 NY3d 714 [2005]).
Nonni’s flight, under the circumstances, did not escalate the level of suspicion so as to justify the ensuing police pursuit. “Flight alone ... , or even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might justify a police request for information, is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has a right ‘to be let alone’ and refuse to respond to police inquiry” (People v Holmes, 81 NY2d 1056, 1058 [1993] [internal citations omitted]; People v Reyes, 69 AD3d 523, 524 [1st Dept 2010] [where the officers arrived knowing only that a 911 call had been received about a “dispute with a knife,” and lacked a description of the subject, and upon arriving at the scene were informed by bystanders “That’s him,” pointing to defendant, the pursuit of the suspects was not justified], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 863 [2010]).
The officers were unjustified in pursuing Parker, who did not even flee but merely walked at a “hurried pace” across Country Club Road (see People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 500 [2006] [merely walking away from approaching police does not raise the level of suspicion]). The majority’s conclusion that the police were justified in pursuing defendants is based on the faulty premise that the circumstances gave rise to a founded suspicion of criminality.
In my view, the fruits of the unlawful pursuits should be suppressed. Since the officer did not have authority to chase *61Parker, the fact that the officer claimed to have later seen a sledgehammer in Parker’s unzipped backpack does not furnish probable cause. The officer testified that he did not see the sledgehammer until after he caught up to Parker. He did not observe the sledgehammer or any other weapon prior to pursuing and detaining Parker. The observation of the sledgehammer after the pursuit cannot validate an encounter that was not justified at its inception (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 215]).
Without the illegally obtained evidence, there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants committed the crimes charged. I would grant defendants’ respective motions to suppress, reverse their respective convictions, and order a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing.
Andrias and Saxe, JJ., concur with Friedman, J.P.; Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ., dissent in an opinion by Manzanet-Daniels, J.
Judgments, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered November 4, 2010 as to defendant Parker and November 23, 2010 as to defendant Nonni, affirmed.