Court Opinion

ID: 9682999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:20:29.883773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:43.884257
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, J.
concurring and dissenting.
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of Batson1 and its progeny, I must dissent to that portion of the majority’s opinion. As a consequence, I would sustain appellant’s third point of error. In- all other respects, I agree with the majority’s conclusions.
BATSON MOTION
In his third point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State’s peremptory strike of prospective juror number eight. Specifically, appellant contends the State’s explanation for striking Curtis Evans was not racially neutral because the State did not strike a nonmi-nority prospective juror who also believed “people were a product of their environment.”
1. Standard of Review
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from challenging a potential juror solely because of his race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. The Texas Legislature codified Batson in article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992); Carrion v. State, 802 S.W.2d 83, 88 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no pet.).
When we review Batson issues, we follow the clearly erroneous standard. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 726 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (op. on reh’g). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1239, 111 S.Ct. 2875, 115 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1991). If the record supports the trial court’s ruling, we do not disturb its ruling on appeal. Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
2. Applicable Law
To invoke Batson protections, a criminal defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the State’s peremptory challenges are racially motivated. Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 742, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1871, 128 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994). If the trial court *296eondücts a Batson hearing in which the State offers a race-neutral explanation for its challenges, we do not examine the appellant’s prima facie showing. Wheatfall, 882 S.W.2d at 835.
The burden then shifts to the State to rebut this showing with a race-neutral explanation for its challenge. Id. The prosecutor must give clear, legitimate, and reasonably specific reasons for striking a particular juror. Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 713. If the prosecutor provides a race-neutral explanation, the burden shifts back to the defendant to rebut the prosecutor’s explanation or to show the explanation was merely a sham or pretext. See Williams, 804 S.W.2d at 101. The defendant has the ultimate burden to persuade the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations of purposeful discrimination are true. Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 754, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989); Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. refd) (en banc).
When the defendant rebuts the prosecutor’s explanations, we examine those “neutral explanations” to determine if they are pretexts for racially-motivated peremptory challenges. Reich-Bacot v. State, 789 S.W.2d 401, 403-04 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990) (citing Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 713), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). That a prosecutor assumes some fact about a prospective juror without questioning the prospective juror to verify his theory is some indication that a peremptory strike is not race-neutral. Esteves v. State, 859 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. refd).
We also consider disparate treatment in determining whether a State’s facially race-neutral explanation is a pretext. Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 866. We do not automatically impute disparate treatment to every situation where one of the State’s reasons for striking a prospective juror also applies to another prospective. juror whom the State did not strike. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 689 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 3046, 125 L.Ed.2d 731. Factors that may indicate disparate treatment among prospective jurors include (1) the State’s striking, but not questioning, any of the minority prospective jurors, (2) the State’s striking minority prospective jurors, but not striking nonminority prospective jurors who gave similar answers, and (3) the State’s striking minority prospective jurors, but not striking nonminority prospective jurors who had the same professional, social, or religious characteristics. Young v. State, 848 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992), pet. refd, 856 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). That the State did not strike persons with the same or similar characteristics as the challenged juror weighs heavily against a racially neutral explanation given by the State. Miller-El v. State, 790 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. refd). However, the State’s offering multiple reasons for striking a particular prospective juror indicates a lack of disparate treatment. Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 689.
3. Application of Law to Facts
At trial, appellant objected to the State’s striking of prospective juror number eight, Curtis Evans.2 Appellant contends the State’s peremptory strike of Evans amounted to disparate treatment between Evans and prospective juror number thirty-eight, Detective Loy Smith, a nonminority prospective juror that the State did not strike.3
The State explained that it struck Evans as follows:
The State believes that a big part of the defense is going to be self-defense. So in asking the jurors about what might cause — if there was — could upbringing or background or something like that cause someone to act differently?
No. 5, No. 6 and No. 8 all said that, yes, that they would react to threats differently, that they won’t necessarily — that every*297one does not react the same way. Basically, that they would hold people from a certain socioeconomic background to a different standard. And we struck all the jurors that said that.
This explanation is facially race-neutral. Appellant challenged the State’s reasoning, alleging that the State did not strike Smith who, like Evans, stated that people were a product of their environment. Specifically, appellant stated the following:
[APPELLANT]: Regarding Mr. Evans, No. 8, Detective Smith, No. 38, also stated that people were a product of their environment. The State failed to strike him. They were — as far as his response, I don’t understand how that would be anything that is a race neutral reason.
If somebody is in a certain situation or certain background, of course, they are going to act differently. And that’s what the Court would ask in the charge, that a reasonable and prudent person would place themselves in place of the defendant from his viewpoint, including his background, his environment, etc.
Because appellant rebutted the State’s racially-neutral explanation, we examine the record to determine whether disparate treatment occurred between Evans and Smith.
The State questioned neither Evans nor Smith during voir dire. Only appellant questioned Evans as follows:
[APPELLANT]: Mr. Teele and Mr. Clark were talking about that someone’s reaction may depend on their socioeconomic or their life situation, their background or that type thing.
[EVANS]: Yeah. I can relate to that. Depends on the environment they were raised in or being around certain individuals. Not so much the climate, but the community, the neighborhoods, per se.
[APPELLANT]: Let’s talk about a neighborhood. Do you think somebody from a certain neighborhood might have a different mind set as to a threat made against him that someone in another neighborhood might not?
[EVANS]: Yeah.
[APPELLANT]: I know that’s a terrible question.
[EVANS]: I would say, yeah, because you have a tendency of thinking positive, depending on the neighborhood, than you would thinking negative on the situation where you are.
[APPELLANT]: I mean, if — do you know or how do you feel about somebody maybe being from the neighborhood that— being in a situation where they don’t necessarily trust or rely on the police to help them in certain situations?
How do you feel about that?
[EVANS]: Well, that’s based on what you call survival. You have to come — look out for yourself or your neighbors. I’m opposed to it.
That’s why we got law enforcement officers, to patrol the community and take care of the problems. But sometimes it comes to the point where it’s kind of a do or die situation.
Appellant never asked Evans if he would hold appellant to a lower standard because of his upbringing. Nor did the State ask any questions to verify its assumption — that Evans would hold appellant to a lower standard — at the Batson hearing. But, the State gleans from Evans’s responses to appellant’s questions its opinion that he would hold appellant to a lower standard than he would hold someone from another environment. That the State did not verify its assumption is one indication that its explanation was not race-neutral. See Esteves, 859 S.W.2d at 615.
Moreover, appellant questioned Smith in a similar manner. Smith responded as follows:
[APPELLANT]: I’m going to ask you, Detective Smith, are there parts of Dallas where crime is extreme or violence is a way of life?
[SMITH]: Yes. There are various areas that are more violent than others.
[APPELLANT]: Are there parts of Dallas where those areas are more — violence is more prevalent, to where the police are just flat over-loaded as far as their response?
[SMITH]: That’s correct.
*298[APPELLANT]: Would it surprise you or how would you feel? You’ve seen it. You’ve seen it every day. People that are products of their environment. Would you agree with that?
[SMITH]: That’s correct.
Smith, like Evans, agreed that, in certain areas, violence is a way of life and people are a product of their environment. However, the State did not glean from Smith’s testimony that he would hold appellant to a lower standard than he would hold someone from another environment. Nor did the State strike Smith.
When the trial court asked the State why it did not strike Smith, the State responded: “But, your Honor, there’s a difference between saying that people are products of their environment and the comments by the three jurors on the first row, which is, because of their environment, people react differently to threats which we anticipate will be the defense in this case. And that goes to holding the defendant to a possible lower standard than other people.” The State gave only one reason for striking Evans — that he would hold the defendant to a lower standard. Although both jurors gave similar answers, the State interpreted those answers and reached totally different conclusions.
At trial, the State offered only its belief that Smith would not be reached as a positive attribute to override his belief that people are products of their environments. The majority agrees that “thinking” Smith would not be reached is a positive attribute. The majority ignores the critical inquiry in Bat-son — that the minority prospective juror was within the strike zone, not that the State did not “think” the nonminority prospective juror would “be reached.” See Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.4 Even if “reaching” a prospective juror were the test, it cannot be viewed as a positive attribute used to outweigh a negative attribute.
The majority, however, finds another positive attribute on its own. The majority offers Smith’s occupation of police officer as a positive attribute. Unlike the majority, I find it difficult to conclude from the evidence that the State viewed Smith’s occupation as a positive attribute. It is apparent from the record that the State had two opportunities to offer Smith’s occupation as a positive attribute and did not do so. The State could have raised this “positive attribute” in response to appellant’s prima facie case or to the trial court’s questioning why the State did not strike Smith who gave a similar response as Evans. I do not read Batson to place a burden on the reviewing court to come up with reasons the State could have given. Only the State knows why it did or did not strike a prospective juror, and it has a burden to offer its reasons to the trial court for review. We cannot assume the State relied on a reason it did not offer.
The majority relies on Vargas v. State, 838 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), to support its position that the State may argue anything found in the voir dire proceeding for the first time on appeal. Vargas does not stand for this proposition. The State in Vargas presented no new argument to the reviewing court.
Young cannot support the majority’s position. In Young, the defendant argued disparate treatment among prospective jurors for the first time on appeal. The court of criminal appeals held that a defendant may, within the confines of the evidence before the trial court, argue disparate treatment for the first time on appeal. Young, 826 S.W.2d at 146. In the face of a “new” argument on appeal, the Young court agreed that the State may respond to that “new” argument with any evidence found in the voir dire record. Id. Because Young argued disparate treatment for the first time on appeal, the State had no opportunity to respond to that argument below. These two facts are critical to the holding in Young. These two facts are absent in this case. Here, appellant argued disparate treatment in the trial court. Appellant makes no new argument on appeal. *299The State responded to appellant’s disparate treatment argument in the trial court. Young does not authorize the State to present a different or additional response on appeal to the same argument defendant presented below and responded to by the State during voir dire.
The record establishes that (1) the State struck Evans without questioning him, (2) the State struck Evans for a reason that applied equally to Smith, but did not strike Smith, and (B) the State did not articulate a positive attribute of Smith that outweighed the negative attribute shared by Evans and Smith. These three factors reveal disparate treatment by the State, and I can only conclude on a racial basis. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, I cannot say the record supports the trial court’s ruling on Evans.
Accordingly, I would shstain appellant’s third point of error, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand this cause for a new trial.

. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

. The record shows that Curtis Evans and appellant were both African American.

. The parties direct this Court to no place in the record that reveals that Smith is a nonminority. However, at trial, appellant argued disparate treatment as if Smith were a nonminority and the State never challenged appellant’s designation of Smith's race.

. I agree with the majority that any error would be harmless if a minority prospective juror was too far down the jury list to have been reached. Harrell v. State, 882 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). However, Evans was prospective juror number eight and would have been reached.