Court Opinion

ID: 9890533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 14:09:27.782668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:39.183536
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William S. Harris                   :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 963 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Borough of West Hazleton and        :
Borough of West Hazleton Police     :
Pension Fund                        :
                                    :
Appeal of: Borough of West Hazleton : Argued: September 11, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                       FILED: October 13, 2023

      The Borough of West Hazleton (Borough) appeals from the August 18, 2022
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (trial court), which
relevantly held that William S. Harris (Harris), a retired Borough police officer, was
not a grievant under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
the Borough and the West Hazleton Police Association (Association) and that Harris
was not required to follow the grievance procedures in the CBA in pursuing a cost
of living adjustment (COLA) to his police pension benefits. The sole issue before
this Court is whether a retired police officer should be considered a grievant under
the CBA, which defines the term as “any individual or group of bargaining unit
employees, or their bargaining representative.”1 After careful review, we affirm the
trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

      1
          Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 1, Ex. A.
                                    I. Background

      Subsection 20(J) of the CBA provides that “[i]n addition to other monthly
pension or retirement allowances or increments, each person receiving retirement
benefits shall receive annual [COLA] increases[.]” O.R., Item No. 1, Ex. A. Section
21 of the CBA describes a grievance process by which a grievant may file a
complaint regarding “the interpretation and application of any language” in the
CBA. Id. The grievance process in Section 21 consists of three steps. “Step 1”
provides that a grievant “may” present his or her written complaint to the Borough
Mayor within 30 days of the date upon which the matter complained of occurred or
the date upon which the grievant “reasonably should have known [the matter] to
have occurred.” Id. The Borough Mayor must provide a decision on the grievance
within seven working days. If the grievance is not resolved at Step 1, a “Step 2
appeal shall be initiated in writing to the [Borough] Council President for submission
to the Borough Council[.]” Id. The Borough Council “shall respond” within seven
working days following its next regularly scheduled or special meeting date. Id. If
the grievance is not satisfactorily resolved at Step 2, a “Step 3” appeal shall be
initiated within 30 calendar days by written notice of intent to proceed with binding
arbitration. Id. Should the Borough fail to comply with the time limits in Section
21, the grievance “shall be automatically appealed to the next step.” Id. If a grievant
fails to comply with these time limits, the grievance shall be deemed resolved in
favor of the Borough and any further appeal “shall be barred[.]” Id.

      Harris worked as a full-time police officer for the Borough from May 6, 1987,
until he retired on June 1, 2007. In a letter dated January 2, 2015, Harris advised the
Borough Administrator, Jane Mikulca (Mikulca), that he recently became aware of
the COLA provisions in the CBA. As Harris had not received a COLA since retiring

                                          2
on June 1, 2007, Harris requested that Mikulca “forward [the] information to those
responsible for the [p]ension [p]lan.” O.R., Item No. 13, Ex. C. After receiving no
response from Mikulca, Harris sent a letter on January 28, 2016, to the Borough
Mayor, Frank Schmidt (Mayor Schmidt), requesting his assistance in the matter.
Harris sent Mayor Schmidt a second letter on January 12, 2017, indicating that he
had not received a response to the January 28, 2016 letter. In a letter dated March
23, 2017, Michael Bogart (Bogart), the president of Christina Lodge #84, Fraternal
Order of Police (Union), advised Mayor Schmidt that Harris sought the Union’s help
in resolving the COLA issue. Bogart requested that the Borough provide Harris the
requested COLA, and he expressed hope that the matter could be settled without the
involvement of legal counsel.

      On February 23, 2018, Harris filed his complaint, alleging that the Borough
failed to pay him the annual COLA provided for in Subsection 20(J) of the CBA.
As a result, Harris sought declaratory relief regarding his entitlement to a COLA and
an order directing that the Borough pay Harris any COLA amounts due, effective
January 1, 2008. The Borough filed an answer denying that Harris was entitled to
an annual COLA, as he failed to comply with the grievance procedures in Section
21 of the CBA.

      On May 16, 2022, the Borough filed an amended motion for summary
judgment requesting the dismissal of Harris’s complaint.2 The Borough argued that
Harris was a grievant, as defined in Subsection 21(A) of the CBA, and that he should
have submitted a grievance regarding his right to a COLA. Furthermore, the
Borough asserted that Harris was “fully aware” that his monthly pension benefit did

      2
          The Borough withdrew its initial motion for summary judgment when it filed the amended
motion.

                                                3
not include a COLA.3 O.R., Item No. 21, ¶ 12.              Despite this knowledge, Harris
waited several years before asserting his entitlement to a COLA. As a result, the
Borough contended that Harris waived his right to a COLA. Additionally, the
Borough argued that, even if Harris’s January 28, 2016 letter to Mayor Schmidt
initiated the grievance process, Harris failed to comply with the requirement that he
provide the Borough Council President with written notice of his intent to proceed
with binding arbitration.4 Because Harris failed to submit his grievance for binding
arbitration, the matter was resolved in the Borough’s favor, and the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Harris’s civil action. Finally, the Borough argued
that Harris’s declaratory and mandamus claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations, as any controversy regarding his entitlement to a COLA arose
on January 1, 2008, and Harris filed his complaint on February 21, 2018.

       Harris also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law because he was indisputably entitled to a COLA that
he had not received. Harris rejected the Borough’s assertion that he was a grievant
and bound by the CBA’s grievance procedures.

       The trial court issued an order on August 18, 2022, denying the Borough’s
amended motion for summary judgment to the extent it was predicated on Harris’s

       3
          Harris acknowledged during an October 30, 2020 deposition that he participated in
negotiations for the first CBA between the Union and the Borough, that he was familiar with the
CBA’s terms, and that he would have received a copy of each CBA executed by the Borough and
the Union. Harris only learned he was entitled to a COLA in 2015, however, when he reviewed
the CBA to address an issue with his wife’s prescription coverage. This realization prompted
Harris’s January 2, 2015 letter to Mikulca.

       4
         The Borough reasoned that, because the Borough did not comply with the time limits
established for Steps 1 and 2 of the grievance process, the matter would have immediately
proceeded to binding arbitration under Step 3.

                                              4
status as a grievant. The trial court noted that the CBA defined grievant as “any
individual or group of bargaining unit employees, or their bargaining
representative.” Trial ct. op at 5-6. The trial court interpreted this language to mean
that a grievant was an individual bargaining unit employee, a group of bargaining
unit employees, or the bargaining representatives thereof. As Harris was a retired
police officer and not an employee, the trial court concluded that he was not bound
by the grievance procedures in the CBA.

       Regarding the statutes of limitations, the trial court found that Harris’s cause
of action accrued on March 23, 2017, when Bogart raised the possibility of litigation
in his letter to Mayor Schmidt. The trial court agreed, however, that Harris’s
mandamus claim was time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations set forth in
Section 5522(b)(1) of the Judicial Code.5 Accordingly, the trial court granted the
Borough’s amended motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought dismissal
of Harris’s mandamus claim. The trial court granted Harris’s motion for summary
judgment with respect to his claim for declaratory relief, which was governed by the
four-year statute of limitations in Section 5525(a) of the Judicial Code.6 As Harris’s
claim arose on March 23, 2017, the complaint he filed on February 23, 2018, was
timely.

       5
          42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(b)(1). Section 5522(b) establishes a six-month statute of limitations
for “[a]n action against any officer of any government unit for anything done in the execution of
his office[.]” In dismissing Harris’s mandamus claim, the trial court also noted that Harris should
have named the appropriate officers of the governmental unit in his civil action.

       6
       42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a) generally provides that an action upon a contract must be
commenced within four years.

                                                5
        Pursuant to Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act,7 the trial court
held that Harris was entitled to a COLA to his pension benefit, as provided for in
Subsection 20(J) of the CBA. The trial court directed that the Borough pay to Harris
all COLA payments due following his retirement on June 1, 2007, plus interest.
Additionally, the trial court directed that a hearing be held on October 27, 2022, for
the purpose of determining the total amount due to Harris. The Borough filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on August 31, 2022.

        On September 9, 2022, the Borough filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal
(Petition) with this Court, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311(a)(1), which governs
Interlocutory Appeals by Permission.8 We granted the Petition on January 30, 2023,
and stayed any further proceedings before the trial court pending our resolution of
the instant appeal. The sole issue on appeal9 is whether Harris is a grievant, as
defined in Subsection 21(A) of the CBA.

                                             II. Discussion

        The Borough argues that the dispute over Harris’s right to a COLA involves
the interpretation and application of the terms in the CBA.10 As such, the Borough

        7
          Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act grants a court the “power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
7532.

        8
            The trial court stayed the October 27, 2022 hearing pending this Court’s resolution of the
Petition.

        9
           Our review of a trial court’s grant summary judgment is limited to determining whether
the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Kaplan v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
688 A.2d 736, 738 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

        10
           The Borough of West Hazleton Police Pension Fund joined in the Borough’s principal
brief filed with this Court.

                                                   6
maintains that resolution of this matter is governed by the grievance procedures in
Section 21 of the CBA. The Borough notes that terms throughout the CBA apply to
retired police officers, and Section 21 of the CBA is devoid of any language
excluding retired police officers from the three-step grievance process. Furthermore,
the Borough contends that the term “individual” in the definition of grievant should
be broadly interpreted to include any employee, whether actively employed or
retired. Stated otherwise, a grievant under Subsection 21(A) is an individual, a group
of bargaining unit employees, or their bargaining representative. The Borough also
suggests that Harris’s continued membership in the Union constitutes evidence that
Harris is a grievant under the CBA.

      Pennsylvania courts have previously reviewed whether a retiree is bound by
the grievance procedures in a CBA. Generally, we look to whether the express
language in the CBA limits the grievance process to employees. In Danville Area
School District v. Danville Area Education Association, PSEA/NEA, 754 A.2d 1255,
1262 (Pa. 2000), our Supreme Court held that a retiree had standing to file a
grievance because the CBA permitted “persons” to file a grievance and did not limit
the process to employees. Similarly, in Edgell v. City of Aliquippa, 272 A.3d 1011,
1020 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022), this Court held that the grievance procedures in a CBA
applied to retirees because the CBA expressly provided that a retiree could contest
a determination made by the pension plan administrator through the CBA’s
grievance and arbitration provisions. We came to the opposite conclusion in
Borough of Dunmore v. Arnone (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 783 C.D. 2019, filed March 6,
2020), as the grievance procedure applied to “any Employee or group of
Employees” with the stated purpose of settling any grievance between the local fire

                                          7
department and its union. Id., slip op. at 4 (emphasis in original).11 Because the
plain language in the CBA limited the grievance process to employees, and not
retirees, we held that retired firefighters were not obligated to follow the CBA’s
grievance procedures.

       Instantly, as noted above, a grievant is defined in Subsection 21(A) of the
CBA as “any individual or group of bargaining unit employees, or their bargaining
representatives.” O.R., Item No. 1, Ex. A. Neither Subsection 21(A), nor any other
provision of Section 21, references retired employees or suggests that they are bound
by the grievance provisions. The remaining sections of the CBA clearly differentiate
between active police officers and retired police officers, and any provision that is
applicable to retired police officers contains specific language to that effect. For
example, Subsection 6(B) states that a “retired police officer” is entitled to health
insurance “at no cost to the retired employee,” unless the “retired employee” is
covered by another health plan. O.R., Item No. 1, Ex. A. The “retiree’s” health plan
is the same as that provided for “active employees.” Id. In Section 8 of the CBA,
which governs “Court Time[,]” a “retired officer” subpoenaed after the effective date
of his or her retirement shall be paid the salary he or she would have earned while
employed. Id. Section 12 provides that retiring personnel shall receive their full pay
for unused sick and vacation leave. Id. Under Subsection 20(E) of the CBA, a police
officer who is disabled in the course and scope of employment “shall be eligible for
immediate retirement benefits[;]” however, a claim for disability retirement requires
proof of disability from a licensed medical practitioner. A contested claim for

       11
         Pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s internal operating procedures, 210 Pa. Code §
69.414(a), an unreported opinion of this Court may be cited as persuasive authority.

                                               8
disability retirement “shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the grievance
procedure contained in the [CBA.]” Id.

      Based on the above review, we cannot agree with the Borough that the
definition of grievant encompasses retired police officers, as there is no language in
the CBA to suggest that retired police officers are bound by the CBA’s grievance
procedures. The grievance process only governs a dispute over disability retirement
benefits when a police officer’s right to such benefits has yet to be determined. In
the absence of language that expressly binds retired police officers to the CBA’s
grievance procedures, the trial court did not err in holding that Harris is not a grievant
and that he was not obligated to engage in the grievance process to pursue a COLA
to his police pension benefits. This conclusion is also consistent with the last
antecedent rule. Under this rule of construction, when several words are followed
by a modifying phrase, the language demands that the modifying phrase applies as
much to the first word as it does to the last. Summit Twp. Indus. v. Cnty. of Erie, 980
A.2d 191, 208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the phrase
“bargaining unit employees” would apply equally to “individual” and “group.”
Therefore, a grievant is an individual bargaining unit employee, a group of
bargaining unit employees, or the bargaining representative thereof.

      For these reasons, we affirm the trial court and remand this matter to the trial
court to calculate the amount of Harris’s COLA entitlement.

                                         __________________________________
                                         ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                            9
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William S. Harris                   :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 963 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Borough of West Hazleton and        :
Borough of West Hazleton Police     :
Pension Fund                        :
                                    :
Appeal of: Borough of West Hazleton :

                                      ORDER

      AND NOW, this 13th day of October, 2023, the August 18, 2022 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (trial court) is hereby AFFIRMED. This
matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the foregoing
opinion.
      Jurisdiction is relinquished.

                                       __________________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge