Court Opinion

ID: 9788734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:16:55.901863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:58.304398
License: Public Domain

OSBORNE, J. pro tempore,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority that the physical elements of defendant’s prior convictions are not sufficiently similar to the acts at issue in this case to satisfy State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56, 725 P2d 312 (1986). I would hold that the evidence is similar enough, that the other Johns criteria are satisfied as well, and that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court.
As the majority correctly notes, the first issue is whether the evidence of defendant’s 1991 convictions for rape in the third degree and furnishing alcohol to a minor are relevant to some issue other than defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. Johns, 301 Or at 549. In this case, defendant argues that intent is not an issue, because his defense at trial was that he did not touch the victim’s breast at all. The state argues that whether an element of an offense is disputed does not mean that it must not be proven. I agree with the state that, because it has the burden of going forward and proving its case with all relevant evidence at its disposal, the fact that *347defendant chose not to dispute a particular element does not mean that evidence relating to it is not relevant.
Having determined that the evidence is relevant, I would then turn to the Johns criteria:
“(1) Does the present charged act require proof of intent?
“(2) Did the prior act require intent?
“(3) Was the victim in the prior act the same victim or in the same class as the victim in the present case?
“(4) Was the type of prior act the same or similar to the acts involved in the charged crime?
“(5) Were the physical elements of the prior act and the present act similar?”
Johns, 301 Or at 555-56. In this case, defendant argues only that the evidence did not meet the third, fourth, and fifth criteria.
Regarding the third criterion, the victim of the crimes resulting in defendant’s 1991 convictions was the same age and gender and therefore was in the same class as the 14-year-old female victim in this case.
Regarding the fourth criterion, the types of acts— namely, sexual conduct and offering alcohol to a minor— were the same in both instances.
Regarding the fifth criterion, the majority is correct that, under State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 213-15, 785 P2d 350 (1990), we review the trial court’s determination as a matter of law and that we must take into account both the similarities and the differences between the prior and current acts. Having said that, I confess that Pratt is less than satisfying in that it offers no objective way for us—or, more importantly, for the trial courts—to draw the conclusion that crimes either are sufficiently similar or are not. The inquiry is essentially subjective. Given that, I would defer to the trier of fact, who is in the best position to make that determination. I would conclude that, given the facts that sexual contact and furnishing alcohol to minors were involved in both instances, the trial *348court did not err in concluding that they were sufficiently similar to satisfy Johns.
I would then turn to the question whether the probative value of the evidence of prior bad acts is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or presentation of cumulative evidence, as provided in OEC 403. That question is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 238, 986 P2d 5 (1999). One of the factors to be weighed by the trial court when making that evaluation is the state’s need for the evidence or the availability of other means of proof. In this case, defendant argues that, because his defense was that the sexual contact never occurred, the state’s need to prove intent was not great, while the potential for unfair prejudice was significant. Even assuming that to be the case, however, the fact remains that this case was tried to the court rather than to a jury. Indeed, the trial court stated on the record its misgivings about the evidence. From that, I would infer that the court did not give it undue weight. Nor, in a trial to the court, is there a need to be concerned about misleading the jury, undue delay, or a needless presentation of cumulative evidence. I would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In short, I would hold that the evidence of defendant’s prior convictions was admissible as proof of his intent and, on that basis, would affirm.