Court Opinion

ID: 9598654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:10:31.221439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:36.569722
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as I believe the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the automobile in which defendant was a passenger. The evidence in question, including a sawed-off shotgun, was found after a stop of the vehicle for making a turn without signaling. As construed in Clark v. State, 208 Ga. App. 896, 897 (1) (432 SE2d 220), OCGA § 40-6-123 requires a signal prior to turns or lane changes only if necessary for “reasonable safety.” The holding in Clark, while physical precedent only, was embraced by a full panel of this Court in State v. Jones, 214 Ga. App. *34593 (448 SE2d 496).
My reading of the trial transcript in the case sub judice reveals no evidence that reasonable safety required a signal to precede the turn made by the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. I do not know what type of turn defendant made, the conditions during which the turn was made, whether reasonable safety required the use of a turn signal, or any other factors which would support the officers’ conclusory testimony that the vehicle in which defendant was riding turned improperly. Indeed, if reasonable safety was not involved, then á turn signal was not required pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-123. See State v. Goodman, 220 Ga. App. 169 (2) (469 SE2d 327) (1996). In addition, the record does not reveal any independent basis for stopping the vehicle other than the allegedly improper turn. Therefore, in my view, the stop of the automobile occupied by defendant cannot be justified, and the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the automobile. State v. Jones, 214 Ga. App. 593, supra; Clark v. State, 208 Ga. App. 896, 897 (1), supra.
Contrary to the majority’s view of the evidence, I find nothing in Officer Wareham’s and Officer Ramsey’s trial testimony which in any way indicates that the officers had an independent basis for stopping the car due to a police radio broadcast concerning it. Indeed, it is my view that even a liberal reading of Officer Wareham’s and Officer Ramsey’s testimony does not authorize a finding that these officers were aware that a police alert had been dispatched on the suspect vehicle at the time of the stop. And to this extent, I am compelled to note that the majority’s statement — “Wareham added, though without elaborating the point, that he was alerted by DeKalb County of the vehicle” — leads readers into believing that Officer Wareham testified that he and Officer Ramsey stopped the suspect vehicle because a police lookout had been dispatched for the vehicle from DeKalb County. The fact is, Officer Wareham’s testimony supports no such inference. Indeed, the portion of Officer Wareham’s trial testimony upon which the majority relies amounts to nothing more than the officer’s unresponsive answer to a question concerning whether he had made further examination of the suspect vehicle after the stop. The entirety of Officer Wareham’s testimony regarding the reason he and Officer Ramsey stopped the suspect vehicle, as well as the portion of Officer Wareham’s testimony the majority references in support of the conclusion about the DeKalb County alert, provides as follows:
“[STATE’S ATTORNEY:] Were you involved in the arrests of the occupants of a red Mustang on that day? [APPELLANT:] Yes, ma’am, I was. Q. Please tell the jury how that occurred. A. Okay. On the date and time in question, myself and Officer Ramsey were patrolling *35around Eastlake Meadows — it’s a housing development in the City of Atlanta — when we observed the vehicle that the Accused was a passenger in. The vehicle was driven by a Rocky Turnquest. We observed the vehicle making an improper turn. At that time we blue-lighted the vehicle and began to approach the vehicle. At that time Officer Ramsey observed a shotgun sticking from underneath the passenger’s seat. At that time we removed the subjects from the vehicle and placed them under arrest. Q. Can you describe the car that they were driving? A. It was a red Mustang with chrome wheels. Q. I show you a photograph that has been marked as State’s Exhibit 5. Can you identify that photograph? A. Yes, ma’am. I took this picture. Q. And when did you take that picture? A. On the date of the incident. Q. And what is that a picture of? A. That’s a picture of the Mustang that the Accused was a passenger in. It’s on the flat bed. Q. When you say the Accused, who are you referring to? A. Mr. Daniels. Q. And is he the same person who was the passenger in that Mustang on November 23rd of 1993? A. Yes, ma’am. Q. Did you have occasion to make any further examination of the car yourself? A. Yes, ma’am. We were alerted by DeKalb County of the vehicle. Q. Did you remove — did you yourself remove any other items from the car? A. I removed a hood and a beige bag containing currency.”
Likewise, the majority’s statement — “Officer Ramsey referred to the car as ‘the listed auto’ ” — leads readers into believing that Officer Ramsey testified that he and Officer Wareham stopped the suspect vehicle because it was “listed” on a DeKalb County police alert for the vehicle. The fact is, Officer Ramsey’s use of the words “the listed auto” is not a reference to a DeKalb County police alert, but appears merely as jargon the officer employs in describing events. The entirety of Officer Ramsey’s testimony regarding the reason he and Officer Wareham stopped the suspect vehicle, as well as the portion of Officer Wareham’s testimony regarding “the listed auto,” provides as follows:
“[STATE’S ATTORNEY:] Were you on duty on November 23rd, 1993? [OFFICER RAMSEY:] Yes, I was. Q. On that date were you involved in the arrests of the occupants of a red Mustang? A. Yes, I was. Q. Tell the jury how that occurred. A. On the listed date, myself and Officer Wareham were on patrol in the Eastlake Meadows Housing Development. We were driving in the housing development when Officer Wareham saw the listed auto make a left turn without using a turn signal. Officer Wareham effected a stop on the vehicle, at which time Officer Wareham approached the driver’s side. I approached the passenger’s side.”
Since this Court’s responsibility in reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is “ ‘ “to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision, (cit.)” ’ ” (State v. Goodman, 220 Ga. *36App. 169, 170, supra), I am compelled to say that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to suppress in the case sub judice.
Decided June 28, 1996
David L. Whitman, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Nancy J. Dupree, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ruffin joins in this dissent.