Court Opinion

ID: 9681269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:47:05.790181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.949800
License: Public Domain

Swepston, J.
(dissenting).
The majority opinion overrules the motion of appellee to require appellant to give an appeal bond in sufficient amount to cover the decree for a specified sum of money —alimony and counsel fees.
I am of opinion the motion should be allowed and that appellant should give an adequate bond or suffer a dismissal of his appeal.
Appellant has taken a broad appeal in equity and I agree that this brings up the whole case, if the trial judge had the authority in this equity case to allow an appeal on giving bond for costs and damages only; I agree there can be no alimony award without a decree of divorce, either a mensa et thoro or absolute; I agree that in case of a broad appeal divorce and alimony are so inextricably interwoven as to require consideration of both on appeal.
It is because of this last stated postulate that I think Code Section 9045 applies and must be given effect; this *630section contains no exceptions and I think we have no power to make any, even if divorce cases are sni generis. The decree of alimony and fees is for a specific snm of money on which an execution can issue as on any other decree for a specific sum. Buchholtz v. Buchholtz, 175 Tenn. 87, 132 S. W. (2d) 208.
Where the decree is for both divorce and alimony in a specific sum of money and the husband desires to take a broad appeal, there is no reason why he should not be required either to give bond for the money decree or to take the pauper oath, if unable to give bond, as a condition to the allowance of the appeal.
If we now require appellant to amend his bond to the proper amount, or suffer a dismissal of his appeal, I am unable to see how we could find ourselves in the anomalous situation of reversing the decree as to divorce for lack of grounds and at the same time leave in effect a decree for alimony in specific sum, the appeal being broad.
The only two ways by which such a situation could arise, would be either that we grant the alternative motion of appellee to limit the appeal to the question of divorce, which obviously we should not do even if we could, or that in some other case the husband might intentionally take an appeal limited to the divorce only, leaving the decree for alimony in effect; this latter would be a difficulty of his own making and one not likely to occur, but surely, if it should occur through no fault of his or his attorney, he could have relief by injunction ag-ainst the money judgment, after reversal of the decree for divorce. Scurlock v. Scurlock, 92 Tenn. 629, 22 S. W. 858.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority on this question.