Court Opinion

ID: 9670047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:13:07.517585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:16.820046
License: Public Domain

CADY, J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The resolution of this case turns on the intent of our legislature, which the majority circumvents by applying legal principles developed after the enactment of the statute from which the intent must be derived. See City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 2005) (“In interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine the legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute.” (citing State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004))); accord City of Fairfield v. Harper Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Iowa 2005); see also Worth County Friends of Agrie, v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Iowa 2004) (“Our primary concern in interpreting a statute is to determine and effectuate the legislature’s intent.” (citing Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 2002))). Our legislature adopted a statute in 1965 that permitted some tort claims to be filed against the State, and our task is to decide if our legislature at the time intended this statute to include claims based on conduct that occurred decades prior to the statutory enactment. See Barad v. Jefferson County, 178 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Iowa 1970) (“The question of retrospectivity is one of legislative intent.” (citing Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 560, 149 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1967))). This case is not, as the majority discusses, about an old debate over the waiver of sovereign immunity, or whether the appellees’ claim falls within the statute of limitations, or even how the appellees’ claim would be treated if the injury had occurred today. The issue is plain and simple — does the statute waiving partial immunity apply retroactively to include the type of claim presented in this case? The answer is equally clear — our legislature never intended the statute to include the claim brought by the appellees.
Generally, if a statute creates substantive law, it is applied only prospectively. State ex rel. Turner v. Limbrecht, 246 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1976). If the statute is remedial in nature, it is applied both prospectively and retroactively. Id. Ultimately, however, “[t]he question of retro-spectivity is one of legislative intent.” Barad, 178 N.W.2d at 378 (citing Schmitt, 260 Iowa at 560, 149 N.W.2d at 791). Courts search for this intent from the language of the statute, its purpose, and the goals sought to be accomplished. Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) (citing State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)).
Yet, we do not need to focus on the rules of law developed to ascertain the retroactive scope of the statute because our legislature specifically included a provision in the statute addressing its retroactive effect. Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 705 (Iowa 2005) (“If the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, we do not search for legislative intent beyond the express terms of the statute.” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)). In defining the meaning of a “claim” under the Act in 1965, the legislature specifically addressed the retroactive nature of the statute by only including within its coverage “claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963.” 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79, § 2(5). Thus, the legislature clearly sought to implement a limited retroactive scheme, and the issue becomes whether the legislature intended its retroactive scheme to apply to claims that occurred after January 1,1963, or to claims discovered after January 1, 1963. This issue turns on the interpretation of the statute, and it is essential to turn to the language of the Act to reach a resolution. See Cox, 686 N.W.2d at 213 (noting *658we begin with the language of the provision at issue).
The statute initially defined a “claim” to mean:
any claim against the state of Iowa for money only, on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.
1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79, § 2(5). This section then concluded the definition with the important language at the heart of this dispute: “However, a ‘claim’ includes only such claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963.” Id. Significantly, the legislature also established a statute-of-limitations period in the Act. This section provided:
Every claim against the state permitted under this chapter shall be forever barred, unless within two (2) years after such claim accrued or prior to July 1, 1967, whichever is later, the claim is made in writing to the state appeal board under this Act and a suit is begun under this Act.
Id. § 13.
There is no dispute that the legislature desired to place a limitation on the retroactive effect of the statute by defining viable claims with reference to the beginning date of January 1, 1963. This date was two years and three months before the effective date of the statute, March 30, 1965. Thus, the retroactive effect of the statute was two years and three months. The statute-of-limitation provision included in the Act then required any claim to be brought within two years or prior to July 1, 1967, whichever was later. Id. Therefore, under the statute, all claims within the retroactive period of time were required to be brought before July 1, 1967, and claims that “accrued” after needed to be brought within two years.
The need for interpretation is illustrated by the positions taken by the parties. The State claims the January 1, 1963 date was a “sunrise” provision that barred all claims that occurred before that date. The appel-lees claim it only barred claims discovered prior to July 1,1963. Both positions hinge on the intended meaning of the word “accrued.” The dispute turns on the shifting manner in which the law has used the term to express its principles. This transfiguration explains much of the debate today, which requires its meaning to be explored in a historical context.
The term “accrue” is largely embedded in the law governing limitations on actions. In this context, a general rule emerged from our early cases that a cause of action accrued when the injured party had a right to institute and maintain a lawsuit. Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 461, 150 N.W.2d 94, 99 (1967); Dean v. Iowar-Des Moines Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 227 Iowa 1239, 1242, 281 N.W. 714, 717 (1938). In addition, our legislature has long used the term “accrue” to refer to the point when the statute of limitations begins to run on a cause of action. See Iowa Code § 614.1 (2003) (“Actions may be brought within the times [specified] after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared .... ”). Thus, it was generally understood from the earliest development of our law that an action accrued at the time the elements of the cause of action occurred. Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 152-53, 162 N.W. 217, 220-21 (1917). This meant a cause of action for negligence accrued from the time of the act and injury, not the discovery of the injury. Id.; see also Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 721 (Iowa 1974) (“The general rule in *659tort cases is that the period of limitation commences when the tort is committed.” (citing 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 146, at 715; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 205, at 216)). This view was also the early view of the law outside Iowa. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 cmt. e, at 444 (1969) (“Under the early interpretation of the English statutes of limitations, knowledge by the injured person of the existence of the tort was immaterial, and it is still true in many of the states that, in the absence of fraud or concealment of the cause of action, the statutory period runs from the time the tort was committed although the injured person has no knowledge or reason to know of it.”). Thus, the term “accrue” has always meant “[t]o come into existence as an enforceable claim,” Black’s Law Dictionary 22 (8th ed.2004), but the law attached a special meaning to it by using it with reference to a legal principle.
The case of Ogg v. Robb illustrates this predominant view of our law dating back nearly a century. In Ogg, the plaintiff suffered burns on his arms as a result of x-rays taken by a doctor after he broke his wrist. Ogg, 181 Iowa at 147, 162 N.W. at 218. This event took place in 1901. Id. In 1912, the plaintiff developed cancer in his arm, resulting in amputation. Id. In 1915, he brought a negligence action against the doctor alleging the x-rays caused the cancer. Id., 162 N.W. at 219. After finding no evidence of fraudulent concealment of the tort by the physician, the court concluded the cause of action accrued at the time of the burn injury in 1901, and the action was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 156, 162 N.W. at 220. The court emphasized that ignorance of the tort or the injury would not toll the statute of limitations until discovery. Id. at 156,162 N.W. at 220-21.
At this time, the only exception to this rule involved cases in which the tortfeasor fraudulently concealed the cause of action from the injured person. See id. at 152, 162 N.W. at 219 (“ ‘[T]he statute does not begin to run, where a cause of action is fraudulently concealed, until the facts are discovered by plaintiff.’ ” (quoting Cole v. Charles City Nat’l Bank, 114 Iowa 632, 635, 87 N.W. 671, 672 (1901))); Disk Township of Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601, 603 (1875) (“[W]e find the rule to have been very well settled, under the English statute of limitations, that where the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been discovered.” (Citations omitted.)). In that event, it was generally recognized that a cause of action was not considered to accrue until the facts were discovered. Ogg, 181 Iowa at 150, 162 N.W. at 219; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 cmt. e, at 444.
Around the same time as the law pertaining to the accrual of a cause of action was taking its early shape, our legislature began to carve its own exceptions to the application of the statute of limitations for specific types of cases. In 1860, the legislature first declared that actions for fraud would not accrue until “discovery of the fraud by the party aggrieved.” Iowa Code § 2741 (1860). The legislature later added actions for trespass to property to the exception, see 1868 Iowa Acts ch. 167, § 9, and, still later, in 1873, added actions grounded on mistake, see Iowa Code § 2530 (1873). See Beerman v. Beerman, 225 Iowa 48, 51-52, 279 N.W. 449, 450-51 (1938) (tracing the evolution of what was then Iowa Code section 11010 (1935)). The statutory exceptions for actions based on fraud, mistake, and trespass to land *660remain today and are now codified in section 614.4.
Clearly, the legislature understood that a cause of action accrued even without knowledge of the injury under the general statute of limitations, and it sought to eliminate this harsh and “undiscriminating application of the statute of limitations” in three types of cases by creating the exceptions. Id. at 52, 279 N.W. at 451. In Beemian, we considered the legislation that added claims for mistake within the statutory exception to the rule that a claim accrued despite ignorance of the injury:
And it seems quite clear that this relief was intended for the one specific purpose of helping out of a dilemma those litigants who, had they appeared in court under the old law, could not have saved their rights by showing that they had not discovered the mistake within the fixed period of the statute of limitations. To such litigants, and none others, the Legislature granted relief. To litigants generally no extension of time was mentioned or intended.
Id. Thus, it is abundantly clear our legislature understood the general rule was that a cause of action accrued under a statute of limitations when the injury occurred. Absent a defendant’s fraudulent concealment of a cause of action from a plaintiff, this court rejected the argument that a cause of action should not accrue until the plaintiff discovered the injury, see Ogg, 181 Iowa at 150-51, 162 N.W. at 220-21, and our legislature modified this approach by adopting only three limited exceptions, see Iowa Code § 11010 (1935). The state of the law then remained constant well into the twentieth century.
While this state seemed content with the law governing the accrual of a cause of action well into the twentieth century, the law in other states began to apply the “discovery rule” to the general statute of limitations. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, cmt. e, at 445. Under the discovery rule, actions were deemed not to accrue until the plaintiff discovered the injury or should have discovered it in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Id.; see, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-70, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1024-25, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 1292 (1949); Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809, 812-13 (2d Cir.1960); Polzin v. Nat’l Co-op. Refinery Ass’n, 175 Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293, 297 (1954); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368,123 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1963); Dryden v. Omaha Steel Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293, 295 (1947); Rothman v. Silber, 83 N.J.Super. 192, 199 A.2d 86, 92 (1964); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517, 535 (1949); Ginkowski v. Ginkowski, 28 Wis.2d 530, 137 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1965). However, the first mention of this movement to broadly apply the discovery rule to tort actions did not surface in Iowa until our decision in Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967), in 1967.
In Chrischilles, we reiterated that our longstanding approach to the accrual of a cause of action did not recognize ignorance of a right of action to “prevent the running of the statute of limitations.” Chrischilles, 260 Iowa at 461, 150 N.W.2d at 100 (citing Campbell v. Long, 20 Iowa 382, 387 (1866); Garrett v. Olford, 152 Iowa 265, 269, 132 N.W. 379, 381 (1911)). However, we observed a trend in other states around the nation to adopt the discovery rule in a broad number of cases, including actions for malpractice. Id. at 462, 150 N.W.2d at 100 (citations omitted). This trend convinced us to adopt the discovery rule in actions based on negligence. See id. at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 100 (“We now believe the better rule to be that a cause of action based on negligence does not accrue until plaintiff has in fact discovered that he has suffered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it *661and are persuaded the rationale of the discovery doctrine should be adopted.”). Thus, outside the venerable statutory exceptions and the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, this was the first time we considered the accrual of a tort action in relationship to the discovery of the injury.
Today, of course, we are committed to the principle that a statute of limitations in civil cases begins to run when the plaintiff acquires actual or constructive knowledge of the injury. Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 291 (Iowa 2001) (citing State v. Wilson, 573 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Iowa 1998)). In other words, today, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the injury. Id. (citing Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1995)). Clearly, the word “accrue” has taken on a new legal meaning. Yet, while the transformation to the discovery rule began with Chrischilles, what followed was not a sweeping, overwhelming movement to apply the discovery rule in all cases. See Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 2004) (noting Chrischilles adopted the discovery rule as an exception to the general rule). More than a generation passed following Chrischilles before a majority of this court fully adopted and applied the discovery rule to actions, as in this case, brought under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. See Vachon v. State, 514 N.W.2d 442, 445 (Iowa 1994) (holding the discovery rule applies to all claims under the Act); see also Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990) (applying discovery rule to Iowa Tort Claims Act). But see id. at 274 (Andreasen, J., concurring) (opining “[ajpplication of the discovery rule should be determined by the court on a case-by-case basis”); id. (Schultz, J., dissenting) (opining the discovery rule should only be applied “to remove statutory bars in those instances when equitable considerations demand it”). Under these circumstances, it is unlikely, if not a stretch of the imagination, our legislature would have meant to use the definition of accrue in 1965 that we use today. Moreover, the discovery-rule movement was driven by judicial pronouncements. Outside the three longstanding statutory exceptions, and a recent statutory exception for victims of childhood sexual abuse, see Iowa Code § 614.8A (2003) (“An action for damages for injury suffered as a result of sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a child, but not discovered until after the injured person is of the age of majority, shall be brought within four years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse.”), the movement to the adoption of the discovery rule has been accomplished by judicial decisions.
Although the disputed statute in this case is not a statute of limitations, the historical background of the concept of accrual within the context of statutes of limitations is important to the proper determination of what the legislature meant when it used the term “accrues” in the definition of “claim” in 1965 when the Iowa Tort Claims Act was enacted. See 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:01, at 8-9 (2000 rev.) [hereinafter Singer] (stating courts must consider the historical framework of a statute); see also Doe v. Ray, 251 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 1977) (“[I]n construing a statute we must be mindful of the state of the law when it was enacted .... ” (citing Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 1973))). We cannot give a term in a statute a definition it acquired only after the legislature enacted the statute, because the legislature cannot have attributed a definition to a term if it had not yet acquired it. See City of Fairfield v. Harper Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Iowa 2005) (“Our goal in interpreting a statute is to deter*662mine the legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute.” (citing Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201)).
Our legislature is presumed to know the usual judicial meaning of language and to intend the language it uses in its statutes to have that meaning. State v. Shafranek, 576 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1998) (citing State v. Jones, 298 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1980); State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Iowa 1980)); accord 2B Singer § 50:03, at 150 (“The interpretation of well-defined words and phrases in the common law carries over to statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter.”). Moreover, our legislature has specifically provided that “[t]he common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects” should be considered in interpreting statutes. Iowa Code § 4.1(4) (2003). Such resources are important because “[i]t is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter.” 2B Singer § 51:02, at 176; accord State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (stating that in interpreting statutory language, courts may consider similar statutes).
At the time the Iowa Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1965, this court had consistently used the term “accrue” within the context of the statute of limitations to refer to the time of injury, without regard to the time the injury was discovered. See, e.g., Ogg, 181 Iowa at 150-51, 162 N.W. at 220-21. Thus, it must be presumed our legislature understood this approach at the time it enacted the Iowa Tort Claims Act in 1965, and if it was contrary to its intent, would have enacted legislation to change our approach by using different language or providing different instructions. Cf. State ex rel. Palmer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 365 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Iowa 1985) (“‘[A]n amendment substituting a new term or phrase for one previously construed indicates that the judicial or executive construction of the former term or phrase did not correspond with the legislative intent and a different interpretation should be given the new term or phrase.’ ” (Citations omitted.)). Of course, the legislature has done this before by enacting the three statutory exceptions over the years. See Iowa Code § 614.4 (excepting actions based on fraud, mistake, and trespass from general rule that cause of action accrues when its elements occur, not when the injury is discovered). The presence of these exceptions is important because it confirms that our legislature understood our judicial approach to the accrual of a cause of action and knew it was necessary to establish specific exceptions to change that approach in those cases where our approach did not represent its intent. Instead, in the Iowa Tort Claims Act, the legislature made no statutory provision to contravene our longstanding approach of holding accrual occurs notwithstanding the plaintiffs ignorance of the claim. Compare Iowa Code § 11010 (1935) (“In actions for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, and those for trespass to property, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, or trespass complained of shall have been discovered by the party aggrieved.”), with id. § 25A.2(5) (1966) (stating “ ‘claim’ includes only such claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963,” and stating claim must be brought “within two years after such claim accrued or prior to July 1, 1967,” but not containing any specific provision as to when a claim shall or shall not be deemed to have accrued).
I recognize that by 1965, other states around the nation were beginning to apply the discovery rule to the accrual of a cause of action in the context of the statute of limitations. See Chrischilles, 260 Iowa at 462, 150 N.W.2d at 100 (citing cases from *663other jurisdictions applying the discovery rule). Yet, it cannot be presumed our legislature would have intended to adopt such a trend in Iowa in place of our longstanding contrary view, without some specific expression of its intent. Generally, it cannot be presumed that a legislature had statutes of a different state in mind when enacting a statute. 2B Singer § 51:06, at 263. Similarly, it cannot be presumed that a legislature had judicial decisions relating to such foreign statutes in mind when enacting a statute. Id. § 51:06, at 263-64. Consequently, consistent with our longstanding principles of statutory interpretation, any principled analysis must conclude that when our legislature stated in 1965 that only “claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963” were included in the waiver of immunity, the legislature meant to bar liability for torts committed prior to January 1, 1963. There was no intent for the discovery rule to apply in the event a party was not aware that a tort had been committed or was unaware of the resulting injury. This concept had not yet been recognized in Iowa outside the specific exceptions and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and there was no indication the legislature would have wanted to apply the discovery rule beyond these exceptions.8
Of course, the retroactivity provision was repealed in 1969, and since that time, the only mechanism under the Act to govern the time limitation for the filing of a claim was the two-year statute of limitations under section 25A.13. The majority asserts that the repeal means the statute must be treated as if it never existed, and any intent the provision may have expressed when enacted is no longer valid. This view, of course, permits the majority to use the statute of limitations as a means to resolve the dispute freed from all the history behind the statute that unmistakably expresses an intent to exclude appel-lees’ claim. Yet, the repeal of a statute does not simply erase the slate. Instead, our role is to discern the intent of the legislature behind the repeal, not assume it has a single meaning under all circumstances. The act of repealing a statute has no value in the analysis without determining the intent of the legislature behind the repeal.
Any claim that our legislature intended to capture plaintiffs claim by repealing the retroactive provision in 1969 cannot withstand scrutiny. Such an argument is not only speculative, but it is based upon the faulty premise that our legislature would have read Chrischilles to broadly trans*664form the concept of accrual to incorporate the discovery rule, was aware of the trend in other states to broadly apply the discovery rule prior to Chrischilles, and intended to apply the discovery rule in 1969. Such propositions find no support under any legitimate analysis.
As mentioned, Chrischilles was not a broad pronouncement, and we did not extend the discovery rule to the statute of limitations under the Iowa Tort Claims Act until 1994. See Vachon, 514 N.W.2d at 445 (holding the discovery rule applies to all claims under the Act). Without some clear legislative expression, it cannot be discerned that our legislature intended to take the lead in our development of the legal principles surrounding the accrual of a cause of action, instead of following its past action of developing exceptions. Moreover, had the legislature intended to take the lead in making this important change in the law, it would not have done so in the ambiguous, indirect manner of repealing of the retroactivity provision. Additionally, the only written legislative history shows the legislature repealed the retroactive provision because it was “no longer necessary,” which provides no real guidance either way. See Explanation of S.F. 376, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1969) (“[T]he proposed amendment also deleted the last sentence of section 25A.2(5) which is no longer necessary in view of the statute of limitations set forth in section 25A.13”). Our legislature meticulously carved out specific exceptions when it wanted to adopt the discovery rule, and I do not think the legislature would have adopted the discovery rule to the retroactive provision under the Iowa Tort Claims Act without making a similar clear expression of intent.
In partially abrogating sovereign immunity in 1965, our legislature did not intend to apply the discovery rule to the retroac-tivity provision of the Act. Thus, torts committed by the State before 1963, even though the injury was undiscovered, were not “claims” subject to the Act. See Iowa Code § 24A.2(5) (“However, ‘claim’ includes only such claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963.”). Even though we eventually applied the discovery rule to the statute of limitations under the Act in 1994, this event did not bring claims that were previously excluded from the Act’s coverage by virtue of the retroactivity provision back within the scope of the Act. Cf. Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 267 (Iowa 1995) (a new statute of limitations does not revive claims that have been barred under the statute of limitations in existence prior to the new statute). We cannot simply apply today’s law as if there was no history of the definition of claim under the Act. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute does not affect rights that have accrued, including the right of the State to assert sovereign immunity as a defense to a claim. See Iowa Code § 4.1(1) (1966). Torts committed prior to 1963 are not covered under the Act and remain forever barred. They were barred at the time the immunity statute was enacted, and cannot be resurrected by means of a statute of limitations, or the repeal of a statute.
I would conclude the legislature never intended claims for torts occurring before 1963 to be subject to the Iowa Tort Claims Act. The only way to conclude otherwise is to essentially ignore the critical issue of the retroactive application of the statute, which the majority has done. By doing this, the majority also ignores our legislature’s intent and has engaged in the very legislating it expressly disavows.
If the 1965 statute were enacted today, I would have no quarrel with the majority in this case. While our role to ascertain legislative intent would remain the same, our approach to the law today would clearly signal a legislative intent to include appel-*665lees’ claim. Yet, the decision to include or exclude claims that predated the Iowa Tort Claims Act is one of public policy, reserved for the legislature. And that question was decided forty years ago by our legislature by a specific statute. The majority now renews the debate and decides the policy question differently than our legislature did. It does so by using new law, reflecting new policies our legislature could not, under any stretch of the imagination, have had in mind. It is not the role of a court to make a decision that appears fair in a particular case under today’s standards if to do so undermines those timeless, foundational principles responsible for the institutional strength and respect for the judiciary. Courts can only define justice within the principles that define their limited role in government.
CARTER, J., joins this dissent.

. The three statutory exceptions are not helpful to appellees in this case. The only statutory exception that could possibly be applicable to the claims recited in the petition in this case is the fraud exception, as appellees asserted a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. See Iowa Code § 614.4 (providing that cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers the fraud). But see Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Iowa 1986) ("Our court has narrowly construed the word 'fraud' in sections 614.1(4) and 614.4. We have refused to apply those statutes of limitation to actions for money damages; their use has been limited to fraud actions brought in equity which call for equitable relief.” (Citations omitted.)). Moreover, the Act specifically excludes "misrepresentation” and “deceit” from the scope of its coverage. Iowa Code § 669.14(4). Additionally, appellees did not argue before the district court or on appeal that fraudulent concealment prevented their claims from accruing. See Koppes, 384 N.W.2d at 386 ("If fraudulent concealment is established, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should discover, the basis for the cause of action.” (Citations omitted)). But see Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 701 (Iowa 2005) ("[F]raudulent concealment does not affect the running of the statutory limitations period; rather, it es-tops a defendant from raising a statute-of-limitations defense.” (citing 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 380, at 688 (2000)).