Court Opinion

ID: 9939653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 10:10:59.822041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:42.961219
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00043-CR
     ___________________________

       JASON BENSON, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 6
           Tarrant County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 1702971

  Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Jason Benson appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04. In two points on appeal, Benson argues that the

trial court violated his right to confront witnesses and that the trial court erred by

denying his challenge of a venireperson for cause. We affirm.

                                   I. Background

      Because there is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief

summary of the facts is necessary. On September 29, 2021, Officer Esmerelda

Magana observed Benson drive a vehicle with an expired registration, and she

conducted a traffic stop. While speaking with Benson, Officer Magana detected an

odor of alcohol on his breath and noticed that his speech was slurred. Benson initially

told Officer Magana that he had not consumed alcohol but later admitted to having

two drinks prior to leaving work. After having Benson perform field sobriety tests,

Officer Magana determined that he had lost his mental and physical faculties to safely

operate a motor vehicle.

      Benson consented to give a specimen of his breath for testing, and he was

taken to jail to provide the specimen. Officer Donald Maywald obtained two

samples of Benson’s breath. Robert Browder, a senior technical supervisor with the

“Breath[–]Alcohol Testing Division” of the Texas Department of Public Safety,

testified at trial that the results from those specimens indicated that Benson had a

breath–alcohol level of .109 and .095—both above the legal limit in Texas. Benson

                                          2
testified at trial that he had a few drinks prior to driving but that he had not lost the

use of his mental faculties.

       The jury convicted Benson of driving while intoxicated, and the trial court

assessed his punishment at 90 days’ confinement in the Tarrant County Jail and a

$1,000 fine. The trial court suspended imposition of the confinement portion of the

sentence and placed Benson on community supervision for 15 months. This appeal

followed.

                               II. Confrontation Clause

       In the first point, Benson argues that the trial court violated his right to

confront witnesses against him guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution by admitting the breath-test results without the testimony of the

technical supervisor in charge of the machine on the day of his arrest.

A. Standard of Review

       We review a trial judge’s admissibility decision for an abuse of discretion.

Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The trial court abuses its

discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. But

if the evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law—even if the trial

court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for the ruling—we will not disturb it. Id.

B. Applicable Law

       To introduce the results from a breath test into evidence, the State must lay the

proper predicate by establishing (1) that the machine functioned properly on the day

                                           3
of the test as evidenced by a reference sample’s having been run through it; (2) the

existence of periodic supervision over the machine and operation by one who

understands the scientific theory behind it; and (3) proof of the results of the test by a

witness or witnesses qualified to translate and interpret such results. See Harrell v. State,

725 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Rhyne v. State, 387 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

C. Discussion

       The State sought to lay the predicate through the testimony of Officer

Maywald, a certified breath-test operator who administered the test to Benson, and

Browder, the technical supervisor for the machine used to administer the test at the

time of trial. The technical supervisor at the time Benson’s test was administered had

retired, and Browder had replaced her. Benson objected at trial that he was entitled to

confront the technical supervisor who was responsible for the maintenance of the

machine at the time the test was administered. The trial court overruled the objection,

admitted the breath-test results, and allowed Browder to testify as to those results.

       Benson cites Bullcoming v. New Mexico in support of his argument that he was

entitled to confront the technical supervisor who was responsible for the machine at

the time the test was administered. 564 U.S. 647, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). In Bullcoming,

the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant’s constitutional right of

confrontation was violated when the State introduced a report containing the results

of a blood test determining the defendant’s blood–alcohol concentration through the

                                             4
testimony of an analyst who had not performed the test or signed the certification of

blood–alcohol concentration. Id. at 664–65, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. In Bullcoming, the Court

noted that the analyst “certified to more than a machine-generated number” and held

that the report was testimonial in nature. Id. at 661, 665, 131 S. Ct. at 2715, 2717.

       Benson’s argument that he has the right to confront the specific technical

supervisor responsible for the machine at the time of his arrest has been rejected by

this court in Settlemire v. State, 323 S.W.3d 520, 522 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet.

ref’d). This court relied on the footnote in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,

311 n.1, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009), in reaching its conclusion. Settlemire, 323

S.W.3d at 522. The Supreme Court stated in that footnote:

       [W]e do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony
       may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the
       sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part
       of the prosecution’s case. . . . Additionally, documents prepared in the
       regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as
       nontestimonial records.

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.

       Benson argues that the language in the footnote from Melendez-Diaz is dicta

that refers to mere chain-of-custody concerns and does not apply to his argument

concerning the reliability of the procedures used to analyze his breath samples.

However, after Bullcoming was decided, our sister court also relied on the footnote in

Melendez-Diaz and held that a defendant does not have a right to confront the specific

technical supervisor responsible for the machine at the time of the breath test. Trigo v.

                                            5
State, 485 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). The

court noted other courts of appeals have uniformly reached the same holding.1 Id. at

611–12. Following the established precedent of this court and other courts of appeals,

we hold that Benson did not have the right to confront the specific technical supervisor

responsible for the machine at the time of his arrest. We overrule Benson’s first point.

                                  III. Jury Selection

       In his second point, Benson argues that the trial court erred by denying his

challenge of a venireperson for cause.

A. Standard of Review

       When a trial court denies a challenge for cause, we look to the entire record to

determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support its ruling. Hudson v. State, 620

S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Because the trial court is in the best position

to evaluate a venireperson’s demeanor and responses, we review its challenge-for-

cause rulings with considerable deference. Id. Only for a clear abuse of discretion will

we reverse. Id.

B. Applicable Law

       1
        See Hysenaj v. State, No. 11-13-00219-CR, 2015 WL 4733068, at *1–2 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Aug. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Beard v. State, 421 S.W.3d 676, 677–78 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref’d); Lightfoot v.
State, No. 05-12-00428-CR, 2013 WL 3871041, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 23,
2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Alcaraz v. State, 401
S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.); Weber v. State, No. 14-11-
00863-CR, 2012 WL 3776362, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30,
2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                                            6
      Venire members are challengeable for cause if they have a bias or prejudice

against the defendant or the law on which the State or the defendant is entitled to rely.

Id. The test is whether the bias or prejudice would substantially impair the prospective

jurors’ ability to carry out their oath and to follow instructions in accordance with the

law. Id. Before potential jurors may be excused on this basis, the law must be

explained to them, and they must be asked whether they can follow the law regardless

of their personal views. Id. The challenger bears the burden of showing that the

challenge is proper. Id. The challenger does not meet this burden until he has shown

that the venire members understood the law’s requirements and could not overcome

their prejudice well enough to follow the law. Id.

C. Discussion

      Benson specifically complains that the trial court erred by denying his challenge

for cause to Venireperson Naseef. During jury selection, an unidentified member of

the venire remarked that the jury was there because someone got arrested for drinking

and driving and “blew over a .08.” Benson’s counsel then asked the panel if anyone

else had also formed the opinion that Benson must have “blown over a .08.”

Venireperson Naseef responded “yes” to that question.

      The trial court brought in Venireperson Naseef for individual questioning. The

following exchange occurred:

      [Benson’s Counsel:] I’m sorry. Did you say earlier that you had formed
      the idea that he had -- my client had been arrested by a police officer and
      scored over [.08]?

                                            7
[Naseef:] It would be my very strong opinion that, yes, I think he did
blow greater than a .08, and he selected a jury trial to perhaps lessen the
impact on that result.

[Benson’s Counsel:] Okay. So -- okay. That’s fine. I don’t have any
other questions.

[State:] Your Honor, if I could?

[Trial Court:] Please.

[State:] Just a few questions.

       So I know you’ve made some assumptions about things, but as
the client is sitting right here, the defendant, do you feel that he is guilty
or not guilty, knowing the fact that the State hasn’t presented any
evidence?

[Naseef:] No, I -- I don’t know if he’s guilty or not guilty.

[State:] Exactly, right? You need to hear that evidence in order to make
that determination?

[Naseef:] Correct.

[State:] Is there anything that you say in your -- the back of your mind,
that you’re sitting here saying he’s guilty right now as he’s sitting,
knowing that I haven’t presented any evidence?

[Naseef:] Opinions are reasonably formulated. And, yeah, one can
assume that, you know, you wear a blue suit so you’re -- but that, still,
opinions can be changed by fact. So, no. To me, I don’t know if he’s
guilty or not guilty.

[State:] And do you feel that you could be a fair and impartial juror in
this trial?

[Naseef:] Yeah.

[State:] Nothing further from the State, Judge.

                                      8
[Trial Court:] All right. [Benson’s counsel], anything else?

[Benson’s Counsel:] Do you still have the idea he was arrested by some
policeman who thought he was intoxicated and he scored over [.08]?
And that he picked a jury trial to lessen --

[Naseef:] In my opinion --

[Benson’s Counsel:] That he picked a jury trial to lessen the impact?
‘Cause, guess what, they asked for a jury trial, too. Even if -- like, if he
says, I want a bench trial, and the State can say, we want a jury trial --

[State:] Your Honor, at this point, I feel like Defense counsel’s trying to
change the juror’s mind on his answers.

[Benson’s Counsel:] No. He’s already told us in voir dire and he -- and
he still thinks that.

[Naseef:] In my opinion, yes, I -- I think he got caught driving. He blew
greater than a .08, and he wants a jury trial. That’s my opinion.

[Benson’s Counsel:] Okay.

[Naseef:] That doesn’t mean he’s guilty. That just means that’s my
opinion.

[Trial Court:] Mr. Naseef, let me -- let me --

[Naseef:] And can it be changed? Yes.

[Trial Court:] Let me ask you this: Can you follow the instructions and
the law that I give you?

[Naseef:] Can I follow the instructions --

[Trial Court:] And the law that I give you as the judge of this court?

[Naseef:] Yes.

                                     9
      [Trial Court:] Okay. And if that law says the defendant’s presumed
      innocent unless and until the jury’s convinced beyond a reasonable
      doubt of the defendant’s guilt, you can follow that law?

      [Naseef:] Yes.

      [Trial Court: All right. Thank you, sir. You can be excused.

      The trial court denied the challenge for cause. Benson requested an additional

peremptory challenge because he had used one on Venireperson Naseef, and the trial

court denied his request.

      Although Venireperson Naseef had formed an opinion that Benson was

arrested and blew over .08, he stated that he had not formed the opinion that Benson

was guilty. He unequivocally stated that he could follow both the trial court’s

instructions and the law on the presumption of innocence. Benson did not meet his

burden to show that Venireperson Naseef could not follow the law. See id. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Benson’s challenge for cause of

Venireperson Naseef. We overrule Benson’s second point.

                                  IV. Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                    /s/ Wade Birdwell
                                                    Wade Birdwell
                                                    Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 8, 2024

                                         10