Court Opinion

ID: 9939470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 22:04:27.426194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:16.753443
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 232170-U
                                              No. 1-23-2170B
                                       Order filed February 9, 2024
                                                                                          Sixth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                  IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                            FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                              )   Appeal from the
                                                                   )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                     )   Cook County.
                                                                   )
     v.                                                            )   No. 22 CR 0293201
                                                                   )
 Diontay Kimberley,                                                )   Honorable
                                                                   )   Alfredo Maldonado,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                    )   Judge, Presiding.

           PRESIDING JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Hyman and C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1        Held: The trial court abused its discretion by failing to state adequate reasons in its written
                order, as the Act specifically requires, regarding its finding that no condition or
                combination of conditions could mitigate the threat to the safety of the community.

¶2        Defendant-appellant Diontay Kimberley, by and through his attorney, brings this appeal

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023) challenging the trial court’s order
No. 1-23-2170B

entered on November 6, 2023, pursuant to what is commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. 1

Defendant was charged with first degree murder. and the initial bond hearing was held on February

11, 2022, which resulted in a “No Bail” order. Upon the enactment of the Pretrial Fairness Act

and subsequent petitions for release by defendant and for detention by the State, the trial court

conducted a detention hearing and found clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident

and the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense. The trial court also

found that no reasonable set of circumstances could mitigate the danger of release. Accordingly,

the trial court granted the State’s petition for pretrial detention and denied defendant’s petition for

release. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 9, 2023, and a Petition to Grant

Pretrial Release Under New Law on November 6, 2023. Defendant then filed a Notice in Lieu of

Memorandum on January 5, 2023. The State filed a memorandum in response. For the following

reasons, we reverse and remand.

¶3                                         BACKGROUND

¶4      A summary of the relevant evidence proffered by the parties during the hearing on the

State’s Petition for Detention is as follows: On May 19, 2021, at about 11:19 a.m., the victim

Rondell Smith, was standing on the sidewalk outside of a Dunkin Donuts store. At that time, a

Dodge Journey vehicle pulled up along that same sidewalk and multiple gunshots were fired from

the driver’s side window, hitting the victim multiple times. The vehicle had distinctive features

such as a lone roof rack and distinctive rims. After the shooting, the vehicle exited the Dunkin

        1
          In 2021, the General Assembly passed two separate acts that “dismantled and rebuilt Illinois’s
statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4
(discussing Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255, 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending 725 ILCS 5/art.
110) (the Pretrial Fairness Act) and Pub. Act 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (the Follow-Up Act).

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No. 1-23-2170B

Donuts parking lot. Emergency responders took the victim to the hospital where he ultimately

died.

¶5      A police investigation resulted in the following circumstantial evidence. About thirteen

.40 caliber Smith and Wesson shell casings were in the drive-through of the Dunkin Donuts where

the shooting occurred. Upon reviewing the Dunkin Donuts video, multiple surveillance videos

from private businesses, POD videos, and license plate readers, the police were able to track the

vehicle’s path for 15 minutes from the Dunkin Donuts to the Buddy Bear Car Wash a few miles

away. The video at the car wash shows the same vehicle pulling into the drive-through, 15 minutes

after the shooting, and defendant leaning out of the driver’s window and making a payment for the

car wash. The video also shows a gold bracelet on defendant’s left wrist. The license plate readers

along the route from Dunkin Donuts to Buddy Bear Car Wash revealed that the vehicle was

registered to defendant’s girlfriend.

¶6      Officers witnessed defendant getting into the vehicle in question on two separate occasions.

Each time they tried to curb the vehicle, both when defendant was driving and when his girlfriend

was driving, the vehicle fled, and the police decided to terminate pursuit. It was not until September

8, 2021, that Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers were able to apprehend defendant as he

attempted to recover the vehicle, which had been towed by the Evergreen Police Department.

¶7      Upon arrest, defendant was in possession of three cellphones. 2 Detectives were able to

track the phones based on cellphone towers and discovered that defendant appeared in Will County

Courthouse, for probation violation, and then went to the area of the Dunkin Donuts and ultimately

        2
          Defendant was acquitted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) for a weapon that
was also recovered upon his arrest.

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No. 1-23-2170B

went to Buddy Bear Car Wash. This information was further corroborated by the POD videos and

surveillance videos. When arrested, defendant was wearing the same gold bracelet on his left wrist

that was depicted in the car wash video.

¶8     Police also recovered a loaded handgun from defendant's person, as well as narcotics.

Although police later learned that the firearm was not the same firearm that was used in the murder,

a single .40-caliber Smith and Wesson shell casing found lodged in the base of the windshield of

the vehicle did match the casings found at the scene of the shooting. Defendant was placed into

custody at that time and was charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, which he was

ultimately acquitted of, after a jury trial. (21 CR 1304001),

¶9     By way of background, defendant had a 2017 felony, for defrauding a financial institution,

for which he received two years’ probation. He had a 2015 felony, for driving on a suspended or

revoked license, for which he received two years’ probation which was terminated unsatisfactorily.

In 2008, defendant had a reduced armed robbery conviction for which he received boot camp. He

also had six failures to appear, with the most recent being in 2017.

¶ 10     The pretrial services assessment reported a score of five on the new criminal activity scale,

and a four on the failure to appear scale. The representative recommended maximum conditions

and noted a response of “yes” to the violent criminal activity flag.

¶ 11   Defendant contended that the State’s case was entirely circumstantial. There were no

eyewitnesses, confessions, or admissions. The video from Dunkin Donuts does not have good

resolution and the license place was not clear. The officers looked at the video and determined

that the vehicle looked like a Dodge Journey and proceeded to look at other surveillance videos

until they found a Dodge Journey and then tracked that license plate. Defendant also pointed out

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No. 1-23-2170B

that the State also had an alternative suspect who had a motive and who had previously threatened

the victim. Additionally, there was a second person in the video at the car wash but there is no

evidence that the prosecution interviewed or otherwise ascertained whether that person had

information or was involved in the shooting.

¶ 12   The defense proffered the following facts in mitigation during the initial bail hearing:

Defendant was 31 years old and a lifelong resident of Cook County. He resided with his

grandmother in Chicago and had a child on the way. Defendant graduated from high school and

earned an associate degree from Richard Daley Community College. At the time of the hearing,

he was enrolled in school for welding and had worked construction for two years. At the detention

hearing, defendant’s counsel added that defendant had a 16-month-old daughter who was born

during his incarceration and whom he had never met.

¶ 13   As an alternative to detention, defendant suggested that house arrest with GPS tracking

would mitigate the potential danger of release.

¶ 14   The trial court ultimately found that, under the clear and convincing standard, proof is

evident that defendant committed the offenses listed in the indictment. In its written order, the

trial court found that defendant posed a real and present danger where “[t]he allegations involve a

killing by use of a firearm on the city streets.” The trial court indicated that it was troubled by the

fact that, if proven true, defendant went to Will County court regarding a probation violation and

then went right out and shot and killed someone in a public way. With respect to defendant’s

suggestion of GPS tracking, the trial court found:

       “I don’t find that the GPS tracking that counsel suggests would be appropriate. I don’t think

       it really allays the fears that I have here. The allegations contained in the indictment are

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No. 1-23-2170B

       about a shooting in the public way that, thankfully, only—I mean, I don’t want to say

       thankfully because someone did die, but more people could have died.”

As such, the court did not find that GPS tracking, as suggested by defendant, would be appropriate

and “no reasonable set of circumstances can mitigate the danger.” Accordingly, defendant was

detained under the Act.

¶ 15   Defendant’s appeal was timely filed within 14 days, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon

this court. In considering this appeal, we have reviewed the following documents that were

submitted pursuant to Rule 604(h): the supporting common law record, report of proceedings,

defendant’s Notice of Pretrial Fairness Act Appeal, Petition to Grant Pretrial Release under New

Law, Notice in lieu of Memorandum, and the State’s response memorandum.

¶ 16                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 17   On appeal, defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear

and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant

committed the qualifying offense of first degree murder; the State failed to meet its burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the

case; the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case, or

defendant’s willful flight; and, the trial court erred in its determination that no condition or

combination of conditions would reasonably ensure the appearance of defendant for later hearings

or prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.

                                               -6-
No. 1-23-2170B

¶ 18     The circuit court’s determination regarding the dangerousness and or conditions of release

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶¶ 9, 15;

People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion occurs when the

decision of the circuit court is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person

would agree with the position adopted by the circuit court. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶

9; Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10.

¶ 19     Pretrial release is governed by Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq (West 2022)). Under the Code, all persons charged with an

offense are eligible for pretrial release before conviction. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022).

¶ 20     Pursuant to the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily

limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022). Upon the State’s filing of a verified petition

requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a

qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety

of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid

a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and or prevent the

defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-2; 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5), (4), (8) (West

2022).

¶ 21     At all pretrial hearings, the prosecution has the burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that any condition of release is necessary. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(b) (West 2022). In any order

for detention, the court shall make a written finding summarizing the court’s reasons for

concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive

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No. 1-23-2170B

conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant’s willful

flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022).

¶ 22   Section 110-6.1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) provides that all defendants

shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release and the State has to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-

10 can mitigate the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a).

That paragraph includes forcible felonies such as those that defendant is charged with.

¶ 23   First, defendant alleges that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense charged, first

degree murder, because the State’s case is entirely circumstantial except for the purportedly

matching shell casing that was found several months later in the windshield area of defendant’s

girlfriend’s vehicle. Defendant relies on the fact that there are no eyewitness identifications, no

incriminating statements by defendant, no surveillance video that clearly shows the identity of the

shooter or vehicle involved. He also argues that the cellphone records only place defendant in the

general area at the time. There is no established motive, and the shell casing was found months

later and there is a viable alternative suspect with motive to kill the victim, because according to

the victim’s sister, the victim had an affair with the suspect’s girlfriend, and the suspect made a

statement consistent with future intent to kill the victim: “We don’t beef on social sites, we just hit

our target.”

¶ 24   The State responds that defendant fails to offer an actual explanation of “how it was

unreasonable for the court to determine that the evidence was sufficient to meet the People’s

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No. 1-23-2170B

burden to show that the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed the

qualifying offenses.” Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24. The State compares the instant case

to Horne, where mere police synopsis and pretrial services bond report were sufficient to meet the

State’s burden.

¶ 25   We agree with the State. Here, the State’s proffer consisted of much more, including highly

technical video, photographs, cell tower evidence, a shell casing and subsequent flight when police

tried to curb his vehicle. The police had surveilled the vehicle for a period of time and attempted

to curb the vehicle before finally being able to arrest defendant. Accordingly, we find no abuse of

discretion in the court’s finding that proof was evident or presumption great that defendant

committed the qualifying offenses.

¶ 26   Defendant next argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case because the State

failed to establish any motive for the killing, or reason that defendant would have an intent to harm

the victim, or others. Nor did the State establish that defendant posed a specific threat to any

specific person or persons.

¶ 27   With respect to whether the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or the community, the State relies on People v. Stock, where defendant discharged a firearm

inside his own home with others present. 2023 IL App (1st) 231753. There the court found that

the alleged behavior, “at a bare minimum was dangerous, and posed a threat to those around him.”

Id. The State essentially argues that, if the mere discharge in a defendant’s private home poses a

                                                -9-
No. 1-23-2170B

threat, then surely first-degree murder in public, as we have here, posed a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community.

¶ 28   We find the trial court’s finding that the defendant poses a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or the community reasonable where there is substantial evidence that could

connect the defendant to a killing at a Dunkin Donuts store in broad daylight. Cf. People v. Hillard,

2023 IL 128186, ¶ 22 (“the presence of firearms during an offense poses an extreme danger to

both the intended victims and innocent bystanders”).

¶ 29   Next, defendant alleges that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence, and the trial court erred in finding that no condition or combination of

conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case, and defendant’s willful flight,

because there was no indication that defendant failed to appear in court. On the day in question,

defendant willfully appeared in Will County for a pending case and had no evidence of failure to

appear in the Cook Conty case. Further he points out that there was no explanation for why home

confinement with GPS or electronic monitoring would not address any threat that defendant

purportedly poses or that he poses a risk of willful flight. The record shows defendant has strong

family ties to Chicago, has employment history, and does not have the financial means to flee or

conceal himself elsewhere. Defendant also has a relative with whom he could live.

¶ 30   The State responds that a court may properly base a finding that no conditions can mitigate

defendant’s threat upon the same concerns supporting its finding that defendant does indeed

present such a threat, citing People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 34. The State argues that

the court expressly considered all the circumstances surrounding defendant’s Will County

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No. 1-23-2170B

appearance prior to participating in murder which was the basis for the court’s grave concern as to

whether any conditions would mitigate the danger.

¶ 31    Here, the trial court based its decision to deny defendant pretrial release primarily on its

determination that the allegations contained in the indictment concern a shooting in the public way

that could have resulted in more people dying. As such, the court determined that neither GPS nor

any reasonable set of circumstances could mitigate the danger.

¶ 32    However, section 110-6.1(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that the

trial “court shall, in any order for detention: (1) make a written finding summarizing the court’s

reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less

restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat *** or prevent the defendant's

willful flight.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). In the case at bar, the written findings of

the trial court merely state that the reason that there are no conditions that could mitigate the threat

of harm was “[o]n the day of the alleged killing, [defendant] was in court on his probation matter

in Will County.” The written order does not indicate that the trial court considered any alternatives

to defendant’s detention. Thus, we find that the written order denying pretrial release was an abuse

of discretion and remand for consideration of detention alternatives and entry of an appropriate

written order that complies with the Act, and which may or may not provide for detention.

¶ 33    Lastly, defendant states that a jury found him not guilty of aggravated use of a weapon by

a felon (AUUW), stemming from the discovery of the single shell casing that was allegedly

recovered from the external windshield area of the vehicle during his arrest. However, as the State

points out, no argument or authority was presented regarding the effect on the trial court’s

                                                 - 11 -
No. 1-23-2170B

detention order.   Therefore, we merely consider this statement as additional background

information.

¶ 34                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 35   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order, entered November 6, 2023, of the Circuit

Court of Cook County that required defendant’s pretrial detention and remand to the trial court for

further consideration of pretrial detention alternatives and entry of a written order that complies

with the Act. Mandate shall issue instanter.

¶ 36   Reversed and remanded.

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