Court Opinion

ID: 9522817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:35.280514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:03.140578
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this cause for further proceedings. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. As the majority of this court observes, it is for the trial court to decide as a matter of law whether or not there exists an ambiguity in the written instrument. This court determines the correctness of a trial court’s ruling on a question of law, independently of the judgment of the trial court. (Lepkowski v. Laukemper (1943), 317 Ill. App. 304, 314, 45 N.E.2d 979, 983.) A contract is ambiguous when the language used is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Susmano v. Associated Internists of Chicago, Ltd. (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 215, 219, 422 N.E.2d 879, 882. I think it is a reasonable interpretation of this contract that the parties agreed to trade real estate for real estate. In support of that interpretation, I note that certain essential terms for sale of the St. Louis County property to the Lukases are expressed in the contract. The property is specifically identified. Its price is stated as its “fair appraised market value.” “Financing” consists of set-off against the Jackson County property. Why are these terms in the contract? The proper assumption is that the parties inserted each provision in the contract deliberately and for a purpose. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Schmitt (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1065, 419 N.E.2d 601, 603.) Further, if the only reasonable interpretation of the document in question is that the Lightfoots were free to opt to trade or not to trade the St. Louis County property, why is there no “option” or “election” language among its terms? Considering, as well, that the document in question was drafted by laymen (cf. Weiland Tool & Manufacturing Co. v. Whitney (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 105, 116, 251 N.E.2d 242, 248, observing that an attorney should be presumed better able than a layman to express his intentions in plain and concise English), I believe that the trial court should have heard extrinsic evidence regarding whether at the time the contract was executed the parties intended a trade rather than a mere option. Finally, the parties dispute who drafted the contract, so we need not indulge in the secondary rule of construction that ambiguities are to be construed against the draftsman. See Weiland Tool & Manufacturing Co. v. Whitney (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 105, 251 N.E.2d 242. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the contract is ambiguous on the matter in question and that the Lukases are entitled to their day in court on the issue of the intention of the parties at the time of execution. I would reverse and remand, and I therefore dissent.