Court Opinion

ID: 9575594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:15:11.674258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:35.647130
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join my colleagues in affirming the judgment of the district court with respect to the claims, by Rest Haven and the municipal defendants. However, I believe that the amendments to the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“Illinois RFRA”) made in the O’Hare Modernization Act (“OMA”), Ill. Pub. Act No. 093-0450, violate the Free Exercise Clause, and, for that reason, must be subject to strict scrutiny. I further believe that there remain factual questions regarding whether the City of Chicago (“City”) has shown that the proposed modernization and expansion plan of O’Hare Airport is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest the City claims. These factual issues render dismissal inappropriate at *643this stage in the litigation. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
BACKGROUND
The majority’s thoughtful and comprehensive opinion sets forth the facts of this case in great detail; therefore, I shall provide only a brief description of the pertinent facts.
In May 2003, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the OMA. The legislation amended various provisions of Illinois law to facilitate the planned expansion of O’Hare Airport. One of the legal impediments that this legislation sought to remove was a restriction on the power of the City to condemn particular properties for the expansion, including two religiously-affiliated cemeteries, one of which, St. Johannes Cemetery (“St. Johannes”), is owned by St. John’s United Church of Christ (“St. John’s”). Among the changes aimed at facilitating the condemnation of these cemeteries was an amendment to the Illinois RFRA that repealed otherwise generally applicable statutes only with respect to the relocation of cemeteries in connection with the O’Hare expansion.
St. John’s and two of its congregants1 filed this action, challenging both the City’s attempt to acquire the land on which St. Johannes is located and the amendment to the Illinois RFRA. St. John’s asserted that the City’s actions violated its rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 St. John’s maintains that the relocation of St. Johannes would violate a major tenet of its religious beliefs, which requires that those buried in St. Johannes must remain undisturbed until resurrected by Jesus Christ on the Last Day. St. John’s further contended that, because the amendments to the Illinois RFRA singled out religious cemeteries near O’Hare, the law was not neutral and of general applicability, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court dismissed St. John’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that the OMA was a neutral law of general applicability; thus, it was subject only to rational basis scrutiny under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
II
DISCUSSION
The First Amendment ensures religious freedom by firmly committing the state to a position of neutrality in the relationship between individuals and religion. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). The Supreme Court has observed that, with respect to religious freedom, the principle of government neutrality, the government “protects] all, it prefers not, and it disparages none.” Id. at 215, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati, February 1870) (Taft, J., dissenting) (unpublished case), reproduced *644in The Bible in the Common Schools (Robert Clark & Co. ed., 1870)). The Free Exercise Clause advances the command of government neutrality by securing “religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority” and protecting against the coercive effect of legislation “as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.” Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (emphasis added); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378, 384, 110 S.Ct. 688, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990); Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 996 (7th Cir.2006). At a minimum, the Free Exercise Clause protects against laws that “discriminate[ ] against some or all religious beliefs.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993).
State action that offends the Free Exercise Clause must satisfy strict scrutiny, i.e., be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 996; Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 763 (7th Cir.2003). Additionally, when a legislative classification offends a fundamental right, such as the Free Exercise Clause, an equal protection challenge to that classification is subject to strict scrutiny. Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 1000. A law offends the Free Exercise Clause and its requirement of government neutrality with respect to religion in two circumstances. First, a law that burdens the free exercise of religion and that is not facially neutral and of general applicability will be subject to strict scrutiny. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217; Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 996. Second, a facially-neutral law that “imposes a substantial burden on religion” offends the Free Exercise Clause and likewise is subject to strict scrutiny. Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 996. The OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA violates the Free Exercise Clause under either of these approaches.
A law is not neutral on its face if its object or purpose “is the suppression of religion or religious conduct.” City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (emphasis added). To determine whether a law is neutral and of general applicability, we first look to the text of the statute to determine whether it discriminates on its face. Id. “A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from language or context.” Id. Applying these standards, it is clear that the OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA is not facially neutral. OMA added a new section 30 to the Illinois RFRA which reads:
Nothing in this Act limits the authority of the City of Chicago to exercise its powers under the O’Hare Modernization Act for the purposes of relocation of cemeteries or the graves located therein.
775 ILCS 35/30. The panel opinion determines that, because cemeteries and the burial, or relocation, of the dead are not inherently religious, the amendment to the Illinois RFRA is textually neutral. However, this analysis fails to appreciate that, when read in context, the new section 30 of the Illinois RFRA affects only religious cemeteries. The phrase “this Act” in the new section 30 refers to the Illinois RFRA. See id. 35/1. The Illinois RFRA, in turn, protects against government actions that substantially burden an individual’s free exercise of religion, id. 35/15, which the Illinois RFRA defines as “an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious belief,” id. 35/5. Thus, the only cemeteries affected by OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA are those religious cemeteries that the City may seek to relocate. Moreover, because the Illinois RFRA’s protections apply only where the government action substantially burdens *645an individual’s free exercise of religion, the amendment affects only those religious cemeteries whose relocation would substantially burden an individual’s free exercise of religion.
The effect of the amendment is to remove from the protections afforded to every other individual’s religious observance, those individuals whose religious practices would be substantially burdened by the relocation of cemeteries in connection with the expansion of O’Hare. The OMA amendment to the Illinois RFRA offends the Free Exercise Clause by penalizing those individuals whose religious observance is affected by the expansion project by denying them “an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). Illinois RFRA demands that the government show a compelling interest and the lack of viable alternative before it burdens anyone’s religious beliefs. By the amendment, Illinois has watered down, significantly, the protection afforded these plaintiffs. It does not matter that Illinois has not chosen to single out the United Church of Christ (the faith with which St. John’s is affiliated) for unfavorable treatment across the state. The Free Exercise Clause protects the individual’s right to the free exercise of religion. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 384, 110 S.Ct. 688; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560. Thus, the OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA both burdens the free exercise of religion and lacks facial neutrality, and, therefore, strict scrutiny must be applied to the amendment.
However, even if the amendment to the OMA was facially neutral, it would still be subject to strict scrutiny because it imposes a substantial burden on religion. As the Supreme Court said in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993):
Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause “forbids subtle departures from neutrality,” Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) and “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs,” Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 702 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.
See also Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 996. We have held that a burden on the free exercise of religion rises to the level of a constitutional injury when the law places significant pressure on the adherent to forego its religious precepts. Id. at 999. The effect of relocating St. Johannes on St. John’s religious observance is neither hypothetical nor speculative, but, rather, inescapable. The relocation of St. Johannes would force St. John’s to forego its religious precepts regarding the burial of its members. This burden goes further than placing pressure on St. John’s to forego its religious precepts. By relocating St. Johannes Cemetery, St. John’s would be “coerced by the Government’s action into violating [its] religious beliefs.” Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449, 108 S.Ct. 1319. By forcing St. John’s to “perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of [its] religious beliefs,” this coercion presents the precise “danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).
Because the amendments to the Illinois RFRA offend the Free Exercise Clause, the law must survive strict scrutiny under *646both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under strict scrutiny review, the Government bears the burden of proving both that the act in question advances a compelling state interest and that the means chosen to pursue that interest are narrowly tailored to that end. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005); see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.2006); Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 996. The majority opinion accepts the City’s assertions that the current modernization plan is narrowly tailored. Perhaps the City is correct. However, accepting the City’s assertions at this stage in the litigation is inconsistent with our obligation when reviewing a motion to dismiss to accept all well pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiffs. Patel v. City of Chicago, 383 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir.2004). At this stage in the litigation, there has been none of the factual development necessary to determine whether the means chosen by the City are narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest asserted here.
Therefore, I would remand the case for further proceedings to allow factual development. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the panel’s opinion that rejects St. John’s claim. I am pleased to join the opinion in all other respects.

. Because the congregants assert the same claims as St. John’s, I shall refer, for ease of reference, to the plaintiffs collectively as St. John's.

. The owner of the second cemetery, Rest Haven Cemetery Association, originally joined St. John’s in these claims. As noted by the majority opinion, the City no longer seeks to acquire the land on which Rest Haven is located, rendering Rest Haven's challenges moot.