Court Opinion

ID: 9469030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:30:18.085641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:10.910750
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority determination that the plaintiff is a commercial buyer dealing with *224the defendant from a position of relatively equal economic strength is the thread from which the remaining legal conclusions in its opinion hang. If I could agree with that finding I would have less trouble with the majority opinion. In any event, I must respectfully dissent because I cannot agree that Purvis’ tobacco farming constitutes the type of “commercial” activity that precludes application of South Carolina’s strict products liability statute, S.C.Code § 15-73-10 (1976). While in its broadest sense the meaning of “commercial” could include any activity intended to yield a profit, in common parlance the term is generally associated with manufacturing or retail activities. It is an unfair interpretation to equate Purvis’ relatively small farming operation with traditional business activities.
The majority relies primarily on Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 55 Cal. App.3d 737, 127 Cal.Rptr. 838 (1978), for the rule that commercial transactions are exempt from the doctrine of strict products liability. However, even if we accept “commercial activity” to include farming, we should not extend that rule to the situation at hand. A close reading of Kaiser and its progeny,1 reveals only that “the doctrine of strict liability does not apply between large corporate enterprises which have allocated risks by contract.” S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). We can hardly say that Purvis, a small-time farmer, operates a large corporate enterprise.2 To do so yields harsh results, as is evident by the majority’s decision, and unduly restricts the doctrine of strict products liability beyond that intended by the “commercial setting” exception.
Finally, the majority suggests that the defendant should not be held liable on strict liability grounds because the “Conto” barn was not unreasonably dangerous to plaintiff’s property. However, this was a question of fact which was properly submitted to the jury. Since the jury’s determination was not clearly erroneous, I would affirm the district court’s judgment, holding the defendant liable to Purvis under South Carolina’s strict products liability statute.

. E.g., Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2nd Cir. 1980); Scandanavian Airlines System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979); and Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 460 F.Supp. 163 (E.D.Pa.1978).

. Of course, we would face a more difficult question if the plaintiff was a large corporate farmer with thousands of acres of land, but that is not the case here.