Court Opinion

ID: 9449511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:14:16.372333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:52.044534
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
In Williams v. Overholser1 where Williams had pleaded guilty to a misdemean- or charge, we pointed to the availability of the provisions of D.C.Code § 21-306 (1961) et seq. as one basis for commitment proceedings, holding that otherwise § 24-301 authorized confinement only upon a determination that an accused is mentally incompetent to stand trial.
Three years later after further consideration, this court sitting en banc decided Overholser v. Lynch2 on January 26, 1961. The majority thought a trial judge, possessed of reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused at the time of the offense, should not accept a plea of guilty even though its consequences had been carefully considered by an able attorney and by the accused who had been judicially determined competent to stand' trial and to assist in his own defense. Thus six judges concluded that an accused found not guilty by reason of insanity could be confined to a hospital for the mentally ill as § 24-301 (d) provides. On June 2, 1961, this course was followed" as to Fisher.
The Supreme Court reversed in Lynch v. Overholser,3 saying that a trial judge-may refuse to accept a guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty. “We decide in this case only that if this is done and the defendant, despite his own assertions of sanity, is found not guilty by reason of insanity, § 24-301 (d) does not apply.”4 Thus commitment could not be based upon § 24-301 (d) unless the accused himself raised the defense that he was insane-at the time of the commission of the offense.
But, if he did not so plead, but was-found not guilty by reason of insanity, the Court went on to say: “If commitment is then considered warranted, it must be accomplished” 5 in either of two-ways, one being resort to section 24-301 (a).6 The Court had already noted that, two different types of inquiry were set forth in § 24-301 (a). “This inquiry, therefore, is not limited to the accused’s competence to stand trial; the judge may consider, as well, whether the accused is *736presently committable as a person of unsound mind.” 7 (Emphasis added.)
Recognizing a distinction 8 between mental “competence” and “unsound mind” the Supreme Court must mean, as I see it, that § 24-301 (a) is available only in limited situations where the condition of “unsound mind” is a factor. For example, if after examination the accused shall have been found competent to stand trial and after trial, the jury brings in a verdict of guilty as charged, but the judge is satisfied nevertheless that at the time of trial or before sentence,9 the accused is presently of unsound mind, a further inquiry is authorized and may be undertaken. If the accused is thereupon found to be of unsound mind, he may be committed until he shall be found competent. Only then may he be sentenced, with an understanding of the position in which he then stands. He must be able to assist, competent, in short, to make personal allocution if he shall choose to do so.10
In this case, Fisher was first committed on June 2, 1961 as the order recited “pursuant to Public Law 313, 84th Congress, Chapter 673, 1st Session.” But he was not committed simply until his mental competence might be restored, for he was found not guilty on the ground that he was insane at the time of the offense. That judgment precluded the 1962 hearing, it develops, because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lynch v. Overholser, supra.
If in June, 1961, the trial judge upon receipt of the psychiatric report11 had found that Fisher was mentally competent, he could have accepted Fisher’s plea of guilty. The trial judge then could have sentenced Fisher to jail. The Supreme Court tells us that under D.C. Code § 24-302, “if an accused who pleads guilty is found to be in need of psychiatric assistance, he may be transferred to a hospital following sentence.”12
That the Municipal Court in June, 1961, followed the course we set out in Overholser v. Lynch, supra, is clear. That Fisher one year later was lawfully released by the District Court13 after the Supreme Court had spoken is obvious, and we must affirm. In argument it developed that Fisher’s release within a few months has led only to his further indictment. Charged now in three counts with arson, the burning of his wife’s clothing, and setting fire to his dwelling, the District Court’s records reveal that, as in 1961, he has again been found competent to stand trial—and yet as of the date of the offenses, December, 1962, to have been suffering from an “emotionally unstable personality.”14 *737Perhaps he will again plead guilty. If so, the guidance of the Supreme Court as to the applicability of § 24-802 may point the way to his ultimate rehabilitation.15

. 104 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 259 F.2d 175 (1958).

. 109 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 288 F.2d 388 (1961).

. 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063 (1962).

. 369 U.S. at 719-720, 82 S.Ct. at 1072.

. 369 U.S. at 720, 82 S.Ct. at 1072.

. Ibid., the other being recourse to the-civil commitment proceedings discussed-in our Williams case, supra note 1.

. 369 U.S. 719, 82 S.Ct. at 1072.

. See Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 26, 254 F.2d 725, 729 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958), as to the distinction between persistent mental disease and competency to stand trial; id., dissenting opinion, 103 U.S.App.D.C. at 31-32, 254 F.2d at 734-735.

. Or even after sentencing if the situation develops “prior to the expiration of any period of probation,” § 24-301 (a).

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a); Gadsden v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 167, 223 F.2d 627, 632 (1955); Couch v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 235 F.2d 519 (1956); cf. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653 (1961).

. On May 26, 1961, Dr. Gordon reported that Fisher was “presently of sound mind, able to understand the charges against him, and capable of participating in his own defense.”

. Lynch v. Overholser, supra, 369 U.S. at 718, 82 S.Ct. at 1071.

. Only a few days earlier, the Municipal Court in July, 1962, heard testimony in proceedings which, it develops, were invalid. Dr. Robertson testified that Fisher was still suffering a mental illness and “would be dangerous to others if he was released to the stress of living outside of the hospital, dangerous to others.”

. Classified by some psychiatrists as a mental disease; St. Elizabeths staff has advised the District Court no “valid opinion” can be formed as to whether or not the alleged criminal offenses were the product of his mental disease.

. Cf. Carter v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 405, 408, 283 F.2d 200, 203 (1960).