Court Opinion

ID: 9709441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:47:52.491287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.932517
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: Today, the majority holds that the Illinois Supreme Court is powerless to implement a common law negligence cause of action for injuries sustained in alcohol-related car accidents that result when adults serve minors liquor in their homes and then permit the minors to leave in a vehicle while in a state of intoxication. Under the guise of deferring to the legislature’s "preemption” of the field, the majority turns its back on a development in the common law that is long overdue and has been recognized as such by the appellate court of this State and by courts of other jurisdictions. I dissent from the majority’s interpretation of this court’s precedent and I disagree with the majority’s apparent belief that adults who allow or condone underage drinking and driving should enjoy judicially-created immunity from any civil liability for the injuries caused by teenage drunk driving. The facts of the instant appeals illustrate the tragic consequences that result when social host adults allow teenagers to drink and drive. According to the plaintiffs’ complaints, Lynn Sue Charles was 16 years old when she went to a party at the home of Alan Seigfried. She drove herself to the party in her car. The party started in the evening on February 15 and lasted into the early morning hours of February 16, 1991. Seigfried provided drinks for everyone there, including Lynn Sue. In fact, Lynn Sue had so much to drink that she became extremely intoxicated. Seigfried had personal contact with her during the party and knew the advanced state of drunkenness that she had reached. He also knew that she had driven her own car to the party. Nevertheless, Seigfried allowed Lynn Sue to leave the party, while she was extremely intoxicated, by driving her own car. She had a fatal collision while driving from the party. At the time of her death, Lynn Sue’s blood-alcohol content was 0.299, which was three times the level of legal intoxication for an adult. Paula Bzdek was 15 years old when she went to a party that was held at the Townsley home on September 15, 1990. The Townsleys gave her alcohol to drink while she was at the party. They also provided it to David Duff, who was 18 years old. Both Paula and David became intoxicated. They left the Townsley home in David’s car while they were inebriated. The Townsleys knew that the couple left their home in David’s vehicle, which he was driving, and that both were intoxicated when they left. While David was driving the vehicle, he lost control of the car and crashed into oncoming traffic. Paula sustained injuries as a result of the accident. Suit was filed against the adult social hosts on behalf of both Lynn Sue Charles and Paula Bzdek. The pleadings alleged that the adult defendants had been negligent when they permitted minors to drink alcohol at the parties, to become intoxicated, and had then allowed the teenagers to drive a car from the gathering. The trial court dismissed the pleadings for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, but the appellate court reversed these determinations. Relying upon Cravens v. Inman (1991), 223 Ill. App. 3d 1059, the appellate court held that Illinois common law recognizes a negligence action against a social host for injuries resulting from an alcohol-related vehicle accident when the host served alcohol to minors, allowed them to become intoxicated, and then permitted the minors to leave the gathering in an automobile. The facts of Cravens are remarkably similar to the facts in the present appeals. In Cravens, adult social hosts held a party at which minors were allegedly allowed and permitted to drink alcohol to the point of intoxication. The social hosts then allowed the minors to leave the party in an automobile, although the hosts knew or should have known that they were inebriated. The driver of the vehicle lost control of the car, causing it to crash. One of the teenagers in the vehicle sustained injuries that resulted in her death. The appellate court in Cravens squarely confronted the merits of the legal issues raised by the parties. The court held that the Dramshop Act did not preempt a common law negligence cause of action for social host liability in the provision of alcohol to a minor who becomes intoxicated and sustains injuries in an alcohol-related car accident. The Cravens court reasoned that there was nothing in the express terms of the statute, nor its jurisprudential interpretations, that excluded social host liability for the provision of alcohol to a minor. (Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1072-75.) The court also determined that principles of stare decisis could not legitimate a court’s refusal to recognize a tort claim necessitated by modern-day realities. (Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1075.) Reviewing the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court found the pleadings sufficient to state a claim for common law negligence. Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1076-80. I reaffirm the views expressed in Cravens, and incorporate them herein by reference. There is no legal impediment to recognition of social host liability in cases where an adult social host permits a minor to drink to the point of intoxication, permits the minor to leave the gathering in a vehicle, and the minor or a third party sustains or causes injuries in an alcohol-related car accident. The citizens of this State deserve the full protection of our common law principles of tort liability, and this court has the power and the prerogative to extend to them such protections. In today’s decision, the majority reverses the rulings of the appellate court and overrules the holding in Cravens. In so doing, the majority perpetuates an injustice in our State to all victims of teen-aged drunk driving and to our taxpayers who pay much of the costs of injuries and deaths caused by alcohol-related accidents involving teen-aged drivers. This court can, and should, recognize a common law negligence cause of action for social host liability in the provision of alcohol to a minor under the limited circumstances established in Cravens. Social host liability is a valid claim under common law principles of ordinary negligence where an adult holds a social gathering which minors attend, the adult allows the minor to drink alcohol to the point of intoxication, the adult permits the inebriated minor to leave the gathering in an automobile although the adult knows of the minor’s intoxicated condition, and the minor or a third party is then injured in an alcohol-related traffic accident. I cannot join in my colleagues’ refusal to recognize social host tort liability under the limited circumstances delineated in Cravens. In my view, the reasons advanced by the majority are hollow and stale. The majority’s protestations of legislative preemption, stare decisis, and public policy cannot withstand the scrutiny of legal reasoning. I The majority concludes that the plaintiffs’ claims for negligence against the defendant social hosts are preempted by the Illinois Dramshop Act (235 ILCS 5/6 — 21 (West 1992)) and that any move to enlarge the Act, in order to include claims such as those of the plaintiffs, should be undertaken by the Illinois legislature. The majority’s recitations regarding legislative preemption are misguided. This court has often held that the Dramshop Act preempts the field with respect to liability for the commercial sale of alcohol to an adult. (Hopkins v. Powers (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 206; Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 435; Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 76-77; Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 23; Howlett v. Doglio (1949), 402 Ill. 311.) But the Dramshop Act, in neither its express terms nor its underlying intent and purpose, makes any reference to and in no way precludes social host liability for the provision of alcohol to a minor. It is illogical to construe a statute so that it says something about a topic on which the statute is clearly silent. The majority’s analysis of its own precedent is equally ill-advised. The majority states that "[flor over one century, this court has spoken with a single voice to the effect that no social host liability exists in Illinois.” (165 Ill. 2d at 486.) This is an inaccurate statement of the common law of this State. What is correct as a statement of law is that this court has never addressed the issue of whether there should be social host liability for injuries caused by the provision of alcohol to a minor. Rather, this court’s past decisions all address the question of whether there should be social host or dramshop liability for the provision of alcohol to an adult. See Hopkins v. Powers (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 206 (dramshop owner not subject to "liability in tort”, for purpose of contribution among joint tortfeasors); Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 435 (Wisconsin dramshop not subject to jurisdiction under Illinois long-arm statute); Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665 (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 1 (Dramshop Act has no extraterritorial effect outside Illinois; reaffirmed rule that Act preempts common law negligence liability for dramshop sale of alcohol to adult); Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 23 (Dramshop Act preempts common law liability for sale of alcohol to adult); Cruse v. Aden (1889), 127 Ill. 231 (Dramshop Act preempts common law liability for gift of alcohol to adult). To rely upon this court’s antiquated decision in Cruse, as the majority does (165 Ill. 2d at 488), is also inaccurate. The facts in Cruse involved a grown adult male who became intoxicated, was thrown from his horse, and died. The underage drinkers in the present appeals were not riding horses. They were driving in automobiles, which are infinitely more complex, complicated, and dangerous than a common farm animal. This critical distinction is lost on the majority. It is also very important that the injured párty in Cruse was an adult male, not a young child. This court in Cruse reasoned that ''[i]t was not a tort, at common law, to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to 'a strong and able-bodied man’ ***.” (Cruse, 127 Ill. 2d at 234.) This reasoning has no relevance to instances where the person who consumed the alcohol was under the legal drinking age. The issue at bar does not involve the provision of alcohol to an adult. Rather, we are specifically concerned with a social host’s provision of alcohol to minors who are permitted to become intoxicated and then drive a vehicle. As the court stated in Ely v. Murphy (1988), 207 Conn. 88, 540 A.2d 54: "The proposition that intoxication results from the voluntary conduct of the person who consumes intoxicating liquor assumes a knowing and intelligent exercise of choice, and for that reason is more applicable to adults than to minors. With respect to minors, various legislative enactments have placed them at a disability in the context of alcohol consumption. *** These *** statutes reflect a continuing and growing public awareness and concern that children as a class are simply incompetent by reason of their youth and inexperience to deal responsibly with the effects of alcohol. *** This growing public awareness *** causes us to conclude that common law precepts in this area also warrant reexamination.” Ely, 207 Conn, at 93-94, 540 A.2d at 57. Our appellate court has expressed growing dissatisfaction with jurisprudence of this State regarding civil liability for alcohol-related injuries. Appellate decisions have already created exceptions to the general rule of non-liability for the provision of alcohol in contexts other than dramshop actions. (See, e.g., Haben v. Anderson (1992), 232 Ill. App. 3d 260; Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 231 (imposing common law negligence liability when minor "required” to consume alcohol during college "hazing” party).) The injustice of the majority’s ruling in the case at bar has been readily apparent to our appellate court: "Our courts have observed that the extraordinary toll in personal injuries and property damage caused by alcohol-related accidents 'may well warrant’ a reevaluation of current legal precedent in this State. (Estate of Ritchie [v. Farrell (1991)], 213 Ill. App. 3d [846], 850.) Our decisions have also acknowledged that there 'may well be validity to the position’ that the Dramshop Act should not be considered an exclusive remedy when liquor is provided to a minor, and that perhaps the law should be altered so that all persons who furnish alcohol to minors are held financially accountable for injuries proximately caused by the minors’ alcohol use. (Puckett [v. Mr. Lucky’s Ltd. (1988)], 175 Ill. App. 3d [355], 357.) It has also been cogently observed that the furnishing of alcohol to a minor seriously endangers the health, safety, and welfare of all Illinois citizens. Puckett, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 361 (Knecht, J., dissenting).” Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. The concerns expressed by our appellate court are valid and compelling and deserve this court’s full attention and consideration. Unfortunately, the majority refuses to exercise this court’s authority to review our concepts of common law negligence liability with a view to whether they are just and fair, when considered in light of the present-day reality of the needless carnage and destruction wrought by underage drunk driving. II In an effort to bolster its position, the majority also invokes principles of stare decisis. The majority recites that this court must "stand by precedent and leave settled points of law undisturbed.” (165 Ill. 2d at 492.) According to the majority, "[decisions that have been established for a long period of years should, in the orderly administration of justice, be deemed controlling unless and until the General Assembly provides otherwise. [Citation.]” (165 Ill. 2d at 492.) The majority believes that "it is apparent that the legislature has acquiesced in the court’s construction of the statute, which has by now become part of the fabric of the Dram-shop Act. [Citations.]” 165 Ill. 2d at 492. However, this court’s view of stare decisis has never been used, as the majority does in the present cause, as an excuse for judicial inaction that amounts to an abandonment of this court’s duty to guide and develop the common law of this State. "Our common law, which is of judicial origin, is comprised of broad, flexible principles that find their source in fundamental values of justice, logic, and common sense, and is adapted by the judiciary according to the changing demands of our society. [Citation.] As [this court] noted in Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 406 ***, wherein [we] recognized the common law right of a woman to sue for loss of spousal consortium: 'We find no wisdom in abdicating to the legislature our essential function of re-evaluating common-law concepts in the light of present day realities. Nor do we find judicial sagacity in continually looking backward and parroting the words and analysis of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts of the past.’ 20 Ill. 2d at 429.” Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1074. As these principles demonstrate, the rule of stare decisis is not "so static that it deprives the court of all power to develop the law. (Alvis [v. Ribar (1981)], 85 Ill. 2d [1,] 24.) *** [T]he maintenance of stability in our legal concepts does not and should not occupy a preeminent position over the judiciary’s obligation to reconsider legal rules that have become inequitable in light of the changing needs of our society. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 24.” Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1075. Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis provides no refuge for the majority in the present cause because, as noted more fully above, this court has never addressed whether there should be social host liability for the provision of alcohol to a minor. The legislature’s failure to adopt proposed statutory provisions that would have been consistent with Cravens does not establish that the General Assembly has repudiated the principles enunciated in Cravens. Rather, the General Assembly’s actions reveal that the legislature has chosen to "conform! ] the statutes to the then-existing laws as announced by the court.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 23.) This court’s reasoning in Alvis, where we adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence notwithstanding the General Assembly’s failure to enact equivalent legislation, is particularly applicable: "We believe that the proper relationship between the legislature and the court is one of cooperation and assistance in examining and changing the common law to conform with the ever-changing demands of the community. There are, however, times when there exists a mutual state of inaction in which the court awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the court. Such a stalemate is a manifest injustice to the public. When such a stalemate exists and the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to remedy a gap in the common law that results in injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court to repair that injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society.” Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 23-24. This court’s analysis in Alvis is equally persuasive in the present appeals. Although the General Assembly has not enacted legislation to formally adopt Cravens, the legislature has also never enacted legislation to overturn the appellate court’s Cravens decision. As a result, it is incumbent upon this court to exercise its power and prerogative to develop the common law of this State and to decide that our common law encompasses a claim for social host negligence liability for injuries resulting from teen-age, alcohol-related vehicle accidents. This court can and must "repair th[e] [present] injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society.” Furthermore, it cannot be cogently argued by the majority that this court has never expanded upon the explicit terms of the Dramshop Act. To the contrary, this court has created, by judicial flat, a significant exclusion to the applicability of the specific provisions of the Dramshop Act. That exclusion is commonly known as the "complicity doctrine” and bars recovery by a plaintiff who actively procured or contributed to the intoxication of the person now sued for wrongful conduct. The complicity doctrine was woven from whole cloth by this court and has never been expressly adopted by the legislature. Yet it stands, and remains, as a valid exception to the Act. See Walter v. Carriage House Hotels, Ltd. (1995), 164 Ill. 2d 80. Since this court possessed and exercised the power to create the complicity doctrine as an exception to the Dramshop Act, then this court certainly has the power to create an additional exception for social host liability in the provision of alcohol to a minor under the limited circumstances recognized in Cravens. The majority’s refusal to do so, under the guise of stare decisis, is therefore all the more untenable. Ill I also disagree with the majority’s view that social drinking is such a sensitive public policy issue in this State that we should defer to the legislature to decide whether there should be social host liability in the provision of alcohol to a minor under the limited circumstances recognized in Cravens. The majority complains that it is ill-suited to weigh the various competing factors that are implicated in determining whether social hosts should avoid civil liability when they facilitate drunk driving by minors. The concerns of the majority are exaggerated. This court has faced other difficult and pressing issues that implicated broad social policy, such as the legality of withdrawing life-saving artificial nutrition and hydration (In re Greenspan (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 1; In re Longeway (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 33), adoption of principles of comparative negligence (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1), and adoption of rules that allow contribution among joint tortfeasors (Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1). In each of these instances, this court confronted the questions raised both forthrightly and directly. Certainly the issues considered in Greenspan, Longeway, Alvis, and Skinner were just as difficult and complicated as those that we are called upon to consider now. In the past, we have not been persuaded by the argument that this court should refrain from taking action because the General Assembly had considered, but rejected, legislation that would have achieved what was accomplished by judicial decision in our rulings. Instead, this court acknowledged and acted upon its mandated responsibility to develop and guide the common law of this State, including common law principles regarding tort liability for damages caused by negligent behavior. (See, e.g, Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 52-55; Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 21-24; see also Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 13-14.) These visionary and ground-breaking decisions would never have been adopted if the court had adhered to the present majority’s inaccurate perception of stare decisis. The majority’s treatment of jurisprudence from other States is equally distorted. Notwithstanding the majority’s protestations to the contrary, there is a clear national trend favoring social host liability for the provision of alcohol to minors subsequently injured in alcohol-related vehicle accidents. (See Appendix to Dissent.) In fact, since Cravens was decided, three more States, Arizona, North Carolina and Washington, have adopted social host liability for the provision of alcohol to a minor. (See also Born v. Mayers (N.D. 1994), 514 N.W.2d 687 (dramshop statute creates private cause of action against social host who provided alcohol to an obviously intoxicated adult).) Thus, as of the date of this writing, 26 states have adopted social host liability for injuries caused by adult social hosts who knowingly permitted teen-age drunk driving. Although the majority makes particular reference to some of the decisions from other States (165 Ill. 2d at 495-97), its references are highly selective and, at times, somewhat misleading. Contrary to the majority’s understanding of the pertinent case law, both Louisiana and Delaware have adopted social host liability. Also, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted social host liability as a judicially created negligence action based upon the provisions of relevant statutory provisions prohibiting the sale or giving of liquor to a minor. In so ruling, the court noted that the "trend in recent decisions of other jurisdictions is to allow causes of action where adults have assisted in furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors” and included a lengthy appendix detailing these decisions. (Martin v. Watts (Ala. 1987), 508 So. 2d 1136, 1141.) The handful of States that have limited recovery to third parties, or have imposed a cap on the amount of recovery, have nonetheless adopted social host liability. The Nevada decision cited by the majority is not pertinent to our present inquiry, since the case involved the question of whether the court should adopt common law liability for the commercial sale of alcohol, and the " 'new trend’ argument” that it rejected did not pertain to social host liability for the noncommercial furnishing of alcohol. (Hinegardner v. Marcor Resorts (1992), 108 Nev. 1091, 1094-95, 844 P.2d 800, 803; see also Pelzek v. American Legion (1990), 236 Neb. 608, 463 N.W.2d 321 (commercial sale of alcohol).) The majority neglects to acknowledge the single thread running through many of the decisions from other States that have recognized social host liability: the overwhelmingly significant social policy of deterring adults from providing alcohol to minors in social settings and then permitting the teenagers to drive a vehicle while intoxicated. I am unpersuaded by the majority’s professed apprehension for the potentially "unlimited” liability of social hosts in comparison to dramshop owners. The majority’s concern fails to appreciate the distinctions between common law negligence liability and liability under the Dramshop Act. "[T]he limited dollar recovery provided in the Act reflects the unique liability created under the Act: a dramshop owner is liable without fault. [Citation.] The defendants’ common law negligence liability, on the other hand, requires proof that the defendant breached a duty to exercise the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances, i.e., proof of fault. [Citation.] In addition, the defendants’ common law negligence liability would not be 'unlimited,’ but would be offset by the percentage attributable to the plaintiff’s comparative fault, if any, and the contribution, if any, of other tortfeasors. [Citation.]” Cravens, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 1079-80. Little sympathy can be extended to adults who, as alleged in the present cases, engaged in criminal conduct by openly fostering and furthering the alcoholic intoxication of teenagers, and who then permitted those young persons to get into automobiles knowing full well that they were inebriated. I believe this court should be more concerned about the injuries and fatalities caused by needless teenage drunk driving, and should be less preoccupied with the exposure to liability of the social host adults who promoted that drunk driving. The majority’s reference to social host’s need for a "license” to serve alcohol is not well founded, since providing alcohol to a minor is a criminal offense in this State for which no one, whether social host or dramshop, would ever be issued a "license.” It is beyond dispute that the General Assembly’s actions thus far to curb underage drunk driving have been considerable and commendable. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s implicit view that Cravens represented judicial interference in the legislature’s duties or powers. Development of the common law is an inherently judicial function. As justices of this State’s supreme court, we are elected to facilitate the evolution of our common law in order to accommodate the changing needs of our citizens. Consequently, recognition of negligence liability, which is and has always been the common, judge-made law of this State, does not interfere with the legislature’s role. Recognition of social host liability for the provision of alcohol to minors who become intoxicated and are then injured in alcohol-related vehicle accidents is not inconsistent with the spirit or policy for the General Assembly’s adoption of the Dramshop Act. "When first enacted, the Illinois dram shop laws were an innovative and progressive approach to dealing with problems arising from the consumption of alcohol. The laws provided for strict liability and called for a liberal construction to ensure the protection of the 'health and welfare of the people of Illinois.’ The dram shop laws initially, in harmony with their purpose, gave a sword to innocent victims by allowing them to overcome the common law prohibition against dram shop actions.” (Comment, Illinois Dram Shop Reform, 28 John Marshall L. Rev. 215, 215-16 (1994).) Recognizing social host liability under the limited circumstances set forth in Cravens is completely consistent with the purposes of dramshop liability. By imposing liability on adults who promote teenage drunk driving, this court would fashion a progressive rule to aid the legislature in its "war on drunk driving” by teenagers. The General Assembly’s recent legislation (see 165 Ill. 2d at 497) to further curb drunk driving is also wholly consistent with Cravens. Surely the legislature’s enactments were not meant to imply that this court should sit idly by and pass off to the legislature any and all decisions regarding the recognition of social host civil liability for provision of alcohol to a minor. There is nothing contradictory in the "war on drunk driving” and the ruling in Cravens. In fact, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) filed an amicus curiae brief in Cravens and asked the appellate court to recognize social host liability. Its arguments included the following: "This lawsuit is the very first in which MADD *** has sought to lend its voice and the voice of its members. While focussing its efforts on the types of programs and outreach efforts which exemplify the national organization, MADD has awaited the response of Illinois’ courts and legislature to the prayers for a remedy directed against those who facilitate illegal under-age drinking. The interest of MADD in this lawsuit is simply to impress upon the Court the need for our judiciary to endorse liability against irresponsible social hosts and enable justice to be done for the innocent victims of callous and careless private citizens. MADD is strongly committed to the position that sound public policy and legal principles support such a remedy.” After reviewing reports regarding the consumption of alcohol by minors, and the increased likelihood that minors will suffer alcohol-related vehicle accidents, MADD argued: "These statistical realities squarely support the causal link between teenage drinking, motor vehicle collisions and injuries. With scores of teenagers and innocent victims being killed in alcohol-related collisions, society requires an avenue of recourse against those contributing to the illegal consumption of liquor. The imposition of liability on those who unlawfully serve liquor to and encourage consumption by teenagers is overwhelmingly justified.” Information cited by MADD established the extent to which adolescents are unable to appreciate the consequences of drinking. This showed that adolescents do not appreciate the effects of alcohol and do not recognize the likelihood that their driving abilities would be impaired if they were to attempt to drive after having become intoxicated. Statistics recently published by the Illinois Secretary of State in conjunction with his "War on Drunk Driving” similarly paint a grim picture of underage drinking in this State. The Secretary of State relates that, according to the National Commission Against Drunk Driving, car accidents are the leading cause of death for minors age 16 to 20 (40,000 Lives: A Decade of Progress 4), and minors are much more likely to be involved in car crashes in their first few years of driving (40,000 Lives: A Decade of Progress 5). More than a third of teen-age drivers who were killed in car accidents in 1992 had a blood alcohol level of at least .10 percent. 40,000 Lives: A Decade of Progress 5. It is a sad commentary that the citizens of this State must suffer the staggering consequences of the majority’s refusal to take a firm stand against social hosts who allow minors to get drunk and then drive a car. Under the majority’s holding, adults are free to serve alcohol to minors until the youths are intoxicated, and nevertheless permit the minors to then drive a vehicle in spite of their inebriation. In so ruling, the majority holds that such adults are wholly shielded and immune from any civil penalty for their actions. In my view, this result is an injustice and an outrage. It completely forsakes victims of teenage drunk driving and affords them no civil remedy whatsoever under the law from the adult social host who provided the alcohol and fostered the minor’s intoxication. In addition, the majority’s decision imposes on taxpayers the unwarranted and tremendous tax burden of covering much of the costs associated with injuries and deaths caused by teenage drunk driving. (See Secretary of State, 1993 DUI Fact Book, at II (stating that according to national estimates, alcohol-related crashes cost taxpayers millions of dollars in tax monies).) The clear and manifest injustice perpetuated by the majority’s disposition is entirely unnecessary, since there is no sound legal justification for the majority’s refusal to apply time-honored principles of common law negligence in the cases presently before us. In view of the majority’s decision, legislative action becomes all the more critical. Until more is done, adults who host parties where minors are allowed to become inebriated and then drive a vehicle will have less incentive to change their ways and "just say no” to teenage drunk driving. Adult social hosts must realize that there are legal ramifications, both civil and criminal, to allowing teenage drunk driving. Unless that lesson is taught and learned, we all will suffer the ugly and tragic consequences, whether physical, emotional, social, and economic, that are inflicted when minors are permitted to drink and drive. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent. APPENDIX TO DISSENT Alabama Martin v. Watts (Ala. 1987), 508 So. 2d 1136 Arizona Estate of Hernandez v. Arizona Board of Regents (Ariz. 1994), 866 P.2d 1330 Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12 — 47—128.5 (1994) Connecticut Ely v. Murphy (1988), 207 Conn. 88, 540 A.2d 54 Delaware DiOssi v. Maroney (Del. 1988), 548 A.2d 1361 Georgia Sutter v. Hutchings (1985), 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716; Ga. Code Ann. § 51 — 1—40 (1994) Idaho Slade v. Smith’s Management Corp. (1991), 119 Idaho 482, 808 P.2d 401; Alegria v. Payonk (1980), 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135; Idaho Code § 23 — 808 (Supp. 1994) Indiana Brattain v. Herron (1974), 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 Iowa Bauer v. Dann (Iowa 1988), 428 N.W.2d 658 Louisiana Gresham v. Davenport (La. 1989), 537 So. 2d 1144 Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 28-A, § 2501 et seq. (West 1994) Massachusetts McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1986), 398 Mass. 152, 496 N.E.2d 141 Michigan Longstreth v. Gensel (1985), 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 340A.801 (1994), abrogating Holmquist v. Miller (Minn. 1985), 367 N.W.2d 468 Montana Nehring v. LaCounte (1986), 219 Mont. 462, 712 P.2d 1329; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 16 — 6—305, 27 — 1—710 (1994) New Jersey Batten v. Bobo (1986), 218 N.J. Super. 589, 528 A.2d 572 New Mexico Walker v. Key (App. 1984), 101 N.M. 631, 686 P.2d 973; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41 — 11—1 (Michie 1994) New York Montgomery v. Orr (1986), 130 Misc. 2d 807, 498 N.Y.S.2d 968; N.Y. General Obligations Law § 11 — 100 et seq. (McKinney 1989) North Carolina Hart v. Ivey (1992), 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 Ohio Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798 Oregon Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity (1971), 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18; Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.950 (1994) Pennsylvania Congini v. Portersville Valve Co. (1983), 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 Utah Utah Code Ann. § 32A — 14—101 (1994) Vermont Langle v. Kurkel (1986), 146 Vt. 513, 510 A.2d 1301; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 501 (1994) Washington Hansen v. Friend (1992), 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 Wisconsin Koback v. Crook (1985), 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857