Court Opinion

ID: 9846635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:34.117008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:40.909691
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge,
dissenting.
A fair trial before an unbiásed, impartial decision-maker is a basic requirement of due process. As was the case in Hearne v. Sherman, the instant case presents the due process problem of a final administrative determination in which the decision-maker ultimately adjudicated contested issues of fact regarding her own credibility and whether her own decision was discriminatory. As I did in Heame, I continue to find that such a process flagrantly violates due process notions of fairness and impartiality, and on that basis I would reverse the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Our Courts have long recognized the importance of a fair proceeding as a cornerstone of fundamental justice. See In re *252Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946 (1955) (noting that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process”); Crump v. Bd. of Education, 326 N.C. 603, 613, 392 S.E.2d 579, 584 (1990) (same). A vital component of a fair trial is the integrity of the procedure used to obtain a result. “Procedure must be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice.” State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 266, 45 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1947). A crucial component in insuring that a proceeding is just and in accordance with principles of fundamental fairness is the impartiality of the decision-maker. “An unbiased, impartial decision-maker is essential to due process.” Crump, 326 N.C. at 615, 392 S.E.2d at 585.
There is an inevitable bias when a fact-finder is evaluating her own credibility.
While the word “bias” has many connotations in general usage, the word has few specific denotations in legal terminology. Bias has been defined as “a predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction,” Black’s Law Dictionary 147 (5th ed. 1979) .... Bias can refer to preconceptions about facts, policy or law; a person, group or object; or a personal interest in the outcome of some determination.
Id. (citations omitted). It is fundamental that no person may sit in judgment over his or her own case. “[0]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 99 L. Ed. at 946.
In the present case, Petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing alleging that Osborne’s decision not to promote her was based upon Petitioner’s “race, her color, and her gender.” Petitioner filed an affidavit of personal bias regarding Osborne, requesting that she be disqualified from the case. Petitioner also filed a motion to examine Osborne for personal bias before Osborne rendered the final agency decision. In her affidavit, Petitioner stated, inter alia, that Osborne had “always shown hostility toward” her, that she harbored racially discriminatory attitudes toward Petitioner, and that Osborne had given Petitioner lower evaluations because of her bias and because of media coverage of the case. In the final agency decision, Osborne rejected Petitioner’s affidavit as “obvious, apparent, and self-serving” and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of *253law determining that Petitioner failed to show that Osborne discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race or gender or for retaliatory reasons. In doing so, Osborne was the ultimate fact-finder in a case in which her own credibility was a central issue. As such, the proceeding violated fundamental fairness and thereby North Carolina’s Constitution.
This case is distinguishable from those cases where an administrative decision-maker is merely familiar with the facts of a matter. “Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not . . . disqualify a decision-maker.” Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Asso., 426 U.S. 482, 493, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9 (1976). Our Supreme Court has provided guidance on distinguishing between the permissible and impermissible:
“It is perfectly clear that the exercise of its duties by an administrative body must necessarily proceed in a different fashion from the orthodox method of administering justice in courts. . . .
Nevertheless, if the administration of public affairs by administrative tribunals is to find its place within the present framework of our government it is essential that it proceed, on what may be termed its judicial side, without too violent a departure from what many generations of English-speaking people have come to regard as essential to fair play. One of these essentials is the resolution of contested questions by an impartial and disinterested tribunal.”
Crump, 326 N.C. at 619, 392 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting Berkshire Employees Ass’n, Etc. v. National Labor R. Bd., 121 F.2d 235, 238-39 (3d Cir. 1941)) (emphasis added).
Here, the ultimate decision-maker adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding her own credibility and her own decision not to promote Petitioner. Such a process violates our established standards of fairness, impartiality and integrity. I would find Petitioner’s due process rights to have been violated, and on that ground I would reverse the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, I dissent. As noted by the majority, the decision in Hearne stands without precedential value. Our Supreme Court is now afforded the opportunity to provide further guidance on this troubling issue.