Court Opinion

ID: 9883969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:28:46.025782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:33.978748
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent, as two provisions of this insurance policy exclude the property damage to the Krajewskis’ land from coverage. I would reverse the court of appeals and hold that Milwaukee is not obligated to defend or indemnify Thommes for the damage to the Krajewskis’ property-
First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that insurance policy exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6) are ambiguous. On the contrary, the plain meaning of the provisions clearly provide for an exclusion from coverage. Provision 2j(5) provides that the insurance does not apply to “ ‘[property damage’ to * * * [tjhat particular part of real property on which you * * * are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations.” The plain meaning is nothing more or less than what the words say — here the exclusion applies because Thommes was “performing operations” on the Krajewskis’ property by clearing and grubbing their land, and damage to the Krajewskis’ trees, shrubs, and grass falls squarely within the reference to “property damage.” The ambiguity found by the majority regarding whether the exclusion applies to property owned by third parties comes not from the language of the exclusion, but rather from the majority’s conception of the underlying purpose of CGL insurance — that is, to cover the risk that a contractor’s work will cause bodily injury or property damage to other property, giving rise to tort Lability. In so doing the majority limits the definition of “real property on which you * * ⅜ are performing operations” to property Thommes was supposed to be working on under the clearing subcontract with Richard Knutson, Inc. This is a distortion of the policy language and does not support a conclusion of ambiguity that justifies ignoring the 2j(5) exclusion.
Likewise provision 2j(6) is unambiguous and clearly excludes Thommes’s claim for coverage. Provision 2j(6) provides that coverage does not apply to “ ‘[pjroperty damage’ to * ⅜ ⅜ [tjhat particular part of *885any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.” The policy’s definition of “your work” includes “[w]ork or operations performed by you or on your behalf’ — there is no contention that Thom-mes did not do the work. As in Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229 (Minn.1986), and Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn.1982), the insurance policy does not provide coverage for claims for work incorrectly performed — and what could be more incorrect than performing the work on the wrong property? The exclusion applies to property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property” that is damaged, and by no stretch of the exclusion terms can it be limited to property that Thommes was hired to clear and grub as it contends, nor can reference to “your work” be limited to the work called for by the terms of the contract. The plain meaning of the exclusion- — -that it bars coverage for damage resulting from work performed incorrectly — should be given effect.
Finally, the result seems absurd and inconsistent with our long-standing principle that we construe contracts to avoid absurd or unjust results, where reasonably possible. See Mead v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 198 Minn. 476, 478, 270 N.W. 563, 565 (1936). That Thommes should have liability coverage for damages that he inflicted as a trespasser but not have coverage for claims based on work done on the land specified in the clearing contract defies comprehension.
I would reverse the court of appeals.