Court Opinion

ID: 9582916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:47.024815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:45.108143
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Judge.
We find no merit in the assignments of error relating to trial and verdict. The sole assignment of error which merits discussion concerns the sentencing procedure.
*39After verdict the State called as a witness a deputy sheriff. He testified, over defendant’s objection, that he had developed a reliable, confidential informant, who had told the witness that he had purchased marijuana from defendant on numerous occasions, and that defendant “was doing between $500 and $1,000 worth of grass a week.” Defense counsel and the District Attorney made statements to the court. Thereupon, the trial court found that defendant (under 21 years of age) would not benefit from sentencing as a committed youthful offender under G.S. 148-49.4. The court then imposed two consecutive five-year prison terms.
The record on appeal does not disclose that defendant had any record of prior convictions nor does the record disclose that any other evidence or information was offered and considered by the court in aggravation of punishment.
The importance of sentencing, both to the defendant and the State, demands that the trial judge have adequate information as the basis for a proper sentence. Under G.S. 15-198 the trial court may require a probation officer to make a presentence investigation and report, which should be received and disclosed in open court. See G.S. 15A-1332, a part of the Trial State and Appellate Procedure Act of 1977 (Criminal Code Commission), effective 1 July 1978; State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E. 2d 126 (1962). In sentencing, the trial court is not confined to the evidence relating to the offense charged. It may inquire into such matters as age, character, education, environment, habits, mentality, propensities, and record of the person about to be sentenced. State v. Cooper, 238 N.C. 241, 77 S.E. 2d 695 (1953). And the court may inquire into alleged acts of misconduct in prison. State v. Thompson, 267 N.C. 653, 148 S.E. 2d 613 (1966).
Different evidentiary rules govern trial and sentencing procedures. See G.S. 15A-1334, Act of 1977, supra; State v. Pope, supra; State v. Dawson, 23 N.C. App. 712, 209 S.E. 2d 503 (1974). It would be unreasonable to require that all information in a presentence, report be free of hearsay. Nor should the formal rules of evidence apply to the testimony of witnesses in a sentencing hearing. But the sentencing hearing must be fair and just, and the trial court must provide the defendant with full opportunity to controvert hearsay and other representations in aggravation of punishment.
In State v. Pope, supra, at page 335, we find a statement often quoted in other decisions: “Unsolicited whispered representations and rank hearsay are to be disregarded.” We shy from attempting to define the term “rank hearsay.” But in the case before us it ap*40pears from the record on appeal that defendant was under 21 years of age and that no record of prior convictions was offered by the State. The only evidence in aggravation of punishment was the testimony of a law officer that an unidentified but reliable informant told him that defendant “was doing between $500 and $1,000 worth of grass a week.” Whereupon, the trial court found that defendant would not benefit from sentencing as a youthful offender under G.S. 148-49.4, and the court then imposed maximum consecutive prison sentences of five years on each of the two counts. Since the informant, referred to by the law officer witness as the one who informed him that defendant was dealing in drugs, was not identified, the defendant not only had no opportunity to confront the witness but had as well no effective way of contradicting the damaging and prejudicial information. Further, this prejudicial hearsay information was the only evidence in aggravation of punishment which, according to the record on appeal, was presented to and apparently considered by the trial court in imposing punishment.
The State contends that hearsay evidence is not ground for disturbing the sentence in the absence of prejudice, relying on State v. Perry, 265 N.C. 517, 144 S.E. 2d 591 (1965). In Perry, the defendant, charged with two counts of burglary, entered pleas of guilty to breaking or entering rooms in a girls’ dormitory. At sentencing hearing the investigating officer testified as to statements made to him by the occupants of the dormitory. Parker, J. (later Chief Justice), for the Court, wrote: “While the procedure in the instant case of the court’s hearing testimony of officers as to what witnesses said instead of having the witnesses present in court to testify is not approved, under the facts of this case it cannot be said that the hearing of such testimony by the judge before sentencing the defendant was prejudicial to the defendant, or that it manifested inherent unfairness or injustice, or that it was conduct which offended the public sense of fair play.” 265 N.C. at 520-521.
It is noted that in Perry, supra, the hearsay evidence in the sentencing hearing related to circumstances of the offenses to which defendant pled guilty, and the defendant, who was present with counsel, had full opportunity to offer any evidence in mitigation of the offenses. Sub judice, the hearsay evidence offered by the State, over the objection of defendant, related not to the offenses of which the jury found him guilty blit to information in aggravation of punishment other than the offense charged. Too, the defendant in Perry pled guilty, and in so doing “ ‘waives the right to trial and the *41incidents thereof.’ ” Perry, supra, at page 520, citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 495, p. 484.
A trial judge should not be unduly limited in sentencing by restrictive procedure. Nor should he be required to justify the sentence imposed by designating the basis for his punishment. He must be allowed to exercise wide discretion in determining appropriate punishment for the protection of society and rehabilitation of defendant. 4 Strong, N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law, § 138. But the trial judge should not base his sentence solely (except for the circumstances of the offense) on “unsolicited whispered representations” or “rank hearsay.”
We find no error in the verdict, but the judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.
Vacated and remanded.
Judge PARKER concurs.
Judge MORRIS concurs as to verdict and dissents as to sentencing.