Court Opinion

ID: 9675254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:47:04.365978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:32.803408
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
HARWOOD, Presiding Judge.
In Snellings v. Jones, 33 Ala.App. 301, 33 So.2d 371, 372, we wrote:
“In the hurry of perfecting an appeal it is the usual practice of lawyers to assign as error all matters that might be even faintly meritorious. Upon further study while preparing his brief he may conclude that, in his anxiety to fully cover all possible errors in his assignments, he has included some that are untenable. These he is free to abandon simply by not carrying them forward in his brief and argument, for as a corollary to the rule that errors not assigned will not be considered on appeal is the proposition that assignments not specified in the brief are considered as abandoned.”
In his application for rehearing counsel for appellant complains of our inadequate statement of facts, and also contends that we erred in our conclusions of law in several instances.
Upon further study we are satisfied as to our conclusions of law as set forth, and adhere to them.
As to the facts set forth, in our opinion, we set forth sufficient facts to afford a fair review of the points raised when read in connection with the errors specified in the brief, and the argument made in relation to such specifications.
While we refer to errors specified in the brief, there actually is no formal specifications of error therein. Counsel for appellant does however, in his argument, refer to certain assignments of error, either in the course of his argument, or at the conclusion thereof. These we have treated as errors specified.
In our opinion we wrote to every assignment of error mentioned in the argument, these being assignments of error 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, and 13.
Assignments of error 1, 2, 3, and 4 relate to alleged errors in rulings on pleadings.
Assignment of error 12 alleges error in the action of the court in permitting the plaintiff to testify, over defendant’s objection, that the reasonable rental value of the damaged house was “$35.00 per month; per side.”
The facts material to a discussion of this assignment were in our opinion amply set forth.
*668As to assignment of error 13, the entire argument of appellant in connection with this assignment is as follows:
“After the plaintiff rested his case, and after the trial court ruled out count three of the complaint, this appellant moved the court to exclude all the evidence (record, bottom of page 99 and top of page 100).
“We think that Jones v. Kirkpatrick Sand & Cement Company, cited under our proposition IV, is direct authority for the proposition that the trial court’s ruling in this instance is reversible error. We have undertaken to raise this question by our assignment of error numbered 13 which, we insist, is well made.
“It will be noted that in count one the only damages claimed are (1) ‘ * * * damaging the roof of plaintiff’s house in the amount of $300.00”; and (2) “Thereby the plaintiff has lost 21 month’s rent and is further damaged by the defendant in the amount of $2100.00. Plaintiff hereby claims as a proximate consequence of defendant’s actions herein defendant has damaged him $2400.00 by ruining his roof and depriving him of his rents as herein stated, hence this suit to recover such amounts.’
“It will be further noted that in count two the only damage claimed is ‘hence the plaintiff claims the amount specified in count one as damages against the defendant.’
“It will be remembered that the house which is the subject of this suit was an out house or storage house consisting of two rooms and which was situated on plaintiff’s homestead lot, along with plaintiff’s homestead house, when plaintiff bought the property in 1947. That in 1949 plaintiff got the ‘do-it-yourself’ urge, and he and his father-in-law moved the little house to the back of plaintiff’s homestead lot, added rooms to it and put a roof on it. When plaintiff and his father-in-law finished with their ‘do-it-yourself’ project it was unfit for habitation. Then plaintiff in 1952 contracted with defendant, which contract is the subject of this suit.
“At no time had the house ever been rented to a tenant. Patently, prospective rents, as an element of damages, are too remote and too speculative to be allowed in this case, whether counts one and two be construed as in contract or in tort. See authorities under our proposition numbered V. Nevertheless, the only damage claimed in count one and in count two, exclusive of the prospective rents, is damage to the roof of the house in the sum of $300.00. But the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff for $600.00 and, necessarily, the trial court awarded some damages to the plaintiff on account of loss of prospective rents. This is error to reverse.”
A reading of our opinion we think discloses that all of the facts relevant to the argument were set forth substantially as. set forth by counsel in his brief.
This being a civil case we have of course confined our review to the errors specified and argued in appellant’s brief.
Application overruled.