Court Opinion

ID: 9588652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:37.44044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:39.611958
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge.
Appellant, Father Richard McDonnell, was selected by the Episcopal Diocese of Georgia to serve as minister for two of its mission churches. After he had served for about one-and-a-half years, he was *175terminated from that capacity by the diocese against his wishes. He sued to recover damages for breach of an alleged employment contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the diocese and denied partial summary judgment to appellant on the issue of the existence of such a contract.
When Father McDonnell accepted the call, the diocese furnished him with a copy of a manual of directives entitled “Diocesan Policies and Practices and Liturgical Customary.” He asserts that a binding 3-year contract was created by the following language contained in this document: “DIOCESAN MISSION CLERGY. When a clergyman accepts the Diocesan’s call to fill a mission cure in the Diocese, such acceptance constitutes an implied agreement that his tenure will be for a minimum of three years. Resignation prior to three years, unless such termination is by mutual agreement by the Bishop and the clergyman, constitutes a breach of contract.”
A provision of the manual dealt with involuntary termination: “INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION. It is recognized that, from time to time, a pastoral situation may occur which might necessitate a priest’s removal from his cure. The Diocesan Council has urged the Diocesan to offer such a clergyman a reasonable period of transition, during which he may be relieved of all pastoral responsibilities.”
Father McDonnell asserts that, pursuant to the manual, his termination from this position prior to the expiration of three years was effected without “such cause as would necessitate a priest’s removal from his cure under the policies, practices and, or customs of [the Diocese].”
We hold that summary judgment was mandated, but for a very different reason than stated in the appealed judgment. The trial court was prohibited by the First Amendment, applicable to the courts of Georgia by the Fourteenth Amendment, from exercising judicial authority in this dispute. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696 (96 SC 2372, 49 LE2d 151) (1976); Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987); Monahan v. Sims, 163 Ga. App. 354, 359 (2) (294 SE2d 548) (1982).
Neither the defendant nor the court raised this issue below, and it did not arise until oral argument in this court, after which the parties filed supplemental briefs to discuss it. Even though it was not raised in defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court must sua sponte ascertain whether it has jurisdiction, when it appears that it may not. OCGA § 9-12-16; Southeastern Underwriters Assn. v. Cravey, 216 Ga. 599, 600 (118 SE2d 471) (1961); Baggett Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68 (132 SE2d 229) (1963). The same threshold inquiry must be made by ours. Barland Co. v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 172 Ga. App. 61, 62 (322 SE2d 316) *176(1984). The civil court cannot take jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical issue even if the parties present it for resolution, because the First Amendment prohibits such action by the civil judicial system.
The entanglement of civil authority into ecclesiastical affairs which is prohibited by our fundamental law and which was one of the promptings of the creation of this nation is evident in this lawsuit. A priest sues his church, bringing to a civil court a dispute over his termination as vicar of one mission church and priest-in-charge of another. He seeks monetary damages representing lost wages, consequential damages, interest and costs, claiming breach of an alleged civilly enforceable contract governing his call.
Father McDonnell submits that the contract was formed by his acceptance of the call, which acceptance was based on a provision in a manual. He urges that his termination before the expiration of three years was not in conformity with the manual’s provision for involuntary termination. He contends that, in the words of the manual, his circumstances could not be described as “a pastoral situation . . . which might necessitate a priest’s removal from his cure.”1
Thus Father McDonnell places before the civil court, and seeks to place before a jury, the question of whether the bishop, as head of the church in Georgia, was legally justified in removing him from this cure.
The trial court, and this court, have become embroiled in a controversy over whether the words of the manual constitute a legally enforceable contract. Resolution is sought by the application of principles fashioned for nonecclesiastical employer-employee relationships and for the construction of contracts generally. To do this it is necessary to enter the fray even deeper by determining whether in the church’s polity the manual’s language conflicts with the provisions of the canons and, if so, whether the canons govern.
As shown by the foreword to the manual, it was written by the bishop and the diocesan administrator and is described as a collection of “diocesan directives” and as “policies.” The administrator rather than the bishop prepared the sections heretofore quoted. Canon 6 Section 2 provides that: “The Missions of the Diocese shall be under the supervision and control of the Bishop. He shall appoint all Mission clergy and may, at his discretion, suspend or remove them.” The bishop is elected by the church’s Convention, which according to the church’s constitution, is to be convened annually. He is the ordinary of the diocese (Canon 0) and serves as president of the Council, which is directed to “carry out the policies, programs and directives of Con*177vention; . . . .” (Canon 15 Section 1.)
The case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, involved the church’s removal of the bishop, as well as his ultimate defrocking, and the reorganization of the diocese into three dioceses. The Supreme Court held that the Illinois state courts contravened the First and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in improper inquiries into ecclesiastical matters, a prohibited zone even though some property questions were involved. That decision, and those upon which it is built, constitute the firm foundation upon which the unavoidable conclusion must be reached in this case, which is that it involves a religious dispute the resolution of which does not belong in the civil tribunal.
For the court to decide whether a binding civil contract was intended; for the court to construe the meaning of that contract if there is one, or leave to a jury its construction if ambiguity raises questions of fact; for the court or jury to determine whether canons or manual directives control; and most clearly, for a jury to decide whether “a pastoral situation” occurred which warranted removal of the missions’ spiritual leader; all of these incursions into religious controversy constitute a large leap beyond the constitutional boundary. Inextricably entangled is whether the priest’s performance of his duties as a priest met the requirements of his church as measured by ecclesiastical concerns.
The Supreme Court in Serbian Orthodox Diocese crystallized the constitutional mandate “that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” 426 U. S. 713. What is involved here falls within that territory, which must remain foreign to civil tribunals.
The application of the Supreme Court’s established principles by the lower federal court in Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, supra, and by this court in Monahan v. Sims, supra, show the way which must be trod by this court in reversing the trial court in this case. As quoted by this court in Monahan from Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 116 (73 SC 143, 97 LE 120) (1952): “Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.” As demonstrated by.Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the removal of the clergy is also an ecclesiastical matter even when property is involved.
The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to the defendant church and denying summary judgment to the plaintiff priest, but for the reason that it did not have jurisdiction. A judgment *178right for any reason is to be affirmed. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536, 539 (307 SE2d 914) (1983).

Judgment affirmed.

Carley, C. J., Birdsong and Benham, JJ., . concur. McMurray, P. J., concurs in the judgment only. Deen, P. J., Banke, P. J., Sognier and Pope, JJ., dissent.

 “Spiritual charge; care of souls; the office of a parish priest or of a curate; hence, that which is committed to the charge of a parish priest or of a curate; a curacy.” Webster’s New Intl. Dictionary, 2nd ed., Unabridged.