Court Opinion

ID: 9931007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 01:01:47.738492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:25.335002
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. L.P. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re L.P. et al., Persons Coming                              B324736
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________                                 (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02180A, B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
         v.
BILL E.,
         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from findings and order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Linda Sun, Judge. Affirmed.

      Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               _______________________
                       INTRODUCTION
      The juvenile court found that Bill E. (Father) committed
sexual abuse on his step-daughter L.P. Father does not challenge
these findings as to his step-daughter; he appeals from the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings only as to his minor son,
L.E. Father argues the juvenile court erred in exercising
dependency jurisdiction over L.E. because he was not at risk of
sexual abuse or other harm by the time the jurisdictional hearing
was held. Conversely, the Los Angeles Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) contends Father forfeited his
challenge to jurisdiction when he asked the court to sustain the
sexual abuse count and dismiss a second count alleging alcohol
abuse. DCFS also contends Father’s appeal is moot because the
juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction and issued a custody
order granting physical custody of L.E. to his mother, legal
custody of L.E. to both parents, and unsupervised visitation of
L.E. to Father.
      We affirm on the merits.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Before the petition was filed, L.E. (born May 2013) lived
with Father, his mother, and his half-sister L.P. (born June
2008). In April 2022, L.E. came to the attention of the DCFS
after L.P. disclosed that six months earlier in September 2021,
Father, while drunk, had inappropriately touched her. Both
children were detained from Father on June 1, 2022.
      On June 6, 2022, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 300. The petition alleged that in

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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September 2021, Father sexually abused L.P. by laying on a
futon with her, rubbing her stomach, fondling her thigh and
breasts and sliding his hand down her shorts/underwear, and
touching the top of her vagina. L.P disclosed the abuse to her
mother who allowed Father to continue to live in the home and
have access to L.P, placing L.P. as well as L.E. at risk of serious
physical harm. The petition also alleged Father’s history of and
current abuse of alcohol rendered him incapable of providing
regular care to both children and that mother failed to protect
them notwithstanding her knowledge of Father’s alcohol abuse.
       Father was interviewed on May 21, 2022 and stated, “I
don’t know” what happened. He said he had no recollection of
what occurred that weekend night and the only thing he does
remember is having a hangover. He was first made aware of the
situation when L.P. told mother on Monday. He tried going to
AA meetings but said he was “ashamed. How can I confess what
I almost did to my own daughter? I’m so embarrassed. I’m
crying. I don’t cry ever ask [L.P.’s Mother].”
       On June 20, 2022, the juvenile court ordered L.E. detained
from Father and released him to his mother. Father was granted
monitored visitation with his son and ordered to have no contact
with L.P. On July 22, 2022, Father was charged with three
criminal misdemeanors (annoying a child under the age of 18,
sexual battery, and attempted sexual battery) based on his
conduct in September 2021.
       On October 11, 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated the
petition against both parents and, as to L.E., found him at risk of
sexual abuse under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), (d), and (j).
The court found L.P. very credible. Father argued that because
there was no actual penetration, there was no sexual gratification

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and therefore no sexual abuse. In response the court stated,
“Even though there is no penetration, it’s not accidental touching
at all. The father started touching her stomach and touched her
boobs and in a rubbing motion. And when she pushed his hands
away, he went under to try and touch her vagina. And when she
stood up to go to the bathroom, the father asked her to return. If
that is not sexual gratification, I don’t know what it is. And the
father himself also admitted that he is ashamed. He admitted
that he is ashamed and embarrassed, and he cried during his AA
meetings.”
       The juvenile court also found “father’s abhorrent sexual
behavior would jeopardize a male child as well.” The court
dismissed the count alleging Father’s chronic alcohol abuse “for
lack of future risk. But that is not to say that the father was not
struggling with sobriety. It is just that he has taken care of it
now, and he had been actively addressing his alcohol issue since
the incident.”
       Both children were declared dependents of the court. L.E.
was placed with his mother and removed from Father, who was
ordered to participate in weekly random drug testing, a parenting
course, sexual abuse awareness counseling for perpetrators, and
individual counseling. Father timely appealed.
        Six months later, the court terminated jurisdiction as to
L.E. and issued a custody order granting sole physical custody of
L.E. to his mother, joint legal custody of L.E. to both parents, and
unsupervised visitation with L.E. to Father.2

2      We grant Father’s request to take judicial notice of the
orders terminating jurisdiction and determining custody. We
exercise our discretion to adjudicate the appeal on the merits.
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 285–287.)

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                         DISCUSSION
   Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Assertion of
   Dependency Jurisdiction.
      Father argues that by the time of the jurisdictional
hearing, he had stopped drinking and begun attending Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings. Therefore, L.E. was not at risk of physical
harm because his sexual acts with L.P. were the result of his own
alcohol abuse. He also argues that his sexual acts were too
insignificant to support a finding of risk to L.E. and that L.E., a
male child, was not at risk of sexual abuse because his abused
sibling, L.P., was female.
      1.    Standard of Review
       A jurisdictional finding that the minor is a person described
in section 300 must be made by at least a preponderance of the
evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993)
5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires
DCFS to demonstrate the following three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful conduct, failure, or
inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical
harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness. (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.) The
relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether
circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing “ ‘subject
the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (In re T.V. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.)
       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting jurisdictional findings and related dispositional
orders, we “consider the entire record to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.” (In
re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133; accord, In re I.J. (2013)

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56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “Substantial evidence is evidence that is
‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable
trier of fact could make such findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.)
       In making our determination, we “ ‘ “do not reweigh the
evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of
the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; see In
re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) We uphold the
juvenile court’s findings unless they are “ ‘ “so lacking in
evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable.” ’ ”
(Jamieson v. City Council of the City of Carpinteria (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 755, 763.) “The parent has the burden on appeal
of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s order.” (In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 138.)
      2.    Applicable Law
       Section 300, subdivision (b) authorizes a juvenile court to
exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child if the “child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” the “failure or
inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child” or the “willful or negligent failure” of the parent
“to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of
the custodian with whom the child has been left” or by the
“willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.”
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) “The court need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the
steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843; see In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th

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at p. 133 [the “focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the
child”].)
      3.    Analysis
       We review the trial court’s finding of a risk of detriment
under the substantial evidence standard of review. (Angela S. v.
Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)
       Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding of a substantial risk of
detriment to L.E. is supported by substantial evidence.
       The jurisdictional hearing occurred six months after the
sexual touching of L.P. by Father. During those six months,
Father moved out of the family home and stopped drinking. He
also began attending AA meetings.
       Nevertheless, these positive acts by Father do not overcome
other factors supporting the juvenile court’s finding of substantial
risk of detriment to the children. First, there is no evidence in
the record that drinking was the sole cause of Father’s aberrant
behavior. While he and Mother contended as much before the
juvenile court, at the time of the jurisdictional hearing it was still
an open question why Father had admittedly chosen to sexually
touch L.P. Consequently, without an answer to that question,
substantial evidence supported the finding that both children
were at substantial risk of physical and emotional harm.
       Second, at the jurisdictional hearing, Father did not argue
that the sexual acts did not happen; indeed, he had admitted
them when interviewed by DCFS. He submitted on the sexual
touching allegations (other than to point out that no penetration
occurred) and instead asked the court to dismiss the remaining
allegation that he had an alcohol problem that put the children in
harm’s way. He told the court he had stopped drinking after the

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incident. As stated above, that he stopped drinking did not solve
the conundrum of why the uncontested sexual acts happened in
the first place and whether L.E. would be subject to similar acts
in the future as well.
       Father also argued that because L.P. left the futon for the
protection of her brother’s bedroom before acts of penetration
could occur, the abuse was not significant enough to warrant a
finding of risk of physical harm to L.E. We disagree. That
penetration did not occur does not negate or undermine the risk
created to both children by the uncontested sexual acts
committed on L.P. by Father. Sexual assault is defined in Penal
Code section 11165.1 as “intentional touching of the genitals or
intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner
thighs, and buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a child . .
for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification . . . .” (Pen. Code,
§11165.1, subd. (4).) The juvenile court’s findings that Father
acted for the purpose of sexual gratification were strongly
supported by the fact that Father continued to physically molest
L.P. despite her pushing him away several times. Then he asked
her to return to the futon when she told him she had to get up to
use the bathroom. Father’s touching of L.P. fully supported the
juvenile court’s findings and exercise of jurisdiction. And, as
explained below, the juvenile court’s findings properly supported
the exercise of jurisdiction over L.E. as well.
       That L.E. is a male does not negate the risk posed to him
by his father’s unexplained and prolonged acts against L.P.
Sexual abuse of a child by a parent places the victim’s male and
female siblings who remain in the home at risk of similar
aberrant sexual behavior. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at
pp. 779–780; In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 517; In re

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Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 90–91; In re P.A. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347.) Father’s behavior toward L.P. in
the family home is a “ ‘betrayal of the appropriate relationship
between the generations’ ” and an abandonment and violation of
the parental role. (In re I.J., at p. 778.)
                          DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court’s jurisdictional order is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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