Court Opinion

ID: 9914936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 19:01:02.990903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:27.173916
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50951    Document: 00517019362       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/03/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                             _____________                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                               No. 22-50951                               FILED
                             _____________                          January 3, 2024
                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                              Clerk

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                    versus

   Jose Guadalupe Diaz Diaz,

                                                     Defendant—Appellant,

                          consolidated with
                            _____________

                               No. 22-50956
                             _____________

   United States of America,

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                    versus

   Martin Perez Marrufo,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                         USDC Nos. 3:10-CR-2213-8,
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                               3:10-CR-2213-9
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
           This appeal arises out of the convictions of two Barrio Azteca sicarios,
   Jose Guadalupe Diaz-Diaz (“Diaz”) and Martin Perez-Marrufo (“Perez-
   Marrufo”), 1 for their involvement in the murders of three people in Ciudad
   Juarez, Mexico in 2011. While Diaz and Perez-Marrufo separately appealed
   parts of their convictions and sentences, a key issue for both appellants is
   whether sufficient evidence existed to support their 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1)
   convictions for conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country. The
   appeals were consolidated to jointly address this issue. In addition to the
   conspiracy conviction, Diaz challenges his aiding-and-abetting convictions
   and his three consecutive life sentences for his convictions under 18 U.S.C.
   § 924(c) and (j). Perez-Marrufo also challenges an obstruction of justice
   enhancement imposed at sentencing. For the following reasons, we
   AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND in part.
           I. Factual and Procedural Background
           Diaz and Perez-Marrufo were two of the total thirty-five defendants
   charged in the Western District of Texas in 2011 for the Consulate Murders,
   so called because one of the victims, Leslie Ann Enriquez Catton
   (“Enriquez”), was a U.S. Consulate employee. The other two victims were
   Enriquez’s husband, Arthur Redelfs (“Redelfs”), and Jorge Alberto Salcido
   Ciniceros (“Salcido”), husband to another U.S. Consulate employee, Hilda
   Antillon. The third superseding indictment contained twelve counts,
   including charges under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) for conspiracy to kill persons
           _____________________
           1
            Note that the parties refer to each defendant using different variations of their
   names. Many of the gang members are also referred to by various nicknames: Diaz is known
   as “Zorro” and Perez-Marrufo is known as “Popeye.”

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   in a foreign country and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j) for murder resulting
   from the use of a firearm in relation to crimes of violence and drug trafficking.
   At the end of an eleven-day trial, the jury convicted Diaz and Perez-Marrufo
   on all counts.
          To fully understand the defendants’ convictions, it is helpful to have
   a better understanding of Barrio Azteca, the paramilitary gang to which both
   defendants belong. Barrio Azteca was formed in 1986 by Texas prisoners “to
   unite inmates that were native to the El Paso, Texas, and West Texas area.”
   Although still headquartered in the Coffield Unit (a Texas prison), the gang
   is highly active in Juarez, Mexico, and operates on both sides of the border.
   The cross-border relationship is important to the gang’s operations, as the
   gang members are required to “see each other as brothers” and “help each
   other” in prison. To aid this relationship, Barrio Azteca relies heavily on a
   vast communication system, involving letters, telephone calls, and prison
   visits. To Barrio Azteca, “communication is essential” and “nothing will be
   accomplished without communication.” To that end, the gang often uses
   coded language and complex combinations of various languages and dialects
   in an attempt to mask their illegal activities.
          Diaz and Perez-Marrufo are known as Azteca “sicarios” or hitmen,
   who lead hit teams for the gang. Barrio Azteca has a rigid hierarchy with set
   leadership ranks including the Capo Mayor, lieutenants, sergeants, and
   soldiers. Under this hierarchy, Chino Valles (“Valles”) served a crucial role:
   he was the chief liaison between gang members in Juarez and those in the
   United States at the time of the Consulate Murders. As the lieutenant
   handling most cross-border communications, Valles worked closely with
   members in El Paso, and when members were released from prison in the
   United States, they reported to Valles in Mexico to receive work
   assignments.

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          Barrio Azteca operates under a set of “sacred rules” that members
   must follow or else face severe consequences. If a gang member refuses to
   carry out an order from a superior, for example, he will face disciplinary
   action, which may include death. To both enforce the rules within the gang
   and to carry out the gang’s illegal activities, Barrio Azteca uses extreme acts
   of violence, including killing rival drug dealers and gang members. From
   2008 to 2010 specifically, Barrio Azteca allied with the Juarez Cartel in its
   war against the Sinaloa Cartel for drug market territory, a period
   characterized by extreme violence and many deaths.
          With this context, we now turn to the facts at issue here. At the time
   of the Consulate Murders, Arturo “Benny” Gallegos Castrellon was, as a
   Barrio Azteca lieutenant, one of the gang’s top leaders in Juarez. In March of
   2010, Benny grew concerned that a white Honda Pilot with Texas plates was
   surveilling his house. Via radio, Benny asked Valles, as the lieutenant in
   charge of cross-border communication, to check out the Honda Pilot and find
   the address where it was registered.
          On March 13, 2010, a U.S. Consulate employee held a birthday party
   for her child in Juarez. Enriquez, Redelfs, and Salcido all attended this party.
   At the same time, Benny learned that a white Honda Pilot was located near
   the party hall. Diaz and Perez-Marrufo separately responded to Benny’s
   radio calls ordering Azteca members to head to the Honda Pilot’s location.
   When the hit teams arrived, however, they noticed both a white Honda Pilot
   with Mexico plates and a white Toyota RAV4 with Texas plates, parked near
   each other. Benny ordered both cars to be followed as they left the party; Diaz
   followed the Toyota, and Perez-Marrufo followed the Honda Pilot. Benny,
   again via radio, ordered the hitmen to kill the occupants of both cars. Diaz
   fired on the occupants of the Toyota, killing Enriquez and Redelfs. Perez-
   Marrufo fired on the occupants of the Honda Pilot, killing Salcido and
   wounding the three children in the backseat. Later, Benny learned that the

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   gang mistook the identities of both cars’ passengers—none of the victims
   were involved in the ongoing drug war, nor were they conducting surveillance
   on Benny’s house.
          During Diaz and Perez-Marrufo’s trial, the jury heard the testimony
   of various Barrio Azteca members, including: (1) Jesus “Camello” Chavez
   Castillo, the boss of the Azteca hit teams who testified that Benny asked his
   men to check out the Honda Pilot; (2) Alberto “Fresa” Payan (also referred
   to as “Nunez”), a sicario who participated in many murders with the
   defendants and heard the radio communications on March 13, 2010; and (3)
   Miguel “Lentes” Nevarez, another Azteca member who followed the
   Toyota on Benny’s orders and was present when Diaz killed the occupants.
          After the Government concluded its case, Diaz and Perez-Marrufo
   moved for a judgment of acquittal. For the conspiracy to commit murder in a
   foreign country charge (Count 5), Perez-Marrufo argued that the
   Government failed to prove that an overt act occurred in the United States
   and that a conspirator was present in the United States at the time of the
   agreement. Diaz joined this argument and also challenged the sufficiency of
   the evidence on certain drug-trafficking and money-laundering charges
   (Counts 2, 3, and 4). Diaz did not explicitly challenge the sufficiency of the
   evidence for the aiding-and-abetting charges (Counts 8 and 11). The district
   court denied both defendants’ motions.
          After the jury verdict finding them guilty on all counts, Diaz and
   Perez-Marrufo were sentenced to concurrent life sentences for Counts 1, 2,
   3, 5, 9, 10, and 11, to run concurrently with a 240-month sentence on Count
   4. The court also imposed three additional life sentences for Counts 6, 7, and
   8, to run consecutively to all other counts. Diaz and Perez-Marrufo both
   timely appealed, and their appeals were later consolidated.
          II. Analysis

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          This appeal involves four issues, which we address in turn: (a)
   whether the Government produced sufficient evidence to support Diaz and
   Perez-Marrufo’s convictions for conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign
   country; (b) whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing an
   obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement in Perez-Marrufo’s case; (c)
   whether the Government produced sufficient evidence to support Diaz’s
   convictions for aiding and abetting in Salcido’s murder; and (d) whether the
   district court plainly erred in imposing mandatory consecutive life sentences
   for Diaz’s three section 924(j) convictions.
          a. Conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country
          The issue central to both defendants’ appeals is whether the evidence
   adduced at trial was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy to
   commit murder in a foreign country. To obtain a conviction for a conspiracy
   under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1), the Government must prove four elements: “(1)
   the defendant agreed with at least one person to commit murder; (2) the
   defendant willfully joined the agreement with the intent to further its
   purpose; (3) during the existence of the conspiracy, one of the conspirators
   committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the object of the
   conspiracy; and (4) at least one of the conspirators was within the jurisdiction
   of the United States when the agreement was made.” United States v.
   Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 538 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v.
   Castrellon, 636 F. App’x 204, 206 (5th Cir. 2016) (specifying that the overt
   act in element (3) must occur in the United States); 18 U.S.C.A. § 956
   (imposing punishment where a conspirator “commits an act within the
   jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy”).
   Here, both Diaz and Perez-Marrufo challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
   on elements (3) and (4).

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          This Court reviews preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the
   evidence de novo, “with a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the verdict.”
   United States v. Cabello, 33 F.4th 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2022). Our review is
   “highly deferential” to the jury’s finding of guilt. United States v. Zamora-
   Salazar, 860 F.3d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 2017). As such, the Court will uphold
   the jury’s verdict so long as “any rational trier of fact could have found the
   essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
   Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court views “all
   evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most
   favorable to the government.” United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 341 (5th
   Cir. 1993). “[C]ircumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately
   considered, may, by their number and joint operation, especially when
   corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive
   proof.” United States v. Rodriguez-Mireles, 896 F.2d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 1990)
   (citation omitted). Of course, “the jury is free to choose among reasonable
   constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597
   (5th Cir. 1994).
          Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
   Government produced sufficient evidence to support the defendants’
   convictions. To establish element (3) of the charge, the Government relied
   on evidence that Benny ordered Valles to work with his men in El Paso,
   Texas, the location of Azteca headquarters, to investigate the registration of
   a Honda Pilot with Texas plates. See Transcript of Record at 381–82, 394.
   Receiving this phone call in the United States served as the Government’s
   evidence of an overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy under
   element (3). See United States v. Cardona–Ramirez, 358 F. App’x 562, 564
   (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here is a sufficient factual basis to establish that a
   portion of the conspiracy, the overt act of receiving the telephone call, took
   place in the United States.”); accord United States v. Caldwell, 16 F.3d 623,

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   624 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that telephone calls were made in furtherance of
   conspiracy); United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994)
   (“Phone calls can constitute overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.”).
          As for element (4), the Government concedes that it did not name or
   otherwise explicitly identify a person in the United States who served as a co-
   conspirator; however, the Government argues on appeal and argued to the
   jury that “the Azteca’s operations, structure, and Benny’s and Valles’
   responsibilities within that structure” support an inference that an El Paso
   gang member followed the chain of command to carry out the task of
   investigating the Honda Pilot. See United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144, 165
   (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming conviction based on “substantial circumstantial
   evidence” of defendant’s “role in the organization”). In sum, we agree that
   “[e]xtensive evidence regarding the operation of the Barrio Aztecas, coupled
   with evidence that Benny ordered that his men involve the El Paso Aztecas
   in the investigation of the Honda Pilot, was sufficient for a reasonable juror
   to conclude that an Azteca both conspired, and committed an overt act,
   within the jurisdiction of the United States.”
          While it is clear that the Government relies on purely circumstantial
   evidence to satisfy elements (3) and (4), circumstantial evidence consistently
   suffices to support a conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Gallo, 927
   F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The Government is not required to prove the
   existence of the conspiracy and the agreement between the co-conspirators
   and the defendant by direct evidence, but may present circumstantial
   evidence, such as the co-conspirator’s concerted actions, from which the jury
   can infer that a conspiracy existed.”). Here, based on the “collocation of
   circumstances,” a reasonable jury could have found that an Azteca soldier
   working under Benny and Valles would obey the order to search for the
   Honda Pilot with Texas plates. See United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379,

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   1381 (5th Cir. 1979). In fact, it is inconceivable that an Azteca soldier would
   not follow such an order. See Transcript of Record at 394.
          Notably, this Court considered the same issue, under essentially the
   same set of facts, in United States v. Castrellon, in which Benny appealed his
   own conviction for conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country. While
   not controlling precedent, 2 the Court’s analysis of Benny’s sufficiency of the
   evidence argument is helpful here. In Castrellon, the Court found that
   circumstantial evidence existed from which the jury could conclude that
   elements (3) and (4) of the conspiracy charge were met. 636 F. App’x at 206.
   The Court highlighted that Camello, who also testified in Diaz and Perez-
   Marrufo’s trial, “testified that he heard [Benny] order Valles to call the El
   Paso Aztecas and find out to whom the white vehicle was registered.” Id.
   Naturally, the Court held, “[b]ecause Valles conducted the communication
   between Juarez and El Paso, a telephone call to El Paso would be routine for
   him, and there is no reason to assume that he would not follow [Benny’s]
   direct order.” Id. at 206–07. The Court also emphasized the structure and
   modus operandi of Barrio Azteca as important circumstantial evidence: first,
   “the chance that Valles contacted El Paso is heightened considering how
   important the Aztecas considered communication”; and second, “[t]he
   notion that an El Paso Azteca would not take some action on an order by a
   lieutenant such as [Benny] is extremely unlikely—they could face
   punishment including death for failing to follow such an order.” Id. at 207.
   Because the facts in Castrellon mirror the facts in the present case, this Court
   reaches the same outcome: the Government’s circumstantial evidence
   suffices to establish elements (3) and (4) of the charge. See United States v.

          _____________________
          2
            Castrellon is an unpublished, per curiam opinion. Additionally, the standard of
   review was for plain error (rather than de novo) because Benny failed “to preserve his
   challenge by renewing it at the close of the evidence.” Castrellon, 636 F. App’x at 205.

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   Montgomery, 210 F.3d 446, 459 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The agreement may be
   implicit, and the jury may infer its existence from circumstantial evidence.”).
          Diaz argues that, even if someone in the United States received the
   call to trace the license plates, there is no evidence showing that that person
   was a conspirator to murder specifically. Helpfully, the Court in Castrellon
   addressed this same argument and held that “given the open communication
   between Juarez and El Paso—and the fact that Azteca members were
   required to be familiar with the organization’s activities in both locations—it
   is likely that the Aztecas in El Paso understood why Valles requested the
   investigation.” Castrellon, 636 F. App’x at 207. “Because the vehicle
   allegedly belonged to a rival cartel and Valles often discussed hits with the
   Azteca representative in El Paso, they likely understood that [Benny]
   planned to take violent action against its owner and implicitly agreed to
   further this unlawful purpose.” Id. Because the facts are extremely similar, if
   not identical, for Diaz and Perez-Marrufo on this point, and because this
   Court’s reasoning in Castrellon was sound, we again reach the same
   conclusion here: the circumstantial evidence in the record supports a finding
   that an Azteca soldier in the United States followed the order to trace the
   license plates in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit murder in Mexico.
          Diaz responds that the evidence produced at Benny’s trial was
   materially different from that presented at his own, and that the Government
   cannot rely on testimony elicited during a co-conspirator’s trial to support
   the conviction. Perez-Marrufo makes a similar argument, focusing
   specifically on the differences in the testimony that Camello gave regarding
   Benny’s order to be on the lookout for the Honda Pilot. However, the
   differences appellants point out, even if true, are not decisive here. For
   example, although Camello’s testimony may have been less explicit at the
   appellants’ trial, he did testify that Benny instructed Valles to check on the
   white Honda Pilot with Texas plates, as part of Valles’ job to conduct cross-

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   border communication. See Transcript of Record at 340–44, 381–82.
   Further, Camello testified that calls between El Paso and Juarez regularly
   concerned “anything from drugs that might be needed somewhere
   to . . . having to kill someone.” Transcript of Record at 271. Drawing all
   reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, evidence that Benny ordered
   Valles to initiate an investigation of the Honda Pilot, combined with all of the
   evidence regarding Azteca operations, suffices to support the conspiracy
   conviction. Because a rational trier of fact could conclude that the
   Government met its burden on elements (3) and (4), we affirm the
   defendants’ convictions for conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign
   country.
          b. Sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice
          Perez-Marrufo argues that the district court improperly applied the
   section 3C1.1 sentencing enhancement for obstructing or impeding the
   administration of justice based on the destruction of the vehicle Perez-
   Marrufo used in the Consulate Murders. This Court reviews “a district
   court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual
   determinations for clear error.” United States v. Garza, 587 F.3d 304, 308
   (5th Cir. 2009). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if, based on the
   entirety of the evidence, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
   conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d
   678, 712 (5th Cir. 2012).
          Section 3C1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines states:
          If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
          attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice
          with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
          the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive
          conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction

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          and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense,
          increase the offense level by 2 levels.
   U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Evidence at trial showed that Perez-Marrufo returned the
   Ford Explorer used during the Consulate Murders to Camello, and Benny
   ordered Camello to “make it disappear.” Camello testified that he had
   another Azteca member burn the car, before he and the rest of the hit teams
   laid low to avoid detection in the days following the murders. Thus, there is
   no question—and Perez-Marrufo concedes—that the vehicle was burned to
   conceal evidence implicating Barrio Azteca in the crimes.
          Despite this concession, Perez-Marrufo argues that the enhancement
   is inapplicable because there was no evidence to establish that the vehicles
   were destroyed “during the course of an investigation.” He cites to this
   Court’s decision in United States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1990), for
   the proposition that the obstruction of justice must occur during the
   investigation or prosecution of the offense. However, Perez-Marrufo’s
   reliance on Wilson is misplaced. In Wilson, the Court explicitly noted that the
   defendant “was unaware that any investigation was taking place” and that
   the defendant’s “intent clearly was not to impede the investigation or
   prosecution of his offense.” 904 F.2d at 235. The opposite is true here. Perez-
   Marrufo, along with Camello and Benny, clearly intended to conceal
   evidence so as to “impede the investigation” of the murders. And
   importantly, the investigation into the Consulate Murders began
   immediately, likely before the car was even burned. According to witnesses,
   law enforcement arrived on the scene right away, and the FBI began its
   investigation less than three hours after the murders. The district court
   therefore reasonably applied the sentencing enhancement where the
   investigation was likely already under way and Perez-Marrufo intended to
   prevent law enforcement from finding the car.

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          Further, as the Government points out in its brief, a 2006 amendment
   to section 3C1.1 allows a court to consider “pre-investigation conduct . . . if
   misconduct occurs with the defendant’s correct belief that a governmental
   investigation is probably underway or will probably be underway.” United
   States v. Stubblefield, 942 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 2019). As a result, the
   enhancement applies “to a defendant who (1) believed that there was or
   would be a governmental investigation and (2) acted to obstruct or impede
   that investigation.” Id. Here, the sentencing enhancement applies because
   Perez-Marrufo (1) clearly believed there would be an investigation and (2)
   acted to destroy the car as potential evidence in that investigation. Thus, the
   district court’s application of the section 3C1.1 guideline was “plausible in
   light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Adam, 296 F.3d 327, 334 (5th
   Cir. 2002).
          Regardless, any possible error in applying the enhancement here was
   ultimately harmless because the adjustment made no difference to Perez-
   Marrufo’s sentence. As the Government succinctly stated: The
   enhancement “raised [the] adjusted offense level in each grouping from 46
   to 48, and raised the combined adjusted offense level from 51 to 53. But the
   total offense level was reduced by default to 43, the highest offense level
   available under the guidelines . . . Because a two-level reduction would still
   result in a total offense level of 43, any error did not affect [Perez-Marrufo’s]
   substantial rights.” Br. for Resp’t at 36; see also United States v. Nava, 957
   F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendant could not prove any
   error affected his substantial rights where two-level reduction would still
   result in total offense level of 43). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
   imposition of the sentencing enhancement.
          c. Aiding and abetting Salcido’s murder

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          Diaz challenges his convictions on Counts 8 and 11 for aiding and
   abetting Salcido’s murder because, he argues, Perez-Marrufo murdered
   Salcido and Diaz himself was not present during that murder. Diaz argues the
   evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on both counts.
          First, the standard of review. The Government argues that where a
   defendant asserts specific grounds in a Rule 29 acquittal motion, he waives
   all other grounds. See United States v. Herrera, 313 F.3d 882, 884 (5th Cir.
   2002). In response, Diaz asserts that he “made particularized arguments
   about the sufficiency of the evidence on some of the charged counts, but the
   district court clearly understood him to have moved for judgment of
   acquittal . . . as to all counts.” However, the district court’s ruling—
   including the statement that it “believes there is sufficient evidence to go to
   the jury regarding the remaining counts of Two through Eleven”—does not
   support Diaz’s position. The court’s general finding that sufficient evidence
   existed to take the whole case to a jury does not excuse Diaz’s failure to object
   with specificity on each grounds for acquittal that he now challenges on
   appeal. Because Diaz did not properly preserve his arguments on Counts 8
   and 11, they are forfeited, and we review the newly raised claim for a manifest
   miscarriage of justice. United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir.
   2002). Under this narrow standard, the Court will only reverse “if the record
   is ‘devoid of evidence pointing to guilty.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz,
   860 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1988)).
          Now, the merits. Count 8 charged Diaz under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) for
   using a firearm to commit murder during and in relation to a crime of violence
   or drug trafficking crime. Similarly, Count 11 charged Diaz under the Violent
   Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (“VICAR”) statute, which penalizes those
   who commit murder “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining
   or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.” 18
   U.S.C. § 1959(a). A person is liable as a principal under both statutes if he

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   “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the crime’s]
   commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 2; see United States v. Hankton, 51 F.4th 578, 613
   (5th Cir. 2022) (affirming aiding-and-abetting conviction under VICAR),
   cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 839 (2023); United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 246
   (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming aiding-and-abetting conviction under section
   924(j)). To prove a defendant is liable for aiding and abetting, the
   Government must show that the defendant “(1) [took] an affirmative act in
   furtherance of the offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s
   commission.” United States v. Carbins, 882 F.3d 557, 563–64 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (citation omitted). Diaz apparently does not contest the sufficiency of the
   evidence as to the intent element. He instead argues that he did not commit
   any “affirmative act that assisted in the success of the venture.”
          Diaz’s argument misses the mark. The affirmative-act element
   “comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement,
   support, or presence . . . even if that aid relates to only one (or some) of a
   crime’s phases or elements.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 73
   (2014) (cleaned up); see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 515 (1943)
   (“[A]ll who shared in [the crime’s] execution have equal responsibility
   before the law, whatever may have been the different roles of leadership and
   subordination among themselves.”). Such assistance does not “require[]
   lending physical aid”—instead, “words may be enough.” United States v.
   Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 771 (2023); see Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471,
   490 (2023) (“[I]ntentional participation can come in many forms . . . such as
   through words of encouragement or driving the getaway car.”). Thus, “a
   person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he
   helps another to complete its commission.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 70. That
   is exactly what happened here: although Diaz was not physically present at
   the scene where Salcido was murdered, he helped Perez-Marrufo complete

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   its commission through words of encouragement and his readiness to render
   aid.
           While Diaz claims that upholding his convictions for aiding and
   abetting “would allow Diaz to be convicted for his mere membership in
   Barrio Azteca,” such an argument completely overlooks the reality of the
   situation on the day of the Consulate Murders. Both Diaz and Perez-Marrufo
   responded to Benny’s radio call directing the Azteca hit teams to go to the
   location of the Honda Pilot. Diaz was armed from the moment he arrived at
   the designated location, prepared to carry out whatever Benny (or another
   superior) ordered him to do. Diaz and Perez-Marrufo then each followed a
   separate car under Benny’s orders to kill the occupants of both. 3 The two
   sicarios gave each other’s hit teams real-time updates via radio, because, as
   explained above, communication was key to Barrio Azteca operations. At the
   very least, testimony at trial demonstrated that Diaz aided and abetted in
   Salcido’s murder through “words of encouragement” on the radio
   throughout the commission of the crime. See Taamneh, 598 U.S. at 490. Even
   further, evidence of the Aztecas’ vast communication network was
   supported by testimony that the Aztecas typically murdered in groups, often
   with both lookout and support teams. Just because Perez-Marrufo ultimately

           _____________________
           3
             To the extent Diaz argues that he cannot be held liable for Salcido’s murder
   because Salcido was not the gang’s intended victim, the Government directs the Court’s
   attention to the doctrine of transferred intent and notes that “[a] principal is liable for
   murder if he sets out to commit a murder and, in doing so, committed that act against the
   wrong person.” Br. for Resp’t at 29; see also United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 382
   (2d Cir. 1992) (“It was sufficient for the government to prove that Concepcion, as a
   member of a RICO enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, set out to commit a
   proscribed act of violence in order to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise,
   and that, in the course of so doing, he committed that act against a person who got in his
   way.”). Because Benny ordered the hit teams to kill the occupants of both cars, without
   regard to who the passengers actually were, it follows naturally that unintended victims
   would be included in the murders.

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   did not need Diaz to fire any bullets for Salcido’s murder does not mean Diaz
   was not ready to render such aid, and vice versa. See United States v. Bell, 812
   F.2d 188, 195 (5th Cir. 1987) (“We decline to carve the defendants’ . . .
   scheme into discrete subparts and to absolve any malefactor who was not
   physically present at every misdeed.”). Rather than acting as “merely a
   knowing spectator” in Salcido’s murder, Diaz acted in concert with Perez-
   Marrufo’s hit team to murder the occupants of both cars. The evidence was
   therefore sufficient to support Diaz’s convictions on Counts 8 and 11.
           d. Consecutive life sentences for section 924(j) convictions
           The district court imposed upon Diaz three consecutive life sentences
   for the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j) for using a firearm to
   commit murder during the course of a crime of violence or drug trafficking
   crime (Counts 6, 7, and 8). Diaz did not object to these sentences at the time
   they were imposed. Where a defendant fails to object below, this Court
   reviews a district court’s interpretation of a sentencing statute for plain error.
   United States v. Warren, 986 F.3d 557, 565 (5th Cir. 2021). Error is plain when
   it is clear or obvious and affects a defendant’s substantial rights. See United
   States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1993).
           Even under the exacting plain error standard, Diaz is entitled to relief
   on this issue. The record indicates that the district court believed the
   consecutive life sentences on these three counts were mandatory. However,
   while    this   case   was   pending,        the   Supreme    Court   held   that
   section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences does not extend to a
   sentence imposed under section 924(j). Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453,
   455, 458 (2023) (“Subsection (j) contains no consecutive-sentence
   mandate.”). As a result, a district court has discretion to impose a section
   924(j) sentence concurrently with another sentence. Id. at 464. The district
   court in Diaz’s case did not exercise that discretion.

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           The parties agree that the sentences for Counts 6, 7, and 8 should be
   vacated in light of Lora and that the matter should be remanded to the district
   court for resentencing. 4 We agree and remand to the district court for
   resentencing only as it relates to Diaz’s consecutive life sentences on Counts
   6, 7, and 8.
           III. Conclusion
           For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE and REMAND as to
   Diaz’s consecutive life sentences for the three section 924(j) convictions,
   and AFFIRM the remainder of the district court’s judgment as to both Diaz
   and Perez-Marrufo.

           _____________________
           4
              See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013) (“[W]e conclude that
   whether a legal question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, it is enough that an
   error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration for the second part of the Olano test
   to be satisfied.”) (quotation omitted).

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