Court Opinion

ID: 9482426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:49:53.493123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:59.034971
License: Public Domain

ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority finds that the facts of this ease constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This Circuit has found such per se violations in only two limited circumstances: where, unknown to the defendant, his or her counsel was, at the time of trial (1) not duly licensed to practice law because of a failure ever to meet the substantive requirements for the practice of law, see United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir.1990) (counsel fraudulently procured license by misrepresenting that he was entitled to a dispensation from the bar examination); Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir.1983) (counsel repeatedly failed the bar exam) or (2) implicated in the defendant’s crimes. See United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.1984). Even on these occasions, we have applied the per se rule “without enthusiam.” United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 531 (2d Cir.1990).
The present case simply does not fall within the facts or underlying rationale of this narrow category of cases. Guran was duly licensed at the time of trial and I cannot subscribe to the majority’s attempt to recast reality and treat him as if he were not. Similarly, there is no allegation that Guran was involved in the misdeeds of Bellamy. In addition, the facts of this case, fully developed, demonstrate that at the time of trial, Guran was completely mentally competent to defend Bellamy.
Moreover, the majority implicitly concedes that Bellamy cannot establish that Guran’s representation was ineffective un*632der the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Indeed, the record reflects that Guran called numerous witnesses (all well prepared to testify) and mounted a vigorous and cogent defense, highlighted by the fact that despite the overwhelming evidence against Bellamy, the jury deliberated for five days before convicting him.
Because Guran provided Bellamy constitutionally effective representation, and because the majority’s application of the per se rule to the facts of this case is an unwarranted departure from prior decisions of this Court, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority indicates, the underlying action in this case stemmed from petitioner Perry Bellamy’s participation in the brutal murder of State Parole Officer Brian Rooney. Lorenzo “Fat Cat” Nichols, a notorious Queens drug dealer, ordered Rooney’s murder from Nichols’ jail cell. This “hit” was a revenge killing for Rooney’s role in placing Nichols behind bars. Over one year prior to the start of Bellamy’s trial in January 1987 for his role in Rooney’s murder, Bellamy’s mother contacted Attorney Sidney Guran to represent Bellamy. Although he was retired and living in Florida, Guran had represented Bellamy several times in the past and agreed to represent him again. At that time, Guran was seventy-one years old and had been a successful member of the bar for almost fifty years.
In the months preceding and during Bellamy’s trial, Guran was the subject of disciplinary proceedings in the First Department. In October 1986, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee alleged that Guran had converted client funds in 1976 and had negligently handled a real estate transaction in 1977. The Committee scheduled a hearing on the charges for December 11, 1986. On November 10, 1986, Guran’s attorney, Richard L. Baltimore, Jr., requested that the hearing be adjourned because more time was needed to compile documents for the hearing and because Guran was [then] “not mentally capable of preparing for the hearing.” Baltimore based his evaluation of Guran’s capacity on phone conversations with Guran in which he found “a certain amount of disorientation” and on a letter, dated October 29, 1986, from Guran’s physician, Dr. Richard P. Cohen.
According to Dr. Cohen, Guran suffered from a variety of physiological ailments, including a recently diagnosed polyneuro-pathy, a condition “characterized by peripheral motor weakness [and] unsteadiness” on one’s feet. Dr. Cohen had been treating Guran for that condition for the preceding six weeks. During that time, as a result of the “physical and emotional stress” associated with Guran’s recently discovered illness and of certain medications, Guran had been “virtually incapacitated.” Dr. Cohen also noted that as a result of that condition, Guran “at times” had “an inability to concentrate.” The prognosis for Guran’s newly discovered condition was uncertain at that time, but Dr. Cohen “anticipated” that evaluation and treatment of the polyneuro-pathy would take three to six months, and that Guran would be “effectively incapacitated during that time.”
Based on these communications, and on the underlying charges, the Disciplinary Committee petitioned the First Department on November 21, 1986 for Guran’s immediate, indefinite, suspension from the practice of law. In response, Guran submitted an affidavit to the First Department on December 12, 1986, in which he admitted his medical problems, but stated that a suspension, with its attendant stigma, was unnecessary. According to Guran, he had been essentially retired since 1984, having taken on no new work except for Bellamy’s case. Because of his prior representation of Bellamy and because of his familiarity with the case, Guran requested that he be permitted to represent Bellamy, stating:
I, of course, will not attempt to try this case by myself. I will have a competent attorney, but I must be present to assist him. Bellamy relies on and trusts only me and his mother has paid me. It would be a complete disservice to this defendant and jeopardize his right to a fair trial if I were not permitted to assist in his trial and defense.
*633Neither the Disciplinary Committee nor the First Department responded to Guran’s affidavit.
On December 11, 1986, Guran also advised the trial judge, John T. Gallagher, in an ex parte submission, about the pending disciplinary charges and the motion to suspend him pending his recovery from health problems. Among other things, Guran informed Judge Gallagher:
You might remember that I had a Dr. [sic] appointment ... at N.Y. Hospital at which time a tentative diagnosis of [a form of polio commonly known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease] was made. Needing time to prepare [for the disciplinary hearing scheduled for December 11, 1986], feeling miserable, [and] discouraged, I returned home and, through my lawyer, sent a copy of my medical statement to the Committee. Immediately they moved to suspend me pending my recovery. ...
I am feeling better and have secured the services of Marvin D. Skeledsky, Esq. [to assist me with the trial], (emphasis added).
Jury selection in Bellamy’s trial began on January 6, 1987. Because Skeledsky was unexpectedly occupied with another case at that time, Guran represented Bellamy alone. At no time was Bellamy informed of Guran’s disciplinary or health problems. On January 24, 1987, after five days of deliberations, the jury convicted Bellamy of second degree murder and second degree criminal possession of a weapon.
On March 26, 1987, over two months after Bellamy’s conviction, the First Department — without a hearing — suspended Guran from the further practice of law. The First Department chose to suspend Guran based on his December 1986 representation that he was then not mentally capable of preparing for a disciplinary hearing. The First Department determined that Guran’s representation, “implicitly concedes that he is, at this time, incapable of practicing law.”
Having learned that Guran had been suspended, Bellamy moved in June 1987, pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Proc.L. § 440 (McKinney 1983), to vacate his judgment of conviction based, among other things, on Guran’s alleged incapacity to serve as counsel and his subsequent suspension on those grounds. Alternatively, Bellamy requested that a hearing be held to determine Gu-ran’s competency. Judge Gallagher denied Bellamy’s § 440 motion and his request for a hearing, observing in pertinent part that:
He did an excellent job in trying that case. I don’t know of any mistakes that he made in trying the case.
Further, with respect to the Appellate Division, Mr. Guran came to me before he started this case. He told me that he had a matter pending before the Appellate Division. This was with the First Department. I called the First Department and I told them that Mr. Guran was in my court and he had a matter to try here and I asked if it was appropriate for me to permit him to try this case, and they told me that it was permissible for me to do that and that’s exactly what I did .... so there’s no impropriety with respect to Mr. Guran’s conduct or how he tried the case.... (emphasis added).
Upon Bellamy’s motion for reconsideration, the court ordered a hearing to determine the competency of trial counsel. Neither Guran nor Bellamy testified at the § 440 hearing. The principal witness at the hearing was Dr. Cohen. Dr. Cohen first testified about his authorship of the October 29, 1986 letter, written at Guran’s request, that was sent to the First Department in support of Guran’s efforts to secure an adjournment of the disciplinary hearing. With regard to the October letter, Dr. Cohen testified essentially that:
[H]is opinion in the October letter that Guran was “virtually incapacitated” related primarily to his patient’s inability to travel frequently between his home in Florida and New York, as he understood would be required to participate in the disciplinary hearing. As the doctor explained, Guran’s ailments gave him a poor sense of balance and made him susceptible to falls. Frequent travel heightened this risk. ... He explained that the *634inability to concentrate noted in his letter related primarily to difficulty he perceived Guran would have focusing on other matters if he were in a situation where it was difficult for him to keep his balance.
Bellamy v. Cogdell, No. 90-4225 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 1991) (found at Joint Appendix, pp. 566-67). Significantly, based on a follow-up examination conducted on January 6, 1987 — the day Bellamy’s trial commenced and over two months after the October letter was written — Dr. Cohen further testified that he had placed no restrictions on Guran’s practice of law and, more importantly, stated unequivocally that Gu-ran’s physical problems had no effect on his mental capacities, i.e., there was nothing wrong mentally with Guran at the time of Bellamy’s trial. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court again denied Bellamy’s motion to vacate his conviction, concluding that at the time of trial, [Guran] “was mentally and physically capable to try the defendant’s case and did so in a competent manner.” People v. Bellamy, Ind. No. 5382-85 (Queens Co.Sup.Ct. Jan. 31, 1989).
After exhausting state court remedies, Bellamy filed a petition for a writ of habe-as corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claiming, among other things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel under the per se rule. The district court, in a well-reasoned opinion, rejected this claim, holding that the per se rule did not apply under the facts of this case. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the district court, agreeing with the trial court, found that there was “no evidence ... of any mental infirmity” of Guran at the time of trial that impeded his ability to present a defense, and that Guran in fact conducted a vigorous defense. I agree with the district court that the facts of this case are simply outside the ambit of this Court’s per se Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
As discussed above, we have applied the per se rule in a limited number of cases, namely when, unknown to the defendant, his or her attorney is not duly licensed, see Novak, 903 F.2d at 890; Solina, 709 F.2d at 167 or is engaged in the defendant’s misdeeds. Cancilla, 725 F.2d at 870. Further, as the district court observed, we have advanced two rationales for applying the per se rule. The first is “jurisdictional” and applies in cases where the attorney is not duly licensed. It stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1948), that the failure to provide a criminal defendant with counsel created “a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction.” See Solina, 709 F.2d at 168-69 (discerning no meaningful distinction between total absence of representation and representation by unlicensed counsel). The second rationale is based on notions of conflict of interest, and applies in cases both where the lawyer is not duly licensed, see Novak, 903 F.2d at 890; Solina, 709 F.2d at 164 and where the lawyer is implicated in the crimes of his client. See Cancilla, 725 F.2d at 870. Under these circumstances, the defense is necessarily compromised because the advocate “cannot be wholly free from fear of what might happen if a vigorous defense should lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to inquire into his [or her] background and discover his” or her own wrongdoing. Solina, 709 F.2d at 164.
Under either rationale, it is plain that for a defendant to prevail on a per se claim, the defendant must show that his or her attorney had an actual substantive defect in licensure or an actual conflict of interest that existed at the time of trial. See, e.g., Novak, 903 F.2d at 890; Solina, 709 F.2d at 164; Cancilla, 725 F.2d at 870; see also United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 531-32 (2d Cir.1990) (“theoretical or merely speculative conflict never invokes the per se rule”).
In light of these principles, the majority’s application of the per se rule to the facts of this case is wholly unwarranted. Neither rationale for our per se cases applies. Gu-ran was duly licensed and admitted to the bar at the time of trial, thereby precluding application of the “jurisdictional” rationale. The mere pendancy of disciplinary charges during Bellamy’s trial is an insufficient ba*635sis to treat Guran as if he were not licensed at that time. See Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir.1988). Moreover, Guran clearly had no conflict of interest at the time of trial that would have prevented vigorous advocacy on Bellamy’s behalf.
The majority nonetheless advances two related grounds for applying the per se rule. First, analogizing this case to the fraudulently procured license in Novak, the majority finds that but for Guran’s unfulfilled promise to have co-counsel at Bellamy’s trial, Guran “almost certainly” would have been suspended before the trial. Second, the majority contends that Guran’s statements of mental incapacity made in connection with his efforts to postpone his disciplinary hearing, which ultimately were relied on by the First Department to suspend Guran in late March 1987, are “perhaps more reason to fear inadequate representation” than if he had a conflict of interest. I do not believe that either ground justifies extending the per se rule to this case.
The majority’s reliance on Novak is misplaced. Unlike the “attorney” in Novak, or the “attorney” in Solina for that matter, Guran was, as discussed above, fully licensed and had been duly admitted to the New York bar for almost fifty years at the time of Bellamy’s trial. Also, whereas the attorney in Novak certainly would not have been licensed and allowed to practice without his fraudulent misrepresentation, the effect on the First Department of Guran’s promise to secure co-counsel is far less clear. As the district court observed, “[sjince there is no 'conditional admission’ to practice law in New York, this court cannot speculate ... that [Guran] would have been suspended but for his representation that he would secure the assistance of other counsel.” This is particularly so given the First Department’s failure to respond to Guran’s affidavit or to take action against him until well after Bellamy’s trial. There is simply no justification to treat Guran as if he were not admitted and fully licensed to practice law at the time of Bellamy’s trial.
In addition, Guran’s representation to the First Department regarding the use of co-counsel does not approach the type of “institutional” fraud on the court present No-vak. Although Guran apparently did not tell the trial court of his promise to secure the services of co-counsel, Guran made no attempt to conceal from the court his pending disciplinary hearing or his possible suspension for health reasons. To the contrary, Guran fully informed the court of his predicament, including his planned collaboration with Attorney Skeledsky. Indeed, the trial court contacted the First Department to determine whether Guran could represent Bellamy. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Guran’s conduct approached the egregious deceptive behavior present in Novak or Solina, or that Guran, like the “attorneys” in Novak and Solina, was precluded from providing a vigorous defense because he had something to hide. See Aiello, 900 F.2d at 531-32; Waterhouse, 848 F.2d at 383.
Slightly more troublesome are the statements contained in Dr. Cohen’s October 29 letter and Guran’s own statements in his December 12 affidavit regarding his inability to prepare for his disciplinary hearing, which formed the basis of Guran’s suspension in late March 1987. However, that the First Department — without conducting a hearing to determine Guran’s competence — ultimately suspended Guran based on statements made over three months earlier as to his then-existing state of health, is simply an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that Guran was not competent to defend Bellamy at the time of trial.
Indeed, the evidence adduced at the § 440 hearing through the testimony of Dr. Cohen — based on an examination Cohen conducted on Guran the day Bellamy’s trial commenced — clearly demonstrated that Gu-ran had no mental incapacity at the time of trial. This medical evidence was buttressed by the trial judge’s own favorable observations regarding Guran’s mental acuity and physical condition during the trial. Given this evidence, the district court agreed with the trial court’s finding that at the time of trial, the relevant moment of inquiry, Bellamy was certainly *636competent to present a spirited defense. This factual finding — the import of which is wholly ignored by the majority — is amply supported by the record, is therefore not “clearly erroneous,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and precludes application of the ;per se rule in this case.
In sum, when a lawyer is duly licensed at the time of trial, when disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer have not resulted in an adverse ruling, and when the medical evidence and observations of the trial judge establish that at the time of trial, the lawyer was mentally competent to represent the defendant, application of the per se rule is unwarranted. In finding a per se violation on this record, the majority unjustifiably opens the gates to per se Sixth Amendment challenges whenever a defendant can show that before and perhaps sometime after the defendant’s trial, his lawyer had an illness that the defendant contends — contrary to the evidence — rendered the attorney incompetent at the time of trial.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s denial of Bellamy’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.