Court Opinion

ID: 9375496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 22:02:28.159705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.270629
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 P. v. Diaz CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E076440

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. INF1302087)

 LUIS RAUL DIAZ,                                                         OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Reversed.

         Eric S. Multhaup, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Julie L. Garland and Charlese C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney Generals, Arlene

A. Sevidal, James M. Toohey, Lynne G. McGinnis and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy

Attorney Generals, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Defendant and appellant Luis Raul Diaz appeals from a trial court’s order denying

defendant’s petition for relief under Penal Code1 section 1170.95. For the reasons set

forth post, we find that defendant made a prima facie showing that he falls within the

provisions of section 1172.6, and is therefore entitled to a remand for further proceedings

on his petition.

                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.     PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In 2014, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and found true the

special circumstances that the murder occurred during the commission of a kidnapping

under sections 187 and 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(B). The trial court found true that

defendant had a prior serious felony conviction under § 667, subdivision (a). Thereafter,

the trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the murder,

plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction.

       On January 22, 2016, after defendant appealed, we affirmed the judgment in

People v. Diaz [unpub. opn. 2016] E062324.

       On September 21, 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section

1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant. The People filed

opposition. On January 8, 2021, the trial court summarily denied defendant’s petition.

       1  All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
In addition, section 1170.95 was renumbered effective June 30, 2022, to section 1172.6.
(Stats. 2022, c. 58 (A.B. 200), § 100, eff. June 30, 2022.) We will refer to the new
numbering and current version in this opinion.

                                              2
       On January 14, 2021, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of

his section 1170.95 petition. On February 4, 2021, defendant filed a second notice of

appeal. In an unpublished opinion filed on October 1, 2021, we affirmed the denial of the

petition based on the state of the law at that time.

       Defendant filed a petition for review, which was granted. On October 26, 2022,

the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with instructions to

vacate our previous decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Strong (2022)

13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). In Strong, the California Supreme Court found that felony

murder special-circumstance findings issued by a jury before the decisions of People v.

Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark),

which clarified the terms “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life” in

the special-circumstance statute, do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima

facie case for resentencing of a felony-murder conviction, even if the trial evidence

would have been sufficient to support the findings under Banks and Clark.

       On October 27, 2022, we vacated our previous opinion and requested that

defendant and the People file supplemental briefs. Defendant did not file a supplemental

brief. In its supplemental brief, the People concede that “[b]ased on Strong, the matter

should be reversed and remanded.” For the reasons set forth post, we will remand the

matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

                                               3
      B.      FACTUAL HISTORY2

              1.     “DISAPPEARANCE OF THE VICTIM AND DISCOVERY OF HIS

                     SKELETAL REMAINS

      “Destiny Ayala was the victim’s sister. She last saw the victim in July 2011. She

exchanged text messages with him in August 2011. She became concerned in early

September when she had not heard from him. She went to his house in Palm Springs but

he was not there. She filed a missing person’s report with the Palm Springs Police

Department.

      “On December 19, 2011, a Riverside County Sheriff’s deputy responded to a call

that skeletal remains had been found in the area of Sky Valley. In order to access the

area, the deputy had to use a dirt road. The area where the skeletal remains were found

was remote, open desert. The remains were scattered, most likely due to animal activity.

There were two burn areas near the remains. A melted belt buckle, a fired projectile, a

live round of ammunition, and a burned T-shirt were found by the remains.

      “Sergeant Deborah Gray of the Riverside County Coroner’s Office was a forensic

anthropologist trained to examine skeletal remains. She was called to the Sky Valley

area to examine the skeletal remains. She determined that all the bones found belonged

to one person. The person had been deceased between two weeks and six months. The

person was likely male, White or Hispanic, and between 20 to 23 years old.

      2   The facts are taken from the unpublished opinion in case No. E062324.

                                            4
       “Riverside County Sheriff’s Investigator Martin Alfaro was the lead investigator

on the case. Based on DNA identification and dental comparison, it was determined the

remains belonged to the victim. An autopsy was performed on the victim’s remains. The

victim had a semicircular defect in his skull, which was likely the result of a bullet

wound.”

              2.     “ASHLEY PRIETO’S TESTIMONY

       “Ashley Prieto was living in Morongo during the summer of 2011. She knew De

Los Santos from high school. After they graduated, Prieto started buying drugs from De

Los Santos. She had known the victim since 2010; she had purchased drugs from him.

She also knew defendant because he dated her friend, [C.A.].

       “In August 2011, Prieto received a telephone call from the victim. He told her that

he was in a car with De Los Santos and defendant on the way to Las Vegas. She was

concerned because defendant and De Los Santos were heavily involved in drug sales and

the victim was not as heavily involved. The victim went missing.

       “Several months later, in approximately October, Prieto was in Palm Springs with

De Los Santos. She and De Los Santos were smoking marijuana. She asked him what

had happened to the victim. De Los Santos told her that he believed the victim had

broken into his house and tied his girlfriend up during a robbery. As a result, De Los

Santos told Prieto that he took the victim out to the desert and shot him in the head. De

Los Santos told her that the victim had confessed to being involved in the robbery of De

Los Santos’s girlfriend so he deserved to be killed. Prieto felt that De Los Santos was

proud to have killed the victim.

                                              5
       “On December 28, 2011, Investigator Alfaro interviewed Prieto. Prieto told him

that De Los Santos had told her he shot the victim in the head. The information that the

victim had been shot in the head had not been released to the public. Prieto would not

have known the information from another source.”

              3.     “WALDO BARKER’S TESTIMONY

       “Waldo Barker[3] was arrested during an automobile theft investigation; he told the

arresting officer that he knew about a murder involving defendant and De Los Santos.

Investigator Alfaro interviewed him. Barker was made no promises of leniency in the

automobile theft case.[4]

       “Barker met De Los Santos in 2011. Barker was a mechanic and he worked on De

Los Santos’s car. Barker and De Los Santos used drugs together. Barker had met

defendant through De Los Santos.

       “Sometime in August 2011, around 4:00 a.m., Barker went to a condominium in

Cathedral City, where De Los Santos lived, to eat and get ‘high.’ Defendant was with De

Los Santos. While Barker was at the house, the victim called De Los Santos looking for

heroin. Around 5:30 a.m., De Los Santos left the house to get the heroin and Barker went

home. Barker was unsure if defendant also went home.

       3  ”Barker was unavailable for trial because he invoked his Fifth Amendment right
not to testify; his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury.”

       4 “Barker had a 2004 conviction for burglary, a conviction for automobile theft,
and a conviction for possession of methamphetamine.”

                                            6
       “De Los Santos called Barker around 7:30 a.m. and told him to come back to the

condominium. When Barker got to the condominium, he saw that the front door jamb

had been broken and the place was ransacked. De Los Santos was upset. He had a

handgun in his waistband. De Los Santos asked Barker where he had been since he had

left the house. De Los Santos told Barker that he had been robbed. Barker advised De

Los Santos that he had been working; De Los Santos told him that he believed him. He

said he knew who had done it and that he already had him.

       “De Los Santos took Barker to his bedroom. The room was ransacked. In a

nearby bathroom, he saw the victim; the victim had a split lip and a black eye. The

victim repeatedly told De Los Santos that he had not committed the burglary. De Los

Santos had Barker sit with the victim while he went to do something. The victim had

blood on his shirt.

       “De Los Santos returned and told the victim to put on a hooded sweatshirt, a hat

and sunglasses. He told the victim that he was going to take him home. The victim

continued to plead with De Los Santos, advising him he had not committed the burglary.

De Los Santos told Barker to watch the house for him because the front door was broken.

       “De Los Santos walked the victim out of the house while holding the handgun. De

Los Santos told the victim not to do anything stupid and not be loud, and ‘everything will

be cool.’ De Los Santos gave Barker a look that Barker interpreted ‘like a wink,’ that he

was not going to take the victim home.

                                            7
        “De Los Santos and the victim left in a green sedan that was driven by defendant.

Defendant had been outside waiting in the car; De Los Santos and the victim got in the

backseat.

        “Barker observed spots of blood on the hallway floor. De Los Santos called

Barker and asked him to try to clean up the blood. Barker tried to clean up the blood but

was unsuccessful. Barker went home around 8:45 a.m. De Los Santos was still not

home.

        “Barker saw De Los Santos and defendant several days later. Barker told

defendant that the victim’s girlfriend was worried that she had not heard from the victim.

Defendant told Barker that they had driven the victim out to the desert in Sky Valley.

The victim kept asking De Los Santos not to hurt him. Defendant claimed he tried to

convince De Los Santos not to hurt the victim, and to convince the victim to tell the truth

about the burglary. Defendant claimed that De Los Santos ‘snapped.’ Defendant walked

away and De Los Santos shot the victim. De Los Santos told Barker that the victim had

‘told more truth than he should have’ and had admitted his involvement in the burglary.

De Los Santos admitted to Barker that he had lost it and shot the victim. They left the

victim’s body tied to a post.

        “Barker directed Investigator Alfaro to the condominium where De Los Santos

had lived. De Los Santos’s no longer lived in the condominium. The front door jamb

showed signs of damage. There were bleach stains on the carpet. Chemical tests were

done on some of the walls and carpet, and were presumptive for blood. During a search

                                             8
of De Los Santos’s car, police found shotgun shells. Police also found a loaded rifle, and

.40-caliber ammunition in De Los Santos’s new apartment.”

              4.     “[C.A.]’S TESTIMONY

       “[C.A.] was defendant’s girlfriend in 2010 and 2011. She and defendant used

drugs when they were dating, including heroin and methamphetamine. [C.A.] and

defendant moved into an apartment together in Palm Springs. The victim would come to

the apartment approximately once each week. They would all do drugs together. [C.A.]

met De Los Santos in high school; he was her drug supplier. In 2011, defendant drove

several different cars, including his mother’s Toyota sedan. At the time of the victim’s

murder, defendant had been working with De Los Santos selling drugs for him.

       “The last time [C.A.] saw the victim was in August 2011; she became concerned

when she had not heard from him in a week. [C.A.] asked defendant whether he had

talked to the victim recently. Defendant told her he had not talked to the victim and that

she was not to mention the victim any more. She thought this was strange because they

had been friends. [C.A.] heard rumors about what had happened to the victim. [C.A.]

asked defendant if he had killed the victim, and he claimed he had nothing to do with it.

In a pretrial interview, [C.A.] had claimed that when she asked defendant about the

victim, he told her to ‘stay the fuck out’ of the disappearance and was adamant that she

not mention the victim’s name.

       “During the investigation, Detective Alfaro discovered that defendant was in

prison. No search of defendant’s home could be made because of his incarceration. The

parties stipulated that defendant pleaded guilty in Riverside County on September 30,

                                             9
2011, to one felony count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. He was

sentenced to two years eight months in prison.”

                                       DISCUSSION

       In light of the decision in Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th, remand to the trial court for

further proceedings is necessary.

       SB 1437 became effective January 1, 2019. “[SB 1437] modified California’s

felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure murder

liability is not imposed on someone unless they were the actual killer, acted with the

intent to kill, or acted as a major participant in the underlying felony and with reckless

indifference to human life.” (People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 220.) As

relevant here, SB 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e), which provides, “A participant

in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death

occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was

the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,

aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the

actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a

major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human

life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).) Section 190.2,

subdivision (d) provides, “Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual

killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids,

abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a

felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some

                                              10
person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be

punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of

parole if a special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been

found to be true under Section 190.4.”

       SB 1437 also created a process through which convicted persons can seek

resentencing if they could no longer be convicted under the reformed homicide law.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), provides in part, “A person

convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences

doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that

person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced

the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter

conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts.” Section 1172.6,

subdivision (c), provides, “Within 60 days after service of a petition . . . , the prosecutor

shall file and serve a response. The petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days

after the prosecutor’s response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good

cause. After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold

a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If

the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the

court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show

cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” If the

petitioner makes a prima facie showing he is eligible for relief under section 1172.6, the

                                              11
court shall hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) At this hearing,

either party may present new evidence and the prosecution bears the burden of proving

the petitioner could still be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1172.6, subd.

(d)(3).)

       In Strong, the California Supreme Court resolved a split of the Courts of Appeal as

to whether a special circumstance finding reached prior to Banks and Clark precluded

relief under section 1172.6. Banks and Clark “substantially clarified the law” regarding

what it means to be a major participant who acts with reckless indifference to human life

for the purposes of the special circumstance statute. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp.

706-707, 721.) The Strong court concluded that where a defendant’s “case was tried

before both Banks and Clark, the special circumstance findings do not preclude him [or

her] from making out a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1172.6.” (Strong,

at p. 721.) A court “err[s] in concluding otherwise.” (Ibid.)

       In this case, the trial court summarily denied defendant’s petition for resentencing

based on the felony-murder special circumstance finding made by the jury. However, the

jury finding predated Banks and Clark. Hence, the special circumstance finding did not

preclude defendant from “making out a prima facie case for resentencing under section

1172.6.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 721.) Therefore, we agree with the People that

“[s]ince the felony-murder special circumstance finding in appellant’s case predated

Banks and Clark, that finding does not render appellant categorically ineligible for

resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.” The trial court erred by summarily

denying the petition relying on the special circumstance finding.

                                            12
       Accordingly, we must remand the matter for the trial court to consider defendant’s

petition in light of Strong as nothing in the record demonstrates that defendant is

ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The trial court shall give defendant’s counsel an

opportunity to provide briefing, determine whether defendant has made out a prima facie

case for relief and, to the extent necessary, issue an order to show cause and conduct an

evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1) & (3).)

                                       DISPOSITION

       The trial court’s order denying the petition is reversed and the matter is remanded

for further proceedings pursuant to section 1172.6, as set forth in this opinion.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                         MILLER
                                                                                    Acting P. J.

We concur:

SLOUGH
                                  J.

RAPHAEL
                                  J.

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