Court Opinion

ID: 9457650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:28:43.463639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:26.890361
License: Public Domain

CHOY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The voluntariness of Griswold’s guilty plea was the sole subject of an evidentiary hearing, conducted after the Arizona Supreme Court issued a writ of cor-am nobis. In my opinion, the lower state court’s findings, which were affirmed by the state’s supreme court, are not entitled to the presumption of correctness provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). At least two of the exceptions to the raising of this presumption are applicable here.
If “the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing,” the findings are not presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (3). Griswold has long alleged certain facts that were not adequately developed at the eoram nobis hearing.
Griswold, who was sixty-three years old at the time, was in poor health and in need of medical attention during the five month period from his arrest to the entry of his guilty plea. According to his petition, he was denied medical attention by the prosecutor, with the remark, “I hope he dies[;] it will save the State a lot of money.”
Although the lower court made a finding of fact to the effect “That Mr. Gris-*926wold had a cardiac condition, ulcers and was hard of hearing during the pendency of his case, and that his health deteriorated during the time he was in jail,” the court did not investigate the claim that the role played by the prosecutor brought about this “deterioration.” This is plainly a fact “material” to the voluntariness of Griswold’s guilty plea.
Nor did the court develop other facts relating to the conduct of the prosecutor. Griswold’s funds and property were confiscated at the direction of the prosecutor, who refused to allow the assets to be used to pay defense counsel. The prosecutor filed a list of approximately seventy potential witnesses, most of whom spoke only Navajo. Two days before the date set for trial, the prosecutor reduced the number to twenty-eight.*
These factual allegations are “material” to the voluntariness of Griswold’s plea. If they are true, they make out a convincing case that the prosecutor coerced the plea by using an array of heavy indirect pressures on Griswold and his counsel. Yet, the prosecutor was not called to testify in the coram nobis evidentiary hearing.
My review of the record leads me to conclude that the state court’s “factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (8). In addition to the above factors, it is significant that Griswold’s two defense attorneys pressured him for an additional $5,000, just four days before the date set for trial. I think the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that this did not affect the voluntariness of Griswold’s plea (State v. Griswold, 105 Ariz. 1, 5, 457 P.2d 331, 334 (1969)) is not borne out by the whole record.
In sum, there were inadequacies in the state hearing of such magnitude that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. I would reverse and remand.

 Defense counsel’s motion for a continuance was denied. As a result, he stated in court just before the guilty plea was entered that the defense was not prepared for trial.