Court Opinion

ID: 9853579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:50:35.758421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:51.474649
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur specially, not because I disagree with the premises upon which the court founds its conclusions as far as it went, but because there are features of this case that must not be overlooked. I thoroughly agree that the court was entirely correct in finding that the consents to adoption were not obtained by fraud, undue influence, and misrepresentation. That was a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge, as pointed out in the court’s opinion.
There were other issues in the case which I believe ought to be mentioned, so that no question or impression will be left that the trial court did not consider them or that we did not consider them important enough to discuss. Fortunately, the legislature has restored reason and purpose to an interlocutory decree. As mentioned by the court’s opinion here in its footnote 2, there was a provision in old Section 1-710.3, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., in effect when this case was heard by the trial court, which provided that “The entry of the interlocutory or final decree of adoption renders any consent irrevocable.” That provision rendered entirely useless any provision of the then existing adoption laws providing for withdrawal of a consent for cause and as far as the natural parent was concerned negated any purpose of a waiting period between the entry of an interlocutory and a final decree.
To his credit, the trial judge did not rely upon that provision of the law but went ahead in his findings and conclusions of law and gave effect to the genuine purpose of the waiting period, pointing out that
“ ‘The requirement is to prevent an unduly precipitated action; it is intended for the benefit of all parties to the adoption proceedings, including the natural parents, and it is aimed at determining with some certainty whether the child’s best interests will be promoted by the adoption.’ ” 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 50, at p. 469.
There was some conflicting evidence as to whether the natural mother’s consent was precipitated by ill health and whether there were changed conditions due to the death of the adoptive father justifying the denial of a final decree.
It has been my observation that there is probably a tendency to undervalue the rights of the natural parent and base a decision on what person is the most affluent and provides more physical benefits to a child. There is.no finding by the court here that the natural parent is unfit. For that reason, there should not only be concern about the interests of the child but also the interests of the natural parent. While set *710in a background of the nonconsenting parent, in Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo. 1976, 550 P.2d 481, the principles there stated are also applicable to the ill-advised consent of a natural parent made under the stress of misfortune and in the light of then existing circumstances, since changed. The relationship of parent and child is a sacred tie and parents have the first and natural right to their children. Adoption tears apart that relationship and for that reason courts should cautiously guard the natural, warm relationship and love of a parent for his or her child, a precious right. If the natural relationship can be rescued, then it should be. The interlocutory period affords an opportunity for that possibility.
I think it should be pointed out that the trial judge specifically in his findings did not overlook the parental rights but could not under the evidence find that the natural parent-child relationship could be retained, the best interests of the child being so overwhelming and in areas other than affluence, thereby overcoming the balance between rights of the natural parent and best interests of the child, a delicate problem.