Court Opinion

ID: 9535695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:51:58.45166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:18.568681
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J.,

dissenting:

Agreeing with the majority’s opening statement that “[t]his case is a reprise of American Newspapers v. Tax Comm’n, 174 Md. 56 [American Newspapers v. McCardell], 197 A. 574 (1938),” but disagreeing with the majority’s treatment of that precedent, I dissent.
In American Newspapers, this Court, cognizant of the fact that “[t]he appellant has a plant containing much valuable machinery and employing a large number of people in the printing and publishing of the two newspapers,” but basing its decision on “.. . the character of the work done in the operation of his publishing business” (emphasis added), held that the publishing of a newspaper did not constitute manufacturing. It may be of some significance to note that there is no reason to believe the equipment used in 1938 was not as sophisticated and automated as the existing technological plateau would permit. But it is clear a comparison of the facts contained in the record extracts in American Newspapers and in the instant case shows that “the character of the work done” has not changed. The basis processes and machinery remain the same; the differences are ones of degree and of dollar amounts occasioned by technological advances in the intervening years. Nor does it appear that the second factor cited by the majority, the common understanding of the word manufacturing, has *647changed since we observed in American Newspapers that “it had not occurred to many persons that newspapers are made in a factory.” 174 Md. at 60, 197 A. at 576. See, Perdue v. St. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 264 Md. 228, 236-38, 286 A. 2d 165, 169-70 (1972). On the purely factual level, therefore, there appears to be no basis for a change from our earlier decision.
More importantly, sound rules of statutory construction preclude a shift in position by this Court. Our holding in American Newspapers was not grounded on the subsequently deleted provision of the Baltimore City ordinance which expressly excluded from the tax exemption “manufacturing apparatus, tools, type or machinery used in the preparation, printing or issuing, by the printers or publishers thereof, of any daily journal or other periodic publication.” At the time of American Newspapers, Baltimore City’s authority to grant exemption from local taxation was only that specifically conferred by the General Assembly, by public general law (then Maryland Code, Article 81, § 7 (25) and (26)) and public local law (then Article 4, § 6 (28)(c)), both of which authorized the Mayor and City Council to exempt from local taxation property used in manufacturing. On the basis of these enabling acts and the general language of the ordinance, we refused the appellant the exemption, expressly noting:
“The exception of ‘any journal or other periodical’ does not depend on the ordinance, but whether in fact it is a ‘manufacturing business,’ within the meaning of the statute.” 174 Md. at 59, 197 A. at 575.
Our judicial construction of “manufacturing business” as not including newspaper publishing became, by long-honored rules of statutory construction, a binding interpretation on this Court. “Decisions of this court construing the statute become part of the statute and continue to be so unless and until changed by statute.” Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 115, 122 A. 2d 570, 575 (1956). See also, Stack v. Marney, 252 Md. 43, 49, 248 A. 2d 880, 884 (1969); Smolin v. First Fidelity Ass’n., 238 Md. 386,
*648393, 209 A. 2d 546, 549 (1965); Nutwell v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 205 Md. 338, 343, 108 A. 2d 149, 151 (1954); Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, 198 Md. 227, 233, 81 A. 2d 617, 620 (1951); Smith v. City of Baltimore, 120 Md. 143, 87 A. 824 (1913); Jackson v. Jackson, 13 Md. App. 725, 284 A. 2d 654(1971).
In the thirty-five year interval since the American Newspaper case, there has been no legislative action showing an intent to change the result reached in that case. I cannot acquiesce in the majority’s supposition that the City Council, in dropping the specific exception which the ordinance contained at the time of American Newspapers, thereby intended the ordinance to be more liberally construed with respect to newspapers. The language of the specific exception was not what prevented a “liberal construction” in American Newspapers; the term “manufacturing,” in the context of the ordinance, has not been significantly changed by any of the subsequent amendments to the ordinance. Nor has the General Assembly manifested an intention to alter the construction we placed on the term “manufacturing” in American Newspapers. See, Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.) Article 81, § 9 (23) and (24). Moreover, in 1965, the General Assembly added a definition of manufacturing which does not include newspaper publishing, Article 81, § 2 (25). As we noted in Perdue Foods, Inc. v. State Dept. of Assessments & Taxation, 264 Md. 672, 689, 288 A. 2d 170, 179 (1972): “From this failure to define, the inference is drawn that the Court’s determination of legislative intent in . . . [a previous decision of this Court] meets with the approval of the General Assembly.” I, therefore, fail to see any evidence on the part of the legislative bodies, either State or local, to change the result reached in our previous decision, and, therefore, would vote to abide by it.
I think the Court should have reached and decided the constitutional issue. I add only that I am not persuaded by the brief dicta contained in the majority’s treatment of the equal protection question. An administrative interpretation, while entitled to weight, is not binding on this Court, Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 449, 295 A. *6492d 223, 228 (1972). More importantly, without consideration of the differences between job printers and newspaper publishers in light of the purpose behind the classification, no legitimate judgment can be made of its constitutionality.
I would vote to affirm the order of the Maryland Tax Court. I am authorized to state that Judge Digges concurs in this opinion.