Court Opinion

ID: 9381306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:03:28.412458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.512660
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/23 P. v. Lopez CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A164096
                           v.                                          (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
 JOSEPH KENNETH LOPEZ, JR.,                                            SCR5387451)
         Defendant and Appellant.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
                                                              I.
         Appellant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, active
participation in a criminal street gang, and unlawful possession of a
semiautomatic firearm. The jury rendered true findings for firearms
enhancements under Penal Code2 section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c),
and (d), in connection with the murder conviction. The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of a few months short of 44-years-to-life, composed of a
15-years-to-life term for the count 1 murder conviction; plus a consecutive
25-years-to-life term for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement; plus a consecutive determinate three-year upper term for the
count 2 participation in a criminal street gang conviction; plus a consecutive

       We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to the
         1

California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
         2   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                               1
determinate eight-month term for the count 3 unlawful possession of a
semiautomatic firearm conviction. It stayed sentence on the other
enhancements.
      In a prior appeal, we affirmed the convictions but remanded for
resentencing in light of the intervening enactment of Senate Bill No. 620
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “to consider whether to strike some or all of the
firearm enhancements imposed under section 12022.53.” (People v. Lopez
(Dec. 12, 2018, A129664) [nonpub. opn.] [2018 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 8400].)
Rather than restate the factual and procedural background, we will assume
familiarity with our prior opinion. In the resentencing proceeding on
remand, the trial court declined to strike any of the enhancements. In this
appeal, appellant argues that we should remand again because, even though
the court refused to strike any of the enhancements, its silence on his
alternative request for reduction of the enhancements indicates it was
unaware it had the discretion to order such reductions. We are unpersuaded
and will affirm.
                                      II.
      At the resentencing on remand, the trial court denied all relief.
The court explained it was “wholly unpersuaded that the factors argued by
the defense constitute[d] a basis . . . to exercise its discretion when considered
against the overwhelming backdrop of factors to the contrary.” “The
characterization of [appellant’s] conduct as mitigated and due to
circumstances beyond his control [was] belied by the tonnage of information
indicating otherwise.” “The conclusory leap made by the defense in the
pleadings that . . . ‘if Joseph had been a little older and his brain had been
more mature, this incident would never have happened,’ [was] pure
speculation, completely without foundation, and directly contradicted by
everything else known about [appellant] and the night in question.”

                                        2
      “Without getting into the individual details of the murder,” which, the
trial court noted, were “captured in the record on appeal, the facts of this
underlying case [were] horrendous and ha[d] left a deep and tragic scar on
the survivors of the incident and the community at large.” The court took
into consideration “[t]he cruel and callous nature of the murder, [appellant’s]
continuing lack of remorse[,] . . . his violent criminal history, and his ongoing
failures at rehabilitation” such as “his continued use of alcohol, . . . and his
involvement in the Northern Structure prison gang, and as recently as April
of [2020] . . . , his participation in a riot and a fight with another inmate.”
In addition, the court noted, “the relevant rules of the court and the factors
delineated therein, all . . . clearly demonstrate and indicate . . . that
[appellant’s] background, character, and prospects do not warrant the sought-
after relief and striking the enhancements would not be in the interest of
justice.”
      The trial court observed that “[s]ociety receives maximum protection
when the penalty, treatment or disposition of the offender is tailored to the
individual case and proportional to the offense.” In appellant’s case, “that
protection [was] afforded by imposition of the firearm enhancements found
true by the jury.” Accordingly, the court denied the “invitation to strike” so
that the “original sentence remain[ed] as imposed.”
      Finally, the trial court explained it was “aware of Senate Bill [No.] 81
[(Reg. Sess. 2021–2022)] and its amendment to Penal Code [s]ection 1385.”
“Due to the procedural posture of [appellant’s] case and the language in
[section] 1385(c)(7) that [the statute would] go into effect in January of 2022,”
the court was “of the opinion the changes to the law found in [section] 1385(c)
[did] not and [would] not apply to this case.” “That having been said, to the
extent any court on review [would] examine[] this record for findings at this

                                         3
hearing related to amended provisions of [section] 1385,” the court made “the
specific finding that for all the previously mentioned reasons for denying the
request for relief . . . , dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public
safety as defined under [section]1385.”
                                     III.
      Even if the trial court was unaware of its discretion to reduce
appellant’s sentencing term, as appellant claims it was, remand is
unnecessary if “ ‘the record shows that the trial court clearly indicated when
it originally sentenced the defendant that it would not in any event have
[reduced the] enhancement’ even if it had the discretion.” (People v. Franks
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 892, quoting People v. McDaniels (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.) We find that to be the case here. Contrary to
appellant’s characterizations of the record, the trial court gave two clear
indications that it would not reduce the enhancement terms. Specifically, the
court (1) declined to strike any of the enhancements despite knowing the
consequences of doing so; and (2) described its basis for doing so in terms that
illustrated its belief that a 25-year-to-life term for the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement was the precisely appropriate term.
      Appellant nonetheless insists “it is not entirely clear that the trial court
was aware that it had any discretion other than making the binary choice of
either entirely striking the firearm enhancements or instead entirely leaving
them in place.” According to appellant, “there was another option in the
law,” permitting a trial court to substitute a lesser-included section 12022.53
subdivision (b) or (c) firearm enhancement for a section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement.” But while appellant’s focus on resentencing
was striking of the enhancements in their entirely, he did request imposition
of lesser enhancements as an alternative, citing People v. Morrison (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 217, 220–223, the principal case he now relies upon.

                                        4
      At the time, there was a split of authority concerning whether trial
courts have power to reduce sentencing enhancements under section
12022.53, with Morrison and other cases taking the view that there is such
authority, on the one hand, and People v. Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637,
643, reversed (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, and other cases taking the view that
there is no such authority, on the other hand. Our Supreme Court has since
clarified the point, holding in Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, that the
Morrison view is correct. But the fact the trial court here did not expressly
rule on appellant’s alternative request is of no moment. Nothing in the
record indicates it decided to follow the now disapproved view of the Court of
Appeal in Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 637. From its silence, we presume
the court was aware of its discretion and exercised it accordingly. On this
record, another remand would be futile. It is abundantly clear from the
court’s comments that it was unimpressed by appellant’s case for mitigation,
and that, if specially called upon to rule on a request for reduction of the
enhancements, it would deny such relief. (People v. McVey (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 405, 419 [“In light of the trial court’s express consideration of
the factors in aggravation and mitigation, its pointed comments on the
record, and its deliberate choice of the highest possible term for the firearm
enhancement, . . . remand in these circumstances would serve no purpose but
to squander scarce judicial resources.”].)
                                DISPOSITION

      Affirmed.
                                                     STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:

BROWN, Acting P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

                                        5