Court Opinion

ID: 9453272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:08:46.385858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:35.619082
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
The term “disability” in the Social Security Act covers inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable “mental impairment” which can be expected to last continuously for at least a year (42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) (1) (A) and 423(c) (2)). The social security regulation in question (20 C.F.R. § 404.1519(c) (2) (iii), 42 U.S.C.A.App. p. 494) provides:
“Personality disorders are characterized by patterns of socially unacceptable behavior, such as chronic alcoholism, sexual deviation and drug addiction. In the absence of an associated severe psychoneurosis or psychosis, a personality disorder does not in itself result in inability to engage in substantial gainful activity. A person confined in a correctional institution because of antisocial behavior will not be considered disabled unless he has other severe impairments which would preclude any substantial gainful activity if he had not been so confined.”
Psychiatrist Frank M. Perez’s last report on plaintiff states:
“The inmate is basically a socio-pathic personality with pedophilic tendencies. He has never profited from previous experiences or repeated periods of incarceration. He has been classified as a Sexually Dangerous Person according to the provisions of the Penitentiary Act. He is not considered mentally ill or intellectually deficient. From the prognostic point of view, the social rehabilitation of a person with his long record of offenses is very poor from the probability point of view.
“It is felt that inmate should remain in this prison until the conclusion of the maximum term of his sentence.”
The Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance found that plaintiff had a “mental condition.” Subsequently the hearing examiner found that plaintiff had a “mental aberration” that had reached the “long-continued and indefi*849nite stage.” In my judgment these findings presently qualify plaintiff for “disability” as defined in the statute. In rejecting plaintiff’s application, the hearing examiner relied on the Regulation. However, to the extent that the Regulation is inconsistent with the statute, it must give way. Marion v. Gardner, 359 F.2d 175, 181 (8th Cir. 1966). This, of course, does not mean that court-imposed hospitalization or incarceration will establish the statutory disability except in unusual circumstances, such as presented in Marion and here. -