Court Opinion

ID: 9915270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 22:03:25.52005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:20.937006
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U
                                              No. 1-23-1879B
                                        Order filed January 4, 2024
                                                                                           Fifth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                     IN THE
                         APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                              )   Appeal from the
                                                                   )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                     )   Cook County.
                                                                   )
     v.                                                            )   No. 23DV7627201
                                                                   )
 MATTHEW CHAPMAN,                                                  )   Honorable
                                                                   )   Torrie Corbin,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                    )   Judge Presiding.

           JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Mikva and Navarro concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention.

¶2        Defendant Matthew Chapman appeals from an order of the circuit court denying him

pretrial release under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/art. 110 (West 2022) (Code)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),

commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today Act (Act). Mr.

Chapman argues that the court erred in granting the State’s petition where the State referred to
No. 1-23-1879B

surveillance video of the alleged incident in its proffer, but did not tender the video or a summary

of its contents to the defense prior to the hearing. Mr. Chapman also contends that the circuit court

erred in finding that the State met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof was evident or the presumption great that Mr. Chapman committed the offenses charged,

that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that real and present threat. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶4      On September 9, 2023, Mr. Chapman was charged by felony complaint with unlawful

restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 2022)), aggravated domestic battery causing permanent

disfigurement (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2022)), and aggravated domestic battery, strangulation

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2022)), and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On September 29,

2023, the State filed a petition for a pretrial detention hearing. In the petition, the State alleged that

Mr. Chapman committed the offense of aggravated domestic battery in that, during an altercation

at O’Hare International Airport, he strangled his former girlfriend, bit her cheek, which caused a

permanent scar, and grabbed her and would not let go.

¶5      At the hearing, the assistant State’s attorney (ASA) represented that she tendered to defense

counsel the police reports that were in her possession, Mr. Chapman’s “rap sheet, his LEADS, a

copy of all of the complaints, and summaries from the victim and eyewitness’ statements.” In its

proffer, the State alleged that the incident occurred on July 13, 2023, at O’Hare Airport. The victim

and Mr. Chapman had been dating “on and off’ since 2020. While the victim was in the security

line, Mr. Chapman approached her and grabbed her from behind. He then grabbed her throat with

his left hand, impeding her ability to breathe. Mr. Chapman then bit the victim’s cheek, causing

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No. 1-23-1879B

two lacerations on the side of her face. He then held the victim by the neck and directed her to a

different security line. Once they were back in line, Mr. Chapman attempted to rip open the

lacerations on the victim’s face with his fingers.

¶6     The victim was able to get away from Mr. Chapman and ran, but Mr. Chapman caught her,

pushed her against a wall, and bit her cheek again. He also struck her with a closed fist, and then

threw her to the ground and continued to attack her. He bit her on the face again and bit her on the

right side of her abdomen. Two civilians lifted Mr. Chapman off of the victim and she fled for the

airport exit. Mr. Chapman followed her outside of the airport where he again grabbed her by the

neck and pushed her against a metal railing causing her to sustain a “fracture.” A nearby TSA

agent flagged down police and Mr. Chapman was still on the scene when police arrived. The ASA

represented that the entire incident was captured on surveillance video. The video was currently in

police custody, but the felony review unit reviewed the video prior to filing the charges. The victim

identified Mr. Chapman in a show-up and the victim had visible lacerations on her face.

¶7     The State also presented evidence of Mr. Chapman’s criminal background. In 2021, Mr.

Chapman received a three-year sentence for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. He was on parole

for that offense when the offenses in this case occurred. Mr. Chapman was also convicted of

robbery in 2005, for which he received a sentence of seven years. Mr. Chapman had three

misdemeanors, a 2017 “driving 40 plus miles an hour where he was attempting to obstruct,” and a

2013 retail theft. Mr. Chapman also had four previous arrests for domestic battery, the most recent

from 2021 with the same victim as in this case.

¶8     In mitigation, defense counsel represented that Mr. Chapman was 37 years old and had

lived in Chicago his entire life. He lived with his mother and one of his two children. He was not

working due to a heart condition. Defense counsel noted that because this case was originally

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No. 1-23-1879B

charged as misdemeanor and was dismissed before being brought as a felony, Mr. Chapman had

been out of custody for more than 30 days and there was no indication that he made contact with

the victim during that period. Defense counsel contended that it was clear that lesser conditions

could satisfy the safety of the complaining witness, including a no contact order, GPS monitoring,

and home confinement.

¶9     Defense counsel noted that the original statement from the victim did not include any

allegations that Mr. Chapman grabbed her by the neck, and the only injuries noted were the marks

on her face. In addition, none of the witness statements indicated that they saw Mr. Chapman grab

the victim by the neck or choke her. Counsel also asserted that the State did not proffer any

evidence of permanent disfigurement. Defense counsel finally noted that her office had not been

tendered the surveillance video referenced by the ASA.

¶ 10   The pretrial services officer stated that Mr. Chapman had received a “Yes” for new violent

criminal activity flag. Mr. Chapman had been rated a 4 out of 6 on the new criminal activity scale

and a 3 out of 6 on the failure to appear scale. Pretrial services recommended maximum conditions.

¶ 11   The court found that if the State’s allegations were true, then this was a “very brazen”

attack because it occurred in public. The court stated that even if defense counsel’s representations

that Mr. Chapman did not grab the victim by the neck were true, the allegations were still

“extremely troubling.” The court noted that Mr. Chapman’s actions were “pretty bold” to do in an

airport. The court acknowledged that Mr. Chapman had been out of custody for 30 days and had

not contacted the victim, but the court also noted that half of that time he was still on parole for

his unlawful use of a weapon by a felon conviction, and would not want any parole violations. The

court found that it was “problematic” that Mr. Chapman was alleged to have committed these

offenses while he was on parole for a felony offense.

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No. 1-23-1879B

¶ 12    The court found that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mr.

Chapman committed the felony offenses of aggravated battery and aggravated domestic battery.

The court found that Mr. Chapman posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community and there were no conditions or combination of conditions of pretrial relief that

could mitigate that threat. The court therefore remanded Mr. Chapman to the custody of the Cook

County Sheriff while the case was pending for trial.

¶ 13    Mr. Chapman filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court’s order. We find that

we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(j) (West 2022);

Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).

¶ 14                                         II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15    On appeal, Mr. Chapman contends that he was denied an opportunity for a fair hearing

where the State did not tender the surveillance video or a summary of the video prior to the hearing.

He also contends that the State failed to meet its burden by proving by clear and convincing

evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that Mr. Chapman committed the

offenses charged, that Mr. Chapman was a real and present threat to any person or the community,

and that there were no less restrictive means to mitigate that threat.

¶ 16    Under the Act, we presume that all defendants are entitled to pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-2(a) (West 2022). The State has the burden of proving at a hearing that a defendant should

be denied pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). To meet its burden, the State

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great

that the defendant has committed an offense that qualifies for pretrial detention; (2) the defendant

poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community based on

the specific and articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions of

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No. 1-23-1879B

pretrial release can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the

community, based on the specific and articulable facts of the case. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West

2022).

¶ 17                                    A. Surveillance Video

¶ 18     Mr. Chapman first contends, relying on section 6.1(f)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(f)(1) (West 2022)), that the State was required to tender the surveillance video or a summary

of its contents to the defense prior to the hearing. That section provides:

         “Prior to the hearing, the State shall tender to the defendant copies of the defendant’s

         criminal history available, any written or recorded statements, and the substance of any

         oral statements made by any person, if relied upon by the State in its petition, and any

         police reports in the prosecutor’s possession at the time of the hearing.” Id.

Mr. Chapman acknowledges that the statute does not specifically list surveillance videos, but urges

us to broadly construe the statute, maintaining that the statute was intended to allow the defense a

more robust opportunity to prepare for a detention hearing than that provided by the previous law.

He asserts that we should not read the items listed in the statute as an exhaustive list because that

would allow the State to improperly benefit by keeping information to itself.

¶ 19     The State responds that Mr. Chapman is asking this court to inject language into the statute

that was not provided by the legislature. The State maintains that the surveillance video does not

fall within any of the categories listed in the statute and this court may not modify the statute by

creating a new category. The State also points out that section 110-6.1(f)(2) allows the State to

rely on “reliable information,” in its proffer, which includes surveillance videos.

¶ 20     At the hearing, when the ASA referenced the surveillance video, defense counsel

interjected that she had not seen the video. The ASA responded that she did not have the video,

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No. 1-23-1879B

but stated that she tendered a supplemental report that contained a summary of the surveillance

video. Defense counsel responded that the only thing she had was “a line that says an officer

reviewed surveillance video. Just below that, a short statement that my client allegedly made, and

then said that the video corresponds with that statement.” The ASA again represented that she had

tendered everything in her possession that was relied upon for charging. The ASA later stated

regarding the video: “That surveillance video is in police custody, and it was reviewed by felony

review prior to these charges.”

¶ 21   Section 110-6.1(f)(1) is clear that the State is required to tender only reports and

information in its possession if relied upon by the State in its petition. In this case, the ASA

represented that the video was in police custody, and not in the possession of the State. The ASA

also represented that she tendered a summary of the video contents to defense counsel prior to the

hearing. Although Mr. Chapman now argues that the summary was inadequate, he does not allege,

and the record does not reveal, that the State had anything else in its possession that it failed to

tender. While we encourage the State to diligently comply with the mandates of section 110-

6.1(f)(1), we find no error here.

¶ 22                                  B. The State’s Burden

¶ 23   Mr. Chapman next contends that the State failed to meet its burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that Mr. Chapman

committed the offenses charged. We note that Mr. Chapman does not contest that he was charged

with a detainable offense under the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)). Mr. Chapman

did not address this issue in his memorandum, but instead relies on the arguments raised in his

notice of appeal. In his notice of appeal, Mr. Chapman noted that he was originally charged with

a misdemeanor in this case. The misdemeanor complaint did not allege any strangulation or contact

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No. 1-23-1879B

with the neck of the victim. The State eventually dismissed the misdemeanor charge and later filed

a felony complaint. Mr. Chapman argued that the State failed to support either aggravated domestic

battery charge at the hearing.

¶ 24   Mr. Chapman contended that the Chicago Police Incident Report also did not include any

allegation of strangulation and the victim did not allege that Mr. Chapman made contact with her

neck until speaking with police almost a month after the incident. He further asserted that the State

did not proffer that any of the witnesses observed any type of visible injury to the victim’s neck.

The officer who responded to the scene did not note any “redness” to the victim’s neck and the

State did not proffer any medical records to support the allegation of strangulation or neck injury.

¶ 25   With regard to permanent disfigurement, Mr. Chapman asserted that the initial

misdemeanor complaint alleged only that Mr. Chapman caused “minor lacerations” when he struck

the victim with “closed fists.” He contended that the State did not demonstrate that the victim

contemporaneously alleged that Mr. Chapman bit her cheeks and the responding officers did not

mention bite marks. Mr. Chapman further asserted that the State failed to produce any photographs

of the bite marks or independent eyewitness statements regarding permanent scarring.

¶ 26   The Act does not establish a standard of review for orders granting, denying, or setting

conditions on pretrial release. We generally afford great deference to the trial court’s factual

determinations and will reverse them only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450, ¶ 8. The trial court’s ultimate decision to detain

or not, however, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)

230864, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9); People v. Whitmore,

2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is

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No. 1-23-1879B

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would agree with the position

adopted by the trial court. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9.

¶ 27   In this case, the court heard the State’s proffer, which stated that Mr. Chapman had

physically attacked the victim in a public area, causing her significant injuries. Defense counsel

made the same arguments regarding the allegations in the prior misdemeanor charge that Mr.

Chapman made in his notice of appeal. The court found that Mr. Chapman’s attack was “very

brazen” and “extremely troubling.” The court stated that even if what defense counsel argued was

true and that Mr. Chapman did not grab the victim by the neck, but “grabbed her by her hair and

pulled her out of line or something, that’s pretty bold in an airport to do to someone and troubling

to the court.” The court also noted that Mr. Chapman was on parole for his unlawful use of a

weapon conviction at the time of the alleged offenses. The court found that it was “problematic

that while on parole for a felony offense charge, he was charged and accused of this offense.”

¶ 28   The State proffered that the allegations were supported by eyewitness statements, including

from the victim, and video surveillance. The ASA represented that the victim had “visible

lacerations about her entire face” and was taken to the hospital after the incident where she was

treated for “multiple lacerations and bite marks to her face, abrasions to her neck, [and] bite

wounds to her abdomen.” At this stage, the State does not have to prove the elements of the charged

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 13. Here, we find that the

circuit court’s finding that the proof was evident or that the presumption was great that Mr.

Chapman committed the charged offenses was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 29   The next consideration is whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that

Mr. Chapman posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West

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No. 1-23-1879B

2022). In his notice appeal, Mr. Chapman argued that he did not have any prior convictions for

domestic battery, aggravated battery, or even simple battery, and that the State did not allege any

violent psychological or social history. He also contended that there was “serious doubt” as to

whether he actually strangled or bit the victim and the State “[a]t most” alleged that he committed

misdemeanor domestic battery. He also points out that because of the procedural history of this

case, he was out of custody, off parole, and not under the supervision of the court for almost a

month and did not threaten or attempt to threaten the safety of the victim or anyone else during

that time.

¶ 30   First, as we have already found, the court’s finding that the State met its burden of showing

the proof was evident or the presumption was great that Mr. Chapman committed the charged

offenses was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the State did more than

allege that he committed “[a]t most” misdemeanor battery. In addition, the court addressed Mr.

Chapman’s argument that he was out of custody for almost a month and did not attempt to threaten

the safety of the victim during that time. As the ASA represented, Mr. Chapman was on parole for

his unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charge until September 15, 2023. The hearing occurred

on September 29, 2023. Therefore, Mr. Chapman was out of custody and off parole for only a

period of two weeks. The court found that Mr. Chapman “surely did not want any parole

violations.” Moreover, the State proffered that Mr. Chapman had previously been arrested for a

domestic dispute involving this same victim. We therefore find that the circuit court’s finding that

Mr. Chapman posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 31   Finally, the third element was that the State was required to prove that “no condition or

combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate

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No. 1-23-1879B

(i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on

the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3)(i) (West 2022). In his notice

of appeal, Mr. Chapman repeated his arguments regarding the period of time he spent out of

custody after the misdemeanor charges were dismissed and the felony complaint was filed. Mr.

Chapman maintains that court-ordered conditions such as GPS monitoring, house arrest, or a no

contact order would be sufficient to mitigate any threat Mr. Chapman poses to the victim or the

community.

¶ 32   Section 110-5 outlines factors for the court to consider in determining the conditions of

release. These factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of

the evidence against the defendant, and whether the defendant was on parole at the time of the

offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1), (2), (3)(B) (West 2022). In addition, subsection (a)(6) provides

additional factors for the court to consider where, as here, the defendant is charged with aggravated

domestic battery. In such circumstances, the court can also consider, inter alia, whether the person

has access to deadly weapons or a history of using deadly weapons and whether the alleged

incident involved physical injury or strangulation. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(6)(F), (H) (West 2022).

In this case, the circuit court commented on Mr. Chapman’s conviction for unlawful use of a

weapon noting his access to deadly weapons even when he was not entitled to possess a weapon.

The alleged offense also involved physical injury and strangulation. In its written detention order,

the court found that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat Mr.

Chapman posed because of his extensive criminal history including prior arrests for domestic

battery, and the fact that he was on parole at the time of the offense. Therefore, the record is clear

that there were sufficient facts to support the circuit court’s conclusion that the State proved by

clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the

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No. 1-23-1879B

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community and we find no

abuse of discretion.

¶ 33                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 35   Affirmed.

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