Court Opinion

ID: 9928320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 16:02:08.931378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:53.910745
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2187     Document: 010110992781       Date Filed: 01/31/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          January 31, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  DAVID WARNER,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 23-2187
                                                  (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00544-WJ-DLM)
  KATIE G. LUND; LISA ABEYTA;                                  (D. N.M.)
  ANDRE BILLINGSLEY; NEW MEXICO
  STATE POLICE; NEW MEXICO
  TAXATION AND REVENUE
  DEPARTMENT,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       David Warner, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal without

 prejudice of his amended complaint, which alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

 New Mexico state law. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2187       Document: 010110992781            Date Filed: 01/31/2024       Page: 2

                                      I. BACKGROUND

                             A. Amended Complaint Allegations

        Mr. Warner alleged in his amended complaint that New Mexico State Police

 Officer Andre Billingsley issued a traffic citation to him but then failed to accomplish

 any one of three alternative state law requirements: obtain Mr. Warner’s signature on the

 citation, detain him, or bring him before a magistrate. Instead, unbeknownst to

 Mr. Warner, Officer Billingsley filed the citation and a criminal summons in state court.

 State Magistrate Judge Katie Lund held an arraignment hearing and issued bench

 warrants when Mr. Warner failed to appear. Mr. Warner was arrested and detained for

 three days until he posted bail. ROA at 46-50.

                                B. District Court Proceedings

        When Mr. Warner filed his original complaint, he moved to proceed in forma

 pauperis (“ifp”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The federal magistrate judge granted the ifp

 request and noted that “[t]he statute governing [ifp] proceedings states ‘the court shall

 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a

 claim on which relief may be granted.’” ROA at 28 (alterations in original) (quoting

 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). The magistrate judge concluded the complaint failed to state a

 claim, ordered Mr. Warner to file an amended complaint, and said “[t]he Court will not

 order service of Summons and Complaint on Defendants at this time because the

 Complaint fails to state a claim over which the Court has jurisdiction.” Id. at 28-29.1

        1
          The magistrate judge added that “[t]he Court will order service if Plaintiff
 files: (i) an amended complaint that states a claim over which the Court has
                                                  2
Appellate Case: 23-2187      Document: 010110992781         Date Filed: 01/31/2024         Page: 3

        Mr. Warner filed an amended complaint naming the original defendants—Officer

 Billingsley, Magistrate Judge Lund, and Magistrate Court Clerk Lisa Abeyta—and

 adding the New Mexico State Police and the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue

 Department as defendants. His § 1983 claims alleged violations of Amendments I, IV, V,

 VIII, IX, X, and XIV of the United States Constitution. His state claims alleged

 violations of the New Mexico Constitution and various New Mexico statutes. He also

 alleged various state common law tort claims.

        The district court, noting the amended complaint was “in large part identical to the

 original Complaint,” ROA at 63, dismissed the federal claims against the individual

 defendants for failure to state a claim, dismissed the federal claims against the state

 entities as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and declined to exercise supplemental

 jurisdiction over the state law claims, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

        As relevant to one of the issues presented on appeal, the district court said that

 Magistrate Judge Lund had judicial immunity from suit for monetary damages. ROA

 at 67-69. Although the amended complaint alleged that she “le[ft] the Court House,

 [went] to the New Mexico Department of Motor Vehicle[s] (herein DMV) and personally

 search[ed] plaintiff’s record[s] at the DMV,” ROA at 40, the court said the allegations did

 not establish an exception to judicial immunity—that she “was acting in complete

 absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 68-69.

 jurisdiction; and (ii) a motion for service which provides each Defendant’s address.”
 ROA at 29.

                                               3
Appellate Case: 23-2187     Document: 010110992781        Date Filed: 01/31/2024        Page: 4

        The district court entered judgment dismissing the case without prejudice.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

                        A. Issues Presented in Mr. Warner’s Brief

        Mr. Warner lists four issues for review:2

    1. “Refusing to issue ‘Summons’ to Appellant.” He mentions due process and
       Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 and 5 and argues about the summons giving the
       Defendants notice. Aplt. Br. at 3.

    2. “Service of Process/Notice and Opportunity.” He makes a similar argument about
       lack of notice due to withholding the summons to the Defendants. Id.

    3. “Katie G. Lund investigating Appellant’s driving record at the Department of
       Motor Vehicles . . . .” He appears to argue that Magistrate Judge Lund acted
       outside her jurisdiction and therefore lacked judicial immunity to suit. Id.

    4. “Appellees/Defendants acted in their personal capacity as well as under color of
       law . . . .” He recounts several filings he made in district court and again
       references his concerns about the summons, but his argument is otherwise not
       clear. Id. at 3, 5.

        In addition to this list, Mr. Warner argues he should be allowed to amend his

 complaint. Id. at 4.

                                        B. Analysis

        Because Mr. Warner appears pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See

 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); United States v. Pinson,

 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). But we do not “fashion . . . arguments for him,”

 United States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994), and we may not “assume

        2
          Mr. Warner does not contest on appeal much of the district court’s analysis
 and its conclusions on many of his claims.

                                              4
Appellate Case: 23-2187      Document: 010110992781           Date Filed: 01/31/2024      Page: 5

 the role of advocate,” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008)

 (quotations omitted); see also Pinson, 584 F.3d at 975.

        With the foregoing in mind, we understand Mr. Warner to contend (1) based on

 issues 1, 2, and 4 of his brief, the district court erred in failing to issue summonses for

 service on the defendants; (2) the court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claims against

 Magistrate Judge Lund based on judicial immunity; and (3) he should be granted leave to

 amend the complaint.

    Summons and Service

        Mr. Warner complains that the district court did not issue summonses for service

 on each defendant. But when, as here, the plaintiff proceeds ifp under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1915(a), a court must screen the complaint and “dismiss the case at any time if the court

 determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

 granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

        The district court here sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a

 claim. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) “authorizes the dismissal of a case prior to service of

 process if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can

 be granted.” Collier v. Nelson, 246 F.3d 679, 679 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).3 The

        3
           See also Kersey v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 2017 WL 11622234, *1
 (1st Cir. 2071) (“The district court was not required to issue summonses until after it
 screened the complaint and amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).”)
 (unpublished); In re Wolf, 696 F. App’x 599, 600 (3rd Cir. 2017) (“If the District Court
 grants [petitioner’s] application to proceed in forma pauperis, it will then be required to
 screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before issuing any
 summonses.”) (unpublished); Haba v. Arthur, 851 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2021)
 (“[S]ervice was not required before dismissing the action for failure to state a claim
                                                5
Appellate Case: 23-2187       Document: 010110992781           Date Filed: 01/31/2024       Page: 6

 district court properly followed the statute and did not err in failing to issue summonses

 for service before screening the ifp complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

    Magistrate Judge Lund

        Mr. Warner takes issue with the district court’s determination that Magistrate

 Judge Lund’s alleged search of his DMV records was “complete[ly] abs[ent]” from her

 jurisdiction and, “[a]t most,” was in excess of her jurisdiction. ROA at 67-68; Aplt. Br.

 at 3. He does not contest on appeal that judicial immunity applies to Magistrate Judge

 Lund’s other alleged actions. As to the DMV search, rather than parse the amended

 complaint to determine whether it alleged she acted “in complete absence” or “in excess”

 of jurisdiction, ROA at 67-69, we affirm dismissal on an alternative ground.

        Even if a New Mexico magistrate judge should not search a defendant’s DMV

 records, Mr. Warner alleged in only two sentences that Magistrate Judge Lund did so,

 ROA at 40, 48, and he has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that she violated his

 constitutional rights. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989 (10th Cir. 2020).

 [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) . . . .”) (unpublished). Unpublished cases are not binding
 precedent, but we may consider them for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App.
 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

                                                 6
Appellate Case: 23-2187      Document: 010110992781          Date Filed: 01/31/2024    Page: 7

    Request to Amend

        Mr. Warner requests us to remand with instructions to allow him to amend his

 complaint. We reject this request because he did not move for leave to amend in district

 court and asks to amend for the first time on appeal. See Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257,

 1267 (10th Cir. 2017) (denying plaintiff's request to amend because plaintiff could have

 made request in district court but instead chose to appeal); Dahn v. United States,

 127 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the amendment of a complaint is a

 procedure to be addressed in the first instance by the district court).

                                     III. CONCLUSION

        We affirm the district court judgment.

                                                 Entered for the Court

                                                 Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                                 Circuit Judge

                                               7