Court Opinion

ID: 9497987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:05:09.983195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:32.569433
License: Public Domain

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with most of what the majority writes, I reach a different conclusion. I believe that Okeke has failed to establish that he qualifies for cancellation of removal- because his period of continuous, physical presence ended when he was convicted of a controlled substance violation. Therefore, I would affirm.
As the majority correctly describes, to carry his burden for cancellation of removal, Okeke must establish, inter alia, both continuous physical presence in the United States for ten years immediately preceding his application for relief and that he has not been convicted of an offense under 8 U-S.C. § 1182(a)(2). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(l)(A), (C). If an alien commits a controlled substance violation under section 1182(a)(2), his period of continuous physical presence is “deemed to end.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l). The BIA has held that a new period of continuous physical presence may not restart under section 1229b(d)(l). In re Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000).
Following Mendoza-Sandino, Okeke does not qualify for cancellation of removal under section 1229b(b)(l). He first entered the United States in 1981. His period of continuous physical presence ended in 1983, pursuant to section 1229b(d)(l), when he committed a drug offense in New York. Under the BIA’s holding in Mendoza-Sandino, Okeke may not restart his period of continuous physical presence because the physical presence period ended pursuant to section 1229b(d)(l). But there is more.
In addition to the “commission” trigger, there also exists a “conviction” trigger, which also terminates a period of continuous presence. Judge Ambro quite correctly states that the event barring an alien from receiving cancellation of removal under section 1229b(b)(l) is the conviction, not the commission, of a specified offense. I would hold that Okeke is not eligible for *598cancellation of removal because he was “convicted” of possession of marijuana pursuant to New York Penal Law section 221.20, which is a controlled substance of* fense under section 1182(a)(2).
A conviction is established if: “(i)' a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). “The State Department has interpreted this to mean that a conviction will be found if: (1) there has been a plea or judicial finding of guilt, and (2) the court has imposed a term of probation or some other form of restraint on the defendant.” Id.; see, e.g., Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir.2002). Okeke does not deny that in January 1983 he pleaded guilty to, and the court imposed a term of probation for, possession of marijuana. Thus a “conviction” has been establishéd regarding Okeke’s possession of marijuana.
Okeke, however, argues that it is not permissible to use an individual’s testimony to prove a contested conviction. For that proposition, he cites Matter of Pichardo, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330 (BIA 1996), in which the BIA held that the Immigration Judge’s reliance on such extrinsic evidence of respondent’s testimony was improper. Id. at 334-35. Pichardo is distinguishable. In Pichardo, the respondent did not admit the conviction. In contrast, Okeke has testified that he “pleaded guilty to” and was “sentenced to probation” for possession of marijuana, which meets the exact definition of a “conviction.”' 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). “As the plain language [of the INA] indicates, ‘conviction’ includes a guilty plea.” Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir.2004); see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
Okeke’s sworn testimony affirmatively established that he had been convicted of possession of marijuana — a predicate he cannot now deny. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that an alien’s admission of a drug conviction under oath establishes the alien’s conviction for deportation purposes. See Fequiere v. Ashcroft, 279 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.2002). I would too. The Court there reasoned that the government need not establish a drug conviction by one of the seven forms of proof articulated in 8 U.S.C. §. 1229a(c)(3)(B) because the statute does not state that the forms of proof it lists constitute the sole means of establishing a criminal conviction. Id. at 1327. The Court clarified by stating that “the statute merely says that such forms ‘shall constitute proof of a criminal conviction,’ ” and “[ojther forms of proof will suffice if ‘probative.’ ” Id. Okeke pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and was sentenced for that offense. It follows that Okeke’s own testimony of his conviction and sentence is probative proof of a “conviction” and therefore was properly taken into consideration by the BIA.
The BIA correctly found that Okeke committed and was convicted of an offense referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). I would hold that the BIA properly denied Okeke’s application for cancellation of removal. He has not carried his burden to show the requisite “continuous physical presence” in the United States necessary to qualify for cancellation of removal. For these reasons, I would affirm the BIA’s denial' of Okeke’s Petition for Review.