Court Opinion

ID: 9445223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:23:05.974177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:10.379214
License: Public Domain

MURRAH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In the “considered view” of the majority, the attorneys who procured the assailed judgment stand guilty of aggravated violations of “well recognized ethical and professional standards of long duration and virtually universal observance.” And, the trial court in the first instance, and this court on appeal, has the inherent power to deny the attorneys guilty of such misconduct access to the bar of the court.
To be sure, whether in a given case, an attorney at law-is guilty of such misconduct as to warrant denial of the privilege to practice before the bar of the court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court in the first instance. And, that discretion certainly ought not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse. But the discretion thus committed to the trial court is a judicial discretion, subject to review in accordance with the accepted canons of appellate practice. And, where public policy of such far-reaching importance is at stake, this court has the inescapable duty to speak positively and unequivocally for the guidance of the courts and the profession.
These considerations compel me to express the view that the facts conclusively shown by this record require this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to deny the nonresident attorneys who participated in the trial of this case access to the bar of the federal courts. An attorney who is guilty of an aggravated violation of recognized professional standards has no standing before the bar, and is not entitled to invoke the discretion of the court whether comity will be extended. In short, the uncontroverted facts leave no room for the exercise of a discretion. And see Judy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 111 Kan. 46, 205 P. 1116.
Since, in my view, the attorneys were not entitled to the courtesy of the bar, the trial conducted by such ineligible practitioners was a nullity in all respects. *395See Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 P. 718; Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okl. 520, 49 P.2d 551; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 16b, p. 725. Certainly the attorneys should not be allowed to reap the fruits of a judgment thus procured. I would accordingly reverse the judgment for a new trial.