Court Opinion

ID: 9741369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:54:13.278851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.705717
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the majority’s reasoning and conclusion that Alberici’s appeal must be dismissed. I concur in the majority’s opinion and reasoning that the work involved an "alteration” of Chrysler’s plant. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning and finding that Chrysler is entitled to summary judgment on the Structural Work Act violation and the negligence action. The Act imposes liability for a wilful violation of its provisions. (Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 444.) A wilful violation occurs when one having charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition exists as to a scaffold, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition. Simmons, 104 Ill. 2d at 453. The question of whether a violation is wilful under the Act is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. (Zizzo v. Ben Pekin Corp. (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 386, 396.) It becomes a question of law only when the facts are not disputed and where there can be no difference in the judgment of reasonable persons or inferences drawn. (Dickmann v. Midwest Interstate Electrical Construction Co. (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 494, 497.) Even when the facts are undisputed summary judgment is inappropriate where fair-minded persons could arrive at different inferences from the undisputed facts. (In re Estate of Kietrys (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273.) As will be shown, I believe different inferences can be drawn from the facts of this case. As for the negligence action premised on unsafe working conditions, in Haberer v. Village of Sauget (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 313, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact prevented the entry of summary judgment on behalf of an owner against an employee of an independent contractor suing in negligence. Applying section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965)), the court held that an employee hired by an independent contractor to do construction work may obtain recovery for injuries sustained in the course of the work from the owner of the premises where the owner had retained the requisite control over the work and had failed to exercise that control properly. Haberer, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 319-20. The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that Chrysler had a crew of engineers and managers regularly on site to supervise the work. Chrysler’s agent, Alberici, through its designated safety engineer, John Langford, had a right to stop the work. Langford was on the site daily. Bill White, Chrysler’s safety man, was also regularly on the site. The majority reasons that because it is uncontradicted that the method of welding and lifting the steel beams was done for the first time without Chrysler’s concurrence or direction, it follows as a matter of law that Chrysler did not commit a wilful violation because Chrysler did not have the opportunity to prevent the dangerous method employed by plaintiffs foreman. Citing no cases with a similar result, the majority essentially ignores the fact that Chrysler’s agents had the power to control work-safety procedures and that its agents were regularly on the premises. The majority also ignores the following facts: the welding equipment and hoist equipment had to be brought to the site to weld the 18-foot-long, 300-pound steel beams, and the act of welding two or three steel beams takes time and a finite amount of space. The amount of time and space is not specified in the record. During this time and space exercise, a fair-minded fact finder could infer that Chrysler’s agent should have become aware of the acts of welding and making preparation for lifting the beams and taken appropriate reasonable actions within the context and purposes of the Act and principles of common-law negligence. An owner who is in charge of construction may not escape liability by closing its eyes to the defect at the moment of the accident, if the evidence shows that ordinary care or inspection would have uncovered the defect. (Katz v. Shaf Home Builders, Inc. (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529.) Whether Chrysler, by its agent, should have known of the dangerous work condition, under the facts of the case before us, should be a question for the fact finder. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler.