Court Opinion

ID: 9559124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:23:02.214507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:23.539613
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting).
I think the court did not err in admitting evidence given at the former trial by the witness Hay who could not be produced where, as here, it was shown that due diligence was used in attempting to locate the witness and where he could not be found.
The rule was settled in this jurisdiction fifty-eight years ago in the case of State v. Byers, 16 Mont. 565, 41 Pac. 708, where the court said: “At the preliminary examination of the appellant one John Young was a witness sworn and examined on the part of the state. The appellant was present, and cross-examined the witness. His evidence was taken down in full by the court stenographer, and afterwards transcribed and typewritten by him. Before the trial of this cause, the witness Young died. On the trial of the case the court permitted a transcribed copy of the stenographer’s notes of Young’s evidence, supported by his testimony that it was correct, to be read in evidence, over the objection of appellant. The admission of this evidence is assigned as error. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 15 S. Ct. 337 [39 L. Ed. 409], — a case involving precisely the same condi*423tions as the ease at bar, — Mr. Justice Brown, after an able and extended discussion of the subject, and collating the authorities, English and American, old and new, pro and con, says: ‘Upon the other hand, the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is overwhelming. The question was carefully considered in its constitutional aspect by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Richards, 18 Pick. 434, in which it was said “that provision was made to exclude any evidence by deposition which could be given orally in the presence of the accused, but was not intended to affect the question as to what was or was not competent evidence to be given face to face according to the settled rules of the common law.” ® * The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination. This, the law says, he shall under no circumstances be deprived of, and many of the very cases which hold testimony such as this to be admissible. also hold that not the substance of his testimony only, but the very words of the witness, shall be proven. We do not wish to be understood as expressing an opinion upon this point, but all the authorities hold that a copy of the stenographic report of his entire, former testimony, supported' by the oath of the stenographer that it is a correct transcript of his notes and of the testimony of the deceased witness, such as was produced in this ease, is competent evidence of what he said.’ ”
The opinion in the Byers case has never been overruled or questioned.
The. right of defendant in a criminal case to “meet the witnesses against him face to face” as provided in section 16 of Article III of our Constitution is not an absolute right. The very next section of the Constitution provides for the taking of the deposition of a witness and that such deposition “may be received as evidence on the trial,” if the witness is dead of *424absent from the state and tlie deposition may be taken without the presence of the defendant if he fails to attend after notice. Montana Constitution, Art. III, sec. 17; State v. Vanella, 40 Mont. 326, 106 Pac. 364.
In 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, sec. 187, p. 895, the author points out that at one time evidence given at a former trial was considered a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to-meet the witness but states: ‘ ‘ This, however, is not the view usually taken at the present time. In fact the rule is settled in practically every jurisdiction that the reproduction of testimony taken at a former trial or in the presence of the accused at a preliminary hearing, when the presence of the witness cannot be secured, does not contravene the constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him in whatever language such right has been given. The confrontation of the witnesses at the former trial, if the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine, is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement, and the testimony thus given may be used at the trial, provided the witness is not legally available.” Cases are there cited from most of the states of the Union including United States Supreme Cotu’t cases. Later cases are collected in 122 A. L. R. 417, 426 and 159 A. L. R. 1232, 1242.
This state is not without statutory authority for the reception of such evidence in a criminal case. R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-7209, provides: “The rules of evidence in civil actions are applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this code.” And R. C. M. 1947, sec. 93-401-27, in part provides: “In conformity with the preceding provisions, evidence may be given upon a trial of the following facts: * * * 8. The testimony of a witness deceased, or out of the jurisdiction, or unable to testify, given in a former action between the same parties, relating to the same matter. ’ ’
Here there was ample evidence that the absent witness could not be found and that due diligence was exercised in an effort to locate him. Under such circumstances the evidence given by him upon the former trial may be read to the jury. R. C. M. *4251947, see. 93-401-27, supra; State v. Byers, supra; Morris v. State, 68 Okl. Cr. 147, 96 Pac. (2d) 88; State v. Carr, 67 S. D. 481, 294 N. W. 174.
The majority opinion stresses the fact that the absent witness made a promise to mail a letter with no intention of keeping the promise; that he is “ a bad check artist; an intentional eavesdropper; and a carrier of information to the sheriff”, and that he received a four day cut in his 30 day sentence. All this was doubtless paraded before the jury by able counsel for defendant and whether the jury saw the witness or not had nothing to do with these conclusions. Nor would the appearance of the absent witness alter or change the contents of defendant’s letter delivered to Hay, the absent witness, in which defendant wrote: “Sure looks like I am stuck with first degree murder unless someone confesses.” I do not minimize the importance of permitting the jury to see the witnesses and to observe their demeanor on the witness stand. However, in view of the admitted past record of the absent witness, probably the state and not the defendant was prejudiced by not having the witness present in court.
The majority opinion states, “there is no other evidence, except the testimony of Hay read to the jury, which places or tends to place the defendant at the scene of the crime.” I am not able to agree with that statement. The evidence without the testimony of Hay was sufficient to place defendant at the scene of the crime and to sustain a verdict of guilty. It is elementary that a conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence alone. Here the record shows, without the testimony of the absent witness, that defendant and the deceased had been in a farming-venture as partners. Disagreement arose between the two relative to a tractor acquired by the partnership. When defendant could not reach an agreement with deceased whom he had called over the telephone relative to the tractor, he became angry and announced to his son and former wife, ‘ ‘ I have about lived my life, I’ll get him tonight when he comes home.” On the day of the killing threats were made to employees of Bean to the effect that *426“there won’t be a boss tomorrow,” and “you will have to look for a job tomorrow.” Bean was shot in the back while sitting with his family at the dinner table eating at about 8:00 or 8:15 in .the evening of the day of the threats. Shortly after the killing defendant was found in his. trailer located about 2200 feet from the Bean residence. There was evidence, aside from that given by Hay, that defendant had been in Forsyth but had returned to his residence at his trailer home about 7:30 or 7 :45 the evening of the killing.
Defendant was told by the sheriff that Bean had been killed and defendant replied, “Good, I’m glad, the son of a bitch was no good anyhow.” A .270 Winchester rifle was found in the trailer occupied by defendant and his son and the evidence shows that such a rifle could have been used in the killing.
Without referring specifically to all of the evidence in the record, it is my opinion that there was ample evidence, direct and circumstantial, aside from that of the witness Hay to place defendant at the scene of the crime and to sustain a verdict of guilty. I mention this only to indicate that if the testimony given by Hay at the former trial were inadmissible, the most that defendant is entitled to is a new trial and the majority opinion should so state without equivocation.
Nor do I think there is merit in the proposition relied on in the special concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE ANDERSON to the effect that the opinion on the former appeal settled the point of the sufficiency of the evidence to place defendant at the scene of the crime. I think the statement made in the majority opinion on the former appeal on this point is nothing more than an observation from an oblique approach that the bloodhound evidence was prejudicial to defendant, a point upon which there was no disagreement among the members of the court. The issue as to whether the balance of the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction or to place defendant at the scene of the crime was not before the court. Had that issue been before the court it would have been concluded by the admission of defendant made *427to the witness Hay that, ‘ I did Kill the son of a bitch, ’ ’ referring to the deceased. •.'•••
In my opinion it was not error to receive the testimony given by the witness Hay at the former trial," and that the judgment should be affirmed.