Court Opinion

ID: 9609119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:22:43.437559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:49.153855
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment as to guilt and the determination of death-eligibility. I also concur in the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I dissent, however, from the judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment as to penalty: in my view, defense counsel’s failure to present any evidence in mitigation resulted in a constitutionally unreliable verdict of death.
In People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353 [222 Cal.Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925], this court reversed a judgment of death on the ground that defense counsel’s failure to present evidence in mitigation—albeit in accord with his client’s wishes—rendered the penalty determination constitutionally unreliable. In arriving at this conclusion, the court reasoned as follows.
First, the court determined that counsel’s failure to present evidence in mitigation introduced error into the penalty proceeding.
“To permit a defendant convicted of a potentially capital crime to bar his counsel from introducing mitigating evidence at the penalty phase . . . would . . . prevent this court from discharging its constitutional and statutory duty to review a judgment of death upon the complete record of the case, because a significant portion of the evidence of the appropriateness of the penalty would be missing.
“This deficiency of the record implicates another paramount concern of the state: ‘in capital cases . . . the state has a strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments.’ (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 751 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837].) In Chadd we upheld the validity of a statute that bars acceptance of a guilty plea to a capital charge without the consent of defense counsel. ([Pen. Code,] § 1018.) We observed that the statute was enacted as part of the Legislature’s response to Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726], and its companion cases, which condemned arbitrariness in the operation of death *1159penalty laws: this history, we said, demonstrated that the Legislature intended the statute ‘to serve as a further independent safeguard against erroneous imposition of a death sentence.’ (28 Cal.3d at p. 750.) Since 1976 the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties demands a correspondingly higher degree of reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. (Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961, 96 S.Ct. 2978] (plur. opn.).) And since 1978 the high court has insisted that the sentencer must be permitted to consider any aspect of the defendant’s character and record as an independently mitigating factor. (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604-605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954] (plur. opn. of Burger, C. J.).)
“To allow a capital defendant to prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence on his behalf withholds from the trier of fact potentially crucial information bearing on the penalty decision no less than if the defendant was himself prevented from introducing such evidence by statute or judicial ruling. In either case the state’s interest in a reliable penalty determination is defeated.” (41 Cal.3d at pp. 363-364.)
Next, the court determined that so long as “the record . . . demonstrates ‘the possibility that at least someone might have been called to testify on defendant’s behalf and to urge that his life be spared’ ” (41 Cal.3d at p. 367, italics in original), the error introduced into the penalty proceeding by counsel’s failure to present evidence in mitigation cannot be deemed harmless. The court explained:
“When the sentencer in a capital case is deprived of all or a substantial part of the available evidence in mitigation, ‘the potential for prejudice is too obvious to require proof.’ [Citation.] Indeed, ‘short of substituting a verdict of its own, there is no way for a reviewing court to determine what effect unpresented mitigating evidence might have had on the sentencer’s decision.’ [Citation.] We have no doubt that a judgment of death imposed in such circumstances constitutes a miscarriage of justice (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 13): not only did defendant not have a fair penalty trial—in effect he had no penalty trial at all.” (41 Cal.3d at p. 368.)
In People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251], the court affirmed the soundness of the Deere analysis set forth above. (Id. at pp. 540-542 (plur. opn. of Grodin, J.); see id. at pp. 543-544 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at p. 544 (conc. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Applying that analysis to the facts of Burgener, the court reversed the judgment of death therein.
*1160I now turn to the case at bar. On the face of the record it is plain that Deere error occurred: at defendant’s direction, counsel declined to present any evidence in mitigation. The majority concede as much. As they admit, “The record discloses that defense counsel, acquiescing to his client’s wishes and, going against his own considered judgment, failed to put on any mitigating evidence although it was apparently available to him.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1149.)
It is also plain that the error here cannot be deemed harmless. As in Deere, “the record . . . demonstrates ‘the possibility that at least someone might have been called to testify on defendant’s behalf and to urge that his life be spared.’ ” (41 Cal.3d at p. 367, italics in original.) Again the majority concede as much. In the text quoted above, they admit that mitigating evidence was “apparently available.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1150.) Indeed, at another place they acknowledge that the record revealed “defense counsel had specific witnesses in mind . . . .” (Id. at p. 1150, fn. 12.)
Although, as shown above, they effectively concede that reversible Deere error occurred here, the majority nevertheless hold to the contrary. To support their conclusion, they claim in substance that the verdict of death in this case is not as “unreliable” as the verdicts in Deere and Burgener. In so doing, they rely on the following points: (1) unlike the jurors in Burgener, the jurors here were not misled as to the nature and substance of the penalty determination or as to the relevance of evidence relating to the defendant’s background and character; (2) unlike the jurors in Burgener, the jurors here were left to consider certain statutory factors bearing on mitigation; and (3) unlike the jurors in Burgener and Deere, the jurors here were not presented with a statement by the defendant asking for the death penalty.
To my mind, the majority’s attempt to distinguish this case from Deere and Burgener on its facts is at best empty and at worst sophistical. Put simply, the fact that the verdict of death in each of those cases may have been more unreliable than the verdict here is immaterial: the verdict of death in this case remains constitutionally unreliable.
Further, each of the points relied on by the majority reveals a distinction without a difference. To begin with, that the jurors here may not have been misled as to the nature and substance of the penalty determination or the relevance of defendant’s background and character cannot make up for the total lack of mitigating evidence for them to weigh in determining the appropriateness of death, and therefore cannot neutralize the prejudicial effect of the Deere error. Similarly, it is immaterial that the jurors here may have been allowed to consider certain statutory factors bearing on mitigation: there was no mitigating evidence for them to weigh under those *1161factors. Finally, that defendant did not ask for the death penalty is of no consequence: it is the complete absence of evidence in mitigation that is significant here and nothing else.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the verdict of death must be vacated because of Deere error. Accordingly, I am compelled to dissent from the affirmance of the judgment as to penalty.
Broussard, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 26, 1988. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.