Court Opinion

ID: 9520522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:41:44.882835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:21.740307
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CALLUM, dissenting: As we determine whether the constitution permits a finding to be made by a judge, rather than a jury, Apprendi instructs us to ask the following question: “[D]oes the *** finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365. If the answer is yes, the jury must make the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the judge’s “brutal or heinous” finding exposed defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict, and defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The following facts are indisputable. Alone, the jury’s guilty verdict exposed defendant to a maximum of 60 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(1)(a) (West 1994). That is, before making the finding, the judge had no statutory authority to impose a greater sentence. However, after the finding was made, defendant was exposed to a maximum of life imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(1)(b) (West 1994)) or, for the purposes of extended-term sentencing, 100 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—2(a)(1), 5 — 5—3.2(b)(2) (West 1994)). Thus, the judge’s finding exposed defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict. The majority insists that defendant’s sentence complies with Apprendi because the judge was statutorily authorized to impose it. The majority states that “a trial court is statutorily authorized to impose an extended term *** when the defendant is convicted *** and the trial court finds that the offense was *** brutal or heinous ***.” 331 Ill. App. 3d at 425. That statement is obviously true, but it does not answer the Apprendi question. Indeed, Apprendi does not hold that a statutorily authorized sentence is ipso facto constitutional, as such a holding would make no sense. Thus, I freely concede that defendant’s sentence was statutorily authorized. It was unconstitutional, however, because it was statutorily authorized upon a fact that was not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Unwittingly, in accurately summarizing the relevant statutory scheme, the majority proves the Apprendi violation. As it states, an extended term requires two things: the defendant’s conviction and the trial court’s finding. Thus, the majority acknowledges that the conviction alone does not expose the defendant to an extended term; rather, the greater punishment is statutorily authorized only upon the trial court’s finding. In other words, the finding exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the conviction alone, i.e., the jury’s guilty verdict. That is the answer to the Apprendi question. Cf. People v. Tenney, 329 Ill. App. 3d 430, 442 (2002) (a defendant is not eligible for a sentence of life imprisonment upon a conviction of first-degree murder, but only upon the existence of certain aggravating factors). When this court has asked the Apprendi question, it has answered it correctly. See Joyner, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 109-10 (invalidating life sentence based on judge’s “brutal or heinous” finding); People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127, 128-29 (2001) (extended-term sentence). Unfortunately, in Rivera, which the majority follows, we went astray. In that case, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, and the judge, finding the crime “brutal or heinous,” imposed a life sentence. Adopting the First District’s analysis in Vida, we concluded that Apprendi was not violated because the life sentence was “specifically authorized by statute.” Rivera, 333 Ill. App. at 1104. Again, however, Apprendi does not ask whether the punishment is “specifically authorized by statute”; it asks whether the punishment is greater than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict. Thus, the Rivera court, like the Vida court, neglected to answer the question that Apprendi presents. Indeed, this court has already noted that “the reasoning in Rivera is flawed.” Tenney, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 442. ■ In Rivera, we erred further in relying on the supreme court’s decision in Ford. In that case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. He waived a jury for his capital sentencing hearing, and the judge found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty. The judge then found the crime “brutal or heinous” and sentenced the defendant to 100 years’ imprisonment. The supreme court held that the “brutal or heinous” finding did not increase the authorized punishment in violation of Apprendi. The distinction between Ford and Rivera is obvious. In Ford, the maximum of death was set by facts that were submitted to the trier of fact and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, when the “brutal or heinous” finding produced a sentence of imprisonment, the finding did not increase the punishment beyond that established in accordance with Apprendi. In Rivera, however, the facts that were submitted to the trier of fact and proved beyond a reasonable doubt established a maximum of only 60 years’ imprisonment. Thus, the “brutal or heinous” finding did result in a greater punishment, life imprisonment, which was unconstitutional. After following Rivera, the majority cites three supreme court cases that supposedly “provide us with a glimmer of guidance with respect to the issue now facing us on appeal.” 331 Ill. App. 3d at 423. In my view, however, each case is as distinguishable as Ford. In Davis, the supreme court followed Brownell to reject the defendant’s argument that death-eligibility factors had to be charged in an indictment. However, whether a factor must be charged in an indictment is a question different from whether that factor must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, in Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the former issue. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447 n.3, 120 S. Ct. at 2355 n.3; Ford, 198 Ill. 2d at 72 n.1. Thus, though Davis suggests that the “brutal or heinous” factor need not be charged in an indictment, the case does not bear on the issue here — whether a jury must find the factor beyond a reasonable doubt. In Jackson and Hill, the supreme court noted that judges do not exceed their statutory authority in imposing extended-term sentences based on their “brutal or heinous” findings. However, the court recognized that a statutorily authorized sentence is not necessarily a sentence that complies with Apprendi. Indeed, because the defendants had pleaded guilty, the supreme court declined to address their claims that their sentences, though statutorily authorized, were unconstitutional. Thus, in evaluating whether defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional, Jackson and Hill provide no guidance at all. I believe that our inquiry should begin and end with Apprendi itself. Once again, Apprendi asks, “[Djoes the *** finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365. Here, the answer is yes. The jury’s guilty verdict exposed defendant to 60 years’ imprisonment. The “brutal or heinous” finding exposed him to life or 100 years’ imprisonment. Because the jury did not make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s 80-year sentence is unconstitutional. I dissent.