Court Opinion

ID: 9562144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:22:23.543058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:13.565663
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain Ketchel's petition. However, in my opinion the showing made by Ketchel in the superior court did not warrant the issuance of the order directing in part that the warden allow a psychiatric examination of Ketchel and the superior court therefore abused its discretion in issuing that order.
I cannot agree with the majority that defendant’s right to effective representation on appeal includes counsel’s right to employ a psychiatrist for the purpose of examining defendant. This holding fails to give adequate consideration to the proper scope of appellate review and creates serious problems regarding the necessity of furnishing to indigent appellants at public expense services by psychiatrists and experts in numerous other fields without any substantial showing of need for those services.1 If the showing made by Ketchel entitled him to be examined by a psychiatrist employed by counsel as part of Ketchel’s effective representation on appeal, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution might entitle indigent appellants to such examinations at public expense upon similar showings, and if indigent appellants are entitled to such examinations they might likewise be entitled under the equal protection clause to the services of criminalists, ballistic experts, and experts in numerous other fields at public *404expense again without any substantial showing of necessity for those services.
The habeas corpus petition, filed in Ketchel’s behalf by his attorney, alleged that the attorney had been appointed to represent Ketchel on his pending automatic appeal and that in the attorney’s opinion it was necessary to effectively represent Ketchel on that appeal that Ketchel be examined by Dr. Amini, a psychiatrist, and by a psychologist if Dr. Amini thought such examination necessary. The petition incorporated a letter from the attorney to the warden requesting that Dr. Amini be permitted to examine Ketchel and the warden’s reply stating that, “It has not been the policy of the Department of Corrections ... to permit examinations of condemned men by staff other than specified in [the Penal Code.] ” The petition prayed that the court order the warden to permit examination of Ketchel by a psychiatrist and a psychologist.
In the superior court defense counsel, in addition to asserting that his statement as to the necessity for a psychiatric examination was by itself a sufficient showing to justify granting the requested relief, gave the following reason for seeking the examination: “We intend to make the point on appeal, . . . that the trial court . . . erred in failing to require some evidence other than the facts of the offense in the course of the penalty proceeding. It will be our argument that the Legislature contemplated that the requirement of some testimony, some evidence as to the background, as to the man himself be elicited before the jury in order for it to adequately determine the question of penalty. ’ ’
The order sought was not justified by either defense counsel’s conclusionary assertion that in his opinion a psychiatric examination was necessary to the effective representation of Ketchel on appeal nor by the specific reason advanced quoted above. A psychiatric examination of Ketchel would not be of assistance to him in connection with the proposed argument on appeal since matters disclosed by that examination could not be considered on appeal. It is an elementary rule that matters not presented to the trial court and hence not a proper part of the record on appeal cannot be considered on appeal. (People v. Merriam, 66 Cal.2d 390, 396-397 [58 Cal. Rptr. 1, 426 P.2d 161] ; People v. Reeves, 64 Cal.2d 766, 776 [51 Cal.Rptr. 691, 415 P.2d 35] ; People v. Arguello, 61 Cal.2d 210, 213 [37 Cal.Rptr. 601, 390 P.2d 377]; People v. Agnew, *40516 Cal.2d 655, 660 [107 P.2d 601]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) p. 666; see also rule 13 of California Rules of Court.)2
The majority, although purporting to recognize these rules, state: “[A] possibility lies in the aid the psychiatric report might render counsel in determining whether defendant had been adequately represented by trial counsel in the face of his failure to raise a valid defense, such as that of diminished capacity [citations]3 **,” and footnote 3 reads in part, . .It would certainly be anomalous to require counsel to present an issue before this court [apparently on appeal] in the absence of his opportunity, by methods including expert examination of his client, to decide whether it rests upon any basis in fact.” Such a requirement is not anomalous, however, because, as we have seen, this court must decide the issue solely from the record on appeal.
It is further suggested by the majority that 11 Counsel might desire to urge changes in the law of the penalty trial, but only to the extent that defendant would benefit thereby; the psychiatric examination, of course, would be useful in determining whether defendant could so benefit.” However, any changes in the law of the penalty trial would benefit defendant on appeal only if those changes necessitated a reversal of the judgment as to penalty. Whether that judgment should be reversed must be decided solely from the record on appeal and the law. Irrespective of the results of the psychiatric examination, defendant would benefit from changes in the law of the penalty trial necessitating a retrial of that issue since a different trier of fact would determine the penalty, other evidence might be introduced, and conceivably a different result might obtain.
The majority also state, “Our disposition of this matter is certainly consistent with, if not compelled by, the recent ease of Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396].” However, (1) Anders does not involve the question presented here; (2) to the extent that Anders has any bearing whatever on the duties of counsel on appeal, it negates what is contended for here by restricting counsel “to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. ’ ’ (Italics added.)
*406It bears emphasis that this is not a ease where defense counsel informed the superior court that he had agreed to represent Ketch el on a collateral attack on the judgment if a ground for such an attack could be discovered, or where defense counsel made a showing that due to mental illness Ketehel was unable to cooperate on appeal, and the questions presented by such cases are not before us.
Orderly procedures have long been established for obtaining relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence. An application in the trial court for a new trial on the basis of such evidence may be granted under appropriate circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 8; People v. Williams, 57 Cal.2d 263, 270 [18 Cal.Rptr. 729, 368 P.2d 353].) A judgment may also be set aside in a proceeding such as coram vohis, where such relief is warranted. (E.g. People v. Welch, 61 Cal.2d 786, 788 et seq. [40 Cal.Rptr. 238, 394 P.2d 926]) Executive clemency is another alternative available to a defendant. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 8; Pen. Code, § 4800 et seq.) Under the circumstances I do not think that the fact the present ease is one involving the death penalty warrants our ignoring settled rules of appellate review.
I would reverse the order.
MeComb, J., concurred.

Ketehel’s attorney did not request the superior court for psychiatric fees. Previously, however, he had written this court (Supreme Court) setting forth substantially the same reason given the superior court for seeking examinations of Ketchel by a psychiatrist and a psychologist (which reason is set forth hereafter) and asking if the fees for the examinations would be allowed as a proper cost of preparation of the brief on appeal. The clerk of this court replied to defense counsel that “The Justices considered your letter . . . and have requested me to inform you that the cost . . . incident to an examination of . . . Ketchel by a psychologist and by a psychiatrist is not an expense allowable to counsel at the conclusion of the appeal. ’ ’

Bule 13 provides: 1 ‘ Every appellant shall file an opening brief, . . . The opening brief shall contain a statement of the case, . . . The statement shall be . . . confined to matters w, the record on appeal.” (Italics added.)