Court Opinion

ID: 9559308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:26:24.350119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:33.468288
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the conclusion reached in this case: “That part of the decree quieting title to an undivided one-half interest in the lands in question in respondent and requiring appellants to pay all the taxes thereon is reversed”, and I agree that the facts proved show no title to the land in question in Ray (respondent).
I dissent from that part of the opinion which reads: “The trial court did not err in refusing to quiet title in appellants against the lien of respondent’s mortgage”.
Under the statutes of this state, respondent Ray held no valid or enforceable mortgage covering the lands in question, nor did he have any interest by lien or otherwise in said lands.
Sec. 55-817, I.C. enacted 1935 Session Laws, Ch. 107, page 256, reads as follows:
“No public record of any mortgage or other lien on real property, given prior to July 1, 1929, shall constitute notice of the existence or contents of such mortgage or lien, to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the property affected thereby, for a longer period than ten years from the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness, as changed by extension, if any, of the time of payment, filed for record before the expiration of said period of ten years, except as provided in section 2 hereof. If the public records do not disclose the date of maturity, then the date of the execution of such mortgage or lien shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness.”
This section was amended by the 1951 Session Laws, Ch. 127, page 295,. changing the date “prior to July 1, 1929” to read “prior to July 1, 1945”. (Immaterial here.)
The mortgage hi question here is dated April, 1926, due in April, 1927, and is clearly outlawed under Sec. 5-216, I.C.
The facts are that Ray never claimed he was paid anything on the mortgage, and did not contend that it was not outlawed. He slept on' his rights, if any he had, for some twenty years. When the cases of Miller v. Monroe, 50 Idaho 726, 300 P. 362, and Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 50 Idaho 315, 296 P.192, were decided by this Court, the above quoted statute was not in effect. If applicable the same should be overruled.
In taking title to the land, respondents here did not assume the mortgage nor agree to pay the indebtedness for which it was security. Under such circumstances the respondents had no legal or moral obligation to discharge the debt in question.
*240The land was not bound either legally or equitably by the claimed mortgage debt which was conclusively shown not to exist. The following cases support this rule: Faxon v. All Persons, 1913, 166 Cal. 707, 137 P. 919, L.R.A. 1916B, 1209; Muhs v. Hibernia Sav. & L. Co., 1913, 166 Cal. 760, 138 P. 352; Fontana Land Co. v. Laughlin, 1916, 199 Cal. 625, 250 P. 669, 48 A.L.R. 1308; Zuege v. Nebraska Mortg. Co., 1914, 92 Kan. 272, 140 P. 855, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 877, Ann.Cas. 1916B, 865; Kingman v. Sinclair, 1890, 80 Mich. 427, 45 N.W. 187, 20 Am.St.Rep. 522; Cunningham v. Davidoff, 187 Md. 134, 46 A.2d 633, 164 A.L.R. 1383.
It seems to me that the rule applicable here could be stated in substance as follows:
•“Where one takes a deed to land which is encumbered by a mortgage,' but does not assume or agree to pay the mortgage, no personal relation or obligation subsists between him and the holder of the mortgage, and where the mortgage has been long in default and the cause of action thereon barred by lapse of time such vendee has a-right to have his title, whatever it might be, cleared of record by a judgment that the mortgage constituted no subsisting lien upon his land.”
Whether Trusty knew of the mortgage because of the public record or from personal information seems to me to be of no importance. Why should a vendee have his land encumbered dr clouded by an outlawed, unenforceable mortgage, which by no possible deduction or rule lie owed or could be required to pay ?
The contention that the statute of limitations is a rule of defense and not offense seems to me to have no application in cases such as this. Appellants ■ did not contract the debt or assume it and the land is not liable for it.
I therefore feel that the rule announced in the majority opinion that the appellants could not quiet title to the land in question should be reversed, and the title quieted. I am. also of the opinion appellants are entitled to costs.