Court Opinion

ID: 9486862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:02:37.47463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:58.680041
License: Public Domain

OSTEEN, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur with my distinguished colleagues that this case must be affirmed on the issues raised by the defendant, I must respectfully dissent on an issue raised sua sponte during my review of the case and put to the parties during oral argument. During its instructions to the jury, the district court failed to instruct on an essential element of the kidnapping charge against Mr. Childress. Because this failure was not an isolated incident that was cured by other instructions, I believe that it constitutes the type of plain error that results in a miscarriage of justice. Thus, I would reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
The federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), provides in relevant part that “[wjhoever unlawfully seizes, confínes, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person ... when: (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.” In addition to the interstate commerce requirement, the essential elements of the offense, as defined by Devitt & Blackmar, are first, that the defendant knowingly and willfully seized, confined, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away a person; and second, that the defendant held that person for ransom, reward, or other benefit or reason. 2 Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Criminal § 39.03 (4th ed.1990). Decisions by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court support this position. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 459, 66 S.Ct. 233, 235, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946); United States v. Lewis, 662 F.2d 1087, 1088 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 955, 102 S.Ct. 1464, 71 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982); see also United States v. Young, 512 F.2d 321, 323 (4th Cir.1975) (noting that “it is clear that Congress has made unlawful much more than strict kidnapping as defined at common law”), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956, 96 S.Ct. 1432, 47 L.Ed.2d 362 (1976). “The phrase ‘and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise’ means to detain a person for anything that the individual who is holding that person feels is of benefit or has value. Such benefit is not limited to money or any measurable or material item.” Devitt et al., supra, § 39.05. Thus, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted for some reason that would benefit him in any way. See Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128, 56 S.Ct. 395, 397, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936).
The jury in this case was not so instructed. Instead, they were told that
[i]n order for the defendant to be found guilty of [kidnapping], the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant knowingly and willfully seized, kidnapped, or carried away the victim, Regina Retassie; second, that such person was thereafter transported in interstate commerce while so seized or kidnapped. Third, that these acts were done willfully. To kidnap a person means to forcibly and unlawfully hold, keep, detain, and confine the person against her will. So [involun*505tariness] or coercion in connection with the victim’s seizure and detention is an essential element of the offense. It need not be proved, however, that a kidnapping was carried out for ransom or personal monetary again [sic] so long as it is proved that the accused acted willfully.
(J.A. 359-60.) The court had previously instructed the jury that “willfully” meant “that the act was committed voluntarily and purposefully with the specific intent to do something the law forbids. That is, to say with bad purpose, either to disobey or to disregard the law.” (J.A. 359.)
It is clear from the above instruction that the jury was not explicitly instructed that the government had to prove that Regina Retas-sie was held for ransom, reward, or some other benefit or reason. In fact, the court effectively told the jury quite the opposite, that the government did not have to prove that element. Although it is true that the purpose of the kidnapping does not have to be ransom or reward, United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 81, 84 S.Ct. 553, 557, 11 L.Ed.2d 527, (1964), the government must nevertheless show some benefit to the defendant from the kidnapping, whether it be for the purpose of assisting escape, silencing a potential witness, extorting information, even sexual gratification. See Young, 512 F.2d at 323 (assisting escape); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 850 (11th Cir.1984) (silencing witness), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2362, 86 L.Ed.2d 262 (1985); Matter of Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 676, 686 n. 11 (N.D. Cal.1988) (extortion); United States v. McBryar, 553 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.) (sexual gratification), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862, 98 S.Ct. 191, 54 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). By not mentioning this point, the district court in this case relieved the government of its burden of proof on an element of the offense. See United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 272 (5th Cir.1985) (observing that government’s problems of proof do not warrant instruction that removes essential element of offense from jury’s consideration).
Because the defendant’s counsel failed to object to the instruction as given by the court, this Court may order a new trial only if the error amounts to plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). That rule enables appellate courts “to correct ‘those errors that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,”’ but only if those errors are ‘“particularly egregious.”’” United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). That is to say, the doctrine should only be applied when “the error was ‘such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. at 240. However, when the error involves the omission of an element of an offense from the jury charge, this Court has stated that such a failure to instruct “would typically constitute plain error, because it would deprive the accused of his substantial right to an instruction that includes every element of the offense which must be proved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1293 (4th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). My review of the erroneous instruction, within the contexts both of the charge as a whole and the entire trial, id., leads me to believe that the plain error standard, strict as it is, has been met in this case.
To begin, at no point in the court’s charge to the jury was the jury told that it must find that the defendant received some benefit from the kidnapping before it could convict. Thus, this case stands in strong contrast to this Court’s recent McLamb decision, in which it was found that the district court did not commit plain error in failing to include an element of the offense in its summary when it had previously read to the jury both the indictment and the statute, and had also previously and correctly spelled out all of the essential elements. Id. at 1292-93. It is true that in the instant case the district court did read the statute to the jury immediately before listing the elements of it, and that the statute did include the phrase “ransom, reward, or otherwise.” This Court has held, however, that an omission of an element in a jury instruction is not cured by a reading of the statute to the jury. United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir.1965).
Additionally, the failure to instruct the jury on the specific element that the kidnapping was done for ransom, reward, or other benefit or reason was not and cannot be cured by a charge that the kidnapping was done willfully, that is, voluntarily and pur*506posefully with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. That substitute, at best, is not as extensive as the required element. At worst, it is simply no substitute at all. Clearly, doing an act with the bad purpose of disobeying or disregarding the law is not interchangeable with doing the act to gain some benefit for oneself.
Furthermore, a review of the trial as a whole reveals that the error in the jury instruction was not an isolated incident. See Mitchell, 1 F.3d at 239-40. In fact, quite the opposite is true: The instruction represents the culmination of a series of events, each one building upon and compounding the one before. At the outset, the indictment did not charge that the Mdnapping victim was held for ransom, reward, or otherwise. Next, there were no preliminary instructions to aid the jury in understanding the evidence. Consequently, when the government misstated the elements of the kidnapping in its opening statement,* the jury could not know that the government was wrong, and had no reason to look for evidence of any benefit to the defendant in carrying out the kidnapping.
Prior to the charge conference, each side submitted proposed instructions. The instructions on kidnapping submitted by the defendant followed exactly the pattern instructions laid out in the standard source, Devitt & Blackmar, including the instruction on “and held for ransom, reward, or otherwise” quoted above. In contrast, although purporting to base its proposed instruction on Devitt & Blackmar, the government omitted the “benefit” element. Instead, it substituted the element “that these acts were done willfully,” without, however, citing a source to support this substitution. At the brief charge conference, the judge stated,
It is going to be simple. You don’t have any big disagreements, and let’s just move through [the instructions] swiftly. We have got the opening.... Then we get to Count One, the [statute], then the elements, you all can look at that, but I don’t think there is any disagreement about anything here. Then we have got Count Two....
(J.A. 347.)
In its closing argument, the government once again misstated the elements of the kidnapping charge against Mr. Childress.
Count One is the kidnapping charge and it simply requires you to find that the victim was taken against her will and transported across a state line. That’s the crime. It doesn’t require ransom. You will hear the instruction. For ransom, reward, or otherwise. [Otherwise] is anything. So ransom is not an element in the kidnapping charge. All you have to find is that Regina Retassie was taken against her will and was taken across a state line and the crime is complete the minute they cross the state line of Virginia into Maryland.
(Tr. 381.) Therefore, when the court finally gave its instructions (following almost verbatim the proposed instruction submitted by the government), those instructions only reiterated what the jury had already heard. As a result, not once during Mr. Childress’ trial did the jury hear a full and accurate statement of what it was required to find before it could convict him of kidnapping.
Finally, the fact that there was some evidence in the government’s ease to support the missing element does not excuse or cure the omission: The error is not remedied merely because an appellate court, upon review, is satisfied that the jury would have found the essential elements had it been properly instructed. United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393, 398 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888, 107 S.Ct. 286, 93 L.Ed.2d 261 (1986). This is so even when the evidence is quite strong, or even wholly uncontested. United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1167 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193 (1976); United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. *5071975), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir.1988); Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 941 (D.C.Cir.1965).
The majority declines to find error in the instructions given to Mr. Childress’ jury on the ground that a kidnapper’s motivation is not an element of the offense. I would agree with this proposition: A showing of motivation is not required by the federal kidnapping statute. What is required is a showing of benefit to the kidnapper. I note merely that motivation and benefit, although they may frequently overlap in a given case, are nonetheless separate and distinct concepts. Further, even if motivation and benefit were conceptually the same, the cases relied upon by the majority have been, at the least, called into question, if not seriously undermined, by more recent decisions — including opinions issued by this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 662 F.2d 1087, 1088 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 955, 102 S.Ct. 1464, 71 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982).
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Therefore, I dissent.

 The government told the jury:
The indictment charges three crimes. There are three counts to the indictment. Counts One, Two, and Three. Count One charges kidnapping, and that is simply the taking of a person, the victim here, Ms. Retassie, against her will. And it is a federal crime. That means when you transport the person across a state line. In this case, the transportation was from Virginia into the State of Maryland, and then into the State of Pennsylvania.
Count Two charges the carrying and using of a firearm....
(Tr. 6.)