Court Opinion

ID: 9772294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:13:58.309597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:29.042678
License: Public Domain

DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Jerry Lane Joseph, et al., appealed the trial court’s decision dismissing their action against Marriott International, Inc. Mr. Joseph contended on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) finding Marriott did not owe a duty to Mr. Joseph; and (2) holding section 876 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) does not apply to this case and, hence, Marriott could not be held liable for allegedly contributing to the City of Osage Beach’s tortious actions. This court affirmed the decision of the trial court in an opinion filed February 10,1998.
Mr. Joseph filed a motion for rehearing on February 25, 1998. Among the arguments asserted was the claim that the court’s opinion of February 10, 1998, should be vacated and rehearing granted due to the *631court’s “erroneous belief of property ownership.” In support of this contention, Mr. Joseph notes that in its opinion, the court stated “Marriott granted the City an easement to build a sewer line and service facility.” Mr. Joseph argues that the motion for rehearing should be granted because “this statement is totally contrary to the undisputed, true, fact that the property from which the easement was taken was not owned by Marriott, only a lessee of the adjacent property, but by the Duenke Estate, original developers of the area, which did grant the easement to the City of Osage Beach for the construction of the sewer facility in question privately serving Marriott’s Tan-Tar-A Resort.” (emphasis in original). Mr. Joseph failed to cite any reference to the legal file supporting this allegation. The Duenke Estate’s alleged ownership of the property is not asserted in the petition filed initiating the action. Additionally, the assertion that the property from which the easement was taken was owned by the Duenke Estate rather than Marriott is not referenced in either Mr. Joseph or Marriott’s statement of facts in their briefs to this court and was not mentioned in oral arguments before this court. Review of the legal file reveals that the only reference to the Duenke Estate’s alleged ownership of the property from which the easement was taken is in footnote 1 of Marriott’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings were Marriott stated:
Although not specifically pleaded, and not required for this motion, Marriott states to the Court that the easement owned by the City was on property owned by the Duenke Trust, and not Marriott. Therefore, not only was the deodorant pump station and stairs to be placed upon an easement owned by the City, but that easement was not even on property owned by Marriott.
(L.F. 68). This reference to the Duenke Estate’s alleged ownership of the property on which the easement for the sewage facility existed is insufficient to accept as a formal assertion in contravention of assertions made to this court that Marriott owned the property on which the easement was granted and, therefore, rehearing is not warranted.
Even assuming arguendo, that the reference to the Duenke Estate’s alleged ownership of the property on which the easement was granted was sufficient for this court to consider as a fact or a factual assertion the Duenke Estate’s ownership of the land, such would not alter the ultimate decision of this court. As noted in the court’s opinion, providing for sewerage is a governmental function and an exercise of the police power of the state. Lodge of the Ozarks v. City of Branson, 796 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo.App.1990). When the government exercises its police, power to provide sewerage, the landowners who grant easements to the city for such services may not be held liable for the conditions of the services. Zubcic v. Missouri Portland Cement Co., 710 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo.App.1986). The principle enunciated in Zubcic applies equally where the liability of a lessee is at issue. Sheppard v. McFadden Lighting Co., 816 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Mo.App.1991). Thus, when the city possesses an easement on a portion of the property owned by the lessor which is leased to the lessee, the lessee may not be held liable for the government’s maintenance of that easement. Id. The Duenke Estate’s alleged ownership of the property from which the easement was granted, therefore, was not dispositive of Marriott’s legal liability. Accordingly, even if Marriott leased the property from which the easement was taken rather than owning the property, it does not impose a duty on Marriott to maintain the service center.
The other arguments asserted in Mr. Joseph’s Motion for Rehearing are without merit, also.
Mr. Joseph’s motion for rehearing is denied.