Court Opinion

ID: 9649299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:47:51.066969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:55.031486
License: Public Domain

Hammond, C. J.,
dissenting:
I accept the majority’s statement of the facts with only minor additions later mentioned, but I cannot accept their conclusion. Although the precise question here involved is one of first impression in Maryland the application of well-established rules regarding the assumption of risk and causation leads me to conclude that as a matter of law there was an assumption by Mrs. Chalmers of the risk of misfortunes which might result from Mrs. Willis’ inexperience, and that the risk assumed was the cause of the accident which resulted in Mrs. Chalmers’ injury.
The doctrine of assumption of risk rests upon the plaintiff’s express or implied consent to encounter a known risk, which *389relieves the defendant of an obligation of conduct with regard to that risk or results in the abandoning in advance of the right to complain of harm flowing from the consequences of the risk incurred. It refers to the situation in which the plaintiff with full knowledge of the risk voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant involving danger to the plaintiff through the defendant’s conduct. Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418; Bull Steamship Lines v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 524-25; Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60. If the defect or danger which creates the risk is obvious, knowledge is presumed. Gibson v. Beaver, supra; Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Board Co., 184 Md. 16, 20; Gordon v. Maryland State Fair, Inc., 174 Md. 466, 468-69. In the Gibson case we stated: “In determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk, an obj ective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him.” (p. 421)
Here, Mrs. Chalmers expressly agreed and undertook to teach Mrs. Willis to drive. It is obvious that Mrs. Chalmers regarded Mrs. Willis as a complete novice since for the initial lesson the teacher took the pupil to an out-of-the-way, “uninhabited” area where there was no traffic and began by teaching her the most basic fundamentals — stopping, starting, and steering. On the second day, the teaching continued and immediately prior to the accident Mrs. Chalmers gave instructions on looking for traffic and using the mirror before making turns. Continuous driving instruction is not ordinarily given to a driver in whose driving skill and experience one has confidence. Having thus demonstrated her appreciation of Mrs. Willis’ inexperienced state down to the moment of the accident and having acted as she did in light of that inexperience, Mrs. Chalmers cannot be heard to deny her awareness of the specific dangers which might flow from Mrs. Willis’ inexperience. The fact that Mrs. Willis had driven without incident for a total of some 30 to 40 miles over a two-day period did not render her an experienced driver. Inexperience in driving, by its very nature, is only eliminated slowly and by degrees. It is not totally or even significantly eliminated by 30 to 40 miles of safe driving. Legislative recognition of this fact has been given in recently enacted Ch. 717 *390of the Laws of 1967, amending Art. 66Y¿, § 88 (1), to require that persons under 18 years of age applying for operator’s licenses have at least 30 hours of classroom and 6 hours of in-car approved professional driving instruction. It also might be noted that this age group is probably one where the development of effective reflexes in driving would be somewhat more rapid than average. Some of the hazards of driving instruction have also been recognized by the Legislature, which in Code (1965 Repl. Vol.), Art. 77, § 212 (4), requires that cars used in school driver training programs “bear a red flag clearly visible from both front and rear” to warn the public. It is common knowledge that other “driver training” cars also frequently have signs warning that the driver is a learner and dual controls which, it might be noted, would have avoided the misfortune involved in this case. We think that the conclusion is compelled that Mrs. Chalmers must have appreciated Mrs. Willis’ continuing inexperience and its potential consequences, and consented to assume the risk of misfortunes caused by this inexperience.
It is also plain that the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence is that the accident was the result of inexperience. It is agreed that Mrs. Willis had been driving carefully within the limits of her competence, and there is no evidence of inattentiveness, speed or distraction on her part at the time of the accident.1 The turn was Mrs. Willis’ first left turn between pillars and into a somewhat narrow road. The testimony indicates that most of her driving over the two days had been over straight roads and around circles, with relatively few left turns. In any event, even two days of making an ordinary number of turns would not make Mrs. Willis experienced in this respect. More than two days is required to learn to react instinctively to various driving situations. In the absence of some explanation such as inattentiveness, speed, distraction, ■or some peculiar physical condition of the road or the car, the ■only conclusion to be drawn is that Mrs. Willis lacked the instinctive reactions which an experienced driver would have and *391that her failure to let the wheel come back or to pull the wheel back was the result of this inexperience. Under the circumstances, no attentive, experienced driver would have failed to instinctively pull the wheel back properly. Mrs. Willis’ failure to do so, due to her lack of experienced instinctive reactions, was the cause of the accident and was precisely the type of risk which Mrs. Chalmers had assumed.
We have held that the doctrine of assumption of risk should be applied, as a matter of law, in cases such as this where the undisputed evidence and all permissible inferences deducible therefrom clearly establish that the risk of the danger which causes the accident was fully known to- and understood by the plaintiff whose consent thereto may be implied. Gibson v. Beaver, supra; Evans v. Johns Hopkins University, 224 Md. 235; Velte v. Nichols, 211 Md. 353.
Our conclusions are supported by the decisions in other jurisdictions involving a plaintiff instructing an inexperienced operator. The general rule is stated in 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles, § 539, p. 98:
“Generally, one who is licensed to operate a motor vehicle, and who voluntarily accompanies a driver who has just received a learner’s permit for the purpose of teaching him to drive, assumes the risk of the learner’s inexperience and may not recover damages for personal injuries caused by the lack of skill or inexperience of the learner.”
One of the cases supporting this statement is Richards v. Richards (Ky.), 324 S. W. 2d 400. In that case, on the second day of driving instruction, the learner “put his foot ‘too hard’ on the accelerator and lost control of the car” which hit a tree. Holding that the question of assumption of risk was not for the jury because the instructing brother was injured in an accident clearly caused by the inexperience of the learning brother, the Court said:
“Allen knew his brother Edgar was without experience in operating a modern car. Thus, Allen assumed a risk when he got in the car with his brother and undertook to teach him to drive. * * *
*392“It cannot be said this accident was caused by Edgar’s negligence. It was obviously caused by his inexperience in the proper handling of the mechanical controls. * * * This is exactly the situation a person must anticipate when he undertakes to teach another how to drive. This is the risk he assumes.” — 402
The Courts of New York have adopted the same view in Spellman v. Spellman, 128 N. E. 2d 317; Le Fleur v. Vergilia (App. Div.), 117 N. Y. S. 2d 244; Aloisio v. Nelson (Supr. Ct.), 209 N. Y. S. 2d 674, 675; St. Denis v. Skidmore (App. Div.), 221 N. Y. S. 2d 613. In Aloisio the Court, citing Spellman and Le Fleur, stated: “A licensed operator who accompanies an operator possessing only a learner’s permit in order to instruct that unlicensed operator, assumes the risk of the permittee’s inexperience, and cannot recover damages for injuries caused by that inexperience or lack of skill.”
As suggested by the majority, there are other cases which allow the question of assumption of risk to go to the jury when there is evidence that the injured passenger was merely accompanying the driver to satisfy a statutory requirement and was not giving instruction. Turner v. Johnson (Ky.), 333 S. W. 2d 749; Jennings v. Hodges (S. D.), 129 N. W. 2d 59; Roberts v. Craig (Cal.), 268 P. 2d 500. One explanation for the distinction which is made between these cases and those where instruction is being given may arise from the evidentiary effect of the giving of instruction. As we have noted, the giving of instruction is a clear indication of appreciation of the lack of skill and experience of the driver. When no instruction is being given, the facts as to the accompanier’s appreciation of the risk ordinarily may be more in dispute and therefore for the jury. In Turner, for instance, the questions of whether the claimant was a teacher or a mere passenger and whether the claimant knew the driver was inexperienced were disputed matters of fact. The other cases cited also involved jury questions as to> whether the conduct of the novice driver was the result of inexperience or negligence.
I would affirm. Judge Horney and Judge Finan have authorized me to say that they concur in my view of the case.

. The appellant did not undertake to prove negligence on a res ipsa loquitur theory as apparently was done in Corbett v. Curtis (Me.), 225 A. 2d 402.