Court Opinion

ID: 9793906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:02.869811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:45.895646
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
with whom RABINOWITZ, J., joins, dissenting.
The rule of law that should govern this ease is that a judgment resulting from a voluntary dismissal is appealable where the dismissal was solicited in order to expedite review of a prior order which disposed of the only claims that the appellant wishes to pursue. This is the rule of law employed in the federal courts. Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v. World-wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 94-95 (2nd Cir.1987); Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d 1005 (11th Cir.1986). See 9 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.13[1], at 153 (1986). The policy on which this rule is based is that it is wasteful to require a party to go to trial on claims the party is willing to concede in order to preserve the party’s right to appeal claims which have already been decided. This rule should apply to this case because the only claim Legge wished to pursue when she solicited the dismissal was her claim to enforce the terms of the settlement.
In my view Legge’s briefing is not so cursory as to justify this court’s refusal to apply the foregoing rule. Legge’s failure to address the appealability issue in her opening brief is understandable as the trial court had not made an adverse ruling on it. Legge’s discussion in her reply brief refers to the approach taken by this court in criminal law cases. That analogy is not exact, but it is reasonable as the policy reasons for a “Cooksey ”1 plea in a criminal case are similar to those underlying the voluntary dismissal-appeal procedure discussed above. As we stated in Cooksey, “it would be wasteful of legal resources” to require the defendant to “undergo a full trial for the mere sake of preserving the right to appeal” the trial court’s earlier ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 524 P.2d at 1256. We also noted a reluctance “to establish a rigid rule *610requiring a defendant to undergo the costly and futile ordeal of a complete trial” to preserve the right to appeal a ruling on a pretrial motion. Id. at 1255-56. Similarly, Legge argues that “there are no efficiency or fairness arguments favoring Greig’s position that, after the trial court denied Patricia’s motion to confirm, she should have been required to go to trial solely to preserve her appeal right.”
I would proceed to review this case on the merits of the question whether the court erred in not enforcing the settlement contract. On the merits I think a remand is in order so that the court can hold an evidentia-ry hearing on factual issues pertaining to whether Greig’s offer was conditional on acceptance by all three plaintiffs.

. So named because Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974), was the first in a line of cases allowing criminal defendants to appeal trial court rulings after entering nolo contendere pleas. See C. Pengilly, Post-Plea Appeal of “Dis-positive” Issues, 5 Alaska L.Rev. 221 (1988).