Court Opinion

ID: 2951176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-16 20:21:15.993131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:04.558515
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-87-00071-CR

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                       TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
                                   TYLER, TEXAS

6R0VER DANIEL WEST, APPELLANT             §          APPEAL FROM THE 86TH
                                          s          JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE              §          OF KAUFMAN COUNTY, TEXAS

     Grover Daniel West was convicted of burglary of a habitation by a jury
who assessed his punishment at ninety-nine years and a$9,044 fine.
     West presents three points of error contending the trial court erred In
overruling his pretrial motion to suppress his written confession, in overrul
ing his motion for Instructed verdict, and in conducting ahearing on his
motion for new trial in his absence. We affirm the judgment.
      It 1s undisputed that the home of John Allen Manning and his wife,
 Ralaine Manning, located near Mabank in Kaufman County, was burglarized during
 the daylight hours of November 12, 1986. The record reveals that the Manning
 family departed their home at about 7:30 a.m. on that date and returned home
 in the late afternoon. The Manning's seventeen-year-old daughter, Keefa, was
 the first to return home. She arrived at about 3:45 p.m. and discovered the
 burglary. She testified that some of her parent's guns, clothing, and jewelry
 were missing. John Manning testified that when he arrived home at about 4:00
 p.m. he noticed that awindow on the west side of the garage had been broken.
 He testified that various knives, guns, VCR tapes, clothing, and jewelry had
 been taken in the burglary. At trial he identified aColt Trooper .357 magnum
 revolver with afour-inch barrel, Introduced into evidence as State's Exhibit
  No. 1, as one of the weapons stolen by the burglar. Ralaine Manning
catalogued anumber of articles stolen from the home, Including aGE VCR with
remote control, ten VCR tapes, compound hunting bow, th1rty-f1ve cassette
tapes, and various fInarms. Including the Colt revolver, a Frencia .22
caliber automatic rifle, aMarlin 30-30 rifle, aRemington bolt action .243
rifle, aWinchester MK II 12 gauge automatic shotgun, an H&R 20 gauge single
shotgun, and a Mossberg 22 caliber rifle.
     Jessie Van Horn, a Dallas resident and acquaintance of West, testified
for the State that West sold him the .357 Colt Revolver shortly before Thanks-
giving in 1986.
     Neal Morgan, aKaufman County deputy sheriff, testified without objection
that West orally informed him that the Colt revolver could be found at the
home of Jessie Van Horn in Dallas, and that he went to Van Horn's home and
 recovered the pistol.
      West gave awritten statement on November 28, 1986, confessing to the
 burglary. Omitting the warnings and formal parts, the confession reads as
 follows:

      Mr. Morgan is typing this statement as Itell 1t to him.
            On November 12, 1986, Willie Baird and Bobby Linley and Iwere
      in Mahank tfsee my old girlfriend Connie Hartline. About 9:30 a.m.
      w2 went to a brick house down the road from my girlfriend's house
      going toward Kaufman and away from Mabank I went through the
      window on the west side of the garage and took a Remington Bolt
      Sat!    ?243 rifle with ascope, Colt 357 -*£ J"*1* *{] n2
      30-30 rifle, with scope, Frencia .22 rifle, Winf^ter-m, u(
      nannp 259 S.W. 1085 (1924); Henderson v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. R. 18, 127 S.W.2d 902
(1939); Phillios v. State, 163 Tex. Cr. R. 13, 288 S.W.2d 775 (1956); Mares^
State, 571 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978); and Cooper v. State, 631 S.W.2d
508 (Tex. Cr. App. 1982).
      In Powers, 5 S.W. 153, a murder case, the facts were that 1n the
 defendant's absence a venireman was examined, peremptorily challenged by the
 State and was excused by the court. In addressing Powers' claim that these
 facts required reversal of his conviction, Presiding Judge White wrote:
           Aselection of the jury 1s beyond doubt one[°\^\™s^Zlu
      +=„+ foatiir** of a trial for a capital felony, and we can wen
      Sm'eh^lmpomnt        Uis ordinarily for adefendant to be presen
      during such proceedings. But 1n any case, when a rule Is invoked
      for non-observance, there should at least appear some slight reason
      3C ££? ^^XT?^™.^ r^'ceases^oe
        HSdV^star tKW Injury £,*«£
             Under the circumstances disclosed, if error was committed it
      was manifestly harmless error, for which no just ground of complaint
      can lie.

  Powers, 5 S.W. at 156.

       5The 1907 version was article 646, and the 1925 version was article 580.
  Both of these versus contain the identical language quoted above.
    In Cartwright v. State, 259 S.W. 1085, asignificant decision, the record
reveals that after the state rested in abootleg6 case, the defendant and his
counsel retired from the courtroom into an anteroom to discuss the case. The
jury was apparently still seated in the jury box. During the defendant's
absence, the prosecutor exhibited a"glass jug containing aquantity of the
liquor found at [defendant's] still." The jug was earlier Introduced into
evidence. Whereupon, several jurors smelled the jug. The court, construing
fonner article 646 of "Vernon's Code of Criminal Procedure," concluded that
Cartwright sustained "no injury" utilizing the ratio of Judge White in Powers
v. state, 5S.W. at 156, quoted above. Cartwright, 259 S.W. at 1086.
      In Henderson v. State, 127 S.W.2d 902, the defendant was absent when his
motion for new trial in amisdemeanor case was heard and overruled by the
trial court. The court reversed the judgment, concluding that under former
 article 5807 "it was error, for the court, in the absence of appellant, to
 hear, consider and overrule the motion." (Citation omitted.)
      The Henderson court pretermitted any discussion of the "harmless error-
 doctrine espoused in Cartwright, but carefully noted that the defendant was
 charged with misdemeanor theft on December 5, 1938, she was arrested and
 jailed on the same day, and that on the morning of the following day she was
 brought before the county court where she pleaded guilty before the judge
 after waiving ajury trial (presumably without the assistance of counsel). The
 trial court assessed her punishment at afine and imprisonment in the county

       6Illegal manufacture of whiskey.
       7. ... -,„ con ™>aH in nart- "In all prosecutions for felonies, the

  Imprisonment in Jail .•."" (Emphasis ours.)
jail for sixty days. The record shows that following her conviction she
employed counsel who filed amotion for new trial, alleging that the guilty
plea was coerced by the sheriff. Our reading of Henderson is that the harm to
Henderson was obvious. She was prevented from presenting her testimony in
support of her allegation that her plea of guilty was coerced.
     In PMIlios v. State, 288 S.W.2d 775, the court 1n a brief opinion
written by Judge Morrison, reversed the defendant's conviction of assault with
attempt to rape, tersely stating that the record shows that the defendant "was
not present when his motion for new trial was overruled, that he was in jail,
and that he did not waive his right [under article 580] to be present." An
 insight into the significance of Phillips is gained by noting that the court
 cites Henderson v. State, 127 S.W.2d 902, and as has already been observed in
 Henderson, the harm or injury to the defendant there was clearly demonstrated
 by the record. In our view, Phillips and Henderson are "two peas in apod."
       In any event, the question whether aviolation of an accused's right
 under article 33.03 to be present at trial requires reversal in the absence of
 ashowing of harm or prejudice to the defendant, was settled by the Court of
 Criminal Appeals by its 1978 decision- in Mares v. State, 571 S.W.2d 303. The
 Mares case, following the lead of Cartwright, held that where adefendant is
  absent during atrial proceeding, reversal is not required by article 33.03
  unless "injury 1s shown to the defendant or [unless] there are facts [shown by
  the record] from which injury [to the defendant] can be inferred." (Citation
  omitted.) Mares was reaffirmed in Cooper v. State,8 631 S.W.2d at 511-512.

      8Tt u noteworthy that the court in both Mares and Cooper seems to place
  the burden'ofSTSuSdto       establish prejud^Tto his3 cause resulting fnj
  SI absence in spite of the requirement of article ^'^^
     We conclude that West sustained no harm or Injury by the violation of the
statute. No evidence was heard by the court; Indeed, no evidence other than
that already before the court was admissible under the ground alleged in
West's motion.
     The court under the circumstances here erred in hearing and overruling
West's motion for new trial in his absence, but we hold the error to be
harmless beyond areasonable doubt. We apply that standard because it appears
that Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2) is inapplicable to a post-trial proceeding,
since under that rule of reversible error in criminal cases the presence of an
error requires reversal "unless the appellate court determines beyond a
 reasonable doubt that, the error mad* no contribution to the conviction or to
the punishment." (Emphasis ours.) Errors contemplated by Rule 81(b)(2)9 are
errors necessarily committed during the course of the trial itself.
     West contends that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
 and Tex. Const, art. 1, §10, were violated by the court's action 1n hearing
 and overruling his motion for new trial in his absence.
      Under the present circumstances, we hold that West's rights under these
 state and federal constitutional provisions are not implicated. Mares v.
 State, 571 S.W.2d 303. However, assuming, without deciding, that the court's
 action did violate both state and federal constitutional protection afforded
 West, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
 r.hapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

  SSSSSy^lSt!5        Additionally, both decisions seem to confuse the concept
  Sf-harmless error" as applied by Cartwright with no error.
       9As modified by current Tex. Code Crim. Proc.Ann art 44 29 Act of May
  26, 1987, ch. 179, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2711, 2712 tVernon;.

                                          10
    West's first point of error 1s overruled
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed         \
                                                   i^iUlUv-
                                                   PAUL §. COLLfcV
                                                      Justice

Opinion delivered November 24, 1987.

                                       (PUBLISH)

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