Court Opinion

ID: 9538159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:31:24.674576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:35.075698
License: Public Domain

FORT, J.,
specially concurring.
The majority here appears to conclude from the evidence that the decedent entered into a valid common law marriage with Ida Mae Booker, appellant herein, in the state of Texas in 1951, that the marriage was consummated, and that she and James E. Booker, the decedent, lived continuously together thereafter, except for his periods of penal confinement, as husband and wife, until 1973. In October 1973, the trial court found and this court concludes, that James E. Booker and Rosie L. Taylor obtained a marriage license in Oregon, that no marriage was ever solemnized or attempted in Oregon, but that in October 1973, sometime after he and Rosie had journeyed to Texas, and, as the majority states, "while residing in the state of Texas, she and the decedent entered into the requisite agreement to become husband and wife.” Thereafter James and Rosie lived as man and wife until his death. It is conceded that both the first and second wife are now alive.
ORS 41.360(2) provides that in Oregon it is a disputable presumption that
"[a] thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.”
In State v. Eggleston, 45 Or 346, 77 P 738 (1904), a prosecution for adultery, the court, after concluding that there was evidence the defendant was validly married to another, said:
"* * * 'In the absence of affirmative evidence, the dissolution of the marriage is not to be presumed to have occurred, either by divorce or by the death of one of the *786parties to it.’ It is a disputable presumption that a thing once proved to exist continues as long as it is usual with things of that nature: B. & C. Comp. § 788, subd. 33. The solemnization of a marriage is based upon the mutual assent of the parties that the relation entered into shall continue until it is severed by the death of one of them. * * *” 45 Or at 356.
The majority relies on the more recent case of Smith v. Smith, 169 Or 650, 131 P2d 447 (1942). I concede that there is language in that opinion, standing alone, which supports the result it has reached. I believe, however, that there is a basis for distinguishing it from this case. I note initially that Smith nowhere refers to Eggleston. It is elementary that reversal of prior decisions by implication only is not favored.
Smith requires in a case such as this that three things must be proven: (1) the prior marriage, (2) the prior marriage has not been terminated, and (3) the prior spouse is still alive.
In the case at bar the majority as stated concludes that the prior marriage to Ida Mae Booker is established, that she is still alive, and indeed is the appellant here. In Smith the crucial issue, as gleaned from the court’s brief opinion, was whether a prior spouse of the woman who had married the deceased owner of the realty involved in that suit was still living when she later married the man who owned the property in dispute.
In Smith, in addition to the language quoted by the majority and immediately prior to the last portion quoted, the court said:
"The proof falls far short of meeting the essential requirements to set aside and hold for naught a subsequent marriage. It is argued that defendant has failed to show that Quirino Apigo Tadina was dead at the time of her second marriage. The authorities above cited require plaintiffs to show that Tadina was alive at such time. All the evidence, instead of showing that Tadina was alive, *787tends to show that he was dead at such time. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.) 169 Or at 652.
Thus in my view the decision appears to have turned entirely on the failure of the plaintiff to prove, in the face of "all the evidence” to the contrary, that the first husband of the surviving widow of the deceased owner of the realty was alive at the time she married the owner of the realty. Here, on the contrary, not only is there no evidence at all that the first wife is dead, but it is conceded that she is very much alive and is the appellant in this proceeding.
The reality of the majority’s opinion is that the first wife is compelled to prove a negative and one that is virtually impossible to establish, namely, that James E. Booker did not somewhere at some time divorce her before his purported common law marriage to Rosie in 1973. There is absolutely no evidence that he did divorce Ida Mae. She testified that she had never been served with papers of any kind relating to divorce or separation, that Mr. Booker at all times knew her whereabouts and was in regular touch with her long after as well as before his marriage to Rosie.
It seems to me that once the position has been taken, as the majority has done here, that the marriage of Ida Mae and James E. Booker was a valid common law marriage, the burden of showing its lawful termination, as in Eggleston, should be on these facts on the person claiming that her subsequent marriage was valid because the first marriage of James E. Booker has been validly terminated.
Here, however, the trial court in a carefully considered opinion concluded that Ida Mae Booker had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she and James E. Booker had in 1951 entered into a valid common law marriage in Texas, because it was unable to conclude that the requisite mutual intent to enter into a marriage contract existed between them. Accordingly it concluded that Ida Mae Booker had not established a valid common law marriage with James *788E. Booker. It was for that reason primarily that it concluded there was no valid legal impediment to the marriage in 1973 of Rosie Taylor and James E. Booker.
Although the question is close, I would defer to the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses, particularly when as here credibility is a major factor. For that reason I concur in the result.