Court Opinion

ID: 9473089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:19:02.07334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:18.754733
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part II of the opinion written by Judge John R. Gibson. I would, however, remand this case to the district court for a determination of the merits of the claim because I believe Purnell has exhausted his state remedies.
In his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Purnell asserted inter alia the following grounds for relief:
Ground (12) A-One: Petitioner is being held unlawfully and unconstitutionally restrained of his liberties, by the respondent named herein, inthat [sic] such is the unconstitutional product of the court abuse of its discretion, and out right denied petitioner his sixth amendment right to have a witness in his behalf to a material issue, in excluding expert psychiatrists [sic] testimony who had examined petitioner and found him mentally healthy and not psychotic, in view of the bizarre manner in which the alledged [sic] assailant conducted himself in the coarse [sic] of the rape, i.e. smearing feces on the victim and in her panty hose, this kind of behavior definitely exhibited a psychotic breakdown, which this expert could show the fact petitioner was not psychotic, and not likely to act in such a bizarre manner.
* * *
Ground (12) C-Three: Petitioner is being held unconstitutionally restrained of his liberties by the respondent named herein, inthat [sic] petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a fair trial by a jury free from outside influence when the trial court refused to declare a mistrial upon defense counsel request, after victim-witness Judy Hampton during the *711recess in front of and within the hearing of the jurors, made inflammatory prejudicial statements to the Circuit Attorney (referring to cross-examination by defense counsel. Siad [sic] statements tended to inflame the members of the jury and caused undue sympathy for the witness and thereby denied petitioner a fair trial.
These contentions raise evidentiary and trial issues which have been decided by the Missouri Supreme Court (see the discussion in Judge Gibson’s opinion at 705-06).
In his habeas petition and his appeal to this court, Purnell raises these same issues but frames them as violations of his constitutional rights. The first claim concerning the admissibility of certain expert testimony merely presents an evidentiary issue for collateral review which Purnell labels as a sixth amendment violation. Whether this claim is framed as raising an evidentiary or a constitutional issue, the state court is likely to reach the same result reached in Purnell’s direct appeals. In my view the claim is essentially frivolous and the purposes of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) are not served by declining federal jurisdiction for lack of exhaustion in the state courts. See Venen v. State of Missouri, 734 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir.1984).
The Missouri Supreme Court has also considered the second issue,' relating to mistrial, and ruled that no reversible error occurred. Absent reversible error, no constitutional issue can arise. Again, if this claim were referred to the state court, the issue would be decided exactly as it was previously decided, regardless of whether the issue was characterized as a constitutional error or an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Accordingly, referral of this case to the state courts would be futile and a waste of judicial time and energy. Thus, the result reached in Judge Gibson’s opinion is clearly proper and I join in the result for the reasons stated in Part II of that opinion.