Court Opinion

ID: 9698067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:40:50.090686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:43.129124
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the Court’s disposition of this appeal only to the extent that it remands the matter to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for further proceedings. I write separately primarily to note my disagreement with that portion of the Court’s opinion that limits the scope of the remand merely to a determination whether inmate McDonald’s due-process right to call witnesses on his behalf and to confront and question adverse witnesses was violated. In my view, the remand should afford McDonald a hew disciplinary hearing, and the prior determination should be vacated. Nor can I join that aspect of the Court’s disposition that does not prohibit the same DOC hearing officer from redetermining factual matters concerning the conduct of the hearing that that hearing officer previously determined and noted in his report. Finally, although I agree with the Court’s conclusion that this record would not support a determination requiring tape-recording of prison-disciplinary hearings, I strongly disagree with the Court’s dismissive assessment concerning the due-process implications of tape-recording prison-disciplinary hearings. Ante at 200-201, 652 A.2d at 706.
I
Inmate McDonald was charged with assaulting a fellow inmate with a chair. Two corrections officers observed the incident and filed reports. Officer Connell’s report stated that while he had been on duty at the East Jersey State Prison visit hall he had seen McDonald twice lift a chair over his head and swing it downward. Connell could not identify who was hit by the chair, but heard “the *204impact of the chair hitting flesh.” Officer Watley filed a similar report, noting that McDonald had struck inmate Smith with the chair. McDonald’s version of the incident was that an inmate named Spivey had hit him with a folding chair and that he had grabbed the chair from Spivey to avoid being hit a second time. The record confirmed that McDonald had been treated for a three-quarter-inch superficial laceration on his head, but no evidence was adduced suggesting that inmate Smith, McDonald’s alleged victim, had sustained any injuries.
A handwritten report of the adjudication of the charges against inmate McDonald, signed by Hearing Officer Donald Mee, Jr., constitutes the only record of the disciplinary hearing. According to that report, no witnesses testified against McDonald, and McDonald testified on his own behalf. Inmate Lamb, who was called as a witness, stated, “I ain’t got nothing to say.” The evidence against McDonald consisted of the reports of Lt. Connell and Officer Watley, a nurse’s report of McDonald’s injury, and the original Disciplinary Report that summarized the charges against McDonald. The portion of the adjudication report entitled “Confrontation/Cross-Examination requested” contains the Hearing Officer’s handwritten notation, “not requested.” The report states that the Hearing Officer relied on Lt. Connell’s report in concluding that McDonald was guilty as charged.
According to both McDonald and his counsel-substitute, they requested that the investigating officers obtain statements from inmates Spivey, Smith, and Lamb, apparently contemplating that such statements would also be offered in evidence. The Hearing Officer informed them that only inmate Lamb’s statement had been obtained. In addition, McDonald’s counsel-substitute contended that he had requested permission to call inmate Smith as a witness and to cross-examine officer Watley concerning his report that he had observed McDonald hit Smith with the chair. According to McDonald and his counsel-substitute, the Hearing Officer denied both requests.
*205As noted by the majority, the hearing officer found McDonald guilty and imposed as sanctions 15 days detention, 180 days loss of commutation credits, 180 days administrative segregation from both inmate Smith, the alleged victim, and inmate Spivey, whom McDonald claimed to have been the assailant, and 365 days loss of visitation privileges. Both the assistant superintendent of the prison and the Appellate Division affirmed the Hearing Officer’s determination. Ante at 193, 652 A.2d at 702.
II
The majority acknowledges that inmates are permitted to call witnesses and present documentary evidence at disciplinary hearings “ ‘when permitting them to do so will not be unduly hazardous to correctional facility safety or goals.’” Ante at 196, 652 A.2d at 704 (quoting N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(a)). If a hearing officer denies a request to call witnesses, the regulations require that “the reasons for each such refusal shall be separately specified on the Adjudication Form.” N.J.AC. 10A:4-9.13(a).
In addition, the regulations afford inmates the right of confrontation and cross-examination “where the * * * Disciplinary Hearing Officer deems it necessary for an adequate presentation of the evidence, particularly when serious issues of credibility are involved.” N.J.AC. 10A:4-9.14(a). The Hearing Officer is authorized to deny such a request if confrontation and cross-examination “would be unduly hazardous to correctional facility safety or goals.” Ibid. In Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975), we held that in disciplinary proceedings in which the right of confrontation or cross-examination was denied, the reasons for such denial must be entered on the record and communicated to the inmate. 67 N.J. at 532, 341 A.2d 629.
As noted, the Hearing Officer’s report conflicts with the assertion by McDonald and his counsel-substitute that they requested the right to cross-examine Officer Watley and that the request was denied by the Hearing Officer. The adjudication report prepared and signed by the Hearing Officer indicates that no *206request was made to confront or cross-examine any witnesses, nor does the report contain any notation either confirming or contradicting McDonald’s contention that he requested that inmate Smith be produced to testify at the hearing.
The majority opinion concedes that the Court is unable to resolve “the discrepancy between McDonald’s claim that the hearing officer denied his request to call other witnesses and to confront adverse witnesses and the fact that the adjudication form reflects no such claim.” Ante at 200, 652 A.2d at 706. Accordingly, the Court remands the matter to DOC to resolve that conflict.
In my view, the Court’s remand to DOC is flawed in at least two respects. To the extent that the remand does not preclude the original Hearing Officer from presiding at the rehearing, the remand would appear to violate DOC’s own regulations as well as the basic due-process requirement of an impartial hearing tribunal. Because no witness other than McDonald testified at the original hearing, only the original Hearing Officer could corroborate his own notation on the Adjudication Report that no request was made to cross-examine witnesses, and only that Hearing Officer could refute McDonald’s contention that he requested that inmate Smith be produced as a witness. Thus, if the matter were remanded to the same Hearing Officer, he would be required to resolve fact issues concerning which his own testimony and recollection would be indispensable. DOC’s regulations prohibit rehearings before the original “hearing body” if there is a “substantial likelihood of prejudice.” N.J.A.C. 10A:4 — 11.6(b). Moreover, the requirement of a neutral, unbiased adjudicatory decision maker is a basic tenet of due process. See 2 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 9.8 (3d ed. 1994); see also N.J.A.C. 10A:4-8.3(d) (restricting DOC staff member from serving on committee conducting disciplinary hearing if member witnessed incident under consideration); Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 525-28, 341 A.2d 629 (suggesting modification of DOC standards to insure impartiality of disciplinary-hearing tribunal). *207Because the original Hearing Officer cannot be impartial in resolving the conflict between his notations on the Adjudication Report and the recollection of McDonald and his counsel-substitute, he cannot conduct impartially a rehearing ordered to adjudicate that conflict.
Moreover, the Court errs in assuming that a remand, even before a new hearing officer, could provide a reliable resolution of the conflict concerning what occurred at McDonald’s disciplinary hearing on September 8, 1992. The affidavit of McDonald’s counsel-substitute alleges that hearing officers invariably deny requests to call or cross-examine witnesses and routinely fail to record on the Adjudication Report that any such requests were made. That allegation suggests the possibility of a widespread practice of refusing requests for witnesses or for cross-examination in prison-disciplinary hearings, even if meritorious. See, e.g., Walker v. Bates, 28 F.3d 652, 656 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that because hearing officer summarily refused requests by inmate to call witnesses at disciplinary hearing, “[t]he denial of an inmate’s right to call witnesses under circumstances such as those revealed here, constitutes, without more, a compensable constitutional due process violation”); Moye v. Selsky, 826 F.Supp. 712, 718 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (finding that hearing officer’s refusal to permit inmate to call witness at disciplinary hearing “was not logically related to any correctional goals” and hence deprived inmate of due process).
Because DOC maintains no record of such hearings other than the report prepared by the Hearing Officer, reliable resolution of conflicts such as the one presented by this record becomes highly unlikely. Close to two and one-half years have elapsed since the disciplinary hearing in question. The Court’s assumption that the original Hearing Officer accurately could recall the events at the prior hearing simply is unrealistic. Inevitably, an officer presiding at a remand hearing would have to decide whether the original adjudication report was more reliable than the recollection of McDonald and his counsel-substitute. In that context, the remand *208ordered by the Court is little more than a formality, with a predictable outcome: The chance that McDonald’s recollection will be found more credible than that of the original hearing officer ranges from slim to none. Under the circumstances, the Court’s uncertainty over whether McDonald’s due-process rights adequately were protected should be resolved in his favor, and the disciplinary determination adverse to him should be vacated, without prejudice to DOC’s right to retry the charges before a new hearing officer.
Finally, based on the record before us the Court perceives “a need for DOC to improve its recordkeeping.” Ante at 199, 652 A.2d at 705. Subsequent to oral argument, we were provided with a revised report form for prison-disciplinary-hearing adjudications, approved by DOC’s Commissioner. The revised form affords the inmate or counsel-substitute a designated space either to acknowledge that the Hearing Officer’s account of the proceeding is accurate, or to state the reasons for disputing the Hearing Officer’s account of the proceedings. The Court anticipates that the revised form will avoid repetition of the issues presented by this appeal. Ante at 199, 652 A.2d at 705. Moreover, the Court notes that the revised form will achieve “many of the same purposes as would tape-recording.” Ante at 202, 652 A.2d at 707. It characterizes tape-recording of disciplinary hearings as a process producing “a multitude of problems such as cost, burden and delay,” and describes its only benefit as “a lengthy but accurate record of what happened at the hearing.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Court concludes that tape-recording of prison-disciplinary hearings is permissible but not required to address due-process concerns.
In my view, the Court’s conclusion concerning DOC’s obligation to tape-record disciplinary proceedings is unnecessary to resolve this appeal, and does not address adequately the competing considerations that should inform any such determination. Surely this record does not establish that DOC’s failure to tape-record disciplinary hearings deprived McDonald or other inmates of *209constitutionally protected rights, and the Court has acknowledged that other procedures, such as the revised adjudication form, might adequately address the procedural shortcomings highlighted by McDonald’s appeal. Whether DOC’s failure to provide a tape-recorded record of disciplinary proceedings so adversely restricts other inmates’ access to appellate review should await resolution on the basis of an adequate record.
Although prison-disciplinary proceedings are not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, see Zeltner v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corrections, 201 N.J.Super. 195, 199-200, 492 A.2d 1084 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 299, 508 A.2d 186 (1985), the APA’s provisions requiring a transcribed record of proceedings in all contested cases at either party’s request reflects the indispensability of a verbatim record in providing appellate review of administrative hearings. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9; N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2. The APA’s provisions also apply to all other state agencies except for the State Board of Parole, the Public Employees Relations Commission, and the Division of Workers’ Compensation. See N.J.S.A. 52:14F-8. In Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 302-03, 57 S.Ct. 724, 729-30, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1100-01 (1936), Justice Cardozo acknowledged that the absence of an adequate record thwarts effective appellate review of administrative proceedings:
From the standpoint of due process — the protection of the individual against arbitrary action — a deeper vice is this, that even now we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which the Commission took[ ] notice and on which it rested its conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them out.
* * * To put the problem more concretely: how was it possible for the appellate court to review the law and the facts and intelligently decide that the findings of the Commission were supported by the evidence when the evidence that it approved was unknown and unknowable?

Ubid.]

Although the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 956 (1974), required only a written record by the finder of fact of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action, other courts *210have concluded that a transcript of the record of prison-disciplinary hearings is necessary to assure adequate appellate review. In McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (1975), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that tape-recording of prison-disciplinary proceedings was required by the Alaska Constitution. The court observed:
In our view, the requirement of a verbatim record will help insure that administrators faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and even the courts when it is asserted that fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. A verbatim record of the proceedings will furnish a more complete and accurate source of information than the “written statement” requirement of Wolff, will assist in facilitating a more intelligent review of the disciplinary proceeding, and moreover, the use of cassettes and other means of recording healings may well prove less burdensome than the written statement requirement.
[Id. at 1236.]
In addition, a number of other states have adopted regulations mandating that prison-disciplinary hearings be tape-recorded. See, e.g., Colo.Code Regs., DOC Regulation 203-1(h)(1) (1984); D.C.Mun.Regs. tit. 28, § 511.5 and .6 (1987); Mass.Regs.Code tit. 103, § 430.12(3) (1993); New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Policy and Procedure Directive, Ref. No. EC2-4085 & C24177 to -4196, IV D.11 (July 17, 1992); N.Y.Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 254.6(b) (1994); Vermont Department of Corrections, Policy Directive 4,10.03 E.8.e. (August 15, 1994). Those regulations undoubtedly reflect a recognition by those states that tape recording of prison-disciplinary hearings facilitates inmates’ access to the courts to seek appellate review. Federal eases reviewing prison-disciplinary proceedings have recognized that “ ‘the constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights’ ” Souza v. Travisono, 498 F.2d 1120, 1123 (1st Cir.1974) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814, 40 L.Ed.2d 224, 243 (1974)).
If available, a transcript of McDonald’s prison-disciplinary hearing would have definitively resolved the issues that concern the Court — whether McDonald exercised his right to call inmate Smith and to cross-examine officer Watley, and whether the *211Hearing Officer denied those requests. In the companion case, Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 652 A.2d 712 (1995), also decided today, a transcript would have resolved the question the Court was unable to determine — whether Jacobs was informed of his right to confrontation and cross-examination. Id. at 221, 652 A.2d at 716. Because this record does not inform us adequately of the extent to which inmates’ access to effective appellate review of prison-disciplinary proceedings generally is inhibited by the lack of a transcript, I would not decide whether tape-recording of prison-disciplinary proceedings is mandated by the due-process guarantees afforded by our State Constitution. Moreover, the issue might more productively be first addressed by DOC. The undesirability of basing review of prison-disciplinary cases on a written summary of the evidence prepared by the Hearing Officer that decided the matter is self-evident: The Hearing Officer’s summary inevitably will reflect his or her view of the evidence and might tend to tilt the record to favor the Hearing Officer’s disposition. From the standpoint of appellate review, the advantage of assuring the availability of a verbatim transcript prepared from a tape-recorded hearing is so clear as to be indisputable. On this flimsy record, the majority opinion’s implication that the cost and burdens of tape-recording prison-disciplinary hearings might outweigh the benefits of a verbatim transcript is both unwarranted and unsubstantiated. In my view, DOC would be well advised to consider whether the reliability of the review afforded by tape-recorded hearings does not outweigh concerns based on their cost and any administrative burden that they entail.
I would vacate DOC’s determination that McDonald was guilty of the filed charges, as well as the sanctions imposed, but would remand the matter to DOC to permit the charges to be retried before a different hearing officer.
For modification, affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI — 4.
For reversal and remandment — Justice STEIN.