Court Opinion

ID: 9608108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:06:20.147904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:05.709382
License: Public Domain

WORKMAN, Justice,
dissenting:
This case is an anomaly on the landscape of the well-settled law in West Virginia. The majority fails to adhere to the principles set forth in numerous cases in West Virginia and elsewhere in the country, effectively preventing the State from presenting key evidence of the Defendant’s motive to commit murder.
Ironically, I take no real issue with the law stated by the majority. It is sound. But once again, there is a suspension of both common sense and adherence to our precedent in its application to the facts.
The majority incorrectly concluded that the testimony of four witnesses regarding statements made by the victim at a time close to her death were inadmissible. Simply stated, the statements were not hearsay, as they were not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. See W.Va.R.Evid. 801(c).1 The majority, however, adds insult to injury, by first incorrectly concluding that the statements were hearsay, and then proceeding to incorrectly conclude that the statements were inadmissible under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 803(3).
Although Justice Cleekley provides us with a wonderful little handbook on Rules 803(1) and (3), he misses the point that, although Rule 803(1) is the rule under which the trial court erroneously concluded that some of the statements were admissible, it is actually Rule 801(c) which permits their admission. The trial court judge made the right decision for at least partially the wrong reason. In the past, we have consistently held that “[t]his Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its judgment.” Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W.Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965); see also Cumberland Chevrolet Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. v. Gener*591al Motors Corp., 187 W.Va. 535, 538, 420 S.E.2d 295, 298 n. 4 (1992) (stating that “even if the reasoning of a trial court is in error ... we are not bound by a trial court’s erroneous reasoning”); State ex rel. Dandy v. Thompson, 148 W.Va. 263, 274, 134 S.E.2d 730, 737, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 819, 85 S.Ct. 39, 13 L.Ed.2d 30 (1964) (stating in criminal context that “correctness of ... [trial court’s] final action is the only material consideration, not the stated reasons for [the trial court’s] taking such action”).
The majority proceeds to embark on its lengthy discussion of why these statements were inadmissible under West Virginia Rules of Evidence 803(1)2 and 803(3), without first even determining whether the statements were in fact hearsay. Without any further analysis, the majority does state in footnote 25 that “[a]rguably, the statements could have been admitted as nonhearsay as proof of motive, intent, etc., under Rule 404(b).” In my view, the contested evidence here more closely approximates statements which circumstantially tend to show a relevant fact, namely that the Defendant had a possible motive. As the author of the majority opinion correctly states in his respected treatise on evidence, these types of statements are “perhaps the most frequently used justification to avoid exclusion under the hearsay rule.” 2 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, § 8-2(A)(2)(c) at 123 (3d ed. 1994). In essence, the statements should be reviewed as original evidence because they were not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”. Id. In syllabus point one of State v. Maynard, 183 W.Va. 1, 393 S.E.2d 221 (1990), we held that
[generally, out-of-court statements made by someone other than the declarant while testifying are not admissible unless: 1) the statement is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but for some other purpose such as motive, intent, state-of-mind, identification or reasonableness of the party’s action_
Id. at 2, 393 S.E.2d at 222. In Maynard, we concluded that two police officers’ testimony regarding an anonymous phone caller’s statement to the officers implicating the defendant in a robbery were not hearsay, since the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather were offered “to show the motive or reasonableness of the police officers’ actions in including the defendant’s photograph in a group of photographs shown to the victim.” Id. at 4, 393 S.E.2d at 224.
Similarly, in State v. Perolis, 183 W.Va. 686, 398 S.E.2d 512 (1990), a case involving the defendant’s alleged sexual assault of his babysitter, we analyzed whether the trial court erroneously precluded the development of evidence which tended to show that the victim may have been angry with the defendant and his wife because they had told the victim’s parents about statements that the victim made to them which indicated that she was planning to run away from home. Id. at 690, 398 S.E.2d at 516. We determined that the victim’s statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted:
Whether ... [the victim] planned to run away from home does not matter. The only thing that matters is that ... [the defendant and his wife] told ... [the victim’s] parents that ... [the victim] planned to run away from home. The act of making such a statement to ... [the victim’s] parents would give ... [the victim] cause to be angry with ... [the defendant and his wife], regardless of the truth of the statement.
Id. at 690-91, 398 S.E.2d at 516-17. Accordingly, we concluded that “[t]he evidence the defense was attempting to elicit was ... [not] irrelevant, ... because it would have enlightened the jury as to a possible motive for ... [the victim] to fabricate her story.” Id. at 690, 398 S.E.2d at 516.
*592The majority never discusses3 this line of cases and now leaves the lower courts confused on what the law is on statements of this sort. This kind of confusion does not aid the courts below in making sound, consistent evidentiary decisions.
Likewise, in Peña v. State, 864 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Ct.App.1993), where the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife, the Texas court upheld a witness’ testimony that the victim told her that she (the victim) was planning on leaving the defendant as soon as an income tax refund arrived, but that the check never arrived. Id. at 149. The Peña court concluded that the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; “instead, it was offered to show her state of mind — she wanted to leave ... [the defendant] but felt economically trapped.” Id.
In applying these same principles to the present case, the actual fact of whether the victim truly intended to divorce the Defendant or whether the Defendant was actually engaged in marital infidelities 4 is irrelevant. Thus, the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of these matters. The testimony was offered to circumstantially prove the Defendant’s possible motive to murder his wife. Moreover, to conclude, as the majority essentially does, that these statements do not establish such a motive or that motive is irrelevant in a case where the Defendant claims “accidental killing” is, quite frankly, absurd!
Moreover, only the victim’s statements concerning the Defendant’s infidelities need be analyzed with regard to West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b), since it was only those statements which arguably could be character in nature. In syllabus points one and two of State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d 516 (1994), we set forth guidelines for admitting statements pursuant to Rule 404(b):
When offering evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the prosecution is required to identify the specific purpose for which the evidence is being offered and the jury must be instructed to limit its consideration of the evidence to only that purpose. It is not sufficient for the prosecution or the trial court merely to cite or mention the litany of possible uses listed in Rule 404(b). The specific and precise purpose for which the evidence is offered must clearly be shown from the record and that purpose alone must be told to the jury in the trial court’s instruction.
Where an offer of evidence is made under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, is to determine its admissibility. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing as state in State v. Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688, 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986). After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct occurred and that the defendant committed the acts. If the trial court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct was committed or that the defendant was the actor, the evidence should be excluded under Rule 404(b). If a sufficient showing has been made, the trial court must then determine the relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing required under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. If the trial court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, it should instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which such evidence has been admitted. A limiting instruction should be given at the time the evidence is offered, and we recommend *593that it be repeated in the trial court’s general charge to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence.
An examination of the lengthy in camera hearings which the trial court conducted in determining the admissibility of the statements (together with the fact that the State never offered the statements for anything other than proof of motive) reveals that all the same considerations as would be made in a Rule 404(b) hearing were made here. Hence, any error in discussing the issue in the context of the wrong rule would be harmless. Moreover, the fact that one of the witnesses had personal knowledge of the Defendant’s infidelity satisfies the preponderance of the evidence burden established in McGinnis. See 193 W.Va. at 151, 455 S.E.2d at 520, Syl. Pt. 2.
Even assuming, arguendo, that these statements were hearsay, the majority incorrectly concludes that the statements were inadmissible under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 803(3).5 The majority holds in syllabus point six that:
An extrajudicial statement offered for admission under the state-of-mind exception of Rule 803(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence must also be tested under the relevancy requirements of Rule 401 and Rule 402 of the Rules of Evidence. If the declarant’s state of mind is irrelevant to the resolution of the case, the statement must be excluded.
Based on this syllabus point, the majority concludes that none of the statements were properly admitted under Rule 803(3)6 because
[i]n this case, the declarant’s state of mind was not directly in issue and was only remotely related to the issues in this case. The issue before the jury was whether the shooting was accidental. When standing alone, it was of no consequence to the jury’s task whether the victim believed her husband had been unfaithful and she intended to pursue divorce proceedings.7 (Footnote added).
In State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 881 P.2d 1158 (1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2588, 132 L.Ed.2d 836 (1995), the defendant was charged with the murder of his girlfriend. The state, at trial, introduced statements the victim made prior to her death which indicated that the victim was fearful of the defendant and that she desired to end their relationship. 881 P.2d at 1167. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the introduction of these statements at trial, relying on general principles of relevancy, as well as Rule 803(3), stating that “[ejvidenee is relevant ‘if it has any basis in reason to prove a material fact in issue or if it tends to cast light on the crime charged.’ ” 881 P.2d at 1167 (quoting State v. Moss, 119 Ariz. 4, 579 P.2d 42, 43 (1978)). The Wood court further reasoned that
[tjhe statements about ... [the victim’s fear and desire to end the relationship helped explain Defendant’s motive. The disputed trial issues were Defendant’s motive and mental state — whether Defendant acted with premeditation or as a result of a sudden impulse. The prosecution theorized the Defendant was motivated by anger or spite engendered by ... [the vic*594tim’s] termination of the relationship. [The victim’s] statements were relevant because they showed her intent to end the relationship, which in turn provided a plausible motive for premeditated murder.
881 P.2d at 1167-68 (footnote omitted). The court ultimately concluded that the statements were properly admitted under Rule 803(3). 881 P.2d at 1168.
Likewise, in Nicholson v. State, 319 Ark. 566, 892 S.W.2d 507 (1995), the victim, who was the defendant’s husband, died of apparent natural causes. Upon closer examination, however, it became apparent that the victim ingested poison and his wife was charged with his murder. Id. at 508 and 507. The defendant wife, was not only the beneficiary of a $100,000 policy on the victim husband’s life, but also was the beneficiary of the victim’s will. Id. at 509. The victim’s attorney was permitted to testify at trial that the victim told him that “he was unhappy in his marriage and intended to end it.” Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Nicholson upheld the admissibility of these statements under Rule 803(3). 892 S.W.2d at 510.
Further, in United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1058, 110 S.Ct. 1528, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether the district court properly permitted the victim’s mother to testify to hearsay statements the murder victim made that she intended to move out of a military base apartment she shared with her defendant husband, as well as separate from the defendant. 878 F.2d at 737. The federal appeals court held that the statements were properly admitted under Rule 803(3), stating that
[t]he testimony went not to show that the defendant was soon to kill the declarant, but, rather, to show the existence of the deceased’s plan to move out of the base apartment and separate from her husband. The government properly sought to persuade the jury to infer from her statements that she had such a plan and, in turn, to infer from that plan and the defendant’s awareness of it that he had a motive for murder....
878 F.2d at 737-38.
Finally, in State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 394 S.E.2d 158 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092, 111 S.Ct. 977, 112 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991), a case factually analogous to the present case, the defendant husband was charged with murdering his wife. The state’s evidence against the defendant tended to show that the defendant intentionally shot and killed his wife with a single gunshot from a gun he had just finished cleaning. 394 S.E.2d at 159. While the defendant in Payne admitted that initially he had planned to kill his wife for insurance money and to get out of the marriage, he further claimed that he had changed his mind at the last instant, and that the gun truly discharged accidentally. Id. 394 S.E.2d at 164. The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed whether the trial court properly admitted the victim’s statements to the defendant, which were related by the defendant to police officers that concerned “the victim’s questions to the defendant as to whether he wanted ‘out of their marriage, whether he was having an affair, and why the couple did not ‘fool around’ as much as they apparently did at one time.” Id. 394 S.E.2d at 164. The Payne court upheld the admissibility of the victim’s statements under Rule 803(3), stating that “[t]he victim’s statements tended to show that the victim felt the ... marriage was troubled and had related her feeling to the defendant. Such evidence was relevant to corroborate one of the defendant’s admitted motives for deciding to kill his wife — to ‘get out of the marriage.’” 394 S.E.2d at 165.
These cases readily illustrate the majority’s fallacious conclusion that the victim’s statements were inadmissible to show motive under Rule 803(3). It is exceedingly evident in this case not only that motive was relevant to combat the defense of accidental shooting, but that motive could be derived from the victim’s statements that she intended to divorce her husband and take half of their assets.
Finally, contrary to the majority’s position that reversible error occurred in the admission of these statements, any error which may have occurred in the admission of any of *595these statements was harmless.8 As the majority reasoned,
[w]hen dealing with the wrongful admission of evidence, we have stated that the appropriate test for harmlessness is whether, after stripping the erroneous evidence from the whole, we can say with fair assurance that the remaining evidence independently was sufficient to support the verdict and the jury was not substantially swayed by the error. State v. Atkins, 168 W.Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980).
The majority then concludes that “[ajfter excluding all the impermissible evidence, we cannot say the jury would have arrived at the same result considering the pervasive nature of the evidence admitted[,]” without any real examination of the totality of the evidence the State presented in this case.
To arrive at its conclusion, the majority simply ignores the weight of the evidence introduced at trial. The State offered the testimony of a neighbor, Mrs. Harris, who contradicted the Defendant’s story that he accidentally shot his wife with a shotgun in the living room of his home, then immediately called 911 and ran out of the house. Mrs. Harris testified that she did not hear a shotgun blast at the time the Defendant alleged he shot his wife. Further, Mrs. Harris, as well as another witness testified that they had observed the Defendant arriving home the morning his wife was shot wearing camouflage clothing, but no such clothing was ever recovered from the crime scene. Further, the Defendant claimed that his wife’s body was found where she was shot while lying on the sofa; however, the State’s forensic evidence showed that the body had been moved and gunpowder stippling patterns on the victim’s body indicated that she had not been lying down at the time of the gunshot. Moreover, the Defendant testified that he had returned home from turkey hunting the morning of the shooting after he shot at a turkey and missed, expelled a shell, and the gun jammed. The Defendant further testified that when he returned home, he began to run shells through the chamber and that the gun suddenly discharged killing his wife. The gun, however, was examined by the manufacturer and determined not to be defective. Thus, even without considering any of the statements, there was certainly ample evidence to sustain the Defendant’s conviction due to the inconsistencies between the Defendant’s statement to the police and what the evidence actually showed.
It is difficult to understand how Justice Cleckley, as West Virginia’s leading expert on evidence, could have reasoned this opinion in this manner. I must conjecture that he wanted an opportunity to write on Rule 803, and the law he sets forth is excellent in the abstract. But on re-trial, the State will not have the benefit of the whole line of cases cited herein (and not overruled or declined to be followed by the majority) in presenting to the jury perfectly good and admissible evidence of the Defendant’s motive.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

. The State was not attempting to prove that the Defendant committed adultery, or that the victim did in fact plan to leave the Defendant, and seek half their assets, but instead to prove circumstantially that she told the Defendant that, thereby giving him a motive to kill her.

. The majority is correct in its analysis that these statements would not be admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. See W.Va. R. Evid. 803(1).

. While the majority does set forth the syllabus point of Maynard, as restated in syllabus point two of State v. Dillon, 191 W.Va. 648, 447 S.E.2d 583 (1994), there is no discussion or application of that syllabus point to the present case.

. Even more significant is the fact that the State offered direct'evidence of the Defendant's extramarital affairs through the testimony of Ms. Marsh. It is difficult to believe that the Defendant suffered any prejudice with regard to the out-of-court statements concerning his affairs, given that direct evidence was presented on this matter.

. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides:
Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. — A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.

. Even Justice Cleckley admits, however, that the application of Rule 803(3) is a close call.

.I find the majority's reasoning here almost amusing, it is so out of touch with common sense. They say the victim’s state of mind was not directly in issue and only remotely related to the issues. They characterize the issue before the jury as being whether the shooting was accidental. Thus, they conclude the victim's state of mind as to her husband's infidelity is of no consequence. The true issue before the jury was whether the Defendant murdered his wife. Accordingly, the issue of the victim’s state of mind and her husband’s motive as a result thereof is of great consequence!

. The majority was certainly cursory in its review of this issue, giving it one paragraph!