Court Opinion

ID: 9720501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:33:16.529144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.823015
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KUEHN, dissenting: This is checkmate. After a series of improvident moves, defendant has lost his right to appeal. No further maneuver on his part can salvage it. The deadline for the pursuit of the right to file a late notice of appeal expired while we debated whether a premature notice of appeal conferred appellate jurisdiction. While this blunder could be attributed to a host of failures, defendant made but one mistake. He put his faith in a judge’s advice. He did precisely what a judge told him to do in order to perfect his appeal. Perhaps he should have known better than to follow directions from a judge on how to invoke appellate jurisdiction, but I would allow for his misguided reliance and remand for better instructions. We do not have to deprive defendant of the right to appeal. Under the circumstances presented, we are empowered to remand for further proceedings that would allow defendant to renew his efforts. People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 474, 665 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1996). Since the majority does not examine the circumstances that concern me, here is what happened. The defendant was told: “[L]et me advise you that if you have a wish to move to change the sentence that I give you, you have to file a written motion within 30 days. If you wish to file an appeal of your case, you have to file that appeal within 30 days. You have to file those motions if you are unable to employ your own counsel, then we will appoint counsel to represent you.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant was not told that if he moved to change sentence, he should await decision on that motion and file his notice of appeal within 30 days after the ruling. Despite this recipe for a premature notice of appeal, the court’s invitation to file two pro se pleadings within the same 30-day deadline was declined. Defendant did not file a pro se motion to change his sentence. On June 8, 1998, the public defender filed a boilerplate motion to reconsider sentence on defendant’s behalf. We know that defendant wanted to appeal his conviction. Having been told that he had to file for appeal on his own within 30 days, defendant filed a handwritten pro se notice of appeal from the Madison County jail on June 10, 1998. We are not as certain that defendant wanted to pursue a motion to reconsider sentence. He did not pursue the judge’s directions to file a pro se motion to change sentence. Moreover, he did not want the public defender to act on his behalf. Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the public defender with his pro se notice of appeal. In it, he stated his intention to raise on appeal the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion to dismiss his lawyer was signed by defendant and verified by jail personnel on June 8, ■ 1998, the same day that the motion to reconsider sentence was filed. In any event, the perfunctory motion to reconsider sentence, in all probability filed as a matter of course to preserve defendant’s sentencing issues for appeal, was denied in summary fashion. The June 12, 1998, record is devoid of any hearing or argument on the motion. It does not appear that defendant was even present when the court ruled upon the motion. Defendant received no further instructions on how to proceed. Instead, he was appointed the appellate defender to pursue the appeal that he attempted to initiate. The majority opinion describes the events that ensued. The State points out that the trial judge told defendant that he had to file a notice of appeal within 30 days, which is what Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)) requires. However, the State does not address the question that concerns me. When the trial judge added advice on sentence modification to his admonition that an appeal had to be pursued within 30 days, he invited the filing of a posttrial motion that would impair any appeal initiated pursuant to his admonition. The purpose of Supreme Court Rule 605(a) is to assure that a defendant understands how to perfect his right to appeal. This purpose is not achieved and, indeed, can be frustrated by advising a defendant to file for a sentence modification and an appeal within the same 30-day deadline. Without more information, a defendant does not understand how to perfect an appeal. This defendant was told that he should file a motion to change sentence and a notice of appeal within 30 days, and that is precisely what he did. Obviously, he did not understand how to perfect his appeal. The question is whether we will allow a defendant to lose the fundamental right to appeal where he relies on and complies with judicial direction designed to assure its protection. Since the defendant did no more than what he was told to do, and as doing it resulted in a defective appeal, we should remand for further proceedings, rather than dismiss the appeal. Defendant should not forfeit his appeal rights under the circumstances presented. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 474, 665 N.E.2d at 826; People v. Robinson, 229 Ill. App. 3d 627, 628, 593 N.E.2d 148, 149 (1992); People v. Raue, 236 Ill. App. 3d 948, 953, 602 N.E.2d 846, 850 (1992); People v. Patrick, 188 Ill. App. 3d 542, 546, 544 N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (1989). There is another salient reason to remand rather than dismiss. The trial judge who told defendant to file for sentence reconsideration and appeal within the same time frame should have recognized that such advice resulted in a defective notice of appeal when he entered his June 12, 1998, final order. He had- defendant’s pro se notice of appeal file-marked June 10, 1998, in hand when he denied the motion to reconsider sentence. The notice of appeal was premature on its face. It was filed two days before the trial court ruled upon the motion to reconsider sentence. Notwithstanding, the judge did not correct the error. He exacerbated it. He did not vacate the notice of appeal and again advise defendant. He did not even allow the public defender 30 days to file an efficacious notice of appeal after the final order was entered. Instead, the judge treated the premature notice as though it was effectual and acted on it in a way that assured the inevitable outcome. On the same day that he entered final judgment, the judge relieved defendant’s public defender by the appointment of an appellate defender to proceed with the defective appeal. Ordinarily, we correct for a judicial mistake that contributes to noncompliance with our rules rather than allow that mistake to work forfeiture of a fundamental right. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 474, 665 N.E.2d at 826. We should do so here.