Court Opinion

ID: 9964738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 18:00:40.370888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.413379
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10724           Document: 58-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/30/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                                    No. 23-10724
                                  ____________                                     FILED
                                                                               April 30, 2024
Raymond Donnelly; O’Tara Johnson,                                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                   Clerk
                                                               Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                         versus

Academic Partnerships L.L.C.,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:20-CV-1106
                  ______________________________

Before Jones, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      O’Tara Johnson and Raymond Donnelly sued their employer
Academic Partnerships L.L.C. (AP) for, among other things, retaliation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act (TCHRA), Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.001–21.556. The district
court granted summary judgment for AP on all claims. We affirm.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                 No. 23-10724

                                      I.
       Johnson’s and Donnelly’s claims arise from two discrete sets of facts.
We first outline the facts underlying Johnson’s retaliation claim and then
those underlying Donnelly’s. Because the district court granted summary
judgment in AP’s favor, we construe all facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to Johnson and Donnelly. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C.,
817 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 2016).
                                      A.
       AP is a higher education service provider offering integrated
university, marketing, and student services. AP hired Johnson, a black
woman, as an Enrollment Specialist in November 2015. In February 2017,
AP promoted Johnson to Enrollment Manager. Johnson alleges that upon
promotion, AP only gave her a $6,000 raise, when male employees promoted
to similar positions were given $10,000 raises. She complained about this
discrepancy to a supervisor and Human Resources (HR) and tried to
negotiate a higher salary, but she was told the salary offer would not be
increased.
       In January 2018, Robert Wagner, a black man, and Mark McCreight,
a white man, were also promoted to Enrollment Manager. Wagner and
McCreight told Johnson that they were allowed to negotiate their salaries. So
Johnson again complained, to her manager, James Twedt, and the Senior
Vice President of HR, Mary Ann Doran. After Twedt and Doran “refused
to fix the issue,” Johnson escalated her complaint to Earl Frischkorn, Senior
Vice President of Enrollment Services. Frischkorn gave Johnson a 4.5%
increase in pay to rectify her concerns.
       Johnson alleges that after her complaint regarding the pay
discrepancy, AP began retaliating against her. For example, she asserts that
Salah Eid and Mark Mendoza, two of her supervisors, told Johnson that her

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salary was lower because of her “effort and attitude,” and that Eid told
Twedt that he had been “trying to work on some form of progressive
discipline [for Johnson] for five to eight months.” Further, in November
2018, Johnson applied for a promotion to a Partner Support position. After
she applied, she avers that Eid asked her “what a black girl going to do with
all that money when you get that job?”
       In December 2018, AP promoted GiGi Tippens, a white woman, to
Senior Manager. Johnson alleges that AP “cherry-picked” Tippens and did
not allow other qualified candidates, who were all black, to interview for the
position. Johnson lodged another complaint on December 17 with HR’s
Doran that AP was engaging in a “pattern of discriminatory treatment and
hiring practices.” She explained to Doran that she was nervous about coming
forward with her complaint because AP might retaliate by denying her
application for the Partner Support position.
       On January 7, 2019, Ashley Harris, another Enrollment Manager,
complained to Eid that Johnson had revealed confidential information about
the impending termination of an Enrollment Specialist on Harris’s team to
Ijeoma Nkele.     Eid and HR representative Tena Bracy investigated.
Afterwards, Bracy informed Frischkorn that Nkele confirmed that Johnson
told her about the termination. But when Eid and Bracy asked Johnson about
the incident, she denied that it happened. Eid and Bracy then consulted with
Frischkorn, who decided to issue Johnson a Final Written Warning. That
action made Johnson ineligible for the Partner Support promotion.
       Eid and Bracy met with Johnson to convey the Final Written Warning.
After the meeting, Bracy reported to Frischkorn that Johnson was
“extremely aggressive and combative during the meeting,” so much that
Bracy “felt threatened by Johnson’s unprofessional behavior, and thought
Johnson was going to hit her.” Bracy told Frischkorn that Johnson “yell[ed]

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at [her] in an aggressive tone,” “bang[ed] her hand on the table,” and
“walk[ed] out of the meeting[,] . . . slamming the door so hard that it shook
the room causing other employees to inquire about Bracy and Eid’s well-
being.” Frischkorn confirmed Bracy’s allegations with Eid and then talked
to Mendoza and Doran, who told him that Johnson also confronted them in
an “unprofessional manner” after the meeting. In her telling, Johnson
admits that she was “upset” and “emotional” during the meeting, but she
maintains she was seated the entire meeting and denies that she was
“yelling” or “combative.”
        Doran met with Johnson on January 11. Afterwards, Doran advised
Frischkorn that Johnson admitted to acting unprofessionally when she
received the Final Written Warning. Johnson asserts that she also raised a
complaint during this meeting with Doran, that the Final Written Warning
was in retaliation for her December 17 discrimination complaint. 1 Doran did
not advise Frischkorn that Johnson made any complaint about discrimination
or retaliation during the meeting. 2
        After considering Johnson’s behavior over the weekend, Frischkorn
decided to fire her. A “decisive factor” was that “[he] could not support a
member of leadership engaging in such unprofessional conduct, especially
given that [he] had recently held a leadership meeting . . . wherein [he]
emphasized leadership style and the importance of setting a good example for
[AP’s] teams.”         Frischkorn was not aware of Johnson’s making any

        _____________________
        1
         AP argues we should not consider Johnson’s statement that she complained about
discrimination in the January 11 meeting because the district court struck that statement
when ruling on the motion for summary judgment. But this court already denied AP’s
motion to strike that part of Johnson and Donnelly’s brief.
        2
           In fact, Doran asserts that Johnson did not broach the topic of discrimination or
retaliation at all in their January 11 meeting.

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allegations of discrimination or unfair treatment when he decided to fire her.
Johnson’s termination was effective January 14, 2019.
                                     B.
       AP hired Donnelly, a 54-year-old black man, as an Enrollment
Specialist in September 2014. Donnelly was responsible for facilitating the
enrollment of students with AP’s partners over the phone. Between July
2015 and June 2016, AP issued Donnelly multiple warnings for missing
performance goals and repeated tardiness. On June 21, 2016, Donnelly sent
an e-mail to HR Manager Jennifer Shelton about his Industry Coach, Cortney
West, a black man.      Donnelly criticized West’s “training style” and
complained about receiving low scores for his call reviews, but he never
alleged that West, or anyone else, discriminated against him based on a
protected class.
       In August 2016, Donnelly sent another e-mail to Shelton and his
supervisor, Miranda Behn, complaining about West’s behavior. Among
other things, Donnelly asserted that West targeted him with “malicious and
inflammatory comments” and stated that he had “lost all respect for and
trust in . . . West as a member of [AP] leadership.” But again, Donnelly did
not state that he was discriminated against based on any protected class.
       After his second e-mail, Donnelly contends that Behn and another
supervisor, Sal Meherali, unfairly targeted him “by repeatedly interfering
with [his] chances of promotion.” He alleges that he received an increased
number of verbal warnings that prevented him from being eligible for
promotions; Behn told her team that Donnelly “should not be eligible for
anything”; and he overheard a phone call in which Behn asked Johnson to
“manufacture a reason to write up Donnelly.”
       In December 2017, Donnelly sent an e-mail to Shelton asserting that
several team members were “out to get” him, he was being targeted, and it

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seemed like there was a “witch hunt” against him. Donnelly also complained
to Doran in January 2018 about “all [the] incidents . . . from [the] beginning
of [his] tenure.” But Donnelly never asserted that he was discriminated
against based on a protected class. 3
        In August 2018, Meherali confronted Donnelly about accessing AP’s
database before his shift to search for call leads. Meherali later sent an e-mail
to his entire team stating that this type of data manipulation was against AP’s
policy and “could result in further disciplinary action.” In September,
Meherali issued Donnelly a written warning with a performance
improvement plan (PIP) after one of his calls failed a quality assurance
screening. Later that month, Donnelly failed another quality assurance
screening. Meherali issued Donnelly a Final Written Warning with another
PIP.
        In October, Donnelly asked Meherali to transfer him a call lead that
belonged to another Enrollment Specialist. In response, Meherali asked
Donnelly why he would be calling students who did not belong to him.
Donnelly admitted that he had been contacting students who did not
originate with him, in violation of AP’s policy outlined in Meherali’s earlier
teamwide e-mail. As a result, Meherali consulted with HR’s Bracy about
Donnelly’s data manipulation. Then, at the end of October, Donnelly failed
yet another quality assurance screening.
        On October 29, Bracy consulted with Frischkorn about Donnelly’s
ongoing performance issues. On October 31, Donnelly requested a meeting
with HR, and a meeting was scheduled with Bracy for November 1. Prior to
        _____________________
        3
         Donnelly contends in his brief that in December 2017 he “submitted a complaint
to Shelton explaining that he was being discriminatorily targeted,” and in January 2018 he
“met with Doran and complained of AP’s discriminatory hiring and promotion practices.”
Those statements are not supported by the record.

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Bracy’s meeting with Donnelly, Shelton met with Frischkorn, Bracy, and
Meherali to discuss Donnelly’s performance and behavioral issues. During
that meeting, Frischkorn decided to terminate Donnelly due to his ongoing
data manipulation and other performance issues. But Shelton decided to wait
until after Donnelly’s meeting with Bracy before signing off on Donnelly’s
termination “from an HR perspective.”
       Donnelly met with Bracy. Donnelly asserted in his deposition that he
told Bracy he “felt like [he] was being targeted . . . discriminated
against . . . [and that] there was a disparity with the difference between the
way—as far as promotions, the way blacks and whites were treated at the
job.” However, upon further questioning, Donnelly conceded that he did
not “recall the specifics of the dialogue between [him and Bracy].” Bracy’s
notes from the meeting do not disclose that Donnelly made any allegation
that he was discriminated against based on a protected class. Moreover, on
November 8, Donnelly sent Bracy a follow up e-mail detailing his grievances,
none of which alleged discrimination based on a protected class.
       On November 14, 2018, AP fired Donnelly for data manipulation and
performance issues.
                                       C.
       Johnson and Donnelly sued AP on May 1, 2020, alleging
discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation claims under
Title VII, § 1981, and TCHRA. 4 In December 2022, AP moved for summary
judgment on Johnson’s and Donnelly’s claims, and, in June 2023, the district

       _____________________
       4
         Another plaintiff, Dante Williams, sued AP as well. But the district court
dismissed his claims with prejudice, and that order is not at issue.

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court granted AP’s motion. On appeal, Johnson and Donnelly challenge only
the district court’s dismissal of their retaliation claims.
                                           II.
        “We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court.” In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456,
462 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Templet v. Hydrochem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 477 (5th
Cir. 2004)). “[A] court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We may
affirm a grant of summary judgment ‘based on any rationale presented to the
district court for consideration and supported by facts uncontroverted in the
summary judgment record.’” Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters.,
Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 887 (5th Cir. 2002)).
        The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to
retaliation claims under Title VII. Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d
212, 219 (5th Cir. 2016); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
800–06 (1973). 5 Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of retaliation. Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753
F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2014). If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
underlying employment action. Id. Finally, if the defendant has satisfied its

        _____________________
        5
           We use the same “rubric of analysis” for retaliation claims under § 1981 and
TCHRA as we do for Title VII claims. See Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 399
(5th Cir. 2021) (Section 1981); Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 170–
71 (5th Cir. 2014) (TCHRA). Accordingly, we do not distinguish between Johnson’s and
Donnelly’s Title VII, § 1981, and TCHRA claims for the purposes of our analysis.

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burden of production, the plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason
is mere pretext for retaliation. Id.
                                         III.
        The district court concluded that Johnson could not establish a prima
facie case of retaliation because she failed to show a causal link between her
protected activity (the December 17 complaint) 6 and AP’s adverse
employment actions (the Final Written Warning and her termination).
Specifically, the court held that “[t]he causal link [did] not exist because
Frischkorn . . . testified that no one at AP ever told him that Johnson raised
any race-based discrimination or unfair treatment allegations.” AP also
argued that Johnson failed to show that its legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons
for firing her—the sharing of confidential information and her unprofessional
conduct—were pretextual. But the district court did not address that
argument.
        As to Donnelly’s retaliation claim, AP first argued that Donnelly failed
to establish that he engaged in a statutorily protected activity, as required for
his prima facie case. The district court assumed without deciding that
Donnelly engaged in protected activity when he complained to Bracy on
November 1, and instead found no causal link between that complaint and his
termination because Frischkorn decided to terminate Donnelly before
Donnelly’s meeting with Bracy.            Alternatively, it found that Donnelly
presented no evidence of pretext to rebut AP’s legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for firing Donnelly.

        _____________________
        6
         As explained supra note 1, the district court did not consider Johnson’s January
11 complaint.

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       We first discuss Johnson’s retaliation claim and then Donnelly’s.
                                      A.
       Johnson contends the district court erred in holding that she did not
establish a prima facie case for her retaliation claim because the temporal
proximity between her December 17 (and January 11) complaints and her
January 14 termination was sufficient to establish a causal link,
notwithstanding Frischkorn’s lack of knowledge of her complaints. She is
likely correct.
       To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show
that: “(1) she engaged in [a] protected activity; (2) an adverse employment
action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.” Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C.,
736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.
Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007)). “While generally, a causal link is
established when the evidence demonstrates that the employer’s decision to
terminate was based in part on knowledge of the employee’s protected
activity, it can also be established simply by showing close enough timing
between the two events.” January v. City of Huntsville, 74 F.4th 646, 653
(5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This court
has previously held that a six-week span “does the trick.” Id.
       The timing between Johnson’s December 17 and January 11
complaints and her January 14 termination easily satisfies a causal link for her
prima facie case.    See id.   AP counters that “while a close temporal
proximity . . . can be enough to establish a causal link, the causal link is
shattered if uncontroverted evidence is presented that the decision-maker is
unaware of the alleged protected activity.” However, that argument is
foreclosed by January. There, the district court “concluded that [the
plaintiff] did not establish a causal connection because he failed to show that

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[the ultimate decisionmaker] knew that [the plaintiff] intended to file charges
with the employment commissions when he was fired.”                        Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). This court unequivocally held that the district
court erred because “the short time between [the plaintiff’s] protected acts
and his firing [was] itself enough to show causation.” Id. Accordingly,
Johnson established her prima facie case.
        However, Johnson’s claim nonetheless falters because she fails to
show that AP’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for firing her—the sharing
of confidential information and her unprofessional conduct—were
pretextual. 7 The standard for proving causation at the pretext stage is more
stringent than at the prima facie stage. See Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1001 (5th Cir. 2022). Consequently, though temporal
proximity between a plaintiff’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse
employment action is relevant, it is not alone sufficient to demonstrate
pretext. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 579 (5th Cir. 2020).
Rather, a plaintiff “must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-
for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Zamora v. City of
Houston, 798 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013)). Normally, this is done by providing
significant evidence that the ultimate decisionmaker harbored retaliatory
animus towards the plaintiff. See id. Alternatively, a plaintiff may “use a
cat’s paw theory of liability when [she] cannot show that the
decisionmaker . . . harbored any retaliatory animus.” Id. But to invoke the

        _____________________
        7
           As noted above, AP argued in its motion for summary judgment that Johnson
failed to show pretext. Though the district court did not address pretext in its order, we
“may affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is
different from that relied on by the district court.” Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, L.L.C. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 754 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

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“cat’s paw” analysis, a plaintiff “must submit evidence sufficient to
establish two conditions: (1) that a co-worker exhibited [retaliatory] animus,
and (2) that the same co-worker ‘possessed leverage, or exerted influence,
over the titular decisionmaker.’” Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647,
653 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219,
227 (5th Cir. 2000)).
        Because Johnson does not dispute that Frischkorn lacked knowledge
of her complaints, she necessarily relies on a cat’s paw theory of liability.8
She argues that “the Final Written Warning and termination decisions were
based almost solely on the recommendations of Eid, Bracy, Doran, and
Mendoza—not Frischkorn’s investigation.” But that is not enough to show
pretext; Johnson must also show that Eid, Bracy, Doran, or Mendoza
exhibited retaliatory animus. See Roberson, 373 F.3d at 653. “While we have
not precisely defined [animus],” it suggests at least some form of “ill will,
antagonism, or hostility.” See Roque v. Natchitoches Par. Sch. Bd., 583 F.
App’x 466, 467 (5th Cir. 2014) (Jolly, J., concurring). Johnson provides no
evidence that Bracy, Doran, or Mendoza exhibited any such behavior.
Accordingly, she cannot rely on their actions to establish pretext.
        Johnson points to Eid’s statement that he was “trying to work on
some form of progressive discipline [for Johnson]” and his question about
“what a black girl going to do with all that money when you get that job?” as
“strong indicators of retaliatory animus.”                  But even assuming those
statements rise to the level of “animus,” Frischkorn’s uncontroverted

        _____________________
        8
         AP asserts that Johnson forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district
court. True enough, the only contention Johnson raised in the district court that could be
construed as a “cat’s paw” argument was related to her discrimination claim. Regardless
of whether she forfeited her argument, her claim fails for the reasons discussed above the
line.

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testimony shows that Eid did not possess leverage or exert influence over
Frischkorn. As to the Final Written Warning, Frischkorn testified that
Bracy—not Eid—advised him that Nkele confirmed that Johnson had told
Nkele about the impending termination. And as for Johnson’s termination,
Frischkorn’s testimony clearly shows that he primarily relied on information
from Bracy and Doran when making his decision. Although Frischkorn
“spoke with Eid” before terminating Johnson, it was only to corroborate
Bracy’s statements. Consequently, Johnson’s cat’s paw theory of retaliation
as to Eid fails on the second prong. See Roberson, 373 F.3d at 653.
       Though the district court likely erred by concluding that Johnson
failed to establish a causal link for her prima facie case, her retaliation claim
still fails because she has not shown that AP’s legitimate, non-retaliatory
reasons for its adverse employment actions were pretext for retaliation. We
therefore affirm summary judgment for AP as to Johnson’s claim. See Nola
Spice Designs, 783 F.3d at 536.
                                      B.
       Donnelly contends the district court erred because he “satisfied both
the causal connection [of his prima facie case] and pretext” for his retaliation
claim. We need not reach Donnelly’s pretext argument because we agree
with AP that Donnelly fails to establish that he engaged in a statutorily
protected activity. Moreover, we agree with the district court that he fails to
establish the causal link required to sustain his prima facie case.
       Again, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
show that: “(1) [he] engaged in a protected activity; (2) an adverse
employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Royal, 736 F.3d at
400. “Protected activity is defined as opposition to any practice rendered
unlawful by Title VII . . . .” Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385

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(5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “This court ‘has consistently held that a
vague complaint, without any reference to an unlawful employment practice
under Title VII, does not constitute protected activity.” Paske v. Fitzgerald,
785 F.3d 977, 986 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 448
F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases)).
       As explained above, none of the complaints lodged by Donnelly prior
to his November 1, 2018, meeting with Bracy alleged that anyone
discriminated against him based on a protected ground. See supra Part I.B.
Accordingly, those complaints cannot satisfy the first element of Donnelly’s
prima facie case. See Paske, 785 F.3d at 986.
       As to the purported November 1 complaint, Bracy’s meeting notes do
not substantiate any assertion by Donnelly that he was discriminated against
based on a protected class. Likewise, Donnelly’s November 8 follow-up e-
mail does not disclose any grievance of discrimination based on a protected
class. Though Donnelly alleges that he told Bracy that he “felt like [he] was
being targeted . . . discriminated against . . . [and that] there was a disparity
with the difference between the way . . . blacks and whites were treated at the
job,” he later admitted—via sworn testimony—that he did not “recall the
specifics of the dialogue between [him and Bracy].” Donnelly’s other
deposition statements that he “felt like [he] was being . . . discriminated
against” are not sufficient evidence to show that he engaged in a statutorily
protected activity. See Turner, 476 F.3d at 343 (“[A] party cannot defeat
summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions,
or only a scintilla of evidence.”). Accordingly, Donnelly’s retaliation claim
fails on the first element of his prima facie case.
       Even if we assumed otherwise, Donnelly’s claim still fails on the
causal element because Frischkorn decided to terminate him before
Donnelly’s meeting with Bracy. See Davis, 448 F. App’x at 493–94. In

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evaluating temporal proximity, Donnelly asserts that we should consider the
day his termination was effective, rather than the day Frischkorn decided to
terminate him. But “[t]he mere fact that [Frischkorn’s] decision was made
prior to the conclusion of any formal investigation, or that it was finalized in
the period after [Donnelly] filed [his] grievance . . . does not change the
outcome.” Id. “Because [Donnelly’s alleged] protected activity occurred
after [Frischkorn settled on his termination], [Donnelly] cannot demonstrate
causation.” Id. 9
        Accordingly, the district court properly entered summary judgment
dismissing Donnelly’s retaliation claim.
                                          IV.
        For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment for
AP is
                                                                       AFFIRMED.

        _____________________
        9
          Donnelly also contends that Frischkorn’s statement that he decided to terminate
Donnelly before his meeting with Bracy is “uncorroborated” and “disputed.” However,
Frischkorn’s statement is corroborated by Shelton’s testimony and Bracy’s timeline of
events that she sent to Shelton on November 6. Contrarily, Donnelly provides no evidence
to dispute Frischkorn’s statement.

                                           15