Court Opinion

ID: 9398852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 15:05:16.943858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.907091
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                             ____________

                          No. SC2021-1450
                            ____________

                          ZAVION ALAHAD,
                             Petitioner,

                                  vs.

                        STATE OF FLORIDA,
                           Respondent.

                            June 1, 2023

LABARGA, J.

     We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of

Appeal in Alahad v. State, 326 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). In

Alahad, the district court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Zavion

Alahad’s motion to suppress eyewitness identifications resulting

from an out-of-court police procedure, and in doing so, applied the

abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s ruling on

the eyewitness’s out-of-court identification. Id. at 1143. Alahad

expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this Court in

Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2016), and with a decision of
another district court in McWilliams v. State, 306 So. 3d 131 (Fla.

3d DCA 2020); in each of the conflict cases the court applied a

de novo standard of review to trial court rulings on the same issue.

Moreover, as we will explain, this Court’s Walton decision was itself

inconsistent with previous decisions of our Court on the conflict

question. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

     For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the proper

standard of review is abuse of discretion review. We also agree with

the Fourth District’s analysis of the merits under that standard.

Consequently, we approve Alahad; clarify our Court’s inconsistent

case law in this area; and disapprove McWilliams to the extent that

it applied de novo review to trial court rulings on motions to

suppress out-of-court identifications.

               FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

     Alahad was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted

robbery with a firearm. Alahad, 326 So. 3d at 1143. Alahad had

been outside a convenience store around noon when Loretta

Matthews, the eyewitness, arrived with her boyfriend, the victim.

While Matthews waited in her car, the victim exited the store and

was confronted by Alahad. Matthews first saw the victim and

                                 -2-
Alahad when they were ten to fifteen feet away from the car. Alahad

grabbed the victim and demanded his money, and during the

struggle the two reached the hood of the car. The victim fell on his

back, and Alahad shot and killed him. Alahad ran from the scene.

     Matthews told police that the shooter was “a black male,

approximately 5 [feet] 10 [inches], 125 pounds, skinny, in his

twenties or younger, and [] wearing a gray sweatshirt”; that she “got

a good look at” the shooter’s face; and that if she saw the shooter

again, she would be able to fully identify him. Id. at 1144. She also

showed police the area where she saw the shooter run. Later that

afternoon, a woman reported to police that Alahad, whom she

identified by name, had run through her yard with a firearm and

was currently in a nearby apartment.

     At the apartment, police found Alahad and several other men.

Alahad and Adrian Nixon, one of the other men, both matched

Matthews’s description. Alahad was “a black male, 5 [feet]

9 [inches], seventeen years old, and weighed 150 pounds.” Id.

Nixon was “twenty-five years old, 5 [feet] 8 [inches] or 5 [feet]

9 [inches], and very thin but muscular.” Id. Both also had facial

markings. Nixon had two teardrop tattoos on the right side of his

                                  -3-
face, and Alahad had a “teardrop-shaped birthmark or scar” in the

same place. Id.

     About three hours after the shooting, the police contacted

Matthews and arranged to conduct a show-up, explaining that they

would show her “a guy from [her] description.” Id. (alteration in

original). 1 Because of the identifying information from the woman

who reported Alahad running through her yard, Alahad was the

only person shown to Matthews at the show-up. Matthews

identified Alahad as the shooter from approximately thirty feet

away. She stated that she was “pretty positive” Alahad was the

shooter, and when asked if she was one hundred percent sure, she

replied “yes.” Id.

     Claiming a violation of his due process rights, Alahad moved

before trial to suppress Matthews’s out-of-court identification at the

show-up and any in-court identification by her. Alahad argued that

the identifications resulted from an unnecessarily suggestive show-

      1. In a show-up procedure, “the police take a witness, shortly
after the commission of an observed crime, to where the police are
detaining the suspect, in order to give them an opportunity to make
an identification.” Walker v. State, 776 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000).

                                 -4-
up that gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification. At the suppression hearing, Matthews testified

about her view during the shooting and what police told her before

the show-up:

     When the shooter first approached the victim near
     [Matthews’s] passenger door, [she] “couldn’t really see the
     face too much then but [she] saw clothes until they
     [moved] around the car.” When he ran up to the victim,
     the shooter had the hoodie covering his hair, and she
     initially only saw him from the side. She saw the
     shooter’s face when the victim fell to the ground. She
     saw his whole face “straight”; he was facing the untinted
     front window of her car. She explained that, when the
     shooter fired the gun, “I sat back in the seat and
     observed what was -- what should be my next move. I
     was scared to -- it happened so fast that my first thought
     really was to pay attention to who was doing this to him
     and I paid attention to the face.” She estimated that she
     saw his face for three or four minutes, “[p]robably more,”
     but she was not sure. It was “[n]ot just a piece, not just
     the side,” but “the whole face,” and she “concentrated on
     it.”
           [She] testified that, prior to the show-up, the law
     enforcement officers told her that they found someone
     who matched the description that she gave, and she
     initially denied that the officers told her that they found
     him in the area where she said he went. However, after
     being confronted with her prior deposition testimony, she
     stated that the officers told her that they found him in
     the area to which she said the shooter ran.

Id. at 1145 (several alterations in original).

                                  -5-
     Two of the detectives involved in the show-up, Detective

Almanzar and Detective Novak, testified at the suppression hearing.

Detective Novak testified that he may have told Matthews that the

suspect matched her description, and Detective Almanzar testified

that he did tell her this information. However, Detective Novak

testified that he did not tell Matthews that Alahad was found in the

area where she said the shooter ran, and Detective Almanzar

testified that he did not recall doing so.

     Matthews further testified that at the show-up, the suspect

stood with an officer on each side of him. She also stated that she

could not remember whether he was wearing handcuffs. Detective

Almanzar testified that she did not hesitate when she identified the

suspect as the shooter, and that she stated that she believed the

shooter had a tear-shaped tattoo under his right eye. In her

testimony, Matthews admitted making this statement at the show-

up; she did not tell it to police in her initial description. The trial

court denied the motion to suppress. 2

     2. The trial court did not reach the inquiry for the in-court
identification because it found the out-of-court identification
admissible.

                                   -6-
     On appeal to the Fourth District, Alahad raised multiple

issues, including that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress Matthews’s out-of-court identification. In setting forth the

standard of review applicable to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress, the district court stated that “appellate courts must

accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s

determination of the historical facts, but must independently review

mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the

constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 1146 (quoting Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65

(citation omitted)).

     However, despite setting forth this mixed standard of review,

the district court further stated that “[t]he decision to admit a

pre-trial identification is within the sound discretion of the trial

court and the decision should be overturned only upon a showing of

abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Walker v. State, 776 So. 2d 943,

945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).

     Although it noted that the trial court’s determination was

“likely a close call,” the district court affirmed “[d]ue to the abuse of

discretion standard of review.” Id. at 1147. Alahad argued that the

                                  -7-
show-up was unnecessarily suggestive because (1) Alahad “was in

handcuffs and flanked by two officers,” (2) police told Matthews that

Alahad matched her description and that he was found in the area

she saw him run to, and (3) Alahad was the only person included in

the show-up even though Nixon also matched Matthews’s

description. Id. at 1146-47.

     The district court rejected Alahad’s first argument, stating that

standing alone, the presence of officers or handcuffs is not enough

to make a show-up unnecessarily suggestive. See id. at 1147 (citing

State v. Jackson, 744 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)).

Declining to hold that “no reasonable judge would rule otherwise,”

the district court held on Alahad’s second argument that the show-

up was not unnecessarily suggestive from the police’s statement

that the suspect matched Matthews’s description. Id. at 1147-48.

The district court reasoned that the statement that Alahad

“matche[d] the description” was vaguer than the statements police

made in cases where courts found procedures unnecessarily

suggestive. Id. at 1147 (citing Anderson v. State, 946 So. 2d 579,

582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Smith v. State, 362 So. 2d 417, 418-19

(Fla. 1st DCA 1978)).

                                -8-
     Noting that Alahad’s third argument presented “the most

troubling fact,” the district court still held that “[r]easonable minds

could differ” as to whether the police’s failure to include Nixon in

the show-up rendered the procedure unnecessarily suggestive. Id.

However, the district court reasoned that the neighbor’s report

identifying Alahad by name gave police a basis to focus on him for

the show-up. Id. at 1148. Because it concluded that the show-up

was not unnecessarily suggestive under the abuse of discretion

standard of review, the district court did not reach the second part

of the out-of-court identification analysis—whether the

unnecessarily suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. (citing Davis v. State,

207 So. 3d 177, 207 (Fla. 2016)). 3

     Our review follows.

                              ANALYSIS

     This case requires us to clarify the proper standard of review

for trial court rulings on motions to suppress out-of-court

identifications made during police procedures. In doing so, we

     3. Without discussion, the district court also affirmed
Alahad’s other arguments on appeal.

                                  -9-
review the Fourth District’s decision de novo. See Van v. Schmidt,

122 So. 3d 243, 252 (Fla. 2013) (stating that whether the district

court applied the proper standard of review “present[ed] a pure

question of law”).

     Previously, we have applied two different standards to trial

court rulings on out-of-court identifications. In some earlier

decisions, we applied abuse of discretion review. See Thomas v.

State, 748 So. 2d 970, 981 (Fla. 1999); Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d

544, 546 (Fla. 1993); Hayes v. State, 581 So. 2d 121, 125 (Fla.

1991). In more recent decisions, we applied a mixed standard of

review; we gave a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s

factual findings but reviewed the ultimate question of law de novo.

See Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65; Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495,

517 (Fla. 2005).4 Our precedent therefore reveals that while we

have been consistently deferential to the trial court’s factual

      4. De novo review is independent review of the application of
the law to the facts. See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 606 (Fla.
2001) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98
(1996)). Under abuse of discretion review, “[i]f reasonable [people]
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court,
then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of
an abuse of discretion.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197,
1203 (Fla. 1980).

                                 - 10 -
findings regarding an out-of-court identification, we have not firmly

espoused how Florida appellate courts should review application of

the law to those facts.

     We conclude that abuse of discretion review is the proper

standard of review because here, the application of the law to fact is

a determination of the ultimate reliability of a piece of evidence—the

out-of-court identification. We reach this conclusion after

summarizing the general law on out-of-court identifications,

examining the nature of the trial court’s ruling, and considering the

conflict cases. We also agree with the Fourth District that in the

present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the out-of-court identification.

         I. General Law on Out-of-Court Identifications

     To determine whether an out-of-court identification made

during a police procedure should be suppressed, the trial court

conducts a two-prong test: “(1) [D]id the police employ an

unnecessarily suggestive procedure in obtaining an out-of-court

identification; (2) if so, considering all the circumstances, did the

suggestive procedure give rise to a substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification[?]” Grant v. State, 390 So. 2d 341, 343

                                 - 11 -
(Fla. 1980) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977)).

If on balance the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure

outweighs the reliability of the identification, then there is a

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Manson

v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977). In that instance, the

out-of-court identification should be suppressed. See id.

     Across different types of police procedures, there is no bright-

line rule to determine whether the procedure was unnecessarily

suggestive. A line-up or photograph spread can be unnecessarily

suggestive depending on its composition. Way v. State, 502 So. 2d

1321, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Moreover, a show-up “is

inherently suggestive because a witness is presented with only one

suspect for identification.” Perez v. State, 648 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla.

1995). However, a show-up “[is] not unnecessarily suggestive

unless the police aggravate the suggestiveness of the confrontation.”

State v. Jackson, 744 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (citing

Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1987)).

     To determine whether an unnecessarily suggestive procedure

gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,

the trial court considers the following:

                                 - 12 -
     [1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
     the time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of attention,
     [3] the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
     criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the
     witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time
     between the crime and the confrontation.

Grant, 390 So. 2d at 343 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-

200 (1972)).

     This Court has stated that “[t]he primary evil to be avoided in

the introduction of an out-of-court identification is a very

substantial likelihood of misidentification” and that “[a]n

impermissibly suggestive identification procedure is one that

creates the danger of misidentification so great that it violates due

process.” Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65 (citing Simmons v. United States,

390 U.S. 377, 386 (1968)). An out-of-court identification resulting

from an unnecessarily suggestive procedure “is not per se

inadmissible, but may be introduced into evidence if found to be

reliable and based upon the witness’ independent recall.” Edwards

v. State, 538 So. 2d 440, 442 n.5 (Fla. 1989). If it concludes that

the procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, then the trial court

does not need to move to the second prong of the test. Fitzpatrick,

900 So. 2d at 518.

                                - 13 -
     In sum, an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is

impermissibly suggestive if the resulting out-of-court identification

is unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. 5 Reliability “is

the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification

testimony . . . .” Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.

            II. The Nature of the Trial Court’s Ruling

     This Court has stated that “[s]uppression issues are

extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the gamut from (1) pure

questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law and fact, to (3) pure

questions of law” and that “the proper standard of review depends

on the nature of the ruling in each case.” State v. Glatzmayer, 789

So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001).

     The issue of whether to suppress an out-of-court identification

presents a mixed question of law and fact because the two-prong

test requires application of the law to historical facts. See Walton,

208 So. 3d at 65 (treating the trial court’s ruling on the issue as a

      5. We recognize that some courts have used interchangeably
the terms “unnecessarily” and “impermissibly” when referring to the
first prong. See Johnson, 817 F.2d at 729 (“Under these
circumstances, Jordan’s out-of-court identification was not
unreliable even if it had been impermissibly suggestive . . . .”).

                                 - 14 -
mixed question of law and fact); Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598,

606 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-15

(1995)) (stating that an ultimate determination involving application

of the law to the historical facts presents a mixed question of law

and fact).

     Historical facts, or factual findings, address “scene- and

action-setting questions.” See Connor, 803 So. 2d at 606 (quoting

Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112-15). In other words, historical facts

define “who did what, when or where, how or why.” U.S. Bank Nat’l

Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Village at Lakeridge,

LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018) (citing Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111,

116). For the unnecessarily suggestive prong, the historical facts

may include any relevant circumstances of the procedure; the

existence of any exigent circumstances, how police presented the

suspect, and what police said to the eyewitness before and during

the procedure are likely factual findings. For the substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification prong, the historical facts

may include circumstances of the eyewitness’s observation such as

how close the eyewitness was to the suspect at the time of the

crime; the angle at which the eyewitness viewed the suspect; the

                                 - 15 -
eyewitness’s description of the suspect; the suspect’s actual

physical characteristics; and any other relevant circumstances.

     The ultimate determination for the trial court is a mixed

question of law and fact, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597

(1982), which involves application of a legal rule to certain historical

facts, see United States v. Constant, 814 F.3d 570, 576 (1st Cir.

2016). Although mixed questions of law and fact are often reviewed

under the mixed standard of review, not all mixed questions should

be reviewed under that standard. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967

(“Mixed questions are not all alike.”).

     Indeed, we review some mixed questions under the mixed

standard and others for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v.

State, 969 So. 2d 938, 946 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the validity of a

challenge for cause “is a mixed question of law and fact, on which a

trial court’s ruling will be overturned only for ‘manifest error.’

‘Manifest error’ is tantamount to an abuse of discretion.”) (citations

omitted); Connor, 803 So. 2d at 608 (holding that the mixed

standard of review applies to mixed questions “that ultimately

determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth

and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the

                                 - 16 -
Florida Constitution”); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1031-32

(Fla. 1999) (holding that the mixed standard of review applies to

ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d

7, 22 (Fla. 1959) (stating that the competency of a challenged juror

is a question “of mixed law and fact to be determined by the trial

judge in his discretion”). And on the mixed question before us, the

federal circuits are divided; some apply abuse of discretion review to

the application of law to fact while others apply de novo review to at

least part of the application. See, e.g., Constant, 814 F.3d at 576-

77 (abuse of discretion review); Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893,

895-97 (11th Cir. 1988) (clearly erroneous review for the

unnecessarily suggestive prong and de novo review for the ultimate

reliability determination). Therefore, we must clarify the proper

standard of review for this mixed question given the nature of the

ruling.

     We conclude that out-of-court identification suppression is

chiefly about reliability—a determination that belongs in the trial

court. Notably, we ask, “[W]hich kind of court ([trial] or appellate) is

better suited to resolve [the mixed question]?” U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct.

at 966. To start, the two-prong test for ruling on an out-of-court

                                 - 17 -
identification is analytically similar to the balancing test for ruling

on the admissibility of evidence under section 90.403, Florida

Statutes (2022). We review section 90.403 rulings for abuse of

discretion. Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1124 (Fla. 2009);

Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000).

      In a section 90.403 analysis, the trial court excludes relevant

evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” § 90.403, Fla. Stat. Just as the

trial court determines under section 90.403 whether the probative

value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, the trial court determines under the out-of-court

identification test whether the reliability of the identification is

outweighed by its corrupting effect. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114

(“Against these [reliability] factors is to be weighed the corrupting

effect of the suggestive identification itself.”).

     The mixed question presented by a trial court’s ruling on a

motion to suppress an out-of-court identification is properly subject

to the abuse of discretion standard of review, which respects the

trial court’s superior point of view. See Sims v. Brown, 574 So. 2d

131, 133 (Fla. 1991) (“The weighing of relevance versus prejudice or

                                   - 18 -
confusion is best performed by the trial judge who is present and

best able to compare the two.”).

     Moreover, whether the ruling involves “primarily legal or

factual work” indicates which court is better suited to answer the

mixed question. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967. Appellate courts

review de novo mixed questions that require legal clarification. Id.

However, appellate courts typically review with deference mixed

questions that amount to factual findings—a task for trial courts.

See id. Examining each prong of the trial court’s out-of-court

identification analysis shows that here, the application of the law to

historical fact is primarily factual work.

                    A. Unnecessarily Suggestive

     Although the phrase “unnecessarily suggestive” carries legal

overtones, the trial court’s determination on this prong is

essentially a factual inquiry. No clear rule exists for determining

whether an out-of-court identification procedure is “unnecessarily”

suggestive. 6 The trial court’s conclusion for this prong often turns

     6. Some courts have listed exigency as a specific
consideration for show-ups. See, e.g., Amador v. Quarterman, 458
F.3d 397, 414 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[S]how ups often will not violate a
defendant’s due process rights when they are performed out of

                                 - 19 -
on whether police did or did not take particular actions. For line-

ups and photograph spreads, the trial court analyzes how police

composed the line-up or spread. See Way, 502 So. 2d at 1323. For

show-ups, the trial court analyzes whether police aggravated the

inherent suggestiveness of the procedure. See Perez, 648 So. 2d at

719; Jackson, 744 So. 2d at 548. The trial court may also consider

the presence of any corroborating evidence. See Alahad, 326 So. 3d

at 1148 (“A neighbor identified the defendant by name, so law

enforcement had a legitimate basis to zero in on the defendant for a

show-up.”).

     Because the trial court is better positioned to find facts, Salve

Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991), it is likewise

better positioned to conclude that a procedure was unnecessarily

suggestive. For example, unnecessary suggestiveness may turn on

whether police made a statement to the eyewitness that the suspect

in a show-up would match the eyewitness’s specific description.

See Anderson v. State, 946 So. 2d 579, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

necessity or urgency . . . .”); McWilliams, 306 So. 3d at 135 (“The
record below remains undeveloped as to any emergent or exigent
circumstances that would necessitate the use of such a
procedure.”).

                                - 20 -
The trial court is better positioned than the appellate court to

determine whether the statement was or was not made, and if so,

how it was made.

     Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit held in Cikora that trial court

conclusions on this prong require deference. 840 F.2d at 895-96.

In Cikora, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the unnecessarily

suggestive prong from the “ultimate question” of constitutionality—

the question of reliability. Id. at 896 (quoting Sumner, 455 U.S. at

597). 7 Relying on Sumner, the federal circuit court treated the

unnecessarily suggestive prong as involving “questions of fact that

underlie this ultimate conclusion . . . .” Id. (quoting Sumner, 455

U.S. at 597).

     For all these reasons, we believe that a trial court’s decision on

the unnecessarily suggestive prong of the inquiry should be

reviewed for abuse of discretion.

   B. Substantial Likelihood of Irreparable Misidentification

     If the trial court determines that a show-up is unnecessarily

suggestive, and thus, must reach the substantial likelihood of

      7. The court stated that the ultimate conclusion was subject
to “plenary” (de novo) review. Id. at 895.

                                - 21 -
irreparable misidentification prong, the trial court must then

determine the overall reliability of the out-of-court identification.

See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972) (“We turn, then, to the

central question, whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’

the identification was reliable even though the confrontation

procedure was suggestive.”). On this prong, the trial court analyzes

the reliability factors to weigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive

procedure against the reliability of the identification. See Manson,

432 U.S. at 114-16. The trial court’s determination on the overall

weighing should receive deference not only because it is similar to a

section 90.403 weighing, but also because the assessment of the

reliability factors is primarily a factual analysis.

     The reliability factors raise highly-specific questions of fact.

The first two factors relate to the eyewitness’s observation at the

time of the crime. The first factor, the opportunity of the witness to

view the criminal at the time of the crime, may involve facts such as

the angle at which the witness viewed the criminal and how close

the two were to each other. See McWilliams, 306 So. 3d at 136

(determining that the witness had ample opportunity to view the

criminal at the time of the crime when the two stood “face-to-face”

                                  - 22 -
and there was no distance between them). The second factor, the

witness’s degree of attention, may involve facts such as the

interaction between the witness and the criminal and the lighting in

the space. See Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 518 (determining that the

witness had a sufficient degree of attention when he had a

conversation with the appellant in a well-lit room). For this factor,

the trial court may also consider the quality of the witness’s

memory. See Walton, 208 So. 3d at 66 (“Gillan’s hazy memory of

the incident does not give us confidence in her identification of

Walton.”).

     The third factor, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description

of the criminal, is a comparison of historical facts; the trial court

compares what the witness told police with the suspect’s actual

physical characteristics. See McWilliams, 306 So. 3d at 136. The

last two factors relate to the identification procedure. The fourth

factor, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the

confrontation, involves the facts of what the witness said and how

the witness conveyed their statements. See id. (determining that

the witness showed certainty when she conveyed the identification

statement with a “visceral reaction” and repeated her assurance).

                                 - 23 -
The fifth factor, the length of time between the crime and the

confrontation, is a basic historical fact. The trial court is

undoubtedly better-positioned than the appellate court to find the

above facts and any other relevant facts under the totality of the

circumstances approach.

     In Constant, the First Circuit observed that in the context of

rulings on the admissibility of identification evidence, abuse of

discretion review is really “an assessment of ‘reasonableness’ in the

district court’s fact-bound application of the law.” 814 F.3d at

576. 8 The court aptly noted:

      8. Constant involved an in-court identification. Id. The
standard of review that applies to suppression of out-of-court
identifications would apply equally to suppression of resulting in-
court identifications. After determining that the out-of-court
procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the trial court considers
whether a challenged in-court identification is “reliable and based
solely upon the witness’ independent recollection of the offender at
the time of the crime, uninfluenced by the intervening illegal
[procedure].” Edwards, 538 So. 2d at 442. This consideration is
essentially the substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification
prong. Although some Florida courts use seven slightly different
reliability factors for in-court identifications, see, e.g., State v.
Dorsey, 5 So. 3d 702, 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing Edwards, 538
So. 2d at 442), we have stated that these factors are “substantially
the same” as the five Neil factors for out-of-court identifications.
Edwards, 538 So. 2d at 443 n.6. The alternate Florida factors are:

                                 - 24 -
     All that remains unclear, in sum, is whether we ask
     whether the district court’s application of law to fact was
     reasonable, or whether we ask whether we would have
     reached the same conclusion. We opt for the more
     deferential formulation. Simply put, gauging the
     reliability of a witness’s testimony in a case like this is
     precisely the type of judgment that trial judges are both
     well-equipped and well-positioned to make.

Id. at 576-77.

     We agree with this reasoning. The ultimate application of the

law to fact on the second prong—the weighing of the corrupting

effect against the reliability factors—is both a primarily factual

analysis and one similar in nature to that of section 90.403

determinations. Abuse of discretion review of out-of-court

     the prior opportunity the witness had to observe the
     alleged criminal act; the existence of any discrepancy
     between any pretrial [procedure] description and the
     defendant’s actual description; any identification prior to
     the [procedure] of another person; any identification by
     picture of the defendant prior to the [procedure]; failure
     to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; any time
     lapse between the alleged act and the [] identification
     [made during the procedure]; and any other factors
     raised by the totality of the circumstances that bear upon
     the likelihood that the witness’ in-court identification is
     not tainted by the illegal [procedure].

Id. at 443.

                                 - 25 -
identification rulings respects the trial court’s superior ability to

apply the law to the facts in this context.

                          III. Conflict Cases

     We now turn to the express and direct conflict with Walton

and McWilliams. Although both decisions applied the mixed

standard of review, neither analyzed whether the mixed standard is

the appropriate standard of review for rulings on motions to

suppress out-of-court identifications.

     In Walton, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of

attempted murder of a law enforcement officer with possession and

discharge of a firearm and two counts of attempted armed robbery

with possession of a firearm. 208 So. 3d at 63. The trial court had

denied the petitioner’s motion to suppress an out-of-court

identification made during a photograph array procedure. Id. The

First District affirmed the convictions without discussing the

identification suppression issue. Walton v. State, 106 So. 3d 522,

523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). On discretionary review, we stated that “a

trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of

law and fact that determines constitutional rights” and quoted the

mixed standard of review:

                                 - 26 -
     In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
     suppress, appellate courts must accord a presumption of
     correctness to the trial court’s determination of the
     historical facts, but must independently review mixed
     questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the
     constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth
     Amendment. See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608
     (Fla. 2001); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032
     (Fla. 1999); Albritton v. State, 769 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d
     DCA 2000).

Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65 (quoting Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754,

758 (Fla. 2003)).

     We applied the mixed standard of review and held that the

out-of-court identification was unnecessarily suggestive and gave

rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id.

at 65-67.

     In McWilliams, the appellant was convicted of three counts of

sexual battery, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of

aggravated assault. 306 So. 3d at 132. The trial court had denied

the appellant’s motion to suppress an out-of-court identification

made during a show-up. Id. at 133-34. The Third District

expressly acknowledged that the issue of whether an identification

procedure violates due process presents a mixed question of law

and fact. Id. at 134 (citing Sumner, 455 U.S. at 597). For the

                                 - 27 -
standard of review, the district court stated it would “defer to [the]

trial court’s findings of fact as long as they are supported by

competent, substantial evidence, but . . . review de novo [the] . . .

application of the law to the historical facts.” Id. (alterations in

original) (quoting Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 414 (Fla. 2010)

(citing Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007))).

     The Third District applied the mixed standard of review and

held that the out-of-court identification was unnecessarily

suggestive but that it did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of

misidentification. Id. at 134-37.

     Thus, Walton and McWilliams applied a mixed standard of

review, which conflicts with the more deferential abuse of discretion

standard employed in the decision below, without considering

possible distinctions in the out-of-court identification context. As

we have already said, the nature of the trial court’s ruling on this

type of evidence convinces us that abuse of discretion review is the

proper standard.

                                 - 28 -
       IV. Applying Abuse of Discretion Review to Alahad

     We agree with the Fourth District that in the present case, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the out-of-court

identification.

     On the first prong of the analysis, we conclude that reasonable

minds could differ as to whether the show-up procedure was

unnecessarily suggestive. As mentioned above, although a show-up

is inherently suggestive, Perez, 648 So. 2d at 719, it is

not unnecessarily suggestive unless police aggravate the

suggestiveness of the procedure. Jackson, 744 So. 2d at 548 (citing

Johnson, 817 F.2d at 726). We conclude that there is competent,

substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s

factual findings. For the first prong application of law to fact, we

agree with the Fourth District that it was reasonable for the trial

court to conclude that the procedure was not unnecessarily

suggestive. Presenting the suspect in handcuffs or with flanking

officers does not make the procedure unnecessarily suggestive. See

id. at 548 (stating that presenting the suspect in handcuffs was not

police conduct aggravating the suggestiveness of a show-up) (citing

Johnson, 817 F.2d at 729). Neither does a police officer’s general

                                 - 29 -
statement to the eyewitness that the suspect matches the

eyewitness description. See Anderson, 946 So. 2d at 582

(concluding that police aggravated the suggestiveness of the

procedure when they made a specific statement to the eyewitness

that the suspect had clothing fitting the description and had a

screwdriver, the weapon used).

     Moreover, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that

police’s failure to present Nixon in the show-up did not make the

procedure unnecessarily suggestive when police had corroborating

evidence leading to Alahad. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.

377, 384-85 (1968) (stating that the “inconclusive clues” leading to

the suspects were one factor, among others, that did not make the

procedure unnecessarily suggestive).

     Because we agree with the district court that the trial court

reasonably concluded that the show-up was not unnecessarily

suggestive, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in ending the inquiry and admitting Matthews’s out-of-court

identification.

                                 - 30 -
                            CONCLUSION

     For these reasons, we approve Alahad, clarify our Court’s

inconsistent case law in this area, and disapprove McWilliams to the

extent that it applied de novo review to trial court rulings on out-of-

court identifications.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
SASSO, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
     Direct Conflict of Decisions

     Fourth District – Case No. 4D19-3438

     (Broward County)

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C. Geraghty,
Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm
Beach, Florida,

     for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and
David M. Costello, Assistant Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Respondent

                                - 31 -