Court Opinion

ID: 9569423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:42.217297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:32.080521
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the sentence at issue here is unambiguous and not subject to interpretation. Where a trial judge imposes two sentences, only one of which is denominated “consecutive,” it of necessity follows the other. Moreover, while I agree that a judicial officer is not empowered to determine whether parole will be granted, I fundamentally disagree with the suggestion that a judge cannot structure a sentence in such a way that the defendant is never eligible to be considered for parole. In order to find that the Legislature intended such a result where a defendant is convicted of both a violent offense and of using a weapon in the commission of that offense, one need look no further than S.C.Code Ann. § 16-23-490(B) (2003), which specifically authorizes the judge to make the five year weapons sentence consecutive.
In interpreting sentences, the Department looks to the sentences imposed, not to the statutes. Moreover, only if there is an ambiguity in the sentences, must the Department or the court ascertain the intent of the judge, not, as the majority suggests, the intent of the parties. Finally, while certain parole eligibility determinations are statutorily committed to the Department,8 as is the decision whether to grant parole,9 there is no authority for the statement that a judge violates the separation of powers doctrine when he structures a sentence so that an otherwise parole-eligible defendant will never receive a hearing before the Board. See cases collected in People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983) (no separation of powers issue in sentence structuring).
Finally, I read Mims v. State, 273 S.C. 740, 259 S.E.2d 602 (1979) to hold that where a defendant receives consecutive sentences, they are to be “aggregated,” i.e. added together, in *472order to determine the date upon which the defendant first becomes parole eligible. In State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214, 399 S.E.2d 760 (1990), the Court simply recognized the logical impossibility of aggregating multiple life sentences. Here, we are asked to aggregate a life sentence and a consecutive five year sentence, a sentence which the General Assembly specified could, in the sentencing judge’s discretion, be made consecutive. The result is admittedly harsh,10 and perhaps not desirable, however, it is not an unlawful sentence.
I would reverse the order of the ALC.
KITTREDGE, J., concurs.

. E.g., whether multiple violent offenses are part of a continuous course of conduct. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (2003); State v. McKay, 300 S.C. 113, 386 S.E.2d 623 (1989).

. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-30 (2003).

. Respondent committed murder in 1990, at which time the possible sentences for murder were death, life with twenty year parole eligibility, or life with thirty year eligibility where an aggravating circumstance is found but a death sentence not imposed. § 16-3-20 (Supp. 1990). He received a "twenty-year” life sentence. In the weapons statute, the General Assembly has specified that the five year weapons sentence "does not apply” in only three situations: where the defendant is sentenced to death or to life without the possibility of parole, § 16-23-490(A), or where a mandatory minimum sentence in excess of five years is required for the violent offense itself. § 16-23-490(B). A person convicted of murder under the current statute would not be subject to the five year weapons sentence since the three sentencing choices currently are death, life without the possibility of parole, or a mandatory minimum thirty year sentence. § 16-3-20(A). Respondent, however, is not subject to the "mandatory minimum” exemption.