Court Opinion

ID: 9607658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:01:09.73016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.714834
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
(concurring separately).
I join the majority opinion, except that portion that purports to describe the standard to be applied in reviewing custody decisions of trial courts.
I find nothing objectionable in the majority’s statement that we give wide deference to trial court decisions in the custody area, at least when we are reviewing rulings, such as the instant one, that involve initial placements. And I strongly support that portion of the opinion that requires written findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how the factors relevant to a determination of the best interests of the child bear upon the ultimate resolution reached by the trial court. However, I disagree with any implication in the majority opinion that decisions regarding the modification of earlier custody awards also are entitled to such broad deference. In my view, that is not the law, and it is not sound policy. See Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 202 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., *427dissenting); see also Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result) (very high standard for reopening custodial orders); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (custody changes governed by strict standards, different from those applicable to initial custody awards). To state the applicable standard carelessly is to invite confusion in an area in which courts have exceptional powers over the lives of children of divorced parents, an area where the eradication of such confusion should be an important goal. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d at 1322 (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately).
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.