Court Opinion

ID: 9531919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:15:58.633739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:37.130469
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in result because I agree that the trial court was not entitled under Indiana Code § 85-88-5-1 to summarily deny Ryan's petition for expungement. The majority takes issue with the trial court's order because the trial court's finding that Ryan had been previously arrested was not based on information contained in sworn statements by individuals who represent an agency pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-88-5-1(d)(8)(B), nor did the order contain the alternative determination that the petition was insufficient pursuant to Indiana Code § 85-88-5-1(d)(8)(A). Slip op. p. 5.
First, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that, because the information regarding Ryan's previous arrest was not contained in sworn statements by individuals who represent an agency, the trial court could not summarily deny the petition. In its response to Ryan's petition for expungement, the State asserted that Ryan had been arrested and convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and the State provided the cause number in that case. Appellant's App. p. 28. No one contends that the State's assertion is incorrect. See Boykins v. State, 470 N.E.2d 765, 766 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (finding remand for findings on laches issue futile where no evidence was presented at trial), reh'g denied, trans. denied. As our Supreme Court has explained in the past,
*47Although our procedural rules are extremely important, it must be kept in mind that they are merely a means for achieving the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice. We must examine our technical rules closely when it appears that invoking them would defeat justice; otherwise we become slaves to the technicalities themselves and they acquire the position of being the ends instead of the means. This is especially true in a case such as the one at bar where we prejudice no one by allowing the record to be corrected at this point.
Am. States Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Jennings, 258 Ind. 637, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1972). Thus, I would find that the State substantially complied with the requirements of the statute even though its statement was not sworn. See Bowles v. State, 820 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (finding that detective who filed affidavit one day later than required by statute substantially complied with the statute because the purposes justifying the rule were met and defendant did not contend that he was prejudiced), trans. denied.
However, I agree with the majority that the trial court was not entitled to summarily deny Ryan's petition. Indiana Code § 35-38-5-1(d)(8) allows the trial court to summarily deny a petition if the petition is insufficient or if, "based on information contained in sworn statements submitted by individuals who represent an agency, the petitioner is not entitled to an expungement of records." This portion of the statute governing summary denial without a hearing fails to enumerate under what cireumstances a petitioner is not entitled to an expungement. However, our Court has previously held that Indiana Code § 35-88-5-1 is the only means by which a petitioner can obtain an expungement of arrest records; trial courts do not have discretion to order expungement of arrest records in cireumstances not contemplated by the statute. Kleiman v. State, 590 N.E.2d 660, 661 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), reh'g denied; but see Blake v. State, 860 N.E.2d 625, 627-28 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (finding that Indiana Code § 35-38-5-1 does not govern the expungement of arrest records for defendants who have been convicted and later pardoned). We thus look to the statute for the ctreumstances under which a petitioner's records may be expunged.
Indiana Code § 35-38-5-1(f) provides that, after a hearing is held, a petition shall be granted unless the court finds that the conditions in Indiana Code § 35-38-5-1(a) have not been met, the individual has a record of arrests other than minor traffic offenses, or additional criminal charges are pending against the individual. I agree that the trial court's order thus correctly cites Indiana Code $ 35-38-5-1(f) as a potential reason why the petitioner is not entitled to expungement under Indiana Code § 85-38-5-1(d)(8)(B). However, as the majority notes, slip op. p. 6 n. 2, Indiana Code § 35-88-5-1()(2) requires that "the individual has a record of arrests other than minor traffic offenses." (Emphasis added.) I would agree that operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is not a minor offense. But a single arrest is not sufficient to justify the denial of an ex-pungement petition. See 1978 Ind. Op. Atty. Gen. 76, Opinion No. 78-27 (diseuss-ing precursor to Indiana Code $ 35-88-5-1 regarding the return of an individual's photographs and fingerprints) ("The individual's record of prior arrests is the see-ond condition; that is, if the individual has a record of two or more arrests prior to the arrest for which the individual otherwise would be entitled to the destruction or return of the photographs and fingerprints, the law enforcement agency must refuse the individual's request for their destruction or return."). Because the trial *48court did not summarily grant the petition and the trial court was not entitled to summarily deny the petition, the trial court is required to set the matter for a hearing under Indiana Code § 85-38-5-1(f).
For the foregoing reasons, I disagree with the majority's rationale in this case. However, I agree with the outcome. I therefore concur in result.