Court Opinion

ID: 9855391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:01.704378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:12.967916
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
By invoking the concept of “inherent” power, the majority opin*442ion is attempting to accomplish and sanction indirectly that which, by statutory prohibition, cannot be done directly.
The writer sought to distinguish “inherent” power from “implied” power in Echols v. DeKalb County, 146 Ga. App. 560 (247 SE2d 114) (1978). “The federal judiciary has implied power but not inherent power.” Id. at 567. The former “power” seems to be a more restricted and definable exercise of discretion, while the latter “power” implies an unlimited, autonomous, absolute expression of sovereign authority.
I concur with the majority opinion as to the existence of implied power to procure additional prosecutorial aid in the trial of a particular criminal case. Hannah v. State, 212 Ga. 313 (92 SE2d 89) (1956). However, Judge Birdsong’s dissent is convincing in its outline of the restrictions of OCGA § 15-18-46, which, in my opinion, would under the facts of this case further curtail and limit the exercise of the independent “implied” powers discussed.