Court Opinion

ID: 9745582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:11:30.037673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.654542
License: Public Domain

DOSSEE, J.
I respectfully dissent. On the face of the discovery statutes themselves, the 20-day waiting period for oral depositions (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025, subd. (b)) does not apply to a deposition for production of business records from a nonparty.1 The majority acknowledges the statutory omission but concludes that the 20-day waiting period of section 2025, subdivision (b), nevertheless applies because a deposition for production of business records is equivalent to an oral deposition. I cannot concur in the majority’s reading of the statutory language. It may well be that the omission of a waiting period was a legislative oversight, but, if that is so, then I believe it must be the Legislature which corrects the omission.
1. Methods of Discovery
Section 2020 expressly identifies three ways to obtain discovery from a nonparty: “The method for obtaining discovery within the state from one who is not a party to the action is an oral deposition under Section 2025, a written deposition under Section 2028, or a deposition for production of business records and things under subdivisions (d) and (e).” (Italics added.) The first two methods—an oral deposition under section 2025 or a written deposition under section 2028—are broadly applicable; they may be taken of “any person,” whether a party or nonparty. (§§ 2025, subd. (a), 2028, subd. (a).) In contrast, the third method of discovery—a deposition for production of business records and things under section 2020, subdivisions (d) and (e)—applies exclusively to a nonparty.
The Legislature has imposed a waiting period only for the first two methods of discovery identified in section 2020. An oral deposition under *27section 2025, when taken by the plaintiff, is subject to a 20-day waiting period following service upon any defendant. (§ 2025, subd. (b).)2 A written deposition under section 2028, being subject to the procedures for taking oral depositions (§ 2028, subd. (a)) is likewise subject to the 20-day waiting period. Nowhere in the discovery statutes is there any prescribed waiting period for a deposition for production of business records and things from a nonparty under subdivisions (d) and (e) of section 2020.
Moreover, the process for compelling discovery from a nonparty is a deposition subpoena, which is governed by the statutory provisions (§ 1985 et seq.) for a subpoena duces tecum. (§ 2020, subd. (a); see also § 2025, subd. (h)(2).) There is no statutory waiting period for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. All that is required is a “pending” action. (§ 1985, subd. (c); cf. § 2017, subd. (a) [discovery permitted in any “pending action”].)3
Pursuant to section 2020, a deposition subpoena may be used to command three types of information from a nonparty: only oral testimony, only production of business records for copying, or both oral testimony and production of documents or tangible things. (§ 2020, subds. (a), (c), (d), (e).) When the deposition subpoena commands only oral testimony pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 2020, then, as the majority correctly observes, the subpoenaing party is requesting an oral deposition under section 2025. However, the Legislature has identified in section 2020 a “deposition for production of business records and things under subdivisions (d) [commanding only production of business records for copying] and (e) [commanding both oral testimony and production of business records and tangible things].” (Italics added.) As I read section 2020, a deposition for production of business records under subdivisions (d) and (e) is an independent method of discovery, separate and distinct from an oral deposition under section 2025 or a written deposition under section 2028.
*28The majority relies upon the fact that only two types of depositions—oral depositions and written depositions—are identified in section 2019. Yet, section 2019 separately enumerates among the discovery methods “[inspections of documents, things, and places.”4 A deposition for production of business records and things under section 2020 seems to be a unique hybrid. Although denominated a “deposition,”5 it actually provides a method of discovery from a nonparty parallel to a demand for inspection of documents or things in possession of a party to the action (§ 2031, subd. (a)).61 cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that a deposition for production of business records under subdivisions (d) and (e) of section 2020 is equivalent to an oral deposition.
2. Notice
When the deposition subpoena commands oral testimony from a nonparty, a notice of deposition is required: “A party desiring to take the oral deposition of any person shall give notice in writing in the manner set forth in subdivision (d).” (§ 2025, subd. (c).)7 Subdivision (d), in turn, sets forth the contents of a deposition notice and further provides that “[i]f the attendance of the deponent is to be compelled by service of a deposition subpoena under Section 2020, an identical copy of that subpoena shall be served with the deposition notice.” The deposition notice must be given to “every other party who has appeared in the action.” (§ 2025, subd. (c).)
In contrast, when the deposition subpoena commands only production of business records for copying, no separate deposition notice to the subpoenaed party is required. Subdivision (c) of section 2025 provides: “[Wjhere *29under subdivision (d) of Section 2020 only the production by a nonparty of business records for copying is desired, a copy of the deposition subpoena shall serve as the notice of deposition.” Presumably, the deposition subpoena, serving as a notice of deposition, must likewise be given to all parties who have appeared in the action. (§ 2025, subd. (c).)
The majority relies upon these references within section 2025 to a deposition subpoena under section 2020 as a further indication that the Legislature has equated a deposition for production of business records with an oral deposition. On the face of the statute, however, subdivision (c) of section 2025 merely requires notice—either notice of an oral deposition or a copy of a deposition subpoena—to all parties who have appeared in the action. That provision does not require that any defendant have actually appeared.
Although I agree that section 2025 seems to contemplate the existence of an adversary to receive notice, I find nothing in the statute which mandates service of the complaint upon a defendant as a prerequisite to service of a deposition subpoena upon a nonparty. I can see nothing in the notice requirements of subdivision (c) of section 2025 which relates to the waiting period. It is subdivision (b) which imposes a waiting period, not subdivision (c) , and subdivision (b) by its terms applies only to oral depositions, not to depositions for production of business records by a nonparty.
3. Potential for Abuse
I am, of course, cognizant of the potential for abuse if discovery is allowed to proceed before any party has been served. In my view, however, the Legislature has established sufficient safeguards against abuse in the statutory provisions which afford an opportunity to object to the production of the business records. First, a deposition subpoena is subject to the statutory provisions governing a subpoena duces tecum. (§ 2020, subds. (a), (d) (2).) And according to those provisions, the court may on motion or sua sponte quash or modify the subpoena or make any appropriate protective orders. (§ 1987.1.) Furthermore, when the business records sought by a deposition subpoena are personal records of a “consumer,” notice must be given to the consumer (or his or her attorney) as well as the custodian of the records. (§ 1985.3, subds. (b), (c); § 2020, subd. (d)(2).) The consumer then may object to the production of the personal records. (§ 1985.3, subd. (g).)
I can discern nothing in the 20-day waiting period for oral depositions which affords any greater protection against discovery abuse. The 20-day waiting period follows service of the complaint upon “any defendant” (§ 2025, subd. (b)); the defendant served need not have any relationship to *30the deponent or any incentive to object to the deposition.8 Moreover, the 20-day waiting period may be shortened with approval from the court. The true protection from abuse is provided not by the waiting period following service of the complaint, but by notice to all parties who have appeared (§ 2025, subd. (c)) and the opportunity to obtain a protective order (§ 2025, subd. (i)). Similar safeguards against abuse are established in the statutory provisions for notice and an opportunity to object to deposition subpoenas to obtain business records from a nonparty.
In summary, although plaintiff here may have had more expedient ways to obtain the information sought, I can find no legitimate basis for denying plaintiff discovery of the business records. Hence, I would conclude that the trial court erred in quashing the deposition subpoenas for business records of United Shellfish Co., and I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 22, 1997.

A11 further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 2025, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part: “[A]n oral deposition may be taken as follows: ... [1 (2) The plaintiff may serve a deposition notice without leave of court on any date that is 20 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, any defendant. However, on motion ... the court, for good cause shown, may grant to a plaintiff leave to serve a deposition notice on an earlier date.” The evident purpose of this waiting period is to permit the defendant time to obtain counsel and prepare for the inquiry. (See 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Discovery and Production of Evidence, § 1439, p. 1418.)

An action is “pending” from its inception until rendition of final judgment. (Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 728 [275 Cal.Rptr. 156]; Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1134, col. 1.) Here, there is no doubt that the action was pending. It was initiated when the complaint was filed. At the time plaintiff served the deposition subpoena, two defendants had actually been served. The first, Lange, had demurred and obtained a judgment of dismissal. The second, United Shellfish Co., had been served through its “agent,” Carola Svedise. It is true that once Svedise obtained an order quashing service there were no longer any viable defendants in the action. However, the action had not been concluded; it was still “pending.”

Section 2019 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Any party may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: HO (1) Oral and written depositions. [1 (2) Interrogatories to a party. HQ (3) Inspections of documents, things, and places. HQ (4) Physical and mental examinations. HQ (5) Requests for admissions. HQ (6) Simultaneous exchanges of expert trial witness information.”

The appellation “deposition” is admittedly odd. Section 2004, which preceded the enactment of the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 by over 100 years, defines a deposition as a “written declaration, under oath, made upon notice to the adverse party, for the purpose of enabling him to attend and cross-examine.” A deposition for production of business records for copying requires no attendance by a deponent and provides no opportunity for cross-examination. (§ 2030, subd. (d).)

A demand for production of documents from a party is subject to a waiting period of 10 days after service of the summon on or appearance by the party to whom the demand is directed. (§ 2031, subd. (b).)

Section 2025, subdivision (c) provides: “A party desiring to take the oral deposition of any person shall give notice in writing in the manner set forth in subdivision (d). However, where under subdivision (d) of Section 2020 only the production by a nonparty of business records for copying is desired, a copy of the deposition subpoena shall serve as the notice of deposition. The notice of deposition shall be given to every other party who has appeared in the action.”

Here, one named defendant, Lange, had in fact been previously served, and more than 20 days had expired before service of the deposition subpoena. Although plaintiff has arguably waived the point by failing to raise it below, the fact remains that even under the majority’s view that the 20-day waiting period applies to a deposition for production of business records, the waiting period was satisfied here.