Court Opinion

ID: 9928941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:02:49.529681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:58.346647
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/1/24 P. v. Knight CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084883
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                           (Kern Super. Ct. No. BF186054A)
                    v.

 JOSHUA KNIGHT,                                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Judith K.
Dulcich, Judge.
         Victoria H. Stafford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez, and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Defendant and appellant Joshua Knight raises several appellate issues after he was
sentenced to 860 years to life for horrific sex crimes perpetrated primarily against his
young daughter. We accept the Attorney General’s concession that the matter must be
remanded for the trial court to orally recite fines and fees imposed on defendant and to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment. We otherwise reject defendant’s contentions
and affirm.
                                        BACKGROUND
       In an amended information filed May 23, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney
charged defendant with 25 counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a minor
(Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b);1 counts 1, 5–7, 9, 11, 13, 16–18, 20–21, 25–26, 29–30,
32–36, 41–43), 12 counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a);
counts 2–4, 15, 23–24, 28, 31, 37–40),2 7 counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a
child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a); counts 8, 10, 12, 14, 19, 22, 27, 44),
possession of child pornography with a prior conviction (§ 311.11, subd. (b); count 45),
possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a); count 46), misdemeanor
possession of methamphetamine (Health & Safety Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 47.)
The information further alleged a multiple victim enhancement (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4))
and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5),
(a)(8), (a)(11), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5).
       A jury convicted defendant on counts 1 through 45 and 47 but acquitted him on
count 46. The jury also found the multiple victim allegations true. (§ 667.61.)

       1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
      2 Counts 38 and 39 initially identified Jane Doe as the victim but was later
amended to identify John Doe as the victim.

                                                   2.
First Parole Search
       Then-parole agent Farrah Gamez (Gamez) conducted a parole search of
defendant’s residence on August 11, 2020.3 Gamez had received information that led her
to bring additional agents and conduct a more thorough search than usual. Defendant
was present at the residence with his two children, Jane Doe and John Doe. Jane Doe
was born in March 2013 and John Doe in July 2009.
       Gamez located three smart phones belonging to defendant. Gamez turned the
phones over to the Department of Homeland Security to perform a forensic search.
       A forensic analyst with the Department of Homeland Security named Nicholas
Daigle (Daigle) performed a forensic analysis of defendant’s mobile devices. Daigle
created a thumb drive with 33 different photographic and video files taken from
defendant’s mobile devices. The videos were numbered to correspond to the counts to
which they applied. The thumb drive was admitted into evidence as People’s exhibit 1.
The files in exhibit 1 were contained in an application called Hide It Pro, which is used to
hide files.
       Daigle provided a description of each video and picture file on the thumb drive. A
document containing Daigle’s descriptions was admitted as People’s exhibit 9.
       The first video from exhibit 1 was played for the jury. The video showed
defendant orally copulating Jane Doe. After the video played, defense counsel asked for
a sidebar. Defense counsel wanted to speak with his client to see if they could offer a
stipulation so the remaining videos would not be played to the jury. Defense counsel said
defendant was in agreement that they could proceed by using Daigle’s report about the

       3 Another parole search was conducted on June 26, 2021, on a different residence
where defendant had moved. In the top drawer of a nightstand next to the bed in the
bedroom, agents found a piece of plastic with an off-white crystalline substance. An
analysis indicated the substance was 6.2524 grams of methamphetamine.

                                             3.
contents of the video. The prosecutor indicated she needed some time to ensure she was
comfortable with the stipulation.
       Eventually the parties entered into a stipulation in front of the jury. The
stipulation provided that Daigle’s descriptions listed in exhibit 9 “are each an accurate
and truthful synopsis of the sexual conduct contained within each individual video file or
picture file, and these relate specifically to the files in People’s [e]xhibit 1.” No further
videos were shown to the jury; however, they were available to the jury for viewing since
exhibit 1 had been admitted into evidence.4
       The remaining videos on exhibit 15 that were not played for the jury in open court
depicted extensive sexual activity between defendant and Jane Doe, including oral
copulation of defendant by Jane Doe, oral copulation of Jane Doe by defendant, digital
intercourse, vaginal intercourse, masturbation, and Jane Doe stroking defendant’s erect
penis with her hands. Some videos may have shown defendant engaged in anal
intercourse with Jane, but that determination could not be definitively made.
John Doe
       John Doe was born in July 2009. John had been in special education classes since
he started school. John testified he never saw defendant touch Jane’s private part.
       John Doe was asked if he himself touched Jane’s “private part” with his own
“private part.” John Doe testified that he had done so.

       4 Defendant states that only the evidence pertaining to counts 38, 39 and 40 are
pertinent to the evidentiary issues he raises on appeal. We will discuss the evidence
pertaining to those counts in the “Discussion” of this opinion.
       5 Except for video 38 and video 39-40, which are described below in connection
with the appellate contentions to which they pertain.

                                              4.
       John Doe was then asked if he video-recorded it, to which he responded, “I don’t
know.” The next question was, “[W]here did you learn to do that?” to which John
responded, “Nobody.”6
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support Counts 38, 39, 40
       Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support counts 38, 39, and
40.
       A.     Legal Considerations
       In counts 38 and 39, defendant was convicted of committing lewd acts upon his
son, John Doe, a child under the age of 14. (§ 288, subd. (a).) In count 40, defendant
was convicted of committing lewd acts upon his daughter, Jane Doe, a child under the
age of 14. (§ 288, subd. (a).)

              1.     Crime of Lewd and Lascivious Acts Upon a Child Under the Age
                     of 14
       Section 288, subdivision (a) applies to a person who “willfully and lewdly
commits any lewd or lascivious act … upon or with the body, or any part or member
thereof, a child who is under the age of 14, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child.” (§ 288,
subd. (a).)
       The concept of a “constructive” touching “permits conviction under section 288
where, at the defendant’s direction and for a lewd purpose, a young child touched himself

       6 Defendant describes this testimony as John saying he did not learn to touch
private parts from anyone. However, the question was actually a follow up to whether
John Doe was the one who video-recorded the incident. Evaluating this testimony in the
light most favorable to the judgment, we infer John Doe was saying he did not learn how
to record video from anyone, not that he did not learn how to make sexual contact with
another person from anyone.

                                              5.
or touched a third person.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 343; see also People v.
Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 176.)
              2.     Substantial Evidence Review
       “ ‘ “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we ‘examine the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence –
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value – such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] We
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases
in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special
circumstance allegations. [Citation.] ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s
findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ [Citation.] We do not reweigh
evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th
997, 1117–1118.)
       B.     Background Facts
              1.     Video 38
       Exhibit 9 describes video 38 as follows:

              “The video appears to be of [John Doe] masturbating. The male
       juvenile is standing on a textured tile floor and can only be seen from the
       upper waist down.”
       The video was 12 seconds long and appeared to have been created November 10,
2020, at 4:00 p.m. It had an abnormal file path, which Daigle believed was a result of
using the Hide it Pro application.

                                             6.
              2.     Video 39-40
       Exhibit 9 describes video 39-40 as follows:

              “The video begins with [Jane Doe] lying down on a bed wearing
       only a sweatshirt and underwear. At approximately 2 seconds into the
       video, a male juvenile (likely [John Doe]) can be seen sliding [Jane Doe’s]
       underwear to the side exposing her vagina. At approximately 25 seconds
       into the video, [John Doe] can be seen with his sweatpants pulled down and
       his erect penis exposed. [Jane Doe] can be heard saying, ‘[F**]k me baby,
       f[**]k me … f[**]k me hard’ during the video. [John Doe] appears to be
       positioning himself to engage in vaginal intercourse with [Jane Doe].”
       The video was 56 seconds long and appeared to have been produced on
November 11, 2020, at 10:43 a.m. The video had an abnormal file path, which indicated
to Daigle that the Hide it Pro application had been used.
       The parties agree John Doe recorded these videos.
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant contends the videos were insufficient to support convictions for lewd
and lascivious acts. He posits that there was no evidence he instructed or instigated John
Doe to masturbate or molest Jane on video. To the contrary, we conclude there was
evidence that raised an inference defendant was involved.
       First, the videos were on defendant’s phone.
       Second, most 11-year-old children do not record themselves masturbating and
molesting their sister. This raises an inference that he performed these acts on camera at
the behest of another. Furthermore, there was evidence raising a strong inference that
person would have been defendant. Other videos showed defendant had previously
recorded himself masturbating and molesting the same victim, Jane Doe. Moreover,
those videos were hidden with the Hide it Pro application – the same application used for
videos 38 and 39-40. Taken together, these facts raise convincing inferences that John
Doe committed these acts on camera at the behest of another person, and that the person
was defendant.

                                            7.
       Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction under
section 288 pursuant to a “ ‘constructive’ touching” theory. (See People v. Scott, supra,
9 Cal.4th at p. 343; see also People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 176.)

II.    The Pleading Gave Sufficient Notice of a Potential Sentencing Under One
       Strike Law
       Defendant next contends that his 25 years to life terms on counts 2, 3, 4, 15, 23,
24, 28, 31, 37, 38, 39, and 40 must be reduced to 15 years to life terms. He argues that
the information’s citations to subdivisions (c) and (e)(4) of section 667.61 were
insufficient to put him on notice that he could be sentenced under subdivision (j)(2) of
that section.
       A.       Law
                One Strike Law
       Section 667.61, often referred to as the “One Strike” law, provides for mandatory
prison sentences of 15 or 25 years to life for certain sex offenses committed under certain
circumstances. (§ 667.61.)
       Section 667.61, subdivision (c), lists the sex crimes to which the statute applies –
i.e., multiple types of rape, multiple types of lewd or lascivious acts, sexual penetration,
sodomy, oral copulation, and continuous sexual abuse of a child.
       Section 667.61, subdivisions (d) and (e), set forth two categories of
“circumstances” under which these crimes could be committed. For example, the
circumstance of defendant inflicting great bodily injury during the offense or committing
the offense against multiple victims.
       The One Strike Law provides the defendant “shall” receive a sentence of 25 years
to life in any of the following situations: (1) one or more of the circumstances under
section 667.61, subdivision (d) applies (§ 667.61, subd. (a)); (2) two or more of the
circumstances listed in subdivision (e) apply (§ 667.61, subd. (a)); or (3) one of the

                                              8.
circumstances listed in subdivision (e) applies and the offense was committed upon a
child under 14 years of age (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).)
          The defendant “shall” receive a sentence of 15 years to life if only one
circumstance in subdivision (e) applies (§ 667.61, subd. (b)), and the offense was not
committed against a child under the age of 14 (see § 667.61, subd.(j)(2).)7
                 Pleading
          “It is a fundamental rule of due process that a defendant must be given fair notice
of any alleged crimes in order to mount a possible defense. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.
[‘the accused shall enjoy the right … to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation’]; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) A defendant’s right to
fair notice applies equally to ‘allegations that will be invoked to increase the punishment
for his or her crimes.’ ” (In re Vaquera (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 233, 238–239, review
granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258376.)
          In California, an “accusatory pleading does not have to state the number of the
statute, it may be ‘in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of
which he is accused.’ (§ 952; [citation].)” (In re Vaquera, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at
p. 239.) “Similarly, the number of an enhancement statute does not have to be alleged, so
long as the accusatory pleading apprises the defendant of the potential for the enhanced
penalty and alleges every fact and circumstance necessary to establish its applicability.”
(Ibid.)
          The One Strike law has a specific provision concerning pleading. Its
subdivision (o) provides: “The penalties provided in this section shall apply only if the
existence of any circumstance specified in subdivision (d) or (e) is alleged in the
accusatory pleading pursuant to this section ….” (§ 667.61, subd. (o).)

          7 The One Strike law also provides for a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole in certain situations not present here. (See § 667.61, subds. (j)(1) & (l).)

                                                9.
              Additional Facts
       In the present case, defendant was charged with 12 counts of lewd and lascivious
act upon a child under the age of 14 years (counts 2–4, 15, 23–24, 28, 31, 37–40), which
is a qualifying crime under section 667.61, subdivision (c). In those counts, the
information alleged the victims were each a child under the age of 14 years.
       As to the One Strike enhancements, the information alleged:

              “It is further alleged that in the commission of the crime … the
       defendant has been convicted in the present case or cases of committing an
       offense specified in section 667.61(c) of the Penal Code against more than
       one victim, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61(e)(4).”
       The jury convicted defendant on the 12 counts of lewd and lascivious acts.
       The jury also found true the multiple victim enhancements to those counts. Those
findings were worded as follows:

               “We, the Jury, empaneled to try the above entitled case, find it to be
       true as to [defendant], that the defendant has been convicted in the present
       case or case [sic] of committing an offense specified in section 667.61(c) of
       the Penal Code against more than one victim, within the meaning of Penal
       Code section 667.61(e)(4), as alleged in the Information.”
              Analysis
       Defendant contends the information failed to sufficiently apprise him of the
potential for being sentenced under subdivision (j)(2) of section 667.61.
       We begin by observing the information alleged every factual predicate needed for
a 25-year-to-life sentence under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) of the One Strike law,
even though it did not cite subdivision (j)(2) directly.
       First, it alleged that defendant committed 12 counts of lewd and lascivious
conduct. This crime is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c) of the One Strike law as a
qualifying sex offense. And the information expressly cited subdivision (c) to this effect.
       Second, the information alleged that defendant committed a qualifying offense
against more than one victim. This is one of the circumstances listed in section 667.61,

                                             10.
subdivision (e). (See § 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) The information expressly cited to
subdivision (e)(4) of the One Strike law.
         Finally, the information alleged that the lewd and lascivious conduct crimes were
committed against a child under the age of 14 years.
         Given these three facts, the One Strike law provides that defendant “shall” be
sentenced to 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).)8
         As defendant emphasizes, the information did not expressly cite to section 667.61,
subdivision (j)(2) or subdivision (b). However, it was not required to, as explained
below.
         Identifying a specific subdivision of section 667.61 can be sufficient to provide
adequate notice, but it is not required. (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 754.)
Adequate notice can also be conveyed by a factual description of the qualifying statutory
circumstances and a general reference to section 667.61 without any subdivision
citations. (Ibid.) The important factor here is that the information contained all of the
factual allegations needed to impose sentence under subdivision (j)(2), and the
enhancement contained several other citations to the One Strike law.
         In sum, we find the combined effect of two factors to be dispositive: (1) the
information made amply clear that the prosecution intended to have the One Strike law
applied to defendant’s case, and (2) all of the facts ultimately used to select which One
Strike law sentence would be imposed were alleged in the information. In light of these

         8 Moreover, each of these three facts were ultimately found true by the jury. The
fact that defendant committed the underlying offenses and that those offenses were
committed against children under the age of 14 years is reflected in the jury’s guilty
verdicts on those counts. (These verdicts necessarily reflect a finding as to the children
being under 14 years because that was an element of each of these offenses.) And the
fact that defendant committed qualifying offenses against more than one victim is
reflected in the jury’s true finding on the enhancement.

                                              11.
two factors, the absence of a direct statutory citation to section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2)
does not warrant reversal.
              Section 667.61, Subdivision (o)
       Section 667.61, subdivision (o)’s requirement that the information alleged the
“circumstance specified in subdivision (d) or (e)” does not alter this conclusion. The
exceedingly plain language of that provision requires only one thing: that the information
allege one or more circumstances under subdivision (d) or (e). The information here
satisfied that requirement in alleging the multiple victim circumstance under
subdivision (e).
       Section 667.61, subdivision (o) does not speak to pleading the legal effect of the
circumstance(s) present from subdivision (d) or (e). The legal effect of one or more
factual circumstances in subdivision (d) or (e) is governed by other provisions, such as
subdivisions (a), (b) and (j). Subdivision (o) quite reasonably concerns itself with a
singular factual allegation that must be present in the charging document: the
circumstance(s) present from subdivision (d) or (e). The Legislature’s choice not to
require allegations concerning other aspects of the One Strike law is not one for us to
disturb. By declining to require anything more, the Legislature left in effect the standard
pleading rules as to all other aspects of the One Strike law, including the principle that
specific statutory citations are not necessarily required.
       Defendant relies on People v. Jimenez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 373, where the
Court of Appeal ruled differently under similar circumstances. Jimenez concluded that
because the information cited section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e),9 but not (j), it
“only informed [the defendant] he could be sentenced to terms of 15 years to life under
… section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e) for committing the alleged offenses against
multiple victims.” (Jimenez, at p. 397.) The unstated premise behind this conclusion is

       9 The information here cited to subdivisions (c) and (e) but not (b).

                                             12.
that a charging document can only “inform” a defendant of a possible sentence by citing
to the specific subdivision under which sentence would be imposed. We disagree with
that premise. As noted above, identifying a specific subdivision of section 667.61 is one
of several ways to provide notice to a defendant. (People v. Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th
at p. 754.) Alternatively, adequate notice can also be conveyed by a factual description
of the qualifying statutory circumstances and a general reference to section 667.61
without any subdivision citations. (Ibid.)
       Here, by citing to the One Strike law and alleging the factual predicates needed to
impose sentence under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2), the information provided
sufficient notice to defendant.

III.   We Accept the Attorney General’s Concession the Matter Must be Remanded
       for the Trial Court to Recite Fines and Fees and Create an Amended
       Abstract of Judgment
       Defendant contends the matter must be remanded for the court to recite fines and
fees on the record. The Attorney General concedes the matter must be remanded.
       A.     Additional Facts
       At sentencing, the court stated:

       “[Defense counsel], as to the fines and fees listed in the probation officer’s
       report, do you stipulate to each of those without them being read into the
       record?”
       Counsel agreed to stipulate, after which the court said, “I’ll order each of the fines
and fees that are listed on each count in the probation officer’s report.” Moreover, not all
the fines and fees listed in the probation report are included on the abstract of judgment.
       B.     Concession
       In appellate briefing, the Attorney General disclaims any objection to remand for
an oral recitation of fines and fees in the probation report “and/or” amending the abstract
of judgment accordingly. We accept the concession.

                                             13.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The matter is remanded for the trial court to pronounce judgment as to the
individual fines and fees listed in the probation report and imposed on defendant. The
trial court shall prepare and forward to all appropriate parties a certified copy of an
amended abstract of judgment referencing said fines and fees. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.

                                                                POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

                                             14.