Court Opinion

ID: 9894195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 20:04:03.516328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:08.267708
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 P. v. Hatter CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B322177

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. BA240172-03)
           v.

  CLAUDELL HATTER,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed with direction.
      Law Office of Marc Eric Norton and Marc Eric Norton for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
      Claudell Hatter participated in an armed robbery during
which his accomplice shot and killed a security guard. A jury
convicted Hatter of felony murder. Thereafter, he petitioned for
resentencing under then recently enacted Penal Code1 section
1172.6,2 which limited accomplice liability for murder. After an
evidentiary hearing under that section, the trial court denied
Hatter’s petition, finding that he was a major participant in the
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, and
alternatively, that he committed implied malice murder. Hatter
now appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition. Because
we find that there was insufficient evidence to support the
finding that Hatter acted with reckless indifference to human life
or committed an implied malice murder, we reverse the order and
remand for further proceedings.
                        BACKGROUND
I.    The robbery and murder3
      Hatter was jointly tried with Rollin Denem, Thomas
Bridges, and Wardell Joe.
      “The evidence at their trial showed that in 1998, the men,
assisted by Reginald Howard, Jesse Singleton, Amar Mobley, and

1
       All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
       Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.)
3
       The background is from People v. Denem (Feb. 21, 2023,
B318106) [nonpub. opn.]. On our own motion, we take judicial
notice of that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) We have
also taken judicial notice of the record in People v. Bridges (Jan.
30, 2006, B176263) [nonpub. opn.]. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

                                 2
Tiasha Croslin, committed an armed robbery at a market during
store hours, when employees and customers were present. The
robbers were all members of 69 East Coast Crips, except Bridges,
who was a member of a related gang, and Croslin, Bridges’s
girlfriend, who had been a member of a San Diego gang. In the
course of the robbery, Howard shot and killed the security guard,
Juan Hernandez. The robbers also took Hernandez’s gun.
Bridges robbed a cashier at gunpoint, obtaining money and food
stamps. Leonard Jackson, a gang associate of the robbers,
arrived at Hatter’s home just as the robbers returned from the
crime scene.
       “Eyewitness Gilbert Davis lived down the street from the
market. He became suspicious when he saw a Buick Regal, an
Oldsmobile Cutlass, and a Pontiac Trans Am in front of his home.
Davis saw four men enter the market. Davis and his friends
walked toward the market. The Cutlass’s driver, who was alone
in the car, looked straight ahead. Someone then got into the
Cutlass, and they took off.
       “A market employee saw three men looking around the
store. One man, identified as Denem, wore a hat and had long
curly hair.4 Denem ordered everyone to get down, pointed a gun
at the ceiling, and fired one shot. Thirty seconds later, the
employee heard another shot.
       “The market’s cashier saw the security guard struggling
with two men. The cashier heard a gunshot and saw one of the
men run from the market. The cashier ran to the manager’s
office, but the manager locked the door before she could enter.

4
      There is no dispute that Denem had disguised himself with
a hat and wig.

                               3
An armed man took her at gunpoint to the cash registers and
forced her to empty their contents into a bag.
      “The crime went unsolved for two years until Jackson
offered to assist law enforcement in the hope of obtaining a
reduction of a prison term he was serving. In 2001, Jackson
identified six of the robbers and offered the name of the seventh,
Denem. The detective then showed photographic lineups to the
market employees. One identified Singleton and Bridges; a
second identified Howard; and two others identified Singleton.
The cashier could not identify anyone, although, at trial she
thought that Bridges looked similar to the man who forced her at
gunpoint to empty the cash registers.
      “The neighbor who lived down the street, Davis, identified
Hatter and Croslin as the individuals he had seen in the Regal
outside the market and identified Joe as the driver of the
Cutlass.
      “Croslin, who was now incarcerated in connection with an
unrelated bank robbery, admitted her role in the robbery and
identified the participants.5 She and Jackson testified against
Denem and his codefendants. At trial, Croslin testified that at
the time of the crimes she lived with Bridges, and Jackson lived
in the house in front of them. Through Bridges, Croslin met
Hatter and Denem, both of whom were members of the 69th
Street Crips. Hatter’s nickname was Doughboy and Denem’s

5
      Croslin initially faced a term of life without the possibility
of parole for her involvement in the robbery. However, Croslin
pleaded no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter and
two counts of robbery in exchange for a prison term of 12 years
and her truthful testimony in this case.

                                  4
nickname was Baby Doughboy, indicating the two had a close
relationship.
       “On the morning of the robbery, Bridges and Croslin went
to Hatter’s home where Denem, Hatter, Joe, Bridges, Singleton,
Howard, and Mobley discussed a robbery. Hatter said he needed
money to get a car out of impound. When the conversation
ended, Bridges told Croslin to get into a Regal with Hatter, who
then drove them to the market. After Hatter and Croslin entered
the market, Hatter said, ‘This is where we’re going to hit.’ Hatter
and Croslin made a purchase, then left the store. They drove
past a Cutlass driven by Joe and a parked Trans Am driven by
Mobley. Shortly thereafter, Hatter and Croslin drove past the
market and saw individuals running from it.
       “After the robbery, the entire crime team returned to
Hatter’s home. Howard was pacing and repeatedly said, in a
scared manner, ‘I killed him, I killed him.’ They divided the
money and food stamps obtained in the robbery.
       “When Croslin later learned that the security guard had
been killed, Bridges told her, ‘Howard was tussling with the
security guard and shot him.’ Bridges indicated his role was to
get the money from the safe in the office with Denem or
Singleton, and Howard was supposed to distract the security
guard. Bridges said Denem wore a disguise of a hat and a curly
wig.
       “Jackson testified that he was at Hatter’s home when the
robbers returned from robbing the market. Denem had a hat and
a wig. Once inside, they argued. Hatter asked where the money
was, and Bridges said they only got food stamps and complained
that they would have gotten more if Howard had not been ‘so
trigger happy.’ They divided the food stamps among themselves

                                 5
and gave Jackson some. When they saw a news report[ ] of the
robbery, Bridges and Denem said police sketches of the suspects
did not look like them, and Denem laughed because the sketches
depicted him as having long hair.
       “Two days after the robbery, Jackson was arrested for
violating parole. Approximately five months after telling a
detective what he knew about the robbery, Bridges and Jackson
were incarcerated together. Bridges related details of the crime
to Jackson, saying that Hatter and Croslin entered the store first
to ‘check the move out[.]’ Bridges said he and Denem intended to
force the manager to open the safe at the back of the store, but
the manager locked himself in a room. When Bridges heard a
shot, he ran with Denem to the front of the market and saw that
Howard and Singleton already had fled. Bridges then took food
stamps from the cash register. Bridges said Howard had a .45
caliber handgun.” (People v. Denem, supra, B318106.)
II.   Verdict and sentence
       In 2004, a jury convicted Hatter of special circumstance
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17); count 1) and of
robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 3) with true findings on principal gun
use (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d) & (e)(1)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)) allegations.6 That same year, the trial court sentenced
Hatter on count 1 to life without the possibility of parole plus 25
years to life for the gun enhancement. The trial court imposed
concurrent sentences on counts 2 and 3.
       This Division affirmed Hatter’s judgment of conviction on
direct appeal. (People v. Bridges, supra, B176263.)

6
      The jury found the gang allegations true as to counts 1 and
3 only.

                                 6
III.   Postconviction petition for resentencing
       Thereafter, our legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which limited
accomplice liability for murder and allowed eligible defendants
convicted of murder to petition for resentencing. In 2021, Hatter
petitioned for vacation of his murder conviction and resentencing
under that new law. The trial court issued an order to show
cause and held an evidentiary hearing.
       At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
stated it had read the case file, including minute orders and trial
transcripts, and had considered People v. Bridges, supra,
B176263 for its procedural history only. The People did not
introduce any new or additional evidence. However, Croslin and
Hatter testified for petitioner at the hearing.
       Croslin testified that on the day of the robbery, all
participants met beforehand at Hatter’s aunt’s house, where they
discussed the plan, but Croslin did not know until after the
robbery that the plan included holding a security guard at
gunpoint. Hatter was the oldest of the participants. Croslin and
Hatter then drove to the market and walked through it, and
Hatter told her they were going to rob the market. Patrons and a
security guard were in the store, but Croslin denied seeing the
guard. Croslin and Hatter left the market and drove past the
other participants, who were waiting in their cars. Croslin and
Hatter then parked, and she saw individuals running out of the
market with their faces covered. The robbers all returned to the
house, where one of the men said he thought he had killed the
security guard. Hatter told him to calm down, and not to worry,
“ ‘They don’t have anything on you.’ ” The men split the money.
At no time while Croslin was with Hatter did they discuss

                                 7
firearms. She did not learn that the security guard had been
fatally shot until after the robbery.
       Hatter testified that while planning the robbery they did
not discuss using firearms, and Hatter was not personally armed
with a gun. He first learned that firearms were used after the
robbery, at the house.
       In ruling, the trial court said it was discounting much of
Croslin’s testimony because it was “plainly unbelievable.” The
trial court also did not believe Hatter’s testimony. It then found
that Hatter was “the planner,” had motive to commit the crime
(to get his car out of impound), and directed the plan by checking
out the location. The trial court accordingly found that Hatter
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Further, the trial court found that Hatter was guilty
as a direct aider and abettor who acted with implied malice.
Because Hatter was guilty of murder under current law, he was
not entitled to resentencing.
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Senate Bill 1437 and standard of review
      Senate Bill 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019,
limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder, to the end of ensuring that a person’s sentence
is commensurate with the person’s individual criminal
culpability. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes);
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) As
relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule
by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for

                                 8
felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was
not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct
aider and abettor; or (3) the person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision
(d). (Gentile, at p. 842.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6, which created a
procedure whereby persons convicted of murder under a now-
invalid theory of murder may petition for vacation of their
convictions and resentencing. A defendant is eligible for relief
under section 1172.6 if the defendant meets three conditions: the
defendant (1) must have been charged with murder under a
theory of felony murder, (2) must have been convicted of first or
second degree murder, and (3) could no longer be convicted of first
or second degree murder due to changes to section 189
effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a
petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief,
the trial court shall issue an order to show cause (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the
prosecution bears the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder” under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3)). The parties may offer new or additional evidence at
the evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) The trial court sits as an
independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory of
murder. (People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
       On appeal, we review the trial court’s findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298; accord, People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575,

                                 9
591.) Under that standard of review we “ ‘ “examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a
rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Clements, at p. 298.) We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact that can be
reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Owens (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.)
       As an initial matter, we reject Hatter’s “object[ion] to the
superior court denial on the grounds the court never found the
People proved their case” beyond a reasonable doubt. The only
basis Hatter asserts for this objection is the speed with which the
trial court issued its decision. On appeal, however, we presume a
trial court was aware of and followed applicable law in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. (People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398.) Although the trial court
here did not expressly refer to the burden of proof, nothing in the
record shows that the trial court misunderstood its role as an
independent factfinder who had to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hatter had the requisite mental state for murder.
II.   Sufficiency of the evidence Hatter was a major participant
      in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
      life
      Hatter contends that the trial court erred by denying his
section 1172.6 petition because there was insufficient evidence to
support its conclusion that he was a major participant in the
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. As we
now explain, we agree that there is insufficient evidence Hatter
acted with reckless indifference to human life.

                                10
      A. What it means to be a major participant who acts with
         reckless indifference to human life
       This area of law regarding what it means to be a major
participant in a crime who acts with reckless indifference to
human life has its genesis in two United States Supreme Court
cases: Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137. Enmund held that the death
penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed
robbery getaway driver who was a minor participant in the crime,
was not present when the murder was committed, and had no
intent to kill. (Enmund, at pp. 798, 801.)
       In contrast, Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at page 139,
did not preclude imposing the death penalty for two defendants,
brothers, who had helped their father and his cellmate—both
convicted murderers—escape from prison. The defendants gave
them guns, and the group later kidnapped a family of four. The
defendants then stood by while their father debated whether to
kill the family and proceeded to shoot the family, including a
toddler and a teenager. (Id. at pp. 139–141.) The court held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing the death
penalty on a nonkiller who lacked the intent to kill, but whose
“participation [in the crime] is major and whose mental state is
one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (Id. at
p. 152; see also id. at pp. 157–158.)
       Years later, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our
Supreme Court addressed Enmund and Tison and substantially
clarified the “major participant” and “reckless indifference to
human life” requirements. Banks, at page 794, considered “under
what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill

                               11
may qualify as a major participant.” The court listed various
factors that should be considered in making that determination:
“What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at
the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
       The court then turned its attention to “reckless indifference
to human life” in Clark. Reckless indifference to human life is
“ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616.)
It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”
(Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective and an
objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, the defendant must
consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively,
recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s
conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would
observe.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Clark listed factors to consider when determining whether
reckless indifference existed: “Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons

                                 12
were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at
the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
[summarizing Clark factors].)
       Cognizant that the Banks and Clark factors overlap, we
next focus our analysis on whether Hatter acted with reckless
indifference to human life, without deciding whether he was a
major participant. (See, e.g., Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 614
[declining to decide whether defendant was major participant].)
      B. Reckless indifference to human life
       In reaching its conclusion that Hatter was not entitled to
relief, the trial court relied primarily on evidence Hatter planned
the robbery. To be sure, Hatter was intimately involved in
planning the robbery: planning discussions took place at his
home; Hatter’s motive for the robbery was to get his car out of
impound; Hatter cased the market; Hatter greenlit the robbery
after casing the market; and after the robbery, Hatter told an
accomplice to get rid of a car, apparently because it had been
identified.
       Notwithstanding this evidence of Hatter’s leadership role
in planning the robbery, Hatter is little different than the
defendant in Clark, who was the robbery’s “mastermind,” having
planned and organized the robbery and orchestrated the events
at the scene. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 612.) Even so, the
Clark court found he did not act with reckless indifference to

                                13
human life based on a consideration of other factors, including
that the defendant planned for his accomplice to use an unloaded
gun. (Id. at pp. 618–619.)
       Of course here, Croslin testified that the plan included
pointing a gun at the security guard, and we will assume Hatter
knew the guns were loaded, as there is no evidence to the
contrary and the trial court disbelieved Hatter’s testimony he did
not know guns would be used. While wielding a gun during a
robbery certainly can weigh in favor of a reckless indifference to
human life finding (see, e.g., People v. Bradley (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1033 [personally wielding gun during robbery
reflects reckless indifference to human life]; People v. Bascomb
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 [defendant enabled murder by
using gun to keep victims at bay during bank robbery]), it does
not necessitate such a finding. Instead, Clark supra, 63 Cal.4th
at page 617, instructs that a defendant’s mere knowledge his
accomplices are armed is insufficient by itself to establish
reckless indifference to human life. (Accord, In re Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682 [anyone who plans or participates in
armed robbery anticipates lethal violence might be used, given
that 1 in 200 armed robberies results in death; that alone does
not establish reckless indifference to human life].) Therefore,
Hatter’s knowledge that his accomplices would hold victims at
gunpoint does not establish his reckless indifference to human
life.
       We would find to the contrary if the evidence showed that
the plan included Denem shooting at the ceiling or Howard
shooting the security guard. Instead, the evidence suggests that
use of lethal force was not planned. (Compare People v. Williams
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281–1282 [defendant acted with reckless

                               14
indifference to human life where he instructed fellow gang
members carrying out carjackings to shoot resisting victims].)
When the robbers regrouped at the house after the robbery,
Howard was pacing back and forth, scared, repeating, “ ‘I shot
him.’ ” There was a “lot of arguing,” and people were telling
Howard to calm down and to shut up. Also, Jackson testified
that after the men learned someone had died, they were “just
saying it was messed up.” Bridges was unhappy that Howard
shot Hernandez, because they would have gotten more money
had Howard not been “trigger happy.” Thus, the robbers’
reactions to the murder were ones of surprise, fear, and upset
that it precluded them from getting more money—all of which,
while callous, shows that lethal force was unplanned.
       Next, although Hatter cased the market and approved it as
the robbery’s target, he was not in the market during the robbery
and instead was outside, in a parked car. Hatter was therefore
nowhere near Howard when Howard shot the security guard and
in no position to restrain Howard. (See, e.g., In re Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [quickness of shooting suggested
defendant lacked control over accomplices’ actions]; People v.
Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 989 [defendant lacked
meaningful opportunity to intervene when he and shooter were
on opposite sides of victim’s car, and attempted carjacking was
quickly executed]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 452
[defendant present during robbery but not “ ‘close enough’ ” to
restrain shooter].) Where, as here, there is no evidence lethal
force was part of the agreed-upon plan, absence from the scene
“may significantly diminish culpability for death.” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. 5; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 619 [proximity to murder and events leading to it “may be

                               15
particularly significant where, as in Tison, the murder is a
culmination or a foreseeable result of several intermediate
steps”]; In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1008–1009,
1023–1024 [defendant planned robbery but was not present
during murder, so culpability was based on role as planner and
driver for a robbery rather than on actions on the ground in
events leading to murder].)
      Although Hatter’s absence from the murder scene meant he
had no control over the events once they started, there is
otherwise no evidence Hatter tried to minimize the risk of
violence. Instead, he and Croslin cased the market, which
suggests he would have seen the security guard and noted he was
armed, as Hernandez wore a security belt with a gun holster.7
Yet, Hatter approved the market to rob8 and decided to rob it in
the morning, when employees and customers were present.
(Compare People v. Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024
[bank robbery posed high risk of violence because it occurred
during business hours with 20 people present and robbers were
armed], with Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622 [plan to rob
store after it was closed minimized risk of violence]; In re
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [defendant’s plan to beat
victim and steal his money did not involve use of weapons].) That
the plan included armed men entering a busy market could
heighten the risk of violence, even if the plan did not include

7
      At trial and the evidentiary hearing, Croslin testified that
she could not remember seeing a security guard. The trial court
disbelieved this testimony.
8
      After casing the market, Croslin and Hatter drove down
58th Place, which signaled to the others to proceed with the
robbery.

                                16
what in fact happened: Denem shooting at the ceiling, and
Howard shooting Hernandez.
       The next factor we examine is the crime’s duration because
there is generally a greater opportunity for violence when victims
are held at gunpoint or restrained for prolonged periods. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) It is unclear how long the robbery
lasted. But the plan included forcing the manager to open the
safe at the back of the store. A robbery involving moving victims
and opening a safe could be one of some duration, certainly longer
than a quick grab and go robbery. Still, it is unclear the planned
duration of the robbery here increased the likelihood of violence
beyond that in Clark, where the plan was to handcuff a computer
store’s employees in a bathroom so that the robbers could load
computers into a van. (Id. at pp. 620–621.) Although the Clark
robbery was planned to be of “substantial duration” (id. at
p. 620), the interaction between the robbers and victims was
designed to be limited (id. at p. 621). So even though the robbery
was in a public space and involved the prolonged detention of
employees and risk of interlopers (indeed, the murder victim was
an employee’s mother who had come to pick up her child from
work), the duration of the felony was insufficient to support a
conclusion the defendant acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Ibid.)
       Handcuffing victims and forcing them into a bathroom—
even in the absence of a loaded weapon—creates a volatile
situation. The risk a victim might resist or fight back, prompting
a violent response from the robbers, is just as likely in the Clark
scenario as here, it seems to us. Moreover, because Hatter was
not present during the robbery, this factor is nuanced as to him,
as he had no immediate control over the events once they started

                                17
and could not, for example, call off the robbery once the violence
escalated. Therefore, we cannot find the differences between the
Clark robbery and this one significant enough to dictate a
different finding on the reckless indifference to human life prong.
       As for what Hatter knew about any propensity for violence
his accomplices, and in particular Denem and Howard, might
have had, there is no evidence on this factor, other than that all
participants were gang members. But mere co-membership in a
gang does not by itself establish knowledge of a propensity for
violence. (See, e.g., In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 976
[although defendant and killer belonged to same gang and had
committed follow-home robberies together, no evidence they had
participated in shootings, murder, or attempted murder].)
       Nor does the evidence show that Hatter callously failed to
aid the wounded security guard. (See generally Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 619; In re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 539, 544
[reckless indifference shown by failure to aid or comfort victim];
People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 10 [petitioner
“displayed no interest in moderating violence or in aiding his
bloody and suffering victim,” and instead picked his pocket].)
Hatter saw his accomplices flee the store, but the evidence does
not show he knew that Hernandez had been shot. The evidence
suggests to the contrary, because when the men were back at the
house, Howard informed the others that he had shot the security
guard, while Hatter tried to calm the agitated Howard.
       In evaluating the sufficiency of this evidence to support the
trial court’s finding, we are mindful that no one Clark factor “ ‘is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Rather, we evaluate the factors
under the totality of the circumstances to determine Hatter’s

                                18
place on the culpability spectrum. (In re Scoggins, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 675.) Ultimately, we cannot find that the factors
weighing in favor of a reckless indifference finding—that the
robbery occurred during regular business hours in a busy store
where customers and employees were present and that the plan
involved moving victims at gunpoint—outweigh those factors
showing that Hatter did not knowingly create a grave risk of
death. That is, there is no evidence the plan included lethal
violence or that Hatter knew his accomplices had a propensity for
violence. Hatter was not present when the robbery and murder
took place, and therefore he had no control over events on the
ground and was in no position to restrain his accomplices or to
help Hernandez.
III.   Sufficiency of the evidence of implied malice murder
      The trial court alternatively found that Hatter was guilty of
implied malice murder.9 Based on a similar rationale as
expressed above, we cannot find there was substantial evidence
to support Hatter’s murder conviction under this alternative
theory.
      Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or
implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) The primary difference between the
two is the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not.
(People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) Implied malice murder
requires the killing be proximately caused by an act, “ ‘ “ ‘the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act
was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his

9
      Implied malice murder is murder in the second degree.
(§ 189, subd. (a).)

                                 19
conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 988.) Proximate causation thus requires the act to have been a
substantial factor contributing to the death. (Ibid.)
       The guilt of an aider and abettor to a crime, including
murder, is “based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s
acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.”
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) “A person aids
and abets the commission of a crime when [the person], (i) with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and
with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or
encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
       Accordingly, for aiding and abetting liability on a theory of
implied malice murder to be imposed, a direct aider and abettor
must, by words or conduct, aid the perpetrator’s commission of a
life-endangering act with the “knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life,” and the aider and abettor must act “in conscious
disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689, 713, italics omitted, cited with approval by
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991 [implied malice murder
requires proof of aider and abettor’s “knowledge and intent with
regard to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act”].) In other
words, under current law, “a direct aider and abettor of the
killing who knew that his (or her) conduct endangered the life of
another and acted with conscious disregard for life, may be guilty
of second degree murder.” (People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th

                                20
972, 979.) Implied malice remains a valid theory of second
degree murder liability for an aider and abettor after Senate Bill
1437’s enactment. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850.)
       Here, the trial court never clearly identified what act or
acts Hatter performed or aided and abetted that proximately
caused the security guard’s death, although it appears the trial
court relied on Hatter’s planning activities, i.e., scoping out the
market and giving the greenlight for the robbery to proceed.10
However, an act that merely creates a dangerous situation in
which death is possible, depending on how circumstances
unfolded, standing alone will not satisfy the proximate causation
requirement of implied malice murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 989.) Rather, implied malice murder requires a high
probability death will result; the danger to life cannot be merely
vague or speculative. (Ibid.; People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 513 [probability of death cannot be remote or merely
possible].)
       In Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 985, for example, the
defendant Reyes was at a park with fellow gang members, one of
whom openly displayed a gun. After someone in Reyes’s group
called out to a passing car, the group chased the car, and
someone (not Reyes) shot at the car, killing its driver. (Ibid.)
Our California Supreme Court found that Reyes’s act of traveling
with an armed fellow gang member into rival gang territory could
result in a gang confrontation during which it was possible
someone could get hurt or killed, but the act did not by itself “give

10
      The People also do not identify what act or acts Hatter
engaged in or aided and abetted that proximately caused the
death.

                                 21
rise to a high degree of probability” death would result. (Id. at
p. 989.) Further, there was no evidence Reyes’s “acts precipitated
or provoked the shooting.” (Ibid.) And if the act of shooting was
the dangerous act, there had to be evidence Reyes knew the
shooter intended to shoot, to aid him in shooting, knew shooting
was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard to life.
(Id. at pp. 991–992.)
       Similarly here, Hatter’s act of planning the armed robbery,
including casing the market, certainly created a dangerous
situation in which death was possible, depending on how
circumstances unfolded. But it did not create a high probability
of death, especially given the absence of evidence that the
robbery plan included lethal violence. Indeed, what the Reyes
defendant did could be viewed as just as dangerous as what
Hatter did. The Reyes defendant was with fellow gang members,
one of whom he knew was armed with a gun; they issued what
inferentially was a gang challenge to the passing victim; and they
pursued that victim. Therefore, some type of physical
confrontation was planned or expected, even if there was not a
high probability of death. In contrast, Hatter planned an armed
robbery at which he was not present, and which did not include
planned violence. Further, as in Reyes, even though the evidence
supports a finding that Hatter knew his accomplices were armed,
there is no evidence Hatter knew that either Denem or Howard
intended to shoot. Rather, the evidence is to the contrary, that
they were not supposed to use lethal force.
       Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s order, the record does not contain substantial
evidence that Hatter aided and abetted Hernandez’s murder with
implied malice.

                               22
                         DISPOSITION
      The order denying Claudell Hatter’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is reversed with the direction to the trial court to
vacate his murder conviction and to resentence him in accordance
with section 1172.6.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                        EGERTON, J.

                        ADAMS, J.

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