Court Opinion

ID: 9965124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 18:03:52.44937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.631641
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DIVISION
                           MERCIER, C. J.,
                    MCFADDEN, P. J., and RICKMAN, J.

                   NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                   physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                   days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                              https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                       May 1, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A24A0126. MCCLOUD v. THE STATE.

      MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

      On February 6, 2019, three-week-old A. M. was hospitalized with numerous,

serious acute and healing injuries, including multiple fractures. Medical experts

determined that the infant had sustained non-accidental blunt force trauma over a

period of time, and the state jointly charged his parents, both individually and as

parties to a crime, with several counts of family-violence aggravated battery (OCGA

§ 16-5-24) and cruelty to children in the first degree (OCGA § 16-5-70).

      This appeal concerns the convictions of A. M.’s father, Jarrett McCloud, for

those crimes. McCloud argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

directed verdict, because the evidence of his guilt was circumstantial and did not
exclude the reasonable hypothesis that another person, such as A. M.’s mother,

injured the infant. We hold, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support

McCloud’s convictions.

      McCloud also argues that the trial court erred in permitting evidence of his

marijuana use on the day A. M. was taken to the hospital, but we hold that the

evidence was admissible as intrinsic to the charged offenses. He argues that the trial

court erred in failing to grant him a mistrial sua sponte in response to purported

misconduct by the jurors and the bailiff, but we hold that he has not preserved those

claims of error for appellate review. Finally, he argues that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to request a mistrial both in response

to the juror and bailiff issues and in response to the state’s allegedly improper closing

argument, but we hold that he has not met his burden of showing both deficient

performance and prejudice.

      So we affirm.

      1. Directed verdict

      We review the trial court’s denial of McCloud’s motion for a directed verdict

under the same standard as that used “for determining the sufficiency of the evidence

                                           2
to support a conviction. Under that standard, the relevant question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Shelton v. State, 313 Ga. 161, 168 (2) (869 SE2d 377) (2022) (citations and

punctuation omitted). (Some of the evidence discussed below is the trial testimony of

A. M.’s mother, Megan Richmond, who was indicted with McCloud. Whether she

was McCloud’s accomplice, such that her testimony would require corroboration to

establish a fact in this case, was a question for the jury, which was instructed on that

issue. See Caldwell v. State, 313 Ga. 640, 643 (1) (872 SE2d 712) (2022).)

       So viewed, the evidence showed that A. M. was born on January 14, 2019, and

was discharged from the hospital two days later. At that time, he had no physical

injuries.

       From January 16 to January 25, A. M. and his mother, Richmond, stayed with

McCloud in a room within a small mobile home that McCloud shared with other

family members. McCloud was one of the infant’s caregivers and on at least one

occasion during this time period A. M. was in his sole care. A. M. had some visible

scratches and other abrasions on his body during this time period. He also cried a lot

                                           3
and showed signs of discomfort whenever his body was moved or manipulated, such

as when his clothes were being changed. Richmond discussed some of these issues

with A. M.’s pediatrician and on January 21 searched the internet for “why [her]

baby’s eye [was] swollen.” McCloud did not attend any of A. M.’s pediatrician

appointments.

      Between January 25 and January 31, 2019, A. M. and Richmond visited

Richmond’s parents. McCloud did not accompany them and had no contact with A.

M. during those days. A. M. did not display any new injuries during the visit.

      On January 31, 2019, A. M. and Richmond returned to the room in the mobile

home that they shared with McCloud, and McCloud again had access to the infant.

The next day, Richmond noticed bruises on the infant’s face. A. M. also sustained a

cut near his eye while he was in McCloud’s sole care. A photograph of A. M. taken

on February 3 showed the infant with a noticeable cut under his eye and bruises on his

face. McCloud told Richmond that the injuries were normal and that the infant had

inflicted them on himself. Richmond continued to have concerns about A. M.’s

physical condition and sought answers from her parents, from a friend, and through

                                          4
internet searches on issues such as the presence of blood in a baby’s stool and why a

baby’s joints popped.

       On February 5, 2019, McCloud yanked A. M. out of Richmond’s arms during

an argument. Upset, Richmond walked out of the room, leaving the infant in

McCloud’s care for a bit. Later Richmond noticed that one of A. M.’s legs was badly

swollen and larger than his other leg. During the night, she tried to discover the cause

by conducting internet searches such as “why is my baby’s thigh swollen?” and

sending her close friend a picture of A. M.’s leg. Richmond told McCloud that she

thought A. M. needed medical attention, but McCloud disagreed and the two got into

an argument about it. McCloud refused to let Richmond leave the room with A. M.,

stating that the infant had a blood clot that could be addressed by massaging the

swollen leg.

      The next morning, February 6, 2019, another resident of the mobile home

stated that she would call 911 if Richmond did not seek medical care for A. M., and

later that day, Richmond and McCloud’s mother took A. M. to the hospital. McCloud

did not go with them, having stated that “it was a bad idea” and that “DFCS would

get involved and take [A. M.] away.”

                                           5
      When A. M. arrived at the hospital on February 6, 2019, he had significant

injuries. Many of the injuries were immediately visible, including severe bruising,

several scratches, and dried blood on his face; bruising and discoloration on numerous

other parts of his body; his eye injury; and his badly swollen leg. Initial scans revealed

that A. M. also had several fractures, including a broken leg.

      Suspecting child abuse, hospital personnel immediately notified law

enforcement and took custody of A. M. Law enforcement asked McCloud to come to

the hospital, and when he arrived McCloud appeared to be under the influence and

stated that he had been smoking marijuana.

      A. M. was transferred to a specialized children’s hospital, where additional

observation, scans, and other testing revealed that he had numerous serious injuries,

including blunt force trauma to his “diaper area”; trauma to his brain, tissues, and

abdomen; and various fractures. Some of his injuries, including a fracture to his right

clavicle, were in the process of healing, meaning that they had occurred sometime

between his birth and January 28. Other injuries were acute and had not yet begun to

heal, meaning that they had occurred sometime between January 24 and February 6,

when A. M. was hospitalized. Still other injuries could not be dated.

                                            6
      A doctor who examined A. M. at the children’s hospital and who was an expert

in child abuse pediatrics opined that the infant’s injuries were non-accidental trauma,

meaning that they had been intentionally inflicted upon him. Some, such as the leg

injury, were caused by significant force. The doctor testified that A. M.’s right femur

(or upper leg) was “significantly displaced,” meaning “the bone was literally bent,”

and his right tibia and fibula (or lower leg) had a type of fracture caused by “forceful

yanking, twisting, or shearing.” Those fractures would have occurred shortly before

A. M.’s leg started swelling. The doctor testified that the infant could not have

inflicted the injuries on himself, and the injuries would not have occurred in a single

incident.

      McCloud argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict because this evidence

was insufficient to support his convictions. Because the trial court merged several of

the convictions for sentencing, we consider only the convictions for which McCloud

was sentenced. See Rivera v. State, 317 Ga. 398, 405 (1) (893 SE2d 696) (2023);

McIntyre v. State, 312 Ga. 531, 534 (1) n. 5 (863 SE2d 166) (2021). Those convictions

are for family-violence aggravated battery for injuring A. M.’s right clavicle between

January 16 and January 25 (Count 1); first-degree child cruelty for causing fractures

                                           7
to A. M. between January 16 and January 25 (Count 15); and first-degree child cruelty

for causing multiple injuries to A. M., including fractures, bruises, and scratches,

between January 31 and February 6 (Count 17).

      McCloud argues that there was only circumstantial evidence that he was the

person who injured A. M. and that the evidence did not exclude the reasonable

hypothesis that another person, such as Richmond, inflicted the injuries. Although we

agree that there is only circumstantial evidence of McCloud’s guilt, the evidence

nevertheless authorized his convictions.

      As an initial matter, we do not address whether the circumstantial evidence

authorized McCloud’s convictions on a theory that he was a party to the crimes,

because even though the state charged McCloud both individually and as a party to

the crimes, the trial court instructed the jury that “the party-to-a-crime doctrine [did]

not apply to this case.” (We discuss that instruction in more detail below, in

connection with one of McCloud’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.) We

note, however, that our Supreme Court has recently held that where a young child

sustained fatal injuries while in the exclusive care of her mother and her mother’s

boyfriend, and the defendant boyfriend downplayed and failed to account for those

                                           8
injuries, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show either that he personally

injured the child or that he was a party to inflicting those injuries. Payne v. State, 318

Ga. 249, 252-254 (2) (897 SE2d 809) (2024).

      “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not

only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other

reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. But

      not every hypothesis is reasonable, and the evidence does not have to
      exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only
      those that are reasonable. The reasonableness of an alternative
      hypothesis raised by a defendant is a question principally for the jury,
      and when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though
      circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save
      that of the accused’s guilt, [an appellate court] will not disturb that
      finding unless it is unsupportable as a matter of law.

Hamilton v. State, 309 Ga. 1, 6 (2) (843 SE2d 840) (2020) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Accord Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020).

“We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence,

credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences derived from the facts. Likewise,

we allow the jury to decide whether the defense theory was reasonable and not

                                            9
excluded by the other evidence.” Butler v. State, 310 Ga. 892, 895 (1) (855 SE2d 551)

(2021) (citations and punctuation omitted).

      The jury could infer from the circumstantial evidence presented at trial that

between January 16 and January 25, McCloud caused the broken clavicle and other

fractures alleged in Counts 1 and 15, and that between January 31 and February 6,

McCloud caused the fractures, bruises, and scratches alleged in Count 17. That

evidence included: (1) expert opinion testimony that A. M. could have sustained the

injuries during periods in which he was in McCloud’s care; (2) expert opinion

testimony that the injuries “were the result of non-accidental, significant force

generated by multiple blows[,]” Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 207 (2) (897 SE2d 760)

(2024); (3) evidence that A. M.’s serious leg injury became apparent soon after

McCloud yanked him from Richmond’s arms and then spent time alone with him; (4)

evidence that the large scratch under A. M.’s eye occurred while he was in

McCloud’s sole care; (5) evidence that McCloud downplayed or offered unreasonable

explanations for the injuries, such as that A. M. had injured himself; (5) evidence that

McCloud displayed a nonchalant, indifferent attitude about his health, especially when

the infant was in obvious need of immediate medical attention; and (6) evidence that

                                          10
McCloud displayed callousness toward A. M. in other ways, such as referring to the

infant as “it” or as an “obnoxious motherfucker,” cussing at the infant, and telling

the infant to “shut the fuck up.” See Rashad, supra (evidence that the defendant had

physically hurt the child victim on an earlier occasion supported the finding that the

defendant was the person who later murdered the child); Moore v. State, 314 Ga. 351,

354-355 (877 SE2d 174) (2022) (evidence that the defendant downplayed a child’s

injuries and displayed “apparent indifference” to and a nonchalant attitude about the

child’s general health and condition after being injured supported a finding of

sufficient circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s role in the child’s death); Scott

v. State, 307 Ga. 37, 40 (1) (a) (834 SE2d 88) (2019) (finding evidence sufficient to

support defendant’s conviction for felony murder of a child where there was expert

testimony that the injuries sustained by the child while in the care of the defendant

were non-accidental). Cf. Payne, 318 Ga. at 254 (2) (evidence that the defendant

downplayed the injuries of a child in his care and “failed to account for the extensive

damage to [the child’s] body” supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of

crimes related to the child’s death, either by inflicting the injuries himself or as a party

to the crime).

                                             11
      McCloud argues that this evidence did not exclude other reasonable

hypotheses. He asserts that A. M.’s injuries could have occurred during the time

when A. M. and Richmond were staying with Richmond’s parents and McCloud did

not have access to the infant. And he asserts that no matter when the injuries

occurred, Richmond or someone else could have been responsible.

      But the evidence authorized the jury to reject these hypotheses. For example,

there was evidence that while A. M. was staying with Richmond and her parents he

did not sustain any additional injuries, but once he returned to McCloud’s residence

he incurred new and significant injuries, such as facial bruises, the cut to his eye, and

the damage to his leg. And there was evidence that Richmond, unlike McCloud, was

puzzled and concerned by the injuries; she researched potential causes, asked others

for advice, pushed for A. M. to get medical care, and sought updates from hospital

personnel.

      “Accordingly, the jury was not required to conclude that the hypothes[es]

proposed by [McCloud were] reasonable.” Hamilton, 309 Ga. at 6 (2) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Instead, to the extent there was evidence questioning the timing

or cause of A. M.’s injuries, “the jury was entitled to discredit [that evidence] and

                                           12
find that [McCloud] inflicted the . . . injur[ies alleged in Counts 1, 15, and 17] during

the window[s] of time in which the medical experts estimated the blunt-force trauma

occurred.” Moore, 314 Ga. at 354-355.

      2. Evidence of marijuana use

      McCloud argues that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of

evidence of his marijuana use. In a ruling on a motion in limine, the trial court

permitted such evidence but limited it to evidence about McCloud’s appearance and

statements at the hospital. The state introduced1 the evidence through a hospital

security officer, who testified that when McCloud arrived at the hospital he appeared

to be under the influence of marijuana and that he admitted having smoked marijuana

because “he was nervous. . . . Just what all was going on with [A. M.] He was nervous

about everything.”

      McCloud contends that this was improper character evidence that should have

been excluded under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). But the trial court held that it was

      1
         Under questioning from McCloud’s counsel, a friend of McCloud also
testified that McCloud sometimes used marijuana. To the extent McCloud also
complains that the jury heard his friend’s testimony, that claim has no merit because
the testimony was elicited by his counsel. See Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153, 154-157 (2)
(800 SE2d 341) (2017).
                                           13
admissible as intrinsic evidence, which our Supreme Court has held is “outside the

reach of Rule 404 (b)” even if it incidentally puts the defendant’s character at issue.

Smith v. State, 307 Ga. 263, 272 (2) (c) (834 SE2d 1) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted). We review this ruling for abuse of discretion, see Abbott v. State, 311 Ga.

478, 482 (2) (858 SE2d 696) (2021), and find no error.

      “‘Intrinsic evidence’ is defined as evidence that (1) pertains to an uncharged

offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged

offense; (2) is necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) is inextricably

intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” Abbott, 311 Ga. at 482

(2). “In assessing whether evidence is necessary in this context, [our Supreme Court

has] noted that ‘necessary’ is not used in a strictly literal sense, but rather, refers to

what evidence is reasonably necessary for the [s]tate to complete the story of the

crime.” Jennings v. State, __ Ga. __ (1) (__ SE2d __) (Case No. S24A0095, decided

Mar. 5, 2024) (citation and punctuation omitted). Evidence that advances the state’s

theory of the case can be “necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.

. . .” Harris v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 379 (2) (b) (850 SE2d 77) (2020) (citation and

punctuation omitted). If it is relevant to the defendant’s guilt on the charged crimes,

                                           14
it is intrinsic. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a) n. 4 (883 SE2d 802) (2023);

see also Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 236 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 501) (2022) (citing United

States v. Battle, 774 F3d 504, 511 (II) (8th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that “[w]hen

evidence of other crimes tends logically to prove any element of the crime charged,

it is admissible as an integral part of the immediate context of the crime charged and

is not extrinsic”) (citation and punctuation omitted). This is so even if the evidence

concerns the defendant’s use of illicit drugs. See Smith v. State, 302 Ga. 717, 725-726

(4) (808 SE2d 661) (2017).

      The state’s case against McCloud rested in part on the theory that McCloud

had a nonchalant attitude about A. M.’s well-being and medical care. As discussed

above, McCloud’s attitude towards the infant was relevant to the question of whether

McCloud was the person who injured him. See Moore, 314 Ga. at 355. His attitude also

was relevant to one of the child-cruelty charges, which alleged his failure to seek

timely medical care for the infant. (That charge merged with another child-cruelty

count for sentencing.)

      McCloud’s decision to smoke marijuana instead of accompanying his badly

injured infant to the hospital was part of a larger body of evidence that addressed this

                                            15
theory of the case. The state presented evidence that McCloud did not attend A. M.’s

pediatrician appointments and that he attempted to convince Richmond not to seek

medical care for the infant’s obvious leg injury. The state presented opinion testimony

from A. M.’s examining physician, who was also an expert in child abuse pediatrics,

that McCloud’s appearance at the hospital under the influence of marijuana after

earlier choosing not to go to the hospital with the infant was “significant” in assessing

the risk of child abuse. The state elicited similar testimony from a licensed clinical

social worker, who stated that in assessing the risk of child abuse, it was “clinically

concerning” for McCloud to choose to smoke marijuana rather than to accompany A.

M. to the hospital.

      Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in

determining that the evidence of McCloud’s marijuana use — which, as noted above,

the trial court limited to McCloud’s appearance and statements at the hospital — was

intrinsic to the charges against him. See Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 491-492 (4)

(863 SE2d 137) (2021) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s involvement in

uncharged shootings was intrinsic to the charged crime of criminal gang activity

because the evidence was probative of the state’s theory that the defendant was

                                           16
involved in other shootings as part of his gang “work”, and so it was reasonably

necessary to complete the story of the charged crime); Smith, 307 Ga. at 271-272 (2)

(c) (holding that evidence that the defendant and another person had been seen using

and possibly selling drugs on the street corner where a shooting occurred was intrinsic

to the charged crimes connected with that shooting because the evidence advanced

the state’s theory that the shooting was the culmination of a series of drug-related

robberies). See also Roberts, 315 Ga. at 236-237 (2) (b) (limited evidence of an

uncharged crime may be admissible as intrinsic even if evidence of the crime as a

whole is not intrinsic).

      Cases cited by McCloud that concern evidence of drug use by a victim rather

than a defendant — such as Gill v. State, 296 Ga. 351 (765 SE2d 925) (2014) and

Crowe v. State, 277 Ga. 513 (591 SE2d 829) (2004) — are inapposite, because the

admissibility of evidence implicating a victim’s character is subject to a different

analysis. See White v. State, 307 Ga. 882, 885 (2) (838 SE2d 828) (2020)

(“Admissibility of evidence of a victim’s character is now governed by OCGA §§ 24-

4-404 (a) (2) and 24-4-405 (a), which generally limit evidence of a victim’s character

to reputation or opinion and not specific bad acts.”).)

                                          17
      “Because th[e] evidence was intrinsic to the crimes charged, it was [not] barred

by Rule 404 (b). . . . And although the evidence may have incidentally placed

[McCloud’s] character at issue, its probative value was not substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice under these circumstances.” Williams v. State, 302

Ga. 474, 487 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d 350) (2017). See Johnson, 312 Ga. at 491 (4) (“the

exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that trial

courts should grant only sparingly”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      3. Juror and bailiff issues

      During the state’s case-in-chief the courtroom bailiff informed the trial court

that he had seen notes on the jury room’s chalkboard (also referred to in the record

as a whiteboard). The notes suggested to the bailiff that the jurors were already

discussing the case. The bailiff stated that he told the jurors to erase the notes and

informed them that they could not discuss the case until the trial court instructed

them to do so. The trial court then gave the jurors an instruction, agreed to by the

prosecutor and McCloud’s counsel, that they could not begin deliberating until the

court told them to do so after the close of the evidence, and that until such time they

must keep their notes to themselves and not discuss the case with each other.

                                          18
       In two enumerations of error, McCloud argues that the trial court should have

declared a mistrial sua sponte because the jury had improperly engaged in

deliberations before the close of the evidence and because the bailiff, by telling the jury

to erase their notes, “had caused the destruction of evidence of juror misconduct

without any direction from the court or parties.”

       These claims of error are not subject to our review. McCloud did not preserve

them for ordinary appellate review because he “did not raise any objection below to

the trial court’s handling of [this] issue.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 1, 5 (2) (b) (880 SE2d

201) (2022) (concerning alleged juror misconduct). See also Hill-Blount v. State, 339

Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (793 SE2d 436) (2016) (concerning alleged improper

communication between bailiff and juror). And McCloud is not entitled to plain-error

review, which

       is limited to the sentencing phase of a trial resulting in the death penalty,
       a trial judge’s expression of opinion in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, . .
       . a jury charge affecting substantial rights of the parties as provided under
       OCGA § 17-8-58 (b), and, for cases tried after January 1, 2013, . . .
       rulings on evidence . . . affecting substantial rights [as provided under]
       OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).

                                            19
Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 497 (2) (a) (842 SE2d 22) (2020) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See Clark, supra (declining to apply plain-error review to a

claim “that the trial court should have sua sponte conducted its own investigation into

[a] juror’s alleged [misconduct]” rather than simply reminding the jurors to avoid

contact with persons outside the jury).

      4. Ineffective assistance of counsel

      McCloud argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing

to request a mistrial (1) in response to the juror and bailiff issues discussed above and

(2) when the state made an allegedly improper closing argument. To prevail on this

claim, McCloud

      must prove both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient and
      that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. To prove that the
      performance of his lawyer was deficient, [McCloud] must show that the
      lawyer performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way,
      considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing
      professional norms. And to prove that he was prejudiced by the
      performance of his lawyer, [McCloud] must show a reasonable
      probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
      proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
      probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. This
      burden is a heavy one.

                                             20
Simpson v. State, 298 Ga. 314, 318 (4) (781 SE2d 762) (2016) (citations and

punctuation omitted). As detailed below, McCloud has not met this burden.

       (a) Failure to seek a mistrial in response to the juror and bailiff issues

       McCloud argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to move for

a mistrial when it was discovered that jurors had been improperly deliberating prior

to the close of the state’s evidence and that the bailiff in this case had destroyed

evidence of this deliberation making the ability to ascertain details of this improper

conduct impossible.” Instead, trial counsel expressly waived any objection and agreed

to a curative instruction. McCloud has not shown that his trial counsel performed

deficiently.

       McCloud argues that his trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial because

the chalkboard notes seen by the bailiff indicated improper jury deliberations, the

extent of which could not be determined because the notes had been erased. In his

order on McCloud’s motion for new trial, the trial court appears to have concluded

that the jury did, in fact, engage in premature discussions about the case.

Nevertheless, the trial court found that trial counsel had not performed deficiently in

failing to request a mistrial, citing trial counsel’s testimony at the motion-for-new-trial

                                              21
hearing that he thought the case was going well for McCloud; that, in his experience,

a retrial of a case usually was “worse for the defense the second time”; and that he

believed proceeding with the trial would be in McCloud’s best interest.

      McCloud has not shown that no reasonable lawyer would have made a similar

decision. See McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 614-615 (2) (791 SE2d 69) (2016)

(finding no merit in appellant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to ask for a mistrial after co-defendant’s counsel commented on appellant’s right to

remain silent; trial counsel had testified that he did not want to risk a less effective

second cross-examination of the state’s key witness on retrial, and appellant did not

show that no reasonable counsel would have failed to move for a mistrial under the

circumstances). Although he argues that it was the state’s burden “to disprove the

prejudicial nature of any deliberations or discussion,” he cites no authority for this

proposition in support of his argument that his trial counsel performed deficiently by

not asking for a mistrial. And we are not persuaded that the authorities he cites in

support of his separate claims that the trial court should have declarated a mistrial sua

sponte require a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Those authorities address

presumptions of harm when jurors engage in irregular conduct and bailiffs engage in

                                           22
improper jury communication. See, e. g., Lockridge v. State, 260 Ga. 528, 529-530 (397

SE2d 695) (1990); Battle v. State, 234 Ga. 637, 638 (217 SE2d 255) (1975). They do not

address the reasonableness of an attorney’s decision to not seek a mistrial despite the

possible occurrence of irregular or improper conduct.

       Consequently, McCloud did not show that his trial counsel performed

deficiently for failing to seek a mistrial in response to the juror and bailiff issues.

       (b) Failure to seek a mistrial in response to the state’s closing argument

       During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jurors that the trial court

would “instruct [them] regarding parties to a crime[,]” and then began to explain that

concept, stating: “A person can be committed [sic] for a crime to which they are a

party. A person is a party to a crime even if he does not directly commit the crime. If

he intentionally helps in the commission of a crime, or if he intentionally advises –.”

At that point McCloud’s counsel objected on the ground that the state had not

requested a parties-to-a-crime jury charge, and the trial court then gave the jury the

following curative instruction: “Ladies and gentlemen, just prior to your break,

counsel for the state argued that a person can be held responsible for a crime, even if

they did not commit the crime, if they were a party to it. You are to disregard

                                             23
counsel’s statements because the party-to-a-crime doctrine does not apply to this

case.” McCloud’s trial counsel appears to have drafted that instruction and did not

object to the trial court giving it in response to his objection.

      McCloud argues that this constituted ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

Instead, McCloud asserts, his trial counsel should have requested a mistrial under

OCGA § 17-8-75, which permits a trial court to either give a curative instruction or

grant a mistrial when a prosecuting attorney “make[s] statements of prejudicial

matters which are not in evidence[.]”

      Whether to grant a mistrial, either under OCGA § 17-8-75 or for another

reason, is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Harper v. State, 318 Ga. 185, 194

(2) (897 SE2d 818) (2024); Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 824 (2) (783 SE2d

344) (2016). And McCloud has not shown that the trial court was required to grant a

mistrial in this case. To the contrary, although the state does not argue the point, it is

not apparent to us that OCGA § 17-8-75 applies to an objection about a legal concept

raised in closing argument. See Elliott v. State, 275 Ga. App. 359, 362 (2) (620 SE2d

584) (2005) (OCGA § 17-8-75 “concerns the introduction of facts not in evidence”)

(emphasis supplied).

                                            24
      Nor is it apparent to us that there was anything else objectionable about the

prosecution’s closing argument. As discussed above, the state indicted McCloud both

individually and as a party to a crime. And notwithstanding the trial court’s curative

instruction that the party-to-a-crime doctrine did not apply in this case, the trial court

later charged the jury on aspects of that doctrine. The trial court charged the jury that

“[k]nowledge on the part of the defendant that the crimes of aggravated battery and

cruelty to children in the first degree were being committed and that the defendant

knowingly and intentionally participated or helped in the commission of such crime must

be proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial

court also charged the jury that “should you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

defendant had knowledge that the crime was being committed and that the defendant

knowingly and intentionally participated or helped in the commission of it, then you would

be authorized to convict the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) And the trial court

charged the jury:

      [T]he accused’s presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled
      with knowledge and approval of the act, not amounting to
      encouragement, is not sufficient to show that the accused is a party to the
      crime. In order to find that the accused was a party to the crime, it is

                                           25
      necessary that there be proof that the accused shared a common criminal
      intent to commit the crime with the actual perpetrator.

(Emphasis supplied.) See generally OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) (“[e]very person concerned

in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted

of commission of the crime[,]”); OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3), (4) (“[a] person is

concerned in the commission of a crime[, among other ways,] if he . . . [i]ntentionally

aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or . . . [i]ntentionally advises,

encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime”).

      Trial counsel is “not deficient in failing to pursue a meritless course of action.”

Tyson v. State, 312 Ga. 585, 602 (6) (f) (864 SE2d 44) (2021). Here, McCloud’s trial

counsel was able to obtain a favorable curative instruction in response to an objection

of questionable merit on a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Under such

circumstances, McCloud

      has not carried his burden of showing that his trial counsel performed
      deficiently by failing [instead] to move for a mistrial. . . . Because the trial
      court would have acted within [his] discretion in denying a motion for
      mistrial, the failure of [McCloud’s] trial counsel to make a motion that
      the trial court was authorized to deny does not establish ineffective
      assistance by that counsel.

                                            26
Vallejo v. State, 362 Ga. App. 33, 42 (3) (a) (865 SE2d 640) (2021). See Hill v. State,

310 Ga. 180, 189-190 (6) (850 SE2d 110) (2020) (defendant did not show that trial

counsel was deficient for failing to ask for a mistrial in response to the presentation of

bad character evidence, where the trial court would have been authorized to deny such

a motion and the trial court had, on the defendant’s objection, given a curative

instruction).

      Judgment affirmed. Mercier, C. J., and Rickman, J., concur.

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