Court Opinion

ID: 9398039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-29 09:08:48.857701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.244452
License: Public Domain

In the
                    Court of Appeals
            Second Appellate District of Texas
                     at Fort Worth
                ___________________________
                     No. 02-22-00412-CV
                ___________________________

CHRISTOPHER RAMSEY, NATASHA RANDOLPH, KYNDEE VENABLE, AND
                AUBREY VENABLE, Appellants

                               V.

 CRICKETT MILLER, PAT DEEN, GEORGE CONLEY, CRAIG PEACOCK,
         LARRY WALDEN, AND STEVE DUGAN, Appellees

              On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
                     Parker County, Texas
                  Trial Court No. CV22-0923

             Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   I. INTRODUCTION

       In this case, we must decide whether the trial court has subject matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellants’ complaints concerning Parker County’s use of an

electronic voting system.      The trial court granted Parker County’s plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissed Appellants’ lawsuit. Because we agree with the trial court’s

conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction, we will affirm.

                                    II. BACKGROUND

       In August 2022, Appellants Christopher Ramsey, Natasha Randolph, Kyndee

Venable, and Aubrey Venable—all acting pro se—filed suit against Parker County1

claiming that its use of an electronic voting system had violated—and will continue to

violate—certain provisions of the Texas Election Code and certain of Appellants’

federal and state constitutional rights, including their rights to due process and equal

protection. In broad terms, Appellants alleged that electronic voting systems may be

subject to attack by cybercriminals or hostile foreign actors who might wish to

manipulate the outcome of elections and that this vulnerability creates a risk that

Appellants’ votes might not be counted properly.           Based on these allegations,

       Appellants named Parker County Elections Administrator Crickett Miller;
       1

Parker County Judge Pat Deen; and Parker County Commissioners George Conley,
Craig Peacock, Larry Walden, and Steve Dugan as defendants. Because Appellants
sued these individuals in their official capacities, we refer to the defendants (Appellees
here) collectively as Parker County for ease of discussion.

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Appellants sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that Parker County’s

approval of its electronic voting system was unlawful and emergency injunctive relief

prohibiting Parker County from “requiring or permitting voters to have votes cast or

tabulated using any electronic voting systems . . . .”

       Parker County filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss

Appellants’ lawsuit in which it asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because, among other things, Appellants did not have standing and had

failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome Parker County’s governmental immunity.

After a hearing, the trial court signed an order dismissing Appellants’ lawsuit for lack

of jurisdiction. Appellants, again acting pro se, timely filed this appeal.

                                    III. DISCUSSION

A. Pleas to the Jurisdiction Generally: Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).

A jurisdictional plea’s purpose is to defeat a cause of action without regard to the

asserted claims’ merits. Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea

may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo

Heights ISD v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). The plea to the jurisdiction

standard generally mirrors that of a traditional motion for summary judgment under

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,

133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). Under this standard, the governmental unit must

                                             3
meet the summary judgment standard of proof by successfully asserting and

supporting with evidence that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The

burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who—when the facts underlying the merits and

subject matter jurisdiction are intertwined—must show that there is a disputed

material fact regarding the jurisdictional issue. Id. (citing Huckabee v. Time Warner Ent.

Co., 19 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. 2000)).

       Whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question that we

review de novo. Id. at 226. We review a plea to the jurisdiction by considering the

pleadings, the factual assertions, and all relevant evidence in the record. City of Houston

v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 575 (Tex. 2018). When reviewing a

plea to the jurisdiction that incorporates evidence implicating the merits of the case,

we must “take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and “indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Miranda,

133 S.W.3d at 228 (citing Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.

1997)). If the evidence creates a fact question regarding jurisdiction, the trial court

must deny the plea and leave its resolution to the factfinder. Id. at 227–28. But if the

evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the

trial court rules on the plea as a matter of law. Id. at 228.

B. Scope of this Appeal

       While Appellants’ brief addresses the jurisdictional issues raised in Parker

County’s plea to the jurisdiction, it also includes arguments regarding the substantive

                                             4
merits of Appellants’ claims, which are not properly at issue in this appeal. See Kehoe v.

Kendall Cnty., No. 04-19-00825-CV, 2020 WL 4045991, at *2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio July 15, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing MHCB (USA) Leasing & Fin. Corp.

v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. Rev. Bd., 249 S.W.3d 68, 89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)). Because all of Appellants’ enumerated appellate issues

relate to the substantive merits of their claims, we will not address them.2 Rather, we

will limit our inquiry to the sole question decided by the trial court: whether it has

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellants’ claims.3 See MHCB, 249 S.W.3d

at 89. To resolve this question, we must, as a threshold matter, determine whether

Appellants have standing.

      2
       Although we will not address the merits of Appellants’ claims, we may, if
necessary, consider the claims’ viability in determining whether Parker County retains
governmental immunity. See Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. 2022).
      3
        In their brief, Appellants argue that the trial judge was biased because
Appellants’ lawsuit calls into question “the methods and mechanisms through which
[he himself was] granted office.” We construe this as a complaint that the trial judge
should have recused himself due to bias. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(b)(2) (providing that
“[a] judge must recuse in any proceeding in which . . . the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party”). “But a litigant claiming that a
judge is biased or prejudiced must timely move to recuse the judge in the trial court in
accordance with Rule 18a; otherwise the issue is waived on appeal.” Jonson v. Duong,
642 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (first citing Nairn v. Killeen
Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 229, 250–51 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.); and then
citing Esquivel v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2005, no pet.)); accord Franklin v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-12-00453-CV, 2014 WL
3696092, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the
record contains no motion to recuse, and Appellants do not contend in their brief that
they raised the trial judge’s alleged bias below. Accordingly, the issue is not preserved
for our review, and we will not address it. See Jonson, 642 S.W.3d at 195.

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C. Standing

      “Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit[]” and an essential

component of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley,

146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004). Ordinarily, a citizen lacks standing to bring a

lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of governmental acts. Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297,

302 (Tex. 2001). “This is because ‘[g]overnments cannot operate if every citizen who

concludes that a public official has abused his discretion is granted the right to come

into court and bring such official’s public acts under judicial review.’” Andrade v.

Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 136–37 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555).

      The general test for constitutional standing in Texas is whether there is a

justiciable controversy between the parties that will actually be resolved by the relief

sought in court. Bacon v. Tex. Hist. Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 174 (Tex. App.—Austin

2013, no pet.) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446

(Tex. 1993)). Thus, constitutional standing concerns not only whether a justiciable

controversy exists, but also whether the particular plaintiff has a sufficient personal

stake in the controversy to assure that it is “actual” in the sense that the court’s

decision would resolve it. Id. (first citing Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d

439, 442 (Tex. 1998); and then citing Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist.,

925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996)).

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      The Texas Supreme Court, noting the parallels between the tests for standing

under federal and Texas law and looking to the United States Supreme Court for

guidance, has explained that standing requires three essential elements:

      First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of
      a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
      (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second,
      there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
      complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
      challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
      independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it
      must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will
      be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992)).

      Thus, a plaintiff “su[ing] solely as [a] citizen[] . . . insist[ing] that the

government follow the law” does not have standing. See Andrade v. NAACP of Austin,

345 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2011). Rather, “regardless of the claim asserted, ‘a plaintiff

must show that he has suffered a particularized injury distinct from the general

public.’”4 Perez, 653 S.W.3d at 199 (quoting Venable, 372 S.W.3d at 137).

      4
        We note that Appellants seek, among other things, injunctive relief under
Texas Election Code Section 273.081. But the Texas Supreme Court has made it
clear that this statutory provision does not itself create standing; rather, a plaintiff
seeking injunctive relief under Section 273.081 must still show “injury or damage
‘other than as a member of the general public.’” In re Morris, No. 23-0111, 2023 WL
2543047, at *7 n.47 (Tex. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d at
17).

                                            7
       Here, Appellants have failed to establish standing. First, the injury that they

have alleged is not “concrete and particularized.” See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154–55

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S. Ct. at 2136). Instead, Appellants merely

assert a generalized grievance. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74, 112 S. Ct. at 2143. The

preliminary statement to Appellants’ petition reveals the generalized nature of their

claims:

       This . . . is an action to bring transparency, fairness, honesty, and
       exemplary quality to Texas elections and to hold responsible those
       government officials who violate the equal protection and due process
       rights of [Appellants] (and all Texas citizens) guaranteed by the Texas
       Constitution. . . . [Appellants] (and all Texas citizens) ha[ve] a fundamental
       legal right to the clearly established principles of election equality,
       integrity, accurateness, honesty, and justice. [Emphasis added.]

This      excerpt   plainly   demonstrates   that   Appellants   filed suit    “solely   as

citizens . . . insist[ing] that the government follow the law.” See NAACP of Austin,

345 S.W.3d at 8. Far from asserting disparate treatment or a particularized injury,

Appellants actually imply that they are in the same situation as “all Texas citizens.”5

       5
         In NAACP of Austin, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that voters often
have standing to bring claims asserting a denial of equal protection and held that the
appellants had standing to sue for an equal protection violation based on their
complaint that they were forced to use a specific electronic voting system adopted by
Travis County while absentee voters, members of the military, and voters living in
counties other than Travis County were not. 345 S.W.3d at 6–11. Appellants assert
an equal protection claim, but unlike the NAACP of Austin appellants, they do not
allege disparate treatment. The closest Appellants come to making such an allegation
is their statement that “[a] voting system that counts ballots cast by some voters using
different standards from ballots cast by other voters also violates the Equal Protection
rights of the voters.” Even if this vague assertion—which is buried in Appellants’
request for emergency injunctive relief and is not included in the section of their

                                             8
Thus, they have failed to show that they have “suffered a particularized injury distinct

from the general public.” See Perez, 653 S.W.3d at 199 (quoting Venable, 372 S.W.3d at

137); see also Garcia v. City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 206–08 (Tex. 2019) (holding

appellant lacked standing to bring prospective claims regarding the constitutionality of

red-light traffic cameras because he “st[ood] in the same shoes as any other citizen

who might potentially be fined for running a red light” and therefore “lack[ed] the

particularized interest for standing that prospective relief requires”).

       Second, Appellants do not allege an “actual or imminent” injury. See Heckman,

369 S.W.3d at 154 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136). Appellants’

claimed injury is premised on the possibility that cybercriminals or hostile foreign

actors might be able to manipulate the outcome of elections in Parker County.

However, Appellants have not shown that such manipulation has actually occurred or

petition describing their equal protection cause of action—could be considered
sufficient to assert an equal protection claim based on disparate treatment, Appellants
would still lack standing because, as will be discussed below, their complaint of
possible injury is based on the certification of electronic voting systems, a duty given
exclusively to the Texas Secretary of State, not Parker County. See Tex. Elec. Code
Ann. § 122.031(a). Thus, the alleged injury is not “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant.” See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. Moreover,
even if we were to assume that Appellants have standing to bring such a claim, the
trial court would still lack subject matter jurisdiction because the claim is not viable
and thus Parker County would retain governmental immunity. See NAACP of Austin,
345 S.W.3d at 11–14; see also Perez, 653 S.W.3d at 198 (“If the plaintiff’s claim lacks
merit even when taking the pleaded facts as true, the pleading has not overcome the
government’s immunity.”). As the supreme court pointed out in concluding that the
NAACP of Austin appellants’ similar equal protection claim concerning the
certification of electronic voting machines was not viable, “[n]o voting system is
[perfect],” and while other voting systems may provide more security, “the equal
protection clause does not require infallibility.” 345 S.W.3d at 14.

                                             9
is imminent. Because Appellants allege an injury that is merely “‘conjectural’ or

‘hypothetical,’” they have not established standing. See id.

       Third, Appellants’ alleged injury is not “fairly . . . traceable” to Parker County’s

conduct. See id. Appellants’ complained-of injury stems from the certification and

approval of the electronic voting system utilized by Parker County (or electronic

voting systems in general). But Parker County plays no role in the certification

process; rather, this is the sole responsibility of the Texas Secretary of State. See Tex.

Elec. Code Ann. § 122.031(a).         Thus, Appellants have failed to show a causal

connection between Parker County’s actions and the potential injury that they allege.

See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136);

Ellis v. Wildcat Creek Wind Farm LLC, No. 02-20-00050-CV, 2021 WL 1134416, at *3,

*6–8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that

appellants lacked standing because, among other things, they had failed show a causal

link between their injury and the defendant’s conduct).

       In sum, because Appellants failed to establish the required elements of

standing, the trial court properly dismissed their lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

       Having determined that Appellants lack standing and that the trial court thus

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal order.

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                               /s/ Dana Womack

                               Dana Womack
                               Justice

Delivered: May 25, 2023

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