Court Opinion

ID: 9891925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 20:04:41.34338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:01:21.832391
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/19/23 P. v. Rombeau CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B323493

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. LA076805)
           v.

 MICHAEL ROMBEAU,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Terrance T. Lewis, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
      Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ________________________
       Defendant Michael Rombeau came with his parents to the
United States from France as an infant; while a legal resident, he
never became a citizen. In 2013, Rombeau pleaded a combination
of guilty and no contest to drug possession offenses in two
separate cases. In 2014, Rombeau pleaded no contest to a charge
of possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Safety Code,
§ 11351.5) following a negotiated plea. Shortly after his 2014
conviction, federal immigration authorities removed Rombeau to
France.
       In 2022, Rombeau sought to vacate his three prior
convictions based on claims that he was mistaken about the
immigration consequences of his pleas when he entered them.
The superior court vacated both of the 2013 convictions; the
validity of those vacaturs is not at issue in this appeal. The court
declined, however, to vacate Rombeau’s 2014 plea pursuant to
Penal Code1 section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), which permits a
court to reach back and vacate a past conviction that is “legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences
of a conviction.” It found the trial court in 2014 had advised
Rombeau of the immigration consequences of that plea before
Rombeau entered it, and thus Rombeau’s claim of mistake was
not credible.
       Rombeau now appeals the court’s denial of his request to
vacate his 2014 plea. Rombeau does not dispute that the court
advised him of the immigration consequences of that plea before

      1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.

                                 2
he entered it or that he understood the court’s admonition when
it was given. He instead argues he misunderstood based on his
counsel’s advice that his two 2013 pleas—both of which were
found to be invalid in 2022 based on defects that existed at the
time of those 2013 pleas—made his removal from the United
States a foregone conclusion. Under the mistaken impression
that he would be removed based on these prior 2013 convictions
no matter what, Rombeau pleaded guilty in 2014 to minimize the
time he would spend incarcerated before he was sent to France.
      We conclude that at the time Rombeau entered his 2014
plea, he mistakenly believed his 2013 pleas made his removal a
certainty, which in turn damaged his ability to meaningfully
defend against the adverse immigration consequences of the 2014
charge. As Rombeau has established a reasonable probability
that but for these errors he would not have entered the 2014 plea,
we reverse.
                         BACKGROUND
A.    Criminal History
            The 2013 Felony Deferred Entry of Judgment Case
       A complaint filed on April 23, 2013, charged Rombeau with
felony possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a); count 1), felony possession of a controlled
substance (id., § 11350, subd. (a); count 2), misdemeanor battery
against a spouse (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 3), felony assault
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 4),
and felony false imprisonment (§ 236; count 5).
       According to Rombeau, prior to a June 19, 2013 hearing,
his defense counsel advised him of a plea offer that included a

                                  3
deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) under section 1000 et seq.2
“[I]t was [Rombeau’s] understanding that if [he] completed DEJ[,
his] plea could not be used against [him] for any purpose
whatsoever. [He] was not told that [his] failure to complete DEJ
would result in [his] deportation. [He] was unaware that,
regardless of whether [he] completed DEJ, [his] plea to [c]ount 1
made [his] deportation mandatory.”
       The docket indicates that at the June 19, 2013 hearing, the
trial court provided several advisements to Rombeau, including
an immigration advisement that “If you are not a citizen, you are
hereby advised that a conviction of the offense for which you have
been charged will have the consequences of deportation, exclusion
from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Rombeau claims no
such advisement was in fact made, and that such advisements
were typically not given in connection with DEJ pleas at the time
because they were thought to be immigration safe. Although
Rombeau did not designate the reporter’s transcript for the
June 19, 2013 hearing as part of the record on appeal, as part of
the 2022 post-conviction proceedings the superior court vacated
the DEJ plea pursuant to section 1016.5, thus impliedly finding
the 2013 court did not in fact properly advise Rombeau about the
immigration consequences of the DEJ plea.3

      2 Section 1000 et seq. permits a trial court to divert from
the normal criminal process first-time drug offenders who are
found to be suitable for treatment and rehabilitation. (See People
v. Barrajas (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 926, 928.)
      3 Section 1016.5, subdivision (a) requires that “[p]rior to
acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . , the court

                                  4
       Rombeau then pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 3. The trial
court dismissed the other counts, placed Rombeau on DEJ for at
least 18 months as to count 1, suspended the imposition of
sentence as to count 3, and imposed certain restitution fines. The
trial court ordered Rombeau to cooperate with his probation
officer in a plan for drug abuse counseling and scheduled a DEJ
progress report for December 19, 2013.
       On December 19, 2013, Rombeau failed to provide proof of
enrollment in a DEJ program. The court did not cancel the DEJ
program; instead, it continued the progress report hearing to
February 19, 2014.
            The 2013 Misdemeanor Possession Case
       On December 13, 2013, Rombeau was charged with
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). According
to Rombeau, his attorney discussed a plea offer with him, but
“[t]here was no discussion regarding the actual immigration
consequences that would result.” He “was unaware that a plea to
a violation of [Health and Safety Code section] 11377 would make
deportation mandatory.”
       According to the docket, at Rombeau’s December 27, 2013
arraignment, the trial court advised him that his conviction “will
have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission
to the United States, or denial of naturalization.” As discussed

shall administer the following advisement on the record to the
defendant: [¶] If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised
that conviction of the offense for which you have been charged
may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States.”

                                5
below, the People later stipulated, and the superior court found,
that no proper advisement about the immigration consequences
of the 2013 misdemeanor plea was in fact given to Rombeau.
Rombeau pleaded nolo contendere to the charge. The court
placed him on summary probation for 24 months, sentenced him
to 12 days in county jail, and credited him with 12 days of
custody credits.
            The 2014 Felony Possession for Sale Case
       On February 6, 2014, police officers responded to a report of
domestic violence. When they arrived, they observed a baggie of
methamphetamine, a scale, numerous empty baggies, a Brillo
pad, and a cell phone on which they found evidence of drug sales.
When asked if he had anything illegal on his person, Rombeau
reached into his buttocks area to remove multiple baggies of
narcotics before throwing them on the ground.
       On February 10, 2014, a felony complaint charged
Rombeau with possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11351.5; count 1) and possession of methamphetamine for
sale (id., § 11378; count 2). The complaint alleged the total
sentence for the charges ranged between four years four months
to eight years.
       Rombeau later declared that prior to entering his plea in
this matter, his trial counsel advised him that there was an
immigration hold placed on him and that he was already subject
to mandatory deportation due to his 2013 pleas, “so there was no
point in fighting the case and [he] should just seek a lesser
sentence.” Rombeau claimed, “Had I known that the prior pleas
were legally invalid, I would have rejected the proposed plea . . .
and would have insisted that my attorney pursue an
immigration-safe plea, and if no such plea could be obtained, I

                                 6
would have gone to trial in hopes of preserving my ability to
remain in the United States”; “If I had known that deportation
could have been avoided, I would have gone to any length in
order to do so”; Rombeau repeated that “If an immigration safe
plea could not be obtained, I would have proceeded to trial if that
was my only hope of remaining in the [United States].”
       At the February 21, 2014 preliminary hearing, the trial
court noted that a negotiated plea had been reached and asked
Rombeau, “have you had enough time to discuss the case with
your attorney, including any and all possible defenses to the
charges, what your rights are, as well as the consequences of your
plea?” Rombeau responded yes. Rombeau confirmed that he
wanted to enter a no contest plea as to count 1 with a disposition
of a three-year period of probation and 120 days in county jail.
The court then referred to a felony advisement of plea form and
asked Rombeau if he had initialed and signed the form.
Rombeau confirmed he had, and his counsel confirmed he had
also signed the form. Item 12 on the form which Rombeau
initialed, stated, “Immigration Consequences – I understand that
if I am not a citizen of the United States, I must expect my plea of
guilty or no contest will result in my deportation, exclusion from
admission or reentry to the United States, and denial of
naturalization and amnesty.” Rombeau also confirmed that he
read the form, went over the form “in detail” with his attorney, in
fact understood all waivers and consequences of his plea, and
that he waived and gave up his rights. The court and Rombeau
then had the following colloquy:
       “The court: If you are not a citizen of the United States,
this conviction will have the consequence of deportation, removal
exclusion from admission to the United States, denial of reentry

                                 7
and denial of naturalization as well as denial of amnesty
pursuant to the United States law. Do you understand that?
      “The defendant: Yes, sir.”
      The trial court then asked Rombeau and his counsel
several questions to ensure Rombeau entered into his plea
voluntarily and knowingly. Rombeau pleaded no contest to
count 1.
      The trial court suspended the imposition of Rombeau’s
sentence and placed him on probation for three years on the
condition that he serve 120 days in county jail. It also
terminated the DEJ in the 2013 case due to Rombeau’s violation
of that program based upon his plea. It ordered that upon
Rombeau’s release from county jail, Rombeau was to enroll in a
Proposition 36 program.4 As to the 2013 misdemeanor case, the
trial court revoked probation due to his plea and reinstated it on
the same terms and conditions.
B.    Rombeau Is Removed
      After completing his jail sentence, Rombeau was
transferred to an immigration detention center. On March 19,
2014, the United States Department of Homeland Security issued
a notice to appear in removal proceedings, alleging that Rombeau
was removable because he had been convicted of possession for
sale of cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11351.5. On April 8, 2014, an immigration court ordered that

      4 “ ‘Proposition 36 mandates probation and diversion to a
drug treatment program for those offenders whose illegal conduct
is confined to using, possessing, or transporting a controlled
substance.’ ” (People v. Zeigler (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 638, 655.)

                                 8
Rombeau be removed to France. On June 24, 2014, Rombeau
was removed.
C.    The Legislature Enacts Laws to Aid Noncitizen
      Defendants Who Did Not Meaningfully Understand
      the Immigration Consequences of Their Pleas
      After Rombeau’s removal to France, the Legislature
enacted and amended statutes to ensure noncitizen defendants
“receive clear and accurate advice about the impact of criminal
convictions on their immigration status, along with effective
remedies when such advice is deficient.” (People v. Vivar (2021)
11 Cal.5th 510, 516.)
      1.    Section 1203.43
       In 2015, the Legislature passed section 1203.43, effective
January 1, 2016. (Stats. 2015, ch. 646, § 1.) Section 1203.43’s
purpose was to remedy misinformation about DEJ dispositions,
including their potential immigration consequences. The
Legislature expressly recognized that its prior statement in
section 1000.4 that “ ‘successful completion of a [DEJ] program
shall not . . . be used in any way that could result in the denial of
any . . . benefit . . .’ constitutes misinformation about the actual
consequences of making a plea in the case of some defendants,
including all noncitizen defendants, because the disposition of the
case may cause adverse immigration consequences . . . .”
(§ 1203.43, subd. (a)(1).) The Legislature accordingly “declare[d]
that based on this misinformation and the potential harm, the
defendant’s prior plea is invalid” (id., subd. (a)(2)) and provided a
method by which defendants may withdraw such a guilty or nolo
contendere plea. (Id., subd. (b).)

                                 9
      2.    Sections 1016.2 and 1016.3
       The Legislature also enacted sections 1016.2 and 1016.3,
effective January 1, 2016 (Stats. 2015, ch. 705, §§ 1 & 2), to codify
federal and state case law holding that defense counsel must
“provide affirmative and competent advice to noncitizen
defendants regarding the potential immigration consequences of
their criminal cases” and “must investigate and advise regarding
the immigration consequences of the available dispositions, and
should, when consistent with the goals of and informed consent of
the defendant, and as consistent with professional standards,
defend against adverse immigration consequences.” (§ 1016.2,
subd. (a); see § 1016.3, subd. (a).)
       These sections supplemented section 1016.5, which existed
as of the time of Rombeau’s various pleas. Section 1016.5
requires that prior to accepting a plea a court must advise the
defendant that such a plea may have immigration consequences
(§ 1016.5, subd. (a)), and provides as relevant here that if “the
court fails to advise the defendant as required by this section and
the defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which
defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have the
consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States, the court, on
defendant’s motion, shall vacate the judgment and permit the
defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and
enter a plea of not guilty.” (Id., subd. (b).)
      3.    Section 1473.7
       In 2016, the Legislature passed section 1473.7, effective
January 1, 2017. (Stats. 2016, ch. 739, § 1.) Under subdivision
(a)(1) of section 1473.7, a person no longer in custody can seek to

                                 10
vacate a prior conviction that is “legally invalid” due to
“prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences.”
(Ibid.) In 2018, the Legislature amended section 1473.7, effective
January 1, 2019, “to provide clarification to the courts regarding
[s]ection 1473.7 . . . to ensure uniformity throughout the state
and efficiency in the statute’s implementation.” (Assem. Bill
No. 2867 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) § 1(b).) The amendments
included that, “There is a presumption of legal invalidity . . . if
the moving party pleaded guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to a
statute that provided that, upon completion of specific
requirements, the arrest and conviction shall be deemed never to
have occurred . . . .” (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(2); Stats. 2018, ch. 825,
§ 2.) The Legislature also enacted amendments to clarify that
“[a] finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (§ 1473.7, subd.
(a)(1).) The amendments also provided, “When ruling on a
motion under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the only finding
that the court is required to make is whether the conviction is
legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving
party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. . . .” (Id.,
former subd. (e)(4).)
       Section 1473.7, including these later amendments, applies
retroactively. (See People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
301, 309, 311 [applying § 1473.7 to a plea made 15 years earlier];
People v. Ruiz (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1066 [the 2018
amendments “made it easier to retroactively challenge

                                 11
convictions based on the ground that the defendant was not
properly advised of the immigration consequences”]; see also
People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 976 [applying
§ 1473.7 to a plea made 17 years earlier and stating, “[a]s
explained in the report of the Senate Committee on Public Safety
when considering the bill that became former [§] 1473.7
[citation], the purpose of the legislation was to ‘fill a gap in
California criminal procedure’ [citation] by providing a means to
challenge a conviction by a person facing possible deportation
who is no longer in criminal custody and thus for whom a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus is not available”].)
       As explained in People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
998, “even if [a section 1473.7] motion is based upon errors by
counsel, the moving party need not also establish a Sixth
Amendment violation as by demonstrating that ‘counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” ’ ‘ “under prevailing professional norms,” ’ as
stated in Padilla[ v. Kentucky (2010)] 559 U.S. [356] at pages 366,
368-369, . . . quoting Strickland [v. Washington (1984)] 466 U.S.
[668] at pages 688, 694 . . . .” (People v. Camacho, supra, at
p. 1008.) Instead, “the focus of the inquiry in a section 1473.7
motion is on the ‘defendant’s own error . . . .’ ” (People v. Mejia
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871, italics omitted; see also People v.
Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1176 [“in deciding whether
the defendant has shown error, the focus of our inquiry is on the
defendant’s own error in misunderstanding the immigration
consequences of the plea”].) “[A] petitioner’s own subjective error
qualifies for relief under the statute if the evidence shows he or
she misunderstood the immigration consequences of a plea deal.”
(People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769.)

                                12
D.    Rombeau Moves to Vacate His Convictions
            The Parties’ Filings
      On May 4, 2022, Rombeau filed a motion to vacate his 2014
felony plea pursuant to section 1473.7. Rombeau and his then-
current counsel filed declarations in support of his motion. The
declarations attached the dockets in the 2013 DEJ matter, the
2013 misdemeanor case, and the 2014 felony plea, documents
relating to the federal procedures to remove him from the United
States, and supporting letters from Rombeau’s mother and
brother. Rombeau also filed separate motions to vacate his pleas
in the 2013 DEJ matter and the 2013 misdemeanor case. Neither
motion relating to the 2013 convictions is included in the record.
      Rombeau declared that he was born in France in 1982.
When he was a few months old, he and his parents moved to
Hollywood, California.5 When he was four years old, he obtained
legal permanent resident status. His two younger brothers were
born in the United States. In 1999, he graduated from high
school in Southern California and began working. In 2004, his
mother became an American citizen and encouraged him to do
the same. Rombeau delayed doing so. In February 2007, his son
was born. In 2012, his youngest brother died. Rombeau became
depressed and began to abuse drugs.
       Rombeau further declared that having only lived in France
for a few months as an infant, he did not know anyone in France
when he was deported there in June 2014. He had no place to
live, and he could not read or write French. He stated that he
has not been able to maintain a relationship with his son, now 16

      5 A letter from Rombeau’s mother states that his parents
brought him to the United States when he was two years old.

                                   13
years old, because his son’s mother would not permit Rombeau to
speak with him and his only connection to his son is through his
brother who stays in touch with his son.
       Rombeau’s motion argued that “[d]ue to legally invalid
pleas in two prior cases . . . , [he] was under the mistaken belief
that, at the time of the plea in this matter, he was already subject
to mandatory deportation as conveyed to him by his attorney.”
As to his 2013 plea in the DEJ matter, Rombeau contended that
in enacting section 1203.43, the Legislature acknowledged that
noncitizens like him had been misinformed that DEJ pleas did
not have immigration consequences. Thus, his 2013 DEJ plea
was “legally invalid.” (See § 1203.43, subd. (a)(2) [declaring prior
DEJ pleas “invalid”].) As to the 2013 misdemeanor case,
Rombeau argued that neither his trial counsel nor the court
advised him as required of the immigration consequences of his
plea. Rombeau concluded that under case law “the focus is on a
‘defendant’s own error.’ ” (People v. Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 871, italics omitted.)
       The People opposed Rombeau’s motion and appended
Rombeau’s 2014 executed felony advisement of rights, waiver,
and plea form to their opposition. Neither Rombeau nor the
People obtained a declaration from any attorney that represented
Rombeau during the 2013 or 2014 pleas.
            The Stipulation to Vacate Rombeau’s 2013
            Misdemeanor Conviction
      On June 3, 2022, the People and Rombeau stipulated to
allow Rombeau to withdraw his plea in the 2013 misdemeanor
case as “legally invalid” because Rombeau “did not have a full
and complete understanding of the consequences of the plea at
the time of his original plea.” The superior court accepted the

                                14
stipulation, permitted Rombeau to withdraw his plea, and
sentenced Rombeau on an amended count. In connection with
accepting the stipulation, the superior court signed an order
vacating Rombeau’s conviction pursuant to sections 1016.5,
subdivision (b) and 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).
            The Hearing on Rombeau’s Motions to Vacate the
            2013 Felony Conviction and the 2014 Felony
            Conviction
       On July 8, 2022, the court heard Rombeau’s motions to
vacate the 2013 DEJ plea and the 2014 felony plea. Rombeau,
who remains in France, was not present. Rombeau’s counsel
argued that at the time Rombeau pleaded guilty in 2013,
defendants were misinformed as to the consequences of a DEJ
plea. Counsel further represented that the waiver in the 2013
DEJ plea did not contain mandatory immigration advisement;
rather, it included only a conditional advisement that “you could
be” deported instead of stating “you will be deported.” Counsel
claimed “[t]he transcript from the plea hearing indicates that no
advisement was given on the record. The court’s docket stated
incorrectly.” “There would have been no reason to give him the
advisement at that point in time, because there was the
widespread belief that DEJ was a viable option for noncitizens.”
Counsel also observed that the plea in the 2013 misdemeanor
case had been vacated. Counsel then argued that Rombeau’s
basis for taking the plea in the 2014 case “was because he was
told that he was already going to be deported, so there was no
reason for him to fight the charges in the case. As a result of
that, he accepted the plea” because “[h]e was misinformed about
the consequences of his plea.”

                                15
       After hearing from the People and additional arguments
from Rombeau’s counsel, the superior court asked, “How do you
get around in the most recent case, he is informed that he
initialed, he signed and he said immigration consequences,
number[ ] 12, I understand that I am not a citizen of the United
States. I must expect my plea of guilty or no contest will result in
deportation, exclusion from admission or reentry into the United
States and denial of naturalization or amnesty. Anything else?
Or do you want to submit?” Counsel submitted.
       The superior court granted Rombeau’s motion to vacate the
2013 DEJ plea under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, subdivision
(a)(1). The court denied the motion to vacate the 2014 felony
plea.
                          DISCUSSION
      The superior court vacated both the 2013 misdemeanor
plea and the 2013 DEJ plea pursuant to sections 1016.5 and
1473.7. Neither party appealed these orders. Thus, we address
only whether the court should have vacated the 2014 felony plea.
A.    Legal Principles and Standard of Review
      With regard to the 2014 felony plea, “section 1473.7 allows
noncitizens who have served their sentences to vacate a
conviction if they can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that their conviction is ‘legally invalid due to prejudicial
error damaging [their] ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.’
[Citations.] To establish prejudicial error, a defendant must
demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability that the defendant would
have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood

                                 16
its actual or potential immigration consequences’ [citation] and
must corroborate any assertions with ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’
[citation].” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316
(Espinoza).)
       On appeal, section 1473.7 motions are subject to
independent review. (People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 524-528.) “ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court
exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the
facts satisfy the rule of law.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 527.)
Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review.
(Ibid.) “An appellate court may not simply second-guess factual
findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.”
(Ibid.) “Where, as here, the facts derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents, however, there is no reason to
conclude the trial court has the same special purchase on the
question at issue; as a practical matter, ‘[t]he trial court and this
court are in the same position in interpreting written
declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7
proceeding. [Citation.] Ultimately it is for the appellate court to
decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts
establish prejudice under section 1473.7.” (Id. at p. 528, fn.
omitted.)
B.    Rombeau Has Demonstrated Error Affecting His
      Ability to Meaningfully Understand or Defend
      Against the Immigration Consequences of the 2014
      Felony Plea
      Rombeau argues that at the time of his 2014 felony plea, he
mistakenly believed, based upon his counsel’s advice, that due to
his 2013 convictions, his removal from the United States was a
forgone conclusion. He contends he did not realize at the time he

                                 17
was considering the 2014 plea that his earlier pleas were then
subject to challenge. While the People attempt to characterize
this claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel argument,
Rombeau does not claim he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with his 2014 plea. As stated above,
Rombeau does not need to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel to obtain relief; his own error suffices. (See People v.
Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 871.)
       The record demonstrates that Rombeau’s analysis of
whether to accept the 2014 felony plea depended upon his
misunderstanding that he would be deported based on his prior
convictions regardless of what he chose to do in the 2014 case. As
shown by the later vacatur of both 2013 pleas under section
1016.5—which was in effect at the time of his pleas—it was not a
fait accompli that Rombeau would be deported based solely on
those convictions.6 This demonstrates Rombeau mistakenly
understood that the 2013 convictions foreclosed his ability to
avoid deportation when he agreed to the 2014 plea bargain, when
in fact those pleas were subject to challenge at the time of his
2014 plea. The court’s advisement during the 2014 plea colloquy
did not clear up this mistake, as the misunderstanding was based
on the 2013 convictions making the immigration consequences of
the 2014 plea cumulative rather than the 2014 plea alone leading
to deportation.

      6 When evaluating a claim under section 1473.7, the key “is
the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or
didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.” (People v.
Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.)

                               18
      Further, imposing upon Rombeau continuing consequences
from his now vacated pleas in the 2013 DEJ and misdemeanor
matters is contrary to the legislative purpose of sections 1016.5,
1203.43, and 1473.7. Thus, we conclude Rombeau has
demonstrated his 2014 felony plea was contemporaneously based
on errors that prevented him from meaningfully understanding
and defending against the immigration consequences of that
plea.7
C.     Rombeau Has Demonstrated Prejudice
       In addition to showing an error that “damaged his ‘ability
to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of [his]
plea of . . . nolo contendere,’ ” a defendant must also show the
error “to be prejudicial.” (People v. Camacho, supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.) This prejudice test differs from the one
for ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires a “reasonable
probability of a different outcome in the original proceedings
absent the error.” (Ibid.) Instead, to establish prejudice for
purposes of section 1437.7, “a defendant must demonstrate a
‘reasonable probability that [he or she] would have rejected the
plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or
potential immigration consequences’ [citation] and must
corroborate any assertions with ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’

         7 Having so concluded, we need not address Rombeau’s
alternative arguments regarding alleged misunderstandings of
the immigration consequences of his 2014 felony plea.

                                 19
[citation].”8 (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316.) “Reasonable
probability” does not mean more likely than not, but merely a
reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. (People v.
Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610; People v. Rodriguez, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 324.) Therefore, “ ‘reversal is required when
there exists “at least such an equal balance of reasonable
probabilities as to leave the court in serious doubt as to whether
the error affected the result.” ’ ” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, at
p. 324, quoting People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1225; see
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837.)
       “[T]he inquiry under section 1473.7 requires consideration
of the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ which necessarily involves
case-by-case examination of the record [citation], and no specific
kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 325.) “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry
include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance
the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
disposition was possible.” (People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 529-530.)
       “Ties to the United States are an important factor in
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they
shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities.” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) Here, Rombeau demonstrated deep

      8 “Objective evidence includes facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence
of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 321.)

                                20
and longstanding ties to the United States. He came here as a
very young child and became a legal permanent resident when he
was four years old. He lived in the United States for nearly his
entire life before he was removed. His entire family continues to
live here, including his son, mother, and brother. Each of them is
a United States citizen. Before he was removed, he had been
employed and was supporting his son. His mother and brother
submitted letters describing that they miss him and that since
his absence, Rombeau’s brother has also had a son and a
daughter. In contrast, at the time of his removal, he had no ties
to France and did not speak or read French. (See People v. Lopez
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 714 [“[the] factors courts may consider
in determining the reasonable probability that the defendant
would have rejected the plea because of immigration
consequences include: the defendant’s remaining ties or lack
thereof to his or her home country”].) Thus, Rombeau’s ties to the
United States (and lack of ties to France) weigh heavily in favor
of finding prejudice.
       In Espinoza, our Supreme Court explained, “Another
consideration is whether alternative, immigration-safe
dispositions were available at the time of the defendant’s plea.
Factors relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s criminal
record, the strength of the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of
the charges or whether the crimes involved sophistication, the
district attorney’s charging policies with respect to immigration
consequences, and the existence of comparable offenses without
immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 323.) In that matter, “Espinoza had no prior criminal history
at the time of his plea. This fact is relevant because a defendant
without an extensive criminal record may persuasively contend

                               21
that the prosecutor might have been willing to offer an
alternative plea without immigration consequences. [Citation.]
[¶] Additionally, Espinoza presented evidence from an
immigration attorney that there were alternatives the
prosecution could have offered that would not have resulted in
mandatory deportation.” (Id. at p. 324.) Thus, Espinoza
demonstrated “that a plea deal without immigration
consequences ‘would or could have been negotiated’ [citation].”
(Ibid.)
       Rombeau argues he “could have hoped for or expected to be
able to negotiate a plea bargain with a better immigration
outcome.” However, unlike the defendant in Espinoza, he does
not provide any evidence to support this conclusion,9 and our
independent review of the record leads us to conclude this factor
weighs against a finding of prejudice. Indeed, with respect to the
2014 charges for possession for sale of narcotics, the police found
Rombeau with multiple drug baggies secreted on his person,
drugs and drug sale paraphernalia in the motel room where he

      9 Rombeau’s appellate briefing argues that he could have
bargained for comparable offenses without immigration
consequences such as burglary in the first or second degree
(§§ 459, 460, subds. (a), (b)), attempting to dissuade or prevent a
victim or witness to a crime from reporting it to the police
(§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), or accessory after the fact (§ 32) based on
others providing him the drugs as long as the imposed sentence
was less than a year. While “[t]he court does not decide if the
prosecution would have offered a different bargain[,] it considers
evidence that would have caused the defendant to expect or hope
a different bargain would or could have been negotiated.” (People
v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 567.) Rombeau failed to
provide any evidence to the superior court in this regard.

                                22
was arrested, and evidence of drug sale transactions on his
phone. The case against him was strong and his recidivism made
him a poor candidate for leniency. (See Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 324 [noting in contrast that “a defendant without an
extensive criminal record may persuasively contend that the
prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea
without immigration consequences”].)
       This does not mean, however, that Rombeau’s only option
was to accept a plea with immigration consequences. He could
instead “have rejected any plea leading to deportation—even if it
shaved off prison time—in favor of throwing a ‘Hail Mary’ at
trial.” (See Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 367-368
[137 S.Ct. 1958, 198 L.Ed.2d 476].) As the United States
Supreme Court noted, “common sense (not to mention our
precedent) recognizes that there is more to consider than simply
the likelihood of success at trial. The decision whether to plead
guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a
conviction after trial and by plea. [Citation.] When those
consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, similarly
dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial may look
attractive.” (Id. at p. 367.)
       Rombeau declared repeatedly that, “Had I known the truth,
I would not have accept the plea . . . and would have fought this
case at all costs in order to preserve my ability to remain in the
United States.” Given Rombeau’s ties to the United States and
unfamiliarity with France, we find this statement persuasive.
Thus, on balance, the record supports a reasonable probability
that Rombeau would have rejected the 2014 felony plea if it had
not been for the errors affecting his ability to meaningfully
understand and defend against its immigration consequences—

                               23
even if his only other alternative was to throw a “Hail Mary” at
trial. (See People v. Soto, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 610; People
v. Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311-312, 324.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying the motion to vacate Rombeau’s
conviction is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
instructions to grant the motion and vacate the 2014 felony plea
in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. LA076805.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                           WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

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