Court Opinion

ID: 9681053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:43:14.031692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.973830
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment. But I respectfully dissent to the majority holding that the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter does not exist in Texas, or, at least, in this thirty-two county judicial district.
The effect of the holding is to deny a defendant the submission of a defense affirmatively and properly raised by the evidence. If at trial of a person accused of attempted capital murder or attempted murder, the facts show that attempted death may have been caused while the defendant was under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, that defendant is entitled to a jury *404charge encompassing the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. There is yet another compelling reason to recognize the offense as a lesser included offense. It is now a settled principle that the trial court may, in homicide cases, under certain facts, properly deny a jury charge on aggravated assault when the weapon used by the defendant is a deadly weapon per se. This is because use of the deadly weapon gives rise to a presumption that an accused intended to kill the victim. See Valore v. State, 545 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). The majority holding would leave a defendant with an “all or nothing” situation if the trial court could refuse to submit either of the lesser included offenses in a jury charge, even though the evidence raises the issue of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
The majority cites two cases to illustrate that “at least two jurisdictions have recognized that attempted voluntary manslaughter is not an offense per se. . . . ” People v. Foster, cited in the majority opinion, defined the New York law of manslaughter 225 N.E.2d at 201, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 605:
[T]he crimes of manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the second degree respectively are homicides committed ‘without a design to effect death.’
Noting that there must be a specific intent to constitute an attempt, the court wrote:
An attempt to commit manslaughter is apparently a contradiction because the specific crime of manslaughter involves no intent, and, accordingly, an intent to commit a crime whose distinguishing element is lack of intent is logically repugnant.
With this reasoning our Court of Criminal Appeals agrees. Gonzales v. State, 532 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). It is readily apparent that the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute, Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.05 (Vernon 1974) possesses no specific intent element. The Gonzales court at 345 stated:
Attempted involuntary manslaughter would be a contradiction in terms under the new penal code. Involuntary manslaughter negates any specific intent to kill. One cannot intend ‘involuntarily’ to kill another. . . . There is no offense of ‘attempted involuntary manslaughter.’
It is obvious that the two manslaughter offenses discussed in the Foster case are the same as Texas’ involuntary manslaughter offense in that a specific intent to kill is not an element of the offense.
In People v. Genes, cited in the majority opinion, 227 N.W.2d at 242, the court stated:
We reject the defendant’s contention that there is no such thing as attempted manslaughter. While there can be no such thing as attempted involuntary manslaughter, where the theory is voluntary manslaughter there can be an attempt. (Emphasis added.)
The concurring-dissenting opinion stated 227 N.W.2d at 245:
With voluntary manslaughter there is an intent to take a life under provocation which is serious enough to deprive the killing of its malicious character. Involuntary manslaughter, however, involves no intent. (Citations omitted.)
An essential element of the crime of attempt is an intent to commit the substantive crime. (Citations omitted.) Since the offense of voluntary manslaughter includes as an element an intent to take a life, voluntary manslaughter may be attempted. On the other hand, since the offense of involuntary manslaughter does not include as an element any intent whatsoever (citations omitted), ... it is impossible to attempt it. (Note: This writer believed the guilty plea of the defendant to the offense of ‘manslaughter’ was uncertain and possibly for a nonexistent crime).
Finally, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognizes that attempted voluntary manslaughter does exist as an offense which may be a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The conviction in Morgan v. State, 545 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), was for attempted voluntary manslaughter, the indictment charging attempted murder.
*405The holding in the instant case would lead to a refusal by the trial courts to submit in a charge to the jury the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter although raised by the evidence and requested as a charge. It creates a potential denial of a fair trial to the defendants in those cases. In my opinion, such a denial would assume constitutional dimension.
The evidence in the instant case fails to support a charge on attempted voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment and dissent to the part which would excise an offense from the penal laws.