Court Opinion

ID: 9856020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:36:38.846833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:55.327176
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting in part. In my opinion, paragraph 10 of the Seventh Further Answer and Defense, and paragraph 2 of the prayer for relief, should not have been stricken, and in these respects the order of the court below should be reversed.
In the Court’s opinion, this question is posed: “In an action against two defendants, as joint tort-feasors, may one defendant set up a plea for contribution against the codefendant and thereby preclude dismissal of the codefendant during the trial and before judgment (paragraph 10 of the Seventh Further Answer and Defense) ?” The Court answers, “No.” In my opinion, the correct answer is, “Yes.”
In Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E. 2d 833, cited by the Court, the plaintiff alleged he received personal injuries proximately caused by the collision of an automobile operated by Miss Lucy Lacey and an automobile owned by Vincent Walter Christopher and operated by Larry Cecil Christopher. He sued Miss Lacey and the Christophers, alleging the collision and his injuries were proximately caused by their joint and concurrent negligence. Answering, Miss Lacey denied negligence on her part and alleged, conditionally, in the event she were found negligent, the codefendants Christopher were joint tort-feasors and, under G.S. 1-240, she was entitled to contribution from them in respect of any recovery plaintiff obtained against her.
Miss Lacey’s right to allege such cross action for contribution was not challenged.
The Christophers, in reply to Miss Lacy’s cross action for con*695tribution, alleged the collision was caused solely by her negligence. Thereafter, they alleged two cross actions against Miss Lacey for affirmative relief, one for $300.00 for damages to the Christopher car, the other for $5,000.00 for personal injuries received by the driver thereof.
The hearing was on Miss Lacey’s motion to strike the Christophers’ said cross actions for affirmative relief. Judgment allowing Miss Lacey’s said motion was affirmed.
Under Bell v. Lacey, supra, and cases cited therein, where two defendants are sued jointly by the plaintiff, neither may allege a cross action against the other for affirmative relief. Such a cross action is not germane to the plaintiff’s claim. But Bell v. Lacey, supra, is not authority for the proposition that a defendant may not allege, conditionally, that his codefendant is a joint tort-feasor from whom, under G.S. 1-240, he is entitled to contribution in respect of any amount plaintiff may recover against him. A recovery by plaintiff is a prerequisite to such cross action.
An original defendant may, under G.S. 1-240, join an additional party and allege, conditionally, a cross action for contribution. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the original defendant moves for judgment of nonsuit. The only question then before the court is whether the evidence is sufficient for submission to the jury as between the plaintiff and the original defendant. If the motion is allowed, this ends the case since the cross action for contribution presupposes a recovery by plaintiff against the original defendant. If the motion is overruled, the original defendant may offer evidence. The original defendant’s cross action for contribution may not be dismissed until the original defendant has had opportunity to offer evidence in support of such cross action. Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E. 2d 773. If an original defendant may join an additional defendant and allege such cross action for contribution, I perceive no sound reason why he may not so allege where the codefendant is already a party to the action.
In Smith v. Kappas, 218 N.C. 758, 12 S.E. 2d 693, plaintiff sued Kappas and the Straus Company as joint tort-feasors. Over the objection of the Straus Company the court permitted plaintiff, before plaintiff had concluded his evidence, to take a voluntary nonsuit as to Kappas. Straus Company, in its original answer, did not allege, conditionally, it was entitled to contribution from Kappas but made such allegation in an amended answer. The opinion contains this statement: “In the original answer in the present action no demand was made for affirmative relief, but before the trial an amended answer was filed by the Straus Company, Inc., which we think sufficient to have *696Kappas held as a party defendant under N. C. Code, 1939 (Michie), sec. 618.” (Our italics) C.S. 618 is now codified as G.S. 1-240. Based on this factual situation, the court held that, upon Straus’ demand for contribution against Kappas, his codefendant, it was error to permit plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit as to Kappas and awarded a new trial.
In Smith v. Kappas, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E. 2d 375, a petition to rehear was allowed on the ground the record did not support the quoted factual statement but showed Straus Company “did not tender its proposed amended answer and move that it be permitted to file the same until after verdict. Nor did it request that Kappas be made a party defendant, as a joint tort-feasor, prior to verdict.” On rehearing, the court overruled the exception of Straus Company on the ground it had failed to assert in apt time its alleged cause of action against Kappas for contribution.
In Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E. 2d 566, the plaintiff sued the Receivers of the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company and Fred W. Staudt, trading and doing business as Staudt’s Bakery, alleging he was injured by the joint and concurring negligence of said defendants. The Receivers’ demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the Receivers. Upon failure of plaintiff to amend his complaint in respect of allegations against the Receivers, the action, as to the Receivers, was dismissed. Thereafter, Staudt answered, denying negligence and alleging, conditionally, a cross action against the Receivers for contribution; and, upon Staudt’s motion, the Receivers were again made parties. The Receivers then demurred to Staudt’s cross complaint for contribution. It was held that Staudt’s cross complaint did allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for contribution and that the Receivers’ demurrer to said cross complaint was properly overruled.
In my opinion, the decisions in Smith v. Kappas, supra, and in Canestrino v. Powell, supra, are authority for the proposition that where two defendants are sued jointly by the plaintiff, one defendant may allege, conditionally, a cross action against his codefendant for contribution. If he elects to do so, the procedure is as follows: If, when plaintiff has rested his case, the evidence is sufficient for submission to the jury as to defendant A (pl-aintiff in the cross action for contribution) but not as to defendant B, judgment of nonsuit as to plaintiffs action against defendant B should then be entered. Even so, the action as to defendant B should not be dismissed. Defendant A should be permitted to offer evidence in support of his cross action against defendant B for contribution. The action as to defendant B *697in respect of said cross action for contribution should be dismissed only if defendant A fails to offer evidence sufficient to support the allegations of his cross complaint.
The question considered in Bell v. Lacey, supra, was quite different from that here presented. This Court had held in Norris v. Johnson, supra, and cases cited therein, that, where the plaintiff sued one defendant and the original defendant joined an additional defendant for contribution under G.S. 1-240, the additional defendant could assert a cross action against the original defendant for affirmative relief. In Bell v. Lacey, supra, the Court refused to extend this rule to a situation where plaintiff had sued both defendants. Here, we are not concerned with cross actions by one defendant against his codefendant for affirmative relief, that is, for the recovery of damages by the plaintiff in said cross action from the defendant therein, but are concerned only with a cross action for contribution as permitted by G.S. 1-240.
The foregoing is in accord with what I have understood and now understand to be the correct rule and procedure.
ParKee and RodmáN, JJ., concur in dissenting opinion.