Court Opinion

ID: 9737779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:34:29.408395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.297568
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The question presented concerns the constitutionality of an amendment of § 625a of the Michigan Vehicle Code providing that if after an accident the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident is transported to a medical facility and a sample of his blood is withdrawn at the time for the purpose of medical treatment, the results of the chemical analysis of that sample shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution for certain crimes there described to show the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance, and that
[t]he medical facility or person performing the chemical analysis shall disclose the results of the analysis to a prosecuting attorney who requests the results for use in a criminal prosecution as provided in this subsection.[1]
*335We would hold that the quoted language, requiring the medical facility or person performing a chemical analysis to disclose the results of the analysis to a prosecuting attorney who requests the results for use in a criminal prosecution, is unconstitutional.2
The statute authorizes a search by the state without a warrant of a person’s medical records without a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances.3
The majority declares that a driver does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the results of á chemical analysis because "we do not believe that an expectation of privacy in blood alcohol test results, under these circumstances, is one which society is willing to consider reasonable.”4
There is the nub of our disagreement. The ma*336jority states: "we believe that defendants shared a subjective expectation that their test results would remain private.”5 We do not agree that such an expectation is one that society is unwilling to consider reasonable. We are of the opinion that society considers such an expectation to be reasonable6 and, therefore, absent exigent circumstances, a person’s medical records may not be obtained without a warrant.
A person’s medical records are an intensely personal matter. Few persons would willingly share their medical records with the state. In today’s society, a person has little choice but to undergo medical treatment at a medical facility, generally licensed by and authorized to operate by the state. Few persons have the ability to obtain medical treatment in their homes, and even such persons would, of necessity, employ physicians and other medically trained persons who would be subject to the statutory edict.
A driver does not consent to a search by the state of his medical records for the results of a chemical analysis of his blood by ingesting alcoholic beverages or a controlled substance, driving a motor vehicle, becoming involved in an automobile accident, permitting himself to be transported to a medical facility, or allowing a sample of his blood to be withdrawn for the purpose of medical treatment.
Under the circumstance that a person who becomes involved in an automobile accident, in need of medical treatment, ordinarily has no choice but to permit himself to be transported to a medical facility and to allow blood to be withdrawn for the *337purpose of emergent medical treatment, and having in mind the intensely personal nature of medical records, the permission granted by the driver for such purpose—to the medical facility7 and not to the state—differs from lodging, in nonemergent circumstances, tax records with an accountant,8 or financial records with a bank.9 Nor are a person’s medical records like garbage left for collection at the curb outside the curtilage of the home.10
Nor do we think it of importance that the Legislature, by enacting the amendment of § 625a, has expressed a policy of permitting a search of medical records for the purpose of obtaining the results of chemical analysis of a driver’s blood. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is a limitation on the power of government that cannot be avoided by legislative decree. While the Legislature may have the power to modify the physician-patient privilege, it does not have the power to modify the scope of the Search and Seizure Clause.
We note in conclusion that in Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589, 605-606; 97 S Ct 869; 51 L Ed 2d 64 (1977), where the Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute requiring that physicians identify patients obtaining certain prescription drugs so that their names and addresses could be recorded in a centralized computer maintained by the state, the Court said:_
*338A final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this record does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.11
Cavanagh and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J._

 The amendment was enacted by 1982 PA 310 which added subsection (9) to § 625a. MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)(9).

 In each of the consolidated cases, the results of the chemical analysis were provided pursuant to a request made on the basis of the quoted language before the commencement of a criminal prosecution. We thus see no need to express an opinion whether the results of the chemical analysis would be admissible in a criminal prosecution were the results obtained other than on the basis of the quoted language.

 Breithaupt v Abram, 352 US 432; 77 S Ct 408; 1 L Ed 2d 448 (1957), was decided before the federal Search and Seizure Clause was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 768; 86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966), decided after Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), made the federal search and seizure exclusionary rule applicable in state court criminal prosecutions, the Court said "there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” and that there' were exigent circumstances justifying the officer directing the taking of a blood sample without a search warrant.

 Ante, p 318.
See People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 28; 360 NW2d 841 (1984), relied on and quoted in the majority opinion (ante, p 317), stating that in determining whether "a defendant may attack the propriety of a search or seizure,” "the court must decide whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure and whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” (Emphasis added.)

 Ante, p 318.

 Cf. State v Copeland, 680 SW2d 327, 330 (Mo App, 1984) (dictum); Commonwealth v Hipp, 380 Pa Super 345, 354-355; 551 A2d 1086 (1988) (dictum).

 To be sure, the medical facility or person performing the chemical analysis is not the state. Were they to disclose the results of the chemical analysis without the constraint of statute, a different question would be presented.

 See Couch v United States, 409 US 322; 93 S Ct 611; 34 L Ed 2d 548 (1973).

 See United States v Miller, 425 US 435; 96 S Ct 1619; 48 L Ed 2d 71 (1976).

 See California v Greenwood, 486 US 35; 108 S Ct 1625; 100 L Ed 2d 30 (1988).

 Justice Brennan filed a separate concurring opinion stating that the statute did not, on its "face, amount to a deprivation of constitutionally protected privacy interests, any more than the more traditional reporting provisions.” Id. at 607.