Court Opinion

ID: 9373077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:35.733122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.554842
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KARL BROOKINS,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                           DE-0432-18-0359-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: January 19, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Karl Brookins, Honolulu, Hawaii, pro se.

           Deborah E. Yim, Esquire, Lakewood, Colorado, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                     Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                        REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43. For the reasons set forth below,
     we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     the appeal to the Denver Field Office for further adjudication consistent with
     Santos v. National Aeronautics & Space Administration , 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
     2021).

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         Prior to the removal at issue in this appeal, the agency employed the
     appellant as a GS-12 Fish Biologist in the Ocean and Coastal Resources Branch,
     Water Resources Division (WRD) of the National Park Service (NPS). Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 25, 27.        As a Fish Biologist, the appellant was
     responsible for providing “direct technical assistance to parks in the areas of
     fisheries management, habitat restoration, and population recovery” and “liaison
     with fisheries professionals in the academic community, as well as regulatory
     compliance, training, and other professional assistance” in support of the
     agency’s activities. IAF, Tab 10 at 77-80.
¶3         On May 2, 2017, the appellant’s supervisor placed him on a 90 -day
     performance improvement plan (PIP) to give him an opportunity to improve his
     performance to at least minimally successful for critical element 5. IAF, Tab 19
     at 83-87. On July 31, 2017, she notified him that he had successfully completed
     the PIP. IAF, Tab 9 at 96. Just over 5 months later, on January 11, 2018, 2 his
     supervisor placed him on a second PIP to allow him an opportunity to improve his
     performance to at least minimally successful in critical elements 1 and 2 by
     completing specified tasks—namely, for critical element 1, one panel-reviewed
     funding proposal and, for critical element 2, one approved interagency program
     initiative—within 42 days. IAF, Tab 8 at 72, Tab 9 at 70-73.
¶4         On May 2, 2018, the appellant’s supervisor proposed his removal under
     chapter 43 for “failure to achieve an acceptable level of performance after

     2
      The agency also denied the appellant’s within-grade increase (WIGI). The appellant
     appealed both the denial of his WIGI and his placement on the PIP. Brookins v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket Nos. DE-531D-18-0028-I-1, DE-3443-18-
     0140-I-1. His petitions for review in those appeals were resolved in separate decisions.
                                                                                        3

     unsuccessful completion of a [PIP].” IAF, Tab 8 at 71-75. She explained that he
     did not timely complete either project required by the PIP and that his
     performance was thus unsatisfactory in both critical elements 1 and 2. Id. After
     the appellant responded, the deciding official issued a decision letter removing
     him effective June 18, 2018. Id. at 27-31, 46-52. The appellant filed a Board
     appeal in which he contested the merits of the removal and raised d ue process and
     harmful procedural error affirmative defenses. IAF, Tabs 1, 7, 14, 21-22, 27, 38.
     After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued
     an initial decision affirming his removal. IAF, Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID).
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has responded, and
     the appellant has replied to the agency’s response. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1, 3-4.

                                        ANALYSIS
     Although the administrative judge correctly found that the agency m et its burden
     to prove most of the elements of its performance-based charge by substantial
     evidence, we must remand the appeal for consideration of an additional element .
¶6         At the time the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that,
     in a performance-based action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43, an agency must
     establish by substantial evidence that (1) the Office of Personnel Management
     (OPM) approved its performance appraisal system; (2) the agency communicated
     to the appellant the performance standards and critical elements of his position;
     (3) the appellant’s performance standards are valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1);
     (4) the agency warned the appellant of the inadequacies of his performance during
     the appraisal period and gave him a reasonable opportunity to improve; and
     (5) the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical
     element. 3   White v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5

     3
       Substantial evidence is the “degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
     even though other reasonable persons might disagree.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p).
                                                                                          4

     (2013). 4 In this case, the administrative judge found that the agency proved all of
     these elements.     ID at 6-20.         On review, the appellant challenges the
     administrative judge’s determinations that his performance standards were valid,
     that the agency informed him of the deficiencies in his performance and afforded
     him a reasonable opportunity to improve, and that hi s performance remained
     unacceptable in at least one critical element. 5 PFR File, Tabs 1, 4.

           The administrative        judge    correctly   found   the   performance
           standards valid.
¶7         Performance standards must, to the maximum extent feasible, permit the
     accurate appraisal of performance based on objective criteria. 5 U.S.C.
     § 4302(c)(1); Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 29
     (2010). Standards must be reasonable, realistic, attainable, and clearly stated in
     writing.   Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 29.       Provided these requirements are met,
     however, the Board will defer to managerial discretion in determining what
     agency employees must do to perform acceptably in their positions. Id.
¶8         Here, the appellant’s Employee Performance Appraisal Plan (EPAP)
     contained five critical elements, and the agency rated his performance on a
     five-tiered rating system, in which the possible ratings were exceptional, superior,
     fully successful, minimally successful, and unsatisfactory. 6 IAF, Tab 9 at 75-94.
     For each critical element, the EPAP set forth three components that must be met

     4
       Although White provides that criterion 3 requires that performance standards must be
     valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1), the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018
     redesignated subsection 4203(b) as subsection 4302(c).           Pub. L. No. 115-91,
     § 1097(d)(1)(A), 131 Stat. 1283, 1619 (2017).
     5
       The appellant has      not challenged, and we discern no reason to disturb, the
     administrative judge’s   findings that the agency established that OPM approved the
     agency’s performance      appraisal system and that the agency communicated the
     performance standards    and critical elements of his position to him. ID at 5 -7; IAF,
     Tab 7 at 4-5.
     6
       OPM approved this five-level performance appraisal system in 2005. IAF, Tab 10
     at 82.
                                                                                             5

     in order to achieve each rating level. Id. As relevant here, the EPAP specified
     that, to achieve a rating of minimally successful in critical element 1, the
     appellant must meet the following requirements:            (1) develop at least one
     approved peer-reviewed publication, presentation, or webinar; (2) independently
     develop and submit at least one panel-reviewed funding proposal to provide
     additional service to parks; and (3) develop at least one new working relation and
     maintain existing working relationships to accomplish specified tasks.               IAF,
     Tab 9 at 77. To achieve a rating of minimally successful in critical element 2, he
     must meet the following requirements:              (1) participate in at least one
     collaborative effort that results in tangible benefits to NPS; (2) initiate and
     develop at least one collaborative effort that results in tangible benefits to NPS;
     and (3) develop at least one approved interagency program initiative that supports
     NPS goals. Id. at 80. For purposes of the annual performance appraisal, the
     appellant had to meet all three components to achieve a rating of minimally
     successful; if he failed to do so, he would receive a rating of unsatisfactory in that
     critical element. Id. at 77, 80.
¶9         In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that critical
     elements 1 and 2 were written, measurable, and attainable.            ID at 7 -11.    He
     explained that, to the extent the standards required subjective interpretation, it
     was unavoidable given the qualitative aspects of the appellant’s scientific field
     and the agency’s mission. ID at 9, 11. In finding the standards attainable, he
     credited the appellant’s supervisor’s testimony that two other scientists had been
     able to satisfy the same standards, in addition to fulfilling their other duties,
     without complaint. ID at 9. Accordingly, he concluded that the performance
     standards were valid. 7 ID at 10-11.

     7
       In assessing whether the appellant’s performance standards were attainable, the
     administrative judge considered but found lacking in credibility the appellant’s cla im
     that the status reports he was required to submit to his supervisor during the PIP period
     took him 8 hours per week. ID at 9-10. However, the effect of a PIP requirement on
     the appellant’s ability to successfully complete the PIP appears to be more
                                                                                             6

¶10         On review, the appellant argues that, in considering whether the
      performance standards were valid, the administrative judge erred in applying
      5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1), rather than 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c). PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-19.
      As noted above, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 redesignated
      subsection 4203(b) as subsection 4302(c). Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(d)(1)(A),
      131 Stat. 1283, 1619 (2017). Accordingly, section 4302(c)(1) now sets forth the
      statutory requirements for a valid performance standard, i.e., to the maximum
      extent feasible, performance standards must permit the accurate evaluation of job
      performance on the basis of objective criteria related to the job in question for
      each employee. 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1). Although the appellant is correct that the
      administrative       judge   incorrectly cited   to   section 4302(b)(1),   rather   than
      section 4302(c)(1), this citation error did not affect the outcome of the a ppeal
      because he set forth and applied the correct law for assessing whether
      performance standards are valid. ID at 7-10; see Panter v. Department of the Air
      Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (providing that an adjudicatory error that is
      not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an
      initial decision).
¶11         The appellant next argues that his performance standards were not valid
      because, counting the critical elements and their components, the PIP involved
      6 “legally-defined elements” and his performance standards contained a total of
      17 “legally-defined elements,” which both exceed the limit of 5 critical elements
      approved by OPM. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-19. The Board has long held, however,
      that a critical element may include subelements and that the incumbent of a
      position for which a compound standard has been established may be required to
      perform acceptably with respect to each of those subelements. Lee, 115 M.S.P.R.

      appropriately considered as a challenge to the adequacy of the appellant’s opportunity
      to improve. See White, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5. Accordingly, we address the
      administrative judge’s findings on this point and the appellant’s challenges to them
      below in our discussion of whether the agency met its burden to show that it gave the
      appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve.
                                                                                             7

      533, ¶ 31; Shuman v. Department of the Treasury, 23 M.S.P.R. 620, 627-28
      (1984). Here, the subelements/components set forth under critical elements 1 and
      2 contribute to the clarity of the appellant’s performance standards by describing
      the quality, quantity, timeliness, and manner of performance required to be
      appraised at a particular level of performance and are consistent with his job
      description. See Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 31; Shuman, 23 M.S.P.R. at 627-28;
      5 C.F.R. § 430.203 (defining “performance standard”). Thus, the fact that each
      broadly labeled critical element contained component parts does not render the
      performance standards invalid.
¶12         The appellant also argues that his performance standards did not conform to
      the “agency-wide performance levels” in the agency’s Departmental Manual
      (DM), which define in general terms each rating level, 8 and instead required him
      to complete specific tasks. 9 PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-20; IAF, Tab 24 at 12-13. The
      Board’s inquiry into the validity of performance standards, however, is limited to
      whether they permit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of
      objective criteria and are reasonable, realistic, attainable, and clearly stated in
      writing. Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 29. Provided these requirements are met, an
      agency is free to set its performance standards as high as it thinks appropriate and
      to utilize “absolute” performance standards—i.e., under which a single incident
      of poor performance will result in an unsatisfactory rating on a critical element.
      See Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 97 M.S.P.R. 13, ¶¶ 9-15 (2004).
      Here, we find that the appellant’s performance standards were valid because they

      8
        For example, the DM defines “fully successful” as “a good, sound performance that
      meets organizational goals while effectively applying technical skills and
      organizational knowledge to get the job done.” IAF, Tab 24 at 12-13.
      9
        The appellant appears to raise this argument for the first time on review. Nonetheless,
      we have considered it because it appears to pertain to the validity of his performance
      standards. See Neal v. Defense Logistics Agency, 72 M.S.P.R. 158, 161 (1996) (stating
      that the agency must prove its action was based on valid performance standards, and the
      Board is obliged to consider this issue, regardless of whether it has b een raised by the
      parties).
                                                                                           8

      meet the statutory requirements and discern no merit to his contention that they
      are invalid because they require him to perform certain tasks rather than rating
      him in accordance with the general definitions in the DM.
¶13         The appellant additionally argues that the panel -reviewed funding proposal
      component of critical element 1 violates section 4303(b)(1)(A) because it is not
      about the “performance by the employee” performing the “critical elements of the
      employee’s position.” 10 PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, 21-22. As stated above, however,
      so long as performance standards are objective and meet the other statutory
      requirements, the Board will defer to the agency’s managerial discretion to
      determine what the appellant must do to perform acceptably in his position. See
      Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 29. The requirement that the appellant submit a funding
      proposal for panel review is related to the appellant’s duties and responsibilities
      and permits the accurate evaluation of his job performance on the basis of
      sufficiently objective criteria. IAF, Tab 10 at 76-81. Although the outcome of a
      panel review and the time required by the panel may be out of the appellant’s
      control, he has not alleged or shown that the agency imposed the panel review
      requirement in an unreasonable manner.        See Guillebeau v. Department of the
      Navy, 362 F.3d 1329, 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that a requirement that
      “[a]ll web pages be peer reviewed prior to final submission” was not invalid
      because the agency applied the requirement in a reasonable manner).
      Accordingly, we discern no basis to conclude that the panel-reviewed funding
      proposal component of critical element 1 was invalid .
¶14         Lastly, the appellant argues that, in finding the performance standards
      attainable, the administrative judge erred by comparing his work, as the “only
      marine fish biologist,” to the “non-fish biologists.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. This

      10
        Section 4303(b)(1)(A) provides that, when an agency proposes to demote or remove
      an employee for unacceptable performance under chapter 43, he is entitled to 30 days’
      advance written notice of the proposed action, which identifies the “specific instances
      of unacceptable performance by the employee” and “the critical elements of the
      employee’s position involved in each instance of unacceptable performance.”
                                                                                        9

      cursory argument, however, does not establish error in the administrative judge’s
      determination that his performance standards were attainable.       Moreover, we
      discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s decision to credit the
      appellant’s supervisor’s testimony that other scientists were able satisfy the same
      standards as the appellant, in addition to fulfilling their other duties, without
      complaint. See Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1373
      (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based credibility determinations “[e]ven if demeanor is not explicitly
      discussed”).
¶15        In light of the foregoing, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant’s performance standards were valid.

            The administrative judge correctly found that the agency warned the
            appellant of his performance deficiencies and afforded him an
            opportunity to improve.
¶16        The agency next must prove by substantial evidence that it warned the
      appellant of the inadequacies of his performance during the appraisal period and
      gave him an adequate opportunity to improve. Towne v. Department of the Air
      Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶¶ 6, 8 (2013).           OPM’s regulations governing
      performance-based actions under chapter 43 require that, “[a]s part of the
      employee’s opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance, the agency shall
      offer assistance to the employee in improving unacceptable performance.”
      5 C.F.R. § 432.104. The employee’s right to a reasonable opportunity to improve
      is a substantive right and a necessary prerequisite to all chapter 43 actions. Lee,
      115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 32.     In determining whether an agency has afforded an
      employee a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance,
      relevant factors include the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the
      employee’s position, the performance deficiencies involved, and the amount of
      time which is sufficient to enable the employee with an opportunity to
      demonstrate acceptable performance. Id.
                                                                                       10

¶17        Here, the appellant’s supervisor advised him in the January 11, 2018 PIP
      memorandum that, as discussed at his October 2017 year-end performance
      review, his performance in critical elements 1 and 2 was unsatisfactory and that
      he would be placed on a PIP to allow him an opportunity to improve his
      performance in each element to at least minimally successful.          IAF, Tab 9
      at 70-73. She stated that, to be considered minimally successful by the end of the
      PIP period, the appellant must do the following:       (1) for critical element 1,
      independently develop and submit “one panel reviewed proposal for funding from
      outside of WRD” for a viable project that provided additional services to parks;
      and (2) for critical element 2, develop and obtain his supervisor’s approva l for an
      “interagency program initiative” supporting the goals of the NPS. Id. at 72. She
      further instructed him to submit weekly status reports regarding his progress,
      invited him to stop by her office if he had any questions, and warned him that
      failure to improve his performance to minimally successful in critical elements 1
      and 2 by the end of the PIP period would be grounds for his removal or demotion.
      Id. at 72-73. Although the PIP memorandum stated that the PIP would end on
      February 22, 2018, the appellant requested and received a 1-day extension due to
      the 1-day Government shutdown, and the PIP ended on February 23, 2018. Id.
      at 70; IAF, Tab 8 at 72.
¶18        In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that substantial
      evidence established that the agency warned the appellant of his performance
      inadequacies in the January 11, 2018 PIP notice, as well as in his October 31,
      2017 performance appraisal. ID at 11-12. Regarding the opportunity to improve,
      he found that the appellant received 42 days to demonstrate improvement, that
      this was a reasonable amount of time given the nature of the PIP, and that he
      should have been able, within 42 days, to develop and submit “at least one panel
      reviewed proposal” and to develop “at least one approved in teragency program
                                                                                       11

initiative.” 11 ID at 12-14. He found that the appellant’s supervisor provided him
adequate assistance by requiring him to submit weekly status reports regarding
what he was doing to demonstrate improvement, sending him substantive
guidance as to what he needed to do to improve his performance, and offering to
speak to him about his progress. ID at 14-15. He considered but found incredible
the appellant’s claim that he was not informed that he was expected to obtain
panel review of his funding proposal during the PIP period. ID at 17-18. In
addition, he found incredible the appellant’s claim that the status reports took
8 hours per week because he never rebutted his supervisor’s testimony that she
told him not to spend more than 30 minutes per week on them and because it
appeared that he lacked time management skills when it came to this type of task.
ID at 9-10. He thus concluded that the agency proved by substantial evidence

11
   In finding that 42 days was a sufficient amount of time for the a ppellant to complete
the 2 requirements of the PIP, the administrative judge considered the fact that the
appellant had been on notice of the deficiencies in his p erformance in critical
elements 1 and 2 since his March 31, 2017 midyear performance review. ID at 13. As
the administrative judge noted, the Board has previously considered prior warnings of
unacceptable conduct in assessing the reasonableness of the opportunity to improve.
Id.; see Mattes v. Department of the Army, 24 M.S.P.R. 477, 480 (1984) (noting in a
chapter 43 appeal that, when the appellant received a prior warning of unacceptable
performance and a reminder that timely submissions were critical, a 30-day
improvement period “would have been sufficient” if the appellant had been given a
reasonable opportunity to demonstrate improvement); see also Ray v. Department of the
Navy, 34 M.S.P.R. 289, 292 (1987) (finding in a chapter 75 appeal that 45 days for an
improvement period was sufficient when the appellant had al so been issued letters of
caution and reprimand). Here, however, it is unclear how prior notice of the appellant’s
performance deficiencies in critical elements 1 and 2, which he received nearly a year
before the beginning of the PIP at issue, relates to the reasonableness of his opportunity
to improve during the PIP period. IAF, Tab 10 at 7-8. In any event, because we agree,
on the basis of other factors, with the administrative judge that the appellant received a
reasonable opportunity to improve, any error in this regard did not affect the outcome
of the appeal. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282. Because we do not consider the midyear
performance review in our assessment of the opportunity to improve, we need not
address the appellant’s argument on review that the administrative judge erred in
finding that the midyear performance review placed him on notice that he was “skating
on thin ice” in critical element 2. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-24.
                                                                                      12

      that the appellant received an adequate opportunity to improve his performance.
      ID at 15.
¶19        On review, the appellant reiterates his claim that the weekly status reports
      took him 8 hours per week and argues that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that his supervisor told him not to spend more than half an h our per week
      on them.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-8; ID at 9-10.      Although we agree with the
      appellant that his supervisor did not testify that she explicitly told him not to
      spend more than 30 minutes per week on the report, she did testify that she told
      him he was spending too much time on the weekly status reports and that she
      estimated they should only take about 30 minutes per week.          IAF, Tab 35,
      Hearing Transcript (HT) at 209-10 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor).
      Nonetheless, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      determination that the appellant’s claim that the status reports required 8 hours
      per week is not credible.     The appellant has not rebutted his supervisor’s
      testimony that she told him he was spending too much time on the status reports
      or her testimony that she did not require that the status reports be in any
      particular format. Id. In addition, the evidence of record, including the status
      report instructions in the PIP memorandum and the content of the reports
      themselves, which include a significant amount of recycled material from prior
      weeks, establish that they should not have taken the appellant a significant
      amount of time each week to complete. ID at 9-10; IAF, Tab 9 at 5-68, Tab 10
      at 72. We further agree with the administrative judge that, if t he appellant spent
      8 hours per week on the status reports, it represents a failure on his part to
      properly manage his time, rather than an overly burdensome requirement that
      deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate improvement. ID at 10.
¶20        The appellant also argues that the administrative judge erred in finding
      incredible his claim that he was unaware of the requirement that he obtain panel
      review during the PIP period on the ground that he did not raise this concern in
      his response to the proposed removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13; ID at 17. He
                                                                                       13

      argues that it is “irrelevant to the issue’s fundamental credibility” when he elects
      to introduce an issue and that there is no statutory basis for requiring that all
      issues that could be raised during an appeal be included in the response to the
      proposed action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14. Although there is no requirement that
      the appellant raise every argument he intends to raise before the Board in his
      response to the proposed action, the consisten cy of prior statements is a relevant
      consideration in assessing his credibility.   Hillen v. Department of the Army,
      35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). Accordingly, the Board has found an appellant’s
      allegations less credible when he raised them for the first time on appeal. See,
      e.g., Reynolds v. Department of Justice, 63 M.S.P.R. 189, 195 (1994); Abatecola
      v. Veterans Administration, 29 M.S.P.R. 601, 607 n.3, aff’d, 802 F.2d 471 (Fed.
      Cir. 1986) (Table).   In addition, the Board routinely considers an appellant’s
      response to the proposed action in assessing claims regarding deficient notice or
      confusion with the charges, e.g., Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture,
      119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 11 (2013); Mouser v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 30 M.S.P.R. 619, 624 (1986). We therefore find no basis to disturb the
      administrative judge’s determination that the appellant’s claim la cked credibility.
      Furthermore, the PIP memorandum specifically stated that, to be considered
      minimally successful in critical element 1, the appellant must submit “one panel
      reviewed proposal for funding,” i.e., a funding proposal that had been reviewed
      by the panel. IAF, Tab 9 at 72. Thus, the appellant knew or should have known
      that he was required to obtain panel review of his funding proposal by the end of
      PIP period.
¶21        The appellant additionally appears to argue on review that he did not have a
      reasonable opportunity to demonstrate improvement because the panel review was
      out of his control. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-22. While we agree that the panel’s
      review of the appellant’s funding proposal was not within his exclusive control,
      there is no reason here to find that the panel review requirement deprived him of
      a reasonable opportunity to improve given that he did not even submit his
                                                                                         14

      proposal to the panel within the PIP period. Cf. Sandland v. General Services
      Administration, 23 M.S.P.R. 583, 591 (1984) (finding that the appellant did not
      receive a reasonable opportunity to improve when, as a result of his supervisor’s
      actions during the improvement period, he was unable to perform the work
      required to demonstrate improvement); Mattes v. Department of the Army,
      24 M.S.P.R. 477, 480 (1984) (finding that the appellant did not receive an
      adequate opportunity to improve when the late submi ssion of three reports was
      caused by circumstances outside of his control).
¶22         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge failed to consider his
      total “compounded” workload during the PIP, which included “one plan, one
      proposal, a weekly reporting requirement, and maintaining performance on the
      seventeen 2018 performance appraisal components, i.e., a full -time workload plus
      the proposal, plan, and reports.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-9. We find no merit to the
      appellant’s argument that the administrative judge failed to consider his total
      workload in finding that he received an adequate opportunity to improve.          See
      Marques v. Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132
      (1984) (recognizing that an administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the
      evidence of record does not mean that she did not consider it in reaching her
      decision), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).         The administrative
      judge carefully considered the requirements of the PIP and concluded that the
      appellant should have been able to complete them within the 42 -day period. The
      appellant has not specifically identified what other work he beli eves deprived him
      of a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate improvement in critical elements 1
      and 2 during the improvement period, and there is no evidence reflecting that he
      raised concerns of this nature with his supervisor at any time during the PIP.
      Accordingly, notwithstanding the weekly status reports and the appellant’s other
      work requirements, we find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      determination that 42 days was a sufficient amount of time to complete the
      limited tasks required by the PIP, especially in light of the fact that his supervisor
                                                                                       15

      clearly advised him of the importance of focusing on those tasks during the PIP
      period. IAF, Tab 8 at 92, Tab 9 at 72-73.
¶23        The appellant next argues that the PIP requirements became more extensi ve
      over the course of his PIP. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-24. As set forth above, the
      January 11, 2018 PIP memorandum specifically advised the appellant of his
      performance deficiencies and of what he must do to be rated minimally successful
      in critical elements 1 and 2 by the end of the PIP—namely, that he must complete
      one panel-reviewed funding proposal and one approved interagency program
      initiative. IAF, Tab 9 at 72. In addition, both the PIP memorandum and 2017
      performance appraisal advised the appellant that he must meet all three
      components of each critical element and that failure to meet any one of the
      components would result in a failure to meet the minimally successful standard.
      IAF, Tab 9 at 71, Tab 30 at 8, 11. Ultimately, the appellant’s supervisor found
      that the appellant failed to timely complete the tasks specified in the PIP notice
      and, for that reason, proposed his removal for failure to achieve an acceptable
      level of performance in either critical element 1 or 2.      IAF, Tab 8 at 71-75.
      Accordingly, we find no merit to the appellant’s claim that the requirements for
      him to successfully complete the PIP changed over time.
¶24        In sum, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      determination that the appellant received a reaso nable opportunity to improve.
      The Board has found that a 30-day PIP may be sufficient to satisfy an agency’s
      obligation to provide an employee with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
      acceptable performance. See, e.g., Melnick v. Department of Housing & Urban
      Development, 42 M.S.P.R. 93, 101 (1989), aff’d, 899 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
      (Table); Wood v. Department of the Navy, 27 M.S.P.R. 659, 662-63 (1985). Here,
      the appellant received 42 days to demonstrate improvement by completing
      one component of critical element 1 (submit one panel-reviewed funding
      proposal) and one component of critical element 2 (one approved interagency
      program initiative), and there is no evidence in the record that this length of time
                                                                                       16

      unfairly prevented him from demonstrating acceptable performance. See Papritz
      v. Department of Justice, 31 M.S.P.R. 495, 499 (1986) (finding that the appellant
      received a reasonable opportunity to improve when there was no evidence the
      length of the PIP unfairly prevented him from demonstrating acceptable
      performance). To the contrary, the record reflects that he received adequate time
      and substantial assistance to complete these limited tasks and that, despite being
      informed of the minimum requirements to pass the PIP and encouraged to discuss
      his progress with his supervisor, he never requested an extension or expressed
      any need for additional time. See id.
¶25        In light of the foregoing, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency met its burden to show by substantial evidence that it warned the
      appellant of his performance deficiencies and afforded him an adequate
      opportunity to improve.

            The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s
            performance remained inadequate in at least one critical element .
¶26        Lastly, the agency must show by substantial evidence that, after an adequate
      improvement    opportunity    period,   the   appellant’s   performance   remained
      unacceptable in at least one critical element. Towne, 120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 6. A
      detailed proposal notice can be considered part of an agency’s valid proof of i ts
      allegations in a chapter 43 case; however, the proposal notice alone is insufficient
      to meet the agency’s burden of proof and instead must be accompanied by
      corroborating evidence. Thompson v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 372,
      ¶ 12 (2015). When an employee is removed on the basis of fewer than all the
      components of a performance standard for a critical performance e lement, the
      agency must present substantial evidence that the employee’s performance
      warranted an unacceptable rating on the performance element as a whole.
      Leonard v. Department of Defense, 82 M.S.P.R. 597, 599 (1999).
                                                                                          17

                   Critical Element 1
¶27        As noted above, the PIP memorandum stated that, to obtain a rating of
      minimally successful in critical element 1, the appellant was required to develop
      and submit “one panel reviewed proposal” for funding for a viable project that
      provided additional services to parks.       IAF, Tab 9 at 72.        To fulfill this
      requirement, the appellant sent the Division Chief a funding proposal for a Nature
      Fund “Fishscaping” project to “develop scientific capacity in fish echosounding”
      at 8:00 p.m. on February 22, 2018. IAF, Tab 8 at 81-85. In the proposed removal
      notice, the appellant’s supervisor stated that, because he emailed his proposal to
      the Division Chief at 8:00 p.m. on the night before his PIP deadline, there was no
      time to obtain approval from the three supervisors who needed to review the
      proposal before submitting it for panel review. IAF, Tab 7 at 72. In addition, she
      noted that the appellant’s late submission presumed that the panel “would
      actually be able to review [his] document with such little notice.” Id. Thus, she
      concluded   that   the   appellant’s   performance   in   critical   element   1   was
      unsatisfactory. Id. The administrative judge found that the agency proved that
      the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in critical element 1 because
      he failed to fulfill his obligation to develop and submit at least one
      panel-reviewed proposal within the PIP period. ID at 16-18.
¶28        On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that he did not improve his performance in critical element 1, ostensibly
      because he should not have been required to obtain the supervisory signatures and
      panel review during the PIP period. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-14. As discussed
      above, however, we find unavailing the appellant’s assertion that he was not
      aware of the requirement that he obtain panel review during the improvement
      period, as well as his alternative argument that he should not have been required
      to do so. While we acknowledge that the time required for a panel review is to
      some extent out of the appellant’s hands, he did not even submit the completed
      proposal to the panel for its review within the PIP period. Rather, he waited unt il
                                                                                       18

      8:00 p.m. on the night before the end of his PIP to request the first of the three
      supervisory signatures required before he could submit his funding proposal to
      Nature Fund for panel review. 12 IAF, Tab 8 at 81, Tab 9 at 72. Accordingly, we
      agree with the administrative judge that the agency established by substantial
      evidence that the appellant failed to demonstrate acceptable performance in
      critical element 1.

                   Critical Element 2
¶29         To be considered minimally successful in critical element 2, the PIP
      memorandum stated that the appellant must, by the end of the PIP period, have
      developed and obtained his supervisor’s approval for an interagency program
      initiative with goals, objectives, activities, and expected outcomes that he would
      be able to start working on upon final approval. IAF, Tab 9 at 72. The appellant
      submitted two proposals to his supervisor in an attempt to fulfill this requirement.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 47, 73. First, on January 26, 2018, he proposed a “Fundamental
      Fishing Information pilot project and Program Initiative”; however, his supervisor
      informed him on January 26 and 29, and February 7, 2018, that his proposal was
      not interagency and would not satisfy the requirements of his PIP. Id. at 92-99.
      Second, on the evening before the end of his PIP, he emailed his supervisor
      requesting approval of an “ecosystem character and fishing impacts interagency
      program initiative.” Id. at 77-79. Although it was the last day of the appellant’s
      PIP, his supervisor responded the next day explaining that this idea was not
      interagency and suggesting they “discuss another option and timeframe for
      addressing this component of [his] assignment.” Id. at 77. The appellant did not
      respond, testifying at the hearing that he did not open his email until after
      February 23, 2018, because he was busy working on his last status report. HT
      at 148 (testimony of the appellant).       In the proposed removal notice, the

      12
         As the appellant acknowledged in his email to the Division Ch ief, a Nature Fund
      requires that funding proposals have three supervisory signatures before being
      submitted to the panel. IAF, Tab 8 at 81.
                                                                                       19

      appellant’s supervisor reiterated that neither of the appellant’s proposals involved
      “interagency” participation and thus found his performance in critical element 2
      to be unsatisfactory. IAF, Tab 8 at 73-74.
¶30        In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that substantial
      evidence supported the appellant’s supervisor’s determination that the appellant’s
      two ideas were not interagency and that he failed to fulfill the requirements of
      critical element 2. ID at 18-20. In so finding, he observed that the appellant was
      negligent under the circumstances by failing to check his email on February 23,
      2018. ID at 19.
¶31        On review, the appellant argues that administrative judge failed to consider
      his argument that the PIP notice did not inform him that he was required to obtain
      agreement from a partner agency to work on his plan and that his supervisor
      informed him of this requirement only after he submitted his February 22, 2018
      idea. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15; IAF, Tab 38 at 17. Although the administrative
      judge did not address this argument, such error is harmless as the argument is
      clearly without merit. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282. The PIP notice explicitly
      advised the appellant that he must obtain his supervisor’s approval for an
      “interagency program initiative,” i.e., a program initiative that involves another
      agency. IAF, Tab 9 at 72. Contrary to the appellant’s characterization of his
      supervisor’s rationale for finding he did not satisfy this requirement, she did not
      require him to have approval from a partner agency prior to the end of the PIP
      period; rather, she required that his program initiative idea involve collaboration
      with another agency. IAF, Tab 8 at 73. Although she stated in the proposed
      removal notice that the appellant’s second proposal identified “no one else who
      had agreed to participate in the initiative,” this observation was simply one of a
      number of things his proposal failed to do, in addition to not identifying another
      agency for collaboration, partner tasks, or roles or functions for another agency.
      Id. Finally, she noted that, “[a]ll of the listed tasks and outcomes were tasks that
      you would work on, and thus there was no ‘interagency’ participation.”           Id.
                                                                                      20

      Accordingly, we find no merit to the appellant’s contention that the PIP notice
      did not place him on notice of the requirement that his program initiative proposal
      involve participation by another agency and agree with the administrative judge
      that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that the appellant’s
      submissions did not satisfy this criterion.
¶32         The appellant also challenges on review the administrative judge’s
      determination that he was negligent under the circumstances, arguing that he had
      to turn in his final status report on February 23, 2018, and that he believed the
      deadline for the program initiative was February 22, 2018.         PFR File, Tab 1
      at 10-11. In other words, he appears to argue that it was reasonable to spend his
      workday on February 23, 2018, on his final status report without checking his
      email because it was too late to make any further submissions towards successful
      completion of his PIP. Even if the appellant believed that February 22, rather
      than February 23, 2018, was the last day of his PIP period, we agree that he acted
      in a negligent manner in failing to check his emails on a workday, which resulted
      in him not seeing his supervisor’s email informing him that his initiative was not
      interagency and offering to “discuss another option and timeframe.” Nonetheless,
      the finding of negligence is not material to the outcome here because, as
      discussed above, the appellant failed to obtain his supervisor’s approval for an
      interagency program initiative before the end of the PIP period, despite her
      numerous emails, expressed concerns, and offers to provide additional assi stance
      and to work together to come up with an interagency program initiative idea.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 92-99. Thus, even if the administrative judge erred in finding that
      the appellant acted in a negligent manner, such error provides no basis to disturb
      the initial decision. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282.

                   A rating of unsatisfactory in one component of a critical
                   element is sufficient for an overall unsatisfactory rating.
¶33         The appellant further argues that the administrative judge erred in finding
      that his performance was unacceptable in critical elements 1 and 2 because he
                                                                                    21

      successfully completed two of the three components of each critical element.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-22; IAF, Tab 38 at 6-7. However, as the administrative
      judge correctly observed, the performance standards made clear that the appellant
      must meet “all three components” of the critical element and that a “[f]ailure to
      meet any one of the components will result in an overall failure to meet the
      minimally successful standard.” ID at 16, 18; IAF, Tab 9 at 71, Tab 30 at 8, 11.
      Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      determination that the agency provided substantial evidence tha t the appellant
      failed to develop and submit one panel-reviewed funding proposal and one
      approved interagency program initiative and that he therefore failed to meet the
      minimally successfully standard for critical elements 1 and 2 as a whole, even if
      he satisfactorily completed the other components of the critical elements.   See
      Leonard, 82 M.S.P.R. 597, ¶ 6.

            We must remand this appeal in light of Santos.
¶34        Although the appellant has identified no basis for us to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings regarding the agency proving the elements
      described above, we must remand this appeal for the agency to prove an
      additional element of its charge. During the pendency of the petition for review
      in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in
      Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61, 1363, that in addition to the five elements of the
      agency’s case set forth above, the agency must also “justify the institution of a
      PIP” by proving by “substantial evidence that the employee’s performance was
      unacceptable . . . before the PIP.”   The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos
      applies to all pending cases, including this one, regardless of when the events
      took place.   Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16.
      Accordingly, we remand the appeal to give the parties the opportunity to present
      argument and additional evidence on whether the appellant’s performance during
      the period leading up to the PIP was unacceptable in one or more critical
      elements. See id., ¶¶ 15-17. On remand, the administrative judge shall accept
                                                                                         22

      argument and evidence on this issue, and shall hold a supplemental hearing if
      appropriate. Id., ¶ 17.

      On remand, the administrative judge should analyze the appellant’s affirmative
      defense that the agency violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) under
      the harmful error standard.
¶35            In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the agency did
      not violate the appellant’s due process rights by giving him 15 days to respond to
      the notice of proposed removal and prohibiting him from entering his duty station
      and contacting his coworkers during the response period because he received a
      meaningful opportunity to respond to the proposed removal. ID at 20-21. He
      also found that, even if the agency violated the CBA by giving the appellant only
      42 days to demonstrate improvement and 15 days to respond to the notice of
      proposed removal, he failed to show that such violation was harmful.               ID
      at 13-14, 21-22. Accordingly, he concluded that the appellant failed to establish
      any affirmative defense.
¶36            On review, the appellant does not challenge, and we discern no basis to
      disturb, the administrative judge’s determination that he did not prove an y due
      process violation or that the 15-day response period constituted a harmful
      procedural error.      However, he reiterates his argument that he should have
      received a 90-day improvement period pursuant to the CBA. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 23.
¶37            In finding the appellant failed to prove this claim, the administrative judge
      relied on his determination that the agency met its burden to prove the charge
      including, as relevant here, that the length of the PIP was reasonable.            ID
      at 13-14. We find his reliance on the agency’s proof of its charge to be in error
      because the requirement for the agency to prove that it afforded an appellant with
      a reasonable opportunity to improve differs from the appellant’s burden to prove
      harmful error. See Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 32 (discussing the relevant factors in
      determining if the agency afforded an appellant a reasonable opportunity to
                                                                                          23

      improve). The harmful error standard applies to allegations of agency error in
      applying collective bargaining agreements in performance actions brought under
      chapter 43. DeSousa v. Agency for International Development, 38 M.S.P.R. 522,
      526 (1988). When an appellant alleges that the agency committed a procedural
      error, he bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that the agency’s
      procedural error caused substantial harm to his rights, i.e., that the agency would
      likely have reached different conclusion in the absence of the error. 13 Wood,
      27 M.S.P.R. at 663; 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.4(r), 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C). A mere showing
      that there was a possibility of prejudice is insufficient.        Wood, 27 M.S.P.R.
      at 663.
¶38         Here, the appellant argued that the agency violated the CBA by not
      affording him at least 90 days to demonstrate improvement and th at “[a]nother
      few days beyond the 42-day PIP would have made a significant difference in the
      outcome.” IAF, Tab 38 at 7-8. Specifically, he alleged that, if he had been given
      a longer PIP period, he would have been able to obtain the three signatures
      required to approve his proposal and could have addressed his supervisor’s
      concerns with the interagency program initiative program idea that he sent to
      her on February 22, 2018. Id. at 8. He also claimed that, if he had been given a
      90- or 180-day PIP period, he “would have considered continuing to seek
      approval for the Fundamental Fishing Information pilot project and Program
      Initiative by further addressing his supervisor’s many questions.” Id. He alleges
      that he did not do so during his 42-day PIP because, given his supervisor’s
      questions and comments, he decided to spend the last 15 days of his PIP
      “pursuing a different independent approach.” Id. at 8-9.
¶39         The agency disagrees with the appellant’s contentions.            It argues, in
      essence, that the appellant failed to show that if he was on the PIP for a longer

      13
        A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
      person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
      contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                     24

      period, he likely would have met the PIP requirements. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-11.
      It points to testimony and documentary evidence reflecting that the appellant was
      on notice that his performance in critical elements 1 and 2 required improvement
      as early as March 2017. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-11. Thus, this issue is in dispute
      and resolution may require credibility determinations.      Such determinations
      should be made in the first instance by the admini strative judge who conducted
      the hearing.   Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 18
      (2016).   Therefore, on remand, the administrative judge should make findings
      regarding the appellant’s claim that the agency violated the CBA , applying the
      harmful error standard. See Wood, 27 M.S.P.R. at 663.
¶40         In conclusion, we must remand this decision in light of Santos and for a
      new determination regarding the appellant’s claim that the agency violated the
      CBA. On remand, the administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence
      on whether the agency proved by substantial evidence that the appellant’s pre -PIP
      performance was unacceptable, and shall hold a supplemental hearing on this
      issue if appropriate. Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 17. The administrative judge shall
      then issue a new initial decision consistent with Santos and the guidance above.
      See id. If the agency makes the additional showing required under Santos on
      remand, the administrative judge may incorporate h is prior findings on the other
      elements of the agency’s case and the appellant’s other affirmative defenses in
      the remand initial decision. See id. However, regardless of whether the agency
      meets its burden, if the argument or evidence on remand regarding the appellant’s
      pre-PIP performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s
      affirmative defenses, he should address such argument or evidence in the remand
      initial decision. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R.
      587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must identify all material
      issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and
      include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as
      well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).
                                                                                25

                                          ORDER
¶41        For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the field office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.