Court Opinion

ID: 9860727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:31:03.047073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:34.711210
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCORMICK, dissenting: The circumstances under which a reviewing court will overturn a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence are limited to where the trial court’s ruling is "manifestly erroneous.” (People v. Adams (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 387, 400, 546 N.E.2d 561.) "Manifestly erroneous” or "against the manifest weight of the evidence” occurs where the trial court’s ruling is " 'palpably erroneous and wholly unwarranted’ or 'arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based upon the evidence.’ ” (People v. Leach (1993), 245 Ill. App. 3d 644, 655, 612 N.E.2d 825, quoting People v. Shelby (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1039, 582 N.E.2d 1281, appeal denied (1992), 143 Ill. 2d 646, 587 N.E.2d 1023.) This standard of review acknowledges the level of deference we must accord the trial court’s rulings on a motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. The majority fails to accord that deference to the trial court’s ruling that has historically been a fundamental tenet of due process. Because of the trial court’s ruling in favor of a defendant, we must consider as true testimony which favors the defendant’s position, unless that testimony is clearly unreasonable. (People v. Graham (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 798, 805-06, 573 N.E.2d 1346, appeal denied (1991), 141 Ill. 2d 550, 580 N.E.2d 124, citing People v. Holloman (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 311, 317, 263 N.E.2d 7, 11.) The trial court in this case heard contradictory testimony. Defendant testified that Officer Callaghan approached him with his gun drawn. Officer Callaghan, on the other hand, stated that he never drew his gun. The trial court viewed this statement in light of the fact that the officer stopped defendant’s car on a suspicion that it was used in an armed robbery, that he called for back up and that he told defendant and his companion to remain in the car "with their hands up.” Indeed a police officer may, under certain circumstances, conduct an investigative stop with an unholstered gun in hand. Common sense will often dictate this caution. However, the denial of this fact under oath could adversely impact upon the officer’s credibility. The impact upon the officer’s credibility could have been slight and of no consequence. On the other hand, the impact upon the officer’s credibility could have been devastating. We cannot explore the inner recesses of the trial court’s mind and objectively determine the credibility accorded the police officer’s testimony. Because of this limitation, a reviewing court relying upon a written transcript cannot assess the credibility of witnesses. We must give deference to the trial court’s findings because of this inherent difficulty. Defendant also testified that he informed Officer Callaghan that his car had been stolen, that he had just gotten it started, and that he had not yet registered the car. Defendant’s statement that the vehicle was stolen was not an admission, as the majority suggests, that he stole the vehicle. It is merely an indication that defendant’s vehicle had been stolen. Officer Callaghan "couldn’t recall” whether defendant actually said this. He had no information that the car defendant was driving was stolen. His vehicle check revealed only that the car was not registered to defendant and at that time there was no report of the car as stolen. Officer Callaghan also testified that the vehicle had wires hanging from the dashboard and that the lid of the trunk had been "punched.” On re-cross-examination, however, he testified that a car with such indications "does not necessarily” mean that the car is, in fact, stolen. In view of Officer Callaghan’s admission that the appearance of the vehicle did not necessarily mean that the vehicle was stolen, the testimony which favors defendant’s position was not clearly unreasonable. Notwithstanding that Officer Callaghan had a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, he did not possess sufficient facts for probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Where the evidence is contradictory, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. (People v. Benoit (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 185, 188, 608 N.E.2d 250; Graham, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 805.) The trial court did not make express findings of fact. The trial court ruled that the evidence did not establish probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of a stolen automobile. The majority’s opinion reassesses the contradictory evidence and arrives at a contrary conclusion. The trial court’s ruling was not arbitrary or palpably erroneous. In fact the trial court’s ruling was reasonable and supported by the evidence. The majority advances no reason why it abandons its heretofore enlightened opinion in which it stated, "[i]t is the function of the circuit court in a hearing on a motion to suppress to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflict in their testimony [citation], and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of disputed evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. [Citation.]” (People v. Walker (1993), 253 Ill. App. 3d 93, 103-04, 624 N.E.2d 1353.) We should take care not to abandon such a treasured principle. We should affirm the trial court’s rulings.