Court Opinion

ID: 9697098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:05:47.820285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:29.129175
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Under the totality of the circumstances presented, the search of Tariq’s vest was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.
Prior to the search the police officers received consent from Tariq’s mother to search the house and “anything in it.” Thus, it may have been reasonable at the outset for the officers to believe they had permission to conduct a broad general search of areas such as the dining room. Subsequently, however, Tariq’s objection to the search of his vest should have raised an ambiguity in the minds of the police officers. At the moment Tariq asserted his interest and expectation of *497privacy in the vest, the officers should have turned to his mother, who was present at the scene, and specifically clarified that the original general consent to search also included the search of the item of Tariq’s clothing located in the dining room.
It is clear that an individual may waive the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment through knowing and voluntary consent. The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, that is, what would an ordinary reasonable person understand to be the scope of consent between the officer and the consenting person. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991); Wilkerson v. State, 88 Md.App. 173, 594 A.2d 597 (1991). In conducting the reasonableness inquiry, the court must consider what the parties knew to be the object of the search at the time. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-1804, 114 L.Ed.2d at 302-303. Thus, the scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); see also Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120, 129, 567 A.2d 95, 100 (1989) (“Of course, ‘[a] consensual search may go no farther than the limits’ defined by the consent,” quoting State v. Jensen, 44 Wash.App. 485, 723 P.2d 443, 446 (1986)).
While the majority concedes that “children have Fourth Amendment rights and the parent’s authority and control of the child do not singlehandedly define the scope of a child’s right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures” (Opinion at 495, 701 A.2d at 696), it ends its inquiry with a finding that the mother had the authority to consent to the search. The majority fails to examine whether the scope of the search was reasonable and states that “any objection lodged in the face of a parent’s lawful consent under these circumstances is unavailing” {id. at 496, 701 A.2d at 697). In so holding, the majority ignores its own statement that, “[i]n further assessing the validity of the search, one’s expectation of privacy is to be measured as of the time of the offending intrusion” (id. at 491, 701 A.2d at 694 emphasis added). The validity and *498reasonableness of the search, therefore, are determined at the moment Tariq expressed an expectation of privacy in his vest. Tariq’s protest gave rise to an ambiguous situation which the officers were in an excellent position to resolve with little or no burden. They needed simply to turn to Tariq’s mother and confirm that they did, indeed, have permission to proceed with the search of the vest.
In holding that there was a valid consensual search of Tariq’s vest, the majority particularly relies on United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971);1 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969), and their progeny. The facts in the case at bar, however, are fundamentally different from the facts in the above-cited cases. In each of those cases, there was no question or ambiguity concerning the scope or object of the consented search.
In Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. at 991, 39 L.Ed.2d at 247, the officers conducting the warrantless search identified that “they were looking for money and a gun” prior to asking permission to search. When consent for the search was given, the object and scope were known and adhered to. Similarly, in Frazier, supra, 394 U.S. at 740, 89 S.Ct. at 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d at 693, the police requested permission to search a duffel bag that belonged to the defendant but was in his cousin’s house and was being used by his cousin. The police received permission to search the bag from both the cousin and the cousin’s mother. Again, the scope of the warrantless *499search was established prior to its execution and carried out in accordance with the permission given. In both instances the police officers and the consenter were clear concerning the permission given. The scope of the consented search was identified to the third party and the permission given was specific to the asserted scope.
The majority also relies on dicta from McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964), for the proposition that an owner and co-tenant of a home has the authority to consent to a search. Although McCray is not an authority to consent case, it presents a set of facts illustrative of reasonable behavior that is lacking in the instant case. In McCray, supra, 236 Md. at 14, 202 A.2d at 322, the police officers executing the warrantless search “informed [the defendant’s father] of the reason for their visit” and asked permission to search the premises. Thereafter the father escorted the officers to the room his son occupied on the few occasions when he spent the night. The father refused to sign a consent to search form, but he left the officers alone in the room, saying his wife would sign it. At that moment the police officers reasonably believed that they had permission to search the room: the father invited them into the home, knew they were investigating a robbery, left them to their own devices in the room where his son slept, and went to get his wife so that she could sign the consent form. Under the totality of the circumstances it was reasonable for the officers to believe they had permission to conduct a search.
Likewise, it may have been reasonable for the police officers in the present case to believe, at the outset of the search, that they had permission to conduct a broad search of rooms used by all family members. At the instant Tariq objected, however, a warning light should have gone off in the minds of the officers. In McCray, the wife refused to sign the consent to search form and the search was immediately discontinued. The officers faced with Tariq’s protest should have confirmed that they had his mother’s permission to continue.
*500Another case relied on by the majority which illustrates reasonable behavior is Tate & Hall v. State, 32 Md.App. 613, 363 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 278 Md. 736 (1976). In Tate, the officers first received permission to search the home for the defendant. Failing to find him, the officers then asked for and received permission to “conduct a search of the house for evidence.” Tate & Hall, supra, 32 Md.App. at 618, 363 A.2d at 626. Thus, the officers recognized that the initial consent limited the scope of their search, and it was appropriate for them to seek permission to broaden their search.
Jones v. State, 13 Md.App. 309, 310-311, 283 A.2d 184, 185 (1971), cert denied, 264 Md. 749 (1972), is the sole case relied on by the majority which involved consent to a general undefined search. As here, the mother in Jones gave broad general permission to the police to search the house, and both she and her son were present during the search. Jones, however, is easily distinguished. In Jones, the mother went to the police station and requested that her son be arrested on drug charges. An arrest warrant was obtained for the defendant, and the police officers accompanied the mother back to her home. Her son was arrested, and she consented to the police officer’s request to search the property. She knew that drugs were present in the home when she gave her permission to search. The defendant was present during the search, and at no time did he object to the search or assert a privacy interest in the personal items being searched. Thus, there was no ambiguity, and under the totality of the circumstances the police officers’ behavior was reasonable.
Conversely, under the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, the officers’ conduct was not reasonable. Here, Tariq and his mother were present at the search. The original consent given was extremely general in nature and was not in response to a request to search for specific items. Subsequently, Tariq asserted an interest in the vest. At that moment the question arose: Did the consent given include items in which Tariq expressed a privacy interest? Faced with such an ambiguous situation, the officers should have made further inquiries. “It is the government’s burden to *501establish that a third party had authority to consent to a search ... [and that] burden cannot be met if the agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry.” United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C.Cir.1991). The additional burden of asking Tariq’s mother for permission to search the vest was slight. Thus, I would hold that the search was unreasonable and that the evidence should have been suppressed.2
BELL, C.J., agrees with the views expressed herein and joins this opinion.

. It is interesting that the majority relies on Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. In Coolidge, the Court held that the officers did not go to the defendant’s home to conduct a search. Rather, they merely asked if the defendant owned any guns and the guns were offered to the officers. The officers then asked for and were given the clothes of the defendant. The Court held that under these facts a search did not take place. Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 489, 91 S.Ct. at 2050, 29 L.Ed.2d at 596. Assuming, arguendo, that Coolidge is a consent to search case, the items sought were clearly identified, the scope of any “search” was known by the third party at the time of the consent, and there was no ambiguity concerning the consent.

. If the officers had asked Tariq’s mother for permission to search the vest, and if she had specifically granted the permission despite Tariq's objection, 1 would agree with the majority that Tariq's mother could “consent to a search of [her minor] child’s personal belongings left in the common area of their home, over the child’s objection.” (Opinion at 487, 701 A.2d at 692). It is important to emphasize that the majority’s holding is limited lo the circumstances here, involving a child’s vest left in a common area of the home. Whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances, a parent may be authorized to consent to a search of a child’s person, or of a container belonging to the child, or of a room used exclusively or primarily by the child, are questions not presented by this case and not decided by the majority. (See Opinion at 494-496, 701 A.2d at 696-697). While I also express no views on such questions at this time, it should be noted that children do have constitutional rights independent of their parents and that, under some circumstances, parents cannot waive their children's rights. See generally, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 738-740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 729-732 (1985) (Fourth Amendment applies to search of a 14-year-old student's purse by school officials who arguably stood in loco parentis at the time); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788, 808 (1976) (“Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights”), and cases there cited; Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C.Cir.1971); In re Scott K., 24 Cal.3d 395, 155 Cal.Rptr. 671, 595 P.2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973, 100 S.Ct. 468, 62 L.Ed.2d 388 (1979) (police officers were not authorized to search a tool box belonging to a minor based on his father's consent); State v. Carsey, 295 Or. 32, 664 P.2d 1085 (1983).