Court Opinion

ID: 9615941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:42:02.360773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:53.770926
License: Public Domain

GRODIN, J.
I concur in the result, though not in the reasoning, of the majority opinion.
For starters, I note that even if the trial court did err in instructing the jury on the Kubichans’ liability, that error was not likely to have affected the verdict. The jury entered a special verdict finding the Reids negligent— presumably on the basis of their conduct in refilling the pool and making alterations to its exterior—but finding also that their negligence was not a legal cause of plaintiff’s injury. Since the Kubichans’ relationship to the *128injury was even more remote than the Reids’, the prospect of the jury finding the Kubichans to be liable—even if it found them to be negligent—seems exceedingly slight. On that ground alone the judgment can be affirmed. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
If it were necessary to the decision of this case, I think more could be said in favor of the plaintiff’s position than the majority allows. The Restatement Second of Torts, upon which the majority heavily relies, itself distinguishes in certain contexts between conditions which a vendor of land has created, and those for which he is not actively responsible. With respect to persons outside the land, the Restatement proposes that a vendor who has created a condition which involves unreasonable risk of harm “because of its plan, construction, location, disrepair, or otherwise” may be held liable (whether or not he has concealed the condition) until the vendee discovers the condition and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. (Rest.2d Torts, § 373, subds. (1), (2).) The comment to section 373, subdivision (2) explains; “Where the vendor has himself created the unreasonably dangerous condition, his liability to persons outside of the land stands upon the same footing as if he were not a vendor but a third person who had created the condition, such as a trespasser or a contractor.”
Harper and James argue that “no sound basis” exists for distinguishing, in the case of conditions created by the vendor, between injury occurring on and off the land (2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 27.18, p. 1520), and in light of this state’s jurisprudence, which refuses to draw fine distinctions between the duties owed to different classes of the general public who are foreseeable victims of negligence (see, e.g., Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97,443 P.2d 561,32 A.L.R.3d 496]), their criticism may well have merit. Moreover, while it is probably true in this case that even the more extended rule of section 373 of the Restatement would not result in liability on the part of the Kubichans—it being apparent that the Reids had both discovered the condition of the pond and had reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against its risk—the liability of a contractor in this state would not be so limited. (See Stewart v. Cox (1961) 55 Cal.2d 857 [13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345]; Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Co. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 720 [321 P.2d 736].) If it is good policy to impose upon vendors who themselves create unreasonably dangerous conditions the same liability as a contractor would have, whether the harm occurs on or off the land, then imposition of liability upon the Kubichans might be appropriate.
I think it wise to refrain from unnecessary speculation as to the state of the common law in this regard, however, in light of recently enacted legislation which imposes upon transferors of real property the obligation to *129make certain disclosures to the buyer. (Civ. Code, § 1102 et seq., operative Jan. 1, 1987.) Among the information required to be supplied is an identification and explanation of any room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs made without necessary permits, or not in compliance with building codes. (Civ. Code, § 1102.6.) Willful or negligent failure to comply with the disclosure requirements may result in liability “in the amount of actual damages suffered by a transferee.” (Civ. Code, § 1102.13.) What effect, if any, these new provisions may have upon problems of the sort presented here is a question best left to a case in which it is squarely presented and briefed.
Bird, C. J., concurred.