Court Opinion

ID: 9955647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:02:40.383704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:09.629843
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Evangelista CA2/8
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B328423

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA506988)
                   v.

ROBERT FRANKES
EVANGELISTA,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part with directions.
      Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte and Kenneth C. Byrne, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                          **********
       Defendant and appellant Robert Frankes Evangelista appeals
from his conviction of one count of carjacking, one count of robbery
and one count of attempted robbery. He contends the trial court
committed instructional error, evidentiary error and sentencing
error, and also raises a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel. We reverse the sentence imposed on counts 1 and 2 and
remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct
a new sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgment of conviction in
all other respects.
         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant was charged, along with codefendant Hugo
Pereida, with carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 1),
second degree robbery (§ 211; count 2), attempted carjacking
(§§ 215, subd. (a), 664; count 3), and attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664;
count 4). The charges arose from events that occurred on July 6,
2022, involving two different victims, Cris Flores (counts 1 & 2) and
his father, Luis Flores (counts 3 & 4).
       Cris Flores lived with his father in Boyle Heights. On July 6,
2022, around 6:30 a.m., Cris arrived home from working the
graveyard shift at his job. His father’s BMW was parked in front of
the house when he got home. The BMW is silver and has
distinctive chrome rims.
       Sometime later that morning, Luis was getting ready to leave
for his job, but could not find his car keys. He woke up Cris and
they searched the house. They were unable to find the keys.
Around 11:00 a.m., Luis noticed his BMW was no longer parked in
front of their house. Cris got into his black Dodge and drove around
the neighborhood looking for the BMW to no avail. In the
meantime, Luis called 911 to report the car stolen and was told that
a unit would be responding to the house, but no officers ever
arrived.

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       Because a key to their house was also on Luis’s missing key
chain, Cris and Luis bought new locks for the front door and
installed them. By the afternoon, the police still had not arrived, so
Luis decided they should drive to the police station to report the car
theft. They took Cris’s Dodge. Luis drove. On their way to the
police station, they saw the stolen BMW parked next to a taco
stand.
       Luis pulled up next to the BMW and parked, blocking the
BMW from being driven away. The doors of the BMW were open,
and a man dressed in black was seated in the front passenger seat
(later identified only as “Sierra”).
       Luis and Cris approached the BMW on the driver’s side and
asked Sierra where he got the car. Sierra grabbed something from
the center console area before jumping out of the BMW. Luis
reached into the car hoping to find his keys but they were not in the
car. He saw a blow torch near the center console and grabbed it.
       Luis then saw defendant and Pereida approaching them from
across the street. Defendant was wearing a pair of shoes Luis had
left in the BMW (brown suede “Jordans” referred to as “peanut
butter shoes” because of their color). Luis and Cris asked defendant
what was going on and where he got the car. Defendant claimed
the BMW was his and that he bought it from some “homegirl.” Luis
responded that it was his car and it had been stolen from his house.
After some yelling back and forth, defendant eventually tossed the
key chain to Luis, but the house key was not on it—only the key fob
for the BMW. Luis demanded his house key and told everyone that
no one was leaving, they were going to wait for the police to arrive.
       Luis allowed defendant to retrieve some personal items from
the BMW (a hat and some gloves), but defendant also grabbed
paperwork belonging to Luis. Defendant told Pereida to “grab the
rest of their shit.” Pereida took something from the trunk of the

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BMW, but Luis was not sure what it was. At the same time, Sierra
grabbed a backpack from the BMW from which he pulled out a gun
and pointed it at Luis and Cris.
       Luis said the “dynamic” of their confrontation changed at that
point. Luis was concerned for his son, who was standing slightly
behind him and videotaping the incident on his cell phone.
Defendant told Luis that he had the paperwork from the BMW so
he knew where Luis lived, and he would go to his house and “blast”
or “smoke” him. Defendant told Sierra several times to shoot Luis
and Cris. The audible portions of the videotape of the incident were
transcribed and show defendant twice telling Sierra to “Shoot this
fool” and another time saying, “Blast this fool.”
       Luis and defendant squared off as if to fight and each took a
few swings, but neither landed any punches. Luis continued to hold
onto the blow torch believing it was keeping defendant at bay.
       Defendant and Sierra continued to threaten Luis and Cris,
saying to back off, and they were going to take both cars. At some
point, Sierra chased after Cris with the gun, while defendant
walked up to Cris’s Dodge and opened the driver’s side door as if to
get in. Sierra ran to the Dodge, jumped in and drove off. Defendant
and Pereida fled on foot. Luis and Cris got into the BMW and tried
to follow the Dodge but were unable to find it. They flagged down
two deputy sheriffs and reported the incident.
       Luis testified he did not sell the BMW to anyone and did not
give defendant or anyone permission to take the BMW. Cris
testified he did not give anyone permission to take his Dodge. The
Dodge contained a cell phone, air pods, money, jewelry, and both
Cris’s and Luis’s wallets, none of which was recovered. None of the
items taken from the BMW was recovered, except for the pair of
shoes that defendant had taken from the car and put on. The shoes
were returned to Luis after defendant’s arrest.

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       Videotape evidence of the incident from Cris’s cell phone and
a nearby security camera were played for the jury.
       Defendant did not offer any witnesses or testify on his own
behalf. Codefendant Pereida testified that defendant showed up at
his work, with Sierra, in a BMW and told him that he had just
bought the car. Defendant appeared to have paperwork for the car,
but Pereida did not read it or know what it said. Defendant offered
to drive Pereida to a nearby taco stand to get some lunch. After
ordering his food, Pereida walked toward a liquor store to buy a
phone charger, but before he got inside he heard a commotion
behind him. When he turned around, he saw defendant and Sierra
arguing with two other men. He walked back over and tried to
diffuse the “chaotic” situation, but everyone kept yelling at one
another. At some point, Sierra pulled out a gun.
       The jury found defendant guilty on counts 1, 2 and 4 and
acquitted him on count 3. Pereida was acquitted on all charges.
       Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on aggravating
factors and admitted he suffered two prior convictions in 2020 for
which he served a prison term: burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800).
       The court sentenced defendant to six years six months
calculated as follows: a five-year midterm on count 1, plus a
consecutive one-year term (one-third the midterm) on count 2, plus
a consecutive six-month term (one-third the midterm) on count 4.
Defendant was awarded 224 total days of presentence custody
credits (195 actual, 29 conduct).
       This appeal followed.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Penal Code Section 654 (Counts 1 & 2)
       The People concede that Penal Code section 654 applies to
counts 1 and 2, acknowledging People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th

                                 5
307, 315 which held that the forceful taking of a victim’s car was a
“single physical act for purposes of section 654 because that act
simultaneously accomplished the actus reus requirement for both
the robbery” of the valuables in the car and the carjacking of the
vehicle itself.
       The People contend that remand is not necessary, and this
court should modify the judgment to impose a stay on count 2.
Defendant says remand for resentencing is necessary because Penal
Code section 654 no longer requires the court to impose the longest
possible sentence when an act is punishable under two different
statutes. We agree remand is warranted.
       Defendant was sentenced on January 17, 2023, a year after
Assembly Bill No. 518’s amendments to Penal Code section 654
went into effect. Section 654 now grants trial courts the discretion
to choose which sentencing provision to apply when defendants
have committed criminal acts that are punishable under more than
one statutory provision. Trial courts are no longer obligated to
impose the sentence under the provision that contains the longest
sentence but may, instead, stay the term of the longer sentence and
apply an applicable provision that contains a shorter term. (Stats.
2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
       Carjacking (count 1) is punishable under Penal Code section
215, subdivision (b) which specifies a sentencing triad of three, five,
or nine years. Second degree robbery (count 2) is punishable by a
term of two, three, or five years. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) Nothing in
the record unequivocally indicates whether the court would exercise
its discretion to impose the longer sentence on count 1 and stay
count 2 or vice versa. Remand is therefore appropriate to allow the
trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in the first instance.
We express no opinion as to how the court should exercise its
discretion at resentencing.

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2.     The Unanimity Instruction (Count 4)
       Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial
error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury that it had to
unanimously agree on the act which constituted the attempted
robbery of Luis charged in count 4. He says the prosecution
presented and argued both an attempted taking from the BMW and
an attempted taking from the Dodge without making an election,
and he offered different defenses to both acts, thus necessitating a
unanimity instruction.
       It is undisputed defendant did not request a unanimity
instruction. However, the court has a sua sponte duty to provide
such an instruction if the evidence warrants it. (People v. Riel
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199.) “ ‘The [unanimity] instruction is
designed in part to prevent the jury from amalgamating evidence of
multiple offenses, no one of which has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, in order to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant must have done something sufficient to convict on
one count.’ [Citation.] [¶] On the other hand, where the evidence
shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement
as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s
precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis
or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is
guilty.’ ” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo).)
       A unanimity instruction is not required when the acts
committed by the defendant constitute “a continuous course of
conduct . . . so closely connected in time as to form part of one
transaction.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423; People v.
Bui (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1010–1011 [“ ‘continuous conduct’
exception [citation] applies if the defendant tenders the same
defense or defenses to each act and if there is no reasonable basis
for the jury to distinguish between them’ ”].) Russo instructs that

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“unanimity as to exactly how the crime was committed is not
required. Thus, the unanimity instruction is appropriate ‘when
conviction on a single count could be based on two or more discrete
criminal events,’ but not ‘where multiple theories or acts may form
the basis of a guilty verdict on one discrete criminal event.’ ”
(Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.)
       Defendant did not offer separate defenses to carjacking or
robbery of the BMW. His conduct appears to be part of a
continuous course of conduct, asserting his right to possess the
BMW and all its contents irrespective of the fact it was blocked by
the Dodge. In any event, assuming it was error, it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
       There is a split of opinion in the appellate courts as to which
harmless error standard applies in a unanimity instruction case.
(See, e.g., People v. Matute (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1448-1449
[noting conflicting authorities].) Like the majority of courts that
have addressed the issue, we apply the federal standard. (People v.
Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576–577.) “[W]here the
defendant offered the same defense to all criminal acts and ‘the
jury’s verdict implies that it did not believe the only defense
offered,’ failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless error.”
(Id. at p. 577.) Because defendant has not demonstrated prejudice,
his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a unanimity instruction also fails.
3.     The Impeachment Evidence
       Defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by
excluding evidence that Luis had a prior felony conviction of
assault. Defendant says the evidence was directly relevant to his
claim of self-defense and admissible under Evidence Code sections
352 and 1103 and should not have been sanitized by the court.
Defendant concedes his trial counsel did not object to the court’s

                                  8
decision to sanitize the prior conviction evidence and urges us to
find his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object.
       Defendant has waived this claim of evidentiary error by
failing to object in the trial court. (People v. Flinner (2020)
10 Cal.5th 686, 726.)
       Defendant has also failed to demonstrate his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object. (People v.
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653 (Johnson) [under two-pronged
test, a defendant must show counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability
that but-for counsel’s error, the defendant would have obtained a
more favorable outcome at trial]; Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 688, 693–696.)
       An attorney’s failure to object rarely constitutes ineffective
assistance. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206.) Our
ability as an appellate court to assess whether an attorney’s
representation was constitutionally deficient is limited because the
record, as here, usually does not contain any explanation of the
attorney’s strategy. (Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 653.) For this
reason, the Supreme Court “long ago adopted the rule that ‘ “[i]f the
record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in
the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for
an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on
appeal. [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.] The merits of such claims are
more appropriately resolved, not on the basis of the appellate
record, but rather by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.”
(Ibid.)
       In any event, even assuming the contention had been
preserved, we would reject it. Defendant has not shown that
evidence that Luis’s prior conviction was for assault would have

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caused the jury to form a different impression of Luis’s credibility.
The felony conviction was almost 10 years old at the time of trial
and had been reduced to a misdemeanor false imprisonment charge
by a subsequent order of the court. Defendant was not denied the
opportunity to impeach Luis with the prior felony conviction and in
fact, Luis candidly admitted to both that conviction and the
misdemeanor contempt of court conviction.
       Moreover, the jury was able to reasonably and fairly assess
defendant’s claim of self-defense based on the videotape evidence of
the incident. The jury was able to assess Luis’s credibility in light
of that evidence, as well as defendant’s claim of self-defense which
was presented only as argument by counsel since defendant
exercised his constitutional right not to testify. Defendant has not
demonstrated either prong of an ineffective assistance claim.
                           DISPOSITION
       The sentences imposed on counts 1 and 2 are reversed and
the case is remanded to the superior court for the limited purpose of
conducting a new sentencing hearing. The judgment of conviction is
affirmed in all other respects.

                              GRIMES, J.
      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        VIRAMONTES, J.

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