Court Opinion

ID: 9945908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 19:04:48.883605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:16.285181
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 P. v. Leedy CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Shasta)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098151

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 22F01677)

           v.

 RAKIM EXAVIER LEEDY,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Rakim Exavier Leedy appeals following his convictions for possessing
an assault weapon, possessing a controlled substance for sale, and several other offenses.
He raises two arguments: (1) a state law generally barring possession of assault weapons
violates the Second Amendment, and (2) he received ineffective assistance because his
trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s finding that he had the ability to pay

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certain fees and fines. We affirm, finding neither argument has merit, but will direct the
trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment to correct a clerical error.
                                      BACKGROUND
       While conducting surveillance, an officer saw Leedy leave an apartment with a
duffel bag and a cooler. Leedy walked to a nearby car, placed the duffel bag and cooler
in the trunk, and got in the passenger seat. Officers stopped the car shortly after and
conducted a search. On searching the cooler in the trunk, officers found four large bags
of cannabis. On searching the duffel bag in the trunk, they found, among other things, an
AR-15 style rifle, a high-capacity magazine holding over 10 rounds, a Glock-style pistol,
additional rounds of ammunition, MDMA, and OxyContin pills.
       Following the filing of charges against Leedy, a jury found Leedy guilty of two
counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)), three
counts of possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377), and
one count each of possessing an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a)), unlawfully
possessing ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), receiving a large-capacity magazine
(§ 32310, subd. (a)), possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11378), and transporting cannabis for sale (id., § 11360, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also
found that Leedy was 18 or older when he transported the cannabis for sale. Following
the jury’s verdicts, the trial court held a bench trial and found true several allegations. It
found Leedy had a prior strike conviction for assault with a firearm (§ 1170.12, subd.
(b)(1); see § 1192.7, subd. (c)(31)) and found his prior convictions were of increasing
seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)).
       Leedy afterward filed a motion in arrest of judgment under section 1185, arguing
that the statutes prohibiting possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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are unconstitutional. But the trial court denied the motion. The court sentenced Leedy to
a total term of seven years four months in prison and ordered him to pay $2,200 in fees
and fines. Leedy timely appealed.
                                        DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                    Second Amendment
       Leedy first raises a facial challenge to section 30605. He argues the statute, in
generally prohibiting possession of an assault weapon, violates the Second Amendment
of the United States Constitution. We reject his argument—an argument our court has
rejected already. (People v. Bocanegra (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1236, 1239 (Bocanegra);
see also People v. James (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 662, 667 [rejecting Second Amendment
challenge to § 30605’s predecessor].)
       A.     Bruen
       The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” The Supreme Court has found this language protects an individual right to
possess and carry arms for self-defense (District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S.
570, 592, 595, 620 (Heller)) and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, has found this “right
is fully applicable to the States” (McDonald v. Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 750). The
court, however, has emphasized that “ ‘[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited.’ ” (New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen
(2022) 597 U.S. 1, 21 (Bruen).) It does not extend to all weapons (Heller, at p. 623), nor
does it prohibit all government regulation even for those weapons it covers (Bruen, at p.
24).
       In determining whether a weapon regulation is consistent with the Second
Amendment, courts apply the standard described in Bruen. Under that standard, a party
challenging the regulation must first show the Second Amendment’s plain text applies,

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including showing that the weapons covered in the regulation are “Arms” within the
meaning of the Second Amendment. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24; Bevis v. City of
Naperville (7th Cir. 2023) 85 F.4th 1175, 1194 [parties challenging weapon regulation
have the “burden of showing that the weapons addressed in the pertinent legislation are
Arms”]; Del. State Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Del. Dept. of Safety & Homeland Sec.
(D.Del. 2023) 664 F.Supp.3d 584, 591 [same].) Once a party has established that the
Second Amendment’s plain text applies, “[t]he government must then justify its
regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation.” (Bruen, at p. 24.) Courts after Bruen have called this two-step
standard “Bruen step one” and “Bruen step two.” (Bevis, at p. 1198; United States v.
Alaniz (9th Cir. 2023) 69 F.4th 1124, 1128.)
       Several issues concerning this standard remain unsettled following Bruen.
(See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 82 (conc. opn. of Barrett, J.) [mentioning “just a few
unsettled questions”].) One of those issues, and the only one we consider here, concerns
whether the weapons covered in a challenged law are in common use for lawful
purposes—a critical consideration under Bruen. As the Supreme Court has explained,
“the Second Amendment protects the possession and use of weapons that are ‘ “in
common use at the time” ’ ” (Bruen, at p. 21) and “does not protect those weapons not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled
shotguns” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 625).
       Although the court has highlighted the importance of this consideration, it has not
yet explained “whether the common-use issue belongs at Bruen step one or Bruen step
two.” (Bevis v. City of Naperville, supra, 85 F.4th at p. 1194.) This issue matters to the
allocation of burdens. Does the challenging party have the burden at step one to show a
regulated weapon is in common use for lawful purposes? Or does the government have
the burden at step two to prove a negative—the regulated weapon is not in common use
for lawful purposes? Consistent with several courts that have addressed this matter, we

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conclude that common use is properly addressed at Bruen step one. (United States v.
Alaniz, supra, 69 F.4th at p. 1128; National Assn. for Gun Rights v. Lamont (D.Conn.,
Aug. 3, 2023, No. 3:22-1118 (JBA)) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis 134880, at p. *51; Hanson v.
District of Columbia (D.D.C., Apr. 20, 2023, No. 22-2256 (RC)) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis
68782, at p. *21; Del. State Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Del. Dept. of Safety & Homeland
Sec., supra, F.Supp.3d at p. 591; Oregon Firearms Federation, Inc. v. Brown (D.Or.
2022) 644 F.Supp.3d 782, 799.)
       Two principal considerations guide our conclusion that common use pertains more
to a challenging party’s need to show the Second Amendment’s plain text applies (Bruen
step one) than to the government’s need to show its regulation is consistent with the
historical tradition of firearm regulation (Bruen step two). First, in applying its own two-
part standard, the Bruen court covered common use when discussing the applicability of
the Second Amendment’s plain text, not when discussing the historical tradition of
firearm regulation. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 32-34.) Second, consistent with
Bruen, Heller suggests that common use is critical to understanding the types of weapons
considered to be bearable “Arms,” a textual issue, explaining that “the Second
Amendment right . . . extends only to certain types of weapons” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S.
at p. 623) and that “the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the
time’ ” (id. at p. 627). Consistent with these authorities, we find common use is
appropriately addressed at Bruen step one.
       B.     Applying Bruen
       Applying Bruen’s framework here, we find Leedy has not met his burden to show
that the assault weapons covered in section 30605 are in common use for lawful
purposes. Because he raises only a facial challenge, his burden is particularly heavy.
Our Supreme Court—noting the relevant “standard governing facial challenges has been
a matter of some debate”—has explained that a party bringing a facial challenge must
either show that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications (“the strictest

                                               5
requirement for establishing facial unconstitutionality”) or that it is unconstitutional “ ‘in
the generality or great majority of cases’ ” (“the more lenient standard” for establishing
facial unconstitutionality). (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1126.)
Leedy has made neither showing, however, for he has not shown that all, most, or even
any of the assault weapons covered in section 30605 are in common use for lawful
purposes. (See §§ 30510 [defining assault weapon], 30515 [further defining assault
weapon].)
       Attempting to show that these assault weapons are in common use, Leedy first
cites our court’s decision in Bocanegra. He claims we acknowledged there that these
weapons “ ‘are in common use in . . . jurisdictions’ ” other than California. But we never
wrote those words. We instead only acknowledged the possibility that assault weapons
like AR-15 rifles “may be in common use in other jurisdictions.” (Bocanegra, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 1253.) We also concluded that these weapons “are ‘weapons not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes’ ”—which if true, would
be fatal to Leedy’s position here. (Id. at p. 1252; see Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 625
[“the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes”].)
       Leedy next, quoting New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Cuomo (2d Cir. 2015)
804 F.3d 242, 255, asserts “ ‘the assault weapons . . . at issue are “in common use” as that
term was used in Heller.’ ” But Leedy never shows that the assault weapons at issue in
the cited case—which were weapons covered under New York and Connecticut law (id.
at p. 247)—are the same assault weapons at issue here—which are weapons covered
under California law (see City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068,
1099 [courts “ ‘are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them’ ”]).
       Citing another case, Heller v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 2011) 399 U.S.
App.D.C. 314 [670 F.3d 1244, 1261], Leedy contends “semi-automatic rifles are in
common use” because “since 1986, roughly 1.6 million of them had been manufactured

                                              6
and constituted, at that time, ‘5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 percent of all rifles
produced in the U.S. for the domestic market.’ ” But the quoted language shows only
substantial production of semiautomatic rifles, not common use of these rifles.
Production numbers and use numbers may often be correlated, but they are not the same
thing. And even if we assumed that semiautomatic rifles are in common use, Leedy fails
to appreciate that section 30605 does not prohibit the possession of all semiautomatic
rifles. It only prohibits possession of certain types of semiautomatic rifles (see §§ 30500,
30515), and Leedy has not shown that those types of rifles are in common use.
       Leedy next cites a law review article for factual support. Quoting Chapman, Are
Semiautomatic Rifles “Dangerous and Unusual” Weapons? (2023) 54 U.Tol. L.Rev.
191, 210, he asserts: “ ‘[S]emiautomatic rifles like the AR-15 are widely owned and used
by private citizens for lawful purposes in the millions. As such, they are in no way
among the “dangerous and unusual” weapons historically outside the ambit of the
traditional right to keep and bear arms and are well within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection.’ ” But reviewing the quoted page of this article, we find no
citation or explanation supporting this factual assertion. We decline to treat this as
sufficient evidence that the assault weapons covered in section 30605 are, as Leedy
claims, in common use. (See County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434,
1450 [declining to take judicial notice of two law review articles].)
       Even if we accepted the article’s factual assertions, moreover, Leedy has failed to
show that all (or even many) of the referenced rifles are assault weapons prohibited under
section 30605. The term “assault weapon” is a defined term, with both section 30510 and
section 30515 defining the term. Section 30515, subdivision (a)(1) provides the relevant
definition here. It states that “assault weapon” means “[a] semiautomatic, centerfire rifle
that does not have a fixed magazine but has any one of the following: [¶] (A) A pistol
grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon. [¶] (B) A thumbhole
stock. [¶] (C) A folding or telescoping stock. [¶] (D) A grenade launcher or flare

                                               7
launcher. [¶] (E) A flash suppressor. [¶] (F) A forward pistol grip.” (30515, subd.
(a)(1).) The jury in this case, in finding Leedy possessed an assault weapon, found that
his AR-15 style rifle had one or more of these characteristics. But Leedy has not shown
that any of these characteristics is typical of the rifles referenced in the law review article.
Nor has he shown that these rifles are otherwise covered under the statutes defining
“assault weapon.”
       Lastly, in his reply brief, Leedy cites Miller v. Bonta (S.D.Cal., Oct. 19, 2023, No.
19-cv-01537 BEN (JLB)) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis 188421, app. pending. That court found
that assault rifles like AR-15 rifles are commonly owned for lawful purposes (id. at p.
*23) and issued an order—since stayed—enjoining enforcement of section 30605 to the
extent it applies to the assault weapons described in section 30515, subdivision (a)(1)-(8)
(Miller v. Bonta, at pp. *97-98). But while we may certainly consider that court’s
analysis, neither its factual findings nor its legal conclusions are binding on our court.
(People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86 [“we are not bound by the decisions of the
lower federal courts even on federal questions”]; United States v. Mendoza (1984) 464
U.S. 154, 159-163 [the government, after receiving an adverse ruling on an issue in one
case, is generally not estopped from raising that issue in another case against a different
party].) We also note that its factual findings appear to conflict with our own court’s
findings in Bocanegra that these weapons are “ ‘not typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes.’ ” (Bocanegra, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1252, italics
added; see also People v. James, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 676 [“assault weapons, like
machine guns, are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”].)
Finding no evidence in the record bearing on this topic, we have no ability to weigh in on
the merits of these competing factual findings. (See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 25, fn. 6
[anticipating that courts will “decide a case based on the historical record compiled by the
parties”].)

                                               8
       In the end, Leedy has cited nothing in the record showing that the assault weapons
covered in section 30605 are in common use for lawful purposes. Nor has he cited
anything outside the record sufficient to make this showing. We consequently reject his
Second Amendment challenge to section 30605.
                                               II
                                       Fees and Fines
       Leedy next raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Citing People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, he states that a trial court must account for a
defendant’s ability to pay when imposing fees and fines. He then contends he received
ineffective assistance because his trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s finding
that he had the ability to pay certain fees and fines—namely, a $1,500 restitution fine
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $300 court facility fee (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)), and a
$400 court operations assessment fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). We reject his argument.
       To support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must (1)
“show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” and (2) “show resulting prejudice,
i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Although establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is often difficult, it is “particularly
difficult” on direct appeal. (Ibid.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for
ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational
tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason
and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All
other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus
proceeding.” (Ibid.)
       In this case, before imposing fees and fines, the trial court specifically said it
considered Leedy’s ability to pay. It said: “Mr. Leedy, I want you to be aware, sir, that

                                               9
the recommendation from Probation was to impose a $10,000 restitution fine, which is
the maximum fine. I considered the fact that you will be serving a state prison sentence
according to the Court’s sentencing here today. I’ve also considered the fact that you
have been able to work, and you have been successful in obtaining employment in the
past, so I wanted to set the restitution amount at an[] amount I felt you had the ability to
pay, sir, but, yet, wouldn’t burden you with such a significant fine that when you are
released from state prison that would be such a significant debt over your head, I guess is
the best way to state it, Mr. Leedy. So I have significantly reduced fines and fees being
imposed, because I want to help you be successful upon your release from prison, sir.”
       Leedy acknowledges these facts. But he argues his trial counsel should have noted
that at the time of his arrest, according to the probation report, he was only “earning
income erratically through under-the-table work laying concrete.” He adds that his
counsel should have noted that it will be harder for him to obtain this work once he is
released from prison because of the additional felony convictions. Leedy then argues that
had his counsel made these points and asked the court to strike the fees and stay
execution of the restitution fine, there is a reasonable probability the trial court would
have followed this request.
       We reject his argument. The probation report, to start, says more than Leedy
acknowledges. True, it noted his erratic income from laying concrete. But in the next
sentence, it also noted that Leedy was employed at a restaurant around the time of his
arrest. And Leedy said these two jobs kept him busy. Leedy’s claim here, then, that he
only earned an erratic income from laying concrete is inaccurate—and we do not find his
trial counsel ineffective simply because he failed to attempt to mislead the trial court.
Even setting that aside, reasonably competent counsel could have determined that an
objection based on the probation report’s mention of Leedy’s concrete work would have
been futile, for the trial court already told counsel that it had read and considered the
probation report. As case law makes clear, “[c]ounsel does not render ineffective

                                              10
assistance by failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines
would be futile.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387.)
       Turning to the adverse effect of felony convictions on job prospects, Leedy treats
the point as so obvious that he neglects to point to any data or citation to substantiate the
claim. He then asks us to assume that this point—though obvious—was not known by
the trial court, so it was necessary for his counsel to inform the court. We are
unpersuaded. The trial court, consistent with the probation report, found Leedy had
“been able to work” and had “been successful in obtaining employment in the past,” even
though he had “multiple prior felony convictions.” Leedy believes his trial counsel
should have objected that obtaining employment following his release would be more
difficult this time given his growing felony history. But his counsel could have
reasonably concluded that an objection along these lines would only be a waste of time
given the trial court’s comments about Leedy’s prior success in gaining employment
despite already having a significant felony history. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (See
People v. Anzalone (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 380, 394 [“Attorneys are not required to
make every conceivable objection”]; People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 996, 1003
[attorneys are not ineffective simply because they have “not pressed every motion or
made every possible objection”].)
                                              III
                                       Clerical Error
       The People raise one issue of their own: The abstract of judgment describes
Leedy’s sentence for possessing a controlled substance for sale (count 9) as one year four
months, one-third the low term, doubled, even though the trial court ordered him to serve
one year four months, one-third the middle term, doubled. (See § 1170.1, subd. (a) [the
“subordinate term for each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle
term of imprisonment”]; see also § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) [the term for an offense with an

                                              11
indeterminate term is doubled when the defendant has a prior serious or felony
conviction].) We agree this clerical error should be corrected, which Leedy does not
dispute, and will direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment to correct
this error. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of
judgment to note that the sentence for count 9 is one year four months, one-third the
middle term, doubled. The court is directed to forward a certified copy of the corrected
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                      /s/
                                                  BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

   /s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

    /s/
MESIWALA, J.

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