Court Opinion

ID: 9789559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:38:28.638023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:23.183262
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree with the dissent of Justice Gordon that if the statute, A.R.S. § 13-531, is void on account of vagueness and overbreadth, then to allow the conviction to stand because defendant is a “hard core violator” puts the doctrine of judicial review on an ad hoc basis in which the affirmance or reversal is based not upon the law but upon the subjective views of the members of an appellate court as to whether they approve or disapprove of the defendant’s conduct.
I am not persuaded, however, that as applied to the acts of the defendant in the instant case, the statute is unconstitutional and that therefore defendant has standing to raise the issue.
To begin with, it should be noted that a statute that is unconstitutional as to one set of defendants or to one type of conduct may not be unconstitutional as to other defendants or other conduct. Broadrick v. *362Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 522, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960).
For the purposes of our decision, we must accept the fact that as applied to “topless dancers” the statute is overbroad and vague. Attwood v. Purcell, D.C., 402 F.Supp. 231 (1975). But being overly broad and vague as to topless dancers does not mean that the statute is overbroad and vague as to the facts in the instant case. The defendant ran down the street in tights with the crotch removed, exposing his genitals to the public. This was anti-social conduct to which the statute applies. I believe that:
“[T]here are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.” United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d 796, 816 (1973).
We believe that “men of common intelligence” need not “necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926).
Because this statute is not overbroad or vague as to the defendant, I do not believe that he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute as it applies to others. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
“Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court, (citations omitted) A closely related principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously, (citation omitted) These principles rest on more than the fussiness of judges. They reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws. * * * ” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at 610-11, 93 S.Ct. at 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d at 839 (1973).
And while the court in Broadrick, supra, recognized the fact that they are more likely to find facial overbreadth in First Amendment cases, the court did state:
“ * * * But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe, (citations omitted) To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute may not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. * * * whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations * * *Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. at 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d at 842. See generally, The First Amendment Over-breadth Doctrine, 83 Harvard Law Review 844 (1970).
*363The United States District Court was concerned in Attwood, supra, with the question of nude dancing as a form of expression and stated:
“We feel that the conclusion is inescapable: nude dancing can be a protected form of expression under the First Amendment and as such is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Our consideration of A.R.S. § 13-531 therefore must of necessity be guided by the constitutional standards applied to state control over such expression.” Attwood v. Purcell, supra, 402 F.Supp. at 234.
And the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated:
“ * * * while, the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by the judges) or in quality (as viewed by the critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who, having worked overtime for the necessary wherewithal, wants some ‘entertainment’ with his beer or shot of rye.” Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21, n. 3 (2nd Cir. 1974) aff’d 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975).
Therefore, I disagree with the reasoning of the majority but concur in the result.