Court Opinion

ID: 9711195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:26:12.393268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.752428
License: Public Domain

Cole, J.,

dissenting:

Today no one perhaps notices because only a small, obscure criminal is the victim. But every person is the victim, for the technology we exalt today is everyman’s master.
Mr. Justice Douglass, dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 757, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971).
The majority holds today that the installation of a pen register, by the telephone company, at the request of the police and without the authorization of a warrant, at its central office to record all numbers dialed from the defendant’s telephone, does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment because “there is no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a telephone system.”
I disagree and I respectfully dissent.
The issue of whether the use of a pen register is a search and must therefore comply with the standards of the fourth amendment is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Heretofore, this Court has only addressed the question of whether government electronic interception of a conversation is a search. E.g., Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337 A. 2d 415 (1975); Siegel v. State, 266 Md. 256, 292 A. 2d 86 (1972); Trovinger v. State, 34 Md. App. 357, 367 A. 2d 548 (1977); Pennington v. State, 19 Md. App. 253, 310 A. 2d 817 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1019 (1974); State v. Graziano, 17 Md. App. 276, 301 A. 2d 36 (1973). The pen register alone does not record “conversations,” nor whether a call was completed; it *179only records' the fact that certain numbers were dialed from a telephone. The question actually before us, then, is whether police interception of the information from Smith’s telephone (certain numbers dialed) by means of a pen register, was a “search.” 1
A “search” in the constitutional sense has three components: it is (1) an invasion into otherwise private or concealed areas or matters (2) by the government (3) exploring for evidence of guilt in a criminal prosecution. See von Lusch v. State, 39 Md. App. 517, 387 A. 2d 306 (1978); Minnick v. State, 4 Md. App. 81, 241 A. 2d 153 (1968); Kleinbart v. State, 2 Md. App. 183, 234 A. 2d 288 (1967). Other courts have adopted similar definitions of the term “search.” See, e.g., United States v. Lisk, 522 F. 2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1078 (1976); United States v. Davis, 482 F. 2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); Marshall v. United States, 422 F. 2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Tully, 166 Conn. 126, 348 A. 2d 603 (1974); State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Alcorn v. State, 255 Ind. 491, 265 N.E.2d 413 (1970); State v. Person, 34 Ohio Misc. 97, 298 N.E.2d 922 (1973); State v. Cundy, 201 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 928 (1973); Long v. State, 532 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 937 (1976). Especially concise is the definition in Davis, supra, at 896-97:
'[S]earch is a functional, not merely a physical, process.’ Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74, 78, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949). A search begins with the planning of the invasion and continues 'until effective appropriation’ of the fruits of the search 'for subsequent proof of an offense.’ *180Id. The Fourth Amendment applies to a search whenever the government participates in any significant way in this total course of conduct. ‘The decisive factor ... is the actuality of a share by a[n] ... official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means.’
A “search,” therefore, is a step in a criminal investigation by the government which focuses on the gathering of information or clues relevant to prosecution.
Information is not restricted to the contents of oral communication. In many situations non-verbal' action may be more explicit and highly relevant to a criminal investigation. Such signals may be a command to bet or not to bet, to print or not to print, to preserve or to destroy, or indeed, to stay or flee. It is only left to the investigator to understand the question being answered. I agree with the majority that conversation is protected under the teachings of United States v. Katz, 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). However, information received from monitoring Smith’s telephone is also entitled to protection. Technologically, a distinction between verbal and digital transmissions is absurd. There can be no doubt that the fact that Smith made certain calls from his home telephone is highly relevant information in a criminal prosecution for obscene or annoying phone calls.
The “government action” part of the definition of a “search” is satisfied in Smith’s case because the telephone company attached the pen register to Smith’s line at the request of the police and was not ordered to do so by a court or acting under compulsion of a warrant. In essence, the telephone company, not conducting an independent investigation of its own, assumed the role of an agent of the government in conducting a warrantless search. The majority cites cases which on this point are inapposite. The surveillance of the defendants’ telephones in Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F. 2d 254, 256 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Harvey, 540 F. 2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Clegg, 509 F. 2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); Nolan v. United States, 423 F. 2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1969); cert. denied, 400 U. S. 848 *181(1970); and Brandon v. United States, 382 F. 2d 607 (10th Cir. 1967) was conducted solely by the telephone companies, independent of government agencies.2 Furthermore, in United States v. Baxter, 492 F. 2d 150 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U. S. 801 (1973); DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F. 2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 949 (1971); and United States v. Covello, 410 F. 2d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 879 (1969), no pen registers or blue boxes were ever used; government agencies merely subpoenaed the toll or long distance billing records routinely kept by the telephone company. United States v. Fithian, 452 F. 2d 505 (9th Cir. 1971), also involved the exercise of governmental power to subpoena telephone company records rather than governmental or telephone company surveillance of the making of calls, although the opinion is unclear as to whether the documents recorded local or toll calls, or both.3
The “invasion of privacy” prong of the definition of a “search” is also met in this case. While telephone companies routinely maintain records of toll and long distance calls for billing purposes, or monitor a telephone line to correct problems with services, or deal with customer complaints, local calls made by Smith on his home phone are a private matter. Routine telephone company activities do not include the monitoring of local calls because customers usually pay for basic use of equipment at a flat rate. Nor would the government routinely be privy to information concerning Smith’s private local calls absent a warrant.
*182The majority contends that a legal distinction between telephone customer expectations regarding local calls and toll calls cannot be made because subscribers have no real knowledge as to the geographic boundaries of their local calling area. This amounts to mere speculation as to what the average telephone customer knows. In addition, in Maryland, a person using the telephone must have some knowledge of his local calling zone because a special number prefix, “1,” must be dialed in order just to complete in-state calls which are made to telephones outside one’s local calling zone. It is also difficult to agree with this argument because it assumes that telephone subscribers are so unconcerned about the amount of their monthly bills that they pay no attention to whether they are making toll calls.
Second, the .majority suggests that since all telephone calls must pass through equipment owned by the telephone company, the telephone company will have knowledge of the fact that calls were made. The majority then attempts to construct an analogy between the facts in this case and prior cases holding that transfer of information to the government by a “wired” informant, United States v. White, supra, or by a bank, United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), or by means of “mail covers” e.g., United States v. Leonard, 524 F. 2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 958 (1976), or by observation in a public area, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F. 2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1002 (1976), did not violate the fourth amendment because those defendants had no constitutionally protected expectations of privacy when they gave information to the person(s) who ultimately turned the information over to the government.
This analogy just does not hold water. In White, supra, a conversation between the defendant and an informant was relayed by the informant to the police by means of an electronic transmitter that the informant was wearing. The majority opinion in White stressed that because the revelation to the government was made by a “party” to conversation with the defendant, the defendant had no justifiable or constitutionally protected expectation of privacy concerning *183the conversation. 401 U. S. 745 at 749.1 cannot agree that the telephone company in this case was a “party” to Smith’s calls in the same sense as the informant in White. Smith did not speak to the telephone company in the direct manner that White spoke to the informant. The telephone company was “neutral” in the telephone call. See California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 48-49, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974). Smith was leasing the telephone in order to make private calls from his home. If Smith had known that a pen register would be attached to his phone merely at the request of the police, without a warrant, he would have little reason to lease a “private” home phone. A home phone would afford him little more privacy than a public phone.
Similarly, in Miller, supra, the Supreme Court held that because the defendant’s bank was a “party” to the instruments negotiated by the defendant, the bank’s revelation of information about the defendant’s accounts upon government subpoena did not implicate the fourth amendment. 425 U. S. 435 at 440. According to the Court, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that situation. Once again, I cannot agree that the telephone company is a “party” to its customers’ telephone conversations in the same sense in which a bank operates with regard to its customers’ negotiable instruments, so as to render unreasonable Smith’s expectation of privacy in the use of his home phone. Even if the majority’s analogy to Miller is valid, (and I do not agree) and Smith should have expected that the telephone company could itself monitor his phone for billing purposes, to improve service to its customers, or to verify complaints, Smith nevertheless had a reasonable expectation that the telephone company would not, without the safeguards of appropriate legal process, act for the government in collecting information relevant to a criminal prosecution. See California Bankers Association v. Shultz, supra, 416 U. S. 21 at 52.
The majority’s analogy to “mail covers” is also unconvincing. While use of the postal service involves essentially public facilities where any writing on the outside of an envelope or on a postcard can be easily read by postal *184employees, telephones are placed in the home to provide privacy regarding the parties to and content of a conversation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the aura of privacy which surrounds activities in the home, as contrasted with “public” activities. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (Fourth Amendment context). The decision in Miller, supra, does not preclude this type of analysis because the Court in Miller expressly based its decision on the assumption that the documents subpoenaed were not the respondent’s “private papers.” Miller, supra, 425 U. S. 435 at 440. Unlike Miller, who voluntarily gave information to another “party” to his commercial transactions, his bank, and never operated on the assumption that the information was private, defendant Smith sought to maintain his privacy regarding his phone calls by placing them in his home. In contrast to the .majority, I believe that the use of “mail covers” is less of an invasion of privacy than a pen register. The address and return address on an envelope are easily visible to anyone handling it, while use of a home phone is designed to make telephone communications a much more private matter.
The same argument also shows the weakness of the majority’s reference to observations made on a public highway by the police. Smith placed these calls on his home telephone precisely to avoid “knowingly exposing” information to the public, as did the defendants in Hufford, supra, and in United States v. Moore, 562 F. 2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977).
The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the warrantless search through electronic detection placed upon Smith’s telephone violated the Fourth Amendment. The test that must be applied is one of the. reasonableness of the search:
[Tjhere is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’
*185Katz, supra, 389 U. S. 347 at 361; Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 52, 367 A. 2d 949, cert. denied, 421 U. S. 932 (1977).
While I would agree with the majority that it is difficult to know whether a telephone subscriber harbors an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers which he dials, I would contend that the facts in this. case clearly support an inference that Smith had an expectation of privacy in the local calls he made. As previously stated, a phone call placed in the home would demonstrate an expectation of privacy, in contrast to one placed from a public phone or a private phone located in someone else’s home. In addition, the telephone company does not usually keep records of every local call for routine billing or service purposes. At the very least, Smith certainly had an expectation that the telephone company would not act as a government agent in monitoring his calls for purposes of a criminal investigation without appropriate legal process. That such expectation is reasonable seems undebatable.
Finally, the majority dismisses Smith’s contention rather summarily by stating that “[e]ven if he did harbor such an expectation, we are not prepared to say on the record before us that it is one that society would recognize as reasonable and constitutionally protected.” I emphatically disagree.
Not only is society prepared to recognize this expectation of privacy in the use of one’s home telephone but society would welcome the fact that this Court would declare its recognition of the right and protect it. Stated differently, I do not believe anyone in our society would be surprised to learn that the police were illegally tapping phones, examining mail or otherwise engaging in unlawful snooping. However, they would be shocked to learn that this Court or any other court condoned, tolerated or put its stamp of approval on such practices.
The majority fails to give due weight to the impact of Watergate and its progeny, the recent revelations of illicit surveillance conducted by the F.B.I. upon activities of various civil rights, labor and political leaders, or indeed, the potential abuse to which the pen register may be put by police *186authorities.4 These factors and others have created an environment of distrust, fear and lack of confidence.
I believe society condemns any such unlawful practice and awaits the forces of good to restore the basic right of privacy which has been steadily eroded. I believe that each citizen still clings to the notion that while being deprived of his privacy, he still has the right to it and relies upon the courts to safeguard that privacy from warrantless intrusion.
Lest we forget, the heart of the fourth amendment is to protect citizens against every unjustifiable intrusion by the state upon their privacy, whatever the means employed. For the fourth amendment to remain viable, it must adjust to the times and afford protection against new forms of invasions of privacy, however sophisticated and whether they are generated through electronics or even advances in the psychic or related sciences.
In the instant case, no such intrusion was legal without proper review of a magistrate. I would recognize Smith’s right of privacy and suppress the fruits of the warrantless search.

. Two federal circuits have held that use of a pen register constitutes a search. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 546 F. 2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976); Application of U.S. in Matter of Order, 538 F. 2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 98 S. Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). Dicta from other circuits endorse the views of Mr. Justice Powell in United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (concurring and dissenting opinion). See United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. John, 508 F. 2d 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 962 (1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F. 2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 955 (1975).

. Although not cited by the majority in this case, two other recent Ninth Circuit decisions specifically excluded fourth amendment considerations because monitoring activities were conducted by telephone companies, independent of the government. See United States v. Bowler, 561 F. 2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Glanzer, 521 F. 2d 11 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).

. In the case sub judice the police obtained information about all of Smith’s outgoing calls, not just long-distance or toll calls, as in Baxter, DiPiazza, and Covello, supra. The majority attempts to minimize the significance of these factual distinctions by quoting a portion of Hodge, supra, in which, without citing any authority other than its own opinion, the Ninth Circuit stated that the difference between a pen register’s recording of all attempted outgoing telephone calls and a telephone company’s routine records of completed toll and long distance calls is not of constitutional dimension. See Hodge, supra, 555 F. 2d at 256-57 and n. 6.

. A pen register may be subject to abuse because it may be easily converted into a wiretap by attaching headphones or a tape recorder to appropriate terminals on the pen register unit.Newer models of pen registers have automatic voice actuated switches which can automatically turn a tape recorder on and off as the telephone is used. See Note, Circumventing Title III, The Use of Pen Register Surviellanee in Law Enforcement, 1977 Duke L. J. 751, 759. The pen register also has the potential of inhibiting freedom of association. If pen register data were fed into a central computer on a widespread basis, patterns of acquaintances and dealings among a substantial group of people would be available to the government. A. Miller, Assault on Privacy, supra, at 43.