Court Opinion

ID: 9521864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:13:53.463743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:21.145285
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
With respect to the issue concerning trying Miller in absentia, I concur in result. The trial court could consider the unsworn statements of defense counsel and the deputy prosecutor only in light of the duty of candor owed by attorneys to the court. As noted by the majority in footnote 2, Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 permits a court to credit and rely upon an unsworn representation made by counsel as to a matter within counsel’s personal knowledge unless and until the contrary is shown. This reliance is especially warranted, where, as here, the court must make an immediate ruling as to whether to proceed with the trial.
The representation made by defense counsel was never contested, even when Miller had an opportunity to do so. He therefore failed to demonstrate any reasonable explanation for his absence at trial. Accordingly, he has shown no entitlement to reversal upon this basis.
I fully concur in the majority’s resolution of the issue of failure to object to the accountant’s testimony upon grounds of privilege.
As to the admission of witness Adich’s testimony, I concur in the conclusion that his testimony tended to show the overall scheme to defraud the investors. I must, however, disagree that evidence of unrelated criminal activity is always admissible upon a general vague suggestion that it “completes the story”. Notwithstanding McCormick v. State (1982) Ind., 437 N.E.2d 993 at 996, such evidence should not be admitted unless it otherwise qualifies to demonstrate the common scheme or plan. This is particularly so when the prejudicial effect of the evidence tends to heavily out*1255weigh its relevance to prove the crime charged.
I concur that Marion County was an appropriate venue for the trial even though the actual security sales took place elsewhere. An essential element as to each cognizable charge was failure to register the securities and/or himself as a dealer with the Indiana Securities Commission located in Marion County.
I must respectfully dissent however from affirmance of the convictions upon all of the eighteen counts filed. The six counts which charge failure of Miller to register as a broker-dealer specifically reiterate the identical six acts which constitute the charges in the first six counts. Similarly, the six counts involving allegations of securities fraud depend upon the same six sales alleged in Counts I-VI.
The sales to six named purchasers, which constitute criminal acts under Counts I-VI, are also included as essential elements of the crimes charged in Counts VII-XII, and of the crimes charged in Counts XIII-XVIII. The sales themselves are included offenses in Counts VII-XVIII because of the way those offenses are charged. The convictions under Counts VII-XII and Counts XIII-XVIII cannot co-exist with the convictions upon Counts I-VI. Watkins v. State (1991) Ind., 575 N.E.2d 624; Bowling v. State (1990) Ind., 560 N.E.2d 658; Wellington v. State (1990) Ind., 560 N.E.2d 496; Griffin v. State (1991) 2d Dist., Ind. App., 583 N.E.2d 191.
Accordingly, I would affirm the convictions and the six consecutive eight-year sentences imposed upon Counts I through VI for an aggregate sentence of forty-eight years. I would reverse the convictions upon Counts VII through XVIII and, in doing so, note that the time to be served by the defendant is not affected thereby.