Court Opinion

ID: 9782616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:00:18.084947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:06.577916
License: Public Domain

*79Graffeo, J.
(dissenting). In this child sex abuse case, defendant Marcos Fernandez sought to introduce testimony at trial that complainant, his young niece, had a poor reputation in their family for veracity. The trial court barred the evidence for lack of a proper foundation based, as relevant here, on its determination that the family was not a reliable community for purposes of establishing a reputation. Following defendant’s conviction on three counts, the Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial (74 AD3d 1379 [2010]), concluding that defendant was entitled to present such evidence, and a majority of this Court now affirms that ruling. Because I believe that the trial court did not err in precluding defendant’s proffered reputation testimony under the circumstances of this case, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority correctly recounts, it is well settled that a witness may be impeached by evidence of a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity “once a foundation has been laid” (People v Hanley, 5 NY3d 108, 112 [2005]). We have cautioned, however, that a proper foundation for such evidence requires a showing that the proposed testimony has a “reasonable assurance of reliability” (People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130, 139 [1980]). It is on this point that I diverge from the analysis of the majority.
Typically, the reliability inquiry focuses on whether the associations of the witness whose credibility is at stake “are of such quantity and quality as to permit him to be personally observed by a sufficient number of individuals” (id.). But the identity of the “community” is also relevant to a court’s determination of admissibility (see Hanley, 5 NY3d at 113 [the community must be “probative and rehable”]). We have held that a witness’s reputation in a number of different settings can be probative, including reputations formed in a residential neighborhood (see People v Van Gaasbeck, 189 NY 408, 418-419 [1907]); the business community (see Bouton, 50 NY2d at 140); a vocational school or army post (see People v Colantone, 243 NY 134, 137-138 [1926]); and, most recently, a place of employment (see Hanley, 5 NY3d at 113). Notably, however, no New York case has ever addressed whether the family of a witness can constitute a reliable community, particularly the family of a pre-adolescent child witness.
Other jurisdictions have been wary of treating families as communities for purposes of introducing testimony regarding a witness’s reputation for untruthfulness. In fact, courts have *80repeatedly held that it is proper to exclude evidence sought to be offered by relatives because “the inherent nature of familial relationships often precludes family members from providing an unbiased and reliable evaluation of one another” (State v Gregory, 158 Wash 2d 759, 805, 147 P3d 1201, 1226 [2006]; see also State v Ricker, 770 A2d 1021, 1024 [Me 2001] [trial court committed no error in preventing testimony of family members as to the reputation of the sexual abuse victim, defendant’s niece, for untruthfulness within the family]; Adcock v Commonwealth, 702 SW2d 440, 445 [Ky 1986] [“(A) witness cannot testify as to general reputation based solely upon what family members have stated to him or in his presence. General reputation in the community may be entirely different from the regard in which he is held by family members. It is only general reputation about which testimony can be received”]; Gonzalez v State, 871 So 2d 1010, 1011 [Fla Dist Ct App 2004], review denied 886 So 2d 226 [Fla 2004] [“A person’s family is too narrow a segment of the community to be the source of reputation testimony”]; State v Berry, 2002 WL 31757250, *1, 2002 Iowa App LEXIS 1302, *2 [Ct App 2002] [“A crucial foundational requirement for such testimony is that the reputation must be not among a limited group such as a family, but that of a general cross-section of the community where the witness lives or works”]).
I share these concerns and would hold that a family is too insular and self-interested a grouping to provide a reliable community under our jurisprudence. The circumstances of this case well illustrate the inherent problems in characterizing a witness’s family as a “community.” The evidence defendant offered to impeach the reputation of the child complainant — who was only eight years old at the time of the crime — was to be given by defendant’s parents, Juan Collazo and Ramona Fernandez. It goes without saying that there is •a keen danger of blatant bias when a defendant’s parents are called to give testimony pertaining to the reputation of their son’s accuser.
These concerns are only magnified where, as here, the reputation of a young child is at issue. Children are dependent on their families for support and guidance, care and protection, and acceptance and affection — all factors essential to the emotional well-being of a child. It is questionable whether even an older adolescent could weather this form of public criticism from close relatives impugning his or her character and trustworthiness within the family unit. But, clearly, the *81trust relationship necessary for healthy child development is seriously eroded when a young girl eventually discovers that she has been labeled a liar and a troublesome child by the very individuals she views as her “grandparents.” And to what end? Are we to believe that a jury will alter its view of the facts because a defendant’s parents testify on a topic as subjective as a child complainant’s reputation for truth or veracity? I believe jurors will readily comprehend the inherent and unavoidable bias presented by a parent providing such testimony on behalf of a son or daughter accused of having committed a crime.
Every defendant is entitled to present a defense, and the veracity of complainant was undoubtedly of paramount concern to the defense in this case. I am not, therefore, suggesting that a child should not be the subject of reputation testimony. But there are numerous other community sources capable of providing testimony regarding a child’s veracity and behavioral problems that are not of dubious reliability, would carry more credibility with a jury, and are not as likely to unjustifiably damage the child’s psychological well-being. Teachers, pediatricians, school psychologists, neighbors, coaches, troop leaders or any person in a relevant community who has consistent and meaningful contact with a child can potentially address the child’s reputation for truthfulness. In the search for truth, we need not sever whatever remains of the child’s emotional dependence on close relatives or encourage an intrafamily battle of biased witnesses.
For all of these reasons, I believe that the trial court in this case was warranted in determining that the requisite “reasonable assurance of reliability” (Bouton, 50 NY2d at 139) was lacking. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority establishes a troubling precedent under which a trial judge commits reversible error by not allowing a defendant’s parent to testify that a child complainant in a sex abuse case has a reputation in the defendant’s family for not telling the truth. I cannot subscribe to such a rule nor do I think it is compelled by our precedents.
Consequently, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as it is appealed from, and remit to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not decided on the appeal to that court.
*82Judges Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge Graepeo dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed.