Court Opinion

ID: 9743839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:46:25.097149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:44.299560
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD dissenting in part: The majority concludes that the defendant is not entitled to credit for the 4 months and 25 days served in Pennsylvania on- a conviction for another offense, prior to the filing of the petition to revoke in Illinois. To this extent I disagree, for in my view, this conclusion engrafts an exception which is inconsistent with the very interpretation which the majority places on the statute. The opinion states that “ ‘Time served on probation means just that.” And, although the majority opinion recognizes that the interpretation may lead to absurd results when applied during the latter part of a probation period in certain instances, it is constrained from denying the plain meaning of the words used. The same considerations would apply to the credit which the majority opinion denies. Defendant was still on probation for the Illinois offense until the filing of the revocation petition in Illinois. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, eh, 38, par. 117 — 3(a).) The only obvious meaning of the statutory language in question is one that computes “time served on probation” from the time it begins until the time it is tolled according to statute or until probation is revoked. See Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—4 (a). If the statutory language is to be interpreted so as to avoid absurd results it is not logical just to single out time spent in jail involving a conviction for a different crime. If a qualitative analysis of the probation credit may be made under the statute, credit, for example, should also be denied for time spent in jail for any reason which leads to revocation regardless of conviction; or even any time not spent in custody after a violation of probation but before- temporary revocation, whatever the violation may be.