Court Opinion

ID: 9635652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:58:21.653418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:18.809669
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
Concurring.
Although I agree that Appellant’s request for post-conviction relief should be denied, I write separately to disassociate myself from a few ancillary issues the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court addresses that are essential to a proper disposition of a PCRA petition.
First, the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court commingles the terms “pleading” and “proving” and appears to hold that a petitioner is required to prove her case in the pleadings in order for the court to address the claims on the merits. As I noted in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 528 (Pa.2001), this effectively turns the statute on its' head and renders a PCRA proceeding merely a paper shuffle where the petitioner is denied the opportunity to demonstrate eligibility for relief. This is not consistent with the statutory language of the Act or the criminal rules applicable to PCRA proceedings.
As I stated in Williams,
Section 9543 of the Act, where the “plead and prove” language originates, refers solely to the “Eligibility for [post-conviction] relief.” The section does not speak to any prerequisites a petitioner must satisfy in order to have a claim considered by the court. As long as the petitioner has *257set forth “each ground relied upon in support of the relief requested,” as set forth in Pa.R.Cr.P. 1502(b) (Content of Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief; Request for Discovery), and attaches any relevant affidavits or other evidence in support of the grounds for relief (or states why they are not attached) in accordance with Pa.R.Cr.P. 1502(d), the petitioner is entitled to review of the claim by the trial court. This is not to say that our Court is precluded from dismissing a claim on appeal from denial of PCRA relief on the grounds that the petitioner failed to adequately develop an argument in support thereof (e.g., failed to demonstrate that the claim was not waived or that counsel did not have a reasonable basis for his conduct). This principle, however, is not unique to PCRA petitions, but may arise in appeals of any context where an appellant fails to support a claim with authority or sufficient argument.
Id. at 528-529 (footnote omitted).
Here, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase adequate evidence of mitigation regarding Appellant’s history of extensive sexual and physical abuse as a child and young adult, her psychological disorders and the effects of drug abuse in the past and on the night of the murder. Appellant’s brief describes the alleged mitigation evidence in great detail and refers to supporting affidavits and exhibits that were attached to the amended petition filed in the PCRA court, including affidavits of a licensed psychiatrist1 and two family members.
Tn determining whether Appellant is entitled to relief on this claim, we must consider whether the PCRA court improperly denied her the opportunity to prove her allegations at an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 1507 (Disposition Without Hearing) and *2581509 (Procedures for Petitions in Death Penalty Cases; Hearing; Disposition), a petition may be dismissed without a hearing if the judge is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief. In other words, where the facts alleged, if proven, would not entitle a petitioner to relief, then an evidentiary hearing is not required.
Although the substantial facts alleged in Appellant’s PCRA petition were relevant to her ineffectiveness of counsel claim, they would not, even if accepted as true, entitle her to relief. I agree with the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court that Appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s chosen course of action was unreasonable. As noted by the PCRA court, counsel made a clear strategic decision regarding the type of character evidence to be introduced at the penalty phase. Appellant was portrayed as a woman who led a difficult life, but who bettered herself by obtaining an education and becoming a nursing assistant. This tactic is not unreasonable considering Appellant’s prior mental health evaluations conducted by a court psychologist indicated that an “underlying major pathology was not clinically evident.” PCRA Court Opinion at 30, citing Defense Exhibit 2. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is not required, as a reasonable strategy is apparent from the record.
My final point of contention with the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court is its extensive reference to a petitioner’s innocence in the context of a PCRA petition. Its reliance on language in the dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980), is misplaced. As the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court concedes, the discussion in Watlington was predicated on the unlimited filing of serial PCRA petitions, a practice prohibited by the current version of the Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). Although the PCRA is intended to provide collateral relief for those “persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences,” id. at Section 9542,1 strongly disagree with any implication that a petitioner *259alleging ineffectiveness of counsel must plead and prove his innocence. Such a burden is insurmountable and would virtually foreclose any possibility of a petitioner obtaining collateral relief. This is clearly not what was intended by the legislature.2

. The psychiatrist opined tha1 Appellant's “post-traumatic stress disorder, together with her depression, paranoid personality disorder, and possible learning impairments, constitute an extreme emotional disturbance and substantially impair her capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.” Appellant's Brief at 56, citing affidavit of Julie Kessel, M.D., paragraph 16.

. Moreover, (he only reference to innocence in the eligibility provisions of the Act is contained in Section 9543(A)(2)(iii), regarding an unlawfully induced guilty plea "where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent.”