Court Opinion

ID: 9860655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:28:44.997369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:18.170970
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: Today’s majority opinion erroneously holds that police may interrogate a criminal suspect in their custody without an attorney present, even after that suspect has clearly and unambiguously requested the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation. I therefore dissent. FACTS On November 13, 1994, defendant was arrested for drinking on a public way and for felony possession of cannabis. During defendant’s initial court appearance, defendant’s attorney filed her appearance form. This form was signed by defendant, and contained the following notice: “BE ADVISED, the undersigned defendant serves this NOTICE OF REPRESENTATION on the State, it’s [sic] agents and on all law enforcement officers barring the defendant’s participation, without the presence of his/her counsel, in any questioning, identification process or other procedures on any case or matter whatsoever.” Defendant did not post bond and remained in custody. Just three days later, and while he was still in continuous custody, on November 16, 1994, two Chicago police officers questioned defendant regarding the shooting death of Ronnie Johnson. Defendant’s counsel was not present during this interrogation. During the course of this questioning, defendant confessed to the shooting. Defendant was subsequently charged with Johnson’s murder. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement given to police. In the motion to suppress, defendant argued that police violated his fifth amendment right to counsel by questioning him without his counsel being present even after defendant had requested the assistance of counsel in dealing with custodial interrogation. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, however, finding that the request for counsel was merely “surplus-age” attached to counsel’s appearance form, and was not binding upon the State except in relation to the original drinking and cannabis charges. At defendant’s subsequent murder trial, the statement was admitted into evidence against defendant. The circuit court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement. The appellate court affirmed, but for different reasons. Whereas the trial court had found fault with the manner in which defendant attempted to invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel, the appellate court found fault with defendant’s choice of forum. The appellate court reasoned that a proper invocation of a defendant’s fifth amendment right to counsel requires “ ‘at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does not bear that construction.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) No. 1 — 96—1139 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2209 (1991). Accordingly, the appellate court held that defendant’s fifth amendment right to counsel had not been violated. The majority today adopts the reasoning of the appellate court, but also goes one step further. In addition to holding that a defendant cannot invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel during his initial court appearance, the majority also holds that a defendant does not even have such a right until custodial interrogation begins. 193 111. 2d at 239. DISCUSSION Both the appellate court and the majority today base their holdings in large part upon the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991). Because the majority misreads McNeil, a thorough examination of the facts of that case is required. McNeil was arrested for an armed robbery committed in West Allis, Wisconsin. Shortly after his arrest, police advised McNeil of his Miranda rights and sought to question him. McNeil refused to answer questions, but did not request an attorney. The police promptly ended the interview. Some time later, McNeil appeared in court for a bail hearing. He was represented at that hearing by an attorney from the Wisconsin public defender’s office. McNeil did not post bail and remained in custody. Later that same evening, two detectives questioned McNeil in jail. During that and subsequent interviews, and after being informed of his Miranda rights, McNeil gave statements admitting involvement in the Caledonia crimes. Before trial, McNeil moved to suppress his confession. According to McNeil, his courtroom appearance with an attorney for the West Allis crime constituted an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, and any subsequent waiver of that right during police-initiated questioning regarding any offense was invalid. The trial court denied the motion, and McNeil was convicted of second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and armed robbery. The Supreme Court held that the police questioning of McNeil was proper. First, the Court accepted that defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had attached and been invoked with respect to the West Allis armed robbery at the time McNeil confessed to the Caledonia crimes. The sixth amendment right to counsel, however, is offense specific. Accordingly, because defendant had not yet invoked his sixth amendment right to counsel with respect to the Caledonia crimes, that right posed no bar to the admission of McNeil’s confession. The Supreme Court recognized, however, that McNeil was relying upon the right to counsel which the United States Supreme Court had held to be implicit in the fifth amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 705, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1611 (1966). In contrast to the sixth amendment right to counsel, the right to counsel secured by the fifth amendment is not offense specific. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). Accordingly, once a suspect asserts the fifth amendment right to counsel for one offense, a defendant may not be approached for questioning regarding any offense unless counsel is present. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988). Despite its recognition of the broader scope of the fifth amendment right to counsel, however, the McNeil Court held that police had not violated this right because McNeil had never invoked it. The court noted that Me-Neil’s only expression of a desire for the assistance of counsel had been his appearance with counsel at his bail hearing. This was not enough, the Supreme Court explained, because invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel, “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does not bear that construction.” (Emphasis in original.) McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 169, 111 S. Ct. at 2209. What is clear from the Supreme Court’s opinion in McNeil is that the Court’s analysis focused not upon the time or place when the defendant made his request for assistance of counsel, but upon the type of assistance of counsel which the defendant requested. In McNeil, the defendant had, at best, expressed a desire for the assistance of counsel at a bail hearing. In the case at bar, however, defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed “a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 169, 111 S. Ct. at 2209. Accordingly, McNeil does not defeat defendant’s claim in this case. The majority further relies upon dicta in a footnote from the McNeil opinion. That footnote, in its entirety stated: “The dissent predicts that the result in this case will routinely be circumvented when, ‘[i]n future preliminary hearings, competent counsel ... make sure that they, or their clients, make a statement on the record’ invoking the Miranda right to counsel. [Citation.] We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than ‘custodial interrogation’— which a preliminary hearing will not always, or even usually, involve [citations]. If the Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect. Assuming, however, that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, and would be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the principle of our decisions will not have substantial consequences is no reason to abandon that principle. It would remain intolerable that a person in custody who had expressed no objection to being questioned would be unapproachable.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 171 n.3, 111 S. Ct. at 2211 n.3. Based largely upon this footnote and upon decisions of other courts relying on this footnote, the majority holds that the fifth amendment right to counsel cannot be invoked until custodial interrogation has begun or is imminent. The majority’s reliance on the McNeil footnote is misplaced for several reasons. First, as the majority candidly admits, the United States Supreme Court has never addressed-the issue of whether a defendant may invoke the sixth amendment right to counsel before interrogation begins or is “imminent” (whatever that means). Second, the footnote is clearly dicta. The Supreme Court’s McNeil opinion was based entirely upon the fact that defendant had never invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel. As such, the time and place of any such invocation was never at issue. Third, the footnote does not state, even in dicta, that a defendant cannot invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel under the facts of this case. Rather, the footnote merely noted the existence of the issue without deciding it. Finally, the footnote was written in response to a dissent which was joined by three Justices. Thus, while precisely zero of Justices on the McNeil Court explicitly argued that the fifth amendment right to counsel could not be invoked in the manner which the defendant in this case claims to have employed, three Justices of that Court expressly argued that the fifth amendment right could be invoked in this fashion. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 184, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 172, 111 S. Ct. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). Accordingly, the majority’s prediction of how the United States Supreme Court would rule on this issue is pure speculation. From a purely policy perspective, the rule announced by the majority is a bad one. After today, police arresting a suspect will no longer have any reason to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights until immediately before they initiate questioning. Indeed, under the rationale of the majority, police may now freely interrogate a suspect who states “I refuse to answer questions without a lawyer” as the police are applying the handcuffs, as long as the police wait until later to ask any questions. In such a scenario, the suspect’s request for counsel would have been" made at a time when interrogation was not imminent. Accordingly, the majority would hold that such a suspect had no fifth amendment right to invoke. Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the values which the Miranda decision was meant to protect. The majority’s concern, borrowed from the McNeil footnote, that a person could invoke the fifth amendment right to counsel even before arrest, is directed at a straw man.2 The defendant in this case did not attempt to invoke his right to counsel by letter prior to arrest. On the contrary, defendant was in continuous police custody from the time he requested an attorney to assist him during interrogation until the time when the interrogation took place. In any event, giving effect to the defendant’s clear and unambiguous request for counsel under the facts of this case would not require this court to expand the right to the extremes supposed by the majority. Rather, this court should rule that the fifth amendment right to counsel attaches and may be invoked by a defendant at any time after he is taken into custody. This rule would strike a proper balance between the recognition of a suspect’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination and the interests of law enforcement in obtaining evidence. This court should further hold that the State was bound in this case to honor defendant’s request not to be questioned without his attorney present, and that police questioning in spite of this request violated defendant’s constitutional rights under the fifth amendment. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress his confession. Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and JUSTICE RATHJE join in this dissent.  The majority’s additional concern, that acceptance of defendant’s rule would require the presence of a judge every time a suspect receives Miranda warnings, is specious. Defendant did not argue that Miranda rights may only be waived in front of a judge. Rather, the defendant correctly points out that the rule now adopted by the majority deprives defendants of the single most effective means of insuring that their fifth amendment rights are respected, namely, invocation of those rights in open court.