Court Opinion

ID: 9726609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:00:12.345192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:43.254034
License: Public Domain

McDANIEL, J., Concurring.
Although the procedural posture of this case necessarily resulted in a disposition of the appeal as above, the circumstance remains that the substantive dispute which led to this litigation continues unresolved. Moreover, it can readily be inferred from the record that Mr. Martin is not likely to cease his writing and speaking for the purpose of airing his views on the L.D.S. Church. Similarly, it can be inferred that Mr. Johnson and others of equal devotion to the church will not cease to take issue with the opinions of Mr. Martin.
*609As a consequence, there is likely to be further litigation, and so, because the parties did address the substantive issues in their briefs, I feel constrained to discuss those issues as they did appear to have been treated by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
More particularly, from my reading of the record, the trial court appeared to grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show, in those paragraphs of his declaration not stricken, that defendant Johnson had either published or uttered the alleged defamatory statements with “malice.” Thus, the trial court assumed, as did both parties, that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412],1 “actual malice” test applied regardless of whether the defendants were characterized as media or nonmedia defendants. In my view, defendants here are properly characterized as nonmedia defendants.2 Thus, while the trial court’s assumption that Sullivan applied regardless of defendants’ status proved to be correct in the final analysis, comment on a refinement of that issue, presented by the facts of this record, is in order.
*610In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 [18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 87 S.Ct. 1975], the United States Supreme Court held that the “actual malice” test articulated in Sullivan applied with equal force where the plaintiff was a public figure.3 Hence, a critical issue the trial court here was required to consider, was whether plaintiff met the somewhat esoteric definition developed by the Supreme Court for classifying persons as public figures:4 “[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 [41 L.Ed.2d 789, 812, 94 S.Ct. 2997].) “[C]ommonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” {Id., at p. 345 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 808].)
Assuming the trial court decided plaintiff was within the parameters of the “public figure” definition articulated in Gertz, I conclude that such a decision was correct. Plaintiff, for some 25 years, voluntarily injected himself into and helped fuel a specific controversy; whether Mormonism is a Christian religion or a non-Christian cult. Such a controversy is properly characterized as “a particular public controversy.” (See, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. 323, 345 [41 L.Ed.2d 789, 808].) Furthermore, plaintiff publicly advocated that Mormonism is a non-Christian cult, through the publication of books and pamphlets, recording tapes, frequent lecturing, and conducting a radio program entitled “The Bible Answer Man.” In my view, therefore, plaintiff thrust himself to the *611forefront of that controversy and attempted to influence its outcome. (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. 323, 345 [41 L.Ed.2d 789, 808].) Thus, plaintiff can be correctly characterized as a public figure.
Assuming plaintiff is a public figure, whether he still must show defendants published or uttered defamatory statements with actual malice is not at all clear. “Throughout the expansive development of the [Sullivan] doctrine, very little attention has been given to determining who besides the ‘mass media’ may utilize this constitutional privilege as a defense in defamation actions.” (Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants (1974) 47 So.Cal.L.Rev. 902-903, fn. omitted.) As already noted, both plaintiff and defendants assumed the Sullivan test applied if plaintiff were a public figure. The gravamen of their conflicting arguments at the summary judgment motion therefore was limited to whether plaintiff was a public figure. Both parties unfortunately failed to consider whether the actual malice test should apply if the defendant, like defendants here, were not media related. In other words, is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, solely a free press rather than free speech case extending greater constitutional protection to media rather than nonmedia communications? Recently, a commentator has addressed that precise issue. (Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology (1978) 25 UCLA L.Rev. 915.)
Professor Shiffrin argues that Gertz can be read to infer that the court has adopted “a politically based interpretation of the first amendment. . . .” (Id., at p. 928.) He states; “A clue is provided by the Court’s attempt to limit its holding to a limited class of defendants interchangeably described at various points to include newspapers, and broadcasters, the press and broadcast media, publishers and broadcasters, the media, the news media, the communications media, and the press.” (Id., at p. 928, fns. omitted.) However, Professor Shiffrin notes that “[t]his apparent attempt to distinguish between media and nonmedia defendants is entirely unexplained.” (Id., fns. omitted.) In that regard, he posits a theory explaining that distinction.
Professor Shiffrin reasons that the court, by impliedly limiting First Amendment protections advanced by Sullivan to media defendants only, and by holding that communications not relevant to public issues are “nonetheless . . . entitled to a level of first amendment protection” (id., at p. 927) has rejected the “public issues” test advocated by Alexander Meiklejohn to determine the scope of First Amendment constitutional *612protections. That approach theorizes that “speech relevant to self-government is absolutely protected under the first amendment [whether uttered by a media or nonmedia defendant], speech not relevant to self-government is beyond its scope and . . . fair game for government regulation so long as due process requirements are respected.” (Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology (1978) 25 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 917, citing Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1960) p. 27, italics added, fns. omitted.) Professor Shiffrin views the court’s rejection of Meiklejohn’s theory as demonstrating its “belief that the inability to distinguish precisely between private and public speech requires that some private speech be afforded a level of constitutional protection so that public speech be not unnecessarily chilled.” (Id., at p. 929.) Apparently, the court doubts “the wisdom of committing to judges the task” of deciding what is public versus private speech. On that basis, Professor Shiffrin reasons that “the distinction between media and non-media defendants . . . becomes comprehensible” because the majority of media defamation involves matters of public interest while the majority of defamatory comments by nonmedia defendants does not. (Id.)
In noting that “by placing all defamatory media speech within the scope of the first amendment, the Court may believe it has protected relatively little non-public speech,” Professor Shiffrin argues “the Court may fear that if Gertz were extended to non-media speech, the result would be to protect much speech having nothing to do with public issues, while safeguarding relatively little that does.” (Id., at p. 929, italics added.)
Regardless of whether the court appears to have limited the Sullivan test to media defendants only, Professor Shiffrin concludes that to extend the actual malice test to nonmedia defendants when defamatory speech is directed at public officials or public figures would not be inconsistent with the court’s current approach. The underlying basis of such an extension would be that defamatory speech directed at either class is relevant to public issues. “So understood, Gertz implies that debate on public issues will be sufficiently robust and wide-open for first amendment purposes if defamatory non-media speech is constitutionalized only to the extent that it involves public persons.” (Id., at p. 930.)
Professor Shiffrin’s reasoning here is persuasive. Regardless of the fact defendants are not media defendants, plaintiff, a public figure, was correctly required by the trial court to prove “actual malice” within the framework of the Sullivan “actual malice” test.
*613He further notes that the apparent limitation of the actual malice test to media defendants in Gertz may have origins other than that of a politically based interpretation of the First Amendment. Simply, the court may believe that the media is constitutionally special and therefore entitled to greater First Amendment protection than nonmedia speakers. “Under this view, neither Sullivan nor Gertz would protect defamatory non-media speech. Thus all defamatory non-media speech, even that discussing public officials, would be beyond the scope of the first amendment.” (Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology (1978) 25 UCLA L.Rev. 915, 930.)
I agree also with Professor Shiffrin, however, that the “Sullivan standards should be required of public officials or public figures whether or not the defendant fits into the media category.” (Id., at p. 935.) Professor Shiffrin articulates a persuasive rationale for such a rule: “The idea that first amendment protections should be consciously divvied out in more generous doses to those with knowledge, wealth, and capacity to cause damage is indefensible. Particularly disquieting is the idea that those with greater capacity to cause damage should be afforded special protection. Such a perspective would not only bespeak a disrespect for the interest in reputation, but it would also reflect an indifference to the growing public concern with the ‘vast accumulations’ of power in the ‘modem media empires.’ ” (Id., at p. 934, fns. omitted.)
Moreover, grafting principles of “mediaocracy” onto the First Amendment thereby granting media defendants a preferred status and greater protection would have substantial detrimental effects on society in general. Such a rule likely would “deter nonmedia contributions to the democratic dialogue (and thus would weaken the media’s contribution), would favor those with greater capacity to cause damage and with greater ability to compensate for that damage (by spreading the risk), would require difficult determinations as to which communications would and would not merit the label ‘press’ or ‘media,’ would strain basic principles of first amendment equality, and would diminish respect for the democratic process.” (Id., at p. 935, fns. omitted.)
In sum, if the issue were properly before us, I would vote to adopt the analysis discussed here and apply the Sullivan actual malice test where a nonmedia defendant engaged in defamatory speech concerning a public figure.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 13, 1979.

The precise holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, is that: “The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” (Id., at pp. 279-280 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].)
I note that the California Supreme Court, in Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Hogard, 22 Cal.3d 672 [150 Cal.Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572], recently held that “[w]here . . . the allegedly libelous remarks could have been understood by the average reader [as either a statement of fact or opinion and hence ambiguous], the issue [whether the statement is one of fact or opinion] must be left to the jury’s determination. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 682.) More importantly, in articulating a malice definition to be used in cases of publication of ambiguous words the court held: “the jury must find not only that the words were reasonably understood in their defamatory, factual sense, but also that the defendant either deliberately cast his statements in an equivocal fashion in the hope of insinuating a defamatory import to the reader, or that he knew or acted in reckless disregard of whether his words would be interpreted by the average reader as defamatory statements of fact.” (Id., at p. 684.)
Arguably, the alleged defamatory statements involved here do not present a problem of ambiguous interpretation as either fact or opinion. In my view they constituted statements of fact.

One commentator has suggested an approach to aid in identifying a media versus non-media defendant. He argues that “[t]here are, . . . identifiable characteristics of newspapers, magazines, television and radio” and “[t]he sufficient presence of these characteristics in any other speaker might also justify calling it a ‘media’ defendant . . . .” (Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants (1974) 47 So.Cal.L.Rev. 902, 929.) That commentator contends the Sullivan “standard for the media may be justified because these speakers are subject to internal restraints on the abuse of privilege. These internal restraints have been identified as (1) self-policing through professional standards of conduct; (2) the right of *610reply in the media involved; (3) fear of the judgment of the market place.” (Id., at p. 930.)
In my view neither defendant Johnson nor defendant church is subject to those types of restraints and hence are not properly denoted as media defendants.

In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S. 130, a majority of five members of the court agreed that the “actual malice test was applicable to ‘public figures.’ ” Four other members of the court instead adopted a standard based on highly unreasonable conduct and phrased in terms of extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. (See, 388 U.S. at p. 155 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1111], (Harlan, J.).)

“The definition of public official may be relatively free of gray areas, but the definition of public figures is disturbingly opaque and difficult to apply. . . .” (Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology (1978) 27 UCLA L.Rev. 915, 960, fn. omitted.)