Court Opinion

ID: 9427727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:42.005991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.416875
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
The Court holds that the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 (ESAA) 1 renders ineligible for ESAA funding any school district whose faculty assignment policies have resulted in racial disparities, even in the total absence of any evidence of intentional racial discrimination. I disagree. It is my view that a school district is ineligible to receive ESAA funds only if it has acted with a racially discriminatory motive or intent in its faculty assignment policies.
I
The controversy in this case turns on the proper construction of §706 (d)(1)(B) of ESAA, which provides:
“No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under this chapter if it has, after June 23, 1972—
“(B) had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismis*153sal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups in conjunction with desegregation or the implementation of any plan or the conduct of any activity described in this section, or otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, color, or national origin in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees of the agency. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Since the only discriminatory activity alleged in this case involves the assignment of teachers, the inquiry must focus on the second (italicized) clause of § 706 (d) (1) (B). The precise question is what Congress intended when it used the phrase “or otherwise engaged in discrimination.”
In deciding that question, the starting point is the language of the statute itself. See, e. g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 405. That language, as the positions of the parties to this suit confirm, may be read in two different ways. The first, that urged ‘by the respondents and endorsed by the Court, is that the ineligibility standard under the second clause of § 706 (d)(1) (B), like that under the first clause, turns solely on a finding of disparate racial impact. This reading is supported by the argument that the second clause, which renders ineligible for ESAA funding any school district “engaged in discrimination . . . in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees” is finked by the word “otherwise” to the first clause, which unambiguously contains a disparate-impact standard. The argument thus is based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, construing the word “otherwise” to mean “in a similar manner” or “similiarly.” The second way to read the statute, that urged by the petitioners, is to find different ineligibility standards in the two clauses of §706 (d)(1)(B) — disparate impact alone under the first clause, and discriminatory motive or intent under the second. This reading of the statute is supported by the fact that although the first clause of § 706 (d)(1)(B) is explicitly written in terms of disproportionate *154impact, the second clause is framed in terms that, as the Court today perceives, “possess an overtone of intent.” 2 Ante, at 139. Since the meaning of § 706 (d)(1)(B) is thus conced-edly ambiguous, it is necessary to look beyond the statutory words in order to ascertain their meaning.
II
That inquiry may appropriately focus on whether the intent of Congress can be determined from a consideration of the legislative history of § 706 (d)(1)(B) itself, or of other provisions of ESAA.3
*155A
The legislative history of the specific provision in issue reveals that the language that ultimately was enacted in § 706 (d) (1) (B) first appeared in S. 1557, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., a 'bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1971. In explaining the language at issue here, the Committee noted:
“The phrase ‘disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups’ is not modified or in any way diminished by the subsequent phrase ‘or otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, color or national origin/ which renders ineligible local educational agencies which have engaged in other discrimination, including discrimination in hiring, against minority group employees.” S. Rep. No. 92 — 61, p. 19 (1971) (emphasis added).
It is thus apparent that the Senate Committee that drafted the language now appearing in § 706 (d)(1)(B) not only recognized a distinction between the ineligibility standards under the first and second clauses, but also regarded the standard of ineligibility under the first clause as more burdensome to the applicant than the standard under the second.
The purpose of .this differentiation is also made clear in the legislative history. Congress singled out staff demotions and dismissals as appropriate for a disparate-impact standard because it was well documented that desegregation activities had in some States resulted in the wholesale firing of Negro faculty members: “HEW statistics indicate that between 1968 *156and 1970, in the States within the Fifth Judicial Circuit alone, the number of black teachers was reduced by 1,072, while the number of white teachers increased by 5,575.” S. Rep. No. 92-61, supra, at 18. These statistics so disturbed Congress that it adopted a per se rule of ineligibility for disproportionate demotions or dismissals of Negro faculty members in conjunction with desegregation activities, even at the cost of withholding ESAA funds from school districts that had in no way intentionally discriminated against Negro faculty members.
The legislative history of § 706 (d)(1)(B) thus strongly suggests that the petitioners have advanced the proper interpretation of the statute. This reading of § 706 (d) (1) (B), under which the first clause is governed by disparate impact and the second by motive or intent, is consistent with the fact that Congress not only recognized a distinction between the ineligibility standards under the first and second clauses, but also regarded the standard of ineligibility under the first clause as more burdensome to the applicant than the standard under the second.
Apparently recognizing that the legislative history cannot support a reading of § 706 (d) (1) (B) that gives the same meaning to the ineligibility standards under its first and second clauses, the Court observes:
“If there is a distinction between the two phrases, however, it is not inconsistent with the general impact orientation of § 706 (d)(1) (B). For the impact approach itself embraces at least two separate standards: a rebut-table disparate-impact test and a stricter irrebuttable disproportionate-impact test. To the extent that the ‘demotion or dismissal' clause sets a higher standard for school boards to meet, it corresponds to the irrebuttable impact test.” Ante, at 143-144.
To draw this distinction between the two clauses is, however, totally at odds with the Court’s earlier endorsement of *157the respondents’ reading of the language of the provision. That reading depends wholly on the proposition that inasmuch as the first clause describes disparate impact, the presence of the word “otherwise” in the second clause “lends weight to the argument that a disparate-impact standard [is] also [the standard of ineligibility under the second clause].” Ante, at 143. It should follow that the standard contained in both clauses is the same — that the second clause incorporates the irrebuttable disparate-impact standard embodied in the first. The Court’s contrary suggestion that an irrebuttable standard is contained in the first clause, but only a rebuttable standard in the second, is nowhere in the Court’s opinion squared with the Court’s express agreement with the respondents’ reading of the language of § 706 (d) (1) (B).4
*158The fact of the matter is that the legislative history simply belies the respondents’ reading of the statutory language. That history strongly supports the conclusion that, while the first clause of § 706 (d)(1)(B) incorporates a disparate-impact standard, the second clause makes ineligibility depend upon discriminatory motive or intent.
B
The other provisions of ESAA, and particularly the so-called Stennis Amendment, do not, it seems to me, support the weight the Court places upon them.5
*159The Stennis Amendment, enacted as § 703 of ESAA, 86 Stat. 354, provides:
“(a) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to [ESAA] shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing with conditions of segregation by race in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation.
“(b) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing with conditions of segregation by race whether de jure or de facto in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation.”
The Court concludes that the Stennis Amendment and its legislative history “indicat[e] that the statute means exactly what it says: the same standard is to govern nationwide, and is to apply to de facto segregation as well as to de jure segregation. It suggests ineligibility rules that focus on actualities, not on history, on consequences, not on intent.” Ante, at 146-147 (footnotes omitted).
My difficulty with this reasoning stems from the fact that the Stennis Amendment is applicable not only to ESAA, but also to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the latter has been construed to contain not a mere disparate-impact *160standard, but a standard of intentional discrimination. In University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, five Members of the Court concluded that Title VI, which prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs, prohibits only discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth. Id., at 281-287 (Powell, J.); id., at 328-355 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Those constitutional provisions, in turn, have been construed to reach only purposeful discrimination. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252; Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189. It thus follows from Bakke that Title VI prohibits only purposeful discrimination.
It is wholly incongruous to hold in this case that the Stennis Amendment supports a mere “disparate impact” reading of the term “discrimination” in § 706 (d)(1)(B) of ESAA, when only two Terms ago five Members of the Court construed the prohibition against “discrimination” in federally funded programs under Title VI, which is equally subject to the Stennis Amendment, to incorporate a purposeful-discrimination test. If Congress in fact intended the Stennis Amendment to establish a uniform national standard- prohibiting action leading to disparate racial impact, then it is difficult to understand why this standard should not govern Title VI as well as § 706 (d)(1)(B).6
*161III
The conclusion that ineligibility under the second clause of §706 (d)(1)(B) depends upon a showing of a school district’s purposeful discrimination is persuasively supported by the interpretations that have been given to analogous provisions of Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When Congress enacted ESAA in 1972, it was not writing on a clean slate. To the contrary, when Congress left undefined the term “discrimination” in the second clause of § 706 (d)(1)(B), it had already enacted both Title VI of the 1964 Act, which provides that “[n]o person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 7 and §703 (a)(1) of Title VII of that Act, which provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 8 These provisions are, in the absence of any explicit definition of “discrimination” in ESAA or its legislative history, a useful guide in determining what Congress intended when it concluded that school districts “engaged in discrimination” should be ineligible to receive ESAA funds.
*162Title VI and § 703 (a)(1) of Title VII point clearly toward the necessity of finding discriminatory motive or intent in order to hold a school district ineligible under the second clause of § 706 (d) (1) (B).9 Title VI, as already pointed out, has been construed to prohibit only discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth, University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 281-287 (Powell, J.); id., at 328-355 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.); and, in turn, those constitutional provisions have been construed to prohibit only purposeful discrimination, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, supra; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra; Washington v. Davis, supra; Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colo., supra. And, in construing § 703 (a)(1) of Title VII, which, at its core, prohibits an employer from “treat [ing] some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15, we have held that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical,” ibid. Accord, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 579-580; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 805, n. 18.10
*163If the term “discrimination” in § 706 (d)(1)(B) was in fact intended to mean something other than what it means under Title VI and § 703 (a)(1) of Title VII, Congress could have been expected to state the difference in explicit terms. Since there is no such expression of congressional intent, it follows that the meaning of the term “discrimination” under § 706 (d)(1)(B) should be no different from its established meaning under Title VI and § 703 (a)(1) of Title VII.11
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 20 U. S. C. §§ 1601-1619. In 1978, Congress re-enacted ESAA with amendments not material here and recodified the statute at 20 U. S. C. §§3191-3207 (1976 ed., Supp. II). See Education Amendments of 1978, Title VI, 92 Stat. 2252, 2268. The provision at issue here, former § 706 (d)(1)(B), is now codified at 20 U. S. C. § 3196 (c) (1) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. II). In the interest of consistency with the Court’s opinion, all statutory references herein are to the original statutory and Code provisions.

 The petitioners also argue that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not appropriately applied in this context inasmuch as the word “otherwise” is not preceded by an enumeration of a number of types of conduct, but rather by a single type of highly particularized conduct. See 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). In this 'context, the petitioners argue that the word “otherwise” conveys a sense not of similarity, but of contrast: the section first describes, without regard to motive or intent, disproportionate demotions or dismissals; then, in apparent contrast to the first type of conduct, it describes “discrimination” in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of staff.

 The respondents also rely on the “general scheme” of ESAA for its reading of the second clause of § 706 (d) (1) (B) as incorporating no more than a disparate-impact ineligibility standard. This reliance is misplaced. Although one of the concerns of Congress in enacting K3AA was to eliminate minority isolation regardless of its cause, Congress also had in mind other important objectives in enacting the legislation. One such objective was to meet the special educational needs of minority group children from environments in which the dominant language is other than English. See S. Rep. No. 92-61, pp. 22-24 (1971). To attain this objective, Congress earmarked certain ESAA funds for programs to assist these children in developing linguistic skills in both English and the language they speak at home. § 708 (c) of ESAA, 20 U. S. C. § 1607 (c).
The respondents' construction of § 706 (d) (1) (B), if literally applied, could wholly frustrate this congressional purpose by making ineligible for ESAA funds those school districts whose faculty assignment policies have caused racial disparaties resulting from bona fide efforts to meet the special educational needs of non-English-speaking children. In a situation where, for example, a school district is making special efforts to provide bilingual instruction to Spanish-speaking children, it would be hardly *155surprising to find a disproportionate number of Hispanic teachers assigned to schools serving Hispanic students. Yet, if the disparate-impact test were literally applied, this bona fide attempt to advance the goals of ESAA would render the school district ineligible for further ESAA funding. It can hardly be said, therefore, that the overall purposes of ESAA unerringly point to the respondents’ reading of the second clause of §706 (d)(1)(B).

 Yet another problem with the Court’s conclusion that the second clause of § 706 (d) (1) (B) creates a rebuttable disparate-impact standard is the fact that the Court never explains its later suggestion that an applicant may rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination only by proof of error in the statistics or by an “ 'educational necessity’ [showing], analogous to the 'business necessity’ justification applied under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Ante, at 151.
By referring to the “business necessity” justification under Title VII, the Court apparently is construing the term “discrimination” in § 706 (d) (1) (B) by reference to those cases under Title VII which have not required a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424. Under the doctrine of those cases, a Title VII violation may be found if the plaintiff demonstrates that an employment practice has a disparate racial impact and the employer is then unable to justify the practice on the grounds of “business necessity.” Id., at 431-432. By analogy to this type of employment discrimination, the Court apparently concludes that the second clause of § 706 (d) (1) (B) renders ineligible any school district whose faculty assignment policies have a disparate racial impact not justified by educational needs.
It is my view, however, that this category of Title VII cases has no bearing on the meaning of the term “discrimination” in the second clause of §706 (d)(1)(B). Our eases make clear that the theory of “disparate impact” under Title VII is a gloss on the specific statutory language of §§ 703 (a) (2) and 703 (h) of Title VII, see General Electric Co. v. Gil*158bert, 429 U. S. 125, 137; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425, n. 21; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, at 426, n. 1. Under §703 (a)(2), it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2 (a)(2).
Section 703 (h) provides that it is not unlawful for an employer “to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h).
The language of these provisions quite plainly does not track that in § 706 (d) (1) (B), for § 703 (a) (2) fails even to include the term “discrimination,” and while the term does appear in § 703 (h), it is expressly modified — “used to discriminate” — in such a manner as to incorporate a disparate-impact test. Since the language of §§ 703 (a) (2) and 703 (h) of Title VII in no way resembles that at issue here, those provisions are obviously not an appropriate guide to the definition of “discrimination” under §706 (d)(1)(B).
If there is an appropriate analogy to Title VII, it is a quite different one. See Part III of this opinion.

 The Court also finds support for its reading of § 706 (d) (1) (B) in the fact that at least two of the three other ineligibility provisions in § 706 (d) (1) do not require a showing of intent. Accordingly, the Court notes that “an effect test is the Act’s rule, not its exception.” Ante, at 142.
Even putting aside doubts as to the validity of the premise of this *159argument (namely, that a statutory provision should be construed in accordance with the majority of arguably related provisions), the Court's tally of these other provisions is extremely questionable. In short, it seems clear that the ineligibility standard of § 706 (d) (1) (A) does not, as the Court suggests, amount to an “effect” test. That provision by its own terms rather plainly requires at least a showing of negligence before a school district is rendered ineligible for ESAA funding.

 In response, the Court argues that Congress enacted two different versions of the Stennis Amendment. Ante, at 146-147, n. 10. This argument is premised on the fact that the Conference Report indicated that § 703- (b), the section of the Stennis Amendment applicable to Title VI, was intended to restate and not to supersede a provision in Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §2000d-6, which provides:
“(a) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to Title VT of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . dealing with conditions of segregation by race, whether de jure or de facto, in *161the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States whatever the origin or cause of such segregation.
“(b) Such uniformity refers to one policy applied uniformly to de jure segregation wherever found and such other policy as may be provided pursuant to law applied uniformly to de facto segregation wherever found.” (Emphasis added.)
The flaw in this argument is that the Conference Committee in no way indicated, as the Court seems to suggest, that § 703 (a), the section of the Stennis Amendment applicable to ESAA, was to be construed any differently than § 703 (b).

 42 U. S. C. §2000d (emphasis added).

 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (emphasis added).

 There may be a difference between the standard of Title VI and that of § 703 (a)(1) of Title VII. But it is clear that a finding of discrimination under either provision ultimately depends upon a finding of either discriminatory motive or discriminatory intent.

 Because direct proof of an illicit motive is often unavailable, the eases under §703 (a)(1) have established a procedural mechanism under which an employer, once an employee has adduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of a discriminatory motive, must bear the burden of establishing that he acted for “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” If the employer meets that burden, then the employee must show that the proffered explanation is in fact a pretext. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 575-577; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S., at 357-360; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S., at 800-805. This procedural mechanism is simply designed to provide a means of inferring an employer’s motive in the absence of direct evidence. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, supra.

 The Court finds support for its interpretation of §706 (d)(1)(B) in the -fact that Congress, though aware that HEW had construed the section to incorporate a disparate-impact test, re-enacted it without change in 1978. Ante, at 148-149. This inaction by Congress, in the Court’s view, “strongly suggests that Congress acquiesced in HEW’s interpretation of the statute.” Ante, at 149.
This argument might have force if the Court today construed § 706 (d) (1) (B) the way HEW interpreted it in 1978. But the Court has not done so. The HEW regulation implementing § 706 (d) (1) (B) provides, as it did in 1978, that:
“No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under the Act if, after June 23, 1972, it has had or maintained in effect any other practice, policy, or procedure which results in discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in the recruiting, hiring, promotion, payment, demotion, dismissal, or -assignment of any of its employees . . . , including the assignment of full-time classroom teachers to the schools of such agency in such a manner as to identify any of such schools as intended for students of a particular race, color, or national origin.” 45 CFR § 185.43 (b)(2).
By lumping together “demotions and dismissals,” on the one hand, with employee “assignments,” on the other, the HEW regulation rather clearly equates the ineligibility standard of the second clause of §706 (d)(1) (B) with the irrebuttable disparate-impact standard of the first clause. By contrast, the Court says that the ineligibility standards under the two clauses substantially differ. Ante, at 143-144. Since the Court departs from HEW’s 1978 interpretation of § 706 (d) (1) (B), it is hard to see how the failure of Congress to overturn that interpretation lends support to the Court’s different construction of the section in its opinion today.