Court Opinion

ID: 9665834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:01.924606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.355954
License: Public Domain

BIEGELMEIER, Judge
(dissenting).
I believe the St. Auto Casualty Underwriters v. Ruotsalainen opinion, 1965, 81 S.D. 472, 136 N.W.2d 884, applies here for the reason the county court held Shabley (1) competent and (2) no undue influence. On appeal the circuit court tried the issues on the transcript of evidence received in the county court plus depositions of two doctors and other witnesses. All of this evidence was directed only to competency' — none of it to undue influence.
The circuit court also held Shabley competent however, and as the opinion states, his “testamentary capacity is not in issue”. Only the undue influence issue is involved, and on that the circuit court had, as we here have, the transcript of county court evidence. So in our review here
*703“there is no presumption in favor of the trial (circuit) court’s determinations, (and) Accordingly, it is our duty to review the evidence and determine the issues involved as though presented here in the first instance.” St. Auto Casualty Underwriters v. Ruotsalainen, 81 S.D. 472, 136 N.W.2d 884.
On this issue the “facts” are not much in dispute by any of the witnesses — the evidence is analyzed in the thorough 15-page opinion by the county judge. It was on this testimony, where the witnesses appeared before him, that the county judge held no undue influence was shown, and on the transcript of this evidence the circuit judge held the opposite. Under that situation we should give greater weight to the county judge’s findings than those of the circuit judge even if we did not have the Ruotsalainen rule to follow.
As to the evidence, it was general in effect. I do not review it here in detail. With respect to the In re Daly’s Estate, 59 S.D. 403, 240 N.W. 342; In Re Metz’ Estate, 78 S.D. 212, 100 N.W.2d 393; and In Re Blake’s Estate, 81 S.D. 391, 136 N.W.2d 242 opinions, I cannot conclude there was any confidential relationship with Wahls here — if anything, Rhodes was in such status until sometime in early 1967.
In Metz where the court held a confidential relationship existed, Imel the beneficiary had a power of attorney from the deceased (this agency is a trust relation) and used it to withdraw several thousand dollars from the Metz bank account, sell his property, etc. Metz was bedridden or in a wheelchair, totally dependent on Imel who also alleged in a petition to be appointed guardian of Metz that he was “childish”. In Re Daly’s Estate, supra, the New Jersey lawyer drew a will which left practically all Mrs. Daly’s property to him in trust for his own son, referring therein to the lawyér as a cousin, which he was not.
The 1965 In Re Blake’s Estate, 81 S.D. 391, 136 N.W.2d 242, opinion states:
“Influence to be undue must be such as to destroy the free agency of the testator and substitute the *704will of the person exercising it for that of the testator.”
Shabley was not of that type. Even some of Rhodes’ witnesses admitted he was “stubborn” and “had a mind of his own”. This evidence is without dispute. These same witnesses also testified he knew he had relatives and a farm, and was understandably attached to it. He appeared without counsel at a hearing on the guardian bank’s petition to sell it in probate court and fought for it, as he objected “Very strenuously” to having it sold. He battled the guardian bank, its attorney and a county judge who now testifies he was then incompetent — and prevented the sale of the land. This was in December 1967, eight months after the challenged April 1967 will was executed.
In Re Blake’s Estate, supra, declares “The burden is on the contestant to establish undue influence” and, there as here,
“The testator had no near relatives and there was no unnatural disposition of his estate. Nieces and nephews (who were contestants) are collateral heirs and because of such relationship alone are not the natural objects of a testator’s bounty.”
Further, in Blake the court then said:
“The evidence on the degree of affection or' animosity between the decedent and Arthur Blake (contestant) and between him and Mrs. Dotson (no blood relation who got 35%) was in dispute * * * the more persuasive seems to be on the side of a definite ill feeling between the testator and Arthur (contestant).”
Here the ill will of testator toward contestant Rhodes prior to April 1967 is undisputed. Rhodes himself testified:
“Q. Who was it that instituted this guardianship proceeding (April 19, 1967)?
“A. (Mr. Rhodes) * * * when they asked me I said someone must look after his finances and I *705couldn’t because he is mad at me.” (Emphasis supplied. Rhodes did, however,, sign the petition to appoint a guardian).
Conversely, a Rhodes' witness, Gladys Ferren, testified Mrs. Wahl gave Shabley “Good care” and he “liked her”.
After my review of the record I conclude contestant Rhodes did not sustain the “burden * * * on the contestant to establish undue influence”, Blake’s Estate, supra. It seems only natural that Shabley would want his property to go to a person who gave him good care and whom he liked rather than to Rhodes, in whose own words, “he was mad at” and other nephews and nieces (and now some grandnephews and grandnieces unknown to him). Rhodes was careful enough in the Rhodes’ dictated and prepared will to give himself and each of his children a 1/10 interest in that will, the same 1/10 it gave Shabley’s own sister in Washington and other nephews and nieces and not the sister’s share she was entitled to under the laws of succession. Therefore, no weight can be given to this small share to the sister. Rather it shows an unnatural bias against her in favor of the Rhodes clan. The county court, which here was the real trial forum, was correct in admitting the 1967 will to probate.
It is unfortunate the litigants here have had two trial courts determine the facts and their rights and reach differing results. This was occasioned by the law then effective, SDCL 30-35-1, which allowed appeals from the district county court to the circuit court, with trial de novo therein. SDCL 30-35-19. The legislature may have recognized this problem as SDCL 30-35-1 was changed by Ch. 151, § 5, S.L.1971, to allow appeals in these proceedings direct to the Supreme Court.
WOLLMAN, J., concurs in this dissent.