Court Opinion

ID: 9695502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:03.902592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.289039
License: Public Domain

*109CASTILLE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority that, based upon his testimony at the suppression hearing, appellant Elijah Williams a/k/a Bob Torres had no subjective expectation of privacy in Apartment C-5. Therefore, the search of that apartment did not violate Williams’ constitutional rights. I also agree with the majority that Williams’ derivative challenge to the warrant to search his Dennison Street apartment necessarily fails. Accordingly, I join in the disposition of Williams’ appeal.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s resolution of the appeal of David M. Torres a/k/a Michael Williams. In disapproving of the warrant to search Apartment C-2, the majority wrongly characterizes the sources of the information provided to the affiants, entirely fails to accord the issuing authority the deference due its decision, and wrongly subjects the warrant affidavit to the sort of hypertechnical, legalistic, hindsight scrutiny that animated the now discarded Aguilar/Spinelli1 review of warrant affidavits. Hence, I dissent in the Torres appeal.
Prior to this discretionary appeal, five judicial authorities reviewed the warrant affidavit here. Four of the five — the issuing authority and the unanimous three-judge panel of the Superior Court — approved it. The lone dissenter was the suppression court judge. I do not dispute that reasonable judicial minds might disagree over the sufficiency of this affidavit, as they might disagree over many, or even most, affidavits. But that is why we must be careful not to overstep our limited standard of review: deferential to the issuing *110authority, looking only to see if there was a substantial basis for the probable cause determination, and viewing the affidavit in a common-sense and non-technical manner.
The majority finds fault with the Superior Court’s deferential review because the panel supposedly “gave too much weight to the indicia of reliability attending the information included in the affidavit.” Majority Op. at 99. Essential to the majority’s analysis is its characterization of the unnamed witnesses who provided that information as “anonymous” “tipsters/informants”. Proceeding from that predicate, the majority reasons that, “[wjhere, as here, there is no attempt made to establish either the basis of knowledge of the anonymous sources or their general veracity, a strong showing of the reliability of the information that they have relayed to the police in the specific case is required in order to support a finding of probable cause.” Majority Op. at 100. I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the issuing authority was required to treat the sources of information here as “anonymous” sources whose information was subject to greater scrutiny for reliability.
The warrant affidavit presented to the issuing authority did not identify the police sources as “anonymous,” as “informants,” as “confidential informants” or as “tipsters.” Instead, it consistently referred to the sources, whom the police interviewed as part of their investigation into this drug-related triple homicide, only as “witnesses.” The affidavit went further, relating that the affiants knew the identity of the “witnesses,” and that “[tjhese witnesses will be available to testify at any necessary court proceedings.” In my view, with our deferential standard of review in mind, the issuing authority was not obliged to ignore what the warrant actually said and question whether the “witnesses” were something other than as described. Instead, the issuing authority was perfectly justified in deeming them to be witnesses. These witnesses were decidedly not anonymous tipsters; they identified themselves to police. The police simply decided not to name them, a not-surprising circumstance in a case involving witnesses in a drug-related triple homicide.
*111There is a vast difference between anonymous sources, i.e., sources whose identity is unknown to anyone, such as the author of the letter in Gates, supra at 227, 103 S.Ct. 2317, and sources who come forward to police, identify themselves, provide the police with detailed information essential to apprehending murderers and indicate a willingness to testify. The information provided by such witnesses, even if they go unnamed in the affidavit, may properly be deemed reliable precisely because their identity is known to the police and they have expressed a willingness to state in court what they told police. By making themselves known to police, such witnesses expose themselves to serious consequences if they provide false information. The “witnesses” should not be treated in the same way as anonymous tipsters and police informants; their information should not have to be corroborated or their reliability independently established before they may be deemed reliable.
A person willing to stand behind his words and accusations, and to be accountable for them, is obviously more reliable than a person who hides behind a veil of anonymity.
When ... the underlying source of the police department’s information is an anonymous telephone call, the courts have recognized that the tip should be treated with particular suspicion.... As we recently observed ... the anonymous tip may have been a mere prank call. Equally, it may have been based on no more than the caller’s unparticularized hunch.
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 490, 698 A.2d 571, 573-74 (1997) (citations omitted). In addition, of course, it is human nature to be more careful and accurate in what one says when there are consequences for misspeaking. It is for these reasons that anonymous tips have been deemed sufficient to establish probable cause only if there is additional evidence establishing the reliability, veracity or basis of knowledge of the tipster, if the information provided by the tipster is corroborated, or if the tip is predictive of the suspect’s criminal behavior. See Gates, supra, at 242-46, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
*112Police “informants” likewise are generally considered to be unreliable. As commonly used in law enforcement, an “informant” is not just anyone who provides information to police^ 1. e., he is not just “any witness.” Rather, the police informant is usually from “the underworld or its periphery.” State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113 (Minn.1978). As noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
Information supplied to officers by the traditional police informer is not given in the spirit of a concerned citizen, but often is given in exchange for some concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject. The nature of these persons and the information which they supply conveys a certain impression of unreliability, and it is proper to demand that some evidence of their credibility and reliability be shown.
State v. Paszek, 50 Wis.2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836, 842 (1971).2 Police informants differ from anonymous tipsters and concerned citizens in that they often have an ongoing relationship with police. Thus, a police informant’s reliability can be established as a result of supplying reliable information in the past. Accordingly, the lack of information concerning the basis of the informant’s knowledge is not necessarily fatal to a finding of probable cause. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); see also Gates, supra at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
At the other end of the reliability continuum, this Court has acknowledged that the citizen witness who reports a crime is presumptively trustworthy. Commonwealth v. Weidenmoyer, 518 Pa. 2, 9-10, 539 A.2d 1291, 1295 (1988). This is so because a citizen informer:
[A]cts with an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own personal safety. He does not expect any gain or concession in *113exchange for his information. An informer of this type usually would not have more than one opportunity to supply information to the police, thereby precluding proof of his reliability by pointing to previous accurate information which he has supplied.
Id. at 10, 539 A2d at 1295 (citations omitted). Thus, “when an average citizen tenders information to the police, the police should be permitted to assume that they are dealing with a credible person in the absence of special circumstances suggesting that such might not be the case.” Commonwealth v. Sudler, 496 Pa. 295, 305, 436 A.2d 1376, 1381 (1981) (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(a) at 592 (1978)).
Building upon this recognition, some courts have gone so far as to find that unnamed and unknown witnesses should be accorded the same presumption of trustworthiness as the citizen witness. In United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.1979), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit accorded an unnamed witness, whose identity was unknown to the police, greater reliability than the traditional anonymous witness because of the context of the information provided. In Melvin, police investigating a tavern explosion secured a warrant to search the home of the defendant. The relevant portion of the affidavit in Melvin reported that, “an unknown male stated that a white Cadillac had left the scene moments before the explosion.” Id. at 494. In upholding the warrant, the court reasoned:
While the affidavit does not expressly disclose the source of the “unknown male’s” information, the nature of the information he provided and the circumstances of this “on the scene” report could strongly suggest to the issuing judge that he was relating what he had personally observed.... [T]he reasonable implication of the affidavit is that the “unknown male” was a bystander witness, not an informant.
Id. at 497. Under these circumstances, the information from the “unknown male” deserved a presumption of reliability. Id.See also People v. Hoffman, 45 Ill.2d 221, 258 N.E.2d 326, 328 (1970) (holding that “officers ... were justified in relying on the information received from the [unidentified] worn-*114an.... [T]he usual requirement of prior reliability which must be met when police act upon ‘tips’ from professional informers does not apply to information supplied by ordinary citizens.”).
Unlike the majority, other courts have recognized that unnamed witnesses who are known to the police do not fall into the same suspect category of witnesses subject to scrutiny for reliability as the anonymous tipster and police informant. See State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn.1993) (key information tying defendants to murder weapons provided by eyewitness whose identity was known to police, but who wished to remain anonymous, properly considered in establishing probable cause); State v. Cole, 128 Wash.2d 262, 906 P.2d 925 (1995); but cf. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 403 Mass. 483, 531 N.E.2d 255 (1988). The unnamed but known witness is properly treated differently because it is not the disclosure of a witness’ name in the affidavit that makes him reliable, but his willingness to identify himself to police and to stand behind his words by testifying. Where information comes from a truly anonymous source, there is no consequence for giving false information. The unnamed but known witness, in contrast, faces consequences, including the prospect of criminal prosecution, for giving false information. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (“Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’ ”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The issuing authority here was justified in according the known but unnamed witnesses a presumption of reliability. The affidavit, drafted by homicide detectives no doubt well familiar with informants and confidential informants, describes the sources as “witnesses,” not as “informants,” “tipsters,” or “anonymous sources.” The plain meaning of the term “witnesses” suggests that they had first-hand knowledge. Furthermore, even though the witnesses were unnamed in the affidavit, their willingness to identify themselves to police and their avowed willingness to testify in a drug-related triple *115homicide, is reason enough to credit their information. Indeed, in this fearful day and age, these witnesses perhaps deserve badges of good citizenship for coming forward to aid the authorities in this murder prosecution.
Even if corroboration or further evidence of reliability were necessary, I would find that the warrant here was properly issued. Police confirmed certain aspects of the information supplied by the witnesses, and the credibility of each witness providing that information was enhanced by the information provided by the other witnesses. See Weidenmoyer, supra at 10, 539 A.2d at 1295 (witness’ statement “is substantiated by the additional sources in the affidavit.”). In addition, the affidavit referred to “the description of the suspect car that was fleeing the shooting.” This account suggested that at least certain of the witnesses were at or near the scene of the crime, i.e., they saw the fleeing car well enough to describe it. Finally, the witnesses’ explanation of the previous interaction between the suspects and the victims, i.e., explaining the drug debt-related motive for the killing, was itself corroborated by the indisputable physical fact of the murders. Multiple homicides are thankfully rare, and even more rarely explainable on their face. The witnesses’ ability to explain plausibly why this one occurred suggested the reliability of the citizen sources.
The majority’s mischaracterization of the witnesses here, its refusal to defer to the issuing authority’s judgment, and its lawyerly, hypertechnical approach will make the task of the police, who conscientiously sought antecedent judicial approval of the search in this case, needlessly more difficult. This Court has already deemed the good faith reliance by police upon judicial approval of a warrant to be irrelevant. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (rejecting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) good faith exception to the exclusionary rule). The warrant conscientiously drafted by veteran police officers here satisfied not only the issuing authority, but also a unanimous Superior Court panel. The majority’s too-ready willingness to third-guess in such an instance will make police walk an even finer, and often more dangerous line, between *116disclosing enough information to survive judicial second- and third-guessing, and withholding enough identifying information to ensure the safety of their sources. The United States Supreme Court’s admonition in Gates seems particularly appropriate in respect to the homicide investigation here:
[Affidavits “are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.”
Gates, supra at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citations omitted). Viewed in such a light, the affidavit here is certainly sufficient.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the Superior Court relating to David Torres.

. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The Aguilar/Spinelli approach required (hat a warrant "pass two specific tests, under which the issuing authority had to be able to see, on the face of the affidavit of probable cause, both the informant's basis for his knowledge and independent facts showing the reliability of the informant." Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 481, 503 A.2d 921, 924 (1985). The United States Supreme Court replaced the Aguilar/Spinelli test with a totality of the circumstances test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). This Court adopted the Gates test for probable cause as a matter of state constitutional law in Gray.

. Notably, however, if the police informant is not part of the criminal underworld, he may be deemed more reliable. See Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224, 85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 (1965) ("unlike narcotics informants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect, the sources in this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy information.”).