Court Opinion

ID: 9515081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:53:38.552431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:24.722761
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Justice
(concurring).
[¶ 37.] I join the Court’s opinion and write only to amplify its reasoning. First, it is noteworthy that the policy language at issue has been the subject of countless disputes in numerous courts for more than five decades. Yet, there has been no resolution of its meaning. In light of this history of conflicting results, one must conclude that the language “in, upon ...” is ambiguous. “A contract is ambiguous when application of rules of interpretation leave a genuine uncertainty as to which of two or more meanings is correct.” Alverson v. Northwestern Nat’l Cas. Co., 1997 SD 9, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 234, 235 (citations omitted). Because courts cannot agree upon this provision’s meaning, the ambiguity conclusion is compelling.
[¶ 38.] It is also compelling because, as the Court notes, the word “upon” is included in the definition of “occupying.” All words of the definition must be presumed to mean something, and the word “upon” must mean something other than the remaining definitional words. See Tata v. Nichols, 848 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tenn.1993) (stating that “unless ‘upon’ should be considered to have no meaning, it includes some relationship [with the automobile] different from ⅛,’ ‘getting in,’ ‘getting on,’ ‘getting out,’ and ‘getting off ”). However, the exact nature of that other relationship is uncertain. That uncertainty and ambiguity require our interpretation of “upon” in favor of Roden. See Alverson, 1997 SD 9, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d at 235.
[¶ 39.] It is also noteworthy that, notwithstanding the extensive litigation over the contradictory interpretations of this insurance clause, the policy definition of “occupying” remains essentially unchanged today. In light of this history, it is not unreasonable to require insurers to specifically exclude this type of nexus with an auto if they claim it excluded from coverage. Until the Legislature or the insurance industry so acts, we must follow the majority of jurisdictions that attempt to establish a “rational limit” on the activity that may be encompassed within the term “occupying” and hold that “ ‘occupying’ ... includes those [cases that] can establish a certain ‘relationship’ with the insured car at the time of the accident.” Tata, 848 S.W.2d at 651. The factors used to determine that relationship are recited by the Court. I join the Court’s application of those factors to this case. That application is consistent with the purpose of uninsured (and therefore underinsured) motorist statutes. Id. at 654.
[¶ 40.] With respect to summary judgment, I only add the observation that the medical records do not conflict with Mr. Dunkel’s description of Roden’s physical contact with the vehicle. The physicians’ reports merely state that Roden crossed *631the highway, which he obviously had to do before conducting business with Dunkel at the company pickup. Therefore, even if the medical records were admissible, they did not create a material issue of disputed fact.
[¶ 41.] I therefore concur.