Court Opinion

ID: 9369768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 18:00:48.418246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.001841
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11740    Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 02/09/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-11740
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       MARCELLUS HENDERSON,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                 Respondent- Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket Nos. 1:20-cv-01695-LMM,
                          1:03-cr-00648-LMM-GGB-1
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-11740

                            ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Marcellus Henderson, a federal prisoner represented by
       counsel, appeals the district court’s denial of his authorized, succes-
       sive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. The district court, after
       denying the motion, granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”)
       on whether Henderson’s conviction, for aiding and abetting at-
       tempted bank robbery resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
       §§ 2113(a), (d), and (e) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §
       924(c)(3)(A).
              On appeal, Henderson argues that his motion should have
       been granted because attempted bank robbery resulting in death is
       not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, par-
       ticularly in light of United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022).
       Henderson also argues that aiding and abetting attempted bank
       robbery resulting in death is not a crime of violence because an
       aider and abettor need not participate in every element a principal
       participates in.
              When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion,
       we review questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear
       error. Steiner v. United States, 940 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2019).
       Whether a particular conviction is a crime of violence under
       § 924(c) is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Id. The scope
       of our review of an unsuccessful § 2255 motion is limited to the
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       21-11740               Opinion of the Court                        3

       issues enumerated in the COA. McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d
       1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
              Section 924(c) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides for a
       mandatory consecutive sentence for any defendant who uses or
       carries a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking
       crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). For the purposes of § 924(c), a “crime
       of violence” means an offense that is a felony and:
             (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                 threatened use of physical force against the per-
                 son or property of another, or
             (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
                 physical force against the person or property of
                 another may be used in the course of commit-
                 ting the offense.
       Id. § 924(c)(3)(A), (B) (emphasis added). Section 924(c)(3)(A) is
       known as the “elements clause,” while § 924(c)(3)(B) is known as
       the “residual clause.” See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 924
       F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2019).
              In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the residual
       clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. United
       States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). Therefore, an offense
       can only qualify as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the
       use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
       person or property of another.” Id.
             “[W]e use a categorial approach to determine whether a
       predicate offense is a ‘crime of violence’ under the elements clause.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                21-11740

       That is, we ask whether the elements of the predicate offense in the
       statute denote a ‘crime of violence’; we do not look to the particu-
       lar facts of the defendant’s conduct or the specifics of the defend-
       ant’s trial.” Alvarado-Linares v. United States, 44 F.4th 1334, 1342
       (11th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1286
       (11th Cir. 2020)). “Specifically, we must decide whether a convic-
       tion. . . requires the government to prove—as an element of the
       offense—the use or attempted use of physical force.” Id. at 1346.
               Section 2113 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code states, in relevant
       part:
               (a)   Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimi-
                     dation, takes, or attempts to take, from the per-
                     son or presence of another, or obtains or at-
                     tempts to obtain by extortion any property or
                     money or any other thing of value belonging
                     to, or in the care, custody, control, manage-
                     ment, or possession of, any bank, credit union,
                     or any savings and loan association; or

                     Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank,
                     credit union, or any savings and loan associa-
                     tion, or any building used in whole or in part
                     as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan
                     association, with intent to commit in such
                     bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan
                     association, or building, or part thereof, so
                     used, any felony affecting such bank or such
                     savings and loan association and in violation of
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       21-11740                Opinion of the Court                       5

                     any statute of the United States, or any lar-
                     ceny–

                     Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
                     more than twenty years, or both.

              (d)    Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to
                     commit, any offense defined in subsections (a)
                     and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or
                     puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the
                     use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be
                     fined under this title or imprisoned not more
                     than twenty-five years, or both.
              (e)    Whoever, in committing any offense defined
                     in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to
                     avoid apprehension for the commission of
                     such offense, or in freeing himself or attempt-
                     ing to free himself from arrest or confinement
                     for such offense, kills any person, or forces any
                     person to accompany him without the consent
                     of such person, shall be imprisoned not less
                     than ten years, or if death results shall be pun-
                     ished by death or life imprisonment.

       18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and (e).
             We have held that a bank robbery conviction under
       § 2113(a) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s
       elements clause because a “taking ‘by force and violence’ entails
       the use of physical force” and “a taking ‘by intimidation’ involves
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 21-11740

       the threat to use such force.” In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th
       Cir. 2016). We have also held that armed bank robbery convictions
       under § 2113(a) and (d) qualify as crimes of violence under the ele-
       ments clause. In re Hines, 824 F.3d 1334, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2016).
               In Taylor, a federal prisoner filed a successive § 2255 motion,
       challenging the enhancement of his sentence based on a prior con-
       viction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery being identified as the
       predicate crime of violence. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2019; id. at 2027
       (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Fourth Circuit had granted
       Taylor leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion). The dis-
       trict court denied his motion, but the Fourth Circuit vacated and
       remanded. Id. at 2019-20. On certiorari review, the Supreme
       Court resolved a circuit split and held that attempted Hobbs Act
       robbery does not qualify as a predicate crime of violence under
       § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. Id. at 2019-21. At the outset, the
       Court noted that, under the categorical approach, the facts of a par-
       ticular defendant’s case are immaterial because the “only relevant
       question is whether the federal felony at issue always requires the
       government to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element
       of its case—the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” Id.
       at 2020.
              The Court then explained that, to prove attempted Hobbs
       Act robbery, the government must show that the defendant in-
       tended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of
       actual or threatened force and completed a “substantial step” to-
       ward that end. Id. But the Court noted that, while the government
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       21-11740                Opinion of the Court                         7

       would have to show that the defendant took an “unequivocal” and
       “significant” step towards committing robbery, the government
       need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted to use,
       or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). Id. at 2020
       21. The Court stressed that “an intention to take property by force
       or threat, along with a substantial step toward achieving that ob-
       ject, . . . is just that, no more.” Id. at 2020. For example, the Court
       elaborated, a defendant who was apprehended before reaching his
       robbery victim could be convicted of attempted Hobbs Act rob-
       bery, even though he has not yet engaged in threatening conduct,
       so long as the government had other evidence of his intent and a
       substantial step. Id. at 2020-21. Therefore, the Court concluded
       that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence un-
       der the text of § 924(c)(3)(A). Id. at 2021.
              In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s
       argument, adopted by this Court in United States v. St. Hubert, 909
       F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018), that, because a completed Hobbs Act rob-
       bery qualifies as a crime of violence, an attempted Hobbs Act rob-
       bery must qualify as well. Id. at 2021-22 (citing St. Hubert, 909 F.3d
       at 352-53). The Court emphasized that the “elements clause does
       not ask whether the defendant committed a crime of violence or
       attempted to commit one,” but rather “asks whether the defendant
       did commit a crime of violence.” Id. at 2022 (emphasis in original).
       The Court concluded that, had Congress intended the elements
       clause to encompass attempted crimes of violence, it could have
       explicitly included attempt in its definition. Id. Ultimately, the
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11740

       Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to reverse and remand
       Taylor’s enhanced sentence. Id. at 2019-20, 2025-26.
               In Alvarado-Linares, which was decided after Taylor, we af-
       firmed the defendant’s convictions under, the Violent Crimes in
       Aid of Racketeering Act (“VICAR”) and § 924(c), holding that mal-
       ice murder and attempted murder qualified as “crimes of violence.”
       Alvarado-Linares, 44 F.4th at 1348. Because the indictment alleged
       that the VICAR charges were based on violations of Georgia’s mal-
       ice murder and attempted murder statutes, we relied on the ele-
       ments of Georgia malice murder and concluded that it necessarily
       entails the use of physical force against another, and thus qualifies
       as a crime of violence. Id. at 1343-45. It also noted that the federal
       definition of murder also contains an element of force, so a VICAR
       murder conviction predicated on federal murder would also meet
       the definition of a crime of violence. Id. at 1345.
               We also held that, under the categorical approach, Al-
       varado-Linares’s convictions for attempted murder qualified as
       crimes of violence because a conviction for attempted murder un-
       der Georgia or federal law requires the intent to kill someone and
       the completion of a substantial step toward that goal, which quali-
       fies as an attempted use of force. Id. at 1346-48. We distinguished
       Taylor because, unlike Hobbs Act robbery, an individual always
       must use force to commit murder and cannot commit the least-cul-
       pable form of murder via a mere threat. Id. We interpreted “Tay-
       lor to hold that, where a crime may be committed by the threat-
       ened use of force, an attempt to commit that crime—i.e., an
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       21-11740                Opinion of the Court                         9

       attempt to threaten—falls outside the elements clause.” Id. at 1346.
       Therefore, because the completed crime of murder has an element
       of the use of force, attempted murder has as an element the at-
       tempted use of force. Id. at 1348.
               Section 2(a) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code states, “Whoever
       commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
       sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
       as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
               In In re Colon, we found that aiding and abetting a Hobbs
       Act robbery also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the
       use-of-force clause in § 924(c)(3)(A). In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301,
       1305 (11th Cir. 2016) (successive application context). In reaching
       this conclusion, we noted that, under 18 U.S.C. § 2, aiding and abet-
       ting is not a separate federal crime, but rather, an alternative charge
       that permits one to be found guilty as a principal for the substantive
       crimes, taking on the acts of the principal as a matter of
       law. Id. This Court also reasoned that, “because an aider and abet-
       tor is responsible for the acts of the principal as a matter of law, an
       aider and abettor of a Hobbs Act robbery necessarily commits all
       the elements of a principal Hobbs Act robbery.” Id.
               For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not
       err in denying Henderson’s motion to vacate and affirm.
              AFFIRMED.