Court Opinion

ID: 9373223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:32.394054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.143008
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     GREGORY LEONARD FINCH,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          AT-1221-20-0167-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: November 16. 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Gregory Leonard Finch, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, pro se.

           Brandon Iriye, Esquire, United States Army Garrison Daegu, South Korea,
             for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review ,

     1
      A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Atlanta Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is a Food Program Manager at Fort Rucker in Alabama.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 134. In 2019, he filed a complaint with the
     Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that, in retaliation for his engaging in
     various protected activities, he was not selected for several positions.         IAF,
     Tab 12 at 21-23.        The appellant identified his protected activities as filing an
     administrative grievance in 2010, contacts with an equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) officer between 2012 and 2014, and a complaint to the agency’s Office of
     the Inspector General (OIG) in May 2018. Id. at 21, 29, 32. He alleged that in
     retaliation for these activities, he was not interviewed for several vacancies
     between June and October of 2019. Id. at 21, 32. OSC subsequently closed its
     inquiry into the matter and informed the appellant of his right to file an IRA
     appeal with the Board. Id. at 32-33.
¶3         The appellant subsequently filed the instant IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-5.
     The administrative judge informed the appellant of his burden of proof regarding
     jurisdiction.    IAF, Tab 3.     The agency moved to dismiss the appeal, and the
     appellant responded to the agency’s motion. IAF, Tab 8 at 10-11, Tab 10 at 6.
     The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack
     of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 13, Initial Decision (ID). She found that the appellant’s
     EEO contacts and administrative grievance were not protected activity. ID at 4-5.
     However, she found his OIG complaint was protected activity.                 ID at 5.
     Nonetheless, she found that the appellant failed to meet his burden of
     nonfrivolously alleging that his OIG complaint was a contributing factor in his
     nonselections.    Id.     She based this finding largely on the declarations of the
     individuals on the hiring committees for the vacancies, who declared that they
     had no knowledge of the appellant’s OIG complaint and were not influenced by
                                                                                          3

     any individual with such knowledge.            Id.   She was not persuaded by the
     appellant’s claim that he emailed a hiring committee member discussing his
     “EEO and [O]IG issues.” Id. She reasoned that the appellant did not submit the
     emails in question.       Id.   Accordingly, the administrative judge found that the
     appellant   failed   to    nonfrivolously allege     the   knowledge   prong    of       the
     knowledge/timing test. Id.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1.   He alleges that he provided copies of his emails with the hiring
     committee member below and also attaches them to his petition. Id. at 5-7. The
     agency has responded to his petition for review, and the appellant has replied t o
     its response. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
     exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous
     allegations that (1) he made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under                  5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
     was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
     personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 2 Salerno v. Department
     of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016).

     The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant exhausted h is
     administrative remedies with OSC.
¶6         Without specifically making a finding, the administrative judge implicitly
     found that the appellant exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his
     administrative grievance, EEO claims, and 2018 OIG complaint. ID at 4; IAF,
     Tab 12 at 21. Additionally, she implicitly found that the appellant exhausted his
     2
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of fact that, if proven, could establish a
     prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal. Carney v. Department
     of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 11 (2014).
                                                                                         4

     administrative   remedies     regarding    four   personnel    actions,   namely,       his
     nonselection for four vacancies. ID at 4 n.1; IAF, Tab 8 at 8, Tab 12 at 21, 32.
     She found, however, that the appellant did not exhaust with OSC a 2019 OIG
     complaint that he submitted below.        ID at 4 n.2; IAF, Tab 12 at 46-47.        The
     parties do not challenge these findings on review, and we see no reason to
     disturb them.

     The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s administrative
     grievance and EEO complaints were not protected but that his OIG complaint was
     a protected activity.
¶7         The appellant here exhausted his administrative remedies regarding three
     activities: his 2010 administrative grievance, his 2012-2014 EEO complaints, and
     his 2018 OIG complaint. We address them in turn.
¶8         The administrative judge found that the appellant’s administrative grievance
     and EEO activity were not protected activities for purposes of this IRA appeal.
     ID at 4-5. The parties do not challenge these findings on review, and we decline
     to disturb them. The Board’s IRA jurisdiction covers reprisal for exercising “any
     appeal, complaint, or grievance right . . . with regard to remedying a violation of
     [5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)].”     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i); see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a);
     Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013).
     However, the Board’s jurisdiction does not cover claims arising under
     section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), which includes grievance and EEO claims filed for
     reasons other than remedying a violation of section 2302(b)(8).                5 U.S.C.
     § 1221(a); Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7; see also Young v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 961 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 3

     3
       Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
     for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
     the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115 195, 128 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
     petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
     circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
     Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
     review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                                   5

¶9          The substance of the appellant’s grievance here did not concern remedying
      an alleged violation of section 2302(b)(8), but rather, his assignment of work in
      relation to his position description. IAF, Tab 12 at 41-42. Therefore, insofar as
      the appellant alleged that the agency took personnel actions in reprisal for his
      grievance, we agree with the administrative judge that the Board lacks
      jurisdiction to consider such allegations in the context of this IRA appeal. Mudd,
      120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7.
¶10         As to the appellant’s complaints to an EEO officer about various actions by
      his supervisors which he perceived as abusive, the record does not appear to
      contain the appellant’s communications with the EEO office r. IAF, Tab 12 at 29,
      32, 35. However, the appellant provided emails which are seemingly his attempts
      to rectify the situation with management.     Id. at 51-57.   The emails seek to
      remedy allegedly hostile behavior from management officials but do not attribute
      that hostility to any prior alleged whistleblowing.       The appellant has not
      separately alleged that he sought to remedy whistleblower reprisal in his contacts
      with the EEO officer. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that
      the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his complaints to the EEO
      officer were protected activities.
¶11         Finally, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s 2018 OIG
      complaint was a protected activity under section 2302(b)(9). ID at 5. The parties
      do not challenge this finding on review, and we agree with the administrative
      judge. Regardless of the content of the disclosure itself, section 2302(b)(9)(C)
      protects disclosures of information to the Inspector General, and the Board has
      recognized that disclosures to the OIG are protected. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C);
      see Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶¶ 9-13
      (2016) (determining that the Board has IRA jurisdiction over a claim that an
      agency retaliated against an employee because it perceived him as having
      engaged in the protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(C) of reporting matters
      to the agency’s OIG). The appellant here provided a copy of his 2018 complaint
                                                                                     6

      to the OIG and a letter from the OIG acknowledging receipt of his complaint.
      IAF, Tab 12 at 37, 40. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that
      the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he engaged in protected activity by
      filing the 2018 OIG complaint.

      The appellant has sufficiently made a nonfrivolous allegation that his OIG
      complaint was a contributing factor in his nonselections.
¶12         The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to meet his burden
      of proof regarding contributing factor. ID at 5. The appellant on review reasserts
      that an individual on the hiring committees, as well as a management official, had
      knowledge of his protected activity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7; IAF, Tab 9 at 131,
      Tab 10 at 6, 29-30, Tab 12 at 21-22, 24. We agree with the appellant that he met
      his jurisdictional burden.
¶13         The final jurisdictional issue an appellant must establish is whether he made
      a nonfrivolous allegation that his disclosure or activity was a contributing factor
      in the nonselection decisions. Nasuti v. Department of State, 120 M.S.P.R. 588,
      ¶ 7 (2014). To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage
      of an IRA appeal, the appellant only need raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the
      fact or the content of the protected activity was one factor that tended to affect
      the personnel action in any way. Bradley v. Department of Homeland Security,
      123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 13 (2016).       One way to establish this criterion is the
      knowledge/timing test, under which an employee may nonfrivolously allege that
      the disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through
      circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official who took the personnel
      action knew of the protected activity or was influenced by someone who knew of
      the activity and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such
      that a reasonable person could conclude that the protected activity was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action. Id., ¶¶ 13, 15.
¶14         At this stage, the appellant can meet his burden of proof without
      specifically identifying which management officials were responsible for the
                                                                                     7

      reprisal. Id., ¶ 16. The burden to establish jurisdiction is the appellant’s, but,
      when the personnel action at issue is a nonselection, the evidence concerning who
      was involved in the selection process, what they knew about the appellant’s
      protected disclosures, and who may have influenced their decision is exclusively
      within the agency’s possession.    Id. The appellant both below and on review
      provided a September 2019 email exchange between himself and a member of
      three different hiring committees for positions for which the appellant applied.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7; IAF, Tab 9 at 131, Tab 10 at 29-30.           In the email
      exchange, the appellant discussed being referred for several positions but not
      being interviewed. IAF, Tab 10 at 29-30. He further remarked that there were
      some individuals at the location to which he applied that he “had dealings with,
      either EEO, [O]IG, or just plain told them they were wrong.” Id. The individual
      on the hiring committees responded to this email. Id. at 29.
¶15        The record below reflects that this individual was a panel member for a
      Food Services Specialist position, which the appellant applied to, that was filled
      in early October 2019. IAF, Tab 9 at 4, 24. The agency provided résumé scoring
      sheets from the panel members for this position. Id. at 43-46. The appellant was
      the only individual on the certificate of eligibles whose ratings are not included
      on the sheet. Id. at 24-25, 43-46. The record further reflects that the individual
      the appellant emailed in September 2019 was also a panel member for a
      “[Contracting Officer’s Representative] Food Service Specialist” position, for
      which the appellant applied, that was also filled in early October 2019. Id. at 66,
      81. Additionally, this individual was also a panel member for a “Battalion Food
      Service Specialist” position, for which the appellant applied, that was filled in
      late August 2019, which predates the panel member’s alleged knowledge of the
      appellant’s OIG complaint. IAF, Tab 8 at 84, Tab 10 at 29-30. As to the fourth
      vacancy for which the appellant exhausted his administrative remedies, a Food
      Service Specialist position filled in late July 2019, this individual was not on the
      hiring panel. IAF, Tab 8 at 37.
                                                                                      8

¶16         Although the record is unclear as to what role this individual played in the
      hiring decisions, or what authority he had, the appellant has nonfrivolously
      alleged that he had knowledge of the appellant’s OIG complaint prior to two
      October 2019 nonselections at issue in this IRA appeal. We thus find that the
      appellant has sufficiently met the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test.
      Bradley, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 16 (finding an appellant met his jurisdictional
      burden as to contributing factor when he alleged that s enior agency officials with
      knowledge about his protected disclosures conspired with others not to select him
      for the position at issue). Moreover, these nonselections occurred within 1 month
      after the appellant informed the member of the hiring panel of his OIG complaint,
      and less than 2 years after the OIG complaint itself. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7; IAF,
      Tab 12 at 40, Tab 9 at 4, 66. We therefore find that the appellant has sufficiently
      met the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test as well.         See Mastrullo v.
      Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015) (finding a personnel action
      taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of the appellant’s protected disclosures
      satisfied the knowledge/timing test). To the extent the individual on the hiring
      panel declared that he was unaware of the appellant’s OIG complaint, we find that
      this constitutes a mere factual contradiction of the appellant’s otherwise adequate
      prima facie showing of jurisdiction, and we thus may not weigh the evidence and
      resolve the conflicting assertions of the parties.   See Carney v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 11 (2014) (explaining that, at the
      jurisdictional stage, an administrative judge may not weigh the evidence, and the
      agency’s evidence may not be dispositive); see also Hessami v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[W]hether the appellant has
      non-frivolously alleged protected disclosures that contributed to a personnel
      action must be determined based on whether the employee alleged sufficient
      factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face .”).
      As such, we find that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that his OIG
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      complaint was a contributing factor in his two October 2019 nonselections and
      remand this appeal for adjudication on the merits. Nasuti, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 9.
¶17        The appellant further alleged that the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC)
      Director was aware of the appellant’s OIG complaint and had retaliated against
      the appellant by influencing individuals involved in his nonselections.        IAF,
      Tab 12 at 21-22, 24. Any doubt or ambiguity as to whether the appellant has
      made nonfrivolous allegations should be resolved in favor of finding jurisdiction.
      Bradley, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6; see Nasuti, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶¶ 8-9 (explaining
      that at the jurisdictional stage, an appellant’s uncontroverted allegation of
      knowledge is sufficient; he does not have to present evidence of actual
      knowledge). In light of the nature of the alleged personnel actions , we find the
      appellant   has   nonfrivolously   alleged    the   knowledge    prong    of       the
      knowledge/timing test. As discussed above, he filed his OIG complaint less than
      2 years before his other two nonselections in July and August 2019. IAF, Tab 8
      at 37, 84, Tab 12 at 40. We therefore find that the appellant has nonfrivolously
      alleged that he met the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test as well.
      Mastrullo, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21.     To the extent the members of the hiring
      panels declared they were not influenced by the LRC Director in the appellant’s
      nonselections, we will not weigh this evidence at this point in the proceedings .
      Carney, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 11.     Accordingly, we find that the appellant has
      nonfrivolously alleged that his OIG complaint was a contributing factor in his
      July and August 2019 nonselections and remand this appeal for adjudication of
      the merits of these alleged nonselections as well. Nasuti, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 9.
¶18        Accordingly, we vacate the initial decision. On remand, the administrative
      judge may reimplement his prior findings regarding the appellant’s grievance and
      EEO complaints in his remand initial decision. The administrative judge shall
      then determine whether the appellant established by preponderant evidence that
      his 2018 OIG complaint was a contributing factor in the nonselections in
      question. If the administrative judge finds that the appellant has met his burden,
                                                                                 10

      he shall determine whether the agency has met its burden to show by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have made the same hiring decisions absent the
      appellant’s protected activity.

                                          ORDER
¶19         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.