Court Opinion

ID: 9791109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:05:39.483331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.084830
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
specially concurring.
The skeletal facts are that after defendant was advised of his rights, including the right to have counsel present, and while defendant was represented by counsel, the defendant told the police he wanted to talk and he did, without the presence of counsel. The majority holds that statements so made are admissible.
In State v. Atherton, 242 Or 621, 410 P2d 208 (1966), this court held admissible a statement obtained by interrogation without the presence of counsel from a defendant represented by counsel. The majority reasoned that by responding to the interrogation the defendant expressed his waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Mr. Justice Sloan and I dissented.
In my opinion the present case can correctly be distinguished from State v. Atherton, supra. In that case the statement was obtained by interrogation; in this case the conversation with the police was initiated by the defendant. The defendant so admitted.
The principal basis of Escobedo and Miranda, etc., is prophylactic; i.e., to prohibit certain police practices. As shown by my dissent in State v. Atherton, supra, I do not believe that the police should be permitted to interrogate a prisoner who has an attorney without the attorney’s presence. I do not believe that there is any reason to prohibit the police from listening to a prisoner who wants to talk.