Court Opinion

ID: 9747934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:44:16.570334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:28.592648
License: Public Domain

SCHRODER, J.,
dissenting:
Rather than admit that the AOC Director improperly fired an appointee of an elected official (a sitting Family Court Judge), the majority redefines the issue, overlooks controlling precedent, and ignores our Supreme Court policies. Judge Nance is entitled to the writ because the legal remedy for terminating the employee has not been followed.
Simply stated, the facts reflected by the record are:1 By letter dated March 26, 2009, the former AOC Director informed the court administrator of elected Family Court Judge William Nance, that he (the AOC Director) had concluded she should be terminated, and that he was terminat*76ing her effective March 27, 2009.2 Recognizing that the AOC Director had no authority to fire his employee, Judge Nance complained to the Chief Justice.3 Believing the AOC Director possessed such authority and that cause existed, the Chief Justice acquiesced in the AOC Director’s decision.4 Again, Judge Nance complained to the Chief Justice that the AOC Director did not have the authority to fire his employee. The Chief Justice responded that, on further review, he remained resolute ■with the AOC’s termination.5 Judge Nance thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ to enjoin the AOC Director from firing his court administrator.

THE AOC DIRECTOR CANNOT TERMINATE THE APPOINTEE OF AN ELECTED COURT OF JUSTICE OFFICIAL

The AOC Director has no authority to hire or fire a non-AOC employee. AOC is a department within the Court of Justice. While all AOC employees are Court of Justice employees, not all Court of Justice employees are AOC employees (see organizational chart in appendix).6 Elected officials in the Court of Justice, and their staffs, are not AOC employees.7 These elected officials include justices, judges, and circuit/district court clerks.
Personnel policies and procedures for the Court of Justice, which includes elected officials and their staffs, and the AOC, are set by the Supreme Court. Ky. Const. § 116; SCR 1.050. This Court has established a policy that the elected official shall be the appointing authority8 for personnel in his or her office. Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice, § 1.03(1).9 The AOC Director’s appointing authority is limited to “personnel at the Administrative Office of the Courts.” Id. Therefore, as the majority agrees, the AOC Director has no independent authority to terminate the employee of an elected judge. Accordingly, under the facts in the record, Judge Nance is entitled to his writ.
But wait! Not wanting to grant the writ, the majority changes the facts and redefines the issue. After realizing the Director said “I” in the letter of termination, the majority spends the next two pages rationalizing that it was “really” done by the Chief Justice through his delegation of powers through KRS 27A.020 (but recognizing that said statute does not *77list termination authority), and redefines the issue as a firing by the Chief Justice.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE CANNOT DELEGATE POWERS WHICH HE DOES NOT HAVE

For argument’s sake, even if the firing was through delegation to the AOC Director by the Chief Justice, or ratified by the Chief Justice, Judge Nance would still be entitled to the writ because the Chief Justice cannot delegate powers that he does not have. The Chief Justice does not have the power to unilaterally terminate the appointee of an elected official.
Section 110 of the Kentucky Constitution creates the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court consists of a Chief Justice and six associate justices. Ky. Const. § 110(1). The Chief Justice is not the Supreme Court. Where the Constitution, statute, rule, or policy refers to the “Supreme Court,” this means the seven justices of the Supreme Court. Sections 110(2)(a) and 116 of the Kentucky Constitution vest control of, and rule-making power for, the Court of Justice in the Supreme Court.10 See, e.g., Abernathy v. Nicholson, 899 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Ky.1995) (recognizing that Section 110(2)(a) grants the Supreme Court supervisory control over the Court of Justice, and that Section 116 vests rule-making power for the Court of Justice exclusively with the Supreme Court); Combs v. Huff, 858 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Ky.1993) (“With the adoption of the Judicial Article and creation of a unified court system, this Court was granted rule-making power over matters affecting the Court of Justice.”); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. South East Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Ky.1992) (“The authority to exercise administrative control . of the judicial branch of government is vested in the Supreme Court of Kentucky.”); Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky.1984) (recognizing the Supreme Court’s rule making power is “firmly rooted within the Constitution”); Francis v. Taylor, 593 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Ky.1980) (“The Supreme Court, in addition [to appellate jurisdiction], has the control (or supervision) of the entire Court of Justice.”); Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Ky.1978) (“[Section] 110 vests the supervisory and policy-making authority of the judicial department in the Supreme Court.”). Supreme Court Rule 1.020(l)(a) requires that “matters of policy or administration shall be decided by a concurrence of at least four of its members.”. Orders of the Court are signed by the Chief Justice. SCR 1.020(? )(b). ;
Section 110(5)(a) of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the election of a Chief Justice by the members of the Court. Section 110(5)(b) provides that the Chief Justice shall be the “executive head” of the Court of Justice, and perform necessary administrative functions relating to the Court. The majority misconstrues the role of an “executive head” to be superior to the role of the Supreme Courts and would give the Chief Justice veto power over all Court of Justice personnel deci*78sions. There is no basis in reason or in the law for this interpretation.
The Chief Justice, as the executive head of the Court of Justice, administers, or carries out, the policies of the Court of Justice, which are adopted by the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice has no independent policy or rule-making authority for the Court of Justice. Therefore, in performing his administrative functions, the Chief Justice is constrained by the policies and rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. “Though Const. § 110(5)(b) provides that the Chief Justice ‘shall be the executive head of the Court of Justice,’ there can be little doubt that § 110 vests the supervisory and policy-making authority of the judicial department in the Supreme Court.” Farley, 570 S.W.2d at 620.
“Section 110(5)(b) of the Constitution does not confer unbridled, absolute or unlimited power on the Chief Justice in his capacity as Chief Executive of the court system.” Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Ky.1994). “The power of the Chief Justice is not absolute. It must be exercised under the authority granted by the constitution and is subject to review by the entire Supreme Court.” Id. at 684. Thus, in administrative matters, the Chief Justice is accountable to the entire Supreme Court for his actions. As this Court recognized in Kuprion, actions of the Chief Justice acting in an administrative capacity are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 682-84.
Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution specifically authorizes the Supreme Court (not the Chief Justice individually) to adopt policies and procedures for personnel matters for the Court of Justice. Under this constitutional authority, the Supreme Court established the policy that the elected official is the appointing authority for personnel in his or her office. Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice, § 1.03(1). The Chief Justice is bound by this policy.

THE SUPREME COURT, NOT THE CHIEF JUSTICE, CAN TERMINATE THE NON-TENURED EMPLOYEE OF AN ELECTED COURT OF JUSTICE OFFICIAL

The Supreme Court has designated the elected official as the appointing authority for his or her office personnel. This means Judge Nance, the elected Family Court Judge, has the discretion and authority to both hire and dismiss his court administrator. The issue facing this Court is — how can a non-tenured employee who engages in conduct which interferes with the operation of the Court of Justice (as alleged in this case) be removed, when the appointing judge refuses to act?. While, for the reasons stated above, the Chief Justice individually does not have the authority to amend or override Court of Justice personnel policies,11 the Supreme Court does have said authority. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(a); Ky. Const. § 116. “In addition to the Court’s Constitutional rule making power, the Court is also vested with certain ‘inherent’ powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction.” Smothers, 672 S.W.2d at 64. Pursuant to Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution and SCR 1.020(O(a), termination of Judge Nance’s court administrator would require a vote of four justices.12

*79
THE AOC DIRECTOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, AND THE COURT MAJORITY ARE NOT FOLLOWING SUPREME COURT PERSONNEL POLICIES

The letters from the Chief Justice to Judge Nance add another complication to the case. The letters indicate that the AOC Director terminated the employee for having violated Sections 2.02 (Confidential Information), 2.05 (Abuse of Position) and 3.02 (Workplace Harassment) of the Court of Justice personnel policies.13 The added complication is that Section 3.02 requires specific procedures to be followed for both tenured and non-tenured, elected and appointed, employees accused of workplace harassment, including review and findings by the Court of Justice Harassment Complaint Panel (COJ HCP). Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice, § 3.02(8)(a)-(e). The record before this Court does not indicate that these procedures were followed. The majority simply ignores the Court’s own harassment policy.
The majority also blatantly ignores, as evidenced by the letters in the record, the AOC’s and Chief Justice’s obvious misunderstanding of what constitutes “workplace harassment” or “hostile work environment” as those terms are used in a legal sense (per Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344, and Section 3.02 of the Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice). Under Section 3.02, “unlawful workplace harassment” (hostile work environment) must be based on “race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation [or] political affiliation.”14 Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice, § 3.02(2)(a)-(b). Judge Nance points out in his petition that there was no allegation that his employee engaged in any such conduct. While an “atmosphere of fear,” if true, would be undesirable, I remind the majority that this does not constitute a “hostile work environment” in the legal sense, which is what Section 3.02 of our personnel policies encompasses. Accordingly, from the face of the limited record, termination under Section 3.02 appears improper.
Finally, whatever offense(s) the Court Administrator may or may not have committed, and any evidence thereof, are outside the record. Even if the majority believes the Chief Justice has the power to do so, how, without having seen the evidence, can the majority conclude the Chief Justice “properly” terminated the employee? The record before this Court contains *80no allegations of fact, no investigative report, nor any explanation of the conduct which constituted the alleged violations. How can this Court conduct a meaningful review without the evidence?

CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court ignores its own rules, it can only diminish respect for this Court and the rule of law in this Commonwealth. I have taken an oath to uphold the Kentucky Constitution and will not abdicate my responsibilities and cede the Court’s power to the AOC Director or to the Chief Justice. As the facts and the law stand in this case, the writ should be granted and the matter remanded to the whole Court for further proceedings.
APPENDIX
Kentucky Court of Justice Organizational Structure
APPENDIX
Kentucky Court of Justice Organizational Structure
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*81Organizational Chart, Kentucky Court of Justice, http://courts.icy.gov/research

. The record before this Court is extremely limited, and consists only of Judge Nance's petition, AOC's response, and three letters attached as exhibits. Because the investigator’s report is not contained in the record, we do not know what the allegations against the court administrator were.

. See Exhibit B of the Petition (Exhibit A of Response), Letter from former AOC Director to Sharon Travis.

. See Exhibit B of the Response, Letter from Chief Justice Minton to Judge Nance dated April 10, 2009.

. See Exhibit B of the Response, Letter from Chief Justice Minton to Judge Nance dated April 10, 2009.

. See Exhibit C of the Response, Letter from Chief Justice Minton to Judge Nance dated June 30, 2009.

. The AOC was created to serve as the staff for the Chief Justice in executing the policies and programs of the Court of Justice. KRS 27A.050; Ky. Const. § 110(5)(b). Consistent, however, with the Supreme Court’s control and rule-making authority over the Court of Justice, AOC policies and procedures must be approved by the Supreme Court, and all of its personnel actions must conform to the requirements of the judicial personnel system approved by the Supreme Court. SCR 1.050; Ky. Const. § 110(2)(a), § 116.

. The AOC provides services to elected officials and their staffs, such as payroll, benefits, facilities, and technical support.

. The “appointing authority” is the individual who is authorized to hire and dismiss said employees. Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice, § 1.03(1).

. Adopted by the Supreme Court (Order No. 2005-03).

. Section 110(2)(a) of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause, or as may be required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.
Section 116 provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe rules governing its appellate jurisdiction, rules for the appointment of commissioners and other court personnel, and rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice. The Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern admission to the bar and the discipline of members of the bar.

. Amendments to the Personnel Policies for the Kentucky Court of Justice made by the Chief Justice alone, like those before the 2009 layoffs (Order Nos. 2009-08, 2009-10, and 2009-11) are ultra vires and void.

. While only the Supreme Court may amend or override a Court of Justice personnel poli*79cy (in this case, Section 1.03(1) — the grant of appointing authority to the elected official), I note that an alternative remedy lies with the Judicial Conduct Commission. A judge who declines to terminate an employee whose conduct interferes with the operation of the Court of Justice can face the Judicial Conduct Commission. See SCR 4.300, Canon 3. The Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that "[t]he judge's judicial duties include all the duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law," SCR 4.300, Canon 3A, and holds the judge personally accountable for the actions or inactions of his or her staff. Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are punishable by the Judicial Conduct Commission, which has the authority to discipline judges, with punishments ranging from a private reprimand to a suspension or removal from office. Decisions of the Judicial Conduct Commission are reviewable by the Supreme Court. By operation of law, a judge's removal terminates his appointing authority.

. See Exhibit B of the Response, Letter from Chief Justice Minton to Judge Nance dated April 10, 2009, and Exhibit C of the Response, Letter from Chief Justice Minton to Judge Nance dated June 30, 2009.

. Section 3.02 incorporates protected criteria set forth in KRS 344.040 (race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, and disability) while adding sexual orientation and political affiliation.