Court Opinion

ID: 9373063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:26.482878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.381664
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     HENRY CHIN HONG,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         NY-4324-17-0202-I-1

                  v.

     GENERAL SERVICES                                DATE: January 20, 2023
       ADMINISTRATION,
                  Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lawrence Tomscha, New York, New York, for the appellant.

           Nicole Ludwig, Esquire, New York, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal under the Uniformed Services
     Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and REMAND

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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     the case to the New York Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with
     this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant is a veteran serving as a GS-12 Architect with the agency.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1.   The appellant filed an appeal with the
     Board alleging that he was being harassed because of his veterans’ status in
     violation of USERRA. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6, 8-9, Tab 4 at 4.
¶3        Specifically, the appellant asserted that, because he is a veteran, his
     supervisor misconstrued his statements during a meeting as indicating that he was
     suicidal and then stated that belief to coworkers and a hospital where the
     appellant was purportedly a patient. IAF, Tab 1 at 8, Tab 4 at 4-5, Tab 6 at 4,
     Tab 7 at 17.    According to the appellant, based on their belief that he was
     suicidal, his superiors denied him entry into his workplace and forced him to
     telework, reassigned an integral aspect of his work, threatened him with an
     unacceptable rating, and negatively affected his potential for promotion. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 8-9, Tab 4 at 7, Tab 6 at 4-5. He also alleged that an agency manager
     shouted near many employees that he “wouldn’t want to be in a f*cking fox hole”
     with the appellant. IAF, Tab 4 at 5.
¶4        The administrative judge issued an order setting forth the jurisdictional
     elements of a USERRA claim and directing the appellant to file a statement
     addressing the Board’s jurisdiction over his appeal.        IAF, Tab 3.     After
     considering the parties’ responses, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing. IAF,
     Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. She found that he failed to nonfrivolously
     allege both that he lost a benefit of employment and that the agency’s actions
     were motivated by his military service. ID at 4-8. She also concluded that he
     failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ID at 8. The appellant
     has filed a petition for review, essentially reiterating the allegations of
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     harassment he made below and setting forth some new allegations. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.

                         DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The appellant has established the Board’s jurisdiction over his USERRA hostile
     work environment claim.
¶5         There are two types of cases that arise under USERRA:              reemployment
     cases under 38 U.S.C. §§ 4312-4318; and discrimination cases under 38 U.S.C.
     § 4311(a) and (b). Bostwick v. Department of Agriculture, 122 M.S.P.R. 269, ¶ 5
     (2015).     Here, the appellant has brought a discrimination case under section
     4311(a). IAF, Tab 6 at 4. That section provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person
     who . . . has performed . . . service in a uniformed service shall not be denied
     initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any
     benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that . . . performance of
     service.”      38    U.S.C.   §     4311(a);   Beck   v.   Department   of   the   Navy,
     120 M.S.P.R. 504, ¶ 7 (2014).
¶6         To establish jurisdiction over a USERRA discrimination claim before the
     Board, an appellant must nonfrivolously allege that (1) he performed duty or has
     an obligation to perform duty in a uniformed service of the United States; (2) the
     agency denied him initial employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or
     any benefit of employment; and (3) the denial was due to his performance of duty
     or obligation to perform duty in the uniformed service. Beck, 120 M.S.P.R. 504,
     ¶ 8. The Board employs a liberal approach in determining whether an appellant
     has established the Board’s jurisdiction under USERRA, and the relative
     weakness of an appellant’s assertions in support of his claim is not a basis for a
     jurisdictional dismissal.     Id.     Rather, if an appellant fails to develop his
     contentions, his claim should be denied on the merits. Id. Once an appellant has
     established the Board’s jurisdiction over his USERRA appeal, he has a right to a
     hearing on the merits of his claim.              Gossage v. Department of Labor,
     118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10 (2012).
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¶7        We    agree   with   the   administrative   judge   that   the     appellant   has
     nonfrivolously alleged that he performed duty in a uniformed service of the
     United States and has thus satisfied the first jurisdictional element of his
     discrimination claim. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 4 at 11. For the reasons that follow, we
     find that the appellant also satisfied the second and third jurisdictional elements
     of his discrimination claim and that a remand is therefore required to provide the
     appellant his requested hearing on the merits.
¶8        In finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the second jurisdictional
     element; namely, that the agency denied him any benefit of employment, the
     administrative judge seemed to consider whether some of the discrete allegations
     made by the appellant would, individually, constitute a lost benefit of
     employment. ID at 4-6. Although the appellant did not explicitly argue below
     that his various allegations should be considered together as a whole, we find that
     it would be appropriate to do so to determine whether he has made a nonfrivolous
     allegation of a hostile work environment under USERRA.                To establish the
     Board’s jurisdiction over a USERRA hostile work environment claim, an
     appellant must nonfrivolously allege that he was subjected to a pattern of ongoing
     and persistent harassing behavior based on his military service that was
     sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment.
     Petersen v. Department of the Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227, 239 (1996); see also
     Kitlinski v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 19 (2015), vacated in part
     on other grounds, 857 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
¶9        As previously indicated, the appellant has alleged that, because he is a
     veteran, his superiors slandered him as suicidal to his coworkers and others and
     that, based on their belief that he was suicidal, denied him entry into his
     workplace and forced him to telework, reassigned an integral aspect of his work,
     threatened him with an unacceptable rating, and negatively affected his potential
     for promotion. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-9, Tab 4 at 7, Tab 6 at 4-5. In addition, as noted,
     according to the appellant an agency manager shouted to many employees that he
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      “wouldn’t want to be in a f*cking fox hole” with the appellant. IAF, Tab 4 at 5.
      Taken together as a whole, we find that the appellant’s allegation s, if proven,
      could establish a pattern of ongoing and persistent harassing behavior sufficiently
      severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of his employment. See
      Petersen, 71 M.S.P.R. at 235. Although a failure by the appellant to develop his
      contentions could lead to a denial of his claim on the merits, we find that he has
      made a nonfrivolous allegation of a hostile work environment under USERRA. 2
      Beck, 120 M.S.P.R. 504, ¶ 8.
¶10         Regarding the third jurisdictional element; namely, that the denial of any
      benefit of employment was due to his performance of duty or obligation to
      perform duty in the uniformed service, the appellant indicated that his superiors
      linked his military service with suicidal tendencies and believed that they could
      create a “believable-conviction” that he was suicidal because he is a veteran.
      IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 4 at 4, Tab 6 at 4. He further suggests that he would never
      have been asked questions about his state of mind and whether he was suicidal
      were it not for the fact that he is a veteran. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, 8, Tab 4 at 4-5,
      Tab 6 at 4.   The appellant also alleged that nonveteran employees have never
      been questioned or treated in the way he was and that a manager shouted a
      negative comment about him that referred to his military service. IAF, Tab 4
      at 5, 7-8. Under the Board’s liberal approach to determining whether an appellant
      has established jurisdiction under USERRA, we find that the appellant has
      nonfrivolously alleged that his military service was a motivating factor in the

      2
         Among other things, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s own
      admission—that he told the agency that he sometimes thinks of harming himself or
      others—weighs against a finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the
      agency slandered him. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 1 at 8. Although the appellant’s admissions in
      this regard may make his assertions in support of his claim relatively weak, such a
      relative weakness should not serve as a basis for a jurisdictional dismissal. See Beck,
      120 M.S.P.R. 504, ¶ 8.
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      agency’s harassment of him.       See Beck, 120 M.S.P.R. 504, ¶ 8; Swidecki v.
      Department of Commerce, 113 M.S.P.R. 168, ¶ 9 (2010).
¶11        Because jurisdiction has been established, the appellant is entitled to the
      hearing he sought. See Gossage, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 12. Accordingly, a remand
      to the administrative judge is appropriate. On remand, the appellant must prove
      by preponderant evidence that his military status was at least a motivating or
      substantial factor in the agency’s decision to deny him any benefit of
      employment. Id. The appellant may meet this burden by using direct or indirect
      evidence. 3 Id.   Discriminatory motivation under USERRA may be reasonably
      inferred from such circumstantial evidence as temporal proximity between the
      appellant’s military activity and the adverse employment action, “inconsistencies
      between the proffered reason and other actions of the employer, an employer’s
      expressed hostility towards members protected by the statute together with
      knowledge of the [individual’s] military activity, and disparate treatment of
      certain [individuals] compared to other [individuals] with similar work records or
      offenses.” Id. (quoting Sheehan v. Department of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1014
      (Fed. Cir. 2001)).   If the appellant meets his burden, the burden shifts to the
      agency to prove that legitimate reasons, standing alone, would have induced it to
      take the same action. Gossage, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 12.

      The appellant has stated a claim for which relief can be granted.
¶12        The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to state a claim
      for which relief can be granted because he did not assert lost wages or other
      benefits. ID at 8-9. The Board’s remedial authority under USERRA derives from

      3
        For the first time on review, the appellant asserts the following: (1) his building
      access was restored on September 13, 2017; (2) he has been relocated to a new
      worksite; and (3) he has been assigned a project at another worksite, requiring him to
      travel between two worksites. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13 -14. It is apparent that these
      alleged incidents occurred shortly before or after the initial decision was issued on
      September 14, 2017. ID at 1. On remand, the administrative judge should consider
      these additional allegations as a part of the appellant’s USERRA hostile work
      environment claim.
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      38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(2), which authorizes the Board to enter an order requiring an
      agency to comply with the provisions of USERRA and to compensate an
      appellant for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of such lack of
      compliance. Johnson v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 11 (2014).
¶13        Therefore, in some cases, the Board is unable to provide any effe ctive
      remedy for past violations. See, e.g., id. (dismissing a USERRA allegation for
      failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the Board could
      not remedy the since-retired appellant’s denial of a lateral reassignment); Hudson
      v. Department of Homeland Security, 104 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶ 8 (2006) (finding that
      the Board could provide no relief for an alleged USERRA vio lation concerning
      military leave because the appellant had not alleged that he lost any wages or
      other compensation and it would have no effect to order the agency to comply
      with USERRA since he had left the agency). Here, at a minimum, there appears
      to be an allegation of an ongoing hostile work environment. IAF, Tabs 4, 6; PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 13-14.    If the appellant proved such an ongoing hostile work
      environment, the Board could order the agency to cease its harassment based on
      his prior military service in compliance with 38 U.S.C § 4311(a). See 38 U.S.C.
      § 4324(c)(2). Accordingly, we find that the appellant has stated a claim upon
      which relief can be granted.

      The Board lacks jurisdiction in this USERRA appeal to consider the appellant’s
      allegations of prohibited personnel practices.
¶14        The appellant also asserts that the agency committed prohibited personnel
      practices in reprisal for his disclosures about waste and incompetence in the
      engineering department. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. The Board lacks jurisdiction to
      consider such allegations in a USERRA case. See Schoch v. Department of the
      Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 134, ¶ 13 (2001). Moreover, the appellant has not submitted
      evidence that he exhausted his rights before the Office of Special Counsel by
      filing a prohibited personnel practice complaint of reprisal for making a protected
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      disclosure or engaging in protected activity.         Therefore, the Board lacks
      jurisdiction over his claim as an individual right of action appeal. Id.

                                            ORDER
¶15         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the New York Field
      Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.       The
      administrative judge shall provide the appellant with a hearing on his USERRA
      claim and issue a new initial decision on the merits of that claim.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.