Court Opinion

ID: 9937381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 19:01:15.467058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:55.562226
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FILED
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          FEB 9 2024
                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No.    23-30033

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. No.
                                                  1:22-cr-00056-SWS-1
 v.

JOSEPH ALAN HOADLEY,                              MEMORANDUM*

                 Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Idaho
                 Scott W. Skavdahl, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted February 7, 2024**
                                 Portland, Oregon

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Joseph Hoadley, a former police lieutenant, appeals his convictions, following

a jury trial, for (1) falsification of records to impede an investigation in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count 2); (2) tampering with a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(d)(2) (Count 3); and (3) evidence tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1512(c)(1) (Count 4). Hoadley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each

conviction. Although we review the sufficiency of evidence de novo, United States

v. Jaimez, 45 F.4th 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2022), we “construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution” and “determine whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

      1. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, as charged in Count 2, the government had the

burden to prove that “(1) [Hoadley] knowingly falsified a record or document; (2)

[Hoadley] acted with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence an actual or

contemplated investigation; and (3) the investigation concerned a matter within the

jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Justice or the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.” United States v. Gonzalez, 906 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). The

third element is not disputed, and sufficient evidence supported the first two

elements.

      First, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Hoadley

knowingly made false statements in his police report about the incident with B.H.

At the time of B.H.’s arrest, Hoadley admitted that he “knocked [B.H.] down,” and

both B.H. and Officer Ibarra testified that Hoadley struck B.H. in the head. A

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rational jury could conclude that Hoadley made a false statement when he instead

reported that he “force[d] [B.H.] to the ground by his shirt collar.” A rational jury

could reach this conclusion despite Hoadley’s contrary testimony and explanation

of his statements. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164 (“[A] reviewing court ‘must

presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact

resolved any [evidentiary] conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution.’” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979))). Officer

Ibarra’s account was not “impossibl[e],” as Hoadley alleges, and regardless, a

rational jury could still convict based on the other evidence.

      Second, sufficient evidence established that Hoadley acted with the intent to

impede or obstruct a contemplated investigation. This element is satisfied when an

officer “concoct[s] a false cover story” in order to “appear as though the force [he]

used was justified, thereby shielding [him] from the punishment that would likely

follow if the truth were revealed.” Gonzalez, 906 F.3d at 794. A rational jury could

conclude that Hoadley’s statement in the report was written to make his use of force

appear justified so that he would be shielded from punishment.

      Further, there is no inconsistency between Hoadley’s conviction for falsifying

records and his acquittal on the charge of excessive force (Count 1). A rational jury

could find that Hoadley struck B.H. in the head without using excessive force but

that Hoadley still made a false report about the incident. In any case, any perceived

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inconsistency in the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1 and 2, standing alone, is not grounds

for vacating the conviction. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 (1984)

(“[T]here is no reason to vacate respondent’s conviction merely because the verdicts

cannot rationally be reconciled.”).

      2. Sufficient evidence supported Hoadley’s conviction for witness tampering.

18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(2).      C.H., a subordinate officer, testified that Hoadley

threatened him in the context of the FBI investigation. This conversation occurred

the day after the FBI informed the Chief of Police that Hoadley was being referred

for possible criminal prosecution.     A rational jury could conclude, based on

Hoadley’s statements to C.H. and the context of the exchange, that Hoadley

intentionally harassed C.H. in an attempt to dissuade him from cooperating with the

FBI’s investigation. Although Hoadley testified that his conversation with C.H.

concerned an employment dispute, the jury was free to credit C.H. and to “disbelieve

[Hoadley] and infer the opposite of his testimony to support its verdict.” United

States v. Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004).

      3.    Sufficient evidence supported Hoadley’s conviction for evidence

tampering. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1). Hoadley, a long-time veteran of the police force

who had training on evidence preservation, wiped all data from his department-

issued cellphone and laptop the day after he was arraigned in this case. A jury could

rationally infer that Hoadley had a corrupt purpose in resetting his devices. Hoadley

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cites no authority for his theory that the government was required to prove the

destruction of relevant records. Regardless, there was sufficient evidence for a

rational jury to conclude that Hoadley had destroyed relevant records given that he

used the devices in question while the investigation into his conduct was taking

place.

         AFFIRMED.

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