Court Opinion

ID: 9761765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:53:41.670873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:26.159038
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the Majority’s discussion of the Statute of Limitations. I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s affirmation of the trial court order granting the Commonwealth’s motion for temporary assignment of issuing authority to a judge of the court of common pleas.
I am in agreement that the question at hand is whether the president judge had the authority to reassign the instant case from District Justice Hunsicker to a judge of the court of common pleas. In light of the facts of this case I find that the president judge did not have such authority. The case at bar came about through a motion procedure. Pa.R.Crim.P. 23(d) states:
A motion may be filed requesting a temporary assignment under paragraph (b) on the ground that the assignment is needed to insure fair and impartial proceedings. Reasonable notice and opportunity to respond shall be provided to the parties.
The Majority finds that the president judge had the authority to reassign the case even though the moving party herein did not allege in their motion any way that assignment of another issuing authority was necessary “to insure fair and impartial proceedings”.
In Commonwealth v. McAndrew, 361 Pa.Super. 60, 521 A.2d 472 (1987), this Court interpreted Pa.R.Crim.P. 23(d) in a case where, as in the present matter, a motion for temporary assignment had been filed. The court in McAndrew relied on the following comment to Rule 23:
The motion procedure of paragraph (d) is intended only to apply when a party requests temporary assignment to *188insure fair and impartial proceedings. The president judge, may of course, order a response and schedule a hearing with regard to such motion.
Id., 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 63, 521 A.2d at 473, 474. The McAndrew court interpreted this comment to mean that a petition wholly without foundation may be dismissed without a hearing. Id., 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 64, 521 A.2d at 474.
In the immediate matter, the Commonwealth’s motion for a court of common pleas judge was merely a recitation of the procedural posture of the case; no explanation was given for the request. As the court stated in McAndrew, a petition for temporary assignment in a specific case is analogous to recusal. The party seeking to have a judge removed “bears the burden of producing evidence of establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating the recusal, and failure to adduce competent evidence will result in a denial of the recusal motion”. Id. at 361 Pa.Superior Ct. 64, 521 A.2d 474. The Commonwealth’s petition herein was wholly without foundation in that it did not assert any manner in which its case would have been prejudiced if it had remained before Justice Hunsicker and therefore it should have been denied.
I agree with the Majority’s position that as long as the statute of limitations period has not expired, the Commonwealth has a right to a de novo review of a refiled complaint before another judicial officer. However, this case is distinguishable from cases in which the Commonwealth is seeking a new hearing before another issuing authority after the case has been disposed of by the initial judge. Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 425 A.2d 367 (1981), Commonwealth v. Hetherington, 460 Pa. 17, 331 A.2d 205 (1975), Riggins Case, 435 Pa. 321, 254 A.2d 616 (1969), and McNair’s Petition, 324 Pa. 48,187 A. 498 (1936). In the immediate matter, the Commonwealth is seeking a new hearing before another issuing authority while in the midst of preliminary proceedings before District Justice *189Hunsicker. The Commonwealth is seeking to replace the present issuing authority, as opposed to beginning the hearing process anew. If a judge could be removed at this stage of the proceedings, without cause shown “the purpose of our independent judiciary would be frustrated”. Commonwealth v. McAndrew, supra, 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 64, 521 A.2d at 474.
I disagree with the implication of the Majority’s position that a president judge would be empowered to make the reassignment sua sponte, notwithstanding an improper motion by the Commonwealth requesting such reassignment. My interpretation of the following section of the comment following Rule 23 is pertinent to the discussion:
The motion procedure is not intended to apply in any of the many other situations in which president judges make temporary assignments of issuing authorities; in all these other situations the president judges may make temporary assignments on their own without any motion, notice, response, or hearing.
This comment, which permits president judges to make temporary assignment of issuing authorities without a motion or hearing, addresses situations unlike the present one. The comment would apply to an instance where assignment was necessary to replace a district justice due to illness or due to the unavailability of a justice. It would not apply to an instance of removal of a particular justice from a particular case at the request of a party. To suggest otherwise would promote “judge shopping”.
For all of the aforementioned reasons. I would have denied the Commonwealth’s motion for temporary assignment of a Court of Common Pleas issuing authority absent a hearing.