Court Opinion

ID: 9692967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:14:22.114813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:38.480123
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
More than any other Justice on this Court, I have written on the harmless error rule. This encompasses a period of over eight years.
Although I concur in the result of this case, I do not agree with the adoption of the new standard set forth in the majority opinion. Under the new standard, that the “jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if the alleged error had not occurred,” it will be easier for prosecutors in this Court to gloss over prejudicial error. I agree with the Remade decision, also written by Chief Justice Wuest, that “[wjhether error is prejudicial must be determined on the basis of the facts in any given case.” State v. Remade, 386 N.W.2d 38, 40 (S.D.1986) (quoting State v. Waller, 338 N.W.2d 288, 291 (S.D.1983) (citing State v. Branch, 298 N.W.2d 173 (S.D.1980); State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58 (1963)). I do agree that this Court must have a standard by which to determine prejudicial error. The Remade decision, which comported with previous decisions, is as recent as *7271986, by the same author of the majority opinion.
We have long lived with the rule that prejudicial error is such error as in all probability must have produced some effect upon the result of the trial, namely, the verdict of the jury, and that it must be an error which is harmful to the substantial rights of those assigning it. SDCL 23A-44-14 states: “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”
The problem is in applying this statute with our previous decisions to the facts at hand. To determine prejudicial error, the facts must be examined in any given case.
Persuasion by illegitimate means is wrong. If a prosecutor persuades by illegitimate means, and it produces some effect upon the final result of the trial, it is prejudicial error if a substantial right of the defendant has been impaired. To “produce some effect” upon the final result of the trial, impliedly means that the verdict of the jury has been affected. It means that the outcome has been affected as a consequence of illegitimate means. This should not be.
The hearsay evidence in this case, although improper, was cumulative. There was evidence, which went in without objection, prior to Brenda Trembath’s testimony proving the very facts sought to be established by her hearsay testimony. In State v. Devine, 372 N.W.2d 132, 138 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting), I discoursed on prejudicial error and called it a “[fjriend of those seeking to advocate constitutional guarantees and those who would ring the Liberty Bell.” Id. at 141. I further mentioned:
“Prejudicial error” is not vacuous, vague, or vaporous. It has a well-settled meaning in this state. “Prejudicial error” is that which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights of the party assigning it. See K & E Land & Cattle, Inc. v. Mayer, 330 N.W.2d 529 (S.D.1983); State v. Tribitt, 327 N.W.2d 132 (S.D.1982); Matter of M.B., 288 N.W.2d 773 (S.D.1980); State Highway Comm’n v. Beets, 88 S.D. 536, 224 N.W.2d 567 (1974); State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58 (1963); and State v. Pirkey, 24 S.D. 533, 124 N.W. 713 (1910).
Devine, 372 N.W.2d at 141. Now, we are informed that we should change our old rule and adopt a new one which would further lessen the rights of individuals charged with crimes, i.e., to be convicted by an even more liberal interpretation of what does and does not constitute prejudicial error. This Court has already abounded in liberality under the old rule. See my writings in Remacle, 386 N.W.2d at 40 (Henderson, J., specially concurring); State v. Dokken, 385 N.W.2d 493, 505 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., specially concurring); State v. Chief Eagle, 377 N.W.2d 141, 144 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting); and Devine, 372 N.W.2d at 138 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
Apparently, as one can read by the paragraph in the majority opinion which cites Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, this Court is beginning to recognize the differences in the application of harmless error to state procedures/state law/federal constitutional questions. See Remacle, 386 N.W.2d at 41 (Henderson, J., specially concurring).*
In each one of these cases, where the question arises on prejudicial error, a platform of thought and rationale must be established and questions must be asked:
1) Was there a violation of a state procedural provision?
2) Was there a violation of a state constitutional provision?
3) Was there a federal constitutional transgression?
*728As I stated in my special concurrence in Remacle, 386 N.W.2d at 41, we cannot go back to State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58 (1963), and its progeny if a federal constitutional error arises. Chapman's basic tenets then becomes applicable and that is when a court must declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126, 130 (S.D.1982).
Harmless error continues to be the prosecutor’s friend and a woe unto defendants and defense counsel. I agree that there should be a standard but I disagree with the new standard adopted by the majority opinion, and I caution that the harmless error rule should never be used to justify unfairness at trial. Remacle, 386 N.W.2d at 42 (citing State v. Webb, 251 N.W.2d 687 (S.D.1977)).

 I make special reference to the outstanding and scholarly work of former Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, "The Riddle on Harmless Error,” appearing in Law Forum Series of the College of Law of Ohio State University, No. 7 (Ohio State Univ. Press 1970), as cited in my special concurrence in Remacle, 386 N.W.2d at 41.