Court Opinion

ID: 9926845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 19:02:36.911206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:02.940409
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 Ebbing v. Connors CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 ANDREA EBBING,                                                       D080537

           Appellant,

           v.                                                        (Super. Ct. Nos. 21FL004748C
                                                                    & 21FDV01613C)
 JAMES CONNORS,

           Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Paula S. Rosenstein, Judge. Affirmed.
         Andrea Ebbing, in pro. per., for Appellant.
         James Connors, in pro. per., for Respondent.

         Andrea Ebbing (Andrea) appeals a June 1, 2022 custody order,
awarding the parties joint custody of their two minor children and
determining that the children shall primarily reside with their father in
Massachusetts. She challenges the court’s application of Family Code section
3044,1 the validity of the record, opposing counsel’s conduct, and the
evidentiary basis for the custody ruling. Based largely on the limited record

and the appellant’s burden on appeal to show prejudicial error, we affirm.2
                                        I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Andrea and James Connors (James) have two minor children. The
couple previously lived together with their children in San Diego, but in
January 2021 James and the children moved to Middleboro, Massachusetts.
In February 2021 James filed a complaint, in Massachusetts court, for
custody, support, and parenting time. The court granted temporary custody
orders on an emergency basis.
      On April 6, 2021, Andrea initiated a case in San Diego, seeking a
domestic violence restraining order against James and custody of the
children. Complete copies of any temporary orders issued in response to this

1    All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise specified.

2     Andrea filed five requests for judicial notice. Judicial notice may be
taken of the matters specified in Evidence Code sections 451 and 452.
However, only relevant material is subject to judicial notice. (State
Compensation Insurance Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 422, 442.) We also do not take judicial notice of matters that
were not presented to the trial court absent exceptional circumstances.
(Weiss v. City of Del Mar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 609, 625.) Nor do we take
judicial notice of matters that are already in the record, as that is
unnecessary. (Adams v. Bank of America, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
666, 674.) None of Andrea’s requests comply with these rules. She seeks
judicial notice of matters that are within the clerk’s transcript, not subject to
judicial notice, or irrelevant. She also seeks judicial notice of matters that
were not presented to the trial court without demonstrating exceptional
circumstances for their consideration. We therefore deny all five requests for
judicial notice.

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filing are not in the record, but James concedes a temporary restraining order
was issued against him.
      After discussing the case with the court in Massachusetts on
April 14, 2021, under the authority of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (§ 3400, et seq.), the court in San Diego
determined that it had home state jurisdiction. The court in Massachusetts
then vacated all prior orders and dismissed its case on June 22, 2021.
      On May 21, 2021, Andrea initiated a second family law case in San
Diego by filing a petition for custody. James filed an ex parte application for
custody and consolidation of the two San Diego cases in response on
May 25, 2021. The court granted the request for consolidation on
May 26, 2021. James thereafter filed a request for an order regarding
custody, visitation, and relocation of the children.
      On July 1, 2021, the court denied Andrea’s request for a restraining
order. Andrea filed two subsequent requests for restraining orders on August
16, 2021, and January 13, 2022, but she ultimately decided to not pursue
them. James also sought a restraining order against Andrea, which was
partially granted on September 10, 2021, and expired after one year.
      On July 28, 2021, the court set the matters of custody, visitation, and
relocation for an evidentiary hearing. Evidentiary hearings took place over
several days between October 6, 2021, and June 1, 2022. At the conclusion of
those hearings, the court ordered Andrea and James shall share joint legal
custody, the children shall primarily reside with James in Plymouth County,
Massachusetts, and Andrea may visit the children on a specified schedule.

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      Andrea argues the June 1, 2022 order3 should be reversed because:
(1) the court did not properly apply section 3044; (2) the record has been
altered; (3) opposing counsel committed misconduct; and (4) the foundation of
the order is based on lies. The limited record before us does not support
Andrea’s claims of error, thus we affirm.
                                       II.
                                DISCUSSION
A.    Guiding Appellate Rules
      We begin with several principles of appellate law that guide our

review.4 First, the parties must support their factual assertions with
citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Both
parties disregard this rule. James’s brief does not contain any record

citations.5 Andrea’s brief contains numerous factual assertions without
citation, and when she does provide citations, they often do not support her

3     Andrea also appears to dispute two earlier orders entered on May 26,
2021, and July 1, 2021. We lack jurisdiction to consider these orders because
Andrea’s notice of appeal identifies only the June 1, 2022 order as the order
from which the appeal is taken. (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp.
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239.) Additionally, deadline for appealing those
orders had lapsed when the notice of appeal was filed. (California Rules of
Court, rule 8.104; K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th
875, 881.)

4     As a self-represented litigant, Andrea is entitled to the same but no
greater consideration than other litigants, and she must therefore follow the
rules of appellate procedure. (County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861.)

5     We note that Andrea did not file a reply to James’s brief.

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factual assertions.6 We therefore disregard the asserted facts that are not
supported by a proper citation. (Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
864, 868.)
      Second, “it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a
trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on
an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
“ ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate
record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Id. at p. 609.)
An appellant therefore has the burden of providing a reporter’s transcript, an
agreed statement, or a settled statement if the appellant intends to raise an
issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.120(b).) Similarly, “ ‘[w]here exhibits are missing we will not
presume they would undermine the judgment.’ ” (Hiser v. Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 640, 657.)
      At the evidentiary hearings that led to the challenged order, the court
admitted witness testimony and various exhibits. The first two hearings
were reported, while the final three were not. The record does not include a
reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled statement regarding any of the
hearings, nor does it include any of the exhibits that were admitted. As

6      Andrea does not properly cite to the second volume of the clerk’s
transcript. Instead of referring to the designated page numbers (pages 241 to
383), her citations appear to be based on pagination starting over at page one
for volume two. For example, she cites to “2 CT 21” for a document located at
the 21st page of volume two, which should have been cited as “2 CT 261.” We
have interpreted these citations the best we can.
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discussed below, this hampers our review of the claimed errors and requires
that we resolve them against appellant.
        Third, “ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot
be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the
theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried.” ’ ” (Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) There is no indication that
Andrea previously raised many of the issues she now complains of,
preventing her from raising them on this appeal.
        Fourth, “ ‘[w]here a point is merely asserted by [appellant] without any
[substantive] argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be
without foundation and requires no discussion.’ ” (Holden v. City of San Diego
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418.) Andrea appears to assert additional
grounds for challenging the June 1, 2022 order in the conclusion of her brief.
She states Plymouth is too far away and has inadequate facilities for the
children, her visitation rights are impossible to accommodate, and she and
the children did not consent to the move. Andrea does not provide any
argument or legal authority to support these grounds, so we do not consider
them.
        Finally, in an initial custody order such as the one in this case, “the
trial court has ‘the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the
best interest of the child.’ ” (In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1072, 1087.) Our review of such an order is governed by the deferential
abuse of discretion test, and the order will be upheld when the trial court
“ ‘could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the
“best interest” of the child.’ ” (Johnston-Rossi v. Rossi (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
1081, 1087.)

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B.    Section 3044
      “Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years against the
other party seeking custody of the child, or against the child or the child’s
siblings, . . . there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint
physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic
violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child . . . .” (§ 3044,
subd. (a).)
      Andrea argues that section 3044 applies because she obtained a
temporary domestic violence restraining order against James on April 6,
2021. The limited record in this case prevents adequate review of this issue
because we do not have a copy of any temporary restraining order against
James, and without a reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled statement,
we are unable to determine if section 3044 was addressed in the trial court.
Nonetheless, as noted above, James concedes a temporary restraining order
was issued against him, and we will address the effect of that order under
section 3044.
      Unlike a regular domestic violence restraining order, a temporary
domestic violence restraining order may be issued on an ex parte basis
without notice. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th
220, 226.) The court must rule on a request for a temporary domestic
violence restraining order the same day it is filed, or by the next business day
if it is filed too late in the day to permit effective review. (§ 6326.) If the
court denies the request, it must state its reasons (§ 6320.5, subd. (a)), but
there is no corresponding requirement that reasons be given for granting the
request. The court also cannot deny a jurisdictionally adequate request for a

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temporary domestic violence restraining order unless it provides the
petitioner a right to a noticed hearing. (§ 6320.5, subd. (b).)
      As can be seen, the granting of a temporary domestic violence
restraining does not require findings. Instead, the court merely conducts a
facial review of the allegations to determine if they would constitute abuse.
(See Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [finding that that
a jurisdictionally adequate request for a temporary domestic violence
restraining order may only be summarily denied if the facts alleged fail to

constitute abuse].)7 As such, the issuance of the temporary order meant that
Andrea’s allegations, if true, were sufficient to constitute domestic violence,
but there were no findings of domestic violence at that time. When the court
ultimately ruled on the issue on July 1, 2021, it denied Andrea’s request,
showing that the court did not find James perpetrated domestic violence.
      Further, although the record contains other allegations of domestic
violence by James, Andrea has not identified any court findings on those
allegations, and our independent review of the record does not disclose any.
      For these reasons, Andrea has failed to establish that section 3044
applies, and no error has been shown on this ground.
C.    Record Alteration
      Andrea alleges “The record in this case has been dramatically altered,
mutilated, and seemingly forged. . . . This pattern of tampering was set to
intentionally mislead and confuse the Presiding Family Court Judge.” There
is no indication that Andrea raised this claim in the trial court, and she has
failed to provide any record citations to support it. Additionally, our review

7     The opinion in Nakamura v. Parker led to the enactment of section
6320.5. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill. No. 2553
(2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 29, 2008, p. 4.)

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of the record, which includes two sets of the registers of actions for each of the
consolidated cases and the clerk’s transcript designated by Andrea, does not
reveal any alterations. Andrea has therefore failed to show the alleged
record alteration occurred.
D.    Misconduct by Opposing Counsel
      Andrea claims the actions of James’s attorney, Ben Embry, “constitute
legal malpractice, professional misconduct, and a violation of ethical rules.”
Andrea alleges Mr. Embry filed false papers, improperly served documents,
failed to coordinate service as agreed, refused communication, and facilitated
James’s improper behavior.
      Again, there is no indication that Andrea raised this issue in the trial
court, and most of her allegations are not supported by citations to the record.
      Even if we assume misconduct, it would not warrant reversal unless
Andrea shows that she would have achieved a more favorable result in the
absence of that misconduct. (Jackson v. Park (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1196, 1216.) Most of the alleged misconduct occurred prior to the evidentiary
hearings that led to the challenged order, so it was unlikely to affect the
outcome of those hearings and the record does not show otherwise. The only
instances that conceivably occurred during the pertinent evidentiary
hearings are the general allegations that Mr. Embry “knowingly and willfully
misrepresent[ed] facts in both cases, to all judges,” and that he “continued
manipulating Judge Rosenstein.” Andrea does not provide any record
citations or explanation connecting these allegations to the relevant hearings,
and our review of the record does not show any misrepresentation or
manipulation at those hearings.
      Based on the foregoing, Andrea has failed to show reversable error
based on Mr. Embry’s conduct.

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E.    Alleged Lies
      Andrea claims the foundation of the June 1, 2022 order is based on lies
found in papers James filed on May 25, 2021. “ ‘We do not judge credibility
on appeal.’ ” (Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 824.)
Additionally, there is no indication that the court considered James’s filings
from May 25, 2021, at the evidentiary hearings that resulted in the
June 1, 2022 order. Accordingly, the “alleged lies” do not warrant reversal.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.

                                                                      IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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