Court Opinion

ID: 9547360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:46:23.750163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:39.254103
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
PADGETT, J.
I respectfully dissent. We are here dealing with a heinous crime but we are also dealing with an asserted constitutional right and are bound by the decisions on the subject by the United States Supreme Court. Despite the revulsion I feel with respect to the crime in question, and, equally, with respect to the result that suppressing appellant’s confessions might lead to, I cannot join in the affirmance.
It seems clear to me that the Supreme Court has said that once an accused has asked for counsel, interrogation (other than routine matters such as requests for name and address) must cease unless the accused himself initiates further contact. That is not what happened here, and, in my view, appellant’s rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States were violated.
The facts of this case lie squarely within the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S, 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).1
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to *569further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. ...
Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
It is uncontested on appeal that appellant was initially suspected of being a witness to the murder under investigation; that appellant was confronted with the testimonial evidence linking him to the incident; that upon his denial of any involvement, appellant was informed that he could be charged with “hindering prosecution”; that appellant was told that he had “flunked” the polygraph examination; that appellant challenged the accuracy of the examination and asserted his right to the presence of counsel during any further questioning; and that appellant was then informed that he would be held for further questioning and that he could be held for 48 hours without charges and without bail.
It is also uncontested that appellant was taken to another room to be “booked”; that the booking officer was Lt. Bartolomé, who knew appellant personally, both as a police counselor and later casually; and that Bartolomé was alone in the processing room with appellant when he asked appellant the question: “What’s happening, Eldred? It must be pretty heavy for two detectives to be bringing you down to be processed.” In response, appellant began explaining why he was being held for questioning, then broke down crying and saying, “Bartolomé, I cannot lie to you. You have been too nice to me in the past and you’ve always helped me out. You did a lot for me, and I cannot lie to you. I shot the haole.” At trial, Bartolomé testified on cross-examination that he (Bartolomé) must have said “something” else before appellant further stated that he would tell Bartolomé the whole story and that he did not need a lawyer present.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the court held that custodial interrogation of a putative defendant must be preceded by advice to the accused of his right to remain silent and his right to the presence of an attorney. The court outlined the now famous Miranda warnings as well as procedures to be followed subsequent to giving those warnings: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627, 16 L.Ed. at 723 (footnote *570omitted). “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the court made it clear that “custodial interrogation” under Miranda is not so narrowly defined as to be limited to express questioning of a defendant while in custody.
The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the “interrogation environment” created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would “subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner” and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. . ..
Id. at 299, 100 S.Ct. at 1688, 64 L.Ed.2d at 306, quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 457-58, 86 S.Ct. 1617, 16 L.Ed.2d at 694.
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. . . .
Id. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d at 307-08 (footnotes omitted).
The court in Innis held that the defendant, although in custody, had not been “interrogated” as a result of a conversation between two police officers held in the defendant’s presence. The court first noted that the “first prong” of the definition of interrogation had not been satisfied, because there had been no express questioning of the defendant. Id. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308. Nor had the defendant been subjected to the “functional equiva*571lent”of questioning, because the conversation between the police officers did not amount to “words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response ____” Id. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691, 64 L.Ed.2d at 309.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from the result reached in Innis, supra. Here, Officer Bartolomé (1) initiated a conversation, (2) with appellant, (3) beyond the indifferent necessities of the booking process, (4) by asking the direct question: “What’s happening, Eldred? It must be pretty heavy for two detectives to be bringing you down to be processed.” It cannot reasonably be maintained that this statement was not intended to draw some response from appellant. Nor can it be gainsaid that the question clearly related to the subject of appellant’s arrest and the reasons therefor. Thus, the trial court’s finding that the officer’s remarks were merely part of an exchange of pleasantries was, in my view, clearly erroneous.
From the record in this case I can only conclude that appellant was impermissibly solicited to enter a conversation on the subject of his incarceration within minutes of his formal, written assertion of his right to remain silent absent the presence of counsel and before such counsel had been provided. “[I]t is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d at 387 (emphasis added).
Even if it is assumed that our analysis should reach the “second prong” of the test for custodial interrogation it is patently clear from the facts adduced by the lower court that Officer Bartolomé either knew or should have known that his question was likely to invite an incriminating response from appellant. Bartolomé had counselled appellant “one-to-one” when appellant was in intermediate school and Bartolomé was a police liaison officer assigned to that school. Bartolomé testified at the suppression hearing that he and appellant exchanged greetings as acquaintances during the years following appellant’s term in school, and that Bartolomé had known appellant off and on for approximately 10 years. Finally, the testimony of Bartolomé as well as the other police officers indicates that Bartolomé regularly addressed or referred to appellant by his first name or by the nickname “Ika.”
*572The court in Innis found “nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience .. . 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d at 309. In the instant case, the familiarity of appellant and Bartolomé, based on a prior confidential relationship, is of itself sufficient to show that Bartolomé should have known that appellant would likely respond to his overture by offering incriminating statements. Nor is it reasonable to assume that Lt. Bartolomé, an officer of 13 years of experience, lacked this knowledge simply because he may not have known at the time whether appellant had been informed of and asserted his constitutional rights. By his own statement to appellant in the processing room, Bartolomé was aware that appellant was being held for something “pretty heavy.”
The parties agree that appellant effectively asserted his right to be free of questioning absent the presence of counsel. It is uncontested that appellant did not initiate the exchange with Bartolomé which led to appellant’s inculpatory statements. It is also clear from the record that counsel was not made available to appellant during the brief interim between his assertion of his constitutional rights and the question posed by Bartolomé. On these three facts alone, it is clear that appellant was impermissibly subjected to custodial interrogation at the instance of the government and contrary to the letter and to the principles enunciated in Edwards. Appellant’s statements to Bartolomé were not made pursuant to a valid waiver and therefore were inadmissible. I would hold that the trial court erred in failing to suppress appellant’s statements to Bartolomé and the tainted evidence subsequently obtained thereby. The judgment of conviction should be vacated and the order denying suppression reversed.

 Compare the facts set forth in the recent case of Shea v. Louisiana, _ U.S. _, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), where all parties conceded that Edwards had been violated.