Court Opinion

ID: 9645141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:13:56.687815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:23.705152
License: Public Domain

PRESLAR, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial Court granting title to Appellee.
This is a trespass to try title case and Appellee as plaintiff pled the five and ten-year statutes of limitations. The trial court granted judgment for Appellee. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were neither requested nor filed and it must be presumed on appeal that the trial court made such implied findings as were necessary to support the judgment. Texas Van Lines, Inc. v. Godfrey, 313 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The proof is clear that Appellee met all of the requirements of the five and ten-year statutes of limitations, and, in fact, Appellants do not present points of error questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain such findings. Under this state of the record I see no escape from an outright affirmance of the trial court judgment.
*882In solving the intriguing question of the construction of the will it seems to me that the majority overlooks the significance of the limitations statutes. Assuming they are correct in the construction of the will, Appellee must still prevail under its limitations claims. Art. 5513, Vernon’s Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann., provides: “Whenever an action for the recovery of real estate is barred by any provision of this title, the person having such peaceable and adverse possession shall be held to have full title, precluding all claims.” The various statutes of limitations as to the titles to land are statutes of repose intended for the purpose of quieting title in land and differ from the ordinary limitations statutes in that under them one may acquire an absolute title to land. This, even though he be a naked trespasser. We need only to look at the early decisions to see the construction that the Courts of Texas have placed on these statutes to carry out this purpose of quieting title. In the early case of Burton’s Heirs v. Carroll, 96 Tex. 320, 72 S.W. 581, decided by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1903, certain quotations are pertinent:
“A title by limitation constitutes a chain of title from the sovereignty of the soil; * * *. It being true that a title by limitation may be used as outstanding title for defense of possession merely, and will defeat a regular paper title, it follows that title by limitation is superior to all other claims to that land.”
“ * * * Full title embraces legal and equitable title to the property, and comprehends that which passed from the government by patent; consequently, if limitation confers full title upon the possessor, then it must divest title out of all other claimants, and vest the same in the possessor under the claim of limitation. ‡ * ‡ !)
Similar expressions may be found in the many decided cases under the limitations statutes. In the case of Cox v. Elerson, 437 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1968, writ ref’d n. r. e.), the Court quoted from the Supreme Court case of Brohlin v. McMinn, 161 Tex. 319, 341 S.W.2d 420 (1960), as follows:
“ ‘As indicated by the ten-year statute, it is the policy of this state to give effect to an adverse holding, even by a naked possessor, when the adverse holding measures up to the statutory requirements so that title by limitation may be acquired by one who had neither title, color of title, nor muniment of title duly registered. The claimant is required only to have had the exclusive, peaceful and adverse possession of the land under a claim of right for not less than ten years. 2 Tex.Jur.2d, Sec. 116, at p. 227. When the statutory requirements are complied with, title is vested in the adverse claimant as completely as by a deed or patent, and the title that is created constitutes a chain of title from the sovereignty of the soil. Burton’s Heirs v. Carroll, 96 Tex. 320, 72 S.W. 581.’ ”
The majority is concerned that the Appellants had no knowledge of the fact that they had inherited this land. Possibly that is true of the many decided cases because many of them involve heirs, but the law makes no exception from the limitations statutes for lack of knowledge. Art. 5518, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., lists the disabilities of persons that suspend limitation. They are: A person, including a married person, under twenty-one years of age, or a person in the military or naval service in time of war, or a person of unsound mind, or a person imprisoned. These are the only statutory disabilities. No case can be found which shows that one’s ignorance of his cause of action will not prevent the statute of limitations from running, in the absence of some form of fraud. In fact the decided cases hold to the contrary. State v. Jones, 315 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.). And it has been held that the statutes of limitations, barring an action for the recovery of land, run against those who inherit an interest in property whether they are aware of such inheritance or not. Krause v. Hardin, 222 S.W. 310 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1920, writ *883dism’d); McCook v. Amarada Petroleum Corporation, 93 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.Civ.App.— Texarkana 1936, writ dism’d); 37 C.J. § 350, p. 969; 2 Tex.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 53, p. 118. In the McCook case, the Court said:
“The appellants contend that the statutes of limitation against their action for the recovery of the land could not run against them for the reason that they did not know until 1931 that they inherited an interest in the land in controversy. The trial court found it to be a fact that appellants did not know of their title to the land until about this time. Such fact alone, it seems, will not toll the statutes of limitation in this state. * * * ”
In the same case, it was held that to prevent the running of the statute of limitations there must be proof that the claimant fraudulently concealed from the other party knowledge of such party’s interest in the land. On this question, our Supreme Court has held that the concealment of the right to a cause of action must be fraudulent to prevent the running'of the statute of limitations. Owen v. King, 130 Tex. 614, 111 S.W.2d 695, 114 A.L.R. 859 (1938); City of Vernon v. Low, 158 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Civ. App. — Amarillo 1942, no writ). Mere silence does not constitute concealment. Hickok Producing & Development Co. v. Texas Co., 128 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. Tex.1942). The gist of the majority holding is in their paragraph: “We do not hold that the statutes of limitations could not begin to run just because the Appellants did not know of their rights under the 1941 will, but because the Appellee as trustee had a duty to disclose its position and was required to repudiate its position of trust, or otherwise give notice to Appellants of their rights.” They then cite Bice v. Ward, 92 Tex. 704, 51 S.W. 844 (1899), which was a case entirely different from this one in that it was a suit against the fraudulent trustee. Fraud was the basis of the decision. There is absolutely no hint of fraud in this case before us. Fraud is also in the case of Born v. Blue-stein, 220 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1949, no writ), cited by the majority. In this regard it should be noted that not only did the Appellee not engage in fraudulent conduct, but that it was entirely without knowledge of the existence of the Appellants, or their claim. It was stipulated by the parties that the probate proceedings of the 1941 will of Minnie Gay Denny were never placed of record in Terrell County where the land is located, so there was no constructive notice to Appellee. It is undisputed that the Appellee did not know of the Appellants or their claim. Yet, the majority decides this case on the basis that the Appellee had a duty to disclose its position, was required to repudiate its position of trust, or otherwise give notice to Appellants of their rights. Appellee is found at fault for not disclosing what it did not know to people it did not know existed. In Owen v. King, supra, the Court said:
“Generally, the question of tolling a statute of limitation arises in cases founded upon fraud, but the rule is not limited in its application to such cases. The fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the defendant, even though that cause of action may not have arisen in fraud, will avoid the bar of the statute of limitation, where the plaintiff, after exercising ordinary diligence, fails to discover the existence of a cause of action. But the concealment must be fraudulent. Mere failure to disclose a cause of action or mere concealment of a cause of action, when the defendant owes no duty to disclose, is not fraudulent concealment. A defendant has the right to rely upon the statutes of limitation the same as upon any other statutes, and will be denied that right only when his own fraudulent conduct has prevented the other party from discoyering his rights. McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Co. v. Texas Bice Land Co., Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W. 916, affirmed, Tex.Com.App., 265 S.W. 888.”
Even if we hold Appellee to the standard of conduct required by the majority, it must prevail, for it has made a clear *884repudiation of any trust by acceptance of the deeds giving it full title, placing them of record, and entering into possession. A similar case is Ewalt v. Luna, 316 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.). There the widowed mother gave a deed to one son and years later the heirs of her other children sued seeking to impose a constructive trust for their share of the property. Citing the recording statute, Art. 6646, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., which provides that a deed duly recorded shall be taken and held as notice to all persons of the existence of such deed, the Court held:
“By the provisions of Art. 6646, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., appellants were on notice that the warranty deed from Mrs. Sara Luna to her son Emmett carried full title to the property therein conveyed and constituted an absolute repudiation of any theory of trust. In consequence, appellants here ought not be permitted to assert claim to the property as against the various pleas of limitations, they having delayed for more than twenty-five years to institute action for its recovery. Owens v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W.2d 305.”
Appellee placed its deed of record, entered into possession, paid the taxes, did other acts asserting its ownership for a period of ten years prior to suit. It should prevail under both the five and ten-year statutes of limitations. Arts. 5509 and 5510, Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
April 30, 1975.