Court Opinion

ID: 9631189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:31:19.110291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:49.913772
License: Public Domain

SPECIAL CONCURRENCE BY
WAKATSUKI, J.
The majority seems to believe that defendant is protected from the harsh consequences of the Slate’s negligent loss of potentially exculpatory evidence by providing an exception where the *189destroyed evidence is “so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair” without it. I believe such an exception provides little, if any, real protection for the defendant because the most determinative matter in deciding how critical the lost evidence is to the defense is the evidence itself, and that evidence no longer exists.
If an expert could testify that the rip in the panty could not have been caused by the forcible act of defendant, that testimony would surely be “critical to the defense.” Yet, the State’s own negligent destruction of the panty prevents defendant from making such a showing. The majority claims that Detective Fujinaka’s testimony and the police evidence report (which both described the panty as ripped in the crotch area) do not suggest that the panty would have aided the defense. The fact of the matter is that we can draw no inference one way or another from such testimony and report inasmuch as we have no idea whether the rip was of such a nature as to help or hurt the defense.
The majority’s position provides hardly any incentive for the police to rectify careless police practices in the handling of evidence in their custody and control. Because the defendant will be at the mercy of conjecture and speculation as to the criticalness of the evidence to his defense, the prosecution will likely suffer no consequence as long as the destruction of the evidence by the police was “merely” negligent.
Nevertheless, I do not believe it necessary to dismiss the complaint. Rather, defendant’s due process rights can be adequately protected and the police encouraged to improve their procedures and practices in preserving evidence by instructing the jury that it may infer that the destroyed evidence which was in the custody and control of the State would be favorable to the defense and against the State. Cf. Arizona v. Youngblood (noting that the trial court gave a similar instruction).
I would remand to the circuit court with instructions that defendant is entitled to such a jury instruction if he demands one.