Court Opinion

ID: 9384852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 14:00:39.302322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.474931
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10230    Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/05/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10230
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        RONDELL HALL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00286-KD-C-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10230

        Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
                This appeal presents a question of first impression about su-
        pervised release and home confinement. The relevant statutes pro-
        vide that a district court may impose home confinement with elec-
        tronic monitoring in two circumstances. First, a district court may
        impose home confinement as a special condition of probation or
        supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19). Second, a court
        may impose home confinement to punish a supervised release vio-
        lation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4). In both instances, Congress
        specified that district courts may order home confinement with
        electronic monitoring “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Id.
        §§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). Considering this limitation, the question
        for us is whether a district court may sentence a defendant to home
        confinement for violating the terms of his supervised release even
        if the district court has sentenced the defendant to the statutory
        maximum period of imprisonment for that violation. We join the
        Fifth Circuit in answering this question “no.” See United States v.
        Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2004).
                Rondell Hall, a class C felon, violated the conditions of his
        supervised release. After revoking his supervised release, the dis-
        trict court sentenced Hall to the statutory maximum of two years’
        imprisonment and added one year of home confinement with lo-
        cation monitoring. We conclude that Hall’s sentence is incon-
        sistent with the limitation that a district court may impose home
        confinement “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Because the
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                        3

        district court sentenced Hall to the statutory maximum term of
        two years’ imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose an addi-
        tional year of home confinement with electronic monitoring “as an
        alternative to incarceration.” We therefore vacate Hall’s sentence
        to the extent it imposed a term of home confinement and remand
        for resentencing.
                                       I.

               The story of how Hall received the sentence at issue in this
        appeal begins in 2016, when he pleaded guilty to unlawful posses-
        sion of a firearm as a convicted felon, a class C felony. 18 U.S.C. §
        922(g)(1). After Hall served fifty-seven months in prison, he began
        a three-year term of supervised release. Hall’s supervised release
        included the conditions that he: (1) refrain from committing an-
        other crime, (2) keep his probation officer apprised of his current
        residence, (3) avoid places where people sell or use controlled sub-
        stances, and (4) avoid associating with anyone involved in criminal
        activity or convicted of a felony. Hall’s supervised release began in
        September 2020.
               Roughly one year into his term, the district court revoked
        Hall’s supervised release because he violated multiple conditions.
        Specifically, at the revocation hearing, Hall admitted to changing
        his residence without telling his probation officer and frequenting
        a place known for illegal drug activity. The district court addition-
        ally found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hall violated
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10230

        his conditions by engaging in domestic violence and possessing a
        firearm.
               In response to these violations, the district court revoked
        Hall’s term of supervised release and imposed a modified sentence
        under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The court noted that the statutory max-
        imum term of imprisonment for a class C felony upon revocation
        of supervised release is two years. The court sentenced Hall to two
        years’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum—followed by a
        one-year term of home confinement. The district court made clear
        that home confinement would mean that Hall must submit to lo-
        cation monitoring and be “restricted to [his] residence at all times,”
        except for preapproved activities, like employment, church, or
        court appearances.
               Hall objected only to the home confinement order, which
        the district court noted and overruled. Hall then moved to vacate
        the home confinement order. The district court denied Hall’s mo-
        tion. Hall timely appealed.
                                       II.

               We review de novo the legality of a sentence, including a
        sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of a term of super-
        vised release. United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th
        Cir. 2007). We also review issues of statutory interpretation de
        novo. Id.
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                        5

                                       III.

                Sections 3563(b)(19) and 3583(e)(4) both provide that a dis-
        trict court may order a defendant to “remain at his place of resi-
        dence during nonworking hours” and “be monitored by telephonic
        or electronic signaling devices, except that [a condition or order]
        under this paragraph may be imposed only as an alternative to in-
        carceration.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). In light of this
        statutory language, the sole question in this appeal is whether the
        district court lawfully sentenced Hall to home confinement in ad-
        dition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for his su-
        pervised release violation. Hall argues the court did not, and we
        agree.
               Our discussion proceeds in three parts. First, we set out the
        statutory framework for sentencing upon revocation of a defend-
        ant’s supervised release. Second, we determine the ordinary mean-
        ing of “as an alternative to incarceration” in Sections 3563(b)(19)
        and 3583(e)(4). Third, we address (and dispose of) the govern-
        ment’s arguments for why home confinement may be imposed on
        top of a statutory maximum sentence of incarceration.
                                       A.

              We start with some basics. A district court may impose a
        sentence only if a statute authorizes that sentence. See generally 18
        U.S.C. § 3551. Accordingly, a sentence cannot exceed the maxi-
        mum term authorized by statute. See id. §§ 3581, 3583. And a
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10230

        district court cannot impose a sentence in circumstances that a stat-
        ute forbids.
               Federal law authorizes a category of sentences called “super-
        vised release,” “a form of postconfinement monitoring” provided
        “to facilitate a transition to community life.” Mont v. United States,
        139 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2019) (cleaned up). When a district court sen-
        tences a defendant to a term of imprisonment, it may include “as a
        part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on
        a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. §
        3583(a). The district court should include conditions during this
        term of supervised release to encourage the defendant to avoid fu-
        ture criminal activity. For example, a district court must order as a
        condition of supervised release that the defendant “not commit an-
        other . . . crime.” Id. § 3583(d). It has the discretion to impose other
        conditions, such as “any condition set forth as a discretionary con-
        dition of probation in section 3563(b).” Id. Section 3563(b) lists
        about twenty potential discretionary conditions, such as working
        in community service or refraining from excessive use of alcohol.
        See id. § 3563(b).
               If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release,
        the district court may revoke the supervised release and impose a
        revised sentence. Id. § 3583(e)(3). The revised sentence may in-
        clude imprisonment for a term “authorized by statute for the of-
        fense that resulted in such term of supervised release,” i.e., the orig-
        inal offense. Id. For a defendant convicted of a class C felony, like
        Hall, the revised sentence’s term of imprisonment may not exceed
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                         7

        two years. Id. A district court may also impose a new term of su-
        pervised release after the revised term of imprisonment. Id. §
        3583(h). That term cannot exceed the original maximum term for
        supervised release (here, three years) less the time the defendant is
        sentenced to prison upon revocation. Id. § 3583(b)(3), (h). So, if
        someone like Hall is sentenced to two years imprisonment, they
        can be sentenced to a maximum of one year of supervised release
        to follow.
                For its part, a sentence of home confinement requires a de-
        fendant to “remain at his place of residence during nonworking
        hours and, if the court so directs, to have compliance monitored by
        telephone or electronic signaling devices.” Id. § 3583(e)(4); see also
        id. § 3563(b)(19). Two relevant provisions authorize district courts
        to sentence defendants to home confinement. First, as explained
        above, when a court sentences a defendant to probation or super-
        vised release, it may impose any of the discretionary conditions
        listed in Section 3563(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Home confine-
        ment is one such discretionary condition. Id. § 3563(b)(19). Second,
        Section 3583(e) separately authorizes courts to impose a term of
        home confinement as punishment when a defendant violates the
        conditions of his supervised release. Id. § 3583(e)(4). Importantly,
        in both instances, the statute provides that an order for home con-
        finement “may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.”
        Id. §§ 3583(e)(4), 3563(b)(19).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10230

                                       B.

               We now turn to Hall’s arguments. Everyone agrees that,
        upon revoking his original term of supervised release, the district
        court could sentence Hall to two years of imprisonment (the max-
        imum) and one year of supervised release (three years minus the
        term of imprisonment). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3), (e)(3), (h). But Hall
        argues that, because the district court sentenced him to the statu-
        tory maximum term of incarceration for his violation, the court
        erred by imposing one year of home confinement as an additional
        punishment for that offense. The government argues that this sen-
        tence—the statutory maximum term of imprisonment followed by
        one year of home confinement—was not an abuse of the district
        court’s discretion.
                There are two ways to understand the home confinement
        portion of Hall’s sentence. The district court may have imposed a
        year of home confinement as punishment for Hall violating the
        conditions of his previous supervised release. See id. § 3583(e)(4).
        Or the district court may have imposed one year of supervised re-
        lease to follow Hall’s two years of incarceration, see id. § 3583(h),
        and added home confinement as a special condition to that one-
        year term of supervised release, see id. § 3563(b)(19). The district
        court cited both statutes in explaining its sentence. Either way, the
        statutes that authorize a sentence of home confinement provide
        that it is authorized “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Id. §§
        3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). Accordingly, to resolve Hall’s argument we
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                         9

        must determine the ordinary meaning of “except [home confine-
        ment] may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.”
               In the government’s view, the phrase is merely hortatory or
        suggestive. Specifically, the government asks us to read “only as an
        alternative to incarceration” as a directive to sentencing courts to
        treat home confinement and incarceration as different things. The
        government contends that Congress wanted sentencing courts to
        appreciate that home confinement “is not imprisonment itself.”
        We cannot agree with this interpretation.
               For starters, the government’s reading would give this
        phrase no operative effect. Home confinement is the only enumer-
        ated condition of probation or supervised release that includes the
        caveat “except that a condition under this paragraph may be im-
        posed only as an alternative to incarceration.” 18 U.S.C. §
        3563(b)(19). It appears in both places where the statute authorizes
        home confinement. See id.; id § 3583(e)(4). But it is not the only
        supervised release condition with an express limitation on a district
        court’s authority to impose it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(10) (capping
        nights and weekends in custody at “the lesser of one year or the
        term of imprisonment authorized for the offense”). Nothing about
        the placement of these provisions or the text suggests they are hor-
        tatory. And we cannot adopt an interpretation of this phrase that
        simply “render[s] it superfluous.” In re Shek, 947 F.3d 770, 776 (11th
        Cir. 2020); see also Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278,
        1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A] statute should be construed so that effect
        is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10230

        superfluous, void or insignificant.”) (quoting Corley v. United
        States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).
                The government’s reading also makes very little sense in
        light of the statute’s text. The statute does not say that “courts shall
        not consider home confinement to be imprisonment.” Instead, the
        operative phrase expressly conditions a district court’s authority to
        impose a sentence of home confinement. The statute provides that
        a district court may impose home confinement “except . . . only as
        an alternative to incarceration.” The word “except” means “other
        than” or “but.” See Except, Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d.
        ed. 1988). The phrase that follows “except” is an exception: courts
        may impose home confinement “except . . . only as an alternative
        to incarceration.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4) (empha-
        sis added). See Except, Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d. ed.
        1988). The government’s interpretation would read out “except”
        altogether. We are confident that, if Congress had wanted to say
        only that home confinement does not count as incarceration, it
        would have done so with different language.
               Finally, we note that there was no reason for Congress to
        tell courts to treat imprisonment and home confinement differ-
        ently. The Code already makes clear that the twenty-three discre-
        tionary conditions that courts may impose during probation or su-
        pervised release do not count as incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. §
        3563(b); see also id. § 3583(d). Like home confinement, these con-
        ditions are allowed as part of probation or supervised release,
        which the sentencing statutes treat separately from incarceration.
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                        11

        See id. § 3563(b); see also United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305,
        1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “residence in a halfway house is
        not tantamount to imprisonment” because it “is a lawful and rea-
        sonable part of [a] probationary sentence”). But, unlike home con-
        finement, there are no phrases suggesting that these conditions are
        “not imprisonment.” The reason: such statements are unnecessary.
                Because we disagree with the government, we conclude that
        the phrase—“except that a condition under this paragraph may be
        imposed only as an alternative to incarceration”—must limit a dis-
        trict court’s sentencing authority. To determine what that limita-
        tion is, we begin, as always, with the words of the statute. Harris v.
        Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Lacking appli-
        cable statutory definitions, “we look to the common usage of
        words for their meaning” and may turn to “dictionary definitions
        for guidance.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d
        1217, 1222−23 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). The
        word “alternative” is defined as “providing or being a choice be-
        tween two or among more than two things,” see Alternative, Web-
        ster’s New World Dictionary (3d ed. 1988), or “a choice limited to
        one of two or more possibilities, as of things, propositions, or
        courses of action, the selection of which precludes any other possi-
        bility.” See Alternative, Random House Dictionary (2d ed. 1987).
        For example, “[t]he alternative to riding is walking” because “the
        selection of [one] precludes” the other. Id. Employing this defini-
        tion buttresses our common sense understanding of the term “al-
        ternative”: an alternative is a choice between at least two things.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10230

               In light of this definition, we see two possible ways to under-
        stand home confinement as an “alternative to incarceration.” This
        language could preclude a district court from ordering home con-
        finement and incarceration in the same sentence i.e., the selection
        of one entirely precludes the other. Or the phrase “alternative to
        incarceration” could mean that a district court may impose home
        confinement only if it could have imposed incarceration i.e., that
        choosing one is an “alternative” to choosing the other.
                We can quickly dispose of the first reading. Faced with the
        same argument, the First Circuit has concluded that home confine-
        ment as an “alternative to incarceration” does not mean the two
        cannot be combined in the same sentence. United States v. Mar-
        cano, 525 F.3d 72, 73 (1st Cir. 2008). We agree. Because the statute
        expressly allows courts to combine incarceration and supervised
        release in the same sentence, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), and ex-
        pressly allows home confinement as a condition of supervised re-
        lease, id. § 3563(b)(19), courts must be able to combine incarcera-
        tion and home confinement in the same sentence. The statute’s use
        of the phrase “alternative to incarceration” thus cannot be read to
        mean “that the imposition of any period of incarceration pursuant
        to § 3583(e)(3) necessarily precludes any home confinement during
        the ensuing period of supervised release.” Marcano, 525 F.3d at 73.
               Instead, we believe the second reading is the correct one.
        That is, a district court imposes home confinement “as an alterna-
        tive to incarceration” when the district court has the authority to
        impose a term of imprisonment but chooses to impose home
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                       13

        confinement instead. The upshot is that a district court may con-
        sider home confinement as an option only when a term of incar-
        ceration is also on the table. Conversely, a district court without
        the authority to impose imprisonment cannot impose home con-
        finement. If a district court lacks authority to impose a term of im-
        prisonment, then a term of home confinement would not be “as an
        alternative to incarceration.”
                Here, the district court sentenced Hall to the maximum
        term of incarceration and an additional year of home confinement.
        Based on our understanding of the statute, we agree with Hall that
        this sentence is illegal. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, a court
        cannot “impose the maximum term of incarceration under subsec-
        tion (e)(3) and also impose a period of home confinement under
        (e)(4).” Ferguson, 369 F.3d at 851. The reason is that incarceration
        beyond the statutory maximum term is not an option available to
        a district court. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3581, 3583(e)(3). Because the dis-
        trict court did not have the option to impose imprisonment, it
        lacked authority to impose home confinement.
                Whether we view Hall’s term of home confinement as a spe-
        cial condition of supervised release under Section 3563(b)(19) or as
        a stand-alone punishment under Section 3583(e)(4), a court may
        impose it “only as an alternative to incarceration.” 18 U.S.C. §§
        3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). The ordinary meaning of these provisions
        is that the district court erred by imposing a term of home confine-
        ment when it could not have imposed the same term of imprison-
        ment.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10230

                                       C.

               The government makes three final arguments against this
        common sense reading of the statutory text: (1) our holding, it ar-
        gues, is inconsistent with our prior precedent; (2) our decision
        would split with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
        Hager, 288 F.3d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 2002); and (3) the difficulties of
        differentiating special conditions of supervised release from home
        confinement make our holding impracticable. We explain why
        each argument fails in turn.
                                            1.

               First, the government argues our plain text reading conflicts
        with our prior precedent in United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d
        1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2007). We are not persuaded.
               The facts in United States v. Mangaroo bear little resem-
        blance to those here. In Mangaroo, the defendants were convicted
        of firearm offenses that, by statute, required a minimum term of
        incarceration and prohibited probation. Id. at 1353−54. We thus
        held that the district court erred in sentencing the defendants to
        home confinement—a “condition[] of probation”—because “home
        confinement is not incarceration.” Id. at 1354. Unlike the statute in
        Mangaroo, Section 3583(e) provides courts with a range of options
        for resentencing upon revocation of supervised release, including
        incarceration, home confinement, or a combination of the two. 18
        U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (4). And, of course, we did not address the
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                      15

        meaning of “alternative” in either Section 3583(e)(4) or Section
        3563(b)(19) in Mangaroo.
               In any event, our reasoning in Mangaroo aligns with our rea-
        soning here. The government emphasizes our conclusion in Man-
        garoo that “home confinement is not incarceration.” See Manga-
        roo, 504 F.3d 1354. But we agree that “home confinement is not
        incarceration.” The whole point is that, under Section 3583(e)(4) or
        Section 3563(b)(19), they must be treated as “alternatives” that are
        not the same. That is, they are mutually exclusive options where
        the selection of imprisonment precludes, in some respects, the se-
        lection of home confinement.
                                         2.

                Second, the government argues that we are creating a split
        with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hager, 288
        F.3d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 2002). Again, we disagree. In Hager, the
        Fourth Circuit considered whether a defendant should receive
        credit against the statutory maximum sentence for a new revoca-
        tion for time he served on home confinement when his supervised
        release was previously revoked. Id. at 136. The court in Hager
        noted that “the word ‘alternative’ does not indicate that home con-
        finement and incarceration are equivalents under the statute.” Id.
        at 137. And the court held that a previous period of home confine-
        ment from a prior revocation does not count as imprisonment for
        calculating the statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed
        for a new violation of a supervised release. Id. at 139.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-10230

              Hager is inapposite for at least two reasons.
                First, the court in Hager was answering the inverse of our
        question. The language we are interpreting restricts the district
        court’s power to impose home confinement, not its authority to
        impose incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3), 3563(b)(19). But
        the court in Hager was considering whether the district court could
        impose a new term of imprisonment, not a new term of home con-
        finement. Hager, 288 F.3d at 139. Hager has nothing to say about a
        district court’s ability to impose home confinement. And, con-
        versely, our opinion says nothing about when a district court can
        impose a term of imprisonment.
               Second, Hager is based on a reading of the statute that has
        been superseded by an amendment and that we have already disa-
        vowed. The court in Hager began by “assum[ing] without deciding
        [] that § 3583(e)(3)’s maximum prison term”—here, two years—
        “limits the total prison time that may be imposed for multiple vio-
        lations of supervised release.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added). Then it
        addressed whether a previous sentence to home confinement
        should count toward that aggregate limit. Id. at 137−39. Congress
        has since amended Section 3583 to clarify that the maximum prison
        term a defendant may serve on revocation of supervised release
        does not aggregate over revocations; instead, it applies “on any
        such revocation.” See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
        End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-
        21, Title I, § 101, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 651 (codified as amended
        at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). As we have explained, this statutory
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        22-10230               Opinion of the Court                       17

        change clarified that “upon each revocation of supervised release a
        defendant may be sentenced to the felony class limits contained
        within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to imprisonment previously
        served for revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Cun-
        ningham, 800 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, the question
        presented in Hager can no longer arise— because the full statutory
        maximum applies to each new revocation, there is no need to de-
        cide whether to count previous sentences for home confinement
        (or imprisonment) as credit against sentences for future revoca-
        tions.
                                         3.

                Finally, the government argues that our holding will be dif-
        ficult to apply in practice because it is hard to determine whether a
        special condition of supervised release amounts to home confine-
        ment. We disagree.
               We are not convinced that it will be difficult in practice to
        distinguish home confinement from other conditions of supervised
        release. Consider this case as an example. The district court ex-
        pressly ordered Hall to complete “home detention with location
        monitoring.” Thus, the district court’s home detention order is
        plainly one that, under Sections 3563(b)(19) and 3583(e)(4), “may
        be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.”
              Moreover, the relevant statutes expressly distinguish home
        confinement from other kinds of conditions that may be imposed
        during probation or supervised release. Both Section 3563(b)(19)
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10230

        and Section 3583(e)(4) provide a definition for home confinement:
        an “order [that] the defendant [must] remain at his place of resi-
        dence during nonworking hours and, if the court so directs, to have
        compliance monitored by telephone or electronic signaling de-
        vices.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4); accord id. § 3563(b)(19). Accordingly,
        if courts have any difficulty in distinguishing home confinement
        from other conditions of supervised release, that difficulty arises
        from the text of the statute, not our holding.
                                       IV.

              For these reasons, we VACATE Hall’s revised sentence with
        the home confinement condition and REMAND for resentencing.