Court Opinion

ID: 9740141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:51.612185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.414117
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 20 (dissenting). It is an oft-repeated cliché that a trial is a search for the truth. Consistent with that ideal paradigm, the rules of evidence permit trial judges to call and interrogate witnesses. See Wis. Stat. Rule 906.14.1 This is because, as Judge Learned *183Hand recognized almost sixty years ago, "[a] judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see that the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert." United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945). This is also the law in Wisconsin:
[T]he trial judge is more than a mere referee. The judge does have a right to clarify questions and answers and make inquiries where obvious important evidentiary matters are ignored or inadequately covered on behalf of the defendant and the state. A judge does have some obligation to see to it that justice is done but must do so carefully and in an impartial manner.
State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 437, 249 N.W2d 529, 540-541 (1977) (emphasis added).
¶ 21. A trial judge in Wisconsin is given broad berth by the rules. As we have seen, Wis. Stat. Rule 906.14 is quite plain: "The judge may, on the judge's own motion. . ., call witnesses." Wis. Stat. Rule 906.14(1) (emphasis added). Further, "[t]he judge may interrogate witnesses, whether called by the judge or by a party." Wis. Stat. Rule 906.14(2) (emphasis added). Indeed, this power includes the discovery and development of new information. Thus, the trial judge has the authority to appoint expert witnesses — even on the "judge's own motion." Wis. Stat. Rule 907.06(1).
*184¶ 22. Of course, the trial" 'judge should not take an active role in trying the case for either the state or the defense.'" Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 437, 249 N.W2d at 540 (quoting State v. Garner, 54 Wis. 2d 100, 104, 194 N.W.2d 649, 651 (1972)). Nevertheless, Asfoor affirmed the conviction in that case even though the judge "took a somewhat active role in questioning witnesses" in front of the jury. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 437, 249 N.W.2d at 540.
¶ 23. Garner, relied on by both Asfoor and the Majority here, is also instructive. There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found no prejudice even though the trial judge in that case "served, in effect, as prosecuting attorney," during the probation-revocation hearing. Garner, 54 Wis. 2d at 104, 194 N.W.2d at 651. Indeed, the trial judge in that case "called and examined all the state witnesses himself." Ibid. Of course, Garner recognized:
A trial judge while exercising his limited discretion to call and examine a witness should not function as a partisan, as this could very well mislead the jury. But even where there is no jury, the judge should not take an active role in trying the case for either the state or the defense. The judge who acts as an advocate skates on thin ice in any judicial hearing and runs the risk of turning the adversary system into an inquest wherein the trier of the fact calls and questions the witnesses.
Ibid, (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, even though the trial judge in Garner, as noted, "called and examined all the state witnesses himself," the supreme court found "no reversible error on these facts." Ibid.
¶ 24. An example where a trial judge falls through the "thin ice" of partisanship is Marzano. There, the trial judge not only called and interrogated witnesses who were awaiting sentence before him, but also, by his *185conduct of the questioning in front of the jury, made the jury believe that there was evidence beyond what they heard in open court that indicated that the defendant was guilty.
[I]t must have appeared to the jury extremely probable that, not only was he satisfied that [the witnesses he called and questioned] were accomplices [of the defendant], but that he was relying upon more than the testimony of the [other witnesses who were alleged to have been drug "decoys"]; that he had other grounds for his belief which had not come out upon the trial; for he would scarcely have gone the lengths which he did, merely upon such testimony.
Marzano, 149 F.2d at 926.
¶ 25. There are two matters that, in my view, are critical to this appeal. First, the jury neither saw nor knew that the trial court called and interrogated Kenneth Morrow. Thus, this case is different than all but one of the foreign cases the Majority marshals in support of reversal. Only Auger v. Auger, 546 A.2d 1373 (Vt. 1988), was a non-jury trial. Moreover, of all the jury-trial cases cited by the Majority, only United States v. Victoria, 837 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979); and State v. Delarosa, 547 A.2d 47 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988), reversed convictions because of the trial judges' alleged lack of impartiality.
¶ 26. Second, Johnnie Carprue's trial lawyer never objected. See Wis. Stat. Rule 906.14(3) (specifying when a party may object "to the calling of witnesses by the judge"). Thus, this case must be evaluated in the context of whether Carprue was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374-375 (1986); State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 200, 567 N.W.2d 905, 919 (Ct. App. *1861997). The Majority glissades over the first and it ignores the second, which, in my view, is dispositive.
¶ 27. To prevail here, Carprue must show both that his trial lawyer's performance was deficient, and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 236, 548 N.W.2d 69, 76 (1996). Again, this is the test that we must apply, see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 374-375, not "harmless error." Assuming that Carprue's lawyer's failure to object to the trial court's calling Kenneth Morrow out of the presence of the jury was less-than "reasonably effective representation," State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 80, 519 N.W.2d 621, 626 (Ct. App. 1994), Carprue has, in my view, utterly failed to show prejudice — that is, he has not even come close to demonstrating that " 'but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d at 236, 548 N.W2d at 76 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
¶ 28. The evidence here was strong; the Majority does not opine that it was not. Further, the Majority recognizes that proof of "prejudice" in the Strickland sense has not been shown — the Majority concedes: "[W]e cannot say with absolute certainty whether Morrow's testimony affected the jury's ultimate decision. It could be that Carprue's flight did not influence their decision at all. It could be that the victim's testimony was entirely more credible than Carprue's claim that the sexual act was ■ consensual." Majority op. at ¶ 14. A defendant loses an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when the prejudice/no-prejudice equation is so balanced.
¶ 29. Clearly, the Majority does not like what the trial court did in "hinting" to the State that it should call *187a witness, who was already in the courtroom, to negate a portion of the defendant's testimony that did not ring true. See Majority op. at ¶ 13. I disagree. In my view, silence by the trial judge in the face of something that she knew was wrong would háve been an abdication of her obligation "to see to it that justice is done" by making "inquiries where obvious important evidentiary matters are ignored or inadequately covered." Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 437, 249 N.W.2d at 540-541. In my view, the "search for the truth" should not be a sporting event, where possible miscues can let the guilty go free:
Over 75 years ago, Roscoe Pound condemned American courts for ignoring "substantive law and justice," and treating trials as sporting contests in which the "inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?" Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Ann. Rep. 395, 406 (1906). A criminal trial is not a "game."
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 15 (1983). I agree. Wisconsin law, Asfoor and Garner, amply support what the trial court did here. It is that law, and not foreign law upon which the Majority relies, that governs this case. State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 533, 348 N.W.2d 159, 163 (1984) (court of appeals bound by supreme court precedent).
¶ 30. The victim in this case claimed that she was raped. A jury believed her. The Majority now makes her endure either another trial or seeing the man who raped her get a plea-bargained deal. A victim's trauma on any retrial is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether marginal errors warrant a new trial. Morris, 461 U.S. at 14-15. In my view, however, there were no errors, and I would affirm.
*188¶ 31. I respectfully dissent.

 Wisconsin Stat. Rule 906.14 provides:
Calling and interrogation of witnesses by judge. (1) Calling by judge. The judge may, on the judge's own motion or at *183the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
(2) Interrogation by judge. The judge may interrogate witnesses, whether called by the judge or by a party.
(3) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the judge or to interrogation by the judge may he made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present.