Court Opinion

ID: 9566640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:41:34.89549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:49.105080
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority opinion holds that the certified copy of the results of the blood test from the State Toxicologist’s Office was erroneously admitted as evidence because “the State failed to prove that the blood sample tested was the same one drawn from Reil....” But, this ruling does not really explain how it gets around the explicit directions of subsections (5) and (10) of NDCC § 39-20-07. Subsection (10) says:
“A signed statement from the nurse or medical technician drawing the blood sample for testing as set forth in subsection 5 is prima facie evidence that the blood sample was properly drawn and no further foundation for the admission of such evidence may be required.”
Astonishingly, the majority opinion rejects this evidence without a single reference to our North Dakota Rules of Evidence. This is all the more astonishing when the Federal Rules of Evidence (from which our NDREv are drawn) are identified in the quotation from Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., supra, which correctly outlined the modern approach to use of blood test results under the Fed.R.Evid. Curiously, Ballou held a blood test admissible, which the trial court had excluded “due to concerns regarding possible breaks in the ‘chain of custody’ ...” 656 F.2d 1154-1155. And, two other decisions cited in the majority opinion sustained the admissibility of blood test results over objections about gaps in the “chain of custody.” Sullivan v. Municipality of Anchorage, 577 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Alaska 1978) (“We do not believe there is anything to gain by requiring a mechanistic parade of witnesses to ensure that the possibility of error or tampering is precluded beyond any doubt.”); People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Colo.1984) (“We hold that in the absence of any evidence of tampering or lack of authentication, the proponent of evidence relating to the results of a blood-alcohol test and the supporting exhibits is not required to call each witness who may have handled the exhibit.”)
The exhibit excluded by the majority opinion contained the signed statement of the nurse who obtained the blood sample *106on the top half of a single sheet. The report of the analysis by the State Toxicologist’s Office was on the bottom half of the same form. I believe this internal integration sufficiently connects the blood sample with the results of the laboratory analysis, when certified by the State Toxicologist. It is evident that the blood sample got from the nurse to the laboratory. Any other doubts about the authenticity of such a blood sample report should go to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. State v. Vetsch, 368 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D.1986).
NDREv Rule 901(a) says:
“(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”
NDREv Rule 901(b) says:
“(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
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“(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
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“(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or identification complying with these rules, or other rules adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, or as provided by statute.”
NDREv Rule 104(b) says:
“(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. Whenever the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or in the court’s discretion subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.”
See also NDREv Rule 1008.
When we do not pay attention to our current rules of evidence, I fear we perpetuate anachronistic and outmoded attitudes about evidence. Better consideration of the modern approach of our rules of evidence is essential to promote their purposes:
“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence, to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” NDREv Rule 102.
Several excerpts from the work of a current scholar on evidence may help make my point:
“The central point is that whenever proffered evidence is challenged on grounds of authenticity or identity, it should be admitted once a prima facie case has been made on the issue. Such a finding of authenticity does not guarantee that the evidence will be considered by the trier of fact. While it permits admission of the evidence it is — as are all questions of conditional relevance under Rule 104(b) — subject to the jury’s ultimate determination as to its genuineness. The opposing party may introduce evidence disputing genuineness and argue the point to the jury. Once the evidence is admitted the question becomes one of credibility and probative force and the trier may ultimately disbelieve the proponent’s proof and entirely disregard or substantially discount the persuasive impact of the evidence admitted. The rule requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification. The rest is up to the jury.” J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 5 Weinstein’s Evidence H 901(a)[01], at 901-16 to 18 (1983).
“The draftsmen opted to treat authentication and identification as specialized rules of relevance. As a result, the preliminary condition of fact is one for the trier of fact and the standard of admissibility is identical to that required under Rule 104(b) relating to matters of condi-
*107tional relevance generally — would a finding of fulfillment of the condition be supported by the evidence? This approach reflects the Rules’ generally liberal preference for admission of evidence and comports with the conclusions of earlier codifiers.
“This rule does not ignore or repudiate the policy justifications for the authentication requirement. It simply recognizes that where the question is one of probative force or credibility — as it necessarily always is with questions of authenticity and identity — the jury is as competent as the court. The jury is constituted expressly for the purpose of applying common sense and community mores to disputed issues of fact where the principal question is almost always one of credibility. In Rules 104(b), 602, 901(a) and the second sentence of Rule 1008 the court is told to admit where a reasonable juror might find for the proponent on the issue of relevancy. In deciding whether to admit, issues of credibility are decided in favor of the proponent. See discussion in 111008(a)[02].” Id., H 901(a)[02] at 901-21 to 22.
“Wigmore’s conclusion that mere contents will not suffice to authenticate unless only the author would have known the details is contrary to the federal rules and unsound. Even if other persons would have known the details of the writing, it can be shown that under the circumstances it was unlikely that they would have written the letter. Proof of these circumstances and the contents of the writing can then sufficiently authenticate the document. The common law prejudice against self-authenticating documents is not carried over into the Federal Rules.” Id. If 901(b)(4)[01] at 901-50 to 51.