Court Opinion

ID: 9670529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:22:03.479423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:21.482146
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant Belcher for assault and battery, and against defendant Nichols under the dram-shop act, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993. After a jury trial, a verdict for plaintiff was returned against both defendants. The jury computed plaintiff’s damages at $180,000, but found that 25% of plaintiff’s damages were attributable to plaintiff’s negligence. A judgment for plaintiff for $135,000 plus costs and interest was entered, and defendants appeal by right.
I
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a mistrial. The motion was made after counsel for plaintiff cross-examined defendant Belcher concerning a police report and asked defendant if his attorney in another proceeding had admitted that the report was accu*347rate. Defendant testified that he had no knowledge of any such admission. The report was used as the factual basis for the acceptance of a nolo contendere plea by defendant Belcher to criminal charges arising out of this incident, but the criminal nature of the other proceeding and defendant’s plea were not mentioned before the jury. After counsel for defendant objected, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard all references to the other proceeding.
Decisions on motions for mistrial are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Anderson v Harry’s Army Surplus, Inc, 117 Mich App 601, 615; 324 NW2d 96 (1982). The cross-examination at issue here was prohibited by MRE 410 and Wheelock v Eyl, 393 Mich 74; 223 NW2d 276 (1974). However, such an error does not require reversal in every case in which it appears. See Ilins v Burns, 388 Mich 504, 510-511; 201 NW2d 624 (1972). Because the criminal nature of the other proceedings was not disclosed to the jury, because defendant Belcher denied having admitted the accuracy of the police report, and because the trial court gave a prompt cautionary instruction, we cannot say that denial of the motion for a mistrial presents an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
II
Defendants also argue that the trial court erred by excluding the deposition testimony of Dr. Kent Wu. We will assume without deciding that Dr. Wu’s testimony falls within the attorney-client privilege; see Lindsay v Lipson, 367 Mich 1; 116 NW2d 60 (1962). We hold, however, that any such *348privilege was waived by plaintiff when plaintiff testified on direct, cross-, and redirect examination concerning his examination by Dr. Wu. Under the rule stated in Lindsay, when an attorney sends his client to a doctor for an examination in preparation for litigation, the results of the examination are treated as a confidential communication between the client and the attorney. However, the attorney-client privilege is waived as to a confidential communication when the client testifies on direct examination concerning the communication. Hartford Fire Ins Co v Reynolds, 36 Mich 502, 504 (1877); Passmore v Estate of Passmore, 50 Mich 626, 627; 16 NW 170 (1883); Leverich v Leverich, 340 Mich 133, 137; 64 NW2d 567 (1954); In re Arnson Estate, 2 Mich App 478, 484-485; 140 NW2d 546 (1966). See also Anno: Party’s Waiver of Privilege As to Communications With Counsel by Taking Stand and Testifying, 51 ALR2d 521, § 5, pp 529-537, and the cases cited therein. Once waived, the privilege may not be reasserted at a subsequent trial. In re Arnson Estate, supra, p 485.
Plaintiff argues that the exclusion of Dr. Wu’s deposition testimony was, at most, harmless error. Dr. Wu testified that he could not substantiate plaintiffs claimed injuries "in any way whatsoever”. Because none of the other medical experts whose testimony was admitted at trial was willing to go so far, we cannot say that Dr. Wu’s testimony would have been merely cumulative or that its exclusion was harmless. However, because Dr. Wu’s testimony was relevant only to the issue of plaintiffs damages, a new trial is necessary on remand only as to that issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.