Court Opinion

ID: 9819736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:33:25.596941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:26.380456
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TULLY, specially concurring: I concur in the judgment of the majority but write separately to emphasize that our resolution of this case is legally correct but morally indefensible. The circumstances of the minors in this case illustrate an unacceptable gap in the safety net created by the Juvenile Court Act to protect the children of this state. The majority correctly concludes that the limitation on the trial court’s authority is not a question of jurisdiction but, rather, the lack of a remedy for minors who are subjected to neglect or abuse while under the age of 18, but who turn 18 before the trial court enters a dispositional order under section 2 — 23 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/ 2—23 (West 2004)). I have carefully reviewed the text of section 2 — 23 and must reluctantly agree with the majority that relief is available under that provision only for “[a] minor under 18 years of age.” 705 ILCS 405/2— 23 (West 2004). A minor who has been abused or neglected does not magically recover from such adversity simply because she reaches the age of 18. Any parent knows that the decisions a young person makes shortly before and after her eighteenth birthday about employment and education can have profound impact and can affect the course of a young person’s life for many years to come. The legislature likewise recognizes that the services received by an abused or neglected minor shortly after her eighteenth birthday can determine whether the minor will go on to become a productive member of society. This is reflected in section 2 — 31 (705 ILCS 405/2—31 (West 2004)), which provides that proceedings under the Act, and a wardship created under the Act, do not automatically terminate until a minor reaches the age of 19 and can be continued by the trial court for good cause until the age of 21. Eighteen is clearly not an age at which the need for services automatically ends or at which the trial court loses jurisdiction over a minor. Unfortunately, the minors in this case have fallen through a gap in the statute and have been denied the potential benefits of state intervention in this critical period in their lives. The need for intervention was recognized prior to the minors’ eighteenth birthdays, but because of delays inherent in locating the minors’ parents, or perhaps as the result of the State’s and the trial court’s failure to recognize the importance of their impending birthdays, no disposition was made until it was too late to do so under section 2 — 23. As a result the minors have been denied the benefits of extending any potential wardship until the age of 19 or possibly as long as the age of 21 as provided under section 2 — 31. Accordingly, because of the conflicting language of these statutory sections, the legislature has created an effective cutoff date for intervention in the lives of minors, not at age 18, but at some ill-defined date weeks or months prior to age 18 determined by the speed with which the State and the courts can dispose of the cases. There is no logical reason why the minors in this case should have been denied the services available to them at this critical juncture in their lives merely because they were born six days too early or because the State and the trial court failed to act until six days too late. I believe it is incumbent upon the legislature to act to correct this gap in the protection of the Juvenile Court Act by amending section 2 — 23 to allow for the disposition of cases that were properly filed before a minor’s eighteenth birthday, even if the minor reaches that age before the dispositional hearing.