Court Opinion

ID: 9765826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:21:23.216931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.038034
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Under the principle of respondeat superi- or, unless the act of the servant is committed within the scope of the general authority of the servant in furtherance of the master’s business and for the accomplish*43ment of the object for which the servant is employed, the master cannot be held liable for the servant’s act. Broaddus v. Long, 135 Tex. 353, 138 S.W.2d 1057 (1940). The evidence shows that appellant was only the carrier; its trucks picked up the coils of steel from the docks in Houston and delivered them to Merco in Dallas. Weisinger, ex-chairman of the board for appellant, testified: “[I]t was the company’s (Merco’s) responsibility to unload my trucks ...; my rates are based upon shipper load and consignee unload ...; I didn’t know it was being unloaded that way.” In my opinion this testimony raised, at least, a fact issue of whether the act of Webb, in enlisting the assistance of the deceased to unload the truck, was an act committed “within, the general authority of the servant.” I do not believe the only special issue submitted (Issue No. 1 set out in the majority opinion), as worded, was sufficient. The jury should have been made aware of the requirement that the act had to have been “committed within the scope of the general authority of the servant” in order to hold the master liable. While I do not believe two special issues should have been submitted, as I read the requested, but refused, explanatory instruction (again, as set out in the majority opinion) it was a substantially correct statement of the law and was sufficient to call the trial court’s attention to the defect.
I respectfully dissent.