Court Opinion

ID: 9704365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:33:09.676652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:01.307383
License: Public Domain

Quinn, P. J.
Defendant appeals from her sentence following the revocation of her probation on the following allegations of error: defendant was denied counsel at her probation revocation hearing; defendant was denied counsel at sentencing; defendant’s uncounseled plea of guilty to the probation violation was invalid.
Defendant was not denied counsel at her revocation hearing. The record establishes that she intelligently waived counsel at that time.
Defendant’s argument that she was denied counsel at time of sentencing is based on the premise that counsel must be present at the time of sentencing, or that she must again be advised of her right to counsel at time of sentencing and again intelligently waive that right.
Neither the decided cases nor GCR 1963, 785.8(1) cited in support of defendant’s basic premise apply to a sentencing following revocation of probation where defendant intelligently waived her right to counsel prior to the revocation hearing. The cases are factually inapposite and GCR 1963, 785.8(1) must be read in context with the total rule. When this is done, it is apparent that 785.8(1) has no application to probation revocation proceedings. *216They are fully covered by statute, MCLA 771.4; MSA 28.1134, except for the right to counsel requirement or intelligent waiver thereof.
The third allegation of error merits no discussion.
Affirmed.
D. E. Holbrook, J., concurred.