Court Opinion

ID: 9898613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:10:58.125653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:23.320226
License: Public Domain

J-S37033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SALIYAH JELISSA MARSHALL                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 316 EDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 13, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
                Criminal Division at CP-46-CR-0004286-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023

       Saliyah Jelissa Marshall (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after a jury convicted her of endangering the welfare of

children (EWOC).1 Upon review, we affirm Appellant’s conviction, but vacate

her judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

       The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

             Shortly before 9:30 a.m. on June 9, 2020, Kendall Chisem,
       a security guard working at a FedEx facility located at 601 River
       Road in Upper Merion Township, observed a small child alone in
       the front seat of a car in the facility’s parking lot. The child was
       J.M. [(Child)], [Appellant’s] three-year-old son. The parties
       stipulated that [Child’s] date of birth is November 21, 2016. All
       of the car’s windows were up, and [Child] was crying for his
       mother. Mr. Chisem saw a bag of food and an electronic tablet in
       the front seat. The weather on June 9, 2020[,] was sunny, and
       Mr. Chisem found [Child] sweating profusely.           After [Child]
       unlocked the car, Mr. Chisem removed him from the car and
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).
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     brought him to the security guard building. Security then called
     the police. [Child] continued to cry for his mother while in the
     security guard building. Security officials gave [Child] food and a
     drink, at which point [Child] slowly stopped crying.

           Officer Anthony Alosi [(Officer Alosi)] of the Upper Merion
     Township Police Department arrived at the FedEx facility at about
     9:30 a.m. and went to the security office. Mr. Chisem and … a
     security specialist at FedEx[] then brought [Officer] Alosi to the
     vehicle in which [Child] had been found. While at that location
     investigating, [Appellant], an employee at the FedEx facility,
     arrived. She informed [Officer] Alosi that she had been at work
     since 3:00 a.m. and completed her shift around 9:30 a.m.

           While in the FedEx parking lot, [Officer] Alosi also spoke with
     Sadat Claude, who was the vehicle’s operator and [Appellant’s]
     co-worker at the FedEx facility. Mr. Claude told [Officer] Alosi that
     he had picked up [Appellant] and her son, driven them to the
     FedEx facility, and [Appellant] had left [Child] in the vehicle.
     Based on this information, [Officer] Alosi believed that [Appellant]
     had left [Child] in the car for about seven (7) hours.

           [Officer] Alosi described [Appellant’s] demeanor as calm.
     [Appellant] told [Officer] Alosi that a babysitter, Chantel Jones,
     had dropped off [Child] at the FedEx parking lot at approximately
     8 a.m. [Appellant] provided a phone number for Chantel Jones.
     [Officer] Alosi called the number, but the woman who answered
     said she had no idea what he was talking about.

            [Officer] Alosi took [Appellant] into custody.           After
     processing [Appellant], [Officer] Alosi input information related to
     this incident to the ChildLine website so the Office of Children and
     Youth could conduct a follow-up investigation. [Officer] Alosi then
     released custody of [Child] to [Appellant].

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 2-4 (footnotes and citations to record

omitted).

     The Commonwealth charged Appellant with EWOC. On May 16, 2022,

the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence, under

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Pa.R.E. 404(b), of a subsequent incident in which Mother left Child unattended

(the December 2021 incident). The Commonwealth alleged:

     1. On December 22, 2021, East Norriton police officers responded
     to Timberlake Apartments for a well-being check. The caller had
     reported an unattended 5[-]year[-]old boy in the main lobby of
     the building. Upon arrival, Officer Ryan Meinke spoke with the
     [Child], as well as the caller, Terry Hall. Terry Hall reported that
     she had seen [Child] in the elevator by himself and he was crying
     that he wanted his mother.

     2. [Child] told Officer Meinke that he lives in Apartment B706 with
     his mother, [Appellant]. He stated his mother was at work.
     Officer [Meinke] went to Apartment B706 and noticed the front
     door was ajar. He checked the interior of the apartment and was
     unable to locate any adult.

     3. Officer Meinke called [Appellant], who advised him that she was
     at work. She said that a friend, Lenoce Smith, was supposed to
     be watching [Child]. She advised that the friend had come to the
     apartment at 11[:00 p.m.] the night prior to watch [Child], and
     she did not know that [Child] was unattended.

     4. [Child] advised he had not eaten yet that morning, and another
     resident provided him with food and milk. [Child] said that when
     his mother is at work, sometimes his father would watch him and
     sometimes it is just him and his dog ….

     5. A short while later, [Appellant] arrived on scene and took
     custody of [Child].

     6. Officers were unable to contact Lenoce Smith using the contact
     information [Appellant] provided.

Motion in Limine, 5/16/22, at 2-3.

     The trial court heard testimony and argument concerning the motion in

limine prior to trial. The trial court granted the motion and ruled that the

Commonwealth could introduce evidence of the December 2021 incident to

show absence of mistake. See N.T., 6/14/22, at 25.

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      Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant of EWOC, graded as a

second-degree felony. With the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report,

the trial court sentenced Appellant to three years of probation. Appellant filed

a timely post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence. The

trial court denied the motion. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and

the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following issues:

      1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
      the Commonwealth’s Pa.R.E. 404(b) motion to admit other acts
      evidence at Appellant’s EWOC trial that only showed that she had
      the propensity to leave her son alone while she was at work,
      depriving her of the presumption of innocence, and the probative
      value of which was outweighed by its danger for unfair prejudice?

      2. Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to sustain
      Appellant’s EWOC conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1) where
      there was no evidence that she knew her three-year-old son was
      alone in a hot car?

      3. Whether Appellant’s sentence is illegal because it is improperly
      graded as a felony of the second degree where she only admitted
      that her son was under six years old and none of the other
      aggravating factors were found beyond a reasonable doubt by the
      jury for it to be graded above a felony of the third degree?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

      In her first issue, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion

by granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to admit other-acts

evidence under Pa.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 18. Appellant claims the December

2021 incident was offered as substantive evidence to establish the mens rea

of EWOC, i.e., that she knowingly left her son locked in the car. Id. at 18-24;

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see also id. at 23 (“[T]here are only two incidents, indicating that it was

merely a ‘remarkably unlucky’ coincidence that [Appellant’s] son was twice

found alone while she was at work.”). According to Appellant, the trial court

failed to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential for

unfair prejudice. Id. at 24. She describes the other-acts evidence as “weak”

based on contradictions in testimony and the police officer’s minimal effort to

contact the babysitter. Id. at 28.

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      [A]dmissibility of evidence is a matter for the discretion of the trial
      court and a ruling thereon will be reversed on appeal only upon a
      showing that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. An
      abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate
      court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a
      result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,
      or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 286 A.3d 1288, 1295 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

      As our Supreme Court has explained, generally,

      all relevant evidence, i.e., evidence which tends to make the
      existence or non-existence of a material fact more or less
      probable, is admissible, subject to the prejudice/probative value
      weighing which attends all decisions upon admissibility.

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136 (Pa. 2007) (citing Pa.R.E. 401

and 402); see also Pa.R.E. 403 (permitting the court to “exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).

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     One exception is identified in Pa.R.E. 404(b):

     (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

     (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
     is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
     that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
     the character.

     (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
     purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
     plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
     accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the
     probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair
     prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added).

     “Unfair prejudice” in Rule 404(b)(2) “means a tendency to suggest

decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its

duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Dillon, 925 A.2d at 366 (citing

Pa.R.E. 403, cmt.).

     Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the
     defendant. Th[e Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has stated that it
     is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts
     from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the
     issues at hand and form part of the history and natural
     development of the events and offenses for which the defendant
     is charged. Moreover, we have upheld the admission of other
     crimes evidence, when relevant, even where the details of the
     other crimes were extremely grotesque and highly prejudicial.

Id. at 367 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

     Here, the trial court concluded the evidence was admissible to show

absence of mistake. “Evidence of a prior crime may [] be admitted to show a

defendant’s actions were not the result of a mistake or accident, where the

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manner   and   circumstances     of   two    crimes   are   remarkably     similar.”

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 359 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

     The standard for admission of evidence under the absence of
     mistake exception is virtually the same as the common plan or
     scheme exception; namely, the evidence must be distinctive and
     so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same
     perpetrator, and its probative value must not be undermined by
     the lapse in time between incidents.

Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 272-73 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).       “Rule 404(b) does not distinguish

between prior and subsequent acts.” Commonwealth v. Wattley, 880 A.2d

682, 685 (Pa. Super. 2005).

     In its opinion, the trial court referenced the statements it made on the

record after hearing argument on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine:

     All right. So it’s pretty clear to me that this incident does fit in
     with the criteria of [Rule] 404(b) to establish lack of mistake.

     The incidents have sufficient similarities in terms of the evidence
     showing that the [C]hild was left alone; the evidence showing that
     [Appellant] claimed that the [C]hild was not left alone, but in the
     custody of somebody else who has never appeared or been
     produced; and it will be up to the jury to decide whether or not
     the evidence is sufficient.

     But if believed, I think it is sufficient to establish a lack of mistake,
     so I’ll grant the Commonwealth’s motion.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 7 (citing N.T., 6/14/22, at 25). The court

reiterated that the December 2021 incident was similar because it involved

Appellant leaving Child unsupervised while Appellant was at work, and

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Appellant “claiming she left [Child] with a babysitter who could not be found.”

Id. at 7-8. “Moreover, the incidents are sufficiently close enough in time,

having occurred within approximately 18 months of each other.” Id. at 8;

see also Gilliam, 249 A.3d at 273-74 (upholding trial court’s admission of

other bad acts evidence under absence of mistake exception where the other

incidents occurred 4 to 5 years before the charged offenses).

      The trial court also concluded the probative value of the evidence

outweighed its potential for undue prejudice. The trial court explained:

            Evidence of the December [] 2021 incident is relevant
      because it has a tendency to show the absence of mistake on the
      part of [Appellant] in leaving [Child] unattended on June 9, 2020.
      While damning because it shows a virtual repeat of [Appellant’s]
      conduct for which she was charged, it is highly relevant given
      [Appellant’s] claim in both situations that she left [Child] with a
      “phantom” babysitter when in fact she left him alone and went to
      work. There is no doubt the evidence is prejudicial, but its
      relevance outweighs any such prejudice. In short, this evidence
      is not so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to decide the
      case based upon something other than the legal propositions
      relevant to the case.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 8-9.

      Significantly, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the

December 2021 incident only for the limited purpose of establishing that

Appellant knew Child was unattended, and it was not a mistake.               N.T.,

6/15/22, at 122-23. The trial court advised the jury not to treat the evidence

as proof of Appellant’s bad character or criminal tendencies.         Id. at 123.

“Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.” Tyson, 119 A.3d

at 362.

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      The trial court’s analysis is supported by the record and the law. We

discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in admitting evidence of the

December 2021 incident, or concluding that the probative value of the

evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice. Because the trial court

issued a cautionary instruction, we also presume the jury considered the

December 2021 incident only for its intended purpose. See id. Therefore,

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

      In her second issue, Appellant contends the Commonwealth’s evidence

was insufficient evidence to support her EWOC conviction. Appellant’s Brief

at 31. Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to prove that she knew Child

was alone in the vehicle. Id. at 34. Instead, Appellant argues a babysitter

dropped off Child at approximately 8:00 a.m. and left Child with one of

Appellant’s coworkers, who had agreed to watch Child until Appellant’s shift

was over. Id. at 32-33, 35.

      We adhere to the following standard of review:

            As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
      claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
      favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit
      of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
      Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
      establishes each material element of the crime charged and the
      commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
      mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
      to be resolved unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
      that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
      the combined circumstances.

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           The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
     wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the
     evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is
     circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence
     coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
     overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may
     not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so
     long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable
     to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of
     a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
     convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation and brackets omitted).

     Section 4304(a)(1) of the Crimes Code defines EWOC as follows:

     (a) Offense defined.--

        (1) A parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare
        of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or
        supervises such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly
        endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care,
        protection or support.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).

     This Court has employed a three-prong test to determine whether
     the Commonwealth’s evidence is sufficient to prove that a
     defendant knowingly violated a duty of care under section
     4304(a)(1): (1) the accused must be aware of his or her duty to
     protect the child; (2) the accused must be aware that the child is
     in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or
     psychological welfare; and (3) the accused either must have failed
     to act, or must have taken action so lame or meager that such
     actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s
     welfare.

Sebolka, 205 A.3d at 337 (citation and paragraph break omitted). “[C]ourts

must consider whether the conduct at issue offends the ‘common sense of

community’ and the ‘sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most

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people entertain.’” Commonwealth v. Howard, 257 A.3d 1217, 1228 (Pa.

2021) (citation omitted).

      Appellant only challenges the second prong of the test, i.e., that she

knowingly placed Child in circumstances that could threaten his welfare. The

Crimes Code defines “knowingly” as follows:

      (b) Kinds of culpability defined.--

                                      ***

         (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
         of an offense when:

            (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
            attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
            that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

            (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
            aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
            such a result.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2). “[T]he defendant must be aware that they have

placed the child in a perilous or dangerous situation, but they do not have to

be aware of the certainty of a particular result….”         Commonwealth v.

Delamarter, __ A.3d __, 2023 WL 57332271 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing

Howard, 257 A.3d at 1225).

      In rejecting this claim, the trial court explained:

      [V]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth, the jury could have found, and presumably did
      find, that [Appellant] left her three-year-old son alone in a locked
      car with all the windows closed during the early morning hours
      from 3 a.m. to 9 a.m. It was during late spring, and when found,
      [Child] was crying for his mother and sweating profusely. Without
      question, the evidence established that [Child’s] mother,

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      [Appellant], knowingly placed her son in danger of physical and/or
      psychological harm and took no reasonable actions to protect him.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 10.

      The record supports the trial court’s findings and conclusion.       For

example, Officer Alosi testified he attempted to contact the woman whom

Appellant identified as Child’s babysitter. N.T., 6/15/22, at 28-29. Officer

Alosi called the phone number Appellant provided, but the woman who

answered stated “she had no idea what I was talking about.” Id. at 29.

      Appellant suggests that her testimony conclusively demonstrated she

was unaware that Child was in a dangerous situation. However, the jury, as

factfinder, was free to consider Appellant’s testimony, assess its credibility,

and weigh it against other testimony presented at trial. See Commonwealth

v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[T]he trier of fact, while

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence

produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” (citation and

brackets omitted)).

      Our review reveals that the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient

for the jury to conclude that Appellant knowingly violated her duty of care and

placed Child in a dangerous situation. Sebolka, 205 A.3d at 336-37. We

reiterate that the Commonwealth may prove its case through circumstantial

evidence. See id. Thus, Appellant’s second issue fails.

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     In her third issue, Appellant asserts the trial court imposed an illegal

sentence by grading her EWOC conviction as a second-degree felony.

Appellant’s Brief at 37-38.   The Commonwealth and the trial court agree.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 18; Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 12-14.

            The scope and standard of review applied to determine the
     legality of a sentence are well established. If no statutory
     authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is
     illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be
     vacated. In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our
     standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining
     whether the trial court committed an error of law.

Commonwealth v. Whatley, 221 A.3d 651, 653 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

     Section 4304(b) of the Crimes Code dictates the grading for EWOC:

     (b) Grading.--

        (1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), the following
        apply:

            (i) An offense under this section constitutes a misdemeanor
            of the first degree.

            (ii) If the actor engaged in a course of conduct of
            endangering the welfare of a child, the offense constitutes a
            felony of the third degree.

            (iii) If, in the commission of the offense under subsection
            (a)(1), the actor created a substantial risk of death or
            serious bodily injury, the offense constitutes a felony of the
            third degree.

            (iv) If the actor’s conduct under subsection (a)(1) created a
            substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury and was
            part of a course of conduct, the offense constitutes a felony
            of the second degree.

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           (2) The grading of an offense under this section shall be
           increased on grade if, at the time of the commission of the
           offense, the child was under six years of age.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(b).

      Instantly, the criminal information charged Appellant with EWOC under

section 4304(a)(1), stating:

      Being the parent, guardian, or other person supervising the
      welfare of a child under 18 years of age, to wit: [Child];
      11/21/2016 [Appellant] did knowingly violate a duty of care,
      protection and support.

Criminal Information, 12/16/20. The criminal information alleged no conduct

under subsections (b)(1)(ii)-(iv), such as a course of conduct or serious bodily

injury, to increase the grading. Cf. Commonwealth v. Popow, 844 A.2d 13,

18 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that for EWOC “to be graded as a third-degree

felony, the Commonwealth must allege in the information and present

evidence at trial of an additional factor of ‘course of conduct’ ….”).

      As    the   trial   court   stated,    “[Appellant’s]   conduct   constituted   a

misdemeanor of the first degree….” Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 14; see

also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(b)(1)(i). However, the parties stipulated to Child’s

date of birth. N.T., 6/15/22, at 6. Because the stipulation established Child

was less than 6 years old, subsection (b)(2) applies, and the offense should

have been graded as a third-degree felony.              18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(b)(2),

supra; see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 14 (“[T]he grading of the

offense should be increased one grade since [Child] was under six years of

age at the time of the offense….” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we vacate

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Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for the trial court to resentence

Appellant for EWOC graded as a third-degree felony.

      Judgment of sentence vacated.         Case remanded for resentencing.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 11/14/2023

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