Court Opinion

ID: 9908100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:06:22.913075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:33.423001
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   53
                           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    LAWRENCE F. PANIK, AN                                    No. 84679
                    INDIVIDUAL,
                    Appellant,
                    vs.                                                         F LED
                    TMM, INC., A NEVADA
                                                                                NOV 30 2023
                    CORPORATION,
                                                                              ELIV
                    Respondent.                                             CLERV                   RT

                                                                           BY
                                                                                ilEF DEPUTf CLERK

                               Appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP
                   special motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
                   Gloria Sturman, Judge.
                               Reversed and rernanded.

                   Weide & Miller, Ltd., and F. Christopher Austin, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Lex Tecnica Ltd. and Adam R. Knecht and Vincent J. Garrido, Las Vegas,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, C.J., and LEE and BELL,
                   JJ.

                                                    OPINION

                   By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
                               Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to protect citizens'
                   First Amendment rights to petition the government for redress of

                   grievances and to free speech by limiting the chilling effect of civil actions
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                that are based on the valid exercise of those rights in connection with an
                issue of public concern (SLAPP actions). 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, at 1363
                (preamble to bill enacting anti-SLAPP statute). To achieve that intended
                goal, the statutes allow defendants to file a special motion to dismiss to
                obtain an early and expeditious resolution of a meritless claim for relief that
                is based on protected activity, as defined in NRS 41.637. NRS 41.650; NRS
                41.660.
                            In this opinion, we clarify that the anti-SLAPP statutes do not
                exclude any particular types of claims for relief from their scope because the
                focus is on the defendant's activity, not the form of the plaintiff s claims for
                relief. The district court thus erred in concluding that the claims against
                appellant Lawrence F. Panik "do not fall within the categories of claims
                subject to the [a]nti-SLAPP statute," without further analysis. And because
                we conclude that Panik established by a preponderance of the evidence that
                respondent TMM, Inc. (TMMI) brought its claims based upon Panik's "good
                faith communication[s] ... in direct connection with an issue of public
                concern," NRS 41.660(1), we reverse the district court's order and remand
                with instructions to address prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.'
                                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            Panik is the president and CEO of nonparty Dimension, Inc. In
                2000, Panik and several other nonparties invested in a company, Digital
                Focus, Inc. (DFI), to purchase the license to a computer code (the Code).
                DF1 later transferred its interest in the Code license to nonparty Digital
                Focus Media, Inc. (DFMI), Dimension's predecessor-in-interest. TMMI
                purchased DFI and sued Dimension and DFMI in 2013 seeking to establish

                       'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
                is not warranted.
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                its rights to the Code license (the 2013 lawsUit). The district court. found
                that Dimension owned the rights to the Code license, and this court
                affirmed. See TMM, _Inc. v. Dimension, Inc., Nos. 72025 & 72779, 2018 WL
                6829001 (Nev. Dec. 27, 2018) (Order of Affirmance).
                            In 2019, Dimension brought the underlying action (the 2019
                lawsuit) against TMMI for abuse of process relating to the 2013 lawsuit.
                During settlement discussions, TMMI discovered that Dimension was in
                possession of several Code- derivatives that TMMI contends belong to it.
                Settlement discussions ceased, and TMMI filed counterclaims -against
                Dimension, alleging that Dimension converted the disputed Code
                derivatives from TMMI-. TMMI later filed a third-party complaint against
                Panik, asserting claims for trade libel, misappropriation of trade secrets,
                conversion; injunctive relief, abuse of process, and alter ego liability. TMMI
                alleged that Panik made statements to "current and prospective [TMMI)
                shareholders, directors, [and] officers" that Dimension, not TMMI; owns the
                exclusive rights to the Code and its derivatives and that TMMI was
                defrauding its- shareholders, directors, and officers by claiming it owned the
                dispUted derivatives. Panik filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss,
                arguing that TMMI filed its third-party claims in retaliation for Panik's
                alléged statements concerning the rights to the Code derivatives. Panik
                now appeals from the district court's order denying that motion: •
                                               DISPUSSION
                          We review a district court's "decision to grant. Or deny An anti-
                SLAPP special motion to dismiss de novo." Srnith v, Zilverberg, 137 Nev.
                65, 67, 481 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2021). We. also -review a district court's
                interpretation•of a statute de novo. Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737,
                334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). Nevada.'s a nti-SLAPP statutes direct the district
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                court to conduct a two-prong analysis, where it must first "[d]etermine
                whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the
                evidence, that the claim[s are] based upon a good faith communication in
                furtherance of . . . the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue
                of public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). To meet the burden under the first
                prong, the defendant must show "that the comments at issue fall into one of
                the four categories of protected communications enumerated in NRS
                41.637."2 Stark v. Lackey. 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020). Once
                the defendant establishes that the communications fall within one of those
                categories, they must then demonstrate "that the communication• 'is
                truthful or [wa]s made without knowledge of its falsehood." .ïd. (quoting
                NRS 41.637). "[I]f the district court finds the defendant has met his or her
                burden" under the first prong, "the court must then 'determine whether the
                plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of
                prevailing on [its] claim[s]." Id. (quoting NRS 41.660(3)(b)).
                The district court erred in its interpretation and application of the anti-
                SLAPP statutes
                            Panik argues that the district court failed to apply the correct
                standard under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis when it
                summarily concluded that the claims against Panik "do not fall within the
                categories of claims subject to the [a]nti-SLAPP statute." We agree.

                      2The four categories of protected communications are any
                (1) communication "aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral
                action"; (2) communication to government or political entities "regarding a
                matter reasonably of concern to" that entity; (3) "[w]ritten or oral statement
                made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative,
                executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
                law," and (4) "[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of
                public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." NRS
                41.637.
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                                 "When interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language. If
                    a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we enforce the statute as
                    written, without resorting to the rules of construction." Zilverberg, 137 Nev.
                    at 72, 481 P.3d at 1230 (citation omitted). Nevada's anti7SLAPP statutes
                    provide irnmunity "from any civil action for claims based upon" a person's
                    protected good faith communications.             NRS 41.650; see ctlso NRS
                    41.660(1)(a) (providing that, when "an action is brought against a person
                    based upon a [protected] good faith communication," that Person "may file
                    a special motion to dismiss" the action). The statute's plain language directs
                    courts to examine the substance of the defendant's communications, not the
                    title of the plaintiff s claims for relief. NRS 41.660(3)(a) ("If a special motion
                    to dismiss is filed . . ., the court shall. .. [d]etermine whether the moving
                    party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Claim is
                    based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to
                    petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of
                    public concern . . . ."). As the California Supreme Court has explained in
                    discussing California's similar anti-SLAPP statute, "[t]he ... statute's
                    definitional focus is not th.e form of the plaintiff s cause of action but, rather,
                    the defendant's activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability--and
                    whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning." Navellier
                    v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002).3
                                 NRS 41.660(3)(a) affords the defendant (the moving party) the
                    opportunity to establish that the plaintiff's claims for relief are based upori

                          3Given  "the similarities between California's and Nevada's anti-
                    SLAPP statutes," this court has "routinely look[ed] to California courts for
                    guidance in this area." Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749
                    (2019).
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                protected good faith communications. That first step in the anti-SLAPP
                analysis necessarily looks beyond the fbrm of the plaintiff s claims for relief,
                which makes sense given the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statutes' special-
                motion-to-dismiss procedure—to provide a mechanism for the expeditious
                resolution of meritless SLAPPs regardless of the form the SLAPP takes. See
                NRS 41.660(2) (allowing a defendant 60 days after service of a complaint
                based on the defendant's good faith communication in furtherance of
                petitioning or speech rights to file a special motion to dismiss). If the focus
                were instead on the form of the 'plaintiff s claims for relief, the plaintiff
                would be completely in control of the anti-SLAPP statutes' application. This
                would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the Legislature's intent to limit the
                chilling effect that SLAPPs have on the rights to petition and to speech and
                frustrate the quick resolution of meritless SLAPPs.               Accordingly,
                "fclonsistent with the broad construction that the anti-SLAPP statute is to
                receive, [the statute] may apply to any cause of action." Thomas R. Burké,
                Anti-SLAPP Litigation § 4.1 (2022) (observing that anti-SLAPP protectiOns
                have been extended to over 40 different types of claims). Indeed, we have
                recognized that anti-SLAPP protections may apply in cases involving a
                variety of claims for relief. See, e.g., Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 66-69, 481 P.3d
                at 1226-28 (defamation per se, conspiracy, and injunctive relief); Abrarns v.
                Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 85, 458 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2020) (defamation,
                intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, false light,
                business disparageMent, civil conspiracy, and concert of action); Delucci V.
                Songer, 133 Nev. 290, 292, 396 P.3d 826, 828 (2017) (defamation and
                intentional infliction of emotional distress).
                            Here, rather than evaluating the statements that are the has'is
                of TNIMI's third-party claims against Panik, the district court considered

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                whether those claims were of the type entitled to anti-SLAPP protections.
                Because the statutes do not limit anti-SLAPP protections to only certain
                claims for relief, the district court erred when it denied Panik's motion
                based on its finding that "the subject claims do not fall within the categories
                of claims subject to the [a]nti-SLAPP statute."
                      Panik rnet his burden under the first prong
                           Panik further argues that he met his burden under the first
                prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Under that prong, Panik was required
                to demonstrate by a preponderance of•the evidence that his statements fell
                within one of the four statutorily defined categories of protected speech. See
                NRS 41.637.       TMMI alleged that Panik made statements to its
                shareholders, directors, and officers challenging TMMI's claim to the Code
                derivatives.4 We agree with Panik that such statements were "made in
                direct connection with an issue under consideration by a . . . judicial body,"
                NRS 41.637(3), and thus fall within one of the statute's categories. Indeed,
                the statements were directly connected to the ultimate issue in TMMI's
                counterclaims in the 2019 lawsuit, and Panik made those statements to
                people with an interest in the litigation—TMMI directors, officers,
                shareholders, and potential shareholders. See Patin v. Lee, 134 Nev. 722,
                726, 429 P.3d 1248, 1251 (2018) (explaining that for a statement to be
                protected under NRS 41.637(3), "the statement must (1) relate to the

                      4While the parties dispute whether Panik made the challenged
                statements, the court "must evaluate the communication as it is alleged in
                the plaintiff s complaint and in any of the plaintiff s clarifying declarations."
                Spirtos u. Yernenidjian, 137 Nev. 711, 715-16, 720, 499 P.3d 611, 616-17,
                620 (2021) ("[A] moving party's denial that he or she made the alleged
                statements has no relevance . . . .").
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                substantive issues in the litigation and (2) be directed to persons having
                some interest in the litigation").
                            Panik also met his burden to establish that his statements were
                "truthful or made without knowledge of [their] falsehood." NRS 41.637; see
                also Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 12, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019) (recognizing
                this as part of the movant's burden). In particular, Panik offered the final
                judgment from the 2013 lawsuit, which held that Dimension was the sole
                owner of the Code license, as well as several addendums to the original Code
                license agreement that support his belief that Dimension is the sole owner
                of any Code derivatives, including those at dispute in TMMI's
                counterclaims. Panik also provided a declaration stating that he believes
                the statements concerning Dimension's exclusive rights are true. That
                evidence, "absent [any] contradictory evidence in the record," is sufficient to
                meet Panik's burden of showing that the statements were made in good
                faith. See Stark, 136 Nev. at 43, 458 P.3d at 347 (holding that "an affidavit
                stating that the defendant believed the communications to be truthful . . . is
                sufficient to meet [his] burden absent contradictory evidence in the record").
                      The district court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating TMMI's
                      claims under the second prong
                            Finally, Panik argues that the district court also erred when it
                evaluated TMMI's claims under the second prong because the court applied
                the wrong test, finding -that [TMMI's] claims [were] prompted by TMMI's
                good faith belief in material issues of fact." We agree.
                            The language in the district court's order indicates that the
                court treated Panik's motion as one for summary judgment. Doing so
                ignores the statute's direction that, on the second prong analysis, the court
                must "determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie
                evidence a probability of prevailing on [its] claim [s]." NRS 41.660(3)(b). As
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                   explained in Coker, while the previous version of NRS 41.660 "instructed
                   courts to treat [a] special motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
                   judgment, . . . [i]n 2013, the Legislature removed [that] language . . . and
                   set forth [the] specific burden-shifting framework" noted above. 135 Nev.
                   at 10, 432 P.3d at 748.
                              Because the statute no longer directs district courts to treat a
                   special motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, the relevant
                   inquiry is not whether the plaintiff can establish a genuine issue of material
                   fact, but whether the plaintiff can produce prima facie evidence in support
                   of its claims. Compare NRCP 56 (directing the district court to "grant
                   summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
                   to any material fact"), with NRS 41.660(3)(b) (requiring the plaintiff to
                   demonstrate "a probability of prevailing on [its] claim[s]" with prima facie
                   evidence). In conducting the second prong analysis, the •district court must
                   "review each claim and assess the plaintiffs probability of prevailing,"
                   which "is determined by comparing the evidence presented with the
                   elements of the claim." Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 70-71, 481 P.3d at: 1229. The
                   district court's analysis here did not comport with NRS 41.660's burden-
                   shifting framework, as it failed to consider whether TMMI produced prima
                   facie evidence sufficient to demonstrate that its third-party claims against
                   Panik "have minimal merit." Id. at 70, 481 P.3d at 1229; see also Abrams,
                   136 Nev. at 91, 458 P.3d at 1069 (adopting California's "minimal Merit"
                   burden under the second prong of the analysis).
                                               COIVCL USION
                               Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes make clear that on prong one of
                   the analysis, the district court's focus in evaluating a special motion to
                   dismiss must be on the defendant's communications rather than the form
                   of the plaintiff s claims. We conclude that Panik has met the burden under
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                  the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by demonstrating that the claims
                  in the complaint are based on "good faith communication[s] ... in direct
                  connection with an issue of public concern." NRS 41.660(1). Because Panik
                  satisfied the burden under the first prong and the district court did not
                  apply the correct analysis under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
                  analysis, we reverse the district court's order and remand this matter with
                  instructions for the district court to determine, consistent with NRS
                  41.660(3)(b), whether TM1V11 "has demonstrated with prima facie evidence
                  a probability of prevailing on [its] claim[s]."5

                                                                                 ,   C.J.
                                                        Stiglich

                  We concur:

                                                   J.

                                                   J.

                        5Given our disposition, we deny Panik's request for an award of
                  attorney fees, costs, and an additional award under NRS 41.670(1), as that
                  statute only authorizes the court to make such an award after it grants a
                  special motion to dismiss.

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