Court Opinion

ID: 9540600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:06.799192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:04.021067
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree with the conclusion articulated in the majority opinion to affirm the summary judgment in favor of Norton Construction, Inc. I also am in accord with the declination to adopt the accepted work doctrine as that concept is urged by Norton. I find, however, that my focus is much like that of Justice Car dine in his concurring opinion, in which I join, and I would ground the decision to affirm this case not upon a conclusion no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the question of proximate causation, but upon the ground that, in this instance, Norton owed no duty to the Lynches.
Our rule, which we have adhered to steadfastly, is that the question of whether a duty exists on the part of any alleged tortfeasor is a question of law assigned to the court for determination. Alternatively, our general rule is that a question of fact such as proximate causation is assigned to the jury, i.e., the finder of fact, for its determination. This distinction is significant in this case because disputes regarding questions of fact do not ordinarily lend themselves to summary judgment while, on the contrary, questions of law are ripe for summary judgment as being outside the purview of jury deliberation. See, e.g., Hill *1101v. Park County By and Through Bd. of County Comm’rs, 856 P.2d 456 (Wyo.1993); Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186 (Wyo.1992); Hozian v. Weathermon, 821 P.2d 1297 (Wyo.1991); Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533 (Wyo.1991).
Our approach is consistent with that articulated in 6 James W. Moore et al., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.17[42] (1988), where it is stated:
Issues of negligence, including such related issues as wanton or contributory negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or against the claimant, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.
In Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372 (Wyo.1988), we said summary judgment is not ordinarily applicable to issues of negligence and is a drastic remedy that deprives a litigant of the right to trial. In negligence cases, it is preferable for a summary judgment to be grounded upon a question of law as a matter within the ambit of the court to decide. In this particular instance, the question of law is whether a duty was owed by Norton to the Lynches.
An examination of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions teaches me other courts have concluded that liability on the part of either the owner or the contractor is a question of law to be resolved by determination as to which party had the actual present duty to protect the injured third party. In Slavin v. Kay, 108 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla.1958), the court stated in support of a general rule of nonliability for the contractor:
There must be a present duty on the part of an alleged tortfeasor toward one claiming liability, and that there could be no such “present duty” if the premises were in the possession and control of another at the time of the injury.
Slavin still is good law in Florida. See, e.g., Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 609 So.2d 504 (Fla.1992); Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So.2d 260 (Fla.1988); Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Vaughn, 491 So.2d 551 (Fla.1986); Lubell v. Roman Spa, Inc., 362 So.2d 922 (Fla.1978); Green Springs, Inc. v. Calvera, 239 So.2d 264 (Fla.1970); Mai Kai Inc. v. Colucci, 205 So.2d 291 (Fla.1967); U.S. Lodging v. H.B. Daniel Constr., 617 So.2d 448 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993); Fitzgerald v. Cestari, 553 So.2d 708 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Kala Investments, Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So.2d 909 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989), review denied, 551 So.2d 461 (Fla.1989); Seitz v. Zac Smith & Co., Inc., 500 So.2d 706 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987); Jackson v. L.A.W. Contracting Corp., 481 So.2d 1290 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 492 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1986); Birch v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 478 So.2d 454 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985); Mori v. Industr. Leasing Corp., 468 So.2d 1066 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985); Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So.2d 559 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla.1983); Conley v. Coral Ridge Properties, Inc., 396 So.2d 1220 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); El Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So.2d 763 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977).
Another example is found in Schlender v. Andy Jansen Co., 380 P.2d 523, 526 (Okl.1962), where the rule of nonliability for contractors prevails, and the court noted that the contractor’s duty and liability terminates when:
The work * * * has been accepted by the proprietor * * * but the responsibility, if any, for maintaining or using it in its defective condition is shifted to the proprietor. The contractor remains liable, if at all, only to the proprietor for breach of his contract.
In New Mexico, we find a case in which the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to adopt a per se rule of contractor nonliability, stating:
Generally, an independent contractor may be liable to third parties who may have been foreseeably endangered by the contractor’s negligence, even after the owner has accepted the work * * * subject to two limitations:
1) The independent contractor should not be liable if he merely carefully carried out the plans, specifications and directions given him, at least where the plans are not so obviously *1102dangerous that no reasonable man would follow them, and
2) If the owner discovers the danger, or it is obvious to him, his responsibility may supersede that of the contractor.
Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm’n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375, 1379 (1982) (citations omitted).
Of similar tenor are the following cases: Kennecott Copper Corp. v. McDowell, 100 Ariz. 276, 413 P.2d 749 (1966); Trushcheff v. Abell-Howe Co., 239 N.W.2d 116 (Iowa 1976); Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. W.R. Grace Corp., 258 N.J.Super. 94, 609 A.2d 92 (1992); Cumming v. Nielson’s, Inc., 108 N.M. 198, 769 P.2d 732 (1988); Baker v. Fryar, 77 N.M. 257, 421 P.2d 784 (1966); DeArman v. Popps, 75 N.M. 39, 400 P.2d 215 (1965); Southern California Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 70 N.M. 24, 369 P.2d 407 (1962); Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388, 356 P.2d 46 (1960); Jackson v. City of Franklin, 51 Ohio App.3d 51, 554 N.E.2d 932 (1988); Leininger v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965).
My examination of these cases persuades me to agree with the majority opinion that a contractor does owe a duty of reasonable care to foreseeable users, even after the owner has accepted the work, and traditional negligence principles can be applied to the questions of contractor liability. I would, however, like the New Mexico court, limit the potential liability of the contractor to those situations in which the plans are so obviously dangerous no reasonable man would follow them and those situations in which there was an apparent danger. I do choose, however, to resolve this case upon the premise that, under the circumstances, there was no longer a duty owed to Mrs. Lynch by Norton, rather than upon the concept of proximate cause.
My decision to affirm is premised upon the proposition a contractor like Norton owes no duty to third persons, as a matter of law, if that contractor in good faith constructed the project according to the owner’s plans and specifications, and no danger or defect from following those plans and specifications was obvious to the contractor. Traditional negligence principles do not justify a finding of duty on the part of the contractor if there is no foreseeability of harm to third parties. The fact that, at some later time, the danger or defect becomes obvious to the owner upon subsequent discovery, while the premises are in the control of the owner, would assign to the owner the duty to avoid injury-
In this instance, there is nothing to suggest that Norton could foresee the school district, the owner, for more than a year would fail to protect its employees by refusing to salt the accumulations of ice and snow or to sand the known icy spots. Nothing indicates the contractor was forewarned by any information concerning any drainage problem that would relate to the construction of the sidewalk. The legal duty was assigned to the school district, in this instance, and it, having failed to adjust the plans and specifications to avoid the dangerous condition and having failed to remedy those problems when known, was the party responsible to those who might be injured.
I concur in the disposition of the case, but my concurrence is premised upon a lack of duty on the part of the contractor, rather than a conclusion there was no causal relationship between the work performed by the contractor and Mrs. Lynch’s injuries.