Court Opinion

ID: 9915755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:05:27.576148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:28.469962
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-867

                   THE SHORELINE CORPORATION & another 1

                                       vs.

                                BENJAMIN PEÑA.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        On appeal from a summary process eviction, the tenant

 Benjamin Peña argues that the judge erred in concluding, based

 in part on the testimony of the building's maintenance

 supervisor, that the eviction was justified by the tenant's

 overuse of hot water.       The tenant further argues that the judge

 should have allowed his posttrial motions for reconsideration of

 the judgment because of the tenant's cognitive disability, for

 the landlord's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,

 and for a psychological evaluation and appointment of a guardian

 ad litem.    We affirm.

        Background.    With the assistance of Federal housing

 subsidies, the tenant rents an apartment in Lawrence (apartment)

 1   Valebrook Associates.
that is owned and managed by plaintiffs The Shoreline

Corporation and Valebrook Associates (collectively, the

landlord).   In January 2018, with the assistance of a housing

specialist, the tenant and the landlord entered into an

agreement under which the tenant agreed not to run the hot water

in his apartment "for more than ten (10) minutes at a time."

After a Housing Court judge approved this agreement, it became a

legally binding court order.

     In February 2021, the landlord served the tenant with a

notice to quit alleging, "you have been repeatedly and

excessively running the hot water in your apartment which has

created a large amount of moisture and condensation to form on

your windows and walls . . . and it has caused issues with the

heating loop resulting in inconsistent heating temperatures for

the building."   A Housing Court judge entered a preliminary

injunction that, among other things, ordered the tenant to

"utilize the water in his apartment in a reasonable manner,"

including not running water without a specific purpose or using

hot water for longer than twenty minutes.   The judge also

ordered the matter referred to the Tenancy Preservation Program

(TPP) "[t]o assess and make an opinion on [the tenant]'s . . .

mental capacity" and "whether the court should appoint a

                                 2
guardian ad litem for [the tenant]." 2   In March 2021, the

landlord served the tenant with a summary process complaint

alleging that the tenant had violated the lease and interfered

with the "health, safety and welfare of other residents," and

reiterating the factual allegations in the notice to quit.

     On July 1, 2021, which had been scheduled as a trial date,

the tenant moved to continue the trial; his counsel expressed

concerns about the tenant's "mental health" and asked for "an

opportunity to have him evaluated by a medical professional."

The judge continued the trial to allow the tenant to file a

reasonable accommodation request.

     In August 2021, the tenant filed a motion for reasonable

accommodation, arguing that he needed to take hot water baths to

ease his frequent pain from his "numerous physical disabilities,

including diabetes, osteoporosis, and arthritis."    The tenant's

counsel informed the judge that she had previously understood

that the tenant needed a "reasonable accommodation related,

potentially, to [his] mental capacity," but after she "received

2 A "'cooperative effort' between the Housing Court and private
nonprofit agencies," TPP is intended to assist tenants suffering
from mental illness (citation omitted). Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 845 (2009). TPP investigates
"whether a tenancy can be preserved through reasonable
accommodations for a tenant's disability." Adjartey v. Central
Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 847 n.23 (2019).

                                 3
more information . . . the direction changed."    The judge denied

the motion for reasonable accommodation.

     Based on the evidence at the September 22, 2021 trial, the

judge found as follows.   As a result of frequent complaints from

other residents about the lack of hot water, the landlord's

maintenance supervisor checked the building's hot water tanks

and found that the volume of the hot water was low and was

falling quickly.   On several occasions including January 20, 29,

and 31, 2021, the maintenance supervisor went to the apartment,

where the tenant was running hot water from all of the faucets.

The tenant's excess water usage caused condensation resulting in

water dripping from the ceiling of the apartment below, buildup

of about two inches of ice on the apartment's windows, and lack

of hot water for other residents.    To adjust for the tenant's

excessive use of hot water, the maintenance supervisor had to

raise the water temperature for the building, creating a risk of

scalding water for residents.   On January 5, 2022, the judge

issued a memorandum of decision, concluding that the tenant was

in material noncompliance with his lease.

     On January 18, 2022, the tenant moved pursuant to Mass. R.

Civ. P. 59, 365 Mass. 827 (1974), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365

Mass. 828 (1974), for the Housing Court to reconsider and amend

the judgment, arguing that the judge had not fully considered

the tenant's "physical and mental disabilities."   The tenant

                                 4
supported the motion with an affidavit from a homemaker who

assisted the tenant in his apartment four days each week; the

affidavit described the tenant's physical symptoms and "trouble

facing reality with things that make him stressed." 3    The tenant

argued that the affidavit supported an inference that he "may be

suffering from some undiagnosed capacity issue or mental

disability," which warranted reconsideration of the judgment and

exploration of possible reasonable accommodations.      The tenant

also moved for a psychological evaluation and appointment of a

guardian ad litem. 4    The judge denied the motions, and the tenant

appealed.

     Discussion.   1.    Maintenance supervisor's testimony.   The

tenant contends that the judge erred in allowing the landlord's

maintenance supervisor to testify as an expert about how the

tenant's use of hot water affected the water temperature in the

building.   At trial, the tenant objected to the maintenance

supervisor's testimony that, as a result of complaints from

other residents about the lack of hot water, the maintenance

supervisor checked the building's three hot water tanks every

hour and found that the tanks were "draining" because they were

3 We note that the affidavit was not signed under the pains and
penalties of perjury.
4 The tenant subsequently submitted a report of a psychologist

that described and diagnosed certain cognitive impairments of
the tenant. We have reviewed that report, which is impounded.

                                   5
"overworking."    The judge ruled that, to the extent the

testimony included expert opinion, he would allow it.

     We review the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of

discretion.    See Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 455

(2021).    To qualify as an expert, a witness must have

"sufficient 'education, training, experience and familiarity'

with the subject matter of the testimony" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Rintala, 488 Mass. 421, 425 (2021).    See Mass.

G. Evid. § 702 (2023).    Additionally, expert testimony must

"rest[] on a reliable foundation."    Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487

Mass. 212, 217-218 (2021), quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).

     We discern no abuse of discretion.    Most of the maintenance

supervisor's testimony related facts that he perceived directly:

the other residents' complaints, the dropping levels in the hot

water tanks, the faucets running hot water in the tenant's

apartment, and the conditions in that apartment and the one

below.    To the extent that the maintenance supervisor opined as

an expert by drawing a causal connection between those facts,

the judge was within his discretion to admit that opinion.      At

the time of trial, the landlord's maintenance supervisor had

worked in his position for almost seven years and checked the

boiler systems in the building on a "daily basis."    Based on the

maintenance supervisor's experience and familiarity with the

                                  6
boiler system, the judge acted within his discretion in

admitting the maintenance supervisor's opinion testimony.     See,

e.g., Lenehan v. Travers, 288 Mass. 156, 158-159 (1934) (expert

qualified based on work experience, even without specialized

training or education); Lavin v. Lavin, 24 Mass. App Ct. 929,

931 (1987) (expert qualified based on work experience and

familiarity with field).

     The tenant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that

the methodology underlying the maintenance supervisor's

testimony was unreliable.    The tenant waived that argument by

not raising it before or during trial.     See Matter of Esteraz,

90 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 335 (2016) ("The failure to request a

Daubert-Lanigan hearing to establish the reliability of expert

testimony constitutes waiver of the issue").     See also Daubert,

509 U.S. at 592-595; Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24-

26 (1994).

     2.   Sufficiency of evidence.    The tenant argues that the

judge erred in finding, based on the evidence at the trial, that

there was "good cause" for the tenant's eviction from Federally

subsidized housing. 5   On review of summary process actions, we

5 To the extent that the tenant argues that the judge's
memorandum of decision contained an error of law because it
omitted discussion of Federal housing regulations, we are not
persuaded. The judge's memorandum of decision did address
Federal requirements, even if it did not explicitly cite them.
Thus, the tenant misplaces his reliance on RFT & Assocs. v.

                                  7
accept as true the factual findings of the judge, but

"scrutinize without deference the legal standard which the judge

applied to the facts" (citation omitted).    Cambridge St. Realty,

LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 123 (2018).    Based on the

evidence set forth above, including the testimony of the

maintenance supervisor, the judge had ample basis in the facts

to conclude that the tenant had violated the lease.    See 24

C.F.R. § 247.3 (permitting termination of Section 8 tenancy for

good cause, including "[m]aterial noncompliance with the rental

agreement," which may include "[r]epeated minor violations" of a

lease which "[d]isrupt the livability of the project,"

"[a]dversely affect" other residents' quiet enjoyment of their

property, or "[i]nterfere with the management of the project"). 6

     3.   Posttrial motions.   The tenant argues that the judge

erred in denying his posttrial motions to revise and reconsider

Smith, 419 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) ("trial court
did not address the fundamental 'good cause' requirement for
termination of [a] Section 8 lease").
6 The tenant argues, apparently for the first time on appeal,

that even if there was good cause to evict him, the judge should
have applied the "equitable anti-forfeiture doctrine" and
considered whether the harm to the tenant from eviction
outweighed the harm to the landlord. Based on the evidence at
trial, including the interference with other residents' quiet
enjoyment, that argument is unavailing. The tenant misplaces
his reliance on cases where courts have granted equitable relief
against forfeiture when a "lessee has failed to pay rent" or has
breached a "collateral covenant . . . due to accident or mistake
and no harm has resulted to the lessor." Howard D. Johnson Co.
v. Madigan, 361 Mass. 454, 457-458 (1972), quoting Eno Sys. Inc.
v. Eno, 311 Mass. 334, 338 (1942).

                                  8
the judgment of eviction, to require the landlord to provide him

with a reasonable accommodation, for appointment of a guardian

ad litem, and for a psychological evaluation. 7     The tenant argues

that information he submitted with those motions shows that he

has a cognitive disability, and so the judge should have set

aside the judgment in order to determine if the tenant was

entitled to a reasonable accommodation.

     This court reviews denials of motions for reconsideration

for an abuse of discretion.    See Blake v. Hometown Am.

Communities, Inc., 486 Mass. 268, 278 (2020).       We discern no

abuse of discretion in the judge's implicit conclusion that that

information proffered by the tenant after trial did not warrant

reconsideration of the judgment.       Before trial, the tenant's

counsel was aware of his possible cognitive issues, as shown by

her comments at the July and August 2021 pretrial hearings.

Indeed, in his motion to reconsider, the tenant stated that

"awareness of [the tenant]'s disabilities predate[d] the filing

of this case."   Thus, what the tenant proffered after trial was

not information which "could not by due diligence have been

discovered earlier."   Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co.,

451 Mass. 343, 361 (2008).    Moreover, neither the homemaker's

7 In the Housing Court, the landlord argued that the tenant's
motion to reconsider was not timely under Mass. R. Civ. P. 59.
The landlord does not raise that argument on appeal, and so we
do not consider it.

                                   9
affidavit nor the psychological evaluation supports the tenant's

position strongly enough to amount to a "substantial reason"

justifying relief.    Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).

     As to the tenant's claim that the judge should have allowed

his posttrial motion for a reasonable accommodation, it is

without merit.    The factors entitling a tenant to a reasonable

accommodation include whether (1) the tenant is disabled; (2)

there is a nexus between his disability and his conduct; and (3)

the requested accommodation is reasonable.    See Boston Hous.

Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 843-844, 848-849 (2009).

See also Glendale Assocs., LP v. Harris, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 454,

462-464 (2020).    We assume, without deciding, that the tenant

provided sufficient information with his posttrial motions for

the judge to have found that he met the first Bridgewaters

prong, and has a cognitive disability.    In those circumstances,

the tenant cannot show prejudice from the judge's denial of his

posttrial motions for a psychological evaluation and appointment

of a guardian ad litem, which in any event were in the judge's

discretion.   See G. L. c. 123, § 19; G. L. c. 185, § 40.

     As to the second Bridgewaters prong, the tenant did not

demonstrate a nexus between his cognitive disability and his

excess hot water use.    Based on the evidence at trial, the judge

found that the tenant ran hot water "to create a warm and humid

environment . . . as well as a topical treatment for his pain."

                                 10
Since the judge found that the tenant's conduct was intentional,

to relieve his physical pain, the judge could properly conclude

that the tenant's posttrial filings did not show a nexus between

that conduct and tenant's asserted cognitive disability.

       Nor did the tenant meet the third prong of the Bridgewaters

test.    Even if there was sufficient evidence to support a nexus

between the tenant's cognitive disability and his excess hot

water use, the tenant did not demonstrate that a reasonable

accommodation was available.    Among the submissions before the

judge were documents asserting the tenant's claim that shut-off

attachments could be installed on the apartment's faucets, as

well as those setting forth the landlord's response that those

attachments are not compatible with the building's plumbing.       We

discern no error or abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of

the tenant's posttrial motion for a reasonable accommodation.

                                      Judgment and orders denying
                                        motions for reconsideration
                                        and for psychological
                                        evaluation affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Milkey & Grant, JJ. 8),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:     January 8, 2024.

8   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 11