Court Opinion

ID: 9569801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:17:31.223516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:03.037317
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The majority’s attempt to distinguish this case from Hilden v. Ball is unconvincing. In Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 P.2d 1122 (1990), the plaintiff alleged that Dr. Ball was negligent in failing to pre-oxygenate his patient before surgery, and this negligence proximately caused the patient’s death. The doctor defended, producing evidence that the cause of the patient’s death was a bronchial spasm which precluded any oxygen from transferring from the lungs to the blood, and that pre-oxygenation would not have made a difference. In Hilden we approved the “but for” proximate cause instruction of IDJI 230.
In this case the plaintiff alleged that Dr. St. Clair was negligent in artificially rupturing Mrs. Fussell’s fetal membranes when the child’s head was too high, thereby permitting the umbilical cord to prolapse. Dr. St. Clair defended on the ground that the prolapsed umbilical cord occurred naturally (an occult prolapsed umbilical cord) and was not caused by his conduct. In both this case and in Hilden v. Ball, the doctors defended on the ground that the condition occurred naturally, and not for the reason asserted by the plaintiff. *606In Hilden v. Ball we stated that under those circumstances the IDJI 230 “but for” proximate cause instruction was the correct instruction to be given. In this case the majority says it was not.
I am unable to see a meaningful distinction between this case and Hilden v. Ball. In each case the defense to the plaintiffs claim was that the death or injury occurred as a natural result of conditions in the patient’s body. In Hilden v. Ball it was the bronchial spasm in the lungs. In this case it was a natural occult prolapsed umbilical cord.
I believe that the trial court properly gave the IDJI 230 instruction which we approved in Hilden v. Ball. I.R.C.P. 51(a)(2) directs that the court should have given that instruction. We should not reverse a jury trial of seven days on such a tenuous distinction as the Court has drawn in this case. We cannot expect perfection in the conduct of trials, only fairness. I believe it is unfair to reverse the jury’s decision in this case based upon two words in a jury instruction which we approved less than a year ago in Hilden v. Ball.