Court Opinion

ID: 9554882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 15:00:40.684481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:28.715901
License: Public Domain

21-6307
     Traore v. Garland
                                                                                             BIA
                                                                                      Aikman, IJ
                                                                                     A216 083 122

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of August, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                       SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 8                       STEVEN J. MENASHI,
 9                       ALISON J. NATHAN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   OUSMANE TRAORE,
14          Petitioner,
15
16                       v.                                             21-6307
17                                                                      NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                          Ousmane Traore, pro se, Batavia, NY.
24
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 2                                       Attorney General; Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant
 3                                       Director; Robert Michael Stalzer, Trial
 4                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 5                                       United States Department of Justice,
 6                                       Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Ousmane Traore, a native and citizen of Burkina Faso, seeks

11   review of a May 10, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a December 3, 2020 decision

12   of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

13   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Traore,

14   No. A 216 083 122 (B.I.A. May 10, 2021), aff’g No. A 216 083 122 (Immig. Ct. Batavia

15   Dec. 3, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

16   procedural history.

17         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., without the

18   findings regarding withholding of removal that the BIA declined to reach. See

19   Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).       The

20   applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)

21   (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
                                              2
 1   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v.

 2   Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual findings for substantial

 3   evidence and questions of law and application of law to fact de novo).

 4         As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Government that Traore has

 5   abandoned his asylum claim by failing to address, in his opening brief, the

 6   agency’s ruling that the claim was untimely filed more than a year after his entry

 7   and that no exception to the filing deadline applied. LoSacco v. City of Middletown,

 8   71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that pro se appellant abandoned issues

 9   not raised in his brief). Traore has likewise abandoned his claims premised on

10   feared harm based on his religion or perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups by

11   failing to mention them in his brief. See id. What remains before us are Traore’s

12   withholding of removal and CAT claims, both premised on the risk that he would

13   be targeted by government authorities because of his father’s political activities.

14          As to withholding of removal, Traore argues that the BIA erred in

15   concluding that he waived that claim by failing to “meaningfully” challenge the

16   IJ’s denial of that form of relief in his appellate brief. The BIA’s conclusion was

17   reasonable because, while Traore’s brief contained several arguments that

18   implicitly related to the denial of withholding, he failed to challenge several

                                              3
 1   dispositive grounds that the IJ gave for denying that form of relief.

 2         To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an applicant has the

 3   burden to demonstrate either past harm rising to the level of persecution or that

 4   future persecution is “more likely than not” to occur, and that a protected ground

 5   is “one central reason” for the past or feared harm. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),

 6   1231(b)(3)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1206.16(b); Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109–14

 7   (2d Cir. 2022) (upholding BIA’s application of “one central reason” standard to

 8   withholding of removal). Because Traore did not challenge the conclusion that

 9   he failed to show past harm rising to the level of persecution, he could not argue

10   that he was entitled to a presumption of future persecution.            See 8 C.F.R.

11   § 1208.16(b)(1), (2).   Accordingly, to meaningfully challenge withholding of

12   removal on appeal to the BIA, he had to argue that he would “more likely than

13   not” be targeted on account of his political opinion if he returned to Burkina Faso.

14   Id. However, he did not respond to the IJ’s reasoning that he was not involved in

15   his father’s political activities and there was no reason to believe his father’s

16   political opinions were imputed to him, or that the basis for his testimony about

17   this relationship was a series of assumptions and rumors.          Accordingly, the

18   agency reasonably found that Traore waived his claim for withholding of removal.

                                               4
 1         To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant has the burden to show that he

 2   would “more likely than not” be tortured by or with the acquiescence of

 3   government officials. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1); Khouzam

 4   v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004). In assessing whether an applicant

 5   has satisfied his burden of proof, the agency must consider all evidence relevant

 6   to the possibility of future torture, including evidence of past torture. 8 C.F.R.

 7   § 1208.16(c)(3). The applicant “will never be able to show that he faces a more

 8   likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be

 9   more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming

10   together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events

11   cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119,

12   123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)).

13         Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Traore failed to

14   satisfy his burden for establishing CAT relief.        First, the agency reasonably

15   concluded that Traore was not previously tortured.          He testified that he was

16   assaulted during his father’s first arrest, resulting in swelling to his face and a

17   bloody nose, but he did not provide sufficient detail about the nature and severity

18   of the assault to compel the conclusion that it amounted to “an extreme form of

                                               5
 1   cruel and inhuman treatment.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (defining “torture” and

 2   explaining that the definition “does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or

 3   degrading treatment or punishment”); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d

 4   Cir. 2006) (holding that “torture requires proof of something more severe than the

 5   kind of treatment that would suffice to prove persecution”).

 6         Second, substantial evidence also supports the finding that Traore’s fear that

 7   government officials are more likely than not to torture him because of his father’s

 8   political beliefs is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d

 9   Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In the absence of solid support in the record . . . [an

10   applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”).      Even assuming Traore presented

11   sufficient evidence to establish that his father was harmed because of his political

12   opinion, it does not follow that Traore can show that he himself is more likely than

13   not to be harmed in the future based on his father’s political opinion. Traore

14   testified that he never participated in political activities and that he is no longer in

15   contact with his family, and a reasonable factfinder could conclude that he was

16   previously harmed because he was present when his father was being arrested,

17   not because of an imputed political opinion. Traore did not allege there were any

18   threats or attempts to harm him during the period of more than a year that he

                                                6
1   remained in Burkina Faso after the 2014 beating. See Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of

2   Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring “particularized evidence” to

3   support a CAT claim).

4         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

5   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

6                                        FOR THE COURT:
7                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
8                                        Clerk of Court

                                            7