Court Opinion

ID: 9908305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:38.696594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.278402
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0877-MR

ALEX THOMPSON                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 21-CR-00237

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Alex Thompson (“Thompson”) appeals from a Taylor Circuit

Court judgment convicting him of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and

sentencing him to four years’ imprisonment. After careful review, we affirm.

             Thompson was indicted on five counts of first-degree sexual abuse

involving three girls, A.T., C.B., and C.S. The charges relating to A.T. were later

severed from those relating to C.B. and C.S. This appeal concerns only the two

counts of first-degree sexual abuse relating to C.B. and C.S. Following a jury trial,
Thompson was convicted on both counts and sentenced to four years in prison.

This appeal followed.

              Thompson argues the trial court erred in admitting portions of a letter

he sent to the trial court and allowing testimony that it was common for sexual

abuse victims to delay disclosing their abuse. Both allegations of error are

evidentiary issues, which we review for abuse of discretion. Leach v.

Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Ky. 2019) (citations omitted). “The test for

abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).

              Concerning his first allegation of error, at trial the Commonwealth

sought to introduce portions of a letter Thompson had written to the trial court.

Thompson objected stating the Commonwealth had not properly authenticated the

letter. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the following portion of

the letter to be read to the jury:

              The night my wife kids and I spent in Campbellsville I
              just don’t believe that really happened. It couldn’t have.
              I’m ashamed of this, but I was passed out, blackout drunk
              that night. I passed out in the middle of the floor. How
              was [C.B.] that close to me on the floor for me to even
              touch her sir?

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                On appeal, Thompson argues the trial court erred in admitting this

portion of the letter because it was not properly authenticated. We disagree. KRE1

901(a) provides: “The requirement of authentication or identification as a

condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” “The burden on

the proponent of authentication is slight; only a prima facie showing of authenticity

is required.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Ky. 2010) (citation

omitted). “The contents of the letter, taken in conjunction with the circumstances,

can be relied upon in determining authentication.” Ordway v. Commonwealth, 352

S.W.3d 584, 593 (Ky. 2011) (citing KRE 901(b)(4)).

                In Ordway, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s

admission into evidence of a letter written by the defendant over his objection that

it was not properly authenticated. The Court noted the letter was sent from the

defendant and referenced specific facts of the case such as the charges, a seized

gun and clothing, and a potential prison sentence. It concluded the letter was

properly authenticated “[b]ased on the quantity of identifying facts contained in the

letter[.]” Ordway, 352 S.W.3d at 593.

                Similarly, here, the letter was addressed to the trial court and signed

by Thompson. The letter includes specific details about his case, including the

1
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                            -3-
victims’ names and the locations of the alleged abuse, as well as the date of his

arrest and his attorney’s performance. These identifying facts were sufficient to

authenticate the letter under KRE 901. We find no abuse of discretion.

                Thompson next argues the trial court erred in allowing a detective to

testify it was not uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to delay reporting their

abuse. Thompson concedes this error is not preserved for review and requests

palpable error review under RCr2 10.26. “A palpable error must be so grave in

nature that if it were uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the

proceedings.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006)

(citation omitted). “[W]hat a palpable error analysis ‘boils down to’ is whether

the reviewing court believes there is a ‘substantial possibility’ that the result in the

case would have been different without the error.” Id. (citation omitted).

                At trial, the Commonwealth questioned Detective Nelson Bishop on

redirect whether it was unusual for victims to delay disclosing crimes committed

against them. Detective Bishop responded that it was not uncommon. Thompson

argues admission of this testimony was error, citing Ordway v. Commonwealth,

391 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Ky. 2013) and Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d

612 (Ky. 1992). Of the two, we believe Hellstrom is more applicable to the facts

of this case.

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -4-
             In Hellstrom, our Supreme Court reversed a conviction based upon

testimony that “‘delayed disclosure’ is common in these kinds of cases.” Id. at

613. More recently, in King v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Ky. 2015),

the Court held testimony that a sexual abuse victim’s five-year delay in reporting

his abuse was not unusual because, in her experience, it was “very rare” for

children to immediately report abuse. Citing Hellstrom and other cases, the Court

held the admission of the statement, while obvious error, was not palpable error.

             Assuming the admission of Detective Bishop’s testimony was error,

we cannot say the error created the “probability of a different result or . . . [was] so

fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.”

Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006), as modified (May 23,

2006). Although circumstantial, the evidence against Thompson was significant,

including the corroborating testimony of two different victims, and Thompson’s

own statements from his letter. As the Court in King, “we are satisfied . . . the

evidence was not so damaging to Appellant’s case that it resulted in manifest

injustice.” King, 472 S.W.3d at 528.

             Finally, Thompson argues the foregoing errors amount to cumulative

error requiring reversal. Under the cumulative error doctrine, “multiple errors,

although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative

effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313

                                          -5-
S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Here, there is “insufficient harmless error to create a

cumulative effect which would mandate reversal for a new trial.” Tamme v.

Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 40 (Ky. 1998).

            For the foregoing reasons, the Taylor Circuit Court’s judgment is

affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Robert C. Yang                            Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Ken W. Riggs
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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