Court Opinion

ID: 9678595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:25:01.418022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.062485
License: Public Domain

PATRICE M. BARRON, Justice (Assigned),
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
Because I believe the trial judge correctly allowed the drug counselor’s testimony, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction on counts one, two, and four.
My belief is based on the Legislature’s abrogation of the general chemical dependency privilege, in the limited context of child abuse eases: “In any proceeding regarding the abuse or neglect of a child ... evidence may not be excluded on the ground of privileged communication except in the case of communications between attorney and client.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 34.04 (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).1 “Abuse” is defined with reference to sexual conduct involving a child as defined in the Penal Code. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 261.001(1)(G) (Vernon Pamph.1996). “[Rjeports ... shall be made to: (1) any local or state law enforcement agency....” Act of June 20, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 1055, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3587 (formerly Tex. Fam. Code *342ANN. § 34.02).2 In fact, the failure of any person, even an attorney, to report suspected child abuse is itself a Class B misdemeanor. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 261.101(c), 261.109 (Vernon Pamph.1996); Morris v. State, 833 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961, 113 S.Ct. 1387, 122 L.Ed.2d 762 (1993).3
“The heading of a title, subtitle, chapter, subchapter, or section does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.024 (Vernon 1988); Brooks v. State, 682 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd, untimely filed). Thus, the fact that the communications are declared nonprivileged in the Family Code should not restrict the purview of such nonprivileged status to civil proceedings brought in the Family Court or to suits affecting the parent-child relationship. “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988). In construing a statute, the rules of construction are to be resorted to only when the statute is ambiguous. Texas Water Comm’n v. Brushy Creek Mun. Util. Dist., 917 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1996). The main goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent, with words and phrases read in context and given their common, everyday meaning unless they have acquired technical or particular meaning. R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1994, writ denied). Thus, in my view, the counselor’s testimony was admissible here, because “[i]n any proceeding[4] regarding the abuse or neglect of a child ... evidence may not be excluded on the ground of privileged communication.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 34.04 (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).
Any inconsistency in the law is to be removed by reasonable construction, and the statutes and rules must be harmonized where possible. M.R.R. v. State, 903 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1995, no writ). Thus, while the rules of criminal evidence and criminal procedure protect communications made during chemical dependency treatment as privileged, principles of statutory construction militate in favor of an exception to that privilege in the limited context of child abuse eases. First, specific provisions control over general provisions; in other words, the specific situation of child abuse, where there is no privilege, except attorney-client, should control over the broad grant of privilege in any other type of criminal case. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988); City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex.1994); State v. Kinkle, 902 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.). Second, under the doctrine of in pari materia, in discerning legislative intent, all laws bearing on the same subject should be considered and given effect. Kinkle, 902 S.W.2d at 189; Reed v. State of Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulartion, 820 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, no writ); 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.05 (1984). To do so precludes the application of the chemical dependency counselor privilege in the context of a criminal prosecution for child sexual abuse. Third, under the doctrine of expessio unius5 had the Legislature intended to except chemical dependency counselors from the requirement of testifying in any proceeding involving child abuse, it would have done so expressly, as has been done with the attorney-client exception. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 34.04 (Vernon 1986); see also *343Fenton, Texas’ Clergyman-Penitent Privilege and the Duty to Report Suspected Child Abuse, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 281, 241-42 (1986).
Most importantly, court promulgated rules of evidence and procedure cannot override legislatively granted substantive rights. This is because the court’s rulemaking power, granted by the Legislature, does not allow the court to “abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of a litigant.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 22.108(a), 22.109(a) (Vernon 1988). Thus, in my view, a reasonable construction of the laws is that the Texas Legislature saw fit to give child abuse victims the substantive right to have chemical dependency counselors testify in actions brought on the victim’s behalf which are aimed at stopping the abuse. Similarly, in cases of child abuse the Legislature expressly disallowed a defendant’s right to have evidence excluded based on privilege (other than the attorney-client privilege). The courts cannot enlarge those substantive rights. The Legislature made the policy determination that stopping child molestation is more important than chemical dependency counseling and treatment. It is my belief that it is not for the courts to override this legislative determination, through rulemak-ing, procedure or case law.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of appellant’s conviction on counts one, two, and four. I would affirm the conviction on those counts. In all other respects, I concur in the result only of the majority’s opinion.

. Section 1 of Acts 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20 reenacted Title 2 and added Title 5 of the Family Code, effective April 20, 1995. Section 2(1) of the Act repealed Title 2 of the Family Code, as that title existed before the effective date of the Act. The former section 34.04 is now found at section 261.202, which now reads: “In a proceeding regarding the abuse or neglect of a child, evidence may not be excluded on the ground of privileged communication except in the case of communications between an attorney and client.” Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 261.202 (Vernon Pamph.1996).
Because of the version of the Family Code in effect at the time of trial in this case, throughout the remainder of this opinion, where appropriate, X will cite to the former Family Code sections as they appear in the Vernon 1986 bound volume of the Tex Fam.Code Ann., unless noted otherwise, and note the new locations as they appear in the Vernon Pamph.1996 of the Code.

. The former section 34.02 is now encompassed in Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 261.103 (Vernon Pamph. 1996).

. Former section 34.07 did not expressly include even those persons whose communications may otherwise be privileged, such as attorneys. In the 1995 amendments, the Legislature expressly included such privileged persons in the reporting requirement. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 261.101(c) (Vernon Pamph.1996).

4. It is interesting to note that the Legislature did not limit the abrogation of privileges to "suit[s]” or “suit[s] affecting the parent-child relationship,” which are defined in the statute. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. §§ 101.031, 101.032 (Vernon Pamph.1996) (formerly § 11.01(5)).

. The express mention or enumeration of one thing is like an express exclusion of all others. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 572 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex.1978); Maley v. 7111 Southwest Freeway, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).