Court Opinion

ID: 9673152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:07:19.713509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.417890
License: Public Domain

Gerrard, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the rule announced by the majority regarding the circumstances under which apportionment of fault must be submitted to the jury, and I concur in the result of the instant case. *159However, I write separately to address the propriety and effect of the trial court’s directed verdict of Traphagan’s negligence.
This court has long held that a motorist is deemed negligent as a matter of law if he or she operates a motor vehicle in such a manner as to be unable to stop or turn aside without colliding with an object or obstruction in the motorist’s path within his or her range of vision. German v. Swanson, 250 Neb. 690, 553 N.W.2d 724 (1996); Nickell v. Russell, 247 Neb. 112, 525 N.W.2d 203 (1995). However, as the majority notes, we have established an exception to the general rule where a motorist, otherwise exercising reasonable care, does not see an object or obstruction sufficiently in advance to avoid colliding with it because it is similar in color to the road surface and relatively indiscernible. Nickell v. Russell, supra. When the facts of a case fall within the exception to the range of vision rule, then the determination of negligence becomes a question for the jury. Id.
In the present case, the evidence as to the discernibility of the Mid-America truck was disputed. On the one hand, Bridget Turman, who was traveling behind Traphagan, testified that she was able to discern the truck from about 1 mile away and observed that it was not moving. On the other hand, Dr. Freeman Hall, Jr., testified that (1) Turman had the benefit of Traphagan’s car juxtaposed between her position and the Mid-America truck by which to gauge the movement of the truck and (2) two visual perception problems could have interfered with Traphagan’s ability to perceive the truck, specifically the lack of a discernible shadow moving down the highway and the camouflage effect of the “jumble” of objects in the back of the truck. Ralph Rhoads testified that prior to the accident, he observed several vehicles approaching the truck too fast and having to brake quickly to avoid it.
A trial court should direct a verdict as a matter of law only when the facts are conceded, undisputed, or such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom. Reavis v. Slominski, 250 Neb. 711, 551 N.W.2d 528 (1996). There was a question presented as to whether or not Traphagan was able to discern the truck and, consequently, a question presented as to whether or not the facts of this case fall within the exception to the range of vision rule. Accordingly, the directed verdict *160against the personal representative was erroneous, and the question of Traphagan’s negligence ought to have been submitted to the jury.
However, we have held that error without prejudice provides no ground for appellate relief. Ashby v. First Data Resources, 242 Neb. 529, 497 N.W.2d 330 (1993); In re Interest of R.R., 239 Neb. 250, 475 N.W.2d 518 (1991). The issue, thus, is whether the personal representative was prejudiced by the directed verdict. We have not, heretofore, addressed the effect of an erroneous directed verdict against one of the parties when a jury ultimately compares relative degrees of negligence and apportions damages under the new comparative negligence statute. Other jurisdictions have considered the adequacy of jury instructions and the record as a whole in determining whether a party is prejudiced by the granting of an erroneous directed verdict in a comparative negligence case. See, e.g., Ricklin v. Smith, 670 P.2d 1239 (Colo. App. 1983); Niedbalski v. Cuchna, 13 Wis. 2d 308, 108 N.W.2d 576 (1961).
In essence, comparative negligence “abrogates the common-law concept of contributory negligence, thus relieving both parties of an all-or-nothing situation, and substitutes apportionment of the damages by fault.” John J. Palmer & Stephen M. Flanagan, Heft & Heft’s Comparative Negligence Manual § 1.10 at 3 (rev. ed. 1986). Because its purpose is to allow juries to compare relative negligence and to apportion damages on that basis, the court in Ricklin v. Smith, supra, held that it was error for the trial court to fail to tell the jury what conduct of a party prompted the trial court to enter a directed verdict. The court reasoned that “[t]he jury needed to know the [trial] court’s reason for the directed verdict in order to make a comparison of the relative fault of each party.” Id. at 1241. The reasoning of the court is persuasive. '
In considering the record and the jury instructions in the instant case, the jury was told what conduct of Traphagan prompted the trial court to enter a directed verdict against the personal representative, and what specific conduct of Mid-America potentially violated its duty of reasonable care. Thus, the jury had access to the applicable law to determine both parties’ comparative negligence. See Watson v. Regional *161Transp. Dist., 729 P.2d 988 (Colo. App. 1986). The jury was also instructed to “not consider the ruling of the Court concerning contributory negligence in deciding the issue of Mid-America’s negligence or in deciding how the negligence of Kathy Traphagan compares in degree to any negligence [attributable] to Mid-America.” The jury was told that it may attribute “any amount” less than 100 percent of the negligence to Mid-America.
Thus, even though the trial court erroneously directed a verdict regarding Traphagan’s negligence, the jury was properly instructed to weigh the relative contributions of the parties’ negligence under the comparative negligence statute. Apportioning the relative negligence of the parties required the jury to evaluate Traphagan’s negligence, as well as the negligence of Mid-America. It was within the jury’s province to assign as little as 1 percent of the negligence to Traphagan; they did not do so. Instead, the jury not only found Traphagan negligent as instructed, but assigned 25 percent of the comparative negligence to Traphagan and 75 percent to Mid-America.
I cannot conclude that the personal representative was prejudiced in the instant case when utilizing the standards enunciated herein. The record as a whole supported a finding that both Traphagan and Mid-America were negligent and supported the apportionment made by the jury. Furthermore, the jury was told what specific conduct on the part of each party potentially constituted negligence so that they could make an informed comparison of the relative fault of each party. See Ricklin v. Smith, supra. The jury was also properly cautioned not to give greater importance to the negligence found by the trial court than that found by the jury. See Niedbalski v. Cuchna, supra.
For these reasons, the personal representative’s cross-appeal is properly dismissed, and I concur in the result reached by the majority.
White, CJ., and Caporale and Fahrnbruch, JJ., join in this concurrence.