Court Opinion

ID: 9891179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 18:03:40.075069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:38.909280
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/17/23 Hutcherson v. G&P Enterprises CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLE D. HUTCHERSON,                                                D081840

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
                                                                     00015719-CU-NP-NC)
G&P ENTERPRISES, LLC et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Earl H. Maas III, Judge. Affirmed.
         Terence J. Mix for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Klinedinst PC, Natalie P. Vance and Robert M. Shaughnessy for
Defendants and Respondents.

         Nicole D. Hutcherson appeals the order granting the motion of G&P
Enterprises, LLC, dba Allied Trustee Services (Allied), and Sommerset Villas
Maintenance Corporation (Sommerset) to strike her complaint as a strategic
lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). She contends the superior
court erroneously ruled she had not met her burden to establish a probability
of prevailing on her claims. We disagree and affirm the order.

                                       I.
                                BACKGROUND
A.    Hutcherson’s Default on Monthly Dues Owed to Sommerset
      In April 2007, Hutcherson bought a unit in a condominium complex in
Escondido for which Sommerset was the homeowners association (HOA). She
paid monthly HOA dues through April 2009, when she lost her job and then
defaulted on her mortgage loan and HOA dues. The mortgage lender
commenced foreclosure proceedings in June 2009; and the following month,
Allied, acting on behalf of Sommerset, began demanding payment of the
unpaid monthly HOA dues. Hutcherson petitioned the United States
Bankruptcy Court for relief in February 2010, and obtained a discharge of all
prepetition debts the following May. Her mortgage lender sold the
condominium at a foreclosure auction in June 2010. Hutcherson moved to
Riverside and then to Chino in October 2011.
B.    Sommerset’s Small Claims Action Against Hutcherson
      In June 2012, Sommerset filed an action in the small claims division of
the superior court to recover the monthly HOA dues Hutcherson had not paid
between her bankruptcy filing and the foreclosure sale, plus interest, late
charges, and collection fees. Sommerset listed a Riverside address for
Hutcherson on the claim form. The court assigned a trial date of September
4, 2012. The claim form advised Hutcherson: “You and the Plaintiff must go
to court on the trial date listed below. If you do not go to court, you may lose
the case.” Allied, acting on behalf of Sommerset, could not find Hutcherson

                                        2
at her Riverside address, but found her at her Chino address and served her
there in July 2012.
      A week before the scheduled trial date, Hutcherson filed a form request
to postpone the trial until December 4, 2012. As reasons for the
postponement, she wrote: “I am unemployed. I literally DO NOT have the
gas money to drive down to San Diego right now. I also need to find my
bankruptcy paperwork in storage.” The form advised, “If you do not hear
from the court, you should go to court on the scheduled trial date.” The
court postponed trial until October 17, 2012, and mailed notice of the
postponement to Hutcherson at her former Riverside address, even though
she had listed her Chino address on the postponement request. She never
received the notice and did not appear for trial. The court entered judgment
against Hutcherson for $2,227.39 on the continued trial date, and mailed a
notice of entry to her Riverside address on the following day.
      Hutcherson received a copy of the notice of entry of judgment and a
demand for payment from Allied, on behalf of Sommerset, at her Chino
address in November 2012. She was “not that concerned about the judgment
because [she] believed the bankruptcy discharge would be a total obstacle to
Sommerset ever collecting on it.” Sommerset formally assigned the judgment
to Allied in April 2014. Allied unsuccessfully tried to collect on the judgment
over the next several years.
C.    Hutcherson’s Civil Action Against Allied and Sommerset
      Based on the efforts of Sommerset and Allied to collect the monthly
HOA dues Hutcherson had not paid, she filed a complaint against them in
the superior court in April 2022. In a count for malicious prosecution,
Hutcherson alleged Sommerset and Allied: (1) knew the notice of
postponement of trial in the small claims action had been sent to the wrong

                                       3
address and she had not received it and would not be appearing at trial; (2)
knew their claim lacked probable cause to proceed with trial in her absence;
(3) knew any resulting judgment would deny her constitutional right to due
process of law; (4) maliciously and without justification did not inform the
court about the wrong address; and (5) maliciously and without probable
cause attempted to enforce the void judgment. In a count for abuse of
process, Hutcherson alleged Allied and Sommerset violated the Rosenthal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act; Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.)
by making false, deceptive, and/or misleading representations in their efforts
to collect on a judgment they knew was void for lack of effective service of
process. She realleged the same facts in a separate count for violations of the
Rosenthal Act. In a count for fraudulent concealment, Hutcherson alleged
Allied and Sommerset: (1) provided the small claims court with a wrong
address for her on the claim form; (2) never notified the court of her correct
address, even though they knew it because they had served her there; and (3)
concealed from her and the court that she had not received notice of the trial
postponement and that the judgment they tried to collect on was void and
unenforceable. As a result of the wrongful conduct of Allied and Sommerset,
Hutcherson alleged she incurred legal fees and suffered severe emotional
distress. She sought general and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees.
      Allied and Sommerset filed a special motion to strike the complaint
under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). They argued all of
Hutcherson’s claims arose from protected litigation activity in the prior small
claims action and therefore were subject to being stricken. Allied and
Sommerset also argued Hutcherson could not prevail on any of her claims,
because each was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and because
her action was an improper collateral attack on the judgment entered in the

                                       4
small claims action. They further argued the malicious prosecution claim
failed because Hutcherson could not establish a favorable termination of the
small claims action; the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) barred
the fraudulent concealment and abuse of process claims; and the Rosenthal
Act claim failed because the monthly HOA dues they sought to collect did not
involve a “consumer credit transaction” (id., § 1788.2, subd. (e)). In support
of the motion, Allied and Sommerset submitted a declaration from Allied’s
general counsel, which described their involvement in the small claims action
and judgment collection efforts and attached related documents.
      Hutcherson filed opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion in which she did
not dispute her claims arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute, but argued the motion should be denied because she had a
probability of prevailing on the claims. She argued the small claims
judgment was void on its face and subject to collateral attack because she
never received notice of the continued trial date. Hutcherson argued none of
her claims was time-barred. She argued she could prevail on the malicious
prosecution claim, because: (1) Sommerset and Allied acted maliciously and
without probable cause by proceeding to trial in her absence, even though
they knew she intended to defend the case but had not been given notice of
the continued trial date, and by seeking to collect prepetition dues they knew
had been discharged in bankruptcy; and (2) the small claims action
terminated in her favor to the extent the judgment included damages for
monthly HOA dues that had been discharged. She argued the litigation
privilege did not bar the abuse of process and fraudulent concealment claims,
because they were based on nondisclosures, not communications. Hutcherson
argued the HOA monthly dues constituted consumer credit transactions
under the Rosenthal Act because she could pay them 15 days after the first of

                                        5
each month without incurring a late charge. As part of the opposition,
Hutcherson submitted declarations from her attorney and herself, which
described the small claims action and Allied and Sommerset’s efforts to
enforce the judgment and attached related documents.
      The superior court held a hearing and granted the anti-SLAPP motion.
The court noted there was no dispute Hutcherson’s claims arose from
protected activity, and ruled she had failed to meet her burden “to establish
that there is a reasonable probability that she will prevail on the merits of
her claims at trial.” The court ruled all claims failed because the judgment in
the small claims action was not subject to collateral attack as void on its face.
The court went on to rule: (1) the malicious prosecution claim lacked merit
because Hutcherson failed to establish the small claims action terminated in
her favor; (2) the litigation privilege barred the claims for abuse of process
and fraudulent concealment; and (3) the Rosenthal Act claim failed because
the HOA monthly dues did not involve consumer credit transactions.
      Hutcherson appealed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16, subd. (i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)
                                         II.
                                  DISCUSSION
A.    Contentions on Appeal
      Hutcherson challenges the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion on
several grounds. She first contends the superior court erroneously required
her to show she would more likely than not prevail at trial rather than to
make a prima facie showing sufficient to sustain a judgment in her favor.
Hutcherson next contends the small claims judgment is void on its face and
subject to set-aside because the court violated her due process rights and
exceeded its jurisdiction by entering the judgment without having notified

                                          6
her of the continued trial date. She concedes her abuse of process claim is
barred by the litigation privilege, but insists she showed each of the other
claims had sufficient merit to withstand the anti-SLAPP motion. She asks us
to reverse the order and to remand the matter for further proceedings.
B.    General Principles on Anti-SLAPP Motion and Standard of Review
      We begin with the anti-SLAPP statute: “A cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Ruling on an anti-SLAPP
motion involves a two-step process. The court first must decide whether the
defendant has shown the challenged claim arises from activity protected by
section 425.16; and if the defendant has done so, the court then must decide
whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on the claim.
(Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67;
Sugarman v. Brown (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 152, 159.) Only a claim that both
arises from protected activity and lacks merit is a SLAPP subject to being
stricken under section 425.16. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89;
Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 282 (Weeden).)
      Hutcherson did not dispute in the superior court (and does not dispute
in this court) that Allied and Sommerset met their first-step burden to show
her claims arose from protected activity, namely, statements made or actions
taken in connection with the small claims action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
subd. (e) [protected activity includes written or oral statements made in
connection with judicial proceeding]; Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th

                                        7
1048, 1056, 1065 (Rusheen) [protected activity includes filing and prosecuting
civil action and enforcing judgment].) The burden thus shifted to her to show
a probability of prevailing on the claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1); Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) To sustain that
burden, Hutcherson must submit evidence that, if accepted as true and with
all reasonable inferences drawn in her favor, would suffice to sustain a
judgment for her. (Baral, at pp. 384-385; Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 757, 787.) As to any affirmative defenses Allied and Sommerset
raised, Hutcherson must show the defense does not apply as a matter of law
or submit evidence that if credited would negate the defense. (Weeden, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 288; RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 434.) Claims with “ ‘at least “minimal merit” ’ ”
may proceed. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1009; accord, Soukup v. Law Offices v. Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260,
291 (Soukup) [plaintiff need only establish her claim has ‘‘ ‘minimal merit’ ”].)
      We review de novo the superior court’s determination Hutcherson
failed to meet her second-step burden. (Weeden, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p.
282; Charney v. Standard General, L.P. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 149, 158
(Charney).)
C.    Whether the Superior Court Imposed an Improper Burden on
      Hutcherson

      Hutcherson complains the superior court erroneously imposed a
heightened burden on her on the second step of the anti-SLAPP motion. She
argues that by citing this court’s opinion in McGarry v. University of San
Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 108 (McGarry) for the point that the burden
required her to establish “a reasonable probability” she would prevail on her
claims at trial, the court required her to show she would more likely than not
prevail when she was only required to make a prima facie showing sufficient
                                        8
to sustain a judgment in her favor. Hutcherson says McGarry is “directly at
odds” with Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th 260. We disagree.
      The superior court properly relied on McGarry, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th
97. In setting out the shifting burdens on an anti-SLAPP motion in McGarry,
we stated: “After the defendant satisfies the first step, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability he or she will
prevail on the merits at trial.” (Id. at p. 108.) Although we used the term
“probability” found in the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)) and not
the phrase “minimal merit” found in Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at page 291,
we went on to describe the plaintiff’s burden in terms that are consistent
with the corresponding description in Soukup. Both cases make clear that to
defeat an anti-SLAPP motion the plaintiff need only submit evidence that if
accepted as true would support her claims and would negate any defenses
raised by the defendant; neither case states or implies the plaintiff must
show she will more likely than not prevail at trial. (Compare McGarry, at p.
108 with Soukup, at p. 291.) The superior court recognized the consistency of
the cases by citing Soukup immediately after citing McGarry in its order
granting the anti-SLAPP motion. We thus reject Hutcherson’s contentions
that the two decisions are “directly at odds” and that the superior court’s
citation of McGarry for the burden on step two of an anti-SLAPP motion
“dictates a reversal on this ground alone.”
D.    Whether Hutcherson Showed Her Claims Have Minimal Merit
      We next consider each of the claims Hutcherson has not abandoned to
determine whether she met her burden to show it had minimal merit. As will
appear, she did not.

                                       9
      1.    Malicious Prosecution
      Hutcherson cannot show her claim for malicious prosecution has
minimal merit. “To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff
must show that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of
the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the
plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with
malice.” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292, italics added.) Favorable
termination of the prior action “is an essential element of the tort of
malicious prosecution, and it is strictly enforced.” (Ferreira v. Gray, Cary,
Ware & Freidenrich (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 409, 413.) Hutcherson cannot
satisfy this essential element, because the prior small claims action she
alleged Sommerset and Allied maliciously prosecuted against her terminated
in a judgment against her for $2,227.39.
      It is no answer to say, as Hutcherson does, that the judgment is void on
its face because she was not given notice of the continued trial date, and that
Allied and Sommerset acted maliciously and without probable cause in trying
to enforce a judgment they knew was void. Even were the judgment void (a
point the parties dispute but we need not and do not decide), Hutcherson
neither appealed nor sought to vacate the judgment, and the time to do either
expired more than a decade ago. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 116.740, subd. (a)
[motion to vacate judgment by defendant who was not served and did not
appear at trial due 180 days after discovery of entry of judgment], 116.750,
subd. (b) [notice of appeal due 30 days after clerk mails notice of entry of
judgment].) Even if we assume Hutcherson could attack the judgment at this
late date, success would result in a new trial, not entry of a judgment in her
favor. (See id., §§ 116.730, subd. (d), 116.740, subd. (d).) The possibility
Hutcherson might prevail at a new trial in the future is insufficient to allow

                                       10
her to assert a malicious prosecution claim now. (See Babb v. Superior Court
(1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 846 [“the cause of action for malicious prosecution first
accrues at the conclusion of the litigation in favor of the party allegedly
prosecuted maliciously”].)
      We also find unpersuasive Hutcherson’s argument the allegedly
improper inclusion in the judgment of amounts for debts discharged in
bankruptcy established a termination of the small claims action in her favor.
(See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(1) [discharge voids judgment to extent it determines
debtor’s personal liability for discharged debt], 727(b) [discharge extends to
prepetition debts].) Her theory is that “a claim for malicious prosecution may
be pursued against a defendant charging multiple grounds of liability when
some, but not all, of the grounds were asserted without probable cause and
with malice,” and that “the void judgment . . . reflects on [her] innocence . . .
regarding a number of the damage claims.” Even if the failures to pay each
month’s HOA dues gave rise to separate causes of action, some of which were
barred by the bankruptcy discharge, that partial bar would not amount to a
favorable termination. The fact remains Allied and Sommerset obtained a
judgment against Hutcherson for those and other amounts. And even if the
discharge somehow made the portion of the judgment for prepetition HOA
dues favorable to Hutcherson, the portion for postpetition dues, to which the
discharge does not extend (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)), would not allow her to sue
for malicious prosecution. “[F]avorable termination requires favorable
resolution of the underlying action in its entirety, not merely a single cause of
action.” (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 117,
128, italics added.) Thus, if the plaintiff in the prior action (i.e., Sommerset)
“succeeds on any of [its] claims, the favorable termination requirement is

                                        11
unsatisfied and the malicious prosecution action cannot be maintained.”
(Lane v. Bell (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 61, 64.)
      2.     Fraudulent Concealment
      Hutcherson cannot prevail on her claim for fraudulent concealment
because it is barred by the litigation privilege, “a defense that may be
considered with respect to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.”
(Weeden, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 288.) A privileged publication includes
one made “[i]n any judicial proceeding.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).)
“Although originally enacted with reference to defamation [citation], the
privilege is now held applicable to any communication, whether or not it
amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except malicious
prosecution.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) “The
usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication
(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that ha[s] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Ibid.) The
privilege also extends to a litigant’s actions that are “logically and legally
related to the realization of a litigation objective,” such as “collection of a
judgment.” (O’Keefe v. Kompa (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 130, 135 (O’Keefe).)
Hutcherson’s claim is based on such privileged communications and actions.
      As noted earlier, Hutcherson alleged Sommerset and Allied listed the
wrong address for her on the small claims form, and then concealed from both
her and the small claims court that she did not receive notice of
postponement of the trial and that the judgment on which they tried to collect
was void and unenforceable. Filing in court a document with false
information is privileged. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058; Pettitt v.
Levy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 489.) So is taking steps to obtain or to enforce

                                         12
a judgment, even if such steps involve fraud. (O’Keefe, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th
at p. 135; Wilton v. Mountain Wood Homeowners Assn. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th
565, 570-571.) Because the communications and actions in the small claims
action of which Hutcherson complained were privileged, her fraudulent
concealment claim failed as a matter of law and was properly stricken as a
SLAPP. (Rusheen, at p. 1065; O’Keefe, at p. 135.)
      In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, Hutcherson argues the
“gravamen” or “foundation” of her fraudulent concealment claim was the
refusal of Sommerset and Allied to tell the small claims court at trial that she
had not been given notice of the continued trial date, a refusal she says
breached their duty of disclosure and resulted in the judgment against her.
Because that nondisclosure was noncommunicative, argues Hutcherson, the
litigation privilege does not apply. The litigation privilege, however, covers
not only affirmative representations by a participant in a judicial proceeding,
but also a participant’s silence when circumstances impose a duty to speak
but the participant remains silent and thereby communicates the
circumstances do not exist. (See, e.g., Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 210
[attorney’s alleged nondisclosure of preexisting relationship potentially
affecting neutrality of recommended expert]; Herterich v. Peltner (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 1132, 1136, 1142 [executor’s alleged concealment from court that
plaintiff was decedent’s son and had not been served with petition to
administer estate]; Kupiec v. American Internat. Adjustment Co. (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 1326, 1333 [defendants’ “alleged concealment and
misrepresentation of facts” in prior litigation were “in their essential nature,
communicative”].) Hutcherson therefore cannot avoid the bar of the litigation
privilege simply by asserting her claim is based on noncommunicative acts.

                                       13
      3.    Rosenthal Act
      Hutcherson’s claim alleging violations of the Rosenthal Act lacks
minimal merit because the Act does not apply to Allied and Sommerset’s
efforts to collect unpaid monthly HOA dues. The purpose of the Rosenthal
Act is “to prohibit debt collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the collection of consumer debts and to require debtors to act
fairly in entering into and honoring such debts.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.1, subd.
(b).) The Act defines “consumer debt” as “money, property, or their
equivalent, due or owing or alleged to be due or owing from a natural person
by reason of a consumer credit transaction.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (f).)
It defines “consumer credit transaction” as “a transaction between a natural
person and another person in which property, services, or money is acquired
on credit by that natural person from the other person primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.” (Id., subd. (e).) “Thus, for debt collection
activity concerning money to fall within the scope of the Rosenthal Act, it
must involve money due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, by reason of
a transaction in which property, services, or money is acquired on credit
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Hagey v. Solar
Service Experts, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1303, 1308.) Attempts to collect
monthly HOA dues do not fall within the scope of the Act.
      The defect in Hutcherson’s claim is the absence of any “property,
services, or money” given to her by Sommerset “on credit . . . primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (e); see
Davidson v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 283, 296 (Davidson) [defining
“on credit” as “obtaining something of value without immediate payment on
the promise to make a payment or payments in the future”].) Hutcherson
concedes the dues at issue were “of a traditional nature consistent with

                                       14
[Sommerset’s] overseeing the common areas on an ongoing basis,” and were
“payable monthly, incidental to acquiring title to the subject real property.”
(Fn. omitted.) “In other words, the obligation of a member of [Sommerset],
like [Hutcherson], to pay the assessments is not a promise to pay later for
value to be received, but, rather, it is an obligation to pay the costs of
ownership as those costs arise. The assessments simply do not involve a loan
or credit to members of [Sommerset], like [Hutcherson]. Nor do the
assessments involve the acquisition of a product or service by a homeowner
for [personal,] family or household use,” because they are used for common
area upkeep. (Dickson v. Century Park East Homeowner’s Assn. (C.D.Cal.,
May 13, 2021, No. 2:20-cv-05152-JWH-MAAx) 2021 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 141845,
at pp. *9–10, fn. omitted (Dickson).) Hence, “regular HOA assessments for
ongoing maintenance and general services do not constitute a ‘consumer
credit transaction’ ” under the Rosenthal Act. (Durham v. Continental
Central Credit (S.D.Cal., Oct. 20, 2009, No. 07cv1763 BTM(WMc)) 2009
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 96760, at p. *18.)
      Hutcherson urges us not to follow Dickson, supra, 2021 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 141845, because, she says, it is “a noncontrolling federal trial court
decision” and “is clearly distinguishable” as involving a special assessment
for construction work collected before the work was done. “Although not
binding precedent on our court, we may consider relevant, unpublished
federal district court opinions as persuasive.” (Futrell v. Payday California,
Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1432, fn. 6.) We consider Dickson
persuasive and not distinguishable on the ground Hutcherson argues.
Dickson involved both a special assessment and regular assessments. For the
reasons quoted in the preceding paragraph, the district court ruled “neither
the regular assessment nor the special assessment is a ‘consumer credit

                                        15
transaction’ for the purpose of the Rosenthal Act.” (Dickson, at p. *4.) Those
reasons apply to the HOA dues at issue here and support our conclusion that
efforts to collect them are not within the scope of the Act. (See Civ. Code,
§ 3511 [“Where the reason is the same, the rule should be the same.”].)
      We are not persuaded to reach a different conclusion by Hutcherson’s
purported analogy of HOA dues to mortgage payments, collection of which
does fall within the scope of the Rosenthal Act (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (f);
Davidson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 297). It is true, as Hutcherson points
out, both debts are incident to ownership of real property, are generally
payable monthly with a grace period before a late charge is imposed, and if
not paid can result in imposition of a lien and foreclosure. But unlike a
mortgage loan, which is an extension of credit from a lender to a borrower
“primarily for [the] personal, family, or household purpose[ ]” of buying a
home (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (e); see Davidson, at p. 297), HOA dues are
not an extension of credit from an HOA to a homeowner; they are assessed to
pay for services the HOA acquires to maintain common areas. (Dickson,
supra, 2021 WL 3161179, at p. *5.) The extension of a grace period for
payment of HOA dues before a late charge is imposed does not transform
them into a “consumer credit transaction.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (e).)
An HOA’s allowance of “a few extra days to pay [monthly dues] without
receiving, or expecting to receive, anything in return” is a “generous act [that]
simply cannot be construed as a ‘consumer credit transaction.’ ” (Yatooma v.
OP Property Management LP (C.D.Cal., July 20, 2017, No. 2:17-cv-02645
ODW (SSx)) 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 114298, at p. *8.)
      In sum, the unpaid HOA dues Sommerset and Allied tried to collect
from Hutcherson did not involve a “consumer credit transaction” within the
scope of the Rosenthal Act (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (e)). We thus need not,

                                       16
and do not, consider the parties’ arguments on whether Sommerset was a
“debt collector” under the Act (id., § 1788.2, subd. (c)) or whether Allied and
Sommerset violated the Act as alleged in the complaint (id., §§ 1788.15, subd.
(a), 1788.17).
      4.    Conclusion
      For the reasons discussed above, Hutcherson did not sustain her
burden to show her claims for malicious prosecution, fraudulent concealment,
and violations of the Rosenthal Act had the minimal merit needed to survive
Allied and Sommerset’s anti-SLAPP motion. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp.
384-385; Weeden, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 287.) The superior court
therefore correctly granted the motion and struck the complaint. (Charney,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 158; Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys,
APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 214.) That conclusion makes it
unnecessary for us to consider, as an alternative basis for affirming the
court’s order, Allied and Sommerset’s contention that each claim is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.

                                         17
                                    III.
                              DISPOSITION
     The order granting the special motion to strike the complaint is
affirmed.

                                                                   IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

RUBIN, J

                                    18