Court Opinion

ID: 9583919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:05.934885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:50.708134
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict (JNOV), following a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Because I believe the majority has misapplied the legal precedents and imposed burdens on plaintiff that the law does not require, I dissent with respect to the primary claim of employment discrimination. I concur, however, with the disposition of the issue of punitive damages.
“In considering a motion for JNOV, the trial court is to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion; the nonmovant is to be given the benefit of every reasonable inference that legitimately may be drawn from the evidence; and contradictions must be resolved in the nonmovant’s favor.” Tomika Invs., Inc. v. Macedonia True Vine Pent. Holiness Ch. of God, 136 N.C. App. 493, 498, 524 S.E.2d 591, 595 (2000). The standard of review for the denial of a JNOV is whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. Id. “The hurdle is high for the moving party as the *173motion should be denied if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the plaintiffs prima facie case.” Id. Thus, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiffs prima facie claim of discrimination, we must affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motions.
“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is not onerous.” North Carolina Dep’t of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 137, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1983). “[A] prima facie case of discrimination may be made out by showing that (1) a claimant is a member of a minority group, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he was discharged, and (4) the employer replaced him with a person who was not a member of a minority group.” Id. The precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context and were “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 967 (1978). “Aprima facie case of discrimination may... be made out by showing the discharge of [a minority employee] and the retention of [a majority employee] under apparently similar circumstances.” Gibson, 308 N.C. at 137, 301 S.E.2d at 83. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has evidenced an intent to ease the burden of proving discrimination. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 (2003) (holding that discrimination is unlawful even if only one of several motives for adverse employment action).
Making a prima facie case is not the same as proving discrimination. Gibson, 308 N.C. at 138, 301 S.E.2d at 84. “Rather, it is proof of actions taken by the employer from which a court may infer discriminatory intent or design because experience has proven that in the absence of an explanation, it is more likely than not that the employer’s actions were based upon discriminatory considerations.” Id. at 138, 301 S.E.2d at 84. This Court has held that the “plaintiff met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination [by presenting] evidence satisfying three of the four elements recited in Gibson-, plaintiff was an African-American discharged from his position at CPI and replaced by a white worker.” Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 681, 688, 504 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1998) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id.
In reviewing the denial of defendant’s motions for directed verdict and for JNOV then, we consider whether, taking all evidence in *174the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiff’s prima facie claim of discrimination. Because the evidence is undisputed that plaintiff, who is white, was qualified for his position at the historically black college, was fired by defendant, and was replaced by a non-white employee, on this basis alone plaintiff has met the requirements of a prima facie case as articulated by this Court in Brewer.
Here, plaintiff alleges he was fired because of his race. Defendant’s evidence tended to show that he was fired for violating policy regarding a student’s grade change. Under defendant’s policies, such a request would be initiated by a professor (plaintiff, then passed on to the department head (Babfemi Elufiede), and if approved by the department head, would be passed on again to Mr. Ramsey, the academic dean, for final approval and implementation. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Ramsey, his and Elufiede’s supervisor regarding grade changes and contract matters, acted in a racially discriminatory manner when he recommended that plaintiff be terminated. The evidence tended to show that Mr. Ramsey is the supervisor of both plaintiff and Mr. Elufiede in the matter of grade changes, and that both plaintiff and Mr. Elufiede approved the grade change in question. As special assistant to the president for academic affairs, Mr. Ramsey was responsible for making recommendations to the college president about termination of faculty. Mr. Ramsey treated plaintiff and Mr. Elufiede differently, despite essentially identical actions in this regard. Defendant offered no explanation for the disparate treatment of plaintiff and Mr. Elufiede, and in fact presented no evidence at the trial.
Although under Brewer, it may not be necessary to prove such, the majority focuses on the “similarly situated” prong, as articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1973). The only possibly disputed issue between the parties is whether plaintiff was treated differently than a similarly situated non-white employee, Mr. Elufiede. If the evidence, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, supports that inference, the trial court acted properly sending plaintiff’s case to the jury. I conclude that, even if plaintiff’s burden included presenting a prima facie case of disparate treatment of similarly situated employees, the evidence does support that inference and that the trial court properly denied the motions to dismiss and for JNOV.
A long line of cases have explored the definition of “similarly situated.” The majority’s opinion frames the issue as solely controlled *175by whether the plaintiff and the comparator employee had the same supervisor. “However, the ‘same supervisor’ criterium has never been read as an inflexible requirement.” Seay v. TVA, 339 F.3d 454, 479 (6th Cir. 2003). Courts have rejected “the proposition that whenever two different supervisors are involved in administering the disciplinary actions, the comparators cannot as a matter of law be similarly situated for Title VII purposes.” Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 2001). “[M]aking an independent determination as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiffs employment status and that of the non-protected employee is crucial.” Id. Indeed, one of the cases cited by the majority makes clear that the determination of whether a comparator employee is similarly situated must be based on “all material respects” of the case. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). “[A] court must look at all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case.” Radue, 219 F.3d at 617 (emphasis added). In Gibson, as here, one of the comparator employees in the trial court’s analysis was plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. Gibson, 308 N.C. at 142, 301 S.E.2d at 85. The majority opinion, holding that the same supervisor requirement bars this plaintiff as a matter of law from making a prima facie case is inconsistent with these cases, and overlooks the crucial and undisputed fact that the plaintiff and his comparator (Elufiede) actually reported to the same supervisor (Ramsey) regarding the matter at issue.
Here, both plaintiff and Mr. Elufiede were faculty members working for defendant; both were under the supervision of Mr. Ramsey with regard to final decisions on grade changes; both were subject to the same policies and procedures regarding grade changes; and both approved the same proposed grade change for the same student in the same course. Although the majority states that the actions of the two were not similar because “plaintiff initiated the grade change” but Mr. Elufiede “merely approved it,” no evidence suggests that defendant used this purported difference to justify treating the two differently. To the contrary, the evidence indicates strong similarity in their actions, that “[b]ecause Mr. Elufiede felt that [plaintiff’s grade change] request was legitimate, Mr. Elufiede signed the request.” The stipulated summary of the evidence reveals the following from Mr. Elufiede’s narrated testimony:
If Mr. Miller broke the policy by recommending the grade change, then Mr. Elufiede broke the policy by approving it, but he was he not fired. Mr. Rainey (black) was hired to replace Mr. Miller. . . . *176Because Mr. Elufiede felt that Mr. Miller [sic] [grade change] request was legitimate, Mr. Elufiede signed the request.
In light of this evidence of “relevant factors,” I am unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiff and Mr. Elufiede are not similarly situated under the applicable case law. Radue, 219 F.3d at 617. Thus, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the law requires, this issue was properly for the jury to decide.
Further, because “the ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination,” the identity and actions of the decision-maker are relevant factors. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 123 (2000)). In adverse employment actions, an employer is liable for the improper motivations of the “person who in reality makes the decision.” Id. 354 F.3d at 31. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reeves, held that the employer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the McDonnell Douglas framework where one of petitioner’s superiors in the chain of authority, “was motivated by [discriminatory] animus and was principally responsible for petitioner’s firing.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 122. Thus, when the alleged discrimination was committed by someone other than the plaintiff’s direct supervisor, the identity and motivations of the decision-maker, rather than the direct supervisor, are the proper points of focus in establishing the prima facie case. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268, 305 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (holding that statements by nondecision-makers are not relevant to satisfying the plaintiff’s burden of proving discrimination); Koski v. Standex Int’l Corp., 307 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the pertinent inquiry is whether the decision-maker, as opposed to other managers or subordinates, evaluated the aggrieved employee based upon discriminatory criteria).
As a result of their essentially identical actions, plaintiff was fired and Mr. Elufiede was not. Plaintiff was replaced by an individual of the majority race in his employment situation. Plaintiff alleges racial discrimination accounts for this action, and the evidence constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence to support the plaintiff’s prima facie case, based on both replacement theory under Brewer, and on disparate treatment theory by Ramsey of similarly situated employees (plaintiff and Elufiede). Under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny as *177well, this evidence constitutes a prima facie case. See Hill, supra. Whether defendant’s contentions about non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiffs termination were persuasive was a factual matter for the jury to decide. Thus, I conclude that the court’s denial of defendant’s motions for directed verdict and JNOV were proper, and that we should affirm those rulings.
It is important to note that the majority opinion would have the effect óf heightening the plaintiff’s proof requirements in race discrimination cases, and would push our State’s law outside the national mainstream, to the detriment of those who seek redress for discrimination based on race. Although this case involves “reverse discrimination” against a white plaintiff, the primary impact of the decision will be on those individuals and groups who have historically suffered the most from discrimination in our State. The United States Supreme Court has continually cautioned lower courts against attempting to impose heightened burdens on plaintiffs in race discrimination cases. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 95 (holding that “no heightened showing is required”). I do not believe this Court should increase such burdens, contrary to precedent, as the majority here has done. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
However, with respect to the issue of punitive damages, I agree that plaintiff failed to meet his burden. “Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so ‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.’ ” Kolstad v. Ada, 527 U.S. 526, 530-31, 144 L. Ed. 2d 494, 502 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)). “Applying this standard in the context of § 1981a, an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages.” Id. at 336, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 506. Plaintiff presented no evidence that defendant discriminated against him with the requisite intent, and the jury made no finding that defendant acted “with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights” of plaintiff. Thus, I agree that we must vacate the award of punitive damages.
In sum, for the reasons discussed above, I believe we should hold that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for his case to go to the jury. As a result, we should uphold the jury’s verdict finding discrimination, and affirm the denial of the post-trial motions. However, *178because the plaintiff presented no evidence to support the award of punitive damages, we should vacate that award and remand for the trial court to enter judgment on the underlying claim of discrimination. Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.