Court Opinion

ID: 9589184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:58.587358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:12.341283
License: Public Domain

Duff, J.,
dissenting.
*38I cannot join the majority opinion because my view of the case fails to show a sufficient material change of circumstances that would justify changing the custody of the child.
Since May 25, 1984, there have been three contested evidentiary hearings regarding custody. After the first, the court specifically found that it was in the best interests of the child that custody be with the father. Accordingly, a decree was entered on June 20, 1984. On August 1, 1984, the mother filed a notice for review and change of custody. After an ore terms hearing on November 5, 1984, a decree was entered on January 10, 1985, finding no material change in circumstances and continuing custody with the father.
On May 23, 1985, another petition for change of custody was filed by the mother and a hearing was held on September 11, 1985. The decree emanating from this last hearing was entered October 1, 1985, and ordered that custody be changed from the father to the mother.
The primary bases for the change of condition alleged by the mother are: (1) that she had remarried and her marriage had stabilized; (2) that the child had become more withdrawn since being with her father and had expressed a preference to live with her mother; and (3) that two of the psychologists whose reports were considered recommended placement with the mother. There is no claim that the father is in any way an unfit parent. The record reveals that the child is well mannered, well groomed, well adjusted, doing well in school and progressing well emotionally. In short, the father was doing a good job as the custodial parent. A complete social service investigation was ordered prior to each evidentiary hearing. The last such report found no material change in circumstances and suggested that custody be continued with the father.
The fact of Anita’s remarriage existed at the time of the second hearing. Less than five months after that decree was entered, however, the mother’s marriage had allegedly “stabilized,” and this was asserted as a material change in condition supporting a change in custody. Conceding for the sake of argument that remarriage is an appropriate change in condition, the short lapse of time since the court awarded custody to the father seriously dilutes the weight that I believe should have been given to this *39claim.
The record further reflects that in earlier investigations, the child expressed a desire to live with her father but that she has now changed her mind and wants to live with her mother. The last report from the Department of Social Services dated June 17, 1985, stated that the mother was manipulating the child to get the child to want to live with her. Whether this is true or not, it emphasizes the risks inherent in placing undue weight on the transitory wishes of a child of this young age. This is particularly true in the absence of evidence of neglect by the custodial parent.
The psychological report of Dr. Gray tendered by the mother at trial was based upon one visit with the child. Dr. Gray had no testing data, only handwritten notes upon which the report was based. Dr. Loganbill found that both parents were fit, that they were providing the child supportive, nurturing parenting, and that the child had a healthy bond with each parent. The child’s expressed preference for living with her mother was because she got to do “exciting things” with the mother, while the best thing that she stated about living with her father was: “He plays with me.”
I am unable to find in the record sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that there was a change of circumstances and conditions warranting a reversal of the two adjudications made within the preceding sixteen months, that the custody of this child should be with her father. I would reverse the decree from which this appeal was taken.