Court Opinion

ID: 9941312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:15:57.931552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:31.537410
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2477-21

VINCENT C. MAISANO, on
behalf of himself and those
similarly situated,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LVNV FUNDING, LLC,

     Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________

                   Argued December 19, 2023 – Decided February 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2258-18.

                   Philip D. Stern argued the cause for appellant (Kim
                   Law Firm, LLC, and Scott C. Borison (Borison Law
                   Firm) of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and
                   California bars, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys;
                   Yongmoon Kim, Muhammad Hasan Siddiqui, and Scott
                   C. Borison, on the briefs).

                   Jacquelyn Alena DiCicco (J. Robbin Law PLLC)
                   argued the cause for respondent.
PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Vincent C. Maisano (Maisano) appeals from a March 4, 2022

order granting summary judgment to defendant LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV),

and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

                                        I.

      Since we previously issued an opinion in this matter, we are fully familiar

with the facts and circumstances. Maisano v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No.

A-1775-18 (App. Div. November 27, 2019) (slip op. at 1). We recite a brief

history to provide context for our determination. Maisano entered into a credit

card agreement (Agreement) with Credit One.           Id. at 1.   The Agreement

contained an Arbitration Agreement, which "identifie[d] covered claims,

including disputes related to the application, enforceability or interpretation of

th[e] Agreement, . . . ." Id. at 2. Maisano used the credit card to make purchases.

Ibid. He defaulted by failing to tender the required payment. Ibid. LVNV

acquired the unpaid credit account through assignment. LVNV filed an action

against Maisano to collect the debt and, as a result of that lawsuit, Maisano made

payments to satisfy the outstanding debt. Id. at 3.

      Thereafter, Maisano filed a putative class action for declaratory judgment,

injunctive relief, and damages against LVNV. Ibid. In lieu of an answer, LVNV

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filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreemen t.

Ibid. In support of its motion LVNV submitted affidavits from a Vice President

of Credit One, and a records custodian employed by LVNV's corporate affiliate.

Ibid. Maisano opposed the motion. The judge determined the Arbitration

Agreement was valid, and granted LVNV's motion to compel arbitration. Id. at

5. We affirmed.

        Maisano filed a demand and amended demand for arbitration with JAMS,

and LVNV filed responses. Thereafter, LVNV moved for dismissal of the

arbitration in its entirety with prejudice.       The arbitrator dismissed the

arbitration.1

        LVNV filed a summary action to confirm the arbitrator's decision.

Maisano filed opposition and sought to vacate the decision. A different judge

confirmed the arbitrator's award.

                                        II.

        On appeal, Maisano argues: (1) the arbitrator refused to consider evidence

and engaged in undue means in making her decision and, therefore, the award

should not have been confirmed; (2) the Agreement was void and unenforceable

1
    The appellate record does not contain the arbitrator's Final Award.

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so there was no enforceable Arbitration Agreement; and (3) the arbitrator's

acquisition of an ownership interest in JAMS was improper and its disclosure

was not timely or properly made. 2

      Maisano argues our prior opinion charged the arbitrator with determining

the validity of LVNV's assignment. Moreover, he contends the arbitrator erred

because she failed to review the series of agreements that led to LVNV's

acquisition of his unpaid credit account and, instead, "relied on affidavits that

claim[ed] to provide details of the agreements." Therefore, Maisano argues the

arbitrator's decision should not have been confirmed because the arbitrator

"engaged in undue means" and refused to "consider evidence material to the

controversy," citing N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)(1)(3). We are not persuaded.

      In our earlier opinion, we noted the judge explained she was "obligated to

compel arbitration" because she determined "there[ wa]s a valid agreement and

secondly, that the dispute fell within the scope of the agreement." Maisano, slip

2
   Maisano for the first time argues JAMS and the arbitrator engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and therefore the arbitrator's Final Award of
dismissal is void and should not have been confirmed. We "decline to consider
questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity
for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go
to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. '"
Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds
Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). Neither
of these situations are present and we decline to consider this issue.
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op. at 3-4. Moreover, we observed "[t]he judge also determined the Agreement

applied to Credit One and its successors and assigns, including [LVNV], based

on the language in the document." Id. at 4.

      In affirming the judge's decision, we explained the United States Supreme

Court recently held "a court may not decide an arbitrability question that the

parties have delegated to an arbitrator." Id. at 6 (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v.

Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019)). Noting

the Arbitration Agreement clearly and expressly stated claims relating to the

"application, enforceability or interpretation of th[e] Agreement, including th[e]

arbitration provision" was subject to arbitration, we held the issue of arbitrability

was to be determined by the arbitrator. Id. at 7.

      Therefore, our prior opinion did not, as Maisano suggests, require the

arbitrator to determine the validity of the assignment.         The judge already

determined the Agreement applied to LVNV and the Arbitration Agreement was

valid. Id. at 4-5. We affirmed that decision.

      Further, Maisano fails to support his argument that the arbitrator erred by

relying on affidavits "that claim[ed] to provide details of the agreements," rather

than reviewing the actual agreements. Indeed, Maisano cites to no law for this

argument. Moreover, in our earlier opinion, we concluded the judge did not

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abuse her discretion when considering affidavits in support of LVNV's motion

to dismiss and compel arbitration because: (i) the Vice President of Credit One's

affidavit was "made in the regular course of . . . business, was an authentic

business record, and therefore fell within an exception to the hearsay rule," id.

at 9 (citing Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Dudnick, 292 N.J. Super. 11, 17-18 (App.

Div. 1996)); and (ii) "the statements were based on personal knowledge," id. at

9-10 (citing N.J.R.E. 602). The Vice President certified she was a current

employee of Credit One and therefore had personal knowledge of the Agreement

and the records custodian of LVNV's corporate affiliate reviewed the regularly

maintained business records regarding the Agreement. We find no basis to hold

the arbitrator to a different standard.

      Maisano further contends that LVNV was not licensed, and therefore the

Agreement—including the Arbitration Agreement—between him and LVNV

was void and unenforceable. He relies on the New Jersey Consumer Finance

Licensing Act N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49 (Act), for the proposition that "[n]o

person shall engage in business as a consumer lender or sales finance company

without first obtaining a license or licenses under th[e] [A]ct." N.J.S.A. 17:11C-

3(a). Moreover, "[a] contract of a loan . . . shall be void and the lender shall

have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges [if a]

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consumer lender . . . violates or participates in the violation of [N.J.S.A. 17:11C-

3(a)] . . . ." N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).

      In our earlier opinion we considered Maisano's argument that the judge

erred in deeming the validity of the Agreement's assignment to LVNV was

arbitrable. Maisano, No. A-1775-18 slip op. at 6. We noted, because LVNV

was not licensed under the Act, at the time Credit One assigned the Agreement,

Maisano claimed the Agreement was invalid and therefore the Arbitration

Clause was void. Ibid.

      However, we explained the first question is whether there was an

arbitration agreement. Ibid. (citing Henry Schein Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 530 (citing

9 U.S.C. § 2)). Here, there is an Arbitration Agreement.

      We also stated, where specified disputes are properly delegated, the

disputes are within the exclusive determination of the arbitrator.        Id. at 7.

Additionally, we noted, the Arbitration Agreement clearly and expressly stated

claims relating to the "application, enforceability or interpretation of th[e]

Agreement, including th[e] arbitration provision" are subject to arbitration.

Ibid. Therefore, the threshold issue of arbitrability was to be determined by the

arbitrator. Ibid. Here, the arbitrator determined the dispute was subject to

arbitration.

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      Next, Maisano's argument that the arbitrator made a mistake of law is

unavailing. The arbitration statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a), only permits a court

to vacate an arbitration award on very narrow grounds. Those grounds do not

include an arbitrator's alleged mistake of law.        Tretina Printing, Inc. v.

Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 357-58 (1994). In Tretina, the Court

adopted the "standard set forth in the Chief Justice's opinion concurring in the

judgment in" Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479 (1992).

Id. at 358. The standard is:

            arbitration awards may be vacated only for fraud,
            corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the
            arbitrators. [They] can be corrected or modified only
            for very specifically defined mistakes as set forth in
            [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9]. If the arbitrators decide a matter
            not even submitted to them, that matter can be excluded
            from the award. For those who think the parties are
            entitled to a greater share of justice, and that such
            justice exists only in the care of the court, I would hold
            that the parties are free to expand the scope of judicial
            review by providing for such expansion in their
            contract; that they may, for example, specifically
            provide that the arbitrators shall render their decision
            only in conformance with New Jersey law, and that
            such awards may be reversed either for mere errors of
            New Jersey law, substantial errors, or gross errors of
            New Jersey law and defined therein what they mean by
            that. I doubt if many will. And if they do, they should
            abandon arbitration and go directly to the law courts.

            [Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Perini Corp.,
            129 N.J at 548-49) (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).]

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      Therefore, we are satisfied the issue of arbitrability was appropriately

before the arbitrator and will not disturb her decision.

      Finally, Maisano argues JAMS's notice of "the arbitrator's acquisition of

an [ownership] interest in JAMS[,] during the course of [his] proceeding" was

"untimely" and raises an issue of the arbitrator's impartiality which should not

have been determined solely by JAMS. However, Maisano's bald assertion of

partiality, falls far short of the "fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing . . ."

that would be required to vacate an arbitrator's award. Tretina, 135 N.J. at 358.

      To the extent we have not addressed any of Maisano's remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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