Court Opinion

ID: 9776009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:16:27.071941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.797490
License: Public Domain

BOLGER, Judge,
dissenting.
We recently held that a prisoner at a halfway house was "confined" in a "correctional facility" for purposes of the good-time credit statute.1 I believe that the escape statute should be construed the same way. The requirement of armed guards is not mentioned in the text or history of this statute or in the numerous other criminal procedure statutes where these terms are used.
The central issue in this case is whether Northstar Center is a "correctional facility"-that is, a "premises ... used for the confinement of persons under official detention."2 We considered the meaning of the term "confinement" when we addressed another section of the escape statute in Beck-man v. State.3 We concluded that Beckman was subject to "confinement" when he was allowed to attend residential treatment at Akeela HouseA4 But Beckman was not confined "under an order of a court," as required by the definition of "official detention," because he was released to attend Akeela House as a condition of his probation.5
The legislature amended the definition of "official detention" in 1991.6 The amendment was intended to overrule two of our cases that had construed this term narrowly.7 I believe that the amendment corrected an ambiguity in the term "confinement" as it had been previously construed. The definition of "official detention" now includes "actual or constructive restraint" imposed by a court order.8 When this definition is inserted into the definition of "correctional facility," that term now includes a facility designated for "confinement" under the constructive restraint of a court order. In other words, the statute now includes facilities where the prisoners are constructively re*932strained as well as facilities with barbed wire and armed guards.
The terms "confinement" and "correctional facility" are used in many criminal statutes. The definition of "correctional facility" that we construe in this case will also determine the scope of correctional facility litigation,9 liability for sexual assault,10 lability for promoting contraband,11 the responsibility for victim notification in domestic violence cases,12 the lability for correctional facility surcharges,13 and the deadline for sex offender registration.14 None of these applications suggest that this term should be limited to facilities with armed guards.
These terms are also used to define the requirements for eriminal punishment. Various statutes require that a person sentenced to imprisonment must report to serve a term of "confinement" at a "correctional facility," 15 that he will accrue good-time credit if he follows the rules of the "correctional facility" where he is "confined," 16 that he will be returned to "confinement" in a "correctional facility" if he violates parole,17 and that he will begin probation upon his release from "confinement in a correctional facility.18
My point is that these terms are used throughout the criminal statutes, and they should be construed consistently.19 I would read the terms that apply to the escape statute in the same way that we have applied those terms to the good-time credit statute. In other words, I agree with the trial judge's instruction in this case-a halfway house is a "correctional facility" for those pretrial detainees who are placed there by the Department of Corrections.

. State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska App.), aff'd on reh'g, 246 P.3d 338 (Alaska App. 2010).

. AS 11.81.900(b)(9).

. 689 P.2d 500 (Alaska App.1984).

. Id. at 502.

. Id.

. See Ch. 91, § 3, SLA 1991.

. See id. at§ 1.

. AS 11.81.900(b)(40).

. See AS 09.19.200(g)(3).

. See AS 11.41.425(a)(@2).

. See AS 11.56.375, .380.

. See AS 12.30.027(d).

. See AS 12.55.041(a).

. See AS 12.63.010(a)(1).

. See AS 12.55.025(c).

. See AS 33.20.010(a).

. See AS 33.16.250(a).

. See AS 12.55.125(0).

. See State v. Strane, 61 P.3d 1284, 1286 n. 4 (Alaska 2003) (stating that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together as a scheme that maintains the integrity of each statute).