Court Opinion

ID: 9952444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 20:01:34.19574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:20.113204
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USCA11 Case: 23-10004    Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 03/19/2024    Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                    In the

                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10004
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        NUR A ALAM SIDDIQUE,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A203-183-190
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court               23-10004

        Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
               Nur A. Alam Siddique seeks review of the Board of
        Immigration Appeals order denying his motion to reconsider its
        order aﬃrming the denial of his petition to remove conditions on
        his lawful permanent residence. On appeal, Siddique argues that
        the immigration judge and the Board violated his due process
        rights in several respects and committed a legal error by admitting
        documents proﬀered by the government at his removal hearing.
        Because none of Siddique’s legal or constitutional claims are
        colorable, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
                                         I.
               Siddique, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, was admitted
        into the United States as a lawful permanent resident on a
        conditional basis related to his marriage to a United States citizen,
        Tamarah Vergel. About two years after his admission, Siddique
        ﬁled a joint petition with Vergel for removal of the conditions on
        his residency pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1). That petition fell
        through when Vergel did not appear for the required joint
        interview with the United States Citizenship and Immigration
        Services (USCIS). Following Vergel’s no-show at the joint
        interview, USCIS terminated Siddique’s status as a conditional
        permanent resident in September 2015.               See 8 U.S.C.
        § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i) (requiring termination of permanent resident
        status if the Secretary of Homeland Security determines within
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        23-10004               Opinion of the Court                        3

        two years of admission that the qualifying marriage was entered
        into “for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission as an
        immigrant”). The next month, Siddique and Vergel divorced.
               After the divorce, Siddique ﬁled another petition for removal
        of the conditions on his residency, this time ﬁling individually and
        seeking a waiver of the requirement for a joint petition on the
        ground that he entered into his marriage with Vergel in good faith,
        though the marriage was later terminated. See 8 U.S.C.
        § 1186a(c)(4). During an interview with USCIS agents on his
        second petition, Siddique refused to provide a sworn statement
        about his marriage with Vergel. USCIS denied his individual
        petition for removal of the conditions on his residency and initiated
        proceedings to remove him from the United States.
               USCIS charged that Siddique was removable as a noncitizen
        whose conditional resident status had been terminated because he
        was not engaged in a bona ﬁde marriage with a United States
        citizen. Siddique responded by admitting that he was a native and
        citizen of Bangladesh admitted to the United States on a
        conditional basis but denying that his marriage to Vergel was not
        bona ﬁde. At the master calendar hearing before an immigration
        judge, Siddique also admitted that his conditional resident status
        had been terminated, thereby conceding removability. He
        requested review by the immigration judge of USCIS’s decision on
        his individual petition for a good-faith marriage waiver and
        removal of the conditions on his residency. In support, he
        submitted ﬁnancial records and statements from Vergel, members
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-10004

        of her family, and friends of Vergel and Siddique stating that their
        marriage was bona ﬁde.
               In rebuttal, USCIS introduced a Homeland Security
        Investigation report and a Form I-213 Record of
        Deportable/Inadmissible Alien. According to the Form I-213,
        Siddique admitted in an interview with Homeland Security
        Investigation agents that he only married Vergel to obtain
        residency in the United States.
               Siddique testiﬁed at the removal hearing and denied that he
        told immigration agents that he married Vergel to get residency.
        He testiﬁed that he had married Vergel because he loved her and
        for no other reason.
              The immigration judge denied Siddique’s petition to remove
        the conditions on his resident status and ordered him removed
        from the United States to Bangladesh. The immigration judge
        observed that Siddique had conceded removability, though he
        contested the factual allegation that his marriage to Vergel had not
        been bona ﬁde. The immigration judge concluded that Siddique
        had not met his burden of showing that his marriage to Vergel was
        in good faith, so he was not eligible for a waiver of the joint ﬁling
        requirements.
               Siddique appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the
        Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the immigration judge
        erred in denying his petition for a good-faith marriage waiver and
        removal of the conditions of residency. He argued that the
        immigration judge should not have admitted the Homeland
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        23-10004               Opinion of the Court                          5

        Security Investigation report and the form I-213 into evidence
        because the statements in the documents were hearsay and because
        the documents were not produced before the hearing so that he
        and his attorney could properly review them.
              The Board of Immigration Appeals aﬃrmed the
        immigration judge’s decision and dismissed Siddique’s appeal.
        Siddique did not ﬁle a petition in this Court for review of the BIA’s
        dismissal order. He ﬁled a motion for reconsideration, which the
        Board denied. Siddique now seeks our review of the Board’s order
        denying his motion for reconsideration.
                                          II.
               We review questions concerning our jurisdiction de novo.
        Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 866 (11th Cir. 2018).
        We review a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying a
        motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). The Board abuses its
        discretion “when it misapplies the law in reaching its decision” or
        “by not following its own precedents without providing a reasoned
        explanation for doing so.” Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240,
        1243 (11th Cir. 2013). Finally, we review the Board’s decision on
        legal and constitutional issues de novo. Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 692
        F.3d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 2012).
                                         III.
              We must consider ﬁrst whether we have jurisdiction to
        entertain the petitioner’s claims. Bing Quan Lin, 881 F.3d at 866.
        Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, we generally lack
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10004

        jurisdiction to review a decision speciﬁed under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–
        1378 “to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
        Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). We
        retain jurisdiction to review such decisions only to the extent that
        the petitioner raises colorable constitutional or legal claims. 8
        U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1275
        (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). To be colorable, a claim “must be non-
        frivolous” and “have some possible validity.” Ponce Flores v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 64 F.4th 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).
               The decision whether to remove the conditional basis of
        permanent resident status for a noncitizen whose qualifying
        marriage was entered into in good faith is explicitly assigned to the
        discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security by 8 U.S.C. §
        1186a(c)(4). See Fynn v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 752 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir.
        2014). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the denial of an
        application for a good-faith marriage waiver and removal of
        conditions on residency except to the extent that the petitioner
        raises colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8
        U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 1252(a)(2)(D); Patel, 971 F.3d at 1275.
        This jurisdictional bar extends to our review of the Board’s related
        denial of a motion for reconsideration. See Butalova v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 768 F.3d 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 2014).
              To assess our jurisdiction, therefore, we must determine
        whether Siddique raises any colorable legal or constitutional
        claims. In his petition for review, Siddique argues that the
        immigration judge and the Board violated his due process rights
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        23-10004                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        by (1) failing to review USCIS’s termination of his status and his
        removability; 1 (2) allowing the government to introduce the Form
        I-213 into evidence without producing the document to him before
        the hearing; and (3) showing bias against him by ﬁnding his
        testimony and the written statements he submitted less credible
        than the statements attributed to him by USCIS agents in the Form
        I-213. He also argues that the immigration judge committed legal
        error in admitting the Form I-213 without requiring authentication
        or an appropriate foundation for the document.
              We emphasize that our review is limited to the Board’s
        December 12, 2022, order denying Siddique’s motion for
        reconsideration. We cannot review the earlier order dismissing
        Siddique’s appeal because his petition for review was not ﬁled
        within 30 days of that order as required by the Immigration and
        Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

        1 We part ways with the concurrence on this issue in two respects. First, based

        on Siddique’s own summary of the argument, we understand his complaint to
        be that the immigration courts failed to review USCIS’s termination of his
        status (on which the government would have borne the burden of proof),
        before reviewing the denial of his application for a good-faith marriage waiver
        (on which he bore the burden of proof). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2) with
        § 1186a(c)(4). Second, even if we focus solely on the burden of proof applied,
        our decision in Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. is not controlling here.
        In Bourdon, we concluded that a specific provision of the Adam Walsh Act
        prohibited judicial review of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decisional
        process in determining whether a citizen posed a risk to his foreign spouse.
        940 F.3d 537, 543–44 (11th Cir. 2019); see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).
        Neither the Adam Walsh Act nor an agency no-risk determination are at issue
        here.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10004

        399 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (the statutory period for
        ﬁling a petition for review is “mandatory and jurisdictional”
        (quotation omitted)); see also Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)
        (a motion for reconsideration does not toll or extend the statutory
        deadline).
                                          A.
               Turning ﬁrst to the constitutional claims, we conclude that
        Siddique is unable to state any colorable claim for a violation of his
        due process rights. Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration
        and review a prior decision is “up to the Board in its discretion”;
        reconsideration is not available as a matter of right. Santos-Zacaria
        v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 424–25 (2023); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)
        (2022). The “failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in
        nature does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest and
        thus cannot deprive an alien of due process under the Fifth
        Amendment.” Ponce Flores, 64 F.4th at 1218 (quotation omitted);
        see Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (noncitizen had no constitutionally protected interest in
        reconsideration by the Board).
                In addition, Siddique’s due process claims have other fatal
        ﬂaws. His claim that the immigration judge and the Board failed
        to review the termination of his conditional status or consider the
        issue of removability is without merit because he explicitly
        conceded removability during the removal hearing and did not
        raise either issue in his brief on appeal to the Board or in his motion
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        23-10004              Opinion of the Court                        9

        for reconsideration. The Board could not have abused its discretion
        in failing to reconsider an issue that Siddique did not raise.
               As to Siddique’s due process claim regarding the
        immigration judge’s admission of the Form I-213, the Board held
        that he waived that claim by failing to object on any related ground
        before the immigration judge. Siddique does not address that
        conclusion in his brief ﬁled in this Court, much less raise any
        colorable legal or constitutional claim arising from the Board’s
        refusal to reconsider it.
               And ﬁnally, although Siddique couches his argument about
        the immigration judge’s decision to credit the Form I-213 over his
        testimony and witnesses in constitutional terms, his allegations of
        bias center on the judge’s credibility determinations and the
        relative weight given to the evidence. As we have explained before,
        this “is a garden-variety abuse of discretion argument that is
        insuﬃcient to state a legal claim over which we have jurisdiction
        under § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Fynn, 752 F.3d at 1253 (quotation omitted).
                                        B.
               Siddique also raises one claim of legal error: that the
        immigration judge and the Board erred in ruling that the Form I-
        213 was admissible as a business record without requiring proper
        authentication or foundation for the document. Siddique raised
        this argument for the ﬁrst time before the Board in his motion for
        reconsideration. The Board ruled that, like Siddique’s other
        contentions about the admissibility of the Form I-213, he waived
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-10004

        the argument by failing to object on those grounds before the
        immigration judge.
               In his petition for review, Siddique again argues that the
        Form I-213 should have been excluded at the merits hearing for lack
        of authentication and foundation, but he does not challenge (or
        even mention) the Board’s decision that he had waived those
        arguments by not raising them before the immigration judge. He
        therefore fails to make any colorable claim that the Board
        misapplied the law, failed to follow its own precedents, or
        otherwise abused its discretion in denying his motion for
        reconsideration. See Ferreira, 714 F.3d at 1243.
                                        IV.
               Our jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration
        Appeals order denying Siddique’s motion for reconsideration is
        limited to colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See
        8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 1252(a)(2)(D); Fynn, 752 F.3d at 1252.
        Because none of the constitutional or legal claims Siddique raises
        in his petition are colorable, we must dismiss the petition for lack
        of jurisdiction. See Ponce Flores, 64 F.4th at 1217.
              PETITION DISMISSED.
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        23-10004           JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part                   1

        JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part.
               In his petition for review of the BIA’s decision, Mr. Siddique
        raises ﬁve issues, some of which can be grouped together. Here’s
        how I would resolve them.
               ● Mr. Siddique argues (issue 1) that the IJ violated his due
        process rights by placing the burden on him to establish that his
        marriage to Ms. Vergel was bona ﬁde in violation of 8 C.F.R. §
        1216.3. See Appellant’s Br. at 8. I believe we lack jurisdiction to
        review this argument under Bourdon v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland
        Security, 940 F.3d 537, 542-46 (11th Cir. 2019), which involved a
        similar claim that immigration authorities had used an improper
        standard of proof. I dissented in Bourdon, but the case constitutes
        binding circuit precedent that we are obliged to follow.
                ● Mr. Siddique contends (issues 2, 3, and 4) that the IJ
        violated his due process rights when she allowed the government
        to ﬁle, submit, and introduce (i.e., admit) documents at the hearing
        despite not complying with the March 15 deadline for “all ﬁlings.”
        One of these documents, he points out, was a hearsay report of an
        interview in which he allegedly stated that he had married Ms.
        Vergel to obtain residency. He denied making that statement at the
        hearing, but he contends that he was unable to secure witnesses on
        his behalf and conduct cross-examination of the report. See
        Appellant’s Br. at 10-12, 13-14. In my view, the evidentiary
        arguments are foreclosed by Fynn v. United States, 752 F.3d 1250,
        1252-54 (11th Cir. 2014), and similar decisions like Contreras-Salinas
        v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713-14 (2d Cir. 2009). As for the due process
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        2                  JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part            23-10004

        arguments, I think we have jurisdiction, see Stewart v. Atty. Gen., 776
        F. App’x 573, 576 (11th Cir. 2019), but those arguments fail once the
        evidentiary challenges are out of the calculus.
                ● Mr. Siddique asserts (issue 5) that the IJ was biased against
        him because she remarked (and prejudged) that Mr. Siddique and
        his aﬃants had “great reason not to speak candidly.” Appellant’s
        Br. at 17. It seems to me that we have jurisdiction to consider this
        claim of bias because it concerns the neutrality of the adjudicator
        and not the ultimate denial of relief. See, e.g., Cardona-Franco v.
        Garland, 35 F.4th 358, 363-64 (5th Cir. 2022). Nevertheless, the
        claim fails on the merits because the IJ made the statement in her
        oral decision (later reduced to writing) after the submission of
        evidence in an adversary proceeding. The IJ’s decision to not credit
        the evidence submitted by Mr. Siddique is not suggestive of bias,
        but is instead within the province of the trier of fact.
               I would dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.