Court Opinion

ID: 9492154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:33:23.43114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:08.383421
License: Public Domain

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I approve and join in Parts I, II and III of the majority’s opinion. I dissent from Part IV because I do not agree that we should reverse a conviction when, as we all agree, the trial court gave the jury com-*736píete and accurate instructions on reasonable doubt before the jury deliberated. The majority overturns the conviction on the basis of language with which the District Court described reasonable doubt in preliminary comments made to the jury before they heard opening statements or evidence. However, in light of the majority’s concession that there was no error in the instruction on reasonable doubt when it was included in the charge that was given to the jury four days later, immediately before the jury proceeded to deliberate, the effect of the majority’s decision is to elevate those preliminary comments to incurable error. In my view, the majority’s result is serious error, both because in the circumstances here the erroneous instructions, if any, were cured and because, as a general principle, incurable error is limited to grievous faults.
I.
The trial of Julio Hernandez began on February 4, 1998, on a three-count superseding indictment charging (count 1) conspiracy to obstruct, delay and affect commerce and the movement of commodities in commerce by robbery of a tractor-trailer and the contents thereof, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (count 2) obstructing, delaying and affecting commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce by robbery, and threatening physical violence to a person in furtherance of a plan to rob a tractor-trailer and its contents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; and (count 3) receiving and possessing with the intent to convert to his own use goods and chattel, namely 494 cases of cigarettes valued at over $250,000 that had been embezzled and stolen from a motor truck and were moving as part of an interstate shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 659 and 2.
The jury received comments and/or instructions from the trial judge on reasonable doubt on three separate occasions. The first occasion was on February 4 during what the majority characterizes as the “voir dire instruction.” Hernandez contends that because the court stated in the course of those comments that the jurors would have to use their sense of “what sounds likely” in evaluating the evidence, he was entitled to a new trial. The majority rejects Hernandez’s contention and concludes that there was no error in the remarks made by the District Court at that time.
The third occasion was the formal jury charge, given to the jury orally and in writing on February 13, before it proceeded to deliberate. The defendant does not challenge the instruction and the majority finds that charge to be without error. That instruction fully incorporates all of the relevant elements of a reasonable doubt charge, which the majority refers to as the “traditional charge” on reasonable doubt. In it, the District Court stated as follows:
Now, what is reasonable doubt? Now, I’ll try to define that. Reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is doubt based on reason and common sense. A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause you to hesitate to act in matters of importance in your own lives. A reasonable doubt may arise from a lack of evidence. It is doubt based on reason, logic, common sense and experience. Reasonable doubt is not vague or hypothetical doubt. It is not speculative, imaginary qualms or misgivings. It is not just an excuse by a juror to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty. It is not the normal sympathy which one human being may hold for another.
It is not necessary for the United States or the Government to prove the guilt of a defendant to a mathematical certainty or beyond all possible doubt. The reason is in this world of ours, it is practically impossible for a person to be absolutely and completely convinced regarding any disputed fact which by its nature is not susceptible of mathematical certainty. Consequently, the law is such that in a criminal case it is sufficient if the proofs establish that a defen*737dant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all possible doubt.
Reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty existing in your mind as to the guilt of the defendant after carefully considering all the evidence. A reasonable doubt may be said to exist in any case when after a careful consideration of all of the evidence the jury would be unwilling to rely upon that evidence unhesitatingly in a matter of importance in its own affairs.
App. at 800-02.
The majority’s decision to reverse Hernandez’s conviction thus rests on its conclusion that the remarks made by the District Court on the second occasion, February 9, immediately after the jury was sworn and before the opening statements, which the majority characterizes as “the initial instructions,” were such flagrant error as to mislead the jury and be incurable.
These remarks are quoted in full in the majority’s opinion. What are the majority’s objections?
The majority focuses on the statement made by the District Court, after it advised the jury that there is no specific definition of reasonable doubt (a patently accurate comment), that “[i]t’s what you in your own heart and your own soul and your own spirit and your own judgment determine is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. at 175. The majority has two objections: this statement “allows each juror to judge the evidence by a visceral standard unique to that juror, rather than an objective heightened standard of proof applicable to each juror,” Majority Opinion at 731, and it “allows jurors to convict based upon their individual gut feeling.’ ” Id. The majority fails to acknowledge that in those remarks, which were really comments rather than instructions, the District Court emphasized, at the outset of even that initial stage, that “[t]he burden of proof is on the Government. The Government brings the charges. The Government has to prove the charges.” App. at 175 (emphasis added). Nor does the majority specify what the jurors were told that might lead them to look to their “gut feelings” rather than the evidence to which the District Court repeatedly referred.
If the majority’s objection to the language used by the District Court is that it improperly suggests a subjective approach, then the majority is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the concept of reasonable doubt as a “subjective state of near certitude,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis added); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
The majority’s objection to the District Court’s “initial instructions” takes those comments out of context. It gives short shrift to the government’s argument that these comments were merely meant to give an overview of the trial procedure. An examination of the court’s entire presentation at that time reveals that the court was providing precisely that overview. See generally Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 95 (4th ed. 1996) (Preliminary jury instructions “are intended to give the jury, briefly and in understandable language, information to make the trial more meaningful.”). The District Court began by explaining the jury’s function and role, that witnesses will be called, that there will be interpreters, who the lawyers will be, that the burden of proof is on the Government, the sequence of events, where the jurors could lunch, and the courtroom procedures to be followed. The comment to which the majority objects is one sentence in an overview that covers eight pages. App. at 172-79.
The District Court emphasized the preliminary nature of those comments, stating on several occasions that the charge and the instructions would be given to the jury at a later time. Immediately after the language on which the majority focuses, the District Court expressly told the jurors that it would give them “some definitions *738at the end of the trial when I give the Judge’s charge to the jury.” App. at 175. Shortly thereafter, the court, continuing its explanation of the sequence of events that would follow, stated that after the lawyer on each side makes a closing argument, “the Judge gives the Judge’s charge to the jury. When I do that, I’ll give you something written so you can read along with me. That’s when I’ll define proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I’ll define the presumption of innocence, what does that mean. I’ll define robbery. I’ll define the various terms that you are hearing throughout the trial.” App. at 176 (emphasis added). The court’s procedure was consistent with common practice, under which the formal instructions containing precise definitions are left for the end of trial, following a formal charge conference.
There is no reason to assume that the jurors were unaware that the formal instructions and definitions, including that for reasonable doubt, would be given later in light of the District Court’s clear statements to that effect. Just as we assume that jurors follow the accurate, formal instructions of the court, see Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 94, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954) (“To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the- court in arriving at their verdict. Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.”); United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir.1993) (jury presumed to follow curative instructions regarding stricken evidence absent “overwhelming probability” jury was unable to follow it), we should assume that the jurors here listened to the judge’s preliminary instructions regarding when and how they would receive their formal ones.
Even were this not enough to show that there was no prejudicial error from the court’s overview at the beginning of the trial, this conclusion is reinforced by the District Court’s clarification of the import of the earlier language as soon as counsel objected. At sidebar, defense counsel stated:
I’m also objecting to the Court’s lack of definition of burden of proof as far as reasonable doubt is concerned as something you feel inside which suggests they can go with some sort of a gut or bias or prejudice or some feeling about the case, while beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest burden we have in our system of justice.
App. at 182.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that what it regards as the infirm instruction was not corrected, but merely contradicted by the final charge, the District Court took steps almost immediately in response to counsel’s objection. After reviewing the indictment with the jury, the court stated as follows
Now, I have told you proof beyond a reasonable doubt will be defined in my charge, just as I will explain at greater length presumption of innocence. Because I refer to the fact that proof beyond a reasonable doubt has no accurate measuring rod, I don’t want you to think that it is so ephemeral that it’s meaningless or so subjective that it’s an unworthy concept. It is a very important concept. It’s indeed the backbone of the criminal law that proof must be convincing to a jury as to the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. And you will have to analyze the proofs so as to decide in your own mind: Was this proven beyond a reasonable doubt?
App. at 191.
In light of the prompt correction to the remarks that the majority finds objectionable, the court’s emphasis to the jury that the instruction on reasonable doubt would be given later (and in writing), and the majority’s acknowledgment that the final instructions on reasonable doubt were not objectionable, I believe that there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors were misled to use an improper definition of reasonable doubt in finding Hernandez guilty.
*739I believe the majority’s reversal of a conviction based on its view that the court’s preliminary remarks were incurable is out of step with the precedent. Underlying our jurisprudence is recognition that error will occasionally be made, even error of constitutional magnitude, but that most error either can be cured through an instruction or has not prejudiced a defendant’s right so substantially that the conviction must be reversed. See generally Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (“Although some occurrences at trial may be too clearly prejudicial for ... a curative instruction to mitigate their effect, the [prosecutor’s comment that defendant hoped to be convicted of a lesser charge] is hardly of such character.”); United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc) (“In determining prejudice, we consider the scope of the objectionable [prosecutorial] comments and their relationship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction.”); Newby, 11 F.3d at 1146 (“[W]e presume that the jury will follow a curative instruction [regarding stricken evidence] unless there is an ‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow it and a strong likelihood that the affect of the evidence would be ‘devastating’ to the defendant.” [citations omitted]); United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1974) (“[A]ny harm done by the [mid-trial] charge was vitiated by the later proper and curative instructions.”). To evaluate a claimed error in a jury instruction, as in this case, an appellate court must look to the charge as a whole. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994).
There was extensive analysis of two reasonable doubt instructions by the Supreme Court in Victor, where the petitioners challenged their reasonable doubt instructions. In one case, the petitioner challenged the charge that defined reasonable doubt in terms of “moral evidence” and “moral certainty,” but the Court, although not condoning use of those terms, nevertheless concluded that they neither suggested a standard of proof lower than required by due process nor allowed conviction on factors extraneous to the government’s proof. Id. at 16, 114 S.Ct. 1239. In the other case, the Court held that the instruction that a reasonable doubt is “not a mere possible doubt” also did not require reversal because other language in the instruction made clear the meaning of that instruction. Similarly, the Court, while agreeing that the trial court’s equating of a reasonable doubt with a “substantial doubt” was problematic, nonetheless concluded that “taken as a whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Id. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 1239.
It is significant that Justice O’Connor, speaking for the Court in Victor, pointed out that “in only one case have we held that a definition of reasonable doubt violated the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239. In the case to which she referred, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), the Court held that an instruction defining a reasonable doubt to be “an actual substantial doubt” was fatally defective because it suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328. Certainly, the alleged error here in the court’s preliminary, overview remarks is in no way equivalent with that in Cage, particularly as the error, if any, was followed by a prompt cure and, ultimately, a fully correct charge.
The majority suggests that the decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), may be analogous to this case. Not so. The instructions in Franklin were not defective because of the reasonable doubt portion of the charge but because the instruction on intent effected a mandatory presumption in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that the state prove every element of a criminal offense.
*740In fact, in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), the Court, in considering the petitioner’s challenge to a reasonable doubt charge in a federal criminal trial, agreed that there were problems with the charge, which “should have been in terms of the kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate to act ... rather than the kind on which he would be willing to act ...,” but nevertheless declined to reverse, noting “the instruction as given was not of the type that could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there was some.” Id. at 140, 75 S.Ct. 127.
Similarly, in this case, I see no basis to conclude that the court’s initial comments to the jury in an overview of the procedure that was to take place could have misled the jury. Although the court may not have adopted the most felicitous expression in its overview, both the curative instruction and the final charge were correct. The District Court’s final jury instructions emphasized that “[a] defendant is never to be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture”; “Reasonable doubt is not vague or hypothetical doubt”; “[i]t is not speculative, imaginary qualms or misgivings.” App. at 801. Those final instructions correctly conveyed the meaning of reasonable doubt and adequately neutralized whatever misleading effect may have been caused by the “what you feel inside” language in the remarks some four days earlier.
Our zealousness to insure that a defendant has had a fair trial and that justice has been done does not mean that every error, although corrected, must lead to reversal. In this case, I disagree with my colleagues that a small portion of the trial court’s initial comments, which were promptly corrected and later neutralized by the final charge, requires reversal of Hernandez’s conviction. I therefore respectfully dissent.