Court Opinion

ID: 9926338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:04:03.432166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:42.288217
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Jan 24 2024, 8:51 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP                        Attorney General
Madison, Indiana                                           Megan M. Smith
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Zachariah David Konkle,                                    January 24, 2024
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-783
        v.                                                 Appeal from the
                                                           Jackson Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Richard W. Poynter, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           36C01-2108-MR-1

                               Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                                 Judge Brown concurs.
                      Judge Bradford dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                            Page 1 of 33
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   To convict a defendant of murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is a basic tenet

      of criminal law that the State must prove that the killing was done

      “knowingly.” A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when they engage

      in the conduct, they are aware of a high probability that they are doing so.

[2]   Zachariah David Konkle fought Michael Steele, and Steele died. Before the

      fight, Steele had an enlarged heart, 90% occlusion of his coronary arteries, and

      a history of prior heart attacks. Konkle did not know about Steele’s heart

      problems, yet the State charged him with murder. During trial, the sole issue

      was whether Konkle knowingly killed Steele, as the State conceded that the

      killing was not intentional. The State’s position was that Steele died because of

      asphyxiation caused by Konkle placing Steele in a headlock or lying on his

      chest and thus he was guilty of knowingly killing Steele. Konkle argued that

      Steele would not have died but for his preexisting heart problems of which he

      was unaware. Thus, he argued that he was guilty of a lesser-included offense,

      either reckless homicide or involuntary manslaughter, neither of which requires

      a knowing killing. There was evidence from pathologists and eyewitnesses

      supporting both the State’s and the defense’s theories.

[3]   During closing argument, the State, for the first time, contended the “eggshell

      victim rule” applied, which relieved the State of proving that Konkle knowingly

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024      Page 2 of 33
      killed Steele. The State argued that the eggshell-victim doctrine provides that

      the defendant takes the victim as they find them and that “if one throws a piece

      of chalk at a victim with an eggshell skull and the chalk strikes the victim and

      fractures his skull, the perpetrator would be guilty even if he didn’t intend to

      bring bodily harm.” The jury found Konkle guilty of the lesser-included offense

      of voluntary manslaughter.

[4]   Because the issue was whether Konkle knowingly killed Steele and there was

      credible evidence supporting both theories, we find the prosecutor’s statement

      constituted misconduct and fundamental error. We reverse Konkle’s conviction

      and remand for a new trial.

      Facts and Procedural History
[5]   On July 27, 2021, forty-two-year-old Steele and thirty-two-year-old Konkle

      were working at the Jackson County Fair in Brownstown. That night, a mother

      and a father attended the fair with their three daughters. When one of their

      daughters, who has “multiple mental and behavioral issues,” threw a tantrum

      after losing the goldfish game, a worker made fun of her. Tr. Vol. II p. 234. The

      mother went to look for a supervisor to make a complaint about the worker.

      Konkle approached the mother and told her he “would take care of it.” Id. at

      235. The family then went home.

[6]   Later that night, Konkle told some fellow workers that “somebody [had been]

      messing with a mentally handicapped child” and that “if he found the person . .

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 3 of 33
      . he was going to hurt them.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 18-19. The workers told Konkle

      not to take matters into his owns hands and to let management handle it.

      Konkle did not take their advice. At first, Konkle believed that Robert Clark

      was the worker who had made fun of the girl, so Konkle attacked Clark. Clark,

      however, was the wrong person.

[7]   Konkle later encountered Steele and told him that if he found out “he hit the

      wrong person the first time the second one was going to get it twice as worse.”

      Tr. Vol. II pp. 244-45. Unknown to Konkle, however, Steele had several heart

      problems, including significantly blocked coronary arteries and an enlarged

      heart. Steele, who appeared “intimidated” by Konkle, eventually “got tired of

      hearing it” from Konkle and said, “let’s go.” Id. at 245, 250. Steele threw the

      first punch, following which both men exchanged punches. Both men ended up

      on the ground. Steele had his face “in the ground,” and Konkle’s chest was on

      Steele’s head. Id. at 250; Tr. Vol. III p. 11. It “looked like” Konkle’s arms were

      “around” Steele’s neck. Tr. Vol. III p. 4; see also Tr. Vol. II p. 245 (“[Y]ou really

      couldn’t see [Konkle’s] arms where they were located so I really can’t say he

      was choking [Steele] because I don’t know.”); Tr. Vol. III p. 132 (testifying that

      Konkle’s arm was around Steele’s neck as they fell to the ground). Konkle hit

      Steele five or six times in the back of the head and said, “[G]o to sleep bit**.”

      Tr. Vol. II p. 246; Tr. Vol. III p. 11. Steele then started making gurgling sounds.

      At that point, Konkle got off Steele, as it appeared that Konkle didn’t “mean[]”

      for “anything like that” to happen. Tr. Vol. II p. 247. Another worker started

      CPR, and Konkle joined in.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024        Page 4 of 33
[8]    Konkle asked those who were present to tell law enforcement that Steele had

       fallen in the shower. Law enforcement was summoned from the other side of

       the fairgrounds and took over CPR until EMS arrived. Konkle was interviewed

       on the scene and then again at the police department. On the scene, Konkle

       said he was mad at Steele for making fun of the special-needs girl because he

       has a special-needs child. Ex. 5. He explained that Steele punched him in the

       head, he punched Steele back, they both went to the ground, and he put his

       arms around Steele and laid on him to calm him down. Id. He said that when

       Steele started gasping for air, bystanders told him to let go and that Steele had

       heart issues. Id.

[9]    Steele was taken to IU Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis, where he died. Dr.

       Bruce Wainer, a forensic pathologist at the Marion County Coroner’s Office,

       performed the autopsy. He concluded that Steele’s cause of death was

       “[m]echanical asphyxiation complicating compression of the carotid artery

       through a ‘choke hold.’” Ex. 31. The autopsy report also noted Steele’s heart

       problems.

[10]   The State charged Konkle with murder. A jury trial was held in February 2023.

       The key issue at trial was whether Konkle knowingly killed Steele, as the State

       conceded that Konkle did not intentionally kill Steele. Dr. Wainer was no

       longer employed at the Marion County Coroner’s Office, so Dr. Christopher

       Poulos, the chief forensic pathologist at the office, testified instead. He largely

       agreed with the two causes of death that Dr. Wainer identified in the autopsy

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024         Page 5 of 33
       report.1 First, Dr. Poulos found that Steele’s brain was not functioning properly

       from lack of blood flow due to “mechanical asphyxiation,” that is, outside

       compression of the body that results in the inability to transmit oxygen to the

       brain. Tr. Vol. III p. 81. Dr. Poulos said the asphyxia could have been from a

       chokehold, which Dr. Wainer based his cause of death on, or compression of

       Steele’s chest, which witnesses testified to at trial. Dr. Poulos acknowledged

       that there were no injuries to Steele’s neck (externally or internally). Id. at 107.

[11]   Second, Dr. Poulos found that Steele had “bilateral conjunctival petechial

       hemorrhages consistent with repetitive compression of the carotid arteries.” Id.

       at 81. Dr. Poulos acknowledged that petechiae have several other causes,

       including heart disease, and that Steele’s cardiovascular system was in “poor”

       health. Id. at 83, 104. Steele’s heart was enlarged and his coronary arteries were

       “narrowed by 90 percent,” which constituted “critical stenosis” and had the

       potential, on its own, to cause death. Id. at 84. His heart also showed signs of

       “previous heart attacks,” one of which was recent. Id. Dr. Poulos said it was

       “[q]uite possible” that Steele had a heart attack during the fight with Konkle. Id.

       at 85. Dr. Poulos maintained that Steele did not die from natural causes but

       rather “homicide,” that is, death “at the hands of another.” Id. at 110. He

       1
        Dr. Poulos testified that he didn’t agree with Dr. Wainer’s phrasing of the cause of death and said that he
       would phrase it as “mechanical asphyxiation and compression of the carotid arteries.” See Tr. Vol. III pp. 82,
       102, 103.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                               Page 6 of 33
       concluded his testimony by saying that “if just the struggle caused a heart attack

       [he] would still call it a homicide.” Id. at 113.

[12]   Another forensic pathologist, Dr. George Nichols, II, testified for the defense

       that Steele died from natural causes, specifically, a “terribly diseased heart” and

       heart attack. Id. at 232. Dr. Nichols pointed out that there were no injuries to

       Steele’s neck and that he had only minor injuries, such as scratches and bruises.

       In short, Dr. Nichols said that Steele had no injuries “that would have

       prevented him from walking away had he not ceased activity of his heart.” Id.

[13]   Following the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed on murder

       (knowing or intentional killing) as well as Level 2 felony voluntary

       manslaughter (knowing or intentional killing under sudden heat), Level 5

       felony reckless homicide (reckless killing), and Level 5 felony involuntary

       manslaughter (killing while committing or attempting to commit battery). The

       jury was also instructed on the definition of “knowingly”:

               A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in
               this conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
               If a person is charged with knowingly causing a result by his
               conduct, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
               that he must have been aware of a high probability that his
               conduct would cause the result.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130.

[14]   During closing argument, the State argued that Konkle acted knowingly and

       asked the jury to find him guilty of murder. The State told the jury that because

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024        Page 7 of 33
Konkle “seriously injure[d]” Steele, he was aware of a high probability that

Steele could die. Tr. Vol. IV p. 18. The State then argued, for the first time, that

the “eggshell victim rule” applied2:

         [The State:] . . . There’s a principle of the law called the eggshell
         victim rule, sometimes called the eggshell plaintiff rule,
         sometimes called the eggshell skull rule. A longstanding rule I
         mean read it literally because this – I didn’t type this up. A
         longstanding rule of criminal law and tort, that’s civil law, that a
         defendant takes his victim as he finds him. And this is where the
         phrase goes, if one throws a piece of chalk at a victim with an
         eggshell skull and the chalk strikes the victim and fractures his
         skull, the perpetrator would be guilty even if he didn’t intend to
         bring bodily harm.

         That’s essentially saying if somebody picks on somebody who for
         one reason or another, health, age, is weak, as a perpetrator you
         don’t get a bonus for picking on a weakling. Does that make
         sense? Next slide please. A defendant is liable for aggravation or
         exacerbation of a current injury. Somebody has a heart condition
         and you cause them to have a heart condition you’re liable for
         that. Again, I’m not making this up. Indiana Supreme Court law
         from 10-11 years ago.

         [Defense counsel:] Your honor I’m going to object. May we
         approach.

         [Trial court:] Counsel, the objection’s overruled.

2
  Based on comments made during closing argument, it appears that the State used a PowerPoint
presentation and that there was a slide for the eggshell-victim doctrine. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. IV pp. 27-28
(prosecutor telling co-counsel “Next” and “Next slide please”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                                   Page 8 of 33
                  [The State:] The victim may have a greater sensitivity to pain,
                  they are no less victims. Our law in many aspects tries to protect
                  those who are weaker. The defense wants you to believe it’s the
                  other way around. That it’s Mr. Steele’s fault that he’s dead. No.
                  Zachariah Konkle just happened to attack somebody and try to
                  put to sleep somebody who had another condition.

       Id. at 27-28.3 Defense counsel argued that Konkle did not kill Steele knowingly

       and asked the jury to find him guilty of either reckless homicide or involuntary

       manslaughter. The jury found Konkle guilty of Level 2 felony voluntary

       manslaughter. Konkle then admitted being a habitual offender. The court

       sentenced Konkle to twenty-four years for voluntary manslaughter enhanced by

       ten years for being a habitual offender, for a total of thirty-four years.

[15]   Konkle now appeals.4

       Discussion and Decision
[16]   Konkle contends the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing

       argument when it “told the jury that the Indiana Supreme Court, under the

       eggshell skull doctrine, has allowed people to be convicted even if they did not

       intend the harm the victim sustained.”5 Appellant’s Br. p. 10. Konkle argues the

       3
        The trial court did not give—and we see no indication that the State requested—an instruction on the
       eggshell-victim doctrine.
       4
           We held oral argument on December 11, 2023. We thank counsel for their helpful advocacy.
       5
           Konkle raises other issues on appeal, but given our resolution of this issue, we need not address them.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                                  Page 9 of 33
       doctrine does not apply to murder and voluntary-manslaughter cases and that

       therefore this was a misstatement of the law.

[17]   “In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial

       court, we determine (1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the

       misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position

       of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise.”

       Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014) (quotation omitted). “Whether a

       prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case

       law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. The gravity of peril is measured

       by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather

       than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Id. “To preserve a claim of

       prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged

       misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is

       desired, move for a mistrial.” Id.

       I. Konkle waived his prosecutorial-misconduct argument
[18]   The State says Konkle waived this issue because he didn’t “request an

       admonishment or mistrial when his objection was overruled.” Appellee’s Br. p.

       21. As referenced above, although defense counsel objected during the State’s

       closing and asked to approach the bench, he did not request an admonishment

       or move for a mistrial. Konkle argues that doing these things would have been

       futile given that the trial court had just overruled his objection and rejected his

       request to approach the bench. But under the Indiana Supreme Court’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 10 of 33
       authority, this still constitutes waiver. See Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1111

       (Ind. 1997) (“Failure to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial results

       in waiver of the issue. Generally this is so, even if the court has overruled a

       timely objection.” (citations omitted)); see also Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051,

       1058-59 (Ind. 2000) (“To preserve an issue regarding the propriety of a closing

       argument for appeal, a defendant must do more than simply make a prompt

       objection to the argument. Defendant must also request an admonishment, and

       if further relief is desired, defendant must move for a mistrial.”), reh’g denied. At

       oral argument, Konkle acknowledged this authority but argued that it should be

       reconsidered. We understand the difficult position defense counsel was in even

       objecting during closing let alone having the court sustain the objection and

       deny his request to approach the bench. Even so, we cannot overrule Supreme

       Court precedent. Given this precedent, defense counsel should have asked the

       court if he could make a record. If counsel was denied the opportunity during

       closing to make a record, then immediately after the jury left the courtroom, he

       should have asked for an admonishment to the jury and moved for a mistrial.

       Because Konkle didn’t do so, he has waived the issue, and he must establish not

       only the grounds for prosecutorial misconduct but also that the prosecutorial

       misconduct constituted fundamental error. Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 667-68.

       II. The State’s comments during closing constitute
       fundamental error
[19]   “Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where

       the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024        Page 11 of 33
       prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial impossible.” Id. at

       668. To establish fundamental error, the defendant must show that the alleged

       error constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of

       due process and presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id.

[20]   Konkle claims the State misstated the law when it said the eggshell-victim

       doctrine applied, which constitutes misconduct. Misconduct can occur when

       the prosecutor misstates the law during closing argument. See Pritcher v. State,

       208 N.E.3d 656, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The Indiana Supreme Court case the

       State referred to during closing is Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2012).

       There, the defendant shoved and poked his wife, causing her pain. He was

       convicted of domestic battery, which was enhanced from a Class B

       misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor due to “bodily injury.” 6 On appeal, the

       defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the bodily injury

       enhancement. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29 (defining “bodily injury” as “any

       impairment of physical condition, including physical pain”). The issue before

       our Supreme Court was whether any level of pain constitutes bodily injury or

       whether some minimum level is required. Our Supreme Court ultimately

       concluded that a bright-line test was preferrable and that any level of pain

       constitutes bodily injury. The Court reasoned that holding otherwise could

       6
        The Class A misdemeanor was enhanced to a Class D felony due to a prior conviction, but the defendant
       did not challenge that enhancement.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                         Page 12 of 33
               unfairly discount the suffering of certain victims who may have a
               lower pain tolerance than others, which runs counter to the long-
               standing rule of both criminal and tort law that a defendant takes
               his victim as he finds him. See Defries v. State, 264 Ind. 233, 244-
               45, 342 N.E.2d 622, 630 (1976) . . . . Though they may have a
               greater sensitivity to pain, these individuals are no less victims
               than someone who may be more tolerant.

       Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 142. Defries, in turn, is an aggravated-battery case. In that

       case, our Supreme Court explained that under the aggravated-battery statute in

       effect then, which required “great bodily harm,” the defendant did not have to

       intend to do great bodily harm to be convicted:

               [I]f one throws a piece of chalk at the legendary victim with an
               eggshell skull, and the chalk strikes the victim and fractures his
               skull, the perpetrator would be guilty under our statute even
               though he did not intend to do great bodily harm.

       Defries, 342 N.E.2d at 630.

[21]   These references to the eggshell-victim doctrine in Bailey and Defries are

       consistent with the principle that the knowingly or intentionally mens rea does

       not apply to the severity of an injury under our battery statutes because the

       severity of an injury is an aggravating factor and not an element of conduct. See

       Lowden v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1220, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. But

       murder and voluntary-manslaughter cases are different because killing is an

       element of conduct to which the mens rea applies. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1

       (providing that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human

       being commits murder); I.C. § 35-42-1-3 (providing that a person who

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024          Page 13 of 33
       knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while acting under

       sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter).

[22]   Indeed, the State does not cite, nor can we locate, any Indiana cases where the

       eggshell-victim doctrine was applied to a murder or voluntary-manslaughter

       case to establish that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed someone.

       A search of other jurisdictions doesn’t reveal many cases, but those we found

       support that the eggshell-victim doctrine doesn’t apply to murder or voluntary-

       manslaughter cases. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

                The eggshell-skull principle does not quite fit a case of intentional
                murder, for the murderer must intend his victim’s death and
                ordinarily this will presuppose some awareness of the likely
                consequences of his act. It is not murder to kill a person by a
                slight blow harmless to an ordinary person if you do not know
                the person is unusually vulnerable; there is even a presumption in
                Illinois that one who beats another with his bare fists does not
                intend to kill him.

       Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also

       State v. O’Bannon, 274 P.3d 992 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). The State misstated the

       law during closing, which constitutes misconduct.7

[23]   The question, then, is whether this misconduct placed Konkle in a position of

       grave peril and made a fair trial impossible. Konkle claims the misconduct

       7
        As noted above, it does not appear that the State requested an instruction on the eggshell-victim doctrine.
       Had it done so, this problem may have been avoided, as the parties and the trial court would have had the
       opportunity to consider this issue in depth.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                              Page 14 of 33
       placed him in a position of grave peril because it left the jury “with the

       impression that [he] could be convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter

       even if there was no evidence that [he] was aware of a high probability” that his

       actions would cause Steele’s death. Appellant’s Br. p. 17. On this record, we

       agree with Konkle.

[24]   The only issue for the jury to decide was whether Konkle was aware of a high

       probability that his actions would cause Steele’s death. It was undisputed that

       forty-two-year-old Steele had almost completely blocked coronary arteries that

       put him at risk of death, that he had prior heart attacks, that he likely suffered a

       heart attack during the fight, and that Konkle knew none of this. Konkle’s

       forensic pathologist testified that Steele died from a “terribly diseased heart”

       and heart attack. He explained that Steele had only scratches and bruises and

       that nothing would have prevented him from walking away from the fight had

       he not had a heart attack. The State’s forensic pathologist found that Steele died

       from mechanical asphyxiation and compression of the carotid arteries (either

       from a chokehold or compression of his chest) and concluded his testimony by

       saying that “if just the struggle caused a heart attack [he] would still call it a

       homicide.”

[25]   During closing, the State acknowledged it had to prove that Konkle acted

       knowingly to obtain a guilty verdict for murder. But then things started to go off

       the rails. First, the State told the jury that because Konkle seriously injured

       Steele, he knowingly killed him. That, however, is not the law. Instead, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024         Page 15 of 33
       State had to prove that Konkle was aware of a high probability that his conduct

       would kill Steele. See Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 664.

[26]   To make matters worse, the State then argued that the inapplicable eggshell-

       victim doctrine applied, telling the jury that because Steele had preexisting heart

       problems, Konkle was guilty of a knowing killing “even if he didn’t intend to

       bring bodily harm.” The State tried to bolster this argument by emphasizing

       that the Indiana Supreme Court had established this rule a decade earlier. But

       as already explained, that is simply not the case. Defense counsel objected, but

       the trial court, in the presence of the jury, overruled his objection and prohibited

       him from approaching the bench. This reinforced the State’s argument that the

       eggshell-victim doctrine applied. Given the conflicting evidence, it is entirely

       possible that the jury concluded that Steele wouldn’t have died but for his

       preexisting heart problems. If that happened, the State’s misconduct was

       probably the deciding factor in the case.

[27]   At oral argument, the State, citing Pritcher, argued there is no fundamental

       error. In Pritcher, the defendant, who was 6’2” and weighed over 240 pounds,

       beat his seven-year-old son, L.P., who weighed seventy-seven pounds. L.P.,

       who was covered in bruises from head to toe, died from blunt-force injuries to

       his head, and the defendant was charged with murder. During closing, defense

       counsel argued that the defendant did not “knowingly” kill L.P. In rebuttal, the

       State claimed the jury need only find that the defendant was aware of a high

       probability that he was beating L.P., not that he was aware of a high probability

       that he would kill L.P. The defendant did not object, and the jury found him

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024      Page 16 of 33
       guilty of murder. On appeal, we found that the State’s comments constituted

       misconduct but not fundamental error because the trial court’s instruction

       defining “knowingly” cured the State’s misstatement of the law. Id. at 665.

       Here, although the trial court also instructed the jury on the definition of

       “knowingly,” that did not cure the State’s misstatement of the law that the

       eggshell-victim doctrine applied.

[28]   The State’s prosecutorial misconduct made a fair trial impossible and

       constitutes fundamental error. We therefore reverse Konkle’s conviction for

       voluntary manslaughter and remand for a new trial.8

[29]   Reversed and remanded.

       Brown, J, concurs.

       Bradford, J., dissents with separate opinion.

       8
        Because there is sufficient evidence to support Konkle’s conviction, double jeopardy does not bar retrial. See
       Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 681-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                              Page 17 of 33
       Bradford, J., dissents with opinion.

[30]   Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Konkle was denied a fair

       trial due to fundamental error, I respectfully dissent. In order to adequately

       explain my position, I feel it necessary to relate some additional facts.

[31]   On the evening of July 27, 2021, Shelby Vance was at the Jackson County Fair

       with, among others, her special-needs, seven-year-old daughter. When Vance

       heard that a worker at one of the carnival games had been making fun of her

       daughter, she reported the incident to Konkle, who told Vance that “he would

       take care of it[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 235. Konkle, who worked for Poor Jack

       Amusements, told fellow employee Christopher Gartrell that he had become

       aware of “somebody messing with a mentally handicapped child” and “[t]hat if

       he found the person he was going to hurt him.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 18, 19. Soon

       thereafter, Konkle “sucker punched” fellow Poor Jack employee Clark but

       Clark persuaded Konkle that he was not the person who had been ridiculing

       Vance’s daughter. Tr. Vol. III p. 199.

[32]   Around 1:00 a.m. the next morning, Poor Jack employee Matthew Walker

       heard a commotion outside of his sleeping quarters and emerged to find Konkle

       confronting Steele, telling him “[t]hat if [he] found out he hit the wrong person

       the first time the second one was going to get it twice as worse.” Tr. Vol. II p.

       244–45. Steele, apparently tired of “hearing it,” turned and threw the first

       punch. Tr. Vol. II p. 245. After the exchange of a few blows, Konkle managed

       to get Steele face down on the ground, with his arms “up underneath [Steele’s]

       head [….] look[ing] like they around his neck” and his chest on the back of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024         Page 18 of 33
       Steele’s head, where he punched him five times in the back of the head and told

       him to “go to sleep b[****.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 246, 250; Vol. III p. 4. Brittany

       Fry later testified that she had left her sleeping quarters and had seen Konkle

       holding Steele in a “headlock position” as they “were on their way to the

       ground[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 132. Steele began to gurgle, convulse, and foam at

       the mouth and died on July 31, 2021, never having regained consciousness.

       After Steele was taken away in an ambulance, Konkle unsuccessfully attempted

       to persuade multiple persons to tell authorities that Steele had fallen in the

       shower. While the police were still on the scene investigating the incident,

       Konkle and his wife attempted to drive away from the fairgrounds but were

       prevented by Konkle’s employer, who stood in front of the vehicle and removed

       the keys from its ignition.

[33]   The State charged Konkle with murder and alleged that he was a habitual

       offender. The trial court delivered preliminary instructions at Konkle’s jury

       trial, which included the following:

                    • “The case was started when an Information was filed
                      charging the Defendant with Murder, a felony. That
                      Information, omitting formal parts reads: The
                      undersigned says that on or about July 28, 2021 in Jackson
                      County, State of Indiana, Zachariah David Konkle, did
                      knowingly or intentionally kill another human being, to wit:
                      Michael Steele, contrary to the form of the statutes in such
                      cases made and provided by I.C. 35-42-1-1(1) and against
                      the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.” Tr. Vol. II
                      pp. 166–67 (emphasis added).
                    • “To overcome the presumption of innocence, the State
                      must prove the Defendant guilty of each element of the crime

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 19 of 33
                        charged, beyond reasonable doubt.” Tr. Vol. II p. 167
                        (emphasis added).
                    • “You are the exclusive judges of the evidence, which may
                      be either witness testimony or exhibits.” Tr. Vol. II p. 168
                      (emphasis added).
                    • “The Court’s instructions are your best source in
                      determining the law.” Tr. Vol. II p. 168.
                    • “When the evidence is completed, the attorneys may make
                      final arguments. These final arguments are not evidence.” Tr.
                      Vol. II p. 170 (emphasis added).
[34]   The State called Marion County Chief Forensic Pathologist Dr. Christopher

       Poulos as a witness. Dr. Poulos testified that, while Dr. Bruce Wainer had

       performed the autopsy on Steele, he had formed an independent opinion

       regarding Steele’s case. Dr. Poulos nonetheless agreed with Dr. Wainer’s

       conclusion that Steele’s brain had ceased to function properly due to a lack of

       blood flow caused by mechanical asphyxiation. This conclusion was based on

       the fact that Steele had had conjunctival petechial hemorrhages in both eyes,

       injuries consistent with somebody compressing the neck or other parts of the

       body, impairing blood flow to the brain. Dr. Poulos concluded that the

       compression in Steele’s case had led to “the death of the brain due to lack of

       blood flow and lack of oxygenation.” Tr. Vol. III p. 82. Dr. Poulos, however,

       indicated that in cases of chokehold “like the carotid sleeper hold, there will not

       necessarily be evidence of external injury to the neck.” Tr. Vol. III p. 96.

[35]   Forensic pathologist Dr. George Nichols, II, testified as the sole witness in

       Konkle’s case-in-chief. Dr. Nichols opined that the manner of Steele’s death

       had been natural, not homicide. Dr. Nichols testified to his opinion that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024           Page 20 of 33
       Steele’s body had produced “relatively massive amounts of epinephrine” during

       his fight with Konkle, causing his heart rate and blood pressure to rise and

       triggering a fatal heart attack. Tr. Vol. III p. 242. On cross-examination,

       however, Dr. Nichols acknowledged that, before taking the stand, he had been

       unaware of evidence regarding Konkle’s arm having been around Steele’s neck.

       Dr. Nichols agreed that his previous understanding of what had occurred “may

       not be entirely accurate” and that one person intentionally making another

       person lose consciousness could be deadly. Tr. Vol. III p. 250.

[36]   During closing, the prosecutor began by conceding that Konkle had not

       intentionally killed Steele, arguing only that he had knowingly done so:

               This is a knowing murder. State of mind. You as the jury have
               to figure out what is in the defendant’s mind. Conduct which is
               knowingly is done if when he personally engaged in conduct,
               engaged in a conduct he’s aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
       Tr. Vol. IV p. 18 (emphasis added).

[37]   The prosecutor later made the following statement:

               There’s a principle of the law called the eggshell victim rule,
               sometimes called the eggshell plaintiff rule, sometimes called the
               eggshell skull rule. A longstanding rule I mean read it literally
               because this—I didn’t type this up. A longstanding rule of
               criminal law and tort, that’s civil law, that a defendant takes his
               victim as he finds him. And this is where the phrase goes, if one
               throws a piece of chalk at a victim with an eggshell skull and the
               chalk strikes the victim and fractures his skull, the perpetrator
               would be guilty even if he didn’t intend to bring bodily harm.
               That’s essentially saying if somebody picks on somebody who for
               one reason or another, health, age, is weak, as a perpetrator you
               don’t get a bonus for picking on a weakling. Does that make

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024             Page 21 of 33
               sense? Next slide please. A defendant is liable for aggravation or
               exacerbation of a current injury. Somebody has a heart
               condition and you cause them to have a heart condition you’re
               liable for that. Again, I’m not making this up. Indiana Supreme
               Court law from 10–11 years ago.
       Tr. Vol. IV p. 27–28. Konkle objected on unknown grounds at this point,

       which objection was overruled.

[38]   The trial court’s final instructions included the following:

                    • “Included in the charge of Murder is the crime of
                      Voluntary Manslaughter that is defined by law, in part, as
                      follows, a person who knowingly or intentionally kills
                      another human being while acting under sudden heat
                      commits Voluntary Manslaughter, a Level Two (2)
                      felony.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 41–42 (emphasis added).
                    • “If the State did prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
                      Defendant knowingly or intentionally killed Michael Steele,
                      but the State failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
                      the Defendant was not acting under sudden heat, you may
                      find the Defendant guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, a
                      Level 2 felony.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 42 (emphasis added).
                    • “A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he
                      engages in this conduct, he is aware of a high probability
                      that he is doing so. If a person is charged with knowingly
                      causing result by his conduct, the State is required to prove
                      beyond reasonable doubt that he must have been aware of
                      high probability that his conduct would cause the result.”
                      Tr. Vol. IV p. 43.
                    • “The Court’s instructions are your best source in
                      determining the law.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 45–46.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 22 of 33
       The jury found Konkle guilty of voluntary manslaughter, he admitted to being a

       habitual offender, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of

       thirty-four years of incarceration.

       I.      Prosecutorial Misconduct as
               Fundamental Error
[39]   Konkle contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that the

       eggshell-skull doctrine applied in this case, warranting a reversal of his

       conviction. While Konkle seems to contend that he properly preserved this

       issue in the trial court, the record does not support that contention, indicating

       neither the ground for his objection to the prosecutor’s statements regarding the

       eggshell-skull doctrine nor that he requested an admonishment. “To preserve

       an issue regarding the propriety of a closing argument for appeal, a defendant

       must do more than simply make a prompt objection to the argument.

       Defendant must also request an admonishment, and if further relief is desired,

       defendant must move for a mistrial.” Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1111

       (Ind. 1997). Failure to request an admonishment results in waiver of the issue

       for appellate review. Phillips v. State, 719 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 1999).

[40]   The only way for Konkle to avoid the effects his waiver would be to establish

       that fundamental error occurred. “The fundamental error exception is

       ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant

       violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and

       the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Delarosa v.

       State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024          Page 23 of 33
       578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). To be fundamental, the error “must either ‘make a fair

       trial impossible’ or constitute ‘clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary

       principles of due process.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131

       (Ind. 2009)). The exception applies “only in ‘egregious circumstances.’” Id. at

       694–95 (quoting Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003)). I would

       conclude, however, that Konkle has failed to make a cogent argument

       regarding fundamental error on appeal, citing a definition of fundamental error

       but failing to explain how the prosecutor’s statement made a fair trial

       impossible. Failure to make a cogent argument or cite legal authority or the

       record as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) waives the issue for

       appeal. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). While I would stop

       here, I cannot agree that anything like fundamental error occurred in this case.

       A.      Prosecutorial Misconduct
[41]   As an initial matter, although the issue is not squarely before us, I am inclined

       to agree with the proposition that the eggshell-skull doctrine does not apply in

       cases of murder or voluntary manslaughter. The relevant statutes require that

       the defendant either has to intend to kill the victim or know that his actions will

       likely result in the victim’s death, which is inconsistent with the proposition that

       you take your victim as you find him. That said, I cannot agree that any

       misconduct occurred in this case, because, at the time the prosecutor made his

       comments regarding the eggshell-skull doctrine, they were 100% consistent with

       Indiana Supreme Court precedent on the matter.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 24 of 33
[42]   As it happens, the phrase “eggshell skull” appears in the Indiana criminal

       reports a grand total of three times, most recently in 2012:

               First, it could unfairly discount the suffering of certain victims
               who may have a lower pain tolerance than others, which runs
               counter to the long-standing rule of both criminal and tort law that a
               defendant takes his victim as he finds him. See Defries v. State, 264
               Ind. 233, 244–45, 342 N.E.2d 622, 630 (1976) (“On the other
               hand, if one throws a piece of chalk at the legendary victim with
               an eggshell skull, and the chalk strikes the victim and fractures
               his skull, the perpetrator would be guilty under our statute even
               though he did not intend to do great bodily harm.”); cf. Alexander
               v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 284 (Ind. 2000) (defendant liable for
               “aggravation or exacerbation of a current injury”). Though they
               may have a greater sensitivity to pain, these individuals are no
               less victims than someone who may be more tolerant.
       Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 142 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis added). Because

       Bailey, as written, stands for the proposition that a defendant takes his victim as

       he finds him in the criminal law, the prosecutor’s statement in this case was

       100% consistent with relevant precedent. Under the circumstances, I cannot

       agree that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred.9

[43]   As it is, Konkle claims only that the prosecutor’s argument left him in

       undeserved great peril because “the jury was […] left with the impression that

       Konkle could be convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter even if there

       was no evidence that Konkle was aware of a high probability that Steele would

       9
         Unless and until the Indiana Supreme Court redefines the doctrine of prosecutorial misconduct, I will
       continue to assume that claims of prosecutorial misconduct require actual misconduct and not just some sort
       of mistake (which I also do not think occurred in this case).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                           Page 25 of 33
       die from a heart attack during the fight.” Appellant’s Br. p. 17. The fatal flaw

       of this argument is that it is based on the false premise that the State was

       required to prove that Konkle was aware of a high probability that Steele would

       die from a heart attack during the fight, which itself is based on the contested

       assertion that Steele had, in fact, died of a heart attack. All the State was

       required to prove in this (or any other case involving an allegation of a knowing

       killing) is that Konkle was aware of high probability that his conduct would

       cause the result. To that end, the jury heard evidence that Konkle had held

       Steele in a chokehold as he had said “go to sleep, b[****]” and had kept him in a

       chokehold until he had lost consciousness and had begun to gurgle, convulse,

       and foam at the mouth. The jury was well within its rights to conclude that

       Konkle must have been aware that these actions might well kill Steele. So,

       regarding the only argument the Konkle actually makes, a statement that does

       no worse than leave the jury with the impression that the defendant can be

       convicted in the absence of evidence the State is not required to produce is

       hardly fundamental error.

       B.      Fundamental Error
[44]   Konkle does not make a separate argument concerning fundamental error or

       any argument resembling the majority’s reasoning. Because that reasoning is

       the basis for the reversal of Konkle’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter,

       however, I feel it necessary to address it directly. The majority’s reasoning

       appears to go as follows: (1) because Steele’s actual cause of death was an

       underlying heart condition of which Konkle had known nothing, and (2)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 26 of 33
       because the evidence that Konkle choked Steele was conflicting, and (3)

       because the jury could have concluded that the eggshell-skull doctrine applied to

       intentional or knowing homicides, and (4) because the jury could have believed

       that Konkle had taken no action that had had a high probability of killing

       Steele, (5) the jury could have convicted Konkle based on the eggshell-skull

       doctrine even though it did not believe that he had knowingly killed him. The

       mere possibility that the jury could have convicted Konkle on an arguably

       improper basis, however, falls far short of establishing that the prosecutor’s

       comments constituted fundamental error. See Nix v. State, 158 N.E.3d 795, 801

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“And, in any event, given that Nix’s arguments are

       nothing more than speculation, he has not shown that a fair trial was

       impossible.”), trans. denied.

[45]   Most of this reasoning is based on conjecture. For example, there is no reason

       to think that the jury believed that Steele’s true cause of death was a heart

       attack, as opposed to manual asphyxiation.10 As for whether evidence that

       Konkle choked Steele is conflicting, this is, in fact, the case. Brittany Fry

       testified that she had seen Konkle with Steele in a “headlock[,]” Tr. Vol. III p.

       132, and Walker testified that he had seen Konkle’s arms around Steele’s neck.

       While Christopher Gartrell indicated that he had also seen the fight but had not

       10
          This strikes me as a flawed assumption, especially in light of (1) the jury’s guilty verdict and (2) Dr.
       Nichols’s admission that his conclusions had failed to take into account evidence that Konkle had had Steele
       in a chokehold. Dr. Nichols (who himself agreed that choking someone into unconsciousness can be fatal)
       went so far as to admit that his understanding of what had occurred during the fight may not have been
       accurate. (Tr. Vol. II p. 250). It seems to me that a much more reasonable assumption is that the jury did not
       credit Dr. Nichols’s testimony regarding Steele’s cause of death.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                             Page 27 of 33
       seen any chokehold, he also indicated that he was “close friends” with Konkle

       and that the two of them socialized “a lot,” testimony the jury was entitled to

       consider in evaluating Gartrell’s credibility. Tr. Vol. III p. 17. The mere fact of

       a conflict in evidence, however, is not proof that the jury was confused or

       uncertain about the subject of that evidence.

[46]   The majority’s disposition also relies on the likelihood that the jury listened to

       the prosecutor’s explanation of the eggshell-skull doctrine and took that

       statement to heart while ignoring the trial court’s instructions.11 As mentioned,

       the trial court properly instructed the jury that it was required to at least find

       that Konkle had knowingly killed Steele in order to support a conviction of

       murder or voluntary manslaughter. “‘When the jury is properly instructed, we

       will presume they followed such instructions.’” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3,

       20 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Duncanson v. State, 509 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ind.1987)).

       There is nothing in the record to rebut the presumption that the jury followed

       the trial court’s proper instructions.

[47]   It is vaguely possible that the jury disbelieved all of the evidence that Konkle

       had knowingly killed Steele and, while also disregarding the trial court’s

       instructions, nonetheless convicted him on the basis of the eggshell-skull

       doctrine. Fundamental error, however, requires that a fair trial was rendered

       11
         The trial court instructed the jury (1) that it could not convict Konkle of murder or voluntary manslaughter
       unless it found that he had knowingly or intentionally killed Steele, (2) regarding the statutory definition of
       “knowingly,” (3) that the final arguments of counsel are not evidence, and (4) that its instructions were the
       best source of law.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024                              Page 28 of 33
       impossible, not that an unfair trial was a vague possibility. In my view, this

       case falls far short of the very high standard for fundamental error. See Nix, 158

       N.E.3d at 801.

       II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[48]   “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,

       appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable

       inferences supporting the verdict.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.

       2007). We will neither assess witness credibility nor “weigh the evidence to

       determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. When presented

       with conflicting evidence, we “must consider it most favorably to the trial

       court’s ruling.” Id. We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable fact-

       finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

       Id. “It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable

       hypothesis of innocence.” Id. “The evidence is sufficient if an inference may

       reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Id.

[49]   Konkle only challenges the jury’s conclusion that the evidence sufficiently

       proves that he acted knowingly when he killed Steele. A person commits

       voluntary manslaughter when he knowingly or intentionally kills another

       human being while acting under sudden heat. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a). The

       existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what would

       otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(b).

       Again, a person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he engages in the

       conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. Ind. Code § 35-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024     Page 29 of 33
       41-2-2(b). In other words, “[a] person knowingly kills when they are ‘aware of

       a high probability’ that their actions may kill.” Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878,

       882 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b)). The State was required to

       prove that Konkle was aware of the high probability that his actions—wrapping

       his arms around Steele’s neck while laying on top of him—would result in

       Steele’s death. “Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the trier of

       fact must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence.” Young v. State, 761

       N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. 2002).

[50]   I have little hesitation concluding that the State produced sufficient evidence to

       sustain the jury’s finding that Konkle had knowingly killed Steele. Konkle first

       attacked Clark, and, when he realized that he had attacked the wrong person,

       became even angrier and went looking for Steele. Konkle confronted,

       threatened, and antagonized Steele until Steele lashed out and punched Konkle.

       After an exchange of blows, Konkle wrapped his arms around Steele’s neck and

       laid his body on top of Steele’s. While holding Steele down, Konkle told him,

       “go to sleep, b[****.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 246. Konkle held Steele in that position

       until he was gurgling, gasping for air, and foaming at the mouth.

[51]   From this evidence, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Konkle had

       intended to cause Steele to pass out or make him unconscious. “It is generally

       presumed that a person intends the natural, necessary, and probable

       consequences of his or her acts.” Book v. State, 880 N.E.2d 1240, 1252 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2008), trans. denied. The natural and probable consequence of Konkle

       choking Steele into unconsciousness was that Steele would be deprived of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024      Page 30 of 33
       oxygen, which deprivation, if sufficiently prolonged, leads to death. Moreover,

       Konkle asked several carnival employees to lie and say that Steele had fallen

       while taking a shower. See, e.g., Stone v. State, 555 N.E.2d 475, (Ind. 1990)

       (noting that attempts at concealing evidence may be considered by a jury as

       revealing consciousness of guilt). Finally, when paramedics and law

       enforcement arrived, Konkle attempted to flee. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d

       1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (noting that efforts to avoid arrest can be viewed as

       consciousness of guilt). The State produced evidence from which a jury could

       have reasonably concluded that Konkle knowingly killed Steele, which is

       sufficient evidence to sustain Konkle’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter.

       III. Sentence
[52]   We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of

       the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in

       light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind.

       Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due

       consideration to the trial court’s sentence because of the special expertise of the

       trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an

       authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.”

       Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (citations

       and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate

       at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the

       severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that

       come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024       Page 31 of 33
       2008). In addition to the “due consideration” we are required to give to the

       trial court’s sentencing decision, “we understand and recognize the unique

       perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State,

       866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Konkle was sentenced to an

       aggregate term of thirty-four years of incarceration out of a possible maximum

       of fifty years.

[53]   As to nature of his offense, Konkle killed Steele for his alleged ridicule of a

       special-needs child. Konkle sought out Steele after being told by numerous

       other carnival employees and family to let management address the situation.

       Instead, Konkle continued to seek out Steele over the course of a few hours and

       threatened him until a physical altercation ensued. After the altercation,

       Konkle asked other carnival employees to lie about what had happened and

       when they refused, attempted to flee the scene.

[54]   Konkle’s character also does not support a reduction of his sentence. As a

       juvenile, Konkle was adjudicated a delinquent for domestic battery. Konkle

       violated juvenile probation numerous times for failing drug screens and

       engaging in violent behavior with other family members. As an adult, Konkle

       has been convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor, battery resulting in

       bodily injury, battery, and operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license.

       See, e.g., id. at 874 (concluding that the number of prior offenses in relation to

       the current offense is significant in assessing the defendant’s character). Konkle

       has also repeatedly violated the terms of probation and has had probation

       revoked. Konkle’s repeated and consistent disregard for the law does not cast

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024        Page 32 of 33
       his character in “a positive light,” which is his burden to show under Rule 7(B).

       Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Konkle has failed to

       demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his

       offense or his character.

[55]   Because I would vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court, I respectfully

       dissent.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024      Page 33 of 33