Court Opinion

ID: 9487886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:29:09.787114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:32.548112
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
partially concurring:
I concur fully in Part I, but write separately because I disagree with the majority’s holding in Part II that the district court’s finding that Weems had no knowledge of the marijuana grow at the Puyallup property was necessary to the district court’s judgment that the Puyallup property was forfeitable because it was purchased with structured funds.1 Majority Opinion at 532.
The district court in the civil forfeiture proceeding entered judgment ordering that “the property identified as [the Puyallup property] is hereby FORFEITED to the United States.” ER Tab 1 at 10. Thus, the Government was the prevailing party. The determination that Weems was an innocent owner, though fully and fairly litigated and decided, did not support the judgment in favor of the Government that the property *534was forfeitable. The law in the Ninth Circuit is that a determination adverse to the prevailing party is not necessary to the judgment and is therefore generally not given preclusive effect. United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1994); see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Int'l Mkt. Place, 773 F.2d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir.1985).
The three major treatises'on this topic are in accord with Ninth Circuit law that the determination that Weems was an innocent owner was not necessary to the'judgment of forfeiture. See James Wm. Moore, et al., 1B Moore’s Federal Practice H.443 [5.-1], at 585-86 (2d ed. 1994); Restatement Second of Judgments, § 27, comment h, Illustrations 13 & 14, “Determinations Not Essential to the Judgment” (1982); Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Jurisdiction § 4421, at 199 (1981).
The majority disregards this authority, and holds that the determination that Weems was an innocent owner — a determination adverse to the prevailing party — was necessary to the judgment of forfeiture. Majority Op. at 531-32. The majority goes astray by substituting one of the two rationales underlying the “necessary to the judgment” rule for the rule itself.
The two rationales supporting the “necessary to the judgment” rule are: (1) “to ensure that the finder of fact in the first case took sufficient care in determining the issue,” Pettaway v. Plummer, 943 F.2d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 296, 121 L.Ed.2d 220 (1992); and (2) to protect against the fact that “appellate review of a determination may not be available where the issue is not necessary to the determination of the final judgment,” id. n. 1; accord Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 289 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994); Moore et al., ¶ .433[5.-1], at 585; Wright, Miller § 4421, at 193. The majority takes the first rationale and converts it into the test for whether a decided issue is “necessary” to the final judgment: the majority concludes that because “it is very clear that the district court heard evidence and argument from both sides” the determination that Weems was an innocent owner must have been necessary to the judgment of forfeiture. Majority Op. at 532-33. This conclusion is. logically flawed.
The two rationales underlying the “necessary to the judgment” rule ultimately justify why a determination made in a prior proceeding should or should not have preclusive effect on later proceedings. They do not, however, necessarily go to what determinations are “necessary to the judgment.” See Wright, Miller § 4421, at 196-97. It is precisely for this reason that even though I disagree with the majority’s holding that the innocent owner determination was necessary to the judgment, I nevertheless agree that it should be given preclusive effect. Neither of the two rationales underlying the “necessary to the judgment” rule are implicated here: the innocent owner issue was fully and fairly litigated and the Government had an opportunity to challenge the adverse finding on cross-appeal. Majority Op. at 532-33. Therefore, this case warrants an exception to the general rule that preclusive effect should be given only to determinations that are, among other things, necessary to a previous judgment. See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85, 99 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that because the prevailing party could have sought review of an adverse determination through cross-appeal, the adverse determination would be given preclusive effect despite the general rule that “determinations adverse to the winning litigant do not have conclusive effect as collateral estoppel”); Home Owners Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 238 N.E.2d 55, 59 (1968) (“[O]ur holding expands the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to encompass certain findings not strictly essential to the final judgment in the prior action.... Such findings may be relied upon if it is clear that the issues underlying them were treated as essential to the prior case by the court and the party to be bound.... We deem this limited extension of the rule warranted in view of the strong and oft-stated public policy of limiting each litigant to one opportunity to try his case on the merits.”); Wright, Miller § 4421, at 200 (“Preclusion could be made available so long as it can be made to appear that real *535care was in fact taken in litigating and deciding the unnecessary issue.”)-

. Recall that collateral estoppel applies when (1) the issue sought to be litigated is sufficiently similar to the issue present in an earlier proceeding and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first case, and (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the first case. United States v. Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir.1978) (emphasis added).