Court Opinion

ID: 9557529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:51:48.050054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:55.306209
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom KAUGER, V.C.J. and WATT, J., join.
The Attorney General requests rehearing for the purpose of determining whether this Court’s opinion applies retroactively or prospectively. Appellees have no objection to his request. The general rule is that a court’s opinion declaring a statute unconstitutional is retroactive, unless stated otherwise. Ethics Commission of State of Oklahoma v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1079 (Okla.1993). See Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Comm*34ission, 872 P.2d 910, 913-916 (Okla.1993). But there are exceptions.
For example, retroactive application does not open final judgments. A judicial proceeding that is final cannot be reopened. State ex rel. Tharel v. Board of County Commissioners of Creek County, 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542, 550 (1940). As explained by the United States Supreme Court: “New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed.” Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 1751, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995).
What about contracts entered into pursuant to the statute prior to October 10, 1995, the date the statute was held unconstitutional? Retroactive application of a new rule of law as to an unconstitutional statute does not necessarily alter such a contract. A contract will survive if it rests on other general constitutionally valid provisions. Richardson v. Mustang Fuel Corp., 772 P.2d 1324, 1326-1327 (Okla.1989); General Motors v. Oklahoma County Bd. of Equalization, 678 P.2d 233, 237-238 (Okla.1983); Board of County Commissioners of Pottawatomie County v. A.C. Davis & Sons, 184 Okla. 258, 86 P.2d 782 (1939); Gordon v. Conner, 183 Okla. 82, 80 P.2d 322 (1938).
A Court’s opinion does not reach back in time to invalidate a public contract where the provisions of the contract are valid apart from the unconstitutional Act. Those general laws authorizing government entities to contract, combined with the reliance of the parties, are sufficient to uphold the otherwise valid unchallenged contracts. When the contract was legally binding it is not subject to being invalidated on the basis of this Court’s opinion. Board of Commissioners of Pottawatomie County v. A.C. Davis & Sons, supra; Gordon v. Conner, supra, Richardson v. Mustang Fuel Corp., supra.
A contract executed after October 10, 1995 is, of course, subject to attack if it incorporates the now unconstitutional statutory wage provisions. This is because public officials cannot rely upon the presumed constitutionality of the infirm Act after our pronouncement on October 10,1995.
The Court’s opinion explains and imposes upon this ease, at least for the benefit of the “public builders”, its version of the pipeline doctrine. See Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 872 P.2d 910, 915 n. 44 (Okla.1993), which explained how a new rule of law could be applied in cases subject to direct review as opposed to collateral review.
I would state the pipeline doctrine for this case as follows: Those contracts of strangers to this litigation in situations where the contracts became legally binding prior to October 10, 1995, unless subject to administrative or judicial review as of that date, in proceedings where the Constitutionality issue decided in this ease is timely raised, are not subject to being invalidated on the basis of this Court’s opinion. Board of Commissioners of Pottawatomie County v. A.C. Davis & Sons, supra; Gordon v. Conner, supra, Richardson v. Mustang Fuel Corp., supra. Those entities in the pipeline (as explained above) as of that date should have the benefit of our declaration of the statute’s invalidity, even though their contracts pre-dated October 10,1995.