Court Opinion

ID: 9736365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:54:00.242625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:06.199908
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s analysis and agree that the outcome here is dictated by precedent. That does not mean that I believe such an outcome is logical or fair.
The proposition that merely because an injured employee is treated at a facility that has links to the employment site where the original injury was sustained, he or she is prohibited from bringing a sepa*356rate action for neglectful or reckless care makes no sense to me. If that employee was treated at a facility where there was no such link, his or her ability to bring a separate action would be considerably enhanced. This result seems to single out hospital or healthcare provider employees for unequal treatment under the Act. It appears a construction worker injured on the job, for example, would not be precluded from bringing a malpractice action if he or she received negligent aftercare from a healthcare provider. See Seaton, 223 Ind. at 414-15, 61 N.E.2d at 181.
As the majority points out, however, our precedent is very strict regarding the genesis of the injury and leads necessarily to the conclusion that under facts such as these, Vitatoe’s exclusive remedy against Community for injury caused by her treatment that exacerbated her workplace injury is under the Act. Perhaps our legislature will examine what I consider to be this inequity in the future.