Court Opinion

ID: 9782436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:32:25.973297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:33.019118
License: Public Domain

OPALA, V.C.J.,
dissenting in part.
T1 The court reverses today the trial court's counsel-fee award to the special master and denies his appeal-related attorney's fee quest. I agree with the court's pronouncement insofar as it rejects the notion that the provisions of 48 0.S8.2001 § 110(D) are invocable here to support the special master's claim for a counsel-fee award. I disagree that the fee award is not sustainable by another legislative source. The provisions of 12 0.8.2001 § 9861 authorize an allowance of attorney's fee in an action to recover "for services." A special master's claim for professional services is clearly comprised within the purview of § 986.
I
A SPECIAL MASTER'S QUEST FOR AN ATTORNEY'S FEE PRESENTS AN ANCILLARY CLAIM
T2 The court has apparently adopted the mistaken view that a special master's compensation quest is not fit for classification as a claim. I disagree. It is as much a court claim as any other. It falls under the rubric of ancillary claims. Our pronouncement in Rand v. Nash2 empowers a judge to appoint an "arm of the court" to secure needed services. One so appointed has an ancillary claim for the value of services.3 A dispute over liability for the services may be treated by a court as ancillary to a case.4 The special master's counsel-fee quest for trial-related legal services stands preserved here by his timely nisi prius request and by his later demand, made both in the petition in error and the brief, for an appeal-related attorney's fee.
II
THE SPECIAL MASTER'S COUNSEL-FEE AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BASED ON A DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY SOURCE FROM THAT INVOKED BY HIS COUNSEL
T3 The special master's claim to affir-mance of his nisi prius counsel-fee award is neither fatally nor eternally flawed by his erroneous district-court reliance on the terms of 43 0.98.2001 § 110(D). A nisi prius judgment or order must be affirmed if it is supported by any applicable legal principle.5 This court's decision in Barnes v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Insurance Co.6 conflicts with its fee rejection today. In Barnes7 the court invalidated the wrongly rested counsel-fee award but remanded the cause with directions that the plaintiff be permitted to explore for the availability of other authorities. Barnes supports the view that no litigant should be barred from relief by rely*705ing on the wrong statute for securing a counsel-fee award.
II
BY THE AUTHORITY OF 12 0.S8.2001 § 936 A SPECIAL MASTER MAY BE GRANTED A COUNSEL-FEE AWARD FOR SERVICES INCIDENT TO A § 619 COMPENSATION RECOVERY
T4 The terms of 12 O.S. § 986 8 apply to all parties whose claims for services prove successful, whether in demands pressed by their action or in proceedings ancillary to the action. Hamilton v. Telex. Corp. teaches that the totality of an attorney's compensation includes time spent on recovering an earlier court-granted fee.9 There the quest was rested on the terms of § 986.10 Here, the special master performed valuable services in a divorce proceeding. His status as an appointed arm of the court pressing an ancillary _ compensation-for-service - claim stands on a footing at least equal to others who provide services dehors a judicial appointment. The § 986 11 authority is invoca-ble by all prevailing parties in a quest for the value of performed services, whether by contract or court appointment. A compensation claim for a 12 0.8.2001 § 619 12 service may not be excluded from the benefit of § 936 without offending the state constitution's mandate for uniformity of court procedure.13
{5 I hence recede from the court's view that § 619-either by its text or by its jurisprudential gloss-prevents a prevailing service renderer from invoking a $ 986 right to a counsel-fee award. The court has indeed used pure ipse dixit to pronounce today that a § 619 compensation-for-service recovery will not support the special master's counsel-fee quest. No extant jurisprudence negates the notion that a prevailing special master in a $ 619 proceeding is entitled to an attorney's fee authorized by $ 986.
IV
THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR JURISPRUDENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR THE COURTS SUB SILENTIO NOTION THAT A BENEFICIARY OF COURT-GRANTED COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES MAY NOT RECEIVE AN ATTORNEY'S FEE ABSENT SOME EXPLICIT LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL
T6 It appears that the court's refusal to affirm the trial court's counsel-fee allowance rests on its unsupportable sub silentio assumption. There is no jurisprudential basis for the notion that in the absence of some explicit legislative approval an attorney's fee may not be added to a judge-allowed compensation-for-service: recovery to one who acted as a court-appointed arm. Oklahoma case law supports the opposite view. In Hamilton14 this court granted a counsel-fee award to a lawyer for collecting and enfore-ing his own earlier-granted fee for legal services.15
*706T7 Several federal jurisdictions have allowed recovery of additional fees expended for legal service in enforcing a court-granted counsel fee"16 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that not awarding an additional expense incurred in counsel-fee collection would "dilute" a counsel-fee allowance.17 National jurisprudence clearly approves of a counsel-fee award for services rendered in collection and enforcement of a court-granted fee.
18 A special master performs services pursuant to court appointment. As a prevailing party, a special master is as much entitled to an attorney's fee as are others who sue to recover for services rendered under a contract. If Hamilton (and national jurisprudence) allow a lawyer's fee award to be augmented by the time spent on enforcing that award, a special master's compensation for court-required services may also be enhanced by the value of legal work rendered to secure and enforce the master's judicially approved compensation in the case.
y
THE SPECIAL MASTER IS ENTITLED TO AN APPEAL-AS WELL AS A CERTIORARI-RELATED - ATTORNEY'S FEE
T9 When statutory authority supports one's quest for an attorney's fee as a prevailing party in a proceeding for services, a counsel-fee award may also be allowed for legal services in the reviewing courts.18 It is hence appropriate here to authorize an attorney's fee for the special master to compensate him for legal services on review. The provisions of § 986 afford ample legal basis for that award. In short, the special master should be allowed an attorney's fee for appeal- and certiorari-related legal services.
VI
THE COURT IS MISTAKEN IN THE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY IT AFFIRMS TODAY
[ 10 Although the court reverses today the trial court's award of an attorney's fee, it nevertheless mistakenly allows that fee by affirming the nisi prius judgment for $48,703.40. That amount includes an attorney's fee.19 The stated figure is hence plainly in error. According to the record, the sum of $48,780.40 represents both recovery and attorney's fee for the trial-related services, rather than solely the § 619 compensation to the master. Severing the total award into two parts-recovery and fee-would be impossible. The materials in the record do not show these figures separately.20
VIH
SUMMARY
4 11 I would affirm the award of $48,708.40 for the master's compensation-for-service recovery and for his nisi prius counsel-fee al-lowanee; I would also authorize that he be *707granted an additional fee for review-related legal services.

. For the pertinent terms of 12 0.$.2001 § 936 see infra note 8.

. 1935 OK 1086, 18, 51 P.2d 296, 298.

. The district court is duty-bound to consider an ancillary claim correctly invoked by one whom the court appointed to render service in a case. Rand, supra note 2 at I 8, at 298.

. Tisdale v. Wheeler Bros. Grain Co., 1979 OK 94, ¶ 3, 599 P.2d 1104, 1105; Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Rittenhouse, Hanson, & Evans, 1955 OK 133, ¶ 10, 285 P.2d 186, 189; Opperud v. Bussey, 1935 OK 1221, ¶ 14, 172 Okla. 625, 46 P.2d 319, 321; Simpson v. Baker, 1926 OK 957, ¶ 6, 123 Okla. 118, 252 P. 834, 835.

. There is no need here to comment on the now-rejected legal authority the district court assigned to support its fee allowance. A legally supportable judgment must be affirmed, even though rested below on an incorrect legal premise. Myers v. Lashley, 2002 OK 14, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 553, 557; Akin v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1998 OK 102, ¶ 35, 977 P.2d 1040, 1054; Bivins v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Memorial Hosp., 1996 OK 5, ¶ 22, n. 40, 917 P.2d 456, 465, n. 40; Matter of Estate of Maheras, 1995 OK 40, ¶ 7, 897 P.2d 268, 272.

. 2000 OK 55, 157, 11 P.3d 162, 182.

. Barnes, supra note 6.

. The pertinent terms of 12 0.S.2001 § 936 provide: "In any civil action to recover for labor or services rendered ... unless otherwise provided by law ... the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs."

. 1978 OK 33, % 6, 576 P.2d 769, 770.

. Hamilton, supra note 9.

. Had the special master filed his claim in a separate action, he would have undoubtedly been entitled to relief under § 936.

. The terms of 12 0.$.2001 § 619 provide: ''The referees shall be allowed such compensation for their services as the court may deem just and proper, which shall be taxed as part of the costs in the case."

. The terms of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., provide in pertinent part: 'The Legislature 'shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing ... [rlegulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts."

. Hamilton, supra note 9.

. The so-called American rule requires that authority to grant an attorney's {ee be rested either on contract or legislation. Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70, ¶ 7, 690 P.2d 1048, 1049; Garner v. City of Tulsa, 1982 OK 104, ¶ 32, 651 P.2d 1325, 1329-30. In contrast, the extent or quantum of an allowable fee recovery may rest solely on a norm of the common law. Hamilton, supra note 9.

. Burke v. Guiney, 700 F.2d 767, 772 (1st Cir.1983)(allowing a counsel-fee award for contempt sanctions); Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1305 (11th Cir.1988)(a claimant was allowed compensation for services rendered until all the court-granted fee was obtained); Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 538, 545 (10th Cir.2000)(allowing the collection of post-judgmenit fees under the provisions of the False Claim Act as well as under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 59 F.3d 58, 60 (7th Cir.1995)(awarding costs of collection becomes necessary to carry out a judg-men? when entitlement to a fee is established).

. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 684 (N.D.Cal.1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978).

. Sisney, supra note 15 at ¶ 20, at 1051; Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 1986 OK 30, ¶ 13, 720 P.2d 721, 728; Cook v. Oklahoma Bd. of Public Affairs, 1987 OK 22, ¶ 46, 736 P.2d 140, 154.

. The 4 Sept. 2001 nisi prius order awarded the special master "fees and costs."" These are termed as "said attorney's fees and costs."

. My careful perusal of the record did not yield separate figures either for the total of the special master's § 619 compensation-for-service recovery or for his nisi prius counsel-fee allowance.