Court Opinion

ID: 9669031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:37:40.70852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.630294
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The points first argued on rehearing relate to insufficiency of the Hunter amended affidavit of date July 9, 1955 as raising an issue of fact by way of newly discovered evidence; and similar insttfficiency of the City’s unsworn motion and amended motion for new trial. Appellee’s point 1 will be quoted: “This Court erred in reversing and remanding said cause on the ground that the amended affidavit of Homer Hunter related to matters in the nature of newly discovered evidence, and that the trial court was in duty bound to grant appellant a new trial based solely upon the filing of said amended affidavit with the clerk of the court after trial and rendition of judgment for appellee on July 12, 1955, since (a) the uncontradicted record shows that the amended affidavit related to matters of which appellant and its attorneys of record had both actual and constructive notice for a period of nearly three months before rendition of said judgment; (b) said motion for new trial was not sworn to by either of appellant’s attorneys of record or by any officer or agent of appellant City; and (c) the unsworn motion for new trial is utterly void of any showing or allegation that appellant and its attorneys of record did not discover the facts to which said affidavit related until after the trial of the cause and judgment rendered thereon.” Point 3 asserts error on the further ground that the grant of a motion for new trial is a matter for the trial court’s discretion; the instant record not disclosing any arbitrary court action or that such discretionary power has been abused. In this connection, the City’s amended motion for new trial refers to the amended affidavit of Hunter, “dated July 9, 1955 which is on file in this cause and which is hereby incorporated herein as a part of this pleading * * then quoting that part of the affidavit emphasized in original opinion.
We agree with appellee’s reiterated statement of principles governing any motion for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence; in other words, the applicant must show that knowledge of its existence was acquired subsequent to the trial; that it was not due to want of diligence that such evidence was not discovered and obtained in time to be used when the case was tried; that it was material (not cumulative) and that if admitted it would probably change the result on another trial. 31 Tex.Jur., p. 90. But the cited rules more properly relate to the trial *282of a cause on its merits; it being enough, we think, in a proceeding for summary-judgment that the affidavit reflecting such belated issue of fact be brought to the Court’s attention during course of the trial. And a court trial as commonly known is inclusive of every step taken in the determination of the issues between the parties, and therefore includes the motion for new trial. Lawyers Lloyds v. Webb, 137 Tex. 107, 152 S.W.2d 1096. “Ordinarily, a party moving for summary judgment is held strictly to a conclusive showing that no fact issue exists and that he is entitled to judgment without further delay, and courts accord resisting party considerably more indulgence, and motion will be denied if it appears that a substantial fact dispute may exist, regardless of informalities or defects in resisting party’s papers. * * * The underlying purpose of Rule of Civil Procedure authorizing summary judgment is elimination of patently unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses, and rule was not intended to deprive litigants of their right to full hearing on merits of any real issue of fact.” (Emphasis ours.) Kaufman v. Blackman, Tex.Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 422, syls. 3 and 4.
Further points and argument thereon will be discussed briefly: (1) We have not held that Bostick, appellee’s Vice President, was “thereby precluded from testifying.” Our conclusion in that connection was that the affidavit of Bostick, an interested witness, was not conclusive on summary judgment hearing; his sworn statement at most merely demonstrating the existence of a fact issue; (2) appellee says that it is now entitled to judgment, having sued on an implied contract to compel restitution and compensation for the money furnished; and cites Hayward v. City of Corpus Christi, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 995, 1004, where the rule is followed that: * * [W]here, under a contract which is merely invalid and not fraudulent or malum in se, one has furnished to a municipality, or other political subdivision, real or personal property, whether or not enhanced by his own labor,, which property the public fails to pay for, he may upon equitable terms recover it in specie, if recovery may be had without material injury to other property and without causing the public any inconvenience other than results from depriving it of that to which it has no just claim.’” However, plaintiff has first declared upon an express contract, seeking recovery of $80,656.74 (less refund, or a net of $79,339.19), and only alternatively for the same amount, “being the reasonable value of the benefits received and accepted by defendant from the money advanced by plaintiff to it and as well the reasonable value of the constructed sewer and water lines accepted by defendant and which were paid for by use of plaintiff’s furnished money”; obviously comprehending an issue of fact for determination by court or jury. Here we may add that this Development Company has thus stated a cause of action,, concerning which the rule announced in Sluder v. City of San Antonio, Tex.Com.App., 2 S.W.2d 841, 842, is undoubtedly controlling. The Supreme Court there held: “[WJhere a county or municipality receives benefits under a contract, illegal because not made in conformity with the Constitution or statute of the state, or charter provision of the city, it will be held liable on an implied contract for the reasonable value of the benefits which it may have received.” Also that the right to recover under an implied contract for benefits conferred upon municipalities applies with equal force, whether a party contracting with a city furnishes money, property, or personal services.
And lastly appellee argues that the amended affidavit of Hunter relates to reasonable value of the sewer and water lines as of July 9, 1955 — an immaterial date. Plaintiff alleged no fixed date as to when its suit on an implied contract had accrued; whether on date of petition declaring on same (February 1955), or on date of acceptance of the'work by the City (July 21, 1954), or at time the money was fur*283■nished (April 6, 1954). At any rate the Hunter affidavit as amended qualifies affiant as a witness throughout the period mentioned.
Motion for rehearing is overruled.