Court Opinion

ID: 9770707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:41.137722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.004990
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice. As I read the majority opinion, the plaintiff, in securing personal jurisdiction upon a nonresident pursuant to the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2501, et seq. (Supp. 1977), no longer has to make a showing that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in this state. The reason for that assumption is that the burden of proof in such matters is upon the nonresident defendant. Thus, under today’s majority decision, a nonresident becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state upon a mere verified allegation of the plaintiff that the nonresident defendant has availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in this state. The majority’s position is incorrect for the following two reasons. (1) By the terms of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2502 C. 1., a presumption of jurisdiction is not authorized. That section provides: C. Personal jurisdiction based upon conduct. 1. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a (cause of action) (claim for relief) arising from the person’s (a) transacting any business in this state: (b) . . . . 2. When jurisdiction over a person is based upon this section, only a (cause of action) (claim for relief) arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him .... As can be seen from the very terms of the Uniform Act, jurisdiction of the person is limited to “acts” performed by the person — not from a presumption of facts. (2) The presumption created by the majority opinion makes the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act invalid under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. In Pennsalt Chemical Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 244 Ark. 638, 426 S.W. 2d 417 (1968), after pointing out that the United States Supreme Court had recognized the right of a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for acts committed outside the state but affecting a resident of the state, we recognized the limitation of that right in this language: The only restriction in International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945), and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra, is that before a state can exercise such jurisdiction it is essential that there be a showing that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. It is recognized that such activities may be carried on by mail, Travelers Health Ass’n. v. Commonwealth of Va., 339 U.S. 643, 70 S. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed. 1154 (1950), and by an independent agent or manufacturer’s representative, Jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Va. 1965); Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961); Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 22 App. Div. 2d 138, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 258 (1964); and Coreil v. Pearson, 242 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. La. 1965). The unconstitutional burden placed upon a nonresident defendant by the majority decision can be demonstrated by assuming the case of the ex-mothér-in-law who wishes to help the daughter fight her battles and assumes that the ex-son-in-law, a nonresident, works for an interstate airline. The mother, a resident of Arkansas, can file suit and verify a complaint alleging that she loaned the ex-son-in-law $2,500 in cash when he came through Arkansas on his honeymoon. When the son comes into court and testifies that he had never been to Arkansas before in his life, the ex-mother-in-law only has to testify that the ex-son-in-law is a liar and the trial judge, not knowing which one to believe, will have to find against the ex-son-in-law on the matter of jurisdiction because the majority says that he has the burden of proof. New people can tell you where they were on a Saturday thirty months ago and still fewer can find anyone to corroborate their locations on such a day. Yet the majority opinion places the onerous burden upon the nonresident of disproving his alleged contacts with the state. A nonresident defendant has enough problems when sued in a foreign jurisdiction without being “home towned” in favor of the plaintiff by a presumption that he must have done the things the plaintiff has alleged. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.