Court Opinion

ID: 9679581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:57:32.156719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:16.062384
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 44. {concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that Graham's workplace injury is compensable under Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1).
I
¶ 45. The majority opinion, at ¶ 36, explains how the worker's compensation remedy provided by Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) applies to a limp. The limp must be a permanent disfigurement. It must occasion potential wage loss taking into account the age, education, training and previous experience and earnings of the employee; the employee's present occupation and earnings; and the likelihood of future suitable occupational change. Furthermore, the limp must occur on an area of the body that is exposed during the normal course of employment. Finally, the Department of Workforce Development must take into account the appearance of the disfigurement, its location, and the likelihood of its *321exposure in occupations for which the employee is suited when determining the award of compensation.
¶ 46. Relating to the requirement that a limp occur on an area of the body that is exposed during the normal course of employment, the majority opinion draws a puzzling distinction between a limp that "occurs on an area of the body" (namely the leg) and a second kind of limp that is "merely a motion." Majority op., ¶ 40. The majority opinion does not explain this distinction or how to determine whether a limp falls into one or the other category. Because I do not understand the distinction, I would not adopt it.
II
¶ 47. Purporting to adopt a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, the majority opinion states that" '[a] review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.1 "1 I do not agree that statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.2
¶ 48. A statute's meaning is "plain" when the meaning is so readily apparent from the statute's text *322that inquiry beyond the text is unnecessary.3 In seeking a plain meaning, the court seeks a meaning that anyone — a lawyer, a party, an administrator, or any reader — could discern simply by examining the text of the statute, perhaps with the aid of a dictionary, a book generally available to all.
¶ 49. The majority opinion cites two authorities in support of its position that a plain meaning analysis may encompass the review of statutory history: Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; and State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52 n.9, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Neither of the cited authorities supports the proposition that the majority opinion sets forth.
¶ 50. Richards, authored by the author of the majority opinion in the present case, cites ¶ 69 of my concurring opinion in Kalal (without noting that the cited paragraph appears in my concurrence and not in Justice Sykes' majority opinion) as support for the position that a review of statutory history is part of the plain meaning analysis. Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, ¶ 22. Nothing in my Kalal concurrence states that *323statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis. Rather my Kalal concurrence at ¶ 69 (cited by the Richards court) provides a "nonexhaustive list of the various forms of 'history,'" including both statutory history and legislative history, "that have been and will be helpful in interpreting a statute."4
¶ 51. The majority opinion's second reference is to footnote 9 of the Kalal majority opinion, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 52. Kalal's footnote 9 simply explains the scholarship of Professor Cass Sunstein. Professor Sunstein distinguishes statutory history from legislative history and advocates some degree of caution in relying upon the latter. The Kalal majority opinion states neither that statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis nor that Professor Sunstein considers statutory history to be part of a plain meaning analysis.5
¶ 52. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 53. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 Majority op., ¶ 27.

 A review of repealed statutory provisions is useful because "[b]y analyzing the changes the legislature has made over time, a court may infer [legislative] intent" that is not expressed in the statute's plain text. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 69, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Ahrahamson, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 979-82, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996) ("examining] the history of lemon laws in general," as well as the history underlying Wisconsin's lemon law statute, to determine whether to include the purchase price of the car as pecuniary damages under the statute); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-41 (2001) (although "[e]ach of the parties [argued] that the plain meaning of the [statutory] words 'remedies' and 'available'... [was] con*322trolling," statutory history yielded an inference of Congressional intent that the statute's words did not).

 In State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶ 14, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171, for example, this court characterized the plain meaning analysis as follows: "If the language of a statute is clear on its face, we need not look any further than the statutory text to determine the statute's meaning." See also State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).

 Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 69 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 In his article, Professor Sunstein characterizes the "plain meaning approach" to statutory interpretation as requiring courts to "rely on the words [in a statute] or on their ordinary meaning. ..." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 418-19 (1989). See also id. at 410, 416 ("[S]ome courts and observers see the text or 'plain meaning' of statutory language as the exclusive or principal guide to meaning.... Some textualists emphasize the 'plain meaning' or dictionary definition of statutory terms; others are more sensitive to the particular settings...."). Professor Sunstein does not suggest that the plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation may incorporate a review of statutory history.