Court Opinion

ID: 2964545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:14.210286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:09.151336
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1372

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                     JACK CIOCCA,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                       [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
                                          ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                     Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                                _____________________

               John C. McBride, with whom McBride  & Keefe was on brief for
               _______________            ________________
          appellant.
               F. Mark Terison, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
               _______________
          Jay  P.  McCloskey,  United  States  Attorney,  and  Jonathan  R.
          __________________                                   ____________
          Chapman,  Assistant United  States  Attorney, were  on brief  for
          _______
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  February 24, 1997
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief  Judge.  On June 8,  1995, a complaint
                    TORRUELLA, Chief  Judge.
                               ____________

          was filed against Defendant-Appellant  Jack Ciocca ("Ciocca") and

          Harold  Nelson ("Nelson"),  who is  not a  party to  this appeal,

          charging both with  conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with

          intent  to distribute, cocaine in  violation of 18  U.S.C.   846,

          and  distribution and  possession  with intent  to distribute  in

          violation of 18 U.S.C.    841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).  After  a jury

          found  Ciocca guilty on both counts, the district court sentenced

          him  to imprisonment for a term of 188 months, supervised release

          for  a term of eight  years, and a  fine of $70,000.   Ciocca now

          appeals his conviction on three grounds.   He claims that (1) the

          district court erred in refusing to admit the psychiatric records

          of prosecution  witness  Kevin  Caporino  ("Caporino");  (2)  the

          evidence was insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction; and

          (3) the  district court erred in admitting tapes of conversations

          involving Ciocca and Caporino.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    We  present the  facts the  jury reasonably  could have

          found, in the light most favorable to the verdict.  United States
                                                              _____________

          v.  Josleyn,  99 F.3d  1182,  1185 n.1  (1st  Cir. 1996).   Kevin
              _______

          Caporino  met  Ciocca  in  1981  when  Ciocca  entered the  Maine

          restaurant in which Caporino was working.  At that first meeting,

          Caporino gave Ciocca some cocaine for personal use.  Ciocca later

          stopped  back at  the restaurant  and told  Caporino that  he was

          involved  in a cocaine trafficking  business.  Within  a month of

          that initial  meeting, Caporino  then met Ciocca  in Connecticut.

                                         -2-

          At the Connecticut meeting,  Ciocca gave Caporino an eighth  of a

          kilogram  of cocaine,  which  Caporino tried  to  sell in  Maine.

          Caporino continued  to sell cocaine  for Ciocca until  1983, when

          Caporino  was involved in an  automobile accident.  This accident

          caused  Caporino to suffer  amnesia and led  to extensive therapy

          intended to recover his memory.

                    In  the spring  of  1994, Ciocca  and Nelson  contacted

          Caporino  and requested that he serve as a courier between Ciocca

          in Connecticut and Nelson in Maine.  Caporino agreed.  During the

          1980s,  Caporino  had  served   Ciocca  in  a  similar  capacity,

          transporting  cocaine between  Connecticut  and Maine  up to  ten

          times.   Caporino's role was to retrieve money from Nelson, drive

          the money to Ciocca  in Connecticut, wait for Ciocca to count the

          money,  then  transport  a  kilogram  of  cocaine  from  Ciocca's

          residence back to Nelson.  For his role, Caporino was paid $2,000

          by Nelson for  each delivery,  although sometimes he  was paid  a

          pound of marijuana in lieu of the $2,000.  Caporino made six such

          trips prior to his arrest in May 1995.

                    In late April  or early May  1995, Caporino received  a

          kilogram of  cocaine from Ciocca and delivered  it to Nelson.  At

          this point, Nelson  gave him an ounce of cocaine for repayment of

          money owed to  Caporino.   Caporino in  turn gave  this ounce  to

          undercover  Agent  Scott Durst,  of  the  Maine Drug  Enforcement

          Agency.   Upon this transaction, Caporino was arrested and agreed

          to cooperate with law enforcement personnel.  On May 11, Caporino

          was paid $250 for further debts owed him by Nelson.

                                         -3-

                    On May 3, 1995, Ciocca participated in a controlled buy

          with  Agent   Durst,  using  Caporino   as  a  conduit   for  the

          transactions.    The  buy  was  arranged  by  means   of  several

          electronically monitored telephone  conversations between  Ciocca

          and  Caporino, during which  Ciocca told  Caporino that  he would

          bring three  and a half ounces  of cocaine to a  meeting place in

          Boston.   Prior to the  controlled buy, Caporino  was searched by

          agents  of the  U.S.  Drug  Enforcement  Agency.    The  buy  was

          monitored  by  means  of  an electronic  wire  and  a  micro-tape

          recorder placed on Caporino.  Caporino, accompanied by Durst, met

          Ciocca outside the Boston Gardens.  Ciocca and Caporino entered a

          nearby restaurant  and proceeded to  the restroom.   Caporino and

          Ciocca were in  the restroom  for three to  four minutes,  during

          which  time Caporino gave  Ciocca $3,000,  which he  had received

          from  Durst and  which Ciocca  counted out in  the restroom.   In

          exchange,  Ciocca  gave  Caporino  three  and a  half  ounces  of

          cocaine.    After the  buy, Caporino  gave  the cocaine  to Agent

          Durst.   Caporino and Durst then returned to a nearby DEA office,

          where Caporino was searched again.

                    Between  May  11  and   June  7,  Caporino  engaged  in

          telephone  and in-person  conversations with  Ciocca  and Nelson,

          trying  to determine when the next delivery between the two would

          occur.  On June 7, Nelson informed Caporino that he had the money

          for the  buy and had  spoken with Ciocca,  who had a  kilogram of

          cocaine ready for purchase.   That day, Nelson met  with Caporino

          in  Maine and transferred  to him an  envelope containing $5,500.

                                         -4-

          The  two made  arrangements for  the transfer  of the  cocaine to

          Nelson upon  Caporino's return from  Connecticut.  Both  prior to

          and after this meeting, Caporino and his car were searched.

                    Caporino then travelled with Agent Durst to Connecticut

          to pick up  the kilogram of cocaine from Ciocca.   Caporino's car

          broke down along the way and the DEA supplied a truck to complete

          the trip.   Approximately ten minutes  away from Ciocca's  house,

          the agents  transferred Caporino to  the truck.   At the  time of

          this transfer,  Caporino was  searched.  Agent  Durst accompanied

          Caporino  in the  truck until  they were  near Ciocca's  home, at

          which point Durst joined the other law enforcement agents.

                    After being ushered into  the house by Ciocca, Caporino

          waited   while  Ciocca   finished  cooking  with   his  daughter.

          Thereafter, Ciocca and Caporino went  to the master bathroom  and

          closed the  door.  Ciocca put  on thin black gloves  and began to

          count  the  money  Caporino  had  brought from  Nelson.    Ciocca

          retrieved a kilogram of cocaine from a closet in the bathroom and

          gave it  to Caporino.  The  two proceeded down the  stairs to the

          cellar,  from which Caporino left  the house.   During this time,

          law enforcement agents were stationed on the street near Ciocca's

          mailbox, monitoring the wire transmissions from inside the house.

          Upon  meeting up  with the  drug enforcement  agents in  a nearby

          parking lot, Caporino turned over to the agents a brown paper bag

          containing a rectangular package  of cocaine.  Both Caporino  and

          the truck were again searched.

                                         -5-

                    During  the  early  morning  of June  8,  Nelson  paged

          Caporino to  transfer the cocaine.  The two arranged to meet at a

          restaurant  in Portland, Maine.   From there,  the two  went to a

          commuter  parking lot, where Caporino  claimed his car had broken

          down.  Nelson retrieved the kilogram of cocaine from the trunk of

          Caporino's car, after which drug enforcement agents arrested him.

                    Later that  day, a search warrant  executed at Ciocca's

          home turned  up several  firearms, including one  located in  the

          master bathroom closet and  three firearms in an attache  case in

          the  bottom of that closet.  Finally, another firearm was located

          in a  bureau in the master  bedroom.  The agents  also seized the

          $5,500  that Nelson had transferred to  Caporino the previous day

          from the medicine cabinet of Ciocca's master bathroom.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    I.   Denial  of  defendant's  request   for  Caporino's
                    I.   Denial  of  defendant's  request   for  Caporino's
                         medical and psychiatric records
                         medical and psychiatric records

                    Ciocca first argues that  the district court erred when

          it denied his request for discovery of, and failed to admit  into

          evidence, Caporino's  medical and psychiatric records  related to

          his  1983  accident.    Ciocca  contends  that  the  records  are

          exculpatory  evidence  to which  he  is entitled  under  Brady v.
                                                                   _____

          Maryland, 373 U.S. 83  (1963).  Such evidence is  discoverable by
          ________

          the  defendant  where  it "is  material  either  to  guilt or  to

          punishment."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
                        _____

                    In order to succeed on a Brady claim, "a defendant must
                                             _____

          show that the withheld 'evidence was exculpatory, as  measured by

          its materiality.'"   United States v. Watson,  76 F.3d 4,  7 (1st
                               _____________    ______

                                         -6-

          Cir.)  (quoting United  States v.  Hemmer, 729  F.2d 10,  14 (1st
                          ______________     ______

          Cir.), cert.  denied, 467  U.S. 1218  (1984)), cert.  denied, ___
                 _____________                           _____________

          U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1889 (1996).  "Information is 'material' 'if

          there is  a reasonable  probability that,  had the evidence  been

          disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

          been different.'"  United States v. Blais, 98 F.3d  647, 651 (1st
                             _____________    _____

          Cir.  1996)  (quoting  United  States  v. Bagley,  473  U.S.  667
                                 ______________     ______

          (1985)).   "Where,  as here,  the defendant  has made  a pretrial

          request  for   specific  exculpatory  information,   reversal  is

          required if nondisclosure 'might have affected the outcome of the

          trial.'"  United  States v. Devin,  918 F.2d  280, 289 (1st  Cir.
                    ______________    _____

          1990).

                    After carefully reviewing  each of the  sealed records,

          we find that non-disclosure could  not have affected the  outcome

          of the trial.   Disclosure of these medical records,  in light of

          defense   counsel's   unhindered  cross-examination   of  several

          government witnesses on this issue, could not have altered either

          the jury's  conviction or the sentencing  court's disposition and

          is therefore not  material.   Nothing in the  records could  have

          bolstered  defense counsel's  cross-examination of Caporino.   We

          thus find no  error in  the district court's  denial of  Ciocca's

          motion for access to Caporino's psychiatric records.

                    Ciocca emphasizes  that the district court's  denial of

          his disclosure request prejudiced his ability to impeach Caporino

          on   cross-examination,   and   thus   violated   his  right   to

          confrontation  guaranteed by  the  Sixth Amendment.   "The  Sixth

                                         -7-

          Amendment  guarantees criminal defendants an adequate opportunity

          to cross-examine adverse witnesses."   United States v. Butt, 955
                                                 _____________    ____

          F.2d  77,  86 (1st  Cir. 1992).    While a  witness's psychiatric

          records  may  sometimes  be  an appropriate  subject  for  cross-

          examination, the right to cross-examination is not absolute.  Id.
                                                                        ___

          "Once the defendant has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to

          question  a witness'  veracity  and motivation,  the trial  judge

          enjoys  broad discretion in  determining the scope  and extent of

          cross-examination."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).
                               ___

                    As Caporino was the government's primary witness, we do

          not doubt that challenging  Caporino's credibility was crucial to

          Ciocca's defense.   We find,  however, that  Ciocca's ability  to

          impeach Caporino did not  suffer because of, and that  Ciocca was

          not prejudiced by, the district court's denial of access to these

          records.   Defense  counsel  engaged in  a  thorough and  probing

          cross-examination of Caporino, as  well as of Agent Durst  of the

          Maine Drug  Enforcement Agency  and Agent John  Bryfonski of  the

          U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,  regarding the extent of Caporino's

          memory loss after  his accident.   Ciocca brought out  Caporino's

          statements  that  he  was a  "walking  zombie,"  that  he had  to

          "reconstruct  his brain" after the accident,  that just after the

          accident, and  perhaps for  years thereafter, Caporino  could not

          remember  anything  that occurred  prior  to  the accident,  that

          Caporino was hospitalized for amnesia after the accident, that he

          "forgot my whole life," that Caporino had to "build a new brain,"

          and  that Caporino's brain had  "gone the wrong  way."  The above

                                         -8-

          testimony demonstrates  that Ciocca was able to  place before the

          jury ample evidence regarding  Caporino's ability to remember the

          events that transpired prior to and after his accident.  That the

          jury chose  to credit  Caporino's testimony, even  after Ciocca's

          thorough cross-examination, is within its province as factfinder.

          United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir. 1996).  On
          _____________    _______

          review,  we defer to all jury determinations of credibility.  See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir. 1996).
          _____________    _____

                    Thus,  having found  that the  sealed records  were not

          material  to Ciocca's guilt or punishment and that Ciocca was not

          prejudiced  by  this lack  of access  to  the sealed  records, we

          conclude that  the district court  properly denied access  to the

          records as Brady material.
                     _____

                    II.  Sufficiency of the evidence
                    II.  Sufficiency of the evidence

                    Ciocca  next claims  that the  district court  erred in

          denying his motion for  judgment of acquittal.  He  contends that

          no  credible evidence established a conspiracy from the spring of

          1994 to May 1995.1  He argues that there was no evidence, outside

          that  provided  by Caporino,  linking  him to  a  conspiracy with

          Nelson  prior to  May  1995.   He  acknowledges that  there  were

          conversations between  Caporino and  Nelson and between  Caporino

          and Ciocca, but nothing linking the three in a conspiracy.

                    Ciocca is,  in essence, challenging the  sufficiency of

          the evidence.
                              
          ____________________

          1   He  appears to concede  that the  evidence was  sufficient to
          establish  a  conspiracy  during  the  time  following Caporino's
          decision to cooperate with the government.

                                         -9-

                    In assessing a  challenge to the  sufficiency
                    of  the evidence,  we  "review the  record to
                    determine whether the evidence and reasonable
                    inferences therefrom, taken as a whole and in
                    the light most  favorable to the prosecution,
                    would  allow  a  rational  jury  to determine
                    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
                    were guilty as charged."

          United  States  v. Sullivan,  85 F.3d  743,  747 (1st  Cir. 1996)
          ______________     ________

          (quoting United  States v.  Mena-Robles, 4  F.3d 1026,  1031 (1st
                   ______________     ___________

          Cir. 1993), cert. denied,  ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994)).
                      ____________

          "To  uphold  a conviction,  the court  need  not believe  that no

          verdict  other than a  guilty verdict could  sensibly be reached,

          but  must  only  satisfy itself  that  the  guilty  verdict finds

          support in 'a plausible rendition of the record.'"  United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d  675, 677 (1st Cir. 1993)  (quoting United
             _________                                               ______

          States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
          ______    _____                                     ____________

          506 U.S. 1063 (1993)).

                    In  order  to  prove  conspiracy,  the  government  was

          required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that  Ciocca "entered

          an agreement to commit the substantive offense, and that [he] was

          a  voluntary participant in  the conspiracy."   United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          And jar, 49  F.3d  16, 20  (1st  Cir. 1995).   In  addition,  the
          _______

          government  must prove both an  intent to agree  and an intent to

          commit  the  substantive  offense.    Id.    In  considering  the
                                                ___

          evidence,  "a 'common  purpose and  plan may  be inferred  from a

          development  and  collocation  of  circumstance.'"    Id.  at  21
                                                                ___

          (quoting  United States v. S nchez,  917 F.2d 607,  610 (1st Cir.
                    _____________    _______

          1990) (citations and internal  quotations omitted), cert. denied,
                                                              ____________

          499 U.S. 977 (1991)).

                                         -10-

                    In  the  Background  section,  supra,  we  recited  the
                             __________            _____

          evidence  in the light most favorable to  the jury verdict.  That

          evidence indicates that, in the spring of 1994,  Ciocca initiated

          an  understanding  with Caporino  that  Caporino  would serve  as

          courier  in a drug trade between Ciocca in Connecticut and Nelson

          in Maine.  The jury could  have found that Caporino engaged in at

          least  six  transactions   prior  to  May   1995    During   each

          transaction, Nelson contacted  Caporino to let him know  that the

          money  was ready  to be  transported to  Ciocca.   After Caporino

          retrieved the money from Nelson, he drove it to Ciocca's house in

          Connecticut, where  Ciocca counted  it.   Ciocca would  then turn

          over a kilogram of  cocaine to Caporino, who would  transport the

          kilogram of cocaine back to Nelson in Maine.  We believe that the

          jury  could infer from  the evidence as  a whole  that Nelson and

          Ciocca  entered  into  an agreement  in  the  spring  of 1994  to

          transport cocaine between Connecticut and Maine, that they had an

          intent to agree and an intent to distribute cocaine, and that the

          agreement continued up to and including the point at which Ciocca

          was arrested.  See, e.g., And jar, 49 F.3d at 21  (noting that an
                         ___  ____  _______

          appellate court draws all  credibility determinations in favor of

          the verdict, even in instances where the conviction relies solely

          on the uncorroborated testimony  of a confidential informant, "so

          long as the testimony  is not incredible or insubstantial  on its

          face" (internal quotations  omitted)); United  States v.  Cresta,
                                                 ______________     ______

          825 F.2d 538, 546 (1st  Cir. 1987) (recognizing that there is  no

          federal requirement of corroboration of an informant's  testimony

                                         -11-

          provided the testimony is not "incredible or insubstantial on its

          face" (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042
                                                ____________

          (1988); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 195 (1st Cir. 1980)
                  _____________    _____

          (finding it "clear that a [conspiracy] conviction can rest on the

          uncorroborated   testimony  of  a   co-defendant  or  accomplice"

          (internal  quotations omitted)).  Because Caporino's testimony is

          far from being incredible  or insubstantial on its face,  we find

          no  error in the district  court's denial of  Ciocca's motion for

          judgment of acquittal.

                    III. Admission  of  the  taped   conversations  between
                    III. Admission  of  the  taped   conversations  between
                         Ciocca and Caporino
                         Ciocca and Caporino

                    During the  trial, the  government sought  to introduce

          into  evidence  approximately  27  audiotape  recordings procured

          through   consensual  recording.      The  audiotapes   contained

          conversations  between Caporino and  Ciocca and  between Caporino

          and  Ciocca's   co-conspirator  Nelson.     The  district   court

          conditionally admitted the audiotapes,  subject to a later ruling

          under United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
                _____________    ____________

          At the close of all the evidence, Ciocca renewed his objection to

          "all  the  evidence that  relates  to  the conspirator  hearsay."

          Trial Transcript, vol. 2, at 378.  The following colloquy ensued:

                      THE COURT:  Let me see.  You say strike all
                    the  evidence.  What evidence particularly do
                    you wish to have stricken?

                      MR. McBRIDE:  Any statements made by Nelson
                    on the  one hand  that were intercepted  on a
                    consensual monitoring device between Caporino
                    and  Nelson, and  any statement  that existed
                    between Caporino and  the defendant who [sic]
                    in any way reflected a continuing--

                                         -12-

                      THE  COURT:    The   defendant's  statement
                    intercepted by the wire would be an admission
                    to [sic] the party.

                      MR. McBRIDE:  I'm sorry, you are absolutely
                    correct, I'm wrong.

          Id. at 378-79.
          ___

                    On appeal, Ciocca argues that

                    "certain tapes of  conversations were  played
                    for the jury.  Defense counsel had a standing
                    objection   to   the    admission   of    the
                    conversations   as   hearsay.     The   Court
                    overruled the objection,  allowing the  tapes
                    to come in under the co-conspirator statement
                    exception to  the  hearsay rule  as  provided
                    under  Federal  Rule of  Evidence  801(d) (2)
                    (E).   The  Court  erred  because  there  was
                    insufficient    evidence   of    a   criminal
                    conspiracy   between    the   defendant   and
                    Caporino."

          Appellant's  Brief at  19.   We first  note that  Ciocca  has not

          appealed the district court's admission of the tape recordings of

          conversations  between  Caporino  and   Ciocca's  co-conspirator,

          Nelson.  Because  Ciocca has  failed to appeal  that ruling,  the

          admissibility of those recordings is not before us.

                    We next find  that Ciocca has waived  the argument that

          the   taped  conversations   between   Caporino  and   him   were

          inadmissible.    "A  party  waives  a  right  when  it  makes  an

          intentional relinquishment or abandonment  of it."  United States
                                                              _____________

          v.  Mitchell,  85   F.3d  800,  807  (1st  Cir.  1996)  (internal
              ________

          quotations  omitted).   Forfeiture, of  course, is  different, in

          that it occurs only "if a defendant merely fails to make a timely

          assertion of  that right."  Id.   "The distinction is  a key one,
                                      ___

          for '[m]ere forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not extinguish

                                         -13-

          an "error" under Rule 52(b). . . .'  In short, where there  was a

          forfeiture,  we apply  a plain  error analysis;  where there  was

          waiver,  we do not."   Id. (quoting  United States  v. Olano, 507
                                 ___           _____________     _____

          U.S.  725, 733-37 (1993)).   Thus, Ciocca's acknowledgment at the

          Petrozziello hearing  of the correctness of  the district court's
          ____________

          ruling with  regard to the taped conversations between Ciocca and

          Caporino  constitutes  waiver,  which extinguishes  any  error on

          appeal.  United States v.  Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).   Our
                   _____________     _____

          analysis ends here.2
                              
          ____________________

          2    We  point out  that  defense  counsel's  agreement with  the
          district  court's  ruling  on  these conversations  was  in  fact
          warranted and correct as a matter of law.  Ciocca's statements in
          these  conversations constitute  admissions against  interest and
          were properly  admissible pursuant  to Federal Rules  of Evidence
          801(d)(2)(A)  and  804(b)(3).   Additionally,  the statements  by
          Caporino, in response, were properly admissible because a

                    "defendant, having  made admissions, [cannot]
                    keep  from the  jury  other  segments of  the
                    discussion reasonably required to place those
                    admissions in context.  In this instance, the
                    other parts of the conversation were properly
                    admitted   as   'reciprocal  and   integrated
                    utterances,'   .  .   .  to   put  [Ciocca's]
                    statements  into  perspective  and make  them
                    'intelligible to the jury and recognizable as
                    admissions.'"

          United  States v. McDowell, 918  F.2d 1004, 1007  (1st Cir. 1990)
          ______________    ________
          (citations omitted).

             Moreover, while some of Ciocca's statements made in the course
          of  the  conversations  may  not  have  been  admissions  against
          interest, his failure to object to such statements below forfeits
          any argument he may have for the inadmissibility of non-admission
          statements.   Forfeiture  of this  argument triggers  plain error
          review.  Mitchell, 85 F.3d at  807.  Ciocca's brief does not even
                   ________
          indicate which statements may give rise to a plain error finding.
          Thus, Ciocca has not  carried his burden of showing  plain error,
          see  United States  v.  Winter,  70  F.3d  655  (1st  Cir.  1995)
          ___  _____________      ______
          (appellant bears  the burden of establishing  plain error), cert.
                                                                      _____
          denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1366 (1996), and we find no such
          ______

                                         -14-

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    Based on  the foregoing  considerations, we  affirm the
                                                                 affirm

          district court's rulings.

                    So ordered.
                    __________

                              
          ____________________

          error here.

                                         -15-