Court Opinion

ID: 9454792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:59:24.385901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:18.772516
License: Public Domain

KERNER, Circuit Judge.
I concur in the result reached by my brethren.
I am in full agreement with the majority that there was no defect in the search conducted by Federal and local police forces. An increasing number of cases before us have tried to play on the time delay which usually occurs between the commencement of an investigation by local police and the arrival of Federal forces, usually the FBI. As long as the evidence sought to be introduced at trial is not tainted by being obtained through any act which the Federal forces would be prohibited from doing, I see no harm in its use. In this age of increasing criminal sophistication and the nationwide rise in crime, it is imperative that there be the fullest possible cooperation between all law enforcement services. It would be anamalous, to say the least, to restrict the right to prosecute to that jurisdiction whose law enforcement officials were simply first to reach the scene of a joint investigation as to which there was concurrent jurisdiction. This would be the practical result of defendant’s position. I perceive no constitutional or other principle which would compel such a result, much less make it desirable. Cf. United States v. Satter-field, 410 F.2d 1351, at 1353 (7th Cir. May 23, 1969).
Likewise, I agree with the majority as to its disposition of the discovery question. The United States Attorney acted most commendably in offering to let the defense see all the evidence without opposition or restriction. In so doing, he acted in the best tradition of criminal justice looking to its impartial truth-seeking function and- not merely the rigid formalities of the adversary process. This action was proper under the circumstances while not impairing the interest of society in justice and defendant cannot profit from his failure to utilize the offer made to him.
Regrettably, I cannot agree with my senior brethren as to the two remaining issues. While the opinion concedes the gross impropriety of the “lineup” technique used here, it makes its own finding that there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications. The record does support such a conclusion as to Mrs. Winkle’s identification. However, I re*950gard it as insufficient as to the identifications of the other two participating witnesses to the improper “lineup.” Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and United States v. Gilmore, 398 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1968). In my view, a hearing should have been held, out of the presence of the jury, to determine whether there was, in fact, an independent basis for these identifications. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Accordingly, I regard the admission of these identifications as error. However, as later concluded, this was harmless error.
I am also unable to agree with the majority’s disposition of the Bruton question. While Satterfield’s confession was redacted as regards defendant, the documentary evidence before the jury could have left no doubt in the minds of the jury as to the identity of the “friend” mentioned therein. In this regard, it is important to note that the footnote relied on by the majority also contains three citations which cast doubt on the value of redaction standing by itself as a method of curing possible error. Bru-ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Nor do I believe that the admission of the confession was rendered of no consequence by the nature of the defense. This is especially so in view of the fact that' not even the curative instruction found insufficient in Bruton was attempted to be given here.
However, despite the constitutional gravity of the two defects in the proceedings below, I am of the opinion that they can be disregarded under the harmless error rule. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1964); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (June 2, 1969); United States v. Satterfield, supra, 410 F.2d 1351, at 1354; and United States v. Lipowitz, 401 F.2d 591, 593 (3d Cir. 1968). The evidence adduced at trial included the extensive physical evidence seized in the legal searches, the two untainted identifications, Mrs. Winkle’s tainted identification which had an independent basis, and the photographs taken while the robbery was in progress. This mass of evidence was, in my opinion, more than sufficient to hold that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt despite the two constitutional errors below. For this reason, I concur in the affirmance of the conviction.