Court Opinion

ID: 9672685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:52.61152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.815717
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting in part). I decline to join in the opinion of my colleagues, because I am troubled by the manner in which the opinion would extend the application of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, by limiting the scope of the exclusive-remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. The very opinions cited by the majority, Stimson v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361; 258 NW2d 227 (1977), and Slayton v Michigan Host, 122 Mich App 411; 332 NW2d 498 (1983), proceed from the basic premise that "generally, a nonphysical tort such as sex discrimination falls outside the scope of the (workers’ compensation) act”, Slayton, supra, p 416, citing Stimson, supra, p 366. The clear implication is that a "physical” employment-related tort comes within the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act and is consequently barred by that act’s exclusive-remedy provision.
In the present case, although the complaint is couched in terms of sex discrimination, its entire basis is the supervisor’s sexual, assault upon plaintiff, an injury which is by all objective standards "physical” in nature. Contrast Stimson and Slay-ton, where there was no analogous physical assault or injury underlying the entire cause of *464action. I believe that the distinction is significant, because the language of Stimson and Slayton is consistent with the conclusion that the Legislature intended to restrict actions based upon such "physical” employment-related torts to the forum of workers’ compensation. Of course, the issue is one of first impression in this context and the guidance available to this Court is limited.
At this time, I believe that it would be neither appropriate nor useful to engage in an extended discussion of the exclusive-remedy issue. Instead, the question of whether the exclusive-remedy provision bars an Elliott-Larsen sex-discrimination action which is based upon a purely "physical” tort should be addressed directly and resolved conclusively by the learned justices of our Supreme Court. Only then will it be possible for this Court to make an informed statement as to whether the Legislature actually intended to extend Elliott-Larsen to this type of situation.