Court Opinion

ID: 9785129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:04:57.854845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:06.748478
License: Public Domain

Justice McCAFFERY,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with and join much that the majority has written. I agree with the majority’s application of the narrow certiorari scope of review. I heartily agree with the majority’s conclusion that Paragraph 18 of the interest arbitration award pertains to terms and conditions of employment. I believe that the en banc Commonwealth Court majority’s conclusion regarding whether the coverage of legal expenses for civil and criminal actions pertaining to the affected public employees could be characterized as a term and condition of employment to be a patent, egregious, and far-reaching error in need of immediate correction. The majority’s correction of that error will prove to be of significant value to the bench and bar.1 *555Further, I agree with the majority’s recognition that the excess-of-authority prong of the narrow certiorari scope of review is “very constricted;” and, thus, that prong must be applied in an especially narrow manner for purposes of judicial review of public employee arbitration awards. See Part IV(B) of the Majority Opinion (quoting City of Philadelphia v. FOP, Lodge No. 5, 564 Pa. 290, 768 A.2d 291, 294 (2001)). Finally, I concur in the majority’s result that certain provisions of Paragraph 18 of the interest arbitration award were within the arbitration panel’s authority to award.
However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the arbitration panel in this case exceeded its power with respect to the remaining provisions of Paragraph 18. I believe that the panel was within its authority to award Paragraph 18 in its entirety, and I would thus reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order in its entirety.
The majority briefly addresses the issue of whether the Commonwealth, or any other public employer, may skirt its statutory obligation to bargain with public employees by promulgating regulations regarding bargainable employment issues, use such regulations as sacrosanct “authority” to avoid bargaining on these issues, and thus compel a result in its favor on such issues. As the majority notes, long ago we determined that public employers can “not ... hide behind self-imposed legal restrictions.” City of Washington v. Police Department of City of Washington, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437, 442 (1969) (emphasis in original). Here, the majority concludes that because the serious issue of the Commonwealth hiding behind its Chapter 39 regulations was only addressed *556in the parties’ briefs in a minor fashion, if at all, we “leave its ultimate determination for a future case or cases.” Op. at 552, 12 A.3d at 365.
I see no need to leave this issue for another day. Indeed, I believe the resolution of this issue is necessary for the proper disposition of the question this Court certified for appeal.
As the majority correctly determined, any judicial review of the “final and binding” arbitration award in this case would fall under the third prong of narrow certiorari, concerning the limits of the power or authority of the arbitration panel. With respect to the third prong of narrow certiorari, we have held:
Our definition of what constitutes an excess of an arbitrator’s powers is far from expansive. Essentially, if the acts the arbitrator mandates the employer to perform are legal and relate to the terms and conditions of employment, then the arbitrator did not exceed her authority.
FOP, Lodge No. 5, supra at 296-97, 768 A.2d 291 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “This third prong does not provide a portal to unlimited review of an Act 111 arbitration award.” City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 595 Pa. 47, 938 A.2d 225, 230 (2007). Further, we have interpreted this third prong of narrow certiorari as ensuring that an arbitration award “may only require a public employer to do that which the employer could do voluntarily.” Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (“Betancourt”), 540 Pa. 66, 656 A.2d 83, 90 (1995); Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, supra at 230.
It is critical to recognize in this case that the Commonwealth agencies are not prohibited by any legislative act from complying with Paragraph 18 of the award. The Chapter 39 regulations, which the majority here determines limit the authority of the arbitration panel, are not compelled by any statute. These regulations are purely the product of the executive arm of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, that executive arm can voluntarily comply with Paragraph 18 by simply altering its regulations, which it may freely do without fear of *557violating any act of the legislature. Otherwise, the Commonwealth here simply hides behind its own self-imposed limitations. I thus strongly disagree with the majority that the arbitration award in this case compels the Commonwealth to perform an illegal act. Therefore, the Chapter 39 regulations do not preclude the implementation of Paragraph 18 of the arbitration award in any respect under the narrow certiorari scope of review.
I believe that the circumstance presented in this case is exactly the circumstance contemplated by this Court in City of Washington, where we determined that public employers can “not ... hide behind self-imposed legal restrictions.” Id. at 555, 12 A.3d at 442 (emphasis in original). The matters addressed in Paragraph 18 of the award are bargainable terms and conditions of employment. The award is final and binding pursuant to Section 805 of PERA. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court’s invalidation of Paragraph 18 is not in accordance with Section 805. For this reason, I would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order in its entirety.2

. However, I distance myself from the majority’s application of rationale from City of Philadelphia v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 22, 999 A.2d 555 (Pa.2010), and Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 998 A.2d 589 (Pa.2010), which rationale, I continue to believe, has erroneously expanded the excess-of-authority prong of the narrow certiorari scope of review. See City of Philadelphia, supra (McCaffery, J. concurring and dissenting), and Borough of Ellwood City, supra (McCaffery, J. concurring).
Moreover, I disagree with the majority that PERA supports its determination that we may consider whether the award at issue unduly *555infringed upon managerial prerogatives. Section 702 of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.702, does provide that items of inherent managerial policy are not bargainable. However, the provision applicable in this case— Section 805 of PERA, which applies to unique populations of public employees that are closely akin to Act 111 employees — relevantly provides that "[njotwithstanding any other provision of this act ... [the decision of] the panel of arbitrators ... shall be final and binding....” 43 P.S. § 1101.805 (emphasis added). Section 805 thus eschews Section 702, and I take this circumstance as further evidence that City of Philadelphia and Borough of Ellwood City, albeit both Act 111 cases, came to erroneous conclusions on the issue of the primacy of managerial prerogatives or responsibilities.

. Finally, I must respectfully disassociate myself from the majority’s observation, in the last sentence of Section IV, that the majority's invalidation of the significant part of Paragraph 18 of the award is "not untoward.” Op. at 552-53, 12 A.3d at 365. The overarching question here is whether any court, including this one, may review the final and binding arbitration award in the first instance. Any judicial review is permissible only under the highly circumscribed narrow certiorari scope of review. That scope of review is confined to four selectively narrow considerations. Whether a judicial correction of an arbitration award is "untoward” or “not untoward” is not one of them.