Court Opinion

ID: 9552835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:18:07.524256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:10.675792
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, C.J.
The question in this case was certified to us, pursuant to RCW 2.60, by the Western District of Washington at Seattle of the United States District Court.
The question certified is:
In a strict liability cause of action to which the new comparative fault statute (S.B. 3158) [Laws of 1981, ch. 27] is not applicable, does a finding that plaintiff assumed the risk of accident bar the plaintiff's recovery or does assumption of risk operate only as a damage-reducing factor?
The answer is that assumption of the risk operates as a damage-reducing factor rather than a complete bar to a plaintiff in a strict liability cause of action.
The parties stipulated that the federal court plaintiff was injured while working in an aerial manlift manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff makes no negligence claim; he relies upon a strict product liability theory. One of the defenses is assumption of risk.
The necessity for an answer to the certified question arises from several of our cases in this rapidly changing field.
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975), was a strict liability theory. Plaintiff had appealed from a defendants' summary judgment. Assumption of risk was asserted as a defense. We acknowledge that comment n to section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) recognizes such a defense which operates as a bar to recovery. Without definitively ruling on the effect of allowing such a defense to be raised, we said it could not be ruled upon as a matter of law on a summary judgment motion.
In Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wn.2d 149, 157-58, 570 P.2d 438 (1977), without commenting on Tabert's above statement, we said:
*441Although under comment n a plaintiff would be barred from any recovery if the trier of fact found the plaintiff had voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger, the adoption of comparative negligence in this jurisdiction, see RCW 4.22.010, renders the plaintiff's conduct a damage-reducing factor only.
The court left open the question whether the broader contributory negligence defense was applicable in a products case.
Relying upon Teagle, the drafters of the pattern jury instructions provided a damage-reducing instruction when assumption of risk was involved. WPI 110.03, 6 Wash. Prac. 366 (1980).
Next, language in Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn.2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980), dealing with contributory negligence, cast doubt upon the Teagle statement about assumption of risk. The court used the broad terms "comparative fault" and "contributory negligence." The record in Seay demonstrates that the matter of assumption of risk was not in the case. While the opinion arguably modified our earlier statement on assumption of the risk, we do not believe that was the intent of the majority since that issue was not before the court.
Finally, the inaction referred to and relied upon by the majority in Seay is no longer present. Section 8 of chapter 27, Laws of 1981, appears to mandate that comparative fault is not a bar to recovery, but rather a damage-reducing factor. While the statute is not applicable here it does reflect a public policy statement which is persuasive in our determination of judicial policy.
We hold that assumption of risk is a damage-reducing factor, not a bar to recovery.
Stafford, Utter, Dolliver, Hicks, Williams, and Dimmick, JJ., concur.