Court Opinion

ID: 9917332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 01:00:57.691617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:24.543700
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30574        Document: 00517030242             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/11/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                     January 11, 2024
                                      No. 22-30574                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Carlos Alejandro Varela-Avila,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:22-CR-65-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Carlos Alejandro Varela-Avila challenges the district court’s
   application of an enhanced statutory maximum to his criminal sentence
   pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
                                      I.    Background
         On December 26, 2021, local law enforcement arrested Varela-Avila

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30574       Document: 00517030242                Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/11/2024

                                           No. 22-30574

   for criminal property damage in Lake Charles, Louisiana. A grand jury
   subsequently indicted him on one count of illegal reentry of a removed alien
   in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The indictment also cited to § 1326(b)(2),
   an enhanced statutory maximum that applies when a defendant has
   previously been removed subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony.
   See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). However, the indictment did not specify the dates
   that Varela-Avila had previously been removed.
          Varela-Avila initially went to trial and elected to proceed pro se with
   the assistance of standby counsel. However, he decided to plead guilty the
   morning of the trial. The district court then held the guilty plea colloquy,
   during which Varela-Avila admitted to reentering the United States after
   having been previously removed. The plea did not specify the dates of his
   prior removals.
          On September 1, 2022, the district court held the sentencing hearing.
   The modified presentencing report1 detailed Varela-Avila’s immigration
   history, noting that he had previously been removed from the United States
   in June 2005, March 2006, February 2009, and July 2015. The report also
   provided Varela-Avila’s criminal history, including his conviction for
   aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in July 2013. The report ultimately
   recommended a sentence between twenty-seven and thirty-three months.
   Defense counsel stated that he had no objections to the report, and the
   district court sentenced Varela-Avila to twenty-seven months of
   imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Varela-Avila
   timely appealed.
                                     II.      Discussion

          _____________________
          1
            In order to have an expedited sentencing hearing, the probation office prepared
   an abbreviated presentencing report with Varela-Avila’s consent.

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                                    No. 22-30574

          Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), the default maximum sentence for a
   conviction of illegal reentry is two years of imprisonment. However, the
   statute provides for an enhanced statutory maximum of ten years when a
   defendant’s prior removal was “subsequent to a conviction for
   commission of . . . a felony.”       8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1).    The maximum
   increases to twenty years when the prior conviction is for an aggravated
   felony. Id. § 1326(b)(2). Varela-Avila argues that the district court erred in
   applying § 1326(b)(1) without his admission to his 2015 removal—the only
   removal that followed his assault conviction. See United States v. Rojas-Luna,
   522 F.3d 502, 505–06 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a prior removal must be
   proven by a jury or admitted by the defendant for it to be used to enhance a
   sentencing range).
          Ordinarily, when a defendant does not object to the application of a
   statutory enhancement, we review for plain error. Id. at 504. However, “[a]
   defendant may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or
   provoked the [district] court . . . to commit.” United States v. Salazar, 751
   F.3d 326, 332 (5th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (citing United States v.
   Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 487–88 (1997)). Thus, in cases of invited error, we
   review for manifest injustice. Id.
          Here, Varela-Avila invited the error of which he now complains.
   Indeed, defense counsel suggested the exact Sentencing Guidelines range the
   district court later relied on for sentencing. Just before the plea colloquy,
   Varela-Avila asked what would happen if he pled guilty. The district court
   stated that the maximum sentence would likely be ten years because it agreed
   with defense counsel that § 1326(b)(1) applied as opposed to (b)(2). The
   court further stated that it could not provide the exact sentence but estimated
   that the Sentencing Guidelines range would start at thirty-six months.
   Varela-Avila’s counsel responded that the range was not that high and stated
   that the range would be twenty-four to thirty months, or twenty-seven to

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                                            No. 22-30574

   thirty-three months depending on the criminal history category. The court
   then stated that it had no reason to disagree and would accept that
   calculation. Of course, the calculation implies that § 1326(b)(1) applies, as
   Varela-Avila’s sentence would otherwise be capped at twenty-four months.
   Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) with (b)(1). Defense counsel again affirmed the
   application of the enhancement at Varela-Avila’s sentencing hearing.
   Counsel confirmed that he had no objection to the presentencing report,
   which noted that § 1326(b)(1) applied. Counsel further advocated for a
   twenty-seven-month sentence.
           Varela-Avila cannot now claim that the district court committed clear
   error by accepting the sentence he proposed. See United States v. Fernandez-
   Cusco, 447 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that defendant likely waived
   his objection to an enhanced maximum when he “affirmatively recognized it
   was being applied and indicated it was proper”). Defense counsel did not
   merely fail to object to the statutory enhancement, but affirmatively
   recommended a sentence that necessitated its application. Because of this
   invited error, we review solely for manifest injustice, and see no such
   injustice here.2 After all, Varela-Avila does not contest the fact of his 2015

           _____________________
           2
             It is appropriate to simply address invited error in this case. See, e.g., United States
   v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 453 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendants’ Apprendi challenges
   because they invited such errors); United States v. Mamoth, 47 F.4th 394, 398 (5th Cir.
   2022) (rejecting Rule 11(c)(1) challenge based on invited error). However, even if, under
   an abundance of caution, we took a look at plain error, reversal is still not appropriate.
   Varela-Avila did not establish clear or obvious error. The district court discussed his prior
   removals just before the plea colloquy, which Varela-Avila did not contest. Further, he did
   not dispute the guideline calculation, which included the application of § 1326(b)(1). The
   conversations between the court and parties all imply that a removal followed Varela-
   Avila’s felony conviction—the only issue was whether the felony was aggravated. Thus,
   there is no clear or obvious error in the sentence. See Fernandez-Cusco, 447 F.3d at 385
   (noting that plain error review requires a clear or obvious error that affected a defendant’s
   substantial rights).

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   removal and his sentence is only three months over his argued statutory
   maximum. See United States v. Taylor, 973 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (“Manifest injustice occurs when the district court’s error was so patent as
   to have seriously jeopardized the rights of the appellant.” (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted)).
           Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

           _____________________
            But even if it did meet the first three elements of plain error review, we still have
   discretion to determine whether “the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or
   public reputation of judicial proceedings” and, thus, warrants remediation. Puckett v.
   United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). While that is often the case in a sentencing situation, here Varela-Avila has not
   claimed that the presentence report is inaccurate or that the post-conviction removal did
   not occur. Further, he was sentenced to a term at the lower end of the guideline range
   which had been calculated with the help of the defense counsel, who urged the court to
   impose it. Defense counsel’s involvement in the sentence calculation and the slight
   difference in Varela-Avila’s sentence compared with the alleged statutory maximum
   indicates that any alleged error did not significantly affect the fairness and integrity of the
   judicial system.

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