Court Opinion

ID: 9556983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:03:50.52007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.107922
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: August 21, 2023

                         S23A0550. REESE v. THE STATE.

       WARREN, Justice.

       After a jury trial in May 2018, Larry Reese was convicted of the

malice murder of Claynesia Ringer, possession of a firearm during

the commission of a felony based on shooting Ringer, and possession

of marijuana with intent to distribute. 1 Reese raises three claims of

       1 The crimes occurred on August 19, 2015. On May 3, 2016, a Fulton
County grand jury indicted Reese on nine counts: malice murder, three counts
of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, first-degree
criminal damage to property, criminal attempt to sell marijuana, possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. After a jury trial from May 7 to 11, 2018, Reese was
found guilty on all counts except criminal attempt to sell marijuana and the
felony murder count predicated on it. Reese was sentenced to life in prison for
malice murder, five years consecutive for possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute, and a suspended five-year consecutive sentence for possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony. The remaining counts were
vacated by operation of law or merged. Reese filed a timely motion for new
trial on May 14, 2018, which he amended three times. The trial court denied
Reese’s motion for new trial, as amended, on February 15, 2022. Reese filed a
timely notice of appeal. This case was docketed in this Court to the April 2023
term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
error on appeal: (1) that the trial court plainly erred by failing to

instruct the jury on justification, no duty to retreat, and the State’s

burden to disprove affirmative defenses; (2) that the trial court

plainly erred by not giving an accomplice corroboration charge; and

(3) that Reese received constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel.

     1. (a) Shortly before 3:00 a.m. on August 19, 2015, Ringer was

shot and killed inside a red Nissan Versa parked on the street in

front of Reese’s house. Ringer and Reese knew each other and lived

down the street from each other. Evidence showed that Ringer

borrowed the Versa from a friend and drove it to Reese’s house after

her phone sent text messages to Reese’s phone asking to purchase

marijuana.

     The State’s theory of the case was that Reese was a paranoid

drug dealer who shot Ringer after she approached his house in the

early morning hours in the Versa—a car he did not recognize.

Reese’s theory of the case, by contrast, was that Reese shot at the

car in self-defense. That is so, Reese argued, because Ringer, along

                                  2
with an unidentified person (and potentially one of the men she had

spent time and exchanged text messages with earlier that evening),

went to Reese’s house that night to rob Reese under the guise of

purchasing marijuana from Reese. In the course of that attempted

robbery, either Ringer or her companion first shot at Reese before

Reese returned fire in self-defense, shooting and killing Ringer.

     (b) The evidence presented at trial showed the following. At

2:49 a.m., Reese’s mother (with whom he lived), called 911 to report

a shooting in front of her house. Police arrived at the scene within

minutes and found Ringer dead in the driver’s seat of a Nissan Versa

in front of Reese’s house. The car was still running, the driver door

was open, and the other doors were closed and locked. The car was

parked directly in front of Reese’s house facing an SUV registered in

Reese’s name. There were multiple bullet holes and defects around

the car’s driver door, including on the door, the doorframe, and the

driver window. Helen Weathers, a forensics supervisor with the

Fulton County Police Department, testified that the hole in the

window was consistent with a bullet traveling through the window

                                  3
from the outside of the vehicle to the inside. The medical examiner’s

office recovered a .45-caliber metal jacket bullet from Ringer’s body

during her autopsy.

     Among other things, fifteen one-dollar bills 2 and Ringer’s cell

phone were found inside the car. No gun was found inside the car

or at the scene of the shooting. A pack of cigarettes with Reese’s

fingerprints on it and a few cigarette butts were found near Reese’s

SUV. In Reese’s driveway, officers found a single key. And in

Reese’s front yard, officers found a key ring attached to a bright

yellow tag, which contained a key to Reese’s SUV and to his house.

     Five .45-caliber shell casings were found in Reese’s yard.

Officers found two shell casings close to the key ring; the other three

were found days later when officers returned to Reese’s yard with a

metal detector. In addition, officers found two .45-caliber metal

jacket bullets, a metal jacket, and bullet fragments in and around

the Versa. No bullet defects were discovered in cars parked in

     2 As noted below, minutes before the shooting, Ringer’s phone sent a text

message to Reese’s phone asking to purchase fifteen dollars’ worth of
marijuana.
                                     4
Reese’s driveway or in the front door of his house. Officers also

noticed surveillance cameras on the outside of Reese’s house pointed

towards his yard: one on the left side of his house and another on

the right side.

     Based on the presence of surveillance cameras that might have

recorded the shooting and on Reese’s keys that officers found in his

yard near the .45-caliber shell casings, officers obtained two

warrants to search Reese’s house, one for recorded surveillance

videos and another for firearms. The search yielded, among other

things, a DVR system with recordings from the surveillance cameras

affixed to the outside of Reese’s house, 14.7 ounces of marijuana, a

small scale, and cash. Reese’s fingerprint was found on a bag of

marijuana in the house.

     A later search of the contents of Ringer’s cell phone revealed

communications with three phone numbers around the time of the

crimes. One phone number belonged to Reese; another belonged to

Gerald Bell, who lived across the street from Reese and down the

street from Ringer; and another ended in -8146, which Dwoskin

                                 5
Wright, a friend of Ringer’s, identified as his own during an

interview with investigators. 3

     Ringer’s phone also showed various text messages and phone

calls with Reese’s phone from around 12:30 a.m. until around 1:30

a.m. on the night of the shooting; the text messages were about

Ringer having sex with one of Reese’s friends and Ringer arranging

for someone to have sex with Reese, each in exchange for money.

The text messages showed that neither arrangement worked out,

and a message was sent from Reese’s phone saying the situation

sounded like a “set up” anyway.

     Ringer’s phone received a text message from the -8146 phone

number at 1:24 a.m. saying, “I’m finna pull up.” Ringer’s phone sent

a text message to the -8146 phone number with her address at 2:02

a.m.; at 2:09 a.m. the user of the -8146 phone number communicated

that the user was on the way; shortly afterwards, Ringer’s phone

     3 At trial, Wright testified that he had changed his number several times

since the crimes and did not recall having this phone number.
                                     6
and the -8146 phone number exchanged text messages discussing

marijuana.

     Ringer’s phone sent a text message to Bell’s phone at 2:30 a.m.,

saying that a friend wanted to purchase a gram of marijuana for ten

dollars. Also at 2:30 a.m., Ringer’s cell phone made a three-second

phone call to Reese’s cell phone.

     At 2:31 a.m., Bell’s cell phone responded to the message from

Ringer’s phone asking to buy marijuana, asking, “U gone Kum get

it,” and Ringer’s phone responded saying, “Ya” at 2:40 a.m. Then, at

2:43 a.m., Ringer’s phone sent a text message to Reese’s phone,

asking to buy two grams of marijuana for fifteen dollars, and her

phone called Reese’s phone again at 2:44 a.m., this call lasting for

20 seconds.

     Ringer’s phone then received two missed calls from Bell’s

phone number at 2:48 a.m., a text message from his phone number

asking to bring him a “blunt” at 2:49 a.m., and another text message

from his phone number at 3:09 a.m. saying, “Yoo kall me real quick.”

Ringer’s phone also received multiple missed phone calls and

                                    7
FaceTime calls from the -8146 phone number between 2:46 a.m. and

2:59 a.m.

         In November 2015, officers finished reviewing the surveillance

videos from outside Reese’s house. The videos included footage of

the shooting, which the two cameras affixed to Reese’s house

captured from different angles. The video recorded from the camera

on the left side of Reese’s house captured what Reese now concedes

is him firing a gun and running across his yard. The video recorded

from the cameras on the right side of Reese’s house captured the

Versa parking in front of Reese’s house, a flash near the road, and

then a larger flash in Reese’s yard. Reese concedes on appeal that

the larger flash was a muzzle flash that resulted when he fired a

gun. 4

         (c) Video recordings from the surveillance system were played

at trial. The State played the two surveillance videos portraying the

         4 As described in more detail below, Reese contends that the smaller

flash was also a muzzle flash, but that it was from a shot fired by someone
other than him.

                                       8
shooting side-by-side as one exhibit, but the trial court expressly

reserved for the jury the question whether the videos were

synchronized. 5

      A GBI firearm examiner, Investigator Jason Roach, testified at

trial about the surveillance videos, explaining that the first flash of

light shown on the camera from the right side of Reese’s house, near

the road, was not “consistent with a muzzle flash” and was “more

consistent” with “a bullet impact.” He also testified that there was

a muzzle flash seen near the person standing in Reese’s yard, which

occurred after the sparks from the “bullet impact.”                  On cross-

examination, Reese’s trial counsel asked if Investigator Roach could

determine where the gunshot that caused the bullet-impact flash

came from. Investigator Roach testified that if the two surveillance

videos were synchronized, then there was a possibility that the

bullet-impact flash resulted from a gunshot fired by Reese that was

      5 As explained more below, Reese contended at trial that the surveillance

videos were not synchronized—in other words, that they were not two videos
taken at the same time showing the same events from two different angles—
and relies on that to support his claim for slight evidence of justification. The
videos were not time-stamped.
                                       9
depicted in the left-side surveillance video. But Investigator Roach

could not rule out that the bullet-impact flash came from a shot fired

“somewhere else that wasn’t captured on video.”

     Investigator Roach also explained that he determined the five

.45-caliber shell casings were fired from one gun, and that the three

.45-caliber bullets and the metal jacket were fired from one gun, but

he could not match a bullet fragment recovered from the Versa with

the bullets and the metal jacket recovered from in and around the

Versa or in Ringer’s body because the fragment had been “severely

damaged.” Nor could he determine whether the .45-caliber shell

casings were fired from the same gun as the .45-caliber bullets,

metal jacket, and bullet fragments.

     Bell—who lived across the street from Reese and around the

corner from Ringer—testified that he was with Ringer earlier on the

night of the crimes. Specifically, Ringer was at Bell’s house until

around 10:00 p.m. before going home. Closer to 11:00 p.m., Bell went

to Ringer’s house to eat dinner. He returned to his house after

dinner and did not see Ringer again. Bell’s mother, with whom he

                                 10
lived, testified at trial that she heard gunshots that night and that

once police arrived at the crime scene, she “ran downstairs” to wake

up Bell, who was “in his room [a]sleep.” She did not testify about

what time she heard gunshots or woke up Bell.

     Bell also testified about his relationship with Reese. Reese

lived across the street from Bell and they had “spoke[n] a few times.”

Bell and Reese did not have “bad blood or anything.” When the State

asked Bell, “Did you by occasion happen to go over to [Reese’s] house

or see [Reese] that day,” Bell responded, “yeah, earlier.”

     Ringer’s friend, Wright, testified that, on the night of the

crimes, he borrowed his cousin’s red Nissan Versa to drive to

Ringer’s house. Once Wright arrived around 2:20 a.m., he asked

Ringer to go buy some marijuana. He was going to ride with Ringer

to pick up the marijuana, but Ringer said she wanted go alone, and

Wright let her drive the Versa. Wright heard gunshots within “two

to three minutes” after Ringer left. Sometime after hearing the

gunshots, Wright went to speak with Ringer’s mother, whom he met

that night and with whom Ringer lived, and he tried calling Ringer.

                                  11
     Karimah Tarver, Ringer’s mother, lived with Ringer.           She

testified as follows. On the night of the crimes, Tarver was in her

bedroom when she heard gunshots. She left her room and spoke to

Wright, who was still in the house. Bell had been at the house

earlier that night to have dinner with Ringer, but had left before the

shooting (although she did not see him leave).              On cross-

examination, in response to a question from Reese’s trial counsel,

Tarver agreed that, shortly after the shooting, she told Detective Jeff

Rittberg, the lead investigator, that she “suspected” Bell was

“involved” in the shooting. Tarver explained that her suspicion was

just “what [she] was feeling” and that she “wouldn’t say that” she

suspected Bell was involved.

     Detective Rittberg testified that he spoke with Bell’s mother

shortly after the crimes, and Bell was present during the

conversation. Bell did not tell Detective Rittberg that he knew

Ringer, that he was at Ringer’s house on the night before the crimes,

or that he had been communicating with her leading up to her death.

Detective Rittberg acknowledged that Tarver told him that she

                                  12
suspected Bell “was in the vehicle with her daughter” at the time of

the shooting because Bell “was being overly nice” to Tarver. But

Detective Rittberg ruled out Bell as being involved in Ringer’s death

because, based on the evidence he gathered, Bell was at home during

the shooting. Likewise, Detective Rittberg ruled out Wright as a

suspect because Wright was with Tarver at her house during the

shooting.

     Reese did not present any witnesses or testify at trial. During

closing arguments, Reese’s trial counsel argued that Reese was

justified in shooting Ringer because the first flash seen on the

surveillance video, which was near the road, showed the ricochet of

a shot fired at Reese by a shooter outside the camera’s view; that

Reese only fired after first being shot at which might show some

“excuse or mitigation” for the shooting; that Ringer, along with

someone else, was trying to rob Reese; and that the absence of shell

casings from more than one gun did not rule out a second shooter

                                 13
because the second shooter could have fired with a revolver, which

would not necessarily have left shell casings at the scene. 6

      Reese’s trial counsel also argued that Bell might have been

involved in Ringer’s attempted robbery of Reese.                 To that end,

counsel contended that, after the car Ringer was driving passed

Reese’s house, Ringer stopped at Bell’s house before turning the car

around, that Bell saw Ringer during this stop, and that Bell texting

and calling Ringer before and after the shooting showed Bell was

lying when he testified that he was asleep during the shooting.

      The jury convicted Reese of malice murder, possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony. Reese was sentenced to life in

prison and five years, to be served consecutively.

      6 On cross-examination, Investigator Roach testified that semi-
automatic handguns automatically eject shell casings after being fired, but the
only way to eject shell casings from a revolver is for the user to do so manually.

                                       14
      2. Reese contends that the trial court erred by not instructing

the jury on justification and no duty to retreat.7 Although Reese

requested these instructions, he did not object to their omission. As

Reese concedes, we review these claims for plain error only. See

Johnson v. State, No. S23A0338, 2023 WL 4091469, at *11 (Ga. June

21, 2023) (reviewing for plain error the trial court’s failure to

instruct the jury on charges requested in writing when the appellant

did not object to the instruction’s omission). And these claims fail

under the third prong of plain-error review because Reese has not

shown that there is a reasonable probability he would have obtained

a better result had the trial court given the jury instructions he

requested.

      The plain-error standard has four prongs.

      First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of
      “[d]eviation from a legal rule”—that has not been
      intentionally   relinquished    or    abandoned,      i.e.,
      affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal

      7 Reese also argues that the trial court plainly erred by not instructing
the jury on the State’s burden to disprove affirmative defenses. But the record
shows that the trial court instructed the jury that the state bore the burden of
disproving affirmatives defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, so this claim
presents nothing for our review.
                                      15
     error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
     reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
     the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
     case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the
     outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and
     finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
     appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—
     discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
     “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
     reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 637 (884 SE2d 346) (2023) (quoting

Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (781 SE2d 772) (2016)). Reese must

satisfy all four prongs to succeed on this claim. But even assuming

that the trial court not instructing the jury on justification and no

duty to retreat was clear and obvious error and that this assumed

error was not affirmatively waived, this claims still fails because

Reese has not shown that the assumed error likely “affected the

outcome” of his trial.

     “A person is justified in threatening or using force against

another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes

that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or

a third person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful

                                 16
force[.]”   OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).        Relevant here, deadly force is

authorized when the person “reasonably believes that such force is

necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or

herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible

felony.” Id. Someone justified in using such force as authorized by

OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) “has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand

his or her ground and use force” as authorized by law. OCGA § 16-

3-23.1. And when a defendant sufficiently raises a justification

defense at trial, “the State bears the burden of disproving the

asserted defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gobert v. State, 311

Ga. 305, 309 (857 SE2d 647) (2021) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

      Reese’s sole defense at trial was self-defense; his theory was

that someone shot at him first and that he fired the shots that killed

Ringer only in response to someone shooting at him.          But the

evidence supporting Reese’s self-defense theory was not sufficiently

strong that the omission of the instructions likely “affected the

                                  17
outcome” of his trial. Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 722 (873 SE2d

166) (2022).

     No witness testified that there was more than one shooter at

the crime scene. Investigator Roach did not identify muzzle flashes

from the surveillance video anywhere other than in Reese’s yard.

Investigator Roach also testified that all shell casings recovered

from the scene were fired from a single .45-caliber weapon, and that

all of the bullets recovered from the scene were fired from one .45-

caliber weapon.   Detective Rittberg testified that there were no

bullet defects in cars parked in the driveway of Reese’s house or in

the front door to the house, both of which would have been near

where Reese was standing when someone allegedly was shooting at

him, and that no gun was found in the Versa.

     Reese nonetheless points to a number of facts that he says

supports his self-defense theory. First, Reese claims that “forensic

evidence” supported the inference that Reese was “on his own

property when the shots were fired.” But even assuming that is

true, that fact does little, if anything, to show whether someone shot

                                 18
at Reese before he fired his weapon. Second, Reese points to the

surveillance video that showed a flash near the road while Reese

was standing in his driveway, which he contends showed a bullet-

impact spark from a shot fired by someone else. However, the mere

possibility that the bullet-impact spark was caused by a gunshot

fired by someone else is not enough given the lack of physical

evidence suggesting there was more than one shooter. And third,

although there was testimony that Tarver once suspected Bell was

involved in Ringer’s death and that he was in the car with her, she

conceded at trial that she had no knowledge to support that theory

and that it was just a “feeling” she had. Moreover, no witness

testified that Bell was seen at the crime scene, Bell’s mother

testified that she found Bell in bed after she heard the gunshots, and

Detective Rittberg testified that, as part of his investigation, he

ruled out Bell’s involvement in Ringer’s death. And even if the

                                 19
evidence had supported Bell’s presence at the scene, that would not

itself prove Reese’s theory that someone else first shot at Reese.8

      Because the evidence supporting Reese’s self-defense theory

was weak, we cannot say that the trial court omitting jury

instructions on justification likely affected the trial’s outcome. See

Munn, 313 Ga. at 722 (defendant’s substantial rights were not

affected by not instructing the jury on justification when evidence in

support of the defense was weak); Jones v. State, 310 Ga. 886, 889

(855 SE2d 573) (2021) (harmless error to fail to charge on defense of

self or third person because “evidence supporting a charge on

defense of self or a third person” “was meager at best”).9                 And

      8 Reese also contends that some of Investigator Roach’s testimony about

flashes seen on the surveillance video supported his theory that the video
showed someone firing at Reese before Reese fired his gun. But Reese does not
accurately recount Investigator Roach’s testimony: although Reese states that
Investigator Roach identified the initial flash as a muzzle flash, his actual
testimony was that the flash was consistent with a bullet striking an object.

      9 To support his assertion that omission of these instructions likely
affected the outcome of his trial, Reese points to a number of Georgia appellate
cases he says support his analysis. However, three of those cases did not even
assess the likelihood of any error affecting the result. See Tarvestad v. State,
261 Ga. 605 (409 SE2d 513) (1991), Cadle v. State, 271 Ga. App. 595 (610 SE2d
574) (2005), and Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291 (519 SE2d 206) (1999). And in
the fourth, State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213 (790 SE2d 66) (2016), it was

                                      20
because the “no duty to retreat” rule applies when “a person is

otherwise justified in using force,” Arnold v. State, 302 Ga. 129, 132

n.6 (805 SE2d 94) (2017), Reese likewise has not shown that

omitting that instruction likely affected the outcome of his trial.

     3. Reese contends that the trial court plainly erred by failing to

instruct that testimony from an accomplice is insufficient to

establish a fact unless it is corroborated. This claim is reviewed for

plain error because Reese did not request the instruction at trial, see

Rutland v. State, 315 Ga. 521, 523 (883 SE2d 730) (2023), and it fails

at the second step because Reese has not shown that the trial court

committed a “clear or obvious” error. Taylor, 315 Ga. at 637.

     “A jury instruction on the need for accomplice corroboration

should be given if there is slight evidence to support the charge.”

Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 136 (816 SE2d 663) (2018) (citation

undisputed that the defendant’s brother had been in a “fist fight” with the
victim immediately before the defendant shot the victim, id. at 214, and
“justification was the critical disputed issue at trial,” id. at 215. Here, by
contrast, little evidence supported the assertion that anyone besides Ringer
and Reese were present at the crime scene, and that in turn supported Reese’s
asserted theory of justification.
                                     21
and punctuation omitted). An accomplice is someone who “shared a

common criminal intent to commit the crimes in question with the

actual perpetrators.” Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 795 (865 SE2d 150)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[A]ctions and knowledge

after the commission of the crimes” are not enough to make a

witness an accomplice, but “[a]t best” show the witness is an

“accessory after the fact.” Id.

     In Reese’s view, the jury could have inferred Bell was his

accomplice to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute and to the felony murder of Ringer predicated on that

charge. To support that inference, Reese points to the following

evidence: Ringer’s last accepted phone call was from Bell’s phone

number; Ringer’s phone sent text messages to Bell’s phone about her

purchasing marijuana from Bell; Tarver told detectives that she

suspected Bell was involved in Ringer’s death and in the car when

she died; Bell was evasive when police interviewed him; surveillance

video showing a flash in the street before Reese’s muzzle flash; and

Bell had a motive and opportunity to commit the crimes.

                                  22
     But none of the evidence Reese points to amounts to “slight

evidence” that Reese and Bell together possessed marijuana with

the intent to distribute it.    At best, he points to text-message

evidence that Ringer was attempting separately to purchase

marijuana from Reese and Bell the night of the crimes. Nor did the

State or Reese argue at trial that Reese and Bell possessed

marijuana with the intent to distribute it together. Accordingly,

Reese has failed to show the trial court erred, much less clearly and

obviously erred, by not instructing the jury on accomplice

corroboration. See Thornton v. State, 307 Ga. 121, 125-126 (834

SE2d 814) (2019) (trial court did not err, let alone plainly err, by not

giving an accomplice corroboration instruction because “[n]one of

the eyewitnesses to the shooting testified that” the defendant and

the alleged accomplice “acted together to” commit the crime, “none

of the evidence supported an inference” they committed the crime

together, and the defendant did not argue they committed the crime

together but instead argued the alleged accomplice committed the

crime and that he was innocent).

                                  23
     4. Reese contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution in three respects: for failing to (1) move to suppress

unlawfully    obtained   evidence;    (2)   request   an   accomplice-

corroboration instruction; and (3) object to an allegedly improper

sequential jury instruction.

     To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to

the defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356

(689 SE2d 280) (2010). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant

must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an

objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and

in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293

Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 637) (2013). See also Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687-688.   To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must

establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s

                                 24
deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been

different. See id. at 693-694. “If an appellant fails to meet his or

her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the

reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.”

Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533-534 (690 SE2d 801) (2010).

     Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed

questions of law and fact, and “a trial court’s factual findings made

in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

will be affirmed by the reviewing court unless clearly erroneous.”

Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 818 (809 SE2d 738) (2018) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Conclusions of law based on those facts are

reviewed de novo. See Bright v. State, 292 Ga. 273, 274 (736 SE2d

380) (2013).

     (a) Reese contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a motion to suppress what he says was unlawfully obtained

evidence. Reese specifically argues that the key ring with the yellow

tag and the shell casings recovered from Reese’s yard, as well as the

evidence that Reese’s house was equipped with surveillance

                                 25
cameras, should have been suppressed because they were discovered

during a search of his curtilage that violated the Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. 10 Because Reese has failed to

make a “strong showing” that the trial court would have suppressed

the evidence on the basis that it was obtained during an illegal

search of his curtilage, Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 249 (882 SE2d

329) (2022) (cleaned up), he has not shown that his trial counsel was

constitutionally deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress on

that basis.

     As background, Detective Jeff Rittberg, the lead investigator,

testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, as follows. He arrived

at the crime scene around 4:00 a.m.; one officer “made [him] aware

of keys that he had seen in the grass” and another “secure[d] the

     10 Reese also argues that, had the trial court suppressed the key ring,

shell casings, and evidence that surveillance cameras were affixed to Reese’s
house, two warrants relying on those items to establish probable cause to
search his house would have been invalid, so the fruits of the search pursuant
to those warrants—i.e., the surveillance recordings, marijuana, a scale, and
cash, among other things—also would have been suppressed. But because we
conclude that Reese has failed to show that any of the evidence establishing
probable cause to search his house would have been suppressed, we need not
address this argument.
                                     26
keys for evidence purposes.” At some point around the time the key

ring was found, he and other officers were standing in Reese’s front

yard, which was visible from two public streets. Although his back

yard was fenced, his front yard was not. Nor was there “any type of

privacy screen or anything else” blocking the yard from view.

     Detective Rittberg conducted a “grid search” of Reese’s front

yard “after 5:04 [a.m.],” around two hours after the shooting, and

conducted a “grass canvas” with another officer sometime between

5:00 a.m. and 5:57 a.m. Between 7:30 a.m. and 7:40 a.m., a different

officer found two shell casings; they were found “in close proximity”

to the key ring that was lying in the grass in Reese’s yard. The two

shell casings and the key ring were found near what Detective

Rittberg called a dirt “pad” in Reese’s yard leading to the steps to his

front porch.

     Detective Rittberg also testified about the surveillance

cameras on the outside of Reese’s house. Reese’s counsel asked if he

observed the cameras while walking through Reese’s yard, and

                                  27
Rittberg responded that his memory was that the cameras were

“plainly visible from the street.”

     In its order denying Reese’s motion for a new trial, the trial

court expressly found that Reese’s “home was on the corner of two

public streets and could be viewed by pedestrians on both streets,”

and that his “front yard was not surrounded by a fence, gate, [or]

privacy screen.” It further found that Reese did not “attempt in any

other way to obscure the front yard from view,” and concluded that

Reese’s yard was not used as an extension of the home.

     The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally speaking,

this means that law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant

before   conducting   a   search     that   falls   within   the   Fourth

Amendment’s parameters. See Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. 459, 464

(863 SE2d 127) (2021).        But the Fourth Amendment is not

implicated in “all investigations conducted on private property.” See

                                     28
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (133 SCt 1409, 185 LE2d 495)

(2013) (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (44 SCt 445, 68

LEd 898) (1924)).      To the contrary, the Fourth Amendment

“‘indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed

by its protections’: persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Jardines,

569 U.S. at 6 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (104

SCt 1735, 80 LE2d 214) (1984)).

     The Fourth Amendment’s protection of “houses” includes areas

surrounding a house to the extent that the area is properly classified

as curtilage. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. “[F]or Fourth Amendment

purposes,” curtilage is considered “part of the home itself,” id., and

is defined as “the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated

with the home.’” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S.

at 180). The Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,

301 (107 SCt 1134, 1139, 94 LE2d 326) (1987), laid out four factors

for courts to “reference” when answering “curtilage questions”: “the

proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether

the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the

                                  29
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by

the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing

by.” That said, the factors are “useful analytical tools only to the

degree that” they bear upon “whether the area in question is so

intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the

home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection”; “mechanically”

applying the factors is not a guaranteed method of reaching the

“‘correct’ answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions.” Id. See also

Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 719 (878 SE2d 247) (2022).

     Reese has failed to show that a motion to suppress based on his

proposed curtilage argument would have been successful.              See

Tabor, 315 Ga. at 249 (“Where, as here, an appellant claims that

trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress, the

appellant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence

would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.”)

(cleaned up). To start, despite Reese’s arguments to the contrary,

Reese has not shown that officers were in his yard, or on any of his

property for that matter, when they discovered the surveillance

                                   30
cameras. To the contrary, Detective Rittberg testified at the motion-

for-new-trial hearing that, to the best of his memory, the

surveillance cameras were “plainly visible from the street.” Reese

has pointed to no contradictory evidence. Because this aspect of his

claim rested on the premise that officers were in Reese’s yard when

they first noticed the surveillance cameras attached to Reese’s

house, that aspect of his claim fails.

     As for the key ring and shell casings, Reese has failed to make

a “strong showing” that those items would have been suppressed

based on his argument that the officers who found those items

without a warrant did so in an area that was curtilage. Id. at 249.

Pictures admitted into evidence at trial indicate that the key ring

and shell casings were found in close proximity to Reese’s house, but

no evidence was admitted regarding the exact distance between the

house and the area of his yard where the key ring and shell casings

were found, and Reese did not offer evidence about what the relevant

area of his yard was used for. On this score, the trial court concluded

that Reese’s “front yard was not used as an extension of the home.”

                                  31
Moreover, Reese’s front yard was on the corner of two public streets

and the trial court found that it “could be viewed by pedestrians on

both streets,” that Reese’s “front yard was not surrounded by a fence,

gate, [or] privacy screen,” and that “Reese did not attempt in any

other way to obscure the front yard from view.”

      At bottom, Reese introduced very little evidence in support of

this claim at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, and the only fact that

the trial court might have weighed in favor of the relevant area of

Reese’s yard being curtilage was its proximity to Reese’s house. 11

But that proximity was never quantified, and we cannot conclude

that uncertain proximity by itself so clearly established that the

relevant area of Reese’s yard “is so intimately tied to the home itself”

such that the key ring and shell casings likely would have been

suppressed had his trial counsel moved to exclude them. Dunn, 480

      11 To be clear, we do not hold that the type of area where the key ring

and shell casings were found could never be curtilage, but rather that Reese
has not met his burden, in the context of an ineffective-assistance claim, to
make the required “strong showing” that the evidence would be suppressed
based on the theory that the area was curtilage. Tabor, 315 Ga. at 249 (cleaned
up).
                                      32
U.S. at 301. See also United States v. French, 291 F3d 945, 952 (7th

Cir. 2002) (“[P]roximity to the home, standing by itself, does not per

se, suffice to establish an area as within the curtilage.”) (citing

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (curtilage is

the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”)

(quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180) (emphasis supplied); United States

v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012) (front yard was not

curtilage when the only factor suggesting the front yard was

curtilage was proximity, and “the front yard was not enclosed; there

was no evidence as to how the yard was used; nor was there any

evidence that the [the defendant] tried to protect the yard from

observation”). Accordingly, Reese has failed to show that his trial

counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to file a motion to

exclude the key ring and shell casings. See Tabor, 315 Ga. at 249

(to establish trial counsel was deficient in this context, “the

appellant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence

would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion”) (cleaned

up); Ward v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 275 (869 SE2d 470) (2022) (trial

                                 33
counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress

because it “would not clearly have succeeded.”).

     (b) Reese contends his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to request an accomplice-

corroboration charge. His claim fails because, as discussed above in

Division 3, Reese has failed to show that slight evidence supported

an inference that Reese and Bell were accomplices to the charge of

possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Therefore,

Reese has not shown his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient

for failing to request an accomplice-corroboration instruction. See

Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531, 545 (858 SE2d 718) (2021) (“failure

to make a meritless motion or objection” is not constitutionally

deficient) (cleaned up).

      (c) Reese argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by not objecting to an allegedly improper sequential jury

instruction.   Reese has failed to show his trial counsel was

constitutionally deficient for not objecting to this instruction.

                                  34
     The trial court provided the jury the following instructions

about filling out the verdict form:

     If, after considering the testimony and evidence presented
     to you, together with the charge of the court, you should
     find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
     Defendant in Fulton County, Georgia, did on or about
     August 19, 2015, commit the offense of murder, as alleged
     in count 1 of the indictment, you would be authorized to
     find the Defendant guilty. In that event, the form of your
     verdict would be, “We, the jury, find the Defendant guilty
     of murder.” If you do not believe that the Defendant is
     guilty of murder, or if you have any reasonable doubt as
     to the Defendant’s guilt, then it would be your duty to
     acquit the Defendant, in which event, the form of your
     verdict would be, “We, the jury, find the Defendant not
     guilty of murder.” For each of the following counts, counts
     2 through 9 of the indictment, you should follow the same
     procedure as described above as to each of said counts.
     You must make a determination as to each count
     separately. . . .

     Whatever your verdict is, it must be unanimous, that is,
     agreed to by all of you. The verdict must be in writing and
     signed. . .

     You’ll have the verdict form out with you. There are, you
     know, nine different counts. And as I’ve instructed you,
     you’re to consider each one separately. And in count 1, it
     has, we, the jury, find the Defendant Larry Reese - and
     the first entry is guilty of murder. If you believe the State
     proved murder beyond a reasonable doubt, you would
     check that.

                                  35
     And if you don’t find that the State has carried the burden
     of proof on murder, but one of the - you need to determine
     whether the Defendant is guilty of the lesser included
     offense of involuntary manslaughter 7. And if you find
     such, you should check that.

     And if you find that the State has failed to prove the
     Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
     would check number 3, not guilty of murder.

     And the same goes for felony murder. There’s also a lesser
     included offense here. You need to consider the felony
     murder first. If you don’t find that, then you would
     consider involuntary manslaughter. If you don’t find
     that, then it would be not guilty of murder.

     So you follow that course with each count.

     “[W]hen the evidence presented in a criminal trial warrants a

jury instruction on a lesser-included offense,” a trial court violates

the rule against impermissible sequential jury instructions “if it

instructs the jury that it may consider the lesser offense only if it

first unanimously finds the defendant not guilty of the indicted

greater offense.” Stewart v. State, 311 Ga. 471, 473-474 (858 SE2d

456) (2021). Reese contends the trial court ran afoul of this rule

when it instructed the jury to “consider felony murder first. If you

don’t find that, then you would consider involuntary manslaughter.”

                                 36
     Stewart is instructive here.          In Stewart, the appellant

contended that the verdict form the trial court provided the jury in

his case “constituted an improper sequential jury instruction”

because “the trial court instructed the jury of only one circumstance

when it could ‘render verdict’ as to the lesser offense . . . : if it first

reached a ‘verdict,’ which the recited instructions and the verdict

form specified must be ‘unanimous,’ of ‘not guilty’” on the indicted

offenses. Id. at 473, 475. The appellant argued that the trial court

plainly erred in giving that instruction and that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to it. See

id. at 475-476.

     We were unpersuaded.          We noted that the appellant had

“cite[d] only one appellate case that actually reversed a conviction

based on an improper sequential jury instruction”—Kunselman v.

State, 232 Ga. App. 323 (501 SE2d 834) (1998)—and distinguished

the facts of Kunselman from the appellant’s. See Stewart, 311 Ga.

at 476 (“In Kunselman, the Court of Appeals rejected an instruction

that, if the jury found the defendant not guilty of the indicted

                                    37
offense, it would ‘then and only then be authorized to consider the

lesser included offense.’       The instructions in this case did not

expressly prohibit the jury from considering the lesser offense unless

it first unanimously found Stewart not guilty of the greater

offenses.”).   And we concluded that the appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim failed because he did not show that,

“under existing precedent,” “the verdict form clearly constituted an

improper sequential jury instruction.” Id. at 477.

      Here, like the appellant in Stewart, the only case Reese cites

reversing a conviction based on an improper sequential jury

instruction is Kunselman. 12 And unlike in Kunselman, the trial

court in this case did not “expressly prohibit the jury” from

considering the lesser included offenses until after it reached a

unanimous verdict on the indicted offenses. See Stewart, 311 Ga. at

476. To the contrary, the trial court’s instruction in this case better

      12 Reese also cites Cantrell v. State, 266 Ga. 700 (469 SE2d 660) (1996),
but that case did not involve an improper sequential jury instruction. Instead,
the trial court rejected a jury’s guilty verdict on a lesser included offense
because the jury had not reached a verdict on the indicted offense. See id. at
703.
                                      38
resembles jury instructions we have concluded were not improper

than it resembles the sequential instruction in Kunselman. See,

e.g., Yeager v. State, 274 Ga. 216, 219 (552 SE2d 809) (2001) (“The

jury was instructed to consider the lesser offense of involuntary

manslaughter only if they did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt

that appellant was guilty of malice murder.”); Camphor v. State, 272

Ga. 408, 414 (529 SE2d 121) (2000) (“Should you find the defendant

not guilty of the crime of burglary, you would be authorized to

consider under the evidence whether or not he did, at said time and

place, commit the lesser offense of criminal trespass”). See also

Arrington v. Collins, 290 Ga. 603, 608 (724 SE2d 372) (2012)

(appellate counsel not constitutionally deficient for not raising a

sequential jury instruction argument when the trial court instructed

the jury “‘that it could consider the lesser-included offense of simple

possession if it first found [the defendant] not guilty of trafficking’”

because that instruction was “not substantially different from

charges which have been upheld on appeal”).

                                  39
      Reese has “not shown under existing precedent” that the jury

instructions he points to “clearly constituted an improper sequential

jury instruction.” See Stewart, 311 Ga. at 477. And because an

objection to this instruction would have been unsuccessful, Reese’s

trial counsel did not perform deficiently when he did not object. See

Matthews, 311 Ga. at 545 (“failure to make a meritless motion or

objection” is not constitutionally deficient) (cleaned up). 13

       Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

      13 Reese also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors the trial court

committed affected the outcome of his trial. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838
SE2d 808) (2020). However, we have assumed only one error and identified no
others, so this claim presents nothing additional for us to review. See id. at 17.
                                       40