Court Opinion

ID: 9657527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:29:36.998447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:34.224436
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
Being unable to agree with the reasoning set forth in Division II of the majority opinion and ultimate conclusion reached, I respectfully dissent.
I. It is to me apparent the issue of vol-untariness of admissions was raised in this case but not resolved as required by Sims v. State of Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593.
It is my understanding trial of defendant commenced January 30, 1967, therefore governed by the principles set forth in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772 16 L.Ed.2d 882, and perforce Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908.
However, the majority apparently fails to accord defendant recognition of this self-evident fact.
In Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-517, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1345, 10 L.Ed.2d 513, a case decided prior to Miranda or Jackson, both supra, and even before Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, the United States Supreme Court, in a reversing opinion said: “The jury was instructed, in effect, not to consider as relevant on the issue of voluntariness of the confession the fact that a defendant is not reminded that he is under arrest, that he is not cautioned that he may remain silent, that he is not warned that his answers may be used against him, or that he is not advised that he is entitled to counsel. Whatever independent consequence these factors may otherwise have, they are unquestionably attendant circumstances which the accused is entitled to have appropriately considered in determining voluntariness and admissibility of his confession(Emphasis supplied)
*139And in Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-741, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L.Ed.2d 895, opinion issued one week after Miranda, supra is this pertinent statement: “The review of voluntariness in cases in which the trial was held prior to our decisions in Escobedo and Miranda is not limited in any manner by these decisions. On the contrary, that a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made. This factor has been recognized in several of our prior decisions dealing with standards of voluntariness. Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510-511, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1341-1342, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 610, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1883, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961); Turner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64, 69 S.Ct. 1352, 93 L.Ed. 1810 (1949). See also Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 55, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 1212, 1213, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). Thus, the fact that Davis (defendant) was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight to the other circumstances described below which made his confessions involuntary.”
Dealing with the subject at hand one state appellate court, in a decision issued prior to Miranda, recognized absence of in-custody pre-interrogation warnings was a significant factor in testing whether a confession attributed to an accused was freely and voluntarily given. State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3, 10.
By virtue of the authorities cited and quoted supra, I am unable to agree with majority’s holding to the effect that when, in a criminal proceeding, absence of Miranda warnings is asserted, the issue of vol-untariness is not raised. In fact, whenever a confession or admission is challenged by reason of absence of the warnings required by Miranda, voluntariness is the ultimate issue presented. Stated otherwise, absence of Miranda warnings, deprivation of right to counsel, coercive tactics, and voluntariness cannot be neatly segregated. These elements are so inextricably interwoven as to preclude any severance one from the othgr.
For further discussion of the subject matter involved see dissent in Johnson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 390 U.S. 511, 88 S.Ct. 1155, 20 L.Ed.2d 69, opinion filed April 1, 1968.
On the basis of the foregoing I would reverse and remand with directions that specific findings be made on the issue of voluntariness of any confessions or admissions allegedly given or made by defendant.
MASON, J., joins in this dissent.