Court Opinion

ID: 9906989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 17:25:28.251803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:09.836856
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
  KIMBERLY MARIE MAURER                         :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :      No. 230 MDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 1, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001412-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                   FILED: DECEMBER 5, 2023

       Kimberly Marie Maurer appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

after a jury convicted her of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to

commit first degree murder, third degree murder, criminal conspiracy to

commit third degree murder, endangering the welfare of children, criminal

conspiracy to commit endangering the welfare of children, involuntary

manslaughter, and criminal conspiracy to commit involuntary manslaughter.

The    convictions     stem    from     the    death    of   her   paramour’s,   Scott

Schollenberger’s, son. We affirm.

       A fair summary of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth reveals

that the facts of this case are beyond tragic. Maxwell Schollenberger

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“Maxwell”) was born in 2008. Maurer entered Maxwell’s life when she started

dating Scott in 2011. At that time, Maxwell was an appropriately developed

child, both physically and mentally. Maurer moved in with Schollenberger and

the couple had three additional children together. During the years that

followed, Maxwell became the victim of physical and psychological abuse in

the form of severe neglect. Eventually, Maxwell was ostracized from the

household and locked in a bedroom that had no lights and the windows

covered, and he was deprived of meals. Multiple visitors to the house never

knew that Maxwell existed. In fact, Maxwell had never been enrolled in school

or in a home-schooling program.

      On May 26, 2020, the Annville Township Police Department responded

to a report of a dead child at the home of Schollenberger and Maurer on South

White Oak Street. Upon approaching Maxwell’s bedroom, police noticed an

overwhelming stench of bodily excrement. The bedroom door was secured

with multiple locks from the outside. Once the door was opened, the police

observed Maxwell’s deceased emaciated body and a sparsely furnished room

with a significant amount of feces and urine. A door covered one of the

bedroom windows by having been screwed to the wall. Two other windows

had curtains sealed with duct tape. There were no operating light bulbs in the

room. Old feces and food were observed under the bed.

      When Maxwell’s body was taken for autopsy, it was covered in fecal

matter. Despite being twelve-years old, he weighed 47.5 pounds and was 50

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inches tall, which reflected a body mass index that was below the first

percentile for his age. The autopsy revealed multiple medical conditions

consistent with starvation, including under mineralized bones, osteopenia,

misshaped bones, maldeveloped kidneys, liver and heart, and soft tissue

atrophy. Maxwell’s stomach had a large amount of partially digested food, to

the point that the stomach was overfull. Review of Maxwell’s skeletal frame

reflected a lack of weight bearing activity, such that he was likely immobile or

bedridden for a significant period. The autopsy revealed that the cause of

death was blunt force head trauma complicating starvation and malnutrition.

       On September 11, 2020, Maurer was criminally charged.1 Maurer then

filed a motion for change of venue due to pretrial publicity. The trial court

issued a gag order and directed counsel to submit proposed questionnaires to

be mailed to prospective            jurors. The trial court then developed a

questionnaire, disseminated the document, and eliminated from the jury pool

potential jurors affected by pretrial publicity.

       Maurer’s trial began on March 15, 2022, and the jury returned a verdict

on March 22, 2022, finding Maurer guilty of all charges. On June 1, 2022, the

trial court sentenced Maurer to serve life imprisonment on the charge of first-

degree murder. The court also imposed consecutive sentences of 5-10 years

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1 Schollenberger was also charged with the same crimes at CP-38-CR-1387-

2020. It is undisputed that he ultimately pled guilty and received a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole.

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on the charge of endangering the welfare of children, and 5-10 years on

conspiracy to commit first-degree criminal murder. The remainder of Maurer’s

convictions merged for sentencing purposes.

       Maurer filed a timely post-sentence motion on June 10, 2022. On

November 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying the post-

sentence motion on its merits. Maurer filed her notice of appeal on November

16, 2022.

       On appeal, Maurer presents issues challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence, whether the trial court properly denied her request for change of

venue, and whether the trial court correctly denied a requested mistrial. 2 Upon

careful consideration, we find no merit to her issues.

       As a prefatory matter, because the timeliness of an appeal implicates

our jurisdiction, we cannot address the merits of the other issues raised by

Maurer before determining whether this appeal was timely filed. See

Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 2004) (noting that

timeliness of appeal implicates jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte). It

is undisputed that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the

disputed order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Specifically, Rule 903(a) provides that

____________________________________________

2 We note in her appellate brief, Maurer includes an issue stating: “Should the

Trial Court have granted [Maurer’s] Motion for New Trial?” However, the
argument portion of Maurer’s brief does not include a corresponding section
addressing the issue. Because Maurer has not developed this issue in the
argument section of her brief, it is abandoned for purposes of our review. See
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 924 A.2d 1202, 1202-03 (Pa. 2007).

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“the notice of appeal ... shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the

order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 addresses post-sentence procedures and appeals, and

provides, in relevant part: “If the defendant files a timely post-sentence

motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed … within 30 days of the entry of the

order deciding the motion[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a). The Comment to

Rule 720 instructs that “[u]nder paragraph (B)(3)(a) [regarding time limits

for the court’s decision on a post sentence motion], on the date when the

court disposes of the motion … the judgment becomes final for purposes of

appeal.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Cmt.

      A trial court has 120 days in which to decide a post-sentence motion,

and failure to do so within that period results in the motion being deemed

denied by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). When the motion

is denied by operation of law, “the clerk of courts shall forthwith enter an

order” deeming the motion denied on behalf of the trial court and serve copies

on the parties. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). The notice of appeal shall be

filed within 30 days of the entry of the order denying the motion by operation

of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(b). Moreover, we have held that a clerk

of court’s failure to follow the dictates of Rule 720(B)(3)(c) constitutes a

breakdown in the court system such that we may accept an untimely appeal.

See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498-99 (Pa. Super.

2007).

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       Our review of the record reflects that Maurer filed a timely post-sentence

motion on June 10, 2022. The trial court failed to decide the motion within the

120-day period required under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a), and the motion was

therefore deemed denied by operation of law. On November 2, 2022, Maurer

filed a motion for the entry of an order deeming the post-sentence motion

denied by operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). However,

the trial court took no action on the request. Rather, on November 15, 2022,

the trial court denied the post-sentence motion on its merits. Maurer filed her

notice of appeal on November 16, 2022.

       Because the clerk of courts did not follow the dictates of Rule

720(B)(3)(c), we hold that the failure constitutes a breakdown in the court

system.3 Accordingly, we conclude that the entry of the order on November

15, 2022, was the triggering mechanism for the purposes of this appeal, and

we accept the notice of appeal filed by Maurer on November 16, 2022. See

Patterson, 940 A.2d at 498-99.

       In her first two issues, Maurer contends the trial court should have

granted her motion for judgment of acquittal and her motion for arrest of

judgment. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. In her arguments, Maurer challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence stating, “The Commonwealth did not present

____________________________________________

3 We observe the Commonwealth has conceded the occurrence of a breakdown

that excuses the untimeliness of the appeal. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 41,
n.21.

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any evidence that Scott Schollenberger and [Maurer] conspired to murder

[Maxwell],” id. at 17, and “[Maurer] believes there is insufficient evidence to

find her guilty of first-degree murder.” Id. at 19.

      We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under

the following parameters:

            Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences
      derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all
      elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not
      weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
      finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any
      doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so
      weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
      fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When
      evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-
      finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. For
      purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the
      entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations omitted).

      We conclude Maurer has abandoned any argument concerning the

sufficiency of the evidence. Regarding sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues, an

appellant must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was

insufficient in order to preserve the issue for appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding waiver of

sufficiency of evidence claim where the appellant failed to specify in Rule

1925(b) Statement the elements of particular crime not proven by the

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Commonwealth). See also Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281

(Pa. Super. 2009) (finding sufficiency claim waived under Williams for failure

to specify either in Rule 1925(b) statement or in argument portion of appellate

brief which elements of crimes were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt).

       Here, Maurer vaguely specifies in her appellate brief which crimes she

is challenging. However, Maurer failed to delineate in her Rule 1925(b)

statement,4 or in her appellate brief, which elements of any of the crimes she

was convicted of were allegedly not established by the Commonwealth.

Rather, Maurer’s appellate argument consists of citation to general case law,

challenges to the credibility and reliability of the testimony offered by the

Commonwealth’s witnesses, and the lack of physical evidence produced by

the Commonwealth. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-20. Consequently, her non-

specific claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, which fail to specify

the exact elements of the crimes that were allegedly not proven by the

Commonwealth, are waived.5

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4 Maurer’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement presents the following issues, which

fail to specify the elements of the crimes allegedly not proven by the
Commonwealth: “1. Should the Trial Court have granted Defendant's Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal? 2. Should the Trial Court have granted Defendant's
Motion for Arrest of Judgment?” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 11/23/22, at 1.

5 Had we not found Maurer’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
waived for the reasons stated above and addressed the claims that the
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to support her
convictions, we would have affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s thorough
opinion reviewing Maurer’s post-sentence motions, which addressed the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Maurer next argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for

a change of venue due to pretrial publicity surrounding the case. See

Appellant’s Brief at 3, 20-25. Specifically, Maurer states that she “was

subjected to news articles being posted on social media sites such as

Facebook, as well as news articles which propagated on the television and

online websites. Some of these online news articles received upwards of

40,000 comments.” Id. at 22. Maurer further baldly asserts that “[e]ven

though there was a timelapse of approximately two (2) years from the date

of [Maxwell’s] death, this matter was still in the news constantly.” Id. at 23-

24.

       In reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether pretrial publicity

requires a change of venue or venire, we reverse the determination only where

it constitutes an abuse of discretion because the trial court “is in the best

position to assess the atmosphere of the community and to judge the

necessity of the requested change.” See Commonwealth v. Walter, 119

A.3d 255, 199-200 (Pa. 2015).

       Normally, one who claims that he has been denied a fair trial because

of pretrial publicity must show actual prejudice in the empaneling of the jury.

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 584(A). In certain cases, however, pretrial publicity can be

so pervasive or inflammatory that the defendant need not prove actual juror

____________________________________________

sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. See Trial Court Opinion,
11/14/22, at 7-35.

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prejudice. Prejudice is presumed if the pretrial publicity’s content is

“sensational, inflammatory, and slanted toward conviction, rather than factual

and objective[;]” “reveal[s] the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any[;]”

“referred to confessions, admissions or reenactments of the crime by the

defendant,” or is “derived from official police or prosecutorial reports.”

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 314 (Pa. 2011). Nonetheless, even

where prejudice is presumed, a change of venue or venire is not warranted

unless the defendant also shows that the pre-trial publicity was so extensive,

sustained, and pervasive that the community must be deemed to have been

saturated with it, and that there was insufficient time between the publicity

and the trial for any prejudice to have dissipated. Id. at 314-15.

      Although Maurer contends the trial court erred in denying her motion

seeking a venue change, she fails to identify in her brief where she preserved

this issue before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (requiring an appellant

to identify when and how an issue was first raised before the trial court).

Further, as the Commonwealth accurately observes, “no such ruling or [o]rder

exists, because [Maurer] affirmatively acquiesced to the negotiated [jury]

questionnaire plan.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 68. Consequently, the

Commonwealth contends the issue is not preserved for appellate review. See

id. at 71. We agree.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302(a) provides that “issues

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time

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on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Likewise, “[a] claim which has not been raised

before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Lopata, 754 A.2d 685, 689 (Pa. Super. 2000). Moreover,

we have concluded that where defense counsel acceded to the trial court’s

ruling and did not place an objection on the record, the appellant waived his

right to argue the issue. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 846 A.2d 747, 752

(Pa. Super. 2004).

      Our review reflects that Maurer filed her pretrial motion requesting a

venue change on March 1, 2021, and the trial court addressed the motion at

a hearing on September 13, 2021. During the hearing, counsel for

Schollenberger suggested the use of a questionnaire to refine the jury pool

due to pretrial publicity, and Maurer’s counsel agreed stating, “I think that

would be a fair way to proceed.” N.T., 9/13/21, at 29. After further discussion,

the trial court summarized the questionnaire process: “I’m thinking the

questionnaire will be mailed one month out, returned eight days to two weeks.

So that we’ll have all of the questionnaires back two weeks before jury

selection. That is my thought process. Agreed? Disagreed?” N.T., 9/13/21, at

38. Maurer’s counsel affirmatively responded, “Agreed.” Id.

      The trial court further explained the jury selection process as follows:

      (1) We determined that a larger-than-normal jury panel should be
      randomly identified and selected.

      (2) We asked counsel to identify questions that they would like to
      pose to members of the jury panel regarding their knowledge of

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      the above-referenced case. Both counsel presented proposed
      questions to the [trial c]ourt.

      (3) We developed a questionnaire that was mailed to each
      prospective juror. A copy of that questionnaire is attached to this
      Opinion as Exhibit A.

      (4) This [c]ourt conducted preliminary screening of every
      questionnaire that was returned. Any prospective juror who
      indicated that he/she could not be fair due to pre-trial publicity or
      the nature of the case was eliminated from the pool.

      (5) Following the preliminary screening conducted by the [trial
      c]ourt as outlined above, we provided all remaining questionnaires
      to both counsel. We then asked each attorney to identify
      additional individuals who should be eliminated from the pool.
      Both attorneys reviewed and objected to additional jurors. We do
      not recall retaining any juror for whom an objection was lodged.

      (6) All jurors who remained on the list after the above process
      was concluded were summoned to appear in Court for a voir dire.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/22, at 3-4.

      The record further indicates that trial counsel offered no objection to the

empaneled jury after extensive voir dire. Rather, as the Commonwealth

observes, regarding each of the jurors empaneled, “counsel affirmatively

indicated acceptance.” See Commonwealth’s Brief at 71 (citing N.T., 3/14/22,

at 50, 58, 65, 89, 93, 104, 112, 125, 132, 138, 146, 155). In light of Maurer’s

affirmative acceptance of the trial court’s jury selection plan precipitated by

the motion for change of venue, and the fact that Maurer did not challenge

the process during the actual jury selection, we conclude that the issue is

waived for purposes of appeal.

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       Maurer last argues the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion for

mistrial, which she made after the Commonwealth presented evidence

consisting of color images taken from a responding officer’s body camera. See

Appellant’s Brief at 25-26. Maurer explains that the evidence depicted

Maxwell’s deceased body lying in his room. She asserts that the “evidence’s

only purpose was to inflame and infuriate the jury against [Maurer] and

subsequently did not afford her a fair trial.” Id.

       When responding to a motion for mistrial, the trial court is to “determine

whether misconduct or prejudicial error actually occurred, and if so, to assess

the degree of any resulting prejudice.”6 Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 907

A.2d 477, 491 (Pa. 2006). When a party moves for a mistrial, such relief is

required only when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect

is to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. See Commonwealth

v. Feliciano, 884 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Super. 2005). A trial court is vested with

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6     We note Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 605 addresses
mistrials, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

       Rule 605. Mistrial

       (B) When an event prejudicial to the defendant occurs during trial
       only the defendant may move for a mistrial; the motion shall be
       made when the event is disclosed. Otherwise, the trial court may
       declare a mistrial only for reasons of manifest necessity.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 605(B).

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the sound discretion to determine whether a mistrial is warranted, and we

review its decision for an abuse of that discretion. Id.

      Before we address Maurer’s claim, we must consider whether the issue

has been waived. An appellate court is limited to considering only those facts

that have been duly certified in the record on appeal. See Commonwealth

v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (Pa. 2008) (holding the appellant waived a

challenge to the admissibility of an autopsy photograph where he failed to

include the photograph at issue in the certified record).

      Specifically, we are mindful of the following:

      Moreover, “it is Appellant’s responsibility to ensure that this Court
      has the complete record necessary to properly review a claim.”
      Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 963 (Pa. Super.
      2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

             In Commonwealth v. Petroll, 696 A.2d 817 (Pa. Super.
      1997), aff'd, 558 Pa. 565, 738 A.2d 993 (Pa. 1999), the defendant
      argued that the trial court erred by failing to sustain his objection
      to the admission of photographs. This Court found the issue
      waived because of the defendant’s failure to ensure the
      photographs were included in the certified record. See id. at 836.
      Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Lassen, 659 A.2d 999 (Pa.
      Super. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v.
      Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 882 (Pa. Super. 2015), the defendant
      argued that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the
      victim’s injuries. This Court found the issue waived because the
      defendant failed to include the photographs in the certified record.
      See id. at 1008. “In this case, Appellant has failed to provide the
      necessary [photographs] for review. Because our review of the
      issue is dependent upon materials that are not provided in the
      certified record, we cannot consider this claim. Thus, this claim is
      waived.” Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d 247, 249 (Pa.
      Super. 2009), appeal denied, 985 A.2d 219 (Pa. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2016).

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       Our review of the certified record reflects the Commonwealth admitted

several PowerPoint slides depicting what Officer Jason Cleck of the Annville

Township Police Department observed on his approach to Maxwell’s room, as

recorded on the officer’s body camera. See N.T., 3/15/22, at 151-57 (Indexed

as Exhibits 7, 8, and 66).7 However, none of the images admitted at trial were

included in the certified record for transmittal to this Court. Therefore, Maurer

failed to ensure that the complete record is before this Court for review.

Accordingly, because we cannot review the allegedly inflammatory items

presented by the Commonwealth, our review of the issue of whether a mistrial

was necessary regarding the pictures is hampered. Therefore, we are

constrained to deem this issue to be waived on appeal.

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7 The prosecutor explained the preparation of the PowerPoint as follows, “we

took your [body camera] video, combined it with a few crime scene
photographs to show the jury what you found.” N.T., 3/15/22 at 153. She
then expounded, “[F]or purposes of the record, what we’ve done is we made
trial CDs with all of either the voluminous paper copy exhibits, video exhibits,
audio exhibits; and they’re individually marked on the back. The CD itself is
marked as Exhibit 66, and we’ll just continue to add on to that as we go
through trial. So, Exhibit 7 is contained therein. And I would ask permission
to publish Exhibit 8, the PowerPoint.” Id. at 154.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2023

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