Court Opinion

ID: 9953578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 15:00:29.653783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:00.583109
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DICKIE T. LAM,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  PH-0752-22-0250-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: March 21, 2024
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

           THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Karen Weisbord , Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Laura Donohue-Liban , George Johnson , Ronetia Douglas and
             Jayne T. Haiber , Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                             Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which mitigated the appellant’s removal
     to a 60-day suspension without pay. Generally, we grant petitions such as these
     only in the following circumstances:       the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party
     has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review.     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and cross
     petition for review, and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s
     final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         Prior to his removal, the appellant was a GS-12 Customs and Border
     Protection Officer for the agency’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
     division stationed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6
     at 68. On September 12, 2020, the appellant, while on duty, in uniform and in a
     marked CBP vehicle, made a traffic stop on the Walt Whitman Bridge at the
     border of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Id. at 164-65. The appellant notified his
     supervisor of the incident after he returned to his duty station, IAF, Tab 1 at 17,
     and his supervisor notified agency leadership, IAF, Tab 6 at 211.            Shortly
     thereafter, the agency found that the appellant’s statement to his supervisor
     conflicted with the police report, and the Office of Professional Responsibility
     (OPR) initiated an investigation into the traffic stop. IAF, Tab 6 at 198. At the
     conclusion of the investigation, OPR determined that the appellant made an
     unauthorized traffic stop and provided conflicting accounts of the stop to the
     agency, but did not knowingly provide false or misleading information to the
     agency. Id. at 178-96.
                                                                                         3

¶3        On February 18, 2022, the agency proposed to remove the appellant, based
     on the following charges: (1) Misuse of a Government Vehicle for Other than
     Official Purposes, (2) Misuse of Authority, and (3) Lack of Candor (five
     specifications). Id. at 164-73. The agency charged the appellant with misuse of
     his Government vehicle when while on duty, in uniform, and driving a marked
     CBP law enforcement vehicle, he activated the vehicle’s emergency signaling
     device while driving behind a private vehicle to cause the driver to stop without
     an official purpose. Id. at 164. The agency charged him with misuse of authority
     while on duty, and in uniform, he requested the private driver’s license, insurance
     information, and vehicle registration, took custody of his driver’s license,
     detained the driver for approximately 12 minutes prior to local law enforcement
     arriving, and signed the ticket in his capacity as a CBP Officer with no nexus to
     his authority as a CBP Officer and without having peace officer status. Id. The
     agency also charged the appellant with lack of candor when he gave conflicting
     information to his supervisor, in his written statement, and during his OPR
     interview. Id. at 165-66. On May 31, 2022, the agency issued a decision letter
     sustaining the misuse of authority and lack of candor charges and removed the
     appellant effective June 14, 2022. Id. at 70-75.
¶4        The appellant timely appealed his removal to the Board challenging the
     charges against him.    IAF, Tab 1.    He also raised the affirmative defense of
     reprisal for equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. Id. at 18-21. After
     holding the requested hearing, IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tabs 32-34, Hearing Recording
     (HR), the administrative judge issued an initial decision, IAF, Tab 35, Initial
     Decision (ID).   Therein, he found that the agency proved the lack of candor
     charge by preponderant evidence but failed to prove the charge of misuse of
     authority by preponderant evidence. ID at 7-18. He also found that the appellant
     failed to prove his affirmative defense of reprisal for EEO activity. ID at 18-19.
     Finally, although he found that the agency proved that a nexus existed between
     the appellant’s conduct and the efficiency of the service, he found that it failed to
                                                                                             4

     show that removal based on the sole sustained charge of lack of candor was
     reasonable. ID at 19-22. Accordingly, he mitigated the penalty of removal to a
     60-day suspension without pay. ID at 22.
¶5         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. 2 Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-26.           The appellant has responded to the
     agency’s petition for review and filed a cross petition for review challenging the
     administrative judge’s decision to mitigate his removal to a 60-day unpaid
     suspension. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. The agency has filed a reply to the response and
     has responded to the appellant’s cross petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 6, 9.
     Additionally, the appellant has filed motions for leave to file a surreply. 3 PFR
     File, Tabs 7, 10.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         On review, the agency challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the
     agency failed to prove its misuse of authority charge and two specifications of its
     lack of candor charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-19. Specifically, the agency argues
     that the administrative judge made erroneous findings of facts and failed to
     2
       With its petition for review, the agency submitted a certification of its compliance
     with the interim relief order and provided evidence demonstrating that it has complied
     with the administrative judge’s interim relief order. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 1 at 27-31; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). The appellant does not challenge the
     agency’s certification on review.
     3
       Following the agency’s reply to the appellant’s response to its petition for review, the
     appellant filed a motion for leave to file a surreply. PFR File, Tab 7. The appellant
     filed a second motion for leave to file a surreply following the agency’s response to his
     cross petition for review. PFR File, Tab 10. Such pleadings are generally not allowed
     absent approval by the Office of the Clerk of the Board based upon a party’s motion
     describing the nature of and need for the pleading. See Martin v. U.S. Postal Service,
     123 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 8 n.1 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5). Here, the appellant
     argues that a surreply is necessary to address the agency’s misrepresentation of the
     record, the law, and the administrative judge’s initial decision. PFR File, Tab 7 at 5,
     Tab 10 at 5-6. As explained below, we conclude that the administrative judge correctly
     determined that the agency failed to prove its misuse of authority charge and found that
     removal was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Thus, we discern no
     need for these additional pleadings. Accordingly, the appellant’s motions for leave to
     file a surreply are denied.
                                                                                         5

     properly assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The agency also argues that
     the administrative judge improperly mitigated its chosen penalty of removal. Id.
     at 19-26
     The    administrative      judge    made   reasoned     findings    of    fact   and
     credibility - based determinations.
¶7        The agency argues the administrative judge erroneously found that the
     appellant’s actions following the traffic stop to be appropriate based on the
     deciding official’s decision not to sustain the misuse of a Government vehicle for
     other than official purposes charge and his belief that briefly engaging a driver is
     appropriate. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-13; ID at 7-13. It argues that in concluding
     that the appellant’s actions were appropriate and consistent with the actions of a
     witness, the administrative judge failed to correctly address the appellant’s
     misuse of his authority to detain the driver and the driver’s license, to determine
     the requisite traffic charge, and to sign and issue a ticket to the driver. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 10-17. In response, the appellant argues that the administrative judge’s
     findings are supported by the record. PFR File, Tab 3 at 12-13, 19-22. We agree
     with the appellant that the administrative judge made appropriate fact findings
     and properly considered the relevant evidence in making his determinations.
     Here, the agency based its charge of misuse of authority on the following
     specification:
           On September 12, 2020, at approximately 12:42 PM, while on duty,
           and in uniform, with no nexus to your authority as a CBP Officer and
           without having peace officer status, you approached a private driver,
           requested his license and vehicle registration, and took custody of his
           driver’s license; you also requested his insurance information and
           detained the driver for approximately 12 minutes prior to local law
           enforcement arriving. When law enforcement officers from the
           Delaware River Port Authority Police Department (DRPA) arrived,
           you informed them of the State of New Jersey traffic violation to
           charge on the resulting Complaint-Summons (No. 0414-PA-293725),
           signed your name as the complaining witness in your capacity as a
           CBP Officer; and you served the Complaint-Summons on the driver.
                                                                                                6

            Your conduct had no nexus to your authority and position as a CBP
            Officer.
¶8         The administrative judge found that the agency failed to prove its charge by
     preponderant evidence.       ID at 7-13.      In so finding, the administrative judge
     explained that the deciding official conceded that many of the factual allegations
     in the agency’s charge were appropriate.             ID at 10-13; IAF, Tab 33, HR
     (testimony of deciding official). Specifically, he noted that the deciding official
     testified that both the traffic stop and the appellant’s subsequent actions were
     appropriate and that the appellant had no authority over the DRPA officers. 4 ID
     at 10-13; IAF, Tab 33, HR (testimony of deciding official). The administrative
     judge found that those concessions along with the other evidence in the record
     undermined the agency’s charge.            ID at 11-13.       The administrative judge
     concluded that, amongst other things, the evidence and testimony that the agency
     has no policy expressly addressing traffic stops; that CBP officers, including the
     appellant, have made traffic stops and requested and received identification
     without discipline; and that the agency reports reflect that the DRPA officers
     completed and issued the ticket did not support sustaining the agency’s charge
     considering the deciding official’s concessions. ID at 10,13; IAF, Tab 6 at 135,
     147-57, 198, 200; Tab 19 at 150-54; Tab 33, HR (testimony of the appellant, the
     appellant’s supervisor, as well as current and former CBP Officers officers).
¶9         We are similarly unpersuaded by the agency’s argument on review that the
     administrative judge made erroneous findings regarding the 12-minute stop. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 13-14. The agency argues that he “made the erroneous leap that
     because [the deciding official] said it is acceptable for a [CBP Officer] to call
     911, then a twelve-minute detention was out of the Appellant’s control.” Id.; ID
     at 12. However, the administrative judge did not solely consider the deciding
     official’s concession regarding the appropriateness of the 911 call. Instead, he

     4
       The administrative judge found that the deciding official conceded that it was okay for
     the appellant to act as a witness regarding a state crime or violation, to sign the ticket as
     a witness, and to call 911 after making the stop. ID at 12.
                                                                                         7

      made reasoned conclusions based on numerous factors.            ID at 12-13.      In
      particular, the administrative judge considered that the deciding official testified
      that “it is ‘sometimes appropriate to pull over a driver who is reckless or
      dangerous’ and a [CBP Officer] ‘can stop a vehicle if it is a risk to public
      safety.’” ID at 11; IAF, Tab 33, HR (testimony of the deciding official). He
      considered the deciding official’s concession that the appellant properly stopped
      the reckless driver and called 911. ID at 12; IAF, Tab 33, HR (testimony of the
      deciding official).   He also considered the lack of a policy addressing traffic
      stops, and testimony and evidence corroborating that other CBP Officers have
      made similar traffic stops, to include taking identification, without discipline. ID
      at 12-13.
¶10        To the extent that the agency argues that the administrative judge
      erroneously found the appellant to be a mere witness, its argument is without
      merit.   The administrative judge did not determine that the appellant was a
      witness; instead, he expressed that the appellant’s actions “appeared to be that of
      a witness” in large part based on the evidence and testimony that the appellant
      relayed the details of the incident to the DRPA officers, the DRPA officers filled
      out the ticket, asked him about the charge since he witnessed the incident, and
      requested that he sign it as the complaining witness. ID at 12-13; IAF, Tab 6
      at 198, 200, 217, Tab 9 (dash cam video); Tab 33, HR (testimony of the deciding
      official). Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      decision to not sustain the misuse of authority charge. ID at 13.
¶11        The agency also argues that the administrative judge failed to properly
      assess witness credibility in accordance with Hillen v. Department of the Army,
      35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. Specifically, the agency
      asserts that the administrative judge “either did not explain his credibility
      determinations or conducted scant analysis when he did” in finding that it failed
      to prove two specifications of its lack of candor charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7.
      We disagree.
                                                                                         8

¶12        The fact that an administrative judge does not mention all of the evidence or
      Hillen factors does not mean that she did not consider them.              Mithen v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 14 (2015), aff’d, 652 F.
      App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the administrative judge specified that he had
      the opportunity to observe the witnesses, considered their demeanor, and relied
      on the factors identified by the Board in Hillen for resolving issues of credibility.
      ID at 7 n.4. Further, the Board defers to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe
      v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Purifoy v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding
      that the Board erred in failing to defer to an administrative judge’s implicit
      demeanor-based credibility findings after holding a hearing, even though
      demeanor was not specifically discussed); see also Mithen, 122 M.S.P.R. 489,
      ¶ 13 (noting that an administrative judge’s credibility determinations are
      “virtually unreviewable”).
¶13        The agency also asserts that the administrative judge improperly found the
      appellant credible given his numerous inconsistencies regarding what occurred
      during the traffic stop. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. We find this assertion unavailing.
      At the outset, the administrative judge was not required to discredit the
      appellant’s credibility on all issues because he found him not credible on one or
      more issues. Cross v. Department of the Army, 89 M.S.P.R. 62, ¶ 14 (2001); see
      Hawkins v. Smithsonian Institution, 73 M.S.P.R. 397, 404 (1997). Instead, the
      specific instances of lack of credibility are proper considerations in assessing the
      witness’s overall credibility. Cross, 89 M.S.P.R. 62, ¶ 14; see Sternberg v.
      Department of Defense, 41 M.S.P.R. 46, 54 (1989) (explaining that once an
      administrative judge has discredited a witness’s testimony on one charge, he must
      reasonably explain why he accepts the testimony as credible on other charges).
                                                                                        9

¶14        In the initial decision, the administrative judge considered and gave
      reasoned explanations for why he did not sustain the two specifications of the
      lack of candor charge. ID at 17-18. With respect to the specification alleging
      that the appellant failed to disclose information in his written statement, the
      administrative judge specifically explained he found that the missing information
      to be immaterial based on the agency’s testimony, as noted above, that it had no
      issues with the appellant serving as a witness.       ID at 17.     Regarding the
      specification that the appellant’s written statement was inconsistent with his OPR
      interview, the administrative judge found that he credibly explained that he did
      not include the driver’s medical issue in his written statement because he knew it
      was not factual. Id. The record also reflects that the appellant testified that he
      included the information during his OPR interview in response to the
      investigator’s request to describe the incident in as much detail as you can
      remember. IAF, Tab 33, HR (testimony of the appellant). Thus, we find that the
      administrative judge’s credibility analysis was sufficient to justify his factual
      findings.

      We discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant failed to establish his affirmative defense.
¶15        The appellant argued that the agency’s actions were reprisal for engaging in
      protected EEO activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 18-21. The administrative judge found
      that the appellant failed to prove this affirmative defense considering the limited
      evidence and testimony regarding the appellant’s affirmative defense. ID at 18-
      19. The parties do not challenge, and we discern no basis to disturb, this finding
      on review.
                                                                                            10

      We discern no error in the administrative judge’s decision to mitigate the penalty
      of removal to a 60-day suspension. 5
¶16         In addition to proving its charges by preponderant evidence, the agency
      must also establish the existence of a nexus between the misconduct and the
      efficiency of the service, and that the penalty of removal is reasonable. 5 U.S.C.
      § 7513(a); Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 18 (2013);
      Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306-07 (1981). The nexus
      requirement, for purposes of determining whether an agency has shown that its
      action promotes the efficiency of the service, means there must be a clear and
      direct relationship between the articulated grounds for an adverse action and
      either the employee’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactorily or some other
      legitimate Government interest.          Scheffler v. Department of the Army,
      117 M.S.P.R. 499, ¶ 9 (2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We
      agree with the administrative judge’s findings that the agency has met the nexus
      requirement here. ID at 18 (citing Miles v. Department of the Navy, 102 M.S.P.R.
      316, ¶ 11 (2006) (reasoning that misconduct that occurred at work satisfies the
      nexus requirement)).
¶17         Regarding the penalty, when, as here, not all of the charges are sustained,
      the Board will consider carefully whether the sustained charges merit the penalty
      imposed by the agency. Suggs v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R.
      671, ¶ 6 (2010), aff’d, 415 F. App’x 240 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In such circumstances,
      the Board may mitigate the agency’s penalty to the maximum reasonable penalty
      so long as the agency has not indicated in either its final decision or in
      proceedings before the Board that it desires a lesser penalty be imposed on fewer
      charges. Id. In doing so, the Board may not disconnect its penalty determination

      5
         The appellant largely argues in his cross petition for review that the administrative
      judge’s mitigated penalty is unreasonable. PFR File, Tab 4. However, given our
      disposition that the administrative judge appropriately mitigated the penalty to 60-days,
      we deny the appellant’s cross petition for review.
                                                                                          11

      from the agency’s managerial will and primary discretion in disciplining
      employees. Id.
¶18        On review, the agency continues to argue that the penalty of removal is
      reasonable based on both the misuse of authority charge and lack of candor
      charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-26. Because, as discussed above, we agree with
      the administrative judge that the agency failed to prove the misuse of authority
      charge, we agree that the penalty can only be based on the lack of candor charge.
      See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 302 (explaining that the Board reviews the penalty
      based on the sustained charges to ensure that it is within the range allowed by law
      and regulation). The agency argues that mitigation is not warranted in this case.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-26.
¶19        In assessing the penalty, the administrative judge considered the deciding
      official’s decision letter and his testimony.    ID at 20.       The deciding official
      testified that the appellant’s lack of candor readily supported his removal, that he
      lost trust and confidence in the appellant’s ability to perform his duties, and that,
      as a law enforcement officer, the appellant’s actions made him Giglio-impaired.
      IAF, Tab 33, HR (testimony of the deciding official). The administrative judge
      acknowledged that the Board considers lack of candor a serious offense that can
      readily support the penalty of removal. ID at 20 (citing Jackson v. Department of
      the Army, 99 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 6 (2005)). Nonetheless, he properly observed that
      the appellant’s law enforcement status does not preclude mitigation of a lack of
      candor charge. ID at 21 (citing Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56,
      ¶ 31 (2000)). Specifically, the administrative judge determined that mitigation is
      appropriate   given   the   appellant’s   successful   19-year    work   history,   his
      supervisor’s testimony that he is a good and honest officer, and evidence that his
      prior disciplinary actions occurred over 10 years prior. ID at 20 -22. As such, we
      find that the administrative judge properly determined that the maximum
      reasonable penalty under the circumstances of this case is a 60-day suspension
      without pay. ID at 22. For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review
                                                                                        12

      and affirm the initial decision, which sustained the charge of lack of candor but
      mitigated the removal to a 60-day suspension without pay.

                                            ORDER

¶20         We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s June 14, 2022 removal
      and substitute in its place a 60-day suspension without pay. The agency must
      complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. See Kerr
      v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
¶21        We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶22        We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the
      agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶23        No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a
                                                                                           13

¶24         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                      NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                            YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                           ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      6
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      14

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
                                                                                   15

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     16

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                17

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.           5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                       18

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.
                                            DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING
                                                       SERVICE
                                                 Civilian Pay Operations

                               DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
        The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back
pay pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the
following checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing
documentation may substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information
may                           be                           found                          at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

      NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid
by vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐   1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

        Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the
ticket comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐   2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐   3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐   4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐   5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐   6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐   7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

        Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no
authority under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave
payment they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay
award. The annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the
annual leave ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR
§ 550.805(g).
                                                                                               2

       NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
       Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
       Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
       NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay
Period and required data in 1-7 above.
      The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump
Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
       If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.