Court Opinion

ID: 9641108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:23:21.140458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.099926
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
President Judge Bowman,
This is an appeal from an order of the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas granting the City of Johnstown’s (appellee) motion to quash an appeal from the suspension of appellant, an officer in the Johnstown Police Department.
On September 20, 1974, appellant was notified that he was suspended for a period of ten days without pay and/or benefits pursuant to Section 4408 of The Third Class City Code, Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, as amended, 53 P.S. §39408. Appellant promptly requested a hearing which request was denied. He then filed an appeal in the court below alleging, inter alia, that he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to the Local Agency Law, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1133, 53 P.S. §11301 et seq. The Court below granted the appellee’s motion to quash. This appeal followed.
Section 4408 of The Third Class City Code provides, in pertinent part: “All employes subject to civil service shall be subject to suspension by the director of the department for misconduct, or violation of any law of this Commonwealth, any ordinance of the city, or regulation of the department, pending action by the city council upon the charges made against any of such employes. On hearing before the city council, where they may be represented by counsel, they may be fined or suspended for a period not exceeding thirty days with or without pay, or they may be discharged by city council, if found guilty of the charges made against them. The director of each such department may, for misconduct or violation as aforesaid, suspend any employe of such department for a period of *45ten days, with or without pay, without preferring charges and without a hearing of council. ...” (Emphasis added.) Until recently, it was established that there was no right of appeal from a ten day suspension under this provision and the only remedy for a wrongful suspension was an action in assumpsit for lost pay. Loftus v. Carbondale, 405 Pa. 276, 175 A.2d 85 (1961).1 However, Article V, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968 provided, for the first time, an express constitutional right of appeal from an administrative agency to a court of record, the selection of such court to be as provided by law. To implement this provision the Legislature enacted the Local Agency Law (Act), effective January 1, 1969. Section 12 of the Act specifically repeals all other acts and parts of acts insofar as they are inconsistent therewith.
The issue presented here is whether the City’s suspension of appellant constitutes an adjudication by a local agency within the meaning of the Act, thus entitling appellant to a hearing before such suspension can be valid. We hold that it does and therefore reverse.
Section 2 of the Act, 53 P.S. §11302(2), defines a “local agency” as “any department . . . office or other agency of a political subdivision. ...” The police department of the City of Johnstown is clearly within this definition.
The remaining question is whether the suspension constitutes an “adjudication” within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act, that is “any final order, decree, *46decision ... by a local agency affecting personal or property rights ... of any or all of the parties to the proceeding. . . .” 53 P.S. §11302(1). Essentially the same question was presented in Kretzler v. Ohio Township, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 236, 322 A.2d 157 (1974), and we find that decision controlling.
In Kretzler, we held that where the appellant police officers had a statutorily afforded right to their present rank except for certain enumerated reasons, such right constituted a “property or personal right within the meaning of an adjudication, ...” 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 241, 322 A.2d at 160. The appellants in that case were thus entitled to an administrative hearing under the Act before they could be demoted by the township, notwithstanding the absence of a provision for hearing in the Police Tenure Act, applicable to the particular township.
In the present case, Section 4408 of The Third Class City Code provides for suspension only for misconduct or violation of laws, ordinances or regulations. Appellant thus has a statutory right to continued active status, except for the enumerated reasons. As in Kretzler, we believe that this appellant is entitled to the protection afforded by the Act, “thus giving substance and meaning to the right the legislature saw fit to confer upon him. ...” 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 241, 322 A.2d at 160. See also Gingrich v. City of Lebanon, 65 Pa. D. & C. 2d 704 (1974).
In reaching this result we recognize that additional burdens are being placed upon police departments in the routine enforcement of discipline of their police officers. We must, however, recognize the statutorily afforded, right of police officers to be protected from arbitrary and groundless suspensions. In attempting to strike a reasonable balance, we emphasize that our holding-is limited to providing the appellant the right to an administrative hearing and, if aggrieved by the *47resulting adjudication, the right to appeal therefrom in accordance with the provisions of the Local Ageney Law. We do not hold that an administrative hearing must precede the action of suspension. Rather, the suspension may be initially imposed and enforced, provided that a hearing, if sought, is afforded within a reasonable time thereafter.
Order
Now, November 8, 1976, the order of the court below is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 It is interesting to note that The Third Class City Code appears unique with respect to this provision. The Borough Code, The First Class Township Code, The Second Class Township Code, The Police Tenure Act, The First Class City Code and The Second Class City Code all provide some type of hearing with respect to a suspension, for any length of time, of a policeman.