Court Opinion

ID: 9380626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 18:02:23.629917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.494874
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/23 Securus Technologies v. Department of Technology CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,                                                                     C095097

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                         (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                34202180003594CUWMGDS)
           v.

 DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY et al.,

                    Defendants and Appellants;

 GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION,

                    Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

         Appellants California Department of Technology (Department of Technology) and
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections) (together, the
State) awarded a six-year contract to real party in interest and appellant Global Tel*Link
Corporation (Global) to provide communications equipment and services to incarcerated
persons. Respondent Securus Technologies, LLC (Securus), an unsuccessful bidder,

                                                             1
petitioned for a writ of mandate challenging the award of the contract to Global. The trial
court granted the petition and set aside the contract.
        The State and Global appeal, arguing the trial court either misinterpreted a “not to
exceed” (NTE) rate provision in the State’s request for proposals (RFP), or should have
deferred to the State’s reasonable interpretation of the provision. In the alternative, the
State and Global argue any variance from the RFP was inconsequential and does not
justify setting aside the contract. We will reject these arguments and affirm the order
granting the petition for a writ of mandate.
                                      I. BACKGROUND
        Corrections operates correctional facilities throughout the State of California,
including adult institutions, fire camps, and youth facilities. Persons incarcerated with
Corrections have traditionally communicated with the outside world using conventional
telephone equipment (e.g., wall-mounted phones), which allow them to make domestic
and international calls across an inmate/ward telephone network.1 An earlier contract to
administer the inmate/ward telephone network was awarded to Global. 2
        More recently, Corrections has started offering more advanced forms of
communications and services, such as email and inbound video clips and photos
downloadable to a tablet, on a pilot basis in select institutions. According to the State,
such additional forms of communication have been successfully deployed in other
correctional systems around the country and have been shown to increase family and
community unification.
        Prompted by such potential benefits, the Department of Technology issued an RFP
to solicit bids for a contract to provide communications equipment and services to

1   International calls are prepaid only.
2   That contract is not at issue here.

                                               2
persons incarcerated with Corrections.3 The RFP sought to increase access to existing
communications services and eventually provide access to new services, such as video
calling. The successful bidder would be responsible for purchasing and providing all
necessary equipment (including infrastructure, hardware, and software), and providing
maintenance and operational support for an initial term of six years, with options to
extend the primary term to a maximum of 10 years.
A.       The RFP Process
         The RFP was issued pursuant to Public Contract Code section 6611,4 which
authorizes the Department of General Services and the Department of Technology to use
a negotiation process when contracting for information technology and
telecommunications goods and services, provided certain conditions are met. 5 (§ 6611,
subd. (a).)
         The RFP establishes a multi-step process for collecting and evaluating bids. First,
bidders would submit proposals describing the products and services to be provided in
narrative form, and “cost workbooks” identifying the costs associated with those products
and services in tabular form. Proposals would then be scored, with each proposal
receiving a maximum of 2,000 points.6 Bidders could receive up to 1,400 points for their
technical responses, and 600 points for their cost proposals.
         Second, the State would invite eligible bidders to negotiate pursuant to section
6611. Following negotiations, the State would have the option to request that bidders

3 The Department of Technology issued addenda to the RFP in September and October
2020. For convenience, further references to the RFP will include these addenda.
4    Undesignated statutory references are to the Public Contract Code.
5    No one suggests those conditions were not met here.
6 Bidders could receive additional points for incentives and preferences not relevant
here.

                                               3
make best and final offer submissions clarifying any negotiated items or deviations from
their proposals.
       Third, the State would evaluate best and final offer submissions for compliance
with RFP requirements and negotiated items. The contract would be awarded to “the
value effective [best and final offer].”
B.     The Not to Exceed “NTE” Rate
       The State determined the communications system should be revenue generating or
cost neutral. Accordingly, the RFP contemplates that cost was to be “a primary
evaluation criterion weighted at 30% of the total 2,000 points.” To ensure that potential
bidders kept costs top of mind, the RFP calls for an NTE rate of $.05 per minute. To this
end, the RFP provides: “The State has established not-to-exceed (NTE) rates for this
procurement. Bidder’s [sic] rates for calls must not exceed $.05 per minute. Bidders
may propose rates lower than the NTE identified.” (Emphasis omitted.) The parties’
dispute turns on the meaning of the word “call,” as used in the NTE rate provision.
C.     Proposals
       Three bidders submitted timely proposals, including Global and Securus. Global
and Securus presented their proposed rates using the required cost workbooks. The cost
workbooks seek rates for two general categories of communications: telephone calls and
“other offender communication[s].”
       The first general category—telephone calls—is further divided into three
subcategories: (1) “Adult – Local, IntraLATA, InterLATA, Interstate,” (2) Youth –
Local, IntraLATA, InterLATA, Interstate,” and (3) “International Calls (Adults and
Youth[)].” A glossary appended to the RFP defines the terms, “Local,” “IntraLATA,”
“InterLATA,” “Interstate,” and “International.” These definitions are set forth in

                                            4
footnote 7, below.7 Although the definition of “InterLATA” calls appears to include
“International” calls, the parties treat “Local, IntraLATA, InterLATA [and] Interstate”
calls, on the one hand, and “International” calls, on the other, as two separate and
mutually exclusive subcategories. We will do the same. For convenience, we will refer
to “Local, IntraLATA, InterLATA [and] Interstate” calls cumulatively as “domestic
calls.”8 The second general category—other offender communications—includes video
calling.
       Securus proposed the following rates for telephone calls: $0.009 per minute for
domestic calls by incarcerated adults, $0.00 per minute for domestic calls by incarcerated
youth, and $0.05 per minute for international calls by all incarcerated persons, adults, and
youth. For video calling, Securus proposed a rate of $0.99 per transaction (i.e., per video
call) rather than per minute.
       Global proposed the following rates for telephone calls: $0.025 per minute for
domestic telephone calls by incarcerated adults, $0.00 per minute for domestic telephone
calls by incarcerated youth, and $0.10 per minute for international calls by incarcerated
adults and youth. Global proposed a rate of $1.25 per transaction for video calls.

7  The glossary defines “Local” calls as calls “within [a] local exchange.” “An exchange
is a specified area usually encompassing a city, or town and its environs.”

   The glossary defines “IntraLATA” calls as “Local Toll Service or Local Long
Distance . . . calling within a geographic area known as a Local Access and Transport
Area (LATA).” The glossary defines “InterLATA” calls as “all calls outside the local
exchange and local toll service areas,” and “calls that originate in one [Local Access and
Transport Area] and terminate in another and international calls.”

    “Interstate” calls are “calls between two states.”
8 According to the State, “domestic telephone calls made up approximately 99% of all
calls made by incarcerated people in the 8-month period ending in February 2021.”

                                              5
D.       Negotiations
         The State invited Securus and Global to participate in a negotiation process.9
During negotiations, representatives from the State informed Securus that its proposed
rate for video calling ($0.99 per transaction) was high and should be expressed as a rate
per minute, rather than a rate per transaction.10 Securus explained that the proposed rate
assumed a 30 minute call. The State also told Securus that the rate for video calling
should comply with the NTE rate of $0.05 per minute.
         The State separately negotiated with Global. At the end of the negotiations, the
State asked that Securus and Global submit best and final offers.
E.       Best and Final Offers
         Securus and Global each submitted best and final offers. For its best and final
offer, Securus proposed a rate of $0.039 per minute for domestic calls by incarcerated
adults, $0.00 per minute for domestic calls by incarcerated youth, and $0.039 per minute
for international calls by incarcerated adults and youth. Securus proposed the same
rate— $0.039 per minute—for video calling.
         For its best and final offer, Global proposed a rate of $0.025 per minute for
domestic calls by incarcerated adults, $0.00 per minute for domestic calls by incarcerated
youth, and $0.07 per minute for international calls by incarcerated adults and youth.
Global proposed a rate of $0.25 per minute for video calling.
F.       Award
         The State evaluated and scored the best and final offers. Securus received a total
best and final offer score of 1,696.71, comprised of (1) a total non-cost score of 1,312.71,
(2) a total cost score of 284, and (3) an award of 100 incentive points. Global received a

9    The third bidder was not invited to participate in the negotiation process.
10 The cost workbooks specifically requested that rates for video calls be expressed on a
per transaction basis.

                                                6
total best and final offer score of 2,062.15, comprised of (1) a total non-cost score of
1,362.15, (2) a total cost score of 600, and (3) the same award of 100 incentive points.
Corrections’ evaluation and selection team recommended that the contract be awarded to
Global.
       The contract was awarded to Global.
G.     Trial Court Proceedings
       Securus filed a petition for writ of mandate in February 2021, arguing the State
should have disqualified Global for exceeding the NTE rate for international calls and
video calling. The State, in response, did not deny that the NTE rate provision was a key
requirement that bidders were required to meet. Nor did the State deny that awarding the
contract to a nonresponsive proposal would be impermissible. Instead, the State
argued—as it does here—that the NTE rate provision only applies to domestic calls. The
trial court rejected the State’s argument.
       By then, Global had commenced performance on the contract’s initial six-year
term. Among other things, Global had provided tablets to incarcerated persons at one of
Correction’s adult facilities and was in the process of providing tablets to incarcerated
persons at four other facilities.
       The trial court granted the petition and set aside the contract. This appeal timely
followed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.        Standard of Review
       Section 6611 authorizes aggrieved bidders to challenge an unsuccessful
negotiation by way of a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085. (§ 6611, subd. (d).)
       “Appellate review of the award of a public contract is governed by certain well-
established principles. In a mandamus action arising under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085, we limit our review to an examination of the proceedings before the agency

                                              7
to determine whether its findings and actions are supported by substantial evidence.
[Citations.] ‘Our review is limited to an examination of the proceedings to determine
whether the [agency’s] actions were arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary
support or inconsistent with proper procedure.’ ” (MCM Const., Inc. v. City & County of
San Francisco (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 359, 368.) In determining these issues, we defer to
the public entity’s factual findings when they are supported by substantial evidence. (Id.
at p. 374.) To the extent our analysis requires us to decide questions of law, our review is
de novo. (Schram Construction, Inc. v. Regents of University of California (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 1040, 1052; DeSilva Gates Construction, LP v. Department of
Transportation (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1420.)
B.     Interpreting the RFP
       The State and Global argue the trial court erred in interpreting the RFP. They
argue the NTE rate only applies to domestic calls and does not limit rates for
international calls or video calling. We are not persuaded.
       Although the RFP preceded the award and formation of the ultimate contract, we
apply familiar principles of contract interpretation in ascertaining the meaning of the
terms used therein. (Cf. Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United States (Fed.Cir. 2004)
365 F.3d 1345, 1353, fn. 4 [“The principles governing interpretation of Government
contracts apply with equal force to the interpretation of solicitations issued by the
Government for such contracts”]; NVT Technologies, Inc. v. United States (Fed.Cir.
2004) 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 [applying rules of contract interpretation to construe an
ambiguous solicitation provision]; Stratos Mobile Networks USA, LLC v. United States
(Fed.Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 1375, 1380 [“The RFP, like any contract, must be read in light
of its purpose and consistently with common sense”].)
       In considering the meaning of the NTE rate provision, we begin with the plain
language of the RFP. (Cf. Civ. Code, §§ 1638 [“The language of a contract is to govern
its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity”]

                                              8
and 1644 [“The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular
sense”].) Where, as here, the parties dispute the meaning of a provision, we determine
“whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretations urged by the
parties.” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 798.) If the language is
ambiguous, i.e., susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court may
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. (Ibid.; Wolf v. Walt Disney
Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1126.) “When no extrinsic evidence
is introduced or the extrinsic evidence was not relied on by the trial court or is not in
conflict, we independently construe the contract.” (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v.
Shewry (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 964, 980.)
       We must also consider the RFP as a whole and interpret contested provisions in
their context, not in isolation, with the aim of giving effect to all provisions, if doing so is
reasonably possible. (Civ. Code, § 1641 [“The whole of a contract [must] . . . be taken
together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping
to interpret the other”].)
       Another principle is relevant here. Although we review the State’s interpretation
of the RFP independently, “public agencies are entitled to significant deference when
making interpretations that are within their particular expertise.” (Blue Cross of
California v. State Department of Health Care Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 322, 330
(Blue Cross).) Thus, we defer to the State’s reasonable conclusions regarding technical
or scientific matters within its area of expertise. (Ibid.; compare Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (9th Cir. 1984) 746 F.2d 1383, 1387
[federal agency’s interpretation was entitled to deference because it was “clearly based
upon the agency’s expertise in electricity transmission regulation] with Texas Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 263, 268-270 [de novo standard of
review applies to an agency’s non-technical contract clause].)

                                               9
       With these principles in mind, we now turn to the language of NTE rate provision.
As noted, the NTE rate provision states, in pertinent part: “Bidder’s [sic] rates for calls
must not exceed $.05 per minute.” (Emphasis omitted.) The State argues the provision
is ambiguous, because the RFP refers to many different kinds of “calls” but does not
define the term. It is true that the RFP does not define the word “calls.” However, the
RFP includes a glossary, which defines other terms and phrases incorporating the word.
For example, the glossary defines “[o]utbound call[s]” as “telephone, video phone, VRS
[video relay service], or ASL-VCS [American Sign Language video calling services]
calls originating from an [i]ncarcerated individual to their family or friends.”11 The
glossary defines “[v]ideo call[s]” as “simultaneous real-time audio and video
communication between [an] [i]ncarcerated individual and their family or friends.”
Definitions for other terms incorporating the word “call” or “calls” are set forth in
footnote 13, below.12

11  The glossary defines “[i]nbound call[s]” as “calls originating from the public to an
[i]ncarcerated individual.” Inbound calls are prohibited.
12  The glossary defines a “[c]all [d]etail [r]ecord” as a “data record produced by the
[communications and technology solution] that documents the details of the telephone,
video phone, [video relay service], and the [American Sign Language video calling
service].”

    The glossary defines “[c]all [c]ontrol [f]eatures” as “variable call parameters such as
calling schedule, time of day, date, or correction facility.” The glossary defines “[c]all
[d]etection” as a “means of detecting unusual or suspicious activities on a
[communications and technology solution] call.”

    The glossary defines “[c]all duration” as “the total amount of minutes an
[i]ncarcerated individual may converse with the called party on a [communications and
technology solution] call.”

    The glossary defines “[c]all [f]orwarding” as “[communications and technology
solution] calls forwarded by a called party to a third party.”

                                             10
       We have little difficulty concluding the word “calls” includes domestic and
international calls. The common and ordinary meaning of “calls” encompasses telephone
communications from places near and far. (See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict.
(11th ed. 2006) p. 175, col. 2 [defining “call,” in part, as “the act of calling on the
telephone”].) Nothing in the common understanding of “calls” limits the term to
“domestic calls only.” Nor does anything in the RFP suggest the State intended to restrict
the meaning of the term. To the contrary, the use of the plural form of “rates for calls”
indicates the NTE rate provision was intended to apply to more than one type of call. We
conclude the word “calls” unambiguously covers domestic and international calls.13
       This brings us to video calling. Global argues with some force that “calls” refers
to communications made by telephone. (See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict., supra,
at p. 175, col. 2.) To be sure, “calls” have traditionally been made by phone, both in
correctional settings and society at large. But times change, and so too do the common
and ordinary meanings of words. “Calls” can now be made from any number of devices,
including cell phones, tablets, and smart watches. It should come as no surprise, then,
that Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary has updated the definition of “call” to include,
“the act of speaking to or attempting to reach someone by telephone or by a similar

    The glossary defines “[c]alled [p]arty” as “[i]ncarcerated individuals[’] family or
friend.”

    The glossary defines “[t]hree-[w]ay [c]alling” as “[c]alling that involves connecting
three (3) distinct parties.”
13  The State argues the word “calls” should be understood to refer to domestic calls only,
because the RFP was primarily concerned with costs for domestic calls, which account
for the overwhelming majority of calls by incarcerated persons. That the State may have
considered costs for domestic calls to be a priority does not mean the word calls can
reasonably be understood to mean “domestic calls only.” The State could have viewed
costs for domestic calls as a priority and still intended for the NTE provision to apply to
all calls.

                                              11
online communication service.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2023)
 [as of March 16, 2023], archived at
 emphasis added.) Revealingly, Merriam-Webster’s
Online Dictionary offers both “telephone call” and “video call” as usage examples.
(Ibid.) Under the circumstances, and considering the purpose of the RFP was to
modernize communications services for incarcerated persons by providing them with
tablets, we conclude the NTE rate provision unambiguously applies to all “calls,”
regardless of the specific technology used to make such calls.
       We find support for our conclusion in Foxcroft Productions, Inc. v. Universal City
Studios, LLC (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1119 (Foxcroft), a contract dispute between the
creators of the television character “Columbo” and the studio responsible for making the
series of the same name. (Id. at p. 1121.) The parties’ dispute turned on the meaning of
the word “photoplays.” (Ibid.) The creators argued the word was ambiguous and should
not include episodes of the show. (Ibid.) The studio countered that “photoplays” covered
“ ‘any video recorded program,’ ” including episodes. (Ibid., italics omitted.)
       The trial court agreed with the studio and the Court of Appeal affirmed, stating:
“The writers’ argument fails because there is no ambiguity. The [agreement] often uses
the word photoplay with modifiers, like ‘feature-length photoplay’ to refer to a movie or
‘pilot photoplay’ to refer to a pilot episode. When used alone, the word photoplay is
broad and can mean each of these different terms.” (Foxcraft, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1132.) The court elaborated: “An example illustrates the point. Suppose an author
contracts to write books. The contract uses the words ‘fiction books,’ ‘fantasy books,’
‘children’s books,’ and ‘ebooks.’ A term of the contract referring simply to ‘books’
would be broad and unambiguous. It would include all types of books.” (Ibid.) So too
here. The NTE rate provision’s limitation on “rates for calls” unambiguously applies to
all calls, of whatever type.

                                            12
       We conclude the RFP is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged by
the State and Global. Having so concluded, we need not consider whether extrinsic
evidence would support an alternative interpretation.14 (Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fidelity
Federal Bank (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448 [if the contract is not reasonably
susceptible to the proffered construction, “ ‘the case is over’ ”].) That leaves us with
their argument that we should defer to the State’s interpretation of the RFP.
       The State and Global rely on cases recognizing that courts may appropriately defer
to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their own regulations or statutes in fields they
are charged with regulating. (See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of
Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 [“An agency interpretation of the meaning and legal
effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts”]; Simi Corp. v.
Garamendi (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1505 [Insurance Commissioner’s
interpretation of regulations entitled to deference]; see also Akella v. Regents of
University of California (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 801, 815-816 [university’s interpretation
of instructional workload policy was entitled to deference].) We have no quarrel with
these authorities or the principles for which they stand. However, we question whether
the rule of judicial deference applies with equal force to an agency’s interpretation of a
contract or similar instrument in a dispute with an outside party. (See Scenic America,
Inc. v. Department of Transportation (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 2, 2-3, 199 L.Ed.2d
271, 271-272] (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) [“Whether Chevron-type
deference warrants a place in the canons of contract interpretation is surely open to
dispute”].)

14 We have previously denied requests for judicial notice of additional extrinsic evidence
by the State and Global.

                                              13
       Only Blue Cross, on which the State and Global extensively rely, comes close to
suggesting that the State’s interpretation of the RFP should receive deference. 15 There,
another panel of this court considered an RFP for contracts to provide managed health
care services to members of California’s Medi-Cal program in Riverside and San
Bernardino counties. (Blue Cross, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.) The RFP required
separate bid proposals for each county, with lists of providers who had contracted with
the bidder to render medical services to members in the county. (Ibid.) The disappointed
bidder, Molina Healthcare, submitted identical lists of providers with each proposal.
(Ibid.) The Department’s Office of Medi-Cal Procurement (OMCP) rejected Molina
Healthcare’s bids as nonresponsive. (Ibid.)
       Molina Healthcare appealed to the Department. (Blue Cross, supra, 153
Cal.App.4th at p. 324.) A hearing officer ruled the RFP did not preclude the submission
of identical, dual-county provider networks and set aside notices of intent to award the
contracts to rival bidder, Blue Cross of California (Blue Cross). (Ibid.) The trial court
affirmed the decision of the hearing officer, and Blue Cross appealed. (Ibid.)
       On appeal, the court framed the pertinent inquiry as “whether the hearing officer’s
interpretation of the RFP is within the agency’s discretion to interpret its own RFP and
whether the hearing officer correctly applied the interpretation to the undisputed facts.”
(Blue Cross, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 330.) The court explained: “Since the hearing
officer acts for the agency, and his or her determination is final, we apply the rule that

15  Arnold v. California Exposition and State Fair (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 498, 507, on
which Global relies, is also distinguishable. Arnold involved an attempt to vacate an
operator extension agreement granted by California Exposition to Capitol Racing, a
harness racing concern. The court deferred to the determination of the Department of
General Services, as “an administrative agency with expertise in the state government
contracting process,” that the agreement was not a public contract subject to competitive
bidding. (Ibid.) The court did not defer to the agency’s interpretation of a disputed term
in the agreement. Arnold offers no real guidance here.

                                              14
public agencies are entitled to significant deference when making interpretations that are
within their particular expertise.” (Ibid.)
       The hearing officer found—and the court agreed—that nothing in the RFP
prohibited the submission of the same provider network for more than one county. (Blue
Cross, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 332.) The “critical question,” then, was whether
Molina Healthcare satisfied time and distance requirements for service to members
within each county. (Ibid.) The hearing officer determined that Molina Healthcare’s
dual county networks could meet the RFP’s time and distance requirements, and the court
deferred to the hearing officer’s determination.
       Setting aside our questions about whether the rule of judicial deference applies to
matters of contract interpretation (which have traditionally been the province of courts),
we find Blue Cross distinguishable. There, the work of interpreting the RFP was
intertwined with complex questions about the sufficiency of dual networks of primary
care providers offering different types of care (e.g., routine or urgent) in different
subspecialties (e.g., family practice, internal medicine, and pediatrics) and geographic
locations. (Blue Cross, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 324-325.) Here, by contrast, our
task amounts to an exercise in garden variety contract interpretation.
       Although the RFP includes numerous technical requirements, the present dispute
is decidedly nontechnical in nature. We are called upon to ascertain the meaning of a
single word—“calls”—in the NTE rate provision, which is concerned solely with setting
“rates for calls.” These terms and concepts—“rates” and “calls”—are familiar to anyone
who has ever signed up for phone service (e.g., most adults) and do not implicate the
State’s substantive expertise. They are well within the competence of the court to
decipher, at least as used here. We therefore conclude that Blue Cross is inapplicable,
and the State’s interpretation of the NTE rate provision is not entitled to deference.
       To summarize, we conclude the NTE rate provision is neither ambiguous nor
reasonably susceptible to the interpretations urged by the State and Global, extrinsic

                                              15
evidence need not be considered, and the State’s interpretation is not entitled to
deference. The trial court correctly concluded the NTE rate provision applies to all calls.
C.      Discretion to Award the Contract to Global
        Global separately argues that section 6611, the State Contracting Manual
(Manual), and the RFP together gave the State discretion to award the contract to Global,
whether or not Global complied with the NTE rate provision. We disagree.
        Section 6611 directs the Department of General Services to establish procedures
and guidelines for the negotiation process to procure telecommunications and information
technology goods and services. (§ 6611, subd. (c)(1) [“Those procedures and guidelines
shall include, but not be limited to, a clear description of the methodology that will be
used by the department to evaluate a bid for the procurement of goods, services,
information technology, and telecommunications”].)
     The Manual, in turn, provides that where, as here, negotiations are conducted from the
outset of the procurement, the purchasing agency must “[u]se one of the following
options to make a final award: [¶] (a) Using the original criteria in the solicitation, score
all proposals based on either the results of negotiations or, if applicable, the [best and
final offer]. Award to the highest-ranked bidder. [¶] (b) Revise the evaluation criteria
based on the results of the negotiations. Prior to final evaluation, all bidders participating
in negotiations shall be informed of the revised evaluation criteria and shall have the
opportunity to submit a [best and final offer] based on those criteria. Award to the
highest-ranked bidder.” (Off. of Legal Services, Dept. of Gen. Services, State
Contracting Manual (April 2022) ch. 9, § 904
 [as of Mar. 15, 2023],
archived at .) The Manual does not authorize the State
to change the evaluation criteria for the RFP during negotiations without informing
participating bidders and giving them an opportunity to submit best and final offers based
on the new criteria. (Ibid.) Thus, the State could not change the scope of the NTE rate

                                              16
provision without informing Securus and accepting a new best and final offer submission.
(Ibid.) We reject the contention that the State had discretion to award the contract to
Global, despite its failure to comply with the NTE rate provision.16
D.     Global’s Evidentiary Challenge
       Global additionally argues no admissible evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that the State held Securus to a different standard than Global. Global observes
that Securus initially offered only general hearsay evidence that representatives from the
State told Securus that rates for video calling were required to comply with the NTE rate
provision.17 Global does not appear to have objected to this evidence in the trial court,
and we consider the issue forfeited.
E.     Whether Global Received an Unfair Competitive Advantage
       Finally, the State and Global argue Securus failed to meet an evidentiary burden to
show that Securus suffered an actual competitive disadvantage because bidding would
have been different had the deviation from the RFP’s requirements not occurred. The
State and Global both suggest no such showing is possible because Global’s cost
proposal was so far superior to that of Securus. The trial court concluded, and we agree,
that California case law does not impose the burdens the State and Global would assign.
       The State and Global place heavy reliance on Ghilotti Construction Co. v. City of
Richmond (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 897 (Ghilotti), which involved an invitation for bids for

16  Global directs our attention to provisions in the RFP giving the State discretion to
change the RFP’s requirements or waive deviations from the RFP. These provisions do
not displace or supersede the Manual’s requirements. (See generally Gov. Code, §
8547.2, subd. (c) [defining “ ‘improper governmental activity’ ” to include an activity by
a state agency that violates any policy or procedure mandated by the Manual].)
17 Securus subsequently offered additional evidence, by way of a supplemental
declaration submitted with its reply brief. Global appears to have objected to the
supplemental declaration only. The record does not contain a ruling on those objections.

                                            17
a municipal road construction project. (Id. at p. 900.) The city’s invitation for bids
specified that bidders could subcontract no more than 50 percent of the contracted work.
(Ibid.) The winning bidder submitted a bid expressing an intent to exceed that
requirement. (Id. at p. 903.) The second lowest bidder petitioned for a writ of mandate.
(Id. at p. 900.) The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed.
(Ibid.)
          The Ghilotti court explained: “ ‘A basic rule of competitive bidding is that bids
must conform to specifications, and that if a bid does not so conform, it may not be
accepted.’ ” (Ghilotti, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.) “ ‘However,’ ” the court
continued, “ ‘it is further well established that a bid which substantially conforms to a call
for bids may, though it is not strictly responsive, be accepted if the variance cannot have
affected the amount of the bid or given a bidder an advantage or benefit not allowed other
bidders or, in other words, if the variance is inconsequential.’ ” (Ibid.) The Ghilotti court
concluded the deviation there was not material, because the winning bidder could have
met the 50 percent requirement by buying supplies and materials itself, rather than having
subcontractors buy them. (Id. at p. 903.) Since the winner’s bid “could be brought into
compliance with only slight alterations and without affecting the amount of the bid,” the
second lowest bidder could not show the winner had been given an unfair competitive
advantage. (Id. at p. 907.) Accordingly, the Ghilotti court found that the deviation from
the 50 percent requirement was inconsequential. (Ibid.)
          In evaluating the materiality of the deviation, the Ghilotti court observed that “no
evidence” showed the winning bidder “would have submitted a higher bid had it
complied with the specification restricting the use of subcontractors.” (Ghilotti, supra,
45 Cal.App.4th at p. 906.) However, the court did not purport to place an evidentiary
burden on the second lowest bidder to make such a showing. Rather, the Ghilotti court
explained: “ ‘The test for measuring whether a deviation in a bid is sufficiently material
to destroy its competitive character is whether the variation affects the amount of the bid

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by giving the bidder an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders.’ ” (Ibid.)
Thus, Ghilotti teaches that disappointed bidders need only show the existence of a
deviation affecting bid amounts by giving the winning bidder an unfair advantage. (Ibid.)
That showing has been sufficiently made here.
                                     III. DISPOSITION
       The order granting the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. Securus shall
recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

                                                            /S/

                                                 RENNER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

/S/

EARL, J.

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