Court Opinion

ID: 9477065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:12:50.370142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:40.297271
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
with whom JONES, Circuit Judge, joins specially concurring: *
I concur in all of Judge Rubin’s cogent opinion except so much of the last paragraph of part I as may imply that the Louisiana courts do not apply a contemporaneous objection rule in respect to claims of constitutional error, or at least do not do so on habeas corpus under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 362(9).
The principal Louisiana statutory provision requiring contemporaneous objection is Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 841, and it makes no express exception for constitutional error. It is true, as Judge Rubin’s opinion points out, that the official revision comment (b) to article 841 states, “Of course, certain rights are so basic that they can be raised for the first time ... in an application for a writ of habeas corpus (Art. 362)_” However, this statement does not necessarily exclude application of a cause and prejudice, or similar requirement for raising unobjected to claims of constitutional error. It is also true that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 362(9) allows habeas corpus relief for constitutional errors, but this, again, is not necessarily inconsistent with a *1125cause and prejudice or similar requirement where there has been a failure to make otherwise required objections. After all, the federal courts can and do grant collateral relief from both state and federal convictions for constitutional error, but in instances of procedural default a cause and prejudice requirement is nevertheless applied in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as well as under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. I observe in this connection that official revision comment (i)(4) to article 362(9) indicates that a major purpose of that provision was to allow Louisiana courts to grant collateral relief in cases in which the federal courts would otherwise do so, but without intending “to allow habeas corpus to be used as an alternative to an appeal.”
To read article 362(9), and the comments to article 841, as completely doing away with the requirement for objection in proceedings under article 362(9) suggests that, for example, a case could not be reversed on appeal on the grounds of constitutionally improper jury instructions or erroneously admitted evidence, where there was an unexcused failure to object at trial, even though the point was briefed and argued to the appellate court, but the conviction could nevertheless be set aside on habeas corpus under article 362(9). It would seem to be the essence of good judicial administration to review the claimed error on the merits, if it is so to be reviewed at all, at the earliest opportunity to appropriately do so, which will generally be on direct appeal. Of course, that is a determination to be made by Louisiana, not by the federal judiciary. But this consideration does suggest caution in concluding that Louisiana has elected to follow such an unusual path.
I recognize that language in Justice Dennis’ opinion in State v. Nelson, 379 So.2d 1072, 1074-75 (La.1980), does indicate that Louisiana has indeed elected to follow that path, at least in a situation arguably analogous to that here. However, not only was that particular question not before the court in Nelson, which was a direct appeal, but it is clear that a majority of the justices declined to join in Justice Dennis’ opinion. Of the six justices participating, three (Summers, C.J., Blanche and Watson, JJ.) concurred in the result “only” (and did not write), and Justice Marcus’ concurring opinion does not speak to this matter. It is also true that in Clark v. Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531, 533 n. 1 (5th Cir.1980), there is language indicating that the Louisiana contemporaneous objection rule simply does not apply in proceedings under article 362(9). However, this language in Clark would appear to be dicta inasmuch as there “petitioner’s habeas claim was denied by the state courts on the merits,” and for that reason we too were bound to rule on the merits. Id. To take the broad view expressed in the Clark dicta would be to in effect make the contemporaneous objection rule generally unavailable in challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to Louisiana convictions. Yet we have on many occasions applied the cause and prejudice, procedural default rule to Louisiana convictions challenged under section 2254. See, e.g., Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095, 1100-02 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935, 102 S.Ct. 1992, 72 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982); Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113, 116 (5th Cir.1983); Rollins v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.1983); Webb v. Blackburn, 773 F.2d 646, 650-51 (5th Cir.1985); Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1985, 95 L.Ed.2d 824 (1987); Bates v. Blackburn, 805 F.2d 569, 572-76 (5th Cir.1986). Absent some clearer indication that we have misread the relevant Louisiana law, I would not depart from the teaching of these decisions.
Nevertheless, for the reasons stated in the next to last paragraph of part I of Judge Rubin’s opinion, I agree that in this case we may properly reach the merits.

 As neither party in this case has requested oral argument, and as all of the judges participating agree that the case may be disposed of without oral argument, the filing of this special concurrence is consistent with this Court’s summary calendar policies.