Court Opinion

ID: 9737090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:15:15.232694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.448425
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. The issue as framed by the appellant, and on which the majority would reverse, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellants’ Motion to Compel discovery of psychological reports of the victims within the possession of the District Attorney pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(B)(2).1
I find the majority’s application of Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989) inapposite to this issue as presented.
Our supreme court in Lloyd determined that the defendant had a state constitutional right to view the contents of a sexual abuse victim’s psychotheraputic records in the possession of a hospital. In so doing, the court determined that the trial court had no authority or discretion to limit the defendant’s review through its own in camera proce*190dure. By applying the reasoning of Lloyd to the instant case, the majority finds that the trial court had no discretion under Rule 305(B)(2) to limit appellant’s review of the Erie Rape Crisis Center records which were a part of the Commonwealth’s file. To apply Lloyd as the majority proposes today would make not only the Crisis Center reports subject to discovery but also the entire contents of the Commonwealth’s file.2 Although I admit with some candor, that a careful reading of the majority and dissenting opinions in Lloyd leaves several questions unanswered, I cannot discern from my review that Lloyd found the exercise of discretion designated to the trial court during the discovery process pursuant to Rule 305(B)(2) unconstitutional as violative of a defendant’s state constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory process. Until such time as the highest court of this Commonwealth specifically addresses this issue, I choose to apply the reasoning of Lloyd very narrowly.
Rule 305 as promulgated under the rule making authority of our supreme court was specifically designed to satisfy the constitutional guarantees enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In sum, Brady affords a defendant the opportunity to discover information in the possession of the Commonwealth that may be material to his defense. The Rule has passed constitutional scrutiny on several occasions, most recently by this court in Commonwealth v. Carillion, 380 Pa.Super. 458, 552 A.2d 279 (1988), and Commonwealth v. Byuss, 372 Pa.Super. 395, 539 A.2d 852 (1988). Turning to the facts of the instant case, the psychological reports of the victims provided by the Erie Rape Crisis Center had been disclosed to the Commonwealth; therefore, the reports were no longer subject to any privilege as noted by the majority opinion at footnote 4. However, this did not make them any more *191discoverable under Rule 305. If exculpatory information was contained therein, it was subject to discovery by appellant. The Commonwealth refused disclosure of the reports and appellant properly sought relief from the trial court pursuant to a motion to compel discovery of the reports.
In response to appellant’s motion, the trial court conducted an in camera inspection of the reports and determined that they contained nothing of value to the defense. The procedure was in compliance with that provided for in Rule 305 and approved of most recently in Carillion and Byuss. I can find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Further, I cannot find that appellant’s rights of confrontation and compulsory process were violated by the procedures established under the rule.
Judge Brosky’s authored en banc decision in Carillion, which upheld both the trial court’s in camera inspection of discovery material and the release of such material to the defendant, is instructive to the case herein.
As in Byuss, we agree that appellee’s right to confrontation has been neither compromised nor even implicated under the State Constitution. Moreover, the applicable provision of Rule 305 under which appellee’s initial requests fell and which controlled Byuss’ pretrial application for discovery of the medical reports states that disclosure is discretionary with the trial court. See Pa.R. Crim.P. 305 B(2), infra, at note 5. Hence, the procedure set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, and endorsed by Byuss that the trial court conduct an in camera inspection of the file after which, if the court first determines that the sought-after information is extant and material to the accused’s defense may, in its discretion, order the Commonwealth to make such disclosure to the accused is in keeping with the tenor of this Rule. The right here involved stemmed from appellee’s initial request for pre-trial discovery pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 of what he believed to be significant portions of the file. Upon post-trial in camera inspection of the subject file, the trial court determined and we agree, that formerly *192withheld portions of this file were critical to appellee’s defense.
Commonwealth v. Carillion, supra, 380 Pa.Super. at 472-4, 552 A.2d at 286 footnote omitted. Accordingly, in the instant case, if the trial court had determined that the reports of the Erie Crisis Center had contained something of value to the defense, it would have turned over the material information requested by the defense pursuant to Rule 305. However, to the contrary, the court made a specific finding that there was nothing exculpatory or beneficial to the defendant in the records and therefore denied discovery. I cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.
Finding no merit to appellant’s points of error, I would affirm the Judgment of Sentence.

. Discretionary With the Court. In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rule 263 (Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury), if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant’s attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the request is reasonable:
(a) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses;
(b) all written or recorded statements, and substantially verbatim oral statements, of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to call at trial;
(c) all written or recorded statements, and substantially verbatim oral statements, made by co-defendants, and by co-conspirators or accomplices, whether such individuals have been charged or not;
(d) any other evidence specifically identified by the defendant, provided the defendant can additionally establish that its disclosure would be in the interests of justice.

. In response to Judge Brosky’s concurrence in this matter, I find nothing in Commonwealth v. Lloyd, supra, which would limit its broad constitutional ruling regarding defendant’s rights of confrontation and compulsory process at the pre-trial stage only to sexual assault files or sexual assault cases.