Court Opinion

ID: 9900945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 20:02:38.555797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.972451
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23 Stone v. Kim CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

CHRISTOPHER STONE,                                              B324466

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 22STCV00607
         v.

CHARLES KIM,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge. Affirmed.
      Christopher Stone, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Charles Kim, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
                      ____________________
      Christopher Stone, a nonattorney, brought pro. per. Private
Attorneys General Act claims (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (the Act,
also sometimes called PAGA) against his former employer,
Charles Kim. The trial court sustained a demurrer, dismissed
the case, and awarded costs in Kim’s favor. We affirm. A party
bringing claims under the Act represents a state agency and
nonattorneys cannot represent other entities in court. The costs
award was proper because Kim was the prevailing party.
       The Act allows employees to file lawsuits on behalf of the
state to help the state with labor law enforcement. (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 538 & 545; Lab. Code,
§ 2699.) Employees sue as proxies or agents of the state’s labor
law enforcement agency. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46
Cal.4th 969, 986 (Arias).) The United States Supreme Court
distinguished between representative and individual components
of claims under the Act for the issue of arbitrability. (Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. __, __ [142 S.Ct.
1906, 1916 & 1924–1925] (Viking).) The Court noted, however,
that all actions under the Act are representative “in that they are
brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as
agents or proxies—of the State.” (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p.
1916]; see id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1920] [a plaintiff under the
Act “represents a single principal, the [state agency]”].) After
Viking, the California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that
employees who bring actions under the Act are proxies or agents
of the state. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
1104, 1116.)
       An employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and
interest as the state agency: recovery of civil penalties the
agency would have assessed and collected. (Arias, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 986.) A judgment under the Act binds both the
employee and the state. (Ibid.)

                                  2
      Stone, a nonattorney, cannot represent the state agency.
Litigants may represent their own interests in civil proceedings.
(Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 522–
523.) Although no California statute codifies this right,
California courts have consistently acknowledged it. (Ibid.)
Nonattorneys may not practice law for others, however, without
being active members of the bar. (Drake v. Superior Court (1994)
21 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6125
[only active licensees of the State Bar may practice law in
California].) By bringing claims under the Act, Stone attempts to
represent the state agency. He cannot do this, for he is not an
attorney.
      Federal precedents support our outcome. At least two
federal district court opinions in California have found that
plaintiffs may not bring pro. per. claims under the Act. (Ibrahim
v. Morgan Southern, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Oct. 17, 2018, No. 18-4514-
DMG) 2018 WL 5095120; Sherman v. CLP Resources, Inc.
(C.D.Cal. Aug. 13, 2015, No. 12-8080-GW) 2015 WL 13542749
[discussing issue in context of small claims court].)
      Precedent in the analogous federal False Claims Act
context is also instructive. Private people, called relators, can
bring qui tam actions under that statute to help uncover fraud
against the government. (Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of
Education (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (Stoner).) These
relators represent the United States and can bind the United
States to their judgments. (Id. at pp. 1126–1127.) Given the
potential binding consequences, the government must have
adequate representation. (U.S. ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse
Electric Co. (D.D.C. 2003) 274 F.Supp.2d 10, 16.) Relators
therefore need qualified legal counsel. (Ibid.) Under Ninth

                                3
Circuit precedent, relators may not bring pro. per. actions
because the False Claims Act does not expressly authorize such
actions, and there is no other legal basis for bringing the actions
pro. per. (Stoner, at pp. 1126–1127.) A federal statute allows
parties to conduct pro. per. litigation in their “own cases,” but
this does not apply because relators represent the United States.
(Ibid.)
       The False Claims Act reasoning applies to claims under the
Act. Plaintiffs under the Act represent and can bind the
government, which needs adequate representation. The Act does
not expressly authorize pro. per. litigants to bring claims in court.
Stone does not identify another legal source for nonattorneys to
represent other people or entities under the Act. Pro. per.
litigants cannot sue under the Act.
       Stone cites Atherton v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 176
Cal.App.3d 433 (Atherton), but this case does not help him.
Atherton held that a pro. per. litigant was not an attorney and
therefore was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. (Atherton, at pp. 435–437.) The
opinion said nothing about a pro. per. litigant’s right to represent
a state agency under the Act. Instead, the court affirmed the
principle that nonattorneys may not represent others: “As far as
we know, a license is still required to represent anyone other
than oneself in a court of law.” (Id. at p. 437.)
       Although Stone’s complaint sought to recover “on his
behalf, on behalf of the State of California, and on behalf of all
current and other former aggrieved employees of Defendant,” he
does not argue he has separate “individual” claims under the Act
that he should be allowed to bring in pro. per. We do not address
this forfeited argument.

                                 4
       The trial court’s costs award was proper. The court
awarded $1,043.17 in costs against Stone. Unless a statute
“expressly provide[s]” otherwise, prevailing parties are entitled to
costs “as a matter of right.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)
The Act entitles prevailing employees to attorney fees and costs.
(Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (g)(1).) The Act is silent about fees and
costs for prevailing defendants, therefore the default rule from
the Code of Civil Procedure applies. (Cf. Gov. Code, § 12965,
subd. (c) [in Fair Employment and Housing Act case, statute
expressly provides no fees or costs to prevailing defendant unless
action was frivolous].) Under the default rule, “the court has no
discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party.” (Nelson v.
Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.)
       Kim was entitled to costs under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1032, subdivision (b) because he prevailed. Stone does
not dispute that Kim prevailed. Nor does Stone contest the
calculation of the costs. Instead, he argues the costs award was
improper because he is indigent and the case was not frivolous.
Stone supports this argument with just one case citation: Garcia
v. Santana (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 464 (Garcia). That case was
about the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act
(former Civ. Code, § 1350 et seq.), which expressly granted
“reasonable” attorney fees and costs to prevailing parties.
(Garcia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.) That express
provision applied to costs for prevailing parties and meant the
default rule did not apply. Here, the default rule applies. Kim is
entitled to costs as of right as the prevailing party.

                                 5
                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the judgment and award appellate costs to
Charles Kim.

                                       WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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