Court Opinion

ID: 9732951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:46:07.823747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.638437
License: Public Domain

ohn F. Stroud, Jr., Chief Judge, dissenting. I would affirm appellant’s convictions because I believe that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, there is substantial evidence to support the convictions. In Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000), our supreme court, citing Mings v. State, 318 Ark. 201, 884 S.W.2d 596 (1994) stated: It is not necessary for the State to prove literal physical possession of drugs in order to prove possession. Possession of drugs can be proved by constructive possession. Although constructive possession can be implied when the drugs are in the joint control of the accused and another, joint occupancy of a vehicle, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish possession or joint possession. There must be some other factor linking the accused to the drugs: Other factors to be considered in cases involving automobiles occupied by more than one person are: (1) whether the contraband is in plain view; (2) whether the contraband is found with the accused’s personal effects; (3) whether it is found on the same side of the car seat as the accused was sitting or in near proximity to it; (4) whether the accused is the owner of the automobile, or exercises dominion or control over it; and (5) whether the accused acted suspiciously before or during the arrest. 341 Ark. at 47, 14 S.W.3d at 493 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). I agree with the majority that in the present case, only factors three and four are present. However, there is no set number of factors that are required to be present in order to link a defendant to the contraband. Furthermore, this list of factors to be considered is not an exhaustive one. In addition to the five factors fisted above, our supreme court has also considered the improbability that anyone other than the occupants of the vehicle placed the contraband in the vehicle, and the improbable nature of the accused’s explanation for his journey. Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 912 S.W.2d 917 (1995). In this case, appellant and Abies drove up to a Quonset hut that was filled with stolen merchandise at 1:30 in the morning. Appellant’s stated reason for being in Mount Vernon was that he was going to Ables’s mother’s house to spend the night and to help start a garden and clean the yard. He said that when he missed the driveway, Abies told him to go on up to the Quonset hut because she knew some girl that was there and she wanted to see if she was home. Appellant said that he could not understand why Abies would tell the police that they were at the Quonset hut to see Dan because they had heard someone had been arrested. Appellant, who admitted that he had previous felony drug convictions, testified that he told Abies that she needed to clean her car out because he knew that she had been “convicted of crystal meth.” He denied knowing that the gloves were in the car and said that when he got in the car, it appeared to have been picked up. However, decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses are for the trier of fact, and the trier of fact is not required to believe any witness’s testimony, especially the testimony of the accused since he is the person most interested in- the outcome of the trial. Hickson v. State, 50 Ark. App. 185, 901 S.W.2d 868 (1995). In my opinion, there is substantial evidence to support appellant’s convictions. Appellant was driving the car, the drugs were found under his seat, and when asked, he gave an improbable explanation as to why he was at a secured crime scene at 1:30 in the morning. I dissent, and I am authorized to state that Judges Pittman and Jennings join in this dissent.