Court Opinion

ID: 9469300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:37:03.230228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:19.313952
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS W. HILLMAN, District Judge,
concurring:
This court today affirms an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granting Stacy’s writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Weick, quoting Chief Justice Burger, implies that the majority has either ignored or forgotten that it is for the jury, not the judge, to make factual findings. In addi*1215tion, Judge Weick has produced a scoreboard, listing those individuals, presumably found by the decision of this court to have acted irrationally in having found Stacy able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Specifically, Judge Weick says:
“In other words the 12 jurors were not rational, the trial judge who entered judgment on the guilty verdict was not rational, the three judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals were not rational, and the three Justices on the Supreme Court of Tennessee were not rational. The result is that only the two dissenters on the Supreme Court of Tennessee and the district judge were rational.”
These allegations warrant a response.
It is axiomatic that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
Here, Stacy relied upon the defense of lack of mental capacity. Under Tennessee law, having made out a prima facie case of lacking the requisite mental capacity, he could not be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the crime. Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn.1977). Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. In his habeas petition, Stacy is confronted with two legal hurdles: First, the language of section 2254(d) itself provides that a factual determination by a state court shall be presumed to be correct unless “(8) ... the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.” Secondly, his petition will be denied if the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Or, in the language of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), “... the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Also, of course, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The difficulty arises in the application of the rule.
In this case, as pointed out by Judge Weick, a jury of 12 unanimously found Stacy sane “beyond a reasonable doubt” and that finding was affirmed both by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and a divided (3-2) Tennessee Supreme Court. Do those facts, as Judge Weick implies, conclude the matter? How does a federal judge determine whether an individual or a group of individuals have acted rationally?
The problem facing the federal courts is highlighted by Fuller v. Anderson, 662 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied- U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1734, 72 L.Ed.2d 150 (1982), where an experienced and distinguished Chief U. S. District Judge concluded that insufficient evidence existed in the record to conclude petitioner had intended to commit a crime. Specifically, in that case, it was his considered judgment that no rational juror could find from the record the requisite intent required in a charge of first degree murder. A majority of this Court agreed, Judge Weick dissenting. Yet on the same identical record, in a dissent to the denial of certiorari, the Chief Justice of the United States said: “It is sheer nonsense to suggest that, on this record, the 12 jurors acted irrationally.”
Although trial by jury is the linchpin of our judicial system, nevertheless no system is infallible. As Justice Stewart said in Jackson, supra, “A properly instructed jury may occasionally convict when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” All trial lawyers, as well as judges, know that on occasion and with no logical explanation, juries occasionally go haywire. Undoubtedly, such factors as the nature of the crime, a fear or hatred of the accused, pre-trial publicity, outstanding advocacy, public uproar, and notoriety of the parties could, and on occasion do, produce such results. To conclude categorically that because of a unani*1216mous verdict a jury has acted rationally seems to me to fly in the face of understandable human passions and frailties.
Jackson requires more than a tally sheet. It mandates an independent review of the evidence to determine whether the evidence reasonably supports a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. No two cases are alike. Presumably, each case must be decided on its own facts. After a careful reading of the entire record in this case, I am simply unable to say that the jury was warranted, on the evidence before it, in failing to entertain a reasonable doubt that, except for a diseased mental condition, Stacy would have killed the ticket clerk.
Judge Martin, writing for the court, has detailed the evidence surrounding Stacy’s mental condition at the time of the killing. Giving the Government the benefit of all legitimate inferences to be drawn from the record evidence of Stacy’s mental condition, it was at best meager and inconclusive. Stacy not only made a prima facie case, but an overwhelming one. As a matter of law, the evidence produced by the State with respect to Stacy’s mental condition was not enough to rebut Stacy’s evidence and did not meet the Government’s high burden.
Despite recent pleas1 that increased deference be given to the decisions of the state court system, we are reminded by Professor Yale Kamisar, Constitutional Law Desk-book (1978) (published by the National College of District Attorneys), that Justice Harlan repeatedly warned that the striving for “compelled uniformity” between the State and federal criminal justice systems is not only “inconsistent with the purpose of our federal system,” but that a consequence might well be a “dilution in federal law enforcement of the specific protections found in the Bill of Rights.” See, e.g., his dissent in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1969).
In reviewing habeas claims, we must constantly be vigilant so that constitutional values are not jeopardized in any way, and it is that vigilance which today leads me to concur in the majority opinion.

. See, e.g., Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court’s Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 Iowa L.Rev. 233 (1979).