Court Opinion

ID: 9770013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:10:59.141096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:09.932728
License: Public Domain

HOLLAND, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which PRICE, J., joined.
I dissent to the majority’s decision to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals. I do not agree with the majority that the State’s second ground for review is disposi-tive of this case. I believe the State’s question of whether “an application for a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle by which to raise a claim of collateral estoppel” is moot. Pursuant to our decision in State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), appellant had no valid claim of collateral estoppel to raise in either a pretrial writ of habeas corpus or in a pre-trial motion to suppress. It serves no purpose for this Court to decide whether a motion to suppress or a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is the more appropriate vehicle to raise a claim when this Court has decided there is no merit to that claim.
In State v. Brabson, this Court concluded, “Article 67011-5, Section 2(f), does not authorize the administrative judge to make findings on the issue of probable cause for an arrest nor does it put the “State” on notice that this issue may be litigated at the administrative hearing. This is important for collateral estoppel purposes because the question of whether probable cause existed that appellee operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a different question from whether probable cause existed for his arrest. Cf. Neaves v. State, 767 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (whether probable cause to believe the defendant had been driving while intoxicated existed at the time the police requested a blood or breath specimen from the defendant is not an issue of ultimate fact in the defendant’s prosecution for driving while intoxicated). Resolution of the former question does not necessarily resolve the latter question....”
“Therefore, it cannot be said the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest was “properly before” the administrative judge or that the “State” had an “adequate opportunity” to litigate that issue at the administrative proceeding.... Based on the foregoing, the administrative judge’s finding of no probable cause for appellee’s arrest does not preclude the “State” from litigating that issue in the criminal proceeding.”
State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d, at 185. An administrative judge’s decision whether probable cause existed that appellant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated does not collaterally estop the State from litigating the issue of probable cause to arrest in the criminal proceeding. It does not matter if a defendant raises the issue in a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus or in a pre-trial motion to suppress.1 There is no collateral estoppel on this issue.
In light of our decision in Brabson, it is not necessary for this Court to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the merits of appellant’s claim of collateral estop-pel. There was no collateral estoppel claim for appellant to raise in either the district court or the Court of Appeals. In the future, if a defendant has raised and lost a meritori*230ous claim of collateral estoppel prior to trial in a district court, and then has brought that appeal to the Court of Appeals, it could be necessary and appropriate for this Court to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the merits of that claim. I would dismiss both the State and appellant’s petitions for discretionary review as improvidently granted.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to do otherwise.

. In State v. Brabson, the defendant raised the collateral estoppel issue in a pre-trial motion to suppress. In a recent decision, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals dealt with a claim of collateral estoppel which was raised in a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated. Relying on our decision in Brabson, the Court of Appeals concluded "the D.A. is not precluded by the A.L.J.'s decision from litigating the elements of the DWI offense. The D.A. is not the same party as the D.P.S_” Ex parte Richards, 968 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1998)(pet.ref.’d). Though decisions of the lower courts of appeals are not controlling on this Court, I agree that there is no issue of collateral estoppel to be raised in a driving while intoxicated prosecution from a decision by an administrative law judge in a license revocation proceeding.