Court Opinion

ID: 9524574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:54:26.872747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:05.583121
License: Public Domain

*158ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Royse, J.
This court recognizes that like all other human institutions it may err in its decisions or in the reasoning upon which a decision is based. Therefore fore we welcome petitions for rehearing when a litigant believes we have made a mistake. In such petitions we do not resent honest criticism regardless of how vehement such criticism may be.
However, we do feel that attorneys who act for their clients in this court should not let their zeal for their client’s cause, or their chagrin at an adverse decision lead them into making false and unjust charges that this court has uttered an untruth. The appellees have done just that in their petition for a rehearing in this case.
In our original opinion, in our discussion of the authorities cited in support of our conclusions, we said: “Insofar as intestate estates are concerned they represent the majority view of the states which have passed on the questions presented by this case.” In their petition for rehearing, referring to that statement, appellees say:
“Intellectual honesty requires the statement that this is untrue, for the following reasons:
“The Kentucky cases cited are contrary to the majority view, as evidenced by the candid admission of the Kentucky court in Dawson v. Gaines (1945), 299 Ky. 100, 184 S. W. 2d 895, where the court observed that it is unnecessary to discuss either the majority rule, or ‘our own decisions.’ ”
The case of Dawson v. Gaines, supra, did not involve an intestate estate. In that case the court held that a provision of the will required that the federal tax be paid out of the residuary estate. The court then said:
*159“Since we have concluded that the tax should be paid out of the residue of the estate, it is unnecessary to discuss either the majority rule that the burden of the Federal estate tax should be charged against the general estate or its residue except where there is a contrary direction found in the will or a state statute, or our own decisions which appellants urge us to overrule to the effect that in the absence of such a direction, and in cases of intestacy, the tax should be borne by the beneficiaries in proportion to the benefits received.” (Our emphasis) .
In our original opinion, in addition to the two Kentucky cases cited we cited authority from Florida and Louisiana authorizing apportionment in intestate estates. It is significant to us the appellees have not, either in their original brief or their petition for rehearing, cited a single authority to sustain their allegation that our statement was untrue.
As a further ground for rehearing, appellees say:
“By its refusal to grant a new trial, and its judgment that the trial court must sustain appellants’ exceptions, the Court has denied appellees the opportunity to introduce evidence on the problem of equitable apportionment. For example, appellees are denied the opportunity of introducing any evidence (a) whose assets purchased the tenancies by the entireties, (b) what the assets of decedent were when he married appellee, Mary E. Day, (c) whether the efforts of Mary E. Day, produced or contributed to the collection of these assets.”
Our decision and mandate does not affect any rights the widow may have in reference to those matters. They are questions to be determined between her and the Federal government.
Petition for rehearing denied.
NOTE. — Reported in 98 N. E. 2d 231.