Court Opinion

ID: 9765663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:12:25.853227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:12.687582
License: Public Domain

Horney, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
The majority, despite eminent authority to the contrary,1 which they declined to follow on the theory that a statutory court is not empowered to issue the common law writ of error coram nobis, in my opinion, have indubitably denied the appellant her fundamental right to due process. To me it is incredible that a people’s court established by law pursuant to constitutional authority does not have power to issue a writ of error coram nobis in a proper case to review its own judgment as to an alleged error of fact in order to determine whether or not the judgment should be vacated as void.2
*14The explicit holding3 of the majority to the effect that the People’s Court of Prince George’s County was without power to vacate a judgment of conviction and to grant a new trial in the absence of specific statutory authority to do so is based primarily on the cases of State v. Jacob, 234 Md. 452, 199 A. 2d 803 (1964) and Frazier v. Griffie, 8 Md. 50 (1855). Neither of these cases is in point and both are distinguishable from the case at bar. The Jacob case is distinguishable in that we were there concerned with the statutory power of a trial magistrate to grant probation in a criminal case without verdict which (as therein stated) was essentially a question of jurisdiction. Here, however, we are concerned with the inherent power of all courts (including courts which are not of record) to issue a writ of error coram nobis for the purpose of considering facts material to the validity and regularity of the trial, which, had they been known to the court at the time, would have prevented entry of the judgment of conviction. The Frasier case, cited by the majority for the proposition that a justice of the peace has no authority to strike out a judgment once entered and grant a new trial, is at least distinguishable in that we are concerned here, not with a justice of the peace of the old school, but with a modern people’s court within the trial magistrates system created under constitutional authority and possessing statutory power “to do all acts which may be necessary for the exercise *15of [its] jurisdiction * * * in the same manner, and to the same extent as the circuit courts” have power to do. Code (1957), Art. 52, § 13(a).
In any event, even if there is no fundamental difference in the powers of inferior courts under the old and new magisterial systems, the Frazier case, as well as the Delaware case of State v. Stoesser, 183 A. 2d 824 (1962), also cited by the majority, are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar in that both of those cases involved situations in which the judgments previously entered had been stricken out or set aside merely because the justices (who had no power to correct an issue of fact wrongly determined and adjudicated) were of the opinion that the judgments were erroneous, while in the case at bar, if it is assumed that the alleged facts are true, it is apparent that the People’s Court had power to vacate the void judgment and proceed as though no judgment had ever been entered. See Clubine v. City of Merrill, 163 Pac. 85 (Or. 1917); State v. Stoesser, supra; 51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace, § 113.
In my opinion, the contention of the appellant that the People’s Court had power under the facts and circumstances of this case to issue a writ of error coram nobis, and that that court should have treated her petition for a new trial as an application for such a writ, was correct. Even though the statute does not in terms expressly authorize the court to issue the writ, there is, on the contrary, nothing to preclude the court from so doing in a proper case. Likewise, although there is no case law in this State on the question one way or the other, the appellate courts in two other jurisdictions have held that tribunals which are not courts of record nevertheless have power to issue the common law writ of error coram nobis. In Hogan v. Supreme Court, 65 N. E. 2d 181 (1946), the Court of Appeals of New York, after stating that a court not of record or continuing jurisdiction was not debarred from entertaining a cor am nobis application when no other remedy is available to vacate a judgment which was void because of fraud, held that the refusal of a court of special sessions to deal with the matter by way of coram nobis would deprive the appellants of their constitutional rights to due process. In People v. Superior Court, 82 P. 2d 718 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1938), where a writ of error coram *16nobis is treated as a motion to vacate a judgment and the question was whether a police court had power to consider such a writ, the District Court of Appeals held that where fraud or other facts overriding the free will and judgment of a defendant is involved, and no statutory remedies are available, he was entitled to the common law remedy of a writ of error coram nobis in order to withdraw a guilty plea and have his case heard on the merits.
Without attempting to consider the merits of the appellant’s claim (which is first a matter for the People’s Court to consider) that she was the victim of a fraud, mistake or irregularity arising out of the conduct of her counsel in that he had led her to believe (despite her desire to plead not guilty) that she might be able to prevent revocation of her liquor license by pleading guilty to a charge of selling whiskey on Sunday, it is apparent to me that the consecutive adverse rulings of the People’s Court, the Circuit Court and the majority of this Court to the effect that the People’s Court had no power to issue a writ of error corami nobis, absent express statutory authority to do so, to vacate what may well be a void judgment of conviction, has not only foreclosed4 the appellant from having the case heard on the merits, but has deprived her of the constitutional right to due process.
The case, in my opinion, should be remanded to the People’s Court to the end that it may issue a writ of error coram nobis for the purpose of inquiring whether or not the judgment of conviction was void because of fraud or other valid reason.

. See the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Hogan v. Supreme Court, 65 N. E. 2d 181, and the subsequent reference thereto in this dissenting opinion.

. The purpose of the writ of error coram nobis, as stated in Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, is not to permit a review of the evi*14dence given in connection with the issues actually tried but to determine whether facts existed which were unknown to the court at the trial, and were not in issue under the pleadings, but which, if known, would have prevented the judgment. See also Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1; Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425.

. Although the record contains three appeals, there is but one basic question — whether or not the People’s Court of Prince George’s County lacked power to issue a writ of error coram nobis. The majority ruled, as did the lower court, that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, either at law or in equity, could not decide the question under the pleadings presented. As to this, there is no disagreement. Nor is there disagreement that this Court had the power to decide the question treating the appeal (from the Circuit Court in its appellate capacity) as an application for certiorari. But this member of the Court does not agree that the People’s Court was without power to issue a writ of error coram nobis under the extraordinary facts and circumstances of this case.

. The appellant is foreclosed from pursuing the usual statutory-remedies because her right to enter a direct appeal has expired and because the right to post conviction relief -was never available to her since she was fined and not imprisoned.