Court Opinion

ID: 9624500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:05:11.019575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:54.914003
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the error complained of in this case is capable of repetition, but is likely to evade judicial review, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as moot. Collins v. Lombard *538Corp., 270 Ga. 120, 121 (508 SE2d 653) (1998) (where “the error is capable of repetition and yet evades review, the appeal will be considered”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).
Decided May 19, 2008.
Victor Y. Johnson, for appellant.
Barry L. Fitzpatrick, Fortson, Bentley & Griffin, Jeffrey W. DeLoach, for appellee.
Here, the trial court denied the City injunctive relief that would have prevented Seymour from conducting his October 2007 haunted house without a permit. Halloween occurs every year, and if Seymour decides to have another haunted house at the same location as his 2007 haunted house, any attempt by the City to enjoin Seymour’s efforts would be barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel in light of the trial court’s prior ruling on the merits of this same issue between these same parties. See, e.g., Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 865-866 (1) (463 SE2d 5) (1995) (“[r]es judicata prevents a plaintiff from instituting a second complaint against a defendant on a claim that has already been brought, after having previously been adjudged not to be entitled to the recovery sought on that claim”) (footnote omitted); Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 254 Ga. 684, 685 (333 SE2d 835) (1985) (collateral estoppel “precludes readjudication of an issue already adjudicated between the parties or their privies in a prior action”) (citation omitted). Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in denying the City injunctive relief in the first instance, Seymour would nevertheless be allowed to conduct his haunted house every year at the same location without the City having any recourse. This would be true even if the City had a potentially meritorious legal argument for enjoining the haunted house activities that were occurring without a City permit. OCGA§§ 9-12-40 and 9-12-42. Therefore, dismissal is inappropriate in this case, as it will serve only to ensure that the underlying issues in this case may recur in perpetuity while constantly evading substantive judicial review. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as moot.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley joins in this dissent.