Court Opinion

ID: 9399458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-03 21:00:28.504444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.282286
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 17-4487      Doc: 36         Filed: 02/28/2018       Pg: 1 of 8

                               Certiorari granted by Supreme Court, June 28, 2019
                             Vacated and remanded by Supreme Court, June 28, 2019

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 17-4487

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        DONOVAN LETRELL HALL,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Elizabeth City. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (2:16-cr-00020-BO-1)

        Submitted: February 20, 2018                                    Decided: February 28, 2018

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jaclyn L. DiLauro, Assistant Federal
        Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
        Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Donovan Letrell Hall appeals following his guilty plea to being a felon in

        possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012), and the

        imposition of a 110-month downward variant sentence.            Hall challenges both the

        procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and contends that the

        Government violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy by prosecuting

        him after he was prosecuted for the same conduct in state court.          We reject these

        arguments and affirm the criminal judgment.

               Turning first to Hall’s double jeopardy claim, because Hall did not raise this

        argument in the district court, our review is limited only to plain error. See United States

        v. Jackson, 706 F.3d 264, 270 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing unpreserved Fifth

        Amendment double jeopardy challenge for plain error under United States v. Olano, 507

        U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993)); United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003)

        (reviewing constitutional claim that was not raised below for plain error). The protection

        against double jeopardy “prohibits the government from subjecting a person to multiple

        punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Schnittker, 807 F.3d 77, 81 (4th Cir.

        2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, under the dual sovereignty doctrine,

        “the Supreme Court has continually held that federal and state crimes are not the same

        offense, no matter how identical the conduct they proscribe.” United States v. Alvarado,

        440 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Abbate v.

        United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-96 (1959) (declining to overrule established principle

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        “that a federal prosecution is not barred by a prior state prosecution of the same person

        for the same acts”).

               While Hall is correct in that there are several certiorari petitions that raise this

        issue currently pending before the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Gamble v. United States, No.

        17-646 (docketed Nov. 2, 2017); Ochoa v. United States, No. 17-5503 (docketed Aug. 4.

        2017), the Court has not granted certiorari in these cases. Thus, as Hall readily concedes,

        Abbate remains good law, and we reject this argument on that basis.

               We next consider Hall’s sentencing arguments. We review every federal sentence

        for reasonableness, employing an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Lymas,

        781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015). Reasonableness review first requires that we consider

        whether the district court committed a significant procedural error, such as failing to

        consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors or failing to adequately explain the

        chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Hall first challenges the

        procedural reasonableness of his sentence, focusing on the district court’s analytical

        process and explanation for the selected sentence.

               When rendering a sentence, the district court must make and place on the record

        an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case. United States v.

        Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). While the sentencing court must state in

        open court the specific bases for the selected sentence, the court’s explanation “need not

        be exhaustive.” United States v. Avila, 770 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 2014); see also

        United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (court need not explicitly

        reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record). The court’s explanation must

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        be sufficient “to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments

        and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v.

        United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

               “Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a

        different sentence than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should

        address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United

        States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 220 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Although it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the

        context surrounding its decision, United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th

        Cir. 2006), “an appellate court may not guess at the district court’s rationale, searching

        the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues

        that might explain a sentence[,]” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329-30. An insufficient explanation

        of the sentence imposed constitutes significant procedural error by the district court.

        United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).

               Where, as here, the defendant preserved the issue of whether the explanation was

        adequate by arguing for a sentence different than that which was imposed, we review the

        issue for abuse of discretion. Id. If we find such abuse, we must reverse unless we

        conclude that the error was harmless. Id. The Government bears the burden of showing

        “that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the result and

        we can say with fair assurance that the district court’s explicit consideration of the

        defendant’s arguments would not have affected the sentence imposed.” United States v.

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        Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (alterations and internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               Hall does not contest the computation of his Guidelines range, which was then

        reduced to the applicable 10-year statutory maximum. He does contend, however, that

        the district court procedurally erred in failing to explain either why it declined to award a

        downward departure based on U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.23, p.s. (2016),

        or the reasons for the chosen sentence.

               The first prong of this argument stalls out of the gate. Defense counsel did not

        specifically ask the district court at sentencing to grant a downward departure under

        USSG § 5K2.23, p.s., which permits—but does not require—the sentencing court to

        depart downward from the defendant’s Guidelines range for a completed term of

        imprisonment for another offense that would constitute relevant conduct to the instant

        offense. The record makes plain that defense counsel instead framed her argument in

        terms of a downward variance. By the same token, nothing in the record suggests that the

        district court was unaware of its authority to depart downward on this basis. Because

        “[w]e lack the authority to review a sentencing court’s denial of a downward departure

        unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so[,]” United States v. Brewer,

        520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008), we agree with the Government that Hall’s challenge to

        the procedural reasonableness of the sentence “is better suited as one to the general

        explanation of the sentence, not the explanation of a particular departure ruling.”

        (Appellee’s Br. (ECF No. 26) at 20).

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               On review, we conclude that the court’s statements prior to announcing sentence

        demonstrate that Hall’s individualized circumstances informed the court’s decision to

        grant a 10-month downward variance from the 120-month statutory maximum. Indeed,

        the record makes plain the court’s view that a long sentence was appropriate mostly

        because of Hall’s extensive criminal background, which had been punished previously

        with light sentences and probationary terms. This is consistent with two of the main

        purposes identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)—to protect the public from future crimes

        by Hall and to specifically deter Hall from continuing to engage in crime. Moreover, the

        record establishes that a focal point at sentencing was Hall’s contention that his federal

        sentence should be reduced, at minimum, in consideration of the state sentence he had

        served. The district court actively engaged both attorneys on this topic and ultimately

        acceded to defense counsel’s request for such a reduction—even if not to the full extent

        sought.   The sentencing transcript demonstrates that the judge considered Hall’s

        individual characteristics and history, as well as the circumstances of this offense, see 18

        U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), in fashioning its sentence, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-59.

               Even if we were to find procedural error in the district court’s explanation, see

        United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 519-21 (4th Cir. 2017) (vacating sentence and

        remanding for resentencing when the record did not provide adequate “contextual

        support” to discern the sentencing court’s reasons for rejecting defendant’s arguments for

        a downward departure), we accept the Government’s alternative contention that such an

        error is harmless, see Boulware, 604 F.3d at 839-40.          The court considered—and,

        ultimately, mostly accepted—Hall’s argument for a sentence below the statutory

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        maximum, which was based on the following facts: (1) that Hall’s conviction arose from

        a guilty plea as opposed to after trial; (2) that Hall accepted responsibility and apologized

        to the arresting officer; (3) that Hall wanted to change his life for the better; and (4) that

        the same conduct formed the basis for Hall’s state conviction. While it initially resisted

        defense counsel’s arguments, the court eventually retreated from its position that it

        should impose the statutory maximum 120-month sentence and awarded a 10-month

        downward variance. Accordingly, even if there was a deficit in the court’s explanation,

        we alternatively hold that the Government has established that such an error is harmless.

                 Finally, then, we address Hall’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his

        sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Of course, we presume that a sentence within or below a

        properly calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi,

        674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); see Blue, 877 F.3d at 519-20. “Such a presumption

        can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against

        the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.

        2014).

                 To undermine the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to the below-

        Guidelines sentence he received, Hall relies on the same core reasons advanced to

        demonstrate procedural error. But these arguments invite us to reweigh the § 3553(a)

        factors and the relevant circumstances in this case, which we will not do. See United

        States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “district courts have

        extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the

        § 3553(a) factors”). On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its

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        discretion in giving controlling weight to the need to protect the public from Hall’s

        unrelenting criminal conduct, Hall’s extensive criminal history—which carries with it an

        increased likelihood of recidivism—and the seriousness of the underlying offense, which

        likewise was a focal point at sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). Accordingly,

        we hold that Hall has failed to overcome the presumption of substantive reasonableness

        afforded the below-Guidelines sentence he received.

              For these reasons, we affirm the criminal judgment.        We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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