Court Opinion

ID: 9594722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:32:25.757877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:04.997396
License: Public Domain

BABCOCK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the General Assembly intended the provisions of § 8-73-107(7)(a)(I) through (VI), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) to be exhaustive of the categories of aliens “permanently residing in the United States under color of law.” Because claimant did not meet the criteria for inclusion in any of these categories during his base period, I would affirm.
Section 8—73—107(7)(a)(I) through (VI), became effective on April 30, 1985. Colo. Sess.Laws 1985, ch. 82 at 366-367. Before this statute’s adoption, this court announced Arteaga v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 654 (Colo.1985), aff'd, Industrial Commission v. Arteaga, 735 P.2d 473 (Colo.1987). Arteaga adopted the reasoning of Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.1977), that “color of law” did not necessarily mean affirmative action, but could be evidenced by inaction by INS with full knowledge of the alien's illegal status.
In my view, the General Assembly’s amendment of § 8-73-107(7)(a) “overruled” Arteaga to specify the only circumstances under which an alien may receive unemployment compensation benefits. The majority’s interpretation of this statute as being non-exclusive represents a usurpation of the General Assembly’s legislative function and renders its 1985 amendment meaningless.