Court Opinion

ID: 9748517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:04:28.054938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:36.548706
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice WINTERSHEIMER.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it was not error for the trial judge to deny Quarels the right to testify on her own behalf. At her second trial, Quarels was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life without parole for aggravated murder, twenty years for first-degree arson and ten years for each of two criminal attempts to murder.
She had been indicted for events occurring in 1998, when she doused the bed in which she and her three children lay with lighter fluid and ignited it. Quarels and two of the children survived, but her two-year old child died in the resulting fire. Prior to her first trial, Quarels made repeated emotional outbursts and became disruptive and hysterical. Her defense counsel advised the court that the attorney/client relationship had completely broken down and the trial judge determined that Quarels was unable to continue in her present state and ordered a competency evaluation. The result was a mistrial and eventually the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center determined that she was competent to stand trial.
At the second trial which occurred almost a year later, Quarels continued to have outbursts throughout the trial and was forcibly removed from the courtroom on at least one occasion. She stated on numerous occasions before the trial judge and at least one time in front of the jury her desire to testify on her own behalf. Defense counsel informed the trial judge that she wished to testify after her defense case was closed and against the advice of counsel. Pursuant to Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412 (1994), the trial judge conducted an extensive hearing to determine whether she was capable of intelligently directing her own defense by making a decision to testify on her own behalf. Ultimately, the trial judge found that it would be very detrimental to her defense case if she were to testify based on her previous outbursts and inability to control her emotions. Quarels then stated she wished to fire her attorney and represent herself so that she could take the stand.
I find that the rationale of Jacobs, supra, which was first articulated in Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900 (1989), to be controlling in this situation. In Dean, this Court explained that “... even if a defendant is found competent to stand trial, he may not be capable of making an intelligent decision about his defense.” Jacobs, 870 S.W.2d at 418, quoting Dean, supra. This Court went on to say that “... although found competent to stand trial, the trial court shall hold a hearing as to ability to voluntarily and intelligently understand and waive defense” which was pertinent in that case. Accordingly, defense counsel requested a hearing to determine whether or not Quar-els was capable of intelligently exercising her right to direct her own defense despite the advice of counsel to the contrary. Defense counsel was obviously concerned that if the defendant took the stand and testified, she would in effect be waiving the insanity defense counsel had been presenting since the beginning of this trial.
Clearly, the trial judge had serious reservations as to whether or not the defen*89dant could appreciate the danger and/or damage that could be occasioned to her defense if she took the stand. Obviously, the trial judge in an attempt to act in the best interest of the defendant, engaged in a lengthy discussion with her before refusing to allow her to testify. The trial judge concluded that the defendant’s desire to testify did not arise from the belief that it would aid her defense, but rather only serve a cathartic need to explain her crimes. The seriousness of the charges against Quarels cannot be brushed aside. In granting a new trial in these circumstances, it is apparent that the defendant could again face the possibility of the death sentence. There can be no doubt from the record in this case that the trial judge was simply trying to protect the defendant from her own foolish behavior. Quarels had repeatedly stated that she wanted the prosecutors to just kill her. Defense counsel had told the trial judge that the defendant was acting out an attempt to use the death penalty to commit suicide and that her testimony might have an effect on the insanity defense.
It is disappointing to realize that the majority in this case in choosing not to apply the reasoning of Jacobs could well be providing a distinct disservice to a criminal defendant. Both Jacobs and Dean involved the assertion of an insanity defense. The desperate attempts of the majority to fashion a distinction based on case-by-case treatment is unconvincing.
There is no question that the right of a defendant to testify at trial is zealously guarded by both defendants and the judiciary. However, as admitted in the majority opinion, the right to testify is not without restrictions or qualifications. Surely, consideration for the best interests of the defendant could be recognized as such an exception.
The noble language of the majority opinion is reduced to mere words without meaning. Serious public doubt should arise as to the underlying fairness of a trial where the best interests of the defendant are ignored by appellate fiat. Even the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the denial of a right to testify by a defendant can be harmless error in certain instances. United States v. Diomande, 40 Fed. Appx. 120, at 123 (6th Cir.2002) quoting United States v. Reifsteck, 841 F.2d 701 (6th Cir.1988). Academic discussions concerning the legal doctrines of harmless error and structural error are of little interest or value to a defendant who potentially faces a death sentence.
I would affirm the decision of the trial judge and the jury verdict in all respects.
GRAVES, J., joins this dissenting opinion.