Court Opinion

ID: 9666018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:02:15.174564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:22.176066
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Wright.
The City of Dallas appeals the denial of its amended plea to the jurisdiction. The majority affirms the trial court’s order with respect to Zetterlund’s claim for compensation for the invasion and use of his property and reverses the trial court’s order with respect to Zetterlund’s claim for denial of access. I concur in the majority’s resolution of Zetterlund’s denial of access claim. I disagree, however, with the majority’s holding that the evidence raises a fact issue on Zetterlund’s inverse condemnation claim for use and damage to his property. I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority’s opinion.
In his original petition, Zetterlund alleged that the City has failed to compensate him as promised for the use of his land “both on an unauthorized basis initially and thereafter on an authorized basis” and that the City continues to have his property encumbered with the earthen berm precluding access to his property. In his first supplemental petition, Zetter-lund asserted his inverse condemnation claim as follows:
The conduct of the City of Dallas and its agents, ..., in commandeering plaintiffs property without notice to plaintiff, without consent from plaintiff, and without complying with the statutory guidelines required by Texas eminent domain laws constitute an unlawful “taking” by the City of Dallas and its agents.
(Emphasis added). Thus, Zetterlund confined his takings claim to the time period that the City used his property without his consent. In the same supplemental petition, Zetterlund sought damages “for the unauthorized use of plaintiffs property *836and the unauthorized changing of the character of plaintiffs property.” Zetterlund then filed a second supplemental petition in which he broadened his inverse condemnation claim to include the construction of the earthen berm which he alleged denied him access to his property. There is no dispute that the construction of the earthen berm occurred after Zetterlund authorized the City to use his property. Zetter-lund’s claims are separate and distinct, both in time and in damages. I will address these two uses as defined by Zetter-lund.
1. Unauthorized Use
To constitute a taking of property, the government must authorize the damage in the exercise of its lawful authority. Tarrant County v. English, 989 S.W.2d 368, 373 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied). Damage caused by negligent acts of employees or agents of a government do not amount to a taking. Texas Highway Dep’t v. Weber 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1949).
Zetterlund seeks compensation for the initial intrusion onto his property, clearing of his property, and using it as a staging area for the pipeline project. He claims that City employees permitted its contractors to use his property. The City contends that such use was by mistake and not intentional as required for an inverse condemnation claim.
To support his position, Zetterlund relies on the testimony of Rudy Renda, the construction contractor for the project. Renda testified that Toni Contreras, project manager and City employee, permitted the contractors to use the land. In my opinion, this testimony would be relevant only if Contreras knew at the time that he allegedly gave permission that the land was owned by Zetterlund. There is no evidence that Contreras had knowledge of Zetterlund’s ownership at the time he allegedly gave permission to the contractors to use the land.
Renda’s other testimony supports the position that Contreras was not aware that Zetterlund owned the land at the time he allegedly gave permission for its use. He testified that it could be inferred from the plans that the City owned the land. Ren-da testified that he asked for permission to use the land at a meeting at the site attended by him, Jim Rezda, Tony Atkins, Mr. Handel, and Contreras. At this meeting, Renda was still operating under the mistaken understanding that the land was owned by the City. He testified that no one at the meeting suggested otherwise. Ren-da stated, “It was a reasonable error on everybody’s part.” In his deposition, Contreras denied that he had authorized the use of the land and he testified that no one contacted Zetterlund about the use of his land because no one knew he owned the property. Moreover, when Zetterlund brought this matter to them attention, they conducted a survey to find out who actually owned the land.
Other evidence likewise shows that the City’s authorization of use of the land was without knowledge that the land was privately owned. On March 22, 2004, Zetter-lund, Contreras, John Levitt, and Cliff Gaither held a meeting. The minutes from that meeting state:
It was agreed by all parties that in fact the use of Mr. Zetterlund’s property without his permission or authorization had occurred. It was stated by Messers Contreras, Levitt, and Gaither that this was not done intentionally as the Bach-man Plant personnel truly thought it was DWU (Dallas Water Utilites) property and the “permission” to use the property for access, staging, and storing as needed for the installation of the pipeline was given to the contractor.
*837A July 30, 2004 memo to City Council-member Mitchell Rasansky from Assistant City Manager Ramon Miguez reiterates the point that use of Zetterlund’s property was “due to the lack of knowledge that the contractor was utilizing private property.”
The facts in this case are similar to the facts in a case relied upon by the City. See State v. Gafford, No. 04-03-00168-CV, 2003 WL 22011302 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 28, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.). In Gafford, State employees mistakenly cleared a portion of Gafford’s land and stored equipment on his property while working on a project for the Texas Department of Transportation. When Gafford informed the State that they were on his property, its employees quit using his property. Gafford sued the State for inverse condemnation. The State filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that it had not intentionally used Gafford’s property. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction. In reversing the trial court’s order, the court of appeals held that the State’s use was negligence and negligent use does not constitute a compensable taking. Like the facts in Gafford, here, the City’s use of the land was mistaken, not intentional.
Thus, even assuming that City employees authorized the use of Zetterlund’s property as a staging site, it was given under the mistaken belief that it was City-owned property. Authorization under such circumstances does not constitute an intentional taking. See Weber, 219 S.W.2d at 71. In my view, the record shows only a mistaken use of Zetterlund’s land, not an intentional use. Therefore, Zetterlund cannot establish the essential element of intent. Accordingly, I believe the City has not waived sovereign immunity.
2. Authorized Use
The only claim asserted by Zetterlund following his own authorization of the use of his property is the denial of access caused by the construction of the earthen berm. I agree with the majority’s holding with respect to Zetterlund’s denial of access claim.
Even assuming, however, that he asserted other claims for damages after he gave his consent to the City to use his property, I contend any such claims cannot constitute a taking as a matter of law. See State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex.2007). As noted earlier in this opinion, Zetterlund acknowledged this fact when he pleaded his inverse condemnation claim in terms of the City entering and using his property without his consent.
In my opinion, the City conclusively established that it did not intentionally take Zetterlund’s property before Zetterlund authorized its use. Moreover, Zetterlund’s own pleadings establish that any use by the City after his authorization does not support an inverse condemnation claim. Accordingly, the City has not waived sovereign immunity. I would reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction in its entirety.