Court Opinion

ID: 9776348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:31:17.255214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.455768
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent, respectfully of course. The majority has chosen to base its reversal of summary judgment on the factually dissimilar federal district court case, Stoner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Tex.1999). Although the majority pays “lip service” to our Texas Supreme Court decisions in Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Tex.1975) and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.1998), it ignores the fundamental requisite requirements of Gonzalez in evaluating our present case.
In reviewing the record in this appeal and determining that dissent was essential, I became somewhat fascinated with the trial court’s written opinion contained in the October 8, 1998, letter: “TO ALL COUNSEL.” Following an in-depth review of this letter I believe my dissenting opinion can be best stated through my plagiarism/adoption of Judge Shuffield’s letter:
October 8, 1998
Re: No. D-155,598; Betty Duncan v. Black-Eyed Pea U.S.A., Inc.
TO ALL COUNSEL:
I have now had an opportunity to consider the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Black-Eyed Pea U.S.A., Inc. in connection with the above-captioned matter. At issue is whether there is any evidence to support a conclusion that the defect complained of would be considered unreasonably dangerous and, secondly, whether the defendant knew or should have known of such condition on its premises. As pointed out by the parties, our Supreme Court has recently raised the bar in terms of the requisite proof to establish constructive knowledge on the part of a premise owner. See; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Flora Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 811 (May 1998). In that case, the Court held that there must be more than circumstantial evidence from which inferences of constructive knowledge may be drawn to constitute legally sufficient evidence.
In the instant case, the defendant has moved for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 166a(i) on the grounds that there is no evidence:
a. That defendant had knowledge or constructive knowledge of any alleged premises defect; and/or
b. That any hazard was unreasonably dangerous.
In support of its opposition to defendant’s Motion, plaintiff seeks to establish a factual basis for constructive knowledge from the following:
a. The fall occurred in an area that is frequently traveled by employees and, therefore, they “should *451have known” of the alleged condition.1
b. Plaintiffs affidavit states that the area was slippery and it felt to her as if there was a film of grease on the floor. The area is located near the kitchen and, therefore, the grease must have come from the kitchen in question.
In slip-and-fall cases, Texas courts have allowed actual or constructive knowledge to be met in one of three ways, to wit:
1. Evidence that the owner/operator put the foreign substance on the floor;
2. Evidence that the owner/operator knew that it was on the floor and negligently failed to remove it; or
3. Evidence that the substance was on the floor for such a period of time that in the exercise of ordinary care it should have been discovered and removed.
Keetch v. Kroger, 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.1992); Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 963 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no writ).
In the instant case, there is no evidence that Black-Eyed Pea placed the foreign substance on the floor. While plaintiff argues that it might, circumstantially, be established through its proximity to the kitchen as having come from the kitchen, this is nothing more than impermissible speculation inasmuch as an opposite conclusion would be equally plausible. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Flora Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d at 936.
There is, likewise, no evidence from which it can be established that Black-Eyed Pea knew that the bread and/or slippery substance was on the floor and failed to remove it.
Thus, only in the event that the evidence establishes that the substance was on the floor so long that, in the exercise of ordinary care, it should have been discovered and removed can the requisite level of knowledge be found.
Plaintiff first relies on Collard v. Interstate Northborough, 961 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no writ) in support of her position that the circumstantial evidence would support such a conclusion. The Collard case is distinguishable, however, on two bases. First, there the allegation pertained to the inherent slipperiness of the entire floor of a bathroom. In the instant case, plaintiff complains of a greasy spot suggestive of a foreign substance on the floor. More importantly, Collard involved a summary judgment granted pursuant to 166a T.R.C.P. Under that particular form of summary judgment motion,' the burden was on the defendant to prove that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the liability cause of action. In the instant case, defendant has moved pursuant to Rule 166a(i) T.R.C.P., which places the burden on the plaintiff to present evidence. Here, plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence that defendant: (a) was responsible for the slippery substance on the floor (beyond impermissible speculation prohibited by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez); (b) knew of the slippery substance/bread on the floor and failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the situation, or; (c) that the slippery substance/bread had been on the floor for such a period of time as to charge defendant with constructive knowledge.
In addition, plaintiff relies on Furr’s Super Market v. Garrett, 615 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) for the proposition that constructive knowledge can be inferred under the current circumstances. The Garrett decision, however, would turn on the peculiar facts of that case. In that case, *452the evidence established that there were five employees of the defendant’s store who were located near the place of the fall (within 5-6 feet or closer); that such employees were there for a continuous time before the plaintiff fell and that they were there at the time of the plaintiffs fall and immediately thereafter. Moreover, the substance on the floor which caused plaintiffs fall was a banana skin and liquid which were readily visible. In the instant case, although the evidence establishes that employees of the defendant traversed the area, the nature of the defect is not conspicuous .and the continuity of presence by defendant’s employees has not reached the level of those in the Garrett case.
The Supreme Court has raised the level of proof to establish the requisite elements for premises liability by disallowing proof through circumstantial evidence if it does nothing more than support speculation (i.e. the evidence does not exclude an opposite interpretation).2 As such, this Court is bound to give effect to such pronouncement.
For the above reasons, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. Accordingly, I have executed the attached Order as of today’s date.
Very truly yours,
/S/ Judge Milton Gunn Shuffield
JMGS/ml

. Plaintiff primarily testifies that there was a dried piece of bread on the floor. She, likewise, gives inconsistent testimony as to whether the area was slippery.

. Despite the acknowledged hardship on the plaintiff under such circumstances.