Court Opinion

ID: 9475264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:21:54.373697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:36.627936
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree entirely and concur with the court’s holding that appellee was a franchisee within the meaning of the Missouri franchise statute; that the 90-day termination notice given was meaningless if at any time without warning the franchisor could refuse to do business, and that a reasonable jury could and did find in favor of appellee for a franchise statutory violation.
I also agree with the court’s holding that the failure of appellant to furnish bid information within the 90-day termination notice period was a contract violation under the peculiar circumstances in this case.
On the other hand, I do not agree and dissent from the court’s holding that under Missouri law appellee has made a showing of commission of an independent tort or duty imposed either by statute, regulation, public policy considerations as developed by case law or by operation of law that is independent of the undertaking imposed by the contract. Here, appellee’s abortive attempt to terminate the contract and its refusal to furnish bid information at best is a mere contract violation. To adopt the majority analysis is to make every contract violation into an intentional tort founded upon the creative imagination of counsel.
Consequently, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court with instructions: (1) to affirm the judgment on the contract claim and franchise violation, and (2) to reverse and dismiss the judgment on the interference with contract claim.