Court Opinion

ID: 9463809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:16:59.985823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:17.810850
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge,
concurring;
With one limited exception, I fully concur in Judge MacKinnon’s excellently crafted opinion for the court in these eighty-one consolidated cases, and in the companion cases also decided today, Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 75-1503 *1134et al., 180 U.S.App.D.C. -, 554 F.2d 1135 (decided December 16, 1976). My sole reservation concerns how far this court should go in these decisions in attempting to define the content of the “value to the recipient” standard of the Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 31 U.S.C. § 483a (Supp.1975). The Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974) (NCTA) apparently read this phrase as the “measure of the authorized fee” 1 that may be charged by a federal agency under the Act. The Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation in NCTA seemingly eliminates the other considerations clearly sanctioned by the statutory language2 with the implied admonishment that they not be “read literally.”3 In light of this substantial'diminution of agency discretion in setting “fair and equitable” fees, I do not believe that we should now attempt to limit further the applicable statutory standard by peremptorily defining “value to the recipient” as including only the costs and not also the value of the benefits bestowed on a regulatee.
Of course, as the court holds in these cases, if an agency chooses a cost basis approach, as the FCC did in its 1970 fee schedule being challenged here and in Capital Cities, it should be required to identify the specific items of cost and demonstrate how they are related to the benefits for which the fee is assessed. As I read NCTA, however, that case does not dictate that the proportion-of-cost basis is the only acceptable method of determining a proper fee. Such a requirement would implicitly limit all definitions of value to some proportion of the agency’s costs. It would also prevent the agency from becoming self-sustaining. Some of its costs simply could not be directly related to benefits conferred on those regulated, particularly where the benefit may be a service, license, privilege, publication or “similar thing of value or utility”4 for which the discrete cost basis may be incalculable. What for instance is the cost basis of a “privilege” or “license” for which the Act permits reimbursement?
I am not convinced that NCTA prohibits the Commission from developing a fee schedule through a measure of “value to the recipient” that is not initially related to its costs. Thus, for example, the Commission by rulemaking could determine for each class of fees what factors best reflect the value of that benefit to the regulatee and then calculate a fee based on those criteria. As it now stands, however, the court’s formulation of the statutory standard artificially limits all definitions of value to a cost basis that in certain cases may be largely hypothetical.
Any limitation on the “value to the recipient” standard of the Act has far-reaching implications for the fee-setting authority of federal regulatory agencies in general. While I am not insensitive to the need finally to end this extensive and extended litigation, I believe that it is best left first to the agencies to establish the proper criteria for determining what constitutes “value to the recipient” and, if necessary, ultimately to the courts in cases where the issue is clearly presented and thoroughly briefed and argued.
I would remand these cases to the Commission to determine cognizable standards for setting fees within the framework of “value to the recipient” as delimited by NCTA and, once such standards have been established, to calculate the refunds due.

. 415 U.S. 336, 343, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974).

. Section 483a expressly provides that the fees must be
fair and equitable taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to the Government, value to the recipient, public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts . . .
31 U.S.C. § 483a (Supp.1975).

. 415 U.S. at 341, 94 S.Ct. 1146; see id. at 359, 94 S.Ct. 1146 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (Supp.1975).