Court Opinion

ID: 9634982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:31:09.088728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:14.117853
License: Public Domain

*85Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The trial court properly applied the law to the facts when it concluded (1) that “[ajppraiser Bishop was influenced in his decision by Mr. Ball”; (2) that “appraiser Bishop failed to use his own experience” and “his own judgment in determining the value of the subject property”; and (3) that “Mr. Bishop delegated a part of his authority as court-appointed appraiser to Mr. Ball and agreed to pay Mr. Ball a fee for doing so.” Those conclusions are fully supported by the finding1 and the appendices2 to the briefs.
*86Section 49-14 requires that appraisers appointed by the court for the purpose of a deficiency judgment shall make a written report of their appraisal to the court and that “such appraisal shall be final and conclusive as to the value of such mortgaged property.” The statute makes no provision for the mortgagor against whom a deficiency judgment is sought to receive notice of or an opportunity to be heard at the meeting of the appraisers. It is at that meeting that the appraisal is determined, and thereafter it is reported to the court.
Our law requires that such appraisers, appointed pursuant to the provisions of §49-14, “determine the value of property upon their own experience and judgment.” Buck v. Morris Park, Inc., 153 Conn. 290, 293, 216 A.2d 187, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 2, 87 S. Ct. 33, 17 L. Ed. 2d 2; Connecticut Savings Bank v. Hanoman Realty Corporation, 168 Conn. 554, 558, 362 A.2d 827.
In the Buck case, decided in 1965, this court was confronted with the claim that the procedure set forth in § 49-14 was unconstitutional in that it made no provision for notice of the meeting of the appraisers to be given the mortgagor so that he might introduce evidence and be heard on the question of value, thus depriving the mortgagor of his property without due process of law in violation of the federal and state constitutions. In rejecting that constitutional claim, the court placed much emphasis on the fact that the appraisers must determine the value of the property on their own experience and judgment and, “[c] onsequently, they are not required to hear evidence or to give notice of the meeting at which they make the appraisal.” Buck v. Morris Park, Inc., supra, 293; Vincent v. German Ins. Co., 120 Iowa 272, 278, 94 N.W. 458.
*87After a hearing on the remonstrance filed by the mortgagor to the appraisers’ report, the trial court ruled that appraiser Bishop did not “determine the value of the property upon his own experience and judgment” and sustained the remonstrance.
My colleagues, however, have concluded that Bishop did ultimately give his opinion as to value and that whether that opinion was influenced by a third party not appointed as an appraiser by the court is of no consequence since such outside influence on an appraiser’s opinion is common in the appraisal field.
The flaw in that reasoning is that court-appointed appraisers under §49-14 cannot be equated with ordinary real estate appraisers. Appraisers appointed pursuant to § 49-14 partake of a special quasi-judicial nature. Buck v. Morris Park, Inc., supra, 292. They are appointed to make an appraisal that is binding and conclusive on the court and on the parties. They do not take the witness stand, do not give testimony and are not subject to cross-examination. They are, in fact, appointed officers who, in an ex parte proceeding attended only by themselves, determine value from which no right of appeal lies.
The traditional real estate appraiser, on the other hand, is generally a witness in a court proceeding whose testimony is subject to cross-examination and whose opinion may be rejected in whole or in part by the court. Moreover, it is the court which makes the ultimate determination of value from which judgment a right of appeal lies.
In essence, appraisers under § 49-14 can be equated to a jury of three which, after deliberating, return a verdict to the court as to value. Like any *88other such deliberative body, the opinions of the individual members are subject to being influenced by the opinions of their fellow jurors but cannot be so influenced by anyone not a member of the deliberative body, nor by any other outside influence. Unlike the verdict of a jury, however, the appraisal is not subject to any review by the trial court, nor to an appeal.
There is then no basis for equating the two types of appraisers. While it is true that the ordinary real estate appraiser can express an opinion as to value regardless of its source, that opinion is not binding on the court and is subject to the safeguards of a judicial hearing. The determination of value by appraisers under § 49-14, however, amounts to a conclusive judgment which is subject to none of the safeguards of a judicial hearing. The latter procedure is permitted only because our law requires that such appraisers determine the value of property upon their own experience and upon their own independent judgment. Otherwise, the procedure under § 49-14 would be in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. See Roundhouse Construction Corporation v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778.
I would, therefore, find no error and would uphold the action of the trial court in sustaining the remonstrance to the report of the appraisers.

 “Mr. Bishop felt the need of help from Mr. Ball and agreed to pay him a fee. Mr. Ball recommended to appraiser Bishop that the subject premises were worth $450,000. It is admitted by Mr. Bishop that the advice of Mr. Ball influenced the ultimate decision rendered by Mr. Bishop. It is stated by Mr. Bishop that part of the basis for his appraisal was made ‘purely on the recommendation of Mr. Ball, that he thought it was worth $450,000.’”

 “Joseph A. Bishop testified, when asked whether there was some reason why ho was not sure of himself in doing an appraisal in the subject premises, as follows: ‘I felt the need of help, yes.’ When asked why, Mr. Bishop responded: ‘Well, because I hadn’t done anything of that nature in years. And I had just started in a new association with Philip Ball who is a professional appraiser. And I made an arrangement with him prior to this on another occasion where we appraised a building. And I felt that T needed his advice.’ When asked whether he agreed to pay Mr. Ball a fee for his advice, Mr. Bishop responded: ‘Correct.’ When asked who did this appraisal work, Mr. Bishop responded: ‘I went there to the building twice with Mr. Ball.’ When asked what function Mr. Ball served in assisting him, Mr. Bishop responded: ‘I took Mr. Ball out there and we viewed the premises together. Subsequent to that, I talked with him on four or five occasions. And his recommendation to me was that he didn’t think the building was worth much more than $450,000. Now, he is a professional appraiser and that is the advice 1 got from him.’ When asked if he was an appraiser of real estate, Mr. Bishop responded: ‘I do appraisal work, yes. I am not considered a professional appraiser.’”
Philip William Ball, called by the plaintiff, the New Haven Savings Bank, testified on cross-examination: “When asked if he had a fee arrangement with Mr. Bishop on this particular appraisal, Mr. Ball responded: ‘Yes, sir.’”