Court Opinion

ID: 9845545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:24:00.985582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:13.387901
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
There has been some small progress in undoing the unfortunate rule fashioned by State v. Mena, supra. I concur with that portion of the lead opinion which permits a witness to testify about matters recalled prior to being hypnotized. I dissent from the remainder of the opinion.
In my judgment the so-called Frye test has been misapplied in this case. As pointed out in my earlier dissent, it is not the answers given under hypnosis which are being offered. The results of the hypnotic session are not being offered as scientific evidence of a fact. The witness, himself, is being offered with the hypnotic session as just one of the many factors which affect a witness. The effects of hypnosis have been studied by the scientific community and conclusions reached. We are aware from these studies of the dangers in the process. The fact of hypnosis, in my view, should be a matter of weight with the trier of fact but not a disqualification. The recent decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Chapman v. State, supra, supports this conclusion.
Mr. Justice Hays takes a different approach to the admission of post-hypnotic testimony in that he would require the safeguards adopted in State v. Hurd, supra, and corroboration by other independent evidence. I believe this position is overly restrictive and unnecessary to assure reliability. It would appear to me that if the testimony of a witness was corroborated by independent evidence, that should be sufficient assurance of reliability without the necessity of additional safeguards.
The standards adopted in State v. Hurd, supra, are certainly reasonable and carefully drawn, and the adoption of such standards would appear far better than our present rule.