Court Opinion

ID: 9731505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:47:50.665254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.741128
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WARD, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I disagree with the majority basically for the reasons stated in my dissent in People v. Massarella (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 531. I consider that from Massarella and the majority’s holding here there has been an evolution and growth in the prosecutive powers of the Attorney General that cannot be supported. This appears to be the sequence in the development. The legislature gave the Attorney General authority, when the interests of the People of the State required it, to attend the trial of a person accused of crime and to assist in the prosecution. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 14, par. 4.) Bills which would have enlarged the powers of the Attorney General were introduced in the General Assembly at its 1975 session. These proposals would have given the Attorney General authority to prosecute for offenses involving the collection of taxes and would have conferred all of the powers of the State’s Attorneys in criminal proceedings. The General Assembly, however, rejected the bills. Manifestly the Attorney General in seeking this legislation recognized the limitations on his prosecutive authority and the necessity of legislative action to enlarge it. Next, the majority in Massarella held that the Attorney General has authority to “assist the State’s Attorney to the extent that he may discharge all those powers of the State’s Attorney at all stages in a prosecution *** where [the State’s Attorney] does not object.” (72 Ill. 2d 531, 538-39.) This is holding, it seems to me, that the passivity of the State’s Attorney may remarkably enlarge the authority and power of the Attorney General to prosecute. The majority states here that the Attorney General has the power concurrently “with the power of the State’s Attorney to initiate and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions.” (78 Ill. 2d at 454.) This certainly goes far beyond the power to “attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and assist in the prosecution.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 14, par.. 4. The majority does acknowledge that unless a statute gives the Attorney General exclusive authority to institute and prosecute, as in Cigarette Tax Act cases, he does not have the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution. (78 Ill. 2d at 455.) It thus recognizes the statutory limitations on the Attorney General’s power to prosecute and their effectiveness. The majority does not say that this concurrent authority to prosecute is limited to revenue cases, and its holding may be interpreted to mean that the Attorney General, if the State’s Attorney says nothing, will be able to exercise powers of prosecution in all criminal matters. Accordingly, in cause No. 51768, I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the dismissal of the indictments charging the defendants with theft. I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the dismissal of the other charges in cause No. 51768 and from the reversal of the judgments in cause No. 58135. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.