Court Opinion

ID: 9403631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:07:42.664729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.421929
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1891
                              Filed June 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

FITSUM HUNEGNAW RUSSELL,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Justin Lightfoot, Judge.

      A defendant appeals his sentence following an Alford plea. AFFIRMED.

      Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.

       Fitsum Russell entered an Alford plea to one count of assault with intent to

commit sexual abuse causing bodily injury. The plea agreement recommended

his “sentence be imposed concurrently with sentence previously imposed in” a

separate sexual abuse case.

       But, at sentencing, the district court ordered the sentence to run consecutive

to the previous sentence, explaining:

              The consecutive sentence is appropriate in light of the factor
       I mentioned, but particularly, the fact there are multiple victims. The
       victim here had nothing to do with what happened in [the previous
       case].
              This was not part of one string of crimes that happened in the
       same day or even the same week. They were separate crimes which
       caused substantial harm on two separate, unrelated victims. The
       only common thread here is that the defendant was the person who
       committed both of the crimes.

       Russell appeals his sentence,1 arguing the court abused its discretion by

ordering his sentence run consecutive to his previously imposed sentence rather

than concurrently. Specifically, he argues (1) the parties agreed to concurrent

sentences, (2) had he known he would receive consecutive sentences, he might

not have taken the Alford plea, and (3) the evidence against him was uncertain.

“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the

statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and [it] will only be

overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate

matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “An abuse of

1 Though Russell pled guilty, he has good cause for this appeal. See State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that good cause exists to
appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his
or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.”).
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discretion will not be found unless we are able to discern that the decision was

exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.”

Id.

       As to Russell’s first two arguments, the plea agreement Russell signed

acknowledged that “the [c]ourt [was] not a party to this agreement and that this

agreement does not bind the [c]ourt in any manner.” The district court was under

no obligation to follow the recommendations and did not abuse its discretion in

exercising that discretion by considering the distinct nature of the crimes. See

State v. Goodwin, No. 16-1346, 2017 WL 2461603, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7,

2017) (finding the distinct nature of the crimes committed were proper

considerations for imposing consecutive sentences). And, while Russell might

believe the State’s evidence against him was not strong, this consideration was

his to make before he accepted the Alford plea and its terms—including the chance

the district court would disregard the State’s recommendations. See State v.

Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Iowa 2005) (noting that defendants do not have a

constitutional or other right to enter an Alford plea). When sentencing following an

Alford plea, “[r]eality and common sense require the sentencing judge to act upon

the basis of the central presumption that the defendant is guilty. Following a plea

of guilty or a trial, a convicted defendant stands before the sentencing judge no

longer clothed with the presumption of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). As such,

the district court was not required to consider the strength of the evidence against

Russell; it could properly treat him as any other defendant being sentenced. See

id. at 88. The reasons the district court gave for the sentence were appropriate
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and, on this record, we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion and affirm the

sentence.

       AFFIRMED.