Court Opinion

ID: 9955998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-30 06:15:08.313595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:02.170885
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed March 28, 2024

                                                 In The

            Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                              __________

                                      No. 11-23-00234-CV
                                              __________

  IN THE INTEREST OF J.S., A.B., H.O., AND C.O., CHILDREN

                         On Appeal from the 326th District Court
                                  Taylor County, Texas
                            Trial Court Cause No. 10718-CX

                                            OPINION
        This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother, S.S., to her four children, J.S., 1 A.B., H.O., and
C.O. 2 On appeal, Appellant (S.S.) presents four issues in which she challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings and the trial court’s

        1
         We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the children. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).

        The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s fathers. Neither of the fathers
        2

appealed.
decision to “allow” the two older children (J.S. and A.B.) to attend and observe the
final hearing. We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.
                             I. Termination Findings and Standards
        The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2023). To terminate
one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U),3 and
that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. at § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and
convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019).
        In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant committed at least one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1)—specifically, that Appellant: (1) engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and (2) failed to
comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions
necessary for Appellant to obtain the return of the children who had been in the
permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and
Protective Services (the Department) for not less than nine months as a result of the
children’s removal from Appellant under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the

        3
          We note that the legislature recently amended Section 161.001 to include additional requirements
for trial courts in termination suits filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services and a new
ground for termination that relates to convictions for solicitation of a minor; however, these amendments
only apply to suits filed on or after September 1, 2023. Act of May 26, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 728, §§ 1,
3, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1770, 2177 (codified at FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(V)); Act of May 29, 2023, 88th
Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 1, 8, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 1646–47 (codified at FAM. § 161.001(f), (g)). The
original petition to terminate the parent-child relationship in this case was filed prior to September 1, 2023.
We therefore apply the statute in effect on the date the above suit was filed.

                                                      2
children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O). The trial court further found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Appellant challenges both the legal
and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
      In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its
finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’ and the factfinder is ‘the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002) (then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As
such, when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not
substitute our judgment for the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
      In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).

                                           3
      With respect to the best interest of a child determination, no unique set of
factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d
261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).              Further, the best interest
determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re D.M.,
58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). However, courts may
use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the
desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs
available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the
stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent
that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
      To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
      The absence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the factfinder
from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that termination
is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that the parent-
child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being

                                            4
of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest analysis
evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d
755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d
918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
      In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by her
past conduct and determine whether termination is in the children’s best interest. In
re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); In re
D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder
may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of
the children may recur in the future if the children are returned to the possession of
the parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
no pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1992, writ denied). Further, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability
to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by
the parent to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D.,
436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
                        II. The Evidence Presented at Trial
      The record shows that the Department first investigated Appellant in 2010 for
physically abusing J.S., who was an infant at the time. The Department later
investigated Appellant in 2012 for neglectful supervision of one-year-old A.B. and
two-year-old J.S., and again in August of 2013 through 2014 for physically abusing
them. Despite the Department’s findings regarding those allegations, J.S. and A.B.
were not removed until Appellant was arrested in 2015 after a physical altercation
with her sister.

                                          5
      While Appellant was working Family-Based Safety Services (FBSS) for her
2015 case, she was pregnant with H.O., failed to cooperate with the Department, and
continued testing positive for cocaine and marihuana use. Three-year-old A.B. and
four-year-old J.S. also tested positive for cocaine. Appellant’s 2015 Family Service
Plan noted that she was “in denial of [the] use of illegal substances,” notwithstanding
the results of her positive drug tests. The service plan further indicated that J.S.
suffered from “Sickle Cell,” and had special medical needs. J.S. and A.B. were
ultimately returned to Appellant upon her completion of the required services, and
that case was closed.
      H.O. was born in April of 2015, and C.O. was born in February of 2016. The
Department initiated another investigation in 2017 after Appellant was arrested for
drug possession while caring for H.O. and C.O. All four children tested positive for
cocaine in May of 2018. The children were later removed from Appellant’s
possession; however, she again successfully completed her court-ordered services to
secure the children’s monitored return.
      The investigation that resulted in the final removal of the children began on
April 26, 2022, when Appellant was arrested for possession of methamphetamine
with intent to deliver; she was subsequently placed on deferred adjudication
community supervision for a period of eight years. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 481.112(c) (West Supp. 2023). In mid-2023, Appellant’s community
supervision was transferred to a “high-medium risk” supervisor due to her
noncompliance with the rules of community supervision.
      The Department created a Family Plan of Service for Appellant, which the
trial court amended, approved, and adopted on August 12, 2022. As part of
Appellant’s court-ordered service plan, she was required to maintain stable housing

                                          6
that was free of drugs, violence, and other illegal activity. She was further required
to submit to random drug testing and “refrain from the use of illegal drugs.”
      Appellant tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, cocaine, and
marihuana throughout the pendency of this case. Appellant tested positive for
cocaine and marihuana in February of 2023, and she tested positive for marihuana
in April of 2023. The children were also drug tested in May of 2022—C.O. was
positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, H.O. was positive for cocaine, and
J.S. and A.B. were negative for all substances.
      Appellant admitted that she smoked marihuana after the children’s removal
“[b]ecause [she] was stressed.” Despite her admissions and numerous positive drug
tests, Appellant insisted that she did not have a drug problem and could care for her
children even when under the influence of marihuana. She acknowledged, however,
that sometimes she did not have her children attend school, and that her children
were exposed to drugs while in her sole care and custody.
      The    trial   court   terminated       Appellant’s   parental   rights   under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O) and found termination to be in the best interest of
the children. This appeal followed.
                                    III. Analysis
      A. Termination under Subsection (E) – Endangerment
      In Appellant’s first and second issues, she challenges the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to prove grounds (E) and (O). Although only one
statutory ground is necessary to support termination, we must address a parent’s
challenges to a trial court’s findings under subsections (D) or (E), as they may have
implications for the parent’s rights to other children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1); In
re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due
course of law considerations with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and (E)

                                          7
and holding that an appellate court must provide a detailed analysis if affirming
termination on either ground). Thus, if we conclude that the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding as to subsection (E), we need
not address the arguments raised by Appellant concerning subsection (O). See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
      Subsection (E) requires clear and convincing proof that the parent has
“engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in
conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. 2014). It has been said
that the term “endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize
the child. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987);
S.B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 654 S.W.3d 246, 253 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2022, pet. denied). The term also encompasses a substantial risk of harm to
the child, J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345, and “means more than a threat of metaphysical
injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” In re E.N.C.,
384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012).
      Endangerment under subsection (E) focuses on the parent’s conduct, and
whether the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the
parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re M.G., 585 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.). Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must
be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and
conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. Id.; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d
625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). The offending conduct need
not be directed at the child, nor must the child actually suffer harm or injury. J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d at 345; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. The endangering conduct may include
the parent’s actions before the child’s birth and may relate to the parent’s actions

                                           8
while the parent had possession of other children. In re S.T., No. 11-19-00363-CV,
2020 WL 2610393, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 18, 2020, pet. denied) (mem.
op.).
        Evidence of endangerment is demonstrated in many forms, including the
existence or presence of (1) sexually transmitted diseases, (2) sexual abuse,
(3) criminal convictions, (4) alcohol and drug abuse, (5) neglect, and (6) domestic
abuse. S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d at 585; see also In re I.R.H., No. 11-17-00070-CV, 2017
WL 3994682, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(evidence of sexual abuse of one child is sufficient to support a finding of
endangerment with respect to other children) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732,
742 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). Drug use and its effects on the
parent’s life and ability to parent may also establish an endangering course of
conduct. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Illegal drug use creates the possibility
that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of parenting.”).
        “A finding of endangerment is supported ‘if the evidence . . . shows a course
of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being
of the child.’” In re C.E., No. 23-0180, 2024 WL 875455, at *4 (Tex. March 1,
2024). Further, endangerment may be inferred based on a parent’s “course of
conduct” that presents a substantial risk to the child’s physical or emotional well-
being. In re R.R.A., No. 22-0978, 2024 WL 1221674, at *6 (Tex. March 22, 2024).
Thus, drug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent and care for a
child may establish an endangering course of conduct under Subsection (E). See,
e.g., R.R.A., 2024 WL 1221674, at *6–8; J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; A.A.M., 464
S.W.3d at 426; see also In re K.B., No. 01-23-00658-CV, 2024 WL 791630, at *6
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 27, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

                                           9
      Here, there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that Appellant engaged in a continuing course of drug abuse, for
nearly a decade, that directly endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her
children. A.B. and J.S. tested positive for cocaine in 2015, and all four children
tested positive for cocaine in 2018. In May of 2022, J.S.’s and A.B.’s drug tests
were negative, but six-year-old C.O. tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine, and seven-year-old H.O. tested positive for cocaine.
      Appellant admitted to repeatedly using cocaine and marihuana in the years
prior to and after the removal of her children and she conceded that her children were
previously removed “[f]or marijuana use.” The results of numerous drug tests
confirmed her continued use of marihuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine. “[A]
parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination
suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child, may support a finding that the parent
engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.”
See In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.
denied). Such is the case here.
      Even then, Appellant steadfastly refused to acknowledge that she had a drug
problem, testifying that she “was distributing,” rather than using, the
methamphetamine with which she was arrested in 2022. But any “[d]rug activity
‘significantly harms the parenting relationship’ and can constitute endangerment
even if it occurs outside of the child’s presence.” K.B., 2024 WL 791630, at *6
(quoting A.M., 495 S.W.3d at 579). Illegal drug use exposes the children to the
possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned, as it did in this case. See
In re S.C.F., 522 S.W.3d 693, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet.
denied); A.M., 495 S.W.3d at 579.

                                           10
      Additionally, A.B. and J.S. were exposed to domestic violence in their early
childhood years. K.O., the biological father of H.O. and C.O., pled no contest to
assaulting Appellant in 2012. K.O. was released from prison in October of 2022,
and he and Appellant used cocaine together the following December or January,
according to Appellant. See In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“A parent’s abusive or violent conduct can produce a
home environment that endangers a child’s well-being.”).
      Based on the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably found
by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant engaged in a course of conduct that
endangered the children. See R.R.A., 2024 WL 1221674, at *6–8; J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 345. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (E). Accordingly, we
overrule Appellant’s first issue.
      Because only one statutory ground is necessary to support a finding of
termination, and because we have upheld the trial court’s termination finding under
subsection (E), we need not address Appellant’s second issue regarding the trial
court’s termination finding under subsection (O). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1); N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232–35; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 363
(Tex. 2003); see also In re M.M., No. 11-22-00359-CV, 2023 WL 4003260, at *5
(Tex. App.—Eastland June 15, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
      B. The Best Interest of the Children Determination
      In Appellant’s third issue, she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
is in the best interest of the children. Specifically, Appellant contends that the
evidence supporting the trial court’s best-interest finding is lacking because: (1) A.B.
and J.S. expressed their desire to remain with Appellant; (2) there are no plans for

                                           11
permanent placements or adoptive homes for the children, and A.B. informed the
trial court that he did not want to be adopted; (3) there is a lack of evidence of several
Holley factors since no one is currently seeking custody of the children; and
(4) Appellant “was not court[-]ordered to test negative,” so her positive drug tests
should not be used against her. Appellant likewise complains of the trial court’s
failure to find on the record that termination was in the children’s best interest.
      First, we reiterate that evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support
a best interest finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at
*13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Put differently, the
absence of evidence on some of these factors does not preclude a best interest
finding, “particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.). Indeed, “evidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a
particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best interests of the
child.” In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.).
“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-
circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee,
411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013).
      The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty to disturb the
determinations of the trier of fact so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving
due deference to the trial court, as we must, we hold that, based on the evidence and
the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have reasonably formed a

                                           12
firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
best interest of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      As we have said, in its best interest determination, a trial court, as the
factfinder, may infer that a parent’s past endangering conduct may recur if the child
is returned to the parent. See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re T.B.,
No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 WL 6787523, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19,
2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“factfinder may consider prior CPS history of neglect,
drug abuse, or lack of care for the children”). Evidence that is relevant to Section
161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may also be relevant to the determination of the
child’s best interest. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019,
pet. denied). And evidence that supports termination under the grounds listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1) can be considered in the best-interest analysis. See C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. Thus, the trial court could properly
consider Appellant’s drug abuse, arrests for criminal conduct, and other evidence of
endangerment in determining whether the termination of her parental rights was in
the children’s best interest. See id.
      While Appellant was caring for the children in the months preceding their
removal, the children did not attend school for at least sixty days. A.B.’s behavioral
issues led to his suspension from elementary school. Soon after removal, A.B. was
aggressive toward his sisters, and “they couldn’t get along.” Robert Smith, the
2INgage permanency case manager, testified that being in foster care has “affected
[the children] greatly[,] especially [J.S.].” In fact, J.S. became depressed after the
children’s third removal and placement into foster care. C.O. and H.O. also had
difficulty readjusting to foster care for a third time. Smith testified that, after a year
of therapy since their removal, the children’s behavioral patterns have improved, and

                                           13
remaining in foster care will ensure that they continue to engage in therapy to address
their emotional trauma and needs.
      Appellant testified that she believes she can stay sober for “[f]orever,” and
attested that she is “doing everything for [her] kids.” Her assurances aside, it is
undisputed that Appellant frequently smoked marihuana while this case was pending
in the trial court below, claiming that it was necessary “[b]ecause [she] was
stressed.” Appellant has thus neither achieved, maintained, nor made a significant
effort to attain sobriety. Instead, her persistent and unapologetic drug use while
under both Department supervision and community supervision for a felony drug
offense shows her clear disinterest in placing the welfare of her children before her
own. See, e.g., S.O., 2023 WL 2237084, at *12–13 (“Mother’s drug use was not
isolated but had been an ongoing problem in her life.”); see also N.T., 474 S.W.3d
at 479 (“[R]ecent improvement alone is not sufficient to avoid termination of
parental rights.”).
      J.S. and A.B. expressed their desire to return to Appellant’s care, and A.B.
advised the trial court that he did not want to be adopted. While we do not ignore a
child’s desires, it is only one factor that we consider in the overall best interest
analysis. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; cf. In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“A child’s love for a parent
cannot be ignored as a reflection of the parent’s ability to provide for the child’s
emotional needs.”). Although a child’s desires or wishes for residing with a parent
is an important consideration in determining the best interest of the child, “it cannot
override or outweigh evidence of danger to the child.” F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at
732. Moreover, a child’s expressed preference is not binding on the trial court;
rather, it is only one factor, among others, that the trial court considers in its best
interest determination. FAM. § 153.009(c) (West 2014); see Hart v. Kozik, 242

                                          14
S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing In re Marriage of
Stockett, 570 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ)). Here, the trial
court explained to A.B. and J.S. that it had to “make the very best decision” for them,
even though it “may not be what [they] want.” Given Appellant’s conduct that has
directly endangered her four children, and the children’s needs and desires for a safe
and stable home environment, this factor does not weigh against a finding of
termination. See Hart, 242 S.W.3d at 109.
      Furthermore, although “[e]vidence about placement plans and adoption are,
of course, relevant to best interest,” a “lack of evidence about definitive plans for
permanent placement and adoption cannot be the dispositive factor.” C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 28. Otherwise, terminations would regularly be subject to reversal on the
sole ground that “an adoptive family has yet to be located.” Id.; see also F.M.E.A.F.,
572 S.W.3d at 732. Smith testified that the children’s current caregivers in their
respective placements are committed to providing them with an environment and
structure where they can succeed. Appellant, on the other hand, has not provided
her children with a safe, drug-free home environment. Therefore, we conclude that
the trial court properly found that this factor does not weigh against a best-interest
finding and termination of Appellant’s parental rights. See C.H., 89 S.W.2d at 28;
F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 732.
      Appellant proffered several excuses for her positive drug tests and attributed
her children’s drug exposure to her sister’s methamphetamine use. Appellant
consistently maintained that she has not been in the presence of methamphetamine
since May or June of 2022, despite the many positive test results to the contrary.
Rather than showing a modicum of remorse, Appellant has exhibited nothing but
apathy and nonchalance about her methamphetamine distribution and ongoing drug
abuse. For example, according to Appellant, because she was only allegedly selling

                                          15
methamphetamine, rather than using it, this conduct somehow weighs against a
finding of terminating her parental rights. Like the trial court, we reject this logic.
Certainly, any drug activity may render the parent incapable of parenting. See
R.R.A., 2024 WL 1221674, at *6–8; A.M., 495 S.W.3d at 579; A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d
at 426.
      Concomitant with Appellant’s apathy and denial of drug abuse, she insisted
that her parental capabilities remained unaffected. She testified: “[E]ven if I was
smoking weed, I was still taking care of them. I was still making sure they had meals
. . . clean clothes . . . [and] ate three times a day.” Appellant’s ability to survive each
day while under the influence of drugs is not an issue before us, and her blasé attitude
towards sobriety supports the trial court’s findings.              By its best-interest
determination, the trial court properly found that it is in the best interest of
Appellant’s children to have sober and drug-free caregivers who can prevent them
from ingesting illegal substances, take them to school, teach them non-aggressive
behaviors, and meet their physical and emotional needs beyond simply ensuring
“that [they] had lights, water, and gas” at home. Appellant’s conduct has caused and
resulted in her absence from her children’s lives, three removals, the children to
endure several foster care placements, as well as the children’s disappointment,
embarrassment, loneliness, and lack of belonging.
       The State honored the constitutional-protected relationship of Appellant with
her children until it became clearly and convincingly apparent that Appellant’s
primary interest was not the protection of her children. See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361.
Years of resources were exhausted in an effort to keep Appellant’s children in her
care, but she has pushed reunification efforts to their outermost limits and has shown
that she is not “fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities” of parenthood.
See id. Indeed, Appellant attempted to comply with the required court-ordered

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services, and she temporarily achieved sobriety during her prior Department
investigations; however, each time she reverted to drug use and criminal activity
once the State’s involvement concluded. But this time, she brazenly used drugs in
the face of possible termination of her parental rights during the pendency of this
case.
        Appellant has been given countless opportunities to properly care for her
children throughout the years, and the trial court determined, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that this chance was her last. Appellant’s substance abuse,
criminal history, negative history with the Department, and refusal to address the
issues that caused the Department’s years of involvement support the trial court’s
firm belief or conviction that the termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; see also Yonko v. Dep’t
of Family & Protective Servs., 196 S.W.3d 236, 245 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.).
        With respect to the trial court’s lack of an oral pronouncement of its best
interest determination, we reject Appellant’s argument that the trial court is required
to make its best-interest finding on the record. Here, the trial court issued its written
order and expressly recited and found that the termination of Appellant’s parental
rights to her four children was in the children’s best interest.
        The Family Code permits a trial court to make pronouncements orally, in the
form of “renditions.” FAM. § 101.026. But when, as in this case, there is an
inconsistency between the trial court’s written judgment and its oral pronouncement,
the written judgment controls. In re C.J.B., 681 S.W.3d 778, 787 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); In re D.A.Z., 583 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); In re K.M.B., 148 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see also In re A.C., No. 04-12-00679-CV, 2013

                                           17
WL 352449, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(affirming the trial court’s judgment terminating parental rights, even though the
trial court’s oral pronouncement did not include best-interest findings, because the
trial court’s written judgment included these findings).
      Appellant has not cited to, and our research has not revealed, any authority to
support her argument. Moreover, and as we have said, to the extent there is any
inconsistency between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and its final judgment in
this case, its final judgment controls. See In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 206 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (rejecting the parent’s argument that
the trial court’s oral rendition made without a best-interest finding resulted in error
even though the finding was made and expressed in the final judgment).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
      C. Children’s Presence in the Courtroom During the Final Hearing
      In her fourth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it allowed J.S. and A.B. to attend and observe the final hearing and “witness[]
evidence and testimony . . . of their parents’ failure to secure their return,” thereby
“further traumatiz[ing]” them.
      A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding
rules or principles—that is, if its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry,
221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). We may not substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court merely because we would have ruled differently under the
circumstances. In re M-I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2016); Low, 221
S.W.3d at 619–20. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion,
we uphold the ruling on any theory of law applicable to the case that finds support
in the record, and we imply any findings of fact necessary to support its ruling. See
Rinkle v. Graf, 658 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022,

                                          18
no pet.). “A trial court cannot abuse its discretion if it reaches the right result, even
for the wrong reasons.” Hawthorne v. Guenther, 917 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1996, writ denied) (“we are not bound by an incorrect statement of the
law as it applies to a case”); see also In re J.M., No. 07-15-00438-CV, 2016 WL
6024279, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
      Nothing in the record indicates that these children were present for the first
day of trial. On the second day of the final hearing, the trial court noticed that J.S.
and A.B. were present. No objection was made by either party about their presence,
and the Department proceeded with presenting its case.
      Prior to Smith’s testimony that concerned Appellant giving J.S. a tablet during
a visitation session that contained sexually explicit content, Appellant’s trial counsel
asked that the children exit the courtroom. The following exchange occurred during
a bench conference:
             THE COURT: Well, if one of the children saw it, then the
      children -- you want the children in here, so we’re going to hear the
      good, the bad, and the ugly.
             ...
            [TRIAL COUNSEL]: Just renew my objection is that they’re in
      the courtroom at all. Therapeutically, I think this is devastating.
             THE COURT: I understand but the kids -- the law is what the
      law is. I hate it, too.
             [TRIAL COUNSEL]: Until it’s changed by another law.
             THE COURT: That’s right. All right.
We have found no other objections in the record concerning whether J.S. or A.B.
were present in the courtroom during the final hearing, and Appellant does not direct
our attention to any. Instead, Appellant posits that “the legislature has provided
measures for children to be heard outside of the courtroom setting.”

                                           19
        The legislature has also explicitly required the presence of the children at the
final hearing “unless the [trial] court specifically excuses the child[ren]’s
attendance.” See FAM. § 263.302. Because Appellant failed to object when the trial
court acknowledged J.S.’s and A.B.’s presence, she has not preserved her complaint
for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (“As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint
for appellate review, the record must show that . . . the complaint was made to the
trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion.”).
        Even if Appellant’s subsequent objection had preserved this issue for our
review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed
J.S. and A.B. to attend and observe the trial proceedings. As the trial court noted,
“the law is what the law is,” presumably referring to Section 263.302.4 Here, the
trial court was simply following the established law as it is bound to do. See FAM.
§ 263.302.       Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we overrule
Appellant’s fourth issue.
                                     IV. This Court’s Ruling
        We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                         W. STACY TROTTER
                                                         JUSTICE

March 28, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

        4
          “The child shall attend each permanency hearing unless the [trial] court specifically excuses the
child’s attendance.” FAM. § 263.302.

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