Court Opinion

ID: 9396769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:03:44.909754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.581565
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/23/23 P. v. Clarke CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    2d Crim. No. B319821
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 21F-08938)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (San Luis Obispo County)

 v.

 KELLEN JOHN CLARKE,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Kellen John Clarke appeals the judgment entered after a
jury convicted him of making criminal threats (Pen. Code,1 § 422,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to two years in state
prison. Appellant raises claims of insufficient evidence and
prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.2

       Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the
         1

Penal Code.

       Appellant also filed an in pro. per. petition for writ of
         2

habeas corpus claiming that the trial court erred in denying his
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On the night of December 16, 2021, appellant went to a bar
in San Luis Obispo. Bar employee Daniel Wandzel recognized
appellant from a recent prior occasion when he had been asked to
leave the bar due to “aggressive and . . . inappropriate behavior.”
After Wandzel sold appellant a beer, bar employee Chris Woloch
saw appellant “very rapid[ly] . . . walking around the bar.”
       Appellant was playing pool when another bar patron told
Wandzel and Woloch that appellant was acting aggressively and
had called the patron’s partner “a slut or a skank or something.”
Woloch approached appellant and told him to leave. As appellant
was walking out of the bar, Wandzel could tell he was upset and
saw him “throw[] a couple of looks back over his shoulder that
definitely caused some concern.” Wandzel told Woloch he was
going to “go stand out on the patio and keep an eye on that
entrance for a couple of minutes” because he “had an uneasy
feeling about” appellant and wanted “to make sure that he didn’t
try to come back in.”
       About three minutes later, appellant returned and told
Wandzel he wanted to go inside to retrieve his phone. Wandzel
responded that appellant was not welcome inside the bar and
offered to look for his phone. Appellant became aggressive, tried
to enter the bar, and said he was going to call the police.
Wandzel asked appellant how he was going to call the police
without his phone. While keeping one hand in his pocket,

motion to dismiss under section 1118.1 and that the verdict was
rendered in violation of his constitutional rights. We summarily
deny that petition in a separate order filed the same day as this
opinion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(B).)

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appellant became “more aggressive” and told Wandzel “I have
something for you.”
       Wandzel told appellant to leave. Appellant walked back to
the parking lot and began rummaging through his car. Wandzel
subsequently saw appellant walking back toward the bar with a
gasoline can in his hand. While making direct eye contact,
appellant asked Wandzel “[h]ave you ever been set on fire before”
then added, “I’m going to get some gas and I’m going to burn you
and this bar down.” Wandzel was scared and took the threat
seriously.
       After appellant began walking toward a nearby gas station,
Wandzel told Woloch what had happened and called 911.
Wandzel watched appellant fill up the gas can with gasoline and
begin walking back toward the bar. Woloch noticed that Wandzel
was afraid. Sheriff’s deputies arrived as appellant was walking
back toward the bar. One of the deputies opened that gas can
and observed that it contained gasoline. Wandzel testified that
he “was in fear of what [appellant] was capable of doing from the
second he walked by with the gas can and . . . felt at ease when
the officers arrived.”
                           DISCUSSION
                   Sufficiency of the Evidence
       Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction. We disagree.
       In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, “we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33

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Cal.4th 1158, 1212.) “We presume every fact in support of the
judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from
the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify
the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v.
Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) “‘A reversal for insufficient
evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support’” the jury’s verdict.’” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th
126, 142.)
        “The elements of the crime of making criminal threats are
‘“(1) that the defendant ‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime
which will result in death or great bodily injury to another
person,’ (2) that the defendant made the threat ‘with the specific
intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if
there is no intent of actually carrying it out,’ (3) that the threat—
which may be ‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of an
electronic communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the
circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the
person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the
threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the
circumstances.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re A.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 647, 653-654.)
        Appellant challenges only the jury’s finding on the fourth
prong of the statute, i.e., that his threat to set Wandzel on fire

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actually caused Wandzel to be in sustained fear for his safety.
“Sustained fear” is defined as “a period of time that is more than
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.” (CALCRIM No. 1300, italics
omitted; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 634.) The
trier of fact may consider all relevant circumstances, including
the defendant’s actions after making the threat, in determining
whether the victim was placed in sustained fear as provided in
section 422. (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013.)
       Wandzel testified that he was placed in fear by appellant’s
threat to “burn [him] and [the] bar down” and that his fear lasted
from the time appellant first walked by him with the gas can
until the deputies arrived several minutes later. Woloch also
testified that Wandzel appeared to be afraid as a result of
appellant’s threat. This evidence is plainly sufficient to support
the finding that Wandzel’s fear was more than momentary,
fleeting, or transitory, such that appellant’s threat caused him to
be in sustained fear for his safety.
       Appellant’s assertions to the contrary essentially disregard
the controlling standard of review, which compels us to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. (People v.
Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) Appellant also refers us to
other cases in which the evidence has been found sufficient to
support a finding of sustained fear under section 422. (See, e.g.,
People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333; People v. Ortiz
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 410.) But none of those cases purport to
establish a minimum threshold for the amount of time that must
pass or the factual circumstances that must exist for a jury to
find that a victim was placed in sustained fear as contemplated
in section 422. In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1138,
in which the appellant had merely threatened to “get” a teacher,

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is also plainly inapposite. Here, appellant threatened to set
Wandzel on fire and subsequently took steps that led Wandzel to
reasonably believe that he was actually going to do so.
Appellant’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction thus fails.
                     Prosecutorial Misconduct
       For the first time on appeal, appellant also contends that
the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Wandzel whether
he was “scared” as result of appellant’s threat, and by later
asking him to “put a time frame on when [he] truly started
feeling afraid to when maybe that fear started to subside.” He
claims that both inquiries were improper leading questions as
provided in Evidence Code section 767.
       Appellant’s trial attorney did not object to either of the
questions that are now challenged on appeal, nor did he request a
curative admonition. Appellant’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct is thus forfeited. (People v. Cowan (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1152, 1161.) We are not persuaded by appellant’s
assertions that an objection would have been futile and that any
harm would not have been cured by an admonition.
       In any event, the claim fails. “‘A prosecutor’s conduct
violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution
when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the
conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that
does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is
prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the
use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade
either the trial court or the jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 401.)

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       “As a general matter, a ‘leading question may not be asked
of a witness on direct or redirect examination.’ [Citation.] ‘“‘A
“leading question” is a question that suggests to the witness the
answer that the examining party desires.’ [Citation.] Questions
calling for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer are not leading unless they are
unduly suggestive under the circumstances.”’ [Citation.]
However, ‘“leading questions are not always impermissible on
direct examination.”’ [Citation.] The Evidence Code permits
their use ‘under special circumstances where the interests of
justice otherwise require.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 401.) For example, leading questions are
permissible when they “‘serve[] “to stimulate or revive [the
witness’s] recollection.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at. pp. 401-402.)
Moreover, “[t]rial courts have broad discretion to decide when
such special circumstances are present. [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 402.)
       Appellant fails to demonstrate that either of the
prosecutor’s challenged questions were leading. Although the
question asking whether Wandzel was “scared” called for a “yes
or no” answer, it did not unduly suggest a “yes” rather than a
“no.” In addition, the question was preceded by Wandzel’s
testimony that he believed he needed to physically defend himself
after appellant made the threat against him. And the question
asking Wandzel to “put a time frame on” the duration of his fear
was not leading at all. In any event, other evidence—which
includes Woloch’s testimony that Wandzel appeared to suffer
prolonged fear as result of appellant’s threat—is independently
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Wandzel suffered
sustained fear as a result of the threat. Appellant’s claim of

                                 7
prosecutorial misconduct thus fails for lack of prejudice. (See
People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 36.)
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      YEGAN, J.

                                 8
                   Craig Van Rooyen Judge
           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
               ______________________________

      Patricia S. Snyder, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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