Court Opinion

ID: 9731203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:38:04.822229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:15.516299
License: Public Domain

KAUS, P. J.
I concur in the result. My reasoning is, however, quite different from that of the majority.
Briefly it is my view that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court had no statutory authority to dismiss. I therefore do not reach the merits of the evidentiary ruling discussed in the court’s opinion.
After the court- made its ruling—“the motion to exclude is hereby granted”—it asked; “Can the People proceed at this time?” The prosecutor replied: “No, Your Honor.” The following dialogue then ensued.
“The Court: I might indicate for the record that I personally believe— however I have ruled in this case and I did rule in favor of the defendant—but I personally believe that a writ would be in order in this case.
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I have familiarity with the transcript. The transcript reflects that the primary evidence in this case is the identification by the witness that testified. There may be other evidence and before I make a representation that there is not, I would like to have an opportunity to check that fact.
“The Court : All you need to do is indicate to the Court whether you can or cannot proceed at this time based upon what ruling of the Court has been so far, whether you have sufficient evidence to proceed.
“[Prosecutor]: At this particular point in time, Your Honor, the People cannot proceed.
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, then there will be a motion to dismiss on behalf of the defendant.
*186“The Court: The motion of the defendant is granted.”
The legal effect of these proceedings apparently gave at least the clerk some concern. The minute order reads as follows: “Motion to Suppress certain evidence-is called for hearing. Gordon V. Stevenson, James G. Dawson, and George Timothy Dewberry, are sworn and testify for defendant. The motion is argued and granted. The People declare their inability to proceed at this time. On motion of defendant, case is dismissed. Defendant is released on this case only. ...”
Further down the page we see this notation: “(Dismissal is pursuant to Sec. 1385 PC.)” The clerk apparently appreciated that Penal Code section 1385 was the only conceivably statutory basis for the dismissal.
It is, however, undeniable that:
1) . The defense did not move the court to dismiss under section 1385 of the Penal Code;
2) . The court did not purport to dismiss under section 1385 of the Penal Code;
3) . If it had so dismissed the case, it would have had no statutory authority to do so because section 1385 permits dismissals “in furtherance of justice” only on the court’s own motion or on application of the prosecution;1 and
4) . The court did not comply with the statutory mandate that “[t]he reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.”
What does appear is that the prosecutor first announced that he was unable to proceed, that the court then expressed its belief “that a writ would be in order in this case,” that the prosecutor asked for time to determine whether he had any proof other than the stricken “primary evidence,” that the court then encouraged the prosecutor to state he could not proceed and, finally, that defense counsel then successfully moved to dismiss.2
*187- On these uncontrovertible facts it seems clear to me that the court acted in excess of its powers in dismissing the case.
In People v. Ritchie, 17 Cal.App.3d 1098 [95 Cal.Rptr. 462], the trial court dismissed a prosecution on motion of the defendant under these circumstances: The defense was in the process of presenting a motion to suppress under section 1538.5 of the Penal Code when it appeared that the physical evidence in question had been misplaced. The defense then moved to dismiss “in light of the fact that the evidence is not in court.” The motion was granted for the purpose of obtaining an appellate ruling on the necessity of the evidence being in court. The People appealed under subsections (7) and (8) of subdivision (a) of section 1238 of the Penal Code. The Court of Appeal first held that the appeal under subsection (7) was not well taken because such an appeal only lies from a dismissal on the court’s own motion based on an order granting a defense motion to suppress. No such order had been made. The People’s right to appeal was therefore based on subsection (8) as from an “order or judgment dismissing ... the action before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy . . . .” Subsection (8) is, of course, the statutory provision under which the People appeal in this case.
Adverting to the merits of the People’s appeal, the Ritchie court found several reasons for reversing, some of which are equally applicable to this case.
After reviewing the various statutory provisions authorizing a trial court to dismiss a criminal prosecution, the court concluded that if the dismissal was authorized at all, section 1385 was the only possible authority. Section 1385 is, of course, the only possible basis for the dismissal in the case at bar.
The Ritchie court then pointed out that section 1385 “does not confer upon the defendant the privilege of moving to dismiss in the furtherance of justice.” (Ibid., p. 1104.) That was the first reason for the reversal in Ritchie. It should be the first and only reason for the reversal in this case.
Ritchie also held, citing a wealth of authority, that the statutory mandate that the reasons for the dismissal be set forth in the minutes is not merely directory, and that “neither trial nor appellate courts have authority to disregard this requirement.” (Ibid.., pp. 1104-1105.)
The Ritchie court then pointed out that while the reporter’s transcript showed the trial court’s motivation, the minutes did not even go that far. That is equally true here. The minutes recite simply that the People declared their inability to proceed “at this time.” The reporter’s transcript *188indicates, however, that the trial court’s motivation for dismissing was precisely the same as that of the trial court in Ritchie-, it wanted an appellate ruling on a point of law. Finally, it appears to be the law that even if the reporter’s transcript discloses a reason for the ruling which might pass appellate muster, the dismissal is unauthorized unless those reasons are carried over into the minutes. (People v. Beasley, 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [85 Cal.Rptr. 501].)3
These procedural defects alone demand a reversal. Yet even if the court had dismissed with every requirement of section 1385 punctiliously observed, I would hold as a matter of law that the dismissal was not “in furtherance of justice.”
What happened here is simply this: Before jeopardy attached the defense made a nonstatutory motion to suppress certain evidence. Analytically, the motion to suppress Stevenson’s courtroom identification was nothing but an objection to certain prosecution evidence which everyone assumed would be presented. Normally such pre-jeopardy timing is merely a matter of convenience to all concerned. (People v. Smith, 273 Cal.App.2d 547, 552 [78 Cal.Rptr. 405]; cf. People v. Martin, 2 Cal.3d 822, 832, fn. 11 [87 Cal.Rptr. 709, 471 P.2d 29].) I recognize that a defendant may have sound tactical reasons for moving to suppress certain evidence before jeopardy attaches. Certain it is that the ruling is not binding and that the trial court is free to change its mind after the case proceeds to trial. (Saidi-Tabatabai v. Superior Court, 253 Cal.App.2d 257, 266 [61 Cal.Rptr. 510].) Nothing in any statute of which I am aware suggests that the Legislature intended section 1385 to become a means for testing the correctness of a ruling adverse to the People simply because the prosecutor announces that because of the ruling he cannot proceed. While I have no doubt of the prosecutor’s sincerity and judgment in the case at bar, I do note that he wanted time to evaluate his position in light of the adverse ruling and that his definitive declaration that he could not proceed was encouraged by the court.
It is, however, not difficult to imagine situations where a prosecutor simply misjudges the strength of his case or where his duty to be frank with the court is overwhelmed by his desire to teach it a lesson “upstairs.”
Thus, even in the case at bar, I am not at all sure that the prosecution *189would have been unable to prove a prima facie case without Stevenson making a courtroom identification of defendant. He could still have described the person he saw in his home, and testified to the license number of the car in which he left. Defendant, it appears, was seen or arrested while driving that car a little later. Or what if unbeknownst to the court or defense counsel, the intruder was observed by other witnesses while entering or leaving the Stevenson residence?
These theoretical possibilities should, I submit, give us pause for concern before holding, expressly or by implication, that section 1385 authorizes dismissals “in furtherance of justice” simply because the prosecutor announces after an adverse pre-jeopardy ruling that he no longer has a case.
The net effect of a holding that 1385 dismissals are proper when, after an adverse evidentiary ruling which happens to have been made before the attachment of jeopardy, the People announce that they cannot proceed, is to give the People—via an appeal under Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a)(8)—a right to have such rulings reviewed on appeal. In view of the common law tradition against such review4 and the very limited right to such review extended by section 1252 of the Penal Code,5 I would require very clear proof that the Legislature ever intended the People to have the benefit of such review. I find the evidence to be mostly the other way.
As far as superior courts are concerned, pre-jeopardy dismissals did not become appealable until 1968. (Stats. 1968, ch. 532, p. 1185, § 1.)6 If, at that time, the Legislature had felt that 1385 dismissals were proper just because an adverse evidentiary ruling had undermined the People’s case— and that, therefore, the People’s new right to appeal gave them a right to have such rulings reviewed—one wonders why, a year earlier (Stats. 1967, ch. 1537, p. 3652) the Legislature had gone to so much trouble to declare that after an adverse ruling under section 1538.5 of the Penal Code the trial court could dismiss the- action—but only on its own motion— under section 1385 (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (1)), and to extend to the *190People a right to appeal from such dismissal.7 In 1967 the Legislature apparently appreciated that 1385 dismissals were not designed to salvage a prosecution which had become embarrassed for lack of proof. (Cf. People v. Disperati, 11 Cal.App. 469, 476 [105 P. 617].) It therefore carefully restricted both the People’s right to appeal from dismissals under section 1538.5, subdivision (1) and the very power to dismiss under that subdivision to dismissals on the court’s own motion, eliminating dismissals “upon the application of the prosecuting attorney,” otherwise proper under section 1385. If the trial court, nevertheless, dismisses on application of the People, they cannot appeal. That is the clear holding of People v. Caserta, 14 Cal.App.3d 484, 487 [92 Cal.Rptr. 382].
It thus appears that the Legislature is acutely aware of the extraordinary nature of appellate review of rulings adverse to the People. If, in 1968, it had thought that 1385 dismissals were appropriate simply because the prosecutor asserted that a pre-jeopardy evidentiary ruling had gutted the People’s proof, it would have been less casual about instituting appellate review of such rulings than just to say that such dismissals were appeal-able.8
Be that as it may—the issue is obviously debatable—the question of legislative intent with respect to the proper substantive uses of section 1385 should be left for decision in a case in which the trial court has at least attempted to comply with the procedural requirements of the statute.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 26, 1974, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 5, 1974.

Penal Code section 1385 reads as follows: “The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading.”

I certainly do not mean to criticize the trial court. It was obviously motivated solely by a desire to have a difficult evidentiary ruling which possibly undermined the prosecutor’s case reviewed by a higher court.

“The statement of reasons is not merely directory, and neither trial nor appellate courts have authority to disregard the requirement. It is not enough that on review the reporter’s transcript may show the trial court’s motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason ‘so that all may know why this great power was exercised.’ [Citations.]’’ (People v. Beasley, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 637. Italics in original.)

See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204, 78 S.Ct. 221, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119].

Penal Code section 1252 reads, in relevant part as follows: “On an appeal by a defendant, the appellate court shall, in addition to the issues raised by the defendant, consider and pass upon all rulings of the trial court adverse to the State which it may be requested to pass upon by the Attorney General.”

Pre-jeopardy dismissals by inferior courts have been appealable since 1935. (Stats. 1935, ch. 769, p. 2145, § 1.) (See Pen. Code, § 1466.)

The People’s right to appeal from such dismissals was provided by what is now Penal Code section 1238, subdivisions (a)(7). The unique nature of rulings suppressing evidence on illegal search and seizure grounds was explained in In re Sterling, 63 Cal.2d 486 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5].

I realize that these considerations leave in doubt just what the Legislature intended to happen if after a successful nonstatutory pre-jeopardy objection to prosecution evidence the People no longer have a case. The motion being nonstatutory, the Legislature may be forgiven for not having provided a solution. In most cases it would probably be a waste of time to proceed to trial, although, as noted, the court has the power to change its ruling. A practical solution would be for the People to apply for a dismissal and for the court to grant it. Having moved for the dismissal the People should not be in a position to argue qn appeal that the court exceeded the bounds of a correct application of section 1385. (Cf. People v. Ritchie, 17 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1107 [95 Cal.Rptr. 462].)