Court Opinion

ID: 9760777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:14:31.301499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:17.098477
License: Public Domain

Andree Layton Roaf, Justice, dissenting. Once again we have litigants caught short in the morass of subject-matter jurisdiction between our chancery and circuit courts. And once again this has occurred after trial on the merits, without either party or the trial court detecting that there might be a problem with jurisdiction; the parties do not even raise the issue on appeal. Of course, we have repeatedly addressed this issue. We have said that it is well established that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined from the pleadings. Maroney v. City of Malvern, 320 Ark. 671, 899 S.W.2d 476 (1995). Further, subject-matter jurisdiction is given to a particular court by the Arkansas Constitution. Id. Finally, it is settled law that subject-matter jurisdiction, if lacking, cannot be induced simply because there is no objection. J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Smackover State Bank, 310 Ark. 342, 836 S.W.2d 853 (1992). However, that general rule applies only where jurisdiction could not “under any circumstances” exist or where chancery court is “wholly incompetent to grant the relief sought.” Id. In Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986), we noted that our cases demonstrate that we have come to the position that unless the chancery court has no tenable nexus whatever to the claim in question we will consider the matter of whether the claim should have been heard there to be one of propriety rather than one of subject matter jurisdiction. We will not raise the issue ourselves, and we will not permit a party to raise it here unless it was raised in the trial court. Id. Thus, unless the chancery court has no tenable nexus whatever to the claim in question, we will consider the matter of whether the claim should have been heard there to be one of propriety rather than subject matter jurisdiction. McCoy v. Munson, 294 Ark. 488, 744 S.W.2d 708 (1988). In the instant case, the appellees sought an injunction to prevent the appellants from docking their accrued vacation and compensatory time for 56 hours that appellees allegedly “did not work.” An injunction is a command by a court to a person to do or refrain from doing a particular act; it is mandatory when it commands a person to do a specific act, and prohibitory when it commands him/her to refrain from doing a specific act. Butler v. State, 311 Ark. 334, 842 S.W.2d 434 (1992). Further, an injunction is an equitable remedy of which a chancery court has jurisdiction. Manitowoc Remfg., Inc. v. Vocque, 307 Ark. 271, 819 S.W.2d 275 (1991). In addition, the appellees asserted they had no adequate remedy at law. The appellees also asserted that appellant Villines should be estopped from denying the appellees’ compensation because of his delegation of authority to Judge Humphrey to supervise and direct appellees in the performance of their duties. Estoppel in pais is the doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his acts or conduct or by failure to act or speak under circumstances where he should do so, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. Daves v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 302 Ark. 242, 788 S.W.2d 733 (1990). Our case law is quite clear that estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel may be pled in both courts of equity and courts of law. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 302 Ark. 310, 790 S.W.2d 152 (1990). Where subject-matter jurisdiction is concurrent, the issue is one of propriety, not one of subject-matter jurisdiction, and unless the propriety of filing the action is raised by the parties, we will not consider it. See Liles, supra. The majority characterizes appellees’ suit as an action for mandamus. A party seeking a writ of mandamus must show a specific legal right and the absence of any other adequate remedy. State v. Roberts, 321 Ark. 31, 900 S.W.2d 175 (1995). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a public officer is called upon to do a plain and specific duty, which is required by law, and which requires no exercise of discretion or official judgment. Sanders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 898 S.W.2d 43 (1995). The fact that an injunction may be, in effect, equivalent to a writ of mandamus should not be relied upon to defeat subject-matter jurisdiction in this instance. We did not do so in Venhaus v. Adams, 295 Ark. 606, 752 S.W.2d 20 (1988), a case which involved an appeal from a judgment of the Pulaski County Chancery Court granting judgment for overtime pay to employees of the county sheriff’s office. Appellants were the county judge and Pulaski County. This case was decided on the merits and reversed and dismissed, without any discussion of the jurisdiction of the chancellor to hear this matter. Nor did we raise the issue in Venhaus v. Bd. of Education of Pulaski Co., 280 Ark. 441, 659 S.W.2d 179 (1983), in which the appellee sought and obtained an injunction against the county for office rent charged against school tax monies collected. The chancellor’s decision to issue the injunction and order the monies refunded was upheld by this court. Finally, although it states that as a general rule, equity does not undertake the revision or supervision of governmental action lawfully exercised through the legislative or executive or administration departments, 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 176 (1969) also provides that injunction may lie under special circumstances, and when necessary to the protection of property or other rights of individuals or the public against irreparable injury. For the foregoing reasons, I do not agree that the chancellor in this case was “wholly incompetent” to grant the relief sought and would reach the merits of this case. I respectfully dissent. Brown, J., joins in this dissent.