Court Opinion

ID: 9772090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:07:04.945806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.025139
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
W. C. DAVIS, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order revoking appellant's probation. On September 20, *1981977, the appellant was convicted for the offense of burglary and he received a ten year probated sentence. Appellant’s probation was revoked on September 19, 1978, and on the 28th of September, 1978, the appellant was sentenced.
The case is one where the trial court, at the hearing on State’s Motion to Revoke, took judicial notice of the proceedings which occurred at appellant’s trial for burglary four days earlier. At the hearing, the trial court overruled the appellant’s objection to the taking of judicial notice, and stated,
“Let the record show that this Court heretofore on September 11th and September 12th, 1978, presided over Case No. 18686 styled The State of Texas versus Teddy Joe McDonald wherein it was alleged that Mr. McDonald committed the offense of burglary of a habitation alleged to have been committed on the 8th day of May of 1978 and that a jury was impaneled; the evidence was heard by the jury and the Court.
That the Defendant was very ably represented by Mr. David Bass, a practicing attorney who is now present with the Defendant in this hearing.
And that the jury could not arrive at a verdict and after being out some three to four hours, reported that they were hopelessly deadlocked and could not reach a verdict by deliberating any longer, at this time this Court declared a mistrial; and that the case now still pending.
Let the record further show that I was present at all times and heard all of the evidence that is now being introduced and am aware and acquainted with the testimony and have before me now my notes taken as well as the docket sheet, reflecting all of the happenings.
And with that, an offer of all the entire testimony will be received by this Court over the objection of the Defendant; and he has his exception.”
The transcription of the trial proceedings appear in the record on appeal. Judicial notice was properly taken under the authority of Broussard v. State, 598 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); O’Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
On original submission, the three judge panel issued three disparate opinions. In the 1-1-1 “decision”, Judge Clinton held that the order revoking probation was not supported by competent evidence because the trial court did not submit for this Court’s benefit, its findings concerning the weight and effect that it had given to the testimony of the “principal witness” in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. The panel opinion stated,
“It will not do, as does the dissent, merely to say ‘it was for the trial judge independently to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.’ As a reviewing Court addressing the central issue in this revocation matter-whether the trial court abused its discretion in making and entering the order that it did-we must know what weight, if any, was given to the trial testimony of Marshall.
Accordingly, on the thin issue that is critical to our review in this unique setting, we hold that a trial court which takes judicial notice of all testimony and other evidence admitted before a jury in a former trial of the primary offense that is mistried, because the jury deadlocked ostensibly over credibility of the principal witness presented by the State, is required by the Due Process and Due Course clauses to make specific findings concerning its acceptance or rejection of any testimony given by and credibility of the principal witness, and include them in its order revoking probation.” (Footnote omitted)
At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court stated its findings and entered the same in the written order revoking appellant’s probation.1 *199These findings by the trial court are sufficient. The appellant did not request further findings or clarification at the hearing, nor does he complain that he was denied these findings on appeal. See Rodriquez v. State, 552 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Valdez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Cr. App.1973); Sappington v. State, 508 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Regarding the concern expressed in panel opinion as to the jury being deadlocked “ostensibly over credibility of the principal witness,” we note that the record reflects merely that the jury was deadlocked. Whatever the reason, the fact that the jury could not reach a verdict in the prior trial has no bearing on the proceeding which is now before this Court. In a criminal trial, the jury is required to find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict; in a revocation of probation proceeding, the State must prove a violation by the probationer by a preponderance of the evidence. See Kelly v. State, 483 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The appellant’s probation was revoked after it was determined by the trial court that the appellant had committed an offense, not that he had been convicted for an offense. See Bradley v. State, supra, at 730. See also Beck v. State, 492 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Thus, the fact that the jury was unable to reach a verdict at appellant’s trial for the offense which was subsequently used to revoke his probation, is inconsequential to this appeal. Appellate review of revocation of probation proceedings is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Fronatt v. State, 543 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). In such a proceeding, the trial court is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Fronatt v. State, supra; Gonzales v. State, 508 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Beck v. State, supra. The failure of the trial court to include unsolicited findings as to who or what it believed or disbelieved and why does not render the evidence insufficient, nor does it call for a reversal of the court’s order. The State’s Motion for Rehearing is granted.
In ground of error one, appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. The State alleged in its Motion to Revoke that appellant violated the conditions of his probation by committing the offense of burglary. The trial court took judicial notice of Troy Marshall’s testimony. Marshall testified that on May 8,1978, he and appellant went to a pawn shop where appellant pawned a watch. Marshall stated that he returned to the pawn shop with appellant on the 11th of May. The witness stated that appellant went to the pawn ship to pawn more merchandise and to pick up the watch that appellant pawned earlier. Marshall testified that the appellant told him he needed to pick up the watch because it was taken from a burglary. Marshall’s statement to the police, which was introduced into evidence, recites:
“I wish to state that Monday, 5-8-78, Delmore Kennum told me that last Saturday night someone called him at the Auction and asked for Paul Mclaughlin (sic). Delmore told the caller that Paul was out of town, and Delmor didn’t know who the caller was. Delmor told me that Paul’s house had also been broke in to and said I guess I really fixed him up, didn’t I? Later that same day I was at Daniel *200Lunde’s house on 32nd St. It was about 7:00 pm when Daniel showed me a Colt 38 Cal. pistol. It was black with black plastic handles with Colt written on them. The barrel was about five inches long. Teddy Joe McDonald was present in the room at this time he stated that he had called the Auction and found out that Paul McLaughlin was out of town and that he and Daniel Lunde had went and broke into Paul’s house. Earlier on 5-8-78 at about 4:00 pm I went to a pawn shop on 4th st at about Uvalde with Teddy Joe and he pawned a silver pocket watch which he told me was his grandfather’s. On Thursday, 5-11-78 Teddy Joe, Barbara Grantham and I went back to the same pawn shop where Teddy Joe sold a TV, a TV Game, a clock radio and a snake statue to a heavy set guy with a moushtache. Teddy Joe did not get a receipt for these items. At this time he also tried to pickup the watch he had pawned Monday, but he didn’t have the pawn ticket or any identification so the man wouldn’t give it to him. When we left Teddy Joe said he needed to pickup the watch because it came from the burglary. At this time he also said he had taken the rest of the jewelry from the burglary and threw it on top of his apartment house but it came down, so he threw it in the alley behind his building. He had said he had gotten a couple of rings and three or four other watches, and I guess this is what he threw away. The day after Daniel Lunde showed me the pistol he said he had sold it for dope. I can read and write the English language and have completed the eleventh grade in school.”
On cross-examination, it was shown that the witness was on felony probation for burglary.
Next, Scotty Flowers, owner of the pawnshop, testified that the appellant brought in a pocket watch, which was shown to have been stolen in the burglary. Flowers stated that the appellant used the name “James Bill Petty” when he pawned the watch for $15. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain the order revoking probation.
In ground of error two, the appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking appellant’s probation because it was shown that appellant was living up to six conditions of his probation and was making a valuable contribution to society. Evidence which supports a finding that the appellant violated one condition of his probation is sufficient to sustain the order revoking probation. The ground of error is overruled.
Finally, appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of appellant’s trial is overruled. See Broussard v. State, supra; Cleland v. State, 572 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Bradley v. State, supra; O’Hern v. State, supra; Barrientez v. State, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.
DALLY, J., concurs in the result.
ONION, P. J., and CLINTON, J., dissent.

. The order recites:
“And it appearing to the Court, after a hearing was had and the testimony heard, that Defendant, TEDDY JOE MCDONALD, had violated the conditions of said probation, to wit:
*199(a) On or about the 8th day of May, A.D. 1978, in Lubbock County and State of Texas, and after having been heretofore placed on probation, Probationer did then and there without the effective consent of Paul McLaughlin, the owner thereof, enter a building not then and there open to the public, and that said building was then and there a habitation occupied by the said Paul McLaughlin, with intent to commit theft, to-wit: with intent then and there to appropriate property unlawfully from Paul McLaughlin, without the effective consent of Paul McLaughlin, the owner of said property, and with intent to deprive the said owner of said property.
And that such violations of the terms of said probation occurred within the probationary term as heretofore set out in this cause;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the probation heretofore ordered, set out and granted to the Defendant, TEDDY JOE MCDONALD, is in all things revoked ...”