Court Opinion

ID: 9605167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:31:05.392665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:26.356005
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Judge,
dissenting.
This suit was brought by plaintiff to recover certain medical expenses under the provisions of a policy of insurance issued by defendants (now merged to form one insurance company). Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Richard P. Michael, an English medical doctor employed as a professor of medicine at Emory University School of Medicine. The dispute relates to the period of time beginning on June 23, 1976, when plaintiff initially received treatment until February 9, 1977, when Dr. Michael received a regular medical license. During a portion of the disputed period Dr. Michael held an institutional license which authorized him to practice medicine under proper medical supervision, in the medical college employing him, and at other times during the disputed period Dr. Michael held no current license to practice medicine. During the disputed period Dr. Michael was a resident of DeKalb County but at no time prior to February 9,1977, was any certificate or license to practice medicine recorded with the Clerk of the Superior Court of DeKalb County.
After paying a sum based on an initial claim of plaintiff, the insurance company identified the disputed claim as suspect due to questions as to the license status of the physician, Dr. Michael. After an investigation no *491further sums were paid to plaintiff.
Plaintiff brought this action for the balance of the disputed sum, and the insurance company counterclaimed seeking reimbursement of the initial sum paid to plaintiff. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant insurance company. However, the court denied plaintiffs prayers for punitive damages and attorney fees. The insurance company appeals in Case No. 56295, contending that Dr. Michael was not legally entitled to practice medicine and perform surgery during the disputed period, and that the insurance benefits are not to be provided under the terms of the insurance policy when the services in question are not rendered by a medical doctor legally entitled to practice medicine and perform surgery. Plaintiff cross appeals in Case No. 56456.
1. The insurance policy provided for payment of benefits for services rendered by a physician. Physician was defined under the terms of the policy as "[a]ny Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.) licensed by the Composite Board of the State of Georgia or a similar board of any other state, legally entitled to practice medicine and perform surgery...” The insurance company contends that Dr. Michael was not legally entitled to practice medicine in Georgia during that portion of the disputed period during which he held a current institutional license because he had failed to cause his institutional license to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which he resided. Code Ann. § 84-908 (Ga. L. 1931, pp. 7, 37) provides that "[b]efore any person who obtains a certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners may lawfully practice medicine and surgery, he shall cause the said certificate to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which he resides . . . Each applicant receiving a certificate from the Board shall cause the same to be registered within 30 days.”
Plaintiff contends that this Code section is inapplicable to Dr. Michael’s institutional license. In Murray v. Williams, 121 Ga. 63, 64 (48 SE 686), the Supreme Court states that the purpose of registration of *492physicians is to protect the public against incompetent and unqualified practitioners of medicine and "[o]ne who practices medicine without having registered as the code requires can not recover for his services.” Plaintiff contends that the protection of registration is not necessary in regard to the institutional license because of the restrictions placed on the activities of the physician who holds the license and because of the provisions related to issuance of institutional licenses provided by Code Ann. § 84-927 (Ga.L. 1970, pp. 301, 312, since amended, Ga. L. 1977, pp. 334, 339; 1978, p. 223).
I disagree with plaintiff. The provisions governing the activities of the holder of an institutional license to practice medicine, as opposed to a regular license to practice medicine, are additional protections afforded the public in regard to physicians who have not yet proven that they meet the basic minimum requirements for examination by the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners or for the issuance of a permanent license to practice medicine and are not substitutes for the protection afforded by Code Ann. § 84-908, supra.
Dr. Michael having failed to register his institutional license to practice medicine with the clerk of the superior court of the county of his residence and at other times during the disputed period being entirely without a current license of any type to practice medicine, I would hold that Dr. Michael was at no time during the disputed period legally entitled to practice medicine. See also Code § 84-906 (as amended Ga. L. 1970, pp. 301, 305; 1972, p. 673); Code§ 84-9914; Code§ 84-907 (amended Ga. L. 1935, p. 412; 1966, p. 232; 1967, p. 826; 1970, pp. 301, 306; 1972, p. 847; 1976, p. 403, since amended, Ga. L. 1977, pp. 334, 335; 1978, pp. 1381, 1382).
2. Additionally, attention must be directed to that portion of the disputed period during which, due to the expiration of the term of the institutional license, Dr. Michael held no current license of any type to practice medicine. I do not believe that an individual who holds no license of any type to practice medicine can be viewed as "licensed by the Composite Board of the State of Georgia,” or "legally entitled to practice medicine and perform surgery,” so as to come within the definition of physician *493as used in the insurance policy in question.
The majority applies a doctrine of license by estoppel to dismiss the absence of a license to practice medicine during a portion of the disputed period. The majority analogizes the omission of a formal request for renewal of Dr. Michael’s institutional license to the doctrine of de facto as opposed to de jure corporations, an entity technically deficient in licensing recording or incorporation if otherwise operating legally and holding themselves out as properly licensed or incorporated are deemed able to transact business and to be held accountable. Under this reasoning in Hall v. Kimsey, 48 Ga. App. 605 (3) (173 SE 437), cited by the majority, the "Young L. G. Harris College” continued to operate after its charter had expired and to hold itself out to the public as a corporation. In a suit against it as "Young L. G. Harris College,” to recover on open account for property and service furnished to it as that entity, it was not allowed to escape liability upon the ground that its charter had expired and there was no such corporation. The majority also cites Brown v. Atlanta R. &c. Co., 113 Ga. 462, 468 (1) (39 SE 71), which recognizes that a party may have had no dealings with the persons composing an alleged corporation which would estop him from bringing in question their right to exercise corporate powers.
Here the insurance company has had no dealings whatsoever with Dr. Michael, with Emory University, or with the Composite Board of the State of Georgia. Nor do I see any manner in which plaintiff Grenwald’s dealings may be imputed to the insurance company so as to estop it from questioning the licensing status of Dr. Michael.
Brown v. Atlanta R. &c. Co., supra, also points out the requirement that in order for the license by estoppel principle to be applicable so that the corporation de facto may exist, a colorable compliance with the requirements of the law must be made. Here there was none and this should require an entirely different result than that reached by the majority.
3. I also disagree with the decision of the majority to absolve Dr. Michael of responsibility in relation to his own licensing status by placing the burden entirely upon Emory. Indeed, in the case of an institutional license the *494institution in question, in this case Emory, does have responsibilities in relation to obtaining the license. This should not, however, absolve Dr. Michael of the responsibility of remaining informed and knowledgeable as to his licensing status, including a responsibility to refrain from practicing medicine whenever his license is allowed to expire.
It is true that Dr. Michael may have had limited control over the licensing process but he did have absolute control over his own activities. He should not be rewarded for disregarding the licensing statutes enacted by the General Assembly of this state for the protection of the public.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent and would reverse Case No. 56295. This would render moot the issues raised by plaintiffs cross appeal alleging error in the denial of his claim for bad faith damages and attorney fees. I would therefore affirm in Case No. 56456.