Court Opinion

ID: 9859418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:31:00.858823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:10.218205
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Chief Justice, dissenting. I agree with the majority’s statement that the decisive question in this case is whether Robert intended to abandon his homestead rights in the property. However, because I believe the majority errs in its conclusion regarding Robert’s intent, I must respectfully dissent. In this case, the trial court made the following findings: The issue is whether Robert Johnson had a homestead interest in the property.... Robert Johnson had long possessed the property as a homestead. He was forced to move out by the dynamics of the divorce but considered the move temporary in nature. He signed an apartment lease for one year — the shortest term available. However, he repaired and maintained the property which was difficult to show for private sale. Further, Robert and Tiffany were forced to sell the property as a result of the financial difficulties of their marriage andTiffany’s business. They may have agreed on the sale between themselves, but they were clearly forced to sell by their financial circumstances. The word “forced” is used in a broad sense. The Johnsons were not required to experience a more drastic method of sale or pressure to sell before the word became applicable. The evidence was insufficient to show an abandonment or waiver of the homestead until its actual sale. Although this court has not previously addressed the issue of whether a court-ordered partition resulting from a property settlement agreement in a divorce is a forced sale or a voluntary sale, in Obenshain v. Obenshain, 252 Ark. 701, 702-03, 480 S.W.2d 567, 568 (1972), we stated: When the owner of a homestead voluntarily sells the property, the proceeds of sale are not exempt. Drennen v. Wheatley, 210 Ark. 222, 195 S.W.2d 40 (1946). On the other hand, when the property is subjected to a forced sale, the debtor’s share of the proceeds is exempt if he intends to use the money to acquire another homestead. Sims v. McFadden, 217 Ark. 810, 233 S.W.2d 375 (1950). Here the former rule applies, for the parties voluntarily agreed to list the property with a broker for sale at a reasonable price. We are not called upon to decide whether a sale ordered by the chancellor under Act 340 of 1947,1 Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-1215 (Repl. 1962), might in some situations be considered to be a forced sale. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the majority concludes, for the first time, that a court-ordered partition resulting from a property settlement agreement is a voluntary sale, rather than a forced sale. I disagree. A forced sale is “[a] hurried sale by a debtor because of financial hardship.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1365 (8th ed. 2004). Here, as the trial court recognized, due to financial hardship, the Johnsons were forced to sell their home as part of a court-ordered partition of their property. The trial court’s finding that Robert did not intend to abandon his homestead is not against the preponderance of the evidence. As such, the trial court should be affirmed. Corbin and Gunter, JJ., join.   Act 340 of 1947 provides in relevant part: Courts of Equity, designated Chancery Courts within the State of Arkansas, shall have the power to dissolve estates by the entirety or survivorship, in real or personal property, upon the rendition of a final decree of divorcement, and in the division and partition of said property, so held by said parties, shall treat the parties as tenants in common.