Court Opinion

ID: 9766178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:36:10.663847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.201347
License: Public Domain

*730GREENHILL, Justice
(concurring).
This is a “concurring” opinion because I agree with the judgment of the majority that there must be a remand of this cause for a trial on the adverse possession points. I strongly disagree with the majority that there was a conveyance of only a right of way easement over all the land in question. In substance, therefore, this is a dissenting opinion.
The Dickerson deed (and it was labeled “Deed” on its outer cover) did not, fairly construed, convey a right of way over all the land in controversy. It conveyed a right of way (easement) over the center strip, and a conveyance of the fee upon condition subsequent to the two outer tracts.
There is, at the beginning of the instrument, a granting clause of a right of way over a particularly described area for the railroad tracks. I shall call this area tract A.
Then, in the paragraph following, another tract (called tract B for purposes of this opinion) is described. That paragraph begins:
“Also the following land [and the use of the word land is important as will be noted below] for Station Grounds described by metes and bounds as follows viz:—
Beginning at a point in the south boundary line of the right of way 100 feet wide. * * * ” [Emphasis throughout is mine.]
In a third paragraph, the instrument conveys what I shall call tract C:
“Also another tract [of land] the same survey beginning * * * in the north boundary line of the right of way. * * * 99
The metes and bounds description continues and calls for a joinder point “in the north boundary line of the right of way.”
A fair construction of the following paragraph is that the grant of the right of way, the center tract, is made unconditionally. But the grant of the land in tracts B and C is upon a condition subsequent. The condition was that there be erected a station house and side tracks. It is agreed that these were built, thereby fulfilling the conditions.
That paragraph reads:
“This conveyance is made upon the condition that the said Texas and New Orleans Railroad shall upon the construction and operation of said Railroad construct a side track or side tracks and establish a flag station at which all regular freight or passenger trains, except express trains shall stop on signal for the receipt and delivery of freight and passengers, and that a depot suitable for the accommodation of freight and passenger business shall be established and maintained upon the said lands as soon after the construction and operation of said Texas and New Orleans Railroad as the business at said station shall be deemed by said Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company to be of sufficient volume to warrant the establishment of said depot. It is agreed and understood however by the grantor herein that the foregoing does not in any manner apply to the right of way for said Texas and New Orleans Railroad as heretofore described and this conveyance as to said right of way is absolute and unconditional.”
Each of the 3 tracts is described separately. There is no over-all, outside description so as to bring them all within the same granting clause of the right of way in the first paragraph. The paragraph quoted just above emphasizes the separate character of the lands dealt with. The conditions imposed on tracts B and C (erection of the station house et cetera) “does not in any manner apply to the right of way * * * as heretofore described, and this conveyance as to said right of way is absolute and unconditional.” Thus the parties described an unconditional grant of a right of way over tract A, *731and the grant of “the following land” and of “another tract” [of land] upon conditions subsequent which have been fulfilled. The word “grant” is necessarily implied in the two paragraphs in which the grantors convey “also the following land” and “also another tract the same survey.”
If there was the granting of a mere right of way over one large tract, I would agree with the majority opinion. But if, as in the case of tracts B and C, there is a grant of land, then there is a conveyance of a fee, or fee upon condition subsequent as is the case here.
There have been a number of cases in this State concerning the title to strips of land granted for railroad purposes. Some have held that an easement only was conveyed; others that a fee simple was conveyed even though the particular purposes of the grant were stated; and still others have held that a fee simple upon condition was conveyed. This Court has applied the “intention of the parties as expressed in the writing” rule, and has said that the instrument must be considered as a whole and viewed from its four corners. One of the keys in the cases mentioned above is the granting clause. If the grant is of land, the Court has found a fee even though the instrument within itself refers to the tract as a right of way.
One of the early cases was Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W. 737 (1913). This was an action to restrain the railroad from drilling for oil on what the plaintiffs considered to be only a right of way. The conveyance to the railroad was a simple one and described only one tract. The granting clause was to “the right of way” over a described tract; and the railroad was further given the right to use the “timber, earth, stone, and mineral existing or that may be found within the right of way hereby granted.” 1 The holding was that the railroad owned only an easement, and it was enjoined from the drilling.
The grants in Stevens v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 212 S.W. 639 (Tex.Comm. App.1919), were of strips of land on condition that they would be used exclusively for railroad depot grounds and railroad business purposes. There was also a provision that upon a cessation of such use, “said land” should revert to the grantors or their successors. Within the instrument, it was stated that the conveyances were of rights of way for the railroad. Other portions of the instrument referred to “the right of way.” It was contended that the instruments conveyed only an easement for railroad purposes, or alternatively, that the grant was a fee upon a limitation (determinable fee), not on condition subsequent. The holding is that the grant was of land; and that the wording of the instrument, fairly construed, compelled a holding that the conveyance was of a fee simple upon condition subsequent.
In Brightwell v. International-Great Northern Railroad Co., 121 Tex. 338, 49 S.W.2d 437 (1932), the grant was “a strip of (200) Two Hundred feet in width of land.” A final paragraph also granted the railway the right to use “earth, material, timber and rock as may be found on my lands herein mentioned, and granted herein as right of way * * *.” The railroad was also released from damages because of works in the right of way. There is a good deal of detailed reasoning, but the holding is that the conveyance was of the fee simple; i. e., the grant was of land.
In Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Martin, 123 Tex. 383, 71 S.W.2d 867 (1934), the instrument “granted * * * unto the Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. for Depot purposes and uses, all that tract of land *732* * The instrument later repeated that “the same [land] to be permanently used by said R. R. Co. for depot purposes, on the Pacific Av. route through Dallas.” The railway did use the land for such purpose for many years, but then it abandoned the depot. The holding was that the instrument conveyed a fee simple, and that the stating of the purpose of the grant, or the contemplated use, did not change the estate granted.
The Brightwell and Martin opinions were followed in Texas Conservative Oil Co. v. Thompson, 163 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Civ.App. 1942, writ refused, opinion by the late Justice Norvell). By the instrument, the grantor did “grant, sell and convey” to the railroad “ * * * all those certain tracts, pieces or parcels of land,” describing them. The instrument then stated that, it was “conveyed to said railway company to be held, occupied and used by it as and for its use as a right of way.” In the same instrument, other land was described. As in our case, the second conveyance simply began “Also, three (3) several tracts [with description] * * * conveyed to said railway company to be held, occupied and used by it, as and for its use as depot grounds.” The holding was that all of the tracts were conveyed in fee simple.
These and several other cases were considered together in an able opinion by Justice Smedley in Texas Electric Ry. Co. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 252 S.W.2d 451 (1952). The grant was of “the following described piece or parcel of land, to-wit * * *.” (a strip 550 feet long and 80 feet wide). The conveyance was upon the condition that the railroad would “establish a stop on the right of way here-inabove conveyed,” and that such stop should be kept and maintained forever. There was a usual habendum clause followed by these words, “However, this deed is made as a right-of-way deed * * *, and in case said railway shall not be constructed over said land then this conveyance shall be of no effect.”
The instrument also provided that the railroad would permit the opening of streets “across said right of way.” The holding was that the conveyance was of the fee. The Court emphasized that the grant was of land, and the language about the right of way was descriptive of the use to which the land was to be put. The Court noted a condition as to the establishment of a railroad, but the condition had been fulfilled. The portion stating that the stop should be maintained forever was held to be a covenant only.
Part of the reasoning of the Court in deciding that a fee was conveyed and not a mere easement was that a “stop” must be established on land. The opinion stated that “It [the stop] could not be established on an intangible right, that is, an easement. The same is true of the obligation to allow streets to be opened ‘across said right of way.’ ” 252 S.W.2d at 454. Bravo calls our attention to the fact this reasoning is applicable here, and that the passenger and freight depot were required to be constructed on “said lands.”
Under the above cases, the center tract passes as a right of way under Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., the first case cited above. Under all of the other cases cited, there being a conveyance of land, tracts'B and C were conveyed in fee upon condition subsequent even though they were granted in conjunction with a right of vyay.
The reasoning of the majority opinion begins with a reference to a series of statutes dealing with the powers of condemnation of land by railroads. If the land is acquired by condemnation, the railroad gets only an easement. But these statutes have absolutely nothing to do with this case. There is not even a hint in this record that any of the land in controversy was acquired even under threat of condemnation. The grantors wanted the railroad to come to their little area, and they gave the right of way to the railroad (tract A) unconditionally, and conveyed tracts B and C upon condition that side tracks and a depot *733would be built. There are a great many cases which hold that a railroad may acquire land by gift or purchase completely apart from these irrelevant condemnation statutes. Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris, 77 Tex. 18, 13 S.W. 453 (1890); Brightwell v. International-Great Northern Ry. Co., 121 Tex. 338, 49 S.W.2d 437 (1932); Stevens v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 212 S.W. 639 (Tex.Comm.App.1919).
The second premise from which the majority starts its reasoning is that some intention may be gained by the use of the words “Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company” in some places in the Dickerson deed, and the words “Texas and New Orleans Railroad” in other places. To me, this is a complete non sequitur, — a distinction without a difference. If anything, it strengthens the construction that the parties intended two different estates; i.e., a right of way for the railroad (the railroad tracks and ties) and a fee for the depot, storage areas, and other facilities for the railroad company.
It was the contention of Rio Bravo that since (or if) it owns the fee on both sides of the easement, it owns the fee, i. e., the minerals to the center of the easement strip under Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 121 Tex. 427, 50 S.W.2d 1080 (1932). Since the majority holds that Bravo here owns no fee estate, no useful purpose would be served by an analysis of the Weed opinion. There are also several interesting questions raised, and which are discussed in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, regarding parties, default judgments, and the filing of disclaimers. Since no holdings are made on these points, no useful purpose would be served by discussing them in a concurring [dissenting] opinion.
At the very least, it should be held that the railroad acquired a fee simple upon condition, now performed, to the two tracts adjoining the center tract conveyed as a right of way.
CALVERT, C. J., and McGEE, J., join in this concurring opinion.

. There is also a holding, not relevant here, that the right to take “stone and mineral” which might be found in the right of way did not include a grant of subsurface oil and gas.