Court Opinion

ID: 9882322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 19:00:56.188769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:09.375848
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13519    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 10/05/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13519
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       TRACI BURGEN,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       PINE ENTERPRISES LLC,
       ROBERT CABRAL,
       JEAN CABRAL,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13519

                       D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00829-JPB
                           ____________________

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Appellant Traci Burgen, proceeding with counsel, appeals
       the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the
       defendants, Pine Enterprises, LLC, Robert Cabral, and Jean Cabral,
       her previous employers (collectively referred to as “Pine”).
       Additionally, Burgen argues that the district court abused its
       discretion by denying her second motion to extend discovery.
       Burgen also challenges the district court’s conclusion that she did
       not make out a prima facie case in support of her claim for
       retaliation under the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (“EPSLA”) of
       the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127,
       §§ 5102(a)(2), 5104(1), 134 Stat. 178, 195-97 (2020), because she did
       not: (i) establish a causal connection between her protected activity
       of seeking paid leave under the EPSLA and her termination; and
       (ii) did not show that the proﬀered reason for her ﬁring ⸺⸺
       allegedly poor performance ⸺⸺ was pretextual. Having read the
       parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we aﬃrm the district
       court’s orders.
                                        I.
              We review a district court’s denial of a motion to extend
       discovery for an abuse of discretion. Josendis v. Wall to Wall
       Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011).
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       22-13519               Opinion of the Court                          3

       Generally, a district court’s discovery rulings will be overturned
       only if “it is shown that they resulted in substantial harm to the
       appellant’s case.” Id. at 1307 (quotation marks and alteration
       omitted); see also Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir.
       2014).
               We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
       judgment. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 2010). “We will aﬃrm if, after construing the evidence in the
       light most favorable to the non-moving party, we ﬁnd that no
       genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled
       to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 1263-64. A fact is material
       when it might aﬀect the outcome of the case under the relevant
       law. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th
       Cir. 2004). Additionally, we may aﬃrm the district court’s
       judgment on any ground in the record. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting,
       Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
                                            II.
               Burgen asserts on appeal that the district court abused its
       discretion by denying her second request to extend the discovery
       period. Pine contends that Burgen waived this issue by failing to
       articulate clearly her argument on appeal. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 16(b), the district court must issue a scheduling order that limits
       the time to complete discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). As a
       result, a scheduling order “may be modiﬁed only for good cause
       and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Additionally,
       when a party seeks to extend an expired deadline, the court may do
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13519

       so for good cause if that party failed to act because of excusable
       neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). To establish good cause, a party
       must show that it could not meet the applicable deadlines despite
       due diligence. See Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th
       Cir. 1998). Thus, we have routinely held that a district court’s
       decision to hold litigants to the terms of its scheduling order is not
       an abuse of discretion. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1307-08.
               When an issue is raised without citation to authority, we
       consider the issue waived. Continental Tech. Services, Inc. v. Rockwell
       Int’l Corp., 927 F.2d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 1991). Further, pursuant
       to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant’s argument must
       contain “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to
       the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
       relies.” See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). Thus, arguments that are
       “briefed in the most cursory fashion . . . [are] waived.” Center v.
       Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018)
       (citing In re Globe Mfg. Corp., 567 F.3d 1291, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir.
       2009)).
               We conclude that Burgen has waived her claim that the
       district court abused its discretion by denying her second motion
       to extend discovery because she does not point to any authority
       upon which she relies, and she briefed the issue in only a cursory
       fashion. See Continental Tech. Services, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1199; Center,
       895 F.3d at 1299; see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). Moreover, even if
       we were to deem the argument properly preserved, Burgen cannot
       show that the district court abused its discretion. Burgen did not
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       22-13519               Opinion of the Court                         5

       show good cause or exercise due diligence to support the requested
       extension, as she cancelled one scheduled deposition that she later
       asserted as a basis for extending the discovery period. Sosa, 133 F.3d
       at 1418. Nor can she demonstrate that substantial harm resulted
       from the denial of her motion, as she already had two chances to
       depose the individual she identiﬁed in the former motion. Josendis,
       662 F.3d at 1306. Thus, based on the record, the district court did
       not abuse its discretion when it denied Burgen’s second motion to
       extend discovery, and we aﬃrm in this respect. See Id. at 1307
       (stating that the decision to modify a ﬁnal scheduling order is
       ultimately at the discretion of the court).
                                            III.
              Burgen contends that the district court erred by granting
       summary judgment to Pine on her retaliation claim under the
       EPSLA because Pine terminated her the day she returned to work
       following her COVID-19 leave. Under the EPSLA, an employer
       who discharges an employee for seeking to exercise her rights
       thereunder is considered to have violated § 15(a)(3) of the Fair
       Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). See 29 C.F.R. § 826.150(b)(2)(a). To
       establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA, the
       plaintiﬀ must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in a protected
       activity under the Act; (2) she subsequently suﬀered an adverse
       action by the employer; and (3) there was a causal connection
       between her activity and the adverse action. Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co.,
       200 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2000).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13519

               The plaintiﬀ has the burden of proving causation by
       demonstrating that “the adverse action would not have been taken
       but for the assertion of FLSA rights,” where the adverse action
       must occur after the assertion of FLSA rights. Id. (internal
       quotation marks omitted). Generally, close temporal proximity
       between the employee’s protected conduct and the adverse action
       is suﬃcient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of
       material fact of causal connection. Patterson v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 38
       F.4th 1336, 1352 (11th Cir. 2022). However, we have held that, in a
       retaliation case, “when an employer contemplates an adverse
       employment action before an employee engages in protected activity,
       temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
       subsequent adverse employment action does not suﬃce to show
       causation.” Drago v. Jeune, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)
       (emphasis added).
               Under the burden-shifting model set forth in McDonnell
       Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), even if a
       plaintiﬀ makes out a prima facie case, and the employer articulates
       a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, the employee
       must still demonstrate that the employer's proﬀered reason was
       pretextual by presenting evidence suﬃcient to “permit a reasonable
       factﬁnder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were
       not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Batson
       v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2018). “A reason is
       not pretext for retaliation unless it is shown both that the reason
       was false, and that retaliation was the real reason.” Gogel v. Kia
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       22-13519               Opinion of the Court                        7

       Motors Mfg. of Ga., 967 F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal
       quotation marks and alteration omitted).
               To establish pretext, Burgen must show that the proﬀered
       reason, poor performance, was not the true reason for her
       termination. See Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n., 405 F.3d 1276,
       1289 (11th Cir. 2005). A plaintiﬀ’s proof of pretext can include
       evidence of “weaknesses, implausibilities, incoherencies, or
       contradictions” in the employer’s proﬀered legitimate reasons for
       its action that a worthy factﬁnder could ﬁnd them unworthy of
       credence. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jeﬀerson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160,
       1163 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, a lack of evidence in support of
       speculation cannot establish pretext for retaliation. Hornsby-
       Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1314 (11th Cir. 2018).
               The record demonstrates that the district court did not err
       in granting summary judgment to Pine on Burgen’s claim for
       retaliation under the EPSLA. First, Burgen failed to show
       causation. While there was temporal proximity between her
       request for paid leave and her subsequent termination, the record
       reveals that Pine had decided to terminate Burgen before she
       requested paid COVID-19 leave. Drago, 453 F.3d at 1308. Although
       Pine did not provide written evidence of its decision to terminate
       Burgen before she requested COVID-19 leave, Burgen does not
       provide any authority for the proposition that a personnel
       discussion or decision that is not reduced to writing should not be
       believed. Thus, Burgen did not show that the adverse action would
       not have occurred but for her assertion of her EPSLA rights and
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13519

       failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Wolf, 200 F.3d at
       1342-43.
               Further, even if Burgen established a prima facie case, she
       failed to demonstrate pretext. Burgen did not provide evidence
       that disputed Pine’s’ nondiscriminatory reason for her termination
       — her poor performance. Instead, she speculated regarding the
       timing of the termination decision, and she pointed to how Pine
       did not memorialize in writing its concerns with her performance.
       Nevertheless, speculation and the absence of a writing cannot
       satisfy Burgen’s burden to establish pretext on summary judgment.
       See Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1314 (ﬁnding that the district
       court did not err in granting summary judgment on the plaintiﬀ’s
       retaliation claim where she oﬀered only speculation and no
       evidence to support her claim). The record does not support a
       ﬁnding that Pine’s reason for Burgen’s termination, poor
       performance, was false. Burgen has failed to meet her burden to
       show that she was terminated solely because she requested
       COVID-19 leave. Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1136. Thus, the district court
       properly granted summary judgment to Pine.
               Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we aﬃrm the
       district court’s order denying Burgen’s second request for extension
       of the discovery period, and its order granting summary judgment
       to Pine on Burgen’s retaliation claim under the EPSLA.
              AFFIRMED.