Court Opinion

ID: 9765014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:57.479065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:03.483608
License: Public Domain

Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON
dissenting.
[A]fter the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order.
N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
Because Melissa Ann Jarrell is statutorily barred from challenging the adoption decree, I dissent.
The legislature identified two narrow situations when challenges are allowed, and neither permits Jarrell’s challenge. Id. First, Jarrell did not appeal within thirty days of the final adoption decree. Id. § 48-2-607(b) (2009). Second, she failed to move to set aside the decree within six months of a discovery that her consent to the adoption was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. § 48-2-607(c) (2009). Instead, Jarrell challenged the adoption nearly two years after entry of the final adoption decree. This she cannot do. The plain language of N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607(a) bars her claim.
This Court must respect the statutory limitations imposed by the legislature and should not reach substantive issues not before it. The *554legislature determined it to be'in the best interest of minors that adoptions be final, see id. §§ 48-l-100(b)(l) (2009), 48-2-607(a), and allowed challenges in narrow circumstances, none of which are satisfied in this case. The wisdom of these restrictions to adoption challenges is an issue for the legislature to decide, not this Court. And if the members of our General Assembly wish to modify these restrictions, it is their prerogative and role to do so.