Court Opinion

ID: 9716344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:34:54.467375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:44.067631
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, dissenting: Because I find the trial court’s determination that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of decedent’s donative intent at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy was against the manifest weight of the evidence, I respectfully dissent. The creation of a joint tenancy is presumed to have been made with donative intent unless the party seeking to avoid the gift comes forward with clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy, no gift was intended. (Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 587, 589.) This burden does not shift to the survivor of the joint tenancy. (Murgic, 31 Ill. 2d at 591.) Clear and convincing evidence is something less than beyond a reasonable doubt, but something more than a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544, 556-59.) However, factors that may be considered include evidence that the transfer was made solely for the convenience of the creator and the value of the account in relation to the total assets of the estate. (See Guzak, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 555.) Especially relevant, however, is the retention of control and authority over the account by the grantor. (Guzak, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 555.) Thus, circumstances and events that occur after the creation of the account may be considered. Guzak, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 555. In addition to the presumption of donative intent, respondent offered evidence that, at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy, the right of survivorship was fully explained to and understood by decedent. Shortly before the creation of the joint account, decedent indicated an intent to make a future gift to respondent by naming respondent as the executor and primary beneficiary under decedent’s will. Decedent also executed a power of attorney in favor of respondent and relinquished all control over her financial affairs to respondent. The joint account contained slightly more than $22,000 in contrast to the balance of decedent’s estate in excess of $150,000. To rebut the presumption and this circumstantial evidence, petitioner offered testimony of decedent’s attorney’s spouse, who was a family friend, that decedent had indicated that the account was created so that respondent would have access to the funds to pay any extraordinary medical expenses incurred by decedent, and respondent’s affirmative response to a question at her deposition inquiring whether the creation of the joint account was for decedent’s convenience. Thus, there was some evidence that the creation of the joint account was as a convenience for decedent. However, such evidence does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. The crucial factor of retained control is absent. (Guzak, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 555-56.) There is no evidence that convenience was the sole reason for decedent’s actions. (See In re Schneider (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 180, 183 (decedent told joint tenant that purpose of joint account was “in case I am sick you can go and get the money for me”).) Respondent qualified her affirmative response to a question concerning the creation of the joint account for decedent’s convenience by indicating that there had been no discussion of the matter. Although the creation of the joint account was undoubtedly convenient for decedent, absent evidence of retained control or an express indication that it was created solely as a matter of convenience for decedent, it does not absolutely follow that decedent did not also intend respondent to eventually receive such funds. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of donative intent arising from the creation of the joint account, which was further circumstantially supported by evidence of decedent’s conduct in contemporaneously naming respondent her primary beneficiary, evidence of decedent’s clear understanding of the import of the creation of the joint account, and the complete lack of control or authority retained by decedent over such account. Therefore, because I would hold that petitioner failed its burden of proof to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption of donative intent at the time the joint account was created, I respectfully dissent.