Court Opinion

ID: 9782828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:21:09.557048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:13.879880
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and part ways with the majority’s view that the trial court “abused its discretion when it failed to acknowledge Caraway’s guilty plea” as a mitigating factor. Op. at 853. Thus, I do not believe that resentencing is required in this instance.
The majority points out that the trial court identified Caraway’s show of remorse as a mitigating factor. Id. at 849. In my view, the trial court’s specific finding that Caraway showed “some remorse” for his actions, Tr. p. 28, encompasses his acceptance of responsibility for the crime that includes his decision to plead guilty to the offense. And our Supreme Court has recognized that a guilty plea demonstrates the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the crime and at least partially confirms the mitigating evidence regarding his character. Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind.2005).
I also find it significant that Caraway did not plead guilty until nearly sixteen months after the crime was committed. And even after the guilty plea, Caraway attempted to excuse his actions by claiming that he “didn’t remember the offense” because he was “drinking very heavily the night of the offense.” Appellant’s App. p. 58.
Finally, even if it could be said that the trial court should have specifically identified Caraway’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor, it is apparent to me that his decision to plead guilty was merely a pragmatic one and was not an expression of remorse or acceptance of responsibility. More specifically, Caraway confessed that he shot his unarmed wife multiple times in the face and abdomen, killing her. Id. at 63. Caraway was alone at the house with his deceased wife, and the coroner determined that her wounds were not self-inflicted. Id. Given this evidence, it cannot be said that Caraway’s guilty plea was significantly mitigating. See Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant mitigation where the evidence against the defendant is such that the decision to plead guilty is merely a pragmatic one).
In short, I am convinced that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence, even though Caraway’s decision to plead guilty might not have been speeifi-*855cally identified as a mitigating circumstance. For all of these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.