Court Opinion

ID: 9775247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:51:40.822004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.008021
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
There is no showing in the record before us that the trial court abused its discretion in setting bond for the appellant. Following the hearing, the trial court reduced from $20,000 to $17,500 the amount of bail required pending appeal.
In addition to the requirements of Article 17.15, V.A.C.C.P., we must consider certain other factors prior to determining that a trial court abused its discretion. Additionally, the burden is on appellant to show that the bail which has been set is excessive. Ex parte August, 552 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
As noted by the majority, the primary factors to be considered in determining reasonable bail pending appeal are the length of the sentence [Mayo v. State, 611 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Cr.App.1971)], and the nature of the offense [Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1980)]. Additionally, this Court will consider an appellant’s work record, family ties and length of residency; ability to make bond; prior criminal record; conformity with previous bond conditions; other outstanding bonds; and aggravating factors involved in the offense. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
The record before us is void of any work history by appellant. Although she had been in Lubbock intermittently for two and one-half years, appellant’s family ties are in Mission, and there is nothing to indicate there exists a restraining influence or duty on appellant to remain in Lubbock. Finally, the record does not reflect any facts concerning the offense other than her common-law husband and co-indictee was a fugitive and had jumped a $250,000 bond.
*411In reducing the bond to $17,500, I fail to perceive an abuse of discretion.
I dissent.