Court Opinion

ID: 9838832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 14:05:50.231631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:17.249661
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0019-MR

RODNEY BRATCHER                                                       APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-004445

BRIAN MORRIS                                                            APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Rodney Bratcher appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit

Court granting summary judgment to Brian Morris in this real property dispute.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

                  I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             This dispute involves two parcels of real property that can be traced to

a common grantor. On January 6, 1975, Charles and Mary Bramer subdivided

their property in Jefferson County into two tracts. The Bramers retained Tract 1
and continued to reside there. Tract 2 was conveyed by deed to the Jefferson

County Riverport Authority (“JCRA”). The record before us indicates the

conveyance included a plat that reserved to the Bramers the right of ingress and

egress across Tract 2 and provided Tract 2 was “dedicated to public use.”1

              In 2012, Bratcher purchased Tract 1 from Mary Bramer. In addition

to using Tract 2 for ingress and egress to his property, Bratcher also used the parcel

for various outdoor family events and generally maintained the grounds. In 2019,

Morris purchased Tract 2 from JCRA. Shortly thereafter, Morris informed

Bratcher that Tract 2 belonged to him, and Bratcher was no longer entitled to use

the parcel. Bratcher eventually filed the underlying lawsuit, seeking to quiet title

to Tract 2 through adverse possession, and numerous other causes of action that are

ongoing and not relevant to this appeal. Morris filed a motion for partial summary

judgment, arguing that Bratcher’s alleged possession of Tract 2 could not be

deemed hostile because Bratcher’s predecessor-in-interest (the Bramers) conveyed

Tract 2 to Morris’s predecessor-in-interest (JCRA) and the Bramers’ subsequent

and ongoing use of the parcel is not hostile under Kentucky law. Bratcher argued

the law cited by Morris was antiquated and urged the circuit court to follow a more

1
 Although the plat contained in the record before us is small and of diminished quality, the
parties do not dispute the land conveyed from the Bramers to JCRA was “dedicated to public
use” as is indicated above their signatures.

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recent, but unpublished, case. Relying on the published caselaw, the circuit court

granted summary judgment in favor of Morris. This appeal followed.

                             II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kentucky Rule

of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. When a circuit court grants a motion for

summary judgment, the standard of review for the appellate court is de novo

because only legal issues are involved. Hallahan v. The Courier Journal, 138

S.W.3d 699, 705 (Ky. App. 2004). We must consider the evidence of record in the

light most favorable to the non-movant (i.e., Bratcher) and determine whether the

circuit court correctly found there was no genuine issues as to any material fact and

that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft,

916 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Ky. App. 1996).

                                    III. ANALYSIS

             To acquire title of real property through adverse possession, certain

elements must be satisfied. To wit: 1) possession must be hostile and under a

claim of right, 2) it must be actual, 3) it must be exclusive, 4) it must be

continuous, and 5) it must be open and notorious. Appalachian Regional

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Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Inc., 824 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky.

1992). “These common law elements of adverse possession must all be maintained

for the statutory period of fifteen years, and it is the claimant’s burden to prove

them by clear and convincing evidence.” Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 77-78

(Ky. 2010). 2

              However, there exists a special exception to acquisition of title by

adverse possession in Kentucky’s common law. This exception deals specifically

with the grantor/grantee relationship. Dating back to at least 1836, our highest

court has reiterated that, “[a] vendor of land, who, after the conveyance, remains in

possession, holds under, not against his vendee – whose title is estopped to

deny[.]” Griffith v. Dicken, 34 Ky. 561, 563 (1836). Further,

                the possession of one who conveys land to another and
                remains in possession is not presumed to be adverse but
                peaceable. He remains in possession as tenant of his
                grantee and nothing short of an express disclaimer of
                such relation and a notorious assertion of title in himself
                is sufficient to change the character of his possession and
                render it adverse to his grantee.

Williams v. Thomas, 285 Ky. 776, 149 S.W.2d 525, 527-28 (1941).

               In the decades that followed, this Court and the Kentucky Supreme

Court have followed the precedent set forth in Williams in both published and

2
  In order to meet the statutory fifteen-year requirement, Bratcher tacked on the length of time
the Bramers resided on Tract 1 but continued to use Tract 2 after conveyance to JCRA. See
Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 413.010; Cole v. Gilvin, 59 S.W.3d 468 (Ky. App. 2001).

                                                -4-
unpublished opinions (see, e.g., Watlington v. Kasey, 293 Ky. 382, 168 S.W.2d

988, 990-91 (Ky. 1943); Smith v. Burchell, 297 Ky. 707, 181 S.W.2d 48, 48-49

(1944); Harris’ Ex’x v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 304 Ky. 840, 202 S.W.2d 154,

155-56 (1947); Hoagland v. Fish, 238 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Ky. 1951); Louisville Gas

& Elec. Co. v. Brown, 391 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ky. 1965); Haag v. Wilson, No.

2008-CA-001983-MR, 2010 WL 135139, at *4 (Ky. App. Jan. 15, 2010); Acree v.

Kentucky May Coal Co., Inc., No. 2011-CA-000007-MR, 2012 WL 3143926, at *2

(Ky. App. Aug. 3, 2012)).

             However, Bratcher urges this Court to simply ignore long-standing

precedent in favor of the holding set forth in Nally v. Cissell, No. 2010-CA-

001570-MR, 2011 WL 3654490 (Ky. App. Aug. 19, 2011). Briefly, Cissell,

subdivided and sold his land as various tracts in 1975. The remainder of the

property was retained by Cissell until it was lost to foreclosure in 1984. Also in

1984, Donald Ploetner and his wife, Lillian, purchased as one parcel several of the

smaller tracts that had been broken up in 1975. In 1985, Cissell was able to

repurchase the remainder of the property that had been lost to foreclosure.

Cissell’s property abutted the Ploetners’. Nally purchased the property from the

Ploetners in 1989. Cissell erected a fence that enclosed over an acre of Nally’s

property and made numerous improvements to the land. Nally even assisted in

building the fence and did not contest its location until 2005, when he filed suit to

                                         -5-
quiet title. Nally argued title by adverse possession was impossible because Cissell

was a previous grantor in Nally’s chain of title. The circuit court ruled Cissell had

established title to the disputed land within the fenced area by adverse possession.

This Court affirmed the circuit court, reasoning that “Cissell did make a ‘notorious

assertion of title’ by virtue of erecting the fence and improving the disputed land.”

Id. at *9.

             In analyzing the applicability of Nally to the instant action, the circuit

court noted that, in Nally, this Court did not address the need for an express

disclaimer as well as making a notorious assertion of title. We agree.

             Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 41 provides

             (A) Kentucky Opinions. “Not To Be Published”
             opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
             are not binding precedent and citation of these opinions is
             disfavored. A party may cite to and rely on a “Not To Be
             Published” opinion for consideration if:

                    (1) it was rendered after January 1, 2003,

                    (2) it is final under RAP 40(G),

                    (3) there is no published opinion of the
                        Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
                        that would adequately address the point
                        of law argued by the party, and

                    (4) the party clearly states that the opinion is
                        not binding authority.

                                          -6-
              As outlined previously in this Opinion, there are numerous published

opinions of the Kentucky Supreme Court and its predecessor that address the point

of law at issue here. Even though the Bramers, then Bratcher, continued to use and

make improvements to Tract 2 after the Bramers deeded the tract to JCRA in 1975,

under Williams, ongoing use by the grantor is deemed peaceable, not hostile, in the

absence of an express disclaimer and a notorious assertion of right. Bratcher never

at any point identified an express disclaimer in the grantor/grantee relationship.3, 4

              Bratcher’s assertion that Williams is antiquated law is unavailing.

“Neither the Court of Appeals, nor the circuit court, has the authority to declare

that decisions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky or its predecessor court have

implicitly been overruled because of age.” Revenue Cabinet v. Kentucky-American

3
  For an example of an express disclaimer, see Rains v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 254 Ky. 794, 72
S.W.2d 482, 483 (Ky. 1934). Rains claimed title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The
land was enclosed on Rains’ property by a fence that had been erected by a railroad company,
who later sought to reclaim it. Our then-highest Court reasoned

               what better notice of disclaimer and assertion of ownership in
               himself could there be that Sim Rains intended and was intended to
               hold and claim this property as his own than what was done when
               the railroad company itself so relocated the fence as to leave the
               25-foot strip in dispute inclosed with Sim Rains’ other property
               and moved his house and relocated it upon it.

Id. at 483.
4
 Morris also argues the Bramers could not have established title by adverse possession when
Tract 2 belonged to JCRA because JCRA is a discreet component unit of Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Government and “adverse possession does not run against a city.” Louisville v.
Louisville Scrap Material Co., 932 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Ky. 1996). However, we agree with
Bratcher that this argument is unpreserved and, therefore, we are unable to consider it. Norton
Healthcare, Inc. v. Lual Deng, 487 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Ky. 2016) (citations omitted).

                                               -7-
Water Co., 997 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Ky. 1999). Further, Kentucky Supreme Court Rule

(“SCR”) 1.030(8)(a) provides that “[t]he Court of Appeals is bound by and shall

follow applicable precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and

its predecessor court.” In other words, both long-established caselaw and the

Kentucky Supreme Court Rules dictate that we are without authority to overrule or

ignore Williams.

                                IV. CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is

affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael A. Valenti                        Robert W. DeWees, III
Hayden A. Holbrook                        Greg J. Daly
Louisville, Kentucky                      Louisville, Kentucky

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