Court Opinion

ID: 9408359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 16:01:02.057874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.422518
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAY HYMAS, DBA Dosmen Farms,               No. 20-35733

               Plaintiff-Appellant,       D.C. No. 4:20-cv-
                                            05036-SMJ
 v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE                       OPINION
INTERIOR,

               Defendant-Appellee.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Eastern District of Washington
      Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted June 8, 2023
                   Seattle, Washington

                    Filed July 12, 2023

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Carlos T. Bea, and Daniel
               A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

                  Opinion by Judge Bea
2                         HYMAS V. USDOI

                          SUMMARY *

                            Filing Fees

    The panel affirmed the district court’s decision ordering
pro se plaintiff Jay Hymas to pay a partial filing fee in his
civil action against the U.S. Department of the Interior.
    Plaintiff,     an    unemployed       non-prisoner    with
approximately $1,000 in cash, filed an application to proceed
in forma pauperis (IFP), i.e., without repaying filing fees or
costs, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The district court
granted Plaintiff’s application in part and ordered him to pay
a partial filing fee of $100.
    An order denying an IFP application is immediately
appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but
Plaintiff’s application was not denied altogether. The panel
held that the same rationale for allowing an immediate
appeal of an order denying an IFP application altogether
applied in this case: if Plaintiff did not pay the partial fee,
there was nothing for the district court to do but dismiss the
action.
    The panel held that district courts have the authority to
impose partial filing fees on non-prisoner civil litigators
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The panel rejected Plaintiff’s
argument that the holding in Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d
109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995) (courts have the discretion to
impose partial filing fees under the IFP statute), was limited
to IFP applications brought by prisoners. The panel also

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        HYMAS V. USDOI                         3

rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Prison Litigation
Reform Act superseded the holding in Olivares. The fact
that the statute dictates how the initial portion of a prisoner’s
full fee is to be calculated does not shed any light on the
authority of the court to impose partial filing fees on non-
prisoners.
    The panel next held that, based on Plaintiff’s own
representations in the IFP application, the district court’s
determination that a $100 filing fee was fair and appropriate
was not implausible, illogical, or unsupported by the record.

                         COUNSEL

Douglas A. Smith (argued) and Maximillian W. Hirsch
(argued), Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, California, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Molly Smith (argued), Tyler H. L. Tornabene, and John T.
Drake, Assistant United States Attorneys; Vanessa R.
Waldref, United States Attorney; Office of the United States
Attorney, Spokane, Washington; for Defendant-Appellee.
4                        HYMAS V. USDOI

                            OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

     Plaintiff Jay Hymas appeals the district court’s decision
ordering him to pay a $100 partial filing fee in his civil
action. Plaintiff, an unemployed non-prisoner with
approximately $1,000 in cash, filed a pro se complaint
against the United States Department of Interior (DOI)
asserting violations of federal contracting law and financial
assistance law. 1 Ordinarily, the fee for filing this civil action
would be $402: a $350 filing fee and a $52 administrative
fee. Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP), i.e., without prepaying fees or costs, under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A magistrate judge granted
Plaintiff’s application in part and ordered Plaintiff to pay a
partial filing fee totaling $100. Plaintiff moved for
reconsideration. The magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation, which recommended denying the motion
to reconsider. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation and ordered Plaintiff to pay the $100 partial
filing fee within fourteen days. Plaintiff appealed. On
appeal, Plaintiff argues that district courts may either make
a plaintiff pay the full fee or waive the fee entirely but may
not impose a partial fee.

1
  Though the precise nature of Plaintiff’s gripe is unclear from the
complaint, he appears to take issue with DOI’s process for leasing
farming land and DOI’s failure to provide notice of opportunities for
farming and financial assistance.
                           HYMAS V. USDOI                                5

    I. Jurisdiction 2
     An order denying an IFP application is immediately
appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Roberts
v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 339 U.S. 844, 845
(1950); Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548, 548 (9th Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application was granted in part, rather
than denied altogether. But, as in a case where the IFP
application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case could not
proceed unless and until the fee were paid. The same
rationale for allowing an immediate appeal of an order
denying an IFP application altogether applies in this case: if
Plaintiff did not pay the fee, there was nothing for the district
court to do but dismiss the action. The only difference
between this case and those in which the IFP application is
denied altogether is the amount of the fee. Because the
amount of the fee has no bearing on jurisdiction, we see no
reason to distinguish between a full filing fee and a partial
filing fee in this context. We therefore hold that we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district
court’s order granting in part Plaintiff’s IFP application and
imposing a partial filing fee. The district court in this case
has yet to order a formal order of dismissal, but the absence
of that order does not deprive us of jurisdiction when it is
clear that Plaintiff has no intention of paying the partial filing
fee. See United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d
1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he finality requirement is to
be given ‘a practical rather than a technical construction.’”

2
  Although neither party disputes that the court has jurisdiction over this
appeal, the court has an independent duty to determine its proper
jurisdiction. In re Martinez, 721 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1983).
6                            HYMAS V. USDOI

(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.
368, 375 (1981))).
    II. District Courts Have the Authority to Set Partial
        Filing Fees
    Plaintiff argues that a district court may either make a
plaintiff pay the full fee or waive the fee entirely but may not
impose a partial fee. Whether a district court can order a
non-prisoner litigant to pay a partial filing fee is a question
of law, which we review de novo. See Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
    In Olivares v. Marshall, this court explained that “the
greater power to waive all fees includes the lesser power to
set partial fees,” and held that “[c]ourts have discretion to
impose partial filing fees under the in forma pauperis
statute.” 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995). The court further
reasoned that partial filing fees serve the goals of the IFP
statute: allowing “equal access to the courts regardless of
economic status,” minimizing judicial costs, and “screening
out frivolous claims.” Id. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions
otherwise, Olivares governs this case.
    First, we reject Plaintiff’s argument that the holding in
Olivares is limited to IFP applications brought by prisoners.
Although the present version of the IFP statute distinguishes
between prisoners and non-prisoners, 3 the prior version of

3
  The present version of the IFP statute, in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s
filing, provides:

         (a)(1) Subject to subsection (b), any court of the
         United States may authorize the commencement,
         prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
                             HYMAS V. USDOI                             7

the statute, in effect at the time Olivares was decided, made
no such distinction. 4 The relevant portion of the Olivares

           proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
           without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a
           person who submits an affidavit that includes a
           statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the
           person is unable to pay such fees or give security
           therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the
           action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the
           person is entitled to redress.
           …
           (b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner
           brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma
           pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full
           amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when
           funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court
           fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20
           percent of the greater of--
                (A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s
                   account; or
                (B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s
                   account for the 6-month period immediately
                   preceding the filing of the complaint or notice
                   of appeal.
           …

28 U.S.C. § 1915. As we have previously recognized, and as Plaintiff
concedes, § 1915(a)(1) “applies to all persons notwithstanding its
‘prisoner possesses’ language.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047,
1051 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lister v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 408 F.3d
1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005)).
4
    The previous version of the IFP statute provided:

           Any court of the United States may authorize the
           commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit,
           action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
8                          HYMAS V. USDOI

opinion (four short paragraphs) does not contain any
reference to prisoners or non-prisoners. Nor does the
reasoning in the opinion rely on an IFP applicant’s status as
a prisoner or non-prisoner but rather on the general principle
that “the greater power to waive all fees includes the lesser
power to set partial fees.” Id. at 111. Thus, although the two
plaintiffs in Olivares were prisoners when they applied for
IFP status, see id. at 111–12, nothing in the opinion itself
limits its holding to IFP applications brought by prisoners.
    Second, we reject Plaintiff’s argument that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) superseded the holding in
Olivares. The previous version of the IFP statute granted
courts the authority to waive fees for any person “unable to
pay.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1979). Under the previous
version of the statute, every circuit to consider the issue held
that district courts could impose partial filing fees on civil
plaintiffs. See Samarripa v. Ormond, 917 F.3d 515, 518 (6th
Cir. 2019) (collecting cases). The PLRA amended the IFP
statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current
version of the IFP statute, “if a prisoner brings a civil action
or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). However, notwithstanding the carve-out for
prisoners, the portion of the IFP statute authorizing courts to
waive fees for persons “unable to pay” remains largely

        therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or
        security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that
        he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
        Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action,
        defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that he is entitled
        to redress.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1979).
                              HYMAS V. USDOI                           9

unchanged from the previous version. 5 The PLRA therefore
did not alter the courts’ discretion regarding filing fees as to
non-prisoners.
     Plaintiff asserts that “the PLRA is instructive for what it
does not do,” in that it expressly authorizes an initial partial
filing fee for prisoners but does not expressly authorize a
partial filing fee as to non-prisoners. This argument ignores
the structure of the statute. The statute expressly requires
prisoners to pay “the full amount of a filing fee” and provides
a structured timeline for collecting this fee: the “initial
partial filing fee” is to be calculated based on “the average
monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account” or “the average
monthly balance in the prisoner’s account” over a 6-month

5
    In relevant part, the previous version of the statute provided:
           Any court of the United States may authorize the
           commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit,
           action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
           therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or
           security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that
           he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1979) (emphasis added). The current version of the
statute provides:

           Subject to subsection (b) [the carve-out for prisoners],
           any court of the United States may authorize the
           commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit,
           action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
           therein, without prepayment of fees or security
           therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
           includes a statement of all assets such [person]
           possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or
           give security therefor.

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (emphasis added).
10                      HYMAS V. USDOI

term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in “monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income
credited to the prisoner’s account.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–
(2). The fact that the statute dictates how the initial portion
of a prisoner’s full fee is to be calculated does not shed any
light on the authority of the court to impose partial filing fees
on non-prisoners. If anything, “Congress’s limit of
discretion in this one area, while leaving § 1915(a)(1)
substantially the same, suggests no alteration to the court’s
discretion to require partial prepayment in other cases under
§ 1915(a)(1).” Samarripa, 917 F.3d at 518.
    Accordingly, we hold that Olivares controls, so district
courts have the authority to impose partial filing fees on non-
prisoner civil litigants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
  III. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
       Setting a $100 Partial Filing Fee
     We review the district court’s imposition of a partial
filing fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) for abuse of
discretion. Alexander v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d
1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993). “A district court abuses its
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or when
its findings of fact or its application of law to fact are
‘illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that
may be drawn from the record.’” Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d
505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hinkson,
585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
     District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether
a filing fee is “fair and appropriate in a particular case,”
though this discretion “is not unbridled.” Alexander, 9 F.3d
at 1449 (citation omitted). For example, district courts do not
have “discretion to deprive litigants of their last dollar.” Id.
(citing In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1989)). “When
                       HYMAS V. USDOI                        11

determining the ability of an in forma pauperis plaintiff to
pay a partial filing fee, the court may consider the plaintiff’s
cash flow in the recent past, and the extent to which the
plaintiff has depleted his savings on nonessentials.” Id. The
amount of payment should serve the IFP statute’s “goal of
granting equal access to the courts regardless of economic
status” while also “serv[ing] the dual aims of defraying some
of the judicial costs of litigation and screening out frivolous
claims.” Olivares, 59 F.3d at 111.
    In the operative IFP application, Plaintiff represented
that he was unemployed and had no income. Plaintiff
represented that he had $1,033 in cash and the following
assets: “One vehicle valued at about $6,000 and another
valued at about $1,200. Books, computer, storage of food
and fuel, clothing, house furnishings, farming-gardening
tools and supplies, etc.” Plaintiff explained that he is self-
sufficient and has a practice of keeping a year-long supply
of food, housing supplies, fuel, and clothing. He estimated
that the value of his monthly expenses is approximately $730
per month, but this estimate “represents the ‘value’ and not
money actually spent,” as Plaintiff was relying on stores on
hand. He explained that his stores of meat and food are
replaced through gardening, which he performs on a 2.5-acre
piece of land provided by a friend. Plaintiff did not report
any debts or financial obligations.
    Plaintiff argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to impose any fee given that Plaintiff had no
income and did not report spending any money on
nonessentials. Plaintiff asserts: “No litigant should have to
choose between justice or spending [his] last dollar,
especially if that litigant has no active income to speak of.”
But Plaintiff was not presented with such a choice here—the
partial filing fee of $100 did not represent Plaintiff’s “last
12                     HYMAS V. USDOI

dollar,” but rather 10% of Plaintiff’s cash. And, although
Plaintiff had no income, Plaintiff did not demonstrate that he
needed cash to cover monthly expenses. Rather, Plaintiff
was living off of stores of food, clothing, and fuel.
Accordingly, Plaintiff was not forced “to choose between
food and filing this lawsuit seeking to vindicate his rights.”
     Based on Plaintiff’s own representations in the IFP
application, the district court’s determination that a $100
filing fee was fair and appropriate was not implausible,
illogical, or unsupported by the record. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at
1262. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
     AFFIRMED.