Court Opinion

ID: 9916819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 18:05:35.838226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:01.418783
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-1537
                               Filed January 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF R.R.-A.,
Minor Child,

T.A., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

         Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel Block,

Associate Juvenile Judge.

         A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.

AFFIRMED.

         Thomas J. Richter of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris Et. Al., Waterloo, for

appellant father.

         Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

         Joseph G. Martin, Cedar Falls, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

         Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

        A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, R.R.-A.

The father contends the State failed to prove statutory grounds for termination,

termination does not serve the child’s best interests, a permissive exception should

be granted due to the parent-child bond, a six-month extension should have been

granted, and a relative guardianship should have been granted. The mother

voluntarily consented to the termination of her rights during the same proceeding

and does not appeal. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the termination of the

father’s parental rights.

   I.      Background Facts and Proceedings.

        The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services first became involved

with this family soon after R.R.-A.’s birth in 2018. The parents have a substantial

history of substance abuse and domestic violence. The father was charged with

domestic abuse assault impeding flow of air or blood and child endangerment after

an incident of domestic violence against the mother in April 2019, and a no-contact

order was issued. Another incident of domestic abuse assault occurred in front of

R.R.-A. during the most recent time the Department assessed the family. During

the same period, R.R.-A. was also reportedly playing in the street while the father

was supposed to be supervising him. These incidences led to the Department’s

investigation being founded. The State petitioned to adjudicate R.R.-A. a child in

need of assistance in July 2019, and the juvenile court granted the petition.

        The next four years were a rollercoaster of noncompliance by the father.

Throughout the proceedings, the Department was concerned that the father was

more interested in rekindling his relationship with the mother than connecting with
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his child. Department providers had reservations about the father’s willingness to

participate and comply with services. The father’s providers described him as

“manipulative” and argumentative, engaging in “outbursts” in front of R.R.-A. He

lied frequently about attending and “completing” services, following the no contact

order against the mother, and his housing situation. When R.R.-A. was placed

with the paternal grandmother, the father blatantly violated the Department’s

directives by cohabitating with them both. He also had frequent unsanctioned,

unsupervised contact with R.R.-A., even taking him from his placement and

bringing him to the mother’s home for overnight stays without the Department

being contacted. When this situation was eventually discovered, the grandmother

was considered an unsafe placement and R.R.-A. was placed with a foster family.

       The Department was also very concerned with the long history of domestic

violence and conflict between the parents. There were multiple incidents and

allegations of domestic abuse throughout the proceedings, leading to multiple

charges against the father. Just two weeks before the termination hearing, the

parties engaged in what was described by the mother as “horrible violence”

resulting in yet another no contact order.

       The high level of conflict was not limited to the father’s relationship with the

mother. There was also growing animosity between the parents and the paternal

grandmother. The Department’s caseworker testified that R.R.-A. was “[p]ainfully”

aware of the disharmony between his family members and this has had a negative

impact on him.      During visitations that included both the father and the

grandmother, the two often used the time to “vent” or argue rather than spending

it engaging with R.R.-A. When the grandmother served as relative placement, the
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father and grandmother argued over who would be primary caregiver if the

proceedings continued.

      The father also has severe substance-abuse issues. He has a substantial

history of methamphetamine use, dating back to when he was twelve or thirteen

years old. He struggled to remain sober despite the multitude of mental-health

and substance-use services offered.         He frequently missed appointments,

resulting in being discharged from his mental-health programming twice for non-

attendance.   He dallied with scheduling and completing a substance-abuse

evaluation, and he lied to providers for weeks before being caught. When pressed

for answers, he told the Department that he was unsure why he had not completed

the evaluation, but “that he was just kind of tired of this whole proceeding and

wanted it done.” His drug tests showed a similar narrative of noncompliance, with

him often refusing to show. When he did test, there were periods of sobriety

followed by periods of relapse. As recently as January 2023, the father tested

positive for methamphetamine using a hair-strand test. Three months later in

March, police officers discovered methamphetamine in his vehicle and he was

charged as a result.

      The father was as inconsistent in attending visitation throughout the

proceedings as he was with the rest of his services. There were periods where he

would request visits and attend regularly while at other times, he would not. For

example, the father had no visits with R.R.-A. between February 17, 2020, and

July of that year. He declined the video conferencing offered because of the

COVID-19 pandemic and expressed to the Department that “he felt it best for

[R.R.-A.] if he did not have any contact with him right now.” On another occasion,
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the father requested visitations but demanded the Department was “going to have

to bring [R.R.-A.] to him because he didn’t have a [driver’s license].” In general,

the father’s repeated incarcerations for domestic abuse assault also contributed to

the inconsistent contact with his child.

          Based on the inconsistency with services and engagement with R.R.-A., the

juvenile court ordered the State to petition for termination in April 2023. The State

petitioned to terminate parental rights on May 9. After an August termination

hearing, the juvenile court terminated parental rights. The father appeals.

   II.       Review.

          Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d

489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While not binding, “we give weight to the trial court’s findings

of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses.” Id.

   III.      Discussion.

          Iowa courts use a three-step analysis to review termination of parental

rights, including whether (1) grounds for termination have been established,

(2) termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) we should exercise any of

the permissive exceptions to termination. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472–73

(Iowa 2018). We address each step, but our primary concern is the best interests

of the child. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020).

   A. Grounds for Termination.

          The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(e), (f) and (l) (2023). We may affirm if the evidence supports

termination on any one ground. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010).
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We focus on section 232.116(1)(f), which allows the court to terminate parental

rights if it finds:

               (1) The child is four years of age or older.
               (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
        assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
               (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
        the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
        for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
        has been less than thirty days.
               (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
        time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
        as provided in section 232.102.

The issue on appeal is whether the child could be returned to the father’s custody

at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4); see also

D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting “at the present time” to mean “at the time of

the termination hearing”).

        While the father claims he has addressed his substance-abuse, criminal,

and domestic-abuse concerns that were originally at issue, we disagree. Clear

and convincing evidence shows that R.R.-A. cannot be returned to the father’s

custody. Although the father has had periods of sobriety and engagement with

services during the four years between removal and termination, he was largely

inconsistent. There were frequent times during that span when he was using

methamphetamine, committing acts of violence, and was otherwise noncompliant

with services. In the past, the father has been dishonest with the Department in

his self-reporting, and we are not convinced that any recent improvement is either

genuine or lasting. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495 (considering a parent’s “past

performance” as reflective “of the quality of the future care that parent is capable

of providing” (quoting In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981))). We
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therefore affirm the finding that R.R.-A. could not be returned to his father at the

time of the termination hearing.

   B. Best Interests.

       Next, the father contends that termination is not in R.R.-A.’s best interests.

In determining best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety,

to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,

and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa

Code § 232.116(2). The “defining elements” of the best-interests analysis are the

child’s safety and “need for a permanent home.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748

(Iowa 2011) (citation omitted).

       We agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the best interests of

R.R.-A. In four years, the father has not shown that he can provide and care for

his child consistently. He has struggled to maintain sobriety, engage with services,

and attend visitations. There have been times where the father rejected offered

services outright and did not comply with the Department’s requirements. “It is not

in the best interest of the child to return to a parent who refuses to address the

[Department’s]’s primary concerns.” In re A.G., No. 18-1161, 2018 WL 6131920,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018) (cleaned up). We therefore find termination of

the father’s parental rights to be in the child’s best interests.

   C. Permissive Exception to Termination.

       The father also argues an exception to termination should be granted

because of the bond between him and R.R.-A.1 See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)

1 The father makes this argument as part of the best-interests analysis, but we

address it here instead.
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(providing a discretionary exception to termination when “[t]here is clear and

convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the

time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). The court is given wide

discretion “based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests

of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child

relationship.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). This

burden is placed on the parent, who must establish “that, on balance, that bond

makes termination more detrimental than not.” In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315

(Iowa 2021). We do not discount the love the father has for his child. But we find

no showing that R.R.-A. would be particularly disadvantaged by the termination

and decline not to terminate based on a parent-child bond.

   D. Extension of Time.

       The father argues that a six-month extension would have provided him

sufficient time to resume custody. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (permitting the

juvenile court to grant an extension to work toward reunification if “the need for

removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the

additional six-month period”). He cites his recent improvements and sobriety as

reasons for the extension.

       While we commend any progress the father has made, it comes too late.

See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495 (“A parent cannot wait until the eve of termination,

after the statutory time periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express

an interest in parenting.”). Throughout most of the proceedings, he has relapsed

multiple times and been noncompliant with services. His history of inconsistency

and instability does not convince us an additional six months would make a
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difference. R.R.-A. has already waited a substantial portion of his short life for his

parents to be able to care for him, and we cannot delay permanency for him with

the hope that the father will change. A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112 (finding “that we

cannot deprive a child of permanency . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn

to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child” (quoting In re

P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010))).

   E. Guardianship.

       Finally, the father asks us to place R.R.-A. in a guardianship with his mother

to eliminate the need for termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a) (stating that

the court need not terminate parental rights if “[a] relative has legal custody of the

child”). But Iowa courts do not prefer guardianship over termination and adoption.

A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477.      “The child’s best interests always remain the first

consideration.” Id. at 475 (citation omitted).

       We find a guardianship would not serve R.R.-A.’s best interests and, in all

likelihood, would prove harmful. The grandmother has already been deemed

unsuitable by the Department based on her dishonesty as well as her inability to

maintain care of the child. When R.R.-A. was placed with her, she allowed the

parents to engage in unsafe and unsupervised visits with him. Further, the level

of conflict between the grandmother and the father has been shown to have

detrimental impacts on the child. Finally, R.R.-A. has been without permanency

for over four years, and a guardianship will not provide it. Id. at 478 (declining to

establish a guardianship because it would be “woefully inadequate to achieve the

sort of stable, nurturing and permanent home” the child needs). We therefore

decline to order a guardianship.
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   IV.      Disposition.

         Because we find the statutory grounds are satisfied, termination and the

denial of a guardianship are in the best interests of the child, and no permissive

exceptions or extensions apply, we affirm termination of the father’s parental rights.

         AFFIRMED.