Court Opinion

ID: 9409543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 16:09:32.424878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.362421
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court

                                              (Dissent begins on Page 18)

      Jessica Marie Purcell         :

               v.                   :          No. 2023-26-M.P.

       Clay Johnson et al.          :

 Clay Johnson, in his capacity as   :
Council Appointee to the Chariho
Regional School Committee, et al.

               v.                   :          No. 2023-28-M.P.

    Chariho Regional School         :
          Committee.

         NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
         before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
         are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
         Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
         Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email
         opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or
         other formal errors in order that corrections may be made
         before the opinion is published.
                                                   Supreme Court

                                                   (Dissent begins on Page 18)

         Jessica Marie Purcell          :

                   v.                   :          No. 2023-26-M.P.

          Clay Johnson et al.           :

    Clay Johnson, in his capacity as    :
   Council Appointee to the Chariho
   Regional School Committee, et al.

                   v.                   :          No. 2023-28-M.P.

       Chariho Regional School          :
             Committee.

      Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                  OPINION

      Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. These are petitions in equity in the

nature of quo warranto, which came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on

April 13, 2023. Jessica Marie Purcell (Purcell) brings an action in quo warranto,

seeking a determination by the Supreme Court that Clay Johnson (Johnson) be

removed from the Chariho Regional School Committee (the School Committee) and

ordering the Town Council (the Council) of the Town of Richmond (the Town) to

appoint Purcell to the School Committee. Similarly, Johnson brings an action in quo

warranto, seeking a determination that he rightfully retain his membership on the

                                       -1-
School Committee following his appointment to same by the Council. 2 For the

reasons set forth herein, we grant Purcell’s petition and deny Johnson’s petition.

                                  Facts and Travel

      The facts giving rise to the instant dispute are taken from the parties’ agreed-

upon statement of facts, as well as from their submissions to this Court. The Chariho

Regional School District (the School District) includes the towns of Charlestown,

Richmond, and Hopkinton, and its operating authority is the School Committee. The

jurisdiction of the School Committee is governed by the Chariho Act. See P.L. 1958,

ch. 55, as amended by P.L. 1986, ch. 286. The Chariho Act was adopted to authorize

the towns of Charlestown, Richmond and Hopkinton, to incorporate and join a

regional School District, providing for the issuance of bonds, construction and

operation of a regional school system for the joint use of the participating towns. Id.

At present, each member town elects four individuals to the twelve-member School

2
  The Town and Johnson indicated in their brief that their quo warranto petition was
filed
           “prior to the School Committee meeting at which Johnson
           was to be seated – after counsel for the Chariho School
           Committee represented that he would advise his client not
           to recognize the new appointee as a member. On the night
           of the meeting, however, counsel relented, and advised
           that Johnson should be seated while Purcell’s quo
           warranto petition was resolved, thus obviating the need for
           the Town/Johnson petition.”

However, our record indicates that Johnson’s petition has not been withdrawn and
remains before the Court.

                                         -2-
Committee. The School Committee members are elected to four-year terms on a

“staggered two-year election cycle,” meaning that each town elects two members of

the School Committee every two years. In the event of a vacancy on the School

Committee, § 10(1)(c) of the Chariho Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

             “the town council of the member town in which
             such vacancy occurs shall fill such vacancy by election by
             a majority vote of the town council of said town for the
             unexpired term of the member whose office is thus
             vacated.”

      The Town adopted a Home Rule Charter (the Charter) in 2008, which was

later ratified by the General Assembly in 2009. See P.L. 2009, ch. 12. Article 2,

§ 5(B) of the Charter, entitled “Vacancy in elective office[,]” provides, in part, if “a

school committee seat becomes vacant, the Town Council shall appoint the

unelected candidate who received the greatest number of votes for that office in the

most recent general or special election.”

      On November 8, 2022, members of the Town elected two residents to their

town’s vacant seats on the School Committee; those positions were filled by Patricia

Pouliot, who received 1,549 votes, and Kathryn Colasante, who received 1,496

votes. The certified results indicated that Purcell received the third-highest number

of votes (1,469 votes), making her the unelected candidate with the highest number

of votes. On or about January 5, 2023, Gary Ligouri (Ligouri) submitted his

                                         -3-
resignation from the School Committee to the Town Council.3 On January 19, 2023,

the Town Council voted to appoint Johnson to the resulting vacancy to serve the

remainder of Ligouri’s term. Johnson was thereafter sworn in and seated on the

School Committee.

      On January 23, 2023, Purcell filed a petition in equity and memorandum of

law for writ of quo warranto against Johnson, the Council, and the School

Committee, seeking an order that removes Johnson from the School Committee and

requires the Council to appoint Purcell thereto, as prescribed by the Charter.4 The

next day, on January 24, 2023, Johnson and the Town filed an emergency quo

warranto petition, claiming right and title to the public office pursuant to the Act. 5

                                     Jurisdiction

      This Court has recognized that “‘an action to test one’s title to office is an

action in quo warranto,’ whereby one may bring a petition in equity in the nature of

quo warranto, asserting his or her right to the office at issue.” Felkner v. Chariho

Regional School Committee, 968 A.2d 865, 869 (R.I. 2009) (quoting McKenna v.

Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 228, 229 (R.I. 2005)). An action in quo warranto, “or an

3
  Ligouri was elected to the School Committee from the Town in 2020, and his term
would have expired in 2024.
4
  Purcell and Johnson are both residents of the Town.
5
  Of note, the School Committee did not submit a brief in this matter. Furthermore,
neither the School District, nor the Towns of Charlestown and Hopkinton sought to
intervene. These actions were consolidated by an order entered on January 31, 2023.

                                          -4-
information in the nature of quo warranto, is a common law remedy or proceeding

whereby the state directs an individual to show by what warrant he holds public

office and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim is not well found.” Fargnoli

v. Cianci, 121 R.I. 153, 161, 397 A.2d 68, 72 (1979). A petitioner who prevails

“obtains a decree which not only ousts the respondent from office but also declares

that the petitioner is the rightful holder of the office in dispute.” Fargnoli, 121 R.I.

at 162, 397 A.2d at 73. The petitioning party “bears the burden of establishing by a

fair preponderance of the evidence that the respondent is not entitled to the office

and should be ousted and that the petitioner is the rightful holder of the office.”

Seemann v. Kinch, 606 A.2d 1308, 1310 (R.I. 1992).

        Jurisdiction over such claims is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court when

brought by a private citizen. See G.L. 1956 § 10-14-1 (“The title to any office, to

determine which the writ of quo warranto lies at the common law, may be brought

in question by petition to the [S]upreme [C]ourt.”); see also McKenna, 874 A.2d at

229 (“A private citizen who questions the right of an incumbent to hold office may

employ only a petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto, and jurisdiction over

such petitions is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court.”). 6

6
    Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-14-2:

              “In any proceeding upon writ of quo warranto, or by
              information or by petition in the nature of quo warranto,
              the [C]ourt may determine the title of the relator or

                                         -5-
                                     Discussion

      The ultimate question presented by the instant petitions is whether the Council

followed the proper procedure in appointing Johnson to fill the vacancy on the

School Committee subsequent to Ligouri’s resignation. More specifically, whether

the Council properly elected Johnson pursuant to § 10(1)(c) of the Chariho Act, or

whether the Council violated Article 2, § 5(B) of the Charter by not appointing

Purcell, the unelected candidate who received the greatest number of votes for that

office in the most recent general or special election.

      We must start by addressing the threshold question of whether the Charter has

been ratified. This Court has stated that “no provision affecting education contained

within a home rule charter, so called, can effectively regulate the conduct of school

committees as agents of the state unless expressly validated by an act of the general

assembly.” Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 30, 160 A.2d 572, 575 (1960). However, “if

[the General Assembly] chooses to do so it may by appropriate legislation validate

             petitioner as well as that of the respondent; and in any such
             proceeding, all or any persons claiming the same office by
             whatever title, or claiming different offices depending
             upon the same election or appointment, may be made
             parties, and their respective rights may be ascertained and
             determined; and the court may consolidate for the
             purposes of healing and adjudication all such proceedings
             if brought separately.”

                                         -6-
any provision in a home rule charter which is inconsistent with this [requirement].”

Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 288, 296, 96 A.2d 627, 631 (1953).

      Purcell maintains that the General Assembly expressly ratified the entire

Charter in section 1 of P.L. 2009, ch. 12 and, further, that the Chariho Act and the

Charter can be read congruently. She emphasizes that this Court has said that to be

considered expressly ratified, the ratification of a charter as a whole is sufficient.

Purcell argues that, if the Chariho Act and the Charter are in conflict, the canons of

statutory construction mandate that the Charter prevails because it is more specific

than the Chariho Act and that it became effective and is more recent in time than the

Chariho Act.

      Johnson’s most emphatic argument is that the vacancy provision of the

Charter was not expressly ratified by the General Assembly because the Chariho Act

was not referenced in either section 1 or 2 of the public law ratifying the Charter

and, therefore, it did not attain the status of a state law. Specifically, Johnson asserts

that the voters of the Town approved a Charter that would supersede any inconsistent

legislation enacted by the General Assembly specifically for the benefit of the Town,

and, thus, the Chariho Act does not qualify because it governs three municipalities.

Moreover, Johnson points to the Rhode Island Constitution, which gives authority

to the General Assembly over all aspects of public education as a matter of statewide,

not local concern. Johnson maintains that “the General Assembly passed a specific,

                                          -7-
limited ratification” of the Charter that did not repeal the Chariho Act’s vacancy-

filling provision because the Chariho Act applies to three municipalities and is not a

statute of general statewide application, nor does it apply to just the Town.

Therefore, according to Johnson, the Chariho Act controls. If the Court deems the

Charter ratified, then Johnson argues that the statutes cannot be harmonized because

they are incompatible and, therefore, the Chariho Act should control.

      The initial question before us is what constitutes “express validation.” The

Town voted on and adopted the Charter in 2008. The General Assembly ratified the

Charter in 2009. In pertinent part, P.L. 2009, ch. 12, states:

             “SECTION 1. In all respects in which the Home Rule
             Charter adopted by the electors of the Town of Richmond
             on November 4, 2008 may require ratification,
             confirmation, validation or enactment by the General
             Assembly, but in no other respects, the provisions of the
             Home Rule charter of the Town of Richmond are hereby
             ratified, confirmed, validated and enacted. It is the express
             intent of the General Assembly by the passage of this Act
             to give effect and to ratify, confirm, validate and enact
             those provisions of the said Home Rule Charter of the
             Town of Richmond that require ratification, confirmation,
             validation or enactment, and by the passage of this Act,
             the General Assembly does hereby ratify, confirm, validate
             and enact said Home Rule Charter, but nothing in this Act
             shall be construed to abrogate or impair the powers now
             or hereafter granted to the towns by Article XIII of the
             Constitution of the State of Rhode Island or those rights
             retained by said Town of Richmond.

             “SECTION 2. All special acts or portions of special acts
             of the General Assembly enacted solely for the benefit of
             the Town of Richmond that are inconsistent with the

                                         -8-
            provisions of the Home Rule Charter adopted by the
            electors of the Town of Richmond on November 4, 2008
            are hereby repealed, including but not limited to Chapter
            1674 of the Public Laws of 1930 (election of town
            officers), Chapter 3705 of the Public Laws of 1956
            (election of town officers), Chapter 264 of the Public Laws
            of 1968 (tax assessor and board of review), Chapter 106 of
            the Public Laws of 1969 (tax assessor and board of
            review), Chapter 362 of the Public Laws of 1978 (fees
            collected by public officials), Chapter 35 of the Public
            Laws of 1988 (tax bills), Chapter 79 of the Public Laws of
            2002 (Planning Board alternates), Chapter 124 of the
            Public Laws of 1986 (street acceptance), Chapter 39 of the
            Public Laws of 1967 (budget committee), Chapter 17 of
            the Public Laws of 1990 (budget committee), Chapter 52
            of the Public Laws of 1990 (financial town meeting),
            Chapter 17 of the Public Laws of 1993 (financial town
            meeting); and Chapter 51 of the Public Laws of 1990
            (board of finance).” (Emphasis added.)

      Ratification of a charter as a whole by the General Assembly has been

sufficient to expressly ratify a provision of the charter. See Foster Glocester

Regional School Building Committee v. Sette, 996 A.2d 1120, 1125-26 (R.I. 2010)

(holding that an inconsistent special act creating a regional school district and a

ratified Home Rule Charter must be analyzed using statutory construction); see also

P.L. 1991, ch. 55. Here, the General Assembly expressly ratified the entire Charter.

Section 1 of P.L. 2009, ch. 12 provides that “[i]n all respects in which the Home

Rule Charter * * * may require ratification, confirmation, validation or enactment

by the General Assembly, but in no other respects, the provisions of the Home Rule

charter of the Town of Richmond are hereby ratified, confirmed, validated and

                                       -9-
enacted.” See P.L. 2009, ch. 12, § 1 (emphasis added). As was the case in Sette, the

public law ratifies the Charter with broad language, thereby enacting all provisions

that required it. See P.L. 1991, ch. 55; P.L. 2009, ch. 12. 7 We “presume[] that the

General Assembly knows the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends

a statute.” Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213,

1222 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of

Rhode Island v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 287 (R.I. 2004)). To require the General

Assembly to enumerate each provision of a municipal charter, after stating its

express intent to ratify, confirm, validate or enact all of the provisions therein that

require it, would be an absurd result. Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I.

2012) (“[U]nder no circumstances will this Court construe a statute to reach an

absurd result.”) (internal quotations marks omitted).

7
  As is true in the present case, P.L. 1958, ch. 109, the act creating the Foster-
Glocester Regional School District, provided a comprehensive statutory structure
that laid out procedures and authorizations for the operation of a regional school
district. See Foster Glocester Regional School Building Committee v. Sette, 996
A.2d 1120, 1122-23 (R.I. 2010). In pertinent part, P.L. 1958, ch. 109, § 1 states:

             “There is hereby established a regional school district
             comprising the towns of Foster and Glocester in
             accordance with the terms of the agreement filed with the
             town councils of the towns of Foster and Glocester by the
             regional school district planning board established under
             the provisions of general laws, 1956, 16-3 and accepted by
             the town of Foster at a financial town meeting held on
             March 3, 1958 and by the town of Glocester at a financial
             town meeting held on March 8, 1958.”

                                        - 10 -
      It is clear that the language used by the General Assembly in section 1 of P.L.

2009, ch. 12 enacts all provisions of the Charter, including Article 2, § 5(B). Section

2 repeals all special acts or portions of special acts enacted by the General Assembly

“solely for the benefit of the Town of Richmond that are inconsistent with the

provisions of the Home Rule Charter,” and it specifically enumerated those acts. See

P.L. 2009, ch. 12, § 2 (emphasis added). No portion of the Chariho Act was listed

among the statutes to be repealed. 8 See id. Under the Home Rule Amendment that

is set forth in article 13 of the Rhode Island Constitution, a municipality may adopt

charter provisions that affect education, as long as such charter provisions are

ratified by an explicit legislative act. See Town of Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123,

128 (R.I. 2006).

      Next, we must determine if the Chariho Act and the Charter can be

harmonized. It is “an especially well-settled principle of statutory construction” that

when two laws are in pari materia, the Court will harmonize them whenever

possible. Horn v. Southern Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 295 (R.I. 2007); see also Kells

v. Town of Lincoln, 874 A.2d 204, 212 (R.I. 2005). Even if the laws appear at first

to be inconsistent, the Court will make every effort to construe the provisions “in

such a manner so as to avoid the inconsistency.” Kells, 874 A.2d at 212 (quoting

8
  At oral argument, both sides conceded that the Chariho Act was not amended or
repealed either in whole or in part.

                                         - 11 -
Montaquila v. St. Cyr, 433 A.2d 206, 214 (R.I. 1981)). “This rule of construction

applies even though the statutes in question [may] contain no reference to each other

and are passed at different times.” State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I.

1981).

      Purcell’s contention is that there is no impediment to the Council’s conduct

being in harmony with both the Charter and the Chariho Act. She reasons that to

follow the procedures for filling a vacancy set forth in the Charter, the Council does

not necessarily need to breach the procedure mandated by the Chariho Act.

Conversely, Johnson maintains that the ministerial procedure of appointing the next

highest vote-getter set out in the Charter cannot be harmonized with the discretionary

procedure, giving the Council the authority to choose the next School Committee

member, in the Chariho Act. Johnson suggests that the possibility of the Council

appointing Purcell without violating the Chariho Act is not the proper standard, and

that the question is whether the Charter’s mandated appointment is inconsistent with

the Chariho Act’s discretionary appointment.

      The Chariho Act is silent as to whom the Council may appoint. That silence

places no limitation on whom the Council may elect. Orthopedic Specialists, Inc. v.

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 120 R.I. 378, 387, 388 A.2d 352, 357 (1978)

(“[W]here the Legislature is silent, we cannot break their silence and fill any

perceived statutory voids by judicial interpretation or implication.”). Therefore, the

                                        - 12 -
Chariho Act leaves the discretion of who is elected to the Council. Conversely, the

Charter is specific in requiring that the Council “shall appoint the unelected

candidate who received the greatest number of votes for that office in the most recent

general or special election.” Richmond Town Charter, Art. 2, § 5(B). It is clear that

there is no discretion within the Charter’s procedures as to filling a vacancy on the

School Committee. The direction of the Council’s conduct in the Charter is clearly

inconsistent with the discretion provided to the Council in the Chariho Act. In

attempting to harmonize the inconsistent provisions, the discretion of the Chariho

Act is effectively nullified. Section 10(1)(c) of the Chariho Act and Article 2, § 5(B)

of the Charter cannot be harmonized.

      We must now turn to the applicable canons of statutory construction to

identify which of the conflicting laws controls. “When this Court engages in

statutory construction, ‘our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as

intended by the Legislature.’” Powers v. Warwick Public Schools, 204 A.3d 1078,

1085 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 958 (R.I. 2015)). This

Court follows the rule of statutory construction that, when faced with “competing

statutory provisions that cannot be harmonized, we adhere to the principle that ‘the

specific governs the general * * *.’” Felkner, 968 A.2d at 870 (quoting Morales v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)). “When a specific statute

conflicts with a general statute, our law dictates that precedence must be given to the

                                         - 13 -
specific statute.” South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 215

(R.I. 2015) (quoting Warwick Housing Authority v. McLeod, 913 A.2d 1033, 1036-

37 (R.I. 2007)). “[I]t is a ‘general rule of statutory construction that when a statute

of general application conflicts with a statute that specifically deals with a special

subject matter, and when the two statutes cannot be construed harmoniously

together, the special statute prevails over the statute of general application.’” City of

Woonsocket v. RISE Prep Mayoral Academy, 251 A.3d 495, 501 (R.I. 2021)

(deletion omitted) (quoting Whitehouse v. Moran, 808 A.2d 626, 629-30 (R.I.

2002)). If a statute cannot be construed as more specific, we will adopt the statute

more recent in time. Berthiaume v. School Committee of City of Woonsocket, 121

R.I. 243, 248-49, 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979) (“Only when the two statutory

provisions are irreconcilably repugnant will a repeal be implied and the last-enacted

statute be preferred.”).

      Originally enacted in 1958, the Chariho Act set forth a statutory structure that

created the Chariho Regional School District and took governing jurisdiction over

the School District. See P.L. 1958, ch. 55. The statutory structure laid out procedures

and authorizations for special elections, corporate powers, bond authorizations,

committee meetings, curricula, building committees, and budgets, among other

things. See id. This expansive statutory structure did not, however, account for a

vacancy on the School Committee in any provision. In 1986 the General Assembly

                                         - 14 -
authorized amendments and additions to the 1958 form of the Chariho Act. See P.L.

1986, ch. 286. The amendments and additions included amendments concerning

special elections, bonds, budgets, meeting procedures, and the addition of a School

Committee vacancy-filling provision. See id.

      The Charter was originally adopted in 2008 and was later ratified by the

General Assembly in 2009. See P.L. 2009, ch. 12. It provides that it was enacted “to

secure for [the citizens] and for future generations the right to local self-government

guaranteed to us by Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island[.]”

Richmond Town Charter, Preamble. Thereafter, amendments to the Charter were

adopted in 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2022.9 The relevant language from Article

2, § 5(B) of the Charter, entitled “Vacancy in elective office[,]” has never been

amended from its original 2008 form.

      The primary question of statutory construction before us is which statute is

more specific, the Charter or the Chariho Act. We have been clear that when “the

specific terms are controlling, this Court will defer to the more precise language

governing a particular subject.” Felkner, 968 A.2d at 870. As was discussed above,

Sette made clear that a charter ratified by the General Assembly prevails over a

9
  The Charter’s 2022 amendments have just recently been ratified by the General
Assembly and became effective without the Governor’s signature at the time of this
writing with legislation that mirrors the ratification language of P.L. 2009, ch. 12,
with the exception that there is no explicit repeal of inconsistent laws in the recent
legislation.

                                        - 15 -
statewide law and that an act limited to regional school issues cannot be fairly

characterized as a general state law. Sette, 996 A.2d at 1125-26. However, in the

event of conflict, we will construe “the provisions of a municipal charter in

accordance with the customary rules of statutory construction.” Id. at 1126. In Sette,

this Court said that a home rule charter that has been ratified “by an explicit

legislative act” carries the same weight as a special act. Id. at 1125.              More

specifically, like in the instant case, the ratified legislation’s purpose was to establish

and manage a regional school district. See id. at 1122-23. We were clear in Sette

that a charter ratified by the General Assembly prevails over an inconsistent

provision of a law of statewide application. Id. at 1125-26. This Court concluded

that Glocester’s charter had been explicitly ratified; therefore, in the event of a

conflict, the question becomes one of specific versus general. Id. at 1126.

       The Chariho Act provides a simple mechanism where the Council by a

majority vote shall fill a vacancy on the School Committee. There is no guidance as

to who the new appointee will be, with complete discretion given to the Town

Council. These general terms of the Chariho Act are applicable across three towns

with just one procedure in place.10 See P.L. 1958, ch. 55, as amended by P.L. 1986,

ch. 286, § 10(1)(a). At oral argument, counsel acknowledged that it sets out a

 Again, we note that the School Committee, the School District, and the Towns of
10

Charlestown and Hopkinton opted to not seek to be heard in these matters.

                                          - 16 -
completely discretionary procedure. By comparison, the Charter precisely sets forth

a process by which the Council shall appoint “the unelected candidate who received

the greatest number of votes for that office in the most recent general or special

election.” Richmond Town Charter, Art. 2, § 5(B). Furthermore, the Charter outlines

an entire procedure to fill the vacancy in the event that appointee is not available by

selecting, “in sequence the unelected candidates who received the next greatest

number of votes.” Id. If no appointee in that sequence is available, the Charter gives

authority to the Council to “appoint a qualified elector to serve the remainder of the

term.” Id. The Charter is specific in its outline of a substantive procedure to fill the

vacancy and precise in who the appointee will be. The Charter is clearly more

specific. For these reasons, the Charter controls.

      Our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the statutes as intended by

the General Assembly, and we presume that the Legislature knew that the Chariho

Act included a general vacancy provision for the School Committee when it

approved the Charter that included a more specific vacancy-filling provision for the

School Committee. See Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership, 134 A.3d

at 1222. It is clear that it was the will of the voters in the Town to have procedures

in place to fill a vacancy on the School Committee with an individual who had shown

some effort and desire to be on the School Committee by running for the seat. Article

2, § 5(B) of the Charter fills the vacancy with the next-highest vote-getter in the most

                                         - 17 -
recent general or special election. While the Chariho Act affects three towns, all of

the towns have an equal number of seats on the School Committee. The procedures

by which an empty seat is filled by one community has no bearing on the other

communities.

                                     Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, Johnson’s petition is denied and dismissed.

Accordingly, Purcell’s petition is granted, and she is legally entitled to the office of

Chariho Regional School Committee member. A judgment of ouster from the office

of school committee member in the Chariho Regional School District shall be

entered against Johnson.

      Justice Goldberg, dissenting. Because I am convinced that the decree and

judgment of ouster issued by the majority has been wrongfully decided, I dissent. 1

Under this Court’s long-standing and well-established jurisprudence unless, when it

ratified the Richmond Home Rule Charter (Richmond Town Charter or Charter), the

General Assembly expressly ratified and validated a specific provision—Article 2,

§ 5(B) of the Richmond Town Charter—the provision addressing the filling of

vacant seats on the Chariho Regional School Committee, an elected body, vested

1
 I confine my analysis in this dissenting opinion to the petition of Jessica Marie
Purcell.

                                         - 18 -
with “all the powers and duties conferred by law in this state upon school committees

of towns,” P.L. 1958, ch. 55, § 10(3) as amended (the Chariho Act), the Charter

provision is void as to the Chariho Regional School Committee.

      The responsibility of resolving conflicts that arise where the state and a

municipality have each legislated on the same subject matter is left to the courts.

Marro v. General Treasurer of City of Cranston, 108 R.I. 192, 196, 273 A.2d 660,

662 (1971). After carefully examining the relevant statutory provisions upon which

petitioner Purcell relies, including the various iterations of the Chariho Act that span

sixty-five years and this Court’s numerous and clear pronouncements when

confronted with a provision in a home rule charter that concerns the constitutional

authority over education and elections reserved to the General Assembly, I am of the

opinion that Article 2, § 5(B) of the Richmond Town Charter does not supersede the

Chariho Act under article 13 of the Rhode Island Constitution.

      This Court has declared that “the regulation of elections, Opinion to the House

of Representatives, 80 R.I. 288, 96 A.2d 627 [(1953)]; education, Royal v. Barry, 91

R.I. 24, 160 A.2d 572 [(1960)]; licensing, State v. Krzak, [97 R.I. 156, 196 A.2d 417

(1964)]; Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, [92 R.I. 51, 166 A.2d 216 (1960)]; and

the conduct of business, Nugent ex rel. Hurd v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I.

518, 238 A.2d 758 [(1968)], were matters with respect to which the state had not

                                         - 19 -
surrendered its sovereignty to a home rule municipality.” Marro, 108 R.I. at 196 n.5,

273 A.2d at 662 n.5.

      I am of the opinion that Article 2, § 5(B) of the Richmond Town Charter strips

the town council of its discretion, by election of a majority vote of the town council,

to fill a vacancy on the Chariho Regional School Committee, a separate body politic

statutorily created by the General Assembly. Because Article 2, § 5(B) mandates

the appointment of an unelected candidate from the last election, it is in conflict with

the General Assembly’s exclusive jurisdiction over elections and education and it

does not supersede the Chariho Act.

      In accordance with this Court’s long-standing and well-established

jurisprudence, this Court should conclude, in the exercise of our original jurisdiction,

that the Charter provision was not expressly ratified by the General Assembly, as

that requirement has been defined by this Court. The majority’s reliance on the

general ratification provision for the Richmond Town Charter, found in P.L. 2009,

ch. 12 is erroneous, in my opinion. It is my belief that express ratification is a

manifestation of assent by the General Assembly that a specific provision of a charter

that affects the plenary powers of the General Assembly over school committees and

education has been delegated to a city or town, after the enactment of a home rule

charter.

                                         - 20 -
      I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Article 2, § 5(B) of the

Richmond Town Charter meets this Court’s long-standing canons of statutory

construction that is the more specific provision before us. As will be discussed

herein, when an act of the General Assembly conflicts with a charter provision that

has been expressly validated by the General Assembly, as the majority concludes,

the charter provision takes precedence over the statute and the analysis is at an end.

Statutory construction is unnecessary.

      I also disagree with the conclusions reached by the majority that the provision

in the Richmond Town Charter is the more specific enactment before us. The

majority failed to examine the Chariho Act in its entirety and the sixty-five-year

history of the General Assembly’s authority over this regional school district. The

majority, erroneously I conclude, confined its analysis to a single subsection of

Section 10 of the Chariho Act.

      The vacancy provision of the Chariho Act that is the subject of this petition

was first enacted and approved by the voters of three towns in 1986; Section 10 was

amended twice after 1986, in 2006 and in 2016, and each amendment restated the

vacancy provision. Section 10 of the Chariho Act addresses, in every aspect, the

creation, election, duties, and authority vested in a regional school district. It spans

several pages of text and sets forth in comprehensive detail the number of seats on

the School Committee, the number of members, who must be elected (not appointed)

                                         - 21 -
in direct proportion to its population in the district, and be qualified electors of the

town, and, significantly, it sets forth how a vacancy must be filled by each of the

three member towns. Although it is my opinion that statutory construction is

unnecessary in this case, it is safe to conclude that Article 2, § 5(B) is not the more

specific of the two.

                                    Quo Warranto

       When this Court presides over a petition in equity in the nature of quo

warranto, in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 10-14-1, we exercise our original

jurisdiction, in which the petitioner asserts his or her right to the office at issue.

McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 229 (R.I. 2005). “A successful petitioner

obtains a decree which not only ousts the respondent from office but also declares

that the petitioner is the rightful holder of the office[] in dispute.” Fargnoli v. Cianci,

121 R.I. 153, 162, 397 A.2d 68, 73 (1979). Accordingly, the Court proceeds by

carefully examining the claim or claims before us, with cautious attention to the

warrant upon which the petitioner seeks to establish his or her own title to the office

and to oust a purported holder of that office. See Whitehouse v. Moran, 808 A.2d

626, 628-29 (R.I. 2002) (citing Fargnoli, 121 A.2d at 162, 397 A.2d at 73). I begin

with the Chariho Regional School Committee, the body to which the petition relates

and the Act of the General Assembly giving rise to the Chariho Regional School

District.

                                          - 22 -
                                  The Chariho Act

      Sixty-five years ago, the General Assembly enacted enabling legislation

authorizing “the Towns of Charlestown and Richmond together, or together with the

Town of Hopkinton, to join a Regional High School District,” P.L. 1958, ch. 55,

upon vote of the qualified electors of the three towns, at a special election, id. § 1,

after which the towns “jointly together [were] hereby incorporated into a regional

high school district as a body corporate and politic * * *.” Id. § 2 (emphasis added).

      After voter approval by each municipality, the regional high school district

committee became operational. The 1958 enabling act set forth the authority of the

regional high school district to issue bonds and construct a regional high school, after

approval by a majority of the qualified voters at a meeting of the regional high school

district.2 See P.L. 1958, ch. 55, § 1. Section 10 of the enabling act provided for a

regional high school committee “consisting of three (3) members from each member

town, each of whom shall be a duly elected or appointed member of the school

committee of the respective towns.” Id. § 10. Thus, these members were drawn from

the existing school committees of each town, which, of course, continued to operate

their respective school systems, except the high school. Section 10 also specifically

detailed the selection of future members in the event “the school committee of any

2
 A quorum for regional high-school district meetings was seventy-five qualified
voters. See P.L. 1958, ch. 55, § 9(5).

                                         - 23 -
member town is or shall be increased in size from the now existing three (3)

members[,] the school committee of such town shall choose from among its own

membership the three (3) members to serve on the regional high school committee.”

Id. (emphasis added).

      Twenty-eight years later, in 1986, the General Assembly again turned its

attention to education in the towns of Charlestown, Hopkinton, and Richmond and

amended the 1958 enabling act significantly, including the name. Public Laws 1986,

ch. 286, entitled “An Act in Amendment of and in Addition to Chapter 55 of the

Public Laws, 1958 * * *,” was enacted, approved by the voters and created a regional

school district. The 1986 Act amended every section of the 1958 enabling act—

including the name. It has become known as the Chariho Act and the body politic

that was formed after the requisite voter approval is the Chariho Regional School

Committee.

      The 1986 Act granted authority for the regional school district “[t]o adopt a

name and to adopt and use a corporate seal” and “acquire, take over, operate and

control all regional schools including lands, buildings, equipment, furnishings * * *

for the joint and common use of the member towns * * * for the education of pupils

attending grades kindergarten through 12 inclusive * * *.” Public Laws 1986, ch.

286, § 2(1), (3).

                                       - 24 -
      Section 10 of the 1986 Act provided for the creation of a regional school

committee consisting of eleven members, with each town represented “in direct

proportion to its population as determined by the most recent population census

figures.” Public Laws 1986, ch. 286, § 10(1)(a).               Section 10(1)(a) was

comprehensive. It set forth with precision the manner in which the members are to

be elected, the number and length of terms for the initial years and thereafter, and

the filling of vacancies. Section 10 of P.L. 1986, ch. 286 provides in relevant part

as follows:

              “(1)(a) There shall be a regional school committee for said
              district consisting of eleven (11) members, each member
              town shall be represented on the committee in direct
              proportion to its population as determined by the most
              recent population census figures. The total population of
              the district shall then be divided by eleven (11) and the
              resulting quotients thus obtained shall be used as the basis
              for determining the proportionate representation of each
              said member town on said committee, and realizing that
              the mathematical divisions of said formula will not obtain
              absolute evenness, fractions of .5 or more shall be
              construed as 1 point and fractions less than .5 shall be
              construed as 0. Subject to limitations aforesaid, the
              members of said committee from each of the member
              towns to be elected or appointed for terms hereinafter set
              forth shall be determined as of the time of each bi-annual
              election and each of the said member towns, based upon
              the census aforesaid. The first such regional school
              committee shall be elected in the general election in
              November, 1988. In the general election 1988 each town
              electing three (3) members of the school committee shall
              elect two (2) members to serve a term of four (4) years and
              one (1) member to serve a term of two (2) years. A town
              electing more than three (3) representatives shall elect

                                         - 25 -
            three (3) members for a term of two (2) years and
            additional members for a term of four (4) years.
            Thereafter members shall be elected for a term of four (4)
            years. Until such time as those elected in that election
            shall be certified and qualified, the existing Chariho
            Regional High School District Committee shall serve as
            the Regional School Committee. In the event of any
            vacancy by death, resignation or incapacity to serve of any
            term of any member of said regional school district
            committee, the town council of the member town in which
            such vacancy occurs shall fill such vacancy by election by
            a majority vote of the town council of said town for the
            unexpired term of the member whose office is thus
            vacated.” (Emphasis added.)

      While it is clear that in enacting P.L. 1986, ch. 286, the General Assembly

exercised its plenary authority over both education and the election and terms of

school committees, my focus in this dissent is the authority of the General Assembly

over education. The highlighted final sentence in Section 10(1)(a) in the 1986

enabling act, although restated by the General Assembly over the years, has

remained unchanged, the last iteration in 2016 a mere seven years ago. The 2016

amendment, P.L. 2016, ch. 86, provides in relevant part as follows:

            “SECTION 1. Section 10(1) of Chapter 286 of 1986 Public
             Laws, * * * is hereby amended to read as follows:

            “SECTION 10. (l)(a) There shall be a regional school
            committee for said district. * * * Each member town shall
            be represented on the committee in direct proportion to its
            population. * * * On the effective date of this amendment,
            one seat shall be added to the school committee, for a total
            of twelve (12) seats. The Richmond Town Council shall
            appoint a qualified elector to the twelfth seat for a term
            that expires in November 2018. In the general election of

                                       - 26 -
             2018, Richmond voters shall elect a school committee
             member to the twelfth seat to serve a four-year (4) term
             that expires in November 2022.

             “* * *

             “(1)(c) In the event of any vacancy by death, resignation,
             or incapacity to serve of any term of any member of said
             regional school district committee, the town council of the
             member town in which such vacancy occurs shall fill such
             vacancy by election by a majority vote of the town council
             of said town for the unexpired term of the member whose
             office is thus vacated.” 3 (Emphasis added.)4

      My examination of the amendments to the Chariho Act over the years

convinces me that the General Assembly has thoughtfully fulfilled its constitutional

obligations for education over this, one of the first regional school districts in the

state, and has shepherded its development for more than six decades. The Chariho

Regional School Committee is an independent corporate body and the operational

authority for the Chariho Regional School District. It is currently composed of

twelve members, an increase from the eleven-member threshold in the 1986 Act,

based on a population increase in the town of Richmond. See Felkner v. Chariho

Regional School Committee, 968 A.2d 865, 869 (R.I. 2009) (“The Chariho Regional

3
  Thus were I to conclude that statutory construction was necessary to my analysis
in this case, the 2016 amendment to the Chariho Act is the most recent
pronouncement by the General Assembly.
4
  Public Laws 2016, ch. 91 is the identical House version of the 2016 amendment to
the Chariho Act.

                                        - 27 -
School Committee is composed of eleven members, with representation from each

of the three towns in proportion to their respective populations.”).

      In the 2016 amendment, the General Assembly increased the membership to

twelve members and, importantly, mandated that the new seat would be temporarily

filled by the Richmond Town Council, which “shall appoint a qualified elector to

the twelfth seat for a term that expires in November 2018[,]” until the 2018 general

election, when “Richmond voters shall elect a school committee member to the

twelfth seat to serve a four-year (4) term that expires in November 2022.” Public

Laws 2016, ch. 86, § 10(1)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, in 2016, the General

Assembly enacted a vacancy-filling provision in tandem with Section 10 of the

Chariho Act—by majority vote of the town council—and preserved the discretion

vested in the Richmond Town Council by the Chariho Act.

      Additionally, the 2016 amendment sets forth another complex formula, to

calculate the minimum (10), and the maximum (14), number of seats, based on the

population schedules of the most recent federal decennial census, beginning with the

2022 general election and every ten years thereafter, in order to “provide the most

equal representation in proportion to population for all three (3) towns in the

district.” Public Laws 2016, ch. 86, § 10(1)(b). As noted, the 2016 amendment

restates and preserves unchanged the vacancy provision of the 1986 enabling act

                                        - 28 -
and provides for the new, temporary seat to be filled in accordance with that section.

Id. § 10(1)(c); see P.L. 1986, ch. 286, § 10(1)(a).

      Accordingly, the General Assembly has enacted legislation concerning the

composition of the Chariho Regional School Committee several times 5 and on each

and every occasion has provided that in the event of a vacancy, “the town council of

the member town in which such vacancy occurs shall fill such vacancy by election

by a majority vote of the town council of said town for the unexpired term of the

member whose office is thus vacated.” See P.L. 2016, ch. 86, § 10(1)(c) (emphasis

added); P.L. 2006, ch. 419, § 10(1)(a) (emphasis added).               This orderly,

comprehensive, and consistent statutory scheme convinces me that the General

Assembly has been actively engaged in exercising its plenary authority over all

aspects of education in this bucolic southwestern corner of our state, such that the

Chariho Regional School District is an established and well recognized “body

corporate and politic,” vested with “all the powers and duties conferred by law in

this state upon school committees of towns.” Public Laws 1958, ch. 55, §§ 2, 10(3).

Having carefully reviewed the 1958 enabling act and the subsequent amendments, it

is apparent throughout that the General Assembly has also seen fit to ensure that

each member town was treated equally and with the utmost fairness.

5
 In 2006, the General Assembly amended a portion of Section 10 of the Chariho
Act, but did not amend the vacancy provision. See P.L. 2006, ch. 419, § 10(1)(a).

                                        - 29 -
      Significantly, the General Assembly has distinguished circumstances in which

a town council of a member town may fill a vacancy by appointment, which

appointments are rare and temporary, from occasions when a member must be

elected by a majority of the members of the town council of a particular town is

mandated. Elections to fill vacancies on the Chariho Regional School Committee

by the town councils in Charlestown and Hopkinton apparently have occurred over

the years. According to the papers filed by respondent Johnson, “Hopkinton filled

vacancies in 2020 and 2021, while Charlestown filled a vacancy in 2002” in

compliance with Section 10(1)(c) of the Chariho Act.

                         The Richmond Town Charter

      Richmond adopted its Home Rule Charter in 2008 and included Article 2, §

5(B), entitled “Vacancy in elective office.” This subsection provides that in the

event of a vacancy on the town council or the school committee,

            “the Town Council shall appoint the unelected candidate
            who received the greatest number of votes for that office
            in the most recent general or special election. If that
            person is unavailable, the Town Council shall appoint in
            sequence the unelected candidates who received the next
            greatest number of votes.” Richmond Town Charter, Art.
            2, § 5(B).

       The town council has no discretion in making this appointment and must

name an individual who was not elected by the voters, nor the town council. Clearly,

this provision cannot be reconciled with the Chariho Act, such that no further

                                       - 30 -
discussion is warranted. In my opinion, although this provision applies to a town

council vacancy and would apply should the town terminate its membership in the

regional school district and revert to local education, this provision does not trump

the Chariho Act.

        The law with respect to the General Assembly’s plenary authority over

education is quite clear: “[N]o provision affecting education contained within a

home rule charter, so called, can effectively regulate the conduct of school

committees as agents of the state unless expressly validated by an act of the general

assembly” because sole responsibility for education is “expressly and affirmatively

reserve[d] to the legislature” in the state constitution. Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 30,

160 A.2d 572, 575 (1960) (emphasis added); see also Coventry School Committee

v. Richtarik, 122 R.I. 707, 713, 411 A.2d 912, 915 (1980).

      Because Article 2, § 5(b) of the Richmond Town Charter directly, and

irreconcilably conflicts with a special act of the General Assembly concerning the

election of school committee members, our jurisprudence has been clear and

unequivocal: The charter provision must be explicitly validated by the General

Assembly to be operative. See Royal, 91 R.I. at 30, 160 A.2d at 575. That is, the

specific charter section must be expressly validated and textually apparent. A

generalized, catch-all provision by the General Assembly does not carry the day in

this constitutional realm, in my opinion, and there is no law to the contrary. This

                                         - 31 -
general validation language appears in several charter ratification acts and has never

qualified as an express validation of conflicting law.

      This is not the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to decide

whether a provision in a municipal charter takes precedence over a matter within the

exclusive constitutional province of the General Assembly, or a state law of general

application. “Notwithstanding the right of towns and cities to regulate local matters,

we have held previously, that ‘[w]hen local laws conflict with general laws of

statewide application, the former must defer to the latter.’” Town of Johnston v.

Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 128-29 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Local No. 799, International

Association of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347, 1349 (R.I.

1986)).

      The long-recognized exception to this rule, however, arises “when the

conflicting charter provision has been legislatively ratified” by the General

Assembly. Santilli, 892 A.2d at 129. “In such instances, we view the conflicting

charter provision as ‘a special act [that] takes precedence over any inconsistent

provisions of the general laws.’” Id. (quoting Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1349). In the

case at bar, the majority’s conclusion that a specific provision of the Richmond

Town Charter has been expressly ratified by P.L. 2009, ch. 12, the charter ratification

special act, is incorrect, in my opinion, because the Richmond Town Charter does

not contain any provision in which the voters referred to the Chariho Act and

                                        - 32 -
certainly there is nothing, anywhere, that would suggest to me that the General

Assembly even referenced the Chariho Act in general, or Section 10, in particular.

The Charter is silent and the ratification statute was equally silent.

      My conclusion that the Richmond Town Charter does not comply with the

mandate of express ratification arises from our well-established jurisprudence over

the last seventy years. As has long been the case, “the Legislature continues to

exclusively occupy the fields of education, elections, and taxation, thereby

precluding any municipality’s foray into these areas, absent specific legislative

approval.” Amico’s Incorporated v. Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 903 (R.I. 2002). Our

analysis has never wavered. The requirement that in order to trump the statute, the

charter provision must be expressly ratified by the General Assembly was born

shortly after the Home Rule Amendment was approved by the voters after the 1951

constitutional convention. See Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 288,

297, 96 A.2d 627, 631 (1953). The General Assembly “may[,] by appropriate

legislation validate any provision in a home rule charter which is inconsistent” with

the General Assembly’s constitutional authority. Id. at 296, 96 A.2d at 631

(emphasis added). Express ratification of a conflicting charter provision is not

accomplished by implication; the specific section of the charter must be “ratified by

an explicit legislative act.” Foster Glocester Regional School Building Committee v.

Sette, 996 A.2d 1120, 1125 (R.I. 2010) (emphasis added). The term “explicit” is

                                         - 33 -
defined as: “Fully and clearly expressed; leaving nothing implied.” The American

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 625 (5th ed. 2011). The term “express”

means:

             “Clearly and unmistakably communicated; stated with
             directness and clarity.” Black’s Law Dictionary 726 (11th
             ed. 2019).

While employed interchangeably at times, these terms are not identical.

             “Usage: Explicit and express both apply to something that
             is clearly stated rather than implied. Explicit applies more
             particularly to that which is carefully spelled out: explicit
             instructions. Express applies particularly to a clear
             expression of intention or will: an express promise or an
             express prohibition.” The American Heritage Dictionary
             of the English Language 478 (2d College ed. 1982).

      Because      we     are       faced      with   a   special     act    of   the

General Assembly, the Chariho Act, that falls within the General Assembly’s

exclusive constitutional authority over education and, additionally, concerns a

charter provision concerning the filling of an elective office, our law is clear: to

supersede the Chariho Act, § 10 must be expressly validated and ratified, that is, in

my opinion, set forth in words. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the

provision was expressly ratified.

                          Express Ratification and Validation

       In Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 288, 96 A.2d 627 (1953),

this Court was confronted with fifteen questions propounded by the House of

                                            - 34 -
Representatives concerning the validity of certain provisions that allowed for

nonpartisan nominations and that fixed the time for a municipal election that were

contrary to state law, as set forth in a recently adopted charter in an unnamed

community. Id. at 289-93, 96 A.2d at 627-29. This Court concluded that the charter

provisions intruded upon the General Assembly’s exclusive authority over elections

and were not valid. Id. at 294, 96 A.2d at 630. Notably, we issued our advisory

opinion on April 23, 1953; after a municipal election had been held, two weeks

earlier, on April 7, 1953, in the city of Woonsocket.6

      After careful review of the issues raised in the request for an advisory opinion,

the justices succinctly answered each of the first thirteen questions 7 “by saying that

all matters pertaining to the conduct of municipal general elections referred to in

such questions are exclusively within the province of the general assembly and are

subject to existing general laws.” Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I.

at 296, 96 A.2d at 631 (emphasis added). The justices hastened to advise the

Legislature how it could remedy this situation. Id. at 296-97, 96 A.2d at 631. The

6
  In answering the request for an advisory opinion, (after the election had been held),
the justices declared that they had “given these questions long and serious study,
even to the extent of taking time from the consideration of a lengthy list of litigated
cases which have been heard and are awaiting our determination.” Opinion to the
House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 288, 293, 96 A.2d 627, 629-30 (1953).
7
  Because we concluded that questions fourteen and fifteen related to the rights of
individuals with little bearing on the provisions of a charter, we declined to address
them. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. at 297, 96 A.2d at 631.

                                        - 35 -
justices declared that provisions in a home rule charter that intrude upon the authority

of the General Assembly, or otherwise conflict with the general laws could be

reconciled. Id. We advised as follows:

              “Of course if it chooses to do so [the General Assembly]
             may by appropriate legislation validate any provision in a
             home rule charter which is inconsistent with this opinion.
             Such an act would be an exercise of the general assembly’s
             plenary power over the conduct of elections as it was
             reaffirmed by section 7 of article XXIX of amendments.”
             Id. at 296-97, 96 A.2d at 631.

       Two months later, on the heels of Opinion to the House of Representatives,

the General Assembly, on June 17, 1953, enacted P.L. 1953, ch. 3235, “An Act

Pertaining to Municipal Primaries and Elections in the City of Woonsocket State of

Rhode Island, and Also Validating Certain Provisions in City of Woonsocket Rhode

Island Home Rule Charter.” (Emphasis added.) It did so with explicit language that

textually manifested the General Assembly’s express intentions:

             “[I]t is the express intention of the general assembly of the
             state of Rhode Island by the passage of this act to give
             effect to all of the provisions of the city of Woonsocket
             Rhode Island home rule charter, said charter having been
             duly adopted by the qualified electors of said city in a
             general election held on November 4, 1952, in accordance
             with the provisions of article XXVIII of the amendments
             to the constitution of the state of Rhode Island and
             whereas, it is the express intention of the general assembly
             by the passage of this act to give effect, more especially,
             to those certain provisions in said home rule charter
             pertaining to municipal primaries and elections in said

                                         - 36 -
             city; now, therefore, in the conduct of city primaries and
             city elections in said city of Woonsocket for the purpose
             of nominating and electing city officers under said home
             rule charter[.]” Public Laws 1953, ch. 3235 (emphasis
             added).

      Additionally, as suggested by the justices in the advisory opinion, “to avoid

the possibility of a contest over the legality of a municipal general election”—that

had already taken place—the General Assembly was advised by the justices to “also

provide in the act for the conduct of such election consistently with existing law; or

else it should expressly provide by special act for all necessary [election] procedures

to be followed in the * * * holding of a municipal general election in a particular city

or town.” Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. at 297, 96 A.2d at 631

(emphasis added). The enabling act set forth a series of election laws that applied

solely to the City of Woonsocket and specifically declared,

             “[I]t is the express intention of the general assembly by the
             passage of this act to give effect, more especially, to those
             certain provisions in said home rule charter pertaining to
             municipal primaries and elections in said city; now,
             therefore, in the conduct of city primaries and city
             elections in said city for the purpose of nominating and
             electing city officers under said home rule charter[.]”
             Public Laws 1953, ch. 3235.

      Furthermore, in a separate provision, the 1953 Act went on to specifically

ratify and validate the election that previously was held in Woonsocket on April 7,

1953, in accordance with the newly enacted city charter, “as if this act had been

                                         - 37 -
enacted prior to the date of the holding of said election, and all persons elected in

said election shall be deemed to have been lawfully elected.” Public Laws 1953, ch.

3235, § 31.

      Thus, this Court’s jurisprudence concerning the constitutional authority of the

Legislature to enact laws in areas that are constitutionally committed to the General

Assembly in harmony with the Home Rule Amendment and the prerogatives of the

cities and towns to self-govern came to be and is well established. Our subsequent

caselaw has been consistent and exact.

       This Court’s opinion in Royal is instructive. Royal presented an actual case

or controversy concerning § 4-1806 of the Pawtucket City Charter that mandated

that all meetings of the school committee shall be in open session that conflicted

with a state statute concerning the General Assembly’s plenary authority over

education. Royal, 91 R.I. at 30, 160 A.2d at 575. We rejected the contention that a

special act of the General Assembly, issued in accordance with this Court’s opinion

in Opinion to the House of Representatives, which validated charter provisions

concerning elections, also served to validate other provisions of the charter because

there was no provision that expressly validated the provisions of the charter relied

upon by the petitioner. Id. at 30-31, 160 A.2d at 575-76. Because there was nothing

in the validating legislation for the Pawtucket Home Rule Charter that either

expressly or impliedly ratified the charter requirement for open-meetings, the

                                         - 38 -
provision was invalid. Id. In contrast, in Coventry School Committee, 122 R.I. 707,

411 A.2d 912, an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the

authority of the Coventry School Committee to retain counsel separate from the

solicitor’s office, the parties conceded that the Coventry town charter had been

expressly validated by the General Assembly in all respects; this Court examined the

charter as a whole. Id. at 709, 713-14, 411 A.2d at 912-13, 915. Notably, in deciding

this case the Court was not confronted with two conflicting statutory provisions. Id.

      Turning to the City of Providence, in 1980, the citizens of Providence enacted

a home rule charter and our caselaw concerning charter ratification was further

refined. One case of note arose in 1986, that challenged the residency requirement

for new employees of the City of Providence, after the home rule charter was

adopted. Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1347. In Napolitano, the union and thirty-one

members of the fire department sought to enjoin enforcement of § 1210 of the

Providence charter, which mandated that all employees hired after January 3, 1983,

reside within the city. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that § 1210 was superseded by

several provisions of the general laws, specifically G.L. 1956 § 45-2-15, providing

that no city or town may require an individual to reside within the city or town as a

condition for appointment in a police or fire department, and G.L. 1956 § 16-12-9

(same as applied to school teachers). Id. at 1348.

                                       - 39 -
        This Court affirmed the trial justice’s conclusion that because § 1210 was

expressly validated by P.L. 1981, ch. 37, “[t]he clear and unambiguous language of

this enactment indicates that the Legislature intended to validate § 1210 of the home

rule charter.” Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1349. The General Assembly’s declared

intent to unambiguously validate § 1210 (and several other provisions) of the

Providence Home Rule Charter, satisfied this Court that § 1210 superseded state law.

Id.

        Conclusively, in my opinion, § 1210 was textually referenced by the General

Assembly in the ratification statute, and its absence with respect to the Richmond

Town Charter is fatal to the petition before the Court. In ratifying the Providence

Home Rule Charter, the General Assembly provided in P.L. 1981, ch. 37, in relevant

part:

              “Section 1. In all respects in which the home rule charter
              of the city of Providence, approved on November 4, 1980,
              may require ratification, confirmation, validation or
              enactment by the general assembly, but in no other
              respects, the provisions of the home rule charter including,
              but not limited to sections 201, 204, 208, 209, 707, 908,
              1210 and 1404 so adopted are hereby ratified, confirmed,
              validated and enacted.” Public Laws 1981, ch. 37
              (emphasis added).

Significantly, after setting forth the specific provisions of the Charter it expressly

intended    to   ratify, the   General    Assembly     then   included   the   general

charter-ratification language that is almost identical to the provision exclusively

                                         - 40 -
relied upon by the majority in its conclusion that the vacancy filling provision of the

Charter was expressly ratified.

       Notably, in Napolitano, we were confronted with a charter provision that was

in conflict with a state law of general application. Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1348.

The decision rested on our conclusion that because § 1210 of the home rule charter,

the residency requirement, was expressly validated by P.L. 1981, ch. 37, § 1210, it

“supersedes §§ 45-2-15 and 16-12-9 to the extent that it conflicts with these

provisions.”8 Id. In deciding Napolitano, we again looked to Opinion to the House

of Representatives, and echoed our long-standing holding that the General Assembly

may “grant permission to a municipality to legislate in areas already regulated by

the general laws” if it does so in conformity with that holding. Id. at 1349. We

declared that the General Assembly “may by appropriate legislation validate any

provision in a home rule charter * * *.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Opinion to

the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. at 296, 96 A.2d at 631). Importantly, we

declared that P.L. 1981, ch. 37 “specifically provides that § 1210 of the home rule

charter is ‘hereby ratified, confirmed, validated and enacted.’” Id. The “clear and

8
  We also noted that just prior to the time the trial justice issued his decision, on June
7, 1985, the General Assembly amended G.L. 1956 § 45-2-15 to specifically exclude
the city of Providence from its application. Local No. 799, International Association
of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347, 1348 (R.I. 1986). We
deemed that amendment to be irrelevant to our decision, which rendered it
meaningless in light of our unequivocal holding. Id. at 1348-49.

                                          - 41 -
unambiguous language of this enactment indicates that the Legislature intended to

validate § 1210 of the home rule charter.” Id. This was not the case in Richmond.

      The General Assembly ratified the Richmond Town Charter in 2009. That

act, P.L. 2009, ch. 12, does not refer to Article 2, § 5(B), the vacancy-filling

provision, nor does the act refer to the school committee in general or the Chariho

Regional School Committee in particular. In my opinion, Purcell’s petition must be

denied because there is no express and unambiguous validation of Article 2, § 5(B)

(vacancy filling provision) of the Charter and it therefore cannot take precedence

over the Chariho Act.

      Additional cases concerning the City of Providence and its Home Rule

Charter are also of note. There were eight separate provisions in the Providence

Home Rule Charter that were explicitly ratified by the General Assembly in section

1 of P.L. 1981, ch. 37. This Court has had occasion to address several of them. Our

opinion in Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of City of Providence

v. City Council of City of Providence (Retirement Board), 660 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1995),

is most instructive. That case concerned two provisions of the Providence Home

Rule Charter that were textually and explicitly ratified by the General Assembly in

P.L. 1981, ch. 37. Retirement Board, 660 A.2d at 725. The Providence City Council

enacted an ordinance that transferred the authority to invest pension funds to the

Board of Investment Commissioners, that was created by ordinance. Id. The

                                      - 42 -
plaintiff, the Providence Retirement Board, took exception to the diminution of its

authority and brought suit, claiming that “the [ordinance] was in reality an attempt

to amend the city’s Home Rule Charter and thus required a citywide referendum.”

Id. at 723.9 This Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and declared

that under the 1980 Home Rule Charter, “the retirement board was designated a

board of the city in § 908 of the charter” and, further, that § 908 was “ratified,

confirmed, validated and enacted” by the General Assembly in P.L. 1981, ch. 37, §

1. Id. at 725, 729. Section 908 was among the eight charter provisions expressly

ratified by the General Assembly. See P.L. 1981, ch. 37, § 1.

      Turning to the authority of the city council to direct who can invest the city’s

pension funds, we looked to charter provision § 1404, entitled “Inconsistent acts and

ordinances” which provides:

             “Upon the taking of effect of this Charter and the
             validation of this section by the General Assembly, this
             Charter shall be deemed to have superseded Chapter 832
             of the Public Laws of 1940 and all acts in amendment
             thereto which are inconsistent with this Charter and shall
             be deemed to have superseded all other acts and parts of
             acts applicable to the City of Providence which are
             inconsistent with this Charter. Upon the taking of effect
             of this Charter, all ordinances and resolutions inconsistent
9
  A companion case by seven members of the Employees’ Retirement System,
alleging individual harm was consolidated by order of the Superior Court.
Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of City of Providence v. City
Council of City of Providence (Retirement Board), 660 A.2d 721, 723-24 (R.I.
1995).

                                        - 43 -
             therewith shall be deemed to have been repealed, and all
             ordinances and resolutions which are consistent therewith
             shall remain in effect until amended or repealed by the city
             council in conformity with the terms of this Charter.”
             Retirement Board, 660 A.2d at 727 (emphasis added).

Based on § 1404, which was adopted by the voters and textually validated by the

Legislature and § 908, which was also expressly validated by the General Assembly,

this Court concluded that the retirement board became a city board and its “status as

an independent corporate entity did not survive its incorporation into the charter.”

Id. at 728. In so doing, we again referenced and highlighted the General Assembly’s

express ratification of the charter in P.L. 1981, ch. 37, § 1 “which specifically ratified

the section establishing the retirement board: ‘[T]he provisions of the home rule

charter including, but not limited to sections 201, 204, 208, 209, 707, 908, 1210 and

1404 so adopted are hereby ratified, confirmed, validated and enacted.’” Id. This

analysis was focused on the specific provision of the Providence Home Rule Charter

set forth in the ratification statute and not the general ratification language. Id.

      Of particular note, in my opinion, is Retirement Board of the Employees’

Retirement System of the City of Providence, which concerned a special act of the

General Assembly, the Retirement Board Act, that created the Retirement Board,

and was inconsistent with a provision in the Providence Home Rule Charter.

Retirement Board, 660 A.2d at 725-26. We concluded that the charter superseded

                                          - 44 -
the special act by § 908 of the charter. Id. at 728.10 Because the charter provision

trumped the special act, we did not engage in statutory construction.

      Our decision in Bruckshaw v. Paolino, 557 A.2d 1221 (R.I. 1989), also

concerns a special act, but in a different context. Public Laws 1985, ch. 468, was

enacted by the General Assembly after home rule and was in conflict with § 908,

which had been expressly ratified by the General Assembly. Bruckshaw, 557 A.2d

at 1222-23. The General Assembly was found to have intruded upon the home rule

prerogatives of the City of Providence when it enacted the special act concerning the

purchase of retirement benefits for certain employees of the Providence retirement

system. Id. at 1222. After the Retirement Board refused to comply with the special

act, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment seeking a judicial determination of

its validity. Id. This Court affirmed the trial justice’s holding that the charter

provision prevailed over the special act because, inter alia, the authority to regulate

city employee pensions was vested in the city by the charter that was ratified by the

General Assembly; the regulation of pensions was a matter of local concern and,

because the special act did not apply to the state as a whole, nor was it submitted to

the voters of Providence, it was invalid and unenforceable. Id. at 1224.

10
  This Court also rejected the Retirement Board’s argument that the source of its
authority to continue to invest retirement funds derived from § 908 of the charter.
Retirement Board, 660 A.2d at 728.

                                        - 45 -
      Furthermore, the second part of the ratification statute, P.L. 1981, ch. 37, § 1,

which is the general catch-all ratification provision that is found in various special

acts that ratify home rule charters, is almost the identical language upon which the

majority relies in the instant case:

             “It is the express intention of the general assembly by the
             passage of this act, to give effect to, ratify, confirm,
             validate and enact those certain provisions of the home
             rule charter of the city of Providence approved on
             November 4, 1980, which require ratification,
             confirmation, validation or enactment, but nothing in this
             act shall be construed to abrogate or impair the powers
             now or hereafter granted to towns and cities by Article
             XXVIII of the amendments to the constitution and other
             applicable laws of the state of Rhode Island or those rights
             retained by said city in said charter.”

      I am hard-pressed to view this general ratification as qualifying as an explicit

validation of a specific provision of a home rule charter that satisfies the

constitutional requirements of express validation.       Public Laws 2009, ch. 12

provides:

             “SECTION 1. In all respects in which the Home Rule
             Charter adopted by the electors of the Town
             of Richmond on November 4, 2008 may require
             ratification, confirmation, validation or enactment by the
             General Assembly, but in no other respects, the provisions
             of the Home Rule charter of the Town of Richmond are
             hereby ratified, confirmed, validated and enacted. It is the
             express intent of the General Assembly by the passage of
             this Act to give effect and to ratify, confirm, validate and
             enact those provisions of the said Home Rule Charter of
             the Town of Richmond that require ratification,
             confirmation, validation or enactment, and by the passage

                                        - 46 -
             of this Act, the General Assembly does hereby ratify,
             confirm, validate and enact said Home Rule Charter, but
             nothing in this Act shall be construed to abrogate or impair
             the powers now or hereafter granted to the towns by
             Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of Rhode
             Island or those rights retained by said Town
             of Richmond.”

      In my opinion, this general ratification simply cannot qualify as an express

ratification and validation of Article 2, § 5(B) of the Richmond Town Charter as

required by the Constitution. Article 2, § 5(B) concerns a matter over which the

General Assembly has exclusive constitutional authority and any delegation thereof

must be explicitly set forth, as in every case that has come before us.

      I also note that when it ratified the Richmond Town Charter, the General

Assembly referenced a multitude of special acts “enacted solely for the benefit of

the Town of Richmond that are inconsistent with the provisions of the Home Rule

Charter * * *.” See P.L. 2009, ch. 12, § 2. Section 2 of P.L. 2009, ch. 12 provides:

             “SECTION 2. All special acts or portions of special acts
             of the General Assembly enacted solely for the benefit of
             the Town of Richmond that are inconsistent with the
             provisions of the Home Rule Charter adopted by the
             electors of the Town of Richmond on November 4,
             2008 are hereby repealed, including but not limited to
             Chapter 1674 of the Public Laws of 1930 (election of town
             officers), Chapter 3705 of the Public Laws of 1956
             (election of town officers), Chapter 264 of the Public Laws
             of 1968 (tax assessor and board of review), Chapter 106 of
             the Public Laws of 1969 (tax assessor and board of
             review), Chapter 362 of the Public Laws of 1978 (fees
             collected by public officials), Chapter 35 of the Public
             Laws of 1988 (tax bills), Chapter 79 of the Public Laws of

                                        - 47 -
             2002 (Planning Board alternates), Chapter 124 of the
             Public Laws of 1986 (street acceptance), Chapter 39 of the
             Public Laws of 1967 (budget committee), Chapter 17 of
             the Public Laws of 1990 (budget committee), Chapter 52
             of the Public Laws of 1990 (financial town meeting),
             Chapter 17 of the Public Laws of 1993 (financial town
             meeting); and Chapter 51 of the Public Laws of 1990
             (board of finance).”

      This convinces me that the General Assembly was well aware of its prior

enactments that solely affected the Town of Richmond before home rule and was

certainly aware of the Chariho Act and its numerous amendments, which not only

concerned education, but also encompassed two other communities. One could

conclude that the omission of any reference to the Chariho Act was deliberate.

      Lastly, there are two opinions cited by the parties that are of little relevance

to the case at bar, in my opinion, because neither case deals with charter ratification:

Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, and Sette, 996 A.2d 1120. In Santilli, this Court was

confronted with competing arguments concerning whether, under the provisions of

the Johnston Town Charter, the Johnston School Committee could engage “the

services of attorneys not affiliated with the town solicitor’s office[,]” despite the

charter’s “clear language” that the town solicitor “is to ‘be the attorney for the town

and legal advisor to the Mayor, town council, and all other departments, offices and

agencies of the town government.’” Santilli, 892 A.2d at 125 (emphasis added).

However, in 1998, the town council enacted Ordinance 1029, which authorized the

school committee to hire its own lawyer. Id. at 126. This harmony was short-lived

                                         - 48 -
in Johnston and, in July 2002, the Johnston Town Solicitor informed the school

committee that, in accordance with the charter, his office would provide legal

services to the school committee. Id. Because the school committee continued to

employ outside legal counsel, Ordinance 1029 was repealed and the town filed a

complaint for declaratory relief. Id. The school committee counterclaimed and

sought declaratory and injunctive relief to retain legal counsel, independent from the

town council. Id.

      Although this Court began by recognizing the constitutional implications

concerning the General Assembly’s “responsibility to ‘promote public schools * * *

and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary to secure to the people the

advantages and opportunities of education,’” Santilli, 892 A.2d at 128 (quoting R.I.

Const., art. 12, § 1, that is juxtaposed with article 13, the Home Rule Amendment),

we decided this case on the basis of the duties of the town solicitor as legal

representative for all town departments, id. at 131. We began by addressing the

“interplay between the Legislature and town governments in regulating public

education,” and we looked to the seminal holding in Royal that “no provision

affecting education contained within a home rule charter, so called, can effectively

regulate the conduct of school committees as agents of the state unless expressly

validated by an act of the general assembly.” Id. at 128 (quoting Royal, 91 R.I. at 30,

160 A.2d at 575). We further elucidated that when the conflicting charter provision

                                        - 49 -
has been legislatively ratified, the conflicting charter provision is viewed as “a

special act [that] takes precedence over any inconsistent provisions of the general

laws.” Id. at 129 (quoting Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1349).

      In Santilli, because only one of the two relevant provisions of the Johnston

Town Charter had been ratified by the General Assembly, this Court eliminated the

unratified provision from our discussion. 11 Santilli, 892 A.2d at 129. We concluded

that the school committee could not retain independent legal counsel based on the

restrictions found in the language of § 6-4 of the charter, id. at 131, which provides

in relevant part as follows:

             “Sec. 6-4 Duties.

             “The town solicitor shall be the attorney for the town and
             legal advisor to the mayor, town council, and all other
             departments, offices and agencies of the town government
             and shall direct the work of the assistant solicitors.” Id. at
             127 (original emphasis omitted; new emphasis added).

      Despite our conclusion about the legislative validation and precedence of

charter provision § 6-4, the school committee persisted in its argument that the

committee was not a “department” of the town. Santilli, 829 A.2d at 129. We

looked to Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977), in which we

held that “school committees, although exercising a portion of the state’s power

11
  The Johnston Town Charter was ratified in May 1963 in P.L. 1963, ch. 187.
Notably, the charter’s election procedures were explicitly ratified. See P.L. 1963, ch.
187, § 1.

                                         - 50 -
over education, are, nonetheless, municipal bodies, and their employees * * * are

municipal employees.” Id. (quoting Cummings, 119 R.I. at 330, 377 A.2d at 1073).

Our decision in Coventry School Committee was also of note because in that case,

this Court concluded that the Coventry School Committee lacked the authority to

retain its own counsel based on a town charter provision that the parties stipulated

had been legislatively ratified. Id. at 130. Turning to Johnston’s town charter, “we

faile[d] to see any meaningful distinction between the charter provision in

[Coventry School Committee] and the one at issue here[,]” and held that § 6-4 of the

Johnston Town Charter provision prevailed. Id. at 131.12 We did not engage in

statutory construction.

      In Sette, 996 A.2d 1120, four members of the Glocester Town Council who

voted to remove a member of the Foster Glocester Regional School Building

Committee by declaring his seat vacated, appealed from a declaratory judgment in

favor of the building committee by a justice of the Superior Court. Sette, 996 A.2d

at 1122. This Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice that in order for the

town council to have removal authority, “there must be explicit legislation to that

effect.” Id. at 1122-23. We decided that there was no state law before us authorizing

12
  The Court in Town of Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123 (R.I. 2006), went on to
address those situations in which “the solicitor’s ethical and professional
obligations” prevents the solicitor from serving as counsel to the school committee,
a discussion not relevant to this case. Santilli, 892 A.2d at 131.

                                        - 51 -
removal. Id. at 1128. Because there were no provisions in the enabling act that

created the regional school district, nor any other legislative acts, that granted

removal authority to the town council, we concluded that the council lacked the

requisite authority to remove the member. Id. at 1127-28.

      The defendants argued to this Court that the council was vested with removal

authority in Article XIV, § C 14-2 of the Glocester Town Charter, which provides

that the term of office of members of boards and commissions was concurrent with

the term of the town council. Sette, 996 A.2d at 1124. 13 We began our analysis as

always, by referencing Article 12, § 1 of the state constitution that assigns

responsibility to the General Assembly “to promote public schools * * * and to

adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the

advantages and opportunities of education * * *.” Id. at 1125 (quoting R.I. Const.,

art. 12, § 1). We contrasted this provision with article 13 of the constitution, the

Home Rule Amendment, that permits a municipality to “adopt charter provisions

that affect education, as long as such charter provisions are ratified by an explicit

legislative act.” Id. (citing Santilli, 892 A.2d at 128).

      Although unnecessary to the ultimate holding in Sette, after referring to the

long-standing rule of Royal that “[n]o provision affecting education contained

13
  The defendants also argued alternatively that there was an implied power to
remove members of committees it had appointed. Foster Glocester Regional School
Building Committee v. Sette, 996 A.2d 1120, 1125 (R.I. 2010).

                                          - 52 -
within a home rule charter, so called, can effectively regulate the conduct of school

committees as agents of the state unless expressly validated by an act of the general

assembly[,]” we declared that the Court would “not assume that the town council

possesses the authority to remove a member of a regional school body, such as the

[building committee] in the absence of legislation that expressly grants that

authority.” Id. at 1125, 1127. After examining the charter, the Court concluded that

“the municipal charter does not authorize the town council to remove members of

the [building committee.]” Id. at 1127. We looked to the enabling act, P.L. 1958,

ch. 109, and likewise concluded that nothing in that act authorized the town council

to remove members. Id. at 1128 n.5. Thus, in Sette, this Court was not confronted

with conflicting provisions between a town charter and a special act of the General

Assembly. Id. at 1128; see also Marro, 108 R.I. at 194, 196, 273 A.2d at 661, 662

(in answering the question whether a provision in a home rule charter permitted the

city of Cranston to transfer to an employee retirement board the powers and duty

over the disability and retirement of police officers that was assigned to the mayor

and city council under a prior enabling act of the General Assembly, the Supreme

Court declared that police and public safety were matters of state control).

      Although Santilli and Sette are emblematic of the clear and consistent path

this Court embarks upon when confronted with municipal charters and state law,

neither case concerned the ultimate issue in the case at bar: whether the General

                                        - 53 -
Assembly has expressly ratified a provision of a municipal charter that concerns a

matter within its exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, the charter provision in Santilli

concerned the duties of the town solicitor, a purely local matter. See Santilli, 892

A.2d at 127. Because the case before us presents an issue of constitutional

dimension, committed to the judiciary for resolution, I am not in agreement with

the majority’s conclusions.

                              Statutory Construction

      As noted herein, it is my opinion that where a charter provision that concerns

a matter over which the General Assembly has exclusive authority is found to have

been expressly validated, as set forth in our caselaw, we do not engage in statutory

construction, the charter provision is given precedence because it serves as a

delegation of that authority to the city or town. I therefore disagree with the

majority’s entry into this realm and respectfully suggest that the majority has

deviated from the well-settled and appropriate standards for statutory interpretation.

      When undertaking statutory interpretation, this Court is “oblig[ed] to give, if

possible, effect to all of the act’s provisions, with no sentence, clause, or word

construed as unmeaning or surplusage.” In re Rhode Island Commission for Human

Rights, 472 A.2d 1211, 1212 (R.I. 1984). We do not confine our analysis to a single

provision or subsection of an act. “Where one provision is part of the overall

                                        - 54 -
statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be gathered from the entire statute and

not from an isolated provision.” State v. Caprio, 477 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1984).

      The majority has confined its analysis of Section 10 of the Chariho Act to a

single subsection and has, in my opinion, deviated from our statutory interpretation

principles. The majority’s analysis should begin with the Chariho Act as a whole,

and end with Section 10, which is extensive.

      As noted herein, in 1986, the General Assembly comprehensively amended

the Chariho Act, including the election, tenure, and authority of the body politic, that

embraces three communities. Section 10 of P.L. 1986, ch. 286 provides in relevant

part as follows:

             “Sec. 10. (1) (a) There shall be a regional school
             committee for said district consisting of eleven (11)
             members, each member town shall be represented on the
             committee in direct proportion to its population as
             determined by the most recent population census figures.
             The total population of the district shall then be divided by
             eleven (11) and the resulting quotients thus obtained shall
             be used as the basis for determining the proportionate
             representation of each said member town on said
             committee, and realizing that the mathematical divisions
             of said formula will not obtain absolute evenness, fractions
             of .5 or more shall be construed as 1 point and fractions
             less than .5 shall be construed as 0. Subject to limitations
             aforesaid, the members of said committee from each of the
             member towns to be elected or appointed for terms
             hereinafter set forth shall be determined as of the time of
             each bi-annual election and each of the said member
             towns, based upon the census aforesaid. The first such
             regional school committee shall be elected in the general
             election in November, 1988. In the general election 1988

                                         - 55 -
            each town electing three (3) members of the school
            committee shall elect two (2) members to serve a term of
            four (4) years and one (1) member to serve a term of two
            (2) years.     A town electing more than three (3)
            representatives shall elect three (3) members for a term of
            two (2) years and additional members for a term of four
            (4) years. Thereafter members shall be elected for a term
            of four (4) years. Until such time as those elected in that
            election shall be certified and qualified, the existing
            Chariho Regional High School District Committee shall
            serve as the Regional School Committee. In the event of
            any vacancy by death, resignation or incapacity to serve
            of any term of any member of said regional school district
            committee, the town council of the member town in which
            such vacancy occurs shall fill such vacancy by election by
            a majority vote of the town council of said town for the
            unexpired term of the member whose office is thus
            vacated.” (Emphasis added.)

      This provision convinces me that the General Assembly has expressed its

clear intent to legislate exclusively with respect to the Chariho Regional School

Committee, statutory construction need go no further.

                                    Conclusion

      For the reasons set forth in this opinion, I respectfully dissent.

                                        - 56 -
                                               STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

                                         Jessica Marie Purcell v. Clay Johnson et al.

Title of Case                            Clay Johnson, in his capacity as Council Appointee to
                                         the Chariho Regional School Committee, et al. v.
                                         Chariho Regional School Committee.
                                         No. 2023-26-M.P.
Case Number
                                         No. 2023-28-M.P.

Date Opinion Filed                       July 18, 2023

                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
                                         Long, JJ.

Written By                               Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal                         N/A

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        N/A

                                         For Plaintiff:

                                         Jeffrey L. Levy, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                         For Defendant:

                                         Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)