Court Opinion

ID: 9724635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:05:27.821563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:03.352074
License: Public Domain

W. J. Giovan, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent, as I cannot concur with the result of Potes v Dep’t of State Highways, 128 Mich App 765; 341 NW2d 210 (1983).
The first sentence of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) imposes the duty of reasonable repair on a governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway. The second sentence is that which allows a right of action for violation of that duty. It provides that "Any person sustaining bodily injury ... by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair . . . may recover the damages suffered by him from such governmental agency ” I do not read the words "such governmental agency,” as apparently the Potes Court did, as referring exclusively to an agency that had jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the injury. The antecedent of "such governmental agency,” rather, is "any governmental agency” which failed to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair.
Stated another way, the statute does not employ the term "jurisdiction” to identify a temporal circumstance that will render an injury actionable. It is used, rather, to identify the relationship of a governmental agency to a highway that will im*15pose on the agency the duty of maintenance. Where the violation of that duty is causally related to an injury, as is alleged in the case at bar, I see nothing in the language of the statute disclosing a purpose to insulate a governmental agency from liability for the consequences of improper maintenance by nothing more than the transfer of jurisdiction over the highway to another agency prior to the occurrence of the injury.
The Potes Court found support for its conclusion in Bennett v Lansing, 52 Mich App 289; 217 NW2d 54 (1974), lv den 399 Mich 840 (1977); Austin v Romulus, 101 Mich App 662; 300 NW2d 672 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 955 (1981); and Summerville v Kalamazoo Road Comm’rs, 77 Mich App 580; 259 NW2d 206 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 924 (1978), all of which declined to find that more than one governmental unit had jurisdiction over a particular road for the purposes of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). To say, however, that only one agency can have jurisdiction over a road at any given time is not the same as saying that two governmental agencies which successively have jurisdiction over a road cannot each be responsible for their separate failures to perform the duty of reasonable maintenance imposed by the statute.
In Hargis v Dearborn Heights, 34 Mich App 594; 192 NW2d 44 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 751 (1971), the Court held that the Wayne County Road Commission was not necessarily exempt from liability for negligent maintenance of a bridge by its relinquishment of jurisdiction over the bridge to the City of Dearborn Heights, the death in that case occurring after the transfer of jurisdiction to the city. It should be noted that the Court reached that conclusion notwithstanding a provision in the statute under consideration which provided that, upon relinquishment of jurisdiction, "jurisdiction *16and control of such road,, or part thereof, shall revert to the township or municipality within which the same is situated, and the county shall be relieved of the responsibility therefor.”1 As against the county’s claim that this provision obviated any liability for an injury which occurred after the transfer of jurisdiction, the Court said:
Nor does the transfer of jurisdiction of the bridge relieve the county from liability for the consequences of its negligent acts of commission or omission before the transfer of jurisdiction. In declaring that the county "shall be relieved of responsibility” for the bridge upon relinquishing jurisdiction, the Legislature focused on the continuing responsibility to keep the bridge in repair, reasonably safe, and convenient for public travel. It was not intended thereby to relieve the county of responsibility for damages suffered after the transfer of jurisdiction that were caused by a lapse in the performance of the county’s statutory duty which occurred before jurisdiction was relinquished. [Hargis, supra, p 601.]
The Potes Court distinguishes the Hargis case on the basis that "its factual situation accrued prior to the effective date of the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq.” Potes, supra, pp 769-770. That distinction avoids the issue, since it was a provision of the governmental immunity act that was under construction in Potes, as it is here. The Hargis case presented an issue of statutory interpretation that was parallel to that in Potes and its holding cannot be dismissed as irrelevant on the sole basis that its facts preceded the enactment of the statute under consideration here and in Potes. Indeed, the provisions of MCL 691.1402; MSA *173.996(102) are similar to those of the statutes that were applicable in the Hargis case.2
Finally, under the construction of the statute urged by defendant, a person suffering injury because of a negligently maintained highway could conceivably be deprived of any remedy whatsoever. Under MCL 691.1403; MSA 3.996(103) the liability of a governmental agency for injury caused by a defective highway is conditioned upon a reasonable opportunity to learn of and repair the defect, the opportunity being conclusively presumed in the event of a readily observable defect that exists for at least 30 days. If a person should suffer injury because of a highway defect within 30 days after jurisdiction of the highway is transferred to an agency, that agency, if without notice of the defect, would not be liable for the injury. But neither would the agency that created or tolerated *18the defect be liable, having relinquished jurisdiction prior to the occurrence of the injury. I do not believe that the Legislature contemplated such a captious result.
To be sure, as the Hargis case suggests, the lapse of time between the transfer of jurisdiction over a highway and a subsequent accident could exculpate the transferring agency (assuming its negligence) under the facts of this or any other given case.3 However, for the reasons stated, I disagree with the view of Potes and the trial court that MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) demands that the examination into the liability of an agency that has had the obligation to keep a highway in reasonable repair is ended with the bare showing that it transferred jurisdiction over the highway at any time prior to the occurrence of injury.
I would reverse and remand the action for further proceedings.

 MCL 224.18; MSA 9.118.

 As noted in footnote 4 of Hargis v Dearborn Heights, supra, the county’s liability arose under MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121:
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges, and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel. The provisions of law respecting the liability of townships, cities, villages and corporations for damages for injuries resulting from a failure in the performance of the same duty respecting roads under their control, shall apply to counties adopting such county road system.
The liability of the city, in turn, was predicated on MCL 242.1; MSA 9.591 (repealed 1964 PA 170, § 14, effective July 1, 1965):
Any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross walks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, cross walk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such township, village, city or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case before any court of competent jurisdiction.

 It seems to me that the principles governing that question should be like those that apply in determining the liability of a vendor of real property who parts with title, possession and control of the property. Those principles are discussed in Justice Levin’s opinion in Christy v Prestige Builders, Inc, 415 Mich 684; 329 NW2d 748 (1982).