Court Opinion

ID: 9585746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:03:32.82766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:11.206232
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice
(dissenting) :
I dissent, concluding that Hallums was not acting within the scope of his employment when he ordered Morgan to shoot appellant.
According to § 228(1) of the Restatement of Agency, Second:
“Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.”
The record in this case is utterly devoid of any evidence which would satisfy the foregoing criteria.
There was no evidence that Hallums’ scope of employment as manager of Howard’s Party Shop included collecting debts. See 22 A. L. R. (2d) 1227. In fact, the evidence was undisputed that Hallums had been instructed by Howard not to sell merchandise on credit. The instant assault occurred after working hours, away from the shop. Moreover, Howard could not anticipate that the manager of his party shop would order a customer killed as part of his duties.
*391In McDermott v. American Brewing Co., 105 La. 124, 29 So. 498 (1901), a servant had no authority to make a credit sale but, nevertheless, extended credit. In attempting to collect the debt, he assaulted the plaintiff. The Court held the master was not liable as the servant was not serving the interest of his master.
Hallums’ outrageous and unprovoked attack on appellant indicates he was acting from purely personal motives. See Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed. 1971, page 465. As manager of a party shop, Hallums could not be expected to use force in the performance of his duties as might a police officer, a night watchman, or a “bouncer.” See Beggerly v. Walker, 194 Kan. 61, 397 P. (2d) 395 (1964); Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, et al., 233 So. (2d) 325 (La. App. 1970). Even employees who have implied authority to use force would be acting outside the scope of their employment in perpetrating such a violent, unjustified assault.1 Moreover, there is no indication that Hallums had been violent in the past or that Howard retained him in his employ with knowledge of such a propensity. See Mistletoe Express Service, Inc. v. Culp, 353 P. (2d) 9 (Okl. 1959); Lane v. Modern Music, Inc., 244 S. C. 299, 136 S. E. (2d) 713 (1964).
In Simmons v. Okeetee Club, 86 S. C. 73, 68 S. E. 131 (1910), the Court declined to hold a corporation liable for the act of its agent in shooting a property owner who had cut down a fence built by the corporation, even though the agent was charged with the duty of keeping the fence. The Court stated:
“[W]e fail to see what relation the shooting had to the protection of the property, as it could not be successfully contended that it would prevent the plaintiff, in [the] future, from cutting the fence.” 86 S. C. at 76, 68 S. E. at 132.
*392Similarly in this case, the shooting of appellant had no relation to the management of Howard’s Party Shop. It was a crime perpetrated by Hallums outside the scope of his employment. See Wegner v. Delly-Land Delicatessen, Inc., 270 N. C. 62, 153 S. E. (2d) 804 (1967).
Even if it is assumed that the purpose of Hallums was to benefit Howard, that in itself would not make the latter liable. Clemmons v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 274 N. C. 416, 163 S. E. (2d) 761, 765 (1968).
It is inconceivable that Hallums was within the scope of his employment in attempting to' kill appellant. If appellant had died, there would be no one to pay, how could this be in furtherance of employment?
I would adopt the statement:
“To assault and beat a creditor is not a recognized or usual means resorted to for the collection of a debt, nor is it one likely to bring about a settlement of a disputed account . . .” Collette v. Rebori, et al., 107 Mo. App. 711, 82 S. W. 552, 555 (1904).
In sum, and to repeat with some embellishment what I stated at the beginning of this dissent: Hallums was not employed to collect debts of his employer; was not at his place of business and, this incident occurred after business hours— all unexpected by his employer.
“To create liability for a battery by a servant upon a third person, the employment must be one which is likely to bring the servant into conflict with others. The making of contracts—, or collection of accounts, does not ordinarily have this tendency.” See Restatement of the Law, Agency (2d), § 245, p. 539.
This Court has uniformly held:
“ ‘[T]he liability of the master for the torts of his servant arises only when the servant is acting about the master’s business, within the scope of his employment; if he is upon his own business acting outside oj his employment the mas*393ter is not liable.’ ” (Emphasis added). Bolin v. Bostic, et al., 235 N. C. 319, 322, 111 S. E. (2d) 557, 558 (1959).
Also, an assault resulting from an attempt on the part of the employee to collect money due the employer, the latter is not to be held accountable. 6 Am. Jur. (2d), Assault & Battery, § 144, p. 122.
I would concede that the policy of the law of this State is to hold the master responsible for the torts of the servant although in fact the tort was committed against the will of the master and in violation of his rules or instructions. However, outside of the scope of employment the servant is his own master, responsible alone, as other persons, for his wrongs.
Appellant asserts it was error to grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment. In my opinion, there is no evidence from which the authority of the agent to act upon or in relation to the subject matter involved may be legitimately inferred by the Court. As there is only one inference to be drawn from the record, the question is one of law. LePore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591, 207 A. (2d) 451 (1965). 2
I would hold Howard entitled to judgment as a matter of law and affirm .the order of summary judgment.

 Henderson v. Laclede Radio, Inc., 506 S. W. (2d) 434 (Mo. 1974), a salesman for a radio station, attempting to collect a debt due the station, on salesman’s own time, held not in scope of employment. Wellman v. Pacer Oil Co., 504 S.W. (2d) 55 (Mo. 1973), where a gas-station attendant in an attempt to collect debt shot patron.

 For related cases, see 34 A. L. R. (2d) 372 at 402, 430 and 436.