Court Opinion

ID: 9521047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:55:52.558933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:33.548644
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
dissenting.
I would reverse the judgment because of the giving of State's final instruction No. 5 (final instruction number 19) over Defendant's objection. It was as follows:
"An accomplice is a competent witness, and a person may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."
Although the instruction is a correct statement of the law, it should not have been given in view of our numerous opinions that instructions as to credibility should be general and apply equally to all witnesses.
I acknowledge that the instructions in those cases to which we have been referred by Defendant went further and burdened the testimony of the witnesses to which they were directed with, at the very least, a suggestion that they were less creditworthy than others. While the instruction in this case did not directly charge that accomplices were either more or less creditworthy than other witnesses, it could not add to the jury's appreciation of its province in assessing credibility, and the matter had been covered, generally, by other instructions, as had the matter of the level of proof required to sustain a conviction. The instruction, therefore, could serve no bona fide purpose but was a harpoon to suggest to the jury, albeit subtly, that the State was entitled to have the testimony of accomplice witnesses accepted free from the stigma that inherently accompanies it. Witness competency is a matter to be determined by the court-not the jury. The accomplices, having been permitted to testify, their testimony was to be considered and assessed for credibility by the same standards as the testimony of other witnesses. It is error to advise or suggest that the testimony of any witness is entitled to less credit than the jury would give it under the instructions applicable to all witnesses. Swanson v. State, (1944) 222 Ind. 217, 52 N.E.2d 616; Alder v. State, (1958) 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716; Taylor v. State, (1972) 257 Ind. 664, 278 N.E.2d *1344273; Turner v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 267, 280 N.E.2d 621; Drollinger v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228, 1241; Taylor v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 141, 143; Gadacz v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 376, 379; Tawney v. State, (1982) 439 N.E.2d 582, 587. It follows that it is error to single out the testimony of a witness and suggest that it is entitled to more credit than the jury would give it under such general instructions.
"'We think that it is error for the court to single out any special witness, personally, and burden his testimony with any suggestions which might indicate to the jury that in the opinion of the court such witness was liable to testify falsely. Instructions as to the credibility of witnesses should be general, and apply equally to all of the witnesses for the state and the defendant alike. Because a witness may be the defendant is no reason why he should be visited with condemnation upon the one hand, or clothed with sanctity upon the other. He is before the court as a witness, and should be treated by both the court and the jury just as other witnesses are treated-no better and no worse.'"
Swanson v. State, (1944) 222 Ind. at 219, 52 N.E.2d at 617-618, quoting Fletcher v. State, (1909) 2 Okla.Cr. 300, 101 P. 599.
The instruction, in context, could not have done other than tell the jury that it need have no concern that the conviction of Defendant hinged upon the testimony of accomplice testimony. In my judgment this was an improper intrusion.