Court Opinion

ID: 9960112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 14:07:23.033618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:11.314990
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1701-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MOHAMED BAYOUMI,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted April 8, 2024 – Decided April 15, 2024

                   Before Judges Sabatino and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-10-
                   1418.

                   Jennifer Nicole Silletti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Craig S. Leeds, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Nancy Anne Hulett, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Mohamed Bayoumi appeals from a November 28, 2022 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. We affirm.

      We incorporate the facts leading to defendant's conviction and sentence

from our decision on defendant's direct appeal, State v. Bayoumi, No. A-0163-

20 (App. Div. June 1, 2021) (slip op. at 1), certif. denied, 249 N.J. 107 (2021),

where we affirmed defendant's conviction and aggregate sentence to an eleven-

year prison term, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility.

      The victim worked at the Caravan Motor gas station in Avenel where he

attended the gas pumps and sold various items from a small booth. On August

30, 2018, he was approached by a "shorter," "thin" man sporting a "light beard"

wearing an "extra[-]long" white, dotted t-shirt and white pants. The man asked

to purchase a pack of cigarettes, but when the victim went to retrieve the

cigarettes, the man followed him into the booth, pressed what appeared to be a

gun wrapped in black electrical tape into the victim's body, and demanded

money. The victim resisted, and the man fled.

      After defendant was arrested two-blocks away by an officer who received

a description of defendant and his direction of flight, a show-up occurred and

defendant was identified by the victim. Although defendant was not in actual

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                                        2
possession of a weapon, an imitation firearm was located nearby and was found

to contain defendant's DNA in two places.

        The incident was captured by Caravan's security cameras.        Although

officers viewed the video at the gas station, for unknown reasons when it was

downloaded, no video was captured. Prior to trial, the prosecutor advised the

judge she did not intend to use what was obtained from the surveillance cameras

and did not intend on calling the police officers who watched the footage at the

gas station. Defense counsel insisted this evidence be presented so the jury

would learn "there [had been] a video" but they "[would]n't [be able to] see it."

The trial judge informed defense counsel if she chose to "open up that Pandora's

box" he would not "preclude the State then from asking a witness what he had

seen on that video before it was lost." After defense counsel raised the issue in

front of the jury, the State called the two officers who viewed the video at the

gas pumps, and they testified to their observations. After a three-day jury trial,

defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), and

fourth-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(e).

        Defendant then filed a direct appeal, which primarily addressed the issue

of the lost surveillance video and the officers' testimony regarding the content

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                                        3
of the video. We held these arguments were barred by the invited error doctrine,

which precludes a party from attacking on appeal the very outcome sought in

the trial court. State v. Bayoumi, No. A-0163-20 (App. Div. June 1, 2021) (slip

op. at 6). Defendant then timely filed a PCR petition, arguing the court should

vacate his conviction and grant him a new trial because he received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. On November 28, 2022, his petition was denied

without an evidentiary hearing.

      Defendant appeals from that denial and argues the following:

            POINT I

            [DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE   OF   TRIAL   COUNSEL    IN
            VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW
            JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE LOWER
            COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING OTHERWISE.

                  A.  TRIAL    COUNSEL   WAS
                  INEFFECTIVE BY OPENING THE
                  DOOR TO TESTIMONY REGARDING
                  THE    CONTENTS     OF  THE
                  SURVEILLANCE VIDEO.

                  B.  TRIAL     COUNSEL   WAS
                  INEFFECTIVE BY REFUSING TO
                  ALLOW [DEFENDANT] TO TESTIFY
                  ON HIS OWN BEHALF.

                  C.  TRIAL     COUNSEL      WAS
                  INEFFECTIVE FOR THE REASONS SET

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                                       4
                   FORTH IN [DEFENDANT'S] PRO SE
                   PETITION.

                   D.  THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT
                   TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE
                   REPRESENTATION RENDERED THE
                   TRIAL UNFAIR.

             POINT II

             THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING
             [DEFEDANT'S]   PETITION   FOR  POST-
             CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
             HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

                                         I.

      PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992)). It provides a "built-in 'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not

unjustly convicted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v.

McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). It affords a defendant a final opportunity

to raise any legal error or constitutional issues, including a violation of the right

to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey

Constitution. Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49; McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482. "Ordinarily,

PCR enables a defendant to challenge the . . . final judgment of conviction by

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                                         5
presenting contentions that could not have been raised on direct appeal."

Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49 (citing McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482-83).

      Ineffective assistance of counsel claims must satisfy the two-prong test

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by

the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 57-58 (1987). The

Strickland/Fritz test requires a petitioner to show:       (1) the particular way

counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced their

right to a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

      To satisfy the first Strickland prong, the defendant must show counsel's

performance was deficient by demonstrating counsel's handling of the matter

"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and "counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This is

because there is a strong presumption counsel "rendered adequate assistance and

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment." Id. at 690. Therefore, counsel's errors "even if professionally

unreasonable," will not require setting aside a judgment if they had no effect on

the judgment. Id. at 691. "[T]he quality of counsel's effectiveness [cannot]

fairly be assessed by focusing on a handful of issues, while ignoring the totality

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of counsel's performance in the context of the State's compelling evidence of

defendant's guilt." State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 165 (1991).

      To satisfy the second prong, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.         A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Gideon,

244 N.J. 538, 550-51 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694). "Prejudice is not to be presumed." Id. at 551 (citing Fritz, 105

N.J. at 52). "The defendant must 'affirmatively prove prejudice.'" Ibid. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). A defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors

of counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding.        United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).

      Defendants are entitled to evidentiary hearings if they present a prima

facie case supporting PCR, the court determines there are material issues of fact

that cannot be resolved based on the existing record, and the court finds an

evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims presented. R. 3:22-10(b).

"A prima facie case [for PCR] is established when defendant demonstrates 'a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" State

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                                         7
v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). "[A] defendant

must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel." Id. at 355 (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999)). Where the PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary

hearing, our review of both the factual inferences drawn from the record by the

PCR judge and the judge's legal conclusions is de novo. State v. Aburoumi, 464

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020). We generally defer to the PCR court's

factual findings when those are "'supported by adequate, substantial[,] and

credible evidence.'" State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (quoting Toll

Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).

                                        II.

                                        A.

      Defendants claims his trial counsel was ineffective by bringing up the lost

video tape and opening the door for the State to have the officers testify to their

observations. However, "complaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not

serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy . . . ." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54

(quoting State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)). "[A] defense attorney's

decision concerning which witnesses to call to the stand is 'an art[]' and a court's

review of such a decision should be 'highly deferential.'" State v. Arthur, 184

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                                         8
N.J. 307, 321 (2005) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689, 693). The decision whether to call a witness is generally informed by the

testimony expected to be elicited and the possibility of impeachment. Ibid.

      Here, based on the identification of defendant by the victim and two of his

co-workers, his arrest two blocks from the scene, and a weapon with his DNA

on two spots, defense counsel's reasonable strategy was to attempt to counteract

those proofs by challenging the State's loss of allegedly crucial video evidence.

This was sound trial strategy based on the overwhelming evidence of defendant's

guilt. Additionally, defendant has failed to show a different strategy would have

resulted in a different outcome.

                                       B.

      Defendant also claims his counsel did not let him testify. This is belied

by the record. Although we have held many times a defendant is constitutionally

afforded the right to testify on his behalf, a defendant may waive his right to

testify if the waiver is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Rock v.

Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 628 (1990).

Defendant knew he had the right to testify because it was addressed by the trial

judge with defendant. When the court first addressed defendant, defendant told

the court he had not yet discussed his choices with counsel, so the court

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                                       9
continued with witness testimony and addressed defendant afterward. The judge

specifically had trial counsel speak with defendant outside the courtroom. When

counsel and defendant returned to the courtroom, the judge asked defendant if

he had spoken to his lawyer; defendant answered yes. When the judge asked if

defendant had enough time to speak with counsel, defendant answered yes.

When the judge asked defendant what his decision was on whether he wanted to

testify, defendant said, "I'm not going to testify." In response to the judge's

question, defendant said he wanted the court to instruct the jury on his right to

remain silent and that the jury was to make no adverse inference. Although

defendant now argues he should have testified he sold drugs to the victim on

multiple occasions and money owed to him by the victim was his reasoning for

demanding money from him at the gas station, there is no proof this would have

changed the outcome of the case because defendant does not assert he did not

stick the weapon into the victim's side. Additionally, the victim's identification

would have been reinforced by the number of times he had been with defendant.

The trial record shows defendant discussed the decision to testify with counsel

and defendant told the judge he had decided not to testify. The arguments

offered by defendant are made with the distorting effects of hindsight. In the

end, defendant made the voluntary decision not to testify.

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                                       10
                                        C.

       Defendant next asserts his trial counsel failed to request a Wade hearing;1

failed to adequately test the State's evidence; failed to raise a Fourth Amendment

argument regarding the Woodbridge Police Department's taking of a buccal

swab from him; and failed to address the issue of whether defendant was ever

afforded an opportunity to sign a Miranda2 waiver card. These claims were

properly rejected as too vague and conclusory to warrant post-conviction relief.

Defendant made no showing that a pre-trial hearing on identification testimony

was warranted and would have resulted in suppression of that evidence.

Moreover, the trial record shows trial counsel mounted a reasonable doubt

defense at trial and there was no evidence produced by defendant to show trial

counsel's performance was deficient or prejudicial under Strickland.

                                        D.

       Defendant submits even if defense counsel's alleged individual errors did

not deny him effective representation of counsel, cumulatively they were

prejudicial. The cumulative error doctrine recognizes "even when an individual

1
    United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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                                       11
error or series of errors does not rise to reversible error, when considered in

combination, their cumulative effect can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to

require reversal." State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008) (citing State v.

Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 540 (2001)). In State v. Lockett, we applied the

doctrine to reverse a defendant's conviction due to "the accumulation of errors,"

including the improper admission of inflammatory photographs of the victim's

body, improper questions on cross-examination of defendant, and other

improper comments by prosecutor in summation. 249 N.J. Super. 428, 431-36

(App. Div. 1991).    Since we have found each of the allegations made by

defendant was without merit, it follows that the cumulative effect was of no

harm to defendant.

                                      III.

      The PCR court also correctly determined an evidentiary hearing was not

required. As we noted, a hearing on a PCR petition is required only when a

defendant presents a prima facie case for relief, the existing record is not

sufficient to resolve the claims, and the court decides a hearing is required to

resolve the claims. Porter, 216 N.J. at 354. Defendant failed to present a prima

facie case for relief. Moreover, the existing record was sufficient to resolve

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                                      12
defendant's claims. The remainder of defendant's arguments lack sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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