Court Opinion

ID: 9769144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:35:58.465894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:34.304910
License: Public Domain

John F. Stroud, Jr., dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion because I think the evidence was insufficient to establish that the appellant intended to commit an act punishable by imprisonment when he entered the residence of Charles Jackson. The majority opinion relies on five factors to prove the appellant’s intent to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment. First, the appellant’s entry into the residence was unlawful because it was not authorized. As the majority opinion points out, however, the specific intent, which is required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-201 (Repl. 1993), cannot be inferred solely from proof of an illegal entry. See Forgy v. State, 302 Ark. 435, 790 S.W.2d 173 (1990). Furthermore, the prosecution must separately prove specific intent and illegal entry as independent elements of the crime of burglary, and it cannot shift to the defendant the burden of explaining his illegal entry by merely establishing it. Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 453-54, 609 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1980). The following discussion in the Norton decision is directly on point: Not only is illegal entry an independent element of burglary, but it also constitutes a separate crime punishable as criminal trespass .... By implying a specific criminal intent from mere evidence of illegal entry, the state not only evades its constitutional evidentiary burden in criminal prosecutions but imposes upon a defendant the responsibility to prove he only committed a criminal trespass or stand in jeopardy of a conviction of burglary. 271 Ark. at 454, 609 S.W.2d at 3. Here, there was no breaking or forced entry as is present in most burglary cases. The appellant entered a house in the middle of the day with a truck parked in front of the house, the door to the house open, and a television turned on inside; these were hardly inviting circumstances for a burglary. The second factor the majority relies on was that Mr. Jackson testified that the appellant was walking toward a stereo and entertainment center when Mr. Jackson saw him. Heretofore, Arkansas cases have required the moving of an object or at least the touching of an object to infer an intent to remove it. Walking toward an object is certainly short of that, and in fact it would be difficult to walk in a house without walking toward some moveable object or piece of furniture. Evidence that items had been moved went to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain burglary convictions in Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W. 2d 850 (1985); Jimenez v. State, 12 Ark. App. 315, 675 S.W.2d 853 (1984); and Golden v. State, 10 Ark. App. 362, 664 S.W.2d 496 (1984) (reversed and remanded on other grounds). The third factor relied upon by the majority is the fact that appellant fled. Arkansas cases where fleeing has been considered a factor to show intent include the following fact situations: fleeing after entering a building at night and ignoring the surveillance officer’s order to freeze, Grays v. State, 274 Ark. 564, 572 S.W.2d 847 (1978); ignoring an order to halt and fleeing the investigating officer after a burglar alarm was set off, Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985); or fleeing after a girl in the house screamed, Wortham v. State, 5 Ark. App. 161, 634 S.W.2d 141 (1982) (distinguished from flight to avoid arrest: burglary conviction was reversed and reduced to criminal trespass). Here, a different reason existed for fleeing: Mr. Jackson sicced his rottweiler dog on appellant. I don’t find fleeing under that circumstance to be evidence of the required intent, but rather the exercise of prudent judgment. The fourth and fifth factors relied upon by the majority opinion were that appellant gave amickname, “June Bug,” and an improbable explanation, that he wanted to rake leaves. He was, however, in the predicament of being penned against a fence when Mr. Jackson asked him what his name was and why he was in the house. There is no indication that “June Bug” is anything other than the name customarily used by appellant, and I do not think it is unusual to give an improbable explanation while penned by a 125-pound rottweiler. The circumstances of this case and of the Wortham case, supra, are similar. There was no forced entry, and no objects were moved or touched. In both cases the party fled, one from a screaming girl and the other from a rottweiler. No prior convictions for theft or burglary were present in either case, although such convictions have been the deciding factor to show criminal intent in at least one Arkansas case. In Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992), a homeowner testified that she heard a noise at her back door and found appellant in her kitchen, looking at a scanner on a table. He told her that he had seen boys running from her house, had found the screen door wide open, and had come in to see what they had taken. Neighbors testified that they had seen appellant walk around the house but had not seen any boys, and the investigating officer stated that the back door had been forced open. The appellant also testified, and on cross-examination the State introduced evidence of prior theft and burglary convictions. The appellant in Rudd alleged error in the trial court’s allowing evidence of his prior convictions and claimed the evidence insufficient to support the burglary conviction. The supreme court discussed these points as follows: Clearly, the state’s case placed the appellant unlawfully in the Rogers’ house . . . and appellant’s testimony did nothing but enhance the state’s evidence when reading his questionable explanation of why Mrs. Rogers found him in her house. No one testified as to having seen anyone run from the Rogers’ house except the appellant. And, in giving his account of what happened, his story differed in both major and minor ways from those versions given by Mrs. Rogers and her neighbors. Clearly, the jury could infer from the evidence that he went to the Rogers’ house . . . thinking that Mrs. Rogers would not be at home. He went to the back door, and unlawfully forced it open, only to be surprised by Mrs. Rogers’ presence. Concerning appellant’s purpose when entering the Rogers’ house, the state introduced appellant’s prior theft and burglary convictions to show his intent to commit burglary and to counter appellant’s defense of mistake and his explanation as to why he entered the house .... . . . [W\ithout appellant’s prior theft and burglary convictions, the state had no evidence showing appellant’s reason for unlawfully entering the Rogers’ house. 308 Ark. at 406, 825 S.W.2d at 568 (emphasis added). In other words, the Rudd court held that forcing entry, looking at a moveable scanner, and giving an implausible explanation were not enough to affirm the burglary conviction without the added factor of proof of prior theft and burglary convictions. In the case presently on appeal, there are two similar factors: looking at but not touching a moveable stereo and giving an implausible explanation. The differing factors are hardly comparable: fleeing from a rottweiler here, versus forced entry and proof of prior theft and burglary convictions in Rudd. In Wortham v. State, supra, the accused entered a house where a loud radio was playing and two girls were painting in a bedroom. He fled when one of the girls saw him in the living room and screamed. He offered no explanation for entering the house, although this court surmised one when it said: From the evidence presented, it is not unreasonable to assume that appellant came to the house with no criminal purpose in mind and that he entered the open side door of the house when he could not get anyone to hear his knock above the noise of the music. When the young girl saw appellant and screamed, he could have panicked and then fled. This court noted that although flight from the scene of a crime can corroborate other proof of guilt, there was no evidence that the accused fled to elude arrest. We found the circumstantial evidence in Wortham to be insufficient and reduced the conviction from burglary to criminal trespass. Surely the implausible explanation offered here versus no explanation in Wortham does not sufficiently differentiate this case to justify affirming here and reversing in Wortham. I would reduce the burglary conviction in this case to criminal trespass, as we did in Wortham. I am authorized to advise that Judge John Jennings joins in this dissenting opinion.