Court Opinion

ID: 9943558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 20:02:30.144209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:18.935313
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 Verceles v. Cal. Commission on Teacher Credentialing CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION TWO

 JUNNIE VERCELES,                                                 B323426
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           v.                                                     Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  22STCV02113)
 CALIFORNIA COMMISSION
 ON TEACHER
 CREDENTIALING,
           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
      Junnie Verceles, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris Knudsen; Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kelsey Linnett, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Paloma Carrero, Deputy Attorney General
for Defendant and Respondent.

                __________________________________________
      Junnie Verceles, a teacher, was fired by the Los Angeles
Unified School District (LAUSD) for mistreating his students.
He sued the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing
(CCTC), the state credentialing agency, for imposing a 14-day
suspension of his teaching credential based on LAUSD’s
investigation. The trial court dismissed Verceles’s lawsuit.
Verceles appealed, representing himself. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Facts
      A.     LAUSD’s Termination of Verceles and Report to
      the CCTC
      Verceles was a middle school teacher for LAUSD in 2015,
when allegations of misconduct were raised against him.1
Verceles reportedly threw a book at a student, hit a student with
an iPad, and used force against a student. Verceles was removed
from his school and reassigned pending an investigation.
      Following the investigation, LAUSD suspended and/or
terminated Verceles for misconduct and reported its adverse
action to the CCTC.2
      B.     The CCTC and Its Investigating Arm
      The CCTC is an independent state agency that determines
the professional standards for obtaining teaching credentials in
California public schools. (Ed. Code, § 44225, subd. (d).) The
CCTC has jurisdiction to investigate and, if warranted, to take

      1 Verceles currently holds a California teaching credential
that is valid until April 1, 2025.
      2 The date of Verceles’s termination from LAUSD is not
clear from the record.

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disciplinary action against credential holders. (Ed. Code, §§
44242.5, 44421.) The CCTC is authorized to privately admonish
or publicly reprove a credential holder, or revoke or suspend a
teaching credential for immoral or unprofessional conduct,
refusal to obey school district regulations, or unfitness for service.
(Ed. Code, §§ 44421, 44440.)
       The CCTC appoints the Committee of Credentials
(Committee) to investigate allegations of misconduct by
credential holders, and, if necessary, to recommend any adverse
actions to be taken. (Earnest v. Commission on Teacher
Credentialing (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 62, 70 (Earnest).)
       The Committee’s investigation may consist of three phases:
“ ‘the preliminary review [citation], the initial review [citation],
and the formal review.’ ” (Earnest, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 68.) If the investigation continues to the initial review phase,
the credential holder is given notice that his or her fitness to hold
a teaching credential is under review and an opportunity to
provide written materials for the Committee’s consideration. (Id.
at p. 69.) If the investigation proceeds to the formal review
phase, the credential holder may appear at the hearing, answer
questions under oath, and the Committee may call witnesses to
testify. (Id. at p. 70.) If the Committee finds probable cause, the
credential holder may request an adjudicatory hearing before the
Office of Administrative Hearings. (Ibid.) Otherwise, the
Committee reports its probable cause findings and
recommendations of any adverse actions to the CCTC, which may
or may not adopt them. (Ibid.)

                                  3
      C.     The CCTC’s Suspension of Verceles’s
             Teaching Credential
       According to Verceles’s first amended complaint, after
learning of LAUSD’s adverse action, the CCTC notified Verceles
that he was the subject of an initial review of his fitness to hold a
teaching credential. The notice included LAUSD’s reports of the
three incidents of alleged misconduct.
       Verceles provided material to the CCTC “to clear his name”
and advised that LAUSD’s information “was biased against him,”
and “include[ed] incidents that were not thoroughly investigated,
the omission of dates and names of witnesses making allegations,
and student statements that were illegible or were not signed
under penalty of perjury.”
       The Committee reviewed Verceles’s responses, set a formal
review, and “required” him to travel to Sacramento for a hearing.
Prior to the hearing, the Committee “attempted to intimidate”
Verceles by informing him of the potential adverse actions if the
misconduct allegations were found true. Verceles submitted
additional information, which he maintained supported his
claims that both LAUSD and the CCTC engaged in corrupt and
discriminatory practices.
       At his formal review on September 11, 2019, the Committee
failed to discuss “any of the exculpatory evidence or inaccuracies
of the investigation that [Verceles] wanted [Committee members]
to address and explain.”
       On September 20, 2019, the Committee recommended that
Verceles’s teaching credential be suspended for 14 days. Verceles
requested the suspension be reconsidered; he never sought an
adjudication hearing before the Office of Administrative
Hearings. The Committee reviewed and upheld its suspension of

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Verceles’s teaching credential, which the CCTC enforced from
March 8 through March 21, 2020.
II.    Procedural Background
       Verceles timely filed an administrative complaint of
employment discrimination against the CCTC with the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing. He received a
right-to-sue notice. Verceles also filed a civil suit against
LAUSD.
       Representing himself, Verceles sued the CCTC for
damages. His verified first amended complaint alleged 11
separate causes of action against the CCTC: Five causes of
action for discrimination/retaliation in violation of the California
Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA), one cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and various
violations of the Education Code, California Constitution, the
Bagley-Keene Act, and 42 United States Code (USC) sections
1981 and 1983.
       The CCTC demurred to the first amended complaint in its
entirety and to the separate causes of action. Following a
hearing, the trial court sustained the demurrer on all grounds
raised by the demurrer. The court dismissed the first amended
complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
                            DISCUSSION
       Verceles contends the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to his first amended complaint without leave to amend.
I.     Standard of Review
       “In reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, we must ask (1) whether the demurrer
was properly sustained, and (2) whether leave to amend was
properly denied.” (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12

                                 5
Cal.App.5th 1331, 1335.) The first question requires us to
“independently evaluate whether the operative complaint states
facts sufficient to state a cause of action” (Alborzian v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 29, 34), and in so doing,
we accept as true “all material facts properly pled” in that
complaint (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th
148, 152). “The second question ‘requires us to decide whether
“ ‘ “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect [in the
operative complaint] can be cured by amendment.” ’ ” ’ ” (Schep,
supra, at p. 1335, quoting McClain v. Sav-On Drugs (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 684, 695, affd. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 951.) Because
Verceles proffers no suggestion on how to further amend his
complaint and because we perceive no viable way to do so, the
propriety of the dismissal order in this case turns entirely on
whether his complaint states one or more viable causes of action.
II.    The First Amended Complaint Was Properly
       Dismissed
       We independently agree with the trial court that Verceles’s
first amended complaint was properly dismissed on demurrer.
       A.     Statutory Immunity
              1.    Government Code section 818.4
       Government Code section 818.4, which the trial court
concluded was the basis of the CCTC’s immunity, provides that a
“public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance,
denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization.” (Gov. Code, § 818.4;
Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 997.)
The statute applies to discretionary, not mandatory decisions.
(See Corona v. State (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 723, 733.) It is

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undisputed the CCTC’s determination of the status of a teaching
credential is a discretionary act. The first amended complaint
alleges neither a lack of immunity nor a mandatory duty the
CCTC failed to discharge. All 11 of Verceles’s claims arise from
the CCTC’s suspension decision and thus fall within the scope of
immunity conferred by Government Code section 818.4. They
were properly dismissed on demurrer.
              2.     Government Code section 821.6
       All of Verceles’s claims are also barred by Government
Code section 821.6. That statute provides that a public employee
is not liable for injury caused by the employee’s instituting or
prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the
scope of the employee’s employment, even if the employee acts
maliciously and without probable cause. (Gov. Code, § 821.) This
immunity has been extended to public entity employers. (Gov.
Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).) We agree with the trial court that
because the gravamen of Verceles’s 11 claims are that CCTC’s
investigations, hearings, and decisions were wrongful,
discriminatory and/or retaliatory, this immunity applies. (Ross v.
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 1507, 1516.) The demurrer was properly sustained
on this ground.
       B.     Failure to State a Claim
              1.     Lack of standing
       The first amended complaint asserts FEHA claims of age,
color, race, national origin, sex, and gender discrimination;
retaliation; and denial of employment due to a history of
convictions. (See Gov. Code, §12921.) FEHA claims are
predicated on an employment relationship. (Vernon v. State of
California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 123.)

                                7
      To demonstrate the requisite employment relationship with
the CCTC, Verceles first relies on the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills
Act) (Gov. Code, § 3512 et seq.) in his first amended complaint.
The Dills Act established collective bargaining for state
employees. (Gov. Code, § 3512 [purpose of the Dills Act is to
“promote full communication between the state and its employees
by providing a reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
between the state and public employee organizations”].)
      The CCTC, Verceles’s only named defendant, is a state
agency subject to the Dills Act.3 (Ed. Code, § 44225, subd. (d).)
Verceles alleges he is a state employee as defined by the Dills
Act, which provides, in pertinent part: “ ‘State employee’ means
any civil service employee of the state, and the teaching staff of
schools under the jurisdiction of the State Department of
Education or the Superintendent of Public Instruction.” (Gov.
Code, § 3513, subd. (c).) However, Verceles fails to allege facts
showing he is, or has ever been employed in a civil service
position by the CCTC (or any other state agency), or by a school
“under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Education or
the Superintendent of Public Instruction.”4 While Verceles was

      3 LAUSD, by contrast, is a public-school employer subject
to the Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code
section 3540 et seq., which established collective bargaining for
California’s public schools (K-12) and community colleges.
      4 This language appears to refer to institutions in the State
Special Schools and Services Division. As a subdivision of the
California Department of Education, the State Special Schools
and Services Division furnishes services to deaf, hard-of-hearing,
blind and visually impaired students in addition to offering
LEA/district special education programs with assessment

                                 8
an employee at the relevant times alleged, he was not an
employee of the CCTC or the State of California.
       Nonetheless, the first amended complaint asserts the
CCTC and LAUSD were Verceles’s joint employers. “ ‘ “Joint
employment occurs when two or more persons [or entities] engage
the services of an employee in an enterprise in which the
employee is subject to the control of both.” ’ ” (Morales v. 22nd
Dist. Agricultural Assn. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 85, 94, fn. 14.) To
be a joint employer, an entity must have had the ability “(a) to
exercise control over . . . wages, hours or working conditions, [or]
(b) to suffer or permit [the] work, or (c) to engage, thereby
creating a common law employment relationship.” (Martinez v.
Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64.)
       “ ‘ “There is no magic formula for determining whether an
organization is a joint employer. Rather, the court must analyze
‘myriad facts surrounding the employment relationship in
question.’ No one factor is decisive.” ’ ” (St. Myers v. Dignity
Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 311.) “ ‘Factors to be taken
into account in assessing the relationship of the parties include
payment of salary or other employment benefits and Social
Security taxes, the ownership of the equipment necessary to
performance of the job, the location where the work is performed,
the obligation of the defendant to train the employee, the
authority of the defendant to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or
discharge the employee, the authority to establish work
schedules and assignments, the defendant’s discretion to
determine the amount of compensation earned by the employee,

services, technical assistance and staff development. (See Ed.
Code, §§ 59001, 59100.)

                                 9
the skill required of the work performed and the extent to which
it is done under the direction of a supervisor, whether the work is
part of the defendant’s regular business operations, the skill
required in the particular occupation, the duration of the
relationship of the parties, and the duration of the plaintiff’s
employment.’ ” “The most important factor is ‘ “the defendant’s
right to control the means and manner of the workers’
performance.” ’ ” (St. Myers, supra, at pp. 311–312, quoting
Vernon v. State of California, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 124–
126.)
       Verceles’s first amended complaint alleges: (1) The CCTC
controls Verceles’s wages: “As [Verceles] holds a clear credential
issued by the CCTC to get a paycheck, LAUSD also shares
control over [Verceles’s] wages as it determines when [he] gets
paid and how much money [he] can earn.” (2) The CCTC controls
the hiring of Verceles: The CCTC granted Verceles a teaching
credential allowing him to work for LAUSD; the school district
will rely on the CCTC’s Web site to confirm Verceles’s credential;
and the CCTC has “substantial direct and immediate control of
the hiring, firing, and discipline of teachers.” The “CCTC and
LAUSD share in the process as an employer of hiring [Verceles.]”
(3) The CCTC controls the disciplining of Verceles: The “CCTC
and LAUSD both share the responsibility of disciplining
employees in order to maintain a standard of good conduct for
teachers.” Verceles’s discipline history and credential record can
be viewed on the CCTC’s Web site by prospective employers.
(4) The CCTC supervises Verceles’s employment: “[Verceles] was
enrolled in a teacher credentialing program in order to obtain his
clear teaching credential.”

                                10
       Verceles’s allegations are insufficient to establish the CCTC
and LAUSD were joint employers of Verceles. First, most of the
allegations are based on a purported “shared” relationship
between the two entities over Verceles’s employment. Assuming
LAUSD was Verceles’s employer, whether the CCTC was
Verceles’s employer depends upon its relationship with Verceles
(primarily the CCTC’s right to control Verceles’s work
performance), not on the CCTC’s relationship with LAUSD.
       Second, nothing in the allegations or the record indicates
the CCTC hired Verceles to teach, set the amount of his
compensation or actually paid him for his services, provided him
with on-the-job training, supplies or equipment, determined his
work assignments, supervised his daily work performance, and
had the authority to discipline, promote, transfer, or terminate
Verceles. The first amended complaint fails to allege facts that, if
true, would show the CCTC to have been Verceles’s employer. In
the absence of an employment relationship, Verceles lacks
standing to sue the CCTC. Lack of standing is an appropriate
basis for sustaining a demurrer. (McKinny v. Board of Trustees
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 79, 90.)
             2.     Claims subject to Government Claims Act
       Pursuant to the Government Claims Act, a plaintiff seeking
money damages against public entities and public employees
acting within the scope of their employment is required to file an
initial claim with the relevant public entity. (See Gov. Code,
§§ 905, 950.2.) Failure to do so precludes the plaintiff from suing
the relevant public entity and public employees and thus
furnishes a ground for sustaining a demurrer. (Gov. Code,
§ 945.4; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730,
737–738.) Here, Verceles’s failure to plead he has complied with

                                11
the requirements of the Government Claims Act means he cannot
state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and violations of Education Code section 44944, article I,
section 7 of the California Constitution, and the Bagley-Keene
Act.
              3.   42 USC sections 1981 and 1983
       The trial court properly sustained the demurrer to
Verceles’s alleged violations of 42 USC sections 1981 and 1983.
Government entities which are an “ ‘arm of the state’ ” are
immune from litigation under those statutes. The reason is such
entities are not persons within the meaning of sections 1981 and
1983. (Mackey v. Trustees of California State University (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 640, 653–654.)
       We have independently concluded the trial court did not err
in this case.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed. The parties will bear their own costs
on appeal.

                                         LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     ASHMANN-GERST, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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