Court Opinion

ID: 9727437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:37:11.353946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:37.866574
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The factual background as set forth by the majority shows a previous section 19(b — 1) petition having been filed December 28, 1987. The claimant in this first petition alleged that he had ordered the records of the medical providers and would provide them prior to the hearing. At the time of this first section 19(b — 1) hearing, claimant provided the records of Dr. Arias which contained the doctor’s notes through December 3, 1987, which was the last visit prior to claimant’s automobile accident of December 11, 1987. As the arbitrator points out in his decision: "The only document which mentioned the automobile accident was a letter to the petitioner’s attorney dated February 18, 1988, which was, therefore, issued subsequent to the time the respondent was allowed to respond to the [section] 19(b — 1) petition.” Section 19(b — 1) allowed the respondent only 15 days from the filing date, December 20, 1987, to January 4, 1988, to respond. The arbitrator’s decision on the second section 19(b — 1) petition also shows: "The 19(b — 1) petition, filed on December 28, 1987, did not list the River Grove and Melrose Park Clinics as medical facilities where the petitioner had been treated. In fact, the petitioner was not seen at these clinics until January, 1988. As such, the respondent would have had no opportunity to present these records at the initial [section] 19(b — 1) hearing.” As the arbitrator noted, respondent had the right to rely upon claimant’s assertion that he had the complete records of Dr. Arias. The arbitrator also found: "The record is clear that the petitioner did not submit the full records of Dr. Arias at the first [section] 19(b — 1) hearing. The records of the River Grove and Melrose Park Clinics could not have been placed into evidence since the petitioner did not receive treatment at those facilities until after the [section] 19(b — 1) petition was filed.” A review of the arbitrator’s award on the first petition and the Commission’s specific findings and confirmation of the first award do not even mention the December 11, 1987, accident. How can this be collateral estoppel? It is interesting to note, both section 19(b — 1) petitions were heard by the same arbitrator. Owens is cited with respect to the application of collateral estoppel. Owens requires that "the issue of fact decided in the first case is identical to the issue raised in the present action.” (Owens, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 821, 561 N.E.2d at 149.) As stated above, there was no determination of whether there was an intervening accident. Neither the first award nor first decision even mentions the accident of December 11, 1987, or its effect upon claimant’s application. For the same reasons, there was no judgment on the merits on the effect of the intervening accident. The factual issue was not "actually and necessarily litigated.” In defending its position, the majority presupposes that the arbitrator would have found good cause to extend the time for closing proofs at the first hearing. As argued by the respondent, section 19(b — 1) proceedings are specific as to the contents of the petition and the response. Such petitions request immediate relief and deal only with temporary disability. "No award may be entered for permanent [partial] disability ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b — 1).) There has been no determination of whether the intervening accident should bar further recovery. SLATER, J., joins this dissent.