Court Opinion

ID: 9418522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:29:20.813232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:04.772830
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McKenna,
dissenting.
I concur in the judgment of the Court. I dissent from the grounds upon which the Court bases it. It is my opinion that the record establishes that the requisition of the land was made under the first paragraph (a) of the Housing Act of March 1, 1918, the fee simple in the land acquired and, necessarily, it became subject to all of the uses accessorial to the fee, every use whatever; for the use of trolley tracks to connect with a street railway as in this case, or for the erection of a church for the spiritual guidance of employees and their families, or for a dance hall and an accompanying refectory for the amusement of their leisure. Indeed, for any use under the sun.
Twenty days after the requisition, the President seeing the situation and that the land was so subject, availed of it — availed of the power given him under the Act of April 22, 1918, c. 62, 40 Stat. 535, to take over transportation systems for the transportation of shipyard and plant employees, issuing his executive order of June 18, 1918, by which he directed that the Fleet Corporation should “ have and exercise all power and authority vested ” in him by *256the act. By this direction and delegation, the Fleet Corporation proceeded to construct the trolley tracks with the assistance of the Public Service Railway Company, a defendant in the case. The land became a terminal for the latter Company.
The act of the President was in the public service, but it was not an act of requisition of the land, it was after the requisition of the land, — not its requisition. If this were not so there is color for the accusation of the Land & Improvement Company that the Housing Act was used as a pretense — used under the pretense of acquiring land for the building of houses when the purpose was, in effect, a different one.
During the taking of the testimony, counsel for the Fleet Corporation several times declared that the requisition was under the Housing Act and that whatever use the land was subsequently put to was immaterial.
I quote from the record as follows:
“ Now then, the power under which we took this land was a power delegated under 40 Statutes 438, directly delegated to the Fleet Corporation so that we could not in this requisition say that the Fleet Corporation took this land by virtue of the Act of March 1, 1918, and by virtue of the Act of April 22, 1918, because the power was not given to us under both of those Acts, it was only [given] under one of them.
“ The Court: You claim you were the deputy of the President?
“ Mr. Pearse: Later.
“ Mr. Jacobsen: After the taking of the land we claim we were. At the time we took the land we had the right to take it by virtue of statute, and after we had it we used it by virtue of power delegated to us by the President. [Italics mine.] Those are the actual facts; in other words, we took this land under a direct power delegated to us.”
*257It will be observed that Mr. Pearse, of counsel for the' Fleet Corporation, in response to the Court’s inquiry as to when the Fleet Corporation became the deputy of the President, answered, “ Later.” It will also be observed that Mr. Jacobsen, of counsel for the Fleet Corporation, continuing his comment said that, “ after the taking of the land we [the Fleet Corporation] claim we were.” “Later”, and “after the taking of the land”, meaning-after the executive order. Until it there is nothing in the record to show that there was prophecy or thought of trolley tracks or transportation systems.
The opinion of the Court now delivered is, in my view, in opposition to this. There is an attempt at consistency with it by the declaration that the requisition was under the act and for the uses and purposes expressed in the act and that the uses and purposes were facilities for neighboring shipyards. In determining the correctness of this conclusion all paragraphs of the act must, of course, be considered, but not one of them has provision for any housing of employees except what houses may be erected on the land and for the employees who should occupy them.
As I have said, the President’s order was moved by consideration of the public service. The difference between the Court and me is how the service was accomplished— was it by requisition of the land or the use of the land after requisition?
I think the latter — the Court declares the former. In other words, it was a part of the requisition. Of course, the occupation of the land after the construction of the trolley tracks was as useful, whether the right was acquired and exercised one way as the other — the trolley would be a facility as much in one case as in the other; and to ascribe it to one and not to the other is to give that one a gloss and show that it is denied to the other — a fictitious importance.
I repeat, the difference between the Court and me is one of means — not of effect, and my view is that of the Circuit *258Court of Appeals; it is that of the Land & Improvement Company; it is, in essential foundation, that of the Government. These circumstances cannot, of course, obstruct the declaration of superior authority, as this Court is, although the grounds of the exertion of the authority may surprise.