Court Opinion

ID: 9703939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:13:37.337664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:53.215097
License: Public Domain

Irvine, Justice
(concurring specially).
I agree that there must be a new trial if all issues are to be con*459sidered. However, if the case were properly tried, it seems likely that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action for defamation or interference with future contracts (but not both), and that he could prove damages. Therefore, in order possibly to avoid the agony and the expense of a new trial, I would give the plaintiff the option of agreeing to a remittitur to One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000).
Odden, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the concurring opinion of Judge Irvine.
Johnson, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the concurring opinion of Judge Irvine.
On October 16, 1975, the following order was filed:
Upon all the files and records herein, and being fully advised in the premises, and for the reasons stated in the memorandum which is attached to and hereby made part of this order,
It Is Hereby Ordered that the relief requested by respondent John J. Wild, M.D., in his motion dated August 15, 1975, be and hereby is denied.
It Is Also Hereby Ordered that the order of the Clerk of the Supreme Court entered August 25, 1975, disallowing to defendants-appellants the taxation of costs and disbursements in this matter, be and hereby is affirmed.
It Is Also Ordered and Directed that the stay of proceedings heretofore granted in this matter is now hereby vacated, and this matter is remanded to the District Court of Hennepin County for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court filed on the 17th day of January, 1975.
Dated this 16th day of October, 1975.
By the Court:
ROBERT J. SHERAN
Chief Justice
MEMORANDUM
The relief requested by respondent’s motion dated August 15, 1975, implicitly involves the following contentions:
*460(1) That the district court judges appointed to serve as the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota for the purpose of considering and deciding the appeal here involved were without authority to act;
(2) That some of the judges so appointed were not qualified to decide this case by reason of their interest in its outcome;
(3) That the opinion filed herein on the 17th day of January, 1975, by said judges exercising the authority of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota for the purpose of deciding this appeal and the subsequent order by said judges denying respondent’s petition for reargument require confirmation by the permanent members of the Supreme Court and are subject to revision or review by the permanent members of the Minnesota Supreme Court who did not participate in the decision;
(4) That this court should allow the attorneys for respondent $500,000 as attorneys fees and $20,000 as costs in the interests of justice and equity.
1. Minn. Const., art. 6, § 2, provides:
“The supreme court shall consist of one chief judge and not less than six nor more than eight associate judges as the legislature may establish. It shall have original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as may be prescribed by law and appellate jurisdiction in all cases, but there shall be no trial by jury in said court.
“Judges of the district court may be assigned as provided by law temporarily to act as judges of the supreme court upon its request.”
Minn. St. 2.724, subd. 2, provides in part:
“Any number of justices may disqualify themselves from hearing and considering a case, in which event the supreme court may assign temporarily a retired justice of the supreme court or a district judge to hear and consider the case in place of each disqualified justice. * *
In this case, affidavits and representations and actions filed *461on behalf of respondent were of such a nature that each of the permanent members of the Minnesota Supreme Court decided not to participate in the decision of this appeal.1 It was therefore determined that the procedure prescribed by Minn. St. 2.724, subd. 2, should be employed. The permanent members of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota then resolved, unanimously, that the following principles for the selection of replacement judges should be applied:
(A) That the chief judge of each of the ten judicial districts of the State of Minnesota except the second (Ramsey County) would be invited to hear and consider the appeal in this case.2
(B) That in any case where the chief judge of a judicial district declined to serve, the judge of that district senior in service as a district judge would be invited to serve in the chief district judge’s stead.3
Pursuant to these principles of selection, the Chief Justice, acting for the permanent court, invited the following chief district court judges to serve on this appeal:
The Honorable Robert J. Breunig, Chief Judge of the First Judicial District;
The Honorable Glenn E. Kelley, Chief Judge of the Third Judicial District;
The Honorable Douglas K. Amdahl, Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial District;
*462The Honorable Milton D. Mason, Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial District;
The Honorable Donald C. Odden, Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial District;
The Honorable Chester G. Rosengren, Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial District;
The Honorable C. A. Rolloff, Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial District;
The Honorable James E. Preece, Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial District;
The Honorable Robert D. Gillespie, Chief Judge of the Tenth Judicial District.
In three judicial districts, the chief judge of the district was unable to accept the invitation to serve. As a result, the following district judges senior in service in their respective districts were invited to serve:
The Honorable Rolf Fosseen, Senior District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District;
The Honorable L. J. Irvine, Senior District Judge except for the Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial District;
The Honorable William T. Johnson, Senior District Judge except for the Chief Judge of the Tenth Judicial District.
As a result of this process, the judges who constituted the panel for this case were:
The Honorable Robert J. Breunig, Chief Judge of the First Judicial District;
The Honorable Glenn E. Kelley, Chief Judge of the Third Judicial District;
The Honorable Rolf Fosseen, Senior District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District;
The Honorable L. J. Irvine, Senior District Judge except for the Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial District;
The Honorable Donald C. Odden, Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial District;
*463The Honorable Chester G. Rosengren, Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial District;
The Honorable C. A. Rolloff, Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial District;
The Honorable James E. Preece, Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial District;
The Honorable William T. Johnson, Senior District Judge except for the Chief Judge of the Tenth Judicial District.
This method of selection complied with the authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions set out above. The suggestion that each of the permanent members of the Minnesota Supreme Court selected his own replacement is contrary to fact and without merit.
2. The judges who were appointed to hear and decide this case and did so were not disqualified from serving by reason of interest in its outcome. The burden of establishing disabling disqualification rests with the party who asserts it.4 We find nothing in the affidavits filed by and on behalf of respondent which supports the assertions of respondent in this regard.
3. The district judges assigned the responsibility of hearing and deciding this case acted as the Minnesota Supreme Court in so far as this appeal is concerned.5 The opinion filed on January 17, 1975, was the official pronouncement of the Minnesota *464Supreme Court with respect to this case. The original opinion, filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, is initialed by each of the judges who participated in the decision. By initialing the opinion, each judge expressed his agreement with and adoption of its contents. This done, the opinion, written “per curiam,” became the official opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court, and made final the disposition of this case, subject only to the provisions of law pertaining to petitions for rehearing.6 The petition for rehearing, constituting in effect a challenge to the opinion as originally filed, was properly referred to the district judges who heard and decided the case.7 When the petition for rehearing was 'denied by order dated July 31,1975, the temporary panel of judges had completed their responsibilities.8 The opinion filed January 17,1975, is the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court in this case and it constitutes a final disposition of this matter on appeal. Upon remand, the district court will have jurisdiction to proceed with the new trial mandated by the opinion. Because the temporary panel’s opinion is based upon the assignment of authority contained in art. 6, § 2, of the Constitution and Minn. St. 2.724, subd. 2, it is entitled to the same weight and credit as any other opinion of this Court.9 We acknowledge and follow this principle by our action today.
4. Respondent’s request that attorneys’ fees in the amount of $500,000 and costs in the amount of $20,000 be allowed is denied.
5. The order of August 25, 1975, disallowing taxation of costs *465and disbursements to the appellants, is affirmed on authority of Village of Blaine v. Independent School District No. 12, 265 Minn. 9, 121 N. W. 2d 183 (1963).
Let this Memorandum be attached to and made part of the foregoing Order.
R.J.S.
Mr. Justice Otis took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and did not participate in establishing the principle of selection adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court explained in the memorandum.

 One of the permanent members of the Minnesota Supreme Court is and for some time has been a Director of the Foundations. None of the other members of the Supreme Court has served the Foundations in any capacity.

 The second judicial district (Ramsey County) was excluded because appellant’s charitable activities have been centered there.

 A statement setting forth the above principles and procedures followed in the selection of replacement judges in this case was made by the permanent Supreme Court on May 8, 1975. The statement was filed ■with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and copies sent to the parties involved.

 Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil Refining Co. 441 F. 2d 631 (5 Cir. 1971), certiorari denied, 404 U. S. 941, 92 S. Ct. 285, 30 L. ed. 2d 255, rehearing denied, 404 U. S. 996, 92 S. Ct. 532, 30 L. ed. 2d 549. Cf. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N. W. 2d 762 (1956).

 Since, under Minn. St. 2.724, subd. 2, “any number of justices may disqualify themselves from hearing and considering” a particular case, it follows that when all the justices disqualify themselves the substitute court becomes the Minnesota Supreme Court for the case in question. See, United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124 (7 Cir, 1973). As was held in Fay v. District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate Dist., Division 2, 200 Cal. 522, 254 P. 2d 896 (1927), a substitute justice, assigned to assist an appellate tribunal, has the same powers as possessed by the regularly constituted members of the tribunal.

 Rule 140, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

 United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124, 1168-69 (7 Cir. 1973).

 A substitute judge has power and authority to act until the completion of any business begun before him, but his commission expires with the final disposition of the case. State v. Meisinger, 258 Minn. 297, 103 N. W. 2d 864 (1960); Anderson v. Bledsoe, 139 Cal. App. 650, 34 P. 2d 760 (1934). Upon selection of a special or substitute judge, the powers of the regular judge are suspended so far as they relate to the case which the former has been chosen to try or hold. Kane v. Ferguson, 195 Okl. 292, 157 P. 2d 194 (1945).

 State v. Wear, 145 Mo. 162, 46 S. W. 1099 (1898).