Court Opinion

ID: 9411893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 14:06:00.416425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:16.885524
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                        Court of Appeals

               NOS. 2021-CA-1269-MR & 2021-CA-1375-MR

JOHN BYRNES                               APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

   APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE ERIC JOSEPH HANER, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 19-CA-001454

KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY                  APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

                           OPINION AND ORDER
                               DISMISSING

                               ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE, AND LAMBERT
JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: The instant cases are before us following remand for an

evidentiary hearing in Byrnes v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Company, No.

2019-CI-1790-MR, 2021 WL 1583865 (Apr. 23, 2021). Because the parties have
appealed from an interlocutory opionion and order that did not adjudicate all the

claims, we dismiss the appeal.

               John Byrnes (Byrnes) represented three individuals who had been

involved in a minor, motor vehicle incident. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual

Insurance Company (KFB) insured Byrnes’ clients and provided them their basic

reparations benefits (BRB). KFB then informed Byrnes that it had its own counsel

to pursue its personal injury protection BRB subrogation. KFB then instituted an

arbitration proceeding against the tortfeasor’s insurance company.

               Byrnes successfully settled his clients’ claims with the tortfeasor’s

insurance carrier, and KFB successfully obtained reimbursement for BRB in the

arbitration proceeding. Byrnes then requested attorney’s fees from KFB pursuant

to KRS1 304.39-070(5).2 KFB refused the demand, asserting there was no legal

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
    That statute reads:

               An attorney representing a secured person in any action
               filed under KRS 304.39-060 shall be entitled to a
               reasonable attorneys’ fee in the event that reparations
               benefits paid to said secured person by that secured
               person’s reparation’s obligor are reimbursed by any
               insurance carrier on behalf of a tortfeasor who is the
               defendant in any such action filed by the said secured
               person or in the event such potential “action” is settled by
               said potential tortfeasor’s insurance carrier on his behalf
               prior to the filing of any such suit.

                                           -2-
requirement to pay any attorney’s fee. Byrnes then filed a complaint in Jefferson

Circuit Court against KFB. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to KFB,

and on appeal we reversed and remanded for the Trial Court to conduct a hearing

pursuant to Baker v. Motorists Insurance Companies, 695 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1985),

and determine if Byrnes conferred a benefit upon KFB, thus entitling Byrnes to

attorney’s fees for said benefit. We further remanded Byrnes’ remaining claims,

including requests for compensatory and punitive damages raised under various

theories including an alleged violation of the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement

Practice Act. We specifically stated, “After the determination of entitlement to the

statutory fees, the circuit court then shall address Byrnes’ remaining claims, if not

otherwise rendered moot by the court’s ruling.” Byrnes v. Kentucky Farm Bureau

Insurance Co., 2021 WL 1582865, *5 (emphasis added).

              The Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and entered an

opinion and order finding Byrnes was entitled to $500 in attorney’s fees, but the

opinion and order is silent on Byrnes’ remaining claims. The opinion and order

does not contain any finality language per CR3 54.02. Indeed, it does not appear

that the opinion and order was intended to be a final determination of all claims, as

during closing arguments both parties noted there were additional claims

outstanding that would be moot only if there were no award of attorney’s fees.

3
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                         -3-
The Trial Court noted it needed additional proof on those claims, and KFB

specifically requested additional proceedings on those claims if there was an award

of attorney’s fees. The opinion and order granted attorney’s fees, thus there are

additional claims outstanding.

             Curiously, both parties’ briefs have addressed a punitive damages

claim on appeal, though neither side has cited to any opinion or order on the

subject. KFB even states, “The Circuit Court’s Order dismissing these claims

should be upheld.” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Brief at 19. KFB provides no

citation to where we should find this order in the record, and we have discovered

no such order in our review of the record.

             “Only a final order is appealable.” Town of Wallins v. Luten Bridge

Co., 291 Ky. 73, 163 S.W.2d 276, 279 (1942). See also Wright v. Ecolab, Inc.,

461 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Ky. 2015). Final judgments are those that either

“adjudicat[e] all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding” or have

been “made final under Rule 54.02.” CR 54.01. “While the parties did not raise

the issue of appellate jurisdiction in their briefs, we are the guardians of our

jurisdiction and thus are obligated to raise a jurisdictional issue sua sponte if the

underlying order appears to lack finality.” Padgett v. Steinbrecher, 355 S.W.3d

457, 459-60 (Ky. App. 2011) (citations omitted).

                                          -4-
             The instant opinion and order lacks such finality. It neither

adjudicates all claims nor contains finality language. The parties below informed

the Trial Court that additional proceedings would be necessary if the Trial Court

awarded attorney’s fees. The Trial Court logically is expecting additional

proceedings, not an appeal of its interlocutory order. Byrnes’ claims alleging

negligence per se, statutory bad faith, and violations of the Kentucky Unfair

Claims Settlement Practice Acts, with corresponding requests for compensatory

and punitive damages, remain outstanding.

             Accordingly, as the parties have appealed from a non-final judgment,

we DISMISS the instant appeal.

             ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: _July 21, 2023_____
                                               JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-                 BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-
APPELLEE:                                  APPELLANT:

Jeffrey A. Sexton                          Brian D. Stempien
Louisville, Kentucky                       Louisville, Kentucky

                                         -5-