Court Opinion

ID: 9626048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:00:19.552708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:20.074845
License: Public Domain

BOSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority enter judgment for the defendants upon a purported issue which neither the trial judge nor the parties recognized as in the case. By adopting a view of the evidence which the parties did not take and which was not submitted to the jury the majority sustain the entry of judgment in the defendants’ favor notwithstanding the return of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. In that manner the plaintiff is deprived *115of trial by jury of a purported issue which the majority deem the crux of this case.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff deposited the sum of $5,000, mentioned by the majority, with the defendant Tucker “subject to, and conditioned upon plaintiff’s father loaning plaintiff the money for the down payment of $20,000 to be made in addition to said deposit.” There can be no doubt but what the oral condition precedent was attached to the down payment. The first time that the defendant Tucker saw the plaintiff he noticed that the plaintiff was a young man, and realizing that the purchase price of this ranch called for a large sum, inquired of the plaintiff whether he had arranged for needed financial assistance. At that point the plaintiff told Tucker fully that he was forced to look to his father for financing and that all of his commitments and agreements pertaining to the purchase of the ranch would have to be conditioned upon his father’s willingness to lend him the needed money. Tucker, as a witness, reluctantly but nevertheless fully conceded that the conversation occurred and that he was the one who started it. It is clear from his testimony that he did not wish to devote time to the plaintiff, a very young man, unless needed finances were available to the plaintiff. That is why he made his inquiries of the plaintiff the first time that the plaintiff came to his office. It is also clear that the oral condition precedent was attached to the contemplated transaction, not as a temporary expedient but as a provision which would protect the plaintiff until his father could view the ranch.
The manner in which the plaintiff and Tucker viewed the coming of plaintiff’s father from California to the ranch is highly significant. If the consummation of the transaction was not dependent upon (1) the *116father’s favorable reaction to the ranch and (2) his willingness to lend the plaintiff $20,000, the visit of the father would have been a social event only. The father was elderly and ill. The trip for him was arduous. His coming to the ranch was viewed as vitally important.
After the father had inspected the ranch and had announced (a) his dissatisfaction with it and '(b) his unwillingness to finance his son in its purchase, the contemplated purchase at once came to an end. The plaintiff immediately gave Tucker the unwelcome news and demanded the return of the sum of $5,000. The foregoing clearly indicates that the oral condition precedent was still in effect.
It seems fair to infer that the trial judge did not believe that the oral condition precedent was of short duration only and that it was discarded a month or two before the plaintiff’s father came to the ranch from California. The trial judge denied the defendants’ motions for a judgment of involuntary nonsuit and for a directed verdict. He sustained the defendants’ motion for the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict under a belief that the plaintiff had waived the oral condition precedent.
The instructions to the jury render it very clear that the sole issue submitted to them was this: was an oral condition precedent formed by the parties and did it render any agreement by the plaintiff to purchase contingent upon his father’s willingness to finance him. No other issue concerning the substantive rights of the parties was submitted to the jury. The pertinent instruction reads:
“Here’s the issue you have to worry about in this case. * * * I want to read it to you, and I want you to listen most carefully, because we are *117now involved in determining what it is you have to be looking for.
“The plaintiff has alleged that he deposited said sum of $5000.00 with the def endants as earnest money on the purchase of said O’Bryant farm, subject to and conditioned, however, upon the plaintiff’s father lending or loaning the plaintiff the money for the down payment of $20,000 to be made in addition to said deposit; that thereafter, plaintiff’s father refused to loan plaintiff said money; that as a result of plaintiff’s father’s refusal to loan the plaintiff said money, the plaintiff was and is entitled to the return of said $5000.00
“Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you find that there was an agreement orally entered into between these parties providing that this contract — the earnest money agreement — would not go into effect or be binding on the parties unless the plaintiff was able to raise -the $20,000 from his father, and if you further find that he was not able to get the $20,000 from his father then the plaintiff is entitled to the return of $5000.00 from the defendants. In other words, if your finding is that an oral agreement existed whereby this earnest money receipt — Exhibit ‘11’ — was not to be binding under any circumstances unless the plaintiff was able to get the extra $20,000 as a down payment, then of course plaintiff is entitled to his money. But if you find that there wasn’t any such oral agreement, and the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that — if you find there wasn’t any oral agreement at all, and ‘agreement’ means among the parties^-between the parties — regarding the financing by the father, then of course he isn’t entitled to get his money back. This 'Court holds as a matter •of law that if the agreement — the earnest money receipt — was entered into, if it in fact was entered into, then under no circumstances would the plaintiff be entitled to the return of his $5000.00, and the defendants were right in the forfeiting of the money.
“Now, it is that simple. Was there in fact an *118oral agreement between tbe parties providing that this agreement — tbe earnest money receipt— wouldn’t go into effect unless the plaintiff was able to get the additional $20,000 from his father? If you find that that agreement exists — if you find that it exists, and that it continued to exist even at the time when this earnest money receipt was signed, then plaintiff is entitled to $5,000. * * *”
When the paragraph of the instructions last quoted, in referring to the oral condition precedent, said: “If you find that it exists, and that it continued to exist even at the time when this earnest money receipt was signed,” it undoubtedly meant that if the plaintiff and Tucker, when they first met, agreed that the oral condition precedent should extend down to the day when the plaintiff’s father reached a decision upon financing the purchase of the ranch, the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict. It will be noticed that the instructions said nothing about changing the agreement, modifying it, or waiving any part of it. I have quoted the entire instructions which stated the substantive law governing the rights of the parties. Further, the trial judge rejected an instruction requested by the defendants which read:
“Further, if you find that there was such a condition, then you should consider whether or not the condition, if any, was waived by the plaintiff, and in that connection if you find that the plaintiff conducted himself in such a manner with ref erence to this transaction as to indicate that the condition had either been fulfilled or was no longer of importance to the plaintiff, such conduct, if any, would amount in law to a waiver of such condition.”
The rejection of that requested instruction manifestly indicates that no issue of waiver was in the case. The treatment of the subject just mentioned indicates that *119the instructions meant that if the parties formed an oral condition precedent which extended down to the day when the father visited the ranch, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, but that if such a condition precedent was not formed, the defendants were entitled to prevail.
The jury tried no issue concerning the modification, waiver, or termination of the oral condition precedent. The evidence clearly indicates that the oral condition precedent was formed during the first meeting of the plaintiff and Tucker. In short, the majority decide this case upon a purported issue that the pleadings do not form and which was never submitted to the jury.
Waiver was not plead. When an opportunity to plead waiver is available, it must be plead: Miller Construction Co. v. Watts Construction Co., 223 Or 504, 355 P2d 215; Williams v. Mt. Hood Ry and Power Co., 57 Or 251, 110 P 490, 111 P 17; Anno Cas. 1913A 177; 56 Am Jur, Waiver, § 18, page 118; and Clark on Code Pleading, 2d ed. 284. In this case the defendants had ample opportunity to plead waiver if they had any thought that the plaintiff had waived the oral condition precedent. The plaintiff has never had any trial whatever upon the matter of waiver. The answer does not plead waiver, and no issue of that kind was submitted to the jury.
Possibly the majority do not make their decision turn upon waiver, but appear to believe that after the plaintiff and Tucker had created the alleged oral condition precedent they abandoned it when some papers were signed. No one testified to that effect, and as we have seen, the parties intended that all of the plaintiff’s commitments to purchase should be conditioned upon his father’s willingness to advance the first pay*120ment. The paper which the plaintiff signed is perfectly in harmony wtih the oral condition precedent which the plaintiff and Tucker agreed upon. An oral condition precedent of this kind does not contradict the writing to which it is attached. It merely indicates that the writing never became effective or that it does not represent an entire integration.
A motion for the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be sustained if substantial evidence supports the verdict. See Oregon Constitution, Article VII (amended) § 3. No one asserts that the verdict lacks support by substantial evidence.
It is seen from the foregoing that the majority decide this case upon an issue that was not plead and by taking a view of the evidence that even the parties had not adopted.
The challenged judgment should be vacated and one should be entered for the plaintiff based upon the verdict.
I dissent.
Chief Justice McAllister and Justice Sloan join in this dissent.