Court Opinion

ID: 9834089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:16:55.404027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.478768
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[5, 6] Appellants, in their motion for a rehearing, strongly urge that this court is in error in affirming the judgment of the trial court, and submit three grounds of error. They also insist that we review Blythe v. Crump Bros., 28 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 66 S. W. 885, and Sealing v. First National Bank, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 154, 87 S. W. 716, used in their brief, but to which we made no reference in disposing of the case. In view of the fact that, as we are advised, another case is pending in this court involving the identical question disposed of in this case, we have concluded to more fully express our views upon some features of the case. It is insisted that, under the facts found and stated in the opinion, Mrs. Chapman had no title to the automobile and was unlawfully in possession of same, and that therefore Wiley acquired no title. The insistence is that Mrs. Chapman was the bailee of the automobile merely; that having failed to comply with the terms of the contract under which she was in possession, in several particulars, she forfeited whatever rights she had under the termsi of the contract, and was in fact amenable to a criminal prosecution under article 1348, Vernon’s Criminal Statutes, for having fraudulently converted the automobile to her own use, she having possession thereof under a contract of hiring. The terms of the contract under which Mrs. Chapman was put in possession of the property is set out in the opinion. It is referred to by appellants as a lease contract and is so designated by the contract itself. But while it is in form of bailment for hire, it provides for and had in view by its terms a sale of the automobile upon the conditions stated. Some confusion is found in the earlier reports in efforts to distinguish between the different forms of contract under which parties undertook to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price where a sale of a chattel was in contemplation by taking some kind of security on the thing sold. In some instances, the instruments were held not to be within the registration laws, owing to the interpretations to be placed upon the contract, thus confusing the question of its registration to the injury of third persons, and thus favoring secret reservations of title, and conducive to fraud and collusion. Knittel v. Cushing, 57 Tex. 354, 44 Am. Rep. 598; Dunn v. Elser, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 720, and cases there referred to. We need not go into a discussion of those cases, but refer to them solely for the purpose of enabling us to more fully appreciate and apply the purpose and need of the two registration articles of the statute as amended, referred to in the opinion.
The state’s public policy is thus manifested in the two articles of the statute. Article 5654 declares that all reservations of the title to or property in chattels as security for the purchase money thereof shall be held to be chattel mortgages and, when possession is delivered to the vendee, is void as to creditors and bona fide purchasers, unless such reservations be in writing and registered as required of chattel mortgages, and the only exception made in the article is that it shall not be construed to contravene the landlord and tenant act. Registration is essential to give the instrument effect as to creditors and bona fide purchasers where possession is given by the owner to the purchaser. Brothers v. Mundell, 60 Tex. 246; Keller v. Smalley, 63 Tex. 519; Bowen et al. v. Lansing Wagon Works, 91 Tex. 385, 43 S. W. 872; Eason v. *982De Long, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 531, 86 S. W. 347, and cases cited. It is insisted, however, that the registration of the instrument required by the above article has no application to the contract in this case for the reason that Mrs. Chapman, having no title could convey none. That, probably, is a correct statement of the law as formerly stated in some of the opinions. We think the confusion in some of the earlier decisions referred to above is removed by the enactment of the above article 5654. See Judge Willson’s note at end of Dunn v. Elser, supra. Since the enactment of the above article of the statute, the uniform holding of our courts is that all reservations of title to property in chattels are chattel mortgages, and, when, possession is delivered to the vendee, the reservation of title, unless registered, is void as to bona fide purchasers, such as we- find Wiley to be. If such is not the effect of the statute, it has but little, if any, application. The contract certainly by its terms contains a reservation of title. It provides for a sale of the automobile; possession was delivered to the vendee; Wiley purchased without notice of the reservation, or any of the conditions in the contract. It is immaterial as to the form of the contract. The equity of Wiley in making the purchase is made by the statute a legal right and grows out of the fact that he has parted with a valuable consideration for the thing-purchased without notice of the reserved title or other provisions in the instrument. Appellants insist, under this ground of error, that it is not contrary to the public' policy Of this state to award them the relief prayed for, and refer to the article of the Penal Code (supra) under which, it is claimed, Mrs. Chapman could be prosecuted for a crime in disposing of the automobile. If such be true, and wo are not dealing with that branch of the case, it would follow that article 5654, supra, would have no application if Mrs. Chapman, by disposing of the automobile, would be guilty of the crime indicated in the article of the Penal Code referred to. But public policy has been designated by Mr. Justice Burroughs as “an unruly horse pursuing us, and, when you once get astride of it, you never know where -it will carry you.” We think, however, the public policy of the state as between appellants and Wiley is fixed by the articles of the Civil Code, supra. Public policy is manifested by public acts, legislative and judicial. Giant Powder Co. v. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 42 Fed. 470, 8 L. R. A. 700; Picket Pub. Co. v. Commissioners, 36 Mont. 188, 92 Pac. 524, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, 122 Am. St. Rep. 352, 12 Ann. Cas. 986.
[7] The sustaining of the judgment of the-court as to Wiley is not, in our judgment, denying to appellants any right they had under the law of the state of California, in that we fail to give full faith and credit to the public acts of that state, as claimed in appellants’ second ground of error.
[8] We are requested to discuss Blythe v. Crump and Scaling v. Bank, supra. Whether the cases are in conflict or not in conflict, we think we need not discuss them. If in conflict, we do not follow them. The cases speak for themselves. Our opinion in this case would not in the least settle a conflict between our holding and the holding in those cases. But for the statement of the Seventh Court of Civil Appeals in Farmer v. Evans, 192 S. W. 343, and referred to in our opinion, we would not think Blythe v. Crump in conflict, under the facts of that case, as tested by the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in San Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 90 Tex. 78, 37 S. W. 311, in determining what constitutes a conflict. Under that rule, to be in conflict, the rule announced in the Blythe-Crump Case and the case at bar “must be based practically upon the same state of facts and announce antagonistic conclusions,” or of such a natux-e that one would operate to overrule the other in case they were both rendered in the same court. In the first place, we note that the Blythe-Crump Case and Sanger v. Jesse French P. & O. Co., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 523, 52 S. W. 621,'referred to in our opinion, were decided by the same court. Judge Templeton, in writing the opinion of the court in the Blythe-Crump Case, does not refer to their former opinion in the Sanger v. Jesse French P. & O. Co. Case. We must infer that the court did not consider the two opinions in conflict. In the Blythe-Crump Case, the main and controlling issue was the question of priorities of the two mortgages which was not determined by the judgment rendered, and which the court held necessary to a proper disposition of the case. In deciding the Blythe-Crump Case, the court did not refer to the Oxosby v. Huston Case, nor to articles 5654 and 5655 of the statute, but while not referring to any decision of our own courts, following in part the rule laid down by some of our own courts prior to the enactment of the articles of our statute above referred to, but made no reference to any of them. It still is not clear to us that the court intended to announce a rule in that case different to that announced in the Sanger v. Jesse French P. & O. Co. Case, as it is stated:
“When Crump Bros, took their mortgage, they had no notice of Shuptrine’s lien; and, in so far as they were incumbrancers for value before they received such notice, their mortgage was superior to his.”
And-the court says, the case not having been tried on the issue of superiority of liens, the court could not determine from the record whether Crump Bros.’ lien was superior to Shuptrine’s. However that may be, we are of the opinion that the statute of - this state, in the articles referred to, control the issue as to the superiority of the respective titles as between appellants and Wiley. Much of what we have said applies to Scaling *983v. First National Bank. We need not review tlie case at length, hut refer to the case for the facts. The court nowhere undertakes to apply the articles of the statute referred to above to the facts of that case.
We are asked to certify the question considered upon the ground that our decision is in conflict with Blythe v. Crump and Scaling v. Bank, supra. We do not think there is such a conflict under the rule announced in Insurance Co. v. Roberts, supra, as to require this court to certify. After a very careful consideration, we believe the conclusion reached by this court is correct, and, in view of the congested condition of the docket of the Supreme Court, we are not disposed to further incumber that docket by certifying questions unless we are clearly of the opinion that we should do so. In this case, we think no such question is presented.
For the reasons indicated, the motions for rehearing and to certify are both overruled.