Court Opinion

ID: 9518723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:00:32.97145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:32.850811
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 28. (dissenting). Karen Bammert's (Bammert) 26 years of employment at Don's Super Valu ended by her being fired. Bammert was not fired for showing up late to work or treating customers poorly. In fact, she was not fired for any job-related reason at all.
¶ 29. She was fired for her husband's actions.
¶ 30. Her husband made no mistake either. He was a police officer. He fulfilled his obligation to society by assisting in the drunk driving arrest of Nona Williams. Nona is the spouse of Bammert's employer.
¶ 31. Retaliation for Bammert's husband's actions as a police officer was the reason Bammert was fired. In my view, this is unacceptable. There is a strong public policy in vigorous enforcement of the law. Society is not served by police officers being influenced in how they do their job because of the potential consequences of a retaliatory firing. Furthermore, extending the employment at-will doctrine to protect police officers is consistent with past precedent. Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not agree. The result is that an individual will be able to influence a police officer in the form of a retaliatory firing. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 32. Bammert was an at-will employee of Don's Super Valu. The general rule regarding employment relationships in Wisconsin is the at-will doctrine. The doctrine generally allows an employer to "discharge an employee 'for good cause, for no cause, or even for a cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.'" Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 567, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (footnote omitted). However, Wisconsin law does allow narrow *363exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine for public policy reasons. The public policy exception allows the firing of employees to recover if the firing violates a well-established and important public policy. Id. at 572-73. The exception that I propose is a narrow one, and certainly is a well-established, important public policy — retaliatory firing in response to a police officer's lawful actions in his or her capacity as a police officer is actionable.
¶ 33. The exception I propose is narrow in that it covers only a police officer acting lawfully in his or her capacity as an officer. This exception will not open the floodgates to litigation, as there are very few instances when a firing could fit into this exception. And when it does, it should.
¶ 34. The public policy in the case at hand is well-established and of utmost importance. Police officers have to be able to do their jobs without being influenced by the possibility of a retaliatory firing. A police officer must be able to arrest a drunk driver without his or her spouse being fired because of the arrest. Public policy dictates the vigorous enforcement of the law no matter who is on the receiving end of the enforcement. Without an exception to the at-will doctrine for retaliatory firings against police officers acting lawfully in their capacity, this public policy will be undermined.
¶ 35. Although there is little doubt that influencing, intimidating, or bribing a police officer is against public policy, Brockmeyer dictates that public policy must be shown by a constitutional or statutory provision. Id. at 573. Wisconsin Stat. § 946.10(1) (1997-98) states:
946.10 Bribery of public officers and employes. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:
*364(1) Whoever, with intent to influence the conduct of any public officer or public employe in relation to any matter which by law is pending or might come before the officer or employe in the officer's or employe's capacity as such officer or employe or with intent to induce the officer or employe to do or omit to do any act in violation of the officer's or employe's lawful duty transfers or promises to the officer or employe or on the officer's or employe's behalf any property or any personal advantage which the officer or employe is not authorized to receive;....
See also State v. Rosenfeld, 93 Wis. 2d. 325, 286 N.W.2d 596 (1980); Wis. Stat. §946.17 (1997-98) ("Corrupt means to influence legislation; disclosure of interest.").
¶ 36. As Wis. Stat. § 946.10 (1997-98) clearly points out, as a society we do not allow a person to bribe, intimidate, or otherwise illegally influence police officers about any pending matter or any matter that "might come before the officer". In turn, there is no reason to allow an employer to bribe, intimidate or otherwise influence a police officer in this regard. There is no reason to give an' employer a get-out-of-jail free card that is not afforded to the rest of society, simply because the employer has some retaliatory influence over a police officer. There should not be one standard of the law for employers and one standard for everyone else.
¶ 37. There is no legitimate reason to protect the conduct of this employer. In a normal circumstance, this employer could not reach the person that the employer wishes to retaliate against. In this circumstance, the employee is married to one of the officers participating in the arrest, which allows the employer to therefore reach this officer. Normally, the officer would be protected from the disgruntled arrestee, but in this case, the arrestee can reach the officer. As stated *365previously, we do not allow retaliation against a police officer for performing his or her duty, but in this circumstance the employer has a way around the protection of the officer. In my opinion, this loophole that allows an employer to retaliate against a police officer must be put in line with the rest of our laws, and the loophole that provides a retaliatory tool for the employer must be closed, thereby protecting police officers.
¶ 38. Furthermore, society owes its police officers a duty not to put them in the no-win position that Bammert's husband was placed in. On the one hand, he was sworn to uphold the laws of Wisconsin. On the other hand, if he keeps his oath and upholds the laws of our state, he is put in the position that the person that he assists in arresting could retaliate against him. The majority gives Bammert's husband a choice: either do your job and assist in the arrest of the drunk driver or protect your family by looking the other way. I want to eliminate this no-win situation by giving police officers the tools to do their job without the fear of retaliation. We owe such officers, like Bammert's husband, that much.
¶ 39. Moreover, the exception that I propose is consistent with past precedent. This court has recognized that compliance with an affirmative legal duty requiring action comports with a well-defined public policy, and the rationale of the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine. See Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 571 N.W.2.d 393 (1997). In Hausman, we gave employees that fulfilled their legal duty protection from retaliatory firing. The idea behind the exception is simply that we want people to fulfill their legal duties. In Hausman, it took the form of reporting abuse in a nursing home. We do not want people to be afraid to report nursing home abuse because they are afraid to be fired; therefore, we protect *366them. In the present case, we do not want a police officer to not enforce the law because the officer is afraid of a retaliatory firing. We should protect the officer, not subject him to retaliatory firing.
¶ 40. I recognize the reluctance to expand the at-will doctrine, and I too appreciate the importance of keeping with the policy of the well-defined narrow policy exception rule. We have a well-defined, extremely important policy, and we should carve out a very narrow exception that is consistent with past precedent. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 41. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.