Court Opinion

ID: 9929343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:37.642922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:12.916364
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1474-MR

XING ZHANG                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 17-CR-00279

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: On April 4, 2017, Appellant, Xing Zhang, was charged with

promoting prostitution in Boone County, Kentucky. He entered a guilty plea to the

amended charge of operating a sham or front company. On May 2, 2018, the

Boone Circuit Court entered an order granting Zhang’s motion for pre-trial

diversion. He was sentenced to diversion for five years.
                On March 8, 2019, a probation and parole officer filed an affidavit to

modify/revoke Zhang’s diversion status because he had absconded from

supervision. The circuit court issued a warrant, which remained outstanding for

over three years. It was finally served on September 26, 2022, while Zhang was

residing in Illinois, where his supervision had been transferred. A revocation

hearing was held in Boone Circuit Court on November 17, 2022. The court voided

Zhang’s diversion agreement and sentenced him to serve five-years’ imprisonment.

Zhang appeals to this court as a matter of right. His arguments on appeal are

summarized as follows: 1) he was denied his procedural due process rights when

his diversion was voided and he was sentenced in the same hearing; and 2) the

circuit court erred by revoking Zhang’s diversion, because it failed to properly

consider the relevant statutory factors. For the following reasons we affirm.

                Zhang’s arguments are unpreserved, and the Commonwealth requests

that we review for palpable error. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 664 S.W.3d 582,

592 (Ky. 2023) (applying palpable error review to issue concerning compliance

with KRS1 439.3106). See also Burnett v. Commonwealth, 538 S.W.3d 322, 324

(Ky. App. 2017) (failure to enter sufficient findings under KRS 439.3106(1)

constitutes palpable error). “An error is palpable, we have explained, only if it is

clear or plain under current law . . . .” Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665,

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -2-
668 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we proceed

accordingly.

                 The Kentucky Supreme Court has summarized the relevant

substantive law as follows:

                         As a condition of pretrial diversion, the defendant
                 is required to enter an Alford[2] plea or a plea of guilty.
                 KRS 533.250(1)(f). “If the defendant successfully
                 completes the provisions of the pretrial diversion
                 agreement, the charges against the defendant shall be
                 listed as ‘dismissed-diverted’ and shall not constitute a
                 criminal conviction.” KRS 533.258(1). If the defendant
                 fails to complete the diversion agreement, the diversion
                 agreement can be voided by the trial court, and the court
                 is to “proceed on the defendant’s plea of guilty in
                 accordance with the law.” KRS 533.256(1). At that
                 point, “[t]he defendant has the same right to a sentencing
                 hearing as if he or she had pled guilty without the
                 diversion agreement.” Peeler v. Commonwealth, 275
                 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Ky. App. 2008).

Prather v. Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 20, 22 (Ky. 2009). Moreover, the

underlying Court of Appeals decision in Peeler relied on the following reasoning:

                         From the architecture of KRS 533.256(1) and (4),
                 it is clear that separate proceedings are contemplated.
                 There must be a hearing to determine whether the
                 diversion agreement should be voided, and a subsequent
                 hearing to determine what action shall be taken
                 thereafter.

                  ....

2
    North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).

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                       Although Peeler’s defense counsel failed to object
                to final sentencing at the diversion revocation hearing,
                we are not convinced that Peeler had sufficient notice
                that final sentencing was about to take place to require an
                objection, let alone sufficient time to prepare for an
                RCr[3] 11.02 sentencing hearing. Edmonson v.
                Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1987). In any
                event, sentencing errors are not held to exacting
                standards of preservation, and we note that Peeler’s
                counsel argued against imprisonment at the revocation
                hearing. Cummings v. Commonwealth, supra.[4] We
                cannot say, therefore, that the result may not have
                been different if Peeler had been given his panoply of
                rights at a separate sentencing hearing.
                Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 95 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2002).

Peeler v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 223, 225-26 (Ky. App. 2008) (emphasis

added). Unlike Peeler, the result here would most likely not have been different

had Zhang received a separate sentencing hearing.

                For example, in its final judgment the circuit court noted that it

“previously afforded Defendant and Defendant’s counsel a copy of the Pre-

Sentence Investigation Report prepared by the Division of Probation and Parole,

[and] inquired if Defendant agreed with the factual contents.” Accordingly, Zhang

and his counsel were afforded the materials necessary to present a defense as to

revocation and sentencing. Cf. Spurling v. Commonwealth, No. 2021-CA-1253-

MR, 2022 WL 16842280, at *4 (Ky. App. Nov. 10, 2022) (reversing and

3
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4
    Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62 (Ky. 2007).

                                            -4-
remanding order terminating felony diversion where court did not hold a separate

sentencing hearing, and there was no presentence investigation report prepared

prior to sentencing). Moreover, because Zhang was a native Mandarin Chinese

speaker, the Commonwealth was concerned that there may be difficulty obtaining

a court appointed interpreter, in the event of subsequent hearings. During the

revocation hearing at issue here, however, an interpreter was present. The court

and counsel, via the interpreter, were very thorough in ensuring that Zhang was

sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charges and proceedings. There was no

palpable error.

             Zhang’s second argument is that the circuit court erred by revoking

his diversion for failing to comply with KRS 439.3106(1).

             KRS 439.3106(1) requires trial courts to consider
             whether a probationer’s failure to abide by a condition of
             supervision constitutes a significant risk to prior victims
             or the community at large, and whether the probationer
             cannot be managed in the community before probation
             may be revoked.

Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014). “Neither KRS

439.3106 nor Andrews require anything more than a finding to this effect

supported by the evidence of record.” McClure v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.3d

728, 733 (Ky. App. 2015). Furthermore, KRS 533.010(2) requires that the Court

shall consider the possibility of probation as an alternative sentence. A decision to

void pretrial diversion applies the same criteria as a decision to revoke probation.

                                         -5-
KRS 533.256(2); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 494 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Ky. App.

2015). We review the circuit court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014) (citing

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2009)). “Under our abuse of

discretion standard of review, we will disturb a ruling only upon finding that ‘the

trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945

(Ky. 1999)).

               Zhang specifically argues that the circuit court’s order revoking

diversion made insufficient findings, and should therefore be reversed. We

disagree. There was substantial evidence presented during the revocation hearing

that Zhang had absconded for years. See Compise v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.3d

175, 182 (Ky. App. 2020) (“[A] defendant who will not cooperate with the

conditions of her supervision may indeed constitute a significant risk to the

community at large and be unmanageable in the community.”).

               And while the revocation order did not expressly consider the relevant

statutory factors, the final judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered that

same day provides evidence that they were considered. It provides in relevant part:

               The Court having given due consideration to
               community service as an alternative to a prison term,
               probation, probation with alternative sentencing plan
               and conditional discharge; however, the Court is of the

                                           -6-
             opinion that confinement is necessary for the
             protection of the public because;

                    A. There is a substantial risk that during a
                    period of probation or conditional discharge,
                    the Defendant will commit another crime;

                    B. The Defendant is in need of correctional
                    treatment that can be provided most
                    effectively by the Defendant’s commitment
                    to a correctional and/or treatment institution.

                    C. Probation or conditional discharge would
                    unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
                    Defendant’s crime [KRS 533.010(2)].

                    D. Community Service is not in the best
                    interest of the Defendant and the public.

(Emphasis added.) Lastly, although we believe these findings are sufficient, we

note that explanations of findings pursuant to KRS 439.3106(1) are not required.

See New v. Commonwealth, 598 S.W.3d 88, 90 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted)

(“A trial court is not required to provide explanations for those findings . . . .”).

Based on the foregoing, there was no abuse of discretion here. There was certainly

no palpable error. Therefore, we affirm.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                           -7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kevin Moser             Daniel Cameron
Covington, Kentucky     Attorney General of Kentucky

                        Courtney Hightower
                        Assistant Attorney General
                        Frankfort, Kentucky

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