Court Opinion

ID: 9395892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 19:03:42.493504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:12.553903
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/18/23 Zhang v. Knapke CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

JEFF BAOLIANG ZHANG,                                              B318744

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                      21STCV27604)

KORY KNAPKE,

         Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
         Jeff Baoliang Zhang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
         Cole Pedroza, Kennth R. Pedroza, Dana L. Stenvick;
Reback, McAndrews & Blessy, Raymond L. Blessey and Sean L.
Cooper, for Defendant and Respondent.
      Jeff Baoliang Zhang was charged with attempted murder in
December 2011 after firing shots at the Chinese consulate in
Los Angeles following a protest. Dr. Kory Knapke, a forensic
psychiatrist, was appointed in February 2012 to conduct a
competency examination of Zhang. Dr. Knapke’s report led to a
finding that Zhang was not competent to stand trial within the
meaning of Penal Code section 1368 and to his commitment to
Patton State Hospital. Zhang was ultimately found competent,
pleaded no contest in 2015 to aggravated assault and shooting at
an inhabited dwelling with related firearm enhancements and
was sentenced to nine years in state prison. He was released
from prison in June 2019 but committed to Atascadero State
Hospital as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) until
July 2020.
      Zhang, representing himself, sued Dr. Knapke on July 28,
2021. After a demurrer to the original complaint was sustained
with leave to amend, Zhang filed a first amended complaint
alleging causes of action for fraud, elder abuse, other unspecified
intentional torts and violations of federal law and the United
States Constitution. Zhang asserted, in part, that Dr. Knapke
created a “counterfeit” version of his February 5, 2012 report to
the court in the summer of 2017 that was used in proceedings to
continue his post-prison confinement as an MDO. He further
alleged in his amended complaint that a March 2013 report by
Dr. Knapke containing a false diagnosis of delusions, which,
according to Zhang’s original complaint, Dr. Knapke showed him
at that time and had been used to continue the finding he was
not competent to stand trial, was also a “counterfeit,” not created
until 2019 for use in the MDO proceedings.

                                2
      The trial court sustained without leave to amend
Dr. Knapke’s demurrer to the first amended complaint, ruling
Zhang’s claims were barred by the three-year statute of
limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d).
The court also ruled Zhang had failed to allege sufficient facts for
a cause of action under the elder abuse statute. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Zhang’s Original Complaint
       Zhang was arrested on December 15, 2011 for firing shots
at the Chinese consulate after protest signs he had been using
were confiscated while he was at lunch.1 His original complaint
focused on three purported actions by Dr. Knapke that created or
continued a false picture of his mental health—the original
February 2012 report regarding Zhang’s competence to stand
trial, a “counterfeit” version of that report purportedly prepared
“around summer 2017,” and Dr. Knapke’s March 2013 report that
was the basis for the superior court’s finding that Zhang
remained not competent to stand trial at that time.

1      In a statement attached as an exhibit and incorporated in
his complaint, Zhang explained, “On 12-15-2011, I went and
made a new protest at the Chinese consulate in LA because for a
long time, their agents and mobsters had been heatedly after me
for my life due to my political ideas about China and my criticism
after their judicial corruption. I displayed eight big signboards
which denounced their murder plots and their persecution
against me . . . . [Upon returning from lunch, I] found all the
signboards disappeared. I immediately realized that the
consulate staff had removed them away. . . . [In despair I] reeled
down the car window and used my legal weapon to fire some
shots at the closed side-door of the empty Chinese consulate.”

                                 3
       Specifically, Zhang alleged Dr. Knapke was hired on
February 2, 2012 and interviewed Zhang at the Twin Towers
Correctional Facility where he had been in custody since his
arrest. Zhang’s original defense attorney (a deputy public
defender) told Zhang that Dr. Knapke had made a positive
evaluation of him: “‘The doctor believes you are a man of
intelligentsia [sic].’ That was all for Knapke’s mental evaluation
about Plaintiff at that time.”2 Notwithstanding this report,
Zhang alleges that a different public defender thereafter deceived
the superior court mental health department, which found Zhang
not competent to stand trial. Zhang was sent to Patton State
Hospital for involuntary antipsychotic medication and
treatment.3

2      In the section of his report dated February 5, 2012 labeled
“Psychiatric-Legal Opinions,” attached to Zhang’s complaint,
Dr. Knapke stated that Zhang “appears to be a very intelligent
individual” and that he understood the charges and proceedings
against him. However, Dr. Knapke opined, “The defendant
suffers from Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type. He
currently has a vast paranoid conspiracy theory that Communist
Chinese agents have been persecuting him for years because of
his anti-Communist activism. He believes his Chinese agents are
attempting to assassinate him. He also believes the Chinese
agents have infiltrated the American Mafia organizations and as
a result he also believes mobsters are attempting to kill him as
well. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [T]he defendant ruminates on his
persecutory delusions to such an extent that I believe it impairs
his ability to rationally cooperate with his attorney.”
3     Zhang in July 2021 sued two of the public defenders who
had represented him during the time he was found not competent
to stand trial, apparently for legal malpractice, fraud and elder
abuse. The trial court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend.

                                4
       Zhang was returned to county jail in mid-February 2013.
Dr. Knapke came to see Zhang a second time in March 2013 and
allegedly showed Zhang a “fake medical report with the diagnosis
of ‘delusion’” based on an intentional misrepresentation by
Dr. Knapke of Zhang’s diagnosis while at Patton State Hospital.
Zhang alleged that Dr. Knapke’s March 2013 false medical report
“sabotaged” his scheduled release, caused him to be sent back to
Patton and led to his confinement for the following eight years.
       Zhang additionally alleged that in the summer of 2017,
while Zhang was confined at the California Institute for Men in
Chino, Dr. Knapke wrote a “counterfeit evaluation” of his mental
health, replacing his original positive February 2012 report with
a negative one, declaring that Zhang had serious mental
problems. That false report, which retained the February 5, 2012
date, was used to support the finding that Zhang was an MDO
and his commitment to Atascadero State Hospital for treatment
in June 2019.
       Zhang alleged a cause of action for fraud, based on
Dr. Knapke’s reportedly false March 2013 mental health
evaluation and alteration in the summer of 2017 of his original,
positive mental health report made in February 2012. Zhang
asserted, “Since March 2013 to the time Plaintiff was discharged
from [Atascadero State Hospital] in July 2020, Defendant’s
two fake reports played a very hostile and important part in
harming the Plaintiff.” He also alleged a federal law violation
(perjury) based on the two counterfeit medical reports and a
violation of his sacred rights as a United States citizen in

Zhang failed to file an amended complaint. A judgment of
dismissal with prejudice was affirmed on appeal. (Zhang v.
County of Los Angeles (Feb. 27, 2023, B319492) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                5
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought $200 million
in damages.4
       Dr. Knapke demurred and moved to strike portions of the
complaint, arguing Zhang had failed to allege fraud with the
requisite specificity and the fraud cause of action was, in any
event, barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 338,
subdivision (d)’s three-year statute of limitations.5 In his
opposition Zhang insisted the complaint sufficiently identified
two frauds, “One happened on March 20, 2013, the other
happened in summer 2017.” As for his failure to file within three
years of learning of the fraud as early as 2013, Zhang argued he
was unable to do so because of his wrongful detention from
December 2011 to July 2020.
       The trial court sustained Dr. Knapke’s demurrer to the
original complaint on November 3, 2021. Zhang was given leave
to amend.6
       2. Zhang’s First Amended Complaint
       Zhang filed a first amended complaint on November 19,
2021, which contained a greatly expanded description of Zhang’s

4      Zhang filed a statement of damages in September 2021
that divided his request for damages into categories, including a
prayer for $30 million in damages because he “[l]ost eight years
of freedom due to the counterfeit medical report in 2013.” The
statement also specified that he sought $50 million in punitive
damages.
5    The record on appeal does not include Dr. Knapke’s
demurrer and motion to strike; but Zhang’s opposition papers,
which are included, quoted the pertinent portions of those
documents.
6     The record on appeal does not include the trial court’s
ruling on the demurrer.

                                 6
mistreatment by Dr. Knapke and others.7 The amended pleading
asserted “this case is about fraud and intentional tort liability”;
realleged Zhang’s claims for violating federal law (perjury) and
the United States Constitution; and added a new cause of action
for elder abuse. Zhang again alleged that Dr. Knapke’s
February 5, 2012 report was “a completely counterfeit document
[that] never existed at that time. The full content was created
[at] a later date in order to send Plaintiff to the mental hospital
again or to keep such a bad record for my mental history.”
However, although Zhang alleged, as he had in his original
complaint, that the February 5, 2012 report was not actually
prepared until the summer of 2017, elsewhere in the first
amended complaint Zhang quoted a December 14, 2014
evaluation by another mental health professional that referred
to, and quoted from, Dr. Knapke’s 2012 report in which
Dr. Knapke diagnosed Zhang as having a “delusional disorder,
persecutory type” and noted that, after the treatment team at
Patton believed Zhang had been restored to competency and
returned him to county jail (in 2013), Dr. Knapke again wrote
“the defendant had not reached trial competency due to his
continuing delusional beliefs (for example, that a jury trial would
be preferred because this would ‘. . . minimize the Chinese
government’s influence on the legal proceedings.’” Zhang
included the December 14, 2014 report as an exhibit to his
pleading.
       The first amended complaint again alleged that Dr. Knapke
brought with him in March 2013 a false evaluation stating Zhang

7     Zhang’s original complaint with attachments was 36 pages
long. His first amended complaint with exhibits totaled 112
pages.

                                 7
was delusional, but also alleged, “As for the second report dated
03-21-2013, Plaintiff believes it should be written by Defendant
in summer 2019 for my MDO treatment” and that, “[T]he second
mental report by Defendant dated 03-21-2013 was in fact created
around summer 2019 to send Plaintiff to the mental hospital for
the third time although Plaintiff has not seen its full contents till
this date.”
       Among the exhibits attached to, and incorporated in, the
first amended complaint were (1) the minute order dated
March 2, 2012 from the superior court’s mental health
department 95 finding Zhang mentally incompetent within the
meaning of Penal Code section 1368 and committing him to the
Department of Mental Health for placement at Patton State
Hospital, which stated, “Counsel waive oral testimony of
Doctor Kory Knapke. Certificates of medical examiner are
received in evidence by reference”; and (2) the minute order dated
April 10, 2013, again finding Zhang incompetent to stand trial
and recommitting him to Patton State Hospital, which stated
Dr. Knapke’s report dated March 21, 2013 had been received, and
noted, “Counsel waives oral testimony of DR. KORY KNAPKE.
Certificates of Medical Examiner are received in evidence by
reference.”
       The newly added cause of action for elder abuse included
the allegation that Zhang was 68 years old in April 2012 when he
was sent to Patton State Hospital for involuntary treatment and
69 years old when he was returned to Patton in May 2013. The
treatment he received because of Dr. Knapke’s slanders and
failure to provide a fair evaluation was “absolutely unnecessary”
and caused Zhang to suffer “serious harm mentally and

                                  8
physically” not only in 2012 and 2013 but also “for quite a few
years to 2019 and afterwards.”
        3. Dr. Knapke’s Demurrer and the Trial Court’s Ruling
        Dr. Knapke demurred to the first amended complaint on
December 21, 2021. The demurrer emphasized that in his
original complaint Zhang had alleged Dr. Knapke made a
counterfeit medical report in 2013 and another counterfeit
evaluation in 2017 and “‘[t]hese two reports aimed at bringing
serious harms to Plaintiff’s mental health.’” Then, in an effort to
avoid the statute of limitations after Dr. Knapke’s demurrer to
the original complaint had been sustained, Zhang alleged for the
first time that the report dated March 21, 2013 had actually been
created in the summer of 2019. Dr. Knapke argued the new
allegation was prohibited by the sham pleading doctrine, Zhang’s
cause of action for fraud was based on conduct that had occurred
nine years earlier and thus barred by the governing statute of
limitations, and Zhang had again failed to plead fraud with the
requisite specificity. With respect to the new cause of action for
elder abuse, Dr. Knapke argued Zhang had failed to seek leave of
court to add this claim; it, too, was barred by the applicable
statute of limitations (two years pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 335.1); and Zhang failed to properly plead the
elements of the cause of action, including that the necessary
custodial relationship existed between Zhang and Dr. Knapke.
        In his response to the demurrer Zhang now asserted that
Dr. Knapke made three counterfeit reports: one with a diagnosis
of “delusion” that Dr. Knapke showed Zhang on March 20, 2013;
a second one revealed to Zhang in the summer of 2017 that was
dated February 5, 2012; and a third report revealed to Zhang in
the summer of 2019 dated March 21, 2013 that Zhang had not

                                 9
previously seen. Zhang contended there was no contradiction
between the allegations in his original complaint and the first
amended complaint and the sham pleading doctrine did not
apply.
        Zhang also argued his first amended complaint was
sufficiently specific, noting he had repeatedly alleged that
Dr. Knapke made false accusations and false reports, which
forced him to stay in the mental hospital in 2012, 2013 and 2019.
And he contended he had been unable to file his lawsuit any
earlier because his unlawful confinement and isolation while in
custody prevented him from representing himself or obtaining
fair representation in his criminal and civil matters.
        The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend and dismissed the lawsuit. In its ruling the court
explained that Zhang’s causes of action for fraud and elder abuse
were based on a report by Dr. Knapke written in 2012 and 2013
that had been part of Zhang’s psychiatric record for eight or nine
years and “Plaintiff concedes that he was aware of the report for
all of this period of time since 2013 and has tried to have it
deleted or not have an effect on his custodial status.”
Notwithstanding Zhang’s argument in opposition to the demurrer
that he discovered the effects of the report only in 2017, the court
continued, his claims are barred by the three-year statute of
limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d).
In addition, the court ruled, Zhang had not alleged sufficient
facts demonstrating reckless, fraudulent or malicious conduct to
plead a cause of action for elder abuse. Finally, the court added,
“Whether plaintiff has causes of action that he might file in
federal court, as orally suggested by him at length during oral
argument, is beyond the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction.”

                                10
      Zhang filed a timely notice of appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Standard of Review
       A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual
allegations in a complaint. We independently review the trial
court’s ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or
discloses a complete defense. (Mathews v. Becerra (2019)
8 Cal.5th 756, 768; T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017)
4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
       We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual
allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those
expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been
taken. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 20; accord,
Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net
of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Schifando v. City of
Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) However, “[i]f facts
appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the
exhibits take precedence.” (Holland v. Morse Diesel Internat.,
Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447; accord, Westamerica Bank
v. City of Berkeley (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 607 [“‘The well-
pled allegations that we accept as true necessarily include the
contents of any exhibits attached to the complaint. Indeed, the
contents of an incorporated document . . . will take precedence
over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary allegations set
out in the pleading’”]; Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 [“[u]nder the doctrine of truthful
pleading, the courts ‘will not close their eyes to situations where
a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with

                                 11
attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts which are
judicially noticed’”].)
       A demurrer based on an affirmative defense is properly
sustained when the face of the complaint and matters judicially
noticed clearly disclose the defense or bar to recovery.
(See Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 189, 224; see also Stella v. Asset Management
Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 191; Marina Tenants
Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d
122, 130-132.) If “‘the complaint’s allegations or judicially
noticeable facts reveal the existence of an affirmative defense, the
“plaintiff must ‘plead around’ the defense, by alleging specific
facts that would avoid the apparent defense. Absent such
allegations, the complaint is subject to demurrer for failure to
state a cause of action.”’” (Esparza v. County of Los Angeles
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 452, 459.)
       We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated
in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons
(Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967;
Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 837, 848), but liberally construe the pleading
with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 452; Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 719, 726; see Schifando v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.)
       “‘Where the complaint is defective, “[i]n the furtherance of
justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a
plaintiff to amend his [or her] complaint.”’” (Aubry v. Tri-City
Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 970.) A plaintiff may
demonstrate for the first time to the reviewing court how a

                                12
complaint can be amended to cure the defect. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 472c, subd. (a) [“[w]hen any court makes an order sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend the question as to whether or
not such court abused its discretion in making such an order is
open on appeal even though no request to amend such pleading
was made”]; see Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold
Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1132 [plaintiff may carry burden of proving
an amendment would cure a legal defect for the first time on
appeal].) However, leave to amend should not be granted where
amendment would be futile. (See Ivanoff v. Bank of America,
N.A., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 726; see also Rubenstein v. The
Gap, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 870, 881 [“‘[w]hile such a
showing can be made for the first time to the reviewing court
[citation], it must be made’”].)
      2. Zhang’s Lawsuit Was Properly Dismissed as Time-
         barred
      Zhang’s first amended complaint alleged, in essence, that
Dr. Knapke falsely diagnosed Zhang with a mental illness and
prepared reports for the superior court’s mental health
department incorporating the false diagnosis, which, in turn, led
to Zhang’s involuntary commitment and improper treatment, all,
apparently, at the behest of the Chinese government. Based on
those allegations, Zhang purported to state causes of action for
fraud, elder abuse and violation of his federal civil rights. Each
of those claims is barred by the applicable statute of limitations—
three years from discovery of the facts for fraud (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 338, subd. (d));8 two years for an elder abuse claim based on

8    The plaintiff’s justifiable reliance on the defendant’s
misrepresentation or actionable nondisclosure is an essential

                                13
physical or mental abuse under Code of Civil Procedure
section 335.1 (see Benun v. Superior Court (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 113, 125-126 [applying Code of Civil Procedure
section 335.1 governing personal injury actions to elder abuse
claim]);9 and two years pursuant to the statute of limitations
governing personal injury actions for Zhang’s cause of action for
deprivation of civil rights under title 42 United States Code
section 1983 (section 1983 cause of action) (see Shalabi v. City of
Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 847 [“[a] section 1983 cause of
action is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for
personal injury torts”].)10

element of a cause of action for fraud. (See In re Tobacco II Cases
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326; Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th
1082, 1096; Missakian v. Amusement Industry, Inc. (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 630, 653.) Zhang, of course, does not allege that
he relied on Dr. Knapke’s false reports of his delusional disorder.
Accordingly, even were it timely, the cause of action for fraud
would be properly dismissed for failure to state sufficient facts.
9      Although Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.7
establishes a four-year limitations period for financial elder
abuse, the Elder Abuse Act does not specify the limitations period
applicable to claims for physical abuse and infliction of emotional
distress under the Act. The two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury claims as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
section 335.1 presumably governs those claims, as held in Benun
v. Superior Court, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 125-126, but an
argument can be made that the three-year statute of limitations
in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), applicable
to statutory causes of action, governs. Zhang’s elder abuse claim
is time-barred under either statute.
10     Zhang’s allegations regarding perjury do not state a cause
of action under California law. (Pollock v. University of Southern

                                 14
       Zhang’s pleading presented a confusing chronology; but the
exhibits attached to it unequivocally established that Dr. Knapke
performed his court-ordered services in 2012 and 2013, many
years before Zhang filed his original complaint on July 28, 2021.
Zhang alleged, as he must, that Dr. Knapke interviewed him in
February 2012 and March 2013. His allegation that
Dr. Knapke’s original evaluation was positive and that the
unfavorable report dated February 5, 2012 was not prepared
until summer 2017 (which would still be outside the governing
two- and three-year limitations periods) is contradicted by
Zhang’s additional allegations that Dr. Knapke’s “false
accusations and false reports” forced him to stay in the mental
hospital beginning in 2012, as well as by his allegation that Dr.
Phani Tumu, in his December 14, 2014 evaluation of Zhang
pursuant to Evidence Code section 730, “cited quotes from Kory
Knapke’s report dated 02-05-2012 as an important source to tell
that Plaintiff had got serious mental problems.” As discussed,
Zhang’s pleading included excerpts from Dr. Tumu’s report that
expressly referred to Dr. Knapke’s February 5, 2012 report and
attached Dr. Tumu’s report as an exhibit.
       Similarly, the June 29, 2015 report from Dr. Andrea
Bernhard, quoted by Zhang in his first amended complaint and
attached as an exhibit, referred to Dr. Knapke’s February 5, 2012

California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1429 [“[t]here is no civil
cause of action for ‘perjury’’’]; accord, Lambert v. Carneghi (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1143, fn. 9; Kappel v. Bartlett (1988)
200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1463.) To the extent Zhang sought to allege
Dr. Knapke’s reports violated his rights under the United States
Constitution or title 18 United States Code section 1621
(perjury), any such claim, if cognizable at all, would necessarily
fall within the ambit of his section 1983 cause of action.

                                15
report, which “opined that Mr. Zhang was incompetent to stand
trial.” Moreover, the minute order from the March 2, 2012
hearing at which Zhang was found incompetent was attached and
incorporated into the pleading. That order identified Dr. Knapke
(oral testimony waived) and received into evidence the medical
certificates necessary to commit Zhang to Patton State Hospital.11
Even if Zhang had not made his own inconsistent allegations, the
contents of the documents he attached as exhibits supersede any
contrary allegations set out in the pleading. As did the trial
court, we disregard the allegation that Dr. Knapke’s negative
February 5, 2012 report did not exist until 2017.
       As to the March 2013 report by Dr. Knapke, Zhang
conceded in his opposition to the demurrer that Dr. Knapke
prepared a report dated March 20, 2013, which was the basis for
the court’s 2013 order committing him to Patton State Hospital
for a second time. But he then argued there was an additional
negative report, dated March 21, 2013, that was not prepared by
Dr. Knapke until summer 2019 for use in the MDO proceedings.
In his first amended complaint, however, Zhang insisted there
were only two negative reports by Dr. Knapke—the purportedly
counterfeit February 5, 2012 report made in 2017 and a new
counterfeit report, dated March 21, 2013, created in summer
2019.

11     Zhang alleged in paragraph 115 of the first amended
complaint, “In early March 2012, Defendant began to make false
comments or counterfeit reports to harm the Plaintiff who was a
mentally healthy man. Defendant sent Plaintiff to PSH [Patton
State Hospital] as Defendant was the only doctor listed on the
first Court Minute Order dated 03-02-2012.”

                               16
       Like the claim the February 2012 report was not created
until 2017, neither of these internally inconsistent sets of
allegations regarding a counterfeit 2019 report withstands
scrutiny. Dr. Tumu’s 2014 report stated that Dr. Knapke’s
second report following Zhang’s initial release from Patton State
Hospital indicated Zhang had not reached trial competency due
to his continuing delusional beliefs. Zhang was then recommitted
to Patton on April 10, 2013. The minute order from that hearing,
attached as an exhibit to Zhang’s first amended complaint,
identified the medical evaluation received in evidence as
Dr. Knapke’s report “dated 03/21/13.” There was only one March
2013 report by Dr. Knapke. It was dated March 21, 2013 and
existed more than six years prior to the summer of 2019.
       Zhang’s allegations he was unaware of the 2012 and 2013
reports when they were submitted to the court do not save his
untimely complaint under the delayed discovery rule. To
reiterate, both Dr. Knapke’s original February 2012 report and
his second report of March 2013 leading to Zhang’s
recommitment to Patton State Hospital were described in
Dr. Tumu’s December 2014 evaluation report. And
Dr. Bernhard’s June 2015 report quoted Zhang as being familiar
with Dr. Tumu’s report, criticizing it as “‘a big fraud, it is
deceptive, it is harmful to me.’” Thus, even accepting as true
Zhang’s allegations that he had not seen either of Dr. Knapke’s
formal reports at the time, he was necessarily familiar with their
general contents—Dr. Knapke’s diagnosis that Zhang suffered
from persecutory delusions—by June 2015. Accordingly, all
causes of action based on allegations that Dr. Knapke reported
that false diagnosis to the court accrued at least six years before
Zhang’s lawsuit was filed. (See, e.g., Jolly v. Eli Lilly &

                                17
Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 [“[u]nder the discovery rule, the
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or
should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that
someone has done something wrong to her”]; Alexander v. Exxon
Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1251 [“The limitations period
begins once the plaintiff has notice or information of
circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry. Subjective
suspicion is not required. If a person becomes aware of facts
which would make a reasonably prudent person suspicious, he or
she has a duty to investigate further and is charged with
knowledge of matters which would have been revealed by such an
investigation” (cleaned up)]; McCoy v. Gustafson (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 56, 108 [same]; see also State of California ex rel.
Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
402, 417 [a plaintiff is on inquiry notice when “‘he at least
suspects . . . “that someone has done something wrong” to him
[citation], “wrong” being used, not in any technical sense, but
rather in accordance with its “lay understanding”’”].)
       Zhang’s effort to avoid the preclusive effect of the governing
limitations periods by alleging the harmful consequences of
Dr. Knapke’s 2012 and 2013 reports continued until 2020 as a
result of his confinement as an MDO is misplaced. Zhang’s
claims against Dr. Knapke arise from Dr. Knapke’s 2012 and
2013 reports to the court. Any causes of action relating to those
discrete acts accrued years before the lawsuit was filed. (See
Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737,
745 [“[I]f continuing injury from a completed act generally
extended the limitations periods, those periods would lack
meaning. Parties could file suit at any time, as long as their
injuries persisted. This is not the law. The time bar starts

                                 18
running when the plaintiff first learns of actionable injury
[citation], even if the injury will linger or compound”].) The
“continuous violation” or “continuous accrual” doctrine, in
contrast, involves recurring or continuous conduct, not ongoing
effects based on prior misconduct. (See, e.g., Richards v. CH2M
Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 823 [ongoing disability
discrimination in employment]; Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 786 [last overt act in a civil conspiracy to
commit an ongoing fraud]; see also Aryeh v. Canon Business
Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1200-1201 [recurring
imposition of fraudulent charges for copier rental]; Gilkyson v.
Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1341
[recurring duty to pay music royalties].)12
       Zhang’s reliance on equitable tolling is similarly without
merit. “[E]quitable tolling is a narrow remedy that applies to toll
statutes of limitations only ‘occasionally and in special

12     Zhang does not—and cannot—allege a caretaking or
custodial relationship existed between him and Dr. Knapke.
Accordingly, Zhang’s allegations that the harsh conditions of his
confinement through 2020 constituted elder abuse are immaterial
for purposes of assessing the timeliness of his claims. (See Winn
v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 155 [“a
claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act requires a caretaking
or custodial relationship—where a person has assumed
significant responsibility for attending to one or more of those
basic needs of the elder or dependent adult that an able-bodied
and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of
managing without assistance”]; Kruthanooch v. Glendale
Adventist Medical Center (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1129 [the
Elder Abuse Act “does not apply unless the caretaking
relationship is ‘robust’ and the measure of responsibility assumed
by the caretaker is ‘significant’”].)

                                19
situations.’” (Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of
Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 724.) “[E]quitable tolling
today applies when three ‘elements’ are present: ‘[(1)] timely
notice, and [(2)] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and
[(3)] reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the
plaintiff.’ [Citation.] These requirements are designed to
‘balanc[e] . . . the injustice to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of
his claim against the effect upon the important public interest or
policy expressed by the [operative] limitations statute.’” (Id. at
724-725; accord, Tarkington v. California Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503, see McDonald v.
Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th
88, 102.)
       In his briefs in this court Zhang insisted the delayed filing
of his lawsuit should be excused because “[i]solation and fear of
death threat prevented [him] from filing it earlier in prison, [and]
the poor financial situation and unstable living conditions after
release also delayed the legal work.” Absent from this argument
for equitable tolling is any indication that Dr. Knapke was
notified of Zhang’s claims at any time prior to Zhang’s belated
filing of his original complaint in late July 2021. In contrast, in
Lewis v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 366, the lone
equitable tolling (or “implicit tolling,” as the Lewis court called it)
authority cited by Zhang, the defendant and its insurer were on
notice of the plaintiff’s personal injury claim prior to the running
of the limitations period, and active settlement negotiations were
ongoing. (Id. at p. 377.) However, the plaintiff’s lawyer, a sole
practitioner, was struck by an automobile and suffered life-
threatening head injuries five days before the limitations period

                                   20
ran. The lawsuit was filed only six weeks late, after the lawyer
was released from the hospital and resumed his practice.
      In sum, none of Zhang’s causes of action was timely filed.
Neither the delayed discovery doctrine nor equitable tolling saves
his lawsuit.13
                          DISPOSITION
      The order dismissing Zhang’s first amended complaint is
affirmed. Zhang’s motion for sanctions is denied. Dr. Knapke is
to recover his costs on appeal.

                                      PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur.

            FEUER, J.                 ESCALANTE, J.*

13     In his respondent’s brief Dr. Knapke argued, because
Zhang’s claims were all based on Dr. Knapke’s role as a court-
appointed medical examiner, his conduct and reports were
protected by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2)’s litigation
privilege, as to Zhang’s state law causes of action, and by quasi-
judicial immunity as to Zhang’s federal civil rights claim. We
need not address whether these defenses, not raised in the trial
court, have merit and could properly be decided on demurrer.
*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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