Court Opinion

ID: 9540714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:19:07.439039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:12.894378
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the injuries and subsequent death of Shanae Keefe did not derive from an injury to her mother. Its holding is based on the premise that “regardless of whether the mother was injured, the injury to the child was separate and distinct from the mother’s injuries and subjects the employer to separate liability.” Maj. op. at 101. Because I believe the majority improperly dissociates Shanae’s injuries from their source, I respectfully dissent.
While I agree that a child has a cause of action for in útero injuries, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Shanae Keefe’s injuries sustained while in útero can be divorced from the injuries sustained by her mother which provide the entire basis for this action. Though the majority recognizes the well settled derivative-injury principles in the context of workers’ compensation, it fails to properly incorporate them into its analysis.
As pertinent here the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado (Act) provides coverage for:
[ A]ll causes of action, actions at law, suits in equity, proceedings, and statutory and common law rights and remedies for and on account of such death or personal injury to any such employee and accruing to any person_ § 8-41-102, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)
(Emphasis added.)
The plain language of the statute indicates its exclusivity for all causes of action that accrue on account of an injury to an employ*103ee. E.g., Williams v. White Mountain Const. Co., 749 P.2d 423, 425 (Colo.1988) (the Act is meant to be the exclusive remedy for all work-related injuries).
Under the derivative-injury doctrine, no cause of action exists for any party who sustains injury as a direct result of an employee’s work-related injury. See, e.g., Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen, 166 Colo. 118, 444 P.2d 397 (1968) (when the claim of an employee’s dependent derives from the injury to the employee, the injuries are covered by the Act), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1063, 89 S.Ct. 715, 21 L.Ed.2d 706 (1969). For instance, there is no cause of action for surviving heirs of an employee killed during the course and scope of employment, even though the heirs sustain their own distinct injuries. Ryan v. Centennial Race Track, Inc., 196 Colo. 30, 35, 580 P.2d 794, 796-97 (1978). Similarly, no cause of action exists for loss of consortium based on a work-related injury, even though loss of consortium is an injury recognized apart from the injured spouse. Alexander, 166 Colo. at 124, 444 P.2d at 400. These injuries, though “separate and distinct” from the injury to the worker, are nevertheless covered by the Act because they derive from or are “on account of such death or personal injury to any such employee.” § 8-41-102, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Thus, the question in a derivative-injury action is not whether the third party sustained a “separate and distinct” injury, but rather, whether the third party’s injury derived from a work-related source.
Throughout these proceedings Paula Keefe has claimed that she was coerced into performing work in excess of that permitted by her doctor, and that as a result she sustained bodily injury of a severe and permanent nature. She and her husband also allege that as a result of the defendant’s conduct the child was bom prematurely and died. The majority concludes that “it makes no [analytical], difference that Shanae Keefe’s injuries were sustained before her birth.” Maj. op. at 101. Though I agree that viability is not determinative of whether a cause of action exists, the fetal status is relevant to whether the injuries are derivative.1 Injuries sustained in útero are by definition injuries sustained while the fetus is in the womb. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, at 798 (25th ed. 1990). While in útero the fetus is inseparable from its mother. See Bell v. Macy’s California, 212 Cal.App.3d 1442, 261 Cal.Rptr. 447 (1989). Indeed, I can think of no situation where third-party injuries derive more directly from the employee’s injury than injuries sustained by a fetus while in útero. Because Shanae Keefe was injured “on account of’ her mother’s work-related injuries, her injuries are covered by the Act.
Examination of the complaint reveals the derivative nature of Shanae’s injuries. It contains no allegation of direct injury to Sha-nae, but rather claims her injuries occurred as a result of her mother’s treatment. Paragraph 12 alleges that “[d]espite the medical work restrictions imposed on Mrs. Keefe by her treating physicians, the Defendants compelled Mrs. Keefe to work on a full-time schedule, and to otherwise violate the medical work restrictions which had been imposed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Paragraph 13 continues “that the death of Shanae Keefe was a proximate result of the negligence and wrongful acts of the Defendants, and their employees and agents.” Paragraph 14 then states that such wrongful conduct included, but was not limited to, “Defendant’s failure to conform Mrs. Keefe’s work schedule and job duties to the medical requirements which were communicated to them by Mrs. Keefe’s treating physicians, and their failure to formulate and implement an adequate medical disability policy.” According to the complaint, Mrs. Keefe’s work-related injuries caused premature delivery and ultimately resulted in Shanae’s death.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Shanae’s injuries are analogous to injuries that may be sustained by a child when visiting a parent at the workplace. Any such injury does not necessarily occur as a result of an injury to the employee. Indeed, the parent may not be present when *104the child is injured. Here, however, Sha-nae’s injuries occurred solely as a result of her mother’s work-related injuries. There was no negligent treatment of Shanae independent of the harm inflicted upon her mother.
Further, an employer’s relationship to the unborn children of its employees differs from its relationship to typical non-employees. While employers have the option to reduce their risk of liability to third persons by restricting access to the workplace, when a pregnant employee is involved such restrictions are generally unavailable. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (striking a fetal protection policy in a battery manufacturing plant).2 Under the majority’s broad holding an injured fetus has a cause of action for any work-related injury regardless of whether the injury pertained to the pregnancy.3 Thus, an employer is effectively subject to two standards of liability in the workplace over which the employer has no control, at a time when injury to the employee carries with it the high likelihood that injury to the fetus will also occur. See Bell, 261 Cal.Rptr. at 455 (considering the policy implications of allowing independent tort actions for in útero injuries sustained by a fetus while in the workplace, including the possibility of “financially driven discrimination by liability conscious employers”). In my view the court’s holding today only increases the tension between workers’ compensation law, tort law and employment discrimination law. See Susan S. Grover, The Employer’s Fetal Injury Quandary after Johnson Controls, 81 Ky. L.J. 639 (1992-93).
Because I conclude Shanae Keefe’s injuries derived from her mother’s work-related injuries and are covered by the Act, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON and Justice VOLLACK join in this dissent.

. The majority dismissed the fact that the injuries were sustained before the baby’s birth by relying on the fact that in this particular case the baby was bom alive. Maj. op. at 101 n. 3. I believe this conclusion ignores the Act's coverage of injuries that accrue in the workplace.

. In Johnson Controls the Court struck a fetal protection policy based on its discrimination against women. There, the Court explained that "[lit is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more important to herself and her family than her economic role.” Id. 499 U.S. at 194-95, 111 S.Ct. at 1201. While I agree that the decision to work while pregnant is personal to the woman, I believe that along with this autonomy must go an acknowledgment that certain work-related risks of fetal injury exist.

. While Paula Keefe’s claims related to her pregnant status, and thus the harm to Shanae is traceable to the claimed mistreatment of her mother, future cases may involve simple work-related injuries that bear no relationship to the pregnancy but result in harm equally as devastating to the fetus.