Court Opinion

ID: 997832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:02:20.854086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:51.592073
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CURTIS SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                 No. 98-2255
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap.
Glen M. Williams, Senior District Judge.
(CA-97-6-B)

Submitted: December 22, 1998

Decided: February 8, 1999

Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Curtis Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Shawn C. Carver, SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Julie C. Dud-
ley, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This case arises from a denial of Social Security benefits. On Octo-
ber 20, 1992, Curtis Smith, a forty-three year old male, filed an appli-
cation for disability benefits alleging he was disabled due to
irritability, hearing problems, lung congestion, shortness of breath,
poor stamina, arthritis of the spine and left knee, high blood pressure,
and ulcers. Smith has a high school education and past relevant work
experience as a punch press operator and seasonal laborer. Additional
evidence established that he had a borderline IQ of 75.

The application was denied and after a hearing on April 11, 1995,
the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Smith: (1) had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity between April 1, 1978, the time
of his alleged onset of disability, and March 31, 1979, when his
insured status expired; (2) did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments which met or equaled the criteria of any of the impair-
ments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Reg. 4 (1998);
(3) was prevented from performing his past relevant work; and (4)
had a severe impairment, but retained the residual functional capacity
to perform a full range of light work. Further, a vocational expert tes-
tified that there was work in the national economy that Smith could
perform. Thus, the ALJ found that Smith was not disabled.

The Appeals Council declined Smith's request to review the ALJ's
decision, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1998). Smith then filed a
civil action seeking review of denial of benefits. After the parties con-
sented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636,
the magistrate judge determined that the Commissioner's decision
was not supported by substantial evidence. The Government objected
to the magistrate judge's finding. After a de novo review, the district
court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation and upheld the
Commissioner's decision denying benefits. This appeal followed.

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This court must determine whether the Commissioner's findings
are supported by substantial evidence, see Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971), and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Substantial evidence is that evidence which "`a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,'" Perales, 402 U.S.
at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)). The ALJ bears the ultimate responsibility for weighing the
evidence and resolving its conflicts. See Hays , 907 F.2d at 1456.
Smith attributes the following errors to the Commissioner's decision:
(1) there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding
that his knee impairment and smoke allergy did not meet or equal any
of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Reg.
4 (1998); (2) the ALJ erroneously found that he worked as a tobacco
farmer when, in fact, he worked for R.J. Reynolds, a tobacco com-
pany; and (3) the ALJ failed to consider that he attended welding
school and mine repair school. Based on these alleged errors, Smith
asserts that the Commissioner's decision was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.

We have reviewed the record, briefs, and pertinent case law in this
matter. Our review persuades us that the district court correctly found
that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits is based on sub-
stantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the dis-
trict court. See Smith v. Apfel, No. CA-97-6-B (W.D. Va. July 8,
1998).* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________

*Although the district court's judgment or order is marked as "filed"
on July 7, 1998, the district court's records show that it was entered on
the docket sheet on July 8, 1998. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the judgment or order
was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the
district court's decision. See Wilson v. Murray , 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35
(4th Cir. 1986).

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