Court Opinion

ID: 9744649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:11:26.375889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.732482
License: Public Domain

PEEK, P. J.
I dissent.Although I am not entirely convinced of the validity of the majority’s treatment of plaintiffs ’ first contention, it seems unnecessary to discuss at length my reasons therefor, since I am convinced that the second contention made by plaintiffs compels a reversal.
“The rule that the courts will not consider a case in the absence of a justiciable, actual, or bona fide controversy ... is subject to the exception in eases wherein the question involved is of great public interest. Then the rule requiring the existence of a justiciable controversy is not followed, or is relaxed. It seems that the courts have assumed that they possess inherent power to give a declaratory judgment as to matters of public concern.” (1 Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments, § 63, p. 126.)
It appears to me that the factual situation set forth in plaintiffs’ complaint, which by their demurrer defendants admit, brings this case squarely within the exception to the general rule. The majority, however, holds that even under what it considers to be the most liberal interpretation of “justiciability,” nevertheless even when applied to matters of public interest there must be presented something more than a hypothetical question which, when resolved, would not be binding on the parties. Several cases are cited in support of this conclusion, but in none of the cases so cited ■ Whs -the issue of public interest presented.
*727The closest approach which our courts have made to the specific question is found in comments such as in Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander, 97 Cal.App. 12, 14 [275 P. 253]. In that ease the question presented was whether or not plaintiff was required to have a permit to issue securities. In declining to pass on the question, the court held that there was no actual dispute and further that “There is nothing of particular public interest involved.” But as to what the court would have held had there been a “particular public interest” we can only speculate. However, that holding does indicate that consideration would have been given had such a situation been presented. Here we are confronted with a statute which “should be construed with reasonable liberality” (15 Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 4, p. 101; see also 16 Am.Jur., Declaratory Judgments, § 8, p. 282) and an action which is essentially one in equity (Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal.2d 352 [101 P.2d 484]). Surely then, in a proper case traditional rules of procedure and interpretation should give way to the exception previously noted. In other words, if the public interest is such that it is a primary concern, then hard and fast rules predicated upon legal technicalities must be relaxed; otherwise, the very public interest sought to be protected will suffer. (See State ex rel. Miller v. State Board of Education, 56 Idaho 210 [52 P.2d 141].)
In the present case it is the element of public interest which presents something in addition to or more than that which is posed in the traditional hypothetical or academic controversy. Here plaintiffs have alleged that from its inception the defendant Transit Authority recognized Local 256 as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for its employees; that the specific arbitration clause in issue was originally inserted in the first contract in 1955; and that following the expiration of that contract the Authority has refused to include such a clause in any succeeding contract of the parties solely because of an opinion of the city attorney that such a clause was illegal. The complaint concluded with the allegation that the specific question to be determined was, could the Authority “. . . lawfully include in an agreement entered into between it and the Plaintiffs a legally effective arbitration clause ...” similar to the one attached to the complaint, and prayed for an order of the court that it be declared lawful to include such a clause in the contract between the parties. In their briefs and before this court, counsel for plaintiffs further state that a judicial decision on the question posed, whether it be favorable to *728plaintiffs or not, would set the question at rest once and for all, and that plaintiffs would abide thereby.
In the case of Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269 [83 A.2d 482, 483, 31 A.L.R.2d 1133], a similar situation was presented. There the plaintiff Teachers’ Association sought a declaration by the court of 10 questions, all relating to the collective bargaining agreement between them and the board of education. One of the specific questions asked related to the question of arbitration. Also there, as here, the complaint referred to the “ ‘possibility of strikes, work stoppage or collective refusals to return to work by the teachers .. . and the possibility of discharges or suspensions by the defendant by reason of difficult personnel relations, all of which tends to disharmony in the operation of the school system and of the ever present possibility that either, or both, the parties may be unwittingly violating statutes by reason of mistaken or erroneous interpretation thereon. ’ ” The complaint in the present action poses comparable problems, but in more diplomatic terms.
The majority opinion seeks to distinguish the Norwalk ease on the ground that there the disputed arbitration clause was presently in the existing contract when the action was brought and that both parties had agreed in advance to abide by whatever order the court might make. It is neither contended nor intimated that a like situation would not prevail in the present case. The mere raising of issues does not mean that both parties do not desire a determination of them, or that they would refuse to abide by a judicial determination thereof. Here the arbitration clause was in the first contract negotiated between the parties. Thereafter, it was eliminated solely for the reason that the city attorney had advised the Authority that “said arbitration clause was unlawful as an illegal delegation of responsibility’’ of said defendants and from then on plaintiffs had tried vainly to have the clause reinserted in the annual contract negotiated between the parties, but have been met with the same reply.
Plaintiffs note that the position taken by the city attorney is contrary to an opinion prepared by the Legislative Counsel of the California Legislature, pursuant to a request of a member of that body. That opinion specifically noted that no provision had been found which would prohibit the Authority from including a like clause and in support of its conclusion, cited the Norwalk case and Cary v. Long, 181 Cal. 443 [184 *729P. 857], In the latter ease the court held that a municipal corporation had the power to submit to arbitration a question of damages. By analogy, the Legislature could conclude that if this could be done by a municipal corporation, then within the limitations of the Norwalk case, the Authority could likewise submit to arbitration questions arising under the provisions of the contract between it and its employees.
Certainly, the public interest could be no less because the clause is not presently a part of the contract between the parties herein. Hence, to refuse relief on this ground would seem to place form over substance. Furthermore, it seems to me to be wholly immaterial whether both parties join in seeking the same relief or not, since the entire controversy may be settled without the need of a compulsive decree commanding anyone to do anything. The precise question presented is whether the defendant Transit Authority has the power to lawfully insert the arbitration clause in the contract. The trial court was not asked to order it to do so even if it were found that the inclusion would be legal. In fact, to do so would be to go beyond the issues as framed by the pleadings.
Under the existing facts, neither Labor Code section 65, nor Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 are applicable. Hence, it further appears to me to be of extreme importance to note the dilemma which confronts plaintiffs. If the declaration is refused they have no other legal remedy. Their only recourse is a work stoppage and the probability of subsequent injunction proceedings, with the end result that the general public welfare will suffer. Surely our courts are not so impotent that such drastic action must be taken before a court can intervene. The total lack of any other remedy was also noted in the Norwalk case. In view of the recent case of Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal.2d 684 [355 P.2d 905], any discussion of the legality of like action on the part of plaintiffs becomes unnecessary. But legal or not, we know that work stoppages do occur in government, particularly where government is engaged in proprietary activities such as in the present case. (See Ziskind, One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees [1940].)
It would seem to me that the question presented, directly affecting as it does a large urban area, is the precise situation wherein the exception should be invoked and, paraphrasing what the court held in Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc., *73023 Cal.2d 719 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062], thereby serve a very practical end in stabilizing an uncertain relationship which well may deteriorate to the detriment of the entire community.
I would reverse the order and judgment of the trial court.