Court Opinion

ID: 9550676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:40:10.961207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:08.122312
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the reversal of the judgment of dismissal, but do not agree with the law stated in the majority opinion. The majority decision holds that, by implication at least, section 48a of the Civil Code is valid and that it applies to the author of a newspaper article although he has no connection with the newspaper or its publisher; that is, that unless a correction or retraction is demanded and refused, only special damages may be recovered against the author for the publication of a libelous article in a newspaper. I cannot agree with that proposition for two reasons: (1) Section 48a, which grants to newspapers immunity from liability for libelous publications, is invalid, and its invalidity is brought into sharp focus when it is extended to the author of the libelous article. (2) Section 48a does not apply to authors.
The validity of section 48a has been before this court heretofore (Werner v. Southern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal.2d 121 [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252]). I filed a dissenting opinion in that case, and the Supreme Court of the United States allowed an appeal, but a settlement was made of plaintiff’s claim and the appeal has been dismissed. I adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in the Werner case, but it is apparent that the broadened scope now given to section 48a by the majority opinion in this case emphasizes its unconstitutionality and calls for further discussion. Under the construction now given to section 48a, a correction or retraction would have to be demanded of an author of an *794article if it appeared in a newspaper, but if the identical statements appeared in an article published in a magazine or in pamphlet form there would be no immunity. By what legerdemain is an author immunized from general and exemplary damages when his libelous article is published in a newspaper, but is not so immunized when such article is published in a magazine, pamphlet or other form of publication? What possible basis could exist for so classifying authors of libelous articles? These questions are not answered in the majority opinion.
In holding there was no denial of equal protection, the majority said in the Werner case (p. 132): “The Legislature could reasonably conclude that defamation suits against newspapers and radio stations constituted the most conspicuous example of the danger it sought to preclude. It is not prohibited by the equal protection clause from striking the evil where it is felt most. . . . Similarly in this case, we cannot say that the Legislature could not reasonably conclude that because of the business they are engaged in, newspapers and radio stations are the most frequent objects of defamation actions and that the danger of excessive damages in actions against them is greatest because oí.their reputed ability to pay. See, Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 Ill.L.Rev. 36, 43; cf., Packard v. Moore, .9 Cal.2d 571, 578-580 [71 P.2d 922], discussing rule of inadmissibility of evidence that defendant is insured in personal injury actions:
“Moreover, in balancing the danger of recoveries of excessive general damages against leaving plaintiffs with no effective remedy for injury to their reputations, the Legislature could properly take into consideration the fact that a retraction widely circulated by a newspaper or radio station would have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an individual and could thus class newspapers and radio stations apart. . . .
“Section 48a may also be sustained under the equal protection clause on the theory that its purpose is to encourage the dissemination of news. Although it extends its protection to those who may deliberately and maliciously disseminate libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that it was necessary to go so far effectively to protect those who in good faith and without malice inadvertently publish defamatory statements.” (Emphasis added.) Thus it is seen that several things are stressed as a basis for the classification approved by the majority in the Werner case—the Legislature could decide that unfounded suits against newspapers, *795that is, the entity or publisher thereof, are of more frequent occurrence with the possible evil of their being mulcted for excessive damages because of their reputed wealth. But, here we do not have a suit against a newspaper as such, or the publisher. It is against an individual—the author of the libel. Merely because of the circumstance that may have caused it to reach the pages of a newspaper instead of a magazine or pamphlet is not justification for exonerating the author. Authors do not fall in the class of newspapers— publishers who are said to be conspicuously subject to unfounded suits. Hence the classification cannot be justified as to authors on that ground. Furthermore, as seen from the foregoing quotation from the majority opinion in the Werner case, it is also said that the Legislature could find that those engaged in the “business” of operating newspapers are the most common objects of defamation actions because of their reputed ability to pay. Manifestly that reasoning cannot apply to authors, and it also indicates (later discussed) the inapplicability of section 48a to authors. They are not in the newspaper business and their work might appear in a newspaper even without their knowledge. It is also said in the quotation from the Werner case, supra, that newspapers are more widely circulated and thus a retraction would be more effective. An author as such has no circulating medium, for he publishes nothing, and a demand upon him to make a retraction would be idle, for he could not compel the newspaper to publish it and he has no medium in which to publish it himself. Finally, it is said that the classification should extend to those who inadvertently publish defamatory statements to accomplish their objective in the dissemination of news. An author is not disseminating news. He is not operating a newspaper with the accompanying necessity of speed in bringing news to the attention of the public.
It should be clear, therefore, that none of the reasons for the approval of the classification sanctioned in the Werner case fit the author of the defamatory statements here involved. All of those reasons are pertinent only to the newspaper business—a publisher. They do not justify a different liability merely because the defamation appears in a newspaper regardless of who prepared it. The ramifications arising from a contrary view are disturbingly many. An advertiser, a writer of a letter, a columnist and similar contributors to newspapers would thus have their liability restricted to special damages.
*796The Legislature did not intend by section 48a to extend protection against actions for libel beyond the publisher of a newspaper. It will be remembered from the wording of the section that a publication of a libel “in” a newspaper is covered. That might indicate that the only requirement was that it appear in a newspaper, but “in” may be used in the sense of “by.” (Beatty v. Hughes, 61 Cal.App.2d 489 [143 P.2d 110].) Thus the publication must be by a newspaper to come within the section and the other provisions of the section make that conclusion inescapable. A correction or retraction must be demanded of the publisher and refused to authorize the recovery of general damages. Upon whom is the demand made? The publisher. Where? At the place of publication. Plainly, the publisher is the operator of the newspaper. He is not necessarily the author. The author ' may not be in the publishing business. He does not necessarily have a place of publication. If “publish” is given a broad connotation to mean any place the libel is circulated, it would be impossible for the defamed person to know where or upon whom he had to serve his demand. Neither the newspaper operator nor the author would be in all places the paper was circulated. It can only mean, therefore, that the ' publisher is the operator of the newspaper and the place of publication is the site where it is produced. Moreover, the retraction must be published in a regular issue of the paper. Only the publisher issues regular editions. It would avail him nothing to make a demand on the author, as he could not compel a retraction by the paper. Suppose the newspaper is published out of this state and where no correction or retraction is required, but the author resides in this state. Must a retraction be demanded before suit against the author?
Comer v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 151 Ala. 622 [44 So. 676], is precisely in point. There the statute was similar to our section 48a, and the defendant had prepared an article which he paid the newspaper to publish. It was held that the statute did not apply to such person, the court saying: “. . . we are left to the wording of the statute and its apparent object for our guide in its interpretation. The statute provides that the notice shall be served in writing ‘on the publisher or publishers of said newspaper, ’ and no provision is made for serving notice on any other person. The act seems to be for the purpose of preventing litigation in regard to those articles which may have found their way into the columns of the newspapers by inadvertence or without knowledge or care*797ful scrutiny on the part of the publishers. We know that the modern daily paper, with its numerous reporters, gathering news from every quarter, and its busy employees, working until late into the night to place the latest news before the readers early in the morning is peculiarly liable to being • inadvertently led into trouble in these matters, and it seems .a proper classification to regulate this class of libel suits as applied to the publishers of newspapers. But with the individual, who prepares his article and pays for its publication, no such reason exists. For these reasons we hold that this provision of the statute does not apply to the defendants in this suit. It is true that the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied a libel law somewhat similar to our statute to an individual who was sued for a libel published in a newspaper; but it is to be noted that the particular point was not raised in that case, and, besides, the wording of the statute was different, in that the North Carolina statute required that the notice should be served ‘on the defendant or defendants,’ and not on the publisher of the newspaper, as in our statute. Williams v. Smith, 134 N.C. 249, 46 S.E. 502.” The same trend has been evidenced in other eases. (Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 45 Minn. 303 [47 N.W. 781], stating that the purpose of the statute was to require service on the publisher of the newspaper; Thorson v. Albert Lea Publish. Co., 190 Minn. 200 [251 N.W. 177, 90 A.L.R. 1169], protection is for newspapers because of the difficulties of preventing mistakes; Lydiard v. Wingate, 131 Minn. 355 [155 N.W. 212].)
That the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words it uses is clearly stated by the author of the majority opinion in this case as author of the majority opinion in People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [217 P.2d 1], He there said: “The will of the Legislature must be determined from the statutes; intentions cannot be ascribed to it at odds with the intentions articulated in the statutes. . . . The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer. . . . Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the purpose of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, reminders that whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly undertaken and not to be disregarded.” Even if the statute is susceptible of either construction, that given it by the majority decision raises serious constitutional questions not considered in the Werner case and hence the established rule applies that: “It is a well-recognized canon of interpre*798tation that, where a legislative enactment is susceptible of two constructions, one consistent and the other inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution, such enactment should be so construed as'to make it harmonious with the constitution and comport with the legitimate powers of the legislature.” (5 Cal.Jur. 615.)
Being of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of action for special, general and exemplary damages, the judgment should be reversed with directions to the trial court to overrule the demurrer and allow the defendants to answer as to all the issues presented by the complaint.