Court Opinion

ID: 9647502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:38:30.896761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.229312
License: Public Domain

*15POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion on several grounds. First, I would affirm the lower court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to amend their complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. Second, I would affirm the lower court’s grant of compulsory nonsuit since I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “[wjhether the distributor knew or should have known that the beer was being purchased for consumption by minors was, in view of the plaintiffs’ evidence, an issue of fact for the jury to decide.” (Majority op., p. 12). And third, I do not believe a new trial is warranted as to any defendant.
In regard to the amendment of the appellants’ complaint, our Supreme Court, in Wright v. Eureka Tempered Copper Company, 206 Pa. 274, 55 A. 978 (1903), expressed the operative test to be used under the instant facts: “If the effect of the amendment will be to correct the name under which the right party was sued, it should be allowed; if its effect will be to bring in a new party on the record, it should be refused after the running of the statute of limitations.” Wright, 55 A. at 979. See Girardi v. Laquin Lumber Co., 232 Pa. 1, 81 A. 63 (1911); Hoare v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 509 Pa. 57, 500 A.2d 1112 (1985).
To support its decision, the majority relies upon Paulish v. Bakaitis, 442 Pa. 434, 275 A.2d 318 (1971), and Powell v. Sutliff 410 Pa. 436, 189 A.2d 864 (1963) which are clearly distinguishable. Both cases allow the amendment of a complaint when a partnership is substituted for a corporation or vise versa. Thus, those cases stand for the proposition that amendment is allowed when the effect is merely to substitute basically identical business entities. Instantly, the appellants wish to substitute a corporation for an individual in an attempt to recover from the corporation’s assets.1 This situation is not analogous to those cases cited *16by the majority where “the assets subject to liability will not be enlarged.” Powell, 189 A.2d at 865.
Seemingly, the majority has failed to consider the nature of the corporation as a independent legal “person.” In Glazer v. Cambridge Industries, Inc., 281 Pa.Super. 621,625, 422 A.2d 642, 644 (1980), we stated: “A corporation is a distinct and separate entity, irrespective of the ownership of the stock, and the fact that one person owns all its stock does not make him and the corporation one and the same.” See also Kiehl v. Action Mfg. Co., 517 Pa. 183,191, 535 A.2d 571, 575-575 (1987) (parent corporation and subsidiary are separate and distinct entities); United Nat. Ins. Co. v. M. London, Inc., 337 Pa.Super. 526, 487 A.2d 385, 391-392 (1985); Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 379 Pa. 38, 108 A.2d 336 (1954). Accordingly, the fact that Mae Lunardi is the president of Dario’s Beer Distributors and has a significant financial interest in the corporation is not sufficient to consider the appellee and the corporation as identical parties distinguished only by different names. Further, it is abundantly clear that a sole proprietorship and a corporation are not sufficiently similar business entities to allow substitution of one for the other after the statute of limitations has expired.
The majority also cites Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 436, 89 A.2d 527 (1952) in which an amendment substituting an individual for a corporation was permitted after the statute of limitations had run. However, the majority has failed to recognize that in Waugh, supra, our Supreme Court’s underlying concern was that “the plaintiff’s error in pleading might have resulted from deception on the part of the defendant.” Powell, 189 A.2d at 865-866, n. 6. Instantly, the appellants have not alleged and we have not found any deception on the part of the appellee, Mae Lunardi.
In direct contradiction to the majority’s decision, we ruled, in Scranton Private Hospital v. Caum, 61 Pa.Super. 93 (1915), that amendment is properly refused when the statute of limitations has expired and the proposed amend*17ment seeks to substitute a corporation for named individuals. As our Supreme Court, commenting on Scranton Private Hospital, supra, stated: “That amendment was properly refused since liability would have been imposed on a new and distinct party.” Powell v. Sutliff, 189 A.2d at 865; See also Girardi, supra, 81 A. 63 (amendment refused where plaintiff sought to substitute individuals for corporation). Accordingly, the lower court correctly denied the instant motion to amend as the appellants merely sought to substitute a corporate entity, Dario’s Beer Distributor, for a named individual doing business as a sole proprietorship, Mae Lunardi, and, thus, impose liability on a new and distinct party.
Moreover, under Pennsylvania law, a long unexplained delay between the original pleading and the motion to amend will be considered as a factor in deciding whether to permit the amendment. Tanner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 321 Pa.Super. 132, 143, 467 A.2d 1164, 1169 (1983); See also, Comm., Dept. ofTransp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 486 Pa. 186, 404 A.2d 692 (1979) (defendant’s motion to amend answer filed three years after original complaint denied); Hightower v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 267 Pa.Super. 588, 407 A.2d 397 (1979) (motion to amend filed two years and five months after original complaint denied). Instantly, Charles Scott Thomas was injured on June 25, 1982, and the appellants filed their original complaint on October 7, 1983. The record reveals that, in her original answer filed in February of 1984, the appellee specifically denied being an individual doing business as a sole proprietorship, as follows:
The averments contained in paragraph 11 of plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are denied in part. Dario’s Beer Distributors is a Pennsylvania corporation having its place of business at 628 Broadway, McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania. Ma Lunardi is President of Dario’s Beer Distributors, a corporation. At no time relevant to to [sic] plaintiffs’ Complaint did Mae Lunardi engage in any conduct relevant to plaintiffs’ Complaint in any capacity *18other than as President of Dario’s Beer Distributors, a corporation. [Record at 43a-44a].
The appellee, Mae Lunardi, did not waiver in her description of Dario’s Beer Distributors as a Pennsylvania corporation for the entire duration of the action. Moreover, after its incorporation in 1981, the fact that Dario’s Beer Distributors was a corporation, not a sole proprietorship, became a matter of public record which the appellants through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered. However, the appellants, disregarding the appellee’s answers to their complaint and their interrogatories, failed to amend their complaint until September 29, 1986, almost three years after their original complaint was filed and over two years and seven months after notification of the name of the true owner of Dario’s Beer Distributors. I find that the lower court’s action of denying the motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion especially in light of the facts that amendment would add a new party after the statute of limitations has run and that the appellants have not explained their failure to amend their complaint in a timely manner. Consequently, I would affirm the grant of compulsory nonsuit on the ground that the correct party was not named as a defendant.
We also note that the appellants failed to move for leave to amend their complaint until after they had presented their entire case in chief against the appellee. Thus, it appears to this observer that the appellants, realizing that Mae Lunardi could not be held individually liable for the action of the corporation, attempted to bring in a new defendant, the corporation, to replace her. I can find no reason to grant the appellant a second chance at recovery by bringing in a new party after the statute of limitations has expired when, in fact, the appellant’s own litigation strategy has provided the opportunity for the “true defendant” to escape possible liability.
Second, supposing Dario’s Beer Distributors was properly made a party to this action, I would still affirm the lower court’s grant of compulsory nonsuit against the appellants. *19I take exception to the majority’s determination that “[whether] the distributor knew or should have known that the beer was being purchased for consumption by minors was, in view of the plaintiffs’ evidence, an issue of fact.for the jury to decide.” (Majority op., p. 12). Under the rule of Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 112 (1977), an order granting a compulsory nonsuit is proper only if the jury, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff has failed to establish the elements necessary to maintain his or her cause of action. See also Morena v. South Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634, 462 A.2d 680, 682-683 (1983). Instantly, compulsory nonsuit is proper if the appellants failed to establish that the appellee owed a duty to the injured minor.
Under the rule expressed by our Supreme Court in Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441, 442 (1963), if “intoxicating beverages are sold in violation of [47 Pa.S.A. § 493(1) ],2 this constitutes negligence, and if the unlawful act of acts are the proximate cause of an injury, the violator is responsible for the loss suffered.” To support their position that the appellee owed a duty to the minor not to sell beer to the purchasing adult, the majority cites numerous cases which hold that a liquor licensee who knowingly permitted, or failed to prevent, a sale of liquor to an adult for the sole purpose of passing the liquor on to minors is in violation of Section 493(1).3 See In the Matter of J-J Bar, Inc., 210 *20Pa.Super. 849, 233 A.2d 625 (1967); Salvia’s Bar, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 211 Pa.Super. 275, 236 A.2d 839 (1967); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Grand Marcus One, Inc., 69 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 483, 451 A.2d 810 (1982); The Matter of Revocation of Restaurant License No. R-12122, 78 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 159, 467 A.2d 85 (1983). Consequently, the majority holds that if, under the facts presented, a beer distributor knew or should have known that an adult was purchasing beer for consumption by minors, the distributor owed a duty to the minor not to sell the beer to that purchaser. Therefor, under the majority’s rule the question of whether a distributor knew or should have known that beer was purchased for consumption of minors is a question for the jury to decide.
I am not persuaded that the courts of this Commonwealth intended that the aforementioned rules regarding distribution of liquor to minors by licensees on licensed premises apply similarly to over-the-counter distribution of liquor by LCB stores or beer distributorships. Certainly, the liquor licensee and the beer distributor are both under an affirmative duty to see that alcoholic beverages are not provided directly or indirectly to minors. However, the majority fails to consider that the “bar” owner is afforded the opportunity to control and supervise the distribution and consumption of alcohol, while the beer distributor has little or no control over who will be the ultimate consumer of the beer once a legal sale to an adult has occurred.
Additionally, to support its position, the majority cites Reber v. Comm. of Pa., Liquor Control Bd., 101 Pa. Cmwlth.Ct. 397, 516 A.2d 440 (1986). Reber, supra, is the only Pennsylvania decision which holds a liquor retailer liable for injuries sustained by the intoxicated minor for which the liquor was purchased originally. In Reber, supra, our Commonwealth Court held that “the LCB not only violated section 493(1) by selling liquor to the underaged Mr. Geaneotes, but it also violated section 493(1) by selling liquor under circumstances in which it was likely that the liquor would reach the hands of other minors [including the *21injured minor, Mr. Reber], Under our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith v. Clark, [411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963) ], we must find that the LCB breached a duty owed to Mr. Reber not to furnish liquor to minors either directly or through likely intermediaries.” Reber, 516 A.2d at 444.
Upon careful review, it is clear that the holding in Reber, supra, applies only when the initial purchase of alcohol is made by a minor and, thus, the liquor “retailer” violates Section 493(1) which is negligence per se making him liable for all resulting injuries of which the illegal sale was a proximate cause. Consequently, Reber, supra, is distinguishable from the case at bar which involves a legal sale of alcohol and its holding must be narrowly construed to apply only when the initial sale of the liquor was illegal, thus, identifying the purchaser as a “likely intermediary.”4
Instantly, I do not believe that the beer distributor owed a duty to the minor appellant since the beer was sold legally to an adult who later, at a time and place outside of the distributor’s control, provided the minors with alcohol. See Old Express Limited Appeal, 70 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 382, 453 A.2d 679 (1982) (licensee not accountable for beer reaching hands of minors where details of purchase unknown and minors not within licensee’s sphere of control). Arguably, the sale of alcoholic beverages to an adult accompanied by *22minors is a common place occurrence which would not normally arouse a liquor retailer’s suspicions.
For example, consider the following fact pattern and analysis of it under the majority’s holding: A parent of a graduating high school senior orders a keg of beer from a beer distributorship and asks the distributor to deliver the beer. Unknown to the distributor, the adult is buying the beer for consumption by only the parents-adults in attendance at a graduation party held in honor of their respective sons’ and daughters’ graduation. Complying with the request, the distributor delivers the beer to the purchaser’s home, and, while setting up the keg-tap system, the distributor notices a large number of minors preparing for the graduation party. After providing the distributor with proper identification, the parent who ordered the beer pays for the keg with money given to him by one of the minors.
Under the majority’s rule, the beer distributor should not sell beer to this parent for fear of liability arising out of the possibility that a minor at the party may consume a portion of the beer, become intoxicated and somehow injure himself. Taking this example one step further, suppose that some of the minors, without their parent’s consent or knowledge, consume some of the beer and then one of the minors is injured in an automobile accident. Under the majority rule, a jury question now arises as to whether the distributor knew or should have known that the beverage was purchased for consumption by.minors. While the facts of this example clearly show that the beer was not purchased for the consumption of minors, it is possible, if not entirely probable, that a jury, applying hindsight, would find that the distributor is liable for the minor’s injuries since he should have known the beer was purchased, at least in part, for consumption by minors. I do not believe that a beer distributor who has legally sold alcohol to an adult should face possible liability for that adult’s independent action of providing alcohol to minors.
Imposition of a duty owed to the minor for whom the beer was originally purchased is not warranted in the context of *23a legal sale of alcohol. Additionally, I do not find support in the case law for the majority’s holding. Once the beer distributor or LCB sales clerk has ascertained the correct age of the purchasing adult, he has complied with the statutory duty under Section 493(1), and, consequently, he should be absolved from any future liability arising out of the adult purchaser’s independent act of supplying alcohol to minors.
In sum, I do not believe the lower court abused its discretion in granting the compulsory non-suit for the following reasons: 1) The lower court correctly denied the appellants’ motion to amend their complaint since the appellants’ motion was not timely filed and attempted to add a new party to the suit; and 2) The majority erroneously concluded that whether the distributor knew or should have known that the beer was being purchased for consumption by minors was an issue of fact for the jury to decide.
Additionally, since I believe that compulsory nonsuit was properly granted by the lower court, I find no reason to warrant a new trial “as to all defendants.” (Majority op., p. 295). Moreover, I see no reason to remand for a new trial to apportion causal negligence between the minor plaintiff and all remaining defendants, including the defaulting defendant, Kenny Watson.
While the jury verdicts did not specifically enumerate the proportions of causal negligence attributable to each joint tortfeasor as required under Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute, a new trial is not necessary since the verdicts, though incorrect in form, clearly evince the jury’s true intentions.5
*24Under Pennsylvania law, “[vjerdicts which are not technically correct in form, but which manifest a clear intent on the part of the jury, may be corrected without resort to further deliberation or a new trial.” Goertel v. Muth, 331 Pa.Super. 179, 480 A.2d 303, 306 (1984), quoting Rusidoff v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 251 Pa.Super. 208, 211-212, 380 A.2d 451, 453 (1977).
Instantly, after hearing all the evidence, the jury entered two verdicts: The first verdict was entered in favor of defendants Duquesne Light Co., Pittsburgh, Chartiers & Youghiogheny Railway Co. and Norman Cousins declaring that the minor plaintiff was more than 50% responsible for his injuries; and the second verdict stated that the appellant was 70% negligent and Kenny Watson was 30% negligent. Additionally, when the court specifically asked: “Do you, *25the jurors, find that the causal negligence of Charles Scott Thomas is more than fifty percent of the total causal negligence of all defendants involved in the law suit?” (N.T. 272), the jurors answered affirmatively. Consequently, upon review of the record, the jury’s finding that the appellant was overwhelmingly responsible for his injuries is abundantly clear. Obviously, the jury believed that the plaintiff’s causal negligence was more than 50% of the total causal negligence. Therefor, the verdicts were sufficient for the purposes of the Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute, and I find no reason to order a new trial simply to enumerate specifically each defendant’s individual causal negligence.

. The appellants contend that they merely wish to substitute two allegedly similar business entities, a sole proprietorship and a corporation.

. 47 Pa.S.A. § 4-493(1) provides that it shall be unlawful:
For any licensee or the board, or any employee, servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages, or to permit any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to be sold furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits.

. As the majority notes, those cases which are cited in support of this proposition are not negligence cases. However, they are demonstrative of what constitutes a violation of Section 493 by a liquor licensee and, consequently, what constitutes negligence per se on the part of the liquor licensee. However, I am not convinced that a beer distributor should be held to the same standards as a liquor licensee.

. Instantly, the majority believes the issue of foreseeability is whether the distributor knew or should have known the adult was purchasing the beer with the intent of distributing it to minors. However, the Reber court posed a much narrower question of foreseeability as follows: "We must, therfore, consider whether it is reasonable to expect a minor customer to share an illegal liquor purchase with other minors.” 516 A.2d at 444. In resolving the foreseeability issue, the court stated: "We cannot say that the prospect of [a minor] sharing his illegally purchased liquor with another minor, and the injury resulting, is so unforeseeable that [the injured minor] cannot assert that the LCB breached the duty owed him.” Reber, 516 A.2d at 444. Thus, the foreseeability question was limited in scope to impose liability only when a retailer knew or should have known a minor who purchased liquor illegally would share his contraband with another minor. The Reber court did not propose to answer the more expansive foreseeability question posed presently in the context of a legal sale of alcohol.

. The Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 7102. Comparative negligence
(a) General rule. — In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that theplaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be dimin*24ished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution. — Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Interpreting our comparative negligence statute, our Supreme Court, in Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, 515 A.2d 517 (1986), stated:
The Act adopts the notion that injured victims will obtain a recovery in all cases where the victim’s negligence contributing to the injuries is not greater than that of the defendant or defendants. The policy purposes of the Act are met by comparing the plaintiffs negligence to the combined negligence of all defendants. We hold, therefore, that under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, recovery by an injured plaintiff will be precluded only where plaintiffs negligence exceeds the combined negligence of all defendants. Further, each such defendant is liable for the plaintiffs damages in proportion to his degree of negligence even if the portion of negligence attributable to a particular defendant is less’ than the negligence of the plaintiff. Elder, 515 A.2d at 525.
Accordingly, the lower court should have instructed the jury to determine the individual levels of causal negligence of the plaintiff and the defendants, including the defendant in default as it is clear that a defendant’s default status is irrelevant to the application of the statute.