Court Opinion

ID: 9648027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:59:44.458216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:05.284846
License: Public Domain

HUTSON-DUNN, Justice,
dissenting.
In this case, appellant asserts that his counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to secure the presence of witnesses that could rebut the trial testimony of George Russell, the complainant, and corroborate Russell’s pretrial testimony; and (2) failing to obtain a transcript of Russell’s pretrial testimony to aid in impeaching him at trial. The majority agrees with appellant and finds that the failure to take these measures constituted a violation of both prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). I disagree. I believe that many of counsel’s alleged errors fall within the range of what could be considered sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Further, even if appellant’s lawyers had taken all of the measures that the majority finds that they should have, appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).1 Therefore, I dissent.
The majority points to several acts that were allegedly deficient and harmful to appellant’s case. I will discuss each of these in turn.
1. Failure to Call or Subpoena Witnesses
The majority finds that counsel’s failure to call defense witnesses during the guilt-innocence phase of trial constituted ineffective assistance because their testimony would have benefitted appellant’s defense had they been called. See Simms v. State, 848 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at guilt-innocence stage is irrelevant absent a showing that such witnesses were available and that appellant would benefit from them testimony). I disagree. I would find that, even had counsel called or subpoenaed defense witnesses, the record does not show that their testimony would have bene-fitted appellant’s defense.
a. Kimberly Mayfield
Upon careful review of the record, I believe that counsel had a strategical reason to defer calling Kimberly Mayfield until the punishment phase of trial. On cross-examination by the State during punishment, May-field testified that Volley Bastine told her at the beginning of trial, immediately after Tex. R.Crim.Evid. 613 had been invoked, that she *225did not need to wait outside the courtroom because he did not want her to testify. It is possible that Mayfield was unwilling to testify before the punishment phase or that counsel, at that time, felt that her testimony would have been detrimental to appellant.
Further, even if Mayfield had testified during the guilt-innocence phase of trial that Jenkins filled out the credit application, appellant has failed to show how he would have benefitted from her testimony. The jury was charged under the law of parties. This required the jury to find appellant guilty if it found that “acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” TexJPenal Code AnN. § 7.02 (Vernon 1994).
From the evidence in the record, it is clear that the jury would likely have found appellant guilty as a party even if Mayfield had testified. Russell testified during the pretrial hearing that appellant and Jenkins chose the television, and both men discussed with him which television they should purchase. Further, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that appellant knew that Jenkins falsely identified himself as Ronnie Bates when the television was purchased. Officer William Hefner, a witness called by the State at trial, testified that he had arrested Jenkins at appellant’s apartment before April 27 in an unrelated matter and that appellant and Jenkins knew each other at that time. Further, Russell testified during the pretrial hearing that appellant stood next to Jenkins when Jenkins signed the credit increase. Finally, at trial Russell described appellant’s involvement in the May 3 offense, in which appellant and a second companion purchased another television on false credit.
If Mayfield had testified during the guilt-innocence phase of tidal, the jury would probably still have found appellant guilty of theft pursuant to the court’s charge on the law of parties. I would find that appellant has failed to satisfy both prongs of Strickland.
b. Marcus Jenkins
I agree with the majority that the failure to call or subpoena Marcus Jenkins as a witness was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
c. The Court Reporter and Kenneth Poland
The majority finds that counsel was ineffective by failing to secure the presence of the following witnesses at trial so that their testimony could be used to effectively impeach Russell’s trial testimony: (1) the court reporter from the pretrial hearing; and/or (2) Kenneth Poland, pretrial counsel.
Even assuming that counsel should have secured the presence of these witnesses, appellant has failed to show how he would have benefitted from their testimony. As noted, the jury was charged on the law of parties. Assuming these witnesses had testified and the jury had believed them, the jury still would likely have found appellant guilty of theft as a party. The record shows that appellant assisted in the decision to purchase the television, and he knew that Jenkins was not Ronnie Bates.
I would find that appellant has failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland.
2. Failure to Investigate and Prepare a Defense
The majority finds that counsel’s failure to obtain a transcript of Russell’s pretrial testimony demonstrates that Ronald Mock, Bas-tine’s assistant counsel, did not adequately prepare for trial. Regardless of whether the majority is correct on this point, I would find that appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of his Mai would have been different had the pretrial transcript been used to impeach Russell’s testimony at trial.
The record reflects that appellant’s counsel did an adequate job of impeaching Russell even without the benefit of extrinsic evidence to prove his prior inconsistent statement. On cross-examination, Bastine asked Russell whether he had testified earlier that Jenkins had filled out the credit application. He also attempted to get Russell to admit that Jenkins must have been the man who filled out the application because it was Jenkins’ picture on the driver’s license used to get the *226credit. Further, even if appellant’s counsel had obtained and used a transcript of the pretrial healing to impeach Russell, there still would have been sufficient evidence before the jury to find appellant guilty as a party.
I would find that appellant has not met the second prong of Strickland.
I would overrule appellant’s first point of error.
In his remaining two points of error, appellant asserts error in the admission of evidence during the punishment phase of trial, and error in the refusal of a requested charge. Since I would overrule appellant’s first point of error, I would proceed to address these points.

. A defendant must prove his ineffectiveness claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).