Court Opinion

ID: 9460143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:43:01.578006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:30.209242
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
The disposition of this case by the district court was somewhat unusual. On the basis of defendant’s motion to dismiss, supported by affidavits, and without hearing evidence tendered by the plaintiffs at a preliminary hearing, the district court made “findings of fact” and dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. I agree with the majority that the district court committed error. For two reasons, however, I am not prepared to adopt the rationale of the Ninth Circuit in King.1
First, although I certainly agree that the same words may have different meanings in different parts of the same statute, I am not persuaded that the phrase “to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline” in § 609 was intended to be any broader than the strikingly *858parallel phrase “fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined” in § 101 (a)(5). One section deals with procedural safeguards and the other with impermissible grounds for discipline. If Congress had intended the coverage of the substantive protection to be significantly broader than the procedural provision — and certainly the King rationale identifies a most significant difference —I seriously doubt that the intent would have been expressed in such an obscure way.
Second, as I understand the King rationale — at least as it applies to Unions which have not adopted such speech-inhibiting regulations as may be permitted by the proviso to § 101(a)(2)2 — the removal of an appointed union executive who publicly disagrees with the leadership of the union on questions of policy is prohibited. Patronage is by no means an essential attribute of democracy, see Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 928, 93 S.Ct. 1364, 35 L.Ed. 2d 590 but it is difficult to believe that Congress intended to address the patronage issue when it enacted the LandrumGriffin Act in 1959. Had it done so, I am inclined to believe that appointed policy-making officials would have been subject to removal by their sponsors. See Sewell v. Grand Lodge, 445 F.2d 545, 551-552 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, supra, 473 F.2d at 574.3 I therefore disagree with the view that the concept of “discipline” described in § 609 is substantially broader than in § 101(a)(5).
That disagreement does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is clear “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80.
No issue under § 101(a)(5) has been raised by plaintiffs, presumably because it is clear under this court’s holding in Air Line Stewards, et al. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 334 F.2d 805, 808-809 (1964), that Lowry’s suspension pending a full hearing on the Union’s charges is not “discipline” within the meaning of that section.4 Even so, it is possible that additional acts of retribution may constitute discipline. See, e. g., Martire v. Laborers’ Local Union 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 35 (3rd Cir. 1969); furthermore, the important fact that defendant’s actions were directed against an elected rather than an appointed officer may bring this controversy within the Second Circuit’s rationale in Schonfield v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (1973). See Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, et al., 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. September 11, 1973).
As presently framed, I am inclined to believe that the allegations are insufficient. But since the district court refused to permit the plaintiffs to present additional material for its consideration and dismissed the original complaint with prejudice, I agree that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

. Machinist Grand Lodge v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964). The portion of the King opinion which holds that the definition of “discipline” in § 609 is broader than in § 101(a)(5) has not, as far as I have been able to determine, been followed by any other Court of Appeals prior to this decision.

. See 335 F.2d at 346.

. Since I do not believe Congress intended to address the patronage issue in this statute, I also doubt the validity of the implied exception permitting disciplinary discharges for “insubordination.”

. It may be worth noting that the risk of fiscal misconduct, which explains why the temporary suspension of a union officer is not regarded as discipline within the meaning of § 101(a)(5), see the statement by Senator Kennedy quoted in King, 335 F.2d at 342, does not require or justify a narrow interpretation of the word discipline in other situations, including permanent removal, in which the officer is plainly being punished. Why a person occupying an office of trust should be less entitled to fair procedures than other citizens is difficult to understand.