Court Opinion

ID: 9941327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:17:19.862517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:32.108808
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re D.P., 2024-Ohio-480.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        GREENE COUNTY

 IN RE: D.P., M.P., A.N.E.R.                        :
                                                    :
                                                    :   C.A. Nos. 2023-CA-33; 2023-CA-36;
                                                    :   2023-CA-37; 2023-CA-38; 2023-CA-41
                                                    :
                                                    :   Trial Court Case Nos. 2019-C-00043;
                                                    :   2019-C-00044; 2019-C-00045-0C
                                                    :
                                                    :   (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
                                                    :   Juvenile Division)

                                               ...........

                                              OPINION

                                       Rendered on February 9, 2024

                                               ...........

DAWN S. GARRETT, Attorney for Appellant D.P.

ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant Father of A.N.E.R.

ANDREW BARNES, Attorney for Appellant M.P.

GARY SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellant A.N.E.R.

P.J. CONBOY, II, Attorney for Appellant Mother

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

                                              .............

EPLEY, P.J.
                                                                                            -2-

       {¶ 1} Mother, Father of A.R., and children D.P., M.P., and A.N.E.R. (“A.R.”) appeal

from judgments of the Greene County Juvenile Court which awarded permanent custody

of the children to Greene County Children Services (“GCCS”). For the reasons that follow,

the judgments of the juvenile court will be affirmed.

       I.     Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} GCCS became involved with Mother and her three children (D.P., M.P., and

A.R.) in the fall of 2019 when the family’s home was condemned. The children were ages

10, 9, and 8, respectively, at that time. In addition to their being homeless, GCCS had

concerns    about   Mother’s    drug   use    (she      tested   positive   for   amphetamine,

methamphetamine, and marijuana), her unemployment, and the children’s truancy. As a

result, on December 3, 2019, GCCS filed complaints alleging that the children were

neglected and dependent pursuant to R.C. 2151.03 and R.C. 2151.04. A shelter care

hearing was held, and GCCS was granted interim temporary custody of all three children.

       {¶ 3} On January 14, 2020, the children were adjudicated as dependent, but the

magistrate dismissed the neglect allegations. D.P., M.P., and A.R. were then placed in the

temporary custody of GCCS. To facilitate the reunification of the family, Mother was given

a case plan with the following objectives: (1) obtain safe and suitable housing; (2)

successfully complete substance abuse evaluation and classes; (3) complete a mental

health evaluation; (4) submit to random drug screens as requested; (5) keep contact with

the caseworker to discuss progression on the case plan at least once a month and meet

with the caseworker once a month; (6) sign releases of information; (7) abide by the

visitation plan set forth by the agency and caregivers; and (8) respect phone call privileges
                                                                                        -3-

with children and have appropriate conversations. February 18, 2020, Report and

Recommendation of GAL. The plan was modified shortly thereafter to also include the

completion of parenting classes.

      {¶ 4} On March 9, 2021, the parties agreed that it was in the best interest of the

children to extend temporary custody to GCCS. A second such extension was agreed upon

and granted on June 3, 2021.

      {¶ 5} On November 23, 2021, GCCS filed motions requesting modification of

temporary custody to permanent custody. The trial date was originally set for spring 2022

but was delayed because Mother filed a motion for reunification and continuances were

granted to find alternative placements, locate one of the fathers, and appoint an attorney

on behalf of the children (as the wishes of two of them differed from the GAL’s

recommendation). The trial was eventually scheduled for February 7-8, 2023. Prior to the

trial, however, GCCS filed two additional motions: (1) a motion requesting modification of

temporary custody of D.P. and A.R. to legal custody to Shane Elam, Mother’s boyfriend,

and (2) a motion requesting modification of temporary custody of M.P. to legal custody to

Kali M., whose oldest child is M.P.’s cousin.

      {¶ 6} At the trial on February 7, 2023, the court heard testimony from Tamara Roddy,

D.P.’s therapist; Kali M., M.P.’s foster mother; and Hayley Fannin, the caseworker for all

three children. The parties gathered again the following day, and it was expected that Elam

would testify regarding the motion to grant him legal custody of the children. He did not

appear, however, and the court was notified that he was removing himself from

consideration as legal custodian. GCCS officially withdrew its motion as to Elam, and the
                                                                                             -4-

court was left to decide if permanent custody should be granted to GCCS.

       {¶ 7} The final day of the trial was held on April 17, 2023. At the beginning of the

proceedings, Mother’s attorney made an oral motion to reconsider Elam as legal custodian

– this time for all three children – as Kali M. was no longer interested in being legal guardian

of M.P. Resultantly, GCCS withdrew its motion to grant Kali M. legal custody of M.P.

       {¶ 8} After the initial motions, the trial court heard testimony from Fannin, who

returned to the stand, Libby Powers from the Green County Family Visitation Center, Elam,

and Tasha Mills, the guardian ad litem (GAL). Dozens of exhibits were presented for the

court’s consideration. Finally, on June 11 and 12, the trial court granted permanent custody

of all three children to GCCS, finding that they had been in the temporary custody of GCCS

for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that permanent custody was

in the best interest of the children.

       {¶ 9} Mother, Father of A.R., D.P., M.P., and A.R. have all filed appeals. The father

of D.P. and M.P. did not participate below and did not file an appeal.

       II.    Legal Custody

       {¶ 10} All the appellants argue that the trial court erred by not granting legal custody

of the children to Shane Elam, Mother’s boyfriend.

       {¶ 11} If a child is adjudicated a “dependent child,” the court may grant legal custody

of the child “to either parent or to any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing,

files a motion requesting legal custody of the child[.]” R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); In re M.W., 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 28440, 2019-Ohio-5012, ¶ 5. An award of legal custody gives the

custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child, to determine where the
                                                                                            -5-

child lives, “and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide

the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental

rights, privileges, and responsibilities.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(21).

        {¶ 12} The custody determination under R.C. 2151.353 must be made in

accordance with the “best interest of the child” standard described in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).

The factors which must be considered include things like the “parents’ wishes; the child’s

wishes, if the court has interviewed the child; the child’s interaction with parents, siblings,

and other who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; adjustment of the child to

home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all involved persons.”

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); In re M.J.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29292, 2022-Ohio-1114, ¶ 9.

        {¶ 13} “[W]hen determining whether or not to grant an individual or couple legal

custody of a dependent child, a court can do so if it finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that it is in the best interes[t] of the concerned child. Preponderance of the

evidence simply means ‘evidence which is of a greater weight or more convincing than the

evidence which is offered in opposition to it.’ ” (Citations omitted.) In re A.W., 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 21309, 2006-Ohio-2103, ¶ 6, citing In re K.S., 2d Dist. Darke No. 1646,

2005-Ohio-191, ¶ 15. Accord In re C.B., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28113, 2019-Ohio-890,

¶ 17.

        {¶ 14} We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s judgment

on a motion for legal custody and will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. In re

G.D., 2023-Ohio-1913, 216 N.E.3d 775, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). Abuse of discretion implies that the

court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore,
                                                                                             -6-

5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

       {¶ 15} Based on the record in this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion when it failed to grant legal custody of the children to Elam. First,

there is a procedural issue that would prevent Elam from being granted custody. To be

granted legal custody of child, a person (who is not the parent) who has filed a motion

requesting legal custody or who is identified in a complaint or motion must sign a “statement

of understanding” that custody is intended to be permanent, that he or she assumes legal

responsibility for the care and supervision of the child and the person must be present in

court. R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(a)-(d); In re C.P., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2017-CA-48, 2018-Ohio-

1862, ¶ 16.

       {¶ 16} While it is arguable that Elam was identified in a motion for legal custody

(though it was withdrawn when he failed to appear for the February 8 date) and was present

in court (Elam failed to show for the February 8 hearing but did take the stand in April 2023),

he did not sign the “statement of understanding.” This non-compliance disqualified him from

becoming the legal guardian of the children. See In re L.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110676,

2022-Ohio-1586, ¶ 55 (holding that the requirement of signing a “statement of

understanding” applies to non-parents who seek to obtain legal custody); In re R.K., 5th

Dist. Muskingum No. CT2012-0006, 2012-Ohio-2739, ¶ 23 (“We read the statute as

providing for a grant of legal custody to either a parent, or, in the alternative, to any other

person who files a motion for legal custody and a statement of understanding.” (Emphasis

added.)).

       {¶ 17} But even if that were not the case, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse
                                                                                               -7-

of discretion. In considering whether granting Elam legal custody was in the best interest

of the children, the trial court was troubled by his apparent indecision about if he even

wanted to be their custodian. The court noted:

       [Mother’s] current boyfriend, Shane Elam, initially advised Children Services

       he would accept custody of the children. However, he failed to follow through

       with this, despite the children exercising visitation at his home in the past. He

       also failed to sign the Statement of Understand presented to him by Children

       Services agreeing to assume custody of the children. He failed to appear for

       hearing on February 7, 2023, so the matter of custody was continued to

       February 8, 2023 to permit Mr. Elam to once again appear for court. However,

       on this date the court was advised that Mr. Elam no longer wished to be

       considered as the legal custodian.

Judgment Entry & Orders of Permanent Custody at 5. And even though he testified at the

April trial date that he was willing to take custody of all three children, his reason for missing

the first dates were incongruent.

       {¶ 18} According to Elam’s testimony, he missed the first days of trial because he

could not remember about them. Elam told the court that in November 2022 he suffered a

head injury due to an accident. “I had an accident at work in November, fell 15 feet and

landed on my head, two factures, major concussion, been kind of out of it.” Day 2 Trial Tr.

at 186-187. Later, during cross-examination, he testified that he could not recall why he did

not show up for the February hearings. Day 2 Trial Tr. at 195, 202-203. Further, Elam stated

that he had not worked since the accident (although he had been paid) and that his medical
                                                                                              -8-

prognosis was still unclear.

       {¶ 19} Based purely on the medical concerns surrounding Elam and his memory

issues, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that making him the legal custodian

was not in the best interest of D.P., M.P., and A.R. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion, and the assignments of error as to Elam are overruled.

       {¶ 20} In addition to arguing that Elam should have been granted legal custody, M.P.

also avers that Mother’s 21-year-old sister, Aunt, should have been named legal custodian.

This argument is unavailing as well because Aunt neither filed for legal custody nor signed

a “statement of understanding,” failing to meet the requirements set forth in R.C.

2151.353(A)(3)(a)-(d). The trial court did not abuse its discretion and the assignment of

error as to Aunt is overruled.

       III.   Permanent Custody

       {¶ 21} Most of the appellants also claim that it was an error for the trial court to grant

permanent custody to GCCS.

       {¶ 22} The United States Supreme Court has described parents’ interest in the care,

custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054,

147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). This interest, however, is not absolute. “The state has broad

authority to intervene to protect children from abuse and neglect.” State ex rel. Allen Cty.

Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cty. Common Pleas Court, Prob. Div., 150 Ohio St.3d 230,

2016-Ohio-7382, 81 N.E.3d 380, ¶ 58 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting).

       {¶ 23} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-part analysis for courts to consider when
                                                                                         -9-

determining a motion for permanent custody to a public services agency. First, the trial

court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child either (a) cannot or should

not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time; (b) is abandoned; (c) is orphaned

with no relatives above to take permanent custody; or (d) has been in the temporary

custody of a public or private children services agency for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period. In re I.W., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-76, 2020-Ohio-1643,

¶ 20; R.C. 2151.414.

      {¶ 24} If the first prong is met, the court must then determine whether granting

permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. In re J.N., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-

CA-82, 2020-Ohio-4157, ¶ 26; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). To help with this determination, R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) sets out factors the court must consider:

      (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents,

      siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other

      person who may significantly affect the child;

      (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the

      child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;

      (c) The custodial history of the child * * *;

      (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether

      that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody

      to the agency;

      (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply

      in relation to the parents and child.
                                                                                           -10-

“No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance.” In re C.F., 113 Ohio

St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 57.

       {¶ 25} D.P., M.P., and A.R. had been in the custody of GCCS from December 3,

2019, until the permanent custody motion was filed on November 23, 2021. This 23-month

timeframe was far more than the requisite 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period set

forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The trial court’s analysis, therefore, focused only on

whether the grant of permanent custody to GCCS was in the best interest of the children.

Interaction and interrelationships of the children

       {¶ 26} The trial court found, and the record confirms, that the children’s relationship

with one another was “contentious.” During visits at the Greene County Family Visitation

Center, the children’s behavior toward each other was sometimes problematic. For

instance, at a June 2021 visit, D.P. locked his sister, A.R., in a storage shed and verbalized

inappropriate and hostile language towards\ his siblings, especially A.R., whom he called

a racial slur. Hayley Fannin, the family’s caseworker, testified that sisters M.P. and A.R.

were originally placed together in a foster home, but were quickly separated because they

could not get along, and once M.P. was placed in a foster home without her sister, things

did not get better. Fannin testified A.R. had been exhibiting “erratic behavior,” cussing out

and hitting other kids in the foster home. She further explained that A.R. had been

suspended multiple times from school, so “her behaviors are just off the chart right now.”

Day 1 Trial Tr. at 44.

       {¶ 27} D.P. had also had poor behavior according to Fannin. He was placed in a

residential treatment center after he ran away from two different group homes, including
                                                                                           -11-

one time where he was gone for 22 days. M.P. also struggled. Kali Mills, who had originally

asked for legal custody of M.P., withdrew the request in March 2023 citing increased

behavioral problems and the inability to get along with the other children in the home.

       {¶ 28} The children had little to no relationships with their fathers. A.R.’s father was

serving a lengthy prison sentence at the time of trial and refused to be transported for trial.

D.P. and M.P. had minimal contact with their father, who failed to cooperate with GCCS

despite repeated requests. In fact, he had only one happenstance contact with the children

during the pendency of the case.

       {¶ 29} Finally, while the children’s relationships with each other, their fathers, and

their foster providers were strained, testimony indicated that all three loved their mother

and got along well with her.

Wishes of the Children

       {¶ 30} The next consideration is the wishes of the children. The trial court conducted

in camera interviews with all three children, and D.P. and M.P. expressed clear interest in

being with Mother. A.R. stated that she wanted to be with family, but also told the court that

she would be willing to be adopted by her foster mom.

Custodial History

       {¶ 31} All three children had been in the custody of GCCS since December 2019

and lived in multiple foster homes or residential facilities during that time.

Need for Legally Secure Permanent Placement

       {¶ 32} While the Ohio Revised Code does not define what a “legally secure

permanent placement” is, Ohio courts have held that the phrase means “a safe, stable,
                                                                                           -12-

consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.” In re K.M., 4th Dist. Lawrence

Nos. 23CA9, 23CA10, 23CA11, 23CA12, 23CA13, 2023-Ohio-3203, ¶ 35. The trial court

found, and the evidence confirms, that Mother would have a difficult time providing such

an environment for her children.

       {¶ 33} The trial court believed that Mother had failed to take meaningful steps to

regain custody of her children. The evidence relating to her case plan illustrated this. First,

visitations with the children at the Greene County Visitation Center were inconsistent for

Mother. Between November 22, 2021, and February 25, 2022, 11 visits were scheduled;

Mother no-showed for five. From June 2, 2022, through November 16, 2022, Mother had

24 scheduled visits; she cancelled two ahead of time and no-showed another five. In

addition, Mother accrued three behavior violations for being hostile to staff.

       {¶ 34} Mother also failed to obtain housing. While it was confirmed that Mother had

lived for approximately a year with Elam, except for a two-month period in 2021 (before

she was evicted), she had not secured independent housing since January 2020. Fannin

testified that Mother mostly stayed with friends and paramours.

       {¶ 35} Drug testing was also a problem. According to Fannin, “[w]henever [Mother]

is asked to submit to a random drug screen, it’s typically a fight or there are some words

between her and myself that she just will not take it[.]” Day 2 Trial Tr. at 38. When Mother

did submit to the tests, she was typically positive for THC.

       {¶ 36} Mental health counseling was also questionable. Fannin testified that Mother

got the initial assessment completed in November 2020, but did not set up further classes

that were recommended. And while Mother claimed to have been in counseling, Fannin
                                                                                           -13-

testified that she had not been provided any names, numbers, or paperwork to verify,

leading her to believe that Mother had not seen a therapist since at least the summer of

2022.

         {¶ 37} Fannin told the court, in summary, that “[a]t this time [Mother] has not

demonstrated to the agency that she is capable of caring for three kids who are teenagers,

and she has not completed anything on her case plan.” Day 2 Trial Tr. at 50. She went on

to note that there is nothing showing that her “mental health is in check, that she’s not

smoking weed, and that she is overall stable at this time.” Id. The GAL reported concerns

as well. Mother’s “struggles with providing and caring for the children, notably the inability

to have a home or job when paired with the opinions of the majority of the professionals

involved in the children’s lives, gives rise to great concern with Mother being granted return

custody of the children.”

         {¶ 38} Mother notes, however, that Tamara Roddy, D.P.’s counselor, testified that

Mother had been involved in her son’s treatment and that D.P. was “very bonded to his

mother and talks to her every day.” Day 1 Trial Tr. at 13. Roddy also opined that it “would

not be a good thing for him [to be placed with someone else] because he’s very bonded to

his mom * * * and she’s been an integral part in him wanting to get better[.]” Day 1 Trial Tr.

at 19.

         {¶ 39} Because awarding permanent custody is a “drastic remedy that involves the

termination of parental rights, permanent custody determinations must be based upon clear

and convincing evidence.” Id. (Citations omitted.) “Clear and convincing” means more than

a preponderance, but less than “clear and unequivocal.” In re Rose, 2017-Ohio-694, 85
                                                                                          -14-

N.E.3d 498, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). Because R.C. 2151.414 mandates that a juvenile court find by

clear and convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, the sufficiency of

the evidence and/or manifest weight standards of review are the proper appellate

standards of review depending on the arguments presented by the parties. In re Z.C., Ohio

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 11; In re Ca.S., 4th Dist. Pickaway No.

21CA10, 2021-Ohio-3874, ¶ 44 (a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s permanent

custody decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence).

       {¶ 40} When an appellate court reviews whether the lower court’s permanent

custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it “weighs the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a

new trial ordered.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d

517, ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th

Dist.2001). “Thus, if the children services agency presented competent and credible

evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief that

permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.” In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, 997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).

       {¶ 41} The trial court heard testimony that, despite the fact that Mother and her

children were bonded, she had no job, had no home of her own (she lived with various

friends, family, and lovers), she missed many visitation opportunities with the children, she

failed to complete therapy, and she continued to use drugs. The GAL had “great concern”
                                                                                            -15-

with Mother getting custody back.

       {¶ 42} Other family members were not placement options either. The fathers of the

children were either incapable (in the case of A.R.’s father, who is in prison until the 2040s)

or unwilling (in the case of D.P. and M.P.’s father, who has no contact with them) to raise

the children. And despite reasonable efforts from GCCS, extended family placements did

not come to fruition either.

       {¶ 43} Based on the record before us, the trial court’s decision granting permanent

custody to GCCS was not against the weight of the evidence.

       {¶ 44} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “sufficiency is a term of art meaning

that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or

whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.”

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). It is essentially a test

of adequacy: whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of

law. Id. When applying a sufficiency standard, a reviewing court should affirm when the

evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. In re Z.C. at ¶ 13.

       {¶ 45} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that

a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a

finding of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-

881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11; accord State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, 85 N.E.3d 501, ¶ 58

(2d Dist.). As a result, “a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the

evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v.
                                                                                 -16-

Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15.

      {¶ 46} Having already found that the trial court’s decision to grant permanent

custody of the children to GCCS was supported by the weight of the evidence, we must

also conclude that it is supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, appellants’

assignments of error pertaining to those concepts are overruled.

      IV.    Conclusion

      {¶ 47} The judgments of the trial court will be affirmed.

                                     .............

WELBAUM, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.