Court Opinion

ID: 9644179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:49:31.828343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:09.440820
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the questions of law applicable to the evidence presented at trial. See Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963). Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellee’s motion for a new trial, I *359would reverse the Superior Court’s grant of a new trial and reinstate the verdict.
Appellant brought a trespass action against appellee alleging that appellee unlawfully backed his automobile up on a one-way street and struck appellant. At trial, appellant testified that he was struck by appellee’s automobile and pinned against a pole. Appellant testified that he sustained injuries including a broken leg.
Appellee admitted that he backed up on a one-way street, but denied that he struck appellant with his automobile. A witness for the appellee testified that he saw appellant step out on the street and then fall as he stepped back. The witness stated that he did not see appellee’s automobile hit appellant.
Appellant did not submit any points for charge. Appellee requested two points for charge which the trial court rejected: “(1) Under all the law and the facts as presented your verdict must be for defendant; and (2) Your verdict can only be for the plaintiff if you find that the defendant caused the injury to the defendant’s [sic] knee by striking the plaintiff’s knee with the rear of his vehicle. If you find that plaintiff’s injury was caused by a fall no matter what the cause of such fall your verdict must then be for the defendant.”
In instructing the jury, the trial court stated:
“[T]here does not have to be any touching of the plaintiff by the defendant’s automobile to find for the plaintiff. To find the defendant liable as I explained and I will further explain, you must however find that the defendant was negligent and that the negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.”
Appellee took exception to this charge, arguing that the jury instruction was contrary to the factual allegations of appellant’s complaint and the evidence which appel*360lant presented at trial. The trial court denied the exception as did the court en banc. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and granted a new trial.
The majority affirms the Superior Court’s grant of a new trial on the ground that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on a “theory” of recovery not raised by appellant in his complaint or at trial and diametrically opposed to appellant’s testimony.
Although appellant testified that he was struck by appellee’s automobile, a determination that appellant was injured by appellee’s negligence even though there was no impact, is not totally inconsistent with appellant’s testimony or his “theory” of the case. The jury is free to believe all, part or nothing of a witness’ testimony. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. London, 461 Pa. 566, 337 A.2d 549 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kearney, 459 Pa. 603, 331 A.2d 156 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661 (1970). Here, the jury could have believed appellant’s testimony that appellee negligently backed up and believed appellee’s testimony that he never struck appellant, and still find in favor of appellant. Thus I cannot agree with the majority that the jury instruction given by the trial court articulated a factual theory of recovery diametrically opposed to appellant’s testimony.
Nor can I agree with the majority that the principle that a plaintiff may rely on evidence produced by his opponent to make out his claim, see e. g., Silberstein v. Showell, Fryer & Co. (No. 1), 267 Pa. 298, 109 A. 701 (1920), does not govern here. The majority relies on appellant’s pleadings and his case in chief and concludes that Silberstein is not applicable because appellant’s version of the incident is totally at odds with appellee’s version. I find no basis for the majority’s analysis.
Under our current practice, a plaintiff need not articulate his “theories” in the complaint or in the case in chief. The complaint need only allege the material facts upon which the cause of action is based. See generally *361Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017-1044; 1 Goodrich-Amram, Procedural Rules Service §§ 1017-1044 (1973).
“[T]he plaintiff need not plead the exact details of an accident . . . . These are matters to be shown by evidence at trial.” I Goodrich-Amram, Procedural Rules Service § 1044-1.2, at 276 (1973).
Here, appellant alleged sufficient material facts to give appellee notice of the cause of action. Although he alleged he was struck by appellee’s automobile, he was not bound by those pleadings. E. g., Domineck v. Tuskan, 201 Pa.Super. 608, 193 A.2d 626 (1963); see generally, 4 Standard Pennsylvania Practice (1955). If the evidence establishes that appellant was injured in a manner other than alleged in his complaint, he may still be entitled to recover. Since the issue of appellee’s negligence was raised in the pleadings and at trial, the fact that the injury may have occurred in a manner other than alleged by appellant does not preclude his recovery; appellant is entitled to rely on evidence produced by appellee to make out his claim. Silberstein v. Showell, Fryer & Co. (No. 1), supra. The majority ignores this principle and relies solely upon appellant’s pleadings and case in chief to determine whether the jury instruction was proper.
The majority concedes that instruction that the jury could return a verdict in favor of appellant even if appellee’s automobile did not actually strike appellant is a correct statement of the law. E. g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Thompson v. Gorman, 366 Pa. 242, 77 A.2d 413 (1951). Since there was evidence, if believed by the jury, to support the jury’s determination that appellee negligently injured appellant without actually striking him, the trial court properly instructed the jury. Smith v. Clark, supra.
I would reverse the Superior Court’s grant of a new trial and reinstate the verdict.