Court Opinion

ID: 9583445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:38:43.905285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:01.295969
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I fully concur with the majority’s determination that the actions of the Board of Commissioners challenged by the board chairperson did not violate the Georgia Constitution or general laws of the State. I also endorse the majority’s position that the chairperson executes the county’s business, as directed by a majority of the board, and is the supervisor of all county employees. The majority and I part ways on the issue of who the General Assembly, through the passage of local legislation, has empowered to hire and fire Walton County employees.
The majority believes that the local legislation’s failure to delegate specifically the power to hire and fire results in a vacuum which the majority fills by implication. The majority opines that the board does not have authority to hire and fire county employees since it has only been given authority to hire specific employees, and concludes that the power to hire and fire arises out of the chairperson’s power to superintend the work of the county. Maj. Op. pp. 682-683.1 suggest *685that the vacuum which leads to the majority’s interpretation by implication does not exist, as the local legislation gives the full board “complete authority and control over all county matters” (Ga. L. 1971, p. 4052, § 1) and mandates that a majority vote of the board direct the use of all county property28 (Ga. L. 1960, p. 2063, § 1). I believe that the power to hire and fire the employees working for the county is included within these “catch-all” provisions. My position is supported by the local legislation’s proviso that all powers to purchase and contract on matters exceeding $5,000 vest in the full board, and that “[a]ll contracts over $5000 shall be approved and signed by a majority vote of said board before they are entered into.” Ga. L. 1996, p. 3983, § 1. It is likely that most county employees are paid more than $5,000 for their work. I note that even the majority’s definition of the chairperson’s power to “superintend” employees (Maj. Op. p. 682) does not include the power to offer employment to an individual or to discharge an employee; rather, a superintendent oversees, directs, supervises. Id. While the board’s chairperson is authorized to supervise the work done by county employees, the employees are afforded some protection from the whims of the supervisor since it takes a majority of the five-member board to hire or fire the employees supervised by the chairperson.
The majority supports its determination by concluding that it is in line with the board’s personnel policy instituted by the board after the passage of the local legislation at issue. I submit that it is inappropriate to use a county ordinance to bolster one’s interpretation of pre-existing legislation passed by the General Assembly. Here, governing officials at odds with one another over the division of their governing authority sought judicial determination of their respective powers, and the judiciary responds by rendering a decision based on how the officials have exercised their authority. Our review should be limited to the “four-corners” of the legislation involved, and that legislation bestows upon the full board of commissioners full control and authority over all county matters, including directing how county property is to be used. Because I believe that the full board’s broad power and authorization includes the ability to hire and fire county employees, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s belief that the full board has no say with regard to county employment matters and how county monies are expended in order that the county’s work is done.
*686Decided July 16, 1998
Reconsideration denied July 31,1998.
Dillard & Galloway, George P. Dillard, Howell F. Wright, Jr., for appellant.
Fortson, Bentley & Griffin, J. Edward Allen, Michael M. Duelos, Richard L. Ford, Jr., for appellees.

 I see “county property” as including the funds available to the county and used to employ persons to do the county’s work.