Court Opinion

ID: 9896914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:03:54.278098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:52.696847
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 P. v. Thompson CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                2d Crim. No. B322544
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. GA056889)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 MAURICE LAMAR
 THOMPSON,

      Defendant and Appellant.

             Maurice Lamar Thompson was convicted, by jury, of
the 2004 attempted premeditated and deliberate murder of
Adonis Towles (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)1, kidnapping to
commit robbery (§209, subd. (b)(1)), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)),
second degree robbery (§211), and shooting at an occupied motor
vehicle. (§246.) On direct appeal, we reversed the kidnapping
conviction (§207, subd. (a)), modified the sentence accordingly

      All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
         1

otherwise stated.
and affirmed. (People v. Thompson (July 16, 2007, B192159)
[nonpub. opn.].)
             Appellant petitioned for resentencing under former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. The trial court appointed
counsel, reviewed the parties’ briefs, and held an evidentiary
hearing on the petition. The record of that hearing includes the
transcripts of appellant’s preliminary hearing and trial. The trial
court denied the petition after finding appellant ineligible for
resentencing as a direct aider and abettor of the attempted
premeditated and deliberated murder. On appeal, appellant
contends there is insufficient evidence he directly aided and
abetted the attempted murder or that he acted with
premeditation and deliberation. He further contends he is
entitled to a new evidentiary hearing because the trial court was
precluded from finding the “only reason” he and his confederates
kidnapped the victim was to murder him. We affirm.
                                Facts
             Adonis Towles made his living selling merchandise,
for cash, out of his truck. He received a call from appellant, who
he recognized as a past customer. Returning the call, Towles
learned that appellant wanted to purchase “Cuba” brand cologne.
Towles had the cologne and arranged to meet appellant at a
street corner in Pasadena. Appellant was waiting for Towles at
the corner, in front of an apartment building. He told Towles to
drive his truck into the building’s underground garage. Towles
complied. When he got out of the truck, Towles was confronted
by two more men. One had a gun. The man with the gun told
Towles to empty his pockets. Towles did as he was told, giving
the man $90. The two men then wrestled Towles into the trunk
of a nearby yellow Mercedes and handcuffed his hands behind his

                                2
back. Throughout the incident, appellant stood near the
gunman. He did nothing to indicate he was surprised by their
actions, nor did he intervene.
              The men drove Towles around for a long time. When
they finally stopped, one of the men put a gun to Towles’ head
and told him to get out of the trunk. Towles noticed that his
truck was nearby and had been emptied of all his merchandise.
The men ordered Towles to get into the back seat of the truck.
They then shot Towles several times, hitting him twice in the
head. One bullet lodged in Towles’ brain; the other shot out his
right eye and tore the bridge of his nose.
              Towles managed to get out of the truck. A passerby
recognized him and called for help. Just then, an off-duty Los
Angeles police officer drove by and saw Towles standing near his
truck, obviously in distress. The officer stopped to help. Towles
told him that he was shot by “some guys in a yellow Mercedes.”
Towles did not see appellant at the scene of the shooting.
              Two days later, appellant was arrested while driving
a yellow Mercedes. He was the registered owner of the car.
Appellant had an outstanding warrant and was driving with a
suspended license. There was a bottle of “Cuba” brand cologne in
the glove compartment and appellant’s cell phone was on the
floor, directly behind the driver’s seat. Cell phone records showed
that, on the afternoon of the shooting, appellant made a short call
to Towles’ phone. Towles called appellant’s phone a few minutes
later.
              Towles identified a photograph of appellant’s
Mercedes as the car in which he was held. When shown a photo
lineup a few days after his surgery, Towles could not identify
appellant. A few weeks later, however, Towles was shown a

                                3
second photo lineup and identified appellant’s photograph as the
person who met him on the street and showed him where to park
in the underground garage. He was never able to identify the
other men involved in the robbery and shooting.
             There was evidence at trial that appellant belonged
to the PJG gang. About one year before the shooting, a Pasadena
police officer confronted appellant and group of young men in an
underground parking lot on the same street where Towles was
abducted. At the time, appellant was carrying a loaded .38
caliber handgun.
                      Petition for Resentencing
             At the evidentiary hearing on appellant’s petition for
resentencing, the parties agreed that the trial court could
consider the transcript of appellant’s preliminary hearing and the
transcript of his trial. Appellant contended he could not be
convicted of attempted murder under current law because there
is insufficient evidence that he directly aided and abetted
attempted murder or that he acted with premeditation and
deliberation. The prosecution contended the record supported a
finding of direct aiding and abetting with express malice. To
establish direct aiding and abetting, the prosecution relied on
evidence that appellant: set up the meeting with Towles; lured
Towles into the underground parking garage; directed Towles
where to park; stood side-by-side with the man who was holding
Towles at gunpoint; watched his confederates rob Towles of his
cash and cell phone; watched Towles be forced into the trunk of a
Mercedes registered in appellant’s name; and allowed the
confederates to use his car to remove Towles from the parking
garage. In addition, Towles knew appellant from prior

                                4
transactions and could identify him. The apartment complex was
also tied to appellant’s gang.
             Adopting the prosecution’s reasoning, the trial court
concluded appellant was not eligible for resentencing because the
prosecution established beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
could be found guilty of attempted murder with express malice
under current law. The trial court noted its “bottom line” was,
“there was no reason to have Mr. Towles stuffed in a trunk at
gunpoint and handcuffed unless he was being taken out of the
garage to be eliminated. If the plan was just to rob, that could
have all been done in the underground garage. So there was no
reason to remove him from there except to remove him from the
scene and have the killing done at a place that would be less tied
to [appellant] and [to his] companions.” Towles was cooperating
with the robbery. There was no reason to think he would resist,
“[s]o the only reason to put Mr. Towles in the trunk and take him
somewhere else is to dispose of the body in a place that’s going to
be less tied to [appellant] and the two other men.” Appellant also
had a motive to kill Towles because he knew Towles could
identify him.
                             Contentions
             Appellant contends the order denying his section
1172.6 petition must be reversed because there is insufficient
evidence that he personally acted with premeditation and
deliberation, or that he was a direct aider and abettor of the
attempted murder. He further contends the trial court erred
when it found that the “only reason” to kidnap Towles was to
murder him because the jury at appellant’s trial found the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of robbery, not
murder. Respondent contends the trial court’s factual findings

                                 5
are supported by substantial evidence and that it was not
required to prove appellant personally premeditated and
deliberated the attempted murder. Respondent further contends
the trial court was entitled to review the evidence anew and that,
in any event, its findings were consistent with the prior
judgment.
                          Standard of Review
             At an evidentiary hearing on a section 1172.6
petition, the trial court is tasked with determining whether the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner
is guilty of murder or attempted murder under current law. (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).) We review the trial court’s findings of fact for
substantial evidence and its conclusions of law de novo. (People
v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 412; see also People v. Schell
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 473, 442 (Schell).)
             This familiar standard of review requires us to
“‘“examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence –
that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the
defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” [Citation.] Our
job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the
petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant
evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.]” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

                                 6
(Clements); see also People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735,
747.)
                              Discussion
             At an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, “the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(Id., subd. (d)(3).) As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2018-
2019 Reg. Sess.) made sweeping changes to California’s felony
murder rule and to the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, effective January 1, 2019. First, section 188, defining
express and implied malice, was amended to add a requirement
that, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order
to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).) Second, section 189 was amended to provide, “A
participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable
for murder only if one of the following is proven: (1) The person
was the actual killer. (2) The person was not the actual killer,
but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189, subd.
(e).) Robbery and kidnapping are among the felonies listed in
subdivision (a) of section 189.

                                 7
             Appellant contends he is eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6 for two reasons. First, he contends there is
no substantial evidence that he personally acted with
premeditation and deliberation when he aided and abetted the
attempted murder. Second, he contends the evidence is
insufficient to establish that he directly aided and abetted the
attempted murder. Neither contention has merit.
             1. Personal Willfulness, Premeditation and
Deliberation. Appellant’s first contention has been expressly
rejected by our Supreme Court. People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th
613 (Lee) held that, “section 664(a) properly must be interpreted
to require only that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated, but not to require that an attempted murderer
personally acted willfully and with deliberation and
premeditation, even if he or she is guilty as an aider and abettor.”
(Id. at p. 616.)
             People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868 (Favor), applied
Lee where the defendant was convicted of willful, premeditated
and deliberate attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, with robbery as the target offense. First,
our Supreme Court reiterated that section 664, subdivision (a)
does not divide the crime of attempted murder into different
degrees. (Favor, at p. 876.) Rather, section 664, subdivision (a) is
a penalty provision that prescribes an increase in punishment
where the attempt involves the more culpable mental state of
willfulness, premeditation and deliberation. (Favor, at p. 877.)
             Our Supreme Court further held that, where the
defendant is convicted as an aider and abettor under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, “there is no requirement
that an aider and abettor reasonably foresee an attempted

                                 8
premeditated murder as the natural and probable consequence of
the target offense. It is sufficient that attempted murder is a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime aided and
abetted, and the attempted murder itself was committed
willfully, deliberately and with premeditation.” (Favor, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 880.)
             People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, limited Lee and
Favor where the defendant was convicted of first degree willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder as a direct aider and abettor
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine with
assault as the target offense. Without overruling or disapproving
Lee, our Supreme Court held in Chiu that, “an aider and abettor
may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Rather, his or
her liability for that crime must be based on direct aiding and
abetting principles.” (Id. at pp. 158-159.)
             Appellant urges us to conclude that Lee is no longer
controlling based on Chiu and the 2019 amendments to section
188, subdivision (a)(3) which abrogate the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. But our Supreme Court has not overruled
Lee. Until it does so, we are bound by its holding. (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; People v.
Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 823 (Lee remains binding
despite intervening statutory amendments).) Consequently, we
conclude respondent was not obligated to prove at the section
1172.6 evidentiary hearing appellant personally premeditated
and deliberated the attempted murder.
             Appellant contends Lee is no longer controlling
because the 2019 amendments to section 189 also limit the
application of section 664 to those who personally acted willfully

                                9
and with deliberation and premeditation. Under current law,
then, section 664 would not apply to appellant. Section 664,
however, does not define the substantive offense of attempted
murder. Instead, it “constitutes a penalty provision increasing
the punishment for attempted murder . . . when the murder
attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” (Lee,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 616.) Eligibility for resentencing under
section 1172.6, by contrast, is based on the substantive offense,
not applicable sentence enhancements or other penalty
provisions. Because section 664 is a penalty provision, and does
not define a substantive offense, amendments limiting its
application do not render a defendant eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6.
             2. Substantial Evidence of Direct Aiding and
Abetting. Appellant next contends he is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 because there is insufficient evidence that he
directly aided and abetted the attempted murder. We disagree.
In evaluating this contention, we review the record in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s order, “to determine whether
there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
to support a rational fact finder's findings beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) The record
here is the record from appellant’s 2006 trial and the reporter’s
transcript of his preliminary hearing. It discloses substantial
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that, beyond a
reasonable doubt, current law would permit appellant to be
convicted of directly aiding and abetting the attempted murder.
             Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing. (Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.

                               10
623; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 604-605.) A direct
aider and abettor’s guilt “is based on a combination of the direct
perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own
mental state.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116-
1117.)
              As our Supreme Court explained in Lee, “To be guilty
of a crime as an aider and abettor, a person must ‘aid[ ] the
[direct] perpetrator by acts or encourage[ ] him [or her] by words
or gestures.’ [Citations.] In addition, . . . the person must give
such aid or encouragement ‘with knowledge of the criminal
purpose of the [direct] perpetrator and with an intent or purpose
either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission
of,’ the crime in question. [Citations.] When the crime at issue
requires a specific intent, in order to be guilty as an aider and
abettor the person ‘must share the specific intent of the [direct]
perpetrator,’ that is to say, the person must ‘know[ ] the full
extent of the [direct] perpetrator’s criminal purpose and [must]
give[ ] aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of
facilitating the [direct] perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’
[Citation.] Thus, to be guilty of attempted murder as an aider
and abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with
knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the
purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of
the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.
[Citation.]” (Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 623-624.)
              Aiding and abetting requires some overt or
affirmative form of assistance. (People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th
860, 868.) “Evidence that a person aided one crime cannot

                                11
substitute for evidence that the person aided a different crime.”
(In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)
              The totality of the circumstances here supports the
trial court’s finding that appellant directly and with the intent to
kill, aided and abetted the attempted murder. Appellant played
a key role in the plan. He had previously purchased cologne from
Towles and used that connection to arrange another purchase
from him. When Towles arrived at the meeting place, which
appellant chose, appellant made no attempt to hide his identity
from Towles. Instead, he directed Towles into the underground
parking garage and then instructed him where to park. The
apartment building was one associated with appellant’s gang. A
rational fact finder could infer from this evidence that appellant
intentionally set the robbery in motion by luring Towles to the
parking garage and that he intended for Towles ultimately to be
killed, to prevent his identification.
              Appellant’s conduct after the robbery began also
supports the finding that he participated in the crime with the
intent to kill. Appellant showed no surprise when the other men
appeared and surrounded Towles in the parking garage. He
stood near the gunman while Towles was directed to empty his
pockets and was then wrestled into the trunk of a Mercedes that
was registered to appellant. While Towles was being driven
around in the trunk of appellant’s own car, the robbers emptied
Towles’ truck of its merchandise and then drove it to the scene of
the shooting. Once there, Towles was removed from the
Mercedes, ordered into the back seat of his truck and then shot.
Appellant’s Mercedes was then returned to him. He was arrested
while driving that same car.

                                12
              A rational fact finder could conclude that appellant
permitted his associates to use his car to transport Towles away
from a building associated with their gang and then to kill him to
prevent him from identifying appellant. It is reasonable to infer
that appellant felt safe driving the Mercedes because he believed
the plan to kill Towles had been successful. With the only
witness eliminated, neither appellant nor his car could be
connected to the shooting.
              The totality of the circumstances establishes that
appellant was integral to every aspect of the plan to rob and kill
Towles. He set the plan in motion, provided the car used to carry
it out and had a strong motive to see the plan culminate in
Towles’ death because appellant was the person most likely to be
identified by Towles. A rational trier of fact could conclude from
this evidence that appellant assisted his compatriots in robbing
and kidnapping Towles with knowledge of their shared plan to
thereafter kill Towles, and that he provided this assistance with
the intent to kill Towles. Substantial evidence thus supports the
trial court’s finding that appellant was a direct aider and abettor
who acted with the intent to kill.
              3. Issue Preclusion and Law of the Case. Appellant
contends the trial court’s findings of fact are inconsistent with the
jury verdict so the matter must be remanded for a new
evidentiary hearing. Specifically, appellant objects to the trial
court’s statement that, “Bottom line there was no reason to have
Mr. Towles stuffed in a trunk at gunpoint and handcuffed unless
he was being taken out of the garage to be eliminated. If the plan
was just to rob, that could have all been done in the underground
garage. So there was no reason to remove him from . . . the scene
and have the killing done at a place that would be less tied to

                                 13
[appellant] and his . . . companions.” The trial court later
explained it found “the only reason” to remove Towles from the
parking garage “is to dispose of the body in a place that [is] going
to be less tied to [appellant] and the two other men.”
              Appellant contends these statements are inconsistent
with the jury’s verdict convicting him of kidnapping for the
purpose of robbery. To convict him of that offense, the jury had to
find that he aided and abetted the kidnapping with the specific
intent to rob Towles. Appellant contends the trial court
contradicted that verdict when it found the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of killing Towles rather than robbing
him. He contends the trial court was precluded from making that
finding by the doctrines of issue preclusion and law of the case.
We are not persuaded.
              As an initial matter, appellant did not raise either
issue preclusion or law of the case in the trial court. “These
issues are waived. Objections must be timely and specific.”
(People v. Neely (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 767, 781.)
              Had the contentions been preserved for review, we
would reject them. First, the trial court’s finding that the “only
reason” to kidnap Towles was to kill him is not inconsistent with
the prior jury verdict. Appellant was convicted of kidnapping for
the purposes of robbery in violation of section 209, subdivision
(b)(1). This required the jury to find that the kidnappers formed
the specific intent to rob Towles before he was kidnapped. (See,
e.g., People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 717.) But
harboring the specific intent to rob does not foreclose the
possibility that the kidnappers also intended to kill Towles after
they finished the robbery. “All that is required is that the
defendant have the specific intent to commit a robbery at the

                                14
time the kidnapping begins.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th
510, 565-566.)
              Second, even if its findings were inconsistent with the
prior verdict, the trial court did not err because section 1172.6
permits it to independently review the evidence and make
findings that were not required in the original trial. Subdivision
(d)(3) of section 1172.6 permits the parties to introduce new
evidence and the prosecution to rely on new theories of guilt not
previously considered by a jury. (Schell, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 444.) Here, the trial court considered evidence that was not
presented to the jury because it reviewed the transcript of
appellant’s preliminary hearing. “By allowing new evidence and
providing for an evidentiary hearing, the Legislature plainly
intended that the issues concerning whether the defendant was
guilty under theories of murder not previously or necessarily
decided would be resolved anew, through a factfinding process
affording a degree of due process to the petitioner.” (People v.
Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 813.)
                              Disposition
              The order dated May 31, 2022 denying the petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section
1170.95) is affirmed.
              NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                  YEGAN, J.
We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                                 15
                  Kathleen Blanchard, Judge

             Superior Court County of Los Angeles

                ______________________________

             James S. Donnelly, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
             Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.