Court Opinion

ID: 9807711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:13:48.397779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:17.113385
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
concurring in the result.
[¶37] The underlying relationship between the Chegwiddens and Evenson is based on a written lease and a statutory month-to-month extension of that contract. Majority opinion at ¶ 2. Yet the Chegwiddens assert no claims sounding in breach of contract. They instead attempt to advance tort claims for conversion, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 17, 24 and 29.
[¶ 38] The economic loss doctrine limits the Chegwiddens’ recovery to breach of contract damages unless they can establish injury to persons or other property. See Leno v. K & L Homes, Inc., 2011 ND 171, ¶ 17, 803 N.W.2d 543 (“Further, under the economic loss doctrine in North Dakota, ‘economic loss resulting from damage to a defective product, as distinguished from damage to other property or persons, may be recovered in a cause of action for breach of warranty or contract, but not in a tort action.’”) (quoting Steiner v. Ford Motor Co., 2000 ND 31, ¶ 7, 606 N.W.2d 881).
[¶39] Under the economic loss doctrine, the Chegwiddens’ conversion claim is precluded. Not precluded under the doc*852trine is intentional infliction of emotional distress claiming injury to a person. On that claim, I agree with the majority's disposition. Majority opinion at ¶ 28. I also agree with dismissal of the punitive damage claim, but for a reason different than the majority. Id. at ¶ 33. Punitive damages are not recoverable in contract actions. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11(1) (“In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract ... the court or jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”). Here, no non-contract claim supported the Chegwiddens’ punitive damage claim. Therefore, denial of the motion to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion.
[¶ 40] The only other possible exception to application of the economic loss doctrine is the Chegwiddens’ claim for “negligent enforcement of the ‘Smoke-Free’ law.” Majority opinion at ¶ 17. The majority concludes the claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment for lack of a duty. Id. at ¶ 22. That legal analysis is not wrong, but it presumes they have a claim to assert. I would rather follow the district court and determine whether the North Dakota Smoke-Free law granted a private right of action for enforcement. The district court held, “Because N.D.C.C. § 23-12-11 specifically provides that violations of the ‘smoke free’ law results in fines, it is the Court’s position that the legislature did not create or intend to create a private right of action.” I agree.
[¶41] I would hold the district court did not err in determining the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action under the Smoke-Free law. The statute is silent regarding such a right, and the legislature expressly provided remedies for violations. See N.D.C.C. § 23-12-11 (owner of public place who willfully violates Smoke-Free law is guilty of an infraction and subject to fines). Because the Chegwiddens have no private right of action to enforce the Smoke-Free law, their claim denominated as “negligence” fails and summary judgment was properly granted.