Court Opinion

ID: 9412730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 15:02:18.133588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:09.831532
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 16-12638     Document: 97-1      Date Filed: 08/01/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 16-12638
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        SAMUEL LEE LYNCH,
        REO THOMAS NANCE,

                                                   Defendants-Appellants.

                           ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cr-00171-SCB-JSS-1
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 16-12638

                             ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and TJOFLAT,
        Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               A jury in the Middle District of Florida convicted Appellants
        Samuel Lee Lynch and Reo Thomas Nance of conspiracy to com-
        mit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Hobbs
        Act robbery, in violation of § 1951(a); discharging or brandishing a
        firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii); and being a felon in possession of a
        firearm or ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
        District Court sentenced Lynch to life in prison and Nance to 624
        months in prison.
               Lynch and Nance both argue on appeal that their Hobbs Act
        robbery convictions are not predicate crimes of violence for pur-
        poses of their § 924(c) convictions. Lynch also argues that his pre-
        vious Florida felony convictions for aggravated assault with a
        deadly weapon and aggravated battery on a law enforcement of-
        ficer with a deadly weapon are not predicate offenses for his sen-
        tencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 924(e) and 3559(c). After careful review, we affirm.
                                          I.
               We review de novo whether an oﬀense qualiﬁes as a crime of
        violence under § 924(c). Steiner v. United States, 940 F.3d 1282, 1288
        (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). However, an argument raised for the
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        16-12638                Opinion of the Court                            3

        ﬁrst time on appeal is reviewed only for plain error. United States v.
        Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2014). Similarly, where a
        defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for his objection in the
        district court, we review only for plain error. United States v.
        Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish plain
        error, a defendant must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
        aﬀects substantial rights.” Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1251–52 (quoting
        United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005)). Plain
        error review is discretionary, but “the court of appeals should exer-
        cise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error seriously
        aﬀects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial pro-
        ceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 195, 136 S.
        Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
                 To satisfy the plain error rule, an asserted error must be clear
        from the plain meaning of a statute or constitutional provision, or
        from a holding of this Court or the Supreme Court. United States
        v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966, 976 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 500
        (2021). Even if an error was not “‘plain’ at the time of sentenc-
        ing, . . . it is enough that the error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate
        consideration.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th
        Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.
        Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997)).
              A plain error aﬀected a defendant’s substantial rights if it was
        prejudicial, meaning the error actually made a diﬀerence in the de-
        fendant’s sentence. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300. If the appellate
        court would have to speculate that the result would have been
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                   16-12638

        diﬀerent, the defendant has not met the burden to show that his
        substantial rights have been aﬀected. Id. at 1301.
               In this case, neither Lynch nor Nance argued in the District
        Court—in their motions for judgment of acquittal or otherwise—
        that their convictions for Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as
        crimes of violence under § 924(c). Instead, they maintained
        throughout the proceedings below that they were innocent of the
        underlying crimes. And while both objected to the entirety of the
        relevant oﬀense conduct in their respective presentence investiga-
        tion reports (“PSR”), they did so only on the broad grounds that
        they were factually innocent on all counts of conviction. Accord-
        ingly, Lynch and Nance have not properly preserved this issue for
        appeal, and so we review only for plain error.
               Section 924(c) prohibits using or carrying a ﬁrearm during
        and in relation to a crime of violence or possessing a ﬁrearm in
        furtherance of any such crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). It also pro-
        vides increased penalties, including a mandatory consecutive sen-
        tence, for those who brandish or discharge a ﬁrearm while com-
        mitting a crime of violence. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii), (c)(1)(D)(ii).
        A “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 924(c) means that
        an oﬀense is a felony and
               (A)    has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                      threatened use of physical force against the
                      person or property of another, or
               (B)    that by its nature, involves a substantial risk
                      that physical force against the person or
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        16-12638                Opinion of the Court                           5

                       property of another may be used in the course
                       of committing the oﬀense.
        Id. § 924(c)(3). We refer to § 924(c)(3)(A) as the “elements clause,”
        and § 924(c)(3)(B) as the “residual clause.” See, e.g., Thompson v.
        United States, 924 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Lynch and Nance were convicted under § 924(c) for bran-
        dishing a ﬁrearm during the commission of a Hobbs Act robbery.
        Lynch was also convicted for discharging a ﬁrearm during the com-
        mission of a Hobbs Act robbery. They maintain that those convic-
        tions are invalid because Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a
        “crime of violence” under § 924(c). In United States v. St. Hubert, we
        rejected a similar challenge to a defendant’s § 924(c) conviction and
        held that Hobbs Act robbery qualiﬁed as a crime of violence under
        both the elements clause and the residual clause of § 924(c)(3). 909
        F.3d 335, 344–46 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated in part by United States v.
        Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019); see also In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d
        1337, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hobbs Act robbery . . . clearly qual-
        iﬁes as a ‘crime of violence’ under the [elements] clause in
        § 924(c)(3)(A).”).
                The Supreme Court subsequently held in United States v. Da-
        vis that the residual clause of § 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague,
        thus abrogating that portion of our holding in St. Hubert. 139 S. Ct.
        2319, 2336 (2019). But the remaining St. Hubert holding—that
        Hobbs Act robbery qualiﬁed as a crime of violence under the ele-
        ments clause—remains unaﬀected, and we are bound by it.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 16-12638

              Because our binding precedent forecloses Lynch and
        Nance’s argument that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a
        “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause, their argu-
        ment fails the second prong of plain error review. The District
        Court, then, did not plainly err and their § 924(c) convictions are
        aﬃrmed.
                                         II.
                Turning to Lynch’s second argument, we review a district
        court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United
        States v. Perez, 943 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). In
        particular, we review the legal standard de novo, the district court’s
        ﬁndings of fact for clear error, and the district court’s application
        of the legal standard and Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de
        novo. Id. at 1332–33. But if a defendant fails to object to the PSR
        and his sentence with the requisite “speciﬁcity and clarity” to alert
        the government and the district court to the mistake complained
        of on appeal, we review only for plain error. Ramirez-Flores, 743
        F.3d at 824. As explained above, Lynch objected to the allegations
        in the PSR only on the broad ground that he was not guilty of any
        of the crimes of which the jury convicted him. And at sentencing,
        he reiterated only his “general global denial” to the factual allega-
        tions in the indictment and the PSR. As such, Lynch did not
        properly preserve his sentencing challenges for appeal, and we re-
        view only for plain error.
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        16-12638                  Opinion of the Court                               7

               Lynch challenges his sentencing enhancements under the
        “career oﬀender” enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 1 the Armed Ca-
        reer Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), 2 and the fed-
        eral “three strikes” statute, id. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). 3 The District
        Court found that Lynch was a career oﬀender and an armed career
        oﬀender, and additionally that the counts for Hobbs Act robbery,
        conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and discharging and
        brandishing a ﬁrearm all carried mandatory minimum life sen-
        tences, based on his three previous Florida convictions for aggra-
        vated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery on a law
        enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly weapon, and robbery.
               The Court thus sentenced Lynch to (1) concurrent life sen-
        tences on the Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs
        Act robbery counts, pursuant to § 3559(c)(1)(a)(i); (2) 15 years to
        life imprisonment on the felon-in-possession counts, to run concur-
        rently with the life sentences, pursuant to § 924(e)(1); and (3) two

        1 The § 4B1.1 “career offender” enhancement was based on a jury convicting

        Lynch of violations of § 924(c) (Counts Three and Eight).
        2 The ACCA enhancement was based on a jury convicting Lynch of violations

        of §§ 922(g) and 924(e) (Counts Four and Nine).
        3 Prior to trial, the Government submitted a notice that it intended to pursue

        enhanced sentences under the three strikes statute, as it was required to do
        under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The Government identified Lynch’s indictments
        for Hobbs Act robbery (Counts Two, Five, and Seven), conspiracy to commit
        Hobbs Act robbery (Count One), discharging a firearm in furtherance of a
        crime of violence (Count Three), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of
        a crime of violence (Count Eight) as potential “third strikes” that would bring
        18 U.S.C. § 3559’s enhanced penalties into play if Lynch were convicted.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 16-12638

        additional life sentences for brandishing and discharging a ﬁrearm
        in connection with the Hobbs Act robberies, to run consecutively
        to each other and consecutively to the other sentences, pursuant to
        § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) and § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). We ﬁrst consider the
        District Court’s application of the career oﬀender enhancement
        and the ACCA to Lynch’s sentence; we then turn to the Court’s
        application of the three strikes statute.
                                         A.
              A defendant qualiﬁes as a career oﬀender under U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.1 if
              (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the
              time the defendant committed the instant oﬀense of
              conviction; (2) the instant oﬀense of conviction is a
              felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
              substance oﬀense; and (3) the defendant has at least
              two prior felony convictions of either a crime of vio-
              lence or a controlled substance oﬀense.
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
               Lynch argues that his convictions for aggravated assault
        with a deadly weapon and aggravated battery on a law enforce-
        ment oﬃcer with a deadly weapon do not qualify as crimes of vio-
        lence under the Guideline. For purposes of the Guideline, the term
        “crime of violence” means any oﬀense under federal or state law,
        punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, that
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        16-12638                  Opinion of the Court                               9

               (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
               threatened use of physical force against the person of
               another, or
               (2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
               aggravated assault, a forcible sex oﬀense, robbery, ar-
               son, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a
               ﬁrearm . . . or explosive material.
        Id. § 4B1.2(a).
               Further, under the ACCA, a defendant convicted of unlaw-
        ful possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 922(g), is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of
        ﬁfteen years if he has three prior felony convictions for “a violent
        felony or a serious drug oﬀense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
               As with the career oﬀender enhancement, Lynch argues that
        his Florida convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
        and aggravated battery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly
        weapon do not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. 4 The
        ACCA deﬁnes the term “violent felony” as any crime punishable by
        a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that “(i) has as an ele-
        ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
        against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion,
        [or] involves use of explosives.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). In addition, the
        Supreme Court recently held that “[o]ﬀenses with a mens rea of

        4 Again, Lynch does not contest that his robbery conviction qualifies as a vio-

        lent felony under the ACCA.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  16-12638

        recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA.” Bor-
        den v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021).
               Because the career oﬀender Guideline’s elements clause in
        § 4B1.2(a)(1) is identical to the ACCA’s elements clause in
        § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), cases decided under the ACCA’s elements clause
        are binding for the career oﬀender Guideline’s elements clause, and
        vice versa—i.e., what constitutes a “violent felony” under the
        ACCA’s elements clause also constitutes a “crime of violence” un-
        der the career oﬀender Guideline’s elements clause. United States v.
        Golden, 854 F.3d 1256, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
                                          1.
                Lynch’s prior conviction for aggravated assault under Flor-
        ida law is a crime of violence under both the career oﬀender en-
        hancement and the ACCA. In light of Borden, we recently asked
        the Supreme Court of Florida whether Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1)—
        Florida’s assault statute—required speciﬁc intent. Somers v. United
        States, 15 F.4th 1049, 1056 (11th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court of
        Florida responded that “the ﬁrst element of Florida’s assault stat-
        ute, § 784.011(1), required not just the general intent to volitionally
        take the action of threatening to do violence, but also that the actor
        direct the threat at a target, namely another person.” Somers v.
        United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 892–93 (Fla. 2022). Upon receiving the
        Supreme Court of Florida’s answer to our question, we held that
        “aggravated assault under Florida law categorically qualiﬁes as a
        ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA’s elements clause.” Somers v.
        United States, 66 F.4th 890, 896 (11th Cir. 2023). Our most recent
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        16-12638                Opinion of the Court                         11

        decision in Somers, therefore, forecloses Lynch’s argument as to his
        aggravated assault conviction.
                                           2.
               Turning to Lynch’s conviction for aggravated battery on a
        law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly weapon, according to Flor-
        ida law, a person commits aggravated battery when, in the com-
        mission of a battery, he or she (1) “intentionally or knowingly
        causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent dis-
        ﬁgurement”; or (2) “uses a deadly weapon.”              Fla. Stat.
        § 784.045(1)(a). A person can also commit aggravated battery in
        Florida by committing a battery against a person who was “preg-
        nant at the time of the oﬀense and the oﬀender knew or should
        have known that the victim was pregnant.” Id. at § 784.045(1)(b).
               Use of the modiﬁed categorical approach is appropriate
        when a statute is divisible, as is Fla. Stat. § 784.045. See Descamps v.
        United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). A divisible statute is one
        that “sets out one or more elements of the oﬀense in the alterna-
        tive.” Id. If one of the alternatives qualiﬁes under ACCA, but an-
        other does not, “the modiﬁed categorical approach permits sen-
        tencing courts to consult a limited class of documents . . . to deter-
        mine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior
        conviction.” Id. In Lynch’s case, the judgment for his prior aggra-
        vated battery conviction shows he was convicted of aggravated
        battery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly weapon. This
        means Lynch was convicted under § 784.045(1)(a).
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   16-12638

                Using the modiﬁed categorical approach, we have consist-
        ently held that aggravated battery as set out in Fla. Stat.
        § 784.045(1)(a) qualiﬁes as a crime of violence under the ACCA’s
        elements clause. Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d
        1328, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by United
        States v. Hill, 799 F.3d 1319, 1321 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015); see also United
        States v. Vereen, 920 F.3d 1300, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2019); In re Rogers,
        825 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016). While we have not speciﬁcally
        addressed Florida’s aggravated battery statute in light of Borden, we
        have previously held that aggravated battery under § 784.045 is a
        speciﬁc intent crime. United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1299
        (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
                Lynch argues that “[b]ecause the least of the criminalized
        acts of Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon is an unwanted
        touching while carrying a deadly weapon . . . and this does not in-
        volve the use of ‘violent force,’” his prior conviction for aggravated
        battery cannot serve as a predicate oﬀense under either the career
        oﬀender enhancement or the ACCA. But Turner’s holding—that,
        using the modiﬁed categorical approach, aggravated battery under
        Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(a) qualiﬁes as a crime of violence under
        ACCA’s elements clause—has never been abrogated. As such, we
        are bound by it under the prior panel precedent rule “unless and
        until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by
        an opinion of the Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc.”
        United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (per cu-
        riam). The prior panel rule applies regardless of whether we be-
        lieve “the prior panel’s opinion to be correct, and there is no
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        16-12638                 Opinion of the Court                             13

        exception to the rule where the prior panel failed to consider argu-
        ments raised before a later panel.” Id. The District Court is also
        bound by our precedent and could not have erred—plainly or oth-
        erwise—in applying it; rather than telling the District Court that
        aggravated battery under § 784.045(1)(a) didn’t qualify as a crime
        of violence, our precedent told the District Court that it did. And
        since aggravated battery qualiﬁes as a violent felony under the
        ACCA, it qualiﬁes as a crime of violence under the career oﬀender
        enhancement. See Golden, 854 F.3d at 1256–57.
               Accordingly, because our binding precedent dictates that
        Lynch’s convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
        and aggravated battery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly
        weapon qualify as predicate oﬀenses under both the career of-
        fender enhancement and the ACCA, Lynch had the requisite num-
        ber of predicate oﬀenses for each enhancement. 5 The District
        Court did not plainly err in applying either the career oﬀender en-
        hancement or the ACCA, and his sentence is aﬃrmed in that re-
        spect.
                                             B.
               Lynch also argues for the ﬁrst time on appeal that he incor-
        rectly received life sentences under the federal “three strikes” law

        5 The convictions that qualify Lynch for both the career offender enhancement

        and the ACCA are: (1) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; (2) aggra-
        vated battery of a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon; and (3) rob-
        bery. Only two of those convictions needed to qualify for the career offender
        enhancement to apply.
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                      16-12638

        in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). The relevant convictions serving as
        “strikes” are Lynch’s previous convictions for robbery (“strike
        one”), aggravated battery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a
        deadly weapon (“strike two”), and his convictions for Hobbs Act
        robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and discharging
        and brandishing a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a crime of violence
        (each a separate “strike three” supporting a separate life sentence).
        Lynch only challenges the validity of strikes one and two, not strike
        three. That is, Lynch argues that his convictions for robbery and
        aggravated battery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly
        weapon do not qualify as serious violent felonies under the federal
        “three strikes” law in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). 6
              Under the “three strikes” statute, a defendant receives a
        mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if he is convicted of a
        serious violent felony after having been previously convicted on
        separate occasions of two or more such felonies.                 Id.
        § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). The statute deﬁnes a “serious violent felony” in
        two parts. First, it enumerates several oﬀenses that plainly consti-
        tute serious violent felonies, one of which is robbery. Id.

        6 The Government listed Lynch’s conviction for aggravated assault as a predi-

        cate serious violent felony as well. On appeal, Lynch argued that his aggra-
        vated assault conviction could not serve as a strike for the same reasons that
        his aggravated battery conviction could not serve as a strike. Because the Gov-
        ernment conceded that Lynch’s conviction for aggravated assault did not qual-
        ify as a serious violent felony under the “three strikes” law, we need not ad-
        dress that argument.
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        16-12638                Opinion of the Court                          15

        § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). Second, it provides that a “serious violent felony”
        is also
               any other oﬀense punishable by a maximum term of
               imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an ele-
               ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
               force against the person of another or that, by its nature,
               involves a substantial risk that physical force against
               the person of another may be used in the course of
               committing the oﬀense.
        Id. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) (emphasis added). Like § 924(c) and the career
        oﬀender enhancement, the three strikes law can be divided into an
        elements clause and a residual clause at § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii), with an
        additional “enumerated oﬀenses” clause at § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i).
                                           1.
                Lynch’s Florida robbery conviction qualiﬁes as a serious fel-
        ony under the enumerated oﬀenses clause. Lynch nonetheless ar-
        gues that his robbery conviction does not qualify as a “serious vio-
        lent felony” by operation of the aﬃrmative defense provision in
        § 3559(c)(3)(A). Under that provision, a robbery conviction does
        not constitute a “strike,” despite its enumeration as a “serious vio-
        lent felony” in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i), if the defendant can prove by clear
        and convincing evidence that “no ﬁrearm or other dangerous
        weapon was used in the oﬀense and no threat of use of a ﬁrearm
        or other dangerous weapon was involved in the oﬀense.” Id.
        § 3559(c)(3)(A); United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir.
        2001). Lynch argues that his robbery conviction should not qualify
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        16                          Opinion of the Court                        16-12638

        as a predicate oﬀense under § 3559 because the PSR does not indi-
        cate that Lynch used a dangerous weapon or otherwise threatened
        to use such a weapon in connection with the robbery.
                But Lynch did not raise this argument in either the District
        Court or his initial brief on appeal. That argument ﬁrst appears in
        his reply brief, and a legal claim or argument that is not plainly and
        prominently raised in an initial brief before this Court is deemed
        forfeited. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.
        2022) (en banc). We thus deem Lynch to have forfeited any chal-
        lenge to his sentence based on whether his Florida robbery convic-
        tion qualiﬁes as a predicate oﬀense under the three strikes law.
                                                2.
               Lynch essentially argues that because his conviction for ag-
        gravated battery should not qualify under the elements clause in
        the career oﬀender Guideline or the ACCA, it also should not qual-
        ify under the elements clause in the three strikes law. And, so the
        argument goes, since that conviction does not qualify as serious vi-
        olent felony under either the enumerated oﬀenses clause or the el-
        ements clause in § 3559(c)(2)(F), it could only qualify under the re-
        sidual clause, which Lynch argues is unconstitutional in light of
        United States v. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya,
        138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 7

        7 Florida aggravated battery is a second-degree felony, Fla. Stat. § 784.045(2),

        punishable by up to fifteen years in prison, Fla. Stat. § 775.082. It thus satisfies
        the ten-year-sentence requirement in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii).
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        16-12638               Opinion of the Court                       17

               Even assuming, arguendo, that § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii)’s residual
        clause is unconstitutionally vague, we cannot say that the District
        Court plainly erred in ﬁnding that Lynch’s conviction for aggra-
        vated battery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly weapon
        qualiﬁed as a “serious violent felony” under its elements clause. An
        error cannot be “plain” where there is no precedent from the Su-
        preme Court or this Court directly resolving the issue. United States
        v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 590 (11th Cir. 2020). And no deci-
        sion of the Supreme Court or this Court holds that aggravated bat-
        tery on a law enforcement oﬃcer with a deadly weapon under Flor-
        ida law does not qualify as a “serious violent felony” for purposes
        of the three strikes statute. While it does not outright hold so, our
        precedent actually suggests the opposite. Speciﬁcally, Turner held
        that Florida aggravated battery is a violent felony under an ele-
        ments clause nearly identical to that in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii).
               The District Court did not plainly err in ﬁnding that Lynch’s
        robbery and aggravated battery convictions qualiﬁed as serious vi-
        olent felonies under § 3559, or in imposing mandatory life sen-
        tences under the three strikes law.
                                        III.
               In sum, Hobbs Act robbery qualiﬁes as a predicate crime of
        violence for a §924(c) conviction. Lynch’s convictions for aggra-
        vated assault and aggravated battery of a law enforcement oﬃcer
        with a deadly weapon qualify as predicate oﬀenses under the career
        oﬀender enhancement and the ACCA, and the District Court did
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                16-12638

        not plainly err in applying the three strikes statute. For those rea-
        sons, both Lynch and Nance’s sentences are aﬃrmed.
              AFFIRMED.