Court Opinion

ID: 9497546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:53:43.828135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:15.465349
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, despite its efforts at “parsing” the enhancement language challenged by Melendrez, the majority has garbled a different aspect of U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) — the requirement that the means of identification serving as the basis for the sentencing enhancement be “bred” from another means of identification. Because the district court based its sentence on a similar misreading of the guidelines, I would vacate and remand for resentencing.
What Melendrez did — manufacture bogus identification documents on his computer — was illegal. And because he pleaded guilty to unlawfully “produc[ing] an identification document or a false identification document,” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), he will serve time in federal prison. In other words, Melendrez will be punished for creating false identification. The question is whether the identity theft enhancement applies. In my view, it does not because only a single means of identification was involved.
As the majority aptly notes, we are presented with “the convoluted wording and structure of the enhancement and its commentary.” Op. at 881-32. The language is ambiguous at best — a point underscored by the ink spilled by both the majority and the dissent. Here, the lack of clarity requires that we invoke the rule of lenity and adopt a narrow construction of the enhancement, the one most favorable to Melendrez. See United States v. Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792, 799-800 (9th Cir.2003) (holding in sentencing guidelines context that “the rule of lenity requires that we construe ambiguous terms in favor of the accused”).
I. The Text of the Sentencing Provision
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) calls for a sentencing level increase if Melendrez’s offense involved “(i) the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification; or (ii) the possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification.” As is clear from this language, § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) contemplates an increased prison term in situations where one means of identification was used to produce an additional one. The circumstances at issue here, however, do not fall into this category.
At first blush, the text of the enhancement provision appears relatively straightforward. But upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that the term “means of identification” conceals a number of potential pitfalls. Although intuition might suggest that a hard copy document such as a driver’s license card or Social Security card falls under its definition, the statute itself reveals otherwise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(4). As the majority correctly observes, “a means of identification is the identifying name or number of an actual person, not the document on which such name or number is often placed.” Op. at 830-31 (emphases added). In short, the target of the enhancement inquiry is the involvement of one “identifying name or number” to produce another “identifying *838name or number.” Cf. Op. at 833 (noting that “the enhancement identifies two means of identification relevant here: the source ID numbers and the produced ID numbers”).
Applying this formulation to the facts at hand, each bogus Social Security card or DD Form 214 Melendrez crafted on his computer contained one “means of identification” of an actual person — the Social Security number itself. But in each instance, only one “identifying name or number” was ever involved. None of the Social Security numbers was produced or obtained from “another” or “any other” “identifying name or number.” Indeed, in the words of the majority, “the produced ID numbers [were] the same Social Security numbers as the source ID numbers.” Op. at 833. Close examination thus reveals that the Social Security cards and DD Forms 214 do not support the district court’s application of § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C)’s enhancement to Melendrez’s offense.
The majority’s comfort with the opposite conclusion is odd indeed. Unlike the district court, the majority avoids the most tempting misconstruction of the sentencing provision yet somehow still reaches the wrong result. Its trajectory from acknowledging that the means of identification were “the same,” Op. at 833 (emphasis in original), to its assertion that “Melen-drez produced another means of identification (the Social Security number) by duplicating the source ID number,” id. at 835 (emphasis added), can perhaps best be understood as arising from an error we have recently described as a “category mistake.” See Planned Parenthood v. Wasden, Nos. 02-35700, 02-35714, 376 F.3d 908, 930 n. 21 (9th Cir. July 16, 2004) (“[A] category mistake treats a concept as if it belonged to one logical type or category when it actually belongs to another.” (alterations omitted)). In other words, the majority confuses the identifying number (a concept) with its representative symbols as they appear on paper (an iteration of the concept).
The majority’s approach would be correct if the sentencing provision targeted the production of another iteration of an identifying name or number. After all, Melendrez took one iteration of a Social Security number (either written on a piece of paper or simply in his head) and produced another iteration (on the false Social Security card). But the plain text of § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) speaks simply of the “means of identification,” defined by the statute as a “name or number,” and requires it to be produced or obtained from another “means of identification.” The critical point is that the enhancement requires one “means of identification” to produce another “means of identification.” A single “means of identification” is not sufficient. In the case of the Social Security cards and DD Forms 214, no “other means of identification” was ever involved in their production besides the Social Security number itself. Under the only logical reading of § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C), these forms of identification fail to qualify Melendrez for the enhancement.
II. The Purpose of § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C)
The legislative history surrounding the adoption of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) supports the view that the enhancement was not meant to apply to the circumstances here. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 (“ITADA”), Pub.L. No. 105-318, was enacted to fill a gap in federal criminal law.1 Before its adoption, “only *839fraud in connection with identification documents [was] a crime.” S.Rep. No. 105-274, at 5 (1998). ITADA made “fraud in connection with identification information a crime.” Id. The new law was Congress’s response to the growing potency of information alone (without traditional paper documentation) and the concomitant risk of harmful misuse. See id. (“Today, criminals do not necessarily need a document to assume an identity; often they just need the information itself to facilitate ... crimes .... [T]his statute can keep pace with criminals’ technological advances.”); cf. id. at 11 (“ ‘Means of identification’ is a core definition in this bill, intended to capture the varieties of individual identification information technologically feasible which can be compromised and criminally used.”).
ITADA’s directive to the Sentencing Commission contemplated “enhanced penalties for aggravating circumstances often associated with identity theft crimes.” Id. at 5. Recognizing that “there exists no clear definition of identity fraud,” but that it generally “involves ‘stealing’ another person’s personal identifying information .... to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, or to take over existing financial accounts,” id. at 7, Congress urged the Sentencing Commission to consider the impact on identity theft victims as a possible “measure for establishing penalties.” Id. at 12. Individual victims, Congress reported, can sometimes suffer “devastating” harm. Id. at 7. Particularly unfortunate victims' have had “their credit ratings ruined and be[eome] unable to get credit cards, student loans, or mortgages .... [And some victims] have even been arrested for crimes they never committed.” Id. at 16 (additional views of Senator Leahy).
When the Sentencing Commission implemented ITADA, it “determined that the more aggravated and sophisticated forms of identity theft, about which Congress seemed particularly concerned, should be the focus of enhanced punishment under the guidelines.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C § 596 (2002). The Commission explained that “[s]uch offense conduct ... generally occurs within the context of financial and credit account takeovers, [and] involves affirmative activity to generate or ‘breed’ another level of identification means without the knowledge of the individual victim.... ” Id. Heightened punishment for such “sophisticated” activity is appropriate “because of the additional steps the perpetrator takes to ‘breed’ additional means of identification in order to conceal and continue the fraudulent conduct.” Id.
It is evident from this legislative background that' the “affirmative identity theft” targeted by § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) involves the generation of additional identifying information, not documents. The application notes are in accord. Both scenarios offered by the Sentencing Commission as examples of when the enhancement applies involve the production of a different form of identifying information. In the first example, the defendant uses the victim’s name and social security number to obtain a bank loan. The bank loan account number is the means of identification that was “bred.” See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 7(C)(ii)(I) (2002). In the second example, the defendant uses the victim’s name and address to apply for and obtain a credit card. There, the credit card account number is the new means of identification. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 7(C)(ii)(II).
In contrast, in the scenarios offered by the Sentencing Commission as examples of where the enhancement would be inapplicable, the defendant has not generated any *840additional piece of identifying information. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 7(C)(iii) (explaining that the enhancement does not apply to a defendant who uses a stolen credit card to make a purchase or to a defendant who forges a victim’s signature to cash a stolen check). In those cases, as here, the defendant has not engaged in “breeding” and does not deserve the enhancement. In short, no additional or “other means of identification” is produced.
Thus, while I agree with the majority that § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) encompasses more than just full-blown identity takeover, I do not agree with its conclusion that the enhancement applies to the Social Security cards and DD Forms 214 Melendrez produced. None of these forms of identification was the product of “breeding.” They each involved one, and only one, means of identification — the Social Security number. Nor do these forms of identification implicate the more serious harm contemplated by Congress and the Sentencing Commission. Although it is true that in this case Melendrez could have used the Social Security cards to create more mischief, perhaps by opening a credit card account or obtaining a driver’s license, such an action would amount to affirmative identity theft and therefore qualify him for the enhancement.
The majority’s interpretation, in contrast, would subject to the enhancement an underage student trying to enter a bar with a fake ID he created using a real person’s driver’s license number. This result Congress surely did not intend. Cf. S.Rep. No. 105-274, at 17 (Additional Views of Senator Leahy) (explaining that the bill was tailored to avoid “federalization of the status offenses of underage teenagers using fake ID cards to gain entrance to bars or to buy cigarettes”). Nor does such a sweeping interpretation make much sense. Congress made explicit that ITADA was meant to address the developing new problem of identification information misuse, not the old problem of fake identification document production. The majority’s reading of § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) vastly broadens its application while ignoring the purpose behind its adoption. I therefore conclude that the district court should not have applied the enhancement on the basis of the Social Security cards and DD Forms 214.2
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. ITADA directed the United States Sentencing Commission to amend the Sentencing Guidelines. The result was the adoption of *839the provision at issue. See Pub.L. No. 105-318, § 4.

. Whether the enhancement applies on the basis of other documents found in Melen-drez’s possession that may have been the product of "breeding,” such as the Colorado driver's license, is another question entirely, one that should be remanded to the district court.