Court Opinion

ID: 9430273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:23.681467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:24.018331
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” (Emphasis added.)
The question presented in No. 84-744 is whether a mis-joinder of defendants prohibited by Rule 8(b) is an error which affects substantial rights.1 In my opinion, the Court *466has answered that question incorrectly; moreover, its opinion unfortunately confuses rather than clarifies the law of “harmless error.”
I — (
Our central task is, of course, to construe Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, we must consider the history, purpose, and language of that Rule.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court decided that the misjoinder of defendants, as well as the misjoinder of offenses, was an error that deprived the accused of “a substantial right.” McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76, 80 (1896). McElroy concerned both kinds of misjoinder. Five defendants were charged with offenses committed on April 16, 1894, and May 1, 1894, but only three of them were charged with a separate offense committed on April 16, 1894. The two defendants who were not charged with the separate offense made essentially the same objection to their joint trial as did Dennis Lane in this case. As to those two defendants, the Government confessed error and the Court unanimously reversed and remanded for a new trial.2 As to the other three defendants, *467the majority of the Court held that a misjoinder of offenses had occurred, and required a new trial without any special showing of prejudice. After reviewing the misjoinder of defendants and of offenses, the Court concluded:
“Necessarily where the accused is deprived of a'substantial right by the action of the trial court, such action, having been properly objected to, is revisable on error.” Ibid.
Thus, almost a half century before the adoption of Rule 8, the Court squarely held that protection against misjoinder was a “substantial right,” and that the violation of the misjoinder rule required reversal.
- Today, the Court does not dispute that McElroy required reversal for misjoinder. Instead, the Court suggests, rather obliquely, that three developments have undermined that holding: (1) the adoption of Rule 8; (2) the adoption of Rule 52(a) and the passage of the harmless-error statute; and (3) the development of a harmless-error doctrine in constitutional law. Ante, at 444-446. The reliance on the harmless-error developments will be addressed in more detail. Since we are construing Rule 8, however, the majority’s bare citation to it — and apparent reliance on the history of its passage-must be first considered.
The majority seems to be of the view that the adoption of Rule 8 cast doubt on the validity of McElroy. Ante, at 444. Far from disavowing McElroy, however, the Federal Rules continued the misjoinder rule. The notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules state that both subdivisions of Rule 8 represent “substantially a restatement of existing law.” Neither the text of Rule 8, nor the Advisory Committee Notes, nor the history of the Rule contains any suggestion that Rule 8 was intended to change the rule of the McElroy case. Indeed, the Advisory Committee displayed a keen awareness of the McElroy precedent by citing the opinion in *468its discussion of misjoinder.3 At the time the Federal Rules were being considered, moreover, commentators shared the Advisory Committee’s view that the Rules merely continued the misjoinder doctrine in its then current form, and restated existing law.4 The principle that misjoinder deprives the accused of “a substantial right” and therefore is “revisable on error” thus remained the law when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective in 1946.
Furthermore, if one reads Rule 8 in conjunction with Rule 14, it is immediately apparent that the draftsmen of the Rules regarded every violation of Rule 8 as inherently prejudicial. For Rule 14 authorizes the Court to grant a severance, even in the absence of a Rule 8 violation, if either the defendant or the Government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants.5 Thus, it seems clear that the draftsmen of the Rules regarded violations of Rule 8 as inherently prejudicial, and recognized that even joinders that were not prohibited by the Rule should be forbidden if a party *469could demonstrate actual prejudice. This is the way Professor Charles Wright interpreted the intent of the draftsmen in his 1969 treatise. He wrote:
“Indeed there would be no point in having Rule 8 if the harmless error concept were held applicable to it. If that concept could be applied, then defendant could obtain reversal only if the joinder were prejudicial to him. But Rule 14 provides for relief from prejudicial joinder, and a defendant can obtain a reversal, in theory at least, if he has been prejudiced even though the join-der was proper. If misjoinder can be regarded as harmless error, then reversal could be had only for prejudice whether the initial joinder was proper or improper. If that were true, it would be pointless to define in Rule 8 the limits on joinder, since it would no longer be of significance whether those limits were complied with, and the draftsmen would have been better advised to allow unlimited joinder of offenses and defendants, subject to the power of the court to give relief if the joinder were prejudicial.” 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 144, p. 329 (1969).6
Other commentators have agreed that the structure of the Federal Rules strongly supports the conclusion that the draftsmen viewed a violation of the misjoinder rule as inherently prejudicial.7
*470Thus, a review of the state of the law of joinder at the time the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, of the Advisory Committee’s intent to restate then-existing law, and of the text of the Rules themselves requires a conclusion that a Rule 8 misjoinder violation is an error that affects the substantial rights of the accused and therefore requires reversal of a conviction.
I — I I — I
In addition to its unexplained reference to the adoption of Rule 8, the Court suggests that its new misjoinder rule— that prejudice must be shown to justify reversal of a Rule 8 misjoinder error — is supported by its interpretation of developments in the law of “harmless-error.” Specifically, the Court observes that the McElroy approach has been undermined by the passage of a harmless-error statute and rule, ante, at 444, and by the development of a harmless-error doctrine for constitutional errors, ante, at 445. Although the majority does not distinguish between these two categories, they require separate analysis. Neither category, however, remotely supports the majority’s bald assertion that misjoin-der should not be viewed as affecting “substantial rights,” and thus not be viewed as inherently prejudicial.
The majority refers to the current harmless-error statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2111, and to Rule 52(a). As the majority points out, both define harmless error in terms of whether a violation affects “substantial rights.”8 Since this Court had already made clear that misjoinder affected “substantial *471rights,” McElroy, 164 U. S. 76 (1896), it is curious that the majority concludes, with no support at all, that the passage of a statute and Rule which allowed for correction of errors that did not affect “substantial rights” somehow changed the legal status of a violation that had been described in precisely those words. This view is especially curious when it is remembered that the Rule governing joinder was viewed by the draftsmen as a restatement of existing law.
To be sure, McElroy was decided before the first harmless-error statute was passed in 1919. That statute, a reaction to the hypertechnicality that had developed in American jurisprudence, did mark a significant change in our system’s view of the effect of error.9 But it is a long leap from that recognition to a view that the passage of the harmless-error statute in 1919 — and the subsequent adoption of Rule 52(a) in 1946 and the passage of the current harmless-error statute in 1949 — summarily jettisoned all prior jurisprudence on the errors that affected “substantial rights.” Indeed, interpretations of the 1919 statute accorded it a very different mission. As Justice Frankfurter explained in refusing to require a showing of prejudice to justify reversal for a statutory violation: “Suffice it to indicate, what every student of the history behind the Act of February 26, 1919, knows, that that Act was intended to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict.” Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287, 294 (1939). And, while Rule 52(a) and the 1949 harmless-error statute were changed in a way that some commentators have found significant,10 the *472continuation of “substantial rights” as the benchmark for assessing the harmlessness of error provides no support for the proposition that anyone intended to change something that had been found to affect a “substantial right” into something that did not affect a substantial right.
Thus, neither the harmless-error statute, passed within a few years of the adoption of Rule 8, nor Rule 52(a), adopted at the same time as Rule 8, changed the interpretation of the misjoinder rule reflected in Rule 8.
The harmless-error statute and Rule are, however, at least relevant to the inquiry at hand. In contrast, the majority’s reliance on Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), ante, at 445, is plainly misplaced. The majority observes: “Clearly, Chapman and Hasting dictate that the harmless-error rule governs here.” Ante, at 446. Nothing could be less clear. This case does not involve a claim of constitutional error. The harmless-error doctrine that was enunciated in Chapman thus does not settle the issue raised by this case. Simply because constitutional errors may be subject to a harmless-error inquiry does not mean that all noncon-stitutional errors must be subject to harmless-error analysis, and this Court has never so held.11 Rather, our mission in *473reviewing nonconstitutional errors is, first, to discern whether the rule or statute which is being violated was intended to be subject to harmless-error analysis. If there is a definitive answer to that question, our inquiry should be at an end.12 If there is no definitive answer, then we must try to assess the rule or statute in question in light of the purpose of the harmless-error rule and statute. We should not, however, rewrite existing law by adopting a presumption that, simply because a violation is nonconstitutional, it is automatically subject to harmless-error inquiry.
As the majority observes, the Court’s willingness to invoke the harmless-error doctrine has expanded dramatically in recent years. This expansion is a source of considerable concern,13 particularly because the Court has often been unclear and imprecise in its increasingly frequent invocation of harm*474less error.14 In my view, harmless-error analysis is inappropriate in at least three situations: (1) when it is clear that a statute or Rule was not intended to be subject to such a rule; (2) when an independent value besides reliability of the outcome suggests that such analysis is inappropriate;15 and (3) when the harmlessness of an error cannot be measured with precision.16 In my view, misjoinder clearly falls into the first *475category. It also has elements of the second and third. Misjoinder implicates the independent value of individual responsibility and our deep abhorrence of the notion of “guilt by association.” Our criminal justice system has expanded considerably in its tolerance of multiple joinders and massive conspiracy trials. The rule against misjoinder remains, however, as an ultimate safeguard of our cherished principle that one is tried for one’s own deeds, and not for another’s.17 The harmfulness of misjoinder is also the type of error that has consequences that are difficult to measure with precision.18 These concerns may or may not outweigh the societal interests that motivate the Court today, but they are surely strong enough to demonstrate that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules acted responsibly when they adhered to the time-honored rule of the McElroy case. The misjoinder Rule that they crafted is clear, and should be respected.19 Misjoinder affects “substantial rights,” and should lead to reversal.
*476HH t — I
Undertaking a harmless-error analysis is perhaps the least useful function that this Court can perform, cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 516-518 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). For that reason, a decision that a harmless-error inquiry is required should lead to a remand to the Court of Appeals, which is in a far better position than we are to study the complete trial record with care. The majority’s opinion in this case confirms the general advisability of that approach.
The Court’s conclusion that Dennis Lane suffered no prejudice is based on three cursory observations. First, the Court asserts, with no explanation, that there was “overwhelming evidence” of his guilt. Ante, at 450. There are at least two problems with this observation. The first is that the majority fails to appreciate the Kotteakos recognition that the harmless-error inquiry is entirely distinct from a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry.20 The second is that, *477even if it were faithfully applying the Kotteakos distinction between sufficiency of the evidence and harmless error, the majority utterly fails to explain its statement about “overwhelming evidence.” A reading of Kotteakos reveals that only the most painstaking and thorough review of an entire trial record can justify a conclusion that its standard has, or has not, been met. The opinion the Court announces today contains no indication that it has made that kind of analysis of the case against Dennis Lane.21
Second, the Court notes that the jury was properly instructed to evaluate the evidence under each count and against each defendant separately. Since that instruction should be given routinely in every case in which there is a joinder of defendants or offenses, it surely cannot be regarded as an adequate response to a claim that a misjoinder was prejudicial.22
*478Finally, the Court rather hesitantly suggests that the evidence on Count 1 “would likely have been admissible” in a joint retrial on Counts 2-6, ante, at 450. The Court thus assumes that a joint retrial is inevitable. Of course, if mis-joinder is found only as to Dennis Lane, as I suggest below, then the majority’s point collapses. In any event, nothing in Kotteakos or in our harmless-error precedents suggests that this Court should find an error harmless because of the Court’s completely untested speculations about a possible future retrial. Not surprisingly, Kotteakos suggests precisely the opposite.23
A determination that an error was harmless is an extremely weighty conclusion; it implicates profound notions of fairness and justice.24 Even if the majority is correct that Rule 8 misjoinder should be subject to harmless-error analysis, I am convinced that the majority’s summary finding of harmless error in this case fails to give the issue the attention it deserves.25
*479> I — I
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain both convictions of mail fraud and therefore join Part III of its opinion. I also agree with the judgment insofar as it upholds the conviction of James Lane. It is perfectly clear that the violation of Rule 8(b) — the rule prohibiting the improper joinder of defendants — occasioned by the misjoinder of Count 1 did not affect James Lane because he was the defendant in Count 1. But since there is no claim that the son, Dennis Lane, took any part in Count 1 (the mail fraud regarding the 1979 El Toro Restaurant fire), I believe that his right not to be joined as a defendant in his father’s trial for that felony was a “substantial right” that was adversely affected by the misjoinder.
In my view, the Court’s opinion misconstrues the history and purpose of Rule 8, sows further confusion in the Court’s *480harmless-error jurisprudence, and fails to make the kind of harmless-error analysis that Rule 52(a) requires. Because I do not consider these errors harmless, I respectfully dissent from the judgment regarding Dennis Lane in No. 84-744.

 Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.”

 “It is clear that the statute does not authorize the consolidation of indictments in such a way that some of the defendants may be tried at the same time with other defendants charged with a crime different from that for which all are tried.
“It is admitted by the government that the judgments against Stuffle-beam and Charles Hook must be reversed . . . 164 U. S., at 80.
In confessing error, the Government seemed to concede that reversal was appropriate without any specific showing of prejudice. See Brief for United States in McElroy v. United States, O. T. 1896, No. 402, p. 6 (“It cannot be certainly affirmed that Stufflebeam and Charles Hook were not embarrassed and prejudiced, in their defense to the indictments under which they stood charged, by the fact that they were compelled to make their defense in a proceeding in which McElroy, Bland, and Hook were prosecuted for arson committed April 16,1894, which was on the same day of the assaults and fifteen days before the arson for which they were tried”).

 See 5 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Documentary History, Second Preliminary Draft, Feb. 1944, Note to Rule 8, pp. 35-36 (“Since the counts of two or more indictments consolidated for trial, under 18 U. S. C. § 557, are ‘put... in the same category as if they were separate counts in one indictment,’ McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76, 77 (1896), this type of joinder is more widely practiced than is generally realized”).

 See Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 56, 59 (1943) (“Subdivision (b) of Rule 9 provides for a joinder of defendants where they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting or resulting in an offense, and that they may be charged in one or more counts, together or separately, in any manner indicating their respective participation in the offense or offenses. . . . This rule merely restates the present Federal statute . . .”). “Rule 9” became the current “Rule 8” without substantial change. See Orfield, Joinder in Federal Criminal Procedure, 26 F. R. D. 23, 28-29 (1960).

 Rule 14 provides, in pertinent part: “If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.”

 In Ms current edition, Professor Wright notes that a number of federal courts have held that misjoinder may be harmless error, but he concludes that “there remains much to be said for what was once the almost-unanimous view that misjoinder is never harmless error.” 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal, § 145, p. 532 (2d ed. 1982).

 See Note, Harmless Error and Misjoinder Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: A Narrowing Division of Opinion, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 544, n. 65 (1978) (“Implicit in the assertion that rule 8 sets the limits of tolerable prejudice is the argument that if its purpose is not to set such limits there is no purpose in the rule. Rule 14 would vest all questions of joinder in the trial court. ... As both rule 14 and rule 8 were included in the rules, rule 8 must have been intended to establish the outer bounds *470within which the trial court has discretionary power under rule 14”). In my view, the majority’s discussion of this issue, ante, at 449-450, n. 12, fails to answer this straightforward reading of Rule 8 and Rule 14.

 See 28 U. S. C. § 2111 (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certio-rari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties”); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”).

 For a discussion of the background of the 1919 statute, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 758-760 (1946).

 The 1919 statute referred to “technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 40 Stat. 1181, 28 U. S. C. § 391 (1946 ed.) (emphasis added). Rule 52(a) referred to “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights”; the 1949 statute referred to “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U. S. C. § 2111. See Note, 6 *472Hofstra L. Rev., supra n. 7, at 540 (discussing possible significance of change). But cf. H. R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1949) (new harmless-error statute intended to “incorporate” former harmless-error statute); Rule 52(a), Notes of Advisory Commitee on Rules, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 657 (Rule intended as “a restatement of existing law”); Kotteakos, 328 U. S., at 757, n. 9 (citing Advisory Committee comment that Rule 52(a) was intended as “ ‘a restatement of existing law’ ”).

 That the Court has recognized the difference between constitutional and nonconstitutional harmless-error inquiries is reflected in the considerable difference in the Court’s standards on these two subjects. Compare Chapman, 386 U. S., at 24 (“before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), with Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S., at 765 (in nonconstitutional cases, “[t]he inquiry . . . is . . . whether the error itself had substantial influence”). To the extent that the majority ultimately cites the Kotteakos standard as governing this case, ante, at *473449, it is consistent with this distinction in our case law; to the extent that the majority suggests that Chapman controls the outcome of this case, however, ante, at 446, it reveals confusion about this distinction.

 Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court. . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”).

 See Comment, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. Crim. L. & C. 457, 475 (1983) (“The harmless error standards as currently applied in review of criminal trials are eroding the integrity of the criminal justice system by encouraging violations of longstanding trial rules”); Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L. & G. 421, 422 (1980) (“the doctrine of harmless constitutional error destroys important constitutional and institutional values”); Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 538, 540 (1979) (“increased use of harmless error analysis is inherently dangerous regardless of whether the errors violate the Constitution, statutes, or the common law”) (footnotes omitted); Cameron & Osborn, When Harmless Error Isn’t Harmless, 1971 Law & Social Order 23, 42 (“while the harmless error doctrine is an extremely useful device... it is not one that is without its dangers”). Cf. United States v. Jackson, 429 F. 2d 1368, 1373 (CA7 1970) (Clark, J., sitting by designation) (“‘Harmless error’ is swarming around the 7th Circuit like bees. . . . [T]he courts may have to act to correct a presently alarming situation”).

 See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error — A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 32 (1976) (“In sum, the case law on the content of the harmless error standard is less than lucid. There is some indication that Supreme Court opinions slip back and forth from one suggested standard to another, without explicit notice of the change, though the change could produce different results in many cases”); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988 (1973) (“Chaos surrounds the standard for appellate review of errors in criminal proceedings”); Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 519, 557 (1969) (“the Court, if only in an effort to further the interest of net judicial economy, should attempt to delineate certain well-defined classes of constitutional error which require automatic reversal”).

 In the constitutional area, the Court has made clear that certain independent values render a harmless-error analysis inappropriate. See, e. g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury is not subject to harmless-error analysis); Chapman, 386 U. S., at 23 (“there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error”). Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (some constitutional errors “are so fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity of the process by which that judgment was obtained”).

 In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 491 (1978), Chief Justice BurgeR explained that harmless error was inappropriate in assessing the constitutional error of inappropriate joint representation in part because such an inquiry required “unguided speculation.” See also Note, 64 Cornell L. Rev., supra n. 13, at 563-564 (“Holloway's rationale naturally extends beyond the sixth amendment: it suggests that a rule of automatic reversal should apply to those fundamental, pervasive errors that have uncertain prejudicial impact. . . . The rule of automatic reversal should be extended to all errors, whether or not pervasive or constitutional, that result in unascertainable prejudice”) (footnotes omitted).

 Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 457-458 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Pew instruments of injustice can equal that of implied or presumed or constructive crimes. The most odious of all oppressions are those which mask as justice”).

 See Note, 6 Hofstra L. Rev., supra n. 7, at 563 (harmless error “is inaccurate as a test for ascertaining the prejudice resulting from mis-joinder because of the impossibility of determining the extent of that prejudice”).

 The majority’s suggestion that two Supreme Court opinions have held misjoinder subject to the harmless-error rule is erroneous. The majority writes: “A holding directly involving misjoinder again indicated the harmless-error rule should apply.” Ante, at 447. The decision cited by the majority for this proposition, Schaffer v. United States, 362 U. S. 511 (1960), explicitly found no Rule 8 error and explicitly disavowed the type of “indication” claimed by the majority. See 362 U. S., at 517 (“The harmless-error rule, which was the central issue in Kotteakos, is not even reached in the instant case, since here the joinder was proper under Rule 8(b) and no error was shown”). Thus, the majority’s discussion of Schaffer, ante, at 447-448, is completely beside the point. Indeed, one year after Schaffer was decided, it was read to support, not the majority’s conclusion, but the viability of the McElroy rule. See Ward v. United States, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 136, 137, 289 F. 2d 877, 878 (1961) (Burger, *476J.) (citing Schaffer and McElroy to reject Government suggestion that defendant must show prejudice to obtain reversal after misjoinder of defendants has been established).
Similarly, the majority’s claim that Kotteakos “suggested that the harmless-error rule could similarly apply” to misjoinder, ante, at 447, vastly overstates the case. The Court noted that a possible joinder violation gave added weight to its conclusion that the error before it was not harmless. 328 U. S., at 774-775. The Court observed that “§269 [the harmless-error statute] carries the threat of overriding the requirement of § 557 for substituting separate counts in the place of separate indictments, unless the application of § 269 is made with restraint. The two sections must be construed and applied so as to bring them into substantial harmony, not into square conflict.” Id., at 775. This expression of concern about the possible effect of harmless error on misjoinder, however, hardly supports the notion that Kotteakos held misjoinder subject to harmless-error analysis. And, despite the majority’s view that its holding is the only way to bring harmless error and misjoinder into “substantial harmony,” ante, at 449, a conclusion that misjoinder necessarily affects substantial rights produces the same harmony.

 In Kotteakos, the Court accepted the defendants’ concession that the evidence was not “insufficient, if considered apart from the alleged errors *477relating to the proof and the instructions at the trial.” 328 U. S., at 753. The Court went on to emphasize that the harmless-error analysis is fundamentally different from the sufficiency analysis. “The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” Id., at 765. Even though the evidence was eoneed-edly sufficient without the errors, the Court thus found the errors not harmless, and the convictions reversible. The majority quotes the relevant passage from Kotteakos, ante, at 449, but fails to reflect its principle in its analysis.

 The only specific evidence even mentioned by the majority — the testimony of Heard and Lankford, ante, at 450-451, n. 13 — represents accomplice testimony. Such testimony is, of course, generally recognized as posing special evidentiary problems. See, e. g., 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶107 [04], pp. 107-50-107-51 (1985); 3 S. Gard, Jones on Evidence §20:60, pp. 736-737 (6th ed. 1972).

 Indeed, in the year following Kotteakos, this Court made clear that proper jury instructions might not alleviate the problems inherent in joint trials:
“The grave danger in this case, if any, arose not from the trial court’s rulings upon admissibility or from its instructions to the jury. As we have said, these were as adequate as might reasonably be required in a joint trial. The danger rested rather in the risk that the jury, in disregard of *478the court’s direction, would transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the effect of the excluded admissions from the case as made against Goldsmith and Weiss across the barrier of the exclusion to the other three defendants.” Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 559 (1947).

 “The Government’s theory seems to be, in ultimate logical reach, that the error presented by the variance is insubstantial and harmless, if the evidence offered specifically and properly to convict each defendant would be sufficient to sustain his conviction, if submitted in a separate trial. For reasons we have stated and in view of the authorities cited, this is not and cannot be the test under §269 [the harmless error statute].” 328 U. S., at 767.

 See R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 80 (1970) (“[T]he evaluation of an error as harmless or prejudicial is one of the most significant tasks of an appellate court, as well as one of the most complex. Each evaluation bears upon our traditional understanding that fair trial encompasses not only fair notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before the appropriate tribunal, but also an orderly presentation of evidence and a rational application of the law thereto”).

 A more searching review of the record might require the majority to confront certain troublesome aspects of this erroneous joinder. The majority might have to confront the fact that at least 9 of the Government’s 26 *479witnesses — more than one third — addressed the El Toro fire, the offense for which Dennis Lane was not charged. See Testimony of Morris Loewenstern, Tr. 33-43; Testimony of Earl Simpson, id., at 44-50; Testimony of Cindy Wright, id., at 58-59; Testimony of David Lard, id., at 62-89, 96-103; Testimony of Ben Shaw, id., at 103-112; Testimony of Jack Stotts, id., at 113-123; Testimony of Wayne Cox, id., at 123-132; Testimony of Jay Messenger, id., at 139-157; and Testimony of Sidney Heard, id., at 230-243. It might have to confront the fact that two of the defense witnesses similarly focused on the El Toro fire. See Testimony of Janie Malone, id., at 681-736; Testimony of Jess Maddox, id., at 891-894. It might have to confront the fact that, in their closing arguments, both the Government and the defense counsel devoted considerable attention to the El Toro fire. See Government’s closing argument, id., at 989-993; defense’s closing argument, id., at 1008-1014. And it might, finally, have to confront the fact that the prosecutor’s closing words to the jury were that “each of these charges has been proved against J. C. Lane and Dennis Lane beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 1051 (emphasis added).
This is not to say that I have studied the record with sufficient care to conclude that, if misjoinder is subject to harmless-error analysis, the error here was not harmless. Rather, it is to say that I am convinced that the majority’s opinion gives no indication of having wrestled with the complexities of the 1,000-page trial transcript in a manner that would permit its confident assertion that the error was harmless.