Court Opinion

ID: 9704854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:48:18.217156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.893101
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the Majority Opinion. Because of the importance of the issues raised by this case, however, I am compelled to express my understanding of the interplay between our comparative negligence statute, the former contributory negligence law and the pertinent sections of the uniform *483contribution among tortfeasors acts as now applicable, all of which are necessary in explaining the result reached by the court today.
This is the appeal of George Charles (Appellant) from the Opinion and Order of Superior Court affirming the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County directing the Prothonotary of that County to mark satisfied a judgment entered against Appellees, Giant Eagle Markets, (Giant Eagle), Stanley Magic Door, Inc., and Jed Doors (Stanley).
On January 17, 1977, Appellant was in the process of entering the front door entrance of a Giant Eagle Supermarket on Center Avenue in the City of Pittsburgh. This door is an electronically operated door commonly found in supermarkets, and is activated by stepping on a floor mat adjacent to the door. Appellant stepped onto the mat, which was covered with snow, ice and slush, but the door failed to open.
As Appellant began to apply pressure to the resisting door, his foot slipped on the snow and ice and the door suddenly swung open, throwing him to the ground. The fall caused Appellant to suffer injuries to his right arm, hand, and left leg, and precipitated this trespass action originally brought against Giant Eagle.
In his complaint, Appellant claimed that his injuries were caused by Giant Eagle’s failure to keep the door mat free and clear of snow and ice, and to keep the door in working order. Giant Eagle, in turn, joined Stanley Magic Door, Inc., and Jed Doors, the manufacturer of the door, as additional defendants, claiming that they were responsible to Appellant for his injuries by designing and selling a door that would not operate in extremely cold weather.
Prior to trial, Appellant and Giant Eagle entered into a release pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act1 (UCATA) for $22,500.00. The terms of the release discharged Giant Eagle from any actions, claims *484and demands in consequence of the accident which occurred on January 17,1977, and provided that any recovery Appellant would obtain against any person other than Giant Eagle on account of the accident would be reduced to the extent of Giant Eagle’s pro rata share of such damage as may be attributed to Giant Eagle of Appellant’s damages recoverable against all the tortfeasors.
At trial, a jury found Appellant’s damages to be $31,-000.00, and apportioned negligence between Giant Eagle (60% causally negligent) and Stanley (40% causally negligent). Based on the allocation of negligence, Giant Eagle’s pro-rata share of the damages was $18,600.00 and Stanley’s was $12,400.00. Appellant was found to be free of contributory negligence.
Stanley filed a timely post-trial motion seeking to mold the verdict, which was denied. Stanley then entered judgment on the verdict and claimed that since Appellant received $22,500.00 from Giant Eagle by the terms of the release, Stanley was only required to pay to Appellant $8,500.00 (the difference between the verdict of $31,000.00 and the $22,500.00 settlement received), notwithstanding Stanley’s liability of $12,400.00 (40% of $31,000.00). The trial court agreed with Stanley, and by its order of March 2, 1982, directed the Prothonotary to mark the judgment against Stanley satisfied upon its payment of $8,500.00. Appellant took an appeal to Superior Court, arguing that the Comparative Negligence Act2 has modified the law with respect to contributions among tortfeasors under the UCA-TA so that he is entitled to 40% of the verdict from Stanley regardless of the settlement made with Giant Eagle. The Honorable John Brosky, writing for the Superior Court panel, affirmed the trial court, relying on this Court's prior decision in Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), and the companion Superior Court Case of Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa.Superior Ct. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). In Daugherty, we interpreted Section 4 of the UCATA to require that a verdict winner’s claim against all *485tortfeasors must be reduced by the amount of the consideration paid for the release by a settling tortfeasor. In Mong, Superior Court permitted the overpaying settling tortfeasor to seek contribution from the non-settling tortfeasor to the extent that the amount paid by the settling tortfeasor exceeded its percentage of negligence.
Under this analysis, since Giant Eagle’s liability as determined by the jury was only for $18,600.00, it overpaid its share of liability by $3,900.00 and, therefore, had a right of contribution from Stanley for that amount to the exclusion of Appellant.
Appellant sought review of Superior Court’s opinion with this Court, and renews his arguments that the Comparative Negligence Act has modified the effect of tortfeasor releases executed pursuant to the UCATA so that he is entitled to keep all of the consideration paid by Giant Eagle in its release, and also is entitled to recover the $12,400.00 from Stanley as its judicially determined percentage of liability to him. Allocatur was granted because of the importance of addressing these issues and re-examining our decision in Daugherty and Superior Court’s Mong decision in light of the Comparative Negligence Act. Like the majority, I conclude that the comparative negligence statute has modified UCATA so as to alter the effect of a release as to a non-settling tortfeasor and agree that we must reverse Superior Court and in the process bury Daugherty and Mong forever.
Before discussing the effect of the Comparative Negligence Act on the UCATA, it is important to set out the basic rules of tort law as they existed in Pennsylvania before these statutes were enacted, and to determine how, if at all, these earlier rules of law have been affected since Comparative Negligence became the law of our Commonwealth.
At common law, it was acknowledged as an undoubted rule of law that where one suffered injury through the mutual or concurrent negligence of two or more persons, they were jointly liable and could be sued for the damages *486sustained, jointly or severally at the option of the party injured. If the injured party by his own negligence contributed to his own injury, however, the law would not afford him any remedy whatsoever against any or all of the persons whose wrong, in concurrence with his own, caused the injury. Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 554, 6 A. 372 (1886); Railroad v. Norton, 24 Pa. 465 (1855); Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147 (1854); Wynn v. Allard, 5 Watts and Serg 524 (1843); Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart 320 (1840).
Additionally, when an individual was injured by the negligence of more than one and recovered damages against them, he could proceed against any one for payment of the whole judgment. Such payment would operate as a satisfaction to the injured party and would release all others liable for the same injury. Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959); Anstine v. Pa.R.R. Co., 352 Pa. 547, 43 A.2d 109 (1945); Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (1937); Mason v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 302 Pa. 472, 153 A. 754 (1931); Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey and Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 A. 919 (1914); Seither v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397, 17 A. 338 (1889); Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts and Serg 103 (1841).
Finally, where a tortfeasor was forced to discharge the common liability of his concurrent tortfeasors by paying the full amount of damages to the injured party, he was also forced to bear the entire amount without the right to seek contribution from his confederates. Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Turton v. Powelton Electric Co., 185 Pa. 406, 39 A. 1053 (1898); Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324, 18 A. 127 (1889); North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Pa. 187 (1868); Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186 (1799).
These concepts of 1) joint and several liability, 2) contributory negligence, and 3) no right of contribution between joint-tortfeasors, under the early common law, were premised on three basic assumptions that have plagued tort law ever since they evolved. First, there was the assumption *487by our courts that where parties were mutually at fault, no apportionment of the damages could be made. Since “the law had no scales to determine whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief” (Railroad v. Norton, 24 Pa. 465 (1855)), negligent plaintiffs were not permitted any recovery against defendants whose negligence contributed to their injuries. The corollary to this rule was that the law was also unable to apportion damages among negligent defendants and that, therefore, they were each liable for the full amount of the damages caused by the concurrently or mutually negligent acts of the other tortfeasors. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954); Carlson, et al v. A & P Corrugated Box Corporation, 364 Pa. 216, 72 A.2d 290 (1950).
Where several negligent acts united in one injury to the plaintiff, the law was forced to look at the acts of each concerned or causing the injury as the acts of all. Since each tortfeasor was fully responsible for all the harm caused, a plaintiff could pick and choose among the various tortfeasors for satisfaction of the judgment against the tortfeasor. The law gave the injured person the right to obtain but one satisfaction for the damages done to him and, when that compensation was received from any of the wrongdoers, his right to any further remedy was at an end. Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (1937). Similarly, once one tortfeasor was forced to pay the entire judgment, he could not seek contribution from the other tortfeasors, because the courts would not aid wrongdoers in seeking contributions from wrongdoers. The parties would be left to their own devices, especially since the law did not know how to apportion damages among individuals whose varying degrees of fault caused injury to the plaintiff.
These harsh rules were continuously under attack by bench and bar alike, with the result that exceptions were grafted onto the doctrines to ameliorate their harshness.
The rule that a plaintiffs contributory negligence was an absolute bar to his recovery found certain exceptions, as *488where the defendant’s conduct was “willful,” “wanton” or “reckless,” Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 192 (1863); where the defendant violated a rule of criminal safety, Elliot v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 356 Pa. 643, 53 A.2d 81 (1947), Ennis v. Atkin, 354 Pa. 165, 47 A.2d 217 (1946); where the plaintiff had no way of knowing the danger or the means to guard against it, Pittsburgh A. & M., Pass. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. 421 (1873); where the plaintiff committed negligent acts during an emergency, Johnson v. West Chester P.R. Co., 70 Pa. 357 (1872), Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900) (action taken to save a life), Guca v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 367 Pa. 579, 80 A.2d 779 (1951) (action taken to save property); or where the plaintiff’s negligence did not contribute as the proximate cause of the injury, Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 Pa. 139 (1878). The concept of contribution among tortfeasors also found exception by applying the doctrine that equity is equality, and that since all the defendants were responsible for the damages, they should all share equally in the common burden. Goldman, et al v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955). Since the joint relation of the tortfeasors imposed equality of burden, the courts permitted contribution among tortfeasors as a matter of equity, and not under any theory of tort law, because the law still had not devised a way of apportioning the damages among the tortfeasors.
Once contribution was permitted among tortfeasors, the rule that the release of one tortfeasor released all the tortfeasors also was modified to permit contribution among the tortfeasors and to permit the injured party to recover the balance of his damages from other non-releasing tortfeasors. These rules of contribution were codified and enacted as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of July 19, 1951, P.L. 1130 (42 Pa.C.S. 8321, et seq.) and permitted an injured party to settle with one of two or more tortfeasors and, subject to the limitations of the Act, have recourse to the remaining tortfeasors for the balance of any damages awarded. Specifically, we ruled in Daugherty v. *489Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), that where a plaintiff settled with one party for more than his share of damages (as later determined by the jury), the settlement amount under Section 4 of the Act was applied to the judgment as entered against all tortfeasors to reduce it dollar for dollar. The remaining defendant tortfeasor was only required to pay the balance of the judgment (which, in Daugherty, was less than his share of liability as determined by the jury.)
In Daugherty, plaintiff secured judgments in the amount of $11,720.99 against Hershberger and Mong, who injured him and his family in an automobile accident. Prior to trial, Daugherty settled with Mong for $13,500.00, while the jury awarded $11,720.50 as follows:
Settlement paid by Mong
Jury Verdict
William Daugherty $ 5,145.23 $ 5,559.49
William Daugherty, Guardian for Burdel Daugherty 425.00 500.00
William Daugherty, Guardian for Leora Daugherty 650.00 1,000.00
William Daugherty, Guardian for Rodney Daugherty 1,000.00 500.00
Gertrude Williams 1,500.00 1,161.50
Elaine C. Daugherty 779.77 2,000.00
Elaine C. Daugherty, Administrator of the Estate of Carl D. Williams 4,000.00 1,000.00
Totals.......................... $13,500.00 $11,720.99
In consideration for the money paid in the release, Daugherty agreed to relieve Mong from any liability on account of the accident and to reduce by 50% the damages he could recover against Hershberger, the other tortfeasor. When the jury returned its verdict in favor of Daugherty against Mong and Hershberger for $11,720.99, Daugherty attempted to collect 50% of the verdict ($5,860.50) from Hershberger. Hershberger argued that the verdict should be reduced by the amounts Mong paid under the release provisions as noted above.
*490In short, Hershberger argued that he was liable only for the difference in Mong’s underpayments to William Daugherty in his own right as guardian for his minor children, Burdel and Leora. Where Mong overpaid what the jury later decided were the damages, Hershberger argued that he had no responsibility. And where Mong underpaid in excess of 50% of the jury verdict, as he did to the Estate of Carl D. Williams, Hershberger argued he was responsible only for $1000.00, or 50% of the jury verdict.
This confusing mathematical scheme was endorsed by this Court in Daugherty with the net result that Hershberger was only required to pay Daugherty $1839.26, instead of 50% of the jury verdict ($5860.50).
In Daugherty, this Court reasoned that such an interpretation of the UCATA barred the plaintiff from obtaining a double recovery. Daugherty could be justified as a proper application of the then existing law of contribution among tortfeasors for two reasons. First, both tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable for all the damages caused to plaintiffs and, since the law still possessed no method to apportion damages among the parties, any settlement arrived at by one defendant before trial was construed as discharging part of a common burden shared by all tortfeasors, and not as the extinguishing of the settling tortfeasors’ liability.
Accordingly, Mong’s settlement with Daugherty was an attempt to discharge the common liability of Mong and Daugherty. If Mong paid more for the joint harm of both tortfeasors, he was entitled to pass that benefit on to Hershberger (the joint tortfeasor) and reduce the amount Hershberger would have to pay to Daugherty, thereby not paying Daugherty more than the jury verdict required. Superior Court, in the companion case of Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa.Superior Ct. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962), further refined the analysis in Daugherty and ruled that even though Hershberger did not have to pay to Daugherty $4,021.23 (the difference between the jury verdict— $5,860.50 — and the amount we ordered he pay — $1,839.26), *491it would be inequitable to exonerate him from paying it to Mong, who could be charged with nothing more than an overestimation of the value of the claims. In ruling that Mong had a right of contribution from Hershberger, Superi- or Court invalidated Section 2 of the UCATA, which provided that a settling tortfeasor cannot seek contribution from a non-settling tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement. In reaching its conclusion, Superior Court argued that it would be absurd and unreasonable to deprive Mong of his right to contribution from Hershberger. We refused allocatur, and by implication, endorsed Superior Court's disposition of this issue.
In summary, prior to comparative negligence, our courts held that non-settling tortfeasors were entitled to credit on their share of verdicts for everything that settling tortfeasors paid in excess of their share of the verdict, and that settling tortfeasors were entitled to contribution from non-settling tortfeasors for overpayments made by them. By the first rule, plaintiffs were limited to one recovery, and by the second, defendants were assured that none would be forced to pay more than their common burden imposed by the verdict. Inasmuch as the law was incapable of apportioning liability or damages among the parties, these cases provided the most equitable solution then available.
On September 7, 1976, the Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 855 No. 152, 17 P.S. § 2101 and 2102, now 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, became effective and adopted a comparative negligence system for Pennsylvania. The actual text of this Act is short and provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) General rule — In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall *492be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution— Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Appellant argues that the Comparative Negligence Act has modified the law as concerns the joint and several liability of tortfeasors because their liability is now capable of being apportioned as a matter of law. That being the case, consideration paid by settling tortfeasors should be construed as payments extinguishing that settling tortfeasor’s individual proportionate liability to the verdict winner, and not as an attempt to pay a common share or burden of liability, as was the law prior to comparative negligence. Daugherty, Mong.
Admittedly, the act is silent on this question, and legislative history is meager on the point (See, 1 Pa.Leg.J. 1701-1708 Senate 1976).
In construing the statute, however, courts are guided by the rules of statutory construction, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). These rules require a court to consider, inter alia: (1) the occasion and necessity for the statute; (2) the mischief to be remedied; (3) the object to be attained; (4) the former law; and (5) the consequences of a particular interpretation, (See, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (3), (4), (5) and (6)).
In my view, comparative negligence was the legislative response to the inequities the law formerly imposed because of the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence. And as previously noted, contributory negligence was rooted in the belief that the law was incapable of apportioning fault *493between plaintiffs and defendants, or among defendants. That being the chief mischief to be remedied and the occasion and necessity for the statute, it is obvious that the legislature, in enacting a comparative negligence statute, abandoned the old premise in favor of an acknowledgement that fault and liability could, in fact, be apportioned among a plaintiff and defendants.
It makes no difference that plaintiffs are barred from recovery where their causal negligence exceeds 51% (42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)), because such a limitation only reflects the legislative judgment that a party more at fault than those he sues should not be able to recover against them for damages. This limitation in no way affects the underlying recognition that fault can now be apportioned in any percentage among all the parties.
Section (b) of the Act is more crucial to this case, however, because by its terms it defines a defendant’s liability as “that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b).
In my view our comparative negligence statute represents a departure from the prior law on the subject which made all tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for an equal pro tanto proportion of the judgment. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954); Gorman v. Charlson, 287 Pa. 410, 135 A. 250 (1926). If meaning is to be given to the legislature’s definition of a defendant’s liability, I have no choice but to conclude that joint and several liability, as formerly known to the common law, has been modified to some extent by our comparative negligence statute.
Since a defendant’s liability as a matter of law is now defined to be equal only to his percentage of causal negligence, it necessarily follows that the consideration he pays for any settlement against him alone represents a payment for only his percentage of causal negligence, and discharges *494his liability to the plaintiff to that extent. The plaintiff may still proceed against any remaining non-settling tortfeasor for the full amount of the verdict less the amount which equals the settling defendant’s percentage of causal negligence, that is, his pro-rata share of the damages as fixed by the jury. There is, therefore, no reason to impose on his settlement arrangement the impression that he is paying for anything more than his proportionate share of liability. That being the case, any jury verdict ultimately arrived at will necessarily be reduced by only the settling defendant’s calculated monetary percentage of causal negligence or fault, and not by the amount of consideration paid by such settling defendant in the release.
Applying these principals to the case sub judice, I agree that Giant Eagle’s settlement operated as a release only to the extent of its proportionate share of causal negligence as later determined by the jury. There is no reason to credit Stanley with the $3900.00 Giant Eagle paid in excess of its judicially determined proportionate share of liability and the majority is correct in overruling Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), and in rejecting Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa.Superior Ct. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). Stanley did not participate in the negotiated settlement between Giant Eagle and Appellant; nor did it choose to settle its liability with Appellant, as did Giant Eagle.
As Mr. Justice Musmanno remarked: “The [Giant Eagle] settlement was purely a voluntary compact between two parties and we have no right to step in between them except to see to it that [Stanley] is not called upon to pay more than (40%) of the jury’s verdict. To go further is to intermeddle with the rights of people to settle their own affairs.” Daugherty, dissent 386 Pa. 367 at p. 381, 126 A.2d 730, at 737 (1956).
To summarize, prior to the Comparative Negligence Act, the portion or percentage of liability of each tortfeasor was as a matter of equity equal in proportion to the number of tortfeasors. Under the comparative negligence statute, the liability of each tortfeasor is fixed by law and depends on a *495question of fact determined by an apportionment of the causal negligence attributable to all the tortfeasors. Where a defendant and plaintiff enter into a release, such as the one in this case, the release should operate to satisfy only that percentage of the judgment plaintiff ultimately recovers as the settling tortfeasor’s causal negligence bears to all the causal negligence of all the tortfeasors. Accord, see Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
Here, Giant Eagle’s release satisfied that part of its cause of action for which liability was found (60%) to be attributable to it. The remaining negligence (40%) allocated by the jury to Stanley remains to be collected by Appellant.
Stanley’s argument that Appellant is receiving a $3900.00 windfall is misplaced and wrongly endorsed by the trial court and Superior Court. Giant Eagle did not condition its payment to Appellant on the basis that if it overpaid its liability it could seek a refund from Appellant. In this regard the terms of the release are controlling. The only party who had a legal right to complain about the amount it paid for the release chose to waive its right of complaint. The release does not transfer any such right to Stanley. Stanley could only complain of windfall if it were being compelled to pay more than its 40% of causal negligence. Such is not the case here.3
Nor is this a case which involves contribution. As a matter of Legislative judgment, the right of contribution exists under comparative negligence only where a defendant is compelled to pay more than his proportionate verdict liability. Giant Eagle is not compelled to pay more because it voluntarily settled with Plaintiff, and Stanley is not compelled to pay more than his proportionate share of 40% as fixed by the jury. Neither, then, can seek contribution *496from the other. I agree that the judgment must be vacated so that Appellant can collect the full amount of damages assessed by the jury against Stanley ($12,400.00).
LARSEN, J., joins this concurring opinion.

. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8321, et seq.

. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 855, No. 152, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102.

. Our decision today awards to the Appellant the benefit of his bargain with Giant Eagle ($22,500.00) and the amount awarded to him by the verdict against Stanley ($12,400.00) for a total of $34,900.00. This is so even though the full verdict was for $31,000.00. For if the settlement with Giant Eagle had been for less than $18,600.00, the Appellant would have borne the loss and received a total recovery of less than the verdict of $31,000.00.