Court Opinion

ID: 9764961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:46:29.041983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.804483
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully with Division 2 of the majority opinion.4 However, because I believe that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Ferguson’s conviction for the theft of the Camry, I must respectfully dissent to Division 1.
Mere presence of one where a crime is committed, without more, will not support a conviction. Sweat v. State, 119 Ga. App. 646 (168 SE2d 654) (1969). So too, unexplained and suspicious circumstances are not sufficient to convict the defendant. Rodgers v. State, 213 Ga. 797, 803 (102 SE2d 10) (1958); Donaldson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 532, 533 (474 SE2d 722) (1996) (“[S]peculation and conjecture will not sustain a conviction.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In cases such as this where all of the evidence is circumstantial, the proper standard is whether the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save Ferguson’s guilt. “[T]he evidence need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except guilt of the accused, but only reasonable inferences . . . , beyond reasonable doubt, of guilt.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fitz v. State, 201 Ga. App. 83, 85 (410 SE2d 186) (1991).
The theft of the Camry was based solely on evidence that Ferguson was seen in the area where the theft of the Camry occurred; evidence that Ferguson conceded was true. Moreover, the fact that he was staying at Providence Ministries, the residential facility affiliated with the thrift store, substantiated his legitimate presence in the area. The video surveillance tape merely reflected that Ferguson was in the area as well.
The surveillance tape entered into evidence at trial showed ten clips of varying lengths between the times of 12:43 p.m., when the Camry was parked in front of the thrift store and 1:26 p.m., when the vehicle was stolen. The clips showed a man in khaki pants wearing a light shirt that at times appeared to be light blue. The man holds a *239white bag in some of the clips, papers in others, and in some of the clips he appears to have a dark object over his shoulder that may either be a jacket or a bag. In at least two of the clips the man is not carrying anything. There are time lapses from seconds to over 15 minutes in the clips. The surveillance tape does not show what happened during these stretches of time.
Decided December 1, 2010.
Michael A. Corbin, for appellant.
Kermit N. McManus, District Attorney, John S. Helton, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Likewise, there is no indication of whether other people walked by the Camry during this 45-minute time period because only the clips of Ferguson were extracted from the surveillance tape to compare with the theft suspect. While it is certainly true as the majority notes, that jurors determine questions of fact such as identity, it is beyond the ken of the most astute jury to compare Ferguson as he appeared at trial with the video of a man with a dark object wrapped around his head and declare that they are one and the same. In the cases cited by the majority for this proposition, Carter v. State, supra, and Moses v. State, supra, the defendant was identified from an image on a videotape, not his gait, complexion or clothing.
The only other evidence of Ferguson’s identity was the theft of the Honda, and “[generally in a criminal trial, proof that the defendant committed a distinct, independent, and separate offense is highly and inherently prejudicial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 510-511 (3) (570 SE2d 292) (2002).
While it is true that the appellate courts do not undertake to weigh evidence, we must, however, look to see if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict. Pierce v. State, 243 Ga. 454 (1) (254 SE2d 838) (1979).
Thus, as I believe the evidence was not sufficient to support Ferguson’s conviction for the theft of the Camry, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion as to Division 1.

 Although a different result is not warranted in this case, it is important to reiterate the inherently prejudicial nature of the letter addressed to Ferguson at Dooley State Prison as it raises “an inference that an accused who acted in a certain manner on one occasion is likely to have acted in the same or in a similar manner on another occasion and thereby putting the accused’s character in issue.” Bryant v. State, 204 Ga. App. 856, 861 (3) (420 SE2d 801) (1992). In this circumstance, given that the letter was relevant only to prove Ferguson’s identity, the prison’s address should have been redacted from the letter.