Court Opinion

ID: 9634693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:21:02.337073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:05.781779
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Government action violates the Establishment Clause if (1) “the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion,” McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005); (2) the action “has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion”; or (3) the action “foster[s] an excessive governmental entanglement with religion,”1 ACLU v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 635 (6th Cir.2005). Although the majority purports to apply this test, its application is misguided at best. Because I conclude that the record evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, establishes that the County had a predominantly religious purpose in hanging the Foundations Display (“Display”) and that the Display had the purpose or effect of endorsing religion, I dissent.
I. ANALYSIS
A. The Display’s Predominant Purpose is to Advance Religion
“[PJurpose matters.” McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 n. 14, 125 S.Ct. 2722. “The eyes that look to purpose” behind government action, “belong to an ‘objective observer,’ ” id. at 862, 125 S.Ct. 2722, a person who is “presumed to be aware of the text, legislative history, and implementation of the state action.” Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 630 (quotation omitted). Further, “although a legislature’s stated reasons will generally get deference, the secular purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 864, 125 S.Ct. 2722. If a defendant espouses a purpose in response to litigation, and such purpose contradicts the record evidence, the newly stated purpose may be rejected. See id. at 871, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (rejecting the defendants’ “new statements of purpose[, which] were presented only as a litigating position,” because these statements contradicted the defendants’ pre-litigation religious purpose); cf. Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 631-32 (noting that this court will not “defer to the government’s stated purpose ... ‘where the claim was an apparent sham’ ” (quoting McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 865,125 S.Ct. 2722)).
The County’s asserted purpose here— that the Display was posted for educational or historical reasons — is a sham and should be rejected. The minutes from the September 18, 2001 Grayson County Fiscal Court (“Fiscal Court”) meeting, which constitute the type of “legislative history” of which an objective observer would be aware, reveal the following: (1) Reverend Shartzer, a religious leader, approached the Fiscal Court and asked “the County to place the Ten Commandments in the County buildings”; (2) Reverend Shartzer stated that “the Civil Liberties [sic] would look more favorable [sic] toward [hanging the Ten Commandments] if they were hanging in a grouping with the other historical documents”; (3) “Judge Logsdon and the Court members expressed the desire to place them[, the Ten Commandments,] in the County buildings and asked the County Attorney if he thought they could do so in a way that would not cause problems for the County”; (4) Magistrate *858“Damon Hornback made a motion to place the Ten Commandments in the buildings,” which “died for lack of a second”; and (5) immediately thereafter Magistrate Sandy Farris made another motion, which Damon Hornback seconded and which passed by a unanimous vote, that ordered “[t]he County place the Ten Commandments in the Court House along with the Historical documents.” Record on Appeal (“ROA”) at 417 (09/18/01 Meeting Minutes) (emphasis added). On September 28, 2001, the Fiscal Court reaffirmed the September 18 vote that had already approved the Display, ordering that “[t]he following resolution along with the Historical Documents and the Ten Commandments be placed in a grouping in the Court House.” ROA at 419 (09/28/01 Meeting Minutes) (emphasis added). The vote at this second meeting followed an extensive commentary by Reverend Shartzer about the need for the Display, but the Fiscal Court failed to record the content of the exchange and there is little record evidence concerning what Reverend Shartzer said other than his recollection.
Although the Supreme Court has noted that the Ten Commandments have some historical value, see Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 634, an objective observer reviewing these minutes and their context in the light most favorable to the County would rightly conclude that the Fiscal Court’s predominant purpose in erecting the Display was not secular. The evidence from these meetings clearly indicates that the predominant purpose was to post the Ten Commandments as a religious text and that the additional, “Historical Documents” were added merely to avoid violating the Constitution. Most notably, throughout the Fiscal Court’s discussion of whether to erect a display, the Ten Commandments were always treated as separate from and more important than any of the “Historical Documents” mentioned. Reverend Shartzer, a religious leader, specifically asked the Fiscal Court to display the Ten Commandments. Magistrates Hornback and Farris, both government officials, singled out the Ten Commandments as their primary focus when making their respective motions to place the Display in the courthouse and clearly considered the “Historical Documents” as distinct from the Ten Commandments. Indeed, the actual orders that the Fiscal Court passed on September 18 and September 28 both focused on hanging the Ten Commandments and explicitly distinguished them from the “Historical Documents,” which were mentioned in passing and only as a way to attempt to avoid constitutional problems.
In addition to treating the Ten Commandments and the “Historical Documents” as conceptually distinct, the Fiscal Court never mentioned at the first meeting when it voted to approve the Display that the Display would be educational or showcase America’s legal history. To the contrary, in fact, the Fiscal Court continually treated the Ten Commandments as separate from the “Historical Documents,” indicating that the Fiscal Court did not attribute to the Ten Commandments whatever historical value those other documents held. Moreover, at no point after the Fiscal Court’s first meeting’s vote did the Fiscal Court pass a resolution stating or clarifying that the purpose of the Display was educational, historical, or otherwise secular. Instead, the Fiscal Court members began mentioning the secular aspects of the Display only after litigation commenced.2
*859The majority insists that this evidence is insufficient for the plaintiffs to show that the County had a predominantly religious purpose in erecting the Display because “the simple desire to post the Ten Commandments cannot, in isolation, demonstrate religious purpose.” Maj. Op. at 850. This observation ignores the way in which the Ten Commandments are viewed, particularly by religious leaders such as Reverend Shartzer, and the explicit and vocal manner in which the Fiscal Court treated them. Regardless of any historical value attributable to the Ten Commandments, it is undeniable that the Ten Commandments comprise a religious document. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690,125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (plurality) (“Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious — they were so viewed at their inception and so remain.”). Given this reality, even though a government entity can post the Ten Commandments for educational or historical purposes and not run afoul of the Constitution, that does not mean that a desire to post the Ten Commandments in a constitutionally permissible manner cannot also evidence a predominantly religious purpose for the display in the eyes of an objective observer. When a government entity speaks only and continually about posting a religious document, treats the religious document as separate and distinct from the history-related documents, and focuses principally on ensuring that the religious document is posted in a way that does not upset “the Civil Liberties,” an objective observer would rightly conclude that the predominant purpose behind hanging the religious document was to support and spread the religious message. Under such circumstances, the desire to post the religious document establishes the predominant purpose, even if the government entity never bluntly states that purpose as its rationale.3 As a result, I believe that the plaintiffs have met their burden to show an Establishment Clause violation: The predominant purpose at the time the Fiscal Court voted to approve the Display was a religious one.4
*860This conclusion would not forbid government entities from specifically discussing the Ten Commandments or any other religious document or item, as the majority implies. If a government entity proposed posting the Ten Commandments for historical or educational purposes and, in the course of that discussion, referred specifically to the Ten Commandments, that reference would not necessarily evidence a religious purpose. In such a case, the record may well establish that, although the government expressly referenced the Ten Commandments, it did so only as a way to explain the type of display it envisioned and that, in light of the references to the historical and educational import of the display and the Ten Commandments’ role therein, the predominant purpose was secular. No such record evidence exists in the instant case, however. The Fiscal Court here espoused no purpose other than a desire to post a religious document, and it is the Fiscal Court’s singular focus on posting the Ten Commandments for a sectarian reason that establishes a religious purpose.
To further support its conclusion that the Fiscal Court had a secular purpose in hanging the Display, the majority relies on Reverend Shartzer’s deposition testimony analogizing the display to “road signs.” Maj. Op. at 850. This reliance is misplaced. Even assuming that Reverend Shartzer’s testimony correctly summarizes his statements during the second Fiscal Court meeting, as we must, this testimony cannot support a finding of secular purpose. As Reverend Shartzer admitted in his deposition, he did not make his statements regarding “road signs” until the second meeting, which occurred after the Fiscal Court originally approved the Display. There is no evidence that the Fiscal Court voted to reapprove the Display because it had developed a new purpose sometime between September 18 and September 28; to the contrary, the vote during the second meeting was a response to the county attorney’s recommendation regarding the constitutionality of the Display. See ROA at 417 (09/18/01 Meeting Minutes) (noting that the Fiscal Court ordered that “[t]he County place the Ten Commandments in the Court House along with the Historical documents of the Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, Mayflower Compact, Star Spangled Banner, National Anthem, Magna Carta, Explanation Document, and a County Resolution, after County Attorney Tom Goff has looked at the results of the hearings in other Counties, and if he thinks this can be done without legal action against the County.” (emphasis added)). The Fiscal Court’s purpose in erecting the Display was already established at the time Reverend Shartzer made his statements, and the majority cannot now use these statements to reinterpret the Fiscal Court’s initial purpose.
I also do not believe that the Explanation Document posted with the Display “represents the best evidence” of the Display’s purpose simply because the Explanation Document allegedly identifies the Display’s purpose. Maj. Op. at 851 n. 7. And to reach this conclusion, I do not ignore the presence of the Explanation Document as the majority contends. See id. Rather, while it is true that the Explanation Document states that the Ten Commandments have “influenced the formation of Western legal thought” and “provide the ... foundation of our legal tradition,” ROA *861at 420 (Explanation Doc.), the mere inclusion of the Explanation Document does not, in this case, establish the Fiscal Court’s primary purpose or automatically insulate its actions. Importantly, the Fiscal Court neither drafted nor approved the content of the Explanation Document. In fact, several Fiscal Court members testified that they had not seen, let alone read, the document prior to its posting. Reverend Shartzer also testified that even he had not seen the Explanation Document prior to the Fiscal Court meeting where the Display was approved because the Document was provided to him later by another pastor in response to Reverend Shartzer’s inquiry about “what needed to be in the display” to avoid constitutional problems. ROA at 379-81 (Shartzer Dep.).
Moreover, as outlined previously, at no time during the Fiscal Court’s discussion of the Display did any member indicate that he or she was authorizing the Display for reasons even remotely related to those contained within the Explanation Document. Given this reality, the Explanation Document’s inclusion in the Display is as inconsequential as the presence of the various “Historical Documents” in establishing the Fiscal Court’s primary purpose. It simply cannot overcome the Fiscal Court’s explicit statements. Even viewing the Explanation Document in the light most favorable to the County, it is nothing more than an post-hoc attempt to obfuscate the true, religious purpose. In short, at the time the Fiscal Court voted to approve the Display, the ostensible purpose contained within the yet-to-be-seen Explanation Document was not the Fiscal Court’s own purpose. Based on the Fiscal Court’s actual statements at the time it approved the Display, an objective observer would still conclude that the Fiscal Court’s purpose was predominantly religious, even “in light of the display’s explicit statement.” Maj. Op. at 851 n. 7. Certainly the contents and context of the Display evidence some secular principles, but in light of the Display’s legislative history, which expresses religious preference, they do not evidence secular purpose.
Contrary to the majority’s claim, then, Mercer County is vastly different from the instant appeal. And even though a panel of this court “deferred to the local government’s stated secular purpose” in Mercer County, Maj. Op. at 849, I believe that we cannot do so here. It made sense for the Mercer County panel to defer to the County’s stated secular purpose there because there was no evidence to the contrary. Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 632 (“Mercer County’s stated purpose was more than a mere ‘litigating position’ ” because “there is no evidence in this case that the County’s stated purpose is a sham.”). That is not so with Grayson County. Here, there is evidence in the form of meeting minutes that the predominant purpose of this Display was not the educational or historical purpose now espoused or reflected in the Explanation Document. Instead, the secular rationale upon which the majority focuses embodies the type of “litigating position” that the Supreme Court condemned in McCreary County. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 871, 125 S.Ct. 2722. And the secular purpose directly contradicts the clear religious purpose evidenced by the Fiscal Court’s explicit statements in the meeting minutes and the tenor of the meetings. All of the record evidence supports a finding that the government entity had a predominantly religious purpose in erecting the Display and that any other purpose is a sham. Such a conclusion does not require reliance on erroneous inferences or suspicions gleaned from silence. The record evidence speaks loudly and requires neither.
*862It is true that, in terms of content and position within the courthouse, the Display at issue in the instant appeal is identical to the display that the Mercer County panel found constitutional. But, contrary to the majority’s assertions, that is where the similarities end. The majority is wrong to assert that Mercer County is dispositivethe display in Mercer County had a materially different legislative history than the Display at issue in this case. Unlike Mercer County, all of the evidence of legislative history in this case supports a finding that the Fiscal Court acted with a predominantly religious purpose and went to great lengths to hide that purpose by figuring out what it needed to hang in addition to the Ten Commandments in order to avoid a constitutional challenge. To defer to the Fiscal Court’s newly stated secular purpose ignores the statements the Fiscal Court made when it voted to approve the Display and adopts as legitimate what the Fiscal Court now feels it needs to say in order to avoid running afoul of the law.
Because the Display here “has a history [of] manifesting sectarian purpose that the [Mercer County display] lack[ed], it is appropriate that they be treated differently.” Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 632 (quoting McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 n. 14, 125 S.Ct. 2722) (first alteration in original). Given the legislative-history evidence of religious purpose, I believe that this case is more analogous to McCreary County. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court’s rule in McCreary County, I would hold that the Display violates the first prong of the Lemon test and, therefore, violates the Establishment Clause.
B. The Display Endorses Religion
The Display also fails the second prong of the Lemon test. Government action violates this prong when the action would cause a reasonable person to view the act as endorsing religion. Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 636. This is an objective standard that, similar to the objective-observer standard outlined above, requires a court to consider the perspective of a “reasonable person [who] is deemed aware of the circumstances under which governmental actions arise, including the legislative history and implementation.” Id. Moreover, “[c]ontext is crucial to this analysis.” Id. “If context, history, and the act itself send the ‘unmistakable message’ of endorsing religion, then the act is unconstitutional.” Id. at 637 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
In upholding a display identical to the Display at issue here, the Mercer County panel noted that this court “will not presume endorsement from the mere display of the Ten Commandments.” Id. at 639. The panel further noted that the display was constitutional because, on its face, it “sen[t] the ‘unmistakable message’ of the County’s acknowledgment of legal history,” and that “nothing in the legislative history tend[ed] to show otherwise.” Id. at 638 (emphasis added). In this case, unlike Mercer County, there is evidence tending to show that the defendants were, in fact, endorsing religion. As outlined at length above, the Fiscal Court meeting minutes reflect the desire to post the Ten Commandments for its religious value, as opposed to erecting an educational or historical display. Although a reviewing court cannot presume endorsement from the simple fact that the Ten Commandments were included in the ultimate Display, id. at 639, such a presumption is unnecessary here given that the meeting minutes demonstrate the Fiscal Court’s primary focus was to post a religious text for its religious value. Unlike the historical message sent in Mercer County, the posting of an unquestionably religious document under the circumstances in the in*863stant case sent an “unmistakable message” of endorsing religion that would lead the reasonable person to conclude that the Display and the government behind it endorse religion. See id. at 638. Thus, I would hold that the Display violates the second prong of the Lemon test as well as the first. Each violation constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.
II. CONCLUSION
The record clearly demonstrates that the County erected the Display with a predominantly religious purpose and that the Display has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion. Accordingly, I would AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. However, because the majority has seen fit to imagine that a clear intent to post a religious document only for its religious value does not evidence a predominantly religious purpose, I must dissent.

. Although recently reformulated, see Mercer County, 432 F.3d at 635, this test was originally enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and I will thus refer to this standard as the Lemon test.

. The majority inexplicably ignores the Fiscal Court's statements in concluding that “even assuming that Shartzer had a religious purpose, there is no evidence in the record that the Fiscal Court as a body adopted Shartzer's *859purpose,” Maj. Op. at 851, and imagines silence where there was none.

. By acknowledging the religious underpinnings of the Ten Commandments and the religious manner in which the document is perceived, I do not, as the majority claims, treat the "inherent religious nature of the Ten Commandments as necessarily ‘trumping’ their recognized secular and historical significance.” Maj. Op. at 856. Rather, I analyze the Fiscal Court’s actions in context, and refuse to ignore the fact that the Ten Commandments comprise a religious text and that the document’s religious significance becomes even more pronounced when it is a religious leader who proposes that they be hung. Again, as the Supreme Court has noted, "Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious-they were so viewed at their inception and so remain.” Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690, 125 S.Ct. 2854. To fail to recognize this fact would be as egregious as failing to acknowledge that the Ten Commandments can be viewed secularly, which I do not purport to do.

. The majority's treatment of Magistrate Hornback’s first failed motion to place the Ten Commandments in the courthouse as analogous to "evidence of ‘repeal or repudiation' ” that "negates the suggestion of a religious purpose” and "highlights the care taken by the Fiscal Court to promote its asserted secular purpose,” Maj. Op. at 852, is unconvincing. Instead, in light of the Fiscal Court’s conversation concerning the legal challenges mounted against Ten Commandments displays that immediately preceded the failed motion, the failed motion reflects nothing more than an awareness of the potential legal ramifications of posting the Ten Commandments in isolation. Furthermore, in order to "negate the suggestion of a religious purpose,” the actions the Fiscal Court took after that motion must be in accordance with a secular purpose. They were not. As highlighted above, the second vote still evidenced *860that the Fiscal Court’s purpose was to hang the Ten Commandments for its religious value because the Fiscal Court continued to treat the religious text as separate from the historical texts, which it desired to hang only as an attempt to insulate the Ten Commandments from legal challenge.