Court Opinion

ID: 9392947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 18:12:55.548847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.047185
License: Public Domain

J-A02022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 MICHAEL AARON SCHERBANIC              :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1412 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0010893-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 MICHAEL AARON SCHERBANIC              :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1413 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0010894-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 MICHAEL AARON SCHERBANIC              :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1414 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0010895-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-A02022-23

                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MICHAEL SCHERBANIC                     :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1415 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0010899-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MICHAEL SCHERBANIC                     :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1416 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0010900-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MICHAEL SCHERBANIC                     :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1417 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0004787-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :

                                  -2-
J-A02022-23

 MICHAEL AARON SCHERBANIC               :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1418 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0006462-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MICHAEL AARON SCHERBANIC               :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1419 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0006463-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MICHAEL SCHERBANIC                     :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1420 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0006464-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: MAY 8, 2023

                                  -3-
J-A02022-23

      Appellant, Michael Aaron Scherbanic, appeals from the order entered

November 3, 2021, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       This PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history

of this case as follows:

       Appellant was charged at nine criminal informations relating to
       the sexual abuse of children who were karate students of his,
       and Appellant's subsequent attempts to coerce his victims to
       change their statements. At CP-02-CR-10893-2016, Appellant
       was charged with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
       ("IDSI"), indecent assault, unlawful contact, endangering the
       welfare of a child [(“EWOC”)], corruption of minors, and
       indecent exposure. At CP-02-CR-10894-2016, Appellant was
       charged with IDSI, indecent assault, unlawful contact, [EWOC],
       corruption of minors, and indecent exposure.                 At
       CP-02-CR-10895-2016, Appellant was charged with IDSI,
       indecent assault, unlawful contact, [EWOC], corruption of
       minors, and indecent exposure. At CP-02-CR-10899-2016,
       Appellant was charged with IDSI, indecent assault, unlawful
       contact, [EWOC], corruption of minors, and indecent exposure.
       Appellant was additionally charged at this information with
       intimidation of witnesses or victims and obstruction in child
       abuse cases. At CP-02-CR-10900-2016, Appellant was charged
       with indecent assault, unlawful contact, [EWOC], and corruption
       of minors.

       At CP-02-CR-04787-2017, Appellant was charged with five
       counts of criminal solicitation-homicide, five counts of criminal
       solicitation-arson, five counts of criminal solicitation-retaliation,
       four counts of criminal solicitation-obstruction, three counts of
       criminal solicitation-perjury, and five counts of criminal
       solicitation-intimidation. At CP-02-CR-06462-2017, Appellant
       was charged with indecent assault, unlawful contact, [EWOC],
       and corruption of minors. At CP-02-CR-06463-2017, Appellant
       was charged with IDSI, indecent assault ([one] count[] person
       less than 13 years of age and [one count] person less than 16
       years of age), unlawful contact, [EWOC], corruption of minors,
       and indecent exposure. At CP-02-CR06464-2017, Appellant
       was charged with criminal solicitation-indecent assault,

                                       -4-
J-A02022-23

        unlawful contact, [EWOC], corruption of minors, indecent
        exposure, and open lewdness.

        On September 15, 2016, William Stockey, Esquire [(“Attorney
        Stockey”)] entered his appearance.            Counsel filed several
        motions on Appellant's behalf, including a motion for reduction
        of bail and a motion to sever offenses. On March 10, 2017,
        [Attorney] Stockey filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The
        trial judge, the Honorable Donna Jo McDaniel, granted the
        motion and appointed Richard Narvin, Esquire [(“Attorney
        Narvin”)] to represent Appellant. [Attorney] Narvin shepherded
        Appellant through the trial and verdict. On April 16, 2018,
        following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of several
        counts of [IDSI], indecent assault, unlawful contact, [EWOC],
        corruption of minors, and indecent exposure. He was also
        convicted      of    criminal     solicitation-homicide,    criminal
        solicitation-arson,       [nine]        counts      of      criminal
        solicitation-retaliation,     [three]      counts    of     criminal
        solicitation-perjury,      [five]        counts     of      criminal
        solicitation-obstruction, and one count each of intimidation of a
        witness and obstruction in child abuse cases. [On June 28,
        2018,] J[udge] McDaniel imposed an aggregate sentence of
        78[-]156 years of incarceration. [Attorney] Narvin filed a
        post-sentence motion and withdrew on July 11, 2018.

        Robert Perkins, Esquire replaced [Attorney] Narvin and filed an
        amended post-sentence motion, which J[udge] McDaniel denied
        on October 29, 2018. Appellant filed a direct appeal and on
        April 30, 2020, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
        [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence. [See Commonwealth v.
        Scherbanic, 236 A.3d 1140 (Pa. Super. 2020)].

        On June 29, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition.
        Appointed counsel Diana Stavroulakis filed an amended PCRA
        petition on March 22, 2021. [The PCRA court] gave notice of
        intent to dismiss on October 8, 2021 and dismissed without a
        hearing on November 3, 2021. Appellant filed a [timely] notice
        of appeal on November 24, 2021,[1] and a [timely] concise
        statement of errors alleged on appeal on February 11, 2022.

____________________________________________

1 We note that Appellant filed multiple notices of appeal, one for each trial
court docket number. Each notice of appeal listed all nine trial court docket
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-A02022-23

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/25/22, 1-4 (footnote and superfluous capitalization

omitted) (footnote added).2

        Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:3

         1. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
            was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
            where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
            trial court’s order which limited and interfered with
            attorney/client contact while preparing for trial.

         2. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
            was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
            where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
            trial court’s order that [Appellant] would be shackled during
            the jury trial and forced to testify from counsel table.

         3. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
            was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
            where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pre-trial
            motion requesting an exception to the Rape Shield Law so
            that the defense could present evidence regarding Bonnie
            Kirsch making similar sex[ual] assault allegations against
            another individual which involved victim N.K., prior to this
            case.

         4. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
            was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
            where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to review and
            present medical records to establish that [Appellant] had a
            scar.

____________________________________________

numbers associated with the November 3, 2021 order. Accordingly, we deem
this appeal to be compliant with the decision of our Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), as interpreted by this
Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en
banc).

2This Court granted Appellant’s motion to consolidate appeals on January 4,
2022. Superior Court Order, 1/4/22, at 1.

3   We have reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of discussion and disposition.

                                           -6-
J-A02022-23

      5. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
         was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
         where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to include
         argument in the appellate brief on the issue that the trial
         court erred in denying the defense motion for a continuance.

      6. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
         was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
         where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on
         appeal that the trial court erred in denying [his] motion for
         recusal.

      7. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
         was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
         where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
         challenge the discretionary aspect[s] of [Appellant’s]
         sentence on appeal.

      8. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
         was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
         where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to include
         argument in the appellate brief on the issue that the trial
         court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s February 16,
         2018 motion to join three additional cases for trial.

      9. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
         was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
         where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on
         appeal that the trial court erred in denying the motion for
         severance of the cases.

     10. The PCRA court erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
         was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
         where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
         on direct appeal that the trial court erred by prohibiting the
         defense from questioning witness Travis Pagano regarding
         whether he was offered consideration in his own pending
         criminal matters in exchange for his testimony.

     11. The PCRA court erred in denying relief where the
        Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct by
        failing to reveal that prosecution witness Travis Pagano was
        offered consideration in his own pending criminal matters in

                                    -7-
J-A02022-23

            exchange      for   his   assistance,    constituting a   [Brady4]
            violation.

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9 (footnote added) (superfluous capitalization omitted).

        Our standard of review is as follows:

         Our review of a PCRA court's decision is limited to examining
         whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by the
         record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
         error. We view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence
         of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. With
         respect to the PCRA court's decision to deny a request for an
         evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing,
         such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and
         will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The PCRA
         court's credibility determinations, when supported by the
         record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo
         standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions[.]

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citations

omitted).

        To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

resulted    from   “one    or    more”    of   the   seven   specifically   enumerated

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily

enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in

the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

____________________________________________

4   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

                                           -8-
J-A02022-23

      “[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and [the appellant] bears the burden

of proving otherwise.”   Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa.

2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 796 (Pa. 2008).

To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, an appellant must establish:

       (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
       basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3)
       [appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error such
       that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
       proceeding would have been different absent such error.

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 373–374 (Pa. 2011), citing

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987).

       A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
       accurate, could establish cause for relief. See Commonwealth
       v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) (“if a petitioner raises
       allegations, which, even if accepted as true, do not establish the
       underlying claim ..., he or she will have failed to establish the
       arguable merit prong related to the claim”). Whether the facts
       rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.

       The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis
       for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would
       have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not
       chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of
       success. Counsel's decisions will be considered reasonable if
       they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a
       hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with other
       efforts he may have taken.

       Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
       but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
       been different.     A reasonable probability is a probability
       sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

                                      -9-
J-A02022-23

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some

quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

      In his first issue, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to the trial court’s orders, entered January 10, 2018 and March 6,

2018, limiting Appellant’s access to the telephone, internet, and other forms

of communication while he was committed to Torrance State Hospital.

Appellant’s Brief at 29-32. Specifically, Appellant claims that the trial court’s

orders violated his “right to counsel” because the orders “limit[ed]

[Appellant’s] ability to interact with his attorneys as they prepared for trial.”

Id. at 31. In this same vein, Appellant claims that the trial court’s March 6,

2018 order effectively “prevented privileged attorney-client communications

during the weeks leading up to [his] trial.” Id. Based upon the foregoing,

Appellant argues that “trial counsel had no reasonable basis not to object to

these orders” as they “prevented and interfered with [his] constitutional right

to counsel.” Id.

      The circumstances giving rise to the trial court’s January 10, 2018 and

March 6, 2018 orders are relevant to our review and are as follows. Appellant

was originally “charged with various sex offenses, some in October 2016 and

others in July 2017, relating to [the] sexual assaults of students at his karate

school.” Commonwealth v. Scherbanic, 2020 WL 2096417, *1 (Pa. Super.

2020). On July 29, 2016, Appellant was deemed competent for trial by the

Behavioral Clinic at the Allegheny County Jail. Appellant’s Motion for Behavior

                                      - 10 -
J-A02022-23

Clinic and Psychiatric Evaluation, 7/24/17, at *1 (unpaginated). Thereafter,

in June 2017, “the Commonwealth filed additional charges [against Appellant]

stemming from [his] alleged attempts, while in Allegheny County Jail, to

retaliate against the sexual assault victims, including solicitation to commit

homicide.” Scherbanic, 2020 WL 2096417 at *1

      On June 30, 2017, nearly a month after new charges were filed against

Appellant, his counsel filed a motion seeking court approval for an independent

mental health examination of Appellant because counsel believed he

demonstrated “possible emotional, psychiatric, or psychological issues and

would benefit from an independent examination.”        Appellant’s Motion for

Independent Psychiatric Evaluation, 6/30/17, at *1 (unpaginated).           In

particular, counsel sought approval to engage Dr. Alice Applegate to conduct

an examination, averring her services “would be appropriate for trial strategy

and planning, and in the event of sentencing, for mitigation purposes.” Id.

The trial court granted Appellant’s motion on July 6, 2017. Trial Court Order,

7/6/17, at 1. Then, on July 24, 2017, Appellant’s counsel filed another motion,

raising concerns regarding Appellant’s competency to stand trial based upon

Dr. Applegate’s evaluation.     Appellant’s Motion for Behavior Clinic and

Psychiatric Evaluation, 7/24/17, at *1-*2 (unpaginated). On August 23, 2017,

the trial court entered an order in which it determined that Appellant was not

competent to stand trial. Trial Court Order, 8/23/17, at 1. In addition, the

trial court ordered Appellant to undergo inpatient psychiatric/psychological

examination and treatment, committed Appellant to Torrance State Hospital

                                    - 11 -
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for said treatment, and stayed the matter for further disposition. Trial Court

Order, 8/23/17, at 1.

        It is not entirely clear from the current record the specific time Appellant

was committed to Torrance State Hospital.             Moreover, Appellant does not

specify the exact dates in his appellate brief. Nonetheless, on his previous

appeal, this Court indicated that Appellant “[was] at Torrance [State] Hospital

from Jan[uary] 4[, 2018] to March 14, 2018.” Scherbanic, 2020 WL 2096417

at *1. In that time, the trial court entered two orders. First, on January 10,

2018, the trial court directed that Appellant “have no access to telephone,

internet, or any other form of electronic or written communications with any

persons while committed to Torrance State Hospital.”              Trial Court Order,

1/10/18, at 1. In this same order, however, the trial court specifically stated

that Appellant’s attorney could visit him.          Id.   Then, “upon motion” from

Appellant’s    counsel,5    the   trial   court    amended   Appellant’s   “telephone

privileges” to, inter alia, permit his counsel to “contact [him] by telephone,

incoming call[s] only . . . once [] a week” but required “a member of Torrance

State Hospital [to] be present during the telephone call.” Trial Court Order,

3/6/18. Appellant was apparently released from the hospital on March 14,

____________________________________________

5   Counsel’s motion is not included in the certified record on appeal.

                                          - 12 -
J-A02022-23

2018, and subsequently deemed to be competent to stand trial.6 Appellant’s

trial commenced on April 9, 2018.

       Herein, Appellant’s claim fails for lack of prejudice. First, Appellant does

not engage in any discussion explaining what communications with his counsel

were prohibited during his commitment to Torrance State Hospital, how the

limitations imposed by the trial court impacted his ability to prepare for trial,

or how such communications, if permitted, would have altered the outcome

of his trial.   See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 833–834 (Pa.

2005) (explaining an appellant alleging ineffective assistance must show there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different). For this reason alone, Appellant is not

entitled to relief.     See id.     Second, it must be noted that Appellant is

essentially challenging the trial court’s decision to restrict his communication

with his attorney for a period of approximately three months while he was

undergoing treatment to determine whether he was competent to stand trial,

i.e. at a time when the court and counsel were trying to determine if Appellant

were “unable . . . to participate and assist in his defense.” 50 P.S. § 7402.

The irony of this position is further demonstrated by the fact that Appellant’s

counsel, himself, requested Appellant’s commitment. Hence, it is apparent
____________________________________________

6 It is not clear from the record before us when Appellant was determined to
be competent to stand trial. Nonetheless, as Appellant participated in a jury
trial from April 9, 2018 through April 16, 2018, it is apparent that Appellant
was deemed to be competent to stand trial. See Trial Court Order, 1/10/18,
at 1 and Trial Court Order 3/6/18, at 1. Thus, Appellant was able to
communicate with his attorney while being treated at Torrance State Hospital.

                                          - 13 -
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that the limited restrictions upon Appellant’s communication occurred after his

attorney concluded that evaluation was necessary to determine whether

Appellant could participate in his own defense.7            We therefore dismiss

Appellant’s claim.

       Appellant’s remaining issues generally set forth additional claims of

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. In particular, Appellant

argues that: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s

order that Appellant be shackled during trial and forced to testify from counsel

table (see Appellant’s Brief at 33-36); trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a pre-trial motion to request an exception to the Rape Shield Law to

enable Appellant to present testimony regarding a similar sexual assault

allegation made by a victim (see Appellant’s Brief at 44-46); trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to introduce Appellant’s medical records demonstrating

that he had a scar (see Appellant’s Brief at 59-60); appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to challenge the trial court’s orders denying Appellant’s

motion for a continuance and motion for recusal (see Appellant’s Brief at

37-43); appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the
____________________________________________

7 We also reiterate that the trial court’s order of January 10, 2018 provided
that Appellant’s counsel could visit him at Torrance State Hospital, and the
order of March 6, 2018 permitted counsel to call Appellant once a week so
long as a staff member of the hospital was present. See Trial Court Order,
1/10/18, at 1 and Trial Court Order, 3/3/18, at 1. Thus, Appellant was able
to communicate with his attorney while being treated at Torrance State
Hospital. Moreover, Appellant was apparently released from the hospital on
March 14, 2018, approximately 3½ weeks before trial commenced on April 9,
2018. Nothing in the record indicates, and Appellant does not argue, that he
was unable to communicate with counsel during this time.

                                          - 14 -
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discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence on appeal (see Appellant’s Brief

at 20-28); appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial

court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for severance, as well as the trial

court’s decision to grant the Commonwealth’s February 16, 2018 motion to

join three additional cases (see Appellant’s Brief at 47-49 and 56-58); and,

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s

decision to prohibit the questioning of a witness, Travis Pagano, regarding the

consideration he was allegedly offered in exchange for his testimony against

Appellant (see Appellant’s Brief at 53-55). Lastly, Appellant argues that the

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation. See Appellant’s Brief 50-52.

      We have carefully reviewed the certified record, the submissions of the

parties, the thorough opinion of the able PCRA court, and the pertinent case

law. Based upon our review, we conclude for the reasons expressed by the

PCRA court, Appellant is not entitled to relief on any of his remaining claims.

Moreover, as we find that the PCRA court has adequately and accurately

addressed the issues raised in this appeal, we adopt the PCRA court's opinion

as our own with respect to Appellant’s remaining issues.          Accordingly, the

parties are directed to attach a copy of the PCRA court's March 25, 2022

opinion to all future filings relating to our disposition in this appeal.

      Order affirmed.

                                      - 15 -
J-A02022-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/8/2023

                          - 16 -