Court Opinion

ID: 9379206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 23:02:20.078801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.591537
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/23 P. v. Ibarra-Pineda CA5
(unmodified opinion attached)

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                      F082413

                    v.                                                     (Super. Ct. No. 18CR-03306)

 JOSE JUAN IBARRA-PINEDA,                                              MODIFICATION OF OPINION
                                                                       AND DENIAL OF REHEARING
           Defendant and Appellant.                                    [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:
        It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 22, 2022, in the above
entitled matter, be modified as follows:

         1. On page 11, insert the following new paragraph after the quote ending
         with “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I just want to remind you of my rights, and I
         do not authorize this.”
         On January 22, 2020, during a trial readiness conference, the trial court addressed
defense counsel’s motion to continue the trial to a later date. During this hearing, the
following relevant exchange occurred.

                “THE COURT: [Ibarra-Pineda] is using the interpreter, if she could
         state her appearance.

               “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t authorize her, and she is not my
         lawyer.

         [¶] … [¶]
       “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would like another trial setting. Your
Honor, but I believe that it would take at least 60 days to do the
investigation and necessary research to be prepared, so I’m asking for a
minimum of 60 days.

       “[PROSECUTOR]: Because of the time issue, I don’t know if we
need to set a trial.

       “THE COURT: Yes, I would find good cause to continue the trial
because I know Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda] is objecting to [defense counsel]
representing him and objecting to the whole proceedings, so I think we
should probably set a date.

[Discussion regarding future dates.]

      “[PROSECUTOR]: For the questionnaires, could we do the
Thursday before on the 9th?

        “THE COURT: Let me just double-check. I think that’s probably
free.

         “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t authorize any of this. I’m opposed to
all of it.

        “THE COURT: I understand that, Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda].

[Discussion continues.]

        “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: May I interrupt, please?

       “THE COURT: Not at this point, Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda]. I understand
you’re objecting to all of this, you’ve made that clear, but [defense counsel]
is your attorney, and she’s your spokesperson when you’re in court, and if
we’re in trial and you keep speaking out, you could be removed from the
courtroom where you’re not going to be able to see the witnesses and just
[defense counsel] would be there, so I’m just warning you ahead of time
you need to cooperate with the court process and act appropriately in the
courtroom, and I am finding good cause for all of those dates to allow
[defense counsel] to prepare and get ready for trial.

        “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, just to make it clear, my
client again has refused to speak to me today.

        “THE COURT: I understand that.

                                       2.
            “Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda], again, it would be to your advantage to
     cooperate with [defense counsel]. She has to prepare your defense. You’re
     facing the possible life sentence, I believe, in this case, so anything in your
     defense you would need to tell her about so she can prepare. I’m not going
     to allow you represent yourself because you were not effective in doing that
     when I did allow it the last time.

            “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t need and I don’t accept it.

           “THE COURT: Okay. We’ll note you have that on the record.
     We’re done with his case now, then.”

     This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

     The petition for rehearing is denied.

                                                              SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, ACTING P. J.

PEÑA, J.

                                             3.
Filed 2/22/23 P. v. Ibarra-Pineda CA5 (unmodified opinion)

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F082413
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 18CR-03306)
                    v.

 JOSE JUAN IBARRA-PINEDA,                                                                 OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K.
Ash, Judge.
         Gordon S. Brownell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Kathryn
L. Althizer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
       A jury convicted defendant Jose Juan Ibarra-Pineda of seven counts of lewd and
lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a),
counts 1-7)1 and as to each count found true the special allegation Ibarra-Pineda had
violated section 288, subdivision (a) with multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)). As
to counts 1 through 7, the trial court sentenced Ibarra-Pineda to seven consecutive
sentences of 15 years to life, for a total aggregate term of 105 years to life. Prior to the
jury trial, Ibarra-Pineda indicated he wanted to represent himself, but refused to fill out a
Faretta2 form, did not answer the trial court’s questions, and argued the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over his case. The trial court subsequently denied the Faretta motion.
       On appeal, Ibarra-Pineda contends the trial court: (1) violated his Sixth
Amendment right to represent himself at trial; (2) abused its discretion when it imposed
consecutive sentences on all seven counts of conviction; and (3) incorrectly calculated
his total custody credits. As to this final argument, the People concede error.
       We conclude the trial court properly denied Ibarra-Pineda’s request to represent
himself because his refusal to answer the court’s questions made it impossible for the
court to find he had voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel, and it
unnecessarily disrupted the proceedings. Further, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it imposed seven consecutive sentences of 15 years to life
because it considered both aggravating and mitigating circumstances before making its
determination. Lastly, we accept the People’s concession, and remand for the trial court
to award defendant 1,107 presentencing custody credits, consisting of 963 days of actual
time served plus 144 days of conduct credit. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.

1      All further references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
2      Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).

                                              2.
                             STATEMENT OF THE CASE
       On October 10, 2018, the Merced County District Attorney filed an information
charging Ibarra-Pineda with seven counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288,
subd. (a), counts 1-7). Each count contained a special allegation Ibarra-Pineda had
violated section 288, subdivision (a), with multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)).
       As to all counts, Ibarra-Pineda pleaded not guilty and denied all allegations. On
July 29, 2019, Ibarra-Pineda made a Faretta motion to represent himself. Subsequently,
on August 12, 2019, the trial court denied Ibarra-Pineda’s motion.
       On December 11, 2020, the jury found Ibarra-Pineda guilty as charged. On
February 19, 2021, the trial court then sentenced him to 15 years to life on all seven
counts to run consecutive to count 1 for a total aggregate sentence of 105 years to life.
On that same day, Ibarra-Pineda filed a timely appeal.
                                      DISCUSSION3

I.     The Trial Court Correctly Denied Ibarra-Pineda’s Faretta Motion
       Ibarra-Pineda contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation by denying his Faretta motion, and specifically requests this court reverse
and remand this matter for a new trial. We disagree.
       A.     Additional Factual Background
       On July 29, 2019, Ibarra-Pineda indicated to the trial court he wanted to relieve his
attorney of record and represent himself. The trial court informed Ibarra-Pineda he
needed to complete a Faretta waiver form. Specifically, the trial court stated:

       “If you want to represent yourself there is a form you’ll need to fill out. It
       is in English so you will have to have the [i]nterpreter to go over the form.
       It’s just to make sure you understand all the consequences of representing

3      The underlying facts of the case are irrelevant to our resolution of the issues
presented on appeal. We therefore will not summarize the facts in this opinion.

                                             3.
      yourself. It’s usually not advised to represent yourself, but you certainly
      have that right.

              “So we are going to have you go over this form first because I would
      not let you represent yourself if I did not think you were capable of doing
      so. Have a seat and we’ll have you go over the form and then I will recall
      the matter.”
The trial court provided Ibarra-Pineda two weeks to review the Faretta waiver form and
set the matter over until August 12, 2019.
      On August 12, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Ibarra-Pineda’s Faretta
motion. The relevant exchange between the trial court and Ibarra-Pineda was as follows:

                “THE COURT: Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda], did you fill out or go over
      the Faretta waiver form?

                  “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I did look it through.

                  “THE COURT: Okay. Are you still wanting to represent
      yourself?

                  “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I sure do.

                “THE COURT: Okay. And did you understand what would be
      required of you if you represent yourself? It was all listed on the form.

                 “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Well, since it’s not something that is –
      that I have to turn in as an obligation then I decided not to turn it in.

                  “THE COURT: I won’t make you initial it, but I do need to go
      over everything with you on the record. So you do understand you do have
      the right to an attorney, if you can’t afford one I’ll appoint one for you; you
      understand that?

                “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I would just like to clarify something for
      you. I have the jurisdiction so, therefore, I think that it’s – I’m in my
      complete right not to be questioned.

                 “THE COURT: Well, that’s not correct. I do have jurisdiction.
      This is a criminal complaint that was filed in Merced County alleging the
      crime was committed in Merced County. I did see you filed a motion based
      on jurisdiction.

      “[¶] … [¶]

                                             4.
                  “THE COURT: So, Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda], if you want to represent
       yourself, you’re going to have to be able to answer questions from the
       Court. Are you saying you’re not willing to do that or you don’t
       understand that?

                 “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: No. My right is to remain silent and I
       would like to do that.

                 “THE COURT: Okay. If you want to remain silent then I will
       appoint an attorney for you to represent you because you cannot effectively
       represent yourself at this point. So I will refer it to the Public Defender’s
       office.”
The trial court then denied Ibarra-Pineda’s Faretta motion.
       On August 21, 2019, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to Ibarra-Pineda’s
competency and requested a doctor be appointed to evaluate him. The trial court
suspended criminal proceedings pursuant to section 1368 and referred the matter to a
doctor for a report and recommendation. Ibarra-Pineda responded, “I don’t need a
doctor, and I’m resigning to the services of the public defender. I don’t need her.”
       On September 23, 2019, defense counsel informed the trial court Ibarra-Pineda
“won’t speak to me, and he states he has filed papers with the Court relieving me. He
doesn’t want me to represent him, and he will not speak to me.” Based on defense
counsel’s representations, the trial court held a Marsden4 hearing. The relevant exchange
during the Marsden hearing is as follows:

              “THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda], your attorney has
       said that you refuse to talk to her, and you’re wanting to be represented by a
       different attorney.

              “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: No.

              “THE COURT: If you want that, you would have to tell me why.

             “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe he wants to represent himself,
       Your Honor.

4      People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

                                             5.
       “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Okay. Before anything else, good morning.
I – I want to go pro per. I do not need any representative. The
documentation that has been arriving, paperwork, it explains
comprehensively the whole situation.

        “The – the other more important issue to be able to continue to
pursue what you intend to pursue, I’m requesting kindly the proof be
presented at this ‘administrative agency,’ quote, and – at the administrative
agency because this is – this is jurisdictional. I do not belong to this
jurisdiction.

       “With all due respect, I am trying to say kindly I sent a document to
the representative that was appointed to me to relieve this person without
even having hired this person, but this person refuses to abide by my
petition or request.

       “I am a man of sound mind; clear mind as well. If you have some
records of me in the area that states that I was not a person of a – of – of a
dirty mind or of a mental issue.

       “I had in the previous area a license as a handyman; a license as a
truck driver, semis; I was a construction foreman for many years, which
does not credit at all that I am an insane person as is trying to be purported
here.

       “THE COURT: Okay. Let me just stop you right there, Mr. [Ibarra-
Pineda]. I came back here because your attorney had represented that you
had represented that you no longer want her to represent you. I understand
the issues that you’re raising, but at this point, um, when previously I
granted your request to represent yourself, I formed the opinion I didn’t
think you could do so competently without counsel, so that’s why I
appointed counsel for you.

      “The only issue before the Court right now is whether or not you are
competent to understand the proceedings, so that’s why we appointed the
doctor. It will be up for him to come to talk with you, he’ll give us an
opinion, and then we can decide how to go forward.

       “If you want to contest it if it was unfavorable, you can contest it, but
at this point I’m not going to grant your request to represent yourself or to
relieve [defense counsel], and I realize you don’t agree with that decision,
but at this point I don’t have the belief that you would be able to
competently and effectively represent yourself without counsel, that you
need counsel, so I’m going to leave [defense counsel] as your attorney.

                                       6.
             “We can go back out and set the future date, and I think I’ll have to
       contact [the doctor] for him to make another effort to talk to Mr. [Ibarra-
       Pineda].”
The trial court denied both Ibarra-Pineda’s request that his counsel be relieved and the
Marsden motion.
       Following the Marsden hearing, the trial court, due to a discrepancy in the records
of Ibarra-Pineda’s last name, asked Ibarra-Pineda his true name. The relevant exchange
was as follows:

               “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Once again, good morning. My name
       you’ve already had for sometime now. My previous attorney confirmed
       this, and you took note of it correctly at the time.

             “THE COURT: So your correct name is – I’m trying to think
       because we don’t have the Minute Order – Jose Juan Ibarra-Pineda?

              “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: It’s the same one on – as is what is stated on
       the caption.

              “THE COURT: Because the jail has it Ibarra, and the one that’s
       stated on the Complaint does not have the Ibarra.

              “Now, if you’ve sent letters to the Court, I don’t see those letters
       because that would be improper communication, so I don’t know what
       caption you’re referring to.

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Well, once again, I will represent myself.
       You have all of that information already.

              “THE COURT: Okay. I don’t have anything showing Ibarra, but
       we’ll note on the Minute Order, then, that he may also go by Ibarra-Pineda,
       and we’ll refer it to [the doctor] for him to contact [Ibarra-Pineda], and just
       let him know that it should be under maybe Ibarra-Pineda. I would still
       think they would be able to locate him there.”
       On October 22, 2019, the trial court noted it had received a report from the doctor,
but “indicate[d] [Ibarra-Pineda] refused to speak with [the doctor], and so the doctor is
requesting a re-referral, so I don’t know how counsel wanted to proceed.” The following
relevant exchange occurred between the trial court, defense counsel, and Ibarra-Pineda:

                                             7.
      “THE COURT: Yes, no, I remember, and Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda]
would not respond to the Court, and I just felt he was not able to represent
himself, and so that’s why I referred it under [section] 1368.

        “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand –

        “THE COURT: So at this point –

       “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand the Court’s position. Just so
that I’m clear, what I thought might be beneficial is if [the doctor] was able
to speak to [Ibarra-Pineda], that he would be able to determine not only his
mental competency as far as [section] 1368, but he might be able to help
[Ibarra-Pineda] understand what the Court is looking for as far as his
competency to represent himself in court, because at this point, [Ibarra-
Pineda] has continued to assert that he doesn’t want the services of the
public defender, and he wants to represent himself.

       “I don’t know if it’s required that he answer the specific Faretta
questionnaire in order to represent himself, but –

        “THE COURT: No, it wasn’t that. It was just even in court when
I’d ask him things about the case – because I think he did represent himself
for a short while – and he would not answer me, and he said he wanted to
assert his Fifth Amendment right, and so then at that point, how’s he going
to represent himself?

       “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand, Your Honor. I think at this
point he does want to make a statement. I don’t know what that statement
is because he won’t speak to me, so I would caution him as to what that
statement is, but he does have some right to speak.

        “THE COURT: Yes, no, if he wants to make a statement, he can do
that.

        “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Good morning, Your Honor. I just want to
remind you as the Court and the DA’s office of the evidence and what’s in
the official record from the administrative agency so that it could be
analyzed. Please, if that can be done, because you have jurisdiction over
the subject and the material and that has been stated. That’s all. Thank
you.

      “THE COURT: Okay. And I’ve already ruled on these particular
statements before.

                                      8.
              “So, Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda], I understand you have these – this point of
       view and that you probably – I’m assuming you’re wanting to represent
       yourself at some point, but unless I get something from a doctor saying
       you’re able to, I won’t grant that, so you really need to talk to [the doctor] if
       you want to move your case forward, and I know you probably are not
       going to listen to anything that I’m saying, but that’s my concern.

              “You can represent yourself, but I have to make sure you’re able to
       do so effectively, and when the Court is – if you did represent yourself,
       when the Court was speaking with you, that you can respond, or if you’re in
       front of a jury, you can present your defense. That’s all I’m looking for.

               “So I’m going to give [the doctor] one more chance to come out and
       speak with you, and I would strongly encourage you to speak with him, but
       it is your choice, but I just want to make it clear to you, so I’m not relieving
       the public defender at this point.”

       “[¶] … [¶]

              “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t need the doctor.

              “THE COURT: Okay, but I need the doctor. I need the doctor to
       talk with you; otherwise, I’m not confident – I don’t believe you can
       represent yourself. He has talked to people before, and after he talked to
       them, they were allowed to represent themselves.

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I’ve reserved all of my rights under UCC
       1308 without prejudice.

              “THE COURT: Okay. We have that on the record.

              “And I’ll refer it one more time to [the doctor].”
       Subsequently, in the section 1368 report, the doctor stated defendant “refused to
come to the interview room for this evaluation” and “reiterated his refusal to participate.”
The “[r]esults of [Ibarra-Pineda’s] evaluation suggested the absence of a psychological,
neurological, developmental, or substance abuse disorder” and that his “appearance
during this brief face-to-face interview were all suggestive of the absence of a DSM-5
diagnosis contributing to his decision to represent himself in court or refuse to participate
in this evaluation.” On December 18, 2019, both parties submitted on the section 1368
report and the trial court concluded defendant was competent to stand trial and reinstated

                                              9.
criminal proceedings. As it related to Ibarra-Pineda’s representation, the following
relevant exchange occurred:

             “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, Your Honor, just continuing –

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t consent to that.

             “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: - my client is not agreeing to my
      representation. I understand the Court’s position, and I’m willing to
      proceed as much as he will allow me to. It’s very difficult; in that, he will
      not speak to me to prepare a defense in this case.

             “THE COURT: Yes, but he’s really not able to represent himself
      either. Just based upon the fact that he wouldn’t respond to the Court, I
      don’t think how he could be effective counsel for himself, so I don’t know
      how else to proceed at this point.

             “[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, my understanding is that at this
      point – I mean, the defendant can’t represent himself. He’s not cooperating
      with the court process, but he’s also not allowed to stonewall it and
      completely halt the proceedings of his own volition.

              “He’s been found competent. The Court’s appointed the public
      defender’s office. [Defense counsel] has been assigned. That, at this point,
      I think the Court should, you know, proceed without [Ibarra-Pineda ]. If he
      doesn’t want to cooperate in his own defense, he’s willfully harming his
      own case, and that it’s not something that – if everybody started doing this,
      then we would never get any cases anywhere.

            “He can’t completely block the proceedings from going on if he’s
      voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently creating these problems himself.

             “THE COURT: No, I don’t disagree. I agree that we need to move
      the case forward.

      [¶] … [¶]

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Your honor, may I speak?

             “THE COURT: No. You’re represented by an attorney.

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I do not authorize this. Also, on the DA, if
      she can go ahead and present any documentation that proves that I am the
      person – the person who is guilty.

                                           10.
              “THE COURT: Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda], at this point you’ve already
       raised those issues before. I’ve already ruled on them, so we’ll go ahead
       and set a trial date.

       “[Discussion regarding trial dates.]

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I do not authorize to that. You don’t have
       my consent for that.

       “[Discussion continues.]

              “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I just want to remind you of my rights, and I
       do not authorize this.”
       On April 23, 2020, pursuant a statewide emergency order, the trial court continued
the jury trial. During this hearing, the following relevant exchange occurred:

              “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t authorize any of the proceedings.
       You do not have jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is mine. That is what I told
       you the last time.

                “THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda].

       “[¶] … [¶]

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: So, Your Honor, I just – Your Honor, I just
       wanted to remind you that I have – I have reserved my rights according to
       UCC 1308.

       “[¶] … [¶]

                “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: May I speak?

                “THE COURT: [Defense Counsel], do you want your client to
       speak?

              “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I don’t have a representative. I have no one
       representing me. She’s already been sent a note to fire her, and she has not
       responded and nothing’s been done.

                “THE COURT: Okay. All right.

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And, Your Honor, can I just briefly make
       the record clear that Mr. [Ibarra-Pineda] has never requested counsel. He

                                              11.
      wanted to represent himself. I believe there was a refusal to answer the
      Faretta questions.

             “He has –

            “THE COURT: [Defense Counsel], you have to slow down.
      Because everything you’re stating needs to be interpreted.

             “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m sorry. I apologize. I forgot that. All
      right. Go ahead.

      “[¶] … [¶]

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Your Honor, I would like to please ask the
      District Attorney’s office to present proof of jurisdiction.… Because
      without jurisdiction, there is nothing.

            “And, also, please, this lady lawyer has already been sent a letter of
      termination, and she hasn’t agreed. And that is a conspiracy against me.

           “THE COURT: Okay. Your objections are noted, Mr. [Ibarra-
      Pineda].”
      On May 26, 2020, the jury trial was continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The following relevant exchange occurred:

           “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: That the DA present, tell the judge jury trial
      evidence. That’s what I want.

           “THE COURT: Okay. But just so we can do something today – it’s
      not your trial today, will you appear by video?

      “[¶] … [¶]

            “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: To tell the DA to present evidence of
      jurisdiction. Say that it the judge.”
      On July 7, 2020, the jury trial was again continued due to the COVID-19
pandemic. The following relevant exchange occurred:

             “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: I want to say something.

             “THE COURT: What was it regarding?

                                            12.
                 “[IBARRA-PINEDA]: Good morning. I don’t have a lawyer to
       represent me. I don’t have any lawyer. And you can’t proceed with any –
       anything to do with the trial because you do not have jurisdiction.”

                 “THE COURT: Okay. I have noted that objection before and
       I’ve overruled it. So we’ll note it for the record.”
       On November 19, 2020, the jury trial proceeded with defense counsel representing
Ibarra-Pineda.
       B.      Applicable Law
       In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court considered “whether a State may
constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him,
even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” (Faretta, supra, 422
U.S. at p. 807.) The high court concluded, “The language and spirit of the Sixth
Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the
Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant – not an organ of the State interposed
between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.” (Id. at p.
820.) “An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through a tenuous and
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the
defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very
real sense, it is not his defense.” (Id. at p. 821.)
       The high court acknowledged “that in most criminal prosecutions defendants
could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.”
(Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834.) But “[t]he defendant, and not his lawyer or the
State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore,
who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his
advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own
detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law.’ ” (Ibid.)

                                               13.
       “The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only
whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant’s conduct and
other words. Because the court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of
the right to counsel, the defendant’s conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-
representation may support the court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion. A
motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent
motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of
justice may be denied.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23 (Marshall); see
People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1002 [“Equivocation of the right of
self-representation may occur where the defendant tries to manipulate the proceedings by
switching between requests for counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions
are the product of whim or frustration.”].)
       “A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is required before a
criminal defendant is allowed to represent himself.” (People v. Miranda (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 978, 984 (Miranda).) A defendant seeking to represent himself “should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record
will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ”
(Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) “No particular form of words is required in
admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation,”
rather, “the test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant
understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities
of the particular case.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070.) Erroneous
denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se (People v. Carlisle (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
1382, 1390), and we review de novo, and after a review of the entire record, the question
of whether the defendant’s invocation of the right to self-representation and waiver of the
right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 23-24.)
However, in certain circumstances, the denial of a Faretta motion is within the discretion

                                              14.
of the trial court and reviewed for abuse of discretion, as when a defendant is so
disruptive, disrespectful, or obstructionist in his actions as to preclude the exercise of
self-representation. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 735 (Welch).)
       C.     Analysis
       Ibarra-Pineda contends: (1) he made a timely, unequivocal, and persistent demand
to represent himself at trial; (2) he was competent to make that choice; and (3) the trial
court wrongfully denied his constitutional right to self-representation requiring reversal.
Although Ibarra-Pineda made an initial, timely demand to represent himself at trial, we
conclude the trial court properly denied his request because there is no indication Ibarra-
Pineda understood the consequences of self-representation, his actions and words
demonstrated his unwillingness to cooperate in the trial process, and he never made an
unequivocal request to represent himself after his competency determination.
       The trial court properly denied Ibarra-Pineda’s requests for self-representation.
First, there is nothing in the record to indicate Ibarra-Pineda voluntarily waived his right
to counsel and understood the significance and consequences of his decision to represent
himself. (Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) The trial court attempted to make
Ibarra-Pineda aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and
determine whether he understood the consequences of his request by providing him with
the Faretta form. At the subsequent Faretta hearing, the trial court asked Ibarra-Pineda
if he had completed the form and Ibarra-Pineda stated, “I have the jurisdiction so,
therefore, I think that it’s – I’m in my complete right not to be questioned.” The trial
court responded, “[I]f you want to represent yourself, you’re going to have to be able to
answer questions from the Court” and defendant replied, “No. My right is to remain
silent and I would like to do that.” The trial court subsequently denied the Faretta
motion. Ibarra-Pineda’s refusal to answer the trial court’s questions made it impossible
for the court to determine whether he fully understood the consequences of representing
himself.

                                             15.
       Further, after the section 1368 report, wherein the doctor indicated Ibarra-Pineda
was competent to stand trial, defense counsel indicated that Ibarra-Pineda wanted to
represent himself. However, Ibarra-Pineda never spoke up to make this request on the
record. Additionally, during the subsequent proceedings leading up to his trial date,
Ibarra-Pineda did not invoke his right to represent himself, but rather continued to
reiterate his misplaced belief the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case. Although
Ibarra-Pineda made that initial Faretta request, he never reiterated his desire to represent
himself after it was determined he was competent to stand trial. (See People v. Kenner
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 56, 62 [“Defendants who sincerely seek to represent themselves
have a responsibility to speak up. [W]e believe it is reasonable to require the defendant
who wants to take on the task of self-representation to remind the court of the pending
motion.”].) Accordingly, the trial court properly appointed counsel for Ibarra-Pineda
because he never made an unequivocal request to represent himself after it was
determined he was competent to stand trial and thus, it was impossible for the court to
determine whether his initial waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. (See
Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 171-172.)
       Ibarra-Pineda relies heavily on People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747 (Best) in
support of his contention; however, Best is distinguishable. The First District, Division 4,
concluded the trial court erred in denying the defendant the right to represent herself
because the “[d]efendant had been found competent to stand trial, and … [t]here is no
indication she suffered from severe mental illness to the point she was not competent to
conduct trial proceedings on her own.” (Id. at p. 760.) “Her invocation of the right to
self-representation was unambiguous, and the record indicates it was knowing and
voluntary. She filled out the Faretta waiver form and, at the hearing on the Faretta
motion, said she understood the rights she was giving up and the risk and disadvantages
of representing herself.” (Ibid.) Unlike in Best, Ibarra-Pineda refused to both fill out the
Faretta form and answer the trial court’s questions regarding self-representation.

                                             16.
Therefore, there was no indication Ibarra-Pineda “understood the rights [he] was giving
up and the risks and disadvantages of representing [himself].” (Ibid.) By refusing to
answer the trial court’s questions, Ibarra-Pineda placed the court between a proverbial
rock and a hard place. Ibarra-Pineda argues the trial court committed reversible error by
denying his request to represent himself; however, it would have been error for the court
to grant Ibarra-Pineda’s request to represent himself without a voluntary waiver of his
right to counsel. (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 20 [holding that because the right to
counsel is self-executing and persists unless the defendant waives the right, the court
must indulge every reasonable inference against such a waiver]; see also People v. Bush
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 475 [an inadequate Faretta admonishment is reviewed under
the “Chapman[5] harmless error standard”) The trial court properly denied Ibarra-
Pineda’s motion for self-representation because he did not voluntarily waive his right to
counsel and failed to cooperate with the court’s questioning regarding his ability to
represent himself.
       Additionally, Ibarra-Pineda’s unwillingness to answer the trial court’s questions
unnecessarily disrupted and delayed the proceedings. As our Supreme Court has stated,
“ ‘The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.
Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive
law.’ ” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 734 [further noting, “ ‘an accused has a Sixth
Amendment right to conduct his own defense, provided only that … he is able and
willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol’ ” (italics omitted)].)
“This rule is obviously critical to the viable functioning of the courtroom. A constantly
disruptive defendant who represents himself, and who therefore cannot be removed from
the trial proceedings as a sanction against disruption, would have the capacity to bring his
trial to a standstill.” (Ibid.) Faretta “did not establish a game in which [a] defendant can

5      Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).

                                             17.
engage in a series of machinations, with one misstep by the court resulting in reversal of
an otherwise fair trial.” (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 115 (Clark), abrogated on
other grounds in People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 704-705.)
       “[A] trial court must undertake the task of deciding whether a defendant is and
will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his
or her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to self-representation. The
trial court possesses much discretion when it comes to terminating a defendant’s right to
self-representation and the exercise of that discretion ‘will not be disturbed in the absence
of a strong showing of clear abuse.’ ” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) A record on
appeal is often “cold,” and it is “the trial court … that … is in the best position to judge
[a] defendant’s demeanor.” (Ibid.)
       For example, in Welch, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of self-representation
where the defendant “interrupted the trial court several times to argue what the court had
declared to be a nonmeritorious point; he accused the court of misleading him; he refused
to allow the court to speak and he refused several times to follow the court’s
admonishment of silence.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) This conduct,
“amount[ed] to a reasonable basis for the trial court’s conclusion that [the] defendant
could not or would not conform his conduct to the rules of procedure and courtroom
protocol, and that his self-representation would be unacceptably disruptive.” (Ibid.)
       Additionally, in Clark, the court reached the same conclusion where the defendant
“apparently became disgruntled with the court’s ruling. In front of the jury, he suddenly
stated an intent to stand mute. This statement was clearly not motivated by the sincere
desire to withhold a defense; it was instead an attempt to either inject error into the case,
or to pressure the court into reconsidering its earlier rulings, or, most likely, both. It was
merely one of a series of attempts to manipulate or coerce the trial court,” such as
engaging in “rambling discourse” and “ ‘frivolous’ ” motions. (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at

                                              18.
pp. 113-115.) The defendant’s conduct was “sufficiently disruptive to warrant
termination of his self-representation.” (Id. at p. 115.)
       Here, although Ibarra-Pineda’s conduct did not rise to the level of disruptiveness
displayed in both Welch and Clark, his uncooperative behavior made it unduly
burdensome for the court to move the case forward. Ibarra-Pineda refused to cooperate
with both the trial court and the doctor who performed his section 1368 evaluation.
Ibarra-Pineda routinely reargued and rehashed “nonmeritorious point[s,]” (Welch, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 735) concerning fanciful jurisdictional defects and irrelevant legal
principles. He repeatedly would not give straight answers to the trial court’s questions,
forcing the trial court to go in circles with Ibarra-Pineda to obtain the most basic
information. For example, when the trial court attempted to clarify Ibarra-Pineda’s legal
name, he refused to provide this basic information and told the trial court, “You have all
of that information already.” Therefore, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude
“defendant could not or would not conform his conduct to the rules of procedure and
courtroom protocol, and that his self-representation would be unacceptably disruptive”
and the court’s decision to appoint counsel for defendant ensured the “viable functioning
of the courtroom.” (Welch, at p. 734.)
       Nonetheless, Ibarra-Pineda contends the trial court erred when it denied his
Faretta motion based on his inability to represent himself, and not his disruptiveness to
the trial proceedings, which may have been a proper basis for the denial. However, as
our Supreme Court stated, “Even [assuming] the trial court denied the request for an
improper reason, if the record as a whole establishes defendant’s request was nonetheless
properly denied on other grounds, we would uphold the trial court’s ruling.” (People v.
Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218; cf., Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 763 [“Because the
trial court did not deny [the] defendant’s Faretta motion on grounds of disruptiveness, we
cannot here uphold the trial court’s ruling on this alternate ground.”].) As noted above,
the trial court properly denied Ibarra-Pineda’s Faretta motion because the record is clear

                                             19.
Ibarra-Pineda did not cooperate with the Faretta procedures and refused to answer the
court’s questions regarding his self-representation, thereby making it impossible for the
court determine whether Ibarra-Pineda fully understood the consequences of a possible
waiver of counsel.

II.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Imposing Consecutive
       Sentences on All Seven Counts Because It Properly Weighed All Relevant
       Factors
       Ibarra-Pineda further contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
seven, rather than three, consecutive life terms because the court failed to properly
consider his lack of a criminal record as a mitigating factor. We again disagree.
       A.     Additional Factual Background
       As to each of the seven counts, the trial court sentenced Ibarra-Pineda to seven
consecutive terms of 15 years to life, for a total aggregate term of 105 years to life. Prior
to sentencing, the following relevant exchange between the trial court, defense counsel,
and the prosecutor occurred:

               “THE COURT: … And then I just wanted to – um, my tentative
       ruling would be, obviously, he’s not eligible for probation and that’s
       pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 667.61[, subdivision](h). And also, I
       believe that each sentence would need to run fully consecutive because it
       does involve separate victims or single victims on separate occasions. And
       that’s per Penal Code [s]ection 667.61[, subdivision](h) as well.

              “So, by my calculations, the mandatory sentence by law would be
       105 years to life if I ran each 15 to life consecutive, but I’ll certainly listen
       to arguments from counsel.

       “[¶] … [¶]

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your honor, I just would like the Court
       to take into consideration the lack of criminal record, that my client has not
       so much as had any traffic violations. Um, if you looked in the police – in
       the report of the Probation Department, he has no history via CLETS or
       FBI record; not any record whatsoever. I would like the Court to take that
       into consideration when applying the sentence.

                                              20.
       “And I would be asking that the Court sentence the 15 to life for
each – each complaining witness. And I would be asking for instead 45
years to life.

“[¶] … [¶]

       “[PROSECUTOR]: I think that the Court – so the Court can
exercise its discretion in determining whether to run them consecutively or
concurrently. Um, I – I do feel that the Court should run them
consecutively. I think that with having three separate victims on multiple
occasions, spanning multiple generations would warrant the Court to run
them consecutively. I also do think that he took advantage of a vulnerable
victim that was entrusted for child care to his wife; that he took advantage
of a position of trust. And I do think that that would be appropriate.

       “I just wanted the record to be clear, though, in the Court sentencing
him.

       “THE COURT: Thank you.

       “And I was going to go over the circumstances in aggravation and
mitigation even though he’s not eligible for probation. I still think we
should make a record of that.

      “So as far as circumstances in aggravation: I would agree Rule 421,
subdivision (3) would apply. The victim was particularly vulnerable. They
were young girls.

        “I would find eight applies. The manner in which the crime is
carried out indicates planning, sophistication, or professional. He took
advantage of them when they were at his wife’s home for child care. And
had them go upstairs and get a blanket, or different things occurred that
looks like he was planning to do. I remember there was one thing during a
ride to a birthday party that something occurred. So I think that does show
planning. And he did take advantage of a position of trust or confidence
given his relationship to the victims, and the fact they were placed in his
home for their child care.

       “There is no circumstances in aggravation regarding the [Ibarra-
Pineda]. I would agree he has no prior record. And, so, in mitigation, I
would find Rule 423 [subdivision] (b)(1) does apply, that he has no prior
record.

       “And then regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences, I would
have to agree. I would still run it consecutive even knowing that I do have

                                     21.
the discretion. And I thought about this when I was initially reviewing the
trial, and some of the testimony at trial. Um, Counts 1, 2, and 3 all pertain
to Confidential Victim Number 1, who was the young victim who testified.
She testified that he touched her, um, several times in her chest – chest,
middle area, and butt area under her clothes more than one time since first
grade.

        “And then she recalled a specific last time was in third grade. Um,
so I think those are three separate occasions. And the fact there was more
than one victim spanning over a length of years, this was occurring that
[Ibarra-Pineda] was preying on these children, I think that would justify
consecutive sentencing.

       “And then as far as Counts 3 and 4, those pertain as to [E.T.].

        “[PROSECUTOR]: I’m sorry for interrupting the Court. The Court
just said 3 and 4. I believe it’s 4 and 5.

      “THE COURT: Oh, I’m sorry. I typed this. I have too many
mistakes. Thank you. You’re right, its 4 and 5.

        “As to Counts 4 and 5, regarding [E.T.], she recounted two specific
incidences: The time she went upstairs for a blanket and [Ibarra-Pineda]
came up behind her and pushed against her, moving her up and down. And
she felt his penis rubbing against her vagina.

        “And then Count 5 was another time. After the first time, it’s
alleged in the Information at her brother’s birthday party, he touched her
leg, and then her vagina with his hand, and did some kissing that day as
well. So those were clearly separate incidences. So I think that would
justify consecutive sentences.

        “And as to Count 6 and 7, those are as to [Y.I.]. She recounted the
first time, um, lying on the blankets and he rubbed her vaginal area with
lotion using his hands.

       “Then Count 7 was in the other time. She testified that he kissed her
mouth and her – his tongue was in her mouth. And then she did recall two
or three other incidents, no details.

        “So he basically was preying on these girls and it was over a period
of time that this continued, that he felt he could take advantage of them this
way. So I think his behavior is very reprehensible and heinous and does
justify consecutive sentencing.

                                     22.
              “So even – so I am going to order that probation would be denied.
       And it’s my understanding I would not have discretion to order it, but if I
       did have discretion, I would still not grant probation given the
       circumstances of this offense. And I am going to run each of the counts
       consecutive for the reasons that I just stated.

              “So if we could try to have [Ibarra-Pineda] come out, I’ll go over the
       actual sentencing with him.”
       B.     Applicable Law
       Ibarra-Pineda was convicted of seven counts of violating section 288, subdivision
(a), which does not mandate consecutive sentences. (§ 667.61, subd. (i).) However,
under section 669, a trial court has discretion to determine whether to impose sentences
consecutively or concurrently. (People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 655 [“Whenever a
person is convicted of two or more crimes, the court must impose either concurrent or
consecutive sentences. (§ 669.)”].) The trial court considers the following factors in
deciding whether to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences:

       “(a) Facts relating to crimes[.] [¶] Facts relating to the crimes, including
       whether or not:

       “(1) The crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of
       each other;

       “(2) The crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; or

       “(3) The crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather
       than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single
       period of aberrant behavior.

       “(b) Other facts and limitations[.] [¶] Any circumstances in aggravation or
       mitigation, whether or not the factors have been stipulated to by the
       defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the
       judge in a court trial, may be considered in deciding whether to impose
       consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, except:

       “(1) A fact used to impose the upper term;

       “(2) A fact used to otherwise enhance the defendant’s sentence in prison or
       county jail under section 1170[subdivision](h); and

                                            23.
       “(3) A fact that is an element of the crime.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
       4.425(a), (b).)6
       Rule 4.421 states, “Circumstances in aggravation include factors relating to the
crime and factors relating to the defendant.” (Rule 4.421.) As it specifically relates to
the underlying offense, factors in aggravation include when “[t]he victim was particularly
vulnerable,” (id. at (3)), “[t]he manner in which the crime was carried out indicate[d]
planning, sophistication, or professionalism,” (id. at (8)) and “defendant took advantage
of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense.” (Id. at (11).)
       Rule 4.423 states, “Circumstances in mitigation include factors relating to the
crime and factors relating to the defendant.” (Rule 4.423.) One mitigating factor
includes when “[t]he defendant has no prior record, or has an insignificant record of
criminal conduct, considering the recency and frequency of prior crimes.” (Id. at (b)(1).)
       “A trial court’s sentencing decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512.) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion,
we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’
[Citations.] Second, a ‘ “decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people
might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting
its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ [Citations.] Taken together, these
precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.)

6      All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                              24.
       C.     Analysis
       Ibarra-Pineda concedes, “all three of the [rule 4.425] subdivision (a) factors point
toward imposition of consecutive terms” and the trial court found three circumstances in
aggravation under rule 4.421(a)(3), (8), and (11). Notwithstanding these aggravating
factors, defendant contends, “an important mitigating factor applicable to this case was
that the ‘defendant has no prior record, or has an insignificant record of criminal conduct,
considering the recency and frequency of prior crimes.’ ” Specifically, Ibarra-Pineda
argues the trial court abused its discretion because it “gave little weight, if any, to the fact
that this was [his] first criminal offense.” We disagree. The trial court properly
considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors before imposing consecutive
sentences as to all seven counts.
       As to the aggravating factors, the trial court stated under rule 4.421(a)(3), “[t]he
victim was particularly vulnerable. They were young girls.” Next, as to rule 4.421(a)(8),
the trial court concluded “[t]he manner in which the crime [was] carried out indicat[ed]
planning, sophistication, or professional[ism]” because defendant “took advantage of
them when they were at his wife’s home for child care,” he “had them go upstairs and get
a blanket, or different things occurred that looks like he was planning to do,” along with
another incident occurring “during a ride to a birthday party.”
       The trial court then found a single factor in mitigation under rule 4.423(b)(1).
Specifically, the trial court stated, “There is no circumstances in aggravation regarding
the defendant. I would agree he has no prior record. And, so, in mitigation, I would find
Rule 423(b)(1) does apply, that he has no prior record.” However, the trial court
continued and proceeded to detail the following specific facts regarding each victim and
count and concluded:

              “So [Ibarra-Pineda] basically was preying on these girls and it was
       over a period of time that this continued, that he felt he could take
       advantage of them this way. So I think his behavior is very reprehensible
       and heinous and does justify consecutive sentencing.”

                                              25.
       The trial court did not “g[i]ve little weight, if any, to the fact that this was [Ibarra-
Pineda’s] first offense,” but rather concluded the above mentioned aggravating factors
far outweighed this one mitigating factor. Accordingly, the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences as to all seven counts was not an abuse of discretion and not so
“irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
III.   The Trial Court Incorrectly Calculated Ibarra-Pineda’s Custody Credits
       Lastly, Ibarra-Pineda contends the trial court incorrectly calculated his custody
credits. The People concede error. We accept the People’s concession and conclude
Ibarra-Pineda should be awarded an additional 11 days for a total of 1,107 days.
       Here, the probation report indicated Ibarra-Pineda had been in presentence custody
from July 3, 2018 through the original sentencing date of February 16, 2021, which
comprised 950 actual days. On February 19, 2021, the trial court applied the probation
report’s figure and stated, “So I’ll add three more because we continued it.” The trial
court then concluded the total actual custody credit was 953 days; defense counsel
agreed. The trial court then asked for a calculation of 15 percent of 953 and the
prosecutor stated it was 142.9. The trial court responded, “So I’ll round it to 143. So
we’ll show 953, plus 143 conduct, for a total of 1,096 days credit towards your sentence.”
       This calculation was incorrect. The period between July 3, 2018 and February 16,
2021 comprised 960 days, not 950 days. Ibarra-Pineda was convicted of a violent felony
and thus, his conduct credits were limited to 15 percent. (§ 2933.1, subd. (c).) Fifteen
percent of 963 is 144.45. Ibarra-Pineda was entitled to 144 days of conduct credits and
thus, his total number of credits is 1,107 days presentencing custody credits (963 days
actual time plus 144 days of conduct credit). Therefore, the trial court incorrectly
awarded only 1,096 presentencing custody credits, which was 11 too few.

                                              26.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The trial court is ordered to prepare and file an amended abstract of judgment
awarding Ibarra-Pineda 1,107 presentencing custody credits, consisting of 963 days
actual time served plus 144 days of conduct credit, and is directed to forward a certified
copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and
any other relevant authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                   SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

                                            27.