Court Opinion

ID: 9469421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:40:05.963603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:22.763263
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Chief Judge
(concurring):
I concur in Judge Mishler’s opinion, dubi-tante, and with a sense of frustration. I say dubitante because Judge Mansfield’s dissent is a strong one, and it is difficult to say with assurance whether his reading or Judge Mishler’s reading of the New York precedents is correct. My sense of frustration is occasioned by the amount of time and effort that four federal judges (I include the trial judge) have now devoted in this case to the issue of whether, under New York law, plaintiff is entitled to in-junctive relief, a question that is better answered by the state courts.
At a time when the civil caseload of the federal courts is at an all time high, when the filings in this circuit are reaching astronomical proportions, and when diversity cases comprise 25% of the civil cases commenced in the district courts and 18% of the civil appeals in the circuit courts,1 the anomaly of diversity jurisdiction becomes increasingly apparent. Originally based upon the notion that an out-of-state litigant would encounter prejudice in a local state court but not in a federal forum, diversity jurisdiction in recent years has merely afforded attorneys and their clients another opportunity for forum shopping, a luxury the federal judicial system can no longer afford. In addition, the questions before us can, of course, be answered authoritatively only by the judges of the highest court of the State of New York, presumably with less effort because of their greater familiarity with New York law. Thus, the New York courts could in an opinion at any time render largely irrelevant the interpretation of New York law reached by the majority today. And if enough time had gone by, plaintiff could obtain no redress for what by then would be seen as our error. Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1973, 72 L.Ed.2d 442 (1982).2
Nor is such a result beyond the realm of possibility. Only last year in another diversity case two of my colleagues engaged in a long debate, consuming 12 pages of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, and untold hours of effort, over the issue of what the law of Tennessee provided -with regard to the descendibility of the right of publicity and whether this court should defer to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation, as the court of appeals encompassing Tennessee, absent a controlling decision by the state court. Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., supra. Barely three months later, a Tennessee court decided the issue, rendering both our decision and the Sixth Circuit’s somewhat academic as a practical matter. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Media L.Rep. 2204 (Tenn.Ch.Ct.1981).
My colleagues and I remain bound, of course, to give diversity cases careful consideration and will continue to do so until Congress reassesses the current utility of this grant of jurisdiction.

. Relevant statistical data supporting these assertions appear in Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1981 Annual Report of the Director at 1, 3, 4, A-2, A-12.

. Of course, plaintiff took this risk by deliberately choosing the federal forum, despite the ease with which plaintiff could have obtained an authoritative, conclusive determination in the state courts.