Court Opinion

ID: 9665889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:59:00.061062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.137926
License: Public Domain

Ray Thornton, Justice. Appellant, Eddie Rodgers, was convicted of aggravated assault. This conviction stems from an incident that occurred in late 1999. On December 17, 1999, appellant pointed a gun at Bryant Young’s head, threatened to kill him, and then fired a shot into Mr. Young’s car. During the penalty phase of appellant’s trial, the trial court instructed the jury that it could recommend that appellant be placed on probation as an alternative to imprisonment. However, the trial court informed the jury that ip was not bound to follow its recommendation. The jury chose to sentence appellant to three years’ imprisonment and to impose a $5,000 fine. The trial court adopted the jury’s sentence. After sentencing had been pronounced, appellant’s attorney asked the trial court to set aside the jury’s sentence and to place appellant on probation. The trial court, denying appellant’s request, stated “had the jury recommended that, I probably would, but I have not gone against a jury yet and I don’t think this would be the appropriate time to start.” Appellant appealed the trial court’s ruling to the court of appeals. Citing Acklin v. State, 270 Ark. 879, 606 S.W.2d 594 (1980), appellant argued that the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion in deciding whether appellant should have been placed on probation. In a 4-2 decision, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. Rodgers v. State, 76 Ark. App. 245, 64 S.W.3d 275 (2001). The court of appeals chose to factually distinguish Acklin from appellant’s case. Specifically, the court of appeals determined that Acklin was inapposite because Acklin involved a trial judge’s failure to exercise his discretion in determining whether a defendant was entitled to have his sentences run consecutively or concurrently rather than a trial court’s failure to exercise discretion in determining whether a defendant is entitled to probation. On January 7, 2002, appellant filed a petition for review of the court of appeals’ opinion. We granted appellant’s petition. Appellant raises one point on appeal. We reverse the trial court and the court of appeals, and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.  Before addressing appellant’s point on appeal, we note that the State argues that the matter was not properly preserved for appellate review. Specifically, the State argues that because appellant failed to object to the imposition of his sentence, he is procedurally barred from raising an issue involving the sentence on appeal. We have held that in order to preserve an argument for appeal there must be an objection in the trial court that is sufficient to apprise that court of the particular error alleged. Eliott v. State, 342 Ark. 237, 27 S.W.3d 432 (2000). We have further held that we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Id.  In the case now before us, appellant made a motion to set aside the jury’s sentencing recommendation, thereby asking the trial court to exercise its discretion to place appellant on probation. The trial court denied appellant’s motion. On appeal, appellant challenges this ruling. Appellant’s motion was sufficient notice of the issue raised on appeal. Accordingly, the State’s argument on this issue is misplaced, and the merits of appellant’s issue are preserved for appellate review. See Smallwood v. State, 326 Ark. 813, 935 S.W.2d 530 (1996) (holding that the denial of a motion seeking a particular sentence was sufficient preservation of an issue for appeal).  In his only point on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court did not exercise its discretion when it denied appellant’s request to set aside the jury’s sentence and place appellant on probation. We have explained that under our bifurcated trial procedure, the jury fixes punishment following the penalty phase of the trial. Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996). The jury may recommend an alternative sentence such as suspension or probation. Id. However, the actual assessment of probation is a matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court. Id. We have also noted that in sentencing there must be an exercise of judgment by the trial judge, and not a mechanical imposition of the sentence suggested by the jury in every case. Lawhon v. State, 327 Ark. 674, 940 S.W.2d 475 (1997). Turning now to appellant’s point on appeal, he contends that the trial court did not exercise its discretion in denying his request for probation. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to decide the issue of whether appellant should have received probation. Appellant also argues that the trial judge’s comments suggest that he routinely delegated this responsibility to the jury. After the trial court had adopted the jury’s sentence, the following colloquy took place: Defense counsel: Would the court consider setting aside the jury’s three years in prison and put him on three years’ probation on the condition that he pay the $5,000 back in a shorter period of time? Deputy prosecuting attorney: Your Honor, we would ask the court to follow the jury’s recommendation. The court: Mr. Thompson [defense counsel], had the jury recommended that I probably would, but I have not gone against a jury yet and I don’t think this would be the appropriate time to start. Looking at the statements made by the trial court, we must determine whether it failed to exercise the discretion vested in it by Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301 (b)(c) (Repl. 1997) when it refused appellant’s request for probation.* 1  Appellant argues that our reasoning in Acklin v. State, 270 Ark. 879, 606 S.W.2d 594 (1980), dictates that this case be reversed and remanded for resentencing. In Acklin, the appellant argued that the trial court failed to exercise discretion in sentencing him to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment rather than serving concurrent terms of imprisonment. We outlined the trial judge’s rationale for imposing consecutive sentences. The judge stated: It’s my customary rule to run consecutive sentences imposed by jurors, not because it’s an expense to the county and not because someone elects to do that; it’s just my judgment in the matter that generally that’s what the jury intends to do. Id. We noted that nothing in the colloquy indicated that the trial judge exercised his discretion. Id. We also explained that the trial * judge’s comments suggested that he routinely failed to exercise his discretion, but instead imposed the sentence that he perceived the jury intended. We reversed the case and remanded for resentencing. Id. Appellant contends that we followed our holding in Acklin in subsequent cases. Specifically in Wing v. State, 286 Ark. 494, 696 S.W.2d 311 (1985), we were asked to evaluate the actions of a trial judge to determine whether he failed to exercise his discretion in sentencing. In refusing to run Wing’s sentences concurrently, the trial judge stated: [M]y practice has been, if it is left to me in the first instance, I try to use my own judgment both as to guilt or innocence, and also as to punishment. . . . But when a case is submitted. . . to a jury, then I think they have the right and the prerogative. . . to view the case in the manner in which they see it. Now, I feel it is somewhat presumptuous for me to interfere with their judgment as long as it is within the guidelines of the law. I think I have no choice. . . but to accept their verdict. . . and direct they run consecutively. Id. We determined that the trial judge was attempting to implement what he perceived the jury wanted rather than exercising his own discretion regarding the sentencing. We reversed and remanded for resentencing. Id. See also Wing v. State, 14 Ark. App. 190, 686 S.W.2d 452 (1985); Lawhon v. State, 327 Ark. 674, 940 S.W.2d 475 (1997) (both holding that the trial judge failed to exercise discretion in sentencing).  The trial judge’s comments in the case sub judice are indistinguishable from the comments made by the trial judge in Acklin and those made by the trial judge in Wing. The trial judge’s comments reflect that he had a custom of imposing the sentence recommended by the jury. We hold that the trial court erred by indicating that it routinely deferred to the jury’s sentencing recommendation and in failing to exercise its discretion. Without any implication that the sentence imposed by the trial court was unwarranted, we find it best to reverse and remand this case for resentencing according to the trial court’s discretion. Reversed and remanded. Corbin, Imber, and Hannah, JJ., dissent.   Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-4-301, in relevant part, provides: (b) In making a determination as to suspension or probation, the court shall consider whether: (1) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspension or probation the defendant will commit another offense; (2) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; (3) Suspension or probation will discount the seriousness of the defendant’s offense; or (4) The defendant has the means available or is so gainfully employed that restitution or compensation to the victim ofhis offense will not cause an unreasonable financial hardship and will be beneficial to the rehabilitation of the defendant. (c) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of suspension or probation: (I) The defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm; . (2) The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm; (3) The defendant acted under strong provocation; (4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense; (5) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated its commission; (6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of the offense for the damage or injury that he sustained; (7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense; (8) The defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; (9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense; (10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to suspension or probation; (II) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents; (12) The defendant is elderly or in poor health; or (13) The defendant cooperated with law enforcement authorities in his own prosecution or in bringing other offenders to justice. Id.