Court Opinion

ID: 9465100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:35:37.03238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:58.315754
License: Public Domain

LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge, with whom GOLDBERG and FAY, Circuit Judges,
join, specially concurring:
Although I agree with the majority’s result, I cannot subscribe to all of its reasoning. I therefore write to isolate what I believe to be the controlling features of this case as well as to point up several differences in emphasis.
I am somewhat troubled by the majority’s discussion of the differences between confession bargaining and plea bargaining. In some detail, the majority differentiates between a confession and a guilty plea. This differentiation, though nicely stated, seems largely irrelevant to our present inquiry. There is no question in the present case as to whether the defendant confessed or pled guilty; obviously, no guilty plea was entered. The critical negotiation occurred prior to arraignment. Ordinarily, prior to arraignment, there is no way such a plea can be made. Even so, the fact that a guilty plea is never made would not change the protected character of previous negotiations if those negotiations contemplated plea bargaining at the time they were undertaken. Thus, the question here is not whether Robertson pled guilty but whether such a plea was contemplated by the pre-arraignment negotiations.
Moreover, simply because a guilty plea can be distinguished from a confession, it does not follow that plea bargaining and confession bargaining are equally distinguishable. In fact, in many cases a so-called confession bargain will contemplate or assume a subsequent plea of guilty. I submit that, prior to arraignment, few things could more compellingly evidence a defendant’s commitment not to contest his guilt than what was actually given here — a full confession. Obviously, a confession could subsequently be disavowed but so could an express offer to plead guilty such as the majority seems to require. Indeed, an offer to plead guilty would be easier to later explain away than a full confession. Thus, I have some trouble with the majority’s assumption that parties will confess while contemplating a plea of innocence. Only the rare and hopelessly optimistic defendant will fully confess while intending to plead not guilty.1 Confessions may be later disavowed as a defendant, perhaps after consulting with counsel, re-evaluates his chances. The point is, however, that at the time a confession is given, which is the relevant time for characterizing the transaction, the parties are ordinarily contemplating that no trial contest of the question of guilt will ensue. When such a confession is the result of bargaining, I do not believe the protection of the rules should depend on whether the accused utters a few magic words like, “and, of course, I’m also going to plead guilty.” As the court has observed, “if we are overly exacting in deciding which statements come within this standard, we will deter the unrestrained candor *1372that often produces effective plea negotiations.” United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, I conclude that ordinarily a bargained for confession is tantamount to a plea negotiation because the reasonable expectation of all parties is that the question of innocence will be disposed of without trial. Certainly, some situations may arise in which a defendant confesses while contemplating a plea of not guilty. In the present case, however, there is no indication that such an unusual situation occurred.
While the majority expressly reserves the question of whether third party beneficiary negotiations are encompassed by Fed.R. Crim.P. 11(e)(6) and Fed.R.Evid. 410, the opinion nonetheless seems to stress repeatedly that the defendants sought concessions for their ladies rather than themselves. Majority opinion, 1369-1370. At the least, the majority evidently suggest that this circumstance is a factor weighing against characterizing the transaction as plea bargaining. Any such emphasis is misplaced; I can imagine no reason to sever third party beneficiary negotiations from the protection of the rules. Neither the language of the rules nor analogous cases suggest such a distinction. See United States v. Boss, 493 F.2d 771, 775 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bartoli, 572 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56 (2nd Cir. 1968.) Moreover, the policy underlying these strictures of exclusion is directed to an encouragement of plea bargaining. As the majority noted:
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation.
Majority opinion, at 1365, citing Blackiedge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 736 (1977). If anything, these benefits are augmented in third party negotiations. Both the bargaining defendant and the beneficiary can be spared uncertainty as one accepts guilt while the other is to be relieved of further worry. Further, courts are possibly spared not just one but two trials as the bargainer all but signs and seals his conviction while the beneficiary can escape prosecution altogether. Thus, I am convinced that the rules fully protect third party negotiations; inasmuch as the issue was among the concerns prompting this en banc review, I would resolve the issue accordingly.
In addition to its substantive emphasis, I question the manner in which the majority seemingly gloss over Judge Coleman’s excellent opinion in United States v. Boss, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974). That case held that a transaction essentially on all fours with the present one constituted a protected plea negotiation as a matter of law. The original panel in this appeal distinguished Boss as involving the government’s failure to keep a bargain while the instant situation presents a defendant backing out of the deal. 560 F.2d at 650-651. For good reason, the en banc majority nowhere mentions the distinction utilized by the panel majority. The policy of the pertinent rules seeks to encourage discussion, not to punish promise-breakers. Thus, Robertson’s subsequent decision to assert his innocence could not retroactively change the character of the allegedly protected negotiations.
Although wisely eschewing distinction based upon Robertson’s reneging, the majority offers no other vehicle for reconciliation with Boss. Concededly, Boss was decided before the applicable rules became effective. However, in United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1977), the court specifically said that the new rules codified rather than modified Boss. Id. at 796.2 Of course, the en banc court could now overrule both Boss and Herman, but instead the majority seemingly overlooks their tension with its present holding and *1373had cited both cases with apparent approval. Majority opinion, at 1367. In fact, citing Ross, the majority says that a defendant’s unilateral offer to “take the blame” in exchange for government concession clearly constitutes a protected plea negotiation. Id. That situation is exactly what happened in the present case. Here the defendants asserted that they were the guilty parties and they confessed to obtain favorable consideration for their ladies. According to Ross, Herman, and now the curious dictum of the en banc majority, Robertson’s confession should have been suppressed. I do not suggest that reconciliation is impossible or even difficult, but certainly some further explanation is due.
In my opinion, the procedural posture of this case compels affirmance. Under the plain error standard, our duty is to examine whether any reasonable view of the evidence would support a district court determination that a protected negotiation did not occur.3 In view of the disclaimer of bargaining authority made by the agents in the present case, I cannot say, as a matter of law, that the defendant both actually and reasonably believed that he was plea bargaining. Accordingly, I join in the majority’s result.

. Theoretically, a clever defendant might confess planning to invoke the rules of suppression at issue in this case. The majority’s opinion would not prevent such conduct. Instead, they may be penalizing only those defendants who lack the sophistication to appreciate whether a protected negotiation is underway or how to insure that a negotiation will be protected, for example, by expressly referencing the subject of a prospective guilty plea.

. In any event, because the new rules sought to expand the realm of protected negotiations, there is no basis for concluding that they would reduce protections advanced under previous caselaw. Thus, even if the new rules do not reach Robertson, the holding of Ross and its applicability to his situation remain intact.

. This posture contrasts with that of United States v. Herman, supra, in which the court reviewed a lower court conclusion that, in spite of the agents’ disclaimer, plea bargaining did occur. 544 F.2d at 799. In United States v. Ross, supra, at 775, the disclaimer was weaker than that of the present case. A disclaimer of bargaining authority, if sufficiently brought home to the defendant, will erode the reasonableness of any belief that genuine bargaining is to transpire. A confession given in the face of a sufficient disclaimer might be precatory rather than tendered in exchange for a particular concession.
Thus, although I question the majority’s emphasis on confession bargaining as opposed to plea bargaining, I conclude that Robertson’s transaction may not have been a real negotiation of any kind. The evidence can be reasonably reviewed as portraying defendants who, caught in the midst of incriminating evidence, confessed and requested whatever consideration the authorities might give to their ladies.