Court Opinion

ID: 9591286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:03:29.83831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:09.157859
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur fully with the conclusion that the District’s policy is invalid under state law. I dissent, however, from the decision to award plaintiff her attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). I believe our original opinion, reported at 124 Utah Adv.Rep. 37 (Ct.App.1989), correctly disposed of this ease. I therefore voted to deny rehearing, and take this opportunity to explain why.
As pointed out by the majority, attorney fees are recoverable in cases like this only when the winning state claim is “pendent to a substantial constitutional claim.” Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2576, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe plaintiff’s state claim is pendent to a substantial claim under the federal constitution.
*52Plaintiff alleged in this case that the imposition of student fees on those not receiving public assistance, but still unable to pay, infringed on her children’s right to a free education. However, this is not a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal constitution. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-21, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2396-97, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.”) (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodrigues, 411 U.S. 1, 34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973)), reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 14, 73 L.Ed.2d 1401 (1982). The only reference in plaintiff’s complaint to the federal constitution is in her second cause of action and in paragraph 2 of her prayer for relief. There, plaintiff alleged that her due process rights were violated by defendants’ delay in conducting an appeal hearing on her request for fee waivers. I doubt that this pleading constitutes a viable claim under section 1983.1 It certainly is not a “substantial” claim under the federal constitution, especially in view of the fact that plaintiff had her appeal hearing four months after the District’s decision awarding her a partial waiver.2
Furthermore, to receive her fees under section 1988, plaintiff’s state claim must be “pendent” to a substantial federal claim. Plaintiff prevailed in this case because the District’s policy is more restrictive than the Board’s rules. That is a question of law that suggests nothing about the underlying procedural facts. As recently stated by the United States Supreme Court:
Where the plaintiff’s claims are based on different facts and legal theories, and the plaintiff has prevailed on only some of those claims, ... “[t]he congressional intent to limit [fee] awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fees may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.”
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3470, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984).
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that will support an award of attorney fees under section 1988. In the absence of another applicable statute or agreement, plaintiff is not entitled to her attorney fees.

. Accord Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052-1053 (Utah Ct.App.1990). To treat such a claim as viable will encourage the routine insertion of a generic, procedural due process claim in every suit where state action is alleged. Parties will thereby be able to circumvent the principle that attorney fees are not recoverable absent an explicit contractual or statutory provision. See Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct.App.1989).

. The main opinion’s reliance on other possible due process arguments is misplaced since plaintiff did not include such allegations in her complaint.