Court Opinion

ID: 9782103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:59:03.163749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:47.884737
License: Public Domain

LuCKERT, J.,
concurring: I concur with Justice Davis’ opinion in all respects except the conclusion that it was error to admit the two commercial pornographic photographs.
In justifying the conclusion that it was error to admit the photographs, Justice Davis concludes the relevance of the photographs was “tenuous at best.” 284 Kan. at 701. Yet, he explains that “the State’s theory was that the defendant’s motive behind killing his wife was based on his leading a ‘double life’ — on the one hand, a family man actively involved in his church and his children’s school, and on the other hand, a man who downloaded thousands of pornographic images and was engaged in a 4-year extramarital affair that was very sexual in nature.” (Emphasis added.) 284 Kan. at 700. Justice Davis also notes that “photographic evidence is relevant and generally admissible if the photographs ‘[have] a reasonable tendency to prove a material fact’ in the case.” 284 Kan. at 696 (quoting State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, 384, 807 P.2d 86 [1991]).
This double life of pornography, which defendant attempted to hide from his wife, underlies the State’s theory regarding the motivation for murder. The pervasiveness of defendant’s fixation and the juxtaposition of that fixation to his family life are key to the State’s theory. Motive and intent are material facts in the case. Justice Johnson argues the photographs are not relevant because (1) the defendant had accumulated the photographs over a period of time and, therefore, their existence did not directly trigger the act of murder and (2) if the defendant were trying to hide the photographs he would not have committed the crime in a manner that was likely to lead to the discoveiy of the photographs. These conclusions result from a weighing of the credibility of the State’s theory (by assuming the defendant acted logically when planning the murder of his sleeping wife) and ignore the probative value of the photographs in establishing the defendant’s secret lifestyle. Our *723role is not to weigh the credibility of the evidence. The State is entitled to admit evidence relevant to its theory. Relevancy requires a logical relationship between the evidence and the matter to be proven. It does to require that the matter to be proven be logical.
Interestingly, the defendant does not question the relevancy of the officer’s testimony regarding finding the commercial pornography or regarding the extent or nature of the commercial pornography. In fact, Justice Davis even noted: “[T]he defendant does not argue that this testimony was irrelevant or improperly admitted.” 284 Kan. at 701. If the testimony was relevant, the photographs relating to and demonstrating the testimony are also relevant. Contrary to the other justices’ conclusion, an unrealistic leap of faith is not required to connect the photographs to the material facts in the case. See 284 Kan. at 701.
After noting that the defendant did not object to the relevancy of the officer’s testimony, the other justices conclude the photographs add very little to the jury’s understanding of the issues and the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed the probative value. Justice Davis concedes that the determinations of probativeness and prejudice are areas where “broad” discretion is given the trial court, stating: “ ‘The trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of relevant demonstrative photographs.’ ” 284 Kan. at 696 (quoting State v. Groschang, 272 Kan. 652, 667, 36 P.3d 231 [2001]). Generally, we state: “Discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court.” State v. Moses, 280 Kan. 939, 945, 127 P.3d 330 (2006). This is not, in my opinion, a situation where we can say that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.
The nature of the pornography and the likelihood that it would offend defendant’s wife were relevant. Ironically, the more likely it was that the evidence would offend defendant’s wife and reflect a lifestyle she was unwilling to accept — in other words, the more probative the evidence — the more likely the juiy would be offended. But the offensive nature of the evidence does not make the photographs inadmissible. As we have often said, gruesome *724crimes make gruesome evidence. State v. Green, 274 Kan. 145, 148, 48 P.3d 1276 (2002). The same can be said when the evidence is sordid and offensive. If anything, under the facts of this case and given the State’s theory, the sordid and offensive nature of the evidence establishes the demonstrative nature of the evidence — it showed the jury defendant’s activities, how far those activities strayed from his family life, and how necessary it was that those images and his double lifestyle be hidden from his wife and others.
There was no argument that the two photographs were unrepresentative of the thousands of photographs found on defendant’s computer or that the State selected the two most sensational depictions. Apparently, the two exhibits were fair representations of defendant’s internet activity.
Consequently, reasonable minds could disagree. The evidence was probative and the prejudice, if any, arose because of the nature of defendant’s activities, which the photographs accurately demonstrated to the jury.
McFarland, C.J., and Nuss, J., join in the foregoing concurring opinion.