Court Opinion

ID: 9832957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:20:12.719696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.126774
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Kehearing.
At a former day of this term of this court we held that the county court of Harris county had jurisdiction, in the absence of a plea of privilege, to appoint John A. Weeks guardian of the person and estate of Mary De Young, non compos mentis, whose residence was at the time in Wharton county, and in disposing of the issues presented on appeal from a judgment rendered by the district court of Harris county, to which the cause had been appealed, we confirmed such appointment.
John De Young, husband of Mary De Young, who sought to have the judgment of the county court appointing Weeks as such guardian set aside, has filed his motion for rehearing upon the ground that we erred in holding that the conuty court had jurisdiction to appoint Weeks as such guardian and in confirming such appointment. We now conclude that we erred in holding that the county court of Harris county had jurisdiction, and that the contention of John De Young should be sustained, and that the case should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the county court to make such appointment in the first instance, and, as a consequence, the want of jurisdiction of the district court,, to which the case was appealed, to hear and determine the merits of the case on such appeal.
Article 4059, Vernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes 1914, provides that:
“A proceeding for appointment of a guardian of the person or estate, * * ⅞ of a person of unsound mind, * * * shall be commenced in the county where such person of unsound mind * * * resides.”
We construed this provision as a venue statute, as shown by our original opinion, and held that as the probate courts of Texas were by law clothed with general jurisdiction over probate matters, such courts have jurisdiction to appoint guardians of persons and estates of persons of unsound mind, in the absence of a plea of privilege to have the proceeding begun in the county where such persons reside. We were persuaded to make our holding, as shown by our original opinion, by the construction placed by our courts on section 14 of article 1830, Vernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes 1914, which provides that:
“Suits for the recovery of lands or damages thereto, suits to remove incumbrances upon the title to land, suits to quiet the title to land, and suits to prevent or stay waste on lands, must be brought in the county in which the land, or a part thereof, may lie.”
Our courts have held that, notwithstanding the use of the mandatory words, “must be brought,” in said section, such section is a venue statute only, and in the absence of a plea of exception to the venue, suits for the recovery of lands, etc., may be maintained in any county in this state, regardless of where the land is situated. Mitchell v. Porter (Tex. Civ. App.) 194 S. W. 981; Wolfe v. Willingham, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 167, 94 S. W. 362; State v. Patterson (Tex. Civ. App.) 46 S. W. 224, same case, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 42 S. W. 369.
In support of his contention that the county court of Harris county had no jurisdiction to make the appointment of Weeks as such guardian, counsel for De Young cited Munson v. Newson, 9 Tex. 109, wherein it is held by our Supreme Court that the appointment of a guardian by the Chief Justice of any county, other than that of the residence of the minor, is absolutely void.
In refusing to apply the holding in the above-mentioned case to the law governing the present case, we said:
“An examination of the statute of 1848 referred to, we think, will disclose that it is in no sense a statute conferring general jurisdiction on probate courts or the judges thereof over probate matters, as do the statutes of the present day, and therefore we do not think the decision cited applicable to the present case.”
We now think we were in error in making such statement, as we find that the statute in force at the time the decision in Munson v. Newson was handed down did, as does article 4162 of the present statutes of 1925, *858confer general jurisdiction on probate courts over probate matters, and we find that the statute of 1848, cited by Judge Hemphill in Munson v. Newson, is verbatim the same as article 4117 of the statutes of 1925. Thus it is made to appear that the holding in the case mentioned'is applicable to the facts and law of the present case, and since it is a decision of our Supreme Court which has never been overruled, we must follow the same.
We are also ádvised that, since the rendition of our original opinion, the Supreme Court of this state, in the case of J. W. Mingus, Receiver, v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S. W. 1084, held that statutory provisions relative to the jurisdiction of courts in specified matters are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects, citing Ruling Case Law, p. 322, § 9; Employers’ Ind. Corp. v. Woods (Tex. Com. App.) 243 S. W. 1085. The court said further:
“The Workmen’s Compensation Act having created the rights to be enforced, and provided the remedy therefor, each step in the progress of the maturity of a claim from the time of the injury to its final adjudication is a ^mandatory requirement, necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the first and succeeding statutory agencies. 1 Corpus Juris, p. 988, § 100D, p. 989, section 102B, p. 976, section 72; Statutes (1925), art. 8307, § 4a; Harris v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n [Tex. Civ. App.] 257 S. W. 998; * * * Hood v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n [Tex. Civ. App.] 260 S. W. 243. * * *
“Revised Statutes, art. 8307, § 5, provides that the suit to set aside the final award of the board ‘shall’ be brought ‘in the county where the injury occurred.’ The language used is mandatory, and its purpose evident. -Such a suit of necessity involves the fact of the accident, the issue of the injury, and the wages of the claimant; all of which may'be established with less trouble and expense.”
“Where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive, and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is exclusive. 1 Corpus Juris, p. 989, § 120b; * * * Cunningham v. Robison, 104 Tex. 227 [136 S. W. 441].”
In view of the holdings of our Supreme Court in the cases cited, it becomes our duty to recede from our holding that the county court of Harris county had jurisdiction to appoint Weeks guardian. The motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment set aside, and that portion of the judgment of the cburt below vacating the orders and proceedings of the county court of Harris county in the estate of Mary De Young is affirmed.
We adhere to the conclusions stated in our former opinion, that the court below had no jurisdiction or authority in this suit to adjudicate appellee’s right to the money in the hands of appellant, and for the reasons expressed in tha,t opinion, the judgment of the trial court in favor of appellee for the sum of $20,680 is reversed and judgment here rendered for appellant.
Affirmed- in part.
Reversed and rendered in part.