Court Opinion

ID: 9738396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:51:52.611544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.641046
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The stated object of the Act is "to regulate political activity”.1 All its provisions relate to that one object.
I
To regulate the "political activity” of candidates, electors, appointed and elected public officials, lobbyists and others, is one object. "Legislation, if it has a primary object, is not invalid because it embraces more than 1 means of attaining its primary object.”2 The Act accomplishes its one primary object by regulating the pre-campaign political activity of candidates and electors, by imposing limitations on the post-election political *135activity of elected and appointed public officials and those who would influence their decisions, and, through the Political Ethics Commission, by providing a means of implementing and enforcing such regulations.
Spending money in a political campaign is political activity. Limitations on contributions and expenditures and the filing of statements on the organization of candidate committees and reporting of contributions and expenditures regulate political activity.
Establishing a state campaign fund, "with a diversion of certain taxpayer-designated portions of income tax revenues to the fund for distribution to qualifying gubernatorial candidates”,* *3 regulates political activity in a gubernatorial campaign.
Political activity does not end when the votes are counted and oaths of office are administered. Regulating conflicts of interest and requiring financial disclosure by public officials are efforts to assure that the post-election political activity of officials and those who would influence their "vote, official action, or judgment”4 or "decision”5 is legitimate.
The function of the Political Ethics Commission is to implement the Act’s object of regulating political activity. The Commission is to prescribe and furnish the forms to be filed pursuant to the Act, accept and examine the filings, furnish the public with summaries of non-confidential statements and reports, promulgate rules to carry out the Act, issue declaratory rulings, investigate complaints of a violation of the Act and initiate measures to enforce it.
*136A unifying theme and concern of the Act is money for votes: the legitimate use of money to influence the votes of the electors (in political campaigns) and to influence the votes of elected and appointed public officials (through lobbyists); and the corrupt use of money to buy the votes of public officials. Restrictions on the use of money, public funding of gubernatorial campaigns, public disclosure of financial matters, with corresponding enlargement of accountability and openness, are means related to that theme and concern.
The Court concludes that the Act embraces more than one object. The Act does embrace many concepts and contains diversified provisions as does any law containing more than one idea or thought, or addressing a complex problem. Our duty, if we can fairly do so, is to coalesce these multiple concepts into one object.
"Numerous cases have held that the 'object’ of a statute is the general purpose or aim of the enactment”.6 The "object may be very comprehensive and still be without objection”.7 "[It] may include all matters germane to its object” and "all those provisions which directly relate to carry out and implement the principal object”.8 "[T]his section is not to be given a narrow or strained construction”.9 "The word 'object’ expresses an intrinsically elastic concept. The viewer’s focus defines the object, determining in the main whether the di*137mensions of the object are microscopic or macro-cosmic in size”.10
In oft-quoted language* 11 this Court said:
"This provision has proved a tempting source of attack on the validity of statutes with which parties are dissatisfied, for few laws of any length are enacted where the objection cannot be plausibly urged as to details and auxiliary provisions incidental to the main purpose of the legislation appearing in the body of the act and not itemized in the title. * * * While it contains various related provisions not directly indicated or enumerated in the title, under the construction of this constitutional requirement, as many times reviewed by this court, if the act centers to one main general object or purpose which the title comprehensively declares, though in general terms, and if provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title are germane, auxiliary, or incidental to that general purpose, the constitutional requirement is met. ” Loomis v Rogers, 197 Mich 265, 270, 271; 163 NW 1018 (1917). (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court relies on language in Kent County, ex rel Board of Supervisors v Reed, 243 Mich 120, 122; 219 NW 656 (1928): "The provisions in these two sections might have been enacted in separate laws without either of them in any way referring to or affecting the other”.12 That is not a workable *138rationale. A large number of laws would be invalid under it. In the 45 years since Reed was decided, this Court has not been heretofore constrained to rely on the quoted language.
In Bissell v Heath, 98 Mich 472, 476-477; 57 NW 585 (1894), this Court rejected a similar approach:
"It is suggested that the title expresses two objects, which might very well be the subjects of separate acts. It may be true, of any comprehensive statute, that it might be subdivided, and several laws in pari materia enacted in place of one; but it does not follow that an act which has but one general object is in conflict with the constitutional provision. As is stated in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (6th ed) p 175:
" 'There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.’ ”
The legislation under consideration in Attorney General v Weimer, 59 Mich 580, 588; 26 NW 773 (1886), formed a county out of three townships and organized other territory into new townships. In rejecting a contention that the statute embraced more than one object, the Court said that while "there was no necessary connection between the formation of the county and the organization of the new townships, still the connection is a natural one, and the latter is clearly germane to the former”. (Emphasis added.) The one-object limitation, said the Court, was not designed "to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus *139multiplying their numbers”.13 "To require that every end and means necessary to the accomplishment of [the] general object should be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be senseless but would actually render legislation impossible.” 14
The Court appears to recognize that codifications, such as the Michigan Penal Code,15 the Insurance Code,16 Probate Code,17 Revised Judicature Act,18 the Uniform Commercial Code19 would *140be invalid if they were scrutinized under the Court’s "foreign and incongruous”/"no necessary connection”/"might have been enacted in separate laws” rationale.
A codification "necessarily embodie[s] various and somewhat diversified provisions”.20 "Codification of multifarious enactments would be impossible if the constitution obliges the Legislature to define the object of a codification in narrow terms. Especially in the case of a codification, the Legislature is free to conceive of the object of its endeavors in terms of a common denominator and to express that conception in umbrella words.”21
Codifications are not exceptions to the constitutional requirement that an act embrace only one object. The object of a codification, however, like a mosaic, is many-faceted.
The Court says that it does "not direct attention here to the second concept” ("[t]hat the object which the law embraced shall be expressed in its title”), but it nevertheless seeks to distinguish the codification cases from this case because the title of this Act does not contain the phrase "revise, consolidate and classify the laws”, generally found in most codifications. If that is a prerequisite, the Uniform Commercial Code would also fall because neither those words nor a facsimile appear in its title.22
*141This Act is a revision and a codification, albeit also — like most revisions and codifications — an extension of existing law. As stated by the Court, this Act specifically repeals "five individual and distinct acts. They concerned the licensing and regulation of legislative agents; the corrupt practice section of the general election law; two specific conflict of interest statutes; and an ethics act”.23 The object "to revise, classify and consolidate” the laws "regulat[ing] political activity” appears both from the title24 and from the body of the Act even though the words "revise, classify and consolidate” do not appear in the title. "Only the general object and not all the details and incidents of a statute need be indicated in the title”.25 "Any provisions germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be included in the act.”26
*142The Court finds it "foreign” and "incongruous” to tie together "the creation of a state campaign fund for gubernatorial candidates * * * with regulation of lobbying activities”, and "financial disclosure provisions aimed at preventing unethical conduct * * * with the organization of a campaign committee”.27 Surely this is no more "foreign” or "incongruous” than tying together the law of sales or of negotiable instruments with secured transactions (Uniform Commercial Code), no-fault automobile liability with fire insurance (Insurance Code), neglected and delinquent children with decedents’ estates (Probate Code), governmental tort immunity with the organization of a district court (Revised Judicature Act).
A law does not introduce "foreign and incongruous” matter if, said the Court in phrasing that obiter dictum, it "is confined to the means supposed to be important to the end indicated”.28 (Emphasis supplied.) This Legislature supposes that the regulation of campaign expenditures, state financing of gubernatorial campaigns, lobbying and financial disclosures are means "important to the end indicated” of "regulating] political activity”. This Court does not say otherwise but substitutes its own supposition of the appropriate format of legislation.
*143In People v Milton, 393 Mich 234, 241, 248; 224 NW2d 266 (1974) this Court said:
“Not infrequently there will be a number of existing acts to which the new legislation would be germane, auxiliary or incidental. The legislative choice will not be held invalid merely because an alternative location for the new legislation might appear to some more appropriate.”
We rejected a claim that an amendment to the Revised Judicature Act creating the district court was defective insofar as it purports to vest criminal jurisdiction in that court: "the correct question is not whether the Legislature might have included provisions concerning the criminal jurisdiction of the district court in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but rather whether provisions establishing criminal jurisdiction are germane to the general purpose of the RJA”. (Emphasis supplied.)
The ultimate question here is not congruity, but whether there is one object. Asking the wrong question, the Court ordains a wrong conclusion.
There are five chapters in the Act. The Court does not advise the Legislature what division of the Act would be congruous. Are there one or more chapters that are congruous with each other? Are there any incongruities within any chapter? Nor does the Court indicate whether the defect it perceives can be remedied by adding to the title: "to revise, classify and consolidate”. If not, why not? How does this codification otherwise differ from other codifications?
The Court’s advisory opinion poses more questions than it answers, puts in question the validity of many statutes the constitutionality of which heretofore was undoubted and will encourage costly and time-consuming litigation. By changing *144the emphasis from object to congruity/necessary connection/might have been enacted in separate laws, the Court assures itself of much grist for the mill.
II
The Court commits itself to issue further opinions despite its declaration of unconstitutionality.
The Constitution permits an advisory opinion "on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into lawbut before its effective date”. Const 1963, art 3, § 8. (Emphasis supplied.)
Delegate (now Secretary of State) Austin in proposing on the floor the amendment adding "after it has been enacted into law” stated that the purpose was to "prevent the supreme court from getting involved until the legislative process was completed and they would be working with a law rather than some bills or proposals for legislation”.29
The apparent purpose of issuing further opinions is to assist the Legislature in its further efforts. The Court cannot do so without "getting involved” in the legislative process.
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with Levin, J.

 "AN ACT to regulate political activity; to create a commission; to prescribe the powers and duties of the commission, the secretary of state, and other governmental bodies; to regulate campaign financing; to restrict compaign contributions and expenditures; to require campaign statements and reports; to prohibit anonymous contributions; to require certain anonymous funds to be transmitted to the state; to restrict use of public funds for mailings; to regulate campaign advertising and literature; to provide for segregated funds for political purposes; to create a state campaign fund; to provide for the use of public funds for political campaigns; to provide for reversion of or refunding of unexpended balances; to regulate conflict of interest, influence, and ethics of public officials, public employees, candidates, members of their immediate families, and businesses with which the individuals are associated; to regulate certain participation in making governmental decisions; to require financial statements; to regulate lobbying, lobbyists, and lobbyist agents; to require registration; to require persons to file certain statements and reports; to require persons to keep certain books and records; to permit governmental bodies to enact ordinances similar to matters covered by this act; to provide for defense funds; to provide for the collection of fees; to provide for the voiding of certain contracts; to prescribe remedies and penalties; to provide appropriations; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.”

 Local No 1644, AFSC&ME, AFL-CIO v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich 79, 91; 116 NW2d 314 (1962).

 This is quoted from the opinion of the Court.

 MCLA 169.121; MSA 4.1701(121).

 MCLA 169.124; MSA 4.1701(124).

 Local No 1644, AFSC&ME, AFL-CIO v Oakwood Hospital Corp, supra.

 The People, ex rel the Secretary of State v The State Insurance Co, 19 Mich 392, 398 (1869).

 Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 465; 208 NW2d 469 (1973). W A Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc v Jackson Hospital Authority, 390 Mich 193, 210; 211 NW2d 649 (1973).

 National Loan & Investment Co v Detroit, 136 Mich 451, 452; 99 NW 380 (1904).

 Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra, pp 488-489 (1973) (Levin, J., concurring).

 See e.g., People, for use of Regents of the University of Michigan v Brooks, 224 Mich 45, 49; 194 NW 602 (1923); People v Palm, 245 Mich 396, 402; 222 NW 67 (1929); Young v Ann Arbor, 267 Mich 241, 244; 255 NW 579 (1934); Michigan Boiler & Sheet Iron Works v Dressler, 286 Mich 502, 508; 282 NW 222 (1938); Rohan v Detroit Racing Association, 314 Mich 326, 355; 22 NW2d 433 (1946); Benson v State Hospital Commission, 316 Mich 66, 78; 25 NW2d 112 (1946); Beacon Club v Kalamazoo County Sheriff, 332 Mich 412, 423; 52 NW2d 165 (1952); People v Milton, 393 Mich 234, 241; 224 NW2d 266 (1974).

 The statute would in effect have restored the fee system to the Register of Deeds Office of Kent County, a result inconsistent with the objective expressed in the title. See People v Morton, 384 Mich 38, 40; *138179 NW2d 379 (1970); Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 159; 188 NW2d 593 (1971).

 The quoted words appeared first in People, ex rel Drake v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 495 (1865).

 People, ex rel Drake v Mahaney, supra.

 The provisions proscribing arson, burglary, robbery and homicide could all be enacted in separate laws without any of them referring to or affecting the other. The recent criminal sexual conduct act, 1974 PA 266, MCLA 750.520a, et seq.; MSA 28.788(1), et seq., apart from repealing inconsistent and redundant legislation, stands as separate and independent legislation which does not refer to or affect the law of arson, burglary, robbery or homicide; surely, it is not invalid because it was added as an amendment to the Michigan Penal Code.

 This Court has advised that the no-fault motor vehicle liability act, 1972 PA 294; MCLA 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., did not violate the one object requirement even though it was added to the Insurance Code and it is possible to have an Insurance Code without a no-fault motor vehicle liability act and the latter could have been enacted in a separate law without either enactment referring to or affecting the other. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra.

 The provisions concerning decedents’ estates and fiduciaries have no necessary connection with juveniles. It would have been possible to deal with these two subject matters by separate laws without either of them referring to or affecting the other.

 The statutory provisions abolishing the defense of governmental function resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle (MCLA 600.2904; MSA 27A.2904) and limiting the liability of a merchant for conduct involving persons suspected of larceny of goods (MCLA 600.2917; MSA 27A.2917) could have been enacted as separate laws and have no necessary connection to an act dealing largely with the organization and function of civil courts. See People v Milton, 393 Mich 234; 224 NW2d 266 (1974).

 "The UCC replaced separate laws on sales, stock transfer negotiable instruments, bulk sales, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, bank checks, motor vehicle installment sales contracts, trust receipts, fraudulent conveyances, discharge of chattel mortgages, foreclosures of chattel mortgages, liens on inventory and many more. When first enacted, each of these separate laws stated its own separate object.” *140Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra, pp 488-489 (1973) (Levin, J., concurring). The separate chapters of the UCC might have been enacted in separate laws without referring to or affecting the others. They have "no necessary connection” with each other.

 Regents of University of Michigan v Pray, 264 Mich 693, 697; 251 NW 348 (1933).

 Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, supra, pp 488-489 (1973) (Levin, j.( concurring).

 True, the UCC is dubbed a "code” in the body of the act, and this act is not. We may properly look to the body of the law to determine its object — that is indeed where we should look. See In re Brewster *141Street Housing Site, 291 Mich 313, 341; 289 NW 493 (1939); Attorney General v Union Guardian Trust Co, 273 Mich 554, 558; 263 NW 866 (1935); Kent County, ex rel Board of Supervisors of Kent County v Reed, 243 Mich 120, 122; 219 NW 656 (1928); Loomis v Rogers, 197 Mich 265, 271; 163 NW 1018 (1917). Whether an act in fact embraces only one or more than one object can only be determined upon examination of the act itself, not by reading its title. Upon examination of this Act it is apparent that it is a codification of the laws concerning campaign expenditures, lobbyists, conflicts of interest, standards of conduct for public officials.

 The acts repealed are:
(a) 1947 PA 214, licensing and regulation of the activities of “legislative agents” (lobbyists). MCLA 4.401-4.410; MSA 2.601-2.610.
(b) 1954 PA 116, Ch XXXIV, captioned Campaign Expenses, of the Michigan Election Law, MCLA 168.901-168.929; MSA 6.1901-6.1929.
(c) 1968 PA 317, regulating the conduct of public officials in respect to contracts with public entities. MCLA 15.321-15.330; MSA 4.1700(51)-4.1700(60).
(d) 1968 PA 318, conflicts of interests of members of the Legislature and state officials in respect to contracts. MCLA 15.301-15.310; MSA 4.1700(21)-4.1700(30).
(e) 1973 PA 196, standards of conduct for public officers and employees; creating a state board of ethics. MCLA 15.341-15.348; MSA 4.1700(71)-4.1700(78).

 "An Act to regulate political activity * * * and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.” See footnote 1.

 People v Sowall, 279 Mich 261, 266; 271 NW 751 (1937).

 Westgate v Adrian Township, 161 Mich 333, 335; 126 NW 422 *142(1910); Benson v State Hospital Commission, 316 Mich 66, 77; 25 NW2d 112 (1946).

 The preceding quotations in this paragraph are from the opinion of the Court.

 "The act, with great particularity, prescribes how this police government shall be rendered effectual; but this particularity can not possibly be objectionable so long as it introduces nothing foreign and incongruous, but is confined to the means supposed to be important to the end indicated.” People, ex rel Drake v Mahaney, supra, p 496.
The phrase "no necessary connection”, also from People, ex rel Drake v Mahaney, supra, p 495, is also obiter dictum.
It appears from his writings that Justice Cooley was especially concerned with combinations of special interest groups to enact selective legislation benefiting their private interests.

 1 Official Record Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1548.