Court Opinion

ID: 9591230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:03:05.849027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:08.632625
License: Public Domain

*782EAGLESON, J.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to reject the State Bar Court’s unanimous recommendation of disbarment and to impose five years’ probation conditioned upon eighteen months’ actual suspension.
This is petitioner’s fourth trip through the State Bar disciplinary system. The majority insists that the acts underlying each proceeding are “different.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 780.) However, petitioner’s past and present violations all contain the element of deceit.
In 1974, two years after he was admitted to the bar, petitioner obtained a sizable settlement for his clients and induced them to invest the money in a business venture. He misrepresented its profitability and the extent of his own personal financial involvement. Petitioner also failed to disclose the questionable character of other investors. The clients eventually obtained a fraud judgment against him. (Bar Misc. No. 4830.) (This matter resulted in a sixty-day suspension order which became effective February 1, 1985, and is relevant to misrepresentations made by petitioner in one of two matters at issue here.)
One year later, in 1975, petitioner falsely identified himself as a deputy sheriff during a routine traffic stop. He pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of giving false information to a police officer (Veh. Code, § 31). (Bar Misc. No. 3809.)
In 1979, after having practiced without incident for only four years, petitioner furnished confidential information about a former client for use against him in a contested legal proceeding, misrepresented to the court that he had no attorney-client relationship with the former client, and filed a separate lawsuit against the former client on behalf of another client. (Bar Misc. No. 4623.)
The State Bar Court now finds petitioner culpable of misconduct in two new matters: (1) misleading the court in a 1985 juvenile court matter; and (2) failing in 1986 to withdraw his funds from the Rufos’ client trust account within a reasonable time after his interest therein became fixed. The majority correctly sustains the State Bar Court’s findings that these acts violated Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (d), and 6103, and former rules 7-105(1) and 8-101(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The State Bar Court also properly found that petitioner violated Business and Professions Code section 6106 (dishonesty and moral turpitude as grounds for suspension or disbarment). (See maj. opn., ante, p. 768.)
However, the majority errs in characterizing the first incident as a mere “failure to disclose” information. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 768, 770.) The ma*783jority acknowledges that petitioner “affirmatively” misrepresented to the juvenile court referee that he might be able to appear on February 1, 1985, even though he knew our suspension order made him per se unavailable for court appearances for 60 days beginning that day. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 774.) The State Bar testimony of two witnesses (Referee Smith and opposing counsel Anderson) also suggests petitioner said he could not appear in February 1985 because he had other legal “matters” pending. Because such statements were knowingly false when made, we assume that petitioner acted with an intent to deceive. (Jackson v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 509, 513 [153 Cal.Rptr. 24, 591 P.2d 47]; see also Pickering v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 144-145 [148 P.2d 1].)
As conceded by the majority, petitioner is a presumptive threat to the legal community. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 778.) The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct recommend disbarment for attorneys with “two prior impositions of discipline” unless “the most compelling mitigating circumstances” exist. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, std. 1.7(b) (Standards).) Recently, on March 19, 1990, this court stated: “Our principal concerns in attorney disciplinary proceedings are protecting the public, preserving public confidence in the legal profession, and maintaining high professional standards for attorneys. [Citation.] . . . ‘[W]e will not reject a recommendation arising from application of the Standards unless we have grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline.’ [Citation.]” (In re Billings, ante, 358, 365-366 [267 Cal.Rptr. 319, 787 P.2d 617].) The majority opinion pays insufficient heed to these bedrock principles.
In rare cases, we have not imposed disbarment until the attorney has suffered three prior disciplines. (See, e.g., Kent v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 729, 737-738 [239 Cal.Rptr. 77, 739 P.2d 1244]; Arden v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 713, 727-728 [239 Cal.Rptr. 68, 739 P.2d 1236].) However, the majority cites no case imposing a sanction less than disbarment upon an attorney who is undergoing his fourth disciplinary proceeding for misconduct consisting largely of dishonesty. Such conduct often calls for the strictest disciplinary measures, and has sometimes resulted in disbarment for attorneys with no prior record. (See, e.g., In re Rivas (1989) 49 Cal.3d 794, 800-802 [263 Cal.Rptr. 654, 781 P.2d 946]; In re Lamb (1989) 49 Cal.3d 239, 245-249 [260 Cal.Rptr. 856, 776 P.2d 765]; see also Carter v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1091, 1100 [245 Cal.Rptr. 628, 751 P.2d 894].)
The majority insists petitioner is a special case. It claims that two “mitigating” facts raise “grave doubts” as to the recommended discipline: (1) no “significant resulting harm”; and (2) no “bad faith.” (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 779-780, citing Std. 1.2(e).) In the juvenile court matter, the majority cred*784its petitioner with avoiding any actual representation of his client while on suspension. In the Rufo matter, the majority opinion notes that he did not misappropriate money or dissatisfy the clients.
Such facts are not “compelling” within the meaning of Standard 1.7(b). There is no evidence that petitioner acted under unusual pressure, or that his conduct was aberrational. The only argument he raises to mitigate the first incident is that the 60-day suspension order did not require him to notify anyone of the discipline (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 955), and that his client could have been harmed if opposing counsel had felt free to make legal maneuvers during the suspension period. However, as the majority persuasively responds, petitioner’s “duty toward his client did not entitle him to knowingly create, or leave undisturbed, a false impression that he would be representing the client during the period of suspension. [1f] • • • Absent withdrawal. . . , the attorney has a duty to take whatever steps are necessary to assure that the client is not prejudiced by the hiatus in representation.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 775.) Here, it appears that petitioner’s only response to the suspension order was to “knowingly create” such a “false impression.”
The majority opinion will be read to mean that disbarment is not warranted because petitioner only told a “little white lie” in court, and did not steal money from his clients. These fortuities do not negate his intentional and deceptive conduct. Over a 12-year span, petitioner has manifested a chronic insensitivity to elementary ethical standards imposed upon all who hold the privilege of practicing law. On two prior occasions, he has victimized clients. Because of his consistent pattern of dishonesty, I would adopt the proposed discipline of disbarment.
Lucas, C. J., and Scoville (Harmon G.), J.,* concurred.

 Retired Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.