Court Opinion

ID: 9761274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:37:09.291265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:21.672289
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Neither annexation here changes the voting rights of a single member of any minority group. Therefore, because there is no change whatsoever in the voting rights of any member of any minority, I cannot agree with the majority that the two an*1461nexations at issue in this case are “violation[s] of the [Voting Rights] Act provided discriminatory purpose is shown.” Maj. Op. at 1460.
The majority opinion refers to three Supreme Court decisions holding certain annexations subject to preclearance under section 5 of the Act, City of Port Arthur v. United States, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 530, 74 L.Ed.2d 334 (1982); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971), but in each of those cases the annexations clearly changed existing voting rights of minorities. Typical of these is City of Richmond, where the Court held:
Section 5 forbids voting changes taken with the purpose of denying the vote on the grounds of race or color. Congress surely has the power to prevent such gross racial slurs, the only point of which is ‘to despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.’ ... An annexation proved to be of this kind [a change in the voting rights- of some minority citizens] and not proved to have a justifiable basis is forbidden by [section] 5 whatever its actual effect may have been or may be.
City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U.S. at 378-79, 95 S.Ct. at 2307-08 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347, 81 S.Ct. 125, 130, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960)) (emphasis added). Thus the principles these cases announce are not applicable to this case where there is no change in the existing voting rights of any single minority individual.
The majority relies upon the following partial quotation from City of Port Arthur:
In the City of Port Arthur, Texas v. United States, [— U.S.-] 103 S.Ct. 530, 535 [74 L.Ed.2d 334] (Dec. 13, 1982), the court held that
... even if [a practical] electoral scheme might otherwise be said to reflect the political strength of the minority community, the plan would nevertheless be invalid if adopted for racially-discriminatory purposes ... (emphasis added).
Maj. Op. at 1458. In failing to quote the complete sentence the majority grossly misstates the Supreme Court’s ruling and asserts that an annexation made with a discriminatory purpose — regardless of effect— violates the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1458-1459.
The complete quotation from the Supreme Court opinion in City of Port Arthur v. United States, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 535-36 (emphasis added), reads as follows:
[E]ven if the 4-2-3 electoral scheme might otherwise be said to reflect the political strength of the minority community, the plan would nevertheless be invalid if adopted for racially discriminatory purposes, i.e., if the majority-vote requirement in the two at-large districts had been imposed for the purpose of excluding blacks from any realistic opportunity to represent those districts or to exercise any influence on council members elected to those positions.
A fair reading of this sentence does not support the asserted position of my colleagues. What the Court is truly saying is that an electoral scheme will be denied preclearance, even if minority votes are properly represented in the apportionment, if it is continued with an electoral voting scheme that includes a discriminatory majority voting requirement in at-large districts imposed for the purpose of excluding minorities from any realistic opportunity to represent those districts. The incomplete quotation from City of Port Arthur thus does not fairly represent the factual basis of the decision or the ruling expressed by the Supreme Court.
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971), relied on by the majority, is not contrary. There the annexation increased the number of eligible voters and diluted the weight of minority votes. Neither fact exists here. The Court noted that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act “was designed to cover changes having a potential for racial discrimination in voting, and such potential inheres in a change in the composition of the electorate affected by an annexation.” Id. at 388-89, 91 S.Ct. at 437 (emphasis added). Clearly the Court *1462was concerned that “by including certain [actual] voters within the city and leaving others outside” an annexation could serve as a means for a community to discriminate against minority voters in the community by changing the composition of the electorate to their detriment. Id. at 382 n. 4, 388-90, 91 S.Ct. at 434 n. 4, 436-37. See Maj. Op. at 1458-1459.
The majority also contends that City of Lockhart v. United States, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 998, 74 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983) supports its conclusion, but in that case the Supreme Court reversed a three-judge district court panel and “conclude[d] that the election changes introduced by the 1973_ Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color or membership in a language minority group.” Id. 103 S.Ct. at 1004. In so holding, the Court adopted the position of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who dissented in Lockhart because “the voting strength of Lockhart’s minorities, whether or not enhanced, would not be diminished one whit.” City of Lockhart v. United States, 559 F.Supp. 581, 595 (D.D.C. 1981) (S. Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoted in City of Lockhart v. United States, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 1004). As the majority recognizes, the Court did not consider the “purpose” prong of section 5 in Lockhart because the district court panel had not reached that issue. See City of Lockhart v. United States, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 1001 & n. 4; Maj. Op. at 1458. However, unlike the other cases relied upon by my colleagues, Lockhart involved a fact situation where the existing voting rights of minorities were being altered. Judicial decisions such as Lockhart which involve factual situations where minority voting rights are changed are simply not applicable to situations where there is no change whatsoever in the existing voting rights of minorities and where any changes which might take place in the future are speculative.
The two annexations at issue in this case simply have not changed the voting rights of minorities. The larger, 1979 annexation involves vacant land and does not change the voting rights of a single person, much less minorities. The smaller, 1971 annexation incorporated one family of approximately fourteen whites into the City. While this annexation results in at least a de minimus change in voting rights in the City of Pleasant Grove, it does not change any existing minority voting rights because there are no minority voters in the City or in any of the annexed territory.1 Since the annexations at issue do not change any existing minority voting rights and the Voting Rights Act only applies when there is some “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise,” Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1364, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976), it is my view that the two annexations, one of which is inhabited by one non-minority family, cannot constitute a violation of the Voting Rights Act, regardless of the motives of the City. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.
I do not wish to suggest that the motives of the City of Pleasant Grove are pure. I agree with the majority that, from the facts in the record, “a court could appropriately draw the inference that the City of Pleasant Grove had and has the purpose to discriminate against blacks with respect to voting as [well as] with respect to other subjects.” Maj. Op. at 1457. There may, in fact, be actionable constitutional violations occurring in the City. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341, 81 S.Ct. 125, 127, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960).2 Such violations *1463are not issues before us.3 The purpose of § 5 is to prevent communities from avoiding the Act’s requirements — elimination of literacy tests and other like voting qualifications — by simply enacting slightly different voting qualifications having the same discriminatory impact. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-50, 89 S.Ct. 817, 822-23, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Where, as here, an annexation in no way changes existing voting rights of minorities, or even directly involves a single identifiable member of any minority group, the Voting Rights Act is not implicated.
Support for summary judgment in this case is also found in the language of section 5 itself; the statutory scheme does not contemplate its application to annexations of vacant property. Section 5 provides:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 ... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority group], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure....
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976) (emphasis added). The italicized language setting forth the enforcement provision indicate that Congress only intended the Act to apply where individual minority voters were actually involved.
The question in this action is whether the annexation of vacant land to the west and north of the City of Pleasant Grove is a “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure” having the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language minority group. The mere annexation of property upon which no voters reside cannot be termed “a qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” because the preclearance and enforcement requirement of § 5 contemplates situations where at least some minority individuals’ voting rights are changed by the “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” at issue. The language of the statute thus implicitly indicates that Congress did not intend section 5 to apply to annexations having no impact on the voting rights of minorities, such as the Western and Glasgow additions to the City of Pleasant Grove.
If the majority’s interpretation of the Act were correct, the granting of a building permit by the City of Pleasant Grove for condominiums estimated to sell for $125,000 each could be denied preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act if nonresident minorities demonstrated that they could not afford to purchase the condominiums. In my view Congress did not intend *1464section 5 to be given such an expanded construction; the intent expressed in the language of section 5 does not support such an interpretation.
I therefore find it necessary to dissent. The majority is attempting to extend the Act to a factual situation to which it was never intended to apply.

. I find it significant that the Justice Department failed to object to several annexations of the City of Bessemer, Alabama, because they involved “areas that are not populated or areas the population of which have at most a de minimus effect on minority voting strength.” Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum, Attachment 6, at 2-3. As the majority recognizes, the Attorney General’s interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is “entitled to considerable deference.” Maj. Op. at 1460.

. Of course, Gomillion involved the elimination of practically all Negro voters from the elective franchise in the City of Tuskegee, Alabama. As the Supreme Court remarked:
The essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee’s boundaries is to remove *1463from the city all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra, 364 U.S. at 341, 81 S.Ct. at 127. Gomillion, involving as it does the “unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citizens,” is a far cry from the annexations at issue here. Id. at 346, 81 S.Ct. at 130.

. I cannot agree with the majority’s suggestion that the Voting Rights Act incorporates all of the protections of the Fifteenth Amendment, as well as providing “additional protections in that vital area.” Maj. Op. at 1460 n. 16 (emphasis in original). The Act does provide some additional protections for minority voters; section 5 does so by placing the burden on municipalities to demonstrate, prior to implementation of changes in the existing voting rights of minorities, that such changes do “not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Nothing in the Voting Rights Act, however, imposes the burden on municipalities to disprove allegations of violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the sort involved in the cases cited by the majority. See Maj. Op. at 1459-1460 n. 16.