Court Opinion

ID: 9468112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:05:05.897379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:41.507007
License: Public Domain

WEIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
As the majority explains, this appeal is yet another in the lengthening list of those presenting the often perplexing problem of standing — in its dual aspects, “constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The constitutional requirement is the ever-present one of case or controversy. The prudential consideration here is whether, in defending against the plaintiffs’ claim, Sears should be allowed to interpose the rights of third parties.
The constitutional dimension of standing requires that a litigant who challenges the constitutionality of a statute demonstrate that he suffers some threatened or actual injury from its operation. I agree with the majority that because Sears is exposed to potential civil and criminal liability, that aspect has been shown. When a litigant “asserts the rights of third parties defensively, as a bar to judgment against him, . . . there is no Art. Ill standing problem.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500, n.12, 95 S.Ct. at 2206 n.12.
The second aspect of standing is more troublesome, however, and requires us to address “the further and less easily defined inquiry of whether it is prudent to proceed to decision on particular issues even at the instance of a party whose Art. Ill standing is clear.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 123, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2878, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). The general rule is that “[ojrdinarily, one may not claim standing ... to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.” Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, *11611034, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953). This is a self-imposed, nonconstitutional limitation, founded on prudential considerations designed to minimize unwarranted intervention in controversies where constitutional questions are nebulous and speculative. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193, 97 S.Ct. 451, 454, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).'
The Court has articulated other justifications for the rule. “There are good and sufficient reasons for this prudential limitation on standing when rights of third parties are implicated — the avoidance of adjudication of rights which those not before the Court may not wish to assert, and the assurance that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them.” Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1958). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-22, at 99 (1978); Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Ter-tii, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 423 (1974).
Although the reasons for restricting third-party standing are weighty, a few well-defined exclusions from the rule have been recognized. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 523, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). They may be grouped under three headings: (1) the existence of countervailing considerations, such as the impossibility or difficulty attending third parties’ efforts to assert their rights; (2) the lack of justification for enforcing the rule, as is true when there is such a congruence of interest between the third parties’ rights and those of the proponent that they are tightly interwoven; and (3) the need to vindicate broad constitutional policy, for example, when fundamental rights are at stake.
A combination of facts in each of these categories has led the Court on frequent occasions to relax the rule against surrogate standing and permit litigants to vindicate third-party rights. These elements often occur in combination and are not always clearly separable. Their relative importance in the factual context of a case and the weight to be accorded each are matters that make standing “one of ‘the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law.’ ” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
One factor does appear to be a constant, however. In cases where the Court has permitted surrogate standing, denial would have diluted or adversely affected third-party rights. There is no possibility of that occurring here because the challenged portion of the statute has been repealed. Although this is not an absolute determinant, it is a factor worthy of some consideration together with those more generally applied. I have some difficulty accepting the proposition that in the circumstance of this case the court should adjudicate a constitutional right at Sears behest on behalf of classes no longer affected.
The district court specifically limited its decision to the alleged right of nonfreehold-ers to participate in the gun regulatory procedures and did not discuss the merits of Sears claim to be the surrogate for an amorphous group of vendees who did not know two freeholders. See Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F.Supp. 82,85 n.3 (D.Del.1980). Although the majority opinion considers both approaches, I specifically address only the issue raised by the district court.1 In terms of the traditional tests, *1162none of the exceptions to the rule against third-party standing are present here.
I.
The first category, countervailing considerations, applies when third parties would have great difficulty presenting their own position, so the only effective way the asserted right may be presented is to confer standing on the proponent. An example is the problem that occurs when attempted vindication by the rightholders themselves would destroy the very right claimed. Thus, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), a state court attempted to secure the Association’s membership list despite a challenge that the action violated the rights of those who belonged to the organization. The Court found that the NAACP had standing to litigate the constitutional right of its members, because “[t]o require that it be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion.” Id. at 459, 78 S.Ct. at 1170.
In other circumstances, denial to the third party of a readily accessible forum in which the right may be asserted calls for the grant of standing. Thus, in Barrows v. Jackson, a white landowner who was sued for violating a racially restrictive covenant in a deed was allowed to vindicate the rights of black purchasers. Standing was permitted because it was unlikely that the buyers would have an opportunity to litigate the issue. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 116 & n.6, 126-27 & n.4, 96 S.Ct. at 2875 n.6, 2880 n.4; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-26, at 103-04 (1978). The Barrows case is also an example of overlapping exceptions, because there fundamental rights were at stake. Accord, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), and Craig v. Boren, vendors were permitted to advance the rights of potential vendees. In both instances, the vendor was the “obvious claimant,” the “least awkward challenger,” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 196-97, 97 S.Ct. at 456-457, because the statute prohibited not use, but distribution. Thus, in a prosecution for distribution, the vendor had a forum, but because use of the same product was not a criminal offense, a similar opportunity was not available to third parties. Additionally, in these cases enforcement of the statute against the litigant directly violated the rights of the third parties.
In the matter at hand, the district court reasoned that only a litigant in Sears’ position would have the incentive or inclination to assert the rights of nonfreeholders, since “the interest which is at stake is not of the kind that realistically could be expected to induce a rightholder to undertake the time and expense which litigation entails.” 493 F.Supp. at 87. I am not persuaded that Sears’ pecuniary interest in having the statute struck down and the nonfreeholders’ lack of concern are enough to surmount the prudential limits on standing. Nor is the *1163cost of litigation to the third parties a sufficient justification for avoiding the general rule.
There is nothing that would have prevented nonfreeholders, had they been so inclined, from challenging the validity of the statute before it was amended. The remedy of declaratory judgment and a forum were available to them. The fact that no action was taken has some significance, because, as the Supreme Court has stated, in general there is no need to adjudicate constitutional issues for those who may not care to have them determined. It is only when “there is some genuine obstacle to such assertion . . . [that] the third party’s absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by default the right’s best available proponent.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 116, 96 S.Ct. at 2875.
Theoretical vindication of the nonfree-holders’ rights as of 1976, when the ammunition was purchased, is not a matter that cries out for resolution by overburdened courts. This ease is far removed from NAACP v. Alabama, ex rel. Patterson, where resort to a forum was simply unrealistic. The opinion of the Court in Singleton suggests that the obstacle requirement may be relaxed where the third party’s individual claim is imminently moot, as the pregnant woman’s was there, and as Craig’s was in Craig v. Boren. See 428 U.S. at 118-19 n.7, 96 S.Ct. at 2876-2877 n.7. That factor, however, is not present here, and consequently, the first category does not apply.
II.
The second exception is invoked whenever the underlying justification for the rule is absent. The court should not adjudicate constitutional rights unnecessarily and it may be, in fact, that the holders of the rights do not wish to assert them. On the other hand, if there is a special relationship between the proponent and the third parties, in some circumstances standing should be recognized. “If the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that the right’s enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 114-15, 96 S.Ct. at 2874-2875 (1976). In that circumstance, the relationship between the third parties and the litigant may be such that he will be affected just as deeply as the right-holders.
As a predicate, the relationship of the parties and the congruency of their interests must be scrutinized. The problem is illustrated by Friedman v. Harold, 638 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1981). There, a trustee in bankruptcy sought to set aside a Massachusetts statute that prohibited creditors from attaching a wife’s interest in entireties property, but imposed no such limitation on creditors of the husband. The trustee asserted a claim of gender discrimination, purportedly on behalf of the debtor’s wife.
The Court of Appeals observed that the wife did not wish to assert any such right because she would be economically injured if it were recognized. The trustee’s contentions thus clashed with the third party’s own interest. The court approached the matter from the rightholder’s standpoint, rather than the trustee’s, and noted there was no obstacle to the wife’s invocation of the right, had she been so inclined. Therefore, there was no need to entertain the claim by the trustee.
In Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 82, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979), we expressed concern with avoidance of “ephemeral litigation,” and the possibility that “litigants may, by exaggeration or understatement, distort the interest of those not parties to the suit. ...” Id. at 844. We observed that the mere fact that the litigant has suffered an injury, as in Friedman, is not enough to permit him to assert any right he chooses on behalf of third parties. A court need not embark on exposition of evanescent third-party rights merely to satisfy the curiosity of, or unrelated economic interests *1164of, a litigant. From that perspective, the fact that the statute challenged here has been amended and is no longer a source of injury to the third parties assumes large, if not decisive proportions.
The identity of interests between Sears and the nonfreeholders is far from obvious. In Eisenstadt and Craig the vendors were the best available litigants because the statute regulating their behavior directly affected rights of the third parties. In Craig, for example, the ban on the distribution of beer denied it to third parties and consequently deprived them of their rights. Thus, there was truly a community of interest between vendor and vendee.
That situation is not the same as the one here. As we observed on the first appeal, the challenged statute was designed to make it somewhat difficult to obtain handguns or ammunition by restricting the class of persons who could provide the required identifications. 593 F.2d at 530. Sears would have us hold that the classification is unduly restrictive. But an examination of Sears’ stake shows that its interest and that of the class whose rights it purports to assert are not the same. 593 F.2d at 530.
There is no reason to assume Sears’ sales would improve as a result of having purchasers establish responsibility by references from reputable citizens. To the contrary, the absence of any such requirement might bring about an increase in the gun business. In this case, Sears sold the ammunition without any person identifying the purchaser, and the nonfreeholder’s interest in gun control was irrelevant. At least as to this sale, the company’s economic interests would not have been furthered by the availability of nonfreeholder vouching.
In Craig, the majority observed that in general standing had been given to vendors who resisted efforts to restrict their markets by acting as advocates of third parties who sought access to the litigants’ market or function. Here, the nonfreeholders do not intend to enter Sears’ markets or undertake its function of selling firearms, but in fact, desire to prevent gun sales to those who would misuse them. To carry out that objective, the legislature could validly require identification by a much more limited group, the local police chief or sheriff, for example. The obligation on Sears to obtain identification would remain the same, and a violation would still carry the same sanctions, but it is doubtful that Sears would have standing to champion the cause of citizens who wished to participate in the regulatory function.
This case does not present a situation where an ineligible person furnished the identification, but rather one where none was provided. The composition of the group from which the identification could have been secured, but was not, is therefore irrelevant. Sears has not demonstrated a causal connection between the violation that exposes it to liability and the rights it seeks to assert on behalf of third parties.
III.
The third exception, broad constitutional policy, is likewise not applicable here. When the constitutional question at issue implicates a fundamental right, the prohibition against jus tertii is not enforced. In Barrows v. Jackson, for example, where the issue was racial discrimination in property ownership, standing was recognized. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), the proprietor of a private school was permitted to litigate the interest of parents and children in child rearing and education. And in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977), the Court extended standing to a vendor when its customers’ privacy rights were asserted.
No such important constitutional issues are raised here, however. The right of citizens to participate directly in law enforcement procedures has never been considered to be a fundamental right and, in fact, is more of a burden. The tendency of government is to delegate such responsibilities to professional law enforcement officials. Thus, if the vouching function were limited to the county sheriff or the local police chief, for example, neither freeholder *1165nor nonfreeholder would participate in this particular phase of gun control. It is extremely unlikely that such delegation would fail to survive a constitutional challenge.
The “right” to participate in this field of law enforcement is far removed from such matters as freedom from discrimination in voting, owning property, or availing oneself of first amendment rights of association, privacy, the exercise of religion, and rearing children. Consequently, no persuasive reason has been advanced to justify dispensing with the rule against the assertion of jus tertii on the grounds that serious or fundamental constitutional issues are presented.
Finding no standing on the part of the defendant to raise the constitutional rights of nonfreeholders, I would not reach the equal protection issue, but rather would vacate the judgment of the district court.

. Even though it has not been shown that Full-man, the purchaser, was unacquainted with freeholders, the majority concludes that “Sears could represent potential vendees, who have been discriminated against because they knew no freeholders, as the vendor in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), was permitted to do.” But in Craig, the Court said, “These prudential objectives, thought to be enhanced by restrictions on third-party standing, cannot be furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the relevant constitutional challenge and the parties have sought — or at least never resisted — an authoritative constitutional determination.” 429 U.S. 193, 97 S.Ct. 455. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs have continually resisted an authoritative constitutional determination. Furthermore, the district court specifically declined to “reach the question of whether those unacquainted with any freeholder could be considered a discrete class of individuals for pur*1162poses of review under the Equal Protection Clause,” 493 F.Supp. at 85 n.3, citing San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288-1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). It may be that in peeking down the road the district court saw serious difficulty in sustaining this constitutional challenge, when it seems clear that an even more restrictive regulation would pass muster.
I recognize that as an alternative basis for its holding, the Court in Craig found the requirements for surrogate standing met because “vendors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function.” 429 U.S. at 195, 97 S.Ct. at 456. Here, however, Sears’ practice of accepting a driver’s license as the only method of identifying purchasers demonstrates that it wás not acting as an advocate for potential vendees unacquainted with freeholders. Cf. Ei-senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), where the Court allowed the assertion of third-party rights because the relationship between the rightholders and the party asserting their rights was “not simply that between a distributor and potential distributees,” but that between the third parties and “an advocate” of their rights. Moreover, in both Craig and United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980), traditional exceptions to the rule against surrogate standing rule were present. That is not so here.