Court Opinion

ID: 9403728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:09:11.087295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.190755
License: Public Domain

J-S08041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LAMONT A. ZAMICHIELI                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 896 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 31, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-21-CR-0000560-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: JUNE 21, 2023

        Appellant, Lamont A. Zamichieli, appeals pro se from the judgments of

sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty in absentia of indecent

exposure, unsworn falsification to authorities, false reports to law enforcement

authorities (falsely incriminated another), false reports to law enforcement

authorities (reported an offense that did not occur), and open lewdness.1 He

alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and violating his rights to a speedy trial and self-

representation. He also raises related claims challenging the effectiveness of

his trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1  18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3127(a), 4904(a)(1), 4906(a), 4906(b), and 5901,
respectively.
J-S08041-23

     The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions involved him exposing

himself to a correctional officer and then falsely accusing that officer of

assaulting him. The trial court has summarized those facts as follows:

     [Appellant] was incarcerated in SCI[-]Camp Hill. On September
     3, 2019, he appeared in Lieutenant Mihal’s interview room as a
     purported victim in a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”)
     investigation. Lieutenant Mihal and [Appellant] were the only two
     persons present during the interview due to the confidential
     nature of the investigation. About three to four minutes into the
     interview, [Appellant] exposed his penis and began masturbating.
     Lieutenant Mihal immediately ended the interview and left the
     room.

     Trooper Bierzonski, as the prison liaison for the Pennsylvania
     State Police, was assigned to investigate the incident. During an
     interview with the trooper, [Appellant] reported that Lieutenant
     Mihal assaulted him both physically and sexually. He went into
     great detail about what she did to him and the injuries he
     sustained.    Those details, which included allegations of her
     aggressively biting his genitals, became increasingly inconsistent
     the more [Appellant] explained. The trooper asked [Appellant] to
     provide a signed, written statement of the events, which he did.

     Trooper Bierzonski further investigated the assault claim by
     reviewing the report from [Appellant]’s medical / rape
     examination. There was no evidence of physical injury or foreign
     DNA on [Appellant].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/22, 4-5 (omitting footnotes).

     Appellant was charged with the offenses in this case on May 5, 2020.

Criminal Complaint, 5/5/20, 1-6.     On August 18, 2021, Appellant filed a

counseled motion requesting a preliminary hearing and dismissal of the case

based on a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.     Motion to Dismiss or Remand,

8/18/21, ¶¶ 4-9. On the next day, Appellant filed, inter alia, a pro se motion

                                    -2-
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seeking to waive his appointed counsel and proceed pro se.          Motion to

Voluntarily Waive Appointment of Counsel, 8/19/21, 1-3.

      On August 30, 2021, the trial court presided over a hearing on the

pending motions.    Trooper Bierzonski testified that a preliminary hearing

scheduled for July 13, 2020, could not take place due to technical issues with

coordinating video conferencing equipment during the ongoing Covid-19

pandemic, see N.T. 8/30/21, 3 (“I believe due to the COVID pandemic, and

also I know there were issues with Polycom coordinating with Zoom which was

used by the magistrate.”), and because Appellant could not be available in-

person for a hearing due to a moratorium preventing the transfer of inmates

between state correctional facilities. Id. at 3-4. He then testified that the

same issues prevented a rescheduled hearing from taking place on December

14, 2020. Id. at 4. The trooper confirmed that Appellant would have been

able to attend another rescheduled hearing on March 2, 2021, via

videoconferencing, but, on that date, the hearing was held in absentia after

Appellant refused to “come out of his cell for the video hearing.” Id. at 6-7.

Appellant testified and denied receiving any notices for any dates scheduled

for the preliminary hearing. Id. at 10-11.

      As for the Rule 600 motion, the trial court ruled that there was no basis

for dismissal because the Commonwealth proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the time from the filing of the charges (May 5, 2020), until the

second rescheduled preliminary hearing date (December 14, 2020), were

excludable time “as a result of [Appellant’s] unavailability due to the COVID

                                     -3-
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pandemic.” N.T. 8/30/21, 11-12; Order, 8/30/21, 1. The court ruled that the

subsequent time was not excludable because the Commonwealth failed to

prove that it had proceeded with due diligence.     N.T. 8/30/21, 12; Order,

8/30/21, 1.    The court disregarded the evidence concerning Appellant’s

“opportunity to participate in a preliminary hearing” in March of 2021 as

hearsay and ordered that he was entitled to a new preliminary hearing. N.T.

8/30/21, 12; Order, 8/30/21, 1. As for the motion concerning Appellant’s

representation, the court conducted a colloquy to ascertain the voluntariness

of his request to proceed pro se, during which Appellant declined the request.

Id. at 13-14. The court ordered that the pro se motion was withdrawn. Order,

8/30/21, 1.     It subsequently presided over a preliminary hearing on

September 21, 2021. Order, 9/21/21, 1.

      On October 21, 2021, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw

from representation in response to a pro se motion that Appellant attempted

to file three days earlier, in which he requested the removal of counsel due to

a conflict and requested the appointment of a new attorney.         Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel, 10/21/21, ¶ 6. After a pre-trial conference, the lower

court denied that motion.    Order, 10/25/21, 1 (“the Court finds that the

allegations made by [Appellant] to remove [trial counsel] lack credibility.

                                     -4-
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Therefore, [trial counsel] shall remain in this case and this matter shall

proceed to trial this term.”).2

       Appellant failed to appear for a pre-trial conference scheduled on March

15, 2022, and the trial court issued an order reflecting that “the prison ha[d]

not provided an explanation for [Appellant’s] nonappearance.”             Order,

3/15/22, 1. Trial was then scheduled for March 25, 2022, because Appellant’s

counsel indicated that the case was ready to be tried. Id. On March 18, 2022,

Appellant filed pro se motions seeking to give notice of his intention to present

an insanity defense and to proceed pro se or request the appointment of a

new attorney.       Appellant subsequently failed to appear for trial and the

Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Jeremy Matas who

asserted that Appellant had refused transportation to court for the scheduled

trial. N.T. 3/29/22, 5-7. Detective Matas also confirmed that he informed

Appellant that he would be tried in absentia if he refused to appear for trial.

Id. at 7.     Based on that testimony, the trial court agreed to permit the

Commonwealth to try Appellant in absentia. Id. at 8; Order, 3/29/22, 1.

____________________________________________

2  Future dates for another pre-trial conference were continued for a
competency evaluation that the trial court ordered after Appellant filed a pro
se motion styled as a “Request for the Death Penalty,” in which Appellant
discussed, inter alia, friends of his who were supposedly aliens sent to earth
and who created the “COVID19 virus/Delta Strand.” Pro Se Request for the
Death Penalty, 10/29/21, 1; Order, 10/29/21, 1; see also Order 12/2/21, 1;
Order, 1/13/22, 1; Order 1/19/22, 1. After a hearing on February 7, 2022,
the trial court determined that Appellant was “malingering” and was
competent to stand trial. Order, 2/7/22, 1.

                                           -5-
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       After the trial in absentia, during which the Commonwealth presented

the testimony of Lieutenant Mahal and Trooper Bierzonski, a jury found

Appellant guilty of the above charges.3 N.T. 3/30/22, 57-58; Verdict Slips,

3/30/22; Order 3/30/22, 1.           On May 31, 2022, the trial court sentenced

Appellant (then present for the proceedings by video conferencing) to an

aggregate term of one to two years’ imprisonment to be served consecutive

to any sentence that Appellant was then already serving. N.T. 5/31/22, 3-4;

Sentencing Order, 5/31/22, 1-2. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing,

Appellant stated that he wanted his attorney to appeal the denial of his pre-

trial Rule 600 motion. N.T. 5/31/22, 4. Appellant subsequently filed three

pro se motions requesting to proceed pro se, two pro se notices of appeal,

and a voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).4 On July 5, 2022, the trial court held a hearing pursuant

____________________________________________

3 On the date of the trial, Appellant filed a pro se motion requesting the
appointment of new counsel. Pro Se Motion to Appoint New Counsel, 3/30/22.

4 Both notices of appeal were timely filed within thirty days of the imposition
of the judgments of sentence. Notice of Appeal, 6/21/22, 1; Notice of Appeal,
6/3/22, 1-4. The instant appeal was initiated by the second notice of appeal.
On September 28, 2022, this Court dismissed as duplicative an appeal
docketed at 822 MDA 2022, that was initiated by the initial notice of appeal.
We note that, in the notice filed for this appeal, Appellant purported to appeal
the judgments of sentence imposed on May 31, 2022, and the “order of August
30, 2021 or September 13th or 14th 2021 denying [the] motion Rule 600 to
dismiss…” Notice of Appeal 6/21/22, 1. This appeal, however, properly lies
only from the imposed judgments of sentence. We have amended the caption
accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2
(Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (“In a criminal action, appeal properly lies form
the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence
motions.”).

                                           -6-
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to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), and granted

Appellant leave to proceed pro se on appeal. Order, 7/6/22, 1.

     Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

     1.    Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion by denying
           [the] motion to dismiss pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 and
           committed further error by improperly excluding time from
           May 5, 2020 to December 14, 2020 from the Rule 600 clock
           although [the] Commonwealth failed to exercise due
           diligence throughout pendency of [the] case and failed to
           bring [Appellant to] a speedy trial within 365 non-
           excludable days [where] Zoom video service [was]
           available?

     2.    Whether [t]rial [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to
           properly argue and litigate [the] motion to dismiss/Rule 600
           motion and failed to present to the court and argue such
           evidence      discovered     [in]  existence   relating   that
           [Pennsylvania Department of Corrections] Secretary John E.
           Wetzel’s memo[randums] signed by [Secretary] Wetzel[,]
           addressed to all [PA DOC] inmates in all [PA DOC]
           institutions dated March 17, 2020 stating that Zoom video
           service was available and being used to co[n]duct [prison]
           visits[ and] court proceedings from March 17, 2020 to
           December 14, 2020; had counsel argued this and presented
           [it] to the trial court as he knew existed having received [it]
           from [Appellant] and [the Department of Corrections]
           website, [the] Rule 600 [motion] would have been granted
           and [the] case [would have been] fully dismissed?

     3.    Whether [t]rial [c]ounsel and [the] Commonwealth violated
           [Appellant’s] 6th [A]mendment right of [the United States]
           constitution by lack of speedy trial although [Appellant]
           could not assert [a] speedy trial [violation] without ever
           being notified in written or orally by [the] State police,
           [DOC] employees, [the t]rial [c]ourt, [the] Commonwealth,
           and[/]or [t]rial counsel …, that criminal charges was
           filed/pending against him until over one year later as
           [Appellant] could not assert a speedy trial right without
           being made aware or given the opportunity to appear at an
           hearing until after a year has elapsed?

                                    -7-
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      4.    Whether [the t]rial [c]ourt and [t]rial [c]ounsel abused
            [their] discretion and violated [Appellant’s] 6th Amendment
            [right to] self[-]representation by forcing [Appellant] to trial
            with [an] ineffective counsel/court appointed public
            defender; a conflict of interest although [Appellant] timely
            and properly filed a motion to proceed [pro se] and waive
            [his] right to counsel but said trial court failed to address
            and by ignoring such motion and motion for continuance to
            secure private counsel before trial and further violated by
            ignoring [the] motion to proceed [pro se] after sentencing
            on direct appeal where [the] outcome would have been
            different and in [Appellant’s] favor?

      5.    [Whether the t]rial court abused [its] discretion by
            manipulating the running of the Rule 600/speedy trial right
            clock by intentionally failing to hold [a f]ormal
            [a]rraignment and failing to direct [the] Commonwealth to
            file a new/updated “[i]nformation” on the charges after the
            second preliminary hearing upon remand although
            [Appellant] timely in writing and orally brought [it] to [the]
            trial court, [the C]ommonwealth and trial counsel’s
            attention but still the parties failed to address [the] issue
            which caused [a] due process violation as counsel’s
            ineffectiveness for failing to bring it to [the] trial court’s
            attention to be addressed such charge from custody is
            warranted?

Appellant’s Brief at 9-11.

      In his first issue presented, Appellant argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

He notes that Rule 600 was suspended statewide from March 19, 2020, to

June 2020 due to the judicial emergency declared in the wake of the Covid-

19 outbreak. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He asserts that the trial court incorrectly

determined that the time from May 5, 2020 to December 14, 2020 was

improperly excluded from the court’s Rule 600 calculation because the court

                                      -8-
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incorrectly relied on Trooper Bierzonski’s testimony that previously scheduled

preliminary hearings could not take place due to technical issues coordinating

video conferencing equipment during the ongoing pandemic. Appellant’s Brief

at 17-18. He points out that the Department of Corrections’ memorandums

during that period reflected that the state corrections system was using Zoom

video conferencing software to carry out virtual prison visits and concludes

that those memorandums belied Trooper Bierzonski’s testimony about an

inability to use the Zoom software to conduct an earlier preliminary hearing.

Id.   at 17-19.   He asserts that the trooper’s testimony should have been

rejected as hearsay passing on what the trooper had heard from other

employees of SCI-Camphill, where Appellant was incarcerated from May 5,

2020, to March 30, 2021, before he was transferred to SCI-Phoenix. Id. at

19-20.

      Appellant generally argues that the Covid-19 pandemic did not excuse

the Commonwealth from trying his case within 365 days through the use of

video conferencing software such as Zoom. Appellant’s Brief at 21. He also

faults the Commonwealth for “not even attempt[ing] to get court dates

scheduled any closer when it realized” that the delays would exceed the

mechanical run-date enforced by Rule 600. Id. at 22. Accordingly, he asserts

                                    -9-
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that the entire time-period from May 5, 2020, to December 14, 2020, should

not have been ruled to be excludable time by the trial court.5 Id. at 23-24.

       Our review of this claim must first begin by examining whether Rule 600

was in operation in the Ninth Judicial District, which consists of Cumberland

County, during the relevant time period addressed by Appellant’s claim. Here,

Appellant’s criminal complaint was filed on May 5, 2020, and his motion for

dismissal under Rule 600 was filed, 470 days later, on August 18, 2021.

Appellant was thereafter tried before a jury on March 30, 2022, 694 days

following the filing of his criminal complaint.

       Beginning in March 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued

emergency orders suspending the computation of time rule at Pa.R.Crim.P.

600(C) statewide through June 1, 2020.6            See In re General Statewide

Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283, 1287 (Pa., filed Mar. 18, 2020) (table);

____________________________________________

5 At the same time, he concedes that if any of that time should be excluded
then only the period from March 19, 2020, to June 1, 2020, should be excluded
pursuant to the statewide judicial emergency. Appellant’s Brief at 26.

6  The statewide emergency orders did not foreclose a defendant from
otherwise asserting speedy trial claims as a matter of constitutional law. See
In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283, 1287 (Pa.,
filed Mar. 18, 2020) (table) (“Nothing in this Order, however, or its local
implementation, shall affect a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial
under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions – albeit that the
circumstances giving rise to this Order and the suspension may be relevant to
the constitutional analysis.”); In re General Statewide Judicial
Emergency, 234 A.3d 408, 409 (Pa., filed May 27, 2020) (table)
(empowering president judges, “subject to state and federal constitutional
requirements, to … [s]uspend statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based
right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial”).

                                          - 10 -
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In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 229 A.3d 229, 232 (Pa.,

filed Apr. 1, 2020) (table); In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency,

230 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa., filed Apr. 28, 2020) (table). While the statewide

judicial emergency ended, our Supreme Court expressly empowered each

judicial district’s president judge to enter self-effectuating declarations of

judicial emergency, which could “[s]uspend statewide rules pertaining to the

rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial.”     In re General

Statewide Judicial Emergency, 234 A.3d 408, 409 (Pa., filed May 27, 2020)

(table); see also In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d

1281, 1282 (Pa., filed Mar. 16, 2020) (table) (“the President Judge specifically

SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY to suspend the operation of Rule of Criminal

Procedure 600 within a judicial district … The purport of the suspension will be

that the time period of the local judicial emergency (or a shorter time period

if specified) shall be excluded from the time computation under Rule of

Criminal Procedure 600(C)”); Pa.R.J.A. 1952(B)(2)(m) (“If the Supreme Court

authorizes the president judge to declare a judicial emergency in the judicial

district, and unless limited by the Supreme Court, the president judge shall

have the authority to … make application to the Supreme Court to temporarily

suspend or modify statewide court rules as applied to any case or cases in the

judicial district.”).

       Prior to the announcement of the statewide judicial emergency, the

Honorable Edward E. Guido, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of

Cumberland County, issued a Declaration of Judicial Emergency for the Ninth

                                     - 11 -
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Judicial District. In that order, President Judge Guido explicitly suspended the

operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 “during the period of the local

judicial emergency,” which then was designated to last from March 16, 2020,

to April 14, 2020.      See In re: Ninth Judicial District – Declaration of

Judicial Emergency, Declaration, P.J. Guido, 3/16/20, at 1, available at

https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010524-file-8513.

pdf. Over the ensuing months, President Judge Guido entered multiple orders

extending the local judicial emergency through August 2, 2021.7

____________________________________________

7 See In Re: Judicial Emergency and Limited Reopening of the Courts,
Administrative Order, P.J. Guido, 5/1/20, at 1 (extending the local judicial
emergency through June 1, 2020), available at https://www.pacourts.us/
Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010729-file-9195.pdf; In Re: Judicial
Emergency Extended, Administrative Order, P.J. Guido, 5/29/20, at 1
(extending the local judicial emergency through August 1, 2020), available at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010801-file-9399.
pdf; In Re: Judicial Emergency Extended, Administrative Order, P.J.
Guido, 7/27/20, at 1 (extending the local judicial emergency through October
1, 2020), available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/
20210519/010832-file-9725.pdf; In Re: Judicial Emergency and Limited
Reopening of the Courts, Administrative Order, P.J. Guido, 9/28/20, at 1
(extending the local judicial emergency through December 31, 2020),
available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010859
-file-10114.pdf; In Re: Covid-19 Restrictions, Administrative Order, P.J.
Guido, at 3 (extending the local judicial emergency to January 31, 2021),
available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010859
-file-10114.pdf; In Re: Judicial Emergency as a Result of Covid-19,
Administrative Order, P.J. Guido, 1/8/21, at 1 (extending the local judicial
emergency through March 31, 2021), available at https://www.pacourts.us/
Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010957-file-11026.pdf; In Re: Judicial
Emergency as a Result of Covid-19, Administrative Order, P.J. Guido,
3/25/21, at 1 (extending the local judicial emergency through April 30, 2021),
available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/011026
-file-11352.pdf; In Re: Judicial Emergency as a Result of Covid-19,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On June 21, 2021, our Supreme Court issued a per curiam order, stating

that president judges were no longer authorized to declare judicial

emergencies, and, “to the extent declarations of local judicial emergencies

[were] in effect suspending the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a

prompt trial,” those declarations “may remain in effect until August 31, 2021.”

See In Re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, No. 553 Judicial

Administration Docket, Order, 6/21/21 (per curiam), at 1 (unnumbered),

available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210621/193440

-june21-judicialadmin.dkt.553certifiedorderinregeneralstatewidejud.emergen

cy.pdf.

       Consistent with President Judge Guido’s unequivocal suspension of the

of Rule 600 “during the period of the local judicial emergency,” that rule was

suspended in the Ninth Judicial District on March 16, 2020, when that district’s

local judicial emergency began, and remained suspended until the eventual

end of the emergency on August 2, 2021. See In re: Ninth Judicial District

– Declaration of Judicial Emergency, Declaration, P.J. Guido, 3/16/20, at

1 (“The operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 shall be suspended in the

9th Judicial District during the period of the local judicial emergency.”),

____________________________________________

Administrative Order, P.J. Guido, 4/19/21, at 1 (extending the local judicial
emergency through June 15, 2021), available at https://www.pacourts.us/
Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/011027-file-11414.pdf; In Re: Judicial
Emergency and Limited Reopening of the Courts, Administrative Order,
P.J. Guido, 6/14/21, at 1 (extending the local judicial emergency through
August 2, 2021), available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/
20210614/205235-cumberlandcounty.pdf.

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available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010524

-file-8513.pdf. Rule 600 was thus effective at the time that Appellant filed his

motion for dismissal under that rule on August 18, 2021.

      In general, a trial court’s denial of a Rule 600 motion is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion; however, it is subject to plenary review when “the

dispositive question implicates legal issues.” Commonwealth v. Harth, 252

A.3d 600, 614 n.13 (Pa. 2021). To the extent that the instant claim can be

resolved by a proper interpretation of the criminal procedures set forth in the

Ninth Judicial District’s judicial emergency declaration, our standard of review

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary because issues of statutory

construction involving the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure present a

pure question of law.    Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 749 (Pa.

Super. 2022).

      Rule 600, in relevant part, provides:

      (A)   Commencement of Trial; Time of Trial

            (1)   For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to
                  commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to
                  trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo
                  contendere.

            (2)   Trial shall commence within the following time
                  periods.

                  (a)   Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
                        is filed against the defendant shall commence
                        within 365 days from the date on which the
                        complaint is filed.

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                                    …

      (C) Computation of Time

            (1)     For purposes of paragraph (A), period of delay at any
                    stage   of   the   proceedings    caused     by   the
                    Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to
                    exercise due diligence shall be included in the
                    computation of time within which trial must
                    commence.     Any other period of delay shall be
                    excluded from the computation.

                                    …

      (D) Remedies

            (1)     When a defendant has not been brought to trial within
                    the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any
                    time before trial, the defendant’s attorney, or the
                    defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion
                    requesting that the charges be dismissed with
                    prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
                    violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the
                    attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with
                    filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the
                    motion.

                                    …

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

      In a Rule 600 analysis, the ‘mechanical run date’ is 365 days after
      the complaint was filed. The ‘adjusted run date’ is then calculated
      by adding any time that is ‘excluded from the computation’ under
      Rule 600(C)(1). If a defendant is not brought to trial by the
      adjusted run date, the case is dismissed.

Commonwealth v. Malone, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 3313781, *2 (Pa. Super.,

filed May 9, 2023) (citations omitted).

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      Here, Appellant only objects to the trial court’s ruling that the period

from May 5, 2020 to December 14, 2020 should be excluded from the court’s

computation under Rule 600(C)(1). That entire period of time elapsed during

the Ninth Judicial District’s local judicial emergency when Rule 600 was

unequivocally suspended in that district pursuant to the plain language of the

district’s initial local judicial emergency declaration.    Appellant’s criminal

complaint was also filed during that emergency.        For computation of time

purposes under Rule 600, the entire period of time from the filing of the

criminal complaint until the end of the Ninth Judicial District’s local judicial

emergency should have been excluded from the trial court’s Rule 600

computation. See Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 719 (Pa. Super.

2023) (“If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600 without qualification,

then the period of the suspension is added to the run date without considering

the Commonwealth’s diligence.”); Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743,

750 (Pa. Super. 2022) (where the plain meaning of a local judicial emergency

declaration in response to the pandemic directed that rule-based, prompt trial

time computations were suspended for the duration of the judicial emergency,

days transpiring during the effective time of the declaration until the expiration

of the declared emergency would not be included under Rule 600

computations).

      Properly accounting for the local judicial emergency suspension period,

the trial court did not err by considering the time from May 5, 2020 to

December 14, 2020, as excludable time for purposes of its calculation under

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Rule 600. There was also no need for consideration of the Commonwealth’s

diligence during that period given the unequivocal suspension of Rule 600

during that time. Where only sixteen days had passed in between the end of

the Ninth Judicial District’s local judicial emergency and the filing of Appellant’s

Rule 600 dismissal notice, there could only have been sixteen days of

includable time for purposes of the mechanical run date when Appellant

alleged a violation of the 365-day speedy trial limit. In these circumstances,

Appellant could not prove a hypothetical violation of Rule 600 that would

necessitate dismissal. Appellant’s Rule 600 motion was premature and thus

the instant claim involving trial court error with respect to the denial of that

motion lacks merit.8

       In his second issue, Appellant asserts that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to properly argue and litigate his Rule 600

motion and failing to preserve claims that the trial court erred by not holding

a formal arraignment and not directing the Commonwealth to file updated bills

of information after his second preliminary hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 30-

32. These ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable on direct

appeal and must be deferred to collateral review under the Post Conviction
____________________________________________

8While it has no bearing on the outcome of our review Appellant’s first claim,
we cannot conceive any Rule 600 violation in this case because the
Commonwealth proceeded to try Appellant within 365-days of the end of the
Ninth Judicial District’s local judicial emergency. See Malone, --- A.3d ----,
2023 WL 3313781, at *4 (holding that, where a defendant’s criminal complaint
was filed while Rule 600 was unambiguously suspended, “[t]he Rule 600
computation … did not begin until Rule 600 was no longer unambiguously
suspended”).

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Review Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.         See Commonwealth v.

Rosenthal, 233 A.3d 880, 887 (Pa. Super. 2020) (refusing to consider

ineffective assistance on direct review), citing Commonwealth v. Holmes,

79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013) (stating that, except in limited, identified

circumstances, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred

to PCRA review”), and Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 228 A.3d 577, 584 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (same).

       Our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the general rule

for deferring review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims until collateral

review:

       The first exception … affords trial courts discretion to entertain
       ineffectiveness claims in extraordinary circumstances where a
       discrete claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the
       record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration
       best serves the interests of justice. The second exception … gives
       trial courts discretion to address ineffectiveness claims on post-
       sentence motions and direct appeal if there is good cause shown
       and the defendant knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement
       to seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence.

Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 360 (Pa. 2018), citing Holmes,

79 A.3d at 563-564. The third exception allows “trial courts to address claims

challenging trial counsel’s performance where the defendant is statutorily

precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review.” Delgros, 183 A.3d at

361.    In this instance, none of these exceptions apply: Appellant is not

statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review; Appellant has

not demonstrated any reason for unitary review necessitating the review of

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ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal; and Appellant has

not demonstrated that he has offered any waiver of subsequent PCRA review.

Accordingly, we must defer review of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims.

      In his third issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court and the

Commonwealth violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. Appellant’s Brief at 33-34, citing Barker

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In evaluating claims alleging constitutional

speedy trial issues, our standard of review “is whether the trial court abused

its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings

and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party.” Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. 2020) (citation

omitted). Here, Appellant makes no effort to discuss any abuse of discretion

with respect to a ruling on a constitutional speedy trial rights claim and instead

appears to be making an argument in the first instance that his speedy trial

right under the Sixth Amendment was violated due to a lack of notice as to

his charges and the scheduling of court proceedings in this matter. Appellant’s

Brief at 33-34.

      We cannot entertain this claim because Appellant waived it by not

preserving it before the trial court. In his counseled motion to dismiss, he

failed to make an explicit assertion of a violation of his constitutional right to

a speedy trial and offer any arguments that addressed a constitutional speedy

trial right violation claim. Instead, in a section in that motion entitled “Rule

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600,” he merely referenced “a violation of Rule 600 and a speedy trial

standard,”    asserted     that    he   never      requested   any   continuances   or

postponements, averred that the “the grace period allotted to the courts for

the COVID-19 pandemic was overreached,” and noted that fifteen months had

elapsed since his arrest. Motion to Dismiss or Remand, 8/18/21, ¶¶ 4-8. To

the extent Appellant seeks to raise a constitutional claim on appeal asserting

a violation of the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, we deem it

to be waived for lack of preservation. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in

the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”);

see also Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(“Even issues of constitutional dimension cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal.”).

       In his last issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred and violated

his right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution by not holding a hearing on his motion to waive counsel

and proceed pro se that he filed on March 18, 2022, prior to him failing to

appear for trial and being tried in absentia.9 Appellant’s Brief at 35-36. He

____________________________________________

9 Within this issue, Appellant also asserts that trial counsel violated his Sixth
Amendment rights by ignoring his motion to proceed pro se and not requesting
a hearing on the motion. Appellant’s Brief at 35-36. Implicit in the trial
counsel ineffectiveness component of this issue, Appellant seems to be
addressing the fact that trial counsel did not preserve any trial court error
claim with respect to the court’s failure to hold a hearing on his motion to
proceed pro se. Consistent with our discussion of Appellant’s second issue,
we must defer any ineffectiveness claim related to the instant issue to
collateral review.

                                          - 20 -
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asserts that the trial court should have granted a continuance to hold a hearing

on the motion to proceed pro se. Id. at 35. This trial court error claim is

waived for lack of preservation because trial counsel, in Appellant’s absence

at trial, raised no objection to the trial court’s decision to proceed with the

trial in absentia without first ruling on the motion to proceed pro se. Pa.R.A.P.

302(a); Strunk, supra.

      Even assuming arguendo that the instant claim was not waived for lack

of preservation, Appellant fails to present this Court with any authority from

which we could conclude that his decision to absent himself from his trial did

not constitute a waiver or forfeiture of his motion to proceed pro se, or in the

alternative, that the trial court should have granted a continuance to consider

the motion to proceed pro se after Appellant willfully failed to appear for trial.

      The right to appear pro se is guaranteed so long as the defendant

understands the nature of his choice to waive counsel. Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806, 821, 835 (1975) (implicit in the structure of the Sixth

Amendment is the right of a criminally accused to conduct his own defense);

see also Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1280 (Pa. 2020) (a

defendant’s right to act as his own counsel “is implicit in the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and explicit in Article I, Section 9 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution”). At the same time, “[i]t is well established that a

defendant can waive the right of self-representation after asserting it.”

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 737 (Pa. 2004). A defendant may

also forfeit his right to self-representation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46

                                     - 21 -
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(a trial court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who

deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct[;] … the right

of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom”

or to fail to “comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law”);

see also Tighe, 224 A.3d at 1280 (“misbehavior affecting the right to self-

representation is not restricted to the courtroom and the ‘relevant rules of

procedure and substantive law’ are not limited to those occurring only in the

trial itself”).

       In Pennsylvania criminal matters, requests to proceed pro se are

addressed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Among other things, the rule provides that a

defendant may waive the right to be represented by counsel and sets forth

the minimum information that must be elicited from a defendant to ensure

that their waiver    of counsel   is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(1)-(2). With respect to the instant case, “[w]hen the

defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing,

the judge shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, whether this is a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(C);

see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(3) (noting that a judge may permit the attorney

for the Commonwealth or the defendant to conduct the examination of the

defendant’s awareness of the factors addressed in Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2) and

that the judge shall be present during that examination); Commonwealth v.

McDonough, 812 A.2d 504, 508 (Pa. 2002) (concluding that Faretta requires

an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy

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may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel). “Before

a defendant is permitted to proceed pro se, however, the defendant must first

demonstrate that he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waives his

constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Starr,

664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (Pa. 1995).

      In the instant case, Appellant waived or forfeited his motion to proceed

pro se by failing to appear for the scheduled trial listing. By willfully absenting

himself from the trial process, he made it impossible for the trial court to

conduct or oversee a colloquy pursuant to Rule 121, and he failed to meet his

burden of demonstrating the voluntariness of his request to proceed pro se

prior to the Commonwealth requesting to proceed with the trial in absentia.

Upon the unjustified absence of Appellant for trial, there was no ability or

reason to conduct a hearing on Appellant’s motion to proceed pro se:

Appellant declined to seek self-representation at the same time that he

declined to be present for trial. In these circumstances, counsel remained in

place and no action was taken on the motion to proceed pro se to ensure that

Appellant kept his representation as the Commonwealth was able proceed

without him.    See Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A) (“The defendant’s absence without

cause at the time scheduled for the start of trial or during trial shall not

preclude proceeding with the trial, including the return of the verdict and the

imposition of sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Sullens, 619 A.2d 1349, 1352

(Pa. 1992) (holding that “when a defendant is absent without cause at the

time his trial is scheduled to begin, he may be tried in absentia”).

                                      - 23 -
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      To the extent that Appellant suggests that the outstanding motion to

proceed pro se should have compelled a grant of a continuance in spite of his

absence for trial, we disagree that the denial of a continuance would have

constituted an abuse of discretion. Our Court has noted that “a defendant’s

constitutional right to counsel of his choice is not absolute and ‘must be

weighed against[,] and may be reasonably restricted by[,] the state’s interest

in the swift and efficient administration of criminal justice.’” Commonwealth

v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019). Moreover, “[a] trial court

has ‘wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs

of fairness … and against the demands of its calendar.’” Commonwealth v.

Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 542 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). When we

made these points in Broitman and Prysock, we were reviewing instances

where trial courts failed to grant continuance requests to permit defendants

to retain new counsel where the requests for the continuances were made

shortly before or on the day of a scheduled jury trial, but they are appropriate

to consider in this instance where Appellant motioned to proceed pro se a

week before a scheduled trial and then ultimately failed to appear for trial.

      To permit a continuance for Appellant’s motion to proceed pro se while

the Commonwealth had the ability to proceed with trial given his voluntary

absence, would have permitted Appellant to succeed at immobilizing the

commencement of trial until a time of Appellant’s choosing and allowed him

to cause delay that would have perhaps discouraged the appearance of

prosecution witnesses. In these circumstances, a request for a continuance

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was undermined by Appellant’s failure to appear for trial and appeared to be

part of a pattern of dilatory conduct by Appellant where the instant request to

proceed pro se was a serial request of that nature and made after another

outlandish pro se motion that compelled the trial court to order a competency

evaluation. See Pro Se Request for the Death Penalty, 10/29/21, 1. In this

instance, a denial of an eleventh-hour continuance for a defendant who failed

to appear for trial would not have been an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 A.3d 466, 475 (Pa. 2014) (holding that a

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a defendant’s untimely, day-

of-trial request for a continuance, so that he could represent himself;

“defendants should not be permitted to unreasonably ‘clog the machinery of

justice’ or hamper or delay the effort to administer justice effectively”). Even

if Appellant had preserved his claims alleging a violation of his right to self-

representation, we would not conclude that they entitle him to relief.

      Appellant’s Rule 600 claim is meritless where time attributed to

statewide and local judicial emergencies in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic

needed to be excluded from a time calculation pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

600(C). His claims challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel must await

collateral review under the PCRA. His claim raising a violation of his speedy

trial right under the United States Constitution is waived for lack of

preservation. His claim alleging a violation of his right to self-representation

is waived for lack of preservation and, in any event, meritless where Appellant

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failed to appear for trial, days after he filed his motion to proceed pro se, and

the Commonwealth moved to proceed with a trial in absentia.

      Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/21/2023

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