Court Opinion

ID: 9763315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:40:59.902212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.962470
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
The appellants and the respondent both file motion for rehearing.
The appellants’ motion suggests that we have departed from the principle of liberal construction which is appropriate for remedial statutes such as § 379.203, RSMo Supp.1982, and from the teachings of Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. banc 1976). Cameron Mutual, however, was not based on a construction of the governing statute, but rather on our analysis of the underlying policy of a statute which did not provide an explicit answer within its four corners to the question presented. There should be some hesitation in implying terms which the legislature did not specify.
The respondent’s motion goes only to Part III of the opinion. It argues that we have overlooked established authority in holding that there is an ambiguity as to whether the limits of liability apply separately to claims of all persons arising out of a single bodily injury, including claims for loss of services. It relies primarily on United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, 522 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. banc 1975). Contrary *272to respondent’s suggestion, however, the cases do not involve “essentially the same language,” but demonstrate a sharp distinction. The language in Safeco refers expressly to “damages for loss of services.” The policy there involved stated explicitly something the policy before us lacks.
Respondent also cites numerous cases from other states. Most of these make express reference to damages for loss of services.1 Two others cite and appear to rely on cases which do.2 The remaining cases involve language very different from the language of the policy now before us.3
What the respondent’s citations show is that it is possible to write policy language that is clearer than the language respondent has chosen to use. Cf. the language used in Hines v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 656 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. banc 1983).
The motions for rehearing are overruled.
RENDLEN, C.J., HIGGINS, GUNN, BILLINGS, BLACKMAR and DONNELLY, JJ., and MORGAN, Senior Judge, concur.
WELLIVER, J., not sitting.

.Sheffield v. American Indemnity Co., 245 S.C. 389, 140 S.E.2d 787 (1965); Smith v. Cassida, 403 Pa. 404, 169 A.2d 539 (1961); Bernat v. Socke, 180 Pa.Super. 512, 118 A.2d 253 (1955); Napier v. Banks, 9 Ohio App.2d 265,224 N.E.2d 158 (1967); Hutton v. Martin, 43 Wash.2d 574, 262 P.2d 202 (1953); West American Insurance Co. v. Buchanan, 11 Wash.App. 823, 525 P.2d 831 (1974); Gass v. Carducci, 52 Ill.App.2d 394, 202 N.E.2d 73 (1964); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hodges, 221 Ga. 355, 144 S.E.2d 723 (1965); Holtz v. Mutual Service Casualty Co., 264 Minn. 121, 117 N.W.2d 767 (1962); Yancey v. Utilities Insurance Co., 23 Tenn.App. 663,137 S.W.2d 318 (1939); Bulman v. Bulman, 271 Wis. 286, 73 N.W.2d 599 (1955). Cf. Ehlers v. Gold, 169 Wis. 494, 173 N.W. 325 (1919).

. Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 Ark. 57, 477 S.W.2d 186 (1972); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Comelsen, 272 Md. 48, 321 A.2d 149 (1974); Universal ' Underwriters Insurance Corp. v. Reynolds, 129 So.2d 689 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1961), in which the opinion does not set out the policy language, but relies on New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hart, 153 Fla. 840, 16 So.2d 118 (1943), involving policy language similar to that of the cases cited in footnote 2, supra.

. Perkins v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., 44 Cal.App.2d 427, 112 P.2d 670, 671 (1941), “... the limit of the company’s liability on account of bodily injuries to or the death of one person