Court Opinion

ID: 9635024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:32:43.676482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:14.970820
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Appellant appeals to our Court from convictions before a jury and judge of the crimes of robbery and criminal conspiracy. He assigns a number of reasons why he should have judgment arrested or a new *144trial granted. We shall discuss these issues in the order in which they are raised. A recitation of the facts is necessary for a better understanding of the issues.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as we must since it is the verdict winner, the following facts appear. There are two stores, in the City of Altoona, involved in this appeal. They are named Sheetz Kwik Shopper. One is located at Lexington Avenue and Fourth Street (Lexington Kwik), the other at Union Avenue and Fifth Avenue (Union Kwik). On July 2, 1975, two masked men, one armed with a gun, the other with a knife, at 2:50 A.M., robbed Lexington Kwik and fled in an automobile. On July 15, 1975, one man armed with a gun (which although shaped like an automatic was actually a starter pistol) at 12:43 A.M. robbed Union Kwik. He escaped in the automobile of John Edward Nagle who was waiting outside to pick him up. The loot was divided although Nagle claimed he returned his share to his accomplice.
On July 16, 1975, Byron D. Musselman was arrested and charged with robbery of the two stores. He made a confession in which he implicated Nagle. On August 20, 1975, Nagle gave himself up to the police. He was charged with robbery1 of Lexington Kwik (On July 2, 1975) and with criminal conspiracy 2 in connection with the robbery of that store (On July 15, 1975). Nagle made a confession in which he also involved Musselman, hereinafter referred to as the co-defendant.
Both defendants were tried together. Nagle was found guilty of robbery of Lexington Kwik and of criminal conspiracy in connection with the robbery of Union Kwik. He was sentenced to not less than three nor more than seven years on the conspiracy charge and two to five years on the robbery to run consecutively.3
*145During the course of the trial the confession of each defendant was introduced into evidence. The name of the non-signing defendant was blotted out of each confession, that is in Musselman’s confession Nagle’s name was deleted. The trial judge gave cautionary or limiting instructions to the jury both at the time the confessions were read into evidence and during his charge to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that each confession could be used solely against the party making it and not against the other party. Appellant claims it was error to allow the confessions into evidence. He relies on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 86 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) wherein the Supreme Court held that an accused’s right to cross-examination is violated when during a joint trial the confession of a co-defendant inculpating the accused is admitted into evidence but the co-defendant, the maker of the confession does not testify. The Supreme Court held this to be so notwithstanding instructions to the jury that the co-defendant’s confession could not be considered and must be disregarded by the jury in determining the accused’s guilt or’ innocence. In Bruton the accused’s name appeared in the co-defendant’s confession. It was on the basis that the jury heard an out of court statement implicating the accused who .had no opportunity to test the truthfulness of it that the Supreme Court held the accused had been denied his right of confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against him. In Bruton it was suggested by the court that a possible means of assuring that a defendant’s right to cross-examination was not abridged and at the same time allowing the admission of a co-defendant’s' confession into evidence was to delete the name of the defendant from the confession. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) footnote 10. Recently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Johnson, 474 Pa. 410, 378 A.2d 859 (1977) wherein it held that a co-defendant’s confession could be admitted into evidence against a defendant provided the defendant’s name is deleted, the narrative integrity of the confession is not altered and the confession does not refer to the defendant. This is to assure *146that the defendant’s sixth amendment rights are not violated. The majority in the instant case maintains that the deletion of the appellant’s name was not sufficient to protect his sixth amendment rights. The majority correctly points out that the purpose of the right to confrontation is to test the truthfulness of the statements contained in the confession. However, with respect to the conspiracy charge, a review of the facts establishes that the truthfulness of the statements were sufficiently tested and therefore the admission of the co-defendant’s confession with the appellant’s name deleted was proper. The confession of Musselman did not attempt to exculpate himself and inculpate Nagle alone, but in its language involved both parties in both robberies.4 Musselman’s statements were competent evidence. They were statements against his penal interest and hence although made out of court were exceptions to the hearsay rule and were qualified to be considered by the fact finder. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 324 A.2d 344 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa.Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973).5 The truthfulness of Mussel-man’s statements were tested in large measure by being *147against his own penal interest. Furthermore insofar as the Union Kwik (July 15th) robbery is concerned the truthfulness of Musselman’s statements were tested further by the confession of Nagle which corroborated the statements in Musselman’s confession. Inasmuch as the truth of the Musselman confession was tested in two ways, one by being against his penal interest and two by Nagle’s own corroborating confession there is no reason or need for cross-examination by Nagle of his nontestifying co-defendant Mussel-man. Nagle’s confession was to the Union Kwik (July 15th) robbery only. He did not confess to the Lexington Kwik (July 2nd) robbery. Inasmuch as Musselman’s statements implicating Nagle in the Lexington Kwik robbery were not corroborated by Nagle in his confession or otherwise, I find that he was denied his right of cross-examination as to the Lexington Kwik robbery. I find this notwithstanding the facts that Nagle’s name was deleted from Musselman’s confession, that the trial judge gave cautionary instructions to the jury and that Musselman’s confession was against his penal interest and did not attempt to exculpate himself and inculpate Nagle.
Appellant’s next argument maintains that the lower court erred in denying his demurrer to the evidence in the Lexington Kwik case. In the light of the evidence introduced at trial the demurrer was properly refused. I would not decide what the decision should be if a demurrer is made in the retrial.
Appellant next argues that the lower court erred in permitting the introduction into evidence of his waiver of rights. He maintains that the waiver had no relevancy to the proceedings and only served to prejudice his case. However, the lower court permitted the waiver to be introduced for the purpose of showing that the appellant’s statement which was also introduced was given voluntarily. In Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972), a case cited by the appellant, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated at 448 Pa. on page 388, 292 A.2d on page 289:
*148Any analysis of the admissibility of a particular type of evidence must start with a threshold inquiry as to its relevance and probative value. A leading commentator has suggested the following desideratum for relevancy: “[D]oes the evidence offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence? . Relevant evidence, then, is evidence that in some degree advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, and is prima facie admissible.” McCormick, Evidence, § 152 at 318-19 (1954) (emphasis in original); (Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 9-10 at 289-95, 3rd ed. 1940).
Whether or not a statement made by a defendant is voluntary is essential to the admissibility of the statement into evidence. Therefore any evidence that would have a bearing on the issue of voluntariness is essential. I find the lower court did not err in permitting the appellant’s waiver of rights to be admitted for the purpose of showing that his statement to the police was voluntary.
Appellant also argues that the statement itself should not have been admitted into evidence. He maintains that the reading into evidence of his statement6 constituted a denial of his right against self incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the statement was not a confession or admission but was totally exculpatory. However, the reasoning of his argument is not sound. If, as he states, the statement was not an admission or a confession then the reading of it into evidence can hardly be called a violation of his right against self incrimination. He refers to the statement as being exculpatory thus its admission could only serve to help him. *149This possibility was even further advanced by the admission of his waiver which established that the statement was voluntary. Appellant cites no authority for his position that if a statement is not an admission or confession then it cannot be admitted into evidence. I therefore find that the lower court did not err when it allowed appellant’s statement to be read into evidence.
Appellant also argues that the verdict was contrary to the law, and contrary to the evidence. As I stated above, the statement of the co-defendant was properly admitted as was the statement of the appellant. These statements along with the other evidence introduced by the Commonwealth were sufficient to sustain the verdicts and therefore the verdicts cannot be said to be contrary to the evidence.
The test of the sufficiency of the evidence — irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial, or both — is whether, accepting as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which he has been convicted. Commonwealth v. Frye, 433 Pa. 473, 481, 252 A.2d 580, 584 (1969).
Finally, appellant argues that the sentences imposed for his involvement in the two robberies was excessive. In view of the way I would dispose of this case, calling for a retrial and for resentencing it is not necessary to consider the claim of excessive sentences.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial at No. 938 of 1975 of the court below. I would affirm at Number 937 of 1975 of the court below and provide that upon the conclusion of the proceedings in the court below at its Number 938 of 1975 the sentence at Number 937 of 1975 shall be vacated for resentencing by the court below.
PRICE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482 No. 334, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.

. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482 No. 334, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

. Musselman was also found guilty on both charges of robbery.

. While Musselman’s confession tried to depict Nagle as the “leader” he nevertheless confessed to his own participation in the robberies.

. Cf. Commonwealth v. Colon, 461 Pa. 577, 337 A.2d 554 (1975). In Colon the court concluded that the facts contained in a declarant’s confession which exculpated a possible accomplice were not statements against interest and hence were inadmissible. However, the court stated that portion of the confession which contained facts contrary to the declarant’s penal interest fell within the exception to the hearsay rule and would have been admissible had it not been that it was deemed irrelevant to the Commonwealth’s case against the defendant. In the instant case, Musselman’s statement involved both himself and the appellant insofar as they acted in concert in committing the Union Kwik robbery. In other words their actions were directly related to each other, and therefore the statement implicated Musselman in two crimes, i. e., criminal conspiracy and robbery. Furthermore, Nagle’s statement corroborated nearly all of the facts related to that particular robbery contained in Musselman’s statement and thus added to its trustworthiness. On the basis of this distinction from the facts of Colon, it is not necessary to consider the problem of possible divisibility of the Musselman statement and it was properly admitted in its entirety as competent evidence.

. Appellant’s statement acknowledged the fact that he was with the co-defendant on July 15, 1975, when the Union Kwik was robbed. However, appellant maintained throughout his statement that he had no idea that the co-defendant was going to rob the store. He stated that the co-defendant obtained the starter’s pistol, which belonged to the appellant and which was used in the robbery, from under the front seat of his car. He further stated that he picked up the co-defendant in his car after he saw him come out of the store with money in his hand and start running down the street. He also stated that initially he took half the money obtained from the robbery but later gave it back to the co-defendant.