Court Opinion

ID: 9514516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:05.832162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.512764
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring specially).
[¶ 16.] I agree that the order granting summary judgment should be affirmed on •the basis that there are no genuine issues of ■material fact concerning Guilford’s defamation cause of action.
. [¶ 17.] I write specially to state that I regard Mark Heuston’s conduct deplorable and inexcusable. Heuston obviously did not view Guilford as an unfit employee — on the •contrary, he rehired him for the same job, salary, and benefits just as soon as he succeeded in ruining Guilford’s plan to change employment.
[¶ 18.] Notwithstanding the fact that Heu-ston’s conduct did not constitute defamation under these circumstances, there are genuine issues of material fact whether his conduct constituted tortious interference with Guil-ford’s relationship with NWPS.* Unfortunately for Guilford, that part of the order granting summary judgment was not appealed.

 See Landstrom v. Shaver, 1997 SD 25, ¶ 73, 561 N.W.2d 1, 16: "We recognized the cause of action of tortious interference with business relationships or expectancies in Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898 (S.D. 1992). Therein we held the plaintiff must prove the following essential elements to prevail on her claim:
1. the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy;
2. knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy;
3. an intentional and unjustified act of interference on the part of the interferer;
4. proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and,
5. damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted.”
(Citing Tibke, 479 N.W.2d at 908).