Court Opinion

ID: 9927855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 15:06:27.71183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:27:41.932828
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                        EVERETT ESTATES V. GINGER WOODS HOME ASSN.

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                              EVERETT ESTATES, L.L.C., APPELLANT,
                                                 V.

 GINGER WOODS HOME ASSOCIATION AND GINGER WOODS II HOME ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES.

                              Filed January 30, 2024.   No. A-23-287.

       Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: LEANNE M. SRB, Judge. Affirmed.
       Heather Voegele and Andreanna C. Smith, of Voegele Anson Law, L.L.C., for appellant.
       Richard P. Jeffries, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson, & Oldfather, L.L.P., and Tavia
Bruxellas McAlister, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellees.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and BISHOP, Judges.
       PIRTLE, Chief Judge.
                                        INTRODUCTION
       Everett Estates, L.L.C., appeals the order of the district court for Douglas County denying
its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Ginger Woods
Home Association and Ginger Woods II Home Association (collectively “Ginger Woods”) finding
that Everett Estates was not a good faith purchaser of the disputed property. Everett Estates also
appeals a subsequent order of the district court finding that it did not prove its adverse possession
claim against Ginger Woods. Based on the reasons that follow, we affirm.
                                         BACKGROUND
        This case involves a dispute over ownership of a piece of property located in western
Douglas County. On September 10, 2019, Everett Estates filed a complaint for declaratory relief
against Ginger Woods, alleging that it purchased the property at issue from Smith & Johnson Land

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Company, Ltd., in October 2017. According to the complaint, Smith & Johnson issued a
partnership warranty deed for the benefit of Everett Estates to transfer the property. On October
18, 2017, Everett Estates recorded the partnership warranty deed with the Douglas County Register
of Deeds. In 2018, Everett Estates intended to sell portions of the property and upon learning of
the proposed sale, Ginger Woods claimed it had an interest in the property based on a partnership
quitclaim deed dated June 15, 1993, it had from Smith & Johnson. The quitclaim deed was never
recorded. Everett Estates alleged that from June 15, 1993, until October 2017, Smith & Johnson
continuously, openly, and notoriously possessed the disputed property, including paying the real
estate taxes; that at the time of purchasing the property from Smith & Johnson, Everett Estates was
unaware of the existence of the quitclaim deed; and since October 2017, Everett Estates has
continuously, openly, and notoriously possessed the property, including paying the real estate
taxes. Everett Estates asserted it was the rightful owner of the property and requested a judgment
quieting title to the property to Everett Estates.
         Ginger Woods filed an answer, and subsequently an amended counterclaim, denying any
knowledge of Everett Estates’ ownership of the property and alleging that any partnership warranty
deed issued by Smith & Johnson for the benefit of Everett Estates was a nullity because Smith &
Johnson had no ownership interest in the real estate subject to said partnership warranty deed,
having conveyed all of its right, title, and interest in the property to Ginger Woods in June 1993
pursuant to a partnership quitclaim deed. Ginger Woods alleged that it owned the property based
on the quitclaim deed and further because it had been in continuous, open, and notorious
possession of the property for more than 10 years. Ginger Woods alleged that Everett Estates has
no interest in the property and that its cause of action should be dismissed with prejudice.
         In response to Ginger Woods’ amended counterclaim, Everett Estates filed an answer
denying the allegations and asserting multiple affirmative defenses. Everett Estates alleged that
Ginger Woods failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; that Everett Estates was
the current owner through ownership by deed; that it was the current owner through adverse
possession; that Ginger Woods’ claim was barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches;
that Ginger Woods abandoned the property at issue; that Ginger Woods disclaimed its interest in
the property; and that Ginger Woods ratified Everett Estates’ ownership in the property.
         Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, asserting ownership of the property and
asking the court to find it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A hearing was held on both
motions.
         The evidence at the summary judgment hearing showed that in June 1993 Everett L. Smith
delivered a partnership quitclaim deed for the disputed property to William J. Fleissner, the
president of Ginger Woods, for the benefit of Ginger Woods. Smith signed the deed as general
partner of Smith & Johnson.
         Kirk Hanson, an officer of Smith & Johnson in October 2017 and at the time of the hearing,
testified in his deposition that Smith, his great-grandfather, was a general partner of Smith &
Johnson but he did not know if he was a general partner in 1993. Hanson testified that in 1993, the
property at issue was owned by Smith & Johnson, as well as prior to October 13, 2017, when the
property was transferred to Everett Estates. Everett Estates was established in September 2016. In
addition to being an officer of Smith & Johnson, Hanson was the managing member or president
of Everett Estates. Hanson testified as to who the partners of Smith & Johnson were, as well as the

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members of Everett Estates as of October 13, 2017, when the warranty deed was signed. On that
date, Kirk Hanson Sr. (Hanson’s father), Hanson Family Investments L.P. (Hanson’s ownership
interest), and Rhonda Hanson (Hanson’s mother) were general partners of Smith & Johnson, as
well as members of Everett Estates. In Hanson’s affidavit he stated that “[a]t no time prior to
October 13, 2017, was Everett [Estates] ever aware of any other deeds or instruments purporting
to transfer any ownership interest in the Disputed Property.”
        Following the hearing, the court concluded that Everett Estates had notice of the 1993
quitclaim deed and was not entitled to protection as a subsequent good faith purchaser as a matter
of law. It found, therefore, that Ginger Woods’ 1993 quitclaim deed took priority over Everett
Estates’ 2017 warranty deed as a matter of law. The court sustained Ginger Woods’ motion for
summary judgment as to that issue.
        The trial court further found there was contradictory evidence regarding Everett Estates’
possession of the property and, therefore, a genuine issue of material fact existed which precluded
judgment as a matter of law on Everett Estates’ adverse possession claim. Additionally, the court
found there was evidence regarding Ginger Woods’ possession of the property which precluded
judgment as a matter of law on Everett Estates’ abandonment claim. Everett Estates’ motion for
summary judgment was overruled.
        A bench trial was subsequently held to determine whether Everett Estates took ownership
of the property through adverse possession between 2005 and 2015, and whether Ginger Woods
abandoned the property. Hanson testified on behalf of Everett Estates. A Ginger Woods board
member and a former Ginger Woods board president testified for Ginger Woods. During Hanson’s
testimony, Everett Estates offered the 2017 warranty deed into evidence. Ginger Woods objected
on relevance grounds based on the court’s previous summary judgment ruling. The court sustained
the objection.
        Following trial, the court found that Everett Estates’ adverse possession claim failed
because it failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its possession of the property
from 2005 to 2015 was exclusive and notorious. The trial court also found, and Everett Estates
concedes, that no evidence was submitted to the court in relation to Everett Estates’ abandonment
claim and, therefore, Everett Estates failed to meet its burden of proof on that issue. The court
entered judgment in favor of Ginger Woods and dismissed Everett Estates’ complaint with
prejudice.
                                  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
       Everett Estates assigns that the trial court erred in (1) finding that it was not a bona fide
purchaser of the property and (2) excluding the partnership warranty deed from evidence at trial.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
        An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Pine
Tree Neighborhood Assn. v. Moses, 314 Neb. 445, 990 N.W.2d 884 (2023). An appellate court
affirms a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be
drawn from the facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In
reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable

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to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Id.
        A trial court has the discretion to determine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence,
and such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of that
discretion. Noah’s Ark Processors v. UniFirst Corp., 310 Neb. 896, 970 N.W.2d 72 (2022). In a
civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly
prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party. Id.
                                             ANALYSIS
Good Faith Purchaser of Property.
         Everett Estates first assigns that the trial court erred in finding that it was not a bona fide
or good faith purchaser of the property and granting summary judgment in favor of Ginger Woods.
         Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pine Tree Neighborhood Assn. v. Moses, supra. The
party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie case by producing enough evidence
to show the movant would be entitled to judgment if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial. Id.
If the moving party makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce
evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter of
law. Id.
         Everett Estates argues that it purchased the property from Smith & Johnson without
knowledge of Ginger Woods’ 1993 quitclaim deed, and it recorded its 2017 warranty deed with
the register of deeds. As such, it contends it is a bona fide purchaser of the property entitled to
protection under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-238 (Reissue 2018).
         Section 76-238(1) provides in part:
         [A]ll deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing which are required to be or which
         under the laws of this state may be recorded, shall take effect and be in force from and after
         the time of delivering such instruments to the register of deeds for recording, and not
         before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith without notice. All such
         instruments are void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice whose
         deeds, mortgages, or other instruments are recorded prior to such instruments.

Under our law, instruments which may be but are not recorded are void as to subsequent bona fide
purchasers who record first. See, § 76-238; Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232
Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989); Mader v. Kallos, 219 Neb. 579, 365 N.W.2d 408 (1985). A
good faith purchaser of land is one who purchases for valuable consideration without notice of any
suspicious circumstances which would put a prudent person on inquiry. Caruso v. Parkos, 262
Neb. 961, 637 N.W.2d 351 (2002); Mader v. Kallos, supra. The burden of proof is upon a litigant
who alleges that he or she is a good faith purchaser to prove that he or she purchased the property
for value and without notice. Id. This burden includes proving that the litigant was without notice,
actual or constructive, of another’s rights or interest in the land. Id.

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        Everett Estates argues that it is a subsequent good faith purchaser so its 2017 recorded
warranty deed controls, and Ginger Woods’ 1993 quitclaim deed is invalid as to ownership of the
property. Everett Estates argues that because Ginger Woods’ 1993 quitclaim deed was not
recorded with the register of deeds, it was not in effect prior to Everett Estates recording its
warranty deed on October 13, 2017. It further argues that because the 1993 quitclaim deed was not
recorded, there were no suspicious circumstances that arose when conducting a title search on the
property to put it on inquiry.
        Everett Estates further argues that the evidence does not support Ginger Woods’ contention
that Smith’s knowledge of the 1993 quitclaim deed was imputed to Smith & Johnson, so Smith &
Johnson knew it could not convey the property to Everett Estates in 2017. Everett Estates claims
that because Hanson testified he did not know if Smith was a partner of Smith & Johnson in 1993,
the evidence did not establish that he was a partner at the time the 1993 quitclaim deed was
executed. And, therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Smith’s role with
Smith & Johnson when he signed the quitclaim deed.
        Under the Nebraska Uniform Partnership Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 67-403(6) et seq. (Reissue
2018):
        A partner’s knowledge, notice, or receipt of a notification of a fact relating to the
        partnership is effective immediately as knowledge by, notice to, or receipt of a notification
        by the partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with
        the consent of that partner.

Pursuant to § 67-403(6), notice to any partner is effective as notice to the partnership. See
Fitzgerald v. Community Redevelopment Corp., 283 Neb. 428, 811 N.W.2d 178 (2012). Smith
signed and delivered the 1993 quitclaim deed as “General Partner” and, therefore, his knowledge
of the deed was imputed to all partners of Smith & Johnson. We agree with the trial court that
Hanson’s testimony that he did not know if Smith was a partner in 1993 does not create a genuine
issue of material fact as to his role at Smith & Johnson. Hanson’s lack of knowledge does not
dispute that Smith signed the 1993 quitclaim deed as a general partner. Based on the evidence,
there is no dispute as to Smith’s role at Smith & Johnson at the time the 1993 quitclaim deed was
executed.
        It is also undisputed, based on Hanson’s deposition testimony, that Smith & Johnson had
overlapping ownership with Everett Estates on the date the 2017 warranty deed was executed. On
this date, Kirk Hanson Sr., Hanson Family Investments (Hanson’s ownership interest), and Rhonda
Hanson were general partners of Smith & Johnson, as well as members of Everett Estates. As the
trial court noted, Hanson, the self-described president of Everett Estates, signed his name on the
2017 warranty deed as the grantor on Smith & Johnson’s behalf. Thus, in accordance with
§ 67-403(6), these Smith & Johnson partners had imputed knowledge of the 1993 quitclaim deed
and also as members of Everett Estates. Therefore, Everett Estates had implied or constructive
notice of the 1993 quitclaim deed and is not entitled to protection as a subsequent good faith
purchaser. Accordingly, Ginger Woods’ 1993 quitclaim deed takes priority over Everett Estates’
2017 warranty deed as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in finding that Everett Estates
was not a bona fide purchaser of the property and in entering summary judgment in favor of Ginger
Woods on that issue. Everett Estates’ first assignment of error fails.

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Evidence at Bench Trial.
        Everett Estates next assigns that the trial court erred in excluding the 2017 warranty deed
from evidence at trial. Everett Estates offered the 2017 warranty deed into evidence, Ginger Woods
objected based on relevance as to the matter of adverse possession, and the trial court sustained
the objection.
        Everett Estates argues that the 2017 warranty deed is relevant to its belief that it was the
owner of the disputed property via title and supports its intent to appropriate and use the land to
the exclusion of others. Ginger Woods contends that the premise of Everett Estates’ argument is
faulty because under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person or entity in possession of land
does not need a deed to obtain legal title.
        A party claiming title through adverse possession must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the adverse possessor has been in (1) actual, (2) continuous, (3) exclusive, (4)
notorious, and (5) adverse possession under a claim of ownership for a statutory period of 10 years.
Beckner v. Urban, 310 Neb. 746, 968 N.W.2d 855 (2022). The acts of dominion over land
allegedly adversely possessed must, to be effective against the true owner, be so open, notorious,
and hostile as to put an ordinarily prudent person on notice of the fact that the lands are in the
adverse possession of another. Siedlik v. Nissen, 303 Neb. 784, 931 N.W.2d 439 (2019). If an
occupier’s physical actions on the land constitute visible and conspicuous evidence of possession
and use of the land, that will generally be sufficient to establish that possession was notorious. Id.
        Clearly, possessing a deed is not necessary to prove adverse possession and further, a
party’s belief or intent based on a deed is not a factor to consider in determining whether that party
adversely possesses property. However, assuming without deciding that the 2017 warranty deed
was relevant to Everett Estates’ adverse possession claim, any error by the trial court in refusing
to admit the deed into evidence was not reversible error.
        In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it
unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party. Noah’s Ark Processors v. UniFirst
Corp., 310 Neb. 896, 970 N.W.2d 72 (2022). We conclude that Everett Estates would not have
prevailed on its adverse possession claim even with the admission of the 2017 warranty deed and,
therefore, it was not unfairly prejudiced.
        The trial court found Everett Estates failed to prove its possession of the property from
2005 until 2015 was either “exclusive” or “notorious,” two of the elements necessary to prove
adverse possession. Everett Estates does not appeal these findings or argue how admission of the
2017 warranty deed into evidence would have helped prove either element.
        Regarding exclusive possession, the trial court found that Everett Estates did not meet its
burden because the evidence showed that throughout the relevant time frame Ginger Woods’
residents had consistently used the disputed property for walking, fishing, and “cowboy
breakfasts.” The residents also consistently used the road on the property to access a boat ramp to
launch and remove their boats. There were also locked gates preventing access to the property.
Regarding the locked gates, the trial court stated:
        It is uncontested that [Everett Estates] and Smith & Johnson never had keys to the gates. It
        is also uncontested that, in 2016, [Everett Estates’] attorney sent a letter to [Ginger Woods]
        about how the locked gates prevented its access to the Property. It is hard to imagine how

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       one’s possession can demonstrate the intention to appropriate and use the property to the
       exclusion of all others, when that [entity] is not able to access the property without
       trespassing on another’s land or having the true owner unlock a gate. For these reasons, the
       Court finds [Everett Estates] did not have exclusive possession of the Property from 2005
       until 2015.

        The 2017 warranty deed, even if relevant, would not help prove exclusive possession for
the relevant time frame for purposes of adverse possession.
        Second, the 2017 warranty deed would not help Everett Estates demonstrate ten years of
notorious possession. The trial court stated it “cannot find that [Everett Estates’] possession was
sufficiently notorious until [Everett Estates] or Smith & Johnson began to make improvements on
the property in 2016.” Having failed to establish notorious possession before 2016, the 2017
warranty deed would not have added evidence of notorious possession for the required time frame.
        We conclude that the admission of the 2017 warranty deed into evidence would not have
changed the trial court’s reasoning regarding Everett Estates’ failure to prove exclusive and
notorious possession of the property and would not have changed the outcome. Therefore, even if
the trial court erred in excluding the 2017 warranty deed from evidence, it did not unfairly
prejudice a substantial right of Everett Estates. Everett Estates’ second assignment of error fails.
                                          CONCLUSION
        We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Everett Estates was not a good
faith purchaser of the disputed property as a matter of law and in granting summary judgment in
favor of Ginger Woods. We further conclude that even if the trial court erred in ruling the 2017
warranty deed was irrelevant, it was not reversible error. Both orders of the trial court are affirmed.
                                                                                            AFFIRMED.

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