Court Opinion

ID: 9621640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:02:23.428982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:06.383315
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Vice-Presiding:
concurs in results.
¶ 1 I concur in the affirmance of the judgment and sentence in this case but write separately to address the issue of lesser included offenses. In this case, we review the issue only for plain error as Appellant failed to raise any objections to the heat of passion manslaughter instructions and waived his right to do so now. Finding no plain error, the remainder of the Court’s discussion is only dicta.
¶ 2 First, I believe a foundational discussion is warranted as to preserving the rule of law and an appellate court’s pivotal responsibility in doing so. Stare decisis is defined as “to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” Black’s Law Dictionary, page 1261, 5th Ed. (1979). This legal principle sets a very important cornerstone in legal jurisprudence. The law must provide a steady plumb line if the rule of law is to prevail. The ability of lawyers to competently advise clients and judges to objectively do justice depends on a *1038certain consistency in the development of the law as dictated by stare decisis.
¶ 3 The right to a lesser included offense instruction in this case is granted by 22 O.S.1991, § 916. The Court should apply that language and not judicially amend it. However, this case presents a classic example of how imprecise writing in appellate opinions can later be the basis to disregard the plain language of a statutory rule and expand a legal concept beyond its legislative intent. Judge Lane, in his analysis in Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1079-83 (Okl.Cr.1997), utilized the correct legal methodology in determining Second Degree Murder is not a lesser included offense of First Degree Murder. It is an analysis which can withstand objective scrutiny and is consistent with established legal principles. I disagree with the abandonment of the objective criteria set out in Willingham for the subjective concept set out in Shrum.
¶ 4 Initially, the Court discusses the meaning of the term “necessarily included” as used in 22 O.S.1991, § 916. However, the Court has failed to read that term as simply another way of saying “lesser included”, as this Court and other states have previously done. Applying that application of the term in the statute, section 916 would then be properly interpreted as stating “[t]he jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is [a lesser] included in that with which he is charged, or of an attempt to commit the offense.” Reading Section 916 in this manner is consistent with our prior case law; prior case law which has remained largely (albeit not entirely) consistent through the years. In finding our application of Section 916 so inconsistent, the Court reads entirely too much into the prior cases, taking discussions on the issue of lesser included offenses out of context and failing to take into consideration shortcuts in writing.
¶ 5 Based upon Section 916, this Court has held “[a] lesser included offense is a part of the greater offense and the establishment of the essential elements of the greater offense necessarily establishes all the elements required to prove the lesser included offense.” State v. Uriarite, 815 P.2d 193, 195 (Okl.Cr.1991). “Stated another way, an offense is a lesser included one only where the greater offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing the lesser.” Id. Although Uñante is a relatively recent statement of law, prior case law has generally held that an offense is a lesser included one only where the greater offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing the lesser. Applying this statement of law to the oft raised issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to give a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, a two part analysis should be used. First, the Court must determine whether the requested instruction was for an offense that was a lesser included offense of the offense charged in the information. This determination is not case specific and can only be made by looking at the statutory elements of the offenses in question. Once the determination has been made that an alternate offense is a lesser included offense, then we look to the evidence in the particular case to determine if the evidence in that case warrants an instruction on that lesser included offense. This determination is case specific, depending on the facts and evidence of each individual case. However, opinions often use a shortcut in that analysis and only the evidence presented at trial is analyzed to determine the necessity for the instruction. In certain cases, such a method of analysis can sufficiently resolve the allegation of error raised by the Appellant. It is the same type of analysis that is often used in addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, i.e. if prejudice cannot be shown there is no requirement to determine if counsel’s performance was deficient. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (where a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel can be disposed of on the grounds of lack of prejudice, that course should be followed.) However, such a shortcut in writing does not and should not mean a new test has been invoked to determine the issue of lesser included offenses.
¶ 6 Regardless of the shortcuts or difference in writing styles in prior opinions, the cases are all based on the underlying premise that the alternate charge must be a lesser *1039included offense of the primary charge and that determination is not based upon the particular facts of each separate case. The offenses that comprise lesser included offenses do not change from case to case. The only change is whether the evidence in each particular case is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction.
¶ 7 Additionally, the Court seeks to overturn Willingham as it relates to lesser included offenses. Willingham adopted the analysis contained in the Committee Comments to the OUJI-CR (2d) as to second degree murder. No explanation has been given for abandoning that line of reasoning, and I can find none. The Committee Comments and Willingham are correct statements of the law. The Tenth Circuit has even recognized Willingham as the law of this State. See Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.1999). This opinion does not provide a sufficient reason for overturning Willingham and changing the course of the law in midstream.
¶8 I understand the issue of lesser included offenses is somewhat vexing to both trial and appellate judges. However, the discomfort of this type of legal challenge should not be allowed to be the catalyst to discard objective legal standards. It is for these reasons I must object to the Court’s embarking on an adoption of a policy regarding lesser included offenses that I believe disregards the doctrine of stare decisis and the plain language of Section 916.