Court Opinion

ID: 9851978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:22:35.54699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:20.687711
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(concurring in result):
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the District Court’s refusal to instruct on the lesser and included offenses of attempted burglary and criminal trespass. However, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning, indicated by the following passage from the opinion, which leads to the conclusion that jury instructions concerning lesser and included offenses should not be given whenever a defendant asserts mistaken identity as a defense to criminal prosecution:
The defendant testified he was not even there, basing his defense on mistaken identity. Consequently, it was either burglary or nothing. [Emphasis added.]
Contrary to the foregoing passage, this Court recently announced the appropriate criteria to be considered in determining whether jury instructions on lesser and included offenses should be given when so requested. In State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175, 177 (1976), the following criteria were succinctly established:
[I]f there be any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable theory of the case under which the defendant might be convicted of a lesser [and] included offense, the court must, if requested, give an appropriate instruction. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, in determining whether a jury instruction is appropriate, the court must survey the evidence of any reasonable theory which tends to reduce the severity of the crime charged, regardless of the accused’s plea of mistaken identity.
The District Court properly refused to instruct the jury concerning the lesser offenses of criminal trespass and attempted burglary, not for the reason that the accused’s defense was one of mistaken identity, but due to the fact that his conduct, however viewed, could not have possibly resulted in the commission of such lesser offenses. The offense of criminal trespass 1 requires, inter alia, entry of one’s entire body upon property. Under the present facts, there was no evidence that the defendant’s entire body intruded into the pawn shop. Consequently, there was no evidence upon which the defendant might have been convicted of criminal trespass and the jury instruction regarding such offense was properly refused.
*189In considering whether there existed any reasonable theory under which the defendant might have been convicted of attempted burglary, an analysis of several Utah statutes is necessary. Utah Code Ann., Sec. 76-4-101 (Supp.1975) states that a person is guilty of an attempted crime if, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the substantive offense, he makes a “substantial step” toward its commission. Utah Code. Ann., Sec. 76-6-202 (Supp.1975) states that a person is guilty of the substantive offense of burglary when, acting with an intent to commit a felony, assault or theft, he enters a building. “Enter”, as pertinent herein, “means intrusion of any part of the body”.2 Attempted burglary therefore occurs when a person, acting with an intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, makes a substantial step towards intruding any part of his body into a building.
The facts now under review indicate that the defendant did not make a “substantial step” toward intruding any part of his body into the pawn shop. Rather, his conduct constituted the “ultimate step” of intruding any part of his body into the pawn shop since the evidence shows that he broke a window and tried to remove a golf bag from a display area. Thus, for the reason that there exists no evidence of any reasonable theory under which' the defendant might have been convicted of attempted burglary, jury instructions concerning this offense were properly denied.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice WILKINS.
HALL, J., does not participate herein.

. Utah Code Ann., Sec. 76-6-206 (Supp.1975).

. Utah Code Ann., Sec. 76-6-20l(4)(a) (Supp. 1975).