Court Opinion

ID: 9604059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:13:47.024371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:21.092281
License: Public Domain

GUTHRIE, Chief Justice,
(dissenting).
The writer feels it necessary to file this dissent in order to express his concerned dismay with the result which the majority approved by affirming the judgment in this case. I cannot but feel that the remainder of the court has not fully considered the implications of the approval of this recovery.
I shall, in this dissent, rely upon only very general citations and summary discussion indicative of the rules which I believe applicable. This is done because it has no authority as precedent. I shall rely in nearly all instances on the statement of facts as appears in the majority opinion, which I believe fair and full in most instances.
The majority opinion recognizes that the facts in this case “present a false picture, if viewed literally. They represent an effort on the part of the executor to shift his undetermined and questioned liability for the payment of a broker’s fee to the defendant. They created a mirage that the plaintiff’s services were performed at the behest and on behalf of the defendant.” It further styles it “a devious manipulation,” with which this writer heartily agrees.
This record reveals a careful and determined effort to avoid submission of the question of the necessity and propriety of the employment of a broker to the judge sitting in probate, and the further avoidance of a determination of the reasonable fee therefor. In my view, by this decision this court approves such improper activity and has in effect said that you may do indirectly that which cannot be done directly, which is an anathema to this writer. Plaintiff cannot claim ignorance or that he was overreached as he contracted with this estate charged with the knowledge of the *460law of the powers of the executor, Cooley v. Frank, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446, 451; Blessing v. Pittman, 70 Wyo. 416, 251 P.2d 243, 250; and this rule has even been applied to corporations, Board of Com’rs of Johnson County v. Searight Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. 777, 31 P. 268, 270.
This writer would find no difficulty in holding this agreement or all these related agreements void as tending to impede the regular administration of justice, Bade v. Pickens, Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 260, 264; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 223, p. 1056 — which is also of application in matters affecting the administration of estates (see note 52, p. 1057, 17 C.J.S.) — but believes there are other reasons supporting this position, which it seems important to set out.
This writer sees a distinction to which I believe the majority has not given proper recognition. The executor of an estate whose acts are under the supervision of a court is governed by different rules and standards than an individual who could freely contract without such supervision, and it is my view that some of the authorities cited are inapplicable by reason thereof.
It may be conceded that even absent statutory authority this executor could make a contract with this broker for his assistance and could personally compensate him. However, in absence of such statute the estate would not be liable but the executor would be personally liable, In re Shaw’s Estate, 85 Cal.App. 518, 260 P. 351, 353; Wilson v. Fleming, 106 Cal.App. 542, 289 P. 658, 661-662; and see 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, § 601, p. 165 (2d Ed.), and 2 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, § 368, p. 362 (2d Ed.). Apparently the executor or his counsel was aware of this rule, as we must infer because of his apparent anxiety to in some manner protect himself from this liability even at the expense of the estate. In furtherance of this design he wrote the letter which is referred to in the majority opinion, and in face of the bid from the appellee herein in the sum of $2,060,000 secured an instrument agreeing to this sale for the lesser amount from Mrs. Peters, whom we assume for purposes of this discussion is the sole heir, although the writer is not satisfied from the record that this is the case.
The executor had no authority to bind the estate for any broker’s fee absent any specific statutory authority 1 or approval by the probate court. Any such purported agreement, which is the basis of plaintiff’s claim, is void and unenforceable as against the estate for any brokerage fee without a determination of the reasonableness or necessity of the employment of such broker. The estate could not be bound by such an agreement without the consent of the probate court, In re Shaw’s Estate, supra; Lowrey v. Rego, 65 Cal.App.2d 16, 149 P.2d 706, 710; and this is so even though the contract was for the benefit of the estate, Hill v. Thomas, Ky.App., 462 S.W.2d 922, 926. See generally 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 198, pp. 1180-1182.
I cannot in any way join with the majority insofar as the affirmance of this case is based upon the theory that Legerski is entitled to recovery by virtue of being a third-party beneficiary of a contract between Loss as executor and appellant herein. In my view the holdings of Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28, 30, and In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956, 958, are not applicable herein, and certain parameters of limitations within the issues and evidence must be recognized by this court or they could transform this court into a tribunal for retrial without even the opportunity of the parties to appear anjj present their positions on the new basis of disposal. Particularly is this true when it has not been raised or argued. In this case this approach demonstrably asserts a new basis for recovery upon which appellee has made no reliance nor has appellant had an *461opportunity to present to us any defense thereto.
Nor do I find the cases of Hendrickson v. Heinze, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1133, or School District No. 32 in Fremont County v. Wempen, 80 Wyo. 311, 342 P.2d 232, authority for a basis of disposal upon the third-party beneficiary theory because of factual distinctions, particularly in Hen-drickson wherein the contention was asserted there was no substantial evidence to support the claim of contributory negligence, which was a question clearly presented by the pleadings. In Wempen, as the writer reads it, the question presented was whether the general jury finding included all subsidiary facts to sustain it. Neither case, in my view, justifies or commands a general exploration for possible new theories or findings outside the scope of the issues as a basis for disposal.
The record and evidence herein do not sustain such a basis for affirmance. Leg-erski in his complaint does not assert a right as a third-party beneficiary but claims under a contract directly with this association. In his testimony he reaffirms this claim and states that the letter agreements upon which he relies, and which are set out in the record as Exhibits 2 and 3, are the basis for his claim. The majority opinion sets out the complete paragraph in the letter from Peters Grazing Association signed by Dow, as president, to Mr. Leger-ski, but I think it proper to emphasize the following:
"In view of the services that you have rendered and the effort that you have made on our behalf * * * in full settlement of any claims that you may have for commission or for services rendered in connection with the acquisition of said ranch. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
In another letter by Loss to the association dated the same day, there appears a paragraph which is set out in full in the majority opinion but from which the writer excerpts the portion he believes material:
“ * * * for any services that Mr. Legerski may have performed on behalf of Peters Grazing Association. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
These clearly indicate the basis of plaintiff’s asserted claim and the consideration therefor to have been services rendered to or on behalf of Peters Grazing Association and clearly demonstrate the nature of that claim.
To arrive at the result of the majority, it is my view the court has transgressed the principle recognized in Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41, 95 P. 846, 848, and reiterated in McGinnis v. General Petroleum Corporation, Wyo., 385 P.2d 198, 203, and has assumed the duty of making a contract for these parties.
I would reverse the judgment herein for the reason there was and is no consideration for the agreement under which Leger-ski claims. I find no evidence in the record of any services which he contributed to the association. The association by its answer squarely raised the question of lack of consideration. The second point asserted in the appeal by appellant squarely raises the issue that appellee had performed no services for this association, which I construe as applicable to consideration. As reason therefor reliance is made upon the following statement of the law:
“If in fact there was no consideration for a promise, it is not made enforceable by the fact that there is a written recital of consideration or an acknowledgement that a consideration has been received.” 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 130, p. 558 (1963 Repl.); also see 1 Williston on Contracts, § 115B, pp. 468-469 (3d ed.).
The court, in Allen v. Allen, D.C.Mun.App., 133 A.2d 116, 118, recognized this rule in reliance upon both these authorities.
This issue was directly tendered in this appeal by the second ground which defendant asserts as error. In connection therewith there is unequivocal testimony of Legerski that Dow did not employ him to *462buy the Peters ranch nor was there any agreement with either Mr. Dow or the association. He never showed the ranch to them nor produced the association as a buyer. The record is clear the association’s interest was not occasioned by any activities of Legerski; and although Leg-erski attempts to involve Mr. Barkley as an agent of the association, and did say he worked for Mr. Barkley on behalf of the association, there is certainly no showing of any agency or authority on Barkley’s part, and he is certainly not a member of the association. I cannot believe it is proper to substitute the view of the court as to what the contract was and what should have been pleaded or claimed.
I particularly disagree with any suggestion that this recovery could in any manner be justified on the doctrine of unjust enrichment and agree with the majority that this is certainly not a “pure case” of unjust enrichment but have some fear that the bench and bar may be misled by this discussion. The case of Gard v. Razanskas, 248 Iowa 1333, 85 N.W.2d 612, 65 A. L.R.2d 982, 986, contains a usable definition of the term “unjust enrichment,” and it is to be noted that this definition relates this right to restitution but particularly to the party “ ‘when he is restored to the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money. . . . ’ [Restatement of the Law, Restitution, § 1, p. 12].” There is demonstrably no element of that in this case. The only entity involved in this entire sorry picture which might successfully assert this would be the Peters estate, which has been the victim of an arrangement which deprived the trust res of that estate of $30,000.
In fairness to the association and because of the implication in the majority opinion that the association has engaged in some inequitable or improper activity, it would appear that the so-called equitable picture drawn by the majority should be supplemented by the following facts. The record shows that plaintiff was an.uninvited volunteer who performed unsolicited acts' and then coupled these with the implied threat of a suit, which led the executor into this unholy arrangement. In the absence of any showing of any services performed for the association by Legerski, and in light of the fact that when there was some discussion between the board of directors and Legerski of this claim he refused to state any services he had performed, and the fact he is a volunteer who might also be styled as an impudent interloper, 1 cannot see the equities which arise in his favor as mentioned in the section of this opinion which treats unjust enrichment.
This writer does not believe it improper to suggest that a large portion of the public has had for some years a jaundiced view of probate procedures and in many cases believe them to be utilized not for the best interests of the estate but as a vehicle for enrichment of lawyers — and in this case a real estate broker. The writer cannot deny that such inference might be readily available from the result reached in this case, and it is his view that such result encourages executors and their attorneys to exercise their ingenuity to escape supervisory control of the. probate court and may well encourage the assertion of questionable claims.

. California has by statute authorized the executor to employ a real estate broker, but even then protects the estate with the words “contracts shall be binding in the amount allowed by the court.” 58, West’s Annot.Cal. Codes, Probate Code, § 760, p. 555.