Court Opinion

ID: 9584262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:06.020935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:19.539262
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. The verdict in this divorce case which awarded real estate of the husband-father to two minor children was not, in my opinion, a void verdict.
*842The majority opinion holds that the award of property (and by this I assume is meant real estate) out of the father’s estate to his children is contrary to law. I do not, agree with this conclusion. I see no distinction between awarding real estate, having a determinable value in money, to children and awarding the husband-father’s money to children.
Georgia law provides that where alimony or support or division of property is involved in a divorce action that the property and earnings of the parties must be set forth in the divorce complaint if this information is known. See Ga. L. 1967, p. 761 (Code Ann. §30-105 (6)).
Our Code § 30-201 defines alimony as "an allowance out of the husband’s estate.”
Code § 30-206 provides that in suits for divorce the trial judge may grant alimony, or decree a sum sufficient for the support of the family of the husband dependent upon him. This is upon the theory that the wife and minor children have a legal claim upon his support. This Code section also provides that in the event such an award is made, then the husband shall not be liable to third persons for necessaries furnished to the family.
Code § 30-207 provides that the jury, on the final verdict, may provide permanent alimony for the wife and may specify what amount the minor children shall be entitled to for their permanent support. This Code section also provides that if an award is made for the minor children, then the husband shall not be liable to third persons for necessaries furnished to the children.
Code § 30-208 provides that orders, decrees or verdicts in favor of the children or family of the husband may be enforced as those in favor of the wife exclusively. Code §30-209 provides that the jury may provide permanent alimony for the wife from either the corpus of the estate of the husband or otherwise.
Code § 30-213 provides that where there is no divorce action pending but the husband and wife are living apart that she may institute an action in behalf of herself or in *843behalf of her minor children or in behalf of herself and minor children jointly for alimony.
Code § 30-215 provides that until provision is made for the support and maintenance of the wife and minor children the husband shall be liable for necessaries furnished to them.
It is beyond question that the jury in its verdict can make an alimony award consisting of real estate out of the husband’s estate to the wife. See Wise v. Wise, 156 Ga. 459 (119 SE 410). And in the case of Gholston v. Gholston, 54 Ga. 285, this court construed and applied an Act of 1806 and held that in a divorce case it was competent for the jury to distribute the property between the parties and their children.
I interpret these Georgia statutes as giving a divorce court authority to award support for children out of the property of the father, and it is my opinion that a jury by its verdict may divest the father of title to real estate and the decree based on such a verdict does transfer such real estate to the children for their maintenance and support. See in this connection the case of Cline v. Cline, 186 Tenn. 509 (212 SW2d 361).
I cannot see or understand any logical, practical reason why a jury in a divorce case cannot award real estate out of the husband-father’s estate to the minor children of the father, so that it will belong to such minor children in fee simple.
In my opinion the verdict in this case was not void.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justices Nichols and Hawes join me in this dissent.