Court Opinion

ID: 9492202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:34:50.803315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:45.101276
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The right of a criminal defendant to address the court personally, to speak on his own behalf and to offer information in mitigation of his sentence, is a bedrock of our constitutional jurisprudence that can trace its lineage to the early common law. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961); United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.1991); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1
The purpose of the right of allocution is to give the defendant “the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation.” Green, 365 U.S. at 304, 81 S.Ct. 653. When addressing the court, he may “present any information in mitigation of punishment” to the court meting out the punishment. Id. Defense counsel’s argument for mitigation cannot replace the defendant’s right of allocution. See id.
*950As our court has made clear, however, this right of allocution “is implicated only-before the imposition of sentence, not in all sentencing situations.” Barnes, 948 F,2d at 329. Indeed, as our colleagues in the Fifth Circuit have put it, the “right of allocution embodied in Rule 32 does not exist merely to give a convicted defendant one last-ditch effort to throw himself on the mercy of the court.” United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, the courts of appeals have been required to delineate those resen-tencing situations in which policies embodied in the right of allocution are at stake and those in which its invocation would be superfluous. In undertaking this task, the courts, as a general matter, have distinguished between those situations in which a resentencing requires the modification of an existing sentence and those in which resentencing requires the imposition of a new one. For instance, when the resen-tencing is merely a sentence reduction or a straightforward correction, the court on remand can simply amend the sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Taylor, 11 F.3d 149, 152 (11th Cir.1994). Similarly, if the defendant is a prisoner in federal custody and is resentenced on collateral review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he does not have the right to allocution under that section.2 See Pasquanlle v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir.1997). Or, if the court must execute a deferred sentence, such as one that was suspended in lieu of a probationary period but reimposed when probation was revoked, the execution of that deferred but preordained sentence does not require a renewed right of allocution. See Barnes, 948 F.2d at 329.
By contrast, when the original sentence is vacated on appeal and the first sentence is nullified, the sentencing court starts the resentencing hearing with a “clean slate.” See id. at 330. At that point, the court must make another sentencing determination and the defendant once again must be afforded the right to be present and to address the court personally before the court imposes a new sentence.3 As we made clear in Barnes, when a defendant’s prior sentence is vacated and he is being sentenced anew, “his right to personally address the sentencing judge was resuscitated at the final hearing regardless of whether he had previously exercised it.” Id.
Mr. Tidwell’s situation presents a rather unique situation, but the essential judicial task remains the same: to ascertain whether the policies that animate the right of allocution require his presence at the resentencing. Crucial to our analysis must be the fact that this resentencing is the first time that the district court exercised any discretion with respect to the punishment of Mr. Tidwell. Therefore, the resentencing hearing presented the first occasion in which the right of allocution was significant. At his original sentencing, Mr. Tidwell’s sentence was a man-datorily imposed sentence of life without parole. The district court had no discretion. That sentence was vacated, however, because an amendment to the sentencing guidelines lowered the maximum base offense level of § 2D1.1 from level 42 to level 38 and, crucially, from a mandatory term of life imprisonment to a range of 360 months to life imprisonment. On resen-tencing, Mr. Tidwell therefore had a very justifiable reason to sense, as my colleagues phrase it, “a ray of hope.” The *951sentencing judge now had the discretion, this second time around, to mete out punishment anywhere on a scale from 360 months to life imprisonment. For the first time, the court was required to give thoughtful assessment to the length of time Mr. Tidwell would spend in prison. Mr. Tidwell therefore had a right to be present at the rehearing and to address the court pursuant to Rule 32. He had a right to describe to the court his evidence in mitigation and his conduct since the prior sentencing hearing. “The right to allocution is the right to have your request for mercy factored into the sentencing decision.” Barnes, 948 F.2d at 329.
The sentencing court’s refusal to allow Mr. Tidwell the opportunity to present his plea in mitigation at the only time when, as a practical matter, it could have made any difference, deprived him of an ancient right grounded in the common law and preserved by our Constitution. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. This right of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence is required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(C):
(3) Imposition of Sentence. Before imposing sentence, the court must:
(c) address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence.

. Section 2255 slates that a “court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing." 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

. See United States v. Taylor, 11 F.3d 149, 151-52 (11th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (vacating sentence because of district court's failure to accord defendant his Rule 32 right of allocution at resentencing); see also United States v. Turner, 741 F.2d 696, 698 (5th Cir.1984) (vacating sentence to accord defendant a right of allocution at resentencing after probation revocation); Paul v. United States, 734 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (5th Cir.1984) (vacating sentence to give defendant the right to be present at resentencing which constitutes a new sentence).