Court Opinion

ID: 9771550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:47:04.239454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:32.846768
License: Public Domain

BRADY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
First, I pay high respect to the majority opinion for its attempt to formulate a logical construction for this complex and confused statute. As stated, art. 911b is a patchwork statute riddled with specific specialized exceptions but intended to be a broad regulation of all the state’s commercial motor carriers.1 Although it is the duty of the courts to attempt to construe legislation in a manner to avoid seemingly illogical results, the literal language of this statute and its accompanying statements of legislative purpose suggest that the Legislature intended a much more restrictive regulatory scheme than is reflected in the majority’s opinion. Because the statutory language strictly confines common motor carriers to regular routes and schedules, the Commission’s action in permitting U.P.S. to deliver this sort of freight over irregular routes and schedules in effect creates a new class of carriers. Given the restrictive nature of the statute and the long history of strict judicial interpretation, I cannot agree that this legislation delegated such broad authority to the Commission.
While the Commission may have had jurisdiction to consider the application, it does not necessarily follow that they had the power to grant all portions of it. In my view, the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court in Railroad Commission v. United Parcel Service, 629 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.1981), approved this Court’s holding that the Commission had authority to consider the application because that application contained a proposal for conventional regular routes and schedules which it combined with an additional proposal for irregular routes and schedules. I think the Supreme Court merely recognized that the history of judicial interpretation of art. 911b has been one of strict construction. Whatever authority is not unequivocally granted to the Commission in clear and explicit terms must be considered withheld. Dye Trucking Co. v. Miller, 397 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Article 911b of the Texas Motor Carrier Act creates two separate classes of motor carriers. The article was enacted fifty-eight years ago and has been amended at almost every session of the Legislature since then. In 1941, substantial amendments created a class of motor carriers called “special commodity carriers” while leaving those provisions concerning “regular route carriers” undisturbed and unre-pealed. As pointed out by Justice Pope in Alamo Express, Inc. v. Railroad Commission, 407 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.1966), the procedures for application and regulation of these two classes of motor carriers have different legislative origins and are contained in separate sections of the Act. These classes are also distinguished by the fact that only specialized commodity carriers are expressly permitted operations over irregular routes or schedules.
The earlier opinion by this Court in Railroad Commission v. U.P.S., 614 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.App.1981) which resulted in the above mentioned per curiam decision by the Supreme Court, distinguished Judge Pope’s opinion in Alamo Express, supra, stating that if that Court had intended to say that common carriers were barred by law from operating on irregular routes and on irregular schedules, that the Court would have expressly said so and not left the matter to be inferred. Id. at 913. However, that question was not presented for review in Alamo Express, and in this writer’s view, Justice Pope’s statement that “procedures respecting the two classes of carriers are and always have been different in many ways,” Alamo Express at 482, is sufficiently instructive that we can infer a clear differentiation of legislative purpose concerning the two classes of carriers. This difference in purpose for each class compels us to precisely construe each dif*780ference in the statutory language creating those classes.
In Railroad Commission v. Central Freight Lines, 434 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.), this Court recognized the difference in purpose between the two classes and strictly construed the statute thereby holding the Commission could not authorize a non-specialized motor carrier to operate over irregular routes. In relation to the requirement of regular routes, this Court said:
This language, in our judgment, must be read in context with all the other statutes on the subject. It does not give the Commission unbridled discretion to issue a certificate on any terms or conditions it pleases and without regard to the application for the certificate and the statutes and decisions respecting the contents of the application by which the privileges which may be awarded applicant must be measured.
Id. at 918. The majority opinion in this case appears to retreat from this strict interpretation of the statute and allows the Commission to authorize a common motor carrier to engage in a method of delivery only expressly permitted to specialized motor carriers.
An examination of the statutory language in art. 911b, § 1(g) and (i) defining “motor carrier” and “specialized motor carrier” reveals that only specialized motor carriers are defined as operating over “irregular routes on irregular schedules.” Furthermore, § 10 of art. 911b requires that no application be considered by the Commission unless it sets forth “(2) the complete route or routes ... and (3) a proposed schedule of service ... in addition to a plat or map showing the route or routes over which the applicant desires to operate.” The only language in 911b which would allow the Commission to consider an application without regular route designations is the language establishing the class of specialized motor carriers. Because the nature of the statute requires the differences between the two classes to be strictly construed, it must be assumed by the courts that each class may only be allowed to operate with the characteristics expressly bestowed by the statutory language defining it.
The Legislature intended the Motor Carrier Act to be an exclusive statute only permitting such commercial carrier traffic as expressly authorized by its provisions. This intent is revealed in its accompanying statements of policy. In Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 911b, § 22a (1964), the Legislature stated:
The business of operating as a motor carrier of property for hire along the highways of this state is declared to be a business affected with the public interest. The rapid increase of motor carrier traffic, and the fact that under existing law many motor trucks are not effectively regulated, have increased the dangers and hazards on public highways and make it imperative that more stringent regulation should be employed, to the end that the highways may be rendered safer for the use of the general public; that the wear of such highways may be reduced ...
(Emphasis added). It was also stated under art. 911b § 4 that:
The Commission is further authorized and empowered and it shall be its duty, to supervise and regulate motor carriers in all matters whether specifically mentioned herein or not so as to carefully preserve, foster and regulate transportation and to relieve the existing and all future undue burdens on the highways arising by reason of the use of the highways by motor carriers, adjusting and administering its regulations in the interests of the public.
(Emphasis added). These statements of the legislative purpose motivating this regulatory scheme evidence a clear intent to limit commercial carrier traffic on our state’s highways. Considering the exclusive legislative purpose behind the Motor Carrier Act, the rigid statutory language creating both carrier classifications, and the long tradition of strict judicial interpretation of this regulatory framework, I can conceive of no consistent construction of *781art. 911b which would support the Commission’s approval of this sort of service.
I must respectfully dissent.

. See Railroad Commission v. United Parcel Service, 614 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex.App.1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).