Court Opinion

ID: 9832696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:06:42.029335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:50.227623
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
A few of what we conceive to be the more important' arguments in appellees’ motion for rehearing will be noticed briefly.
It is insisted that we erred in our original opinion in considering any of the evidence heard by the trial court on the issue of the intent of the parties in entering into the contract. That is not the position assumed by appellees in their brief, as we understand it. It was appellant who objected in his brief to any consideration of this evidence, and in resolving the doubt in favor of a consideration thereof we were overruling the objection of appellant, and not of appel-lees. Appellees had no cross-assignments in their brief. We do not, therefore, think that appellees are in a position to complain on rehearing that we considered this evidence. But, in view of their insistence in their motion, we have again carefully considered this contract, and it is our opinion that, construing same as it is written and as if it contained no ambiguity whatever, we believe the intention of the parties in entering into it was to grant to each landowner a severable cause of action for the specific damages provided therein to accrue to him. In other words, if the contract is unambiguous, which, as stated, we are inclined to believe, then appellaht was entitled to maintain this action for his damages; and, if ambiguous, then the evidence heard by the trial court unquestionably establishes this intent.
A contract may be severable in part and entire in part. There is no fixed rule of law determining the question of when a contract is entire, and courts will always undertake to determine the real intention of the parties with reference to each of the provisions of the contract considered in connection with the whole. If appellees’ contention is correct that, for a breach of this contract in any of its particulars by them, no right of action existed in any one of the lessors unless joined by all, a very unusual and almost impossible contract was signed by these lessors. If the term “lessors” as used in the contract imposed such duty upon each and all of the lessors jointly, then the contract would have to be construed as if each of the lessors contracted to lease each and every tract of land to the lessee; that each lessor was to furnish to the lessee an abstract of title to each and every tract of land included in the block; that each lessor owed the duty of correcting the objections to the title in each abstract; and that each lessor must join with the other lessors in a suit for damages, and, as a condition precedent to recovery in such suit, prove that each and every lessor complied fully with his contract, while, at the same time, the consideration accruing to each was only that proportion of the damages represented by the number of acres furnished by him. Such construction of the instrument would render meaningless other specific provisions thereof. We therefore think that where the contract provides that lessors shall furnish titles and shall comply with the terms of the contract, etc., such provisions must be interpreted in the light of other more specific provisions showing that the duty of each lessor applies only to his specific tract of land, and that the intention of the contract was to give to each lessor his action for damages for a breach thereof without reference to whether the other lessors joined him in the suit. .
It is insisted that in determining that the contract was severable we overlooked the principal consideration of the contract, to wit, the drilling of a well on some part of the proposed block. It is argued at great length, and seems to be conceded by appellant, that, as to the provision for drilling a well, the contract was entire. In a limited sense this is true, but not, we think, in the sense insisted upon by appellees. No one of the lessors had the right to insist that the well be placed upon his particular tract of land, but the benefits to be derived by the drilling of the well were individual benefits for the respective lessors, some greater and some less, according to the location made by the lessee of the well. No joint benefits to lessors were contemplated. We agree that, had the contract contained no measure of damages for the failure of the lessee to drill a well, and had the contract been breached only in that particular and a suit filed against the lessee for damages for a breach of that provision of the contract, all the parties to the lease should be made parties to such suit. But that is not the case before us. This contract provides, in substance, that, if the lessee breaches any condition thereof, then the $5 bonus money per acre shall forfeit to the lessors according to their respective acreage. We think that, under the terms of this contract, had the only breach of the contract been the failure on the part of the lessee to drill a well, each lessor would have been entitled to sue for his damages for such breach, and that, in respect to the right of a lessor who had performed to maintain an action for damages against the *625lessee, it is immaterial as to which term of the contract was breaches by the lessee.
Much stress is placed on the contention that three of the lessors had only life estates in their respective tracts of land. The agreement as to the facts introduced in evidence contains two deeds, one from J. H. Gist to his son, Othello Gist, and another from the said grantor to his daughter, Mrs. Jennie Hill, wife of O. E. Hill. These instruments are not before us for construction to determine the character of estates granted thereby, but we do call attention to the fact that in the deed to Mrs. Hill is contained the fight and power to execute any oil and gas mining lease upon the lands, which contract shall remain in full force and effect, according to its terms and not be terminated by her death. The deed to Othello Gist does not contain this- provision. If the contract were entire, as insisted by ap-pellees, and it was the duty of appellant to correct all objections made to all titles as a condition precedent to his right to sue, then, under the authorities cited in the original opinion, this particular objection to the title was waived by appellees, because they did not furnish such objection to appellant until same was set up as a defense to this suit.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.