Court Opinion

ID: 9956581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 16:01:54.337586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:38.241528
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

       IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0193
                                FILED 4-2-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD42280
               The Honorable Marischa Hope Gilla, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Thomas K. Sanders
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
                        Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1           Venesa A. (“Mother”)1 appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights as to her child, A.S. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            In August 2022, A.S. was born substance-exposed and
suffered withdrawal symptoms requiring emergency care. A few days later,
the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) responded to a report that A.S.’s
parents had engaged in substance abuse. Around the same time, Mother
tested positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine. During an interview
with DCS, Mother admitted recently using fentanyl. She later told DCS she
used drugs to cope with stress and had been using fentanyl and
methamphetamine every few weeks for the past year. At the end of August,
DCS petitioned for dependency, took A.S. into custody, and placed A.S.
with his maternal uncle. In September 2022, the juvenile court found A.S.
dependent as to both parents.

¶3            During the dependency, DCS referred Mother for services,
including drug testing, transportation, supervised visits, and drug
treatment. Mother visited A.S. at his placement, but DCS reported “mother
would show up inebriated, [with] slurred speech, slouch[] and nod[] off
while holding the baby and [exhibit] strange behaviors.” DCS then referred
Mother for supervised visits only but eventually closed the referral because
she did not engage in any visits. Mother completed 10 of 38 scheduled drug

1       A.S.’s father filed a notice of appeal but he did not file an opening
brief or join Mother’s opening brief, and we therefore order his appeal
dismissed as abandoned. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 15(a)(1) (allowing the
court to dismiss an appeal when a party does not timely file an opening
brief).

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
                        Decision of the Court

tests resulting in 4 positive tests for methamphetamine, fentanyl, or both.
She did not engage in any other services.

¶4            In December 2022, DCS reported Mother’s substance abuse
“hinders her ability to respond accordingly to her parental and caregiving
needs” and negatively affects A.S. because Mother “is not alert and
focused” and cannot control her impulses. In April 2023, DCS contacted
A.S.’s parents and reported they “stated the overall lack of stability is a key
factor to why they cannot provide for [A.S.].” DCS also reported “[b]oth
parents admitted they have been struggling with their own addiction which
is why they have not been there for [A.S.] and been doing the bare
minimum.”

¶5            On May 25, 2023, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights on three grounds: neglect, chronic substance-abuse, and six-months
out-of-home care. See Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(2), (3),
(8). Mother requested a contested trial. During an August pretrial
conference, the court provided Mother with the date of the termination
hearing and warned her of the consequences of failing to appear.

¶6            On September 13, 2023, the court held the termination
hearing. Mother did not appear, but her attorney was present. Without
objection, the court proceeded in Mother’s absence, finding that she had
actual notice, was warned of the consequences for failing to appear, and
had no good cause for her absence. DCS admitted 18 exhibits including
several DCS reports and Mother’s drug-testing history. The DCS case
manager for A.S. testified and Mother’s attorney cross-examined him.

¶7             Following the hearing, the court terminated Mother’s
parental rights on all three grounds and found termination was in A.S.’s
best interests.

¶8             We have jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal under
Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-
120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Mother’s Apparent Waiver Does Not Relieve the Juvenile Court of
       its Statutory Duties.

¶9             As a threshold matter, we address DCS’s argument Mother
waived her objection to the court’s factual findings by raising the issue for
the first time on appeal.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
                        Decision of the Court

¶10            “Generally, failure to raise an argument in the juvenile court
waives the issue on appeal.” Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532,
536 ¶ 9 (App. 2018). This includes “when a party first raises the issue of
insufficient findings on appeal and the order includes at least some
statutorily required factual findings.” Id. at 536 ¶ 10. “[T]he decision to find
waiver is discretionary.” Id. at 536 ¶ 9.

¶11            Here, like orders in similar cases where we have found
waiver, the order does contain supportive factual findings. See, e.g., Antonio
M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 371 ¶¶ 5–6 (App. 2009) (finding
waiver where party challenged specificity of factual findings for the first
time on appeal, and the order contained some factual findings). But
Mother’s apparent waiver does not relieve the court of its duty to determine
whether DCS met its burden and submit the ultimate facts it relied on for
its legal conclusions in writing. See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 539 ¶ 20. And when
reviewing an order for termination of parental rights, we must “evaluate all
the statutory elements found by the juvenile court.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 26 (2023).

II.    The Juvenile Court Made Sufficient Factual Findings in its Order
       Terminating Mother’s Parent-Child Relationship with A.S.

¶12            In reviewing the termination of parental rights, we accept the
court’s factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences support
them.” Id. at 478 ¶ 30 (citation omitted). “[W]e affirm the trial court’s order
if the facts at trial support the trial court’s findings whether or not each
supportive fact is specifically called out by the trial court in its findings.”
Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451–52 ¶ 19 (App. 2007).
We will affirm the court’s legal conclusions if supported by “clear and
convincing evidence” and if not “clearly erroneous.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at
478–79 ¶¶ 30–31 (citations omitted).

¶13            Orders “terminating the parent-child relationship . . . shall be
in writing and shall recite the findings on which the order is based.” A.R.S.
§ 8-538(A); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(h) (“At the conclusion of the
[termination] hearing, the court must . . . enter findings on whether the
petitioner or moving party has met its burden of proof and, if so, . . . make
specific findings of fact in support of the termination of parental rights.”).

¶14           To terminate parental rights, the court must conclude the
petitioner has proved: (1) “by clear and convincing evidence that at least
one of the statutory grounds for termination is met”; and (2) “by a
preponderance of the evidence that severance of parental rights would be

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
                        Decision of the Court

in the best interest of the child.” Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230
Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 22 (App. 2012).2 At a minimum, “the court must specify at
least one factual finding sufficient to support each of those conclusions of
law.” Id. (emphasis added). To summarize, the court must specify at least
one factual finding to support the statutory ground for termination and at
least one factual finding to support its best-interests finding. The court is
not required to state “every fact upon which his or her findings are based.”
Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 452 ¶ 19.

¶15            Mother argues the court omitted required factual findings to
support legal conclusions for all three termination grounds. As to the
substance abuse ground, Mother argues the court erred because it “failed
to make any findings of fact regarding any impact of the drug use upon the
ability to discharge parental responsibilities.”

¶16           A court may terminate a parent-child relationship on the
substance-abuse ground if it finds “the parent is unable to discharge
parental responsibilities because of mental illness, mental deficiency or a
history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or
alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will
continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶17             To support the chronic-substance abuse ground, the court
found: (1) A.S. was born substance-exposed to fentanyl and
methamphetamine; (2) “Mother disclosed a history of substance abuse and
is believed to be currently using illegal substances”; (3) Mother tested
positive for illegal substances shortly after A.S.’s birth; (4) Mother disclosed
she uses fentanyl and methamphetamine daily; and (5) Mother has not
engaged in services or otherwise “alleviated the concerns” that caused A.S.
to be with placement. Further, the court noted “Mother disclosed . . . that
sobriety was a barrier.”

¶18             We accept these findings because reasonable evidence
supports them. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30. Mother’s admission of
daily illicit drug-use and it being a barrier to her parenting supports the
court’s conclusion that her drug-use affects her ability to parent A.S. And
nothing in A.R.S. § 8-533 or Rule 353 requires the court to specifically make
a finding regarding the effect of a parent’s drug use on parental ability.

2      Ruben M. refers to Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court
(“Rule”) 66, which was replaced by Rule 353 in 2021 and became effective
in 2022. There were no relevant substantive changes between Rules 66 and
353.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.S.
                        Decision of the Court

Therefore, the court made sufficient factual findings to support its legal
conclusion. Because we affirm on one statutory ground, we need not
consider the others in this case. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(h); Crystal E. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577–78 ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

¶19            Though Mother does not challenge the court’s best-interests
finding, substantial evidence supports it, and, thus, we find no error in the
court’s order.

                               CONCLUSION

¶20           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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