Court Opinion

ID: 9836796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:06.408967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.918245
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
with whom
EFFRON, Judge, joins (concurring in part and in the result):
I agree with the majority that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ohler v. United States, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000), controls this Military Rule of Evidence 609 case. However, Ohler was not decided at the time this appeal was argued at this Court. Assuming it inapplicable, I would still vote to affirm this conviction.
The military judge in this case admitted evidence of appellant’s guilty plea convictions in state court for the same offenses he was being tried for at court-martial. He admitted this evidence for the express purpose of “impeach[ing] the accused on the basis of the cases just cited.” (R. 79-80). Those cases were United States v. Brenizer, 20 MJ 78 (CMA 1985), and United States v. Sitton, 39 MJ 307 (CMA 1994). These are Military Rule of Evidence 609 cases (impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime). Accordingly, I would limit my review in this case to the propriety of the admission of the challenged evidence for the purpose it was actually admitted by the trial judge (impeachment by prior convictions).
Turning to the trial judge’s decision in this regard, I have some concern with his reasoning that the probative value of admitting this evidence for this purpose outweighed its prejudicial effect. See Mil.R.Evid. 609. A number of federal courts have found that evidence of this type presented to a jury was clearly more prejudicial to an accused on his substantive guilt than probative of his credibility. See United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Maestas, 941 F.2d 273, 279 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Denetclaw, 96 F.3d 454, 460 (Lucero, C.J., concurring) (10th Cir. 1996); cf. United States v. Moore, 735 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.1984). I think military case law has also recognized the extraordinary prejudicial impact of evidence of convictions of offenses which are the same as the ones charged. See United States v. Brenizer, supra at 81.
Nevertheless, this was a trial before a military judge alone, which appellant requested after the military judge indicated he would admit the challenged evidence. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Gee, 39 MJ 311 (CMA 1994). Here, the military judge admitted this evidence for the limited purpose of impeachment by prior convictions, and he expressly refused to consider it for substantive purposes. See Mil. R.Evid. 105. I presume military judges know the law and will do what they say. See generally United States v. Kinman, 25 MJ 99,100-01 (CMA 1987). Accordingly, in light of the defense’s decision to have a trial by judge alone, I see little chance of undue prejudice in this case and would find no error under Mil.R.Evid. 609.