Court Opinion

ID: 9562140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:22:18.704604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:13.507182
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, the plaintiff contends that we have overlooked the trial court’s failure to give a requested charge that “exemplary damages can never be allowed in cases arising on contracts.” The plaintiff has never disclosed to this court the location of this request to charge in the record or transcript, as required by Rule 15 (c) (3) (i) (Code Ann. § 24-3615) of this court, nor is its location disclosed by the index to the record on appeal. We shall, nevertheless, examine the merits of the alleged request.
The defendant’s counterclaim was, of course, based not merely on breach of contract but also on fraud; and the requested charge could easily have misled the jury into believing that exemplary damages were not recoverable for fraudulent conduct arising from contractual negotiations. “A request to charge must embody a correct, applicable and complete statement of law, legal and perfect in form and adjusted to the pleadings and evidence;... it must not be so phrased as to have tendency to confuse and mislead the jury or to becloud the issues in the case. [Cits.]” Cohen v. Sapp, 110 Ga. App. 413 (2), 415 (138 SE2d 749) (1964).
The court correctly instructed the jury that damages for breach of contract were allowable only as compensation for injuries sustained. The instruction on punitive or exemplary damages was *863given in conjunction with an entirely separate charge on damages for fraud and misrepresentation and was clearly applicable only to this theory of recovery. The plaintiff did not object to the court’s instructions on damages at trial and will not now be heard to raise such an objection on appeal.
The plaintiff further asserts on motion for rehearing that during cross-examination the defendant admitted he had not relied on any misrepresentations which may have been made to him before he signed the contract. The plaintiff refers specifically to the following exchange: “Q: You have no contention that the lessor, that Gateway Leasing, was to do anything different than what their contract actually shows on it, do you? A. No, sir.”
It appears from the testimony immediately preceding this exchange that the defendant was quite confused as to what he was being asked and very likely believed the question referred to the contract document as it existed when he signed it rather than as subsequently completed by the plaintiff. The jury was not required to interpret the exchange as a repudiation of his prior testimony regarding the representations made to him by the plaintiffs sales agent, and the evidence did not demand a verdict in the plaintiffs favor on the fraud claim.

Motion for rehearing denied.