Court Opinion

ID: 9966105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-05 07:12:29.756549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:12.251269
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed May 2, 2024.

                                      In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-23-00238-CV

                        TATIANNA TURNER, Appellant
                                         V.
                         NICOLE JOHNSON, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 146th District Court
                             Bell County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 21DFAM326110

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In a single issue in this restricted appeal, appellant Tatianna Turner (Mother)
argues the final default order of the trial court awarding joint managing
conservatorship to Nicole Johnson, a family friend who sought conservatorship
rights over Mother’s minor child, should be set aside because Mother did not
receive notice of the final-hearing setting. Concluding that the trial court erred by
conducting the final hearing without proper notice to Mother, we reverse the
default order in the suit affecting the parent-child relationship and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.

                                    I.      BACKGROUND

       In 2020, Mother was involved in a violent encounter in her home witnessed
by her seven-year-old son, N.C. As a result, Mother left N.C. with Johnson and
moved out of state. After more than a year of caring for N.C., Johnson filed a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship in Bell County, Texas seeking appointment
as N.C.’s sole managing conservator. 1

       Mother was served in Alabama and answered. 2 She then filed a
counter-petition against Johnson seeking the return of N.C. to her custody and for
orders appointing her as the sole managing conservator of N.C. The trial court
signed an order in August 2021 for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus requiring
Johnson to bring N.C. to the court. The writ was served on Johnson and N.C. was
returned to Mother.

       In 2022, before the final hearing, Mother’s lawyer moved to withdraw as
counsel for Mother. The court granted the motion, and Mother remained
unrepresented thereafter.

       The trial court conducted the final hearing in the case on October 20, 2022.
Mother did not appear, and the trial court rendered a default final order appointing
both Johnson and Mother as joint managing conservators of N.C. Mother filed a

       1
          The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Court of Appeals for the Third District of
Texas to transfer this appeal (No. 03-23-00152-CV) to this court. Misc. Docket No. 23-9017
(Tex. Mar 21, 2023); see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 73.001, .002. Because of the transfer, we
decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare
decisis if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the transferor court’s
precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
       2
         N.C.’s father, although named and served with Johnson’s petition, did not appear and is
not a party to this appeal.

                                                2
restricted appeal pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30. Tex. R. App.
P. 30.

                                       II.    ANALYSIS

         In her sole issue on appeal, Mother argues that she meets the elements of a
restricted appeal and the default final order should be set aside.

A.       Restricted appeal

         A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a judgment. Roventini v. Ocular
Scis., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
To be entitled to a restricted appeal, an appellant must show that: (1) she filed
notice of restricted appeal within six months after the complained-of judgment was
signed; (2) she was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) she did not participate in
the hearing that resulted in the complained-of judgment and did not timely file any
postjudgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and
(4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Tex. R. App. P. 26.13; Tex. R. App.
P. 30; see Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004). The
first three requirements are jurisdictional; if they are not met, an appellant has no
right to relief by way of a restricted appeal. Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497
(Tex. 2020). “An appellant who satisfies the first three requirements establishes the
court’s jurisdiction and must then establish error from the face of the record to
prevail in the restricted appeal.” Id.

         A restricted appeal affords an appellant a review of the entire case, the same
scope of review as in an ordinary appeal. Norman Commc’ns v. Texas Eastman
Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997). The only restriction on the scope of
restricted-appeal review is that the error must appear on the face of the record. Id.
         3
             Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.012, .013 (writ of error; now restricted
appeal).

                                               3
B.     Error on the face of the record

       In this case, there is no dispute that Mother met the first three requirements;
therefore, the only issue on appeal is whether error is apparent from the face of the
record. The face of the record, for purposes of restricted-appeal review, consists of
the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record. DSC Fin. Corp. v. Moffitt, 815 S.W.2d
551, 551 (Tex. 1991) (discussing appellate record under former 1986 Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure 50(a),4 which was transcript (now clerk’s record) and
statement of facts (now reporter’s record)).

       Here, Mother argues there is error on the face of the record because the trial
court conducted a final contested hearing without notice to her. The trial court
allowed Mother’s counsel to withdraw in July 2022 at which time the trial court
acknowledged there were no pending settings. The final hearing occurred
approximately three months later.

       We presume that the trial court will hear a case only when notice has been
given to the parties. Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.). We accordingly begin with a presumption that Mother had
proper notice of the trial court setting. Felt v. Comerica Bank, 401 S.W.3d 802,
806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). To overcome this
presumption, Mother must affirmatively show her lack of notice. Id. “This burden
may not be discharged by mere allegations, unsupported by affidavits or other
competent evidence, that the appellant did not receive proper notice.” Campsey,
111 S.W.3d at 772. Although Mother argues there is no evidence in the record that
any notice was sent to her of the final hearing, there was evidence of notice in the
record. Johnson filed a “Notice of Trial Setting,” which states that “[n]otice is

       4
         Tex. R. App. P. 50(a), 11 Tex. Reg. 1939, 1997, 49 Tex. B.J. 556, 572 (Tex. Apr. 10,
1986, eff. Sept. 1, 1986) (since amended).

                                             4
given to [Mother]” of the October 2022 trial setting. There is no date on which
notice was sent, so we will presume it was sent on the date Johnson filed the notice
with the trial court—the day before trial. See Cox v. Cox, 298 S.W.3d 726, 733
(Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (if notice of service does not specify date of
service, court will presume service on date notice of service is filed).

       Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 requires contested cases to be set for trial
“with reasonable notice of not less than forty-five days to the parties of a first
setting for trial.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 245; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.003 (except as
otherwise provided, proceedings in suit affecting the parent-child relationship
“shall be as in civil cases generally”). “A trial court’s failure to comply with notice
rules in a contested case deprives the defendant of his constitutional right to be
present at the hearing, to voice objections in an appropriate manner, and results in
a   violation     of   fundamental       due     process.”     Hildebrand       v.   Hildebrand,
No. 01-18-00933-CV, 2020 WL 4118023, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notice of
trial sent to Mother the day before trial does not constitute reasonable notice. 5 See
Highsmith v. Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. 2019) (trial court erred in
rendering judgment in absence of party to divorce proceeding who did not receive
notice required by Rule 245); see also Interest of Z.U.L., No. 06-20-00079-CV,
2021 WL 96864, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(trial court erred in rendering judgment against unrepresented mother in contested
       5
          In her appellant brief, Johnson argues that Mother did receive notice of the final-hearing
setting. Johnson attached, to her brief, a copy of a letter sent by the court coordinator to Mother
at her last known address on September 20, 2022—30 days before the final hearing. The notice
of setting relied on by Johnson is not contained within the appellate record; therefore, we cannot
consider it in our restricted-appeal review. See Nuby v. Allied Bankers Life Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d
396, 398 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ). However, even if it were contained within the
appellate record, it does not provide the forty-five days’ notice required by Rule 245. Mother did
not receive proper notice of the final hearing whether the notice was sent to her 30 days before
the hearing or one day before the hearing.

                                                 5
child-support case who did not receive proper notice under Rule 245 of final
hearing). Therefore, we conclude there is error on the face of the record reflecting
that Mother did not receive the required notice under Rule 245.

       At the final contested hearing, the trial court stated that Mother was “given
notice of the hearing and has not appeared.” The trial court also discussed that the
notice was sent to Mother at her last known address in Alabama. However, there
was no evidence or discussion of the date on which Mother was sent notice or
whether the requirements of Rule 245 were met. Without more, this statement does
not cure the error on the face of the record reflecting lack of compliance with Rule
245.

       We sustain Mother’s sole issue on appeal.

                                III.   CONCLUSION

       We reverse the default order in the suit affecting the parent-child
relationship and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

                                       /s/       Charles A. Spain
                                                 Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.

                                             6