Court Opinion

ID: 9855340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:23:02.673125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:44.092944
License: Public Domain

Neff, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the extension of the ruling of Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106; 98 S Ct 330; 54 L Ed 2d 331 (1977), to include a passenger in a motor vehicle which has been stopped for a routine traffic violation where there is no reason to suspect wrongdoing by or danger from the passenger.
i
In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that a police officer can order a driver to get out of a vehicle after a routine traffic stop, even though the officer does not have any reason to fear for his safety or to suspect criminal activity. In finding no violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court concluded that ordering a driver to get out of a vehicle is reasonably necessary for the officer’s safety from the standpoint of potential assaults on the officer, and because of potential traffic hazards resulting from standing next to the stopped vehicle while talking to the driver. The majority quotes Mimms and seems to adopt the same reasoning to permit an officer to require a passenger to alight from a vehicle without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
It should be noted that Mimms was decided summarily by the Supreme Court at the same time it granted certiorari. The Court granted reversal without full briefing or oral argument, in short, without plenary consideration. The two dissenting opinions both articulate the danger of issuing *173important constitutional pronouncements in summary fashion. Because of the manner in which Mimms was decided, I believe that we should be very wary of expanding its holding beyond its narrow fact situation. In addition, I find the reasoning of Mimms inadequate to justify including passengers in vehicles stopped for the routine traffic violations of their drivers.
It is noteworthy that the Court in Mimms specifically said that it did not hold that an officer could order a driver to get out of a vehicle whenever the officer has occasion to speak to the driver. Id. at 111, n 6. While this comment is somewhat cryptic, it evidences, in my view, a recognition that the holding of Mimms is a very narrow one.
A
The facts of this case could not present a better example of circumstances in which to argue against yet another intrusion on Fourth Amendment protections. There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest any concern for the safety of the police officers at the time the stop was made, either by way of objective evidence or by way of subjective suspicion on the part of the officers.
The vehicle was stopped in the middle of the afternoon on the expressway for speeding and because it was emitting smoke. The chief was not using the radar in his patrol car and could not say how fast the vehicle was travelling, and he acknowledged that the vehicle slowed to approximately the speed limit as it passed him. When he stopped the vehicle, he did not observe any sudden or furtive movements by the occupants, and, while the driver did not have a driver’s license, he did have other identification, including proof of insurance of the vehicle.
*174Chief Lenardson asked the driver to go to the patrol car and left the passenger alone in the stopped vehicle. He expressed no concern about the passenger, did not feel the need for backup assistance,1 and essentially paid no heed to the passenger’s presence in the vehicle while he dealt with the driver, who was sitting in the front seat of the patrol car at the chiefs request.
When Deputy Lenardson came along, the chief asked him to find out who the passenger was. No explanation is offered for wanting or needing the identity of the passenger. Neither police officer had any reason to suspect that any danger lurked in the vehicle. When the passenger indicated that he did not have any identification with him, the deputy asked him to step out of the vehicle so he could be at eye level while they conversed further, although it is not clear just what they had to talk about at that point. It was only when the passenger got out of the vehicle that the deputy was in a position to see into the vehicle and observe the weapon which led to the arrest in this case.
On the basis of these facts, it cannot reasonably be said that there was any articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity or a threat to the safety of the officers. People v Freeman, 413 Mich 492; 320 NW2d 878 (1982). It certainly is of no significance that the passenger of the vehicle did not have a driver’s license or other form of identification, and the passenger was under no obligation to identify himself. No adverse inference would arise from the citation of a driver for a *175traffic violation. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 454-455; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).
B
As noted, the purported justification for the grant of authority to an officer to have a passenger get out of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop is the safety of the officer. Close analysis does not support that argument.
1
One of the arguments advanced is that it is not safe for a police officer to stand next to a vehicle stopped along a highway because of exposure to passing traffic. Mimms, supra at 111. While this line of reasoning may have some validity with regard to approaching the driver of the vehicle, it is unlikely to apply when the officer approaches the passenger side of the vehicle, which is usually shielded from moving traffic by the stopped vehicle itself, as was the situation in this case. In addition, during a routine traffic stop, there is no need for an officer to approach and talk with a passenger.
2
The other argument is that it is necessary to allow officers to require occupants to get out of vehicles to insure safety from assaults. As noted in Justice Stevens’ dissent in Mimms, it is highly questionable whether such assaults are minimized, enhanced, or at all affected by having the occupants get out of the vehicles. Id. at 117-121. In fact, there are apparently some law enforcement authorities which advise an officer never to let a traffic violator get out of a vehicle during a traffic stop. See Yount, Vehicle Stops Manual (1976); *176Folley, Police Patrol Techniques & Tactics (1973), cited by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Mimms. Id. at 119-120.
In balancing the very justifiable concern for the safety of the officer against the intrusion on individual liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, I am not convinced that the intrusion in any way furthers the goal of enhancing the safety of the officer.
Nor am I convinced that a passenger’s status is the same as that of the driver stopped for a routine traffic violation. The passenger has violated no law leading to the traffic stop, and can reasonably expect that the officer will deal with the driver and send them on their way. The passenger who is merely present in a vehicle which has been stopped justifiably has a higher expectation of privacy. The officer makes a decision to stop and detain the driver for conduct quite apart from that of the passenger. Unless the officer has a legitimate reason to question or detain the passenger, that person can refuse to talk with the officer and, indeed, can walk away.
c
In sum, I believe that extending the holding of Mimms to include a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a routine traffic violation expands Mimms beyond its intended boundaries and is an unwarranted violation of the Fourth Amendment.2_
*177II
The majority cites People v McLaurin, 120 AD2d 270; 508 NYS2d 429 (1986), as a case which also extends Mimms to cover passengers. However, I believe that McLaurin is distinguishable because it does not extend Mimms to passengers in all routine traffic stops, as does the majority in this case. In McLaurin, there was an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing by the passenger. Certainly, were that the case here, I would have no objection to the action of the deputy. However, our record is utterly devoid of any evidence or testimony suggesting such a suspicion.
I am more persuaded by those cases which have refused to extend Mimms to situations like the one currently before us. See State v Becker, 458 NW2d 604 (Iowa, 1990); Johnson v State, 601 SW2d 326 (Tenn Crim App, 1980); State v Williams, 366 So 2d 1369 (La, 1978); Commonwealth v Pollard, 450 Pa 138; 299 A2d 233 (1973). I would reverse and remand for entry of an order suppressing the evidence.

 Although he did inform the dispatcher that he was making a stop and where he was, he did not request help, and the record is clear that the second officer came on the scene by happenstance. Testimony at the preliminary examination was to the effect that the chief had just started to contact the dispatcher when the deputy drove up, and he specifically testified that he did not call for backup.

 The majority says that this is a case of first impression. It should be noted, however, that in People v Eichenberg, 108 Mich App 578, 580; 310 NW2d 800 (1981), a panel of this Court did purport to extend Mimms to passengers of vehicles stopped for traffic violations. However, that comment in the opinion was completely gratuitous because the officer was able to see the explosive device inside the car while the passengers were still inside. To say that the officer had the right, under Mimms, to order the passengers to get out of the car, was *177unnecessary to the decision in Eichenberg, and the purest form of obiter dictum.