Court Opinion

ID: 9939744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 17:05:57.085359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:52.821833
License: Public Domain

OPINION

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                              John Doe and Jane Doe,
                 as parents and legal guardians of Jill Doe, a minor,
                                         Appellants-Plaintiffs,                FILED
                                                                          Feb 12 2024, 8:39 am

                                                    v.                         CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

                                      K.M.W. and K.J.W.,
                                        Appellees-Defendants.

                                          February 12, 2024

                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           22A-CT-2922

                                         Appeal from the
                                      Johnson Superior Court

                                         The Honorable
                                       Marla K. Clark, Judge

                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                        41D04-2012-CT-177

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024   Page 1 of 31
                                    Opinion by Senior Judge Shepard
                                    Judges Riley and Tavitas concur.

      Shepard, Senior Judge.

      Statement of the Case                   1

[1]   K.M.W. and K.J.W., the mother and father respectively of K.D.W., a minor,

      hosted a party at their home during which Jill Doe, a minor child of John Doe

      and Jane Doe, was sexually molested by K.D.W. The Does filed a two-count

      complaint against K.M.W. and K.J.W. alleging premises liability and negligent

      parental supervision for the events leading up to and concluding with the sexual

      molestation of their daughter.

[2]   The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of K.M.W. and K.J.W.,

      relying heavily on this Court’s decision in Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172

      (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. not sought, and concluded that the Does were not

      entitled to relief as a matter of law under either theory of negligence.

[3]   The critical inquiry in today’s case is whether this Court’s duty analysis in Wells

      v. Hickman, a negligent parental supervision case, was implicitly overruled by a

      pair of Supreme Court decisions. Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316 (Ind. 2016)

      1
       We held oral argument on July 12, 2023, in the Indiana Court of Appeals Courtroom. We would like to
      commend counsel for the quality of their presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024                      Page 2 of 31
      and Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384 (Ind. 2016),

      clarified the foreseeability in the context of duty analysis in negligence cases,

      specifically in premises liability cases—which were subsequently

      clarified/modified by the Supreme Court in Cavanaugh’s Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd.

      v. Porterfield, 140 N.E.3d 837 (Ind. 2020) and again most recently in Pennington

      v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc., 223 N.E.3d 1086 (Ind. 2024). We

      conclude that the duty analysis used in Wells has not been implicitly overruled.

[4]   Thus, we reverse and remand to the trial court on the theory of negligent

      parental supervision. However, as we explain below, our Supreme Court’s

      decisions lead us to affirm the trial court’s decision as to premises liability.

[5]   We also address whether the court erred by striking portions of a medical

      expert’s affidavit for purposes of its summary judgment decision. Concluding

      that those portions inappropriately express legal conclusions, we affirm the trial

      court’s decision to strike them for purposes of summary judgment. We express

      no opinion about their admissibility in further proceedings.

[6]   Therefore, we affirm on premises liability and reverse and remand on negligent

      parental supervision.

      Facts and Procedural History
      A. Background
[7]   K.D.W. is not the biological son of K.M.W. and K.J.W. He was surrendered

      to the Department of Child Services by his biological mother in 2011. On May

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024       Page 3 of 31
       29, 2013, when K.D.W. was eight years old, K.M.W. and K.J.W. began

       fostering him, and they adopted him on December 4, 2014. They were aware

       that K.D.W.’s biological mother was a prostitute and a drug addict and there

       had been incidents of domestic violence between K.D.W.’s biological parents.

       They also knew that K.D.W. was diagnosed with ADHD.

[8]    K.M.W. arranged for K.D.W. to attend psychological therapy to address issues

       with anxiety, attention deficit disorder, and past trauma. Over time, the parents

       noticed that K.D.W. exhibited oppositional defiant behaviors such as lying,

       stealing, and arguing.

[9]    On June 10, 2017, K.D.W.’s parents sent him to a summer camp at Purdue

       University. He was twelve. At Camp DASH he was housed on campus with

       other program participants whose ages ranged from eleven to fifteen. Late in

       the evening of June 20th, K.M.W. received a call that complaints had been

       made against K.D.W. and that his parents needed to pick him up immediately.

[10]   K.D.W. was dismissed from Camp DASH and later charged by the Tippecanoe

       County Prosecutor with sexual battery after being accused of groping similarly-

       aged female participants over their clothes. The probable cause affidavit

       detailed K.D.W.’s unwanted groping or touching of female campers’ thighs,

       buttocks, and breasts, along with aggressive hugging. Purdue University police

       officers interviewed K.D.W. in his parents’ presence on August 8, 2017, and

       K.D.W. made several admissions about his alleged behavior.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024   Page 4 of 31
[11]   K.M.W. arranged for K.D.W. to see his long-time therapist who had

       experience with sexual maladaptive behavior counseling and gave the therapist

       a copy of the probable cause affidavit. In the course of these therapy sessions,

       the parents learned that K.D.W.’s biological father had shown him

       pornography when he was younger. And K.J.W. noticed after the Camp

       DASH incident that K.D.W. had a preoccupation with sexual behaviors and

       was trying to access electronics more frequently than he had in the past. For

       example, K.D.W. accessed pornography on electronic devices and created a

       profile on a dating website where he represented himself as a twenty-five-year-

       old Romanian man.

[12]   K.D.W.’s therapist determined that he needed a safety plan. That safety plan

       recommended that K.D.W. not be alone with other children. During a

       deposition in this matter, K.M.W. acknowledged that the safety plan did not

       make a distinction between children and young children noting, “It was – just

       said children.” Id. at 19. The therapist further recommended that the parents

       limit his access to electronic devices or supervise his access.

[13]   The parties dispute whether K.M.W. and K.J.W. informed other family

       members about the specific allegations and K.D.W.’s expulsion from Camp

       DASH. John Doe, who is K.M.W.’s brother, did not recall being told the

       substance of the allegations against K.D.W. He recalled generally that there

       were allegations resulting in his expulsion from Camp DASH. At best, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 5 of 31
       Does recalled being informed that K.D.W. was expelled for a lack of

       supervision there and that K.D.W. should not be left alone with children. The

       Does claimed that K.J.W. and K.M.W.’s attitude toward K.D.W., however,

       remained unchanged.

[14]   At the Tippecanoe County Prosecutor’s request, K.D.W. underwent a

       psychosexual evaluation by Dr. Sean Samuels on May 14, 2018. K.D.W. was

       determined to be at low risk of engaging in the charged behavior toward

       younger children, similarly-aged peers, and older individuals. K.M.W. agreed

       during his deposition, however, that low risk did not mean no risk and the

       safety plan remained in place. Dr. Samuels recommended that K.D.W. see a

       therapist who specializes in sexual maladaptive behaviors.

[15]   K.D.W. did receive specialized therapy for such behaviors beginning in July

       2018 at Reach for Youth. K.M.W. expressed several concerns to the therapist

       in the initial joint session, including that: 1) K.D.W. will take flyers from the

       newspaper, as well as lingerie, and/or cheerleader magazines; and 2) she has

       found “naked barbie dolls in his room and hidden in various places in the

       house.” Id. at 95.

       B. The Incident
[16]   On August 26, 2018, K.M.W. and K.J.W. hosted a birthday party at their

       home. John, Jane, and Jill Doe were among the twenty-eight people there,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024     Page 6 of 31
       including other family members. K.D.W.’s safety plan remained in place at

       this time. K.M.W. and K.J.W. did not supervise K.D.W. because they were

       hosting the party and did not ask other adults to help supervise. Additionally,

       they did not tell the adults at the party about the allegations against K.D.W. for

       his behavior at Camp DASH.

[17]   At the party, several cousins ranging in age from two to twenty-two, played

       games throughout the house. Some of the children, including K.D.W. and five-

       year-old Jill Doe went upstairs to play hide and seek and ping pong. Adults,

       including K.M.W., would go upstairs periodically to check on the children.

[18]   According to the probable cause affidavit, on Monday, August 27, 2018, at

       approximately 8:00 p.m., John Doe received a text message from his sister,

       K.M.W., informing him that his daughter Jill Doe and K.D.W. were involved

       in an incident during the family gathering the day before. John Doe learned

       from K.M.W. and Jill Doe that during the game of hide and seek, when

       K.D.W. and Jill Doe were alone in his room, K.D.W. locked the door and

       pulled down his pants and Jill Doe’s pants. Jill later told her father that

       K.D.W. instructed her to touch his penis, and when she said no, “grabbed her

       hand and made her touch it (penis).” Id. at 133. She said K.D.W. then

       “touched her on her vagina.” Id.

[19]   On Friday, August 31, 2018, Greenwood Police Department Detective Doug

       Wood conducted a Child’s First Finding Words interview with Jill Doe.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024     Page 7 of 31
       During the interview, Jill Doe corroborated the information John Doe had

       learned from his sister. The officer spoke with John Doe on Thursday,

       September 13, 2018, confirming the fact that during the birthday party Jill Doe

       and her sister and K.D.W. were observed playing hide and seek. John Doe also

       informed the officer that Jill Doe disclosed the inappropriate touching to her

       sister, who then disclosed the incident when she went to school the next day.

       John further stated that he had received a call from his sister K.M.W. informing

       him of the incident.

[20]   During K.D.W.’s interview with police officers, he verified he was playing hide

       and seek with Jill Doe at the party. However, K.D.W. explained that “his

       pants were partially down and [Jill Doe] had her hand, under his, on his penis

       for approximately 15 seconds.” Id. at 134. He said he told Jill Doe that “if she

       didn’t stop trying to touch him he would stop playing with her.” Id. He then

       stated, “he had made a mistake and was accountable for his actions.” Id. His

       parents acknowledged that K.D.W. was in treatment for his sexual maladaptive

       problems in part to prevent him from being a risk to others, and that it was their

       responsibility to arrange for that treatment.

[21]   On September 19, 2018, probable cause was found to support a charge of child

       molesting, a Level 4 felony if committed by an adult, against K.D.W. Jill Doe

       has had to undergo mental health therapy because of the molestation.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 8 of 31
       C. The Lawsuit
[22]   John and Jane Doe, as parents and legal guardians of Jill Doe, filed a complaint

       for damages against K.M.W. and K.J.W. asserting claims for both premises

       liability and negligent parental supervision. K.M.W. and K.J.W. filed a motion

       for summary judgment arguing they owed no duty to Jill under either theory.

       On July 22, 2022, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and also

       struck portions of the Does’ medical expert affidavit. The Does now appeal.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. Negligence Claims

       A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

[23]   When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of

       review is similar to that of the trial court. Stabosz v. Friedman, 199 N.E.3d 800,

       807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “Summary judgment is appropriate only

       where the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material

       fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Burris v.

       Bottoms Up Scuba-Indy, LLC, 181 N.E.3d 998, 1003-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

       “All factual inferences must be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and

       all doubts as to the existence of a material issue must be resolved against the

       moving party.” Id. (quoting Burris, 181 N.E.3d at 1004).

[24]   “We will not reweigh the evidence but will liberally construe all designated

       evidentiary material in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024      Page 9 of 31
       determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id.

       (quoting Perkins v. Fillio, 119 N.E.3d 1106, 1110-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). “A

       trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of

       validity.” Id. And “[a] grant of summary judgment may be affirmed by any

       theory supported by the designated materials.” Id.

       B. Analysis

       1. Negligent Parental Supervision

[25]   We begin by setting out the following passage from Wells v. Hickman:

               Parents are in a unique position in society because they have a
               special power to observe and control the conduct of their minor
               children. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 123 at 914-15 (5th ed.
               1984). The power held by a parent is unlike that held by a child’s
               teachers or peers because a parent has the ability to influence a
               child’s behavior from birth and can observe and modify [his or]
               her child’s actions. A parent, unlike a teacher, is in the best
               position to discover and act upon changes in [his or] her child’s
               personality and behavior. Parents have a duty to exercise this
               power reasonably, especially when they have notice of a child’s
               dangerous tendencies. That is not to say that a parent should be
               responsible for behavior that is not reasonably foreseeable, nor
               should a parent be held responsible for general incorrigibility or a
               nasty disposition.

       657 N.E.2d 172, 178-79 (some citations omitted).

[26]   The Does brought a claim of negligent parental supervision against K.D.W.

       and K.M.W. As a general rule, the common law does not hold parents liable

       for the tortious acts of their minor children. Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 176. But

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024     Page 10 of 31
there are four common-law exceptions to this general rule. Id. And the

exception at issue here derives from Restatement (Second) of Torts, which

reads:

         A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
         his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others
         or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of
         bodily harm to them, if the parent

         (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
         his child, and

         (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
         exercising such control.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316, at 123-24 (1965). Under this exception,
                                                 2
foreseeability is an element of duty. This exception is applicable “where the

parent fails to exercise control over the minor child although the parent knows

or with due care should know that injury to another is possible.” Wells, 657

N.E.2d at 176 (quotation omitted).

2
  The Supreme Court came to this conclusion in Rogers and in Pennington under the language of Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 343. See Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 324 (foreseeability component already explicit in the
Restatement); Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097 (“an unreasonable risk of harm” defendant “should realize”
exists).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024                            Page 11 of 31
[27]   This exception is known as the tort of “parental failure to control” or “negligent

       parental supervision.” Id. at 177; Shepard by Shepard v. Porter, 679 N.E.2d 1383,

       1389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), reh’g denied. Under this tort,

               a duty attaches when there has been a failure to control and the
               parent knows or should have known that injury to another was
               reasonably foreseeable. Specifically, the parent must know or
               should have known that the child had a habit of engaging in the
               particular act or course of conduct which led to the plaintiff’s
               injury.

       Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 178. The parent’s negligence “is a separate act of

       negligence independent of the child’s wrongful act.” Id. at 177. Indiana

       adopted this exception in Wells and recognizes parental failure to control as a

       viable cause of action. Id.

[28]   At issue here is whether the Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodwin, Rogers, and

       Cavanaugh’s, implicitly overrule the duty analysis in Wells. We conclude they

       do not. But prior to explaining why we reach that conclusion, we first

       demonstrate that even under the Wells analysis alone, the Does designated

       enough evidence to withstand the motion for summary judgment.

[29]   In Wells, in the year preceding the behavior at issue, the child killed a pet dog

       and a pet hamster. Id. at 175. The child also expressed a desire to commit

       suicide, was often visibly angry, and once came home from school with a black

       eye, cuts, and bruises. On October 15, 1991, the child invited a twelve-year-old

       neighbor over to play video games at his house. Neither the child’s mother nor

       his grandparents, with whom he lived, were aware that the two were together.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 12 of 31
       The boys did not play video games, however, and the child later informed his

       mother he thought he had killed his young neighbor. The neighbor’s body was

       later found lying beside a fallen tree on the grandparents’ property.

[30]   Because Wells presented an issue of first impression, this Court turned to other

       jurisdictions which had adopted the failure to control exception and relied on

       K.C. v. A.P., 577 So.2d 669 (Fla. App. 1991) for guidance. K.C. provided that a

       parent has a duty to exercise control over a minor child where “the parent

       knows or with due care should know that injury to another is possible.” Id. at

       671 (emphasis added). K.C. further provided that for a parent to be liable the

       parent must know that the child “had a habit of engaging in the particular act or

       course of conduct which led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (quoting Snow v.

       Nelson, 475 So 2d 225, 2226 (Fla. 1985)). Under that analytical framework, we

       concluded that “[n]either the type of harm inflicted nor the victim in this case

       was foreseeable and, thus, cannot support the imposition of a duty upon [the

       mother].” Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 178.

[31]   However, we rejected K.C.’s use of the term “possible” when analyzing parental

       liability under this exception, instead embracing that part of the analysis

       requiring the parent to have knowledge of the child’s habit of engaging in the

       particular act or course of conduct which led to the injury. Id. at 178 n.3. Instead

       of using the “possibility analysis” we used the analysis from Webb v. Jarvis, 575

       N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991), imposing a duty in negligence cases to

       “circumstances where a reasonably foreseeable victim is injured by a reasonably

       foreseeable harm.” Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 178. We concluded that “a duty

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024     Page 13 of 31
       attaches when there has been a failure to control and the parent knows or

       should have known that injury to another was reasonably foreseeable.” Id.

       “Specifically, the parent must know or should have known that the child had a

       habit of engaging in the particular act or course of conduct which led to the

       plaintiff’s injury.” Id.

[32]   In the present case, the trial court concluded that “the particular harm to Jill

       Doe was not foreseeable,” in part because “K.D.W.’s actions at a camp that

       was away from home and with little supervision constitute[d] a single event”

       such that it was not a habit. Appellants’ App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 30. The court

       further concluded that the “victim, Jill Doe, was also not foreseeable” because

       the “instance” of prior conduct at Camp DASH “occurred exclusively with

       other females near K.D.W.’s age” and “took place outside the home with little

       supervision.” Id. at 31. We disagree.

[33]   The probable cause affidavit, which is part of the designated materials, detailed

       unwanted groping or touching by K.D.W. of several different female campers’

       thighs, buttocks, and breasts, along with aggressive hugging. Appellants’ App.

       Conf. Vol. III, pp. 76-77. And Petition Alleging Delinquency set out that

       “[b]etween June 10, 2017 and June 21, 2017, [K.D.W.] did touch FD, BL, DL,

       DS and/or AT with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of

       [K.D.W.] . . . .” Appellants’ App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 71. D.L. reported that at

       Camp DASH, K.D.W. engaged in “unwanted aggressive hugging” with her

       “that necessitated physical force to get free.” Appellants’ App. Conf. Vol. III,

       p. 76. D.S. was interviewed and told law enforcement that K.D.W. placed his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 14 of 31
       arm around her lower waist along with other unwanted touching

       “approximately 40 times” while at Camp DASH and that she had “observed

       him touch other camper’s [sic] upper thighs and buttocks.” Id. A.T. told law

       enforcement that K.D.W. “touched both her buttocks and breasts” in the

       laundry room at Camp DASH. Id. In sum, this was more than a single

       incident.

[34]   K.D.W.’s behavior not only suggests a habit of engaging in unwanted touching

       in a sexual manner, but also a course of conduct of unwanted touching of

       females especially while unsupervised. Moreover, the record shows that

       K.D.W.’s parents were aware of his behavior at Camp DASH. Thus,

       regardless of the impact of the decisions in Goodwin, Rogers, Cavanaugh’s, and

       Pennington, under the Wells analysis, Jill Doe was a foreseeable victim of a

       foreseeable harm.

[35]   Next, we examine whether subsequent cases issued by our Supreme Court –

       which helped shape the foreseeability in the context of duty analysis – have

       impact on our conclusion that Jill Doe was a foreseeable victim of a foreseeable

       harm, a conclusion we reached under the Wells analysis.

[36]   After Wells was decided, our Supreme Court issued a series of decisions which

       helped shape foreseeability in the context of duty analysis. Although the

       analysis was developed through premises liability cases, the Supreme Court has

       not expressly limited the analysis to such cases. Setting out the evolution of the

       analysis, the Rogers Court explained that in prior cases, appellate courts used the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024   Page 15 of 31
       three-part balancing test announced in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.

       1991). The plaintiff in Webb urged the Court “to find an affirmative duty on the

       part of a physician to administer medical treatment to a patient in such a way

       so as to take into account possible harm to unidentifiable third persons.” Id. at

       995. In other words, the Court was asked to determine whether a cognizable

       cause of action imposing a duty existed. The Webb Court articulated the three-

       factor balancing test used to determine the existence of a duty, which includes

       examining the: (1) relationship between the parties; (2) foreseeability of harm;

       and (3) public policy concerns. Id. at 997.

[37]   The Rogers Court noted that in subsequent cases involving premises liability due

       to activities on the land, such as Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 971

       (Ind. 1991), it had found the Webb balancing test unnecessary. 63 N.E.3d at

       323-24. In other words, because the duty to exercise reasonable care had

       already been determined, “courts must look at one critical element before

       extending that duty to cases where an invitee’s injury occurs . . . due to some

       harmful activity on the premises. That element is foreseeability.” Id. at 324.

[38]   Next, the Rogers Court announced “how the foreseeability analysis is actually

       performed” with respect to duty and set out its “definitive path” as follows:

               When foreseeability is part of the duty analysis, as in landowner-
               invitee cases, it is evaluated in a different manner than
               foreseeability in the context of proximate cause. Specifically, in
               the duty arena, foreseeability is a general threshold determination
               that involves an evaluation of (1) the broad type of plaintiff and
               (2) the broad type of harm. In other words, this foreseeability

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 16 of 31
               analysis should focus on the general class of persons of which the
               plaintiff was a member and whether the harm suffered was of a
               kind normally to be expected—without addressing the specific
               facts of the occurrence. We believe this analysis comports with
               the idea that the courts will find a duty where, in general,
               reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists.

       63 N.E.3d at 324-25 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[39]   And in Goodwin, decided the same day as Rogers, the Supreme Court observed

       that prior appellate decisions had reshaped the Webb balancing test into a

       consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,” “looking to all of the

       circumstances surrounding an event, including the nature, condition, and

       location of the land, as well as prior similar incidents.” 62 N.E.3d at 387

       (internal quotations omitted). The Court further observed that in Northern

       Indiana Public Service Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 2003), it had found the

       Webb balancing test “a useful tool in determining whether a duty exists . . . only

       in those instances where the element of duty has not already been declared or

       otherwise articulated.” 62 N.E.2d at 387 (internal quotations omitted).

       Ultimately, the Court in Goodwin “recognize[d] that although the ‘totality of the

       circumstances’ test is useful in determining foreseeability in the context of

       proximate causation, it is inappropriate when analyzing foreseeability in the

       context of duty.” Id. at 389.

[40]   Like the Rogers decision, the Goodwin decision explained the path courts are to

       take going forward when analyzing foreseeability as a component of duty. The

       Court expressly rejected the Webb analysis and that of its own decision in Estate

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 17 of 31
of Heck ex rel. Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. 2003), in favor of the analysis

set out in this Court’s prior decision in Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475

(Ind. Ct. App. 1996). The Goldsberry analysis adopted in Goodwin follows:

        [T]he foreseeability component of the duty analysis must be
        something different than the foreseeability component of
        proximate cause. More precisely, it must be a lesser inquiry; if it
        was the same or a higher inquiry it would eviscerate the
        proximate cause element of negligence altogether. If one were
        required to meet the same or a higher burden of proving
        foreseeability with respect to duty, then it would be unnecessary
        to prove foreseeability a second time with respect to proximate
        cause. Additionally, proximate cause is normally a factual
        question for the jury, while duty is usually a legal question for the
        court. As a result, the foreseeability component of proximate
        cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence,
        while the foreseeability component of duty requires a more
        general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved,
        without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.

Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 390 (quoting Goldsberry, 672 N.E.2d at 479). And the

rationale behind the analysis is as follows:

        [A] court’s task—in determining “duty”—is not to decide
        whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable
        in light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate
        more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue
        is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that
        liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.
        The jury, by contrast, considers “foreseeability” . . . [in] more
        focused, fact-specific settings. . . .

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024      Page 18 of 31
       Id. at 391 (quoting Strahin v. Cleavenger, 216 W.Va. 175, 603 S.E.2d 197, 207

       (2004)).

[41]   Next, in Cavanaugh’s Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield, a majority of the

       Supreme Court added that,

               [w]hen evaluating the broad class of plaintiff and broad type of
               harm in these cases, we acknowledge a key factor is whether the
               landowners knew or had reason to know about any present and
               specific circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to
               recognize the probability or likelihood of imminent harm. See
               Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 385 (noting that, just before the barroom
               shooting, all the parties were separately “socializing” at “the
               small establishment”); Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 319 (remarking that
               the homeowner observed that her co-host was, before attacking a
               house-party guest, “just ‘being normal,’ and it was not obvious to
               her that he had ‘a buzz going’” from drinking alcohol); id.
               (observing that, before the guest was found dead outside her
               home, the homeowner saw him “lying motionless on the
               basement floor with his eyes closed”). If landowners had reason
               to know of any imminent harm, that harm was, as a matter of
               law, foreseeable in the duty context. See, e.g., id. at 327 (holding
               that it was foreseeable “that a house-party guest who is injured
               on the premises could suffer from an exacerbation of those
               injuries”).

       140 N.E.3d 837, 840-41 (Ind. 2020).

[42]   Thus, although the Supreme Court in Goodwin and Rogers spoke about

       foreseeability in terms of a broad type of plaintiff and a broad type of harm,

       both decisions involved an analysis of the contemporaneous knowledge of the

       landowner of the probability or likelihood of imminent harm—which by

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024      Page 19 of 31
       necessity involves addressing the specific facts of the occurrence to a certain

       extent. See Singh v. Singh, 155 N.E.3d 1197, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)

       (“Accordingly, it appears that, in practice, an examination of particular facts is

       necessary to fully resolve the question of duty at this stage and to properly apply

       Cavanaugh’s required ‘foreseeability as a component of duty’ analysis.”).

[43]   In Cavanaugh’s, the Supreme Court noted that several decisions of this Court,

       post-Goodwin and Rogers, had similarly evaluated foreseeability in the context of

       duty and found duty existed based on the contemporaneous knowledge of the

       defendant. See Hamilton v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 92 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied; Certa v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations Inc., 102 N.E.3d

       336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied; and Buddy & Pals III, Inc. v. Falaschetti,

       118 N.E.3d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied; see also Doe v. Delta Tau Delta

       Beta Alpha Chapter, No. 1:16-cv-1480, 2018 WL 3375016 (S.D. Ind. July 11,

       2018).

[44]   In Pennington, our Supreme Court clarified that in premises cases, in the context

       of duty, there are different foreseeability analyses depending on whether the

       claim is based on the condition of the premises or the harmful activities

       occurring thereon. 223 N.E.3d at 1097. Therefore, it is logical that in a

       negligence case, alleging negligent parental supervision, a different

       foreseeability analysis, such as that announced in Wells, would apply.

       Moreover, premises liability cases begin by presuming that a landowner owes a

       duty of care to invitees. See Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 1991)

       (“[A] landowner owes the highest duty to an invitee: a duty to exercise
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024       Page 20 of 31
       reasonable care for his protection while he is on the landowner’s premises.”).

       But in cases involving parents and the torts of their children, we begin with the

       presumption that the parent owes no duty. See Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 176 (“As a

       general rule, the common law does not hold a parent liable for the tortious acts

       of her minor children.”).

[45]   Thus, when an exception such as negligent parental supervision is alleged, we

       turn not to the Webb analysis—(1) relationship between the parties; (2)

       foreseeability of harm; and (3) public policy concerns—but to the foreseeability

       in the context of duty analysis, first developed by Wells, and shaped by the

       subsequent cases of our Supreme Court. A more stringent foreseeability in the

       context of duty analysis, like the one announced in Wells, is required in order to

       preserve the general rule of non-liability of parents for the torts of their children.

[46]   Consequently, for the exception to apply and the claim to move forward, “the

       parent must know or should have known that the child had a habit of engaging

       in the particular act or course of conduct which led to the plaintiff’s injury.”

       Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 178. And we observe that there are two parts to this

       analysis: whether there is evidence that the parent knew or should have known

       that the child (1) had a habit of engaging in the particular act, or (2) had a habit

       of engaging in the course of conduct.

[47]   Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that K.M.W. and K.J.W. owed a

       duty to Jill Doe. They were aware of K.D.W.’s difficulties at home and his

       behavior at Camp DASH. They were aware of the need for K.D.W.’s safety

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024      Page 21 of 31
       plan. And they were also aware of his sexual maladaptive behavior at home.

       Whether they breached that duty or acted reasonably under the circumstances

       are questions for a jury. However, as for the foreseeability in the context of

       duty analysis, based on what they knew prior to the incident, Jill Doe was a

       foreseeable victim of a foreseeable harm because K.M.W. and K.J.W. knew or

       should have known that K.D.W. had a habit of engaging in the conduct that

       resulted in Jill Doe’s injuries.

[48]   For all the reasons explained above, we conclude that the trial court erred by

       granting summary judgment in favor of K.J.W. and K.M.W. on this count of

       the Does’ complaint.

       2. Premises Liability

[49]   The Does’ negligence claim requires them to establish that (1) K.M.W. and

       K.J.W. owed a duty to Jill Doe; (2) they breached that duty by allowing their

       conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) their breach of

       duty proximately caused a compensable injury to Jill Doe. Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at

       321. The Does allege that K.M.W. and K.J.W. owed a duty to protect Jill Doe

       from harm because she was a social guest upon their premises.

[50]   “Under Indiana premises liability law, the duty a landowner owes to an invitee

       is well established: a landowner must exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s

       protection while the invitee is on the premises.” Id. at 320. “Because this

       general duty has been articulated, the Court need not judicially determine the

       existence of a separate duty today.” Id. “Rather, we look to foreseeability as

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024   Page 22 of 31
       the critical inquiry in deciding whether the landowner-invitee ‘duty to protect’

       extends to a particular scenario.” Id. And “[i]t is well settled that absent a

       duty, there can be no breach.” Id. at 321.

[51]   Reasonable care requires

                  a person to anticipate and guard against what usually happens or
                  is likely to happen and that a failure to do this is negligence; but
                  that reasonable care does not require him to foresee and guard
                  against that which is unusual and not likely to occur, and a
                  failure to do this is not negligence.

       Vetor by Weesner v. Vetor, 634 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting

       Alfano v. Stutsman, 471 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). “Over the

       years, the application of this broadly stated landowner-invitee duty to particular

       situations has depended on one critical element: foreseeability.” Rogers, 63

       N.E.3d at 321.

[52]   In Rogers, the Court recognized that “[w]hen a physical injury occurs as a result

       of a condition on the land, the three elements described in Restatement
                                                   3
       (Second) of Torts section 343 accurately describe the landowner-invitee duty.”

       3
           Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343 provides:
                A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition
                on the land if, but only if, he
                (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize
                that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
                (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect
                themselves against it, and
                (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024                                   Page 23 of 31
       Id. at 322-23. And “while section 343 limits the scope of landowner-invitee

       duty in cases involving injuries due to conditions of the land, injuries could also

       befall invitees due to activities on a landowner’s premises unrelated to the

       premises’ condition—and that landowners owe their invitees the general duty of

       reasonable care under those circumstances, too.” Id. at 323.

[53]   And when there was no “notice of present and specific circumstances that

       would cause a reasonable person to recognize the risk of an imminent criminal

       act, [this Court] has consistently held since Goodwin and Rogers . . . that

       landowners cannot foresee these sudden attacks.” Cavanaugh’s, 140 N.E.3d at

       842-43. See Powell v. Stuber, 89 N.E.3d 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans denied;

       Jones v. Wilson, 81 N.E.3d 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. not sought; Cosgray v.

       French Lick Resort & Casino, 102 N.E.3d 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans not

       sought; and Rose v. Martin’s Super Markets L.L.C., 120 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2019), trans. denied.

[54]   Our Supreme Court recently addressed the foreseeability analysis in Pennington.

       In that case, Jennifer Pennington, a patron of a health and fitness center, was

       injured while swimming in the center’s swimming pool. 223 N.E.3d at 1092.

       While transitioning between different swimming strokes, “her head collided

       with the corner of the wing-wall by the entry steps, causing her injury.” Id.

       Pennington and her husband filed a complaint alleging various theories of

       negligence as the cause of her injuries.

[55]   Our Supreme Court said,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024     Page 24 of 31
        In cases involving conditions on the land or premises, section
        343’s foreseeability analysis focuses specifically on “the
        condition” that allegedly resulted in injury. See Restatement
        (Second) of Torts § 343. In Griffin v. Menard, Inc., for example,
        the plaintiff was injured when a sink fell onto him out of a
        cardboard box. 175 N.E.3d 811, 812 (Ind. 2021). We focused on
        whether Menard had any “actual or constructive knowledge that
        the box was defective.” Id. at 814 (emphasis added).

        A different test applies in cases stemming from “activities on a
        landowner’s premises unrelated to the premises’ condition.” See
        Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 323. In the companion cases of Rogers and
        Goodwin, we explained that, “in the duty arena,” foreseeability
        “involves an evaluation of (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2)
        the broad type of harm.” Id. at 325; see Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at
        394 (restating the same). We consider the “general class of
        persons of which the plaintiff was a member and whether the
        harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected—without
        addressing the specific facts of the occurrence.” Rogers, 63
        N.E.3d at 325 (citing Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 388-89) (emphasis
        added). In Goodwin, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the
        defendant bar should have protected them against being shot by a
        patron. 62 N.E.3d at 385-86. We asked the general question
        whether “bar owners routinely contemplate that one bar patron
        might suddenly shoot another.” Id. at 393-94.

        A critical difference thus exists between the foreseeability tests for
        conditions and activities. The Restatement test that we use for
        conditions looks at whether the danger posed by the specific
        condition involved was foreseeable. Whereas, the
        Rogers/Goodwin test that we use for activities looks at whether it
        was foreseeable that a general class of persons to which the
        plaintiff belonged might suffer the general type of harm involved.
        This distinction makes sense in that a landowner can know the
        precise physical condition of their premises, but only generally
        foresee what conduct or behavior will occur. In today’s case, it
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024      Page 25 of 31
               potentially makes a significant difference whether courts will
               consider the general foreseeability of a swimmer hitting a wall or
               the specific risk of injury posed by the particular wing-wall
               involved.

       Id. at 1097-98. The Court concluded that the appropriate foreseeability analysis

       followed Restatement section 343, and used the test for the foreseeability of

       dangerous conditions. Id. at 1098. The Court concluded that genuine issues of

       material fact existed such that granting summary judgment for the center was

       erroneous. Id. at 1100. Therefore, the foreseeability analysis for premises

       claims arising from harmful activities has been clearly articulated.

[56]   Here, the trial court concluded that “[a] duty of reasonable care requires a

       person to anticipate and guard against what usually happens or is likely to

       happen, and a failure to do so is negligence.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 32.

       The court also concluded that: (1) “[b]ecause K.D.W.’s molestation of Jill Doe

       was not likely to occur, the Defendants were not negligent; and (2) “the

       presence of a troubled child is not equivalent to a dangerous condition or

       activity on the premises.” Id. The court granted summary judgment as a

       matter of law in favor of K.M.W. and K.J.W.

[57]   In today’s case, using the Supreme Court’s analysis for premises claims

       involving harmful activities on the land, the broad type of plaintiff is a female

       child attending a family gathering. And the broad type of harm is sexual

       molestation of that child by another child attending the family gathering. Using

       the Goodwin query, which was embraced in Pennington, the general question we

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024    Page 26 of 31
       ask is whether hosts of family gatherings routinely contemplate that one family

       member/guest might sexually molest another. See Goodwin, 62 N.E.2d. at 393-

       94; Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097. We conclude that they do not and affirm

       the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of K.M.W. and

       K.J.W. on the premises liability claim of the Does’ complaint.

       II. Evidentiary Ruling
[58]   Finally, we address whether the trial court correctly struck portions of the

       affidavit of Dr. Julie Medlin for purposes of its summary judgment order.

       A. Standard of Review

[59]   “We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion to

       strike.” Halterman v. Adams Cnty Bd. Of Comm’rs, 991 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2013). And we “will reverse only when the decision is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

       B. Analysis

[60]   The Does argue that the trial court erroneously excluded the following

       paragraphs from the affidavit of expert witness Dr. Julie Medlin:

               10. As I will explain in this affidavit, it is my opinion that
               [K.M.W.] and [K.J.W.] knew or should have known that in
               August 2018, their son, [K.D.W.] was at risk for engaging in
               sexual abusive behaviors, including the inappropriate touching
               and sexual abuse of a young child like [Jill Doe], if not properly
               supervised by his parents.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024        Page 27 of 31
               ....

               16. It is my opinion that [K.J.W.] and [K.M.W.] knew or
               should have known that failure to follow the safety plan would
               result in [K.D.W.] engaging in sexual maladaptive behaviors,
               including but not limited to the inappropriate touching or sexual
               molestation of a younger child like [Jill Doe].

               17. It is my opinion that on the day of [the] incident that is the
               subject of the above captioned cause, [K.J.W.] and [K.M.W.]’s
               failure to adequately supervise [K.D.W.] made it foreseeable that
               [K.D.W.] would engage in sexual maladaptive behaviors
               including but not limited to the inappropriate touching or sexual
               molestation of a younger child like [Jill Doe].

       Appellants’ App. Conf. Vol. 2, pp. 130, 132-33. The trial court concluded that

       the language used in those paragraphs tracked the Restatement’s language used

       to determine the existence of a duty in claims alleging negligent parental

       supervision. We agree.

[61]   Indiana Rule of Evidence 702 provides for the admissibility of expert opinions.

       The Rule provides:

       Ind. Evidence Rule 702.

               (a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
               experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
               opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
               specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
               evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024     Page 28 of 31
               (b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is
               satisfied that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific
               principles.

[62]   “In addition to asserting admissible facts upon which the opinion is based, an

       expert opinion affidavit must also state the reasoning or methodologies upon

       which it is based.” Thayer v. Vaughn, 798 N.E.2d 249, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),

       trans. denied. “The trial court must be provided with enough information to

       proceed with a reasonable amount of confidence that the principles used to

       form the opinion are reliable.” Id.

[63]   The parties do not dispute Dr. Medlin’s qualifications as an expert. The

       question here is whether Dr. Medlin’s affidavit includes opinions concerning

       legal conclusions. Evidence Rule 704 provides as follows:

               (a) In General--Not Automatically Objectionable. Testimony in
               the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
               objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.

               (b) Exception. Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent,
               guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of
               allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal
               conclusions.

       (emphasis added).

[64]   “[E]xperts should not be permitted to offer legal conclusions as part of their

       testimony because to do so would violate the spirit of Evidence Rule 704(b),

       which provides that ‘[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning . . .

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024        Page 29 of 31
       legal conclusions.’” Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 864 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2005) (quoting Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (West Virginia), Inc., 777 N.E.2d 1110,

       1122-123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (overruled by Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (West

       Virginia), Ind., 841 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Ind. 2006)) (“His opinions concerning

       reasonable care or proximate cause in paragraph 17 embrace ultimate issues to

       be decided by the trier of fact and therefore are admissible.”), trans. denied.

       “The purpose of the rule is that legal conclusions from a witness are not helpful

       to the trier of fact; the judge, not an expert witness, instructs on the law.” Id.

       In today’s case, the statements contained in affidavit paragraphs numbered 10,

       16, and 17 pertain to the legal conclusion the court should make about

       foreseeability in the context of duty. The statements here violate the

       evidentiary rules, particularly Rule 704(b), because they offer legal conclusions

       not to be decided by the trier of fact, but by the trial court, and were properly

       stricken.

[65]   We affirm the trial court’s decision to strike those statements for purposes of its

       summary judgment determination. However, we offer no opinion as to the

       admissibility of the affidavit or any portions thereof in further proceedings.

       Conclusion
[66]   In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

       on the premises liability claim. We also affirm the court’s decision to strike

       portions of the expert’s affidavit. However, we reverse the court’s grant of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024      Page 30 of 31
       summary judgment on the negligent parental supervision claim and remand the

       matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the merits.

[67]   Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.

       Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
       Amy M. Davis
       Law Office of Amy M. Davis
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Katherine A. Franke
       Broadwing Legal
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE
       INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
       Todd C. Barnes
       DOBS & Farinas, LLP

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
       Dina M. Cox
       Anthony J. Simonton, Jr.
       J. Neal Bowling
       Lewis Wagner, LLP
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2922 | February 12, 2024   Page 31 of 31