Court Opinion

ID: 9713579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:18:06.010112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.391300
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE KARNS, dissenting in part: The order of February 28,1975, entered by agreement of the parties, while perhaps erroneous (but see Cooper v. Cooper (1975), 59 Ill. App. 3d 457, 375 N.E.2d 925, and cases therein cited), and subject to modification by the trial court or this court was effective and binding on the parties until modified, expunged or reversed. Even if the order was contrary to the public policy of this State, it was at best erroneous and voidable, not void, as surely the trial court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. (Tucker v. Tucker (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 274, 330 N.E.2d 274.) If this is not an “appropriate order” under the new act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 509), it was one the court had the power to make. The fact that the order was entered with the consent of the parties makes it no less the order of the court, and while there is authority that consent judgments and orders do not have the finality to be accorded the effect of res adjudicata (Freasman v. Smith (1942), 379 Ill. 79, 39 N.E.2d 367 (1942)), it is the law of the case until modified or reversed on appeal and should be protected against collateral attack as between the parties. (Filosa v. Pecora (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 123, 309 N.E.2d 356.) In fact, it is often stated that no appeal can be taken from a consent decree. Nelson o. Nelson (1950), 340 Ill. App. 463, 92 N.E.2d 534. So long as the order of February 28,1975, was in effect, no arrearage in support accrued if the terms of the order were violated, as the trial court found, which finding this court has approved as not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In effect, this decision requires the father to pay retroactive support. Leland v. Brower (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 598, 192 N.E.2d 831, is hardly authority for the decision reached here as there the court, reversing the trial court, gave effect to an Ohio decree relieving a father temporarily of any obligation to pay periodic child support in the absence of a showing that the mother was unable to support the children. Nelson v. Nelson involved an agreement of the parties absolving the father of his duty to pay child support provided for in a decree of divorce. It did not involve a judgment or order of a court modifying a decree. I agree with the majority that the order of the trial court entered June 27,1978, the order from which this appeal is taken, should be reversed as to future child support being made contingent on visitation, and that the father’s obligation to pay future support from June 27 should be affirmed.