Court Opinion

ID: 9959738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 15:07:51.784111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:51.396761
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 126,450

                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                         In the Matter of the Estate of MARTHA MATHER.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appeal from Johnson District Court; JAMES CHARLES DROEGE, judge. Oral argument held March
6, 2024. Opinion filed April 12, 2024. Reversed and remanded.

          Michael R. Ong, of Ong Law Firm, P.A., of Overland Park, for appellant Linda Royceann
Mather.

          Daniel P. Wheeler and Aaron Kirkland, of Kirkland Woods & Martinsen LLP, of Overland Park,
for appellee Ronald A. Mather.

Before WARNER, P.J., ATCHESON and BRUNS, JJ.

          PER CURIAM: This case involves a legal dispute between two siblings—Linda
Royceann Mather and Ronald Mather—regarding the validity of a Second Codicil
executed by their mother, Martha L. Mather, to purportedly amend the terms of her Last
Will. The district court concluded that Royceann lacked standing to file a petition to
probate her mother's Will and to challenge the validity of the Second Codicil. As a result,
the district court dismissed this action. In addition, the district court found that it did not
have the statutory authority to rule on the validity of the Second Codicil.

          For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that Royceann has standing to
petition for the probate of her mother's Last Will and to challenge the validity of the
Second Codicil signed several years after the Will was executed. Likewise, we conclude

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that the district court has the authority to determine the validity of the Second Codicil.
Thus, we reverse the district court's decision, and we remand this matter for further
proceedings.

                                                 FACTS

        On October 12, 2012, Martha executed a document entitled the Last Will of
Martha L. Mather. After the payment of final expenses, the Will provided that Martha's
remaining assets be placed into a trust that she had created in 2001. The trustee was
granted the authority "to hold [the property in the 'residuary estate'] and to administer and
distribute [it] as a part of the trust estate . . . ."

        In the will, Martha named her children—Royceann and Ronald—as the "Personal
Representatives" of her estate. The Will defined "Personal Representative" to encompass
"the terms 'executor' or 'administrator' if those terms are used in the statutes of any state
which has jurisdiction over all or any portion of my estate." In addition, Martha identified
another son as her child but "intentionally made no provisions for [him] under my Will."

        On January 13, 2017, Martha signed a First Codicil amending her Last Will in
which she made Ronald the sole Personal Representative of her estate. Then, on May 10,
2017, Martha signed the Second Codicil that is the subject of this appeal. The Second
Codicil amended the "Disposition of Estate" by naming Ronald to receive "all of the
common stock of Donald R. Mather Construction Co., Inc." and naming Royceann to
receive "[a]ll remaining assets in the Donald R. Mather Revocable Trust . . . ."

        On December 6, 2020, Martha died at the age of 93. A review of the record
reveals that her husband Donald Mather had predeceased her in 2008. About four months
after Martha's death, Ronald filed an affidavit in the district court under K.S.A. 2020
Supp. 59-618a in which he attached her Last Will, the First Codicil, and the Second

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Codicil. However, Ronald did not seek to probate Martha's estate. Instead, Ronald
indicated in his affidavit that he was submitting these documents to the district court "for
the purpose of preserving the same for record in the event that probate proceedings are
later required."

       On October 29, 2021, Royceann filed a petition seeking to probate her mother's
Last Will and requesting that the district court declare the Second Codicil to be void. In
her petition, Royceann stated that she "has an interest in decedent's estate as the daughter
and one of the heirs of Martha." Although the merits of her claims are not before us on
appeal, we note that Royceann alleged—among other things—that Martha "was not of
sound mind and lacked the necessary testamentary capacity to execute a valid codicil to
her Will" at the time the Second Codicil was signed. Additionally, Royceann claimed that
Martha was "subject to undue influence exerted over her by Ronald Allen Mather."

       In response, Ronald moved to dismiss Royceann's petition for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212(b)(6).
Specifically, he claimed that Royceann lacked standing to petition the Last Will for
probate because she was not a beneficiary under the Last Will because all of the residuary
estate was to go into Martha's trust. In the alternative, Ronald filed a counterclaim that
sought admission of the Last Will, the First Codicil, and the Second Codicil as the
combined valid last will and testament of the decedent.

       On December 15, 2021, Royceann filed a response to Ronald's motion to dismiss
in which she reiterated her interest in this matter. She explained that prior to the Second
Codicil, the assets of Donald's trust were to be distributed in equal shares to her and to
Ronald. However, the Second Codicil purports to grant all of the common stock of
Donald R. Mather Construction Co., Inc., to Ronald. As a result, Ronald would receive
approximately 95% of the trust assets if the Second Codicil is found to be valid and that
this "is a dramatic alteration of the prior estate plan disposition of assets."

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       After a nonevidentiary hearing held on January 25, 2022, the district court granted
Ronald's motion to dismiss on the basis that Royceann lacked standing to request
admission of the Last Will dated October 12, 2012. In addition, the district court found
that it did not have the authority to declare the Second Codicil void because no one had
requested that the district court admit it to probate under K.S.A. 59-2225.

       Thereafter, Royceann filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's
ruling. We note that the parties referenced in their briefs and in their oral arguments two
other cases pending in Johnson County District Court that are related to this case. One
involves Martha's trust and the other involves Donald's trust. However, these cases are
not part of this court's record on appeal.

                                             ANALYSIS

Royceann's Standing

       The first issue presented on appeal is whether Royceann has standing to bring this
action seeking to probate the Last Will of Martha L. Mather and to challenge the validity
of the Second Codicil. Standing to bring an action is a requirement to bring a case or
controversy before Kansas courts. Solomon v. State, 303 Kan. 512, 521, 364 P.3d 536
(2015). It is also a component of subject matter jurisdiction. See Cochran v. Kansas Dept.
of Agriculture, 291 Kan. 898, 903, 249 P.3d 434 (2011).

       When the issue of standing is presented at the pleading stage, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing a prima facie case for standing in the case. See In re Adoption of
T.M.M.H., 307 Kan. 902, 915-16, 416 P.3d 999 (2018). Under Kansas law, in order to
establish a prima facie case of standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she suffered a
cognizable injury; and (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged injury and the
challenged conduct. Solomon, 303 Kan. at 521. If standing is not shown, "'there is no

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justiciable case or controversy' and the suit must be dismissed. [Citation omitted.]" Board
of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 750, 189 P.3d 494 (2008).

       As a practical matter, the question of standing "asks whether a party has a
sufficient stake in the controversy to warrant invocation of jurisdiction and to justify the
exercise of the court's remedial powers on that party's behalf." In re Estate of
Mouchague, 56 Kan. App. 2d 983, 986, 442 P.3d 125 (2019) (citing Board of Johnson
County Comm'rs v. Jordan, 303 Kan. 844, 854, 370 P.3d 1170 [2016]). Because standing
is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, it is a question of law over which we have
unlimited review. Chalmers v. Burrough, 314 Kan. 1, 7, 494 P.3d 128 (2021). Moreover,
we also exercise unlimited review on issues relating to statutory interpretation. In re Joint
Application of Westar Energy & Kansas Gas and Electric Co., 311 Kan. 320, 328, 460
P.3d 821 (2020).

       K.S.A. 59-2221 provides that "[a]ny person interested in the estate, after the death
of the testator or intestate, may petition for the probate of his or her will or for
administration." Kansas courts have interpreted the words "any person interested in the
estate" to include a broad class of petitioners. See In re Estate of Milward, 31 Kan. App.
2d 786, 789, 73 P.3d 155 (2003) (executor of will has standing to challenge subsequently
offered codicil purporting to appoint a different executor); Gatewood v. Bosch, 2 Kan.
App. 2d 474, 478, 581 P.2d 1198 (1978) (tort claimant who claimed $1,400 in tort
damage against the estate is an interested party who could have petitioned a will for
probate); In re Estate of Sauceda, No. 122,911, 2021 WL 1323807, at *2 (Kan. App.
2021) (unpublished opinion) (creditor with claim against estate may petition for
administration). Similarly, under K.S.A. 59-2224, "[a]ny heir, devisee, or legatee may
prosecute or oppose the probate of any will." See In re Estate of Beason, 248 Kan. 803,
806, 811 P.2d 848 (1991).

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       Here, as Martha's children, both Royceann and Ronald are heirs of the decedent
who "may prosecute or oppose the probate of [their mother's] will." K.S.A. 59-2224;
K.S.A. 59-501 et seq. (intestate succession); see Jackson v. Lee, 193 Kan. 40, 44, 392
P.2d 92 (1964) (heir is word commonly understood in Kansas to mean one who takes by
intestate succession under the Kansas statutes). Moreover, we find that Royceann is a
"person interested in the estate"—as that term is used in K.S.A. 59-2221—because she is
expressly mentioned in both the Last Will of Martha L. Mather that she seeks to have
probated and in the Second Codicil that she seeks to challenge. Additionally, it is
undisputed that the Second Codicil—if found to be valid—amends the "Disposition of
Estate" as set forth in Martha's will.

       It is also undisputed that if the Second Codicil is found to be valid, it would have a
negative financial impact on Royceann. Significantly, if the district court enforces the
provisions of the Second Codicil, Ronald would receive control of all of the common
stock of Donald R. Mather Construction Co., Inc., that is being held in trust while
Royceann would receive only any assets that may remain. On the other hand, if the
district court finds the Second Codicil to be void or invalid, Ronald and Royceann would
equally divide control of the common stock in the construction company.

       Under these circumstances, we find that Royceann has a sufficient stake in the
controversy over the validity of the Second Codicil and its impact on the Last Will of
Martha L. Mather to warrant invocation of the district court's jurisdiction and to justify
asking the district court to exercise its remedial powers on her behalf. Ronald suggests
that Royceann lacks standing because the trust established by Martha is the sole
beneficiary of her estate. But—as discussed above—it is not only beneficiaries who have
standing to seek to probate a will or to challenge subsequent codicils that ostensibly
amend a decedent's original will.

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District Court's Authority

       Next, Royceann contends that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked
statutory authority to grant her the relief she requested in her petition. In granting the
motion to dismiss, the district court found that neither party had requested that the
Second Codicil be admitted to probate. Further, the district court found that Royceann
had not met the requirements of K.S.A. 59-2225 of the Kansas Probate Code, stating that
"no legal authority exists for the Court to declare void a testamentary document that no
one has asked the Court to admit to probate." As discussed above, our review over issues
involving statutory interpretation is unlimited. In re Westar Energy, 311 Kan. at 328.

       K.S.A. 59-2225 of the Kansas Probate Code provides the procedure for parties
seeking to admit competing wills:

                "If, after a petition for the probate of a will has been filed, another instrument in
       writing purporting to be the last will or codicil shall be presented, proceedings shall be
       had for the probate thereof and thereupon the hearing on the petition theretofore filed
       shall be adjourned to the time fixed for the hearing of the subsequent petition. At such
       time proof shall be had upon all of such wills, codicils, and all matters pertaining thereto,
       and the court shall determine which of such instruments, if any, should be allowed as the
       last will."

       On April 23, 2021, Ronald filed the Last Will of Martha L. Mather, the First
Codicil, and the Second Codicil in the district court. In an accompanying affidavit filed
pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 59-618a, Ronald averred that the purpose of the filing was
to preserve these documents "for record in the event that probate proceedings are later
required." Subsequently, Royceann filed a petition to probate Martha's will—which was
executed in 2012—asking the district court to declare the Second Codicil to be void
because her mother lacked testamentary capacity and/or was subject to undue influence
when she signed the document in 2017.

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       In addition to filing his K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) motion for failure to state
a claim in which he claimed that his sister lacked standing, Ronald also filed written
defenses in which he asserted what he called a "contingent alternative counter-claim." In
this document, Ronald asked the district court to admit Martha's original will, the First
Codicil, and the Second Codicil to be probated if Royceann was allowed to go forward on
her petition. According to Ronald, "all three testamentary documents collectively
comprise the Last Will and Testament of the decedent."

       Because we have found that Royceann has standing to bring her petition seeking
to probate the original will, we also find that the district court has the statutory authority
under K.S.A. 59-2225 to determine the dispute between the parties over the validity of
the respective testamentary instruments. The plain and unambiguous language of K.S.A.
59-2225 provides that "proof shall be had upon all of such wills, codicils, and all matters
pertaining thereto, and the court shall determine which of such instruments, if any, should
be allowed as the last will."

       Finally, we also note the district court's authority under K.S.A. 60-1706:

               "Any executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor,
       devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or beneficiary, in the administration of a trust, or of the
       estate of a decedent . . . or any person holding an interest in such trust or estate, may seek
       and obtain declaration of rights or legal relations to:
               ....
               "(c) determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust,
       including questions of construction of wills and other writings."

       Here, Martha named Royceann as one of the "Personal Representatives" of her
estate under the terms of the original will and thus gave her the powers of an "executor"
and an "administrator." See K.S.A. 59-102(2) (personal representative includes executors
and administrators); K.S.A. 59-3204 (setting forth duties of executor or administrator

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under probate code). Of course, she was also Martha's child and heir. See K.S.A. 59-
2224; K.S.A. 59-501; Jackson, 193 Kan. at 44. So, Royceann could also seek a
declaration of her rights under the terms of the various testamentary instruments signed
by her mother—and the district court had the authority "to . . . determine any . . .
questions of construction of [the will] and other writings"—pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1706.

                                       CONCLUSION

       In summary, we find that Royceann has standing to pursue this matter. We further
find that the district court has the statutory authority to consider Royceann's claim—as
well as Ronald's counterclaim—relating to the validity of the Last Will of Martha L.
Mather and the codicils in order to determine which documents should be considered to
be Martha's last will. We do not, however, take a position on the merits of any of the
claims or defenses asserted by the parties. Likewise, we will yield to the sound discretion
of the district court regarding how to handle the pending cases involving disputes
between Royceann and Ronald from a procedural perspective.

       We, therefore, conclude that the district court's journal entry dismissing this action
should be reversed, and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

       Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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