Court Opinion

ID: 9729937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:53:16.363154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.492481
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it found plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining service of summons on defendant. The trial judge’s ruling should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Segal v. Sacco, 136 Ill. 2d 282, 286, 555 N.E.2d 719, 720 (1990). An abuse of discretion will be found only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court or where the trial court acted arbitrarily. Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 217 Ill. 2d 158, 169, 840 N.E.2d 269, 276 (2005); People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286, 302, 860 N.E.2d 259, 270-71 (2006). The majority contends that no reasonable person could find that plaintiff failed to act diligently in serving defendant after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. In Illinois, the statute of limitations for an injury to the person, such as plaintiffs claim herein, is two years. 735 ILCS 5/13 — 202 (West 2006). Defendant was served seven months after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff, therefore, extended the statute of limitations by nearly 30%. Let us look at the plaintiffs efforts to serve defendant in this case: •On August 15, 2007, the complaint and summons were forwarded to the Du Page County sheriff for service on defendant. On August 23, 2007, the Du Page County sheriff returned the summons complaint unserved. •On September 5, 2007, plaintiffs attorney sent a change of address form to the United States Post Office which was returned on September 12, 2007, as “forwarding ordered expired.” •On November 7, 2007 (over two months later), plaintiffs attorney performed an Internet search which revealed nine potential addresses for defendant’s name. Plaintiff chose the first address on the internet search, 705 Wilmette Avenue, Westmont, Illinois. •On December 13, 2007 (over one month later), plaintiff obtained an alias summons for service on defendant at the Westmont address. •On January 4, 2008, the Du Page County sheriff returned the return of service indicating the defendant had moved. •On February 13, 2008 (over one month later), plaintiff sent a second form letter to the United States Postal Service requesting address information for defendant, citing the Westmont address. The postal service stated that the address was good. •On February 28, 2008, plaintiff caused a second alias summons to be issued for defendant at the same Westmont address. •Finally, on March 17, a special process server, hired by plaintiff, served defendant at his home in Downers Grove, Illinois. This occurred seven months after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. As illustrated above, during this seven-month period, there were periods totaling four months when nothing was done. Yet, the majority later states that “[ujnlike the cases cited by the defendant, the plaintiff did not ignore her case for months at a time,” and that this is “not a case where the plaintiff was attempting to delay service or circumvent the statute of limitations.” 396 Ill. App. 3d at 1046. As set forth above, the plaintiff did indeed ignore the case for months at a time. Moreover, whether or not plaintiff was attempting to delay service is not the point; the fact is, service was delayed for no plausible reason. Plaintiffs efforts were minimal at best. The majority relies almost entirely upon the fact that the ultimate time between the case filing and perfection of service was approximately seven months. However, the time delay is only one factor for the court’s consideration. As explained by the majority above, courts consider a number of factors when determining whether to grant a Rule 103(b) motion. Each case must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 207, 212 (2007). The primary purpose of Rule 103(b) is to promote expeditious handling of lawsuits by giving the court wide discretion to dismiss when service is not perfected with reasonable diligence. Sinn v. Elmhurst Medical Building, Ltd., 243 Ill. App. 3d 787, 612 N.E.2d 932 (1993). Here, the record reflects that the trial judge properly examined the relevant factors, and ultimately concluded plaintiff did not act diligently. Specifically, the judge explained: “The factors that the Court needs to consider are set forth in the defendant’s motion. And those are in support of reasonable diligence, the length of time to obtain service, which was approximately seven months, the activities of the plaintiff. They are set forth in the various pleadings. And I think that we have discussed them on the record. I think that they show that there frankly was not reasonable diligence. And any knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of defendant’s location, the defendant has represented that he has been at the same address during [the] entire seven-month period. The ease with which the defendant’s whereabouts could have been ascertained. He lives and was served actually in Downers Grove, apparently had not recently relocated to that address. Any special circumstances that would affect — I’m sorry — made by the plaintiffs. I don’t think that there are any special circumstances. Actual knowledge of the defendant of the pendency of the action. There is no indication that he was aware of this action. And then, of course, actual service, which was effected seven months after today’s date. So, based upon everything, having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, and having actually read the cases, because I wrote an opinion on, an order on a 103(b) motion, and I read all the cases already. So I am familiar with the case law. I am granting the motion.” The trial judge correctly considered the totality of the circumstances and, therefore, did not act arbitrarily. Moreover, one cannot say that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. It is undisputed that over the seven-month period, two service attempts were made to false addresses once approximately every 71 days. Plaintiff did not rebut that the entirety of her actions taken to perfect service upon defendant during those seven months amounted to “under an hour” of work. Finally, it is undisputed that by the time plaintiff retained her attorney, defendant had been living at his current address for nearly 19 months, and continued to reside there at the time of the hearing. The majority fails to cite a single case where an abuse of discretion was found on behalf of the trial court judge when the delay in service of summons was over six months after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Even assuming that reasonable people could disagree with the trial court’s ruling, one cannot say that the ruling was an abuse of discretion. The majority has ignored the standard of review and substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The trial judge should be affirmed. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.