Court Opinion

ID: 9561222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:33.226524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.589823
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in judgment only.
1. (a) Godbey waived any issue of notice under Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3 by electing to make his character an affirmative defense.1 USCR 31.3 (D); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799 (507 SE2d 833) (1998); Miller v. State, 226 Ga. App. 509, 513 (486 SE2d 911) (1997).2 Amy Fredell’s testimony became admissible regardless of whether any notice had been given at all. USCR 31.3 (D).
(b) Further:
Child molestation, child abuse, and family violence are uniquely those cases in which the victim or victims are repeatedly and secretly the subject of criminal conduct over long periods of time, and the accused may maintain a public facade of “good character,” which can be used to defend against such charges. Thus, when an accused seeks to hide behind the masking evidence of “good character,” the requirements of USCR 31.3 are waived, and evidence of prior similar acts of abuse . . . may be used to strip away the mask.
Miller v. State, supra at 514.
Under USCR 31.3 (D), similar transaction evidence regarding a defendant’s prior, similar sex acts against a child are admissible under rules of evidence to show the defendant’s “lustful disposition,” and bent of mind. OCGA §§ 24-9-20; 24-2-2; 24-9-68; Farley v. State, *535265 Ga. 622 (2) (458 SE2d 643) (1995).3 While such evidence may not be introduced during the State’s case-in-chief in anticipation of a character defense, when a defendant elects to put his character into evidence, such evidence becomes admissible in rebuttal. To me, under most circumstances, it is “highly probable” that the order of the otherwise admissible proof (in the case-in-chief — as opposed to rebuttal) would not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 (230 SE2d 869) (1976); Morrow v. State, 229 Ga. App. 242, 245 (493 SE2d 616) (1997).
2. Further, Godbey had sufficient notice and opportunity to raise his questions regarding the admissibility of the similar transaction prior to trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting such evidence. Bean v. State, 239 Ga. App. 106, 108 (2) (521 SE2d 19) (1999).
(a) Although the notice incorrectly stated that King’s Mountain, North Carolina, was a “county,” Godbey was from King’s Mountain, North Carolina. At the time the similar transaction notice was served on his defense counsel, Godbey had returned to the King’s Mountain area to live and had been living there “for awhile” prior to trial. Defense counsel knew this and contacted Godbey in King’s Mountain to inform him of the similar transaction notice. See Parrish v. State, 237 Ga. App. 274, 279-280 (514 SE2d 458) (1999).
(b) Although the first notice did not contain Fredell’s telephone number and address, Fredell was Godbey’s next-door neighbor when he previously lived in King’s Mountain; she still lived in the same house in King’s Mountain; and Godbey had stayed in “contact” with Fredell over the years. Fredell and Godbey’s daughter were still good friends. Defense counsel called Fredell and interviewed her prior to the similar transaction hearing. Appellant Godbey, who lived “very close” to Fredell, went to see her and interviewed her himself. Defense counsel knew exactly what Fredell was going to say prior to the hearing on the similar transactions.
(c) While the notice did not contain the exact dates of the prior molestation, neither the State nor Fredell knew the exact dates, and defense counsel talked to Fredell about that matter prior to the similar transaction hearing. In addition, the trial court offered counsel a further opportunity to talk to Fredell prior to trial. See Bohannon v. State, 208 Ga. App. 576, 578-579 (431 SE2d 149) (1993).
(d) The defense conceded it was sent a fax transmission regarding the similar transaction ten days prior to trial. The defense used the information contained in that transmission. On this same issue, *536this Court has held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in recognizing a fax as “notice,” because the defense received actual notice of the similar transaction more timely via fax than by mail: “ ‘had service of the notice been accomplished by mail, it would have been complete upon mailing notwithstanding the date of receipt, even though actual notice would have been closer to trial.’ ” Davidson v. State, 232 Ga. App. 250, 251 (501 SE2d 510) (1998); Willis v. State, 202 Ga. App. 447, 449 (2) (414 SE2d 681) (1992). Accordingly, the purpose for similar transaction notice was served. Id. Notably, counsel did not request a continuance with regard to the similar transaction notice. Instead, defense counsel hoped to use the omissions in the initial notice to preclude Fredell’s testimony altogether.
Decided December 2, 1999
Reconsideration denied December 16, 1999.
Davis, Zipperman, Kirschenbaum & Lotito, Nicholas A. Lotito, Paul A. Griffin, for appellant.
William T. McBroom III, District Attorney, Randall K. Coggin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
It is well settled that, “USCR 31.1 provides that the notice be given and filed at least ten days before trial unless the time is shortened or lengthened by the judge. We have interpreted this rule as clothing the trial court with discretion which will not be controlled absent abuse.” (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Bryant v. State, 226 Ga. App. 135, 138 (486 SE2d 374) (1997).
Even if the time was shortened in this case, the rule permits it. The purpose of the notice requirement was fulfilled because Godbey had sufficient notice and opportunity to raise his questions regarding the admissibility of Fredell’s similar transaction testimony prior to trial. Bean v. State, supra. No continuance was requested. Accordingly, there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in shortening the notice time and permitting Fredell’s testimony. Bryant v. State, supra.

 Here, the record shows that Godbey planned to affirmatively put his character into evidence after receiving the State’s notice of similar transaction evidence and, following the State’s case, called several witnesses to testify specifically as to his character.

 Accord Hawkins v. State, 230 Ga. App. 627, 629 (497 SE2d 386) (1998); Kelly v. State, 197 Ga. App. 811, 815 (7) (a) (399 SE2d 568) (1990); Sidwell v. State, 185 Ga. App. 138, 139 (363 SE2d 603) (1987).

 Accord, e.g., Condra v. State, 238 Ga. App. 174 (2) (518 SE2d 186) (1999); Gibbins v. State, 229 Ga. App. 896, 899 (4) (495 SE2d 46) (1997); Wilson v. State, 220 Ga. App. 487, 489-491 (2) (469 SE2d 516) (1996).