Court Opinion

ID: 9859770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:36:19.20962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:05:22.431744
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: Although I do not disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse or anything it says in reaching that decision, I disagree that it should be saying any of this in the first place. The majority claims to be giving deference to Talandis, which held that, in the absence of an appellee’s brief, a reviewing court should reverse (1) if the appellant’s brief demonstrates prima facie evidence of reversible error, (2) the record supports the appellant’s allegations, and (3) a reviewing court cannot easily evaluate the issues on appeal. Talandis, 63 Ill. 2d at 133, 345 N.E.2d at 495. The majority then concludes that "[t]he record in this case is not so complicated as to prevent this court from reviewing the issues on the merits.” 284 Ill. App. 3d at 342. I respectfully disagree. The record in this case is not simple, and the claimed errors are not such that we can easily decide them without the aid of the appellee’s brief. The 22-volume record consists of over 2,500 pages. Further, the scrutiny the majority was required to give this record in order to decide this case and to prepare its carefully detailed opinion belies the majority’s assertion regarding the uncomplicated nature of this record. I agree with the majority that an analysis of the record reveals prima facie evidence of reversible error. Maryse’s brief clearly supports her challenges to the propriety of the trial court’s rulings, with appropriate citations to the record and case authority. Accordingly, we should take the supreme court at its word in Talandis, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand with directions that the trial court grant Maryse all of the relief she requested on appeal. We should do so without ever addressing the merits of the trial court’s order. It is somewhat ironic that part of the explanation the majority provides for its willingness to address this case on the merits is its wish to give deference to the work of the trial judge. See 284 111. App. 3d at 342. I suggest that the majority’s willingness to decide this case on the merits in the absence of an appellee’s brief — which might have addressed some of the majority’s concerns regarding the trial court’s rulings — runs contrary to the deference the majority claims to show. No trial court likes to get reversed, but it would be far more palatable to be reversed because the appellee simply failed to show up at the appellate court than to be reversed — purportedly on the merits — when no one defended the trial court’s rulings in the appellate court."As the majority correctly points out, "a reviewing court should not be compelled to serve as appellee’s advocate.” 284 Ill. App. 3d at 342. So, if this court does not serve as appellee’s advocate, and the appellee elects not to appear himself, then who is supposed to defend the trial court’s rulings? I indicated earlier that I had no disagreement with the majority on the merits, but in so stating I should clarify that this concurrence is based upon the majority’s assessment of the record and the trial court’s rulings in the absence of anyone appearing in this court to argue that those rulings were correct. Under Talandis, we need be satisfied only that the record reveals prima facie evidence of reversible error — a standard I think this record clearly shows. Nonetheless, it is at least possible that had the trial court had someone defending its rulings before us, our assessment of some (or even all) of those rulings might have changed. Speaking only for myself, it often happens that I am much more impressed with an appellant’s arguments after having read only the appellant’s brief than I am after I have also read the appellee’s brief.