Court Opinion

ID: 9700630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:38:25.269348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:12.462192
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s resolution of the first two issues raised by appellant. However, as to appellant’s third issue, I am compelled to dissent to the views expressed by the majority regarding whether a district attorney’s blanket designation of all Assistant District Attorneys as having the *125authority to act in his stead comports with the requirements of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8931.
In relevant part, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8931 states the following:
(d) Duties of prosecuting attorneys—... The district attorney or his designee shall have the duty to inquire into and make full examination of all facts and circumstances connected with each ... case to determine if the facts and circumstances warrant the filing of an information or informations premised upon the transcript...
(e) Disposition of cases—The district attorney shall sign all informations.
(i) Definition—As used in this section “district attorney” includes ... any assistant district attorney whose authority to act for the district attorney under this section is evidenced by a written designation executed by the district attorney ... and filed with the clerk of the courts.
Pursuant to § 8931(i), a properly designated assistant district attorney may undertake the duty of the district attorney in reviewing and signing a criminal information. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Dupree, 290 Pa.Super. 202, 434 A.2d 201 (1981).
The following designation was on file at the clerk of the courts’ office of Westmoreland County:1
DESIGNATION OF AUTHORITY
I, Albert M. Nichols, District Attorney of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania do hereby State and Aver under oath that all Assistant District Attorneys employed by me in the conduct of the said District Attorney’s Office, have been, are now, and will continue to have full authority to act in my stead, and perform all of the duties of prosecuting attorneys and have authority to act for the District Attorney under Section 8931 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 8931.
*126/S/ ALBERT M. NICHOLS
District Attorney of Westmoreland County
(ACKNOWLEDGEMENT)
Appellant argues that a more specific designation of the persons empowered with the District Attorney’s authority is required in order to comport with the intent of the Judicial Code. The majority denies appellant’s contention as follows: “None of the case law advanced by the appellant supports a requirement for a specific, designation by name. So long as the designation, either general or specific is of record, an assistant district attorney’s initials adjacent to his employer’s stamped signature satisfy the promoted policy.”
In my view, the Judicial Code requires something more than a mere blanket designation. The Judicial Code entrusts the district attorney or his designee with the power and ability to sanction the intrusion by the State into the lives of our citizenry without the benefit of the cherished institution of indictment by grand jury. In so doing, the Code has established the district attorney, or his designee, as the critical initial check point along the serious and solemn path down which a citizen must confront the prosecutorial force of the State. Ultimately, however, under § 8931(i), it is the district attorney alone who is responsible for this burden, not his designee. For pursuant to § 8931(i), it is only the district attorney who can delegate to a designee this authority. I cannot agree that the Judicial Code in ultimately placing this responsibility upon the district attorney and in permitting its delegation, intends that it should be bandied about so lightly as is the case with a blanket designation of authority to all assistant district attorneys. To allow the district attorney to delegate this responsibility in such a manner denigrates its importance. It is not an undue burden upon the district attorney for this court to require the delegation of authority to be performed with specificity, in recognition of the importance of this *127awesome responsibility, and in so doing, to require the district attorney to evidence his judgment that every individual to be entrusted with this power is indeed qualified to exercise it.
Moreover, I believe that these concerns are not the only ones done injury by the views expressed in the majority opinion. By requiring that the district attorney’s written designation be filed in the Clerk of Courts office, I believe § 8931(i) of the Judicial Code contemplates that defense counsel, as well as the public at large, would be able to ascertain from a review of the written designation specifically who had the authority to review informations and whether a person so empowered had done so. By permitting the district attorney to file a blanket designation, the majority imposes upon defense counsel the burden of having to determine whether the information was reviewed by a person who falls within the class of persons specified in the written delegation. I do not believe that the intent of the Judicial Code, as set forth above, is furthered by this unnecessary burden placed upon those who would examine a public record.
Although the majority’s views decide only the ineffectiveness claim and do not become the substantive law of Pennsylvania,2 I feel compelled to set forth my views to the contrary on this most important issue.
Accordingly, I would find this issue to be of arguable merit. I would therefore vacate judgment of sentence and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel had a reasonable basis for his failure to challenge the designation.

. See Brief for Appellant, Exhibit B, Certified Copy of the Designation.

. Because trial counsel failed to properly preserve the designation issue by raising it in post-verdict motions, we normally would not consider its merits on appeal. However, the improperly preserved claim may be considered solely for the purpose of resolving the question of ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 483 Pa. 183 n. 5, 394 A.2d 971 n. 5 (1978); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 474 Pa. 218 n. 4, 378 A.2d 297 n. 4 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 277, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).