Court Opinion

ID: 9663502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:40:46.005048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:51.121988
License: Public Domain

LaROCQUE, J.
(dissenting) I dissent to the decision to grant a new trial on the issue of liability. Whether there was an emergency was an issue of fact *156for the jury, which it resolved in favor of the defendant, Bunnell.
An emergency instruction is proper when three conditions are met: (1) The party seeking its benefits must be free from the negligence that contributed to the creation of the emergency; (2) the time element in which action is required must be short enough to preclude the deliberate and intelligent choice of action; and (3) the element of negligence inquired into must concern management and control. Menge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 578, 582-83, 164 N.W.2d 495, 498 (1969). When deciding whether an emergency instruction should be given, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. Lutz v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 743, 754, 235 N.W.2d 426, 433 (1975).
Viewing the evidence most favorably to Bunnell, there was testimony that justified the emergency instruction. Bunnell’s pretrial deposition testimony, read to the jury, included this exchange:
Q As you came to the top of the hill what is the first thing you saw when you came over the top of the hill?
A I didn’t see anything. Bee stung me right before I got to the top, and then I swatted at it, and I didn’t see nothing after that.
Bunnell claimed that he felt the bee sting and that it was painful. He was traveling between forty-five and fifty miles per hour and described the time lapse between the incident and the collision as “spontaneous! ]” and that “it happened just bang, and that was it.” He described the distance from the point the incident occurred to the collision as between fifty to *157seventy-five feet. Although Bunnell also gave testimony that could be construed as less definite, even where a witness makes two contradictory statements, it is within the province of the jury to accept and rely on either version and to disregard in part or in total the other. Graves v. Travelers Ins. Co., 66 Wis. 2d 124, 136-137, 224 N.W.2d 398, 405 (1974).
The decision of Komfar v. Millard, 179 Wis. 79, 190 N.W. 835 (1922), is in accord. There, the trial court erroneously directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the theory that he was confronted with an emergency as a matter of law when he brushed away a bug or a leaf that blew into his vehicle while he was passing a horse and buggy. The supreme court held that the question of emergency in that situation was an issue of fact for the jury and ordered a new trial. The court noted: “If... a bug or a leaf or some similar object should fly in his face without blinding him or seriously injuring him, it is well within the province of the jury to find whether that was sufficient to excuse his losing control of his car and turning into the side of the buggy.” Id. at 83, 190 N.W. at 836.
Because I would affirm the jury’s verdict on liability, I would not review the issue of the damage instructions.