Court Opinion

ID: 9737761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:34:00.887019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.149852
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority. In my opinion, the Legislature has invaded the *548constitutional authority granted to the judicial branch and usurped the judicial function of determining the proper construction of a statute. It is within the power of this Court, not the Legislature, to interpret the legislative intent of 1981 PA 203. Therefore, I would conclude that 1987 PA 28, § 354(17)-(20), violates art 3, § 2 and art 6, § 1 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. Accordingly, I would hold that 1987 PA 28, § 354(17)-(20) is to be applied prospectively from its effective date, May 14, 1987.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1987 PA 28, § 354(17), the Legislature stated:
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 422 Mich 636 [375 NW2d 715 (1985)] is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose.
In Presque Isle Twp Bd of Ed v Presque Isle Co Bd of Ed, 364 Mich 605, 612; 111 NW2d 853 (1961), this Court held:
"It is too elementary to justify us in referring to authority on the question, that a legislative body is not permitted under any circumstances to declare what its intention was on a former occasion so as to affect past transactions. ... Its members have no more right to construe one of its enact*549ments retroactively than has any private individual.”™
A review of the historical background that encompassed the enactment of 1981 PA 203 and 1987 PA 28 serves to illustrate the reasoning behind this prohibition.
As outlined below, the interpretation of § 354 imputed to the 1981 Legislature by the 1987 Legislature was erroneous. The 1981 Legislature was fully cognizant of the consequences of coordinating workers’ compensation benefits, yet it enacted 1981 PA 203 in an attempt to stimulate a poor state economy by lowering the cost of doing business in Michigan.
A. 1981 PA 203
1981 PA 203 was part of a comprehensive reform of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act that was begun one year earlier.1
2 The purpose of the reform, and specifically 1981 PA 203, was to reduce the cost to the business community of workers’ compensation liability and to eliminate perceived abuses of the system. 1981 PA 203 was passed in December, 1981. During the period prior to the enactment of this legislation, Michigan had been struggling through a severe recession. A significant number of businesses either were closing their local operations or leaving the state. The unemployment rate in Michigan during December 1981, was 14.4 percent,3 and the 1981 inflation rate *550for the City of Detroit in 1981 was 9.3 percent.4 It was against this economic backdrop that the Legislature passed 1981 PA 203.5
As noted in Chambers v General Motors Corp, companion case of Franks, supra at 655, "Governor William Milliken discussed his proposals to solve what he deemed the 'biggest single liability to Michigan’s job climate today [November 18, 1981]’ ”:6
"To start with, we must keep in mind that the purpose of workers’ compensation, after all, is to restore wage-earning capacity lost in on-the-job accidents. Workers’ compensation was never intended to be more lucrative than gainful employment or to be a retirement bonus.
"I have proposed that we coordinate benefits from different employer-paid sources so that workers receive the maximum benefits to which they are entitled, but no more. It is only simple justice that an employer not be assessed costs for several different funds which result in reimbursing the injured worker for more than the lost wage-earning capacity.”[7] [Emphasis added.]
The Governor’s concerns were echoed in the Senate Analysis Section, SB 573: First Analysis, p 6 (January 7, 1982):
By coordinating workers’ compensation benefits with Social Security and other benefits, Senate Bill *551595 [1981 PA 203] would provide a major savings to employers in the cost of workers’ compensation while maintaining adequate beneñt levels for disabled workers. [Emphasis added.]
Since 1912, other public and private wage replacement insurance programs have appeared with the result that many employees now receive wage-loss benefits from two, three, or four different programs providing a total wage "replacement” greater than the wages the employee earned while on the job, while employers who must contribute to these programs fínd themselves paying more than once to replace the wages of a single employee. [Emphasis added.]
After SB 595 passed the House vote, five members of the House reserved the right to enter their protests against the passage of the bill. Rep. Cushingberry said:
This measure, while I’m sure will be reported as a major cost savings measure for business; it will prove to produce its benefit. The only thing this bill will do is to perhaps increase the burden on those less fortunate. . . . This outcome of our act tonight effectively cuts the benefits of even those who have a legitimate worker’s disability. [1981 House Journal 2855.]
Reps. Emerson and Vanek protested, "This provision that has been adopted will increase the likelihood that an injured employee could receive no worker’s compensation benefit, hardly an incentive for employers of this state to maintain a safe workplace.” Id. Rep. Kelsey stated:
Additionally, I supported the revisions of the system during the fall of 1980, which will take effect in January, 1982. To my dismay, however, the commitment to only do away with the abuses *552was not kept and it was decided by the proponents of revision to go all the way and not only to take care of the abuses but, again, to abuse and deprive the legitimate victims of on-the-job injuries. It was proposed not only to reduce the length of benefits but also the amount of benefits received by the workers. ... I could not, in good conscience, support the so-called revision which would only add to the current economic depression and harm the citizens of the State of Michigan. [Id. at 2856. Emphasis added.]
Finally, Rep. Elliott added:
This package tonight will relieve many employers of their responsibilities to pay any worker’s compensation benefits, not only to older workers but also to younger workers whose families may be entitled to social security benefits. [Id. Emphasis added.]
The 1981 Legislature knew exactly the consequences of SB 595. The purpose of the bill was to effectuate a cost saving reform for business, and to eliminate duplicate recovery of benefits. While some legislators strongly opposed 1981 PA 203, the majority felt the need for economic reform outweighed the "burden”8 that may be felt by an injured worker receiving benefits from more than one source. Four years later, this Court upheld the clear legislative intent behind 1981 PA 203 when we unanimously held "that this statute clearly and unambiguously requires coordination of workers’ compensation and other specified benefits for all compensable periods subsequent to its effective date, regardless of when the injury occurred.” *553Chambers, supra at 651. However, the 1987 Legislature not only disregarded our Chambers decision as having been "erroneously rendered,” it also ignored the legislative history that served as the basis for the Chambers decision.
b. 1987 pa 28
• 1987 PA 28 claims that the legislative intent of § 354 of 1981 PA 203 was "not to coordinate payments under this section . . . for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982.” However, a review of the voting members of the 1987 Legislature indicates that this claim is impossible to sustain.
The 1987 amendment of §354 was enacted in May 1987. At this time, Michigan was enjoying a much improved economic climáte.9 The level of unemployment was 8.2 percent10 (down from the 1981 level of 14.4 percent), and the 1987 inflation rate for the City of Detroit was 3.0 percent* 11 (down from the 1981 level of 9.3 percent). With Michigan industry in a much improved condition, and with a new Governor, the 1987 Legislature revisited the work of the 1981 Legislature.
The 1987 Legislature was displeased with the decision of this Court in Chambers, so it sought to correct our "erroneous” decision by providing its own "interpretation” of the intent of the 1981 Legislature. However, as pointed out by the appellants, only a fraction of the senators and represen*554tatives who voted in favor of 1981 PA 203 were still around to "interpret” the 1981 legislative intent with 1987 PA 28. Specifically, only eleven of the twenty-six senators12 who voted in favor of 1981 PA 203 were still around to vote in favor of 1987 PA 28.13 Similarly, only twenty of the sixty-two representatives14 who voted in favor of 1981 PA 203 were around to vote in favor of 1987 PA 28.15 Therefore, even though less than half of the senators and less than one-third of the representatives from the 1981 Legislature who voted in favor of 1981 PA 203 also voted in favor of 1987 PA 28, the 1987 Legislature claims that its amendment was the original intent of the 1981 Legislature. This is a claim with which I can not agree.
Furthermore, the claim of the 1987 Legislature that it provided the original intent of the 1981 Legislature flies in the face of the fact that those members of the 1981 Legislature who opposed 1981 PA 203 failed in their attempt to limit its application. As pointed out in Chambers, supra at 659, a legislative resolution16 was passed after the enactment of § 354 which attempted to prevent the coordination of benefits of persons injured prior to its effective date. This Court first noted that the resolution was an attempt by those who opposed 1981 PA 203 to subsequently limit its scope and then held:_
*555Had the Legislature wanted to change § 354 to impose that limitation, it could have properly done so only by amendment. Although § 354 has been amended, such amendments have not limited its application with respect to date of injury. Finally, the respectful consideration to which legislative resolutions are entitled ... is offset here by the fact that a bill introduced to achieve that result was defeated [SB 834, introduced on May 20, 1982]. im
In sum, the economic and political climate surrounding the enactment of 1987 PA 28 was vastly different from that in 1981. Only thirty-five percent of those members of the 1981 Legislature who voted in favor of 1981 PA 203 also voted in favor the 1987 amendment. Also, the legislative history of 1981 PA 203 clearly contradicts the claim of the 1987 Legislature that 1987 PA 28 provided the original intent of the 1981 Legislature.
Through this scenario, the wisdom of the Presque Me Twp School Dist, rule becomes evident—a legislative body is not permitted to declare what its intention was on a former occasion so as to affect past transactions. Therefore, I would conclude that the claim of the 1987 Legislature is nugatory.17
II. REMEDIAL LEGISLATION V SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE
The 1987 Legislature described 1987 PA 28 as a "remedial and curative amendment,” § 354(17). This is a description with which the Court of *556Appeals agreed.181 do not share the same opinion.
The function of curative legislation is to "repair the consequences of legal accident or mistake.” 2 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 41.01, p 338. A legal accident or mistake "can be the result of the failure of the lawmakers to make provision for unforeseen circumstances which should have been provided for or the failure of parties to conform to nonessential legal requirements or limitations.” Id.
The case before us today is not one of "legal accident or mistake.” Quite the opposite is true. 1981 PA 203 was enacted at.the conclusion of a comprehensive reform of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act. The Legislature had made the determination that the system was subject to abuse by employees who were receiving benefits from multiple sources. In turn, this would result in the employee receiving total benefits that were in excess of his workplace compensation. In order to eliminate this possibility, and to reduce the cost of workers’ compensation to businesses, the coordination of benefits provision was enacted.
There was no "failure ... to make provisions for unforseen circumstances.” The Legislature enacted a statute that gave employers the right to coordinate benefits beginning on March 31, 1982. On October 7, 1985, this Court unanimously interpreted the statute to mean that employers have the right to coordinate benefit payments regardless of the date of injury. Consequently, after having the matter resolved by the highest court in the state, General Motors and Ford had the unquestionable right to coordinate the benefits of all employees receiving workers’ compensation bene*557fits who came under the provisions of 1981 PA 203.
Yet, nearly two years after the Chambers decision, and more than five years after the enactment of 1981 PA 203, the 1987 Legislature declared that General Motors and Ford did not have the right to coordinate benefits. Furthermore, § 354(19) of 1987 PA 28, required any amount so coordinated (pursuant to the statutory right as interpreted in Chambers), to be reimbursed with interest.
For a number of years, General Motors and Ford were coordinating benefit payments pursuant to their statutory right. At the very least, the companies were acting within the spirit of the law. Yet, this right was retroactively revoked by "remedial” legislation. Also, the "curative” legislation imposed upon the companies the added obligation of interest. Finally, 1987 PA 28 was enacted to invalidate this Court’s decision is Chambers, thus effecting a substantive change in the law. Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 534; 377 NW2d 300 (1985).
"[T]he word of the 'curing’ legislature should not be conclusive in determining what the prior representatives meant. The question of original intent is ultimately one for the reviewing court.” Eule, Temporal limits on the legislative mandate: Entrenchment and retroactivity, 1987 Am B Found Res J 379, 448. This Court had interpreted the original intent of the 1981 Legislature. Yet, our interpretation was rejected by the 1987 Legislature. Therefore, I can not agree that the 1987 amendment was "remedial and curative.” Rather, I would hold that the 1987 amendment amounted to a substantive change in the law.19_
*558III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A
The majority holds, "[t]he operative provisions of the statute do not encroach upon the sphere of the judiciary. Rather, they merely repeal the act that Chambers construed.” Ante, p 537. However, this argument fails when reviewed against well-settled Michigan case law and the rules of statutory construction.
In Wade v Farrell, 270 Mich 562, 567; 259 NW 326 (1935), this Court unanimously20 held:
"When a statute continues a former statute law, that law common to both acts dates from its first adoption, and only such provisions of the old act as are left out of the new one are gone, and only new provisions are new laws. Where an act is amended . . . the part of the original act which remains unchanged is considered as having continued in force as the law from the time of its original enactment and the new portion as having become the law only at the time of the amendment.” 25 RCL p 907.[21] [Emphasis added.]
The rule quoted in Wade, mirrors the rule enunciated in 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 22.33, pp 287-288:
Provisions of the original act or section which are repeated in the body of the amendment, either in the same or equivalent words, are considered a continuation of the original law. This rule of interpretation is applicable even though the original *559act or section is expressly declared to be repealed. . . . The provisions of the original act or section reenacted by the amendment are held to have been the law since they were ñrst enacted, and the provisions introduced by the amendment are considered to have been enacted at the time the amendment took effect. Thus, rights and liabilities accrued under the provisions of the original act which are reenacted are not affected by the amendment. [Emphasis added.]
Our decision in Chambers interpreted the coordination of benefits provisions as pertaining to all benefit payments due after March 31, 1982, regardless of the date of injury. The majority claims that the 1987 PA 28 "repealed] the act that Chambers construed.” However, 1987 PA 28 adopted verbatim the language of the first fifteen sections of the original act, MCL 418.354(1)-(15); MSA 17.237(354)(1)-(15), and it is within these first fifteen sections that the coordination of benefits provisions are found.
Applying both Michigan law and the rules of statutory construction to the instant matter leads to the conclusion that the coordination of benefits provisions that were interpreted by this Court in Chambers were not repealed. Rather, because they were reenacted by adopting the identical language from the original act, the coordination of benefits provisions are " 'considered as having continued in force as the law from the time of [their] original enactment [March 31, 1982].’ ” Wade, supra at 567.
B
Thus, I am persuaded that the declaration made by the 1987 Legislature in 1987 PA 28, § 354(17) that it was providing the legislative intent of the 1981 Legislature is clearly not supported by the *560economic, political, and legislative history behind the enactment of each amendment at issue here, 1987 PA 28 and 1981 PA 203. Moreover, it violates Michigan case law, Presque Isle Twp Bd of Ed, supra. The amendment enacted by the 1987 Legislature was not "remedial and curative.” Rather, it was a substantive change in the law. Finally, 1987 PA 28 did not repeal the legislative provisions that we interpreted in Chambers.
Therefore, the remaining question is, "What is the net effect of 1987 PA 28, and is the amendment constitutional?”
In my opinion, the net effect of 1987 PA 28 was nothing more than an attempt to "overrule” the decision of this Court in Chambers, to render the Chambers opinion null and void, as if it was never released.22 This Court cannot surrender to this invasion into the constitutionally granted authority of the judicial branch.
It should come as no surprise to the Legislature that 1987 PA 28 was constitutionally defective. After SB 67 (1987 PA 28) was passed, Sen. DeGrow23 commented:
Additionally, we’ve put in language that I think strengthens the argument that what we’ve done with the Chambers decision is constitutional. We put it in a preceding paragraph that tells what the *561intent of the Legislature was and will make stronger the argument that we haven’t passed an unconstitutional act. I’m not sure it will cure the defect, but I think we can feel a little better about ourselves in terms of voting for it; that it is not something that is unconstitutional. [1987 Senate Journal 1236. Emphasis added.]
In his article, Professor Julian N. Eule notes, supra at 445:
The voters do not delegate authority to rewrite history. Their earlier agents exercised legitimate authority when they enacted legislation. While such efforts may be repealed, this is not the same as retrospective eradication. A decision that bills defeated by prior legislatures can now be enacted and treated as if they had been enacted earlier arguably runs afoul of this same principle.[24] The then-authorized representatives made a choice, and this decision demands recognition as the choice of the polity for that point in time. Each set of elected officials ought to be viewed as endowed by their sovereign with the mandate to make policy choices only within a bracketed temporal zone. Just as the delegation of authority does not encompass incursions into the domain of legislatures yet to come, it does not contemplate contravening the sanctity of time past. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Bankers Trust Co of Detroit v Russell, 263 Mich 677, 684; 249 NW 27 (1933), this Court reiterated the rule that to declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, and to declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power. The Court went on to hold, ”[the Legislature] may not *562by statute attempt to exercise judicial power by construing a statute for the court.” Jc?.25
The members of the 1981 Legislature were the "then-authorized representatives” who made their decisions based on the demands of the time. In 1981, they declared what the law "shall be” with regard to the coordination of benefit payments. In 1985, this Court interpreted what the "meaning” of the law was. Subsequently, the 1987 Legislature attempted to exercise judicial power by "rewritpng] history” in order to retroactively construe the statute for this Court, the effect of which was to eradicate the 1981 legislation. I find this to be an unconstitutional encroachment upon the judiciary.
In speaking about the problem of retroactivity, Justice Holmes once remarked, "[p]erhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been as sound as the instinct which directed the decisions.” Danforth v Groton Water Co, 178 Mass 472, 476; 59 NE 1033; 86 Am St Rep 495 (1901). Perhaps this is the case here. In any event, I believe that the circumstances surrounding the retroactive enactment of 1987 PA 28 evidence a particularly egregious intrusion upon the separation of powers and the "one court of justice” articles of the Michigan Constitution.26
*563IV. CONCLUSION
I am not yet prepared to accept the "slippery slope” argument that unless the Court acts now, the Legislature will usurp all of the constitutional authority granted to the judiciary. However, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 mandates the separation of powers between the three branches of government, art 3, § 2, and declares that the judicial power of the state is vested in "one court of justice,” art 6, § 1.
Throughout history, courts of last resort have been called upon to make difficult decisions that may have run contrary to popular opinion. These decisions have included, but are certainly not limited to, issues involving criminal matters, civil rights, and economic legislation. It is necessary to have an equally powerful judicial branch of government in order to ensure that the balance of power is not weighted in favor of the Legislature, and to ensure that individual rights are not circumvented by the will of the majority. Therefore, in order for this Court to maintain its equal position within our tripartite system of government, we must secure our constitutionally granted authority.
While it is understandable that emotions may run in favor of an injured employee and against a large corporation, this Court "can but construe the statute in question as it reads, and not as equitable considerations might impel us to do.” Bankers Trust Co, supra at 684-685. See n 25. In Chambers, *564we unanimously interpreted the intent of the 1981 Legislature when it enacted 1981 PA 203. In 1987, the Legislature "overruled” our decision.
Therefore, I would hold that the 1987 Legislature ran afoul of the separation of powers and the one court of justice articles of the Michigan Constitution when it gave retroactive effect to 1987 PA 28.
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and apply the amendment prospectively from the date of its enactment, May 14, 1987.

 Quoting Northern Trust Co v Snyder, 113 Wis 516, 530; 89 NW 460; 90 Am St Rep 867 (1902).

 Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 649-650; 375 NW2d 715 (1985).

 MESC Report No. 3221 (1981). Provided by the Business Research Office, Michigan Department of Commerce.

 Consumer Price Index for the City of Detroit. Provided by the Business Research Office, Michigan Department of Commerce. Note, the Bureau of Labor Statistics computes the inflation rate only for major metropolitan cities. Detroit is the only city in Michigan for which the inflation rate is computed.

 The Senate passed the act by a vote of 26 yeas to 12 nays, SB 595, 1981 Senate Journal 2607. The House passed the act by a vote of 62 yeas to 43 nays, 1981 House Journal 2854.

 Remarks by Governor William G. Milliken to the Ann Arbor Chamber of Commerce on November 18,1981.

ld.

 I quote the word "burden” because the effect of the coordination of benefits is that an injured employee will receive benefits in an amount equal to what he is entitled, but nothing extra by way of duplicate benefits.

 Perhaps the reforms of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act that were enacted in 1981 served their intended purpose of helping Michigan businesses return to economic health.

 MESC Report No. 3221 (1987). Provided by the Business Research Office, Michigan Department of Commerce.

 1987 Consumer Price Index. Provided by the Business Research Office, Michigan Department of Commerce. Detroit is the only Michigan city for which the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics computes the inflation rate. See n 4.

 Senators Arthurhultz, DeGrow, DiNello, Faust, Fredricks, Gast, Geake, Irwin, Miller, Sederburg, and Welborn.

 The Senate vote in favor of 1987 PA 28 was 35 yeas, one nay, and two excused. 1987 Senate Journal 1232.

 Representatives Alley, Brotherton, Bryant, Dunaskiss, Dutko, Giese, Gilmer, Gnodtke, Griffin, Hillegonds, Johnson, Knight, Maynard, Ostling, Randall, Stacey, Stopczynski, Strand, Trim, and Van Singel. 1987 House Journal 1232.

 The House vote in favor of 1987 PA 28 was 95 yeas, zero nay. Id.

 Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 575 adopted by the Senate on April 1, 1982, 1982 Senate Journal 626, 706; adopted by the House on May 18,1982, 1982 House Journal 1262.

 At the very least, just as the 1987 Legislature felt that our decision in Franks, supra, was erroneous, it is equally plausible that the interpretation imputed to the 1981 Legislature by the 1987 Legislature was erroneous.

Romein v General Motors Corp, 168 Mich App 444, 455; 425 NW2d 174 (1988).

 In fact, the language found in § 354(17) was added in an admitted attempt to “cure the [constitutional] defect.” Statement of Sen. *558DeGrow after the Senate voted in favor of SB 67 (1987 PA 28), 1987 Senate Journal 1235-1236. See text, post, pp 560-56Í.

 The opinion was signed by the six justices who participated, Chief Justice Pottek and Justices Fead, Wiest, Butzel, Bushnell, and Edward M. Sharpe. Justice Nelson Sharpe did not sit.

 See also Perry v Hogarth, 261 Mich 526, 530; 246 NW 214 (1933).

 After the 1987 Senate voted to pass SB 67 (1987 PA 28), Sen. Cherry, a member of the conference committee that prepared the bill, stated, "Additionally, I am pleased that the language in Section 354 will finally correct the gross injustice done by the Supreme Court’s Chambers decision. It is a disgrace that has taken four years for the Legislature to act to rectify this situation which portrays a promise to many older workers.” 1987 Senate Journal 1234-Í235.
Query: Was the "gross injustice,” as perceived by Sen. Cherry, a result of this Court’s decision, or was it a result of the statutory language passed by the 1981 Legislature which this Court is duty bound to interpret?

 Sen. DeGrow was a senate conferee for the Conference Report regarding 1987 PA 28. 1987 Senate Journal 1232.

 Keep in mind that a bill, introduced in an attempt to limit the application of the coordination of benefits provisions, was defeated. SB 834, introduced on May 20,1982. See text, supra at 555.

 Analogous to the current matter, in Bankers Trust Co, the Legislature attempted to retroactively construe the term "trust mortgage” as used in 1929 CL 13498, 13499. The purpose behind the amendment was to assist owners of property and securities who had liens placed upon them as a result of the depression. Addressing the plight of the individuals adversely affected, the Court held, "Conflicting interests are involved in these cases, and the court can but construe the statute in question as it reads, and not as equitable considerations might impel us to do.” Bankers Trust Co, supra at 684-685. (Emphasis added.)

 In his concurrence, Justice Brickley writes that while he is "[troubled” by the 1987 amendment, he must concur with the majority because of the failure of the United States Supreme Court to "articulate any discernible limits on the constitutionality of retroactive . . . legislation . . . .” Ante, p 540.
*563I note that the argument advanced by the appellants, as well as my dissent are based on the Michigan Constitution of 1963. Therefore, the lack of United States Supreme Court guidance is not fatal to the appeal.
Furthermore, only in a parliamentarian system of government is the judiciary subject to a superior legislature. In our republican system, the judicial branch is the equal of legislative branch.