Court Opinion

ID: 9555731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 21:00:59.831354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:31.888805
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11582    Document: 66-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-11582
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        MARIO PONCE RODRIGUEZ,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-23835-DMM
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      21-11582

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Mario Ponce Rodriguez, 1 appeals the district court’s denial
        of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. We granted
        Ponce a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on whether the district
        court erred by rejecting Ponce’s claim that his trial counsel per-
        formed ineffectively without holding an evidentiary hearing.
                                           I.
               In October 2015, Ponce, represented by counsel, ﬁled a mo-
        tion to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
        In relevant part, he asserted that his trial counsel, Diaz, was ineﬀec-
        tive because he had a conﬂict of interest. 2 He contended that the
        conﬂict resulted in ineﬀective representation, speciﬁcally, Diaz’s
        failure to “fully address and investigate ongoing witness collusion,”
        adequately discuss the consequences of Ponce testifying at the trial
        or prepare Ponce for testifying. Ponce ﬁled an addendum to his
        § 2255 where he explained that Diaz “was burdened by a direct, per-
        sonal conﬂict of interest arising from the representation of another

        1 According to the parties, the appellant goes by “Ponce,” which this opinion

        adopts for consistency.
        2 On appeal, this Court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA “) only on

        one issue: “Whether the district court erred by rejecting Ponce’s Claim 1, that
        his trial counsel performed ineffectively, without holding an evidentiary hear-
        ing?” Therefore, we do not address the other issues raised by Ponce.
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        21-11582                   Opinion of the Court                       3

        defendant in a matter analogous to the matter prosecuted in the
        instant case.” Speciﬁcally, he asserted that Diaz was the subject of
        a criminal investigation in another district, which created a conﬂict
        of interest that Diaz failed to disclose and impacted his representa-
        tion of Ponce.
                Ponce later amended and consolidated his § 2255 motion,
        adding new facts and supporting documentation that he discovered
        during the pendency of his § 2255 motion. In relevant part, he con-
        tended that the federal criminal investigation into Diaz created an
        actual conﬂict of interest that should have been disclosed to Ponce
        and that caused Diaz to provide ineﬀective assistance of counsel.
        Additionally, he claimed that Diaz provided ineﬀective assistance of
        counsel by not adequately informing Ponce about the govern-
        ment’s plea oﬀer before it expired; failing to prepare Ponce to tes-
        tify at his trial or otherwise discussing the consequences of Ponce
        testifying at trial; and failing to use favorable Brady 3 evidence and
        cross-examine and impeach government witnesses.
              Subsequently, the magistrate judge issued a report and rec-
        ommendation (“R&R”) recommending that Ponce’s § 2255 mo-
        tion be denied. As to Diaz’s conﬂict of interest, the R&R stated
        that Ponce did not establish an actual conﬂict of interest and was
        not entitled to relief because the Southern District of New York
        was investigating Diaz, but Ponce was prosecuted in the Southern

        3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                 21-11582

        District of Florida, so an actual conﬂict did not exist. The magis-
        trate judge highlighted that this issue was not one of ﬁrst impres-
        sion, as the government had asked numerous courts in the South-
        ern District of Florida to hold McLain 4 hearings based on Diaz’s in-
        vestigation by the Southern District of New York, all of which de-
        nied the government’s motions and found that an investigation in
        another district did not create an actual conﬂict that required a
        McLain hearing.
                Addressing Ponce’s allegations that Diaz failed to call speciﬁc
        witnesses and present speciﬁc evidence demonstrating collusion
        among government witnesses, the magistrate judge noted that
        Diaz did actually pursue that same theory at Ponce’s trial, and
        found Diaz’s decisions about which witnesses to call and what evi-
        dence to present were “the epitome of a strategic decision,” and
        Ponce failed to establish deﬁcient performance by Diaz. As to
        Ponce’s claims that Diaz failed to prepare him to testify, the R&R
        indicated that Ponce’s testimony did not indicate that he was un-
        prepared to testify, and on the contrary, his responses to Diaz’s
        questions were clear and consistent. The magistrate judge also
        stated that Diaz’s questions were clear and organized, and Diaz elic-
        ited testimony from Ponce that was favorable to their theory of the
        case.
              Turning to Ponce’s claim that Diaz did not communicate the
        government’s plea oﬀer to him before it expired, the magistrate

        4 United States v. McLain, 823 F.3d 1457 (11th Cir. 1987).
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        21-11582               Opinion of the Court                        5

        judge concluded that Ponce could not establish prejudice because
        the record established that he had reviewed the plea oﬀer and re-
        jected it under oath and he had not established that he would have
        accepted the oﬀer. Regarding the evidentiary hearing, the magis-
        trate judge stated that he had reviewed the parties’ pleadings and
        briefs and found that Ponce had not established a need for an evi-
        dentiary hearing because he could not show that such a hearing
        would demonstrate that he was entitled to relief.
                Ponce objected to the R&R. The district court overruled
        Ponce’s objections to the R&R, adopted the R&R as supplemented
        by its own ﬁndings, and denied Ponce’s § 2255 motion and a COA.
        The district court found that, as to Ponce’s ineﬀective assistance of
        counsel claim, a conﬂict did not exist based on the Southern Dis-
        trict of New York’s investigation into Diaz based on McLain and the
        decisions of other district courts. Likewise, it found that Ponce was
        aware of the government’s plea oﬀer and decided to go to trial in-
        stead. Generally, the court found that “Diaz zealously advocated”
        on Ponce’s behalf, he extensively, eﬀectively, and vigorously
        cross-examined witnesses, and Ponce’s testimony was not ill-pre-
        pared, but rather, was incredible. As to the evidentiary hearing, the
        court stated that the record of the case conclusively demonstrated
        that Ponce was not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing was
        not necessary.
                                         II.
              When reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to
        vacate, we review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11582

        clear error. Thomas v. United States, 572 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.
        2009). “We review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hear-
        ing in a § 2255 proceeding for abuse of discretion.” Winthrop-Redin
        v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014). “The scope of
        our review of an unsuccessful § 2255 motion is limited to the issues
        enumerated in the COA.” McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190,
        1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
                A district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing on
        a motion to vacate “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of
        the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”
        28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Anderson v. United States, 948 F.2d 704, 706 (11th
        Cir. 1991). Thus, if a movant “alleges facts that, if true, would en-
        title him to relief, then the district court should order an eviden-
        tiary hearing.” Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir.
        2002) (quotation marks omitted). However, such a hearing is not
        required where a movant’s claims are patently frivolous, based
        upon unsupported generalizations, or affirmatively contradicted
        by the record. Id.
                A petitioner alleging that he received ineffective assistance
        of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment must establish two
        elements. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “First,
        the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was defi-
        cient.” Id. Review of counsel’s actions is “highly deferential” and
        “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
        falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
        Id. at 689. Additionally, “every effort [must] be made to eliminate
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        21-11582               Opinion of the Court                         7

        the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances
        of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
        counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. “The widespread use of the
        tactic of attacking trial counsel by showing what ‘might have been’
        proves that nothing is clearer than hindsight-except perhaps the
        rule that we will not judge trial counsel’s performance through
        hindsight.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995).
        Thus, the petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so seri-
        ous that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed
        the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
        687.
                “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient perfor-
        mance prejudiced the defense.” Id. Prejudice occurs when there is
        a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
        rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at
        694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not
        just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.
              A. Conflict
                To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
        sel based on conflict of interest, a defendant must show first, that
        his attorney had an actual conflict of interest, and second, that the
        conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. Pegg v. United
        States, 253 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Freund v. Butter-
        worth, 165 F.3d 839, 858 (11th Cir. 1999)). In order to establish a
        violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant “must demonstrate
        that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11582

        performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1981). A § 2255
        petitioner must show “‘inconsistent interests and must demon-
        strate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative
        courses of action.’” McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th
        Cir. 1990) (quoting Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1404 (11th
        Cir.1987)). “To prove adverse effect, a defendant needs to demon-
        strate: (a) that the defense attorney could have pursued a plausible
        alternative strategy, (b) that this alternative strategy was reasona-
        ble, and (c) that the alternative strategy was not followed because
        it conflicted with the attorney’s external loyalties.” Reynolds v.
        Chapman, 253 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2001). In United States v.
        McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1987), unbeknownst to the trial
        court or the defendant, defense counsel was under criminal inves-
        tigation by the same United States Attorney’s office that was trying
        the defendant. The court held the conflict created ineffective assis-
        tance of counsel but also stated that the defendant could have
        waived the conflict if he had known about it prior to trial. Id. at
        1464 & n. 11.
               Here, the district court properly determined that Ponce
        failed to establish an actual conflict of interest because Diaz was
        under investigation by the Government in a different district. See
        McLain, 823 F.2d at 1464; Reynolds, 253 F.3d at 1342. Although
        Ponce argues that Diaz was being investigated for his role in “an
        analogous case,” Ponce did not explain how that investigation im-
        pacted this case, in a different district. Therefore, he has not shown
        an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his case. Ponce
        is not entitled to a hearing on this claim.
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        21-11582                   Opinion of the Court                             9

                B. Plea Agreement
                Ponce argues that Diaz provided ineffective assistance of
        counsel when he did not present Ponce with the plea agreement
        during its pendency. He further argues that he would have ac-
        cepted the plea agreement had he known of it when it was viable.
        However, Ponce cannot demonstrate prejudice under the Strick-
        land standard. At the April 5, 2012, Colloquy on the plea offer,
        Ponce stated that he wished to go to trial and rejected the plea offer
        several times. Further, at that same hearing, Diaz used the present
        tense to describe the plea offer such that if Ponce were only learn-
        ing of the plea agreement at that time, and its favorable sentencing
        recommendations, Ponce would have thought that the plea offer
        was still open and yet he still rejected it. Finally, if indeed Ponce
        only learned about the plea agreement on April 5, 5 and had wanted
        to accept it as he now asserts, he would have raised this issue with
        counsel after trial in his motion for a new trial, his direct appeal, or
        in his initial § 2255 petition, but he did not. Because he cannot thus
        show prejudice, he cannot show that he is entitled to a hearing on
        this claim.
                C. Trial Testimony
              Next, Ponce argues that Diaz provided ineffective assistance
        of counsel when he failed to prepare Ponce for testifying at trial.
        Like his plea offer claim, this claim also fails under Strickland.

        5 To the extent that Ponce now argues that he only learned in 2019 of the plea

        offer, that claim is belied by his testimony at the April 5 Colloquy.
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                     21-11582

        Between the time Ponce arrived at the local prison and trial, Diaz
        visited Ponce 15 times. His associate, a Honduran attorney, visited
        Ponce for two hours the day before the Ponce’s testimony. At trial
        Diaz questioned Ponce over two days and his questions, and
        Ponce’s answers, were coherent and well-organized. For instance,
        Diaz asked Ponce extensively and knowledgeably about his busi-
        ness holdings and had photographic exhibits of those holdings to
        support his line of questioning. Ponce’s answers do not reflect any
        lack of familiarity with what was expected of him or surprise. Sim-
        ilarly, Diaz’s questioning of Ponce after the Government’s cross-
        examination was thorough and addressed the Government’s ques-
        tioning. There simply was nothing in Ponce’s testimony that sug-
        gests that he was not prepared. Because there is no evidence that
        evens suggests “that that counsel made errors so serious that coun-
        sel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
        by the Sixth Amendment,” Ponce was not entitled to an evidentiary
        hearing on this issue.6 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
               D. Impeachment Evidence
               Ponce argues that Diaz’s impeachment of the Government’s
        witnesses was deficient and cites a number of pieces of evidence
        that he argues Diaz should have used to undermine the credibility
        of the Government’s witnesses. We agree with the magistrate
        judge that, at the trial, Diaz did actually pursue this very strategy,

        6 To the extent that the district court commented that Ponce’s testimony did

        not assist him, that statement appears to have been based on credibility, not
        content.
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        21-11582               Opinion of the Court                         11

        and was not deficient in that regard. Diaz began his defense of
        Ponce with statements in his opening argument about the Govern-
        ment’s witnesses’ lack of credibility, questioned the witnesses
        about what they would be receiving for their testimony, and reit-
        erated, in depth, their credibility issues in closing arguments. Fur-
        thermore, we rejected as cumulative similar evidence that Ponce
        raised in his motion for a new trial, including his new argument
        that the witnesses colluded. United States v. Rodriguez, 703 F. App’x
        784, 786 (11th Cir. 2017). Diaz exerted extensive energy and time
        to attacking the Government’s witnesses’ credibility. “The mere
        fact that other witnesses might have been available or that other
        testimony might have been elicited from those who testified is not
        a sufficient ground to prove ineffectiveness of counsel.” Foster v.
        Dugger, 823 F.2d 402, 406 (11th Cir. 1987). We cannot say that his
        failure to use several other pieces of evidence rises to the level of
        ineffective assistance.
               E. Other Trial Errors
                Finally, Ponce points to several other trial errors that he as-
        serts Diaz made. Specifically, he points to several witnesses that he
        argues Diaz should have called and argues Diaz should have intro-
        duced Ponce’s passport or INS records of Ponce’s travels to the
        United States. However some of the identified omissions—like
        failing to call ex-DEA agent Michael Levine, who would have tes-
        tified that payment for drugs in dollars did not establish that the
        drugs were being shipped to the United States—made perfect stra-
        tegic sense because the defense strategy was that Ponce was not
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                21-11582

        involved in the drug trade. Other evidence, like Wayne Morris’s
        testimony that the helicopter Ponce used did not test positive for
        cocaine, was brought up in another way and thus would be cumu-
        lative. Again, like the impeachment testimony, we cannot fault
        Diaz for not calling some available witnesses or not introducing
        certain evidence when overall, he provided competent counsel.
        These omissions were not “errors so serious that counsel was not
        functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
        Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
                Because Ponce has failed to show that his claims are not
        claims that are patently frivolous, based upon unsupported gener-
        alizations, or affirmatively contradicted by the record, the district
        court did not err when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing.
              AFFIRMED.