Court Opinion

ID: 9931686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 18:01:26.331258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:18.372172
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3215     Document: 010110997734      Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        February 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-3215
                                                   (D.C. No. 6:93-CR-10020-EFM-1)
  CLAYTON ALBERS,                                              (D. Kan.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Defendant-Appellant Clayton Albers appeals pro se from the district court’s

 denial of his motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Exercising

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                           I.

       Mr. Albers was convicted in 1994 in the District of Kansas for multiple drug

 offenses, including conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with intent to

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-3215    Document: 010110997734        Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 2

 distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. He was sentenced to 360 months’

 imprisonment (the Kansas prison term). 1 While serving that sentence, Mr. Albers

 was convicted in the Western District of Oklahoma for additional crimes he

 committed while in prison, including conspiring to impede or injure an officer and

 mailing threatening communications. For those crimes, he was sentenced in 2008 to

 an additional 168 months’ imprisonment (the Oklahoma prison term), imposed to run

 consecutively to the then-uncompleted Kansas prison term.

       On June 29, 2020, Mr. Albers completed serving the Kansas prison term. He

 remained imprisoned on the Oklahoma prison term. On July 5, 2022, he filed a

 motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in the District of

 Kansas, seeking reduction of his prison term under Amendment 782 to the sentencing

 guidelines. 2 The district court denied his motion. It concluded § 3582(c)(2) did not

 give it authority to reduce the Kansas prison term because Mr. Albers had already

 fully served that prison term, and it rejected his argument that the Kansas and

 Oklahoma prison terms should be treated as a single aggregated term. This appeal

 followed.

       1
          Mr. Albers was first given a life sentence, which this court vacated on appeal.
 See United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1996). On remand,
 he was resentenced to 360 months in prison, and this court affirmed. See United
 States v. Albers, No. 97-3228, 1998 WL 223344, at *1 (10th Cir. May 6, 1998)
 (unpublished).
        2
          Amendment 782 reduced the guidelines offense levels for many drug
 offenses and was made available retroactively. See United States v. Green, 886 F.3d
 1300, 1302, 1303 (10th Cir. 2018). For purposes of this appeal, we assume
 Mr. Albers’s Kansas sentence would have been eligible for reduction under
 Amendment 782 while he was serving it.
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                                            II.

                                            A.

       “In general, once a court has imposed a sentence, the court has no authority to

 modify that sentence. However, . . . Congress has provided the court with the

 authority to modify previously imposed sentences in three, very limited

 circumstances.” United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 2020).

 Both the authority to modify a sentence and the limits of that authority are set by

 statute, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See id.

       One of these statutory exceptions allows a defendant to seek reduction of a

 prison term when he was sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has

 subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). A motion

 under § 3582(c)(2) presents a two-step inquiry. United States v. Green, 886 F.3d

 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2018). “First, a court must determine whether a defendant is

 eligible for a sentence reduction. Second, the court must consider whether a sentence

 reduction is warranted in accordance with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

 Here, the district court concluded § 3582(c)(2) did not authorize it to reduce

 Mr. Albers’s already-completed Kansas prison term. We review that determination

 de novo. See United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2008).

                                            B.

       We agree with the district court—and several other circuits that have

 addressed this issue—that § 3582(c)(2) does not give a district court authority to

 reduce a prison term after the defendant has fully served it.

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        Under the express language of § 3582(c)(2), sentence reduction is available

 only if “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

 Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). Therefore, “the Sentencing Commission’s policy

 statements in [sentencing guideline (USSG)] § 1B1.10 are binding on district courts

 and limit their authority to grant motions for reduction of sentences.” United States

 v. McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing Dillon v.

 United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010)). One of these binding limitations is that “[i]n no

 event may the reduced term of imprisonment be less than the term of imprisonment

 the defendant has already served.” USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C). Here, Mr. Albers had

 already completed his Kansas prison term before filing his § 3582(c)(2) motion, so

 any reduction would necessarily have shortened that prison term to less than the time

 he had already served. Because it would be inconsistent with § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) to

 shorten a prison term after a defendant has fully served it, § 3582(c)(2) does not grant

 a district court authority to do so.

        While we have not previously addressed this issue, other circuits have reached

 the same conclusion. See United States v. Llewlyn, 879 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.

 2018) (holding district court was “without authority” under § 3582(c)(2) and

 Amendment 782 to reduce a prison term the defendant had already completely

 served); United States v. Vaughn, 806 F.3d 640, 643 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding

 defendant “is ineligible for relief under Amendment 782 because he has already

 served the entirety of his otherwise eligible sentence”); United States v. Chapple, 847

 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Because Chapple had already served the sentence that

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 was eligible for reduction under Amendment 782, his § 3582(c)(2) motion was not

 consistent with § 1B1.10.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.

 Gamble, 572 F.3d 472, 474–75 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding defendant ineligible for

 sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) because he was “no longer serving” the prison

 term for any offense eligible for reduction). Mr. Albers cites no case that has

 addressed § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) and held otherwise, and we are not aware of any. We

 reach the same result as the decisions of other circuits.

                                            C.

       Mr. Albers acknowledges he had completed his Kansas prison term before

 filing his § 3582(c)(2) motion but argues he should still be eligible for relief because

 he remains in custody completing the Oklahoma prison term. But the Oklahoma

 prison term was imposed years later, by a separate court, based on separate conduct,

 and for offenses that are not eligible for reduction under Amendment 782. 3

 Mr. Albers identifies no authority that has interpreted § 3582(c)(2) to allow one

 district court to modify a sentence imposed by another. He argues that reduction of

 the Kansas prison term would “result in an earlier end date to the Kansas sentence

 and an earlier start date to the Oklahoma sentence,” so that his release would be

 hastened, even though “[t]he length of the Oklahoma sentence would remain

       3
         Mr. Albers has twice sought and been denied early release from his
 uncompleted Oklahoma sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See
 Order, United States v. Albers, No. CR-07-154-D (W.D. Okla. July 21, 2022)
 (denying motion for compassionate release) and Order, United States v. Albers, No.
 CR-07-154-D (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2021) (same). Those decisions are not part of this
 appeal.
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 unaffected.” See Aplt. Br. at 3-F. That may be a true statement of the administrative

 consequences a reduction in the Kansas prison term would have if it were authorized,

 but it does not give the district court the authority to grant such a reduction, since it is

 foreclosed by § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C).

        Before the district court, Mr. Albers (then represented by counsel) argued his

 Kansas and Oklahoma prison terms should be treated as a single aggregated sentence,

 citing 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c). 4 That statute provides that “[m]ultiple terms of

 imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for

 administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment” (emphasis

 added). We agree with the district court that Mr. Albers’s motion under § 3582(c)(2)

 was not an “administrative purpose.” See generally United States v. Gonzales, 520

 U.S. 1, 8 (1997) (stating § 3584(c) “instructs the Bureau of Prisons [BOP] to treat

 multiple terms of imprisonment . . . for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate

 term” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wilson,

 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (stating the BOP “has the responsibility for administering

 the sentence” after it is imposed by a court (emphasis added)).

        Again, while we have not previously addressed this argument, other circuits

 have uniformly rejected similar requests to treat separately imposed sentences as

 “aggregated” when ruling on motions for sentence reduction. See United States v.

        4
         Mr. Albers proceeds without a lawyer in this appeal. Therefore we “liberally
 construe his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d
 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
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 Brow, 62 F.4th 114, 120 (3d Cir. 2023) (“The BOP’s administrative aggregation of

 [a] sentence does not affect our judicial authority.”); United States v. Martin, 974 F.

 3d 124, 137 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Section 3584(c) provides no textual support for the

 position that sentences may be aggregated for the purpose of resentencing, nor has

 any court interpreted the statute in such a fashion.”); 5 Llewlyn, 879 F.3d at 1295

 (“[D]istrict courts’ judicial decisions under § 3582 do not constitute an

 ‘administrative purpose.’” (quoting § 3584(c)); Vaughn, 806 F.3d at 643–44 (“A

 sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) . . . cannot be described as administrative.

 Applying § 3584(c) to this situation would essentially rewrite the statute to extend

 aggregation to all purposes.”); Gamble, 572 F.3d at 474 (“There is no statutory

 requirement that the district court meld the two sentences into a single, aggregate

 term of imprisonment.”).

       Again, Mr. Albers has identified no contrary authority that treats separately

 imposed sentences as “aggregated” for purposes of a motion for sentence reduction,

 and we are not aware of any. 6 He takes the position that Llewlyn and related

       5
          Brow and Martin addressed motions for sentence reduction authorized by the
 First Step Act and brought under § 3582(c)(1)(B). See Brow, 62 F.4th at 119;
 Martin, 974 F.3d at 137. Those cases held the First Step Act does not authorize
 district courts to reduce a sentence the defendant has fully served. Brow, 62 F.4th at
 121; Martin, 974 F.3d at 140. We do not address that question or interpret the First
 Step Act or § 3582(c)(1)(B) here, where Mr. Albers sought relief under § 3582(c)(2).
        6
          To the extent Mr. Albers relies on cases which may have treated
 simultaneously imposed sentences for multiple counts of conviction as aggregated,
 they are non-precedential and non-binding on this court, and they do not address
 § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C). See United States v. Clarke, 499 F.App’x 579, 580–81, 582 (7th
 Cir. 2012) (holding § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce completed crack cocaine sentence
 was not moot because aggregated with simultaneously imposed sentence for gun
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 decisions were “decided wrongly,” but he has not explained how he believes those

 decisions were in error. See Aplt. Br. at 3-H. We conclude that his separately

 imposed Kansas and Oklahoma prison terms are not “aggregated” for purposes of

 deciding his eligibility for relief under § 3582(c)(2). Our conclusion is consistent

 with cases presenting facts we find indistinguishable for purposes of the relevant

 analysis, see Llewlyn, 879 F.3d at 1295; Vaughn, 806 F.3d at 643–44, and we find no

 reason to reach a different result here.

                                            D.

       In addition to arguing his sentences should be aggregated, which was his only

 argument in district court, see R. at 66–67, Mr. Albers raises several additional

 arguments and authorities on appeal. These include: new arguments based on habeas

 corpus cases; reliance on cases where defendants were sentenced simultaneously for

 multiple counts of conviction (including related drug and firearm offenses and crack

 cocaine offenses); cases seeking sentence reduction under the First Step Act;

 conviction; affirming denial of motion) and United States v. Bolin, No. 2:02-cr-176-
 1, 2008 WL 928397, at *1, 3 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 2008) (granting motion to reduce a
 fully served drug sentence treated as aggregated with simultaneously imposed
 sentence for related gun conviction).
        These cases are also readily distinguished. They involved simultaneously
 imposed sentences for drug offenses and related firearm violations under 18 U.S.C.
 § 924(c). Here Mr. Albers’s two sentences were imposed separately, by different
 courts in unrelated cases, and left no question which sentence was to be served first.
        We need not decide here whether multiple terms of imprisonment that are
 imposed simultaneously might, in other circumstances, be appropriately treated as
 aggregated. Accord Vaughn, 806 F.3d at 644 (“Even supposing that simultaneously
 imposed consecutive sentences could be aggregated for the purpose of a § 3582(c)(2)
 sentence reduction—an issue that we do not decide here—this case is different
 because [the defendant’s] sentences were imposed separately.”).
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 Oklahoma state cases, and various district court and unpublished circuit court cases

 which Mr. Albers argues are analogous to his own. See Aplt. Br. at 3, 3-J. He also

 appeals to “common sense,” id. at 5, 15–16; makes new arguments based on the use

 of the indeterminate article to refer to “‘a’ term of imprisonment” in USSG

 § 1B1.10(a)(1), see id. at 3, 3-F; and argues his uncompleted term of supervised

 release meant he was still “in custody on his Kansas sentence,” giving the district

 court jurisdiction to reduce that sentence, see id. at 4.

        “[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for the first time on

 appeal are waived.” Little v. Budd Co., 955 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir. 2020).

 Exceptions to this rule may be warranted “when the issues involved are questions of

 law, the proper resolution of which are beyond doubt, and the failure to address the

 issues would result in a miscarriage of justice”; an intervening change in the law may

 also warrant an exception. Xlear, Inc. v. Focus Nutrition, LLC, 893 F.3d 1227,

 1234–34 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        We conclude circumstances here do not warrant reaching the arguments

 Mr. Albers could have raised at the district court but did not. Other than his

 argument related to supervised release, all of Mr. Albers’s newly raised arguments

 have been raised and rejected in the decisions of other circuits cited above, which

 were decided before he briefed his motion at the district court. See e.g., Llewlyn, 879

 F.3d at 1296–98 (rejecting arguments based on habeas corpus cases and

 distinguishing cases involving simultaneously imposed sentences); Vaughn, 806 F.3d

 at 644 (distinguishing “sentences that were imposed at the same time by the same

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  judge” from sentences that were imposed separately); id. at 645 (rejecting textual

  argument identical to the one raised by Mr. Albers; “The fact that § 1B1.10 uses a

  singular ‘a’ says nothing about whether [a defendant] is serving one single term of

  imprisonment or two separate . . . terms . . . .”). Without revisiting in detail the

  analyses of prior cases, we conclude that Mr. Albers’s new arguments on appeal do

  not warrant relaxing the waiver rule: proper resolution of the issues is not “beyond

  reasonable doubt” and failure to reach them would not result in a miscarriage of

  justice.

         Also waived is Mr. Albers’s newly raised argument that the term of supervised

  release included in his Kansas sentence gave the district court jurisdiction over his

  § 3582(c)(2) motion, even after he had fully served the Kansas prison term. This

  argument was not raised before the district court, which therefore made no legal

  rulings or factual findings on it.

         Finally, as to Mr. Albers’s appeal to “common sense,” and his arguments

  regarding what the Sentencing Commission intended for defendants convicted on

  multiple counts of conviction, these arguments do not change the authority to modify

  an otherwise final sentence provided by § 3582(c)(2), which is limited by the

  statute’s terms and § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C). See Mannie, 971 F.3d at 1148; McGee, 615

  F.3d at 1292. Even if relief has been made available to other defendants in situations

  Mr. Albers finds broadly analogous to his own, cases resolved on different legal

  grounds do not expand the limited authority provided by § 3582(c)(2).

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                                           III.

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Albers’s

  motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

        Judge Rossman concurs in the judgment only.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Allison H. Eid
                                             Circuit Judge

                                           11