Court Opinion

ID: 9599174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:15:33.655907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:57.358654
License: Public Domain

BRAND, J.
I concur in the result. In my opinion, the second adoption proceedings were void. There appears to be no separate affidavit setting forth the facts which would warrant an order of publication of citation addressed to Clarence Meyer. There is a petition for adoption which was apparently signed some time in 1931 which recites that Clarence Meyer, immediately after the 10th day of May, 1927, “disappeared and ever since said time * * # has kept himself hidden away in such a manner that no knowledge of his actual residence can be obtained excepting that he is a nonresident of and has left the State of Oregon.” The petition is verified by Ira C. Parks. Assuming that a verified complaint is such an affidavit as will sustain *534an order for publication, the allegations thereof are, in my opinion, insufficient.
In Dixie Meadows Co. v. Kight, 150 Or 395, 45 P2d 909, this court said:
‘‘Resort to constructive service by publication of summons is predicated upon necessity, and if personal service can be effected by the exercise of reasonable diligence, substituting service is unauthorized. §1-506, Oregon Code 1930;” Citing cases.
The reason for the rule is indicated by the following statement from American Jurisprudence:
<<# * # Service by publication, when personal service can be had, is not due process of law, and therefore any statute assuming to authorize it is unconstitutional. * * *”42 Am Jur, Process, § 72.
The statutes concerning publication should be construed in the light of constitutional provisions. It appears therefore, that an affiant must show that the defendant could not be found by the exercise of due diligence because, if he can be found, he should be personally served, and cannot be served by publication. Dixie Meadows Co. v. Kight, supra, is authority for the proposition that:
“ * * the acts constituting due diligence, or the facts showing that he is a necessary party should be stated. To hold that a bald repetition of the statute is sufficient is to strip the court or judge, to whom the application is made, of all judicial functions and allow the party himself to determine in his own way the existence of jurisdictional facts—a practice too dangerous to the rights of defendants to admit of judicial toleration.’ ”
Neither the citation signed by the clerk, nor the order of default signed by the judge, makes any reference to any sworn statement of any affiant, nor is *535there any finding to the effect that Clarence Meyer has kept himself hidden away so that no knowledge of his residence can be obtained. In an affidavit for publication, the probative, facts must be stated, it not being sufficient merely to use the words of the statute. Felts v. Boyer, 73 Or 83, 144 P 420. The jurisdictional facts must appear in the affidavit, or at least in the complaint, and a finding by the court of the jurisdictional facts would be of no avail unless they appear in the affidavit or complaint. Goodale v. Coffee, 24 Or 346, 33 P 990.