Court Opinion

ID: 9956931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:11:13.7182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:59.007104
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Drew Williams,                            :
                          Petitioner      :
                                          :
             v.                           :
                                          :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania              :
Department of Corrections, and            :
Prison Liaison Unit, et al.,              :   No. 65 M.D. 2023
                           Respondents    :   Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                       FILED: April 3, 2024

             Drew Williams (Williams), an inmate incarcerated in the State
Correctional Institution at Somerset (SCI Somerset), has filed a pro se Petition for
Review (Petition) seeking relief in mandamus in this Court’s original jurisdiction.
Williams seeks an order directing the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(Department) or the Prison Liaison Unit of Philadelphia County (Liaison Unit) to
recalculate the amount of sentence credit awarded to him for time served, pursuant
to a sentencing order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
(sentencing court) dated September 29, 2017. Both the Department and the Liaison
Unit have filed preliminary objections to the Petition. For the reasons discussed
below, we sustain the preliminary objections. We dismiss Williams’s claim against
the Department and transfer his claim against the Liaison Unit to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction.
                                         I. Background
                The Petition recites the following facts, which we accept as true for
purposes of addressing preliminary objections.1 Williams has been incarcerated on
various criminal charges since October 5, 2015. Pet., ¶ 4. On September 29, 2017,
Williams was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years of
imprisonment for various consolidated criminal offenses, as follows:
       No. CP-51-CR-0012559-2015 – concurrent sentences totaling 8-16 years
       No. CP-51-CR-0012560-2015 – consecutive sentence of 1-2 years
       No. CP-51-CR-0012561-2015 – consecutive sentence of 1-2 years
       No. CP-51-CR-0012562-2015 – concurrent sentence of 1-2 years
Id., ¶¶ 5-6 & Ex. A.
                The sentencing court also ordered that Williams receive credit for time
served. Pet., ¶ 6 & Ex. A. Williams alleges that the Department and the Liaison
Unit are refusing to honor the sentencing court’s directive, in that he has been denied
credit for 12 months of presentencing confinement. Id., ¶ 7. He also asserts that the
failure to award credit for time served has resulted in an effective total sentence of
11 to 20 years, thus rendering his minimum sentence more than half the length of
his maximum sentence, in violation of Section 9756(b) of the Sentencing Code,2 42
Pa.C.S. § 9756(b). Pet., ¶¶ 9-10.

       1
         In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, we accept as true all well-
pleaded allegations of material fact in the Petition and all inferences reasonably deducible from
those facts. Black v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 889 A.2d 672, 675 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). However,
we do not accept as true any conclusions of law, unwarranted factual inferences, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion. Dodgson v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 922 A.2d 1023, 1027-28
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
       2
           42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701-9799.42.

                                                  2
                                  II. Discussion
                              A. Mandamus Relief
            The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly held:
            A proceeding in mandamus is an extraordinary action at
            common law and is available only to compel the
            performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where
            there exists no other adequate and appropriate remedy[,]
            there is a clear legal right in the [petitioner], and a
            corresponding duty in the [respondent].
McCray v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 2005) (citing Jackson v.
Vaughn, 777 A.2d 436, 438 (Pa. 2001)). With specific reference to inmate claims
relating to credit for time served, our Supreme Court has observed:
            The Commonwealth Court has routinely entertained
            Petitions for Review in the nature of mandamus seeking
            orders to compel the Department to apply credit for time
            served. . . . Where discretionary actions and criteria are
            not being contested, but rather the actions of the
            Department in computing an inmate’s maximum and
            minimum dates of confinement are being challenged, an
            action for mandamus remains viable as a means for
            examining whether statutory requirements have been met.
McCray, 872 A.2d at 1130-31 (footnote omitted) (first citing Alston v. Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 799 A.2d 875 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); then citing Saunders v. Dep’t of
Corr., 749 A.2d 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); then citing Doxsey v. Bureau of Corr., 674
A.2d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); and then citing Bethlehem Mines Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 340 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975)).

                  B. The Department’s Preliminary Objection
            The Department has filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer. The Department asserts that the Petition and its exhibits demonstrate that

                                         3
Williams is not entitled to the credit he seeks and that he has established neither a
clear right to relief nor a duty on the part of the Department to provide such relief.
               Specifically, the Department observes that Williams received a
sentence on an unrelated conviction on January 5, 2017 (Previous Sentence 1). See
Pet., Ex. B. Although no credit for time served was awarded at that time, Williams
received another sentence for another unrelated conviction on June 6, 2017 (Previous
Sentence 2), at which point he received credit for time served from October 8, 2015
through January 4, 2017, the day before the imposition of Previous Sentence 1. Id.
Thus, when Williams was sentenced for the offenses at issue here, he was given
credit for only one additional day of credit, October 7, 2015, on which he was
confined in relation to those offenses and for which he had not already received
credit against time served.3 That day of credit was applied to Williams’s sentence at
docket number CP-51-CR-0012559-2015. Pet., Exs. A & B. The Department thus
posits that Williams has already received credit for all time served from October 7
forward and that he is not entitled to seek a double credit.
               We agree with the Department’s analysis of this issue in all respects.4
               The sentencing court ordered “credit for time served.” Pet., Ex. A. The
order did not specify the amount of credit to be given. However, that issue is
governed by Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, which mandates that
               the [sentencing] court shall give credit as follows:

       3
          The pleadings provide no explanation of the apparent discrepancy between the October 7
beginning credit date and Williams’s assertion that he was in custody beginning two days earlier
on October 5. That discrepancy is not material to our analysis except as it further illustrates that
there is doubt regarding the amount of credit to which Williams was entitled for time served, which
undermines Williams’s assertion of a clear right to relief in mandamus, as discussed infra at 7-9.
       4
         The Department additionally argues that Williams is not entitled to mandamus relief
because he had another remedy available in the form of an appeal of the sentencing order. Because
we sustain the Department’s demurrer on other grounds, we do not reach this argument.

                                                 4
              (1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum
              term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in
              custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a
              prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on
              which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit
              for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending
              sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
              (2) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum
              term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in
              custody under a prior sentence if he is later reprosecuted
              and resentenced for the same offense or for another
              offense based on the same act or acts. This shall include
              credit in accordance with paragraph (1) of this section for
              all time spent in custody as a result of both the original
              charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or
              for another offense based on the same act or acts.
              (3) If the defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if
              one of the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or
              collateral attack, credit against the maximum and any
              minimum term of the remaining sentences shall be given
              for all time served in relation to the sentence set aside since
              the commission of the offenses on which the sentences
              were based.
              (4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later
              prosecuted on another charge growing out of an act or acts
              that occurred prior to his arrest, credit against the
              maximum term and any minimum term of any sentence
              resulting from such prosecution shall be given for all time
              spent in custody under the former charge that has not been
              credited against another sentence.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 (emphasis added); see also Bernardini v. Commonwealth (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 650 M.D. 2016, filed May 12, 2017), slip op. at 55 (explaining that “a
defendant must be given credit for any days spent in custody before imposition of

       5
         This unreported opinion is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s
Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                               5
his sentence, but only if such commitment is attributable to the offense for which the
sentence was imposed”) (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d
358, 367 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
               Exhibit B to the Petition indicates that Williams already received credit
for time served from October 8, 2015, to January 4, 2017, in connection with his
sentence relating to Previous Conviction 2.                From January 5, 2017, forward,
Williams was serving that sentence, so the time served beginning on that date was
necessarily credited to that sentence. Therefore, the Petition itself establishes that
Williams is not entitled to credit for any of that time as “time served” under the
sentences at issue here.6 The Sentencing Code does not authorize application of
credit against multiple unrelated sentences for the same time served; “Section 9760
of the Sentencing Code ‘does not contemplate credit for time served to be awarded
twice.’” Bernardini, slip op. at 5 (quoting Barndt v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 902 A.2d
589, 595 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). Such a multiple credit would constitute “a windfall
on sentencing for a completely unrelated crime . . . ,” which windfalls the Superior
Court has rejected. Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d 723, 726 (Pa. Super.
1992).7 Like the Superior Court, in considering claims of credit for time served,
“[t]his [C]ourt does not deal in ‘volume discounts.’” Id.

       6
        To the extent that the Petition’s averment of improper credit conflicts with its exhibits,
we note that, in considering preliminary objections, “‘[i]t is not necessary to accept as true any
averments in the [Petition] that conflict with exhibits attached to it.’” Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103
A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); see also Vasilinda v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 440
M.D. 2019, filed Jan. 6, 2021), slip op. at 7 (quoting Allen).
       7
          “Although not binding on this Court, Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions may be cited
for their persuasive value when they address analogous issues.” City of Phila. v. Hart, 224 A.3d
815, 821 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545,
550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)).

                                                  6
             Thus, we agree with the Department that Williams has failed to plead a
claim in mandamus because he has already received the time credit he seeks.
Further, because Williams is not owed any further credit for time served, we likewise
reject his claim that the absence of credit effectively added time to his sentence and
thereby rendered his minimum sentence more than half the length of his maximum
sentence.
             Moreover, we sustain the Department’s demurrer for the additional
reason that the sentencing court’s order is not sufficiently definite to support
Williams’s clear entitlement to relief in mandamus or a corresponding duty on the
part of the Department. This Court has repeatedly concluded that relief in mandamus
is not available where a sentencing order merely orders credit for time served,
without specifying the amount of time to be awarded. See, e.g., Canfield v. Pa. Dep’t
of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 585 M.D. 2016, filed Aug. 11, 2017); Leonhauser v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 499 M.D. 2007, filed Apr. 4, 2008). As we
explained in Canfield:
             Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an error in
             [the Department’s] computation of maximum and
             minimum dates of confinement where the sentencing order
             clearly gives the inmate credit for the time period in
             question and [the Department’s] computation does not
             comply with that credit. . . . It cannot be used to challenge
             [the Department’s] failure to give credit where the
             sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not provide
             the credit at issue. . . . The requirements for mandamus
             cannot be satisfied in those circumstances because there is
             no clear right to relief and because the inmate has an
             adequate and more appropriate alternative remedy of
             seeking modification or clarification of the sentence in the
             trial court. . . .
             [The p]etitioner’s averments here do not satisfy the
             requirements for mandamus. The only alleged error in [the

                                          7
             Department’s] sentence calculation is that it gave [the
             p]etitioner 149 days for time served rather than 730 days.
             The . . . sentencing order did not provide that [the
             p]etitioner was to receive credit for 730 days or any other
             specific number of days against his sentence. Rather, the
             trial court ordered that Petitioner receive “credit for time
             served.” . . . Nothing in the petition for review supports a
             conclusion that [the Department’s] . . . calculation failed
             to give [the p]etitioner full credit for all time served.
Canfield, slip op. at 3-4 (first citing Oakman v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 903 A.2d 106,
108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); then citing Black v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 889 A.2d 672,
677 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); then citing Saunders, 749 A.2d at 556; then citing McCray,
872 A.2d at 1132-33; and then citing Hoyt v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 79 A.3d 741, 742-
43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
             Similarly, in Leonhauser, this Court reasoned:
             We agree with [the p]etitioner that, pursuant to 42 Pa.
             C.S. § 9760(1)[,] he is entitled to credit for the time spent
             in custody on a criminal charge prior to sentencing on that
             charge. We also agree with [the p]etitioner that a writ of
             mandamus may be brought to compel the Department to
             apply credit for time served. . . . However, we disagree
             with [the p]etitioner that he has [pleaded] facts which
             establish that he has a clear legal right to the credit . . . .
             . . . Here, the trial court awarded credit for time served, but
             failed to specify the amount of credit it was awarding. The
             Department cannot speculate as to the time to be credited
             based on its own review of the record or calculate the
             award of credit based on the claims of [the p]etitioner. . . .
Leonhauser, slip op. at 4 (citing McCray, 872 A.2d at 1133).
             Here, as in Canfield and Leonhauser, the sentencing court awarded
credit for time served but did not specify the amount of credit to be given. Williams
has not pleaded facts establishing a clear right to credit for the number of days
Williams claims he is owed for pre-sentencing time served in relation to the offenses

                                           8
at issue here. At best, there is doubt on that issue, as the exhibits to the Petition
indicate that Williams already received credit for the same time period in relation to
other offenses. Accordingly, we are persuaded by our reasoning in Canfield and
Leonhauser that a claim in mandamus will not lie.
               For these reasons, we sustain the Department’s preliminary objection
to the Petition.

                     C. The Liaison Unit’s Preliminary Objection
               The Liaison Unit also preliminarily objects to the Petition, albeit on a
different basis. The Liaison Unit asserts that it is part of the Unified Judicial System
and that, as such, it is not subject to any order in mandamus from this Court in its
original jurisdiction.      Williams does not directly dispute the Liaison Unit’s
contention but maintains that the proper course is not dismissal of the claim, but
rather, transfer to our Supreme Court. We agree with both parties’ arguments.
               The Liaison Unit explains that it is part of the Office of Judicial Records
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Office of Judicial Records);
as such, the Liaison Unit is an entity of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania.
We agree. See Commonwealth v. Williams (Pa. Super., Nos. 1263-1265 EDA 2020,
filed June 14, 2022), slip op. at 7, 2022 WL 21271318 (describing the Liaison Unit
as part of the Office of Judicial Records); Silas v. Off. of Jud. Recs. (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 223 M.D. 2020, filed Mar. 22, 2021), slip op. at 5 (explaining that the Office of
Judicial Records is part of the First Judicial District) (quoting In re: Transfer of

       8
          Unreported decisions of the Superior Court dated after May 1, 2019 may be cited as
persuasive pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P.
126(b), and Section 37 of the Superior Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 65.37.

                                                9
Duties of Prothonotary & Clerk of Quarter Sessions of Phila., First Judicial Dist. of
Pa. (Pa., Judicial Administration Docket No. 412, filed September 30, 2013)).
             As this Court has previously explained, only our Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over a mandamus claim against a judicial entity:
             [T]he Judicial Code provides that the Pennsylvania
             Supreme Court has “original but not exclusive jurisdiction
             of all cases of . . . [m]andamus or prohibition to courts of
             inferior jurisdiction.” . . . The Judicial Code further
             provides that “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have
             original jurisdiction in cases of mandamus and prohibition
             to courts of inferior jurisdiction and other government
             units where such relief is ancillary to matters within its
             appellate jurisdiction. . . .” [T]he Pennsylvania Supreme
             Court, when interpreting a similarly worded provision of
             the Judicial Code governing the Superior Court’s original
             jurisdiction over mandamus actions involving a court of
             common pleas,[] held that the Superior Court only had
             “jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus . . . where an
             appeal properly within its appellate jurisdiction is pending
             before that court and where the issuance of such a writ is
             necessary to protect that court’s appellate jurisdiction.” .
             . . Because no appeal was pending, “there was no predicate
             for the Superior Court's exercise of jurisdiction. . . .”
             . . . Accordingly, we agree with [the r]espondent that this
             Court does not have jurisdiction and sustain its
             preliminary objections.
Silas, slip op. at 4-5 (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Section
721 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 721; then quoting Section 761(c) of the
Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c); and then quoting Mun. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Court of
Common Pleas, 489 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. 1985)); see also Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(a)
(providing that “[t]he [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court shall exercise general
supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts . . . ”); 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 721(a)
(conferring upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court original, though not exclusive,

                                            10
jurisdiction over, inter alia, mandamus claims against courts of inferior jurisdiction) &
1701 (conferring upon our Supreme Court “general supervisory and administrative
authority over the unified judicial system”).
               Here, as in Silas and Municipal Publications, there is no pending appeal
to which the Petition’s request for mandamus relief is ancillary. Therefore, we agree
with the Liaison Unit that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Williams’s claim against
the Liaison Unit. Such jurisdiction lies solely with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.9
               Nonetheless, because our Supreme Court has jurisdiction, we are not
permitted to dismiss the claim. Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code provides:
               (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to
               or brought in a court or magisterial district of this
               Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the
               appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial district
               judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter,
               but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal
               of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter
               shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee
               tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was
               first filed in a court or magisterial district of this
               Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive
               jurisdiction of a court or magisterial district judge of this
               Commonwealth but which is commenced in any other
               tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the
               other tribunal to the proper court or magisterial district of
               this Commonwealth where it shall be treated as if
               originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial
               district of this Commonwealth on the date when first filed
               in the other tribunal.

       9
         Because we lack jurisdiction over Williams’s claim against the Liaison Unit, we do not
reach the Liaison Unit’s additional argument that it is not the entity responsible for calculating
sentence credit for time served.

                                               11
42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). Because we lack jurisdiction over William’s mandamus claim
against the Liaison Unit, Section 5103(a) requires us to transfer that claim to our
Supreme Court. See Silas, slip op. at 5-6 (quoting Section 5103(a)); see generally
Lichtman v. Feder (Pa. Super. No. 2551 EDA 2019, filed Mar. 2, 2020), 2020 WL
996749 (citing and discussing Municipal Publications and transferring a mandamus
claim against the administrator of the Office of Judicial Records to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction).

                                  III. Conclusion
             Based on the foregoing discussion, we sustain the Department’s
preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer and dismiss Williams’s claim
against the Department.     We sustain the Liaison Unit’s preliminary objection
asserting lack of jurisdiction and transfer Williams’s claim against the Liaison Unit
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

                                       __________________________________
                                       CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                         12
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Drew Williams,                             :
                         Petitioner        :
                                           :
            v.                             :
                                           :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania               :
Department of Corrections, and             :
Prison Liaison Unit, et al.,               :   No. 65 M.D. 2023
                           Respondents     :

                                      ORDER

      AND NOW, this 3rd day of April, 2024, the preliminary objections of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) and the
Prison Liaison Unit (Liaison Unit) are SUSTAINED.           The claim against the
Department is DISMISSED. The claim against the Liaison Unit is TRANSFERRED
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).

                                         __________________________________
                                         CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge