Court Opinion

ID: 9587699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:23.215787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:14.805994
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the dismissal of Case No. A98A1689 and agree with the opinion and conclusion in Case No. A98A1631 that the superior court’s order must be vacated. Nevertheless, I write separately with respect to Division 1 to outline an appropriate sanction for the demonstrably vexatious litigant, Anthony Carter.
The court’s order recites that since 1989 Carter had filed, or attempted to file, 17 separate lawsuits against 29 separate defendants. The court further outlines the burden Carter’s litigiousness has placed on it, stating: “[t]his Court has physically looked at the origi*557nal files of all of these law suits, and if each were stacked on top of the other would stand more than three feet above the floor.”
The complaints contained in the record also demonstrate Carter’s litigious nature. The first, filed against two Fayette County Deputy Sheriffs, is entitled “Complaint on Excessive Levy Failure to Levy on Items Specified Negligence, False Affidavit Malice Conspiracy for Promotion.” According to Carter’s complaint, the incidents leading to that suit arose out of officers’ effort to levy property to satisfy a writ “that Fayette Magistrates and Fayette County had for two suits that Superior Court Judge said were frivolous, and granted attorney fees.” In other words, Carter filed a suit for the attempt to levy property to satisfy court-imposed penalties for a prior frivolous lawsuit.
Although the order which the court entered here is overly broad, it is important to acknowledge the tremendously difficult quandary courts face with respect to stubborn litigiousness of this nature. Indisputably, Carter’s actions here require some curtailment. But, frequently the litigants are judgment-proof and the imposition of financial penalties for pursuing the frivolous litigation becomes meaningless.
As the opinion notes, narrow court-fashioned restrictions which incorporate judicial decision-making generally have passed constitutional muster. For example, in Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771 (470 SE2d 678) (1996), the trial court entered an order which enjoined Howard from filing any lawsuits in forma pauperis unless he first obtained approval of the habeas judge and certified that the claims raised were novel. The Supreme Court held that this “narrowly drawn” order was a reasonable restriction of Howard’s right of access in light of his past pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits. In Smith v. Adamson, 226 Ga. App. 698, 699-700 (3) (487 SE2d 386) (1997), the court held that an order requiring future suits filed by a litigious pro se litigant to be approved by the judge and accompanied by two affidavits, one of which was her own sworn assurance of propriety, did not deprive her of meaningful access to the courts. See also Procup v. Strickland, 792 F2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986); compare Bd. of Commrs. of Morgan County v. Winslow, 862 P2d 921, 923-924 (Colo. 1993).
When confronted with vexatious litigants like Carter, courts have considerable discretion in fashioning appropriate injunctions. The court could direct the litigant to accompany all future pleadings with affidavits certifying that the claims being raised are novel, subject to contempt for false swearing. See Urban v. United Nations, 768 F2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court could direct the litigant to seek leave of court before filing pleadings in any new or pending lawsuit; thus, the court could screen the complaint to determine if it had merit. See id.; Howard, 266 Ga. 771. In Procup v. Strickland, 792 F2d *5581069, the court suggested other possible restrictions for a court attempting to deal with an overly litigious litigant, including: limiting the number of pages to a complaint and other pleadings; and limiting further pleadings without an order of the court — after allowing the complaint to be filed. Although these options continue to require the court to be burdened with this type of litigation, until the General Assembly funds more attorneys for public service, it is not feasible to require that a litigant obtain approval from an attorney before filing his complaint.
Decided December 2, 1998.
Anthony J. Carter, pro se.
McNally, Fox & Cameron, William R. McNally, Dennis A. Davenport, for appellee.