Court Opinion

ID: 9758020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:08:00.242005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:46.600560
License: Public Domain

Barney, J.,
dissenting. Unlike the majority, I find prejudicial error in the trial court’s charge. I must also reject, on principle, resort to remarks of counsel to arrive at the jury’s probable understanding of the court’s language. Nor can the difficulty be resolved by reference to the rule that the charge must be viewed as a whole. It is just such a view that reveals that the jury was given two inconsistent rules on causation, as relating to the damage in evidence.
In this case the difficulty is only partly one of selecting the efficient cause of damage. Under the evidence, there were different kinds of damage. It was important for this to be kept before the jury to avoid misunderstanding. At the beginning of the charge, the court briefly and correctly outlined the burden of the plaintiff, inferentially but not specifically limiting the damage issue to that caused by the defendant’s negligence. Later on in the charge the court undertook to develop the issue of causation. When the court went on to charge, as it did, that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing that the defendant’s negligence was the direct and sole cause of damage to the house, it then became incumbent upon the court to make it clear that this test *293was applicable only to damage to the house resulting from the blasting. This was not done. Our Court has ruled that to say one thing is the sole cause of an accident necessarily excludes all other causes. Higgins, Admr. v. Metzger, 101 Vt. 285, 294, 143 Atl. 394. Such language is appropriate where there is an issue of contributory negligence, but not here.
Conceding that, when it came to the issue of damages, the court correctly limited the jury’s consideration to the injury directly caused by the blasting, we cannot assume confusion was dispelled. The jury might well understand, since they were not directed otherwise, that the test of liability might differ from the measure of damages. With a defendant’s verdict in the case, we have nothing to indicate the actual basis on which the plaintiff’s claim was rejected. Conceivably, it could have been because the plaintiff was unable to show that the defendant was “solely” responsible for all the damage existing in the house.
Thus the jury was left in the position of having two rules for determining liability before it. One excused the defendant if there was any damage to the plaintiff’s house not caused by the defendant’s negligence. The other, correctly, would hold the defendant liable for any of the damage which was caused by its negligence. In such cases, where inconsistent instructions are given, it is presumed that the jury felt at liberty'- to follow either the correct or the incorrect. Kinsley v. Willis, 120 Vt. 103, 111, 132 A.2d 163; Farmer’s Exchange v. Brown, 106 Vt. 65, 69, 169 Atl. 906. There is no presumption that the jury selected the right course. The fact that the court may have, at one point, charged correctly, will not overcome the presumed effect of an erroneous charge, if properly challenged. Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 6, 20, 192 Atl. 184, 115 A.L.R. 392.
At the very least, in this case, there is fair ground for saying the jury may have been misled. Morse v. Ward, 102 Vt. 433, 436, 150 Atl. 132. It seems clear that the principles of these cases apply here, and that they require reversal. I would so rule.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Holden joins in this dissent.