Court Opinion

ID: 9392133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 14:07:47.779526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:17.626693
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Deshpande v. Manning, 2023-Ohio-1481.]

                             COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

AMY DESHPANDE, ET AL.,                            :

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,            :
                                                             No. 111971
                v.                                :

ADELBERT MANNING, ET AL.,                         :

                Defendants-Appellees.             :

                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: DISMISSED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 4, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-21-942746

                                          Appearances:

                Kenneth R. Hurley, for appellant.

                McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., Charles A.
                Nemer, and Tracy S. Francis, for appellee.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

               Appellant Amy Deshpande (“Deshpande”) appeals the judgment of the

trial court granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Adelbert Manning

(“Manning”) on his counterclaim against Deshpande for breach of contract. After a
thorough review of the law and facts, we dismiss this appeal for a lack of a final,

appealable order.

                     I. Factual and Procedural History

            In October 2018, A&L, LLC (“A&L”), whose sole members were

Deshpande and Lynn Oryshkewych (“Oryshkewych”), entered into an asset

purchase agreement and management agreement (collectively “The 2018

Agreements”) with Delmonica, LLC (“Delmonica”), whose sole member was

Manning. The agreement was for the purchase of a bar known as “The Paddy

Wagon” in Strongsville, Ohio for $60,000.

            In January 2019, Deshpande and Oryshkewych, as individuals entered

into a separate agreement (the “January 2019 Agreement”) with Manning for the

purchase of Manning’s entire membership interest in Delmonica for $60,000.

            In October 2019, Oryshkewych passed away.

            In January 2021, Deshpande filed a complaint against Manning and

The Estate of Lynn C. Oryshkewych (“the Estate”) and attached the January 2019

Agreement. The complaint asserted claims that Manning did not perform pursuant

to the agreement and misrepresented information prior to the parties entering into

the agreement. The complaint further alleged that Manning failed to “turn the

[liquor] license over to them.” It detailed that in September 2020, Manning “placed

the liquor licenses in safekeeping with the Ohio Department of Liquor Control” and

that this action shut down the operation of the Paddy Wagon.
             Manning filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint.

Manning’s answer denied that he “failed to meet his responsibilities with respect to

transferring the liquor license.” Manning’s counterclaim alleged that Deshpande

and Oryshkewych failed to pay the $60,000 owed under the January 2019

Agreement for Manning’s membership interest in Delmonica and failed to properly

transfer the liquor license, causing Manning to incur expenses and tax liabilities.

Manning alleged that he provided all the necessary documentation to Deshpande

and Oryshkewych, but that they were unable to successfully transfer the license due

to various failures to pay fees, provide information, and pay taxes on the license.

Because the license was not properly transferred, Manning eventually received a

letter from the Ohio Attorney General noting that because the taxes associated with

the liquor license remained unpaid, he was to turn over the liquor license to the Ohio

Division of Liquor Control for safekeeping. Manning also initiated a third-party

complaint against A&L for indemnification in the event that he was found liable to

Deshpande.

             In July 2022, Manning filed a motion for summary judgment on

Deshpande’s complaint and his counterclaim against Deshpande. The motion

argued that (1) Deshpande lacked standing to bring the action since the liquor

license was purchased by A&L; (2) A&L and/or Deshpande failed to properly

effectuate the transfer of the liquor license after Manning complied with all of his

contractual obligations; (3) Deshpande failed to perform her obligation to pay

$60,000 under the January 2019 Agreement; and (4) there is no evidence that
Manning misrepresented anything or breached any of his obligations under the

contracts.

             In August 2022, Deshpande filed a Civ.R. 41(A) dismissal of her

complaint against all of the defendants.

             Deshpande’s response to Manning’s motion for summary judgment

included an affidavit from Deshpande averring that (1) the $60,000 payment was

only owed once, under The 2018 Agreements, and that the January 2019 Agreement

simply restated this purchase price; (2) Manning never demanded an additional

sum in relation to the January 2019 Agreement; and (3) the taxes owed for the liquor

license predated her ownership of the tavern and Manning “falsely represented that

there were no taxes owed that were related to the operation of the tavern prior to

our purchase.”

              The court granted Manning’s motion for summary judgment as it

pertained to his counterclaim and ordered Deshpande to pay the $60,000 owed to

Manning under the January 2019 Agreement. Deshpande appealed, assigning a

single error for our review.

      The trial court erred in its conclusion that there were no material issues
      of material facts established by the Appellant in its stated opposition to
      the Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

                               II. Law and Analysis

             Sua sponte, this court ordered supplemental briefing as to whether the

trial court’s granting of summary judgment as to Manning’s counterclaim was a

final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. This court observed that the
Civ.R. 54(B) language was not present in the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment and the record further reflected that Manning’s third-party claim against

A&L was potentially unresolved.

             In her supplemental brief, Deshpande argued that the trial court’s

omission of the Civ.R. 54(B) language and the outstanding claim against A&L prove

that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was not a final, appealable order.

In his supplemental brief, Manning argues that his third-party claim against A&L,

which was solely for indemnification, was rendered moot by the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of Manning and therefore, the order granting

summary judgment was a final, appealable order.

             Appellate courts are authorized to review only final orders; absent a

final order, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to review an appeal. Stewart

v. Solutions Community Counseling & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 168 Ohio St.3d 96,

2022-Ohio-2522, 195 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 4; Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio

Constitution. An order is final and appealable if it complies with R.C. 2505.02 and

Civ.R. 54(B), if applicable. Madfan, Inc. v. Makris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102179,

2015-Ohio-1316, ¶ 6, citing Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d

86, 88, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989). Pertinent to this appeal, R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) defines a

final order as one “that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect

determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” When an order determines the

action and prevents a judgment, it must “dispose of the whole merits of the cause or

some separate and distinct branch thereof and leaving nothing for the
determination of the court.” Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev.

Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio, 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 545 N.E.2d 1260

(1989). When a case involves multiple parties or multiple claims, the court’s order

must also meet the requirements outlined in Civ.R. 54(B). Madfan at ¶ 7; Chef

Italiano Corp. at 88. Civ.R. 54(B) provides that

      any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
      adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
      than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims
      or parties[.]

Without the mandatory language that “there is no just reason for delay,” an order

that fails to dispose of all claims is not final and appealable. Kent State Univ. v.

Manley, 2022-Ohio-4512, 204 N.E.3d 115, ¶ 12(8th Dist.), citing U.S. Bank Trust,

N.A. v. Osborne, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3930, 2021-Ohio-2898, ¶ 22, citing Noble

v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989).

             After a thorough review of the record, we find that we are without

jurisdiction to review the instant appeal. In his counterclaim, Manning requested

damages for breach of contract for Deshpande’s breach of the January 2019

Agreement; the court’s summary judgment order disposed of this claim. Further

review of the counterclaim indicates that Manning also sought damages for

Deshpande’s failure to pay taxes associated with the liquor license, causing Manning

to incur expenses and fees (Count 2) and also sought to “pierce the corporate veil”

of A&L and hold Deshpande personally liable for the debts incurred as a result of

Deshpande and/or A&L’s failure to pay taxes, causing Manning to incur expenses
and fees (Count 4).1 The court did not dispose of these claims in its judgment entry

nor did Manning voluntarily dismiss them.

              In its order granting Manning’s motion for summary judgment, the

trial court specifically addressed Manning’s claims against Deshpande for breach of

contract “for allegedly failing to pay the $60,000 required under the [January 2019

Agreement].” Further, the evidence the court considered is strictly related to the

January 2019 Agreement and did not relate to Deshpande’s liability to Manning for

any expenses or fees incurred as a result of Deshpande’s inability to transfer the

liquor license. These claims in Manning’s counterclaim remain outstanding, and

the court’s omission of the Civ.R. 54(B) language appears intentional, given that only

the breach-of-contract claim was disposed of, and the $60,000 judgment emanated

only from Count 1 of Manning’s counterclaim. Because the trial court’s order

granting summary judgment left Counts 2 and 4 of Manning’s counterclaim

unresolved, it was not a final, appealable order and we are without jurisdiction to

review it.

                                 III. Conclusion

              Because the judgment from which Deshpande appeals is not a final,

appealable order, we dismiss the instant appeal.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      1
      In the counterclaim, Manning listed two claims as “Count Three.” We renumber
Manning’s claim to pierce A&L’s corporate veil to Count 4 for ease of discussion.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
KEYWORDS
#111970 – Deshpande v. Manning

Final, appealable order; R.C. 2505.02; Civ.R. 54(B); jurisdiction. Appeal
dismissed for want of a final, appealable order. Because the trial court’s judgment
entry granting summary judgment did not dispose of all claims, this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the appeal.