Court Opinion

ID: 9531297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:09:34.654929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:24.155475
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Presiding Judge
(dissenting) :
My dissent with the results reached by a majority of the court in this case is a narrow one.
I agree, that under the constitution and applicable statutes, the Arizona Corporation Commission has the power to enter specialized orders affecting the quality of the service provided by a public utility without the necessity of adopting a general industry-wide regulation covering the subject. However, in my opinion the use of the specialized order power to affect quality of service can and should be utilized only in those situations where the facts indicate that the problem sought to be resolved by the specialized order is not capable of being dealt with by an industry-wide regulation, either because of lack of experience by the Commission to warrant a hard and fast rule, or because the problem itself is local or specialized in nature. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947), quoted at length in the majority opinion. It is further my opinion that because the formulation of rules and regulations of industry-wide application is favored over the formulation of such rules by the use of piecemeal specialized orders, the burden of proof that the use of specialized orders rather than adoption of general application rules is justified rests on the Commission.
With these principles in mind (and I do not believe the majority disagrees with these principles), I believe as a general proposition that the amount of dissolved solids or chlorides in public water is a *131problem of general concern in the southwest and especially in Arizona, and is capable of being dealt with by an industry-wide regulation. California, for example, has had no difficulty in applying an industry-wide regulation controlling this subject. West’s Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 4027 (1970) and § 4028 (Supp.1975). Being a subject which can be regulated adequately by a general application rule, I see no justification for singling out the Palm Springs Utility Co. for a specialized order dealing with the particular quality of its water.
Assuming that the subject of water quality is not capable of being controlled by a regulation or rule of general application (there was no evidence present in this case, one way or the other, and in my opinion results in a failure of proof on the Commission’s part), I fail to find any facts in this case which would justify the use by the Commission of its specialized order power. While there was evidence that the water quality at Apache Junction was poor there was no evidence that the problem of poor water quality was peculiar to Apache Junction. Likewise, there was no evidence presented that the localized problems of water quality present at Apache Junction required specialized treatment as compared to the treatment afforded other water users in the state. The evidence was completely lacking in regard to the Commission’s lack of experience in handling hard water problems so as to justify the “trial run” specialized order entered in the Palm Springs case. Finally, I do not believe the problem of hard water in the state of Arizona where drawing from underground wells through caliche is the rule rather than the exception, is so unforeseeable as to lay the foundation for the type of specialized order entered in this case.
In my opinion the utilization of the specialized order power of the Commission should be restricted to those situations which truly justify its use. To allow its unsubstantiated use, which in my opinion occurs in this case, is to run afoul of the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.
I would therefore affirm the trial court, not on the basis that the power to enter specialized orders does not exist, but on the basis that the Commission failed to show that the use of the power was justified in this case.