Court Opinion

ID: 9958924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:04:18.221635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.324577
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                          JAYNE GREENBERG,
                              Appellant,

                                    v.

COUNTRY ISLES SECTION ONE MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION, INC.,
                   a Florida corporation,
                          Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-2322

                             [April 10, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE18-
021905.

   Lane Weinbaum of Weinbaum P.A., Coconut Creek, for appellant.

  Kimberly K. Berman of Marshall Dennehey, P.C., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellee.

WARNER, J.

   Appellant challenges a final summary judgment entered by the trial
court concluding that res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of
limitations barred appellant’s claims. The trial court also made findings
that appellant had agreed to certain commitments to settle the issues in
the case. However, our reading of the record shows appellant did not make
such agreements, and the judgment cannot be supported on the grounds
upon which appellee sought summary judgment. We therefore reverse.

                               Background

    Appellant, a homeowner in Country Isles’ condominium complex, is a
disabled woman. The instant suit is part of a continuing dispute which
began when appellant filed a lawsuit in 2009 against Country Isles. The
instant suit involves conduct subsequent to that lawsuit and includes
allegations of retaliation for having filed the 2009 lawsuit.
    In 2009, appellant filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against
Country Isles and the Farrells, appellant’s next-door neighbors. Country
Isles’ Covenants contain an outdoor living area easement (the “Easement”)
which allows owners of dominant lots to construct improvements on the
outdoor living area shared between each parcel’s dominant and servient
lots. Appellant and the Farrells live on the same parcel, with the Farrells
owning the dominant lot and appellant owning the servient lot. The
complaint alleged that the Farrells had constructed a fence pursuant to
the easement which interfered with appellant’s safe entry and exit due to
her disability. Appellant requested a declaratory judgment that the
easement was unenforceable against her because the easement posed an
undue burden on her disability. She sought a ruling that the Farrells must
remove the fence.

   The case proceeded to trial in 2016, but the parties entered a stipulated
final order (“SFO”). The SFO found the easement valid and enforceable,
and found that the Farrells were in compliance with it. The SFO permitted
appellant to install a gate on both sides of the Farrells’ fence, at her own
expense, to allow her access to her servient lot without entry on the
Farrells’ dominant lot. The construction of that gate was subject to
approval by both Country Isles and the city, and appellant was ordered to
submit an architectural review application to Country Isles, who in turn
was ordered not to withhold approval so long as the gate was compliant
with its architectural standards. The SFO ordered the Farrells to remove
any improvements, other than the fence, that were physically located on
appellant’s servient lot, including trees and shrubbery. Based on these
stipulations, the trial court dismissed appellant’s complaint with
prejudice, although it retained jurisdiction to enter further orders for
compliance with and enforcement of the SFO.

   Two years later, appellant filed another complaint against Country Isles
and the Farrells. Appellant amended the complaint three times, with the
third amended complaint alleging that Country Isles was retaliating
against her for filing the 2009 lawsuit by, among other things, refusing to
trim appellant’s trees and to fulfill other maintenance requests, selectively
enforcing rules against her, and issuing an unreasonable amount of
notices of violations since appellant had filed the initial lawsuit. She also
made a claim that Country Isles was in violation of the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”), because Country Isles had rejected her proposed accommodation
for her disability and had failed to provide a reasonable alternative. She
sought an injunction and damages for relief. Other than a summary of
appellant’s tumultuous relationship with the Farrells, the third amended
complaint’s allegations exclusively concerned conduct that had occurred
after the SFO was entered.

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   Country Isles filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the third
amended complaint. Country Isles’ affirmative defenses included, among
other things, collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the FHA’s statute of
limitations. Country Isles argued that appellant was rehashing the same
claims as the 2009 case. Appellant responded to these affirmative
defenses, arguing that the 2009 case concerned whether the easement was
valid and whether the Farrells’ fence complied with the easement, while
the instant case concerned retaliation and harassment since the SFO.

   Country Isles filed a motion for summary judgment on all four of
appellant’s claims based on its affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel,
res judicata and the FHA’s statute of limitations. Country Isles did not
address appellant’s claims on the merits. Appellant filed a memorandum
opposing Country Isles’ affirmative defenses. Appellant argued that
collateral estoppel and res judicata did not apply because she was raising
new allegations and new issues based on conduct subsequent to the SFO.
Appellant argued that the FHA’s statute of limitations did not apply
because she had suffered the discriminatory housing practice after the
SFO was entered and within the limitations period.

    At the MSJ hearing, the trial court appears to have been vexed by the
continued controversy, which had lasted for over ten years. The trial court
declared that the case was “just plain and simple a waste of everybody’s
money,” and that the parties needed to reach “some sort of
accommodation.” The court suggested some solutions regarding the
fencing, to which Country Isles agreed but appellant opposed, expressing
intent to continue the litigation. To settle the entire controversy, Country
Isles made an offer to which appellant did not respond. But the court said,
“Well, it sounds like everything’s resolved in this case, you know.”
Appellant argued the issues were not all settled. The court then ended the
hearing with the following exchange:

      THE COURT: You guys try to work this out on your own. I’m
      done trying to be reasonable here, because this is not that
      kind of case. Summary Judgment is granted, and -

      [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Granted?

      THE COURT: -- and you’ll -- yeah, it’s granted.

      [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: How is Summary Judgment
      granted?

                                     3
      THE COURT: Granted. It’s out. You’re done. That’s it.
      Everything has been resolved. First of all, the FHA claim
      before about the aluminum gate, the Order before required
      [Appellant] to pay for it. So [Country Isles] will approve it.
      She’ll put up a brown-colored fence that’s aluminum. That’s
      fine. But as far as the rest of this case, it’s already been done.
      It’s already been decided. And there’s no outstanding penalty
      –

      [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Judge, I think what -- I think –

      THE COURT: -- or anything else. They’ve agreed they’re going
      to do the maintenance anyway, and we don’t need an
      Injunction. So the Summary Judgment is granted. Let me
      have [Country Isles] submit the Order.

   The court’s final summary judgment order found that the issues
presented in this case were addressed and litigated in the prior case, and
settled in the SFO. The court found that appellant’s Florida law claims
were barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, and that her FHA
claim was barred by the FHA’s statute of limitations. To the extent the
instant case concerned compliance with the SFO, the court found that
those issues were resolved at the hearing. Later, the court denied a motion
for rehearing, concluding that the issues were barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the statute of limitations. From the final judgment,
appellant now appeals.

                                  Analysis

   We review a summary judgment de novo. Dist. Advisory Bd. of S. Fla.
Dist. v. Centro De Alabanza Oasis W. Palm Beach, Inc., 338 So. 3d 936, 940
(Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Whether a cause of action is barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and/or the statute of limitations is a question of law
also reviewed de novo. Aronowitz v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 174 So. 3d
1062, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“A trial court’s ruling concerning the
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel is . . . reviewed de
novo.”); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Barbanell, 100 So. 3d 152, 157 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2012) (citation omitted) (“A legal issue surrounding a statute of
limitations question is an issue of law subject to de novo review.”).

   Country Isles moved for, and the trial court granted, summary
judgment based on the affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and statute of limitations. However, we conclude that appellant’s
complaint was not barred by any of these affirmative defenses.

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                               Res Judicata

  In Florida Department of Transportation v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101 (Fla.
2001), our supreme court described when res judicata bars a claim:

      A judgment on the merits rendered in a former suit between
      the same parties or their privies, upon the same cause of
      action, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive not
      only as to every matter which was offered and received to
      sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which
      might with propriety have been litigated and determined in
      that action.

Id. at 105 (quoting Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984)).

   It is undisputed that the SFO is a judgment on the merits rendered in
a former suit between the same parties by a court of competent
jurisdiction. At issue is whether appellant’s third amended complaint in
the instant case concerns the same subject matter as that which was
addressed, or could properly have been addressed, in the former case.

    The SFO was entered in August 2016, and appellant’s complaint is
largely based on what she alleges was harassment by Country Isles that
occurred between September 2016 and August 2020, as well as an FHA
violation which she alleges had occurred in 2020. “The doctrine of res
judicata . . . is not applicable where the claims in the two cases concern
different periods of time.” Woodward v. Woodward, 192 So. 3d 528, 531
(Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting M.C.G. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927
So. 2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Thus, appellant’s claims were not
barred by res judicata.

                            Collateral Estoppel

    “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘bars
relitigation of the same issue between the same parties which has already
been determined by a valid judgment,’ even where the present and former
cause of action are not the same.” Kowallek v. Lee Rehm, 183 So. 3d 1175,
1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Zikofsky v. Mktg. 10, Inc., 904 So. 2d
520, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)); see also Aronowitz, 174 So. 3d at 1066
(citation omitted) (“Collateral estoppel applies to specific issues ‘that were
actually litigated and decided in the former suit.’”). Unlike res judicata,
collateral estoppel can bar claims based on conduct subsequent to the first

                                      5
judgment, where the second case is an attempt to relitigate the same issue
as the first. Kowallek, 183 So. 3d at 1177.

   Although Country Isles argues that this case concerns the same issues
as the first, the first case concerned whether Country Isles’ easement was
valid and enforceable, and whether the Farrells’ fence complied with that
easement. The instant case involves, among other things, allegations of
retaliation, selective enforcement of Country Isles’ Covenants against
appellant, issues with a privacy fence and gate that were erected in 2017,
and issues with Country Isles refusing to trim appellant’s trees. None of
these issues were alleged in the 2009 complaint or addressed in the SFO.
Collateral estoppel does not bar the instant suit.

                      FHA Statute of Limitations

   FHA claims carry a two-year statute of limitations, which begins
running “after the occurrence . . . of an alleged discriminatory housing
practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). Country Isles denied appellant’s FHA
request in February 2020, which appellant argues constitutes the
discriminatory housing practice. That allegation falls within the two-year
statute of limitations, as appellant filed her complaint in December 2020.
However, Country Isles argues that appellant’s FHA claim accrued in
2009, when the Farrells first installed their fence, and so that claim is
barred by the statute of limitations.

   “The FHA’s statute of limitations begins to run as soon as ‘facts
supportive of the cause of action are or should be apparent to a reasonably
prudent person similarly situated.’” Telesca v. Vill. Of Kings Creek Condo.
Ass’n, 390 Fed. App’x 877, 882 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Here,
appellant was granted leave to amend her complaint to add FHA claims.
When she filed her third amended complaint raising such claims in
December 2020, the claim was based at least in part on the denial of her
FHA request to maintain the privacy fence’s location following her
deteriorating mobility from an additional surgery, with both the surgery
and FHA request denial occurring in 2020. The privacy fence was not the
fence in litigation in the 2009 suit and was not constructed until 2017.
Moreover, appellant could not have known of the facts giving rise to her
FHA claim before her January 2020 surgery, bringing the claim within the
statute of limitations. Telesca, 390 Fed. App’x at 882.

   Because the motion for summary judgment was based exclusively on
the applicability of the three affirmative defenses, the court erred in
granting summary judgment.

                                    6
 Final Judgment Based Upon Purported Agreement Between Parties

   In the final judgment, the trial court lists several purported agreements
that appellant and Country Isles reached during the hearing. Appellant
argues that no such stipulations were reached, and the trial court erred
in relying on the purported agreements in reaching its final judgment.
Indeed, the court’s final judgment incorporated these purported
“agreements” as grounds for entering final judgment.

    The court insisted on attempting to get the parties to agree to specific
concessions in order to end the litigation, including a promise by Country
Isles to approve the gate, trim trees if supported by an arborist report, and
other concessions. Country Isles stated that it would agree to these terms,
if such agreement would end the suit. But because the appellant did not
affirmatively agree to the terms and wanted the suit to continue, the trial
court erred in forcing the terms upon the appellant. An oral settlement’s
enforceability requires “[a] stipulation properly entered into the record,
where there is a clear understanding of the finality of that agreement.”
Roskind v. Roskind, 552 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Here,
there was no clear understanding of the finality of the agreement. While
Country Isles agreed to many terms which would have been favorable to
appellant, appellant did not affirmatively agree to all the terms and
expressed her desire to continue with the litigation. Although the trial
court earnestly sought to get the parties to come to agreement, it could not
enter a final judgment based upon an incomplete agreement.

                                 Conclusion

    The trial court erred in entering summary judgment based upon the
affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statute of
limitations, which were the only grounds raised in Country Isles’ motion
and which are not supported by the record. The court also erred in relying
on alleged agreements between the parties to conclude the matter, when
the record shows that appellant did not agree to end the litigation and that
the agreements did not resolve all issues in the complaint. We therefore
reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

   Reversed.

LEVINE and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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