Court Opinion

ID: 9882802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:13.427842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:54.108237
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Myers v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., 2023-Ohio-3045.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                     NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )

DANIEL MYERS                                               C.A. No.   30465

        Appellant

        v.                                                 APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                           ENTERED IN THE
UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS HEALTH                                COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
SYSTEM, INC., et al.                                       COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
                                                           CASE No.   CV-2020-12-3440
        Appellees

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 30, 2023

        HENSAL, Judge.

        {¶1}     Daniel Myers appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas

that granted summary judgment to University Hospitals Health Care System and University

Hospitals Ahuja Medical Center (“University Hospitals”). This Court reverses.

                                                      I.

        {¶2}     In November 2019, Mr. Myers sought treatment from a University Hospitals urgent

care facility in Twinsburg. He paid his co-pay while he was there, but the bills that he received

did not reflect that payment. Mr. Myers paid two of the bills, but because his statements did not

reflect payment of the co-pay, he was billed again. When Mr. Myers did not pay a balance of

$55.38, University Hospitals turned his account over to a collection agency. University Hospitals

ultimately identified a billing error and issued a refund to Mr. Myers. Nonetheless, Mr. Myers

filed a complaint against University Hospitals that alleged fraud, unauthorized disclosure of
                                                 2

confidential medical information, and violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act

(“CSPA”) and the Summit County Consumer Protection Ordinance (“the County Ordinance”).

       {¶3}    University Hospitals moved for summary judgment, and Mr. Myers moved for

partial summary judgment with respect to his claims under the CSPA and the County Ordinance.

Mr. Myers indicated that he did not intend to pursue his claim for unauthorized disclosure of

confidential information, and the trial court dismissed it on that basis. The trial court granted

summary judgment to University Hospitals, concluding that Mr. Myers had not met his evidentiary

burden with respect to summary judgment on his fraud claim and that the undisputed evidence

established that University Hospitals was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court

also granted summary judgment to University Hospitals on Mr. Myers’ consumer claims. In doing

so, the trial court determined that the transaction at issue was between a physician and a patient

rather than a hospital and a patient and, therefore, that the CSPA and the County Ordinance did

not apply. In the alternative, the trial court concluded that University Hospitals was entitled to

judgment on Mr. Myers’ claims if the CSPA and the County Ordinance did apply and, regardless,

that University Hospitals’ billing mistake was a bona fide error.

       {¶4}    Mr. Myers’ appealed, assigning two errors for this Court’s review. His assignments

of error are rearranged for purposes of disposition.

                                                 II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
       GRANTED UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL[S’] MOTION FOR SUMMARY
       JUDGMENT AS TO MR. MYER[S’] CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT
       AND SUMMIT COUNTY CONSUMER PROTECTION ORDINANCE
       CLAIMS.
                                                 3

       {¶5}    In his second assignment of error, Mr. Myers argues that the trial court erred by

granting summary judgment to University Hospitals. This Court agrees.

       {¶6}    As an initial matter, this Court notes that Mr. Myers has not separately argued his

two assignments of error.      Under Appellate Rule 12(A)(2), this Court “may disregard an

assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to * * * argue the assignment

[of error] separately in the brief[.]” See also State v. Walter, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0020,

2022-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17; Loc.R. 16(A)(7) of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, we

exercise our discretion to consider Mr. Myers’ assignments of error in this case. See Walter at ¶

17.

       {¶7}    This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Consequently, this Court must “conduct[] an

independent review of the evidence without deference to the trial court’s findings.” Smathers v.

Glass, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30. Under Civ.R. 56(C), “[s]ummary judgment will

be granted only when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the

evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24,

2006-Ohio-3455, ¶ 10. The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no

genuine issues of material fact with reference to “appropriate evidentiary materials.” Id. Similarly,

the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial[]”

with reference to the type of evidentiary materials specified in Rule 56(E). Id., quoting Civ.R.

56(E). The trial court’s role is to determine if there are disputed facts—not to weigh the evidence.

Smathers at ¶ 32. “[O]n a summary-judgment motion, any inferences regarding the evidence,

including the resolution of ambiguities or inconsistencies, must be made in a manner that favors
                                                  4

the nonmoving party[.]” Id. citing Civ.R. 56(C). The trial court does not consider whether the

movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law unless there is no genuine issue of

material fact. Id. at ¶ 12.

        {¶8}    Both the moving party and the nonmoving party may rely on affidavits. Civ.R.

56(E). In Stone v. Cazeau, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 07CA009164, 2007-Ohio-6213, ¶ 14, this Court

reasoned:

        When a motion for summary judgment or its response points to evidence set forth
        in affidavits, those affidavits must be evaluated as would any other evidence
        permitted by Rule 56 to determine whether the affidavits demonstrate the existence
        or lack of genuine issues of material fact. Affidavits are, therefore, entitled to no
        greater weight than other evidence permitted by Rule 56(E) of the Ohio Rules of
        Civil Procedure. Conversely, they are not to be discounted out-of-hand.

Stone at ¶ 14. We also concluded that “neither a moving party nor a nonmoving party is required

by Rule 56 to provide documents, discovery responses, or transcripts of evidence in addition to

properly framed affidavits[]” and overruled this Court’s previous decisions to the contrary. Id. at

¶ 14.

        {¶9}    In this case, the trial court concluded that Mr. Myers’ affidavit was not “evidentiary

quality[.]” In doing so, the trial court characterized it as “self-serving” and observed that it was

not corroborated by other factual evidence. As this Court has previously held, however, a party’s

own properly framed affidavit is acceptable for purposes of Civ.R. 56(E) and need not be

corroborated by other evidence. Stone at ¶ 13-14. The trial court also noted instances of disputed

facts throughout its decision and, in reaching its conclusions, appears to have misapplied the

summary judgment standard by weighing the evidence. See Horner v. Elyria, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

13CA010420, 2015-Ohio-47, ¶ 11.

        {¶10} “The material issues of each case are identified by substantive law.” Byrd, 110

Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, ¶ 12. With respect to Mr. Myers’ CSPA claims, the threshold
                                                   5

issue before the trial court was whether the claims arose from a “[c]onsumer transaction” as

defined by Section 1345.01(A) and, if so, whether the nature of the transaction fell within the

CSPA or gave rise to a defense. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s error in this case is

harmless given the material nature of the facts at issue. Horner at ¶ 12. In addition, “[w]ere this

Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard, this Court would essentially be sitting as

the trial court rather than the reviewing Court[.]” Id. at ¶ 13. Accordingly, Mr. Myers’ second

assignment of error is sustained on this basis.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED
       MR. MYER[S’] MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
       THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, AND
       UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL[S’] LIABILITY FOR SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS
       THEREOF.

       {¶11} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Myers argues that the trial court erred by

denying his partial motion for summary judgment. Given this Court’s resolution of his second

assignment of error, his first assignment of error is premature.

                                                  III.

       {¶12} Mr. Myers’ second assignment of error is sustained. His first assignment of error

is premature. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this

matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                                Judgment reversed
                                                                              and cause remanded.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
                                                 6

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellees.

                                                     JENNIFER HENSAL
                                                     FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

DANIEL MYERS, pro se, Appellant.

MICHAEL J. RUTTINGER and DAVID A. BERNSTEIN, Attorneys at Law, for Appellees.