Court Opinion

ID: 9701226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:11:22.869624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:54.316905
License: Public Domain

*1127ORIE MELVIN, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I write separately to express my disagreement with the Majority’s resolution of the Appellant’s second issue raised on appeal. Because I believe the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s challenge to remove a juror for cause, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 The juror in question, Maria Delgado McGee, was married to Pennsylvania State Trooper Douglas McGee who was the immediate supervisor of Trooper Tanner, the arresting officer in this case. During the voir dire proceedings, the Court asked the jury panel whether they were personally acquainted with or related to Trooper Tanner. N.T., Voir Dire Hearing 3/9/98, at 11. It appears from Mrs. McGee’s lack of response to this question that she was not personally acquainted with or related to him.
¶ 3 The Majority determined the trial court should have removed Ms. McGee for cause based upon her close situational relationship with Trooper Tanner and her “equivocal responses” to questions regarding her ability to decide the case fairly. Majority Opinion at 1126.
¶ 4 Contrary to the Majority, I find the relationship between Mrs. McGee and Trooper Tanner could only be characterized as an attenuated situational relationship. Mrs. McGee was not related to or personally acquainted with Trooper Tanner. Her connection to Trooper Tanner was merely as a result of her husband’s employment. This attenuated situational relationship should not evoke a presumption of a likelihood of prejudice. Moreover, Mrs. McGee’s answers during voir dire fail to indicate she was incapable of being an impartial juror. Rather, she stated unequivocally she believed she could fairly decide the ease, and the trial court accepted her responses as credible.
¶ 5 I find the instant case is analogous to Commonwealth v. Koehler, 558 Pa. 334, 737 A.2d 225 (1999). In Koehler, a juror apprised the trial court she had an attenuated familial relationship with the Appellant’s co-defendant. Upon questioning by the trial court, the juror responded the relationship would not affect her ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Despite defense counsel’s request, the trial court refused to remove the juror for cause. On appeal, our Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the juror. It reasoned the trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of the juror and refuse to excuse the juror when it believed she would be fair and impartial. Koehler, 558 Pa. at 359-360, 737 A.2d at 238. (citations omitted).
¶ 6 Furthermore, this is not a case where Mrs. McGee’s responses could be interpreted as being biased or favorable to Trooper Tanner. Cf. Commonwealth v. Perry, 441 Pa.Super. 409, 657 A.2d 989 (1995) (holding the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s challenge for cause when prospective juror was best friends with the arresting officer, had no doubts as to his veracity and indicated that depending on the testimony at trial, his personal experiences would possibly affect his ability to evaluate the arresting officer’s testimony); Commonwealth v. Ingber, 516 Pa. 2, 531 A.2d 1101 (1987) (holding trial court erred in denying Appellant’s challenge for cause when prospective juror affirmatively responded she was related to a police officer and admitted she would give greater weight to the testimony of a police officer because of his position). Contrary to the responses elicited from the potential jurors in Perry and Ingber, Mrs. McGee’s responses during voir dire demonstrate she could decide the case fairly. Moreover, although the trial court gave defense counsel the opportunity to make further inquiries regarding Mrs. McGee’s qualifications to serve as a juror, defense counsel declined. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence showing Mrs. McGee was unable to act impartially, and deferring to the trial court’s credibility assessment, I would find the trial court did not abuse its discre*1128tion in denying the Appellant’s challenge to remove Mrs. McGee for cause. Accordingly, I dissent.