Court Opinion

ID: 9532034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:17:20.660261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:39.306955
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Groves
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. My disagreement with the majority opinion concerns the application of the statement therein that the portions of Exhibit 8 admitted in evidence “are either relevant and material to the issues and properly admissible or they are of such a character that even though irrelevant they are not prejudicial to the defendant.” A portion of the exhibit admitted in evidence contained the following statement by one of the interrogating police officers:
“Just a minute! That all came up with that foul up down there on the city job and the City Manager and Delbert Romero when that trouble all came up with the city over the cement and stuff and you went into court and the judge hit you with an eighty dollar fine, didn’t it? And the judge told you he would suspend the fine if you would go to the State Hospital.”
Obviously this statement was not relevant and material and under the majority opinion it is held to be not prejudicial. To me the mention of commission of some crime unrelated to that charged would tend to color the jury’s attitude against the defendant. The suggestion of his admission to the State Hospital (well known to be the hospital for insane and other mental defectives) removes any doubt concerning the prejudicial nature of the evidence. Few rules of law are more firmly established in this state than the one that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense *258of which he is on trial. See Ruark v. People, 158 Colo. 287, 406 P.2d 91 and cases cited therein.
“Ordinarily, in a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which tends to show that the accused has committed other crimes unrelated to the crime charged is irrelevant and inadmissible. Kostal v. People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70, Cert. denied, 365 U.S. 804, 81 S.Ct. 471, 5 L.Ed.2d 462. The judicial philosophy underlying the exclusion of such evidence is that its tendency to inflame and prejudice the jury outweighs its evidentiary value and that an accused is entitled to be tried on the crime charged and not for being a criminal generally.” Naranjo v. People, 161 Colo. 76, 419 P.2d 953.
The defendant’s vigorous objections were amply sufficient to preserve the error of the admission of this evidence and, after the court had overruled these objections, they were not waived by the defendant’s subsequent effort to have portions of the exhibit excised.
The majority opinion states that this evidence appears “to havé a somewhat remote bearing on an apparent effort by the defendant to mend the strained relationship which existed between the defendant and Patsy’s mother and father.” There is a certain inexplicability in the majorities’ statement; but beyond that, even if there was such an apparent effort of the defendant, this does not justify the error committed. The majority would justify the admission of this evidence by the fact that the' attorney present during the interrogation did not object at that time. We are not here concerned with his objections or lack of them at the time of the interrogation, but rather with the admission of evidence at the time of trial.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Day joins in this dissent.
Mr. Justice Lee dissenting.
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Groves. I dissent for the further and additional reason that it is my belief that the court did not sufficiently *259instruct the jury on the laws of excusable homicide. Instruction No. 14 concerning this defense omits substantial portions of the statute (C.R.'S. 1963, 40-2-18[l] and [2]); fails to advise the jury relative to the burden of proving circumstances excusing the homicide (C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-20); and fails to instruct the jury to acquit the accused if it find excusable homicide (C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-19). The ultimate responsibility is the court’s to fully and completely instruct the jury on the law of the case, both as it pertains to the legal defenses asserted, as well as to the crimes alleged to have been committed. Owen v. People, 118 Colo. 415, 195 P.2d 953; Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8,300 P. 575; Stoltz v. People, 59 Colo. 342, 148 P. 865. For this additional reason, I believe the judgment of conviction should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.