Court Opinion

ID: 9683302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:26:18.403473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.982001
License: Public Domain

HOGAN, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached; I do so separately only because I believe the court’s difficulties with the burden of proof are largely self-created and because I do not believe it is the allocation of the burden of proof which prevents development of the facts in this order of litigation.
In my view — and I stress that the views I express are solely my own- — this opinion is not in conflict with McQuate v. White, 389 S.W.2d 206 (Mo.1965), nor with Matter of Estate of Soper, 598 S.W.2d 528 (Mo.App.1980). In McQuate, the surviving spouse sought a declaration that an antenuptial agreement was void; in Soper, Mrs. Soper’s administratrix sought a similar declaration. It should come as no surprise that a party seeking to annul or cancel an instrument has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Cruwell v. Vaughn, 353 S.W.2d 616, 624[1-6] (Mo.1962); Cull v. Pfeifer, 307 S.W.2d 424, 428[6] (Mo.1957).
By contrast, in this case and in Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.App.1980), the marriage settlement was, as put in Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d at 36, “pleaded as a defense,” and ordinary rules allocating the burden of proof would place the burden to show the validity of the agreement upon the heirs of the deceased spouse. Even though there is no formal pleading in the probate court, § 472.080, as amended, Laws of Mo.1980, p. 450, the analogy to a pleading of waiver or estoppel is quite clear. Both waiver and estoppel are affirmative defenses in ordinary civil actions, Rule 55.08, and there is no reason why the heirs of Lyle Murphy should not bear the burden of proving those defenses. The practice of allocating the burden of proof has had its critics,1 but even those critics state it as a general rule that “[t]he pleadings therefore provide the common guide for apportioning the burdens of proof.” McCormick on Evidence § 337, 785 (Clearly ed. 1972). Our courts have ordinarily followed the rule that the party asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proof. Brown v. Sloan's Moving & Storage Company, 274 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Mo.1954). Therefore, the ordinary rules allocating the burden of proof would put the burden of showing the validity of the marriage settlement upon the heirs when the agreement is pleaded or presented as a waiver.
Of course, the real obscurant to the truth in these cases is not the burden of proof, but § 491.010, the Dead Man’s Statute. Allocating the burden of proof is attractive in that the heirs of the deceased spouse are not disqualified by the statute. McKee v. Downing, 224 Mo. 115, 136-138, 124 S.W. 7, 15[14][15] (1909). The surviving spouse is disqualified, Nowack v. Berger, 133 Mo. 24, 35-37, 34 S.W. 489, 490-491[1], 31 L.R.A. 810 (1896), and what is more, the second or “administration” proviso of § 491.010 imposes an absolute disability to testify in a contract action concerning anything which occurred before the commencement of probate. See Fellows v. Farmer, 379 S.W.2d 842, 849-850 (Mo.App.1964); Birdsong v. Estate of Ladwig, 314 S.W.2d 471, 475[3] (Mo.App.1958). In McQuate, 389 S.W.2d at 212[6-10], the court recognized that the surviving spouse can make proof of invalidity only by indirection, holding that the court should have permitted the plaintiff to show the extent of her property immediately after the appointment of the executrices so it might be compared with the estate of the *663deceased spouse as shown by the inventory. Such valuations, the court held, were relevant only because they were the best available evidence.
To make my point with a cliche, I believe that by reallocating the burden in this type of case we only “[come] out by the same door where in [we] went.”2 When the validity of an antenuptial or postnuptial contract is put in issue, proof of its fairness or lack thereof can be made only by the most roundabout means unless the draftsman is available, as was the case in Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. banc 1970), and in Soper. The deceased spouse’s heirs are not testimonially hog-tied, as is the surviving spouse, but who is to suppose that the heirs will have been made privy to the deceased’s confidential discussions with a stepmother or stepfather? Not I. Neither do I suppose the heirs’ recollection will be any less tinged with self-interest than that of the disqualified spouse. Finally, I would note that marriage settlements are matters of equitable cognizance. Estate of Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d at 754, n. 1; Matter of Estate of Soper, 598 S.W.2d at 535 and n. 4. As I understand Youngblood, the ultimate inquiry is whether the surviving spouse against whom enforcement of the agreement is sought has been defrauded or overreached. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d at 756. Overreaching is but a form of equitable fraud, and if it appears by any species of proof or by legitimate inference from the evidence that the surviving spouse has been overreached, because the provisions for him or her are inadequate, such proof:
“raises a presumption of fraud and concealment, throwing the burden of proving the absence of fraud and concealment upon the [surviving spouse] or those claiming under him ... and the contract and all circumstances attending its execution will be ‘regarded with the most rigid scrutiny.’ ”
Jones v. McGonigle, 327 Mo. 457, 464, 37 S.W.2d 892, 894[3] (1931).
In principle, this ease is governed by what was held in Mathis v. Crane, 360 Mo. 631, 643, 230 S.W.2d 707, 714 (1950). The case was tried on a theory of ratification and estoppel, but as held in Mathis, 360 Mo. at 643, 230 S.W.2d at 714, there can be no ratification or estoppel unless the facts are fully known to the party charged with ratification or estoppel. No such knowledge was made to appear, but with respect to my patient colleagues, I think we could have reached that conclusion without reallocating the burden of proof. I therefore concur.

. See Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan.L.Rev. 5, 11 (1959) (“Actually'the reported decisions involving problems of allocation rarely contain any satisfying disclosure of the ratio decidendi.”).

. Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Stanza 27 (Fitzgerald trans. 5th ed. 1889).