Court Opinion

ID: 9628342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:17:23.444696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:04.395388
License: Public Domain

*398ROONEY, Justice.
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on a piece of real property in Natrona County. The original note, payable to ap-pellee-plaintiff in Colorado, was executed on November 24, 1965, by a corporation in which appellant-defendant was a major stockholder. On the same date, appellant and his now deceased wife, both residents of Colorado, executed a document personally guaranteeing payment of the note. On September 29, 1967, after the note was in default, appellant executed a mortgage on the Natrona County real property to secure payment of the note. On February 5, 1968, appellant’s now deceased wife executed a similar mortgage on the same real property. All of the documents were executed in Colorado. Appellee is a Colorado entity. Additional payments were not made on the note and this action was filed on August 23, 1976. In his answer, appellant pleaded the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Several other persons and entities were parties to the action from time to time as it progressed through the trial court. For the purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that a judgment of foreclosure was entered in conjunction with a stipulation of all the parties then in the litigation. The judgment recited a “default in the terms and provisions of the promissory note, guaranties and mortgages”; that the amount in default was $86,500.00; and that such was to be satisfied pursuant to the stipulation. A partial summary judgment had been entered prior to the stipulation and judgment of foreclosure, premised on the rulings: (1) that the Wyoming statute of limitations, rather than that of Colorado, was applicable (therefore, the action was not barred); and (2) that the piece of real property was held in tenancy in common under a conveyance to “Robert W. Baker [appellant], Ruth Jane Baker [appellant’s now deceased wife], G. W. Hales, Jr., and Mary W. Hales” (therefore, the separate mortgages were valid). The judgment of foreclosure resolved all pending issues in the trial court but recited the specification of the stipulation to the effect that the appellant could appeal on the grounds of error in: (1) the ruling relative to the statutes of limitations; and (2) the ruling relative to the status of the estate as that of tenancy in common. Appellant here alleges error in these two respects. We find error in the ruling relative to the statutes of limitations and therefore reverse. Accordingly, we need not address the propriety of the ruling relative to the tenancy in common.
Appellee contends (and the trial court found) that the determinative statute of limitations in this case is § 1-3-105, W.S. 1977, which provides in part:
“(a) Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after the cause of action accrues:
“(i) Within ten (10) years, an action upon a specialty or any contract, agreement or promise in writing.”1
Ten years did not elapse between the execution of the mortgages with subsequent continuing default and the institution of this action.
Appellant contends that the determinative statutes of limitations are § 1-3-117. W.S.1977 (the “borrowing” statute), which provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state,”
and § 13-80-110, C.R.S.1973, a Colorado statute, which provides:
“ * * * the following actions shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues, and not after-wards:
“(a) All actions of debt founded upon any contract or liability in action.”
Six years did elapse between the execution of the mortgages with subsequent continuing default and the institution of this action.
*399The mortgage also contained a promise or obligation to pay the indebtedness. The indebtedness was to be paid in Colorado at a specified time. It was not then and there paid. The cause, of action accrued at that time and at that place. It was “the time and place where that is not done which ought to be done.” Cantonwine v. Fehling, Wyo., 582 P.2d 592 (1978); Bliler v. Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798 (1900), reh. den. 9 Wyo. 57, 61 P. 867 (1900).
Appellee argues, with citations to legal authority, that the law of the forum governs with respect to limitation of actions upon a contract with respect to real property, and particularly with respect to foreclosure actions. It also notes that these mortgages contain a provision that the mortgagee may enforce the same “according to Wyoming Statutes governing mortgage foreclosures.” We have no problem with this argument and law. We do find appel-lee’s conclusion therefrom fallacious. This conclusion is that the ten-year Wyoming statute of limitations (§ 1-3-105) controls the disposition of this matter. This conclusion overlooks the fact that § 1 — 3—117 (the borrowing statute) is as much a part of Wyoming law as is the ten-year statute of limitations. Duke v. Housen, Wyo., 589 P.2d 334 (1979), reh. den. 590 P.2d 1340 (1979). In applying the law of the forum pursuant to appellee’s argument, we must apply the borrowing statute as one of the laws of the forum.
In applying § 1-3-117, we find that it bars an action in Wyoming if it is barred “by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose.” As already indicated, the cause of action arose in Colorado. Is it barred by the laws of Colorado?
Section 13-80-110, C.R.S.1973 (set forth supra) sets six years as the bar to an action “of debt founded upon any contract or liability in action.” The statute applies to actions on notes. First National Bank of La Junta v. Mock, 70 Colo. 517, 203 P. 272 (1921); Purdy v. Deprez, 39 Colo. 68, 88 P. 972 (1907).
Section 38 — 40-105, C.R.S.1973, provides: “ * * * No action shall be brought or maintained to foreclose any mortgage, trust deed, or other lien, unless such action is brought within fifteen years after the maturity of the last installment or payment of the principal indebtedness in the said mortgage, trust deed, or other lien mentioned as the same appears of record * *
However, § 38-40-112, C.R.S.1973, provides:
“ * * * The lien created by any instrument shall be extinguished, regardless of any other provision in this article to the contrary, at the same time that the right to commence a suit to enforce payment of the indebtedness secured by the lien is barred by any statute of limitation of this state.” (Emphasis supplied).
Pursuant to these enactments, this action would clearly be barred in the state of Colorado. The Wyoming borrowing statute therefore precludes the action in the state of Wyoming.2
Reversed.3

. This section is applicable to foreclosure actions rather than § 1-3-103, W.S.1977, which sets the same period of ten years on actions “for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments.” Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434 (1899).

. We need not address the general question of whether or not a mortgage foreclosure action is barred when the action on the underlying debt is barred inasmuch as this case can be determined under the explicit language of the Wyoming “borrowing” statute which bars an action if barred “by the laws” of another state — Colorado, in this instance — , and under the explicit language of Colorado law which bars an action on a lien when the “indebtedness secured by the lien is barred.”

. Remand is unnecessary since the stipulation resolves the positions of the parties subsequent to appeal.