Court Opinion

ID: 9721877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:11:37.40695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:25.893488
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
Plaintiff testified that in 1972, when she met defendant, she was working in a bar and had a hired man running the farm. She met defendant in March of that year and married him in November. Defendant, at the time of the marriage, was operating a crusher for Sweetman Construction Company and was working throughout the State of South Dakota earning $12,000 a year.
After following construction for a short period of time, plaintiff and defendant moved to the wife’s farm in the spring of 1973. Essentially, for six and one-half years, he became the new hired man. He planted and harvested the crops and fed the livestock. Plaintiff’s brief admits: “The evidence showed that both parties contributed labor to the farming operation but due to defendant’s poor managerial abilities, the farming operation failed to show much profit.” However, the trial court’s posture towards defendant’s efforts was somewhat more benevolent, for in Finding of Fact VII it stated:
Partly due to the poor management on the part of the Defendant and partly due to economic conditions, there were no gains made to the net worth of the farming operation except for appreciation of the land which was inherited by plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied.)
During the marriage, defendant contributed approximately $4,000 from retirement savings for the parties’ mutual living expenses and to keep the farming operation solvent. This is borne out by Finding of Fact VIII of the trial court. Plaintiff would lead us to believe, through her brief and the urgings before this Court, that she was the real worker on the farm, the brains, the keeper of books of account, and a better farm manager than defendant. As good a manager as she portrays herself to be, and as bad as he is alleged to be, the point is that for six and one-half years he tilled the land, harvested the crops, and took care of the livestock. In other words, he worked and helped keep the farm unit together. In fairness, it is unquestioned that she likewise contributed farm labor during this period of time. It is important to bear in mind that, during this period of time, the farm realty nearly doubled in value.
When defendant left the farm in August of 1978, the parties had 84 cows, 4 bulls, 32 pigs, 4 horses, $24,000 worth of new farm machinery, 1500 bushels of oats, 350 bushels of corn, 66 yearling cattle and 62 head of calves. Plaintiff sold corn and cattle and received proceeds of approximately $67,000 to $68,000 between August of 1978 and the date of trial, April 11, 1979. Defendant was awarded no livestock. Unless his $12,-000 cash award is construed to be generated from the $67,000 to $68,000 produce sold, defendant received none of the cattle and corn proceeds.
The testimony indicates that the parties acquired $24,000 worth of new farm equipment during the marriage. Plaintiff’s tax return for the year 1972, the year of the parties’ marriage, reflected the farm equipment that she had on hand as having a depreciated value of $5,300. Defendant received no farm equipment award.
Using the parties’ tax returns and eliminating depreciation, plaintiff admitted the parties had $5,800 spendable dollars from their farm operation in 1973 and had also accumulated, by the end of that year, 84 cows, 98 calves, 3 bulls and 19 young cows. Using the same method, in 1974 they had $1,600 in spendable income, and had increased their inventory to 126 cows, 124 calves, 6 bulls, 103 pigs and 63 yearlings.
In 1975 the parties had $5,400 spendable dollars and the inventory of livestock remained constant. In 1976 they had $10,300 *802spendable dollars but the inventory dropped to 96 cows, 4 bulls, 3 calves, 57 yearlings, and 69 hogs. In 1977 they had a cash loss of $2,700 but their inventory jumped to 85 cows, 86 calves, 3 bulls, 55 yearlings and 34 hogs. In the year 1978, however, their income jumped substantially and they profited the sum of $55,800. They also had a substantial inventory of animals, as reflected above. Plaintiff did not economically fare as badly with her husband as she would have the courts of law believe. At the time of trial, defendant had three pieces of used furniture (which the trial court permitted him to keep), his clothes (likewise), a 1968 Chevrolet pickup valued at $1,000, a $2,000 debt incurred for living expenses, and was penniless. From the time he was ordered off the farm in August of 1978 until the date of trial, he received $400 from the farm operations. Plaintiff had access to all accounts, money, farm, machinery, crops, livestock, and the proceeds from sales of crops and livestock.
Although defendant concentrates his appellate thrust on erroneous adjudication of the land valuation increase, his appeal is taken from the final judgment and the whole thereof.
I am convinced that the marital assets were not divided in an equitable manner and the trial court abused its discretion. Defendant was entitled to an equitable share (as distinguished from nothing) of the enhanced farm land values. The trial court, although recognizing there was an appreciation of the farm’s land value, disregarded its own recognition thereof as being an asset of the parties to be equitably divided. This asset amounted to $80,000. Surely defendant had something coming out of that $80,000 increase in value by virtue of his contributions to the farm for six and one-half years. The trial court simply ignored all inflationary equity. Defendant’s sweat helped create that inflationary equity-
As recent as June 4, 1980, we held in Clement v. Clement, 292 N.W.2d 799 (S.D.1980), that the husband’s property, inherited from his father, could be considered in the division of property. Here, we are not only upholding the trial court’s decision to not include property inherited by the wife, but we are going one step further: denying the husband any land value appreciation where he has lived and toiled upon the land for six and one-half years.
In Kittelson v. Kittelson, 272 N.W.2d 86 (S.D.1978), we held that the placement of the parties’ farm, equipment, and livestock into a partnership between the husband and the parties’ sons did not preclude the trial court from scrutinizing the valuation of the partnership’s assets in making an equitable division of the marital property between the husband and the wife. The comparative nexus between Kittelson and this case leads me to conclude that this Court should look beyond the ownership of the land as reflected by the title thereto, and instead look to the respective contributions of the parties.
Defendant’s house in Canistota increased in value from $10,000 or $12,000 when he got married, to a value of $18,000 to $20,000 at the time of trial. The combined value of inflationary equity for the farm and the house was therefore $88,000 of which he received approximately $8,000 to $10,000. This appears to be patently unfair. A circumstance also to be considered is defendant’s loss of income as a construction worker.
In these days of loud and forceful proclamations for “equal rights” for women, I would opt for a clarion call for the equal rights of all. Equity for both men and women is equality under the law.