Court Opinion

ID: 9696084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:35:47.193307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:18.302183
License: Public Domain

Wenke, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the court but, for reasons hereinafter set forth, do not agree with the court’s holdings in certain respects.
The court holds that the provisions of section 7-106, R. R. S. 1943, providing for treble damages, is violative of Article I, section 3, and Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution of Nebraska. I agree that such provision is unconstitutional for the reason that the Constitution of Nebraska does not permit the recovery of punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages by individuals in civil cases. See cases cited in the court’s opinion. However, I would not agree that all remedial statutes establishing the right of individuals to recover fixed amounts as liquidated damages in civil matters, although in the form of a penalty, necessarily come under the provisions of Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution of Nebraska. See, Graham v. Kibble, 9 Neb. 182, 2 N. W. 455; Clearwater Bank v. Kurkonski, 45 Neb. 1, 63 N. W. 133; Hier v. Hutchings, 58 Neb. 334, 78 N. W. 638; Everson v. State, 66 Neb. 154, 92 N. W. 137; Cram v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 84 Neb. 607, 122 N. W. 31, 26 L. R. A. N. S. 1022; Smith v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 99 Neb. 719, 157 N. W. 622. As most recently stated by this court in School District of the City of *940Omaha v. Adams, 147 Neb. 1060, 26 N. W. 2d 24: “Clearly a statutory provision for liquidated damages in favor of a private person where it is not so oppressive as to offend constitutional requirements as to due process, although in the form of a penalty, does not create a penalty that must be appropriated to the use and support of the common schools within the meaning of section 5, article VII, of the Constitution. * * * In this respect the more strict definition of the word ‘penalty’ was intended, i.e. the pecuniary punishment inflicted by a law, ordinance, or police regulation for its violation. While the statute is punitive as to the wrongdoer, it is remedial as to the taxing bodies involved. Consequently, it is not solely a punitive statute. So regarded, the penalty is not one contemplated by section 5, article VII, of the Constitution as we have herein interpreted that section.”
The court concludes there is an inconsistency in our holding in McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N. W. 2d 1, to the effect that we held therein that an action brought under the Installment Loan Act is not an action for the recovery of a penalty within the provisions of Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution of Nebraska, but is a penalty within the meaning of section 25-404, R. R. S. 1943, for the purpose of giving the district court for Cheyenne County jurisdiction of the subject matter. In McNish v. General Credit Corp., supra, we did hold, and I think properly so, that it was not an action to recover a penalty coming within the provisions of Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution of Nebraska. We therein also held as follows: “* * * the district court for-that county had jurisdiction of the subject matter. See § 25-404, R. R. S. 1943. It provides in part: ‘Actions for the following causes must be brought in the county where the cause or some part thereof arose: (1) An action for the recovery of a fine, forfeiture, or penalty, imposed by a statute, * * *.’ ” Without explanation it might appear that an inconsist*941ency exists and for that reason I agree that the basis for our holding therein needs clarification.
It will be noted that section 25-404, R. R. S. 1943, includes, as a basis for jurisdiction, “An action for the recovery of a * * * forfeiture, * * * imposed by a statute, * * a subject not dealt with by Article VII, section 5, of the Constitution of Nebraska. Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2d Ed.), p. 719, defines forfeiture as “the act of forfeiting; the losing of some right, privilege, estate, honor, office, or property, by an offense, crime, breach of condition, or other act.” See, also, the definitions of forfeiture as given in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.), p. 1290; Arthur v. Trindel, 168 Neb. 429, 96 N. W. 2d 208. As stated in the court’s opinion herein, while discussing the causes of action involved in McNish v. General Credit Corp., supra: “While the action is in practical effect punitive as to the lender, it is in fact a forfeiture sustained by him in failing to comply with applicable usury statutes which void the usurious contract and provide that he shall forfeit principal, interest, and charges for so doing.” Thus it becomes evident that the action in McNish v. General Credit Corp., supra, was for a forfeiture and not a penalty and that no inconsistency exists in our holding therein which needs to be overruled.
But let us consider the meaning of the word “penalty” as found in section 25-404, R. R. S. 1943. It is apparent the Legislature did not intend, by subdivision (1) of section 25-404, R. R. S. 1943, to cover the same subject matter as is dealt with by Article VII, section 5, Constitution of Nebraska, for the matter relates to “All fines, penalties and license money” while the former relates to “An action for the recovery of a fine, forfeiture, or penalty, imposed by statute * * (Emphasis mine.) Thus it becomes self evident to me that what the Legislature intended by using the word “penalty” in this statute was to give courts jurisdiction to enforce rights in civil matters which it had, by statute, given individuals *942in the form of a penalty or penalties. ' While not material here, I think section 25-404, R. R. S, 1943, should be considered in pari materia with such statutes.