Court Opinion

ID: 9564221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:56:15.103062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:17.728777
License: Public Domain

BUSSEY, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. I cannot accept the position that 10 O.S.Supp.1979, §§ 1104.2 and 1112(b) place a “burden of proof” on juveniles charged with offenses enumerated in § 1104.2 so that its application to Petitioner in lieu of 10 O.S.Supp. 1975, § 1112(b) works the deprivation of a substantial right in violation of the ex post facto doctrine. Certification has been regarded as committed to the discretion of the Court, see Alford v. Carter, Okl.Cr., 504 P.2d 436 (1972), J. T. P. v. State, Okl.Cr., 544 P.2d 1270 (1975); Shelton v. State, Okl.Cr., 554 P.2d 1378 (1976); Matter of G. D. C., Okl.Cr., 581 P.2d 908 (1978) and I read nothing in the majority opinion as questioning the continued discretionary nature of certification or reverse certification. Rather, my disagreement with the majority is *815with its extension of a process first begun in J. T. P. v. State, supra. In that case, this Court held, without citation of authority and, in truth, out of whole cloth, that “due process” required that the court’s discretion be based on “substantial evidence.” Almost immediately, and regrettably with my assistance, this concept, which was undoubtedly originally intended to express that minimum quantity of evidence required to support a valid exercise of discretion as versus an abuse of discretion, was transformed into a “burden of proof” imposed on the State. See Matter of J. S., Okl.Cr., 556 P.2d 641 (1976), C. P. v. State, Okl.Cr., 562 P.2d 939 (1977) and In Matter of R. M., Okl.Cr., 561 P.2d 572 (1977). In my view, this concept serves to divert the Court and litigants from the true inquiry in such cases, i. e., whether an abuse of discretion has occurred.
When viewed in the proper light, § 1104.2 does not impose a “burden of proof” on the juvenile, it merely requires him to initiate the process whereby the Court makes its discretionary determination as to whether the juvenile court, as versus the adult court, shall exercise jurisdiction over a particular juvenile. The result is a mere procedural alteration relating to the forum in which the determination of jurisdiction is made, and I see no genuine adverse effect on Petitioner’s substantial rights. The ex post facto bar does not require that an accused receive a trial conforming in all respects with the law prevailing at the time of the crime. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). If this be true in the trial of a capital case, it must apply with equal force to a certification or reverse certification hearing. I would affirm.