Court Opinion

ID: 9895666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 15:00:41.318554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.847653
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13756   Document: 58-1    Date Filed: 11/08/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13756
                         ____________________

        BRANDON WASHINGTON,
                                                  Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
        OF ALABAMA,
        COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT
        OF CORRECTIONS,
        WARDEN, HOLMAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

                                               Respondents-Appellees.

                         ____________________
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                   21-13756

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-01091-ACA-GMB
                              ____________________

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,∗ District
        Judge.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
               We grant the Attorney General of Alabama’s petition for
        panel rehearing. We vacate and withdraw our previous opinion
        dated July 28, 2023, 75 F.4th 1164 (11th Cir. 2023), and substitute
        the following opinion.
                                         *          *    *
                Brandon Washington, an Alabama prisoner, appeals the dis-
        trict court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ﬁled
        pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district judge granted a Certiﬁ-
        cate of Appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel provided in-
        eﬀective assistance for failing to convey to Washington a favorable
        plea oﬀer of thirty years’ imprisonment during his capital murder
        trial.
                Because there is a potential justiﬁcation for the Alabama
        Court of Criminal Appeal’s (ACCA’s) conclusion that Washington

        ∗ Honorable Anne C. Conway, United States District Judge for the Middle Dis-

        trict of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        21-13756              Opinion of the Court                       3

        was told about the thirty-year plea oﬀer, that determination was
        not unreasonable. Thus, we aﬃrm.
                                       I.
               First, we will review Washington’s criminal trial and direct
        appeals. Second, we will address Washington’s state habeas peti-
        tion. Last, we will review Washington’s federal habeas petition.
                                       A.
               Alabama indicted Washington for one count of capital mur-
        der for the robbery and killing of Justin Campbell, a worker at a
        local RadioShack. Alabama sought the death penalty.
               In January 2006, Washington proceeded to trial. After the
        lead detective testiﬁed, Deputy District Attorney (D.A.) Mike An-
        derton extended a mid-trial oﬀer of life with parole to Washington
        via Washington’s counsel, Emory Anthony. The trial court asked
        D.A. Anderton about that oﬀer and the outcome, in which he said
        that he spoke with Anthony to convey “sentence of life in this
        case.” D.A. Anderton and Anthony conﬁrmed that Washington did
        not want to accept the oﬀer. Anthony stated that Washington said,
        “he didn’t do it,” saying that “he is not guilty.”
              The trial proceeded, and the jury found Washington guilty
        of capital murder. The jury recommended the death penalty,
        which the trial court accepted.
              Washington appealed. The ACCA overturned his death sen-
        tence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing,
        ﬁnding it was plain error to sentence Washington without the
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                   21-13756

        beneﬁt of a presentence investigation report. Washington v. State,
        106 So. 3d 423, 432–35 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Again, the trial court
        imposed the death penalty. Washington again appealed. This time,
        the Alabama Supreme Court overturned his death sentence be-
        cause the trial court plainly erred by admitting improper victim-
        impact testimony. Ex parte Washington, 106 So. 3d 441, 447 (Ala.
        2011).
               In 2012, at the third sentencing, Alabama did not seek the
        death penalty, and Washington received a life sentence without the
        possibility of parole. The ACCA aﬃrmed.
                                          B.
               In 2013, Washington ﬁled his state habeas petition, alleging
        ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washing-
        ton, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Alabama moved to dismiss, arguing that
        Washington’s trial counsel could not have been ineﬀective because
        D.A. Anderton was so impressed by their performance at trial that
        he oﬀered a second mid-trial plea deal of thirty years. But Wash-
        ington claimed that he did not receive the oﬀer. Although the trial
        record included the exchange between the state trial court, D.A.
        Anderton, and Anthony about the life oﬀer, there is nothing in the
        record about the thirty-year plea deal. As a result, Washington
        amended his petition to include trial counsel’s failure to communi-
        cate the plea deal in violation of Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
              Washington sought an evidentiary hearing on this issue. In
        support, Washington submitted an aﬃdavit from his grandmother,
        Amanda Washington, who adopted Washington when he was
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        21-13756                Opinion of the Court                            5

        thirteen years old and was paying for his criminal defense counsel.
        In the aﬃdavit, Amanda stated that she never “heard of a plea oﬀer
        for 30 years” and that “Anthony [never] mention[ed] any plea oﬀer
        other than for life in prison.” Amanda also stated that she was “con-
        ﬁdent that if any other oﬀer had been communicated to him, he
        would have told me about it.”
                Washington moved to take Amanda’s deposition to preserve
        her statement because she was in poor health. The state habeas
        court 1 granted Washington’s motion unless the parties stipulated
        “for the Court to consider the content of [Amanda’s] Aﬃdavit as
        true.” The parties agreed to the stipulation that Amanda’s aﬃdavit
        is true. In light of Amanda’s aﬃdavit and the lack of discussion on
        the record about this other, mid-trial plea deal, the state habeas
        court ordered Anthony and D.A. Anderton to submit aﬃdavits ad-
        dressing whether Alabama extended the thirty-year plea deal dur-
        ing trial.
               D.A. Anderton submitted an aﬃdavit that said Anthony was
        eﬀective at representing Washington, which led to D.A. Anderton
        oﬀering a plea agreement “that involved a number of years.” D.A.
        Anderton could not “recall the number of years oﬀered, but recol-
        lect[ed] that the oﬀer was for a term of less than a life sentence.”
             Anthony submitted an aﬃdavit that said D.A. Anderton
        “made an oﬀer of 30 years” and that Anthony “talked with Brandon

        1 The same judge presided over Washington’s criminal trial, all three sen-
        tencings, and state habeas proceedings.
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13756

        Washington and his Grandmother, [but] Brandon refused to accept
        the plea oﬀer.”
              The state habeas court denied Washington’s petition and re-
        quest for an evidentiary hearing. The court acknowledged that
        Amanda’s aﬃdavit and Washington’s petition conﬂicted with An-
        thony’s and Anderton’s aﬃdavits. But then the state habeas court
        noted that:
              Regardless of whether this oﬀer of 30 years was
              placed on the record, it is both Mr. Anderton’s and Mr.
              Anthony’s recollection, that any oﬀer of settlement
              for less than Life was communicated and rejected by
              the Defendant. Evidence of the Defendant’s position
              at that time, is made clear from the record in this case
              cited above. Therefore, this court does not ﬁnd that
              [Washington] has met his burden under Frye of show-
              ing a “reasonable probability” that the Defendant
              would have accepted a thirty year oﬀer, or that this
              Court would have accepted the plea agreement, after
              the Defendant had proclaimed his innocence in the
              open and very public courtroom. [Washington] has
              not proven counsel’s performance ineﬀective, or that,
              but for [counsel’s] performance, the result would have
              been diﬀerent under Strickland.

               Washington appealed to the ACCA. For Washington’s Frye
        claim, the ACCA found that:
              Thus, the circuit court resolved the disputed issue,
              i.e., whether a 30-year plea oﬀer was communicated
              to Washington, in the State’s favor. The circuit court
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        21-13756              Opinion of the Court                        7

              also found, based on the aﬃdavits as well as its own
              recollection of the proceedings, that there was not a
              reasonable probability that Washington would have
              accepted a 30-year plea oﬀer nor that [the trial judge]
              would have approved it. Washington points to the
              fact that the parties stipulated to the truth of his
              grandmother’s aﬃdavit. However, Ms. Washington’s
              aﬃdavit stated that she “never heard Mr. Anthony
              mention any plea oﬀer other than for life in prison”
              and that based on her relationship with Washington,
              she was “conﬁdent” that he would have told her
              about any other plea oﬀers. Thus, her testimony does
              not rule out the possibility that Washington may have
              chosen not to tell her about the oﬀer.

                                  *     *      *

              The aﬃdavits of Mr. Anthony and Mr. Anderton,
              though contrary to Washington’s assertion in his pe-
              tition, constitute suﬃcient evidence on which the cir-
              cuit court could have based its ﬁndings, i.e., that de-
              fense counsel did in fact communicate a 30-year plea
              deal to Washington that he rejected. Further, the trial
              court did not ﬁnd Washington’s assertion that he
              would have accepted [] the plea deal to be credible.
              Thus, Washington failed to prove his claim that coun-
              sel rendered deﬁcient performance under Frye. A pe-
              titioner must meet both prongs of Strickland, i.e., de-
              ﬁcient performance and prejudice, in order to prove a
              claim that counsel was ineﬀective. Accordingly,
              Washington failed to meet his burden of proof and
              the trial court was correct to deny this claim.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13756

        Ultimately, the ACCA aﬃrmed the state habeas court’s denial of
        Washington’s state habeas petition.
                                      C.
               Washington ﬁled his federal habeas petition in the Northern
        District of Alabama again alleging ineﬀective assistance of counsel
        based on his counsel’s failure to relay a thirty-year plea oﬀer to him.
        A magistrate judge recommended denying Washington’s petition
        on the merits, explaining that the state court’s determination that
        Washington failed to establish deﬁcient performance was reasona-
        ble. Washington timely objected.
               Rather than focusing on the deﬁcient performance prong,
        the district judge focused on the prejudice prong, ﬁnding that the
        state court’s determination on that prong was reasonable. Wash-
        ington v. Marshall, No. 2:18-CV-1091-ACA-GMB, 2021 WL 4409096,
        at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 2021). The district court explained that
        the two factual determinations—that Washington would not have
        accepted the thirty-year oﬀer and that the state court would not
        have accepted the plea agreement—were reasonable. Id. at *4.
                The district court granted Washington a COA on whether
        trial counsel provided ineﬀective assistance by failing to convey to
        Washington a favorable plea oﬀer of thirty years’ imprisonment
        during his capital murder trial. Id. at *5. Washington timely ap-
        pealed.
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        21-13756               Opinion of the Court                          9

                                         II.
               Because the ACCA denied Washington’s ineﬀective assis-
        tance of counsel claims, our review is subject to the Antiterrorism
        and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA).
        See Lynch v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209, 1217 (11th Cir.
        2015).
               Under AEDPA, a federal court can grant relief to a state pris-
        oner only if he shows that the state court’s determination of his
        claim resulted in a decision that was (1) “contrary to, or involved
        an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
        determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2)
        “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
        the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
               Because Washington argues that the ACCA’s factual find-
        ings were unreasonable, we review only under § 2254(d)(2). A
        state habeas court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct and
        the petitioner bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption of
        correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
               “Even if the state court made a clearly erroneous factual de-
        termination, that doesn’t necessarily mean the state court’s ‘deci-
        sion’ was ‘based on’ an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts in
        light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Pye
        v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (en banc). “Depending on the importance of the factual error to
        the state court’s ultimate decision, that decision might still be
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13756

        reasonable even if some of the state court’s individual factual ﬁnd-
        ings were erroneous—so long as the decision, taken as a whole,
        doesn’t constitute an unreasonable determination of the facts and
        isn’t based on any such determination.” Id. (internal quotation
        marks omitted). Ultimately, Pye requires us to look at “the reasons
        for the state court’s decision” and then “consider any potential jus-
        tiﬁcation for those reasons.” Id. at 1036.
                                         III.
               To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
        Washington must demonstrate: (1) that his lawyer rendered defi-
        cient performance, such that he “made errors so serious that coun-
        sel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth
        Amendment,” and (2) that these errors prejudiced the defense,
        such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
        unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
        been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694.
               Washington claims that his counsel was ineﬀective for not
        informing him about D.A. Anderton’s mid-trial plea oﬀer.
        “[D]efense counsel has the duty to communicate formal oﬀers
        from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
        may be favorable to the accused.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 145. When an
        attorney fails to convey a plea agreement, the petitioner may be
        able to prove deﬁcient performance, thus satisfying the ﬁrst prong
        of Strickland. See id. at 147.
            Under the performance prong, Washington argues that the
        ACCA unreasonably concluded that Anthony communicated the
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        21-13756               Opinion of the Court                        11

        thirty-year plea offer to him. In its opinion, the ACCA explained
        that despite the state habeas court having to take Amanda’s affida-
        vit as true, the affidavits of Anthony and D.A. Anderton show that
        Washington was told about the thirty-year plea offer. The ACCA
        focused on the fact that Amanda’s affidavit did not “rule out the
        possibility that Washington may have chosen not to tell her about
        the offer.” The ACCA thus found that Washington had not shown
        deficient performance.
               Although we are skeptical of the ACCA’s conclusion, we are
        bound by AEDPA and circuit precedent in determining whether
        there was any potential justification for this conclusion. To start,
        we look to three affidavits and Washington’s Rule 32 amended pe-
        tition. First, D.A. Anderton’s affidavit established that the plea of-
        fer was communicated to Anthony and Washington. Second, An-
        thony attested that he told Washington and Amanda about the plea
        offer. Both affidavits explain that Washington rejected the plea of-
        fer. But in his Rule 32 amended petition, Washington said he never
        received the plea offer and had he received it, he would have ac-
        cepted it. Lastly, Amanda attested that she “never heard Mr. An-
        thony mention any plea offer other than for life in prison.”
        Amanda also stated that had Anthony communicated the plea offer
        to Washington, she was confident that Washington would have
        told her about it.
              There are two ways to read Anthony’s affidavit. First, it
        could be interpreted that Anthony told both Washington and
        Amanda about the plea at the same time. But this interpretation is
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       21-13756

        contradicted by Amanda’s affidavit because she claims to not have
        heard the offer. The second interpretation is that Anthony told
        Washington and Amanda separately about the plea offer, which is
        also in line with the ACCA’s conclusion. While Amanda’s affidavit,
        taken as true, also discounts Anthony’s narrative, it does not fore-
        close the possibility that the plea offer was still communicated to
        Washington without Amanda present. D.A. Anderton’s affidavit
        also supports this interpretation. And while Amanda claims she is
        confident Washington would have told her about the plea, as the
        ACCA noted, it cannot “rule out the possibility that Washington
        may have chosen not to tell her.” This is not conclusive enough to
        discount Anthony and D.A. Anderton’s affidavits that Washington
        was informed about the offer. Therefore, there is potential justifi-
        cation for the ACCA’s conclusion, and we must defer to this inter-
        pretation.
               Because Washington has failed to show that the ACCA’s
        conclusion that he received the thirty-year plea offer was unreason-
        able, we need not address his prejudice argument. 2 See Strickland,
        466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that a court considering an ineffective-
        ness claim need not “address both components of the inquiry if the

        2  Had Washington successfully met the performance prong, he would need
        to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland and show “a reasonable probability”
        that: (1) he would have accepted the plea; (2) the prosecution would not have
        withdrawn or canceled the plea; (3) the trial court would have accepted the
        plea; and (4) as a result of accepting the plea, the ultimate conviction would
        have been for a lesser charge or sentence than what he received. Frye, 566 U.S.
        at 147; see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012).
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        21-13756                  Opinion of the Court                               13

        defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”); see also Conner
        v. GDCP Warden, 784 F.3d 752, 766–67 (11th Cir. 2015) (following
        Strickland and only addressing one prong because it disposed of the
        petitioner’s claim).
                                             IV.
               Because there is a potential justification for the ACCA’s con-
        clusion that Washington was told about the thirty-year plea offer,
        AEDPA and our precedent require that we affirm the district
        court’s order denying Washington’s habeas petition and its order
        denying an evidentiary hearing.3
               AFFIRMED.

        3 Because Washington has not cleared the AEDPA hurdle, he cannot show

        that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Madison v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t
        of Corr., 761 F.3d 1240, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2014).