Court Opinion

ID: 9389044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 14:07:28.08752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.712814
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Duff v. Centrome, Inc., 2023-Ohio-1321.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                           WARREN COUNTY

 PAMELA DUFF MUNDY, et al.                          :

        Appellees,                                  :   CASE NO. CA2022-03-014

                                                    :          OPINION
     - vs -                                                     4/24/2023
                                                    :

 CENTROME, INC., et al.,                            :

        Appellant.                                  :

         CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                             Case No. 17CV90268

Robbins, Kelly, Patterson & Tucker, LPA, and Michael A. Galasso and Jarrod M. Mohler,
for appellees, Pamela Duff Mundy, Joshua Humphries, and Kyle Landreth.

Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., L.P.A., and James F. Brockman, for appellee, O'Laughlin
Industries, Inc.

Stites & Harbison, PLLC, and Cassandra L. Welch and Robin D. Miller, for appellant.

        HENDRICKSON, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Mane, Inc., appeals from a decision of the Warren

County Court of Common Pleas ordering it to pay attorney fees and expenses to defendant-

appellee, O'Laughlin Industries, Inc. ("OLI"), and plaintiffs-appellees, Pamela Duff Mundy,

as Administrator of the Estate of James Melvin Duff, deceased, Joshua Humphries, and
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Kyle Landreth (collectively, "plaintiffs"), following a determination that Mane committed

discovery violations. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's decision

and remand for further proceedings.

                         I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        {¶2}    Mane is a large flavoring company with several plants in Ohio. Plaintiffs are

employees or former employees who worked in the microcapsule extruder department at

Mane's Lebanon, Ohio facility.1 From approximately 2012 to 2016, while in the course of

their employment, plaintiffs were exposed to the ingredient diacetyl, which was a

component used in some of the microcap flavors, that were in turn used to flavor other

products. The diacetyl was distributed to Mane by OLI and eight other distributors.2

        {¶3}    Plaintiffs allege that they developed respiratory illnesses and lung disease

from exposure to diacetyl while working at Mane. In September 2017, plaintiffs filed suit

against Mane, OLI, and the eight other diacetyl distributors. In their Second Amended

Complaint, plaintiffs set forth claims of strict liability and negligence under the Ohio Product

Liability Act against OLI and the other diacetyl distributors, contending that the distributors'

warnings about potential diacetyl hazards were inadequate and that they failed to take

precautions that a reasonable person would take in supplying the diacetyl. Against Mane,

plaintiffs set forth a claim for intentional tort, contending that Mane had actual knowledge of

1. In addition to James Melvin Duff, Joshua Humphries, and Kyle Landreth, employees Stefan Fee, Donald
Coffman, Robert Geisler, Cortez Hamilton, Todd Richter, and Rashanna Dews were also named plaintiffs in
the action. In a June 10, 2020 scheduling order, the trial court severed Duff's, Humphries', and Landreth's
claims from those of the remaining plaintiffs, stating "the claims of plaintiffs Pamela Duff Mundy, [a]s
Administrator of the Estate of Melvin Duff; Joshua Humphries; and Kyle Landreth shall be treated together in
one proceeding and shall be and hereby are severed from the remainder of the plaintiffs' claims in Case No.
17 CV 90268 for the purposes of case specific discovery and trial, but shall retain the same case number."
Fee's, Coffman's, Geisler's, Hamilton's, Richter's, and Dews' claims remain pending and they are not parties
to the present appeal.

2. The other eight distributors of diacetyl were (1) Centrome, Inc., d/b/a Advanced Biotech, (2) Berje Inc., (3)
Elan Chemical Co., Inc., (4) Vigon International, Inc., (5) Charkit Chemical Corp., (6) Alfrebro, LLC, (7) Wild
Flavors, Inc., and (8) Archer-Daniles-Midland Co. These eight distributors are not parties to the present
appeal.

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the risks and hazards of flavorings-related lung diseases arising from workplace exposure

to diacetyl, but it deliberately and intentionally misrepresented the risks and hazards to its

employees. Plaintiffs allege that Mane acted "with the intent to injure another, including

Plaintiffs, or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur and acted with

deliberate intent to cause an employee, including Plaintiffs, to suffer an injury, a disease, a

condition, or death within the meaning of R.C. 2745.01."

       {¶4}   Mane and OLI filed answers denying the allegations set forth in plaintiffs'

second amended complaint. As a defense to plaintiffs' claims, Mane alleged in its answer

that it "did not create and was not put on notice of the conditions claimed by Plaintiffs to

have proximately caused Plaintiffs to become ill and injured." Mane further alleged that

"knowledge of the danger that caused harm was not reasonably available or attainable in

light of existing scientific, technical, or medical information" and claimed that "[a]ny

exposure of Plaintiffs to diacetyl * * * was de minimis or inconsequential." OLI, in turn,

asserted as an affirmative defense that "Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they were

employed by a sophisticated employer so that any duty of [OLI] to warn of any danger

incident to diacetyl or diacetyl products, * * * was discharged by Plaintiffs' employer's

intervening duty to give them all required warnings."

       {¶5}   The parties engaged in discovery. In July 2018, plaintiffs served their First

Request for Production of Documents on Mane, seeking information about Mane's

knowledge of the health hazards associated with diacetyl exposure and the necessary

measures Mane took to protect those employees who handled diacetyl. Among other

things, plaintiffs requested the following:

              Plaintiffs' First Request No. 6: Any DOCUMENTS that contain
              any warning language, including but not limited to warnings
              regarding the potential hazards, PERTAINING to DIACETYL * *
              * including but not limited to: a) material safety data sheets, b)
              safety data sheets, c) container labels, d) instructions for use,

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              [and] e) correspondence.

              Plaintiffs' First Request No. 7:             Any DOCUMENTS
              PERTAINING to how DIACETYL * * * was to be handled by
              employees during the TERM OF EMPLOYMENT, including but
              not limited to: a) Hazard Communication DOCUMENTS, b)
              training sessions slides or presentations, [and] c) sign-in sheets.

              Plaintiffs' First Request No. 9:      Any DOCUMENTS
              PERTAINING to any air sampling or industrial hygiene reports
              (including insurance audits or inspections) done at the
              FACILITY at any time by an INDIVIDUAL or PERSON.

       {¶6}   Mane responded with various objections, but also indicated it had already

produced documents responsive to the requests. Specifically, Mane responded as follows

to plaintiffs' First Request for Production Nos. 6, 7, and 9:

              Mane's Response to Plaintiffs' First Request No. 6: Mane
              objects to this Request because it is vague, ambiguous,
              overbroad and unduly burdensome, and because it seeks
              documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to
              lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and
              without waiving its objections, Mane refers to documents
              produced by Mane at MANE 000974-MANE 002039, MANE
              002292-MANE 003953. Mane reserves the right to supplement
              this response.

              Mane's Response to Plaintiffs' First Request No. 7: Mane
              objects to this Request because it is vague, ambiguous,
              overbroad and unduly burdensome, and because it seeks
              documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to
              lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and
              without waiving its objections, Mane refers to documents
              produced by Mane at MANE 000974-MANE 002039, MANE
              002292-MANE 003953. Mane reserves the right to supplement
              this response.

              Mane's Response to Plaintiffs' First Request No. 9: Mane
              objects to this Request because it is vague, ambiguous,
              overbroad and unduly burdensome, and because it seeks
              documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to
              lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and
              without waiving its objections, Mane refers to documents
              produced by Mane at MANE002232-Mane 002258.

       {¶7}   OLI likewise sought discovery from Mane. OLI sought information pertaining

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to Mane's knowledge of the hazards of diacetyl, knowledge as to when and how Mane

gained such knowledge, and when and how Mane disseminated said knowledge and

information to its employees at any of its facilities where flavorings containing diacetyl were

used, including the Lebanon facility. On February 10, 2020, OLI served its First Set of

Requests for Production of Documents on Mane. OLI requested that Mane produce, among

other things, the following:

              OLI's First Request No. 1: All correspondence * * * between any
              Mane employees, about risks associated with diacetyl * * * or
              any flavoring containing diacetyl * * * from January 1, 2011 to
              the present.

              OLI's First Request No. 3: All correspondence * * * between
              any Mane employees, about the use of, or need for, respiratory
              protective equipment of any kind for employees working with
              diacetyl * * * or any flavoring containing diacetyl * * * from
              January 1, 2011 to the present.

              OLI's First Request No. 4: All documents of any kind relating to
              Mane's policies or procedures, whether or not in writing, with
              respect to the use of respiratory protective equipment of any
              kind for employees working with diacetyl * * * or any flavoring
              containing diacetyl * * * from January 1, 2011 to the present.

       {¶8}   Mane responded with various objections, but also indicated it had already

produced documents responsive to the requests. Specifically, Mane responded as follows

to OLI's Requests for Production Nos. 1, 3, and 4:

              Mane's Response to OLI's First Request No. 1: Mane objects
              that this request is overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks
              irrelevant information, as only correspondence related to the
              alleged risks associated with diacetyl * * * in the specific areas
              in which Plaintiffs worked is relevant here. Mane also objects to
              this request to the extent it implies that there are risks
              associated with the quantities of diacetyl * * * to which Plaintiffs
              were allegedly exposed in the course of their employment at
              Mane. Subject to and without waiving these objections or the
              general objections, Mane states that it has already produced
              documents concerning the alleged risks associated with diacetyl
              * * * including but not limited to MANE002292-2560, 2773-3039.
              Mane also refers to the documents being produced with these
              responses.

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             Mane's Response to OLI's First Request No. 3: Mane objects
             that this request is overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks
             irrelevant information, as only the correspondence related to the
             use of respiratory equipment in the specific areas in which
             Plaintiffs worked is relevant here. Mane also objects to this
             request to the extent it implies that respiratory protective
             equipment is always required when working with flavorings
             containing diacetyl * * * regardless of the quantity or
             concentration of diacetyl[.] Subject to and without waiving these
             objections or the general objections, Mane states that it relies
             on, and complies with the applicable governmental regulations
             and promulgations that relate to the use, or need for, respiratory
             protective equipment with its flavorings. Further, Mane states
             that it has already produced its documents concerning the use
             of and need for respiratory protection – including but not limited
             to MANE002292-3433 and the MSDS and SDS it has produced
             in this litigation. Mane also refers to the documents being
             produced with these responses.

             Mane's Response to OLI's First Request No. 4: Mane objects
             that this request is overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks
             irrelevant information, as only the policies or procedures related
             to the use of respiratory equipment in the specific areas in which
             Plaintiffs worked are relevant here. Mane also objects to this
             request to the extent it implies that respiratory protective
             equipment is always required when working with flavorings
             containing diacetyl * * * regardless of the quantity or
             concentration of diacetyl[.] Subject to and without waiving these
             objections or the general objections, Mane states that it relies
             on, and complies with the applicable governmental regulations
             and promulgations that relate to the use, or need for, respiratory
             protective equipment with its flavorings. Mane also states that
             it has already produced documents responsive to this request
             including but not limited to MANE002292-3433 and the MSDS
             and SDS it has produced in this litigation. Mane also refers to
             the documents being produced with these responses.

(Emphasis added.)

      {¶9}   On July 6, 2020, OLI served a second set of requests for production of

documents on Mane requesting, among other things, the following:

             OLI's Second Request No. 6: Any documents showing when
             and how Mane first learned about any potential health hazards
             associated with exposure to diacetyl, including but not limited to
             alleged respiratory conditions or health effects associated with
             exposure to diacetyl.

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                                                                    Warren CA2022-03-014

Mane provided the following response to the request:

             Mane's Response to OLI's Second Request No. 6: Mane
             objects that this request is improperly compound overly broad,
             and unduly burdensome. * * * The request also improperly calls
             for scientific and/or medical expert opinion. Mane objects to this
             request because it seeks irrelevant information, as only Mane's
             knowledge related to any alleged risks associated with diacetyl
             and its own manufacturing processes is relevant here. Mane
             also objects to this request to the extent that it implies that the
             plaintiffs ever handled or encountered raw diacetyl or that there
             is a casual link between exposure to diacetyl and respiratory
             conditions or other health effects. Subject to and without
             waiving these objections, Mane states it has already produced
             the FEMA publications and MSDS that are responsive to this
             request.

(Emphasis added.)

      {¶10} In addition to serving discovery requests on Mane, plaintiffs and OLI also took

the deposition of Mane's corporate representative, Jordan Pearman.            Pearman was

deposed in October 2018, March 2020, and May 2020. OLI's Notice of 30(B)(5) Deposition

for Pearman indicated that OLI was interested in the topic of Mane's "knowledge of the

alleged hazards of diacetyl * * * and/or any flavorings or flavor containing diacetyl * * *

including when and how it became aware of such alleged hazards." Though no formal

objections were filed by Mane to the topics for deposition, counsel for Mane sought to limit

OLI's questioning to Mane's knowledge of hazards relating only to the Lebanon facility

where the plaintiffs worked.

      {¶11} During the course of Pearman's deposition, it became apparent that in 2015,

Mane made numerous changes at the Lebanon facility pertaining to the handling of diacetyl

and formulations containing diacetyl. Pearman explained that the changes Mane made

were done for three reasons: (1) as part of the corporation's continuous desire to protect

its employees, (2) due to the nationwide rollout of the Global Harmonized System, a

program requiring graphic representation of chemical hazards to employees, and (3) a new

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safety manager had recommended the changes. When OLI's counsel sought to question

Pearman about how raw diacetyl was handled at Mane facilities other than the Lebanon

facility, Mane's counsel limited Pearman to testifying about employees wearing respirators

when handling raw diacetyl. Mane's counsel instructed Pearman not to answer any further

questions about processes at facilities other than the Lebanon facility.

       {¶12} Mane's Environmental Health and Safety specialist, Todd Valli, was deposed

in August 2020. Valli indicated he first learned about the potential hazards of diacetyl in

approximately 2014. However, he indicated that his predecessor, Jennifer Bokovoy, knew

of the potential hazards of diacetyl before that due to her involvement in the development

of diacetyl-handling controls at another one of Mane's facilities—the Milford facility. OLI

found Valli's deposition to be troublesome, as Mane had not produced any documents

regarding diacetyl-handling controls at any of its facilities prior to 2014 and had not

produced documents regarding Bokovoy's involvement in that process. OLI sought to

obtain information via a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request served on the federal

Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA").

       {¶13} OSHA provided responsive documents on December 9, 2020 and January 5,

2021. The documents discussed citations that OSHA had imposed on Mane following an

inspection of Mane's Milford facility in 2011. The citations were centered on Mane's failure

to provide records about diacetyl exposure to a Mane employee who worked as a flavoring

compounder and its failure to provide the employee with appropriate hazard communication

training on diacetyl. OSHA's responses also showed that Mane had been notified by OSHA

in February 2013, in connection with a 2012 inspection of Mane's Milford facility, that one

of its flavoring-compounder employees had been overexposed to diacetyl despite wearing

respiratory protection. Mane was cited after testing showed that during one 15-minute

period, diacetyl levels were as high as 1,800 parts per billion, which exceeded the maximum

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use concentration for the type of respirator the employee had been provided.

       {¶14} After receiving the OSHA reports, OLI sought to depose a Mane employee

pursuant to Civ.R. 30(B)(5) about the OSHA reports and about what Mane knew about

potential diacetyl hazards and when and how it knew of the hazards. Counsel for Mane

initially declined to produce a witness.   While Mane and OLI attempted to work out this

discovery issue, plaintiffs became aware of the OSHA citations issued to Mane.              In

response, plaintiffs filed new discovery requests on Mane on December 23, 2020. Then,

on January 13, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Mane based on Mane's

failure to produce any information relating to the OSHA investigations and resulting citations

in response to the original discovery requests served on Mane. A hearing was scheduled

for January 21, 2021 to resolve the parties' discovery disputes. The evening before the

hearing, at 10:17 p.m., Mane produced over 2,700 pages of new documents in response to

plaintiffs' December 2020 discovery requests.

       {¶15} The newly produced documents reflected that Mane was fined and cited by

OSHA multiple times leading up to 2015 when Mane began making changes to its handling

of diacetyl. The documents reflected that air samplings and exposure assessments from

2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2015 indicated exposure was imminent, rather than merely

potential, that Mane overexposed its employees to diacetyl, that Mane was concerned with

media reports about diacetyl exposure, and that Mane had been in communication with its

insurance adjusters about the OSHA citations.

       {¶16} The records also disclosed that Mane was aware of the 5 parts per billion

recommended exposure limit for diacetyl by December 2013, based upon an internal email

Bokovoy had sent to Valli and the OSHA citations. This was of particular concern to

plaintiffs, as plaintiffs had engaged an expert, Dr. Adam M. Finkel, who had produced a

report expressing the opinion that OLI bore liability in part for failing to warn Mane of what

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                                                                    Warren CA2022-03-014

it knew regarding the hazards of diacetyl, including the occupational exposure limits and

that diacetyl carried a recommended exposure limit. A central premise of Dr. Finkle's

opinion was that Mane was unaware of the 5 parts per billion recommended exposure limit.

      {¶17} Prior to its January 20, 2021 document production, Mane had provided in

discovery only a single air sampling/industrial hygiene report. That report was prepared in

June 2015 by Thomas Morris ("the Morris Report"). The Morris Report included information

on the level of airborne diacetyl in one of the rooms where plaintiffs worked in at the

Lebanon facility. Plaintiffs' and OLI's experts believed the Morris Report was the only

evidence of the level of airborne diacetyl to which plaintiffs had been exposed. Pearman,

Mane's representative, had stated in his May 2020 deposition that other than the Morris

Report, he was unaware of any other diacetyl study conducted by Mane or by a third party

on behalf of Mane. The Morris Report concluded that the levels of airborne diacetyl were

insufficient to cause lung disease in humans. However, the documents produced by Mane

in its January 20, 2021 document production contained multiple air sampling and industrial

hygiene reports. Some of these reports indicated exposure to airborne levels of diacetyl in

parts of the Lebanon plant where plaintiffs worked was as high as 13,000 parts per billion—

more than 260 times the exposure levels documented in the Morris Report.

      {¶18} On February 2, 2021, Mane supplemented its initial responses to OLI's First

Set for Production of Documents to reference the documents it produced on January 20,

2021. Thereafter, on February 10, 2021, OLI filed a combined motion to compel and motion

for sanctions against Mane. OLI argued that "Mane withheld documents it knew were

relevant to [OLI's] affirmative defenses while at the same time leading [OLI] to believe that

it had produced all responsive documents in discovery." Referencing the documents it

obtained from OSHA and the 2,700 pages OLI produced on January 20, 2021, OLI argued

that the documents were lately produced and that they "show[ed] that the testimony of

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Mane's corporate representative so far was at best incomplete and at worst inaccurate."

OLI contended Mane's actions had prevented discovery on the issue of Mane's knowledge

of diacetyl hazards and led to a waste of resources and time by the parties and their experts.

OLI sought an order to compel Mane to produce a witness to testify about Mane's

knowledge of the hazards of diacetyl and sought attorney fees, costs, and sanctions related

to retaking Mane's deposition and having expert reports updated given the new information.

       {¶19} That same date, February 10, 2021, Plaintiffs filed against Mane a

supplemental motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 37(C), contending that Mane "willfully and

intentionally withheld thousands of pages of responsive documents * * *, [i]ntentionally gave

false testimony in its deposition * * *, [k]nowingly verified false and misleading discovery in

order to unjustly booster its defenses, and [f]ailed to correct or supplement discovery

responses it knew to be inaccurate." Plaintiffs argued the OSHA documents and the

documents Mane turned over on January 20, 2021 should have been turned over more

than a year beforehand, as they were responsive to their First Request for Production of

Documents Nos. 6, 7, and 9. Plaintiffs asked that Mane's Answer to its complaint be

stricken and that the court "direct that Mane's intent to injure the Plaintiffs * * * be taken as

an established fact for the purpose of the action, prohibit Mane from supporting or opposing

claims or defenses that Mane intended to injure the Plaintiffs, order Mane to pay all costs

and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs as a result of Mane's conduct, and grant such further

relief as is proper."

       {¶20} Mane opposed OLI's and plaintiffs' respective motions for sanctions. Mane

argued that all parties were aware and were in agreement that discovery would be limited

in scope to the products, hazards, and warnings in and at the microcaps extruder

department at the Lebanon facility and that it had appropriately responded to discovery

requests served on it by OLI and plaintiffs. A hearing on plaintiffs' and OLI's motions was

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held on March 4, 2021. Subsequently, on March 24, 2021, the trial court granted OLI's

combined motion to compel and motion for sanctions against Mane and granted in part

Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions against Mane. The court found that Mane's failure to timely

supplement its initial discovery responses pursuant to Civ.R. 26(E) was actionable under

Civ.R. 37(C). It further found that the 2,700 documents produced on January 20, 2021 were

             responsive in part to Plaintiffs' * * * first request for production of
             documents * * * and OLI's first and second requests for
             production of documents. Additionally, a former employee of
             Mane testified that these documents were turned over to
             [Mane's] counsel a few years ago. * * * While this is certainly
             not the complete list of discovery requests these documents
             were responsive to, it is sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs and OLI
             to sanctions under Civ.R. 37.

      {¶21} The court discussed the history of the case, noting that the case had been

pending for more than three years and was set to go to trial within six months, a timeline

that was no longer realistic given Mane's failure to timely turn over relevant documents.

The court noted:

             Depositions have been conducted. Expert reports have been
             prepared and exchanged. While all this work was being done,
             Mane was in possession of documents that [were] relevant,
             discoverable and the subject [of] prior discovery requests.
             Mane also knew or should have known that the disclosure of
             these documents was necessary to reasonably supplement
             and/or correct prior responses.

             It is apparent that Mane has an overly narrow view of the scope
             of the case that is not shared by the Plaintiffs and OLI. Likewise,
             the testimony of the corporate representative of Mane is highly
             selective and, at times, suspect.

             Mane's objections do not sufficiently place other parties on
             notice that there may be documents in Mane's possession that
             it is unwilling to produce, nor do the objections make clear that
             Mane is not even going to undertake to look for them because
             of the hyper-technical and overly legalistic nature of the
             response. Mane's behavior in this case is not outright
             dishonest, but a dishonest motive is not required for sanctions
             to be imposed.

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       {¶22} The court concluded that "[t]he withholding of the discovery in this case [was]

not substantially justified and the additional time, expense, and delay as a result are highly

prejudicial to the plaintiffs and OLI." The court therefore ordered that Mane (1) pay for

reasonable attorney fees, expenses and costs of plaintiffs and OLI associated with the

March 4, 2021 hearing, (2) pay for reasonable attorney fees, expenses and costs

associated with the additional depositions or redepositions resulting from the failure to turn

over the relevant documents, including but not limited to Valli, Bokovoy, Melanie Buck,

Ashley Bishop, and Mane, (3) produce a corporate representative to testify on issues raised

by plaintiffs and OLI, and (4) pay for reasonable fees, expenses and costs associated with

all depositions, and supplemental expert reports that are reasonably necessary and

substantially related to Mane's withholding of discoverable evidence.

       {¶23} To arrive at the amount of fees, expenses, and costs Mane was responsible

for, the court ordered the parties to submit a "written motion with supporting affidavits and/or

documentation" so that it could "issue a decision as to whether the expenditure was

reasonably necessary and substantially related to the withholding of discoverable evidence

and whether the fees, expenses and costs are reasonable." After OLI and plaintiffs filed

their motions and supporting documentation, Mane filed a memorandum in opposition to

the amount of fees and costs requested.

       {¶24} On August 18, 2021, the trial court issued an "Entry on Granting Motion for

Fees and Costs," in which the trial court indicated it was granting court costs, reasonable

attorney fees and other reasonable expenses to OLI and plaintiffs pursuant to R.C.

2323.51(B)(1), as a result Mane's frivolous conduct. The court ordered Mane to pay OLI's

attorney fees in the amount of $66,207 and costs in the amount of $9,305.21 and pay

plaintiffs' attorney fees in the amount of $96,058.50 and costs in the amount of $3,008.64.

       {¶25} Mane appealed the trial court's award of fees and costs. However, this court

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dismissed the appeal as we lacked a final appealable order. See Mundy v. Centrome, 12th

Dist. Warren No. CA2021-09-086 (Jan. 6, 2022) (Entry Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal).

On remand, the trial court ordered the payment of costs and fees by a date certain, April 2,

2022. Mane once again appealed, raising seven assignments of error for our review. We

find our resolution of the first assignment of error is dispositive of the appeal, and moot the

remaining assignments of error.

                                        II. ANALYSIS

       {¶26} Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶27} THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING R.C. 2323.51 SANCTIONS WITHOUT

NOTICE OR HEARING.

       {¶28} In its first assignment of error, Mane argues the trial court erred by awarding

attorney fees, expenses, and costs pursuant to the frivolous conduct statute, R.C 2323.51,

in its August 18, 2021 entry. Mane argues that the parties had not moved for sanctions

under R.C. 2323.51 and it had not received notice that frivolous conduct sanctions would

be considered until the August 18, 2021 entry was issued, thereby violating the notice and

hearing requirements of the statute. In response, plaintiffs and OLI argue that the trial court

had discretion to impose attorney fees and costs pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and that the

hearing that was held on the Civ.R. 37 motion for sanctions was sufficient to award Mane

due process. Alternatively, OLI and plaintiffs argue the trial court's August 18, 2021 entry

imposing sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 rather than Civ.R. 37 was merely a mistake of

phrase by the trial court. They contend that the court had previously "made clear in its

March 22, 2021 order that it was sanctioning Mane under Civ.R. 37(C)" and the award of

attorney fees and costs set forth in the August 18, 2021 entry should be treated as the

imposition of sanctions imposed pursuant to the court's finding of discovery violations under

Civ.R. 37.

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       {¶29} Both R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 37 allow for sanctions against a party. R.C.

2323.51 allows for sanctions where a party has engaged in frivolous conduct. As defined

by R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a), frivolous conduct includes the following:

              It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
              another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another
              improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing
              unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of
              litigation.

              It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a
              good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
              of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument
              for the establishment of new law.

              The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions
              that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
              are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
              opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

              The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are
              not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
              not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

       {¶30} Pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(B)(1), a party in a civil action who claims to have

been adversely affected by "frivolous conduct" may move the court for an award of court

costs, reasonable attorney fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with

the action. Alternatively, a trial court may impose sanctions for frivolous conduct on its own

initiative. R.C. 2323.51(B)(2); See also Baker v. USS/Kobe Steel Co., 9th Dist. Lorain No.

98CA007151, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 6, *4 (Jan. 5, 2000). "However, the statute permits

the court to impose sanctions only after it provides notice to the parties that a hearing will

be held on the issue of frivolous conduct." Id. at *5, citing R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(a) and (b).

       {¶31} Section (B)(2) of the statute sets forth the procedural requirements that must

be followed if a party moves for sanctions on the basis of frivolous conduct or if the court

wishes to consider the issue on its own initiative. Pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(B)(2), a trial

court can award court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and other reasonable expenses for

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frivolous conduct only after the court does all of the following:

              (a) Sets a date for a hearing to be conducted in accordance with
              division (B)(2)(c) of this section, to determine whether particular
              conduct was frivolous, to determine, if the conduct was frivolous,
              whether any party was adversely affected by it, and to
              determine, if an award is to be made, the amount of that award;

              (b) Gives notice of the date of the hearing described in division
              (B)(2)(a) of this section to each party or counsel of record who
              allegedly engaged in frivolous conduct and to each party who
              allegedly was adversely affected by frivolous conduct;

              (c) Conducts the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) of this
              section in accordance with this division, allows the parties and
              counsel of record involved to present any relevant evidence at
              the hearing, including evidence of the type described in division
              (B)(5) of this section, determines that the conduct involved was
              frivolous and that a party was adversely affected by it, and then
              determines the amount of the award to be made. * * *

       {¶32} Conversely, "Civ.R. 37 provides a mechanism by which discovery rules can

be enforced." Rardin v. Salon Professional Academy, LLC, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-16-011,

2017-Ohio-410, ¶ 17. "[F]rivolous conduct is not a condition precedent to the imposition of

sanctions under Civ.R. 37." Id. at ¶ 20. Rather, "[t]he [civil] rule specifically authorizes a

trial court to make 'just' orders in response to discovery violations, including the imposition

of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders." Id. at ¶ 17. Civ.R. 37(C) in

particular provides for sanctions when a party fails to comply with discovery by neglecting

to supplement an earlier response or failing to admit what is requested under Civ.R. 36. As

relevant to the present appeal, Civ.R. 37(C) provides as follows:

              (1) Failure to supplement. If a party fails to provide information
              or identify a witness as required by Civ.R. 26(E), the party is not
              allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on
              a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
              substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of
              this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an
              opportunity to be heard:

                     (a) may order payment of the reasonable expenses,
                     including attorney's fees, caused by the failure;

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                                                                     Warren CA2022-03-014

                     (b) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and

                     (c) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including
                     any of the orders listed in Civ.R. 37(B)(1)(a) through (f).

       {¶33} The record in the present case indicates that OLI's and plaintiffs' respective

motions for sanctions were filed under Civ.R. 37. Nowhere in their respective motions or at

the March 4, 2021 hearing on the motions did OLI or plaintiffs mention sanctions for frivolous

conduct or cite to R.C. 2323.51. Similarly, nowhere in the record does the trial court provide

notice to the parties that it was sua sponte considering the issue of frivolous conduct or that

the March 4, 2021 hearing was intended to address the issue of frivolous conduct in addition

to the Civ.R. 37 discovery violations. "While the trial court may consider R.C. 2323.51

sanctions on its own initiative, notice is still required to allow the party threatened with

sanctions the opportunity to prepare a factual and legal defense." Baker, 2000 Ohio App.

LEXIS 6 at *5. Here, Mane was not on notice that it needed to defend against claims of

frivolous conduct at the March 4, 2021 hearing. As the trial court failed to give adequate

notice to Mane, and the other parties, that it was sua sponte considering the issue of

frivolous conduct at the March 4, 2021 hearing, we find that the award of attorney fees and

costs under R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) constitutes reversible error.

       {¶34} OLI and plaintiffs argue that this court should review the court's August 18,

2021 imposition of attorney fees and costs as sanctions being imposed pursuant to the

finding of Civ.R. 37(C) discovery violations, contending it was merely a "mistake of phrase"

when the court referenced the frivolous conduct statute. However, the trial court's repeated

reference to R.C. 2323.51 and its citation to case law discussing frivolous conduct sanctions

clearly indicates the trial court's intent to award fees under the frivolous conduct statute—

and not under Civ.R. 37, which was never referenced in the court's August 18, 2021 entry.

As the expressed legal basis for the court's sanctions award was R.C. 2323.51, we are not

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                                                                    Warren CA2022-03-014

persuaded by OLI's and plaintiffs' "mistake of phrase" argument.

       {¶35} Additionally, while the trial court's March 22, 2021 Entry and Decision on

Discovery Motions unquestionably found that sanctions were appropriate under Civ.R. 37,

that entry did not determine the amount of sanctions to be imposed. Rather, it ordered the

parties to submit affidavits and documentation showing the amount of fees, expenses, and

costs that were being sought. The court indicated it would review the motions and issue a

subsequent decision. However, the trial court never issued an opinion imposing sanctions

for the Civ.R. 37(C) discovery violation. Instead, it issued sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 for

frivolous conduct. It is well settled that "a court speaks only through its journal entries."

Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties II, Ltd., 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-Ohio-

1101, ¶ 29.   As there was no journal entry imposing sanctions under Civ.R. 37, only an

order contemplating further action upon a finding that Civ.R. 37(C) had been violated, there

is no final appealable order for this court to review with respect to OLI's and plaintiffs'

respective motions for sanctions under Civ.R. 37(C).       See State ex rel. Bd. of State

Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-2205, ¶ 45 ("A

judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken

is not a final appealable order").

                                     III. CONCLUSION

       {¶36} As the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2323.51, we

find that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees, expenses, and costs for frivolous

conduct in its August 18, 2021 entry. Mane's first assignment of error is sustained and the

August 18, 2021 Entry on Granting Motion for Fees and Costs under R.C. 2323.51, and the

subsequent March 24, 2022 Entry and Order Lifting Stay and Ordering Payment of Fees

and Costs by a date certain, are hereby reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court

to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2323.51 in considering sanctions for frivolous

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                                                                   Warren CA2022-03-014

conduct or if the trial court desires to award sanctions for the Civ.R. 37(C) violations, to

issue a final appealable order accordingly.

      {¶37} Given our resolution of Mane's first assignment of error, Mane's six remaining

assignments of error, all of which challenge the award of sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 or

the finding of discovery violations under Civ.R. 37(C), are rendered moot.

      {¶38} Judgment reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

      M. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.

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