Court Opinion

ID: 9898374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:16.761394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:37.186153
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

LANDMARK PROPERTIES, INC.,                           No. 84752-0-I

                                                     DIVISION ONE
                  Respondent,
                                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
            v.

KEITH L. ARNOLD,
                   Appellant.

      FELDMAN, J. — Keith L. Arnold, representing himself, appeals the trial

court’s order granting Landmark Properties Inc.’s motion for a default order and

judgment. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

                                     FACTS

      Landmark rented property to Arnold. On May 31, 2022, Landmark’s agent

mailed a copy of a 120-day notice to vacate the premises to Arnold’s address.

The agent also personally delivered a copy of the notice at Arnold’s address.

According to the notice, following a biannual inspection revealing extensive

damage to the bathroom wall and tub, Landmark was terminating Arnold’s

tenancy to conduct “extensive modifications and remodeling.” The notice

required Arnold to vacate the premises by September 30, 2022, but Arnold

continued to occupy the property after that date.
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       On October 16, 2022, after Arnold refused to vacate the property as

required by the 120-day notice to vacate, Landmark served Arnold with a

summons and complaint directing him to respond by October 25, 2022, or lose

the right to defend himself in court. The summons also provided phone numbers

for free legal assistance. Arnold failed to respond to the summons and complaint

as directed.

       On November 4, 2022, Landmark filed an unlawful detainer action in the

trial court along with a motion to enter a default order and judgment against

Arnold. The trial court granted Landmark’s motion after Arnold failed to appear

or answer by October 25, 2022. Upon granting the motion the trial court directed

the clerk of the court to issue a writ of restitution permitting the sheriff to remove

Arnold from the premises.

       Arnold appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for default judgment for

abuse of discretion. Morin v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 753, 161 P.3d 956 (2007).

Discretion is abused if it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable

reasons. Id. A court likewise abuses its discretion “if the factual findings are

unsupported by the record” or if “the facts do not meet the requirements of the

correct standard.” Fowler v. Johnson, 167 Wn. App. 596, 604, 273 P.3d 1042

(2012). “A default judgment constitutes an admission of all factual allegations

necessary to establish the plaintiff’s claim for relief.” Smith v. Behr Process

Corp., 113 Wn. App. 306, 333, 54 P.3d 665 (2002). The default judgment does

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No. 84752-0-I/3

not, however, admit any conclusions of law contained within the complaint or the

amount of damages. Id. Having considered Arnold’s arguments, we find no

abuse of discretion.

       First, Arnold argues that “the superior court erred in accepting Landmark’s

notice to terminate tenancy reason as a good faith justification for the default

judgment entered November 4, 2022.” We disagree.

       Under RCW 59.18.200(2)(c)(i), a landlord may terminate a tenancy if it

plans to “substantially rehabilitate” the premises. Here, the notice provided to

Arnold explained that the building manager had found extensive damage to the

bathroom walls and tub. The notice also explained that the “unit needs extensive

modifications and remodeling” and it is “not healthy for [Arnold] to be in there.”

These are sufficient reasons to terminate the tenancy. Landmark also provided

120 days’ notice before terminating Arnold’s tenancy as required by RCW

59.18.200(2)(c)(i). Because Arnold continued to occupy the premises after the

120-day notice period, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

Landmark’s motion for a default order and judgment.

       Second, Arnold argues that the trial court erred in accepting Landmark’s

eviction summons as sufficient for the default judgment entered November 4,

2022. We disagree.

       For a summons to be sufficient, it must comply with RCW 59.12.080,

which states as follows:

              The summons must state the names of the parties to the
       proceeding, the court in which the same is brought, the nature of
       the action, in concise terms, and the relief sought, and also the
       return day; and must notify the defendant to appear and answer

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No. 84752-0-I/4

       within the time designated or that the relief sought will be taken
       against him or her.

Here, the summons contained both Landmark’s and Arnold’s names, notified

Arnold that the proceeding was taking place in King County Superior Court, and

stated the relief sought (that Landmark sought to evict Arnold from the premises).

It also stated the return date of October 25, 2022 in bold font in the center of the

document. And it directed Arnold, “If you do not respond by the deadline above,

you will lose your right to defend yourself . . . .” The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that the summons met the requirements of RCW 59.12.080.

       Finally, Arnold argues that because the complaint was filed with the court

on the same day Landmark’s motion for a default order and judgment was

granted, he was unable to refute any of Landmark’s “bad faith presentations.”

We disagree.

       The lawsuit here commenced on October 16, 2022, when Arnold was

served with the complaint and summons. See CR 3 (“[A] civil action is

commenced by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a

complaint, as provided in rule 4 or by filing a complaint.”). And according to the

summons, Arnold had until October 25, 2022 to respond, which was a

permissible return date. See RCW 59.12.070 (“A summons must be issued as in

other cases, returnable at a day designated therein, which shall not be less than

seven nor more than thirty days from the date of service . . . .”). Thus, contrary to

Arnold’s assertion, he had nine days to respond to the summons and was

provided with information detailing how to respond to avoid losing the ability to

defend himself in court. We reject Arnold’s argument that he did not have

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No. 84752-0-I/5

adequate time to respond to the summons and complaint before Landmark filed

its motion for default. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the requested relief. See RCW 59.12.120 (“If on the date appointed in

the summons the defendant does not appear or answer, the court shall render

judgment in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint.”).

       In the event that Landmark prevails on appeal, it requests attorney fees

and costs pursuant to RAP 18.1, which permits a party to seek fees and costs if

“applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or

expenses on review.” Here, RCW 59.18.290 states, “Where the court has

entered a judgment in favor of the landlord restoring possession of the property

to the landlord, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the landlord.”

RCW 59.18.290(3). Because Landmark prevailed in the trial court and has

likewise prevailed on appeal, we grant its request for attorney fees and costs

subject to compliance with RAP 18.1. Having granted attorney fees and costs

under RAP 18.1, we need not address Landmark’s additional request for fees

under RAP 18.9.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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