Court Opinion

ID: 9915555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 18:11:19.011781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:55.131984
License: Public Domain

01/05/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT NASHVILLE
                                January 4, 2023 Session

                PAUL PLOFCHAN v. JAMES HUGHEY ET. AL.

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
                     No. 17C727 Thomas W. Brothers, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. M2021-00853-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

A man sued his arresting officers and others. He claimed he was neither drunk nor violent
when he was arrested and charged with public intoxication, resisting arrest, and assault on
an officer. During discovery, the man claimed to have no communications between him
and a companion that were not protected by attorney-client privilege or as work product.
When such communications were uncovered, the defendants moved for sanctions and
attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants and the
companion. And it dismissed the case as a sanction. Discerning no abuse of discretion,
we affirm.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT
JR., P.J., M.S., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.

Thomas K. Plofchan, Potomac Falls, Virginia and E. Kendall White, IV, Franklin,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Paul Plofchan.

Kevin C. Klein and Ryan P. Loofbourrow, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, James
Hughey, Michael Knupp, Charles Stevens, Vanderbilt University, and Vanderbilt
University Police Department.

                                       OPINION

                                            I.

                                            A.
      Paul J. Plofchan Jr. was drinking at a bar during a bachelor party when he met
Madeleine Byrd. She was with him later when he was confronted by a Vanderbilt
University Police Department officer. According to the officer, Mr. Plofchan was
extremely intoxicated, hostile, and belligerent, so he called more officers to the scene.
Mr. Plofchan insulted the officers when they asked for his identification and became
aggressive when they attempted to place him in handcuffs. He was arrested and charged
with public intoxication, resisting arrest, and assault on a police officer.

        On May 26, 2015, Mr. Plofchan and Ms. Byrd conversed about the event via
Facebook Messenger. Ms. Byrd had sent Mr. Plofchan a message asking if he had her cell
phone. Mr. Plofchan responded that he did not remember anything that happened after
they left the bar. He asked her to describe what she recalled. She explained that he was
shirtless when stopped by the police officer. And he insisted on speaking Russian, insulted
the officer, and tried to fight him. Ms. Byrd said that Mr. Plofchan became “aggressive”
when the officer called for backup and was “really extremely[,] extremely resistant” when
officers put him in handcuffs. Mr. Plofchan said he did not usually act that way, but had
“way too much booze” that night.

       Later, Mr. Plofchan’s then-girlfriend sent Ms. Byrd a message via his Facebook
Messenger account. The girlfriend, now Mr. Plofchan’s wife, told Ms. Byrd that they had
her phone and would mail it. She then asked Ms. Byrd to describe what happened between
her and Mr. Plofchan. Ms. Byrd explained what she remembered and stated that
Mr. Plofchan was “really drunk” throughout the night.

        On June 4, 2015, Mr. Plofchan sent Ms. Byrd a message asking for more specific
details about their encounter with the police. Ms. Byrd indicated that they were not unruly
when the police arrived, but Mr. Plofchan had taken off his shirt, placed it on the ground,
and was urinating on it. She reiterated that he “didn’t make it easy” when the police
arrested him.

      Two weeks later, the criminal charges against Mr. Plofchan were dismissed and
expunged from his record. But Mr. Plofchan, who was a first lieutenant in the United States
Army, still faced an Army disciplinary investigation of his arrest.

        On September 25, 2015, Mr. Plofchan again reached out to Ms. Byrd via Facebook
Messenger. He asked if she would speak with his attorney and prepare a statement for the
Army. Mr. Plofchan “was hoping [she] would say something along the lines of we were
just standing there, minding our own business, you weren’t in distress or anything, then the
cops showed up and started demanding ID.” She initially provided a phone number so that
Mr. Plofchan’s attorney could contact her. But a few days later, she informed Mr. Plofchan
that she was hesitant to be involved and would not make a statement until she spoke with
an attorney. She then blocked Mr. Plofchan’s access to her Facebook account.
                                            2
                                              B.

       On March 27, 2017, Mr. Plofchan sued, among others, the three arresting officers;
the Vanderbilt University Police Department; and Vanderbilt University. Eventually, the
suit was pared down to claims against the officers for defamation and negligence per se
and against Vanderbilt University under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Mr. Plofchan
alleged the officers defamed him by fabricating and repeating the story about his conduct
on the night of the arrest. And he alleged they were negligent per se because they disclosed
records and information about his conduct and the resulting charges to the Army,
supposedly contrary to state statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(A) (Supp.
2023) (requiring the removal and destruction of public records of a person charged with a
misdemeanor or a felony after dismissal of the charges).

       During discovery, the defendants submitted requests for the production of
documents that might substantiate the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Request 9
asked Mr. Plofchan to produce “[a]ny and all emails, text messages, or other
correspondence with Madeline Byrd.” He responded, “[n]one.”

        Mr. Plofchan also claimed privilege protections in response to two other discovery
requests. Request 20 asked for “[a]ll notes, texts, emails, or any other data stored on any
mobile device (including iPhone or iPad) of which you were the primary user, that relate
in any way to the incidents that form the basis for this lawsuit or that you may use to support
any of your claims in this case.” He objected on the basis of “attorney-client privileged
communication and/or work product” but added, “in the spirit of cooperation, none.” And
Request 13 sought “[a]ll e-mails, letters, text messages, or other correspondence you have
sent or received that relate in any way to the incidents that form the basis for this lawsuit
or that you may use to support any of your claims in this case.” He objected on the same
basis. When the court ordered Mr. Plofchan to comply with Request 13, “excluding any
communications with counsel,” he supplemented his response with “[i]n a spirit of
cooperation, none that are not privileged.”

       Mr. Plofchan testified during his first deposition that he “conducted a search” for
any correspondence he had with Ms. Byrd, but he “didn’t have anything.” He also testified
that he did not remember communicating with her after the arrest. However, Ms. Byrd,
through her own counsel, allowed the defendants’ counsel to review his messages with her.

        The defendants then deposed Mrs. Plofchan. She testified that she recalled sitting
with Mr. Plofchan when he and Ms. Byrd first communicated via Facebook Messenger
after the arrest. And she saw the messages on Mr. Plofchan’s Facebook Messenger account
the day before her deposition, but she did not read them. She did not remember much of
the substance of the messages. And she was not involved in the conversation after
Ms. Byrd’s phone was returned.
                                             3
       Based on Mrs. Plofchan’s deposition and communications with Ms. Byrd, the
defendants demanded that Mr. Plofchan supplement his discovery responses and provide
them with a copy of the messages. But Mr. Plofchan did not provide all of the messages.
He only provided the messages starting on June 4, 2015. He did not indicate that other
messages from May 26, 2015 existed. And he did not assert that any of the messages were
privileged or protected as work product. Shortly after, Ms. Byrd provided a copy of all the
messages, including those from May 26, 2015.

        During a second deposition, Mr. Plofchan maintained that he had performed a
diligent search before responding to the defendants’ initial discovery requests. But he
claimed that he forgot about the messages until his wife reminded him. He repeatedly
stated that he did not remember communicating with Ms. Byrd after the arrest due to
“amnesia” he suffered from the police officers’ “beating.” And although he had initially
testified that he did not delete any messages from his Facebook Messenger account, once
he was confronted with the messages from May 26, 2015, he said that it was possible that
he or someone with access to his Facebook Messenger account deleted them.

       The defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Plofchan’s claims as a sanction for failing to
comply with the court’s order compelling him to produce any nonprivileged information
regarding the lawsuit. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.02. The court found Mr. Plofchan’s
contention that he forgot about the messages “disingenuous.” It concluded that he
concealed evidence. See id. 34A.02. And he failed to timely supplement his discovery
responses after accessing the messages. See id. 37.03(1). The court concluded that his
“blatant prevarication and misconduct warrant[ed] the most severe sanctions.” It dismissed
the case.

       The court also ordered the defendants to submit an itemized statement of requested
attorney’s fees and costs. The defendants submitted copies of billing records and a
declaration from counsel addressing the necessity and reasonableness of the fees incurred.
Mr. Plofchan did not file a response to their request.

                                            C.

        Mr. Plofchan then filed several motions, including a motion to reconsider the
dismissal. He first argued that the court erred by finding that he concealed evidence
without holding an evidentiary hearing. Second, he claimed that the messages were
protected work product because his attorney asked him to reach out to Ms. Byrd to obtain
information about the arrest. Third, Mr. Plofchan argued that he could not have produced
the May 26, 2015 messages because he did not have access to them. He and Mrs. Plofchan
also filed affidavits stating that he deleted those messages at Mrs. Plofchan’s direction.

                                            4
       The court denied all of Mr. Plofchan’s motions. It found that Mr. Plofchan was “not
a credible witness.” And his argument that the messages were work product was “novel”
but “not well taken.” It reiterated that dismissal was an appropriate sanction.

       Mr. Plofchan filed a second motion to reconsider.1 He claimed that the billing
records submitted in support of the request for attorney’s fees were “newly discovered
evidence that reveal[ed] misrepresentation and apparent fraud on the Court by Defendants
and their counsel.” He contended that the records revealed that the defendants had
manufactured a discovery “ruse” as a way to get the case dismissed because they showed
that defendants’ counsel was in communication with Ms. Byrd in 2019.

       The court denied Mr. Plofchan’s second motion to reconsider. It awarded the
defendants attorney’s fees and costs for work following Mr. Plofchan’s first deposition
“wherein [he] first concealed the existence of messages with Ms. Byrd.” This amounted
to $50,000.00 in attorney’s fees2 and $5,917.86 in costs. The court also awarded the
defendants another $8,500.00 and Ms. Byrd’s counsel $2,415.00 for the attorney’s fees
incurred opposing subpoenas that Mr. Plofchan issued along with his second motion to
reconsider.

                                                    II.

       Mr. Plofchan raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred
in dismissing his case as a discovery sanction. Next, he argues that the court erred in not
granting his second motion to reconsider. Finally, he argues that the court erred in
awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Defendants and Ms. Byrd.

       We review both a trial court’s decision to impose discovery sanctions and its
decision on a motion to set aside or to alter or amend3 for an abuse of discretion. Discover
Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012); Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134
S.W.3d 121, 133 (Tenn. 2004); Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2000). Our
review of discretionary decisions is limited. Beard v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp., 288 S.W.3d 838,
860 (Tenn. 2009). We do not “second-guess the court below” or “substitute [our]

        1
         Mr. Plofchan also filed a motion to compel. And he issued subpoenas to Vanderbilt University,
counsel for the defendants, and counsel for Ms. Byrd. The trial court denied the motions and quashed the
subpoenas.
        2
         The court determined that the total fees incurred by the defendants after this time was $61,000.11.
But the court reduced this number to an award of $50,000.00 because it “ha[d] already imposed the severe
sanction of dismissal.”
        3
          We review Mr. Plofchan’s motion to reconsider under the standard for a motion to set aside or to
alter or amend. See Section II(B), infra.

                                                     5
discretion for the lower court’s.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn.
2010). Instead, we consider “(1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly
supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the lower court properly identified and
applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether
the lower court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Id.
We uphold the trial court’s ruling as “long as reasonable minds can disagree as to [the]
propriety of the decision made.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)
(quoting State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000)).

        We review questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness.
Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013). But we afford factual
findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. See
TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d). We typically give great deference to the trial court’s credibility
assessments. Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). But when
“a trial court’s findings of fact [are] based on documentary evidence such as depositions,
transcripts, or video recordings,” we may draw our “own conclusions with regard to [its]
weight and credibility.” Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2014).

                                               A.

       Mr. Plofchan first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his case as a
sanction. We first review whether any discovery sanction was warranted. If so, we
determine whether dismissal was the appropriate sanction.

1. Appropriateness of Sanctions

       Mr. Plofchan first argues that the trial court erred in finding his explanation that he
forgot about the messages “disingenuous.” He claims that the court could not make such
a finding without first holding an evidentiary hearing. And even if it could, the record
evidence preponderates against the court’s finding.

       This Court has routinely affirmed sanctions imposed by trial courts that did not hold
evidentiary hearings. See, e.g, Langlois v. Energy Automation Sys., Inc., 332 S.W.3d 353,
356, 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Alexander v. Jackson Radiology Assocs., P.A., 156 S.W.3d
11, 13-14, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). And Mr. Plofchan did not request a hearing. So we
find no error in the court imposing sanctions on documentary evidence alone.

        In reviewing this evidence, we conclude that it does not preponderate against the
court’s findings. The trial court determined that Mr. Plofchan was “not a credible witness”
based on his “conflicting testimony and sworn discovery responses as well as his demeanor
in court.” Mr. Plofchan had originally maintained that he was not aware of any
communications between him and Ms. Byrd. When confronted with some messages, he
testified that he had forgotten about them. The trial court found that “no reasonable person
                                              6
would ‘forget’ about the existence of the communication between himself and Ms. Byrd
concerning the events of that night.” Among other things, Mr. Plofchan “was arrested and
handcuffed while partially clothed,” “faced the ire of his then girlfriend, now wife,” and
“was required to face both a criminal hearing and a military tribunal.” And although
Mr. Plofchan claimed at that time that he had not deleted any messages from his Facebook
Messenger account, he later changed his story again when confronted with those messages.
He then claimed he deleted them at Ms. Plofchan’s direction.

       Mr. Plofchan next contends that he could not be sanctioned for failing to disclose
the messages because they were protected as work product. He maintains that they are
work product because his attorney instructed him to contact Ms. Byrd. As he explains,
“communications by an agent of the attorney are protected by work product” and this may
include “the client acting as agent.” To invoke the work product doctrine, a party must
“establish (1) that the materials sought are documents or tangible things, (2) that the
documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and (3) that the documents
were prepared by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative.” Boyd
v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); TENN. R. CIV. P.
26.02(3). The party asserting the protection bears the burden of proving that the material
is work product. State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Grp. Tr., 209
S.W.3d 602, 617 (Tenn. 2006); Boyd, 88 S.W.3d at 220-21. Mr. Plofchan’s attorney never
filed an affidavit stating that the messages were prepared in anticipation of litigation. So
Mr. Plofchan did not carry his burden of proving that the messages were work product.

       Mr. Plofchan next argues that the court abused its discretion in sanctioning him for
failing to timely supplement his discovery responses because he claims that he did so.
Parties must seasonably amend “prior discovery responses that were incorrect when made
or are no longer correct.” Little v. City of Chattanooga, 650 S.W.3d 326, 366 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2022); TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.05(2). Failure to do so can result in sanctions. Little, 650
S.W.3d at 366; TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.03(1). Mr. Plofchan contends that he supplemented his
discovery responses two business days after his wife reminded him of the messages’
existence. But the court found his claim “disingenuous.” And the evidence does not
preponderate against that finding.

       Mr. Plofchan also argues that he could not be sanctioned for not producing the
messages from May 26, 2015, because “[t]here is no evidence that [he] had access to [those
messages.” It may be true that he did not have access to those messages. But that is no
excuse for failing to produce the others. The court did not abuse its discretion in
sanctioning Mr. Plofchan for failing to supplement his discovery responses.

2. Dismissal as the Proper Sanction

      Mr. Plofchan contends that, even if sanctions were appropriate, dismissal of the case
was too harsh. When warranted, a trial court may dismiss an action when a party conceals
                                            7
evidence during discovery or fails to comply with orders of the court. TENN. R. CIV. P.
34A.02, 37.02(C), 37.03(1), 41.02(1). The trial judge [is] in the best position to determine
whether [a party’s] actions and inactions throughout the proceedings support[] an order to
dismiss [the case].” Langlois, 332 S.W.3d at 359. This is a case-by-case determination.
Murray v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 153 S.W.3d 371, 378 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2004). The power must be exercised with restraint because “[t]he interests of justice are
best served when lawsuits are resolved on their merits.” Langlois, 332 S.W.3d at 357
(quoting Orten v. Orten, 185 S.W.3d 825, 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (Lee, J., dissenting));
see Holt v. Webster, 638 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that dismissal is
a harsh yet necessary sanction in appropriate circumstances). “[A] clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct” is enough to justify a sanction of dismissal. Shahrdar v. Glob.
Hous., Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting In re Beckman, 78 B.R.
516, 518 (M.D. Tenn. 1987)).

       Mr. Plofchan asserts that the defendants were not prejudiced by his failure to
disclose the messages because their counsel knew about the messages and were able to
acquire them. But a showing of prejudice is not required when a party repeatedly disobeys
orders of the court and lies about the existence of evidence.

       Mr. Plofchan misrepresented whether communications with Ms. Byrd existed. He
maintained this position in the face of an order to compel production and during his first
deposition. When confronted with the messages, Mr. Plofchan reported that he forgot
about their existence, but was “pretty sure” he did not delete any of the messages. When
that too was revealed to be false, he claimed that he deleted some of the messages at his
wife’s direction. The court’s choice of dismissal was within the range of acceptable
dispositions for such actions.

                                              B.

        Mr. Plofchan next contends that the court erred in denying his second motion to
reconsider. Tennessee law does not recognize a general “motion to reconsider.” Regions
Bank v. Prager, 625 S.W.3d 842, 845 n.2 (Tenn. 2021). Instead, parties may file motions
to set aside or to alter or amend previous decisions of the trial court. See Discover Bank,
363 S.W.3d at 488-89 (outlining the procedural rules that “govern motions to set aside
previous trial court decisions”). When faced with a “motion to reconsider,” we “consider
the substance of a motion rather than its title or form” and construe it accordingly. Regions
Bank, 625 S.W.3d at 845 n.2.

         The court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Plofchan’s case was “subject to revision at any
time before the entry of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 54.02(1). Mr. Plofchan argues that the court
should have reconsidered the dismissal because of the “newly discovered evidence” in
defense counsels’ billing records that showed the defendants were in contact with
                                                8
Ms. Byrd. He claims they merely feigned ignorance about the messages to create a basis
to dismiss the lawsuit.

       But when the defendants became aware of the messages was irrelevant to the court’s
decision to dismiss Mr. Plofchan’s case. The court dismissed the case because
Mr. Plofchan concealed evidence and was not truthful about the existence of
communications with Ms. Byrd. So the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Plofchan’s motion to reconsider.

                                              C.

       Finally, Mr. Plofchan argues the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the
defendants and Ms. Byrd. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02 directs the trial court
to order a party who fails to obey a discovery order to “pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.02. Monetary sanctions for discovery abuse should be directly related
to the abuse and not excessive. Burnette v. Sundeen, 152 S.W.3d. 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2004); Mansfield v. Mansfield, No. 01A019412CH0058, 1995 WL 643329, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 3, 1995).

       Here, Mr. Plofchan’s failure to obey the discovery order caused the defendants and
Ms. Byrd to incur further expenses. The court determined costs incurred based on billing
records following Mr. Plofchan’s first deposition, the point where he “first concealed the
existence of messages with Ms. Byrd.” And it determined that the defendants were entitled
to $50,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $5,986 in costs. This amount was less than the actual
total fees incurred because the court “ha[d] already imposed the severe sanction of
dismissal.” The court also granted the defendants and Ms. Byrd an additional award of
attorney’s fees for the expenses they incurred opposing Mr. Plofchan’s issuance of
subpoenas after the case was dismissed.

       These monetary sanctions were directly related to the discovery abuses and were
not excessive under the circumstances. See Burnette, 152 S.W.3d at 4. In the operative
complaint, Mr. Plofchan claimed that he was not intoxicated, aggressive, or violent when
he was arrested. But the messages showed the exact opposite. Mr. Plofchan’s deceit forced
the defendants to pursue other avenues to obtain the messages and engage in duplicative
discovery after the messages were finally turned over by Ms. Byrd. Then, after the trial
court dismissed the case, Mr. Plofchan attempted to reopen discovery. This forced the
defendants and Ms. Byrd to incur additional expenses. We discern no abuse of discretion.

       Mr. Plofchan argues that even if monetary sanctions were appropriate, the
defendants “provided no evidence to suggest that the fees charged [we]re reasonable” other
than their counsel’s “self-serving [a]ffidavit.” But an affidavit or declaration is an
                                           9
appropriate way to establish the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. See Coleman v.
Coleman, No. W2011-00585-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 479830, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
4, 2015) (recognizing that “[t]ypically, . . . the party requesting attorney’s fees produces an
affidavit from the attorney who performed or supervised the work”). If a party wishes to
challenge the reasonableness of the fees charged, it is incumbent on that party to request a
hearing on the issue. Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 210 (Tenn. 2002); Moran v.
Willensky, 339 S.W.3d 651, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). Here, Mr. Plofchan “indicated that
oral argument [wa]s not necessary” for the court to decide this issue. So his argument that
the fees were unreasonable is unavailing.

                                             III.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Mr. Plofchan’s case and
ordering him to pay attorney’s fees and costs as a discovery sanction. So we affirm.

                                                       s/ W. Neal McBrayer
                                                    W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

                                              10