Court Opinion

ID: 9625399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:39:54.590056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:07.935790
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(concurring with comments):
In addition to my outright concurrence with the per curiam opinion, I make some *771further comments. I realize that due to the action of the Court in disposing of this case as indicated in the per curiam opinion, what is said about the status of defendant Legislators in relation to their school districts is but dicta in this case. Yet because other views are expressed in anticipation of confrontation of that issue, if and when it is presented, it seems to me that some observations indicating that there is another side to the controversy are justified.
Our constitution in Article VI, Section 10, provides that:
Each house shall be the judge of the election and qualifications of its members
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This adds greater force to the already good and sufficient reasons for exercising judicial restraint and not presuming to intrude into the prerogatives of the legislative branch. Accordingly, unless it appears so clearly that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that there is some violation of a constitutional provision, or irreconcilable conflict therewith, the courts should leave that responsibility where the constitution expressly placed it: with the legislature.1
Should it be thought that this controversy is for the Court to decide these further observations are pertinent. I share the idea expressed by Justice Wilkins that it seems unfortunate that this matter was initiated in this Court on a petition for an extraordinary writ, so there is no sufficient factual foundation, nor any assurance that all parties that may be directly affected thereby, or who may desire to have their interests represented, before the Court, so there is no adequate foundation for a well-advised determination of such an important issue.
It seems to me that the arguments of our esteemed Chief Justice in support of his opinion that school teachers should not be legislators are matters which may well be considered by those whose prerogative it is to fashion the law and its policies. But that is not our prerogative. Rather it is to understand and apply the law as intended by those whose prerogative it is to fashion it.
Under the universally recognized rule of construction, constitutional provisions should be interpreted and applied in accordance with what was intended by its framers. In view of the status of the schools at that time, supported almost entirely from private sources, I cannot see the remotest possibility that the interdiction of Article VI, Section 6, preventing legislators from “holding any public office of profit or trust,” nor Article V, Section 1, providing for the separation of powers and prohibiting any person from exercising powers in two separate branches of government, could reasonably be regarded as referring to school teachers.
In our democratic system, the legislature is intended to represent the people: that is, to be made up from the general public representing a wide spectrum of the citizenry. It is not to be doubted that legislators from the ranks of education are affected by the interests of that calling. But all other legislators also have interests. No one lives in a vacuum. It is sometimes said that: “In the absence of angels, we must get along with human beings.” This includes their interests as well as their varying degrees of wisdom and folly. The same may be said with respect to the varying degrees of integrity which requires them to put the interests of the general welfare above their personal or group interests. I think it will not be gainsaid that people from the educational field have rendered a valuable and important service in the formation of this state and throughout its history. Insofar as I have been able to ascertain, there has never heretofore been a challenge to their right to serve in the legislature.
In regard to the problem of concern herein, I agree that a person should not be actively engaged in the legislative sessions, nor in committee work, at the same time he is supposed to be actively engaged in teach*772ing, and certainly he should not be receiving pay from two public payrolls for the same time.
Upon the basis of the record before us, I am not persuaded that anything has been made to appear which should disqualify the defendants from the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship by serving in the legislature, any more than would be so of any other class of citizens; nor that the public should be deprived of the benefits of some representation from the field of education and the contribution they can make to the general welfare by the defendants so serving.
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WILKINS, Justice
(concurring with comments):
I would like to address the Chief Justice’s comment that we “would be remiss in our duty” by failing to answer the critical question: “Can a teacher serve as a member of the legislature and retain his status as a teacher in the schools?” by stating that this Court was not requested by plaintiffs to answer this question, notwithstanding the enormous interest that it may stimulate. And further, even if we were irresistably compelled to explore the matter, the plaintiffs ought not to prevail in my opinion because of the fatally defective abbreviation of the record before us.
We have here only a record of pleadings, devoid of a hearing where evidence was adduced. It is not enough for us to suppose, to presume, to infer — or to explore questions about these educators (teachers and administrators) concerning whether they can continue to remain educators if they serve in the Utah Legislature or are disabled from doing so because of conflict of interest and separation of powers doctrines in Utah’s Constitution1 without an evidentiary record which would shed light upon these questions.
Having no evidentiary record before us and thereby being disabled from making any meaningful analysis, we should not attempt to illuminate from darkness. And exercising that restraint, in my opinion, is our duty.
HALL, Justice
(concurring):
In light of the brevity of the per curiam opinion which I concur in, I am constrained to make the following observations.
Plaintiffs directly petition this Court seeking an Extraordinary Writ1 mandating the removal of the names of educators or administrators in the Utah Public School System from the list of nominated candidates for election to the Utah Legislature, prohibiting the printing of their names on election ballots and further prohibiting the issuance of certificates of election to them.
The petition fails to assert that “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists,” nor at the time of the hearing thereon was any showing made of extraordinary circumstances as would support a finding by this Court necessary to support or warrant the granting of the relief demanded.2 For these reasons alone the writ could be denied. Nevertheless, the Court duly considered the petition on its merits.
The sole issue presented by the petition for our determination is the propriety of educators and school administrators running for, and being elected to, the Legislature of this state.
Petitioners primarily rely upon the “separation of powers” provision of the Utah Constitution which reads in pertinent part as follows:
. no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, . . . 3
The foregoing language in no way precludes those persons charged with the exer*773cise of powers within one branch of government from running for or being elected to another branch. There are innumerable incidents wherein such has occurred in this state, and at all levels of government, from the highest state office to the lowliest city and county precinct offices. What is precluded is the exercise of “any function” of a different branch of government than that to which one is elected.
Assuming, but not deciding, that educators and school administrators are in fact members of the executive branch of government, the obvious and usual means of complying with the said constitutional provision would be for the successful candidate to simply resign from one office upon assuming another.
The petition in this matter was prematurely filed and this Court has no alternative but to deny it on the ground that there is no basis upon which relief can be granted.
Admittedly, the denial of this petition does not resolve all foreseeable future issues, however, it does resolve the only issue presently before this Court. Despite the urgence of those who would have the Court reach out and address all possible issues, such is not the duty nor the function of courts. As was stated in Lyon v. Bateman:4
They [Courts] are not supposed to be a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.
Should this Court address an issue not presently before it, viz., whether or not an educator may serve at the same time as a legislator, it would constitute a departure from its constitutional and statutory powers and its views thereon would be deemed advisory only.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the concurring opinion of HALL, J.

. That the legislature should be the sole judge of the qualifications of its members, see 72 Am.Jur.2d, States, Sec. 44; 81A C.J.S. States § 44; 107 A.L.R. 205; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Ellison v. Barnes, 23 Utah 183, 63 P. 899 (1901).

.See Art. V, Sec. 1 thereof and also Art. VI, Sec. 6.

. Provided for by Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.

. See Rule 65B(a), U.R.C.P.

. Article V, Section 1, Constitution of Utah.

. 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951), cited with approval in Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978).