Court Opinion

ID: 9544009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:18.428251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:47.566820
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
concurring in the result only:
In this case, the majority affirms the judgment of the court of appeals admitting DNA typing evidence. The majority applies the test for admissibility of scientific evidence set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). We adopted this test with respect to DNA typing evidence in Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884 (Colo.1993). Because I adhere to my prior position in Fishback rejecting Frye, and would apply the relevancy standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), I concur in the result only.
*296In Fishback, the defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, second degree burglary, and mandatory sentence violent crime. As in this case, test results and statistical analysis of the defendant’s blood DNA compared with DNA taken from the victim were presented at trial. This evidence indicated that alleles found in the defendant’s DNA matched those found in samples taken from the victim. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court ruled that the DNA typing evidence was admissible under Frye and the majority affirmed.
In my opinion concurring in the result reached by the majority, I pointed out that, because Frye was premised on the erroneous assumption that once a scientific discovery becomes “generally accepted” it remains so, Frye does not provide certainty or ease of decision-making. Fishback, 851 P.2d at 897 (Mullarkey, J. concurring in the result). Furthermore, there are other serious problems in applying Frye, such as “courts’ inconsistencies in characterizing evidence as ‘scientific,’ difficulty in identifying the relevant scientific field, and ambiguity as to what constitutes ‘general acceptance.’ ” Id. Then, as now, my primary dissatisfaction with Frye is “its unduly restrictive treatment of novel scientific evidence, excluding testimony that may have strong support within the scientific community but not be ‘generally accepted.’ ” Id. Instead, I would apply a relevancy test for the admission of such evidence pursuant to CRE 702. Under that test, “[a]s long as the proffered evidence is reliable and has support, although there may be controversy in the scientific field, such evidence would be admissible.” Id. at 899.
Shortly after we issued our Fishback opinion, the standard I recommended was adopted by the Supreme Court in Daubert, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In Dau-bert, the Court held that the Frye test had been displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. The Court specified that, under Rule 702,29 the trial judge must determine:
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
Under Daubert, some of the relevant factors for a trial court to consider are (1) whether the scientific methodology can be tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) the degree of general acceptance of the methodology. Id. at ---, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2798.
In this case, the application of the Frye test has required the majority to give detailed consideration to the merits of the current academic debate concerning population genetic issues. The outcome of this debate results in a statistical difference of a mere two orders of magnitude in the context of random match probabilities of which the most conservative estimate is roughly one in 1,000,000 to one in 10,000,000. Maj. op. at 293. I agree with the majority that such fine distinctions are “of no practical consequence to the courts.” Id. (quoting Erie S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 Nature 735 (October 27, 1994)). I made a similar observation in Fishback. See 851 P.2d at 900 n. 3.
Unlike the majority, I would admit the DNA typing evidence in question under the relevancy test of CRE 702. Under that test, because this evidence is generally reliable and relevant, I would leave to the jury the determination of the significance of any such critiques of the underlying methodology as *297part of the jury’s evaluation of the weight of the evidence.

. The language of CRE 702 is identical to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While we are not bound by a Supreme Court construction of the rule that does not involve constitutional issues, the Supreme Court's construction is highly persuasive.