Court Opinion

ID: 9669603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:01:28.863788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:58.472863
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with Justice Levine’s well-chronicled dissent to the extent that it demonstrates it is improvident to hold that a North Dakota constitutional provision will always be construed the same as a similar provision in the United States Constitution, or, for that matter, will always be construed differently than a similar provision in the United States Constitution. C.f. City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 579 (N.D.1981 VandeWalle, J., concurring specially) [Right of privacy under N.D. Constitution in personnel information in records of public agency not affecting operation of that agency not foreclosed by majority decision that no such rights exist in municipal personnel files]. State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805 (N.D.1974), which appeared to adopt such a conclusive approach, recognized in Syllabus 8 by the Court that “[e]ach case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn on its own facts.” Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided the precise question we here consider although several State appellate courts have considered the issue under the Federal Constitution. State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D.1995). Therefore, we can only predict what the Federal Constitution protection provides; we cannot adopt a construction not yet announced.
It is one thing to conclude that the framers of the North Dakota Constitution intended nothing more or nothing less [as noted by Justice Levine the first Ten Amendments had not yet been made applicable to the States in 1889, so “less” was a possible intent] than the construction intended by the framers of the United States Constitution when that construction has been announced by the United States Supreme Court. It is something else to “buy-in,” in 1974 or now, to a future and as yet unannounced construction. To analogize to rules of statutory con*154struction, when a statute is adopted from another State it is presumed the Legislature adopted the construction previously placed upon it by the courts of the State from which the statute was taken. E.g., State v. Dilger, 322 N.W.2d 461 (N.D.1982). No such presumption exists when the interpretation and construction by the courts do not precede the adoption of the statute. E.g., State v. Wells, 276 N.W.2d 679 (N.D.1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 2865, 61 L.Ed.2d 300 (1979).
However, I do not agree with Justice Levine’s conclusion that administrative sanctions are punitive. I adhere to the analysis in Zimmerman that administrative suspension of the license is remedial. The same “realistic” look that the dissent takes, i.e., lack of access to mass transit from the standpoint of the individual and the “punishment” imposed by license revocation, is equally true of the remedial nature of the remedy. The lack of mass transit makes it necessary for a greater proportion of our citizens to use the roads and highways; thus it is also necessary to attempt to assure the safety of those roads and highways for that greater proportion. The remedial purpose of removing drunk drivers from the roads, which such a great proportion of our citizens must use because of the lack of mass transit, therefore dominates.
To hold it is a double-jeopardy violation for the imposition of administrative remedies when there is a criminal prosecution would be a substantial change in this State’s legal history. It is a change that, under these facts, I believe is unwarranted and uncalled for by the North Dakota Constitution. The consequences of that holding clearly indicate to me there could have been no such intent by the framers of our Constitution. For example, I expect the framers would be startled, indeed, to learn that a license authorized by the Legislature could not be revoked by the licensing authority when the holder is convicted of a crime because it would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy; or, for another example, that a public school district, a government entity, could not suspend from its basketball team, a student convicted of driving while intoxicated because it would constitute double jeopardy. The dissent looks “realistically” at what suspension of a license to drive means. We should also look “realistically” at what the framers intended to prevent by the prohibition against double jeopardy. That look convinces me the suspension of the license to drive of a convicted drunk driver for the safety of the public was not what they intended to prevent.