Court Opinion

ID: 9395025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 19:11:48.102445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.856824
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  May 16, 2023
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                             EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                 OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re C.S.

No. 22-592 (Kanawha County 22-JA-73)

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Father J.S. 1 appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s June 30, 2022,
order terminating his parental rights to C.S. 2 Upon our review, we have determined that oral
argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is
appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21(c).

        In February of 2022, the DHHR filed a petition alleging that petitioner neglected and
psychologically abused C.S. According to the petition, petitioner frequently belittled the child,
repeatedly referring to him as “pussy” and “retard,” and also telling the child he will “be nothing
when he grows up” and that he should “leave and never come back.” The petition further alleged
that the child disclosed physical abuse by petitioner. Finally, the petition alleged that petitioner
neglected the child due to substance use, citing C.S.’s disclosure that petitioner is “the most
violent and aggressive when drunk” and drinks “three to four times weekly.” The DHHR later
amended the petition to include allegations regarding petitioner’s conduct during the
proceedings. Thereafter, petitioner waived the preliminary hearing.

       An adjudicatory hearing was held on May 11, 2022. A DHHR worker testified that,
roughly two weeks after the preliminary hearing, petitioner tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines and that he was then offered in-patient and out-patient treatment but declined
both. Petitioner failed to respond to at least five other testing requests and tested positive for

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Rebecca Stollar Johnson. The West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”) appears by Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and
Assistant Attorney General Heather L. Olcott. Jennifer N. Taylor appears as the child’s guardian
ad litem.
       2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).

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methamphetamines again on April 20, 2022. The court also heard testimony from the child and
petitioner, after which the circuit court adjudicated petitioner as an abusing and neglectful parent.

        On May 19, 2022, less than two weeks from the adjudicatory hearing, the DHHR filed a
motion to cease petitioner’s services because petitioner “is uncooperative . . . and continues to
send harassing text messages to service providers.” The motion referenced several instances of
text communications between petitioner and various DHHR workers and providers, including
messages from petitioner stating the following: “I’m not participating. You guys can keep that
soft ass rat kid. He doesn’t deserve to have my last name”; “I’m not jumping through stipid [sic]
human trick hoops taking meaningless classes that I’ve probably already taken”; “if he’s that
soft, he doesn’t belong here”; and “take his bitch ass to foster care.” The motion also referenced
the fact that petitioner sent another DHHR worker ten harassing text messages in one day. The
motion was granted on an emergency basis until the parties could convene for a hearing.

        On May 31, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing to address the motion to cease services,
noting that petitioner “failed to respond to the [m]otion; failed to appear at the hearing after
receiving proper notice; and failed to otherwise cooperate with his counsel and the Department.”
Ultimately, the court granted the DHHR’s motion to cease services and granted the guardian’s
motion prohibiting petitioner from having any contact with the child and the child’s mother. The
order also prohibited petitioner from speaking directly with any DHHR caseworkers and directed
all communication between petitioner and the DHHR to be made through petitioner’s counsel.
Despite these extreme measures, the DHHR filed a petition for contempt on June 9, 2022, based
on petitioner’s continued harassment of DHHR workers. Three days prior to the petition’s filing,
petitioner was criminally charged with intimidation of a public official based on this conduct.
Just two days after his criminal charge, petitioner continued harassing a DHHR worker via text.
The petition also alleged that he violated the confidentiality of the proceedings by sending
paragraphs of messages to a friend of the child’s mother with confidential information about the
case, stating, “I just wanted to let you know the quality of the individual I know you have been
close to in your life.”

        The circuit court reconvened in this matter on June 22, 2022, for a disposition hearing.
During the hearing, the DHHR presented evidence that petitioner refused to participate with the
services offered and violated the court’s orders by threatening DHHR personnel and sharing
confidential information about the case. The court also found that petitioner’s text messages
“reflected anger and disrespect towards his son,” which “demonstrated that he was not
committed to a healthy relationship with his child, and had made no efforts to establish one.”
After taking testimony and evidence, the court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood
that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future
and ordered that terminating petitioner’s parental rights to C.S. was necessary for the welfare of
the child. 3 It is from this order that petitioner appeals.

       3
        The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. The permanency plan for C.S. is
guardianship in his current placement.

                                                 2
        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). First, petitioner argues that the DHHR failed to
make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Petitioner argues that the exceptions listed in West
Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(7) absolving the DHHR of its responsibility to make such efforts do
not apply to this case; therefore, petitioner argues that the DHHR “failed to make any effort, let
alone ‘reasonable’ efforts.”

        Petitioner is correct in asserting that the DHHR is required, in most circumstances, “to
provide supportive services in an effort to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child.” W. Va.
Code § 49-4-601(d). However, it is abundantly clear from the record that any claim that the
DHHR “failed to make any effort” has no merit. Here, the DHHR offered petitioner numerous
services, yet petitioner not only expressly refused to cooperate with the services offered, he went
so far as to harass the DHHR personnel responsible for assisting him in completing those
services to the point that he was charged criminally for his conduct. The record is replete with
petitioner’s anger, outbursts, threats, and defiance with the DHHR workers and service
providers, thus showing his refusal to participate in a reasonable plan designed to reunify the
family.

         Petitioner’s argument that the DHHR “made no effort to attempt to accommodate” him is
also without merit, as the record shows that the DHHR immediately complied with his requests
for accommodation, such as changing the location of his services, only for petitioner to continue
in his lack of cooperation. As the circuit court noted, petitioner simply refused to attend services,
traveled out of town for extended stays without notifying workers, and, eventually, stated that he
was no longer participating in certain services. Simply put, there is no basis in the record for any
of petitioner’s contentions that the DHHR did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family,
given that the DHHR offered extensive accommodation in the face of petitioner’s openly hostile
actions. As such, he is entitled to no relief.

        Next, in his second and final assignment of error, petitioner argues that the circuit court
erred in terminating his parental rights “when the least restrictive alternative was termination of
custodial rights.” 4 Petitioner’s argument here is largely based on C.S.’s inability to inherit
benefits from him and his unsupported assertion that terminating parental rights to a sixteen-
year-old child “flies in the face of public policy.” Not only is there no authority for a parent
being permitted to retain their parental rights simply because of a child’s advanced age,
petitioner ignores the fact that C.S. being sixteen years old at the time of disposition required the
court to give consideration to his wishes. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C) (“[T]he court
shall give consideration to the wishes of a child 14 years of age or older . . . regarding the
permanent termination of parental rights.”). Throughout the case and through C.S.’s own
testimony, C.S. consistently expressed his fear of his father. When asked by the court if he
       4
          Petitioner erroneously alleges that termination was inappropriate “when the least
restrictive alternative had already been accomplished through relinquishment of custodial
rights.” There is no evidence in the record that petitioner relinquished his custodial rights to the
child.

                                                  3
wanted to return to live with his father prior to turning eighteen, C.S. responded “no.”
Additionally, the circuit court made the findings necessary for termination of petitioner’s
parental rights upon ample evidence. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting a circuit
court to terminate parental rights upon finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions of neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and when necessary for the
child’s welfare); see also Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)
(permitting termination of parental rights “without the use of intervening less restrictive
alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect
or abuse can be substantially corrected”). Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to no relief.

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
June 30, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

ISSUED: May 16, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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