Court Opinion

ID: 9491222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:07:17.834149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:35.504583
License: Public Domain

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
views on the suggestion for rehearing in banc.
I write separately to point out that the decision of the court not to re-decide this case in banc does not bode the ominous portents suggested by my colleagues in dissent. Whether the panel has correctly implemented the modified rules of equivalency, as applied to the facts of this case, is of course of concern to all of us. Undoubtedly there will be continuing occasion to refine this complex area of law, in fulfillment of the process with which the Supreme Court has charged the Federal Circuit. However, although it is now apparent that there is more than one view of what was decided in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997), I can not find in this court’s remand opinion the accused “discount [of the Supreme Court’s] explicit language as unintended, unclear, uninformed, unfathomable, or whatever.”
The panel conscientiously implemented the Court’s new inquiry into whether an amendment was made for purposes of patentability, and found that an amendment made by Lit*1479ton under 35 U.S.C. § 112 was indeed made for purposes of patentability. The panel pointed out that equivalency is to be evaluated at the time of infringement — another important clarification by the Court, applicable to the facts of record in Litton — as is the Court’s resolution of whether the equitable issue of intent should be considered. The Court’s continued acceptance of equivalency as a question of fact for the jury is also pertinent to the remand. Although the panel had no need to consider the “all-elements rule” as applied to the claims at issue, the Court’s endorsement of that rule is also of significant effect.
Thus I am perplexed by the view of a colleague in dissent that the Court’s opinion in Wamer-Jenkinson would have “no meaningful effect on the doctrine of equivalents” unless the opinion is read as does the dissenter. In Wamer-Jenkinson the Court expressed particular concern for the notice function of patent claims, as a guide to the Federal Circuit as we continue to develop rules for the newly circumscribed doctrine of equivalents. But the Court did not hold that whenever a claim is amended for reasons of patentability, recourse to equivalency is barred absolutely. The Court did not overrule — and was not asked to overrule — our voluminous precedent wherein the scope of prosecution history estoppel is determined as the facts warrant. E.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1999 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“The effect may or may not be fatal to application of a range of equivalents broad enough to encompass a particular accused product. It is not fatal to application of the doctrine itself.”) Although the Federal Circuit has not been generous in its view of equivalency, it, like the Supreme Court, has recognized that the doctrine is an integral part of an effective patent system. The Court in Wamer-Jenkinson did not change that view, and did not act to effect the drastic limitation of the doctrine of equivalents that is postulated by dissenters.
Every patent practitioner knows how rare it is to conclude patent examination with claims that have not undergone amendment during prosecution, based on the examiner’s rejections on grounds of patentability. It is routine for claims to be rewritten several times during the give-and-take of the examination procedure. The practitioner knows, of course, about prosecution history estoppel. However, the practitioner understands that estoppel will be based on what was actually yielded, not that equivalency will be totally barred whenever any claim limitation is amended.
The interpretation of my respected colleagues in dissent can not be reconciled with the Court’s statements, upon considering the views of the United States and other amici, that the doctrine of equivalents serves a useful purpose. It is unlikely that the. Court, while stressing that it is preserving the doctrine of equivalents in the interest of justice, made an arcane ruling that would eliminate access to the doctrine of equivalents in almost every ease. Whether to bar all equivalency to any claim limitation amended for reasons of patentability was not at issue in Warner-Jenkinson. Such a far-reaching ruling as the dissenters postulate can not have been reached by indirection, yet missed by the many commentators on the Wamer-Jen-kinson opinion. The historic custom and culture of patent soliciting, wherein applicants present claims of varying scope and then work out the coverage in interaction with the examiner, would be affected, along with the scope of countless patents prosecuted and issued under those customs. This can not be the “face value” of the Court’s holding. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. at 1050 n. 6, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1872 n. 6 (“To change so substantially the rules of the game now could very well subvert the various balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision”); id. at n. 7 (“We do not suggest that, where a change is made to overcome an objection based on the prior art, a court is free to review the correctness of that objection.... What is permissible for a court to explore is the reason (right or wrong) for the objection and the manner in which the amendment addressed and avoided the objection.”)
*1480The petitioner in Warner-Jenkinson was directly concerned with the issue of whether the Hilton-Davis patent’s claims were amended for reasons other than patentability, for infringement turned on the question of equivalency of the pH limit of 6.0. Although my colleague in dissent states that the Court’s new presumption (about whether an amendment was made for purposes of pat-entability) “adds not much to the law,” it was of critical importance to these litigants. It is unwarranted to trivialize the Court’s reasoning on the dispositive issue in Warner-Jenkinson, in order to promote the argument that the Court intended to massively enlarge the restrictions on equivalency by placing an automatic and complete estoppel on every claim aspect for which the applicant argued patentability. Such a change in the law of the Court and this circuit requires exploration, not indirection.
Undoubtedly the rules of equivalency will receive continuing and careful refinement, as experience accumulates of the practical needs and policy concerns that are served by this doctrine. This court’s action in the case at bar is in the direction of this evolution.