Court Opinion

ID: 9709738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:47.986469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:51.165010
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
I agree that Eldon's cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations but for a different reason than that stated in the majority opinion. In my opinion, Chopra and Chaiken's act of selling the stock in question in June of 1982 constituted the act of conversion. From and after that date, neither Chopra nor Chaiken engaged in any conduct to prevent inquiry, elude investigation, or mislead and hinder Eldon from obtaining the knowledge that a cause of action existed. Therefore, in my opinion, the statute of limitations was not "tolled" by concealment. However, under the discovery rule adopted by our supreme court in Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 84, the statute of limitations began to run less than two (2) years preceding the initiation of an action by Eldon against Chopra and Chaiken in federal court. "[T)he cause of action of a tort claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another." - Wehling v. Citizens National Bank (1992), Ind., 586 N.E.2d 840, 843. Here, the evidence supports the fact find*350er's determination that Eldon was unaware and, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could not have been aware of the act of conversion until the Bartons requested the sale of the subject stock. Only after that time did Eldon discover and have reason to discover that the stock was not in the Barton account. Inasmuch as these events occurred in late June or early July of 1983, and this action was timely filed in state court under the Journey Account's statute, the statute of limitations is not a bar to this action.
As the majority opinion recognizes, this action was not limited to an action for criminal conversion. See at 345. Therefore, I also concur in result because I disagree with the implication in the majority opinion (see at 348-844) that mens rea is an element of tortious conversion. See Coffel v. Perry (1983), Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 1066, 1069. Eldon's action is an action for tor-tious conversion and not criminal conversion.
Otherwise, I concur in the majority opinion.