Court Opinion

ID: 9451716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:22:14.443213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:51.385769
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the Judgment but avail myself of the opportunity to comment on some of the language contained in the opinion.
I refer first to the statement, “it is now settled that ‘the exhaustion principle is a matter of comity, not a matter of jurisdiction’ ”. For fear of the possibility that this may be taken out of context and therefore misapprehended, I would elaborate upon this language by pointing out that Fay v. Noia did state that 28 U.S.C., Section 2254 is not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power.
As to that exercise of power, Congress specifically directed in Section 2254 that:
“An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.”
Whippier v. Balkcom did state that the exhaustion principle is a matter of comity, not a matter of jurisdiction, but went on to say “[i]f the habeas petitioner raises constitutional issues he has never presented to the state courts, and if the *311applicant may still present those issues, he must first exhaust his state remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus”.
Therefore, in the ordinary habeas corpus proceeding, even though the federal district court has jurisdiction it is not due to exercise it unless available state remedies have been exhausted.
The District Judge originally directed that this prisoner be released unless the State of Florida commenced a new trial within 120 days. Situations can be visualized in which a specific limitation, measured by a specific number of days, would be justifiable, such as the likelihood that the prisoner’s term is scheduled for early expiration. On the other hand, the judgments of the District Court are subject to appeal. Moreover, temporary unavailability of witnesses, illness of witnesses, illness of prosecutors, or like circumstances unavoidably rendering it impossible to bring the prisoner to a new trial within a certain time, must be taken into consideration. I understand that our judgment here allows the State “a reasonable time” in which to take permissible action. To me, this is the sound rule to follow in such matters. Granting that some state authorities might be guilty of delaying tactics, the presumption is to the contrary, and should such arise the prisoner has only to bring it appropriately to the attention of the District Court for appropriate relief.
It was made known at the Bar of the Court that counsel for the prisoner did not advise an appeal because of his fear that the prisoner might get the death penalty if he were granted a new trial. As the law stands in Florida this did not excuse his failure to advise his client and to allow him to make his own decision as to that hazard. Nevertheless, it is a real consideration in cases of this kind. There have been instances in which the prisoner obtained his new trial in a capital case, only to suffer the death penalty after a new trial. Cf. Kehoe v. State, Mississippi, 18 So.2d 456, 1944.