Court Opinion

ID: 9783918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:22:00.907969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:27.881101
License: Public Domain

PAUL DANIELSON, Justice, dissenting in part and concurring in part. While I disagree with the majority, I readily acknowledge that reasonable people could differ on this case. Here, I disagree with the majority on four specific points: (1) that there was a violation of Canon 4(G) by Judge Simes; (2) that Judge Simes violated Canon 4(E); (3) that the Commission followed its own rules; and (4) that Judge Simes should be suspended without pay until the end of his current term. Further, I agree that Judge Simes’s due-process rights |29were not violated, but for different reasons than those of the majority. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part. While I agree with the majority that Judge Simes’s failure to act clearly violated Canon 2, I would reject the Commission’s recommendation of removal, but would suspend Judge Simes for ninety days without pay. Let me begin by stating that I in no way sanction or condone Judge Simes’s failure to act regarding the Chandler Estate. He clearly should have removed himself as attorney for the Estate and administrator upon receiving Ms. Corbin’s letter. Indeed, his failure to do so and his failure to act responsibly as an attorney or administrator would be subject to review, either in a court of law or before the Professional Conduct Committee. However, I cannot agree that his failure to act after taking office violated the plain language of Canons 4(G) and 4(E), for the following reasons. I. Canon 1¡.(G) Canon 4(G) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: G. Practice of Law. A judge shall not practice law or appear as counsel in any court within this state. Notwithstanding this prohibition, a judge may act pro se and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judge’s family- Ark.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 4(G) (2006). In Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 253, 16 S.W.3d 212 (2000), this court relied on the following to define “practice of law”: It is quite true that the practice of law is not confined to services by an attorney in a court of justice; it also includes any service of a legal nature rendered outside of courts and unrelated to matters pending in the courts. (Citations omitted.) It is |snuniformly held that writing and interpreting wills, contracts, trust agreements, and the giving of legal advice in general constitute practicing law. 341 Ark. at 268, 16 S.W.3d at 216 (quoting Undem v. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 266 Ark. 683, 692, 587 S.W.2d 563, 568 (1979) (analyzing “engaged in the active practice of law”)) (emphasis in original removed). We have further defined “practice of law” in our Regulations of the Arkansas Continuing Legal Education Board: The practice of law shall be defined as any service rendered, regardless of whether compensation is received therefor, involving legal knowledge or legal advice. It shall include representation, provision of counsel, advocacy, whether in or out of court, rendered with respect to the rights, duties, regulations, liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the legal services. It shall encompass all public and private positions in which the attorney may be called upon to examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law. Ark. Continuing Legal Education Bd. Reg. § 2.02 (2009). As to this canon, Judge Simes urges that there is a lack of evidence that he ever practiced law after becoming a judge. However, the Commission submits that Judge Simes engaged in the practice of law “by failing to ensure that he had withdrawn from further proceedings in the Chandler Estate once he claimed to have been terminated by [Ms.] Corbin.” Additionally, the Commission points to Judge Simes’s continued acceptance of rental payments as farther evidence of his practice of law. The Commission’s argument is nonsensical. It is clear from our definitions of the practice of law that a service of legal nature must be rendered to indeed “practice law.” Here, Judge Simes negligently failed to act. He did fail to remove himself from representing the Chandler Estate upon receiving Ms. Corbin’s letter; however, that failure took place well [S1 before he became a judge. Further, he neglected to do anything with the rental checks he received after becoming a judge, except to file them away. But, did this failure to act constitute the practice of law or an admission of the practice of law? I cannot say that it did. To practice law, Judge Simes had to render a service of a legal nature to another. That he did not do, in my opinion, where he failed to act on behalf of the Estate. Furthermore, the Commission presented no evidence that Judge Simes rendered any service of a legal nature to another during his time on the bench. And, as the majority acknowledges, merely remaining listed as the attorney of record does not equate to the practice of law. While the Commission urges that the acceptance of rental checks is further evidence of Judge Simes’s practice of law, he received those payments in his capacity as an administrator of the Estate, not as attorney for the Estate. Moreover, the evidence in the record demonstrates that, while Judge Simes received certain checks, he did nothing with them but file them away. Under these facts, I simply cannot say that Judge Simes’s failure to ensure his withdrawal or his acceptance and filing of rental checks constituted the practice of law, or service of a legal nature to another. I am further troubled by the majority’s observations that Judge Simes engaged in the practice of law in that he corresponded with the probate clerks regarding his role and the rental checks, that “he worked actively” with the attorney for the Estate to construct an accounting, and that he appeared before the circuit court while a judge. Part of Judge Simes’s defense against the instant charges was that he took no action because he feared it would be | ¡^interpreted as practicing law. Indeed, his fears have come true. It seems to me that these actions are precisely those we would wish taken under such circumstances. Each of these actions was clearly an attempt to remedy the situation; surely no one would rather Judge Simes have ignored the situation in toto. Moreover, Judge Simes represented himself and was in no way acting as counsel for another when he appeared before Judge Arnold, as the Estate had other counsel at that time.1 To find that these actions constituted the practice of law while he was serving as a judge and to penalize Judge Simes for them is simply a misinterpretation and misapplication of the canon. For these reasons, it is my opinion that the Commission’s finding that Judge Simes violated Canon 4(G) was clearly erroneous. II. Canon k(E) Canon 4(E) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part: (1) A judge shall not serve as executor, administrator or other personal representative, trustee, guardian, attorney in fact or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the judge’s family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. Ark.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 4(E)(1) (2006). Here, Judge Simes argues that while he was listed as administrator of the Estate, he did not “serve” as administrator while he was a judge. He contends that because he refrained from any involvement in the Estate after he became a judge, there is no evidence that he served as administrator. I agree. bit is undisputed that Judge Simes remained listed as the administrator of the Chandler Estate even after he became a judge in 1997. However, I cannot say that simply being listed or named on the court docket as an administrator equates to service. “Serve” has been defined as “to hold an office: discharge a duty or function: act in a capacity.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2075 (2002). The question then is did Judge Simes act as an administrator while serving as a circuit judge? The answer is clearly no. The record before us demonstrates that, while Judge Simes received certain rental checks from Mr. Young for the Chandler property after taking office, Judge Simes did not deposit them or remit them to the Chandler heirs. Instead, he turned over to Jesse Daggett the uncashed checks he had received. Nor does the record contain any evidence that Judge Simes acted, in any way, on behalf of the Estate or in the capacity as administrator, while a judge. That being said, the Commission argues that Judge Simes’s failure to perform professionally or with the diligence required by the fiduciary relationship he undertook damaged the Estate and undermined confidence in the bench, thereby violating Canon 4(E). However, the canon clearly speaks to one’s service, not one’s failure to serve. I fail to see the Commission’s logic in its assertion that Judge Simes’s failure to perform as a fiduciary equates to service as a fiduciary in violation of Canon 4(E). Finally, Judge Simes did submit a petition for fees that included one hour and fifteen minutes of time spent while he was a judge. However, I cannot say that the submission of |34the fee petition constituted service as an administrator. Instead, I find that submission much more probative of Judge Simes’s violation of Canon 2. Because I cannot say that merely being listed or named as an administrator constitutes service,2 nor can I say that the failure to act by Judge Simes after assuming the bench constituted service as an administrator, I would hold that the Commission’s finding that Judge Simes’s conduct violated Canon 4(E)(1) was clearly erroneous. III. Due-Process Rights While I agree with the majority that Judge Simes’s due-process rights were not violated, I do so for different reasons. In addition, it is clear to me that the Commission failed to comply with its own rules; however, its noncompliance did not violate Judge Simes’s due-process rights. A. Meaningful Notice Judge Simes asserts that the investigation by the Commission of his involvement with the Chandler Estate began well before 2006, when the complaint in 06-171 was filed. He contends that the Commission gave him no notice when the investigation was actually begun and that he was prejudiced by that lack of notice. Specifically, he avers that the Commission’s failure to abide by Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(D) prejudiced him by 13r,denying him his clear right of dismissal of the instant action, as he claims is mandated by Rule 8, and by rendering him unable to adequately defend himself during the proceedings before the Phillips County Circuit Court and the Committee on Professional Conduct. The Commission, in turn, acknowledges that it received information regarding Judge Simes’s conduct in the Chandler matter prior to the filing of the formal complaint in the instant case, 06-171; acknowledges that its investigator had made preliminary inquiries concerning Judge Simes and the Chandler matter when information regarding such was disclosed during earlier, separate investigations of him; and acknowledges that as part of its investigation of another complaint, it contacted Judge Bell regarding the Chandler matter. The Commission, however, contends that it was “simply involved in the investigation of information or inferences before opening a case against Judge Simes, reflecting the [Commission’s] obligation not to proceed with the disciplinary process without proper investigation and evaluation of the information forwarded to it.” Finally, the Commission urges that Judge Simes has wholly failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of the notice requirement. This court has previously held that the removal of a commissioner by the governor and the discipline of attorneys are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature and that one so charged is therefore entitled to procedural due process, including fair notice of the charge. See Stilley v. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 370 Ark. 294, 259 S.W.3d 395 (2007) (citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968)) (attorney discipline); Rockefeller v. Hogue, 246 Ark. 712, 439 S.W.2d 805 (1969) (citing Ruffalo, supra) (removal of a commissioner). A judge accused of misconduct, then, is entitled to no less. See In re Deming, 108 Wash.2d 82, 736 P.2d 639 (1987). The 2006 Rules of Procedure of the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission set forth the procedure to be followed regarding the conduct of a judge at the time the instant complaint was filed.3 Rule 8 of those procedures provides, in pertinent part: A. Initiation of Inquiry. In accordance with these rules, any information submitted by a complainant or otherwise brought to the attention of the Commission stating facts that, if true, would be grounds for discipline shall initiate an inquiry relating to the conduct of the judge. The Commission on its own motion may make inquiry with respect to the conduct of a judge. B. Screening. Upon receipt of a complaint or other information as to conduct that might constitute grounds for discipline of a judge, the executive officer shall make a prompt, discreet, and confidential investigation and evaluation. Under guidelines approved by the Commission, and in light of the initial investigation and evaluation, the executive officer shall determine whether there exists sufficient cause to proceed to a probable cause determination. The executive officer shall dismiss all complaints for which sufficient cause to proceed is not found. A report as to matters so dismissed shall be furnished to the Commission at its next meeting. The complainant, if any, and the judge, if he has been given notice thereof, shall be informed in writing of the dismissal. C. Optional Notice to the Judge. Notice to the judge that a complaint has been received or an inquiry undertaken may be given at any time. D. Mandatory Notice to the Judge. Except on good cause shown and with the approval of the Commission, no action other than dismissal of the complaint shall be taken as to any complaint about which the judge is not notified within ninety (90) days of the receipt of such complaint. [wArk. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(A)-(D) (emphasis added). Here, the Commission admits that it received earlier information and conducted an investigation of Judge Simes and his involvement in the Chandler Estate, but asserts that he received timely notice of the complaint the Commission received by attorney Ashley Higgins, which served as the basis for case 06-171. My review of the record reveals that perhaps as early as 2004, the Commission had knowledge of Judge Simes and the Chandler matter. Specifically, the record reflects the following evidence of that knowledge: (1) an affidavit by Judge Kathleen Bell regarding events in the matter and stating her recusal from the matter, but referencing a 2004 complaint;4 (2) a letter from attorney Charles Halbert regarding both the Chandler matter and another matter involving Judge Simes, dated February 22, 2005; (3) a letter dated March 8, 2005, from the Commission to Judge Bell, requesting a responsive letter on the status of the Chandler Estate case; (4) a letter from Judge Bell to the Commission, dated March 16, 2005, stating that she had recused from the Chandler matter; (5) a letter from the Committee on Professional Conduct, dated October 31, 2005, forwarding a copy of Judge Arnold’s order in the Chandler Estate; and finally, (6) the March 16, 2006 letter of Mr. Higgins. Guided by the language of Rule 8, it would appear from the record before us that there were at least two specific prior lascomplaints regarding Judge Simes’s involvement in the Chandler Estate, specifically, the February 22, 2005 letter from Mr. Halbert and the October 31, 2005 letter from the Committee on Professional Conduct. Yet, the record fails to reflect that the Commission ever notified Judge Simes of these complaints. While the Commission, pursuant to Rule 8, was permitted to conduct preliminary investigations into each of the earlier complaints, it does not appear from the record that the proper procedures were followed by the Commission with respect to these earlier complaints. According to the rule, based on those initial investigations and evaluations, the director of the Commission was to “determine whether there exist[ed] sufficient cause to proceed to a probable cause determination.” Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(B). If there was not sufficient cause to proceed, the director was to dismiss the complaints. See id. In doing so, a report to the Commission was to be made of matters so dismissed. See id. No record of such a report has been provided by the Commission. In addition, the rules also require that no action other than dismissal of the complaints should have been taken where Judge Simes had not been notified within ninety days of the receipt of the complaints, unless good cause is shown and the Commission has approved. See id. Again, the record lacks any provision of notice to Judge Simes of either of the earlier complaints, nor any dismissal thereof.5  [fflBased on the record before this court, it is clear to me that the Commission failed to follow the procedures set forth in Rule 8 with respect to the two earlier complaints the Commission received in 2005. However, I cannot say that the Commission’s failure to follow its procedures was “so violative of due process as to raise the concern that fundamental fairness may not have attached.” In re Kirby, 854 N.W.2d 410, 416 (Minn.1984) (holding that, despite concern about the insufficient notice given to the respondent judge, the Board on Judicial Standards’s ignoring its own rules was not violative of due process). Procedural due process requires that a judge be given notice of the proceedings, that the judge be given an opportunity to be heard, and that the proceedings against the judge be essentially fair. See In re Graziano, 696 So.2d 744 (Fla.1997). While Judge Simes urges that the Commission’s failure to notify him of the prior complaints rendered him unable to adequately defend himself during the proceedings before the Phillips County Circuit Court and the Committee on Professional Conduct, that is of no moment, as the issue with respect to procedural due process is whether the instant proceedings were fair, and they were. Whether Judge Simes would have been able to better defend himself before the circuit court and the Committee on Professional Conduct would depend on the notice provided in each of those proceedings, not on any notice of the prior |4i)complaints against him. Further, Judge Simes’s claim that the Commission’s failure to follow its rules with respect to the earlier complaints precluded his right to a dismissal of the instant action is too without merit. Again, the Commission followed its rule with respect to Mr. Higgins’s complaint, which was the basis of this case against him, 06-171; therefore, he was not entitled to a dismissal of the instant action. Here, Judge Simes has failed to demonstrate any violation of his procedural due-process rights, as it is clear from the record that he received timely notice of the complaint by Ashley Higgins that served as the basis for this case, 06-171; that he was given, and clearly took advantage of, the opportunity to be heard by the Commission; and that the proceedings against him were fair. B. Promptness of Probable Cause Hearing Judge Simes further contends that the Commission did not provide him with a prompt probable cause hearing, where he received notice of the action on March 27, 2006, and the probable cause hearing was not held until March 21, 2008. The Commission, in turn, urges that any delay in the holding of the probable cause hearing was due to Judge Simes’s failure to file an answer to the complaint until March 18, 2008.6  |t1The 2006 rules clearly contemplate a prompt probable cause hearing. According to the Procedures, if, after the initial investigation and evaluation, it appears there is sufficient cause to proceed, a sworn complaint7 shall be obtained from the complainant or a clear statement of allegations against the judge shall be prepared by the director of the Commission. See Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(E). Then, the sworn complaint or statement of allegations shall immediately be served upon the judge. See Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(G). Within twenty days after service of the sworn complaint or statement of allegations, the judge shall file a written answer or may personally appear. See Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(H). Upon receipt and review of that answer, the Commission may terminate the proceeding and dismiss the complaint, giving notice to the judge and complainant. See Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(1). The Commission also has the right to amend the allegations, prior to a finding of probable cause, provided that notice and an opportunity to respond within ten days is given to the judge. See Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 8(J). It then “shall promptly schedule and hold a formal meeting,” termed a “probable cause determination.” Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm’n R. 9(C). While the Commission urges that the delay was Judge Simes’s, that was not the case. Here, Mr. Higgins’s complaint was received by the Commission on March 20, 2006, and |42notice of it was provided to Judge Simes on March 27, 2006. On May 11, 2006, the Commission again notified Judge Simes of the complaint against him. However, the record reveals that it was not until January 30, 2008, that the Commission provided its statement of allegations against Judge Simes to him. Pursuant to the rules, it was not until after the statement of allegations was served upon Judge Simes that he was required to answer.8  Based on the record before this court, it certainly appears to me that any delay in conducting the probable-cause hearing was of the Commission’s making, as it did not serve the statement of allegations on Judge Simes until some twenty-two months after its receipt of the initial complaint by Mr. Higgins. That being said, it is clear to me that this lapse did not violate Judge Simes’s procedural due-process rights. Again, procedural due process requires that a judge be given notice of the proceedings, that the judge be given an opportunity to be heard, and that the proceedings against the judge be essentially fair. See Graziano, supra. As already set forth above, those requirements were met in the instant case, and Judge Simes’s procedural due-process rights were not violated by the delay in his probable-cause hearing. For these reasons, I concur with the majority that Judge Simes’s due-process rights were not violated. [WIV. Recommendation I turn, then, to the Commission’s recommendation that Judge Simes’s actions compel his removal from his position of circuit judge. It is evident from the record that Judge Simes’s choices in handling the Chandler Estate matter while on the bench were not the most prudent professionally or were the choices that a majority of judges in his situation would have made. However, that is not our standard for determining disciplinary action. We have observed that “[wjhether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the text [of the canons] and should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.” Thompson, 341 Ark. at 280, 16 S.W.3d at 227 (quoting Preamble, Ark.Code Jud. Conduct). As noted by the majority, we have further recognized certain factors to be considered in determining the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct, including: (1) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (2) the nature, extent, and frequence of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (3) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (4) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in his private life; (5) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (6) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his conduct; (7) the length of time of service on the bench; (8) whether there have been prior complaints |44about this judge; (9) the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (10) the extent to which the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires. See id. It is clear that Judge Simes’s actions prior to assuming the bench were not the epitome of what one expects from an attorney. However, he was sanctioned by our Office of Professional Conduct for those lapses in judgment. That additional lapses of judgment took place after Judge Simes took office is also most evident and does require some sort of sanction. Like the majority, however, I cannot agree with the Commission’s recommendation that Judge Simes’s lapses in judgment are of the sort that require his removal from the bench. Certainly, Judge Simes’s situation is one of which many lawyers who assume the bench should take note, but that, again, does not warrant removal in this case. While the Commission presented evidence of other sanctioned behavior by Judge Simes, it does not appear that he previously engaged in the actions that served as the basis of this case, nor does it appear that Judge Simes’s actions greatly affected the judicial system. His misconduct took place outside of the courtroom, not in his capacity as a judge, and Judge Simes seems to acknowledge that the acts occurred. The acts in this case appear to have been isolated and do not appear to require any additional change or modification on Judge Simes’s part, nor do I believe that Judge Simes exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires; instead, he was lackadaisical in exercising his professional judgment. While he has served as a judge for approximately twelve years, and he has had prior complaints filed against him for |4Swhich he has already been sanctioned, the instant allegations, after examining all of the factors in determining the appropriate sanction, simply do not require Judge Simes’s removal. While the majority agrees, it has suspended Judge Simes until the next election for his particular judicial seat. It has further precluded him from the practice of law during his suspension. For all intents and purposes, then, it has removed him, which I believe to be extremely harsh.9 Such a sanction, in my opinion, should be reserved for intentional conduct that is harmful to the integrity of the judiciary, not negligent lapses in judgment. As the majority acknowledges, Judge Simes’s misconduct is in no way as egregious as that in Thompson. Accordingly, taking a reasonable and reasoned application of the text of the canons; looking at the seriousness of the transgression, whether there was a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system; and examining the factors set forth above, as I must under our case law, it is my opinion that Judge Simes violated only Canon 2 and should be suspended for ninety days without pay. For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.  . Canon 4(G) specifically permits a judge to act pro se.   . While the failure to move a court to remove one’s self from a case or from an appointment as a fiduciary once a judgeship election has been won is not the most prudent or diligent behavior, I simply cannot say that the failure to do so constitutes service in violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct. In many cases, such a failure may merely be an oversight on the part of the judge-elect.   . I note that the rules were the same in both 2004 and 2005; thus, the same rules apply to the complaints alleged by Judge Simes to have been brought in those years.   . According to the testimony of Lance Wom-ack, the Commission’s investigator, he thought the earliest allusion to the Chandler Estate matter may have come from attorney Charles Halbert in 2004 in case 04-206. While Judge Bell’s affidavit was undated, the heading of the affidavit reveals that it was in reference to “Complainant No. 04-206.”   . The majority mistakenly concludes that Rule 7(a) rendered any notice of the prior complaints by the Commission to Judge Simes unnecessary; however, that rule does not speak to when a judge shall receive notice. Rule 7 is entitled "Disclosure” and addresses the confidentiality requirements for the Commission and when the Commission’s actions shall be made public. Pursuant to Rule 8, the Commission, at the very least, if no notice was provided to Judge Simes, was required to dismiss the earlier complaints after ninety days. Again, there is no record that the Commission did so in compliance with the rules.   . The Commission seems to misconstrue Judge Simes's argument. His argument is only that the Commission failed to promptly make a probable cause determination, not that it failed to promptly dispose of the charges. Thus, while the Commission points to what it claims were numerous requests for continuances by Judge Simes, those requests were made after the date of the probable cause hearing, so it is clear that they had no bearing on the promptness of the hearing itself.   . This sworn complaint is entirely separate from the complaint originally received by the Commission relating to a judge.   . In its brief, the Commission states that Judge Simes was required to answer the complaint within twenty days. It is wrong. A plain reading of the 2006 rules reveals that the judge shall answer within twenty days of the sworn complaint or statement of allegations. See Ark. Jud. Discipline & Disability Comm'n R. 8(H).   . Even if I agreed with the majority that Judge Simes violated Canons 4(G) and 4(E), I would still disagree with the majority’s sanction, after examining the Thompson factors.