Court Opinion

ID: 9517228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:10:36.927994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:55.272457
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice.
Appellant Wintersun Lemieux was convicted and sentenced in St. Louis County District Court for the crime of first-degree murder in connection with the death of 68-year-old Irwin Teitelbaum. On appeal, Lemieux challenges the admission of evidence as having been derived from an illegal warrantless entry into his residence. Concluding that the entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, we affirm.
Teitelbaum lived with his wife at 3 East 13th Street in the Harbor View housing complex in Duluth. The housing complex consisted of multi-unit homes, somewhat similar to condominiums with separate entrances and no common hallway. Teitel-baum delivered newspapers for the Duluth News-Tribune for some 15 years, having taken over the route from his sons. As a matter routine, he would pick up the bundle of newspapers as soon as they were delivered. On July 9, 2003, when Teitel-baum’s wife woke up, neither Teitelbaum nor the newspapers were there. She looked out the front window, saw her husband lying motionless on his back with blood all over his face, and called 911. The call came in to dispatch at 6:15 a.m.
Responding officers found Teitelbaum’s body on the sidewalk. He had sustained massive trauma to the head, and there was blood on his clothes and a nearby canvas newspaper bag. He had been disrobed, except for a sock on one foot, and his clothes were scattered around the yard. *785Around 6:40 a.m., shortly after the officers cordoned off the area with crime scene tape, one of the officers saw Lemieux riding by the crime scene in a USA minivan taxi.1 The officer called the cab company and found out that the minivan taxi’s fare had originated from 729 West 4th Street. Officers canvassed the area in the “line of sight” of the homicide, but came away with nothing pertinent.
The officer in charge of the investigation, Lieutenant Robert Brasel, convened a major-crime briefing at 10:30 a.m. to discuss what they knew and to “brainstorm” and prioritize what needed to be done. During the meeting, Tawnya Rainey’s name was mentioned. Rainey resided at 15 East 13th Street, about a half block from the crime scene. Rainey was frequently gone from the residence during the summer but would still “pop in and out,” and she also allowed others to stay there so there was a lot of “traffic” through that residence. The officers had previously had problems with that residence, including some criminal behavior; but because Rainey continued to pay the rent, they felt somewhat constrained in what they could do about it. Lieutenant Brasel decided to have an officer go to 15 East 13th Street in an effort to make contact with Rainey' or any other occupants of the residence; he assigned that task to Sergeant Jon Haataja, specifically directing that if nobody was home, no officer was to enter the residence without talking to him (Brasel) first.
Meanwhile, Officer Shana Harris, who was among the first to arrive at the Teitel-baum crime scene but missed the briefing in order to complete her report, returned to Harbor View to do her own canvassing, intending to contact people she knew to see if they could provide any information on the homicide. She asked the Harbor View housing specialist, Susan Jordan, about problem residences, and Jordan brought up Rainey’s name. Officer Harris was familiar with Rainey and had already tried calling her, but Rainey’s phone number had been disconnected. After speaking with Jordan, Harris drove to 15 East 13th Street to do a “knock and talk” with Rainey or anyone else at that residence.
Sergeant Haataja and Officer Harris arrived at 15 East 13th Street at about the same time. When the officers approached the front of the residence, they saw that the screen on the window to the right side of the door had been torn loose, the window had been pushed up, and the door was “slightly open, not latched.” They could hear music playing inside, and a CD sounded like it was skipping. Haataja began pounding on the door loud enough to be heard over the music as Harris shouted out Rainey’s name, calling for her to answer the door. While this was going on, a neighbor from the adjacent dwelling stepped out and told Harris that he had heard someone inside 15 East 13th Street singing “that night.” The officers were concerned that a burglary had occurred. Around noon, approximately 14 minutes after the officers’ arrival, Haataja called Lieutenant Brasel to report what they had observed. Brasel told them to call for backup and to do a “health and welfare” check for possible injured occupants, emphasizing that they were looking for injured persons, not searching or doing anything else. Part of the reason Haataja was given this assignment was that Brasel knew Haataja “understood that.”
Sergeant Haataja and Officer Harris, joined by two other officers, entered the residence with their firearms drawn and did a quick sweep of the floors, “clearing” the rooms as they moved through. As *786Haataja walked through the kitchen after cheeking the back door to make sure it was locked, he saw Teitelbaum’s electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card in plain view. After the sweep-search, the residence was secured and a search warrant obtained. While Haataja was guarding the back entrance pending the arrival of the search warrant and trying to be of more use, he called Lemieux’s probation officer to see if he had an address for Lemieux. Meanwhile, as Harris was guarding the front entrance, the neighbor told her that Lem-ieux had been staying at the Rainey residence. During the execution of the search warrant, police officers found blood smears, that were later determined to match Teitelbaum’s DNA profile, underneath the exterior window and inside on the banister leading to the basement; miscellaneous items belonging to Teitelbaum below the interior window sill; and a credit union envelope, that contained $180 in cash, with Lemieux’s and Teitelbaum’s fingerprints.
In their investigation, police officers learned that the USA minivan taxi that drove by the crime scene on July 9, 2003, had picked up Lemieux from 729 West 4th Street at 6:35 a.m. Lemieux gave the driver $3 in change, wanted to go to Harbor View, and asked whether the driver had heard “if anything exciting” was “going on.” The driver dropped off Lemieux shortly after driving by the crime scene because the cab fare meter had gone Beyond the amount of money he had given her.
The police also learned that Lemieux showed up at 729 West 4th Street in the early morning hours of July 9, 2003. He was alone, “pretty frantic, breathing hard,” and holding a baseball bat. He had blood on his hands and his clothes. He asked the resident, Tracy Wentland, for a change of clothes, and she showed him where an ex-boyfriend had left some clothing. Lem-ieux left his own clothing in a garbage bag in Wentland’s basement. He told Went-land “the whole story”: that he had hit somebody with the baseball bat, that the man was dead, and that he took the man’s clothing off and threw it in the garbage. Wentland called a cab and gave Lemieux $3 in change for the cab fare. During a warranted search of Wentland’s residence, police officers found Lemieux’s clothing and a baseball bat. Forensic testing of the clothing yielded profiles matching Teitel-baum’s' DNA; and the bat had DNA matching Lemieux’s profile on the shaft and Teitelbaum’s profile on the tip.
Lemieux was arrested in the afternoon of July 9, 2003; and following a Miranda waiver, Lieutenant John Beyer questioned him about his activities over the previous 24 hours. Lemieux said that he had been staying at Rainey’s residence, and that on July 8 he got up at 5 p.m., went downtown, and started drinking. He returned to the residence around 11:30 p.m. He said that he did not have a key, but the door was unlocked. He continued to drink and fell asleep. He denied hurting or fighting with an older man in the Harbor View area but admitted slapping and kicking somebody who was in his mid-twenties. Lemieux wanted to know how his name “[came] up in this;” and when told that his name came up because he was in a cab that morning, he said, “So you have got me in here over that?” The next day, the officer told Lem-ieux that he was going to be charged with second-degree murder and that a grand jury would be convened to seek first-degree murder charges. Lemieux responded, “That’s not right, it wasn’t premeditated.”
Lemieux was indicted by grand jury for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and second-degree murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. *787§§ 609.185(a)(1), (a)(3), and 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). While awaiting trial, Lemieux told the police that they “wouldn’t have to go through all of this if [they] would just get him a better deal.” Lemieux went on to say, “I’m not saying I didn’t do it, but you need to get me a better deal.” When asked what he meant by a “better deal,” Lemieux said, “Something other than first-degree.”
Before trial, Lemieux moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the war-rantless sweep-search of 15 East 13th Street, and all evidence derived from that search. Following a three-day omnibus hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding that the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement. At trial, in addition to evidence from the search, the state presented the physical evidence and forensic analysis of the evidence collected from 729 West 4th Street; and also evidence from the crime scene, including Lemieux’s bloody thumbprint on top of the bundle of newspapers, a water bottle with Lemieux’s fingerprints and DNA, and miscellaneous papers with bloody shoe prints similar to the treads on Lemieux’s shoes. There were also Lem-ieux’s police statements. The resident from 729 West 4th Street testified about Lemieux’s confession made in the early morning hours of July 9, 2003, and the taxi driver testified about picking up Lemieux from that residence and driving him by the crime scene. The medical examiner testified that Teitelbaum’s death was caused by blunt-force trauma to the head and neck region, and that he died relatively quickly after the attack started. Witnesses for the defense included a Harbor View resident who, at around 4 a.m. on July 9, 2003, heard people arguing near the Teitelbaum residence; she could not see them, but estimated there were three men. Another Harbor View resident testified that at around 4:50 a.m. on that date, she saw a shirtless, “gangly” young man crashing through the bushes. She saw only one person and did not hear anything, like an argument. The jury found Lemieux guilty as charged, and he was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for the mandatory life term.
On appeal from the judgment, Lemieux challenges the admission of evidence derived from the warrantless sweep-search of 15 East 13th Street.
When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures “should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Minn.1998). The district court’s findings of fact should be reviewed for clear error. Id. at 383.
The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law,’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (footnote omitted). “ ‘[A]t the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home.’ ” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, and law enforcement officers, in pursuing a community-caretak-ing function, “may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency , assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occu*788pant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006);- see also State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.1992).
In applying the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, two principles must be kept in mind: first, that the burden is on the state to demonstrate that police conduct was justified under the exception; and second, that an objective standard should be applied to determine the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that there was an emergency. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223.2 In determining whether an emergency justified a warrant-less entry, a number of courts had followed a three-prong test articulated in People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1976):
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.
See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2000); People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 479-80 (Colo.2002); see John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 433, 532-33 (1999) (proposing a three-prong test as an aid in evaluating justification under the emergency-aid exception). Brigham City, however, rejected the second prong, the subjective motivations of the officers. 126 S.Ct. at 1948 (stating that the officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes).
“But a warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation’ * ⅜ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Any search of a residence following a warrantless entry must be “limited by the type of emergency involved. It cannot be used as the occasion for a general voyage of discovery unrelated to the purpose of the entry.” United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that even if original entry of cabin had been justified under the emergency-aid exception, search of defendant’s backpack for identification was unreasonable). See also Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 891-92 (holding initial entry of apartment to locate methamphetamine lab under the emergency exception was justified, but subsequent entry by investigator was not, given that “the risk of explosion had been defused”).
*789When assessing the reasonableness of an emergency-aid search, the officer who conducts the search' is imputed with knowledge of all facts known by other officers involved in the investigation, as long as the officers have some degree of communication between them. See United States v. Twiss, 127 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir.1997); see also State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn.1997) (using collective-knowledge approach to analyze a war-rantless arrest). Actual communication of information to the officer conducting the search is unnecessary. See Twiss, 127 F.3d at 774.
Here, Lieutenant Brasel testified that he sent Sergeant Haataja to 15 East 13th Street to make contact with anyone using the premises; and Officer Harris testified that she, on her own volition, decided to go to that residence to do a “knock and talk.” While Haataja testified that he was there to do a “welfare check,” the record is not entirely clear as to what he meant by that; but in any event, he adhered to his instructions not to enter the premises without authorization. The district court found that the officers’ purpose in going to the residence was to find out if persons using the premises might have seen or heard something useful to the ongoing homicide investigation and not to gain entry to search for evidence. But once the officers were at the residence, they noted that the window screen was torn loose, the window was pushed up, the door was unlatched, and there was music inside that was skipping; the officers announced their presence, pounded loudly on the door3 and yelled for someone to answer the door, and they learned that someone had been in the residence that night. The officers were concerned about a “forced entry situation” or burglary and obtained limited authorization for immediate entry to look for possible victims.
Burglary of a dwelling is not “deemed a purely property offense because * * * such an offense always carries with it the possibility of violence and therefore some special risks to human life.” State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn.1980). Other courts have concluded that police entry is justifiable under the emergency-aid exception where police have reasonable grounds to believe that a burglary is in progress or has recently occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 730-31 (7th Cir.2003) (upholding warrant-less entry where defendant who was carrying two high-powered rifles fled from police into nearby home but had trouble entering the door and police reasonably feared for the safety of the home’s occupants); United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 970-71 (1st Cir.1995) (upholding war-rantless entry on reasonable, though mistaken,' belief that residence was the source of security alarm); Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir.1995) (upholding warrantless entry during investigation of suspected burglary, where facts known to police indicated that resident was not responding and circumstances suggested that resident should have been present); Carroll v. State, 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376, 384 (1994) (upholding warrantless entry based on open door, a broken window pane, and information that the resident was away and not expected to return for a day or two); see generally 3 Wayne R. *790LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 459-61 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that entry is reasonable “to seek possible victims of violence in premises apparently burglarized recently”); Decker, supra at 490 (stating that “[m]ost courts have applied the emergency doctrine in circumstances where police reasonably believe that a burglary is in progress or has recently occurred”).
Furthermore, here the apparently burglarized residence was in close proximity to a brutal and seemingly random homicide. Ultimately, it was determined that the perpetrator entered the residence through the window: the victim’s blood was under the window on the exterior wall of the residence, the victim’s belongings were inside under the window sill, and, in closing arguments, counsel for both parties acknowledged that the perpetrator gained entry through the window. That the officers later learned Lemieux had entered his own abode is of no moment: “what matters is their reasonable belief’ that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred at the time of the entry. In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 765 (D.C.Cir.1998).
The officers’ search was also limited to the scope of the emergency, sweep-searching the floors for the presence of intruders or injured occupants and departing immediately upon finding the residence unoccupied. And assuming that the officers’ subjective motivations are a relevant state-law consideration, a warrantless search conducted during a criminal investigation does not necessarily preclude application of the emergency-aid exception so long as one of the motives for the warrantless search corresponds to an objectively reasonable emergency. See, e.g., Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 891 (concluding that officer making war-rantless entry to locate a methamphetamine lab during criminal investigation was primarily motivated by concern for the safety of the apartment building’s occupants, as evidenced by the officer’s order that the tenants turn off open flames and evacuate the building); see also Decker, supra at 511-16 (discussing subjective-motivation element). Here, the officers’ war-rantless entry was primarily motivated by concern of a burglary in progress, as evidenced by the call for backup and entry with firearms drawn.4
In conclusion, we hold that the police entry of the residence in close proximity to a brutal and seemingly random homicide was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement because the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred, the entry was motivated primarily to look for possible victims, and the scope of the search was limited to the emergency.
Affirmed.

. The Duluth police officers were familiar with Lemieux from prior contacts.

. Professor LaFave observes that when evaluating emergency-aid searches, courts will ask
whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that some kind of an emergency existed,' that is, whether there is evidence that would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act. The officer must be able to point to specific and articu-lable facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. But * * * this probable cause requirement, must be applied by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer, including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences. As one court usefully put it, the question is whether the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 452-53 (4th ed. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

. Haataja’s pounding on the door caused it to swing open a few inches, and he could see at an angle into the living room, which looked like it had been ransacked. The district court found that the officer's pounding was improperly calculated to open the door, but also found that Harris properly viewed the interior through the front window. In this appeal, the state concedes that the latter finding was clearly erroneous and that what the officers saw through the open door may not be used to support the entry into the residence.

. The dissent suggests that the warrantless entry to investigate a burglary was a pretext for a warrantless search for evidence of the homicide. In fairness to the investigating officers, as previously indicated, the district court found that the officers’ purpose in going to the residence was to talk to whomever might be there and not to gain entry. But it was the circumstances confronting the officers at the residence that caused their concern as to the need for immediate entry. Officer Haataja testified that "based on the things that we [saw] there,” there was concern that a burglary occurred. Lieutenant Brasel did not provisionally order an emergency-aid search before the officers’ arrival; instead, he testified that he directed the officers “to make contact with the residents, and I specifically directed that absolutely nobody' — if nobody was home — that nobody was going into that apartment without talking to me first, that I was going to make that decision.”