Court Opinion

ID: 9859076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 18:38:44.800246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:01.083583
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
Dissenting:
I am unable to bring myself in accord with the majority opinion in so far as it holds that the evidence was insufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury on the question as to whether or not the appellants, Lovett Motor Company, when entrusting the automobile to their employee, Bodie D. Palmer, knew, or from facts known to them should have known, that Palmer was an incompetent driver because of his habits of drink, and was likely to drive the automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to the injury of others, and in so far as it holds that the appellants, Lovett Motor' Company, were entitled to a peremptory instruction on this issue.
It is conceded in the majority opinion that it must be accepted as true on this appeal that Palmer was driving the automobile on the occasion in question while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and thereby caused appellee’s injuries, since the jury found this to be a fact on conflicting evidence. The majority opinion, however, refuses to give this same effect to the finding of the jury favorable to the plaintiff on conflicting evidence on the issue as to whether the Lovett Motor Company, when entrusting the automobile to Palmer, knew, or from facts known to them should have known, that Palmer was an incompetent driver because of his habits of drink.
*406However, it has long been the settled rule in Mississippi that in determining- the right of a party to a requested peremptory instruction, the court is required to take as true the evidence, and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, favorable to the party against whom the peremptory instruction is requested. Masonite Corporation v. Dennis, 175 Miss. 855, 168 So. 613; Bankston v. Dumont, 205 Miss. 272, 38 So. 2d 721; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Whisenant, 58 So. 2d 908.
In Graves, et al. v. Johnson, et al., 179 Miss. 465, 176 So. 256, the Court announced the rule as follows: “But the established rule in this state is that, when looking solely to the testimony in behalf of the party against ■whom the peremptory charge is requested, and taking that testimony as true, there is enough of facts testified to, along with the reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom in favor of said party, to support a verdict for him, the peremptory charge is not allowable.”
Again in the case of Rhodes v. Fullilove, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 841, the Court said: “To entitle a plaintiff to ■a directed verdict, the evidence must be such that no other reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom except liability on the part of the defendant.”
The evidence thus to be taken as true is that the appellant, Arthur K. Lovett, who was in full charge and control of the business of the Lovett Motor Company, entrusted the automobile to Palmer, with authority to drive it during business hours, and, in the event he should not return it to the place of business before closing hours, to take it to his home and keep it over night or over the weekend and return it to the place of business at the next opening hours; that the automobile was thus available to Palmer on occasions over night or over the weekends, if he should choose to use it, without regard to orders; that when Lovett so entrusted the automobile to Palmer, he knew that he drank intoxicating liquor occasionally because he had taken a drink with him; that Lovett testified *407on cross-examination: “Q. Ton bad knowledge that on occasions that he (referring to Palmer) drank, didn’t you? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is right, and that was after he got in your employment, wasn’t it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And after he got in your employment, with that knowledge, you continued to let him have and drive your automobile, didn’t you? A. Yes, sir;” that Lovett and Palmer lived in the same community and that Palmer’s general reputation in that community for drinking intoxicating liquor was bad; that on the occasion of the collision, Palmer was drunk and driving the automobile on the wrong side of the road, and thus caused appellee’s injuries.
The reasonable inference which the jury was warranted in deducing from the testimony that Palmer’s general reputation for drinking intoxicating liquor was bad in the same community in which he and Lovett lived, was that Lovett knew, or with reasonable care should have known, that Palmer was an incompetent driver because of his habits of drink. The test, in considering the request for the peremptory, is not whether there is evidence of the owner’s actual knówledge of the incompetency of the driver in such cases, but whether the evidence taken as true, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, would warrant the jury in finding that the owner knew, or from facts known to him should have known, that the driver was incompetent because of his habits of drink. This is the test announced in all of the authorities reviewed in the majority opinion, beginning with Anderson v. Daniel, 136 Miss. 456, 101 So. 498, and reaffirmed in Herrman v. Maley, 159 Miss. 538, 132 So. 542; Slaughter v. Holsomback, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318; Levy v. McMullen, 169 Miss. 659, 152 So. 899; Rich-ton Tie and Timber Co. v. Smith, 210 Miss. 148, 48 So. 2d 618; Petermann v. Gary, 210 Miss. 438, 49 So. 2d 828; Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. Matthews, 212 Miss. 190, 54 So. 2d 263.
*408In Anderson v. Daniel, supra, the Court said: “It is true that no witness testified that,appellant knew that at the time of thelnjury his'son was operating the car. Nor did any witness testify that appellant knew that his son was a reckless driver. But appellee’s evidence by several witnesses was to the effect that appellant’s son constituted one of appellant’s household, that, he was often seen by the neighbors driving appellant’s car, and that he was not only a reckless driver but had that reputation in the neighborhood where appellant resided and where the injury complained of occurred. This evidence in our opinion was sufficient to go to the jury on the question whether appellant knew that his son was in the habit of driving his car, and also on the question whether appellant knew that his son was a reckless driver.”
It is true that in many of the cases cited, there were facts other than reputation bringing knowledge of incompetency to the owner. But in Anderson v. Daniel, supra, Herrman v. Maley, supra, Slaughter v. Holsomback, supra, Levy v. McMullen, supra, and Richton Tie and Timber Co. v. Smith, supra, reputation for incompetency because of habits of drink or otherwise was deemed and held to be an important circumstance for the consideration of the jury in determining whether the owner knew, or from facts known to him should have known, that the driver was incompetent. In the case of Riehton Tie and Timber Co. v. Smith, supra, the'undisputed evidence was that the driver was a reckless, incompetent driver because of his habits of drink, but the only evidence to prove the owner’s knowledge of such incompetency was proof of the general reputation of the driver for incompetency, and the Court approved the submission to the jury of the issue as to whether or not the owner knew or should have known of such incompetency.
In Vanner v. Dalton, 172 Miss. 183, 159 So. 558, cited in the majority opinion, the Court held that knowledge of incompetency is provable by reputation for incompe*409tency, but denied recovery because there was no proof of incompetency. That case is easily distinguishable from the case under review, since the proof here taken as true shows Palmer’s reputation for drinking intoxicating liquor was bad and that he was driving the automobile while drunk. In Slaughter v. Holsomback, supra, the Court said: “We unhesitatingly and unreservedly declare that a person who has the general reputation of being an habitual drunkard is an incompetent driver, and that one who knows, or should know, facts that lead to the belief that one is an habitual drunkard, should know that such person is just as unsafe a driver as an imbecile or a baby.” It might also be said that one whose reputation for drinking intoxicating liquor is bad is an incompetent driver, even though his reputation be not that of an habitual drunkard because it is not the degree of drunkenness but the fact that such a person is likely to become under the influence of liquor that renders him a dangerous and incompetent driver. Our legislature recognized this when it enacted Sec. 8174 of the Code of 1942, making it unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle within the state.
The danger of committing an automobile to one whose reputation for drinking intoxicating liquor is bad lies in the likelihood, as was said in the case of Levy v. McMullen, supra, “that such a man, according to common knowledge, when under the influence of liquor will drive about in an automobile if one is available to him without regard to orders.” In the case of Levy v. McMullen, supra, the only evidence relied upon to bring knowledge to the owner was the bad reputation of the driver and the fact that the owner knew that the driver “was occasionally a drinking man. ’ ’ There was other evidence of the drinking habits of the driver but not shown to the actual knowledge of the owners. The Court said: “His employers had sufficient actual knowledge to put them upon *410inquiry which, if reasonably pursued, would have led to full knowledge.”
The case of Gooch v. Dillard, 187 Miss. 660, 193 So. 619, has no application here. In that case, when the prospective employee, Brasshear, applied to the prospective employer, Gooch, for work, he referred Gooch to several persons as to his habits, who advised Gooch that Brass-hear did not drink intoxicating liquor while at work but occasionally would while not at work, “but nothing in this information indicated that he was accustomed at any time to become intoxicated.” In other words, the affirmative information which the employer had was that Brasshear did not drink while at work. There was no evidence of bad reputation, but only .the positive and undisputed evidence that he would not drink while at work, and hence the court rightly held that the evidence was insufficient to charge the employer with constructive knowledge that the employee was liable to drink while driving an automobile.
In the case at bar, it is to be taken as true, on the consideration of the question of the right of the appellants, Lovett Motor Company, to a peremptory instruction, that Palmer was a drunken driver and, therefore, an incompetent driver, and that his drunken driving caused ap-pellee ’s injuries; that the employers knew that when they entrusted the automobile to him he occasionally drank intoxicating liquor; that Palmer’s reputation for drinking intoxicating liquor was bad in the community in which he and Ms employers lived. Can it be said on these admitted facts that the jury would not be warranted in reasonably deducing from these facts that the employers knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that Palmer was an incompetent driver because of his habits of drink, and was likely to drive the automobile while under the influence of liquor to the injury of others? I think not. To answer the question in the affirmative would be to do violence to the *411principles enunciated in the previous decisions of this Court, and would violate the well recognized rule announced in Rhodes v. Fullilove, supra, ‘4 that to entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict, the evidence must be such that no other reasonable inference could be drawn therefrom except liability on the part of the defendant. ’ ’
Drunken driving is the greatest menace to life and property on our highways today, and those who entrust an automobile to another when they know, or from facts known to them should know, that such other is an incompetent driver because of his habits of drink and is likely to drive the automobile while under the influence of liquor to the injui'y of others, should be held to accountability. Under our prior decisions, proof of actual knowledge on the part of an employer who so entrusts an automobile to another is not required if all of the facts and circumstances when assumed to be true, and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, are such as to warrant a jury in finding that the employer knew, or with reasonable care should have known, of the driver’s incompetency because of his habits of drink. From the evidence of Palmer’s general bad reputation in the community in which he and Lovett lived, it is difficult to conceive how any reasonable inference could be deduced from such evidence other than that Lov.ett knew of such reputation. I think, therefore, that the trial court was correct in denying the peremptory instruction on this issue.
If the majority opinion is to remain the law in this state, there will be few cases where the owner has entrusted his automobile to another in which recovery for injuries resulting from drunken driving will be warranted.
I am authorized to say that Justices Hall, Lee, and Arrington join in this dissent.