Court Opinion

ID: 9855037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:18:34.214103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.102493
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 71. (concurring). The issue addressed by the majority is whether the amendments that limit a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 respondent's ability to seek supervised release are constitutional. Although I have reservations, ultimately I am persuaded that the respondent has not met the high burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the amendments — as written — transform a constitutional statute into an unconstitutional statutory scheme. Nevertheless, I write separately to voice my concerns that the supervised release provisions — as applied — are on the brink of running afoul of the constitution.
¶ 72. In State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 267, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), which I authored, the court assumed that the State was "prepared to provide spe-*251tifie treatment to those committed under ch. 980 and not simply warehouse them."
¶ 73. In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 308, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), where I joined the majority, the court assumed that "the legislature will proceed in good faith and fund the treatment programs necessary for those committed under chapter 980."
¶ 74. In response to the skepticism expressed by the dissent as to whether supervised release is a viable option, the majority in this case once again relies on an assumption that the State will meet its statutory and constitutional obligations. The majority writes: "we think it is more appropriate that the agencies and individuals that are charged with monitoring the treatment progress of institutionalized sexually violent persons be given the benefit of the assumption that they will carry out their responsibilities as the legislature has directed." Majority op. at ¶ 48 n.5.
¶ 75. The court's assumptions and the State's good faith are wearing thin.
¶ 76. We continue to gain experience with the way that ch. 980 has played out in the real world. Since Carpenter and Post, the case law has become rife with examples of the State's inability to provide appropriate placements for those committed under ch. 980.
¶ 77. For instance, in State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 322, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999), the committed individual went unreleased solely because his county of residence "did not have the appropriate resources to address his treatment needs in a community setting." Other counties with facilities were apparently "unwilling or unable to admit him." Id.
¶ 78. Likewise, in State v. Krueger, 2001 WI App 76, ¶ 2, 242 Wis. 2d 793, 626 N.W.2d 83, "difficulties finding a residence for Krueger derailed the planned *252release." Krueger was to live with his stepfather, but this plan failed after local media attention. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 37.
¶ 79. There was more of the same in State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996). In that case, the State was unable to locate a community placement that would accept the committed individual. Id. at 610. After other alternatives were rejected as impracticable, it settled on placement at a halfway house. Id. at 605. Soon after, however, the halfway house rejected the placement because of fear of "public reaction" and that "the town would take zoning action against it." Id. A final alternative, placement in a private apartment under supervision of a private social worker also failed because of community pressure. Id.
¶ 80. And there is still more: In State v. Keding, 2002 WI 86, 254 Wis.2d 334, 646 N.W.2d 375, one of the many ch. 980 cases that has reached this court in this term alone — even the State recognized the apparent futility of attempted supervised release placements for the respondent. During the course of oral arguments, the State acknowledged that attempted placement in five different counties had failed. When asked if there was any alternative in the community for the respondent, the State replied, "I don't know, and apparently [the circuit court judge] didn't believe there was." The State also said: "If you're asking me what should we do about it, I could come up with some things, but it's not for me to do it. It's for the legislature to do it."
¶ 81. One can only speculate as to how many additional cases there are that present similar facts.
¶ 82. When an individual committed under ch. 980 cannot be appropriately placed, his treatment is severely hampered, if not undermined completely. The viability and feasibility of treatment is a necessary *253predicate to ch. 980's constitutionality. Should the promise of treatment be proven an illusion, this necessary predicate to the constitutionality of ch. 980 is removed.
¶ 83. Although the reality of supervised release and its implications for treatment is my primary concern in writing today, it is not my only one. The majority reasons that ch. 980's constitutionality is also predicated on the various procedures available under the statute for the committed individual to secure review of his commitment. Majority op. at ¶ 48. Whether these procedures are regularly followed by the State is also open to question. In one recent case, it took the State nearly two years to provide the committed individual with the reexamination that the statute requires to occur within six months. State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2002 WI App 133, ¶ 28, 254 Wis. 2d 690, 648 N.W.2d 522, review granted June 11, 2002 (No. 99-2446).
¶ 84. Chapter 980 cannot continue to survive constitutional scrutiny if the predicates for its constitutionality prove to be false. The State must take steps to ensure that proper placement and treatment actually happen. When an individual committed under ch. 980 cannot be appropriately placed, or is not timely assessed, the viability and feasibility of treatment are called into question.
¶ 85. Treatment is a necessary component to the constitutionality of the ch. 980 statutory scheme. Without it, a purportedly civil commitment becomes a "mechanism for retribution or general deterrence— functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment." Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412, 122 S. Ct. *254867, 870 (2002) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372-73 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
¶ 86. It is the oft-stated rule that a statute is presumed constitutional and must be proven unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt." See, e.g., State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶ 30, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528. It is only this rule that leads me to join the mandate of the majority opinion. What little doubt remains continues to slip away.
¶ 87. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the mandate.