Court Opinion

ID: 9530255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:39.749468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:02.887984
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING, dissenting: I would reverse this cause due to the failure of the trial court to grant the City a jury trial. In my opinion the cause should be remanded for a new trial before a jury. I. At the outset I recognize that this issue must be resolved by determining whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the City’s motion for a jury trial after the City failed to file a jury demand in accordance with section 64 of the Civil Practice Act. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case I think the denial of the motion was a clear abuse of discretion. The complaint was filed August 3, 1971. The City filed its answer September 23, 1971. No jury demand was then filed by the City as was required by section 64. The case worked its way through the customary delay awaiting its turn for trial. Then on February 11,1974, the City, by its then recently retained special counsel, filed its motion for leave to file a jury demand.1 This verified motion asserted the oversight of the assistant corporation counsel in failing to file a jury demand; that special counsel was employed January 14, 1974 (obviously as the case was approaching trial); that an appearance was filed January 29, 1974; that because of serious questions of fact it was then determined a jury trial was desirable to protect the rights and interests of the litigants; and that no inconvenience or prejudice to plaintiff’s rights would result by granting the motion. It is to be noted that there was no request by the City to delay the proceedings. On February 11, 1974, the trial court granted the City leave to file a jury demand instanter. Thereafter on February 25,1974, the trial court vacated its order granting the City leave to file a jury demand, and then denied it. The record contains only a handwritten order asserting that the February 11, 1974, order had been granted in the absence of counsel for plaintiff and upon objection tendered by counsel for the plaintiff, the trial court after hearing arguments entered an order of vacatur and denial. The case did not proceed to trial until June 3,1974, at which time the trial court again denied the City’s renewed motion for a jury trial. Article I, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate. This right to a jury trial has been guaranteed in Illinois since the State has been organized. Section 64 of the Civil Practice Act requires affirmative action by a party in order to obtain a jury trial. This procedure was sustained as against constitutional objections in Stephens v. Kasten (1943), 383 Ill. 127, 48 N.E.2d 508. Section 59 of the Civil Practice Act and Supreme Court Rule 183 both provide, upon good cause shown, for the granting of an extension of time for any act either under the practice act or rules.2  In Stephens our supreme court said, “[cjourts zealously guard the right of a person to a trial by jury.” (383 Ill. 127, 133.) The supreme court pointed out that the late filing of a jury demand should be allowed if it does not tend to inconvenience the court, parties litigant, or prejudice parties’ rights in any manner whatsoever, 383 Ill. 127, 135. In discussing the payment of a fee upon the filing of a jury demand, in Morrison Hotel & Restaurant Co. v. Kirsner (1910), 245 Ill. 431, 433, 92 N.E. 285, our supreme court said, * ° the cherished right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the statute should be liberally construed in favor of the right and the inclination of the court should be to protect and enforce the right.” In the case at bar I think there was good cause shown for the late jury demand. The answer of the City was signed by an assistant corporation counsel. It is a matter of common knowledge that the corporation counsel’s office is large with many assistants. Regardless, as the case became ripe for trial, the City retained an able, experienced special counsel. Within 30 days after his employment as special counsel, a verified motion for a jury trial was filed. Special counsel asserted under oath “* * ° that there were serious questions of fact which could most fairly and adequately be determined for both the plaintiff and the defendant by a jury * * There is no denial of this assertion in the record. Likewise, the special counsel claimed there would be no inconvenience or prejudice to plaintiffs rights by granting the motion. That is undenied. In fact the bench trial did not commence until over three months later. In my opinion the record is clear that the late jury demand would not, and did not, inconvenience the court, parties litigant, or prejudice the rights of anyone in any manner whatsoever. If the right to a jury trial should be liberally construed, as set forth in Morrison Hotel, and if the guideline of Stephens is to have any meaning, then the City should have been granted a jury trial. To deny the City a jury trial under the facts and circumstances in my opinion was a clear abuse of discretion. It is my opinion that any trial court should, under these circumstances, gladly afford any party the constitutional right to a jury trial. Cf. Wenban v. Weiner (2d Dist. 1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 561, 563, 319 N.E.2d 580. The majority opinion cites Hudson v. Leverenz (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 87, 139 N.E.2d 255. There is a clear distinction between the facts in Hudson where the plaintiff claimed it would be inconvenienced by a delay, which claim was not disputed in the record. There is no such claim in the instant case. For these reasons I would reverse and remand for a new trial. II. I also disagree with the reference in the majority opinion to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). I do not believe that section applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. There is nothing that I can find that suggests that the services referred to in this section either include or are comparable to the maintenance by a municipality of its street lighting. My reading of section 323 leads me to conclude it has no applicability to this set of facts. ORDER DENYING REHEARING The petition for rehearing is denied. HAYES and JIGANTI, JJ., concur.   The verified proof of service in the record indicates a copy of the motion was served on plaintiffs attorneys by mail on February 6, 1974.    See Hernandez v. Power Construction Co. (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 860, 357 N.E.2d 606.