Court Opinion

ID: 9790261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:42.049021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.837767
License: Public Domain

*530RICHARDSON, P.J.,
dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that defendant can be separately sentenced for more than one count of attempting to use a dangerous weapon. That holding is contrary to recent Supreme Court decisions regarding sentencing of the "multiple criminal offender,” and is in direct conflict with our decision in State v. Perkins, 45 Or App 91, 607 P2d 1202 (1980).
In State v. Cloutier, 286 Or 579, 596 P2d 1278 (1979), the Supreme Court established the general rule that, for a defendant’s multiple offenses to "merge” for purposes of conviction and/or sentencing, the offenses must have been committed as part of a single criminal episode in which the defendant had a single criminal objective. See 286 Or at 595-96; ORS 131.505(4). However, the court in Cloutier did not attempt to establish conclusive guidelines for the penal disposition in all "multiple offender” situations, and it expressly left to this court the task of developing "criteria for multiple convictions and sentencing” in situations involving "the commission of offenses against several victims in a single criminal act or episode.” 286 Or at 598-99.
We undertook that task in Perkins, where we observed at the outset of our opinion:
"Resolution of the question requires application of Cloutier principles to a situation expressly left open in that opinion, namely, where the crime is perpetrated against more than one person.” (Cite omitted.) 45 Or App at 93.
In Perkins, the defendant entered a restaurant with the criminal objective of stealing the restaurant’s cash. Two restaurant employees were on the premises, and the defendant threatened them with weapons and stood guard over them while an accomplice consummated the theft. The defendant was charged with and found guilty of two counts of first degree robbery for his acts against the employees, as well as the theft and two ancillary offenses he committed during the course of the episode. The trial judge "merged” the theft and two ancillary charges into the first degree robbery convictions, but sentenced the defendant separately for both robberies. The defendant contended on appeal that the two robberies should be treated as *531"one offense for sentencing purposes.” 45 Or App at 93. We agreed, concluding that the defendant’s "ultimate criminal objective * * * was theft from the restaurant safe,” 45 Or App at 96, and that he therefore could not receive separate or cumulative penalties for the two robberies committed in the course of carrying out his objective. In sum, we concluded in Perkins that the single criminal episode/single criminal objective "merger” formula of Cloutiervras applicable to cases involving multiple victims.
In the present case, the majority acknowledges that all of the defendant’s offenses were part of a single criminal episode. 52 Or App at 522. The majority further states that it is "debatable” whether the defendant had a single criminal objective. 52 Or App at 522-23. Although I find the single objective issue to be less debatable than does the majority, I understand the majority to be at least assuming that this is a single episode/single objective situation and to be addressing the question whether the defendant can be separately sentenced for crimes against different victims which were committed during the episode. The majority reaches the opposite answer to that question from our answer in Perkins, and, in my view, fails to recognize that the question was answered in Perkins.
The most graphic illustration of the majority’s misunderstanding of the import of Perkins is its statement that "[hjere the courts have generally held that if one views the facts as presenting a single victim, despite the presence of more than one person, as in * * * Perkins, only one conviction and sentence is appropriate.” 52 Or App at 523-24; emphasis added. However, the facts in Perkins cannot be viewed as involving a single victim. The defendant there committed at least three intentional crimes against three different victims: the two robberies against the two restaurant employees and the theft against their employer.1 The question in Perkins, like the question here, *532was whether the fact that there was more than one victim made the defendant’s offenses separately punishable, notwithstanding their, commission as part of a single episode with a single criminal objective. I believe that question was correctly answered in Perkins.
In addition to its failure to ascribe appropriate weight to the holding in Perkins, the majority opinion also disregards the principal rationale for that holding and for similar holdings in other recent cases. The majority states that "[n]o statute in Oregon authorizes or prohibits multiple sentences when the same criminal statute is violated more than once in a single criminal episode.” 52 Or App at 523. We resolved a similar uncertainty as to legislative intent in Perkins by quoting with approval from Bell v. United States, 349 US 81, 75 S Ct 620, 99 L Ed 905 (1955):
"' "When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this is not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment. * * *” 349 US at 83-84.’ ” 45 Or App at 96.
Much of the authority the majority opinion cites predates Cloutier and Perkins, e.g., State v. Dillman, 34 Or App 937, 580 P2d 567 (1978), rev den 285 Or 195 (1979), and the continuing vitality of that authority is doubtful to the extent it is not consistent with recent cases. State v. Dinkel, 49 Or App 917, 621 P2d 626 (1980), upon which the majority appears to rely heavily, is not in point. That case involved the question of whether numerous kidnappings merged with one another and with a robbery which was committed as part of the same criminal transaction. We followed State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980), in holding that, under the kidnapping statutes, it is a question of fact whether an interference with another’s liberty committed in conjunction with another crime constitutes the separate crime of kidnapping. See ORS 163.225. Dinkelh&s no relevance to the issue of multiple punishments for multiple offenses, unless the offenses include kidnapping. See 49 Or App at 926, n 5.
*533Finally, I agree with the majority that Cloutier holds only that the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232, 484 P2d 314, 485 P2d 1194 (1971), had not been legislatively overruled. However, I do not agree with the majority’s suggestion that Cloutiermañe no new law or that the language in the Cloutier opinion which goes beyond the Woolard issue is dicta which this court is free to disregard. Given the present scheme of Oregon’s appellate system, one of the principal roles of the Supreme Court is to resolve issues of law which go beyond the narrow issues which require decision in particular cases. In my view, we are required to follow Cloutier, and we should adhere to our own decision of a year ago in Perkins.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendant can be separately sentenced for the four attempting to use a dangerous weapon offenses.2

 The majority also suggests that the prosecutor’s decision concerning what charges to bring can be determinative of the number of convictions and sentences which can arise from a criminal episode. Undoubtedly, there are situations where the prosecutorial decision can have that practical effect. Where that occurs, however, it does not mean that the result is appropriate; it means that the prosecutorial decision has been made, deliberately or inadvertantly, to circumvent "merger” and related principles which, together with other objectives, are designed to prevent excessive prosecution and punishment for a defendant’s conduct.

 Perkins does not determine whether defendant can be separately convicted of those offenses, as distinguished from being separately sentenced. If it were necessary for me to reach that issue in this dissenting opinion, I would conclude that the separate convictions are also improper.