Court Opinion

ID: 9547850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:53:10.58121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:09.529504
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, defendant, having pleaded guilty to several counts which are wholly unrelated to those counts which are “tainted” by an erroneous suppression ruling, should not be permitted to withdraw his pleas to the former counts merely because he appealed successfully from convictions on the latter counts.
Although the People have conceded that the evidence obtained during the search of the washroom should have been ordered suppressed, most of the charges to which defendant pleaded guilty were not based, either in whole or in part, upon that evidence. Indeed, the record indicates that only one undismissed burglary charge was based upon evidence which was discovered in the course of, or as a result of, the illegal search. The important issue before us is whether, under such circumstances, defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction as to all counts, and an opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas to those counts.
Defendant’s right to appellate review of the convictions entered upon his pleas of guilty is necessarily based upon subdivision (m) of section 1538.5 of the Penal Code. As we recently acknowledged, “Subdivision (m) constitutes an exception to the rule that all errors arising prior to entry of a guilty plea are waived, except those which question the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings. [Citations.]” (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 897 [150 Cal.Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706]; see Pen. Code, § 1237.5.) In pertinent part, subdivision (m) provides that “A defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that such judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty. Such review on appeal may be obtained by the defendant providing that at some stage of the proceedings prior to conviction he has moved for the return of property or the suppression of the evidence.”
In light of the foregoing statutory prerequisite of a prior motion to suppress evidence or return property, it seems apparent to me that authorization of *558review under subdivision (m) extends only to those charges which were based upon an assertedly unlawful search or seizure. Reasonably construed, subdivision (m) does not suspend the finality of all guilty pleas entered by a defendant in a multicount proceeding, but only those pleas to charges which have been previously challenged by a motion to suppress.
Defendant asserts that because his guilty pleas were part of a plea bargain, he should be permitted to withdraw all those pleas, including the ones relating to those counts which are wholly “untainted” by any illegally obtained evidence. Subdivision (m) does not create any such right, however, and the applicable cases have allowed a withdrawal of guilty pleas only if the pleas related to charges previously challenged by a suppression motion.
Thus, in People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731 [117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1], defendants had pleaded guilty to first degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain in which certain other charges were dismissed. Defendants appealed from the judgments of conviction, alleging that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. We held that although the “bulk” of the evidence was lawfully seized and was properly admissible, at least some of the evidence should have been ordered suppressed. (P. 767.) Accordingly, we ruled that defendants were entitled to elect whether, “the suppression of certain items of evidence would alter the situation in a sufficiently favorable manner so as to render a plea of not guilty strategically preferable. ” (P. 769, fn. omitted.)
All of the evidence at issue in Hill related to the charges to which defendants pleaded guilty, and nothing we said in Hill suggests that defendants would have been permitted to withdraw their pleas to any unrelated charges. Indeed, we specifically observed in Hill that “There is no basis whatsoever for concluding that the items which we hold to be inadmissible are in fact unconnected to the murder or would be irrelevant to the prosecution’s case against defendants .... [T]he inference seems inescapable that such items . . . tend to incriminate defendants and therefore aré ‘connected’ to the murder. To conclude otherwise is to engage in unfounded speculation at the expense of defendants. ” (P. 767, fn. 36.) Thus, Hill clearly stands for the proposition that if, on appeal, it is determined that a defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted at least in part, defendant will be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea with respect to any charges to which such evidence relates. (See also People v. Rios (1976) 16 Cal.3d 351, 357-359 [128 Cal.Rptr. 5, 546 P.2d 293] [unlawfully obtained evidence related to count on which guilty plea entered]; People v. Salazar (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 912, 915-916 [156 Cal.Rptr. 125].)
Subsequent cases have uniformly recognized the requirement of some nexus between the unlawfully obtained evidence and the charge on which the guilty plea was based. (People v. Martinez (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 624, 635-636 [173 *559Cal.Rptr. 554] [evidence related to dismissed counts]; People v. Nagdeman (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 404, 412 [168 Cal.Rptr. 16] [evidence related to uncharged offenses]; People v. Punchard (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 995, 999 [163 Cal.Rptr. 366] [evidence related to dismissed counts].)
Punchará, supra, is particularly instructive. There, as part of a plea bargain, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of receiving stolen property; two other receiving counts were dismissed. Defendant had previously moved to suppress certain evidence connected to the dismissed counts and, on appeal from the conviction following his guilty plea, he contended that the foregoing evidence should have been ordered suppressed. The court held that the admissibility issue was rendered “moot” by reason of the dismissal of the counts to which the evidence in question related. (Pp. 998-1000.) As the court explained: “Defendant forwent the risk of conviction under counts II and HI by pleading guilty to count I. He is presumed to have been aware of the possible defense to counts H and HI, and recognized his claim of error in the court’s failure to suppress the evidence. Yet he chose to forego the risks of asserting such defense as he may have had. Rather, defendant chose to seek a certain dismissal of counts H and IH by bargaining away his right to contest count I.
“Nor is the matter one of pure gamesmanship; defendant was thoroughly apprised that in bargaining away his right to contest count I, he was unequivocably [sic] admitting that he did in fact commit the crime charged.
“He cannot now reasonably challenge the validity of his bargain and his plea by pointing to the possible defenses he might have asserted as to the dismissed counts. Defendant knowingly and willingly forwent such defense[s] and cannot raise them now.” (Pp. 999-1000, italics in original.)
Although Punchará does not discuss the point, its holding could be equally sustained on the alternative basis that, as discussed above, Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m), does not authorize appellate review following a guilty plea to charges which were not challenged by a prior motion to suppress evidence. Those pleas are final and unreviewable.
It is argued that had defendant known at the time of his plea bargain the ultimate merit of his earlier motion to suppress, he might not have entered into that bargain or pleaded guilty to the various offenses, and that accordingly he should now be permitted to withdraw his pleas in toto. Every plea bargain, however, requires a careful weighing of the various tactical considerations, including possibly meritorious defenses which might have been asserted at trial or on appeal. As Punchará, supra, explains, the defendant in such a situation cannot claim any surprise or ignorance of the facts. Moreover, as we have seen, the Legislature has chosen to restrict appellate review of convictions *560based upon guilty pleas to those charges to which a prior motion to suppress was directed.
Thus, I would reverse the judgment in part and direct the trial court on remand to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas to any offense or offenses to which his prior motion to suppress was related. Because the People have not requested reinstatement of any charges which were dismissed as part of the plea bargain, I would not reach the question whether such reinstatement would be proper upon partial rescission of a plea bargain. (See People v. Hill, supra, 12 Cal.3d 731, 769.)
Mosk, J., concurred.