Court Opinion

ID: 9848567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:22:25.923252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:24.823532
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL:
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and hold that this checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from setting up a traffic checkpoint where the “programmatic” primary purpose is general crime control. The relevant jurisprudence instructs that the test to determine the primary purpose of a checkpoint is an objective test, and that the examining court should “consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant primary purpose.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-47, 121 S.Ct. 447).
*621In my view, there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the primary purpose of this checkpoint was general crime control. The record shows that in accordance with the sheriffs department’s guidelines, law enforcement officers placed signs on each road approaching the checkpoint alerting drivers to the checkpoint. Law enforcement officers stopped every vehicle, detained the drivers for no more than two minutes, and only after ascertaining probable cause would they ask the driver to pull off the road into a parking lot for further questioning. Additionally, an officer testified that the purpose of the checkpoint was to verify that every driver had a valid license and registration. Considering all the evidence in the record, I do not believe that the primary purpose of this checkpoint was general crime prevention, nor do I believe that this checkpoint allowed officers to exercise standardless and unconstrained discretion. See Delaivare v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (invalidating discretionary “spot checking” in which the officer stopped random motorists on public highways solely for the purpose of checking the drivers’ license and registration).
Further, in my opinion, the majority errs in suggesting that Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) requires the State to provide empirical data regarding the effectiveness of checkpoints or that Mich. Dept, of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) retained this requirement. In ruling on the constitutionality of a suspicionless checkpoint in which police stopped every vehicle, the Sitz court noted that the ease did not involve “a complete absence of empirical data.” Id. at 454 However, the Supreme Court went on to hold that the second prong of the Brown test “was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger” and that “for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis ... [this decision] remains with the governmental officials.” Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454,110 S.Ct. 2481.
In my view, the balance of the public interest and the severity of the interference with individual liberty clearly weighs in favor of this checkpoint. As noted by the trial *622court, the intrusion on individual liberty was minimal and the State has a high interest in preventing unlicensed or uninsured drivers from operating vehicles. In my opinion, this checkpoint provides an effective method of curtailing this problem in that every vehicle was stopped and every driver was required to produce their license, registration, and proof of insurance. Moreover, the fact remains that decisions regarding the techniques and methods of combating roadway dangers remains with law enforcement. See Id. Perhaps most significant, however, is that this checkpoint modeled the types of checkpoints that have been upheld as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (holding that a suspicionless seizure where law enforcement briefly stopped all motorists crossing the checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (distinguishing between the unconstitutional seizure of drivers without reasonable suspicion and the “[questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops”); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (holding that “stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment”). Indeed, while Edmond held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a suspicionless stop whose “programmatic” primary purpose is general crime control, the “holding [ ] [did] nothing to alter the constitutional status of the sobriety and border checkpoints that [the United States Supreme Court] approved in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, or of the type of traffic checkpoint that we suggested would be lawful in Prouse.” Edmond at 47, 121 S.Ct. 447.
For these reasons, I would hold that the primary purpose of this checkpoint was not general crime prevention and that the checkpoint did not violate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.