Court Opinion

ID: 9645744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:34:04.538271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:31.054380
License: Public Domain

CATHELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority. I do, however, agree with the ultimate result, i.e., that the sentence of death in this case must be vacated.
■ Mr. Metheny, if the record and the statement he gave at his sentencing hearing are accurate, is a serial murderer. As such, he is the ultimate characterization of evil. There may well be many sincere proponents of the death penalty who would hold to a position that death would be an appropriate penalty for Mr. Metheny’s crimes against the State. The Legislature, however, has not established serial murder as a death qualified offense. In other words, a person who commits two or more murders during one incident, can be sentenced to death, but a person who commits one murder a month for twelve months before he is apprehended, i.e., a serial murderer, cannot be sentenced to death.
In my view, the real reason the death sentence was sought in this case is that Mr. Metheny was a heinous serial murderer. Because serial murder is not a death qualified offense in this State, the prosecution sought the death penalty on the premise that Mr. Metheny robbed the victim when he buried the victim’s clothing and purse separate from her body. This strategy, which was successfully employed by the State in the circuit court, stretches Maryland’s death penalty statute beyond the scope intended by the Legislature.
A. Conclusion Statements are not Facts
There is simply no evidence (as opposed to conclusions) contained in the agreed Statement of Facts, which is sufficient to support a conviction of robbery. In the case sub judice> the only evidence in respect to a robbery was what the prosecution gleaned from the statements of the defendant, and then *635made its own conclusions—conclusions that were subsequently adopted as facts by both the trial court and, in my view, by the majority in this Court.
Near the beginning of the Statement at issue, it states: “Ms. Magaziner had been in his trailer one hour when the Defendant strangled her, and robbed her of her purse and clothing.” The use of the word “robbed” in this sentence is a conclusion, not a fact. At the end of the statement is another sentence that reads: “The robbery and murder of Catherine Magaziner did occur in Baltimore City.” The use of the term “robbery,” in this context, is a conclusion not a fact. The facts are contained elsewhere in the Statement. They are not hidden. They are expressly identified:
A review of the Defendant’s statements regarding the evidence of robbery is as follows: when the Defendant met the Victim she was fully clothed and was carrying a purse; when he had sex with her, she was partially clothed; after he strangled her, he buried her with no clothing; and finally, he indicated that after he buried her, he buried her clothing and purse at a separate [but nearby] location.
Simply stated I do not perceive the above to satisfy the requirements of the crime of robbery.1
Maryland courts have consistently distinguished conclusions contained in statements of facts from the facts themselves, holding that determinations as to whether the facts are sufficient to support a finding that an offense has been committed by a defendant, are limited to a consideration of the facts, exclusive of the conclusions reached by the prosecution, or for that matter, conclusions reached by a defendant. In the context of taking a plea, it is the court’s function, not the State’s or the defendant’s, to assess the facts and arrive at conclusions as to the commission of offenses. See Md. Rule 4-242(c). As we have said:
*636In Maryland an accused is permitted to plead guilty. Md. Rule 731 a.[2] An acceptable guilty plea is an admission of conduct that constitutes all the elements of a formal criminal charge. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 n. 5[, 23 L.Ed.2d 274] (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171[, 22 L.Ed.2d 418] (1969); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 110, 361 A.2d 113, 117 (1976). An accused who pleads guilty waives any and all defenses. See Cohen v. State, 235 Md. 62, 68, 200 A.2d 368, 371, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844, 85 S.Ct. 84[, 13 L.Ed.2d 49] (1964). See also Palacorolle v. State, 239 Md. 416, 421, 211 A.2d 828, 830-31 (1965); Holloway v. State, 8 Md.App. 618, 626, 261 A.2d 811, 815 (1970). In addition, such an accused waives the right to a jury or court trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469[, 25 L.Ed.2d 747] (1970); Hudson v. State, 286 Md. 569, 599, 409 A.2d 692, 707 (1979). Thus, a plea of guilty, once accepted, is the equivalent of a conviction. Nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711-12[, 23 L.Ed.2d 274]; Gans v. Warden, 233 Md. 626, 628, 196 A.2d 632, 633 (1964); Biles v. State, 230 Md. 537, 538, 187 A.2d 850, 851, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 852, 84 S.Ct. 111[, 11 L.Ed.2d 79] (1963). Of course, before a plea of guilty is accepted and judgment is rendered, a trial court must determine that the acts admitted by the accused constitute the elements of the crime charged. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. at 1713 n. 7[, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 n. 7]. See Hudson, 286 Md. at 599, 409 A.2d at 707; McCall v. State, 9 Md.App. 191, 200, 263 A.2d 19, 24, cert. denied, 258 Md. 729 (1970); Holloway, 8 Md.App. at 625, 261 A.2d at 814-15. See also Md. Rule 731 c.
Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 364-65, 424 A.2d 755, 758 (1981) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The Court of Special Appeals addressed this exact issue, in reference to the acceptance of a guilty plea, in Parren v. State, *63789 Md.App. 645, 647-51, 599 A.2d 828, 829-31 (1991). That court noted:
Both guilty pleas were, we now hold, invalid because of the failure of the court on each occasion to satisfy the strict requirements of Md. Rule 4-242(c), which provides, in pertinent part:
“The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that ... (2) there is a factual basis for the plea.”
In State v. Thornton, 73 Md.App. 247, 533 A.2d 951 (1987), Judge Alpert discussed at some length the requirement that the face of the record reflect, in more than conclusory terms, the factual basis for the plea, pointing out the close relationship between and common provenance of the Maryland Rule and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Judge Alpert concluded, at 73 Md.App. at 252, 533 A.2d 951:
“[Ujnder both federal and Maryland law, before the court may accept a guilty plea, it must determine on the record ... that a factual basis supports the plea.”
The issue that concerns us in this case is the fullness of the factual basis supporting the plea. State v. Thornton, at 73 Md.App. [at ]257-258, 533 A.2d 951, quotes with approval from J.L. Barkai, “Accuracy Inquiry for all Felony And Misdemeanor Pleas; Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?”, 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 88, in terms of how the factual basis for a plea is placed upon the face of the record and how detailed that factual basis must be:
“Although the accused is typically interrogated by the judge, some courts allow the defense attorney or the prosecutor to conduct the questioning. The testimony of these attorneys has also been accepted in some states as a source of the factual basis, provided the defendant is present. A prosecutor’s testimony usually consists of a *638summary of the evidence he expects to present at trial. This method of establishing a guilty plea’s accuracy has been limited at times, however, by requirements that a prosecutor supply concrete facts rather than merely assert that a factual basis exists, and that the truth of the evidence thus summarized be confirmed by the defendant.”
Thornton then holds unequivocally, at 73 Md.App. at 258, 533 A.2d 951, that a full “statement of facts is indispensable” and that a mere conclusory statement that a factual basis for the guilty plea exists will not suffice:
“The factual basis inquiry serves a dual purpose. First, an examination of the law and the acts which the defendant admits he committed ‘protect[s] a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.’ .... ” (citation omitted).
“An inquiry may be made of the defendant, of the attorneys, or by whatever means is appropriate in a specific case. The inquiry, however, must be sufficient to develop the underlying facts from which the court will determine whether the conduct which the defendant admitted constituted the offense to which he has pled guilty.” (citation omitted).
The Court of Special Appeals first applied the requirement that a factual basis be presented in the context of a defendant’s plea in McCall v. State 9 Md.App. 191, 263 A.2d 19, cert. denied, 258 Md. 729 (1970), in reference to a plea of nolle contendere, after the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The Court of Special Appeals held that:
We construe Boykin as also requiring, as constitutionally mandated, that the record affirmatively show that there was *639a factual basis for the plea. In [Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. at 1713 n. 7, 23 L.Ed.2d 274] it quoted from Commonwealth et [ex] rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa.2d 102, 105-106, 237 A.2d 196, 197-198 [1968]):
“A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged, and the permissible range of sentences.” (emphasis supplied)
Thus in this jurisdiction since Boykin, the trial court must determine that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged to which he has pleaded guilty. Requiring this determination of the relation between the law and the acts which the defendant admits having committed is designed to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding nature of the charge but urithout realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge. And the record must affirmatively show the acts which the defendant admits which served as the basis for the court’s determination. We think it preferable that such determination by the court be made before the acceptance of the plea of guilty.
We point out that the determination of the factual basis for the plea is predicated upon conduct of the defendant which he admits. Therefore, insofar as the acceptance of the guilty plea is concerned, it is not a question of the credibility of the defendant or the weight to be given to facts and circumstances with regard to that conduct nor is it a matter of resolving conflicting information before the court regarding his conduct. The inquiry is not a matter of what the State may be able to prove on a trial of the merits, but is confined to what the defendant admits he did. If the conduct which he admits is not sufficient to constitute the offense to which he pleads guilty, the plea shall not be *640accepted. To the extent that this is a departure from our holding in Gopshes v. State, 1 Md.App. 396, [230 A.2d 475 (1967)], Gopshes is overruled. Of course, the requirement that there must be a factual basis for the plea is to be distinguished from the rule that a valid plea of guilty makes unnecessary the production of evidence to support the indictment. Fix v. State, 5 Md.App. 703, 712[, 249 A.2d 224]. An effective plea of guilty obviates the necessity for the State to meet its' burden of proof of the guilt of the defendant for he has confessed it. We note further, that the rule that the acceptance of a guilty plea is not effective unless the court determines from facts and circumstances appearing in the record that there is a factual basis for the plea is to be distinguished from the rule that the fact that there may have been a defense raised to the crime charged, if there had been no guilty plea, does not, of itself, make an otherwise valid entry of a guilty plea ineffective. See Palacorolle v. State, 239 Md. 416, 421[, 211 A.2d 828].
We believe that Boykin impressed upon the rule followed in this State prior to its opinion with respect to the acceptance of a plea of guilty only the need for the specific inclusion of the three designated constitutional rights and the requirement that the trial court determine, preferably prior to acceptance of the plea, upon proper showing appearing in the record, that there was a factual basis, accepted by the defendant, sufficient to constitute the offense to which the plea was tendered. So for a guilty plea to be effective after 2 June 1969, there must be compliance with the rule established in this State as refined by Boykin.
McCall, 9 Md.App. at 199-201, 263 A.2d at 25-26 (some emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals later noted in Murphy v. State, 100 Md.App. 131, 136, 640 A.2d 230, 232 (1994):
Because the agreed statement of facts contained no evidence of “deception ... in addition to any false representation or false representations that there [were] sufficient funds in the drawee bank to cover the check[s],” Art. 27 *641§ 344(b), appellant’s conviction for theft over $300 was improper. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to set aside the verdict. [Alterations in original.]
See Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25, 28, 354 A.2d 499, 501 (1976) (stating that, even in a trial based upon agreed statement of facts, accused must be acquitted if evidence is insufficient to sustain conviction).
In addition to discussing the Statement of Facts, the majority relies on the trial court’s interrogation of Metheny in reference to his plea, pointing out that the appellant responded affirmatively to the court informing him that he had been charged with robbery. He is then asked: “Do you know how the crimes are committed?” He answers: “I committed them. ” That response is a conclusion, not a fact. Relative to the robbery, he is later asked: “Do you know how that crime is committed?” He responds: “Yes. It was committed during the premeditated murder.” He is then asked: “By doing what?” He responds: “By stealing her clothes and stealing her purse.” Every emphasized answer is a conclusion, not a fact.
Accordingly, it is clear, as I see it, that, as a matter of law, in assessing the appropriateness of a finding that a defendant has committed an offense based only on a statement of facts, as occurred in the case at bar, the court must look only to the facts proffered in the statement in support of the State’s 3 position that the specified offense was in fact committed by the defendant.
The facts proffered in this case, as stated above, or any other facts contained in the Statement, or, for that matter, facts contained in any of the four statements of the defendant upon which the Statement of Facts was based, in my view are not sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery, let alone a finding of an aggravating factor in the context of death sentencing.
*642In the present case the error was compounded by the trial court’s conveying to the sentencing jury that the defendant had pled guilty to and been not only convicted of robbery, but, by the trial court’s assertion to the jury panel of its opinion that Metheny had, in fact, robbed the victim. In its opening remarks to the sentencing jury panel during voir dire, the court advised the panel:
Joe Roy Metheny, was found guilty on his plea of guilty to first degree premeditated murder and robbery.... The Defendant robbed the victim of her purse and clothing and buried her in a shallow grave ... and buried her purse and clothing in a separate location. [Emphasis added.]
Additionally, in closing argument the State informed the jury that:
So, you can consider that the Defendant pled guilty, that he entered a plea of guilty to robbery, and you will see when you go to deliberate that there is a typed out statement of facts that were relied on by the Court in convicting the Defendant of the robbery. Those facts are essentially the same as the facts that you had in this courtroom.... [Y]ou may consider ... the fact that the Defendant pled guilty to robbery.
B. Robbery
Stebbing v. State4 notwithstanding, in Maryland robbery maintains its common law definition. Robbery is “the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another from his person by the use of violence or by putting in fear.” Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792, 490 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1985). A more descriptive definition is provided by the Maryland pattern jury instruction:
Robbery is the taking and carrying away of property from someone else [or from [his][her] presence and control], by force or threat of force, with the intent to steal the proper*643ty. In order to convict the defendant of robbery, the State must prove:
(1) that the defendant took the property from (victim) [or from [his][her] presence and control];
(2) that the defendant took the property by force or threat of force; and
(3) that the defendant intended to steal the property, that is, to deprive (victim) of the property permanently.
[Alterations in original.]
MJPI—Cr 4:28, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (1987); see also Maryland Criminal Law, Section 12.0, Common Law Robbery in Maryland, Gilbert & Moylan, (1988 Cumulative Supp.).
We noted in Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 614, 728 A.2d 180, 188 (1999):
The elements of carjacking differ from the elements of robbery and each offense can be committed without committing the other offense. Robbery is the felonious taking and carrying away of personal property from the person of another, accomplished by force or fear. State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606, 298 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1973). Robbery requires asportation of the property. Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 184, 699 A.2d 1170, 1183 (1997), cert. denied, [522] U.S. [1082], 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998). Although reference to the intent requirement begs the question before the Court, we note that robbery is a specific intent crime, and that the specific intent required is the intent to permanently deprive the person of the property. Gover, 267 Md. at 606, 298 A.2d at 381. [Emphasis added.]
Similarly in Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 188-89, 699 A.2d 1170, 1185 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998), we said:
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we hold that Appellant’s use of force against Debra Goodwich satisfied the “force” element of robbery. Debra Goodwich presumably sought to prevent Appellant from removing the items of personal property from her parents’ home. In *644using force to prevent immediate interference with his possession of the property, therefore, Appellant committed the crime of robbery. From this conclusion, it follows that the property was taken from Debra Goodwich’s person or presence, as required under the common law definition of robbery. The law is settled that the victim of a robbery need not be in the same room of the dwelling from which property is taken in order for the “person or presence” element of robbery to be satisfied. See State v. Colvin, 814 Md. 1, 19-20, 548 A.2d 506, 515 (1988) (finding that robbery had been committed in victim’s presence where the victim was stabbed in different room of the house from which the property was taken). Moreover, it should be noted that Appellant was indicted not only for robbery with regard to the jewelry and other items, but also with regard to Debra Goodwich’s 1988 Honda Accord. Appellant stole the vehicle after he murdered Debra Goodwich and as she lay dead in the foyer of the Goodwich home. Even if we had concluded that the elements of armed robbery were not satisfied with respect to the other items, Appellant was at least guilty of armed robbery with respect to the vehicle. See Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 353-54, 473 A.2d 903, 913-14 (holding that taking and asportation of property constitutes robbery even where intent to steal is not formed until after application of force resulting in death), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984).
Additionally, in Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 558, 693 A.2d 781, 796-97 (1997), we said:
The essential elements of the crime of robbery are “the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear.” West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988). Robbery with a deadly weapon is not a separate substantive offense, but if the State can prove that a defendant used a deadly weapon during the commission of a robbery, the defendant is subject to harsher penalties. Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 486, 488; see Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 140-41, 416 A.2d 265, *645266 (1980), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 990, 101 S.Ct. 1688, 68 L.Ed.2d 189 (1981). Appellant was convicted of robbery and robbery with a deadly weapon, and he argues that this conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove the element of taking and carrying away. We hold that the convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
Ms. Johnson regularly kept some money in her wallet, and, on the night of the crime, Ms. Wilson was told by Ms. Johnson that she had twenty dollars. Mr. Johnson testified that when his wife was at home, her wallet was usually kept in her purse, which was stored out of sight. At the scene of the shooting, Ms. Johnson’s purse was found on the floor of her bedroom, and her wallet was found, opened and empty of cash, on top of her dresser. From these facts, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found a taking and carrying away of Ms. Johnson’s personal property beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30-31, 553 A.2d 233, 236 (1989), we said:
Robbery is a specific intent crime.
It is clear that there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent.... Therefore, as larceny is an ingredient of robbery, we look to the components of the former to ascertain the requisite mental element of the latter. Larceny is the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.... Because an intent to steal, the animus furandi, must be present, it follows that larceny, and therefore robbery, is classed as a specific intent crime.
State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606, 298 A.2d 378 (1973) (citations omitted). One of the elements of robbery is the additional mens rea of a specific intent above and beyond the doing of the actus rea.
There is absolutely no evidence in this case that the defendant ever intended to commit a robbery, or was, in fact, murdering the victim in order to steal her clothing and purse. *646The only evidence relating to why he murdered the victim was that he did it because of a:
Sense of power. I don’t know. Vulnerable. I dreaded, just ... I got a very ... got a rush out of it, got a high out of it. Call it what you want. I had no real excuse why other than I like to do it. I don’t know how to describe it.
That is the only reason he ever gave as to why he murdered the victim. There is no evidence that demonstrates an intent to commit a robbery. It is evident that he intended to kill Ms. Magaziner, and that he eventually disposed of her body, clothes, and purse, in an effort to conceal evidence of the murder. Under the circumstances of this case, that is not robbery.
It, standing alone, certainly does not satisfy the intent element of the crime of robbery. Moreover, unlike Stebbing, supra, there was no evidence that Metheny ever took the victim’s clothes and purse from her, even after she was dead. Certainly there is no evidence that he had unclothed her during, or even reasonably close in time to, the application of the force that resulted in her death. In the present case the victim’s clothes were in the trailer when he strangled her. Sometime after he killed her, and, given Metheny’s affinity for post-mortem sexual activity, it could have been days later, he buried her body. Presumably her clothes and purse were wherever she left them when she voluntarily disrobed, or partially disrobed in order to voluntarily engage in sexual activity with Metheny. At this point he has not asported her clothes or purse.
It is later, after he disposed of her remains, that he takes the evidence in his trailer, the clothes and purse, and transports them to the general vicinity of the location of her remains and buries them as well, nearer to the victim’s remains than they had been when they were in the trailer. In my view, Metheny’s disposal of the evidence under these circumstances was not the asportation of property, nor does it indicate an intent to permanently deprive someone of their property. As I have said, supra, he was disposing of evidence of a murder.
*647C. Other Circumstances
The State argues, and the majority agrees, that the circumstances of the offense provide the missing element in the same manner as was supplied in Stebbing v. State, supra. To me, this case is distinguishable.
First, I have not been able to discover anywhere in the record before us as to when, relative to her strangulation, the body of the victim was buried. The defendant dug up her skull approximately six months after he buried her in order to have sex with it, therefore, as I have indicated above, it is just as reasonable to suppose that he kept her body for a period of time after the killing for similar purposes without burying it, as it is to surmise that her body was buried contemporaneously with her murder.
That being possible, it can be surmised that there was a period of time when her clothes remained with her. If so, a question is, was the burying of her clothes near her body at a later date, perhaps days after her demise, the ‘carrying away’, the asportation, of her property? Did it in fact constitute a robbery when he first removed her body and buried it but left her clothes in the trailer? Was he robbing her by separating her body from her clothes? In order for a robbery to exist, the burying of her clothes and purse would had to have been a continuation of the offense of murder, even under Stebbing. There is no factual evidence contained in the statement of facts that the burying of the clothes near the body was a part of the same general occurrence of the murder. The clothes could have been buried weeks or even months later. In Stebbing, the victim’s clothes were forcibly removed during the murder itself as a continuum of the offense, and disposed of relatively contemporaneously,5 and some of the property, a blue sapphire ring, was kept permanently by one of the perpetrators—there is no similar evidence of intent in the case at bar.
*648Conyers, supra, can similarly be distinguished. In that case, there was evidence that Mrs. Johnson, the victim, kept money in her purse. Her purse was found ransacked with all her money missing. From that we held that a trier of fact could find that her money had been transported away during, or just after the murder.
In Ball, supra, Ms. Goodwich interrupted a burglary in process at her parent’s home, and was murdered by the perpetrator. Items of personal property were taken during the burglary. Additionally, Ms. Goodwich’s car was taken as well. We held that his taking of her car, after she was left for dead in the family home, still constituted robbery based on the force used to kill her. In Ball, as in the cases discussed supra, a clear connection with respect to the timing of the force used and the taking of the property had been established to prove that the robbery was a continuation of the initial offense.
The evidence in the case sub judice was all supplied through the statements of the defendant, and the fact portion of the Statement of Facts. It is limited to his statements that he “later” buried the victim’s purse and clothes near where he buried her body. There is no evidence of when the clothes were buried. While it is true that the authorities never found them, there is no evidence contradicting the defendant’s statement as to where he buried them.6 One can only surmise that if he had thrown the clothes in the grave with her body, no robbery would be alleged to have occurred. Would there have been a robbery if he had put the clothes she had voluntarily removed back on her after the murder before burying her? Would there have been a robbery if he had left the clothes she voluntarily removed where she put them, until apprehended?
Reviewing the holding in Stebbing, further, I note that in that case, we held that the disposal of clothes in dumpsters *649and the retaining of the victim’s ring, were sufficient to satisfy the specific intent prong of the elements of robbery and that robbery does not require, “that the defendant’s violence-or-intimidation acts be done for the very purpose of taking of the victim’s property ... [it is] enough that he take advantage of a situation which he created for some other purpose!.]” Id. at 353-54, 473 A.2d at 914 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 94 at 701-02 (1972)).
To better understand our holding in Stebbing and how it may be distinguished, it is necessary to discuss certain facts of that case. Annette Louise Stebbing and her husband, Bernard Lee Stebbing, offered a ride to Dena Marie Polis, (the step-daughter of Bernard’s brother). During the trip Bernard pulled their van to the side of the road and Annette pulled Dena into the back of the van. There, while Dena was still alive, Bernard forcibly disrobed her, and while Annette sat on Dena’s chest with her hands around Dena’s neck, Bernard raped her. During the rape Annette strangled Dena, killing her. The next day they disposed of the clothing in two separate dumpsters at different locations, but kept the victim’s ring. They disposed of the body on the same day in the area of the waterfront “headfirst through a manhole into a sewer.” Stebbing, 299 Md. at 340, 473 A.2d at 907. We further explained:
The instant case makes explicit what was implicit in Midgett [v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958) ], namely that there must be an intent to steal at the time of the taking. If the force precedes the taking, the intent to steal need not coincide with the force. It is sufficient if there be force followed by a taking with intent to steal as part of the same general occurrence or episode. Even if the force results in death, a taking and asportation after death is nevertheless robbery. See Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, [464] U.S. [1073], 104 S.Ct. 985, 79 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).
Id. at 356, 473 A.2d at 915.
Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958), implied that there must be an intent to steal at the time of the taking. *650It is interesting to note, however, that in Midgett we reversed the judgment and sentences of the trial court. In that case, a police officer unexpectedly came upon three men who were waiting in an alley to rob a businessman. One of the men pulled a gun on the officer. When the men attempted to disarm the officer, they were unable to remove his revolver from its holster so they removed the officer’s entire belt assembly. Commenting on the proceedings on remand we advised:
[WJhen the charge of robbery is retried, the trial judge should instruct the jury to the effect that, if it finds that the defendant, by taking and carrying away the equipment of the officer, intended to steal it, then the verdict should be “guilty”, but, if it finds that he merely intended to disarm the officer, without an intent to steal his equipment at the time it was taken and earned away, then the verdict should be “not guilty”.
Id. at 43,139 A.2d at 218 (emphasis added).
There is simply no actual evidence in the case at bar that the defendant at any time contemporaneously with the occurrence or episode of the murder ever acted with larcenous intent in respect to any of the property of the victim. There is even no evidence that the burial of the clothes occurred contemporaneously with the burying of her body. The evidence is to the contrary. Again the events occurred as follows: victim voluntarily partially disrobes in order to have sex with defendant, he murders her, sometime later he buries her, sometime later he buries her clothes in the vicinity of her body. There is nothing more to support the robbery conviction. There is no evidence of any taking. There is no evidence of an intent to steal. In my view, the sparse facts stated above are not enough to establish that a robbery took place. Metheny did not intend to deprive the victim of her clothes and purse at the time he buried them. She was already dead and buried in the ground nearby. I respectfully suggest that the intent to dispose of the items, under the circumstances of this case, is not synonymous with an intent to steal or to rob.
*651We also based our decision in Stebbing, in large part, on a number of out-of-state cases where perpetrators were primarily committing assaults, and then, as an afterthought took money from the victim. None of these cases are factually similar to the present case, although several may be similar to Stebbing.7
There was evidence in Stebbing of force followed by an intent to steal as part of the same occurrence or episode. That type of evidence is not present in the case sub judice. *652Unlike Stebbing, in the present case there is no actual evidence of an intent to permanently, or temporarily, deprive the victim of her property; i.e., no ring. At least in Stebbing there was some evidence that at least a part of the property taken during the act of violence, was taken with the intent to convert it to the perpetrator’s use. That is not so in the case at bar. Metheny deprived Ms. Magaziner of her life, not her property. In Stebbing, and the other cases mentioned, supra, there was evidence, that the taking of property occurred during, or just after, the acts of violence, or at least at the time of the disposal of the remains in Stebbing.
In the present case, because of the limitations of the abbreviated Statement of Facts there is no evidence of when the items of clothes and the purse were buried in the vicinity of the body, no actual evidence of when any clothes were involuntarily removed, if any were, from Ms. Magaziner. It is clear that none were involuntarily removed during the sexual act or the violent act of strangulation, i.e., during the murder. If the State’s logic were to be applied here, i.e., Stebbing’s holdings be extended under the facts of this case, Metheny would not have committed a robbery had he buried the victim with her clothes and purse. He would, however, have committed a robbery by burying her property nearby. By extension of that logic, he would also have committed a robbery when he dug up her skull to have sex with it and disposed of it in Pennsylvania, but would not have committed a robbery if he had returned the skull to the victim’s grave. I do not believe that it was the intention of this Court that Stebbing be extended so far.
In my view the evidence of a robbery in this case does not rise to the level necessary to provide the intent element of robbery, even to the level found in Stebbing. Accordingly, I would reverse Metheny’s conviction for robbery, hold that there was insufficient evidence of robbery as an aggravating factor and vacate his sentence of death for first degree premeditated murder. The evil of a defendant, the horrendous nature of his crimes, the ultimate impact upon victims, should never be enough to let us forget that it is the Legisla*653ture that creates the penalties that we, as judges, or juries in death penalty cases, are permitted to impose.8 We, as judges, should not extend the boundaries the Legislature has put in place. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge join in this dissent.

. There were additional statements elsewhere in the statement of facts, but no factual statements that contradict the summary furnished the Court.

2. Current Maryland Rule 4-242 is derived from former Maryland Rule 731 and M.D.R. 731.

. Or the defendant's position.

. 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903 (1984).

. In Stebbing, the victim was killed on the evening of April 9, 1980. Both the victim's body and her clothing and purse were disposed of the next day.

. The authorities could not initially find the victim’s body either, in spite of being pointed to a location approximately ten feet from where it was eventually found.

. See People v. McGrath, 62 Cal.App.3d 82, 86, 133 Cal.Rptr. 27, 29 (1976) (victim murdered in retribution for homosexual attack on third party; defendant then removed money from victim's pockets); Rex v. Hawkins, 3 Carr. & P. 392 (1828) (Where poachers beat a gamekeeper, left him lying on the ground unconscious, and one of them returned and took his money and gun, only the one who returned had committed robbery); State v. Iaukea, 56 Haw. 343, 356, 537 P.2d 724, 733 (1975) ("The law does not require that the use of force or the threatened imminent use of force be done for the very purpose of taking the victim’s property."); People v. Jordan, 303 Ill. 316, 319, 135 N.E. 729, 730 (1922) (victim knocked out in street fight; then victim's money taken); People v. Pavic, 104 Ill.App.3d 436, 446, 60 Ill.Dec. 175, 183, 432 N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (1982) (force used in rape of victim remained in effect when money taken from victim's purse nearby), overruled in part by People v. Pettit, 101 Ill.2d 309, 78 Ill.Dec. 157, 461 N.E.2d 991 (1984); State v. Myers, 230 Kan. 697, 703-04, 640 P.2d 1245, 1250 (1982) (manslaughter slaying of victim during argument; three hours later defendant returned to scene and took wallet and money from the victim’s body); Howard v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 667, 670, 233 S.W.2d 282, 284 (1950) (attempted rape of victim in her home; defendant takes victim's purse when leaving); State v. Covington, 169 La. 939, 945-46, 126 So. 431, 433 (1930) (intent to rob need not be present during beating of victim whose money was taken after he appeared to be dead); Crenshaw v. State, 13 Md.App. 361, 373, 283 A.2d 423, 430 (1971) (threatened harm to victim’s children compelled victim to submit to defendant's sexual attack in her home; attacker then took money when leaving premises; "[t]he same force and coercion was present in the robbery.”), cert. denied, 264 Md. 746 (1972); Hope v. People, 83 N.Y. 418 (1881) (victim forced to reveal combination to safe located on bank premises; key to bank taken from table in victim’s bedroom when defendants leaving); State v. Nathan, 39 S.C.L. 219 (5 Rich) (1851) (assault wilh intent to rape; victim pays money to dissuade attacker); Turner v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 90, 94, 198 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1946) (victim knocked unconscious in altercation arising out of minor traffic accident; then money taken); Alaniz v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 4-5, 177 S.W.2d 965, 967 (1944) (victim beaten to avenge insult; then money taken).

. Other than for common law offenses with no penalty prescribed by statute, and even then the Legislature has ihe power, and has used it, to, by statute, modify the penalty.