Court Opinion

ID: 9567989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:59:33.124347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:09.785910
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s order amounted to a dismissal for failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-17; that such a dismissal constitutes the grant of a plea in abatement; that, as such, the appeal of the dismissal order cannot be brought under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); and that, accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed due to appellant’s failure to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures prescribed in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). I write separately only to note that I believe it unnecessary to disapprove, as the majority’s opinion does, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Walden v. John D. Archbold Mem. Hosp., 197 Ga. App. 275 (398 SE2d 271) (1990), as I believe that Walden does not demand a result contrary to that reached by the majority.
In Walden, supra, the issue presented was whether dismissal or substitution of parties was the proper remedy where no real party in interest existed at the time the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted. Id. at 277-278 (4). The Court of Appeals reasonably held that the trial court did not err in ordering dismissal because no real party in interest existed at that time for purposes of substitution (though a real party in interest did exist as of the time of appeal). Id. at 278-279 (4). Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, Walden did not hold that the lack of existence of a real party in interest somehow converts what would be the grant of a plea in abatement (where a real party in interest existed but was not named in the suit18) to the grant of a plea in bar. In fact, in Walden, there was no need to address that issue because the appeal there was pursued as an interlocutory appeal, see *888id. at 276, in implicit recognition that the trial court’s dismissal order did not constitute a directly appealable grant of summary judgment, i.e., plea in bar.
In sum, I conclude that the result reached by the majority is not inconsistent with Walden and that it is thus unnecessary to disapprove Walden as the majority does. With this caveat, I concur in the majority’s opinion.

 See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleet Multi Fuel Corp., 178 Ga. App. 859 (344 SE2d 742) (1986).