Court Opinion

ID: 2964318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:56.190871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:54.029489
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1131

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               ANTHONY J. GRABIEC, JR.,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Scott F. Gleason  with whom Gleason Law  Offices was on brief  for
            ________________            ____________________
        appellant.
            George B.  Henderson, II, Assistant  United States Attorney,  with
            ________________________
        whom  Donald  K.  Stern, United  States  Attorney,  was  on brief  for
              _________________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  September 25, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      ALDRICH, Senior Circuit  Judge.  Defendant  Anthony
                               _____________________

            J. Grabiec, Jr., connected with an illegal gambling and loan-

            sharking  organization known  as  the Winter  Hill Gang,  was

            found guilty  of various racketeering offenses,  18 U.S.C.   

            1962(c) and (d), but acquitted on one count under 18 U.S.C.  

            894(a).    On  this  appeal  he  complains  of a  prejudicial

            argument  by the  prosecutor in  his final  summation  to the

            jury,  and of  the court's  refusal to  allow him  to  make a

            particular  argument   based  on  the   government's  opening

            statement.  We affirm.

                      After  defendant's  brief's  lengthy exposition  of

            various types of improper  arguments, their possibly  serious

            consequences,  and  effective   and  ineffective  cures,   it

            developed that the prosecutor's  offense, after defendant had

            charged him with "bias . . . puffery . . . bombast  and . . .

            hot air"1 was to speak of  the defense as "laughable."   More

            exactly:

                           [I]f there is  any bombast,  puffery
                      and hot air in this case, it's not coming
                      from our side of the table.  In fact, the
                      defense in  this case would  be laughable
                      if  the  crimes  involved  were   not  so
                      serious.

            It further  appeared that,  upon  defendant's objection,  the

            court  said to the jury, "Well, the jury will understand that

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Five times.

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            this is argument, not evidence.  It will be  taken that way."

            The  defendant said nothing further.

                      This silence,  of course, means  defendant must now

            prove plain error.  United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 769
                                _____________    ______

            (1st Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
                                    _____________    _____

            731 (1993)); Fed.  R. Crim. P.  52(b).   We do not,  however,

            find even simple error.

                      We can agree with defendant that we  have long held

            that counsel  must not express a personal opinion.  Greenberg
                                                                _________

            v. United States, 280 F.2d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 1960) (Aldrich,
               _____________

            J.).  Again,  in United States v. Nickens, 955  F.2d 112, 121
                             _____________    _______

            (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 835 (1992), we said, "This
                        _____ ______

            court  has  repeatedly  stated  that  it  is  improper  for a

            prosecutor to inject personal beliefs about the evidence into

            closing argument." (citations  omitted).   Although there  is

            perhaps  a heavier  burden on  prosecutors, the  rule applies

            both  ways.   In  United  States v.  Young, 470  U.S.  1, 8-9
                              ______________     _____

            (1985),  the   Court  said,   "Defense   counsel,  like   the

            prosecutor, must refrain  from interjecting personal  beliefs

            into  the presentation  of  his  case." (citations  omitted).

            Strict application  of this  rule in  the course  of extended

            argument, resulting in constant "I suggest  to you that . . .

            " "I ask you  to find . . . " becomes tiresome.  We have been

            content with the court,  in its discretion, substituting "the

            standard  instruction  that  arguments  of  counsel  are  not

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            evidence."  United  States v.  Bennett, 75 F.3d  40, 46  (1st
                        ______________     _______

            Cir.  1996), petition for  cert. filed, __  U.S.L.W. __ (U.S.
                         ________ ___  _____ _____

            Jun. 5,  1996) (No.  95-9237).   There the  prosecutor stated

            that a defense argument was a "diversion."  We were satisfied

            with the  court's giving  that instruction.   We  are equally

            satisfied here.

                      Bennett,  in  fact,  is  even more  helpful.    The
                      _______

            prosecution  there  had  asserted  that  one  of  defendant's

            arguments "doesn't pass the laugh test."  We accepted that as

            within the ordinary "rough and tumble," and not violating the

            prosecutor's duty  "to refrain  from  impugning, directly  or

            through implication, the integrity  or institutional role  of

            defense counsel."  Id. 
                               ___

                       Even without Bennett the prosecutor's  conduct was
                                    _______

            unexceptional  for  there  is   another  rule.    As  against

            defendant's   citation  of   the  oft-quoted   adjuration  to

            prosecutors in  Berger  v. United  States,  295 U.S.  78,  88
                            ______     ______________

            (1935),  defendant  fails to  note  the  Court's more  recent

            observation:

                           [I]f  the prosecutor's  remarks were
                      "invited," and did  no more than  respond
                      substantially  in  order  to  "right  the
                      scale," such comments  would not  warrant
                      reversing a conviction.

            United States  v. Young, 470  U.S. at 14  (footnote omitted).
            _____________     _____

            After defendant's oratorical charges, five times repeated, it

            scarcely lay in his mouth to object to a single reply in like

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            tone.   United  States v.  Whiting, 28  F.3d 1296,  1303 (1st
                    ______________     _______

            Cir.), cert. denied,  ___ U.S.  ___, 115 S.  Ct. 378  (1994);
                   _____ ______

            United  States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112 at 122; United States
            ______________    _______                       _____________

            v. Maccini,  721 F.2d 840, 846 (1st  Cir. 1983).  Even tested
               _______

            as simple error this claim is frivolous.

                      Second, defendant maintains that the court erred in

            restricting his closing argument, thereby ensuring conviction

            on  Count 57, one of two extortion charges.  Specifically, he

            contends  he  was  precluded from  arguing  to  the  jury the

            prosecution's failure  to introduce evidence  promised in its

            opening statement.

                      During his opening, the  prosecutor, in an  attempt

            to describe the defendant's  collection methodology, told the

            jury it would hear evidence that:

                           One night [Grabiec] even barged into
                      Mr. Gagliardi's home in a frenzy, grabbed
                      his wallet, cut up Mr. Gagliardi's credit
                      cards  in front  of Mr.  Gagliardi's wife
                      and  children.   I  suggest to  you  that
                      there can be nothing more terrifying than
                      having  somebody come  into your  home in
                      front of your wife and children and doing
                      something like that.

            While Gagliardi  did eventually testify to  a nighttime visit

            from the defendant that left  him feeling "very, very upset,"

            he  also  testified that  he  had never  been  threatened nor

            intimidated.    When the  government  sought  to introduce  a

            portion of a tape of monitored conversations between Grabiec,

                                         -5-

            Gagliardi  and others  contradicting  Gagliardi's  denial  of

            intimidation,2  the  trial  judge  sustained  the defendant's

            objection and excluded the evidence.

                      The defendant, in  his closing argument,  sought to

            seize  the moment  by  reminding the  jury,  "In the  opening

            statement, Mr. Wyshak said to you that  there was going to be

            evidence that in the  middle of the night Mr.  Grabiec barged

            into the home  of Mr.  Gagliardi and was  threatening him  in

            front--," at  which point the prosecutor objected.  The court

            sustained the objection and cautioned the jury that it "heard

            what was said and you  will take your own memory both  of the

            arguments  and  of the  evidence  rather  than what  opposing

            counsel says the  other counsel  said."    Defendant did  not

            attempt to rephrase  his argument  nor did he  object to  the

            ruling  or  request   a  curative  statement  regarding   the

            prosecutor's opening statement.

                      After the verdict, during a colloquy concerning the

            question of defendant's immediate detention under 18 U.S.C.  

            3143(a)(2), defendant  contended that  he had been  prevented

            from  making, what  was in  his  view, a  legitimate argument

            during summation that was directly relevant to his conviction

            on the  extortion count.  The prosecution  responded that the

            restriction was  proper  because "essentially  defendant  was

                                
            ____________________

            2.  On the  tape, Gagliardi stated that  "[Grabiec] came into
            my house  and he was  fucking terrorizing me  in front of  my
            wife." 

                                         -6-

            trying  to   impugn  the  integrity  of   the  Government  by

            commenting on the  fact that they didn't hear  evidence which

            the defendant on its own motion  asked not to be heard by the

            jury. . . ."

                      After reviewing the transcript, the court observed:

                           [I]t  was  that  middle-of-the-night
                      charge   that   triggered  my   immediate
                      ruling: "Objection sustained."   There is
                      a  lot of  difference  between saying  he
                      barged  in in  a frenzy  in front  of his
                      wife at night, cut  up his credit  cards,
                      and saying he barged  in in the middle of
                      the  night.   That carries  an impression
                      after  everybody's gone  to  bed.    It's
                      quite a different charge.   And if you're
                      going to quote the other side's argument,
                      you need to be accurate about it.

                      Defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment  right to

            assistance of counsel was violated by the court's restriction

            of his closing argument.   See Herring v. New York, 422  U.S.
                                       ___ _______    ________

            853  (1975).    Had  the  jury  been  able  to  consider  the

            government's failure to produce  this evidence, he maintains,

            it  would not have convicted  on this extortion  charge as it

            had not  convicted on  the parallel charge  involving another

            victim.

                      The government, while  maintaining that its  reason

            for  objecting  was   valid,  adds  that   defense  counsel's

            mischaracterization  warranted the  court's action.   Because

            defendant  failed to object to the court's ruling and did not

            attempt  to rephrase his  argument, we again  review only for

            "plain error,"  requiring him to  "show an obvious  and clear

                                         -7-
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            error  under  current  law  that   affected  his  substantial

            rights."  United  States v.  Phaneuf, 91 F.3d  255, 263  (1st
                      ______________     _______

            Cir.  1996); United States v.  Procopio, 88 F.3d  21, 31 (1st
                         _____________     ________

            Cir. 1996); United  States v.  Gilberg, 75 F.3d  15, 18  (1st
                        ______________     _______

            Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

                      Under the Sixth Amendment,  a defendant is entitled

            to the  assistance of  counsel, including  the delivery of  a

            closing argument which is "a  basic element of the  adversary

            factfinding process  in a criminal trial."  Herring, 422 U.S.
                                                        _______

            at  858.  The court,  however, has broad  discretion over the

            scope of summations.  Id. at  862; United States v. Wood, 982
                                  ___          _____________    ____

            F.2d 1,  4 (1st Cir.  1992); United States v.  Coast of Maine
                                         _____________     ______________

            Lobster Co.,  557 F.2d 905 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
            ___________                            _____ ______

            862 (1977); United States  v. Wilbur, 545 F.2d 764,  767 (1st
                        _____________     ______

            Cir. 1976).  Here the court upheld the government's objection

            because,  in  its  opinion,  defendant  mischaracterized  the

            prosecution's  opening  statement.    There  is  a difference

            between "middle of the night" and "one night;" in the context

            of "barging in," the former carries more of an aura of menace

            than the  latter.   To  disallow  a deviation  from  opposing

            counsel's statement  was well within the  court's discretion.

            Moreover, contemporaneous instruction to  the jury to use its

            "own  memory"  of  the  arguments and  evidence  rather  than

            counsels'  representations, in  no way  constrained defendant

            from   continuing   properly  with   his   argument,  without

                                         -8-
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            paraphrasing opposing  counsel.   We find  no error plain  or

            otherwise.

                      Affirmed.
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