Court Opinion

ID: 9908371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 17:01:32.802415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:09.019155
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         DEC 8 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARRETT KAZUO IGE,                               No.   19-56209

                Petitioner-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                 5:18-cv-01237-PA-LAL
 v.

ROSEMARY NDOH, Warden,                           MEMORANDUM*

                Respondent-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted December 5, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, M. SMITH, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Concurrence by Judge VANDYKE.

      Petitioner-Appellant Garrett Ige (“Garrett”) appeals an order of the United

States District Court for the Central District of California which denied his petition

for federal habeas corpus relief.       Garrett argues he was rendered ineffective

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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assistance of trial counsel because his trial attorney failed to investigate and present

exculpatory third-party evidence, viz., Garrett’s brother, Kenden Ige’s (“Kenden”),

confession (shortly before his suicide) that he alone committed the murders for

which Garrett was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility

of parole. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

      We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We

review de novo the district court’s denial of Garrett’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. Demetrulias v. Davis, 14 F.4th 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.1

      Because Garrett’s habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under

AEDPA’s “highly deferential standard,” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 334 n.7

(1997), this Court “must defer to a state court’s decision on any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits unless the decision was: (1) ‘contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States’; or (2) ‘based on an unreasonable determination

1
  Garrett filed a motion which asks us to take judicial notice of the California
Supreme Court’s informal briefing order (Docket Entry No. 43). We may take
judicial notice on appeal. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(f). We may take judicial notice of
documents “not subject to reasonable dispute,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), and “may take
notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial
system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States
ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th
Cir. 1992) (quoting St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1172
(10th Cir. 1979)). We grant the motion.

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of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,’”

Demetrulias, 14 F.4th at 905 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

      We conclude that Garrett’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was

adjudicated on the merits by the California Supreme Court, which adjudication is

therefore due deference under AEDPA.

      Generally, “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same

claim [are presumed to] rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803 (1991). But “the State may rebut the presumption by showing that [an]

unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the

lower state court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were

briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.”

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

      Here, the San Bernardino County Superior Court applied a state procedural

rule to deny Garrett’s petition, and both the California Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court summarily denied Garrett’s petition. However, before it

issued its summary denial, the California Supreme Court requested and received

informal briefing “on the merits” of Garrett’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Therefore, “alternative grounds for affirmance [] were briefed” to the California

Supreme Court, id., and we are convinced this briefing rebuts the presumption that

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the state supreme court’s summary denial of Garrett’s petition rested upon the same

ground as that relied upon by the lower court, see Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding presumption rebutted by California Supreme Court’s

request and receipt of informal merits briefing). This straightforward application of

our holding in Trigueros in no way upsets our decision in Flemming v. Matteson,

where we declined to extend Trigueros to a situation where (1) the relevant ruling

was by the California Court of Appeal, not the California Supreme Court, and (2)

general “opposition to the petition” (which did not specify any particular issues in

which the state appellate court was interested) was requested and received, not

informal merits briefing.     26 F.4th 1136, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2022).          Neither

distinction this Court drew in Flemming applies here.

      We further conclude that Garrett’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

does not overcome AEDPA’s highly deferential standard. “Ineffective assistance of

counsel claims are evaluated according to the familiar standard set forth in Strickland

[v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” Mann v. Ryan, 828 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th

Cir. 2016) (en banc). Under this standard, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate

deficient performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. “Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at

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687. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant “must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Judicial review of ineffective

assistance claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is “doubly deferential.” Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). That is, “[w]hen §2254(d) applies, the

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).

      There is a reasonable argument that Garrett’s trial lawyer adequately

investigated and presented his case. The lawyer spoke to Garrett’s prior counsel’s

investigator, who was present at the time Kenden made the confession, and asked

the investigator to reconstruct a report thereabout for the purpose of disclosing the

confession to the prosecution. Moreover, Garrett ignores that the lawyer explained

to him “that he would not seek admission of the confession because it would not

seem credible because [Garrett] and Kenden were siblings.” Reasonable tactical

decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight,

better tactics were available. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir.

1984) (citing United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524–25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975)).

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      It is also reasonably unlikely that the outcome of Garrett’s case would have

differed had the confession been presented to the jury, given the confession’s

presentation would have created a conflict within the defense: whereas Garrett and

his co-defendant, Lawrence Hughes II, testified that their friend, Jeff Katayama—a

prosecution witness—was present at the scene of the crime, Kenden’s confession

suggested that Katayama was not present at all. Further, the evidence that Garrett

participated in the murders was compelling, and the credibility of Kenden’s

confession was weak, such that a reasonable jurist could conclude that Kenden

plausibly had a motive to lie, in his confession, in order to exonerate his brother,

Garrett.

      Because Garrett is not entitled to habeas relief, he is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. See Sully v. Avers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2013).

      AFFIRMED.

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Garrett Ige v. Rosemary Ndoh, No. 19-56209             FILED
VanDyke, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result:
                                                        DEC 8 2023
I concur in the result.                             MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                     U.S. COURT OF APPEALS