Court Opinion

ID: 9644546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:59:07.705113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:14.625467
License: Public Domain

*260MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent. The trial judge’s erroneous example of murder in the third degree constitutes reversible error.
The majority inaccurately states that appellant does not argue that the example given by the trial judge was incorrect. (p. 1368). In its brief appellant contends that:
“The court erred in failing to fully and adequately explain and define third degree murder, and in failing to fully and adequately differentiate an example of a criminal offense as given by the court from the factual defense of accidental killing asserted by the defendant in the case at bar.
After lengthy deliberation by the jury, they returned to the courtroom requesting, by question, further, explanation of third degree murder. The court responded as follows:
Third degree murder — all murder which is not murder of either the first or second degree is murder of the third degree. Now, this would be an unlawful slaying accompanied by malice as I defined that to you . yesterday, but where there is no specific intention to kill, I might get into a fight with a person and during the course of the fight I may just not know how to stop and I keep going and keep going. I am not trying to kill him but I actually end up killing him. That would be murder in the third degree.” (Emphasis in original.) (Transcript, p. 494.)
Therefore, appellant does argue contrary to the majority’s view that the trial judge inaccurately described murder in the third degree.
The above-quoted portion of the trial judge’s supplemental instruction was confusing because it failed to distinguish to the jury that murder in the third degree included an element of malice while the accidental shooting theory advanced by appellant did not. Hence, my dissent.