Court Opinion

ID: 9857435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:34:17.387708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:24.847379
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, J.,
dissents.
I respectfully dissent. Relator was personally served with a Motion for Contempt and a Show Cause Order which ordered him to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Notwithstanding this command of the court, Relator chose instead to rely on advice of counsel, failed to appear at the designated time and place, and sent counsel in his stead. Where a party deliberately absents himself from a show cause hearing but is represented by counsel, he should not be heard to complain he was denied due process merely because the court failed to make a formal finding his absence was voluntary.
As the majority states, the offense of contempt generally has been regarded by the United States Supreme Court as sui generis, falling somewhere between civil and criminal classification. In past decisions, that court frequently emphasized that procedural safeguards for contempt do not derive from the sixth amendment, but arise under traditional notions of due process. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1959); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 252, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932); Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 44 S.Ct. 272, 68 L.Ed. 577 (1924).
In Blackmer v. United States, supra, the court rejected petitioner’s argument it was a violation of due process to proceed with a criminal contempt hearing where petitioner was notified to appear personally and failed to do so:
This argument misconstrues the nature of the proceeding. “While contempt may be an offense against the law and subject to appropriate punishment, certain it is that since the foundation of our government proceedings to punish such offenses have been regarded as sui generis and not ‘criminal prosecutions’ within the sixth amendment or common understanding.” [Citations omitted]. The requirement of due process in such case is satisfied by suitable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and be heard.
284 U.S. at 440, 52 S.Ct. at 256. (emphasis added).
Relator argues Blackmer is not controlling because the premise of that decision was later rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1967). Relator contends that criminal contempt convictions are now considered criminal prosecutions to which sixth amendment pro-
*423tections apply. Thus, the fact Relator was tried and sentenced in absentia violated the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Two Texas courts of appeals have expressed reservations about proceeding with a show cause hearing in the absence of the accused. See, Atkins v. Snyder, 597 S.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1980) (Massey, C.J., concurring); Ex parte Stanford, 557 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1977).
I am not persuaded that the United States Supreme Court no longer regards contempts as sui generis, but instead regards them as ordinary criminal prosecutions. In Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1959), the Court reiterated that “Procedural safeguards for contempt do not derive from the Sixth Amendment. Criminal contempt proceedings are not within ‘all criminal prosecutions’ to which that amendment applies.” Id. at 616, 80 S.Ct. at 1042. The decision in Bloom was not premised upon an outright rejection of this traditional view of con-tempts, nor has the United States Supreme Court held the due process clause requires persons accused of criminal contempt in state proceedings be accorded the full panoply of sixth amendment rights available to persons in normal criminal proceedings. Until such time as that Court indicates otherwise, we should continue to adhere to the view that contempt is a unique, quasi-criminal sanction in which procedural safeguards are derived from traditional notions of due process rather than the sixth amendment. See United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1099-1101 (7th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 874, 27 L.Ed.2d 809 (1971).
The requirement of due process was met in this case by reasonable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and to be heard. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. at 440, 52 S.Ct. at 256. A contempt proceeding is unlike a civil suit. The person charged may not ignore the show cause order as he might ignore citation in a civil suit. He is commanded to appear and if he ignores the command he may be brought in under a capias. Ex parte Davis, 161 Tex. 561, 344 S.W.2d 153,155-56 (Tex.1961). Although an accused has the right to be present, he also has the corresponding duty to be present. Accordingly, I would remand Relator to the custody of the Harris County sheriff.