Court Opinion

ID: 9392553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 14:05:56.020784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.573633
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0092-MR
                                     AND
                             NO. 2022-CA-0197-MR

ALIXANDRIA D. SHARPE                                                APPELLANT

                APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
v.                HONORABLE TARA HAGERTY, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 19-CI-502309

FELIX H. SHARPE, II                                                    APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: This is a dissolution action in which Alixandria D. Sharpe

has appealed from three orders of the Jefferson Family Court related to the award

of child support and maintenance, including the family court’s finding that she was

underemployed and the amount of income it imputed to her. We affirm.
             Alixandria and Felix H. Sharpe II were married on August 10, 2012,

in Michigan. Three children were born of the marriage; one son in 2016, and twins

(a son and a daughter) in 2019. The parties separated on December 16, 2018, and

Felix filed a petition to dissolve the marriage on July 30, 2019. He requested that

the court grant them joint custody of the children, order him to pay child support,

and equitably divide the marital property and debts after assigning the non-marital

property. Felix, who is an attorney, filed the petition pro se, after which he

retained an attorney to represent him. In his preliminary verified disclosure

statement, Felix listed his gross monthly income as $10,833.33 and Alixandria’s as

$600.00. He paid the children’s insurance premiums of $1,078.00 per month.

Felix also listed their automobiles, checking accounts, and retirement accounts. He

listed a marital debt of $1,962.88 to Champion Farms, an apartment where they

had lived prior to the separation. Felix’s student loan was listed as non-marital.

We note that both Felix and Alixandria have a child born prior to the marriage

from previous relationships.

             On February 16, 2021, Felix filed a motion for a default judgment and

a decree of dissolution. In support of his motion, Felix filed a written deposition in

which he stated that Alixandria was voluntarily unemployed. She had a Bachelor

of Arts degree and was able to work as a schoolteacher earning about $40,000.00

per year. He again requested joint custody of the children with an equal parenting

                                         -2-
schedule. He included the other statutory information to support his petition to

dissolve the marriage and noted that Alixandria was in default as she had not filed

a response, despite having been served by the sheriff on October 4, 2019. In his

tendered decree, Felix stated that Alixandria was capable of earning $40,000.00

per year based upon her education and skillset and that he should pay her

$1,460.27 per month in child support based upon the statutory guidelines. Shortly

thereafter, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Alixandria.

             On May 6, 2021, Alixandria filed her preliminary verified disclosure

statement. For her income, she listed $691.42 in child support, which she received

for her older son born prior to the marriage. She stated the Champion Farms debt

was now $2,235.00 and that she also had a student loan debt. Her monthly

expenses totaled $4,157.00. The following month, Alixandria filed a motion for

the court to enter a financial status quo order. In an attached affidavit, Alixandria

stated that her older child as well as the three children she had with Felix lived

primarily with her. By agreement, Felix had been paying for her rent ($1,625.00

per month), groceries ($400.00 every two weeks), car insurance for the van used to

transport the children, the utility bills for the residence ($214.00 per month),

internet ($43.00 per month), and her cell phone bill ($10.00 to $25.00 per month).

Felix had recently stopped paying the internet bill. Alixandria and the children

were all on Felix’s health and dental insurance plans. Her only independent

                                          -3-
income was child support she received for her oldest son. She needed to take

additional courses or be retrained so that she could be certified as an art teacher.

The court entered a status quo order and ordered that the parties would continue to

share temporary joint custody of the children with Felix continuing to pay for

household expenses as he had during the separation. On July 16, 2021, the court

entered a limited decree dissolving the marriage.

             Felix filed his final verified disclosure statement on September 30,

2021. His gross monthly income was $11,500.00, and he paid $1,624.00 for the

children’s insurance. There were three automobiles, two of which had no debt

owed and one, for which he was the primary driver, had a debt of $20,468.00.

Felix was claiming that car as his non-marital property. He again listed bank and

retirement accounts. His student loan balance was $64,817.00, on which he paid

$500.00 per month, and Alixandria’s student loan balance was $87,197.00.

             Alixandria filed her final verified disclosure shortly thereafter. She

listed her income as $691.42. She worked for Portland Christian School and was

paid via tuition credit. She stated she was paying $5.00 per month for her student

loan.

             In his pre-trial compliance, Felix requested that the court take into

account their 50/50 shared parenting schedule when calculating child support. He

also requested that the court impute an income to Alixandria at a minimum of

                                          -4-
$15.00 per hour for full-time work ($1,733.33 per month). He stated that she

currently earned $10.00 per hour for part-time work. He believed she was capable

of earning at least $15.00 per hour. The only remaining debts were non-marital

student loans. If maintenance were to be granted to Alixandria, Felix requested

that the duration be limited, taking into account the support he had been providing

since their separation three years ago. In an amended disclosure, Felix indicated

that he was currently paying $824.00 per month for the children’s insurance; that

amount would decrease to $428.00 per month when he was able to amend his

coverage.

             On October 3, 2021, Felix filed a motion to hold Alixandria in

contempt related to her failure to abide by their temporary parenting schedule. He

believed she was acting intentionally and in retaliation for his filing the dissolution

action and, therefore, requested legal expenses related to filing the motion.

             Alixandria filed her trial memorandum on October 4, 2021. She

indicated that she was earning $10.00 per hour for her part-time work at Portland

Christian School but that these earnings went to defraying the cost of tuition for

their oldest child. As to the student loans, she stated that they had agreed during

the marriage that they would live frugally to first reduce Felix’s debt, and then they

would do the same with hers. She requested that Felix be ordered to pay the

interest that had accrued during the marriage, which totaled $12,472.25 from 2012

                                          -5-
to 2020. She also stated that during the marriage, she and Felix had agreed that she

would stay home to take care of the children while they were young. She planned

to enroll in a master’s art therapy program at the University of Louisville in the

Fall of 2020, from which she would graduate in 2024. Therefore, she requested

maintenance for three years. Due to the disparity in their incomes, she requested

an award of attorney’s fees and costs. To date, she had incurred $2,800.00 in

attorney’s fees and a mediator’s fee of $475.00.

             A trial was held for October 7, 2021. The parties presented their joint

stipulations prior to the taking of testimony, including that they would share joint

custody of the three children with equal parenting time on a week-on/week-off

basis, the parenting schedule, the holiday and vacation schedule, and that Felix’s

2011 Toyota Highlander was his separate non-marital property. Felix and

Alixandria both testified regarding the remaining contested issues, including

maintenance and child support.

             The parties both filed post-trial memoranda. In his memorandum,

Felix indicated that the issues before the court were maintenance, child support, tax

dependency claims, the division of marital property, attorney’s fees, and his

motion to hold Alixandria in contempt. The court had ruled at the conclusion of

the trial that he would not have to pay any amount toward Alixandria’s student

loans. Felix argued that Alixandria was not entitled to maintenance, noting that

                                         -6-
she had failed to prove that she was unable to support herself through appropriate

employment. In addition, she had been awarded a vehicle worth $12,000.00 and

would be receiving an equitable share of his retirement accounts. If maintenance

were to be granted, he requested that it be temporary. As to child support, Felix

requested that the court impute a higher income to Alixandria based on her level of

education and the current job market.

             In her memorandum, Alixandria pointed out that she had been a

homemaker during the nine-year marriage by mutual agreement. She believed

Felix’s argument that she should have been able to obtain gainful employment

during the separation ignored that she was caring for three young children during

the pandemic, when it was not easy to find childcare. Alixandria sought $1,250.00

per month in rehabilitative maintenance for three years. This would allow her to

continue her education to obtain a degree in art therapy by 2024. She disagreed

that the court should impute income to her of more than $10.00 per hour with

respect to the child support calculation. She was taking two classes that would

require 30 hours per week of her time, and she was working part-time (six to seven

hours per week) earning $10.00 per hour. Her work paid for their oldest child’s

preschool and aftercare fees. Finally, she requested attorney’s fees and costs.

             The court entered an order on December 22, 2021, in which it

addressed the disputed issues. As far as marital property, the court ordered Felix’s

                                         -7-
two retirement accounts to be equitably distributed. One account had a balance of

$65,524.00 (less Felix’s agreed non-marital claim of $15,324.00) at the time he

filed his disclosure, and the other had a balance of $31,797.23 at the date of

dissolution. The court awarded Alixandria the 2014 Dodge Caravan, which had an

assessed value of $10,863.00. For purposes of maintenance and child support

calculations, the court imputed an income of $15.00 per hour for full-time work to

Alixandria. The court did not find it credible that she could not work while

pursuing her master’s degree. The court found that maintenance was appropriate

based upon Alixandria’s role as the primary caregiver for their children, lack of

work outside of the home, and Felix’s substantially higher income. It opted to

award her $1,250.00 per month for 18 months rather than the three years that she

had requested. As to child support, the court found Felix’s obligation to Alixandria

was $718.00 per month based upon his gross monthly salary of $11,500.00 and her

gross monthly income of $2,600.00 (imputing income to her of $15.00 per hour for

full-time employment). This was based upon their 50/50 shared parenting

schedule, including Felix’s payment of $1,577.40 per month for the children’s

insurance and day care expenses. The court ordered Felix to pay $2,800.00 in

attorney’s fees pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.220 due to the

large discrepancy in their incomes. The court then found Alixandria in contempt

                                         -8-
for willfully disobeying the parenting schedule. As a result, the court denied her

motion for Felix to pay the mediation fee.

             On January 12, 2022, Alixandria moved the court to order the parties

to participate in a mediation conference related to child support as Felix had new

employment, among other issues. In an attached affidavit, Alixandria stated that

she was requesting modification of Felix’s child support obligation based upon his

new employment; she requested income records as well as documentation of the

children’s portion of the insurance premium. In response, Felix confirmed that he

had recently obtained new employment with a base salary of $160,000.00 per year.

He also received a sign-on bonus of $8,000.00. He did not believe mediation was

necessary as the court could recalculate child support based on his new salary as

well as Alixandria’s imputed income of $15.00 per hour and the $1,250.00 per

month in maintenance that she received. Felix included a Craig Ross child support

report establishing that his child support obligation was $421.00 per month, which

took into account the $2,154.00 he paid each month in childcare and insurance.

             Alixandria filed a notice of appeal from the December 22, 2021, order

on January 20, 2022 (Appeal No. 2022-CA-0092-MR). Shortly thereafter, Felix’s

counsel withdrew her representation with the note that he would proceed pro se.

                                         -9-
             On February 8, 2022, the court entered an order ruling on Alixandria’s

motion. It addressed the various issues and denied her motion to mediate. As to

child support, the court ruled as follows:

                    The Court has received and reviewed Felix’s proof
             of current income ($160,000.00 base salary), including
             the bonus ($8,000.00); considered the income previously
             imputed to Alixandria ($31,200.00 annual salary);
             considered the monthly maintenance Felix is paying
             Alixandria for eighteen months ($1250.00); considered
             Felix’s monthly day care and health care expenses for the
             parties’ children [$2,150.00]; and considered the
             continued 50/50 parenting schedule. Based on the
             aforementioned figures, the Court hereby modifies
             Felix’s monthly child support obligation to $498.00,
             effective upon entry of this Order.

In a footnote, the court stated that in the December order, it had erroneously failed

to include the $1,250.00 in maintenance Alixandria received as gross income for

her. Once that obligation expired, it would entertain a motion to modify Felix’s

child support obligation.

             Alixandria moved to vacate the February 8, 2022, order pursuant to

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 due to the filing of her notice of

appeal. In response, Felix stated that under Kentucky law, the family court

maintained concurrent jurisdiction with the appellate court while an appeal was

pending for issues of custody and child support, citing Johnson v. Commonwealth,

17 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Ky. 2020). Because the issues before the court in

                                         -10-
Alixandria’s motion dealt with custody and child support, the motion to vacate

should be denied.

             The court entered an order on February 21, 2022. It first summarized

the proceedings at the February 14, 2022, motion hour, indicating that Alixandria,

through counsel, moved to withdraw her motion to vacate, stating that it had been

filed in error. The court stated that it retained jurisdiction to rule on child support

issues and therefore denied her motion to vacate for that reason. Her counsel then

orally moved the court to amend a portion of the February 8th order related to tax

exemptions and requested additional information as to how it had calculated

Felix’s child support obligation. It granted her oral motion as to the tax

exemptions. And it granted the motion to clarify how it calculated child support.

After reciting the amounts it had considered in the February 8th order, the court

stated that it had input the figures into the Craig Ross program, which resulted in a

modification of Felix’s monthly child support obligation to $498.00 per month. It

included the Craig Ross child support report upon which it based that amount. The

report recited that Felix paid $2,150.00 per month in childcare and insurance for

the children. Alixandria did not pay any of those expenses. Alixandria filed her

second notice of appeal from the February 8 and February 21, 2022, orders on

February 22, 2022 (an amended version was filed the next day) (Appeal No. 2022-

CA-0197-MR).

                                          -11-
             On appeal, Alixandria contends that the family court erred in imputing

income to her for purposes of maintenance and the calculation of child support.

She also argues that the court erred in relying upon the Craig Ross program when it

calculated Felix’s child support obligation.

             CR 52.01 provides the general framework for the family court as well

as review in the Court of Appeals:

             In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with
             an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically
             and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and
             render an appropriate judgment[.] . . . Findings of fact,
             shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
             regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
             to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

See Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (footnote omitted) (An

appellate court may set aside a lower court’s findings made pursuant to CR 52.01

“only if those findings are clearly erroneous”). The Asente Court went on to

address substantial evidence:

             “[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable
             mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
             and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the light of all
             the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce
             conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Regardless
             of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the
             fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
             contrary finding, “due regard shall be given to the
             opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
             the witnesses” because judging the credibility of
             witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the
             exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt

                                         -12-
             as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its]
             reversal,” and appellate courts should not disturb trial
             court findings that are supported by substantial evidence.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

             We shall first address Alixandria’s argument related to child support.

Our standard of review of child support obligations is set forth in C.D.G. v. N.J.S.,

469 S.W.3d 413, 418 (Ky. 2015):

                     As the courts of this Commonwealth have
             repeatedly stated, trial courts have broad discretion in
             determining child-support matters. See Artrip v. Noe,
             311 S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ky. 2010) (“The trial court is
             vested with broad discretion in the establishment,
             enforcement, and modification of child support.”); Van
             Meter v. Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ky. App. 2000)
             (“[T]his state’s domestic relations law is founded upon
             general statutory guidelines and presumptions within
             which the trial court has considerable discretion. The
             trial court has discretion in many instances, moreover, to
             deviate from the statutory parameters, but only if it
             makes findings clearly justifying the deviation.”).
             “[T]hat discretion extends, pursuant to KRS 403.211(2)-
             (4), to deviations from guidelines-determined child
             support amounts.” Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health
             and Family Services v. Ivy, 353 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Ky.
             2011).

“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” C.D.G., 469

S.W.3d. at 421 (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.

1999)).

                                         -13-
            KRS 403.211 addresses child support and provides courts with an

option to deviate from the guidelines set forth in KRS 403.212 (or KRS 403.2121)

under certain circumstances:

            (2) At the time of initial establishment of a child support
            order, whether temporary or permanent, or in any
            proceeding to modify a support order, the child support
            guidelines in KRS 403.212 [or KRS 403.2121] shall
            serve as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or
            modification of the amount of child support. Courts may
            deviate from the guidelines where their application would
            be unjust or inappropriate. Any deviation shall be
            accompanied by a written finding or specific finding on
            the record by the court, specifying the reason for the
            deviation.

            (3) A written finding or specific finding on the record
            that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or
            inappropriate in a particular case shall be sufficient to
            rebut the presumption and allow for an appropriate
            adjustment of the guideline award if based upon one (1)
            or more of the following criteria:

                  (a) A child’s extraordinary medical or dental
                  needs;

                  (b) A child’s extraordinary educational, job
                  training, or special needs;

                  (c) Either parent’s own extraordinary needs,
                  such as medical expenses;

                  (d) The independent financial resources, if
                  any, of the child or children;

                  (e) Combined monthly adjusted parental
                  gross income in excess of the Kentucky
                  child support guidelines;

                                       -14-
                        (f) The parents of the child, having
                        demonstrated knowledge of the amount of
                        child support established by the Kentucky
                        child support guidelines, have agreed to
                        child support different from the guideline
                        amount. However, no such agreement shall
                        be the basis of any deviation if public
                        assistance is being paid on behalf of a child
                        under the provisions of Part D of Title IV of
                        the Federal Social Security Act; and

                        (g) Any similar factor of an extraordinary
                        nature specifically identified by the court
                        which would make application of the
                        guidelines inappropriate.

(Footnote omitted.) This version was effective between June 29, 2021, and July

13, 2022; the current version includes the additional mention of KRS 403.2121,

which appears in brackets above.1

                 In Plattner v. Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577, 579-80 (Ky. App. 2007), this

Court discussed the flexibility of the child support guidelines:

1
    The version of KRS 403.2121(1) effective until March 31, 2023, provides, in relevant part:

         Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section or otherwise provided in this
         chapter, the child support obligation determined under KRS 403.212 shall be
         subject to further adjustment as follows:

                 (a) If the parents share equal parenting time, the child support
                 obligation determined under KRS 403.212 shall be divided
                 between the parents in proportion to their combined monthly
                 adjusted parental gross income, and the parent with the greater
                 proportional child support obligation shall pay the parent with the
                 lesser proportional obligation the difference in the value of each
                 parent’s proportional obligation[.]

                                                -15-
        While Kentucky’s child support guidelines do not
contemplate such a shared custody arrangement, they do
reflect the equal duty of both parents to contribute to the
support of their children in proportion to their respective
net incomes. They also provide a measure of flexibility
that is particularly relevant in this case. Under the
provisions of KRS 403.211(2) and (3), a trial court may
deviate from the child support guidelines when it finds
that their application would be unjust or inappropriate.
The period of time during which the children reside with
each parent may be considered in determining child
support, and a relatively equal division of physical
custody may constitute valid grounds for deviating from
the guidelines. Brown v. Brown, Ky. App. 952 S.W.2d
707 (Ky. App. 1997); Downey v. Rogers, 847 S.W.2d 63
(Ky. App. 1993).

       In Downey v. Rogers, 847 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. App.
1993), we declined to conclude that a trial court had
abused its discretion by awarding child support where the
parties shared legal custody and shared equal or almost
equal physical custody of their children. However, our
conclusion was based, in part, upon the fact that the
children’s father had agreed to pay a portion of his child
support obligation to the children’s mother. We also
noted that the children’s father earned twice as much
annually as did their mother; thus, her share of the
children’s expenses was proportionately more
cumbersome.

       The evidence as described in Plattner’s brief is
notably different and distinguishable and does not
support the conclusion that his child support obligation as
reflected in the guidelines should be paid to Levoir. The
parties were awarded joint custody of the children, and
neither of them was designated as the primary residential
custodian. Because physical custody of the children is
evenly divided between the parents, they bear an almost
identical responsibility for the day-to-day expenses
associated with their care. And since there is no

                           -16-
              significant disparity between the parties’ annual income,
              the expenses necessary to provide a home for the children
              (even when they are not in residence) are also incurred
              by each party in equal proportion.

                     The statutory guidelines offer sufficient flexibility
              to allow the trial court to fashion appropriate and just
              child support orders. Under the unique circumstances of
              this case, we conclude that the trial court erred by
              awarding child support to Levoir.

              In the present case, the family court opted to impute income to

Alixandria for purposes of computing Felix’s child support obligation. KRS

403.212(3)(e)2 permits a trial court to impute income to a parent under the

following circumstances:

              1. If there is a finding that a parent is voluntarily
              unemployed or underemployed, child support shall be
              calculated based on a determination of potential income,
              except that a finding of voluntary unemployment or
              underemployment and a determination of potential
              income shall not be made for a parent who is
              incarcerated, physically or mentally incapacitated, or is
              caring for a very young child, age three (3) or younger,
              for whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility;

              2. A court may find a parent is voluntarily unemployed or
              underemployed without finding that the parent intended
              to avoid or reduce the child support obligation; and

              3. Imputation of potential income, when applicable, shall
              include consideration of the following circumstances of
              the parents, to the extent known:

2
 The prior version, which was effective from June 29, 2021, until the present version became
effective on July 14, 2022, contains the same language; only the numbering of the subsection
was changed.

                                             -17-
                   a. Assets and residence;

                   b. Employment, earning history, and job
                   skills;

                   c. Educational level, literacy, age, health,
                   and criminal record that could impair the
                   ability to gain or continue employment;

                   d. Record of seeking work;

                   e. Local labor market, including availability
                   of employment for which the parent may be
                   qualified and employable;

                   f. Prevailing earnings in the local labor
                   market; and

                   g. Other relevant background factors,
                   including employment barriers[.]

            Alixandria cites this Court to Lambert v. Lambert, 475 S.W.3d 646

(Ky. App. 2015), in which this Court reversed the imputation of income to the

mother for purposes of child support because she was caring for her two youngest

children, who were under the age of three.

                   Child support determinations are based on the
            combined gross income of both parents. In calculating
            child support obligations, income may only be imputed to
            parents when the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
            underemployed, and such a calculation is to be based
            upon the parent’s potential income. KRS 403.212(2)(d);
            Howard v. Howard, 336 S.W.3d 433, 439 (Ky. 2011).

                   If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or
                   underemployed, child support shall be

                                        -18-
                    calculated based on a determination of
                    potential income, except that a
                    determination of potential income shall
                    not be made for a parent who is physically
                    or mentally incapacitated or is caring for a
                    very young child, age three (3) or
                    younger, for whom the parents owe a joint
                    legal responsibility.”

             KRS 403.212(2)(d) (emphasis added). Janessa is
             currently caring for her two youngest children, both of
             whom are under the age of three. We therefore find that
             the circuit court abused its discretion by imputing
             minimum wage to Janessa. On remand, the circuit court
             must note Janessa’s income as zero and order the
             minimum $60 monthly child support obligation.
Lambert, 475 S.W.3d at 653-54 (footnote omitted).

             We agree with Felix that the facts in Lambert are different from the

present case as the mother in Lambert was caring for two children under the age of

three who were not involved in the custody action. Here, that is not the case. The

children under the age of three are the subject of the custody order, and the parties

have joint custody of them with 50/50 parenting time. The mother has another

child, but he is older than the age of three. In addition, Alixandria is able to work,

and she was in fact working at a preschool for tuition credit. The twins were in

daycare during the week while she worked, and she would be taking classes.

Alixandria is well-educated, with a bachelor’s degree, and she was planning to

seek a master’s degree. And, as Felix pointed out, Alixandria admitted in her trial

memorandum that she should be imputed an income of $10.00 per hour.

                                         -19-
Therefore, we hold that the exception related to raising a very young child does not

apply here. We find no abuse of discretion in the family court’s decision to impute

an income to Alixandria of $15.00 per hour for full-time employment.

             Alixandria also disputes the family court’s decision to use the Craig

Ross program to calculate child support, arguing that the algorithm used by the

program is at odds with KRS 403.212, specifically citing the enhanced multiplier

the program uses. We find no reason to question the family court’s use of the

Craig Ross program to calculate child support in this instance, especially as it takes

into account how much time each parent has with the children as contemplated in

KRS 403.2121. We also find no abuse of discretion in the family court’s

calculation of child support. As we stated in Plattner, supra, “[w]ithin statutory

parameters, the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support

obligations are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, this

discretion is not unlimited. It must be fair, reasonable, and supported by sound

legal principles.” Plattner, 228 S.W.3d at 579 (citations omitted). The evidence

established that the parties share equal parenting time of the children, Felix pays

$2,150.00 per month in childcare and insurance for the children, and Alixandria

receives $1,250.00 per month in maintenance. While there is a large discrepancy

in their respective incomes, the amount of child support awarded is overall a fair

                                         -20-
amount, and the court noted that the amount could be modified once Alixandria’s

maintenance payments ended.

             Next, Alixandria argues that the family court erred in calculating her

maintenance award when it deemed her to be underemployed. KRS 403.200

addresses when a maintenance award is appropriate and the relevant factors for a

court to consider:

             (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
             separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following
             dissolution of a marriage by a court which lacked
             personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court
             may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it
             finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

                     (a) Lacks sufficient property, including
                     marital property apportioned to him, to
                     provide for his reasonable needs; and

                     (b) Is unable to support himself through
                     appropriate employment or is the custodian
                     of a child whose condition or circumstances
                     make it appropriate that the custodian not be
                     required to seek employment outside the
                     home.

             (2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and
             for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
             considering all relevant factors including:

                     (a) The financial resources of the party
                     seeking maintenance, including marital
                     property apportioned to him, and his ability
                     to meet his needs independently, including
                     the extent to which a provision for support

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                   of a child living with the party includes a
                   sum for that party as custodian;

                   (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient
                   education or training to enable the party
                   seeking maintenance to find appropriate
                   employment;

                   (c) The standard of living established during
                   the marriage;

                   (d) The duration of the marriage;

                   (e) The age, and the physical and emotional
                   condition of the spouse seeking
                   maintenance; and

                   (f) The ability of the spouse from whom
                   maintenance is sought to meet his needs
                   while meeting those of the spouse seeking
                   maintenance.

“This is a matter that comes within the discretion of the trial court.” Browning v.

Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky. App. 1977).

             Alixandria argues that unlike the child support statute, KRS 403.200

does not include a provision that permits the imputation of income to a spouse who

is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. This Court rejected that argument in

McGregor v. McGregor, 334 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Ky. App. 2011), and we find no

reason to disagree with this holding:

                   In contrast, the maintenance statute, KRS 403.200,
             does not explicitly include a similar provision permitting
             a court to impute income to a voluntarily unemployed or
             underemployed spouse. In determining if a spouse is

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             entitled to maintenance, a trial court must find, among
             other things, that the spouse seeking maintenance “[i]s
             unable to support [herself] through appropriate
             employment . . . .” KRS 403.200(1)(b). To set the
             appropriate amount and duration of maintenance under
             KRS 403.200(2), the court must consider several factors,
             including a spouse’s financial resources, ability to find
             appropriate employment, and the standard of living
             enjoyed during the marriage. While a case of first
             impression, it is implicit in this statutory language that a
             court may impute income to a voluntarily unemployed or
             underemployed spouse to determine both the spouse’s
             entitlement to maintenance and the amount and duration
             of maintenance. This practice has found favor in other
             jurisdictions throughout the United States when a trial
             court has imputed income to an underemployed or
             unemployed spouse. See, Evans v. Evans, 45 S.W.3d 523
             (Mo. App. 2001) (imputing income to a spouse
             requesting maintenance); Stirewalt v. Stirewalt, 307
             S.W.3d 701 (Mo. App. 2010) (imputing income to a
             spouse required to pay maintenance); LeRoy v. LeRoy,
             600 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. App. 1999) (a court may
             consider past earnings and earning capacity to estimate
             future income in determining ability to pay maintenance);
             Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 A.D.3d 702, 874 N.Y.S.2d 230
             (N.Y. 2009) (may impute income based upon a party’s
             past income or demonstrated future potential earnings).

             Because the family court awarded her the amount of monthly

maintenance she had requested ($1,250.00), Alixandria’s actual dispute is with the

duration of maintenance she was awarded. She had requested three years of

maintenance during the time it would take for her to finish her master’s degree

program; instead, the court awarded her maintenance for 18 months. The court

considered the relevant factors, including the duration of the marriage and the time

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it would take her to finish her education. The court did not find it credible that

Alixandria would not be able to work more than she currently was (part-time for

tuition credit) while she pursued her master’s degree, noting the current job market

and that she was “a personable and well-spoken person with a college degree.” We

find no abuse of discretion in either the amount or the duration of maintenance

awarded in this case.

             For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Jefferson Family Court are

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 J. Gregory Troutman                       Felix H. Sharpe, II, pro se
 Wm. Dennis Sims                           Louisville, Kentucky
 Louisville, Kentucky

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