Court Opinion

ID: 9726143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:34:25.861743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.676677
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, specially concurring: I fully concur in the court’s decision that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. I concur specially, however, to voice my disagreement with the majority’s treatment of the voir dire issue. I see no reason for the court to decide in this case whether People v. Zehr (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 472, should be applied retroactively. The court states that examination of that question is appropriate because it is “affirming the appellate court’s judgment providing for a new trial.” (112 Ill. 2d at 318.) But this is the very reason why retroactivity is not at issue here: as the majority itself correctly concludes, at the retrial in this case a prospective application of Zehr will require that the tendered questions be asked at voir dire (112 Ill. 2d at 321). It thus seems to me anomalous to choose this case as one in which to express an opinion on retroactivity. Even if there were to be no retrial ordered on other grounds, we would not need to reach the retroactivity question here because the failure to ask the Zehr questions in this case was reversible error in any event. This court’s decision in Zehr affirmed the decision of our appellate court that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to probe on voir dire the jurors’ willingness to return a not guilty verdict if the State did not sustain its burden of proof, and their attitudes regarding the presumption of innocence, the fact that the defendant need not produce any evidence and the fact that his failure to testify cannot be held against him. (People v. Zehr (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 458.) The appellate court filed its opinion in Zehr in November 1982; the trial of defendant Britz commenced some six months later, in April 1983. Thus, at the time the Britz jury was selected, the circuit judge was required by the appellate court’s opinion in Zehr, the most recent decision of our appellate court on the issue, to make the requested inquiries of the jurors. Whether or not the supreme court decision in Zehr is to be given retroactive application, certainly the appellate court’s judgment must be given prospective effect. In overlooking this chronology and addressing the retroactivity question here the majority has implicitly taken the unusual position that an appellate court decision which would otherwise apply to future trials — such as Britz’ original trial — is denied such effect because the appellate court’s opinion is later ratified by the supreme court. Not only does this position seem illogical, it also sends the unfortunate message that trial judges need not follow the edicts, of our appellate court unless and until they are confirmed by this court. I note in passing that the appellate court’s reversal on the voir dire issue in this case (128 Ill. App. 3d 29) is premised on the appellate court’s opinion in Zehr and merely refers to the fact that the supreme court eventually placed its imprimatur on that holding. Since the majority nonetheless addresses the merits of the retroactivity question, I feel it appropriate to state my view that this court’s decision in Zehr should be given effect in all cases pending on direct review. The majority reaches a contrary conclusion, asserting without explanation that Zehr “represented a change in Illinois law” (112 Ill. 2d at 319). I disagree. Rule 234 (103 Ill. 2d R. 234) prohibits voir dire questions which “directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions.” This court’s decision in Zehr, however, did not purport to invalidate this provision of Rule 234, but only interpreted it as permitting the tendered questions because each went “ ‘to the heart of a particular bias or prejudice which would deprive defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury.’ ” (103 Ill. 2d 472, 477, quoting 110 Ill. App. 3d 458, 461.) As the appellate court in Zehr further noted: “While Supreme Court Rule 234 (87 Ill. 2d R. 234) proscribes questioning jurors concerning matters of law or instructions, we do not so perceive the supplemental questions as concerning such, but rather see them as directly probing for bias and prejudice.” 110 Ill. App. 3d 458, 461. Similarly, our recent decision in People v. Stack (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 301, held that the trial court erred in refusing to ask prospective jurors about their feelings concerning the insanity defense. As I read Zehr and Stack, they simply hold that Rule 234 was never intended to preclude voir dire questions probing for bias against “controversial legal requirement[s].” (See People v. Stack (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 301, 312.) Zehr, therefore, as I view the dimensions of that holding, did not announce a new standard in conflict with Rule 234, and there has been no break with prior law sufficient to overcome the general presumption that judicial decisions have retroactive effect. See Solem v. Stumes (1984), 465 U.S. 638, 642-43, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579, 586-87, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1341-42.